

Monday, June 26, 1967, 3:35 p.m.

W.W.R.
7/1
1. ~~mess~~
2. Profile

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a message to a Danish July 4 celebration (the Rebild Festival). The Danes have celebrated our Independence Day at Rebild every year since 1912 (except during the war).

You have sent similar messages before. In 1965 and 1966 Ambassador White read your message at the end of her own speech. She would like to do so again this year. (State agrees that a message be sent.)

Francis M. Bator

Message approved ☒

No ☐

Speak to me ☐

FMB:LSE:mst

PROPOSED MESSAGE

Each year thousands of Danes and Americans gather here at Rebild to celebrate together the anniversary of the Independence of the United States. We have always been proud of the close ties between our two countries, and are deeply grateful for this demonstration of your friendship.

Since the first Rebild Festival a million Danes and Americans have met to pay tribute to their common heritage of liberty, and to reaffirm their dedication to the cause of freedom for all mankind. These meetings are dramatic evidence of our common purpose. They are eloquent testimony to our mutual hope that one day all nations will live in peace and understanding.

My countrymen join me in sending you, and all the people of Denmark, our warmest greetings and best wishes.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 26, 1967 - 2:45 p.m. ⁹²

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the report proposed for public release of the Navy Court of Inquiry on the USS LIBERTY.

It has been cleared by Sect. McNamara, Deputy Sect. Vance and Under Sect. Katzenbach.

Cy proposes to release it at 4 p.m. on Wednesday.

They have considered whether to make it available to the Israelis beforehand. The Israelis have asked for 24 hours lead time. Cy is inclined to feel that 12 hours would be sufficient; but he does recommend that we make it available beforehand since:

-- the judgment -- not flatly stated in the Report -- is that the attack was an accident; and

-- they made available to us the report of their court of inquiry.

You will note (page 15) that the report refers to a failure in our communications which delayed a JCS message to move the LIBERTY farther away from the coast.

As stated on page 2: "It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation." Cy tells me that, in fact, the members of the court, on the evidence available to them, believe the attack resulted from a failure within the Israeli communications system and not from premeditation. But in his view, on the evidence we have, we should not so state.

W. W. R.

O. K. for public release 4 p.m. Wednesday ✓

O. K. for release to Israelis 24 hours before 12 hours before ✓

See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By sig, NARA, Date 6-15-93

has the following all defense recommended
by the Navy, d's, ISA, NSA, General Counsel.

be associated with the service's uniform you wear, young man, and we
thank you very much for your cooperation and fine testimony. 92

Mr. LUCAS: Thank you, Admiral.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

The Court recessed at 1045 hours, 14 June 1967 from taking further
testimony in order to examine exhibits received by the Board.

The Court opened at 1300 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with
the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in
court.

Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, took the stand as a
witness, was duly sworn, advised of his rights under Article 31, Uniform
Code of Military Justice and examined as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Please state your name, rank, organization and present duty station.

A. Commander William L. McGonagle, U. S. Navy, Commanding Officer,
USS LIBERTY (AGTR-5).

Let the record show that although the witness is experiencing
considerable pain from shrapnel wounds in his leg, that he willingly
appeared at this hearing.

Q. Captain McGonagle, as you are well aware, this Court of Inquiry has
been convened to inquire into the circumstances attendant with the armed
attack on the U. S. Naval vessel which you command, USS LIBERTY, which
occurred on 8 June 1967. Will you please describe to the Court the
circumstances of that incident as you recall it?

A. At the time of the incident, LIBERTY was performing her mission in
accordance with JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967. At the time of the
incident, the ship was operating under the operational control of
Commander, U. S. Sixth Fleet. The ship had arrived in its assigned
operating area on the morning of 8 June 1967 after having departed from
Rota, Spain on 2 June 1967. The ship was steaming in international

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 11RAC 00-72

By 441 NARA, Date 03-20-2013

waters and was so at all times. A "condition of readiness three, modified," was set. The "condition three, modified" watch consisted of normal steaming watch, with the exception that one man was stationed in the forward two 50 caliber machine guns, 51 and 52. Lookouts on the bridge were designated to man machine guns 53 and 54 in the event of surprise air or surface attack. Each machine gun had a box of ammunition attached to the machine gun with a round up to but not in the chamber of each mount.

9 During the 0800 to 1200 watch on the morning of 8 June, at about 1030, a flight of two unidentified jet aircraft orbited the ship at about 10,000 feet, three times at a distance of approximately two miles. It was not possible to identify any insignia on the aircraft and their identity remains unknown. [A locating two report was submitted on this sighting. It is not known at this time whether the sighting report was transmitted from the ship or not. Records are not accessible at the time.] It was also possible to see on the 8 to 12 watch in the morning the coastline of the Sinai peninsula. Aircraft activity of an apparent propeller patrol type flying at very low altitude and parallel to and over the coast in the vicinity of El Arish was noted. It is estimated that the altitude of this plane was approximately 500 feet. At no time did this plane approach the ship in any fashion. His distance remained approximately 12 to 15 miles. 9 It was possible to visually sight the minaret which is quite conspicuous at El Arish. This was used as a navigational aide in determining the ship's position during the morning and afternoon of 8 June. It became visible at about 0930 and the ship's position was verified, and was within our established operating area. Radar ranges were taken on the nearest land on the same bearing as the minaret. The minaret was also identifiable by radar. There were no other conspicuous or outstanding navigational features in the area. At about 1056 in the morning of 8 June, an aircraft similar to an American flying boxcar crossed astern of the ship at a distance of about three to five miles. The plane circled the ship, around the starboard side, proceeded forward of the ship and headed back toward the Sinai peninsula. A locating three

report was submitted. It is not known if this report was transmitted.

This aircraft continued to return in a somewhat similar fashion approximately at 30 minute intervals. It was not possible to see any markings on the aircraft and the identity of this aircraft remains unknown. This aircraft did not approach the ship in any provocative manner. It made no attempt to signal the ship. The ship made no attempt to signal the aircraft. At 1039B the Minaret at El Arish was bearing 189°T, 17 miles. At the time the ship was on a course of 253 at speed five knots. At 1132, the ship changed course to 233 true, speed five knots and was on this course and this speed at the time of the attack. At about 1310, 8 June, the ship went to general quarters for drill purposes to conduct training for a mandatory non-competitive exercise to exercise the crew in chemical attack procedures. The drill was performed in a satisfactory manner. Nearly all of the top-side personnel were exercised through the chemical decontamination station and were absent from their battle station for varying periods of time while performing this phase of the drill. After top-side personnel that had been designated to proceed through the decontamination station (these personnel were all gun crew personnel and secondary con personnel) returned to their battle stations and the performance of the crew judged to be satisfactory the crew was released from battle drills at about 1350 and condition three modified was again set. At the commencement of the drill it was possible to see a large billowing cloud of black smoke rising from approximately 15 to 20 miles to the west of El Arish on the beach. The exact identity of the cause and the location of this explosion is not positively known, although it was believed to be near the beach in that area. This was noted at about 1300. At about 1330 a smaller cloud of black smoke was noted to the east of El Arish estimated five to six miles and also along the coastline. Before dismissing the crew from general drills, I gave the crew a short talk on the PA system, reminding them of the importance of expeditiously responding to general quarters and the setting of condition Zebra for drills and in the event

of an actual attack. So that they would be impressed I pointed out to the crew at that time that the column of black smoke on the beach should be sufficient evidence that the ship was in a potentially dangerous location. I had no evidence or indication that an attack would actually be made on the ship at the time that statement was made to the crew. [The statement was made to encourage them to set condition Zebra in a more expeditious manner than they had done for the drill held that afternoon. As I recall all battle stations were reported manned and ready within three minutes for the afternoon drill, but the report of condition Zebra had not been received on the bridge until about four minutes forty-five seconds after the drill commenced. This I considered to be excessive.] After conducting general drills, it is my usual practice to go to the wardroom and have a cup of coffee and critique the drill with the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Armstrong, the Engineering Officer, Lieutenant Golden, and the Damage Control Officer, Ensign Scott, if I have not been particularly satisfied with the drill. If the drill has been satisfactory, usually I contact the officers on an individual basis at some later time during the day and indicate to them that I was satisfied with the drill and point out some of the errors in which improvement could be made and point out also to them the things that I felt had been done properly. With the exception of the length of time that it took to set condition Zebra I was satisfied with the performance of the crew for the afternoon drill and did not assemble the above mentioned officers in the wardroom for a critique. ¶ After general quarters was over from the drill, I lingered on the bridge for a few minutes. As I recall, the following officers were present on the bridge: Armstrong Ennis O'Connor LCDR ARMSTRONG, LT ENNIS, LT O'CONNOR, who is normally officer of the deck during general quarters, LT TOTH, the Operations and Navigator, also Intelligence Officer. LtJG PAINTER came onto the bridge after general quarters to assume the watch as the officer of the deck. [As he assumed the officer of the deck watch, he indicated that he was having difficulty in obtaining an accurate ship's fix. At that time, and the

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time was approximately 1400. I personally sighted the Minaret at El Arish to be on a bearing of 142 from the ship and the range as I recall from the radar was approximately 25.5 miles. I do not know that this radar range can be verified from the records available at this time. I had also earlier in the day established a danger bearing on the Minaret at El Arish to be 119 degrees true from the ship. The danger bearing was established to insure that the ship remained clear of shoal areas to the south of the southwesternmost edge of our operating area. [It was not known if the Minaret would still be visible when we approached the southwest corner of our operating area or not, but the danger bearing was established to be used if the Minaret was visible when the ship arrived at that location.] At this point in the preparation of my statement, I referred to the quartermaster's notebook, 12-1600 watch, Thursday, 8 June 1967. I referred to this log for the purpose of refreshing my memory as to the initial moments of the unexpected attack. The log shows that at 1355, LTJG PAINTER relieved LT O'CONNOR as officer of the deck. The log also shows that at 1355, ENS O'MALLEY, as junior officer of the deck under instruction, assumed the conn. The 12-1600 watch on Thursday, 8 June 1967 has no entry from the time frame 1356 until 1446. I shall relate in my own words and to the best of my knowledge and belief all events of which I have personal knowledge which occurred during that time frame. [About 1400 the lookouts, who were stationed on the 04 level, immediately above the bridge, reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical, to the two aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135, its position angle about 45 to 50 degrees, its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this

aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level, portside amidships, were burning furiously. It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'CONNOR was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. O'CONNOR and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead flank. Up to this time, the ship had one boiler on the line steaming at speed five knots. The other boiler was not on the line but pressure was being maintained in order to be able to respond to speeds in excess of that which is capable with one boiler, approximately 11 knots, should it be necessary. Earlier in the day, the Engineering Officer had requested permission to let number two boiler cool so that he could replace a steamline gasket. This permission had been granted and the boiler had started to cool from about 1200 on 8 June. I do not know whether the engine room acknowledged by the engine order telegraph the flank bell or not, but smoke immediately commenced coming out of the stack and I assumed that they did. It seemed to me that shortly thereafter the ship increased speed. At this time I ordered a person, who

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I believe to have been LT BERNETT, to report to CNO via the highcom that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required. I do not recall whether I ordered any course changes to have the ship zig-zag or not. One helmsman was seriously injured in the starboard bridge bomb blast, and he was replaced by Quartermaster Third BROWN. I do not recall who had the helm at the time of the initial attack. ¶ The response of the crew to general quarters was very expeditious. I do not recall whether all of the bridge personnel ever arrived on station or not, but the public address system, *(an electrically-powered inter-com system)* the 21MC, and most sound powered phone circuits were severed or destroyed during the initial first or second of the total number of six to eight strafing attacks that occurred. ¶ It seemed to me that the attacks were made in a crisscross fashion over the ship, with each attack coming at approximately forty-five second to one minute intervals. After the starboard bridge bomb hit, I ordered personnel to be organized for a fire fighting party to put out the fire in the vicinity of the whaleboat. The whaleboat was burning furiously. It is estimated that the total air attack was completed in approximately five to six minutes. About midway during the attack, Ensign LUCAS was noted on the bridge and at that time he became my assistant and assisted me in every way possible. Runners were used to relay my orders to the repair parties, to main control and other vital stations. ¶ Sometime after the starboard bridge bomb hit while on the starboard side of the pilothouse, another attack from the starboard quarter proceeding forward was made and I was hit with flying shrapnel. I was not knocked off my feet, I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence. I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my trousers right leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further consideration to these minor injuries. ¶ Shortly after this I opened the bridge safe and took out a camera which was maintained on the

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bridge to take pictures of foreign ships and aircraft. I immediately took the camera to the port wing of the bridge and there was able to take several pictures of the planes as they had passed over the ship after their attack. In an effort to obtain documentary evidence to establish the identity of the aircraft, I retained this camera in my possession throughout the remainder of the attack. Later I took pictures of the torpedo boats before and after the torpedo attack, also the helicopters which approached the ship after the attack was over. This film has been turned over to the USS AMERICA for development and further disposition.

9 On what appeared to be the last air attack on the ship, I observed a cylindrical object dropped from one of the aircraft as it was passing from port to starboard ahead of the ship. This object landed in the water an estimated 75 to 100 yards directly ahead of the ship. There was no explosion from this object, but it shattered into several pieces. It appeared to me that it might have been an empty wing tank but I am not certain of this. 9 In the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 at a distance of about 15 miles. The ship at the time was still on course 283 true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots. At no time did the ship stop during the air attack. It is believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats [the time] was about 1420. The boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about 27 to 30 knots. They appeared to be about 150 to 200 yards apart. It appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude, and since I did not have direct communication with gun control or the gun mounts, I told a man from the bridge, whose identity I do not recall, to proceed to mount 51 and take the boats under fire. The boats continued to approach the ship at high speed and on a constant bearing with decreasing range. 9 About this time I noticed that our Ensign had been shot away during the air attack and ordered DAVID, signalman, to hoist a second

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Ensign from the yardarm. During the air attack, our normal Ensign was

flying. Before the torpedo attack, a holiday size Ensign was hoisted. *I alerted the crew as best I could to stand by for torpedo attack from*

starboard. I did not have an accurate ship's position at this time, but I knew that to the left of the ship's course at that time lie shoal waters and by turning to the left I would be approaching land, closer than had been given me in directives which I held in that instant in time. I realized that if I attempted to turn to starboard, I would expose a larger target to the torpedo boats. I elected to maintain a heading of 283 at maximum speed. When the boats reached an approximate range of 2,000 yards, the center boat of the formation was signalling to us. Also, at this range, it appeared that they were flying an Israeli flag. This was later verified. It was not possible to read the signals from the center torpedo boat because of the intermittent blocking of view by smoke and flames. At this time, I yelled to machine gun 51 to tell him to hold fire. I realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error.

I wanted to hold fire to see if we could read the signal from the torpedo boat and perhaps avoid additional damage and personnel injuries. The man on machine gun 51 fired a short burst at the boats before he was able to understand what I was attempting to have him do. Instantly, on machine gun 51 opening fire machine gun 53 began firing at the center boat. From the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level, I observed that the fire from machine gun 53 was extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat. It was not possible to get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge. I sent Mr. LUCAS around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell QUINTERO, whom I believed to be the gunner on machine gun 53, to hold fire until we were able to clarify the situation. He reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53. As far as the torpedo boats are concerned, I am sure that they felt that they

were under fire from USS LIBERTY. At this time, they opened fire with their gun mounts and in a matter of seconds, one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time that this torpedo crossed the stern is believed to be about 1426. About 1427, without advance warning, the ship sustained a torpedo hit starboard side forward, immediately below the waterline in the vicinity of the coordination center. The ship immediately took a 9 degree list to starboard. Oil and debris were noted coming from the starboard side following the explosion. There was no major resultant fire from this explosion. The explosion caused the ship to come dead in the water. Steering control was lost. All power was lost. Immediately, I determined that the ship was in no danger of sinking and did not order the destruction of classified material and did not order any preparations to be made to abandon ship. It was my intention to ground the ship on shoal areas to the left of the ship's track to prevent its sinking, if necessary. I believed that, if the ship was in a sinking condition, we would not be able to reach sufficiently deep water to avoid recovery of classified material on board.

Immediately after the ship was struck by the torpedo, the torpedo boats stopped dead in the water and filled around astern of the ship at a range of approximately 500 to 800 yards. One of the boats signalled by flashing light, in English, "Do you require assistance"? We had no means to communicate with the boat by light but hoisted code lima india. The signal intended to convey the fact that the ship was maneuvering with difficulty and that they should keep clear. Reports received from damage control central indicated the location of the torpedo hit and that flooding boundaries had been established and that the flooding was under control. During the strafing by the torpedo boats and immediately prior to being hit by the torpedo, quartermaster third BFOBN, who was acting as helmsman at the time, was felled at his station. The mess decks were designated casualty collection station and casualties were taken to the collection station by repair party personnel and other members of the

* Time subsequently adjusted to 1434 and 1435, respectively.

* "I am not under command" (not able to control movement of ship).

crew able to assist. Following the torpedo hit, those personnel from ^{that} the Research Area who were able to do so, left their stations. ¶ One of the torpedo boats was identified by a hull number of 204-17. Pictures were taken of the torpedo boats prior to and subsequent to the attack. ¶ About 1515, two helicopters approached the ship and circled around and around the ship at a distance of about 100 yards. The insignia the Star of David was clearly visible. Hull number on one of the helicopters was 04 or D4. The other had a hull number of 08 or D8. It was not known whether these helicopters intended to strafe the ship or not. However, they did not approach the ship in a hostile manner, but kept pointed parallel to the ship as they continued around and never made a direct approach as such. They were not taken under fire by Liberty, nor did they fire at us. The torpedo boats left the general area of the ship at about 1515. About 1537, after they had departed the ship and gone to a range of about five miles, they again headed toward the ship at high speed. Their intentions were unknown. At about this same time two unidentified jet aircraft were also noted approaching the ship from our starboard side, in similar fashion to that which preceded the initial attack. All hands were again alerted to the possibility of repeated attacks. No attacks occurred however, and the jets disappeared from the scene. To further assist in identification of the ship, at 1611 I ordered the ship's international call sign hoisted. ¶ Both boilers had been put back on the line at approximately 1520, but at 1523 lube oil suction was lost to the main engines and the ship again became dead in the water. The heading of the ship at this time is not known. About 1535, communications were restored, and at 1600 a message was sent providing additional information concerning the attack by unidentified aircraft and the fact that the torpedo boats had been identified as Israeli. Preliminary estimate of the number of dead and casualties, as well as the condition of the ship, was also provided. ¶ At the time this message was being dictated to Lieutenant Bennett on the port wing of the bridge, I was laying on the deck with a

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tourniquet being applied to my right leg at the thigh. A few moments prior to this I felt myself blacking out from loss of blood, and called for assistance of Ctl Carpenter to apply a tourniquet. I had assumed the ^{Crew} ~~con~~ immediately upon the air attack and retained the con until rendezvous was effected with the destroyers about 0630 on the morning of 9 June 1967, leaving the bridge only about 3 times during the night hours to make brief head calls on the 02 level. ¶ No bodies were noted in the area of ship following the explosion. Several life rafts, however, were released and placed into the water by various crew members whom I was unable to communicate with prior to their placing the boats in the water. They exercised their initiative on the scene, and no fault can be found with their estimate, not having the information that I had. When the messenger was sent to tell them to leave the lifeboats alone, that the ship was in no danger of sinking at that time, but that the lifeboats might be needed at a later time, no additional lifeboats were placed in the water. [Misinterpretation of the situation by personnel in combat following the order to prepare for torpedo attack to starboard also resulted in the ship's radar being purposely destroyed. Again, I find no fault with this action under the circumstances.] ¶ At about 1637, the torpedo boats commenced retiring from the area without further signal or action. At this time, the ship was attempting to make good a course of 340 magnetic, at speed 8 knots. Emergency manual steering was being conducted from after steering. The amount of rudder was given to after steering over emergency rigged sound powered telephones. They would apply the rudder. When the ship had come to the approximate magnetic heading, the rudder would be shifted to attempt to maintain that heading. It was possible to maintain within plus or minus 30 degrees of the ship's heading most of the time. The exact position of the ship was not known at this time. At 1653 an attempt was made to steer and make good a course of 000 magnetic. It was not known what effect the nearby explosions might have had on the pilot house magnetic compass. The gyro compass was

out. It was not known what the azimuth of the setting sun was, but this was used as a rough guide and it appeared that the magnetic compass had not been unduly affected. The ship's fathometer in combat was working following the attacks. At about 16⁵⁵, the fathometer sounding reported approximately 26 fathoms under the keel. I realized at this point that the ship might be south of its track and could be approaching the shoal areas outside of our operating area. Since I was not positive of the ship's position, I ordered Mr. Lucas to round up as many personnel as he could, and proceed to the forecastle and standby to anchor. My intention was to anchor until it became night so that I could visually sight the North Star to see whether the magnetic compass had been unduly affected or not. Once I was able to sight the North Star, then I would know in which direction the ship was actually proceeding. Mr. Lucas and personnel did go to the forecastle, and at one point I did order the port anchor to let go. But before the port anchor could be let go, I reversed my decision and backed all engines two-thirds to see if I could back clear of the apparent shoal area. I commenced backing the ship at about 1704 and continued backing until 1722, at which time the fathometer reading was approximately 48 fathoms under the keel. With the ship going ahead two-thirds and right full rudder we quickly came to a magnetic heading of about 350 magnetic and continued on to a heading of 025 magnetic about 1729. The ship was at this time making a speed of about 8 knots. At 1730, the ship lost lube oil to the main engines, and all engines were stopped. At 1731, the ship was on a heading of 022 magnetic with 50 fathoms of water under the keel. Lube oil pressure was regained to the main engines within a very short period of time, and the ship continued right to a magnetic heading of 040 at 1737, at which time 72 fathoms was indicated under the keel. At 1743, the ship's heading was 068 magnetic and 82 fathoms of water under the keel. At this time I considered the ship to have stood clear of the immediate danger of grounding and at 1748 increased speed to ten knots on a magnetic heading of 050. The ship remained at general

quarters, and reports from damage control central were to the effect that all watertight boundary bulkheads were holding satisfactory. Dr. ^{Kienfey} HENNER, and the two corpsmen, were doing outstanding work in assisting injured crew members. They advised me from time to time of the number of casualties, the extent of injuries, and efforts being made. At 1750, a message was received from COMSIXTHFLT to the effect that escorts were on the way and that the ship was to proceed on a course of 340 magnetic at maximum speed until 100 miles from present position, then turn 270 magnetic. The ship attempted to carry out this directive. At 1757, COMSIXTHFLT advised that escorts were proceeding to rendezvous with us at maximum speed of destroyers. At 1841, an Israeli helicopter approached the ship and hovered at bridge level approximately 30 feet from the ship. They made various attempts to indicate by visual means that they wished to land a man on board. At one point, I considered granting the request, but considering the obstructions in the area of the forecastle, signalled a waveoff to them. Lettering on the tail of the helicopter was SA32K. On the fuselage were the numerals 06 or D6. At 1857, the helicopter dropped a message on the forecastle. The message was written on the back of a calling card, identified as Commander Ernest Carl Castle, Naval Attache for Air Embassy, USA. The message on the back read as follows: "Have you casualties"? We attempted to advise them by flashing light with an Aldis lamp that, "affirmative", we did have casualties. It was evident that they were unable to understand what we were saying. After some ten to fifteen minutes of unsuccessful efforts to communicate between the helicopter and the ship, the helicopter departed from the area, at a time unknown, but as dusk was approaching the ship. Three musters were taken during the night to identify the dead, the seriously injured, and to determine those who were missing. [It was believed that those initially reported as missing are entrapped in compartments in the forward part of the ship as a result of the torpedo explosion and resultant flooding.] As of 1900,

11. June, two of the persons previously reported missing, have been recovered, One by removing him directly from the space on board ship. The other was recovered by the PAPAGO, a Fleet tug steaming approximately six miles astern of the ship on the morning of 11 June. It is not known at this time whether any of the other individuals reported missing have drifted free of the space through the torpedo hole and vanished from the area. It will not be possible to determine until the ship has been drydocked and the compartment dewatered and remains recovered. Preparation of casualty messages were completed as expeditiously as possible upon the completion of the musters, and necessary message notifications sent.

9 The ship rendezvoused with the two destroyers on the morning of 9 June. Commander Destroyer Squadron Twelve reported on board to inspect damage and confer with the Commanding Officer. Personnel from the USS DAVIS immediately boarded the ship to render assistance with damage control and treatment of injured personnel. I have no complaint to lodge against any officer or man on board USS LIBERTY for any acts of commission or omission during the attack and post attack phase. I have nothing but the greatest admiration for their courage, their devotion to duty, and their efforts to save the ship. As the result of my personal knowledge of the manner in which the following personnel performed their duties during the attack and post attack phase, I intend to commend Ensign LUCAS; Signalman DAVIS; Quartermaster Third BROWN; Lieutenant George GOLDEN, Engineering Officer; and Ensign SCOTT, Damage Control Assistant. I have requested the officers and the petty officers of the ship to advise me of any other individuals, who, to their personal knowledge, performed in such a manner as to warrant special recognition. I also intend to address a letter of appreciation to Lieutenant Commander Bill PATTISON, Chief Staff Officer, COMDESRON TWELVE, for the outstanding manner in which he has assumed the responsibilities of assisting the Commanding Officer in sailing the ship from point of rendezvous to destination of Malta. A message of condolence from the ship has been sent to BUPERS with the request that it

be delivered to the next of kin at the funeral or memorial services conducted for the deceased and those missing in action. A personal letter from the Commanding Officer to the next of kin will be prepared and sent at the earliest possible time. Dr. ^{Kiebler} Kiebler, and the two pharmacist mates will also be awarded letters of commendation from the Commanding Officer. [It is not known at this time the extent of probable compromise of classified material. Destruction of supercoded RFS- distributed material was conducted immediately prior to the attack. Lieutenant PHILIP, Communications Officer and RFS-Custodian discussed the matter with the Commanding Officer on the morning of 8 June, and it was decided at that time that we would make the June burn before the scheduled 15 June date, in view of the location of the ship, and we intended to burn supercoded key cards on a daily basis as they were supercoded. A report to this effect was released by the Commanding Officer. It is not known, however, whether this message was transmitted or not.]

The court recessed at 1600 hours, 14 June 1967

The court opened at 1645 hours, 14 June 1967. All persons connected with the inquiry who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. Commander William McFonagle, U.S. Navy, resumed his position on the stand as a witness.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by counsel for the court:

Q. Captain, will you please continue with your description of the incident?

[A. I would like to relate some additional information which may be of some help to the court. USS LIBERTY departed Norfolk, Virginia 2 May 1967 in accordance with COMNAVSTA FLETC message dtd 281500Z April 1967.

This was to be the fifth deployment of the LIBERTY to foreign station since its conversion and commissioning as a technical research ship in Seattle.]

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Washington 30 December 1964. The deployment initially commenced under the operational control of COMSERNVON EIGHT. The first port of call was Abidjan, Ivory Coast with a scheduled arrival of 22 May 1967. LIBERTY arrived at Abidjan, Ivory Coast on the scheduled date. LIBERTY was scheduled to spend four days in Abidjan, Ivory Coast to depart on 26 May 1967. The operation order was similar to that under which the LIBERTY had deployed on four previous occasions. On the morning of 24 May, approximately 0345Z, a message was received from COMSERNVON EIGHT with a dtg of 240020Z, May 67 in effect directing that LIBERTY get underway immediately and proceed to Rota, Spain for further operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Immediately upon receipt of this message, LIBERTY commenced preparations for getting underway. It was not possible to get underway, however, until about 0730 on the morning of 24 May 1967. The delay was due to awaiting for pilot, tug, and proper tide conditions for transit of the Vridi Canal. USS LIBERTY cleared the Vridi Canal approximately 0745, 24 May 1967, and set course via coastal route direct to Rota, Spain at best speed. An average of about 15 knots was maintained during the transit. During the transit from Abidjan, Ivory Coast to Rota, Spain, operational control of LIBERTY was changed from COMSERNVON EIGHT to USCINCEUR. The reference for this operational control change is COMSERNVON EIGHT 300202Z May 1967. This reference is not immediately available to me. Operational control of LIBERTY was again shifted from USCINCEUR to CINCUSNAVEUR in accordance with USCINCEUR 300932Z May 1967. This change of operational control occurred as LIBERTY arrived at the sea buoy off the port of Rota, Spain at about 0930 local time, 1 June 1967. After completion of fueling, loading provisions, and accomplishing repairs to the special communications relay system (TRSSCOM-1) the ship was RFS at about 1330, 2 June, and at that time got underway in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR move order 7-67, dtg of this move order was CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 311750Z May 67 modified by CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 011305Z June 1967. JCS message dtg 011545Z June 1967 is considered pertinent in LIBERTY's schedule from the period 02 June until the time of the incident. This message gives departure date from Rota, route to

follow, point to proceed to, and the operating area of Liberty during the period of 9 to 30 June 1967. Paragraph 10 of this message is particularly pertinent. At 070001Z June 1967, operational control of Liberty again changed from CINCUSNAVEUR to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with CINCUSNAVEUR dtg 061357Z June 1967. This change of operational control was made by message in which Liberty indicated to COMSIXTHFLT that Liberty was reporting to COMSIXTHFLT in accordance with the CINCUSNAVEUR message 061357Z. This message also included Liberty endurance and provisions, dry, frozen, and chill. It indicated that the ship had on board approximately 85% fuel and utilized approximately 1% fuel per day while on station. The message also indicated that Liberty self-defense capability was limited to four 50 caliber machine guns. The dtg of this message is 062036Z June 67. USS Liberty was operating under the operational control of COMSIXTHFLT at the time of the incident. No additional messages were in hand onboard Liberty concerning area of operation or other guidance for the performance of our mission than previously mentioned in the JCS message of 011545Z June 1967. COMSIXTHFLT message dtg 080917Z June 1967, which directed Liberty to proceed and operate within a 25 mile radius of 33.40 North, 32.30 East until further notice was not received until delivered by hand on 10 June 1967. Had this message been received anytime prior to the attack, Liberty would have attempted to open the range on the coast of the countries indicated in the message to at least be 100 miles specified. The existence of this message was not known by the Commanding Officer of the Liberty at the time of the incident and no action was taken to comply with it. During the four previous deployments of USS Liberty, the ship aroused unusual curiosity only during the first and second deployments. The configuration of the ship with unusual mast antennae arrangements and deckhouse structures caused, so I understand inasmuch as I was not on board as Commanding Officer at the time, some surveillance, primarily surface, from the Southwest African countries during its first two deployments. Lieutenant GOLDEN, who was aboard at the time, may be

able to provide the Board with additional details in this area. There are probably many reasons why the aircraft were unidentified. One reason would be that the distance, and the speed at which the aircraft flew, was such that it was extremely difficult to make out any distinguishing characteristics by personnel on board who do not normally observe any jet aircraft in the area of the ship's operation. The ship normally steams on independent duty along the West Coast of Africa. These countries do not have sophisticated air forces with the possible exception of Angola. Angola does have some jet aircraft but they have been noted to fly over the ship only on one occasion to the Commanding Officer's personal knowledge, while the ship was at anchor in Luanda Harbor. An occasional Piper Cub or helicopter working an oil rig along the coast and infrequently commercial jet aircraft is about the extent of air activity observed by personnel aboard LIBERTY. A recognition manual for Israeli, UAR, aircraft and surface ships was not on board prior to proceeding to the area. General ship characteristic and plane characteristic recognition manuals are on board and were used to hold occasional recognition training sessions. These sessions were primarily devoted to ship recognition. It was not known whether any U.S. aircraft were in the area, but no known U.S. aircraft were sighted by anyone onboard at any time prior to or after the incident. ⁷ A. On further recollection of the event involving machine gun 53 firing, the effectiveness of the firing leads me to believe that a person, whom I believe to be QUINTERO, Boatswain Mate Seaman, to have been on station at machine gun 53 and took the torpedo boats under fire. It is possible that he evacuated his station as a result of the fire and flames from the motor whaleboat prior to Ensign Lucas' arriving to determine who was on the mount. For clarification purposes, the 50 caliber machine guns that are onboard USS Liberty are Browning machine guns, M2, heavy barrel, with a rate of fire of 450 to 500 rounds per minute. These machine guns are mounted on a pedestal and are aircooled weapons. Two men can effectively serve the gun. One as gunner, who uses

an open sight; the other individual, the loader, who keeps ammunition up to the chamber. These machine guns are manually controlled. There is no director means of controlling the fire. The limiting stops for arc of fire of these weapons consist of piping, bent in a shape to prevent the gun barrel from being pointed at a direction which would harm the ship or any portion of its structure, and the outer edge of the gun tubs themselves which offer very limited splinter protection. The machine guns themselves do not have any splinter shields attached. These machine guns are not considered mounts in the normal Navy terminology of a mount. They should be considered more as pedestal mounted machine guns. ¶ The time gap in the Quartermaster's notebook resulted from the fact that there were insufficient number of people in the bridge area to maintain an accurate record of events as they occurred and execute the orders of the Commanding Officer simultaneously. With communications to various stations limited various personnel, as they were noted on the bridge, were used as messengers. At one time during this time frame, the only individuals seen on the bridge were Quartermaster BROWN, who was on the helm, Ensign LUCAS, and myself. Ensign LUCAS was busy relaying my instructions to the various battle stations. The smooth log will be a reconstruction of events as recalled by the Commanding Officer, who was present on the bridge throughout the entire incident and maintained his faculties at all times during the incident. ¶ At this time, I have related all of the events that are considered pertinent and should be brought to the attention of the Board of Inquiry. One additional fact, which should be noted by the board, is the fact that the chart used for plotting the ship's position and for laying out the operating area is identified as Portfolio A3259, Chart DC3924 Nov, Second Edition, September 30, 1963 (revised 5/4/64). This chart shows the approach to the operating area that the USS LIBERTY made, a diagonal transit from northwest to southeast. It lists point A, B, and C as the proposed southernmost limit of the operating area and the intended track of LIBERTY.

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Q. Captain, you mentioned in your testimony that a helicopter hovered over ^{LIBERTY} Liberty and that an object was dropped which you recovered. I show you this card, and ask you if you recognize it?

A. Yes sir, I do recognize this card. It is a calling card.

Counsel for the Court: I'd like to offer this into evidence as exhibit number 9, and to serve as identification, if there is no objection, I would like you to read it now?

A. I read from the card I now hold in my hand. It is a calling card from "Commander Earnest Carl Castle, United States Navy, Naval Attache for Air, Embassy of the United States of America, Tel Aviv." This is on the face of the card. On the back of the card is written, "Have you casualties?" It's noted that this card is smeared with oil smudges on both sides.

Q. Thank you very much. You also mentioned in your testimony that you took a camera out of your bridge safe and were able to start to take some pictures. I show you developed pictures and ask you if you recognize them?

A. Yes, I recognize most of these pictures as having been taken by myself during the attack. Some had been taken by another individual unknown, but I do recognize the scenes depicted therein.

Q. Therefore, will you mark the back of the pictures for record purposes so that identification will be known? and I offer them in evidence as Exhibit 9.

A. Yes sir, I will mark them so that they, the scene or object depicted will be clearly indicated.

President: I'd like to, at this point ask the Captain -- Did you not have wounded still lying about the deck at the time this helicopter was hovering over the ship?

A. Admiral, if you mean the helicopter which the attache was in, I'm not sure that the wounded were still lying around the deck, as such. By that time, most of our wounded had been taken to the casualty collection stations.

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But there were people that were wounded. Whether they were evident to the Naval Attache from his position in the helicopter I do not know. There were injured on deck, however.

Counsel for the Court: In amplification of the Admiral's question, was there not a considerable amount of blood on the decks that would be obvious from a reasonable distance?

A. That is correct. There were numerous blood streams the full length from the 01 level on the forecastle to the main deck, at machine gun mount 51, where one body was still lying. I do recall that now. [With his head nearly completely shot away.] As I recall now, there was also another body in the vicinity of mount 51. The seriously injured were cared for before those obviously beyond help; were taken care of and removed from the place where they were hit.

Counsel for the Court: I'd also like to introduce in evidence at this point, separately from the chronological file of messages, DAO Tol Aviv 082100Z, as Exhibit-10.

LIBERTY

Counsel for the Court: You have in your custody, USS Liberty charts that were used on the day of 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: I request the recorder to mark such charts exhibits 11 and 12 and request photos be substituted in the record.

Counsel for the Court: Will you please read the information relative to this court?

A. [From exhibit 12,] this is a chart of the Mediterranean Sea from Antalya Korfozi to Alexandria including Cyprus. It is further identified by Chart No. DC3924 November, second edition, September 30, 1963, revised 5-4-64. This chart shows points A, B, and C. These three points limit the southern operating area in which Liberty intended to operate in carrying out the directives of the JCS message 011545Z.

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Captain Lauff: Do I understand those to be the southernmost limit of your operating area?

A. Those points represent a point greater, a distance from the beach, greater than that specified in the JCS message, but closely approximate those limits. The lines between point A, B, and C were the intended track of Liberty during the forenoon and afternoon watch of 8 June 1967.

It was planned on arrival at point C to reverse course to the right and proceed again to point B; thence to point A, and continue a back and forth motion along those tracks during our entire stay in the operating area.

It was planned to move point C to where longitude 33°W bisects the 100 fathom curve should it not be possible to obtain accurate fixes as the ship approached point C. The latitude and longitude of these points are as follows: Point A -- 31.27.2N 34.00E. This point is thirteen nautical miles from the nearest land. The coordinates of point B are: 31.22.5N 33.42E. This point is 14.6 nautical miles from nearest land. The coordinates of point C are: 31.31N 35.00E. This point is 18 nautical miles from nearest land. Closest point of approach to nearest land on a line between points A and B is 13 nautical miles. The closest point of approach to nearest land between points B and C is 14.1 nautical miles. Verbal instructions to the officers of the deck were that the ship was not to be to the south of a line connecting these points at anytime. Exhibit number 12 is a chart. The course between point A and B is 253 true. The course between point B and C is 283 true.

Counsel of the Court: Do any of the members of the Court desire to question the witness?

No response.

Witness: Exhibit number 13 is a Mediterranean Sea chart of Egypt and coastline from Damietta to Al Arish. This is further identified as chart No. 3975, seventh edition, March 1931, revised 2/3/64. This chart has on it the previously described points A, B, and C. It also has on it the danger

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minaret at Al Arish

bearing established on the conspicuous Minaret at Al Arish of 119 degrees true from the ship. The shoal areas of five fathoms or less are circled in red to easily call attention to their location.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you in your custody, a
LIBERTY?
CIC log and the radar bearing book for USS Liberty?

A. Yes sir, I do.

Counsel for the Court: Request the recorder mark the radar bearing book as exhibit number 13 and the CIC log as exhibit number 14. I now offer these exhibits into evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Do any members of this Court desire to question the witness concerning the charts, exhibits 13 and 14, or the radar bearing book and the CIC log, exhibits 13 and 14.

No response.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

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A. Yes sir. Every body that I observed down there, there is no doubt in my mind that that person was dead at the time of the explosion.

President: Thank you very very much, Mr. Wickham.

The witness was duly warned and withdrew.

Commander William L. McGonagle, was recalled as a witness, reminded that he was still under oath and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

Questions by Counsel for the Court.

Q. Captain, did you bring with you today the gyro compass record for USS LIBERTY?

A. Yes sir, I did.

Q. Is this it?

A. Yes sir, it is.

I request the recorder to mark this as exhibit number 26 and offer it into evidence as exhibit number 26.

Q. Will you please read pertinent extracts from that.

A. The ship's gyro was last inspected by the USS VULCAN qualified gyro inspection and repair personnel on 30 March 1967.

Q. Is that 30 March 1967 a timely inspection?

A. Yes sir, it is. The ship's gyro is required to be inspected whenever possible by tender or yard personnel specifically trained in this responsibility once each quarter. I would like to indicate that the log shows that the error at the time of this inspection was .1° westerly.

Counsel for the Court: I have no further questions. Does any member of the Court desire to question the witness?

President: Captain, in our previous discussions, you told me a story which I have since come to identify as remarkable humility and self-effacement on your part which I presume has caused you not to mention in testimony the way you navigated this ship out of dangerous waters after the attack. Will you please tell the Court how, while lying on your back, with no compass except the magnetic compass, and based upon your recollection of

~~TOP SECRET~~

your magnetic compass error in relation to the gyro compass book, you used the sun and subsequently the North Star to clear the area.

A. Admiral, after a time on the bridge, when I had received minor injuries, I lost considerable blood and attempts to stem the flow of blood by self-help were unsuccessful, I noticed myself beginning to lose consciousness. I immediately lay down on the deck flat on my back on the port wing and raised the bleeding leg as high as possible, resting it on my port bridge chair, and there a first class communications technician by the name of Carpenter and other persons who I don't recall at this time, applied a tourniquet to my right leg which effectively stopped the flow of blood. I, at no time, lost consciousness and had my full faculties at all times. I realized by that time I had lost considerable amounts of blood because it was sloshing in my shoes and my right leg was completely soaked with blood. They cut the right pant leg off to get it out of the area of the wounds. I looked at my wounds at that time and they still did not appear to me to be serious and since the flow of blood had been stopped I gave no further consideration to - I didn't consider I had any more problem in that area. I asked them to bring me coffee, fluids, a couple of salt tablets, and so forth. I coned the ship by looking aft and by being able to see the wake of the ship I was able to tell after steering which way to apply the rudder and how long to leave it on to attempt to average out the best course that I felt the ship should travel on to stand clear of possible shoal areas. I remained on my back for approximately an hour and a half. I then felt that I had regained sufficient strength that I was able to get up from the deck and con the ship from the wing of the ship and from the pilot house. I couldn't get my leg in a comfortable position so I moved from one place to the other. I couldn't stay in any one place for too long a period of time. It seemed to me that my remaining on the bridge, this would be able to lessen the shock that the rest of the crew had received.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, predicated on your testimony at the last hearing in which you testified, the Court propounded certain questions for you to answer. Will you please now give the Court the answers to those

A. Yes sir, I will. The questions concern the following:

Q. The basic directives for your operations in the Eastern Mediterranean appears to be those contained in JCS message 011545Z which indicated you would operate south of 32°N during the period 9-30 June. Did you receive any directive to commence these operations before 9 June?

A. Directives received both before and subsequent to JCS 011545Z indicated the urgency of initiating operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as possible. For example: COMSERVRON 8 message 240020Z directed LIBERTY to depart Abidjan immediately and proceed at best speed to Rota for logistics and subsequent employment in the Eastern Mediterranean. My 241732Z indicated ETA Port Said area about 061400Z June. This estimate allowed five hours at Rota to fuel, reprovision, and again get underway. Heavy seas and a boiler casualty delayed LIBERTY's arrival Rota. Repairs to an antenna system were undertaken at Rota and the ship was directed to remain at Rota until repairs were completed. On the basis of telephone authorization LIBERTY departed Rota at 021230Z for the Eastern Mediterranean and reported that best speed would be utilized enroute (LIBERTY 022108Z).

LIBERTY 021330Z indicated that the ship would arrive at 32-00N 33-00E at 080300Z and commence operations within 50 miles from 32-00N 33-30E.

LIBERTY SITREP 070908Z indicates that pin would be stationary at 072300Z and operations would be within 30 miles of 31°45N 33-30E.

CINCUSNAVEUR 061357Z, which refers to both LIBERTY 021330Z (MOVREP) and 022108Z (SITREP on departure Rota), directed that COMSIXTHFLT operate LIBERTY to derive maximum benefit from special capabilities.

LIBERTY chopped to COMSIXTHFLT by message at 070001Z.

No messages were received which would indicate that the expressed intentions of LIBERTY was at variance with the implied desires of all higher commands concerned to effectively employ the unique capabilities of LIBERTY at the earliest possible time. Daily SITREPs/PIN reports were

submitted LIBERTY messages: 032020Z June, 042050Z June, 051934Z June, 061844Z June, 070903Z June, 080634Z June pertain.

In spite of the fact that outgoing transmissions were undesirable for research purposes in view of the operational importance of these messages to the ship's technical/operational commanders I directed that the SITREPS that these messages be sent irregardless of their undesirable effects on the effectiveness of the research mission, especially in view of the increased precedence for transmission directed and prior length of time to obtain TOD for further routing of the SITREPS submitted 3, 4 and 5 June.

JCS 062050Z June Priority (TOR 06/0555Z Jun) contains procedure to be utilized in developing and promulgating LIBERTY schedule and changes while operating in USCINCEUR's area of responsibility. Note that LIBERTY is not included in the framework of developing the schedule or changes and a specific note was included in paragraph 3 of that message to the effect that "... on all messages pertaining to skeds for (sic or) sked changes ... USS LIBERTY is not an addressee on these msgs." Since LIBERTY was not privy to background of schedule of changes there was no reason to believe that the reported actions and intentions of LIBERTY were not acceptable to operational/technical commanders nor was there any way to know that they were considering revisions to that schedule until a message is received which directs the ship to change its area of operation.

President: During your testimony yesterday, in relation to the loss of your quartermaster, the loss of your navigational capabilities, and related circumstances making it difficult to reconstruct navigationally and chronologically exactly what occurred, you were asked to develop in conjunction with your ship's officers and through the assistance of any other assets available, such as your engineer's bell book, the CIC log, recollections of ship's personnel the best available story, chronological in words and pictorial on charts and why/for what happened. Have you done this?

A. Yes sir, we have.

President: Would you be kind enough to submit into evidence at this time, those documents?

Counsel for the Court: I ask you if you have the chronological listing of events relative to USS LIBERTY on 8 June.

A. Yes sir, I do.

Q. Would you provide it, please?

A. Here it is.

Counsel for the Court: Request this be marked exhibit number 27 and request that it be introduced into evidence. Will you please now read exhibit number 27 to the Court?

A. Exhibit number 27 is COMDESRON TWELVE Secret Message 150016Z JUN 67 to CINCUSNAVEUR.

FOR ADMIRAL MCCAIN FROM KIDD. DELIVER AT

~~THIS MESSAGE~~, YOUR 141740Z NOT RCVD AS OF 142355Z; HOWEVER REQUESTED 8 JUNE CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:

1. APPROACHING LAND FROM THE WEST DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 8 JUNE, PROJECTED OPERATIONS OF LIBERTY FOR THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF THE DAY WAS TO PROCEED TO A POINT 13 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE COAST OF UAR AT 31-27.2N 34-00E (POINT ALPHA) THENCE TO 31-22.3N 33-42E (POINT BRAVO) THENCE TO 31-31N 33-00E, (POINT CHARLIE) RETRACING THIS TRACK UNTIL NEW ORDERS RECEIVED, SHIP WOULD OPERATE NORTH OF THIS TRACK LINE AT ALL TIMES, IF FIXES COULD NOT BE ACCURATELY OBTAINED AS POINT CHARLIE WAS APPROACHED IT WAS INTENDED TO HEAD DUE NORTH UNTIL THE 100 FATHOM CURVE WAS CROSSED AND THE TRACK MOVED TO THE NORTH TO MORE OR LESS MOVE BACK AND FORTH ON THE GENERAL AVERAGE OF THE 100 FATHOM CURVE. NORMAL STEAMING SPEED WAS TO BE FIVE KNOTS. NORMAL STEAMING COLORS WERE FLOWN AND NORMAL NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS LIGHTED AT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO STEAM AT DARKEN SHIP AT ANY TIME

AND THE SHIP DID NOT EXERCISE AT DARKEN SHIP DRILL DURING
THE DEPLOYMENT

2. ALL TIMES BRAVO UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED

0754 STEAMING ON 130T, SPD 10 KNOTS

0849 PASSED THROUGH POINT ALPHA CHANGED CSE TO 253T

0850 SINGLE JET A/C (UNIDENTIFIED) CROSSED ASTERN DISTANCE 3 - 5
MILES - CIRCLED SHIP FROM STBD TO PORT AND RETURNED TO UAR
MAINLAND. [LOCATING TWO TRANSMITTED (LIBERTY 080742ZJUN)]

0915 DECREASED SPD TO 5 KNOTS

1056 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP-HIGH

1126 ANOTHER A/C CIRCLED SHIP LOCATING THREE DRAFTED FOR
TRANSMISSION AT 081022Z (BUT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN TRANSMITTED)

1132 PASSED THROUGH POINT BRAVO C/C TO 283T

1310 EXERCISED AT G.Q. DRILL

1348 SECURED FROM G.Q. DRILL

1351 3 SMALL SURFACE CONTACTS HELD ON RADAR 32,000 YARDS BEARING
082T ^{Reported} - REJURED TO BRIDGE AS 3 SURFACE CONTACT

1353 RADAR REPORTS POSSIBLE A/C PASSING OVER SURFACE CONTACTS.

1358 SINGLE A/C SIGHTED APPROACHING SHIP FROM 135 DEG RELATIVE
5 - 6 MILES DISTANCE, ALTITUDE APPROXIMATELY 7000 FT.

A/C PASSED DOWN TRACK OF SHIP

1403 LOUD EXPLOSION - PORT SIDE AMIDSHIPS

1405 SOUNDED GENERAL ALARM - LARGE FIRE IN VICINITY OF FRAME 85,
01 LEVEL WHERE FUEL FOR MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMPS ARE LOCATED.

1405 ALL AHEAD FLANK SIGNALLIED BY ENGINE ORDER TELEGRAPH.

1405 - 1410 SHIP UNDER REPEATED AIR ATTACK WITH TWO OR
MORE A/C MAKING COORDINATED STAFING, ROCKET, AND INCENDIARY RUNS
OVER SHIP. THREE MAJOR FIRES TOPSIDE COVERING LARGE AREAS OF
SHIP WITH FLAMES AND HEAVY SMOKE A TOTAL OF EIGHT MEN WERE
KILLED OR DIED AS A RESULT OF INJURIES RECEIVED DURING THE AIR

ATTACK, ONE KILLED AND ONE MORTALLY WOUNDED ON BRIDGE, TWO KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 51, ONE KILLED AT MACHINE GUN 52, ONE DIED FROM WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE MAIN DECK STARBOARD SIDE AND TWO DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED ON THE #1 LEVEL PORT SIDE. APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY FIVE WOUNDED, INCLUDING COMMANDING OFFICER, THROUGHOUT TOPSIDE AREA FROM SHRAPNEL AND SHOCK OF EXPLODING ROCKETS.

1411 BEGAN MAKING TURNS FOR 18 KNOTS.

1424 3 MTB'S SIGHTED ABAFT STARBOARD

BEAM DISTANCE 4.5 MILES

1426 NOTICED NORMAL STEAMING ENSIGN SHOT AWAY DURING AIR ATTACK HOLIDAY SIZE ENSIGN HOISTED ON PORT YARDARM.

1428 MTB SIGNALLING BY FLASHING LIGHT FROM STEBD QUARTER. LIGHT OBSCURED BY DENSE SMOKE FROM BURNING MOTOR WHALEBOAT.

1430 ONE ROUND FIRED BY MACHINE GUN 51. C.O. ORDERED HOLD FIRE.

1431 MACHINE GUN 53 OPENED FIRE. C.O. SENT ENS LUCAS AROUND PORT SIDE OF BRIDGE TO GET MACHINE GUN 53 TO CEASE FIRING

1431 WORD PASSED TO STANDBY FOR TORPEDO ATTACK TO STARBOARD.

MTB COMMENCED STRAFING STARBOARD SIDE OF SHIP

1434 TORPEDO PASSED 75 YARDS ASTERN OF SHIP.

1435 TORPEDO HIT STARBOARD SIDE AMIDSHIPS.

TWENTY SIX MEN DIED AS A RESULT OF THE TORPEDO HIT AND MTB STRAFING FIRE.

1435 LOST ELECTRICAL POWER THROUGHOUT THE SHIP.

1436 LOST STEAM PRESSURE - SECURED ENGINES AND BOILERS -

MANY GAUGES AND METERS IN FIREROOM AND ENGINE ROOM WERE KNOCKED OUT. TORPEDO HIT IN RESEARCH COORDINATION CENTER WHERE

APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MEN WERE AT C.Q. STATIONS. THESE SPACES

FLOODED INSTANTLY AND MOST PERSONNEL IN THIS SPACE DIED OF

EITHER BLAST OR DROWNING. NO SIGNS OF LIFE EMANATING FROM COORDINATION

CENTER AND ADJACENT SPACES WHICH COULD NOT BE OPENED WITHOUT

1400 MTB'S STANDING AWAY FROM THE SHIP. ONE MTB HAS HULL NUMBER

206-17

1503 ONE MTB RETURNED TO SHIP AND SIGNALED "DO YOU NEED HELP"
IN ENGLISH C.O. SIGNALED "NEGATIVE"

1505 MTB'S RETIRED TOWARD SHORE

1507 HELICOPTER BEARING STAR OF DAVID MARKINGS APPROACHED SHIP,
PORT SIDE, HOVERING AT ABOUT 500 YDS DISTANCE.

1508 SECOND HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP.

MARKINGS ON HELICOPTERS ARE 04 AND 03 OR D4 AND D8. HELICOPTER
MADE REPEATED PASSES AROUND AND OVER SHIP. THEY WERE NOT
OBSERVED TO PICK UP ANY BODIES, PERSONS OR DEBRIS.

1519 POWER RESTORED TO BRIDGE BUT RUDDER DID NOT ANSWER -
CONTINUED STEERING FROM AFTER STEERING.

1536 MTB'S APPROACHING SHIP STARBOARD SIDE 7-8 MILES DISTANT.

DURING NEXT HOUR AND A QUARTER THE MTB'S RETURNED TO THE SHIP

HOVES AND BY 1713 THEY HAD RETIRED OUT OF SIGHT OVER
THE HORIZON.

1615 TWO UNIDENTIFIED JET A/C APPROACHED SHIP FROM THE STEB SIDE
AND RECONNOITERED FROM A DISTANCE.

1620 ATTEMPTING TO CLEAR AREA STEERING NORTHERLY COURSE AT SPEEDS
VARYING FROM 0 TO 8 KNOTS. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES WERE TREATED IN
THE WARDROOM ON A CONTINUING BASIS, DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIRE
FIGHTING CONTROLLED FLOODING AND DAMAGE, ENGINEERING
CASUALTIES WERE RESTORED BUT STEERING WAS BY HAND FROM AFTER
STEERING.

1845 ISRAELI HELICOPTER APPROACHED SHIP - CIRCLED CLOSE ABOARD
AND ATTEMPTED TO SIGNAL - THEY APPEARED TO DESIRE TO LOWER
SOMEONE TO THE DECK - C.O. CONSIDERED RECEIVING HIM ON FORECASTLE
BUT RULED THIS OUT AS TO HAZZARDOUS, REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO

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COM. ICATE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. AND 1852 COPTER DROPPED
A MESSAGE PACKET ON FORECASTLE, THE MESSAGE, WRITTEN ON A CALLING
CARD OF THE U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE TEL AVIV, ASKED "HAVE YOU CASUALTIES"
SHIP TRIED BY SEVERAL MEANS TO INDICATE, DURING NEXT
TEN MINUTES THAT THERE WERE MANY CASUALTIES BUT THERE WAS NO
INDICATION THAT THE MESSAGE WAS UNDERSTOOD, THE MUTILATED
BODIES OF THREE DEAD CREW MEMBERS HAD NOT YET BEEN REMOVED
FROM THE FORECASTLE AND MUST HAVE BEEN OBSERVED FROM THE
HELICOPTER. THE HELICOPTER DEPARTED THE SHIP SHORTLY BEFORE
SUNSET (ABOUT 19:45) SHIP CONTINUED STEAMING THROUGH NIGHT TO
RDVU WITH ESCORTS DISPATCHED BY COMSIXTHFLT

3. FOREGOING CONSTITUTES DETAILED RECONSTRUCTION FROM QM NOTEBOOK,
CIC LOG, BELL BOOK AND BEST RECOLLECTION OF CO/CHIEF ENGR/
GUN OFF/BRIDGE PERSONNEL. ALL CONCUR

CP-3

BT

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today your readiness file and your gunnery procedures?

A. Yes sir, I have.

Counsel for the Court: This will be exhibit number 28, the modified condition of readiness three. Exhibit number 29 will be the guide for gunnery officers. I request that they be admitted in evidence.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you today another chart which was requested by the Court of your projected track in relationship to the prescribed areas of operation.

A. Yes sir, I have, and the information requested by the Court has been placed thereon.

Counsel for the Court: I request this chart be marked by the reporter as exhibit number 30 and be admitted in evidence at this time. I also request that the reporter mark the following three exhibits, 31, 32, 33, exhibit 31 and 32 are maneuvering boards, exhibit 33 is bullet and projectile mark photographs. I request that these exhibits be entered into evidence as exhibits 31, 32 and 33.

Counsel for the Court: Captain, do you have with you information as to the number of bullet marks on USS LIBERTY as a result of the attack on 8 June 1967?

A. Yes sir, I have had a topside inspection of the ship made and have recorded the number of projectile hits in various areas of the ship.

President: What was the total number of hits you took, Captain?

A. We took a total of 821 plus one torpedo hit.

Counsel for the Court: That does not include shrapnel marks?

A. No sir, that does not include shrapnel marks which are innumerable.

Counsel for the Court: Does the Court desire to question this witness further?

Captain ATKINSON: One question, on your open fire doctrine, what is your open fire doctrine?

A. The open fire doctrine is that, except in a melee, all fire will be controlled by the Commanding Officer through his normal gunnery control organization. At surprise air and surface attacks, the gunnery personnel

on the mounts are authorized to open fire if they are unable to communicate with gun control or the bridge.

President: Let the record show at this point that the grizzly business of recovery of remains from the torpedoed compartments yesterday and last night resulted in starting out looking for 22 unrecovered bodies. We actually recovered 18 of whom we are reasonably confident that we identified accurately 15. Wholesale dismemberment resulting in many remains virtually being blown to bits made the recovery particularly difficult and identification even more complicated. It cannot be conclusively determined that the four missing of the 22 being sought are not in pieces in the spaces themselves. On the other hand, it is possible that we did lose four floating free after the attack or we may have lost those four immediately at the time of the attack dropping through the hole in the bottom. The degree of dismemberment was so extreme as to be typified by the fact that the last few cases we packed in the small hours this morning contained for example, a head, and an arm in one and similar partial-bodies.

The Court recessed for lunch at 1200 hours on 15 June 1967.

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After recessing at 1200 hours on 15 June, the Court met again at 1330 hours on 15 June 1967.

Counsel for the Court: All persons who were present when the court recessed are again present in court. The Captain, USS LIBERTY is still on the stand and under oath. Commander, do you have anything else you'd like to present?

Commander McGonagle: I gave the list of recommendations to the yeoman and I hadn't completed writing out the last one, but the last one in substance that I would recommend that ships that are engaged in special operations of this type or others of which I'm not aware but that may be of critical importance that they be advised of the decisions of higher authority which are under consideration and could be of value to the ship in being able to respond to the desires of higher command in more timely fashion.

Counsel for the Court: Do any of the members have questions of this witness?

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Yes, I have a question, Captain, if I may. In general, could you tell me what the normal everyday procedures are, as relates to determination of when to come up on a transmitter for the purpose of establishing a ship-shore circuit.

A. Usually, the number of messages - of course, we have no way of knowing what the contents of a missing message number is. I check with the communicators, it is my usual practice to go to the research spaces every morning. At about 0815 there, I receive a sort of informal briefing on the research operations, I review the special traffic. The general service board is usually brought to me before I go down to the research spaces. And, the decision as to whether to come up on a transmitter or not would depend on the urgency of the message that I wanted my superior to be aware of. Generally, I try to deal with routine messages to the maximum extent possible. There are many items which cannot be handled at this level of course. With our defcon operation there were times where there would be only a few hours difference when it was working between coming up on a normal transmitter and reducing our research effectiveness, or waiting a matter of a couple of hours until we got noon time to relay via the noon. In this case I might say wait and send this one by the trascon if possible. There were a couple of times when minimize was imposed in the area where I felt that I could send a

message not meeting minimize criteria by the trascon system because it would not involve any of the mediterranean ships that were a transmitter receive station. I was discussing the matter of that I had authorized release of a routine message which would not normally qualify for transmission under minimize conditions. I specifically put on the bottom of this message "transmit via trascon equipment only" and it was for a spare part for the trascon system and we knew that this would go from the ship direct to Washington via the moon in fact the relay station.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: I was wondering, Captain, in your routine scanning the traffic, was it a normal function for the Comm officer or what have you some personnel to inform you or to keep you cognizant about numbers of missing messages from broadcast files?

A. Not as an everyday occurrence. I did check to see what the backlog of outgoing messages were, sometimes two or three times a day. As usual there would be many times when we would have a backlog of several messages without specifying the number. They would usually let me know in the morning also what the backlog of messages for the night was. This leads me to believe that if we were able to get out we usually had no problems with incoming traffic.

Assistant Counsel for the Court: Would there have been any reason, Captain, on the days of 6, 7, and 8 June for it to be unwise to transmit on a ship-shore circuit terminating with a NAVCOMSTA?

A. I'm not sure what you mean by unwise.

Q. You are steaming along doing your job, at 1500 on June 7th, let us say, would it have hurt things if all of a sudden you came up with a 500 watt transmitter on the line?

A. I can't answer that question specifically because I'm not an expert in that area, although my research officer requested that we hold the number of transmissions to an absolute minimum because we did know that whenever we transmitted our research capability was reduced, and I did this for the most part and the primary exception was the messages which I directed to be sent, PEM reports specifically, that I knew my operational and technical commanders were vitally concerned with receiving in a short period of time. I directed

the transmitters come up with these messages regardless of the consequences upon the research function.

Q. The comm officer is deceased, I understand?

A. Yes, he is.

Q. Was he an Ensign?

A. No sir, he was a Lieutenant. A very capable individual. He had been in his particular specialty for a considerable period of time, the exact number of years I'm not sure, but he had been associated with ten for ten or fifteen years anyhow. The last seven or eight as an officer, and he had been on the ship approximately 11 months at the time.

Q. He was more of specialist than an operational type of officer, is that right?

A. Yes, he was and LDO and quite competent in his duties, and very thorough and conscientious.

Q. President: Captain McGonagle, before you is a message (Defense Attache Tel Aviv 091520) provided by the Court of Inquiry, purporting points advanced by the Israeli Government as justification for their unprovoked attack on USS LIBERTY on 8 June. Would you be kind enough to address yourself to those points.

A. Yes sir, LIBERTY never approached the nearest land closer than 14 NM. The ship was in international waters at all times prior to, during and after the unprovoked attack. To my knowledge there was no declared war zone recognized or sanctioned by the United States Government. I had heard on VOA various statements broadcast by Mr. Rusk and Mr. Goldberg in the UN to the effect that the U.S. attitude of the U.S. Government was neutral in the conflict between Israel and UAR and did not intend to take a position for or against either side. The VOA broadcast and BBC indicated that Israel indicated a willingness to abide by the cease fire that the UN had asked for to be effective about 072000 local time. The above considerations coupled with the right of innocent passage recognized in international law refutes this allegation categorically.

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As counsel for the Court, I have in my possession a file containing messages from the official records of Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe. I received these messages from the communications officer, CINCUSNAVFUR, and they are available for the use of the Court relative to this case. Do any of the Court members desire to examine this file at this time?

Captain ATKINSON: This file contains all pertinent messages concerning USS LIBERTY operations from 24 May to 11 June, is this correct?

Counsel for the Court: Yes.

The President of the Court adjourned the Court at 1445 hours, 15 June 1967, and will meet at his call in London, England.

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12333
SEC. 1.1(a)

Narrative Based on the Report of the Court of Inquiry on the
Armed Attack on the USS LIBERTY

BY kg ON 7-9-91

A Navy Court of Inquiry has determined that USS LIBERTY was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and nationality, and in calm, clear weather when she suffered an unprovoked attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats June 8 in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify LIBERTY correctly. ~~The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack.~~ ^{the}

LIBERTY fired her .50 cal. machine guns at the aircraft and torpedo boats, but only after she had been attacked and hit.

The Court, convened by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, conducted classified hearings in London and aboard LIBERTY in Malta June 11 - 17. Rear Admiral I. C. Kidd, USN, was president of the Court, which consisted of himself and Captains Bernard J. Lauff and Bert M. Atkinson, both attached to Admiral McCain's headquarters.

A Court of Inquiry is a formal fact-finding body which takes testimony under oath. It is not a disciplinary court. Convening of such an inquiry is a normal procedure, commonly employed after any serious accident or incident resulting in substantial loss of life or damage to a ship. The fact of its convening does not, of itself, indicate an assumption by the Navy that anyone within the Navy is at fault.

cc: SecNav
CNO

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The Court's findings were presented to Admiral McCain and approved by him on June 18, and forwarded to the Navy Department for further review.

~~It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation.~~

Witnesses suggested that the flag may have been difficult for the attackers to see, both because of the slow speed of the ship and because, after five or six separate air attacks by at least two planes each, smoke and flames may have helped obscure the view from the motor torpedo boats. The Court heard witnesses testify, however, to significant surveillance of the LIBERTY on three separate occasions from the air at various times prior to the attack -- 5 hours and 13 minutes before the attack, 3 hours and 7 minutes before the attack, and 2 hours and 37 minutes before the attack.

Inasmuch as this was not an international investigation, no evidence was presented on whether any of these aircraft had identified LIBERTY or whether they had passed any information on LIBERTY to their own higher headquarters.

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The Court affirmed LIBERTY's right to be where she was. A neutral nation, the Court stated, has a legal right to dispatch a ship into international waters adjacent to an area of hostilities. So long as such a neutral ship maintains the impartial attitude of neutrality, the Court pointed out, each belligerent has a duty to refrain from attacking her.

The Court found that LIBERTY entered the Mediterranean June 2, after stopping briefly at Rota, Spain, where she took aboard fuel and provisions. Her orders were to steam at best possible sustained speed to an operating area in the Eastern Mediterranean north of the Sinai Peninsula.

Testimony before the Court showed that LIBERTY arrived in her assigned operating area the morning of June 8. Her orders were to steam in an area bounded on the north by latitude 32N, on the east and west by Longitudes 34 East and 33 East, and on the south by a curved line following the contour of the coast 12.5 nautical miles off the coast.

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The U. A. R. claims a 12-mile territorial sea, Israel six miles. The United States claims and recognizes claims of three miles. Thus LIBERTY's operating area was defined to ensure that she would remain in international waters as that term is recognized by all parties concerned, and with some margin to spare. The Court found that she was, in fact, well within her assigned operating area at the time of the attack, and that at no time before or after the attack did she approach closer than 13.6 nautical miles to land. She was under the operational control of Commander Sixth Fleet at the time of the attack.

LIBERTY steamed in her operating area the morning of June 8 in a "modified condition of readiness three." This meant that she had her normal steaming watch on deck, plus one man standing by the forward gun mounts. LIBERTY carries four pedestal-mounted .50-cal. Browning machine guns -- two single mounts on her forecastle and identical mounts on either side of the deck-house aft of the bridge. Under "modified condition three," bridge lookouts would man the two after guns until the crew manned general quarters stations.

LIBERTY steamed southeasterly (130° true) until 8:49 a.m., when she reached the eastern boundary of her operating area and turned to a southwesterly course (253° true). At 8:50, a single unidentified jet crossed her wake, an estimated three to five miles astern, then circled the ship and retired in the direction of the mainland. No signals were

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exchanged between the ship and the plane. LIBERTY was flying her normal size American flag (5 feet by 8 feet) at the masthead. Her name was painted on her stern in English, and her U. S. ^{Navy} distinguishing letters and number on her bow. (Egyptian naval ships carry their names in the cursive Arabic script.) Her configuration, as shown in the international standard naval identification book, "Jane's Fighting Ships," and her standard markings, were clearly sufficient for the aircraft to identify her properly as the non-combatant ship LIBERTY. She was then steaming at 10 knots.

Jet and propeller aircraft circled the ship again at 10:56 and 11:26 a. m. At these times, the ship was steaming at only five knots.

At 11:32 the ship changed to a west-northwesterly course (283° true). She was on this course and steaming at five knots when the attack began.

From 1:10 p. m., until 1:48 p. m., before the attack, LIBERTY's crew was exercised at general quarters. This was a routine procedure, part of the ship's mandatory training program, established by the Commander Service Force, Atlantic Fleet, and was not related to her mission in the Eastern Mediterranean. Upon completion of the drill, the ship returned to her "modified condition three." At 2:00 p. m., the ship's Commanding Officer, Commander William L. McGonagle, Norfolk, Va., fixed her position by radar as being 25.5 nautical miles from the minaret at El Arish, which was to the southeast (bearing 142° true).

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In the Commanding Officer's words: "About 1400 (2 p.m.) the look-outs, who were stationed on the 04 level (above the bridge), reported that jet aircraft were sighted in the vicinity of the ship. At that time, I went to the starboard wing of the bridge with my binoculars and there observed one aircraft of similar characteristics, if not identical, to the aircraft which were sighted earlier in the day and upon which a sighting report had been submitted. The relative bearing of this plane was about 135°, its position angle was about 54° to 50 degrees, its elevation approximately 7,000 feet, and it was approximately five to six miles from the ship. It appeared to be on a parallel course traveling in the same direction as the ship. While I observed this aircraft, I did not see it approach the ship directly in a hostile attitude. Within a couple of minutes, a loud explosion was heard that appeared to me to come from the port side of the ship. (This apparently was a rocket launched by a second aircraft.) I immediately ordered the general alarm to be sounded, and this was done. I went from the starboard wing of the bridge to the port wing to see the area of damage. I immediately noticed that the two 55-gallon gasoline drums stowed on the 01 level (one level above the main deck, two below the bridge), portside amidships, were burning furiously.

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"It was evident that it would not be possible to reach the quick release lever by proceeding down the outside port ladders of the ship. I ordered the Executive Officer (LCDR Philip M. Armstrong of Norfolk, Va., later killed in action) to go to the starboard side of the ship and proceed down to the 01 level, cross over to the port side, and there release the gasoline cans. Lieutenant O'Connor, (LT James G. O'Connor, USNR, of Norfolk, Va.) was still on the bridge and he joined the Executive Officer and both proceeded to the starboard wing of the bridge, 03 level. Approximately the time they reached the top of the ladder to proceed down, the ship received an apparent bomb hit in the vicinity of the whaleboat stowed on the 02 level, starboard side, immediately aft of the bridge. Mr. Armstrong, Mr. O'Connor, and others in the bridge area were thrown back into the bridge and other personnel in the pilothouse were blown from their feet. At this time, I grabbed the engine order annunciator and rang up all ahead ... flank ... (this is an order for maximum speed) ... At this time I ordered a person, who I believe to have been LT Bennett, (LT Maurice H. Bennett of Pittsburgh, Pa.) to report to CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) via the hicom (high command radio circuit) that LIBERTY was under attack by unidentified jet aircraft and that immediate assistance was required."

For the next five or six minutes, aircraft made criss-cross attacks on the ships, hitting her with rockets and machine gun fire. A

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later count entered into the Court's record, showed 821 separate hits on the ship's hull and superstructure.

Testimony failed to establish an exact number of aircraft involved in the attack. The Court's findings state: "In five or six attacks, from various angles, two or more jet aircraft at a time conducted strafing, rocket, and incendiary attacks."

During this period, the ship gradually built up speed from five knots. Her exact speed during the subsequent minutes -- until she lost all power at about 2:36 -- is not known. Her maximum speed is 18 knots, but it is doubtful that she exceeded 11 or 12 while under attack.

The ship's public address system and many of her internal communication circuits were destroyed by the air attack. The helmsman was seriously injured by the bomb hit on the starboard side. He was immediately replaced by Quartermaster Third Class Francis Brown, of Troy, N. Y., who later was killed. A few moments later, while on the starboard bridge wing, Commander McGonagle received a serious leg wound from shrapnel. "I was not knocked off my feet. I was only shaken up and it made me dance around a little bit, but my injuries did not appear to me to be of any consequence," he told the court of inquiry. "I noticed slight burns on my starboard forearm and I noticed blood oozing on my right trouser leg. Since I could walk and there was no apparent pain, I gave no further

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consideration to these minor injuries."

At about 2:24, look-outs sighted three high speed boats approaching the ship from the northeast (from the ship's starboard quarter, relative bearing 135°), heading for the ship in a triangular formation at a speed of 27 to 30 knots. Since the boats appeared to be making a torpedo run, Commander McGonagle ordered a man from the bridge to man the forward starboard gun mount and take the boats under fire.

It was at this time that Commander McGonagle discovered that LIBERTY's American flag had been shot down. He immediately ordered a signalman to hoist the "holiday ensign" -- the largest flag aboard (approximately 7 by 13 feet) from the yardarm, the normal flag halyard having been destroyed. There was smoke from the burning whale boat and other topside fires in the vicinity of the bridge.

Commander McGonagle passed the word, "Stand by for torpedo attack." He held his course, since turning away from the boats would bring the ship closer to land, and turning toward them would swing the ship broadside toward the attackers, giving them a larger target.

When the boats were approximately a mile away, the center boat was seen to be flashing a signal light. Because of smoke and flames just aft of his starboard bridge wing -- in the direction from which the boats were approaching -- Commander McGonagle could not read the signals, but he was able to see what he believed at the time to be

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an Israeli flag. As the air attack had knocked out Liberty's starboard signal light, he attempted to signal with a hand-held Aldis lamp. This may not have been powerful enough to penetrate the smoke pouring from the fires started by the attackers. Believing that the air attack might have been an error, he immediately shouted to the starboard forward gun to withhold fire. The gunner fired a short burst at the PT boats before he understood the Commanding Officer's order. At the same time, the after gun on the starboard side opened fire.

Because of the whaleboat fire on the starboard side, between the bridge and the gun mount, it was necessary to send an officer aft on the port side to pass the word to the starboard gunner to cease firing. ENS. David G. Lucas, USNR, of Virginia Beach, Va. (who was wounded earlier and, unknown to himself, had a piece of shrapnel lodged in his forehead) ran aft on the 03 (bridge) level portside. "The first thing I noticed," he testified to the Court, "was that the mount 54 (on the port side) was vacant. The flames... (from the burning gasoline cans)... had reached mount 54 and chased everyone out of there. I ran back to mount 54, looked over the skylight from the engineering spaces." (This skylight is on the centerline of the ship just aft of the stack. It stands about three feet high and is perhaps ten feet wide, dividing the 03 level at this point into port and starboard areas which meet several yards aft of the gun mounts, aft of the

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skylight structure. It is possible to look over the skylight, but not to cross it. There is no deck above the 03 level aft of the bridge.)

ENS. Lucas continued: "I had a clear view of mount 53 (the starboard mount, which was firing) from, say, the waist level up, and there was no one on mount 53. The flames from the motor whaleboat were coming over the lip of the mount. I assume that the bullets that were in the gun, or bullets that were in the ready service ammunition box, very near there, were cooking off and firing." Apparently by accident, this gun was firing in the direction of the attacking boats.

At this time, the PT's opened fire with their gun mounts, killing the Quartermaster Brown at the helm, and in a matter of seconds one torpedo was noted crossing astern of the ship at about 25 yards. The time was then 2:34. A minute later, a second torpedo struck the ship on the starboard side, immediately forward of the bridge and a few feet below the water line.

The torpedo explosion tore a hole in the side of the ship that extended from a few feet above the water line to below the turn of the bilge. It was shaped like a tear-drop, and was 39 feet across at its widest point. Its immediate effect was to flood all compartments on two decks below the water line, from frame 53 to frame 66. These frames support water-tight bulkheads, and mark the location of what was "number two hold" when LIBERTY was a merchant cargo ship before her conversion for Navy use. LIBERTY used the spaces for store rooms and her research department.

Twenty-five men died in the blast. Those few not killed outright escaped from the compartments. The Court heard testimony from witnesses, including a salvage expert, who stated that beyond a shadow of a doubt those who died there were killed instantly by the blast. None could have survived,

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trapped in the compartment, to die of suffocation or drowning.

The torpedo did not start a major fire, probably because of the immediate flooding of the affected area. LIBERTY immediately took on a nine-degree list to starboard. Power and steering control were lost temporarily, and the ship came to a dead stop.

The three torpedo boats also stopped, less than a half mile astern of the stricken ship. One signalled in English, "Do you need assistance?" Commander McGonagle, not being able to signal by light, ordered a signalman to hoist the international flag signal for "not under command," meaning that the ship was out of control.

Two or three minutes later, two helicopters bearing a Star of David marking approached and circled the ship several times. At 3:19, power was restored, but steering control could not be regained from the bridge. It was necessary to give rudder orders by telephone to men in the "after steering" compartment, and for some time they operated the ship's heavy rudder by hand. The helicopters departed, returned, and departed again, and a pair of jet aircraft circled the ship, but there were no further attacks.

By 4 p.m., Commander McGonagle's wounds were giving him a great deal of pain and he was suffering from loss of blood. The ship's doctor had seen him on the bridge, but had made no effort to get him below to a battle dressing station. "The Commanding Officer at that time was

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like a rock upon which the rest of the men supported themselves," the doctor told the court. "To know that he was on the bridge grievously wounded, yet having the conn and helm and through the night calling every change of course, was the thing that told the men 'we're going to live.' When I went to the bridge and saw this, I should say that I knew that I could only insult this man by suggesting that he be taken below for treatment of his wounds. I didn't even suggest it."

Ensign Lucas told the court, "It would have taken ten men the doctor's size to even begin to get him off the bridge."

"He was in great pain," Ensign Lucas testified, "there were several times when he was still walking around, but it was obvious that he was in great pain. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. At several times he felt dizzy. He would not leave, but if he started to get dizzy he would turn to me, or if Mr. Bennett or Mr. Painter were there, he would say this is what course we're on, what speed to make. He would give instructions."

At about 4 p.m. he lay on the deck while others applied a tourniquet to his thigh. At other times, when he felt faint, he lay on the deck of the bridge wing with his leg propped high, and continued to conn the ship, sometimes by watching her wake.

Lieutenant Richard F. Kieffer, MC, USN, of Brooklyn, New York, the ship's medical officer, performed one major operation and gave

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emergency treatment to wounded men as best he could. He manned the main battle dressing station, together with one hospital corpsman, while the other corpsman operated a secondary battle dressing station in the forward part of the ship. Both stations were flooded with seriously injured men, and for a time there was little opportunity to do more than give first aid. Bleeding was stopped, men were given morphine for pain and treated for shock. Lung wounds were treated to ease breathing. The most seriously wounded men were transferred to the aircraft carrier AMERICA the following day. By that time the doctor and his two corpsmen had been on their feet, giving emergency treatment, for 28 hours. "Any time we needed one volunteer, we'd get ten," he testified. "If anything had to be done...there were hands everywhere. When we asked for two pints of blood for transfusion, we had people on the adjoining tables who were saying, 'If you need some, I have this type' These were people already wounded."

The Court found that "from the time of the first air attack onward, attackers were well coordinated, accurate and determined. Criss-crossing rocket and machine gun runs from both bows, both beams and quarters effectively chewed up the entire topside, including ship control and internal communications -- sound powered -- network. Well directed initial air attacks had wiped out the ability of the four .50 cal. machine guns to be effective."

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"The heroism displayed by the Commanding Officer,, officers and men of LIBERTY was exceptional." The Court reported. "The Commanding Officer is being recommended for an appropriate award and the ship for an appropriate unit citation. These planned actions are fully supported by testimony to the Court."

"It is the opinion of the convening authority that USS LIBERTY was operating in international waters in conformance with the most recent guidance received by her, provided by competent authority," Admiral McCain wrote in his endorsement forwarding the Court record, to the Department of the Navy.

Admiral McCain's endorsement continued:

"Heroism was the order of the day... It is the conviction of the convening authority that the possibility is high that the ship would have been lost completely had there not been the highest order of damage control competence on board, combined with the fact that the ship had secured from General Quarters for drill only minutes before the attack took place."

Early on the 8th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued orders for LIBERTY to move farther from the coast, even though such a move would partially degrade her mission. The messages were misrouted, delayed, and not received until after the attack. LIBERTY's Commanding Officer

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also had the authority to move farther to sea on his own initiative, had he any reason to believe that his ship was in danger of attack, ^{or} ~~as~~ for any other cause. The Court found, however, that since he was in international waters, his standard identification symbols were clearly visible, and foreign aircraft had inspected him three times that day, he had no reason to believe that his ship was in danger of attack. The convening authority specifically concurred that "no indication was received by the ship prior to the attack which would have dictated a need for emergency measures."

LIBERTY continued to carry out her assignment at the location which her Commanding Officer considered optimum for that purpose. The Court reached no judgment on whether earlier arrival of the messages would have reduced the likelihood of the attack.

In an appendix to its findings, the Court noted that LIBERTY might have been mistaken for the Egyptian supply ship EL QUSEIR. In commenting on this possibility, the Court stated: "While EL QUSEIR bears a highly superficial resemblance to LIBERTY, she more closely resembles the majority of older tramp steamers operating in ocean shipping. EL QUSEIR is less than half the size and lacks the elaborate antenna array and distinctive hull markings of LIBERTY. The location of the superstructure island, a primary recognition feature of merchant type ships, is widely different. By this criteria as a justification for attack, any ship resembling EL QUSEIR was in jeopardy."

The Court also noted reports of rumors that the town of El Arish had been bombarded from the sea, but pointed out that neither LIBERTY, with

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four .50 caliber machine guns, nor EL QUSEIR, which is armed with two 3-pounders, could logically be suspected of having conducted a shore bombardment.

USS LIBERTY arrived at Malta, under her own power, at 6 a.m. (local time) June 14, escorted by the destroyer USS DAVIS and the fleet tug USS PAPAGO. She was drydocked the same day.

The hole in LIBERTY's side is being patched and other repairs are being made to make it possible for her to return to the United States safely under her own power. She is expected to be in Malta until about July 10. Her home port is Norfolk, Va.

Note: Excerpts from verbatim testimony of the Commanding Officer are available. Where discrepancy in times are noted, the Court determined that they were caused by battle damage which caused clocks in various parts of the ship to stop at different times or to behave erratically. All times given are ship's local time 6 hours ahead of Washington time.

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94
Pres file

Monday, June 26, 1967, 1:05 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Romanian Premier Maurer and Foreign Minister Manescu, 4:30 p.m., June 26

Nick Katzenbach's good memo (Tab A) gives you a summary of the six questions that are likely to come up. (Biographical sketches of Maurer and Manescu are at Tab C.)

Apart from Vietnam, you may wish to make the following points:

1. The Middle East

-- We are pleased with the constructive Romanian position.

2. U.S. Relations with Red China (Maurer is going to Peking in July)

-- We want to live in peace with China, and hope for eventual reconciliation. (You will not want to mention the internal turmoil in China.)

3. U.S. -Romanian Relations

-- We are strongly for building bridges. Sometimes, however, the Congress moves more slowly than we like.

(State's over-long talking paper is at Tab B.)

Walter Stoessel (Deputy Assistant Secretary - European Bureau) will be there from State. I will be standing by.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:MSE:mst

June 26, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-89

By ing, NARA, Date 3-23-93DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Romanian Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, June 26, 4:30 p.m.

You have agreed to receive Romanian Premier Maurer (Mow-rer), who is in the United States as head of the Romanian delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. He will be accompanied on the Romanian side by Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu (Muh-NES-coo) and an interpreter.

Premier Maurer is able and has traveled widely. At Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23, he showed himself articulate, forceful and quick of apprehension. Foreign Minister Manescu will in all likelihood be elected President of the 22nd United Nations General Assembly this fall, the first Communist to hold that position.

The Romanians are in a unique position because they have been able to stay on good terms with both parties in several current disputes: The USSR and Communist China, East and West Germany, Arabs and Israelis, the United States and North Viet-Nam. Despite their precarious position on the Soviets' doorstep, the Romanians have managed to follow independent policies largely because they take pains to show that they are not anti-Soviet but seek only to advance Romanian interests.

Your talks might touch on the following points, details of which are spelled out in the enclosed Talking Paper:

1. Maurer's Trip to Peking. We believe that a major point in your conversation with Maurer should be our views toward Communist China. Maurer is going to Peking in early July. He will be the first top leader of any nation, particularly the first Communist leader, to go straight from Washington to Peking with a direct impression of your views on China. We therefore believe that you should make a particular point during the conversation of raising China and getting across our central views -- essentially that we are firmly resolved to defend Viet-Nam, but at the same time do not threaten China and hope for an ultimate peace of reconciliation with her.

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

GROUP 1

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and declassification

We urge that you not get into any discussion on the internal situation in Communist China, or Hong Kong. Any remarks on these topics might be misinterpreted by Maurer or the people with whom he talks in Peking.

2. On Viet-Nam, Romania has specifically avoided a mediating role. Maurer has had some talks with North Vietnamese, and you may wish to ask him whether he has any current impressions of their position. However, we do not suggest that he be given anything more than a standard statement of our basic positions -- our desire for a peaceful solution, our willingness to talk, but our insistence that there be some reciprocal military action if we are to stop bombing.

3. Kosygin Talks. You may wish to discuss with Maurer your talks with Kosygin.

4. Near East Crisis. You may wish to welcome the moderate Romanian viewpoint as expressed by Maurer in his General Assembly speech and to set forth U.S. views on the solution of the crisis.

5. U.S.-Romanian Relations. The Romanians have emphasized the importance of active trade with all countries as a key factor in their independence. You may wish to express appreciation of Romania's independent policies and to say that you hope that Congress will take the necessary actions (renewal of the Ex-Im Bank charter, passage of an East-West Trade Bill) to make possible a further increase in our trade.

6. Manescu's Candidacy for the United Nations General Assembly Presidency. If the Romanians raise the question of the possibility of our supporting Manescu for the presidency of the 22nd General Assembly, you may wish to reiterate our high regard for Mr. Manescu ~~but to say that it is still too early for us to make a commitment, and say that~~ *having unforeseen developments, we plan to support his candidacy.**

In addition to the Talking Paper, I am enclosing Background Papers on China, Viet-Nam negotiation efforts, and U.S.-Romanian economic relations, as well as biographic sketches on the Premier and the Foreign Minister.

Nathan Leites
Acting Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Talking Paper.

** Page will follow -
NLSM*

** The State Dept phoned
over this suggested change.
It will certainly please
the Romanians. ND*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH ROMANIAN PREMIER

June 1967

Talking Paper

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-89

By ing, NARA, Date 3-23-93

1. Your Talks with Kosygin

Premier Maurer will be interested in your conversations with Kosygin not only as they related to the Near East and Viet-Nam but also as they touched on the Nonproliferation Treaty, a subject in which the Romanians have shown considerable interest.

Recommended US Position

You may wish to tell Maurer as much as the nature of your talks with Kosygin will permit.

2. Romanian Attitudes on Near East Crisis

Romania has steered a middle course which differs sharply from the anti-Israeli positions of the other Communist countries. Bucharest has not accused Israel of aggression nor broken relations with Israel. It has urged that Israeli forces withdraw from Arab territory and that the parties to the dispute negotiate their differences on the basis of the interests of the peoples involved. Romania has also urged "peaceful coexistence" in the area and a solution of the problem of the Arab refugees.

Premier Maurer, at the General Assembly on June 23, stated Romania's position on the Near East situation in reasoned and moderate terms. He called for the creation of a climate conducive to a real settlement by the countries of the region themselves and guaranteeing to them the right to independence and to security, enabling them to devote their efforts to economic and social progress. He defined the essential conditions for this climate as scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and Israel's withdrawal from and renunciation of all territory gained by military actions; the elimination of all foreign influence in the affairs of the countries of the area; and respect for the basic interests of each state with due regard for its independence and sovereign existence. Notably, he did not call for a condemnation of Israel.

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Group 3

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not automatically declassified.

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-2-

Recommended US Position

We are gratified that the Romanian Government has called upon the parties involved to resolve their differences on the basis of their respective interests. We reject Arab charges of military involvement in the Near East conflict and consider that the first and greatest requirement is that each Near East nation accept the right of its neighbors to stable and secure existence. The US is prepared to cooperate with all nations on the basis of this fundamental principle and to share anew in alleviating the suffering of the peoples of the Near East. It is our earnest hope that the Romanian Government will join in common efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the crisis and permanent stability in the area.

3. Maurer's Trip to Peking

Maurer plans to be in Peking on July 3. Romania has played a relatively independent role in the Sino-Soviet dispute. While not supporting the Communist Chinese position, Romania because of its emphasis on the right of every Communist Party and State independently to determine its own policies has opposed international meetings which would result in condemnation or criticism of another Communist State and Party. At Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23, Maurer confessed lack of detailed information on China and was not sure his visit of a few days could produce much clarification. He thought, however, the period of struggle in Red China was drawing to a close and that there will soon be a period of "considerable consolidation". He was not concerned that the Communist Chinese would probably resent a visit to you on the eve of his journey and said he would welcome Peking knowing that "its views on a certain matter or a certain country" are not Romania's views.

Recommended US Position

a. The US wants peace with the Chinese Communists but is determined to resist and oppose present Chinese Communist efforts to encourage and promote violence and conflict in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

b. The US has watched with puzzlement the development of the internal situation within Communist China over the past year but believes this is solely a matter for resolution by the Chinese

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-3-

themselves. Our interest in internal developments is the hope that ultimately Chinese Communist leaders will be prepared to sit down with the US and other countries in the area to discuss reasonably ways and means of achieving and ensuring peace.

c. The US is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Communists and with their neighbors, whenever they are ready, in promoting peace, stability, and independent and free development of the countries of Asia.

d. The US is prepared to discuss with the Chinese Communists, as with other states, our common interest in avoiding the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. We hope the Chinese will at some point agree to enter into disarmament agreements. In the meantime the US must obviously, along with other interested countries, consider the potential threat to its security which the Chinese weapons program represents.

e. The US dialogue with Communist China continues in Warsaw. Although little progress has been made toward opening up channels of communication and contact or even toward resolving minor issues between the US and the Chinese Communists, the US desires to continue and develop bilateral contacts with Communist China.

f. Differing US-Chinese Communist views on the Taiwan question unquestionably represent major problems, particularly from the Chinese Communist standpoint. We have repeatedly but unsuccessfully tried to get the Chinese Communists to agree to an understanding against the use of force to resolve this question. Communist China must recognize that we will not abandon our commitment to defend Taiwan from armed attack.

g. We have tried to make clear to the Chinese that the US does not have hostile intentions toward it, does not intend to attack it. We do not know whether the Chinese really understand this since they repeatedly allege the contrary. We have told the Chinese Communists of our hope that the Vietnam conflict will not be expanded into a larger war by the injection of new outside elements.

h. We are convinced that a peaceful resolution of the Vietnam conflict can be achieved despite the current Chinese opposition to negotiations.

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-4-

i. The US recognizes a legitimate Chinese interest in their own security. At the same time, the Chinese Communists must recognize the legitimate security interests of their neighbors.

j. The essence of our view on Chinese representation in the UN is that the Republic of China's place in the UN must be preserved and that there is neither justice nor logic in proposals calling for the expulsion of the Republic of China and seating the Chinese Communists in their place.

k. (Should Maurer attribute to the US any remarks regarding the situation in Hong Kong this could prejudice the Hong Kong problem. Consequently, discussion of Hong Kong should probably be avoided.)

4. Viet-Nam

Although more restrained than some of the other Communist countries in condemnation of US policy in Viet-Nam, the Romanians follow the general Communist position.

Recommended US Position

In view of Maurer's projected visit to Communist China, you may wish to use this opportunity to give him a clear statement of the US position.

5. US-Romanian Relations

A significant factor in the development of US-Romanian relations during the past four or five years has been Romania's determination to strengthen its independence and to pursue policies, both internally and abroad, which serve Romanian national interests. Its firm purpose in this regard has been manifested earlier by its uncommitted position in the Sino-Soviet dispute; its successful efforts to eliminate once-pervasive Soviet cultural, economic and political influences within Romania; and its resistance to Soviet attempts to transform the CEMA organization into a supra-national economic planning body and to bring about closer political and military integration within the Warsaw Pact. More recent evidences of Romanian independence have been its establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and the moderate position which it has taken in the Middle East crisis.

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-5-

For the past six or eight months, the Romanians have made clear that they seek closer relations, particularly from the economic point of view, despite Viet-Nam. Manescu said at Secretary Rusk's dinner on June 23 that the Romanians want trade not aid and emphasized their economic development is a force which enables them to be master in their own house. He expressed disappointment at the practical difficulties they have encountered in expanding their trade, particularly the lack of most favored nation tariff treatment. The Romanians understand that Congressional action which would make possible a lifting of discriminatory tariffs is not likely in the immediate future. They are actively negotiating in the US for several large industrial installations, including a glass plant, a pork-packing plant, an artificial fibers plant, and some smaller installations. EXIM Bank has told them it will consider guaranteeing credit for the glass plant, but wishes to wait until Congress has extended EXIM's charter.

Recommended US Position

We understand clearly Romania's determination, while preserving its friendly ties with the Soviet Union, to maintain fully its independence and sovereignty and to act pursuant to its own national interests.

We will continue to do everything we can, within the limits imposed by Congressional attitudes on East-West trade, to encourage increased trade with Romania. The difficulties in getting Congressional approval arise out of a broader context involving Viet-Nam and problems with other Communist countries and not out of any ill will for Romania. We will of course continue to support legislation on East-West trade as well as the extension of the EXIM Bank's authority to guarantee credits, including such authority with respect to the Communist countries.

6. Manescu's Candidacy for the 22nd GA Presidency

The Romanians in November 1966 asked our support for the candidacy of Foreign Minister Manescu for the presidency of the 22nd General Assembly. We told them that we could not commit ourselves so early but commented favorably on Manescu's personal qualifications.

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-6-

Recommended US Position

If the subject is raised by the Romanians, you may wish to reiterate our high regard for Mr. Manescu ~~but to say that it is still too early for us to make a commitment.~~ *and to say that, barring unforeseen developments, we plan to support his candidacy.*

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Ion Gheorge MAURER
Biographic Sketch

94c
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-87
By ju, NARA, Date 1-6-93

President, Council of Ministers; Vice President, State Council;
Member Politburo, Romanian Workers' Party.

A close friend and trusted adviser of the late Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Maurer, who has been closely identified with Romania's policy of self-interest, has traveled widely to consolidate his country's independent position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and to expand its ties with underdeveloped nations and the West. An able lawyer who distinguished himself during the trials of Romanian Communists prior to World War II, Maurer succeeded Chivu Stoica as President of the Council of Ministers in 1961 and became Vice President of the Council of State in the same year. A member of the Central Committee (since 1958) and Politburo (since 1960) of the Romanian Workers' Party (PMR), he was chairman of the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly from 1958 to 1961. He served briefly as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957-58 and is said to lend an air of respectability and intellectualism to the Romanian regime.

Maurer was born on September 23, 1902 in Bucharest. His father, who was of Saxon origin, was a foreign language teacher in Bucharest. After receiving a law degree from the University of Bucharest in 1923, young Maurer worked for a while as a judge and public prosecutor, later practiced at the Bucharest bar. He joined the Romanian Communist Party in 1936. He was imprisoned briefly in 1941 and again in 1948.

Maurer served in various government positions after 1944 but for some years following an unexplained fall from grace in 1948 he was in political eclipse, fully emerging with his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1957.

Able and intelligent as well as dignified and soft-spoken, Maurer is a persuasive spokesman for the regime. He is noted for his amatory exploits and has been married three times. He speaks French and German and knows some English. He impressed American guests at the dinner given for him by the Secretary on June 23 as dynamic, quick in response, a strong Marxist and proud of it.

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Corneliu MANESCU
Biographic Sketch

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-87
By ju, NARA, Date 1-6-93

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Manescu was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 1961. For many years after World War II he had specialized in military affairs and economic planning, and, until 1961, his most prominent period in public life had been in the mid-1950's when he filled the post of Deputy Minister of Armed Forces, with the rank of Lieutenant General, a rank he still maintains. Prior to becoming Foreign Minister, his only diplomatic assignment abroad had been a four-month tour as Ambassador to Hungary in 1960.

He was born in 1916 in Ploesti. A graduate of the Bucharest Law College, he was a member of the Democratic Students' Front and of the wartime resistance movement. He joined the Ministry of Defense in 1948. By 1952, in addition to his other duties, he had been made head of the Romanian Army Song and Dance Ensemble, and in this capacity is said to have accompanied the troupe on tours of the USSR and Communist China in 1952 and 1953.

In November 1955 Manescu left the Ministry of Armed Forces to become a Vice President of the State Planning Committee in charge of planning for the armed forces. He is believed to have been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sometime during the following year. Since becoming Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manescu has traveled extensively within the Bloc. He headed the Romanian delegations to the 16th (1961), 17th (1962) and 18th (1963) sessions of the UN General Assembly and in March 1962 led his country's delegation to the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. During the fall of 1962 he was a member of a Romanian Party-Government delegation which toured Indonesia, India and Burma. In August 1963 he traveled to Moscow to sign the test ban treaty. Manescu was presumably instrumental in the recent establishment of diplomatic relations with Bonn. In addition to Bonn, he has also recently visited Paris.

Manescu, who is courteous and restrained yet easy to talk to, is six feet two inches tall and has an athletic build. An avid sportsman, he served as Vice President of the Union for Physical Culture and Sports and of the Romanian Olympic Committee during 1957. He speaks some French and very halting English.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Monday, June 26, 1967
11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Ben Read gave me the attached sealed envelope with the following comment.

They have no text of the propositions actually passed. Those texts are needed to complete the record.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: sealed envelope from Sec Rusk

Monday, June 26, 1967 -- 11:00 AM

*Hand
Copy*

16

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
routine message of congratulations to
President-elect Abdirascid Ali Scermarche
of Somalia.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKHamilton/vmr

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT
TO PRESIDENT-ELECT OF SOMALI REPUBLIC

Dear Mr. President:

Please accept my congratulations and best wishes
on your inauguration as President of the Somali Republic.
I look forward to working with you in the cause of peace and
prosperity for all the peoples of Africa and the world.

I should also like to take this opportunity to
reaffirm the friendship of the American people for the
people of the Somali Republic.

Sincerely,

97

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 26, 1967
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the message you instructed me to send Saturday to Wilson, Moro, and Klesinger, I said you would let them have a final word on Monday. Herewith a proposed draft.

For reference, I attach the Saturday message to Willson, cleared as you instructed.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 7-9-81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

97a

Monday, June 26, 1967 -- 8:20 a.m.


Draft Message to Wilson, Moro, and Kiesinger.

The public statements made after my second meeting with Kosygin accurately reflect the lack of movement forward on specific matters, and his stiffness, in particular, on the Middle East.

It seemed probable to me that his instructions were to hold the line until he could return home and take stock with his colleagues.

It will take time, therefore, before we know whether Soviet policy will shift from its present familiar tracks.

I found it useful to talk directly with him.



WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1967

Send LDX to S/S, Ben Read, Department of State, from Walt Rostow

Please have following message s sent to Wilson, Moro and Kiesinger,
from the President:

"I thought you would wish to know that my first discussions with
Kosygin were friendly in tone and businesslike. He listened but
did not move from known Soviet positions.

"As you would expect, we concentrated on major issues in the
fields of arms control and Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East.

"I shall be in touch with you again on Monday."

Add following as last paragraph to above:

For Wilson: "I am greatly in your debt for the portrait of
de Gaulle, which I shall not easily forget. "

For Kiesinger: "I look forward greatly to seeing you in Washington."

For Moro: "I greatly enjoyed our meeting the other day and profited
from it. "

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By 128, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86

98

~~SECRET~~

By 128, NARA, Date 6-15-93 Monday, June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of the King of Thailand

The King of Thailand (always addressed as Your Majesty) and Queen Sirikit (also Your Majesty) arrive tomorrow. The schedule is:

5:00 p.m. -- Arrival and full military honors
5:30 p.m. -- Office visit
8:00 p.m. -- White House dinner (black tie)

Our purposes:

- strengthen the Thai conviction of our determination to see a just and stable peace in Southeast Asia;
- demonstrate our gratitude for Thai support of Free World interests in Southeast Asia;
- show our respect for the important role of the Monarchy in Thailand.

The King greatly appreciated the sensitivity with which you dealt with him in Bangkok. Using the same approach, you may wish to emphasize the following:

1. The United States will persist in Viet-Nam until the South is safe from aggression.
2. Our defense commitment to Thailand is solid.
3. We deeply appreciate the Thai contribution to Viet-Nam (a volunteer regiment of 2,300 will soon join the small naval and air units already there).
4. Our heartfelt thanks for the hospitality the Thai have given our 40,000 men in their country. (Note: a Status of Forces Agreement is being negotiated.)
5. Access to Thai bases has been an invaluable contribution to our joint war effort.
6. We are impressed by the growth of the Thai economy, by the Government's efforts to extend social and economic benefits to the villages, and by Thailand's leadership in regional cooperation.
7. Thai actions to oppose Communist insurgency are encouraging. We will continue to support these actions. (Note: you may wish to ask the King for his assessment of the insurgency.)

~~SECRET~~

8. We appreciate the King's leadership in every field of life in Thailand.

You will want to repeat your thanks for the warm reception Their Majesties and the Thai people accorded you and Mrs. Johnson last October.

The King may raise the following points:

1. Possible intensification of Communist efforts in Thailand and Southeast Asia. He believes the next six to eight months may be dangerous. The Communists, facing growing defeat, may redouble their efforts in desperation. We shall all perhaps have to do more. He wants Thailand to accelerate its military and civil efforts.

Suggested response: We agree with the Thai position that actual fighting should be done by the Thai forces themselves against the insurgents. Rural development programs must be conducted by the Thai. For our part, we will continue to supply technical, material and training assistance for the Thai programs.

2. United States military presence. The King is concerned about the impact of a large foreign military presence, though he has said our troops behave well and that incidents are few.

Suggested response: We have urged our men to show full respect for the customs of their hosts. We are grateful for the frankness of Thai authorities in pointing out mistakes and misconduct so we can deal with them quickly and effectively. The new Thai-U.S. committee which will deal with these matters has our full support.

3. The Press. The King is deeply concerned by what he considers the failure of the American press to maintain balance and perspective in reporting Southeast Asia. He thinks too much dissent can be destructive.

Suggested response: We understand his concern. We regret articles unfairly critical of our allies. On balance, we think the image of Thailand conveyed to the American people has been favorable. His visit has helped that cause. In the long run, the best answer to criticism is the success of our policies.

You may wish to read State's memoranda (General, TAB B) in which these matters are discussed in greater detail. Biographic data on the King and Queen are included in the briefing book.

U. S. military aid to Thailand this year is \$60 million and economic aid is also about \$60 million.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

~~SECRET~~

Monday, June 26, 1967

99

Mr. President:

The figures cited by Senator Church are substantially accurate. (They are drawn from public documents). He seeks to use these figures, however, to prove that:

-- our arms sales programs are "burgeoning" in size and is distorting our foreign policy objectives;

-- our military aid and sales program contributed to the Middle East conflict.

The proper perspective on our aid and sales program is as follows:

-- Our total military exports (sales and grants) are not expected to be higher between FY 1962-71 than they were between FY 1952-61. The important fact is that the ratio of grant aid to sales has been reversed. Where in FY 1961, there were two dollars of grant aid for every dollar of military sales to foreign recipients, by FY 1966, the ratio had been reversed, with no increase in total U. S. military exports.

-- Our military sales program is governed by three basic principles:

1. We will not sell equipment to a foreign country which we believe it cannot afford or should not have.

2. We will never ask a potential foreign customer to buy anything not truly needed by its own forces.

3. We will not ask any foreign country to purchase anything from the United States which it can buy cheaper or better elsewhere.

-- Every proposed sale of U. S. arms and munitions is approved only after thorough review of the legitimacy of the requirement, of the recipient's ability to pay, of its potential influence on the peace and stability of the area, and of all other foreign policy considerations involved.

cy T. Hatcher 6/28

-- Our own military programs, and especially our leadership in military research and development, make the United States the lowest cost and most effective potential supplier for a wide-range of military products. If foreign nations do not buy from us, they can always buy elsewhere -- at a higher cost.

-- Of some \$11 billion in arms orders during the period FY 1962-66, 90% came from 21 industrialized NATO nations and countries of Europe and the Far East. Seven of these 21 countries accounted for 90% of this total.* In a recent magazine article -- Esquire, July -- Church acknowledged that it was "entirely proper" to sell to "industrialized countries which can afford to pay." Thus, the sales criticized by Senator Church constitute only 10% of our total sales program. The 10% that went to developing nations was to assist in maintaining internal security, resisting the threat of aggression, and maintaining a reasonable degree of orientation toward the Free World.

Turning to the Middle East in particular, Senator Church's figures are high by a factor of 6 and he has the motives mixed up.

1. True, we have provided some \$322 million in military aid to Arab nations. But only two of those actually fought Israel -- Iraq and Jordan. We have given no significant military aid to Iraq since the Baghdad Pact days before 1957. So, only our \$55 million to Jordan (about 1/6 of the total) falls into Senator Church's category.

2. On top of that, our military aid to Jordan has been given with Israel's acquiescence.

3. You made perfectly clear in your June 19th speech how you feel about the arms race. Our \$322 million compares with some \$2 billion in Soviet arms that have gone to the Arab countries since 1955. Far from promoting an arms race, we've constantly tried to put a damper on it.

*(These seven countries were: Germany, United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Canada, Belgium and Japan).

We have had our policy on the supply of arms to countries of the Middle East under urgent review since the beginning of the current crisis and we will continue to keep it under close supervision. As you said on June 19, this conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle East arms race of the last 12 years. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own shipments to the area have been severely limited.

W. W. Rostow

(ARMS)

WASHINGTON--SEN. FRANK CHURCH TODAY CALLED FOR AN END TO "ARSENAL DIPLOMACY" AND PROPOSED THAT THE U.S. UNILATERALLY BAR FURTHER GIFTS OR SALES OF ARMS TO NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

THE IDAHO DEMOCRAT, IN A SENATE SPEECH, SHARPLY ATTACKED THE U.S. MILITARY AID PROGRAM AND THE PENTAGON'S BURGEONING ARMS SALES TO FOREIGN NATIONS.

"IT IS TIME FOR US TO END THE 'ARSENAL DIPLOMACY' WHICH FOR YEARS HAS VITIATED AND DISTORTED OUR FOREIGN POLICY," CHURCH SAID.

"TODAY, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS THE PRINCIPAL ARMS DISPENSER OF THE WORLD, GIVING AWAY, ADVANCING CREDIT, AND PROMOTING THE SALE OF A VOLUME OF ARMS OVER SIX TIMES THAT OF OUR NEAREST RIVAL, THE SOVIET UNION," HE SAID.

CHURCH SAID THE UNITED STATES, SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, HAS DOLED OUT \$322 MILLION IN MILITARY AID TO THE ARAB NATIONS WHICH ATTACKED ISRAEL.

ISRAEL GOT \$28 MILLION WORTH OF U.S. ARMS, CHURCH SAID, IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS AN ATTEMPT TO "EXERCIZE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE BY A JUDICIOUS DISTRIBUTION OF OUR WEAPONS."

AS IN THE PAKISTANI-INDIA CONFRONTATION OF LESS THAN TWO YEARS AGO, CHURCH SAID, "AMERICAN TANKS MANNED BY JORDANIANS MET AMERICAN TANKS MANNED BY ISRAELIS" OUTSIDE OLD JERUSALEM.

"BOTH OF THESE TRAGIC WARS ILLUSTRATE THE FOLLY OF THE THESIS THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN DEFUSE ARMS RACES BY SUPPLYING WEAPONS," HE SAID.

CHURCH SAID THE U.S. HAS HANDED OUT A "STAGGERING TOTAL" OF SOME \$37 BILLION IN ARMS AID SINCE 1950 INCLUDING MORE THAN 7,000 FIGHTER PLANES, 20,279 TANKS, AND 150,552 TWO-AND-ONE-HALF-TON TRUCKS -- PLUS MORE THAN 3.5 MILLION RIFLES AND CARBINES.

"AS IF TO AUGMENT THESE MASSIVE GIFTS OF ARMS, THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS NOW ENGAGED IN A MUSHROOMING SALES CAMPAIGN. DIRECT SALES TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ALREADY EXCEED \$16 BILLION, WHILE PENTAGON OFFICIALS ANTICIPATE ORDERS WORTH ANOTHER \$15 BILLION IN THE NEXT DECADE," CHURCH SAID.

"NEARLY \$3 BILLION OF THE ARMS SALES IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS WERE ON CREDIT," HE ADDED.

CHURCH SAID ARMS AID AND ARMS PURCHASES BY FOREIGN NATIONS HAVE "DRAINED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AWAY FROM POSSIBLE AID WHICH COULD HAVE IMPROVED LIVING CONDITIONS AND STIMULATED ECONOMIC EXPANSION."

6/26--GE1111A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~June 26, 1967
100
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$22.5 million loan for Turkish private sector steel production

Attached is Bill Gaud's request for your authority to lend \$22.5 million to the Turkish Government for relending to the Ereğli Iron and Steel Works, a private Turkish firm. This loan will permit Ereğli to double its output from the present 470,000 tons to 900,000 tons by financing the installation of improved oxygen making and calcining equipment. This could turn an annual loss of \$7 million to a profit of \$23 million annually. He also wants to defer capital repayments by the Turks on an AID local currency loan until the expanded production begins.

Ereğli has been losing money because its output was not large enough to meet its capital costs, which proved substantially larger than originally estimated. A careful study by a U. S. firm -- the Arnco Steel Corporation -- has recommended the proposed additional investment and operating improvements.

Turkey's economic growth is likely to be enough to assure a market for the additional production.

We also have a political interest in this combined proposal. We're trying to promote Turkey's private sector, and continued losses in this largest and most visible private firm would strengthen the hand of the civil servants, who have long sought to dominate Turkey's economy. The Demirel Government has staked its reputation on successful development, emphasizing the private sector. The \$22.5 million loan and deferred repayment of a local currency loan will help to this end. And we're still negotiating with Turkey on base rights.

Charlie Schultze agrees with Gaud, and Secretary Fowler says okay. I recommend you go ahead.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ *6/29/67*See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-86
By vip, NARA, Date 6-15-93

Attachments: Memorandum from Charles Schultze (Tab A)
Memorandum from W. S. Gaud (Tab B)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 23 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Turkey-Eregli Steel Mill Project Loan

In the attached memorandum, Bill Gaud requests your authority to make a \$22 million loan to the Government of Turkey to help finance the expansion of the Eregli Iron and Steel Works. AID also plans to defer repayment of \$25 million in local currency loans.

With prior AID loans of \$169 million, the \$300 million Eregli mill is the largest private sector project AID has ever financed. However, the mill is now running at a loss. Unforeseen technical problems and cost overruns increased construction costs by 30 percent requiring high cost short-term borrowing. In addition, the prices of coal and iron ore rose 10 to 15 percent above original estimates.

Because of this situation, and prospects for continued losses, AID brought in the Armco Steel Company to study Eregli's operations. (Kopper's Incorporated did the original study.) The present proposal incorporates the Armco recommendations to double the mill's capacity. The equipment provided under the loan, in addition to changes in the proposed operation of the mill, will cut capital costs by 40 percent and turn the \$7 million annual loss into a \$23 million annual profit. The principal innovations include:

- importing high grade ore for mixing with domestic ore to double blast furnace capacity and reduce hot metal costs by 20 percent.
- double steel making capacity and raise rolling mill capacity by 20 percent.
- reduce the labor force by 20 percent.

The company has already hired an experienced American steel executive to supervise the mill's operation.

Balance of Payments

Secretary Fowler agrees that the balance of payments impact of the loan will be minimal. He is willing to go along with the \$25 million deferment of repayments due in Turkish lira in view of its importance to the

C.A. 442

company's future earning capacity and its present inability to service these loans. AID will press other creditors to extend their credits falling due.

This loan is particularly important to our strategy of strengthening the private sector in Turkey. I recommend that you approve the loan for the proposed expansion of Eregli.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

1206

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 19 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Projected Loan Assistance to Turkey

I am requesting authorization for a development loan of \$22.35 million to the Government of Turkey (GOT) for relending to Eregli Iron and Steel Works, a private Turkish corporation, to help finance an expansion of the Eregli Steel Mill. The loan will finance U.S. machinery, equipment and related engineering services to increase ingot capacity from 470,000 metric tons per year to approximately 900,000 tons and to broaden the product line. The loan will also finance continued U.S. supervisory assistance. The loan proposal includes deferment of \$25 million equivalent in local currency payments of principal of existing AID loans due in 1967-1969.

In January you approved the pledging and subsequent signing of a program loan to Turkey of \$65 million. At that time AID indicated its expectation of also making project loans of approximately \$55 million during FY 1967. One project loan for \$31 million has already been approved, and approval of the Eregli loan would make the total \$53 million. We are prepared, however, to act on a number of small project proposals, primarily in education, that would raise the project loan total in FY 1967 to approximately \$70 million.

The Eregli Steel Mill is a \$300 million project that was originally financed by a \$130 million loan authorized in 1960 by the Development Loan Fund. That loan, which was made directly to the project and not on the credit of the GOT, is AID's largest loan to a project in the private sector. Supplemental loans and capitalization of interest have increased AID's investment to \$169 million. Due to overruns and rising costs, the project will not be able to live up to original expectations at its present capacity and, without this expansion, will operate indefinitely at a loss. In 1966, the first full year of operations, the loss was \$12 million; the estimated loss in 1969, when the project will have reached substantially its present capacity, will be \$7 million.

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This expansion is expected to enable the project to operate at a profit of \$23 million per year once expanded capacity is reached. The expansion was recommended by Armco Steel Corporation, the fourth largest U. S. steel company, following a detailed study of the project made last fall under contract to AID.

Self-Help

The Eregli Steel Mill is one of the largest enterprises in Turkey and the largest in the private sector. For this reason it receives a lot of attention, from both within and without the government. Because it cost more to build than originally estimated, and because it has not made a profit, it has been adversely criticized. Some of the criticism has been directed at Koppers Company, Inc., the American sponsor. The project has also been investigated by parliament. In the face of this opposition, the GOT has solidly supported and continues to support the project, although Eregli is not one of the GOT's own state enterprises. This support has taken the form of an initial investment of \$54 million to cover most of the local currency costs and additional investments of approximately \$50 million to cover supplemental costs and losses. All local currency costs of the proposed expansion (approximately \$5 million) will be financed by the GOT. In addition, deferments of AID loans are matched by corresponding deferments of GOT loans.

The GOT's original investment, part of which is in the form of equity shares, gives it slightly over 50% voting rights until such time as private investors can be found to buy these shares. Despite this voting power and despite the increasingly large investment of the GOT in this project, the GOT has not attempted to interfere with the management of Eregli or impose its policies on Eregli affairs. As a result, new as the management of Eregli is, the project appears to be substantially more efficient than the public-sector steel mill at Karabuk, which is Turkey's only other mill of comparable size. As the management of Eregli becomes more experienced, its ability to out-perform Karabuk should demonstrate the relative inefficiency of the State Economic Enterprises and thereby help foster a more liberal GOT attitude towards private participation in the economic growth of the country.

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- 3 -

One of the key elements of the proposed expansion recommended by Armco Steel Corporation is the importation of quality iron ore to meet approximately 50% of the mill's requirements. The GOT has agreed to allocate foreign exchange for these ore imports. Even with this outflow of foreign exchange, the expansion will enable Turkey to conserve an additional \$17 million a year that it would otherwise have to spend on imports of finished steel products. This \$17 million represents an increase of 70% over what could be saved by the project at present capacity, and represents well over 50% of the total investment in the expansion.

Armco's other recommendations were directed at improving the management and operation of the Ereğli Steel Mill. They include appointment of an American steel man to run the plant, consolidation of Ereğli's headquarters at the plant site, reduction of the size of the labor force, and reduction of inventories. Ereğli has already started to implement these recommendations.

U. S. Balance of Payments Considerations

The proceeds of the proposed AID loan will be used to purchase goods and services from the United States. Very few of the imports of finished steel for which Ereğli products will substitute would come from the United States. Thus, this loan and the expansion project will have a negligible effect on the U. S. balance of payments.

Part of the proposal, however, is the deferment of some \$25 million in principal payments under present AID loans and another \$10 million under GOT loans to cover the cash losses of the project until the time when the expansion will enable it to operate above the breakeven point. While all of the AID payments being deferred are in local currency, the U. S. Government is presently buying Turkish Lira with dollars to cover its own expenses; therefore the effect of the deferment on the U. S. balance of payments will be negative. The principal purpose of the expansion, however, is to correct this deficiency by enabling Ereğli to operate profitably and to pay its debts to AID and other creditors as they mature. Without the expansion, and without the debt deferment that will enable Ereğli to survive until the time the expansion is completed, there is little hope that AID could recover its present investment of \$169 million.


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-4-

Recommendation

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the \$22.35 million development loan for expansion of the Eregli Iron and Steel Works.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "William S. Gaud". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized 'W' and 'G'.

William S. Gaud

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Decontrol following June 16, 1972

~~TOP SECRET~~

101
Pres file
June 26, 1967

Mr. President:

The attached cable from General Westmoreland reports on his trip to the Kontum area on Saturday, following the heavy fighting in that area last week.

The General has been concerned with the recent enemy build-up in this area and last week directed the deployment of additional forces to the area. Operation GREELEY, in which Company Alpha was badly malled -- on which he reports in this message -- was the spoiling action by which the General hoped to relieve the enemy pressure in this area.

From his report, it would appear this operation met with some initial success.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *12*, NARA, Date *6-27-91*

TOP SECRET

Monday, June 26, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (MACV, 5995)

SUBJECT: Operations in Kontum Province

I have just returned from Pleiku and Kontum provinces where I talked to key U.S. and Vietnamese officials. It is now quite evident that the 173 Brigade was deployed to Kontum in the nick of time. During the past two weeks the enemy has been very aggressive in the area. He pursued a campaign to harass the people and attack outposts along Highway 14. These actions served as a cover for the positioning of North Vietnamese battalions around Dak To, which I am confident he intended to attack within a matter of days. The population became nervous, manifest by eight hamlets being abandoned with the people seeking refuge in the towns.

As Lt. Col. Luat, Vietnamese 24th Special Zone Commander, explained to me, the first phase of the enemy's plan has now failed and the people have regained their confidence because of the presence of Allied troops. He reports that seven of the eight abandoned hamlets have now been reoccupied.

Larsen has put Peers, Commanding General 4th Division, in command of the operations in Kontum as well as Pleiku. Peers has designated Brigadier General Walker as Task Force Commander and counter-part to Luat of the Vietnamese 24th Special Zone, with headquarters in Kontum City. Walker has operational control over the 173 Brigade and the 2d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division. If additional troops of the 1st Cavalry Division are required, the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry Division will assume command.

The North Vietnamese Army 24th Regiment has apparently been reinforced by additional North Vietnamese troops. Luat believes that this reinforcement could be as much as two regiments, but I believe this to be an over estimate. Perhaps as much as one additional regiment is in the area.

I was briefed in detail by Brigadier General Deane of the 173 Brigade, the Battalion Commander of the 2d Battalion 503d Airborne

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968

By 19 NARA, Date 6-27-91

Infantry, Lt. Col. Partain, and Captain Milton of "A" Company which unit carried the brunt of the battle against what was probably a North Vietnamese battalion. I addressed the 43 men that remained in the company and subsequently visited the 18th evac hospital in Pleiku, where I talked to a number of the wounded.

Company "A" took extremely heavy casualties. Of 141 men, 76 were killed and 22 were wounded. All four platoon leaders were killed. As I analyze the situation, Company "A" made an excellent account of itself although only 106 enemy bodies were actually seen by people who survived. From the reports of the men on the ground and the forward air controllers, and in consideration of the artillery and air strikes delivered against the enemy, actual casualties inflicted were probably several fold greater. The Brigade, Battalion, and Company Commanders estimate that there were over 450 enemy killed. Needless to say, this estimate cannot be chalked up as a matter of record.

Men who were in the battle tell me that they were attacked repeatedly by sizeable forces which they met with maximum fire. After several hours the enemy gave up and withdrew from the battlefield, suggesting that he had had enough. Morale of the men remaining in the hard-hit company is high. They will receive replacements tomorrow and rebuild the company. Their spirits and outlook are remarkable.

The Special Forces and CIDG have done an excellent job in the area but at the cost of four Special Forces NCO's and a number of CIDG soldiers killed. A patrol from the Dak To Special Forces camp on June 13 gave warning of the enemy build-up.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Monday, June 26, 1967 ~~8:20 a.m.~~*From the President to the Prime Minister*~~Draft Message to Wilson, Moro, and Kissinger.~~

CAP 67587

The public statements made after my second meeting with Kosygin accurately reflect the lack of movement forward on specific matters, and his stiffness, in particular, on the Middle East.

It seemed probable to me that his instructions were to hold the line until he could return home and take stock with his colleagues.

It will take time, therefore, before we know whether Soviet policy will shift from its present familiar tracks.

I found it useful to talk directly with him.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By WJ, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

*to susp
2. Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with King Hassan's Emissary

You agreed last week to receive Moroccan King Hassan's personal emissary, Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki. Secretary Katzenbach recommends you see him between Friday and Monday, 30 June to 3 July.

There is no need to schedule more than a 30-45 minute office visit. He brings a message from Hassan and may want to describe the threat to Morocco from the continuing buildup of Soviet arms in Algeria.

You last saw Laraki in mid-March when he left his post as Ambassador here to become Foreign Minister.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, 30 June _____

Monday, 3 July _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. susp.
2. Pres file

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June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ray Hare's Mission to India

Reports from New York indicate that Ray did a superb job on Chagla. Ray's credentials of 40 years intimate knowledge of the Arab world, his former ambassadorship in the UAR, and the fact that he knew India's independent leadership like Nehru, Pant and Prasad give him an authority in dealing with the Indians which is unusual.

In addition, his quiet style forces them to tip their hand and makes it possible for him to weigh in in a manner which is particularly effective because of his low key. At least this is the feedback we get from his talks with Chagla.

W. W. Rostow

Mr. Rostow 105

[Signature]
2. P. m. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcing King Hussein's Visit

With King Hussein coming here Wednesday for lunch, we have to decide when to announce his visit. The main issue is how you want your announcement to relate to his UN speech, probably at 3:30 p. m. today. He may have to say some things that we won't necessarily like. Mac Bundy thinks that, for that reason, it might be better for us to announce tomorrow so both speech and announcement won't end up in the same papers. But you may want to squelch press speculation by announcing sooner. I see three choices:

1. Get it out by special White House announcement early this afternoon, so the invitation will be on the record before Hussein speaks.
2. Announce at George's 4:00 p. m. press briefing this afternoon.
3. Wait until George's 11:00 a. m. session tomorrow.
4. You could do it yourself if you have a press conference.

I would suggest a very simple announcement here with advance notice to Hussein on timing: "King Hussein of Jordan will visit Washington for an exchange of views with the President on Wednesday, June 28. Details are being arranged."

W. W. Rostow

Announce immediately _____
At 4:00 p. m. today _____
I'll do it _____
At 11:00 a. m. tomorrow _____

Text OK _____
See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-86
By *ing*, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~transp.~~
2. Prov file

June 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Kind words for us from an Indian Elder
Statesman

C. Rajagopalachari is one of India's most forthright, no nonsense fellows. He was once President of India and though old and ailing, played a political role in bringing down Kamaraj's government in Madras. He visited here when I was in S/P, and he was very sharp indeed.

In a farewell letter to Bert Franklin, our Consul General in Madras, where "Rajaji" lives, he recently wrote:

"Please tell all the big officials in White House and others of importance in Washington that the people of India are deeply grateful and appreciate all that America has done and is doing for India. Let no one be misled by anyone who holds a contrary view for the sake of non-alignment or any other fashionable folly. This is my message to all my friends in the States."

There are few who express themselves so directly, but many who share his view.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:WHW:amc

Pres file

Monday, June 26, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Addition to U.S. Delegation at Korean Inaugural

State recommends and I concur that our Charge d'Affaires in Seoul, George S. Newman, be added to our official delegation to attend President Park's inauguration.

We are the only government whose Ambassador or Charge in Seoul is not a member of its delegation. His absence from the delegation is complicating his job of working with the Koreans in making arrangements and plans for inaugural ceremonies.

You named Bill Porter to the delegation, but he is not a substitute as he is not yet accredited to the Korean Government and is not present in Seoul.

We have permission from the Koreans to expand our delegation from five men to six.

I also recommend that the names of our delegation ^{*attached*} be released to the press today. We have not yet informed the Korean Government of the names pending announcement here.

W. W. Rostow

Add Newman to the list _____

Do not add Newman _____

See me _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

U. S. Delegation to Korean Inauguration

The Vice President

Ambassador Porter

Senator Strom Thurmond
~~Governor Rockefeller~~

Senator Harris

Congressman Matsunaga

SAFEGUARDS

Hollybush
6/25/67
108

The issue on safeguards (Art. III) in the NPT is not an issue between us and the USSR. It is between the EURATOM countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium) and all the rest. EURATOM views depend essentially upon the veto and negative attitude of France.

Gromyko told Rusk that they would talk to France about this.

What we now want is: USSR agreement to table the existing draft with Article III blank. We agree that we and Soviets (as co-chairmen) will work urgently on Article III. Gromyko and Rusk are meeting early this week on Article III.

If USSR can accept our present language for Article III, of course we could table complete draft.

However, we are committed to our allies, especially the Germans, not to discuss alternative language on Article III with the USSR before discussing it with our allies.

Holby
6/25/67
159

MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Kosygin said to the General Assembly that we should try to find "common language". We agree to try.

The General Assembly's function is to make recommendations to the Security Council and to the parties. It is inconceivable to us that the Assembly would not recommend the elements of a permanent peace in the Middle East.

We have studied Kosygin's speech carefully and believe we ought to find "common language" on:

- Withdrawal of forces.
- Acceptance of Israel as an independent national state.
- Elimination of a state of war or rights of belligerence.
- Re-affirmation of non-use of force or threat of force.
- Rights of innocent passage -- Suez as well as Aqaba.
- Dampening of arms race.
- Commitment to face and solve refugee problem.
- Effective UN presence until peace treaties between Middle East states worked out.
- A mediation procedure.
- Intensified economic and social development.

Some of these elements were contained in the Chairman's speech before the General Assembly. None is inconsistent with Soviet policy as we understand it.

We should work in New York for a resolution and action we both can support.

VENEZUELA

Hollybush
6/25/67
110

We have firm evidence that Cuba is directly and actively encouraging guerrilla operations in seven Latin American countries, This is a form of aggression and it is dangerous to peace in the Western Hemisphere and the world.

In Venezuela, for example, Soviet-manufactured weapons were captured from Cubans landed in Venezuela illegally in July 1966. Their boat and motors are known to have come from Cuba.

In May 1967 a party of Cubans and Venezuelans trained in Cuba landed in a Cuban fishing vessel. Several Cubans were captured.

On March 13, 1967, Castro openly stated his determination to support such activities.

The Venezuelan government is determined that there shall be effective action against it.

Our Ambassador Sol Linowitz is now in Venezuela investigating the evidence along with his OAS colleagues.

It is of the highest importance that Castro be persuaded to stop such illegal activity.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hollybush
6/25/67

DRV AIDE MEMOIRE HANDED TO U. S. DCM BY DRV CHARGE
IN MOSCOW JANUARY 27, 1967

"...The unconditional cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam being materialized, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could then exchange views with the United States concerning the place or date for contact between the two parties as the Government of the United States proposed in its message handed over on January 1, 1967.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7C9 91-15

By rg/lip, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

112

1967 JUN 24 18 25

EEA 115
OO WTE 12
DE WTE 1247

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67584

67 JUN 24 PM 2:22

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THIS REPORT ON SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLAS MAY INTEREST YOU.

MOSCOW APPEARS TO HAVE REGARDED CASTRO'S MARCH 13 ATTACK ON THE POLICIES OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY BOTH AS A THREAT TO THE LEADERSHIP OF MANY OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AND AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. SHORTLY AFTER THIS SPEECH MOSCOW DEVELOPED ITS OPPOSITION TO CASTRO'S POSITION ON THE THEORETICAL LEVEL, AND MOST RECENTLY THE SOVIET PRESS HAS STEPPED UP ITS COVERAGE OF EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA.

IN RECENT WEEKS THE USSR HAS CLEARLY, THOUGH INDIRECTLY, RESPONDED TO CASTRO'S CHALLENGE TO THE ESTABLISHED COMMUNIST PARTIES OF LATIN AMERICA. THE MOST DIRECT RESPONSE WAS THE SUMMARY IN PRAVDA ON MAY 11 OF A LETTER BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV) REAFFIRMING THE POLICIES OF HIS PARTY--POLICIES WHICH CASTRO HAD VIOLENTLY ATTACKED IN HIS MARCH 13 SPEECH. THE LEAD EDITORIAL IN THE APRIL 1967 ISSUE OF THE WORLD MARXIST REVIEW ON LENIN'S "APRIL THESES" WAS ALSO CLEARLY DIRECTED AGAINST CASTRO AND HIS FRENCH-BORN THEORETICIAN, REGIS DEBRAY.

THE SOVIETS APPEARED MOST CONCERNED THAT THE CASTROITE ATTACKS ON THE LATIN AMERICAN CP'S MIGHT ERODE THE POWER OF THEIR PRO-SOVIET LEADERS. THE SOVIETS HAVE A STRONG INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE PRESENT LEADERSHIPS OF LATIN AMERICAN CP'S FROM CASTROITE ATTACK AND WILL PROBABLY WORK OVER THE LONGER TERM AGAINST CASTRO'S POSITION, AS STATED IN HIS MARCH 13 SPEECH AND DEVELOPED BY OTHER REGIME SPOKESMEN AND THE CUBAN-CONTROLLED MEDIA.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72983-41
By sp/ies, NARA, Date 7-9-91

PRESERVATION COPY

SINCE THE LATTER HALF OF MAY, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF MEDIATING EFFORTS BY URUGUAYAN CP FIRST SECRETARY ARISMENDI, THE SOVIETS HAVE MUTED THEIR THEORETICAL OPPOSITION TO CASTRO'S PROGRAM AND HAVE GIVEN SOMEWHAT GREATER ATTENTION TO THE VIOLENT STRUGGLE IN SOME LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WHILE HOLDING TO ITS GENERAL PREFERENCE FOR PEACEFUL "STRUGGLE" IN LATIN AMERICA, MOSCOW APPEARS WILLING TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE ITS DIFFERENCES WITH CUBA. IT APPEARS THAT MOSCOW IS ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO SHOW ITS INTEREST IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE THERE, WITHOUT ACTUALLY COMMITTING ITSELF TO GIVE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLAS.

ON MAY 20, MOSCOW RADIO ANNOUNCED THAT A CAMPAIGN OF "TEN DAYS OF SOLIDARITY WITH LATIN AMERICA," WAS GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION, WITHOUT SAYING WHEN THIS CAMPAIGN HAD BEGUN. THE CAMPAIGN ENDED ON OR ABOUT MAY 28. THIS PROPAGANDA DRIVE WAS DIRECTED ESPECIALLY AT DEMONSTRATING SOVIET SOLIDARITY WITH LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNISTS PRESENTLY SUFFERING THE INDIGNITIES OF IMPRISONMENT, AND FEATURED MASS PROTEST MEETINGS IN VARIOUS CITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION. ONE OF THESE, ON MAY 25, WAS ATTENDED BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, JESUS FARIA, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF COLOMBIA, JESUS VILLEGAS.

SINCE MAY 15 THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO KEPT UP A STEADY ATTACK ON A SUPPOSED "ANTI-CUBAN CAMPAIGN" ALLEGEDLY ORGANIZED BY THE UNITED STATES WITH THE AID OF VENEZUELA AND OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. THESE COMMENTARIES APPARENTLY CAME IN REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CUBAN-ESCORTED GUERRILLA LANDING IN VENEZUELA ON MAY 8, AND THEY HAVE BEEN DEVOTED ALMOST ENTIRELY TO ATTACKING THE UNITED STATES AND VENEZUELA RATHER THAN DEFENDING CUBA. NEITHER IN THIS, NOR IN ANY OTHER RECENT SOVIET COMMENTARY, WAS THERE ANY PROMISE OF DIRECT SUPPORT FOR LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLAS.

1. IN ADDITION, MOSCOW RADIO ON JUNE 3 ANNOUNCED THAT TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE VENEZUELAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE, HECTOR RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO GARCIA, HAD ARRIVED IN MOSCOW "AFTER A FOUR YEAR IMPRISONMENT AND EXILE."

DTG: 241722Z JUN 67

GPS 680 IMI 682

CONFIDENTIAL

[2]

~~SECRET~~
SENT
WHCA

113

1967 JUN 24 17 38

;
EEA113
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1246

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67579

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw/rq, NARA, Date 11-18-99

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 24, 1967 12:30 P.M.

EVRON CAME IN THIS MORNING ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED WITH KOSYGIN. I TOLD HIM THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING TO REPORT HE COULD NOT GET FROM NEWSPAPERS. THE CONVERSATIONS WERE AMIABLE IN TONE BUT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT FROM SECRETARY RUSK'S TALKS WITH GROMYKO THERE WAS OBVIOUSLY GREAT CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REVIVAL OF WAR IF A WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE BROUGHT ABOUT SOON.

EVRON THEN MADE THESE POINTS:

--ASIDE FROM AQABA, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THEIR ACCEPTING WITHDRAWAL WAS SOME CONFIDENCE THAT THE ARMS RACE WOULD NOT BE REVIVED. HE URGED THAT WE BE VERY STRONG WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE ARMS RACE. HE POINTED TO SOVIET NEWSPAPER STORIES AND BROADCASTS THAT THIS WAS ONLY A TEMPORARY SETBACK FOR THE ARABS. A WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD MERELY PERMIT RESUMPTION OF THE ARMS RACE AND PROVIDE TIME AND TRAINING FOR THE ARABS TO DO BETTER MILITARILY IN THE FUTURE WOULD BE NO SOLUTION.

--HE INDICATED THAT THERE IS INCREASING THOUGHT IN ISRAEL ABOUT AN ECONOMIC LINK TO JORDAN. THIS GOES BEYOND A SEPARATE WEST BANK STATE. IT WOULD LEAVE THE TWO STATES OF ISRAEL AND JORDAN POLITICALLY INDEPENDENT BUT WITH OPEN COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS. THIS WOULD COST ISRAEL IN THE SHORT RUN AND BENEFIT JORDAN BUT COULD BE AN EXCELLENT SOLUTION FOR THE REFUGEES AND MANY OTHER MATTERS. HE HOPES THAT HUSSEIN WILL NOT USE THE OCCASION OF HIS VISIT TO TAKE AN UNCONSTRUCTIVE POSITION IN THE UN. HE WAS DISCOURAGED BY HUSSEIN'S TV BROADCAST YESTERDAY.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

--HE SAID THE BASIC MOOD IN ISRAEL WAS IN FACT MODERATE AND NOT EXTREME. THEY HAD LOST THE EQUIVALENT OF 65,000 DEAD IN THE U.S. IN FIVE DAYS OF FIGHTING. MOST FAMILIES, INCLUDING HIS, HAVE LOST MEN. THEY DON'T WANT MORE WAR. HE HIMSELF BELIEVES THAT A REUNIFICATION OF THE LABOR PARTIES OF ISRAEL WITH DAYAN COMING INTO PLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY WOULD BE HELPFUL. IN HIS VIEW DAYAN IS NOT AN EXTREMIST BUT A REALIST AND MODERATE IN THE END. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE DAYAN'S OPPOSITION TO A SHOW OF TANKS AND FORCE IN JERUSALEM ON THE OCCASION OF THE MAY 14TH ANNIVERSARY.

DTG: 241649Z JUN 67

GPS 420 IMI 420
ZEV 1733Z

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

114

SENT
WHICA

EEA113
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1244

1967 JUN 24 16 35

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67578

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 24, 1967

SUBJECT: EMERGENCY RELIEF IN THE MIDDLE EAST

STATE RECOMMENDS THAT YOU ANNOUNCE A \$5 MILLION EMERGENCY RELIEF RESERVE FUND FROM AVAILABLE CONTINGENCY MONEY. THIS WOULD BE SPENT ONLY AS NEEDED THROUGH A VARIETY OF CHANNELS--UN EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND PRIVATE AGENCIES.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT NOW IS TO GET US ON THE PUBLIC RECORD WITH A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE GEARED MOSTLY TO THE ARABS. SOME 20 OTHER NON-ARAB FREE WORLD COUNTRIES HAVE PROMISED \$7 MILLION IN EMERGENCY AID. COMMUNIST NATIONS HAVE OFFERED ANOTHER \$6.6 MILLION, AND ARAB COUNTRIES NOT TOUCHED BY THE FIGHTING HAVE PROMISED \$82 MILLION. SO FAR WE'VE ONLY SENT TENTS TO JORDAN IN ADDITION TO OUR CONTINUING UNRWA SUPPORT AND FOOD DONATION PROGRAMS.

WE WOULD NOT JEOPARDIZE OUR CONTROL OVER FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS BY MAKING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT NOW. WE INTEND TO USE THIS PROGRAM TO CUT OUR SHARE OF UNRWA SUPPORT FROM THE 70 PER CENT WE'VE SHOULDERED IN THE PAST--MAYBE EVEN TO SEE UNRWA GO OUT OF BUSINESS GRADUALLY. WE ALSO WANT TO USE IT TO GET THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS MORE RESPONSIBLY INTO THE ACT. THE PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT (ATTACHED) SHARPLY SEPARATES THIS PROGRAM FROM THE LONG-TERM REFUGEE PROBLEM, SO WE MINIMIZE THE RISK OF GETTING STUCK WITH ANOTHER LONG-RUN PROGRAM. TO MAKE SURE THESE THINGS HAPPEN, I RECOMMEND REQUIRING STATE TO COME BACK FOR YOUR APPROVAL WHEN THEY'RE READY TO SPEND ANY OF THIS MONEY.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 9286

By ig, NARA, Date 6-15-93

PRESERVATION COPY

THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO HOLD ANY ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL WE SEE MORE CLEARLY THE SHAPE OF THE EMERGENCY EFFORT. BUT I THINK WE COULD MAKE THE POLITICAL POINTS WE WANT BY ANNOUNCING NOW WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING LONGER TERM ARRANGEMENTS.

~~SECRET~~

NEITHER MAC NOR I FEELS STRONGLY ABOUT DOING THIS TODAY, BUT WE WANTED YOU TO HAVE THE OPTION IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO BE ON THE RECORD WITH A HUMANITARIAN GESTURE. IF YOU DON'T FEEL PRESSED, WE COULD DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU MONDAY.

WE ARE INCLINED TO FEEL IT BETTER TO HOLD THIS PLUS A \$2 MILLION TRANCHE OF JORDAN AID UNTIL WE SEE HUSSEIN'S SPEECH AT THE U.N. AND TAKE HIS TEMPERATURE GENERALLY.

APPROVE RELEASE TODAY-----
HOLD OFF-----

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

THE RECENT HOSTILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST TOOK THEIR INEVITABLE TOLL IN HUMAN SUFFERING. WHILE WE ARE URGENTLY SEARCHING FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT THE FIRST HUMANITARIAN TASK AND THE FIRST TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION IS TO BIND UP THE WOUNDS OF CONFLICT--TO FIND HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS, FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY AND MEDICAL CARE FOR THE SICK AND WOUNDED.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS RESPONDED GENEROUSLY TO HUMAN SUFFERING ANY WHERE IN THE WORLD. IN KEEPING WITH THIS HUMANITARIAN TRADITION, THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO JOIN WITH OTHER NATIONS IN A SPECIAL EFFORT TO PROVIDE EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AS SPECIFIC NEEDS BECOME CLEAR. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT A RESERVE OF \$5,000,000 BE ESTABLISHED FROM CONTINGENCY FUNDS TO MEET URGENT RELIEF NEEDS IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. WE WILL ALLOCATE THESE FUNDS THROUGH A NUMBER OF CHANNELS--MULTILATERAL, BILATERAL AND VOLUNTARY AGENCY--IN WHATEVER WAYS BEST HELP THE WAR VICTIMS AND ENCOURAGE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHERS, INCLUDING COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA.

AS A FIRST STEP, I HAVE DIRECTED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATE IN THE APPROPRIATE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY PROGRAMS OF FOOD AND MEDICAL RELIEF. IN ADDITION, WE ARE OFFERING \$100,000 TO THE AMERICAN RED CROSS FOR IMMEDIATE USE BY THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TO ASSIST ALL VICTIMS OF THE CONFLICT.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL KEEP EMERGENCY NEEDS UNDER
CONSTANT REVIEW AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS NOW AT WORK.

I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS AN EMERGENCY RELIEF
PROGRAM. EVEN WHILE WE ARE JOINING IN THIS EFFORT TO MEET
URGENT NEEDS, WE MUST LOOK TOWARD A PERMANENT AND EQUITABLE
SOLUTION FOR THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN DISPLACED BY THIS AND
PREVIOUS WARS. IT WILL NOT BE ENOUGH SIMPLY TO FALL BACK
ON THE RELIEF ARRANGEMENTS OF THE PAST. THERE WILL BE NO
PEACE UNTIL THOSE IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED ASSUME RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR A NEW AND DECISIVE ATTACK ON THIS PROBLEM.

DIG 241500Z JUNE 1967

790 GFS IMI 790

PRESERVATION COPY

J 24, 1967

115

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Averell Harriman had this piece of experience to pass along.

With Russians it takes three meetings to make a deal:

the first, courteous; the second, rough; the third, the deal is made.

He gave a number of examples. I made no comment but promised to pass it along.

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~~SECRET~~

116
June 24, 1967 12:30 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Evron came in this morning anxious to know what had transpired with Kosygin. I told him there was really nothing to report he could not get from newspapers. The conversations were amiable in tone but there was no change in Soviet positions. I told him that from Secretary Rusk's talks with Gromyko there was obviously great concern about the possibility of a revival of war if a withdrawal could not be brought about soon.

Evron then made these points:

-- Aside from Aqaba, perhaps the most important element in their accepting withdrawal was some confidence that the arms race would not be revived. He urged that we be very strong with the Russians on the arms race. He pointed to Soviet newspaper stories and broadcasts that this was only a temporary setback for the Arabs. A withdrawal which would merely permit resumption of the arms race and provide time and training for the Arabs to do better militarily in the future would be no solution.

-- He indicated that there is increasing thought in Israel about an economic link to Jordan. This goes beyond a separate West Bank state. It would leave the two states of Israel and Jordan politically independent but with open cooperative economic relationships. This would cost Israel in the short run and benefit Jordan but could be an excellent solution for the refugees and many other matters. He hopes that Hussein will not use the occasion of his visit to take an unconstructive position in the UN. He was

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gwh, NARA, Date 11-18-99

cc Mcg Bundy

LOX to State + Defense EO for Sect

6/24/67

discouraged by Hussein's TV broadcast yesterday.

-- He said the basic mood in Israel was in fact moderate and not extreme. They had lost the equivalent of 65,000 dead in the U.S. in five days of fighting. Most families, including his, have lost men. They don't want more war. He himself believes that a reunification of the labor parties of Israel with Dayan coming into political responsibility would be helpful. In his view Dayan is not an extremist but a realist and moderate in the end. He cited as an example Dayan's opposition to a show of tanks and force in Jerusalem on the occasion of the May 14th anniversary.

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WWZ 004
OO WTE 15
DE WTE 1235

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

Rostow
117

FROM: BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO: MARVIN WATSON FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67571

1967 JUN 24 00 14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO SEND SHORT, PERSONAL NOTES TO WILSON, KIESINGER AND MORO, SAYING THAT:

- YOU DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST, ARMS RACE PROBLEMS AND VIETNAM, ETC.
- YOU WILL HAVE A SECOND MEETING ON SUNDAY;
- YOU WILL SEND THEM A FULL ACCOUNT ON MONDAY.

ALL THREE ARE CERTAINLY ON PINS AND NEEDLES ABOUT A TWO-MAN SUMMIT AND WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR SUCH A NOTE, EVEN IF IT CONTAINS NO DETAIL. (DEPENDING ON THE CONVERSATION, YOU MIGHT OF COURSE WANT TO GIVE THEM A FULLER REPORT EVEN BEFORE SUNDAY.)

IN ADDITION, SECRETARY RUSK MIGHT SEND MESSAGES TO THE OTHER NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, MAKING CLEAR THAT THEY CAN EXPECT A REPORT FROM US VERY SOON.

KNOWING NOTHING ABOUT THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING, I HAVE NOT TRIED TO DRAFT MESSAGES TO WILSON, ET AL WALT (OR ED HAMILTON, WHO WILL BE COVERING FOR ME ON THE WEEK END) CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH DRAFTS IN SHORT ORDER.

DRAFT AND GIVE THE MESSAGES AS ABOVE -----

NO -----

SPEAK TO ME -----

DTG: 23/233Z JUN 67

GPS: 220 IMI 220

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NFJ 92-86
By mg, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

118

Wire to Ranch

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

CA P67577

TO: Jim Jones
FOR: The President
FROM: Walt Rostow

The President agreed last week to see Jordan's King Hussein after Hussein speaks at the UN General Assembly 26 June.

Secretary Katzenbach recommends that the President see him either Wednesday or Thursday, 28 or 29 June, and that the President consider having a very small--say just the Tuesday lunch members--working luncheon for him.

If we could set a time today, we would settle the details with Hussein in New York tomorrow. He arrives there tonight and will spend Sunday with his staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 2-1-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

119

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith Eisenhower's suggestions on the Middle East.

In a conversation with General Goodpaster today, General Eisenhower asked that the following suggestions be reported to you:

1. The U. S. should promote a huge desalination program for the Middle East in order to attract attention away from current less profitable discussion of political issues. He favors our organizing a consortium to build three huge nuclear plants to provide water for irrigation as well as power to Jordan, Syria, Israel and perhaps Egypt. The cost of the plan he has in mind might be two to three billion dollars. The purpose would be to get the Middle Eastern states involved jointly in constructive projects as a way of overcoming political issues which now separate them. The standard of living would be raised and the refugee problem would be solved if power and water resources could be vastly increased by the construction of nuclear plants.

2. The U. S. should not now define its position on a Middle East settlement in detail nor unilaterally put forward a proposal containing specific points.

General Eisenhower believes the objectives of the Israeli Government are:

(1) Access to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba or both.

(2) Security for its territory so that Israel is not continually subject to sudden mobilization -- so that it does not have to live with the knowledge that at any moment it may have to go to war suddenly to preserve its very existence.

cc McG Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By 108, NARA, Date 6-15-93

6/24/67

General Eisenhower thinks a strong international force based at the Strait of Tiran may be necessary to guarantee access to the Gulf of Aqaba. He sees merit in the proposal to internationalize Jerusalem along the line of the pre-war arrangements made for the Free City of Danzig.

The General told Goodpaster he is feeling stronger all the time and there is a good chance he can make his planned trip abroad in October. He expressed appreciation for the briefing on the Hollybush meeting given him by Ambassador Thompson.

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Mr. Rostow 120

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86

By lip, NARA, Date 6-15-93

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Emergency Relief in the Middle East

State recommends that you announce a \$5 million emergency relief reserve fund from available contingency money. This would be spent only as needed through a variety of channels--UN emergency programs, government-to-government arrangements and private agencies.

The main purpose of an announcement now is to get us on the public record with a humanitarian gesture geared mostly to the Arabs. Some 20 other non-Arab Free World countries have promised \$7 million in emergency aid. Communist nations have offered another \$6.6 million, and Arab countries not touched by the fighting have promised \$82 million. So far we've only sent tents to Jordan in addition to our continuing UNRWA support and food donation programs.

We would not jeopardize our control over future arrangements by making this announcement now. We intend to use this program to cut our share of UNRWA support from the 70% we've shouldered in the past--maybe even to see UNRWA go out of business gradually. We also want to use it to get the regional governments more responsibly into the act. The proposed announcement (attached) sharply separates this program from the long-term refugee problem, so we minimize the risk of getting stuck with another long-run program. To make sure these things happen, I recommend requiring State to come back for your approval when they're ready to spend any of this money.

The alternative is to hold any announcement until we see more clearly the shape of the emergency effort. But I think we could make the political points we want by announcing now without jeopardizing longer term arrangements.

Neither Mac nor I feels strongly about doing this today, but we wanted you to have the option if you would like to be on the record with a humanitarian gesture. If you don't feel pressed, we could discuss this with you Monday.

W. W. Rostow

Approve release today _____
Hold off _____

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

The recent hostilities in the Middle East took their inevitable toll in human suffering. While we are urgently searching for a lasting settlement of the Middle East problem, we must bear in mind that the first humanitarian task and the first task of reconstruction is to bind up the wounds of conflict--to find homes for the homeless, food for the hungry and medical care for the sick and wounded.

The American people have always responded generously to human suffering anywhere in the world. In keeping with this humanitarian tradition, the United States stands ready to join with other nations in a special effort to provide emergency assistance as specific needs become clear. Accordingly, I have directed that a reserve of \$5,000,000 be established from contingency funds to meet urgent relief needs in the period immediately ahead. We will allocate these funds through a number of channels--multilateral, bilateral and voluntary agency--in whatever ways best help the war victims and encourage contributions from others, including countries within the area.

As a first step, I have directed that our Government participate in the appropriate United Nations emergency programs of food and medical relief. In addition, we are offering \$100,000 to the American

Red Cross for immediate use by the International Red Cross to assist all victims of the conflict.

The Secretary of State will keep emergency needs under constant review and cooperate fully with the intergovernmental and private organizations now at work.

I must emphasize that this is an emergency relief program. Even while we are joining in this effort to meet urgent needs, we must look toward a permanent and equitable solution for those who have been displaced by this and previous wars. It will not be enough simply to fall back on the relief arrangements of the past. There will be no peace until those immediately involved assume responsibility for a new and decisive attack on this problem.

Mr. Rostow

*sent via wire
to Ranch*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 24, 1967

TO: Jim Jones
FOR: The President
FROM: Walt Rostow

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

The President agreed last week to see Jordan's King Hussein after Hussein speaks at the UN General Assembly 26 June.

Secretary Katzenbach recommends that the President see him either Wednesday or Thursday, 28 or 29 June, and that the President consider having a very small--say just the Tuesday lunch members--working luncheon for him.

If we could set a time today, we would settle the details with Hussein in New York tomorrow. He arrives there tonight and will spend Sunday with his staff.

*1:30 lunch
wed June 28*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date *7-1-91*

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

June 24, 1967

Rostow

102

FROM: Walt Rostow

TO: The President

SUBJECT: Daily CIA Summary of Soviet Arms Shipments

*sent to lunch
via wire
CAP 67581*

The Soviets appear to be beginning an airlift of military equipment to Syria and Iraq. At least 34 flights to Syria and Iraq are scheduled today.

In addition, following a five-day stand-down of flights to Algeria and Egypt, three more transports are scheduled today. Some military equipment may have been delivered to Egypt from Algeria aboard Algerian transport aircraft.

The Soviet freighter Nikolaj Pirogov, which transited the Bosphorus on 22 June, may be en route to a Middle Eastern port -- possibly with a military cargo.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-84
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-18-95

June 24, 1967

123
sent to lunch
via wire
W4 70316

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Averell Harriman had this piece of experience to pass along.

With Russians it takes three meetings to make a deal:

the first, courteous; the second, rough; the third, the deal is made.

He gave a number of examples. I made no comment but promised to pass it along.

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~~SECRET~~

124
Pres file

June 24, 1967

Send LDX to S/S, Ben Read, Department of State, from Walt Rostow

Please have following messages sent to Wilson, Moro and Kiesinger, from the President:

"I thought you would wish to know that my first discussions with Kosygin were friendly in tone and businesslike. He listened but did not move from known Soviet positions.

"As you would expect, we concentrated on major issues in the fields of arms control and Southeast Asia, as well as the Middle East.

"I shall be in touch with you again on Monday."

Add following as last paragraph to above:

For Wilson: "I am greatly in your debt for the portrait of de Gaulle, which I shall not easily forget."

For Kiesinger: "I look forward greatly to seeing you in Washington."

For Moro: "I greatly enjoyed our meeting, the other day and profited from it."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By wp, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~SECRET~~

Friday, June 23, 1967 -- 4:30 PM

*Pres file
125*

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, are proposed messages to Presidents Nyerere (Tanzania), Obote (Uganda) and Kenyatta (Kenya), congratulating them on the creation of the East African Community.

In the first decade of independence the close economic relations between these former British colonies have begun to break down. The future of regionalism in Africa depends heavily on finding ways to reverse this trend.

After interminable haggling, the three countries have taken a step in the right direction. They have signed a new economic treaty which-- if reasonably carried out -- will strengthen most of the present ties and build some new ones. But they will need all the encouragement they can get to make good on the new pact; the divisive currents are running strong. A personal message from you to each of the three presidents would be useful as a pat on the back and a reminder that the world is watching to see whether they can make a go of it.

W. W. Rostow

Hamilton/vmr

125a

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE

Dear Mr. President:

I was most pleased to hear that you, President Obote and President Kenyatta had approved arrangements designed to continue and strengthen the economic ties which link the countries of East Africa. I offer my congratulations to you and your colleagues, Mr. President, for the vision and perseverance which have yielded this welcome expression of unity in East Africa.

Creation of the East African Community can be a landmark in African development. It promises to speed the economic growth of all three countries, and thereby serve to meet the aspirations of your peoples. I hope that this new African institution may serve as an example to other nations, both on your continent and elsewhere in the world.

My best wishes to you, Mr. President, and may the spirit of statesmanship you have displayed be rewarded in the days ahead.

Sincerely yours,

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OBOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I want you to know how pleased I was to hear that you, President Nyerere and President Kenyatta have decided to maintain and strengthen the regional economic cooperation which has helped to link your countries in the past.

The important step you and your colleagues have taken will be an inspiration to other countries in Africa and elsewhere. The East African Community will contribute to the sense of unity which is already manifest on the continent, and stand as clear and living proof that Africans are taking the bold new steps necessary to their economic future.

I offer my warmest congratulations, Mr. President, on the vision and statesmanship which you brought to this decision.

Sincerely yours,

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KENYATTA

Dear Mr. President:

I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to offer my congratulations on the important step recently taken by you, President Nyerere and President Obote to continue and strengthen the economic arrangements which link your countries.

The news of your constructive move is particularly welcome at a time when there is much divisiveness in the world. Creation of the East African Community represents statesmanship of a high order and should serve as an example to your fellow leaders in Africa and elsewhere. It will contribute to the momentum for unity which already exists on the continent. And it will help each of your three countries as you press forward with the vital task of economic development.

With deep admiration for the qualities of leadership which were reflected in your role in this great event, I extend my warmest personal regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

150

Friday, June 23, 1967 -- 4:30 PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, are proposed messages to Presidents Nyerere (Tanzania), Obote (Uganda) and Kenyatta (Kenya), congratulating them on the creation of the East African Community.

In the first decade of independence the close economic relations between these former British colonies have begun to break down. The future of regionalism in Africa depends heavily on finding ways to reverse this trend.

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W. W. Rostow

Hamilton/vmr

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT NYERERE

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My best wishes to you, Mr. President, and may the spirit of statesmanship you have displayed be rewarded in the days ahead.

Sincerely ~~youre~~,

1050

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OBOTE

Dear Mr. President:

I want you to know how pleased I was to hear that you, President Nyerere and President Kenyatta have decided to maintain and strengthen the regional economic cooperation which has helped to link your countries in the past.

The important step you and your colleagues have taken will be an inspiration to other countries in Africa and elsewhere. The East African Community will contribute to the sense of unity which is already manifest on the continent, and stand as clear and living proof that Africans are taking the bold new steps necessary to their economic future.

I offer my warmest congratulations, Mr. President, on the vision and statesmanship which you brought to this decision.

Sincerely ~~your~~,

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PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KENYATTA

Dear Mr. President:

I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to offer my congratulations on the important step recently taken by you, President Nyerere and President Obote to continue and strengthen the economic arrangements which link your countries.

The news of your constructive move is particularly welcome at a time when there is much divisiveness in the world. Creation of the East African Community represents statesmanship of a high order and should serve as an example to your fellow leaders in Africa and elsewhere. It will contribute to the momentum for unity which already exists on the continent. And it will help each of your three countries as you press forward with the vital task of economic development.

With deep admiration for the qualities of leadership which were reflected in your role in this great event, I extend my warmest personal regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - June 23, 1967 - 3:00 pm

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson met with Eleta this morning and reached agreement on the attached proposed statement. They also agreed to recommend that it be released at 4:00 pm Washington time, next Monday, June 26.

With respect to the contents, Bob explained that the Panamanians did not want to go beyond this bare-bones announcement of negotiator-level agreement at this time. Eleta had in mind the sensibilities of his Foreign Affairs Council which must pass on the treaties before President Robles can give approval.

On the timing, they decided on Monday afternoon because Eleta's return Sunday night makes it imperative for something to be said. The afternoon release avoids the Panamanian noon tabloids from getting first crack at the announcement. We know that President Robles is most anxious to make the release jointly with you on Monday.

Bob explained that nothing is to be said about the contents of the treaties until Executive Branch approval has been obtained. Then you and President Robles could make a coordinated substantive announcement, each phrasing his statement with an eye on special domestic considerations related to public acceptance and ratification.

Bob also said that, subject to your approval, he and Jack Irwin proposed to tell these Senators and Congressmen of the announcement in advance (starting Monday morning):

Fulbright	Boggs
Hickenlooper	Albert
Mansfield	Lord
Dirksen	Laird
Aiken	Sullivan.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-86
By ing, NARA, Date 6-15-93

The purpose of the advance notice is to curry some favor. Bill Bowdler told him that he doubted that you would want to give that much advance notice because of the danger of leakage but agreed to consult you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve announcement for joint
release on Monday, June 26, at 4:00 pm

Yes ☒ No ☐ See me ☐

(1)

6/24/67

teletype call
from Gen. G. S. S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(2)

OK for Anderson to give advance notice
to Senators and Congressmen indicated

Yes, during morning ____

Yes, but closer to the
4:00 pm release time ____

No advance notice ____

See me ____.

Attachment

Proposed press release.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, June 23, 1967
7:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this textual report of Sec. Rusk's critical conversation with Kosygin -- to get the flavor.

The question, as phrased here, is even better: "What shall we strive for?" (p. 2)

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5854 (SECTO 16)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 7-8-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

128a
#2

TOP SECRET

Action

Info

CONTROL: 1 9 1 1.3
RECD: JUNE 22, 1967, 7:20PM

O 222200Z JUN 67
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ USUN 5854

NODIS

SECTO 16

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, DOBRYNIN, THE SECRETARY AND
AMB. THOMPSON. SOVIET MISSION, 12 NOON, JUNE 22.

1. AFTER SOME POLITE REMARKS THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD TELEPHONED HIM AND ASKED HIM TO EXPRESS HIS REGRET THAT HE WAS NOT ABLE TO ARRANGE TO EXTEND HIS PERSONAL HOSPITALITY TO THE CHAIRMAN AT THE WHITE HOUSE OR CAMP DAVID. THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD, HOWEVER, THE CHAIRMAN'S CONCERN WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND HOW OCCUPIED HE WAS. HE HOPED THAT ON SOME OTHER OCCASION HE WOULD BE ABLE TO PERSONALLY ENTERTAIN HIM.

2. THE PRESIDENT WANTED, IF THE CHAIRMAN THOUGHT A MEETING TO BE DESIRABLE, TO SUGGEST THAT THEY MEET TOMORROW WITHOUT ANY FORMAL AGENDA. EITHER SIDE COULD BRING UP ANY QUESTIONS THEY THOUGHT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO A USEFUL MEETING. THE PRESIDENT HAD IN MIND DISCUSSING NONPROLIFERATION, THE MISSILE PROBLEM-BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE, THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE WE HAD SOME COMMON POINTS OF INTEREST BUT ALSO SOME DIFFERENCES AND PERHAPS SOUTHEAST ASIA. IF THE CHAIRMAN THOUGHT A MEETING WOULD BE USEFUL THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED MACGUIRE AIRFORCE BASE IN NEW JERSEY. THIS WAS A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FACILITY ABOUT ONE HOUR AND 10 MINUTES DRIVE FROM NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE GLAD TO MAKE A HELICOPTER AVAILABLE AND SUGGESTED THE MEETING MIGHT BEGIN AT ELEVEN. THEY COULD HAVE LUNCH AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO DEPART ABOUT 2:30 OR 3:00 IN THE AFTERNOON.

TOP SECRET

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Authority 76J 90-179
By rg/ep, NARA, Date 78-91

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- 5854 FROM USUN NY JUNE 22 (NODIS)

3. KOSYGIN SAID THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS THE SECRETARY HAD MENTIONED. THE DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED BY A FIXED AGENDA. HE ANTICIPATED A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN WHICH EACH COULD EXPLAIN THEIR GENERAL POSITION. WHAT HE WAS AFTER WAS THE ANSWER TO A QUESTION. WHAT SHOULD WE STRIVE FOR.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID NO ONE CAN ANSWER THIS QUESTION BETTER THAN THE PRESIDENT.

5. KOSYGIN SAID THIS QUESTION WAS DECISIVE FOR THE SOVIETS. IF THIS COULD BE DECIDED THEN ALL OTHER MATTERS WOULD FALL INTO PLACE. HE WISHED TO RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO WHY THE MEETING SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON A MILITARY BASE. BOTH HE AND THE PRESIDENT WERE CIVILIANS ENGAGED IN A PEACEFUL ENDEAVOR.

6. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WISHED TO BE QUITE FRANK. THE LOCATION PROPOSED WOULD BE QUIET AND SECURE. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ARRANGE ON SHORT NOTICE THE COMMUNICATIONS HE NEEDED. HE HAD AN APPOINTMENT TO SPEAK IN CALIFORNIA AND COULD TAKE OFF FROM THE BASE DIRECTLY AFTER THE MEETING. HE SAID THE BASE WAS NOT BRISTLING WITH GUNS. KOSYGIN SAID THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO CONSIDER PUBLIC OPINION. PEOPLE WOULD WONDER WHAT WE WERE TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE. PERHAPS A PLACE COULD BE FOUND OFF THE BASE. HE WAS NOT OBJECTING TO THE AREA. HE STRESSED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WAS NOT IN THE PRESIDENT'S INTEREST TO MEET ON A MILITARY BASE. BOTH COUNTRIES HAD DECLARED FOR A PEACEFUL APPROACH, THEY NEEDED ONLY ONE ROOM FOR ABOUT FOUR HOURS AND EVEN A HOTEL ROOM WOULD SUFFICE. PEOPLE WOULD WONDER WHETHER WE HAD WANTED TO SHOW HIM OUR GUNS OR ROCKETS.

7. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THIS WAS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S THIRD CHOICE. HIS FIRST BEING THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE SECOND CAMP DAVID. IF CAMP DAVID WERE CHOSEN THE SECRETARY COULD ESCORT HIM THERE BY HELICOPTER. THERE HAD BEEN NO DESIGN TO GET KOSYGIN ON THE MILITARY BASE BUT THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHT WAS A FEDERAL FACILITY WHICH WE COULD CONTROL AND ARRANGE THE NECESSARY SECURITY AND PRIVACY.

8. KOSYGIN SAID HE UNDERSTOOD BUT THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT. PERHAPS THE MEETING COULD BE PUT OFF UNTIL SATURDAY IN ORDER TO MAKE BETTER ARRANGEMENTS. HE SAID PERHAPS AMERICANS DID NOT UNDERSTAND HOW EUROPEANS LOOKED ON SUCH QUESTIONS AND HE REPEATED A MEETING ON A MILITARY BASE WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE PRESIDENT. HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET AT 9 OR 10 ON SATURDAY. THE MEETING SHOULD SERVE THE CAUSE OF PEACE AND THE SOLVING OF IMPORTANT WORLD PROBLEMS. HE DID NOT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- 5854 FROM USUN NY JUNE 22 (NODIS)

WANT THIS TO BE CONSIDERED A MEETING WHICH WOULD INCREASE TENSION. HE BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT WANTED IT TO BE OF A FRIENDLY CHARACTER. HE WAS NOT STANDING ON FORMAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DID NOT WANT TO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US. HE APPRECIATED THE INVITATION TO VISIT THE WHITE HOUSE BUT POINTED OUT HE WAS NOT ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF HE COULD RECONSIDER THE SUGGESTION OF CAMP DAVID.

10. KOSYGIN SAID HE SIMPLY COULD NOT GO THERE. THIS WAS NOT HIS CAPRICE. HE HAD TO CONSIDER THE REACTION OF PUBLIC OPINION. PERHAPS WE DID NOT FEEL THE SAME DELICACY.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID WITHIN THE AMERICAN SCENE A MEETING ON A BASE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO US AS IT APPARENTLY WOULD TO THEM. A MILITARY BASE IN OUR SYSTEM DID NOT HAVE THAT CHARACTER AND A MEETING ON IT WOULD BE MORE NORMAL TO US. A BASE WAS NOT JUST SOLDIERS BUT A COMMUNITY WHICH HAD SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS, RESIDENCES, ETC.

12. KOSYGIN SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT GO TO A FARMER'S HOUSE. IF THEY WERE IN THE SOVIET UNION THIS COULD BE EASILY ARRANGED FOR A MEETING OF A FEW HOURS.

13. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD REPORT BACK TO THE PRESIDENT. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROPOSE A FOURTH SITE. THE CHAIRMAN HAS HIS PROBLEMS BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN.

14. KOSYGIN SAID THE PUBLIC NEED NOT KNOW OF OTHER SITES AND THE ONE SELECTED COULD BE PRESENTED AS THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL.

15. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CHAIRMAN WAS STATING A PREFERENCE BUT DID THE CHAIRMAN WISH HIM TO SAY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT HE COULD NOT MEET AT THE BASE.

16. KOSYGIN SAID HE DID NOT WANT THE MATTER PUT IN SUCH BLACK AND WHITE TERMS BUT HE WANTED TO ASK THE PRESIDENT THAT HE TAKE HIS VIEWS INTO CONSIDERATION. KOSYGIN SAID THAT IF IT WOULD HELP MATTERS HE COULD MEET AT ANY TIME ON SATURDAY.

GP-1.

RUSK
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

129

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Friday - June 23, 1967

Mr. President:

SANITIZED NLSDD-50
Authority RAC-NLSDDI-DBB-2-44
By ius, NARA, Date 5-15-02

This is what is going on with guerrillas in Bolivia:

Last March 24 Bolivian security forces were ambushed in a remote area of southeastern Bolivia as they were investigating reports of a guerrilla training camp. Since then 6 other skirmishes have been fought. The Bolivian forces have come off poorly in these engagements, losing 28 of their men to 2 or 3 known rebels killed.

1.5 (c) (d)
3.4 (b) (1)

[REDACTED] a young
[REDACTED] communist [REDACTED] closely associated with Fidel Castro and suspected of serving as a Cuban courier, strongly suggests that the guerrillas are Cuban-sponsored, although this is hard to document. There is some evidence that "Che" Guevara may have been with the group. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1.5 (c) (d)
3.4 (b) (1)

Estimates of the strength of the guerrillas range from 50 to 60 men. It appears that they were flushed out while still in a preliminary training phase and before they intended to open operations. Despite this, they have so far clearly out-classed the Bolivian security forces. The performance of the government units has revealed a serious lack of command coordination, officer leadership and troop training and discipline.

Soon after the presence of guerrillas had been established, we sent a special team and some equipment to help organize another Ranger-type Battalion. On the military side, we are helping about as fast as the Bolivians are able to absorb our assistance. The diversion of scarce resources to the Armed Forces could lead to budgetary problems, and our financial assistance may be needed later this year.

The outlook is not clear. The guerrillas were discovered early before they were able to consolidate and take the offensive. The pursuit by the government forces, while not very effective, does keep them on the run. These are two plusses.

At their present strength the guerrillas do not appear to pose an immediate threat to Barrientos. If their forces were to be quickly

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

-2-

augmented and they were able to open new fronts in the near future, as now rumored, the thin Bolivian armed forces would be hard-pressed and the fragile political situation would be threatened. The hope is that with our help Bolivian security capabilities will out-distance guerrilla capabilities and eventually clear them out.

State, DOD, and CIA are following developments closely. As I mentioned, Defense is training and equipping additional forces. [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b)(1)

The Argentines and Brazilians are also watching this one. Argentina is the only other country with a military mission in La Paz. Close military ties between Argentina and Bolivia are traditional. The Argentines have also furnished military supplies to the Bolivians.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, June 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer is in New York in connection with the special UNGA, and is reported to be leaving early next week for Peking. Members of the Rumanian delegation in New York have advised US/UN that Maurer would be pleased to meet with the President on Monday. We believe that he would also accept a Tuesday appointment, if that were more convenient for the President.

In his speech to the UN in New York today, Maurer broke the East European Communist ranks by calling for a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Middle East crisis by the Arabs and Israel without outside interference. He demanded an Israeli pullback to the positions of June 5, but he became the first Communist representative not to condemn Israel specifically.

Rumania also gave a significant demonstration of independence from Moscow by refusing to sign a communique issued following a Bloc meeting in Moscow on June 9. These actions are the latest in a series of Rumanian positions since 1963 showing that Rumanian foreign policy is increasingly made by considerations of national interest.

I recommend that you agree in principle to meeting with Rumanian Prime Minister Maurer Tuesday, June 27, and that Secretary Rusk be authorized to so inform the Prime Minister tonight at dinner and work out a mutually convenient time for the meeting.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Approve

_____ Disapprove

_____ See Me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By WJ, NARA, Date 6-15-93

WWR:BKS:amc

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, June 22, 1967
8:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some thoughts from Tommy Thompson on the line you might use in opening your discussion with Kosygin.

I will shortly put on paper how I think you might go about answering Kosygin's question: Where are we heading?

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 7-8-91

131a

SECRET/ NODIS

USUN 5850, June 22, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-9 90-177
By kg/wsp, NARA, Date 7-8-91

Pass White House for Walt Rostow from Thompson

1. Following are some personal suggestions for line President might use in opening discussion with Kosygin.
2. Regret first meeting takes place against current background and that Chairman will not have opportunity see more of our country. Hopes some day conditions will permit him to see Soviet Union. Hopes Chairman has good impression from what he has seen of U.S. but New York International city and not typical.
3. President very conscious of heavy responsibility resting on our two countries in an atomic age because of their size and influence.
4. Unfortunately more than one government trying to cause trouble between us in short-sighted view of their narrow selfish interests. Important that we be frank with each other and have the kind of relations which will enable us to frustrate efforts of troublemakers. We believe in real co-existence and not mere absence of war between us. We must find way to prevent quarrels between other countries from involving us.
5. No desire and time available too short to engage in ideological discussion but one point worth mentioning. Soviets have advantage in fact they free to use Leftists including Communist parties in Western world to carry on ideological struggle. This possibility denied to us but this does not concern us. Since we do not consider that whole world has to have same system. What does concern us is that Soviets seem to see pattern of anti-Soviet behavior in our policies everywhere in the world. For example, they seem to consider our policies toward Vietnam and Syria and UAR in same category. Essential difference is that Syrian and UAR governments came into power largely by actions their own people. What we oppose in Vietnam and in some countries in Latin America is outside intervention to determine character of regimes in those countries.
6. Nasser seems to think we were trying to bring him down and there are some indications Soviet Government thinks downfall of Syrian government was objective of our policy. This quite untrue. We gave far more economic and military aid to Arabs than to Israel including very substantial economic aid to UAR. What many of these countries fail to understand is that while we do not wish to dictate their policies on basis our aid, our aid programs are in final analysis dependent upon what the Congress will provide and it is naturally

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-2-

affected when governments we are aiding engage in viscous attacks upon us. Some of the Arab countries that have broken relations with U.S. have indicated they expect us to continue our economic aid. Soviets must have experienced some of same attitudes.

7. The most important thing in my view for President to get across is our desire to resolve current problems and work for better relations. We would be glad to see Soviet Union prosper. Essential that we not devote our energies to working against interests of the other or to let other small countries try to solve their problems by engaging the two of us in a head-on collision.

8. In Middle East we should work to remove the causes of tension in that area -- in disarmament at least a freeze and later reduction -- in the atomic field move quickly to try to prevent proliferation which now particularly important in Middle East. Most critical current problem remains problem Vietnam which we sincerely wish to settle.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-14

By JW, NARA, Date 5-27-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

Authority 76990-177

By g/w, NARA, Date 7-8-91

132

Thursday, June 22, 1967 -- 8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, briefly on paper, my proposed response to the question posed by Chairman Kosygin, "Where are we heading?"

I am informed by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Chairman, that you raised the fundamental question: Where are we heading? He reported that you said if this question is properly answered, all else will follow. I agree with that judgment.

I would like to tell you where I would like to see us both head; that is, both the Soviet Union and the United States.

At this time in history our two countries are like the oldest children in a big and growing family of younger children. We have special responsibilities to each other and to them.

Specifically:

- We have a duty to avoid conflict between ourselves;
- We also have the duty of behaving in ways which prevent, if possible, conflicts among the others.

As I wrote to you on May 21, "neither of our nations fully controls the forces at work" in various parts of the world. "Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains formidable if it is used in the same direction." ... "I believe we must try consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away from each other and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation and peace."

It is in that spirit that we have tried to play our part.

That is why I have been trying to initiate negotiations on the ABM and ICBM which would permit us to avoid another very expensive round in the nuclear arms race.

That is why we have been working with your people, our allies, and our friends to try to create a framework of non-proliferation in the world.

That is why I have appealed to you to help make the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 effective, so that the peoples of Southeast Asia could peacefully determine their own future.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

That is why I set out the other day the five principles on which we believe peace can be created in the Middle East.

That is why, despite many problems abroad and at home, I have pushed forward as far as I could in our bilateral relations with the Consular Treaty, the Air Convention, the Outer Space Treaty, the East-West Trade bill, etc.

Wherever I turn I know we lack the capacity wholly to control events throughout the world. And, quite objectively, I think this is also the case with the Soviet Union -- or any other single power. But I do believe that, working hard together to avoid conflict and working in parallel where we can, we do have the power to make the world a more peaceful and orderly and prosperous place.

That is where I should like us to head.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, June 22, 1967
6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this
essay on the mind and manner of
de Gaulle in his twilight, written
by Prime Minister Wilson.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

T187/67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By ing, NARA, Date 6-15-93

PMUK 001/22
19:30 ZULU JUNE 22, 1967
FROM PRIME MINISTER
TO PRESIDENT
~~TOP SECRET~~
TI87/67

133a

MESSAGE BEGINS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-53
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

V
PAT DEAN WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE DEAN RUSK, AND OF COURSE YOURSELF IF YOU WISH, AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIVE AND A HALF HOURS OF TALK THAT I HAD WITH DE GAULLE ON JUNE 19 AND 20. BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FEW HIGHLY PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS. I KNOW YOU WILL TREAT THEM WITH PARTICULAR CARE AND FOR YOUR PERSONAL EYE ONLY.

THE GENERAL WAS IN A MORE GLOOMY AND APOCALYPTIC MOOD THAN I HAVE EVER SEEN HIM. I THINK THAT HE FOUND HIS TALK WITH KOSYGIN LAST FRIDAY PRETTY SHATTERING. I AM NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT HE HOPED TO GET OUT OF IT - PRESUMABLY AGREEMENT TO A FOUR POWER SUMMIT. IN PRACTICE, KOSYGIN SEEMS TO HAVE TWISTED HIS ARM PRETTY HARD TO GIVE STRAIGHT SUPPORT TO THE SOVIET LINE AND THE GENERAL (WHO DISLIKES HAVING HIS ARM TWISTED) LEFT HIM, AS HE TOLD ME, IN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT FRANCES ATTITUDE. BUT, I THINK THAT THE TALK WITH KOSYGIN, AND THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AS A WHOLE, HAVE FORCED HIM TO FACE UP TO THE REALITIES OF FRANCES LACK OF EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS AND TO ASK HIMSELF WHAT HIS FOREIGN POLICY HAS SO FAR ACHIEVED.

IN HIS HEART I BELIEVE HE REALISES THAT IT HAS LED HIM TO SOMETHING OF A DEAD END. BUT HE IS TOO OLD, AND I THINK PHYSICALLY TOO WEARY, TO WORK OUT A NEW APPROACH. IN ANY EVENT, THIS HAS NEVER BEEN SOMETHING HE DOES VERY READILY. GIVEN THIS RELUCTANT RECOGNITION THAT FRANCE CANNOT FUNDAMENTALLY INFLUENCE AFFAIRS, HIS RESPONSE IS A SAD REFLECTION OF THE OLD MAGINOT LINE APPROACH -- SITTING BEHIND HIS FORCE DE FRAPPE, WATCHING THE WORLD MOVE TOWARDS ARMAGEDDON.

THE GENERAL THEME THAT RAN THROUGH THE WHOLE DISCUSSION WAS THAT, AS HE PUT IT AT ONE POINT, THE UNITED STATES WHICH WAS NOW THE GREATEST POWER IN THE WORLD BEHAVED (AS FRANCE AND BRITAIN HAD DONE IN THEIR HEY-DAY) EXCLUSIVELY IN HER OWN INTERESTS. THE ONLY WAY FOR A MEDIUM-SIZED POWER LIKE FRANCE, (OR, IN HIS VIEW, BRITAIN) TO CONDUCT THEIR AFFAIRS IN SUCH A SITUATION WAS TO DISENGAGE AND TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT AMERICAS QUARRELS ARE NOT OUR QUARRELS AND THEIR WARS WILL NOT BE OUR WARS. ALL THIS WAS OF COURSE RELATED PRIMARILY TO VIETNAM AND THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION AND TO THE DANGER OF WORLD WAR ARISING FROM IT. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE WAY HE HAS NOW PUBLICLY LINKED THE MIDDLE EAST WITH VIETNAM IN CONDEMNATION OF YOURSELF. THIS WAS HIS LINE WITH ME - THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WHILE THE WAR IN VIETNAM CONTINUED TO POISON THE WORLD SCENE, AND HE GAVE AS THE MAIN REASON FOR FRANCES WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO HIS DETERMINATION TO REMAIN WITH US.

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...IN CONDEMNATION OF YOURSELF. THIS WAS HIS LINE WITH ME - THAT THERE WAS NO HOPE OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT WHILE THE WAR IN VIETNAM CONTINUED TO POISON THE WORK SCENE, AND HE GAVE AS THE MAIN REASON FOR FRANCES WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO HIS DETERMINATION TO KEEP HIS HANDS FREE IN THIS CATAclysmic SITUATION.

BRITAIN'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES MADE IT INEVITABLE THAT WE SHOULD BE DRAGGED INTO YOUR WARS. IT ALSO AFFECTED US DAMAGINGLY IN SUCH AREAS AS THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE WE WERE NOW SUFFERING BECAUSE WE WERE REGARDED BY THE ARABS AS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRO-JEWISH AMERICANS. I RUBBED IT INTO HIM VERY HARD THAT, IN THE THERMO-NUCLEAR AGE, IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO THINK THAT FRANCE COULD THUS AVOID INVOLVEMENT AND THAT, FAR FROM BEING DISENGAGED, HE AND WE SHOULD TRY TO BE ENGAGED IN A POSITIVE EXERTION OF INFLUENCE.

THIS LED ON NATURALLY TO OUR EUROPEAN DISCUSSION. WE HAD A USEFUL RUN OVER THE GROUND ON TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL CO-OPERATION AND ON THE LESSON THAT POLITICAL INFLUENCE IS RELATED TO ECONOMIC STRENGTH. HERE AGAIN HIS CONSTANT THEME WAS OUR INVOLVEMENT WITH YOURSELVES AND THE DANGER THAT IF WE CAME IN, ALL THE WEAKER BRETHREN IN THE SIX (THE POOR ITALIANS, THE POOR BELGIANS, THE GERMANS, EXPOSED TO CONSTANT TEMPTATION, AND THE DUTCH ALREADY ON OUR SIDE ANYWAY) WOULD FOLLOW OUR LEAD AND THE WHOLE THING WOULD BECOME AN AMERICAN-DOMINATED ATLANTIC ARRANGEMENT. IT WAS TO PREVENT THIS THAT FRANCE WAS IN THE COMMUNITY.

PAINTED IN THIS WAY, THE PICTURE LOOKS PRETTY SOMBRE FOR OUR E.E.C. PROSPECTS. AND SO, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HE ACTUALLY SAID, I SUPPOSE IT IS. BUT IN PRACTICE, I BELIEVE THIS TO HAVE BEEN A USEFUL VISIT AND I THINK THAT I SHOOK HIM A LITTLE OUT OF HIS COMPLACENT GLOOM. IN THE BROADER CONTEXT, HE SEEMED GENUINELY ATTRACTED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF BRITAIN, FRANCE AND EUROPE GENERALLY PLAYING A MORE EFFECTIVE ROLE IN THE WORLD - AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT, HE SHOWED UNMISTAKABLE INTEREST IN WHAT I TOLD HIM ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE (IF WE GOT IN) IN THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES.

THERE IS SOMETHING STRANGELY SAD ABOUT THIS LONELY OLD MAN OBSESSED IN HIS FATALISTIC WAY BY A SENSE OF REAL IMPOTENCE (A WORD HE USED TWICE WITH ME). FOR OUR EUROPEAN VENTURE, ON THE OTHER HAND, I FEEL MODERATELY ENCOURAGED. THE GENERAL DOES NOT WANT US IN AND HE WILL USE ALL THE DELAYING TACTICS HE CAN (THOUGH, INCIDENTALLY, THE WORD ASSOCIATION WAS NOT ONCE MENTIONED, NOR ANYTHING LIKE IT). BUT IF WE KEEP FIRMLY BEATING AT THE DOOR (AS I TOLD HIM UNEQUIVOCALLY WE SHOULD) AND DO NOT FALTER IN OUR PURPOSE OR OUR RESOLVE I AM NOT SURE THAT HE ANY LONGER HAS THE STRENGTH FINALLY TO KEEP US OUT - A DANGEROUS PROPHECY, AS PROPHECY ALWAYS IS WITH THE GENERAL. BUT THAT IS MY PERSONAL IMPRESSION, FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH.

ALL THIS TOOK PLACE AGAINST THE ASTONISHING BACKGROUND OF THE RECONSTITUTED IMPERIAL SPLENDOR OF THE GRAND TRIANON. AS A TOURIST, I WARMLY RECOMMEND IT (THOUGH THE TONE IN WHICH THE GENERAL SPOKE OF YOUR FAILURE EVER TO CONSULT HIM - WHILE ADMITTING THAT HE NEVER CONSULTED YOU - WAS PERHAPS NOT TOO ENCOURAGING IN THIS RESPECT). BUT, AS A POLITICIAN, I FELT THAT IT ALL UNDERLINED THE KIND OF REGAL ISOLATION INTO WHICH THE GENERAL HAS WITHDRAWN. HE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A MORE KINDLY OR GENIAL HOST, AND, INCIDENTALLY, HE WAS AT PAINS, ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS TO EMPHASISE THAT HIS POLICIES IMPLIED NO HOSTILITY EITHER TO THE UNITED STATES OR TO BRITAIN. BUT IN FRANCE TODAY ONE HAS A DISTINCT SENSE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF AN ERA.

PRESERVATION COPY

DRAFT

Mr. Rostow took
on helicopter -
for glassboro

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6/23/67

Mr. Chairman:

It is good that we are meeting today because we have very special responsibilities not only to our own peoples but to the whole human family.

The world is made up of many nations and many peoples. They will forge their own futures -- each nation in the light of its own history, traditions, and ambitions.

But the power we command should be used to make ^{the} ~~the~~ relations between our countries as peaceful and constructive as they can be. And it should also be used to make it possible for other nations to develop themselves in peace.

That is why we have been discussing arms control measures and the non-proliferation agreement, the possibilities of peace in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The results of our efforts today will be ^{judged} ~~changed~~ by what happens in the future.

But I know it was good for us to meet and to talk.

I ask you to drink with me to the good health of Chairman Kosygin, prosperity of the Soviet people, and peace in the world.

#

**Scenario for Meeting of President and Chairman Kosygin
at Glassboro, New Jersey, Friday, June 23, 1967**

A. M.

- 10:55 President arrives via helicopter at the Athletic Field.
He is met by Governor Hughes and Dr. Thomas Robinson.
(Full press coverage.)
- 10:57 President leaves helicopter pad by automobile for Hollybush,
the residence of the college President (accompanied by Gov. Hughes
and Dr. Robinson)
- 10:59 President arrives at Hollybush. (Full coverage.)
- 11:00 Chairman Kosygin and party arrive at Hollybush by automobile.

The President is introduced to Chairman Kosygin and party by _____
President welcomes the Chairman
- 11:05 President and Chairman and their parties enter Hollybush and
assemble in conference room (first door on left after entering house).

P. M.

- 1:00 Working luncheon at Hollybush (seating capacity, 24)
Toast ?
- 2-2:15 Talks resume in conference room
- 2:45 End of talks

The President and Chairman walk out of the front of Hollybush and
before the press (? make brief remarks to the press. A sound set up
will be available.)
- 3:00 President says goodbye to the Chairman in front of Hollybush.
The Chairman gets into his automobile and departs for New York.
- 3:05 President drives from Hollybush to helicopter pad.

(We will have same type radio set up for the Chairman's car as for
the helicopter pad so timing can be synchronized.)

Telephone: area code 609 - 881-8400 x320, or 881-6680.
(No White House telephones as of 7:00 a. m.)

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, June 23, 1967
7:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this textual report of Sec. Rusk's critical conversation with Kosygin -- to get the flavor.

The question, as phrased here, is even better: "What shall we strive for?" (p. 2)

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5854 (SECTO 16)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-8-91

Friday, June 23, 1967 -- 7:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Dick Moose reports from Glassboro. *(Draft scenario attached.)*

The house is a simple Victorian residence, but fixed up overnight just fine.

The main conference room -- to the left of the front door -- holds about 20 and now has a conference table.

Off the conference room is a small study which will serve well if you and the Chairman wish to go off by yourselves.

Beyond the conference room is the dining room. Holds 24.

To the right of the entrance is another big room -- holds about 20.

Half way upstairs is a room fixed up as a small office. Could be used by Marie.

Upstairs are two rooms which could be used for delegation meetings if the two sides wished to confer at some point during the conference.

The air conditioning has been installed and is now operating.

A few questions for your decision:

1. Moose suggests Gov. Hughes and college President Robinson might meet you on arrival at the helicopter pad.

Yes ✓ No

Question: Should they ride with you to the house?

Yes ✓ No

2. Should ^{we} ~~be~~ prepare a toast for lunch?

Yes No

3. Kosygin's car will pull up very close to the front of the house, but not directly in front, because of TV camera locations. Moose suggests the President might be on the porch at the time. Either the President or (say) Amb. Thompson might go down to greet Kosygin and walk him to the porch where pictures could be taken before the Soviet party went in to meet the U.S. party.

The President will greet _____

Amb. Thompson will greet _____

We should let Gov. Hughes' man know by 8:30 a.m. the answer to question 1.

Incidentally, the press and filing facilities are in a gymnasium about one-half mile from the President's house. We will need a joint press statement or communique at the end. In addition, we will want to get someone to go down to the gymnasium and background the press after the conference.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~*Pres file*

Thursday, June 22, 1967 -- 9:00 pm

Mr. President:

This summary of recent air operations against North Viet Nam is in part factual and in part arguing a case for continued heavy bombing in the northern part of North Viet Nam.

The argument is: we are beginning to get some significant cumulative effects in the northern part of North Viet Nam and "air power for the first time began to realize the sort of effectiveness of which it is capable." (pp. 5-6) The argument presented should not, on the face of it, be accepted; but the evidence cited justifies a fresh, dispassionate analysis of what has and has not been accomplished in recent weeks.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-86
By lip, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

138a
DECLASSIFIED

Thursday, June 22, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-88

By JW, NARA, Date 5-29-92

TEXT OF CABLE FROM CINCPAC

SUBJECT: Air Operations: North Vietnam

General Westmoreland recently provided a summary of recent operations in South Vietnam and an estimate of enemy actions in the near future. The following is an assessment of operations in North Vietnam during the past several months.

On February 24, 1967, Rolling Thunder 54 authorized strikes against important power targets and the Thai Nguyen Steel Plant. Strikes against these targets were delayed by weather. There were three operational flying days in February, four in March, and six in April. As a result, additional critical targets were not assigned until April 22.

In late April 1967, and continuing on into May and June, periods of good weather provided the opportunity to maintain a more consistent level of effort in Route Package Six. The JCS targets assigned in Rolling Thunder 55 on April 22 and in Rolling Thunder 56 on May 2 were destroyed or disrupted in a relatively short period. Armed reconnaissance flights against other vital fixed targets and key lines of communication increased in numbers of targets struck and in numbers of sorties flown.

Starting in late April and over a period of five weeks, the air campaign in the northeast quadrant increased the level of damage in that area and the consequent stress on the Hanoi government more than during the entire previous Rolling Thunder program.

Twenty JCS controlled targets were struck in this period compared with a total of 22 in all of 1966. In an effort to bring any and all weight to bear in a challenge to our air offensive, MIG fighters were committed in substantial numbers. In less than five weeks, 30 were destroyed in air-to-air combat, only 12 less than had been shot

~~TOP SECRET~~

down in the 22 months preceding. Three jet-capable airfields were struck, additional MIG aircraft destroyed on the ground, and continuing strikes disrupted use of the airfields.

The northeast rail line was heavily struck and effectively interdicted for 20 days in the period. Continuing strikes have resulted in its being interdicted an estimated 10 additional days between June 1 and June 15.

The effect of continued offensive force presence, coupled with new tactics, improved CBU-munitions and improved ECM capability shows a major increase in the impact and effectiveness of operations as compared to strikes against the northeast rail line last summer. At that time, 43 aircraft were lost on 1557 combat sorties. In a seven-week period in April, May and June of this year, 11 aircraft were lost on approximately 1600 sorties.

From late April until May 23d, our air campaign, comparatively speaking, was in high gear and effectively using our available resources. A program was in effect periodically authorizing new critical targets. Weather was favorable for continued presence in the key Haiphong-Hanoi complex.

However, on May 23, strikes within 10 miles of Hanoi were prohibited except when specifically authorized. This denied us the option of maintaining air presence in the key Hanoi area. From that date to the present, no new controlled JCS targets have been authorized with the exception of the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant Walleye Strikes. With these limitations in effect, the Route Package Six is now concentrating on armed reconnaissance, with strikes on such fixed targets of value as we are permitted to attack.

The importance of the northeast quadrant to the North Vietnamese is reflected in part by their air defense efforts. Of 1370 SAM sightings from January 1 through June 19, 1967, or 77 percent, have been in Route Package Six. Over 60 percent of the anti-aircraft order of battle is in Route Package Six. Practically all MIG activity has been confined to Route Packages Five and Six. In spite of this concentrated air defense, the aircraft loss rate for the first five and one-half months of 1967 has been 6.2 combat aircraft lost per 1000 combat sorties, a marked improvement over the 10.0 rate for the last six months of 1966.

The increased level of effort in the northeast quadrant with the advent of good weather has not been at the expense of armed reconnaissance throughout the remainder of North Vietnam nor at the expense of the concentrated interdiction effort in Laos and Route Package One. For example, the combat sorties in Route Package Six increased from a low of 500 in February to 3200 in May, 1800 of which were attack sorties, and this rate is continuing in June. During the same period, there have been 4300 attack sorties flown in Route Package One, primarily on interdiction. In May and continuing in June, we have approached a level of effort more nearly in consonance with the importance of the northeast area.

A review of the number and value of targets remaining in Route Package Six indicates what is likely the reason for the North Vietnamese air defense effort in this area. Of the 246 targets currently carried in Annex Alfa to CINCPAC's Rolling Thunder basic operational order, we view 166 in the northeast area as vital and an additional 57 are major or significant. These latter are being analyzed for determination of relative importance to the enemy systems and thus priority for attack. The important thing to note is that there is no lack of critical targets in this area.

Since February, Rolling Thunder has shown a continued high degree of success in the interdiction program. Damage inflicted on vehicles, watercraft and rolling stock has reached a new high. The rail system's capabilities have deteriorated due to strikes against several significant targets. Truck replacement has not kept pace with truck destruction. The number of secondary explosions in Route Package One, although indicating the enemy's continued ability to move materiel south, confirms our capability to locate with improving accuracy his supply stations.

The cumulative results of our strikes have caused multiple management supply and distribution problems. A meaningful share of the modern industrial base has been destroyed. The electrical power system has been disrupted which in turn has caused the shut-down of a number of major industrial facilities and hampered port operations. The loss of cement production has reduced the enemy's repair and construction capabilities, and has deprived him of an important foreign exchange earner. Imports being carried on the rail lines have been destroyed. Port congestion is increasing as noted by pile-up of materials and increased off-loading time for ships.

The continuing strikes over the northeast rail line during the past several weeks have slowed down imports from China. From May 1st through June 13, there have been 1371 combat sorties flown against the northeast rail line and associated road network, inflicting the following damage: 478 railroad box cars destroyed/damaged; 19 railroad yards interdicted; 2 bridges destroyed and 5 damaged. Many rail yard strikes resulted in multiple secondary explosions, indicating destruction of valuable targets. As stated above, loss rates were considerably lower than for a comparable number of strikes in the same area a year ago.

Complementing Rolling Thunder operations, Sea Dragon forces coupled with the mining of river estuaries have been effective in reducing waterborne logistic craft activity. During April, May, and until mid-June, 505 waterborne logistic craft were destroyed or damaged, and 564 targets ashore were hit by Sea Dragon ships.

The most significant aspect of Rolling Thunder operations is the changed situation that has developed since late April, when weather first became suitable for more continued air operations over Route Package Six. These changes are having important effects on the efficiency of our operations and the further degradation of the North Vietnamese capability to support the war. The following are considered the more important changes:

A. MIGs: MIG air order of battle has been reduced 50 percent. Three MIG fields have been attacked periodically and can no longer be used effectively. Their attempt to challenge us in air-to-air combat resulted in the loss of thirty aircraft in less than five weeks. Strike aircraft are now seldom forced to jettison bomb loads because of MIG activity.

B. SAMs: There is increasing evidence of launches without effective guidance. In some cases there is no apparent target. Ineffective barrage-type firings indicate they are attempting any means to achieve better results. Although about 1800 combat sorties have been flown this month to date in Route Package Six, there has been only one aircraft lost to a SAM.

C. Anti-Aircraft Artillery: Since mid-May, ground fire in several areas with a long history of heavy intensity is frequently

less intense and less effective. Our experience along the important northeast rail line is a prime case in point, as described above. Based on our evaluation of operations over the recent brief period, we judge that our improved weapons systems coupled with a concentrated weight of effort is largely responsible for this changed environment. The CBU-24 in particular has been extremely effective against gun sites and enemy anti-aircraft capability in general and with its effectiveness, must be devastating to enemy troop morale. These various factors may add up to one thing -- when we operate in force in an area over a period of time, enemy defenses fall off markedly in effectiveness.

D. Attrition: It is apparent as previously noted that loss rates are changing in our favor. The combination of degraded MIG, SAM and anti-aircraft artillery capability is noticeably lowering our losses.

E. Enemy resupply: The amount of tonnage entering the ports has greatly increased partly due to large amount of food now being imported. Replacement of items is not occurring in all cases. It is estimated that 2000 of 3500 trucks destroyed in the past ten months have not been replaced and a net reduction of 30 percent of the railroad rolling stock accomplished.

F. Weapons: New weapons which add to our advantage are reaching the field in more adequate quantities, particularly CBU-24. The Walleye has been introduced and adds a new degree of accuracy and effectiveness to our attacks.

The above changes indicate that there is an upward trend of strategic impact against North Vietnam. It is most significant that these changes are recent and have occurred since early May when we stepped up our air operations in the North and made our presence felt on a much more continuous basis in the enemy's rear support area, the Hanoi-Haiphong complex and the northeast quadrant. Although much remains to be done, we believe that our targeting systems concept, our stepped up combat air effort over the Northeast and the continued high sortie rate applied against enemy infiltration is paying off. With the exception of Rolling Thunder 55 and Rolling Thunder 56, air power for the first time began to realize the sort of effectiveness of which it

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
is capable. This effectiveness can be maximized if we can be authorized to strike the many important targets remaining.

We are at an important point in this conflict. We have achieved a position, albeit late in the game, from which a precisely executed and incisive air campaign of depth and sustaining persistence against all the target systems will aggregate significant interrelated effects against the combined military, political, economic, and psychological posture of North Vietnam. In our judgment the enemy is now hurting and the operations to which we attribute this impact should be continued with widest latitude in planning and execution in the months of remaining good weather.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1386



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-88

By ju, NARA, Date 5-29-92

CONFIDENTIAL

Thurs., Jun 22, 1967
8:45 p.m.

137

MR. PRESIDENT:

This -- perhaps the most important
of your recent communications with
Kosygin -- became detached from the
folder. I believe you will wish to read
this over carefully before the meeting
tomorrow.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (198583 State)

Thursday, June 22, 1967
8:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Along with your briefing book -- which is well done this time and has a good summary at the beginning -- are:

-- Mac's short memo on the Middle East I asked him to do;

-- My thoughts on an answer to Kosygin's question: "Where are we heading?";

-- A file of your communications with Kosygin.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

Thur. June 22, 1967

8:30 p. m.

141

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith some thoughts from Tommy Thompson on the line you might use in opening your discussion with Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ag, NARA, Date 2-1-91

142

SECRET/NODIS

Thursday, June 22, 1967
8:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some thoughts from Tommy Thompson on the line you might use in opening your discussion with Kosygin.

I will shortly put on paper how I think you might go about answering Kosygin's question: Where are we heading?

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 7-8-91

142

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

USUN 5850, June 22, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 100-90-177
By 18/10/91 NARA, Date 7-8-91

Pass White House for Walt Rostow from Thompson

1. Following are some personal suggestions for line President might use in opening discussion with Kosygin.
2. Regret first meeting takes place against current background and that Chairman will not have opportunity see more of our country. Hopes some day conditions will permit him to see Soviet Union. Hopes Chairman has good impression from what he has seen of U.S. but New York International city and not typical.
3. President very conscious of heavy responsibility resting on our two countries in an atomic age because of their size and influence.
4. Unfortunately more than one government trying to cause trouble between us in short-sighted view of their narrow selfish interests. Important that we be frank with each other and have the kind of relations which will enable us to frustrate efforts of troublemakers. We believe in real co-existence and not mere absence of war between us. We must find way to prevent quarrels between other countries from involving us.
5. No desire and time available too short to engage in ideological discussion but one point worth mentioning. Soviets have advantage in fact they free to use Leftists including Communist parties in Western world to carry on ideological struggle. This possibility denied to us but this does not concern us. Since we do not consider that whole world has to have same system. What does concern us is that Soviets seem to see pattern of anti-Soviet behavior in our policies everywhere in the world. For example, they seem to consider our policies toward Vietnam and Syria and UAR in same category. Essential difference is that Syrian and UAR governments came into power largely by actions their own people. What we oppose in Vietnam and in some countries in Latin America is outside intervention to determine character of regimes in those countries.
6. Nasser seems to think we were trying to bring him down and there are some indications Soviet Government thinks downfall of Syrian government was objective of our policy. This quite untrue. We gave far more economic and military aid to Arabs than to Israel including very substantial economic aid to UAR. What many of these countries fail to understand is that while we do not wish to dictate their policies on basis our aid, our aid programs are in final analysis dependent upon what the Congress will provide and it is naturally

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-2-

affected when governments we are aiding engage in viscous attacks upon us. Some of the Arab countries that have broken relations with U.S. have indicated they expect us to continue our economic aid. Soviets must have experienced some of same attitudes.

7. The most important thing in my view for President to get across is our desire to resolve current problems and work for better relations. We would be glad to see Soviet Union prosper. Essential that we not devote our energies to working against interests of the other or to let other small countries try to solve their problems by engaging the two of us in a head-on collision.

8. In Middle East we should work to remove the causes of tension in that area -- in disarmament at least a freeze and later reduction -- in the atomic field move quickly to try to prevent proliferation which now particularly important in Middle East. Most critical current problem remains problem Vietnam which we sincerely wish to settle.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-14
By kip, NARA, Date 7-25-94

143
Pres file

Thursday, June 22, 1967 -- 8:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, briefly on paper, my proposed response to the question posed by Chairman Kosygin, "Where are we heading?"

I am informed by Secretary Rusk, Mr. Chairman, that you raised the fundamental question: Where are we heading? He reported that you said if this question is properly answered, all else will follow. I agree with that judgment.

I would like to tell you where I would like to see us both head; that is, both the Soviet Union and the United States.

At this time in history our two countries are like the oldest children in a big and growing family of younger children. We have special responsibilities to each other and to them.

Specifically:

- We have a duty to avoid conflict between ourselves;
- We also have the duty of behaving in ways which prevent, if possible, conflicts among the others.

As I wrote to you on May 21, "neither of our nations fully controls the forces at work" in various parts of the world. "Nevertheless, our influence in these matters remains formidable if it is used in the same direction." ... "I believe we must try consciously to overcome the forces drawing us further away from each other and bring to bear our capacity to shape events along paths of moderation and peace."

It is in that spirit that we have tried to play our part.

That is why I have been trying to initiate negotiations on the ABM and ICBM which would permit us to avoid another very expensive round in the nuclear arms race.

That is why we have been working with your people, our allies, and our friends to try to create a framework of non-proliferation in the world.

That is why I have appealed to you to help make the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 effective, so that the peoples of Southeast Asia could peacefully determine their own future.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

That is why I set out the other day the five principles on which we believe peace can be created in the Middle East.

That is why, despite many problems abroad and at home, I have pushed forward as far as I could in our bilateral relations with the Consular Treaty, the Air Convention, the Outer Space Treaty, the East-West Trade bill, etc.

Wherever I turn I know we lack the capacity wholly to control events throughout the world. And, quite objectively, I think this is also the case with the Soviet Union -- or any other single power. But I do believe that, working hard together to avoid conflict and working in parallel where we can, we do have the power to make the world a more peaceful and orderly and prosperous place.

That is where I should like us to head.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

144

Thursday, June 22, 1967
7:30 p. m.

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Robert Anderson called to report the following.

1. Today they signed the declaration committing both delegations to support the Treaty before their two governments.

2. From here the scenario involves the following elements:

-- A joint U. S. -Panamanian announcement of the agreement. Since the negotiation took place in English, there must be an agreed Spanish translation. Moreover, they cannot make the announcement until they present the text to the Foreign Council of the Panamanian Government which has been overseeing the Treaty negotiations. From our end, we cannot make an announcement without having the text available promptly. Therefore, depending on the pace of the translation work in the State Department, which I shall try to accelerate on Bob's behalf, we probably cannot announce jointly until the middle of next week; say, Wednesday.

-- Then comes the question of an Executive Branch signing of the agreement. The Panamanians would like the signing to be joint and they would like it to take place in the White House. That might be 10 or 12 days from now.

3. Eleta has indicated that Robles might wish to come to Washington for this signing. If he does so wish, Anderson recommends that we agree.

4. Bob also recommends that we invite General Eisenhower for the occasion. He is sure the General wishes to help take this out of politics, and he will support the draft Treaty strongly.

5. Consultations with a few key Congressional leaders, informing them of the Treaty draft, might take place early next week.

W. W. R.

Simultaneous joint announcement OK _____

Joint signing at White House OK _____

No _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By 48, NARA, Date 6-15-93

6/22/67

If Robles wishes, he can come for joint signing _____

No _____

See me _____

General Eisenhower to be invited for joint signing _____

No _____

See me _____

Anderson can begin consultations with key Congression
leaders early next week _____

No _____

See me _____

Thursday, June 22, 1967 -- 5:30 PM

Mr. President:

You will recall approving an August visit for President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. We left the first suggestion of dates up to him. He has suggested August 18 - 19 (Friday - Saturday), or August 20 - 21 (Sunday - Monday). He is due at EXPO on the 22nd.

To avoid a weekend visit, we propose to offer Thursday and Friday, August 17 - 18 as a counter-suggestion. You would be involved only on the first day -- Thursday, August 17. We would suggest the usual pattern for EXPO-67 visitors -- a short business meeting and a White House luncheon on that day. Jim Jones tells me that as of now your calendar would permit this.

If you approve, we will quietly explore our suggestion with Houphouet-Boigny, and then work out a simultaneous announcement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve offer of August 17 - 18 _____

Try earlier that week _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, June 22, 1967
10:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's eighth
weekly telegram, full of plans and
policy.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 28493

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-1-91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

126a
Wednesday, June 21, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 28493)

Herewith my eighth weekly telegram:

A. General

The second of the reports on top priority matters mentioned in my weekly telegram of May 31, i. e. Action Program for Stepping Up Revolutionary Development, has been submitted to me by Ambassador Komer. I believe it represents the most complete and comprehensive study including definite and specific recommendations for action that we have had on Revolutionary Development. Ambassador Komer's proposals have been approved by General Westmoreland and myself.

Based on a detailed assessment of where we stand today on pacification, the report develops an action program to give pacification a new thrust during the last half of 1967 and to plan for more rapid advances in 1968. We have given the program the name of Project Takeoff as an indication that we expect to make more rapid progress from here on out (I hope Walt Rostow will recognize the implied compliment). As soon as possible we want to get the Government of Vietnam to adopt the principles of Project Takeoff and to subscribe to a set of action programs. One thing we want to guard against especially is that the pacification program should not slacken during the election period. Just the opposite should occur. Elections and movement toward responsible representative government is a fundamental part of pacification. Elections should support and foster other pacification efforts and vice versa.

In order to get moving rapidly we have limited ourselves to the selection of the most important and most pressing programs in order not to dilute our efforts or overtax the somewhat limited capacities of the Government of Vietnam. They are the following eight action programs:

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 11120

By Julius NARA, Date 11-8-99

- a. Improve 1968 pacification planning.
- b. Accelerate the Chieu Hoi program.
- c. Mount an intensified attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.
- d. Expand and improve support by the Vietnamese Armed Forces. We hope to add as soon as possible 50,000 Regular Force/Popular Force troops and another 50,000 in 1968, the bulk of which will be assigned to pacification.
- e. Expand and supplement the Revolutionary Development team effort and employ also substitute techniques to achieve a more rapid expansion of the pacification program. An example is the combined civil-military teams used in First Corps by General Vinh Loc to carry on Revolutionary Development work in hamlets which Revolutionary Development teams because of lack of trained personnel are unable to cover.
- f. Increased capability to handle refugees.
- g. Improve and expand the National Police and the Police Field Forces. We hope to bring the National Police up to the year end goal of 74,000 and to expand the police field forces to 17,000.
- h. We plan to increase the advisory structure and increase the number of ARVN battalions in direct support of Revolutionary Development programs from 53 to 60 or more. We also plan to put greater stress on night patrolling, active defense instead of digging in, and rapid employment of mobile reaction forces.

As is so often the case, the Government of Vietnam performance remains the crucial factor. Nevertheless I believe by this programming technique, with direct program management on the U.S. side and the systematic evaluation of progress and problems, we cannot help but achieve some increase of effectiveness of the pacification

effort. If certain other things happen concurrently, and I believe there is a good chance this will, such as the successful creation of a functioning, reasonably stable, popularly based government, increased momentum in the anti-main force campaign, a substantial increase in numbers and quality of the pacification security forces, an increase in the Chieu Hoi rate, success in our new plans for attacking Viet Cong infrastructure together with better pacification planning and management control, I believe we should see demonstrable and visible pacification progress during 1967-68.

The relative lull in military operations which I mentioned in my last message has continued. I believe this has been due to the splendidly executed offensive operations undertaken by General Westmoreland beginning in late April which I referred to in my June 7, message. The enemy has been badly hurt, has been kept off balance, and his time schedule has been disrupted. General Westmoreland's strategy of anticipating enemy threats has paid off handsomely.

The enemy's offensive thrust has been blunted but not eliminated. Enemy pressures (from two and possibly three divisions) continues along the Demilitarized Zone. Infiltration through Laos continues steadily and the use of Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries gives the enemy great and, to my mind, unwarranted advantages. It seems to me apparent therefore that the crux of our military problem is how to choke off North Vietnam infiltration. If ways can be found to do this effectively, it should have at least following advantages:

a. It would drastically reduce the dimensions of our problem in South Vietnam. Militarily we would be dealing only with the Viet Cong whose problems of recruitment and supplies would be enormously multiplied lacking the assistance and reinforcements of North Vietnam. I believe the result would be that the Viet Cong would eventually wither on the vine.

b. After the infiltration is choked off, it should be possible to suspend bombings at least for a period and thereby determine whether there is substance to the statement in many quarters that Hanoi would then come to negotiations; we should at least call their bluff.

c. Tensions now existing between the U.S. and Vietnam on the one side and Cambodia on the other should be, over a period of time, relieved and our relations with Cambodia improved, even though initially Sihanouk might continue to allow the North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong to use Cambodia as a haven and a source of certain supplies.

The means to be employed to achieve this objective, of course, present many difficult and delicate problems, both military and political. I have confidence, however, that with imagination and ingenuity these can be met. What is involved, of course, are operations within Laos but I do not believe this fact should present insuperable obstacles. The North Vietnamese government is a signatory to the 1962 Geneva Accords but its forces have been in Laos both before and since the signing of the agreements. It is now using Laos as the main route for infiltration into South Vietnam. Is it not logical and reasonable, therefore, that South Vietnamese troops should oppose and combat North Vietnamese offensive action by whatever method can be devised in order to prevent the invasion of their country?

Guarantees, of course, would have to be given to the Lao government by the South Vietnamese, and I believe should be underwritten by us, that Vietnamese troops were on Lao territory for defensive purposes only and would be withdrawn immediately peace is secured. The operation, especially in its preparatory stages, should be carried out with as much security and secrecy as possible. I have made some recommendations as to methods we might use to achieve these objectives in a message to Secretary Rusk. This is a matter which I believe we should pursue with the utmost concentration.

Political

The split between Thieu and Ky widened somewhat this week. At the same time the general tempo of political activity accelerated markedly with the promulgation of the Electoral Laws and the approach of the June 30 filing deadline for both Presidential and Upper House candidates. It also became clear that the government and the military are increasingly preoccupied with the coming election and the maneuvers of the leading candidates. In this fast-moving and fluid political situation, we are aiming at three major objectives: (1) preservation of the unity and effectiveness of the armed forces despite the division between Thieu and Ky; (2) a clean election which will result in a genuine popular mandate for the nation's new leaders; (3) maintaining and if possible increasing the momentum of the war and pacification effort despite the natural preoccupation of the nation with the vital business of electing a new government.

Thieu made what amounts to a formal declaration of his candidacy on June 14. In a press conference in Hue and also in talking with reporters on his return to Saigon, he indicated

unequivocally that he will run, and he stressed his determination to assure a fair and absolutely honest election. This is also the line he took with me when I saw him shortly after his return from Hue. In our conversation, he alluded directly to some of Ky's less than completely honest campaign tactics. He said that he is determined to do all he can to hold honest elections, that as things now stand he cannot guarantee the honesty of the elections even though as Chief of State, he will be held responsible, and that if he cannot bring about a change in this situation he would rather resign than be blamed for something he is unable to control.

In addition to announcing his candidacy, Thieu made the split with Ky even more evident by choosing not to attend the June 19 ceremonies marking Armed Forces Day and the second anniversary of the assumption of power by the present Thieu-Ky government. At the ceremony, Ky gave a "state of the union" speech in which he recounted the achievements of the present regime and the armed forces. In the question and answer period that followed, a newsman asked why Thieu was not present, and Ky replied that Thieu had telephoned the night before saying he was not well and asking Ky to preside. Two hours after the ceremony, Thieu was at my home for lunch and that evening he attended the Armed Forces Day Reception. In his own Armed Forces Day message, which was carried by Vietnam press and Saigon radio on June 18, Thieu stressed again the necessity to elect the new government in a "totally democratic, free, fair and just manner," and he called on all military personnel to adopt an attitude of "impartiality, justice and honesty."

I saw Ky and Thieu separately on June 14, and I brought them and General Vien, Minister of Defense, together at my home for lunch on June 19 in an effort to find a way to prevent their differences from dividing the armed forces. Ky said on the 14th that he was trying to arrange a meeting with Thieu and that he would continue to do so. Thieu assured me later that day that military unity would be preserved regardless of the number of military candidates. Neither seemed to be making good on these assurances, however, so I decided to try to bring them together. At the June 19 luncheon at my home Ky agreed to my proposal for a joint Thieu-Ky statement of non-involvement of the armed forces in politics. Thieu, however, was rather non-committal and thought that the problem could be handled administratively by General Vien. If something is not forthcoming within a few days, I shall prod them again in an effort to get some action.

I judge from all this that there is little hope of healing the split between Thieu and Ky, though we will of course use every means available to do so. More to the point now is an effort to insure that their rivalry does not seriously divide the armed forces and interfere with the war effort. This is not likely to be easy, and it may well require further constant pressure from us to keep things on the rails. We will be watching for the effects of the Thieu-Ky split on the war effort and will demand prompt action from the principals to resolve any such problems.

With regard to our second objective -- a clean election -- I had a frank talk with Ky on the 14th about reports of unfair tactics in the campaign, particularly censorship of the press and some of General Loan's activities. Since that interview we have noticed some improvement in the situation, at least so far as censorship is concerned. Thieu's announcement statement and his remarks to the press were front-paged by almost all of the press and there was no censorship of any of those articles. In our conversation, Ky defended Loan as a loyal friend, but he did not deny that Loan has used some unfortunate pressure tactics to line up support for Ky. He said that he has cautioned Loan in the past about such things and will do so again. I hope that his warning is more effective this time than it has proved to be in the past and I will be keeping a close watch on this situation.

I suspect that General Thieu is thinking about using the matter of clean elections as a principal issue in the campaign. His public and private remarks plus some CIA reports suggest that he may resign from office at some point on the grounds that Ky is using the government and the armed forces to rig the elections. He might then continue in the race himself or throw his weight behind one of the civilian candidates. Several of the civilian candidates have reportedly been considering withdrawing eventually if it becomes evident that the elections have been rigged.

In our luncheon discussions on the 19th, General Westmoreland and I made clear to Thieu and Ky the great importance we attach to continued progress on both the military front and in Revolutionary Development during the election period. They agreed that efforts on these fronts should not be diminished by diversion of attention to the elections. On the specific point of full mobilization, Ky said that this should be done as soon as possible by the new government, meaning after the elections. General Westmoreland

suggested that as a preliminary to mobilization the terms of those in service should be extended and the draft age lowered. General Vien proposed that he issue orders for extension of service now without making any public announcement before the elections, and both Ky and Thieu agreed that this should be done. Given the political sensitivity of the matter, I think that it may be difficult to get the draft age reduced before the elections, though we will continue to press for that action. We will also continue at all levels to try to insure that preoccupation with the campaign and the elections does not impede the war effort.

Ky's campaign activity intensified last week. He made a number of "inspection trips" in the course of which he made speeches, gave government assistance to flood and storm victims, resided at a military awards ceremony, and attended inauguration ceremonies for newly-elected Hamlet Chiefs. He presided over the public introduction in Saigon of a new youth organization, the Vietnamese Unified Youth Force, which is rather clearly designed to rally youth in support of his campaign. He met with three former generals who have just formed a new veterans organization, the Freedom Fighters Association, and it seems clear that he means to use that organization to try to win the backing of veterans (the official veterans organization is headed by General Pham Xuan Chieu, a Thieu supporter who would not be likely to allow Ky to use the organization for his campaign). Ky went on leave without pay from the Air Force, a step which the Electoral Law requires him to take in order to run for the Presidency, and as noted above, he presided over the celebration of Armed Forces Day and the second anniversary of the Thieu-Ky government.

Ky has been active behind the scenes as he has in public. We have a CIA report that he convened a meeting on June 10 of 12 persons he intends to use as the Central Committee for his Presidential campaign. These include Generals Linh Quang Vien, Nguyen Duc Thang, Nguyen Bao Tri, and Government Ministers Nguyen Xuan Phong (Social Welfare), Tran Van Lu-y (Health), and Truong Van Thuan (Communications and Transport). Ambassador to the United States Bui Diem and the Saigon Port Director Pho Quoc Chu also took part. Minister Phong is to act as coordinator for the Committee. According to this report, Ky urged that government cadres be used in the campaign with no feelings of compunction. He reportedly said that other candidates will exploit government officials, and he named two high officials who, he said, are working almost full time for Tran Van Huong's candidacy.

Discussion within the group on the issue of an "honorable" versus a "strong pressures" approach to the campaign was inconclusive, but most seemed to favor the "honorable" approach. We know from other reports that this group is only one of several overt and covert organizations Ky is forming, though this is probably the most important one.

The Directorate promulgated both the Presidential and the Upper House Electoral Laws on June 15. Both the Presidential and Upper House elections will be held on September 3. The controversial requirement that Presidential candidates be "introduced" by 30 elected officials was dropped from the Law. These provisions were in accord with Assembly actions on Directorate proposals, but the Directorate also took an unexpected action in regard to the voting procedures for the Upper House. The Directorate had proposed that all voters be allowed to vote for six lists of Senate candidates whereas the Assembly had originally opted for only one. In considering the Directorate's proposal the Assembly decided on a compromise, namely that each voter should vote for two lists. The Directorate, however, promulgated the law with a provision that each voter cast ballots for six lists.

The Directorate action, while perhaps technically defensible in terms of the Constitution, upset many Assembly Deputies. Ky supporters in particular took the floor to attack the Directorate's action, probably in large part because it was known that Ky had favored the two list proposal when the matter came before the Directorate. There was even a motion before the Assembly that all Deputies resign in protest against the Directorate's high-handed action. In the end, however, the Assembly merely issued a mildly worded communique which said only that the Directorate's "unilateral action" had disregarded the will of the people's representatives.

The June 30 filing deadline for Presidential and Upper House candidates has resulted in a spurt of behind-the-scenes activity as candidates scramble to put together the required ten-man lists for the Senate. To date, two Presidential candidates have filed: Phan Khac Suu with Phan Quang Dan, and Ha Thuc Ky with Nguyen Van Dinh. (Dinh is relatively unknown and will add very little to Ha Thuc Ky's slate.) Only one Senate list has been filed, that of Saigon Mayor (and brother-in-law to General Loan) Van Van Cua. The short filing period has been criticized by several newspapers. Perhaps in part because of this criticism, the Assembly has publicly suggested that candidates be allowed to continue filing supporting documents until July 8.

In the First Corps the situation remains essentially unchanged from last week. Enemy-initiated ground activity dropped, but Route One was frequently mined with the result that traffic is down and kerosene is again rationed in Hue. The Viet Cong made their presence felt again in the Hue area by burning 46 houses in a refugee hamlet two miles from the city after residents failed to heed their orders to move out.

General Westmoreland reported to the Mission Council this week on the very encouraging results of his vigorous efforts to reduce the size of the American military presence in urban areas, particularly Saigon. The number of American military personnel in the Saigon/Cholon area will be cut to 6,325 by this December. For the entire metropolitan area including Tan Son Nhut, we will be down to 25,434 from the present level of 38,564. Measures are also being taken to reduce the number of transient military personnel in the Saigon area. All of this adds up to a most effective effort to decrease the adverse political and economic impact of the large American presence during our military build-up period, and I am most pleased to be able to report this excellent progress.

Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index again showed a slight decline this week, down from 271 to 269. This is three percent above the level of one month ago and 19 percent above the price level at the beginning of the year. Imported commodities also dropped slightly, from 220 to 219. The most important element in the overall price decrease was the continuing fall of rice prices. The price of rice is now only slightly above the legal retail level for the first time in many months, and the wholesale prices of some qualities are actually below the official level. Another factor contributing to the price decline was the return to normal of kerosene prices when hostilities ceased in the Middle East.

The barge situation at the Saigon port continues to make significant improvement. As of June 10, 116 barges were under load and only 36 of those have been under load in excess of 30 days. These figures compare with 966 barges under load and 658 of that number under load in excess of 30 days as of March 20, 1967.

Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees was up slightly this week, to 485. This compares with 354 for the same week last year. The

total to date for 1967 is 16,660; last year at this time the total stood at 8,879. We have reports that returnees are frequently making important contributions to tactical operations. In Binh Dinh, for example, returnees recently led our forces to a large arms cache.

Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending June 17, the enemy killed 178 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 263 and kidnapped 74. The dead included 6 National Police officers, 22 Revolutionary Development workers, 2 Village Chiefs and 2 Hamlet Chiefs. These figures may be compared with an average of 85 Vietnamese civilians killed each week during the past 8 weeks.

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Thursday, June 22, 1967 - 9:25 am

Mr. President:

Although my Italian is exceedingly feeble, I am firmly convinced this is a warm message of congratulations from Moro on the arrival of Patrick Lyndon.

You may wish to thank Moro for it when you see him at 10:00 a.m. today.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

147a

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THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

VOGLIA GRADIRE VIVISSIMI RALLEGRAMENTI ED AUGURI CHE LE ESPRIMO
ANCHE AT NOME DEL MINISTRO DELGI ESTERI FANFANI PER FELICE
EVENTO CHE HA ALLIETATO LA SUA FAMIGLIA
ALDO MORO.

Mr. Rusk

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Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 22, 1967

7:15 AM

Mr. President:

I thought you would want to see
the attached cable from Secretary
Rusk reporting on his conversation
with Gromyko last night.

Arthur McCafferty
Arthur McCafferty

Thursday, June 22, 1967

Text of Cable from Secretary Rusk (USUN 5841)

Eyes Only for President and Acting Secretary

Before we sat down to dinner tonight Gromyko and I drew aside for a few minutes of private talk about the Middle East. I asked him what the Central Committee meant by accusing the US of being in a plot with Israel. He said they found it very hard to believe the US did not have advance information about the beginning of hostilities and we could have made more of an effort to stop them. I told him categorically that this was not the truth, that we had what we considered to be commitments from both sides that hostilities would not begin, that we had no advance information about the fighting and that our first message to the Chairman expressing our astonishment and dismay represented the exact truth. I told him that Israel was not a satellite of the United States and that I assumed that Egypt was not a satellite of Moscow; otherwise Moscow would bear a heavy responsibility for such acts of folly as the closing of the Strait of Tiran and the whipping up of a Holy War psychology against Israel.

We then turned to the immediate problem before the Assembly and it is clear that the central issue will be the relation between the withdrawal of troops and other elements in a general settlement. Gromyko reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR to the existence of Israel as a state and recalled that both they and we had voted for the creation of Israel twenty years ago. He seemed to show flexibility on international maritime rights although he commented perhaps these matters should be dealt with in special arrangements similar to the Montreux Convention on the Bosphorus. For lack of time we did not get into other elements of a permanent solution, but it is quite clear that they will press for the priority of withdrawal over against the settlement of other issues. I drew the distinction between procedure and substance and said that I thought if there could be broad agreement on substance, modalities could be found to deal with questions of procedure. I also told him I did not think that Israel had any particular interest in trying to retain Egyptian or Syrian territory. (This was based on an earlier conversation I had had with Eban.)

~~SECRET NODIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-89
By lig NARA Date 7-2-92

~~SECRET NODIS~~

I talked to him briefly about non-proliferation which we continued at dinner and got the impression that they were reasonably satisfied with the draft text worked out in Geneva which omits Article Three. He emphasized the importance of controls and said there should be an international system which did not discriminate in favor of members of a particular NATO family. I told him this was not an issue of principle between the USSR and the US but that the obstacle was his friend General de Gaulle. I asked him if Kosygin had discussed NPT with de Gaulle and was told the subject had not come up. He seemed to be more optimistic about the Indian attitude than we.

In a later private exchange Gromyko indicated he would probably stay on for about a week following the departure of Kosygin. This probably means that he will stay around to do his best to get their kind of resolution from the General Assembly. I definitely got the impression that they were prepared to drop the condemnation feature if a simple unadorned demand for withdrawal could get the necessary number of votes.

I am reporting the remainder of the conversation separately.

Rusk

~~SECRET~~

June 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to President Marcos

Attached is the text of a revised letter to President Marcos. The only significant changes from the original version which you approved are:

-- notification of your decision to go forward on the Philippine National Cultural Center support program (p. 3, para 2);

-- reference to postponement of the Vice President's visit (p. 4, para 3).

On the provision of equipment for the additional five battalions, the Congressional consultation you requested has been carried out. There were a number of favorable comments, and no objections. The following were consulted:

Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Hayden, Pastore, Smith, and Russell;

On the House side: the Speaker and Congressmen Albert, Ford, Morgan, Zablocki, Bolton, Mahon, and Passman.

On the basis of the above, I think we should get the letter off to President Marcos right away. We would telegraph the text and send the signed original by pouch.

W. W. Rostow

Letter approved ✓

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

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Authority State let 4-5-78
By rs/llw, NARA, Date 7-8-91

149a

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I still think often and warmly of your and Mrs. Marcos' visit to Washington last year, and of our later meetings in your capital during the Manila conference. And I read with close attention reports from your country, especially those which describe your courageous struggle to meet the urgent problems that confront you.

Some of these reports have caused me to give a good deal of thought in recent weeks to the relations between our two countries. From a remark you made some weeks ago to an American reporter -- that our relations "are in a vexing and irritating period of readjustment" -- I know that this question is very much on your mind, too.

I think it would be useful, therefore, if you and I could exchange views on this important subject. I believe we should explore together what can be done to strengthen and deepen our relations, and to remove, or at least reduce, such irritants as exist.

At the outset, I must say that I have no doubt whatsoever that our relations rest on a solid foundation. Our shared history and common values are important parts of this foundation. In the long run, of course, durable and harmonious relations between nations depend on their national interests, but here, too, I find no cause for anxiety.

Your national interests and ours are on parallel courses. Our two countries are cooperating toward the goal of peace in the Pacific. Our military presence in the Philippines contributes to your security and enables you to concentrate your resources more fully on social and economic development.

At the same time, our presence permits us to fulfill our heavy responsibilities in the area as a whole.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC ltr 5-15-78

By rglip, NARA, Date 7-8-79

You and your administration are making strenuous efforts to build a strong and expanding economy, one that will give your people more jobs, improved housing, a higher standard of living, broader education, and better health. I know that you are pushing ahead to expand internal savings, both public and private, to finance these efforts. We ardently hope that you will succeed.

I know very well the difficult problems you face in these efforts to produce effective programs and convert them into actions. I assure you that we are anxious and ready to help.

At the same time, we both realize that irritations exist. During your visit to Washington and since, you and I have cleared up many of these matters which had been pending too long.

Our governments signed a new agreement on bases tenure. We have supplied high-speed boats to help in your anti-smuggling campaign. We have taken action on veterans' benefits and are making progress on claims. We reached agreement on the first two projects under the Special Fund for Education. Our A.I.D. program is going forward in promising new directions, particularly in rural development. We are ready to begin discussion of the concept of our trade relations after the expiration of the Laurel-Langley Agreement.

Your program to raise rice production is among the most hopeful in Asia today.

We agreed last September to equip five engineer battalions which, in addition to their military mission, are carrying out vital civic action programs. I am assured this equipment will be delivered by the end of this fiscal year. I have read encouraging reports on the potential of those battalions and the key role they are beginning to play in your economic and social development effort.

I have considered providing equipment for the second five battalions, as I promised to do. I am happy to tell you that we will be able to provide equipment for these additional

battalions, subject, of course, to the availability of appropriated funds. The equipment for these battalions will be financed in part from this year's funds, and the balance from new appropriations. Some of these funds represent additional assistance, but some may have to come from within planned military assistance levels with engineer equipment replacing items of a lesser priority. I hope that you will treat this undertaking as wholly private between us. I believe we should consult closely as to the appropriate timing and form of an announcement, and I would appreciate your views on this at your early convenience.

When you were here, you and Mrs. Marcos told us of your deep interest in providing support for the Philippine National Cultural Center. I have looked into this and am delighted to tell you that I have now authorized Secretary Rusk to work out formal arrangements with your officials along the lines of the proposal your Government advanced earlier this year. This calls for a \$3,500,000 contribution into a trust fund, the interest on which will be used to finance the programs and operations of the Cultural Center.

Sometimes we cannot meet requests from your Government. The turnover of Sangley is an example. That base serves important security and defense purposes -- ours, yours, and those of our allies. When we studied the matter, we saw no feasible way of shifting the operations elsewhere.

I assure you that I will do everything in my power to help you in every way I can. I am deeply desirous of doing all possible to reduce irritations. I know the presence of American military personnel in the Philippines is bound to produce some strains. But I am sure you will agree that mutual understanding and mutual sensitivity can keep those strains within bounds.

Our common problems cannot be solved only by the actions of one or the other of us. And I must confess candidly that I am troubled by the chorus of extreme criticism from some Filipinos directed against us, our policies and our actions.

I am troubled, also, by signs of increased hostility toward foreign investment, a matter that is being discussed extensively now in American business circles.

As you know, foreign capital played an enormous role in the economic development of the United States. It could do the same in the Philippines. But it is not likely to be attracted if it is regarded with suspicion and distrust.


I realize you are doing what you can to keep these matters in true perspective for your countrymen. I hope the report by the special committee on Philippine-American relations of your Congress will provide a better and deeper understanding of what is involved in our relations and what needs to be done to further improve them.

It was my hope that Vice President Humphrey would be able to visit your country and to discuss these matters in detail. Unfortunately, his journey to the Philippines and other countries of the area had to be postponed because of the Middle East crisis and other urgent business here. He will be heading our delegation to the inauguration of President Park in Seoul, but will return immediately to Washington.

I had hoped the Vice President could deliver this letter during his visit. I have, instead, asked Ambassador Blair to present it to you promptly.

I have written to you as I can only to a friend, knowing that you have given these matters a great deal of thought. I would deeply value your views on what we each can do to serve better our common interests and our shared purposes. You know how much I value your friendship and advice, and how much I believe in the close and continuing cooperation of our two countries and peoples.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "R. M. Nixon", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Republic
of the Philippines
Manila

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: WWR

The Middle East with Kosygin:

You know all the issues. I think what we need is to probe him on one basic point:

Do they want to cool it off, or heat it up again? They really do have the choice, in two main ways:

- (1) How many planes and tanks they give UAR and Syria. (You can safely refer to "reports" of "hundreds" of tanks and planes, without making the reports your own -- if he denies the reports you can press the value of your call for registration of arms shipments at the UN. This should be mentioned with emphasis somehow, or they'll think you didn't mean it in your speech.)
- (2) Whether they join us in serious negotiations for a realistic peace, which our 5 principles do aim for, or instead stick to unworkable propaganda positions. Specifically, you could not with satisfaction his acceptance of Israel as a state, and press him to get his friends to do the same. The question after that is maritime rights, and after that, recognized and secure boundaries. He'll talk withdrawal; we want withdrawal to peace, not to June 4.

We will match our policy to theirs. We have absolutely no desire for another arms race, nor do we seek any "confrontation" with them. We don't think the Middle East is a promising place for either of us to play such games in -- the players there are too unpredictable. Moreover, we recognize that they can't make a 180 degree turn over-night, nor seem to abandon friends like Nasser -- dangerous, unreliable and ineffective though Nasser has proved. But every move toward peaceful and constructive positions will get full understanding and response from us.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By ijp, NARA, Date 6-15-93

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- 2 -

On the past, you may want to assure him categorically that we did not know of Israeli decision of June 4 that they would have to react to the threat they faced. He does not need to be told that we weren't in the fighting itself -- he knows.

On one separate point: Having been in Saigon at the time, I remember how much Kosygin resented our choice of that moment, when he was in Hanoi, for our first bombing attack. I think you ought to tell him -- in a wholly private word -- that you had no intention of involving him in any way -- you had long since determined that you would have to react at once to the next direct attack on US installations there -- and your hand was forced by the people who hit Pleiku. (I believe this quite personal concern of his is entirely separate from the general question of bombing.)

Finally, while I think you will want to be courteous and even gentle in tone, I think it will be important to be clear and firm in substance -- your public language has been extremely moderate and generous, and we don't want him to miss your strength. The best way to show it will be if he tries any rough stuff -- which I don't predict -- but one way or another this old pro needs to take home a picture of your strength as well as your responsiveness.

McG. B.

McG. B.

~~SECRET~~

1. sup
2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Small P. L. 480 Agreement
for Morocco

Now that we've decided to get back to business as usual with the Arab moderates, I recommend you approve a \$2.1 million add-on to the \$11.3 million Moroccan agreement you approved in February. They want to add some tallow, and Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Schultze approve. In return, the Moroccans will agree to buy more than half of their commercial purchases here.

Charlie Schultze's memo (attached) spells out the details. Mac Bundy agrees.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By ing, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

151a

MAY 15 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement for Morocco

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By inf, NARA, Date 6-15-93

Attached is a memorandum from Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud requesting your authorization to negotiate a \$2.1 million P. L. 480 sale to Morocco for 12,000 tons of tallow. This sale will be paid half in dollars and half in local currency, the same terms as the \$11.3 million wheat agreement approved in February.

Not only is Morocco interested in buying this tallow but we are particularly interested in moving it. U. S. supplies are substantially in excess of normal requirements and prices have dropped 35-40% below last year. We provided the same quantity of tallow in the past as part of our economic assistance program as is now proposed under the P. L. 480 agreement. AID stopped making large scale balance of payments loans to Morocco in 1965.

U. S. Commercial Exports to Morocco

Under the provisions of Public Law 480, and in accordance with our general position in the GATT, all P. L. 480 agreements normally provide that the recipient country will continue to meet its regular commercial imports from traditional free world sources (usual marketing requirement). In this case Morocco will be required to buy commercially 3,000 tons of tallow from the free world.

In order to protect the usual marketings of the United States, also required by law, of the 3,000 tons to be purchased commercially from the free world, at least 1,600 tons must be purchased from the United States. This represents the average level of U. S. commercial sales to Morocco over the past three years. A comparable provision tying some part of the usual marketing requirement to purchases in the U. S. is included in P. L. 480 agreements whenever there is a need to protect U. S. commercial exports.

The agricultural self-help conditions of the previous wheat agreement will apply to this tallow sale.

I recommend that you approve negotiation of the proposed agreement.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 18 1967

K10

To : The President

Subject: P. L. 480 sales Program with Morocco

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco a \$2.1 million increase in the \$11.3 million P.L. 480 dollar credit and local currency sale approved by you early in February. The proposed increase would add 12,000 metric tons of inedible tallow to the 167,000 metric tons of wheat already approved. The same credit terms will apply, that is; under the dollar credit terms, 20 years credit, two-year grace, interest at 1 percent during the grace period and 2½ percent thereafter; and under the local currency terms, 70 percent of local currency proceeds are intended for development loans, 20 percent for U.S. uses and 10 percent for Cooley loans. The Department of State has endorsed this proposal.

In our memorandum of February 2, 1967 (attached), in which we recommended the current P.L. 480 sale, we outlined Morocco's requirements for agricultural commodities, the U.S. interest in Morocco, and self-help efforts to improve that country's agriculture.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate with Morocco the sale of 12,000 metric tons of tallow of which the current market value is \$2.1 million.

William L. Sand

Administrator
Agency for International Development

Quill of Fawcett

Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-90
By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-29-93

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memorandum

151C

TO : The President

DATE: February 2, 1967

FROM :

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-90

By ju, NARA, Date 29-93

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Wheat for Morocco

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Morocco a PL 480 sale of 167,000 tons of wheat for \$11.3 million split 50-50 between local currency and dollar credit financing. The local currency would be earmarked for US uses (20%), Cooley loans (10%) and economic development loans (70%). The credit would be payable over 20 years with interest at 1% during the two-year grace period and 2½% thereafter. The new provision of PL 480 requiring payment in hard currency of 5% of the commodity value upon delivery whenever practicable would apply. The State Department concurs in this recommendation.

Negotiation of the agreement cannot begin until you determine it in the US interest under the "Findley amendment" to PL 480. The Secretary of State is sending you a separate memorandum on that question.

US Interest in Morocco. The US wants Morocco to continue to support US positions in the UN and OAU, to moderate Middle East issues and work toward Maghrebian cooperation, and to permit US use of the Kenitra Naval Base and communications facilities, full access and transit rights for US civil aviation, and use of the Voice of America broadcasting facility at Tangier.

Morocco's Grain Situation. As a result of the serious drought last winter, Morocco's wheat production was 38% below the previous year. Corn production was down by 45% and barley by 57%. Yields of oats, rye, sorghum, other cereals and pulses were severely reduced. The 1966-67 cereal deficit will reach about 1.4 million tons compared to last year's imports of 390,000 tons. The 1967 wheat deficit is estimated to exceed 900,000 tons. About two-thirds of the deficit or some 640,000 tons have been met by commercial purchase from the US and other countries and earlier PL 480 sales and donations.

Self-Help. An unfavorable trend in the balance of payments was reversed for the first time since 1960 by an austerity program of credit and import restrictions which reduced imports by \$63 million in 1965. Reserves continued to increase until recent months when foreign exchange has been used to buy grains. Following IMF and IBRD

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- 2 -

advice, Morocco has controlled inflationary financing and held down prices. The original Five Year Plan was replaced by a more realistic Three Year Plan incorporating IBRD recommendations. Confronted by a 3.2% population growth rate which outstrips GNP growth, the Moroccans have started a birth control program. A High Commission of Population and local commissions coordinate and implement assistance to 20,000 families.

Morocco allocates approximately 30% of the national budget to agriculture. Despite this substantial investment, food production has not kept pace with the population increase. Barley and wheat are Morocco's basic food crops. Barley production has not increased during the past decade and wheat production has increased only slightly. As things now stand, the prospects of Morocco becoming self-sufficient in food production in the short run are not good. However, with political stability and appropriate self-help measures, long-run prospects are favorable. Some specific self-help measures in agriculture are discussed below.

King Hassan recently launched a program to increase cereal yields on 500,000 acres by 30% by providing farmers with fertilizer and improved seed on easy credit and with training in their use. The program could produce 150,000 more tons of wheat yearly, nearly half of Morocco's normal wheat deficit.

Considerable progress has been made in reforestation and control of grazing in the reforested areas. Using US food-for-work assistance this program employs 14 million man-days yearly.

An artificial insemination program has begun and with US cooperation will be expanded in succeeding years. Farmers are being trained to upgrade foundation herds.

Progress has been made in establishing land reform policies and programs. This work is just beginning, however, compared to total country needs.

The sales agreement will state the following self-help measures which Morocco will undertake:

1. Continue efforts to increase grain and livestock production and to improve range management and other land improvement activities;
2. Increase and improve crop and livestock research emphasizing major grain crops in both dryland and irrigated areas;

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- 3 -

3. Improve erosion control measures in upper watersheds adjoining irrigation development projects;
4. Increase agricultural training at the secondary school level;
5. Streamline and stabilize Government institutions responsible for these activities.

Recommendation: That, contingent upon a finding under the Findley amendment, you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

William L. Gaud

Administrator
Agency for International Development

John A. Schmitt

Acting Secretary
Department of Agriculture

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

152
Pres file

June 22, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Luncheon for Japanese Cabinet Ministers

In March, you approved holding the 6th Meeting of the Joint U.S. -Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs in Washington. You agreed at that time to invite the Japanese Cabinet members to lunch at the White House. The Japanese will be in town September 13-15.

For planning purposes, the State Department would like to get your approval of the date for the lunch. The preferred date is September 15, the final days of the cabinet meetings. Second choice is the 13th. The 14th is fully booked with conference matters and a working lunch.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule lunch for September 15 _____

Schedule lunch for September 13 _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 7-7-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju/rq, NARA, Date 11-18-99

~~SECRET~~

June 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Emissary from Moroccan King Hassan

When Secretary Rusk saw Hassan's Personal Representative in New York yesterday, he asked to see you to deliver a personal message from the King. State believes it deals with his position on the Arab-Israeli situation, but it may well include his plea for help against Algeria's arms buildup, which he spoke to you about in February. You'll recall that Hassan suggested coming himself two weeks ago and we politely turned him off.

These fellows probably don't do themselves any good running down here, but that's their problem. We do want to give the moderates something to tie to, and it's hard to refuse a personal emissary who's already at the UN. Even though we risk subjecting you to a plea for aid, Secretaries Rusk and Katzenbach recommend you try to see him early next week. Mac Bundy thinks that, if you prefer, we could probably handle him some other way.

If he comes, we would probably want to keep the meeting as low-key as possible.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him ✓

I'd rather not

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 22, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Minister
Ahmed Balafrej, Personal
Representative of King
Hassan II of Morocco

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-89
By inf, NARA, Date 3-23-93

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive Ahmed Balafrej, Personal Representative of King Hassan II, early next week. Minister Balafrej is attending the United Nations General Assembly and has a message for you from the King.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In his meeting with the Secretary in New York yesterday, Balafrej indicated he was carrying a message from the King which he wished to convey to you this week. The Secretary noted that your schedule was very heavy this week but undertook to explore the possibility of a call on you early next week. We would like to respond promptly to Balafrej's request for an appointment because he will wish to return to Morocco this weekend unless an appointment with you can be arranged for next week.

We believe the King's message deals with the situation in the Middle East and Morocco's position.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

Balafrej is a former Prime Minister and has served as the King's official trouble shooter since 1963. He holds a protocol rank higher than that of Minister.

Nabeles des 10/11/64
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file

11:55 P. M.
21 June 1967

Mr. President:

You may wish to read Tommy T's evaluation
of Central Committee resolution and Volkov's
assorted gossip

Walt

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~~SECRET~~ USUN 5823

LIMDIS

FOR KATZENBACH FROM THOMPSON

1. SECRETARY SUGGESTED I SEND MY PERSONAL ANALYSIS OF PLENUM RESOLUTION AS OF POSSIBLE INTEREST TO THE PRESIDENT. FOLLOWING ARE FIRST THOUGHTS.

2. IT IS CLEAR THAT TEXT WAS DECIDED UPON BEFORE KOSYGIN'S DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW. IT IS MADE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF A SERIES OF SERIOUS SOVIET REVERSES GOING BACK TO CUBA AND INCLUDING INDONESIA, THE FALL OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WITH CONSEQUENT IMPRISONMENT OF COMMUNISTS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE CONGO AND NOW THE MIDDLE EAST IN WHICH SOVIETS LOOK RATHER SILLY. IMPORTANT IN THIS BACKGROUND IS ALSO THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM IN WHICH THE SOVIETS FIND THEMSELVES UNABLE TO DEFEND A SOCIALIST COUNTRY UNDER PROLONGED AMERICAN BOMBARDMENT AND A CONTINUOUS ATTACK BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WHO TWIST THE KNIFE IN THEIR BACK AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY, THE LATEST EXAMPLE BEING CHOU EN LAI'S STATEMENT CARRIED IN FBIS TODAY. THE CPSU STATEMENT IS COINED IN THE IDEOLOGICAL TERMS WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR BUT PROBABLY DOES INDICATE DOMINANCE IN THE POLIT BUREAU OF THE MORE IDEOLOGICALLY ORIENTED MEMBERS.

3. THE STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS STRONG ALTHOUGH THE EMPHASIS IS NOW ON THE REMOVAL OF TROOPS WITHOUT A DEFINITE CALL FOR CONDEMNATION. I SHOULD THINK IT WILL BE SOVIET POLICY TO BUILD UP ARAB ARMED STRENGTH SUFFICIENTLY REALISTICALLY TO THREATEN THE ISRAELIS WITH RENEWED HOSTILITIES UNLESS THEY WITHDRAW. THIS STRONG LINE IS SLIGHTLY BALANCED BY MENTION OF CO-EXISTENCE AND THE NEED FOR RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE AREA. THE CRACK AT MAO TSE-TUNG INDICATES THEIR CONCERN AT CHICOM ACTIVITIES.

4. I AM AFRAID THAT IN THE SHORT RUN WE WILL BE BACK IN A REAL COLD WAR ATMOSPHERE. GIVEN THE WORLD SITUATION AS I THINK THE SOVIETS SEE IT, I THINK STATEMENT IS A DEFENSIVE ONE BUT ONE WHICH WILL DANGEROUSLY BUILD UP THE NECESSITY FOR A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT IF WE ARE TO AVOID COMING CLOSE TO ANOTHER DIRECT CONFRONTATION.

GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 92-990-177

By rg/jap, NARA, Date 7-8-91

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~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

FM USUN MISSION NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5961
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE UNN
STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ USUN 5825

REF: USUN 5817

LEON VOLKOV (NEWSWEEK) GAVE ME FOLLOWING REPORT 6:30 PM
JUNE 21 ON HIS SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR TASS
MAN WASH KOPITYN, WITH SUKHODREV, (KOSYGIN'S INTERPRETER),
AND WITH A YUGOSLAV WHO HAD SPOKEN AT LENGTH WITH AUTHORITATIVE
PRAVADA COMMENTATOR MAISKY.

KOPITYN SAID THERE WAS GOING TO BE MTG WITH PRES BUT
THAT IT WOULD BE "COURTESY" MTG. KOSYGIN WAS ANXIOUS IT NOT
BE MTG ANNOUNCED BY WHITE HOUSE AND GIVEN OFFICIAL, SUBSTAN-
TIVE CHARACTER. KOPTYN SAID HE BELIEVED MTG WOULD TAKE PLACE
NY BUT NOT SURE.

SUKHODREV TOOK ESSENTIALLY SAME POSITION ON NATURE MTG
AS KOPITYN HAD IN EARLIER CONVERSATION WITH VOLKOV (REFTEL)
EXCEPT HE DID NOT MAKE POINT THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE RECOGNIZED
DESIRABILITY US PRESENCE SEA. HE DID NOT LINK VIETNAM
TO ME (IN SENSE DEGAULLE STATEMENT DID) BUT INCLUDED IT IN
SUBJECT MATTERS WHICH HE ASSUMED WOULD BE COVERED IN ANY
TOP-LEVEL MTG.

MAISKY (PRAVADA) TOLD A YUGOSLAV SOURCE WHO SPOKE TO
VOLKOV THAT SOV POSITION WITH RESPECT TO SUBSTANTIVE TALKS
WITH PRES WAS VERY BAD ONE. THEY HAD LITTLE INFLUENCE
OVER COURSE OF EVENTS IN VIETNAM AND WERE RELUCTANT HAVE
THIS UNFORTUNATE FACT EXPOSED IN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS. THEY
WERE IN WEAK POSITION VIS-A-VIS US ON ME NEGOT. UN ASSEMBLY
OPERATION HAD BEEN GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT SO FAR AND THEY
DISILLUSIONED WITH IT. HOWEVER, IT WAS BECAUSE OF THIS
PESSIMISM ABOUT ANY SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENT AT ASSEMBLY
THAT KOSYGIN NEEDED TO AT LEAST HAVE MTG WITH PRES BEFORE
RETURNING MOSCOW.

COMMENT: CONCLUSION DEDUCED FROM ABOVE CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD
SEEM TO BE KOSYGIN IS SEEKING MTG, NEEDS HAVE IT IN OR
NEAR ME, RECOGNIZES IT WILL BE SUBSTANTIVE, BUT DOES NOT
WISH IT BUILD UP AS BEING SUBSTANTIVE IN VIEW LIKELIHOOD
IT WILL NOT PRODUCE ANY CONCRETE RESULTS IN VIEW WHAT HE
REGARDS AS WEAKNESS SOV POSITION.

GP-3
GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

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Authority 76 98-177

By cg/lep. NARA. Date 2-8-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 21, 1967, 8:00 p.m.

155
Moro - Fanfani

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Italian Prime Minister Moro and
Foreign Minister Fanfani; 10:00 a.m., Thursday, June 22

Biographic sketches of Moro and Fanfani are at Tab B. Nick Katzenbach's memo, with more extensive talking points than those below, is at Tab A.

Topics You May Wish to Raise

1. Middle East

(Moro had dinner with Kosygin on June 20. You may want to ask him about it.)

2. Vietnam

3. International Liquidity

-- It is important that we have agreement on a plan for a new reserve asset by the September meetings of the World Bank and Fund.

-- We appreciate the position Italy has taken in the EEC.

4. Nonproliferation Treaty

-- Now that the NPT has been thoroughly discussed in the North Atlantic Council, we hope that major Italian worries have been eased.

-- We consider the NPT more important than ever before, and will keep in close touch with the Italian Government as we move ahead in the negotiations.

5. VP's Trip to Europe and Saragat Visit

-- We are grateful for the warm reception given the Vice President in Italy.

- We look forward to welcoming President Saragat to Washington in September.

Topics Moro May Raise

1. Civil Air Negotiations Moro will probably:

- say he is disappointed that we were not able to get a new civil air agreement before the old one expired on May 31;
- urge you to see if there isn't room for further compromise on our part.

You may wish to answer that:

- we regret we couldn't reach agreement. We offered several compromises, but they were all rejected.
- we are prepared to sign a new agreement at any time, but it must be one that is equitable to both parties.

2. Oil

If Moro raises the problem of possible shortages, you may want to say:

- we must get together quickly in the OECD and work out a procedure to handle any shortages (especially of tankers) that may develop.

* * * * *

Moro and Fanfani will be accompanied by: Ambassador Ortona; Moro's Advisors, Ambassador Pompei and Sereno Freato; and his Press Officer (Sergio Guerzoni).

John Leddy and Wells Stabler (Italian Country Director) will be there from State. Walt and I will be standing by.

Moro and Fanfani are political rivals. If you decide to take Moro in for a private talk, it would probably be wise to take Fanfani as well.

Francis
Francis M. Bator

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro
and Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani,
June 22 at 10:00 a.m.

You have agreed to receive Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani on June 22 at 10:00 a.m. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister are in the United States to attend the special session of the UN General Assembly. Prime Minister Moro last visited Washington on April 20, 1965, and you last saw him in Bonn, Germany, on April 25, 1967, when you attended the Adenauer funeral. You last received Foreign Minister Fanfani in Washington on May 24, 1965 and you also last saw him at the time of your visit to Germany.

The Italian Ambassador, Egidio Ortona, will accompany Prime Minister Moro and Foreign Minister Fanfani. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, John M. Leddy, and Wells Stabler, Country Director for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland, will also be present. * Prime Minister Moro and Foreign Minister Fanfani are not proficient in English and a State Department interpreter will accompany them on the call. Enclosed are a talking points paper and biographic information on Moro and Fanfani.

Richard L. Helphel
Acting Secretary

* Do you want me?

2624

Enclosures:

1. Talking points
2. Biographic sketches.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By *ig*, NARA, Date 3-23-93

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THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER
ALDO MORO AND FOREIGN MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI
June 22, 1967

Topics the President Might Wish to Raise

1. President Saragat's Visit to Washington

Express pleasure at President Giuseppe Saragat's visit to Washington in September.

President Saragat will visit Washington in connection with his visit to Canada to attend EXPO 67. The exact date of the visit has not yet been agreed upon. Saragat's office has suggested September 18, and we have replied that September 19 would be more convenient for you.

2. Middle East

Explain your view of recent developments and the basis of your policy as set forth by you on June 19. Reaffirm our desire to keep in close touch with the Italians. Stress importance that the Middle Eastern states not be allowed to attempt to play one Western country off against another.

Tell him that President de Gaulle's statement attempting to tie the Middle East crisis to Vietnam and the development of a "new spirit of war" will not go down well with the American people.

Moro may inform you of his dinner meeting with Premier Kosygin on June 20. He may reiterate the desire of Italy to cooperate closely with us on the Near East question and indicate Italy is willing to play a mediating role.

3. Oil Emergency

Mention that the United States hopes the Italian Government will approve the establishment of an Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD Oil Committee. This is necessary so that US firms can legally participate in the concerted development of allocation plans to be put into effect if the current emergency situation on oil from the Middle East persists.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-89
By ing, NARA, Date 3-23-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

4. International Liquidity

Stress the importance we attach to achieving a satisfactory agreement by September on the principles of a plan for creating new international monetary reserves and express appreciation for support given by Italy.

Topics Moro Might Raise

1. Viet-Nam

Moro wants your present estimates on the situation in Viet-Nam. While expressing understanding of our policy, he may mention his concern about the eroding public support in Italy for the American position in Viet-Nam. He may urge another pause in the bombing of North Viet-Nam to demonstrate U.S. good will as opposed to Hanoi's intransigence.

Review the prospects for a negotiated settlement and explain why it is not possible to stop half a war.

2. NPT

Moro may indicate that Italy's major preoccupations and reservations on the NPT have now been satisfied, although formal endorsement by the Italian Parliament still presents difficulties.

Reply that you are glad to know that major Italian concerns have been met and that we consider the signing of an NPT more important now than ever.

Assure Moro that we shall continue to keep in close touch as we move forward with negotiations.

3. Civil Air Negotiations

Moro may express disappointment that a new civil air agreement could not be agreed upon before the old one expired on May 31. He may urge the United States to take another "hard political look" at this matter so that it will not become a major irritant in our relations.

Reply that we too are most anxious to reach agreement and hope that progress toward that end can be made. We look to an economically balanced agreement.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-87

By ju, NARA, Date 1-6-93

ITALY

Prime Minister Aldo Moro (AL-doe MO-ro)

An avowed anti-Communist and a strong advocate of the Atlantic Alliance, Aldo Moro has been Premier of Italy since December 1963. Former political secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, he now heads a three-party, center-left coalition government, which includes the Christian Democrats (DC), the Republicans (PRI) and Pietro Nenni's left-wing Socialists (PSI), who in October 1966 merged with the Social Democrats (PSDI) to form the United Socialist Party (PSU).

Generally conservative in his political and economic thinking, Moro favors a domestic program of economic and social reforms aimed at a more equitable distribution of both the nation's wealth and the tax burden, and the establishment of a higher standard of living and greater job security. He feels that these reforms are needed to minimize the serious threat to which Italy's democratic institutions are being subjected by political forces from the extreme left and the extreme right. A studious and highly perceptive individual, Moro also supports private enterprise. His foreign program is strongly based on Western solidarity, European integration and close ties with the US. He has openly expressed understanding of the US action in Viet-Nam and this country's efforts for a negotiated peace.

Moro, who was born on 23 September 1916 at Maglie, studied law and for a number of years he taught related subjects at the University of Bari. He joined the DC in 1944 and made his entry in national politics in 1946 when he was elected to the Constituent Assembly. A leading member of the Chamber of Deputies since 1948, Moro has held several cabinet posts. He was appointed Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs in 1948, Minister of Justice in 1955 and Minister of Education in 1957. In 1959, when he assumed the leadership of his party, it was so deeply divided and faction-ridden that many thought it in imminent danger of splitting. With patience, astuteness, and skill in manipulating rapidly changing situations, Moro managed to rally the party behind him and to bring about a degree of unity which, for a time, many felt was impossible.

Moro is a calm and courteous individual whom no one has ever seen angry. Although he is firm in his decisions, he hardly ever raises his voice. Honest, sincere and in earnest, he is said, however, to be somewhat weak in administrative abilities. US officials have found him friendly and cooperative. He and his wife, the former Eleonora Chiaravelli, have several children. A devout family man, he finds relaxation in listening to classical music, reading works of Shakespeare, Thomas Mann and Marcel Proust, and in raising flowers. He speaks some English.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 9287
By ju, NARA, Date 1-6-93

ITALY

Minister of Foreign Affairs Amintore Fanfani (Ah-MIN-tor-rey Fan-FAN-ee)

Amintore Fanfani, who on 23 February 1966 was reappointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Aldo Moro's new center-left coalition government, is no stranger to US officials, having previously served briefly in the same capacity in 1959, 1962, and again from March to December 1965. He was Premier four times between 1954 and 1963, and during the 20th session of the UN General Assembly in 1965 he served as its President.

Never a man to avoid a fight, Fanfani has been the center of much controversy, both within and outside of his own country. In December 1965 he resigned as Foreign Minister, ostensibly to repudiate criticism leveled at the US policy in Vietnam by Giorgio La Pira, the well-known and controversial former mayor of Florence, often described as a "Catholic mystic". Many, however, believed he was motivated by his desire for freedom of action in a political situation considered opportune to his immediate objectives--the Premiership or the leadership of his party. Fanfani has in the past consistently supported Italy's basic policies in NATO, the UN, the Common Market, and other international agencies. In deeds and words he has generally been a staunch advocate of close US-Italian ties.

Born on 6 February 1908 in Piave Santo Stefano (Tuscany), Fanfani holds degrees in economics and social sciences and has taught economic history at the University of the Sacred Heart in Milan and the University of Geneva. He is the author of numerous works on economics and related subjects. He has served as Minister of Labor (1947-50), Minister of Agriculture (1951-53), and Minister of the Interior (1953-54). He also headed the Christian Democratic Party (DC) from 1954 to 1959.

An excellent, convincing, and at times a rousing speaker, Fanfani has a gift for analyzing facts and presenting them with clarity and frankness. He is intelligent, able, energetic, and forceful, and while on occasion he has been accused of being arrogant and self-righteous, his excellent mental qualities, capacity for work and organizational ability are recognized even by his enemies. Nevertheless, his sharp tongue and often sudden shifts in political direction have antagonized many of his former admirers and collaborators. A devout Catholic, Fanfani has always been opposed to any political alliance with forces

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
- 2 -

of the extreme right or the extreme left, but appears convinced that the future of Italy's democratic institutions depends on the ability of the DC to foster socio-economic programs capable of attracting left-of-center support. Fanfani is a devoted family man with seven children. He does not speak English but is fluent in French and Portuguese.

The President last met with Foreign Minister Fanfani at the Adenauer funeral in Bonn in April 1967.

~~SECRET~~

EUR: AIS: RWTaylorJr: ak 6/21/67



RANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 21, 1967, 7:30 p.m.

156
Brown

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: Your Meeting with George Brown;
12:30 p.m., Thursday, June 22

I understand you will see George Brown at 12:30 tomorrow.
You need no briefing from me, except for a reminder to hit
him hard on East-of-Suez.

* * * * *

Brown will be accompanied by Pat Dean and Sir Paul
Gore-Booth (Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office).
John Leddy and Harold Shullaw (UK Country Director) will be
here from State.

Walt and I will be standing by.


Francis M. Bator

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

157

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Wednesday, June 21, 1967

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

6:15 p. m.

NJ 91-14

MR. PRESIDENT: By W, NARA, Date 5-27-92

1. The case for seeing Kosygin:

-- At home it will cover your flank to the left and among the columnists. If you don't do it, they will blame every difficulty that follows on the lack of a meeting. The Republicans will run on: I will go to Moscow.

-- There is a 20% chance that it will have a net favorable effect in U. S. -Soviet policy;

-- Given the present state of affairs, I think the chance is well under 10% that it could make things worse between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. (The trouble with Vienna was not the meeting itself, but that Khrushchev had decided to see if he could break President Kennedy on Berlin. I do not see the Soviets in an ultimatum mood on either Viet Nam or the Middle East at the moment. There is always, of course, the chance. But if the chance exists it is because the Soviet Government, which is a collective organization, has so decided. And we might as well get it straight and soon, as obscurely and later.)

2. On a cold, hard, objective basis I am confident that your net impact on Kosygin (and through him on his colleagues) will be positive. I have had the privilege of seeing you deal with a wide range of governmental leaders. Your batting average justifies this confidence. Kosygin should feel both the steel and compassion; the determination and flexibility; and, above all, your willingness to treat the Soviet Union as one of the two older responsible children in the human family if they will so behave.

For these reasons, on balance, I am for the meeting, if it can be arranged in ways which leave you feeling comfortable and not cornered. That is why I support strongly Maguire Air Force Base, although it's going to be a little tough for them to swallow.

3. What might come out of the meeting? Aside from your impact on Kosygin, nothing hard that they have not already decided. But it could accelerate the pace.

4. With respect to the Middle East, they may have decided to move in time from a straight confrontation on the question of Israeli withdrawal to playing a role in a settlement. If so, that would emerge in the days ahead

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6/21/67

via Gromyko. You may be able to smoke him out a little in advance.

5. With respect to ABM-ICBM, Kosygin is in a position where he must give you a simple Yes-No answer on whether his government is willing to engage in serious talks. Again, that has probably been decided. It could be communicated diplomatically. You might, through this meeting, get authoritative word earlier than otherwise.

6. On the substantive side, the serious case for talking with Kosygin is Viet Nam. Frankly, I am a little impressed by the fact that the North Vietnamese have initiated contacts with us at several points. I am impressed by the fact that Kosygin dropped "permanent" from his bombing formula. It may be that our polls, which show popular support for a harder policy, have led them to believe that they will not be saved by the election of 1968; they may believe that we are about to make important decisions to increase our forces and perhaps apply more pressure against the North; that the bombing we have been doing is too unpleasant to be accepted over a period of years ahead; that there is danger, if we proceed on our present track, of either a clear-cut Hanoi defeat or a U.S. /Soviet confrontation which they do not want; and that Hanoi is coming to believe that time is no longer its friend.

7. If there is anything at all in this line of thought then, of course, a meeting with Kosygin could be most important. And certainly the most important thing on which you must make up your mind is what you say to Kosygin -- after hearing him out -- on Viet Nam.

8. My own thoughts are not final, but here they are. You might say that he knows our commitment and our views; and that the formula of the Foreign Minister in Hanoi is not satisfactory to us. We cannot accept a stoppage of bombing simply for the possibility of talk. What are his views? If it emerges that he does not repeat the permanent formula and goes on to say he is sure talks could take place if we stop bombing unconditionally, you could then explain that so long as the DMZ is being violated you cannot make a commitment to stop bombing. You might ask him if they would respect the DMZ if we stopped bombing the North. He is most unlikely to be able to give you a definite answer on this; but he might agree to find out.

You could then indicate that there is a certain urgency in this matter. Your forces are under great pressure. They are taking heavy casualties every week. Secretary McNamara is going out to review the situation and to make recommendations. You might then add this: every mature American remembers that we lost more casualties during the Panmunjom negotiating period than we did during the Korean War. The critical question that must

SECRET

-3-

6/21/67

be answered by Hanoi is whether they are or are not willing to make peace on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements and leave the South Vietnamese to settle their own political affairs on the basis of politics and not violence. We are looking for peace in Southeast Asia at the earliest possible time; but not on the basis of turning South Viet Nam over to North Viet Nam/

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158
Wednesday, June 21, 1967
6:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the matching food and agriculture aid thus far, above consortium aid, with roll-overs set aside:

(in \$ million)

	<u>Grain etc.</u>	<u>Agr. Assistance (fertilizers, etc.)</u>
Austria	1.0	
Canada	52.0	10
France	4.1	
Japan		7
Scandinavia		5
	<u>57.1</u>	<u>22</u>

Hard total: 79.1

Not additional to Consortium

Germany	----	10
---------	------	----

Additional from non-consortium members

USSR-Australia (say) \$25	----
---------------------------	------

In short, if Australia and USSR come through, hard total, above consortium is \$104 million as of now.

W. W. Rostow

159

Pres file

Wednesday, June 21, 1967 -- 5:55 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Tommy Thompson's
response to your two questions
about a meeting with Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

Amb. Thompson dictated following over the telephone, June 21, 1967

1. I believe the Soviets have a false idea of our policies and objectives. They consider our action in Viet Nam and their assumption that we were using the Israeli to bring down the Syrian government as being in the same category. The difference is, of course, that the Syrians chose their present regime without outside interference and we did not in fact attempt to use the Israeli to bring it down. Also, I think, and Dobrynin has somewhat indicated this, that the Soviets have a false idea of the President and his policies. Finally, I think the declaration of the Central Committee indicates that the Soviets are committing themselves to giving the Arabs whatever help they may need to bring about either by threat or actual conflict an Israeli withdrawal. While I am no judge of our internal affairs, I should think our people and the world would have expected the President to have ~~to have~~ taken every step possible to have prevented another crisis.

2. I do not think, in view of the high level public declaration of the Central Committee, that a meeting will result in any specific agreement on any specific question. If, however, the President could put the question to Kosygin whether he thought that if our bombing in Viet Nam were cut back to the actual invasion routes in southern Viet Nam, there might be some response from the other side or whether this would enable the Soviets to be more helpful, I believe that this, plus the effect of the President's personality on Kosygin, would enable, when he goes back, to influence his colleagues in a better direction.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
5:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I know it sounds slightly mad,
but this is the third time I've found
this theme in Communist thought;
and this is quite direct.

The rest will interest you, too.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 5817

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 7-8-91

EHA260

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5953

RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE UNN

STATE-GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [USUN 5817]

LEON VOLKOV (NEWSWEEK) DESCRIBED TO BAKER (USUN) AT
12:20 PM JUN 21 FOL CONVERSATION HE HAD JUST HAD WITH SENIOR
TASS REP IN WASH, KOPITYN, WHO CURRENTLY IN NY FOR GA:

QUOTE

KOPITYN STARTED OUT BY SAYING KOSYGIN IS FURIOUS ABOUT BOMBING
OF LAST TWO DAYS IN VIETNAM; HE WONDERS WHY PRES DOES THIS
RIGHT NOW.

THEN WE TALKED ABOUT SITE FOR JOHNSON-KOSYGIN MTG;
KOPITYN SAID KOSYGIN WOULD "CROSS THE RIVER" BUT NO FARTHER;
SYS THIS IS AS FAR AS HE WILL GO AT THIS STAGE.

I (VOLKOV) SUGGESTED HISTORICAL SITE, SUCH AS GETTYSBURG
-- SAID THAT A BIG WAR HAD BEEN FOUGHT THERE. HE (KOPITYN)
SAID YES, BUT HOW TRAGIC IT WOULD BE IF THEY HAD MTG AND
NOTHING CAME OUT OF IT. I (VOLKOV) SAID, BUT MTG IS BETTER
THAN NO MTG AT ALL. KOSYGIN CANNOT GO BACK TO HIS PEOPLE
WITHOUT A MTG; THEY WANT TO HAVE SOMETHING TO TALK ABOUT FOR
THEIR 50TH ANNIVERSARY; WHOLE WORLD WILL TREMBLE IF THEY DON'T
MEET. KOPITYN SAID, YES, BUT WHAT WILL WE DO IF THEY CAN'T
AGREE ON ANYTHING. WHAT WILL WE (SOVS) GET OUT OF IT?
JOHNSON HAS NOTHING TO RISK BUT WE HAVE LOT TO RISK. I (VOLKOV)
SAID, YES, BUT YOU HAVE TO TAKE THE CHANCE.

THEN WE TALKED ABOUT VIETNAM. I (VOLKOV) SAID SOVS
WOULD HAVE TO DO SOMETHING IN VIETNAM. KOPITYN SAID THAT
IF THERE IS MTG, THERE WILL NOT ONLY BE ARAB CRITICISM BUT
ALSO CRITICISM FROM CHICOMS WHO WILL WAVE THEIR H BOMB AROUND.
HOWEVER, WE KNOW THAT NVN NEED US PRESENCE IN SEA SO-AS NOT TO
BE SWALLOWED UP BY CHINESE.

I ASKED KOPITYN IF KOSYGIN WOULD LEAVE TODAY OR TOMORROW.
HE SAID THERE IS A 90 PERCENT CHANCE HE WILL STAY AT LEAST
THROUGH WEEKEND. BUT HE IS NOT GOING FURTHER THAN CROSSING RIVER.
THERE IS A 90 PERCENT CHANCE, TOO, THAT THERE WILL BE
COMPROMISE ON LOCATION AND KOSYGIN WILL MEET WITH JOHNSON.

I (VOLKOV) HAVE AN APPT WITH KOPITYN AGAIN AT TWO PM TODAY.

UNQUOTE.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG

BT

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Authority MLG 90-177

By spj, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

work
L. S. S.
2. Profile

Wednesday, June 21, 1967 - 4:45 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$17 Million Loan to the Congo

In the attached, Messrs. Gaud and Schultze recommend approval of a \$17 million loan to the Congo. Schultze's memorandum (Tab A) gives you a concise summary of the proposal, the self-help conditions, and the economic outlook. Gaud's memorandum (Tab B) provides greater detail. At Tab C is a summary of the economic stabilization program of which this loan would be a part.

This loan is proposed in the following policy framework:

1. Having helped to achieve a reasonably stable and unified Congo, we are now gradually shifting from a very close paternal connection with the GOC to a more standard relation between independent nations. This makes very good sense for the interests of both countries.
2. A major part of this shift is a trend away from slush funds and toward genuine development aid. In 1962 and 1963, we were making huge grants to the Congo. We later shifted to loans. We are now making the loans smaller (this is \$2 million smaller than last year's). Within two years, we plan to eliminate supporting assistance loans altogether.
3. As the loans grow smaller, the self-help terms grow tougher. This loan is conditioned on a complete monetary and economic stabilization program, administered by the IMF. With luck, it will put the basically-strong Congolese economy back into self-sustaining shape.
4. We are a minority financier in the Congo. Even including food, we are providing less than one-fourth of her aid. The great bulk of it comes from the Belgians, the Italians and the EEC, along with the IMF.

Despite these trends, and the very real economic progress the Congo has achieved during the past two years, we should not give you the impression that the sailing is smooth. The Congo survives more perils every week than Pauline ever dreamed of. Mobutu is particularly susceptible to the urge to cut his own throat by finding new ways to kick the Belgians. Thus, the Congolese stability we talk about is very fragile.

It is fair to say, however, that this loan is necessary for any stability, and that, whatever its weaknesses, the present situation is the most stable in recent history. Therefore, I ~~strongly~~ recommend that you approve.

All government agencies, including Treasury, join in the Schultze/Gaud recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve loan ✓

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Hamilton/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

161a

JUN 16 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Supporting Assistance Loan for the Congo (Kinshasa)

Bill Gaud requests your approval to negotiate a \$17 million supporting assistance program loan for Congo (Kinshasa) in 1967. Similar loans were provided in 1965 and 1966. Much larger grants were provided in 1961-1963.

The general situation in the Congo has improved in the last year. Public disorders have largely ceased. High export earnings from copper have allowed imports to increase. Agriculture and mining production have risen. In addition, the government introduced several basic budgetary reforms including its first comprehensive budget, improved controls on expenditures, and a 50 per cent reduction in the deficit in 1966. While nationalization of the Belgian copper mines last January caused serious concern, the government has since attempted to improve the climate for other foreign investment in the industry.

However, the situation is still weak:

- . Prices have continued to rise by 12 per cent during the past six months as a result of government deficits and increased money supply.
- . Copper prices have recently declined and export earnings may fall off by as much as 20 per cent this year.
- . There are still political uncertainties which act to discourage private investment in the Congo.

New Self-help Measures

Our assistance will be conditioned on the Congolese agreement to a monetary reform and stabilization program being negotiated by the IMF.
This program will include:

- . devaluation from 150 to 500 Congolese francs per dollar
- . elimination of the budget deficit
- . ceiling on wage increases and credit controls
- . modest measures to introduce some liberalization of imports

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Authority OMB Ltr 2/2/78

By tg/rny NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The proposed program is very tough and will be difficult to carry out. The IMF will support it with a standby agreement of \$30 million. Others will also help. Belgium or other European banks may offer up to \$20 million to cover short-term credit requirements. Italy has provided \$50 million in suppliers credits, and the EEC has recently provided \$70 million for development projects over several years. In addition, European countries, Canada, Israel and the U. N. provide \$30 million annually for one of the World's largest technical assistance programs.

In total, our \$17 million of supporting assistance (plus \$18 million in P. L. 480 already approved) represents less than 25% of the total long and short-term assistance provided the Congo by the Free World and the U. N.

It does not appear appropriate now - when Mobutu is willing to take on major economic reforms - to cut back significantly on our aid. However, AID will review the situation with the IMF and the World Bank in six months. At that time AID will work out a strategy to terminate our supporting assistance over the next two years. My staff will participate in that review, along with Treasury staff.

Balance of Payments

The procurement under the loan will be limited to the United States. Secretary Fowler agrees that the arrangements proposed for selection of commodities to be financed under the loan will minimize the impact on the U. S. balance of payments.

I recommend you authorize negotiations to conclude the proposed loan.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

1616

JUN 13 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$17 Million Supporting Assistance Program Loan for the
Congo (Kinshasa)

Action Requested

I request your authorization to conclude with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a loan from supporting assistance funds for \$17 million to finance essential imports from the U.S. in calendar year 1967. The members of the Development Loan Committee, comprised of the Treasury, the Export-Import Bank and the Department of State, support this loan.

U.S. Interests

This proposed loan from Supporting Assistance funds is directly in keeping with our AID strategy for Africa as presented to the Congress. The Congo has been designated as a country of special U.S. political interest and as such is eligible for Supporting Assistance. Providing the encouraging progress of the past year continues, we expect to be able to remove the Congo from the category of an S.A. recipient after FY 1969. In keeping with this intent, we plan, in conjunction with the IMF, to review the Congo's economic progress six months after the execution of this loan. If the situation warrants it, we will inform the Congolese at that time that the U.S. intends to reduce Supporting Assistance funds in FY 1968 and would expect to terminate them after FY 1969.

U.S. foreign policy interests are at stake in the Congo primarily because it has on repeated occasions since independence come dangerously close to complete collapse. Because of its size and location this would have a catastrophic effect on the stability of a major portion of the continent. This in turn would permit much greater Communist intervention in Africa. Achievement of a moderate, viable and secure Congolese nation will have an important influence upon the stability and moderation of the neighboring states of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zambia.

While the threat of Communist subversion has diminished somewhat over the past year, the Rhodesian crisis has clearly shown the importance of a stable and friendly Congo as critical to the survival of Zambia and as a source of potential moderation between the more radical African states and the white redoubts in southern Africa.

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Authority AID ltr 5-23-78
By rlg/lp, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Self-Help Measures

The accession to power of Mobutu in November 1965 has brought some improvement in the political stability and economic regeneration of the Congo. Rebel activity in the eastern and northern provinces has been virtually eliminated with the resultant effect that agricultural and mining production have improved considerably.

The suppression of the rebellion and the relative stability of the past year have recently presented the Congo with the opportunity to correct major deficiencies in governmental structure and administration and to plan the institution of a comprehensive monetary reform and stabilization program.

Significant self-help steps already taken include:

A reorganization of all provincial administration which is intended to reconstitute local government services and reduce corruption.

The formulation in 1966 of the first comprehensive national budget since independence and the reduction of deficit expenditure by over fifty per cent. This has been followed in 1967 by the creation of a balanced budget.

Comprehensive reforms instituted by the Ministry of Finance which are intended to bring about a means of controlling government expenditures as well as a method of reporting on current government receipts. These reforms have already brought about a reduction in expenditures for salaries of fifteen per cent.

New Self-Help Commitments

The Congo with assistance from the IMF has now made firm plans to undertake a monetary reform and economic stabilization beginning in late June. The major elements include a deep devaluation of the Congolese Franc and simultaneous efforts to restore internal financial stability by means of sound budgetary, wage and credit policies. The framing and realization of this program is an achievement for the more moderate elements in the Government and is a reflection of the strength of the central government under President Mobutu. While the ultimate effect of a successful reform should be considerable expansion of the economy, the shortrun effect will be to reduce a real income by up to thirty per cent with the resultant risk of popular resentment. The first six months of the reform and stabilization period will, therefore, be crucial. Because it appreciates both the shortrun risks and the ultimate gains for the Congo, the IMF is expected to approve a standby credit of between \$20 and \$30 million for the first twelve months of the program. It is clear, however, that the IMF is agreeing to undertake the leadership of the program on the understanding that the U.S. will also participate by means of continuing its commodity import program through

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

an FY 1967 S.A. loan.

The IMF and, by inference, the Congo are expecting a firm expression of U.S. intent before actually undertaking this program which probably will not succeed unless the U.S. assistance is forthcoming. This loan should, therefore, be authorized in time for the reform to be announced as planned on June 24, 1967 and for the IMF standby to be made available immediately thereafter.

Other Donor Assistance

The principal non-U.S. donors to the Congo are Belgium, the U.N., France, Italy and the EEC. The Belgian technical assistance program, costing \$20 million annually, includes 1,100 teachers and 650 advisory personnel working in the central and provincial governments, and scholarships for undergraduate and graduate training in economics, government, and science for Congolese students in Belgium, 150 Belgian Army personnel and 120 Belgian Air Force personnel to help train the Congolese military forces plus 40 police advisors.

The U.N. continues to fill operational and advisory positions in health, education, finance, telecommunications, and other essential areas. In 1967 the U.N. will provide 450 technical advisors composed of 300 experts under the non-conventional U.N. program and 150 experts under the conventional U.N. program (EPTA, Special Fund, and regular U.N. agencies). In 1967 the EEC has budgeted \$25 million for long term capital projects such as bridges, roads, and dams. The French technical assistance program includes over 300 teachers and government advisors in transport, mining, and finance. Italy is supplying substantial aid, both advisory personnel and equipment, for the Congolese Air Force.

Justification for the \$17 Million Program Loan

The Congo's outstanding problem is the revitalization of a strong and resilient economy which has been periodically disrupted because of internal disorders. Even though relative internal stability over the past year has brought about important advances in mineral production, the agricultural sector has continued to lag. The primary reason for this has been an over-valued currency which has made agricultural export production unprofitable. Monetary reform and related balance of payments assistance are, therefore, essential for the recovery of the export sector as well as increased production for the domestic market.

Within the limitations of available U.S. financial resources, this S.A. loan is designed to provide maximum psychological and financial impact at the time of the initiation of the new stabilization program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

Because of the need to give the Congo and the IMF the support required to undertake and successfully implement these far reaching reforms, we do not feel that it would be desirable to reduce this \$17 million loan below the reduction already made from the FY 1966 S.A. level of \$19 million. Based on the six month review indicated on page 1 of this Memorandum, we would hope to be able to further reduce this type of extraordinary, short-term assistance in FY 1968 and terminate it after FY 1969. The level of these reductions is dependent, to some degree, on the availability of commodities for PL 480 Title I dollar sales currently planned at \$18.5 million and \$15 million for fiscal years 1968 and 1969.

It is planned to time the Program Loan to provide maximum impact in support of the proposed monetary reform. Thus the letters of commitment would be opened late in June 1967. As has been the case in recent years, the leverage afforded by the Program Loan will be used to support U.S. and IMF economic stabilization objectives in the Congo; specifically in this case to persuade the Congolese government to adhere to the main guidelines of the monetary reform and to continue adequate financial controls in the public sector. In fact, release of U.S. funds will be tied to compliance with the reform and stabilization program.

Effects on U.S. Balance of Payments

The Program Loan procurement will be limited to the United States and is not expected to have an adverse effect on the U.S. balance of payments. While some substitution of tied aid goods for commercial U.S. exports occurred in 1961, 62 and 63, U.S. commercial exports have since then more than regained their pre-U.S. aid commercial market share in the Congo. In 1965, the last year for which full data are available, commercial imports (non-aid-financed) from the U.S. occupied almost 9.4% of the Congo non-aid market. 1965 U.S. imports were thus larger than if there had been no change in the pre-aid (1960) relative market share of 8.9%.

Specific favorable effects of this loan on the U.S. balance of payments will arise from:

The operation of the 50/50 shipping clause under which the freight on U.S. ships is financed by the Congo.

Establishment and re-enforcement of markets for commodities not previously imported from the United States.

Inclusion of public sector imports (primarily from U.S. excess stores) which otherwise would have been purchased from other sources.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

Recommendation: That you authorize me to approve this loan. The Department of State concurs.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

161c

ANNEX

The program for monetary reform and stabilization.

The primary elements of the IMF-sponsored reform include:

- a. The elimination of the current dual rate of 150:180 CF to the dollar and the creation of a unitary rate at 500 CF to the dollar.
- b. Liberalization of import controls.
- c. Liberalization of essential capital transfers.
- d. The institution of controls over budgetary expenditure.
- e. Qualitative limitations on additional borrowing and debt burden.
- f. The establishment of a new and flexible export tax system.
- g. Continuation of firm credit controls by the National Bank.

Effects of the Reform

It is anticipated that the deep devaluation of the Congolese franc will bring about the re-establishment of budgetary equilibrium and that a surplus of approximately 10% would be available for a capital budget. Actual receipts should increase from 58 billion CF to 130 billion CF. Based on an estimated increase in expenditures from 72 billion CF to 118 billion CF, a balance of 12 billion CF should be available for capital expenditures long postponed. These projections are based on the assumption that domestic prices will double but that the GDRC will effectively control wage increases to no more than 40%. If this ceiling is held, real wages will be reduced, in the short run, by approximately thirty per cent.

In line with the increased export receipts for producers which will result from devaluation, the GDRC will institute a new tax scale for all exports. This will draw off windfall profits and will replace revenue lost from the removal of the dual rate.

The reduction of real income is expected to bring about a strong contraction on import demands for at least the first six months following devaluation and, therefore, the initial effects of import liberalization should not be felt in terms of increased imports. Import demand is expected to go up after the first six months when the increase of

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority AID ltr 5-23-78

By reg/isp, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX

2

agricultural export earnings will make itself felt in increased earnings for agricultural workers. It is at that time that the benefits of import liberalization will begin to be felt in terms of free market demand.

The devaluation of the franc will raise the local currency price of Congolese exports in full proportion to the extent of the devaluation, world prices of these exports being given, and thereby increase (or restore) the profitability of production for export. This should increase, though admittedly with some time lag, the physical volume of agricultural exports, which have been the most seriously handicapped by the present official exchange rate in the face of rising domestic costs, and thereby increase foreign exchange receipts from this source (the foreign currency price of the Congo's exports can be taken as unaffected by a change in their physical volume). An overall expansion in exports, especially in agriculture, can be anticipated as a result of the devaluation if domestic costs and prices are kept under firm control by the Congolese authorities; a control which is a key element in the proposed program.

On the export side, official foreign-exchange gains will undoubtedly come also from a reduction in smuggling (presently estimated at 15 per cent of total exports), and a shunting of some illegal exports back into official channels, as a result of the narrowing that will come after devaluation in the present abnormally widespread between the official and parallel exchange rates. This should be the most immediate effect of the devaluation on exchange earnings.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
4:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Dick Helms will be filing his assessment of the message about
4 p. m. *(attached)*.

So that you will have a truly independent judgment, here is my guess;
for my first duty is to tell you: I'm not at all sure.

1. Reference to a Central Committee Resolution, probably
on the Middle East, probably backing Soviet policy in recent days.
(As I write, that Resolution has come in -- attached. It is
conventional but quite rough.)

2. Probably reference to Chairman Kosygin-President Johnson talks.

3. Mysterious. Possibly a new Viet Nam move. (It was significant
he left "permanent" off the bombing. This may be key point of your
talks or Sect. Rusk's.)

4. Probably a reference to a Soviet Middle East plan. That is
what he got into in a general way with Moro. Podgorny is in Cairo.

Walt R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

State Dept. assessment also attached

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-50

By CB, NARA Date 2-5-01

TO: SECRETARY OF STATE 02
TO: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 02
TO: DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 02
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI

RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~

1622

JUN 21 17 26

~~SECRET~~ VISIT OF SOVIET PREMIER ALEKSEI KOSYGIN TO U. S.
NINETEEN SIXTY-SEVEN.

~~SANITIZED~~

[REDACTED]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-52
By cg, NARA Date 7-25-00

WEDNI

2

[REDACTED]

3

[REDACTED]

4

PERMANENT COPY

1026

Director ~~Richard Helms~~ 6/21/67 -- dictated over telephone.

The first few lines undoubtedly refer to the resolution of the Central Committee.

Then starting with "Did you receive our _____", we believe this refers to something the Soviets, aided by the East European satellites, are cooking up with Arab states. The best guess is that it is a modified UNGA resolution, probably one calling for simple withdrawal. The two main Arab heads must refer to the Egyptian and either the Algerian ~~and~~ the Syrian, probably the latter.

In the part of the text starting "How can it be achieved" we believe this refers to a meeting of Kosygin with President Johnson and some anxiety as to how a meeting is to be obtained.

Then dropping to the bottom of that page and over on the last page, since Podgorny is in Cairo, it is our conjecture that the Soviets are going to have him try out on the Egyptians something which is unpalatable to them, perhaps an arrangement whereby Israel would get guaranteed access through the Strait of Tiran in exchange for withdrawal.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-49
By cb, NARA Date 2-5-01

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INR BRIEFING NOTE

GIST:

3.4(b)(1), (3)

162E

The Director, INR

DATE: 6/22/87

TIME: 3 p.m.

COMMENTS CONTAINED IN INR BRIEFING
NOTES ARE INITIAL AND TENTATIVE.

SOURCE(S)

CLASS./CONTROL(S)

3.4(b)(1),
(3)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-66
By ebm, NARA, Date 1-22-03

FFICE

BRIEFER

EXTENSION

DS-1118

(Classification)

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INR BRIEFING NOTE

GIST:

3.4(b)(1), (3)

TO:

The Director, INR

DATE:

TIME:

COMMENTS CONTAINED IN INR BRIEFING
NOTES ARE INITIAL AND TENTATIVE.

SOURCE(S)

CLASS./CONTROL(S)

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3.4(b)(1), (3)

INR OFFICE

BRIEFER

Sonnenfeldt

EXTENSION

CPSU PLENUM RESOLUTION

MOSCOW TASS DOMESTIC SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1338Z 21 JUN 67 H

(TASS EMBARGO: THIS ITEM IS TO BE PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPERS NOT EARLIER THAN 22 JUNE AND NOT TO BE CARRIED OVER THE RADIO UNTIL 0500 HOURS MOSCOW TIME 22 JUNE)

(RESOLUTION TO THE PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE ADOPTED ON 21 JUNE 1967 ON THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN THE NEAR EAST)

(TEXT) AFTER HEARING THE REPORT BY CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE GENERAL SECRETARY COMRADE L.I. BREZHNEV "ON THE POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN CONNECTION WITH THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN THE NEAR EAST," THE PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLVES:

TO FULLY APPROVE THE POLITICAL LINE AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO AIMED AT SUPPRESSION OF THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION, AT SUPPORT OF THE UAR, SYRIA, AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES THAT HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO ATTACK, AND AT AVERTING THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGGRESSION FOR THE CAUSE OF UNIVERSAL PEACE.

THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IS THE RESULT OF A PLOT BY MOST REACTIONARY FORCES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM, THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIRST PLACE, AIMED AGAINST ONE OF THE DETACHMENTS OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND AGAINST ADVANCED ARAB STATES THAT HAVE TAKEN THE PATH OF PROGRESSIVE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE INTEREST OF THE WORKING PEOPLE AND IN CONDUCTING AN ANTI-IMPERIALIST POLICY.

UNDER THE CONDITIONS WHEN THE UNITED STATES IS CONTINUING ITS PIRATIC WAR IN VIETNAM, THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION IN THE NEAR EAST REPRESENTS ANOTHER LINK IN THE GENERAL CHAIN OF THE POLICY OF MILITANT IMPERIALIST CIRCLES THAT ARE ATTEMPTING TO STOP THE HISTORIC PROGRESS OF THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, PEACE, AND SOCIALISM.

THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND ALL THE PROGRESSIVE ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES ARE ON THE SIDE OF ARAB NATIONS IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM AND FOR THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SOLVE FOR THEMSELVES ALL THE ISSUES OF THEIR INTERNAL LIFE AND EXTERNAL POLICY. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, BY EXPRESSING THE WILL OF ALL SOVIET COMMUNISTS AND THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE, RESOLUTELY CONDEMNS THE ISRAELI AGGRESSION AND DECLARES ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE UAR, SYRIA, ALGERIA, AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES.

THE PLENUM POINTS OUT THAT THE SWIFT AND DECISIVE JOINT ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER SOCIALIST STATES HAVE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE NEAR EAST HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED. THE POSITION OF OUR PARTY AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND THEIR PRACTICAL STEPS IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVENTS IN THE NEAR EAST HAVE RECEIVED THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE.

(MORE)

21 JUN 1620Z BAM/BK

PRESERVATION COPY

162d

X X X. ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE.

(TEXT) THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATES WITH SATISFACTION THAT AT A SIGNIFICANT MOMENT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST STATES ACTED JOINTLY, SIGNING THE STATEMENT OF 9 JUNE 1967. ONCE MORE IT HAS BEEN CONFIRMED THAT THE JOINT ACTION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS A POWERFUL FACTOR IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AGGRESSIVE INTRIGUES OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM FULLY APPROVES THE STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DATED 9 JUNE THIS YEAR, AND CONFIRMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION TOGETHER WITH OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO ASSIST THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES TO GIVE A RESOLUTE REBUFF TO THE AGGRESSOR AND TO PROTECT THEIR LAWFUL RIGHTS, TO EXTINGUISH THE HOTBED OF WAR IN THE NEAR EAST, AND TO REESTABLISH PEACE IN THAT REGION.

AT THE PRESENT MOMENT, WHEN THE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND NEOCOLONIALISM ARE UTILIZING THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST CREATED BY THE AGGRESSION OF ISRAEL AND ARE ENCROACHING ON THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK IS TO NOT GIVE THE AGGRESSOR A CHANCE TO UTILIZE THE RESULTS OF HIS TREACHEROUS ACTIONS, BUT TO ACHIEVE THE IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL REMOVAL OF THE TROOPS OF THE INTERVENTIONISTS FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES AND COMPENSATION FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE AGGRESSOR TO THE UAR, SYRIA, AND JORDAN.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC AIMS OF THE POLICY OF OUR PARTY (WORD INDISTINCT) 23D CPSU CONGRESS AND CONFIRMED BY THE PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF DECEMBER 1966, IT IS NECESSARY HENCEFORTH TO CONTINUE TO STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MILITANT FORCES OF IMPERIALISM AND THEIR POLICY OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, TO CONTINUE THE POLICY OF SUPPORT TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY, INDEPENDENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND SOCIAL PROGRESS.

IT IS NECESSARY TO FURTHER CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN THE FRIENDSHIP AND SOLIDARITY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB STATES, RESOLUTELY REPULSE THE INTRIGUES OF IMPERIALISM AND UNMASK ITS TRUE ANTIPOPULAR CHARACTER, AND WAGE A STRUGGLE AGAINST THE SLANDER CAMPAIGN AND DISSENTING ACTIONS OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP THAT AIM AT CAUSING DISUNITY AMONG THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST FORCES AND AT UNDERMINING THE TRUST AMONG PEOPLES OF THE ARAB STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM BELIEVES THAT THE EVENTS IN THE NEAR EAST UNDERLINE WITH NEW EMPHASIS THE NEED FOR THE UNITY OF ACTION OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES, THE INTERNATIONAL WORKERS MOVEMENT AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE ASIAN, AFRICAN, AND LATIN AMERICAN PEOPLES, ALL PEACE-LOVING AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES, AND ALL TO WHOM THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLES AND THE CAUSE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE ARE DEAR.

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IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS OF THE 23D CONGRESS, THE CPSU WILL FURTHER CONTINUE UNSWERVINGLY IN THE FUTURE TO WAGE THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AGGRESSIVE FORCES OF IMPERIALISM, TO MAINTAIN THE HIGH VIGILANCE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, TO IMPLEMENT CONSISTENTLY THE LENINIST POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, AND TO DISCHARGE ITS INTERNATIONAL DUTY-- TO EXTEND ALL POSSIBLE SUPPORT TO PEOPLES STRUGGLING FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS. JOINT ACTIONS OF THE FORCES OF PEACE, DEMOCRACY, AND SOCIALISM AND OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT ARE CAPABLE OF CURBING THE AGGRESSOR AND PREVENTING A NEW WORLD WAR.

THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM CALLS ALL PARTY (ORGANIZATIONS) AND ALL THE WORKING PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO NEW LABOR EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM AND THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER TO MEET IN A WORTHY MANNER THE GLORIOUS 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION.

(ENDALL)

21 JUN 1655Z BAM/BK

163

Pres file

Wednesday, June 21, 1967 -- 3:05 pm

Mr. President:

Late flash!

Bob Anderson telephoned me to say: The deal is buttoned up along the lines I indicated last night.

He agreed that we would pay two-thirds of the cost of the Rio Hato road, that sum not to exceed \$6 million. In fact, his rough estimate is that they will have to put up \$12 million and may not do it.

At the minimum, however, our share in the road is a fair rental price for the Rio Hato base.

I congratulated him for achieving a deal at lower cost than he was in fact prepared and empowered to go.

I recommend you call him and tell him and Jack Irwin that you regard it as a job exceedingly well done.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - June 21, 1967
1:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith an FBI report on what the Panamanian Foreign Minister told President Robles yesterday about the status of the treaty negotiations.

We don't know how Eleta arrived at the \$200 million increase in income. It is far short of what they will get. Our mathematics show that the formula agreed to will give Panama about \$17 million the first year, rising to about \$23 million after five years. A conservative estimate of the average return over the 30-year period will be close to \$27 million per year. Taking the \$27 million average, this would be their take:

Annual take for 30 years	-	\$810 million
Less existing payment (\$1.9 million per year) for 30 years	-	<u>\$ 57 million</u>
		\$753 million.

This figure does not include side benefits resulting from the new treaty arrangements.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

FBI Report, June 20, 1967.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-48
By is, NARA Date 2-20-00

~~SECRET~~

164

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
12:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is how they are conducting
their backgrounders.

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

164a

Wednesday, June 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Mr. Donahue of the FBI informed me that simultaneous with the Kosygin/Brezhnev conversation -- which they are now translating -- they have received another report that the Soviet press office in New York is implying to the press people -- specifically Richard Valeriani and an Italian newsman -- that there will be a courtesy call on the President. The only problem, according to them, is that Kosygin feels it should be in New York.



Arthur McCafferty

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-48

By is, NARA Date 2-20-00

165

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
12:40 p.m.

Per file

Mr. President:

Attached is a quick, unofficial (WWR) translation of a document allegedly passed to the French government by the UAR yesterday.

I've checked with Clark Clifford who says the source is an extremely knowledgeable man in Arab affairs, a Bourbon Prince.

It may relate to the second report, indicating de Gaulle wants to make himself the Big Four peace-maker.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-53
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

wid 165a

~~SECRET~~

5

WINSTON GUEST CAME TO SEE ME THIS MORNING AND LEFT THE FOLLOWING TYPEWRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH HE SAID HE HAD RECEIVED FROM A FRIEND OF HIS WHO HAS EXCELLENT CONTACT WITH ARABS. DOCUMENT IS ONE PRESENTED TO FRENCH GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY BY EGYPTIAN EMBASSY AND IS ON DEGAULLE'S DESK THIS MORNING. HE DID NOT WISH TO GIVE SOURCE'S NAME FOR OBVIOUS REASONS BUT HE IS SURE OF RELIABILITY OF SOURCE. IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME I HAVE NOT BOTHERED TO HAVE TRANSLATION

Translation Attached

"A LA SUITE DES DERNIERS EVENEMENTS, ET APRES LE TERRIBLE CHOC PSYCHOLOGIQUE ET EMOTIF QUE LA POPULATION EGYPTIENNE A RESSENTI, LA SITUATION A AMENE DE TRES HAUTES AUTORITES MILITAIRES ET CIVILES A ENTREPRENDRE AUPRES DE SES AMIS TRADITIONNELS DES DEMARCHES, POUR VOIR QU'ELLE AIDE LA FRANCE POURRAIT LEUR APPORTER, "ET AUSSI LEUR INDIQUER QU'ELLES ETAIENT LES INTENTIONS EXACTES DU GOUVERNEMENT EGYPTIEN.

1) CONCESSIONS POLITIQUES

A) RECONNAISSANCE DE L'ETAT D'ISRAEL

B) ABANDON DE GAZA

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-51

By is, NARA Date 3-27-00

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-2- PARIS 20454 CN 17470 June 21, 1967 NODIS

C) LIBRE PASSAGE A AKABA DES NAVIRES
ISRAELIENS

D) LIBRE PASSAGE A SUEZ DES NAVIRES
ISRAELIENS

D) DISCUSSION SUR LE CANAL SUEZ - JORDANIE

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 20454 ~~SECRET~~

2) AIDE ECONOMIQUE

A) AIDE URGENTE PAR LA FRANCE

ON POURRAIT AUTORISER LA COFAPO A AUGMENTER
LE PLAFOND DE SES AVANCES, DE TELLE MANIERE QUE LE
GOUVERNEMENT DE LA R.A.U. PUISSE ACHETER D'URGENCE
CE DONT IL A BESOIN.

DEUX OU TROIS BATEAUX DE FARINE

DES MEDICAMENTS

DU FER BLANC - 5 MILLIONS DE F.F.

"URGENT POUR POUVOIR FAARGBT CONSERVES"

LES PAIEMENTS SE FERAIENT A 180 JOURS ET A 360 JOURS.

IL N'Y AURAIT LA EN SOMME, QU'UNE FACILITE DE CREDIT A UN
DEBITEUR EN DIFFICULTE.

B) PLAN A MOYEN TERME

REPRENDRE LE CREDIT QUI AVAIT ETE ENVISAGE POUR:

A) CONSTRUCTION DE LA FLOTTE DE PECHE

B) USINE D'ENGRAIS A ASSOUAN

C) ACIERIE A ASSOUAN

D) USINE DE MONTAGE CARS - SAVIEM (1000 CARS)

E) USINE DE MONTAGE RENAULT A PORT-SIAD

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-3- PARIS: 20454 CN 17470 June 21, 1967 NODIS

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 20454 ~~SECRET~~

F) PARTICIPATION AU PLAN D'IRRIGATION

D) DE REMBOURSEMENT SE FERAIT PAR LE DEVELOPPEMENT DES ECHANGES ECONOMIQUES, ET SURTOUT PAR LA PARTICIPATION DE LA FRANCE A LA RECHERCHE ET L'EXPLOITATION PETROLIFERE EN EGYPTIE.

D) LA R.A.U. VERRAIT AVEC UN TRES GRAND PLAISIR, UN CONSORTIUM EUROPEEN DIRIGER LES OPERATIONS DE RECHERCHE SUR SON TERRITOIRE

IL EST HERS DE DOUTE QUE L'EGYPTIE A DES RESERVES PETROLIFERES QUI SONT AUSSI IMPORTANTES QUE CELLES DE LA LIBYE OU DE L'ALGERIE.

LE DERNIER POINT, MAIS AUSSI LE PLUS IMPORTANT POUR LES EGYPTIENS, EST LE RETABLISSEMENT DE L'AIDE ALIMENTAIRE 'BLE AMERICAIN'.

"LA R.A.U. NE PEUT VIVRE SANS CETTE AIDE OU UNE SUBSTITUTION A CETTE AIDE.

ELLE A DU PAYER 120 MILLIONS DE LIVRES STERLING CETTE ANNEE. IL NE FAUT PAS CHERCHER AILLEURS UNE RAISON VALABLE A SON ATTITUDE. LA POLITIQUE NASSERIENNE DE CES DERNIERS MOIS, EST UNE POLITIQUE DE DESEPOIR.

IL NE PEUT PLUS NOURRIR SON PEUPLE SANS L'AIDE EXTERIEURE.

PAGE 5 RUFNCR 20454 ~~SECRET~~

LE RETABLISSEMENT DE CETTE AIDE EST LA CONDITION SINE QUA NON DE LA PAIX DANS LE MOYEN-ORIENT.

E) MOYENS MATERIELS

LA R.A.U. RECEVRAIT AVEC PLAISIR UN DELEGUE PERSONNEL DU GENERAL DE GAULLE. CETTE PERSONNALITE DEVRAIT ETRE COMPLETEMENT ETRANGERE AU MILIEU DIPLOMATIQUE.

DE LEUR COTE ILS DESIGNERAIENT MONSIEUR HEYKAL, DIRECTEUR DE EL AHAM ET CONFIDENT DU PRESIDENT NASSER. AUJOURD'HUI, DANA LA SITUATION PRESENTE, IL N'Y A QUE LE GENERAL DE GAULLE QUI PUISSE REALISER UN ACCORD ET FAIRE LA PAIX.

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

-4- PARIS 20454 CN 17470 June 21 NODIS

L'AUDIENGE DU GENERAL DANS LES PAYS ARABES
LA CONFIANCE DES GOUVERNEMENTS DANS SA JUSTICE, ET SON
DESINTERESSEMENT FONT QU'IL EST LA SEULE PERSONNE AU MONDE
AYANT L'AUTORITE ET L'AUDIENGE NECESSAIRE POUR MENER A
BIEN CE PLAN.

"IL FAUT AGIR TRES RAPIDEMENT, AVANT QUE LE TEMPS
ET LES MAUVAIS CONSEILLERS, PUISSENT A NOUVEAU

PAGE 6 RUEN 20454 ~~SECRET~~
AGIR."

GUEST WOULD APPRECIATE COPY OF THIS BEING DELIVERED TO
CLARK CLIFFORD AND ALSO TO TELL HIM SOURCE IS THE SAME
FROM WHICH INFORMATION CONTAINED IN HIS (GUEST'S) LETTER
TO CLIFFORD ABOUT THREE WEEKS AGO.

GUEST SAID SOURCE HAD TOLD HIM THAT NASSER IS NO LONGER
IN CONTROL OF EGYPT AND THAT GROUP WHO REALLY HOLD ALL POWER
ARE THE ONES WHO PUT FORTH ABOVE PROPOSITION. NASSER WILL
BE LEFT IN POWER AT LEAST UNTIL CONCLUSION OF PROPOSED DEAL
AND POSSIBLY EVEN LONGER TO COMMIT HIM TO THIS PROPOSITION
WHICH WILL BE PRESENTED AS NASSER'S OWN. THIS GROUP
APPARENTLY WISHES TO LIQUIDATE ALL OF THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE
IRAELI-ARAB WAR.

COMMENT: I HAVE NO MEANS OF JUDGING THIS DOCUMENT BUT
IT CERTAINLY READS AS THOUGH IT IS AUTHENTIC AND ~~SECRET~~
~~AS STATED TO~~ GUEST IS COMPLETELY CONVINCED OF RELIABILITY
OF SOURCE.

THE SOVIETS DOV'T KNOW. BOHLEN

BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

165-b
5

~~SECRET~~

Action

DE RUFNCR 20457 1721340
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE
STATE GRNC

17496

1967 JUN 21 AM 10 06

BT

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 20456

NODIS MARIA ONE

SUBJECT: FOUR-POWER SUMMIT CONFERENCE PARIS.

SOURCE STATED JUNE 20 THAT DEGAULLE'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE HAD
BECOME A FOUR-POWER SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON MIDEAST EAST WHICH HE
WOULD HOST IN PARIS.

ASSERTING THIS WAS HARD INFORMATION, SOURCE WENT TO SOME LENGTH
TO PLEAD THAT USG NOT RPT NOT ACCEPT SUCH CONFERENCE IN PARIS
WHICH WOULD END IN WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS GREATLY INCREASING
OPPOSITION AT HOME AND ABROAD TO DE GAULLE'S POLICIES.

BOHLEN

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 0051
By is, NARA Date 3-27-00

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165c

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-51

20454
(Paris 18 June 67)

By is, NARA Date 3-27-00

June 21, 1967

In the face of recent events and after the terrible emotional and psychological shock that the Egyptian population has experienced, the situation has led the very high civil and military authorities to undertake approaches to their traditional friends to see what aid France could offer, and also to indicate to them the exact intentions of the Egyptian government. It appears that the directors of the Egyptian government are ready to make great political concessions if serious economic aid can be offered to them very rapidly.

1. Political concessions

- a. recognition of the State of Israel
- b. abandonment of Gaza
- c. free passage of Israeli ships through Aqaba
- d. free passage of Israeli ships through Suez
- e. discussion of the Suez/Jordanian canal

2. Economic aid

a. urgent aid from France. One might authorize La Cofapo to increase the level of its advances in such a way that the government of the UAR could buy urgently what it needs:

- 2 or 3 boatloads of grain
- medicines
- "fer blanc" - 5 million French francs
- I think it's urgent to be able to conserve reserves(?)
- payments could be from 6 months to a year--could be, in effect, a credit facility to a debtor in difficulty.

b. medium-term aid plan to undertake the credit which had been envisaged for:

- (1) construction of a fishing fleet
- (2) a fertilizer plant at Aswan
- (3) a steel plant at Aswan
- (4) an assembly plant for automobiles -- Saviem (1000 cars)
- (5) an assembly plant for automobiles -- Renault -- at Port Said
- (6) participation in irrigation plan
- (7) reimbursement to be made through the development of economic exchanges and especially by the participation of France in the research and exploitation of oil in Egypt.
- (8) the UAR would regard with great pleasure a European consortium directed to research operations on its territories. There is no doubt that Egypt has petroleum reserves which are as important as those of Lybia and Algeria

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- (9) the final point, but also the most important for Egypt, is the reestablishment of food aid in the form of American wheat. The UAR cannot live without that aid or a substitution for such aid. It has to pay 120 million pounds sterling this year. It is not necessary to look further for a basis for its attitude. Nasser's policy of recent months is a policy of despair. He cannot feed his people without external aid. The reestablishment of that aid is the condition sine qua non for peace in the Middle East.

3. Methods

The UAR would receive with pleasure a personal delegate of General de Gaulle. This personality might be completely divorced from diplomacy. From their side they would designate Heykal, Director of El Ahran and confidant of President Nasser. Today in the present situation only General de Gaulle can achieve an agreement and make peace.

The view of the General in Arab countries, the confidence of governments in his justice and disinterestedness, make him the only person in the world having the authority and the posture necessary to bring this plan to fruition.

It is necessary to act very rapidly before the passage of time and bad advice bring about new action.

Wednesday, June 21, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

WWR
160
Lump
2. Pres. file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is the usual routine report on Battle Act determinations. It covers the three quarters from July 1, 1966 to March 31, 1967.

You last approved a similar report in August 1966, covering the period through June 30, 1966.

Francis M. Bator

Approve report ☒

No ☐

Speak to me ☐

FMB:LSE:mst

166a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1967

10004

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report on Presidential Determinations
Under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Control Act of 1951

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed Quarterly Report
on Presidential Determinations Under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Discussion:

Section 103(b) of the "Battle Act" requires a
quarterly report concerning determinations that assistance
should be continued to countries which have permitted ship-
ments of strategic items as listed under the Act. A draft
Presidential report incorporating these matters is enclosed
for your consideration. Your approval of this report would
authorize this Department to transmit it to the chairmen of
the six Congressional committees specified in the Act. The
following matters are to be covered:

- a. A list of Determinations made during the
reporting periods.

No Determinations were made in the
quarters ending September 30 and December 31,
1966, and March 31, 1967.

- b. Your review of prior Determinations.

I have reviewed all Determinations
made previously for shipments of items

determined as having strategic significance pursuant to Section 103(b) of the Act by countries receiving United States military, economic, or financial assistance. The only country involved is Japan, which is currently receiving a small amount of previously obligated military assistance. After consideration of all the criteria stated in the "Battle Act", including the contribution of Japan to the mutual security of the free world, the importance to the security of the United States of the assistance going to Japan, and Japanese cooperation in controlling the export to Communist countries of items of strategic importance, I am indicating in the report that you find that no further comments are necessary with respect to prior Determinations.

c. An analysis of trade.

A statement on Japanese trade with Communist areas is provided.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Draft Report
2. Japan's Trade Analysis

166b

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON DETERMINATIONS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 103(b) OF THE
MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT OF 1951
FOR THE QUARTERS ENDING SEPTEMBER 30 AND DECEMBER 31, 1966
AND MARCH 31, 1967

This Report is submitted to the Congress in accordance with Section 103(b) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951.

There were no new Determinations made during the quarters ending September 30 and December 31, 1966, and March 31, 1967.

The President has reviewed all Determinations made previously and has concluded that no further comments are necessary.

The trade analysis presented herewith as required by the Act brings up to date information contained in previous quarterly reports.

166c

Japanese Trade with Communist Areas

Principal Japanese exports to communist areas are manufactured fertilizer; other chemicals; manmade fiber, yarn, thread, and fabrics; iron and steel pipes and fittings; other iron and steel; nonelectric machinery; and ships.

Principal Japanese imports from communist areas are grains; other foodstuffs; soybeans; wood; coal; crude petroleum; petroleum products; and pig iron.

The value of Japanese trade with communist areas in recent years in dollar terms and expressed as a percentage share of total world-wide Japanese trade is as follows:

	Exports		Imports	
	<u>Millions of dollars</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>	<u>Millions of dollars</u>	<u>Percent of total</u>
1964	\$ 420.2	6.3	\$ 497.8	6.3
1965	481.1	5.7	556.3	6.8
1966	605.7	6.2	710.2	7.5

167

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

John Leddy received a telephone call from Italian Ambassador Ortona reporting the following from Fanfani.

1. Moro and Fanfani met last night with Kosygin and Gromyko for three hours.

2. After some initial tough talk, including the statement that two Soviet armored divisions could clean up the Israelis, Kosygin said that not one Soviet soldier would fight in the Middle East.

3. The Italians said the Middle East presented a "mosaic of different problems that had to be solved." Kosygin replied that they agreed and were ready to talk in those terms. Gromyko could stay in New York for a month if necessary. He would be prepared to talk to the Italians.

4. Moro said that all Europeans felt it would be a good thing if President Johnson and Chairman Kosygin were to meet. Kosygin replied that he had expected to leave earlier, but he might stay a day or two. Perhaps a meeting would be arranged.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *gwl/mg*, NARA, Date 11-18-99

cc *McGeorge Bundy*

Thursday, June 21, 1967
9:30 a. m.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 00-64
By Cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

168

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith two interesting reports on:

1. Life in Hanoi;
2. Communist pressures toward a more moderate policy on a Middle East settlement.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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168a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 94400

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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CITE

DIST 21 JUNE 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM/

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-2
(C)

DOI: AS OF 18 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: RAIDS OF THE SECOND WEEK OF JUNE CAUSE FURTHER DAMAGE
TO HANOI FACILITIES; FOREIGN LEGATIONS PREPARE
EVACUATION PLANS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
(C)

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1.

MAJOR AMERICAN RAIDS FROM THAI BASES AGAIN HIT ADDITIONAL
WATER AND ELECTRICAL FACILITIES IN THE CITY OF HANOI. AS A
RESULT, AS OF 18 JUNE THE WATER SUPPLY SITUATION IN HANOI HAD
"DETERIORATED" GREATLY. WATER WAS IRREGULAR IN SUPPLY AND WAS
OFTEN NOT OF PROPER PURITY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-65

By cb, NARA Date 2-12-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

[REDACTED] AN AUXILLARY WATER SUPPLY UNIT HAD BEEN HIT AS WELL AS A MAIN PUMPING STATION AND [REDACTED] REPAIRS WERE NOT PERFECTLY EFFECTED. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS RESULTED FROM THE 9-10 JUNE RAIDS OR A SUBSEQUENT RAID THE NEXT WEEK).

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-2
(C)

2. ELECTRICITY WAS A CONDITION ALMOST AS BAD, WITH RATIONING STILL IN EFFECT AND POWER BREAKDOWNS OCCURRING. AN ELECTRICAL PLANT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI WAS REPORTEDLY BADLY DAMAGED SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 12 JUNE.

3. THE HANOI GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED THROUGH ITS FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OFFICIALS THAT EMBASSIES AND LEGATIONS IN HANOI WERE WELCOME TO EVACUATE TO A SAFER SPOT SIXTY KILOMETERS TO THE NORTHWEST OF HANOI. [REDACTED]

FOR PERMISSION FROM DJAKARTA TO DO SO BUT WAS TOLD IN RESPONSE

EO 12958 3.
(C)

[REDACTED]
OF MINISTRIES OF GOVERNMENT HAD EITHER REMOVED FROM HANOI OR WERE RESETTLED IN UNDERGROUND BUNKERS [REDACTED] MANY OF THE IMPORTANT PERSONAGES IN IMPORTANT MINISTRIES, EXCEPT THOSE IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY, HAVE NOT BEEN SEEN IN HANOI IN RECENT DAYS.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Y
(C)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

4. THE MORALE OF THE POPULACE, WHILE SUFFERING FROM THE
CONSTANT BOMBINGS, REMAINS HIGH AND THE DETERMINATION OF THE
YOUNG PEOPLE ESPECIALLY, TO CONTINUE FIGHTING SPEAKS WELL OF
THE FANATICAL DISCIPLINE COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION HAS ACHIEVED.
THEY ARE COMPLETELY CONVINCED THAT TIME IS ON THEIR SIDE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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5. ~~SECRET~~ DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT
AND PACFLT.

REPORT CLASS SECRET

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Wednesday, June 21, 1967
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some interesting morning items:

1. Faisal finds his feet, his tongue, his independence.
2. Bruce thinks Wilson has found a not-very-good way to deal with East of Suez in 1975.
3. Bunker has an amiable lunch with Ky and Thieu and talks Vietnamese manpower and cleaner politics.

4 and 5. Two more Hanoi reports: on bombing [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Jidda 5467, June 20, 1967, ~~confidential~~
London 10503, 2 sections, June 20, 1967, EXDIS, ~~secret~~
Saigon 28409, June 20, 1967, EXDIS ~~secret~~
[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED NLJ/RAC 00-64
Authority RAC-NLJ DOI-110-1-32
By iss **NARA, Date** 9-5-02

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

169a

50-44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Action

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INFO RUQVDA/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
RUOTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
RUDKST/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUQNTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
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016293 1967 JUN 20 AM 8 02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JIDDA 5467

1. AS HE USUALLY DOES SHORTLY AFTER ARRIVAL IN JIDDA, KING FAISAL RECEIVED ALL HEADS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AT FONOFF YESTERDAY. NORMAL PROCEDURE SUCH AFFAIRS IS THAT EACH CHIEF OF MISSION, BY ORDER OF SENIORITY, HAS FEW WORDS WITH KING. ON THIS OCCASION UAR, ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN AMBS MADE CONCERTED RUSH ON KING, STUCK LIKE LEECHES AND COMPLETELY

PAGE 2 RUQVRA 5467 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MONOPOLIZED SESSION. THEY WERE IN FOR SHOCK. FAISAL CLEARLY IN FIGHTING MOOD.

2. FAISAL FIRST EXPRESSED SADNESS AT ARAB DEFEAT AT HANDS OF ISRAEL. IT SHOWED ONCE AGAIN NEED FOR REAL ARAB UNITY AND PREPAREDNESS. IN INDIRECT SLAP AT UAR, HE COMMENTED ARABS SHOULD NEVER HAVE TAKEN ON ISRAEL IF THEY NOT RPT NOT PREPARED. UAR AMB PROTESTED EGYPTIAN DEFEAT DUE SOLELY TO US AND UK COLLUSION WITH ISRAEL. ENTIRE AFFAIR MANAGED BY US IN ORDER GIVE ISRAEL MORE TERRITORY.

3. FAISAL SHARPLY REBUTTED UAR AMB'S CONTENTION. PRESIDENT JOHNSON, HE NOTED, HAD SAID ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY. AS FOR CHARGE OF US AND UK COLLUSION, THIS NONSENSE/ SOVIETS COULD HAVE MONITORED ANY AIRCRAFT DEPLOYING FROM CARRIERS. NO, THERE HAD BEEN MUCH ARAB TALK AND LITTLE ACTION. PRAISING KING HUSSEIN AND JORDANIAN ARMY'S VALIANT STAND, KING PHINTEDLY MADE NO REFERENCE TO UAR OR SYRIANS. WHEN UAR AND SYRIAN AMBS INSISTED SUCH COLLUSION HAD TAKEN PLACE, FAISAL ANGRILY NOTED KING HUSSEIN AND PRIMIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By *fw/cg* NARA, Date *11-18-99*

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- Jidda 5467, June 20

JUHA HAD DENIED REPORT. HE CALLED JORDANIAN AMB OVER TO CONFIRM THIS. (JORDANIAN AMB: I FEAR, WAS A BIT FEEBLE IN CONFIRMING KING'S STATEMENT.)

4. ADDRESSING THESE THREE AMBS, FAISAL LAUNCHED STRONG ATTACK ON POLICY ARAB STATES DEALING WITH SOVIETS. ALL HAD WITNESSED HOW LITTLE SOVIET SUPPORT REALLY MEANS. THERE HAD BEEN PROMISES, BUT LITTLE FULFILLMENT. MOREOVER, WHILE NOW GIVING LIP SERVICE TO ARAB CAUSE, SOVIETS ATTEMPTING SELL CHEAP OIL IN TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN MARKETS OF ARAB PRODUCERS. KING STRESSED THAT OIL REPRESENTS ARAB WORLD'S MEAN TO IMPROVE ITS LOT. ARABS SHOULD UNITE UNDER BANNER OF ISLAM, NOT FOREIGN IDEOLOGY.

5. ABOVE SPIRITED EXCHANGE BETWEEN KING AND THREE AMBS LASTED ABOUT 25 MINUTES. NO ONE ELSE COULD GET WORD IN EDGEWISE. WITH TEMPER VISIBLY FRAYING ON BOTH SIDES, KUWAITI AMB (AS DEAN) FINALLY BROKE IN AND REQUESTED PERMISSION FOR DIPLOMATIC CORPS TO WITHDRAW. NORMALLY KING LEAVES FIRST, BUT ON THIS OCCASION CORPS PRECEDED HIM. UAR:

PAGE 4 RUQVRA 5467 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN AMBS LEFT LOOKING VERY DISCONFITED. MOST SAUDIS PRESENT, MAINLY FONOFF TYPES, SEEMED TO RELISH KING'S VIGOROUS TICKING OFF OF UAR: ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN AMBS. VARIOUS OTHER MEMBERS DIP CORPS ALSO CHUCKLED.

6. COMMENT: FAISAL ARRIVED AT RECEPTION MINUTES AFTER PRESIDENT'S SPEECH CONCLUDED. I HAD IMPRESSION THAT HE HAD EITHER HEARD THE SPEECH OR THAT THE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN REPORTED TO HIM JUST A FEW MINUTES BEFORE HE ARRIVED. WHICHEVER IT WAS, IT OBVIOUSLY GREATLY HEARTENED HIM: AND I AM SURE PROMPTED HIS VIGOROUS DIALOGUE WITH UAR, ALGERIAN AND SYRIAN AMBS.

7. WHEN I LEFT, I CONGRATULATED KING ON HIS PERFORMANCE. HE WAS PLEASE WITH HIMSELF AND HAD EVERY RIGHT TO BE SO. ALSO TOLD HIM WOULD SEND FULL ARABIC TRANSLATION OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH SAME EVENING FOR HIS STUDY. WE PROVIDED USIS TRANSLATION TO CHIEF OF ROYAL PROTOCOL ABDUL WAHAB HOUR OR SO LATER. I WAS ALSO ABLE SUMMARIZE TO RASHAD PHARAON THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE PRINCIPLES FOR MIDDLE EAST. PHARAON MADE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- Jidda 5467, June 20

NO COMMENT.

8. WHILE WAITING FOR KING, I REMINDED CHIEF OF ROYAL
PROTOCOL OF MY EARLIER REQUEST TO SAQQAF FOR AUDIENCE WITH
KING AT LATTER'S EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. ABDUL WAHAB SAID HE
WILL ARRANGE SUCH MEETING. GP-3. EILTS
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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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1967 JUN 20

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 LONDON 10503

02

EXDIS

FOR LEDDY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 211766

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-51

By is, NARA Date 3-27-00

1. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO TELL WHETHER A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT WOULD ADD MATERIALLY TO WHAT THE PRESIDENT TOLD PRIMIN WILSON PRIVATELY. WE THINK THAT

PAGE 2 RUJTCR 10503/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE BRITISH ARE STILL VERY MUCH UNDECIDED ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT A MID-70 WITHDRAWAL FROM MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE AND THE FINAL DECISION WILL NOT BE MADE UNTIL THEY HAVE ASSESSED THE RESULTS OF THE HOLT TALKS AND THE COMING TALKS WITH LEE KUAN YEW. WE ALSO THINK THAT UNDER ALMOST ANY CIRCUMSTANCES THE BRITISH ARE GOING TO BE OUT OF SINGAPORE/MALAYSIA BY MID-1970'S REGARDLESS OF WHAT THEY DECIDE OR DON'T DECIDE NOW.

2. AS OF THIS MOMENT WE THINK THE PROBABILITY IS WILSON WILL NOT DECIDE IN FAVOR OF A WITHDRAWAL ANNOUNCEMENT AND INSTEAD WILL BUILD ON THE ALREADY APPROVED DECISION TO MAINTAIN A CAPABILITY FOR USE IN THE AREA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AUTHORIZING A NOT-TO-BE-DIVULGED "PLANNING ASSUMPTION" THAT THE UK WILL NOT BE ON THE GROUND IN SINGAPORE AFTER 1975. THE PROBABILITY IS THAT THIS "PLANNING ASSUMPTION" WILL LEAK AND IN TIME WILL BE REGARDED AS TANTAMOUNT TO A DECISION TO GET OUT.

3. THIS EMBASSY IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OUR PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION IS THE SHORTER RUN POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS BOTH DOMESTICALLY IN THE US AND ABROAD OF A BRITISH DECISION TO MOVE OFF THE SEA MAINLAND, OR WHETHER OUR CONCERN IS MORE ABOUT ACTUAL BRITISH MAINTENANCE IN THE 1970'S OF COMMITMENTS AND A GENUINE MILITARY CAPABILITY. PERHAPS IT IS A COMBINATION OF BOTH.

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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-2- LONDON 10503, 201143Z JUNE 1967 (SECTION I OF II).

4. IF OUR CONCERN IS PRINCIPALLY FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION THAT THE BRITISH ARE GOING TO MAKE IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO ENCOURAGE THE PRESENT TREND OF THINKING HERE AND TRY TO NAIL DOWN SPECIFICALLY WHAT CAPABILITY THE BRITISH WILL RETAIN FOR USE IN THE AREA AND HOW AND WHERE IT WILL BE DEPLOYED. IF OUR CONCERN IS MAINLY WITH THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF AN EARLY BRITISH DECISION IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO SAY THIS TO THEM ONCE AGAIN QUITE DIRECTLY AND LET THEM FEEL THAT GOING AHEAD AT THIS TIME IN THE

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 10503/1 ~~SECRET~~

FACE OF OUR EXPRESSED OPPOSITION WOULD BE EXTREMELY UNSETTLING TO US.

5. AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE PRIMIN IS UNDER SUBSTANTIAL DOMESTIC PRESSURE THAT STEMS BOTH FROM ECONOMICS AND A WIDE-SPREAD FEELING THAT BRITAIN SHOULD BE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO PROBLEMS CLOSER TO HOME AND EXPENDING LESS OF ITS RESOURCES ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WORLD. IF THE CONTINUANCE OF A BRITISH PRESENCE EAST OF SUEZ WERE PUT TO A TEST OF PUBLIC OPINION IT UNQUESTIONABLY WOULD BE DEFEATED. THERE IS ALSO SUBSTANTIAL PRESSURE FROM THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO SET ABOUT MAKING SOME OF THE LONG-POSTPONED DECISIONS REGARDING THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF ITS FUTURE FORCES AND ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF LONG LEAD TIME MILITARY HARDWARE. THE MOD CLAIMS (AND WE ARE IN NO POSITION TO SAY WHETHER THIS IS IN FACT THE CASE) THAT MAINTENANCE OF THE SINGAPORE BASE HAS A "MULTIPLIER" EFFECT WHICH PILES UP COSTS FOR LOGISTIC TAIL, TROOP ROTATION, ETC., ETC. THE ONLY WAY TO SAVE THE MONEY WHICH THEY HAVE DECIDED TO SAVE ON THE DEFENSE

PAGE 5 RUDTCR 10503/1 ~~SECRET~~

SIDE, IS TO CUT OUT THE BASE AND A DECISION TO DO THIS CANNOT BE LONG POSTPONED. THERE IS ALSO A FIRM BELIEF IN MANY MILITARY CIRCLES THAT THE KIND OF POWER HEALEY IS THINKING ABOUT (ESSENTIALLY AIR-MARITIME AMPHIB FORCES BACKED BY A STRATEGIC RESERVE IN THE UK) IS THE ONLY REALLY RELEVANT FORM OF POWER FOR THE FUTURE IN SEA.

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1967 JUN 20 AM 8 56

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 LONDON 10503

EXDIS

FOR LEDDY FROM AMBASSADOR

REPMC STATE 211766

6. IF THE DEPT FEELS, IN LIGHT OF ITS KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT MAY HAVE TRANSPIRED BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND WILSON, AND IN LIGHT OF WHAT PRIME MINISTER HOLD TOLD THE PRESIDENT ABOUT HIS RECENT MEETINGS WITH THE BRITISH, THAT A FURTHER APPLICATION OF PRESSURE WOULD BE DESIRABLE, THESE ARE THE

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 10503/2 ~~SECRET~~

ESSENTIAL POINTS WHICH SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT MAKE: (1) ANY DECISION NOW TO WITHDRAW OR NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM MAINLAND SEA BY 1975 WOULD BE PREMATURE AND DANGEROUS. (2) A DECISION MADE NOW TO WITHDRAW, WHETHER OR NOT ANNOUNCED OR FORMALLY CONFIRMED, WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME KNOWN AND CREATE SERIOUS POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR UNITED STATES-AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND, BOTH IN SEA AND DOMESTICALLY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE LEGISLATURES. IN CASE OF UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC ASPECTS OF THESE DIFFICULTIES WOULD COMPLICATE OUR HANDLING OF MAJOR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEFENSE AND OTHER COMMON INTERESTS NOT ONLY IN SEA BUT IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE. WE BELIEVE IT IS IN UK AND US INTERESTS TO TRY TO AVOID SUCH PROBLEMS ESPECIALLY AT THIS TIME. (3) MOREOVER, EVEN ADOPTION OF AN HMG INTERNAL, NON-PUBLICIZED "PLANNING ASSUMPTION" THAT BRITISH FORCES WILL SOONER OR LATER BE ENTIRELY OUT OF MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE COME WHAT MAY, WOULD BECOME KNOWN AND HAVE MUCH THE SAME ADVERSE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES AS FORMAL

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-2- London 10503, June 20, (SECTION 2 OF 2).

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 10503/2 ~~SECRET~~

DECISION. (4) WHAT WE WOULD LIKE WOULD BE SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT UK INTENDS TO MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES IN THE SEA AREA INDEFINITELY AND THAT DECISION AS TO EXACTLY WHAT FORM THE CAPABILITY WOULD TAKE POST 1971 HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN AND MUST AWAIT ASSESSMENT OF SEA SITUATION NEARER THAT PERIOD. THIS WOULD LEAVE THE UK FREE TO DECIDE IN THE FUTURE WHETHER SINGAPORE BASE COULD BE RELINQUISHED IN 1975, BEFORE THAT TIME, OR AFTER, DEPENDING UPON HOW SECURITY CONDITIONS IN THE AREA DEVELOP OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO.

BRUCE

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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SAIGON 28409

016172

1967 JUN 20 AM 6 20

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-89

REF: SAIGON 28218, STATE 212155 By *ig* NARA. Date 7-2-92

1. AT MY INVITATION THIEU, KY AND GENERAL VIEN CAME TO MY HOUSE FOR LUNCH JUNE 19, TOGETHER WITH AMBASSADOR LOCKE AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND. MY PURPOSE WAS TO BRING THIEU KY AND VIEN TOGETHER IN INFORMAL SURROUNDINGS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND SEE WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET SOME AGREEMENT ON THEIR PART TO A PUBLIC STATEMENT SUBSCRIBED TO BY ALLTHREE REAFFIRMING VIEN'S EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT AND CONTAINING SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ARMED FORCES TO REFRAIN FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL SITUATION. I PROPOSED TO SUGGEST TO THEM THAT SUCH A STATEMENT BE CIRCULATED TO OFFICERS AND RANKS WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO CORPS COMMANDERS TO SEE THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE CARRIED OUT.

2. I ALSO WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH THEM CERTAIN MATTERS RELATED TO THE VISIT OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND UNDER SECRETARY KATZENBACH. THE LUNCHEON TOOK PLACE IN AN INFORMAL AND CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE WITH NO EVIDENCE OF STRAIN BETWEEN OUR VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS.

3. WE INFORMED THEM OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S WISHES TO MAKE THIS A STRICTLY WORKING VISIT AND TO AVOID CEREMONIAL AND PROTOCOLARY AFFAIRS. GENERAL WESTMORELAND OUTLINED PLANS WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR THE SECRETARY'S FIELD TRIPS.

4. WE THEN GOT INTO THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL FREE WORLD TROOPS, A SUBJECT TOO MUCH DISCUSSED IN PUBLIC BY BOTH THIEU AND KY, AND MADE IT VERY CLEAR TO THEM THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO ACCEDE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL TROOPS UNLESS MAXIMUM USE WERE MADE OF AVAILABLE VIETNAMESE MANPOWER. WE FOUND READY ACCEPTANCE ON THEIR PART OF THE FACT THAT THIS WOULD BE NECESSARY. GENERAL WESTMORELAND SUGGESTED AS A MEASURE PRELIMINARY TO MOBILIZATION THAT THE TERMS OF THOSE PRESENTLY IN SERVICE BE EXTENDED AND

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--2- SAIGON 28409, 200830Z JUNE

THE AGE OF INDUCTION REDUCED. THERE WAS AGREEMENT BY THE VIETNAMESE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE. GENERAL VIEN SUGGESTED THAT HE ISSUE ORDERS FOR EXTENSION OF SERVICE NOW WITHOUT MAKING ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. THERE SEEMED TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THIS WOULD BE A GOOD PRO CEDURE.

5. ON THE SUBJECT OF MOBILIZATION, KY ASSERTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (AFTER THE ELECTIONS) BY THE NEW GOVERNMENT, THAT THE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED AND THAT THEY CERTAINLY COULD NOT EXPECT ADDITIONAL FREE WORLD TROOPS UNLESS THEY MADE A GREATER EFFORT THEMSELVES. HE FELT THAT MOBILIZATION WOULD ACTUALLY IMPROVE MORALE IN THE COUNTRY AND WOULD MAKE THE PEOPLE MORE DETERMINED TO BRING THE WAR TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. BOTH THIEU AND GENERAL VIEN ACQUIESCED IN THIS VIEW.

6. WE THEN ENTERED INTO THE QUESTION OF THE DESIRABILITY OF A JOINT STATEMENT OF NON-INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IN POLITICS POINTING OUT THAT TWO IMPORTANT PRINCIPLES WERE INVOLVED: (A) FREE, FAIR AND HONEST ELECTIONS, AND (B) CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES ON FIGHTING THE WAR. BOTH THIEU AND KY REPLIED THAT GENERAL VIEN HAD MADE SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT AND THAT THEY HAD ENDORSED IT FREQUENTLY. I SAID THAT GENERAL VIEN'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN MADE SOMETIME AGO AND I FELT THAT IT NEEDED TO BE REINFORCED AND POINTED OUT THAT RUMORS WERE ALREADY CIRCULATING CASTING DOUBT BOTH ON THE POSSIBILITY OF FREE ELECTIONS AND THE NON-INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY: IT WAS NOT NECESSARILY A FACT THAT MATTERED SO MUCH AS WHAT PEOPLE BELIEVED TO BE TRUE. CONSEQUENTLY I FELT IT MADE SENSE TO ANTICIPATE THESE RUMORS AND WHAT WAS LIKELY TO APPEAR IN THE PRESS. I POINTED OUT THAT BOTH HONEST ELECTIONS AND CONCENTRATION BY THE MILITARY ON THE WAR EFFORT HAD A DIRECT BEARING ALSO N THE MANPOWER PROBLEMS WE HAD PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED; THE FREE WORLD COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO FURNISH ADDITIONAL FORCES IF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY WAS DIVERTED FROM CONCENTRATION ON THE WAR EFFORT.

7. KY SAID THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SIGN SUCH AN AGREEMENT. THIEU FELT THAT IT WOULD BE ADEQUATE IF GENERAL VIEN SHOULD REITERATE HIS STATEMENT AND INSTRUCT HIS TROOP INFORMATION DIVISION TO SEE THAT IT WAS IMPLEMENTED. GENERAL VIEN THEN

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-3- SAIGON 28409, 200830Z JUNE

SUGGESTED THAT SINCE THE DIRECTORATE WAS THE GOVERNMENT, IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO HAVE THE DIRECTORATE ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT. AMBASSADOR LOCKE, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND I ALL FELT THIS WOULD BE EVEN BETTER THAN HAVING A STATEMENT SIGNED BY THIEU, KY AND VIEN. KY SAID THAT THE MATTER COULD BE TAKEN UP AT A MEETING OF THE DIRECTORATE LATER TODAY. (STILL LATER AT GENERAL VIEN'S RECEPTION CELEBRATING ARMED FORCES DAY, KY TOLD AMBASSADOR LOCKE AND ME THAT HE WOULD BE HOST A DINNER FOR HIS GENERALS AND WOULD BRING UP THE MATTER THEREML THIEU, HOWEVER, WAS RATHER NON-COMMITAL.

8. I DO NOT KNOW WHAT THE PRESENT ODDS ARE ON HAVING SUCH A STATEMENT ISSUED, BUT I THINK THAT IN THE LIGHT OF OUR TALK TODAY IF SOMETHING IS NOT FORTHCOMING WITHIN A FEW DAYS, I WILL AT LEAST BE IN A POSITION TO PROD ALL THREE INTO TAKING SOME ACTION.

9. WE HAD A GENERAL DISCUSSION ALSO ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE WAR, METHODS TO HOLD OFF INFILTRATION, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BOMBING AND THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE RD PROGRAM. WE MADE CLEAR THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHED TO CONTINUED PROGRESS ON BOTH THE MILITARY FRONT AND IN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD. THEY AGREED THAT EFFORTS ON THESE FRONTS SHOULD NOT BE DIMINISHED BY DIVERSION OF ATTENTION TO THE ELECTIONS.

10. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE FRIENDLY AND INFORMAL ATMOSPHERE WHICH PREVAILED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, THE FACT THAT EVERYONE PRESENT PARTICIPATED FREELY IN THE DISCUSSIONS AND THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT MATTERS, AMBASSADOR LOCKE, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND I FELT THAT THE LUNCHEON HAD BEEN VERY WORTHWHILE AND THAT WE SHOULD REPEAT THE PRACTICE AT PERIODIC INTERVALS. WHILE I DO NOT EXPECT ANY MIRACLES TO RESULT, IT IS AN OPENING WEDGE AND I THINK FURTHER SUCH MEETINGS MAY PROVE USEFUL. BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 91670

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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E+U DD/E

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

~~SECRET~~

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DIST 19 JUNE 1967

DOI: JUNE 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Y
(C)SUBJECT: HARDSHIPS AND DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED
[REDACTED] IN HANOI

ACQ: 9 JUNE 1967

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-65

By Cbm, NARA, Date 6-14-01

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2000~~SECRET~~

IN 07970 70

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(classification)

1.

LIVING AND

WORKING CONDITIONS IN HANOI ARE MISERABLE. THERE IS NO DECENT FOOD,

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>2
(C)

NO AVAILABLE WOMEN, NO MOTION PICTURES, AND NOTHING TO DO AT NIGHT.
WORK IS INTERRUPTED BY AS MANY AS TWELVE AIR RAID ALERTS IN A 24-HOUR
PERIOD.

ONLY VISITORS ARE SHOWN AROUND. THE NORTH-VIETNAMESE
FACTS AND FIGURES ARE OFTEN FALSE, AND THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF
FINDING OUT THE TRUTH.

2. THE STORY ABOUT A BRITISH SHIP HAVING BEEN HIT BY U.S. PLANES
WAS A LIE. IT WAS HIT BY NORTH VIETNAMESE MISSILES.
WAS IN HAIPONG AT THE TIME BUT WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SEE THE SHIP; THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE TOLD IT HAD SAILED. ON ANOTHER OCCASION A
THERMIC STATION (PRESUMABLY A THERMOELECTRIC PLANT) WAS DESTROYED

EO 12958 3.4(b)
(C)~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

3. [REDACTED] THE CITY OF PHU LY IN NAM DINH PROVINCE [REDACTED] HAD BEEN COMPLETELY FLATTENED BY BOMBING. THE CITY HAS CEASED TO EXIST. [REDACTED]

THE AMERICANS TRY TO TERRORIZE THE POPULATION.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED] THERE IS STILL TROUBLE ABOUT THE TRANSIT OF SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM THROUGH CHINA. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: NORTH VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS ARE CURRENTLY STATING THAT THIS

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PROBLEM HAS BEEN SOLVED. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

PACAF [REDACTED]

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

GROUP-1

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres. file

Wednesday, June 21, 1967
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith UN reactions to your
speech and Amb. Goldberg's.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By leg, NARA, Date 7-7-91

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PP RUEHEX

DE RUEHC 17120 1720727

ZNY CCCCC ZFH-2

P 210313Z JUN 67

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5945
STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 5809

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 9289

By ig NARA Date 7-2-92

SUBJECT: US REPS REACTION TO U.S. STATEMENT AND RESOLUTION

1. INITIAL REACTION TO SPEECH GOOD TO EXCELLENT FROM ALL FREE COUNTRIES AND GOOD MANY MARGINAL COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH WIDE BELIEF US RES AS SUCH WOULD NOT SELL, IT WAS RECOGNIZED AT LEAST AS THE PROPER MOVE TO SET UP ALTERNATIVE TO SOV RES. MANY COMMENTED ON CALM AND DISPASSIONATE APPROACH TO PROBLEMS. INDIVIDUAL COMMENTS FOLLOW.
2. SHAHI (PAKISTAN) THOUGHT SPEECH GOOD STATEMENT OF US POSITION WHICH HE WISHED STUDY FURTHER. HE NOTED REFERENCE TO "RECOGNIZED BOUNDARY" ASKING EXACTLY WHAT US MEANT. LIKE OTHER ARAB SYMPATHIZERS, HE EMPHASIZED NECESSITY WITHDRAWAL ISRAELI TROOPS; CONTRASTED SITUATION IN AREA IN 1956 WITH TODAY, STATING THAT END OF FIGHTING IN 1956 SOME BALANCE STILL EXISTED BETWEEN CONTENDING FORCES IN CONTRAST TO PRESENT SITUATION WHERE ISRAEL SUPREME AND ARAB MILITARY MIGHT NONEXISTENT. ISRAELIS THEREFORE HAVE NOT SAME NEED FOR GUARANTEES AS IN 1956 AND COULD WELL WITHDRAW.
3. RIFAI (JORDAN) COMMENTED THAT GOLDBERG'S SPEECH ATTACKED THE INTELLIGENCE WHILE ISRAELI FONMIN EBAN HAD ATTACKED THE SENTIMENTS THROUGH RHETORIC BUT BOTH MADE SAME POINTS. RIFAI REGRETTED US POSITION APPEARED TO ARABS TO BE EXACTLY SAME AS ISRAELIS.
4. AHDAB (LEBANON) JOHNSON'S SPEECH HAS POSITIVE ELEMENTS BUT GOLDBERG'S SPEECH ONE-SIDED IN FAVOR OF ISRAEL AND CANNOT BE BASIS FOR DEALING WITH AREA. TROOP WITHDRAWAL MUST COME FIRST.
5. GAHLEB KAYYALI (SYRIA) THOUGHT GOLDBERG AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH LINKING TROOP WITHDRAWALS TO FULL ACHIEVEMENT OF ALL FIVE POINTS CREATES IMPOSSIBLE SITUATION. ARABS WILL NOT AND CANNOT BE MADE AGREE ANYTHING BEFORE ISRAELI TROOPS WITHDRAW. ARABS WILL REFUSE NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. US MADE ITS POSITION WORSE WITH ALL ARABS BY TRYING FORCE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN AFTERMATH OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. KAYYALI EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR MORE EXTENSIVE CONVERSATION AT EARLY DATE. CLAIMED CREDIT FOR TONING DOWN ATASSI'S SPEECH WHICH "FORTUNATELY WRITTEN IN NEW YORK, NOT DAMASCUS".
6. CHAMMAS (LEBANON) - ISRAEL'S SMASHING VICTORY MAY HAVE MADE SOME ARABS WILLING NEGOTIATE BUT GREAT MAJORITY NOW HAVE REALLY LEARNED TO HATE AND WILL INSIST ON REVENGE. IN TRYING TO FORCE ARABS TO NEGOTIATE AND IN LINKING TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO ACHIEVEMENT OF FIVE PRINCIPLES US WEAKENED ITSELF FURTHER WITH ITS ARAB FRIENDS. FUTURE IS OMINOUS IN THE EXTREME. USSR IS EXPLOITING WITH GREAT EFFECT THE US POSITION WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER CALCULATED TO PLAY INTO SOVIET HANDS. SOVIETS THUS ARE REGAINING THE GROUND THEY LOST.
7. MAKKAWI (LEBANON) USGA RESOLUTION WORSE THAN US SC RES.
8. MESTIRI (TUNISIA) - GOLDBERG'S SPEECH TOUGHER THAN JOHNSON'S. WE DIDN'T REALLY EXPECT ANYTHING DIFFERENT BUT ARE DISAPPOINTED.
9. ERALP (3RD SECY - TURKEY) PERSONAL REACTION: DP PARA 3A SUGGESTS

AMMAN (LEBANON) - ISRAEL'S BRASHING VICTORY MAY HAVE MADE SOME ARABS WILLING NEGOTIATE BUT GREAT MAJORITY NOW HAVE REALLY LEARNED TO HATE AND WILL INSIST ON REVENGE. IN TRYING TO FORCE ARABS TO NEGOTIATE AND IN LINKING TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO ACHIEVEMENT OF FIVE PRINCIPLES US WEAKENED ITSELF FURTHER WITH ITS ARAB FRIENDS. FUTURE IS OMINOUS IN THE EXTREME. USSR IS EXPLOITING WITH GREAT EFFECT THE US POSITION WHICH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN BETTER CALCULATED TO PLAY INTO SOVIET HANDS. SOVIETS THUS ARE REGAINING THE GROUND THEY LOST.

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9. ERALP (3RD SECY, TURKEY) PERSONAL REACTION: OP PARA 3A SUGGESTS WAY IT WORDED THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT BE COMPLETE (I.E. BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES). (ANOTHER TURK TOLD BUFFUM HE THOUGHT GOLDBERG'S SPEECH LESS CONCILIATORY THAN JOHNSON'S.)

10. EREN (TURKEY) THOUGHT GOLDBERG MADE AN EXCELLENT STATEMENT BUT TOUGHER THAN JOHNSON'S. AS TO US RES STATED NO SETTLEMENT OF ISSUE POSSIBLE UNTIL ISRAELIS WITHDREW SINCE A WITHDRAWAL IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

11. VAKIL (IRAN) THOUGHT SPEECH GOOD STATEMENT BUT APPEARED TO BE PRO-ISRAEL, REPEATED VIEW ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL NECESSITY.

12. ALO (NIGERIA) - US RES IS PRO-ISRAEL. ITS TERMS LIKE THOSE ONE HEARS COMING FROM TEL AVIV.

13. ROUAMBE (UPPER VOLTA) - US RES VERY GOOD. IT FOLLOWS LINE OF HIS OWN OPINION AND OF POLICY HE RECOMMENDED TO HIS GOVERNMENT. UPPER VOLIAN POSITION ON RESES EVENTUALLY VOTED UPON WILL BE DECIDED AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OCAM COUNTRIES.

14. BELEOKEN (CAMEROON) - US RES EXCELLENT. ASKED IF MENTION OF WITHDRAWAL IN RES MEANT TO INCLUDE JERUSALEM? SEEMS UNLIKELY ISRAELIS WOULD AGREE TO THAT.

15. OZLNOVIC (YUGOSLAVIA) THOUGHT GOLDBERG MADE GOOD STATEMENT OF US POSITION BUT EMPHASIZED NO PROGRESS WILL BE MADE UNDER US OR ANY OTHER RES UNTIL ISRAELIS WITHDRAW. THIS HE CONSIDERS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. DISAPPOINTED GOLDBERG'S SPEECH CONTAINED NOTHING NEW; MERELY REPEATING OLD ARGUMENTATION. FELT JOHNSON'S SPEECH PREFERABLE.

16. POPA (ROMANIA) AND GOTMANOV (CZECHOSLOVAKIA) MADE FOLLOWING POINT: TONE GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT TODAY BIG IMPROVEMENT OVER YESTERDAY WHEN TONE - AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTENT - WAS OUT OF PLACE IN REPLY TO HEAD OF GOVERNMENT. THIS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE SINCE KOSYGIN TRYING TO ENCOURAGE BILATERALS. WITH REGARD TO US RES, POPA EXPRESSED VIEW THAT WITHIN PARA 3, SUBPARA E, IS THE MOST IMPORTANT (RIGHT OF NATIONS TO EXIST IN PEACE AND SECURITY) AND SHOULD BE MOVED UP TO BECOME FIRST SUBPARA.

18. TILAKARATNA (CEYLON), MEMBER OF NONALIGNED WORKING GROUPING, OFFERED OPINION THERE IS VERY LITTLE CHANCE OF GA ADOPTING RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL; SUCH RESOLUTION WOULD FIND VERY LITTLE SUPPORT EVEN AMONG AFRO-ASIANS, MOST OF WHOM WOULD ABSTAIN. RESOLUTION FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SOME CHANGE IN PRECONFLICT STATUS QUO WOULD NOT BE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO ASSEMBLY MAJORITY. US RES AS IT PERTAINS TO ARMS LIMITATION IS VERY UNREALISTIC AND THAT PART OF US RES CAN CERTAINLY NOT BE EXPECTED TO SURVIVE IN ANY FORM. FOUND LITTLE NEW IN GOLDBERG SPEECH AND CONSIDERS IT BARGAINING POSITION.

RESOLUTION FOR UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL WHICH DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SOME CHANGE IN PRECONFLICT STATUS QUO WOULD NOT BE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO ASSEMBLY MAJORITY. US RES AS IT PERTAINS TO A 5 LIMITATION IS VERY UNREALISTIC AND THAT PART OF US RES CAN CERTAINLY NOT BE EXPECTED TO SURVIVE IN ANY FORM. FOUND LITTLE NEW IN GOLDBERG SPEECH AND CONSIDERS IT BARGAINING POSITION.

19. DEVENDRA (NEPAL) EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEW TOWARD ARMS LIMIT PART OF US RES. HE FOUND OTHER PARTS OF RES GENERALLY SATISFACTORY BUT FEARED US SPONSORSHIP WOULD NOT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SURVIVAL IN GA. HE AGREED CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL "OUT OF QUESTION" BUT THAT STRONG MAJORITY OF GA WOULD FAVOR "UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL ACCOMPANIED BY SOME ARRANGEMENTS TO PREVENT FURTHER EXPLOSION IN MIDDLE EAST". FEELS EBAN HAD MADE GREAT ERROR IN CRITICIZING SYG - FOR AUTOMATIC REACTION OF AFRO-ASIANS IS TO COME TO SYG'S DEFENSE WHICH NEPAL PLANS TO DO WHEN IT SPEAKS.

20. LAI (MALAYSIA) INDICATED MALAYSIA'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST VERY PASSIVE. HE SAID IT MIGHT EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO BE "SAY NOTHING, SEE NOTHING, AND VOTE ON NOTHING".

21. FOREIGN MINISTER MARTIN OF CANADA APPROACHED AMBASSADOR FINGER AFTER PRESIDENT'S SPEECH YESTERDAY AND COMMENTED THE STATEMENT WAS EXCELLENT, WELL-BALANCED AND MODERATE. MARTIN STATED FOREIGN MINISTER KHOMAN WILL COME TO ASSEMBLY TOWARD END OF WEEK. HE THOUGHT KHOMAN WOULD BE WILLING BE HELPFUL IN DEVELOPING SUPPORT FOR REASONABLE RESOLUTION.

22. DE BEUS (NETHERLANDS) THOUGHT SPEECH EXCELLENT STATEMENT AND ALSO LIKES THE RES ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT THINK IT CAN BE ADOPTED.

23. QUARLES (NETHERLANDS) SAID GOLDBERG'S SPEECH POINT FOR POINT SAME AS NETHERLANDS POSITION. FONMIN WILL SAY SAME NEXT WEEK.

24. TRESSLETT (NORWAY) OF PARA 3A GOOD WORDING. NORWAY, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY NOT VOTING FOR A SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL RES. POPULAR OPINION VERY PRO-ISRAEL BUT MINISTRY NOT CONVINCED GULF BLOCKADE WAS "STRANGULATION" AND MORE IN THE MIDDLE.

25. BROWN (NEW ZEALAND) - US RES QUITE GOOD. IT LIKELY BE CRITICIZED AS PRO-ISRAEL. SUGGEST WORD "RECOGNITION" IN PARA 3A BE CHANGED TO, I.E., "ACCEPTANCE"? SINCE EVERYONE KNOWS DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OUT OF QUESTION NOW. SIMPLE WITHDRAWAL RES, IF WELL-WORDED, WOULD PROBABLY GET REQUIRED VOTE.

26. LYNCH (NEW ZEALAND) - NOW THAT US AND USSR RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED WHOLE QUESTION BIPOLARIZED AND IT NECESSARY HIGH LEVEL US-USSR AGREEMENT BE REACHED BEFORE ANY PROGRESS MADE. FOUND NOT MUCH NEW IN GOLDBERG SPEECH AND VIEWED US RESOLUTION LIKE USSR RESOLUTION AS FIRST POSITIONS AND ONLY ISSUE BEING HOW FAR BOTH SIDES WILLING BACK DOWN.

27. GLASS (UK) FOUND GOLDBERG SPEECH VERY MILD. ADDED HE SAW THREE POINTS IN KOSYGIN SPEECH VERY DISCONCERTING TO ARABS. KOSYGIN'S APPARENT ENDORSEMENT OF ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE I.E. HIS RECOLLECTION OF SOV SUPPORT FOR CREATION OF ISRAEL COUPLED WITH STATEMENT EVERY PEOPLE HAS RIGHT ESTABLISH "INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF OWN;" INDICATION SOV WILLINGNESS COLLABORATE WITH OTHER BIG POWERS DURING GA; AND WARNING TO EFFECT THAT IN NUCLEAR AGE EVEN SMALL, LOCAL WARS ARE DANGEROUS. GLASS FELT ARABS WOULD ALL CONSIDER THESE POINTS QUITE LET-DOWN FOR THEM ON PART OF SOVS.

28. MENIMENGOSLU (FORMER PERMREP, TURKEY) TOLD BUFFUM HE COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHY SOVS HAD BROUGHT ISSUE TO GA. KOSYGIN'S SPEECH SET TONE WHICH COULD BEST BE DESCRIBED AS KEYNOTE FOR CREPE-HANGING SESSION.

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29. GENERAL: SEVERAL DELEGATIONS INDICATED DESIRE HOLD MEETING AMONG LIKE-MINDED STATES DISCUSS TACTICS AND POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS, INCLUDING US DRAFT. AMONG THESE INCLUDED NEW ZEALAND (BROWN), NETHERLANDS (HOUBEN), AUSTRALIA (POCOCK) AND BELGIUM (DENORME). THEIR GENERAL REACTION TO GOLDBERG'S SPEECH AND US DRAFT RESOLUTION WAS FAVORABLE. SOME EXPRESSED CONCERN, HOWEVER, WOULD BE DIFFICULT RETAIN MANY OF GOOD POINTS IN US DRAFT. ALSO FELT GOLDBERG'S SPEECH, OF NECESSITY, ADDED VERY LITTLE TO PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OF PREVIOUS DAY. REACTION OF JAPANESE AND MALAYSIAN DELEGATIONS TO US STATEMENT WAS VERY SIMILAR. PERUVIAN, PARAGUAYAN, CHILE, BRAZILIAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN REPS ALL THOUGHT SPEECH EXCELLENT AND FINE CONTRIBUTION.

30. GENERAL: CONSENSUS OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS WAS THAT GOLDBERG'S SPEECH TO ASSEMBLY HAD BEEN "CALM, REASONABLE AND OBJECTIVE". MOST FELT OUR RESOLUTION OFFERED LOGICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEM BUT ALMOST NONE THOUGHT IT COULD OBTAIN TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. SIMILARLY THEY FELT THAT SOVIET RESOLUTION WAS EQUALLY UNLIKELY TO PASS. RESOLUTION WHICH AVOIDED CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND LIMITED ITSELF TO DEMAND FOR WITHDRAWAL ISRAELI FORCES WOULD PROBABLY ATTRACT NECESSARY MAJORITY THEY FELT. NON-COMMUNIST CORRESPONDENTS VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN REGARDING SOVIET ROLE IN GA SPECIAL SESSION CYNICALLY MOTIVATED BUT A RATHER INEPT PERFORMANCE.

GP-3.

GOLDBER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

Wednesday, June 21, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Amb. Dean got in touch with George Brown. Brown would like to come down and would like to come tomorrow. He would prefer to meet with you early afternoon if convenient to you. He would like to get back to New York early evening. He has a 6:00 p.m. meeting in New York.

Pat Dean said he would come down in the morning and probably have lunch with him at the Embassy; then see you early afternoon, if convenient.

He is grateful for your offer of a plane. This would be most helpful.

W. W. Rostow

Early afternoon okay_____

No_____

See me_____

RLN

Mr. Rostow

Pres file 102

SECRET

June 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A brief chat with Ray Hare

Ray Hare, your new special representative to New Delhi, is planning to go off on Friday afternoon. He could communicate the flavor of your concerns regarding the direction of India's policy more accurately if he had a chance to talk to you directly.

But if your schedule is too tight, we'll brief him for you.

W. W. Rostow

I'd like to see him briefly _____

You see him _____

I recommend Nick see him & MacB _____

*Pres. not available
to see Hare. This memo
returned & not given to
President.*

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18 NARA, Date 7-1-91

Mr. Rostow

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

June 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Prime Minister Pearson

Events rapidly overtook Prime Minister Pearson's memo of 2 June on the Middle East crisis. However, now that the dust has settled and we have sorted out our own position, we owe him a courtesy reply.

The attached should suffice, and your speech yesterday is a fair response to his memo. He heartily supported your five principles in his parliament (see attached cable), and you can use this message to thank him.

Mac Bundy concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By isp, NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mike:

Events in the Middle East have moved rapidly beyond the problems which we discussed together and which you reviewed in your memorandum of June 2. I believe we agree that the new situation, while perhaps no less grave, offers new opportunities.

I appreciate your support for the principles I outlined on June 19. I have no illusions about the difficulty of this task but feel we must do all we can to help bring permanent peace to this troubled region. We are exploring opportunities for resolving both the immediate and the longer run problems and would welcome your thoughts. We feel deeply that real solutions must come from the parties concerned, but we must have our own thoughts in order.

We shall want to keep in close touch throughout this period. The cooperation we are receiving from your representatives is most heartening.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-86
By ing NARA, Date 6-15-93

~~TOP SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

173b

87 UNCLASSIFIED

Action

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1. IN COMMONS THIS AFTERNOON OPPOSITION LEADER DIEFEN-
BAKER ASKED IF FIVE POINTS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT IN QTE
VERY STATESMANLIKE. REMARKABLY CLEAR SPEECH UNQTE WERE
ACCEPTABLE TO GOC. PEARSON REPLIED PRESIDENT VERY SOUND
WHEN HE EXPRESSED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITH COMMITMENTS FOR
ISRAEL'S FUTURE SO THAT THINGS WOULD NOT REVERT TO SITUA-
TION WHICH PREVAILED ONE MONTH AGO. PRIMIN CONTINUED
QTE I AM QUITE SURE THAT THIS PARLAMENT WOULD
PREPARED TO SUPPORT ALL POINTS MENTIONED BY THE PRESIDENT

PAGE TWO RUEHOT 2180 UNCLAS

UNQTE. PEARSON ALSO NOTED SIMILARITY PRESIDENT'S
PRINCIPLES WITH SIX-POINT PROGRAM HE (PEARSON) DELIVERED
TO HOUSE ON JUNE 8 OTTAWA 2131). PEARSON ADDED
LIMITATION OF ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST MENTIONED BY
PRESIDENT ALSO VERY IMPORTANT TO FINAL SETTLEMENT.

2. NDP DEPUTY LEADER LEWIS ASKED IF 2.5 MILLION
DOLLAR AID PROGRAM ANNOUNCED BY PEARSON LAST WEEK WAS
NEW. PEARSON REPLIED QTE WE ARE FORTUNATE IN
HAVING EXISTING APPROPRIATIONS ALREADY APPROVED BY THIS
HOUSE UNQTE. HE SAID GOC ANXIOUS TO EXPEDITE THAT
PROGRAM. CURRENT NEED IS FOR MEANS OF DISTRIBUTION.
TO THAT END GOC HAS PURCHASED DE HAVILAND AIRCRAFT
FOR UNRWA AT THEIR REQUEST. GOC PREPARED TO OFFER RCAF
AIR LIFT IF THERE IS NEED.

3. PRESSED TO STATE HOW MANY ARAB REFUGEES CANADA
WOULD ACCEPT PEARSON SAID IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY SINCE IT
DEPENDS UPON ATTITUDES OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS.
BT

UNCLASSIFIED

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Mr. Rostow

1. *summary*
2. *Per file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan Salinity Control and Reclamation Project

Bill Gaud is asking approval of a \$10.7 million loan to Pakistan, to finance the sinking and equipping of over 1,000 tubewells to serve approximately 660,000 acres. They will irrigate additional acres and help reduce salinity by lowering the water table.

Where such wells have been installed, wheat yields have increased by nearly 60% in three years. Installation nearly doubles the return per farm.

The loan will be conditional on adequate self-help measures, as summarized in the attached memorandum from Charlie Schultze, which could be your action document.

Joe Barr approves for Treasury.

I recommend you go ahead.

W. W. Rostow

Okay ✓

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RG* NARA Date *7-2-91*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2375
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JUN 16 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Pakistan - Salinity Control and Reclamation Project

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud requests your approval of a \$10.7 million loan to the government of Pakistan to construct 1,062 tubewells to serve about 669,000 acres. These wells provide irrigation water, leach salinity from the soil and prevent water logging by lowering the water table to a safe level.

Tubewell development is an integral part of our agricultural strategy in Pakistan. This loan is closely related to the fertilizer loan you recently approved and to the self-help conditions in our P. L. 480 agreements.

AID previously has made four similar loans with impressive results in increased farm production. In the land served by the first project, for example, wheat yields have increased 59% in three years. Annual returns per farm under the present proposal are expected to rise from 631 rupees to 1,477.

As conditions of this loan, AID will require:

- . water rates set at a level to cover project costs
- . adequate plans for operation and maintenance
- . clear organizational responsibility for operating the project
- . satisfactory electrification plan (an area of past problems)
- . plans for modernizing existing water distribution systems and tying these wells into it.

I recommend that you authorize this loan. Secretary Fowler agrees that this loan will have a minimal impact on our balance of payments.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Charles L. Schultze
Director

2375

174b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 13 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Pakistan - Salinity Control and Reclamation Project IV -
Upper Chenab Unit

Recommendation: That you authorize us to inform the Government of Pakistan that we are prepared to negotiate a \$10.7 million Development Loan to finance the foreign exchange costs of the Salinity Control and Reclamation Project IV (SCARP IV) - Upper Chenab Unit.

Background: In June 1965, the Government of Pakistan submitted an application to A.I.D. for \$44 million to finance the foreign exchange costs of approximately 3,000 tubewells and related equipment to be installed in the SCARP IV area. Since the original application, West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WPWAPDA) has negotiated with Yugoslavia to provide an increased number of wells in this area, and a larger sector has been deferred for private tubewell development. The remaining area is not considered feasible for private development due to the time lag that would occur and the high benefits which would result from early implementation. As a result of these changes, in April 1967 WPWAPDA submitted a revised application requesting \$10.7 million to cover foreign exchange costs of a more limited project.

The project under consideration is based on a feasibility study prepared by a U. S. consulting engineering firm and has been found to be economically and technically sound, after review by A.I.D. and the inter-agency Development Loan Committee.

The Project: The project is to provide for construction of 1,062 irrigation/drainage tubewells and associated electric power transmission and distribution facilities in the Upper Chenab Unit of the Upper Rechna Doab (SCARP IV) area, located between the Chenab and Ravi Rivers in West Pakistan. The project would serve about 669,000

culturable acres and is expected to: (1) increase irrigation water supplies by recirculating ground water to cropped areas, (2) reclaim 70,000 acres of saline and alkali-affected lands by leaching with ground water, (3) remove the hazard of water-logging lands by drawing the water table down to a safe level below the surface and (4) increase the cropping intensity from about 92 percent to 150 percent.

U.S. Interest: U. S. assistance strategy in Pakistan has as its top priority goal development of agriculture and agro-economic related activities. In West Pakistan water is a primary limiting factor in agricultural development. Optimum development of agriculture depends on timely completion of SCARP's aimed at putting the entire irrigated portion of the Indus Plain into productive use. This project is part of a continuing SCARP program for which A.I.D. has made four previous loans.

Balance of Payments Effect: These loan funds will be used to finance commodities and services from the United States. By making this loan, the U.S. will be increasing exports of U.S. goods and services which otherwise would likely be procured from other sources.

Self-Help: The GOP has allocated \$239 million equivalent to reclamation projects in West Pakistan during the Third Five Year Plan (1965/66 - 1969/70). For the project under consideration, the GOP will finance local currency costs amounting to the equivalent of about \$22.3 million, more than twice the dollars being made available under this loan.

Indigenous capability to provide both engineering and equipment is being developed as the SCARP program advances. It is expected that all electric motors and pumps for the tubewells under the current project will be procured from local manufacturers, and it is planned to use a local contractor for construction of a limited number of tubewells; all electrification work will be done by WPWAPDA's own forces or local contractors.

Trained operating and maintenance staff is vital to the success of the project, and such staff will be made available from WPWAPDA, the Irrigation Department and other government sources.

The Government of West Pakistan has recognized the principle that farmers should be required to pay the full costs of delivered water and recently, despite some resistance, has doubled the average water rate in the SCARP I area. We will specify in this loan that water rates should be established to recover all operation and amortization costs of the project.

With respect to raising agricultural production, the Government of Pakistan, in its recent PL 480 agreements, has agreed to :

- Give top priority to agricultural development and to fulfilling the goals of the Third Plan.
- Continue to take measures to attract more foreign private capital and technical and management know-how in the production and distribution of agricultural inputs.
- Continue to give high priority to improved seed, insuring to the extent practicable that the combined public and private effort, including any necessary legislation, will be sufficient to reach the established targets for food self-sufficiency including provision for appropriate standards for cleanliness, germination, and labeling of seeds.
- In view of the substantial increase in agricultural credit needed to serve the private sector for purchase of modern agricultural inputs during the Third Plan, give serious consideration to increasing substantially the amount of such credits allocated under the Third Plan.
- Maintain price levels for wheat and rice which will encourage production, taking into account that the purchase price for wheat and rice should be set at levels which, consistent with the requirements of economic stability, will serve as an effective incentive for production.

These all are related to making most effective use of the increased water which will become available under the SCARP.

We believe the Government of Pakistan is undertaking reasonable and substantial self-help measures with respect to the agricultural development.

Action Requested: That you authorize negotiation of the \$10.7 million Development Loan for the Salinity and Reclamation Project IV - Upper Chenab Unit.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Date: _____