

1. ~~summary~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

June 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India and Pakistan Defense Spending

Attached are two studies of this subject.

TAB A is a comparative analysis of the Indian and Pakistan defense budgets, which have just been announced, corrected for inflationary price changes in both countries. On the basis of these figures, India reduced its defense expenditures in real terms by 12% over the past three years. During the same period, Pakistan's expenditures have declined more sharply, by over 25%.

Such comparisons, however, can be very misleading. Pakistan's expenditures peaked in 1965/66, the first year of this analysis, following the Indo-Pak war, as she scrambled among the arms merchants to replace destroyed equipment. So some drop was to be expected. Unlike Pakistan, India worries about two fronts. Each country prepares its budget in a slightly different way. Rates and effects of inflation differ. Past planned defense commitments and longer term trends are also relevant.

TAB B reflects longer run trends, going back to 1958. It shows a sharp rise in India's expenditures after the Chinese attack in 1962, while Pakistan held fairly steady until the Indo-Pak war of 1964, when Pakistan's expenditures jumped, in part the result of the end of MAP from us.

In sum, the new budgets suggest an effort in both countries to restrain military expenditures. Pakistan announced that its ability to stick to this budget would depend upon India's readiness to respond to Pakistan on Kashmir, but we don't know whether this is for public relations or for real. The Pakistan Ambassador attributes his government's restrictive policy to quiet diplomatic work by your staff here and our people in Delhi and Rawalpindi. This is in part true. But both the Finance Ministers have worked hard to get this result. They have been strong allies and we have strengthened their hand in unobtrusive ways against the defense enthusiasts in both countries.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Statute 313-78, NSC 6a 11-30-78

By sg/isp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

76a

~~SECRET~~

Defense Spending in India and Pakistan

BUDGET DATA - Defense Budgets in Billions of Rupees (Current Prices):

A

	<u>1965/66 Actual</u>	<u>1966/67 Budget</u>	<u>1967/68 Budget</u>
India	9.26	9.47	9.63
Pakistan	2.85	2.25	2.18

INDIA DOWNTURN. Taking into account estimated price increases of 19% in the four year period, Indian defense expenditures will have declined 12% in real terms. This is shown by the following defense budget figures expressed in billions of constant (1966) rupees:

1965/66	9.26
1966/67	8.16
1967/68	8.09

This may understate the decline because foreign exchange costs in the total were automatically raised 56% in rupee terms after the June 1966 devaluation.

PAKISTAN DOWNTORN. Taking into account an estimated price increase of 11.5% and an absolute decline in the defense budgets since Pakistan's surge of military expenditures in 1965/66, there is a small decline in real terms this year and a cumulative decline of over 25% over the past three years. This is shown by the following defense budget figures expressed in billions of constant (1966) rupees:

1965/66	2.85
1966/67	2.11
1967/67	1.95

DEFENSE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BUDGET

	<u>1965/66 Actual</u>	<u>1966/67 Budget</u>	<u>1967/68 Budget</u>
India	22	21	22
Pakistan	32	23	20 (est.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 62 4/9/79
R: hsl/ep NARA, Date 6-11-91


~~SECRET~~

76 b


B

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES in INDIA and PAKISTAN


BILLION DOLLARS



PERCENT OF GNP



PERCENT OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES



~~SECRET~~

6830 2-67 CIA

NOTE: YEARS ARE FISCAL YEARS BEGINNING APRIL 1 AND JULY 1 OF THE YEAR STATED FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN RESPECTIVELY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA 62 4-9-79

By Aglip, NARA, Date 6-11-91

Mr. Rostow

77

WWR

June 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to President Ayub

Here is a revised version of the State Department's proposed answer to President Ayub. It looks okay to me.

Draft reply approved

W. W. Rostow

Amend

See me

~~SECRET~~

17a

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of June 14 on the tragic events of recent weeks in the Middle East. I value the opportunity it presents to share with you some of our own concerns over these events and our hope that this time the peoples of the Middle East can build for themselves a lasting peace.

I share most fervently your view that the settlement which emerges must not create more problems than it solves. None of us can say at this point what the specifics of such a settlement can or will be. They must depend in large part on these countries themselves, for no settlement can be viable that is imposed on them or conflicts with their own vital interests.

We recognize full well the difficulty of achieving any such settlement. Passions are aroused and bitterness is rampant. It will require statesmanship of the highest order to bridge the gulf between the bitterness of defeat and the exuberance of victory.

My Government attaches the highest priority to this task. Our objective is first to help preserve the cease-fire and then to bring urgently to bear thereafter whatever influence and whatever contribution we have to help make this peace an enduring one. Our interest, as it always has been, is in the territorial and political integrity of all the states of the area and in conditions that protect the vital interests of all these states.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 72982-184
By sp/ps, NARA, Date 6-11-91

The problem of the Holy Places and of restoring Arab territories is very much in our mind as it is in yours. I know you will agree that this problem cannot be separated from the other problems which must be solved if there is to be a stable peace. I think, for example, of the need to prevent a return to cross border terrorist raids which were so dangerous and destabilizing an aspect of the situation in the months preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Some firm arrangement must be found which will give Israel and its neighbors security from threats to their territory and, indeed, to their national existence.

We continue to believe that the United Nations has a major role in this task and our purpose will be to help make that role both effective and practical. But we also recognize the important role other forces can play.

Mr. President, I believe that Pakistan, with its close and historic ties with the Arab world and with its long-standing commitment to the United Nations, can have a strong voice in the tremendous task that confronts all of us. Although you may look differently at some of these issues, I very much hope that you can use your own considerable influence to counsel restraint on the part of the Arab leaders and a recognition that Israel too has legitimate interests that can no longer be ignored. Even more important with the United Nations General Assembly about to meet, there is an urgent and critical need for the world's statesmen to appeal

~~SECRET~~

-3-

for reason in the face of a great temptation to give vent to emotions in an outpouring of propaganda.

This need is all the more vivid for me because several Arab nations have broken relations with the United States on the basis of totally invented charges. We value highly our relations with all the Arab nations and regret deeply this acceptance of pure propaganda despite our formal denial of any U. S. military participation in the recent hostilities.

I want, Mr. President, to take this opportunity to record my gratification over the announcement by your Finance Minister on June 10 of your Government's intention to make a further reduction in military spending in the coming fiscal year. I know of your own eloquent public expression on several occasions of the importance to both India and Pakistan of finding ways to give increased priorities to development, and I have no doubt that the steps announced by the Minister reflect your own personal interest in this objective.

The war in the Middle East reminds us all of the tragic consequences of an unbridled arms race. We hope there also that the governments involved will see the importance of bringing this problem under control.

When I had to withdraw Ambassador Locke for emergency duty in Saigon, I promised a worthy successor. I trust and believe you will come to agree that I found him in Ambassador Oehlert.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

June 16, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a reply to a further letter from General Gowon of Nigeria stating the Central Government's case in the present confrontation with the rebel Biafrans.

Gowon's letter added nothing of consequence to his earlier message to which you replied last week. Thus, this proposed reply is a simple acknowledgment and a reaffirmation of our hope for a peaceful solution.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EH:dlb 6/16/67

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

78a

PROPOSED REPLY TO GENERAL GOWON

Your Excellency:

Thank you for your further thoughts on the crisis now confronting Nigeria.

I remain deeply concerned about the grave dangers inherent in the current situation. It is my steadfast hope that a peaceful solution will be found.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Major General Yakubu Gowon
Head of the Federal Military Government
Lagos, Nigeria

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - June 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Status of Follow-Up Actions on the OAS Summit

Two months after the OAS Summit, this is where we stand on follow-up:

1. Special Publicity

- State has published an illustrated booklet which you have seen.
- USIA has put out a similar booklet in Spanish and given it wide distribution in LA.
- USIA is putting the final touches on a color documentary which will be ready for release on or about July 1.

2. Congressional Action

- Authorizing legislation for the IDB/FSO replenishment is still pending before the House and Senate. It was reported out favorably by the House Banking & Currency Committee on May 18. It has not been taken to Rules because of uncertainty over whether there are enough votes to defeat two crippling amendments sponsored by Republicans. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings. It may report out the bill next Tuesday.
- Budget amendments covering both the \$300 million for the IDB/FSO replenishment and \$100 million for the Alliance for Progress were sent to the Congress on May 17.

3. Bilateral Commitments

Dominican Republic. All three commitments which you made to Balaguer have been carried out:

- You gave the DR a higher sugar allocation.
- Tony Solomon carefully reviewed the possibility

CONFIDENTIAL

of preferential treatment for Dominican vegetables and found that the prospects are not good. Balaguer has been informed.

- Preliminary work on the dams in the NIZAO basin is proceeding. Parsons Engineering has completed its pre-feasibility study. A detailed feasibility study to determine the location for four dams is the next step. AID will soon ask for bids on this phase of the project.

Ecuador. You promised that loan procedures would be reviewed in order to remove unnecessary delays. This has been done. The review showed that the basic difficulty has been Ecuadorean slowness to act due to almost kaleidoscopic changes in Ministers during the past year and a half and lack of competence. Since the Summit, loans for malaria control and primary education has been approved. Three weeks ago President Arosemena publicly praised US assistance.

Panama. You are familiar with efforts to speed up negotiations and how close we are to an agreement.

Paraguay. You promised Stroessner to review the long shopping list he gave you. This has been done. I am sending you separately a suggested reply to Stroessner.

Trinidad. Prime Minister asked for your help in getting TWA or some other airline to buy heavily into the Trinidad-based British West Indies Airways. Tony Solomon has talked to TWA and put them in touch with the Trinidadian Ambassador.

Venezuela. We have acted on Leoni's five points of concern as follows:

- Delivery of arms for his new Ranger battalions have been expedited.
- We have told the Canadians that they must cut down on oil imports and at a technical level they have indicated willingness to negotiate a voluntary limitation.

- Your directives on research on air pollution abatement have been called to Leoni's attention. The inter-agency committee is at work. The Bureau of Mines' research on removal of sulphur pollutants from stack gases shows much promise. Interior has offered to review this research with Venezuelan officials.
- Interior is holding action on higher asphalt imports pending completion of an OEP study.
- We are supporting Venezuela in its case against Cuba in the OAS. A Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the ambassadorial level will open in Washington on Monday, June 19.

4. Multilateral Action

Economic Integration.

The LAFTA (all South America and Mexico) Foreign Ministers are scheduled to meet in early August in Asuncion, Paraguay to decide how to proceed in carrying out the Summit decisions. The LAFTA Executive Committee is now preparing for the meeting. Prior to the LAFTA meeting there is to be the first session of the LAFTA-CACM (Central American Common Market) Preparatory Group.

We have taken two measures to stimulate action by the Latin Americans:

- Our Embassies have been pursuing with the local governments how they are organizing internally to deal with the many aspects of integration.
- Our delegation to the IA-ECOSOC conference now meeting in Chile will be asking the Latin Americans (and pushing them) regarding how they plan to move toward a staged reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers. Covey Oliver will also encourage them to seek technical assistance from experts in the European Economic Community.

Multinational Projects

The Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank met in Washington in late April. They agreed to increase the resources of the Fund for Special Operations by \$1.2 billion. A good portion of the additional funds will go for multinational projects.

The Bank has recently extended loans or grants for the following projects:

Acaray Dam and Hydra-electric Plant - This plant on the Parana River in Paraguay is designed to provide power to Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina. A second-stage \$14 million loan for plant expansion will increase power output for transmission to the two neighboring countries.

River Plate Basin. - The IDB has granted \$250,000 to INTAL (Latin American Center for Integration) to continue its study of development of the River Plate Basin which includes Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay.

Telecommunications System - The IDB has started feasibility studies in the larger South American countries for linkage of their national systems.

Central American Highways - AID will shortly send you for approval a loan of \$20 million to the Central American Bank for Economic Integration for improvement and linkage of the road system throughout Central America.

Agriculture

The AID Mission Directors met in Washington at the end of April. Linc Gordon directed them to develop good programs designed to increase and diversify agricultural production. In the past two months these actions have been taken on agricultural loans:

- A \$5 million agricultural credit loan has been signed with Costa Rica.
- A \$15 million agricultural sector loan is under negotiation with Uruguay.
- A \$10-20 million agricultural sector loan is being negotiated with Chile.
- A \$5.5 million agricultural marketing loan (for establishment of wholesale and retail outlets which will make it easier for the farmer to market his products) has been signed with Peru.
- A \$1.5 million loan to the Dominican Republic for rural community development.
- A \$2.2 million loan to Nicaragua for agricultural service centers (equipment and seed).
- A \$2.2 million loan to Guatemala for a cadastral survey in aid of agrarian reform.
- A \$2.0 million loan to Bolivia for rural community development.

On screwworm eradication, Agriculture has developed a detailed program, on a cost-sharing basis, for advancing the barrier to Tehuantepec. As soon as Agriculture obtains BOB Clearance and consults on the Hill with respect to costs, it will be in a position to start negotiations with Mexico.

Education, Science & Technology

The Inter-American Cultural Council (IACC) at the end of May took these actions:

- Designated a 13-man Expert Group to develop a Regional Program in Science and Technology, including the establishment of multinational institutes at the

post-graduate level. The Group convenes July 17. Their report is due prior to the IACC Ministerial Meeting in November. Dr. James R. Killian is a member of the Group.

- Established an ad hoc inter-governmental committee: (1) to work out with CIAP how the IACC will participate in the annual reviews of country education programs; (2) to guide the OAS Secretariat in developing proposals for improving education facilities, including a special ETV study; and (3) to make recommendations to the next IACC meeting on where to start in carrying out the Summit Action Program.

Internally, Don Hornig has set up a task force under the direction of Dr. Herbert York. The group will be developing our ideas for a realistic regional program in science and technology, including peaceful uses of atomic energy and creation of an Inter-American Science Foundation. The work of this team will serve as guidance to Dr. Killian in the OAS Expert Group and Chairman Seaborg during his July South American tour.

On fish protein concentrate, AID is studying which Latin American country offers the best conditions for establishment of a demonstration project.

The Marine Science Council is developing proposals which Dr. Killian can discuss with the OAS Expert Group. The proposals will center on: greater US effort in a Caribbean Basin Oceanographic Survey; expanding opportunities for Latin American oceanographers to work on US research ships; preparation of an Inter-American Symposium on Marine Science and Technology; and development of a marine sciences component for a multinational institute.

I believe the foregoing shows solid progress toward carrying out the Summit Program.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file 80

Friday, June 16, 1967

Mr. President:

The Danish Ambassador just called to say Prime Minister Krag is coming to the General Assembly.

The Prime Minister plans to return to Copenhagen on Saturday, June 24, leaving at 4:00 p. m.

He asks might he pay a short visit on you next Friday, June 23, or Saturday morning before he leaves.

I said I would forward the message.

The Danish Ambassador asked whether you were going to New York. I replied that you had made no decision about New York.

I will, of course, inform Sec. Rusk and shall forward his recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

In principle will see Krag_____

Put on noon meeting agenda today_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967 -- 8:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith another report which tends to explain why the ships are piling up in the harbor: transport out of Haiphong appears to be difficult. This reinforces the case for leaving the ships alone and dealing with the rest.

I have checked the location of the reported big hole in the side of the power plant. From the name of the street, it sounds to me as though they put a bomb right through the generator hall. I would assume, therefore, that the Hanoi TPP is not in a very wholesome condition.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-251
By SJ, NARA, Date 11-19-01

81a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 69458

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (EECDEF) JCS AN NAVY AIRI CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SOO AID
DDI EXO (Rostow) USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

DIST 15 JUNE 1967

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM [REDACTED]

DOI: END OF FIRST WEEK OF JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION
NETWORK IN HAIPHONG-HANOI AREA.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. AS A RESULT OF RECENT AMERICAN AIR RAIDS, UTILITIES IN THE CITIES OF HAIPHONG AND HANOI ARE SEVERELY CRIPPLED. TRUCK TRANSPORTATION OF GOODS FROM THE HAIPHONG PORT AREA AND FROM HAIPHONG TO HANOI HAVE BEEN IMPEDED BY SEVERE DAMAGE TO THE ROADS.
2. THE CITY OF HAIPHONG IS ON A WATER RATIONING SYSTEM AND ITS WATER SUPPLY FACILITIES APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN SEVERELY

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-251
By sj, NARA, Date 11-19-01

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

DAMAGED. IN ADDITION, ITS ELECTRICAL POWER, ALTHOUGH IN OPERATION IN MOST ALL AREAS, IS SUBJECT TO FREQUENT SHORT BLACKOUTS AND BREAKDOWNS. THE PRINCIPAL ROADS LEADING FROM THE PORT AREA ARE SO POKED BY HUGE BOMB HOLES THAT TRANSPORTATION IN FOUR-WHEEL VEHICLES IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND NO MAJOR SUPPLY LOADS CAN BE CARRIED. SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN REMOVED PIECEMEAL FROM THE DOCKS IN MANY INSTANCES BY BICYCLES AND TRICYCLES.

3. HANOI'S WATER SYSTEM IS STILL FUNCTIONING PROPERLY BUT ITS ELECTRICAL FACILITIES ARE STILL OUT IN MANY PARTS OF THE CITY. ELECTRICAL RATIONING IS IN EFFECT AND THE CITY IS PRIMARILY DEPENDENT ON THE AUXILIARY POWER FACILITY.

4. IN HANOI THE MAIN FEAR IS THAT THE DIKES OF THE RIVER DAM, WHICH WERE SEVERELY DAMAGED BY RECENT BOMBINGS, HAVE BECOME SO WEAKENED THAT THE DAM WILL BURST ONCE THE HEAVY SEASONAL RAINS START AND CREATE MORE PRESSURE. THIS WOULD CAUSE FLOODING AND ATTENDANT UTILITY AND TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS IN HANOI.

EO 12958 3.A(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT AND PACAF [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.A(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GP-1

~~SECRET~~

sup

Thursday, June 15, 1967
8:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a response to a rather emotional letter from Sheldon Cohen in the midst of the Middle East crisis.

W. W. Rostow

June 15, 1967

Dear Sheldon:

Thank you for sharing your thoughts with me during the tensions of the Middle East crisis. You know that I share your concern.

Now we must all do what we can to try to produce stable peace in that deeply troubled area.

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Sheldon S. Cohen
Commissioner of Internal Revenue
U. S. Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, June 15, 1967
8:25 p. m.

83
Pres. file

Mr. President:

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W. W. Rostow

83a

June 15, 1967

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LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967
5:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker leans on Thieu.

No clear answer yet -- and pretty sticky.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 28170

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb
By *kg*, NARA, Date *6-11-91*

Thurs., June 15, 1967
5:35 p. m.

85

MR. PRESIDENT:

The Australian Minister called to ask if Kosygin's dropping in will affect the party for Holt.

I suppose we have to get the scenario in New York clear first. *

My inclination would be to go through with a quiet weekend at the Ranch, unless you decide to go with a speech on Monday.

W. W. R.

*I'm checking. Sisco says speeches would probably start Monday.

Thurs., June 15, 1967
5:30 p. m.

86

MR. PRESIDENT:

Barbour comes back with just the kind of cable we hoped he would send.

It indicates that a process of realism is beginning to set in in Tel Aviv just as the initial rigid Arab position is beginning to show some cracks. With time and patience on our part -- and a lot of behind-the-scenes work with both the Arabs and Israel -- something constructive might still emerge.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Tel Aviv 4137)

(cc: McGeorge Bundy)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-221
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

87

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967
4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:


there is a 15 by 15 foot hole in the
west wall of the Hanoi power plant.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

I shall be checking as to whether
this is or is not the critical generator
hall.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

Thursday, June 15, 1967
4:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Via Marvin Watson

With respect to Mr. George Brown: He should get in touch with Mr. Peter Strauss, Assistant Administrator A. I. D. for Africa. He is the man to talk with about private investment guarantees.

W. W. Rostow

*Strauss informed, is awaiting
Brown's call.
W*

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, June 15, 1967
3:45 p. m.

89

Per file

MR. PRESIDENT:

In the attached, Secretary Rusk suggests that the President appoint a public committee of prominent citizens to (1) educate the public to the enormous development job ahead, and (2) build popular support for the much-expanded aid programs necessary to do it. He would have the President name the committee in connection with receiving the report of his Science Advisory Committee on food and population.

My views are as follows:

1. The President should not appoint yet another advisory committee on how to sell a much larger foreign aid program unless and until:

-- we have a specific program to sell. (The PSAC Report does not give us one; it recommends that we develop one.)

-- you think it politically feasible to talk -- as the Report does -- in terms of large increases in U. S. foreign aid appropriations, or

-- you decide that we must pre-empt a Congressional move to enact a mandatory reevaluation of the aid program, like the Kennedy Amendment which was barely defeated last year.

2. But we may well face such an amendment and, therefore, we should be prepared.

3. Even if one or more of these criteria is met, the first need will be for a committee to review the substance of the program, not the public relations.

4. The international politics also argue for caution. Among other things, we are now after other donors to:

-- raise their percentage share and quadruple their contributions to IDA over the next three years;

-- match our food contributions to India;

-- maintain or increase their contributions to the India and Pakistan consortia;

-- contribute to Special Funds of the Asian and African development banks;

-- get involved in support of Latin American development;

-- consider generalized tariff preferences for the LDC's;

-- soften the terms of their new loans and roll over many of their old ones.

In this context, a public Presidential call for study of a new, much-expanded global aid strategy (the PSAC recommendation) would probably either (1) maximize internal pressure in the donor countries to call a halt to the upward trend in aid, or (2) provide an excuse for foot-dragging until the new package is ready.

5. I would think -- though it's an amateur's view -- that our domestic position would be hurt by such an announcement before Viet Nam is over and we can talk in similarly ambitious terms about expansion of domestic programs.

Therefore, I recommend caution, unless you feel a Kennedy Amendment must be pre-empted; and would then set up a group to study the substance of the problem rather than to pressure Congress; although it might be given the assignment of helping design a post-Viet Nam global aid policy.

W. W. R.

WW Rostowicz



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Making the Case for Foreign Aid

Recommendation:

That upon the receipt of your Science Advisory Committee's report on food and population, you appoint a commission of leading citizens to consider how to develop widespread support for a program of food and other aid.

Discussion:

The report of your Science Advisory Committee on food and population will undoubtedly again underscore what a staggering problem we face on food and population over the coming years. The extent of the problem and what it implies for our programs of economic aid for at least the next decade have not been recognized by the American public nor many members of Congress or our allies. In fact, we face declining support for our present level of aid.

Some new way must be found to dramatize both at home and abroad this issue and the increased needs of the future. The submission to you of the PSAC report on food and population could offer an appropriate point to start this process. One action on the report might be to appoint a commission of prominent publicists, editors, churchmen and others to consider how to develop the necessary support for a program of the needed scope and duration. The commission should take the need for an expanded program as established by the PSAC report as its starting point and consider how to make the case for it compelling and widely understood.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Thursday, June 15, 1967 -- 3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Thought for the day.

A friend reports a sign in the Dominican Republic:

"Yankee go home -- and take me with you."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thurs., June 15, 1967
2:45 p. m.

91

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

This could be merely appearing sweet and reasonable with the Norwegians, or it could be another indication of a new mood of which we have had straws in the wind in Djakarta, Paris, Vientiane, etc.

With the rains in Laos, we might go back and say: "OK: no bombing if you respect the DMZ. Then we can talk."

Incidentally, this is the first statement I've seen from a Communist that the Chicoms would not be invited in if we invaded North Viet Nam (presumably, the southern part of NVN).

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (OSLO 4531)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

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1967 JUN 15 AM 3 07

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EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By , NARA Date 1-31-00

Postaw

SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN CONVERSATION WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE

1. FONMIN LYG CALLED ME IN JUNE 14 TO REPORT CONVERSATION WHICH TOOK PLACE JUNE 1 BETWEEN AMBASSADOR OLE ALGARD, NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR PEKING, AND NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO PEKING MGO. LYG GAVE ME NORWEGIAN TEXT REPORT OF MEETING WHICH HE ASKED THAT I TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY AND HIS IMMEDIATE ADVISORS, STRESSING HIS DESIRE SUBJECT BE HELD CLOSELY WITH NO RPT NO PUBLICITY OF ANY KIND CONCERNING THIS CONVERSATION. LYG SAID GON NOT RPT NOT IN POSITION TO EVALUATE CONVERSATION'S SIGNIFICANCE IF ANY, BUT SECRETARY HAD ONCE ASKED HIM TO PASS ON ANY INTERESTING CONVERSATIONS NORWEGIANS MIGHT HAVE IN PEKING. IF US GOVT WISHED AMBASSADOR ALGARD TO PURSUE THIS OR ANY RELATED SUBJECTS WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE IN PEKING, GON STOOD AT OUR DISPOSAL. ALGARD SAID NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR INTENDED BROADEN MATTER ALONG SIMILAR LINES TO HIS DANISH AND SWEDISH COLLEAGUES IN PEKING. MGO HAD PREFACED CONVERSATION BY SAYING IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION NORDIC COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH VERY GOOD FRIENDS OF US, DID NOT RPT NOT ENTIRELY SHARE US VIEW OF VIETNAM SITUATION.

2. FOLLOWING IS MY INFORMAL RENDITION ALGARD'S REPORT, TRANPOSED FROM FIRST TO THIRD PERSON:

3. "AMBASSADOR MGO UNDERLINED STRONGLY NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVT DISPOSED TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. AT SAME TIME THEY WERE DEEPLY MISTRUSTFUL OF AMERICANS' INTENTIONS IN VIETNAM. STEADY ESCALATION AND SENDING OF NEW TROOPS INDICATED AMERICANS HAD INTENTION OF STAYING PERMANENTLY IN VIETNAM.

4. "MGO UNDERLINED NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVT IMPOSED ONLY ONE CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY THAT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM BE STOPPED. CLEARLY HAVING IN MIND THE CHINESE,

~~SECRET~~

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- OSLO 4531, JUNE 14, 1967

HE WENT TO LENGTHS TO UNDERLINE THAT SPEECHES FROM OTHER QUARTERS WHICH IMPOSED OTHER CONDITIONS INCLUDING FULL AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH VIETNAM DID NOT RPT NOT REFLECT NORTH VIETNAM GOVT'S THOUGHT. ON NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE ONE GAVE DECISIVE WEIGHT TO STOP IN BOMBING BECAUSE THIS WAS VIEWED AS RESPECT FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY AND SUCH A RESPECT WAS AN ABSOLUTE CONDITION FOR COMING TO CONFERENCE TABLE, BUT WAS ALSO THE ONLY CONDITION. WHEN THEY HAD COME TO CONFERENCE TABLE, NORTH VIETNAM POSITION WOULD BE VERY FLEXIBLE. 'WE ARE,' SAID AMBASSADOR MGO, 'READY FOR VERY FAR REACHING COMPROMISES TO GET AN END TO THE WAR.' AMBASSADOR ALGARD NOTED THAT RECENTLY ONE HAD IMPRESSION THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE WAS COOLER TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. AMBASSADOR MGO DENIED THIS STRONGLY. HE SAID THAT FORMERLY WHEN NORTH VIETNAM SHOWED AN INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS AMERICANS HAD TAKEN SUCH INTEREST AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS AND WITH RESULTS OF STRONGER ESCALATION. THIS WAS BACKGROUND AGAINST WHICH ONE MUST JUDGE SOME RECENT SPEECHES ON NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE. PROVIDED THERE WOULD BE A STOP IN BOMBING, NORTH VIETNAM WAS READY AT ANY TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND FAR REACHING COMPROMISES.

PAGE 4 RUDKSO 4531 ~~SECRET~~

5. "IN THIS CONNECTION THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF U THANT'S ROLE. AMB ALGARD SAID NORWAY STRONGLY SUPPORTED U THANT'S EFFORTS TO GET NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY AND NORWAY HAD ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE IN U THANT IN THIS CONNECTION. THEREFORE NORwegians HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY STATEMENTS OF CHINESE WHICH APPEARED TO HAVE INTENTION TO UNDERMINE U THANT AND TO LOOK WITH DISTRUST UPON HIS CAPACITIES AS MEDIATOR. AMB MGO MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE DID NOT RPT NOT SHARE CHINESE ESTIMATE OF U THANT. TO BE SURE U THANT'S LAST PROPOSITION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO NORTH VIETNAM, BUT NORTH VIETNAM VALUED U THANT'S PEACE EFFORTS AND JUDGED HIM ASIATIC STATESMAN WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE WAR IN VIETNAM INVOLVED.

6. "AMB MGO SAID HE HOPED DEVELOPMENTS WOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE SUCH FORM THAT NORTH VIETNAM MUST ASK FOR FOREIGN, AND IN FIRST INSTANCE CHINESE, HELP. THAT WAS ONE THING THAT THEY WOULD DO THEIR UTMOST TO AVOID. TO QUESTION UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVT FEEL FORCED TO ASK FOR HELP, HE SAID THAT BEFOREHAND ONE COULD NOT RPT NOT DETERMINE FIXED CRITERIA. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT AN AMERICAN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM IN ITSELF WOULD NOT RPT NOT NECESSITATE FOREIGN HELP. NORTH VIETNAM HAD AN ARMY OF 400 THOUSAND MEN WHICH WOULD BE

*New
thought*

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-3- OSLO 4531, JUNE 14, 1967

BE CAPABLE OF MASTERING SUCH A SITUATION. AMB ALGARD HAD IMPRESSION THAT ONLY DANGER OF DIRECT OCCUPATION OF ALL NORTH VIETNAM WOULD FORCE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVT TO ASK FOREIGN HELP. IT WAS PLAIN AMB MGO CONSIDERED IT VERY IMPORTANT TO CLARIFY NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION ON QUESTION OF FOREIGN HELP.

7., "AT END OF CONVERSATION AMB ALGARD BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN NORTH VIETNAM AND SAID IT HAD CAUSED CONCERN, INCLUDING CONCERN IN NORWAY, THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE HAD SO STRONGLY UNDERLINED THESE MEN WERE NOT RPT NOT WAS PRISONERS BUT WAR CRIMINALS. AMB MGO UNDERLINED THAT THIS WAS POINT OF PRINCIPLE FACT NORTH VIETNAM IS FORMALLY NOT RPT NOT AT WAR WITH US AND FOLLOWING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON HANDLING OF WAR PRISONERS DOES NOT RPT NOT THEREFORE APPLY. IF ON NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE THEY SAID THEY WOULD HANDLE WAR PRISONERS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH CONVENTIONS THEY WOULD THEREBY LEGALIZE AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN WAR. HE SAID AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE TREATED ON 'MAN TO MAN' BASIS, BUT HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MORE PRECISE. ALGARD SAID EVEN IF NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVT ON GROUNDS OF PRINCIPLE WOULD NOT RPT NOT APPLY RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL

PAGE 6 RUDKSO 4531 ~~SECRET~~

CONVENTIONS, HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESTIGE IF PEOPLE WERE CONVINCED THE PRISONERS WERE WELL TREATED. EVEN IF THEY WOULD NOT PERMIT INSPECTION BY THE RED CROSS, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND OTHER MEANS OF INSPECTING PRISON CAMPS, FOR EXAMPLE, THROUGH UN OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, IN SUCH A MANNER THAT DID NOT RPT NOT PREJUDICE NORTH VIETNAM'S POINT OF PRINCIPLE IN THIS MATTER. AMB MGO SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS A QUESTION WHICH PREOCCUPIED A GREAT MANY MEN AND WHICH COULD BE DAMAGING TO NORTH VIETNAM AND HE WOULD NOT RPT NOT EXCLUDE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE WOULD TAKE A NEW LOOK AT THIS QUESTION."

GP-3.. TIBBETTS

BT

~~SECRET~~

PROCESSED

92

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967
2:40 p.m.

Pres file
P

Mr. President:

The rainy season has arrived in
Laos, with wholesome results.

W. W. Rostow

Vientiane 7638

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlg, NARA, Date 6-10-91

INFO... CJCS-1 DJS-3 SJCS-1 J3-8 J5-2 SACS-3 NMCC-1
SECDEF-7 ASD/ISA-5 ASD/PA-3 DIA-15 CSA-1 CNO-5
CSAF-1 CMC-2 FILE-1(60)ETO/DS

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INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
RUMSDH/AMCON HONG KONG
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON
RUHHQA/CINCPAC
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LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By inf, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 7638

LIMDIS

1. AFTER SOME DELAY, THE RAINY SEASON HAS BEGUN IN EARNEST THROUGHOUT LAOS. HEAVY RAIN HAS BEEN FALLING FOR THE PAST TWO WEEKS IN THE PANHANDLE. DURING LAST SEVERAL DAYS, DOWNPOUR SO HEAVY IN NORTHERN LAOS AS TO MAKE FLYING ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. MEKONG RIVER VALLEY, WHICH HAD ALREADY RECEIVED NEARLY TWO FEET OF RAINFALL BY THIS TIME LAST YEAR, HAS RECEIVED SEVERAL INCHES

PAGE TWO RUMJFS 7638 ~~SECRET~~
IN PAST FEW DAYS AND RICE CULTIVATION CYCLE HAS BEGUN.

2. RESULT OF THIS SEASONAL CHANGE, AS IN THE PAST, HAS BEEN DRAMATIC REDUCTION IN LEVEL MILITARY ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY. MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS YEAR AND PREVIOUS YEARS IS THAT LAO GOVERNMENT AND FRIENDLY GUERRILLAS HOLD CONSIDERABLE TERRITRIAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH THEY FEEL FULLY CONFIDENT TO PRESERVE. IN FACT, THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY USED RAINY SEASON TO REGAIN DRY SEASON LOSSES. THIS RAINY SEASON THEY MAY BE ABLE CONVERT THAT SORT OF FORWARD ACTIVITY INTO POSITIVE TERRITORIAL GAINS.

3. ON HO CHI MINH AND SIHANOUK TRAILS, VEHICLE TRAFFIC HAS GROUND VIRTUALLY TO A HALT. THERE CONTINUES TO BE SOME SHUTTLE MOVEMENT ON FIRM, HIGH STRETCHES OF ROAD STRUCTURE, BUT LOWLAND REACHES HAVE BECOME IMPASSABLE. OUR ROADWATCH TEAMS REPORT THAT IN MANY STRETCHES OF BOTH STRUCTURES, GROUND HAS ALREADY REACHED SATURATION POINT AND STANDING WATER HAS

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~~SECRET~~

-2- VIENTIANE 7638, JUNE 9

COVERED ROADS. WITH GOOD LUCK, THIS CONDITION WILL PREVAIL FROM NOW UNTIL LATE OCTOBER. IT WILL MEAN THAT TRUCK TRAFFIC ON FULL LENGTH OF TRAILS WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE DURING THESE SEVERAL MONTHS AND THAT MAJOR USE OF THESE LOGISTICS ARTERIES WILL BE RULED

PAGE THREE RUMJFS 7638 ~~SECRET~~
OUT.

4. THIS DOES NOT RPT NOT MEAN THAT ENEMY USE OF LAO TERRITORY FOR LOGISTICS PURPOSE WILL CEASE ALTOGETHER DURING THE RAINS. WATERWAYS, BICYCLE TRAILS, AND HUMAN PORTERS WILL STILL BE USED. WE WILL SHIFT OUR ROAD WATCH TEAMS AND OUR TACTICS TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER, IT DOES MEAN THAT, BY AND LARGE, THOSE ENEMY UNITS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH DEPEND ON THESE TWO LOGISTICS ROUTES MUST LIVE ON SUPPLIES ALREADY IN PLACE OR IN CACHE FOR THE MONTHS AHEAD. IT CERTAINLY MEANS THAT THEY COULD NOT RPT NOT CALL UP MAJOR EMERGENCY LOGISTICS OVER THESE TWO STRUCTURES DURING THE PERIOD AHEAD.

5. WE DO NOT RPT NOT INTEND TO RELAX OUR ROAD WATCH AND OTHER VIGILANCE IN THE PANHANDLE, OR ELSEWHERE IN LAOS, DURING THE RAINS. INSTEAD, WE INTEND TO USE THIS TIME TO EXTEND AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS, TO WORK OUT BETTER LIAISON AND RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH 7TH AF, ETC. BUT WE WILL BE SURPRISED IF WE ENCOUNTER MUCH ENEMY ACTIVITY IN MOST REGIONS AND WILL REPORT AND EVALUATE WHAT WE SEE.

6. WE WILL, OF COURSE, BE ACUTELY INTERESTED IN ANY REFLECTIONS, EITHER POLITICAL OR MILITARY, WHICH ADDRESSEES MAY DETECT TO BEAR

PAGE FOUR RUMJFS 7638 ~~SECRET~~
OUT INEVITABLE ENEMY ACCEPTANCE OF THE FACT THAT THE MONSOON HAS MADE ITS ANNUAL MARK. SULLIVAN
BT

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967 -- 2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I doubt de Gaulle will be able to stay home now, after all his Big Four palaver; although he may send Pompidou, his Prime Minister.

And Wilson's already packed.

Therefore, it will be hard to avoid some kind of Big Four meeting -- not impossible, but hard.

If there's serious business, however, it will clearly be between you and Kosygin. If we can't resist Big Four pressures, we can assure:

- it comes at the end;
- it comes only after the Foreign Ministers have found an agreed Middle East formula.

We can rightly say a Big Four meeting would be unwise unless it ratified an agreement already arrived at.

I believe Kosygin announced because he felt this was the only way to assure the votes for the General Assembly.

I believe he is coming because he believes only a peace-maker stance can really retrieve something of the Soviet position from the Mid-East debacle -- a little like the Test Ban Treaty after the Cuba missile crisis.

W. W. Rostow

cc: McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71982-184

By reg/nc, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967
1:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker's weekly cable.
The net: slow, irregular progress on
a number of fronts, with Ky-Thieu
still worrying problem.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 28095

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 6-11-91

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC #11119

By fw/jcs NARA. Date 9-27-99

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~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Wednesday, June 14, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 28095)

Herewith my seventh weekly telegram:

A. General

General Westmoreland has submitted to me the report which I have requested on programs for reorientation of the Mission of the Vietnamese Armed Forces and improvement in their quality and performance. The report together with his recommendations covering not only activities already underway, but also proposals for further actions looking to both the immediate and longer-term is comprehensive and thorough. It is worthy of and will require careful study and I hope that we shall have an opportunity to go over it in some detail during Secretary McNamara's visit. Among the important matters treated in detail are:

A. Improving the leadership and enhancing the personnel effectiveness of the ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces through such things as improvement in the awarding of commissions and promotions, selective procedures, training of officer candidates, the introduction of an effective personnel management and accounting system, tightening up on discipline, improvement in the treatment of veterans in order to clear the tolls of those incapable of further active duty, and an expanded advisory effort to support properly the Revolutionary Development program;

B. To improve motivation and morale through more equitable pay scales, improvement in rations, and revitalization of the dependent housing program;

C. Improvement in the command structure and equipment of the Regional and Popular Forces and a revised motivation and indoctrination program to reflect the role of the Popular Forces soldier in Revolutionary Development;

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

D. A comprehensive training effort to improve intelligence and reconnaissance operations and to improve the combat effectiveness of battalions; training of ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces for support of Revolutionary Development, particularly in providing security and support to the civil population;

E. Experimentation with various forms of integrated US/Vietnamese operations such as the combined action concept (CAC) initiated by the U. S. Marine Corps; a "buddy system" in which a U. S. Army battalion is paired off with an ARVN battalion all the way down to squad level; a system in which an ARVN company is attached to a U. S. Army battalion; and "combined lightening teams" in which a U. S. squad and an ARVN squad will pair with a Popular Force platoon. The intent of all these operations is to raise the level of training and effectiveness of the ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces units and to practice the principle of economy of force for the U. S. units. As a result of these experiments, it is contemplated that a basic concept for integrated operations will be prepared and put into effect.

F. Institution of quarterly reviews at which time progress is measured against objectives, problems discovered and decisions taken. First of these reviews was held last month.

I have mentioned only a very few highlights among literally hundreds of actions underway to improve the performance of ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces bearing on both the immediate present and the longer term. While there is still a long way to go, particularly with the Regional and Popular Forces, the payoff of these many improved programs is already being felt in many areas.

A. The number of desertions has dropped to a little over half of what it was a year ago.

B. The number of missing in action has dropped to one-half of what it was in early 1966.

C. The trend of weapons lost has been reversed. In early 1966, ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces lost more than twice the number captured. The ratio is now the exact opposite.

D. In large-unit operations, ARVN is making more enemy contacts although fewer total operations are run.

E. In small-unit operations, the ARVN/Regional Forces/Popular Forces rate of enemy contacts has risen by thirty percent. These are encouraging signs although much remains to be done.

The Thieu-Ky situation is still unresolved in spite of the efforts of Ambassador Bui Diem and Foreign Minister Tran Van Do. Despite Ky's assertion both to Ambassador Bui Diem and to me that he would talk with Thieu and endeavor to reach an understanding, he has made only half-hearted attempts to do so and the two have had no meaningful talks. I have appointments today to see both Thieu and Ky. I shall stress to both of them our continuing concern at the prospects of candidacies which could divide the military and threaten national unity as a whole. Although both have asserted in their talks with me that their two candidacies will not **divide** the military and that General **Vien**, the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff, is determined to keep the Armed Forces aloof from politics and the Presidential campaign, I do not accept these statements at face value. I shall press Ky to talk with Thieu promptly to see if a basis still exists for cooperation between them. I intend to indicate again to both, as I have previously, that U. S. national interests cannot permit the vital Constitutional development in Vietnam to be threatened by personal ambitions or rivalry, or by measures to undermine the electoral process. In connection with the electoral process, there have been some disturbing developments in regard to the exercise of censorship and arbitrary press control. Equally disturbing are reports on some of General Loan's activities which would require National Police and National Security Chiefs in the provinces to support Ky actively in such a way as to assure his election. I intend to impress on Ky again the absolute importance, in his own interest as well as ours, of seeing to it that the elections are fair and free.

B. Political

There were no significant new developments on the surface this week with respect to the Thieu-Ky rivalry. Ky has, however, begun to press ahead quite openly with his campaign plans and the National Assembly is back at work after a brief boycott by the pro-Ky Democratic-Alliance Bloc. In an exclusive press interview reported June 12, Tran Van Huong reaffirmed his intention to run for President and indicated that his running-mate would be Southern Buddhist leader Mai Tho Truyen.

I again spoke with Bui Diem on June 8, about his efforts to work out a compromise between Thieu and Ky (Saigon, 27812). The two had reportedly met and talked amicably but with no solution emerging. Thieu told Diem on June 8, that he was still resentful of General Thang and of censorship of his statements by The Information Minister but he had no bad feelings towards Ky. Diem says he pursued the options open to Thieu with him at length indicating that if he (Thieu) withdrew he could be assured the top position in the Armed Forces or the presidency of the Senate. Thieu reportedly did not specify what practical solution might be acceptable but gave his word of honor that he would not split the military or undermine stability. Before leaving for Washington on June 11, Diem told us that while the situation had not fundamentally changed he was convinced that it remained under control. Diem had heard that Thieu might formally announce his candidacy on June 15. Diem thought this perhaps would make it more difficult for Thieu to withdraw but would not preclude a satisfactory arrangement.

I am not as sanguine as Bui Diem, but I continue to believe it highly desirable that the two principals should settle this problem themselves. As I mentioned, I am trying to see both Thieu and Ky as soon as possible and intend to pursue vigorously with each of them the necessity of resolving this problem without dividing the army and the country. I do not plan to indicate that we are trying to dictate who the Presidential candidate should be but rather to make them face up to the problem that exists and agree on an acceptable solution. In my talk with Ky I plan to raise with him some of his more blatant campaign activities which are causing a number of political leaders, not to mention the average citizen, to believe that the forthcoming Presidential elections will not be fair and free ones. (I report further on this below.) I am coming to believe that much of the problem between Thieu and Ky is explained by the former's resentment that Ky took the initiative in announcing his candidacy without thoroughly consulting Thieu and has since begun actively to mobilize the government apparatus in support of his campaign.

Although the draft Presidential Election Law states that the official Presidential campaign period only begins on August 3, Ky is now moving rapidly in an effort to assure his election, putting prospective civilian opponents with neither his means nor his position at a disadvantage. To cite several examples, earlier this week painted signs written in Vietnamese began to appear on walls and billboards throughout Saigon stating "The Government of Nguyen Cao Ky is the Government of the Poor". Again during the week Ky reiterated his position that censorship would continue during the Presidential campaign and there are reports that he plans to restrict papers favoring opposition candidates as much as possible while bestowing favors upon papers supporting his candidacy.

Of greater concern is a report that ~~National Police~~ Director Loan has begun systematically summoning police and military security officers from throughout the country in order to instruct them on how to assure that Ky is elected. The source of this report (which we have also had from another source) states that each officer is being instructed to submit weekly reports on the political situation in his province, including information on activities of Presidential and legislative candidates. Candidates who are not supporters of Ky are to be persuaded to switch their loyalties to Ky, by means of bribes if necessary. If this does not work, then, according to the source, "The exploitation of the vulnerabilities of the candidates will be considered as a means of exerting additional leverage." It is further stated that there will be a number of changes in police and military security personnel in this pre-election period determined by the incumbents' loyalty to Loan and Ky and their willingness to engage in manipulation of the elections.

I am disturbed by reports such as the foregoing which indicate that Ky is determined to get elected no matter what this requires. As an initial step we must impress upon the Prime Minister the need to distinguish between the normal advantages an incumbent enjoys when running for election and the unacceptable use of administrative resources, and I intend to do this. Should this approach not have the desired effect, we will have to seek more concrete ways to make our views felt and to curb the excesses of officials such as General Loan. While we want the most effective government we can find, we can not afford to end up with a narrowly-based regime requiring police pressures to maintain its position.

Last week I reported that the Democratic-Alliance Bloc walked out of the National Assembly on June 3, in an apparent effort to provide justification for the Directorate's amending the Presidential and Senatorial electoral laws. On June 7, Le Phuoc Sang and other Bloc leaders held a press conference at Saigon City Hall to clarify their position. Sang told newsmen that his Bloc had walked out of the Assembly simply to make its views known and that it planned to return to the assembly immediately.

On June 9, the Directorate met to consider the Upper House and Presidential Election Law and, in an official message written the same day, formally requested the Assembly to reconsider three provisions of the Upper House Election Law: (1). that the date of the Upper House election be changed to coincide with the Presidential election; (2). that voters be allowed to cast ballots for six lists instead of only one; and, (3). that the provision which would disqualify an entire list of Senatorial candidates if one of its members is adjudged pro-Communist be reinstated. (The Assembly had voted to drop this latter provision from the draft law at its June 6, session.) In addition, the Directorate informally proposed that the Upper House be reduced in size from 60 to 40 members.

The Assembly met in plenary session on June 13 to consider the Directorate's message. After heated debate, the Deputies decided, by roll call vote, to accept the Directorate's proposal that the dates of the Upper House and Presidential election coincide. With regard to the provision disqualifying an entire list of candidates if one member is found to be pro-Communist, there were insufficient votes to override the Directorate's point of view; and by an absolute majority of the Assembly's membership, Deputies voted to compromise between its original position and the Directorate's by allowing voters to select two lists. This represents a minor victory for Ky and his followers in the Assembly, since Ky reportedly argued strongly in favor of the "two list" solution at the June 9 Directorate meeting but was voted down. As for reducing the size of the Upper House, National Assembly Chairman Phan Khac Suu ruled that the Directorate's suggestion did not constitute a formal request for reconsideration and there was, therefore, no need to debate the matter.

Within the next few days, the Upper House Law will probably be transmitted to the Directorate which will, in turn, be in a position to promulgate both the Presidential and Upper House Election Laws. Barring any last-minute differences within the Directorate, these laws should be promulgated by the beginning of next week. There is now some urgency in the matter of promulgation since administrative preparations for such elections require about three and one-half months. Moreover, the filing date for Presidential candidates is June 30. If the detailed election schedule proposed by the Directorate is used, the filing date for Senatorial candidates will be June 30 as well. In a political sphere, the next two weeks promise to be quite frantic ones.

In the First Corps the Viet Cong again mortared Hue City, this time on the night of June 8. Casualties included 1 U.S. wounded, 2 Vietnamese civilians killed, and 10 Vietnamese, including 4 civilians, wounded. The incident has increased civilian concern over security and sparked renewal of rumors that an attack on the city of Hue is imminent. In most other parts of the First Corps, the incidence of Viet Cong-initiated military activity continued at an unusually low level.

On June 11 voting took place in 321 hamlets in 17 provinces for the fifth and final Sunday in the current series of elections for Hamlet Chiefs and Assistant Hamlet Chiefs. Some 163,743 voters went to the polls, a turnout of 77 percent of the registered voters in those areas. The ratio of candidates to seats was identical to last week's: 2.3 candidates for every seat. There were only two minor incidents of armed Viet Cong anti-election activity.

June 12 was a very important day for prisoner-of-war matters. The repatriation of sick and wounded, originally scheduled for June 2 after long preparations, finally took place on June 12: 39 seriously sick and wounded male POW's and 1 female POW with infant son walked across the Ben Hai River Bridge to North Vietnam.

We have excellent photographs of this repatriation, which we can use to good effect in pressing the North Vietnamese to release our sick and wounded. The South Vietnamese statements to the press that this was an amnesty marking the second anniversary of the Ky Government was not very helpful. Nevertheless, the repatriation was a major move by the Government of Vietnam which we can publicize effectively to exert pressure on the North Vietnamese.

On the same day, the Government of Vietnam released four Viet Cong in Qui Nhon, at our request, to stimulate a resumption of the reciprocal releases of U.S. and Viet Cong POW's. In this instance, Prime Minister Ky was attending an oath-taking ceremony for newly-elected Hamlet Chiefs in Vinh Dinh province, with Deputy Ambassador Locke and several other members of the diplomatic community accompanying him. They and all four Corps Commanders witnessed the release of the POW's. Prime Minister Ky, incidentally, went down from the platform to talk with them. He asked them if they wished to join the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and they said they had had enough of fighting.

These actions further improve our record on the POW problem. They bring to a total of 135 the POW's the Government of Vietnam has repatriated or released (101 repatriated to North Vietnam, and 34 released in South Vietnam.) This does not include the two PT boat POW's secretly repatriated via Cambodia. Thus far, the Viet Cong have released six U.S. POW's, and the North Vietnamese have released none at all.

C. Economic

Retail prices dropped slightly during the week, with the Saigon Retail Price Index moving from 278 to 271. Vegetable, pork and rice prices all declined. The Index of imported commodity prices went down a fraction to 220 from 221 last week.

The Saigon Port situation continues to improve and is much more encouraging than it was six months ago. Congestion and turnaround

times have decreased. During the first five months of this year, almost 1,275,000 tons of commercial cargo have been discharged in the port, an increase of 38 percent during the same period last year. There has been a corresponding increase of 60 percent in military cargo discharged at Saigon port.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees was down again for this reporting period, from 528 to 475. This compares with a figure of 275 during the same week last year. The total to date for 1967 is 16,175; last year at this time a total of 8,525 returnees had come in to the Chieu Hoi centers.

In connection with the current local elections, the Government of Vietnam informs us that as of May 21, a total of 7 Chieu Hoi ralliers had been elected to office. One was elected Village Chief; three were elected members of Village Councils; and three were elected Hamlet Chiefs.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending June 10, the enemy killed 66 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 66 and kidnapped 89. The dead included 3 National Police officers, 4 Revolutionary Development workers, 1 Village Chief and 1 Hamlet Chief. These figures may be compared with an average of 76 Vietnamese civilians killed each week during the past 7 weeks. A District Chief was killed this week in a Viet Cong terrorist attack against a hamlet 16 miles east of Saigon which also cost the life of one of our civilian District Representatives.

F. Visit of Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach

I am delighted that Secretary McNamara and Under Secretary Katzenbach and their colleagues will be here next week. There are many things we can usefully review and discuss. All matters they have indicated they wish to cover are important and I am happy we shall have the opportunity to go over them together.

TOP SECRET

95

Meeting With the President on Viet Nam
Thursday, June 15, 1967, 11:30 a. m.

AGENDA

I. COMPATRIOT. (Sec. McNamara)

- A. The Purpose
- B. Believed consequences for military supply situation.
- C. Risks of detection.
- D. Handling of detection.

(Mr. President: If you are inclined to act positively on this, I suggest you not announce a decision at this meeting. Word should go back to State that you are negative in attitude. Then it should move forward on the most narrow security track possible.)

II. Bombing Policy. (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)

- 1. Do we give the USSR an interval of several weeks to produce a negotiation, while cutting down around Hanoi-Haiphong?
- 2. If that effort fails (or is not attempted), should be go for:
 - A. Intensified attack versus Hanoi-Haiphong logistical base, including mining of ports.
 - B. Concentration south of the 20th parallel.
 - C. Extension of current program, short of mining the ports.
- 3. Relation of bombing decision to troop decision.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, June 15, 1967
11:25 a. m.

96

MR. PRESIDENT:

This specially prepared analysis of recent Hanoi attacks on Mae is interesting.

Note marked passage on page 4.

W. W. R.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-223
By CG, NARA Date 1-24-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

TOP SECRET

97

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967
11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

In light of attached, you may wish to decide about Kosygin session and ask Sec. Rusk to inform Soviet Embassy here.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5450

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 78, NARA, Date 6-10-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 372

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INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN IMMEDIATE 174
STATE GRNC

BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 5450

MOSCOW'S 5423

1. WHILE WE WERE IN FEDOSEEV'S OFFICE TODAY HE RECEIVED PHONE CALL WHICH HE SAID WAS ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT SPECIAL FLIGHT WOULD LEAVE FOR NEW YORK AT 6 A.M. LOCAL TOMMOROW MORNING. HE SAID THIS WAS NOT OFFICIAL YET, AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE US FURTHER DETAILS AND DELEGATION MEMBERS AS SOON AS HE COULD.

2. IN RESPONSE SOVIET REQUEST, WE HAVE ISSUED VISAS (UNDER WAIVER THROUGH INS, VIENNA) TO CREW OF SPECIAL AIRCRAFT WITH ETD O/A JUNE 15 FOR 10 DAY STAY.

GP-3. GUTHRIE
BT

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-15

By sl/p, NARA, Date 6-11-91

Thurs., Jul 15, 1967
11:15 a. m.

98

MR. PRESIDENT:

I believe this note of commendation
from you is justified.

Art and the boys did just fine under
pressure.

W. W. R.

Attachment

1 susp
2 Pass file

98a

June 15, 1967

Dear Art:

Walt Rostow has told me -- and I had the opportunity to observe for myself -- how well you and your crew functioned during the fast-moving events of the past weeks.

You and your colleagues should know what a comfort it is to have the Situation Room manned by such a devoted, professional, and levelheaded team.

Sincerely,

Mr. Arthur McCafferty
White House Situation Room

LBJ:WWR:mz

97

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967--- 10:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

Here are my views on bombing policy.

1. Bob McNamara believes that we may have to live with the war through 1968 and beyond. He holds that we can best do this if we adopt a relatively low-key strategy. This means two things:

-- We should not go for a big troop increase but work patiently and gradually to improve the performance of the Vietnamese; and

-- Limit our bombing to the region south of the 20th parallel.

He believes this is the setting in which the U. S. public will best accommodate itself to seeing the war through; and he holds that in this setting the forces of moderation in Hanoi are most likely to move towards a gradual decline in the level of hostilities and, perhaps, negotiations.

2. Pending the results of the investigation of manpower requirements by Bob, Bus and Nick, I am inclined to think that we need:

-- more troops to work with the Vietnamese in getting at the provincial main force units and thus lay the base for pacification;

-- a decision for some limited call-ups would impress Moscow and Hanoi more than anything else that we have the capacity to see the war through, which is the critical issue of judgment in Hanoi; and

-- that if we do this, we need a strong bombing policy in the northern part of Viet Nam, but short of direct attack on shipping. (Current evidence is that the port is bottlenecking for one reason or another and, therefore, it is internal transport and concentration of supply rather than ships which are the appropriate attritional targets.)

3. Therefore, I would propose:

-- that you give the Russians an interval of several weeks, perhaps via the Kosygin trip, to get Hanoi into serious negotiations, while holding bombing in the north well away from Hanoi and Haiphong;

-- and then make your decision on manpower and bombing policy together, as a package, *after Bob returns*

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

100

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Thursday - June 15, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Soviet Missiles in Cuba

The CIA-DIA Team which keeps watch over military developments in Cuba has received information from one Cuban emigre which makes it "somewhat less certain" of its conclusion that there are no strategic missiles in Cuba. The attached report describes the information, the analysis made by the team, and the recommendations they are forwarding to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for increased intelligence activity to check ^{the} information out.

I think the CIA-DIA team has done a good initial job in checking out the story. The intelligence is far from conclusive, but solid enough to put us on guard. I agree that the quality of the source and the nature of the information justifies greater effort to verify the accuracy of the intelligence. I have asked Dick Helms to convene the USIB as soon as possible to get on with the job.

I was appalled to find that on a subject as politically sensitive as this one 60 copies of the report were printed. From 20 to 30 copies are floating around the Pentagon and State. I have asked Dick Helms to retrieve all the copies, to handle further investigation of the matter on a most restrictive basis, and to keep you directly informed of the progress of the investigation.

Attachment *OCI #1327/67*
4/8
report to Pres.
20 white cpy here
W. W. Rostow

Green copy - Rostow
1 white cpy - Mr. Bowdler

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-26
By cb, NARA, Date 8-31-95

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

101

~~101~~
2. Profile

Limited Official Use

Thursday - June 15, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Secretary Rusk's recommendation that you receive Ambassador Larrea of Ecuador who is retiring from diplomatic service.

The Ambassador was deeply embarrassed by Arosemena's performance at Punta del Este. His departure in part reflects his lack of sympathy with policy at home.

It would be a nice gesture for you to receive him.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Rusk recommendation

Limited Official Use



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2303

101a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

June 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ecuadorean Ambassador's Proposed Call

Recommendation:

That you receive Ambassador Larrea at an early date.

Approve Disapprove

Discussion:

Ecuadorean Ambassador Larrea has asked the Department to try to set up an appointment for him with you at an early date. He states that while going through the reception line at the White House diplomatic reception a few weeks ago he briefly raised this possibility with you, and understands that you would be pleased to receive him.

The stated purpose of such a call would be to pursue further the subjects you and President Arosemena discussed at Punta del Este, and he would like to present a valuable gift of Ecuadorean colonial statuary. This appointment would also constitute a departure call as Ambassador Larrea is retiring from diplomatic service. Ambassador Larrea has commented to Department officers upon the cordial personal relationship established between you and Arosemena during your conversations at Punta del Este and has called attention to your having mentioned to Arosemena that you would welcome a continuing dialogue with the Ecuadorean Government regarding the matters discussed at the Summit Conference.


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- 2 -

The Department perceives no objection to such a call by Ambassador Larrea. In fact such a conversation could be useful in terms of United States-Ecuadorean relations, and would be appropriate prior to his departure. To derive maximum value from any such meeting, we believe that you might once again discuss the need for Ecuador's full self-help efforts as Ecuador strives to carry out its economic and social development programs.

If you agree to receive Ambassador Larrea, the Department will be pleased to prepare briefing papers on this and other subjects which might be raised.



Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Lump
2. Pres file 100

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Other developments in the Near East/South Asia
apart from the Arab/Israeli conflict.

1. The Indian and Pakistani defense budgets are now out. Both show a leveling off in real terms. India's is down from her interim budget a bit, and Pakistan's is considerably down from last year. The Pakistani Ambassador attributes the reduction to our efforts. A separate memorandum is in preparation.
2. Greece and Turkey are resuming their dialogue over Cyprus, interrupted by the military coup. Generally they appear to have picked up where they left off, which is a good sign, though even if they agree on a solution, they'll have real problems with Makarios.
3. Our military negotiations with Turkey seem to be proceeding satisfactorily. Some tough points have already been resolved and the atmosphere is improving.
4. Turkey's food production program is gaining momentum.
5. The situation in Aden is worsening markedly. The Arab defeat has made Aden's Arab nationalists even more excitable and her terrorists more extreme. The British may have even more difficulty in withdrawing in good order.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27

Thursday, June 15, 1967

~~SECRET~~

By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Revisions in Vice President's Schedule

We proposed that the Vice President visit Manila June 27-29. It turns out that President Marcos has major provincial commitments and thinks he must leave Manila the morning of the 28th at the latest (he had planned to leave the 27th).

It has been suggested we move the Vice President's arrival in Manila up to the 26th with departure on the 28th.

However, if the Vice President arrives in Seoul on the 28th, he will be a day in advance of the other delegations. Secretary Rusk believes this would be unwise -- both because it will complicate arrangements with the Koreans, and because we might not wish to extend the Vice President's stay unduly in light of the problem of assembly election irregularities.

In the attached memorandum, Secretary Rusk urges that the gap between Manila and Seoul be filled with a stop-over in Taiwan. He believes the people in Taiwan (not merely the Gimo) will be deeply hurt if we omit their country except for clear and over-riding reasons.

The Secretary also notes that Taiwan is playing a very constructive role in regional economic matters (especially agriculture) and that economic development and regional cooperation could be the theme of a Taipei stop.

I wonder if President Marcos is as inflexible as the message from Manila suggests. He has a good deal to gain by this visit. We might go back to him and propose either that he try to extend his departure from Manila to the provinces by a day -- or that he might want the Vice President to accompany him on the first day of his provincial tour.

If President Marcos's schedule is really firm and we have to move up the Vice President's arrival by a day, he might go to Seoul as planned and use the first day to see a bit of the countryside before he gets caught up in the formalities of the inauguration.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I would opt for:

-- pushing Marcos a bit to either readjust his schedule or have the Vice President accompany him for a day in the provinces;

-- if the schedule must be pushed ahead, getting a day in the Korean countryside;

-- a Taipei stop as third choice.

You may wish to discuss this with the Vice President who is now in Minnesota.

W. W. Rostow

Follow procedure you outline _____

Advance schedule in Manila a
day and arrange stopover in
Taipei _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Revisions in Vice President's Schedule

In accordance with your instructions, we have been working on a Manila visit prior to the Vice President's arrival in Seoul, and Blair last night reached Marcos personally to ask about a visit between June 27 and June 29.

Blair's report is that Marcos has major provincial commitments and feels he simply must leave Manila on the 27th or -- Blair believes -- at the latest on the morning of the 28th. In the light of this, we have now moved the Vice President's arrival in Manila up to the 26th, which would mean that he would leave on the 28th.

Unfortunately, if the Vice President arrives in Korea on the 28th, he will be nearly two days in advance of the arrival of other delegates to the Inauguration, and we believe this would be unwise both for this reason and because we are deeply concerned over the election irregularities in Korea and thus would not wish to extend his stay unduly.

However, the open day and a half now permit a stop in Taipei, which had hitherto been omitted from the schedule. I myself had felt considerable concern over the omission of Taipei, and Ambassador McConaughy has pointed out -- I believe rightly -- that the people in Taipei (not merely the Gimo) could be deeply hurt if we omitted Taipei except for clear and over-riding reasons.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-25
By io, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In my judgment, a stop in Taipei could fit readily into the over-all regional and economic emphasis of the whole trip. Inevitably, there would be a call on the Gimo and presumably a dinner, but we should be able to arrange visits to economic projects and avoid any military implications. The fact is that the Nationalist Chinese are playing a most constructive role in regional developments and are entitled to recognition both for this and their own agricultural and population programs and general economic success. This could be made the theme of a Taipei stop.

The Vice President is being informed this morning of all these considerations. His staff has agreed that the matter is one requiring your decision, although you may wish to talk direct to him. My own recommendation is set forth below.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to explore urgently with Taipei the possibility of the Vice President stopping there, on the 28-29, so that he would arrive in Seoul on the late afternoon or evening of the 29th in accordance with the previous schedule.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 15, 1967

1041

Pre file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Lunch for Ludwig Erhard, July 11

At Tab A is a suggested guest list for your luncheon with Ludwig Erhard on Tuesday, July 11. (You will recall that you earlier said you wanted a list of "the best Germans in the country." There is a domestic shortage of top-notch Germans, and we should invite those available to the Kiesinger dinner, July 7. Most of the people we have suggested, although not German, have long-time connections with Germany. Many of them are old friends of Erhard's. All have met him.)

Bess Abell may have others she will want to invite. Some of the people we have suggested may not be able to come; Bess could add others in their place. I think that a guest list of around 30 people would be appropriate.

May we send the attached list to Bess as a starter?

Yes _____ No _____ See me _____

At Tab B, for your approval, is a proposed press release on the visit. (The University of Michigan has already announced that they will give Erhard an honorary degree on July 14.)

I believe that we should make an announcement. I think Erhard would expect this -- but it should be low-key, and done as soon as possible in order to avoid upstaging Kiesinger. An announcement now would probably attract less attention than it would later. If we wait, it might leak and this could be awkward.

OK for George to issue release
within next few days _____

Release after Kiesinger visit _____

No release _____

Speak to me _____

Eag
ieburger/Moose 6/15

W. W. Rostow

PROPOSED GUEST LIST - ERHARD LUNCHEON
JULY 11, 1967

1. The Vice President
2. Secretary Rusk
3. Ambassador Knappstein
4. Ambassador McGhee
5. George Ball
6. McGeorge Bundy
7. General Lucius Clay
8. James B. Conant
9. Douglas Dillon
10. Governor Harriman
11. Walter Heller
12. Luther Hodges
13. Senator Javits
14. Senator Robert Kennedy
15. John Leddy
16. Senator Mansfield
17. John McCloy
18. Speaker McCormack
19. Paul Nitze
20. Alfred Puhon (Office Director for Germany in State)
21. Congressman Reuss
22. Dr. Frederick Seitz (President, National Academy of Sciences)
23. August Steuer (President, German-American Society of New York)
24. Werner von Braun
25. Walt Rostow
26. Francis Bator

White House

1000

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

The President has invited former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard to have lunch with him at the White House on Tuesday, July 11. The former Chancellor is coming to this country at the invitation of the University of Michigan. The University, in connection with the celebration of its 150th anniversary, is planning to honor former Chancellor Erhard by awarding him an honorary degree on July 14.

6/14/67

PRESERVATION COPY

6/15/67

105

Proposed reply to question: Will the President join in a summit conference with Mr. Kosygin?

Answer: If other Foreign Ministers come to the proposed General Assembly meeting, Secretary Rusk will be there as our spokesman.

The President would, of course, be prepared to meet with Mr. Kosygin if that is also his wish.

The time and place for such a meeting has not yet been discussed or determined.

Pres file

Secret Thursday - June 15, 1967

Mr. President:

This first-hand account of the situation inside Cuba from [REDACTED] has some interesting insights.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

(Enclosure 1 to A-1255,
Mexico D. F.)

Secret

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NL/RAC 99-251
By *SJ*, NARA, Date 11/19/01

106a

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure No. 1
A-1255, Mexico D.F.

MEMORANDUM

Mexican Ambassador to Cuba, Fernando Pamanes Escobedo, made the following comments to Embassy officer Francis Sherry on June 2, 1967.

1. Ambassador Pamanes feels popular discontent in Cuba is now stronger than ever. The main cause is food and clothing shortage with milk, meat and leather items in extremely short supply. Ration coupons are not being honored. Further discontent is caused by bad public administration and disruption of family and business life by partial mobilizations and compulsory work in the fields. Discontent has not reached the point where active resistance has started, but it is the Ambassador's opinion that discontent is now dangerously close to the point where people might express dissatisfaction in much stronger terms than they have up to now.

2. The Ambassador explained that the recent partial mobilization was for political as well as military reasons. Following the landing incident in Venezuela, components of the regular Cuban Army were deployed along Cuba's southern coast, particularly in Oriente province. Reservists were not called but Cubans activated numbers of vigilante and guard groups which in turn freed the regular Army troops from guard and other duties. Based on reports made by various people who had visited the southern part of Cuba, Pamanes estimated that more than 30 thousand troops were freed for defensive duties along the southern coast by placing guards and militia-men on alert status. This type of partial mobilization allowed Castro to further tighten the grip of the regime on the people although the Cubans also appeared genuinely apprehensive of possible Venezuelan reprisals backed by the United States. Without mentioning his name, Pamanes said that he was told by a Cuban official speaking privately that the Cubans foresaw the extreme possibility that the Venezuelans might bomb or shell Cuban installations or attempt limited commando raids along the Cuban coast.

3. During one of his travels to the port of Mariel in April 1967, Pamanes observed the unloading of an unidentified Soviet ship from a distance which included large, long boxes which he felt probably contained small to medium-size ground to air missiles. Four to six were being loaded on trailers of about 30-ton capacity each. Pamanes spotted 8 such trailers which were hauled away under strong escort. This is the only unloading of missiles observed by Ambassador Pamanes since his arrival in Cuba.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-288
By iv, NARA Date 2-3-00

4. In the course of a social function Ambassador Pamanes was recently told by two members of the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet Cuban relations are deteriorating. The Soviets took exception to the recent declaration by Castro that the only way to establish a Socialist system in Central America and South America is by violent subversive action. They also hinted their country is getting tired of paying to support a country which apparently has little faith or trust in the USSR.
5. The Ambassador was recently advised by a member of the Cuban Government that a new group of U.S. citizens would probably be allowed to leave in the not too distant future. Pamanes said he had not seen the Castro brothers since the winter of 1966. While Pamanes did not endorse the suggestion that the Cubans are using the eventual release of U.S. citizens still in Cuba to better their relations with Mexico when frictions occurred between the two countries, he admitted there is little doubt in his mind that the Cubans are using the issue of the release of U.S. citizens as a "political card."
6. Ambassador Pamanes confirmed that the Mexican Embassy in Havana was practically emptied of Cuban asylees at the time of the first group of U.S. citizens were freed from the island. Only 4 remain from that group, but another 13 have since joined them.

107

Pres file

SECRET

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
9:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I want to call these two telegrams to your attention because they indicate that what we now appear to see before us -- namely, a Soviet effort to rally the Arab world against us and around the Arab radicals -- may not hold up.

We can afford to stay steady on course and be calm and play for time.

W. W. Rostow

usun

USUN 5722
Beirut 11455

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72982-184

By ref/les, NARA, Date 6-11-91

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Action

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Info

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUN 14 PM 12-58

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Rortow

~~SECRET~~ USUN 5722

EXDIS

AMB JAKOBSON (FINLAND-PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THEIR AMBASSADORS FROM MOSCOW AND CAIRO REPORT DOUBTS THAT NASSER CAN SURVIVE DEBACLE AND THAT CURRENT STIRRINGS INDICATE THAT CHANGES IN WAR MAY BE IMMINENT.

JAKOBSON ALSO INDICATES THAT FINNISH VIEW IS THAT SOVS WILL NOT RESORT TO DIRECT MILITARY MEASURES UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ALTHOUGH RESUPPLY IS NOT RULED OUT.

FINNISH VIEW IS THAT IF KOSYGIN COMES TO GA IT WILL BE FOR PURPOSE OF HAVING TALKS WITH US ON SUBJECT.

FINALLY HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT SOVS WERE SHIFTING FROM CAIRO TO ALGIERS AS THEIR BASE FOR OPERATIONS AND INFLUENCE IN ARAB WORLD.

GP-1

GOLDBERG
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

~~SECRET~~

PRODUCED
AUTHORIZATION
SECRETARY

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PR RITY 2329
STATE GRNC

Rostow
107b

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 11455

1. FOLLOWING IS CAPUKLE SUMMARY EMBOFF'S CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER INFORMATION MICHEL EDDE, DEPUTY KHALIL KHOURY, AND COUSIN OF PRESIDENT, PIERRE HELOU. ALL CHRISTIANS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305

By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

2. USG MUST SUPPORT PRESIDENT HELOU AND HIS GOVT. THEY FACING REAL CRISIS AND NEED US MORAL SUPPORT AND PERHAPS LATER ECONOMIC SUPPORT.

3. STATE OF TOURIST AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN COUNTRY REAL BLOW TO LEBANON AND IF PROLONGED COULD DO IRREPARABLE DAMAGE TO LEBANON.

4. NASSER IS FINISHED AND MOSLBA LEADERS HERE KNOW IT. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY IS SHAMBLES AND AMB GHALEB HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH NASSER FOR SEVERAL DAYS. UAR PAID AGENTS ALREADY SEEKING NEW SOURCES OF INCOME AND THEY MAY BE EXPECTED TO CALL AT DOOR OF US EMBASSY WITHIN NEXT THREE OR FOUR WEEKS. IF USG DOES NOT "PICK THEM UP", RUSSIANS MOST CERTAINLY WILL. ADVISE THAT ANTI-AMERICAN CLIMATE COULD CHANGE QUICKLY IF USG TAKES OVER THESE AGENTS. SAME APPLIES TO ELEMENTS BEIRUT PRESS WHICH HERETOFORE SUBSIDIZED BY UAR. THEY TOO WILL SOON COME CALLING ON US EMBASSY FOR THEIR BREAD AND BUTTER. IT IN US INTERESTS TO FEED THEM IN THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD:

5. KAMAL JUMBLATT WAS REAL LEADER OF ANTI-US CAMPAIGN AND DEMONSTRATIONS. ALL RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS IN LEBANESE GOVT ARE THOROUGHLY FED UP WITH HIM. 6-2 WILL NOT REPEAT NOT SUPPORT HIM NOW OR IN FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS.

6. PROPOSED BOYCOTT US-UK GOODS IS UNTHINKABLE FOR LEBANON. WHOLE ECONOMY WOULD COLLAPSE WITHOUT DAMAGING

USG ONE BIT. GOL WILL FIGHT BOYCOTT IDEA IN BEST WAY IT KNOWS HOW THOUGH GREAT CAUTION MUST BE USED.

7. MINISTRY INFORMATION HAS CONSISTENTLY REFUSED PERMIT AHMED SHUKAIRY TO BROADCAST OVER RADIO LIBAN URGING BOYCOTT EVERYTHING US AND UK. GOL WILL CONTINUE DO SO.

8. USG AND THE ISRAELIS MUST UNDERSTAND NO ARAB LEADER DARES AGREE TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH ISRAEL. ANYONE ATTEMPTING DO SO WOULD BE SHOT.

9. SYRIA IS REAL PROBLEM NOW. SYRIANS HAVE NOT TASTED DEFEAT. NEVERTHELESS THERE IS MUCH DISSENT IN RANKS OF MILITARY, PARTICULARLY AMONG SUNNIS WHO HAVE BEEN SUBORDINATED BY ALAWITE, DRUSE AND CHRISTIANS. RUSSIA WILL MOVE IN TO SYRIA RAPIDLY TO USE IT AS BASE FOR OPERATIONS. RUSSIANS DELIGHTED NASSER IS

~~PAGE 4 REF ID: A1455~~
-USE ONE BIT. GOL WILL FIGHT BOYCOTT IDEA IN BEST WAY
IT KNOWS HOW, THOUGH () AT CAUTION MUST BE USED.

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AS BASE FOR OPERATIONS. RUSSIANS DELIGHTED NASSER IS
GONE AS HE WAS ACTUALLY AN OBSTACLE TO COMMUNIST
PENETRATION IN MID-EAST.

10. NASSER'S DESIGNATION OF MUHYEDDINE AS HIS SUCCESSOR
(BEFORE NASSER REINSTATED) INDICATES EGYPTIAN HIERARCHY

~~PAGE 4 REF ID: A1455~~ ~~SECRET~~

INTERESTED IN MAKING GESTURE TO US. US CONSEQUENTLY
SHOULD IMMEDIATELY SEIZE INITIATIVE AND SEND HIGH-
RANKING AMERICAN TO CAIRO TO EXPLORE BASES FOR FUTURE
COOPERATION, INCLUDING AID.

11. EGYPT, JORDAN, LEBANON AND PERHAPS SYRIA WILL BE
IN DESPERATE POSITION ECONOMICALLY SOON. US SHOULD NOT
ABANDON THEM TO RUSSIA WHO WILL CERTAINLY MOVE IN QUICKLY
IF US DOES NOT ACT.

12. NEXT WEEKS WILL BE CRUCIAL FOR LEBANON. HOWEVER
THEY MORE OPTIMISTIC TODAY THAN YESTERDAY THAT PROFESSIONAL
STRIFE CAN BE AVOIDED. ALL CHRISTIAN LEADERS
ARE COOPERATING TO SHOW MOSLEMS THEY WISH PRESERVE NATIONAL
UNITY AND THAT THEY RESPECT AND SHARE MOSLEM'S
SHAME OVER LOSS OF WAR AND THAT THEY DESIRE COOPERATE WITH
MOSLEMS FOR GOOD OF LEBANON. THEY FEEL THEIR EFFORTS
ARE SHOWING SOME SUCCESS AND THAT MOSLEMS ARE BECOMING
LESS INTERESTED IN DEMONSTRATING VIOLENTLY THEIR ANGER

~~PAGE 5 REF ID: A1455~~

AND FRUSTRATIONS. NEVERTHELESS ACTS OF TERRORISM BY
FANATIC ELEMENTS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE. UNFORTUNATELY
US AND UK INSTALLATIONS WILL BE INCLUDED AS TARGETS.

12. ALL EXPRESSED KEEN DESIRE KEEP CLOSE TOUCH WITH
EMBASSY AND SAID THEY WOULD WORK TOWARD CALMING DOWN ANTI-
AMERICAN ATMOSPHERE IN LEBANON. ALL AGREE THAT CLOSE
US RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON IS ESSENTIAL FOR LEBANON'S
PRESERVATION.

MIDDLETON

~~SECRET~~

108

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
7:30 p.m.

Presfile

Mr. President:

A response was drafted for my signature, to the telegram to you from your friend Jim Novy. I thought you'd probably prefer to answer him yourself; hence, the attached draft letter. You now have a choice: the President signs; or Rostow signs.

W. W. Rostow

President signs _____

Rostow signs _____

108a

June 14, 1967

Dear Jim:

As you well know, your concern over the situation in the Middle East of recent days was fully shared here.

We shall be doing all we can to bring out of the conflict a stable peace and prosperity for all in that troubled region.

Thank you for sending me your thoughts.

Sincerely,

LBJ

Mr. Jim Novy
Post Office Box 2115
Austin, Texas 78767

LBJ:WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET COMINT~~

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
5:35 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting analysis of the Israeli political situation. With practically no direct knowledge of Israeli politics, I am a little skeptical of the final conclusion; that is, I suspect Dayan may be more capable of making concessions to get a definitive peace settlement than a weak Prime Minister.


SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-223
By cb, NARA Dste 1-24-01

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Cy 1
13 June 1967


Special Assessments on the Middle East Situation

112

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 14, 1967,
5:30 p. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

This minor report from Moscow
may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 5434

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rsj, NARA, Date 6-10-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W/D

110a

17

87-82

~~SECRET~~

Action

INRD
Info

RSR

RR RUFHOL RUEHCR
DE RUEHCR 5434FD 1641750
ZNY SSSSS
R 131600Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY MUNICH
INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 5434

011320
1967 JUN 13 PM 3 17

Post

REF: MUNICH 1014

ROGER CHANNEL

1. RE REFTEL FOLLOWING MAY BE OF INTEREST:

- A. ON JUNE 6, YOUNG SOVIET GEOLOGIST WITH JEWISH NAME TOLD EMB OFF THOUSANDS OF SOVIET CITIZENS WOULD VOLUNTEER FIGHT FOR ISRAEL IF THEY COULD.
- B. ON JUNE 8, ISRAELI DIPLOMAT TOLD EMB OFF HIS EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED MANY CALLS FROM SOVIETS WISHING ISRAEL WELL IN THE WAR.

2. UNUSUALLY LARGE EMPHASIS ON SUPPORT FOR SOVIET GOVERNMENT

POSITION IN COUNTRY-WIDE PROTEST MEETINGS NOW GOING ON SUGGESTS REGIME MORE CONCERNED ABOUT POPULAR REACTION THAN IS USUALLY THE CASE. THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE CONSIDERING FACT OF 3 MILLION JEWS IN USSR, MANY OF WHOM OCCUPY IMPORTANT POSITIONS ESPECIALLY IN SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS. FURTHERMORE, ARABS HAVE NEVER BEEN VERY POPULAR HERE. CROWD OF SOVIET PROTESTERS WHICH GATHERED AT BRITISH EMBASSY AND AT OUR EMBASSY JUNE 10 WAS DISTINGUISHED MAINLY BY ITS APATHY.

3. MORE DETAILS OUR A-1814 BEING POUCHED. GP-1 GUTHRIE
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 4/28/78
By rs/cher, NARA, Date 6-11-81

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
5:00 p. m.

111

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Anderson reports in as follows.

His "guess" is that they are making progress.

The Panamanians want more money. Bob's not giving.

One Panamanian says he may have to resign if he doesn't get more money; another says they may have to go back to President Robles.

But Bob's "hunch" is that they'll settle -- not sure, but feel.

W. W. R.

112

SECRET

Pres. file

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker, for the first time, begins to lean on Ky.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 28090, 2 sections

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NAWA, Date 6-11-91

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1508
INFO RUHHQA/CINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 28090

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

DECLASSIFIED

ESDIX

Authority NLJ 90-262

REF: STATE 210835 AND 210584

By reg/isp, NARA, Date 6-11-91

Rostow

1. I HAD A MEETING OF APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER KY THE AFTERNOON OF JUNE 14 AND I EXPECT TO SEE GENERAL THIEU LATER THIS EVENING.

2. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER I HAD THREE MAIN QUESTIONS THAT I WISHED TO RAISE WITH HIM. I SAID THAT WE HAD SEEN INCREASING SIGNS OF ARBITRARY CENSORSHIP IN THE PRESS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS WHICH MIGHT LIMIT THE CAPABILITIES OF CANDIDATES TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN. I RECOGNIZED THAT THERE WERE GENUINE NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS FOR

~~PAGE 2 RUMBLE 28090 SECRET~~

CENSORSHIP IN WARTIME, BUT IN RECENT WEEKS THE CENSORSHIP HAD BEEN FAR BROADER THAN THIS AND APPEARED TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE STATEMENTS OF CANDIDATES AND OTHER MATTERS CONNECTED WITH THE ELECTIONS. I NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT THE CHIEF OF STATE'S OWN REMARKS ON THESE SUBJECTS HAD EVEN BEEN CENSORED OUT OF THE LOCAL PRESS. I TOLD KY I THOUGHT IT WAS VITAL THAT ON THIS QUESTION, AS ON OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE ELECTIONS, AN IMPRESSION NOT BE CREATED THAT ARBITRARY AND REPRESSIVE MEASURES WERE BEING USED. I ADDED THAT THE FOREIGN PRESS WAS ALREADY BECOMING AWARE OF THIS SITUATION AND THAT WE HAD EVEN HAD INDICATIONS OF CONCERN FROM CONGRESSMEN AND OTHER CIRCLES IN THE U.S. I SAID I WAS SURE THAT HE WOULD APPRECIATE WHAT A DIFFICULT SITUATION WOULD ARISE THESE MEASURES REACHED SUCH PROPORTIONS AS TO BRING INTO QUESTION HIS GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS REGARDING FAIR ELECTIONS.

3. KY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME OVERLY ENTHUSIASTIC STEPS TAKEN BY THE CENSORS BUT SAID THAT WE HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN THIS COUNTRY THE PRESS, WHETHER

~~PAGE 3 RUMBLE 28090 SECRET~~

OVER CLANDESTINE, WOULD ENGAGE IN UNLIMITED CHARACTER ASSASSINATION IF THEY WERE NOT RESTRAINED AND THIS WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE AN UNSTABILIZING EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. HE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT LIKE THE U.S. AND WE HAD TO UNDERSTAND THIS. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY, HOWEVER, THAT HE REALIZED CENSORSHIP OF MATTERS RELATING TO CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN HAD TO BE FAIRLY ADMINISTERED. HE SAID THAT HE ALREADY HAD SOMEONE FROM GENERAL THIEU'S PRESS STAFF IN THE CENSORSHIP OFFICE AND IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO HAVE EACH OF THE CANDIDATES ASSIGN A REPRESENTATIVE TO THIS OFFICE TO MAKE DECISIONS REGARDING CENSORSHIP. I AM

PRESERVATION COPY

RELATING TO CANDIDATES AND THE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN HAD TO BE FAIRLY ADMINISTERED. HE SAID THAT HE ALREADY HAD SOMEONE FROM GENERAL THIEU'S PRESS STAFF IN THE CENSORSHIP OFFICE AND IT WAS HIS INTENTION TO HAVE EACH OF THE CANDIDATES ASSIGN A REPRESENTATIVE TO THIS OFFICE TO MAKE DECISIONS REGARDING CENSORSHIP. I ARO RAISED WITH KY THE REPORTS WE HAD HAD THAT REQUESTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW NEWSPAPERS BY CANDIDATES WERE BEING REFUSED. KY SAID THAT HE DID INDEED NOT INTEND TO ALLOW AN MORE NEWPAPERS TO BE ESTABLISHED, THAT THIS HAD BEEN GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS, NOTING THAT THERE WERE 27 ALREADY IN SAIGON AND THAT THERE WERE PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CANDIDATES TO USE EXISTING NEWSPAPERS.

~~PAGE 4 - 23709 - C - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1~~

4. I THEN TOLD KY THAT I HAD ALSO BEEN GREATLY DESTURBED BY OTHER REPORTS INDICATING THAT MEASURES WERE BEING TAKEN BY HIS SUPPORTERS TO USE QUESTIONABLE TACTICS AND PRESSURE TO ASSURE HIS ELECTION. I REITERATED THAT THE U.S., WITH ALL ITS INVESTMENT HERE IN MEN AND MONEY, COULD NOT TOLERATE THE USE OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD MAKE A FAIR VOTE IMPOSSIBLE. I CITED SPECIFICALLY RECENT REPORTS WE HAD HAD THAT GENERAL LOAN AND HIS MEN WERE BRINGING PRESSURE THROUGH POLICE AND MILITARY SECURITY CIRCLES TO ASSURE THAT THE NECESSARY VOTE WAS OBTAINED FOR KY'S TICKET OR TO REMOVE OFFICIALS WHO DID NOT COOPERATE. KY DID NOT DENY SPECIFICALLY THAT GENERAL LOAN HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN SUCH PRESSURE BUT SAID HE HAD CAUTIONED LOAN AS A FRIEND AND LOYAL SUPPORTER.

5. I SAID THAT THE THIRD SUBJECT I WISHED TO RAISE WAS A MATTER WE HAD DISCUSSED BEFORE, NAMELY, OUR DEEP CONCERN FOR THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY. I RECALLED HIS EARLIER STATEMENT TO ME AND TO AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM THAT HE WOULD

~~PAGE 5 - 23709 - C - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1~~

DISCUSS PRIVATELY WITH GENERAL THIEU THE MATTER OF TWO MILITARY CANDIDATES AND TRY TO WORK OUT A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD NOT RISK SPLITTING THE ARMED FORCES. I OBSERVED THAT NO SUCH TALK HAD APPARENTLY BEEN HELD AND THAT THE PROBLEM SEEMED NO NEARER SOLUTION. I SAID BOTH HE AND GENERAL THEIR HAD GOVEN ASSURANCES TO THE PRESIDENT AT GUAM THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SPLIT IN THE MILITARY AND BOTH HAD RENEWED THESE ASSURANCES TO ME REPEATEDLY SINCE THAT TIME. IT NOW APPEARED LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WOULD BE IN FACT TWO MILITARY CANDIDATES AND THAT DESPITE GENERAL VIEN'S STATEMENT THAT THE ARMED FORCES WOULD NOT TAKE PART IN POLITICS, THE REALITY WAS THAT WHIS SITUATION WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE A DEEP EFFECT ON MILITARY UNITY. I POINTED OUT THAT INEVITABLY THERE WOULD BE SUPPORTERS FOR BOTH HIM AND THIEU WITH THE RANKS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THAT THIS COULD ONLY HAVE A DIVISIVE EFFECT WHICH WOULD IMPEDE THE VITAL WAR ROLE THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES MUST PLAY. I UNDERLINED THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS EFFECT POLITICAL SQUABBLES AMONG THE MILITARY HERE WOULD HAVE ON U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

PRESERVATION COPY

~~PAGE 6 - 23709 - C - 1 - 0 - 1 - 1~~

~~PAGE 5 CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

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~~PAGE 6 CONTAINS SENSITIVE INFORMATION~~

AND SUPPORT AT A TIME WHEN OUR LOSSES WERE HEAVY AND THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR WAS UNSETTLED. I ASKED KY WHAT HE PLANNED TO DO ABOUT TRYING TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM WITH THIEU BEFORE IT WAS TOO LATE.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

EX-118

N

PRESERVATION COPY

REF: STATE 21023 AND 210584

6. KY SAID THAT THE MATTER WAS GIVING HIM SOME CONCERN ALSO. AT HIS MEETING WITH THE FOUR CORP COMMANDERS AND CERTAIN OF THE MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORATE AT QUI NHON ON JUNE 12, THE CORPS COMMANDERS REPORTED THAT THERE WAS BEGINNING TO BE POLITICAL TALK AMONG THE JUNIOR OFFICERS. HE INSTRUCTED THEM TO TELL THE OFFICERS TO KEEP CLEAR OF POLITICS AND GET BACK TO FIGHTING THE WAR AND IMPRESSED UPON THEM THE NECESSITY FOR NOT ALLOWING THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN TO SPLIT THE ARMY. I SAID THAT THIS WAS PRAISEWORTHY BUT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. KY THEN REMARKED THAT HE HAD IN FACT BEEN TRYING TO ARRANGE

~~SECRET~~

A PRIVATE TALK WITH THIEU, BUT THE LATTER HAD NOT RESPONDED. HE SAID HE WOULD TRY ONCE AGAIN TO ARRANGE THIS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND WOULD SINCERELY TRY TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE AND THAT WOULD AVOID A SERIOUS SPLIT IN THE ARMED FORCES. I SAID I HOPED HE WOULD SUCCEED IN THIS IMPORTANT EFFORT AND COMMENTED THAT THERE WAS SURELY A ROLE FOR BOTH OF THEM IN THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM. THEY HAD WORKED TOGETHER CLOSELY AND EFFECTIVELY FOR TWO YEARS AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR THE GOOD OF THE COUNTRY.

7. IN DISCUSSING THIS ENTIRE QUESTION OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD EMERGE FROM IT, I TOLD KY OF MY STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE END RESULT MUST BE A STRENGTHENING OF THE COUNTRY THROUGH A BROADLY-BASED GOVERNMENT COMPRISING UNITY OF THE MILITARY AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ELEMENTS. I SAID I HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED BY THE REPORTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN KY AND HUONG REGARDING USE OF EACH OTHER'S SERVICES, WHICHEVER ONE MIGHT WIN THE ELECTION. I THOUGHT THAT WAS A VITAL PRINCIPLE WHICH SHOULD

~~SECRET~~

BE ENCOURAGED FOR ALL THE CANDIDATES. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE A STATEMENT BY ALL CANDIDATES THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE VERDICT OF THE ELECTORATE AND WOULD SUPPORT WHATEVER GOVERNMENT EMERGED AS A RESULT OF FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS. KY CONFIRMED THAT HE HAD REACHED SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH HUONG AND CONCLUDED WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED AS THE FINAL RESULT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WAS NOT A STRONG MAN BUT A STRONG REGIME.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

Wed., June 15, 1967
4:00 p.m.

113

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft response to Mr. and Mrs. Charles Keck. In this draft I attempt to reply to both, which automatically gives the letter a certain balance because of their difference in emphasis. I tried to make the letter as directly responsive as it would be.

W. W. R.

Attachment

114

Pres file

SECRET

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Ayub.
We will be making suggestions about
a reply.

It would be a good way to engage
a thoughtful and influential Moslem in
a constructive discussion.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 6-10-91

June 14, 1967

114a

Message from President Ayub to President Johnson:

The recent tragic events in the Middle East have caused grave concern to us as they have done to you. I feel it is necessary and indeed vital to see that the settlement that emerges is such that does not create more problems than it solves.

The Israelis have no doubt won a military victory and it would be quite natural for them to make political and territorial demands which, if conceded, will in the long run aggravate the situation instead of alleviating it. This, if I may submit, will be in nobody's interest. So, in the promotion of the interest of all and indeed in the discharge of your obligations as a great power, I would suggest that you may use your immense influence to restrain Israeli ambitions and not allow a settlement to be imposed on the Arabs which their pride will not tolerate. Even if the Arab leaders are made to submit to harsh terms, I have no doubt in my mind that their people will not go along with them. Such a solution would be counter productive.

I would therefore beseech you to give the question of the restoration of the Arab territories and the Holy Places your urgent and sympathetic consideration. By doing so, you will not only win the gratitude of the Arab people, but of the Muslim world and of all peace-loving people.

I am sending a message to Premier Kosygin, Prime Minister Wilson and President De Gaulle on similar lines.

With kindest regards.

Rawalpindi 4665

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-306
By is, NARA Date 2-3-170

(41)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

cy to Uniguns 6/15
neg Bundy
115

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
1:25 p.m.

Rec'd
2 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Ayub.
We will be making suggestions about
a reply.

It would be a good way to engage
a thoughtful and influential Moslem in
a constructive discussion.

good - go ahead -
Walt. Rostow

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 6-10-91

~~SECRET~~

June 14, 1967

1152

Message from President Ayub to President Johnson:

The recent tragic events in the Middle East have caused grave concern to us as they have done to you. I feel it is necessary and indeed vital to see that the settlement that emerges is such that does not create more problems than it solves.

The Israelis have no doubt won a military victory and it would be quite natural for them to make political and territorial demands which, if conceded, will in the long run aggravate the situation instead of alleviating it. This, if I may submit, will be in nobody's interest. So, in the promotion of the interest of all and indeed in the discharge of your obligations as a great power, I would suggest that you may use your immense influence to restrain Israeli ambitions and not allow a settlement to be imposed on the Arabs which their pride will not tolerate. Even if the Arab leaders are made to submit to harsh terms, I have no doubt in my mind that their people will not go along with them. Such a solution would be counter productive.

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With kindest regards.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-306
By is, NARA Date 2-3-00

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

116

Pres file

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
1:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

I support this suggestion. Bill should look at the new set up in Saigon and see its problems directly, if he is to stay on at the job -- however you finally decide his formal status.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

116a

June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretary McNamara and Walt Rostow have suggested I join McNamara's party to Saigon Sunday to take a first-hand look at the new pacification organization and related civil programs. I would also like to check into a fuller use of the Vietnamese manpower pool, new anti-inflationary measures we may need soon, and energizing land reform.

Dick Moorsteen would be in charge of our staff during the four or five days of my absence. Unless you see some objection, I would plan to accept Secretary McNamara's invitation.

OK to go _____

No _____

See me _____

William Leonhart
William Leonhart

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 14, 1967, 1:05 p.m.

~~copy~~
2. Pres. file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed reply to President Nyerere of Tanzania who wrote you to urge restraint just before the outbreak of violence.

Mac Bundy concurs.

Walt
Walt Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Speak to me

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED REPLY TO PRESIDENT NYERERE

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter on the situation in the Middle East was most welcome. Under Secretary Katzenbach has also reported to me his discussion with you during his recent visit to Dar es Salaam. Both expressions of your thought are much appreciated.

When I received your letter, I was still hopeful that an outbreak of hostilities could be avoided. We strongly urged restraint upon all parties to the dispute, and tried throughout -- as we continue to try -- to be impartial in our dealings with them. To our great regret, our efforts to prevent hostilities failed. I am relieved that the cease-fire now seems to be effective and that all of us can turn our efforts to the basic problems of the Middle East, which were reflected in the violence of the past week.

The tragedy which has occurred adds a new urgency to the common effort of the world community of nations to build a lasting peace in the Middle East. (11641)

The task will be difficult; all nations must assist. But I am confident that it is within the power of men of good will, acting together, to bind up the wounds of the past and learn to live with their neighbors in peace. That will certainly be the goal of this Government in the difficult days ahead.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESERVATION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I should be grateful for whatever thoughts and proposals to this end you would care to share with me. I hope that you will also give me the benefit of your assessment of the impact of the Middle East conflict on Africa -- on the problems, the tensions and the arms races -- and whether any of the lessons that have been learned these past days might be usefully applied in your efforts to build a peaceful, prosperous and united Africa.

With my best wishes to you, Mr. President, and with the hope that the goals you have set for the people of Tanzania will increasingly be realized, I remain

Sincerely, ~~yours,~~

Lyndon B. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESERVATION COPY

CC IDENTICAL EXDIS22nd May 1967 1176

President Lyndon B. Johnson,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-27
By JD, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Dear President Johnson,

Like yourself, I am extremely worried about the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, and although my sources of information are undoubtedly deficient I would like to put my ideas before you for your consideration.

As you know, we in Tanzania recognise the State of Israel, and fully understand its anxieties and difficulties. We are also friendly with the United Arab Republic. We have made clear to both of these countries that we wish to be friendly with them both, and that we will not allow either to choose our friends for us.

This does not, of course, mean that we are uninterested in the maintenance of peace in that area. Indeed we recognise that this is yet another region where a local conflict could quickly escalate into a major international war. Clearly the very greatest restraint is required on both sides, and equally clearly this will be extremely difficult to achieve on a matter of such strong passions.

President Nasser's recent policy with relation to Israel appears, I think, to be fairly clear. Without renouncing in any way his objection to the very existence of Israel (which, I repeat, is a matter of disagreement between the U.A.R. and the United Republic of Tanzania), he has been calling for restraint in military opposition. His public position has been that the Arab States are not ready to undertake such activity; you and I may both have our own interpretations of the implications of his policy in this matter. But in any case it is obvious that he has been trying to avoid provocation by groups based in the U.A.R., and that he has been trying - though with much less success - to dampen the activities of Syrian-based groups and the Syrian Government itself. As he could not afford to appear to lessen his basic objections to Israel (even if he wished to do so) this means that the advocacy of his policy of restraint requires statesmanship and courage within his own country and within the Arab world.

Israel's position is also difficult. With the constantly proclaimed policy of her neighbours always in mind she has also been subjected to a considerable number of bomb attacks and border incidents. I do therefore understand Israel's nervousness. Her manner of responding to these actions, however, is not always that most likely to convince world public opinion that Israel is not herself aggressive.

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In particular her participation in the 'Suez' aggression against Egypt has not been forgotten - especially by the Arab States themselves.

I have set these matters out at what is really an unnecessary length, for **you are** undoubtedly better informed of the details **than I am**. But it is reported that your own concern with the present situation has led you to ask the U.S.S.R. to use **its** influence in the area for the purposes of maintaining **peace**. I very much hope that this is done. At the same **time**, the publication of this request does make it appear that **all** the outside pressure is to be put on the United Arab Republic - the more particularly as U Thant is also going to Cairo, and Cairo only. I feel that such one-sided pressure may well make President Nasser's policy of restraint more difficult to operate.

It may be that you have in fact made representations to the Israeli Government, asking them for restraint both in bellicose statements and in what they believe to be retaliatory actions. If not, I am sure that you are considering whether this cannot be done. It seems to me, however, that it would be useful if this action on your part is made known to the world. If you believe that the U.S.S.R. has more influence with **Egypt** than your own country does, it is equally true that **both** the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. believe that the United States has a great deal of influence in Israel. Let me emphasize that I am not myself saying that this is true; I fully recognise that Israel is free and independent. But in **such** dangerous matters as the present situation what is believed is **often** as important as what is. It is for this reason **that I am** asking that the United States should both use its influence **with** Israel, and should be seen to be doing so. **I believe** that this should happen quickly and while the **United States** is asking the U.S.S.R. and others to use their influence **on the** United Arab Republic.

Mr. President, **I have** written frankly, and in some haste, on very difficult questions. I beg you to believe that I have done so only out **of** the greatest concern with the dangers which threaten the **Middle East**, and also the world.

Allow me to close by sending my personal good wishes for your continued health, and the continued prosperity of your country.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, June 14, 1967 -- 10:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an FBI report as of 9:15 a. m.

"Phone call from: UAR official in Cairo
To: El Kony (UAR representative at UN)

"UAR is agreeable to convening of UN General Assembly. Detailed instructions by cable will follow to El Kony. UAR government has been talking to 'several' nations re support. Spain has agreed to support UAR territorial claims against Israel and will use its influence with Latin American countries to support UAR."

El Kony then said Fedorenko told him that Gromyko will "possibly" be coming over. If not Gromyko, a "high" Soviet government official, "possibly" Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-96
By isw, NARA, Date 12-17-03

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
Thursday, June 14, 1967
10:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith 6 rather interesting reports on morale and other conditions in Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-251
By Sj, NARA, Date 11/19/01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 9 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

DOI LATE MAY 1967

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SUBJECT EFFECT OF THE GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA ON THE MORALE OF THE POPULACE
IN HANOI

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ [REDACTED] FIELD NO.
SOURCE [REDACTED]

THE MORALE OF THE POPULACE OF HANOI IS UNIFORMLY LOW AND GRADUALLY BECOMING WORSE. THE PEOPLE ARE TIRED OF THE WAR, BUT DESPITE THIS, THE MAJORITY BELIEVE THE GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA PUBLISHED CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF U.S. PLANES SHOT DOWN, THE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE (NVN) SUCCESSES IN THE SOUTH, AND NORTH VIETNAM'S ULTIMATE VICTORY IN THE WAR. THE CONSENSUS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IS THAT NORTH VIETNAM WILL CONTINUE THE WAR UNTIL THE LAST BULLET IS FIRED AND SOVIET AND CHINESE AID CEASES, OR THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED] MOST OF THE

VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL EXECUTE ANOTHER DIEN BIEN PHU ON THE UNITED STATES). THIS DETERMINATION AMONG THE POPULACE TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT IS

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NLJ/RAC 99-249
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(C)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

MAINTAINED AT A HIGH PITCH BY THE CONSTANT PUBLICATION OF EXAGGERATED U.S. LOSSES IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. HATRED OF THE U.S. PREDOMINATES OVER FEELINGS OF APATHY. [REDACTED]

(THIS VARIES SOMEWHAT ACCORDING TO DAY AND THE PERSON TO WHOM YOU ARE TALKING).

THE PRESS AND RADIO CONSTANTLY PUBLISH REPORTS ON THE EXTENT OF BOMB DAMAGE TO "CIVILIAN" TARGETS WITH MANY PICTURES OF DEAD CIVILIANS, ESPECIALLY CHILDREN. A LARGE PRESS PLAY IS ALSO GIVEN TO THE PROTESTS IN THE U.S., THE NEGRO PROBLEM,

AND EVIDENCE OF DISSENT AMONG THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. PUBLIC MEDIA ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE WAR LASTED FOR TWENTY YEARS, BUT ENCOURAGES THE PEOPLE TO HANG ON FOR ANOTHER TWO YEARS WHEN VICTORY IS ATTAINED. [REDACTED]

THE TOTAL IMPRESSION RECEIVED FROM TALKING TO A FEW VIETNAMESE [REDACTED] AND FROM OBSERVATION OF THE CONDUCT OF THE PEOPLE AT THE EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA DISPLAYS, IS THAT THEY TEND TO ACCEPT MOST ^{OF} WHAT THE GOVERNMENT TELLS THEM, THAT THEY RESENT ALL AMERICANS AND THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO RESIST UNTIL THEY WIN).

3. THE WAR MUSEUM IN HANOI CONTAINS A HUGE WALL CHART SHOWING THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THE INCIDENTS WHICH INDICATE SUPPORT FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. THIS CHART, WHICH COVERS THE DEMONSTRATIONS, PROTESTS AND DRAFT CARD BURNINGS, IS CONSTANTLY KEPT UP TO DATE.

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE USMACV [REDACTED] CINCPAC ARPAC

PACFLT PACAF

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(C)

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(classification) (dissem controls)

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DIST 9 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI MAY - JUNE 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

SUBJECT ELECTRIC POWER AND GASOLINE CONDITIONS IN HANOI

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

ACQ
SOURCE

[REDACTED]

1. THERE IS RATIONING OF ELECTRICITY IN HANOI AT THE PRESENT TIME AND CERTAIN SECTORS OF THE CITY ARE WITHOUT ELECTRICITY AT SPECIFIED TIMES. THE EMBASSIES HAVE ELECTRICITY DAILY ONLY BETWEEN 1700 HOURS AND 0100 HOURS. IT IS QUITE NOTICEABLE THAT THE LIGHTS IN THE EMBASSY AND THE STREET LIGHTS ARE MUCH WEAKER THAN THEY WERE A FEW MONTHS AGO. WHEN THE AIR RAID ALARMS SOUND ALL ELECTRICITY IS CUT OFF. THERE HAVE BEEN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS THAT THE SHORTAGE OF ELECTRICITY IS DUE TO DAMAGE TO POWER PLANTS AS A RESULT OF THE UNITED STATES AIR RAIDS.

[REDACTED]

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT USUALLY CALLS A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CLUB AFTER UNITED STATES AIR RAIDS AND THEY HAVE ALWAYS ANNOUNCED THAT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES WERE A RESULT OF THE BOMBINGS. THEY HAVE NEVER GIVEN ANY INDICATION

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By Sj, NARA, Date 9-19-01

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
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
THAT THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN CAUSED BY FLAK FROM THEIR OWN ANTI AIRCRAFT GUNS.



3. THE VARIOUS EMBASSIES CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ALL THE GAS THEY REQUIRE TO OPERATE THEIR VEHICLES AND THERE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE ANY INDICATION OF A SHORTAGE OF GASOLINE AMONG OFFICIAL AND MILITARY CARS AND TRUCKS IN HANOI.

4. THE CHINESE CIVIL PLANE FROM NANNING ARRIVES AT 2100 HOURS ON MONDAY AND THURSDAY NIGHTS AND DEPARTS FOR NANNING ONE HOUR LATER.

5. [redacted] DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT [redacted]



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COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE MAY 1967

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SUBJECT MISCELLANEOUS OBSERVATIONS IN HANOI

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FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

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1. SUMMARY. [REDACTED] THERE ARE

FIVE ACTIVE UNDERGROUND POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE CITY AND IN THE SUBURBS. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE THE CITY. ALSO, MAJOR INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN MOVED OUTSIDE THE CITY, WHILE SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF THE CITY. AN AGREEMENT WAS REACHED REGARDING THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. [REDACTED] THERE ARE FIVE ACTIVE UNDERGROUND

POWER STATIONS SERVICING HANOI, THREE OF WHICH ARE LOCATED WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS AND THE OTHER TWO ON THE OUTSKIRTS. [REDACTED] ONE OF THE POWER STATIONS IS LOCATED NEXT TO THE INDIAN CONSULATE GENERAL ON LE THAN KIET. IT IS DESCRIBED AS A

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By SJ, NARA, Date 7-19-01

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RELATIVELY SMALL SOLID CONCRETE BUILDING WITH MANY ELECTRIC CABLES EMANATING FROM IT AND WITH THE WORKS LOCATED UNDERGROUND. THERE IS A LARGE POWER PLANT UNDERNEATH THE MAIN POWER STATION WHICH APPARENTLY HAS NOT BEEN SEVERELY DAMAGED. THERE HAS BEEN NO RATIONING OF ELECTRICITY. AUTHORITIES HAVE URGED ALL RESIDENTS INCLUDING THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY TO CUT DOWN ON THE USE OF AIR CONDITIONERS AND OTHER ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES. HOWEVER, NO EFFORT HAS BEEN EXERTED TO ENFORCE THIS EDICT AND THE PLEAS HAVE BEEN DISREGARDED BY RESIDENTS. APART FROM THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE 19 AND 20 MAY BOMBINGS, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SHORTAGE OF WATER IN HANOI.

3. DURING THE AIR RAIDS, THE WELL TRAINED POPULACE RESPOND TO THE AIR RAID ALARMS BY GOING TO THE AIR RAID SHELTERS QUICKLY IN A DISCIPLINED FASHION. A FEW REMAIN OUTSIDE BUT STILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE SHELTERS IN CASE OF AN ACTUAL RAID.

4. THE MAJORITY OF CHILDREN AND OLD PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RELOCATED IN AREAS WITHIN AN EIGHT TO SIXTY KILOMETER RADIUS AROUND HANOI. ONLY THOSE WHO ARE ENGAGED IN SOME ESSENTIAL INDUSTRY OR ACTIVITY REMAIN IN TOWN. ALL SCHOOLS HAVE BEEN CLOSED AND ARE NOW OPERATING IN SMALL GROUPS DISPERSED OUTSIDE OF HANOI. THE PEOPLE ARE NOT SENT TO ANY SPECIFIC RELOCATION SPOTS, BUT RATHER SEEK REFUGE WHEREVER THEY CAN. NO ONE LIVING OUTSIDE OF HANOI IS PERMITTED TO REFUSE SHELTER TO THEM. MANY WHO ARE SENT OUT OF HANOI RETURN, BUT THEY ARE SENT BACK ON BUSES. THERE ARE MANY SOVIET BUSES IN EVIDENCE BOTH IN HANOI AND IN THE ENVIRONS. THE HOURS OF OPERATION ARE FROM 0400 TO 0600 HOURS IN THE MORNING AND AFTER 1900 HOURS IN THE EVENING. MANY SMALL CONSUMER GOODS INDUSTRIES HAVE BEEN PURPOSELY TRANSFERRED TO THE CENTER OF HANOI IN ORDER TO AVOID THE BOMBING. MAJOR INDUSTRIES

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HAVE BEEN RELOCATED OUTSIDE OF HANOI BUT ACTUAL LOCATIONS ARE UNKNOWN. THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IS STILL LOCATED IN HANOI.

EO 12958
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(C)

5. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS WANTED TO CONTROL THE TRANSSHIPMENT OF SOVIET GOODS FROM THE USSR THROUGH CHINA TO NORTH VIETNAM. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE OBJECTED AND STATED THAT THEY WOULD ASSUME CONTROL AT THE USSR BORDER. AT THIS POINT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INTERVENED AND SAID THAT IF THE USSR AND CHINA WERE GOING TO DISAGREE OVER THIS, THEN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT CONTINUE THE WAR. THE AGREEMENT ATTAINED IS A COMPROMISE WHEREBY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES CONTROL AT THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. [REDACTED] IN JANUARY THE SOVIETS PLANNED TO IMPORT FINNED MORTARS POSSIBLY 140MM WITH FIVE MILE RANGE WHICH ARE THE SAME TYPE WHICH WERE USED TO SHELL DANANG AIR BASE TWO MONTHS LATER.)

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6. [REDACTED] AN UNIDENTIFIED AMERICAN PILOT, SHOT DOWN IN A 24 MAY RAID, WAS DISPLAYED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE 25 MAY AT 0500 HOURS. WHEN HE SHOWED SOME RELUCTANCE TO BOW TO THE PRESS THREE TIMES, HE WAS CUFFED ON THE HEAD BY A NORTH VIETNAMESE SOLDIER UNTIL HE DID. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THIS TREATMENT RESEMBLED SOMEWHAT THE EXHIBITION OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER RICHARD STRATTON [REDACTED]



7. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE USMACV [REDACTED] CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT SEVENTH AIR FORCE.

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COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM


DOI LATE MAY 1967

SUBJECT SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS, MEDICINES, AND MEDICAL FACILITIES IN HANOI

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. THERE IS A GREAT SHORTAGE OF DOCTORS IN HANOI WHICH IS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GET AN APPOINTMENT WITH A DOCTOR. MOST OF THE DOCTORS ARE ONLY AVAILABLE ONE OR TWO HOURS DAILY AND THE WAITING PERIOD FOR APPOINTMENTS IS SOMETIMES WEEKS AND MONTHS DEPENDING ON THE URGENCY OF THE INDIVIDUAL CASE. ALL THE VIETNAMESE DOCTORS ARE FRENCH TRAINED. THE FACULTY OF MEDICINE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF HANOI IS STILL IN EXISTENCE ALTHOUGH IT IS NON-OPERATIVE. THERE ARE SIX HOSPITALS IN HANOI, FOUR MILITARY AND TWO CIVILIAN. THE FRENCH ST. PAUL'S AND THE SOVIET WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, A CLINIC LOCATED IN A VILLA ADJACENT TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, COMPRISE THE TWO CIVILIAN HOSPITALS. THE SOVIET HOSPITAL IS STAFFED BY FIVE RUSSIAN DOCTORS. BLOC OR CHINESE DOCTORS HAVE NOT

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NLJ/RAC 99-249
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-19-01



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(classification) (dissem controls)

BEEN OBSERVED IN HANOI.

2. THERE IS ONLY ONE PHARMACY IN HANOI WHICH DISPENSES A LIMITED AMOUNT OF HUNGARIAN, BULGARIAN, CHINESE AND CZECH MANUFACTURED MEDICINES. HOWEVER, THERE IS AN APPALLING SHORTAGE OF ALL KINDS OF MEDICINES, EVEN IN THE HOSPITALS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE IS AN ABUNDANCE OF BIRTH CONTROL PILLS AND MEDICINES WHICH ARE GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED, AND THESE COMMODITIES, WHICH ARE OF CZECH AND POLISH MANUFACTURE, ARE IN HEAVY DEMAND.

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE USMACV [REDACTED] CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF
PACFLT.

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
COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON THE EFFECTS OF US AIR STRIKES, MISSILE
LAUNCHINGS, TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES, AND FOOD
AND DRUG SHORTAGES IN NORTH VIETNAM

- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~FRASBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JEDROP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~KEENE~~
- ~~KEENE S~~
- ~~MEYERS~~
- ~~WELCH~~
- ~~WELCH~~

SOURCE:



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. A CHINESE [REDACTED] FROM NORTH VIETNAM WHO FLED

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

TO CHINA IN MARCH 1967, TOLD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THAT WHILE HE WAS STILL LIVING IN HAIPHONG, NEITHER HE
NOR HIS CIRCLE OF ACQUAINTANCES HAD EVER SEEN THE ACTUAL SHOOT-
DOWN OF ATTACKING UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT AS A RESULT, NEITHER
HE NOR OTHERS BELIEVED THE GOVERNMENT'S STATISTICS ON THE NUMBERS
OF U.S. AIRCRAFT DOWNED IN THE AIR WAR.

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2. IN CONNECTION, WITH THE AIR STRIKES, [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] NORTH VIETNAM'S SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES WERE NOT EFFECTIVE AGAINST ATTACKING AIRCRAFT; IN FACT, THESE MISSILES MANY TIMES WENT AWRY AND CAUSED EXTENSIVE CASUALTIES AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. IF A MISSILE BEHAVED PROPERLY WHEN LAUNCHED, THE SOUND OF TWO EXPLOSIONS, ONE IMMEDIATELY BEHIND THE OTHER, WAS HEARD. HOWEVER, AND THIS WAS MORE OFTEN THE CASE, IF ONLY ONE EXPLOSION WAS HEARD, THIS MEANT THE MISSILE HAD FAILED TO EXPLODE IN THE AIR AND WAS HURDLING BACK TO EARTH.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [REDACTED] IN LEAVING NORTH VIETNAM IT TOOK

HIM FOUR DAYS TO TRAVEL FROM HANOI TO LANG SON, A DISTANCE WHICH HE HAD TO WALK. HE STATED THAT HE WAS LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT GREAT DAMAGE TO NORTH VIETNAM'S INSTALLATIONS AND COMUNICATIONS HAD BEEN WROUGHT BY THE AMERICANS; PORT FACILITIES, INDUSTRIAL SITES, MILITARY, GOVERNMENT, AND PRIVATE STRUCTURES, BRIDGES, RAIL LINES, WATER WAYS, AND MOTOR ROUTES HAD ALL BEEN HARD HIT.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED] THE FOLLOWING PRICES FOR

FOOD WERE BEING ASKED IN THE BLACK MARKET IN HAIPHONG: PORK,

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(classification) (dissem controls)

18 TO 22 DONGS PER KILO, AS COMPARED TO THE OFFICIAL PRICE OF 3.5 DONGS PER KILO WHICH WAS LIMITED TO 200 GRAMS PER PERSON MONTHLY; RICE, 2.5 TO 3 DONGS PER KILO AND BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FIND; AND FRESH VEGETABLES, 4 TO 5 DONGS PER KILO. AS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS, IT WAS DIFFICULT EVEN IN STATE DRUG OUTLETS TO FIND SUCH SIMPLE PREPARATIONS AS THOSE USED TO TREAT HEADACHES, STOMACH DISORDERS, FEVER, AND DIARRHEA.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

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IN 85647

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
DDI EXO USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

091031Z

CITE

[Redacted]

DIST 9 JUNE 1967


DATOR
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GAMALICH
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MAY
MURPHY
NICHOLS
ROBERTS
SULLIVAN
TAMM
TAYLOR
WALSH
WATSON
WILSON
WOOD

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM
DOI: LATE MAY 1967
SUBJ: BOMB DAMAGE AND PEOPLE'S MORALE IN HANOI AREA

ACQ:

SOURCE:



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. (SUMMARY. POWER IN HANOI WHICH WAS OUT COMPLETELY ON 21 MAY 1967 WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY RESTORED BY NOON THE NEXT DAY. DAMAGE OBSERVED ON 28 MAY INCLUDED A RAILWAY REPAIR FACILITY OUTSIDE OF HANOI, TEMPLES, HOMES, PART OF A SCHOOL AND THREE TRUCKS.)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-249
By sj, NARA, Date 9-19-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. ON 21 MAY THERE WAS AN ELECTRIC POWER FAILURE THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF HANOI WHICH CONTINUED UNTIL NOON OF 22 MAY. BY THAT TIME MOST OF HANOI HAD BEEN RESUPPLIED WITH POWER. HOWEVER, AT THE FANCHIMU (PHONETIC) HOTEL, POWER WAS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL LATER THAT DAY. WATER SUPPLY WAS ALWAYS AVAILABLE ON THE FIRST FLOOR OF THE HOTEL, BUT NOT AVAILABLE ON FLOORS ABOVE THE FIRST.

3. THERE IS PRACTICALLY NO WAY TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF CIVILIAN DAMAGE AND CAUSES THEREOF. WHEN AN AIR RAID ALERT IS SOUNDED EVERYONE SEEKS SHELTER TO AVOID JETTISONED FUEL TANKS AND FLAK DEBRIS WHICH FALL IN ABUNDANCE. THE [REDACTED] VISITOR WAS TAKEN ON A TOUR OF THE HANOI AREA ON 28 MAY BY A VIETNAMESE ESCORT AND SHOWN THE FOLLOWING DAMAGE:

A. A BRIDGE TWO KILOMETERS LONG WHICH CONNECTS HANOI WITH SHARON (PHONETIC, POSSIBLY GIA LAM) HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY AIRCRAFT IN DECEMBER 1966, ACCORDING TO THE ESCORT, BUT WAS NOT HIT. HOWEVER, TEMPLES AND HOMES NEAR THE FOOT OF THE BRIDGE WERE COMPLETELY DEMOLISHED. THE VIETNAMESE

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21
EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
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PREPARED BY [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

ESCORT INSISTED THAT LINGERING IN THIS AREA WAS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS BECAUSE THERE WERE NO AIR RAID SHELTERS NEARBY.

B. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT TO SHARON WAS MADE AT NIGHT THERE WAS ENOUGH LIGHT TO SEE THAT A RAILWAY REPAIR SHOP THERE HAD BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED.

EO 12958
3.A(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

C. IN HANOI ITSELF [REDACTED] A TWO STORY CIVILIAN HOUSE [REDACTED] REPORTEDLY HAD BEEN DAMAGED BY ROCKET FIRE FROM AMERICAN AIRCRAFT. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THERE WERE NO CASUALTIES.

D. A DOWNED AMERICAN AIRCRAFT WAS SEEN VERY NEAR THE STREET IN HANOI WHERE ALL THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ARE LOCATED. [REDACTED] PEOPLE WHO WERE IN AIR RAID SHELTERS AT THE TIME OF THE AIRPLANE CRASH WERE NOT INJURED. [REDACTED] THREE TRUCKS NEARBY HAD BEEN DESTROYED WHEN ONE WAS HIT BY THE FALLING PLANE AND THE OTHER TRUCKS CAUGHT ON FIRE. THE TRUCKS WERE STILL IN THE STREET ON 28 MAY.

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E. ONE SECTION OF THE LABOR SCHOOL, A THREE OR FOUR STORY STRUCTURE NEAR UNIFICATION PARK, HAD BEEN DESTROYED.

[REDACTED] A 500 KILOGRAM U.S. BOMB HAD CAUSED THE DAMAGE, [REDACTED] NO ONE WAS INJURED IN THIS INCIDENT BECAUSE THE STUDENTS HAD BEEN EVACUATED EARLIER.

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE AIR STRIKES APPEAR TO HAVE ALMOST NO EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SINCE THEIR LIVING STANDARD IS SO LOW. THE BOMBINGS MAY CAUSE RESENTMENT OR HATRED BUT THEY CANNOT CAUSE A FURTHER DROP IN LIVING STANDARDS. SOMETIMES THE VIETNAMESE EVEN SEEM TO BE ENJOYING THE WAR. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN AIR RAID ALERTS ARE SOUNDED IN HANOI, EMPLOYEES OF THE FANCHIMU HOTEL GRAB RIFLES AND RUSH TO THE ROOF OF THE BUILDING, ALL THE WHILE GRINNING AND APPEARING TO BE ENJOYING THEMSELVES IMMENSELY.)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG USARJ DET4/FTD (ALSO SENT SAIGON). GP-1.

~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

MEMORANDUM

(19)

copy to Wiggins
-msg/brady 6/15
120

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
9:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This letter from Mrs. Gandhi came in the other day, and it is being staffed out.

You will note that she both supports a "cease fire with withdrawal" and talks later about a "just and durable peace."

As you know, the Indian position during this crisis has been very poor indeed.

There are three options:

To Walt

- a tough letter;
- a mild but critical letter; *to this approach I guess*
- sending an emissary to India, in Ambassador Bowles' absence, to lay it on the line, including a response to her unfortunate remarks about food aid.

If you have any guidance to us this would be helpful. Otherwise, you will be getting an analysis of the options open soon.

Walt R.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By fw, NARA, Date 2-8-93

PRESERVATION COPY



122-2

भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 9, 1967.

DECLASSIFIED NLS 99-306
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju/is NARA, Date 2-07-00

Dear Mr President:

I have the honour to transmit to you the following message from the Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi, which has just been received by this Embassy telegraphically :-

"My colleagues in the Government of India and I have watched with growing anxiety and concern the recent turn of the events in West Asia. Situated as we are geographically, the conflict in West Asia affects our vital interests in many ways. Consequently, the maintenance of peace in this entire region is of paramount importance to us.

From the first signs of the gathering war clouds, we made strenuous efforts in the Security Council to prevent an aggravation of the situation. In our judgment, U Thant's efforts and the recommendations he made in his report provided a reasonable basis for action by the Security Council. Subsequent events, however, rendered these efforts nugatory.

With the outbreak of actual fighting, one could only strive for the earliest possible quenching of the flames of war. We felt that it was just and proper not only that there should be a ceasefire, but that the status quo prevailing immediately prior to the

outbreak .. (2)

(2)

outbreak of war should be restored. I am sure you will agree that no one should be allowed to retain what is acquired by war. The linking of the ceasefire with the withdrawal of all armed forces would be in accord with the principles which the Security Council had evolved in the past. I hope that the sincerity of our purpose will be understood.

While we are naturally relieved that cessation of hostilities would take place, we still remain deeply concerned about the prospects of a just and durable peace in West Asia. Naturally, the United States as a great power and you, as its wise and far-seeing leader, have a great contribution to make in laying a sound foundation for peace in this area. It is our firm belief that such a foundation would be weak and unstable unless it is held together by the aspirations, the faith and hopes of the millions who live in West Asia. We in India are deeply interested in this as we cannot remain unaffected by the instability, turmoil, conflicts and wars in the area.

Indira Gandhi."

With my highest regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,



(B.K. Nehru)
Ambassador of India

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the United States,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
9:30 a. m.

121

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W. W. R.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 92-27

By fw/pw, NARA, Date 9-27-99



12/2

भारतीय राजदूतावास
वाशिंगटन, डी० सी०
EMBASSY OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 9, 1967.

DECLASSIFIED NLS 99-306
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
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outbreak .. (2)

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Indira Gandhi."

With my highest regard and esteem,

Yours sincerely,



(B.K. Nehru)
Ambassador of India

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
The President of the United States,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

124

Wednesday, June 14, 1967
9:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Nick Katzenbach's recommendations for the Solicitor Generalship happened to come through this office.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

123
Pres file

Wednesday, June 14, 1967 -- 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some of this morning's take on the Middle East, which you may wish to examine.

1. Eban's first thoughts on a settlement. The net of it is they want security and peace, but have not yet formulated clear positions.
2. The view from Amman. A plea from our Ambassador to strengthen the hands of the Arab moderates for our own purposes as well as Israel's. But, again, no very precise ideas except the rather dubious suggestion marked in paragraph 6.
3. A Soviet KGB officer in Beirut who states that the USSR will send arms to the Arab world despite implication for the arms race, and who is trying to assess how much we are hurting from anti-U.S. attitudes and acts by the Arabs. (There is unverified intelligence this morning that the Soviets are thinking of 200 tanks and 200 aircraft for Egypt.)
4. The Soviets complain to the Egyptians about some of the anti-Soviet talk in Cairo.
5. A small item from the UN people in the field, stating that the Israelis did not attempt to "punish" the Indians and that the Israelis are cooperating with the UN.
6. A run-down on attitudes in the UN towards a meeting of the General Assembly, in which, rather surprisingly, there is quite a lot of sentiment against the meeting, including Arab sentiment. The mood is summed up: "Initial reaction is clearly less than enthusiastic even among those whom Soviets most want to impress."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-224
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-10-03

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH
1230

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

PP RUEHC
DE RUQMLV 4118/1 1641815
ZNY SS3SS
P 131730Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

(7)

006

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-25
By ing, NARA, Date 9-8-92

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 4118 SECTION ONE OF TWO

NODIS

REF: STATE 210497 AND 210499.

1. I SAW FONMIN EBAN IN JERUSALEM THIS NOON AT MY REQUEST IN EFFORT ELICIT ISRAELI THINKING ON QUESTIONS URGENTLY FACING US NOW THAT CEASE FIRE IS IN OPERATION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE'S 210499 I SAID WE NOW DESIRE TO TURN TO NEXT STEPS WITHIN AND OUTSIDE UNITED NATIONS AND THAT WE URGENTLY NEED TO KNOW GOI'S POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE. I EMPHASIZED THE PRESSURES WE FACE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO REQUIRE ISRAELI TROOPS TO WITHDRAW TO PREVIOUS LINES. NOTING THAT OUR POSTURE IS THAT DEFINED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WE HAVE TABLED, I STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING AS MUCH ISRAELI PRECISION AS TO ITS THINKING AS POSSIBLE AT EARLIEST MOMENT. AS TO UNITED STATES POINTS OF DEPARTURE I MENTIONED PRESIDENT'S REAFFIRMATION ON MAY 23 OF OUR COMMITMENT TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL NATIONS IN THE AREA, THE NECESSITY TO ESTABLISH A REGIME OF PEACE ELIMINATING CLAIMS BY EITHER SIDE OF THE RIGHT TO INFRINGE ON THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS BECAUSE OF BELLIGERENCY, U.S. VITAL INTERESTS IN RELATION TO THE ARAB WORLD, AND THE OVERRIDING NECESSITY THAT THROUGH MAGNANIMOUS AND IMAGINATIVE POLICIES, THE FOUNDATIONS LAID FOR A GENUINE RECONCILIATION AMONG PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

2. EBAN APOLOGIZED THAT THERE MUST OF NECESSITY BE A LACK OF PRECISION IN ISRAEL'S THINKING AS TO DETAILED POLICIES BECAUSE OF THE DRAMATIC, RAPID CHANGE WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE AND HAD RAISED OPPORTUNITIES WHICH WERE INCONCEIVABLE BEFORE AND FOR WHICH ISRAEL UNPREPARED. HE REPEATED WHAT HE HAD SAID IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT THIS HOUR OF DANGER IS ALSO AN HOUR OF OPPORTUNITY AND IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MOVE FORWARD TO PEACE AND NOT BACKWARD TO BELLIGERENCE. HE ADDED THAT SINCE THE EARLIER

~~SECRET~~

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TELAVIV 4118 SECTION ONE OF TWO, JUNE 13, 1967, NODIS

EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER JUST PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, THE SITUATION HAD IN FACT BEEN DISRUPTED. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOW TO RECONSTRUCT BUT WE MUST BUILD ANEW. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE POINT OF REFERENCE CANNOT REALLY BE THE PRE-JUNE 4TH SITUATION.

3. WHAT ISRAEL WANTS IS QUITE SIMPLE: (A) SECURITY AND (B) PEACE. NEITHER OF THESE HAS BEEN ENJOYED BEFORE. INVOLVED IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS ARE PROBLEMS IN THE JURDICIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND TERRITORIAL FIELDS. ISRAEL HAS NOT YET HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO STUDY EACH IN DETAIL. HE REITERATED THAT THE DISRUPTION IS SO COMPLETE THAT THEY CANNOT REBUILD BUT MUST ERECT A NEW EDIFICE. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT THE U.S. RESOLUTION TABLED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS FORWARD LOOKING IN LINE WITH THIS CONCEPT.

4. EBAN SAID AN INTERMEDIATE STATUS BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE. WHAT MUST BE DONE IS WORK OUT A BLUEPRINT FOR NEW ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS. THIS IN ITSELF HAS SOME NEGATIVE AND SOME POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS. THE ADOPTION OF THE BACKWARD LOOKING RESOLUTION TABLED BY THE SOVIETS IN CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL TO PREVIOUS LINES IS INCONCEIVABLE. HOPEFULLY IT WILL BE RESISTED WITH THE HELP OF WORLD OPINION BUT IF NOT ISRAEL WILL RESIST IT ALONE. EBAN AGAIN APPEALED THAT WE NOT WASTE THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY AND TRY TO RETURN ISRAEL TO THE STRAIGHT JACKET OF 1957. THE NATIONAL WILL IN ISRAEL IS RESOLUTE AND UNANIMOUS IN REJECTING SUCH A CONCEPT.

5. EBAN SAID THAT AS HE SEES THE SITUATION AT PRESENT THERE ARE TWO QUESTION: (A) HOW TO BUILD AND (B) WHAT IDEAS EXIST AS TO THE SHAPE IN WHICH THE AREA SHOULD BE REBUILT. AS TO HOW TO BUILD, ISRAEL FEELS STRONGLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE DIRECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS TO ACHIEVE VIABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE. A SOLUTION SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED BY OUTSIDE POWERS. IN DIRECT DIALOGUE ISRAEL AND EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD TOGETHER DETERMINE FRONTIERS, ATTITUDES TOWARDS EACH OTHER, ETC. IF EGYPT SHOULD SUGGEST ANOTHER FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION, IT SHOULD BE TOLD IT HAS THE WRONG ADDRESS AND IT SHOULD APPROACH ISRAEL. TO MY COMMENT SUGGESTING SOME SKEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER EGYPT AND THE OTHERS WULD IN FACT SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OR MIGHT NOT MERELY SULK IN THEIR TENTS BEHIND THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENT, EBAN EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT EGYPT WOULD BE UNDER SUFFICIENT INDIGENOUS PRESSURE TO ELIMINATE THE PRESENT SITUATION AND ALL THAT HAD PRECEDED IT TO SEEK NEGOTIATIONS. AS TO IDEAS ABOUT THE SHAPE OF THE NEW STRUCTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, EBAN SAID THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN URGENT CONSULTATIONS TO WORK OUT SPECIFIC IDEAS ON EACH OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED. HE COULD NOT AS YET INDICATE THE OUTCOME OF THESE DISCUSSIONS

~~SECRET~~

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-3- TELAVIV 4118 SECTION ONE OF TWO, JUNE 13, 1967, NODIS

BUT SUGGESTED THAT IN FORMULATING SOME OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED HE MIGHT GIVE SOME CLUES AS TO PRESENT THINKING. QUESTIONS RELATING TO EGYPT ARE, HOW CAN EGYPT AND ISRAEL LIVE TOGETHER? HOW CAN AN ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENCE IN TWO WATERWAYS BE ASSURED? HOW CAN SINAI BE PREVENTED FROM BECOMING ANOTHER SPRINGBOARD FOR ATTACK AND PERHAPS MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL, WHAT ABOUT GAZA? AS TO SYRIA, HOW CAN ISRAEL ENSURE THAT IT IS NOT PERPETUALLY UNDER SYRIAN GUNS, OR IN A POSITION WHERE SYRIA CAN CUT OFF ITS WATER SYSTEM. MOST COMPLEX OF ALL, HE SAID, IS JORDAN AND/OR THE PALESTINIAN WEST BANK. HE ASKED WHETHER IT IS INTELLIGENT TO ENDEAVOR TO REPRODUCE THE UNITY BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND JORDAN OR SOME SORT OF SEPARATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WEST BANK AND ISRAEL AND JORDAN. HOW CAN RELIGIOUS INTERESTS IN JERUSALEM BE ASSURED AND ALSO THE SANCTITY AND UNIT OF THE ISRAELI HOLY PLACES? HE INDICATED CLEARLY ISRAEL COMPLETELY RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF RE-DIVIDING THE CITY OF JERUSALEM NOW THAT IT HAS BECOME UNIED.

6. EBAN THEN TURNED TO TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE RECOGNIZED THE REQUIREMENT FOR SPEED PARTICULARLY UNDER THE PRESSURES CREATED BY UNITED NATIONS PROCEDURES REPEATING AGAIN THAT IT IS TACTICALLY MOST DESIRABLE FOR THE PARTIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED TO GET TOGETHER AND THAT HE HOPED VERY SHORTLY FOR MORE SPECIFIC IDEAS ON THE PROBLEMS CONCERNED, HE URGED THAT IN THE MEANTIME A HOLDING OPERATION OF AT LEAST SHORT DURATION BE UNDERTAKEN AND THAT THE WORLD NOT BE INTIMIDATED BY THE SOVIETS. HE AGAIN SAID IT WOULD BE MOST TRAGIC IF THE SOVIET DOCTRINE REFLECTED IN THE SOVIET SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WERE ACCEPTED. ISRAEL WILL HASTEN THE CRYSTALIZATION OF ITS IDEAS TO PERMIT MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTATION WITH US. ONE PROBLEM HE DESCRIBES AS ALMOST SOLVED, JERUSALEM IS IN FACT UNITED BY THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL AND BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

006

Action

CONTROL: 11319
RECD: June 13, 1967
3:16 pm

Info PP RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 4113/2 1641840
ZNY SSSSS
P 131730Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 4113 SECTION TWO OF TWO

NODIS

SPIRITUAL INTEREST THERE REMAIN. ON THESE HE THOUGHT IT WISE NOT TO BE SPECIFIC TOO QUICKLY.

7. FINALLY, EBAN CONCLUDED BY SUMMARIZING ISRAEL'S POSITION AS WANTING PEACE AND DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS AND RECONGNIZED THAT DETAILS REQUIRE EARLY BUT INTENSIVE STUDY. HE URGED WE NOT BE TOO FATALISTIC AS TO TIMING. WE MUST GAIN SOME TIME BUT ALSO MUST ACT RAPIDLY.

8. AS A POSTSCRIPT, EBAN SAID HE MAY GOF GAIN TO UNITED NATIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMVL 4113/2 ~~SECRET~~
BUT BEFORE DOING SO HE WANTS TO FORMULATE ISRAEL'S IDEAS. HE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE PUTTING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS BUT RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN PROBLEMS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S INTERESTS ARE GREATER THAN OTHERS.

FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT INTERNATIONAL OR NAVAL GUARANTEES COULD BE OBTAINED FOR THE STRAITS? THE UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE HAD NOT HELPED ON THAT POINT IN THE PAST BUT SOME OTHER GUARANTEES MIGHT BE SOUGHT. ALSO ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD THE VARIOUS RELIGIONS IN JERUSALEM WAS OF GREAT INTEREST INTERNATIONALLY AND PROBABLY SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF A QUICK ISRAELI DECLARATION.

GP-3 BARBOUR
BT

~~SECRET~~

BT

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 4284

LIMDIS
LYNF: RABAT'S 5484 (NOTAL)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By is, NARA Date 1-31-00

1038

1. WE FIND VIEWS EXPRESSED BY EMBASSY RABAT FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN AND WISH TO EXPAND ON RABAT'S OBSERVATION ABOUT ASSISTING MODERATE ARAB WORLD FORCES.

2. BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES LAST WEEK, WE HAD

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 4284A ~~SECRET~~

PREDICTED THIS REGIME STOOD TO LOSE WHETHER ARABS OR ISRAELIS EMERGED AS VICTORS. IN OUR PREDICTIONS WE DID NOT ALLOW FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT NASSER WOULD BE QUITE SO DISCREDITED AS HE APPEARS TO BE AT THIS MOMENT AND THAT HIS ARMY WOULD BE SO THOROUGHLY ROUTED. BY A FREAKISH TWIST IN ARAB POLITICS AND DESPITE THE LOSS OF THE WHOLE WEST BANK, HUSSEIN HAS WON A NEW STATUS AMONG ARAB LEADERS, LARGELY THANKS TO THE COURAGE OF THE JORDANIAN ARMY. IT WOULD BE TOO MUCH TO ARGUE THAT HUSSEIN HAS OVERNIGHT SECURED THE LEADERSHIP ROLE OF THE ARAB MODERATES. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE AWARE THAT HIS NEW STATURE COULD BE WHITTLED DOWN BY NASSER'S DIPLOMACY. WE DO, HOWEVER, ARGUE THAT, AS OF RIGHT NOW, HUSSEIN IS IN AN UNEXPECTEDLY GOOD POSITION TO INFLUENCE OPINION IN THE ARAB EAST.

3. AS ADDRESSEES AWARE THE KING HAS BEEN CONVINCED FOR SOME TIME THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE HARBORED THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING OVER THE WEST BANK OF JORDAN. HE ALSO ESTIMATED THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO AVOID SOME SORT OF PARTICIPATION IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. IN MAY AS THE WAR FEVER WAS MOUNTING THROUGHOUT THIS AREA, HE FELT

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HIMSELF UNDER COMPULSION TO ACT TO PROTECT JORDAN AGAINST THE THREATS POSED OF A WEST BANK TAKEOVER AND OF UNCOORDINATED PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES--HOSTILITIES WHICH HE CALCULATED WOULD INEVITABLY INVOLVE HIM NO MATTER WHO STARTED THE WAR. HIS TRIP TO CAIRO WAS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES, AS WELL AS TO SATISFY PRESSURES FROM HIS OWN PEOPLE FOR SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH THE UAR. HUSSEIN ACCEPTED PUTTING HIS FORCES UNDER UAR CONTROL IN EVENT OF HOSTILITIES BECAUSE THIS WAS A STANDARD REQUIREMENT OF SUCH PACTS AND, INCIDENTALLY, WOULD, HE THOUGHT, PLACE BLAME ON NASSER IN EVENT OF MILITARY REVERSES (THE MILITARY DISASTER WAS NOT FORSEEN BY HUSSEIN). HUSSEIN TRUSTED NASSER NO MORE AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE JOINT DEFENSE PACT THAN HE DID BEFORE. HE EXPLAINED THE PACT AT THAT TIME AS SIMPLY A MARRIAGE OF TEMPORARY CONVENIENCE. THE EVENTS OF THE RECENT BATTLE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO DISABUSE HUSSEIN OF HIS SUSPICIONS OF ISRAELI WEST BANK INTENTIONS AND THE BATTLE HAS OBVIOUSLY CONFIRMED TO HIM NASSER'S UNRELIABILITY AS AN ALLY.

4. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTED LAST WEEK THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE ANGRY WITH HUSSEIN BECAUSE OF THE JOINT DEFENSE PACT AND

THE EVENTS OF THE RECENT BATTLE HAVE DONE NOTHING TO DISABUSE
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4. EMBASSY TEL AVIV REPORTED LAST WEEK THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE
ANGERED WITH HUSSEIN BECAUSE OF THE JOINT DEFENSE PACT AND

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 4284A-~~SECRET~~

WITH THE JAA FOR HAVING SHELLED ISRAELI CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS.
WE UNDERSTAND THIS FEELING STILL RUNS HIGH IN ISRAEL. WE
HAVE REPORTED HUSSEIN'S OWN EXPLANATION OF JAA SHELLING OF
ISRAELI VILLAGES IN WHICH HE STATED THAT ONLY MILITARY TARGETS
HAD BEEN PREDESIGNATED AND, WHATEVER ATTACKS ON KUBEL ZIM MAY
HAVE OCCURRED, THESE HAD BEEN ORDERED ON THE INITIATIVE OF LOWER
LEVEL JAA OFFICERS AFTER JORDANIAN VILLAGES HAD BEEN STRUCK BY
THE IDF. WE DOUBT IT WILL EVER BE PROVEN WHO FIRST STRUCK
CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS ON THE OTHER'S TERRITORY.

5. IN ANY EVENT, WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN BEING APOLOGISTS
EITHER FOR HUSSEIN'S TRIP TO CAIRO OR FOR WHATEVER MAY HAVE
OCCURRED IN THE HEAT OF BATTLE BUT MERELY THINK THAT THE
FACTS ON BOTH SHOULD BE PUT IN THEIR PROPER PERSPECTIVE.

6. WHILE WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING GIVING ANY GRATUITOUS OFFENSE
TO THE ISRAELIS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT WE NEED TO PUT MAXIMUM
EFFORT AT THIS JUNCTURE INTO BOLSTERING THE POSITION OF THE
ARAB MODERATES. IN JORDAN'S CASE, THIS MEANS SUPPORTING IN
PRINCIPLE THE RETURN TO JORDAN OF THE WEST BANK. WE HAVE
REITERATED OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
NEAR EAST STATES, AS RABAT SUGGESTED. IN KEEPING WITH THIS

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PRINCIPLE, WE SHOULD NOW CONSIDER GOING FURTHER AND SPECIFICALLY
CALLING ON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW BEHIND FORMER ARMISTICE LINES.
THE VERY FACT OF OUR CALLING FOR THIS, EVEN IF WE DO NOT EXPECT
COMPLIANCE, WILL STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF MODERATE ARABS AND THEIR
JUSTIFICATION FOR WORKING WITH US.

7. CURRENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT THE USG WILL NOT BE CALLED
UPON TO PROVIDE IMMEDIATE AND MASSIVE BILATERAL RELIEF
ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN. ASIDE FROM A SHORTAGE OF TENTS, THE
GOJ'S NEED APPEARS TO BE PRINCIPALLY FOR BETTER ORGANIZATION
OF AVAILABLE EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND OF THOSE WHICH ARE
BEGINNING TO FLOW IN FROM IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND LEBANON
AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES. WHATEVER WE DO TO HELP JORDAN, WE
SHOULD FEEL FREE TO DO SO BILATERALLY, WHETHER THIS PLEASES
ISRAEL OR NOT.

8. THE BASIC FACT IS THAT ISRAEL'S ENEMIES ARE NOT IPSO FACTO
OURS AND THE ARAB MODERATES ARE THE ONLY ACTORS ON THE ARAB
SIDE OF THE STAGE WITH WHOM WE CAN EFFECTIVELY WORK. WE
STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WHEN EVALUATING WHAT WE MIGHT DO FOR
JORDAN THAT WE NOT BE INFLUENCED BY ISRAELI ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS
THIS KINGDOM. WE SHOULD SEE IN THIS REGIME AN INSTRUMENT

PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4284A-~~SECRET~~

WHICH COULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS, AND ISRAEL'S AS WELL (EVEN IF
ISRAELIS DO NOT NOW RECOGNIZE THIS FACT) IN BRINGING ABOUT
SOME MORE DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE NEAR EASTERN CRISIS

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JORDAN NEED APPEARS TO BE PRINCIPALLY FOR SUPPLY OF AVAILABLE EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND OF THOSE WHICH ARE BEGINNING TO FLOW IN FROM IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND LEBANON AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES. WHATEVER WE DO TO HELP JORDAN, WE SHOULD FEEL FREE TO DO SO BILATERALLY, WHETHER THIS PLEASURES ISRAEL OR NOT.

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PAGE 6 RUQMKG 4284A ~~SECRET~~
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GP-1. BURNS
BT

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~~SECRET~~

~~LIMDIS~~

SUBJECT: SOVIET ATTACHE STATION OF MIDDLE EAST STATION

1230

1. EMBOFF PAID CALL JUNE 13 ON AWEFMDIGASPARIAN, ATTACHE AT SOVIET EMBASSY BEIRUT WHO IS IDENTIFIED KGB OFFICER. GASPARIAN TOOK FOLLOWING LINE ON SUBJECTS RAISED BY EMBOFF.

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2. POST-WAR SETTLEMENT. ARAB STATES WILL NOT SIT DOWN WITH ISRAELIS IN FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS. ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW FROM ARAB LANDS IT HAS OCCUPIED AND RETURN TO BORDERS WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO INITIATION OF LATEST HOSTILITIES. ANYTHING LESS THAN THIS WILL ONLY PROLONG ARAB HOSTILITY AND .. A MEDIATOR SHOULD BE CHOSEN. PERHAPS FRANCE CAN FULFILL THIS ROLE. ISRAEL DEFINITELY THE AGGRESSOR AND SHOULD BE CONDEMNED AS SUCH AND FORCED TO WITHDRAW. ARABS CONSIDER THIS AS A MAJOR MILITAR DEFEAT BUT ALSO AS ONLY THE FIRST BATTLE.

3. US ROLE. EMBOFF REFUTED ALLEGATIONS OF US SIXTH FLEET-WHEELUS BASE INTERVENTION IN HOSTILITIES. GASPARIAN INITIALLY STATED THAT US INTERVENTION A PROVEN FACT. HOWEVER, HE LATER ADMITTED THAT US INTERVENTION HIGHLY UNLIKELY WITHOUT SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH SINCE SOVIET SHIPS WERE MONITORING SIXTH FLEET MOVEMENTS AT TIME OF HOSTILITIES. NEVERTHELESS, GASPARIAN POINTED OUT THAT EVERY ARAB IN THE STREET BELIEVES US INTERVENED. DENIED THAT SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR CIRCULATING SUCH A CHARGE

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AND STATED THAT NASSER DID THIS ON OWN INITIATIVE. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR REPORTEDLY TOLD AUB PROFESSOR YESTERDAY THAT NO RPT NO US PLANES TOOK OFF FROM SIXTH FLEET CARRIERS. "WE WOULD HAVE KNOWN IF EVEN A FLY TOOK OFF FROM ONE OF THEM".

GASPARIAN REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT USG MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FORCE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW TO PRE-JUNE 5, 1967 BORDERS. IF USG DOES NOT TAKE THIS POSITION IT WILL COMPLETELY FORFEIT POSITION IN ARAB WORLD. US POSITION HAS ALREADY SUFFERED MEASURABLY AND IT WILL TAKE YEARS FOR US TO REGAIN ANY REAL INFLUENCE IN ARAB WORLD AGAIN. THIS IS TRUE EVEN IN COUNTRIES LIKE KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA. REFERRED TO OIL BOYCOTT AGAINST UK AND US, RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND LOSS OF CREDIBILITY IN ARAB WORLD. STATED THAT EVEN IN LEBANON US POSITION HAS SUFFERED SERIOUS SETBACK. IF USG DOES NOT CONDEMN ISRAEL AS AGGRESSOR THERE IS POSSIBILITY THAT IT MAY NOT REGAIN ITS POSITION

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IN AREA FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. USSR ROLE. WHEN QUERIED ON REPORTS THAT USSR WILL SEND ARMS TO UAR, GASPARIAN STATED THAT USSR DETERMINED TO AID ARABS AT THIS CRITICAL JUNCTURE WITH ARMS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND WHATEVER SUPPORT IS NECESSARY, DESPITE

PAGE 4 RUOMBE 11434 ~~SECRET~~
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USSR HAS NO INTENTION OF REESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ALTHOUGH USSR BROKE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL BEFORE IN 1953, AND THEN REESTABLISHED RELATIONS, SITUATION TODAY IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT.

CONCERNING PRESENT ARAB ATTACKS AND CRITICISM AGAINST USSR OVER ~~THEIR~~ ROLE DURING HOSTILITIES, GASPARIAN SHOWED MUCH SENSITIVITY ON THIS ISSUE AND ACCUSED RIGHT-WING LOCAL ARAB PRESS AND US AGENTS FOR DISSEMINATING THIS QUOTE FALSEHOOD UNQUOTE. CLAIMED THAT RESPONSIBLE ARAB LEADERS DID NOT CONSIDER SOVIET ROLE AS DECEITFUL ONE.

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STATED THAT IN WEEKS TIME THIS PROPAGANDA WOULD BE DISPELLED AND SOVIET PRESTIGE IN ARAB WORLD WOULD BE AT ALL TIME HIGH. HE WAS ASSURED OF SUCH BY HIS LOCAL ARAB CONTACTS. REFERRED TO BOUMEDIENNE'S PRESENT TRIP TO MOSCOW AND CHARACTERIZED IT AS FIRST MAJOR ELEMENT AFTER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR FOR DEVELOPMENT ON USSR-ARAB RELATIONS.

5. ROLE US EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. GASPARIAN SHOWED MUCH INTEREST IN PRESENT STATUS US EMBASSY BEIRUT. STATED HE READ IN LOCAL PAPERS FIFTY-TWO OFFICIALS HAVE REMAINED. ALSO WANTED TO KNOW WHAT HAPPENED TO ALL EMBASSY CARS. QUERIED EMBOFF ON MISSION OF EMBASSY NOW. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT EMBASSY CARRYING ON AS USUAL BUT WITH REDUCED STAFF. GASPARIAN COMMENTED MUST BE DIFFICULT TO WORK UNDER PRESENT TENSION AND SECURITY PRECAUTIONS. EMBOFF STATED GOL MOST COOPERATIVE IN PROVIDING SECURITY AND THIS NO LONGER AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM. EMBOFF NOTED THAT SOV EMBASSY STILL GUARDED BY LEBANESE ARMY ALTHOUGH GASPARIAN DENIED THIS.

MIDDLETON

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SUBJECT: REACTION TO SOV REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY GA.

1. GENERAL REACTION IN UN CIRCLES TO SOV REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY SPECIAL SESSION (USUN 5713) WAS A COMBINATION OF: A) INITIAL DISBELIEF THAT SOVS, EVEN BY IMPLICATION WOULD MAKE REQUEST WHICH POSSIBLE UNDER ONLY "UNITING FOR PEACE" RES (WHICH THEY HAVE LONG CONTENDED IS ILLEGAL); B) SUBSEQUENT FEELING THAT SOVS WILLING ACCEPT INEVITABLE FLACK AND RIDICULE FROM SUCH

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MOVE IN BELIEF EMERGENCY SESSION WILL ENABLE THEM TO PUT US ON SPOT ON QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-CONFLICT POSITIONS; C) UNCERTAINTY AS TO SOV INTENTIONS IN REFERRING ART 11 OF CHARTER AS ARTICLE UNDER WHICH EMERGENCY GA SHOULD CONSIDER ME SITUATION. THERE WAS SOME SPECULATION SOVS MIGHT SIMPLY INTEND USE EMERGENCY SESSION TO DEVELOP WIDE-SPREAD SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THEY REFER QUESTION TO SC FOR ACTION.

2) MEMBERS OF MANY DELS EXPRESSED DOUBTS RE: A) CONFORMITY OF SOV REQUEST WITH GA RULES OF PROCEDURE, I.E. ARGUING SUCH REQUEST NOT POSSIBLE UNDER SC STYMIED BY VETO; AND B) LEGALITY OF HAVING GA ADOPT ANY DECISION RE SITUATION OF WHICH SC STILL SEIZED; AND C) UTILITY OF HAVING GA TAKE UP SUCH COMPLICATED AND EMOTION-LADEN QUESTION WHICH SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROGRESS ONLY IF GREAT POWERS AND PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED CAN AGREE.

3) NEVERTHELESS, WE HEARD VERY FEW DELS EXPRESS VIEW THEY WOULD OPPOSE SOV REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY SESSION:

ARAB REACTION AS FOL:

A) ACCORDING JOUEJATI (SYRIA, PROTECT), ARAB DELS, IN JUNE 13 MEETING, HAD DECIDED SOV INITIATIVE WAS MERELY ATTEMPT TO DO

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WITH WORDS WHAT SOVS HAD FAILED TO DO WITH ACTION. AS RESULT, ARABS GENERALLY UNIMPRESSED BY SOV INITIATIVE, BELIEVING IT TO BE A PROPAGANDA PLOY, BUT ONLY MODERATE ARABS (SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT) INDICATED WILLINGNESS TAKE PUBLIC POSITION OPPOSED TO EMERGENCY GA.

B) TOMEH (SYRIA) SEPARATELY TOLD MISOFF THAT HE FAVORED RESORT TO GA IF SC UNABLE TO ACT. ASKED IF FAILURE SOV RES WOULD PROVE SC INABILITY TO ACT, TOMEH DEMURRED SUGGESTING HE UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT RESORT TO GA AT THIS TIME.

C) ALISA (IRAQ) EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW EMERGENCY GA WOULD DO LITTLE MORE THAN PROVIDE SOUNDING BOARD FOR EXPRESSIONS OF OPINION ALREADY LONG ESTABLISHED IN 20 YEAR ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE.

D) KARAMAT ALI (NETH) TOLD MISOFF HIS SOUNDINGS AMONG ARABS INDICATED MOST OPPOSED EMERGENCY GA (MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY MOROCCO, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, UAR). PINERA (CHILE) SAID SAME VIEW EXPRESSED BY LIBYA, TUNISIA, AND LEBANON.

E) ACCORDING VON BRAUN (GER), AMB. HILMY (UAR) HSAID ARABS HAD NO INTEREST AT ALL IN A GA SESSION. SAID SOVS ARE INTERESTED IN IT BUT ARABS DO NOT WANT TO BE USED.

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F) ACCORDING MOHAMMED (NIGERIA), GENERAL ARAB FEELING IS THAT SINCE GA HAD ACHIEVED NOTHING RE APARTHEID, SWA, RHODESIA AND THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES, IT WOULD ACHIEVE NOTHING FAVORABLE TO THE ARAB CAUSE. WEST WOULD MANAGE TO BLOCK ALL ACTION SINCE EVEN IF A RES PASSED, IT WOULD MEANX WITHOUT WEST SUPPORT.

G) SADI (JORDAN) IN CONVERSATION WITH MISOFF SHOWED LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR GA EXERCISE.

AF REACTION LIKELY BE AFFECTED BY LACK OF ARAB ENTHUSIASM. AGGREY-ORLEANS (GHANNA) TOLD US HE EXPECTED AFS WOULD GO ALONG WITH EMERGENCY GA. WHILE HE DIDN'T THINK SESSION WOULD ACCOMPLISH MUCH, WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE IF POLLED BY SYG. THOUGHT SOME AFS WOULD VOTE FOR SESSION IN ORDER TO GET USSR INVOLVED IN PEACEKEEPING ROLE FOR GA. LYNCH (N.Z) SAID HE THOUGH MOST AFS WOULD NOT WANT TO CONDEMN ISRAEL IN EMERGENCY GA, CITING ISRAELI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO SOME AF COUNTRIES.

WES SAW MOVE AS ENTIRELY MOTIVATED BY SOV NEED RECOUP PROPAGANDA POSITION WITH ARABS. EVEN FRENCH TOOK DIM VIEW, NOTE SUDDEN SOV SWITCH FROM EMPHASIS ON SC TO INVOLVEMENT OF GA.

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EES CONSULTED DURING MAY DEMONSTRATED LITTLE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF SOV MOVE. IF THEIR GOVERNMENTS OR MOSCOW AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN CONSULTED, THEY CLEARLY HAD NOT GOTTEN WORD AND THEREFORE UNPREPARED MAKE CONVINCING ARGUMENTS FOR SUDDEN SOV SWITCH TO GA AND TO PROCEDURE WHICH BASED ON UNITED FOR PEACE RES WHICH SOVS HAD PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED.

LAS QUESTIONED UTILITY OF GA SESSION BUT DID NOT APPEAR INCLINED TO OPPOSE IT. SOME SOUGHT ASCERTAIN DEGREE US OPPOSITION IN ORDER BE GUIDED BY IT. OTHERS INDICATED THEY WOULD ABSTAIN ON ANY POLL BY SYG ABOUT CONVENING GA. THEY BELIEVE THAT SIMPLE RES ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ARAB TERRITORY WOULD BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, DEFEAT IN SPECIAL GA. OTHERS THOUGHT THAT, AS IMPORTANT ACTION, IT WOULD NEED TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY WHICH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO WIN.

COMMENT: INITIAL REACTION IS CLEARLY LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC EVEN AMONG THOSE WHOM SOVS MOST WANT TO IMPRESS. THIS MAY BE DUE IN PART TO CONTINUING ARAB DISILLUSION WITH SOVS, LACK OF ADEQUATE SOV CONSULTATION OR PREPARATION, AS WELL AS GENERAL CONVICTION THAT GA CAN ONLY PRODUCE PROPAGANDA SHOW ON ISSUE OF THIS NATURE.

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BT

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June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your talk with Ambassador Talbot, in from Athens,
Thursday, 1 p. m.

Phil Talbot is a lucid, perceptive political analyst, and you may want to use the occasion to hear his views on Greece's political and constitutional crisis.

Colonel Papadopoulos, who engineered the coup and retains control of key points in Greece, wants a thorough housecleaning and no return to constitutional rule, while King Constantine is determined to press for free elections. We've been quietly supporting him in this. Our leverage is limited, however, since we no longer have an economic assistance program. We have stopped shipping major items of MAP, such as planes and ships, but we are keeping our hand in with the military by continued shipments of small items like ammunition, spares and small arms.

You may wish to raise the following specific questions:

- (a) The constitutional issue: How does Phil expect the constitutional crisis to be resolved?
- (b) Sixth Fleet and King Constantine's problem: The King has pressed us to bring the Sixth Fleet nearer to Greek shores in case his expected confrontation with the coup leaders materializes in the Fall. Phil has resisted this. You may wish to explore this issue, pro and con.
- (c) Andreas Papandreou: Since we took a lot of heat from Andreas' many American friends (he has taught economics at Berkeley and elsewhere and has an American wife) when he was jailed, you may want to hear directly about Andreas' political role, impending trial and likely outcome.
- (d) U. S. arms policy: In view of criticism from Greek liberals, should we supply any military equipment at all?

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 99-306

By is, NARA Date 2-3-90

W. W. Rostow

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Wed., June 14, 1967

125

MR. PRESIDENT:

Carl Rowan called at 5:40 p. m. , with the following message.

One hour ago Oleg Kalugin called on him at his office. Kalugin is formally the Press Attache of the Soviet Embassy. In fact he is reputed to have much more authority than that.

He said that it is a 90% certainty that Kosygin is coming to the UN. His primary mission is to dramatize Soviet support for the Arabs.

His second mission, however, is, hopefully, to have bilaterall conversations with President Johnson.

The Soviets already have a commitment from the French to send "a top figure"; and Kalugin says it is likely that Wilson will be here.

He said that it would be difficult for Kosygin to come to Washington because of the Chinese Communists and the Arabs.

Kalugin asked Rowan: Would President Johnson be willing to meet Kosygin in New York? Rowan says that he told him he didn't have the slightest idea, and asked why this had not been taken up through diplomatic channels.

Kalugin replied: Tcherniakov, the Soviet DCM, "does not have the same contacts" that Dobrynin has.

I thanked Rowan for the message.

W. W. R.

cc: UnderSecy Katzenbach
McGeorge Bundy

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wed., June 14, 1967

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I thanked Rowan for the message.

Walt R.

cc: UnderSecy Katzenbach
McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Rostow 127
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2. Purple file

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June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Messages to Moderate Arabs

We are taking advantage of all quiet opportunities to keep our lines open to those moderate Arab leaders who have resisted Nasser's pressure to break with us. They hope we'll soon be able to make some pro-Arab gesture that will justify their policy. Except for limited humanitarian actions, this will be hard, and any hand-holding we can do is so much to the good.

The attached messages to President Bourguiba and the Amir of Kuwait fall in this category. The message to Bourguiba is a reply to his urgent cable last Friday, asking you to help end the fighting. The message to Kuwait is a general response to the Ruler's assurances to Ambassador Cottam that Kuwait would not break relations and would protect our people.

There is no great substance to either of these, but on balance they seem worth sending. You have exchanged messages with King Faisal, and we proposed earlier a short thank-you to King Hussein for his help in evacuating our people. Secretary Rusk is seeing King Hassan's Foreign Minister in Madrid on his way home from the NATO meeting. Touching base with the Tunisians and Kuwaitis would almost complete this round of contacts with those who haven't broken relations.

I recommend you approve. Mac Bundy agrees.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message to Kuwait _____
Disapprove _____

Approve message to Bourguiba _____
Disapprove _____

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Authority OLG 82-124
By rs/cos, NARA, Date 6-11-91

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1272

June 14, 1967

DRAFT MESSAGE TO
THE AMIR OF KUWAIT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Your Highness:

During these difficult days, it is important for us to understand one another's views on the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East.

Above all, I want to be sure that Your Highness has no doubt that the United States continues to value its relations with all the Arab countries. I regret very much that our formal ties with some of them have been cut, especially since the charges which prompted that break are totally invented. I can assure Your Highness categorically that no U. S. aircraft have been involved in any way against the interests of the Arab countries.

We particularly value the long and friendly relationship between our governments and peoples. Therefore I respect Your Highness' statesmanship, which has helped maintain this relationship throughout this trying period.

We will continue to work for the establishment of peace in the Middle East on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation. I hope the cease-fire can in fact become a first step toward peace and progress for all the peoples of the area and pray that God may grant us all the wisdom and courage to bring this about.

With personal greetings and high regards,

Sincerely,

1270

June 14, 1967

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA

Dear Mr. President:

I fully understand the deep concern expressed in your urgent message of June 9. As you know, we had tried hard to prevent war. Once it started, we energetically supported the efforts of the United Nations Security Council to achieve an effective cease-fire as a prelude to a lasting peace.

As we attempt to mend the torn fabric of relations in the Middle East, your prestige as an advocate of moderation and your consistent support of peaceful solutions to international problems give you an important voice which must be heard.

I am pleased to hear from your son that you continue to regain your strength. I deeply appreciate the message of friendship and understanding which he brought to Secretary Rusk and to my Special Assistant, Mr. Rostow.

With my warmest personal sentiments,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Lyndon B. Johnson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

127c

45-S

Action

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BP

008913

1967 JUN 9 PM 5 40

1.. I HAVE JUST BEEN CALLED URGENTLY TO PRESIDENT'S PALACE WHERE I WAS MET BY BAHY LADGHAM AND MONGI SLIM. THEY SAID THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM MOKKADEM (PRESIDENT GOT PARLIMENT) PRESENTLY IN CAIRO, WHO SAID THAT FOLLOWING RESIGNATION OF NASSER AND DESPITE EGYPTIAN ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE, ISRAELIS HAD STARTED BOBMING INDUSTRIAL SECTION OF CAIRO AND HAD ADVANCED ITS TROOPS TO WEST BANK OF SUEZ. THEY SAID NEWS SERVICES REPORT ISRAELIS HAVE ALSO STARTED DRIVE TOWARD DAMASCUS AND WERE NOW ONLY FIFTY KILOMETERS AWAY. DAMASCUS ALSO BEING BOMBED. THEY WERE IS STATE OF HIGH AGITATION AND CONCERN THAT SUCH ACTION BY THE ISRAELIS WOULD THREATEN ORDERLY GOVERNMENT IN ALL ARAB STATES. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT, THEY SAID, TO FORECAST DEPTH AND FUROR OF POPULAR ANGER.

2.. IN LIGHT OF THIS PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA WAS ASKING ME TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE OF GREATEST URGENCY TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

3.. "AT THE MOMENT WHEN MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE STILL BEING PURSUED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ESPECIALLY BOMBARDMENTS OF CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES BY THE ISRAELI FORCES, I HAVE THE HONOR TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE EXTREME GRAVITY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION. SUCH OPERATIONS HAVE NO OTHER OBJECTIVE THAN TO DESTROY THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THESE COUNTRIES AND TO THROW THEM INTO ANARCHY. THEY CAN ONLY HAVE IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THE RESULT OF PROVOKING PUBLIC EXPLOSIONS IN THE ARAB-MOSLEM WORLD. ABOVE ALL THEY RISK COMPROMISING PEACE OVER THE LONG RUN AND PREVENTING ALL EFFORTS TO FIND A LASTING SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-305
By *12*, NARA Date *1-31-00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- TUNIS 4774, 6/9/67

4., "I ASK YOU MOST URGENTLY TO USE YOUR INFLUENCE TO STOP THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE BEING PURSUED IN VIOLATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SUCH A GESTURE WOULD BE REGARDED IN HISTORY AS AN OUTSTANDING ACTION BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

5. "WITH HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

6., "HABIB BOURGUIBA."

GP-2 RUSSELL
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY DELIVERED TO S/S-0 JUN 9, 5:45PM

PASSED: WHITE HOUSE, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA,
USUN, COMAC, CINCSTRIKE: JUN 9, 5:45PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
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FOR OCIT USE ONLY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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ACTION: AmEmbassy TUNIS FLASH

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You may convey following oral message to Bourguiba:

1. His message to President Johnson has been received and conveyed. Reply will be forthcoming shortly.
2. In meantime, we have taken action in SC/and directly to bring about cease-fire. As yet we have no solid information on alleged bombing Cairo.
3. You should also express appreciation for Bourguiba's message and state we look forward to useful discussions of overall ~~any~~ ^{NE} problem in near future.

END

RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 92-25
By ing, NARA, Date 7-8-92

Drafted by:

NEA:DCBergus:vf

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

NEA:DCBergus

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Campbell
S/S - Mr. Walsh

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

res file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Performance under the Program Loan

Costa e Silva has been in office for three months and it is apparent that his administration varies in style and substance from Castello Branco's. Performance in two areas are of particular concern to us: foreign policy and the domestic stabilization program.

Castello Branco carried out tough political and economic measures designed to consolidate the "revolution" with little regard to their impact on his public image. He kept a tight rein over policy making by his Cabinet. Cooperation with us on foreign policy matters could hardly have been closer.

Costa e Silva is much concerned with being "popular", restoring the "democratic" image of Brazil and "humanizing" the economic recovery program. At the same time, he personally does not want to depart too far from the objectives of the 1964 revolution. Costa e Silva appears to be leaving broad authority with his Cabinet Ministers without close coordination at the top. They have yet to hammer out an overall, consistent policy.

As a result, there is a puzzling ambivalence in the orientation of the Costa e Silva administration. For example, in foreign affairs Costa e Silva expresses close identification with our policies -- and I believe he is sincere in this. But his Foreign Minister publicly advocates a "non-involvement" policy on Vietnam, insists on a nuclear-test-for-peaceful-uses exception in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, strikes a reluctant stance on Venezuela's complaint against Cuba and takes an equivocal position on our efforts to unscramble the Israel-Arab problem.

On the domestic front, Costa e Silva professed support for stabilization program and accepted the self-help terms of the \$100 million program loan negotiated with Castello Branco. On that basis, we authorized the first \$25 million tranche with the clear understanding that release of subsequent tranches would depend on performance.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 9-27-99~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Recent performance has been so poor that fiscal and monetary results deviate widely from CIAP targets which were conditions of the program loan agreement. These targets are no longer attainable. We are therefore being forced to revise our strategy and tactics regarding our economic assistance.

The failure of the Brazilians to meet the targets is illustrated by these key examples:

- At the end of May the budget deficit was 1.12 billion new cruzeiros, while the commitment for the full year was projected at 554 million new cruzeiros.
- The coffee price decision announced four days ago provides for a price increase to growers averaging 28% for the year, instead of the 10-15%, which we understood would be the target. (The increase will act as a strong disincentive to agricultural diversification.)
- The level of domestic credit appears to have expanded during the first five months of 1967 by 600 million new cruzeiros -- the amount projected for the entire year.

It is not clear to what extent these policies are the result of catering to domestic political pressures, technical incompetence on the part of the new Ministers, or lack of coordination and control during the first months of the Costa e Silva administration.

What concerns us is that if Costa e Silva does not develop a responsible fiscal and financial program and stick to it, the stabilization program will be undermined and our assistance will be wasted.

State-AID, together with Treasury and BOB, have developed a strategy for trying to make the Brazilians face their problems and take corrective action. It has these elements:

- Tuthill will personally discuss the situation with Costa e Silva as soon as possible, making clear that we cannot make further disbursements of the program loan because of wide deviations from the loan agreement. He will also indicate that project and sector loans may be affected. At the same

time, he will express our desire to continue to support Brazil's development and will propose that we renegotiate economic policy targets consistent with effective stabilization, development, and reform programs.

- The AID Mission Director will take similar action at the Ministerial level and Covey Oliver will talk to the Brazilian Ambassador here.
- AID/State will coordinate closely with the IMF and IBRD, both of whom will send review teams to Brazil in early July.
- If Costa e Silva is willing to develop a more adequate economic program, we will be prepared to negotiate a new agreement with him for release of the remaining \$75 million of our FY 1967 program loan. The new agreement, of course, would be submitted to you before the final approval.
- If we cannot negotiate a satisfactory agreement in 1967, the \$75 million will not be disbursed and we will try to negotiate a new program in 1968.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. It may be wiser for you to pull him up short with a personal letter expressing your anxiety. W

129
100

Wednesday, June 14, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Interest in Equipment for Philippine Construction Battalions

I have learned that the press office had a query today (from Spence Davis of AP) regarding our supplying of equipment for the Philippine construction battalions. His question: Hadn't we promised to supply equipment for five battalions this year, and for five more in the year ahead?

Bill Jorden suggested the press office answer as follows:

"Last September, the President promised President Marcos that we would supply construction equipment for five battalions. We are supplying it and deliveries will be completed soon. The President also promised to consider supplying equipment for an additional five in fiscal 1968, We are considering the matter as promised."

I wanted to flag this for you because it may mean there is a chance of premature leakage on this matter.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State let 4-5-78

By lg/llh, NARA, Date 6-11-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

130

Pres file

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I seem to remember you
wanted me to reply to Sen. Hatfield;
but you wanted to clear the reply.

W. W. Rostow

Letter okay

Modify _____

See me _____

130a

June 13, 1967

Dear Senator Hatfield:

I am writing in response to your letter to the President regarding possible actions to bring about a settlement in Viet Nam.

You wrote just before hostilities broke out in the Middle East. I assume that in the light of recent developments, you would probably agree the United Nations lacks the will, majority, and capacity to mount the kind of operation you suggest at the DMZ -- quite aside from the fact that Hanoi and Moscow have systematically rejected any U. N. role in Southeast Asia.

Under these circumstances it is hard to agree that "now is an opportune time to reduce American participation in the affairs of Viet Nam." With North Vietnamese Army forces pressing hard against our Marines and the Vietnamese Army in the northern portion of Viet Nam directly across the DMZ, it would evidently be dangerous to reduce our participation in the defense of South Viet Nam.

As you know, we have tried repeatedly to encourage U. N. interest and responsibility in this matter.

In the light of the past record, there are many people and governments who would regard the kind of invitation you suggest to the U. N. from the South Vietnamese government as a rather empty propaganda gesture.

I would also note, incidentally, that there is significant infiltration of men and supplies via Laos and Cambodia which must also be faced.

In general, it seems to me that what is required is an agreement on reasonable terms of a settlement -- and we are ready to discuss such terms at any time -- and then the formation of control and supervisory machinery that could assure that the terms were followed by all concerned. It is the first step that is the toughest -- and most necessary. As of this moment, unfortunately, there is no bit of evidence to suggest Hanoi is yet ready for a settlement short of its domination of South Viet Nam.

You should know that your suggestions are welcomed and that the considerations you and many others have raised in connection with a peaceful solution have received, and will continue to receive, careful and close attention.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
5:45p. m.

131

Pres file
By sent [initials]

MR. PRESIDENT:

Chief Justice Warren is now scheduled to visit Belgrade, Warsaw, and Prague (as well as some Western European stops) June 23-30.

The view in State is that it's a good idea, and calling it off would be a bad idea.

But I wanted you:

-- to know of the trip;

-- to have a chance to turn it off.

The Chief Justice, I understand, is quite relaxed about either going or not going.

W. W. R.

Chief Justice's trip O. K. _____

No _____

See me _____

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
4:55 p. m.

132

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a conversation with Evron, and a message via Dick Helms from General Amit, head of the Israeli intelligence.

You will be interested in all of the latter message, but perhaps particularly in the section on pages 2 - 3 about the LIBERTY.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 86-197 appcc
By 12/15/91 NARA, Date 6-11-91

1326

Tuesday, June 13, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Minister Evron asked to see me today to pick up a copy of the talk I gave in Middlebury.

In fact, he raised two matters:

1. The Israeli negotiating position. He said that a month ago there was no serious crisis in the Middle East; 10 days ago they felt they were being throttled; now there is temporary euphoria and relief at the military victory; but they have not had time to think through their position. The job for Israel is, having won the war, now to try to win the peace. He asked if we had any advice? I said he knew our formal positions, notably the President's statement of May 23 and everything else down to the resolution inscribed at the UN Security Council. We are clearly for both territorial integrity in the Middle East and for peace. Our powers to make peace, however, are extremely limited. A major attempt to retrieve the Soviet-radical Arab positions is under way, including apparently a meeting of the General Assembly. A great deal hinges on what kind of a position they take and especially whether it is one that will draw to it the majority in the UN General Assembly and, in the end, moderate Arabs. As the President had made clear in his press conference this morning, we were committed to certain principles in this situation but did not have a program.

He said that he understood this and, without instructions, he would only say this: It is important that the Arabs find out in the political offensive that the Russians cannot deliver any more effectively than they could deliver militarily. If this political counteroffensive fails, he feels that the Arabs may be willing then to talk. I said, once again, that what happened in the General Assembly and happened with the moderate Arabs depended upon the positions put forward by Israel.

2. He then turned to the notes concerning the LIBERTY. He said that he found no difficulty with our finding the issue "incomprehensible." He was disturbed by the use of the word "wanton"; and he would have wished that we had recognized how promptly the Israeli government had informed us of the error. He said Golda Meir had been with Rabin when he was informed; that considerable soldier "almost fainted" at the news of the attack. He was greatly disturbed by the NEWSWEEK item in Periscope. Without in any way going around his Ambassador or the State Department, it was his personal suggestion that both notes might be amended or dropped and the "tone of the exchange lowered." He repeated that he saw nothing wrong at all in our asking how it could have happened; who did it; and our requesting that the Israeli government do something about it. The implication of purposeful action, however, he

felt was most unfortunate.

He said that although final confirmation had not come to Washington, it was his understanding that those involved in the attack were about to be severely punished.

I explained to him that there was a good deal of strong Congressional feeling about the matter. In addition, the President and the military were understandably concerned. The language of the note was precise. We found the incident literally "incomprehensible." He said the Court of Inquiry was working as fast as it could. Perhaps when we had conducted our investigation, we could close out the incident with some kind of joint statement.

I noted and said I would pass along his thoughts.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-221
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01


133

Pres File

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
4:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

 sees no additional damage to Hamel TPP after the June 10 raid. It doesn't prove damage wasn't done; but the burden of proof now passes to the military and photo reconnaissance.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

134
Pres file

Tuesday, June 13, 1967 -- 3:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith returned for your
pocket, Premier Eshkol's moment
of high statesmanship.

W. W. Rostow

LBJ Fails On Pledge --Eshkol

TEL AVIV — (UPI) —

Premier Levi Eshkol said last night President Johnson "promised great things," but in the end Israel stood virtually alone in her confrontation with the Arab world.

Eshkol talked of Israel's plight in a speech to his party's officials.

Discussing the 21 days before the war broke out, he said:

"We were first asked to wait two days," apparently before taking any action against the Arabs mobilized around Israel.

"Then we sent (foreign minister) Abba Eban to the United States — and were asked to wait a further fortnight. President Johnson promised great things.

"They told us that 40 to 50 maritime powers would sign a guarantee for free passage through the Tiran Straits" which the United Arab Republic had blockaded against Israeli shipping.

"We examined the situation and found that it really came down to a dozen and finally to only two countries and then, perhaps, to one — Israel," he said.

Top

135

SANTITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 99-223
By cb, NARA Date 1-24-01

~~TOP SECRET -- COMINT~~

Pass file

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
12:45 p. m.

Mr. President:


In addition to CIA, I have asked Clark Clifford to make an assessment of the attack on the LIBERTY.

Here's CIA's first cut at the problem.

They do not find evidence of U. S. identification before the attack.

But we shall pursue the matter.

W. W. Rostow

copy
13 June 1967


EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET -- COMINT~~

WWRostow:rla

136

Pres file

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft reply to
Rabbi Besdin and his petitioners.

W. W. Rostow

136a

June 12, 1967

Dear Rabbi Besdin:

Thank you for the encouragement and prayers inscribed in the petition of the Marine Park Jewish Center on the crisis in the Middle East. I hope you will tell each and every petitioner that I am deeply grateful.

As I said during the tense days of last week, I view the end of fighting as a first step toward what we all must hope will be a new time of settled peace and progress for all the peoples of the Middle East.

I urge you to join in my prayer that all parties involved may show the highest statesmanship in achieving that goal.

Sincerely,



Rabbi Abraham R. Besdin
Marine Park Jewish Center
3311 Avenue S
Brooklyn, New York

LBJ:GPR:HHS:tmt 6/12/67

Tuesday, June 13, 1967, 12:20 p.m.

WTR
131

Pro file

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a short answer to Kiesinger's letter of June 2 (Tab B). Your note confirms that you will see Kiesinger ~~here~~ on July 7-8; he had earlier accepted for June 20-22. (A note from you isn't absolutely necessary, but State thinks it would be useful.)

no file

Francis M. Bator

OK to send message _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

FMB:LSE:mst

1370
W.H.R.

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

Mrs. Johnson and I are delighted that you and Mrs. Kiesinger will be able to visit with us on July 7-8. I look forward to talking with you about the many problems of concern to our countries, and to our mutual friends.

*I very much enjoyed visiting with Von Hassel
at lunch yesterday.*
With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

138

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
11:55 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

We learned from a sensitive source that the Russians are putting in a resolution to the Security Council which is a variant of the one they have had before the Council for some time; a condemnation of Israel combined with a simple withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation lines.

McGeorge Bundy's comment: "This is one we think we can block easily. "

The Russians are asking for a Security Council meeting at 2:30 p. m.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

Tuesday, June 13, 1967
11:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Your memory was better than ours: Sen. Robert Kennedy did spend a couple of hours in Saigon en route from Djakarta to Bangkok on February 18, 1962; here is what he said.

W. W. Rostow

13⁰⁰

From Page 1, NYTimes, Feb 19, 1962.

Saigon, Feb. 18. Special to the NYTimes.

Robert F. Kennedy said tonight that U.S. troops would stay in South Viet-Nam until communist aggression was defeated.

The Attorney General of the U.S. said at a hurriedly summoned news conference at Saigon airport: "We are going to win in Viet-Nam. We will remain here until we do win."

Mr. Kennedy did not leave the heavily guarded field during a two hour stop on his flight from Djakarta to Bangkok. He said he wished he could have stayed longer.

Asked whether the U.S. was involved in a "war" here, Mr. Kennedy asserted: "We are involved in a struggle."

"What is the semantics of war and struggle?" He was asked.

"It is a legal difference," explained the Attorney General.

"Perhaps it adds up to the same thing. It is a struggle short of war."

"American boys are dying out here," a British correspondent said. "Do the American people understand and approve of what is going on?"

"I think the American people understand and fully support this struggle," Mr. Kennedy replied. "Americans have great affection for the people of Viet-Nam. I think the U.S. will do what is necessary to help a country that is trying to repel aggression with its own blood, tears and sweat."

Mr. Kennedy's formal remarks were cleared with the State Department in urgent exchanges during the day. In an approved statement

he lauded President Ngo Dinh Diem as "brave and patriotic."

When he was asked about the economic and social reforms the U.S. has been pressing upon President Diem, Mr. Kennedy smiled and replied:

"You heard my statement. We have full confidence in the President."

Ngo Dinh Nhu, who is President Diem's brother and a powerful adviser, heard this tribute. No questions were asked by the South Vietnamese press, which is controlled by the regime.

In his formal statement, Mr. Kennedy said he and Mrs. Kennedy regretted that their visit was "so brief."

"We particularly ^{regret it} ~~regretted~~, " he said, "because Viet-Nam's ^S ~~is~~ struggle to preserve its independence against communist aggression is a grave one which affects free countries everywhere."

"This is a new kind of war, but war it is in a very real sense of the word. It is war fought not by massive divisions but secretly by terror, assassination, ambush and infiltration."

"Hanoi (North Viet-Nam's capital) may deny its responsibility, but the guilt is clear. In a flagrant violation of its signed pledge at Geneva in 1954, the North Vietnamese regime has launched on a course to destroy the ~~Free~~ Republic of Viet-Nam."

Mr. Kennedy said the South Vietnamese people had proved "their courage and tenacity against adversity and their inflexible attachment to their independence from foreign domination."

"The American people," he said, "will see Viet-Nam through these times of trouble to a period when the Vietnamese people will find a long-sought opportunity to develop their country in peace, dignity and freedom."

Monday, June ¹³ 12, 1967 -- ^{11:30 AM} ~~6:10 p.m.~~

Mr. President:

I talked with Sec. Rusk about Bill Leonhart. I explained the reasons you did not wish to sign him on as a Special Assistant to the President. Sec. Rusk confirmed that no White House money is involved in the previous arrangement.

Sec. Rusk and I share the view that his operation is useful; and that he is doing it quietly and competently. This would be a bad time to break it up; and it might fall apart if his position became ambiguous. Sec. Rusk then suggested the following formula: that you designate him Special Assistant to the National Security Council. In that capacity he could report either directly to you or through me. I have not, of course, talked to Leonhart about this situation until we had a formula which either promised to hold his enterprise together or had developed an alternative way to handle the coordination of civil business of Viet Nam in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

I am prepared to designate Leonart
Special Assistant to the NSC _____

He will report directly to me _____

He will report through you _____

No _____

See me _____

Take up whole question at today's lunch (June 13) _____

WWRostow:rln

Mr. Rostow

41

~~1~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

June 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: King Faisal's Reply to Your Letter

Faisal reiterates his desire to continue your close personal relationship and urges us to be even-handed in picking up the pieces of the Mid-East war. He has no doubt that the Israelis committed aggression and asks you to help make sure that they don't gain territorially.

I pass this on only because it is typical of the strong pressures we are getting from our Arab friends to say that our support for the territorial integrity of all the states in the area means pulling the Israelis back behind the 1949 Armistice lines and not forcing a peace settlement. Mac Bundy has seen, and we will have recommendations for you soon.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Jidda 1772, 6/12/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-287
By is, NARA Date 1-31-20

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Jidda 5272

DECLASSIFIED June 12, 1967
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-306
By , NARA Date 2-3-80

Early this morning SAQQAF sent King Faisal's reply to the President's letter cited reftel. Following is English translation prepared by Emboff:

Quote: In the name of God the merciful the compassionate.

Dear Mr. President: I have received with great appreciation your Excellency's message dated June 8, 1967. In expressing to your Excellency my gratitude for the high sentiments contained in your message, I appreciate your Excellency's consideration in taking the initiative to explain the position of the United States Government toward the sudden events and developments to which our Arab region has been exposed. I further appreciate your desire to learn our views on these events, and your assurance that your Excellency will lend them careful consideration.

Starting from the cooperative and friendly spirit on which the cordial relations existing between our countries and ourselves personally are based, and which characterized the discussions which I held with your Excellency in Washington last year, permit me, Mr. President, to comment on four points mentioned in your letter:

1. Your Excellency mentions that you have not been able to learn who began the aggression. In my opinion, the swift surprise attack which Israel carried out, which paralyzed the movement of the Arab Air Forces and destroyed their airports from the first moment of the outbreak of the battle, is absolute proof that she began the aggression.

2. Your Excellency mentions that the policy of the United States is to work within the framework of the United Nations without itself becoming involved in the present dispute, and that you will make all possible efforts to pursue an even-handed and just course. In my opinion this point is worthy of careful attention--reserving my position concerning the Israeli presence in the area--for it's just and fair that Israel should be bound by the resolutions of the United Nations by which it was established and which delineated its borders, rather than attempting from time to time to stir up armed actions through which it may make new gains, as it did in 1948 when it penetrated to the Gulf of Aqaba by force of arms and in 1956 when it imposed freedom of navigation in that Gulf.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

3. Your Excellency also mentioned that the United States Government opposes and will work against any effort aimed at altering frontiers in the area or in settling problems by force of arms. This step is a positive step in the present circumstances, in view of the gravity of the situation and the prevailing tension, and after the Arab States have suffered enormous losses in life, treasury and material.

4. Your Excellency expresses regret at the severance of diplomatic relations of certain Arab States with the United States, and at certain incidents in the Dhahran area. Your Excellency no doubt realizes, by your keen insight and experience of affairs, that what has happened and what may still happen is only one manifestation of the deep feeling which has grown over the years in the hearts of the Arab peoples toward the Palestine problem.

I appreciate Your Excellency's recognition of the gravity of our situation resulting from the violent wave of inflammatory emotion which is sweeping over the Arab world, and beyond it over the entire Islamic world. I see it a necessary duty, as well as in the general interest, to work for calming this down and for limiting its spread so as to permit--as Your Excellency says in your letter--the handling of the underlying problems of the regions more realistically, in cooperations with you and with those countries which desire stability in the area, to insure peace therein, and to preserve the resources which are the basis of its progress and prosperity. To this end, therefore, in my opinion the United States should, at the very least, establish two principles and endeavor to secure their adoption in the United Nations:

1. Condemn Israel for the aggression.
2. Ensure that she is unable to realize any gain as a result of this aggression.

In this way you will assist your friends in limiting the violence of the present dispute and in dampening it down, and halt the violent destruction to which the entire area is now exposed to the detriment of its security and stability. In assuring you of my appreciation of your high sentiments, I express to your Excellency my sincere hope that all factors and motives of such a nature as to complicate sincere efforts to direct all of our abilities toward the realization of security and

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

stability in the area, toward progress and prosperity for its people,s, and toward positive participation in strengthening world peace, will be removed. I am confident that in the exchange of views and contractive cooperation between ourselves and our Governments lies the interest of all, and that this will assist in creating the appropriate atmosphere for the long process of return to tranquility and stability in the area.

Sincerely yours,

Your Friend Faisal. Unquote

SAQQAF states Saudis also wish to keep exchange confidential. Will send signed Arabic original of Faisal's letter soon as courier service is resumed.

Eilts

Pres file 192

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, June 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Leader of Australia's Opposition Party

LYou have agreed to receive E. Gough (Goff) Whitlam at 10:30 a. m. tomorrow, June 14.

Whitlam recently assumed leadership of the Australian Labour Party succeeding Arthur Calwell. He is 51 and a lawyer. He has been in the Australian Parliament for 15 years, and was deputy party leader since 1960.

Calwell was violently opposed to our policy in Viet-Nam and to Australian involvement. Whitlam is much more realistic and moderate. He has problems with the militant left wing of the Labour Party which supports the Calwell line.

He probably will want to discuss:

- Viet-Nam;
- security in Southeast Asia (including plans for British cutbacks);
- the Middle East;
- U.S. -Australian relations (including investment, wool, trade).

He will benefit greatly from exposure to your point of view on Viet-Nam, reinforcing his tendency toward realism and moderation.

You may wish to ask him for his own and his Party's views on Southeast Asia security, and especially Viet-Nam.

In addition to his call on you, he is scheduled to see Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Kuchel, and Kennedy.

Whitlam's wife, Margaret, was an Australian swimming champion. They have four children.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-27
By ju, NARA, Date 2-8-93

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