

July 6, 1967

Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II
Buckingham Palace
London, England

Your Majesty, my countrymen join me in sending you our warmest thanks for your thoughtful and moving message. An eloquent expression of friendship, it means a great deal to us.

We wish you, your government and the British nation every good fortune.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Thurs., July 6, 1967
9:30 a.m.

72

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Pres. file

MR. PRESIDENT:

This transcript of the De Gaulle-Nixon conversation may interest you, although it contains no surprises. De Gaulle's explanation of why the USSR wishes, in his view, to end the war in Viet Nam is mildly interesting, as is his assessment of moderate Soviet intentions in the Middle East.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~ attachment

(Cy 5 of Paris 20998 6/29/67)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 719-85-360
By ag/ep, NARA, Date 7-7-91

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

Cy 5
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 55249
R-XXXII/R-IV
French

PP RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 20998/1 1802110
ZNY SSSSS
P 291828Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 25839
RECD: JUNE 29, 1967
5:43 PM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 20998

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJ: NIXON-DEGAULLE CONVERSATION

SOURCE GAVE EMOFF FULL TRANSCRIPT NIXON-DEGAULLE CONVERSATION:

/HEADING/ MEETING WITH MR. NIXON

JUNE 8, 1967, 4:30-5:05 p.m.

MR. NIXON: DURING THIS THREE-MONTH TRIP I AM MAKING AROUND THE WORLD, I WISH TO SEE THE LEADERS OF THIS FAST-CHANGING WORLD TO LEARN FROM THEM HOW THEY ENVISAGE THE FUTURE. YOU KNOW THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR. I SHALL NOT MAKE ANY DECISION REGARDING MYSELF UNTIL THE END OF THIS YEAR, BUT, IN ANY CASE, I SHALL TAKE PART IN THE CAMPAIGN, AND I INTEND TO CONCENTRATE ON FOREIGN POLICY. IF I SHOULD BE A CANDIDATE, THIS QUESTION WOULD CERTAINLY BE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE. IT IS, INDEED, VITAL, THAT WE ASSUME A NEW ATTITUDE TOWARD MAJOR WORLD PROBLEMS. ON THIS TRIP, I HAVE NO OFFICIAL POSITION. I HAVE NO REPORTERS WITH ME. I AM SIMPLY ENDEAVORING TO GATHER FACTS TO ENABLE ME TO THINK CONSTRUCTIVELY. I RECALL VERY CLEARLY WHAT YOU SAID TO ME AT A DINNER IN THE UNITED STATES: YOU ADVISED ME TO BE THE ADVOCATE OF A NEW AMERICA AND A NEW APPROACH. YOU IMMEDIATELY CONCEDED THAT THAT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ME, SINCE I WAS A MEMBER OF THE PREVIOUS LEGISLATURE. HOWEVER, I MIGHT HAVE BEEN ELECTED, AND I WOULD THEN HAVE FOLLOWED YOUR ADVICE. MY SITUATION IS NOT THE SAME NOW, AND I CAN CONSIDER THINGS IN A COMPLETELY DETACHED MANNER.

GENERAL DE GAULLE: YES, THE WORLD CHANGES, ALTHOUGH BASICALLY, IT DOES NOT CHANGE SO MUCH. THE PROBLEMS ARE THE SAME, PARTICULARLY FOR YOU. IN YOUR ELECTIONS, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE WAR IN VIET-NAM WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 10-185(-#183a) ~~SECRET~~ NODIS
By , NARA, Date 10-14-10

- 2 -

I RECOGNIZE THAT, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR YOU PERSONALLY, TO ASSUME A NEW ATTITUDE REGARDING VIET-NAM. I THINK THAT IT IS VERY GREATLY IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES TO EXTRICATE ITSELF FROM VIET-NAM, BUT PUBLIC OPINION IN YOUR COUNTRY FAVORS A FIGHT TO THE FINISH. THAT CREATES A GREAT DIFFICULTY AS REGARDS THE ELECTIONS.

MR. NIXON: WITH REGARD TO VIET-NAM, THE ESSENTIAL QUESTION IS THE QUESTION OF THE FUTURE, THE KIND OF SETTLEMENT, AND THE MEANS OF BRINGING THE WAR TO AN END THAT WILL NOT BE INTERPRETED AS ENCOURAGEMENT OF OTHER AGGRESSION BY COMMUNISM IN THE ORIENT. IT IS THEREFORE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIND A FORMULA. TWO BIG QUESTIONS ARISE: FIRST OF ALL, DOES CHINA WANT THE WAR TO END? PERSONALLY, I DON'T THINK SO. NEXT, DOES THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS FURNISHING MOST OF THE AID TO VIET-NAM, WANT THE FIGHTING TO CEASE? UNLESS THESE TWO BIG POWERS, OR ONE OF THEM, EXERTS DIRECT INFLUENCE, I SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT HO CHI MINH WILL AGREE TO A SETTLEMENT THAT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO US.

GENERAL DE GAULLE: IT DOES NOT, INDEED, APPEAR THAT CHINA WANTS AN END TO THE WAR. BUT THE SOVIET UNION DOES WANT IT, FOR THIS WAR IS COSTING IT A GREAT DEAL AND IS BRINGING IT NOTHING IN RETURN. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS YOU ARE IN VIET-NAM, THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE COMPELLED TO BE THERE ALSO WITH ITS AID AND ITS WEAPONS; OTHERWISE, IT WOULD LOSE FACE BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD AND BEFORE ALL THE COMMUNISTS, TO THE BENEFIT OF CHINA. THAT IT DOES NOT WANT. THEREFORE, AS LONG AS YOU REMAIN IN VIET-NAM, THE RUSSIANS WILL SUPPORT VIET-NAM. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD LIKE TO WITHDRAW AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WOULD LIKE YOU TO WITHDRAW ALSO.

MR. NIXON: THE SOVIET UNION HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES IN CONTINUING THE WAR. THESE ARE THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE UNITED STATES, THE DIVISION THAT IS APPEARING THERE, AND ALSO THE FRICTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OF ITS FRIENDS IN EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE WAR IS COSTLY FOR THE UNITED STATES ALSO. IT IS SPENDING RESOURCES THAT IT COULD HAVE USED EITHER TO INCREASE ITS MILITARY MIGHT OR TO INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

GENERAL DE GAULLE: THIS WAR IS VERY COSTLY FOR THE SOVIETS. THEY ARE SPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO SEND THEIR AID. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT, AT PRESENT, THEY HAVE REASON TO SAVE THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO DEVOTE THEM TO THEIR [OWN] DOMESTIC NEEDS. I SINCERELY BELIEVE THAT THEY DO NOT WANT THE WAR TO CONTINUE. CERTAINLY, AS LONG AS YOU ARE IN VIET-NAM, THE RUSSIANS WILL BE THERE ALSO, WITH THEIR WEAPONS, THEIR TECHNICAL EXPERTS, AND THEIR MISSILES; BUT THEY ARE NOT HAPPY ABOUT IT. THEY WOULD MUCH PREFER THE WAR TO END, IF YOU WOULD LEAVE. AND, WITHOUT A DOUBT, THEY WOULD NOT ASK ANYTHING MORE. LAST YEAR, WHEN I WAS IN THE SOVIET UNION, KOSYGIN, WHO WAS PREPARING HIS 1967 BUDGET, TOLD ME: "YOU HAVE NO IDEA HOW MILITARY EXPENDITURES HAVE INCREASED BECAUSE OF VIET-NAM."

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MR. NIXON: THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION CONTINUES TO BE: ARE THE SOVIETS TRULY SEEKING A DETENTE? I AM NOT A DOCTRINAIRE WHO WOULD OPPOSE THE COMMUNISTS AS SUCH. ONE MUST CONSIDER THE COMMUNIST LEADERS AND JUDGE THEM AS THEY ARE. HOWEVER, THE PARTICIPATION BY THE U.S.S.R. IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS CAUSES ONE TO DOUBT THAT THESE LEADERS REALLY WANT A DETENTE. WHY DO YOU THINK THEY BLOCKED OUR PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, AND ALSO THE UNITED NATIONS ACTION, AND WHAT ROLE ARE THEY PLAYING NOW?

S.M. CLEVELAND

BT

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

PP RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 20998/2 1802125
ZNY SSSSS
P 291828Z JUN 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
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CONTROL: 25852
RECD: : JUNE 29, 1967
6:17 PM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 20998

NODIS MARIA THREE

GENERAL DE GAULLE: I THINK THAT THEY ARE VERY EMBARRASSED. THEY HAVE, OF COURSE, ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE ARABS; THEY BUILT THE ASWAN DAM; THEY ARE FURNISHING THEM WEAPONS AND ECONOMIC AID. THEY HAVE A CERTAIN POSITION THERE, ESPECIALLY IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT CALL THEMSELVES SOCIALIST. THEY HAVE NEVER OCCUPIED A SIMILAR SITUATION TO THIS EXTENT. THEY DON'T WANT TO LOSE IT AND THAT IS WHY THEY ARE SUPPORTING THE ARABS. BUT THEY ARE NOT GOING VERY FAR AND THEY ARE NOT DOING A GREAT DEAL. FROM THE MOMENT OF THE ISRAELI VICTORY, THE RUSSIANS AGREED TO THE CEASE-FIRE. THEY SAID SO IN THEIR OWN WAY, TO BE SURE, BUT THEY ARE NOT PRESSING FOR TOO MANY COMPLICATIONS. THEY WANT TO KEEP THEIR POSITION AND THEIR REPUTATION OF BEING FRIENDS OF THE ARAB WORLD; BUT THEY HAVE NO INTENTION OF GOING VERY FAR. AS TO THE PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS MADE IN ORDER TO FORESTALL THE ISRAELI ATTACK--AND IT WAS CERTAINLY THE ISRAELIS WHO ATTACKED--RUSSIA WASN'T IN FAVOR OF SUCH A CONFERENCE. SHE DID NOT SAY "NO" EMPHATICALLY, BUT NEITHER DID SHE SAY "YES". I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF SHE DID NOT FEEL SOME REGRET ABOUT THAT NOW. HOWEVER, WITH YOU, IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RUSSIANS DECIDED IN FAVOR OF THE CEASE-FIRE. THAT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO GO VERY FAR. BESIDES, NEITHER DO YOU. YOU, OF COURSE, SUPPORTED ISRAEL, BUT, IN THE GULF OF AQABA AFFAIR, BASICALLY YOU DID NOTHING. AND I THINK THAT YOU WERE RIGHT.

NIXON: DIDN'T THE SOVIETS PERHAPS WAIT TOO LONG TO DECLARE THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE CEASE-FIRE? INDEED, EITHER THEY SUPPORT IT 100% OR ELSE THEY ARE OBLIGED TO GIVE NASSER OR THE ARABS COMPLETE MILITARY ASSISTANCE. NOW, I DON'T THINK THEY WANT TO BECOME DEEPLY INVOLVED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. THE QUESTION THAT ARISES NOW IS WHAT KIND OF SETTLEMENT THEY COULD ACCEPT AND SUPPORT. THAT POSES A VERY DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FOR THE OTHER POWERS CONCERNED: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE VICTOR WILL BE TEMPTED TO DEMAND THE FRUITS OF HIS VICTORY. HOWEVER, I THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE PEACE BE A PEACE OF RECONCILIATION RATHER THAN OF VENGEANCE. FURTHERMORE, THIS IS IN ACCORD WITH THE VERY INTERESTS OF ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD BE UNABLE TO SURVIVE IN THE MIDST OF A SEA OF ARABS AND, IN THE LONG RUN, WOULD LOSE THE WAR. CONSEQUENTLY, THE TIME HAS COME TO WORK OUT A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. TO DO THAT WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF DIPLOMATIC SKILL, PARTICULARLY ON THE PART OF A MAN LIKE YOU. TO HUMILIATE NASSER IS ONE THING, BUT TO HUMILIATE THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD CAN BE VERY DANGEROUS TO A PEACE CONFERENCE.

GENERAL DE GAULLE: I AGREE WITH YOU. THERE MUST A SETTLEMENT AND IT MUST BE MODERATE. I DO NOT THINK THAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED IMMEDIATELY. ISRAEL WON THE INITIAL SUCCESS--WHICH WAS EXPECTED--BECAUSE OF THE GOOD QUALITIES OF ITS ARMAMENT, ITS OFFICER CORPS, AND THE FACT THAT ITS FORCES ARE WELL ORGANIZED. BUT ISRAEL HAS REACHED ITS LIMITS NOW: IT IS NOT GOING TO OCCUPY CAIRO, OR THE NILE VALLEY. IN THE SINAI PENINSULA THERE ARE NO ARABS; THERE IS NOTHING BUT DESERT. BUT IN THE NILE VALLEY THERE ARE ALL THE EGYPTIANS AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THE JEWS LIVING AMONG THEM. NEITHER IS ISRAEL GOING TO CAPTURE DAMASCUS, OR BAGHDAD, OR EVEN BEIRUT. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS GOING TO STOP AND THERE WILL BE A DE FACTO STABILIZATION THAT WILL LAST FOR A WHILE. THE ARABS ARE GOING TO REORGANIZE, RECOVER, PULL THEMSELVES TOGETHER. THEN IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO HAVE NEGOTIATIONS. LIKE YOU, I THINK IT NECESSARY TO ARRIVE AT A MODERATE SETTLEMENT. THE ISRAELIS ARE THE ONES THAT WILL WANT TO GO TOO FAR; AND, AS YOU SAY, THEY MUST NOT, FOR THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO HOLD OUT AGAINST ALL THE ARABS IN THE LONG RUN. BUT THE ISRAELIS ARE PEOPLE WHO [TEND TO] GO TOO FAR; THAT IS SOMETHING THEY HAVE ALWAYS DONE. ONE HAS ONLY TO REREAD THE PSALMS TO REALIZE THAT. THE ARABS, TOO, FOR THAT MATTER. SO, [IN THIS DISPUTE] BETWEEN PEOPLE WHO GO TOO FAR, IT WILL CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY FOR THE BIG POWERS TO MAKE THE VOICE OF REASON HEARD AND OBLIGE THEM TO SUBMIT TO REASON. THE RUSSIANS WILL SURELY HAVE TO BE PRESENT, OTHERWISE NOTHING WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

MR. NIXON: DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIETS DESIRE A MODERATE SETTLEMENT OR THAT THEY WISH TO GO TO THE LIMIT SUPPORTING THE ARABS IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THEIR POSITION?

GENERAL DE GAULLE: THEY WILL WANT TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION, AND THEY WILL SUPPORT THE ARABS UP TO A CERTAIN POINT. THEY WILL NOT GO TO THE LIMIT, FOR I BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE NO DESIRE FOR TOO BIG OR TOO WIDESPREAD A CONFLICT.

MR. NIXON: YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE, WHICH WAS CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE BEGINNING, PERHAPS STILL CONSTITUTES A SOLUTION TODAY. DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN ACCEPT IT NOW?

GENERAL DE GAULLE: NOT TOMORROW, BUT PERHAPS TWO WEEKS FROM NOW. I HAVE BEEN VERY HAPPY TO SEE YOU AGAIN. YOU ARE NOT GOING TO THE ORIENT?

MR. NIXON: THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOW: I AM GOING TO AFRICA IN ORDER TO VISIT THE COUNTRIES OF ETHIOPIA, KENYA, THE CONGO, AND LIBERIA. ON THE BASIS OF THE EXPERIENCE GAINED FROM MY TRIP, I CAN SAY THAT IT IS VITAL FOR THE UNITED STATES NOT TO PLAY AN EXCLUSIVELY BILATERAL ROLE WITH RESPECT TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT OTHER WORLD LEADERS PARTICIPATE. IF

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS WAS THE CASE WITH REGARD TO NONPROLIFERATION, TAKE, BETWEEN THEMSELVES ONLY, DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, THAT WILL NOT PRODUCE GOOD RESULTS. I HOPE THAT, IN THE FUTURE, WE CAN DEVELOP CLOSER CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER GREAT POWERS, SUCH AS FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

COMMENT: SINCE, UNLIKE OTHER MESSAGES FROM THIS SOURCE, PIECE OF PAPER CARRIED NO CLASSIFICATION, IT MAY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO GET TO WASHINGTON. ON OTHER HAND, SOURCE MAY HAVE HAD CLASSIFIED PIECE RETYPED, OMITTING CLASSIFICATION. IT DIFFERS FROM NIXON'S ACCOUNT ONLY IN A) DETAIL AND B) DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE AS COMPARED REPORT PARIS 19999.

FRENCH VERSION ADDS FOLLOWING ADDITIONS TO NIXON VERSION: ON VIETNAM, DEGAULLE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST TO CHINA SOVIETS WANT WAR TO END; HOWEVER, UNTIL US LEAVES, SOVIETS ARE OBLIGED TO CONTINUE THEIR AID WHICH THEY WOULD PREFER TO USE IN MEETING DOMESTIC NEEDS; ON NEAR EAST, DE GAULLE STATED THAT FRENCH PROPOSAL OF FOUR POWER CONFERENCE WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT ISRAEL ATTACK, FOR "IT WAS THE ISRAELIS WHO ATTACKED"; REGARDING REPORT THAT DEGAULLE HAD DENIED THAT SOVIETS TURNED DOWN FRENCH SUGGESTION FOR FOUR POWER CONFERENCE (PARIS 19999), FRENCH VERSION REPORTS DE GAULLE AS SAYING THAT RUSSIANS "DID NOT WANT IT", WITH ADDITION THAT ALTHOUGH RUSSIANS DID NOT SAY DEFINITELY NO, THEY ALSO DO NOT SAY YES.

S. M. CLEVELAND
BT

~~SECRET~~

73

9:14

SECRET
UNCLAS

1967 JUL 6 01 14

VZCZCEEA272
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1433

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67669

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 6-14-92

Pres file

JUL 5 5 PM 9:22

WEDNESDAY

~~SECRET~~

JULY 5, 1967

HEREWITH SECRETARY RUSKS' DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON.

DEAR PRIME MINISTER:

WE ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF MOPPING UP AFTER MR. KOSYGIN'S ONSLAUGHT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE RESULTS OF THE VOTING YESTERDAY FROM WHICH WE CAN CONCLUDE THAT THE RUSSIANS AND THE MORE EXTREME ARABS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET THE UNITED NATIONS TO FAVOR A RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS STATE OF BELLIGERENCE. AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ASKED AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG EARLIER TODAY FOR A 48-HOUR DELAY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO PERMIT SOME FURTHER RECONCILIATION OF VIEWS. MORE SIGNIFICANTLY, HE ADDED THAT MR. GROMYKO NEEDED THE ADDITIONAL TIME FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH MOSCOW. I HAVE SOME DOUBT THAT ANOTHER 48-HOURS CAN SIGNIFICANTLY NARROW THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO PRINCIPAL RESOLUTIONS BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY. MY DOUBT IS BASED PRINCIPALLY UPON SOME SKEPTICISM THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO GO VERY FAR BEYOND THE ARAB POINT OF VIEW. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME SIGNS THAT SECOND THOUGHTS ARE TAKING HOLD AMONG SOME OF THE ARABS, THEY MAY REQUIRE A LITTLE MORE TIME BEFORE THEY DARE TO BE REASONABLE. HOWEVER, WE ARE INCLINED TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS THEIR ADDITIONAL 48-HOURS, AS A MATTER OF COMITY, IN VIEW OF DOBRYNIN'S REMARKS. THE MOST LIKELY PROSPECT IS THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL GO BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHERE IT BELONGS, AND THAT RESULTS WILL HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED OUT BEHIND THE SCENES.

I CONTINUE TO BE MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH YOUR EAST OF SUEZ DECISION. THE ASPAC COUNTRIES ARE NOW MEETING IN BANGKOK WITH THE PROSPECT THAT THEY WILL REGISTER A GROWING SENSE OF SOLIDARITY AMONG THE FREE NATIONS OF ASIA. HANOI SEEMS TO BE CALLING HOME A NUMBER OF ITS KEY AMBASSADORS; WHETHER THIS MEANS A POLICY REVIEW, WE DO NOT KNOW. MEANWHILE, BURMA IS UNDER NEW PRESSURES FROM A CHINA WHICH CONTINUES IN TURMOIL.

~~SECRET~~

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TONIGHT BOB MCNAMARA AND NICK KATZENBACK GO OFF TO SAIGON. ON THEIR RETURN WE SHALL FACE HERE - AND AMONG OUR FIGHTING ALLIES - SOME DIFFICULT AND CRITICAL MANPOWER DECISIONS.

IT JUST DOES NOT SEEM TO ME THAT THIS IS THE TIME FOR BRITAIN TO MAKE OR TO ANNOUNCE A DECISION THAT IT IS SHARPLY REDUCING ITS PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I DO HOPE THAT YOU CAN FIND SOME WAY TO PUT THIS MATTER OFF FOR A TIME AND NOT TAKE A STEP WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO YOUR AND OUR INTERESTS AND TO THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE NATIONS OF ASIA.

THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC THESE DAYS AND IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL TRY TO STAY STEADY ON COURSE.

CORDIALLY YOURS,

DTG 060013Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA271
PP WTE 10
DE WTE 1432

SENT
UNCLAS

Send 7:51
74

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70396

1967 JUL 5 23 57

Pres file
1967 JUL 5 PM 8:10
WEDNESDAY

UNCLAS

JULY 5, 1967

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

MR. PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING ARE THE TEXTS OF A FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT MARCOS AND A SUGGESTED REPLY:

ON THE 191ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, I CONVEY TO YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND THROUGH YOU TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE CORDIAL GREETINGS AND FELICITATIONS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE. SMALL NATIONS WHO BELIEVE IN DEMOCRACY CAN ONLY HOPE THAT THE GREAT AMERICAN REPUBLIC SHALL NOT FALTER NOR FAIL THEM IN THE QUEST FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ON THIS OCCASION, THEREFORE, THE FILIPINO PEOPLE PRAY THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE TO GROW IN WISDOM AND STRENGTH FOR THE SAKE OF ALL LIBERTY-LOVING PEOPLES.

FERDINAND E. MARCOS
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

(SUGGESTED REPLY)

HIS EXCELLENCY FERDINAND E. MARCOS
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY HEARTFELT THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE AND FOR THE GOOD WISHES OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE ON OUR DAY OF INDEPENDENCE. YOU CAN BE CONFIDENT THAT WE SHALL NOT FAIL NOR FALTER IN THE QUEST FOR A LASTING PEACE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IT IS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BUT FOR ALL MEN WHO BELIEVE IN FREEDOM TO GROW IN BOTH WISDOM AND STRENGTH. FOR ONLY THROUGH OUR COMBINED WISDOM AND STRENGTH CAN WE OVERCOME THE PERSISTENT THREATS TO THOSE VALUES WE ALL TREASURE.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DTG: 05/23 13Z JULY 1967

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 5 23 32

75
1967 JUL 5 PM 7:42

WEDNESDAY

Pres file

VZCZCEEA269H
PP WTE 10
DE WTE 1430

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70394

UNCLAS

JULY 5, 1967

HEREWITH PROPOSED DRAFTS TO SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR
GOLDBERG.

TO SECRETARY RUSK:

"I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW HOW GRATEFUL I AM TO YOU AND YOUR
COLLEAGUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE DEVOTED AND HIGHLY
PROFESSIONAL EFFORT WHICH RESULTED IN THE VOTING OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ON JULY 4.

"I UNDERSTAND THE SCALE OF THE DIPLOMACY REQUIRED TO PRODUCE
THIS RESULT AS WELL AS THE SUBTLETY AND GOOD JUDGMENT THAT WENT
INTO IT.

"AS WE FACE THE DIFFICULT WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD WHEN WE
YHALL BE TRYING TO BRING A STABLE PEACE OUT OF THE PRESENT CRISIS,
I WOULD WISH YOU TO KNOW HOW STRENGTHENED I FEEL BY THE DEPART-
MENT'S PERFORMANCE IN RECENT DAYS."

TO AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG:

"AS AN OLD PARLIAMENTARIAN, I THINK I UNDERSTAND THE EFFORT
REQUIRED FROM YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES TO YIELD THE VOTING
RESULTS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON JULY 4.

"THOSE VOTES DID NOT PRODUCE A STABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST, BUT THEY WERE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR US TO GO FORWARD
IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.

"I WANT YOU--AND YOUR COLLEAGUES--TO KNOW HOW GREATLY I
APPRECIATE THE DEVOTED AND EFFECTIVE WORK OF OUR TEAM IN NEW
YORK."

DTG: 052259Z JULY 67

EA

EEA268H
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1429

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67668

SENT
WHCA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 95-244
By sig, NARA, Date 1-9-96

76

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~~SECRET LIMDIS~~ 1967 JUL 5 21 55

JULY 5, 1967

HEREWITH THE RUSSIANS ASK FOR FORTY-EIGHT HOURS TO TRY TO SALVAGE SOMETHING FROM THEIR SETBACK. WE ARE GOING ALONG BECAUSE IT CAN'T EFFECTIVELY BE OPPOSED.

USUN 58

DOBRYNIN, AT HIS REQUEST, CALLED ON GOLDBERG THIS MORNING AND ASKED US TO AGREE TO A DELAY OF 48 HOURS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME TO WORK OUT SOME COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE DEFEATED YUGOSLAV AND LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTIONS. GOLDBERG EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT THE GAP COULD BE BRIDGED SINCE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD TRIED TO DO THIS UNSUCCESSFULLY OVER A NUMBER OF WEEKS. REITERATING OUR GENERAL DESIRE TO BE COOPERATIVE GOLDBERG SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO SOVIET REQUEST AND THAT HE NEEDED TO CONSULT WASHINGTON BEFORE GIVING OUR REPLY BY THE END OF THE DAY. DOBRYNIN STRESSED THAT THE REASON FOR THE REQUEST FOR DELAY WAS ALSO BECAUSE 48 HOURS WERE NEEDED FOR CONSULTATION IN MOSCOW TO DETERMINE COURSE OF ACTION WHICH SOVIETS MIGHT PURSUE.

IN VIEW GOLDBERG'S EXPRESSED DOUBTS THAT SUBSTANTIVE GAP COULD BE BRIDGED, CONVERSATION THEN FOCUSED ON OTHER WAYS TO CONCLUDE THE ASSEMBLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD TAKEN SOME ACTION. TWO POSSIBILITIES WERE DISCUSSED: (A) A POSSIBLE INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL, WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN NOTE OF BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, TO "SEND A DISTINGUISHED SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION"; AND (B) A SIMPLE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD TRANSMIT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROCEEDINGS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD GIVE FURTHER CONSIDERATION TO THIS MATTER.

DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS TO MOSCOW.

REGARDING A POSSIBLE UNITED NATIONS EMISSARY, GOLDBERG SAID WE FELT IT SHOULD BE A GENUINE NEUTRAL SUCH AS A SWISS.

COMMENT: OF INTEREST IS THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS SENT DOBRYNIN RATHER THAN FEDORENKO TO SEE GOLDBERG. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST TIME

Pres file
1967 JUL 5 PM 02
WEDNESDAY

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

DURING THE COURSE OF THE SPECIAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY THAT WE HAVE HAD A SPECIFIC INDICATION FROM THE USSR OF A DESIRE TO TRY TO WORK OUT SOMETHING WITH US. WE NOTED OTHER SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN CORRIDORS THIS MORNING TOUCHING BASE WITH OTHER DELEGATES AND WE ASSUME THEY ARE PROBABLY TAKING SIMILAR LINE REGARDING DELAY WITH THEM. WE, OF COURSE, MUST CONTINUE TO BE ON GUARD THAT THIS IS JUST A SOVIET PLOY TO TRY TO RECOUP SOMETHING FROM THE DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT THEY HAVE SUFFERED AT GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND WHICH WILL GIVE SOME DIFFICULTY IN THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION. HOWEVER, SINCE IT WAS DIRECT BILATERAL REQUEST TO US, AND SINCE SPECIFIC NEED FOR GUIDANCE FROM MOSCOW WAS MENTIONED, IT WOULD SEEM TO ME WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO ALONG WITH REQUEST FOR DELAY. CONFIRMING SECRETARY-SISCO TELECON, WE WILL AGREE AT APPROPRIATE TIME TO REQUESTED DELAY.

FOLLOWING ARE THE TWO POSSIBILITIES WHICH GOLDBERG AND DOBRYNIN DISCUSSED:

THE FIRST IS A POSSIBLE STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL WHICH HE WOULD MAKE AND WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN NOTE OF BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

"HAVING HEARD THE DEBATES ON THIS QUESTION, AND ON THE BASIS OF BROAD CONSULTATIONS, I SENSE THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE AND GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEND A DISTINGUISHED SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AREA TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION AND REPORT THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL."

SECOND IS POSSIBLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION REMANDING MATTER TO SECURITY COUNCIL.

"THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

"TAKING NOTE OF THE VIEWS EXPRESSED AND THE RESOLUTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT THIS EXTRAORDINARY SESSION, RECOMMENDS:

1. THAT THE RECORDS OF THE PROCEEDINGS BE REMITTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL FOR ITS FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER;
2. THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS A MATTER OF URGENCY DEAL WITH THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

ALTERNATIVE 1 WAS A U.S. DRAFT. ALTERNATIVE 2 WAS PROPOSED BY GOLDBERG BUT INCORPORATES SOME SUGGESTIONS MADE BY DOBRYNIN. SPECIFICALLY, PARAGRAPH REFERRING TO RESOLUTION BEFORE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CAME FROM HIM. HE ALSO SUGGESTED ADDITION OF WORD "FURTHER".

GOLDBERG

DTG: 05/2043Z JUL 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

27

VZCZCEEA267
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1428

~~SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67667

SENT
WHCA

Pres file

WEDNESDAY

~~SECRET~~

1967 JUL 5 20 56
JULY 5, 1967

5 PM 5:01

FOLLOWING IS THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT (NO. 6) ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN VIET-NAM --

THERE ARE NO NEW SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS TO REPORT TODAY.

COMMENT ON MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS

WE NOW HAVE SEVERAL VERSIONS FROM PARTICIPANTS OF THE MEETINGS OF GENERALS WHICH RESULTED IN THE THIEU-KY SLATE. THESE VERSIONS ARE GENERALLY CONSISTENT IN INDICATING THAT THE MEETINGS BEGAN WITH DISCUSSION OF THE "BIG" MINH ISSUE AND THEN TURNED TO DISCUSSION OF THE THIEU AND KY CANDIDACIES. IT ALSO SEEMS QUITE CLEAR THAT THIS LATTER DISCUSSION WAS HIGHLY EMOTIONAL. HOWEVER, WHAT IS STRIKINGLY UNCLEAR IS THE NATURE OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS--IF ANY--ON WHICH KY ACCEPTED THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SPOT ON A THIEU TICKET. NOR IS IT CLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT ANY UNDERSTANDINGS ARE GENERALLY KNOWN AND ACCEPTED BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP.

IN ANY CASE, THE AGREEMENT ON A THIEU-KY SLATE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REACHED IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ATMOSPHERE, AND TO HAVE LEFT NUMEROUS SCARS AND MUCH BITTERNESS. THE QUESTION OF SUSTAINED MILITARY UNITY BEHIND THE THIEU-KY SLATE THEREFORE REMAINS IN DOUBT.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH EMERGES FROM THE VARIOUS VERSIONS OF THE GENERALS' MEETINGS IS THE RENEWED INFLUENCE OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS IN HIGH POLITICAL DECISIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. THIS COULD WEAKEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OVER THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS AND THUS LEAD TO A RETURN TO "WAR-LORDISM".

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FINALLY, IT SEEMS REASONABLY CLEAR THAT THE DEEP CONCERN AMONG THE GENERALS FOR A SINGLE MILITARY TICKET ARISES IN LARGE PART FROM THEIR EXPECTATION, AND EVEN INSISTENCE, THAT THE ELECTIONS RESULT IN CONTINUED EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT BY THE MILITARY. IF THE MILITARY GET THEIR WAY, IT WOULD BE UP TO AN ELECTED NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO PROVIDE SOME POLITICAL CHECK ON THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP. IN ANY CASE, THE ATTITUDE OF THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCREASES THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A VICTORY OF THE MILITARY TICKET WILL BE WIDELY CONSIDERED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM AND ELSEWHERE AS A VICTORY FOR THE STATUS QUO. IT ALSO RAISES THE DANGER THAT MILITARY ELEMENTS MIGHT TRY TO UPSET THE RESULTS IF A CIVILIAN TICKET WERE ELECTED.

ACTION REQUIRED

WE ARE REPEATING OUR REQUEST TO EMBASSY SAIGON FOR ITS READING ON THE PRECISE TERMS, MEANING AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE THIEU-KY ARRANGEMENT.

DTG 052015Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEA265
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1426

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 5 20 25

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67666

Free file
67 JUL 5 PM 4:32
WEDNESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMBASSADOR ADAIR CALLED STATE TO REPORT:

AMBASSADOR ARIAS TALKED TO PRESIDENT ROBLES ABOUT SIGNING OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.

PRESIDENT ROBLES SAID HE WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE SIGNING IN THE PERIOD JULY 21-23, BUT NO LATER THAN JULY 26. HE IS PREPARED TO COME TO WASHINGTON FOR 2 DAYS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SIGNING CEREMONY, AS BOB ANDERSON SUGGESTED.

DTG: 05/1956Z JUL 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By lig, NARA, Date 2-13-96

~~SECRET~~

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 5 17 40

1:40 PM
Pres file
1967 JUL 5 PM 1:53
79
WEDNESDAY

EEA262
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1423

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67663

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

JULY 5, 1967

HEREWITH HAROLD HOLT REQUESTS YOUR PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH HAROLD WILSON ON EAST OF SUEZ IN THE MID-1970'S, WHICH APPEARS TO BE MOVING TOWARDS A CABINET DECISION.

SEC. RUSK WILL BE FORWARDING THIS AFTERNOON A DRAFT MESSAGE TO WILSON FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

PRIME MINISTER HOLT HAS REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING MESSAGE DATED JULY 5 BE TRANSMITTED URGENTLY FROM HIM TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

"DEAR LYNDON,
WE HAVE HAD WORD THIS MORNING FROM LONDON THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IS NOW ON THE POINT OF STARTING ITS FINAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ITS DEFENCE POSITION EAST OF SUEZ. WE GATHER THAT THERE ARE STILL SOME STRONG DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET AND THAT IT MAY TAKE A NUMBER OF MEETINGS TO GET TO THEIR DECISIONS, BUT WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THAT TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN'S MEETINGS WITH HAROLD WILSON WILL BE HELD TODAY, AND THAT FROM AS EARLY AS TOMORROW THE BRITISH CABINET'S IMPORTANT MEETINGS WILL BEGIN.

I CAN THINK OF NOTHING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THAT YOU SHOULD, AT THIS CRITICAL STAGE, MAKE A PERSONAL INTERVENTION WITH HAROLD WILSON IN A BROAD POLITICAL SENSE. MY CABINET COLLEAGUES AND I ASSESS THAT ANY QUESTION OF DECISION OR ANNOUNCEMENT NOW OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE MAINLAND BY THE MID-1970'S IS LIKELY TO BE HEADED OFF, AND THAT THE BRITISH WILL KEEP SOME FLEXIBILITY. OUR INFORMATION FROM HARRY LEE, AFTER HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH HAROLD WILSON, PARALLELS THIS. HOWEVER, WHAT CABINET WOULD LIKE TO SEE ARE TWO THINGS - A DEFINITE AVOIDANCE BY THE BRITISH CABINET OF A WITHDRAWAL DATE AND A DECISION TO RETAIN SOME GROUND FORCES, OR AT THE VERY LEAST SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY OF POSITION SO THAT THERE IS NO COMMITMENT AGAINST THE RETENTION OF GROUND FORCES.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-54
cb, NARA Date 10-27-00

I WILL NOT GO INTO ANY DETAILS. I FEEL THEY
ARE UNNECESSARY. BUT IF YOU WERE ABLE TO PICK UP
YOUR PHONE AND SAY SOMETHING AS FROM YOURSELF TO
HAROLD WILSON ENCOURAGING HIM IN THESE DIRECTIONS
YOU WOULD GIVE HIM ADDED STRENGTH IN HIS DISCUSSIONS.
THIS WOULD, I AM SURE, BE OF GREAT VALUE.
WITH WARM REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY,

DTG: 05/1707Z JUL 1967

GPS: 530 IMI 530

~~SECRET~~
TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - July 5, 1967
3:00 pm

80
sent to Ranch
by wire 7/5/67
Pres file

Mr. President:

Ambassador Adair called State to report:

Ambassador Arias talked to President Robles about signing of the Panama Canal Treaties.

President Robles said he would prefer to have the signing in the period July 21-23, but no later than July 26. He is prepared to come to Washington for 2 days to participate in the signing ceremony, as Bob Anderson suggested.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By iq, NARA, Date 8-11-93

Wed., July 5, 1967
9 a. m.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-101
By CG, NARA, Date 4-21-95

82
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another assessment that the USSR will seek to strengthen its control in the Mediterranean via advisers and indirect dominance of the UAR and Syria rather than via Soviet military bases.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(3 Jul 67 DIAISUP-184-67)"Soviet Intentions to Establish Bases in the Middle East

83

VZCZCEAA266
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 1427

SENT
WHCA

FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70393

1967 JUL 5 20 24

Pres. file

UNCLAS

QUEEN ELIZABETH HAS SENT YOU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CANADA:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS WE SAIL THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS OF THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY I SEND YOU MY WARMEST GREETINGS ON THIS FOURTH OF JULY. WHILE I AM WITH MY CANADIAN PEOPLE TO CELEBRATE THE CENTURY OF CONFEDERATION, IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE AT THE SAME TIME TO PAY TRIBUTE TO THE CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT COUNTRIES THAT SHARE THIS WATERWAY. LONG MAY OUR COMMON HISTORY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL. LONG MAY THE UNITED STATES PROSPER."

FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS SUGGESTED REPLY:

"MY COUNTRYMEN JOIN ME IN SENDING YOU OUR WARMEST THANKS FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL AND MOVING MESSAGE. AN ELOQUENT EXPRESSION OF FRIENDSHIP, IT MEANS A GREAT DEAL TO US.

WE WISH YOU, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE BRITISH NATION EVERY GOOD FORTUNE.

SINCERELY,"

DTG 051956Z JULY 1967

84

WEDNESDAY

67 JUL 5 PM 1:57

Sent list

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHCA

1967 JUL 5 17 54

K

A

EEA263
OAAWTE 10
DE VTE 1424

FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67664

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 5, 1967

from file

FROM BATOR VIA ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER TO YOU FROM CHANCELLOR KIESINGER,
JUST DELIVERED BY GERMAN EMBASSY:

QTE DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR AMIABLE MESSAGE OF JULY 3RD
AND FOR YOUR KIND UNDERSTANDING OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT HAS ARISEN
HERE.

I GLADLY AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION TO MEET YOU IN WASHINGTON
IN EARLY SEPTEMBER, AT A DATE CONVENIENT TO YOU.

MRS. KIESINGER AND I SEND MRS. JOHNSON AND YOU OUR BEST
WISHES, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOU IN SEPTEMBER.

VERY SINCERELY AND CORDIALLY YOURS,

K. G. KIESINGER UNQUOTE

I HAVE ASKED STATE TO PREPARE A DRAFT REPLY FOR YOUR APPROVAL.

DTG: 05/1726Z JUL 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPS: 120 IMI 120

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 128, NARA, Date 7-9-91

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WALT ROSTOW

85
sent to Rostow
7/5/67

Mr. President:

Following are the texts of a Fourth of July message from
President Marcos and a suggested reply:

Pres file

On the 191st anniversary of the independence of the United States of America, I convey to you, Mr. President, and through you to the American people the cordial greetings and felicitations of the Filipino people. Small nations who believe in democracy can only hope that the great American Republic shall not falter nor fail them in the quest for a just and lasting peace throughout the world. On this occasion, therefore, the Filipino people pray that the American people will continue to grow in wisdom and strength for the sake of all liberty-loving peoples.

Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Philippines

(Suggested reply)

His Excellency Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Philippines
Manila

Dear Mr. President:

My heartfelt thanks for your message and for the good wishes of the Filipino people on our day of independence. You can be confident that we shall not fail nor falter in the quest for a lasting peace throughout the world. It is important not only for the American people but for all men who believe in freedom to grow in both wisdom and strength. For only through our

-2-

combined wisdom and strength can we overcome the persistent threats to those values we all treasure.

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. ~~W~~ostow

Pres file ⁸⁶

July 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Letter of thanks from Ceylon's
Prime Minister for U.S. assistance**

Prime Minister Senanayake thanks you for the support we gave to the Aid Ceylon Club meeting in Tokyo, despite the severe constraints on our general aid program this year. He hopes still pending aid agreements can be finalized promptly -- since the Ceylon program, small as it is, has been plagued by delays.

I thought you'd welcome a word of thanks for your efforts.

W. W. Rostow

Att: File 2567

Prime Minister

Ceylon

86a

Colombo, 5th June, 1967.

My dear President,

I write to express my thanks to you for your prompt and positive response to my letter of 10th April, 1967 regarding your country's assistance towards the Ceylon Aid Programme sponsored by the World Bank. Although no specific pledges were made at the Aid Meeting held in Tokyo last month by all participating countries, I am glad that your Government has indicated its willingness to assist in the third round of Aid to Ceylon. I consider this a manifestation of goodwill towards Ceylon, and I would like to say that I am sincerely appreciative of your country's assistance towards our efforts at economic progress and development.

I am aware that your decision to assist Ceylon during the present financial year was taken in the context of severe constraints on your general Aid programme.

Both at the Tokyo Meeting and in its recent reports the World Bank emphasised that an upward revision of the annual quantum of Aid to Ceylon was an urgent necessity. Although the donors were not in a position to announce increases at the Tokyo Meeting, I am hopeful that this would prove possible in the future. I would also like to stress the need for us to proceed speedily with the issue of licences for the second half of 1967. In order to do this, it would be necessary to finalise the Aid Agreements early and to complete quickly the procedures that precede the issue of such licences. My officials are in contact with your Mission in Colombo in order to ensure that this is achieved.

I would like, in conclusion, to express again my thanks on behalf of the Government of Ceylon.

With my warmest wishes,

Yours sincerely,

(DUDLEY SENANAYAKE)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By , NARA, Date 8-11-93

His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

IN-REPLY, PLEASE
QUOTE REFERENCE NO.



86b
Embassy of Ceylon
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED
DATE

1967 APR 13 PM 4 09

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

ACTION
is assigned to



#6236

Resid. drafted
by F.A.C. & B. K. K. K.

RS/AN

The Embassy of Ceylon presents its 4/19/67,
compliments to the Department of State and has
the honour to forward herewith a communication
addressed to the President of the United States
by the Prime Minister of Ceylon.

A copy of the communication and two
copies of the annexure to it are attached.

The Embassy of Ceylon avails itself
of this opportunity to renew to the Department
of State the assurances of its highest consid-
eration.

Pol 15-1 US / JOHNSON
XRU AID (1800) 9 Cey

encls. ✓

(2)

4/13/67



3132

July 5, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith proposed drafts to Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Goldberg.

To Secretary Rusk:

"I should like you to know how grateful I am to you and your colleagues in the Department of State for the devoted and highly professional effort which resulted in the voting of the General Assembly on July 4.

"I understand the scale of the ^{diplomatic} ~~diplomatic~~ effort required to produce this result as well as the subtlety and good judgment that went into it.

"As we face the difficult weeks and months ahead when we shall be trying to bring a stable peace out of the present crisis, I would wish you to know how strengthened I feel by the Department's performance in the ^{recent} ~~next~~ days."

To Ambassador Goldberg:

"As an old parliamentarian, I think I understand the effort required from you and your colleagues to yield the voting results in the General Assembly on July 4.

"Those votes did not produce a stable peace in the Middle East, but they were a necessary condition for us to go forward in the weeks and months ahead.

"I want you -- and your colleagues -- to know how greatly I appreciate the devoted and effective work of our team in New York."

WWRostow:rla

Material sent to The Ranch
yesterday (Receipt for State Summary,
which I have attached to my action memo.)

art

88

EA0742
OO WRE12
DE WIE 1407

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUL 4 AM 10:02

TUESDAY

1967 JUL 4 13 58

FROM ART MCCAFFERTY
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 67656

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH SUMMARIES OF SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT CABLES
OF THE DAY

EAST ASIA:

PRISONER EXCHANGE - WE HAVE CALLED FOR EMBASSY SAIGON'S
COMMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS AND DESIRABILITY OF OFFERING
COVERILY TO EXCHANGE CERTAIN SENIOR VIET CONG CADRE RECENTLY
ARRESTED FOR US CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PRISONERS OF THE
VIET CONG. WE THINK THE VIET CONG WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO GET
THESE CADRE BACK, AND EVEN THOUGH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE THEM UP, THE PLIGHT OF OUR
PRISONERS REQUIRES US TO EXPLORE THE IDEA FURTHER.

SUU OPPOSED TO MINH RETURN - NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN
SUU TOLD THE EMBASSY THAT HE STRONGLY OPPOSES "BIG" MINH'S
RETURN, ALLEGING THAT MINH'S "PRO-FRENCH AND NEUTRALIST
TENDENCIES" COULD CAUSE DANGEROUS DIVISIONS IN THE SOUTH
VIETNAMESE MILITARY. SUU REMAINS CONFIDENT OF HIS OWN
PROSPECTS FOR VICTORY, AND BELIEVES THE THIEU-KY TICKET
MAY ACTUALLY STRENGTHEN HIS CHANCES BY DRAWING SUPPORT
FROM FORMER KY BACKERS. THE EMBASSY IS INCLINED TO VIEW
THIS ASSESSMENT AS OVERLY OPTIMISTIC, AND COMMENTS THAT
THE SOUTHERN CIVILIAN CANDIDATES ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE
VOTES MINH MIGHT TAKE AWAY FROM THEM.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102

By 10, NARA, Date 8-11-93

AFRICA

NEW LIBYAN PRIME MINISTER ASSESSED - EMBASSY TRIPOLI
BELIEVES THE RECENT APPOINTMENT OF ABD AL-QADIR BADRI
AS PRIME MINISTER IS NOT ENCOURAGING FOR US INTERESTS IN
LIBYA. IN ADDITION TO HAVING VIRTUALLY NO EXPERIENCE
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE, BADRI HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY
ANTI-AMERICAN AND ANTI-BRITISH. MANY COMPETENT OBSERVERS
HAVE THE IMPRESSION BADRI IS TO BE A STOP-GAP PRIME MINISTER,
AND WAS NOT THE KING'S FIRST CHOICE.

NEAR EAST:

ISRAELI VIEW OF REFUGEE PROBLEM - AMBASSADOR HARMAN
TOLD UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW THAT ISRAEL IS CONCENTRATING
ON REACTIVATING UNRWA AND ESTABLISHED NON-GOVERNMENTAL
RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS ON THE WEST BANK. HARMAN SAID THAT
RAPID PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN REESTABLISHING MUNICIPAL
SERVICES AND IN GETTING NORMAL COMMERCE STARTED AGAIN.
THE ISRAELIS FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF
PEOPLE WILL HAVE TO BE MOVED ELSEWHERE IF A DEFINITIVE
SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IS TO BE FOUND. SYRIA
AND IRAQ WERE MENTIONED AS POSSIBLE AREAS FOR REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUL 4 17 45

92
1967 JUL 4 PM 1:49

TUESDAY

VZCZCEEA253
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1412

FROM ART MCCAFFERTY
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH70387

U N C L A S

JULY 4, 1967-- 1:05 P.M.

THE FOLLOWING IS A ROUGH TRANSLATION OF THE FOURTH OF
JULY MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM THE SOVIET UNION IN THE WHITE
HOUSE TODAY.

*TO THE HONORABLE LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, CONGRATULATIONS TO THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE FROM THE SOVIET PEOPLE ON THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -- INDEPENDENCE DAY.

N. PODGORNYY
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, U.S.S.R.
KREMLIN
JULY 3, 1967

DTG: 041714Z JULY 1967

SENT
UNICA

93

67 JUL 4 PM 12:26

TUESDAY

1967 JUL 4 16 17

EEA249
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1409

FROM ARTHUR MCCAFFERTY.
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70386

UNCLAS

JULY 4, 1967

FOLLOWING IS AN INTERESTING CABLE FROM PARIS COMMENTING ON KOSYGIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE AFTER HIS MEETING WITH THE GENERAL (PARIS, 74).

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, AFTER LEAVING THE ELYSEE ON JULY 1 FOLLOWING TWO HOURS OF CONVERSATION AND LUNCH WITH GENERAL DE GAULLE, KOSYGIN MET THE PRESS IN A JOVIAL MOOD. BANTER ASIDE, HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST IS "SURELY AND CLEARLY" THE BUSINESS OF THE UN;

(B) FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND IT IS GOOD TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TOGETHER;

(C) PEACE IN VIETNAM DEPENDS ON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT (FOR WHICH REASON KOSYGIN COULD NOT SAY WHETHER GLASSBORO AND ELYSEE TALKS WOULD LEAD TO DEESCALATION OF THE WAR). ONLY THE VIETNAMESE COMRADES CAN RESOLVE THE PROBLEM FOR THEY ARE DOING THE FIGHTING.

(D) QUESTION OF FOUR-POWER SUMMIT MEETING WAS NOT DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING.

COMMENT: SOME CORRESPONDENTS WERE STRUCK BY THE WAY IN WHICH KOSYGIN CHOSE TO RESPOND TO (C) AND (D), SPECULATING THAT BOTH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS A REPUDIATION OF DEGAULLE, WHO AT LEAST WOULD HAVE SAID "PEACE DEPENDS ON U.S. WITHDRAWAL".

HAROLD KING, A WELL-CONNECTED GAULLIST CORRESPONDENT FROM REUTERS, HEARD THAT THE DEGAULLE-KOSYGIN MEETING HAD BEEN "GLOOMY" AND THAT KOSYGIN LET IT BE KNOWN THAT THE SOVIETS, UNLIKE THE GENERAL, WERE NOT OPPOSED TO THE US PRESENCE IN VIETNAM; KOSYGIN LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS HOPING FOR A BIT OF DE-ESCALATION ON THE PART OF THE US.

DTG 04/1527Z JUL 67

GPS 270 IMI 270

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

94

1967 JUL 4 16 36

EEA250
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1488

FROM ARTHUR McCAFFERTY
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67637

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-68
By cb, NARA Date 2-12-01

67 JUL 4 PM 12:43

TUESDAY

~~SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

JULY 4, 1967

FOLLOWING IS AN INTERESTING ACCOUNT OF THE ARMED FORCES MEETING THAT PICKED THE THIEU-KY SLATE.

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ON JUNE 27 GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, CONVENED A MEETING OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. THE MILITARY LEADERS HAD WANTED ONLY ONE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE REPRESENTING THE ARMED FORCES IN THE SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS. THE MILITARY LEADERS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT CHIEF OF STATE NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND PREMIER NGUYEN CAO KY FROM RUNNING INDEPENDENTLY. NOR COULD THEY DECIDE BETWEEN THEM, AND THEREFORE DECIDED TO ENDORSE NEITHER CANDIDATE IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD PREVENT ANY SPLIT IN THE ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT FRICTIONS WERE DEVELOPING, PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS. THIS DISSENSION WAS ESPECIALLY DISCONCERTING BECAUSE THE CONTROVERSY DEVELOPING OVER THE RETURN OF GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH FROM THAILAND MADE IT IMPERATIVE THAT THE ARMED FORCES BE UNIFIED. VIEN SAID THAT HE HAD THEREFORE CONVENED THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL TO SEE IF IT COULD NOT FIND SOME PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE KY - THIEU IMPASSE.

THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL FAILED TO PRODUCE A SOLUTION, SO GENERAL VIEN AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS BEGAN A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THIEU AND KY WHICH LASTED FOR TWO DAYS AND TWO NIGHTS. THE MEETINGS WERE VERY EMOTIONAL AND BOTH KY AND THIEU OFFERED TO RESIGN. HOWEVER, GENERAL VIEN AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS FELT THAT THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE WAY FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO SHOW THEIR UNITY WOULD BE TO HAVE BOTH CANDIDATES ON THE SAME TICKET. THEY POINTED OUT THAT SINCE GENERAL THIEU WAS SENIOR TO GENERAL KY IN THE MILITARY HIERARCHY IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE FORMER TO TAKE SECOND PLACE ON A JOINT TICKET. MUCH OF THE TIME, THEREFORE, WAS SPENT CONVINCING KY TO RUN ON THE SAME TICKET WITH THIEU. KY WAS WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE RACE ENTIRELY, BUT HE WAS MOST RELUCTANT TO BE THIEU'S RUNNING MATE.

AT 9:00 A.M. ON JUNE 30, GENERAL VIEN AGAIN CONVENED THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. GENERAL THIEU ADDRESSED THE COUNCIL MEMBERS AND TOLD THEM THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN MADE THAT HE AND KY WOULD RUN TOGETHER ON A JOINT TICKET WITH HIMSELF IN THE TOP POST. THE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS GREETED WITH APPLAUSE. THIEU TOLD THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THAT IF HE WERE ELECTED PRESIDENT IT WAS THE ARMED FORCES THAT WOULD RULE AND THAT HE WOULD EXECUTE THEIR POLICY.

[REDACTED]

IT WAS ALSO DECIDED AT THIS MEETING THAT A COMMITTEE OF COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS WOULD BE ESTABLISHED IMMEDIATELY TO INSURE A STRONG REPRESENTATION OF ARMED FORCES OFFICERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS IN THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES.

AFTER THIS JUNE 30 MEETING, MOST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL PRIVATELY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A VERY CRITICAL PERIOD LAY AHEAD AND SAID THEY EXPECTED INCREASING DIFFICULTIES FROM CIVILIANS. [REDACTED] SO LONG AS THERE WAS A CHANCE THAT A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE COULD WIN THE ELECTIONS, PARTICIPATION BY THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE POPULACE IN THE ELECTIONS WAS ASSURED. IT IS NOW POSSIBLE THAT LARGE GROUPS OF VOTERS MAY ABSTAIN OR BOYCOTT THE ELECTIONS OR THAT KEY CIVILIAN CANDIDATES WILL WITHDRAW IN PROTEST. THERE WILL ALSO BE AN INCREASING DEMAND BY MANY CIVILIANS FOR THE RETURN OF GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. (LEAFLETS DEMANDING HIS RETURN HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SCATTERED AROUND SAIGON.)

[REDACTED] IN ADDITION TO THIEU'S PROFFER OF RESIGNATION AND THE CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBLE RETURN OF GENERAL MINH, THE SENIOR GENERALS WERE DISTURBED BY THE STEAMROLLER TACTICS OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN ON BEHALF OF GENERAL KY. THE SENIOR GENERAL UNDOUBTEDLY WERE CONCERNED THAT A KY-LOAN TEAM MIGHT BECOME SO POWERFUL THAT THEIR OWN INTERESTS WOULD BE THREATENED. IN CONTRAST, A THIEU-KY TEAM REPRESENTING THE COLLECTIVE WILL OF THE MILITARY PRESENTS AN ATTENUATED THREAT TO THE GENERALS.)

DIG 04/1521Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

GPS 760 IMI 760

EO 12958
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67 JUL 4 PM 1:09

TUESDAY

95

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 4 17 05

EEA251
OO WTEIJ
DE WTE 1413

FROM: MCGEORGE BUNDY
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67658

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-102
By 110, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~SECRET~~

JULY 4, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MCGEORGE BUNDY

WE HAVE HAD A RELATIVELY QUIET HOLIDAY WEEKEND SO FAR AND I SEE NOTHING THAT REQUIRES YOUR DECISION IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. HERE IS WHERE THINGS STAND RIGHT NOW:

1. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WILL PROBABLY VOTE TODAY ON THE YUGOSLAV AND LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTIONS, UNLESS THERE IS A SUCCESSFUL COMPROMISE EFFORT. WE SEEM TO HAVE THE VOTES TO PREVENT A REALLY BAD RESULT, AND I THINK BOTH THE DEPARTMENT AND THE NEW YORK PEOPLE ARE DOING A FINE JOB.

2. THERE IS A TRICKY SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF A SEPARATE PAKISTANI RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL FOR ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM. WE CANNOT VOTE FOR IT IN ITS PRESENT FORM, BECAUSE IT ASSUMES THAT THE ISRAELI MEASURES DO AFFECT THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM WHEREAS OUR POSITION IS THAT THEY ARE MERELY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS WHICH DO NOT HAVE THIS EFFECT. OURS IS A MUCH MORE PRACTICAL WAY OF KEEPING HEAT ON THE ISRAELIS, AND IT HAS ALREADY PRODUCED A CONSIDERABLE WITHDRAWAL BY EBAN. OUR RECORD WOULD BE BADLY TANGLED FROM A LEGAL POINT OF VIEW IF WE WERE TO VOTE FOR THE CURRENT PAKISTANI DRAFT. YET WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A RECORD OF APPROVING SOME SUCH PROTEST IF POSSIBLE. IN THIS SITUATION WE ARE TRYING TO GET THE PAKS TO ACCEPT A MODIFICATION WHICH WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH OUR OWN POSITION. THEN WE COULD VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION AND MAKE A LITTLE MONEY WITH MODERATE ARABS. THE SITUATION IS HIGHLY TACTICAL AND THE DECISION TO VOTE FOR THE RESOLUTION OR TO ABSTAIN WILL HAVE TO BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF THE FINE PRINT AS THE HOURS ROLL ALONG. I THINK THE DEPARTMENT IS IN GOOD CONTROL OF THIS ONE, AND THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE ON THE OBJECTIVE.

PRESERVATION COPY

3. WE CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR LITTLE THINGS THAT CAN GIVE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE MORE REASONABLE ARABS. IN THIS CONNECTION I PLAN TO APPROVE A \$2 MILLION BUDGET SUPPORT GRANT TO JORDAN TOMORROW. THIS ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE WE ALL USED WITH HUSSEIN AND REPRESENTS A COMMITMENT INITIALLY MADE SOME MONTHS AGO AFTER THE NOVEMBER RAID BY ISRAEL. IT ALREADY HAS YOUR APPROVAL AS OF THAT TIME AND I BELIEVE ITS RELEASE NOW IS CONSISTENT WITH YOUR GENERAL DIRECTIVES TO US. NEVERTHELESS I INFORM YOU OF IT SO THAT IT CAN BE HELD UP IF YOU WISH.

4. WE ARE ALSO REVIEWING TOURIST POLICY, AND THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A RECOMMENDATION FOR RENEWAL OF PERMISSION FOR THE LEBANON AS SOON AS WE HAVE A CHANCE TO CHECK REACTIONS TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING AND AS SOON AS THE EMBASSY IN BEIRUT IS PREPARED TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING SUCH A RECOMMENDATION. NEWSPAPERS TODAY INDICATE THAT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ARE ADMITTING OUR TOURISTS EVEN THOUGH THEIR PASSPORTS ARE NOT VALID FOR THAT COUNTRY. THEY WANT THE MONEY. WE STILL DO NOT PLAN TOURIST PERMISSION FOR THE COUNTRIES WHICH BROKE RELATIONS.

5. THE MOST INTERESTING CONTEST ON THE SCENE AT THE MOMENT IS NOT THE WELL-PUBLICIZED SKIRMISHING NEAR SUEZ, BUT THE BATTLE FOR LIBYAN OIL. THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED TO RENEW SHIPMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT, AND THE LABOR ORGANIZATION HAS CALLED A GENERAL STRIKE AIMED PARTICULARLY AT SHIPMENTS TO WEST GERMANY. THE RESULT OF THIS TUG-OF-WAR WILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH THE SEVERITY OF ANY OIL CRISIS THIS SUMMER. IT IS A SITUATION IN WHICH WE HAVE ALMOST NO INFLUENCE, AND IN WHICH THE QUIETER WE ARE THE LESS LIKELY WE ARE TO ROCK THE BOAT. AS I REVIEW THE GENERAL PROBLEM IN THIS HOLIDAY PERIOD, I AM INCLINED TO THINK THIS RULE APPLIES TO THE CRISIS AS A WHOLE AND UNDERLIES YOUR OWN SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH IT.

6. FINALLY, I SHOULD REPORT THAT I HAVE HAD A VERY GOOD TALK WITH DEAN RUSK YESTERDAY ABOUT MY OWN FUTURE RELATION TO THIS PROBLEM. WE ARE IN STRONG AGREEMENT ON THE RIGHT STEPS AND WE EXPECT TO HAVE A RECOMMENDATION FOR YOU IN ANOTHER COUPLE OF DAYS. OUR CENTRAL PURPOSE IS TO HANDLE THIS SO THAT YOU HAVE THE NECESSARY MACHINERY ON HAND AT ALL TIMES -- BUT NOT SO MUCH OF IT THAT IT GETS IN ITS OWN WAY.

DTG: 34/1528Z JUL 1967

GPS: 790 IMI 793

~~SECRET~~

RESERVATION COPY

VZCZCEEA252
OO WTE19
DE WTE 1411

FROM BILL JORDEN
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67659

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 4 17 41

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-100

By JW, NARA, Date 7-1-93

JULY 4, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING IS THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT (NO. 5) ON THE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIET-NAM--

SITUATION REPORT ON VIET-NAM

THE FACTS

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, PARTICULARLY THE MINOR ONES, ARE BEGINNING TO COMMENT ON OTHER CANDIDATES AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, ON ISSUES. TWO OR THREE MINOR CANDIDATES ARE QUOTED AS CALLING FOR THIEU'S AND KY'S RESIGNATIONS FROM THEIR OFFICIAL POSITIONS "IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ELECTORAL LAW". OTHER MINOR CANDIDATES CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF CERTAIN CIVILIAN COMPETITORS.

AU TRUONG THANH, THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE WHOSE MOTTO IS "CEASE FIRE" AND WHOSE CAMPAIGN SYMBOL IS "NO MORE BOMBS", IS RECEIVING SOME PUBLICITY IN THE AMERICAN PRESS AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY GET MORE. THANH IS QUOTED IN THIS MORNING'S WASHINGTON POST AS SAYING THAT HE IS THE ONLY CANDIDATE OFFERING AN ALTERNATIVE TO ESCALATION. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN FOR HIS OWN PHYSICAL SAFETY, AND SAID HIS BEST GUARANTEE IS THE AMERICAN PRESS. IN A CONVERSATION WITH A CIA SOURCE, THANH SAID THAT HIS BASIC POLICY IS TO CREATE CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO A CEASE-FIRE IN VIET-NAM. HE DIDN'T SAY HOW.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE PHAN KHAC SUU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE RETURN OF "BIG" MINH. ACCORDING TO SUU, MINH HAS NO REAL CHANCE OF WINNING THE ELECTION BUT IS CAPABLE OF "CAUSING MANY DIFFICULTIES". SUU EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE THIS POSITION PUBLICLY. SUU SAID, IF MINH'S RETURN WOULD REALLY BE HARMFUL TO NATIONAL SECURITY, THE DIRECTORATE SHOULD PUBLICLY ANNOUNCE "ALL THAT IS HIDDEN BEHIND GENERAL MINH'S AFFAIR". SUU INDICATED HE WOULD WELCOME MINH'S DISQUALIFICATION BY THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL. SUU CLAIMED THE THIEU-KY TICKET WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS OWN CHANCE FOR VICTORY, AND THAT MANY OF KY'S FORMER SUPPORTERS ARE NOW LOOKING FOR OTHER CANDIDATES TO BACK.

1967 JUL 4 PM 1:50

TUESDAY

96

COMMENT

WE EXPECT THE AMERICAN PRESS TO FOCUS ON THE GROWING NUMBER OF STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, MAJOR AND MINOR, IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. THE CANDIDATES WILL CERTAINLY SOLICIT AMERICAN PRESS ATTENTION.

THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT SUU OVERESTIMATES HIS CHANCES AND THAT SOUTHERN CIVILIAN CANDIDATES ARE WORRIED ABOUT MINH'S CANDIDACY. OBVIOUSLY THE EASY WAY OUT FOR SUU WOULD BE TO LET THE DIRECTORATE ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BARRING MINH.

THIEU AND KY PROBABLY WILL NOT RESIGN FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTAL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH DEMANDS FOR THEM TO DO SO WILL BE MADE REPEATEDLY. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THEY RESIGN FROM THEIR POSTS IN THE GOVERNMENT, BUT ONLY THAT THEY RESIGN OR GO ON LEAVE OF ABSENCE FROM THEIR MILITARY POSTS.

DTG 04/1644Z JULY 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA254
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1413

SENT
WHCA

FROM BILL JORDEN
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH73388

1967 JUL 4 18 34

67 JUL 4 PM 2:39

TUESDAY

UNCLAS

FOR : THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BILL JORDEN

MR. PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION
ON OUR INDEPENDENCE DAY FROM GENERAL THIEU AND A SUGGESTED
REPLY FROM YOU:

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

ON THE OCCASION OF THE INDEPENDENCE DAY OF THE UNITED STATES
I AM HAPPY TO CONVEY TO YOU ON BEHALF OF THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE AND IN MY OWN NAME OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS AND
MOST SINCERE WISHES FOR THE HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY OF THE
AMERICAN NATION. THE NOBLE IDEALS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
HAVE BEEN, THROUGHOUT TWO CENTURIES, A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION
TO FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLE EVERYWHERE. TODAY, ON THE FRONT
LINE OF THE FREE WORLD, THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE ARE STRUGGLING
FOR THESE SAME IDEALS AND ARE VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE SELFLESS
SUPPORT THAT WE RECEIVE FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. WITH UN-
FAILING RESOLVE TO PRESERVE THE SPIRITUAL VALUES OF OUR
ANCIENT CIVILIZATION AND TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT IN COOPERATION
WITH OTHER FREE NATIONS WE WILL WIN A JUST AND DURABLE
PEACE IN HONOR AND FREEDOM.

CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM
(END TEXT)

(SUGGESTED REPLY)

CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE
REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

SAIGON

YOUR EXCELLENCY:

MY SINCERE THANKS TO YOU AND TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR YOUR WARM MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION ON OUR DAY OF INDEPENDENCE. WE KNOW THAT THE HIGH IDEALS OF OUR OWN REVOLUTION BURN BRIGHTLY IN THE HEARTS OF YOUR PEOPLE. WE KNOW THAT IT IS FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING AND SACRIFICING.

THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IS GIVEN TO YOUR COUNTRYMEN IN THE FIRM CONVICTION THAT THE CAUSE IS JUST AND THAT THE GOAL OF AN HONORABLE PEACE IN FREEDOM WILL CROWN OUR COMMON EFFORTS.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON


DTB: 041752Z JULY 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By , NARA, Date 8-11-93



Sent 3:02

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OO WTE13
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RECEIVED SENT
WHCA WHCA

FROM ART MCCAFFERTY
TO JIM JONES
CITE CAP67663

JUL 12 09 02

~~SECRET~~

PER YOUR REQUEST, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF
MEMCON ON CALL OF ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER
MAURER ON PRESIDENT JOHNSON, MONDAY,
JUNE 26.

I HAVE A LENGTHIER (13 PAGES) VERSION, BUT
IN THE INTERESTS OF SPEED, I AM SENDING YOU
A SUMMARY WHICH COVERS ALL ESSENTIAL POINTS.

PRESIDENT RECEIVED PRIME MINISTER MAURER AND FOREIGN MINISTER
MANESCU FOR ONE HOUR JUNE 26. CONVERSATION WAS CORDIAL AND
BUSINESSLIKE. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.

1. MIDDLE EAST. PRIME MINISTER NOTED HIS TALKS WITH
SECRETARY RUSK IN NEW YORK. HE FELT THERE WAS SIMILARITY OF
VIEWS BETWEEN US AND ROMANIA DUE TO FACT BOTH FELT EVERY-
THING POSSIBLE SHOULD BE DONE TO OBTAIN PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST
AND THAT THIS WAS QUESTION WHICH MUST BE APPROACHED IN REALISTIC
SPIRIT, AVOIDING EXCESSIVE CLAIMS.

2. VIET-NAM. PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD ALSO EXCHANGED
VIEWS ABOUT VIET-NAM WITH SECRETARY RUSK AND THAT ON THIS
SUBJECT ROMANIAN VIEWS DIFFERED FROM THOSE OF US. PRIME MINISTER SAID
VIET-NAM IS HOT-BED OF DANGER WHICH COULD DO DAMAGE TO ROMANIAN DESIRES
FOR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. ROMANIA BELIEVED WAY HAD TO BE FOUND
FOR AMERICAN TROOPS TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM VIET-NAM. PRESIDENT, EX-
PRESSING APPRECIATION FOR FRANK REMARKS OF PRIME MINISTER, STRESSED
OUR DESIRE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN VIET-NAM, OUR WILLINGNESS TO
TALK, BUT OUR INSISTENCE THAT THERE MUST BE SOME RECIPROCAL
MILITARY ACTION IF WE ARE TO STOP BOMBING. PRESIDENT STRESSED
WE DO NOT SEEK DESTROY NORTH VIET-NAM AND WE ARE PREPARED TO BRING
OUR TROOPS HOME IF NORTH VIET-NAM WILL SEND ITS TROOPS BACK TO
NORTH VIET-NAM.

3. CHINA. PRESIDENT STATED WE DO NOT WANT WAR WITH CHINA NOR DO
WE WISH TO CHANGE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA. WE HOPE THAT
CHINA WILL JOIN SOCIETY OF NATIONS. WE HAVE NO DESIGNS ON HER
TERRITORY AND WISH TO GET ALONG WITH HER TO EXTENT THAT SHE WILL
PERMIT. WE WOULD LIKE TO TALK WITH CHINESE ABOUT A NON-PROLIFERATION
TREATY AND TO WORK OUT GROUND RULES TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR. IT
WOULD BE HEIGHT OF FOLLY FOR US TO WANT TO GO TO WAR WITH CHINA;

67 JUL 4 PM 3:06

TUESDAY

PRESERVATION COPY

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~~SECRET~~

NOTHING WAS FARTHER FROM PRESIDENT'S MIND. PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE VISITING OTHER COUNTRIES AND THAT HE WAS AT LIBERTY TO DESCRIBE HIS CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT AND TO QUOTE WHATEVER PRESIDENT HAD SAID, IF THIS WOULD BE USEFUL.

PRIME MINISTER REMARKED THAT HE WOULD BE IN PEKING JULY 3. IT WAS HELPFUL TO HIM TO HAVE HEARD PRESIDENT'S VIEWS. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT USE HE WOULD MAKE OF THEM -- THAT REMAINED TO BE SEEN.

4. BILATERAL RELATIONS. MAURER EMPHASIZED INTEREST IN EXPANDED TRADE WITH THE US AS WELL AS CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES. HE STRESSED PERSONAL INTEREST IN PROJECT INVOLVING PURCHASE OF GLASS PLANT FROM US AND SAID HE HOPED THAT ANY DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS OVER EXIMBANK CREDITS COULD BE RESOLVED SUCCESSFULLY. PRIME MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND ROMANIA MIGHT NOT SEEM IMPORTANT TO US BUT THEY WERE VERY IMPORTANT FOR ROMANIA IN RAISING STANDARD OF LIVING AND PROMOTING INDEPENDENCE.

PRESIDENT RESPONDED WITH EXPRESSION HIS DESIRE FOR FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US AND ROMANIAN PEOPLE AND COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US IN DEALING WITH SUCH PROBLEMS AS IGNORANCE, POVERTY, AND DISEASE WHICH ARE ENEMIES OF MANKIND. HE SAID WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE EAST-WEST TRADE BILL PASSED AND EX-IM-BANK LEGISLATION APPROVED SO THAT OUR RELATIONS COULD BE IMPROVED. ON GLASS PLANT, HE SAID WE APPROACHED SUCH PROBLEMS WITH DESIRE TO REACH UNDERSTANDING.

5. ROMANIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. MAURER REPEATEDLY POINTED TO ROMANIAN DESIRE MAINTAIN AND INCREASE HER INDEPENDENCE. IN SCARCELY VEILED REFERENCE TO SOVIET EFFORTS DOMINATE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MAURER SAID THAT IN TIMES OF CRISIS "COUNTRIES ARE TOLD TO GET TOGETHER TO RENOUNCE SOME OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND SOME OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND TO OBEY COMMAND OF ANOTHER STATE". MAURER SAID SUCH ACTIONS ENDANGER WHAT ROMANIA HAS WON AND IT IS THIS CONSIDERATION WHICH MOTIVATES ROMANIA IN HER INTEREST IN CONTRIBUTING TO A SOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.

6. PRESIDENCY OF GA. WHEN PRIME MINISTER MENTIONED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER MANESCU PROBABLY WOULD BE PRESIDENT NEXT GA OF UN, PRESIDENT JOHNSON COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD BE A GOOD MAN AND THAT WE HAD HEARD GOOD THINGS ABOUT HIM.

7. PRESS RELATIONS. MAURER SEEMED TO WELCOME ATTENTION FROM US PHOTOGRAPHERS AND REPORTERS. IN BRIEF COMMENTS TO PRESS FOLLOWING INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT, MAURER SAID HE WAS LEAVING US WITH A PARTICULARLY STRONG MEMORY OF A GREAT LEADER AND A GREAT STATE.

DTG: 34/1835Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 5 01 36

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM (NOTPING)
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70389

UNCLAS

TUESDAY, 4 JULY 1967
8:40 P.M. EDT

HEREWITH A BRIEF SUMMARY OF TODAY'S ACTIVITIES IN THE
UNITED NATION'S GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HELD TWO SESSIONS TODAY. THERE WERE 20 EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE, AND PAKISTAN FORMALLY INTRODUCED A RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM. THE NON-ALIGNED (YUGOSLAV-INDIAN) DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WAS DEFEATED, 53-46-20. THE LATIN-AMERICAN RESOLUTION LINKING WITHDRAWAL TO AN END TO BELLIGERENCE WAS ALSO DEFEATED, 57-43-20. (BOTH RESOLUTIONS WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY FOR ADOPTION.)

THE SOVIET RESOLUTION CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL, CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AND RESTITUTION BY ISRAEL WAS DECISIVELY REJECTED IN A SERIES OF PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH VOTES. THE US RESOLUTION WAS NOT PRESSED TO THE VOTE.

A RESOLUTION SPONSORED BY SWEDEN AND EIGHTEEN OTHERS COVERING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY.

FINALLY, A PAKISTANI RESOLUTION ON JERUSALEM WHICH CONSIDERED THAT ISRAELI MEASURES TO CHANGE THE STATUS OF THE CITY WERE INVALID, CALLED UPON ISRAEL TO RESCIND THEM AND DESIST FORTHWITH FROM ANY ACTION WHICH WOULD ALTER JERUSALEM'S STATUS, AND REQUESTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION WITHIN ONE WEEK WAS ADOPTED 99-0-20. THE UNITED STATES ABSTAINED.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADJORNED AT 8:05 P.M. EDT THIS EVENING AND IS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED TO CONVENE AT 3:00 P.M. EDT TOMORROW.

DTG 050045Z JULY 67

Monday, Jul, , 1967
2:35 p. m.

100

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bill Gaud's assurance
that U. S. firms can -- and probably
will -- win contracts under the
Central American loan you cleared.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Attachment (6/30/67 memo fm Gaud to WWR "Use of U. S. Consulting and
Construction Firms Financed by AID to the Central American
Integration Fund"

100a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The White House


SUBJECT: Use of U. S. Consulting and Construction Firms Financed by
A. I. D to the Central American Integration Fund

This is to confirm that all consulting and construction contracts resulting from subloans which CABEI's Central American Integration Fund makes from the proceeds of A. I. D. loans, are handled in such a way that U. S. consulting and construction firms have every opportunity to secure the business.

Under the first \$35 million A. I. D. loan to CABEI for use by the Central American Integration Fund, U. S. consulting firms secured all engineering contracts on the various roads financed to date. In the two cases where construction contracts have been awarded, the biggest contract for the construction of the Rancho-Coban road in Guatemala was won by Nat Harrison Associates while the two roads in Nicaragua involving smaller contracts are being constructed by a Nicaragua/Salvadoran consortium.

Under the new \$20 million loan to CABEI, construction contracts for the specific projects will be based on competitive bids, and will be open to Central American and U. S. contractors, or joint ventures of both. A. I. D. will encourage prequalification of bidders for construction contracts. Contractors and key personnel of all contractors will be subject to approval by CABEI and A. I. D. All contracts will, of course, be advertised in the U. S. Commerce Business Daily.

We expect that most construction and engineering contracts will be won by U. S. consulting and construction firms.


William S. Gaud

UNCLASSIFIED

101

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WHCA

1967 JUL 4 00 19

EZA243
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1402

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70384

UNCLAS

JULY 3, 1967

67 JUL 3 PM 8:35

MONDAY

SUBJECT: TOUR OF THE USSR BY GLASSBORO CITIZENS

I RECOMMEND YOU SEND AN ANSWER ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES TO THE GLASSBORO RESIDENTS WHO WANT ASSISTANCE IN ORGANIZING A TOUR TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE CITIZENS THEMSELVES AND THE "CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS" OF STEPHEN JAMES (JAMES OBVIOUSLY COMPOSED THE TELEGRAM TO YOU). IN PROMOTING HIS EXCHANGE CORPS, JAMES HAS NOT HESITATED TO USE ENDORSEMENTS BY PUBLIC FIGURES INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT, TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT AND AGAINST THEIR EXPRESS REQUEST. THE STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS STRONGLY AGAINST THE USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR A TOUR OF THIS KIND. HARRY MCPHERSON, WITH WHOM I'VE TALKED ABOUT THIS, AGREES THIS IS THE RIGHT APPROACH. PROPOSED REPLY FOLLOWS:

"MR. BILL REIVICH, CHAIRMAN OF THE CITIZENS SELECTION COMMITTEE OF GLASSBORO

CARE OF LEVY'S MEN AND BOYS WEAR

GLASSBORO, NEW JERSEY

"THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM INFORMING ME OF YOUR INTEREST IN ARRANGING FOR A GOOD-WILL TOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION BY A GROUP OF GLASSBORO RESIDENTS. WHILE I DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN JUSTIFY THE USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS, I HOPE YOU AND YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO WILL BE ABLE TO ARRANGE AN APPROPRIATE VISIT. I AM SURE IT WOULD SERVE OUR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES OF INCREASING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. FOLLOWING THE WARM GREETING WHICH THE CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO GAVE TO CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN LAST MONTH, I AM CONFIDENT THAT MANY SOVIET CITIZENS WOULD SHOW THEIR PLEASURE AT RECEIVING YOUR GROUP IN THEIR COUNTRY.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

GLASSBORO CITIZENS' MESSAGE TO YOU IS AS FOLLOWS:

GLASSBORO NJER 1

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
COPIES OF FOLLOWING WIRE HAVE BEEN SENT TO NEW YORK TIMES
AND THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AND UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED YOU BY PUBLIC LAW 87-256,
THE MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ACT, PASSED BY
CONGRESS ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1961, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO ASSIST
BY GRANT, CONTRACT, OR OTHERWISE INCLUDING APPEAL FOR PRIVATE
FUNDS, CITIZEN GROUPS WITH PURPOSES AND INTENTIONS SUCH AS
OURS TO FURTHER THE NATIONAL INTEREST THROUGH PEOPLE TO
PEOPLE CONTACT ABROAD. WE, THE CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO WHO HAVE
JUNE 23RD AND JUNE 25TH, 1967 SO ENTHUSIASTICALLY AND WITH YOUR
OWN WARM RECOGNITION, BY FOLLOWING YOUR EXAMPLE, SHOWN THROUGH
HOSPITALITY TO PREMIER KOSYGIN THE PROFOUND DESIRE OF A
BROAD CROSS-SECTION OF YOUR DEEPLY ROOTED AMERICAN COMMUNITY TO
DEMONSTRATE CONCRETELY THE WILLINGNESS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
TO DO EVERYTHING WITHIN THEIR POWER TO BRING ABOUT MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION,
HOWEVER GREAT THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR POSITIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES.

WE THEREFORE ASK YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING
A GRANT OF \$600 PER PERSON TO SEND 100 CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO
TO THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THE EYES OF THE WORLD ARE STILL
FOCUSED ON THE SPIRIT OF HOLLYBUSH, FOR A THREE WEEK
EXCHANGE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

THE CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO WISH TO DO THIS UNDER THE
LEADERSHIP OF A NON PROFIT, NON POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, THE
CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS, WHICH HAS THUS FAR SPONSORED SIX SUCH
EXCHANGE VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND HAVE A TRIP PLANNED
TO LEAVE JULY 14, 1967 WITH AMERICANS FROM EVERY STATE.
ANOTHER SUCH VISIT IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART AUGUST 5TH 1967. "THE
CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS "HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY VICE PRESIDENT
HUMPHREY TO THE FOLLOWING EXTENT: "...THE WORK OF YOUR
ORGANIZATION IS ONE OF GREAT WORTH IN OUR ENDEAVORS TO PROMOTE
WORLD PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING." MEMBERS OF CONGRESS FROM BOTH
POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE ALSO ENDORSED THE WORK OF THE
CITIZEN EXCHANGE CORPS. THERE IS SO LITTLE TIME AVAILABLE AND
SUCH A GREAT LACK OF FUNDS AVAILABLE TO THE AVERAGE CITIZENS
OF GLASSBORO THAT WE MUST APPEAL TO YOU AT THIS TIME.
WE HOPE THAT BY THE POWER VESTED IN YOU, YOU WILL
JOIN WITH US IN EXTENDING THE SPIRIT OF HOLLYBUSH TO AN
INTERNATIONAL SPIRIT OF GOOD-WILL WITH THE CITIZENS OF
GLASSBORO AS ITS AMBASSADORS.

WE THE CITIZENS OF GLASSBORO ARE COMPLETELY AT YOUR DISPOSAL, AT ANY HOUR FOR DISCUSSION OF THIS URGENT MATTER. YOU MAY CONTACT ME, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CITIZENS SELECTION COMMITTEE OF GLASSBORO FOR ANY QUESTIONS OF ANY KIND WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE. I AND THE UNDERSIGNED ARE THE CORE OF THE DEEPLY INTERESTED AMERICANS OF GLASSBORO AND REPRESENT THE GREAT NUMBER OF OUR TOWNSPEOPLE WHO WANT SO GREATLY TO CARRY ON THE SPIRIT OF HOLLYBUSH.

YOURS RESPECTFULLY:

BILL REIVICH, CHAIRMAN OF THE CITIZENS SELECTION COMMITTEE OF GLASSBORO, AND PROPRIETOR OF LEVY'S MEN AND BOYS WEAR.

R.R. SPILLANE, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS GLASSBORO.

ANTHONY ESCRO, REPUBLICAN CITY COUNCILMAN GLASSBORO.

HAROLD WINTNER, PROPRIETOR H & H APPLIANCE CO.

ADELINE WINTNER, CITIZEN.

JACK BOWERS, PROPRIETOR BOWERS AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CO.

MRS. ROBERT LINKEN, CITIZEN.

EVERETT WATSON, CHIEF OF POLICE, CITY OF GLASSBORO.

GLORIA WATSON, CITIZEN.

DOCTOR IRVING GOLDEN, CITIZEN.

MYRNA GOLDEN, CITIZEN.

BILL DALTON, GLOUCESTER COUNTY DEMOCRATIC CHAIRMAN.

EVAN WESCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHER GLASSBORO ENTERPRISE.

GLORIA REIVICH, CITIZEN.

IRV LEVY, PROPRIETOR LEVY'S MEN AND BOYS WEAR.

HARRIET LEVY, CITIZEN.

MARILYN PLASKET, CITIZEN AND DONOR OF THE CITY OF GLASSBORO HISTORY BOOKS GIVEN AS GIFTS TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PREMIER KOSYGIN.

DTG: 032255Z JUL 67

UNCLASSIFIED

Monday, July 3, 57
2:30 p. m.

102

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Perkins letter which leaked today in the New York Times. AID is trying to run down the leak, with the usual success thus far.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Attachment (6/22/67 JAPerkins ltr to Pres w/cover frm Gaud dtd 6/22/67)

102a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR


JUN 22 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations Concerning the World Food Problem by your General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs

Attached is a letter to you from Dr. James A. Perkins, Chairman of your General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs.

This letter was prompted by a meeting, which lasted for a full day, at which the Perkins Committee was briefed by Dr. Ivan Bennett and others who had taken leading parts in producing the report of your Science Advisory Committee on the World Food Problem. The briefing was followed by an extended discussion of the findings and implications of the report.


William S. Gaud

Attachment

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

June 22, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Your Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs has just completed a review of your Science Advisory Committee's report on The World Food Problem. We are impressed.


We believe this study and report on the world food crisis deserves the full and immediate attention of everyone concerned with perhaps the central issue of our times - the prospect of starvation on a catastrophic scale unless the United States and other nations like our own grasp this nettle.

We have two recommendations.

We urge that the report on The World Food Problem be given the full attention of the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government at the very earliest opportunity. We also urge that you direct our Ambassador at the OECD to make this report available to the other members and request an early report on their reactions to it.

We believe that this report makes it almost unthinkable that this country would consider a reduction of our own food production. We are informed, and it is reported in the public press, that such a policy is under consideration. We hope you will not approve. We cannot believe that our country should so flatly turn its back on the world's hunger.

Very sincerely,



James A. Perkins
Chairman

Monday, July 3, 1967 at 12 noon

*1. [unclear]
2. Per file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: International Cocoa Agreement

At Tab A, Nick Katzenbach recommends that you authorize State to agree to terms for a cocoa agreement. The terms have been worked out in bilateral talks with Ghana, the largest cocoa producer. If we agree, the Ghanaians will try to get the other producers to go along. At Tab B is a short description of how the agreement would work. At Tab C is a statistical summary of who's who among cocoa producers and consumers.

Negotiations ^{toward} of a cocoa agreement have been underway for ten years. As the largest single cocoa consumer (30% of world consumption), the U.S. has played a leading role. We have taken an enormous amount of heat from the producers -- mainly Ghana, Nigeria and Brazil -- for "obstructing" an agreement which would stabilize prices and release the producers from their present absolute dependence on a few big U.S. and European chocolate firms. In fact, we have only been trying to get a workable agreement -- one with a reasonable chance of being self-financing. Our situation has been complicated by the fact that the European consumers have let us do the fighting. They have indicated that they will buy anything we will -- implying that they would be much more forthcoming if it were up to them.

Now, at long last, we and the Ghanaians have arrived at a scheme which has a chance of satisfying everybody. They have bought our positions on the mechanics of the price-support operation. The decision before you now is whether, in return, we will agree to a minimum support price of 20¢ per pound. This is 2¢ more than our industry has been willing to accept, and 2¢ less than the producing countries have thus far been willing to buy. The current price of cocoa is running well above this, and the immediate prospect is that it will continue to do so. Thus, the minimum-price question does not have much economic significance for either side. Nevertheless, it is the most comprehensible measure of who is winning the battle between consumers (who would really prefer no agreement at all) and producers (who maintain that an agreement must guarantee a good price for as much cocoa as they care to produce).

This proposal tries to split the difference. Tony Solomon has already tried it out on the industry and met with mild disapproval. (Some of

the industry people told him privately that they were amazed the Ghanaians had agreed to so favorable a proposal. But they will never say this publicly.) We can expect them to continue to oppose the agreement and the enabling legislation it will require. They know the agreement wouldn't hurt them, but it also would do them no good. It isn't clear how much trouble they can really make on the Hill.

Solomon has conducted two sets of consultations with the Congress on this problem within the past few months. In both cases, the interested people shied away from any commitment to either side until the question was formally before them in the shape of a bill. Katzenbach and Solomon strongly recommend that we do not undertake another consultation now. They don't believe we would get any answers. Further, they point out that the chances are no better than even that the other producing countries will buy this proposal, and that even if they do we will not be going to the Congress until next year at the earliest. (Solomon thinks we could put it off even longer if necessary.) They would not fight the Congressional battle before we have to.

On balance, I would second the Katzenbach/Solomon recommendations. A more forthcoming stance on this issue is terribly important to our image in the developing countries -- particularly in Africa. It is one of the recommendations of the Korry Report. It is consistent with your statements on trade at Punta del Este. And it is especially timely with the approach of UNCTAD II, where we will be under great pressure to agree to more trade concessions to the poor countries. On the domestic front, the 20¢ minimum price is so far below the present price that there is no real chance that our companies would be hurt. I know that doesn't solve the political problem, but it would help. All things considered, I would vote for going ahead.

Katzenbach points out that the Ghanaians are anxiously awaiting our answer. We should try to reply early this week if possible.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with State position _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

7/7/67 - telephone call from Jim Jones

2090

J. Hamilton
2. ref.
1300

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: International Cocoa Agreement

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to tell the Government of Ghana that we will support an International Cocoa Agreement along the lines of the proposal shown in the enclosure, if they can convince other producers to go along.

An agreement based on this proposal would stabilize cocoa prices and further our foreign policy objectives. It meets U.S. Government and industry requirements as to how an agreement should operate, but it provides for a minimum price of 20¢, which is 2¢ higher than the industry has been prepared to accept and 2¢ lower than producers are asking for. Our industry is likely to use the price issue to oppose such an agreement. We believe their argument is not justified since cocoa prices have gone below 20¢ only once in the past 15 years. All other consuming countries, furthermore, are prepared to accept a minimum price of 20¢. Should we refuse to make this one concession, now that Ghana has accepted our position on all other issues, we would damage our relations with Ghana and the other cocoa producers and bring into serious question our good faith in 10 years of participation in these cocoa negotiations.

We promised to give Ghana our answer within a week. They are holding off their discussions to line up the other producers until they hear from us.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Discussion:

1. An agreement based on the proposal in the enclosure would stabilize cocoa prices and further our foreign policy objectives. Cocoa is a major source of income to important African economies, providing up to 60 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Brazil is the major Latin American producer. (The enclosed table shows the major producers and consumers of cocoa). As you know, a principal recommendation of the Korry Report is to negotiate a cocoa agreement and such an agreement is an integral part of our program for Africa.

2. The U.S. has been blamed for the failure to reach an agreement last year when all consuming countries except the U.S. were willing to go along. African countries in particular charged that our position was negative and inflexible because the U.S. cocoa industry strongly opposed an agreement.

3. The Government of Ghana initiated bilateral talks with us to break the impasse. They accepted all our requirements on how the agreement should operate and came down from 22¢ to 20¢ on the minimum price on the condition that we also accept this compromise. If we accept this price, we would be in agreement with Ghana on the main outlines of an agreement.

4. We have already met with our industry advisory group to discuss the results of our talks with Ghana and to ask for their comments. The Advisory Group consists of manufacturers, cocoa traders, and confectioners; Clark Clifford's firm is their Washington representative. They have always worked closely with us but they prefer that there be no cocoa agreement. Their preliminary reaction was essentially negative. We do not anticipate any change in their position despite the favorable outcome of our talks with Ghana.

5. Should an agreement be negotiated by the end of the year, which is the earliest possible time, we would seek Congressional approval sometime in 1968. There might not be enough time to complete action before the end of the session.

6. We assume the legislation would have rough going in the Congress. The industry probably would be opposed - either passively or actively. The grounds for their opposition would be weak but they could play on Congressional prejudice against commodity agreements. On the other hand, domestic groups concerned with African political and economic development would support the agreement as a major U.S. foreign policy initiative in relations with developing countries.


CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7. Acceptance of a minimum price of 20 cents and reaching agreement with Ghana would put us in a favorable position internationally and would place the responsibility for making further progress on the producers. They will have their difficulties. In any event, the U.S. would be relieved of the onus of obstructing an agreement.

8. We believe it is essential that we take advantage of our understanding with Ghana to eliminate a major source of friction in our relations with African countries. Arthur Goldberg believes that our rigidity on the price issue on cocoa has prejudiced the U.S. position at the UN. Since the Ghanaians conceded to us on all the main issues and compromised on the price issue, a failure to move would subject us to widespread and serious criticism. The fact is that the cocoa producing countries are among the more moderate elements in Africa and have supported us on many occasions.

The kind of agreement we can now expect to negotiate would enable us to demonstrate to Congress that we are helping the economic development of producers without injury to the U.S. consumer or the U.S. industry. Even if the Congress initially rejects an agreement, the U.S. would still be in a better position than if the Administration showed unwillingness to accept a reasonable settlement. A major effort may well be required to convince the Congress and the industry of the need for an agreement, but it is of the greatest importance to our relationship with Africa that we make this effort.



Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Basis for U.S.-Ghana Understanding
2. Basic data.

CONFIDENTIAL

7.6 B

BASIS FOR A US-GHANA UNDERSTANDING ON
INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT

1. Minimum Price, Intervention Price, and Price Range

The Agreement will have minimum and maximum prices which serve as guidelines for appropriate action. The range between the minimum and maximum prices will be 8 to 10 cents. There will be an intervention point above the minimum price requiring a quota cut and an additional quota cut would be required at the minimum price. The minimum price would be 20 cents and the intervention price 21 cents. A trigger point near the top of the range requiring Buffer Stock sales might be introduced, but in any event all cocoa in the Buffer Stock would be offered for sale at the maximum price.

2. Buffer Stock Mechanism

a) All cocoa--both that arising from quota cuts and surplus emerging at the end of year must be sold to Buffer Stock. In the case of cocoa made surplus by quota cuts during the year, producers have option of cancelling contract if quota cuts are restored during year.

b) Buffer Stock buys surplus cocoa (up to each country's share) at minimum price with appropriate differentials, subject to the following conditions: (1) 50% payment on delivery of cocoa and (2) remaining 50% when and if cocoa is sold and all costs and carrying charges have been met.

c) Each exporting country is allocated a share of the Buffer Stock capacity, proportionate to its basic quota. Any additional surplus cocoa is purchased at the margarine price, but can be held by the Buffer Stock for possible subsequent resale if conditions warrant. Cocoa purchased at the margarine price would be paid for in full on delivery. If such cocoa is subsequently resold for normal market uses, the difference between the margarine price and the minimum price would be paid after all costs and carrying charges have been met.

d) Buffer Stock buys surplus cocoa directly from producing countries; it does not operate in spot or futures markets. Buffer Stock buys cocoa beans only -- no products. It sells cocoa to the market under conditions set by Council and through established channels of trade.

e) At end of agreement, Buffer Stock funds and assets shall be transferred to successor agreement in amounts decided by Council. If cocoa agreement is not renewed, any cocoa in Buffer Stock would be sold on an agreed basis, designed to minimize market disruption. Funds then shall be used for purposes of economic development in producing countries, through regional development banks or such other means as may be agreed. Such funds would be earmarked for use in producing countries in proportion to sales levied paid.

3. Trade Barriers - Tariff Preferences

It is desirable that a solution to the problem of tariff preferences should be sought during the course of negotiation of a cocoa agreement.

4. Prefinancing

Prefinancing is not a major issue to be resolved. In view of the current and short-term prospects for the cocoa market, there would appear to be adequate time for funds to be accumulated from the sales levy. If these accumulated funds did not prove to be entirely adequate, resort could be had to financing from commercial and other sources. The subject of contingency financing should be explored by a Working Party after negotiations are concluded.

5. Standby Operation of the Agreement

It is anticipated that under conditions such as the present, the sales quota and other stabilization features of the Agreement would not be operative. In all circumstances, however, sales would be registered and the levy collected so that surplus cocoa could be effectively removed when world over-supply occurs.

Tab C
103 d.

1965 Cocoa Exports

	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>Est. Value Millions of dollars</u>	<u>% of Total World Exports</u>	<u>Cocoa as % of Producer Country's Total Export Earnings</u>
TOTAL WORLD	1,286,000			
Ghana	494,000	187	38.4	68%
Nigeria	305,000	119	23.7	16%
Ivory Coast	124,000	44	9.6	17%
Cameroon	77,000	27	5.9	40%
Other African	66,000	22	5.1	
Brazil	91,000	31	7.1	2%
Ecuador	39,000	13	3.2	11%
Other Latin American	60,000	19	4.6	

1965 Cocoa Imports

	<u>Metric Tons</u>	<u>% of Total World Imports</u>
TOTAL WORLD	1,202,000	
United States	348,000	28.9
West Germany	162,000	13.5
U.S.S.R.	157,000	13.1
Netherlands	116,000	9.7
United Kingdom	78,000	6.6
France	62,000	5.2

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Sent 9:07

1967 JUL 3 20 07

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67651

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

FOLLOWING IS THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT (NO. 4) ON
VIETNAMESE POLITICS --

SITUATION REPORT ON VIET-NAM
(JULY 3, 1967)

THE FACTS

1967 JUL 3 PM 4:25
MONDAY

THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED
IN THE PAST 24 HOURS. HOWEVER, AN AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL HAS
HAD A CONVERSATION WITH KY (FULL REPORT SENT BY POUCH) WHICH
HAS DISTURBING IMPLICATIONS, (TDCS DB-315/32484-67).

KY TOLD THE AMERICAN OFFICIAL THAT KY, THIEU AND THE ARMED
FORCES COUNCIL HAVE AGREED THAT THIEU WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD
PRESIDENT AND THAT KY WILL ACTUALLY BE IN CHARGE. KY CLAIMS THAT
"TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING OR LATER MANEUVERING BY THIEU" THIS
AGREEMENT WILL BE PUT IN WRITING, WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL, AND
WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH THIEU AND KY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL. ACCORDING
TO KY, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE THIEU-KY SLATE HAS PRODUCED A
STRONG REACTION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, WITH MANY PEOPLE,
INCLUDING "BABY TURK" MILITARY OFFICERS, FINDING IT DIFFICULT
TO ACCEPT KY'S STEPPING DOWN TO A SECONDARY ROLE. KY ASSERTS
THAT HIS SACRIFICE HAS INCREASED HIS SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE AMONG
THE MILITARY AND CORRESPONDINGLY HAS REDUCED THIEU'S INFLUENCE.
HE CLAIMS HE WILL WORK HARD TO PERSUADE HIS SUPPORTERS TO GO ALONG
WITH THE NEW ARRANGEMENT AND THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL ALTERNATIVE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC
By cbm, NARA, Date 5-7-01

~~SECRET~~

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COMMENT

THIS CONVERSATION IS DISTURBING AS A REFLECTION OF KY'S CURRENT STATE OF MIND. HE UNDOUBTEDLY IS REFLECTING REASONABLY ACCURATELY THE VIEWS OF HIS STRONGEST SUPPORTERS. HOWEVER, NOW THAT EMOTIONS ARE COOLING, KY UNDOUBTEDLY REALIZES THAT HE IS NOW UNABLE LEGALLY TO CHANGE HIS DECISION TO STEP DOWN. WE BELIEVE THAT KY IS OVERSTATING THE DEGREE OF AGREEMENT AMONG THE LEADING GENERALS REGARDING HIS CONTINUED DOMINANT POWER POSITION, KY WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO GET THIEU TO AGREE TO ANY PRECISE DEFINITION OF KY'S POWER. KY'S OBJECTIVE IN THIS CONVERSATION IS UNDOUBTEDLY TO IMPRESS US WITH THE FACT THAT HE REMAINS THE MAN FOR US TO DEAL WITH NOW AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE EMBASSY'S PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SLATES. HOWEVER, WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS:

A. THE FIVE LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES ARE THIEU, ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SUU, BIG MINH, FORMER PRIME MINISTER HUONG, AND DAI VIET LEADER HA THUC KY.

B. THREE OR FOUR ADDITIONAL SLATES MAY HAVE SOME LIMITED VOTE-GETTING STRENGTH IN LOCAL AREAS.

C. ONE MINOR SLATE, HEADED BY FORMER MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AU TRUONG THANH, HAS AS ITS SYMBOL THE SLOGAN "NO MORE BOMBS" AND AS ITS MOTTO THE WORDS "CEASE FIRE". THANH'S SLATE WAS APPROVED BY ONLY 54 ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES, THE SECOND LOWEST VOTE FOR ANY PRESIDENTIAL SLATE. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS THE RELUCTANCE OF SOME DEPUTIES TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH SUCH A SIMPLISTIC PEACE THEME.

D. THE REMAINING SLATES ARE OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE.

ACTION REQUIRED

WE WILL ASK FOR BUNKER'S SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON KY'S STATEMENTS.

DTG: 031844Z JULY 67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-102

By , NARA, Date 8-11-93

105

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 3 15 21

Pres file

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67649

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH SUMMARIES OF SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT CABLES
OF THE DAY

N E A R E A S T:

SOVIETS OFFER ARMS TO JORDAN - EMBASSY AMMAN HAS FURTHER
INFORMATION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED TO RE-EQUIP JORDAN'S
ARMED FORCES. THE EMBASSY ALSO REPORTS THAT PRESSURE IS
MOUNTING ON THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE EARLY PROVISIONS
FOR REARMING.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ON WEST BANK - EMBASSY AMMAN BELIEVES
WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS STAGE COOPERATE WITH THE ISRAELIS IN
FURNISHING THEM INFORMATION ON THE WEST BANK ECONOMY AND
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. THE EMBASSY FEARS THAT BY SUCH
COOPERATION WE WILL APPEAR TO BE ENDORSING PLANS FOR A LONG-
TERM ISRAELI PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK. THE EMBASSY AGREES
THAT IT IS DESIRABLE TO PROMOTE A REVIVAL OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
AND EMPLOYMENT ON THE WEST BANK; HOWEVER, IT BELIEVES THAT
ISRAELI ENGINEERS CAN DEVISE SUITABLE PROJECTS WITHOUT OUR
HELP.

LIBYAN OIL FLOWS - RADIO LIBYA ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY
THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED TO ALLOW EXPORTS OF OIL TO
SPAIN, FRANCE, ITALY AND OTHER FRIENDLY STATES, BUT NOT TO
THE US AND UK.

STEPS TOWARD DE FACTO PEACE - WE HAVE ASKED FOR COMMENT
FROM EMBASSIES TEL AVIV AND AMMAN UPON OUR THESIS THAT A
MORE REALISTIC ARAB VIEW OF THE NECESSITY FOR DE FACTO PEACE
WITH ISRAEL MIGHT BE OBTAINED IF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION
PROMOTED THE WELFARE AND PROSPERITY OF ARAB WEST BANK
RESIDENTS. WE HAVE OUTLINED SEVERAL SPECIFIC PROGRAMS AIMED
AT PROMOTING TIES BETWEEN THE EAST AND WEST BANK AND AT
EASING THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

67 JUL 3 AM 11:29

MONDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SAUDIS ASK US TO CONDEMN ISRAEL - ACTING DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAS'UD TOLD AMBASSADOR EILTS THAT KING FAISAL WAS DOING HIS UTMOST TO MAINTAIN A MODERATE STANCE, BUT FOUND THIS MOST DIFFICULT IN THE FACE OF THE US POSITION AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE REITERATED THE SAUDI POSITION THAT IT WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE OR MAKE A FORMAL PEACE WITH ISRAEL, BUT NEITHER WILL IT ATTACK ISRAEL. MAS'UD REPEATEDLY URGED THAT THE US CONDEMN ISRAELI AGGRESSION.

POSSIBLE GREEK MOVE AGAINST MAKARIOS - AMBASSADOR BELCHER REPORTS THAT THE GREEKS AND CYPRIOTS ARE ON A COLLISION COURSE ALTHOUGH IT IS STILL NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE GREEKS ONLY WANT MAKARIOS TO CLEAN HOUSE OR WHETHER THEY WISH TO IMPOSE THEIR OWN INFLUENCE UPON CYPRUS. BELCHER BELIEVES THAT THE INABILITY OF THE CYPRIOTS TO CONTROL THE EXTREMIST PRESS COUPLED WITH THE APPARENT LACK OF UNDERSTANDING ON CYPRUS OF THE MENTALITY OF THE ATHENS COUP LEADERS MAY ULTIMATELY INCITE THE GREEKS TO TAKE ACTION.

E A S T A S I A :

REPORT ON CAMBODIA - UN REPRESENTATIVE DE RIBBING TOLD CHARGE HANNAH OF HIS DEEP CONCERN OVER THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. HE CITED INCREASING AGGRAVATION BETWEEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA AND THE DEEPENING ECONOMIC PLIGHT OF CAMBODIA ITSELF. SIHANOUK EXPLAINED TO DE RIBBING THAT WHICHEVER WAY THE WAR IN VIETNAM ENDS HE FEARS CAMBODIA WILL BE CRUSHED BETWEEN ITS MORE POWERFUL NEIGHBORS.

CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT - VIET CONG RADIO ANNOUNCED ON JUNE 30 THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPOINTMENT OF CUBAN RAUL VALDES VIVO AS THE FIRST AMBASSADOR EVER ACCREDITED TO THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT CENTRAL COMMITTEE. EMBASSY SAIGON BELIEVES THE APPOINTMENT MAY SIGNAL THE INITIATION OF A MAJOR EFFORT ALONG THIS LINE, AND MAY EVEN BE LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR EVENTUAL PROCLAMATION OF A VIET CONG GOVERNMENT IN EXILE.

VICE PRESIDENT TALKS WITH ASIAN LEADERS - VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY TOLD KOREAN PRESIDENT PAK, JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER SATO AND CHINESE VICE PRESIDENT YEN THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS HAVE FIRMER COMMITMENTS OF PROTECTION FROM THE US THAN SOUTH VIETNAM, STRESSING THAT WE WOULD LIVE UP TO OUR TREATIES. PRESIDENT PAK STATED THAT THE ASIAN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT DEPEND ONLY UPON THE US, BUT ALSO SEEK TO PROVIDE MEASURES FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY. YEN CITED COMMUNIST CHIN'S NUCLEAR TESTS AS EVIDENCE OF HER INTERESTS IN AREAS BEYOND ASIA.

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UNITED NATIONS:

US VOTING ON UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS - WE INTEND TO VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE RESOLUTION PUT FORWARD BY THE LATIN AMERICAN DELEGATIONS AND AGAINST THE INDIAN-YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION. THE FORMER LINKS WITHDRAWAL WITH AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND SECURITY COUNCIL EFFORTS TOWARDS A DURABLE AREA SETTLEMENT. WE BELIEVE IT OFFERS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR REAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE INDIAN-YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION CALLS FOR WITHDRAWAL ALONE, AND DOES NOTHING TO TERMINATE THE LONG-STANDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCE. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT EITHER THE US OR SOVIET RESOLUTIONS WILL COME TO A VOTE.

FRENCH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES - ASSISTANT SECRETARY SISCO EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR LUCET THAT THE FRENCH UN DELEGATION WAS LOBBYING WITH THE FRENCH AFRICANS TO CHANGE THEIR PROSPECTIVE VOTES AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION TO ABSTENTIONS. SISCO EMPHASIZED THAT WE REGARD THE YUGOSLAV DRAFT NOT AS A NEUTRAL COMPROMISE BUT AS A REFLECTION OF THE SOVIET POSITION. FRENCH UN AMBASSADOR SEYDOUX TOLD AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED THE FRENCH AS AN INDUCEMENT FOR LOBBYING ON THE SOVIET BEHALF, THE PROSPECT OF BIG FOUR CONSULTATIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION IS ADOPTED.

ITALIANS PROPOSE COOLING OFF BEFORE VOTE - ITALY'S UN DELEGATION REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO URGE A WEEK'S POSTPONEMENT OF VOTING ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

DTG: 031251Z JULY 67

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1967 JUL 3 16 13

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DE VTE 1393

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67650

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By 1-8, NARA, Date 8-11-93

JULY 3, 1967

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HEREWITH A MESSAGE TO YOU FROM ESHKOL

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IT WAS VERY GOOD OF YOU TO SEND ME YOUR MESSAGE OF JUNE 26, WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED BY AMBASSADOR BARBOUR, OF YOUR DISCUSSION WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN. I DEEPLY APPRECIATE YOUR HAVING KEPT ME INFORMED ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS. I WOULD TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY OF EXPRESSING MY APPRECIATION TO YOU IN THE STAND WHICH YOU HAVE TAKEN ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND YOUR EMPHASIS ON THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FORWARD TO PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE IN ISRAEL HAVE PAID A HEAVY PRICE IN REPELLING THE AGGRESSIVE COMBINATION AGAINST US LED BY THE SOVIET UNION AND NASSER. I AM CONVINCED THAT NOW THERE IS A HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST TO MOVE FORWARD TO A TRULY STABLE CONDITION OF FULL RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF EACH STATE IN THE AREA AND THE REGIONAL COOPERATION THAT WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO SETTLE SO MANY PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE ARISEN FROM THE ATTITUDE OF BELLIGERENCE DURING THE PAST 19 YEARS, INCLUDING THE SERIOUS HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS. IN CONDUCTING THE POLICIES OF MY COUNTRY FOR PEACE AND SECURITY I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE REFLECTION THAT YOUR OWN DETERMINED STAND IS VITAL TO THE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF OUR AREA AND TO WORLD PEACE ITSELF.

I HAVE BEEN GREATLY HEARTENED BY YOUR LEADERSHIP DURING THESE ANXIOUS WEEKS. I AM SURE WE WILL ENCOUNTER MANY MORE TESTS ON THIS ROAD IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD BUT I KNOW THAT WE SHALL ALL MEET THEM WITH RESOLVE.

MAY I END ON A PERSONAL NOTE BY EXTENDING MY HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS TO MRS. JOHNSON AND YOURSELF ON THE BIRTH OF YOUR FIRST GRANDSON. IT IS MY PRAYER AND CONVICTION THAT BECAUSE OF WHAT FREE MEN STRIVE TO DO TODAY HE WILL GROW UP IN A WORLD OF PEACE AND LIBERTY. IT IS ONLY FITTING THAT I CONCLUDE BY EXTENDING TO YOU ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AND ON MY OWN BEHALF, OUR HEARTIEST GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF YOUR GREAT DEMOCRACY.

SIGNED LEVI ESHKOL

DTG: 031502Z JUL 67

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PRESERVATION COPY

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1967 JUL 3 PM 12:23
MONDAY

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OO WTE10
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67645

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-54
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

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SUNDAY

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TEL AVIV 004

HEREWITH BARBOUR'S THOUGHTFUL APPRAISAL OF POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE OF JERUSALEM, AS SEEN FROM A TEL AVIV PERSPECTIVE.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL'S ACTION IN UNILATERALLY UNITING OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM WITH NEW CITY SEEMS INEVITABLY PRESENT USG WITH TASK OF REVIEWING ENTIRE QUESTION ITS POLICY RE THIS UNIQUE CITY WHICH IS REGARDED AS SACRED TO JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM. CRUCIAL FACTS IN EQUATION ARE: (1) JERUSALEM IS NOW A UNITED CITY, CERTAINLY A DESIRABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABSTRACT; (2) THIS FAIT ACCOMPLI FOLLOWED UPON AN UNPROVOKED JORDANIAN ATTACK UPON ISRAEL IN GENERAL, AND THE NEW CITY IN PARTICULAR; (3) GOI HAS FORMALLY PROMISED AND ENACTED LEGISLATION TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES TO MEMBERS OF ALL RELIGIONS (TEL AVIV 4325); AND (4) ISRAELIS DETERMINED TO REMAIN AND EXERCISE BASIC ADMINISTRATION OF CITY REGARDLESS OF COST.
2. IN ATTEMPTING TO EVALUATE SIGNIFICANCE THESE FACTS IN TERMS OF LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, THE OVER-RIDING CONSIDERATION WOULD SEEM TO BE FREE ACCESS TO AND PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS SITES. SECONDARY FACTOR OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO USG INVOLVES LEGITIMACY OF ISRAELI TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION.
3. WHILE VIRTUALLY ALL NATIONS AGREE TO DEMANDING THAT ANY SETTLEMENT OF STATUS OF JERUSALEM MUST ENSHRINE RELIGIOUS GUARANTEES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT CONCRETE IMPLEMENTATION THIS PRINCIPLE DEPENDS UPON THE FULL COOPERATION OF WHOEVER ADMINISTERS THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND THE APPROPRIATE JEWISH, MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS.

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4. RE FIRST POINT, OUTSTANDING QUESTION TODAY IS WHETHER JEWISH AUTHORITIES OF UNDIVIDED JERUSALEM CAN BE REALISTICALLY EXPECTED TO RESPECT LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS ATTACHED TO RELIGIOUS SITES. ON THE BASIS OF GOI'S PERFORMANCE OVER PAST 19 YEARS IN PROTECTING CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM SITES IN ISRAEL AND UPON ITS UNQUESTIONED READINESS TO SACRIFICE DISPROPORTIONATE NUMBER JEWISH TROOPS IN OCCUPYING OLD CITY IN WAY WHICH AVOIDED DAMAGE TO CHRISTIAN AND MOSLEM SITES I CAN UNHESITATINGLY RECOMMEND THAT USG ACCORD GOI AS LEAST THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IT HAS DONE IN PAST TO PREVIOUS JORDANIAN AND BRITISH OCCUPYING FORCES. IF GOI ADHERES TO ITS MOST SOLEMN PUBLIC PLEDGES, IT WILL NOT TOLERATE THE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION WHICH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY COUNTENANCED WHEN DURING LAST 19 YEARS ISRAELI JEWS AND MOSLEMS DENIED ACROSS-THE-BOARD ENTRANCE TO HOLY PLACES BY JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, AND ISRAELI CHRISTIANS PERMITTED ACCESS ONLY INEQUENTLY.

5. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE MY BASIC CONFIDENCE IN GOI'S DETERMINATION FULFILL ITS PROMISES, BELIEVE ITS INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IF IT WERE TO ADJUST ITS OWN INTERNAL GOVERNMENTAL POLICY MACHINERY SO AS TO REMOVE ANY POSSIBILITY OF BIAS OR EVEN SUSPICION THEREOF. THUS, I WOULD FAVOR REMOVAL OF JURISDICTION FOR MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES FROM MINISTRY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS WHICH IS PORTFOLIO OF NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY. CREATION OF EITHER A NEW MINISTRY OR ASSIGNMENT THIS TASK TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE WOULD APPEAR MOST DESIRABLE. AN ADDITIONAL STEP WHICH WOULD DEFINITELY HELP ALLAY INTERNATIONAL FEARS WOULD BE PUBLICIZED GOI REITERATION OF FULL FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN ISRAEL AND SPECIFIC ASSURANCES THAT NO LIMITATIONS WOULD BE PLACED UPON NUMBERS OF CHRISTIAN MINISTERS, PRIESTS, MONKS AND OTHERS DESIROUS OF LIVING RELIGIOUS LIFE IN HOLY LAND. SOONER, RATHER THAN LATER, GOI SHOULD ALSO BE PRESSED TO OUTLINE IN DETAIL HOW IT INTENDS HANDLE MUSLIM PILGRIMS FROM NEIGHBORING STATES.

6. IN DISCUSSING ATTITUDE OF APPROPRIATE RELIGIOUS BODIES TOWARDS FREEDOM OF ACCESS AND WORSHIP WE ARE OBVIOUSLY DEALING WITH A MOST SENSITIVE AND DELICATE MATTER. INTERNAL DISPUTES BETWEEN LOCAL CHRISTIAN CHURCHES WHICH OWN AND CONTROL VARIOUS HOLY PLACES HAVE BEEN BITTER AND PRESENT SITUATION RESTS ON A CENTURY-OLD STATUS QUO. GIVEN ON THE ONE HAND USG RELUCTANCE ENTER INTO ANYTHING SMACKING OF DIRECT SUPERVISION OF CULT EXERCISE, AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, FACT THAT PLACES IN QUESTION ACTUALLY BELONG TO CERTAIN DEFINITE CHURCHES, BELIEVE BEST APPROACH TO ASSURING FULL AND FREE ACCESS THERETO LIES IN ENCOURAGING JERUSALEM CUSTODIANS (LATIN, GREEK, ARMENIAN, COPT AND ETHIOPIAN CHURCHES) OF CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES TO END THAT IN INTEREST OF FURTHERING RECENT ECUMENICAL DEVELOPMENTS, THEY REVIEW STATUS QUO WITH THE INTENT OF ENLISTING EVEN GREATER CHRISTIAN COOPERATION AND SUPPORT IN OVERSEEING OF SITES VENERATED BY ALL CHURCHES.

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7. SHOULD THE RELIGIOUS BODIES CONCERNED EVENTUALLY WORK OUT BETWEEN THEMSELVES A REALISTIC MODUS OPERANDI ACCEPTABLE TO THE WHOLE CHRISTIAN WORLD (A FEAT NEVER BEFORE ACCOMPLISHED BY THESE BODIES) ONE MIGHT WELL CARRY THE PROCESS FURTHER BY ENCOURAGING THE GOI AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES TO FORMALIZE THEIR RESPECTIVE COMMITMENTS THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME SORT OF INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR HOLY PLACES. CONCLUSION OF APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN GOI AND CUSTODIANS OF HOLY PLACES MIGHT LEAD TO GOI AGREEMENT TO DELEGATE EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGNTY FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES IN THOSE LOCALITIES. UNDER UN OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL UMBRELLA (E.G. COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SUITABLY DISTANT AND NEUTRAL, BUT INTERESED, NATIONS), POLICING OF SITES AND OTHER MATTERS OF COMMON INTEREST MIGHT BE HANDLED AS AN INTERNATIONAL UNDERTAKING. ALTHOUGH IN PRESENT STATE ISRAELI THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT GOI ACCEPTANCE SUCH A SCHEME PROBLEMATICAL, PASSAGE OF TIME AND DEVELOPING CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT MAKE IT MORE AMENABLE.

8. IN ANY EVENT, I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE ALREADY EXISTS ON THE SPOT THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS FOR ASSURING FULFILLMENT OF LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS INTEREST'S IN JERUSALEM. THROUGH DISCREET APPROACHES TO BOTH THE GOI AND THE APPROPRIATE RELIGIOUS BODIES IN THE PRESENT DE FACTO SITUATION IS READILY SUSCEPTIBLE OF BEING TRANSFORMED INTO ONE DESERVING OF AT LEAST INTERNATIONAL DE FACTO RECOGNITION, AND POSSIBLY EVENTUAL DE JURE RECOGNITION.

9. WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF USG RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION AS SUCH OF THE OLD CITY BY ISRAEL THE CRUCIAL POINT WOULD SEEM TO BE WHETHER WE HAVE ANY REAL ALTERNATIVES TO MAKING THE BEST OF A POTENTIALLY GOOD SITUATION. ISRAEL WAS ATTACKED BY JORDAN AND SUCCEEDED IN SILENCING THE ATTACK THROUGH OCCUPATION OF THE OLD CITY. THE TERRITORIAL CHANGE FOLLOWED UPON A PURELY DEFENSIVE ACTION. WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT LEGITIMATE INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS WILL BE SAFEGUARDED BY THE OCCUPYING POWER. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT BUT THAT THE ARAB INHABITANTS WILL GREATLY BENEFIT MATERIALLY. FOR THE USG TO REFUSE TO COME TO REASONABLE TERMS WITH ISRAEL OCCUPATION OF THIS DISPUTED TERRITORY ON THE GROUNDS THAT ITS COMMITMENT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ENCOMPASSED PREVENTING JUSTIFIED RETALIATION TO INVASION APPEARS TO US TO EXAGGERATE THE MEANING OF SUCH A COMMITMENT. WHILE OF OBVIOUS UTILITY AND NECESSITY IN EXPRESSING AMERICAN DETERMINATION NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE FRUITS OF ISRAELI AGGRANDIZEMENT THROUGH REPRISAL RAIDS SUCH AS SANUA, OR OF ANY POSSIBLE ARAB ATTEMPT ON THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, THE PRINCIPLE SEEMS QUITE ILL-SUITED TO COVER THE UNEXPECTED ATTACK BY JORDAN UPON ISRAEL FROM THE OLD CITY--AND ITS SUCCESSFUL REPULSE. FOR THE USG TO INSIST UPON ITS APPLICABILITY IN THIS CASE WILL HAVE THE PRACTICAL EFFECT OF POISONING A REAL AND ULTIMATELY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM WITHOUT EVEN THE FAINT ASSURANCE OF ARRIVING AT A REAL AND PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE APPROACH.

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10. FOREGOING MAY APPEAR TO ACCEPT TOO FACILLY A UNILATERAL ISRAELI STEP WHICH IS CONTRARY TO LONG-STANDING US POLICY AND IS INFLAMATORY TO THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS WHICH HAVE LONG ACCUSTOMED THEMSELVES TO LIVING WITH AN ESSENTIALLY TEMPORARY ACCOMMODATION OF TWO SEPARATE POLITICAL JURISDICTIONS OVER THE CITY. HOWEVER, THE IMPERATIVES OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS COMBINED WITH HISTORICAL JEWISH ATTITUDES TOWARD JERUSALEM MAKE THE POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO THE PREVIOUS POSITION THROUGH ACTION SHORT OF OUTSIDE MILITARY FORCE UNREALISTIC. ASSUMING THE LATTER NOT TO BE A DEFENSIBLE POLICY POSITION, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE EVENTUAL US ACQUIESCENCE IN ISRAELI EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER UNITED JERUSALEM WITH MAXIMUM NEGOTIABLE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE HOLY PLACES AND SHOULD TAILOR OUR TACTICS IN THE COMING MONTHS TOWARD THAT ASSUMPTION.

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67645

1267 JUL 2 18 17

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

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MR. PRESIDENT

Pres file

FOLLOWING IS THE DAILY VIET-NAM POLITICAL SITUATION REPORT
(NO. 3)---

SITUATION REPORT ON VIET-NAM
(JULY 2, 1967)

THE FACTS

THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE PAST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS HAS BEEN THE VOTING OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO CERTIFY THE DOCUMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL SLATES. OUT OF 19 SLATES FILED, 17 WERE CERTIFIED. ONE SLATE WAS THROWN OUT IN COMMITTEE FOR INADEQUATE DOCUMENTATION. ANOTHER WAS THROWN OUT BY THE ASSEMBLY ON THE SAME GROUNDS.

THE DEBATE ON "BIG" MINH'S CANDIDACY EVOKED MOST INTEREST, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THIEU HAD ADDRESSED A LETTER TO THE ASSEMBLY STATING THAT ON JUNE 28 THE DIRECTORATE HAD DECIDED NOT TO ALLOW MINH TO RETURN TO VIET-NAM FOR SECURITY REASONS. THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE CONSIDERING CANDIDACIES HAD UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED NOT TO CONSIDER THIEU'S LETTER, SINCE THE COMMITTEE'S TASK WAS CONFINED TO RULING ON COMPLETENESS OF DOCUMENTATION. THE ASSEMBLY APPROVED MINH'S DOCUMENTATION BY A VOTE OF 72, 10 MORE THAN THE THIEU-KY SLATE RECEIVED. THE SUU TICKET RECEIVED 84 VOTES IN FAVOR, THE HA THUC KY TICKET GOT 82, AND HUONG'S TICKET GOT 77. MANY OTHER TICKETS RECEIVED OVER 70 VOTES.

FOLLOWING ADJOURNMENT OF THE ASSEMBLY SESSION, THE 17 LISTS OF PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES WERE POSTED OUTSIDE THE ASSEMBLY BUILDING. VOTERS AND CANDIDATES HAVE UNTIL JULY 6 TO FILE COMPLAINTS TO THE ASSEMBLY REGARDING CANDIDATE QUALIFICATIONS.

KY SPOKE ON JULY 1 AT THE CLOSING CEREMONY OF A NATIONAL ELECTION SEMINAR FOR PROVINCE AND DISTRICT OFFICIALS. THIS WAS HIS FIRST PUBLIC APPEARANCE SINCE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE THIEU-KY TICKET. HE STRESSED THE NEED FOR FREE AND LEGAL ELECTIONS AND CALLED UPON THE ASSEMBLED OFFICIALS TO PROTECT THE VOTERS FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND THE PROVISION OF EQUAL FACILITIES TO CANDIDATES. HE ADMONISHED THE OFFICIALS TO EXPLAIN ELECTION PROCEDURES TO THEIR SUBORDINATES AND TO THE PEOPLE, AND ASSURED THEM OF FULL SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. IN CLOSING HE CALLED FOR A "A SELFLESS SPIRIT OF SERVICE". HE NOTED THAT SACRIFICES HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE AND THAT OTHERS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THESE COMMON ENDS.

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THE EMBASSY HAS FOWARDED THE 64 COMPLETE SENATE CANDIDATE LISTS WHICH HAVE BEEN FILED. THESE LISTS INCLUDE A LARGE NUMBER OF PROMINENT POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS, REGIONAL AND ETHNIC LEADERS.

COMMENT

WHILE THE ASSEMBLY'S VOTE ON PRESIDENTIAL SLATES WAS TECHNICALLY MERELY THE CERTIFICATION OF CORRECT DOCUMENTATION, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT SOME ASSEMBLY DEPUTIES DID NOT WISH TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE THIEU-KY TICKET. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO SEE WHETHER THE DIRECTORATE STIMULATES FORMAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE MINH CANDIDACY OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

ACTION REQUIRED

NO ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO THE EMBASSY ARE SUGGESTED AT THIS TIME. CURRENT ACTIONS IN TRAIN ARE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT.

DTG 021639Z JULY 1967

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WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67644

1967 JUL 2 17 57

Pres file

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HEREWITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION
IN SEOUL WITH THE JAPANESE.

SEOUL 024

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By , NARA, Date 8-11-93

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN EISAKU
SATO, RESIDENCE OF THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO KOREA, 4:00PM,
JULY 1, 1967

ATTENDING ON THE JAPANESE SIDE WERE:

EISAKU SATO, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

SHIROSHICHI KIMURA, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENI-
POTENTIARY OF JAPAN

MR HARUKU MORI, DEPUTY VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MR NAOSHI SHIMANOUCI, RESEARCH SECRETARY OF THE PUBLIC
INFORMATION BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (INTERPRETER)

MR TOMOYA KAWAMURA, SECOND SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY OF JAPAN
(RECORDER)

ON THE AMERICAN SIDE:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEORGE NEWMAN

TED VAN DYK, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

JOHN RIELLY, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

JAMES J WICKEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE AMBASSADOR, AMERICAN
EMBASSY, TOKYO (INTERPRETER)

AFTER AN EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, PRIME MINISTER SATO EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN HEARING A REPORT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ON THE
GLASSBORO MEETING. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON
HAD ASKED HIM TO TELL PRIME MINISTER SATO THAT HE WAS LOOKING
FORWARD TO SEEING HIM IN WASHINGTON IN NOVEMBER. THE VICE
PRESIDENT THEN BRIEFED THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE GLASSBORO
TALKS, GIVING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S BRIEFING
FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AND COVERING THE SUBJECTS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST, VIETNAM, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, ARMS LIMITATION
AND CUBA. PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT KOSYGIN
WAS NOT ACTIVE WITH FULL AUTHORITY, BUT RATHER WAS SPEAKING
FOR THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. ON
THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD OUTLINED
THE FIVE POINTS STATED IN HIS JUNE 19 SPEECH.

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KOSYGIN WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD AND FRANK, NEVER ANGRY OR EMOTIONAL. THE CONVERSATIONS TOOK PLACE IN FRIENDLY AND CANDID ATMOSPHERE. THE POSITION OF KOSYGIN WAS MORE RIGID AND INFLEXIBLE IN THE SECOND CONVERSATION THAN IN THE FIRST, PERHAPS REFLECTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW BETWEEN THE TWO MEETINGS. DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PRECISE AGREEMENTS, THE GLASSBORO CONFERENCE WAS USEFUL IN CLEARING THE AIR AND IN PERMITTING BOTH LEADERS TO KNOW ONE ANOTHER. KOSYGIN SEEMED OVERWHELMED BY THE WARM RESPONSE OF THE AMERICAN CROWD AT GLASSBORO AND HE RESPONDED WITH SOME CORDIAL WORDS OF GREETING. ON BALANCE, THE PRESIDENT FELT THE MEETINGS HAD BEEN HELPFUL.

THE VICE PRESIDENT QUOTED GOVERNOR HARRIMAN'S REMARK THAT IN TALKING WITH THE RUSSIANS IT TAKES THREE MEETINGS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS: AT THE FIRST MEETING THE ATMOSPHERE IS WARM AND CORDIAL; THE SECOND MEETING IS ROUGH; AT THE THIRD MEETING THEY MAY BEGIN TO DEAL.

PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT THE MEETINGS WERE OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, AS THEY SHOWED THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE TO AVOID A WORLD CONFRONTATION OVER THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE, WHICH COULD LEAD TO WAR. HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND KOSYGIN'S TRUE INTENT IN MAKING THE TRIP TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE UNITED STATES. DID HE EXPECT SOMETHING DEFINITE OR WAS HE PERHAPS ILL-PREPARED? IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR TO THE JAPANESE WHAT IT WAS KOSYGIN WANTED.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION SUFFERED A SEVERE SHOCK AT THE SUDDENNESS AND FINALITY OF THE ISRAELI VICTORY OVER SYRIA AND THE UAR. BOTH HAD RECEIVED MASSIVE SOVIET AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS. BUT THE ARABS HAVE BECOME DISENCHANTED WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND ARE CLAIMING THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE THEIR FRIENDS UNTIL THEY GET INTO TROUBLE. IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN CAME TO THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEFLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. IN THE UNITED NATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS TAKEN A TOUGHER LINE THAN HAVE MANY OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, APPEARING TO BE MORE ARAB THAN THE ARABS. WE THINK KOSYGIN DID NOT PLAN TO SEE PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT GLASSBORO OR ANY OTHER PLACE OUTSIDE OF NEW YORK; BUT HOPED TO GET THE PRESIDENT TO COME TO ENGAGE IN A PUBLIC ARGUMENT OVER THE MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAITED HIM OUT AND PERSONALLY DECIDED NOT TO GO TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND BECOME EMBROILED IN A DISCUSSION THERE. KOSYGIN THEREFORE ENDED UP USING THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM TO STRENGTHEN THE SOVIET POSITION WITH THE ARABS AND TO AGGRAVATE THE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB WORLD.

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED WITH THIS ANALYSIS OF KOSYGIN'S MOTIVATION. DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS PRINCIPALLY A PROPAGANDA MOVE ON THE SOVIET SIDE, IN THE END A WORLD CRISIS WAS AVOIDED. BUT UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE ABOUT THE ARMS PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE POSSIBILITY OF A RENEWED CONFLICT WILL REMAIN. THE MATTER OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT THEREFORE IS MOST IMPORTANT. PRIME MINISTER SATO WONDERED IF SIMILAR EFFORTS COULD NOT BE MADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO DEAL WITH THE VIETNAM AND CUBA ISSUES. HE

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HOPED THE RUSSIANS DESPITE THEIR CURRENT PREOCCUPATION WITH THE MIDDLE EAST, EVENTUALLY COULD GIVE THE SAME SORT OF ATTENTION TO SUCH PROBLEMS AS VIETNAM AND CUBA. THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI IS GOING TO MOSCOW IN JULY FOR THE REGULAR JAPAN-SOVIET CONSULTATION AND HOPES TO DISCOVER WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY. DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE ANY SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW MR. MIKI MIGHT BE HELPFUL ON ANY OF THESE ISSUES? HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HELP IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA CALLING ONLY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES IS UNSATISFACTORY. IT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL. THERE IS AN ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTION, HOWEVER, WHICH CALLS NOT ONLY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BUT ALSO FOR THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PERMANENT PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THE RUSSIAN RESOLUTION WILL NOT PASS, BUT IF THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION PASSES THIS WILL ONLY HARDEN THE POSITIONS OF BOTH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. THE BEST THING TO DO WOULD BE TO SEND THE ISSUE BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. AN ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO SUPPORT ONE OF THE TWO OR THREE OTHER RESOLUTIONS WHICH PROVIDE MORE FLEXIBILITY IN DEALING WITH UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND SECRETARY RUSK EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT JAPAN WOULD OPPOSE THE NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION. ABOVE ALL, WE WANT CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH JAPAN ON THIS SUBJECT.

THE U.S. IS NOT ANTI-ARAB BUT YOU CAN'T JUST HAVE A CEASE-FIRE AND MAKE IT STICK. YOU CAN'T JUST TELL THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY MUST GO BACK TO STATUS QUO ANTE AND EXPECT THEM TO ACCEPT THIS. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN REPEATED THE FIVE POINTS POSITION OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON THE MIDDLE EAST. IN THE TALKS AT GLASSBORO THE SOVIET LEADER DID NOT WISH TO DISCUSS THESE.

PRIME MINISTER SATO ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS INCLUDED THE NON RECOGNITION OF TERRITORIAL GAINS BY THE USE OF FORCE. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT THERE BE WITHDRAWAL, BUT NOT WITHOUT DISCUSSIONS THAT WOULD PERMIT ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT PEACE IN THE AREA. WE HAVE TAKEN EXCEPTION TO THE UNIFICATION OF JERUSALEM. BUT THE QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES MUST BE DISCUSSED BY THE NATIONS OF THE AREA THEMSELVES. WE DO NOT SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLE OF EXPANSION BY AGGRESSION. BUT THE FACT OF THE WAR IS THERE. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS DO NOT WANT THIS TERRITORY BUT WISH TO USE POSSESSION OF IT TO ACHIEVE CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA, AND TO ACHIEVE GUARANTEES ON CERTAIN ISSUES VITAL TO ISRAEL SUCH AS FREE PASSAGE OF THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE SUEZ CANAL, AND AN END TO TERRORISM FROM SYRIA AND SINAI.

PRIME MINISTER SATO SAID THAT HE AGREED WITH THESE FIVE POINTS, BUT THE PROBLEM IS THAT ISRAEL HAS OCCUPIED TERRITORY WHICH SHE DID NOT OCCUPY BEFORE.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT OUR U.N. RESOLUTION CALLS FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BUT WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE OVERALL PROBLEMS OF THE AREA - FOR EXAMPLE REFUGEES. WE HAVE SPENT MILLIONS ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEMS FOR YEARS AND NOW BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE NATIONS OF THE AREA TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. A RETURN TO THE CONDITIONS WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM. RESPONSIBLE NATIONS SHOULD THEREFORE TELL THE NATIONS OF THE AREA TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED. HE NOTED THE CONTRADICTION OF THE ARAB POSITION WHICH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND INSISTS THAT SHE WITHDRAW FROM HER PRESENT POSITION.

THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCURRED AND POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. THE SOVIET UNION KNOWS ITS RESOLUTION WILL NOT PASS THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY YET SHE INSISTS ON CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE WHICH WOULD ONLY STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE HARDLINERS IN ISRAEL.

PRIME MINISTER SATO AGREED THAT THIS WOULD ONLY INSURE A REPETITION OF HISTORY. HE STATED THAT WHILE JAPANESE HAVE EXTENSIVE RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS, JAPANESE POLICY IS ONE OF STRICT NEUTRALITY. YET, BECAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES-JAPANESE SECURITY TREATY HER NEUTRALITY ON THE MIDDLE EAST IS DOUBTED BY SOME STATES. HE STATED THAT FOLLOWING THE VIETNAMESE ELECTION THIS SEPTEMBER, HE IS PLANNING TO VISIT VIETNAM. HE IS NOT SURE THAT ALL THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF VIETNAM WILL BE SOLVED BY THAT TIME. NEVERTHELESS, HE WANTS TO SEE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM FIRST-HAND AND WHAT HE CAN DO TO AID IN DEVELOPING GOOD RELATIONS. HE ASKED THE VICE

PRESIDENT IF THERE ARE ANY POTENTIAL LEADERS OTHER THAN CAO KY IN VIETNAM., SINCE HE DID NOT SEEM TO SEE ANY OTHERS ON THE SCENE. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT IN A MEETING THIS MORNING WITH GENERAL CHIEU, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, HE HAD EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE UNITED STATES ATTACHES TO HONEST AND FREE ELECTIONS AND TO CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT THAT EMERGES. THE UNITED STATES ATTITUDE WILL DEPEND ON THE KIND OF ELECTION HELD - NOT ON THE CANDIDATE WHO WINS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IS PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE MILITARY CONFLICT. IT NOW APPEARS THAT KY AND THIEU WILL RUN TOGETHER AND WILL AVOID A SPLIT WITHIN THE MILITARY, A SPLIT WHICH WE WOULD CONSIDER TRAGIC. THERE ARE OTHER CANDIDATES BUT AT THE MOMENT IT APPEARS THAT THIEU AND KY WILL RUN TOGETHER AND IF THEY WIN, WILL WORK OUT SOME DIVISION OF LABOR LATER. PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT IT WILL BE A GOOD THING IF THIS MEANS AN INCREASE IN POLITICAL STABILITY, BUT HE DOUBTED THAT A TRULY HONEST ELECTION COULD TAKE PLACE. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT WE MUST KEEP THE PRESSURE ON TO SEE THAT IT DOES. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD ASKED HIM TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL APPRECIATION FOR PRIME MINISTER SATO'S INTERVENTION IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF FOOD AID IN THE KENNEDY ROUND. THE UNITED STATES ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE BECAUSE OF GREAT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE AT HOME AND BECAUSE OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM OF FEEDING THE INCREASING POPULATION OF THE WORLD. BOTH PROBLEMS ARGUED FOR A MULTI LATERAL APPROACH TO MEETING WORLD FOOD NEEDS.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED HIS GREAT SATISFACTION WITH THE SUCCESS OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MISSION TO THE MIDWEST. HE HAD MET WITH THE MISSION AT HIS HOME IN MINNESOTA AND IS VERY PLEASED WITH HIS TALKS WITH THEM. THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ARE EXCELLENT. HE ALSO NOTED THE ACTIVE ROLE WHICH JAPAN IS PLAYING IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN ASIA AND JAPAN'S PLEDGE OF 60 MILLION TO INDONESIA IN THE MEETINGS WHICH TOOK PLACE RECENTLY AT THE HAGUE. WE ARE HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE EXPANDING ROLE WHICH JAPAN IS TAKING IN SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED AMBASSADOR SHIMODA'S COMMENTS ON THE OKINAWA AND BONIN ISLAND QUESTION AND INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS DURING PRIME MINISTER SATO'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THE U.S. AND JAPAN COULD MOVE CLOSER TO ANY UNDERSTANDING AS LONG AS BOTH UNDERSTAND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECURITY IN THE AREA.

PRIME MINISTER SATO STATED THAT IN REGARD TO THE KENNEDY ROUND JAPAN SENT TO GENEVA THE DIRECTOR OF THE ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY MR MIYAZAWA. THEY DISCOVERED THAT AT FIRST THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE IN THE POSITIONS OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENTS AT GENEVA AND THAT SOME ACCOMMODATION WAS REQUIRED. HE BELIEVES THAT IF THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN HAD HAD CLOSER CONSULTATIONS BEFOREHAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER TO REACH A DECISION ON FOOD AID AT GENEVA.

HE WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS THANKS TO THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR RECEIVING THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC MISSION AND HE ASSURED HIM THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING WITH MEMBERS OF THE MISSION ON THEIR RETURN. HE STATED THAT PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA, IN VIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE WITH THE KENNEDY ROUND, IF THERE WERE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ON THE ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED.

THE VICE PRESIDENT READILY CONCURRED AND SUGGESTED THAT THE AGENDA WOULD INCLUDE AMONG OTHER ITEMS THAT OF MUTUAL SECURITY, THE BONIN AND RYUKYUS ISLANDS PROBLEM, REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND TRADE RELATIONS. IN THE MEANTIME, THE VICE PRESIDENT REPEATED THAT HE HOPED PRIME MINISTER SATO WOULD CONSIDER WHAT JAPAN MIGHT DO ON THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTIONS CURRENTLY BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

IN CLOSING, THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED PRIME MINISTER SATO TO EXTEND HIS SPECIAL GREETINGS TO FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI AND PROMISED TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON THE QUESTION OF WHAT MIKI MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO DURING HIS MOSCOW VISIT. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED THAT HIS GREETINGS BE CONVEYED TO GOVERNOR HARRIMAN WHOM HE KNOWS AND GREATLY RESPECTS.

THE MEETING CLOSED WITH AN AGREEMENT TO TELL THE PRESS CORPS OF THE SUBJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION.
NEWMAN

DTG 02/1547Z JULY 1967

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1967 JUL 2 16 33

EEA226
PP WTE10
DE WTE 1381

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67643

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-54
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

Profile

~~SECRET EXDIS~~
MOSCOW 0029

HEREWITH AN INTERESTING DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATION IN MOSCOW

1. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR GAVE ME TODAY ACCOUNT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH VOSLENSKI AS ALREADY REPORTED BY CANADIAN AMB. FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS CANADIAN'S REPORT AND COVERS LATER TALKS. VOSLENSKI IS A MEMBER OF KGB AND AN OLD FRIEND OF AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR.
2. VOSLINSKI SAID ON MAY 31 SOVIETS HAD NEITHER INCITED NOR RESTRAINED ARABS. THEY HAD NOT DEFINITELY TURNED DOWN DEGAULLE'S FOUR-POWER PROPOSAL BUT THOUGHT IT WAS NOT THEN QUOTE ACTUAL UNQUOTE AS IT WOULD ONLY HAVE BEEN USED FOR PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION.
3. WODAK RELATES MIDDLE EAST CRISIS TO VOSLENSKI' EARLIER STATEMENT THAT A COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SET UP TO DETERMINE ON SOME ACTION TO GET EVEN WITH U.S. FOR SVETLANA WHICH HE CALLED LAST STRAW.
4. ON JUNE 6 ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV TOLD WODAK ISRAELI ATTACK WAS COMPLETE SURPRISE AS A COMPROMISE ON GULF OF AQABA WAS BEING WORKED OUT. HE EXPRESSED HOPE CRISIS WOULD NOT AFFECT PROGRESS OF DETENTE WITH U.S. WHICH WAS UNDER WAY.
5. ON JUNE 25 VOSLENSKI TOLD WODAK SOVIETS CONCERNED THAT U.S. WOULD EXPLOIT THEIR QUARREL WITH CHICOMS. HE REPEATED VIEW ALSO EXPRESSED BY KUZNETSOV THAT HARDLY POSSIBLE THINK ISRAELI HAD ATTACKED WITHOUT ASSURANCE U.S. SUPPORT. HE THOUGHT WE CALCULATED THAT SOVIET DIFFICULTIES WITH CHINA WOULD RESTRAIN THEM FROM ANY INVOLVEMENT. HE SAID SOVIET RELATIONS WITH CASTRO AND ROMANIA WERE NOT GOOD. SOVIETS FEARED SOME LATIN AMERICAN STATES WOULD USE EXCUSE OF CUBAN LANDINGS TO STAGE ATTACK ON CUBA AND THAT IN SUCH EVENT PRESIDENT WOULD USE HOT LINE TO SAY U.S. WOULD STAY OUT IF SOVIET UNION DID THE SAME. THIS WOULD PUT SOVIETS IN EVEN MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION THAN IN VIETNAM WHICH WAS EMBARRASSING BUT TO WHICH THEY HAD BECOME ACCUSTOMED.

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6. HE SAID CHINA NOW HAD HYDROGEN BOMB AND IN A FEW YEARS WOULD HAVE ROCKETS TO DELIVER THEM. HE WAS AFRAID U.S. WAS COUNTING ON CHINA AND SOVIET UNION TO KNOCK EACH OTHER OUT LEAVING U.S. TO DOMINATE THE WORLD. HE THOUGHT IT VITAL FOR SOVIET UNION TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH U.S. HE ASSERTED SOVIET MATERIAL SENT TO VIETNAM BETTER THAN THAT SUPPLIED TO EGYPT.

7. VOSLENSKI THOUGHT KEY TO PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST WAS RECOGNITION EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, NO TERRITORIAL GAINS, PERHAPS INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM.

8. AT CANADIAN RECEPTION MAY 30 VOSLENSKI APPROACHED ME AND IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION EXPRESSED OPINION MEETING OF PRESIDENT AND CHAIRMAN HAD BEEN USEFUL. WITH RESPECT TO ANTI BALLISTIC MISSILES, HE IMPLIED SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED THAT WE MIGHT BE THINKING OF DEPRIVING SOVIETS OF DEFENSE AGAINST CHINA. I REPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT BE PROBLEM FOR BOTH OF US BUT ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE IT WAS TO START TALKS.

DTG: 021519Z JULY 67

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1967 JUL 2 17 11

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By 100, NARA, Date 8-11-93

VZCZCEEA228
PP VTE10
DE WTE 1380

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67642

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

HEREWITH SOME SUMMARIES OF INTERESTING CABLES TODAY.

EAST ASIA:

BUNKER-THIEU CONVERSATION - AMBASSADOR BUNKER EMPHASIZED TO THIEU THAT IF HIS TICKET WERE ELECTED, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. THIEU AGREED AND SAID THAT A CIVILIAN SHOULD BE PRIME MINISTER AND THAT MOST OF THE CABINET POSTS SHOULD BE FILLED BY CIVILIANS. THIEU THOUGHT THAT ONLY THE DEFENSE, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND, PERHAPS, CHIEU HOI-INFORMATION PORTFOLIOS NEED BE MILITARY.

BIG MINH'S CANDIDACY - IN VIEW OF THE REPORTED PRESSURE WITHIN THE ASSEMBLY TO SUSTAIN MINH'S CANDIDACY AND HIS RIGHT TO RETURN TO SAIGON AND CAMPAIGN, WE BELIEVE AMBASSADOR BUNKER SHOULD CONSIDER DISCUSSING THE MINH ISSUE WITH THIEU AND KY TO MAKE SURE THEY FULLY UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF KEEPING HIM OUT OF THE COUNTRY UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IF ASSEMBLY PRESSURE CONTINUES, WE BELIEVE THE GENERALS WILL FIND IT HARD TO JUSTIFY THEIR STAND.

AFTERMATH OF THIEU-KY CONPROMISE - AMBASSADOR BUNKER REPORTS THAT INITIAL REACTION WITHIN THE MILITARY TO THE THIEU-KY CONPROMISE IS ONE OF RELIEF THAT THIS CHAPTER AT LEAST IS CLOSED. THE AMBASSADOR BELIEVES THAT THE TASK OF COMBINING THE ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE TWO CANDIDATES WILL BE DIFFICULT BUT NOT INSUFFERABLE. THE EMBASSY WILL ENCOURAGE THIEU AND KY TO WORK TOGETHER FOR FREE AND IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS, AND ALSO TO ASSURE A BASIS FOR BROAD CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS. FOR THE TIME BEING, BUNKER URGES THAT WE NOT PRESS PREMATURELY ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

NEAR EAST:

CYPRUS ACTION DISCOUNTED - EMBASSY ATHENS HAS RECEIVED A NUMBER OF INDICATIONS THAT THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IS BEING ACTIVELY CONSIDERED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. THERE IS NO RELIABLE INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT UNILATERAL GREEK ACTION VIS-A-VIS CYPRUS IS EITHER IMMINENT OR BEING CONTEMPLATED. EMBASSY ANKARA CONCURS WITH THIS ASSESSMENT.

TOP SECRET

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ISRAELI EMISSARY TO VATICAN - FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN TOLD AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG THAT ISRAEL HAD SENT A HIGH-LEVEL EMISSARY TO THE VATICAN TO DISCUSS VATICAN CONCERN FOR JERUSALEM'S HOLY PLACES. THE VATICAN STILL FAVORS INTERNATIONAL CONTROL BUT, SINCE THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE, IT WOULD LIKE TO SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO JERUSALEM TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE HOLY PLACES.

JERUSALEM ANNEXATION ASSESSED - AMBASSADOR BARBOUR SEES ACCESS TO HOLY PLACES AS THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IN EVALUATING ISRAEL'S UNILATERAL ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY. ON THIS SCORE, HE THINKS ISRAEL DESERVES OUR FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR PAST PERFORMANCE IN PROTECTING OTHER RELIGIOUS SITES. WITH RESPECT TO US RECOGNITION OF THE TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION OF JERUSALEM, BARBOUR BELIEVES WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE EVENTUAL ACQUIESCENCE SINCE THERE MAY BE NO REAL ALTERNATIVE BUT TO ACCEPT THE PRESENT SITUATION, WHICH BARBOUR REGARDS AS POTENTIALLY GOOD.

SHAH-HARE TALKS - THE DISCUSSIONS REVEALED NO MAJOR SHIFTS IN THE SHAH'S ATTITUDES. AMBASSADOR HARE FOUND THAT HE IS STILL COMMITTED TO A PUBLIC POSTURE GENERALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE ARABS, BUT IS DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH REGARD TO THE POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF NASSER'S POWER. THE SHAH IS NON-PLUSED IN THE FACE OF THE RAPID SOVIET REPLENISHMENT OF ARAB ARMS, BUT HAS SO FAR REFRAINED FROM URGING THE RUSSIANS TO DESIST.

INDIA HAWKER HUNTER SALE APPROVED - WE HAVE APPROVED THE PROPOSED SALE TO INDIA BY THE UK OF TWENTY HAWKER HUNTER AIRCRAFT. IN REACHING THIS DECISION, WE HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY INDIAN RESTRAINT IN THE RECENT DEFENSE BUDGET, AND HAVE ACCEPTED THEIR ASSURANCES THAT THE ACQUISITION WILL BE PURELY SUBSTITUTIVE RATHER THAN ADDITIVE. STRONG BRITISH INTEREST IN A FAVORABLE DECISION WAS ALSO A FACTOR, AS WAS THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT THE MILITARY SUPPLY FIELD IN INDIA SHOULD NOT BE LEFT COMPLETELY TO THE SOVIETS.

GREEK KING VIEWS ON MILITARY AID - KING CONSTANTINE TOLD AN AMERICAN SOURCE HE FEELS STRONGLY THAT MILITARY AID SHOULD BE RESUMED AND THAT IF IT APPEARS AFTER A FEW MONTHS THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTEND A RETURN TO PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT, THE AID SHOULD BE CUT OFF. THE KING SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GIVE SUCH ASSURANCES PRIOR TO THE RESUMPTION OF AID BECAUSE HE STILL HAS NOT HAD A FIRM COMMITMENT FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

EAST ASIA:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY POSTS CANDIDATES - SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MET YESTERDAY AND VOTED TO POST SEVENTEEN OUT OF THE EIGHTEEN LISTS OF CANDIDATES WHICH HAD BEEN FILED WITH IT. GENERAL MINH'S SLATE WAS AMONG THOSE APPROVED, AND NO MAJOR CONTENDER WAS ELIMINATED IN THIS FIRST POSTING.

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AFRICA:

GOWON DISMISSES OJUKWU - NIGERIA'S FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY THAT GENERAL GOWON HAS DISMISSED COLONEL OJUKWU AS MILITARY GOVERNOR OF THE EAST CENTRAL STATE. THE ANNOUNCEMENT ALSO PUT FORTH THE CONDITIONS FOR THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE SECESSION. THESE INCLUDE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE EAST OF THE REVOCATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE EDICT AND RECOGNITION OF THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER THE EASTERN REGION. EMBASSY LAGOS BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENT COMBINATION OF FACTORS INDICATES WARFARE IS IMMINENT.

GOWON REQUEST US ARMS - GOWON HAS ADDRESSED A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON REQUESTING THAT 12 JET FIGHTER-BOMBERS, 5 FAST DEFENSE BOATS AND 24 ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS BE MADE AVAILABLE TO NIGERIA IN 48 HOURS. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO GRANT HIS REQUEST, HE STATES THAT HE WILL SEEK THE EQUIPMENT "FROM ANY SOURCE WHATSOEVER". THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT GOWON DOES NOT SERIOUSLY EXPECT THAT THE EQUIPMENT REQUESTED CAN BE DELIVERED WITHIN 48 HOURS. IT COMMENTS THAT THE FMG IS PROBABLY CLEARING THE WAY FOR ACCEPTING EAST EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT OFFERS, POSSIBLY FROM THE CZECHS.

OIL PAYMENT TO BIAFRA - THE BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER REPORTS THAT SHELL-BP HAS DECIDED TO PAY "UNDER PROTEST" A 250 THOUSAND POUND "TOKEN" PAYMENT TO OJUKWU. THE ACTION IS IN RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN LEADER'S DEMAND FOR PAYMENT BY JULY 1, AND IS BEING TAKEN FOR THE STATED REASON THAT SHELL HAD NO OPTION IN VIEW OF THE RISK TO THEIR EMPLOYEES AND PROPERTY. THE SAFRAP MANAGER ALSO DISCLOSED TO EMBASSY LAGOS THAT SAFRAP WILL MAKE A PAYMENT TO THE EAST.

EUROPE:

EEC TO NEGOTIATE WITH SPAIN - OUR MISSION TO THE EEC REPORTS THAT THE COMMUNITY INSTRUCTED THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ON JUNE 27 TO PREPARE A DRAFT MANDATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN. THE PROPOSAL WILL PROBABLY BE BASED ON A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE OF PREFERENCES FOR AN INITIAL PERIOD FOLLOWED BY A SECOND STAGE INVOLVING THE PHASED INTRODUCTION OF A FREE TRADE AREA. MOVEMENT TO THE SECOND STAGE WILL NOT BE AUTOMATIC AND THE QUESTION OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP DOES NOT ARISE.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS:

CHE GUEVARA IN BOLIVIA? - THE COMMANDER OF BOLIVIA'S ARMED FORCES YESTERDAY STATED CATEGORICALLY IN A PRESS INTERVIEW THAT CHE GUEVARA IS IN BOLIVIA DIRECTING GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. HE ALSO CLAIMED THAT GUERRILLA STRENGTH IN BOLIVIA IS 150, AND INCLUDES NUMEROUS CUBANS, PERUVIANS, VENEZUELANAS, AND ASIANS INCLUDING NORTH VIETNAMESE VETERANS.

DTG 021450Z JULY 1967

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-54
By is, NARA Date 4-4-00

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OO WTE13
DE WTE 1382

SENT
INCA

1967 JUL 2 16 14

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67644

Pres file

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

HEREWITH A FRENCH REPORT ON SOVIET STOCKPILING OF JETS
IN ALGERIA AND THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME FRENCH UNEASINESS.

ALGIERS 4365

1. ACCORDING FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCE, SINCE EARLY JUNE SOVIETS
HAVE AIRLIFTED, TO ALGERIA BY MEANS OF AN-12 TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT, AN ESTIMATED 100 MIG 21'S AND 17'S. SOME ALREADY
ASSEMBLED, SOME BEING LEFT IN CRATES. FRENCH OFFICIAL
ALSO REMARKED THAT GIVEN SHORTAGE OF TRAINED ALGERIAN PILOTS,
PLUS MATERIAL INABILITY OF ALGERIAN AIR ARM TO ABSORB AND
MAINTAIN THIS NUMBER OF MIG'S. MOST LOGICAL CONCLUSION IS
THAT SOVIETS ENGAGING IN LARGE-SCALE STOCK-PILING OPERATION.

2. WE SEE SEVERAL POSSIBLE AND RELATED INTERPRETATIONS.
FIRST, THIS IS SOVIETS WAY OF ASSURING "PROGRESSIVE ARABS"
AND ALGERIA OF CONTINUED POLITICAL AND MILITARY SUPPORT.
SECOND (WE HAVE THIS CONFIRMED BY ALGERIAN SOURCE LAST
NIGHT) THAT GOA IS ALREADY MAKING PLANS FOR SECOND MILITARY
ROUND AGAINST ISRAEL IN CASE UN AND GREAT POWERS PROVE
UNSUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING ISRAEL TO PULL BACK ITS FORCES TO
PRE-JUNE 5 LINES. THIRD, ALGERIA'S DISTANCE FROM ISRAEL MAKES
IT MUCH SAFER TO STOCKPILE MIG'S THAN UAR OR SYRIA.
FOURTH, SOVIETS MAY BE PLACING THESE MIG'S IN ALGERIA FOR
STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO US/WESTERN
MILITARY PRESENCE IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA.

3. IN ALL EVENTS, WE HAVE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT FRENCH
ARE RAPIDLY LOSING THEIR TRADITIONAL COMPLACENCY ABOUT SIZE
OF SOVIET-BACKED MILITARY BUILD-UP IN ALGERIA AND ARE EVEN
BEGINNING TO WORRY ABOUT ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FRANCE'S
SECURITY.

4. FROM BITS OF INFORMATION HERE AND THERE, WE HAVE IMPRESSION
THAT MOST OF ALGERIAN MIG'S FLOWN TO UAR HAVE BEEN LEFT
THERE. HOFFACKER

DTG: 021523Z JUL 67

GPS: 330 IMI 330

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 JUL 2 14 52

BEA222
PP VTE19
DE VTE 1377

Pres file

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67639

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ij, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

YOU SHOULD KNOW HANOI HAS RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION ITS REPRESENTATIVES FROM PEKING, DJAKARTA, AND PARIS. ALL THREE HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN PROBES ON NEGOTIATIONS. THIS MAY OR MAY NOT-RELATE TO KOSYGIN'S COMMENT IN PARIS THAT PEACE IS UP TO HANOI.

DTG: 02/1436Z JUN 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CPS: 50 IMI 50

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1967 JUL 2 15 17

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP57641

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~ NODIS
CARACAS 002

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-102
By , NARA, Date 8-11-93

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH LEONI PROMPTLY SIGNALS HIS GRATITUDE FOR YOUR
RAISING THE VENEZUELA PROBLEM WITH KOSYGIN.

1. LAST NIGHT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY MANTILLA TOLD ME HE HAD SEEN INSTRUCTED BY PRESIDENT LEONI TO REQUEST EMBASSY TO PASS ON TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON LEONI'S DEEP APPRECIATION FOR JUNE 28 LETTER AND LEONI'S INTENTION TO REPLY IN THE COMING WEEK.
2. LEONI SHARES THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER, MANTILLA ADDED, AND REGARDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON INITIATIVE IN TAKING UP THE CUBAN PROBLEM IN THE KOSYGIN CONVERSATIONS AS ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE DESIRE OF THE U.S. TO HELP VENEZUELA IN FACING CUBAN SUBVERSION, AS DISCUSSED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT LEONI AT PUNTA DEL ESTE APRIL 11.

HERON

DTG 021449Z JULY 1967

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

PRESERVATION Q. Y.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 00-73
By cbm, NARA Date 5-1-01

116

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Pres file

Saturday, July 1, 1967 -- 11:05 am

Mr. President:

Herewith:

1. An interesting -- if true -- Soviet statement of limited objectives in re-supplying Cairo with arms, including an alleged Hollybush deal for a Middle East settlement (p. 3).

2. Further reports of Soviet officers being attached to the Egyptian army, with first signs of a nationalising reaction.

If this is their policy -- no war, but deeper and more direct control of Egypt -- it could fall between two stools and fall in time, notably if we can gradually get a Jordan deal and detach the more moderate Arabs.

W. W. Rostow

[redacted]

1.5(c) + 3.4(b)(1)

Item: USSR-Arab States

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAK 00-67
By cb, NARA Date 12-5-00

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

①
• ROUTINE
IN 02285

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
DD, EXO USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

01003:2

CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 01 JULY 1967

COUNTRY: USSR/ARAB STATES/TURKEY/ISRAEL

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

DOI: 25 JUNE 1967

SUBJECT: SOVIET POSITION MIDEAST SITUATION

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

- [REDACTED]
1. A. ARE YOU SHIPPING WEAPONS TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES?
 - B. THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS WAS TO START AFTER THE SIGNING OF A NEW MILITARY AID PACT DURING THE RECENT VISIT OF USSR CHIEF OF STAFF MARSHALL MATVEY VASIL'YEVICH ZAKHAROV TO CAIRO. I THINK

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

WEAPONS ARE BEING LOADED ON SHIPS IN ODESSA AND OTHER BLACK SEA PORTS, PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF A PACT. SOME FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHED REPORTS THAT THE USSR WAS TRANSPORTING ARMS TO ARAB COUNTRIES BY AIR. THE EXPLANATION FOR THIS IS THAT CERTAIN SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT AT ARAB AIRPORTS WAS DAMAGED. REPLACEMENTS ARE BEING AIR SHIPPED AND REPAIRS STARTED IMMEDIATELY.

2. A. IN YOUR OPINION, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE ARAB STATES TO START FIGHTING AGAIN?

B. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY ARMY WHICH HAS BEEN SO BADLY DEFEATED BOTH MORALLY AND MATERIALLY TO GO INTO A WAR WHICH WOULD LAST FOR MONTHS, OR EVEN YEARS. THE ARABS VERY CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THEY DO NOT ACT LOGICALLY. THIS TIME THE USSR IS PROVIDING WEAPONS WITH THE CONDITION THAT THEY BE USED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES AND UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES FOR OFFENSIVE MEASURES. THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING THESE ARMS IS TO INCREASE ARAB MORALE AND TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA WHICH IS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

LOWERING OUR PRESTIGE WITH THE ARABS. WE HAVE EXPLAINED THIS TO PRESIDENT NASIR. HE MAY NOT LIKE IT, BUT WE DON'T CATCH THESE WEAPONS FROM THE SEA. HE WON'T BE PAYING FOR THE DAMAGED WEAPONS FOR THE NEXT FIVE OR TEN YEARS. FOR NASIR TO BECOME INVOLVED IN A WAR WOULD NOT ONLY BE FOOLISH BUT WOULD BE COMMITTING SUICIDE.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

3. A. WHAT SACRIFICES SHOULD BE MADE BY BOTH SIDES IN ORDER TO REACH AN AGREEMENT; IN OTHER WORDS WHAT SACRIFICES DOES THE SOVIET UNION EXPECT THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS TO MAKE?

B. AS WAS AGREED IN THE FIRST MEETING BETWEEN PREMIER KOSYGIN AND PRESIDENT JOHNSON, WE SHALL PUT PRESSURE ON THE ARABS TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A REALITY. IN RETURN, WE WILL TRY TO PRESS THE ISRAELIS TO AGREE TO THE FOLLOWING: (1) TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY THEY OCCUPIED IN THE RECENT HOSTILITIES; (2) TO PAY INDEMNITY TO CIVILIANS WHO SUFFERED DAMAGES DURING THE FIGHTING; (3) TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

4. A. ISRAEL WANTS TO BE RECOGNIZED BY THE ARABS, AND THE ARABS DON'T WANT TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT?

B. WHEN ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE CONDITIONS WE PUT FORTH, THE ARABS WILL HAVE TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL SO THEY CAN NEGOTIATE THE DETAILS. IN THIS CASE, THE QUESTION WILL BE WHICH OF THE CONDITIONS SHOULD BE MET FIRST. IN OTHER WORDS, WHICH SHOULD COME FIRST. SHOULD ISRAEL FIRST WITHDRAW FROM THE LAND THEY HAVE OCCUPIED, OR SHOULD THE ARABS FIRST RECOGNIZE ISRAEL. ANYWAY, IF ISRAEL CARRIES OUT ITS OBLIGATION UNDER THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT, THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE ARABS SHOULD NOT START NEGOTIATIONS. IF NASIR ACTS STUBBORNLY THEN HE WILL HAVE TO LEAVE LEADERSHIP TO ANOTHER WHO WOULD ACCEPT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT.

5. A. WHAT DO THE SOVIETS THINK ABOUT THE TURKISH POLICY AND ATTITUDE?

B. THE TURKISH POLICY DURING THE CRISIS IS INSPIRED BY AND A RESULT OF THE NEW PRINCIPLE OF FRIENDLY

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(classification)

RELATIONS WITH ARABS. IF IT WERE A RESULT OF ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL POLICY, THEN IT WOULD BE, LIKE ALL OTHER MUSLIM COUNTRIES, TO OPENLY OPPOSE ISRAEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL OF THE DEMIREL CABINET ATTRACTS OUR ATTENTION AS A FOREIGN MINISTER WHO CAN CALMLY AND WITH RESERVE SEE THE FUTURE. THUS HE IS ALSO PREVENTING THE ANTI-TURKISH PROPAGANDA WHICH WE COULD MAKE IN THESE COUNTRIES. IN THE EVENT THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET RUSSIA ALSO AGREE ON OTHER PROBLEMS, THEN TURKISH POLICY IN THE PAST WILL NATURALLY BE CONSIDERED BY BOTH THE ARABS AND U.S.. DURING THIS CURRENT CRISIS, IT WOULD NOT BE WISE FOR TURKEY TO BE ON THE SAME SIDE WITH ISRAEL. GENERAL OPINION WOULD BE WITH THE OPPOSITION. THUS WE CONSIDER THIS ATTITUDE IN FOREIGN POLICY NOT A "DRIFT TO NEUTRALITY", BUT A LOGICAL POLICY IMPOSED BY FACTS.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCMEAFSA CINCUSNAVEUR CINCSOUTH
(PERSONAL).

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-101
By CS, NARA, Date 4-21-95

117

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, July 1, 1967
10:55 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is an interesting and lucid summary of the war and where the Middle East forces now stand.

It notes in passing (p. 9) that the Russians have sent no bombers to Egypt and Syria since hostilities ended -- a hopeful sign.

The marked passage on p. 2 is interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

30 June 1967
DIAISUP-181-67
DIA Intelligence Supplement
Review of the Arab-Israeli Hostilities

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-67
By cb, NARA Date 12-5-00

118

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 1, 1967
10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two views of the North
Vietnamese situation.

1. Summary of a relatively complacent
military analysis published in a Hanoi
military journal, ruling out negotiations.
2. A more disabused view from a
Soviet bloc observer in Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

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WWRostow:rla

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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CONFIDENTIAL

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RIIMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RIIMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE
RIHKKQA/CINCPAC
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-100
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 29244

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: SAIGON 27554 (NOTAL)

SUBJ: VAN TIEN DUNG ANALYZES NVN DRY-SEASON SUCCESSES

1. THE AUTHORITATIVE ARTICLE IN THE JUNE ISSUE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) JOURNAL QUAN DOI NHAN DAN BY NVA CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL VAN TIEN DUNG PROVIDES BEST INSIGHT WE HAVE HAD INTO CURRENT NVN MILITARY OUTLOOK ON DEFENSE AGAINST US BOMBINGS, AND CAPABILITY OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TO COPE WITH US

ATTACKS WITHOUT GREATER EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE EVEN IF FURTHER ESCALATION TAKES PLACE.

2. VAN TIEN DUNG MAKES THE SAME SANGUINE ASSERTIONS AS HAVE OTHER RECENT NVN/VC PROCLAMATIONS THAT THE DRY-SEASON WAS A DEFENSIVE VICTORY OVER U.S. DUNG STATES:

- A) NVN OVERCAME SUPERIOR US FIREPOWER, AND MORALE REMAINS UNSHAKEN.
- B) INFILTRATION WAS SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAINED, AND US ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE THE BATTLEFIELD FAILED. ARVN CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE.
- C) CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALIST SYSTEM IN NORTH KEPT PACE DESPITE BOMBING. FULL MOBILIZATION OF ALL RESOURCES PROVED SUCCESSFUL.
- D) US AIR FORCES SUFFERED GRAVE DAMAGE MATERIALLY AND IN PRESTIGE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-2- SAIGON 29244 6/30/67

E) US HAS BEEN DRIVEN INTO PASSIVE STRATEGIC POSITION WITH ITS SOUTHERN FORCES SCATTERED AND ITS ATTACK ON THE NORTH A FAILURE. CONCURRENTLY NVA/VC COORDINATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WAS STRENGTHENED.

3. DUNG DRAWS THREE STRATEGIC LESSONS FOR NVN WHICH COMPLEMENT FIVE LESSONS TRUONG SON SIMILARLY ENUMERATED FOR VC IN SOUTH IN MAY ISSUE OF QUAN DOI NHAN DAN (SEE REFTEL):

A) CORRECTLY EVALUATE THE ENEMY, BE DETERMINED, AND BE PREPARED: DUNG SAYS THE US HAS MOUNTED A "WAR OF DESTRUCTION." HOWEVER, US AIR FORCES CANNOT FREELY USE THEIR SUPERIOR STRENGTH TO ATTACK NORTH MASSIVELY ON STRATEGIC SCALE. US EFFORT IS "NOT YET" ALL-OUT AND THEREFORE IT CAN BE COPE WITH. LAW OF WAR OF DESTRUCTION IS THAT US MUST ESCALATE IN NORTH TO COUNTER DEFEATS IN SOUTH. US DEFEATS ARE GROWING AND NVN HOLDS THE INITIATIVE; THEREFORE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE REJECTED AND DEFENSE OF NORTH STIFFENED. POLITICAL ISOLATION RESTRICTS US ABILITY TO USE ITS STRENGTH. US AIR FORCE TACTICS DO NOT MATCH CONDITONS AND ARE AWKWARD. TARGETS ARE TOO SMALL, OFTEN MOVING, AND TOO DISPERSED FOR SOPHISTICATED US WEAPONRY. US AIRCRAFT LOSSES NOW SURPASS REPLACEMENT CAPACITY AND PILOT SHORTAGE IS SERIOUS. CENTRAL PROBLEM FOR NVN IS TO INSURE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION.

B) CONTINUE TO PROSECUTE PEOPLE'S WAR AND RELY ON OWN STRENGTH THROUGH FULL MOBILIZATION WHILE SEEKING INTERNATIONAL AID: DUNG NOTES DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PEOPLE'S WAR IN SOUTH AND IN NORTH, AND STATES THAT THE WAR WILL END "ONLY" WHEN US IS COMPLETELY DEFEATED IN SVN. HE WARNS NVN MUST PREPARE TO COPE WITH NEW ESCALATION, "INCLUDING THE ENEMY'S DISPATCH OF HIS ARMY TO RAID THE NORTH." HOWEVER, HE STRESSES "WE MUST RELY MAINLY ON OUR OWN STRENGTH." DUNG REPEATS THEME OF SELF-RELIANCE (CALLING IT AN "IDEOLOGY") THREE TIMES IN DISCUSSING FOREIGN AID TO NVN.

C) BUILD AIR DEFENSE: CHIEF MILITARY PROBLEM FACING NVN IS HOW TO APPLY CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCES OF PEOPLE'S WAR TO THE AIR WAR THE US IS WAGING. JETS AND MISSILES HAVE WEAK POINTS IN DEFENSE. SOLUTION IS "EFFECTIVE MULTI-STRATA NET OF FIRE EVERYWHERE...", AND CLOSE COORDINATION OF CONVERGING DEFENSE ARMS AT ALL ALTITUDES AND DISTANCES WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS AS THE CORE. HE SAYS EVEN US GENERALS MUST RECOGNIZE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NVN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- SAIGON 29244 6/30/67

AIR DEFENSE WHICH HAS PREVAILED OVER US TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY. THIS IS A NEW, CREATIVE ADDITION TO THE THEORY OF PEOPLE'S WAR, HE CONCLUDES.

4. COMMENT: A) DUNG'S ARTICLE IS FOR PROFESSIONAL NVN MILITARY READERS AND IS RELATIVELY SOBER ANALYSIS ALTHOUGH IT IS AIMED ALSO AT ENCOURAGING HARD-PRESSED AIR DEFENSE UNITS. HE INDICATES NVN INTENDS TO RELY ON REGULAR ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS RATHER THAN SAM OR MIG BUILD-UP IN AIR DEFENSES. HE MAKES NO REFERENCE TO SOVIETS WHEN HE DISCUSSES THE SUCCESS OF AIR DEFENSES, AND BY DISPARAGING EFFECTIVENESS OF JETS AND MISSILES ("SUITABLE ONLY IN SOME COMBAT SITUATIONS,") HE ALMOST DISDAINS SOVIET AID. HE AVOIDS ANY REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION OF A BOMBING CESSATION, AND IN FACT GIVES THE IMPRESSION OF LOOKING FORWARD TO A STEP-UP IN ATTACKS.

B) IN UNDERLINING THAT NVN MUST RELY ON STRENGTH, SOLVE ITS OWN PROBLEMS, AND DEVELOP INDEPENDENT SPIRIT IN FACE OF ANTICIPATED US

ESCALATION, DUNG DISSOCIATES NVA FROM DEPENDENCE ON CHICOM ARMY OR AIR FORCE, EVEN DOCTRINALLY. HE IMPLIES HANOI WILL NOT CALL FOR DIRECT CHICOM MILITARY HELP EVEN IF THE US INVADES NVN. ALTHOUGH THE THEME OF SELF-RELIANCE IS STANDARD, THIS IS ABOUT THE STRONGEST EXPRESSION OF NVN MILITARY INDEPENDENCE HANOI HAS ALLOWED TO BE EXPRESSED THROUGH SUCH AN AUTHORITATIVE VOICE. IT MATCHES THE TONE OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE FROM THE MAOISTS WHICH WAS EXPRESSED IN THE MAY HOC TAP ARTICLE.

C) IN LINE WITH THE JUNE 7 NVA COMMUNIQUE AND NHAN DAN EDITORIAL, THE TRUONG SON ARTICLE IN MAY, AND SEVERAL RECENT STATEMENTS BY NGUYEN CHI THANH AND VO NGUYEN GIAP, THE DUNG ARTICLE MANIFESTS A GROWING MILITARY CAST OF LATE TO HANOI PRONOUNCEMENTS. QUESTIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS OR SETTLEMENT ARE CURTLY DISMISSED IN THIS ATMOSPHERE OF HEIGHTENED MILITANCY.

BUNKER

CONFIDENTIAL

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(classification)


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EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

2. TO PROTECT AND CONSERVE FUEL SUPPLIES, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AVOID THE USE OF CENTRALIZED DUMPS BUT HAVE SMALL SUPPLIES SCATTERED "EVERYWHERE", ALONG ROADS, ETC., AND FREQUENTLY CONSISTING OF ONLY A FEW JERRYCANS.

3. DURING AN AMERICAN AIR RAID, A BOMB FELL IN HANOI A FEW YARDS FROM THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMBASSY. SOVIET AND BLOC OFFICIALS IN HANOI BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS A NEAR MISS ON A CHINESE RADIO STATION HOUSED IN THE EMBASSY WHICH HAD BEEN TARGETTED BY THE BOMBER.

4. A POLISH DELEGATION COMPRISING A NUMBER OF SENIOR FIELD GRADE OFFICERS HEADED BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL TADEUSZ TUCHAPSKI, DEPUTY CHIEF, INSPECTORATE OF TRAINING, POLISH ARMED FORCES, IS CURRENTLY IN NORTH VIETNAM TO STUDY THE TACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE WAR. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NO POLISH MILITARY ADVISORS PERMANENTLY IN NORTH VIETNAM. A FEW POLISH PILOTS HAD BEEN THERE PREVIOUSLY.

5.  DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Saturday, July 1, 1967
10:45 a. m.

119
Pres file

Mr. President:

The last paragraph belongs in the man-bites-dog category.

I met Widjojo. He is a first-rate, U. S. trained economist with, apparently, real influence on Suharto.

His main non-economic point with me was: Suharto is a good man but with little knowledge of the outside world. He implied it would be good if he could come to the U. S., among other places.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Mr Rostow

117a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date of Meeting: June 27, 1967

SUBJECT: Indonesian Economic Policies

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Senate:

Senator Frank J. Lausche (D., Ohio)
Senator Karl E. Mundt (R., South Dakota)
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Iowa)
Senator Clifford P. Case (R., New Jersey) (part of time)
Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff, Committee on Foreign
Relations (part of time)
James G. Lowenstein, Staff, Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations

Government of Indonesia:

Professor Widjojo Nitisastro, Chief of Presidium
Economic Advisory Staff, Government of Indonesia
Abdul Hamid, Economic Minister, Embassy of Indonesia

AID:

John C. Bullitt, AA/EA
Stokes M. Tolbert, AID Representative, Indonesia

COPIES TO: A/AID, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Poats; EA/State, Mr. Bundy,
Mr. Barnett; White House, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Jordan;
Ambassador Green, Djakarta

The purpose of the meeting was to introduce Professor Widjojo to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to brief them on the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group (IGG) on aid to Indonesia, held at Scheveningen June 19-21. Mr. Bullitt summarized the results of the Scheveningen meeting, noting that the entire amount of Indonesia's estimated foreign aid needs of \$200 million for FY 1967 had now been pledged, and that the International Monetary Fund had strongly endorsed the progress of the Indonesian stabilization program, and referred to the reduction of the inflation rate from 800% in 1966 to 35% thus far this year and an estimated 80% for the year as a whole. He reviewed the role of the U.S. Government in the IGG and the status of our commitments (\$33 million) to date

against our total pledge of \$65 million. He stressed the multilateral nature of our participation. Mr. Tolbert gave a brief summary of the scope and the status of the stabilization program and related economic developments, after which the meeting took the form of a question-and-answer session, with Professor Widjojo responding to the Senators' queries on a wide range of topics.

The Senators were particularly interested in and sympathetic toward the efforts of the new government to move toward reliance on the market mechanism and away from the controls of the Sukarno era. There were a number of questions regarding the return to foreign owners of property which had been nationalized, the treatment of foreign capital, and related steps to stimulate private enterprise, both domestic and foreign. The Senators were much interested in the outlook for political stability in Indonesia. There was intensive questioning regarding the extent to which the discipline and sacrifices imposed by the stabilization program affected domestic support for Acting President Suharto, which they felt was critical to the success of the Indonesian turnaround. There were also questions regarding the extent to which the Indonesian people wanted the friendship of the United States and also regarding the Indonesian attitude toward the United States role in the multilateral assistance effort.

The questioning was very friendly throughout and the Senators appeared strongly impressed with Professor Widjojo's competence and sincerity and his grasp of the issues raised. His replies were forthright and candid and, whether fortuitously or planned, appeared precisely tailored for maximum favorable impact with the Senators. At one point, for example, when asked about efforts to raise domestic revenues, Professor Widjojo noted that Acting President Suharto had taken a strong public stand that Indonesia could not expect foreigners to tax themselves to assist Indonesia unless Indonesia was making the maximum effort to collect taxes from its own citizens.

Senator Lausche and Senator Mundt pursued in some detail the nature and extent of our 1967 commitments and our plans for 1968. The FY 1968 Congressional presentation for Indonesia was discussed and, after insistence from Senator Lausche, Mr. Bullitt mentioned that the presentation contains a request for \$20 million of DL funds for Indonesia. He stated that we were counting on PL 480 to fill the balance of our commitment for CY 1967 and, except for the DL \$20 million, any balance of a 1968 commitment.

At the close of the meeting, Senator Mundt volunteered the observation that there was "not enough" AID money in the proposed program for Indonesia, and he "could not see how" we could meet our commitments to Indonesia. Senator Lausche commended Professor Widjojo on the stabilization program.

Drafting Officer: AID Rep. ^{JMT} SMTolbert:11
Date of Preparation: June 28, 1967

120

Pres file

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, July 1, 1967
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President

Herewith a Memcon of the
Vice President's talk with President
Park.

W. W. Rostow

VIPTO 3

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 7-9-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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By ju, NARA, Date 12-18-92

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1967 JUN 30 AM 8 58

EXDIS

VIPTO 3

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN THE VICE PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT PARK
CHUNG HUI, FRIDAY, JUNE 30, 10:45 AM. (THE BLUE HOUSE)

ATTENDING ON THE KOREAN SIDE WERE:

PRESIDENT PARK
PRIME MINISTER IL KWON CHUN
CHIEF SECRETARY LEE RUI RAK
VICE FOREIGN MINISTER KIM YOUNG CHOU

PAGE 2 RUALOS 7076/1 ~~SECRET~~

PRESS SECRETARY TO PRESIDENT SHUNN
CHIEF OF PROTOCOL AND INTERPRETER COLONEL CHO SO-HANG

AMERICAN SIDE:

VICE PRESIDENT
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES GEORGE NEWMAN
TED VAN DYK, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
JOHN RIELLY, ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT
RON MYERS, EMBASSY OFFICER (INTERPRETER)

THE VICE PRESIDENT OPENED THE HOUR AND A QUARTER MEETING BY
EXPRESSING HIS REGRETS THAT MRS. HUMPHREY WAS ILL AND THEREFORE
UNABLE TO ACCOMPANY HIM. SHE HAD SENT A LETTER FOR MRS. PARK.
PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED HIS REGRETS ON BEHALF OF MRS. PARK THAT
MRS. HUMPHREY WAS UNABLE TO COME

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WANTED TO GIVE PRESIDENT
PARK A REPORT ON THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT PARK AND
~~SECRET~~ WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 7076, JUNE 30 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

PAGE 3 RUALOS 7076/1 ~~SECRET~~

PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN OUTLINED THE DISCUSSIONS AS DETAILED BY THE PRESIDENT AT THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING, COVERING THE SUBJECTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, VIETNAM, NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS LIMITATIONS AND CUBA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, AND SECRETARY RIJSK AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. THIS MORNING'S PAPERS CARRIED A REPORT THAT AN AGREEMENT TO TABLE A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AT GENEVA HAD BEEN REACHED BY THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

ON THE ISSUE OF CUBA THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED REPORTS INDICATING THAT PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN TOLD CASTRO IN HAVANA THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT SUPPORT GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, WHICH SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT HAD COME EFFECT.

THE OVER-ALL RESULT OF THE JOHNSON-KOSYGIN TALKS WAS NOT A SOLUTION OF PRECISE ISSUES, BUT A "CLEARING OF THE AIR."

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THEIR RESULTS WOULD NOT BE FULLY KNOWN FOR MANY MONTHS. PRESIDENT JOHNSON IMPRESSED KOSYGIN AS A MAN WHO COULD GIVE A CLEAR AND FORCEFUL EXPOSITION OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE IMPORTANT ISSUES OF THE DAY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ADDED HE WAS PLEASED TO GIVE PRESIDENT PARK THE FIRST REPORT ON THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE PERSONALLY GIVEN TO A HEAD OF STATE BY A RANKING U.S. OFFICIAL, BECAUSE KOREA IS A CLOSE FRIEND AND LOYAL ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT PARK'S INQUIRY IF KOSYGIN HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO PRESENT THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT WE BELIEVE KOSYGIN WAS INSTRUCTED BY MOSCOW OVER THE WEEKEND OF THE TALKS AND THAT THE SECOND DISCUSSION REFLECTS THESE INSTRUCTIONS.

PRESIDENT PARK ASKED IF IT IS THEREFORE TRUE THAT NO CHANGE IN POLICY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS REVEALED IN THE TALKS. THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT THIS IS CORRECT; NO CHANGE IN POLICY EMERGED IN THE CONVERSATIONS.

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-3- SEOUL 7076, JUNE 30 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

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ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THEY ALSO INCLUDED THE SUBJECT OF CHINA. KOSYGIN'S REMARKS REFLECTED THE SAME CONCERN ABOUT CHINA THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED IN DECEMBER OF LAST YEAR IN LONDON IN HIS TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON. HIS REMARKS REFLECTED THE SAME PREOCCUPATION WITH CHINA THAT WAS EXPRESSED IN HIS EARLIER CONVERSATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT IN FACT BE BECOMING TOO FRIENDLY WITH RED CHINA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT INQUIRED ABOUT PRESIDENT PARK'S ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM SITUATION TODAY.

PRESIDENT PARK DID NOT DIRECTLY RESPOND, BUT FIRST INQUIRED HOW THE SOVIET UNION RATES THE PROBLEM OF VIETNAM IN COMPARISON TO THE MIDDLE EAST. WHAT HAS PRIORITY TODAY?

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HIS OWN PERSONAL IMPRESSION IS THAT SOVIET LEADERS GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. TODAY THE SOVIET INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS CENTERED ON SYRIA AND INCREASINGLY ON ALGERIA. THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IS GRADUALLY ASSUMING A STATUS SIMILAR TO CUBA -- IN WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS THE SENIOR PARTNER IN AN UNHAPPY MARRIAGE.

GP -1. NEWMAN
BT

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VIPTO 3

PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT IN A DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WITH PROFESSOR ROGER HILSMAN, WHO HAD JUST HAD DISCUSSIONS OF VIETNAM WITH SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW, HILSMAN TOLD HIM THAT SOVIET LEADERS INSISTED THAT IF THE UNITED STATES STOPPED BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD EXERT PRESSURE ON HANOI TO CURTAIL INFILTRATION OF REGULAR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. THEY CLAIMED NO CONTROL OVER THE VIET CONG AND LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO END THE WAR BUT TO DEESCALATE IT. IN THEIR ESTIMATE, CHINA IS READY TO INTERVENE TO HELP NORTH VIETNAM IF SHE IS SUFFICIENTLY WEAKENED. IF SUCH A SITUATION SHOULD ARISE, RUSSIA WOULD BE

PAGE 2 RUALCS 7076/2 ~~SECRET~~
COMPELLED TO COME TO THE AID OF NORTH VIETNAM. PRESIDENT PARK ASKED IF THESE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT HE KNEW ROGER HILSMAN WELL AND THAT HILSMAN UNDOUBTEDLY GAVE THE PRESIDENT A SPECIAL VIEW ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION, A VIEW FAVORING STOPPING THE BOMBING, EMPHASIZING CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE DIRECT INTERVENTION BY CHINA IN THE WAR, AND WHAT THE SOVIET RESPONSE WOULD BE TO CHINESE INTERVENTION. UNITED STATES OFFICIALS HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS EVERY POSSIBILITY FOR DEESCALATING THE WAR. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN REPEATED THE PRESIDENT'S SUMMARY TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF WHAT HE TOLD KOSYGIN ON VIETNAM.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD REPORTED THAT KOSYGIN'S POSITION WAS RIGID AND FAMILIAR: THE UNITED STATES SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING AND GET OUT OF VIETNAM.

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-2- Seoul 7076, June 30 (SECTION 2 OF 2).

AS TO RUSSIAN INTERVENTION, NO ONE CAN REALLY TELL FOR SURE. BUT RECENT EXPERIENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN WHICH THE ARABS FEEL THE

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SOVIETS LET THEM DOWN, SUGGESTS THAT IN A DIRECT CONFLICT INVOLVING A THREAT TO SOVIET VITAL INTERESTS, THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO BACK DOWN REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE INTERESTS OF AN ALLY SUFFER. HE DOUBTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY IN VIETNAM THAN IT DID IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY WILL TRY TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED

STATES, AND WE HAVE TRIED TO AVOID ANY CONFRONTATION AND HAVE THEREFORE CAREFULLY AVOIDED BOMBING HAIPHONG HARBOR.

IN ALL OF THESE QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN THE VIETNAMESE CONFLICT, WE WILL CONSULT WITH ALL OUR ALLIES AND MOST CLOSELY WITH THOSE MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED SUCH AS SOUTH VIETNAM AND KOREA.

PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT HE HAD REFERRED TO HIS DISCUSSION WITH PROFESSOR HILSMAN BECAUSE HE HAD LONG BELIEVED THAT HE HAD A PREJUDICED VIEW OF THE VIETNAM STRUGGLE. HE HAD EXTENDED AN INTERVIEW ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR 10 MINUTES TO 40 MINUTES IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN TO HILSMAN AT LENGTH THE RATIONALE BEHIND KOREAN PARTICIPATION IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT. PARK TOLD HILSMAN THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WITH WHOM HE SPOKE IN MOSCOW OR HOW IMPORTANT THE OFFICIALS

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WERE. BUT HE FELT THAT, WHEN THE SOVIETS TOLD HILSMAN THAT THE CHINESE MIGHT INTERVENE IF NORTH VIETNAM BECAME WEAK, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT BE ATTEMPTING TO BLACKMAIL THE UNITED STATES. THEY ASSUMED OF COURSE THAT HILSMAN, AS A FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, WOULD PASS ON THEIR VIEWS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THOSE WHO CALL FOR A STOPPING OF THE BOMBING ARE MISCALCULATING. IF HANOI DID WITHDRAW REGULAR TROOPS AT THE INSTIGATION OF MOSCOW, BOTH WOULD OF COURSE INSIST ON A RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORCES. THEN THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM WOULD EQUIP AND SUPPLY THE VIET CONG IN THE SOUTH AND WE WOULD BE BACK WHERE WE WERE IN THE BEGINNING. THIS IS WHAT CHINA WOULD LIKE. PARK NOTED THAT HILSMAN REPORTED NO SOVIET CLAIM THAT HANOI WOULD STOP SUPPLYING THE VIET CONG. PARK ASKED IF THE VIEWS OF PROFESSOR HILSMAN REPRESENT THE MAIN THRUST OF THE CRITICISM MADE IN THE UNITED STATES OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY IN VIETNAM.

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-3 - Seoul 7076, June 30 (SECTION 2 OF 2).

THE VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT PERHAPS PRESIDENT PARK WAS MORE PERSUASIVE IN EXPLAINING AMERICAN POLICY TO CRITICS LIKE HILSMAN THAN MANY AMERICAN SPOKESMEN. PRESIDENT PARK WAS CORRECT IN REGARDING HILSMAN AS A REPRESENTATIVE CRITIC. HILSMAN SUPPORTS CESSATION OF THE

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BOMBING OF THE NORTH, BUT DOES NOT SUPPORT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THE QUESTION OF THE BOMBING IS ALWAYS UNDER REVIEW. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHAT EFFECT IT HAS ON LOGISTICS, MORALE, INFILTRATION, AND THE PROGRESS OF THE FIGHTING. SOME CRITICS TRY TO DRAW A SHARP DICOTOMY BETWEEN BOMBING OR NO BOMBING, AS IF THAT WERE THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE.

PRESIDENT PARK STATED THAT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THE SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM PROBLEM CAN BE BASED ON THREE BASIC PREMISES: (1) CONTINUING MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY; (2) CAREFUL SUPPORT OF THE PROCESS OF BUILDING CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM; (3) OPENING OF ALL AVENUES OF DISCUSSION AND DIALOG TOWARD A POSSIBLE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN VIETNAM. IN THEIR VIEW THERE IS NO OTHER POSSIBLE WAY TO SOLVE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM THAN THIS WAY, WHICH IS THE POLICY BEING PURSUED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE KATZENBACH WILL BE GOING TO VIETNAM THIS WEEKEND TO REVIEW THE QUESTIONS OF TROOP LEVELS, THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, THE POLITICAL SITUATION, AND PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL

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GOVERNMENT.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE AGREED WITH PRESIDENT PARK'S ANALYSIS. ONE THING SECRETARY MCNAMARA AND SECRETARY KATZENBACH WOULD BE EXAMINING CLOSELY IS THE MANPOWER NEEDS IN VIETNAM TODAY. WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH PRIME MINISTER HOLT OF AUSTRALIA AND IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH OUR OTHER ALLIES INCLUDING KOREA.

WE BELIEVE THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT CAN BE VERY HELPFUL IN EDUCATING THE LEADERSHIP OF SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND PACIFICATION ARE ESSENTIAL TO SUCCESS IN VIETNAM. MILITARY PROGRESS ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. IN THIS DELICATE AND VITAL SUBJECT OF BELIEVED DEVELOPMENT, KOREAN LEADERS CAN PERHAPS HAVE MORE INFLUENCE

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-4- Seoul 7076, June 30 (SECTION 2 OF 2).

THAN THE UNITED STATES. PERHAPS THE PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER, AND TH
IR
COLLEAGUES WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE
VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION, MR. CHIEU.
ANYTHING THE KOREANS CAN DO TO IMPRESS UPON PRESIDENT THIEU AND

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PRIME MINISTER BY THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL FIELD
WILL BE INVALUABLE.

PRESIDENT PARK RESPONDED HALF HUMOROUSLY THAT SINCE HE IS HAVING
HIS OWN TROUBLES WITH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN KOREA, HE IS NOT
SURE THAT HE CAN ADVISE OTHERS. BUT HE WILL DO WHAT HE CAN WITH THE
VIETNAMESE LEADERS. HE SHARED IN THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VIEW OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND IS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER OF 1967, ESPECIALLY
ABOUT THE RIVALRY BETWEEN KY AND THIEU. HE ASKED IF WE HAVE ANY
INDICATION THAT EITHER KY OR THIEU MIGHT WITHDRAW.

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT, IF VIETNAM CAN HAVE AN ELECTION
AS GOOD AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN KOREA - AND IF THE RESULTS
COME OUT AS WELL - WE WILL BE VERY PLEASED INDEED. AT THE MOMENT
WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT EITHER KY OR THIEU WILL WITHDRAW.
WHEN AMBASSADOR PORTER RETURNS TO KOREA, HE WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE PRESI-
DENT PARK A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM.
BECAUSE OF THE AMBASSADOR'S LONG EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM AND HIS LONG
SERVICE IN COUNTRIES WHERE GUERRILLA WARFARE WAS TAKING PLACE,

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HE IS EMINENTLY WELL QUALIFIED TO GIVE AN ANALYSIS OF THE WHOLE
VIETNAM SITUATION. THIS APPOINTMENT WILL BE VERY HELPFUL IN
MAINTAINING CLOSE CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH
VIETNAM, AND KOREA.

THE VICE PRESIDENT STATED THAT HE WANTED TO BRING UP THE SUBJECT
OF KIMCHI WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
HE DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA LAST WEEK,
AND THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR
EACH KOREAN SOLDIER SERVING IN VIETNAM ONE FULL MEAL RATION PER DAY.
THIS WILL BE DONE THROUGH A TIED LETTER OF CREDIT. THE EMBASSY
HERE WILL CONSULT THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT ON HOW THIS WILL BE
HANDLED. U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE ASKED THAT THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF
THIS DECISION BE HELD UP UNTIL ON OR AFTER JULY 3.

PRESIDENT PARK EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THIS DECISION.

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-5- Seoul 7076, June 30 (SECTION 2 OF 2).

HE AND MADAME PARK HAD RECEIVED MANY LETTERS FROM KOREAN SOLDIERS ASKING FOR KINCHI. THEREFORE MADAME PARK ESPECIALLY APPRECIATES THIS DECISION. IN A WAY HE AND MADAME PARK FOUND THEMSELVES IN A SITUATION COMPARABLE TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MRS. JOHNSON

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RECEIVING LETTERS FROM AMERICAN GI'S ASKING FOR BUTTER. THE VICE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT WE KNEW OF THESE LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND MADAME PARK AND WE WERE DELIGHTED TO KNOW THIS WOULD PLEASE MADAME PARK AS WE THOUGHT VERY HIGHLY OF HER.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WANTED TO ADD THAT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TROWBRIDGE WOULD BE VISITING KOREA IN OCTOBER, FOLLOWING DISCUSSIONS WHICH PRIME MINISTER KWON HAD IN WASHINGTON EARLIER THIS YEAR.

PRESIDENT PARK SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE VICE PRESIDENT ON SUNDAY AT 10 WHEN THEY WOULD MEET TOGETHER WITH OTHER ASIAN LEADERS ATTENDING THE INAUGURATION. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED AND WOULD ALSO BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS WITH PRESIDENT PARK ANY OTHER SUBJECTS OF CONCERN TO HIM - INCLUDING PROCUREMENT IN VIETNAM - BEFORE HE LEFT KOREA NEXT MONDAY.

GP-1. NEUMAN

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Friday - ^{July 1} June 30, 1967
7:30 pm

121
sent to Rusk
via wire
7/1/67

Mr. President:

Positive statements on the Panama Canal treaties were prepared and given to Mansfield, Boggs and Albert yesterday morning.

Mansfield made his statement. From the wire services you will have seen that Fulbright and Morse have also come out strongly for the treaties. These endorsements counter-balance the adverse comments of the Flood-Sullivan group.

Anticipating the need for strong positive statements on each treaty issue which is likely to draw fire, State is now engaged in an extensive speech-writing exercise. When the contents of the treaties are made known, in another 2-3 weeks, these statements will be given to key members of both Houses. With a signing ceremony involving you and President Robles, and with President Eisenhower in attendance, followed by a barrage of favorable statements in Congress, we hope to seize the initiative in the public treatment of the treaties.

The reaction in Panama to the Monday announcement has so far been quite favorable. It caught the anti-treaty forces of Arnulfo Arias off-guard and they remain on the defensive.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By lig, NARA, Date 2-13-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-68
By cb, NARA Date 2-12-01

122

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Here is Ky's view of his problems
and prospects in the wake of recent
events.

W. W. Rostow

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

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Pres file

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

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PAGE 1 OF 10 PAGES

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GROUP 1
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CITE

DIST 3 JULY 1967

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(C)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 2 JULY 1967
SUBJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND
PRIME MINISTER KY THAT THIEU, AS PRESIDENT,
WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD AND KY, AS VICE PRESIDENT,
WILL RETAIN PRINCIPAL CONTROL AFTER THE ELECTIONS

Rustan
EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. (SUMMARY: IT IS AGREED AMONG PRIME MINISTER KY, CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (AFC) THAT THEIU WILL BE A FIGUREHEAD AS PRESIDENT AND KY WILL BE DE FACTO IN COMMAND. THIEU'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE HAS DECLINED CONSIDERABLY AMONG AFC OFFICERS BECAUSE OF HIS SELF-SEEKING BEHAVIOR DURING THE DELIBERATIONS WHICH PRECEDED THE DECISION TO FORM A JOINT THIEU-KY TICKET. KY'S BIGGEST PROBLEM NOW IS TO EXPLAIN, DISCREETLY, TO HIS BACKERS THAT

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[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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HE WILL ACTUALLY HAVE BROAD AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AS THOUGH HE WERE PRESIDENT IN FACT, AND TO PERSUADE HIS CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION TO WORK FOR THE NEW THIEU-KY SLATE.)

2. CHIEF OF STATE THIEU AND PRIME MINISTER KY HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON WHAT THEIR RESPECTIVE ROLES WILL BE IF ELECTED AS PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. THIEU WILL FUNCTION IN A LIMITED, FIGUREHEAD CAPACITY ONLY, WITH KY AS DE FACTO COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE ONE WITH EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, AND INFORMATION, EACH OF WHICH WILL LIKELY BE HEADED BY A MILITARY OFFICER. KY WILL ALSO SELECT ALL THE CABINET MEMBERS. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE A CIVILIAN; AND ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET BEEN SELECTED, HE WILL PREFERABLY BE SOMEONE WITH A BACKGROUND IN ECONOMICS AND WILL HANDLE THE OTHER MINISTRIES WITH PERHAPS OCCASIONAL GUIDANCE FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT. THIEU UNDERSTANDS THIS ENTIRE ARRANGEMENT CLEARLY AND IS WILLING TO ACCEPT HIS LARGELY TITULAR ROLE. TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING OR LATER MANEUVERING BY THIEU, THE AGREEMENT WILL BE PUT IN WRITING, KEPT ON AN UNOFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, AND WILL BE ACKNOWLEDGED BY BOTH

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THIEU AND KY IN PRESENCE OF THE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL.

3. THERE HAS BEEN A BROAD AND RATHER STRONG REACTION TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE THIEU-KY SLATE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY IN THE PAST TWO DAYS, AND MANY PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE "BABY-TURKS" MILITARY OFFICERS, HAVE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THIS COMBINATION. QUITE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAVE STATED THEY FEEL THAT THIEU MAY BE AN ALBATROSS AS THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SLATE TO WIN DESPITE KY'S OWN CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL POPULARITY AND VOTER APPEAL. THERE IS ALSO THE DISTINCT PROBLEM OF THE GENERAL PERVERSITY OF THE VIETNAMESE, WHO IF FORCED TO ACCEPT SOMEONE THEY DO NOT FAVOR FOR PRESIDENT, SUCH AS THIEU, MAY CAST THEIR VOTES ELSEWHERE SIMPLY TO EXPRESS THEIR DISPLEASURE. KY'S PREVIOUSLY-ORGANIZED AND PERSONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN REQUESTING INSTRUCTIONS FROM KY; AND ITS UNITS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THIS SWITCH IN PLANS AND HAVE ASKED WHETHER THEY SHOULD CONTINUE PROMOTING KY FOR PRESIDENT DESPITE THE AGREEMENT REACHED

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FOR KY TO RUN AS VICE PRESIDENT. KY PLANS TO LET THE EXCITEMENT AND CONFUSION ABATE FOR A FEW MORE DAYS AND THEN INSTRUCT HIS SUPPORTERS EXPLICITLY TO WORK FOR THE THIEU-KY TICKET.

4. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR KY TO EXPLAIN HIS DECISION TO MOVE DOWN TO THE VICE PRESIDENCY, AND PARTICULARLY TO GET THE WORD TO HIS SUPPORTERS IN A SUBTLE FASHION THAT HE WILL HAVE A BROAD AUTHORITY IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THAT THIEU'S ROLE WILL BE TITULAR. INFLUENTIAL VIETNAMESE, INCLUDING BUDDHIST LEADER THICH TAN CHAU, HAVE CONTACTED KY IN THE PAST TWO DAYS TO ASCERTAIN THE RATIONALE BEHIND HIS MOVE. ENLIGHTENING PEOPLE SUCH AS THIS AND LINING UP BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE NEW THIEU-KY TICKET WILL TAKE A GOOD DEAL OF PATIENCE AS WELL AS TIME. IF IT IS TO BE DISCREETLY DONE. GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN HAS EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF TO KY THAT THE LATTER MUST HAVE "LOST HIS MIND" ON THIS MOVE AND HAS SAID HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW KY COULD "LET DOWN" HIS MANY SUPPORTERS WHO REALLY BELIEVE IN HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND IN HIS QUALITIES OF LEADERSHIP. LOAN HAS ACCEPTED THIS TURN

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OF EVENTS, HOWEVER, MUCH AS HE DID HIS OWN RECENT REMOVAL AS CHIEF OF THE MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE, AND LOAN WILL ABIDE BY A RECENT ORDER FROM KY THAT HE STAY OUT OF POLITICS AND ELECTION CAMPAIGN ARRANGEMENTS.

5. KY'S DECISION TO STEP DOWN TO THE ROLE OF VICE PRESIDENT WAS NOT A "POLITICAL" DECISION, IT WAS ARRIVED AT PRIMARILY TO SAVE A BAD SITUATION FROM GETTING WORSE WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HAS BEEN DIVIDED OVER THE THIEU-KY CONFRONTATION. IT MAY DEVELOP HOWEVER, THAT IT WILL ADD TO KY'S POLITICAL STATURE AND INCREASE THE NUMBER OF HIS SUPPORTERS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE MILITARY RANKS. THE ARMED FORCES COUNCIL (AFC) MEETINGS OF 29-30 JUNE WHICH RESULTED IN FORMATION OF THE THIEU-KY TICKET HAVE ALSO RESULTED IN A CONSIDERABLE LESSENING OF THIEU'S PERSONAL PRESTIGE AMONG ALMOST ALL THE AFC OFFICERS WHO HAD THIS OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THIEU CLOSELY AT FIRST HAND DURING THESE MANY CRUCIAL HOURS. THESE OFFICERS GOT A CLEAR IMPRESSION OF HIS LACK OF REAL PATRIOTISM AND HIS TOTAL PREOCCUPATION WITH AND CONCENTRATION ON HIS OWN PERSONAL AMBITIONS, REGARDLESS OF THEIR DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE UNITY OF THE ARMED FORCES AND FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY.

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THE CLINCHER WAS THIEU'S APPARENT AGREEMENT TO ABIDE BY WHATEVER DECISION THE AFC REACHED, EVEN IF IT WAS WITHDRAWAL OF HIS OWN CANDIDACY, AND THIS HE RENEGED ON ONLY A FEW HOURS LATER DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS AFFORDED THE AFC OFFICERS A REAL INSIGHT INTO THIEU'S CHARACTER, AND THEY DID NOT LIKE WHAT THEY SAW. CURIOUSLY, DURING THE LATE EVENING SESSION OF 29 JUNE, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS) GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AND THE FOUR CORPS COMMANDERS HAD CONFERRED PRIVATELY AND RESOLVED TO PRESENT THIEU WITH AN ULTIMATUM EITHER TO ACCEPT THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF THE JGS IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, OR TO RESIGN AS CHIEF OF STATE AND FROM THE ARMED FORCES IMMEDIATELY, AND TO PRESENT HIMSELF ENTIRELY AS A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE FOR PRESIDENT. WHEN GENERAL VIEN CAME INTO THE ROOM TO PRESENT THIS ULTIMATUM TO THIEU, THE LATTER APPARENTLY SENSED THAT IT WAS COMINT, AND IMMEDIATELY ANNOUNCED HE WOULD ACCEPT AND ABIDE BY WHATEVER DECISION THE AFC WOULD REACH. VIEN AND THE CORPS COMMANDERS WERE THUS CLEVERLY LED TO BELIEVE THAT THEIU WOULD WITHDRAW ENTIRELY FROM THE RACE IN FAVOR OF KY, AND THEREFORE THEY DID NOT CONVEY

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(classification)



(dissem controls)

THEIR ULTIMATUM TO THIEU. EARLY THE NEXT MORNING THIEU REVERSED HIMSELF COMPLETELY WITH HIS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HE WOULD ENTER THE RACE FOR PRESIDENT. THIS DUPLICITY, COUPLED WITH KY'S DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE HIS OWN PERSONAL POSITION AND DO WHATEVER WAS REQUIRED OF HIM TO PRESERVE THE UNITY OF THE MILITARY, HAS CONSIDERABLY INCREASED KY'S SUPPORT AND INFLUENCE IN THE MILITARY. MANY OF THE SENIOR ARMED FORCES CO UNCIL OFFICERS PERSONALLY MADE A POINT OF COMMENDING KY FOR HIS DECISION TO STEP DOWN TO THE ROLE OF VICE PRESIDENT, WHILE THIEU WAS LARGELY IGNORED EVEN THOUGH SELECTED AS THEIR PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE. GENERAL VINH LOC, II CORPS COMMANDER, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR KY AS A MAN, INDICATING HE HAD NEVER BEFORE USED THE WORD "ADMIRE" TO DESCRIBE HIS FEELINGS FOR ANOTHER OFFICER, AND GENERAL MINH, ACTING COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE, STATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE PERSONALLY HAD FELT REAL ESTEEM FOR ONE OF HIS SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS.

6. KY'S PRESENT DILEMMA IS THAT ALL OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO GENERATE BROAD POPULAR SUPPORT

FOR THE THIEU-KY TICKET, SINCE IT REQUIRES SUCH A MENTAL

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(Classification)

(dissem. controls)

SHIFTING OF GEARS ON THE PART OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING IN HIS BEHALF AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND WHO NOW HAVE TO BE PERSUADED THAT THEIR EFFORTS MUST BE REDIRECTED TO SUPPORT THIEU FOR PRESIDENT INSTEAD. KY'S CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS WILL HAVE TO BE PERSUADED OF THE WISDOM OF HIS MOVE, AND THE YOUNGER "BABY TURK" MILITARY WILL HAVE TO BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THIS THIEU-KY COMBINATION IS A FACT OF LIFE THEY MUST LIVE WITH. WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN RUMORS OF COUP PLOTTING AMONG THE BABY TURK MILITARY. THERE IS NO SUBSTANCE TO THIS, BUT THIS SORT OF TALK DOES INDICATE HOW MUCH CONSTERNATION THERE IS AMONG SOME OF THE MILITARY OVER THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS. KY WILL WORK HARD AT THE TASK OF ELIMINATING THESE TENSIONS AND PERSUADING HIS SUPPORTERS TO GO ALONG WITH THE NEW ARRANGEMENT ON GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO LEGAL ALTERNATIVE SINCE THE OFFICIAL FILING DEADLINE IS CLOSED.

7. THE MULTIPLICITY OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES (17) AND SENATE LISTS (66) SHOW QUITE CLEARLY THE DIFFICULTIES A PURELY CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION WOULD FACE IF ELECTED IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
(classification)

(dissem controls)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

VIETNAM. THE VARIOUS CIVILIAN POLITICAL GROUPS OR WOULD-BE GROUPS ARE POORLY ORGANIZED AND ARE SO SELF-SEEKING THAT THEY CANNOT GET TOGETHER EVEN TO INSURE THEIR OWN SUCCESS AT THE POLLS. THE MANY SENATE LISTS ARE IN-COMPREHENSIBLE EVEN TO EDUCATED, INTELLIGENT VIETNAMESE, AND TO THE AVERAGE CITIZEN THEY ARE ALMOST USELESS AS A MEANINGFUL LIST FROM WHICH HE CAN SELECT OUR QUALIFIED CANDIDATES OF HIS CHOICE. CONSEQUENTLY, THE SENATE ITSELF WILL PROBABLY BE A DISORGANIZED AND INEFFECTUAL BODY. FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN DO AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN LUU VIEN RECENTLY STATED TO KY THAT THEY NOW REALIZE THE FALLACY OF EXPECTING PURE UNLIMITED DEMOCRACY TO WORK IN TODAY'S VIETNAM, AND CITED THE MANY CUMBERSOME SENATE LISTS AS CASES IN POINT. ANOTHER INTERESTING PROBLEM IS HOW TO PROVIDE EQUAL FACILITIES SUCH AS AIRCRAFT, RADIO-TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPER COVERAGE FOR ALL OF THE 17 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. ALTHOUGH KY WILL ATTEMPT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, IT WILL BE NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE TO ARRANGE FROM A PRACTICAL POINT OF VIEW.

8. KY'S PERSONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS FORMED
~~SECRET~~
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

TO PROMOTE HIS OWN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN WILL LIKELY BE USED TO SUPPORT THE THIEU KY SLATE SINCE THIEU HAS NO ORGANIZATION OF HIS OWN AND WILL PROBABLY NOT MAKE ANY CONCERTED EFFORT TO PUT ONE TOGETHER. ALTHOUGH THIS DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN REACHED, FULL USE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE MADE OF THE KY CAMPAIGN MECHANISM SINCE THE THIEU-KY COMBINATION WILL REQUIRE AN EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION THAN IF KY HIMSELF WERE RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

9 [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR LOCKE, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF, J-2) DIR/JUSPAO [REDACTED] CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

GROUP 1

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

123

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

July 1, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a rather interesting poll showing:

- MEast European popular attitudes are basically pro-Israel;
- the proportions are similar to those in Western Europe and the U.S.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 92-102
 By ing, NARA, Date 8-11-93

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Munich 1054 ROGER channel

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

123a

87-80

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-100

By gW, NARA, Date 5-14-92

Action DE RUFHOL 1054K 1811515
 ZNY CCCCC
 INRD R 301505Z JUN 67
 Info FM AMCONSUL MUNICH
 TO RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
 ES RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
 RSR RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 RSC RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
 RUFUAU/AMEMBASSY SOFIA
 RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
 INFO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN
 RUFHOL/USMISSION BERLIN

027071

1967 JUN 30 PM 4 48

STATE GRNC

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUNICH 1054

ROGER CHANNEL

REF: MUNICH'S 1015 OF JUNE 12

1. FOLLOWING ARE PRELIMINARY RESULTS RFE AUDIENCE RESEARCH ON

PAGE 2 RUFHOL 1054K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 EAST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS TO ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT:

"A. SURVEY WAS FIELDIED STARTING ON JUNE 10, 1967, USING SEVERAL PUBLIC OPINION REASEARCH INSTITUTES UNDER CONTRACT TO THE AUDIENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH DEPARTMENT IN AUSTRIA, SWEDEN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY. WE EXPECT THAT SOME 300 INTER-VIEWS WILL HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE MONTH AND THAT A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS CAN BE ISSUED VERY PROMPTLY. THE SURVEY WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO RUN BEYOND THAT DATE.

"B. AS OF JUNE 28, WE HAVE ADVANCE INFORMATION (MOSTLY TRANSMITTED BY TELEPHONE OR CABLE BY THE INSTITUTES) ON 123 INTERVIEWS CARRIED OUT WITH CZECHS, SLOVAKS, BULGARIANS, HUNGARIANS, POLES, AND ROMANIANS WHO HAVE VISITED WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FIVE NATIONAL SAMPLES ARE AS YET TOO SMALL (THEY RANGE FROM 19 TO 37 CASES) TO BE TREATED SEPARATELY. OVERALL RESULTS, BASED ON THE 123 CASES, PROVIDE FOLLOWING VERY PRELIMINARY INFORMATION: 'WHERE DO YOUR SYMPATHIES LIE IN PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS?' WITH ARABS -- 11 PERCENT; WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- MUNICH 1054, 301505z JUN 67.

ISRAELIS--55 PERCENT; WITH NEITHER SIDE--23 PERCENT; DON'T KNOW, NO ANSWER--11 PERCENT.

"C. THUS, AS FAR AS THESE FIRST INDICATIONS GO, ONLY ONE EAST EUROPEAN IN EVERY TEN ENDORSED THE PRO-ARAB STAND OF THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS (ROMANIAN RESULTS DO NOT DIFFER FROM THE REST OF THE SAMPLE.) A MAJORITY OF EAST EUROPEAN POPULATION SEEMS TO BE OPENLY IN FAVOR OF ISRAELIS, WHILE ONE-THIRD APPEARS TO BE UNDECIDED OR UNWILLING TO DECLARE WHERE THEIR SYMPATHIES LIE. BOTH PRO-ISRAELI AND UNDECIDED GROUPS ARE IN CONFLICT WITH COMMUNIST INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS ACCORDING TO WHICH ARAB COALITION IS INNOCENT VICTIM OF 'JEWISH-FASCIST-IMPERIALIST BLITZKRIEG.'

"D. RESPONSE PATTERN OF 123 EAST EUROPEAN CASES IS SIMILAR TO POLL RESULTS PUBLISHED SINCE JUNE 5 IN WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND UNITED STATES: 'WHERE DO YOUR SYMPATHIES LIE IN PRESENT CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND ISRAELIS?' (OR COMPARABLE WORDING). WITH ARABS--U.S. (GALLUP), 4 PERCENT; GREAT BRITAIN (GALLUP), 5 PERCENT; FRANCE (IFOP), 2 PERCENT; GERMANY (WICKERT), 13

PAGE 4 RUFHOL 1054K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
PERCENT; EAST EUROPE (RFE, APOR), 11 PERCENT. WITH ISRAELIS-U.S. (GALLUP), 55 PERCENT; GREAT BRITAIN (GALLUP), 50 PERCENT; IFOP, 58 PERCENT; WICKERT, 50 PERCENT; RFE, APOR, 55 PERCENT. UNCOMMITTED OR NO ANSWER--U.S. (GALLUP), 41 PERCENT; GREAT BRITAIN (GALLUP), 45 PERCENT; IFOP, 40 PERCENT, WICKERT, 37 PERCENT; RFE, APOR, 34 PERCENT.

"E. EAST EUROPEAN SUPPORT EXPRESSED FOR ARABS ON ONE HAND AND ISRAELIS ON THE OTHER FALL WITHIN RANGE OF DIFFERENT WESTERN POLLS, SHOWING BOTH SIMILARITY OF PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS ISSUE EAST AND WEST AND REALIABILITY OF PUBLIC OPINION POLLING."

2. MEDIA HIGHLY APPRECIATIVE OF ADDRESSEES' PROMPT AND PERCEPTIVE RESPONSES TO THEIR INITIAL QUERY (REFTEL). THEY REMAIN INTERESTED IN THE SUBJECT AND WILL BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR CONTINUED POST REPORTING OF EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ONGOING ASSESSMENT OF EVOLVING ATTITUDES IN RESPECTIVE EE COUNTRIES.

GP-1.
CREEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ LIMD

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUL 1 21 35

VZCZCEEA215
PP WTE10
DE WTE 1369

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67635

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

PURSUANT TO YOUR GUIDANCE COMMUNICATED VIA JIM JONES,
HEREWITH A PROPOSED CABLE TO BONN FROM YOU TO CHANCELLOR
KIESINGER FOR YOUR CLEARANCE.

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER FROM
THE PRESIDENT:

QUOTE

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND LETTER. I FULLY UNDERSTAND
THE REASONS WHY YOU HAVE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY TO POST-
PONE YOUR VISIT HERE THOUGH I, TOO, REGRET THAT WE
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TALK TOGETHER NEXT WEEK AS PLANNED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU WHEN YOU HAVE
RESOLVED YOUR PRESENT PROBLEMS. A DATE IN EARLY SEPTEMBER
WOULD BE MOST CONVENIENT FOR ME.

WITH WARMEST REGARDS,

SINCERELY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

UNQUOTE

DTG: 012114Z JUNE 1967

GROUP COUNT: 180 IMI 180

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 7-9-91

SENT
WHCA

USE

VZCZCEEA213
PP WTE13
DE WTE 1366

1967 JUL 1 20 42

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH73373

Pres file

UNCLAS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

KING HUSSEIN HAS SENT YOU THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM: "AS I DEPART FROM THE UNITED STATES ALLOW ME TO EXPRESS MY GRATITUDE FOR YOUR HOSPITALITY AND MY APPRECIATION OF THE USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WE HAD IN WASHINGTON. I ALSO WISH TO AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND TO YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF AMERICA OUR HEARTFELT FELICITATIONS AND BEST WISHES ON THE INDEPENDENCE DAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THIS GREAT OCCASION COMES AT THE TIME WHEN THE PRINCIPLES AND IDEALS OF AMERICA, PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY AND PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS COUPLED WITH INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ARE UNDERGOING A SERIOUS TEST IN OUR PART OF THE WORLD. WE HOPE, INDEED ARE CONFIDENT THAT ALL THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL FOLLOW THE RIGHT PATH WHICH LEADS TO JUSTICE, PEACE, FREEDOM AND STABILITY. THIS IS THE PATH WHICH THE TORCH OF THE STATUE OF LIBERTY IS MEANT TO ILLUMINATE. PLEASE ACCEPT MY HIGHEST ESTEEM AND CONSIDERATION."

I RECOMMEND YOU AUTHORIZE THE FOLLOWING REPLY BE DELIVERED TO HIM IMMEDIATELY IN LONDON: "THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL AND KIND MESSAGE AND YOUR CONGRATULATIONS ON OUR INDEPENDENCE DAY. YOUR MAJESTY WILL ALWAYS FIND A WELCOME IN OUR COUNTRY WHERE YOUR FORTHRIGHTNESS AND COURAGE ARE GREATLY ADMIRER. I APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH YOU AND I PROFOUNDLY HOPE THAT A WAY MAY BE FOUND TO BRING THE BENEFITS OF STABILITY AND PROSPERITY TO ALL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST. AS YOU RETURN TO YOUR COUNTRY TO CARRY OUT YOUR HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES MY BEST WISHES GO WITH YOU AND TO THE PEOPLE OF JORDAN. WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, LYNDON B. JOHNSON."

APPROVE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

DTG: 011957Z JULY 67

RPS: 283 IMI 283

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 1 13 56

1967 JUN 31 AM 10:01

SATURDAY

EEA295
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1356

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN SAN ANTONIO
CITE: CAP67626

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-102

By lig, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JULY 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

POSITIVE STATEMENTS ON THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES WERE PREPARED AND GIVEN TO MANSFIELD, BOGGS AND ALBERT YESTERDAY MORNING.

MANSFIELD MADE HIS STATEMENT. FROM THE WIRE SERVICES YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THAT FULBRIGHT AND MORSE HAVE ALSO COME OUT STRONGLY FOR THE TREATIES. THESE ENDORSEMENTS COUNTER-BALANCE THE ADVERSE COMMENTS OF THE FLOOD-SULLIVAN GROUP.

ANTICIPATING THE NEED FOR STRONG POSITIVE STATEMENTS ON EACH TREATY ISSUE WHICH IS LIKELY TO DRAW FIRE, STATE IS NOW ENGAGED IN AN EXTENSIVE SPEECH-WRITING EXERCISE. WHEN THE CONTENTS OF THE TREATIES ARE MADE KNOWN, IN ANOTHER 2-3 WEEKS, THESE STATEMENTS WILL BE GIVEN TO KEY MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES. WITH A SIGNING CEREMONY INVOLVING YOU AND PRESIDENT ROBLES, AND WITH PRESIDENT EISENHOWER IN ATTENDANCE, FOLLOWED BY A BARRAGE OF FAVORABLE STATEMENTS IN CONGRESS, WE HOPE TO SEIZE THE INITIATIVE IN THE PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE TREATIES.

THE REACTION IN PANAMA TO THE MONDAY ANNOUNCEMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN QUITE FAVORABLE. IT CAUGHT THE ANTI-TREATY FORCES OF ARNULFO ARIAS OFF-GUARD AND THEY REMAIN ON THE DEFENSIVE.

DTG: 01/1324Z JUL 57

GPS: 183 INI 120

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 JUL 1 16 12

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By isp, NARA, Date 8-11-93

Pres file
1967 JUN 31 PM 12:19
SATURDAY

EEA237
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1358

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67628

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

JULY 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH BUNKER ASSESSES FUTURE PROBLEMS AND METHODS IN THE
LIGHT OF RECENT EVENTS.

SAIGON 80

1. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A NUMBER OF PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
REGARDING THE SITUATION WHICH LED TO THE DECISION TO HAVE
A COMBINED THIEU-KY TICKET AND WITH RESPECT TO SOME OF THE
POINTS WE SHOULD BE CONSIDERING FOR THE FUTURE.

2. ALTHOUGH THE FINAL STEP WAS TAKEN BY KY TO FIND A SOLUTION
TO THE GROWING DIVISION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES, A NUMBER
OF ELEMENTS CONTRIBUTED TO IT. ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS
CERTAINLY THE COMMITMENT MADE BY BOTH OF THEM TO PRESIDENT
JOHNSON AND CONTINUING REMINDERS OF THIS TO BOTH THIEU AND KY
BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND ME. OTHER FACTORS CLEARLY
RELATED TO DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES AND THE
INTER-PLAY OF VARIOUS ELEMENTS WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.
EXACTLY HOW THESE FACTORS PLAYED THEIR PART IS NOT YET
CLEAR BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT THERE WAS AN OVERWHELMING
FEELING WITHIN THE MILITARY THAT UNITY HAD TO BE ACHIEVED.
IF THIS WAS TO BE DONE, THE FINAL GESTURE INEVITABLY HAD
TO COME FROM KY IN THE FACE OF THIEU'S ATTITUDE AND SINCE
THE FORCES SUPPORTING KY WERE APPARENTLY UNABLE TO BRING
ABOUT A MORE ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION. KY PRESUMABLY SAW THE
OVERRIDING SENTIMENT FOR UNITY AND THUS THE NEED FOR
SACRIFICE BY HIMSELF. THE EFFECT, AT LEAST INITIALLY, WITHIN
THE MILITARY IS ONE OF RELIEF AND HAPPINESS THAT THIS CHAPTER
AT LEAST IS CLOSED.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. LOOKING BACK AT THE WAY THIS MATTER DEVELOPED I AM MORE THAN EVER PERSUADED THAT OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM WAS THE RIGHT ONE, I.E., TO EXERT CONTINUING BUT CAREFUL PRESSURE ON THE PRINCIPLES, BUT TO BRING THEM IN THE END TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN SOLUTION. AS I SAID IN AN EARLIER MESSAGE, IF WE CAN DO THIS IT WILL BE GOOD FOR THEM AND GOOD FOR US. I THINK THAT THIS CONCLUSION HAS BEEN PROVEN OUT AND THAT WE SHOULD MAINTAIN THIS GENERAL APPROACH IN THE FUTURE. I AM PERSUADED THAT THE PROBLEMS WHICH WILL INEVITABLY ARISE IN FUTURE CAN BE HANDLED IN THE SAME WAY IF THERE IS MUTUAL CONFIDENCE IN THE OBJECTIVES WE SEEK AND PATIENCE REGARDING THE WAY WE TRY TO ACHIEVE THEM ON THE SPOT.

4. AS I HAVE INDICATED, OUR INITIAL SOUNDINGS AMONG THE MILITARY ON THE MORNING-AFTER INDICATE FEELINGS OF GRATIFICATION AND CONVICTION THAT THE UNITY THAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED MUST BE CONTINUED IN THE DIFFICULT PERIOD AHEAD. THE MARRYING OF THE ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THIEU AND KY WILL BE A DIFFICULT ONE BUT I BELIEVE IT IS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE. THERE WILL BE DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS, OF COURSE, AND CERTAIN RUMBLINGS AND UNHAPPINESS UNDER THE SURFACE. OUR OBJECTIVE WITH THIEU AND KY AND THEIR SUPPORTERS WILL BE TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO WORK SINCERELY AND HONESTLY TOGETHER FOR FREE AND IMPARTIAL ELECTIONS. WHAT THEY DO TO OVERCOME THE INEVITABLE INCREASED CIVILIAN FEARS OF PRESSURE AND INTIMIDATION WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT IN THIS NEW SITUATION. WE WILL WANT TO WATCH THEIR MOVES CLOSELY IN THIS CONNECTION AND TO CONTINUE QUIETLY TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PURSUE A COURSE THAT WILL MEET OUR COMMON GOALS.

5. THE PROBLEM OF GIVING THE NEW TICKET A SOLID CIVILIAN ELEMENT AS A BASIS FOR BROAD CIVILIAN-MILITARY COOPERATION AFTER THE ELECTIONS WILL NOW BE GREATER. THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ABLE AND POPULAR CIVILIAN PRIME MINISTER, OR AN ARRANGMENT FOR EVENTUAL COOPERATION WITH ONE OF THE LEADING CIVILIAN TICKETS IN FORMING A GOVERNMENT, WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT. A PUBLICLY PROFESSED WILLINGNESS TO COLLABORATE WITH THE CIVILIAN ELEMENTS AND CANDIDATES IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES WOULD BE A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP. WE WILL SEEK TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO PURSUE THIS GENERAL LINE AND WE WILL TRY TO CREATE A RECEPTIVE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE CIVILIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THE MEMBERS OF THE TICKETS FOR THE SENATE.

~~SECRET~~

[2]

~~SECRET~~

6. OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION OF REACTIONS FROM THE CAMPS OF THE CIVILIAN CANDIDATES IS ONE OF SURPRISE AND CONFUSION AND CERTAIN PREMONITIONS AS TO THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH FACE THEM. THEY HAD COME TO EXPECT A DIVIDED MILITARY CAMP AND NOW ARE FACED WITH THE PROBABILITY OF A UNIFIED MILITARY WITH ALL THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY. ONCE THE INITIAL CONFUSION IS OVER ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE, WE WOULD IMAGINE THAT THERE WILL BE A GREATER TENDENCY FOR THE PRINCIPAL CANDIDATES TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MORE EFFECTIVE COMBINATION TO COMPETE WITH THE THIEU-KY TICKET. WE KNOW THERE HAVE ALREADY BEEN SOUNDINGS BETWEEN THE SUU-DAN AND THE HUONG-TRUYEN SLATES AND HA THUC KY, POSSIBLY WITH THE LATTER AS PRIME MINISTER. THERE MAY ALSO BE INCREASING FLIRTATION BETWEEN THE LEADING CIVILIAN CONTENDERS AND THE MILITARY TICKET, LOOKING TO FUTURE COLLABORATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE MAY ALSO BE A GREATER TENDENCY TO LOOK FOR AN EXCUSE TO CALL FOUL IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS, AS A BASIS FOR ULTIMATE WITHDRAWAL.

7. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING ALL OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO GIVE THIS SITUATION TIME TO SETTLE DOWN AND NOT TO PRESS IN PREMATURELY ON SPECIFIC PROPOSITIONS. I BELIEVE WE HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US AS TO OUR GENERAL OBJECTIVES IN THE PERIOD AHEAD AND WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO ACHIEVE THEM AND TO KEEP YOU INFORMED REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS.

DTG: 01/1440Z JUL 67

~~SECRET~~

EMMS

GPS: 910 IMI 910

[3]

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

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WHCA

067 JUL 1 14 37

167 JUN 31 AM 10:50

SATURDAY

SEA236
OO WTE13
DE WTE 1357

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67527

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

JULY 1, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
WHITE GUIDELINES and
Authority NLT 90-262
By ag/jmp, NARA, Date 7-17-91

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH A FIRST VIEW OF THIEU AFTER THE DEAL.

SAIGON 52 FROM BUNKER

1. I CALLED ON GENERAL THIEU AT NOON JULY 1 AND SPENT ABOUT ONE HOUR WITH HIM. THIEU WAS IN A RELAXED AND CHEERFUL MOOD. I EXPRESSED MY SATISFACTION THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED ON ONE MILITARY SLATE.

2. THIEU RECOUNTED THE EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE JUNE 30 DECISION, REPEATING MUCH OF WHAT KY HAD SAID TO ME THE DAY BEFORE. THIEU SAID THAT THE TALKS AMONG THE GENERALS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY FRANK. HE HAD TOLD THEM THAT SOME OF THE GENERALS HAD NOT GIVEN HIM SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION AND HAD HURT HIS FEELINGS DEEPLY. THIEU SAID THAT HE HAD FINALLY INFORMED THE OTHER GENERALS THAT HE PROPOSED TO RESIGN FROM THE ARMY AND RUN AS A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE, BUT THIS HAD BROUGHT A STRONG NEGATIVE REACTION ON THE GROUNDS IT WOULD DIVIDE THE MILITARY SERIOUSLY. THIEU REPLIED TO THEM THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN THE ONE WHO HAD DIVIDED THE ARMED FORCES AND THAT IT WAS THE ACTIONS OF OTHERS AMONG THEM THAT HAD LED TO THIS SITUATION. HE SAID THAT HE HAD MENTIONED GENERAL LOAN AND GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI SPECIFICALLY.

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~~SECRET~~

3. FOLLOWING THESE DISCUSSIONS, ACCORDING TO THIEU, THE GENERALS HAD INSISTED THAT HE MUST REMAIN IN THE ARMED FORCES. THIEU SAID THAT HE WOULD AGREE TO DO SO ONLY ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: (1) THAT THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ARMED FORCES WOULD BE MAINTAINED AND (2) THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD BE COMPLETELY FREE AND FAIR. HE HAD THEN DECLARED THAT IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT WHETHER THE MILITARY CANDIDATE OR A CIVILIAN CANDIDATE WAS ELECTED PROVIDED IT WAS A FREE ELECTION. OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO UNIFY THE PEOPLE. THIEU REPEATED THIS POINT SEVERAL TIMES TO ME AND SAID THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PROVINCE CHIEFS IN THE SAME SENSE.

4. I EMPHASIZED TO THIEU THAT IF THE THIEU-KY TICKET WERE ELECTED, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO BROADEN THE GOVERNMENT AND TO HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CIVILIAN ELEMENT IN IT. THIEU SAID HE ENTIRELY AGREED. HE BELIEVED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CIVILIAN PRIME MINISTER AND MOST OF THE CABINET POSTS SHOULD BE FILLED BY GOOD CIVILIANS. HE THOUGHT ONLY THE DEFENSE, REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT, AND PERHAPS INFORMATION/CHIEU HOI PORTFOLIOS NEED BE MILITARY.

5. THIEU ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INCREASED PACIFICATION EFFORT. HE THOUGHT THAT DIVISION COMMANDERS SHOULD PLAY MUCH MORE ACTIVE ROLES AND PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEF STAFFS SHOULD BE ENLARGED IN ORDER FOR THEM TO COPE WITH THIS PRIORITY PROBLEM SATISFACTORILY.

DTG: 01/1401Z JUL 67

GPS: 440 IMI 440

~~SECRET~~

EXCISE

~~SECRET~~
EXDIS

SENT
WHCA

EEA210
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1363

1967 JUL 1 19 35

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67632

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-100

By W, NARA, Date 5-14-92

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

MR. PRESIDENT:

HEREWITH THE DAILY SITUATION REPORT (NO. 2) ON THE
POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIET-NAM--

JULY 1, 1967

THE FACTS

FEW NEW DEVELOPMENTS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST 24 HOURS. BUNKER HAS TALKED TO THIEU (SAIGON 52). EMBASSY OFFICERS HAVE GOTTEN PRELIMINARY REACTIONS TO THE THIEU/KY SLATE IN TWO CIVILIAN CANDIDATES' CAMPS (SAIGON 59). BUNKER HAS ALSO FORWARDED HIS PRELIMINARY COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION (SAIGON 80).

THIEU'S ATTITUDE IS INCOURAGING. HE ASSURED BUNKER THAT HE STRONGLY FAVORS HONEST ELECTIONS, A CIVILIAN PRIME MINISTER, AND A LARGELY CIVILIAN CABINET.

CANDIDATE HOUNG'S SUPPORTERS AT PRESENT APPEAR TO BE IN CONSIDERABLE DISARRAY. AN EMBASSY OFFICER ASKED FOR AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE HOUNG IN VUNG TAU, BUT GOT NO ASSURANCE ON WHEN AN APPOINTMENT MIGHT BE ARRANGED. A KEY FIGURE IN KA THUO KY'S CAMP PREDICTED THAT MILITARY UNITY WOULD NOT LAST LONG AND THAT THE BIG MINH ISSUE WOULD BE DIVISIVE AMONG THE MILITARY.

NEWS REPORTS INDICATE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAS CERTIFIED AS VALID BIG MINH'S PROXY APPLICATION TO RUN FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

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KEY ELECTORAL DATES ARE: PRESIDENTIAL SLATES WILL BE REVIEWED AND APPROVED IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BY JULY 19, AFTER WHICH CANDIDATES MAY NOT WITHDRAW; THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN RUNS FOR ONE MONTH BEGINNING AUGUST 3; ELECTION DAY IS SEPTEMBER 3.

US PRESS REPORTING FROM SAIGON GENERALLY TAKES THE LINE THAT KY WAS FORCED OUT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE PARTLY BECAUSE OF IRRITATION OVER KY'S EXCESSIVE ELECTIONEERING. THE SHIFT IS BEING PORTRAYED AS A DEFEAT FOR KY WHICH CAUGHT THE U.S. BY SURPRISE. SOME INITIAL REPORTS (AP, WASHINGTON STAR) CALLED THE RESULT A SERIOUS BLOW TO US POLICY, SINCE WE HAD STRONGLY BACKED KY. OTHER REPORTS ARE MORE BALANCED. ALMOST ALL MENTIONED PAST US CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MILITARY SPLIT. EDITORIAL COMMENT IS RELATIVELY BALANCED, STRESSING THAT MILITARY DISUNITY HAS PROBABLY BEEN AVOIDED. (THE POST REFERS TO THE KY-THIEU PLEDGE AT GUAM THAT THEY WOULD NOT "TEAR THE ARMED FORCES APART BY FIGHTING BETWEEN THEMSELVES.") ALL REPORTS ASSUME THAT THE THIEU-KY TICKET WILL WIN. THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S PROMPT DISAVOWAL OF FAVORITISM TOWARD ANY CANDIDATE IS CARRIED.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ACTIONS

BUNKER'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS INDICATE THAT HE AND WE HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING REGARDING OUR OBJECTIVES THROUGH THE ELECTION PERIOD.

THERE ARE SO FAR NO INDICATIONS OF ANY RESTLESSNESS AMONG KY AND THIEU SUPPORTERS WITHIN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. HOWEVER, THIS WILL BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE IMMEDIATE PERIOD AHEAD. WE WILL WATCH CAREFULLY FOR SIGNS OF TROUBLE.

THE BIG MINH ISSUE IS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS. WE EXPECT PRESSURE IN THE ASSEMBLY TO SUSTAIN MINH'S CANDIDACY AND RIGHT TO RETURN TO CAMPAIGN. WE WILL PROPOSE TO BUNKER THAT HE DISCUSS THE MINH ISSUE FRANKLY WITH THIEU AND KY, IN LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS NOT ADVOCATING MINH'S CANDIDACY BUT MAKING SURE THEY UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF STICKING TO THEIR DECISION TO KEEP HIM OUT OF THE COUNTRY UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

DTG 01/1830Z JULY 67

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VZCZCEEA211
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-102
By imp, NARA, Date 8-11-93

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67630

Pres file

~~SECRET NODIS~~

JULY 1, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH AN AFFIRMATIVE MESSAGE TO YOU FROM PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ ON KOSYGIN CONVERSATIONS.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE OF YESTERDAY, WHICH I RECEIVED THROUGH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES DEARBORN, IN WHICH YOU WERE SO KIND AS TO LET ME BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH CERTAIN INFORMATION AND YOUR IMPRESSIONS WITH REGARD TO THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH YOU HELD ON THE 23RD AND THE 25TH OF THIS MONTH WITH PRIME MINISTER KOSYGIN OF THE SOVIET UNION.

I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED NOT ONLY IN THE DESIRABILITY BUT ALSO IN THE NEED FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE STATES AS A NECESSARY PREMISE FOR THE RESOLUTION, BY PACIFIC MEANS, OF THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE WORLD, AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS NEED IS GREATER WHEN IT INVOLVES COUNTRIES LIKE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS WHOSE EXTRAORDINARY INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY MIGHT MAKES THEM HAVE A VERY SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE.

IT WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED, NATURALLY, THAT IN TWO CONVERSATIONS, NO MATTER HOW AMPLE, DIFFERENCES WOULD BE CONCILIATED WHICH FURTHERMORE ARISE FROM PROFOUND CAUSES AND ALSO REFLECT DIVERSE INTERESTS WHICH NO CHIEF OF STATE MIGHT OF HIMSELF ALTER.

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PRESERVATION COPY

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NEVERTHELESS IT IS HEARTENING TO KNOW, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH WORLD PUBLIC OPINION HAS ALSO APPRECIATED, THAT THE CONVERSATIONS WERE HELD IN A FRANK AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE AND THAT, AT LEAST ON THE CONCRETE POINT OF THE TREATY FOR NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, YOU BELIEVE SOME PROGRESS WAS GAINED.

MEXICO HAS BEEN EAGERLY PARTICIPATING IN THE CONVERSATIONS WHICH ARE TAKING PLACE IN GENEVA WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATY FOR NON-PROLIFERATION, SINCE WE BELIEVE THAT UNTIL OTHER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN FOR THE DEFINITIVE PROSCRIPTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS, IT WILL BE A POSITIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT TO INSURE THAT THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT YET HAVE THEM, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE NATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT, NOT DIVERT THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES IN SEEKING THOSE INSTRUMENTS OF DESTRUCTION. THIS IS, AS YOU KNOW, THE REASON WHY MY GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN SUCH AN INTEREST IN THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, ALREADY SIGNED BY EIGHTEEN COUNTRIES, FOR THE PROSCRIPTION OF SUCH ARMS IN LATIN AMERICA.

PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, A VERY CORDIAL GREETING.

DTG: 011746Z JUNE 1967

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

GROUP COUNT: 410 IMI 410

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-9-99

SENT
WHCA

1967 JUL 1 23 31

Pres file

VZCZCEEA219
PP WTE10
DE WTE 1373

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67637

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH THE BRITISH DECIDE TO VOTE AGAINST THE YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION AND FOR THE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION. THIS IS HELPFUL.

1. FOREIGN OFFICER WARBURTON, UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT, INFORMS US MESSAGE EN ROUTE FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY BROWN TO SECRETARY. LIST OF MAIN POINTS:

A. AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION SECRETARY'S LETTER, UNITED KINGDOM'S UN DELEGATION BEING INSTRUCTED TO LET IT BE KNOWN UNITED KINGDOM WILL OPPOSE (REVISED) YUGOSLAV RESOLUTION.

B. THIS WAS VERY DIFFICULT DECISION, MORE SO FOR UNITED KINGDOM THAN SOME OTHERS. BRITISH GOVERNMENT HOPES IT CAN RELY ON U.S. GOVERNMENT TO GO ALL OUT TO ENSURE LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION COMES TO VOTE. BRITISH HAVE INDICATIONS OF POSSIBLE WAVERING ON THIS CRUCIAL POINT, AND WANT NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT GREAT IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO LATIN AMERICAN RESOLUTION BEING BROUGHT TO VOTE.

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DTG: 012300Z JULY 1967

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PP WTE13
DE WTE 1371

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP57636

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By up, NARA, Date 8-11-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEREWITH BARBOUR'S REPORT OF THE INCIDENT, WHICH CHECKS OUT WITH EVRON'S. THE QUESTION MAY BE: HOW DOES IT AFFECT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY? WILL IT STRENGTHEN THOSE SEEKING UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL; OR THOSE SEEKING AN END TO BELLIGERENCE?

1. GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL STATES THERE WAS SMALL ENGAGEMENT TODAY NEAR PORT FUAD WHICH HAS CEASED AT LEAST FOR NIGHT. ISRAELIS DID NOT DURING HOSTILITIES TAKE PORT FUAD AND HAVE NO INTENTION DOING SO. PORT FUAD SAID TO INVOLVE LAKE AND OTHER WATER EAST OF CANAL NEAR PORT SAID WITH ROAD RUNNING ALONG MEDITERRANEAN. SINCE CEASE FIRE ISRAELIS HAVE BEEN RUNNING DAILY PATROLS WITHOUT INCIDENT. TODAY EGYPTIAN FORCE AMOUNTING TO TWO PLATOONS CROSSED CANAL AND ENGAGED PATROL SOUTH OF PORT FUAD. PLATOONS SUPPORTED BY MORTAR FIRE AND SOME AIR ACTIVITY. ONE ISRAELI CASUALTY WOUNDED.

2. ISRAELIS ASSESS EGYPTIAN ACTION AS RELATED TO GULF OF AQABA AND NOT REPEAT NOT INCLINED REGARD INCIDENT AS SERIOUS.

DTG: 012242Z JUNE 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP COUNT: 173 INI 173

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~~TOP SECRET~~
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DE WTE 1367

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67633

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-101
By cb, NARA, Date 4-21-95

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

I AM MONITORING THE REPORTS ON THE UAR-ISRAELI CLASH NEAR THE SUEZ CANAL. THUS FAR NONE OF OUR MILITARY OR INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CAN CONFIRM THE CLASH REPORTED ON THE WIRES FROM BOTH CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.

THIS MORNING WE HAD THE FOLLOWING INTELLIGENCE RUMORS WHICH MAY-OR MAY NOT-BEAR ON THE SITUATION.

RUMORS THAT THE ARAB STATES MAY UNDERTAKE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE BUT CANNOT BE CONFIRMED.

THE US DEFENSE ATTACHE IN BEIRUT REPORTS THAT, ACCORDING TO AN UNTESTED SOURCE, THE PURPOSE OF THE INFUX OF SOVIET MATERIAL TO THE UAR IS TO SUPPORT A PLANNED LIMITED MILITARY MOVE TO DESTROY THE ISRAELI FORCES ALONG THE EASTERN BANK AS A FACE-SAVING VENTURE BEFORE 15 JULY IN ADVANCE OF THE 24 JULY REVOLUTION CELEBRATIONS. ALGERIAN, CZECHOSLOVAK AND YUGOSLAV AS WELL AS UAR PILOTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN WHAT WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS A LIMITED DEFENSIVE ACTION TO FREE THE SUEZ CANAL. THE PLAN IS SAID TO DEPEND ON A UN CEASE-FIRE DEMAND TO PROTECT THE UAR FROM MASSIVE ISRAELI RETALIATION. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THE ARABS HAVE DEVISED SUCH A PLAN BUT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD DEPEND ON MANY FACTORS -- THE OUTCOME OF CURRENT UN DEBATES, THE SOVIET POSITION AND THE ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE SINAI. NEVERTHELESS, THE ALLEGED KILLING OF TWO EGYPTIANS ON A LAUNCH IN THE CANAL IS TYPICAL OF THE TYPE OF INCIDENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO MORE SERIOUS CLASHES. IN ADDITION, CAIRO EDITORIALS ARE WARNING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF NEW FIGHTING -- INFLUENTIAL EDITOR HEIKAL HAS ASSERTED THE EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS MAY BE "ASKED TO MAKE SACRIFICES FOR THEIR HOMELAND IN HOPE OF VICTORY."

DTG: 012338Z JULY 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

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1967 JUL 1 01 15

EEA198
OO WTE10
DE WTE 1345

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67622

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 11-9-99

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 30, 1967

HEREWITH CHANCELLOR KIESINGER EXPLAINS IN PERSON HIS PROBLEMS AND HIS HOPE FOR AN EARLY MEETING WITH YOU.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I PROFOUNDLY REGRET THAT AN UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION IN BONN HAS PUT ME INTO A DIFFICULT POSITION. DURING THE NEXT WEEK MY GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE ITS MOST IMPORTANT DECISION ON FINANCE AND ECONOMIC POLICY FOR THE COMING YEARS. BECAUSE OF THE ECONOMIC RECESSION IN GERMANY THIS DECISION CANNOT BE POSTPONED. I HAD HOPED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO PUT THIS DECISION BEFORE THE TWO PARLIAMENTARY PARTY GROUPS OF THE COALITION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECISION OF THE CABINET, SO THAT MR. BRANDT AND I WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS. YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, THE CHAIRMEN OF THE TWO COALITION PARTY GROUPS IN THE BUNDESTAG HAVE INFORMED ME AND VICE CHANCELLOR THAT IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULT NATURE OF THE PROBLEM THEY FEEL IT INDISPENSABLE THAT THE PARTY GROUPS BE ASKED TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE DECISION OF THE CABINET, E.G. ON JULY 6TH AND 7TH BEFORE THE PARLIAMENTARY RECESS. THEY FEAR THAT OTHERWISE THE UNCERTAINTY AND THE CONCERN OF THE PUBLIC ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE PARLIAMENT REGARDING THE DECISIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT WOULD INCREASE AND THUS POSSIBLY ACCELERATE THE RECESSION. FURTHERMORE THEY FEAR THAT UNLESS THE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS DECIDE ON THEIR POSITION QUICKLY, THE INFLUENCE OF PRESSURE GROUPS AND INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS COULD ENDANGER THEIR UNITY WHICH WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE ANYHOW. DURING THESE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH THE RESPECTIVE PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS WILL FIRST HAVE TO AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES AND THEN WITH EACH OTHER THE PRESENCE OF THE TWO PARTY LEADERS IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. FOR THIS REASON, MR. BRANDT AS WELL AS MYSELF HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE SHOULD PROPOSE TO YOU A SHORT POSTPONEMENT OF OUR VISIT. I REGRET

Pres file
FRIDAY
1967 JUN 30 PM 9:21

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THAT I HAD TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL SO SHORTLY BEFORE THE AGREED DATE, BUT I HOPE THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, WITH YOUR GREAT EXPERIENCE IN PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, WILL UNDERSTAND OUR DIFFICULT POSITION. PLEASE REST ASSURED THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE MADE THIS PROPOSAL IF WE WERE NOT ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED OF ITS NECESSITY. I THEREFORE WOULD LIKE TO ASK FOR YOUR INDULGENCE AND UNDERSTANDING, AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE SOON UPON A NEW NEAR DATE FOR OUR MEETING.

VERY SINCERELY YOURS,

KIESINGER

CHANCELLOR OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

DTG 302333Z JUNE 67

GPS 470

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Pres file

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PP WTE17
DE WTE 1368

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67634

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 92-102
By ijg, NARA, Date 8-11-93

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HEREWITH THE VICE PRESIDENT REPORTS HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN SEOUL.

1. FOLLOWING IS MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT SEOUL, KOREA, JULY 1, 1967 BETWEEN VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY AND GENERAL PHAM XUEN CHIEU, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. PRESENT ON THE AMERICAN SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENT, AMBASSADOR PORTER, MR. VAN DYK, COLONEL BECKINGTON, MR. REILLY, MR. JEROME STENGER (INTERPRETER). ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDE: GENERAL CHIEU, MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND FINANCE HANH, AND CHARGE KIEU.

2. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED GENERAL CHIEU IF HE HAD ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF LAST NIGHT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF POLITICAL CHANGES IN SAIGON. GENERAL CHIEU SAID THAT HE HIMSELF WAS NOT WELL INFORMED ON THIS LATEST CHANGE. HE HAD READ ABOUT IT IN THE NEWSPAPER. HE BELIEVES THAT WHAT WE ARE SEEING IS AN EFFORT TO ASSURE CONTINUED UNITY IN THE ARMED FORCES OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF THE JOINT CANDIDACY OF GENERAL THIEU AND PREMIER KY ANNOUNCED LAST NIGHT, WOULD RESULT IN SOME AGREED DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE TWO MEN IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. DID THE VICE PRESIDENT OF VIETNAM HAVE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY UNDER THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION? GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED TO HIM BY THE PRESIDENT. THIS WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT, HE SAID, BETWEEN THE TWO MEN AND ONE WHICH HE FELT WOULD BE MADE IN THE FUTURE. THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THE VIETNAMESE VICE PRESIDENT BY AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE SOME ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY AND GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED YES.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN NOTED THE CONCERNS OF OUR GOVERNMENT VIS-A-VIS DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WE BELIEVE VERY STRONGLY, HE SAID, THAT THE MILITARY MUST REMAIN UNITED. WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IMPERATIVE THAT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS THERE BE AN ACTIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN CULMINATING IN HONEST ELECTIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT, FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS, THERE BE

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SUBSTANTIAL CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION. A FAIR ELECTION WITH THE WIDEST POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE IS IMPERATIVE, HE SAID, NOT ONLY FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM, BUT ALSO FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SUPPORT IN AMERICA FOR OUR EFFORT IN VIETNAM.

GENERAL CHIEU SAID HIS GOVERNMENT ALSO FULLY RECOGNIZED THE NECESSITY FOR AN HONEST AND FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS. HE NOTED THE ABSENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF PARTIES. THIS MADE POLITICAL PROCESS MORE DIFFICULT.

ANOTHER DIFFICULTY WAS COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF SUCH POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS AS DID EXIST. THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED GENERAL CHIEU WHO HE THOUGHT WERE THE LEADING CIVILIAN CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY. GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED THAT BECAUSE SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY WAS SO "DISPERSED" THERE WERE NO LEADING CIVILIAN CANDIDATES.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED ABOUT GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED, "THEY WILL NOT LET HIM BACK." THE VICE PRESIDENT: "WHY NOT?" GENERAL CHIEU: "I DON'T KNOW". GENERAL CHIEU THEN NOTED THAT BIG MINH HAS GREAT PERSONAL POPULARITY BUT NO POLITICAL ORGANIZATION BEHIND HIM. AMBASSADOR PORTER INTERJECTED AT THIS POINT TO ASK IF IT WERE CORRECT THAT PERHAPS HIS CANDIDACY WOULD BE PERMITTED IN ABSENTIA. GENERAL CHIEU SAID HE DID NOT KNOW.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN SAID THAT HE FELT THIS PERIOD OF THE NEXT TWO MONTHS WAS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT PERIOD IN THE UNITED STATES - SOUTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONSHIPS TO DATE. HE SAID HE FELT THIS WAS SO BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE WATCHING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTION ITSELF VERY CAREFULLY. HE NOTED THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS HAS WORKED WELL SO FAR, REFERRING TO THE ELECTIONS FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, THE WORK OF THAT ASSEMBLY IN DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SERIES OF LOCAL ELECTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD. ALL OF THIS, HE NOTED, HAS BEEN FULLY REPORTED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND A MATTER OF GREAT INTEREST TO THEM. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE FOUND THIS PROGRESS NOT ONLY PLEASING BUT IN A SENSE SOMEWHAT SURPRISING. THE WHOLE PROCESS TO DATE HAD SERVED TO STRENGTHEN THE CAUSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM IN THE EYES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE HAND OF THE PRESIDENT IN CARRYING OUT THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY IN SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS IS THE REASON, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID, WHY HE HAD SPOKEN SO FRANKLY IN THIS MEETING CONCERNING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THE RECENT EXPERIENCE HERE IN SOUTH KOREA CONTAINED A LESSON. ANY EXCESSES IN THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS SUCH AS UNWARRANTED INTERFERENCE BY THE POLICE OR THE MILITARY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS WOULD BE MOST HARMFUL. HE NOTED THAT HE SPOKE AS A FRIEND AND AS ONE WHO SUPPORTS THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN ITS EFFORT TO ASSIST SOUTH VIETNAM. HE COULD NOT, HE CONCLUDED, OVERSTRESS THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THEY WERE HELD.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED FOR MINISTER HANH'S ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC FRONT. THE MINISTER NOTED THAT THE RISE OF PRICES HAD BEEN STABILIZED SINCE MARCH AND THAT THE OVER-ALL PICTURE WAS GOOD. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT THE PRICE OF RICE WAS NOW STABILIZED. THE MINISTER EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE ENDEAVORING TO MEET PROBLEMS BEFORE THEY DEVELOPED RATHER THAN TO CORRECT THEM AFTERWARD. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE INFLATIONARY GAP HAD NARROWED DOWN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAD JUST REIMBURSED, IN PIASTERS, ONE OF THE THREE LOANS THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD MADE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.

THE MINISTER NOTED WHAT HE TERMED "ONE SAD POINT IN THE ECONOMIC PICTURE": TRANSPORTATION. THE MINISTER SAID HE CONSIDERED THE PORT PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED. HE NOTED THAT IN THE PORT OF SAIGON, INSTEAD OF 1,000 BARGES IN USE AS WAS TRUE AT THE PEAK OF PORT CONGESTION, THERE WERE NOW ONLY 90. THIS, HE SAID, IS A NORMAL NUMBER FOR A PORT THE SIZE OF SAIGON. THE GREATLY REDUCED USE OF BARGES, HE NOTED, HAD A MAJOR EFFECT IN REDUCING PILFERAGE IN THE PORT. THE VICE PRESIDENT INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THE QUESTION OF PILFERAGE IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. THE MINISTER SAID HE REALIZED THIS WAS SO AND THAT, WHILE THE SITUATION WAS NOT 100 PERCENT PERFECT, IT WAS GREATLY IMPROVED AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS TAKING VERY STRICT MEASURES. ONLY IN THE LAST TEN DAYS, HE SAID, SECURITY FORCE IN THE DOCK AND WAREHOUSE AREAS HAD BEEN INCREASED AND THAT THOSE FORCES NOW HAVE ORDERS TO SHOOT TO KILL.

BUT THERE WAS A TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM INLAND. THE VIETCONG CONTINUED TO BE ABLE TO INTERRUPT AND BLOCK NORMAL ROAD AND RAIL TRAFFIC, MOST SERIOUSLY SO IN THE I CORPS AREA. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID AID AND THE MILITARY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MOVE ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES ABOUT THE COUNTRY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED GENERAL CHIEU ABOUT INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE IN THE NORTH. GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED THAT IN HIS JUDGEMENT THE ENEMY WAS ATTEMPTING TO PIN DOWN OUR FORCES, PERHAPS IN PREPARATION FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN ANOTHER LOCALITY. BUT HE FELT THAT THE ENEMY'S MILITARY EFFORT WAS NOT THE MAIN POINT. HE SAID THAT THEIR MAIN GOAL WAS TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE POPULATION IN THE I CORPS AREA. IT WAS A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED GENERAL CHIEU FOR HIS ESTIMATE OF THE IMPACT OF VIET CONG LOSSES IN RECENT MONTHS. THE GENERAL FELT THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE VIET CONG REGULAR FORCES HAS BEEN DECREASING, THAT THEIR LOSSES ARE HIGH AND NOT BEING FULLY REPLACED. BUT HE SAID THAT AS THIS PROCESS WAS OCCURRING, THE STRENGTH OF THE GUERILLA FORCES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCES, HAS BEEN SUSTAINED. THE CONTINUING LEVEL OF GUERILLA ACTIVITY HAS THUS HINDERED PROGRESS OF THE OVER-ALL PACIFICATION PROGRAM.

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RE-PACIFICATION: GENERAL CHIEU SAID THAT THE VIETNAMESE CONCERN HAS BEEN LARGELY ADMINISTRATIVE, I.E. THE BUILDING UP OF CADRES. BUT A MORE BALANCED, MANY-FACETED APPROACH WAS NECESSARY, INVOLVING SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EFFORT. THIS WAS NOT A MILITARY PROBLEM.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF, WITHIN THE SOUTH VIETNAM MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THERE WAS ADEQUATE POLITICAL ORIENTATION. THIS WAS CRITICAL IN PACIFICATION. GENERAL CHIEU DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY, NOTING ONLY THAT THE CIVILIANS MUST BE TRAINED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. HE ADDED THAT THE ARMY PERSONNEL HAVE NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN PENETRATING THE MASSES BECAUSE OF THEIR UNIFORM.

THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE CONCERN OF OUR GOVERNMENT OVER THE ABILITY OF THE VIET CONG TO ATTACK SUDDENLY, UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS, DO GREAT DAMAGE, AND ESCAPE WHILE MANY TIMES THE DEFENDING FORCES DID NOT REACT UNTIL DAYLIGHT. GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED BY NOTING HOW CAREFULLY THE VIET CONG PREPARE FOR THESE ATTACKS, SOMETIMES PLANNING FOR AS LONG AS SIX MONTHS BEFORE A PARTICULAR ACTION.

THE VICE PRESIDENT RETURNED AGAIN TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FORTHCOMING ELECTIONS. MEMBERS OF THE VIET CONG WHO ARE NOT COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES, HE NOTED, MIGHT FIND IN A FREE ELECTION MOTIVATION TO LEAVE THE VIET CONG RANKS. GENERAL CHIEU SAID THIS WAS POSSIBLE, BUT HE OBVIOUSLY WAS DOUBTFUL. HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE IMPORTANCE AND NECESSITY OF POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, SAYING THAT THIS WAS WHAT WAS NEEDED. HE COMMENTED, AS A FORMER PARTICIPANT IN THE RESISTANCE, ON THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFECTING FROM A DISCIPLINED ORGANIZATION.

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED GENERAL CHIEU WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE THE STATUS OF OUR JOINT EFFORT IN VIETNAM.

GENERAL CHIEU SAID HE FELT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS WERE USELESS. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD GO TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE ONLY WHEN IT WAS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE TO DO SO. THEREFORE, HE PERSONALLY DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS NOW WOULD SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE. THE STRUGGLE MUST CONTINUE, HE SAID, UNTIL THE COMMUNISTS CLEARLY SEE THEY CANNOT WIN THE WAR. HE SAID THAT HE FORESAW WHAT HE TERMED THE "MAIN LINE" WAS GRADUALLY DECREASING. IN THE PART OF THE STRUGGLE, HE SAID, WE HAD THE INITIATIVE FOR OVER A YEAR. HE FELT THAT THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NORTH WILL REACH THE LIMIT OF THEIR STRENGTH AND WILL BE UNABLE TO SUPPORT INDEFINITELY THE MAIN LINE UNITS THEY NOW MAINTAIN IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BUT AS THIS OCCURRED, THE GUERILLA WAR WOULD CONTINUE AND THIS IS THE PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE SOLVED BY POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. IT WILL BE A LONG, A DIFFICULT STRUGGLE, HE SAID, BUT A GRADUALLY LESS COSTLY ONE, PARTICULARLY TO THE AMERICANS.

THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD GENERAL CHIEU TO FORESEE GRADUAL DE-ESCALATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF MAIN LINE FORCES TO THE NORTH. THE GENERAL SAID THIS WAS CORRECT.

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THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF A GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PROFESSIONAL MILITARY MEN COULD EFFECTIVELY BUILD THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFULLY COMBAT THE GUERRILLA. THE CHARGE ANSWERED THAT HE THOUGHT SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS IF THERE WERE GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.

THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKED IF THIS WOULD BE DONE. THE CHARGE REPLIED, "I HOPE SO."

THE VICE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED IF THERE WERE ANYTHING STANDING IN THE WAY OF BETTER COOPERATION AND UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF HONESTY AND CANDOR AND OPEN CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

GENERAL CHIEU REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH OBSTACLE AT THE MOMENT, THAT RELATIONS WERE VERY GOOD, AND THAT COOPERATION WAS EXCELLENT. AS CITIZENS OF VIETNAM, HE SAID, WE ALL HOPE THAT OUR FUTURE GOVERNMENT WILL BE THE KIND THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD DESCRIBED, THAT IT WOULD INCLUDE CIVILIANS AND THAT IT WOULD UNITE PEOPLES OF ALL RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND POLITICAL TENDENCIES, AND ONE WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THE CLOSEST RELATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES.

GENERAL CHIEU THEN ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO COMMENT ON THE RECENT GLASSBORO MEETING. THE VICE PRESIDENT LISTED BRIEFLY THE SUBJECTS THE PRESIDENT AND KOSYGIN HAD DISCUSSED. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE DISCUSSION ON VIETNAM, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT CONCERNING THE AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY THE RESULTS OF FREE AND SUPERVISED ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT VIETNAM. GENERAL CHIEU NOTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS OF NORTH VIETNAM WERE POLITICALLY ORGANIZED AND PREPARED FOR AN ELECTION, WHEREAS THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE WERE NOT. ANY VIETNAM-WIDE ELECTIONS NOW, HE SAID, WOULD BE AN UNEQUAL CONTEST. SOUTH VIETNAM NEEDED TIME TO PREPARE ITSELF AND MUST PREPARE FOR SUCH ELECTIONS.

THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT HE WOULD REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THEIR CONVERSATION. HE ASKED THAT GENERAL CHIEU, IN SPEAKING TO PREMIER KY AND GENERAL THIEU REPORT WHAT THEY HAD TALKED ABOUT THIS MORNING. HE REPEATED AGAIN THE NEED FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER OPENLY AND HONESTLY.

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