

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

11 of 92

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
4a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 <i>sanitized per RAC H9-01 (same para.)</i>	7/10/67	A
5a report	Situation Report on Vietnam <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-438</i> S 2 pp.	7/10/67	A
6a note	Bowdler to Rostow <i>open 11-22-99</i> PCI 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/10/67	A
8a cable	Amman 185 <i>open 1-25-96 NLJ 95-244</i> S 3 pp. <i>sanitized 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i> <i>(dup. # 49a, NSF, Counter, Feb, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7)</i>	undated	A
9 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>open 9-10-96 NLJ 95-305</i> TS 1 p. <i>sanitized 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/10/67	A
9a letter	Rusk to the Pres. <i>open 7/26/60 NVJ 00-56</i> TS 1 p. <i>sanitized 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i>	7/10/67	A
10 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>open 12-9-92</i> S 1 p. <i>NLJ 91-437</i>	7/10/67	A
10a report	Recall of NVN Representatives <i>open 11-22-99</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i>	undated	A
12a	duplicate of #15 <i>open 2-13-96 NLJ 92-102</i>		
12b letter	Antonio Carrillo Flores to Henry Dearborn PCI 2 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	6/29/67	A
12c letter	Spanish copy of #12b " PCI 2 pp.	6/29/67	A
13 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama C 1 p. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/10/67	A
14a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>more info released 12-18-98</i> C 3 pp. <i>sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103</i> RAC <i>sanitized 2-20-01 NLJ 00-55 same</i>	7/8/67	A
15 letter	Pres. to Pres. of Mexico PCI 1 p. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/10/67	A
17 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re NSAM 338 " C 2 pp.	7/10/67	A
17a report	re foreign communications " C 3 pp.	6/28/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, "Volume 33,
July 1 - 10, 1967," Box 18

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17b memo	J.D. O'Connell to Rostow C 3 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLS 92-102</i>	6/28/67	A
17c memo	NSAM No. 338 " C 1 pp.	9/15/65	A
18a	duplicate of #18b "		
18b letter	Pres. to Prime Minister of Australia " PCI 2 pp.	7/11/67	A
22 cable	CAP 67722 re Vietnam C 1 p. <i>open 12-9-92 NLS 91-437</i>	7/9/67	A
23 cable	CAP 67720 re the Congo <i>open 11-22-99</i> S 2 pp. [duplicate of #199f, NSF, Country File, "Congo, Volume 13;" sanitized 1979]	7/9/67	A
25 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam TS 1 p. <i>open 12-7-92 NLS 91-437</i>	7/10/67	A
25a map	Vietnam <i>Dup #109 NSF, CF, VN, "3P Proj. Computat" Box 88</i> PCI 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 92-99</i> <i>open 4-1-96 NLS 95-3</i>	undated	A
25b report	Weekly Report #14 <i>Dup #109 NSF, CF, VN, "3P Proj. Computat" Box 88</i> TS 1 p. <i>exempt 5-22-92 NLS 92-99</i> <i>open 4-1-96 NLS 95-3</i>	6/16-22/67	A
27 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>(dup. of #109, NSF, CF, Mid East, Vol 7, Box 109) open 12-7-93 NLS 92-102</i>	7/10/67	A
27a cable	USUN 134 <i>open 5-15-92 NLS 92-100</i> S 6 pp.	undated	A
29 cable	CAP 67714 re Kinshasa 331 S 2 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLS 92-102</i> [duplicate of #82, NSF, Country File, "Congo, Vol. 13;" exempted 1977]	7/8/67	A
30 cable	CAP 67715 re Vietnam C 1 p. <i>open 12-9-92 NLS 91-437</i>	7/8/67	A
32 cable	CAP 67712 re far east <i>open 5-16-01 NLS 00-54</i> S 3 pp. <i>exempt 8-18-92 NLS 92-102</i>	7/8/67	A
34 cable	CAP 67708 re Vietnam <i>(dup #23, NSF, CF, Vietnam "CAP Cables" Box 257)</i> C 3 pp. <i>exempt NLS 92-101</i> <i>open 4/14/00 NLS 00-54</i>	7/8/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
35 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101	7/8/67	A
35a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. sample NLJ 92-103 sanitized H-9-01 per RAC	7/8/67	A
35b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 pp. exempt NLJ 92-103 exempt 1-19-01 NLJ/RAC 00-67; 2 exempt NLJ 019-018-2	7/7/67	A
35d cable	Hanoi 223 open 11-22-99 C 1 p. exempt 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100	7/6/67	A
35e report	re Vietnam exempt NLJ 92-103 sanitized per S 2 pp. RAC 1-19-01	7/7/67	A
35f cable	re Vietnam sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 S 3 pp. Sanitized per RAC H-9-01 (same sani)	7/7/67	A
35g report	re Vietnam sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 S 1 p. Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01 (same sani)	7/5/67	A
35h cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 2 pp. sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 sanitized per RAC H-9-01 (same sani)	7/7/67	A
35i cable	re Vietnam exempt NLJ 92-103 S 2 pp. Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01 (same sani)	7/8/67	A
35j cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 4 pp. sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 sanitized per RAC 1-19-01 (same sani)	7/5/67	A
35k report	re Vietnam sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103 S 1 p. Sanitized per RAC H-9-01 (same sani)	7/7/67	A
37 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam C 1 p. open 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101	7/8/67	A
38 memo	Bator to the Pres. C 1 p.	7/8/67	A
39a letter	Prime Minister Maiwandwal to the Pres. PCI 1 p. open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102	6/29/67	A
39b letter	Pres. to Prime Minister Maiwandwal " PCI 1 p.	undated	A
40 cable	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam per 12-20-91 C 1 p.	7/8/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
41 cable	CAP 67703 re Congo S 2 pp. <i>open 5-10-93 NLS 92-103</i>	7/7/67	A
42 cable	CAP 67701 re Congo <i>open 11-22-99</i> S 4 pp. [duplicate of #202 and 202a, NSF, Country File, "Congo, Vol. 13;" #202 sanitized 1989, #202a opened 1978]	7/7/67	A
44 cable	CAP 67700 re Vietnam <i>open 12-20-91</i> C 1 p.	7/7/67	A
45 cable	CAP 67694 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 5-15-92 NLS 92-100</i>	7/7/67	A
46 cable	CAP 67693 re Vietnam C 2 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLS 92-102</i>	7/7/67	A
47 cable	CAP 67692 re Congo " C 1 p.	7/7/67	A
50 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re oil " S 2 pp.	7/7/67	A
52 cable	Rostow to Ben Read " C 1 p.	7/7/67	A
53 cable	CAP 67689 re Middle East <i>(dup. of #143, NSF, CF, Middle East, Vol. 13, Box 109)</i> S 1 p. <i>Exempt NLS 92-101 Exempt 2-13-01 NLS/RAC 00-68; Exempt NLS 019-818-2</i>	7/7/67	A
54 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re the Congo <i>open 2-13-01</i> S 3 pp. [duplicate of #205a, NSF, Country File, "Congo, Vol. 13;" sanitized 1989]	7/6/67	A
56 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece C 1 p. <i>open 12-7-93 NLS 92-102</i>	7/6/67	A
57 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 5-3-95 NLS 92-101</i>	7/6/67	A
59 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re China <i>open 1-27-93</i> C 1 p. <i>NLS 92-102</i> [duplicate of #79, NSF, Country File, "China, Vol. 10;" exempted]	7/6/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
60 cable	CAP 67682 exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102 S 2 pp. sanitized 2-15-01 NLJ 00-57 more released 4-18-11 NLJ 10-435 (24-6) [duplicate of #105c, NSF, Country File, "Indonesia, Vol. 8;" exempted NLJ 83-46] [2-8-86 FOR "Non-VN: July-Sep 1967" Box 16]	7/6/67	A
63 cable	CAP 67675 re Cuba open 11-22-99 C 1 p. exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102	7/6/67	A
64 cable	CAP 67678 re Middle East (dup of #193, NSF, Mid East Crisis, Vol 7) S 1 p. exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102 open 11-22-99	7/6/67	A
65 cable	CAP 67679 re Congo open 11-22-99 C 1 p. sanitized 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102	7/6/67	A
66 cable	CAP 67680 re Vietnam S 2 pp. open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100	7/6/67	A
67 cable	CAP 67681 re Middle East S 1 p. open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102	7/6/67	A
70 cable	CAP 67671 re Congo C 1 p. "	7/6/67	A
72a cable	Paris 20998 Sanitized 7/26/00 NS 00-56 S 6 pp. open 11-28-10 NLJ/RAC 10-185 (4183a) [duplicate of #183a, NSF, Country File, "France, Vol. 11;" sanitized NLJ 85-358]	6/29/67	A
73 cable	CAP 67669 open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100 S 2 pp. +11a	7/5/67	A
76 cable	CAP 67668 (dup of #111, NSF, CF, Mid East, Vol 7, Box 109) open 1-25-96 NLJ 95-244 S 2 pp. exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102	7/5/67	A
77 cable	CAP 67667 re Vietnam S 2 pp. open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100	7/5/67	A
78	duplicate of #80 open 2-13-96 NLJ 92-102		
79 cable	CAP 67663 re Suez open 11/6/00 NS 00-54 S 2 pp. exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102	7/5/67	A
80 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama C 1 p. open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102	7/5/67	A
82 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR PCI 1 p. open 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101	7/5/67	A

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86a letter	Prime Minister of Ceylon to the Pres. PCI 1 p. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	6/5/67	A
90 cable	CAP 67656 re foreign affairs " TS 1 p.	7/4/67	A
94 cable	CAP 67657 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>sanitized 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101</i> <i>sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-68 more released</i>	7/4/67	A
95 cable	CAP 67658 re foreign affairs S 2 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/4/67	A
96 cable	CAP 67659 re Vietnam C 2 pp. <i>open 7-30-93 NLJ 92-100</i>	7/4/67	A
98 cable	CAP 67660 re Romania <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i> S 2 pp. [duplicate of #111, NSF, Country File, "Rumania Vol. 3"]	7/4/67	A
103a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. C 6 pp. <i>open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i>	6/30/67	A
104 cable	CAP 67651 re Vietnam <i>40 sanitized 7-30-93 NLJ 92-100</i> S 2 pp. <i>Dup. #392, NSF, CFVN "SAI" Box 103</i> <i>#104, NSF, CF, V.N., "CAP cables" Box 289</i> <i>sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-68 same</i>	<i>open 5-17-01 per RAC</i> 7/3/67	A
105 cable	CAP 67649 re foreign affairs TS 3 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/3/67	A
106 cable	CAP 67650 re Middle East " S 1 p.	7/3/67	A
107 cable	CAP 67645 re Middle East <i>Open 4/19/00 NLS 00-54</i> S 4 pp. <i>Exempt 8-8-92 NLJ 92-102</i> <i>[dup. #22, NSF, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7, Box 101]</i>	7/2/67	A
108 cable	CAP 67645 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i>	7/2/67	A
109 cable	CAP 67644 re Japan S 5 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/2/67	A
110 cable	CAP 67643 re USSR <i>Open 4/19/00 NLS 00-54</i> S 2 pp. <i>Sanitized 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/2/67	A
111 cable	CAP 67642 re foreign affairs TS 3 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/2/67	A

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112 cable	CAP 67640 re Middle East ^{Exempt NS 09-018-2} S 2 pp. ^{Exempt 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-68} (dup. # 1472, NSF, Comins, File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7) 8	7/2/67	A
113 cable	CAP 67644 re Algeria S 1 p. ^{Exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102} ^{Open 4/14/00 NS 00-04} (dup. # 17, NSF, Comins, File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 7)	7/2/67	A
114 cable	CAP 67639 re Vietnam C 1 p. ^{Open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102}	7/2/67	A
115 cable	CAP 67641 re Latin America " S 1 p.	7/2/67	A
116a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 pp. ^{Exempt NLJ 92-103} ^{Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01}	7/1/67	A
117 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East TS 1 p. ^{Open 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101}	7/1/67	A
118 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam (dup. # 29, NSF, CF, Vietnam, Negotiation Box 212) S 1 p. ^{Exempt NLJ 92-101} ^{Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01}	7/1/67	A
118a cable	Saigon 29244 C 3 pp. ^{Open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100}	6/30/67	A
118b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. ^{Exempt NLJ 92-103} ^{Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01}	6/30/67	A
120a cable	Seoul 7076 ^{Open 12-22-92 NLJ 92-100} S 8 pp.	6/30/67	A
121	duplicate of #126 ^{Open 2-13-96 NLJ 92-102}		
122 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. ^{Sanitized 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101} ^{Sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ/RAC 00-68 same}	7/1/67	A
122a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 10 pp. ^{Sanitized 5-10-93 NLJ 92-103} ^{Sanitized per RAC 1-19-01}	7/3/67	A
123 memo	Rostow to the Pres. ^{Open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102} C 1 p. ^{Dup. # 10, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol. 13}	7/1/67	A
123a cable	Munich 1054 ^{Open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100} C 2 pp.	6/30/67	A
126 cable	CAP 67626 re Panama C 1 p. ^{Open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102}	7/1/67	A

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127 cable	CAP 67628 re Vietnam S 3 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/1/67	A
129 cable	CAP 67632 re Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>open 5-15-92 NLJ 92-100</i>	7/1/67	A
130 cable	CAP 67630 <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i> S 2 pp.	7/1/67	A
131 cable	CAP 67637 <i>open 11-22-99</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/1/67	A
132 cable	CAP 67636 re Middle East C 1 p. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/1/67	A
133 cable	CAP 67633 re Middle East TS 1 p. <i>open 5-3-95 NLJ 92-101</i>	7/1/67	A
134 cable	CAP 67622 re Germany <i>open 11-22-99</i> S 2 pp. <i>exempt 8-18-92 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/1/67	A
135 cable	CAP 67634 re Vietnam S 5 pp. <i>open 12-7-93 NLJ 92-102</i>	7/1/67	A

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#81 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - Exempt 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-73 TS 1 p exempt RAC 5103	7/5/67	A
#81a report	Intelligence report - Exempt 213 01 NS/RAC 00-74 TS 7 pp exempt RAC 8103	7/4/67	A
#89 cable	President's Daily Brief - Exempt 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-73 TS 1 p exempt RAC 5103	7/4/67	A
#91 cable	Art McCafferty to the President - Exempt 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-73 TS 1 p exempt RAC 8102	7/4/67	A
#116 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 11:05 a.m. - TS 1 p Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-73	7/1/67	A
#116b report	Intelligence Report - TS 1 p. Exempt 227.04 HW/RAC 00-75	n.d.	A

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W.H. R.
Pres file
1

Monday, July 10, 1967, 7:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Harold Russell (Chairman of your Committee on Employment of the Handicapped) and 50 Disabled Danish Youth, 12 Noon, July 11

You have agreed to see Harold Russell and 50 handicapped Danish young people at 12 noon tomorrow (July 11). They range in age from the early teens to the middle 20's and are in Washington for two days as part of a three week trip around the U.S. The tour is in return for a visit by 53 handicapped young Americans to Denmark in 1965. (A description of the project is at Tab A).

Talking Points

- We are honored that you have come to repay the visit that 53 young Americans made to Denmark in 1965.
- I know that these Americans received a wonderful welcome in Denmark, and hope that you will enjoy your visit here as much as they did.
- I understand that you will spend some time studying how we work to rehabilitate the disabled and handicapped here in America.
- We will be most grateful for any comments or suggestions you may have after you have seen our rehabilitation centers and have talked with some of our handicapped people.
- I hope you will also have a chance to see something of the cities and farms of America, and to learn of the great love and respect we Americans have for Denmark and the Danish people.
- America and Denmark have much in common. We are proud of the many Danes who have immigrated to our country. Some of you have relatives who now live here.
- Denmark and the United States share a common desire to see a peaceful world in which all men can live in freedom.

- You will see that we also share a common desire to do all we can to help the handicapped to lead a full and productive life.
- Finally, your Prime Minister and I have something else in common. We are both proud grandfathers.

* * * * *

The Danes will be accompanied by eleven professional companions. Harold Russell will be there with a small group of Americans who have been involved in the visit.

Francis M. Bator

FMB:LSE:mst

1a

This project is under the joint sponsorship of the Easter Seal Society and the Committee for the Handicapped of the People-to-People Program in cooperation with The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. It is backed by Danish organizations and agencies, headed by Lord Mayor Urban Hansen. Her Royal Highness, Princess Benedikte, has graciously offered to be Patroness. A distinguished Citizens Committee has been organized in the United States.

The plan calls for 50 young people with 10 traveling companions to arrive in this country on July 6, 1967, for a three-week tour that will include New York, Washington, Detroit, Chicago, Omaha, Albuquerque-Santa Fe and Los Angeles as the principal cities.

The primary objective of the visit is to provide the opportunity for the Danes to observe and study methods and procedures of rehabilitation of the disabled in the United States by means of inspection tours of rehabilitation facilities and the exchange of ideas with American handicapped persons and professionals in the rehabilitation field. In addition, they will be able to see large cities with their cultural, industrial, educational and social institutions, and will become acquainted with our country's great natural beauties and vast farmlands.

Monday, July 10, 1967
7 p. m.

2

MR. PRESIDENT:

THRU: MARVIN WATSON

Clark Clifford and I have an urgent and sensitive matter which we desire to raise with you at your earliest convenience.

Clark is free:

Tuesday, from 12:30 p. m. until 5:00 p. m.

Wednesday, all morning until 1:30 p. m.

W. W. R.

W.C.R.

3

Monday, July 10, 1967, 6:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ludwig Erhard, 12:30 P.M., July 11

Erhard is in the U.S. to receive honorary degrees from the University of Michigan and Wartburg College (in Waverly, Iowa). He will leave Washington for the Middle West on July 12.

Talking Points

You will not want to raise with him explicitly any of the hard bilateral issues between us, i.e., budget cuts; Nonproliferation Treaty. Not only Kiesinger, but other leading Germans will be sensitive to any hint that we have forgotten who is Chancellor.

1. German Economic Situation

- What is his estimate of the present state of the German economy?
- What are the prospects for a quick recovery?

2. East-West Relations

- How successful has Germany been in its attempts to improve relations with Eastern Europe?

3. Vietnam

* * * * *

Al Puhan -- State's very capable German Country Director -- will be on hand. Walt and I will be standing by.

FMB:LSE:mst

Francis M. Bator

4
**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

Monday, July 10, 1967
6:15 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another picture of Hanoi
generated by Dick Helms' effort
over the weekend.

Walt
W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

4a

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1967

(copy of Intelligence Information Cable [REDACTED])

Country: North Vietnam

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Subject: Conditions in Hanoi

Source: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

1. This is the hot season in Hanoi and there is also a drought which broke on the night of 8-9 July. There was no evidence to confirm the allegation made by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) Ministry of Water Conservancy on 4 July that the United States Air Force was intensifying strikes against dikes and irrigation works. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] Confirmation of serious damage to the dikes or of flooding. Electric power in Hanoi has been cut by districts about three times a week, except for that used by key enterprises, in order that irrigation works could be supplied. An increasing number of generators have relieved the power station. Water functions generally and is working better than it was in May, although emergency wells are widespread. Bus, tram and railway services are crowded but adequate.

2. The morale of the working population is now cheerful and relaxed. Women, babies and old people suffer but are powerless to do anything. [REDACTED] this adaptable, disciplined peasant people will not act differently from those in other towns of North Vietnam already ruined.) Food is tight but it is not at sub-nutrition level. Military and other stores arrived through Communist China at least until 2 July, including 13 heavy AA guns with crews. Six guns were being towed by tracked vehicles from the railroad station on the night of 8-9 July.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

3. [REDACTED] the government [REDACTED] still shaken by the Soviet attitude in the Middle East crisis, [REDACTED] there was a vague rumor that the government party was seriously split while the Middle East crisis was going on, but the specific personalities or issues involved could not be identified.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



4. Ho Chi Minh, President of the DRV, did not appear for the May Day celebrations, nor did he appear for the 19 May celebration of his own birthday. For the latter, there was a photograph of him in the newspaper dressed in winter clothing.

~~SECRET~~

5

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 10, 1967
5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith today's situation
report on Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlp, NARA, Date 7-8-91

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~Situation Report on Viet-NamJuly 10, 1967New Developments

Members of the Central Election Council have told Embassy Saigon that the Council will consider complaints against the minor candidates before taking up complaints against Big Minh and the Thieu-Ky slate. One Council member states his view that the most serious problem for Minh's slate is the complaint against the citizenship qualifications of Minh's running mate, Lieng. He indicated that the Council would need more documentation to disqualify Minh on grounds of national security.

Ambassador Bunker continues to believe that action will be taken to disqualify both Minh and Thanh. However, he intends to discuss the Minh issue with Thieu and Ky at the next opportunity. In Bunker's mind, the issue boils down to the problem of the Directorate making a convincing case against Minh's candidacy or that of his running mate in legal terms which would be made public. The Directorate should stress the fact that it is a matter for the Election Council and the Assembly to rule on Minh's candidacy on the basis of the legal case put before them. Bunker believes that if this is

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 91-438By ing NARA, Date 2-5-92

done, excluding his candidacy will not damage the chances that the elections will contribute to the realization of US objectives in Viet-Nam.

Regarding Thanh, an Election Council member has told the Embassy that the Council has documents signed by Thanh which prove he has been a member of a communist organization. The Council member implied that he expected the Council to uphold the complaint against Thanh's candidacy.

Comment

We believe we should await the results of Ambassador Bunker's discussion of the Minh issue with Thieu and Ky before deciding whether to take any further action on this problem. We do not propose to take any further action on Thanh during the day, pending Ambassador Bunker's reaction to the views we transmitted to him over the weekend.

EA/VN:RHMILLER:bpw

Monday, July 10, 1967
5:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

This account of Cuba-USSR
sugar problems may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Pres. file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RESTRICTED

Monday - July 10, 1967

NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

Cuba this year produced 6.1 million tons of sugar. This is a substantial increase over last year's miserable harvest, but still 1.4 million tons below target. The 6.1 million figure was reached with an 8-month working season instead of the pre-revolution 100-day period.

The British Embassy in Havana gives this analysis of the implications of the shortfall:

"Because of the shortfall in this year's production, Cuba has had difficulties in meeting some of her commitments. CUBAZUCAR have confirmed that a sale of 50,000 tons to Italy has been cancelled, that 30,000 tons that had already been sold to a firm of French sugar brokers have been repurchased and that delivery of 20,000 tons promised to Tate and Lyle is to be deferred until 1968. Cuba has also had to buy 50,000 tons of secondhand Mexican sugar in order not to default on deliveries in June and July. There is, of course, more to this than just the shortfall in production: Cuban experts must have had a pretty good idea of the likely final production figure when many of these commitments were made, and it seems probable therefore that they went ahead in the belief that, as in the past, the Soviet Union would agree to a reduction in her scheduled purchases. Instead, it seems that the Russians are insisting, if not on their full quota, then at least on a high proportion of it. No figures are available about actual shipments to the Soviet Union, but we have been told that 80-85% of this year's sugar has been sold under bilateral trade agreements, a high proportion considering the size of the crop, from which we can deduce in rough figures that Russia has probably taken over three million tons of the four million tons called for by the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement, compared with only 1,843,000 tons last year."

WGB
WGBowdler

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-8-99

Monday, July 10, 1967
5:30 p.m.

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the full Congo memo you requested,
with direct quotations from advisers.

Pres file

In dealing with Scotty Reston (who just called),
I made three simple points:

If we had not responded to the request:

-- racial tragedy was almost certain. (We
have damped it. We may prevent it.)

-- Mobutu would almost certainly have turned
for help to the Communists.

-- We would not have the planes there to get
our people out, if it comes to a crunch.

W. W. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Situation Room

OUT-GOING MSG FORM

7a

White House
r.

8755

Number of
Pages:

3

Rec. for Trans.

Sent

FROM:

Walt Rostow

TO:

Ben Read 5/5

10/1830
LOCAL

10/1833
LOCAL

COMMENT:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

10 6 33

Received -- By: _____

Date--Time: _____

To: ss for Key Room

Monday, July 10, 1967
5:15 p.m.

7b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points on C-130's to the Congo

1. The President's action followed a unanimous positive recommendation from the Secretary of State, the U. S. Ambassador to the Congo (Robert McBride), the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence.

2. Ambassador McBride recommended the C-130's after the most sober reflection. He cabled that he was "acutely aware of the difficult moral, human, and public relations" problems involved. But he recommended "that Mobutu's request be met on basis of extreme urgency on which he has made it." McBride's reasons:

-- "It is important in present most shaky state of Congolese Government to give some specific symbol of support as we have in the past. It is difficult to overestimate the urgency of this matter."

-- "Assistance from U.S. at this timely juncture would assist in counterbalancing menacing racist feeling which is mounting. Understandably, man in street is incensed at actions of foreign, white mercenaries against his country, and this sentiment regrettably risks running to all whites. Fact that U. S. assisted Congolese Government at this time could be a key element in defusing this dangerous situation."

-- "It is important to assist Mobutu now that he faces threat from right... since we helped Congolese when they faced threat from left." This would also be important "in the broader African context."

-- "It would be most desirable to have C-130's in event local situation deteriorates and it is necessary to evacuate all Americans from Congo."

-- In the course of further urgings that the aircraft be sent (the first recommendation was made July 6), McBride commented that the C-130's must be provided if the rebellion were to be put down quickly and "the Congo is not to be set back many years economically and psychologically."

-- As the racial problem worsened in the days before the C-130's were announced, McBride cabled that "the American colony, diplomatic and otherwise, in effect is being held hostage in its entirety."

7/10/67

3. All of the abovementioned advisers to the President supported McBride's position. In addition to his arguments, they made the following points in a joint memorandum:

-- "If we should send C-130's to the Congo, we expect little if any difficulty with the Soviets as they could not behave as if they supported Tshombe or European mercenaries. On the other hand, if we let the situation deteriorate without helping Mobutu, we could expect the Soviets to try and take advantage of the situation."

-- "U. S. support would reassure Mobutu that his pro-Western policy was correct and would enable him to keep from turning in extremis to Arab states, such as Algeria or the UAR, or other African states, who might be willing to intervene."

-- "U. S. support could make it easier for us to deal with the Security Council situation where we might otherwise face a sweeping Congolese indictment of 'Western Imperialism' or of individual Western countries. Our assistance would give us leverage to persuade the Congolese to moderate their claims."

-- "Help for a Black African state would be particularly timely now against the background of the Middle East crisis." (The black Africans were heavily pro-Arab.)

4. It is important to note what the action was and what it was not. It was a favorable response to Mobutu's request for long-range logistical support needed to transport his men and materiel across a country nearly as large as India.

-- It was not the supplying of combat forces. Mobutu was specifically told that the U. S. would not supply combat troops. (The contingent of paratroops which came with the planes is the normal security guard for the aircraft, without which the JCS will not send a plane to any danger spot in the world. They are there to protect the aircraft and that is all.)

-- It was not the first step in a growing U. S. military commitment. Mobutu understands that this is all we can do.

-- It was not an example of callous disregard for the lives of our soldiers. The aircraft commanders have clear orders that the ruling criterion in any decision about their use is to be the safety of our men and equipment.

-- It was not an indication that the U. S. intends to leap into every internal problem in every African country. The Congo is a special case. It is not a civil war, it is an uprising of foreign mercenaries. The principle involved does not require us to get involved in civil conflict elsewhere on the continent.

(This is an oblique reply to the charge that we must now move into the Nigerian problem. You may want to make private use of the fact that we turned down an arms request from the Nigerian central government last week.)

5. One can make a decent case that the President's action has already provided us with one major accomplishment -- the avoidance of major racial violence on Sunday in Lubumbashi (formerly Elizabethville). The stage was set for serious trouble on Saturday. With the help of the leverage provided by the C-130 decision, we were able to get things quieted down. The lives of 100 Americans and 12,000 European whites were involved.

W. W. R.

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 10, 1967 -- 5:25 pm

Mr. President:

This is a pretty realistic and persuasive picture of Jordan as of today and the reasons for Hussein's trip to Cairo (*paras. 9-11*).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18 NARA, Date 7-8-91

RUQMJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 767
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY KUJID 461
RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHAR JM62
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 388
RUQTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 506
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 116
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 149
RUQKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 106
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 651
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 110
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 91
RUEHOT/USMISSION USUN NY 329
STATE GRNC
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 95-244
By ip, NARA, Date 1-9-96

PAGE TWO RUQMKG 185/1 ~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO AMMAN 185
EXDIS

REF: AMMAN 178

GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN (GOJ)

SUBJ: SITUATION IN JORDAN AND HUSSEIN'S TRIP TO CAIRO

1. SINCE AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO AMMAN JULY 5 WE HAVE CONDUCTED FRESH SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF GOJ ESTABLISHMENT INCLUDING PRIMIN JUMA, MININTERIOR ABDULLAH, INTELLIGENCE CHIEF KILANI, ACTING FONMIN ZU'BI FORMER PRIMIN WEECI TEL AND CHIEF OF STAFF AMER KHAMMASH. WE HAVE ALSO TAPPED ARMY OPINIONS AS WELL AS THOSE OF PRIVATE JORDANIANS TO ASSESS CURRENT MOOD AND THOUGHTS ABOUT WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR JORDAN.

2. WE CONCLUDE THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NUMBNESS AFFECTING MOST JORDANIANS SINCE JUNE 8 HAS BEGUN TO WEAR OFF. IT IS BEING REPLACED BY AN UNEASY SENSE THAT THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE OLD ORDER, WHILE STILL PRESENT, ARE NO LONGER AS STRONG AS THEY ONCE WERE. THERE IS A WIDESPREAD AWARENESS THAT THE JORDANIAN MILITARY DID NOT DO AS WELL AS IT SHOULD AND COULD HAVE DONE DURING THE FIGHTING AND THERE IS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT; BOTH ATTITUDES REFLECT AND ENHANCE A GENERAL RESTLESSNESS AMONG THE POPULACE.

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 185/1 ~~SECRET~~
WHILE THE KING RETAINS HIS FOLLOWING, HE IS LESS POPULAR THAN BEFORE THE HOSTILITIES. NONETHELESS, EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE STILL LOOKING TO HUSSEIN TO PUT THINGS BACK TOGETHER AND SOMEHOW PULL A RABBIT OUT OF THE HAT. THAT THERE WILL BE AN EARLY SHAKEUP IN THE GOVERNMENT AND IN THE ARMY IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND IT IS HELD VITAL THAT THE KING SECURES A DIPLOMATIC VICTORY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE KING'S ADVISORS RECOGNIZE THE NEED FOR SOMETHING DRAMATIC TO HAPPEN SOON WHICH WILL AFFECT THE WEST BANK IN JORDAN'S FAVOR. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, THESE ADVISORS PREDICT THAT THE "PRESENT SITUATION" PROBABLY CANNOT LAST BEYOND ANOTHER 30-60 DAYS.

3. THE GOVERNMENT IS GENERALLY RATED AS INADEQUATE FOR THE CHALLENGES CONFRONTING IT. CRITICISMS ARE MOUNTING ABOUT PRIME MINISTER JUMA AND THE CABINET ALTHOUGH NO NAMES OF POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS ARE YET CIRCULATING. ABSENTEEISM IS REPORTEDLY RIFE IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, A REFLECTION OF THE CABINET'S TIMIDITY ABOUT TAKING ANY PLANNING INITIATIVES. (ONE ENCOURAGING SIGN IS THAT THE CABINET HAS JUST AGREED TO ALLOT 4.5 MILLION DINARS FOR IMMEDIATE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS IN

~~PAGE FOUR RUOMKG 185/1 SECRET~~
EFFORT TO STIMULATE THE ECONOMY.)

4. THE ARMY'S RECORD IS UNDER ATTACK. PRAISE FOR (JAF) JORDAN ARMED FORCE "GALLANTRY" REMAINS THE OFFICIAL GOJ LINE BUT IS CAUSING RESENTMENT ON PART OF SOME OFFICERS WHO CRITICIZE THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES FOR CONTINUED ATTEMPTS TO GULL THE PUBLIC. THESE OFFICERS STATE VERY FEW IN JAF EVEN SAW AN ISRAELI SOLDIER AND THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO WERE IN COMBAT FOUGHT BADLY. ("JAF FATALITIES, IT NOW APPEARS, WERE PROBABLY UNDER 500 IN CONTRAST TO THE ORIGINAL ESTIMATE OF 15,000 AND THE MILITARY'S "GLORIOUS SACRIFICE" IS CORRESPONDINGLY DISCREDITED.) WE HEAR CRITICISM OF REGIME'S PLACING OF JAF UNDER COMMAND OF (UAR) GENERAL RIYADH; HOWEVER, IF RIYADH IS BEING BLAMED, SO IS JORDANIAN GENERAL STAFF FOR TACTICAL BLUNDERS. GENERAL KHAMMASH HAS TOLD US OF THE PRESENT INFIGHTING AMONG THE JAF'S GENERAL STAFF WITH EACH TRYING TO OUTBID THE OTHER TO AFFIRM HIS PATRIOTISM AND READINESS TO RESUME THE FIGHT. KHAMMASH RECALLED THAT SOME OF THESE GENERALS, BY ATTEMPTING TO BLOCK THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW, HAD SERIOUSLY MISJUDGED THE REALITIES OF JUNE 5-8 AND, IN KHAMMASH'S VIEW, THEY ARE "STILL LIVING

UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC

~~PAGE FIVE RUOMKG 185/1 SECRET~~
WITH THEIR FANTASIES." DESPITE FOREGOING EVIDENCE OF UNREST AMONG THE MILITARY, WE HAVE NO RUMORS OF ANY INCIPIENT ARMY PLOTS AGAINST THE REGIME. HUSSEIN HAS BEEN WARNED HE SHOULD PURGE THE ARMY LEADERSHIP BUT HAS INDICATED HE IS RELUCTANT TO DO SO EXCEPT ON A GRADUAL, NON-DRAMATIC BASIS. WE DOUBT HE CAN LET MUCH MORE TIME PASS WITHOUT CARRYING OUT A WIDE RANGING SHAKEUP.

GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S

REASONS

5. REFUGEES, WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO BEGIN THEIR RETURN TO WEST BANK TODAY, MAY BE DELAYED FOR REASONS OF GOJ'S DISORGANIZATION, (GOI'S) ANNOUNCED INTENT OF SCREENING ALL RETURNÉES AND, EQUALLY IMPORTANTLY, BY THE FACTS THAT NOT ALL THE CONDITIONS WHICH IMPELLED THEM TO FLEE IN THE FIRST PLACE HAVE YET BEEN ALTERED. (STORIES ARE REPORTEDLY CIRCULATING ABOUT INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF KINDNESS SHOWN REFUGEES BY (IDF). THIS COULD HAVE A VERY BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON THEIR DESIRE TO RETURN, AS WELL AS ON GENERAL JORDANIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAELIS,) GOJ REMAINS DETERMINED SOMEHOW TO FORCE A RETURN EN MASSE BUT MODALITIES STILL UNCLEAR. THE DISPERSAL OF REFUGEES INTO CAMPS AWAY FROM POPULATION CENTERS HAS REMOVED ANY IMMEDIATE SECURITY THREAT FROM THIS SOURCE.

ISRAELI DEFENSE
FORCES

6. IRAQI FORCES IN JORDAN TOTAL SOME 15,000. WE HAVE NO REPORTS INDICATING THEY CONSTITUTE THREAT TO THE REGIME BUT IT ONLY LOGICAL TO ASSUME THAT THEIR PRESENCE IS A FACTOR WHICH GOVERNMENT MUST CONSIDER IN WEIGHING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ITS FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION. BURNS

EXDIS

7. PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS HIGHLY VOLATILE WITH THE MAN IN THE STREET INDULGING IN FLIGHTS OF ROMANTICISM ABOUT REGAINING ARAB RIGHTS AND PRESTIGE THROUGH A VARIETY OF MEASURES INCLUDING TURNING TO THE COMMUNISTS, ORGANIZING GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND GOING BACK TO THE "GOOD OLD DAYS" OF BEDOUIN SUBSISTENCE EXISTENCE WHILE FORCING THE WEST TO ITS KNEES THROUGH A PROLONGED CUTOFF OF ARAB OIL. EVEN RATIONAL JORDANIANS ARE WARNING US "NEVER TO UNDERESTIMATE THE ARABS' CAPACITY FOR SUICIDAL ACTION."

8. **ALTHOUGH** THE AMBASSADOR HAS NOT TALKED DIRECTLY WITH **HUSSEIN SINCE** THE KING'S RETURN TO AMMAN ON FRIDAY EVENING, **JULY 7** THE AMBASSADOR WAS PLANNING TO ASK TO SEE THE KING TODAY-- **THE AMBASSADOR** DID SPEND TWO HOURS YESTERDAY WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR RADHI ABDULLA AND THREE HOURS WITH CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL KHAMMASH, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN WITH THE KING **MOST OF** SATURDAY AND SUNDAY. ADDITIONALLY, ~~EMBASSY~~ *EMBASSY OFFICIAL* **SAW SECURITY** CHIEF MOHAMMAD RASOUL KILANI AFTER HE, TOO, **HAD SPENT** CONSIDERABLE TIME WITH THE KING.

9. TOP GOJ LEADERSHIP HAS ASSESSED THAT THE CHANCES OF A SUMMIT BEING CONVENED BY JULY 15 ARE NOT PROMISING. HUSSEIN

PAGE THREE RUQMKG 185/2 ~~SECRET~~

DECIDED TO GO TO CAIRO SOME TIME THIS WEEK WITH THREE PURPOSES IN MIND: A. TO ASCERTAIN JUST WHAT THE SITUATION IS IN CAIRO; B. TO SOLICIT NASSER'S ASSISTANCE IN PRESURING OTHER ARAB STATES TO AGREE TO AN EARLY SUMMIT; AND C. MOST IMPORTANTLY, TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER NASSER WOULD BE WILLING TO MAKE A SETTLEMENT WITH THE ISRAELIS.

10. TOP GOJ LEADERSHIP REALIZING THAT SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE COURSE FOR JORDAN. THEY CALCULATE THAT IT WOULD BE SUICIDE FOR JORDAN TO RISK TAKING SUCH AN ACTION ON HER OWN--GOJ IS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF ITS OWN PEOPLE, MORE UNEASY ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE ARMY, AND IN ANY EVENT QUITE CERTAIN THAT IN THE CASE OF A UNILATERAL SETTLEMENT, THE OTHER ARAB STATES WOULD TEAR JORDAN TO PIECES.

TOP GOJ LEADERSHIP CALCULATES, HOWEVER, THAT IF HUSSEIN COULD GET NASSER TO GO ALONG WITH HIM ON A SETTLEMENT, THE TWO OF THEM COULD PULL IT OFF AND COULD STAND UP AGAINST THE CALUMNY OF ALGERIA, IRAQ AND SYRIA. IF NASSER WILL NOT GO FOR A SETTLEMENT, JORDANIAN LEADERSHIP FEELS THAT IT WILL BE JUST ABOUT AS BOXED IN AS IT

PAGE FOUR RUQMKG 185/2 ~~SECRET~~

WAS FIVE WEEKS AGO WHEN THEY FELT THEY HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SIGN THE DEFENSE PACT WITH NASSER.

11. THE FACT THAT HUSSEIN LEFT FOR CAIRO THIS MORNING WAS, INsofar AS WE CAN TELL, NOT ANTICIPATED LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON BY TOP GOJ LEADERSHIP. WE CAN ONLY SURMISE THAT PERHAPS BOUMEDIENNE'S PRESENCE IN CAIRO HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH ADVANCING HUSSEIN'S TRAVEL PLANS, BUT ON WHOSE INITIATIVE IS UNCLEAR. ~~GP3~~

BURNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, July 10, 1967
4:45 p.m..

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk told me the third item in the attached memo; but to protect Dobrynin he is not telling anyone in the State Department.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 95-305
By sig, NARA Date 8-27-96

WWRostow:rln

92

~~TOP SECRET~~

July 10, 1967

Mr. President:

You should know the following:

a) When Mr. Radvanyi, the Chargé d'Affaires of Hungary, defected recently, he told us that there had never been anything received from Hanoi to back up the pretensions of Foreign Minister Peter of Hungary when the latter talked to me about the possibility of peace in Viet-Nam and tried to have me believe that he was in serious and responsible contact with Hanoi.

b) We have learned through Japanese sources that North Vietnamese officials told Japanese contacts that Hanoi had said no to the Poles at the very beginning of the exercise we went through with Lewandowski and Rapacki in December of last year.

c) Ambassador Dobrynin told me very privately last Saturday that he himself had carefully inspected the records on the alleged U Thant contact through Mr. Suslov, a Russian member of the Secretariat, in 1964-early 1965 and that there had never been any communication from Moscow to Suslov. Dobrynin emphasized that it was quite impossible for a man in Suslov's position to receive an instruction which he, Dobrynin, did not know about. Dobrynin said that "he could say categorically that Suslov had received no instruction whatsoever relating to an approach from Hanoi or to the possibility of talks in Rangoon." He added that it was possible that Suslov had made some idle personal remark at a dinner or something like that which had been misinterpreted by U Thant.

It is of extreme importance that we protect
Dobrynin for passing along this piece of information.

Dean Rusk

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-56
By CG, NARA Date 7-25-00

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Monday, July 10, 1967 -- 4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

On a courtesy call to introduce his new DCM, Mr. Tomkins, Pat Dean left this British speculative paper on the recall to Hanoi of North Vietnamese representatives.

Evidently the British are not aware that a number of these representatives have initiated probes in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the paper is worth reading, especially the shrewd judgment that the test of seriousness on the part of Hanoi may lie in "some reciprocity for an American move." True seriousness, however, would lie in a willingness to go off secretly and discuss the shape of a final settlement.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-437
By 118, NARA, Date 12-2-92

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

RECALL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVES

In the absence of any hard facts we can do no more than speculate on what might be happening in Hanoi.

2. We are inclined to think that any reappraisal of North Vietnamese policy is more likely to be the result of recent developments in North Vietnamese relations with the Chinese, rather than of Soviet performance in the Middle East war. A recent article in Hoc Tap made it clear that the North Vietnamese are determined not to undergo any form of cultural revolution: this would clearly be disastrous for their war effort. At the same time the North Vietnamese may well be increasingly anxious about the effects of continued disturbances in China upon their supplies. This, coupled with any feeling that the Soviet Union would not risk a real confrontation with the Americans on their behalf, might possibly be predisposing the North Vietnamese leaders to adopt a more flexible attitude towards negotiations, and the West in general, in the hope of making political gains in the foreseeable future.

3. At the same time North Vietnamese analysis of their military position in the South may well be that, despite heavy losses, they retain sufficient military initiative to defeat all American attempts to eliminate them from the South. It is therefore possible that with the advent of the rainy season we may see a renewal of the North Vietnamese tactics of seeing if they can open negotiations on their own terms while at the same time continuing the fighting.

4. On the other hand, we see no evidence that the Communists are yet prepared to modify their position that only after a complete cessation of U.S. bombing could negotiations begin. Equally there is no evidence yet that they would agree to negotiations except on known North Vietnamese terms (i.e. the four points). What we should be looking for, therefore, is any shift in Hanoi's position which could indicate some reciprocity for an American move.

5. The evidence on which to base any assessment of the reasons for the recall of the North Vietnamese representatives is so slim that we would not wish the above speculation to be treated as anything but ephemeral, and certainly not as a basis for suggesting any particular course of action. It is quite possible that decisions may already have been taken in Hanoi, and the overseas representatives summoned simply to get their orders. Nevertheless, if there is a reappraisal still going on, any clear stepping up of the military effort on the American side would not, in our view, predispose the North Vietnamese to a "softer" line: rather the opposite.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 11-8-99~~SECRET~~

W.W.R

11

11

Monday, July 10, 1967, 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a short message to deGaulle on Bastille Day (July 14). It is cooler than in the past, but friendly enough in light of recent French antics.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

FMB:LSE:mst

11a

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT DEGAULLE

Dear Mr. President:

I send you and the people of France, on this national holiday of the French Republic, the congratulations and warm best wishes of the people of the United States.

Lyndon B. Johnson

12

LOU Monday - July 10, 1967
3:30 pm

Mr. President

President Diaz Ordaz has written you expressing appreciation for the information he received on your talks with Kosygin (Tab A). He makes special reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

I suggest that you send him the short acknowledgement at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

LOU

12a

July 10, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your thoughtful comments of June 29 on the usefulness of frank meetings between heads of state. Whether between friends or rivals, such talks are valuable, as demonstrated by Punta del Este and Glassboro.

I particularly appreciate your support for the achievement of a realistic and workable Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Mexico's role in the negotiations at Geneva has been most constructive. I sincerely hope that all of us working together can achieve this treaty which is so important for the peace of the world.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

11

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ig, NARA, Date 2-13-96

His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States

LBJ/WGB:mm

LS NO. 5274
T-114/R-XXXII
Spanish

12b

DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MEXICO

Tlatelolco, D.F., June 29, 1967

Sir:

President Díaz Ordaz has requested me to convey to you the following message for President Lyndon B. Johnson:

"Mr. President:

"I thank you for your message of yesterday, received through Mr. Dearborn, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, in which you were so good as to give me information and your impressions concerning the conversations that you held on June 23 and 25 with Mr. Kosygin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.

"I have always believed not only in the usefulness, but also in the necessity, of communication between States -- a necessary prerequisite to the solution, by peaceful means, of the problems faced by the world; and I am convinced that that necessity is all the greater when countries such as the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, countries whose extraordinary industrial and military power causes them to have a very special responsibility for the maintenance of peace, are involved.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

Mr. Henry Dearborn,

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the United States of America,
City.

"It was not to be expected, of course, that in two conversations, however lengthy, differences could be settled, which derive from deep-rooted causes and reflect diverging interests that no Head of Government can change of his own will.

"But it is heartening--and it seems to me that this is something that world public opinion has failed to appreciate--that the conversations took place in a frank and cordial atmosphere, and that at least on the specific question of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, you consider some progress to have been made.

"Mexico is taking a most active part in the discussions now in progress at Geneva concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty, for we consider that, until other steps can be taken towards the final prohibition of nuclear weapons, it will be a positive step now to ensure that countries which still do not have them, particularly the developing countries, do not divert their limited resources to obtain such instruments of destruction. That, as you know, is why my Government has taken such an interest in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, already signed by eighteen countries, to prohibit such weapons in Latin America.

"I convey to you, Mr. President, a most cordial greeting."
I renew to you the assurances of my high consideration.

(signed) Antonio Carrillo F.

Antonio Carrillo Flores

12c

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By 108, NARA, Date 8-11-93

SECRETARIO
DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES
MEXICO.

Tlatelolco, D. F., a 29 de junio de 1967.

Señor Encargado de Negocios:

El señor Presidente Díaz Ordaz me ha pedido transmitir a Su Señoría el siguiente mensaje para el señor Presidente Lyndon B. Johnson:

"Muy estimado señor Presidente: Agradezco a usted su mensaje del día de ayer, que recibí por conducto del señor Encargado de Negocios a. i. Dearborn y en el que tiene la atención de darme a conocer algunos datos y sus impresiones con respecto a las pláticas - que tuvo los días 23 y 25 del actual con el señor Primer Ministro de la - Unión Soviética Kosygin.

"Siempre he creído no sólo en la conveniencia sino en la necesidad de la comunicación entre los Estados como un supuesto necesario para la resolución, por vías pacíficas, de los problemas que confronta el mundo y estoy convencido de que esa necesidad es mayor tratándose de países como Estados Unidos de América y la Unión de Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas a quienes su extraordinario poderío industrial y militar hace que tengan una muy especial responsabilidad en el mantenimiento de la paz.

"No era de esperarse, naturalmente, que en dos conversaciones, por amplias que fuesen, se lograra conciliar diferencias, que además derivan de causas profundas y reflejan intereses también diversos, que ningún Jefe de Gobierno puede por su sola voluntad variar.

Su Señoría Henry Dearborn,

Encargado de Negocios a. i. de Estados Unidos de América,

C i u d a d .

"Es sin embargo alentador, y me parece que esto es algo que no ha dejado de apreciar la opinión pública mundial, que las conversaciones se hayan llevado en un ambiente franco y amistoso y que, al menos en el punto concreto del Tratado para la no - Proliferación de Armas Nucleares, usted considere que se logró - algún progreso.

"México viene participando con mucho empeño en - las conversaciones que están teniendo lugar en Ginebra con respecto al Tratado de no Proliferación, pues consideramos que entre tanto que no se puedan dar otros pasos para la proscripción definitiva de las armas nucleares, será ya un hecho positivo lograr que los - países que todavía no las tienen, y particularmente los pueblos en desarrollo, no distraigan sus limitados recursos en buscar esos instrumentos de destrucción. Esa es, como usted sabe, la razón por la cual mi Gobierno ha tomado tanto empeño en el Tratado de Tlatelolco, suscrito ya por dieciocho países, para la proscripción de tales armas en la América Latina.

"Envío a usted, señor Presidente, un saludo muy cordial".

Reitero a usted las seguridades de mi atenta consideración y aprecio.



Antonio Carrillo Flores.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 10, 1967
2:45 p. m.

13

MR. PRESIDENT:

I talked with Bob Anderson about Milton Eisenhower. Also about the politics of getting the Canal Treaties through.

1. Because of a troublesome back, Milton Eisenhower doesn't want a full-time job. He would be happy to serve as a consultant on specific projects -- for a week, a month, or longer; but he does not wish to carry the burden of regular line responsibility. He is available from right now and would be prepared to accept a title on a consulting basis.

I asked Bob if he had in mind any specific tasks he would recommend right now as appropriate. He said he would give it some thought and let us know. He did not think -- nor did Milton Eisenhower -- that he could help on the Canal Treaty because its opponents believe his "soft" views excessively influenced President Eisenhower in this matter.

2. On the treaties, he thought our key problem was Senator Russell who said that, although he might be judged old-fashioned, he did not believe in any change whatsoever. Similar views will be taken by the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the D. A. R., and some southern state legislatures. Bob says the trouble with that view is that its proponents wouldn't like to fight against protracted guerrilla warfare to protect the Canal, either. He mentioned a number of people we should mobilize: Meany, Reuther, the church people, Arthur Fleming, Allan Shivers. I suggested he make a list for us and we'd find ways to follow through. He will do that.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By SP, NARA, Date 8-11-93

14

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, July 10, 1967
12:45 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This prisoner may have been telling us
what he thought we wanted to hear, but there
have been others captured in Laos with a
similar view.

W.A.R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

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ROUTINE

IN 07125

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	SDO	AID
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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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080704Z

CITE

DIST 8 JULY 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: MARCH 1967

SUBJECT: POOR MORALE AMONG NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND

POPULACE: EFFECTS OF BOMBING

ACQ: LAOS, VIENTIANE (6 JULY 1967)

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

FROM

NORTH VIETNAMESE CORPORAL WHO WAS WOUNDED IN COMBAT
AND GAVE HIMSELF UP TO A ROYAL LAO ARMY UNIT

1. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME SENIOR LAO DONG PARTY CADRES,
MOST OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE DISCOURAGED AND AFRAID.
THE DESERTION RATE AMONG THE COMMUNIST TROOPS IS MOUNTING DAILY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-55
By CB, NARA Date 2-16-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

AND HAS REACHED 40 PERCENT, COMPARED TO FIVE PERCENT IN PAST YEARS. AS FOR THE MONTAGNARD PEOPLES SUCH AS THAI AND MEO IN THE LAI CHAU-SON LA AREA, 80 PERCENT HAVE DESERTED. IN THE CASE OF A COMPANY OF MONTAGNARDS WHICH HAD JUST BEEN FORMED IN TRUYEN'S BATTALION (FIRST BATTALION OF THE 335TH INDEPENDENT REGIMENT), ALL THE SOLDIERS DESERTED, LEAVING ONLY THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS. COMMENT: CONSIDERING THE TIGHT POPULATION CONTROLS IN NORTH VIETNAM, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT SUCH DESERTIONS COULD OBTAIN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT IT IS OCCURRING IN THE RUGGED HIGHLAND COUNTRY AND AMONG THE MONTAGNARDS, TRADITIONALLY HOSTILE TO THE VIETNAMESE.)

2. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POPULACE IS DISGUSTED WITH THE WAR AND WANTS TO HAVE PEACE. THE LIVING STANDARD IS EXTREMELY LOW. FAMINE HAS OCCURRED IN A NUMBER OF LOCALITIES AND THE DAILY RATIONS HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED IN THEM. RELIGIOUS BELIEF IS FORBIDDEN AND THE PEOPLE HAVE LOST THEIR LIBERTY AND ARE FORCED TO SUPPORT THE WAR WHICH THEY FEAR AND HATE.

3. TRUYEN WITNESSED THE BOMBING OF HANOI IN WHICH THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMBASSY AND OTHER OFFICES ON THE RUE BORGUIS DISBORDE (PHO TRANG TIEN) WERE SERIOUSLY DAMAGED. COMMENT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>

THE BOMBINGS

AT DIEN-BIEN PHU, WHERE TRUYEN WAS STATIONED, AND OTHER PLACES WERE ON TARGET AND CAUSED GREAT LOSS OF MATERIEL. FEW INHABITANTS OR TROOPS HAVE BEEN KILLED. THE SCHOOL FOR OFFICER CANDIDATES AT SON LA WAS BOMBED. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs (C)

4.

5.

DISSEM: STATE ARMY AIR CINCPAC MACV 7TH AIR FORCE PACFLT PACAF ARPAC (ALSO SENT SAIGON

~~CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

15

Profile

July 10, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By isp, NARA, Date 8-11-93

Dear Mr. President:

I appreciate your thoughtful comments of June 29 on the usefulness of frank meetings between heads of state. Whether between friends or rivals, such talks are valuable, as demonstrated by Punta del Este and Glassboro.

I particularly appreciate your support for the achievement of a realistic and workable Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Mexico's role in the negotiations at Geneva has been most constructive. I sincerely hope that all of us working together can achieve this treaty which is so important for the peace of the world.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

15. We deeply appreciate the good work that

His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States

you have done in recent days in the U.N. Ambassador Goldberg says you and Tony Canillo Jones have been superb - R-

WWR

16

1. sup
2. Pres file

July 10, 1967

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a short note thanking Icelandic President Asgeirsson for his Fourth of July message to you (Tab B). State approves.

Your reply notes that you look forward to seeing him on July 18 (he is coming for an informal visit).

I suggest we not release the message here, but tell the Icelanders they can do so.

Francis M. Bator

OK ☒

No ☐

Speak to me ☐

16 a

SUGGESTED REPLY TO PRESIDENT ASGEIRSSON OF ICELAND

The American people and I were grateful for your kind Independence Day message. It will be a great pleasure to welcome you to Washington on July 18.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By WJP, NARA, Date 8-11-93

Monday, July 10, 1967

WJP
17
+ WJP
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Revision of NSAM 338 (September 15, 1965) Policy
Concerning United States Efforts in the Development
of Foreign Communications Capabilities

NSAM 338 approved September 15, 1965 states the policy of the United States with respect to helping other countries develop their communications capabilities by means of satellites. This NSAM directed General J. D. O'Connell, as the President's communications advisor, to keep the President informed of any proposed changes in the policy stated in NSAM 338.

The responsible agencies, in cooperation with General O'Connell, have been reviewing our actual experience in carrying out NSAM 338 and evaluating various proposals for improving international cooperation in space. In part, this review was initiated as a result of an allegation that NSAM 338 was an "irritant" in our international relations, even though there was general agreement that it was necessary for the Government to restrict the export of technology that might be used to increase competition with the international communications system under INTELSAT or to develop military launch vehicle technology. The results of the review were decisive. It was determined that the policy expressed in NSAM 338 is not a deterrent to cooperation, nor is it contributing to the technology gap between the U. S. and friendly foreign countries.

The review, however, did uncover redundancies and ambiguities in language that tended to confuse the policy and make administration more difficult. In addition, the policy was reviewed in light of the upcoming 1969 INTELSAT negotiations and certain language changes were made to strengthen the U. S. position by stating more clearly the U. S. support for the principles underlying INTELSAT.

A revised statement, embodying the improvements outlined above, has been submitted for your approval. It has the concurrence of the Departments of State and Defense, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration. In addition, it has been coordinated with the staff of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the Office of Science and Technology, and the Communications Satellite Corporation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In view of the current overall review of our policy relating to international and domestic communications by satellite that Mr. McPherson is carrying on, and with which my staff has been associated, the revised NSAM was checked with Mr. Pierson on Mr. McPherson's staff and it is in line with our thinking.

I recommend that you approve the revised NSAM 338.

W. W. ROSTOW

Approved

☒

Disapproved

☐

See me

☐

CEJ:em

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17a

June 28, 1967

Policy Concerning U. S. Assistance in
the Development of Foreign Communications
Satellite Capabilities

Purpose

The purpose of this directive is to provide policy guidance for various elements of the United States Government in dealing with requests from foreign nations or foreign business entities for the transfer of, or other assistance in the field of, space technology applicable to communication satellite systems.

Policy

1. The United States is committed to the encouragement of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space. One important use of space is the improvement of communications. In this regard, it is the policy of the United States to support and promote continuing development of a single global commercial communications satellite system. The United States Government is committed to the use of global commercial communications facilities for general governmental communications purposes wherever satellite circuits are required and commercial circuits of the type and **quality** needed to meet government requirements can be made available on a timely basis and in accordance with applicable tariff or, in the absence of Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction, at reasonable cost. Separate satellite communications facilities including surface terminals may be established and maintained by the United States Government to meet unique governmental needs or, as may be determined by the President, when otherwise needed in the national interest. The capacity of these separate facilities shall be limited to that essential to meet such unique needs.

GROUP 3

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intervals; not automatically
declassified

No Foreign Dissemination

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

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2

2. In view of the above factors, within the limits fixed by national security considerations and other pertinent regulations, the United States may decline to make available space technology to other nations when (a) such technology is critical to the development of a communications satellite capability and (b) it has been determined that this technology will be used in a manner inconsistent with the concept of and commitments to the continuing development of a single global commercial communications satellite system as embodied in the 1964 Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system and the related Special Agreement (TIAS 5646) or subsequent definitive arrangements or (in the case of military systems) will be used in a manner inconsistent with the concepts of the United States national defense communications **satellite** system, as discussed in paragraph 3. The same limitations **will apply whenever** the United States assists nations to launch communications satellites for either experimental or operational purposes.

3. The United States has established a national defense communications satellite system to accommodate the unique and vital United States National Security requirements that cannot be met by commercial facilities. It is United States policy to encourage selected allied nations to use the United States national defense communications satellite system, rather than to develop independent systems. Costs of such use shall normally be borne by the participating foreign nations. Foreign use of the United States national defense communications satellite system shall, however, like United States use thereof, be restricted to accommodation of the participant's unique and vital national security requirements that cannot be met by commercial facilities.

4. For purposes of this policy statement, the restraints on the transfer of technology and provision of assistance are intended to refer to those of the following which are critical to the development of a communications satellite capability in terms of time, quality, or cost: complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; detailed engineering drawings pertaining to complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; production techniques and equipment, and manufacturing or fabrication processes pertaining to complete satellites or launch vehicles or components thereof; launch services. It is not intended that this policy statement apply to surface terminals and stations or limit dissemination of information concerning systems concepts, description of spacecraft, and normal scientific and technical publications of a professional character. Furthermore, this

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3

shall not limit the dissemination of information required to be disclosed by Article 10(f) of the Special Agreement of 1964.

5. Requests for provision of technology or other assistance to a foreign nation will be assessed on a case by case basis in relation to the principles set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4 above. If necessary, government agencies may seek to determine the nature of the intended use of the technology or other assistance and need not rely on the intention stated by the requestor. After a review of each request by interested government agencies, it may be decided, consistent with the principles of paragraph 2, to deny an export license for requested technology or to decline to provide other requested assistance.

6. Implementation of restraints provided for in this policy statement shall be through the Munitions Control licensing procedure for items on the United States Munitions List and through the Department of Commerce's export licensing procedure for items not covered by the Munitions List and within the scope of both established procedures.

7. The foregoing policies shall be kept under review by the Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications/Director of Telecommunications Management and the agencies and departments concerned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2481

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

17-6

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 28, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By inf, NARA, Date 8-11-93

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Revision of NSAM 338 (September 15, 1965) Policy
Concerning United States Efforts in the Development of
Foreign Communications Capabilities

This memorandum is provided in accordance with my responsibility under NSAM 338 to keep the President informed of any proposed changes to subject policy. A proposed revision of this policy is attached for consideration by the National Security Council and the President. Approval is recommended.

During the March 23, 1966, meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, the Vice-President asked members to examine objectives and programs to determine whether proposals might be developed for making international cooperation in space more effective. During this meeting the Vice-President appointed a sub-committee under the Department of State (later designated: Working Group on Expanded International Cooperation in Space). In cooperation with my office and other Government agencies, the working group reviewed a number of proposals. NSAM 338 was considered to be a primary "irritant" and at the working group's recommendation, U. Alexis Johnson, in a letter of September 3, 1966, requested that I review NSAM 338, "especially those provisions which relate to the export of communications satellite technology."

In response to Mr. Johnson's request, I held a number of meetings of the Ad Hoc Intra Governmental Communications Satellite Policy Coordinating Committee, Panel #1, during the period October 11, 1966, through January 6, 1967, for the purpose of reviewing NSAM 338 policy with a view toward revision if justified.

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automatically declassified

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2

The essential purpose of NSAM 338 policy is to avoid assisting development inimical to the establishment and operation of a single global commercial communications satellite system. The policy as presently written is, in some respects restrictive, but it also includes guidance for release of space technology to INTELSAT member nations for use in connection with the establishment of the single global system.

The desires expressed to eliminate or revise NSAM 338 policy arose essentially from the belief that it inhibits United States efforts to increase cooperation with foreign nations in space technology. Evidence to support the opinion that NSAM 338 has been a significant deterrent has not been found. During 1966 there were fewer than ten cases involving government-to-government requests for assurances that United States export technology would not be used in competition with INTELSAT or (under NSAM 294) that launch vehicle technology would not be used for other than peaceful purposes. In no case had the Department of State requested foreign assurances under NSAM 338 exclusively. In all cases where assurances were requested, no responses were ever received.

In light of the very small number of requests that were disapproved and in consideration of the fact that United States export controls apply primarily to Military articles, the extent to which NSAM 338 has contributed to the technology gap between United States and friendly foreign countries appears to be negligible.

The many discussions between United States Government agencies during the review of NSAM 338 did, however, bring to light some redundancies and verbosity which might have tended to confuse. Such inadequacies were eliminated. We also considered, in light of the 1969 INTELSAT negotiations, that the request for government-to-government assurances might be misinterpreted by some INTELSAT members desiring to develop arguments to weaken the United States position during the negotiations or that the requirement for assurances might be misinterpreted by potential new members to INTELSAT. The revised version of the policy eliminates this requirement yet retains the controls necessary to United States National Defense purposes and the support of the INTELSAT single global system.

The attached revised NSAM 338 policy statement has the concurrence of:

Department of State
Department of Defense

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

Federal Communications Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Federal Aviation Administration

and has been coordinated with:

Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
National Aeronautics and Space Council
Office of Science and Technology
Communications Satellite Corporation.



J. D. O'Connell

Attachment

cc: Mr. Bromley Smith
Mr. DeVier Pierson
Mr. Charles E. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 15, 1965

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 338

TO: Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications
and Director of Telecommunications Management
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Commerce
Administrator, National Aeronautics & Space Administration
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission

SUBJECT: Policy Concerning U. S. Assistance in the Development
of Foreign Communications Satellite Capabilities

The President has noted and concurred in the promulgation of the national policy statement concerning U. S. assistance in the development of foreign communications satellite capabilities, transmitted to him by a memorandum dated August 25, 1965, from J. D. O'Connell, Special Assistant to the President for Telecommunications and Director of Telecommunications Management.

The President also noted that the policy will be kept under review by his Special Assistant for Telecommunications in collaboration with the departments and agencies concerned, and will be updated as necessary in the light of changing circumstances.

The President will look to his Special Assistant for Telecommunications to keep him informed of any proposed changes in policy that will require his personal attention and decision.

McGeorge Bundy

Information copies

Director, Bureau of the Budget
Executive Secretary, NASC
Special Assistant for Science & Technology
Communications Satellite Corporation

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By 100, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18

Monday, July 10, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Prime Minister Holt

You will recall Prime Minister Holt's latest message dated July 3 (copy attached).

The text of a suggested reply is attached for your approval.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Text approved ✓

See me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-8-91

July 11, 1967

Dear Harold:

I appreciate very much receiving your letter of July 3 with the kind expression from you and Zara regarding our recent visits together. It was a great lift to my spirits to see you again.

Lady Bird was terribly disappointed not to be with us at Camp David, but I am sure you understood that Luci needed her. All went well and I have now seen the young man, who looks like a strapping character. Many thanks for your kind words.

I also have your July 5 letter to me on the British defense position. I have weighed in again with Harold Wilson, and Dean Rusk did so in more detail with George Brown. By the time you receive this letter, we may know what the effect has been of our concerted effort. I believe that we have presented our case as forcefully and logically as possible, and I trust it will have a real effect on the thinking of the British Cabinet.

Turning to the economic issues raised in your letter of July 3, I share your disappointment that despite the strenuous efforts of the officials of both our governments no agreement could be reached on the problems of wool and tobacco. I do understand, however, the political pressures from your tobacco farmers, which made it impossible for your officials to offer more extensive concessions on tobacco. At the same time I hope you can appreciate why it was impossible for us to cut the duty on wool without significant concessions to counter the economic problems and political pressures we face with our wool growers.

On the dairy products, I believe the action I took was the only realistic course open to me, against the background of the very strong feelings of our dairy farmers and the real threat of even more restrictive legislation. Nevertheless, within the over-all level of our dairy imports, we are making allocations which will assure Australia at least its historic share of the trade.

On the matter of the interest equalization tax, I understand that our Treasury people have been in direct contact with yours in the past days. I believe there is now an understanding of the

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By inj, NARA, Date 8-11-93

range of possibilities available to you in the plan outlined in Secretary Fowler's letter to Mr. McMahon of July 24. I hope this plan will lead to a satisfactory arrangement for solving the question of your borrowing here.

Thank you especially for your thoughtful views on Viet-Nam. I agree with your feelings on the timing of another "Manila-type" conference, and we should continue to keep in touch on this. As to force requirements, Secretary McNamara is, as you know, on the ground now assessing General Westmoreland's recommendations in the light of the over-all situation. I appreciate the factors you mention, and of course we shall be reaching no decisions until we have assessed McNamara's conclusions from the trip with great care. But we may well have to do significantly more, simply to meet the military necessities of what the other side is doing, and I want to say frankly that if the need for additional forces become clear, we shall need to talk fairly urgently with you and the other troop-contributing nations on whether a substantial part of the need can be met by others. Even since our meetings, it is plain that key members of our Congress feel very strongly about this, and I am sure you would agree that additional burdens should be shared as equitably as possible. I will keep you posted on our thinking as it develops.

Lady Bird joins me in sending our fondest regards to all of you, and in hoping that we soon again will be together.

Sincerely,

13/ LBJ

Today I received your friends Ronald McDonald and Graham Perkins of the Melbourne Age and had a very pleasant visit.

The Right Honorable
Harold E. Holt
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 11, 1967

Dear Harold:

I appreciate very much receiving your letter of July 3 with the kind expression from you and Zara regarding our recent visits together. It was a great lift to my spirits to see you again.

Lady Bird was terribly disappointed not to be with us at Camp David, but I am sure you understood that Luci needed her. All went well and I have now seen the young man, who looks like a strapping character. Many thanks for your kind words.

I also have your July 5 letter to me on the British defense position. I have weighed in again with Harold Wilson, and Dean Rusk did so in more detail with George Brown. By the time you receive this letter, we may know what the effect has been of our concerted effort. I believe that we have presented our case as forcefully and logically as possible, and I trust it will have a real effect on the thinking of the British Cabinet.

Turning to the economic issues raised in your letter of July 3, I share your disappointment that despite the strenuous efforts of the officials of both our governments no agreement could be reached on the problems of wool and tobacco. I do understand, however, the political pressures from your tobacco farmers, which made it impossible for your officials to offer more extensive concessions on tobacco. At the same time I hope you can appreciate why it was impossible for us to cut the duty on wool without significant concessions to counter the economic problems and political pressures we face with our wool growers.

On the dairy products, I believe the action I took was the only realistic course open to me, against the background of the very strong feelings of our dairy farmers and the real threat of even more restrictive legislation. Nevertheless, within the over-all level of our dairy imports, we are making allocations which will assure Australia at least its historic share of the trade.

On the matter of the interest equalization tax, I understand that our Treasury people have been in direct contact with yours in the past days. I believe there is now an understanding of the


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

range of possibilities available to you in the plan outlined in Secretary Fowler's letter to Mr. McMahon of July 24. I hope this plan will lead to a satisfactory arrangement for solving the question of your borrowing here.

Thank you especially for your thoughtful views on Viet-Nam. I agree with your feelings on the timing of another "Manila-type" conference, and we should continue to keep in touch on this. As to force requirements, Secretary McNamara is, as you know, on the ground now assessing General Westmoreland's recommendations in the light of the over-all situation. I appreciate the factors you mention, and of course we shall be reaching no decisions until we have assessed McNamara's conclusions from the trip with great care. But we may well have to do significantly more, simply to meet the military necessities of what the other side is doing, and I want to say frankly that if the need for additional forces becomes clear, we shall need to talk fairly urgently with you and the other troop-contributing nations on whether a substantial part of the need can be met by others. Even since our meetings, it is plain that key members of our Congress feel very strongly about this, and I am sure you would agree that additional burdens should be shared as equitably as possible. I will keep you posted on our thinking as it develops.

Lady Bird joins me in sending our fondest regards to all of you, and in hoping that we soon again will be together.

Sincerely,



Today I received your friends

The Right Honorable
Harold E. Holt
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

*Russell MacDonall and Graham Perkins
of the Melbourne Age and had a
very pleasant visit.*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday
Thursday, July 6, 1967

WWR
Pres file
19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Extension of Nuclear Energy Agreement with South Africa

The Department of State has requested your approval in principle of the renewal of our present agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which will expire on August 21, 1967 unless renewed. AEC agrees with the conclusion of the Department of State that on balance it would be in our interest to renew the agreement. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has somewhat reluctantly come to the same conclusion. In addition, Ambassador Goldberg has been consulted and recognizes the importance of the reasons that have led the State Department to favor renewal. The attached State Department memorandum outlines the pros and cons and the extent to which the State Department has consulted members of Congress and others who will be effected.

I recommend that you authorize the State Department to proceed with the renewal of the agreement. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State.

It's a tough decision, but on balance, necessary, I believe

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

cc: Ed Hamilton
Spurgeon Keeny

CEJ:em

19a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Extension of Nuclear Energy Agreement with South Africa

The President has noted and concurred in your recommendation that the Department of State should proceed at this time to renew our agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which will expire on August 21, 1967 unless renewed.

It is noted that immediately upon initialing of the agreement, the AEC will submit the proposal formally to the President for his official approval, as required by the Atomic Energy Act, and that upon such approval the AEC will forward the signed agreement to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on or before July 15 in order that the agreement may lie before the Committee for 30 days as required by law.

15/
W. W. Rostow

cc: Ed Hamilton
Spurgeon Keeny

CEJ:em

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S/S 11658

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 5, 1967

2571
1 - Johnson
2 - Hill.
196

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Extension of Nuclear Energy Agreement
with South Africa

Our present ten-year agreement with South Africa on peaceful uses of nuclear energy will expire on August 21, 1967, unless renewed. Because of the obvious international and domestic sensitivity, we have given extended consideration to the question of renewal. A renewal would enable the Atomic Energy Commission to continue leasing enriched uranium for the South African nuclear research program, which we are satisfied is entirely peaceful.

Having in mind that South Africa controls 27 percent of the Free World's uranium supply, we have concluded that a renewal of this agreement would be clearly in our interests.

- A. South Africa has agreed to announce a policy of requiring safeguards on uranium exports, consistent with our present position on safeguards under the NPT.
- B. It will maintain the position of the United States as a dependable source of supply to other countries in the nuclear field and reduce our vulnerability to accusations of playing politics with peaceful nuclear energy.
- C. It will permit continuation of IAEA international safeguards over the South African nuclear research program to assure other African States and the rest of the world that there is no military diversion.
- D. It will continue the modest U.S. and international influence in one element of South African society (scientific and academic) in which some promise of useful communication is still present.

In order to

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

In order to measure and forestall possible domestic political repercussions we have consulted with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and the Foreign Policy Committee of the Democratic Study Group. At the conclusion of an informal presentation by Foy Kohler and AEC Commissioner Nabrit to the Joint Committee, Congressman Holifield stated his support of the renewal and we believe this and the tenor of the hearing assures the support of the Joint Committee.

Most of the other Congressmen with whom we talked were initially concerned by the decision to move ahead with this agreement at this time, but as we outlined the issues they virtually all swung around to a recognition that the Department and the AEC had carefully balanced the pros and cons and had produced a cogent list of reasons for making the extension in spite of the political sensitivity involved.

Although concerned about the possible difficulties that this renewal might pose at the UN, Ambassador Goldberg recognizes the importance of the reasons that have led the Department to favor the renewal. He did urge that careful consideration be given to possible congressional reaction and other domestic policy implications. Also relevant was the absence of any opposition in the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna on June 15, when it approved without objection the extension of the trilateral safeguards agreement between the United States, South Africa and the IAEA. None of the 25 members of the Board of Governors (which includes Ghana, Tunisia, Lebanon, India, Indonesia, USSR, Yugoslavia and Poland) took issue with the continued relationship.

We believe it would be desirable for the President to be informed of our plans to renew the agreement at this stage. If he concurs we will initial the agreed text of the agreement and the AEC will submit the proposal formally to the President for his official approval, as required by the Atomic Energy Act. Congressman Holifield has urged that the signed agreement reach the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy before July 15, since the law requires the agreement to lie before the Joint Committee for 30 days.

We intend to

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
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- 3 -

We intend to brief key Negro leaders on the reasons for the renewal of this agreement when it is transmitted to the Congress.

We would appreciate your informing us of the President's concurrence.

The AEC concurs in the renewal of the agreement.



Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday, July 10, 1967

20

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. As of June 1, 1967, there were 5,465 Australians fighting in South Viet Nam.

2. Following is statement by Lt. Gen. Krulak:

"The Australians are fighting in one of the richest and most populous areas near Vung Tau. They are addressing themselves to the systematic reduction of the Viet Cong infrastructure. They are doing this in a professional and workmanlike way. We all admire the cool fighting qualities of the Australians. "

W. W. R. .

21

July 10, 1967

Senator Albert Gore
c/o U.S. Mission to the European Office
of the United Nations and Other
International Organizations
Geneva, Switzerland

Pres. file

President has asked me to thank you for your interesting and helpful report on the refugee problem. It has been passed, as you requested, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and is being considered this morning within the Executive Branch.

Walt Rostow

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WWRostow:rlh

SENT
NRCA

1967 JUL 9 16 30

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-437
By 118, NARA, Date 12-2-92

67 JUL 9 PM 1:00

Pres. file
SUNDAY

EEA344
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1513

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67722

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH SITUATION REPORT ON VIET-NAM, JULY 9, 1967 NEW DEVELOPMENTS

AN ASSEMBLY DEPUTY CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE DIRECTORATE HAS NOW FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT AGAINST AU TRUONG THANH'S CANDIDACY. THE COMPLAINT CHARGES THAT IN 1964 AND 1966, WHEN THANH WAS MINISTER FOR NATIONAL ECONOMY, "HE IMPLEMENTED THE MARXIST/LENINIST POLICIES OF THE COMMUNISTS WITH A VIEW TO SABOTAGING AND WEAKING THE NATION'S ECONOMY." THE COMPLAINT STATES THAT THE ELECTORAL LAW EXCLUDES FROM CANDIDACY "THOSE WHO HAVE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WORKED FOR COMMUNISM OR PRO-COMMUNIST NEUTRALISM OR WORKED IN THE INTERESTS OF COMMUNISM" AND ATTRIBUTES SUCH ACTIVITIES TO THANH.

THE NEW YORK TIMES THIS MORNING QUOTES THANH AS COMMENTING THAT "IF I SUPPORTED THE VIET CONG, I WOULD HAVE TRIED TO RUIN THE ECONOMY. BUT I DIDN'T DO THAT. I CONCENTRATED ALL MY EFFORTS ON TRYING TO CREATE ECONOMIC STABILITY. IN THE PROCESS I HELPED KY."

THE EMBASSY ALSO HAS TRANSMITTED THE TEXT OF THE COMPLAINT AGAINST "BIG" MINH'S RUNNING MATE, TRAN NGOC LIENG. THE COMPLAINT CHARGES THAT LIENG IN THE PAST SIMULTANEOUSLY HELD FRENCH AND VIETNAMESE NATIONALITY. THE COMPLAINT POINTS OUT THAT THE ELECTION LAW REQUIRES PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TO HAVE VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP SINCE BIRTH. THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE BASIS FOR CLAIMING THAT THE ELECTORAL LAW DISQUALIFIES A PERSON BECAUSE OF DUAL CITIZENSHIP.

COMMENT

WE HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR BUNKER TO DISCUSS THE CASES OF "BIG" MINH AND THANH WITH THIEU AND KY.

DTG: 091606Z JULY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHCA

1967 JUL 9 15 29

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAF67720

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

SUBJECT: CONGO SITUATION REPORT

1. HARD WORK BY OUR PEOPLE SEEMS TO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY HEADED OFF THREAT OF MAJOR RACIAL VIOLENCE IN LUBUMBASHI (NEE ELIZABETHVILLE). TOMORROW IS ANOTHER DAY, BUT IT SEEMS NOW THAT MODERATES ARE IN CONTROL.

2. SECRETARY RUSK HAS AUTHORIZED THE THREE C-130'S TO PROCEED TO KINSHASA. THEY WILL BE ANNOUNCED SIMULTANEOUSLY IN WASHINGTON AND KINSHASA AT 11 A.M. OUR TIME. (GEORGE HAS THE TEXT; IT IS AS LOW-KEY AS WE COULD MAKE IT.)

3. IN RESPONSE TO A RUSK LETTER, THE BELGIANS HAVE NOW AGREED TO SUPPLY MOBUTU WITH TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IF HE REQUESTS IT. WE HAVE INSTRUCTED MCBRIDE TO GET TO MOBUTU AND MAKE SURE THE REQUEST IS MADE. THE BELGIAN HARDWARE WILL NOT BE AS USEFUL AS OURS, BUT IT WILL ESTABLISH A MULTILATERAL PRINCIPLE.

4. WE HAVE NO HARD INFORMATION ON THE FIGHTING. IT APPEARS THAT THE MERCENARIES ARE SLOWLY LOSING GROUND IN KISANGANI (NEE STANLEYVILLE), THE MAJOR CITY THEY HAD ATTACKED. MOBUTU & COMPANY GETTING MORE AND MORE CONFIDENT THEY CAN HANDLE THE SITUATION.

5. MOBUTU IS ELATED AT NEWS OF UNITED STATES MOVE. HE HAS PROMISED HIS PERSONAL AND CONCERTED EFFORTS TO KEEP BLACK/WHITE PROBLEMS IN CHECK. WE SHOULD NOT DELUDE OURSELVES, HOWEVER. SENTIMENT IS STRONG AMONG THE BLACKS--AND HARD TO TURN OFF. AT THE LEAST, WE CAN EXPECT SUBSTANTIAL WHITE DEPARTURES WHEN CRISIS EASES, WITH ATTENDANT WORSENING OF CONGO'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR MCBRIDE'S CABLE CONCERNING C-130'S.

KINSHASA 390

1. OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENTS 3301 WE COVERED EARLIER, BUT I WANTED EXPRESS AGAIN MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR AUTHORITY TO CALL FORWARD C-130'S IN LIGHT ACUTE PROBLEMS AT HOME. IN ADDITION TO ALL USUAL RELUCTANCE GET INVOLVED IN AN OPERATION OF THIS TYPE, THERE ARE PARTICULARLY DISAGREEABLE ASPECTS OF THIS SITUATION. FIRST OF COURSE IF THAT REALISTICALLY SPEAKING, OTHER COUNTRIES ARE NOT RESPONDING TO CONGOLESE APPEAL. FURTHERMORE. THERE ARE CONFIRMED

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jw, NARA, Date 11-9-99

Free file

JUL 9 AM 11:48

SUNDAY

23

REPORTS OF CONGOLESE ARMY EXCESSES AGAINST EUROPEAN CIVILIANS NOT ONLY IN LUBUMBASHI BUT IN BUKAVU AS WELL, PLUS MANY UNCONFIRMED STORIES OF KILLINGS, ESPECIALLY FROM KISANGANI, WHICH WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO FOLLOW. AS I MENTIONED BEFORE, I REALIZE THIS MUST PRESENT DEPARTMENT WITH WELL-NIGH INSUPERABLE PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM.

2. ATMOSPHERE THIS MORNING, HOWEVER, WAS SUCH THAT I ACCEPTED YOUR AUTHORITY TO CALL FORWARD THESE PLANES. I CANNOT EVEN GUARANTEE THIS WILL TERMINATE AUTOMATICALLY EXCESSES AGAINST EUROPEANS AND WE STILL DON'T KNOW SITUATION IN KISANGANI, ALWAYS A HORROR SPOT. MY STAFF, MANY OF WHOM HAVE MUCH LONGER EXPERIENCE IN CONGO THAN I DO, AGREE WITH ME THAT ONLY POSSIBLE OUTCOME, IF CONGO IS NOT TO BE SET BACK MANY YEARS ECONOMICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY, IT TO END THIS MERCENARY-KATANGESE REVOLT AT ONCE, AND I THINK C-130'S WILL PROVIDE THE LIFT, PHYSICALLY AND OTHERWISE, DO THIS.

3. I CAN GUARANTEE TO YOU, MR. SECRETARY, THAT WHEN I SEE MOBUTU IN A FEW MOMENTS TO INFORM HIM OF UNITED STATES RESPONSE, I WILL MOST SOLEMNLY ENJOIN ON HIM AGAIN IMPERATIVES OF HIS ASSUMING FULLY HIS RESPONSIBILITY TOWARDS EUROPEAN POPULATION. THERE ARE SOME HELPFUL SIGNS DURING PAST TWELVE HOURS IN THIS REGARD AND HE HAS SENT INTERIOR MINISTER TO LUBUMBASHI THIS MORNING. ALSO, TONE OF TELEVISION AND RADIO LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING WAS MORE RESPONSIBLE AND NOT INFLAMMATORY.

4. THEREFORE, I BELIEVE C-130'S WILL RENDER POSITIVE SERVICE IN FINISHING OFF REVOLT IN ITS BROAD ASPECTS. I BELIEVE FURTHERMORE THAT WE CAN IMPOSE DEADLINE ON HOW LONG THESE PLANES REMAIN AND I WOULD PROPOSE DO THIS, THOUGH FULLY AWARE PROBLEMS OF SLIPPAGE.

5. FINALLY, THIS IS OF COURSE ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT LIFT TO AMERICAN COLONY, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHERWISE, WHICH IN EFFECT, IS BEING HELD HOSTAGE IN ITS ENTIRETY.

6. AFTER THIS IMMEDIATE CRISIS IS OVER, MR. SECRETARY, I SHALL BE GIVING MOST EARNEST THOUGHT TO REDUCING OUR PRESENCE IN CONGO SO THAT WE SHALL AT LEAST LESSEN DEGREE TO WHICH WE ARE PRISONER OF THESE SITUATIONS. FURTHERMORE, OF COURSE, WE WILL BE SEEKING TO IMPLEMENT OUR POLICY OF SPREADING THE LOAD SO THAT WE ARE NOT IN THIS POSITION OF GOING IT ALONE. I FULLY APPRECIATE THE PROBLEM IN WASHINGTON AND AM SORRY NOT TO BE MORE HELPFUL IN MEETING IT. FINALLY, I APOLOGIZE FOR GIVING YOU ANOTHER PROBLEM.

DTG: 091419Z JULY 1967

GPS: 860 IMI 860

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Monday, July 10, 1967
9:15 a.m.

24

MR. PRESIDENT:

Some time ago, Sect. Rusk asked Gene to look back over his first seven months and set down the areas and initiatives in which he had been involved.

This was the result.

W. W. R.

Attachment

242

May 15, 1967

PERSONAL

THE SECRETARY

You asked me to look back over the seven months since I came to work, and jot down a sentence or two about the more important of the jobs on which I have been working, particularly about new ventures which you and I have started after exchanging a few words, and projects now on the drawing board.

Here is the result:

(1) My contribution to the President's October 7 speech, which, rhetoric apart, was the Atlantic Alliance section, and the subordination of the other two themes -- European Union and East-West detente -- to the need to modernize and strengthen the Alliance as a world-wide influence.

(2) From the day I walked in, I have been pushing on the force-level problem in Germany, recently as Chairman of the working party dealing with the question. The one-division rotation strategy was mine. I sold it gradually to the various sects and factions, hoping that it would meet both the political and the security needs of the situation. I suppose I wrote most of the big memo that came to the President, and took a pretty central part in the writing, talking, telephoning and persuading that was involved in Washington, and in some of the political talks abroad as well.

(3) I jumped into the NPT process some time ago, after a private meeting with Butch Fisher, and pressed hard here for full consultations with the Allies before the Treaty was tabled. I think that the consultative process has strengthened Alliance relations and NAC itself as a forum for serious work.

(4) The Harmel Resolution in NATO, calling for a high-level study of the future tasks of the Alliance, and of procedures for carrying them out, is in considerable part my baby (the attached letter from Ridgway Knight may interest you). (Tab A). I worked out the plan with the Belgians, and helped you put it through, both here and in Paris. I regard it as a major and non-recurring opportunity, not to be wasted, to move the Alliance forward into something like partnership with us in peace-keeping and aid. The chances, of course, are slim. But I believe we should try hard to make this a major step towards a post-Vietnam world of collective western action.

(5) I started the project of a NATO working party on the Middle East -- a ticklish subject, but one which I think finally is in motion. I enclose a couple of cables and memos on the subject. (Tab B). With Luke Battle, I am trying to move it into high gear rapidly. It will probably take a lot of my time for the next few months. If we succeed here, it should help make success possible on item (4).

(6) On Indian Food Aid, I took the working oar for the Department, both in Washington (the President's message, the bureaucratic meetings, and the labors on the Hill), on the round-the-world trip and in the Paris Consortium meeting.

(7) I handled the Indonesian debt negotiations in Paris, a fascinating exercise, which went well. Since you may not have been aware of the problem, I enclose a few stray documents. (Tab C).

(8) I have tried to play an active part here in the diplomacy of Vietnam, and I have worked on many of the papers.

My chief original input has been the idea of a deal with the Russians without necessarily involving Hanoi in the first instance. You floated the thought to Dobrynin early in January, and we have pushed it in various forms since. I attach an exchange of letters with Tommy Thompson on the subject, and a memorandum of conversation with Dobrynin. (Tab D).

(9) I have spent a good deal of time working with the Treasury on a number of problems, and intend to be much more active on the monetary front. And of course I have been occupied with the Kennedy Round, trade policy generally, cocoa agreements, P.L. 480, OECD, DAC, technological gap, brain drain, and such.

(10) I have started and sold the idea of a project (which Ben Stephansky is scheduled to do) for developing a comprehensive economic plan for the Caribbean Islands in relation to the United States. The instruction is to be bold. The islands are all going to the dogs, and there is an ever present danger of more troubles of the Dominican scale.

(11) I have the troops working on a major initiative along the lines of the proposals made in my testimony to Senator Hart last spring. (I enclose a copy.) (Tab E). I think I'll add a chapter proposing an international commission with which intergovernmental agreements would be filed. The Commission would be required to file reports evaluating such agreements from the point of view of the public interest.

(12) I have started a project that would review our international Intelsat policy, and another to contemplate post-NPT policy in the atomic field. I am persuaded as you know that the present position is unstable, expensive for us, and full of political tensions. Similarly, I have one going on our trade policy position vis-a-vis Europe on the assumption (a) that Britain does not get into EEC or (b) that it does get in, and the EEC becomes a real giant. My guess is that an industrial free-trade area is the right answer ten years hence.

(13) I have had no success in stirring our colleagues to stir the British or others to start talks in or near Rhodesia. Everytime I think the project is in motion, I have to leave on a trip, and when I return I find passivity. I have raised the possibility of talks by private persons, by Australians or Canadians, to get back to the Tiger agreement, minus its first article. I still think the idea is sound.

We have, however, gotten some motion -- although very slow motion -- into the project to talk privately with the South Africans about the South West African problem, and perhaps other issues as well. (Tab F)

(14) I have asked for a study of possible scenarios of ways to get Japan into a security system with us, and of possible alternative solutions for the Singapore base.

(15) I have had the fisheries brief, by virtue of the office -- a very lively affair. So far we have not quite gotten into war with Canada, Peru or Ecuador, and we are pushing a program of international agreements to establish systems of economic regulation on the high seas.

(16) It might be noted that a considerable dose of travel time, of representation (OECD, ~~REC~~, Bilderberg, etc.), and of speech-making has been included in this initiation period.

Eugene V. Rostow

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Letter from Amb. Ridgway Knight.
- Tab B - Cables and Memos on Middle East.
- Tab C - Material on Indonesian Debt negotiations.
- Tab D - Exchange of letters with Amb. Thompson
and a memo of conversation with Amb. Dobrynin.
- Tab E - Testimony to Senator Hart.
- Tab F - Telegram reporting conversation with Amb. Taswell.

25

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~LITERALLY EYES ONLY~~

Monday, July 10, 1967
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

There was probably substance
behind your instinct about landslides.


The incident, you will recall,
concerned landslides in the A Shau
valley trapping enemy forces which
were then heavily bombed by B-52's.

In the week of June 16-22, the
area was seeded which may well have
contributed to the result.

W. W. Rostow
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-437
By 148, NARA, Date 12-2-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-3
By 10, NARA, Date 3-19-96



~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

256
~~MR VANCE HAS SEEN~~

~~MR. NITZE HAS SEEN~~

PROJECT COMPATRIOT (TS)

~~See Det has seen~~

WEEKLY REPORT #14

1 JUL 1967

A. Period of Report: 16-22 June 1967.

B. General: Persistent southwesterly winds are providing adequate moisture for seeding. A total of 300 seeding units were expended during this period.

C. Intelligence Summary: Seedings occurred on 19 June primarily south of Route 923 and east of Route 96. Light to moderate rain showers were observed in the seeded areas. Isolated seedings were made over Route 96 just north of the 96/165 Junction and south of Route 165, west of Route 96. On 20 June, three landslides were reported on Route 96 north of Route 165, and Route 964 was reported as possibly too wet for truck traffic. On 20 June, a large area was seeded between Route 92D and 23J. Ground based radar reports indicated precipitation in the seeded area. Routes 911D and E have been closed by water and mud throughout most of the reporting period. Extensive seedings occurred over Route 8E on 18 June. The aircrew observed a large thunderstorm developing in the seeded area. Isolated seedings were made on 14 and 15 June east of Route 923 and moderate rain showers were observed. Two isolated seedings were made on 15 June over Routes 92C and 922. Moderate rain showers were observed but no ground effects could be correlated.

Forecast for next week: The atmosphere is unstable enough to produce the convective activity required. Seeding activity should continue to increase.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-3

By sig, NARA, Date 3-19-96

~~TOP SECRET "EYES ONLY"~~

SECRET EXDIS

**Monday, July 10, 1967
8:35 a.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith Bunker states case for
letting South Vietnamese exclude Big
Minh from candidacy, on legal grounds,
rather than endanger unity of military.**

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 620

~~**SECRET**~~

26

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 7-17-9

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2803
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 620

EXDIS

REF: A. STATE 3374 B. SAIGON 613 C. SAIGON 608

1. WE UNDERSTAND FROM MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL THAT THEY INTEND TO CONSIDER COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE CANDIDACIES OF THE MINOR CANDIDATES BEFORE GETTING TO THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST BIG MINH AND THIEU-KY. THE COUNCIL MET BRIEFLY JUNE 31 AND WILL MEET AGAIN ^{JULY} JUNE 10.

2. A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, DEPUTY SCA COMMISSIONER NGUYEN DINH XUONG, TOLD EMBOFF JULY 8 THAT HE THINKS POSSIBLE THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR MINH'S SLATE IS THE COMPLAINT AGAINST MINH'S RUNNING MATE (REF C). HE TENDS TO INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION (ART. 53) AS REQUIRING THAT A PRESIDENTIAL OR VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE CANNOT HAVE HELD ANY CITIZENSHIP EXCEPT VIETNAMESE SINCE BIETH. XUONG SAID THAT HE THINKS THE COUNCIL WILL ASK FOR MORE DOCUMENTATION IN THE LIENG CASE.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 620 ~~SECRET~~

3. BOTH XUONG AND THE ASSEMBLY MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL, LY VAN HIEP, TOLD EMBOFFS THAT THE MINH DOSSIER IS IN ORDER AS FAR AS THEY CAN MAKE OUT. IF MINH IS TO BE BARRED FROM RUNNING ON THE GROUNDS OF NATIONAL SECURITY,

THEY BELIEVE THE COUNCIL WILL NEED MORE DOCUMENTATION. SO FAR THE COMPLAINT BY VIEN AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS HAS NOT BEEN BACKED UP BY FURTHER STATEMENTS, REASONS, OR DOCUMENTS. HIEP OBSERVED THAT IF MINH IS A COMMUNIST OR A PRO-COMMUNIST NEUTRALIST, THE COMPLAINT COULD BE UPHELD, BUT THE COUNCIL HAS NO EVIDENCE OF THIS AND THE MILITARY HAS NOT EXPLAINED WHAT IT MEANS BY "NATIONAL SECURITY".

4. IN CONNECTION WITH THE MINH CANDIDACY, WE THINK IT MAY BE IMPORTANT TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT ON VIEN AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS (AS WELL AS KY AND THIEU) IF MINH SHOULD RUN AND WIN. THEIR FUTURE WOULD BE UNCERTAIN, TO SAY THE LEAST, AND THEIR REACTION TO SUCH AN UNCERTAINTY

COULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONTAIN. POLICE GENERAL LOAN COMMENTED TO A MISSION OFFICER ON THIS PROBLEM JULY 6. LOAN SAID THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL

TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF A BIG MINH VICTORY AT THE POLLS. ONE OBVIOUS RESULT, ACCORDING TO LOAN, WOULD BE THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE FROM VIET NAM OF A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT FIGURES, INCLUDING CAO VAN VIEN, WE FEAR THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PALACE-TYPE COUP CAN NOT BE EXCLUDED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES.

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Authority NLJ 90-262
By WJ/imp, NARA, Date 7-17-91

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5. IN ADDITION TO MILITARY RESISTANCE TO BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY, IT SHOULD
BE NOTED THAT THE CATHOLICS ARE SOLIDLY AGAINST IT. THE CATHOLIC PRESS,
BOTH LEFT AND RIGHT, HAS FOR SEVERAL DAYS RUNNING CARRIED STRONG EDITORIAL
STATEMENTS OF OPPOSITION TO THE MINH CANDIDACY. WE CONSIDER THAT BIG
MINH'S RETURN AND CANDIDACY COULD SPARK CATHOLIC DEMONSTRATIONS THAT COULD
BE HARDER TO CONTROL THAN THE LIMITED NUMBER OF PEOPLE TRI QUANG SEEMS
ALREADY CAPABLE OF MOBILIZING FOR STREET PROTESTS.

6. AS REGARDS AU TRUONG THANH, THE VIETNAMESE APPEAR IN GENERAL TO BE
TAKING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM RATHER CALMLY. SOME SUPPORTERS OF
TRAN VAN HUONG THINK THANH'S CAMPAIGN TACTICS ARE MISTAKEN AND DANGEROUS.
THEY DO NOT CONSIDER THE ARRESTS REPORTED IN REFERENCE B AS A
THREAT TO THEM OR TO HUONG'S CANDIDACY. IN FACT THE PEOPLE ARRESTED
SEEM TO HAVE LITTLE STANDING AND ARE LITTLE KNOWN IN RESPONSIBLE CIRCLES
HERE. THERE IS NOT MUCH DOUBT THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM ARE IN FACT
WORKING WITH THE VIET CONG.

7. IT APPEARS NOW THAT THANH WILL MOST LIKELY BE ELIMINATED FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL RACE. XUONG TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT THE ELECTION COUNCIL HAS
DOCUMENTS SIGNED BY THANH WHICH PROVE HE HAS BEEN A MEMBER OF A COMMUNIST
ORGANIZATION. BOTH XUONG AND HIEP IMPLIED THAT THEY EXPECT THE
COUNCIL TO UPHOLD THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THANH'S CANDIDACY.

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THE LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL CATHOLIC POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, DAI DOAN KET OR GREATER SOLIDARITY FORCE, HAS COME OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THANH'S CANDIDACY, AND THEY IMPLY THAT HE IS WORKING WITH THE COMMUNISTS. WE HAVE FOUND LITTLE SYMPATHY FOR HIM AMONG ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES. FROM PRESENT INDICATIONS WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY SIGNIFICANT POPULAR REACTION HERE TO HIS BEING BARRED FROM THE RACE.

8. REFERENCE A SUGGESTS THAT THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY BE DISCUSSED WITH THIEU AND KY. I AGREE THAT IT IS NOW TIME TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH THEM, AND I INTEND TO DO SO AT THE NEXT OPPORTUNITY. IN CONSIDERING THE PROPER LINE TO TAKE WITH THEM I THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT FOR US TO KEEP IN MIND THE POSSIBLE REACTIONS TO BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY

ON THE PART OF MILITARY AND RELIGIOUS ELEMENTS. THE OPPOSITION OF BOTH THE LEADING MILITARY FIGURES AND THE CATHOLICS SUGGESTS THAT A BIG MINH VII

ORY COULD PUT US BACK IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF 1963-64. I HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MINH WOULD PROVE ANY MORE SUCCESSFUL IN UNITING THE MILITARY AND THE CIVILIANS AGAINST THE VIET CONG THAN HE DID AT THAT TIME. IT IS OF COURSE BY NO MEANS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT MINH WOULD WIN THE ELECTION IF HE WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN.

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BASED ON PRESENT READINGS WE DOUBT THAT HE WOULD. HOWEVER, MANY VIET-NAMESE, INCLUDING SOME OF THE LEADING MILITARY FIGURES, CLEARLY FEAR THAT HE WOULD. IF HE IS ALLOWED TO RETURN IN ORDER TO RUN, THEIR REACTIONS WILL IN MANY CASES BE BASED ON THE CALCULATION THAT HE WILL WIN. THIS POSES A GRAVE THREAT TO POLITICAL STABILITY, FOR THE MILITARY AND CATHOLIC ELEMENTS INVOLVED ARE CAPABLE OF MOVING LARGE GROUPS OF PEOPLE WITH CONSIDERABLE EFFICIENCY. THIS MIGHT BE PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME IF IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE US WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DECISION IN FAVOR OF BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY.

9. IN THINKING ABOUT HOW TO HANDLE THIS MATTER WITH THIEU AND KY, I THINK WE MUST ALSO CONSIDER THE SITUATION IF BIG MINH IS ALLOWED TO RUN BUT IS PHYSICALLY BARRED FROM RETURNING TO THE COUNTRY. WHILE THIS MIGHT AT THE MOMENT NOT APPEAR TO BE A BAD SOLUTION--MANY WOULD ARGUE THAT IT WOULD REDUCE HIS CHANCES OF WINNING WHILE NOT VIOLATING THE LAWS-- I BELIEVE

IT WOULD IN THE END PROVE LESS TOLERABLE THAN AN OUT-AND-OUT BAR TO HIS CANDIDACY. THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN, I WOULD EXPECT THAT THE PRESS WOULD CONCENTRATE ON BIG MINH'S ABSENCE, PERHAPS MORE THAN ON ANY OTHER FACTOR.

HIS PRONOUNCEMENTS FROM BANGKOK WOULD GET HEADLINES ABROAD IF NOT HERE. IT WOULD OF COURSE BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PRETEND THAT HE HAD BENEFITED FROM

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EQUAL FACILITIES. THUS, I DO NOT REALLY THINK THAT IT IS PRACTICAL OR DESIRABLE TO SEPARATE THE QUESTIONS OF HIS RETURN AND HIS CANDIDACY.

10. ALL OF THIS LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE RETURN AND CANDIDACY OF BIG MINH WOULD CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS THREAT TO MILITARY UNITY AND POLITICAL STABILITY HERE. IN FACT THE DIRECTORATE STATEMENT THAT HIS CANDIDACY ENDANGERS NATIONAL SECURITY APPEARS TO ME TO BE ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE. THUS, IN DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH THIEU AND KY, I DO NOT THINK THAT I SHOULD IMPLY THAT WE FAVOR

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PAGE 6 RUMJIR 620 ~~SECRET~~

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10. ALL OF THIS LEADS ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE RETURN AND CANDIDACY OF
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ENDANGERS NATIONAL SECURITY APPEARS TO ME TO BE ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE.
THUS, IN DISCUSSING THE MATTER WITH THIEU AND KY, I DO NOT
THINK THAT I SHOULD IMPLY THAT WE FAVOR
THEIR ALLOWING HIM TO RUN. INDEED

I THINK THAT I WILL HAVE TO GO TO SOME PAINS
TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS IS

NOT OUR POSITION. OUR EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR CLEAN AND LEGAL
ELECTIONS HAS BEEN READ BY SOME VIETNAMESE--AND

MIGHT WELL ALSO BE INTER-

PRETED BY THIEU AND KY -- TO MEAN THAT WE WANT BIG MINH TO RUN AND WIN.
BUNKER

BT

SECRET

EXDIS

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EXDIS

11. THE MILITARY, WHEN THEY ARE UNITED USUALLY HAVE HAD ENOUGH INFLUENCE TO GET THEIR WAY WITH THE ASSEMBLY. IN THIS CASE THEY ARE PUBLICLY UNITED IN THEIR OPPOSITION, AND THEIR PRESTIGE IS THIS ENGAGED. WE ALSO KNOW THAT SUU IS AGAINST HIS RETURN. WE SUSPECT THAT THE OTHER CIVILIAN CANDIDATES SEE HIM AS MORE OF A THREAT THAN ANYTHING ELSE. UNLESS IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT THE AMERICANS WANT BIG MINH, WE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ASSEMBLY MAY WELL BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH FINDING THAT BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY IS A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY. WE WILL BE MAKING FURTHER SOUNDINGS WITH NA MEMBERS SINCE IT IS STILL EARLY IN THE PROCESS OF THEIR CONSIDERATION AND THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL MAY NOT RULE FOR SEVERAL DAYS.

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12. THE ISSUE BOILS DOWN TO THE PROBLEM OF MAKING A CONVINCING CASE AGAINST BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY OR THAT OF HIS RUNNING MATE IN LEGAL TERMS. IT IS THE LEGAL PROCESS THAT THIEU AND KY SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO FOCUS ON. THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AMPLIFIED. ALTERNATELY, THE CASE AGAINST BIG MINH'S RUNNING MATE MIGHT BE AMPLIFIED. ONE WAY OR ANOTHER A LEGAL CASE SHOULD BE MADE AND HOPEFULLY UPHELD BY THE LEGAL BODIES CONSTITUTED FOR THE PURPOSE.

13. GIVEN THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, I THINK IT WOULD BE WELL TO STRESS AGAIN TO THIEU AND KY THE GREAT IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE CARRYING OUT OF FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. I WOULD COUPLE THIS, HOWEVER, WITH A STATEMENT THAT WE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE MANY REIMPLICATIONS BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY WOULD HAVE, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE THE DECISION ON HIM TO THEIR JUDGMENT. WE ARE VERY CONCERNED WITH THE REACTION AT HOME AND ABROAD, HOWEVER, AND WE THINK IT MOST IMPORTANT THAT THE LEGAL PROCESS BE BROUGHT INTO SHARP FOCUS. MOST IMPORTANT, THE CASE AGAINST BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY AND POSSIBLY THAT OF HIS RUNNING MATE SHOULD BE MADE QUITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING. THE REASONS AGAINST HIS RUNNING SHOULD BE STATED PUBLICLY, AND STRESS PUT ON THE FACT THAT THIS IS A MATTER FOR THE ELECTION COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY TO DECIDE.

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14. IF THIS IS DONE, AND IF BIG MINH IS THEN DENIED PERMISSION TO RUN AS A DEMONSTRABLE RESULT OF THE LEGAL PROCESS HERE, I DO NOT THINK THAT BLOCKING HIS CANDIDACY WILL DAMAGE THE CHANCES OF THE ELECTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO THE REALIZATION OF OUR OBJECTIVES.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET LIMDIS~~

Monday, July 10, 1967
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dobrynin, having sounded out Sec. Rusk on the steadiness of our position, probes Amb. Goldberg in a highly civilized way, looking for one compromise or another on a Middle East resolution.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 134

~~SECRET~~

27
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By isp, NARA, Date 8-11-93

DI
~~SECRET~~ USUN 134

LIMDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-100

By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

27a

THIS MORNING AT 10 A.M. I WAS CALLED BY USUN COMSEC AND ADVISED THAT REQUEST HAD BEEN MADE BY SOV MISSION FOR URGENT MEETING WITH ME BY AMB DOBRYNIN. I ASKED THAT USUN COMSEC IMMEDIATELY CALL AND ADVISE SOV MISSION I WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET WITH AMB DOBRYNIN AT HIS CONVENIENCE THIS MORNING. CALL WAS MADE AND 12 NOON AT USUN WAS FIXED FOR TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING. I MET WITH AMB DOBRYNIN ALONE FOR ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES. HE STATED TO ME THAT HIS CALL WAS AFTERMATH OF HIS MEETING WITH SECY RUSK YESTERDAY AND WAS DESIGNED TO EXPLORE WHETHER THERE WOULD BE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN SOVS AND US FOR COMPROMISE RES TO WIND UP ASSEMBLY.

I SAID THAT THROUGHOUT WHOLE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WE HAD BEEN SEEKING COMMON GROUND WITH SOV UNION TO RESTORE PEACE AND STABILITY TO MIDDLE EAST BUT THAT UP TO NOW WE HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL IN WORKING OUT COMMON LANGUAGE TO THIS END. I REMINDED AMB DOBRYNIN THAT AT THE LAST MEETING BETWEEN SECY RUSK AND FONMIN GROMYKO AT WHICH I WAS PRESENT BOTH SECY AND I HAD REFERRED TO LANGUAGE OF KOSYGIN SPEECH TO GA WHERE HE HAD SPOKEN IN TERMS OF COMMON LANGUAGE BUT THAT UNTIL NOW THERE HAD BEEN NO EFFORT BY SOV DEL TO EXPLORE WITH US POSSIBILITY OF COMMON AGREEMENT.

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN SAID THAT THIS WAS THEIR PRESENT DESIRE AND I SAID THAT WE WELCOMED THIS EFFORT AND WOULD BE GLAD TO HEAR ANY CONCRETE PROPOSAL ON HIS PART. AMB DOBRYNIN SAID HE HAD NO CONCRETE LANGUAGE TO OFFER BUT THAT IN GENERAL HE WONDERED WHETHER THE IDEAS HE HAD PUT FORTH TO THE SECY YESTERDAY PROVIDED BASIS FOR COMMON UNDERSTANDING.

I TOLD HIM THERE WAS NOTHING I REALLY COULD ADD VERY MUCH TO WHAT SECY HAD SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY WITH RESPECT TO HIS GENERAL IDEAS AND I THOUGHT SECY HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT US FEELS IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SOV UNION AND OURSELVES BE VERY CLEAR THAT IN ORDER TO RESTORE CONDITIONS OF PEACE IN ME AN EQUAL-HANDED APPROACH ADDRESSED BOTH TO ISRAEL AND ARAB NATIONS WAS REQUIRED. THIS, AS SECY STATED AND AS THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR AT GLASSBORO TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN, INVOLVED ON ONE HAND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS BY ISRAEL AND ON OTHER HAND TERMINATION BY ARAB STATES OF THEIR STATE OR CLAIM TO BELLIGERENCY.

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN INQUIRED WHETHER WE WERE FIXED TO THE WORD "BELLIGERENCY-". I SAID WE WERE NOT ATTACHED TO THE WORD. WE WERE HOWEVER DEDICATED TO PRINCIPLE THAT TIME HAD COME FOR PERMANENT PEACE IN ME AND NOT MERELY THE FRAGILE PATCHWORK OF FRAGILE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF BELLIGERENCY WHICH HAD PRODUCED THREE WARS IN 20 YEARS.

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER I THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY POSSIBILITY IN A RES SUCH AS SUGGESTED TO THE SECY THAT CONTEMPLATED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND REFERRAL TO SC FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION DETAILED EXAMINATION OF OTHER POINTS WHICH WERE INVOLVED IN ME CRISIS.

PRESERVATION COPY

TO WHAT SECY HAD SAID TO HIM YESTERDAY WITH RESPECT TO HIS GENERAL IDEAS AND I THOUGHT SECY HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT US FEELS IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT BOTH SOV UNION AND OURSELVES BE VERY CLEAR THAT IN ORDER TO RESTORE CONDITIONS OF PEACE IN ME AN EQUAL-HANDED APPROACH ADDRESSED BOTH TO ISRAEL AND ARAB NATIONS WAS REQUIRED. THIS, AS SECY STATED AND AS THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR AT GLASSBORO TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN, INVOLVED ON ONE HAND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS BY ISRAEL AND ON OTHER HAND TERMINATION BY ARAB STATES OF THEIR STATE OR CLAIM TO BELLIGERENCY.

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I SAID THIS WAS THE APPROACH IN YUGO RES AND THAT I DID NOT BELIEVE THIS OFFERED ANY POSSIBILITY OF COMMON GROUND. I EMPHASIZED THAT IN OUR VIEW THIS WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT PEACE AND INDEED REALISTICALLY IT WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I REPEATED TO HIM WHAT PRESIDENT HAD SAID AT GLASSBORO AND WHAT SECY HAS FREQUENTLY SAID THAT WHILE WE WERE PREPARED TO USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES INVOLVED, NONE OF THESE COUNTRIES WAS PUPPET OF US AND WE COULD NOT DICTATE TERMS OBVIOUSLY UNACCEPTABLE. HE AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT ARAB STATES WERE NOT PUPPETS OF SOV UNION AND I SAID I RECOGNIZED THIS BUT THAT REAL QUESTION WAS WHETHER SOV UNION AND US WERE PREPARED TO TAKE STAND IN THIS ASSEMBLY WHICH MIGHT HAVE IMPACT UPON VARIOUS PARTIES CONCERNED.

PRESERVATION COPY

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN SAID LANGUAGE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH LA'S PRESUMABLY EMANATING FROM SPANISH DEL ABOUT SOME PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF FORCE. I IN TURN REPLIED THAT THIS LANGUAGE WAS TAKEN ALMOST VERBATIM FROM ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND THAT WE CONCEIVED THIS APPROACH TO BE MERELY REFORMULATION OF LANGUAGE IN YUGO RES CALLING FOR OBSERVANCE OF GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS. I READ TO AMB DOBRYNIN FROM 1951 SC RES WHICH CONTAINED FOL PASSAGE: "CONSIDERING THAT SINCE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR NEARLY TWO AND A HALF YEARS IS OF A PERMANENT CHARACTER, NEITHER PARTY CAN REASONABLY ASSERT THAT IT IS ACTIVELY A BELLIGERENT." I POINTED OUT THAT IF THIS WAS TRUE IN 1951 IN A RES WHICH THE SOVS HAD SUPPORTED, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY TRUE IN 1967.

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER I HAD ANY LANGUAGE IDEAS IN MIND. I SAID THAT I DID AND IF THE WORD "BELLIGERENCY" WAS STUMBLING BLOCK WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER WITH THEM ANOTHER FORMULATION AS FOLLOWS:

"(A) WITHOUT DELAY, WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL OF ITS FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM;

"(B) WITHOUT DELAY, RECOGNITION BY ARAB STATES THAT ISRAEL ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH."

I POINTED OUT THAT PARA (B) WAS VERY CLOSE PARAPHRASE FROM CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN'S SPEECH TO GA. DOBRYNIN APTLY SAID, AND I DID NOT DISPUTE THIS, THAT THIS WAS A MORE REFINED WAY OF SAYING THAT ARAB STATES COULD NOT PROFESS STATE OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL, AND HE ADDED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WHILE HE DID NOT ARGUE THAT THIS WAS CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT, NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS. AGAIN I REMINDED HIM IN TURN THAT PARA (A) WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL AND THAT WE WERE NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS EVEN-HANDED APPROACH.

AMB DOBRYNIN THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER IT IS FAIR SUMMARY FOR HIM TO REORT TO GROMYKO THAT WE WERE IN DISAGREEMENT AS TO PRINCIPLES WHICH MIGHT BE FORMULATED IN FINAL SUBSTANTIVE RES TO ASSEMBLY. I SAID THAT BASED UPON OUR EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND HIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SECY AS WELL AS CONVERSATION PRESIDENT HAD AT GLASSBORO AND SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECY AND GROMYKO, THIS WAS CORRECT ASSESSMENT UNLESS AT THIS STAGE SOVS WERE PREPARED TO MOVE IN DIRECTION OF RECOGNIZAIING THAT PEACE WOULD NOT EXIST IN ME WITH PARTIES IN AREA PROFESSING RIGHT TO MAKE WAR AGAINST EACH OTHER.

DOBRYNIN THEN ASKED WHETHER LA RES HAD REPRESENTED OUR ESSENTIAL POSITION. I SAID TO HIM THAT DESPITE DOUBT WHICH APPEARED IN HIS FACIAL EXPRESSION, LA RES HAD BEEN DEVELOPED WITHOUT PARTICIPATION ON OUR PART AND THAT FROM OUR STAND POINT IT WAS COMPROMISE RES. US BASIC VIEW WAS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT IN HIS FIVE POINTS BUT NEVERTHELESS WE HAD SUPPORTED LA RES AS AT LEAST RECOGNIZING INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELEMENTS OR WITHDRAWAL, BELLIGERENCY AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE AREA. IN THIS CONNECTION I TOLD HIM THAT PRESIDENT, AS HE HAD INDICATED TO KOSYGIN, WAS STILL VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN PURSUING WITH HIM REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME AT ASSEMBLY QUESTION OF ARMS LIMITATION IN ME. I REMINDED HIM OF KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT IN HIS SPEECH ABOUT THIS. HE MADE NO REPLY TO ME

~~STAGE SOVS WERE PREPARED~~
~~THAT PEACE WOULD NOT EXIST IN ME WITH PARTIES IN AREA~~
~~PROFESSING RIGHT TO MAKE WAR AGAINST EACH OTHER.~~

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AMB DOBRYNIN THEN ASKED ME IF MY ASSESSMENT WAS THAT IF WE COULD NOT AGREE ON SUBSTANTIVE RES WHETHER, NOTWITHSTANDING, THE ASSEMBLY WOULD AGREE. I THEN SAID THAT DESPITE THEIR INTENSIVE LOBBYING, TO WHICH HE INTERJECTED, "AND YOUR OWN", I DID NOT SEE THAT SITUATION HAD CHANGED THE BASIC POSITION OF PARTIES.

DOBRYNIN INQUIRED AS TO WHETHER RES COULD BE REDRAFTED IN TERMS OF PRINCIPLES. I REPLIED THAT INDEED IT COULD PROVIDED BOTH PRINCIPLES WERE INCORPORATED INTO RES. SPECIFICALLY I SAID RES COULD DECLARE (1) THAT NO STATE COULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN FORCES ON TERRITORY OTHER THAN ITS OWN OR (2) PURSUE POLICY OF WAR OR OTHER THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST SOVEREIGN EXISTENCE OF ANOTHER STATE. THIS DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES COULD BE THEN FOLLOWED BY REFERRAL OF MATTER TO SC TO IMPLEMENT. I ADDED HOWEVER THAT WE COULD NOT SUPPORT DECLARATION WHICH WOULD CALL UPON ISRAEL FOR WITHDRAWAL AS SPECIFIC ACT AND THEN FOLLOW IT WITH MERE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLE THAT STATE OF NON-BELLIGERENCE SHOULD EXIST WITHOUT CALLING UPON ARAB STATES TO IMPLEMENT THIS PRINCIPLE. DOBRYNIN THEN CORRECTLY COMMENTED THAT THIS MEANT AGAIN THAT OUR BASIC POSITIONS REMAINED UNCHANGED AND I AGAIN AGREED.

DOBRYNIN THEN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY IDEAS ABOUT PROCEDURAL DISPOSITION OF ASSEMBLY'S WORK IF IT TURNED OUT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE RES. I ASKED WHETHER HE HAD AND HE SAID HE HAD NO LANGUAGE TO SUGGEST. I THEN SAID WE HAD FURTHER CONSIDERED MATTER AND WE DID HAVE SOME IDEAS ABOUT PROCEDURAL RES AND HANDED HIM COPY OF FOL PROCEDURAL RES:

PRESERVATION COPY

"THE GA,

TAKING NOTE OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AND THE RESOLUTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE GA IN ITS EXTRAORDINARY SESSION,

1. REQUESTS THE SYG TO APPOINT A UN MEDIATOR FOR THE ME;
2. EMPOWERS THE MEDIATOR TO PERFORM THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:

(A) TO USE HIS GOOD OFFICES WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR THE RESTORATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE ME;

(B) TO ASSURE THE PROTECTION OF THE HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES IN JERSUALEM;

(C) TO PROMOTE A PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT OF THE FUTURE SITUATION IN THE AREA;

(D) TO ASSURE THAT THE PARTIES FULFILL IN GOOD FAITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THEM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER, AND IN PARTICULAR,

(1) THAT THEY SHALL SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, AND JUSTICE, ARE NOT ENDANGERED, AND

(2) THAT THEY SHALL REFRAIN IN THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY STATE, OR IN ANY OTHER MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSES OF THE UN CHARTER.

3. REQUESTS THE MEDIATOR TO REPORT PERIODICALLY THROUGH THE SYG TO THE SC AND THE MEMBERS OF THE UN.

4. TRANSMITS THE RECORDS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SESSION TO THE SC FOR ITS FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER AND REQUEST THE SC TO DEAL WITH THE SITUATION AS A MATTER OF URGENCY."

AFTER READING RES DOBRYNIN ASKED ME WHETHER WE HAD ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT WHO MEDIATOR OUGHT TO BE.

I REMINDED HIM OF OUR PRIOR CONVERSATION IN WHICH WAHLEN HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BUT STATED THAT IN CONVERSATION I HAD WITH SYG HE HAD INDICATED THAT WAHLEN IN HIS VIEW WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE. I THEN SAID JARRING, THE SWEDISH AMB IN MOSCOW, HAD BEEN MENTIONED. DOBRYNIN ASKED WHETHER WE HAD SUGGESTED HIM. I SAID WE HAD NOT, THAT I DID NOT EXACTLY REMEMBER HOW HIS NAME HAD ENTERED THE DISCUSSION BUT I DID RECALL THAT SYG INDICATED HIGH REGARD FOR JARRING. DOBRYNIN THEN OBSERVED THAT HE SHARED THAT HIGH REGARD.

DOBRYNIN THEN ASKED ABOUT ORIGINS OF PROCEDURAL RES. I SAID WE TOOK IT LARGELY FROM GENERAL MANDATE GIVEN TO COUNT BERNADOTTE IN 1948. HE SEEMED TO NOTE THIS WITH SOME INTEREST BUT THEN SAID THAT AS THINGS NOW STAND HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT MANDATE WAS EXPLICIT ENOUGH. I ASKED IN WHAT RESPECTS. HE REPLIED IT DID NOT REFER TO WITHDRAWAL TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT IF IT REFERRED TO WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO REFER TO BELLIGERENCY AND WE WOULD THEN BE GOING AROUND IN CIRCLES.

WE THEN MADE A BRIEF STATEMENT

BUT THEN SAID THAT AS THINGS NOW STAND HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT MANDATE WAS EXPLICIT ENOUGH. I ASKED IN WHAT RESPECTS. HE REPLIED IT DID NOT REFER TO WITHDRAWAL TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT IF IT REFERRED TO WITHDRAWAL IT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO REFER TO BELLIGERENCY AND WE WOULD THEN BE GOING AROUND IN CIRCLES.

HE THEN MADE VERY INTERESTING OBSERVATION THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BEST FOR US TO CONSIDER TOGETHER PROCEDURAL RES WHEN IT WOULD BE CLEAR THAT ASSEMBLY COULD NOT AT RESUMED SESSION ON WEDNESDAY AGREE UPON SUBSTANTIVE RES. I SAID THAT WE WERE QUITE AGREEABLE TO TALK WITH THEM AT ANY TIME ABOUT EITHER SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL RES TO WHICH HE REPLIED THAT BY OUR EXCHANGE IT WOULD NOT APPEAR THAT WE COULD AGREE UPON SUBSTANTIVE RES BUT THAT WE SHOULD RESERVE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON PROCEDURAL RES IF ASSEMBLY TOOK NO FURTHER ACTION ON SUBSTANCE. I SAID THIS WAS AGREEABLE AND AGAIN REPEATED WE WOULD BE GLAD TO CONSULT WITH THEM AT ANY TIME. DOBRYNIN SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS IN THE PROCEDURAL RES THE REFERENCE BACK TO SC COULD REFER TO PEACEFUL WAYS AND MEANS FOR SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS UNDERLYING SITUATION, LEGAL, POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN. THIS OBVIOUSLY WAS TAKEN FROM YUGO RES. I SAID THAT IN PROCEDURAL RES WE WOULD BE GLAD TO NEGOTIATE WITH HIM ON PRECISE LANGUAGE.

COMMENT: AS ALWAYS WITH DOBRYNIN CONVERSATION WAS VERY CORDIAL IN TONE AND FRANK IN ITS APPRAISAL OF SITUATION. IT IS QUITE APPARENT HOWEVER THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR LOBBYING IN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN REVERSAL OF VOTES TAKEN LAST WEEK AND IT IS ALSO QUITE APPARENT THEY UNDERSTAND WE WILL CONTINUE TO STAND ON POSITION WE HAVE TAKEN. HOW SUCCESSFUL THEY OR WE WILL BE WILL DEPEND UPON LA'S. IF LA'S REMAIN FIRM IT IS MY VIEW THEY WILL NOT PRESS FOR ANOTHER VOTE. IF HOWEVER LA'S FALL INTO DISARRAY THEN WE CAN ANTICIPATE ANOTHER RES WHICH WILL REFLECT VIEWS OF SO-CALLED SPANISH DRAFT AS POSSIBLY REVISED BY SOME LA'S. IT IS ALSO APPARENT THAT DOBRYNIN REALLY DID NOT EXPECT US TO CHANGE OUR POSITION AND THAT HE HAD REACHED THIS CONCLUSION FOLLOWING HIS CONVERDATION WITH SECY YESTERDAY. IN ANY EVENT EXERCISE WAS USEFUL ONE SINCE (1) WE GAVE HIM ALTERNATIVE DRAFT WHICH DID NOT USE WORK "BELLIGERENCY" BUT WHICH AS I POINTED OUT IS NEVERTHELESS UNACCEPTABLE, AND (2) IT WOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE PROCEDURAL DISPOSITION WITH US IN EVENT ASSEMBLY TAKES NO FURTHER ACTION ON SUBSTANCE.

GP-1
GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

PRESERVATION COPY

EEA339
OO WIE 19
DE WIE 1907

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67719

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 9 14 16

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RELEASE TO BE ISSUED SIMULTANEOUSLY AT
11 A.M. TODAY WASHINGTON TIME BY STATE DEPARTMENT AND
CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT:

BEGIN TEXT

IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FROM GENERAL NOBUTU, PRESIDENT
OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAS DESPATCHED THREE C-130 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
AND CREWS TO KINSHASA. THESE AIRCRAFT WILL PROVIDE LONG-RANGE
LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT IN MEETING
THE MERCENARY-LED REBELLION. THEY WILL BE IN NON-COMBATANT
STATUS. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND UNITY OF THE CONGO.

END TEXT

THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK HAVE AGREED THAT THIS SHOULD
BE PLAYED IN VERY LOW KEY. SUGGEST YOU REFER ALL QUESTIONS TO
STATE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIG:091346Z JULY 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-19-79, NSC 6-25-79
By rg/isp, NARA, Date 7-11-91

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

EEA338
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 1499

1967 JUL 8 18 51

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67714

67 JUL 8 PM 3:07

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH MCBRIDE DESCRIBES THE GROWING PRESSURE TO MOVE THE C-130'S FORWARD. HE ASKS FOR A PROMPT DECISION AND ANNOUNCEMENT.

KINSHASA 351

1. WHEN I FINALLY ABLE TO LOCATE MOBUTU THIS MORNING, I TOLD HIM THAT THREE C-130S HAD BEEN PLACED IN READINESS. I WAS RELUCTANT TO GO ANY FARTHER IN INDICATING POSITIVE REACTION TO HIS REQUEST, AND MOBUTU DID NOT REACT STRONGLY. I THEN ASKED HIM WHAT HE COULD TELL ME ABOUT STEPS TAKEN TO SETTLE DOWN CONGOLESE POPULATION. MOBUTU SAID HE COULD ASSURE ME AS OF LAST REPORT ALL OF CONGO EXCEPT KISANSANI CALM. HE GAVE ME FULL MILITARY SITREP, ALL OF WHICH INFO ALREADY REPORTED SEPARATELY. SAID THERE NO NEW REPORTS THAT EUROPEAN POPULATION BEING THREATENED AND HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD ALL NOW BE STOPPED. I AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT DETERIORATION RACIAL SITUATION IS CAUSE OF DEEP CONCERN TO HIGHEST LEVELS IN USG.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-102
By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

2. LATER IN MORNING, MOBUTU ASKED BLAKE AND ME TO COME URGENTLY TO HIS HOUSE. HE ASKED WHETHER THERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS RE HIS REQUEST FOR C-130S. PRESIDENT NOTED THAT SEVERAL NATIONAL RADIOS REPORTING WASHINGTON HAD ANNOUNCED THAT CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT HAD MADE REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THIS NEWS NOW KNOWN THROUGHOUT CONGO. WHAT WAS PRESENT SITUATION? I TOLD HIM I HAD NO MORE INFO RE HIS REQUEST. MOBUTU SAID HE NOW PLACED IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION. HIS REQUEST KNOWN HERE, BUT THERE NOTHING TO INDICATE TO CONGOLESE PEOPLE THAT USG IN FACT WILLING HELP. SAID VERY SOON CONGOLESE WILL BEGIN ASK WHETHER WESTERN ORIENTATION PAYS.

3. MOBUTU THEN LAUNCHED INTO DISCUSSION OF DIFFICULT PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM HE FACES RE DETERIORATION RACIAL RELATIONS. SAID HE SPENDING MOST HIS TIME CALLING GOVERNORS AND ANC (CONGOLESE ARMY) COMMANDERS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY INSISTING STRONG MEASURES BE TAKEN TO PROTECT EUROPEAN POPULATION. YET, CONGOLESE REACTION IS THAT CITIZENS OF WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE THE ONES RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLING MANY CONGOLESE AS RESULT MERCENARY REVOLT. HE JUST HAD REPORT THAT LARGE NUMBER CONGOLESE SHOT BY MERCENARIES IN BUKAVU. THESE KILLINGS


PRESERVATION COPY

HAVE ENRAGED PEOPLE IN BUKAVU AND THEIR IMMEDIATE AND SIMPLE REACTION IS THAT EUROPEANS SHOULD PAY FOR KILLING CONGOLESE. PRESIDENT SAID HE DEPLORED THIS REACTION BUT IT NATURAL.

4. MOBUTU ADDED THAT BOMBOKO AND HE GETTING SERIES SHARP PROTESTS FROM WESTERN AMBASSADORS CALLING FOR PROTECTION WHITE POPULATION, BUT TOO FEW SEEM TO CARE THAT LARGE NUMBER OF CONGOLESE KILLED AS RESULT OF WHITE-LED REVOLT. MOST OFFER SYMPATHY BUT NO HELP. PRESIDENT SAID WHAT HE NOW NEEDS URGENTLY ARE PHYSICAL SIGNS THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES SYMPATHIZE WITH CONGO'S PLIGHT AND THAT WESTERN NATIONS EQUATE VALUE OF AFRICAN LIVES WITH THOSE OF EUROPEANS. HE ASKED THAT I MAKE URGENT ANOTHER APPEAL FOR C-130S TO COME IMMEDIATELY SO THAT HE CAN SHOW CONGOLESE TANGIBLE PROOF OF AT LEAST US SUPPORT.

5. COMMENT: AS I INDICATED KINSHASA 304 NEED FOR EARLY AND POSITIVE ACTION ON MOBUTU'S REQUEST FOR C-130S IS GREATER THAN EVER. PUBLICITY GIVEN TO REQUEST HAS MADE EARLY FAVORABLY REPLY ALL THE MORE URGENT ALTHOUGH REASONS FOR POSITIVE RESPONSE REMAIN SAME: (A) NEED FOR DRAMATIC ACT WHICH WILL REINFORCE PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION OF MOBUTU'S POLICIES; (B) VITAL IMPORTANCE OF TAKING STEP WHICH WILL CONVINCE BROAD MASS CONGOLESE, WHO COULD TOO EASILY AT THIS STAGE LET THEIR EMOTIONS GET COMPLETELY OUT OF CONTROL, THAT THEIR FEARS OF UNITED "WESTERN PLOT" AGAINST CONGO IS NOT CORRECT AND THAT USG AT LEAST IS READY HELP SUPPRESS WHITE MERCENARY REVOLT - AM MORE THAN EVER CONVINCED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF ARRIVAL C-130S WILL DO MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE TO REVERSE PRESENT TERRIBLY DANGEROUS RACIAL TENSIONS; AND (C) NEED FOR GREATER CAPABILITY FOR POSSIBLE EVACUATION AMERICANS.

6. PRESS REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON THAT MOBUTU HAS APPEALED TO USG FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE HAS GREATLY INCREASED RISKS IF WE DON'T ANSWER REQUEST POSITIVELY AND VERY SOON. NOW THAT THIS INFO IS OUT, FAILURE TO PROVIDE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE WILL MAGNIFY MANY TIMES NEGATIVE IMPACT ON WESTERN ORIENTATION OF CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND EVEN ON ACTUAL FATE EUROPEAN POPULATION IN CONGO, FROM WHICH FATE AMERICANS CANNOT ULTIMATELY BE EXCLUDED. I THEREFORE AGAIN URGENTLY RECOMMEND THAT I BE INSTRUCTED INFORM MOBUTU IN NEXT FEW HOURS OF USG DECISION SEND C-130S HERE. I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT WE CAN ANNOUNCE "IMMINENT ARRIVAL OF C-130S" TODAY, BOTH HERE AND IN WASHINGTON, IF POSSIBLE SIMULTANEOUSLY.



DIG 081746Z JULY 1967

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 JUL 8 18 47

Free file

67 JUL 8 PM 3:05

SATURDAY

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OO WTE10
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67715

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 8, 1967

AS YOU KNOW, THE MILITARY COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND CHIEF POLITICAL OFFICER OF THE VIET CONG IN SOUTH VIET NAM IS REPORTED DEAD OF A HEART ATTACK. HIS NAME WAS GENERAL THANH. HE AND GENERAL GIAP WERE THE ONLY FOUR-STAR GENERALS IN NORTH VIET NAM. THEY WERE LONG REPORTED TO BE RIVALS, WITH THANH BELIEVED FROM HIS WRITINGS AS WELL AS HIS REPUTATION TO BE THE LEADER OF A HARD-LINE RATHER THAN A FLEXIBLE POSITION.

THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS SPECULATING THAT HIS DEATH MAY NOT HAVE BEEN NATURAL AND COULD REFLECT OR CAUSE A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF HANOI'S POLICY.

BUT THERE IS NOT ONE SCRAP OF EVIDENCE BEYOND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS DEATH AND TOP-DRAWER HANOI FUNERAL ON JULY 7.

DTG: 081815Z JULY 1967

GPS: 130 IMI 130

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-437

By mg, NARA, Date 12-2-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 8 18 00

VZCZCEEA329
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1498FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67713~~SECRET~~

JULY 8, 1967

THIS CABLE FROM MCBRIDE GIVES THE FLAVOR OF THE CONGO
SCENE TODAY AND OF HIS THINKING ABOUT THE C-130'S.

KINSHASA 304

1. I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF DIFFICULT MORAL, HUMAN AND PUBLIC RELATIONS POSITION IN WHICH UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN PLACED OVER CONGOLESE C-130 REQUEST BECAUSE OF REPULSIVE BRUTALITY AND (CONGO NATIONAL ARMY) IN LUBUMBASHI AND EXCESSES ELSEWHERE. INCIDENTALLY, EXPERIENCE WOULD INDICATE FIRST DAY OR TWO AND REOCCUPIES A TOWN ARE MOST CRITICALLY DANGEROUS. PRESENT SITUATION IS OF COURSE EXACERBATED BY FACT THAT ANC IS RETAKING TOWNS (THEY MAY SIMPLY HAVE BEEN EVACUATED) WHICH WERE OCCUPIED BY WHITE MERCENARIES, SO SITUATION WOULD BE CRITICAL EVEN WITHOUT CONGOLESE GOVERNMENTS' ACTION IN AROUSING ANTI-WHITE SENTIMENT WHICH, AS REPORTED, WAS LESS EXTREME OVER LAST NIGHT'S TELEVISION AND RADIO; THOUGH THIS MORNING'S RADIO NOT GOOD.

2. AS OF THIS MOMENT THERE ARE NO NEW ELEMENTS IN SITUATION. KISANGANI PARTLY IN HANDS OF ANC BUT THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE AIRPORT WHERE APPARENTLY LARGE GROUP OF EUROPEANS HAVE BEEN GATHERED UNDER MERCENARY CONTROL. THERE IS LIKEWISE NOTHING NEW FROM LUBUMBASHI. FATE OF REBELLION ITSELF IS HAZY IN EXTREME, HOWEVER. THERE LITTLE DOUBT THAT SOME MERCENARY-KATANGESE BANDS REMAIN IN OPERATION DESPITE REPORTS AT LEAST ONE PLANELOAD OF MERCENARIES AND OTHERS HAS LANDED IN RHODESIA.

67 JUL 8 PM 2:39

Pres file
SATURDAY

DECLASSIFIED

 Authority *State ltr 12/13/77*
 By *rg/rg*, NARA, Date *7-11-91*

3. I AM NOW ATTEMPTING TO REACH MOBUTU TO CONVEY CONTENTS PARAS 2 AND 3 DEPARTMENTS' 3252 BUT HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL YET. I WILL OF COURSE NOT CLARIFY TO HIM ALL PURPOSES FOR WHICH C-130'S MAY BE PRE-POSITIONED BUT SIMPLY INDICATE AS DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTS THAT THEY ARE BEING PLACED IN READINESS. REPORT ABOUT READINESS OF C-130'S WILL NOT SATISFY MOBUTU LONG AND HE WILL BE PRESSING TO KNOW WHEN THEY MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FOR HIS MISSIONS. I WILL DISCUSS IN AS NON-INFLAMMATORY WAY AS POSSIBLE, QUESTION OF THERE AVAILABILITY IN CONTEXT HIS NEED TAKE URGENT MEASURES ALL ASPECTS OF RACIAL SITUATION. AT SAME TIME, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT NOT MAKING AVAILABLE C-130'S RISKS CAUSING DETERIORATION OF CONGOLESE WILL TO TAKE DETERMINATE MEASURES TO IMPROVE POSITION OF EUROPEAN OPOULATION. ON OTHER HAND. I AM SINCERELY CONVINCED ARRIVAL OF C-130'S WILL BE KIND OF DEMONSTRATION OF WESTERN SUPPORT WHICH WOULD HELP QUICKLY SETTLE DOWN SITUATION.

4. FINALLY, THERE ARE NO NEW ELEMENTS IN EVACUATION SITUATION SINCE LAST NIGHT AND CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT EFFECTIVE PRESENCE C-130'S HERE ON AMERICAN MORALE REMAIN PERTINENT. OBVIOUSLY, IT IS OF COURSE ESSENTIAL THAT CONGOLESE NOT KNOW EVACUATION IS A FACTOR IN OUR DESPATCHING PLANES TO CONGO AND INDEED EVACUATION FROM AREAS CONTROLLED BY ANC IS A HIGHLY DELICATE FACTOR IN ITSELF.

DTG: 081706Z JULY 1967

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GPS: 498 IMI 498

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1967 JUL 8 17 42

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67712

~~SECRET~~

JULY 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN HOW HOLYOAKE PUT THE CASE TO
WILSON AGAINST ANNOUNCING A FAR EAST PULL OUT.

I HAVE HAD A FULL ACCOUNT FROM JACK MARSHALL OF HIS
MOST USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH YOU, AND WITH MR HEALEY AND
MR BORDEN, ON THE FUTURE PATTERN OF BRITISH PARTICIPATION
IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA. I
KNOW THAT HE GAVE YOU A DETAILED EXPOSITION OF OUR THINKING
BUT I FEEL THAT, BEFORE YOU PROCEED TO DECISIONS, I SHOULD
TRY TO DRAW TOGETHER IN BROAD TERMS OUR VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

WE ACCEPT WITHOUT QUESTION THAT YOU HAVE A NEED TO
EASE THE STRAIN THE FAR EAST BASES PUT ON THE BRITISH
ECONOMY, AND THAT THIS MAKES IT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO CUT
BACK SUBSTANTIALLY BOTH YOUR FORCES AND YOUR FACILITIES
IN THE REGION. WE DO NOT RPT NOT QUESTION YOUR VIEW-INDEED
WE SHARE IT-THAT THE LONG-TERM AIM IS A SOUTH-EAST ASIA OF
INDEPENDENT, VIABLE AND STABLE STATES ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR
THEIR OWN SECURITY WITHOUT NEEDING THE GUARANTEE OF WESTERN
FORCES BASED ON THEIR TERRITORY. I MUST SAY FRANKLY
HOWEVER THAT THE PROPOSAL PUT TO ME BY GEORGE BROWN IN
WASHINGTON IN APRIL, TO WITHDRAW BRITISH FORCES ENTIRELY
FROM THE REGION BY THE MID-SEVENTIES, WOULD IN MY VIEW MAKE
IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE OF A
STABLE SOUTH-EAST ASIA.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-54
By sj, NARA Date 5-2-01

Pres file
67 JUL 8 PM 2:04
SATURDAY

FIRST OF ALL, WE SEE NO RPT NO GROUNDS FOR CONFIDENCE THAT BY THE MID-1970'S SOUTH-EAST ASIA WILL HAVE CEASED TO BE AN AREA OF INSTABILITY, OR THAT COMMUNIST CHINA WILL HAVE CEASED TO EXERT A MAJOR DISRUPTIVE INFLUENCE. WE ARE THE MORE PERTURBED, THEREFORE, AT WHAT SEEMS TO US THE LIKELY EFFECT ON THE PRESENT SECURITY AND FUTURE SHAPE OF THE REGION IF IT BECAME KNOWN THAT BRITAIN HAD DECIDED (OR WAS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF A RATIFIED ASSUMPTION) TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS LAND-BASED FORCES FROM MAINLAND SOUTH-EAST ASIA BY A SPECIFIC FUTURE DATE. WE ARE AFRAID THAT THE STILL-FRAGILE CONFIDENCE GENERATED IN THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES BY THE SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDONESIA CONFRONTATION, IN WHICH BRITAIN PLAYED THE LEADING PART, AND BY THE AMERICAN DEFENCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, WILL BE SHATTERED, AND THAT THE OLD DIVISIONS, UNCERTAINTIES AND SUSPICIONS WILL RE-APPEAR AND SPREAD. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THE INCREASED DIFFICULTIES FOR THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IN GIVING EFFECT TO ITS RESOLVE TO SEE THINGS THROUGH IN VIETNAM. IT IS GOING TO TAKE A LONG TIME TO BUILD A VIABLE SOUTH VIETNAM, AND A BRITISH DECISION TO LEAVE THE SOUTH-EAST ASIAN MAINLAND, TAKEN WHILE THE END OF THE STRUGGLE IS STILL NOT RPT NOT IN SIGHT, COULD ONLY STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE IN THE UNITED STATES WHO WISH TO GET OUT OF ASIA, WHATEVER THE COST. A WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH BRITISH AND AMERICAN FORCES FROM MAINLAND ASIA, IN THE SORT OF CONDITIONS WE ARE FACING TODAY, WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE SECURITY OF AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. I KNOW AND WELCOME THE FACT THAT YOU CONTEMPLATE RETAINING A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THE AREA, BUT WHATEVER THE COMPARATIVE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FORCE YOU HAVE IN MIND, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN LAND-BASED FORCES AND FORCES OVER THE HORIZON IS VERY REAL. THE FEELING IN ASIA WILL BE THAT THE BRITISH ARE PULLING OUT. ON THIS GROUND ALONE I WOULD FEEL JUSTIFIED IN URGING YOU NOT RPT NOT TO COMMIT YOURSELF NOW TO DECISIONS OR PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS (WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY BECOME A MATTER OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND BE INTERPRETED AS DECISION) WHICH MAY WELL SET OFF IN ASIA A CHAIN REACTION OF THE KIND WE ARE ALL SO ANXIOUS TO AVOID.

OUR SECOND MAJOR CONCERN IS A MORE PRACTICAL AND, IF YOU LIKE, A MORE SELFISH ONE. THIS IS YOUR PLAN TO START REDUCING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE COMMONWEALTH BRIGADE IN 1968 AND TO WITHDRAW YOUR BATTALION FROM IT BY 1969. AS YOU KNOW, OUR FORCES IN THE AREA HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMONWEALTH STRATEGIC RESERVE AND HAVE NO RPT NO ABILITY TO MAINTAIN THEMSELVES AS AN INDEPENDENT ENTITY. BRITISH LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND FACILITIES IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA ARE THEREFORE A VITAL ELEMENT IN OUR CAPACITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEFENCE OF THOSE COUNTRIES. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF OUR GROUND FORCES, WHICH FORM PART OF A COMPOSITE COMMONWEALTH UNIT. FOR THIS VERY REASON, THE COMMONWEALTH BRIGADE AT TERENDAK CAMP HAS SPECIAL VALUE AS A PRACTICAL EXAMPLE OF COMMONWEALTH COOPERATION FOR DEFENCE. WE FEAR THAT THE EARLY BREAK UP OF THE BRIGADE WILL BE SEEN AS HERALDING THE EFFECTIVE END OF COMMONWEALTH MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE AREA. LET ME BE FRANK AND SAY THAT IN MY VIEW IT IS THE BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA WHICH MAKES THE COMMONWEALTH MILITARY PRESENCE CREDIBLE. I AM CONCERNED THAT THE DEPARTURE OF BRITISH FORCES WILL RENDER THE POSSIBILITY OF OUR CONTINUED PRESENCE DOUBTFUL NOT RPT NOT ONLY FROM A PURELY PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF A LACK OF MILITARY - - AND HENCE POLITICAL - CREDIBILITY.

WHILE ACCEPTING THAT SOME CHANGES ARE INEVITABLE, MY COLLEAGUES AND I FEEL THAT THE NEED IS NOT RPT NOT TO ELIMINATE COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE COOPERATION IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, BUT TO MAINTAIN IT - EVEN ON A VERY REDUCED SCALE - AND POSSIBLY EXTEND IT TO INCLUDE MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE. WE ARE NOT RPT NOT THEREFORE OPPOSED TO A RETHINKING OF OUR POLICIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, OR THE MEANS BY WHICH WE SEEK TO GIVE EFFECT TO THEM. OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN IS THAT DECISIONS TAKEN NOW SHOULD NOT RPT NOT, BY REMOVING THE ABILITY TO RESPOND TO EVENTS AS THEY UNFOLD, BE FOUND IN FUTURE YEARS TO CONSTITUTE A SORT OF STRAIT-JACKET. THIS IS WHY I WOULD URGE YOU AGAIN NOT RPT NOT TO COMMIT YOURSELF TO A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION AS FAR AHEAD AS THE NINETEEN SEVENTIES, AND TO KEEP THE COMMONWEALTH BRIGADE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE AT LEAST UNTIL 1970-71, WHEN WE SHALL KNOW MUCH BETTER WHAT SORT OF SITUATION IT IS WE ARE FACING, AND HOW IT CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY BE MET.

DTG 081623Z JULY 1967

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 8 16 25

67 JUL 8 PM 12:40

Pres. file
SATURDAY

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DE WTE 1495

FROM LATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67711

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 8, 1967

IN YOUR DISCUSSION WITH NEWSMEN ON GERMANY I DOUBT THAT YOU WILL WANT TO RAISE THE RECENTLY ANNOUNCED CABINET DECISION TO CUT THE GERMAN DEFENSE BUDGET (WHICH COULD MEAN AN ARMED FORCES REDUCTION OF FROM 40,000 TO 60,000 MEN). HOWEVER, IF ASKED, YOU MIGHT WISH TO SAY:

- WE HAVE HEARD UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE CABINET DECISION, BUT HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL WORD FROM THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.
- IT IS THEREFORE PREMATURE FOR ME TO MAKE ANY COMMENT.
- IN GENERAL, AS YOU KNOW, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT SUBSTANTIAL FORCE CHANGES BY THE NATO ALLIES ARE A MATTER FOR THE MOST CAREFUL INTER-ALLIED AND NATO CONSIDERATION.
- I BELIEVE THE TRILATERAL TALKS, AND NATO CONSIDERATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS THAT EMERGED, PROVIDE A GOOD EXAMPLE OF INTER-ALLIED AND NATO CONSULTATION.

DIG: 381559Z JULY 67

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY RG ON 7-17-91

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1967 JUL 8 15 37

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67708

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 99-54
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH AN APPRAISAL OF BOMBING EFFECTS IN HANOI
AND NEGOTIATING POSSIBILITIES FROM AN OBJECTIVE JAPANESE.
DICK HELMS' ROUNDUP WILL BE SENT
AS SOON AS RESULTS COME IN FROM HIS QUERIES.

KYODO NEWS AGENCY FOREIGN NEWS BUREAU DIRECTOR OTA, ALONG
WITH YOMIURI NEWSPAPER COMPANY CORRESPONDENT KOMIYAMA,
VISITED NORTH VIETNAM FROM MAY 18 UNTIL MAY 29. AFTER RETURNING
HOME, HE RELATED UNOFFICIALLY THE FOLLOWING CONCERNING
THE RECENT SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM ON 11 JUNE:

1. BOMBING OF THE NORTH

AS A RESULT OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH, THERE IS NO
DOUBT THAT CONSIDERABLE LOSSES HAVE APPEARED. CONSEQUENTLY,
ITS STATEMENTS THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS NOT LOST (ANYTHING)
THROUGH THE BOMBINGS ARE NOT CORRECT. HOWEVER, THE CITIZENS
OF HANOI ARE CONTINUING TO PURSUE THEIR LIVELIHOOD AMONGST
THE FLAMES. FROM THE INSTANT AFTER THE LIFTING OF THE AIR-
RAID WARNING, THEY BEGIN THEIR DAILY WORK. IT IS BELIEVED
THAT FOR THE TIME BEING FOOD IS SUFFICIENT.

2. TALKS WITH OFFICIALS

(1) I MET IN HANOI WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY
TRINH, MEMBER(S) OF THE VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY EDITORIAL COMMITTEE,
AND REPRESENTATIVE(S) OF THE VIET CONG STATIONED IN HANOI.
(I PERSISTENTLY REQUESTED A MEETING WITH HO CHI MINH,
BUT NEVER COULD MEET HIM. HO RECENTLY HAS NOT MADE AN APPEARANCE
BEFORE THE PEOPLE, AND HE MAY BE SICK.)

(2) THROUGH MY TALKS WITH PEOPLE IN HANOI, INCLUDING
FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH, I FELT THAT THERE IS THE FEELING
THAT NORTH VIETNAM STRONGLY DESIRES UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION
OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH. (THE FACT THAT THE UNITED STATES
IS ADDING CONDITIONS TO A CESSATION OF BOMBING OF THE NORTH
IS ABSOLUTELY DIFFICULT FOR NORTH VIETNAM TO ACCEPT.)

- FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH SAID THAT, IF THE UNITED STATES STOPS THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH, AN HONORABLE SOLUTION OF THE STRUGGLE, INCLUDING SAVING THE UNITED STATES FACE, CAN BE ATTAINED. (THE CONCRETE MEANING OF THIS IS UNCLEAR.) OFFICIALS OF THE NORTH VIETNAM INFORMATION MINISTRY, WHICH TOOK CARE OF US, SAID NORTH VIETNAM COULD LAY OUT A RED CARPET FOR AN HONORABLE SOLUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES IF THERE IS A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH. NORTH VIETNAM FORMALLY SAYS THAT "ONLY AFTER UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH WILL TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES BE POSSIBLE." HOWEVER, THIS WAY OF SPEAKING IS ONLY TO AVOID LOSING THEIR OWN FACE. TO BE SURE, AS FAR AS NORTH VIETNAM IS CONCERNED, IT APPARENTLY WILL NOT BE ALL RIGHT TO BEGIN TALKS AS SOON AS THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS STOPPED.

(3) FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH IS A VERY QUIET MAN, AND HE SPOKE BIT BY BIT IN A LOW VOICE. HOWEVER, HE SAID HARSHLY THAT "WE OVER VALUED THE UNITED STATES WEAK POINTS."

3. RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIET CONG

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SIDE GLADLY EXPLAINS THAT NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAMS ARE ONE, BUT VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVE NGUYEN VAN TIEN, STATIONED IN HANOI, SAID, "EVEN AFTER THE SOUTH IS LIBERATED AND PEACE IS RESTORED, TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTH AND NORTH WILL CO-EXIST UNTIL UNIFICATION," AND DID NOT RULE OUT THAT THE NORTH WOULD BE SOCIALIST AND THE SOUTH NEUTRAL WITH THE 17TH PARALLEL AS A BORDER LINE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. REPRESENTATIVE TIEN IS A VERY STRONG-MINDED MAN, AND, AMONG THE PEOPLE I MET DURING MY TRIP THIS TIME, HE LEFT THE STRONGEST IMPRESSION. UPON OCCASION, HE ABSOLUTELY IGNORED OFFICIALS OF THE NORTH VIETNAM SIDE SENT TO ACCOMPANY US.

4. EVALUATION BY NORTH VIETNAM TOWARD THE U THANT PROPOSAL, ROLE OF JAPAN FOR PEACE

(1) AS TO U THANT'S NEW PROPOSAL, HANOI IS VERY COLD. (AS FAR AS HANOI IS CONCERNED, THE SIMULTANEOUS CESSATION OF FIGHTING CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL IS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION FOR CESSATION OF THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH, AS STATED ABOVE, IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT.)

(2) I THINK IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR JAPAN TO TAKE ON THE TASK OF MEDIATION. OFFICIALS OF THE INFORMATION MINISTRY, WHICH TOOK CARE OF US, SAID VARIOUS SEVERE THINGS CONCERNING JAPAN'S "COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES" IN THE VIETNAM WAR.

(3) AS FAR AS NORTH VIETNAM IS CONCERNED, INTERMEDIARIES FOR PEACE, INCLUDING JAPAN, APPEAR UNWANTED, AND, WHEN THE RIGHT MOMENT COMES, NORTH VIETNAM WILL HOLD DIRECT TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES. FOR NORTH VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES, IN A CERTAIN SENSE, MAY BE EASIER TO TALK WITH THAN COMMUNIST CHINA.

(4) WHEN NORTH VIETNAM'S ATTITUDE IS LIKE THIS AND WHEN ONE THINKS THAT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN THINKING, AS STATED ABOVE, BETWEEN NORTH VIETNAM AND THE VIET CONG, THE ONLY THING JAPAN MAY BE ABLE TO DO FOR PEACE IS TO APPROACH THE VIET CONG DIRECTLY AND REALIZE TALKS BETWEEN IT AND THE UNITED STATES (OR WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT).

5. USSR, COMMUNIST CHINA, NORTH VIETNAM

(1) IN HANOI THERE ARE VERY MANY RUSSIANS, AND MEMBERS OF THE TASS NEWS AGENCY MET US EASILY AND TALKED TO US ABSOLUTELY FRANKLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WERE SHUT OUT ENTIRELY BY THE CHINESE SIDE (EMBASSY, NEWSPAPER REPORTERS).

(2) IN CANTON, NORTH VIETNAM CONSULATE PERSONNEL CAME TO MEET US. THEY SEEMED PERPLEXED AND SHOWED NO SPECIAL INTEREST DURING THE UPROAR OF THE GREAT CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN CANTON.

(3) NORTH VIETNAM CLEARLY IS PERPLEXED IN THE FACE OF THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION. FOR MOST PEOPLE IN NORTH VIETNAM, THERE IS NO PROBLEM OF IDEOLOGY.

6. FURTHERMORE, BUREAU DIRECTOR CIA, WHILE STAYING IN HANOI, MADE TAPES WHICH HE RECORDED WHILE TAKING REFUGE IN AIR-RAID SHELTERS. ON THESE TAPES ARE RECORDED THE SOUNDS OF AIR-RAID WARNING SIGNALS, JET PLANES, AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING, WHICH ARE VERY INTERESTING.

DTG: 081411Z JULY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

35

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 92-101
By cb, NARA, Date 4-21-95

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 8, 1967
3:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms' summary of the situation in Hanoi, with some recent specific reports from the ground and elsewhere.

My impression is:

- the bombing down to June 10 hurt more than anything in the past;
- the present transport bombing puts some significant pressure on them outside Hanoi;
- they have something to think about as they look ahead over the next year, but it is not yet for the government in Hanoi an unmanageable situation.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

CIA memorandum (
The Situation in Hanoi
7 July 1967
No. 0669/67 cy 1
plus attached

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By CG, NARA Date 12-5-00

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY 35a
IN 07284

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STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF. JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO
DD/I EXO

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081318Z

CITE

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

DIST 8 JULY 1967 (C)

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM
DOI: MAY AND JUNE 1967
SUBJECT: ATTITUDE OF NORTH VIETNAM AND VIET CONG LEADERS
AND PEOPLE TOWARD WAR

ACQ:

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

DONG IS FED

UP WITH THE WAR. HO CHI MINH, HOWEVER, DOES NOT SHARE THIS FEELING; HO HAS HIS HEAD IN THE CLOUDS AND IS OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE REALITY OF THE WAR.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

2. [REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WHO DO MOST OF THE FIGHTING IN THE WAR ARE BETWEEN THE AGES OF FIFTEEN AND TWENTY-FIVE. THEY HAVE NEVER KNOWN ANYTHING BUT WAR AND THEY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONDITIONED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ONLY END THE WAR CAN HAVE IS VICTORY FOR THEIR SIDE.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

3. IN DISCUSSING AN EXTREMELY HARD-LINE SPEECH CONCERNING THE WAR IN VIETNAM WHICH WAS MADE BY DINH BA THI, CHIEF OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF) MISSION IN BUDAPEST AND HEAD OF THE NLF DELEGATION TO THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, [REDACTED] THI HAS BEEN IN BUDAPEST FOR TWO YEARS WITHOUT RETURNING TO HANOI. AS A RESULT OF THIS, THI HAD NOT SHARED THE HARDSHIPS OF THE PEOPLE LIVING IN NORTH VIETNAM AND CONCEIVES THAT THE PEOPLE CAN ENDURE THESE HARDSHIPS INDEFINITELY.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] "IT IS EASY TO TAKE A HARD LINE ON THE WAR

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

07284

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~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem controls)

WHEN LIVING IN BUDAPEST."

4. [REDACTED] THE SPEECH THI DELIVERED AT THE
CONFERENCE WAS SOFTER THAN THE ONE HE ORIGINALLY
SUBMITTED [REDACTED] THI THEN
DECIDED NO NLF DELEGATION WOULD ATTEND THE CONFERENCE.
HE SUBSEQUENTLY RELENTED AND AGREED TO ATTEND AS AN
OBSERVER ONLY.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

35c

British Consulate Telegram to Foreign Office

35d

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By JW, NARA, Date 11-9-99

PRIORITY HANOI
TELEGRAM NO 223

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
TO WASHINGTON
6 JULY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 233 OF 6 JULY
REPEATED FOR INFO TO SAIGON AND F.O.

~~NORTH-VIETNAMESE SOURCE SAID TODAY THAT SERIOUS DISRUPTION~~
~~TO HANOI-HAI PHONG RAILWAY HAD BEEN CAUSED BY BANDS ON HAI DUONG~~
~~ON, I THINK 2 JULY.~~

SOSFA

GROUPS 35A

SENT AT 07/0005Z CAE

CHANCERY GENERAL
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681:CHY:fmk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

DOI: 7 July 1967

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] the Stockholm ^{World} Vietnam
Conference on Vietnam, by comparison with the NLF representatives,
the two DRV representatives were skin and bones. One of those, DO
Xuan Danh, a member of the North Vietnam Peace Committee [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said that
there was adequate food in Hanoi but that bombing and consequent
removal of offices from Hanoi caused loss of sleep. ~~Persons allowed a~~
~~return Hanoi once per week. Diesel generators from Russians which~~
~~provided each village have greatly eased electricity problems caused~~
~~by bombings of power stations.~~ Do stated North Viet Peace Council
has lost two secretaries in single month due bombing. Added that
they have suffered much but that suffering only strengthened their
resolve. Latter remark made in presence of Nguyen Minh Vy, who is
Do's superior.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] the Vietnam Conference
in Stockholm, the speeches of both the DRV and NLF delegates at
the opening session were extremely hard line. ~~They held out no prospects~~
~~for a soft line.~~ This appeared to shock many of the participants.
Isabella Blume was heard to say that if the line is to be so hard,
the conference will get nowhere. ~~Engin Fedorov, Chief of the Soviet~~
~~delegation looked grim and unhappy during the Vietnamese speeches.~~

Positions were straight party line, stressing North Vietnam has nothing to reciprocate from American cessation bombing or troop cut back/withdrawal. North Vietnam rep and Fedorov exhibited concern over alleged plan bomb dykes. Fedorov speech, at least by comparison, soft and hopeful.

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By cl, NARA Date 12-5-00

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 7 JULY 1967

SUBJECT OBSERVATIONS ON CONDITIONS IN HANOI AS OF
7 JULY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ACQ

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. ON THE EVENING OF 7 JULY, MOST OF THE CITY OF HANOI WAS ILLUMINATED. SMALL SECTIONS OF THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL PART OF THE CITY WERE BLACKED OUT. AT GIA LAM AIRPORT, THE USUAL TWO FLOODLIGHTS WERE BEING EMPLOYED IN THE PARKING AREA. GIA LAM DISTRICT ITSELF WAS FULLY LIGHTED. THE PONT DES RAPIDES WAS NORMALLY LIGHTED.

2. ~~IT WAS RELIABLY REPORTED IN HANOI THAT THE CENTRAL THERMAL ELECTRIC PLANT APPEARED TO BE 90 PERCENT REPAIRED.~~ THE AREAS

UNDERGOING REPAIR WERE WELL CAMOUFLAGED. WATER CONSUMPTION APPEARED NORMAL. HANOI OFFICIALS HAVE, HOWEVER, BECOME CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ABNORMAL PERIOD OF DROUGHT. THE LEVEL OF THE RED RIVER IS FROM TWO TO THREE METERS BELOW ITS USUAL LEVEL AND THERE IS CONCERN ABOUT HAVING SUFFICIENT WATER FOR THE FORTHCOMING RICE SEASON. HANOI OFFICIALS HAVE, IN FACT, ALREADY SERVED NOTICE THAT EMERGENCY MEASURES MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO TRANSFER WATER FROM ONE RICE AREA TO ANOTHER BY A DIKE SYSTEM. SIGNS WERE OBSERVED IN TMB CITY DIRECTING INHABITANTS TO HELP EACH OTHER. ~~THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WAS SHOWING LESS HOPE AND VITALITY, AND THIS WAS DEFINITELY RELATED TO THE 9-10 JUNE RAIDS ON THE CENTER OF HANOI, WHICH WERE A TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCE FOR THE HANOI POPULACE~~

3. TRANSPORT IN HANOI WAS NORMAL. TRAMWAYS WERE FUNCTIONING AND TRAFFIC WAS MOVING AT ITS NORMAL PACE. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONSTRUCTION WORK.

4. ON 7 JULY A HEAVY CONVOY WAS SIGHTED AT 1940 HOURS HANOI TIME, WHICH COINCIDED WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE ICC PLANE. WHEN THE AIRCRAFT LEFT AT 2010 HOURS THE CONVOY HAD ALREADY MOVED INTO THE CITY OF HANOI.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY
AMBASSADOR LOCKE, MR. CALHOUN) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND,
GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, GENERAL KERWIN, GENERAL
DAVIDSON) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL S ZRP AND POLAD) PACAF (GENERAL RYAN)
PACFLT (ADMIRAL JOHNSON) ARPAC (GENERAL BEACH) 7TH AIR FORCE
(GENERAL MOMYER)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GROUP

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By CG, NARA Date 12-5-00

359

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

5 July 1967

SUBJECT: Recall of DRV Representatives
From Abroad to Hanoi

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SOURCE :

DOI : 4 July 1967

The DRV Mission Chiefs have returned from Paris, Djakarta and New Delhi. The Mission Chiefs have also returned from Laos, Cambodia and Poland.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] vague rumor that the government party was seriously split while the Middle East crisis was going on.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] the Mission Chiefs have been recalled either to take part in general policy discussions in the light of the rather soft line the Russians took during the Middle East crisis, or less likely, they were recalled to be told of some policy decision which had already been taken.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] Ho Chi Minh did not appear for the May Day celebrations nor did he appear for the celebration of his own birthday, 19 May. For the latter, there was a photograph of him in the newspaper dressed in winter clothing.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] it would be a great mistake to misjudge the psychology of the locals by trying to exploit their apparent indecision by hitting them harder.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By cg, NARA Date 12-5-00 35h

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable IN

ROUTINE

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDG
 EXO DDI ONE ORR

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GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic
 downgrading
 declassification

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CITE

DIST 7 JULY 1967

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI LATE MARCH 1967

SUBJECT REACTION OF RESIDENTS OF NORTH VIETNAM TO AMERICAN BOMBING

ACQ

SOURCE

FIELD NO. EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1.

2. THE OTHER DAY, AT ABOUT ONE O'CLOCK IN THE AFTER-
 NOON, THE AMERICAN BOMBERS ATTACKED THE DOWNTOWN AREA OF
 HAIPHONG. HOUSES NEAR THE CATHAY THEATER WERE HIT AND SOME
 PEOPLE WERE KILLED. EVEN SO, THE HEARTLESS AMERICAN DEVILS
 CANNOT FRIGHTEEN THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM FOR THEIR CAUSE IS
 JUST. ON THE CONTRARY THIS BOMBING SHOWS THAT THE AMERICANS
 ARE FACED WITH FAILURE AND THEY ARE STRUGGLING FOR THEIR
 EXISTENCE. WE ARE SURE THAT WE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM WILL WIN (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

5
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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

THE WAR IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE AND WILL LIBERATE SOUTH
VIETNAM AND UNIFY OUR ENTIRE COUNTRY.

3.

4.  DISSEM. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 


EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

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1.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

A. [REDACTED] HANOI MAINTAIN THAT CITY LIFE CONTINUING
AT NORMAL LEVEL. NO MENTION POWER OR WATER SHORTAGES.
PROVINCIAL [REDACTED] DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT,
[REDACTED] HEAVY DAMAGE TO ROADS AND RAIL LINES.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

B. THERE MANY COMPLAINTS OF FOOD SHORTAGES AND HIGH
FOOD PRICES ON OPEN MARKET, COUPLED WITH COMMENTS ON
LOW SALARIES. HOWEVER, SOME [REDACTED] MAINTAIN THAT
THEIR ECONOMIC SITUATION GOOD AND SUFFICIENT FOR THEIR
NEEDS.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

C. [REDACTED] HANOI GENERALLY SHOW HIGH LEVEL OF
MORALE. EVEN THOSE WHO COMPLAIN OF CURRENT LIVING
CONDITIONS USUALLY INCLUDE [REDACTED] DETERMINATION
TO CARRY ON AND THEIR FAITH IN EVENTUAL VICTORY.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 00-67

By cb NARA Date 12-5-00

PAGE 2

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~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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IN 04183

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STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	DDO	AID
OSI 2		DDSET 2							USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

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050630Z

CITE

DIST 5 JULY 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM


EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

DOI 18-29 MAY 1967

SUBJ OBSERVATIONS IN HANOI IN LATE MAY 1967

ACQ

SOURCE



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. (SUMMARY: IN LATE MAY 1967 TANKS WERE USED IN ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY POSITIONS IN THE HANOI AREA. PETROLEUM CANS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY IN THE FREIGHT TRAINS. ALTHOUGH FOOD RATIONING CONTINUED, PRICES ON SOME ITEMS HAD BEEN REDUCED AND GOODS APPEARED PLENTIFUL.)

2. ABOUT 100 MEDIUM-SIZE TANKS SERVING AS ANTI-AIRCRAFT EMPLACEMENTS WERE STATIONED ALONG THE BANK OF A LARGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

RIVER NEAR THE STEEL RAILROAD SPAN OUTSIDE HANOI.

EACH TANK PULLED AN ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN MOUNTED ON A WHEELED PLATFORM. IN ADDITION TO ITS OWN CANNON EACH TANK HAD A DOUBLE BARRELLED ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN PROTRUDING FROM THE TURRET OPENING.

3. MOVEMENT OF FREIGHT CARS IN HANOI INCREASED CONSIDERABLY SINCE LAST YEAR. IN ADDITION TO A LOCOMOTIVE IN FRONT EACH FREIGHT TRAIN HAD ANOTHER LOCOMOTIVE. PETROLEUM CARS WERE SEEN FREQUENTLY.

4. FOOD ITEMS WERE APPARENTLY PLENTIFUL AND PRICES ON GOODS AS A WHOLE SEEMED TO HAVE DECREASED. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PRICE OF RICE, WHICH WAS RATIONED, HAD BEEN REDUCED ABOUT TEN PER CENT. SIMILAR PRICE DECREASES WERE NOTED FOR SUCH ITEMS AS SOY SAUCE, MEDICAL GOODS AND BEAN MASH. DOMESTIC VACCINES FOR CHOLERA AND TYPHUS WERE BEING PRODUCED FOR USE IN THE NORTH AS WELL AS IN THE SOUTH.

5. DURING THE PERIOD 18-29 MAY NO BOMB DAMAGE WAS NOTED IN THE AREA OF HANOI GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS OR TO PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH'S QUARTERS. NOR WAS THERE EVIDENCE OF BOMBING AT AN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

UNIDENTIFIED AIRFIELD NORTH OF HANOI WHERE THE FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT WERE SEEN: A TWIN ENGINE MILITARY PLANE, ABOUT 20 KHAKI-COLORED MILITARY HELICOPTERS AND FIVE OR SIX CIVILIAN CRAFT.

6. A FAIRLY LARGE SIZE AUTOMOBILE REPAIR PLANT SITUATED SOUTH OF THE FANCHIMU (PHONETIC) HOTEL APPEARED TO HAVE EVACUATED ITS MAJOR FACILITIES AND WAS CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON MINOR REPAIRS. TWO OTHER FACTORY BUILDINGS LOCATED SOUTH OF THE HOTEL HAD BEEN EVACUATED AND WERE VACANT.

7. CHINESE WERE SEEN IN VARIOUS PARTS OF HANOI. FIVE OR SIX HAD QUARTERS IN THE FANCHIMU HOTEL. THEY WOULD DEPART IN THE MORNING, RETURN AT NOON AND LEAVE LATE IN THE AFTER-NOON FOR SOME UNKNOWN DESTINATION. THEIR MISSION IN HANOI WAS NOT KNOWN.

8. VIETNAMESE WORKERS WERE REPORTEDLY VOLUNTARILY RETURNING 20 PER CENT OF THEIR PAY TO THE GOVERNMENT, AND ALLEGEDLY PRODUCTION HAS GREATLY INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

IN 74183

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(reclassification) (dissem controls)

9. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMATT

NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPACJ COMNAVJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG USARJ

DET/4FTD [REDACTED] GP-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By CG, NARA Date 12-5-00

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EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

7 July 1967

SUBJECT: Further Comments Regarding Question of Damage to
Dykes in North Vietnam

SOURCE:

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] no evidence to confirm the allegation made by the DRV Ministry of Water Conservancy on 4 July that the United States Air Force was intensifying strikes against dykes and irrigation works in twelve provinces. [REDACTED] personal observation and extensive inquiries, [REDACTED] have produced as confirmation of serious damage to the dykes or of flooding. [REDACTED] unable to visit the "dyke protecting Hanoi on the North" [REDACTED] this refers to the dyke North of the police post. [REDACTED] this dyke may be damaged and "rumor" confirms this.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Saturday, July 8, 1967 -- 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

I took the liberty of opening this because I thought, coming from Mrs. Papandreou, it might require some staffing. It does not.

It is simply that rare thing, a human being thanking you directly for an act of public policy; namely, your intervention on behalf of Greek political prisoners, including her husband.

I have showed the letter to no one else.

It does not require an answer; and, as you can see from the attached letter from Mr. Schwartz, an answer might be complicated and complicating to deliver.

We might consider instructing our Ambassador in Athens to deliver safely a simple message such as her letter to Washington was received and appreciated.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Maggapila Papandreu

Fila 58

Wynio - Anwai

36a

June 21, 1967.

President Lyndon B. Johnson
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Johnson,

I want to thank you, from the depth of my heart, for your swift humanitarian action on behalf of my husband Andreas and other political leaders in those early days right after the military coup. We shall be forever grateful.

Sincerely yours,

Margaret C. Papandreu
Margaret C. Papandreu

36b

LAW OFFICES
JAMES SCHWARTZ

17341 CLARK STREET
ENCINO, CALIFORNIA 91316
TELEPHONE 789-8672

July 5, 1967

Mr. Irv. Sprague
Presidential Assistant
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sprague:

You may remember that I met you at the White House after Governor Brown and I returned from Greece. It was a pleasure meeting you and I hope we can renew our acquaintance in the near future.

In 1964, President Johnson sent his private plane to Greece to pick up Mr. George Papandreou (then Prime Minister) and Mr. and Mrs. Andreas Papandreou. They were guests of the President and conferred with him at that time. Margaret Papandreou acted as hostess for Mrs. Johnson when Mrs. Johnson went to Greece.

Margaret Papandreou sent me a letter through certain channels for the President. I do not know its contents. I forward the letter to you with the hope that you can get it to the President.

If the President does receive the letter and wishes to answer it, it would be extremely unwise to send a letter to her address. Her mail is opened, phones tapped etc. The best procedure is to send mail to the American Embassy in Athens who would then call Margaret to pick up a letter.

Accept my thanks and appreciation for any efforts you may make in regard to the enclosed letter.

Kindest regards,

Cordially yours,


JAMES SCHWARTZ

37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

As you know, the military commander in chief of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops and chief political officer of the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam is reported dead of a heart attack. His name was General Thanh. He and General Glap were the only four-star generals in North Viet Nam. They were long reported to be rivals, with Thanh believed from his writings as well as his reputation to be the leader of a hard-line rather than a flexible position.

The intelligence community is speculating that his death may not have been ~~be~~ natural and could reflect or cause a shift in the balance of Hanoi's policy.

But there is not one scrap of evidence beyond the announcement of his death and top-drawer Hanoi funeral on July 7.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-101
By CB, NARA, Date 4-21-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

38

July 8, 1967

Sent Rumsfeld
via wire

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW

In your discussion with newsmen on Germany I doubt that you will want to raise the recently announced Cabinet decision to cut the German defense budget (which could mean an armed forces reduction of from 40,000 to 60,000 men). However, if asked, you might wish to say:

- We have heard unofficial reports of the Cabinet decision, but have not yet received any official word from the German Government.
- It is therefore premature for me to make any comment.
- In general, as you know, it is our view that ^{substantial} ~~any~~ force changes by the NATO allies are a matter for the most careful inter-allied and NATO consideration.
- I believe the Trilateral Talks, and NATO consideration of the recommendations that emerged, provide a good example of inter-allied and NATO consultation.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-102

By lig, NARA, Date 8-11-93

*Pres file*LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 8, 1967

SUBJECT: Letter to You from Prime Minister Maiwandwal and
State's Proposed Reply

Before leaving the UNGA for Kabul, Prime Minister Maiwandwal wrote you the attached letter. He thanks you for your friendly hospitality when he was here and expresses his peoples' desire to promote friendly relations with us. As was to be expected of the head of a Muslim country, he hopes our position at the UN will be in accordance with our traditional friendship with Arab and Afro-Asian peoples.

State's proposed draft reply to be sent by cable thanks him for his letter and restates our position--sustain the cease-fire, promote a climate in which the states of the area themselves can achieve a settlement, retain friendly relations with all the Arab nations and reaffirm an interest in the territorial and political integrity of all the states in the area.

I recommend you approve the attached message.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Read to Rostow memo, 7/7/67,
enc. telegram to Kabul for clearance (WH-2605)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dear Mr. President:

Upon leaving New York, I should like to address myself to Your Excellency while recalling with gratitude the friendly hospitality you accorded me during my visit to the United States of America three months ago.

My current visit was in connection with the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly and being therefore confined to New York, I should like to take the opportunity, through this letter, to convey once again to Your Excellency the desire of my people to promote the friendly relations which so happily exist between our two countries.

We are deeply grieved by the grave situation in the Middle East characterized by the Israeli military occupation of territories belonging to Jordan, the United Arab Republic and Syria.

We hope that the stand to be taken by the United States Government on the present debate in the General Assembly will be not only in accordance with its traditional friendship with Arab and Afro-Asian peoples, but also in support of the principles for which it stands.

I take this opportunity to extend to Your Excellency the expression of my highest consideration.

Prime Minister Maiwandwal

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ijg, NARA, Date 8-11-93

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of June 29th. On reading it, I recalled with great pleasure your recent visit to the United States and our meeting then. We Americans value highly our traditionally friendly relations with Afghanistan, and we welcomed that opportunity to demonstrate the warmth of our friendliness.

You know, Mr. Prime Minister, of my Government's own deep concern over the recent tragic events in the Middle East. I can assure you that we will do all we can to help preserve the present cease-fire and to assist in the even larger task of finding the basis for a lasting and peaceful settlement. We are, of course, guided by our desire for friendly relations with all the Arab nations, our interest in the territorial and political integrity of all the states in the area and in conditions which protect their vital interests. We fully recognize the difficulties before us, but we will spare no effort in seeking to help create an atmosphere in which the countries of the Middle East themselves can achieve a settlement, for no solution which is imposed on them or which conflicts with their legitimate interests can endure.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

40

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 8, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

*sent Rostow
via wire
C AP67709*

Further digging indicates Teddy White also saw at State
Chet Cooper and Tom Hughes. Discussions centered on
organization and morale of the Viet Cong.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By per DCH NARA, Date 12-20-91

VZCZCEEA316
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1484

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67703

SENT
WHCA

~~SECRET~~

1967 JUL 8 01 04
JULY 7, 1967 - 7:30 P.M.

One file

MR. PRESIDENT,

HEREWITH, CIA'S LATEST REPORT DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IN
THE CONGO

NO. 1256/67

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
7 JULY 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-103
By WJD, NARA, Date 4-6-93

THE SITUATION IN THE CONGO

1. THE DISTURBANCES IN THE EASTERN CONGO ARE THREATENING TO PROVOKE WIDE-SPREAD ANTI-WHITE VIOLENCE. THE CONGO RADIO'S SLASHING ATTACKS ON WHITE MERCENARIES HAVE APPARENTLY INCITED UNPROVOKED VIOLENCE AGAINST EUROPEANS IN A NUMBER OF CONGOLESE POINTS PRINCIPALLY IN KATANGA. DEATHS ARE REPORTED FROM LUBUMBASHI (ELISABETHVILLE) AND OTHER INCIDENTS HAVE OCCURED IN LULUABOURG, JADOTVILLE AND KOLWEZI.

2. ON 6 JULY PATROLS OF THE ANC (THE CONGOLESE ARMY) PICKED UP NINE EUROPEAN MEN--BELGIANS AND GREEKS--IN DOWNTOWN LUBUMBASHI AND MASSACRED EIGHT OF THEM BY BAYONET OUTSIDE OF TOWN. THESE EUROPEANS, PERHAPS THROUGH IGNORANCE, WERE STILL ON THE STREET IN VIOLATION OF A 1800 CURFEW. THIS INCIDENT CULMINATES TWO DAYS OF INCREASING TENSION AND ANTI-WHITE SENTIMENT IN LUBUMBASHI (ELISABETHVILLE). ARMY AND POLICE ARE CONDUCTING HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCHES FOR ARMS, RADIO RECEIVERS AND TRANSMITTERS. THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF ROUGH TREATMENT OF EUROPEANS BY THE ARMY AND POLICE, AND SOME 100 EUROPEANS MAY HAVE BEE ARRESTED. NO EUROPEANS ARE PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE CITY, ON 7 JULY THE CONSULAR CORPS MADE A DEMARCHE TO GOVERNOR OF KATANGA, MANZIKALA, TO DEMAND SECURITY FOR FOREIGNERS, FAIR TREATMENT AND TRIAL OF ARRESTED PERSONS AND ACCESS TO CONGOLESE OFFICIALS. THE GOVERNOR CLAIMED TO HAVE EVIDENCE OF SOME EUROPEAN COMPLICITY IN RECENT SABOTAGE IN THE KATANGA AREA AND ADVISED ALL WHITES TO KEEP OFF THE STREETS.

3. OTHER REPORTS TELL OF ANTI-EUROPEAN VIOLENCE IN OTHER KATANGA AREAS SUCH AS KOLWEZI, JADOTVILLE, KAMINA; EUROPEANS IN THE MINING CENTER OF KOLWEZI HAVE REPORTEDLY RESIGNED EN MASSE AND DEMANDED IMMEDIATE REPATRIATION OF THEIR FAMILIES. VIOLENCE MAY SPREAD TO OTHER CONGO AREAS AND MOBUTU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE PROVINCIAL CITIES WHERE THE ANC IS AS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN ANTI-WHITE TERRORISM AS ARE LOCAL THUGS. THE 2ND PARATROOPER BATALION WAS PREVIOUSLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LOOTING IN KISANGANI (STANLEYVILLE) AND HAVE BEEN WIDELY HATED IN KATANGA.

4. THE CONGO IS FERTILE GROUND FOR DISTURBANCES. DURING MOBUTU'S 19-MONTH ADMINISTRATION, BASIC PROBLEMS HAVE NOT BEEN SOLVED AND HE HAS PROMISED HARDER TIMES TO COME. HIS DICTATORIAL METHODS AND ANC BRUTALITY HAVE DONE LITTLE TO INCREASE THE REGIME'S POPULARITY. MANY TRIBAL GROUPS CONTINUE TO OPPOSE CONTROL BY ANY REGIME IN KINSHASA AND OFTEN ARE VIRTUALLY AT WAR WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. KATANGA IS UNHAPPY BUT COWED BY THE BRUTAL GOVERNOR MANZIKALA AND LOCAL MILITARY UNITS.

5. THERE HAVE AS YET BEEN NO REPORTS OF VIOLENCE IN KINSHASA (LEOPOLDVILLE) AND AT THIS TIME THERE APPEARS TO BE NO EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE TO MOBUTU IN THE CAPITAL.

6. AT THIS POINT THE VIOLENCE IS SPORADIC BUT APPEARS TO BE SPREADING. IT COULD SUBSIDE AS QUICKLY AS IT BEGAN, BUT IT COULD ALSO INTENSIFY AND RESULT IN A PRECIPITOUS EUROPEAN EXODUS.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 072334Z JUL 1967

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEE0315
00 WTS10
DE WTE 1482

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

42

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67701

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

1967 JUL 8 00 56

~~SECRET~~

NSC Memo, 11/30/65, State Dept. Guidelines
By *guly*, NARA, Date 11-18-99

JULY 7, 1967

Pres file

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOLLOWING IS STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONS
ON THE CONGO.

YOU SHOULD KNOW, IN ADDITION:

1. IT APPEARS THAT CONGOLESE TROOPS HAVE KILLED EIGHT
EUROPEANS FOUND ON THE STREET AFTER CURFEW (NO AMERICANS).
THIS FLOWS FROM RACIAL FEVER STIRRED BY EVENTS AND MOBUTU'S
HANDLING OF THEM. WE ARE GOING URGENTLY TO MOBUTU TO DEMAND
THAT HE STOP RACE-BAITING.

2. THERE ARE REPORTS THAT MERCENARIES ARE FLYING OUT OF
AT LEAST ONE OF THE TWO MAJOR CITIES THEY HAD OCCUPIED.
DESTINATION UNKNOWN, ALTHOUGH AS I WRITE THIS, UPI-134
TELLS ME ONE OF PROBABLY THREE DC-3'S HAS LANDED IN
RHODESIA.

3. AT THE U. N. THE SITUATION IS GETTING HOTTER, WITH
CONGOLESE POINTING INCREASINGLY TOWARDS PORTUGAL AND PER-
HAPS OTHERS. WE HAVE NO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. RESOLUTIONS
THAT EMERGE COULD BE HARD FOR US AND EASIER FOR SOVIETS
TO SUPPORT.

YOU WILL WISH TO TALK TO SECT. RUSK, BUT IN BALANCING ALL
THE ELEMENTS IN THIS PICTURE IT SHOULD ALSO BE BORNE IN
MIND THAT THE OFFER OF THE C-130'S IS ABOUT ALL THE
LEVERAGE AMBASSADOR MCBRIDE IS GOING TO HAVE IN PRESSING
FOR A TONING DOWN OF RACIAL AND U. N. LINES.

OBSVIOUSLY THESE NEW ELEMENTS ARGUE FOR HOLDING BACK; AND
THAT MAY BE THE RIGHT DECISION. BUT THE C-130 OFFER MAY STILL
BE WORTH CONSIDERING ON LEVERAGE GROUNDS.

(STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE FOLLOWS)

SUBJECT: FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE CONGO SITUATION

1. BELGIAN POSITION. WE HAVE ASKED THE BELGIANS HERE AND
IN BRUSSELS FOR FURTHER AIR CREWS FOR THE CONGO. THEY KNOW
THAT WE HAVE HAD A REQUEST FOR C-130'S AND HAVE AGREED TO
DELAY REPLYING TO A CONGOLESE REQUEST FOR MATERIEL
ASSISTANCE UNTIL THEY LEARN OUR REACTION. MR. ROSTOW WILL
DISCUSS THE SUBJECT AGAIN WITH THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR AT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2:45 TODAY. (ASTERISK - MEMORANDUM WILL BE LDX'D TO WHITE HOUSE AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED. BHR) THE BELGIAN POSITION IS A BIT SHAKY. THE ABDUCTION OF TSHOMBE WAS BADLY RECEIVED IN SOME BELGIAN CIRCLES. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE GOVERNMENT OF BELGIUM IS SMARTING UNDER CONGOLESE PRESS AND RADIO ATTACKS LUMPING THE MUTINEERS, MANY OF WHOM ARE BELGIANS, WITH THE REST OF THE BELGIAN POPULATION OF THE CONGO AND WITH BELGIAN FINANCIAL INTERESTS. BRUSSELS HAS SAID THAT BELGIAN AIR CREWS NOW IN THE CONGO WILL CARRY OUT GDRG ORDERS, THAT OTHER BELGIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL (TRAINING TROOPS) WILL STAND BY, AND THAT A REQUEST FROM THE CONGO GOVERNMENT FOR ARMS AND MUNITIONS HAS BEEN RECEIVED. THE BELGIANS MAY ACT FAVORABLY ON THE LATTER REQUEST, IF WE PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AND IF CONGO PRESS ATTACKS ABATE. HOWEVER, THEIR INITIAL REACTION INDICATES THAT THEY WOULD INSIST ON A MODERATION OF ANTI-BELGIAN PROPAGANDA AS A PRECONDITION TO SUCH AID. OUR AMBASSADOR IN THE CONGO IS POINTING OUT TO THE CONGOLESE THE DANGERS OF OVER-EXCITING THE CONGOLESE POPULATION. WE HAVE MADE THE SAME POINT TO AMBASSADOR ADOULA HERE. WE ARE KEEPING THE BELGIANS INFORMED OF THESE ACTIONS.

WE DO NOT, IN SUMMARY, EXPECT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER TAKING THE LEAD IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE CONGO UNTIL IT IS SURE THAT THE US IS READY TO HELP AND UNTIL IT IS SURE THAT A WAVE OF ANTI-BELGIAN AND ANTI-WHITE PROPAGANDA IN THE CONGO IS BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL AND POSSIBLE INCIDENTS AVOIDED. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BELGIUM DICTATE THIS CAUTIOUS STAND. SHOULD THERE BE AN UNPROVOKED SLAUGHTER OF BELGIANS (AND SUCH MAY HAVE JUST OCCURRED IN KATANGA) THEN THE BELGIANS WILL PULL BACK FROM ASSISTANCE.

2. MERCENARY OBJECTIVES. MERCENARIES IN THE CONGO, EVEN THOUGH IN THE PAY OF THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT, ALWAYS REPRESENTED A POTENTIAL TROJAN HORSE BECAUSE THEIR POLITICAL SYMPATHIES WERE ESSENTIALLY VERY CONSERVATIVE, EVEN COLONIALIST, AND OFTEN PRO-TSHOMBE. NO SINGLE LEADERSHIP OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS HAS BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED NOR HAS THERE APPARENTLY ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE REBELS.

EMBASSY KINSHASA SPECULATES THAT MERCENARY OBJECTIVES MAY BE TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE EASTERN CONGO AS A BASE TO CHANNEL IN REINFORCEMENTS AND EVENTUALLY TAKE OVER MINERAL-RICH KATANGA. PRESUMABLY THEY WOULD WELCOME THE CONGOLESE (OR KATANGAN) LEADERSHIP OF SOMEONE LIKE TSHOMBE OR OTHER PLIABLE CONGOLESE ELEMENTS WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH THEM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER INFORMATION IT IS UNCERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT THE MERCENARIES SEEK. IT IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANT THAT THEY HAVE NOT USED THE RADIOS AT KISANGANI OR BUKAVU TO BROADCAST THEIR AIMS. HOWEVER, AS THE REBELLION OF 1964-65 SHOWED, A VERY FEW DETERMINED, WELL-TRAINED AND WELL-ARMED MERCENARIES CAN TAKE OVER LARGE PARTS OF THE CONGO AND THIS IS THE THREAT THAT THE GDRG NOW FACES.

THE BELGIANS TELL US THAT THEY ARE UNSURE WHAT THE EXACT MOTIVATIONS WERE. THEY SAY IT COULD HAVE BEEN PART OF A LONG-PLANNED PRO-TSHOMBE PLOT, A SUDDEN MOVE TO THWART THE EXTRADITION OF TSHOMBE, OR PERHAPS ONLY A DISSATISFACTION WITH LACK OF PAY.

3. AFRICAN REACTION. ZAMBIA CONDEMNED THE MERCENARY REBELLION AND OFFERED ASSISTANCE. KUNDA SAID: "THE CONGO AGGRESSION MEANS THERE WILL BE NO PEACE FOR COUNTRIES SMALL IN TERMS OF MILITARY MIGHT." HE CONGRATULATED THE US AND USSR FOR CONDEMNING THE MERCENARIES.

RWANDA HAS CONDEMNED THE MERCENARIES, PLEDGED SUPPORT TO MOBUTU AND OPENED THE AIRPORT OF KAMEMBE TO US AIRCRAFT FOR THE EVACUATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AND TO THE CONGO GOVERNMENT, SHOULD IT NEED IT.

CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) HAS STRONGLY CASTIGATED THE MERCENARY ACTIONS AND PLEDGED ASSISTANCE, INCLUDING TROOPS IF NECESSARY, TO HELP SUPPRESS THE REBELLION.

THE NIGERIAN AMBASSADOR HERE HAS EXPRESSED THE VIEW OF MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN STRONGLY CONDEMNING THE MERCENARIES. THE SOMALIES AND ETHIOPIANS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY ARE HORRIFIED THAT FOREIGN MERCENARIES ARE TRYING TO DISRUPT THE UNITY OF THE CONGO.

AT THE UN, THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL (INCLUDING ETHIOPIA, MALI, AND NIGERIA) MET FRIDAY MORNING AND UNANIMOUSLY AGREED TO SUPPORT THE CONGOLESE PROPOSED RESOLUTION CALLING ON ALL COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM ASSISTANCE TO THE MERCENARIES.

4. MILITARY SITUATION. FOR AN AS YET UNDERTERMINED CAUSE, DISSIDENT ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE HELD BUKAVU FOR TWO DAYS LEFT THE TOWN IN THREE COLUMNS ON THEIR OWN VOLITION EARLY THIS MORNING AND CONGOLESE TROOPS RETURNED. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME DANGER OF ANTI-EUROPEAN ACTS BY THE ANC.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DESPITE GURC CLAIMS THAT AN ANC PARACOMMANDO UNIT DROPPED ON KISANGANI EARLY THIS MORNING, DESTROYED DISSIDENT HELD T-28 AIRCRAFT, AND OCCUPIED MOST OF THE CITY, ANOTHER MORE RELIABLE REPORT INDICATES THAT KISANGANI STILL IS PARTLY IN MERCENARY HANDS AND THAT THE T-28'S WERE NOT DESTROYED.

THE CONGOLESE POLICE REPORT THAT KINDU RADIO WENT SILENT THIS MORNING, WHICH MAY MEAN THAT TOWN IS IN REBEL HANDS.'

ANTI-WHITE TENSIONS ARE REPORTED HIGH IN LUBUMBASHI AND WE HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT 13 EUROPEANS WERE MASSACRED BY THE ARMY.

5. ASSESSMENT OF RUSSELL/RIVERS REACTION. IN BILL MACOMBER'S ABSENCE, TULL TORBERT TALKED WITH MR. STEMLER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LEGISLATIVE LIAISON. STEMLER FEELS THAT NEITHER RUSSELL NOR RIVERS WOULD BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE RETURN OF THE C-130'S TO THE CONGO BUT WOULD GO ALONG IF THE MOVE WERE EXPLAINED IN A CLEAR, WELL CONSIDERED POLICY STATEMENT. IN GENERAL, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE SOMETHING TO SHOW FOR THE ASSISTANCE, FOR EXAMPLE A BETTER PUBLIC POSTURE BY MOBUTU TOWARD WHITE WESTERNERS AND/OR A DEAL ON TSHOMBE. TORBERT DEFERS TO STEMLER'S JUDGEMENT ON THE REACTION OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN.

DIG: 07/2140Z JULY 1967

~~SECRET~~

43
SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 8 00 21

VZCZCZEA313
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1484

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70412

UNCLAS

JULY 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH PROPOSED DRAFT TEXT OF MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY
TO MARCOS.

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL CONDOLENCE MESSAGE
TO PRESIDENT MARCOS

I LEARNED THIS MORNING WITH SADNESS OF THE UNFORTUNATE
PLANE CRASH IN NEGROS AND THE TRAGIC DEATH OF THE PASSENGERS
AND CREW. I HOPE YOU WILL CONVEY MY HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES
TO THEIR FAMILIES.

EA/PHL:RMSERVICE:STS
7-7-67

DTG:072334Z JULY 67

EEA311
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1479

FROM VALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67730

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 JUL 7 23 23

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RECEIVED
WIDA

Free file

JULY 7, 1967

FOLLOWING IS DEFENSE REPORT ON WHO SAW TEDDY WHITE.

HARRIMAN IS THE ONLY ONE AT STATE HE SAW ACCORDING TO STATES RECORDS. HE REPORTS THEY DISCUSSED NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS.

TEDDY WHITE HAS INDICATED TO OUR PEOPLE THAT WHAT HE IS INTERESTED IN ESSENTIALLY IS A PIECE ON THE ENEMY-- WHO HE IS, WHAT KIND OF A GUY IS HE, WHAT HE THINKS, WHAT MOTIVATES HIM, ETC. HE SAID HE PLANS TO SPEND FROM THREE TO FOUR WEEKS IN SVN, WAS NOT YET SURE EXACTLY WHEN HE WOULD DEPART.

HE SAW SECRETARY MCNAMARA FOR ABOUT FIFTEEN MINUTES THE AFTERNOON BEFORE THE SECRETARY'S DEPARTURE. PHIL SAT IN ON THIS SESSION.

SUBSEQUENTLY, TEDDY SPENT MORE THAN AN HOUR GETTING A GENERAL FILL-IN ON SVN FROM MARINE COLONEL TOM FIELDS, WHO HEADS OUR SEA OFFICE AND WHO WAS FORMERLY INFORMATION CHIEF IN I CORPS. ALSO SITTING IN WAS ARMY LT. COLONEL DAN BIONDI, FORMERLY OF THE MACV INFORMATION OFFICE. TEDDY ALSO MET WITH COLONEL HAL MOORE, WHO HAD A BRIGADE WITH THE FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION (AIR MOBILE) AND IS NOW WITH ISA, AND ALSO WITH COLONEL FRANK C. SCHOFIELD, JR., FORMERLY DEPUTY J-2 AT MACV AND NOW WITH DIA.

HE ALSO SPOKE BRIEFLY WITH ARMY BRIG. GENERAL WINANT SIDLE WHO HAS BEEN PHIL'S MILITARY ASSISTANT AND WHO NEXT MONTH BECOMES GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S TOP MILITARY INFORMATION OFFICER IN SAIGON.

TEDDY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE SEEING GOVERNOR HARRIMAN AFTER LEAVING HERE.

TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, HE SAW NO ONE ELSE DURING HIS VISITS TO THE PENTAGON.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY mw per DCH ON 12-20-91

DTG: 07/2143Z JULY 1967

VZCZCEEA332
OO WTE19
DE WTE 1468

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67694

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

1967 JUL 7 21 37

SENT
INCA

45

Pres file

HEREWITH TODAY'S SITUATION REPORT ON VIET-NAM, JULY 7, 1967

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

KY HAS TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER THAT AT A MEETING ON JULY 6 ATTENDED BY THIEU, KY AND SEVERAL OTHER GENERAL OFFICERS OF THE DIRECTORATE, A SECRET AGREEMENT WAS PUT INTO WRITING OUTLINING THE AUTHORITY TO BE HELD BY KY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. KY SAID THAT ONLY ONE COPY OF THE AGREEMENT WAS MADE AND THAT IT WAS RETAINED BY KY. THE AGREEMENT IS BRIEF AND SPELS OUT IN BROAD TERMS THAT KY AS VICE PRESIDENT MUST APPROVE ANY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT DECISIONS AND IN PARTICULAR THOSE DEALING WITH MAJOR MILITARY MATTERS AND EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE WAR. THE AGREEMENT ALSO STATES THAT KY WOULD NAME THE PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET MINISTERS. ACCORDING TO KY, THIEU IS SATISFIED WITH THE AGREEMENT AND UNDERSTANDS HIS LIMITED ROLE AS PRESIDENT. KY ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD ALMOST DECIDED TO NAME HIS FORMER VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE, NGUYEN VAN LOC, AS PRIME MINISTER AFTER ELECTIONS. LOC IS A SOUTHERNER.

THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST GENERAL MINH'S CANDIDACY BY GENERAL VIEN, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS SIMPLY INFORMS THE ASSEMBLY OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL'S DECISION TO PREVENT MINH FROM RETURNING "FOR REASONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY". THE EMBASSY, HOWEVER, IS RECEIVING REPORTS THAT THE GENERALS MAY SUPPORT THEIR COMPLAINT WITH ALLEGATIONS REGARDING COMMUNIST CONNECTIONS OF MINH'S RUNNING MATE, THE FACT THAT MINH'S BROTHER IS A VIET CONG GENERAL, THAT TRI QUANG IS PREPARING TO USE MINH'S CANDIDACY TO STIR UP TROUBLE AND THAT MINH'S RETURN COULD CAUSE DISSENSION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. KY HAS TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER THAT THE GENERALS REMAIN FIRMLY OPPOSED TO MINH'S CANDIDACY. KY CITED NO LEGAL OBJECTION BUT RATHER MINH'S INABILITY TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY AFTER DIEM'S DOWNFALL AND THE FACT THAT TROUBLE-MAKERS LIKE TRI QUANG WOULD EXPLOIT MINH'S CANDIDACY TO CREATE STRIFE WHEREVER POSSIBLE.

A SOUTHERN ASSEMBLY SOURCE HAS INDICATED TO THE EMBASSY THAT THE SMALL SOUTHERN BLOC HE BELONGS TO IN THE ASSEMBLY WILL MAKE ONLY A SHOW OF OPPOSITION TO THE DIRECTORATE'S POSITION ON MINH BUT THAT BASICALLY THEY DO NOT DISAGREE WITH IT. THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL MUST PRESENT ITS FINDINGS ON ALL THE CANDIDACIES TO THE ASSEMBLY BY JULY 15.

ONE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE HUONG'S KEY SUPPORTERS HAS CLAIMED TO AN EMBASSY OFFICER IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT MINH AND HUONG ARE COOPERATING. HE CLAIMED THAT MINH'S REAL INTENTION IS TO SUPPORT HUONG, AND THAT AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, MINH WILL ANNOUNCE HIS BACKING FOR HUONG, WHETHER FROM BANGKOK OR SAIGON. HUONG'S MAN ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE AND HUONG HAVE CAUTIONED MINH TO ORDER HIS SUPPORTERS NOT TO DEMONSTRATE ON HIS BEHALF. IN RESPONSE TO THE EMBASSY OFFICER'S QUERY, THE SOURCE SAID MINH WOULD RETURN TO SAIGON ONLY IF THE GOVERNMENT APPROVED.

THE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO RECEIVE REPORTS WHICH INDICATE THAT SOME GROUPS FORMERLY COMMITTED TO KY ARE NOW LESS SURE THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT THE THIEU-KY SLATE. THERE IS APPARENTLY SOME FEELING, PERHAPS WISHFUL THINKING, AMONG CIVILIAN GROUPS THAT A PURELY MILITARY TICKET WILL LOSE SUPPORT BECAUSE IT WOULD BE "MORE OF THE SAME". KY HAS CLAIMED TO AN AMERICAN OBSERVER THAT A POLITICAL BLOC MADE UP OF CAO DAI, HOA HAO AND VNQDD ELEMENTS WILL ANNOUNCE IT IS FORMALLY IN SUPPORT OF THE THIEU-KY TICKET. HE DID INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME PROBLEMS REMAINING FOR KY IN PERSUADING HIS PERSONAL SUPPORTERS TO GET BEHIND THE THIEU-KY SLATE.

COMMENT

THE EMBASSY CONTINUES TO FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE SHOULD NOT INTERVENE IN THE MINH ISSUE, THAT HIS CANDIDACY IS A THREAT TO MILITARY UNITY AND THAT THEREFORE IT WOULD BE BEST IF HE WERE NOT A CANDIDATE. WE AGREE THAT AT THIS POINT WE SHOULD NOT PRESS THE GVN TO REVERSE ITS POSITION ON MINH, BUT WE FEEL IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE EXTREMELY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF BLOCKING MINH'S CANDIDACY BE FULLY CONSIDERED BY THIEU AND KY BEFORE THEY DIG THEMSELVES DEEPER INTO THEIR PRESENT POSITIONS. THEREFORE WE WILL BE ASKING AMBASSADOR BUNKER TO REVIEW WITH THOSE LEADERS IN FRANK AND POSITIVE TERMS THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF THEIR POSITION.

WHILE THE EMBASSY FEELS IT IS TOO EARLY TO JUDGE WHETHER THE THIEU-KY TICKET HAS LOST SUPPORT WHICH WAS PRETTY WELL COMMITTED TO KY, IT BELIEVES IT POSSIBLE THAT SOME OF KY'S SUPPORTERS MAY DEFECT TO HUONG OR SUU.

EA/VN:RHMILLER:SPV

DTG: 072018Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

THIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By wp, NARA, Date 8-11-93

SENT
WHCA

46
SENT: LBJ RANCA

3:30 PM
7 JULY 67

VZCZCEEA393
OO WTEIJ
DE WTE 1463

1967 JUL 7 19 30

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67693

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 7, 1967

SEC. RUSK ASKED ME TO FORWARD THIS OBSCURE BUT POSSIBLY INTERESTING SHIFT IN HANOI'S PUBLIC NEGOTIATING STANCE.

NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH IN AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH VIENNA VOLKSTIME (COMMUNIST) CORRESPONDENT JANACEK HAS APPARENTLY EMPLOYED SOME NEW LANGUAGE ON THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENT. THE UNDATED INTERVIEW WAS CARRIED IN THE 2 JULY ISSUE, BUT THUS FAR HAS NOT BEEN CARRIED IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESS OR BY RADIO HANOI. IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS ON PEACE AND VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION, TRINH MAKES THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

1. EVERY TIME THE U.S. TALKS ABOUT PEACE, IT BRINGS MORE TROOPS AND INTENSIFIES ATTACKS AGAINST THE NORTH, "IT TALKS ABOUT 'NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS' BUT IN ACTUAL FACT IT DEMANDS THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ACCEPT THE ARROGANT AMERICAN CONDITIONS: 'MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION'".

2. "IF THE U.S. IS REALLY LOOKING FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM, THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTIES. IN HIS REPLY TO U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON OF 15 FEBRUARY 1967, OUR PRESIDENT HO CHI MINH SAID QUITE CLEARLY: 'THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS STARTED AN AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM. IT MUST DISCONTINUE THIS AGGRESSIVE WAR. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE.'"

3. "I, MYSELF, MADE A STATEMENT ALONG THE SAME LINES ON 28 JANUARY 1967: 'IF THE U.S. UNCONDITIONALLY DISCONTINUES ALL BOMBING RAIDS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, THEN THERE CAN BE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE DRV AND THE U.S.' I NOW REPEAT THIS STATEMENT."

4. "THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE---WILL NEVER CONDUCT TALKS WITH THE AGGRESSORS UNDER THE PRESSURE OF FORCE."

5. "THE SVN LIBERATION FRONT, THE ONLY GENUINE REPRESENTATION (SIC) OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, PURSUES A CLEAR-CUT POLICY AIMED AT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL, AND NEUTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM AND AT A SUBSEQUENT TRANSITION TO THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY."

PRESERVATION COPY

INR COMMENT:

THE GERMAN VERSION OF THE INTERVIEW USES THE SAME FORMULATIONS AS THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION, THUS REDUCING THE POSSIBILITIES OF MISTRANSLATIONS WHILE NOT ENTIRELY ELIMINATING THEM. WE DO NOT KNOW IN WHAT LANGUAGE TRINH GAVE THE INTERVIEW.

IF THE FORMULATIONS ARE AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF HANOI'S POSITION, AND ARE NOT CHANGED IN A SUBSEQUENT OFFICIAL VERSION, THEY REFLECT A SLIGHT SHIFT IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE STAND. HANOI HAS NOT PUBLICLY SAID AT A HIGH LEVEL THAT "IF THE U.S. IS REALLY LOOKING FOR A SETTLEMENT---THERE WILL BE NO DIFFICULTIES." IN ADDITION, TRINH'S STATEMENT THAT IF THE U.S. UNCONDITIONALLY DISCONTINUES ALL BOMBING RAIDS AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR THERE "CAN BE NEGOTIATIONS" IS NOT, AS HE IMPLIES, A DIRECT QUOTE OF HIS JANUARY 28 STATEMENT. THE JANUARY 28 STATEMENT IS IN FACT LESS FORTHCOMING, AND MERELY SAYS THAT IF THE U.S. "REALLY WANTS TALKS, IT MUST FIRST HALT UNCONDITIONALLY THE BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR---IT IS ONLY AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR THAT THERE COULD BE TALKS." TRINH'S COMMENT ON SETTLEMENT, WHICH INCLUDES AN INFREQUENT REFERENCE TO THE GENEVA AGREEMENT'S PROVISION FOR REUNIFICATION THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS, ARE ALSO RELATIVELY MILD. THUS TRINH CALLS FOR A "SUBSEQUENT TRANSITION TO THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY," WHICH APPEARS TO STRESS GRADUALISM. FINALLY, TRINH IS QUOTED AS SAYING HANOI WILL NOT TALK UNDER THE "PRESSURE" OF FORCE (RATHER THAN THE "THREAT" OF FORCE), POSSIBLY IMPLYING A READINESS TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT A PERMANENT BOMBING HALT.

NONETHELESS, TRINH DOES USE SOME STANDARD TOUGH FORMULATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE HE DOES NOT CALL FOR RECOGNITION OF THE FRONT, HE DOES REFER TO THE FRONT AS THE "ONLY GENUINE REPRESENTATION (SIC?) OF THE SVN PEOPLE." HIS DENUNCIATION OF "MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION" ALSO IMPLIES CONTINUED HANOI REJECTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY. THIS INTERVIEW CONSTITUTES THE FIRST WORD WE HAVE HAD FROM TRINH SINCE HIS TALK WITH JAPANESE NEWSMEN, CARRIED IN ONE VERSION BY KYODO ON JUNE 2 AND IN AN ALTERED, HARDER VERSION BY HANOI RADIO ON JUNE 6. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT TRINH MAY BE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO USE THE PRESS IN COUNTRIES LIKE JAPAN AND AUSTRIA AS A VEHICLE FOR ENUNCIATION OF A MORE REASONABLE LINE. CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, THE SHORT MOSCOW TASS PICKUP OF JULY 2 OF THE INTERVIEW DOES NOT QUOTE THE SOFTER PORTIONS OF THE TEXT.

DTG 071733Z JULY 1967

GROUPS:

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1:48

Pres file

1967 JUL 7 17 48

EEA298
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1462

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67692

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-102
By *ing*, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 7, 1967

67 JUL 7 PM 1:54

FRIDAY

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH INTERIM RESPONSE TO CONGO QUESTIONS. OTHER QUESTIONS
WILL BE ANSWERED AFTER LUNCH.

1. NITZE SAYS IF WE ARE TO HELP AGAINST MERCENARIES,
C130'S NECESSARY. OTHER AIRCRAFT LACK RANGE AND CARRYING
CAPACITY AND MOBUTU DOESN'T TRUST FOREIGN PILOTS NOT TO
DEFECT.

2. GENERAL MCCONNELL TAKES THE SAME VIEW EMPHASIZING
UNRELIABILITY OF FOREIGN PILOTS.

3. ON USE: AMBASSADOR WOULD FULLY CONTROL. HE HAS MILITARY
ADVICE AVAILABLE FROM BOTH DEFENSE ATTACHE AND A 50-MAN
UNITED STATES TRAINING MISSION HEADED BY A COLONEL JEFFRIES,
WITH WHOM HE IS EVIDENTLY IN CLOSE TOUCH.

4. ON DANGERS, NITZE SAYS PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IS NOT TO SEND
PLANES INTO AIRFIELD CONTROLLED BY MERCENARIES.
MCCONNELL SAYS THERE IS ALWAYS SOME DANGER OF SHOOTING OR
SABOTAGE IN AN UNSETTLED SITUATION; BUT RECALLS
SUCCESS OF AIR FORCE WITH BELGIAN PARATROOP MOVEMENT IN CONGO.

5. ARTHUR GOLDBERG IS STRONGLY FOR HELPING MOBUTU.
A UNITED STATES STANCE AGAINST INTRUSION OF FOREIGN
MERCENARIES WOULD HELP IN AFRICA GENERALLY AND IN UNITED
NATIONS CONTEXT.

6. WE SHALL BE ASSESSING PROBABLE REACTIONS OF RUSSELL,
RIVERS, AND FULBRIGHT. SECRETARY RUSK THINKS WE SHOULD
STRONGLY EMPHASIZE THAT THESE AIRCRAFT ARE BEING
RETURNED TO THE CONGO WHERE THEY WERE DOWN TO 1965.
IT IS NOT A WHOLLY NEW MOVE.

7. I SHALL REPORT LATER ON THREE QUESTIONS FROM PAGE
6 OF STATE MEMO.

DTG: 071722Z JULY 1967

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

48

For the President
From Walt Rostow

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Herewith the memo requested *this morning*. July 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Press file.

sent Rostow
7/7/67
CAP 67698

~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT~~

SUBJECT: Viet-Nam

increasingly The Viet-Nam situation is not a stalemate. We are moving uphill -- slowly but steadily. The enemy is moving downhill, paying *an* heavy price for his aggression.

Politically, there has been more rapid progress than we or the Vietnamese dreamed possible only a year or two ago. Items to note:

-- free elections last September (80 percent of those eligible voted);

-- a Constituent Assembly (free and frank debate, wide representation);

-- a new Constitution (a solidly democratic document);

-- a political campaign now being launched for a new government (President and Vice President, and a two-house legislature);

-- wide interest (19 possible candidates for President, 640 candidates for 60-seat Senate).

The clear lesson: the vast majority of Vietnamese, including prominent leaders and officials, are convinced their country has a future and that the people themselves can build it.

Militarily, progress has been slow *but* no less real. Items to note:

-- performance of ARVN improving (specifically, recent actions by the 18th division in III Corps, 2nd Ranger Group in II Corps, 47th Regiment and Airborne groups in I Corps have been vigorous, aggressive, professional);

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY *ry* ON *7-18-91*

CONFIDENTIAL

-- GVN desertion rate steadily declining over past year;
Communist desertions steadily growing;

-- weapons losses (two years ago, ARVN was losing three weapons for each ~~VC~~ ^{Communist} weapon captured; today the ~~VC~~ ^{Communist} are losing almost four weapons for each one they captured);

-- casualties -- ~~VC~~ ^{Communists} losing more than four times as many killed as South Vietnamese, Americans and other allies combined;

-- additional on casualties

VC and North Vietnamese have had more killed (18,400) in last two months than U.S. killed (11,400) in six years of the conflict.

U.S. highway deaths were 52,500 in 1966.

Total U.S. casualties in Viet-Nam -- 72,700.

Total U.S. highway casualties in 1966 alone -- 1,952,500.

Over the July Fourth weekend we killed 722 Americans, about the same as one month of killed in Viet-Nam.

North Vietnamese are paying a high price for their aggression.
Items:

-- gradual erosion of confirmed ^{VC} combat strength; North Vietnamese make up an increasing share of casualties;

-- more damage to northeast section of North Viet-Nam since April than during entire air campaign to date;

-- 30 MIG's destroyed in five weeks compared with 42 destroyed in previous 22 months;

-- our aircraft loss ratio has gone down: 10 per thousand sorties in last half of 1966; 6.2 per thousand since January 1;

CONFIDENTIAL

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-- other troubles -- North is losing more trucks than they are getting; major power disruption; industrial shutdowns; slowed port operations; prospect is for another bad harvest (deficit last year was 300,000 tons of rice).

Conclusion: Enemy is hurting badly -- but he still has capacity to fight for a long time, as long as he feels it is worth the price -- but the price is going up, slowly but steadily.

~~W. W. ROSTOW~~

~~Att.~~

CONFIDENTIAL

48a

Subject: The MIDDLE EAST

June 7, 1967

sent Rusk
7/7/67
CAP 67698

Where we are. The truce arrangements of 19 years have fallen apart. Already we and others have started down several tracks to try to build a stable peace in their place.

--The President in his talks with Kosygin made clear the importance of a general agreement to end belligerency and of big-power restraint on arms. While we have been aware of Soviet re-supply shipments from the beginning and are watching them closely, it is too soon to conclude that Soviet leaders have made a decision to return to the wasteful arms policy of the past ten years.

--The UNGA session demonstrated that the world will not accept pure demagoguery in place of a solution.

--The main economic pressures will fall on the parties to the war, especially the UAR. We are under no pressure, and even Western Europe's oil shortages are manageable.

--We and others have already begun to meet the vast immediate human needs of the refugees, and we believe the Israelis have begun thinking about an equitable solution for the bigger refugee problem of the past 19 years.

What choices must be made. As the President has said, "the parties to the war must be the parties to the peace." But others hold key cards too.

--Israel has an important responsibility to make a proposal for peace--on refugees, on boundaries, on maritime rights, on the Holy City Jerusalem and on future security for all.

--Arab leaders must choose whether they will keep alive the myth of 19 years that they must destroy Israel or whether they will join in building a partnership for progress. It may well be that some of the more forward-looking leaders will decide to go ahead on their own and leave behind those who insist on living by dead creeds that don't produce results.

--The USSR must decide whether it will use its influence with the Arabs to end belligerency and the arms race or to stoke up another conflict.

Where we might go if the right choices are made. The end of belligerency could open the door to a series of practical arrangements combining troop withdrawal with agreements on permanent boundaries, security, trade, and refugee settlement. There are ways to do this while preserving the honor of all.

486

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW July 7, 1967

Following are talking points on Germany:

Subject: Germany

sent Rusk
7/7/67
CAP 67698

1. Kiesinger Visit

- We are sorry the Chancellor had to postpone his visit, but understand his reasons.
- The German Government is now faced with some tough and urgent domestic financial problems. Both the Chancellor and Vice Chancellor Brandt felt they could not leave Bonn until these issues were resolved.
- The Chancellor and I have agreed to an early rescheduling of the visit.

(Note: Kiesinger faces a fight in the Cabinet and Parliament between the strict budget-balancers and those who want to take expansionary fiscal measures. With excess capacity, unemployment and little or no growth -- and a balance of payments surplus -- there is an overwhelming case for an expansionist policy. But this means increasing an already large budget deficit, and Strauss and the conservatives are taking a George Humphrey line. If the conservatives win, it will mean not only a rise in taxes, but a cut in spending. This would be bad not only for their economy and our balance of payments, but might also mean a reduction in defense spending. This last could give us real trouble.)

2. U.S. Relations with the Kiesinger Government

- We have been working well with the new German Government. For example:

(1) Trilateral Talks: Successfully completed.

- On troops, the three of us recommended to NATO an agreed plan for a limited redeployment of troops and aircraft.

(Note: The U.S. would rotate two brigades of one division in Germany and parts of three air wings -- a total of up to about 35,000 men and 96 aircraft.

Redeployment would begin in 1968. The forces would remain committed to the NATO Command and would rotate back to Europe regularly.)

- On balance of payments, the Germans agreed to help neutralize the U.S. and UK drain due to troops in Germany.
- In addition, the FRG agreed to continue to cooperate in the management of its monetary reserves (i.e., no conversion of dollar holdings to gold).

(Note: I would advise against our getting into a press battle with Kiesinger on whether he knew in advance about the air wings. If you are asked: McCloy first told his counterpart, Duckwitz, about a possible redeployment of part of the 3 air wings on March 3 in London. On March 13 he gave Duckwitz a full explanation of our plans. On March 16 we instructed Embassy Bonn to explain the details to the Foreign Office. Your first talk with Kiesinger in Bonn was on April 24.)

(2) Non-Proliferation Treaty:

- We have carried on extensive consultations with the FRG.
- I believe we have successfully worked out most of our differences.

(Note: If asked about details, you may want to say that it is premature to discuss matters under negotiation.)

(3) New German Policy vis-a-vis Eastern Europe

- We are sympathetic toward, and support, Germany's policy of improving relations with the East.

(4) Kennedy Round

- The Germans were very helpful in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

3. International Money

- We hope for a constructive and forward looking German position in this summer's monetary negotiations (preparatory to the Rio Bank and Fund meeting in September).

4. Food Aid

- We hope to see an expansion of Germany's role in providing aid to the LDCs. Her part in the Indian food aid program was a constructive step.

Handwritten note:
MORE TO FOOD
LONGER'S
MESSAGE.
A.D.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TALKING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Communist China and the United States

48c
sent Rusk
7/7/67
CAP 67698

There is another problem which is of deep concern to us and that is the relationship of Communist China to the world community.

By design, for some time we have not had much to say on this subject, and I shall not say very much now. I do, however, want to make a few points clear:

1. It is evident that the past year has been one of great travail on the Chinese mainland.

2. We have sincerely wished to refrain from any observations on that drama which could be viewed in any way as interference in the domestic affairs of ~~the People's Republic of China.~~ *mainland China.*

3. We have not sought to take advantage in any way of what evidently is a time of disruptive reappraisal for the mainland Chinese people and their government.

4. No one yet knows just what will come out of this reappraisal. We can all hope, however, that Peking leadership may find it possible for their great country to come to more realistic terms with its neighbors and with the rest of the world.

5. A peaceful China can expect friendship and cooperation from us. A reckless China must expect vigilance and opposition.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

On a number of occasions I have expressed the hope for a freer flow of ideas and people between mainland China and the U.S. The shape of the 20th Century demands cooperation rather than enmity. The explosive development in communications, travel, data recording, retrieval and exchange, and a host of other realities are opening up all manner of opportunities for cooperation among countries, to their immense mutual benefit. Those who remain on the periphery of this intercourse will lag far behind in the world of tomorrow.

Last October in Honolulu, I said "sooner or later the pragmatic and compassionate spirit of the Chinese people will prevail over outmoded dogmatism . . ."

"We do not believe in eternal enmity. All hatred among nations must ultimately end in reconciliation. We hopefully look to the day when the policies of mainland China will offer and will permit such a reconciliation."

I do not know how to state our attitude any clearer, or more sincerely.

Just last month in speaking to the Foreign Policy Conference for Educators at the State Department I observed "We maintain our dialogue with the authorities in Peking, in preparation for the day when they will be ready to live at peace with the rest of the world." Indeed, we should like that dialogue enlarged.

I expressed the general outlines of our flexible policy toward Communist China to Prime Minister Maurer when I saw him just prior to his visit to Peking.*

* Note: Mr. President:

A minor point.

Some experts think that by surfacing your conversation with Maurer you might reduce whatever effectiveness his message might have.

My judgment is: It doesn't make any difference: The Chinese will shift when they are ready to shift. But I thought you should know this reservation.

Walt

July 7, 1967.

Mr. President:

At lunch the other day Dean Acheson asked ~~that~~ I send you the attached speech on the problems we face in the UN. It was given in Austin last March by the New Zealand Ambassador.

I have lined through the most important passages.

W. W. Rostow

49

7/8/67
sent upstairs
to Pres office

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-102
By imp, NARA, Date 8-11-93
Walt

Friday, July 7, 1967 -- 5:00 PM

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW
1

Following is a summary of the international oil supply situation:

sent Rostow
7/7/67
CAP 67699

1. Production

- Middle East oil production is running at less than 60% of normal.
- There has been a cumulative production shortfall so far of over 150 million barrels (most of this would have gone to Europe). This shortfall has been absorbed in Western Europe by drawing ^{down} some 18 days reserves.
- Total world production shortfall is running at almost 4.5 million barrels per day. This is equivalent to over half of Europe's normal daily consumption (8.5 million barrels).
- Persian Gulf capacity is sufficient for Europe's needs, with Iran supplying the U.K. But the closing of the Suez Canal and the resulting tanker shortage has forced a production cutback to about 5 million barrels a day in the area.

2. Export Bans

- All Arab countries have banned exports to the U.S. and U.K. Libya has also banned shipments to West Germany. (The Libyans have said privately they want to resume shipments to West Germany.) Iraq permits exports only to France, Turkey, Spain and Greece.

3. Supply

- The supply problem will improve temporarily when tankers reach the Persian Gulf, load and return to Europe.
- This "bunching" of tankers will make the European supply situation erratic for some time, even assuming no further cuts in Arab oil production.

~~SECRET~~

4. Industry Studies

- Industrial representatives began meeting today to prepare recommendations for the OECD. (The industry group includes Gulf, Marathon, Mobil, Murphy Oil, Esso, Texaco and Continental from the United States as well as French, German, British, Dutch, Italian and Belgian companies.)
- The industry group will report on the supply problem to the OECD oil committee July 17 and OECD action will probably follow shortly thereafter. The OECD plan will almost certainly include: (1) plans for managing tankers; (2) increasing production and exports from more convenient sources (i.e., the Western Hemisphere); (3) equitable division in Europe of available supplies.

5. Outlook

- It may be possible to avoid serious rationing in Europe if: (1) the OECD comes up with a plan along the lines of the above; (2) exports from the Western Hemisphere to Europe are increased by at least 1.5 million barrels a day; (3) Libyan production returns to normal; (4) the Iraqi pipeline is fully reopened.

51

July 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

*sent Ranch
7/7/67
CAP 67702*

Two unrelated items as I close down this city desk for the day.

1. Hostilities have broken out between the Nigerian government and the East.

Pres. file

2. Georg von Lilienfeld of the German Embassy reports Von Hase has pointedly underlined for the German press that whereas you reported promptly to Kiesinger on your Kosygin talks, De Gaulle didn't send him one line. Lilienfeld wanted you to know your messages were not merely a good act of partnership but good politics.

###

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 7, 1967

52

Pres file

Send LDX to S/S, Ben Read, from Walt Rostow.

Following is message approved by the President for dispatch to Mobutu.

Dear Mr. President. I have received your letter of July 5 about the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. I am consulting urgently with my advisers here to determine how, within the limitations of our own resources, we can help your government at this difficult time. We shall communicate with you as soon as possible through my Ambassador to the Congo, Robert McBride. We are confident you will succeed in restoring order and resuming the path on which you have already embarked toward stabilization and progress in the Congo. The Congolese National Army, backed by the Congolese people, acting together under your courageous leadership will, I am sure, reestablish the calm necessary to that task.

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By ig, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, July 6, 1967 -- 9:00 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Help for the Congo

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-57
By CB, NARA Date 2-5-01

54
sent - Rumsfeld
via Powell
7/6/67

In the attached, Secretary Rusk* -- supported by Paul Nitze, Dick Helms, and the Joint Chiefs -- recommends that you authorize the use of three U.S. C-130 aircraft to help Mobutu put down the current mutiny of white mercenaries in the Congo. The State memorandum contains a good summary of the background of this decision and the costs and benefits involved.

There is little visceral satisfaction in helping Mobutu. He is irritating and often stupid. By our standards, he can be cruel to the point of inhumanity. It is perfectly true that he is trying to get his hands on Tshombe, and if he succeeds there is an excellent chance Tshombe will hang. However, we have to balance these facts against some others -- just as hard, cold, and unattractive:

1. Political stability in the Congo is the key to manageable African politics. The Congo is almost as large as India and has much the same dominance over the tone of African politics that India does on the sub-Continent. It would be disastrous to retreat to the Congo of a few years ago where warring regional factions created chaos simply begging for big-power involvement which could spread the arms race to Africa and lead to an eventual big-power confrontation.
2. Mobutu's regime is by far the most stable and widely-supported in Congolese history. It is the first that has some semblance of mass support. It is vigorously supported (and Tshombe vigorously hated) by every country of black Africa.
3. There is no other Congolese leader in sight who stands a reasonable chance of holding the country together, much less maintaining the present friendly relations with us.
4. Whatever Mobutu's personal faults, he has made some impressive economic steps. The IMF is now about to install and support -- with help from us and other countries -- a comprehensive economic stabilization program which is by far the best hope yet of changing a land basically rich in resources from an international beggar (which costs us on the order of \$50 million per year in aid) into a cohesive, productive economy.

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*The memorandum is signed by Gene, but approved by the Secretary, who had to leave while it was being typed in final form.

5. Mobutu does have alternatives. He is under great pressure to denounce us and throw in his lot with the radical Africans and, by implication, the Soviets and/or the Chicoms. Though ~~it~~^{his} would give the communist brethren some problems, it would be a major political problem for us -- foreign and domestic.

With these facts in mind, your advisers have arrived at the recommendation that we supply three transport planes and crews. This recommendation is a result of a careful examination of our four major options: to do nothing; to try to finesse the problem through clandestine help to Mobutu; to provide the aircraft he has requested; and to throw the whole problem into the lap of the UN, taking no bilateral action in the meantime.

We are agreed that to do nothing would risk very serious dangers ranging from the splintering of the Congo to a sharp turn to the left in Congolese political orientation, perhaps involving military operations by the Algerians and other hostile forces now smarting from their defeat in the Middle East and looking for a way to recoup. As to the second alternative, there just doesn't seem to be a way that we can covertly give Mobutu what he needs. He simply doesn't have the air transport capability to move his men and vehicles in the numbers and with the speed necessary to snuff out the mutiny quickly. The UN is already addressing the problem -- the Security Council met this afternoon. But UN action would undoubtedly take time, particularly if it involved blessing American assistance. The Soviets might well block any such resolution in the hope that meanwhile their friends could get into the act and get the credit. (Obviously, this does not mean we would oppose UN action in any event, but it does not appear to us that we can lean on the UN as a substitute for modest bilateral help to Mobutu.)

The C-130's would be provided on the following conditions:

- that we make it crystal clear to Mobutu that this is not the first^{step} in anything. We are talking about three C-130's and that's all. We would specifically rule out combat forces.
- that planes will be used only for the transport of men and material in operations we think are soundly planned and have a reasonable prospect of success.
- that Mobutu will not execute Tshombe, on pain of withdrawal of our planes.

One further condition was left out of the State memorandum by mistake, but will be enforced if you approve: that Mobutu will stop seeming to lump the U.S. and Belgium under the heading "Western white colonialists" in his public statements.

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- 3 -

There are risks to this approach. We don't know whether the mutiny is part of an organized plot to overthrow Mobutu. We don't know whether or how it is related to the Tshombe incident. Most important, we don't know how well the regular Congolese troops will do against these rough and ready freebooters. Even though the mercenaries are small in number -- apparently about 200 -- they are formidable military forces in the Congo.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that these risks are outweighed by the benefits. This move would be hailed by all the Africans, along with the other poor countries and most of the industrialized world. (The Soviets are already committed publicly against the mercenaries.) By quick action, we may be able to avoid a painful, drawn-out conflict in the bush which could negate all the progress made in the Congo over the past two years. And in doing so, we could preempt large opportunities which this crisis could present for the communists.

Therefore, I would vote that you approve the Secretary's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve State memorandum; go ahead and use 3 C-130's _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

54a

A.

546

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

JUL 6 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: C-130's for the Congo

Recommendation:

We recommend that we agree to return to the Congo temporarily three C-130 aircraft with US crews for use in ferrying Congolese army troops and materiel. If you concur, we would instruct our Ambassador to exercise the tightest possible control over these aircraft to ensure they are used only for the transport of men and material under safe conditions and not subject to interdiction by rebel-controlled aircraft. The Ambassador would also make clear to Mobutu that the United States is not prepared to make combat forces available to the Congo.

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Authority State for 12-13-77, NSC 7-24-78

By kg/ip, NARA, Date 7-17-91

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

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Background

On July 4, approximately 160 white Congolese mercenaries, largely French and Belgian, leading 1,000 - 2,000 Katangese troops of the Congolese Army, seized several towns in the northeast area of the Congo. These mercenaries, originally recruited by Mobutu, and currently paid by the Congolese Government, are now obviously in a state of mutiny. Apparently their actions were prompted either by a Tshombe plot to overthrow the Congolese Government or by the kidnapping of Tshombe and by attempts of the Congolese Government to extradite Tshombe from Algeria. It is not clear to what extent they are receiving support from forces outside the Congo, although we suspect they are backed by individual Belgians in financial and mining circles.

Although the present situation is extremely fluid, Mobutu considers it a serious threat to his regime. The mercenaries have a reputation of toughness, and the Congo Army of about 20,000 is reluctant to engage them. Mobutu believes that in order to defuse the situation he must very quickly show he is able to take a counteroffensive.

To prepare for such a counterattack, Mobutu has asked the US Government for three C-130 aircraft on an urgent

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-2-

basis to transport Congolese troops and materiel within the interior. His present aircraft capability is extremely limited. The eleven armed T-28's we previously provided Mobutu are operational but the pilots are mercenaries and Mobutu seems unwilling to chance using them now. His transport fleet, consisting largely of C-47's, lacks sufficient maintenance and flying personnel; the pilots include some Italian trained Congolese and some Belgian aircraft crews on loan. Past experience has shown that the existing transport fleet cannot provide the vehicle and personnel lift over long distances in the Congo necessary to meet this need.

Mobutu has requested African support from every African state through the OAU. He feels it is politically impossible at the present time to ask for Belgian military support although he has asked for and received assurances of Belgian political support. He views the US as historically the only source on which he can count.

Mobutu has also requested an immediate emergency session of the UN Security Council which is being held tonight.

The Soviet press has denounced the mutiny and the French and Belgian Governments have announced their complete

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-3-

support of the Mobutu Government. We know of no government taking sides with the mercenaries. If we should send C-130's to the Congo, we expect little if any difficulty with the Soviets as they could not behave as if they supported Tshombe or European mercenaries. On the other hand if we let the situation deteriorate without helping Mobutu, we could expect the Soviets to try and take advantage of the situation in unhelpful ways.

Ambassador McBride believes a quick delivery could have a critical psychological effect in the Congo, both with the central government which needs bucking up and as a deterrent to the mutineers. He strongly recommends that we supply the aircraft.

Supplying the aircraft would have the following advantages:

-- US support for an African Government against an uprising led by white mercenaries and supported by foreign right wing groups would strengthen the US position among Black African countries. Help for a Black African state would be particularly timely now against the background of the Middle East crisis.

-- Quick symbolic action by the US could help prevent the situation from growing out of hand by bolstering Mobutu

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-4-

and deterring the mutineers.

-- We helped the Congolese in 1964 by making available four C-130's when they faced the threat from the left.

Assisting them now when they face a threat from the right would be another demonstration of our even-handedness.

-- US support would help to counter the Congolese racist feeling which is mounting rapidly against white mercenaries and which may grow to include all whites. It would enable us strongly to urge Mobutu to desist from anti-white propaganda, and propaganda against us, the Belgians, and others as "imperialists".

-- US support would reassure Mobutu that his pro-Western policy was correct and would enable him to keep from turning in extremis to Arab states, such as Algeria or the UAR, or other African states, who might be willing to intervene.

-- US support could make it easier for us to deal with the Security Council situation where we might otherwise face a sweeping Congolese indictment of "Western imperialism" or of individual Western countries. Our assistance would give us leverage to persuade the Congolese to moderate their claims.

-- The availability of the C-130's in the Congo would facilitate large scale evacuation of Americans, should this become necessary.

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-5-

Supplying the aircraft also involves certain risks:

-- There is danger in moving military equipment before we know precisely whether there is a real need for it, how it would be used and the dangers to which it will be exposed.

-- We may be confronted with a follow-on request for U.S. combat troops if Mobutu judges the ANC would not alone be able to defeat the mercenaries.

-- Even though the aircraft would be supplied at the request of the Congo Government, our action could be viewed by some as unilateral US intervention.

-- Furnishing military transport planes might encourage future requests for direct assistance from other countries in similar situations. (The distinguishing characteristic here, however, is that foreign white mercenaries are involved.)

-- In helping Mobutu put down an insurrection that is sympathetic to Tshombe, we recognize that an early extradition and execution of Tshombe will provoke strong adverse reactions from his traditional supporters. If we comply with the request for C-130's we would use the opportunity to urge Mobutu strongly not to execute Tshombe. We would make it clear that if the execution occurred, we would be obliged to withdraw the planes.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-6-

Action Already Taken

-- We have established an inter-agency task force composed of State, DOD, JCS, CIA, and USIA representatives to deal with the Congo crisis.


-- We have contacted the Belgians today to explore the possibility of joint action and to see if the GOB can increase the number of air force crews in the Congo.

-- We have determined that the three C-130's are available.

-- We are talking to African Ambassadors to determine climate of opinion among African states.

-- We are asking American Consul in Bukavu to ascertain the mercenaries' motivations and intentions.

Secretary Rusk, Acting Secretary Nitze and DCI Helms concur in this recommendation.



Eugene V. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, July 6, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to a letter to you from Spyros Skouras who is, as you know, a most influential member of the Greek-American community.

W. W. Rostow

~~1 copy~~
2. Pres file
sent to Rostow
via pouch

5512

July 7, 1967

Dear Mr. Skouras:

Thank you for your detailed observations on recent developments in Greece. I have read them with great interest.

I am glad to know that you see a steady trend back toward constitutional government. As you know, we have felt that this must come if Greece is to get back on the road to orderly progress.

Sincerely,

/S/

Mr. Spyros P. Skouras
Chairman
Twentieth Century Fox
444 West 56th Street
New York, N. Y.

LBJ:HHS:tmt 7/5/67

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

July 6, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell call by Greek Ambassador Matsas

Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive Ambassador Matsas for a brief farewell call prior to his departure from Washington on July 18. He suggests any time at your convenience between July 6 to July 18.

Ambassador Matsas has been here since 1962 and is being retired because he is not sufficiently enthusiastic about the new government. But he has close ties to the Greek royal family; and such a show of U. S. interest would be useful as we face the complicated problem which Phil Talbot described to you of moving Greece out of the hands of coup leaders and back to a constitutional base.

There would be no need for substantive discussion in this brief visit. It's mainly a friendly gesture to a man who has worked well with us for over five years. He deeply appreciated your sending him flowers from the diplomatic reception this spring when his gall bladder operation kept him away. He is a gentleman of the old school and, because of your kindness, would hate to leave without saying good-bye.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him _____

Sorry, I won't have time _____

Attached: file #2577

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

56
L. Rusk
2. Pres file
sent to Rusk
via pouch
7/6/67
7/7/67 - Jim Jones notified
Mr Rostow that Pres. will
see Matsas.
Date will be worked out
later

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - July 6, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

I had another good round yesterday with Covey Oliver and other members of the inter-agency working group on Cuban subversion in Latin America.

This time we examined the adequacy of current Public Safety (police) programs in the seven countries with active or potential insurgency movements.

1.3(a)(4)

Our conclusions were:

Bolivia

This is our most serious problem, not because of the size of the guerrilla movement, but the weakness of the security forces and fragility of the political situation. Given Bolivia's limited capacity to assimilate our assistance, we should for now:

- press forward with the training of a second Ranger Battalion, and develop an intelligence unit to work with the Battalion.
- expand our police program in rural areas.
- start contingency planning for dealing with a situation which Barrientos can no longer control.

Colombia

President Lleras Camargo is concerned and working for better coordination and action by his security services. We have good on-going military, intelligence and police programs. We agreed that:

- DOD would review equipment needs of the armed forces in the light of CINCSO's recommendations.
- Covey Oliver would consider a modest expansion of the rural police program.

Dominican Republic

With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good progress in our internal security programs. No additional

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measures by us are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police. Covey Oliver will ask John Crimmins to make the pitch.

Ecuador

There is no active insurgency, but this is a good time to help the Ecuadorians improve their grossly deficient rural police. Covey Oliver will work out an expanded program with AID/Public Safety.

Guatemala

Mendez Montenegro has tackled the insurgency problem with energy and has accomplished a good deal. He has welcomed our assistance and we have responded with additional help on the military and police side. Our present programs look about right. A modest increase in our rural police program is warranted and Covey Oliver will pursue this.

Peru

There is no active insurgency. The security forces have demonstrated their ability to handle insurgent bands in the past. Our current programs are adequate.

Venezuela

We have done what Leoni asked you for at Punta del Este: to expedite delivery of equipment for 9 new Ranger battalions. [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] Additional support for the National Guard (police) in rural areas is needed and Covey Oliver will work this out with AID/Public Safety.

Another decision reached by the group is that henceforth Covey Oliver will organize a group (probably the same people who attended yesterday) which will meet on a regular basis to:

- keep a close watch over Cuban insurgency trends throughout the hemisphere.
- review individual country situations and requirements.
- expedite decisions on increased assistance, as necessary.

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-3-

As a starter Covey Oliver will write each Ambassador to impress upon him the importance which you attach to alertness to internal security requirements and communicating needs to Washington in a timely way.

From the review which I have made, I am convinced that at the present level of insurgency in Latin America, the important elements of the equation are:

1. For the most part, the institutional base for internal security in Latin America is primitive. The opportunities we have to build it up vary with the local officials in power. We must be alert to every chance given us to advance the building process.
2. If the President of the country is concerned over the problem and willing to act, the armed forces will back him and, with our assistance, they can produce impressive results. This has been the case in Guatemala. We hope to repeat it in Bolivia.
3. The cost to us in furnishing "preventive medicine" assistance is small, but our Ambassadors and their country teams must understand the key importance of "preventive medicine" and exploit every opportunity which presents itself.
4. The "Establishment" in Washington must be geared to keeping a continuous review of the problem and acting quickly on assistance requirements.

W. W. Reston

~~SECRET~~

LOU

Thursday - July 6, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

You agreed to meet with our section of the United States-Mexico Border Development Commission on July 19 and formally announce its composition. You also asked that we try to get President Diaz Ordaz to do likewise on the same date with the Mexican section.

Ray Telles reports that Diaz Ordaz has agreed to do this.

W. W. Rostow

LOU

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thurs., July 6, 1967
12:00 noon

59

MR. PRESIDENT:

This dispatch gives as clear a picture of the nature of the unresolved political problem in mainland China as we are likely to get.

Pres. file

Mao is trying:

- * to run a revolution against the existing establishment he created;
- while maintaining at least minimum levels of production and national order;
- using the military as a stop-gap, while seeking to avoid a military takeover;
- proceeding slowly, with the end by no means in sight.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

(Airgram A-738, subj: Chou En-lai Speech of April 30 - 6/27/67)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-242
By ing, NARA, Date 1-27-93

EA-6

AIRGRAM

POL 15-1 Chicom

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-738

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED

HANDLING INDICATOR

59a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JUL 3 8 27 AM 1967

ANALYSIS BRANCH

Rostow

TO : Department of State

INFO: AmEmbassy NEW DELHI
AmEmbassy TAIPEI

FROM : AmConGen HONG KONG

DATE: June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Chou En-lai Speech of April 30

REF : New Delhi's 17037

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Cr. 2/28/75By any, NARA, Date 7-17-91SUMMARY

The speech is clearly a major document. In it, Chou restates the Maoists' intentions that each level of government and organizational unit shall undergo a power seizure by the masses. Following seizure, the units are to be reconstructed on the principles of the 3-way alliance. However, this plan has been thwarted, says Chou. "Sham" seizures by recalcitrant cadres and disunity within the rebel camp have set back the Maoists' schedule. These obstacles have required Peking to turn to stopgap tactics to maintain order and "supervise" the movement. Specifically, Chou gives a situation report on the state of the revolution as of the end of April. In the provinces Peking has been compelled to adopt the "excessive measure" of PLA* control in 10 or more provinces, he states, and to seek negotiations with the rest, with varying degrees of success. In the government bureaucracy the leaders of some units seized have been kept at work -- under "supervision"; in the process most ministries and commissions have been concentrated and placed under three top leaders and two committees.

* *Peoples Liberation Army; that is, the military.*GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: *CH*
POLCHill:nm 6/26/67Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:RDnethercut

Clearances:

1967 JUL 3 AM 10 15

COPYFLO-PBR

The speech reveals the Maoists as willing to absorb setbacks and take a cautious, painstaking approach to establishing new revolutionary administrations. Nonetheless, difficulties persist, and Maoists may be forced to prolong and solidify tactics originally intended to be temporary, with the resultant tendency toward elements of a garrison state.

END OF SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

The major speech delivered by Chou En-lai to various State Council departments on April 30, transmitted by New Delhi (New Delhi's 17037), was independently given to us by the local Norwegian Consulate. The document is a translation by Norwegian correspondent Harald Munthe-Kaas of Red Guard material seen by him at Peking University. Munthe-Kaas passed the speech to the British, Indian and Norwegian Embassies in the capital. Economic aspects of the speech have already been commented upon in our Weekly Economic Review.

The speech is unquestionably a major document, although there may be some inaccuracies in the original Red Guard version -- or the translation of it (see below). Chou, in effect, is providing a situation report for his listeners, spelling out in unusual detail the state of the Cultural Revolution as seen by the Maoist leadership. Although subsequent provincial developments outdate some of Chou's run-down, it remains a very illuminating document in terms of clarifying leadership attitudes and techniques in promoting the Cultural Revolution.

Precise analysis of the document is difficult. It appears to be less a formal speech than a somewhat rambling, off-the-cuff commentary. Chou jumps from topic to topic, and the reader is often unsure which subject is being discussed. Moreover, Munthe-Kaas was forced to copy in haste and his retranslation from Norwegian to English is less than crystal-clear. We have had, however, the opportunity to discuss the speech with Munthe-Kaas in person and feel that some fairly solid conclusions can be reached.

The speech can be separated into two parts: Chou's general comments on plans and problems, and a specific run-down on the current situation in the provinces and in the governmental bureaucracy.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PART I - Peking's Plans, Tactics and Attitudes

- a. Goals
- b. Problems
- c. Tactics
- d. Attitudes

PART II - Situation Report

- a. The Provinces
- b. The Government

PART I - Peking's Plans, Tactics and Attitudes

a. Goals of the Cultural Revolution

Chou's speech reasserts the general aims of the movement and the sincerity of the Maoists' desire that they be achieved. The central problem is power seizure and subsequent reconstruction of social and governmental order.

Apparently to clarify just what Mao desires, Chou begins his remarks by explaining that before 1949 power was seized from bottom to top. After "liberation" the technique chosen to "clean" the system was the rectification campaign, a less than thorough process which moved from top to bottom. The Cultural Revolution, he stresses, is a return to the true revolution which moves from the bottom up. Although less than completely clear, the speech indicates that the purpose and goal of the current movement is to seize and dismantle the present organizational system, replacing it with "3-way alliances" in organizations, units and factories as well as in the various levels of government. (While the military has been described as the "pillar" of the 3-way alliance in the provinces, Chou makes no reference to the Army's role in the alliances to be built in government departments and production units.)

The achievement of the 3-way alliance is to take the masses as a foundation, with later additions of leadership cadres at

the middle and the top. When this has been satisfactorily achieved, the new alliance will receive the approval of the Central Committee. Chou makes it clear that in actual circumstances this ideal progression has been thwarted, primarily by the resistance of leading cadres and by rebel disunity.

b. Problems Encountered

Chou first mentions the sham seizure. By this device some recalcitrant cadres have been able to retain their original positions under the cloak of carrying out a truly Maoist revolutionary seizure, he asserts. Chou specifies that these sham seizures were prevalent in February in the governmental organs. As an example, he cites the "Agricultural Department." We recall that the severe attacks on Tan Chen-lin in February and March accused him both of false power seizures and of representing the "adverse current" in the agricultural bureaucracy. Chou's speech specifically links the two concepts, providing the first clear-cut explanation we have had of just what the oft-repeated "adverse current" means in Maoist terms. The speech substantiates other material from the provinces (Kweiyang Radio, June 6; HK A-697) to clarify how provincial leading cadres and bureaucrats have attempted to stay in power by nominally adhering to Cultural Revolution policies.

The second hindrance to progress, Chou says, are the splits and squabbles within Maoist revolutionary organizations, a phenomenon amply documented by poster reports and the continuing editorial campaign against anarchy.

c. Tactics Devised to Deal with the Problems

These obstacles have forced the Maoists to turn to stopgap measures in order to hold the line against chaos while providing guidance and organization for the continuing effort to make "full revolution." One of these stopgaps has been the "supervision" of officials and cadres in seized areas and units. This device had to be adopted, Chou says, even in areas where sham seizures had occurred, because the "needs of the work," made it imperative that managers and technicians be kept on their jobs.

("Supervision" was a temporary and pragmatic tactic endorsed by Chou in February when "commune"-style seizures threatened to oust trained workers and managers from bureaucratic and production units.) Presumably, the failure of the revolutionary masses to unify and effectively operate the unit seized compelled the leadership to take steps to preserve the pre-seizure chain of command until the masses were competent to make a "whole revolution" without destroying production and normal governmental functions. This need for "supervision" apparently lies behind the specific arrangements or "readjustments" outlined by Chou for governmental Ministries and Commissions (see Part II b).

Citing the Foreign Ministry, Chou states that supervision is working, but is not "satisfactory," indicating that Maoists consider it only a way-station on the road to the 3-way alliance.

A second stopgap measure is that of PLA "supervision." According to Chou, this "excessive measure" has been put into effect in 10 provinces (see Part II a). The Army has been used where the rebels' position was not clearly superior and where they have failed to organize sufficiently. The revolutionary masses, Chou says, "desired" that the PLA take this role in order to gain the guidance and experience which their own leaders apparently have been unable to provide. The term "excessive measure" indicates that the decision to call in the PLA was required in order to keep the situation in the provinces involved from deteriorating dangerously. Thus, apparently some of the Maoists, and Chou, wish to avoid use of the Army if possible and regard its take-over in troubled areas as a temporary measure.

d. Attitudes of the Leadership

Chou's exposition of the purpose, problems and tactics of the Cultural Revolution sheds some light on the Maoist attitudes toward the current situation. He says that the Party Central can provide broad guidance, but that the revolutionaries themselves must solve the concrete problems presented by each situation. To find such solutions Chou recommends a practical and extended move toward "winning over" the opposition. He

states that the number of "genuine rightists" are few and that the "vast majority of contradictions are internal" and must be tolerated in order to construct the new society.

While the speech as a whole indicates that the Maoists intend the Cultural Revolution to result in major changes in society, these phrases indicate that the process cannot be rushed. Chou's description of the concrete steps taken as stopgap measures portray the leadership as taking the long view, willing to absorb setbacks and adopt a protracted, piecemeal, yet deliberate approach toward achieving their goals.

Despite this mood of confidence, the speech reveals that the Maoists' endurance is not limitless. Chou displays impatience with the disruption that has rent the Maoist movement, and his attitude toward his audience (he threatened to call on the Army if the young revolutionaries misbehaved on May Day) indicates he regards them as a volatile force. At the time of the speech (April 30) Chou's schedule for getting the movement organized (allowing until the end of June in government units) seemed to provide ample time, but considering interim reports of continuing strife and lack of organization, the Maoists still have a very long way to go. If stopgaps fail and the situation continues to deteriorate, the moves described by Chou as holding actions may solidify, with all that that entails in terms of bringing about a garrison state.

PART II - Situation Report

a. The Cultural Revolution in the Provinces

Chou En-lai's breakdown of the situation by provinces as of the end of April is as follows:

6 Areas where the power seizure has been satisfactorily completed:

Shanghai
Kweichow
Heilungkiang

Shansi (The last three were not
Peking mentioned by Chou by name,
Shantung but official media has named
them as among the six
"liberated" areas.)

- 5 Provinces where the recalcitrance of local leaders compelled Peking to turn to the PLA to supervise the situation:

Yunnan	Kiangsi
Sinkiang	Shensi
Chekiang	

- 5 Provinces where "other problems" required PLA supervision:

Tsinghai
Inner Mongolia (described obliquely as having a single revolutionary organization but still lacking a firm foundation for the 3-way alliance)

Kwangtung
Tibet
Anhwei

- 1 Province "just now solved." (Presumably a successful instance of PLA supervision.)

Fukien

12. Areas still unsolved, but Peking is "in contact with them." This bloc is divided into 5 places where "we are trying to come to an agreement after negotiations":

Tientsin	Honan
Szechuan	Hopei
Kwangsi	

and 7 places "where we have not got this sort of contact"

Ninghsia	Kirin	(Chou did not name these places; listed are the seven provinces not dealt with by Chou elsewhere in the speech.)
Kiangsu	Liaoning	
Hunan	Kansu	
Hupei		

COMMENT

Chou's situation report on the progress of the revolution in the provinces again makes clear that Peking, after months of painstaking effort, has little to brag about.

In discussing provinces under PLA "supervision," Chou makes the distinction between those where the local leadership refused to crumble under the onslaught of the Cultural Revolution, and those where "other problems," presumably the revolutionaries' inexperience or internal bickering required Army backbone. The number of provinces under military supervision (Chou lists ten, but elsewhere says "a majority") reveals how widespread and debilitating the rebels' inadequacy has been.

Turning to the 12 "unsolved" areas not under "revolutionary" or PLA control, but with which Peking is "in contact," Chou does not reveal whether they are regarded by the Maoists as being in better or worse shape than those under PLA guidance. However, the "unsolved" areas are described by Chou as having achieved some form of single supreme revolutionary command. This leads us to believe that the difficulties there may be due to organizational inexperience, or squabbles within the revolutionary groups.

Of these 12 areas, Chou reports that Peking is in contact with five, attempting to reach an agreement "after negotiations." "We have not got this kind of contact," Chou says, with the remaining seven. While a jumbled text precludes a precise reading, it appears that Chou is not describing these seven as being in virtual secession from the central government, but rather that no grounds for negotiation along desired lines has yet been achieved.

Chou's list, in the main, is in accord with the Provincial situation as it has been revealed in other sources, official and unofficial. To date, we have heard from poster reports or other sources of six provinces where the local "problem" has been dealt with by a Central Committee decision (Sinkiang,

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Inner Mongolia, Tsinghai, Anhwei, Szechuan and Chekiang). Of these, only Szechuan is not listed by Chou as under PLA control as of April 30. Whether military supervision there has been successfully carried out is open to some question, but Peking Radio June 20 provided the first official mention of the presence in Chengtu of the four men named in posters, and confirmed by Radio Peking, as members of the preparatory committee for the Szechuan Revolutionary Committee.

b. The Cultural Revolution in Government Ministries and Commissions

Summarizing Chou's "agenda" for "readjustment" of the Government:

Chou En-lai will be "in charge" of:

Finance Departments
Foreign Affairs Departments
Agricultural Departments

Li Fu-chun will "take care" of:

Planning Departments
Capital Construction Departments

Nieh Jung-chen is taking care of:

Scientific Departments, which will include the
Scientific and Technological Commission and the
"Scientific Academy."

The Military Affairs Committee (through Su Yu, Wang Shu-sheng, and Hsiao Hua) will be in charge of:

Departments for National Defense and Industry, including the 2nd (atomic energy), 3rd (military supply) and 4th (electronics) Ministries of Machine Building, the "office in charge of National Defense and Industry" and the "National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission."

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The Central Committee's Cultural Revolution Group are managing:

Cultural, Education and Health Departments. Three subgroups of the CRG will take care of propaganda publications, culture, education and films.

COMMENT

Chou's speech reveals that all departments of the central government are in the process of seeking unity through criticism, a process which is to lead to the establishment of a 3-way alliance in each unit. He cites the example of the Cultural Revolution in the Foreign Ministry and Railway Ministry to illustrate that the 3-way alliance is suitable for and possible to achieve in organizations, factories and bureaucratic units as well as in the city and provincial governments.

as
Although Chou's speech elides the point, it is clear that/the Cultural Revolution proceeds in ministries and organizations, it will continue to involve assaults upon the bureaucrats who run these units, creating a management vacuum. The disruption which must flow from this process of "unity through criticism" apparently accounts for the concentration of multiple governmental jurisdiction (everything but civilian industry and transport is covered, although Chou says "all departments will be readjusted") into the hands of three individuals and two committees. These concentrations would repose authority in the hands of experienced, pragmatic figures who are not (or were not) under attack, thus providing "supervision" at a time when ministers and secondary leaders would be rendered ineffective by the "struggle" process (e.g., Chen I, Tan Chen-lin, Yu Chiu-li). This is not to say that the revolution will not produce organizational "readjustments" possibly involving departmental mergers similar to those listed by Chou. However, the fact that such disparate areas as Foreign Affairs and Agriculture are to be placed under Chou's direct leadership leads us to believe that these "readjustments" constitute a holding operation for the government paralleling the use of the PLA in the provinces.

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ 10-435-466
NARA, Date 4-18-11

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EA4288
PP WTE10
DE WTE 1449

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67682

~~SECRET~~

JULY 6, 1967

THIS IS NOT URGENT OR OPERATIONAL BUT I THOUGHT YOU
WOULD ENJOY READING SUHARTO'S REFLECTIONS ON VIET NAM
AND THE MIDDLE EAST. HE SOUNDS LIKE A CONSIDERABLE MAN.

DJAKARTA 100.

1. REGARDING VIETNAM, ACTING PRESIDENT SUHARTO BRIEFLY
REFERRED, IN COURSE OF THREE HOUR CONVERSATION ALONE WITH
ME LAST NIGHT, TO CONVERSATIONS WHICH HIS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVES HAVE HAD WITH NORTH VIETNAM AMBASSADOR PHAM
BINH, AND TO HIS HOPES THAT PHAM BINH MAY RETURN TO DJAKARTA
(HE IS NOW IN HANOI) WITH SOMETHING OF INTEREST TO CONVEY TO
GOVERNMENT OF INDONESIA (GOI). SUHARTO SAID HE WOULD KEEP
IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ME ON THESE TALKS AND PASS ON ANY INFOR-
MATION WHICH MIGHT BE OF USE TO US. HE HOPED TO HAVE BETTER
COVERAGE OF HANOI FROM BOTH OVERT AND OTHER SOURCES.
2. I REPLIED THAT WE GREATLY APPRECIATED GENERAL SUHARTO'S
COOPERATION IN THIS MATTER AND THE ASTUTE WAY HIS PEOPLE
ARE HANDLING TALKS WITH PHAM BINH. AS TO OUR POSITION, I
DREW GENEROUSLY ON PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 7 OF STATE 21856 TO
GIVE OUR CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN I POINTED OUT FACTORS THAT MIGHT CAUSE
HANOI TO REVIEW ITS POSITION, SUHARTO SUGGESTED ANOTHER
FACTOR THAT MIGHT INDUCE HANOI TO SEEK POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT.
HE SAID LACONICALLY: "WHAT ABOUT FLOODS?" WHEN I ASKED IF
HE MEANT MAN-MADE FLOODS, SUHARTO SMILED ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A FAR GREATER BLOW TO AGRARIAN
ECONOMY LIKE THAT OF NORTH VIETNAM THAN STRIKING HANOI-
HAIPHONG INSTALLATIONS. BLOW WOULD BE FELT LONG LONG AFTER
IT WAS FIRST STRUCK AND WOULD DRIVE HOME NEED FOR SETTLEMENT
THE WAY NOTHING ELSE WOULD.
3. SUHARTO SEEMED TO SEE A BIT MORE POTENTIAL "GIVE" IN
HANOI'S POSITION THAN THAT REFLECTED IN OUR ASSESSMENT. HE
VENTURED THAT BY MAINTAINING STEADY PROBES AS TO EXACTLY
WHAT HANOI CAN ACCEPT IN WAY OF QUID PRO QUO FOR ANY MOVES ON
OUR SIDE TO SCALE DOWN FIGHTING, WE LIKELY TO TURN UP SOME
POSITIVE REACTION FAIRLY SOON.

67 JUL 6 PM 6:54

THURSDAY

4. I SUGGESTED THAT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PEKING, MOSCOW, HANOI AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVNLF) MIGHT BE CONSIDERABLY GREATER THAN OUTSIDERS REALIZE AND THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE FOR GENERAL SUHARTO'S GROUP ALSO TO EXPLORE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THESE ELEMENTS IN DJAKARTA. FOR EXAMPLE, LITTLE IS KNOWN OF THE SVNLF MISSION IN DJAKARTA, WHICH ONLY RECENTLY MADE A MAJOR PUBLIC STATEMENT, THE FIRST I RECALLED ITS MAKING IN PAST TWO YEARS.

5. SUHARTO AGREED THAT THESE MATTERS WERE WORTH PROBING, BUT ADDED THAT GETTING INFORMATION ABOUT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT "THEY DON'T EXACTLY TRUST US."

6. I SAID I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR SUHARTO TO HAVE SEVERAL OF HIS TRUSTED ASSISTANTS VISIT SOUTH VIETNAM. WE WOULD DO ALL POSSIBLE TO MAKE THEIR TRIP INFORMATIVE AND REWARDING. IF GENERAL SUHARTO WANTED THE TRIP ARRANGED WITHOUT ANY PUBLIC NOTICE, I WAS SURE WE COULD COOPERATE SUCCESSFULLY IN THAT REGARD. SUHARTO APPRECIATED THE SUGGESTION.

7. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, OUR DISCUSSION WAS BRIEFER. AGAIN IT WAS SUHARTO WHO RAISED QUESTION BY SAYING THAT HE KNEW WE KNEW WHERE GOI STOOD ON THIS MATTER (I TAKE IT HE WAS REFERRING TO TALKS I HAD HAD WITH MALIK AS WELL AS INFO BY MILITARY ASSISTANTS OF SUHARTO). ONLY POINTS SUHARTO MADE WERE: (A) GOI DESIRES TO HAVE UN TAKE ACTIVE ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST FOR WHICH PURPOSE MALIK INSTRUCTED TO TELL UN THAT, IF IT NEEDED TROOPS, GOI PREPARED TO HELP OUT, (B) INDONESIA ONLY HAS RELATIONS WITH ARABS, BUT IT IS DEVELOPING CERTAIN TIES, CLANDESTINE AT PRESENT, WITH ISRAELIS WHICH COULD PUT INDONESIA IN POSITION WHERE IT MIGHT PLAY EFFECTIVE MIDDLE-MAN ROLE. (C) HIS APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SPEECH ON EVE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL MEETING.

3.3
(b)(1)(6)

8. MY COMMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST WERE DRAWN FROM STATE TELEGRAM. I PURPOSELY DID NOT PURSUE GOI'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF YUGOSLAV-INDONESIA RESOLUTION LEST THERE BE AN IMPLICATION OF OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH MALIK'S PERFORMANCE. DELICACIES OF THIS PROBLEM ALREADY COVERED IN PREVIOUS TELEGRAM.

9. I MENTIONED THAT ASSIGNMENT OF AMBASSADORS NUGROHO AND MARAMIS TO HANOI AND MOSCOW RESPECTIVELY SHOULD BE HELPFUL TO SUHARTO IN ASSESSING ATTITUDES IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES REGARDING VIETNAM AND THE MIDDLE EAST. I WONDERED WHETHER THERE SEEMED TO BE ANY CHANGE IN MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE TOWARD INDONESIA. SUHARTO REPLIED THAT MOSCOW'S HARD LINE ON INDONESIA HAD SHOWN SOME VERY RECENT SIGNS OF RELAXATION, BUT HE FELT THIS MIGHT BE ASCRIBABLY TO MOSCOW'S REACTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE IT HAD SUFFERED A SERIOUS SET-BACK IN PRESTIGE AND WHERE MOSCOW MIGHT THEREFORE BE MORE WILLING TO WOO INDONESIA, AT LEAST MOMENTARILY, FOR TACTICAL REASONS. SUHARTO SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE AS YET ANY REAL CHANGE IN MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDONESIA.

DTG 062112Z JULY 1967

GROUPS 860 IMI 360

~~SECRET~~

EEA291
PP WTE13
DE WTE 1453

FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67684

SENT
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1967 JUL 6 23 09

JULY 6, 1967

FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS A DRAFT REPLY TO KIESINGER'S LATEST LETTER TO YOU. IT SUGGESTS SEPTEMBER 12-13 FOR THE CHANCELLOR'S VISIT (JIM JONES REPORTS THAT THESE DATES ARE CLEAR ON YOUR CALENDAR).

QUOTE

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

MRS. JOHNSON AND I ARE DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT YOU AND MRS. KIESINGER WILL BE ABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER. I SUGGEST WE SET ASIDE SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13 AS THE DATES FOR THE VISIT, IF THAT IS CONVENIENT FOR YOU.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOU AND MRS. KIESINGER TO WASHINGTON.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

THE TEXT OF KIESINGER'S LETTER FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR KIND MESSAGE OF JULY 3RD, AND FOR YOUR CONSIDERATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT HAS ARISEN HERE.

I GLADLY AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION TO MEET YOU IN WASHINGTON IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, AT A DATE CONVENIENT TO YOU.

MRS. KIESINGER AND I SEND OUR BEST WISHED TO MRS. JOHNSON AND TO YOU, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN SEPTEMBER.

VERY SINCERELY AND CORDIALLY YOURS

K. G. KIESINGER

UNQUOTE

DTG: 06/2236Z JUL 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 7-9-91

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1967 JUL 6 PM 7:20
THURSDAY
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62

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67 JUL 6 PM 12:18

Pres file
THURSDAY

EEA279
OO WTE
DE WTE 1442

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70399

UNCLAS

JULY 6, 1967

HEREWITH A DRAFT REPLY TO BILL FULBRIGHT, FOR ME TO
SEND AFTER APPROPRIATE MODIFICATION.

"DEAR BILL:

THE PRESIDENT HAS READ WITH INTEREST YOUR THOUGHTFUL LETTER
OF JUNE 30 ON VIET NAM. AS ALWAYS, I AM SURE HE WILL TAKE
YOUR VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT IN THE DECISIONS WHICH LIE AHEAD.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SAIGON IS, OF COURSE, COMPLEX
AND UNCERTAIN. BUT I THINK WE OUGHT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS
BELEAGUED, INEXPERIENCED, UNDERDEVELOPED NATION IS TRYING
VERY HARD TO MAKE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS WORK.
LOOKING AROUND THE WORLD THERE ARE MANY MORE FAVORED NATIONS
AT THIS STAGE OF THEIR HISTORY WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE
TO SUSTAIN DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT BE
COMPLACENT ABOUT THE FUTURE, I DO BELIEVE YOU WOULD AGREE
THAT THEY HAVE COME A LONG WAY SINCE KY'S SPEECH IN
JANUARY 1966. WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER ON THE SPOT AND WITH
THE SUPPORT OF ALL OF US HERE, WE SHALL DO EVERYTHING WE
CAN TO HELP THEM THROUGH THE ELECTION PROCESS IN THE WEEKS
AHEAD AND IN THE FORMATION OF AN EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT.

SINCERELY,

W. W. ROSTOW"

DTG: 061548Z JULY 1967

SENT
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

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OO WTE13
DE WTE 1443

1967 JUL 6 17 08

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67675

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *ju*, NARA, Date *11-9-99*

JUL 6 PM 1:15

THURSDAY

63

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 6, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOV

EMBASSY LONDON HAS SENT US THIS BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF THE
KOSYGIN-CASTRO TALKS:

"1. BARKER (WHO IS THE NEW ASSISTANT HEAD OF THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE) HAS SHOWN US A BRIEF TELEGRAM FROM THEIR AMBASSADOR SLATER IN HAVANA REPORTING ON THE KOSYGIN VISIT. ACCORDING TO SLATER, THREE FULL DAYS WERE DEVOTED TO TALKS WHICH WERE CONDUCTED IN ABSOLUTE SECRECY. HE, THEREFORE, HAS LITTLE HARD INFORMATION ABOUT WHAT TRANSPIRED, BUT FROM WHAT HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO PICK UP LOCALLY, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT KOSYGIN CAUTIONED CASTRO ABOUT THE MILITANT LINE HE IS PURSUING IN LATIN AMERICA. SLATER WAS RELUCTANT TO SPECULATE ON HOW CASTRO MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED THIS CAVEAT, BUT HE NOTED THAT PROPAGANDA BUILD-UP FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION AND EXHORTATIONS TO MILITANT GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA HAVE CONTINUED UNABATED. HE SUGGESTS THAT KOSYGIN'S ADVICE MAY HAVE SOME RESTRICTIVE EFFECT, BUT WILL IN ANY EVENT NOT BE IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT IN TERMS OF OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND. SLATER NOTED THAT KOSYGIN APPEARED FAIRLY FRESH AT HIS AIRPORT DEPARTURE, AND THOUGH THE RUSSIANS WERE ACCORDED FULL PROTOCOL TREATMENT, CASTRO LOOKED GRIM AND EXHAUSTED. SLATER REPORTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER ROA HAD NOT PARTICIPATED IN MOST OF THE TALKS. BARKER INDICATED THAT THEIR REPORTING FROM MOSCOW HAD NOTED A PRAVDA PHRASE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE TALKS WERE "VERY FRANK" AND ASSUMED THIS MEANT CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

"2. BARKER, WHO JUST COMPLETED A FOUR-YEAR TOUR IN MEXICO CITY, SEEMS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE DEGREE OF RESTRAINT THE RUSSIANS CAN EXERT ON CASTRO, AND INDICATED THAT IF THE SOVIETS ATTEMPTED TO REIN HIM IN TOO ABRUPTLY, CASTRO WOULD ONLY KICK UP A PUBLIC ROW WITH THEM AND PERHAPS BECOME EVEN MORE MILITANT. HE THOUGHT THAT CASTRO KNEW FULL WELL THAT THE RUSSIANS COULD NOT AFFORD TO CUT HIM LOOSE COMPLETELY AND WOULD PROBABLY NOT CONSIDER REDUCING THEIR ASSISTANCE TO HIM APPRECIABLY. NONETHELESS, BARKER THOUGHT CASTRO HAD A MORE REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF WHAT HE COULD DO WITH RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT THAN THE EGYPTIANS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND WOULD NOT ATTEMPT ANY MILITARY ADVENTURES BEYOND HIS CAPACITY."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG:061619Z JULY 1967

~~SECRET~~

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67 JUL

for file 6 PM 3:35

THURSDAY

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OO VTE10
DE VTE 1445

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-8-99

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67678

~~SECRET~~

JULY 6, 1967

THE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN PRESSING US FOR SEVERAL DAYS TO ALLOW THEM TO BUY 6,000 ROUNDS OF TWO TYPES OF TANK AMMUNITION (\$220,000) AND A ROTARY COUPLER FOR A RADAR SET (\$20,000). THEY COULD EITHER DRAW DOWN THE \$14 MILLION CREDIT YOU HAVE ALREADY APPROVED OR USE SOME OTHER CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS.

YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU A BROADER MEMO FROM MAC BUNDY COVERING THE WHOLE RANGE OF POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO OUR CURRENT SUSPENSION TO MILITARY AID SHIPMENTS TO THE MIDDLE EAST. I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND WHY YOU MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER THAT FOR A WHILE LONGER. HOWEVER, SECRETARIES RUSK AND NITZE HAVE SENT YOU A MEMO SAYING THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT ISRAEL DOES URGENTLY NEED THESE THREE ITEMS AND RECOMMENDING YOUR APPROVAL OF THESE EXCEPTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY.

I CAN ADD A PERSONAL NOTE FROM MY TALKS WITH EVRON. HE EXHIBITED GREAT CONCERN WHEN HE LEARNED INDIRECTLY THAT WE WERE SUSPENDING MILITARY SHIPMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO THE ARABS. I CHECKED WITH BOB MCNARA AND PUT THE ISRAELIS BACK INTO REGULAR DEFENSE-STATE CHANNELS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THEY MUST PROVE REAL NEED. I INFORMED MAC BUNDY IN NEW YORK WHO APPROVED.

THIS RECOMMENDATION IS THE FIRST RESULT. BY APPROVING THESE THREE SMALL EXCEPTIONS NOW, WE CAN, I BELIEVE, HOLD THE LINE AND AVOID PRESSURE FOR A WHILE.

APPROVE.....

DISAPPROVE.....

DTG 061855Z JULY 67

GPS 280 INI 280

~~SECRET~~

EEA283
00 WTE13
DE WTE 1446

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67679

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 JUL 6 20 29

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-9-99

JULY 6, 1967

FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSED REPLY TO MOBUTU, RECOMMENDED BY
BOTH STATE AND DEFENSE.

ITS POSITIVE TONE RESULTS FROM A JUDGMENT THAT THE
FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH THE CONGO DEPENDS ON OUR DIVORCING
OURSELVES SHARPLY FROM THE REVOLT. THE AMBASSADOR FEARS
A TURN TO THE COMMUNIST BLOC FOR ASSISTANCE IF WE ARE
NEGATIVE IN THE FACE OF MOBUTU'S PROBLEM WITH THE
MERCENARIES.

WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND, IN FACT, IS THAT AMBASSADOR
MCBRIDE MERELY ALLOW MOBUTU TO USE CERTAIN AIRCRAFT IN THE
CONGO, WHICH WE CONTROL AND WHICH WOULD HELP HIM MOVE HIS
TROOPS ABOUT IN DEALING WITH THE REBELLION. WE WILL CHECK
WITH YOU BEFORE AUTHORIZING ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS OF THIS
NATURE.

BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER
OF JULY 5 ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO. I ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU AND YOUR
GOVERNMENT HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF MY GOVERNMENT. AT THE
SAME TIME WE STRONGLY CONDEMN THOSE WHO HAVE MOMENTARILY
INTERRUPTED THE PROGRESS OF THE CONGOLESE NATION AND PEOPLE.
I AM CONSULTING URGENTLY WITH MY ADVISERS HERE TO DETERMINE
HOW, WITHIN THE LIMITATION OF OUR OWN RESOURCES, WE CAN HELP
YOUR GOVERNMENT AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. WE SHALL COMMUNICATE
WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH MY AMBASSADOR TO THE
CONGO, ROBERT MCBRIDE. WE ARE CONFIDENT YOU WILL SUCCEED IN
RESTORING ORDER AND RESUMING THE PATH ON WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY
ENBARKED TOWARD STABILIZATION AND PROGRESS IN THE CONGO.
THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY, BACKED BY THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE,
ACTING TOGETHER UNDER YOUR COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP WILL, I
AM SURE, REESTABLISH THE CALM NECESSARY TO THAT TASK. LBJ.
END TEXT.

DTG 061954Z JULY 1967

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67 JUL 6 PM 4:34

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-102

By sig, NARA, Date 8-11-93 1967 JUL 6 20 29

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THURSDAY


EEA2830
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1446

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67679

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 6, 1967

FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSED REPLY TO MOBUTU, RECOMMENDED BY
BOTH STATE AND DEFENSE.



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BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR LETTER
OF JULY 5 ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO. I ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU AND YOUR
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SAME TIME WE STRONGLY CONDEMN THOSE WHO HAVE MOMENTARILY
INTERRUPTED THE PROGRESS OF THE CONGOLESE NATION AND PEOPLE.
I AM CONSULTING URGENTLY WITH MY ADVISERS HERE TO DETERMINE
HOW, WITHIN THE LIMITATION OF OUR OWN RESOURCES, WE CAN HELP
YOUR GOVERNMENT AT THIS DIFFICULT TIME. WE SHALL COMMUNICATE
WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THROUGH MY AMBASSADOR TO THE
CONGO, ROBERT MCBRIDE. WE ARE CONFIDENT YOU WILL SUCCEED IN
RESTORING ORDER AND RESUMING THE PATH ON WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY
EMBARKED TOWARD STABILIZATION AND PROGRESS IN THE CONGO.
THE CONGOLESE NATIONAL ARMY, BACKED BY THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE,
ACTING TOGETHER UNDER YOUR COURAGEOUS LEADERSHIP WILL, I
AM SURE, REESTABLISH THE CALM NECESSARY TO THAT TASK. LBJ.
END TEXT.

DTG 061954Z JULY 1967

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-100

By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

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OO WTE13
DE WTE 1447

1967 JUL 6 21 32

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67680

~~SECRET~~

JULY 6, 1967

67 JUL 6 PM 5:38

THURSDAY

MR. PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING IS THE DAILY REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN
VIET-NAM (NO. 7) ---

BUNKER REPORTS IN SAIGON 418 THAT DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE
GENERALS ARE CONTINUING, PRESUMABLY ON THE UNDERSTANDINGS
BEHIND THE THIEU-KY SLATE. ACCORDING TO GENERAL THANG,
MINISTER FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, KY IS CONCERNED ABOUT
THE VAGUENESS OF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THIEU. KY IS MEETING WITH
CORPS COMMANDERS "IN AN EFFORT TO NAIL DOWN WHAT HE REGARDS
AS THEIR DEBTS TO HIM".

THE EMBASSY ALSO REPORTS THAT BIG MINH'S RUNNING MATE
LIENG HAS REPORTEDLY SENT LETTERS TO THIEU, KY AND ASSEMBLY
CHAIRMAN SUU REQUESTING THAT MINH BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO
VIET-NAM BY JULY 15. MINH TOLD REPORTERS HE WOULD APPEAR IN
SAIGON SOON AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. HE IMPLIED HE WOULD
GO CLANDESTINELY IF NECESSARY. GENERAL VIEN, CHIEF OF THE
JOINT GENERAL STAFF, AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS HAVE
FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST MINH'S CANDIDACY. THE EMBASSY DOES
NOT YET HAVE THE TEXT, BUT UNDERSTANDS THE COMPLAINT IS BASED
ON GROUNDS OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

THE EMBASSY ALSO REPORTS THAT COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN FILED
AGAINST THIEU-KY, INCLUDING ONE FILED BY "PEACE" CANDIDATE
AU TRUONG THANH. THEY CLAIM THAT THIEU AND KY ARE DISQUALIFIED
BECAUSE THEY DID NOT TAKE LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM THEIR JOBS AS
DIRECTORATE CHAIRMAN AND PRIME MINISTER UPON FILING THEIR
CANDIDACIES. COMPLAINTS AGAINST TWO MINOR CANDIDATES HAVE
BEEN FILED. THEY QUESTION ONE CANDIDATE'S RESIDENCY QUALIFICATION
AND ANOTHER'S CITIZENSHIP QUALIFICATION.

COMMENT

CURRENT EMBASSY COMMENTS IN GENERAL CONFIRM THE ASSESSMENT PROVIDED IN YESTERDAY'S SITUATION REPORT. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT ACCEPTANCE OF ANY THIEU-KY AGREEMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AS WELL AS THE REAL NATURE OF THAT AGREEMENT, IS STILL VERY MUCH UP IN THE AIR. THE EMBASSY NOTES THAT FEW OF THE CONCERNED GENERALS HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE THE SITUATION FULLY IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND POSITIONS. PRESUMABLY KY'S TALKS WITH THE CORPS COMMANDERS CONCERN THEIR FUTURE ROLE WITH THE IMPLICATION THAT HE (RATHER THAN THIEU) WOULD BE PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH SUCH MILITARY QUESTIONS.

THE EMBASSY ALSO SAYS THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE SUPPORTING KY'S JUDGMENT OF A FEW DAYS AGO THAT SOME OF HIS SUPPORTERS WOULD HAVE DOUBTS ABOUT SUPPORTING THE NEW THIEU-KY TICKET. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME CATHOLIC LEADERS WHO REPORTEDLY FAVORED KY ARE NOW DOUBTFUL ABOUT SUPPORTING A THIEU-KY TICKET. THE EMBASSY NOTES THAT SOME CIVILIAN SUPPORT MAY BE LOST BECAUSE THE THIEU-KY TICKET IS PURELY MILITARY. THIS WILL DEPEND TO SOME DEGREE ON THIEU'S AND KY'S ACTIONS TO ATTRACT CIVILIAN BACKING.

THE EMBASSY STILL BELIEVES THAT US INVOLVEMENT IN THE BIG MINH ISSUE WOULD NOT HELP MATTERS AND COULD PROVE EMBARRASSING.

THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT THE COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE THIEU-KY SLATE ARE BEING TAKEN AS PUBLICITY STUNTS IN SAIGON POLITICAL CIRCLES. THE CLEAR INTENT OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS NOT TO REQUIRE CABINET OR DIRECTORATE MEMBERS TO RESIGN OR TAKE LEAVE IN ORDER TO BECOME PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. THE PERTINENT ELECTION LAW PROVISION STATES THAT CIVIL SERVANTS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL MUST REQUEST LEAVE WITHOUT PAY WHEN THEY FILE THEIR CANDIDATES.

ACTION REQUIRED

WE ARE PREPARING A NEW MESSAGE TO BUNKER REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY OF HIS DISCUSSING FRANKLY WITH KY AND THIEU THE FULL IMPLICATIONS OF BARRING MINH FROM CANDIDACY AND FROM A RETURN TO CAMPAIGN.

SECRET

DTG:062038Z JULY 1967

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1967 JUL 6 21 38

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67681

~~TOP SECRET~~

67 JUL 6 PM 5:53

Pres file
THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

JULY 6, 1967

BOB ANDERSON CALLED TO REPORT THE FOLLOWING, WHICH I SHALL BE TAKING UP WITH MAC BUNDY AND OUR OTHER MIDDLE EASTERN HANDS.

1. THE INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE OIL COMPANIES SUGGESTS THAT THE FUTURE OF JERUSALEM MAY BE THE CRITICAL AND TRULY EXPLOSIVE PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ARABS REGARD THE SYRIAN HEIGHTS AS A SYRIAN PROBLEM; THE WEST BANK AS A JORDANIAN PROBLEM; GAZA AS AN EGYPTIAN PROBLEM; BUT THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM IS CAPABLE OF STIRRING THE MOBS IN THE STREETS TO THE POINT WHERE THE FATE OF OUR MOST MODERATE FRIENDS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WILL BE IN JEOPARDY AND THE BASIS LAID FOR A LATER HOLY WAR.

2. SPECIFICALLY, THEY REPORT:

--FEISAL IS WORRIED ABOUT HIS OWN FUTURE ON THIS ISSUE;
--THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS SIMILARLY WORRIED;
--ANTI-AMERICANISM IS RISING DUE TO OUR ABSTAINING ON THE PAKISTAN RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM.

3. BOB UNDERLINED THAT NO GOVERNMENT SHOULD RELY ON PRIVATE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES; AND WE SHOULD MAKE UP OUR OWN MIND IN THIS MATTER. HE UNDERSTANDS THAT YOU MADE A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE JERUSALEM QUESTION; BUT HE BELIEVES WE MUST DO MORE BOTH TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS AND TO CLARIFY OUR OWN POSITION.

4. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE EUROPEAN OIL PROBLEM IS GOING TO TURN OUT TO BE MORE SERIOUS THAN IN 1956-57, DUE TO INCREASED EUROPEAN REQUIREMENTS AND THE UNAVAILABILITY OF MEDITERRANEAN OIL. (ON THE LATTER, HOWEVER, AN ITEM HAS JUST COME OVER THE TICKER SAYING THAT LIBYA WILL RESUME SHIPMENTS TO FRANCE, JAPAN, TURKEY, GREECE, AND ITALY, THAT WOULD NARROW THE MAJOR PROBLEM DOWN TO BRITAIN AND GERMANY.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

DTG: 462058Z JULY 67

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Pres file

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THURSDAY

167 JUL 6 PM 5:59

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DE WTE 1458

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67683

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 6, 1967

SECRETARY RUSK HAS CLEARED THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED DRAFT MEMORANDUM FROM MAC BUNDY TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS FORWARDED NOW FOR YOUR FINAL APPROVAL.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

IT APPEARS LIKELY THAT THE NEED FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST WILL CONTINUE SOME TIME TO COME, BUT THE EVIDENCE OF THE LAST TWO WEEKS SUGGESTED THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO TRANSACT OUR BUSINESS WITH FEWER MEETINGS THAN WERE NECESSARY IN THE FIRST WEEKS AFTER JUNE 7. THE PRESIDENT HAS GRANTED MY REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO BEGIN TO DEVOTE PART OF MY TIME TO THE WORK OF THE FORD FOUNDATION IN NEW YORK. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE ASKED ASSISTANT SECRETARY BATTLE TO ADD TO HIS OTHER DUTIES THE WORK OF SERVING AS DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. THE PRESIDENT HAS ALSO ASKED MR. HARRY MCPHERSON TO BE A MEMBER OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE. AT TIMES WHEN I AM NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE, MR. BATTLE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STAFF WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, AND MR. MCPHERSON, WORKING WITH MR. WALT ROSTOW, WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESIDENTIAL CLEARANCE AS NECESSARY.

DTG: 06/2115Z JUL 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 18, 1983.

BY Ry ON 7-17-91

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THURSDAY

'67 JUL 6 PM 12:00

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1967 JUL 6 15 52

Pres. file

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FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70398

UNCLAS

JULY 6, 1967

LUDWIG ERHARD HAS ASKED FOR A SHORT PRIVATE TALK WITH YOU
BEFORE YOUR 1:00 P.M. LUNCH FOR HIM ON JULY 11. SECRETARY RUSK
RECOMMENDS THAT YOU SEE HIM. (THIRTY MINUTES -- FROM 12:30
TO 1:00 -- SHOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME.)

OK FOR JIM JONES TO SET UP 12:30 P.M. APPOINTMENT -----

NO -----

DTG:061533Z JULY 1967

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FROM WALTHROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67671

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By ig, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HERewith A MESSAGE AND REQUEST FOR AID FROM MOBUTU. WE
WILL BE DEVELOPING A DRAFT RESPONSE TOMORROW MORNING.

KINSHASA 135

FOREIGN MINISTER BOMBOKO JUST DELIVERED TO ME (AMBASSADOR
MCBRIDE) THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM MOBUTU TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

BEGIN QUOTE:

MR. PRESIDENT, WE MUST UNHAPPILY INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCY
THAT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CONGO TODAY WAS OBJECT OF AGGRESSION
FROM GROUP OF FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN SERVICE OF GROUPS HOSTILE
TO PEACE AND SECURITY OF OUR COUNTRY.

THIS MORNING AT 6:30 LOCAL TIME TWO UNIDENTIFIED
AIRPLANES PARACHUTED GROUP OF COMMANDOS ON KISANGANI AIRFIELD.
SIMULTANEOUSLY, MERCENARIES IN EMPLOY OF ARMY NATIONALE
CONGO LAUNCHED HOSTILITIES AT BUKAVU. JUST PRIOR TO THIS PEACE
AND TRANQUILITY EXISTING THROUGHOUT DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC CONGO
FOR NINETEEN MONTHS WERE DISTURBED BY ACTS OF ECONOMIC SABOTAGE
IN KATANGA PROVINCE.

YOU WILL EASILY UNDERSTAND THAT THIS SITUATION CAN
COMPROMISE NOT ONLY TRANQUILITY OF CONGO BUT ALSO PEACE
OF ALL CENTRAL AFRICA.

IN VIEW OF GRAVITY OF SITUATION WE, LIKE ALL PEOPLE
DEVOTED TO PEACE AND LIBERTY, HASTEN TO APPEAL TO FRIENDLY
PEOPLE OF US, CHAMPIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY.

WE, THEREFORE, ASK YOUR EXCELLENCY TO MAKE AVAILABLE
TO US AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE NECESSARY MEN AND MATERIAL TO
PERMIT US TO RID OURSELVES ONCE AND FOR ALL OF THIS GROUP
OF BRIGANDS.

WE KNOW THAT WE CAN COUNT ON AID OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND
OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AS WELL AS UPON THAT OF GOVERNMENTS OF
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES.

WITH DEEP GRATITUDE IN ADVANCE FOR CONSIDERATION WHICH
YOU WILL GIVE TO OUR REQUEST, WE RENUEW TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT,
OUR HIGH AND FRIENDLY CONSIDERATION. SIGNED J.D. MOBUTU,
PRESIDENT OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO. END QUOTE

DTG 060231Z JULY 1967

PRESERVATION COPY