

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 10]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
3a memo	Solomon to the Under Sec. of State C 2 pp. open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25	6/20/67	A
3b table	Total Aid to India, " " PCI 1 p.	undated	A
3c table	India: Aid... " PCI 1 p.	undated	A
3d table	India: Food & Debt Offers " C 1 p.	undated	A
5 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam PCI 1 p. open 11-5-91	6/20/67	A
5b memcon	Mai Van Bo and Claiborne Pell C 3 pp. open 11-5-91	6/19/67	A
6a cable	Paris 20345 exempt NLJ 92-25 S 1 p. open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305	6/19/67	A
7 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama G 1 p. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	6/20/67	A
9 memo	Bator to the Pres. " C 1 p.	6/20/67	A
9a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. re Atlantic Conference C 2 pp. open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25	6/19/67	A
10a memo	Jorden to Rostow re Vietnam S 3 pp. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	6/20/67	A
11a memo	Davis re USSR " PCI 2 pp.	6/20/67	A
17 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East ^{sanitized 2-5-01} S 1 p. exempt 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26 NLJ/RAC 99-221 (dup't #140, NSF, Country File, M.E. Crisis, Vol. 6 Cables Box 100)	6/20/67	A
17a cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt per RAC 12104 S 3 pp. exempt 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 (dup't #140 as above) exempt 9/20/01 NLJ/RAC 99-249	6/19/67	A
20 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR C 1 p. open 6-1-92 NLJ 91-14 [duplicate of #39, NSF, Country File, USSR, "Hollybush 6/67 II, Pres. Meeting with Kosygin, under review NLJ 91-14]	6/20/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, "Volume 31, June 13 - 20, 1967," Box 17

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
21a memo	Read to Rostow re Ecuador open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25 C 2 pp.	undated	A
21b biography	Ambassador of Ecuador to the US open 10-20-99 C 1 p. exempt 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23	6/19/67	A
21c report	US Economic & Technical Assistance... C 3 pp. open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25	undated	A
24a cable	from Director, FBI S 1 p. sanitized 4-14-92 NLJ 92-24 Sanitized 8/15/00 NSJ/RAC 99-250	6/20/67	A
24b cable	from Director, FBI S 1 p. sanitized 4-14-92 NLJ 92-24 Sanitized 8/15/00 NSJ/RAC 99-250	6/19/67	A
25 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	6/19/67	A
25a cable	Saigon 28293 3 TS open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25	6/17/67	A
27a cable	CIA 7697 sanitized 9-20-93 NLJ 92-23 S 5 pp. sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/19/67	A
27b cable	Deptel 212155 to Saigon open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25 S 3 pp. [duplicate of #28, NSF, Country File, "Vietnam, 1G(1), 6/1 - 8/12/67 Election," Box 65]	6/16/67	A
28 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR PCI 1 p. sanitized 6-1-92 NLJ 90-178 sanitized 11-22-96 NLJ 92-25 same item sanitized 9/20/01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/19/67	A
33 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR S 1 p. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	6/19/67	A
34a draft	message to Prime Minister Sato PCI 2 pp.	undated	A
36 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East sanitized 2-5-01 S 1 p. exempt 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26 NLJ/RAC 99-221 (dup #145, NSF Country File, M.E. Crisis, Vol 6, Cables Box 108)	6/19/67	A
36a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 pp. exempt 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 Exempt 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-222 exempt 12/01/00 RAC	6/17/67	A
38a memcon	Dobrynin, Sec. State, Thompson S 1 p. open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25	6/16/67	A

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38b memcon	Debrynin, Sec. State, Thompson <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> S 3 pp. <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305</i>	6/16/67	A
38c memcon	Debrynin, Sec. State, Thompson <i>open 10-20-99</i> S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25</i>	6/16/67	A
39a memo	Schultze to the Pres. C 2 pp. <i>open 2-10-13 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/16/67	A
39c memo	to the Pres. re India C 1 p.	5/30/67	A
40 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East TS 1 p. <i>open 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26</i>	6/19/67	A
42c letter	B.K. Nehru to the Pres. <i>Dup # 32181 NSF, Files of Sec. of State NSC "India" (Body)</i> PCI 2 pp. <i>exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-27</i> <i>open 2-18-00 NLJ 99-306</i>	6/9/67	A
48 cable	CAP67552 re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 2-18-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/18/67	A
51a memo	Sec. State to the Pres. re USSR <i>open 10-20-99</i> S 3 pp. [duplicate of #52a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 83-159]	6/17/67	A
52b memo	Thompson to Rostow <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> S 1 p. <i>open 10-20-99</i> [duplicate of #109b, NSF, Country File, "USSR, Vol. 15," exempted 1978]	6/16/67	A
53a cable	Tunis 4838 <i>sanitized 8-12-82 NLJ 82-175</i> C 1 p. <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305</i> [duplicate of #40a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 82-175]	6/17/67	A
53b cable	Tripoli 175 <i>open 10-20-99</i> S 2 pp. [duplicate of #40b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 82-148]	undated	A
55 cable	CAP67545 <i>open 2-18-00 NLJ 99-306</i> C 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/17/67	A
56 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. <i>exempt 10-14-95 NLJ 92-26</i> <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-221</i>	6/17/67	A

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June 13 - 20, 1967," Box 17

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
56a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 pp. <i>exempt 1-27-93 NLS 92-23 exempt per RAC 8/03</i> <i>Exempt 9-20-01 NLS/RAC 91-249</i>	6/16/67	A
57 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Paraguay C 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLS 92-27</i>	6/17/67	A
57a letter	Pres. to Pres. of Paraguay " PCI 2 pp.	6/17/67	A
57b letter	Pres. of Paraguay to the Pres. " PCI 2 pp.	4/21/67	A
57c memo	re Paraguay <i>open 10-26-92 NLS 92-25</i> PCI 6 pp.	undated	A
57d memo	re Paraguay " PCI 3 pp.	undated	A
57e report	Marketing of High-Priority Basic Products " PCI 2 pp.	undated	A
58 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama C 2 pp. <i>open 2-10-93 NLS 92-27</i>	6/16/67	A
60a memo	Jorden to Rostow re Vietnam " S 3 pp.	6/16/67	A
64 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam " S 1 p.	6/16/67	A
64a cable	Saigon 28218 <i>open 10-26-92 NLS 92-25</i> S 4 pp. [duplicate of #117, NSF, Country File, Vietnam "1G(1) 6/1 - 8/12/67 Elections," Box 65]	undated	A
65a cable	Rawalpindi 4685 C 1 p. <i>open 10-26-92 NLS 92-25</i>	6/16/67a	
66 memo	agenda for meeting with Pres. <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLS 99-307</i> TS 1 p. <i>(more released)</i> [duplicate of #35, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," <i>sanitized NLS 82-184</i>]	6/16/67	A
67 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. <i>open 11-5-91</i>	6/16/67	A
67a cable	Cairo 748 <i>exempt NLS 92-25</i> C 3 pp. <i>open 2-9-00 NLS 99-305</i>	6/13/67	A

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69a cable <i>more info released</i> <i>2-24-04 NLJ 03/168</i>	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 pp. sanitized 2-20-01 NLJ 99-308 same [duplicate of #42a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 83-156 and # 146a, NSF, CF, M.E. Crisis Vol. 6, Cable Box 108]	6/16/67	A
70a cable	Moscow 5451 C 2 pp. <i>open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25</i>	6/15/67	A
71 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Western Europe S 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/16/67	A
71a message	to Pres. from Prime Minister <i>open 10-20-99</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i> [duplicate of #37, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," exempted NLJ 86-197]	6/16/67	A
72 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/16/67	A
72a cable	USUN 5736 <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> <i>open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305</i> C 1 p.	6/15/67	A
73a cable <i>more info released</i> <i>2-24-04 NLJ 03/168</i>	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. sanitized 2-20-01 NLJ 99-308 [duplicate of #33a, NSF, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 82-157 + # 152a, NSF, CF, Middle East Crisis Vol. 6, Box 108]	6/15/67	A
74 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam PCI 1 p. <i>open 11-5-91 per DCH</i>	6/16/67	A
74a airgram	A-746 from Saigon <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> C 2 pp. <i>open 10-20-99</i>	6/9/67	A
74b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/15/67	A
75a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 13 pp. <i>exempt 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23</i> [duplicate of #60a, NSF, Country File, "USSR, Vol. 15," exempted 1980 + # 154, NSF, CF, M.E. Crisis Vol. 6, Cable Box 108]	6/15/67	A
79 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 6 pp. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/16/67	A
81 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>sanitized 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26</i> <i>Sani (more info) 11/27/01 NLJ/RAC 99-251</i>	6/15/67	A

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81a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23</i> <i>Same seri 10/29/01 NLJ/RAC 99-251</i>	6/15/67	A
87 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>Ed. p. #40, VN, Reprisal Pres</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26</i> <i>sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-221</i>	6/15/67	A
87a report	re Vietnam <i>exempt per RAC 8/03</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23</i> <i>Exempt 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249</i>	6/15/67	A
91 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/15/67	A
91a cable	Oslo 4531 <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> open 2-9-00 S 3 pp. <i>NLS 99-305</i>	6/14/67	A
92a cable	Vientiane 7638 S 2 pp. <i>open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25</i>	6/9/67	A
94a cable	Salgon 28095 <i>open 10-20-99</i> S 9 pp. [duplicate of #2a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8B(1)[A] 6/67-11/67 Bunker's Weekly Report to the President," sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	6/14/67	A
95 agenda	for meeting with the Pres. on Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/15/67	A
99 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam " TS 1 p.	6/15/67	A
100 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. <i>open 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26</i>	6/15/67	A
102 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Near East G 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i>	6/15/67	A
103 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re VP's Schedule " S 2 pp.	6/15/67	A
103a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re VP's Schedule S 2 pp. <i>open 10-26-92 NLJ 92-25</i>	6/15/67	A
106 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba S 1 p. <i>sanitized 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27</i> <i>Same seri 11/29/01 NLJ/RAC 99-251</i>	6/15/67	A
106a memo	Memorandum re Cuba <i>exempt NLJ 92-25</i> S 2 pp. <i>open 2-18-00 NLJ 99-288</i>	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
107a cable	USUN 5722 open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305 S 1 p. [duplicate of #21a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 85-84]	6/14/67	A
107b cable	Beirut 11455 open 2-9-00 NLJ 99-305 S 2 pp. [duplicate of #21b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLJ 85-84]	undated	A
114a message	Pres. Ayub to Pres. ^{Dup. of NSF, Files of Spec. Comm. of NSC, Pakistan, Box 6} S 1 p. exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-27 [dup. of #40a, NSF, Hofs Corresp, Pakistan, Ayub, Vol. 2]	6/14/67	A
115a	Duplicate of #114a open 2-18-00 NLJ 99-306	Open 2-18-00	NLJ 99-306
117a draft	Pres. proposed reply to Pres. Nyerere C 2 pp. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	undated	A
117b letter	Nyerere to the Pres. " C 2 pp.	5/22/67	A
118 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. exempt 5-28-92 NLJ 92-27 exempt 11/1/00 NLJ 99-309	6/14/67	A
119 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. sanitized 10-19-95 NLJ 92-26 same sani 10/27/01 NLJ/RAC 99-251	6/14/67	A
119a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/9/67	A
119b cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 2 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/9/67	A
119c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/9/67	A
119d cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/9/67	A
119e cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99-249 (same)	6/8/67	A
119f cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 4 pp. sanitized 1-27-93 NLJ 92-23 Sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 99	6/9/67	A
120 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re India PCI 1 p. open 2-10-93 NLJ 92-27	6/14/67	A

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120a	Duplicate of #42c open 2-18-00 NLS 99-306		
121	Duplicate of #120 open 10-20-99		
121a	Duplicate of #42c open 2-18-00 NLS 99-306		
123a cable	Tel Aviv 4118 open 10-26-92 NLS 92-25 S 4 pp. [duplicate of #12a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," NLJ 85-84]	6/13/67	A
123b cable	Amman 4284 exempt NLS 92-25 open 2-9-00 S 3 pp. NLS 99-305	undated	A
123c cable	Beirut 11434 exempt NLS 92-25 S 2 pp. open 2-9-00 NLS 99-305	undated	A
123f cable	USUN 5718 exempt NLS 92-25 sanitized 10-26-92 C 2 pp. open 2-9-00 NLS 99-305	undated	A
124 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece open 2-18-00 NLS 99-306 S 1 p. sanitized 2-10-93 NLS 92-27	6/14/67	A
127a draft	message to the Amir of Kuwait PCI 1 p. open 2-10-93 NLS 92-27	6/14/67	A
127b draft	message to Pres. Bourguiba PCI 1 p. "	6/14/67	A
127e cable	Tunis 4774 exempt NLS 92-25 C 2 pp. open 2-9-00 NLS 99-305	6/9/67	A
127d cable	Deptel 209980 to Tunis open 10-26-92 NLS 92-25 C 1 p.	6/9/67	A
128 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Brazil open 10-20-99 C 3 pp. [duplicate of #82, NSF, Country File, "Brazil, Vol. 7," sanitized 1981]	6/14/67	A
132b memo	Helms to the Pres. Exempt 2-2-01 NLS 99-286 S 4 pp. exempt 1-27-93 NLS 92-23 [duplicate of #8b, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," exempted NLS 87-83] ← #2416, NSF, CF, Th. E. Crisis Vol 5, Box 108	6/13/67	A
133 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam dup #141, VN. Reprisal Program Vol 7 S 1 p. exempt 10-11-95 NLS 92-26 sanitized 2-5-01 NLS/RAC 99-221	6/13/67	A

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133a report	re Vietnam <i>exempt per RAC 8/03</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 1-27-93 NLS 92-23</i> <i>exempt 9/20/01 NLS/RAC 99-249</i>	6/13/67	A
138 memo	Rostow to the Pres. PCI 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLS 92-27</i>	6/13/67	A
141 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>open 2-18-00</i> S 1 p. <i>NLS 99-287</i> [duplicate of #10, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," sanitized NLS 82-184]	6/13/67	A
141a cable	Jidda 5272 <i>exempt NLS 92-25</i> S 3 pp. <i>Open 2-18-00 NLS 99-306</i> [duplicate of #10a, NSF, NSC History, "Middle East Crisis, Vol. 5," exempted NLS 86-197] - exempt NLS 92-25	6/12/67	A
142 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Australia C 1 p. <i>open 2-10-93 NLS 92-27</i>	6/13/67	A

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#49cable TS	Walt Rostow to the President CAP 67550 4 pp Exempt 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-223 exempt 5/03	6/18/67	A RAC
#96 memo TS	Walt Rostow to the President 11:25 a.m. 1 p sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-223	6/15/67	A
#109 memo TS	Walt Rostow to the President 5:35 p.m. 1 p sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-223	6/14/67	A
#123 memo TS	Walt Rostow to the President 8:50 a.m. 1 p open 3/14/03 NLJ/RAC 99-224 (Duplicate of #121, National Security File, NSC History, Middle East, Vol. 5) Sanitized NLJ 82-187 appeal	6/14/67	A
#123d cable TS	Intelligence report 1 p exempt 5/03 RAC	6/13/67	A
#123e cable TS	Intelligence report 1 p exempt 5/03 RAC	[6/67]	A
#135 memo TS	Walt Rostow to the President 12:45 p.m. 1 p sanitized 2-5-01 NLJ/RAC 99-223	6/13/67	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 31, 6/13-20/67
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Saturday, June 17, 1967 -- 7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sen. Fulbright informed Bill Macomber that he is writing to Kosygin to invite him to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The invitation implied the meeting need not be in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

June 20
June 21 - 7:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a quick survey of expert opinion on the Central Committee meeting.

Dick Helms will have us a report by noon tomorrow.

He personally thinks it's like a leadership meeting: To explain their problems and troubles and consolidate support at a difficult time.

He expects no ultimatum.

Walt Rostow

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
7:30 p. m.

3

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a full account of the whole India aid picture.

The answer to your question about what has been matched hard is in Table 3 plus the marked column in Table 1.

I know you don't think much of debt relief; but if it's additional to consortium aid, it's just as good as new money.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

3a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-25
By ing, NARA, Date 9-8-92

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

FROM:- E - Anthony M. Solomon *offg for AMS*

SUBJECT: Total Foreign Aid to India - 1967.

You have asked for our best estimate of aid to India from all donors this calendar year. We have looked at prospects in terms of (a) India consortium pledges; (b) matching emergency food aid; (c) U.S. bilateral food aid; and (d) non-consortium assistance.

Prospective U.S. aid to India this year amounts to about \$900 million, including roughly \$520 million in food and other PL 480 aid (calendar 1967) and a \$380 million contribution to the consortium target for Indian fiscal year 1968. All except about \$275 million in food aid is subject to commensurate action by others and is still under consideration.

Other regular consortium aid, the \$190 matching food emergency aid, and assistance from non-consortium donors would bring total non-U.S. assistance up to about \$840 million. The presently indicated non-U.S. total could reach \$760 million, assuming a number of favorable developments, e.g., IDA replenishment. (Table I).

We have reasonable indications, but not firm commitments on the bulk of assistance in all categories. Non-project consortium assistance of \$900 million was pledged for Indian fiscal year 1967 (ending March 31) (Table 2). At the April 1967 meeting of the consortium in Paris, members agreed on a planning target for this Indian fiscal year of \$1,300 million in program aid and matching food emergency assistance. The \$1,300 million target includes U.S. matching food aid of \$190 million.

Throughout India's Third Five Year Plan, the USSR provided about \$100 million annually, principally in project aid. In the Fourth Plan, the Indians have projected a somewhat higher level; it is generally expected that the Soviets will at least maintain prior levels of assistance.

Other non-consortium donors, mainly Eastern European countries, have been providing relatively small amounts which, however, have been increasing and reached \$37 million in Indian FY 1966.

As noted above, there are as yet insufficient indications that the prevailing \$900 million level of non-project consortium aid will be sustained. ^{Further} A ~~uncertain element is the \$190 million in matching food emergency aid.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Three channels have offered the most promising matching prospects; ~~direct food aid; agricultural input supplies; and debt relief.~~

Table 3 shows the amounts of each that have emerged ~~thus far~~ \$97.6 million. ~~Of this, \$16.2 million clearly is not additional to normal consortium pledges. About \$50 million represent a repetition of food aid given last year outside consortium pledges, mainly by Canada and some \$30 million represent entirely new aid.~~

At this stage, the only prospects for additional matching food aid are the USSR and the Australians, amounting to roughly 400,000 tons of grain, ~~valued at \$25-27 million.~~

~~Debt relief appears the only significant device for closing the matching gap. The IBRD has offered to provide India a new loan of about \$80 million, equivalent to India's debt service due the IBRD this year. This relief, however, is contingent on commensurate debt relief by other major creditors and is related to a long term solution of India's debt servicing problem. Several important creditors have already indicated that any debt relief they may provide this year will be counted against their normal consortium pledges. ~~To this~~ ~~relief will not be additional.~~~~

Attachments

- Table 1
- Table 2
- Table 3

Clearances

E/ORF - Mr. Fried

E/IMA - Mr. Ghardi

E/ORF/OFP/FFD:TEArnold:mp 6-20-67
E/OMA/FOD:WFCourney:ACCizaskas

TABLE I

Summary

Total Aid to India

For Indian FY April 1967 - March 1968
(in million \$)

<u>Program & Project</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	
	<u>PL 480</u>	<u>Total</u>
382	520	902

	<u>Others</u>		
	<u>Programs & Project</u>	<u>Food Emergency</u>	<u>Total</u>
Other consortium member countries	303	76*	379
IBRD	215	**	215
Australia		9	9
Scandinavia		5	5
USSR	100	18	118
Others, mainly Eastern Europe	37		37
	655	108	763

* clearly additional to consortium pledges

** The IBRD has offered debt relief of 77 million for emergency purposes if other countries take commensurate action.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By lig, NARA, Date 9-8-92

TABLE II

INDIA: AID INDICATED AT NOVEMBER 7/8, 1966 CONSORTIUM MEETING

(\$ million)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Austria	4.7
Belgium	1.2
Canada	38.7
France	17.0
Germany	60.0
Italy	34.0
Japan	45.0
Netherlands	11.1
United Kingdom	89.6
United States	382.0
Bank/IDA	215.0
Total	898.3

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
By NIJ 92-25, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Table 3

INDIA: FOOD AND DEBT OFFERS - INDIAN FY 1968

(\$ million)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Grain or Other Food</u>	<u>Food Resources (inputs)</u>	<u>Firm Debt Relief</u>	<u>Total</u>
Austria	1.0	--	0.4	1.4
Canada	52.0**	10.0	1.9	63.9
France	4.1	--	--	4.1
Japan	--	7.0	6.2*	13.2
Germany	--	10.0*	--	10.0
Scandinavia	--	* 5.0	--	5.0
	<u>57.1</u>	<u>32.0</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>97.6</u>

*Not additional to normal Consortium pledges.

**Additional to Consortium pledge, but about equal to previous fiscal year.

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NIJ 92-25
 By 118, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file
4

June 20, 1967
7:00 P. M.

Mr. President:

The speech went great in
Tel Aviv.

W. W. Rostow

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INFO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 47

RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 450

RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 492

RUDTCR/AMEMBASFEBONDON 285

RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 220

RUDHDT/USMISSION USUN 359

STATE GRNC

BT

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 4218

Rostow

PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON MIDDLE EAST

1. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FOREIGN POLICY BROADCAST AS WELL AS THE UNGA SPEECHES OF PRIMIN KOSYGIN AND FONMIN EBAN ARE EXTENSIVELY COVERED BY ALL PAPERS. EDITORIAL OPINION IS UNANIMOUS IN PRAISING THE PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS AND CONDEMNING THAT OF THE SOVIET LEADER.

PAGE 2 RUQMWL 4218 UNCLAS

2. MASS CIRCULATION NATIONALISTIC MAARIV (INDEPENDENT) CALLS THE PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST QUOTE REALISTIC UNQUOTE AND QUOTE MORE LIKELY TO CONTRIBUTE TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND STABILITY THAN ALL DUBIOUS PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION AND OF REINSTATING UN AS SCREEN BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS. UNQUOTE

3. WRITING IN YEDIOT AHARONOT (INDEPENDENT) POLITICAL COMMENTATOR GINAY DESCRIBES THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AS BEING IN SOME RESPECTS MORE POSITIVE THAN COULD HAVE BEEN HOPED FOR. IN HIS OPINION, QUOTE IF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER HAD ADOPTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PRESENT POSITION IN 1956, THE LATEST FLAREUP COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. AND IF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PRINCIPLES FINALLY PREVAIL- AND THERE ARE REMARKABLE PROSPECTS THAT THEY WILL SOONER OR LATER NOTWITHSTANDING SOVIET SABOTAGE EFFORTS-THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER FLAREUP IN MIDDLE EAST. UNQUOTE ON BASIS OF PRESIDENT'S STATESMANLIKE SPEECH,

ETAY CONCLUDE THAT W E ISRAEL HAD TO WAGE WAR ALONE, IT HAS AN ALLY, IN THE FIGHT FOR PEACE, A FIGHT WHICH CANNOT BE WON WITHOUT ALLIES.

4. RIGHT-WING NATIONALISTIC HAYOM (GAHAL) APPLAUDS THE QUOTE

PAGE 3 RUQMWL 4218 UNCLAS

JOHNSON PLAN UNQUOTE WHICH IT STATES TOUCHES DIRECTLY ON KEY POINTS OF AREA TENSION AND OFFERS PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR PERMANENT PEACE. IT PROVES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S QUOTE POLICY IS NOT TO GIVE IN TO ARAB PRESSURE OR SOVIET THREATS, NOR EVEN TO OPPORTUNISTIC VIEWS REPRESENTED BY CERTAIN EXPERTS AND SOME OF HIS ADVISERS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. UNQUOTE.

5. ACCORDING TO LEFT-WING AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) QUOTE EVEN IF

AVOIDED. AND IF PRSIDENT JOHNSON'S PRINCIPLES FINALLY PREVAIL AND THERE ARE REMARKAB'E PROSPECTS THAT THEY WILL SOONER OR LATER NOTWITHSTANDING VIET SABOTAGE EFFORTS-THE WILL BE NO FURTHER FLAREUP IN MIDDLE EAST. UNQUOTE ON BASIS OF PRESIDENT'S STATESMANLIKE SPEECH,

ETAY CONCLUDE THAT W E ISRAEL HAD TO WAGE WAR ALONE, IT HAS AN ALLY, IN THE FIGHT FOR PEACE, A FIGHT WHICH CANNOT BE WON WITHOUT ALLIES.

4. RIGHT-WING NATIONALISTIC HAYOM (GAHAL) APPLAUDS THE QUOTE

~~PAGE 5 RUCQWL 4218 UNCLAS~~

JOHNSON PLAN UNQUOTE WHICH IT STATES TOUCHES DIRECTLY ON KEY POINTS OF AREA TENSION AND OFFERS PRACTICAL PROPOSALS FOR PERMANENT PEACE. IT PROVES THAT THE PRESIDENT'S QYOTE POLICY IS NOT TO GIVE IN TO ARAB PRESSURE OR SOVIET THREATS, NOR EVEN TO OPPORTUNISTIC VIEWS REPRESENTED BY CERTAIN EXPERTS AND SOME OF HIS ADVISERS IN THE STATE DEPTARMTNT. UNQUOTE.

5. ACCORDING TO LEFT-WING AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) QUOTE EVEN IF ONE SHOUD DISAGREE WITH ONE OR THE OTHER OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS, ONE CANOT BUT GO ALL OUT IN PRAISING THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT WHICH PERVADED HIS WORDS. UNQUOTE.

6. HATZOFEH (NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY) DECLARS THAT IF THEY ARE FAIRLY IMPLEMENTED PRESIDENT'S FIVER POINTS ARE CAPABLE OF LEADING TO PEACE. HIS QUOTE SUPPORT OF ISRAEL'S POSITION OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAB STATES WILL BE RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION. THE SPEECH WAS TO THE POINT, OBJECTIVE AND PRVADED BY SEARCH FOR A JUST SOLUTION OF ISRAELI-ARARB DISPUTE. UNQUOTE

7. ACTIVIST HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) EXPRESSES SATISFACTION AT

~~PAGE 4 RUCQWL 4218 UNCLAS~~

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND THE HOPE THAT USUN WILL ADHERE TO PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED THEREIN, SPARING NO EFFORT MAKE SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION FAIL. BARBOUR

BT

5

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Claiborne Pell came in at 6:00 tonight with the attached letter and memorandum of conversation for you.

We've known one another a long time, but he began by saying quite formally that, as a Senator, he would like to ask for an interview with you. He said he had only asked to see you three times. Of these, two had turned out to be useful, in his judgment: that is, his presentation of his views on Germany and the railroads.

Now he was asking to talk with you directly face to face on Viet Nam.

I promised to deliver his message.

He said that he was "disappointed" in the interview. He had flown over on Sunday night and returned on Monday night from Paris. Despite his disappointment, it should be noted:

-- Bo's formula is exactly like Kosygin's. They have dropped "permanent" in discussing a cessation of bombing;

-- they say negotiations "will begin" rather than "could begin."

I explained to Pell how difficult it would be to stop bombing if they continue to violate the DMZ and put pressure on our men in I Corps. He said it was for precisely that reason that he pushed "mutual de-escalation" as part of the package ending the bombing.

This request of Bo to see Pell fits in with a number of other indications we have had, stemming from North Vietnamese rather than from Eastern Europeans.

Since the roads in Laos are out with rain, the question to raise with the Vietnamese by one or another of our channels is simply this: if we stop bombing, will you stop crossing the DMZ?

If we wanted to make it more subtle and take into account the problem Kosygin raised with Wilson about the units now in the South, we could say: would you stop sending military units or formations across the DMZ? Implicitly that would mean that fighting would have to stop but they could still try to infiltrate replacement supplies into the South, if we couldn't catch them.

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED

W. W. R.

Authority NLJ 82-57
By per DCH NARA, Date 11-5-91

LEO To USecy Katzach

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CLAIBORNE PELL
RHODE ISLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 20th, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I thought the enclosed would interest you.

Warm regards and respects,

Ever sincerely,



Claiborne Pell

Enclosures

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN MAI VAN BO,
DELEGATE OF NORTH VIETNAM IN PARIS, AND CLAIBORNE PELL
ON 19 JUNE 1967

My suggestions for a resolution of the Vietnam War given on the Senate floor May 23, 1967, and attached as an Annex, were passed on to Mai Van Bo in Paris, who, in turn, had transmitted them to Hanoi. After several weeks, Bo was expressly authorized by his government to talk with me and twice expressed an interest in doing so. For this reason, I went to Paris on 19 June for a few hours and returned the same day. In fact, I was informed this was possibly the reason Bo had postponed a month's trip to Hanoi until June 23.

Bo kept repeating that bombing of North Vietnam must cease "without condition" (sans condition). But he never said, even when pressed and given opportunity, that it must end "for good" (pour jamais).

He stated flatly that, if bombing ended without condition, North Vietnam would be willing to enter into negotiation. In response to my statement of belief that we suffered more casualties in Korea after negotiations started than before, Bo replied "it is not the same as Korea" and expressed belief that basic negotiation could be completed in a few weeks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-57
By per DCH, NARA, Date 11-5-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I asked Bo if either (1) an agreement not to increase the level of forces in South Vietnam or (2) a mutual de-escalation of violence might be included as part of a diplomatic package ending the bombing. He replied that he "took note of this thought." I asked him if he received a reaction to it, to please let the reaction be known. I added that it would be better if he relayed the reaction to our Paris Embassy. In this connection, he mentioned that as long as bombing of North Vietnam continued, he could not be in contact with our Paris Embassy.

I emphasized that the mood of our American people was to escalate the war and that our Administration is subject to far more pressure to escalate, rather than to de-escalate. He did not deny this fact, adding obliquely that his government had to make use of propaganda just as did any other.

Bo said the other proposals I had made could be discussed at a conference table, but would not comment specifically on any of them at this time.

Our conversation was in French, lasting from two until half-past three in the afternoon, and was correct, cordial, and without diatribe.

Bo offered me coffee. He had a Secretary of Legation present.

CONFIDENTIAL

In conclusion, I was left with the belief that the reason Bo wished to see me was as a means of emphasizing (1) importance of ending bombing without conditions and (2) willingness to negotiate very shortly after cessation of bombing. The fact that such negotiations would be serious and in good faith is implicit in his lack of objection to my repeated statement that, if they were not, we would be free to resume bombing.

* * *

ADDENDUM

In an earlier conversation in Geneva on 30 May with Dr. Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister of South Vietnam, I got an impression of greater flexibility than from Bo. Dr. Do stated there that his Government was in accord with idea of returning to Geneva Agreements. Dr. Do commented specifically on my proposals saying they were acceptable in principle with two exceptions: (1) he did not like the idea of unilateral cessation of bombing without some sort of understanding as to what would follow and (2) American troops should not be withdrawn until after North Vietnamese troops had been withdrawn.

20 June 1967

Clairon F. 46

ANNEX

As a first step, I believe we should cease bombing the north and hold our present level of men in the south, at the same time seeking either North Vietnamese assurance or some responsible third party guarantee that the North Vietnamese will not increase their level of men in the south and will negotiate and agree upon a cease fire and an end of violence, to be followed by: first, verified free election, with candidacies for office and right to vote open to every citizen of South Vietnam; second, in accordance with principle of self-determination, internal affairs of South Vietnam, including consideration of reunification and constitutional issues, to be settled by the South Vietnam Government resulting from the election; third, agreement in principle to eventual complete American withdrawal of troops, and withdrawal in fact based on completion of arrangements leading to election, replacement by Asian troops, and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces; and, fourth, immediate release of all political prisoners, amnesty for any political actions in past, and right of asylum for any South Vietnamese wishing it.

Congressional Record

AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1967

No. 81

Senate

As a first step, I believe we should cease bombing the north and hold our present level of men in the south, at the same time seeking either North Vietnamese assurance or some responsible third party guarantee that the North Vietnamese will not increase their level of men in the south and will negotiate and agree upon a cease fire and an end of violence, to be followed by: first, Verified free election, with candidacies for office and right to vote open to every citizen of South Vietnam; second, in accordance with principle of self-determination, internal affairs of South Vietnam, including consideration of reunification and constitutional issues, to be settled by the South Vietnam Government resulting from the election; third, agreement in principle to eventual complete American withdrawal of troops, and withdrawal in fact based on completion of arrangements leading to election, replacement by Asian troops, and the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces; and, fourth, immediate release of all political prisoners, amnesty for any political actions in past, and right of asylum for any South Vietnamese wishing it.

The final objective would be a general military neutralization of the whole area

emerge from the Vietnamese war, under our present policies, will perhaps appear to our administration to be a victory, but I believe it will be only a facade of victory and can prove to be a long-term defeat for our country. From a physical viewpoint, too, we would have to survey our so-called victory in much the same way that the Roman general Tacitus did when he said: "We made a desert, and we called it peace."

Yet, I am convinced that there is nobody who wants a peaceful resolution to the war in Vietnam more than does our President. Why then do we find ourselves in such contradictory circumstances?

It seems to me that the basic problem is that we are looking at the situation from a short-term or middle-term, but not a long-term viewpoint; that the sense of history and the lessons which may be drawn from history are too often absent when it comes to our decision-making processes. To put things in perspective, let us examine why we are in Vietnam today. Our job here is to try to make the complicated comprehensible.

We are familiar with the reasoning of President Eisenhower's October 1, 1954, letter to President Diem, the SEATO Treaty and the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

...and that in each of these

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
6:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is one small reflection of
the gradually deepening crisis in China.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 20345 -- MARIA THREE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982

By *rg*, NARA, Date 6-11-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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6

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 20345

By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES PEKING

QUAI RECEIVED TELEGRAM DATED JUNE 16 FROM PEKING SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

AMBASSADOR PAYE REPORTED THAT PEOPLES DAILY OF JUNE 14 HAD LAUNCHED SERIOUS ATTACK ON INDIAN DIPLOMATE RAGHUNATH AND HIS COUNTRY, WHICH WERE "IN THE SERVICE OF THE US, UK AND USSR." THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR FOUND IT PARTICULARLY OMINOUS THAT THE ARTICLE STATED THAT "ANYONE ELSE WILL GET THE SAME TREATMENT, WHATEVER THE RANK". FRENCH AMB CONSIDERED IT A "PURE AND SIMPLE SUPPRESSION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES".

THE ARTICLE STATED THAT IT WAS A NECESSITY FOR THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT NOT ONLY TO SUPPRESS INTERNAL ENEMIES OF THE PEOPLE BUT ALSO BE VIGILANT REGARDING SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BY EXTERNAL ENEMIES. THERE SHOULD BE NO TOLERANCE WITH RESPECT TO REACTIONARIES. ALL MUST RESPECT PUBLIC ORDER IN ACTIONS AND WORDS. NO LIBERTY COULD BE PERMITTED TO ACTIVITIES OF COUNTER-ESPIONAGE.

AMB PAYE COMMENTED THAT THIS PUBLICITY LEFT "NO PLACE FOR ANY AMBIGUITY." IT HAD NATURALLY AROUSED PROFOUND EMOTION IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, MEMBERS OF WHICH HENCEFORTH WOULD BE OFFICIALLY EXPOSED TO INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND COULD BE DENOUNCED FOLLOWING THE LEAST FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REGULATIONS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ENUNCIATED, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF WHICH DEPENDED SOLELY ON CHINESE AUTHORITIES. FOREIGN DIPLOMATS THUS RAN THE DAILY RISK OF PUBLIC HUMILIATION.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THAT SUCH A SERIOUS MOVE ON THE PART OF CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN SUCH A FORM REFLECTED CLEARLY THE GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHINA. "SUBVERSION OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" AND "SABOTAGE OF THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION", REASONS USED TO JUSTIFY THIS MEASURE, MIGHT THUS BE WHAT WAS HAPPENING.

S. CLEVELAND
BT

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday - June 20, 1967
6:00 pm

Mr. President:

This morning Bob Anderson reached tentative agreement with the Panamanians on compensation for both the lock and sea level canal treaties.

The formula for the lock canal is:

- For Panama, 17 cents per ton with an increase of 1 cent per ton per year for 5 years.
- For the United States, 8 cents a ton with an increase of 1 cent per ton per year for 2 years.

These fixed amounts are to last for the duration of the treaty (i. e., until the year 2000.) Any surplus is to be split on a 50-50 basis.

On the sea level canal, it was agreed to leave the compensation formula to be decided at the time that the financing for construction of a new canal is worked out. However, certain basic guidelines for arriving at a compensation formula were included in the treaty.

The Panamanians did not press any of the side benefits which they asked for last week, except for the one dealing with the Rio Hato military reservation. In exchange for renewal of the agreement which permits us to use Rio Hato, Eleta asks that we build a section of road. Bob Anderson is checking costs. If the price is not too high, he is prepared to agree in an exchange of notes with the Panamanians that we will ask Congress for the money.

Anderson hopes to give our response on Rio Hato to the Panamanians tomorrow. If they accept it, the compensation problem will have been resolved. All other issues having already been settled, the negotiators will be in a position to submit the three treaties to their Presidents for approval.

Before Eleta returns to Panama, Anderson and Irwin will discuss with him plans and procedures for handling ad referendum approval, signature, publication and ratification so that there will be close coordination between both governments.

W. W. Rostow

WGB: mm

8

Pres file

Tuesday, June 20, 1967 -- 5:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

Minister Abba Eban telephoned to express his "respectful admiration" for your "masterful" address of yesterday.

In his judgment, it was a great demonstration of "how to keep your options open while still being significant." I said we thought he was pretty good, too.

He said that he had a number of practical ideas for a Middle East settlement, which he would communicate to the Secretary of State whom he is scheduled to see tomorrow in New York.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

W.H.D.,
— 2

2. Pres file

Tuesday, June 20, 1967, 5:50 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

At Tab A Nick Katzenbach recommends that he explore inside the government, and then with the OECD, the desirability of OECD-sponsored Atlantic conferences on:

- youth exchange programs;
- social programs, i. e., Head Start, War on Poverty, etc.;
- urban problems.

These conferences were recommended by the Vice President after his spring trip to Europe. If you approve, Nick will check with HUD, HEW and OEO to see what they think of the idea. He will then go to the OECD for a reading on attitudes there. If these consultations show there is interest, we will come back to you with recommendations.

Francis M. Bator

OK to explore Atlantic Conference possibilities _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2360

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

9a

June 19, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Atlantic Conferences

On returning from his recent trip to Europe, the Vice President recommended several Atlantic conferences on key social issues confronting developed nations. His recommendations, as set forth in his report, were the following:

"--That new youth exchange programs be instituted between the United States and Europe -- on the order of VISTA -- with young people of all nationalities becoming involved in the problems which plague all our countries. We should expand high school and college academic exchanges. This is a subject I intend to place before the President's Council on Youth Opportunities in the immediate future.

"--An Atlantic Conference on Social Progress, to engage all of us more fully in each other's concerns and to learn more from each other; i.e., Head Start, War on Poverty, Education, Health, Pollution.

"--An Atlantic Urban Conference to take advantage of the progress in design, in concept, and in social innovation now taking place on both sides of the Atlantic."

I believe that such conferences could make a large contribution to our foreign policy objectives, if they were well supported and attended by the U.S. Government at a policy-making level.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-25
By lig, NARA, Date 9-8-92

If you approve, I will initiate the following course of action:

1. Approach HUD, HEW, and OEO to ensure that the necessary U.S. backstopping is available.


2. Ask our Ambassador to the OECD to consult other member governments about these intended conferences.

3. If the results of that consultation are favorable, ask you to send a message to the OECD, proposing that the OECD sponsor a series of semi-annual high-level conferences for member countries on key problems confronting developed countries. The first meeting would be held this fall in the United States and might deal with problems of youth. I would hope that you could make a welcoming speech and that the Vice President, as head of your Council on Youth Opportunities, could attend for the U.S. The second and third meetings, to be held in the spring and fall of 1968, could deal with such issues as urban problems and social progress, and I would hope that U.S. cabinet level officers could attend.

Recommendation:

That you approve the course of action outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓



Nicholas deB Katzenbach

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
5:45 p. m.

10

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bill Jordan's response to Bunker's cable.

The reason for his recommendation on page 2 is:

- time is very short, in Bill's judgment;
- Bui Diem is trusted by Ky.

If not this route, then Bob should get out there fast.

W. W. R.

SECRET-NODIS attachment

P.S. Perhaps you might talk to Bui Diem on the three key points (p. 2).

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, June 20, 1967

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker's Proposals

I would have to vote against the proposals. I don't think they will work. I think they would do more harm than good.

First, I simply do not agree with the Mission's appraisal -- shared to a great extent by State -- that Ky is the only choice and that any other would be a disaster. As you know, I think highly of Ky and he might be an effective President. But I have come to believe that the healthiest thing that could happen in Viet-Nam right now would be the election of a civilian. The best government I can think of would be: Huong as President, Big Minh as Vice President, Ky as Prime Minister, and Thieu as chief of the Army.

Ky is a military man -- and there is a strong stream of opposition to continuing military rule. He is a Northerner, and the electorate is largely Southern, and regional feelings are strong. He is young, and there remains a deep underlying respect for maturity. Moreover, his campaign, thanks to the activities of Loan and others, is rapidly becoming a source of bitterness.

A good many Vietnamese believe deeply that Ky's election would be proof-positive that corruption, pressure, and bribery dominated the political process.

I urge that we not get out too far on a "Ky is the only man for us" limb.

Further, on the proposals:

-- The kind of direct U.S. involvement proposed would be a grave mistake. It would be known. It would put us right in the middle of internal contention. And I recall too many people getting burned in the past when they felt one Vietnamese was indispensable.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 28-93

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~~SECRET~~-NODIS

-- The removal of Loan would not in itself solve the problem of chicanery and manipulation. They are plenty of eager successors in the wings. It would have some useful cosmetic effects, but they would not be long lasting if the same practices persisted.

-- I am utterly convinced that a power play against Thieu would backfire badly. It would become widely known, and would put us in a bad light with many thinking Vietnamese. His future is going to have to be worked out in a Vietnamese context.

-- Financial assistance for one candidate is a bad idea. This, too, will become known.

This being said, what do we do?

I would favor the following:

1. I would put real heat on Ky to rein in his followers, to do it fast, and to make it stick. I would call in Bui Diem and lay down the ~~law and urge him to return immediately to Saigon with the message. I~~ think you should do this rather than State; it would underline the President's concern and strong feeling.

There are three principal items that need correcting:

-- the use of the police and security apparatus in support of Ky;

-- inept use of censorship on political matters;

-- Ky's use of his position and the machinery of government for political purposes.

I would stress that a dishonest election would undercut our President's position and endanger continued American support. I would state that we are not going to consider any additional U. S. involvement unless we are convinced that Viet-Nam has a reasonable political future and that Vietnamese are putting their country ahead of themselves.

2. Some Vietnamese of real standing and ability has to be put in charge of Ky's campaign. General Thang is an obvious choice, though the blow to RD is obvious. But, again, we get into the indispensable man argument. RD would be a good assignment for Big Minh, though he probably wouldn't take it. How about General Thi? How about a civilian?

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

3. Instead of backing one man, we should be working closely with all candidates. With the deep involvement we have in Viet-Nam, it is shocking that our contacts with the country's leading politicians is so tenuous. I would pick four good men to work with Ky, Thieu, Huong and Suu on a full-time basis. We should touch base regularly with the others, too, but it is less important.

Our contact men should have plenty of political savvy and solid empathy for the Vietnamese. They could provide advice, suggestions, and ideas, and help to keep their man on the track. They would make clear that the U.S. interest was in real democracy and the development of a solidly-based political process. They would also, by their actions, make clear our strict neutrality in the electoral process.

4. The Ambassador should stay very aloof from these proceedings. We have had a succession of envoys who have hurt themselves by over-involvement in politics and personalities. We are involved -- and deeply -- but I urge that we keep the Ambassador out of the front lines.

These, in any case, are my sentiments.

As a footnote: how much money are we putting into the Vietnamese police program? how many advisors do we have working on police and security services and how effective are their contacts with Loan and his subordinates? Doesn't our help -- and our contacts -- give us any leverage at all? Someone should look into this angle.

Bill
William J. Jordan

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
5:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a conversation today
between out Nat Davis and the
Counselor of the Soviet Embassy.

W. W. Rostow

11

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Lunch with Y. M. Vorontsov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy

Mr. Vorontsov called me this morning. He said he had come down from New York last night, and had to go back this afternoon, and wondered if I could have lunch with him. I agreed to meet him at the Sans Souci at 1:15 p.m. Before the lunch was over, Vorontsov said he wanted me to understand he was speaking personally and informally, and not bearing any official proposal.

Vorontsov expressed an immediate interest in the prospects for a summit meeting. He said Kosygin's business would keep him in New York only a few more days, and this Friday was his tentative departure date. He indicated a strong Soviet interest in the possibility of a summit, but said that I should understand Kosygin could not travel "220 long political miles" to Washington. The Arabs would accuse Kosygin of having come to New York on a pretext -- to meet President Johnson. If the President found a way to be in New York "or in the vicinity", Vorontsov was sure a meeting would be arranged without any difficulty. I asked whether that meant the Soviet side would still expect the Americans to request the meeting. Vorontsov's answer was that this would "not be a problem."

I asked how far the "vicinity of New York" extended -- for example, as far as Philadelphia. I added that I had no authority to make any suggestion in this regard, but was simply wondering what he meant by "vicinity." Vorontsov said he was in no position to give any official answer, but certainly Philadelphia was in the right direction, and far better than anything that was suggested.

Vorontsov said he had heard in Washington that our reluctance to have a meeting was because the Bundy Committee had not completed its work, and our policy was not thought through beyond the five principles stated by the President in his speech. My reaction was that I was sure nobody could expect a meeting to produce a complete, agreed solution of the entire problem, and this didn't strike me as a valid reason one way or the other. I added that I had heard nothing indicating a policy obstacle of this kind on the American side.


I asked Vorontsov whether he thought, if there were a meeting, Chairman Kosygin would want to confine the talks to the Mid-East crisis. Vorontsov's reaction was that he knew Kosygin was a direct and forthright man, and would be prepared to talk about the whole range of subjects of interest.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

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Vorontsov asked me what I thought of Kosygin's speech. I said I did not know what the President thought of it, but had noticed that the Washington Post thought it was more conciliatory than the New York Times did. His answer was that we all knew where the New York Times stood. Earlier drafts of the speech had been longer and along sharper lines, but the speech had been toned down in the redrafting process -- by implication at Kosygin's initiative. Vorontsov said the passage affirming Soviet recognition of Israel had been cut down in the process of pruning the speech. Nevertheless it represented a clear policy decision to make this point in spite of Arab opposition. Vorontsov also said that the passage in favor of seeking "common language", and the implied support for the possibility of talks had not been accidental.

On prospects for a basic settlement in the Middle East, Vorontsov stressed the possibility of an expanded UN role and international guarantees, but said he thought the Arabs could not be brought to a recognition of Israel as a state -- particularly after their recent humiliation. Vorontsov made a point of the obvious U.S. interest in repairing its relations with the Arab world, the importance of oil, the U.S. economic interest, etc. He said he thought Israel was "drunk with victory" and even we were a little bit intoxicated. He claimed we might well be experiencing a hangover in a few months. When Vorontsov indicated that the next step should be a simple Israeli withdrawal, I said I couldn't really see how the Soviet Government could expect a withdrawal to the June 4 situation without some serious effort to achieve a broader and more lasting settlement.


Nathaniel Davis

cc: Mr. Rostow/Mr. Smith
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Bator
Mr. Ash
Mr. Toon (State)
Mr. Sonnenfeldt (State)
S/S - State

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
5:15 p. m.

12

MR. PRESIDENT:

Congressman Ogden Reid has been pressing Marv very hard for a chance to see you.

I have agreed to see him at 6:00 p. m. tomorrow (Wednesday). He says he wishes to be helpful to you. I told him that I would be glad to discuss whatever is on his mind and report; but the pressures on you were such that you had limited contacts with interested and concerned Members of Congress and others; and I could not promise that you would be free.

He asked me to call him back tomorrow afternoon to see if there was any chance of his slipping upstairs to see you.

We will be having a 6:30 Bundy committee meeting tomorrow. My question is: would you want me to tell him before he comes at 6:00 p. m. that he might be able to drop in for a few minutes before that meeting; say, 6:20.

Only you can assess whether acceding to his request is, on balance, a good idea.

W. W. R.

Bring him up at 6:20 tomorrow _____

No _____

See me _____

13

Handwritten notes:
~~W. J. ...~~
2 Per file

Tuesday, June 20, 1967, 4:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

I understand that you have agreed to see Moro and Fanfani on Thursday, and Krag on Friday. Since they do not have their own transportation, would you be willing to authorize the use of a plane to bring them to Washington and take them back to New York (it would mean a total of two round-trips)? This would be a nice gesture.

Francis M. Bator

Handwritten initials:
OK
FB

OK to use plane

No

Speak to me

FMB:LSE:mst

Red stamp:
JUN 21 1967

~~SECRET~~

14

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, June 20, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. 5 A.I.D. Projects for Clearance before end of Fiscal 1967.
(Under Sec. Katzenbach)
2. Response to Ellsworth Bunker's cable on Vietnamese Politics.
(Under Sec. Katzenbach)
3. Middle East Issued for Today. (Mr. McGeorge Bundy)
4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rs, NARA, Date 6-10-91

WWRostow:rin

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Tuesday, June 20, 1967 -- 1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I communicated your two points to Sec. Rusk and Amb. Goldberg on the Kosygin visit and a non-contentious posture, via a member of Sec. Rusk's staff.

Amb. Goldberg came back in some irritation, saying:

- he has not talked to the press about a Kosygin meeting and his staff is firmly instructed to forward all inquiries to Washington;
- his speech was fully cleared by Washington and Sec. Rusk;
- although a non-contentious stand is all right, the U. S. will be under attack from one Arab Foreign Minister after another;
- does the President want him to turn over his Mission to Sec. Rusk?

I told him the President merely hoped we would be able to maintain the posture we achieved yesterday; that, indeed, the President had fully cleared his speech last night; and generally smoothed feathers a bit.

You may -- or may not -- wish to tell him you thought his speech was fine.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

16

Pres. memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
12:52 p. m.

Mr. President:

This is a somewhat livelier analysis of Kosygin's speech, underlining the road of retreat he left open from the Assembly back to the Security Council (p. 3).

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 6-11-91

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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N. S. C.

*Intelligence
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June 19, 1967

- 502-100
- BOWLER
- BUREAU
- FILES
16a

To : The Secretary
Through : S/S
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *G.C.D.*
Subject : Kosygin Opens With Maximum Demands

- BURGESS
- HAMILTON
- JAMES
- JOHNSON
- KENNEDY
- KERRY M
- MOYERS
- TAYLOR
- WATSON

Kosygin's opening speech at the General Assembly was most notable for its lack of originality -- the Soviet Premier said little that had not been foreshadowed by Fedorenko in the Security Council. The Soviet Premier's principal effort was directed at trying to persuade as many UN members as possible that withdrawal of Israeli forces was a precondition for any other steps toward a settlement in the area.

Issues Avoided. In line with that pitch, Kosygin avoided any discussion of issues which may be involved in a settlement. *Although* Soviet officials have been unofficially canvassing for ~~American~~ reactions to such ideas as an international regime for the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, the internationalization of Jerusalem, and possible modalities for a UN presence and perhaps arms limitations in the area, the Soviet Premier said nothing on these subjects, beyond demanding that Israel leave Jerusalem and quit the banks of the Canal so that it could be reopened.

Propaganda Lines Familiar. Kosygin's propaganda lines were for the most part ones well known from Fedorenko's Security Council speeches. Kosygin belabored the theme of Israeli aggression against "progressive" Arab regimes over

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this report has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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Authority NLS 83-159
By RG/ics, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the years, spicing it with current atrocity charges. In detailing the charge of aggression, he said the USSR has had information of an Israeli troop concentration in May -- the US could find no evidence of one -- and thus seemed to justify the warnings which Moscow passed to the Arabs and which helped trigger the crisis. Kosygin betrayed some sensitivity to Israeli charges of recrudescence of Soviet anti-Semitism and charges by Western European leftists that the Soviets seem to be in opposition to the continued existence of Israel as a state. He explained that the USSR was not against Israel, but against Israeli extremist ruling circles which practice aggression. In attacking the US, Kosygin of course did not mention the Arab charges of American and British planes taking part in the fighting, but he did dwell on the theme of support and encouragement of Israeli aggression and tried to show that American policy in this regard was of a piece with American policy of attempting to suppress national liberation in Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo. Kosygin did not attempt to draw any more subtle links between Vietnam and the Middle East.

Danger of Nuclear War. Invoking visions of the danger of such situations as that in the Middle East escalating into nuclear war, Kosygin sought, as Soviet representatives often have, to use that notion to enlist the interest of as many members of the Assembly as possible. At the same time, his references to the needs of statesmen in this day and age to act circumspectly in the face of the danger of nuclear war may also serve to remind the Arabs of the limits of Soviet support.

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-3-

Soviet Warnings. In reviewing the instances of Israeli obstinacy in not heeding the Security Council resolutions, Kosygin noted that Israel came around only after being firmly warned by the USSR and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union is thus now making a public record of the idea that the Israelis were finally brought to a ceasefire by the Soviet Union's firm support of the Arabs. Moreover, Kosygin renewed Soviet warnings, saying that the USSR would take any measures necessary to ensure Israeli withdrawal whether in or out of the UN. This threat will presumably serve in coming weeks as part of Moscow's pressure tactics against Israel.

Draft Resolution Refurbished Slightly. Kosygin tabled a draft resolution which was drawn from the last Soviet draft before the Security Council in its operative condemnation and withdrawal paragraphs. It added draft language for the idea of Israel's obligation to make restitution, and finally the draft called upon the Security Council to take action to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression. Kosygin seems to be a good bridge player -- he is setting up his ruff back to his hand for use after he finishes up in the dummy. His planned move back to the Security Council may be designed to open the way for great power bargaining, to which Kosygin alluded vaguely, and thus to avoid a dead end for Soviet policy once the GA has run its course.

A Position to Haggle From. It is hardly likely that Kosygin expects the Assembly to adopt his draft resolution as it stands. He probably expects the provision on restitution to be dropped and the one on condemnation to be at least

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-4-

modified and more likely dropped, too. But he may hope by his extreme opening demands to produce a final resolution close enough to the Soviet position to avoid the appearance of a turndown. In particular, he probably calculates that however little of his rhetoric the Assembly accepts it will vote a resolution calling for withdrawal. Kosygin may also foresee the possibility that the Assembly may in addition vote some other provisions which he has not proposed, but he probably counts on a withdrawal provision to serve as the basis for continued pressure on Israel later on when the scene shifts back to the Security Council for work on the nuts and bolts of any future arrangement. In the meantime, Moscow can use the Assembly as a place to canvass reactions on possible elements of a settlement to see if one acceptable to the USSR's Arab clients is possible.

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REF ID: A66743

17

Presidential

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
12:50 p. m.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Mr. President:

Herewith [redacted] shows clarity,
lucidity of mind, and -- if he follows
through -- some courage.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-221
By CB, NARA Date 1-24-01

W. W. Rostow

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
12:45 p. m.

18

MR. PRESIDENT:

Evron called to say he has been asked by Prime Minister Eshkol to express through me to you his "deep appreciation" for your speech of yesterday.

W. W. R.

19

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA analyses of
Kosygin's and Eban's speeches.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Cy 1
20 June 1967
No. 0659/67
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
Soviet Premier Kosygin's UN Speech, 19 June 1967

Cy 1
20 June 1967
Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban's UN Speech, 19 June 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
9:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

What I presume this Soviet delegate in New York is saying to our man is: Kosygin's speech was mild so as not to preclude a meeting with the President.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5782

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-14
By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-92

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Pres file

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RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 765
STATE GRNC
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D.

(Mission Officer)

SUBJECT: KOSYGIN

AFTER KOSYGIN ADDRESS UNGA EVTEEV (USSR) SAW MISOFF AND ASKED FOLLOWING QUESTION: (QUOTE) DID YOU GET THE MESSAGE? (UNQUOTE) MISOFF REPLIED GRATIFIED SEE KOSYGIN DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND OF INVECTIVE IN HIS SPEECH. EVTEEV WONDERED WOULD THERE BE A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT. MISOFF SAID HAD NO INFORMATION WHATEVER. EVTEEV COMMENTED IT WOULD BE (QUOTE) YOUR MISTAKE (UNQUOTE) IF MEETING NOT HELD. HE EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS GRATIFIED WITH RECEPTION OF KOSYGIN SO FAR IN NEW YORK CITY, ESPECIALLY NOTING THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL DEMONSTRATIONS.

GOLDBERG
BT

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Authority 77L9 91-15
By ls/yp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

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21

Confidential

Tuesday - June 20, 1967
9:00 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a briefing memorandum describing the purpose of Ambassador Larrea's call on you and some suggested talking points.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 6-10-91



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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21a
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-25

By ing, NARA, Date 9-8-92

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Ecuadorean
Ambassador Larrea on June 20 at 10:00 a.m.

Ambassador Larrea is calling in the name of Ecuadorean President Arosemena to present a gift consisting of an art object, and to pursue further the subjects which President Johnson and President Arosemena discussed at Punta del Este. Ambassador Larrea also plans to mention his as-yet-unannounced departure from Washington. During his 2 1/2 years in Washington, Larrea has been one of the ablest members of the Latin American diplomatic corps and has played an especially helpful role in softening the nationalistic excesses which are endemic in the unstable and volatile climate of Ecuadorean politics.

Suggested Talking Points:

- 1) Ambassador Larrea will wish to relay President Arosemena's present thinking regarding future U.S.-Ecuadorean cooperation in the Alliance for Progress. The President might again discuss the need for full Ecuadorean self-help efforts as Ecuador strives to carry out its economic and social development programs.

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automatically declassified.


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- 2 -

- 2) In addition to expressing gratitude for President Arosemena's gift, the President may wish to express appreciation to Ambassador Larrea for his outstanding efforts in fostering good U.S.-Ecuadorean relations.

Ambassador Covey T. Oliver, designated Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, will accompany Ambassador Larrea.

A biographic sketch of Ambassador Larrea is enclosed along with a summary of the current status of our U.S. AID program in Ecuador.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

1. Biographic Sketch.
2. Summary of U.S. AID program in Ecuador.

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June 19, 1967

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

Gustavo LARREA Cordova
(Pronounced: Lah-RAY-ah)

Amba sador of Ecuador to
the United States

Ambassador Larrea was born in Cuenca, Ecuador, on June 4, 1901. He worked as a journalist for several years, but spent most of his adult life in Colombia as an importer and commission merchant. His knowledge of English is limited.

From September 1937, to August 1958, he served as Ecuadorean Consul ad honorem in Manizales, Colombia. He served on Ecuador's U.N. delegation at various times between 1955 and 1957. In August 1955, he was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of China and Minister to Japan ad honorem. He was appointed Ambassador to Japan in March, 1961, and Ambassador to South Korea ad honorem in April, 1963. He was Consul General in Manizales, Colombia, from January, 1964, until his appointment as Ambassador to the United States. He presented his credentials on December 15, 1964.

His outstanding ability as Ecuadorean Ambassador to Washington is attested to by the fact that he has now served three Ecuadorean Governments: the Military Junta, Interim President Clemente Yerovi, and now for the past seven months, President Arosemena. He now plans to retire from diplomatic service.

Ambassador Larrea is described as a political independent. He is a close personal friend of former Ecuadorean Presidents Galo Plaza (Liberal) and Camilo Ponce (Conservative). He has not been active in politics. He is considered to be genuinely friendly to the United States.

Ambassador Larrea is approximately 5'4" in height, slight in build, balding and light complexioned. He is mild mannered, soft spoken and prefers informal, frank exchanges of views. His mild mannerisms tend to conceal the fact that he is an extremely intelligent and alert individual. He is particularly interested in promoting U.S. private investment in Ecuador.

He is married to the former Maria Eugenia Mejia, a Colombian citizen, born in Manizales, Colombia, on March 11, 1903. The Larreas have no children.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-25

By ms, NARA, Date 9-8-92 216

U.S. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO ECUADOR

1. Developments following the Summit Meeting

At the Summit Conference President Arosemena sharply criticized U.S. trade and aid policies toward Latin America. Arosemena continued in the same vein on his return to Ecuador and directed his complaints more specifically toward certain AID loans. However, during this difficult period the United States avoided over-reacting; we continue to judge new AID projects on the basis of Alliance for Progress criteria. This approach seems to have been effective. Arosemena has recently appeared to be taking a more realistic look at foreign assistance. Several new project agreements have been signed, Arosemena recently praised AID efforts toward establishment of cooperatives, and agreement was at long last reached on the \$2.0 million Malaria Eradication loan, signed on May 30.

2. AID Program

At present, the FY-1967 AID program totals \$3.7 million in technical cooperation. As of March 31, 1967, AID's total active loans to Ecuador amounted to \$42,650,000 of which \$16,535,000 have been disbursed. The proposed FY-1968 program totals \$5 million in development loans and \$4.1 million (recently revised downward from an initial request of \$4.6 million) in technical cooperation. Under its list of priorities, AID has programmed \$1.0 million in technical assistance in FY-1967 and another \$1.0 million in FY-1968 to further its primary goal of increasing Ecuador's agricultural productivity. A \$3 million loan is proposed to provide supervised agricultural credit.

AID has a number of continuing technical assistance projects (totaling \$613,000 in FY-1967 and \$544,000 in FY-1968) designed to assist the Ecuadoreans to develop human resources, especially through university and secondary education. A loan to Ecuadorean universities is being considered which would provide a student loan fund and additional resources for

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- 2 -

full-time professors. A technical assistance project, funded at \$576,000 in FY-1967 and \$614,000 in FY-1968, is directed toward improving the manpower and education planning capability of the Ministry of Education.

Other technical assistance projects are designed to improve public administration, strengthen institutional development, including free labor unions, and increase the effectiveness of the police in maintaining internal security. Through the Consultative Group and the consortium highway loan, AID maintains close coordination with other major donors to Ecuador. The Inter-American Development Bank, acting as financial agent for Ecuador, heads the Consultative Group which encompasses nineteen countries and twelve international lending agencies. The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and AID jointly monitor the \$63 million consortium highway project.

3. Self-help

Past efforts by the U.S. Government to secure substantial GOE action in tax reform, agricultural and land reform, public safety financing, civic action and fiscal-monetary reforms, have been largely frustrated. Part of the problem during the past year lay in the country's acute economic and fiscal crises. In a successful effort to help the GOE during the difficult transition back to constitutional government, the USG disbursed \$7 million (of an originally-approved \$10 million) budget support loan. This helped stimulate restoration of a favorable economic position for Ecuador.

The new constitution (adopted May 25, 1967) provides that President Arosemena will remain in office as Constitutional President until September, 1968. The policies which he and his successors follow regarding Ecuador's own development efforts will determine what direction U.S. assistance should take. We would hope that the GOE will prove capable of making the necessary changes in tax and public investment policies to adequately support economic and social development. If not,

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- 3 -

the U. S. intends to concentrate assistance on those areas and institutions which show promise of contributing directly to economic productivity and needed social changes in the short run, waiting to undertake more ambitious programs until such time as the GOE is able and willing to undertake the kind of self-help measures envisaged in the Alliance for Progress.

Active AID Loans to Ecuador

<u>Number & Title</u>	<u>Amount</u> (in thous. of dollars)
Aerial Photo- mapping	\$ 1,800
Housing Bank	5,000
Industrial Credit	5,000
Highway	2,700
Feasibility Studies	2,000
Consortium Highway	13,300
Rural Electric Cooperative	650
Cooperative Bank	1,200
Electric Power	700
Industrial Credit (COFIEC)	3,000
Primary School	5,300
Malaria Eradication	<u>2,000</u>
Total	\$42,650

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You approved an invitation to Prime Minister Sato, of Japan, to come to Washington in November as part of the foreign visitor schedule for the last half of 1967. Preliminary discussion with the Japanese indicates that November 7-8 (Tuesday-Wednesday), would be acceptable dates. We have checked this against your schedule, as well as Mrs. Johnson.

Although November is still some time away, Sato plans to visit Canada after coming to Washington, and wishes to firm up his visit with you before making his Canadian arrangements.

If you approve November 7-8, we will inform the Prime Minister and arrange for a simultaneous announcement, which George Christian will confirm with you later.

Approve November 7-8 _____ See me _____

I suggest the following program for the visit:

- Greeting on the lawn.
- Meeting in your office for an hour (with time reserved for a second meeting should it later appear desirable).
- Black tie dinner.

Approve program _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

Moose 6/20

cc: Jordan

June 20, 1967

23
—

Dear Bill:

I am glad to have your views, as expressed in your letter of June 19th, on the desirability of my meeting with Chairman Kosygin on the occasion of his visit to the United Nations.

On my initiative we have made our position clear to him several times, most recently this morning. As I explained to you on the telephone last night shortly after I received your letter, we are ready to meet with him if there is any indication that he wishes and he is willing to discuss with us substantive problems of common interest and if a meeting can be arranged in a mutually agreeable place.

We are not yet clear what will develop but I did want you to know what our position is and to inform you that there is no lack of communication between the Chairman and myself.

Your own desire to be helpful to me under these circumstances and in this situation is appreciated.

Sincerely,



Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:yb

23a

Tuesday, June 20, 1967
12:45 p. m.

~~Lang~~
2 Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith proposed immediate
reply to Bill Fulbright.

W. W. Rostow

234

June 20, 1967

Dear Bill:

I am glad to have your views, as expressed in your letter of June 19, on the desirability of my meeting with Chairman Kosygin on the occasion of his visit to New York.

We have made our position clear to him several times, most recently this morning. As I explained to you on the telephone, we would be glad to meet him under two conditions:

- first, if there is an indication that he wishes and is empowered to discuss with us substantive problems of common interest;
- second, if a meeting can be arranged in a quiet and relaxed setting, which, of course, excludes New York City.

It is not yet clear what Chairman Kosygin's position will be in this matter, but I did want you to know what our position is and to be assured there is no lack of communication between the Chairman and myself.

Sincerely,

Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, June 19, 1967
10:12 P.M. EDT

24
Pres file

Mr. President:

I thought you'd like to read
these little gems.

The marked passage is interest-
ing. Kosygin is going to be around
awhile.

We're in the Situation Room
working, if wanted.

~~Walt~~ Rostow

SANITIZED

24a


830PM 6-19-67 JRL
TO THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM 020
TO SECRETARY OF STATE 021
TO DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 025
TO DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 019
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

RECEIVED
WHCA


1967 JUN 20 00 33

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION~~

VISIT OF SOVIET PREMIER ALEXEI KOSYGIN TO THE UNITED STATES,
NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN



PAGE TWO



GP-1

END

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-250
By CG, NARA Date 8-1-00

~~SANITIZED~~

24b

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUN 20 01 24

927 PM 6-19-67 JRL
TO THE PRESIDENT 021
TO SECRETARY OF STATE 022
FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~(SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION)~~
VISIT OF SOVIET PREMIER ALEKSEI KOSYGIN TO UNITED STATES, 1967

GP-1
END
H O L D FOR ACKS

~~SANITIZED~~
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-25D
By CB, NARA Date 8-1-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

See file

Monday, June 19, 1967
7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in these reflections on the war in Viet Nam by Ellsworth Bunker, which led him to the conclusion that we should go for a physical barrier well into Laos, along the line of the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 28293

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 28-93

WWRostow:rln

Mr. Rostow
25a

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

cy Bundy

Action

CONTROL: 1 4 4 1 3
RECEIVED: JUNE 17, 1967, 2:28 A.M.

Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 28293 1680600
ZNY TTTT
P 170500Z JUNE 67
FM AMEMBASS SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GCNC
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-25
By ms, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~TOP SECRET SAIGON 28293~~

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

1. I HAVE BEEN GIVING A GOOD DEAL OF THOUGHT TO THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE WAR AND THE PROBLEMS BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEMMING FROM THE INCREASINGLY LARGER SHARE OF THE ENEMY EFFORT BEING ASSUMED BY NORTH VIET-NAM. INTELLIGENCE INDICATES THAT THE VIET CONG ARE HAVING INCREASING DIFFICULTIES IN RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND HAVE DROPPED THE AGE OF INDUCTION TO 14 OR 15. AT THE SAME TIME THERE HAS BEEN NO DECREASE, IN FACT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME INCREASE, IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ENEMY COMBAT TROOPS. IT IS APPARENT THEREFORE THAT VIET CONG DEFICIENCIES HAVE BEEN COMPENSATED FOR BY LARGER NUMBERS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. SEVERAL NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS ARE POISED NORTH OF THE DMZ AND AT LEAST TWO DIVISIONS ARE BASED IN NORTHEAST CAMBODIA.
2. I THINK THAT ONE CAN ARRIVE AT SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION:
 - A) OPERATION OF US FORCES AGAINST THE ENEMY, WHEN THEY CAN BE ENGAGED, HAVE BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF ARVN HAS BEEN IMPROVING IN A NUMBER OF SECTORS.
 - B) GUERILLA WARFARE, A CONTINUING THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF HAMLETS AND VILLAGES, WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM REMAINS A MAJOR PROBLEM.
 - C) AERIAL BOMBARDMENT HAS BEEN HELPFUL IN GREATLY INCREASING THE DIFFICULTIES OF INFILTRATION BY THE NVN FORCES AND IN KEEPING THEM SUPPLIED. IT HAS ALSO DESTROYED OR DAMAGED A LARGE AMOUNT OF THE NVN INFRASTRUCTURE.
 - D) AERIAL BOMBARDMENT HOWEVER, THOUGH EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, HAS NEITHER INTERDICTED INFILTRATION NOR BROKEN THE WILL OF THE NVN AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT IT CAN ACCOMPLISH EITHER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 28293, JUNE 17. N O D I S

E) AN INCREASINGLY LARGER SHARE OF THE WAR EFFORT IS BEING BORNE BY THE NVN:

3. IT SEEMS APPARENT THEREFORE THAT THE CRUX OF THE MILITARY PROBLEM IS TO CHOK OFF NVN INFILTRATION. IF WAYS CAN BE FOUND TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST THE FOLLOWING DAVANTAGES:

A) IT WOULD DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE DIMENSIONS OF OUR PRO-N SOUTH BIET-NAM. MILITARILY WE WOULD BE DEALING ONLY WITH THE VIET CONG WHOSE PROBLEMS OF RECRUITMENT AND SUPPLIES WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY MULTIPLIED LACKING THE ASSISTANCE AND REINFORCEMENTS OF NORTH VIET-NAM. I BELIEVE THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE VIET CONG WOULD EVENTUALLY WITHER ON THE VINE.

B) WHEN THE INFILTRATION IS CHOKED OFF, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SUSPEND BOMBINGS AT LEAST FOR A PERIOD AND THEREBY DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS SUBSTANCE TO THE STATEMENT IN MANY QUARTERS THAT HANOI WOULD THEN COME TO NEGOTIATIONS. IF THE BOMBINGS WERE STOPPED IT WOULD AT LEAST CALL THEIR BLUFF.

C) TENSIONS NOW EXISTING BETWEEN THE US AND VIET-NAM ON THE ONE SIDE AND CAMBODIA ON THE OTHER SHOULD BE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, RELIEVED AND OUR RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA IMPROVED, EVEN THOUGH INITIALLY SIHNAOUK MIGHT CONTINUE TO ALLOW THE NVA/VC TO USE CAMBODIA AS A HAVEN AND A SOURCE OF CERTAIN SUPPLIES.

4. THE PROBLEM OBVIOUSLY IS WHAT MEANS CAN BE EMPLOYED THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY CHOK OFF NVN INFILTRATION. THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM YOUTH OF THE DMZ IS UNDERWAY, AS ARE PREPARATIONS FOR ILLINOIS (FORMERLY PRACTIVE 9). IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MORE POSITIVE STEPS ARE NEEDED. I BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP MEANS OF EXTENDING AN EFFECTIVE OBSTACLE TO THE INFILTRATION ACROSS LAOS AS AN EXTENSION OF THE DMZ LINE WESTWARD TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO BLOCK THE MAIN INFILTRATION ROUTES. THE NATURE OF THE BARRIER OF COURSE WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT. WHETHER IT WOULD ULTIMATELY BE SOMETHING SIMILAR TO A STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM OF A DEFENSIVE LINE OR SOME COMBINATION OF METHODS WILL HAVE TO BE STUDIED AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND IS NOW ENGAGED IN EXPLORING PRELIMINARY STEPS. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE MANNED BY VIETNAMESE TROOPS WITH THE US TAKING CARE OF THE LOGISTICS, AND THESE FORCES SHOULD BE CLEARLY CONFINED TO THE STATED OBJECTIVE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 28293, JUNE 17. N O D I S

OF CUTTING INFILTRATION ROUTES. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF AN EFFECTIVE BLOCK IS IMPOSED SOUTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL AND EXTENDING FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ON THE EAST ACROSS SOUTH VIETNAM SOUTH OF THE DMZ, THENCE ACROSS LAOS, IF NECESSARY TO THE THAI BORDER ON THE WEST (THOUGH IN ALL PROBABILITY IT WOULD NOT HAVE TO EXTEND THAT FAR), IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CHOK OFF NVN INFILTRATION.

5. I REALIZE THAT THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, ESPECIALLY POLITICAL. THE US IS A SIGNATORY TO THE 1962 GENEVA AGREEMENTS. THE HOLD OF THE LAO GOVERNMENT ON THAT PART OF THE COUNTRY WHICH IT STILL CONTROLS IS PRECARIOUS. ON THE OTHER HAND THE NORTH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT IS ALSO A SIGNATORY TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS AND ITS FORCES HAVE BEEN IN LAOS BOTH BEFORE AND SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENTS. IT IS NOW USING IT AS THE MAIN ROUTE FOR INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM. IS IT NOT LOGICAL AND REASONABLE THEREFORE THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD OPPOSE AND COMBAT NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFENSIVE ACTION BY WHATEVER METHOD CAN BE DEvised IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE INVASION OF THEIR COUNTRY? GUARANTEES OF COURSE WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE LAO GOVERNMENT BY THE SVN, AND I BELIEVE SHOULD BE UNDERWRITTEN BY US, THAT VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE ON LAO TERRITORY FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES ONLY AND WOULD BE WITHDRAWN IMMEDIATELY PEACE IS SECURED. THE OPERATION, ESPECIALLY IN ITS PREPARATORY STAGES, SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH AS MUCH SECURITY AND SECRECY AS POSSIBLE, THE PRESS EXCLUDED FROM THE AREA AND NO ACKNOWLEDGMENT MADE BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE, LAO OR US GOVERNMENTS THAT VIETNAMESE TROOPS WERE IN LAO TERRITORY. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THESE PROBLEMS WILL BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT UNLESS WE CAN PERSUADE KY TO KEEP HIS MOUTH SHUT. BUT I AM AN OPTIMIST AND HAVE HOPES OF MAKING SOME PROGRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. BUNKER

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Monday, July 19, 1967
7:40 p. m.

26

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a third report on U. N. reactions
to speeches: yours and the others.

You will enjoy the Roumanian comment.
In fact, they have been very tough with
Moscow on the Middle East crisis.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Third Report on UN Reaction to the President's Speech, Kosygin and Eban

The President's Speech. Friendly and neutral states not closely aligned to the Arabs continue to make favorable comments about the constructive and moderate tone of the President's speech. Interestingly, the Ethiopian's was very favorable. (I understand a cable is coming down reporting it.) The Romanians commented that the President's position was close to their own. A few Africans -- including Botswana -- were also highly favorable. The Nepalese liked the President's speech.

An Indian commented that the speech had "nothing new." Several Arabs said the speech should have given them something more.

Kosygin's Speech. In general, the sentiment among friendly and neutral states was that Kosygin didn't show up too well in comparison with the President. The Arabs continue to make comments about the Kosygin speech that it was "words." However, there is also an undercurrent of comment that Kosygin -- for a Russian -- was not as intransigent as he might have been. Some neutralists point out that at least Kosygin made a point of Soviet recognition of Israel as a state. The New Zealander remarked that there was an undertone as follows: "If you Americans hold back the Israelis, we'll try to hold back the Arabs." A few delegates thought that Kosygin had back-watered. (It is hard to see from the text that Kosygin really did. I suspect that the comments about Kosygin's mildness stem from the fact that (1) He is not as sarcastic as Fedorenko; (2) His style of delivery was calm and moderate -- particularly if you didn't listen to what he said; and (3) There is a great hope for a great power accommodation, and the wish is father of the judgment.)

There is a good deal of hope expressed in New York that the President and Kosygin will pull the rabbit out of a hat. There is almost an assumption on the part of many that somehow a Big Two meeting will be arranged. This mood could, of course, change very quickly.

The Eban Speech. Eban's speech was almost universally regarded as eloquent and forceful. A few neutralists criticized him for having renewed the attack on Thant's precipitate withdrawal of UNEF. There was some criticism of the speech as being too long.

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DECLASSIFIED

Nathaniel Davis

Authority NLQ 83-157
 By rg/ics, NARA, Date 6/1/91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967 -- 7:30 pm

Mr. President:

This is a critically important cable sent by Amb. Bunker via the back channel. It is being held most closely at State. There will be no action on it, of course, without your considering it.

Nick may raise it at lunch tomorrow.

The referenced telegram, #212155, is attached.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 6-10-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

27a

~~SECRET~~

015582

VZCZCEIZ377

PP RUEHC
DE RUEPIA 62 1701555
ZNY SSSSS
P 191406Z JUN 67
FM CIA WASHDC
TO SECSTATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ CIA 7697

NOTE TO SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK (EYES ONLY)
FROM DIRECTOR CIA

AMBASSADOR BUNKER HAS SENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO ME FOR PASSING TO YOU EYES ONLY. YOU WILL NOTE AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S PARENTHETICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT. (SAIGON 8185, DTG 191253Z)

(FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE WHICH AMBASSADOR BUNKER REQUESTS BE PASSED TO SECRETARY OF STATE RUSK. AMBASSADOR HAS REQUESTED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PROPOSAL BE HELD TO MINIMUM. OUTSIDE OF STATION, PROPOSAL IS KNOWN ONLY TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LOCKE, AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND. LATTER TWO HAVE CONCURRED.)

"1. I HAVE BECOME CONCERNED AT THE DETERIORATING POLITICAL SITUATION HERE WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM SEVERAL FACTORS. ONE OF THESE, OF COURSE, IS GENERAL THIEU'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS CANDIDACY FOR PRESIDENT, WITH RESULTS WHICH ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE DEPARTMENT. OF MUCH GREATER

PAGE 2 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

SERIOUSNESS, HOWEVER, ARE THE RATHER BLATANT ELECTION-RIGGING TACTICS OF GENERAL LOAN. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE BROUGHT LOAN'S ANTICS TO OUR ATTENTION

[REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

"2. LOAN'S TACTICS HAVE CREATED A SITUATION IN WHICH MUCH OF WHAT WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DOING OVER THE PAST YEAR IN WORKING TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS BEING VITIATED WITHIN A VERY SHORT TIME. LOAN'S ACTIONS ARE SO WIDELY KNOWN THAT, AS LONG AS HE REMAINS IN HIS PRESENT POSITION, THE RESULTS OF THE SEPTEMBER ELECTION WILL REMAIN IN DOUBT REGARDLESS OF HOW WELL IN THE END IT MAY BE CONDUCTED. EVEN IF KY TAKES MEASURES TO REIN IN LOAN AND TO INSURE THAT THE ELECTION IS CONDUCTED FAIRLY, VERY FEW VIETNAMESE WILL HAVE FAITH IN THE FAIRNESS OF THE RESULT IF LOAN REMAINS AS POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR POSITION HERE, ELSEWHERE ABROAD AND AT HOME ARE TOO OBVIOUS TO NEED SPELLING OUT.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-249 + 92-23
By Sj, NARA, Date 9-19-01

~~SECRET~~

-2- CIA 7697

"3. IN THINKING ABOUT THIS PROBLEM WE MUST, HOWEVER, REALIZE THAT SOME OF THE BLAME IS PROBABLY SHARED BY THIEU. WHILE SUCH A JUDGMENT IS OF NECESSITY UNCERTAIN, IT IS

PAGE 3 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

NOTABLE THAT THERE WAS NO SOLID EVIDENCE OF ANY INTENTION ON THE PART OF KY AND LOAN TO RIG THE ELECTION UNTIL THIEU TOSSED HIS HAT RATHER TENTATIVELY INTO THE RING ON 20 MAY. FROM THAT POINT ON, WE BEGAN TO SEE A FLURRY OF BEHIND-THE-SCENES ACTIVITY. THE MOST OFFENSIVE WAS CARRIED ON BY LOAN AND WAS AIMED AT UTILIZING THE _____ ADMINISTRATION AND POLICE MACHINERY NATIONWIDE TO INSURE A KY VICTORY.

"4. IF KY WERE NOT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO WIN, WHETHER BY PROPER OR IMPROPER MEANS, AND IF HE WERE NOT ON BALANCE THE BEST AVAILABLE CANDIDATE, THROUGH NOT EXACTLY A PRIZE PACKAGE, THE PROBLEM COULD BE VIEWED FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE. HOWEVER, SINCE WE SHALL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO CONTEND WITH HIM AS THE PRESIDENT AND DOMINANT POLITICAL FORCE FOR SOME TIME TO COME, IT IS IN MY JUDGMENT URGENT THAT WE TAKE STEPS TO RESTORE FAITH IN THE FAIRNESS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION AND OF THE HONESTY OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS.

"5. I HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY EXAMINING THE MEANS WHICH MIGHT BE EMPLOYED TO EXERT PRESSURE ON KY TO PUT HIS HOUSE IN ORDER. ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZE THE WEIGHT OF POINTS MADE IN DEPTEL 212155, I NEVERTHELESS FEEL THAT HE MUST BE PERSUADED

attached

PAGE 4 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

THAT LOAN, HOWEVER VALUABLE HE MAY BE TO KY AS THE LATTER'S MOST TRUSTED LIEUTENANT, HAS NOW BECOME A PERNICIOUS FORCE WHOSE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN HIS PRESENT OFFICE NEITHER KY NOR OURSELVES CAN IN OUR OWN BEST INTERESTS CONTINUE TO TOLERATE. I THINK THERE ARE WAYS OF PERSUADING KY OF THIS UNHAPPY FACT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING OUR GOOD RELATIONS WITH HIM PERSONALLY.

"6. IF WE ARE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR LOAN'S REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE, THIS WILL, OF COURSE, PROBABLY BE A TEMPORARY MEASURE AND SHOULD BE MANAGED WITH SUITABLE ATTENTION TO SAVING FACE. SINCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE AND REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY WITHOUT CONTINUING HIS UNDESIRABLE ACTIVITIES, ONE OBVIOUS SOLUTION IS TO ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SENT TO THE UNITED STATES FOR TRAINING, PERHAPS AT ONE OF THE MILITARY STAFF COLLEGES. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE DEPARTMENT COULD LOOK INTO THIS POSSIBILITY.

"7. THE ADVANTAGES WHICH WILL FLOW FROM LOAN'S REMOVAL ARE, OF COURSE, CONSIDERABLE. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THEM IS THAT THE VIETNAMESE WHOSE OPINIONS COUNT WILL

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

PROBABLY, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, INTERPRET HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE SCENE AS AN EARNEST OF THE GOV'S INTENTION TO CONDUCT A FAIR ELECTION. LOAN'S REMOVAL, PRECISELY BECAUSE IT IS RATHER A DRASTIC STEP, IS ONE OF THE FEW MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE SO INTERPRETED. WE ARE ENTITLED TO HOPE THAT A MAJOR SHARE OF THE CREDIT FOR LOAN'S REMOVAL WILL ACCRUE TO KY, WHOSE IMAGE AT THE MOMENT BADLY NEEDS REFURBISHING. A VERY LARGE SHARE OF THE CREDIT IS ALSO CERTAIN TO ACCRUE TO OUR OWN GOVERNMENT, THUS MINIMIZING ANY BASIS FOR CHARGES THAT WE ARE SUPPORTING A CORRUPT REGIME.

"8. OVER AND ABOVE WHAT WE DO ABOUT LOAN, WE NEED TO ACT ENERGETICALLY TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE OF THIS TYPE OF PROBLEM. SINCE THIEU'S ACTIONS HAVE CONTRIBUTED IMPORTANTLY TO CREATING THE PROBLEM IN THE FIRST PLACE, THERE MAY BE MEASURES WHICH WE CAN TAKE TO EXERT BEHIND-THE-SCENES PRESSURE ON THIEU TO WITHDRAW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE. IF SO, WE SHALL REDUCE THE DANGERS TO KY'S CANDIDACY, MAKING IT EASIER FOR HIM TO RUN AN HONEST CAMPAIGN. WE ARE ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING THESE MEASURES [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

"9. THE CORE OF THE PROBLEM WHICH WE FACE, HOWEVER,

PAGE 6 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

REMAINS THAT FACT THAT KY DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE OR POLITICAL WISDOM OF HIS OWN AT THIS POINT TO CONDUCT HIS CAMPAIGN WITHOUT SOUNDER ADVICE THAT HE CAN COMMAND FROM HIS COMPATRIOTS. IT IS THEREFORE INCUMBENT UPON US TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KY IN ORDER TO EXERT ON HIM THE SORT OF CONTINUOUS INFLUENCE WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE THROUGH FORMAL OFFICIAL CONTACTS. [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

"10. THE DISADVANTAGES OF GIVING ANY TYPE OF BACKING TO ANY PARTICULAR CANDIDATE ARE, OF COURSE, NUMEROUS AND WELL KNOWN, AND OUR PUBLIC POLICY OF REMAINING NEUTRAL AS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS CANDIDATES HAS BEEN REITERATED MANY TIMES. [REDACTED]


3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

-4- CIA 7697

PAGE 7 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~



3.4(b)(1)

12.

3.4(b)(1)

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-5- CIA 7697

PAGE 9 RUEPIA 62 ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
"13.

3.4(b)(1)

"14. I THINK YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THIS DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED SITUATION TO SPELL OUT IN COMPLETE DETAIL THE STEPS WHICH WE WOULD TAKE [REDACTED] BUT I CAN ASSURE THAT I WILL FOLLOW AND CONTROL THEM CLOSELY, [REDACTED]

3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] I WOULD HOPE FOR YOUR APPROVAL TO PROCEED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE, SINCE THE PRESENT SITUATION DOES NOT PERMIT OF MUCH DELAY. SIGNED, ELLSWORTH BUNKER."

GP-1
BT

NOTE: HANDLED AS NODIS PER REQUEST CWO.

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM Department of State

212155

2

27-8

ACTION: Anembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

JUN 16 10 28 PM '67

STATE 212155

EXDIS

SUBJECT: Thieu and Ky and Elections

REF: Saigon 28218

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By ~~10~~, NARA, Date 7-8-92

1. Greatly appreciate your thoughtful analysis. We fully agree with your conclusions and rationale in paras 4 and 5 reffed. We agree that Thieu is not likely to withdraw and thus major differences between Thieu and Ky difficult to avoid. While we appreciate that you will continue doing what you can to minimize their differences, we agree that now we should concentrate our efforts on getting the military establishment sterilized to the extent possible from the political process. In addition to pressing Thieu and Ky in this regard, you may also wish to consider getting this message across to all key generals. We found your warnings to Thieu and Ky of potential consequences of disunity to the U.S. position in Viet-Nam particularly pertinent. We have

Classified by /NS:RM/MLL:aoa 6/16/67	Tel. Ext. 4535	Telegraphic transmission and classification approval by: EA - Phillip C. Habib
Clearances EA-Mr. Bundy (substance)		S/S - JP Walsh

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

some reservations about your proposed luncheon for Thieu, Ky and Vien, but of course leave this to your judgment. We wonder whether Thieu would be willing to have confrontation with Ky, especially under American auspices, and whether it would be preferable to see them -- and Vien -- alone.

2. Your proposals for forcing Ky to commit himself to a fair election raise trickier issues. Even though you are apparently persuaded that Ky's current actions have already reached point where they are very rapidly destroying possibility of free elections, we believe we should continue our efforts to persuade him to resist temptation to resort to unfair election measures and to rein in his key organization men, particularly Loan. (In this regard you might point out to Ky the difference between political organization which channels genuine political support and political organization which seeks to control population.) We believe firm reiteration of points you have made to Thieu and Ky in your last conversations is preferable to trying to remove Loan. We have serious doubts that Ky would agree to Loan's removal, even on an extended training visit to the U.S., and that Ky instead would interpret this as a clear U.S. move against him (Ky). Moreover, if Ky is bent on rigging elections, he will find some other trusted organizer

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~~SECRET~~

and we would still have General Tri and other Ministers to ^{curb.}/~~limit~~ We would welcome your judgment as to whether or not Ky is likely to heed our warning and clean up his election operations, because if he does not do so, we may face some difficult decisions ahead.

3. We agree with the thrust of your paras 7 and 8. However, as you suggest, such an effort with the other candidates will depend on whether they are persuaded that Ky is going to permit a reasonably free election. Otherwise, our efforts to encourage a "government of national union" may be interpreted as an effort to get everyone under Ky's control.

4. Your further comments would be welcome.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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Monday, June 19, 1967, 7:20 pm.

28

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Unusual Activity of Crews of Premier Kosygin's Two Soviet Planes: *Further, less exciting report.*

FBI reports that a Pan Am official scheduled a sight-seeing tour this afternoon for the nine man crew of Kosygin's plane. The crew members later told Pan Am they could not go today because of a meeting but agreed to take the trip tomorrow.

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] that this afternoon the two Soviet planes each took on 900 gallons of fuel - one tenth of their fuel capacity. This is said to be usual practice to avoid condensation in the tanks. It is not known how many gallons were in the tanks before the additional fuel was put in this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-249
By SI, NARA, Date 9-19-01

29

Monday, June 19, 1967
7:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Epple's reaction
to your speech.

W. W. Rostow

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



29a
שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

June 19, 1967

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear ~~Mr. Rostow~~: *Walt,*

I hasten to write a few lines to tell you how impressive was the President's address this morning. It was a major statement which eloquently put forward the constructive and forward-looking position which the President takes in the present crisis. Its sharp contrast with Kosygin's truculent outburst a few minutes later must have left an indelible impression in the minds and hearts of all people of good will.

I have in the meantime spoken to my boss in New York. He told me that the President's speech was an excellent one.

Cordially,


Ephraim Evron
Minister

Monday, June 19, 1967 -- 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gene reports Irving Engel thought the speech was "superb."

Abe Feinberg reported to me what he told Marv: It was "wonderful."

And as of tonight the Arabs haven't cut the pipelines or our throats.

In fact, it was great; and, as I well know, it was yours as I've rarely seen a presidential address.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967
6:35 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This strictly military review
by Westy will interest you -- especially
the report on ARVN improvement (p. 3).

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec 3.4(b)
WHISKEY, Feb. 24, 1983
By: *rg*, The SA, Conf. 6-7-91

31a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND
(COMUSMACV, 19985)

SUBJECT: Recent Operations in Vietnam

During the past three weeks, the pace of the conflict in South Vietnam has leveled off compared to that of the previous two months. No new formations were engaged in battle and our forces throughout the country continued to have multiple, sporadic contacts with enemy forces of less than battalion size; the exception to this was an estimated regimental-size force with which contact was made in Quang Tin province during Operation UNION II. During the relatively short period of this operation, May 26 to June 5, 701 enemy were killed.

The enemy is continuing his attempts to launch his summer campaign, although his timetable has been disrupted by search-and-destroy actions of friendly forces. Major enemy forces are still located in and just north of the DMZ. They are in the Khe Sanh area and are using Ashau Valley.

Although set back by the operations of friendly forces in Quang Tri, there is no indication that the enemy has abandoned his plans to campaign in the two northern provinces of the First Corps. Moreover, in the Second Corps there are indications of a southerly movement of enemy units to the west of the First Cavalry Division, in northern Binh Dinh province, with the possible objective of circumventing friendly forces and reasserting some control in the coastal areas. The enemy has been ejected from these areas since last fall by a series of fast-moving, hard-hitting search-and-destroy operations.

Major enemy forces continue to be reported in Cambodia adjacent to Pleiku and Kontum provinces, and they continue their attempts to insert major forces into the western highlands of these provinces with apparent employment in the Kongtum-Dak To areas.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Sec 3.3
DATE 5 1998
By RG NARA Date 6-7-91

In the northern Third Corps and southwestern Second Corps, the newly-formed military region 10 remains active and indications are that the enemy is taking advantage of the poor operation weather to rebuilt his forces and prepare the battlefield for future operations in accordance with his summer campaign plans. These point to War Zone D north of Saigon as an area of major effort.

Throughout the country, harassment and terrorism are being inflicted on both military and civilian personnel. Revolutionary Development cadres are a target for many of the lower-level enemy assaults. Mortar and rocket attacks have continued although at a lesser intensity than during April and May.

There has been no let-up of sustained operations by friendly forces. The lack of publicity-rich actions should in no way be taken as an indication of any decline in the intensity of our operations. Friendly forces in the DMZ area are probing and searching constantly to keep unrelenting pressure on the enemy, ascertain his intentions, and preempt the execution of his plans.

In Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces, operations are pressed against the 2d North Vietnamese Army Division. Task Force OREGON in Quang Ngai province is making considerable progress in securing that important area and in opening Route One. A convoy moved from Quang Ngai to Duc Pho on June 15.

The First Cavalry Division in Operation PERSHING is enlarging its area of operation and inserting forces into areas long unvisited by friendly forces to prevent enemy reentry into the secured areas now recovered from years of Viet Cong control and domination.

In the Western Highlands, the 173d Airborne Brigade has been released to the control of the Commanding General, I Force, to permit greater flexibility in the use of the brigade against the enemy threat in the Kontum area.

Due to the operational weather in the Third Corps, U. S. and free world forces are involved primarily in brigade and battalion-size operations against close-in enemy forces and base areas; they are designed to increase the security of the people, resources, and lines of communications in and around the national priority areas.

However, BILLINGS and AKRON are larger-scale search-and-destroy operations in the Third Corps. For example, the BILLINGS operation is beginning to apply heavy pressure on the enemy along the eastern edge of War Zone D. As of the 17th of June, up to three battalions of the U.S. First Infantry Division were heavily engaged with what appears to be the 271st Viet Cong Regiment. On the 17th alone, BILLINGS killed 196 of the enemy.

The Mobile Riverine Force has begun offensive operations in the river areas of the Third Corps concentrating initially on the Rung Sat Special Zone.

Long-term operations, such as FAIRFAX and ENTERPRISE, continue without pause and are having a salutary effect on the clearing and securing of the environs of Saigon and the area immediately south of the city.

The success of the concentrated aerial attacks north of the DMZ during Operation HICKORY has led to further use of the grand slam technique, and areas immediately north of the DMZ have been identified for attack in this manner, using Navy resources coupled with in-country air against these targets. One such attack took place on June 17. Prairie Fire operations have continued to demonstrate their value in locating lucrative enemy targets, directing air strikes against them, and committing exploitation forces to assist in the destruction of enemy forces and supply bases. Slam Five is in progress now.

The ARVN continues to demonstrate an improved combat effectiveness, particularly in operations such as LAM SON 54 and 63. In Quang Tri province, ARVN forces have shown an ability to react quickly, attack aggressively, and use to best advantage their available combat power in support of ground maneuver units. For example, LAM SON 54 lasted for 10 days and resulted in 392 enemy killed and LAM SON 63 lasted for only 2 days and resulted in 243 enemy killed. Likewise, in Phong Ding province, Operation AN CHI 289 A lasted for 4 days and resulted in 220 enemy killed.

There are no major changes foreseen in the enemy situation in the near future and there are no indications that the enemy will slacken his efforts to launch a summer campaign. Continued contact can be expected in the threatened areas already mentioned and terrorism, harassment, and attempts to disrupt Revolutionary Development and the election program will continue.

In summary, the major hostile threats during the past three weeks continue to be those along the DMZ and the Ashau Valley area in the First Corps and in the Western Highlands of the Kontum and Pleiku provinces in the Second Corps.

Friendly actions during this period were characterized by an intensive series of attacks and medium-scale search-and-destroy operations of which there were 161 battalion size or larger actions with contact and 1025 small unit actions with contact. The total casualty results amounted to 5570 enemy killed as opposed to 1090 friendly killed.

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, June 19, 1967 -- 6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Central Committee contains 192 members, according to Foy Kohler. Reuters says they are going to meet on the Middle East and "internal matters." The latter is a little odd with the head of the government out of the country.

The last time a Central Committee meeting was called with a major figure away was October 1964, when Khrushchev happened to be out of town and they gave him the heave ho.

At the minimum we can expect the Central Committee to go on record in support of the Soviet Middle East position.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State 7-27-78; USC 2-7-80
By ng/ijp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967
5:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Our U. N. -watcher, Nat Davis, reports as follows:

"We have a report that the crew members of one of the two Russian planes in New York have been pulled off a sightseeing tour in order to fuel up their plans.

"We also have press reports that the Central Committee of the Communist Party may meet tomorrow in Moscow. Putting these together, one might speculate that Kosygin is returning for the meeting. "

I'll follow it.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow

34

Monday, June 19, 1967, 12:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

The Japanese are again dragging their heels on food aid in the Kennedy Round -- and the time is getting very short. Bill, Roth, Gene Rostow and I believe we should send the attached urgent message to Prime Minister Sato asking him to take the plunge. Bill Bundy agrees. Japanese participation is critical to getting a grains agreement, and this in turn affects the balance of the entire Kennedy Round.

If possible, we should try to get this off today. (The Japanese negotiator will be leaving Tokyo for Geneva tomorrow, where Roth and the others will have to settle it.)

Francis M. Bator

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
Speak to me _____

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER SATO

34a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Some months ago your Government and mine joined with other nations to meet the threat of famine in India. Together we were able to avoid disaster. The Government of Japan played a most positive and enlightened role in this historic effort.

Now, as you know, our representatives in Geneva are working on a grains agreement that would provide a more dependable mechanism for meeting the urgent food needs of the developing countries while they are taking the steps necessary to increase their own production. Not only would this agreement represent a long step toward the goal of providing reliable and substantial aid to countries in need of food, but it is for the United States an indispensable element in the balance of the entire negotiation.

I understand that Japan alone among the major participants in the negotiations has yet to pledge its quota in grain or cash equivalent. The failure of Japan to contribute to the program could, I fear, cause other countries to reconsider their position, and place the entire agreement in jeopardy. Moreover, it is now clear that none of the other major parties have accepted or will accept the proposed Japanese reservation.

The time is now very short for the further consideration which it was agreed would be given the question of Japanese participation when

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By fw, NARA, Date 28-93

the Kennedy Round agreements were concluded in mid-May. I very much hope that your Government will find it possible to reconsider its position as a matter of urgency. I believe that a strong and active Japanese role is essential to a successful Kennedy Round and to an equitable and effective program to meet the urgent needs of the developing nations.

Accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my warmest personal good wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Monday, June 19, 1967 -- 10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Cy Sulzberger is here.

He recalls that you said you'd like to see him when in town.

He's in town and would like to see you, if possible and convenient.

W. W. Rostow

Have Marv fix it _____

No _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rln

1234567890
11/19/67
The White House
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

36
Pres file

Monday, June 19, 1967
10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

This is a good -- but some-
what out of date (June 13) -- picture
of [REDACTED] mind on the Middle
East.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 99-221
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

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Monday, June 19, 1967 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

I have checked Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, as well as Mac, on the 12:00 o'clock meeting today.

The items are:

- Next move, if any, on Kosygin meeting.
- Kosygin's speech, if then available.
- Possible Arab reactions to your speech of this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
 White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
 By , NARA, Date 6-7-91

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967
10:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

These conversations with
Dobrynin have been reported to you
as they took place; but you may wish
to read the full texts.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

38

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-7-91

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38a
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10593

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 16, 1967

SUBJECT: (Part 1 of 3) Special UNGA

*Rostow
Cy to Bundy*

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador

COPIES TO:
S SECDEF
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By , NARA, Date 9-8-92

After an exchange of pleasantries, the Secretary said that while no decision had been made, the President was rather reluctant to go to New York at a time like this. As it was, half the police force in New York would be engaged in protecting the people who would be coming to the Special Assembly. He mentioned that we were informed that Castro was now coming which did not make the problem easier and there would be a great many other chiefs of state or heads of government there. The Secretary mentioned that in addition to Washington and Camp David, there were such places as Hot Springs, Virginia, and White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.

10534

WH
38b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 16, 1967

SUBJECT: (Part 2 of 3) Middle East Crisis

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador

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- S EUR
- U NEA
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- G INR
- WH CIA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
 By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

The Secretary remarked that we thought we had had a commitment from Israel not to initiate hostilities. The Egyptian Ambassador had told us upon instructions that they would not begin them.

We were wholly uninformed of any Israeli attack. When Dobrynin asked if we had not known about it on the eve of the attack, the Secretary said we had no advance information whatever. He himself had been called about 2:30 in the morning. We had thought we had about another 10 days before Israel would make a judgment on what it would do about the closing of the Strait of Tiran. Asking that the Soviets not pass this on to any other Government, the Secretary said that Robert Anderson had had a long personal talk with Nasser. Although no serious problem had been solved, Nasser had decided to send his Deputy Prime Minister here, and we had thought this would be a very important conversation. The Secretary said that on the Strait of Tiran there was involved not only our general attitude on the innocent passage of international straits, but also the commitment by President Eisenhower in 1957 about the Strait of Tiran, which was in the interest of Egypt. Although Egypt had not formally underwritten this commitment, they were well aware of it.

Nasser had told Anderson that the Egyptians had been surprised both with the speed with which U Thant acted on their request on UNEF and also on his action in withdrawing all of UNEF although it had only been asked to withdraw from certain areas. Sharm al Shaikh had not been included in the areas from which withdrawal was requested, and if U Thant had not acted so precipitously and had at least referred the matter to the Security Council in order to gain time the whole issue of the Strait might not have arisen.

When the Secretary inquired about the atmosphere in Moscow, Dobrynin replied that everyone had lots of work.

The Secretary said he thought he should inform the Ambassador of the strong negative public reaction in this country to the statements that Fedorenko had made in the Security Council debates in New York and particularly to the polemical nature and tone of his remarks. The State Department and the White House had received some 200,000 letters, many of which referred to this aspect. When Dobrynin inquired whether any of this had been on TV, the Secretary replied that almost all of the proceedings had been televised including one session at half past four in the morning.

Dobrynin said that the manner of speaking depended very much on the speaker. While Fedorenko, of course, had his instructions and knew the general line, none of his speeches were written in Moscow.

The Secretary said that the problem was complicated because the big powers could not command or control the small powers in the area. When Dobrynin said they could be influenced, the Secretary replied that we could not command the Israeli, and he doubted whether the Soviets could command Nasser. The Secretary thought that we would have to return to the Security Council at some point.

Dobrynin said that it had made a very bad impression in Moscow that the fighting had continued after the Security Council resolution. While the Soviets had been talking with us on the "Hot Line," they had been directly in touch with their Ambassador in Damascus.

The Secretary said he had sent a strong message to Eban in the middle of the night saying that the fighting simply had to stop. A problem for us had been that the UN observers had been restricted on both sides, as had our military attaches, and it had been difficult for us to get any information.

Dobrynin asked why we opposed Israeli withdrawal. The Secretary asked "withdrawal to what"? Dobrynin replied "to the armistice lines." The Secretary asked whether it was expected that this be done while the Arab States were still in a state of belligerency. The Arabs would not recognize existence of Israel, and when we talked to the Egyptians about the Strait of Tiran they rested their case on still being in a state of war. He thought that withdrawal standing alone did not solve anything. He said it was difficult for us to say to the Arabs that we supported territorial integrity if they won't recognize the existence of Israel. The Arabs take part but not all of our position. Over the years we had in fact acted more often on behalf of the Arabs than Israel, and he mentioned Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, and the events of 1956. He concluded that there must be some recognition of the fact of Israeli statehood.

Dobrynin said that the Soviets would like for all of these countries to have better relations. They had no interest in the continuation of tension in this area.

The Secretary said we hoped there could be some limitation on the arms race in this part of the world. As he had often said, it was only the Soviet Union and the United States who were really interested in applying arms reduction to themselves. We were not the principal arms supplier to that part of the world. We thought it would be constructive to have some understanding on this problem.

Dobrynin said that in the present situation it was, of course, difficult because of recent events.

The Secretary referred briefly to the Israeli attack on our ship, the LIBERTY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10530 (5) WH 38C

Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 9-27-99

DATE: June 16, 1967

SUBJECT: (Part 3 of 3) Viet Nam

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The Secretary
Llewellyn E. Thompson, American Ambassador

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S SECDEF S/AL
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M INR
G CIA
WH S/AH

Dobrynin asked what about Vietnam. The Secretary said we had been curious about an important Hanoi editorial publication in *Hop Tac* about three weeks ago. We were not sure what this indicated. We had nothing through private contacts to indicate any change in the situation since the President's February letter to Ho Chi Min. Our military were expecting a North Vietnamese offensive which appeared to be building up.

Dobrynin remarked that the DRV offer was still outstanding. The Secretary said no one tells us that the North Vietnamese would not attack if we stopped bombing. We could not tell our Marines to wait until the enemy was within a mile or two but that they could not attack them when they were nine miles away. He said we were interested in de-escalation and in either private or public talks. We were not, however, interested in stopping half the war while the other half went on. We had been disappointed in the result of an experiment which we had made in not bombing in a 300 square-mile area around Hanoi. We had made clear to the other side we had not asked for a specific quid pro quo but would be watching for any reaction. When Dobrynin said we had waited a very short time, the Secretary replied that we had waited for four months. When Dobrynin said that within

one month we had backed away from any commitment, the Secretary replied that we could not in this situation make any firm commitment.

Dobrynin said that when Kosygin made his statement in London, it had been a deliberate one and the Soviets had been disappointed that we had not reacted in any really positive sense. The Secretary asked the Ambassador to suppose the talks lasted for two years while only half of the war was stopped and the other half continued. No one had been able to tell us what would happen on the ground if we stopped our bombing.

Dobrynin said the Soviets were very much concerned at the attack on the "Turkestan." This had made a bad impression on the whole country. The ship was now in Vladivostok. The Soviets now know for certain that the sailor had not been killed by fragments from anti-aircraft shells but from American weapons. In fact, they had one of the 20mm cannon shells which had not exploded, and it was possible that Gromyko would bring it to New York. He thought it was the type which we called Vulcan but he was not sure of the name.

The Secretary said our forces were under the most stringent orders not to fire on Soviet ships. We had looked at the films from the gun cameras and there was no indication that they had attacked the ship. Dobrynin asked if the cameras acted on each shot. The Secretary replied that he thought they did, but he was not certain. He understood the ship was 400 yards offshore. He said we would, of course, look into the matter again. Dobrynin said it was of the greatest importance that there be no repetition and the Secretary fully agreed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, June 19, 1967
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Charlie Schultze relates certain pending loan decisions to our FY 1968 AID position on the Hill.

For your convenience, I attach the memos on India and Afghanistan from my "See Me" folder.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MS, NARA, Date 6-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

39a

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-27

By fw, NARA, Date 2-8-93

June 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: AID New Commitments in FY 1967

There are three AID loans now pending your approval:

India Program Loan	\$50 million
Afghanistan Kajakai Power	13 million
Afghanistan Helmand Valley	<u>4 million</u>
	\$67 million

Also, for your information, seven other loans are in the final review process and should reach you in the next two weeks:

Congo Program Loan	\$17 million
Pakistan Irrigation	11 million
Pakistan Locomotives	17 million
Turkey Steel Mill (Eregli)	22 million
Chile Education	10 million
Central American Bank	20 million
Uruguay Program Loan	<u>15 million</u>
	\$112 million

If you approve these loans, AID probably will be able to obligate all available FY 1967 development loan funds. Failure to obligate all of this year's loan money will substantially damage AID's posture in 1968 appropriations.

- Passman deducts unobligated funds from the next year's budget
- In 1967 Congress appropriated \$500 million for loans compared to our \$665 request. For 1968 we are asking \$774 million
- If we don't even obligate this year's \$500, our 1968 request will be seriously in trouble.

Much depends on how we handle the \$50 million Indian program loan. One way to avoid having a \$50 million unobligated balance would be to approve Gaud's request to authorize the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

Indian loan, for the purpose of obligating the funds, but hold up negotiation of the agreement with the Indians until the World Bank completes its negotiations with the Germans to make up the required total aid package.

If you plan to hold the India or Afghanistan loans beyond June 30, it would be helpful to inform Gaud now so that he could obligate funds for some other projects. However, a sizeable carryover would still result.

Gaud and Katzenbach support the suggested approach on the Indian loan. Nick may also want to discuss the general problem with you.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Authorize Indian loan, but hold agreement subject to satisfactory World Bank negotiations on other donor aid _____

Take no action on Indian loan _____

Approve Afghan loans _____

Defer Afghan loans _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

396

35

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 1, 1967
4:08 p. m.

Mr. President:

I do not wish to move the
CARE program and the program
loan without your assent.

Walt
W. W. Rostow

*See me when we
can*
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
C

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 6-10-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

34

CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Indian Aid Requests

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

As I wired you Saturday, the Indian Government via B. K. Nehru's firm promise has agreed to place 50% of its remaining commercial grain orders in the U. S. this year. On the strength of your Monday approval, we have let the Indians begin buying against their next PL 480 agreement on a reimbursable basis. But the following Indian aid decisions still await your approval:

1. Release 1.5 million tons of wheat and sorghum (\$100 million) plus some vegetable oil (\$12 million) as recommended by the Freeman-Gaud memo of 10 May (Tab I-A). Our consortium effort has so far produced firm matching for \$97.6 million, so the 1.5 million tons have been evenly matched under the terms of your February message to Congress. We stand a good chance of matching the whole \$190 million when George Woods completes his debt relief exercise next month, but the famine is reaching its peak, and the pipeline is thinning out. Moving this half of our offer now would keep the Indian ports full as well as help our own market situations

under conditions set by the President.

Release now _____ See me _____

2. A \$50-million famine relief program for Bihar state, where the famine is worst. This is mainly to broaden the CARE program you launched in your food message to provide nutritional supplement to about half the children and mothers with babies. But we would also tell the Indians this would more than compensate them for the freight differential (\$2 - 3 million) on their extra commercial purchases here (Tab II)

Approve _____ See me _____

3. A \$50-million program loan from FY 1967 money recommended in Bill Gaud's memo of 4 May (Tab I-B). This is the first slice of our non-project loan to support this year's consortium effort to bolster quickly India's exchange reserves and to keep the Indians on the imports liberalization route.

Approve _____ See me _____

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 10, 1967

SUBJECT: Next Step on Indian Food

We can now consider releasing some of the 3 million tons offered in your food message and endorsed by the Joint Congressional Resolution. The Consortium has accepted food aid as an integral part of its work and has incorporated food targets in its overall economic goals. We have firm matching food-related aid for \$97.6 million—about half of the \$190 million target. Therefore, Secretary Freeman and Bill Gaud recommend (Tab A) releasing 1.5 million tons costing about \$100 million (375,000 tons of that in sorghum) plus \$12 million in vegetable oil.

Our main debate has been over whether to release all three million tons now. Secretary Freeman earlier recommended (Tab C) that we go ahead with the whole amount in order to boost our domestic market and take some of the steam out of farmers' criticism that the Administration deliberately increased wheat acreage last year to drive prices down. The fact is that excellent crops in Canada and elsewhere have undercut prices, but Freeman has had a hard time selling that to the farmers. However, he agrees that we should go with only half that amount now provided we release the rest early this summer.

We have good prospect of getting pretty firm matching aid for the rest of the 3 million tons by the end of June. Because food is not available for this purpose, we have devised new ways of breaking loose special financial aid that the Indians can use in buying food. These are frankly pioneering ventures in the Consortium, and we can measure their success only by seeing whether they actually make it possible for India to buy additional food. We understand that the Indians are already placing orders for 745,000 tons of grain and plan to spend another \$50 million as soon as some of this financial aid is firm. But we will have a clearer idea when the Consortium working group meets again in June to pin down final arrangements for debt relief and for freeing other pledged money for food purchases. (with whom?)

I know this second half of our matching effort may look a bit fuzzy to you at this stage. However, after reviewing the figures (see Schultze's memo attached), I regard it as an honest effort to achieve matching aid that is truly additional to regular economic aid. We're still in mid-stream, so I would not mislead you by saying that our job is done. But this is a sound effort in which I think you can have faith.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

Authority: State Ltr 313-78, NSC 11-30-78

By: rg/yp, NARA, Date: 6-12-91

42

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, June 19, 1967
9:10 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the dally summary of Soviet Arms Shipments to the Middle East. Except for the marked first 2 paragraphs, the balance of the paper is only marginally different from the report on cumulative Soviet arms deliveries sent to you on the wire yesterday at Camp David.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 72-26
By cb, NARA, Date 8-31-95

Cy 13
18 June 1967
SC No. 01419/67

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

June 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Mrs. Gandhi's letter of June 9

Attached is Secretary Rusk's proposed reply to Mrs. Gandhi's letter and a covering memorandum which summarizes his views on why we should send such a moderate though critical letter.

He also recommends sending George Allen to talk with her (to tell her the facts of our own political life and to explore ways of moderating their position at the UN and with the UAR).

His memorandum covers the situation well. The draft letter looks all right to me. And the idea of an emissary is a good one. But if you only want to send the letter, it could stand alone, and we could simply drop the last paragraph.

There is some urgency in sending off this message, for if it gets to Delhi in time, it may help to moderate Foreign Minister Chagla's position at the UN.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1988
By *kg*, NARA, Date *6-11-91*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

42a
June 18, 1967

10168

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Indian Position on the Middle East
Crisis

On June 9, 1967, Prime Minister Gandhi sent you a message setting forth her views on the crisis and calling on the United States to help lay a sound foundation for peace in the area. Essentially, her message re-endorsed the position India has taken at the Security Council in support of the Arabs in their conflict with Israel.

The Indian position has been unhelpful but it is not unexpected. In supporting the Arabs, the GOI is reiterating positions it has maintained since 1947. At present Mrs. Gandhi says her government does not want to see Israel destroyed, but it does insist on Israel's withdrawal from Arab territory to precede rather than be part of a settlement.

Our impression is that Mrs. Gandhi is influenced by out-dated concepts of where India's interests lie. Many Indians seem to agree and there is strong criticism within India of the GOI's one-sided Middle East policy. We would do a dis-service to these forces if we publicly pressed India's leaders in a way that simply led them to harden their view.

The question we face is how to deal with the Indians and how to use their entree in Cairo and other Arab capitals to more positive purposes in the difficult negotiations and discussions ahead. We need to open a dialogue with them and turn it into a more constructive direction.

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Ex 10-10-78

By rglip, NARA, Date 6-11-91

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

Although I can find no grounds whatsoever for sympathizing with the way the Indians have handled themselves in the present crisis, I believe a sharp approach at this stage would not be in our interests. I recommend a letter from you to Mrs. Gandhi which would outline clearly, but in a restrained way, our views and which, secondly, would propose to send to New Delhi a person designated to speak for us on the crisis.

The emissary should focus on the Middle East crisis and explain the policies we have followed in the area. He would seek to identify common ground in our respective positions and to isolate differences. He would explore possible areas for collaboration between our two governments at the UN and elsewhere and he would clarify what role the GOI might play in our mutual objectives, given its special relationships with the area. To the extent possible, he would encourage the Indians to analyze in some detail the implications of the Suez Canal closure in particular and the level of stability in the Middle East in general for India's future welfare.

My suggestions as to the emissary in order of preference are: John Badeau, Former Ambassador to Cairo; Raymond A. Hare, Former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Cairo; and George V. Allen, Former Assistant Secretary of State and * Ambassador to India. All three are well informed on the politics of the area and on our objectives, experienced in negotiating, and respected by the Indians.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested reply to Prime Minister Gandhi

~~SECRET~~

** my preference. He could also visit Iran; the Shah wants such a visitor and Allen was also amb. to Iran*

DR

~~SECRET~~

426

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Dear Mrs. Gandhi:

The past three weeks have been exceptionally difficult for all of us who are working to preserve peace and the prospect of progress in the world. With an effective cease-fire in the Middle East, the immediate problem has been surmounted and the first essential step toward a peaceful resolution of many fundamental questions has been taken.

I am aware that your and our governments have different approaches to the present situation in the Middle East. I will be glad to see our two governments consult in greater depth and detail in order to discover the extent of possible agreement and the extent of our differences.

We are in full agreement, I believe, on certain fundamentals: further hostilities must be prevented, each of the states of the area has a right to continue to exist, the Suez Canal should be kept open to international commerce. Other problems must also be dealt with, and on some of these we may differ, but the crucial issue, on which we should be able to agree, is that Israel's right to exist must be

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Dec 10-10-78

By 186j, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~SECRET~~

-2-

accepted by her Arab neighbors. A simple return to the status quo ante is no solution; it would merely perpetuate a state of belligerency which is directly contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. Obviously, if the Arabs attempt to rely upon belligerent rights arising from a "state of war" with Israel, Israel will do the same. We see no peace in that direction.

Tensions have been rising in the Middle East over the past year, a year punctuated by repeated raids into Israel from Arab countries and counteraction by Israel. Syrian raids were particularly troublesome and kept the Israel-Syrian frontier in a high state of tension. And some Syrian raiders used Jordan as their point of entry. I do not — and did not at the time — condone Israel's counteraction at El Samu last winter. The position we took during Security Council consideration of that incident and our assistance rushed to the aid of Jordan should have made that clear enough. But the present situation cannot be understood without recalling repeated terrorist penetrations of Israel from the Arab side.

For better or worse, last week's war shattered the uneasy half truce of the past decade; now it is up to the nations of the area — as well as all peaceful nations — to replace it with something better.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

I recognize the fact of your government's policy of maintaining a close relation with Cairo. Particularly at present, we need the help of friendly governments that can communicate effectively with both Cairo and Washington. The Soviet Union has demonstrated a selfish and, I believe, destructive and short-sighted interest in the polarization of the Arab-Israeli conflict into an issue between it and the United States. But it is very much against the interests of both my country and the Arab nations -- and yours as well, I should think -- that such polarization occur. In this context, I consider President Nasser's recent steps to destroy his country's relations with mine to be utterly self-defeating acts. But I am prepared to be patient, in the hope that he will recognize the consequences of his ill-considered action and, encouraged by friendly governments like yours, take steps to reverse the recent trend. Meanwhile, I would hope that your government will do whatever it can, within the United Nations and elsewhere, to bring about that change in attitudes that will make possible the establishment of a stable and just peace in the area.

The renewed interest of the Communist Chinese to take a one-sided position against Israel and to inject themselves into the matter is another troublesome development.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

I recall that in some of our earlier correspondence we have agreed on the importance of understanding each other as completely as possible. It is of particular importance today that we understand each other's respective views on the Middle East, where so much is at stake. I propose, therefore, sending to New Delhi Mr. _____ to undertake an exchange of views with you and your colleagues.

Mr. _____ is thoroughly versed in United States views and policies on the Middle East, and he has my complete confidence. He will explain the policies we have followed in that area. He will seek to identify with you common ground in our respective positions and to isolate differences. I would hope also that he could explore possible areas for collaboration between our two governments at the United Nations and elsewhere.

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~



भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 9, 1967.

DECLASSIFIED NLG 99-306
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JW/jio, NARA, Date 2-07-00

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you the following message from the Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, which has just been received by this Embassy telegraphically :-

"My colleagues in the Government of India and I have watched with growing anxiety and concern the recent turn of the events in West Asia. Situated as we are geographically, the conflict in West Asia affects our vital interests in many ways. Consequently, the maintenance of peace in this entire region is of paramount importance to us.

From the first signs of the gathering war clouds, we made strenuous efforts in the Security Council to prevent an aggravation of the situation. In our judgment, U Thant's efforts and the recommendations he made in his report provided a reasonable basis for action by the Security Council. Subsequent events, however, rendered these efforts nugatory.

With the outbreak of actual fighting, one could only strive for the earliest possible quenching of the flames of war. We felt that it was just and proper not only that there should be a ceasefire, but that the status quo prevailing immediately prior to the

outbreak .. (2)

outbreak of war should be restored. I am sure you will agree that no one should be allowed to retain what is acquired by war. The linking of the ceasefire with the withdrawal of all armed forces would be in accord with the principles which the Security Council had evolved in the past. I hope that the sincerity of our purpose will be understood.

While we are naturally relieved that cessation of hostilities would take place, we still remain deeply concerned about the prospects of a just and durable peace in West Asia. Naturally, the United States as a great power and you, as its wise and far-seeing leader, have a great contribution to make in laying a sound foundation for peace in this area. It is our firm belief that such a foundation would be weak and unstable unless it is held together by the aspirations, the faith and hopes of the millions who live in West Asia. We in India are deeply interested in this as we cannot remain unaffected by the instability, turmoil, conflicts and wars in the area.

Indira Gandhi."

With my highest regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,



(B.K. Nehru)
Ambassador of India

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the United States,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Monday, June 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ambassador Lodge has sent word that he has arranged, at your request, to pay a visit to General Eisenhower. An appointment has been set for Thursday, June 29, at Gettysburg.

Ambassador Lodge would like to have a helicopter for transportation to and from Gettysburg.* If you approve, I will pass the word to Colonel Cross.

Yes _____ No _____ See me _____

Should you also wish me to talk with Ambassador Lodge before he meets General Eisenhower, I will do so.

W. W. Rostow

**Lodge says you said chopper would be o.k. for such occasions.
W*

cc: Col. Cross

Pres file

Monday, June 19, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Special Fund Support for Philippine National Cultural Center

The State Department (see attached memo from Secretary Rusk) recommends that you authorize the commitment of \$3.5 million from the Special Fund for Education in support of the Philippine National Cultural Center.

The money would be placed in a trust fund. The interest would finance programs and operations of the Center. You will recall President Marcos expressed his hope that support for the Center would be forthcoming. Mrs. Marcos has a deep personal interest in the Center.

The Special Fund for Education, established in 1963, has an uncommitted balance of about \$15 million. Use of the Fund is jointly determined by the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines.

The Treasury Department and Bureau of the Budget approve this proposal. Congressman Zablocki, author of Special Fund legislation, is satisfied. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been informed and raised no objections.

I believe it would be useful to go forward on this project. I also agree with State's suggestion that, if you approve the project, it be mentioned in your proposed letter to President Marcos. On the latter, the Congressional consultation you asked for, should be completed in the next day or two.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Cultural Center project approved _____

Disapproved _____

Include reference to project in letter to President Marcos _____

See me _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



10420

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1967

44a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Philippine Special Fund for Education:
Cultural Development Fund Project

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize a project agreement with the Philippine Government for the expenditure of approximately \$3.5 million from the Special Fund for Education (PL 88-94) in support of the Cultural Development Fund of the Philippine National Cultural Center.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That language to this effect be included in the draft letter to President Marcos which you recently approved.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Special Fund for Education, the uncommitted balance of which is now about \$15 million, held in the Philippine Education Program account of the U. S. Treasury, was established by a 1963 amendment to Philippine War Damage Legislation of 1962. The

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Exempted from automatic decontrol.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

Fund is to be used as jointly determined by the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines to further educational programs to the mutual advantage of both countries.

On March 22, 1967 you approved Special Fund support for the classroom construction and textbook production proposals submitted by the Philippine Government. Agreement on the classroom proposal was reached in an exchange of notes on May 17, 1967. The proposal for textbook production is in final stages of negotiation.

President Marcos raised the question of Special Fund support for the National Cultural Center, a project of close personal interest to Mrs. Marcos, during his September 1966 State Visit. At that time he was orally assured of U. S. willingness to see the Center supported by the Special Fund in some manner. We received the detailed Philippine proposal for the Cultural Development Fund on February 24, 1967. We have considered the proposal carefully and believe it fully meets the criteria for support under Special Fund auspices and fulfills the requirements of the 1963 legislation.

The proposal is for a \$3.5 million contribution to a trust fund the interest of which would finance the programs and operations of the Philippine National Cultural Center. This proposal meets with the approval of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget Staff. Congressman Zablocki, author of the Special Fund legislation, has expressed his satisfaction with the project. We have also touched base with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on our plans to move ahead on the Cultural Development Fund project.

The Philippine Government is particularly anxious to obtain early agreement on the project. On March 3, President

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3

Marcos personally stressed to Assistant Secretary Bundy his high priority for the Cultural Development Fund proposal.

We believe that it would now be wise to include this firm decision--if you approve--in your letter to President Marcos. Ambassador Blair would work out the timing of an announcement.

In negotiating an agreement on this project, it is our intention to discuss with the Philippine Government appropriate ways of identifying the Cultural Development Fund as a project jointly approved by the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines for financing from the Special Fund for Education.

Enclosed is a memorandum containing further details on the Cultural Development Fund project.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Background Memorandum

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Message to be delivered to

The Right Honorable Harold E. Holt, Prime Minister of Australia
and Mrs. Holt

(on their departure from Los Angeles)

Dear Harold and Zara:

It was a comfort and a delight as always to share your company,
your ideas, and your thoughtful advice these last few days at Camp David.

These are trying and testing times for us all. I feel better and stronger,
as we face our common trials and the problems of our troubled world,
knowing that we understand each other and that we and our peoples are
tied together by a friendship and a confidence that will not be severed.

Lady Bird has asked again that I express her deep regret at not
being able to be with us, but we know that you grandparents understand,
and by the way, please give a hug for me to my friend Christopher.

We wish you a pleasant journey across the wide Pacific to your
precious homeland. I know that Ed and Ann Clark--than whom there
are no better--will help to make it so. We would welcome an early
reunion with you both, and I guess our Pacific meeting--such as Manila--
will be coming up before long.

Do give me your thoughts and judgements on VietNam.

With genuine friendship,

Lyndon B. Johnson

P. S.

Our Mary is already planning another church service for your

6/19/67
as amended &
approved by the
President.
Sent LDK to
S/S, State,
for dispatch.

talented and exciting, press secretary, the charming Mr. Eggleton,
even though she realizes as you reported yesterday that there is no
doubt a warm feminine welcome awaiting his return down under.

LBJ:mf
6-19-67
11:30a

46

Pres file

Monday, June 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Prime Minister and Mrs. Holt

Attached, per your request, is a proposed message to Prime Minister Holt and to Mrs. Holt for delivery on their departure from Los Angeles.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Message approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

4/6/68

Message to be delivered to

The Right Honorable Harold E. Holt, Prime Minister of Australia
and Mrs. Holt

(on their departure from Los Angeles)

Dear Harold and Zara:

It was a deep pleasure as always to share your company, your ideas, and your thoughtful advice. These are trying and testing times for us all. I take renewed courage, as we face our common problems and the problems of our troubled world, in the knowledge that we understand each other and that we and our peoples share bonds of friendship and confidence that will not be severed.

Lady Bird has asked again that I express her deep regret at not being able to be with us, but we know that you understand.

We wish you a pleasant journey across the wide Pacific to your precious homeland. I am sure that Ed and Ann Clark will help to make it so. We look forward to an early reunion with you both.

Lyndon B. Johnson

June 19, 1967

47

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Preliminary Report on Precedents for Arms Registration Proposal

Pending a fuller report tomorrow, a hasty search of the State Department files reveals two instances when other nations proposed the registration and publication of arms sales and shipments:

1. A proposal made in the League of Nations disarmament conference which was not adopted. Details are being researched.

2. A proposal made in 1965 by the Government of Malta called for the registration and publication by the UN of all sales and shipments of armaments from one state to another. Application was to be global. The proposal was defeated in the UN General Assembly. The United States abstained because the plan covered all states but the US Representative stated that the proposal might be acceptable if it applied to specific regions.

A full account of the specifics of both proposals will be sent to you tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

Pres file

1967 JUN 18 21 13

57 JUN 18 PM 5:20

SUNDAY

VZCZCEAA456
OO WTE5
DE WTE 1205

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67552

~~SECRET~~

HERE'S A MOSLEM WITH A LEVEL HEAD--FROM DJAKARTA.
DJAKARTA 6175

1. MALIK, WHO IS LEAVING EARLY JUNE 19 FOR NEW YORK, CALLED ME IN TODAY TO DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER MATTERS.
2. HE FAVORS FOLLOWING POSITION IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: (A) RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL WITHIN BOUNDRIES BEFORE RECENT CONFLICT (WITH ALLOWANCE FOR POSSIBLE SLIGHT ADJUSTMENTS), (B) ISRAEL'S RIGHTS TO TRANSIT TIRAN STRAITS AND SUEZ CANAL, (C) INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSLALEM, (D) GENEROUS ISRAELI CONTRIBUTION TO RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES, (E) STATIONING OF UN FORCES IN KEY TROUBLE SPOTS. RE LATTER POINT, MALIK HAS SAID TO ME ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS THAT INDONESIA WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE CONTRIBUTION.
3. MALIK WISHES TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH USUN AND BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE IN PROMOTING A LASTING FORMULA FOR PEACE, WHICH IN HIS OPINION MUST INCLUDE ARAB ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S REALITY AND ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ESSENTIALLY SAME TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES AS BEFORE RECENT HOSTILITIES.
4. MALIM EXPECTS TO REMAIN IN NEW YORK ONLY ABOUT ONE WEEK.

GREEN

DTG: 182043Z JUN 67

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 17, 1967
6:55 p.m.

~~1. send~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

As instructed, herewith an immediate acknowledgment to Bill Fulbright. Sec. Rusk has the letter in hand, for consideration.

W. W. Rostow

letter to Fulbright
not sent - ^{Pres} telephoned
Fulbright

50a

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of June 17 with its
constructive suggestions.

I shall be studying it and discussing it with
Secretary Rusk.

Many thanks, as always, for your thoughts.

Sincerely,

Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rln

J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

June 17, 1967

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
ARTHUR M. KUHL, CHIEF CLERK

50b

6-17-67
3:25 PM

3:45 PM
w TO Pres

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I write to express my satisfaction with reports that you are likely to confer with Premier Kosygin while he is in the United States. Whatever the immediate motives for his trip to the United States -- policy, propaganda or both -- the Premier's presence in the United States seems to me to provide an important and unusual opportunity. A personal meeting between you and Premier Kosygin will, at the very least, permit you to explore the possibility of a stable and equitable settlement in the Middle East.

Should it appear to you that Premier Kosygin is disposed to cooperate with the United States in matters relating to the Middle East, an atmosphere might be created in which you would also find it possible to talk with him candidly about Vietnam. The thought occurs to me that the key to winning Premier Kosygin's cooperation in this matter may well lie in what you could tell him about the terms of a peace settlement which the United States would find acceptable rather than in the preconditions for entering negotiations. It might just be that the latter would turn out to be more tractable than it has been in the past if each side could be given some idea of the terms of peace which the other would find acceptable.

Most important of all, a meeting would give you the opportunity to make a personal appraisal of Premier Kosygin and, on the basis of that, a broader assessment of the possibility of some fundamental changes in our relations

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
with the Soviet Union. Underlying the issues that often divide but occasionally unite our two countries are the fundamental attitudes, mostly but not entirely unfavorable, which we hold toward each other. The matter cannot of course be prejudged, but it seems possible that Soviet policy has become in recent years sufficiently prudent and responsible to permit of a fundamental reassessment of attitudes and, on the basis thereof, to broaden the area of our common interest in avoiding nuclear war and, more specifically, in preventing irresponsible third parties from setting us against each other.

Through your policy of "building bridges" you have already had success in altering the ideological animosities that have bred in the minds of people on both sides the idea that what is bad for one of the two great powers is good for the other. I believe we have reached the time when further progress can be made toward encouraging more positive attitudes on both sides, attitudes which might give rise to a general expectation on the part of each of the two great powers that cooperation with the other is not only desirable but possible. Should it be possible to develop such expectations, some of the specific problems that now seem insoluble might become more tractable. My basic point is that new attitudes can give rise to opportunities whose exact nature cannot now be foreseen.

I believe that a personal meeting between you and Premier Kosygin might facilitate progress in all of these areas -- in matters relating to the Middle East and to Vietnam, and in the more general area of Soviet and American attitudes toward each other.

With every good wish,

Sincerely yours,



J. W. Fulbright
Chairman

B. I appreciate very much your letter of the 14th and so does Brito. we enjoyed the visit

51

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 17, 1967 -- 5:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's statement of the consensus which emerged from the meeting this afternoon.

The only question you have to decide immediately is the fairly non-committal message as suggested in paragraph (g), for Tommy to give to Dobrynin in New York.

Also enclosed are Averell's notes on your talking with Kosygin.

Harry McPherson will be sending to you on the wire a draft speech which he will put together by about 9:00 p. m. tonight. He will also give copies to Mac and to me. Your boys will be available tomorrow to work on it under your instruction.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 6-10-91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

By ju, NARA, Date 9-27-99

June 17, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ~~THE~~ SECRETARY

1. The following is Ambassador Thompson's memorandum of the message from Ambassador Dobrynin:

"Ambassador Dobrynin telephoned me from New York to say that Mr. Kosygin wished to thank him very much for the message from the President which I had transmitted to Dobrynin. The Chairman appreciated the invitation to visit the United States. Unfortunately, he was very busy and would not have time now to visit the United States. The Chairman did not plan to visit Washington. If the President wishes or has some plans to be in New York, Mr. Kosygin will be ready to meet him in New York at any time or place convenient to the President.

"Dobrynin went on to add personally that this meant any place in or near New York but not any place far away from New York."

2. We are now revising the **speech which** you would make at the State Department at 9:30 on Monday morning **to** include the other subjects along the lines of your suggestions. We **hope** the next draft can be in your hands later this evening.

3. The most serious question for you to consider is what to do about a meeting with Kosygin. McNamara, Katzenbach, Vance, Bundy, Rostow, Thompson and McPherson and I discussed this question this afternoon. Our views may be summarized as follows:

no

(a) There is/need for you to rush up to New York to see Kosygin before his speech to the General Assembly. If the two of you meet before his speech, he might even be under pressure to be tougher in the General Assembly than he might otherwise — to avoid the impression among the Arabs or the Chinese that he was in some personal collusion with you. In any event, a tough speech by him after a meeting with you would make it appear that you had "failed" in your private talk with him.

(b) We do believe, pending some **change** in the situation, that there would be enormous political **loss** to you if Kosygin were to go home without a conversation **between the** two of you. We could

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

not rely wholly upon his refusal to come to Washington since he has indicated that he would see you in New York. You should bear in mind that his theory that he is visiting the United Nations and not the United States. It just happens that the United Nations is in the United States. You have said on other occasions that you would "go anywhere, see anybody" in the interest of peace. If it became generally known (as it would from the Russians) that you had refused to see Kosygin in New York, we believe that you would be under very severe domestic criticism — quite apart from international public opinion.

(c) There will be intense press interest in the question of whether the two of you will meet until the point is clarified. The Russians may do some leaking on their own. It is not clear, therefore, that the question can be held over until, say, next weekend.

(d) I would recommend that, in any event, Ambassador Thompson proceed to New York on Sunday and have a long talk with Dobrynin. Then, I would go on to New York on Tuesday and have a talk with Gromyko.

(e) The group named above would recommend that you decide now that you will see Kosygin before his departure even if it means your going to the New York area. If you do that, you can also see Krag, Wilson and one or two other Heads of Government who might be in New York at the same time. There would be considerable advantage in letting it be known early that you expect to see Kosygin in order to avoid a churning press. If you agree with us that it is important to see him before he leaves the United States, it would be better to make the arrangement early rather than appear to be submitting to UN, US or Congressional pressures.

(f) You need not go into New York City to see Kosygin; arrangements could be made to meet him at an estate on Long Island or in Westchester County. None of us thinks that your going to New York to see Kosygin would require you to appear in the General Assembly. You always have the option of appearing in the General Assembly if the course of Assembly discussion leads you to believe you would like to do so.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

-3-

(g) If you do not wish to make a final decision before you hear Kosygin's opening speech on Monday morning, Llewellyn Thompson could go back to Dobrynin with a message substantially as follows:

"The President regrets that Mr. Kosygin feels unable to visit Washington. The President will study his own schedule about other possibilities and will be pleased to know what Mr. Kosygin's own schedule is if that is now known. "

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

2349
Copy for Walt Rostow
from Walt
516

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Kosygin Talks on
Vietnam Settlement

Background:

Your meeting with Kosygin offers a unique opportunity for progress towards negotiations for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Direct or indirect cooperation of the Soviets is, I believe, essential to get talks going.

There is undoubtedly a difference of opinion within the Kremlin on this question, as is always the case on important matters. During the war, I knew that this was true even in Stalin's Politburo, at least until he made the decision.

From my talks with Kosygin two years ago and his actions in London last February, it is clear that Kosygin believes Soviet interests are best served by the ending of hostilities in Vietnam. However, of first importance in Soviet foreign policy is their conflict with Peking, and Moscow will not be anxious to get out in front and give credence to the accusation that they are conniving with the United States. In addition, Kosygin still smart's under what he considers a deliberate personal affront because bombing commenced during his visit to Hanoi.

Recommended Action:

Under all these circumstances, I believe that to achieve positive results from your discussion with Kosygin it is important that you make some unilateral gesture. I therefore recommend that you inform him that you have decided to de-escalate the bombing, perhaps in accordance with the 20th Parallel proposal, without any commitment as to the length of time this restraint would hold. You might suggest that you are not going to make this decision public, but that he is free to inform Hanoi if he wishes. This gesture on your part would unquestionably improve

Kosygin's

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Authority NLG 83-19
By sg/jcs, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

2

Kosygin's position with his colleagues, and perhaps make it possible for him to carry on an exploratory discussion with you in an objective manner on what each side might do to encourage a de-escalation of the fighting and a commencement of discussions.

Comment:

Although Kosygin is a devoted Communist, his first concern is solving in a pragmatic way their internal economic problems. I believe you will find him interested in further progress in the control of nuclear weapons and curtailment of military expenditures if Vietnam can be gotten out of the way.

I would not be discouraged if little progress can be made on fundamental agreements on the Middle East. This is an area in which the Soviets have attempted to expand their influence at our expense for the last dozen years with the expenditure of billions of dollars in military and economic aid. Nevertheless, I would not rule out progress on what Dobrynin in his talk with Dean called the Number One subject, namely, Vietnam.

W. Averell Harriman

TOP SECRET

52

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 17, 1967 -- 10:15 am

Mr. President:

Herewith observations by Tommy Thompson and Brzezinski on a possible meeting with Kosygin.

With respect to Brzezinski's point, the third of the three points you gave me on the telephone yesterday seems just right; namely, that we welcome the Soviet Union as the other "older child" in the family of nations and look to the Soviet Union as a partner in setting a framework which will avoid hostility between ourselves and by the other members of the family.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

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Authority State 7-27-78, NSC 2 7-80
By ry/ijp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

52a

MEMORANDUM

June 16, 1967

SUBJECT: Kosygin's Mood and Perspective

In the event the President meets with Prime Minister Kosygin, some consideration should also be given to Kosygin's mood and perspective on US policy. It is quite likely that Kosygin will be influenced by:

a. A sense of humiliation and frustration, brought on by recent events in the Middle East as well as by Soviet inability to deter the United States from bombing North Vietnam.

b. A strong suspicion that the Soviet Union is facing "a general offensive by the forces of imperialism". The Communist mind likes to reason in patterns and to detect broad trends. Accordingly, ~~the Soviets are inclined to see a connection between events in Brazil, Ghana, Indonesia, Congo, the Dominican Republic, and Greece. To them, the recent hostilities in the Middle East were part of this general effort to install pro-US regimes--thus to topple Nasser and the pro-Soviet Syrian Government, with Israel acting as a front for the US.~~

~~Given that, it is rather important that Kosygin emerge from any eventual meeting with the President disabused of the notion that the United States is out to humiliate the Soviet Union and is currently engaged in a broad political offensive directed against it. Some gesture may be in order. Kosygin should be made to feel that the President remains determined to pursue a policy of reconciliation, along the lines outlined in his speech of October 7th.~~

At the same time, it is also important that Kosygin does not leave with the erroneous impression--which apparently Khrushchev took home with him from the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy--that a policy of bluff and bluster will get the Soviet Union anywhere. He is not likely to do so if in the course of the conversations the essential US interests either in the Middle East or in Vietnam--interests which we cannot afford to compromise--are concretely and specifically spelled out to him. This would not only help to allay his ideologically-rooted suspicions; it would appeal both to his Russian common sense and to his communist sensitivity to realities of power.

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Zbigniew Brzezinski

Authority 70989-136

By ref/imp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 9-2-99

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1967


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT W. ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

We do not know for sure what Prime Minister Kosygin's position is on major Soviet policies. He is, of course, a convinced and hard-boiled Communist. On the other hand, his behavior during his visit to London and his strong interest in dealing with the Soviet Union's internal problems as well as what appears to be a superior intellect and capability compared to his colleagues gives some grounds for believing that if there is in fact, as I believe, a split Politburo, it is likely that Kosygin would be more inclined than his principal rivals to support policies which would be in our interest. There are indications that he stuck his neck out in London, and it is difficult to see how he could achieve any great success at the Special Assembly. His taking this on is probably a gamble on his part that shows considerable courage.

If the President does see Kosygin and if we are contemplating some change in our bombing policy in North Vietnam, it would be much to our interest, in my view, that we handle it during the President's talk with Kosygin as this would greatly assist him in swaying his colleagues toward the direction we would want them to go. Perhaps the best approach if feasible would be for the President to respond to the line Kosygin takes in a discussion on Vietnam with the President's appearing to be responsive by offering to cut back the pattern of our bombing if Kosygin would undertake to try to help us to achieve either negotiations or a gradual cutback in violence. Kosygin is particularly sensitive on the bombing because it started when he was in Hanoi, and he has often said that this was done without any prior consultation with the Soviet Government which might have been able to avoid the developments that have occurred.



Llewellyn E. Thompson
American Ambassador

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

53

Pres file

~~SECRET~~
E@NKIDENKIDAKXXXX

Saturday, June 17, 1967 -- 9:40 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a fear that will mount: a Nasser takeover of Libya after U.S. - U.K. bases are withdrawn. The takeover could be either from within or without, probably the former. It would put Nasser on easy street with oil and bring great pressure to bear on Tunisia. But, as the second attached report indicates, we shall try to buy time on the bases. A good deal depends on whether the King can sweat it out.

W. W. Rostow

Tunis 4838
Tripoli 175

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Authority 710982-184
By 29/100, NARA, Date 6-11-91

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RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 220
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 269
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 184
STATE GRNC
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53a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By , NARA Date 1-31-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-TUNIS 4838

WHEN I SAW BOURGUIBA, JR. OFF AT AIRPORT JUST NOW, HE TOOK ME ASIDE TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. HE HOPES U.S. WILL NOT ONLY CONCUR BUT TAKE LEADERSHIP IN GETTING GA RESOLUTION CONFIRMING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE STATES IN ME AND DEMANDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHIN

PAGE 2 RUDKCR 4838 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THEIR FRONTIERS. HE SAID POSITION I PASSED ON TO BENGHAZI YESTERDAY (STATE 211610) WOULD BE REGARDED BY ALL ARAB STATES AS WITHDRAWAL FROM PREVIOUS U.S. POSITION SINCE IT INCORPORATED PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO PRESS JUNE 13 WHICH LEFT DOUBTS AS TO OUR INTENTION. I TOLD HIM I HAD JUST HEARD VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCAST WHICH CARRIED STATEMENT MADE BY PRESIDENT YESTERDAY ON SUBJECT WHICH WAS UNAMBIGUOUS.

2. LIBYAN DEMAND THAT US AND UK REMOVE ALL FORCES FROM LIBYAN TERRITORY BEARS OUT HIS AND PRESIDENT'S FREQUENTLY ASSERTED FEARS THAT U.S. AND BRITISH BASES IN LIBYA DID NOT CONSTITUTE A RELIABLE DEFENSE FOR GOT AGAINST THREAT FROM NASSER. IF NASSER CAN COMPLE GOL TO OUST U.S. AND UK FROM THEIR BASES HE CAN TAKE NEXT STEP AND INSTALL PUPPET GOVERNMENT. TUNISIA THEREFORE DEFENSELESS AGAINST THREAT FROM EAST.

3. U.S. RECENTLY ANNOUNCED POLICY OF SUSPENDING SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO COUNTRIES IN AREA COUPLED WITH SOVIET'S SHARP INCREASE IN ARMS SHIPMENTS WILL PUT MODERATE STATES AT MERCY OF STATES WHOSE POLICIES ARE CONCERTED WITH THOSE OF USSR

PAGE 3 RUDKCR 4838 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
AND WHO IN ANY EVENT ARE HOSTILE TO ANY STATE PURSUING POLICIES OF MODERATION AND PRO-WEST ORIENTATION. GOT NOW FACED IN FACT WITH THREAT TO ITS EXISTENCE THAT PRESIDENT FORETOLD TO ME AND TO CLOWES GROUP EIGHTEEN MONTHS AGO.

4. HE ANXIOUS TO MEET PALMER IF LATTER IS GOING TO BE IN NEW YORK.

GP-3. RUSSELL
BT

PRESERVATION COPY

REF: TRIPOLI 165

Rostow

US/UK BASE ISSUE

1. WHILE IN NO WAY DISCOUNTING SERIOUSNESS OF LIBYAN GOVERNMENT'S INTENT "LIQUIDATE" FOREIGN BASES, I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME THAT THIS MEANS THE EARLY END OF US OR UK MILITARY FACILITIES OR MILITARY RIGHTS IN LIBYA IF EITHER COUNTRY WISHES RETAIN THEM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date 9-27-99

2. FORMULA WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN REFTTEL IS ESSENTIALLY ONE TO BUY TIME. DURING THE TIME WE ARE PREPARING THE TABLE AND ARE NEGOTIATING IT MANY THINGS CAN HAPPEN. CAIRO'S VOICE, INTERESTS, AND INFLUENCE COULD CHANGE.

PAGE 2 RUQMTI 175 ~~SECRET~~

LIBYAN GOVERNMENT, IN CALMER LIGHT, MAY SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY. LIBYANS GENERALLY AND LIBYAN MILITARY COULD ALTER OPINION. AT SAME TIME WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SITUATION DIFFERS FROM 1964 IN THAT WHEELUS IS DIRECTLY LINKED TO MAJOR ARAB MILITARY DEFEAT IN PUBLIC MIND.

3. RIGHT NOW IS NOT TIME TO PLEAD OR ARGUE WITH GOL DECISION. WE HAVE ALREADY RESPONDED TO IT IN CALM AND DIGNIFIED MANNER, THEREBY RESPECTING SOVERIGN RIGHT OF GOL MAKE SUCH REQUEST (TRIPOLI 165). THERE IS MERIT IN OUR NOT APPEARING GIVE OUR CONTINUED PRESENCE UNDUE WEIGHT, BEYOND POINTING OUT, AS I DID TO FOREIGN MINISTER, OUR REGRET OVER TIMING AND IMPLICATIONS REQUEST AND PRESSING HOME ASPECTS OF LIBYAN INTEREST INVOLVED.

4. KING, UNDER INTENSE PRESSURES OF PRESENT SITUATION, MAY, HIMSELF, AGAIN HOPE PLAY FOR TIME AS HE DID IN 64, ALTHOUGH HE MAY NOT BE IN POSITION ADMIT THIS AT MOMENT. I STILL HOPE FOR AUDIENCE WITH HIM ON GENERAL SITUATION DURING WHICH, HOPEFULLY, WE WILL GAIN MORE INSIGHT INTO HIS ATTITUDE AND INTENTIONS RE BASE.

PAGE 3 RUQMTI 175 ~~SECRET~~

5. BELIEVE, IF WE WANT SEEK MAINTAIN SOME FACILITIES HERE, WE SHOULD NOT MOVE PERCIPITOUSLY TO CHANGE OUR PRESENT POSTURE. BASE FACES SOME IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS IN DECISIONS WITH RESPECT REMAINING DEPENDENTS AND REDUCTION LABOR FORCE FOLLOWING REDUCTION BASE POPULATION. MAINTENANCE STATUS QUO THESE ASPECTS FOR MOMENT, I BELIEVE, IN INTEREST OUR FUTURE POSITION. IF PEASE LABOR TO BE REDUCED IT SHOULD BE DONE IN NORMAL MANNER IN CONSULTATION WITH LABOR OFFICE AND WITHOUT REFERENCE GOL REQUEST.

6. ANNOUNCEMENT OF GOL REQUEST TO WITHDRAW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE SOME CONCERN IN UNOFFICIAL AMERICAN CIRCLES HERE. I AM ADVISING HEADS PRINCIPAL COMPANIES THAT MATTER IS IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND THERE SHOULD BE NO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING MANNER OR TIMING OF OUTCOME.

PRESERVATION COPY

5. BELIEVE, IF WE WANT TO MAINTAIN SOME FACILITIES HERE, WE SHOULD NOT MOVE PERCIPITOUSLY TO CHANGE OUR PRESENT POSTURE. BASE FACES SOME IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS IN DECISIONS WITH RESPECT REMAINING DEPENDENTS AND REDUCTION LABOR FORCE FOLLOWING REDUCTION BASE POPULATION. MAINTENANCE STATUS QUO THESE ASPECTS FOR MOMENT, I BELIEVE, IN INTEREST OUR FUTURE POSITION. IF PHASE LABOR TO BE REDUCED IT SHOULD BE DONE IN NORMAL MANNER IN CONSULTATION WITH LABOR OFFICE AND WITHOUT REFERENCE GOL REQUEST.

6. ANNOUNCEMENT OF GOL REQUEST TO WITHDRAW WILL UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE SOME CONCERN IN UNOFFICIAL AMERICAN CIRCLES HERE. I AM ADVISING HEADS PRINCIPAL COMPANIES THAT MATTER IS IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AND THERE SHOULD BE NO ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING MANNER OR TIMING OF OUTCOME. WE HAVE EVERY REASON BELIEVE WHATEVER IS DECIDED BY DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN TWO GOVERNMENTS WILL PROCEED IN ORDERLY MANNER. WE SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAY, AS ASKED, WISH MAKE SIMILAR POINTS.

PAGE 4 RUQMTI 175 ~~SECRET~~

7. BRITISH REPLY REPORTED TRIPOLI'S 143. IT IS ALMOST CERTAIN THEY WILL MOVE TOWARD EARLY WITHDRAWAL, AT LEAST OF GARRISON BENGHAZI. AMBASSADOR SARRELL HAS SUGGESTED TO LONDON THEIR TIMETABLE BE CONSECUTIVE ONE, WITH PROCESS WITHDRAWAL EL ADEM NOT COMMENCING UNTIL DEPARTURE BENGHAZI GARRISON, THUS GIVING MAXIMUM TIME FOR CHANGES OF MIND ON EITHER SIDE.

8. SUGGEST THAT, IF WE WISH SEEK RETAIN AT LEAST SOME FACILITIES, WE PLAN IN TERMS ALTERNATE TIMETABLES, ONE CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A YEAR TO 18 MONTHS WITH TRAINING CONTINUING DURING THAT PERIOD AND WITHOUT ANY FURTHER SERVICES TO RLAF; THE SECOND CALLING FOR PHASED TURN OVER TO GOL DURING NEXT FOUR YEARS IN CONTEXT F-5 PROGRAM AND INCORPORATING US PRESENCE AND CONTINUED USE EL UOTIA RANGE. IN BOTH CASES WE SHOULD SEEK MAINTAIN TRANSIT RIGHTS AND AIR RESCUE PRESENCE BEYOND TERMINATION DATE. BELIEVE WE SHOULD NEGOTIATE IN TERMS WITHDRAWAL FROM AGREED AREAS UNDER ARTICLE I, PARA(2), MAINTAINING CONTINUED INTEGRITY OF AGREEMENT. I DO NOT THINK WE CAN AVOID DISCUSSING TIMETABLE IN SOME FORM.

9. IF DEPARTMENT AGREES OUR PROPOSED STRATEGY, SUGGEST

PAGE 5 RUQMTI 175 ~~SECRET~~

THAT, AFTER I HAVE MET PRIME MINISTER AND RECEIVED AUDIENCE WITH KING, AND IF SITUATION HERE REMAINS REASONABLY QUIET, I RETURN FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION VIA WEISBADEN AND LONDON. MY ABSENCE FOR THIS PERIOD COULD PROVIDE FURTHER RATIONALE FOR COOLING OFF PERIOD PRIOR TO ACTUAL DISCUSSIONS.

10. FOREGOING RECOMMENDATIONS ALSO RESPONSIVE.

USCINCEUR ECJE 09523. NEWSOM

BT

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of June 14 on the tragic events of recent weeks in the Middle East. I value the opportunity it presents to share with you some of our own concerns over these events and our hope that this time the peoples of the Middle East can build for themselves a lasting peace.

I share most fervently your view that the settlement which emerges must not create more problems than it solves. None of us can say at this point what the specifics of such a settlement can or will be. They must depend in large part on these countries themselves, for no settlement can be viable that is imposed on them or conflicts with their own vital interests.

We recognize full well the difficulty of achieving any such settlement. Passions are aroused and bitterness is rampant. It will require statesmanship of the highest order to bridge the gulf between the bitterness of defeat and the exuberance of victory.

My Government attaches the highest priority to this task. Our objective is first to help preserve the cease-fire and then to bring urgently to bear thereafter whatever influence and whatever contribution we have to help make this peace an enduring one. Our interest, as it always has been, is in the territorial and political integrity of all the states of the area and in conditions that protect the vital interests of all these states.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 76982-184
By rs/ia, NARA, Date 6/1/91

The problem of the Holy Places and of restoring Arab territories is very much in our mind as it is in yours. I know you will agree that this problem cannot be separated from the other problems which must be solved if there is to be a stable peace. I think, for example, of the need to prevent a return to cross border terrorist raids which were so dangerous and destabilizing an aspect of the situation in the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Some firm arrangement must be found which will give Israel and its neighbors security from threats to their territory and, indeed, to their national existence.

We continue to believe that the United Nations has a major role in this task and our purpose will be to help make that role both effective and practical. But we also recognize the important role other forces can play.

Mr. President, I believe that Pakistan, with its close and historic ties with the Arab world and with its long-standing commitment to the United Nations, can have a strong voice in the tremendous task that confronts all of us. Although you may look differently at some of these issues, I very much hope that you can use your own considerable influence to counsel restraint on the part of the Arab leaders and a recognition that Israel too has legitimate interests that can no longer be ignored. Even more important with the United Nations General Assembly about to meet, there is an urgent and critical need for the world's statesmen to appeal

~~SECRET~~

-3-

for reason in the face of a great temptation to give vent to emotions in an outpouring of propaganda.

This need is all the more vivid for me because several Arab nations have broken relations with the United States on the basis of totally invented charges. We value highly our relations with all the Arab nations and regret deeply this acceptance of pure propaganda despite our formal denial of any U. S. military participation in the recent hostilities.

I want, Mr. President, to take this opportunity to record my gratification over the announcement by your Finance Minister on June 10 of your Government's intention to make a further reduction in military spending in the coming fiscal year. I know of your own eloquent public expression on several occasions of the importance to both India and Pakistan of finding ways to give increased priorities to development, and I have no doubt that the steps announced by the Minister reflect your own personal interest in this objective.

The war in the Middle East reminds us all of the tragic consequences of an unbridled arms race. We hope there also that the governments involved will see the importance of bringing this problem under control.

When I had to withdraw Ambassador Locke for emergency duty in Saigon, I promised a worthy successor. I trust and believe you will come to agree that I found him in Ambassador Oehlert.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUN 17 18 32

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS 745

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67 JUN 17 PM 2:46

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW.

I THOUGHT YOU WOULD LIKE TO READ THIS REPORT TO OTTAWA FROM THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO.

THIS MORNING WE RECEIVED SOME INTERESTING INFO, FROM EGYPTIAN SOURCE FOR WHOSE RELIABILITY WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE PREPARED TO VOUCH, BUT WHICH WE THINK WORTH TRANSMITTING TO YOU BECAUSE IT DOES NOT RPT NOT SOUND ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE.

2. OUR INFORMANT SAYS THAT, ONCE ARAB DEFEAT BECAME APPARENT, RUSSIANS ENCOURAGED ALY SABRY TO TAKE STEPS TO GET RID OF NASSER AND SET UP SOVIET TYPE STATE IN UAR. ALY SABRY ALLEGEDLY ACTED ON THIS ADVICE, BUT WAS DISCOVERED AND STRIPPED OF HIS POWERS FOLLOWING NASSER'S CONFIRMATION IN OFFICE. SABRY IS NOW SUPPOSEDLY UNDER SOME FORM OF CONFINEMENT AND THIS EXPLAINS WHY HE HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN MENTIONED OR APPEARED IN PUBLIC DURING PAST WEEK.

3. OUR SOURCE ALSO SAYS THAT MAJOR CABINET CHANGES ARE IMMINENT. GOVT OF TECHNOCRATS FORMED LAST YEAR UNDER SIDKY SOLIMAN TO ADMINISTER VARIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS NO RPT NO LONGER CORRESPONDS TO NEEDS OF COUNTRY. WHAT IS NOW REQUIRED IS CABINET OF POLITICIANS HEADED BY POLITICAL PM. HE SUGGESTS THAT MOHIEDDINE MAY VERY WELL BECOME PM IN NEXT FEW DAYS OR FAILING THAT HE WILL BECOME FIRST VICE PRESIDENT. OUR INFORMANT SAYS THAT WHATEVER OFFICE MOHIEDDINE IS GIVEN, HE AND NOT RPT NOT NASSER WILL EXERCISE REAL POWER IN COUNTRY.

STARNES

DTG 171309Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-288306
By jo, NARA Date 2-3-00

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 99-221
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

56

Pres file

SECRET **Saturday - June 17, 1967**

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting report on
[redacted] attitude toward Fidel
Castro [redacted]
[redacted]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Fidel is turning out to be a heavy
burden to bear.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

1. copy
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - June 17, 1967

Mr. President:

State/AID made a careful review of the shopping list which Paraguayan President Stroessner left with you at Punta del Este (Tab C).

They recommend that the reply be made in two parts:

- a letter from you to President Stroessner commenting favorably on the over-all possibilities of being able to help. (Tab A).
- a detailed memorandum with State/AID comments on each of the projects on the shopping list which our Ambassador would give to President Stroessner at the time he delivers the letter (Tab B).

I recommend that you sign the letter.

Incidentally, the Paraguayans have not approached State on the date for a state visit as you told President Stroessner to do when he asked you about it at Punta del Este.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

- Tab ^C~~A~~ - Shopping list
- Tab ^A~~B~~ - Proposed Presidential letter to Stroessner
- Tab ^B~~C~~ - State/AID comments.

J. at Roberts

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-27
By JW, NARA, Date 2-8-93

June 17, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

At the Punta del Este meeting you gave me a memorandum describing several projects in which you are particularly interested. In the intervening weeks, your proposals have been carefully considered here in Washington. This review leads me to think that by dividing the projects among the different lending agencies, it will be possible to make progress on quite a number of them.

Two of the largest projects would appear to be multinational projects of the type referred to in our Punta del Este Declaration. It is my hope, if Congress approves, to make funds available through the Inter-American Development Bank to assist in the financing of projects of a multinational nature. I am asking our Embassy and AID representatives in Asuncion to provide technical assistance to the Paraguayan officials you may designate to help them prepare the applications for the studies which must necessarily precede actual development operations.

I am glad to note in your memorandum a reference to the great efforts Paraguay is making to accelerate its development. In the last analysis, self-help must be the principal force of any development effort. The ability of outside sources to assist in Paraguay's development will be severely limited if genuine self-help measures, such as those recommended by the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress last October, are not taken. On the other hand, with a determined effort on both sides, much can be accomplished.

You will soon receive a memorandum discussing in greater detail the action which may be possible on the various points raised in your memorandum.

I want to thank you for the fine Paraguayan gifts you presented during the meeting of the American Chiefs of State, as well as for the interesting newspapers from your country. These gifts will be valued reminders of our meeting at Punta del Este. I am grateful also to have the inscribed photograph which you sent me.

With warm and friendly regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

LBJ
Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
General of the Army
Alfredo Stroessner
President of the Republic of Paraguay
Asuncion

LBJ/WGB:mm

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Presidencia
de la

República del Paraguay

Asunción, April 21st., 1967.

His Excellency
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
President of the United States of America
WASHINGTON

Honorable Mr. President:

I returned from Punta del Este with the conviction that the conference of America's Heads of States achieved positive results and showed at the same time a promising starting point to improve the destiny of the people of Latinamerica.

Among the greats and unforgettable satisfaction that that event has given me, I consider very specially the visit which Your Excellency granted to the people of my country through me, and also, for the topics of our discussion during our conversation which made me be certain that the points of the "memorandum" I had the honour to put in your hands on the occasion, will materialize in the near future the intensification of the development of my country and the strengthening of the traditional friendship between our two peoples.

I can assure Your Excellency that our meeting confirmed, once again, the understanding, solidarity and cooperation happily existing between our two governments and reassured the liking that my people feel towards the progressive people of the United States of America, leader of democracy and freedom in the world.- I am also certain that the aims of the historic Declaration of Heads of States which made me happy to subscribe, represent, with regard to its fulfillment in the so called decade of urgency, an unavoidable command for the Government I preside and another evidence of the industrious will of the paraguayan people.

It is with these feelings, that I recalled my participation in the meeting of Punta del Este, and above all, the kindness that Your Excellency has given to the

//.....

President and Delegation of Paraguay.

Please accept, Mr. President my warmest greetings and my wishes for the happiness of your people and may also, your gesture of statesman at home and abroad, be crowned with permanent success.

General of Army ALFREDO STROESSNER
President of the Republic of Paraguay

DEPARTMENT OF STATE MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-25
By 118, NARA, Date 9-8-92 57c

With reference to the memorandum which President Stroessner presented to President Johnson at Punta del Este on April 13, 1967 and to President Johnson's letter to President Stroessner of June the following additional comments and reflections are submitted:

1. Improvement of the navigability of the Paraguay River.

The United States understands the importance of improved year-around low cost transportation facilities to the Paraguayan economy. The United Nations Special Fund study program already arranged should provide the facts necessary to provide a solid base for future plans. In order to cooperate fully with this program a United States river transportation specialist can be provided who will be able to assist the United Nations group to utilize to best advantage the earlier studies made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He will also be available to help determine the feasibility of additional river channel improvements.

2. Improvement of the Trans-Chaco Highway.

This appears to be a multi-national project eminently suited for consideration by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). As indicated in President Johnson's letter additional funds have been requested from the Congress of the United States to enable the Inter-American Development Bank better to finance such international projects. It is understood that the IDB is planning to finance the cost of a feasibility study for asphaltting the first 100 kilometers of this highway.

PRESERVATION COPY

3. Assistance in the provision of food storage facilities.

A specialist of the Agency for International Development has been sent to Asunción to assist the appropriate agencies of the Government of Paraguay to plan a program of food storage and marketing. Should additional technical assistance be required for planning a suitable program for food storage the Agency for International Development will be pleased to see that it is arranged. Funds can be made available from already approved agricultural credit loans for the construction of new storage facilities.

4. Hydrological survey of the Chaco.

U.S. Government experts on water resources can be made available to assist the Government of Paraguay make a preliminary survey of the extent and scope of the work needed in order to obtain a meaningful hydrological study of the Chaco. Depending upon the result of the preliminary study, the Government of Paraguay may wish to seek financing through a development loan.

5. Road building equipment.

It is believed the Government of Paraguay's request for road building equipment can best be coordinated with the loan application for road machinery which the Government of Paraguay presently has pending with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The United States would be prepared to provide at a nominal cost and as available from excess property stocks certain road machinery to supplement the efforts of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

PRESERVATION COPY

6. Private investment.

The United States shares the Government of Paraguay's views on the important role which private investment has in the development of the nation's economy. In this regard a United States trade mission is scheduled to arrive in Paraguay in April 1968. Preliminary discussions regarding this mission have already been undertaken with officials of the Government of Paraguay. Personnel of this mission will be familiar with many of the industries with development potential for Paraguay. In order to cooperate further with the Government of Paraguay in strengthening private investment, the United States Government is prepared to expand its already existing efforts and to undertake new programs. The newly opened Productivity Center will be given additional financial support by the Agency for International Development. The Productivity Center will also be affiliated with the Inter-American Investment Development Center which will act as a clearing house for promoting investment of United States private capital and technical knowledge in Paraguay. A survey of investment opportunities in Paraguay will soon be forthcoming.

7. Air transport.

The United States shares the Government of Paraguay's views that air transport facilities are of increasing importance for Paraguay. With respect to aircraft, the Export-Import Bank of Washington would be prepared to consider sympathetically, within the framework of the Bank's lending

policies, an application from the Government of Paraguay for assistance in financing the purchase of aircraft for Paraguayan air lines for commercial passenger and cargo use.

8. National Fund for Economic and Social Development.

The Government of Paraguay has requested funds to accelerate economic and social development. A 1966 amendment by the Congress of the United States to the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the United States make loans only for social and economic projects and programs which are consistent with the findings and recommendations of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) in its annual review of national development activities. It is noted that the Government of Paraguay already has under consideration actions responsive to the recommendations made in CIAP in late 1966 which would seem related to this problem. Implementation of these recommendations would greatly enhance the ability of the United States to contribute, as it desires, to the solution of Paraguay's development problems.

9. Wheat.

The Government of Paraguay's request for a new wheat sales agreement (Public Law 480) is receiving careful attention. United States supplies are such that we could supply an amount needed over and above Paraguay's usual commercial purchases.

^{10. Sugar}
The Government of Paraguay's request for a sugar quota

has also been carefully considered. Unfortunately, the terms

of the current law do not permit the President to authorize the establishment of a sugar quota for Paraguay or for any other country by Executive action.

The legislation setting the formula by which U.S. sugar needs are to be met by various countries is enacted by the Congress for extended periods of time. The current legislation does not expire until 1971 and it is not anticipated that any proposals to amend and extend the Sugar Act will be presented to the Congress until shortly before it expires.

However, when proposals to amend and extend the Sugar Act are made to the Congress the inclusion of a quota for Paraguay will be given most sympathetic consideration.

11. Tung oil.

Paraguayan producers of tung oil have received considerable benefit over the years from the United States Government policy of purchasing tung oil from U.S. producers at a supported price of 24 cents a pound. Whenever the international market price has dropped below that level, U.S. consumers have purchased tung oil from abroad while U.S. tung oil production has been placed in storage. Imports of tung oil currently provide approximately 90 per cent of U.S. market requirements.

A sharp increase in world production of tung oil has been primarily responsible for the markedly low prices during the past year. Total Latin American production increased from 92 million pounds in 1965 to 77 million pounds in 1966; Paraguay provided a substantial proportion of these totals.

In October 1966 the United States Government initiated a program to dispose of a quantity of tung oil which had been in storage for several years and which was subject to deterioration. Since the beginning of this sales program an amount equal to only 9 per cent of U.S. annual consumption has been sold. These sales have been made at prices carefully calculated to conform with existing world market price levels.

12. Coffee.

The Government of the United States has suggested that Paraguay seek to join the International Coffee Agreement. As the Government of Paraguay is aware, this agreement offers great hopes for the stabilization of coffee prices at remunerative levels and for improving the prospects for orderly economic development in regions of Latin America. The Government of the United States will be happy to support a request for an export quota for Paraguay which conforms to the rules and practices of the Coffee Organization.

57d

MEMORANDUM
FOR THE INTERVIEW BETWEEN PRESIDENT STROESSNER AND
PRESIDENT JOHNSON

A. HIGH-PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Navigation of the Paraguay and Paraná rivers

Paraguayan exports are shipped down the Paraguay and Paraná rivers to the seaports of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. It is of fundamental importance to improve the navigability of these rivers, rendering it practicable at all times.

Paraguay's objective is to transform Asunción into a port accessible to seagoing vessels. Preliminary studies regarding the navigability of the rivers have been carried out with the aid of the United Nations' Special Fund.

It is requested that the United States Army Corps of Engineers cooperate in making full engineering studies of the Paraguay River from its confluence with the Paraná up to Asunción. American cooperation is also requested in financing execution of the works that may be recommended as a result of those studies.

This program represents a means of overcoming difficulties and limitations deriving from Paraguay's landlocked situation. It will also be of benefit to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay.

2. Trans-Chaco Highway

The Trans-Chaco Highway, 472 miles long, links Asunción with the Bolivian frontier. It is one of the trunk roads in the physical integration of South America. It constitutes

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By , NARA, Date 9-8-92

part of the Pan American Transversal Highway, and will connect up with the Bolivarian Forest-edge Highway.

It is requested that the United States assist in the definitive engineering studies, and in financing the work of improving and asphaltting the Trans-Chaco Highway.

3. Road-building equipment

Continuing with its highway plan, Paraguay must proceed urgently to build access roads, especially in agricultural areas that have been newly opened up in connection with agrarian reform. In order that the country may carry out these road works by its own efforts, it is requested that the United States Government cooperate by providing machinery and equipment.

4. Silos, warehouses, and cold-storage plants

If Paraguay is to produce greater quantities of foodstuffs, it must have a system of silos, warehouses, and cold-storage plants for storage and rational marketing.

United States technical and financial assistance is requested for setting up a broad program for immediate implementation.

5. Hydrological studies of the Paraguayan Chaco

The Paraguayan Chaco is an extensive zone that is lacking in fresh water. It is of fundamental importance to resolve this problem if cattle-raising and agriculture are to be expanded.

It is requested that the United States cooperate in studies of sources from which drinking water may be obtained. These studies should include aerial photography of the region.

6. United States private investment in Paraguay

Paraguay requests the active cooperation of the United States Government in interesting private capital in investment in industries for processing the country's raw materials.

Paraguay has ratified the agreements covering reciprocal guarantees signed with the United States of America.

7. Air transport

Paraguay has begun a program for developing air transport for passengers and cargo. For economic and technical reasons relating to operations, aircraft of wider range and with greater passenger and cargo capacity are needed.

The cooperation of the United States Government is requested in obtaining at least five (5) turbo-prop airplanes suitable for the program for the development of air transport.

8. National fund for economic and social development

Paraguay is making the greatest efforts to accelerate its development within the framework of the Alliance for Progress. Limited domestic resources render it difficult to hasten the execution of projects.

The request is made for an adequate global grant to make up for the deficiency of domestic resources needed for financing the national plan for the economic and social development of the country.

B. MARKETING OF HIGH-PRIORITY BASIC PRODUCTS

1. Wheat

Paraguay requests the United States to continue trade in wheat between the two countries under the terms of F.L. 480. It is requested that guarantee be made for the future of the sale of ninety thousand (90,000) tons a year.

2. Sugar

The United States administration has recommended to the Congress that Paraguay be granted a quota in the list of sugar suppliers, but it has been eliminated from the list. Paraguay requests that it be granted an annual import quota of fifteen thousand (15,000) tons by whatever procedure may be feasible.

Paraguay asks for special consideration in view of the economic and social disturbances that are being produced in the agricultural and labor sectors by the accumulation of sugar surpluses and the impossibility of harvesting future crops, with a consequent reduction of the labor market.

3. Tung oil

Paraguay's export economy has been seriously affected by the substantial lowering of prices for tung oil resulting from the mass sale of stocks which the C.C.C. is carrying out.

Paraguay requests suspension of the subsidized sale of surpluses by the C.C.C. at prices lower than seventeen cents (US\$0.17) a pound, which is the going price for the product in the international market.

The action of the C.C.C. is at variance with the regulatory measures established by the United States for such cases.

4. Coffee

Paraguay is a coffee-producing country. Seventy-five percent of the coffee-growers are United States citizens who have made private investment in Paraguay.

Paraguay requests support from the United States at the International Coffee Organization when the question comes up of fixing an adequate export quota.

CONFIDENTIAL

58,
Friday, June 16, 1967 - 7:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Anderson called in to report the present state of the Panama negotiations. He will be meeting again on Monday afternoon. He will use his own judgment in dealing with the two positions set out below unless you wish to give him instructions which he would, of course, welcome.

I. Our position

We have offered:

-- 17¢ per ton for the Panamanians; we would keep 8¢;

-- the lock canal treaty ends in the year 2000, but will continue to 2010 if construction on the sea level canal is under way;

-- the sea level canal treaty would run 60 years from the time it became operational;

-- we would maintain the right to defend the lock canal for 10 years past the expiration of the treaty (the Panamanians argued for 5 years);

-- payments under the sea canal would be negotiated at the time that financing was arranged; but guidelines are written into the present treaty.

II. Panamanian position

They ask:

-- 20¢ per ton for Panama in the first year; 5¢ for the U. S. ;

-- an increase of 1¢ up to 25¢ per year in the subsequent five years; (at this time that would absorb the calculated amount available after costs without raising tolls; but in the future, that may not be the case since other aspects of the treaty are likely to reduce canal costs.)

-- a guarantee for the value of the dollar over the whole period of the life of the lock canal in terms of the purchasing power of the dollar in 1967.

-- a guarantee of \$1.9 million a year (the present annuity) in addition to the sums to be derived from the new split of profits from tolls;

-- a 60-40 division in favor of Panama if tolls should increase (we are calling for a 50-50 split);

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By fw, NARA, Date 2-8-93

-- an exchange of letters in which we agree to look into their request for preference in U. S. markets for Panamanian goods;

-- a U. S. commitment to build a 4-lane highway 10-12 miles in length from our military base in Rio Hato to La Chorrada;

-- the U. S. should build an underpass between the beach and Rio Hato to avoid our military vehicles from crossing the highways;

-- that we build an all-weather road from Vera Cruz to Arrajan -- about 8-10 miles.

III. Bob Anderson's thinking

Up to this point he has made no concessions to the Panamanian position. His thought is that he move his offer up from 17¢ a ton to 20¢, leaving us 5¢. As an alternative he is considering letting 20¢ be the base, letting the Panamanian take rise 1¢ a year for 5 years, but reserving 10¢ for ourselves (this reservation would not be real unless tolls were raised over this period or operating costs declined.)

Without any commitment he would be prepared to give a letter indicating our willingness to consider the problem of Panamanian preference in the U. S. market.

He is hesitant about the roads, underpass, etc., because he doesn't know the price tag and they would be subject to Congressional appropriation.

The atmosphere has gotten increasingly emotional as the climax of the negotiation comes near. De La Rosa has stated that he would probably have to resign if the Panamanian proposal is not accepted. They have almost certainly been in informal communication with their President. They have suggested Presidential communications. Bob Anderson has tried to discourage this by saying that's not the way we operate.

As he approaches this final stage, having narrowed the issues, his general attitude is to be mildly generous about the financial terms -- and prepared to take the heat in the Congress for that -- rather than to risk for the President and the country a Panamanian explosion.

He concluded, as I indicated, by saying that he didn't wish to burden you at this time. He wished you to know how things were proceeding and that he would welcome any guidance you might wish to give him before his meeting on Monday afternoon.

W. W. R.

Pres file

Friday, June 16, 1967 -- 6:55 p. m.

Mr. President:

You asked me to check out Mr. Ingersoll of Borg Warner, with Nick Katzenbach.

Nick has checked with Tony Solomon and others and reports the following:

- He is probably a registered Republican.
- He has expressed himself in favor of your foreign policy and in support of Sec. Rusk.
- He is pro-East-West trade.
- He is likely to be helpful with Dirksen, Gerry Ford, etc.
- He is highly recommended by pro-LBJ Republicans. (This according to Tony Solomon.)
- He has had an apparently amiable conversation with the Vice President.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Friday, Jun 16, 1967
6:30 p. m.

63

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bill Jordan's account of a talk with
Ambassador Bui Diem provides a
good feel for Vietnamese politics
at the moment.

Pres. file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Friday, June 16, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Talk with Ambassador Diem

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

My talk with Bui Diem yesterday was wide-ranging, sometimes roaming far afield, but very candid, as usual.

On Ky, he notes:

-- The Prime Minister is determined to run for President, will not back out, and is confident of winning.

-- He is completely firm in carrying out his pledge not to split the military.

-- He is ready to bend over backward to try to find some formula for Thieu to save face.

On Thieu, he said:

-- Thieu is a bitter man. He deeply resents being pushed into the background. He is mad at Ky for declaring his candidacy before the two could work something out (the delay in "working things out" was, of course, almost all on Thieu's side). He resented General Westmoreland's approach to him which seemed to say: drop politics and go back to the Army. He was, above all, resentful about his treatment by the other generals, especially Thang and Tri.

-- Thieu knows he has virtually no chance of winning the election.

-- His main goal appears to be now to defeat Ky.

-- He would probably drop out, however, if he could be firmly assured that he would be elected to the Senate and, more important, would be picked as President of that body. (Ky and Loan have pledged his election but say they cannot determine who will be the President because the Senate is not likely to be that firmly under anyone's control.)

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Diem thinks it may now be time for us to weigh in hard with Thieu to get him to withdraw. But he thinks this should not be done until Ky has had a chance to approach Thieu and try to develop some Vietnamese formula.

Diem thinks that the problem of "splitting the military" is now much less of a problem than it would have been a month or two ago. He says that the vast majority of the military leaders regard Thieu as too slow at decision-making to be a good President. Moreover, few of them think he has the remotest chance of winning, and therefore have decided to throw their support to Ky. He claims that Thieu has the loyalty of only a few officers ("a handful of majors and colonels who owe their promotions or assignments to Thieu").

(For what it is worth, my own assessment of this matter is different from the Embassy's. I believe that if Thieu runs, it will strengthen Ky. A good many votes are going to be cast, I think, not for a candidate but against something -- Ky, military rule, etc. My guess is that a Thieu candidacy will split the anti-Ky vote. The danger to Ky is that Thieu will withdraw with a statement in favor of Huong or of civilian rule.)

Ky's people have done a preliminary estimate on the election. They reckon there are 5 million voters and that 80 per cent (4 million) will vote. They calculate Ky will get about 1,800,000 (45 per cent) minimum, and possibly as high as 2,300,000. Diem thinks this is over-optimism.

Diem is deeply conscious of the problems of Loan's activities, press censorship, etc. He has talked with Ky about these matters and plans to follow up vigorously when he gets back to Saigon (about the end of June). He is confident Ky wants the election to be clean and that he will curb Loan's excessive zeal to help his friend Ky.

Ky is prepared to "Beg" Thieu to withdraw. He is ready to promise him any job he wants in the Government. He will rally support among the military for Thieu as Defense Minister or Armed Forces Commander. He is willing to travel with him and let Thieu walk out in front "and I (Ky) will follow far in the rear."

(I told Diem that Ky may have waited too long for this, but the sooner he did it, the better -- even now.)

Diem is quite aware of the anti-Ky, anti-Northern, anti-military sentiment in the South. He thinks Ky's strongest support comes from the military and from the young people. He mentioned that high school girls go wild when Ky visits a school; I reminded him that high school students don't vote.

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~~SECRET~~

-3-

A sidelight: it is clear that Diem, Ky and others are deeply worried about "Big" Minh. They know Minh would be a powerful candidate and they are determined to keep him out of the country at all costs. I asked what they would do if Minh simply announced he was a candidate for President -- how could they keep him out and explain it to the world? Diem said he didn't know, it would be hard, but it would have to be done. I asked him why they didn't get Minh on the Ky bandwagon -- and then bring him back.

Diem said I was the only American who seemed to really understand Vietnamese politics (did Dorothy Parker say "flattery will get you everywhere?"). He and Ky had been thinking along the same lines, but found it impossible thus far. Diem had done the next best thing, won the support for Ky of Minh's principal lieutenant, General Don. (I presume this means Don will have a good job in any Ky Government, probably Defense Minister.)

Bill

William J. Jordan

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

W.H.R.
61

Friday, June 16, 1967, 6:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a pleasant reply to Belgian King Baudouin's message of congratulations on the twentieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan.

Francis M. Bator

Approve

Disapprove

Speak to me

FMB:EKH:MST

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED REPLY TO KING BAUDOIN

Your Majesty:

I greatly appreciated your kind words in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Every citizen of the Atlantic Community is indebted to *President Truman and* General Marshall for the vision which yielded the most significant example of creative economic cooperation between nations in the long history of mankind.

However, your Majesty, Americans understand that no vision on this side of the Atlantic could have been of any effect if it had not been shared by the people of Europe, and if Europeans had not given wholeheartedly of themselves to bring it to reality. It was the foresight and the effort of Belgium and her sister nations which made the Marshall Plan work. As admiring partners, we are pleased to share in the celebration of this great achievement.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

SECRET

Friday, June 16, 1967 3:50 pm

(VIA PRIVATE WIRE)

62

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON

Your messages of the last two days have been helpful, as always.

None of us can predict what situations may arise in the days ahead, but my present thinking is this.

First, at the moment I doubt that anything useful can come from my personal participation in the General Assembly.

Second, from the beginning of this crisis I have not looked with favor on a four-power meeting outside the U. N. Security Council. It is something of an illusion that the four powers have the capacity to design and impose successfully a peace plan on the Near East. The states of the area have made it abundantly clear that they are not subject to effective control from outside. What the major powers can do is to try to create a climate in which the nations of the area themselves might gradually settle their affairs on a peaceful basis. But I am not confident that a four-power session is the best way to do this.

Moreover, I should think both of us would wish to avoid the possibility of having the four of us split or otherwise be strained in such a session.

I hope we can keep in close contact in the days ahead as the situation evolves, and we might wish to counsel together shortly after the smoke clears to assess the situation and see what is required to move things forward towards our common objective of stable peace in the area.

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Authority 71983-157
By sp/ics, NARA, Date 6-11-81

cc: state

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 16, 1967
3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jordan's
evaluation of Bill Blair's position
and attitude.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AG, NARA, Date 6-10-91

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Pres file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

63a

Friday, June 16, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW (EYES ONLY)

SUBJECT: Ambassador Blair

You asked about Bill Blair.

It is clear that he wants to leave Manila. He is increasingly frustrated in dealing with the Filipinos. His wife has never been happy with the assignment. His relations with Marcos appear fairly good, but he has become a favorite target for many Filipino critics. He has not found the Filipino temperament congenial, but he has labored long and hard to solve our mutual problems. Those of us who know him believe he has run out of gas, and that he feels it is time for a change.

I know of no particular bitterness he feels -- except toward some Filipinos who have been severely and unfairly critical of him -- and the frustration anyone would feel if he had worked hard but could point to no major progress on vital issues.

My guess is that he would welcome another overseas post, but probably only in Europe. Latin America might be another possibility, but I have no feel for this aspect. I would guess he would be delighted with a place like Spain or Belgium.

As a footnote: Bill Bundy thinks that Blair's departure is overdue.

Bill

William J. Jordan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State Ex 4-5-78
By ref/llw, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Friday, June 16, 1967 -- 2:10 pm

Mr. President:

In my judgment, Bunker should not go forward with his proposal to get Ky to send Loan away (p. 3) until you, Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara walk around the proposition most carefully.

There's flavor of impending political crisis here.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 28218

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By pw, NARA, Date 2-8-93

64c

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-25

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~ By msj, NARA, Date 9-8-92

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 28218)

You will have seen my reports of separate conversations on June 14, with Ky and Thieu and be aware of Thieu's announcement made the same day in Hue and Saigon.

Some additional rigidity of positions and tension have been injected into the military side of the picture by Thieu's public declaration, although the civilian candidates are clearly pleased by this development. I have once again urged both Ky and Thieu to come together promptly and attempt to work out an amicable understanding, but I am not optimistic that this will be done, or that if the meeting comes about, much progress will be made. As I have reported, Ky is determined to run and to win, and as of now, he appears prepared to use whatever means are needed for this purpose unless we bring our influence to bear directly and forcefully on him regarding some of the pressure moves he has already initiated to assure his election. I have impressed upon him that some of the methods he has been using can damage his own image to such an extent that it may affect both his chances of election and, if elected, his ability to govern.

Thieu's candidacy has made Ky's task much more difficult by assuring some reduction of army votes and support for him. This was undoubtedly one of Thieu's chief objectives; another perhaps being to lay the groundwork for combining forces with a civilian ticket, for example, as Prime Minister to Huong if this could be agreed. Running on his own, Thieu will weaken Ky's support. In combination with Huong, he would, in addition, improve the latter's prospects. We have heard that supporters of Huong and Thieu have talked, but we have no confirmation that they have reached any sort of understanding.

We do not see how dual military candidacies or Thieu's ultimate joining with a civilian ticket can fail to have some divisive effect on the military, especially on regional grounds. Ky will feel greater urgency to demonstrate that he is a winner and to develop a band-wagon atmosphere in order to attract both military and civilian support. He has already been resourceful in doing this and, by moving rapidly and effectively, he has undercut any intention by Thieu to do the same. Thieu probably now sees his candidature

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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as a last chance to sabotage Ky's efforts and also as an opportunity to join a winning combination against Ky. All of these factors make increased military involvement in political maneuvering probable and, if not checked, the result could be to impede the Vietnamese military effort at a critical juncture. While I think it will be difficult to sterilize the military from this political process, as General Cao Van Vien has announced, I believe a genuine ~~further effort in this direction~~ should, nevertheless, be made. I am now trying to arrange a small luncheon with Thieu, Ky and Vien to ~~bring them together in~~ intimate and informal surroundings to discuss this problem. ~~I would hope, as a minimum, to secure their agreement to a public statement, subscribed to by all three, reaffirming Vien's earlier announcement and containing specific instructions to the Armed Forces to refrain from further involvement. I would also hope to get an agreement that the statement would be circulated to officers and ranks and that specific instructions would be issued to Corps and Division Commanders, placing responsibility on them to see that the instructions are carried out. This should help the situation, but the problem will remain and will require constant vigilance and prodding to see that some effect is given to the instructions.~~

I do not believe that we can bring about Thieu's withdrawal by direct pressure on him without running the unacceptable risk of failing and of giving Thieu a major weapon to use against us and against Ky, who would then be the "American Candidate." Our chief role in the Constitutional process should be to assure that it proceeds on a reasonably fair and equitable basis and that the result broadens the popular base of the Vietnamese Government and increases national unity for prosecution of the war and negotiation of the peace. A secondary, but important, objective is to bring into office as qualified and effective a team of leaders as possible for these same purposes. Fundamental to the primary objective, of course, is a fair election, and Ky's current actions are very rapidly destroying this possibility. All political elements are fully aware of what is going on and have concluded that Ky is getting away with it because the Americans support him and condone his methods. Even if we think Ky is the most efficient and energetic leader on

the scene, and this is not entirely certain, his election as a result of clearly repressive measures would in the long run, destroy his effectiveness and sow the seeds of disunion and dissidence. The chief ones to benefit in the end from this process would be the Viet Cong and Hanoi.

To demonstrate that we stand for a fair election ahead of support for any one individual, I am convinced that we must force Ky to take certain measures to counteract the damage that has already been done. One possibility would be prompt exportation of General Loan, perhaps on invitation to an extended training visit and program in the U.S. This would be symbolic and possibly easiest for Ky to accept once he is convinced that we will not tolerate the course he is following and that we are prepared to engage him publicly on this score. A quiet removal of Loan from the scene would be understood by all and might not involve a too direct loss of face by Ky himself, especially if he personally instructs Loan to absent himself, as he apparently did on the earlier trip to Washington.

Once this move has been taken and if we can get Ky to initiate other quiet measures to control censorship and to assure equal facilities for all candidates, there might then be a basis for seeing how we could encourage the leading candidates to prepare the ground for working together in a government of national union whatever the election outcome may be. (I have reported that Ky claims to be working in this direction with Huong and, if elected, would plan to take other civilian elements into his government. Thieu seems to be working along the same lines.) This will obviously be a delicate and difficult undertaking, but I would hope that once the election is publicly cleansed, we would be in a position to work quietly with the principal candidates and their supporters to impress upon them the absolute necessity from their viewpoint and our own of bringing about such a coalition so long as the war continues. Essential ingredients in this press would be employment of the talents of the most highly qualified individuals to fill key government posts, a full and responsible role and authority for the Armed Forces in the government, and an understanding with the new legislative leaders that the war effort must take precedence over less urgent objectives until an acceptable peace has been attained. Only through some such broad understanding and cooperation among the key

political elements--military, civilian, regional, religious, and minorities--can we hope to overcome the divisive effects which are now evident and which are already undermining the political process.

I would also hope that it might be possible to get all the candidates to state publicly that they would abide by the verdict of the electorate and would support whatever government emerged as the result of fair and free elections.

Bunker

65
/

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 16, 1967
2:06 p.m.

Mr. President:

At last -- agreement for
Oehlert.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 6-10-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Rastow

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RAWALPINDI 4685

REF: RAWALPINDI 4632

AGREEMENT CHANNEL

1. CHIEF OF PROTOCOL TYABJI INFORMED ME JUNE 16 GOP HAS GRANTED AGREEMENT PROPOSED NOMINATION BENJAMIN HILBORN OEHLERT JR. TYABJI SAID FORMAL MFA NOTE TO FOLLOW SOONEST AS WELL AS PRESIDENT AYUB'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MAY 31 LETTER SAME SUBJECT.:

2. TYABJI REQUESTED GOP BE INFORMED AS MUCH IN ADVANCE AS POSSIBLE OF TIMING OF WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, IN ORDER PERMIT SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENT HERE BY MFA INDICATING GOP

AGREEMENT. PLEASE ADVISE.

GP-4. CARGO.
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

Meeting with the President
Friday, June 16, 1967, 12:00 noon
By cb, NARA Date 1-29-01

NLJ 99-307

Agenda

1. President's personal plans: return tonight, stay at Camp David
2. Evaluation of Kosygin visit in light of Thompson conversation.
3. The speech at New York: contingency plan for Secretary Rusk -- but leave flexible for alternate plan.
4. Secretary McNamara's trip to Viet Nam.
5. Bombing policy while Kosygin is here: how to avoid unfortunate inflammatory incidents.
6. Urgent intelligence evaluation: [REDACTED]
7. Plans for examining present speech draft.
8. Next conversation with Dobrynin: make clear that President is prepared to see him in Washington, Camp David, or any other place away from the UN where 120 other nations are involved.
9. Procedure for protecting our flank with press and public if Kosygin refuses.
10. Talking points for Kosygin: Middle East -- Viet Nam -- ABM -- ICBM, etc.

EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(G)

~~TOP SECRET~~

W. W. R.

Friday, June 16, 1967
11:00 a. m.

67

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a rather gloomy assessment by
the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo
of Arab attitudes towards peace, as of
June 13.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Cairo 748 of 6/13/67)

cc: Bundy

(Copy of cable from the Canadians in Cairo - 748 June 13, 1967)

67a

Is Mid-East peace settlement possible?

Israeli leaders have said they would like to seek permanent settlement by direct negotiation with Arab states. From Israeli and certain Western points of view, it is apparently envisaged that Israel would withdraw her forces from some positions now held, e. g. Sinai, though not, repeat not, from all conquered areas (excluded might be Sharm el-Sheik, Gaza Strip, Jordanian Jerusalem and possibly even large part of West bank in return for recognition from Arabs of her right to exist, freedom of navigation, end of terrorist activities, and guarantees for a lasting peace. These objectives, somewhat like schemes devised a fortnight ago with the aim of persuading UAR to open Straits of Tiran, seem like wishful thinking in face of present Arab attitude. In the same category may be put suggestions we have heard that because Nasser is strong, he is the one Arab leader who can lead people to acceptance of an inglorious peace in keeping with the Israeli victory.

Arabs (as indicated in ourtel 730, June 12) do not, repeat not, consider they have been defeated; Israelis, in spite of their obvious successes and heavy losses imposed on Arabs, nevertheless have not, repeat not, advanced far enough either in Jordan, Egypt or Syria to impose the kind of settlement suggested above on their adversaries, who regard the results of last week's battles as mere "setback" in terms of long term struggle. While they may regard it as UN responsibility to see that Israeli forces withdraw from recently occupied territories, left to their own devices they would probably choose to forego temporarily a return to Sinai and even West Bank rather than give impression they were submitting to Israeli demands for peaceful coexistence. (This may partly explain Israeli insistence upon direct negotiations.) Nasser said he accepted cease-fire "in view of assurances given in Soviet draft resolution to Security Council and of French declarations that no, repeat, no one will be allowed to achieve regional expansion on basis of this latest aggression." Arab states consider they are still at war with Israel.

Arab attitude is demonstrated in actions of Algeria and to lesser extent Iraq and Kuwait, who apparently have still not, repeat not, accepted UN call for cease-fire. President Boumedienne went yesterday to Moscow, it is thought, on behalf of several Arab states to demand from Soviet leaders an answer on extent of support they may expect during next and future phases of armed struggle against Israel. Iraqi press is reported to have called for "second round" of battle. Proposed Arab summit meeting, if confronted with two alternatives described to me by El Feki (mytel 719 June 11) seems much more likely to opt for continuation of war, if necessary by "unconventional" means rather than accept humiliating peace settlement.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-305

By js, NARA Date 1-31-00

President Nasser clearly is unrepentant. He acknowledged June 9 that his gamble had not, repeat not, paid off, that his forces had not, repeat not, been strong enough to prevail against the enemy as he expected they would be. Nasser has withdrawn from battle a little ashamed, but not, repeat not, unduly concerned over victims of this futile exercise -- Arab sons who at any rate have been sacrificed to highest cause. Nasser shows more interest in weapons still available to him and how these might be used in the future. The principal mistake, in Nasser's view, was not, repeat not, miscalculation of his adversary's armed might, but rather the Arab failure to use all means available to remove last traces of imperialism from the area before the battle began so as to "leave Israel alone." Nasser appears still to imagine that Western countries cannot, repeat not, live without the Suez Canal and Arab oil, and that by threatening to deny them access to these invaluable Arab resources, Western countries can be made to submit and to withhold their support from Israeli. It is the failure to make the best use of these two key weapons that Nasser regrets most. Thus he imagines he is still in the driver's seat.

In view of the number of statements in recent days suggesting the time has come to seek a permanent solution for Mid-East problems, it seems necessary to sound a word of caution lest it be assumed that Arabs are in a contrite mood and likely to be prevailed upon to accept terms inimical to their chief aim in life, which remains the liquidation of the State of Israel. If transit of Israeli flag in the Gulf of Aqaba and elsewhere was as described by Nasser "unbearable" to Arab pride before recent hostilities, it is no, repeat no, less so now. The Arabs may be expected to follow the same dangerous and futile course so long as Nasser is their leader and until such time as conditions are created whereby new leaders can step forward who have strength and courage necessary to chart a bold new course for the Arab world. Present ~~conditions~~ conditions are that 6-day Mid-East war has not, repeat not, provided a means for volte-face in Arab policy.

This is a gloomy prognostication, but I believe realistic. As I see it, the only hope of a lasting settlement being reached which both sides can accept is if USSR and the USA can work together. This, however, has become immeasurably more difficult to achieve with breaks in Arab-USA relations, and Soviet-Israeli relations, and involvement of Soviet Union in humiliating Arab military defeat. I was told by USA Embassy a few days ago that they are satisfied that Soviet assessment of impending Israeli attack on Syria, which was passed by Soviets to UAR authorities in Moscow and triggered off Nasser's actions in Sinai, was based on faulty and exaggerated intelligence reports. Thus, USSR not, repeat not, only backed the wrong horse but they appear also to have fired the starting gun for the race. Both Arabs and Russians have lost face. In the circumstances, I think

it is important for the US Government to avoid a situation developing where the Soviet Union has little or no room for maneuver in extracting itself from its difficulties. Thus I would hope USA authorities will not, repeat not, yield to the temptation to cash in on Israeli territorial gains.

One of the few matters upon which the Soviet Union and the USA are likely to be able to agree in the present situation is the principle of "territorial integrity of all nations in the area" declared earlier by US Government. It seems to me important in terms of USA-Soviet cooperation as well as future Arab-USA relations that the principle be jointly affirmed by USA and USSR although clearly modalities of applying it to Israel's frontiers will form a vital element of whatever negotiations can be arranged. If the USA can bring itself to support USSR in this matter, a way may be opened for further joint action without which I see little prospect of bringing either Arabs or Israelis to heel.

Starnes

67

Pres file

Friday, June 16, 1967 -- 10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

I was under a misapprehension. Tommy is not scheduled to see Dobrynin this morning. That session was cancelled until Dobrynin had a reply from Kosygin. But Sec. Rusk does plan to see Dobrynin this evening.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, June 16, 1967
10:20 a. m.

69
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a rather interesting analysis of the impact of de Gaulle's Middle East shenanigans on French politics.

The real effect depends, I believe, on what happens in the days ahead rather than in days past.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

TDCS 314/08849-67

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 716982-158
By sgjip, NARA, Date 6-11-91

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE ^{69a}
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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE TDCS 314/08849-67

~~SECRET~~

DIST 16 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: FRANCE

DOI: EARLY JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: IMPACT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CRISIS ON THE FRENCH POLITICAL SCENE

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-168
By iw, NARA, Date 12-12-03

ACG;
SOURCE:



1. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS MAY PROVE TO HAVE BEEN A TURNING POINT IN FRENCH INTERNAL POLITICS. THE STAND TAKEN BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WAS UNPOPULAR NOT ONLY WITH THE FRENCH PEOPLE BUT ALSO WITH MANY OF THE UNCONDITIONAL GAULLISTS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT. DIVISIVE FORCES WITHIN ALL THE FRENCH POLITICAL GROUPS HAD ALREADY MADE THEMSELVES EVIDENT FOLLOWING THE SPRING ELECTIONS. THE MIDDLE EAST AFFAIR UNDERLINED EXISTING DIFFERENCES AND CREATED NEW DIVISIONS.

2. BEFORE THE MARCH ELECTIONS GAULLISM WAS NEITHER SO STRONG AS MANY BELIEVED NO SO FEEBLE AS OTHERS HOPED. AFTER THE ELCTIONS THERE

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

WERE ON THE SURFACE THREE GROUPINGS CONSISTING OF A RATHER WEAK CENTER BRACKETED BY THE GAULLISTS AND A LEFT WING FEDERATION. HOWEVER, IT SOON BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE WERE MORE DIVISIVE THAN COHESIVE TENDENCIES WITHIN BOTH THE GAULLIST FORMATION AND THE FEDERATION OF THE LEFT. FRANCOIS MITTERAND LOOKED UPON THE FEDERATION AS A NEW AND POTENTIALLY PERMANENT GROUPING OF THE LEFT; GUY MOLLET REGARDED THE FEDERATION AS A MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH THE SOCIALIST PARTY COULD ENLARGE ITS SIZE AND INFLUENCE; WHILE THE COMMUNISTS LOOKED UPON THE FEDERATION AS A STEPPING STONE TO A POPULAR FRONT. IT BECAME EQUALLY CLEAR THAT THERE WERE MANY FACTIONS WITHIN THE GAULLIST MAJORITY, INCLUDING GAULLISTS OF THE LEFT, GAULLISTS OF THE RIGHT, AND THE AUTONOMOUS-MINDED INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS OF GISCARD D'ESTAING.

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DE GAULLE DECIDED TO TAKE THE POSITION HE DID IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE HE TRULY BELIEVED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT MILITARILY CAPABLE OF DEFEATING THE WELL-ARMED AND NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR ARAB FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, INsofar AS THE MIDDLE EAST IS CONCERNED, DE GAULLE THINKS IN HISTORICAL TERMS AND WOULD LIKE

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

TO SEE A RENEWAL OF THE EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE FRANCE ONCE HAD IN MOSLEM COUNTRIES BORDERING ON THE MEDITERRANEAN. ALSO, DE GAULLE, AS MANY OTHER FRENCH MILITARY MEN WITH BACKGROUNDS SIMILAR TO DE GAULLE'S, IS ESSENTIALLY ANTI-SEMITIC.

4. PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WAS SUPPORTED IN HIS POSITION ON THE MIDDLE EAST BY ONLY A FEW STALWARTS SUCH AS COUVE DE MURVILLE AND CHRISITAN FOUCHET. IF THERE WERE SUCH A THING AS A VOTE IN THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DE GAULLE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN **OUTVOTED** AT THE 7 JUNE MEETING ON HIS STAND VIS-A-VIS ISRAEL, SINCE THE MAJORITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT MEMBERS ARE FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS PRO-ISRAELI. ADDITIONALLY, THE GAULLIST PARLIAMENTARY GROUPING IS IN THE MAJORITY PRO-ISRAELI AND WERE **DISMAYED** WITH DE GAULLE'S POSITION. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS **BASICALLY** UNPOPULAR STAND, MANY OF THE FORMER UNCONDITIONAL GAULLISTS **HAVE** COME TO THE REALIZATION THAT THEIR LEADER CAN MAKE MISTAKES AND IS THEREFORE MORTAL. BEING A MORTAL IT THEREFORE FOLLOWS THAT DE GAULLE WILL NOT BE WITH THEM FOREVER, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME THERE IS SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITHIN THE GAULLIST CAMP OF "POST DE GAULLE FRANCE". ON THE SURFACE, THIS MAY APPEAR **AN** UNIMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. IN TRUTH THIS NEW MENTALITY AMONG **FORMER** UNCONDITIONALS MAY RESULT IN FURTHER DIVISIONS AND MANEUVERINGS FOR POSITION WITHIN THE GAULLIST GROUPING.

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(classification)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(dissem controls)

5. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS ALSO CUT ACROSS EXISTING DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE FEDERATION OF THE LEFT. THE ORIGINAL POSITION TAKEN BY THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PARROTING THE LINE TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION) WAS UNPOPULAR WITH THE ESSENTIALLY PRO-ISRAELI, ANTI-ARAB INTELLECTUAL LEFT, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE PRESS AND PUBLICATION FIELDS. AS A MATTER OF FACT THE DECISION TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET UNION'S POSITION WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER A STORMY SESSION OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST POLITICAL BUREAU WHEN DISSENTING VOICES WERE HEARD CONCERNING THE PRO-ARAB POSITION TAKEN BY THE PARTY. (AS A RESULT OF THE REACTION AGAINST ITS POSITION, THE PARTY HAS BEEN FORCED TO MODIFY SOMEWHAT ITS STAND.) TO THE QUESTION OF WHAT EFFECT THE MIDDLE EAST AFFAIR HAS HAD ON THE POTENTIAL FORMATION AT SOME FUTURE DATE OF A POPULAR FRONT, THE ANSWER IS THAT THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY HAS PUT BACK THIS POSSIBILITY AT LEAST FOR SEVERAL YEARS.

6. IN SUM, THE FRENCH POLITICAL SPECTRUM FROM THIS POINT ON WILL BECOME EXCEEDINGLY COMPLEX. THE VARIOUS POSITIONS AND INTERESTS THAT HAVE DEVELOPED OVER THE RECENT

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MONTHS NO LONGER CAN BE ARRANGED INTO THE SIMPLIFIED PATTERNS WHICH PREVIOUSLY EXISTED OR WHICH MAY TO A SUPERFICIAL OBSERVER FOR A TIME APPEAR TO BE THERE.

7. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

73
Pres file

Friday, June 16, 1967 -- 7:47 am

Mr. President:

Herewith a Moscow assessment
of forces pressing on the Russians
as Kosygin comes to the General
Assembly.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5451

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 6-10-87

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

46

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-25

By WJ, NARA, Date 9-8-92

IO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOV 5451

1. IN PAST FEW DAYS IT HAS BECOME CLEAR THAT IN HANDLING THE CRISIS SOVIETS ARE INCREASINGLY AWARE OF IMPLICATIONS THIS ISSUE HAS FOR SINO-SOVIET POLEMIC IN GENERAL AND ITS EFFECT ON SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WITH HANOI, AS WELL AS OTHER HARD-LINE REVOLUTIONARIES. LATEST REFLECTION OF EXTREME SOVIET SENSITIVITY ON THIS ISSUE IN APPEARANCE OF PRESS ARTICLES (A) ATTACKING CHINESE AND ALBANIANS FOR ANTI-SOVIET SLANDER WHICH PLAYS INTO REACTIONARIES' HANDS BY SOWING DOUBT RE MOSCOV'S SUPPORT FOR ARABS, AND (B) CONTRASTING WORTHLESS AID OFFERS TO ARABS BY CHINESE PROVOCATEURS WITH STEADFAST SUPPORT OF USSR, WHICH SERVES AS ARSENAL FOR VIETNAM AS WELL AS ME.

2. IT HAS BEEN INTERESTING TO WATCH MOSCOV'S TIGHTROPE ACT AS IT HAS COME UNDER INCREASINGLY HEAVY CHINESE ATTACK FOR COLLUDING WITH ISRAELIS AND IMPERIALISTS TO BETRAY ARABS. (THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE REPORT THAT CHINESE DIPLOMATS HERE HAVE BEEN VERY ACTIVE WITH THEIR ARAB COLLEAGUES THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, PRESUMABLY PEDDLING THESE CHARGES.) WITH PEKING SCREAMING "SELLOUT", SOVIETS MUST HAVE BEEN

RSR
RSC

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 5451FD ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
VERY UNCOMFORTABLE IN AGREEING, AFTER THEY HAD WATCHED ISRAELIS CRUSH ARABS, TO CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS WHICH FAILED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "VICTIM" AND "AGGRESSOR"--NOTWITHSTANDING THE SCORN SOVIETS HAD PREVIOUSLY HEAPED ON SIMILAR US CEASEFIRE PROPOSALS RE VIETNAM. WHILE THEIR DESIRE TO SALVAGE SOME PRESTIGE WITH ARABS IS UPPERMOST IN THEIR MINDS, THE SOVIET LEADERS' ANXIETY ABOUT HOW THEIR POSITION HAS LOOKED TO HANOI, PYONGYANG AND OTHER "REVOLUTIONARIES" HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN ANOTHER FACTOR IN ACCOUNTING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Moscow 5451, June 15

FOR FRANTIC AND DRAMATIC MEASURES THEY HAVE BEEN TAKING TO CONVOKE
THE SUMMIT MEETING, BREAK DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAELIS, AND
REQUEST EMERGENCY SESSION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

3. WHILE SUMMIT GATHERING HERE JUNE 9 AND STATEMENT IT PRODUCED
WAS OCCASIONED BY, AND ADDRESSED ITSELF SPECIFICALLY TO, THE CRISIS
(MOSCOW'S 5405), WE BELIEVE ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
WILL NOT BE LOST ON OTHER CPS. INDEED, PARAGRAPH IN STATEMENT THAT
DECISIVE JOINT ACTIONS ARE NECESSARY NOW AS NEVER BEFORE IS LIFTED
VIRTUALLY VERBATIM FROM STANDARD MOSCOW STATEMENTS ON CHINA AND
VIETNAM. THUS JUNE 9 GATHERING WAS PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO
COUNTER, BY SHOWING THAT MOSCOW CAN RALLY ITS FRIENDS IN DEFENSE
OF VICTIMS OF IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION, CHINESE CHARGES TO HANOI AND
OTHERS ABOUT SOVIET UNRELIABILITY AND PERFDY WHEN REAL CRUNCH
IS ON. IN THIS SENSE THEN, SOVIET IMAGE IN VIETNAM IS NOW
INVOLVED ALONG WITH THEIR PRESTIGE AND STATUS IN ARAB WORLD.

GP-3 GUTHRIE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

21

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 16, 1967
7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Wilson tells us
he will follow de Gaulle's lead
on the General Assembly.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By yw, NARA, Date 9-2-99

~~SECRET~~
MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON FROM PRIME MINISTER

DAVID BRUCE TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THAT YOU WOULD PROBABLY NOT DECIDE UNTIL TODAY HOW TO HANDLE THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT ANY POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KOSYGIN. I WAS GRATEFUL FOR THIS VERY PROMPT RESPONSE TO OUR ENQUIRIES AND SHALL OF COURSE BE GLAD TO KNOW YOUR PLANS AS SOON AS THEY ARE REASONABLY FIRM.

FOR MY PART, I REMAIN BROADLY OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN MY MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY. BUT MY FINAL DECISION IS BOUND TO BE AFFECTED BY DE GAULLES TALK TODAY WITH KOSYGIN. THE GENERAL MAY BE URGED TO ATTEND THE SESSION IN PERSON WITH PERHAPS THE BAIT OF A FOUR POWER SUMMIT DANGLED BEFORE HIM. IF HE DECIDES TO GO, I SHALL DO LIKEWISE. HE ASKED OUR AMBASSADOR IN PARIS YESTERDAY WHETHER THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS LIKELY TO AFFECT MY PLANS FOR MY TALK WITH HIM ON MONDAY. I HAVE SENT HIM A SHORT REPLY SAYING THAT THIS MUST CLEARLY DEPEND TO SOME EXTENT ON THE CONCLUSIONS HE DRAWS FROM HIS TALK TODAY WITH KOSYGIN. IF HE DECIDES IN THE LIGHT OF THAT, THAT HE WISHES TO GO AT ONCE TO NEW YORK, THEN CLEARLY I SHALL GO TOO AND SHALL EITHER HAVE MY TALK WITH HIM THERE OR TRY TO FIT IT IN ON OUR EVENTUAL RETURN. BUT I HAVE SAID THAT MY PRESENT ~~DISPOSITION~~ DISPOSITION IS TO STICK TO THE TIMETABLE FOR MONDAY. THE ASSEMBLY WILL PROBABLY GO ON FOR DAYS, AND IF AT ANY POINT IT LOOKS AS IF THERE IS A PROSPECT AND A NEED FOR A TOP LEVEL FOUR POWER MEETING, THEN HE AND I CAN GO OVER AT THAT STAGE TO MEET WITH YOURSELF AND KOSYGIN. NOTHING IS MORE RISKY ~~THAN TO PREDICT~~ THAN TO PREDICT HOW THE OLD MAN WILL HANDLE A TACTICAL SITUATION. BUT MY SLIGHT HUNCH IS THAT HE AND I WILL MEET AS PLANNED AT THE TRIANON ON MONDAY.

G

END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Friday, June 16, 1967
7:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith UAR begins to toss
an anchor to windward and tries to
open a dialogue with us.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5736

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Mc L. Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

TELEGRAM Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5736

EXDIS

NUMBER TWO MAN IN UAR MISSION, AMB MILMY, WHO IS FORMER GENERAL, PHONED BUFFUM TODAY TO RELATE FOL MESSAGE. SINCE THERE ARE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVTS AND SINCE UAR WOULD STILL LIKE TO BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH U.S. HE HAS BEEN DETAILED TO SERVE AS A CHANNEL FOR THIS PURPOSE. MILMY INDICATED HE IS AVAILABLE TO TRANSMIT MESSAGES OR OTHERWISE EXCHANGE VIEWS AT ANY TIME. HE ASKED THAT THIS INFO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. BUFFUM SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT THIS MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON AND WAS SURE US WOULD WELCOME FACT THAT OFFICIAL CHANNEL REMAINS OPEN DESPITE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS.

SOMEWHAT EARLIER AND QUITE SEPARATELY, MOHAMED RIAD ASKED MISOFF DISCREETLY TO INFORM AMB BATTLE OR BERGUS THAT HE IS AVAILABLE IF EITHER WISH TO PASS INFO TO HIM IN ABSENCE OF AMB KAMEL. HE CHARACTERIZED UAR OFFICERS REMAINING WASHINGTON AS PURELY "CARETAKERS". WITHOUT DEPARTING FROM UAR LINE, RIAD HAS DELIBERATELY CONVEYED IMPRESSION HE WISHES DO WHATEVER HE CAN TO WORK FOR IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND UAR.

GP-3
GOLDBERG
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

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PRESERVATION COPY

73

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 16, 1967
7:25 AM

Mr. President:

Herewith UAR attitude towards
the General Assembly and USSR.

W. W. Rostow
W. W. Rostow

TDCS DB-315/02097-67
15 June 1967

73a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 89800

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDC MH
DAI, EXO XJ5XX XDXK 022X XDXK 02X

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GROUP 1
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~~SECRET~~

CITE [REDACTED]

SANITIZED DIST 15 June 1967

COUNTRY: UAR/UNITED NATIONS

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-168

DOI: [REDACTED] JUNE 1967

By us, NARA, Date 12-12-03

SUBJECT: COMMENTS [REDACTED] CONCERNING FUTURE OF UAR
PRESIDENT NASIR AND SOVIET TACTICS IN THE UNITED NATIONS
RE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

PADA: [REDACTED]

FIELD NO.

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

1.

[REDACTED]
IN THE LONG-RUN UAR PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD AL-NASIR CAN NOT MAINTAIN
A POSITION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE UAR. NASIR WAS RESTORED TO POWER
DESPITE HIS OFFER TO RESIGN BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUCCESSOR
AVAILABLE - ONE OF THE MAJOR WEAKNESSES OF A MILITARY
DICTATORSHIP - AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CHIEF
OF STATE WITHOUT A REPLACEMENT WHO ENJOYED POPULAR CONFIDENCE WOULD

507

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

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HAVE LED TO CHAOS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE CAIRO GOVERNMENT.

LINKED THE SITUATION TO THAT OF A SINKING SHIP:
THE MORALE OF THE SHIP'S CREW MAY BE MAINTAINED BY GIVING THE
APPEARANCE THAT THE CAPTAIN REMAINS IN COMMAND; HOWEVER THE SHIP
SINKS AND THE CAPTAIN SINKS WITH IT.

2. / A NUMBER OF THE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE UAR PERMANENT
MISSION TO THE UN AND IN THE UN SECRETARIAT HAVE BEEN DISMAYED
AND ANGRY AT THE SOVIET MOVE TO TRANSFER THE LOCUS OF THE UN STRUGGLE
CONCERNING THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THESE OFFICIALS CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET
MOVE IS A GESTURE AIMED AT TRYING TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE USSR
RATHER THAN A TRUE SOLICITUDE FOR ARAB INTERESTS; WHEN SOVIET AID
WAS NEEDED BY THE ARABS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS, THE SOVIET UNION FAILED
TO SUPPORT THE UAR; NOW, AFTER THE ARAB DEFEAT, THE SOVIET UNION IS
TRYING TO REGAIN ITS PRESTIGE THROUGH TALK AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
AND LEGALISTIC MANEUVERING WITHIN THE UN.

~~SECRET~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

PREVIOUS
EDITIONS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/
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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE CURRENT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY WELL DAMAGE RATHER THAN HELP THE UAR IN THE LONG RUN BECAUSE THE SPECIAL SESSION COULD BUILD PRESSURES WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON TERMS WHICH WOULD BE MUCH WORSE THAN THOSE RESULTING FROM A SITUATION IN WHICH THE UAR CONTINUED TO ENGAGE IN DELAYING ACTIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. / ONE SENIOR OFFICIAL HARSHLY CRITICIZED THE "STUPIDITY" OF THE SENIOR UAR OFFICIALS IN CAIRO WHO SO READILY ACQUIESCED TO THE SOVIET MOVE FOR THE SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: ALSO SENT USUN.

~~SECRET~~

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74

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 16, 1967
7:25 AM

Mr. President:

Herewith two more Hanoi bombing
reports.

W. Rostow
Rostow

A-746 from Saigon, 6/9/67
TDCS 314/08732-67, 15 June 1967

55-56

AIRGRAM

POL 27 VIETS

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HM/R	REP	AF
ARA	EUR	FE
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L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
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ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA

A-746
NO.

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COPY NO. _____ SERIES B

74a

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : CINCPAC FOR POLAD, COMPACFLT, LONDON

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JUN 14 8 23 AM 1967

L-I-M-D-I-S

FROM : Amembassy SAIGON

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH
DATE: June 9, 1967

SUBJECT : British Reports from Hanoi - Effect of Bombings

REF :

The following are excerpts from recent reports prepared by British Consul General John Colvin in Hanoi (protect source) and passed to us by the British Embassy in Saigon. The reports provide indications of mounting economic difficulties in North Viet Nam as a result of the bombing:

1. May 4: "Missions (diplomatic) have been reminded to conserve electricity, increase food stocks and build boats for 'eight to ten day emergency' if the bombing of the city should begin. Nothing was said about the evacuation plan for corps (diplomatic) and the implication was that Hanoi would continue to function even if flooded."

2. May 8: "Estimated 2,000 laden travellers of all ages waiting to board trains at railway station at 1800 last night and similar numbers have been seen for some days past. I think that many children and old people have left recently but officials will only repeat that population is at 24 hours standby for evacuation with first aid, rice and spare clothing to hand. Construction of air-raid shelters have been increased. Kerosene and firewood are almost unobtainable in countryside. It is reported that North Viet Nam expected an air attack on Hanoi city within next 7 days."

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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In Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL:RFRogers:paz 6-7-67

Contents and Classification Approved by

POL:JACalhoune

Clearances:

POL:TMRecknagel

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 9-27-99

3. May 11: "A fairly reliable source states that in Hanoi non-cadres and lower cadres had received 25 percent of May rice ration in flour, and 1 litre of kerosene per household per 4 months since 20 March. Non-cadres have received 150 grammes of fat monthly since Tet but no meat, and lower cadres (their children under 2) little or no meat. There is once more no petrol at civil supply point.

This is not decisively worse than previous crises in Hanoi which is even now better off than the provinces."

4. May 12: "Ministry of Foreign Affairs have told North Vietnamese employed by foreign mission that shortages will continue and that they must (a) become accustomed to smoked meat and fish (b) learn the use of flour (c) live off missions as far as possible."

5. May 27: "It is learned from a reliable source that rice ration for June consists (group undec) of 40% (25% this month) of flour. We should not make too much of this: Noodles are acceptable and general here, but it is interesting that ration applies not only to civil population and lower cadres but for the first time to Middle cadres (Deputy Director level)."

6. June 3: "According to reliable source following advice was issued to population on Hanoi at street committee level meetings held here on 31 May.

- A) All non-essential civilians must wherever possible be evacuated.
- B) All necessary personnel must 'owing probably destruction of Hanoi' prepare air-raid shelters at home.
- C) Prepare against destruction of Hanoi power plant by storing kerosene and kerosene lamps (no increase in rations however).
- D) Prepare against subsequent stoppage of water supplies by digging communal wells."

7. June 4: "I was informed by reliable source that cement is now unobtainable in Hanoi (Black Market source also finished)."

LOCKE 

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 90487

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
1 (Rostow) EXO DDI USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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~~SECRET~~ CITE [REDACTED] DIST 15 JUNE 1967

15 72 30 Z

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: ASSERTION BY NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL THAT AMERICANS WILL LEAVE VIETNAM FROM DISCOURAGEMENT AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE IF BOMBING OF NORTH STOPS EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ: [REDACTED]
SOURCE: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

1. [REDACTED] MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS [REDACTED]

A. ALREADY THE AMERICANS ARE SPEAKING OF STOPPING BOMBING

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

PRESERVATION

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-249
By Sj, NARA, Date 7-19-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

IN 90487



PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

OF NORTH VIETNAM. THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD BRING US TO OUR KNEES BY VIOLENCE BUT HAVE FOUND THEY CANNOT. THEY WILL QUIT THE SOUTH, TOO, WHEN THEY REACH THE SAME CONCLUSION THERE.

B. WHEN FRIENDS TELL US WE SACRIFICE TOO MUCH, WE REPLY THAT IF WE DO NOT MAKE SACRIFICES NOW WE SHALL HAVE TO MAKE MUCH GREATER ONES IN THE FUTURE. IF WE SURRENDER NOW WE WILL HAVE TO PAY A HEAVIER PRICE LATER. FAMINE FELLEDE TWO MILLION PEOPLE IN HANOI IN 1945 UNDER THE JAPANESE AND FRENCH. THE AMERICAN BOMBINGS ACTUALLY KILL FEWER PEOPLE THAN DIEM DID WITH HIS POLICE.

C. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION IS THAT IF BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS STOPPED TALKS WILL BECOME POSSIBLE. IF THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT HEARD NORTH VIETNAM SAY THIS IT IS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT WANT TO BUT PREFERS TO FIGHT RATHER THAN PARLEY. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOUR POINTS ARE ITS VIEW OF THE CORRECT SOLUTION OF THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM, BUT NORTH VIETNAM WILL LISTEN TO OTHER POINTS OF VIEW.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: POINTS A AND C ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE MADE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND REPORTED [REDACTED] ALTHOUGH [REDACTED] IN THE REVERSE ORDER.

THEY ARE REPORTED TO SHOW CONSISTENCY OF LINE. POINT B MAY BE OF

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SECRET

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

INTEREST IN STUDYING NORTH VIETNAMESE MOTIVATION.

3. DISSEM: CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~GROUP 1~~

~~SECRET~~

Rostow 75

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, June 16, 1967
7:20 AM

Mr. President:

You will wish to read every word of this.

It's as near an **honest** account of the Soviet mind on the **Mid-East** crisis as we're likely to get, **with a** few marked exceptions sidelined where **complete candor** would be **excessively painful**.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

TDCS DB-315/02113-67
15 June 1967