

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

[1 of 9]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
2 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>Admitted 7-14-95</i> S 1 p. NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103 <i>Open 6/13/00 NS 98-236</i> NSJ 94-163	7/24/67	A
2a letter	Patrick Dean to Rusk S 1 p. example NSJ 94-163 <i>OPEN 3-27-98 UK GUIDELINES</i>	7/24/67	A
2b message	Text of Message <i>Open 2-16-00 NSJ 98-228</i> S 5 pp. example NSJ 94-163	7/24/67	A
2c cable	from Jordan <i>Open 9-14-99 NSJ 98-228</i> TS 3 pp. example NSJ 94-163	7/23/67	A
2d cable	London 622 <i>Open 2-16-00 NSJ 98-228</i> S 2 pp. example NSJ 94-163	7/24/67	A
3	duplicate of #2		
3a	duplicate of #2a <i>OPEN 3-27-98 UK GUIDELINES</i>		
3b	duplicate of #2b <i>Open 2-16-00 NSJ 98-228</i>		
3c	duplicate of #2c <i>Open 9-14-99 NSJ 98-228</i>		
3d	duplicate of #2d <i>Open 2-16-00 NSJ 98-228</i>		
4a report	Situation Report in Vietnam S 1 p. <i>Dup #22a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i> <i>Open 7-25-94 NSJ 94-163</i>	7/24/67	A
9a memo	Read to Rostow S 2 pp. <i>Open 7-25-94 NSJ 94-163</i>	7/21/67	A
9b cable	Saigon 1233 " C 1 p.	7/17/67	A
9c cable	Deptel 10595 to Saigon " C 3 pp.	7/19/67	A
11 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>Open 7-14-95 NSJ 94-162</i>	7/24/67	A
12b letter	Chester Bowles to the Pres. C 4 pp. <i>Open 3/4/94</i> <i>(Dup #176, NSF, Country, File, India, Exchange with Bowles, "Box 134")</i>	5/18/67	A
14 memo	Rostow to the Pres. S 1 p. <i>Open 7-14-95 NSJ 94-162</i>	7/23/67	A
14a cable	Kinshasa 1453 <i>Open 7-25-94 NSJ 94-163</i> S 1 p.	7/22/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, "Volume 35, July 16 - 24, 1967," Box 19

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[2 of 9]

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15 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Panama <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS 00-137</i> S 1 p. Sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 94-165 [duplicate of #55, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	7/23/67	A
15a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS 00-138</i> S 2 pp. Sanitized 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164 [duplicate of #55a, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	7/22/67	A
15b cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS 00-138</i> S 2 pp. Sanitized 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164 [duplicate of #55b, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	7/22/67	A
16 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NLS 124400-208</i> S 1 p. Sanitized 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164 Sanitized 10-6-95 NLS 94-165	7/23/67	A
16a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 1/17/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i> S 5 pp.	7/22/67	A
17 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. Sanitized 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209 Sanitized 10-6-95 NLS 94-165	7/23/67	A
17a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt 4/17/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i> S 4 pp. Exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/22/67	A
17b cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Exempt 4/17/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i> S 5 pp. Exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/22/67	A
17c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. Exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164 Exempt 4/17/02 NLS/RAC 00-209	7/22/67	A
18 memo	Rostow to the Pres. C 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162	7/23/67	A
18a cable	USUN 321 open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163 C 4 pp.	7/22/67	A
21a letter	Pres. to Gen. Eisenhower C 1 p. open 7-14-94 NLJ 94-162 [duplicate of #16, NSF Name File, "Eisenhower, Dwight D., General [1 of 2];" sanitized NLJ 85-331; #47 in this file is also a duplicate]	7/21/67	A
23 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East open 11/6/02 NLS 00-139 S 1 p. Sanitized 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162	7/22/67	A
23a cable	Amman 431 <i>Sanitized 11/6/00 NLS 00-140</i> S 2 pp. Exempt NLJ 94-163	7/22/67	A

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[3 of 9]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
24 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>Open 7/12/01 NSJ/RAL 00-208</i> S 1 p. sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 94-165	7/22/67	A
25 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-165	7/22/67	A
25a memo	for Rostow <i>sanitized 1/17/02 NSJ/RAC 00-209</i> S 1 p. exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/22/67	A
25b memo	Dir. of Current Intelligence to Rostow S 1 p. exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/22/67	A
<i>Sanitized 8-9-04 NLJ/RAL 03-213</i> 25c memo	re Middle East <i>sanitized 1/17/02 NSJ/RAC 00-209</i> S 3 pp. exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/21/67	A
27a report	Situation Report in Vietnam S 1 p. Dup # 23a, NSF, CF, VN, "SAI" Box 103	7/22/67	A
28 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 94-165 <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NSJ/RAC 00-208</i>	7/22/67	A
28a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>exempt 1/17/02 NSJ/RAC 00-209</i> S 7 pp. exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164	7/21/67	A
28b cable	Rabat 301 S 1 p. open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163	7/22/67	A
30a cable	Manila 668 // S 2 pp.	7/20/67	A
30b cable	Deptel 11575 to Manila // S 3 pp.	7/21/67	A
31 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Greece <i>Sanitized 4/6/04 NSJ 00-137</i> S 2 pp. sanitized 8-9-04 NLJ 05-299 <i>(dup. # 93, NSF, Country File, Greece, Vol. II, Box 126)</i>	7/22/67	A
<i>Sanitized 4-9-04 NLJ 05-304</i> 31a memo	Rusk to the Pres. <i>sanitized 3-31-95 NLJ 94-163</i> S 3 pp. same sanitization 4/17/02 NSJ/RAC 00-209	7/21/67	A
34a page	page 3 of telegram to Manila S 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162	undated	A
34b draft	of page 3 of telegram to Manila S 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162	undated	A
34e memo	Rostow to the Pres. C 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162	7/21/67	A

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[4 of 9]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
34d cable	Deptel to Manila <i>Open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i> S 3 pp.	7/21/67	A
34e cable	Manila 626 S 2 pp. <i>Open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163</i>	7/21/67	A
34f cable	Manila 583 " S 1 p.	7/20/67	A
35 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Pakistan <i>Open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i> C 1 p. <i>[dup. of # 75b, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol 7]</i>	7/21/67	A
35a memo	Schultze to the Pres. <i>OPEN 1-19-96 NLS 94-162</i> C 1 p. <i>[dup. of # 75d, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol 7]</i>	7/11/67	A
35b memo	Gaud and Freeman to the Pres. C 2 pp. <i>[dup. of # 75f, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol 7] Open 1-5-96 NLS 94-319</i>	7/5/67	A
36a report	Situation Report in Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>Dup # 24a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	7/21/67	A
38 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East PCI 1 p. <i>Open 10-6-95 NLS 94-165</i>	7/21/67	A
38a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>Exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-165</i> <i>Exempt 4/17/02 NLS IRAC 00-209</i>	7/20/67	A
40 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America S 1 p. <i>Open 5-22-95 NLS 94-271</i>	7/21/67	A
40a memo	Research Memorandum S 10 pp. <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-163</i>	7/19/67	A
41 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>Open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
41a cable	USUN 305 S 3 pp. <i>Open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163</i>	7/21/67	A
43a cable	USUN 304 C 2 pp. "	7/21/67	A
44 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. <i>Open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
44a cable	from Amman <i>Open 9-16-94 NLS 94-350</i> C 1 p.	7/21/67	A

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[5 of 9]

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
44b cable	Detpel 10625 to Amman C 1 p. <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/21/67	A
44c cable	Amman 415 C 1 p. "	7/20/67	A
45 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Cuba <i>open 7/12/01 NSJ/RAC 00-200</i> TS 1 p. <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/21/67	A
46 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re the Navy C 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
46a memo	Vice Pres. to the Pres. C 2 pp. <i>OPEN 1-19-96 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
47	duplicate of #21a <i>open 7-14-94 NLJ 94-162</i>		
48 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the Pres. re Middle East PCI 2 pp. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
50 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East C 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/21/67	A
53a message	from Prime Minister of Australia to the Pres. PCI 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/13/67	A
53b letter	Pres. to Prime Minister of Australia PCI 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/20/67	A
54 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Brazil S 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/20/67	A
54a letter	Pres. to Pres. of Brazil u S 2 pp.	7/20/67	A
54b report	Talking Points S 5 pp. "	undated	A
54c memo	Rusk to the Pres. S 3 pp. <i>open 3-31-95 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/20/67	A
54d cable	Rio de Janeiro 475 C 3 pp. <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/18/67	A
56 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East S 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/20/67	A

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56a memo	Rusk to the Pres. <i>Open 11/6/00 NLS 00-140</i> S 2 pp. <i>exempt NLS 94-163</i>	7/20/67	A
59 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America C 1 p. <i>open 4-6-00</i>	7/20/67	A
60a cable	Canberra 301 <i>Open 11/6/00 NLS 00-139</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 94-162</i>	7/20/67	A
61a report	Situation Report in Vietnam S 3 pp. <i>Dup. #258, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	7/20/67	A
62 memo	Rostow to the Pres. <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> S 1 p. <i>(dup of #140, NSF, CF, UK, Vol 12, Bx 211)</i>	7/20/67	A
62a cable	London 496 <i>Sanitized 9-14-99 NLS 98-228</i> S 8 pp. <i>Sanitized 3-11-94 NLS 93-293</i> <i>Open 2-15-01 NLS 98-54800-244</i>	7/19/67	A
63 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re USSR TS 1 p. <i>Sanitized 7-11-95 NLS 94-162</i> <i>Sanitized 8/16/01 NLS 00-137</i>	7/20/67	A
63a cable	USUN 290 S 8 pp. <i>open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163</i>	7/20/67	A
63c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. <i>Sanitized 10-20-94 NLS 94-164</i> <i>Same sanitization 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i>	7/19/67	A
64 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Uruguay C 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i>	7/20/67	A
66 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Austria and Romania C 1 p. <i>exempt NLS 94-162 open 4-6-00</i>	7/20/67	A
70 memo	Rostow to the Pres. S 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162</i>	7/19/67	A
70a memo	William Bundy to Sec. State re Vietnam S 4 pp. <i>Sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-163</i> <i>Same sanitization 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i>	7/19/67	A
70b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164</i> <i>exempt 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i>	7/15/67	A
70c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 pp. <i>exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164</i> <i>exempt 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i>	7/17/67	A
70d cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 pp. <i>exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164</i> <i>exempt 11/7/02 NLS/RAC 00-209</i>	7/15/67	a

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70e memo	re Vietnam exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164 S 2 pp. exempt 11/7/02 NLT/RAC 00-209	7/18/67	A
72a report	Situation Report on Vietnam S 2 pp. Dup. #26a, NSF, CF, VN "8A1" Box 103	7/19/67 open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163	A
73 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162	7/19/67	A
73a memo	Helms to the Pres. Sanitized 10-20-94 NLS 94-164 S 1 p. open 4/19/02 NLT/RAC 00-209	7/19/67	A
73b cable	Saigon 0208 Sanitized 3-17-95 NLS 94-164 S 2 pp. same participation 4/17/02 NLT/RAC 00-209	7/19/67	A
77a report	re Middle East exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164 S 2 pp. exempt 2-20-01 NLT/RAC 00-129	7/19/67	A
77b cable	extracts from Amman 4945 S 2 pp. open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163	7/19/67	A
78 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Israel exempt NLS 94-162 PCI 1 p. open 2-10-00	7/18/67	A
78a memo	with Evron, Rostow exempt NLS 94-162 C 1 p. open 2-10-00	7/18/67	A
80a report	Situation Report on Vietnam S 2 pp. Dup. #27a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103	7/18/67	A
85a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Zambia C 1 p. open 7-25-94 NLS 94-163	7/15/67	A
85b message	Pres. to Pres. of Zambia PCI 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162	undated	A
86a report	re Romania exempt 10-20-94 NLS 94-164 S 2 pp. Sanitized 4/17/02 NLT/RAC 00-209	6/26/67	A
88a report	from Lt. Gen. Momyer S 7 pp. open 3-13-95 NLS 94-351	7/8/67	A
89 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Vietnam S 1 p. open 7-14-95 NLS 94-162	7/18/67	A
89a memo	Katzenbach to the Pres. S 1 p. open 3-31-95 NLS 94-163	7/17/67	A

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90 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Latin America <i>open 4-6-00</i> C 3 pp. [duplicate of #81, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 2; sanitized NLJ 89-203] <i>sanitized 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162 same sanitization</i>	7/18/67	A
92 cable	to Amemb. Bangkok S 4 pp. <i>open 3-31-95 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/18/67	A
93 memo	McGeorge Bundy to the Pres. <i>open 2-10-00</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt NLJ 94-162</i>	7/17/67	A
94a report	Situation Report on Vietnam S 2 pp. <i>Dup. #28a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	7/17/67	A
95 memo	Rostow to the Pres. S 1 p. <i>open 7-14-95 NLJ 94-162</i>	7/17/67	A
95a cable	Deptel to Bangkok S 6 pp. "	7/17/67	A
97a memo	Rusk to the Pres. re Iceland C 2 pp. <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/15/67	A
97b biography	Asgeir Asgeirsson <i>exempt 4/19/02 NLJ/RAC 00-209</i> C 1 p. <i>exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164</i>	undated	A
99 memo	Rostow to the Pres. re Middle East <i>Excep dup #12c, CE, MEC, Sandstrom/Wahlwind... "Box 113"</i> S 1 p. <i>exempt NLJ 94-162</i> <i>Exempt 4/11/02 NLJ 00-209</i>	7/17/67	A
99a cable	Amman 4945 S 6 pp. <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/17/67	A
99b cable	Amman 4592 <i>exempt 4/19/02 NLJ/RAC 00-209</i> S 8 pp. <i>exempt 10-20-94 NLJ 94-164</i>	7/17/67	A
105a cable	Canberra 210 C 1 p. <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-163</i>	7/17/67	A

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#1 memo	Walt Rostow to the President 7:00 p.m. re Mexico S 2 pp.	7/24/67	A & C
#38b cable	Intelligence report - <i>exempt 8-27-97 NLJ 94-387</i> TS 1 p	7/21/67	A
#43 memo	Rostow to the President 8:15 a. m. - TS 1 p <i>sanitized 10-24-95 NLJ 94-389</i>	7/21/67	A
#43b memo	Thomas Hughes to Secretary Rusk - TS 4 pp. <i>sanitized 10-7-96 NLJ 94-390</i>	n.d.	A
#43c cable	Intelligence report - TS 3 pp <i>exempt 8-27-97 NLJ 94-387</i>	7/15/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to the President - 5:40 p.m. TS 1 p. <i>Open NSA 1-16-98, state declass of exec 6176 + NSA NLJ 94-389 6-25-98</i>	7/18/67	A
#82a memo	Clark Clifford to the President TS 1 p <i>open 10-24-95 NLJ 94-389</i>	7/18/67	A
#82b report	Intelligence report - TS 5 pp <i>sanitized 10-30-95 NLJ 94-389 Same sanitization 416101 NS/RAC 00-214</i>	7/18/67	A
#98 memo	Rostow to the President 4:25 p.m. - TS 1 p. <i>sanitized 10-24-95 NLJ 94-389 Sanitized 416101 NS/RAC 00-214</i>	7/17/67	A
#63b cable	re Middle East - TS 3 pp.	7/14/67	A

FILE LOCATION

Volume 35

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, MEMOS TO THE PRESIDENT, WALT ROSTOW, JULY 16-24, 1967 Box 19

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-236
By CB, NARA Date 6-9-00

2

Pres. file

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Monday, July 24, 1967 -- 6:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith three documents which everyone concerned with the Middle East will be considering in the next few hours.

1. A message to Sec. Rusk from George Brown urging that we postpone an approach to Hussein until we know what the Israelis decide as their negotiating terms.
2. A British telegram from Amman indicating, as we know, that Hussein feels he has a bit more time in hand.
3. A cable from Bruce supporting George Brown's plea for a delay in executing our message to Hussein.

The British argument is, in essence, that the Israeli terms might not be such as to permit a settlement with which Hussein could live; Hussein might do better negotiating on an Arab basis; and, therefore, we should not be in the position of pushing Hussein into a negotiation which might not come off.

I will not offer any recommendation at this time except to note that our message to Hussein is more conditioned -- and much less dogmatic in advising him -- than the British response suggests.

W. W. Rostow

copy of Rostow's memo (only) sent to Mr. McGeorge Bundy

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

2a

~~SECRET~~



Immediate

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24 July, 1967

Dear Secretary of State,

--- I enclose herewith the text of a message about the Middle East which my Secretary of State has asked should be passed to you immediately.

I am available at any time if you wish to discuss it.

--- I also enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador in Amman, which will no doubt have had in some influence on Mr. Brown/coming to this conclusion.

Yours Sincerely
P. V. Dean

The Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority UK Guidelines
By pu NARA, Date 3-27-98

24 July, 1967. 2/2Text of Message

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-228
By is, NARA Date 2-9-00

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 902 OF 23 JULY.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON ¹⁶⁴ AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NUMBER 2433.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-228
By , NARA Date 8-19-99

JORDAN/ISRAEL.

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CHANCERY GREEN DISTRIBUTION

Chancery Green Action plus: Mr. Urwick /AND
670: ap UKMIS New York (28)

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F.O. PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON 164 AND NEW YORK 111.

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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NODIS/SANDSTORM

FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-228
By is, NARA Date 2-9-00

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-2- 622 FROM LONDON, JULY 24, 1967 (NODIS)

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GP-2. BRUCE

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Monday, July 24, 1967 -- 6:35 p. m.

Mr. President:

He rewith three documents which everyone concerned with the Middle East will be considering in the next few hours.

1. A message to Sec. Rusk from George Brown urging that we postpone an approach to Hussein until we know what the Israelis decide as their negotiating terms.

2. A British telegram from Amman indicating, as we know, that Hussein feels he has a bit more time in hand.

3. A cable from Bruce supporting George Brown's plea for a delay in executing our message to Hussein.

The British argument is, in essence, that the Israeli terms might not be such as to permit a settlement with which Hussein could live; Hussein might do better negotiating on an Arab basis; and, therefore, we should not be in the position of pushing Hussein into a negotiation which might not come off.

I will not offer any recommendation at this time except to note that our message to Hussein is more conditioned -- and much less dogmatic in advising him -- than the British response suggests.

W. W. Rostow

*cy of sent to McGeorge Bundy
Kroger*

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Immediate

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24 July, 1967

Dear Secretary of State,

--- I enclose herewith the text of a message about the Middle East which my Secretary of State has asked should be passed to you immediately.

I am available at any time if you wish to discuss it.

--- I also enclose a copy of a telegram from our Ambassador in Amman, which will no doubt have had some influence on Mr. Brown/coming to this conclusion.

Yours Sincerely
Ruskin

The Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority UK Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 3-27-98

24 July, 1967.

38

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INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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NODIS/SANDSTORM

FOR SECRETARY FROM BRUCE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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GP-2. BRUCE

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2. Pres file
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Monday, July 24, 1967
2:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is today's situation report
on political developments in Viet Nam.
The Thieu-Ky ticket obviously enjoys
a tremendous head start in organization
and resources.

Walt Rostow

MW:hg

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Situation Report in Viet-Nam

July 24, 1967

Political activity is beginning to focus heavily on organizing for the forthcoming presidential campaign.

Thieu and Ky are reported to have worked out the details of a campaign organization operating on at least two different levels: an open political "front" (or bloc) composed mainly of government, Cao Dai, VNQDD, and Hoa Hao leaders working for the Thieu-Ky ticket, and a campaign committee probably headquartered in the presidential palace, utilizing largely governmental/military resources for communications, personnel, etc., and basing its platform mainly on the accomplishments of the present GVN. A third organization, a covert campaign apparatus loyal to Ky personally and intended to operate without the knowledge of Thieu, is reported in place in each district and will be given instructions to work for the Thieu-Ky ticket. Financing for the Thieu-Ky campaign will require large sums of money, the amount estimated to be the equivalent of between \$750,000 to \$875,000 U.S. The exact source of this money is not clear, but it too will probably be drawn somehow from GVN resources.

Embassy officers' recent conversations with candidates Tran Van Huong and Phan Khac Suu reveal considerably less organizational activity in their camps. Both complain of a serious lack of funds, and both appear to be relying primarily on their personal appeal and a less formal, volunteer campaign organization than Thieu and Ky. Both remain suspicious of the GVN's intentions in regard to allowing a fair campaign and election, though their suspicions seem to have lessened slightly as a result of the GVN's abolition of press censorship.

From both men's discussion of the issues, it is clear that "peace" will be a major element in their respective platforms. However, they have framed the issue relatively conservatively, Huong stating he would "never" negotiate with the NLF and Suu calling essentially for continued partition into a non-communist South and a communist North.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-163

By inf, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~SECRET~~

5

Monday - July 24, 1967
11:00 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

In addition to having Vicente Kimenez as a member of our section of the United States Mexico Border Development Commission, Ray Telles recommends that Interior and Commerce also be represented.

Subject to your approval, I will have Secretary Rusk ask Secretaries Udall and Trowbridge to designate a member of their staffs to serve on the Commission. This was the procedure followed in setting up the Commission.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____.

Disapprove _____.

See me _____.

6

Monday, July 24, 1967 -- 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith last week's press contacts.

Stuart Lancaster, PACE magazine. An interview recommended by George Christian on the contemporary meaning of freedom. I will edit before publication.

Jack Leacacos, Cleveland Plain Dealer: review of Middle East and Viet Nam, nailing down latest evidence on forward movement on which he is quite clear.

Robert Shaplen, The New Yorker: as you know, he is professionally pessimistic on politics in Saigon; but I reviewed with him the bases for a temperately optimistic position.

Saville Davis, The Christian Science Monitor: Why no stalemate? Result attached.

Philip Potter, Baltimore Sun: He has been concentrating on Middle East and I caught up with him on Viet Nam.

Murrey Marder, The Washington Post: Clifford-Taylor mission. A long telephone call before he filed his story. I sought to shift him over to the summit preparation away from troops. Perhaps some small effect on his text.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Why Johnson sees progress in Vietnam

By Saville R. Davis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The case for a verdict of "progress" in the Vietnam war as opposed to "stalemate" rests on a detailed analysis which cannot readily be set before the public.

The facts are not secret, for the most part. But the judgment that is involved is not easy to transmit. It is a mixture of military and political judgment, applied to the unorthodox type of war that is being fought in Vietnam.

Following is a review of the reasoning which underlies President Johnson's statement: "We are generally pleased with the progress we have made militarily. We are very sure that we are on the right track." It supplements the lists of factors that show improvement, printed earlier in these columns, which were given out by Gen. William C. Westmoreland and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, after the latter's trip to Vietnam.

When examined in detail, the war shows a pattern. This does not emerge from any single statistic. But when one indicator after another is plotted, the same trend shows up.

The pattern is roughly this: In the period

before the massive American build-up began, about two years ago, the war was going very badly for the Saigon government. It was being rapidly pushed toward outright defeat.

Then came a period when the war was suddenly lifted onto a far higher level of intensity. The curves showing activity by both sides shot upward.

Infiltration slows

Just as a few eyes and ears cannot cover the war, so one or two curves on a chart cannot picture it. The gathering of statistics in wartime is not that reliable, as officers and reporters both know. There are hot arguments inside the armed forces and outside, for example, over the rate of infiltration from the north.

But something more fundamental is said to be happening now in Vietnam than a few indicators or visits to battlefronts would necessarily show. It appears in figures put together from many parts of Vietnam, and in charts that analyze many different aspects of the conflict. Beginning sometime

toward the end of last year and early this year, the other side began to show signs of squeeze.

Recruits were not found as easily and men and supplies from the north were not coming through so fast. The numbers of small actions started by the enemy began to slack off a little and large-scale actions did likewise. What was not clear from a small sample, it is said here, did become clear when the whole picture was analyzed and experience in one area and with one element in the war was cross-checked with another.

The charts were jolted in a negative direction for a while, when the enemy switched to a new offensive across the demilitarized zone.

But the expected second punch—the increased attacks further south where the American forces had to be thinned out to meet the attacks at the DMZ — failed to come. The charts seem to be back on the same path again, spelling out less action and more trouble for the other side.

At the same time, another positive sign is seen in the way certain units of the Army

The Christian Science
Monitor, Monday,
July 24, 1967

of South Vietnam are responding to training. Successes in the field are reported by American advisers and commanders which the Vietnamese troops would not have been capable of, many months ago. It is recalled that the South Korean Army began to respond to training after a similar period and became an effective fighting force.

An analytical trend

Meanwhile, it is taking the Hanoi government a little longer to repair bomb damage to transport and communication lines in the north. The damage is more systematic and sustained, especially in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, with the help of new weapons and devices for operating at night and in bad weather. Antiaircraft fire is being thinned. Ships are piling up in Haiphong Harbor as a measure of enemy difficulty.

This is a brief review of the indications which, according to the President's advisers, came so consistently from so many levels and areas of the conflict, that they added up to a sound conclusion. The enemy is faced by a trend that now is going always a little more against him.

It is the kind of trend which the experienced military analyst—on both sides—looks for and draws conclusions from.

WWR

Presley
7

Monday, July 24, 1967, 10:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Raymond Guest, your Ambassador to Ireland (since mid-1965), will see you today at 1 PM. He will probably not want to raise any substantive issues.

(Note: We have only one bilateral problem with the Irish -- our request for landing rights for Pan American in Dublin. The Irish serve several large cities in the U. S. , but will let us land only at Shannon. State is studying a proposal that we terminate our bilateral air agreement unless they give in.)

Francis M. Bator

FMB:LSE:mst

Monday, July 24, 1967
9:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith thanks to you from
President Somoza for your help in
Nicaraguan polio epidemic.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

cc: Wm. Bowlder

WWRostow:rlh

Burden

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SUBJ: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SOMOZA TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON

VICE FOREIGN MINISTER MARIN ABAUNZA CALLED ON ME AT EMBASSY THIS EVENING TO PRESENT PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SOMOZA TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON. LETTER WILL BE AIRPOUCHED JULY 22. OUR FREE TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE THE HONOR TO EXPRESS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA AND OF MYSELF OUR GRATITUDE FOR THE VALUABLE HELP THAT THE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE USA HAVE GENEROUSLY PROVIDED FOR THE CAMPAIGN BEING CONDUCTED IN MY COUNTRY TO COMBAT THE PAINFUL POLIO EPIDEMIC THAT HAS STRUCK

PAGE 2 RUESMG 49B UNCLAS
NICARAGUAN CHILDREN, AND WHICH, THANKS TO THIS KIND COOPERATION, FORTUNATELY IS BEING BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL.

"I CAN ASSURE YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE HAVE RECEIVED WITH A FEELING OF PROFOUND GRATITUDE THE OPPORTUNE AND DECISIVE COOPERATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AT THE EXACT MOMENT IT WAS MOST NEEDED.

"PERMIT ME, DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, TO TAKE THIS OCCASION TO RENEW TO YOU THE EXPRESSION OF MY MOST HIGH AND DISTINGUISHED CONSIDERATION AND ALSO MY BEST WISHES FOR THE PROSPERITY OF YOUR NOBLE AND FRIENDLY NATION AND THE PERSONAL WELL BEING OF YOUR EXCELLENCY." ENGLE
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 24, 1967 -- 9:03 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an ugly situation for which we must prepare as best we can.

I'm inclined to think postponement would be a good idea -- if possible.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Memo for Mr. Rostow from Ben Read, 7/21/67
"McClellan Hearings on Pharmaceuticals and Aid
Diversions in Viet-Nam. "

cc. Marshall Wright

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date *7-17-91*



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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S/S 12838

July 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: McClellan Hearings on Pharmaceuticals
and Aid Diversions in Viet-Nam

I wish to bring to your attention the enclosed cables discussing the forthcoming McClellan hearings on aid diversions in Viet-Nam. The Department understands that the first case likely to be considered during the hearings is that of La Thanh Nghe, recently-resigned Minister of Commerce and a prominent Vietnamese businessman who is closely associated with Prime Minister Ky. Nghe is also a candidate for the Upper House in the September 3 elections. As the exchange of cables indicates La Thanh Nghe has been implicated in several illegal dealings (receiving kickbacks from U. S. drug suppliers) involving pharmaceuticals imported under the U. S. Commercial Import Program. The investigation of his activities in public congressional hearings is likely to have an adverse impact here and in Saigon during a period of intense election activity in South Viet-Nam. Carl Rowan wrote an article some time ago on the Nghe case alleging not only corruption but diversion of drugs to the VC and a high level U.S. decision to kill an investigation. In response to congressional and public inquiries, we have acknowledged obtaining refunds for the kick backs but refuted the other two Rowan allegations. It is possible that Rowan is pursuing his interest in the case.

We have considered whether efforts might be made to persuade the Committee to postpone its hearings until

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By ijg, NARA, Date 7-20-94

after the September elections. However, we believe that the Committee hearings could be just as damaging if postponed until after the elections, especially if the Thieu-Ky ticket wins, as they would be if held prior to the elections. Moreover, it would be exceedingly delicate to interfere with the timing of congressional hearings. We conclude that the disadvantages of making an effort to have the hearings postponed are likely to be greater than the damaging effects of the hearings themselves.

We have asked Ambassador Bunker to alert Prime Minister Ky to the problem and will consider further possible actions thereafter.

John F. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Saigon 1233 (EXDIS)
2. State 10595 (EXDIS)

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-163

By , NARA, Date 7-20-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 1233

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end of month

REF: A. STATE 162932 B. SAIGON 21704

1. HAVE LEARNED INFORMALLY FROM SHAPIRO AND FIELDS OF MAZZO CO STAFF IN AID/V THAT MCCLELLAN AND NELSON COMMITTEES ARE PLANNING HEARINGS IN NEAR FUTURE ON ASPECTS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL IMPORTS INTO VIETNAM. WE ARE FURTHER TOLD THAT THE MCCLELLAN HEARINGS WILL COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY AND WILL FEATURE REVELATIONS OF IMPROPER PRACTICES BY PHARMACY LA THANH, WHICH IS CONTROLLED BY LA THANH NGHE AND HIS BROTHER LA THANH TRUNG. WE ARE ALSO TOLD THAT INFORMATION IS BEING COMPILED ON BUI DIEM AND HIS COMPANY, COBIDO, PARTICULARLY BY CARL ROWAN.

2. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF THESE HEARINGS TURN UP INFORMATION WHICH SULLIES THE REPUTATION OF EITHER LA THANH NGHE OR BUI DIEM, THIS WOULD BLACKEN THE IMAGE OF THE GVN IN THE U.S. IT WILL, OF COURSE, ALSO GIVE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS HERE A NEW POWERFUL AND UNPREDICTABLE WEAPON TO USE DURING THE UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

3. BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY HERE OF THE UPCOMING CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON LA THANH NGHE, I WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON WHEN THESE HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AND THE NATURE OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST NGHE. DEPENDING UPON THIS WASHINGTON ASSESSMENT IT MAY BE DESIRABLE TO INFORM KY AND THIEU SO THAT THEY COULD TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION BEFORE THE HEARINGS COMMENCE. THIS MIGHT BE CONSTRUCTIVE FROM OUR VIEWPOINT AND IT MIGHT PREVENT THIS ISSUE FROM BECOMING MAJOR ISSUE IN THE UPCOMING ELECTIONS HERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, KY MIGHT WELL BE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO MOVE AGAINST LA THANH NGHE.

4. IN ANY EVENT, THESE HEARINGS COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS HERE AS WELL AS IN WASHINGTON. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS AND GUIDANCE. BUNKER
BT

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By ip, NARA, Date 7-20-94

1. Information available indicates McClellan hearings to start about first of August and that opener will be case of La Thanh Nghe. Belief here is that Committee intends to press hard on issue of La Thanh Nghe as recent member of Cabinet and presently candidate for high elective office by disclosing history of his collusion with Olin Mathison, American Cyanamid, Sherer and Schearing and proven arrangement of kickbacks and side payments from them. Allegedly committee deliberately ~~intends~~ intends hold hearings before Sept. elections for maximum publicity.

2. We know Committee in possession of information that refunds totaling over \$700,000 have been obtained through claims or legal action from the above four firms in transactions involving Pharmacie La Thanh, a sole proprietorship of La Thanh Nghe.

~~Committee also has information on goods sold by USA supporters to many of the companies in hands of La Thanh Nghe~~

Drafted by: EA:PHChadbourn Jr;bpw
VN/CM/CCS:ROKennedy: 7/19/67 6168
Tel. Ext. 6168
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - Philip C. Habib

Clearances:

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AID/VN: Mr. Stoneman

E- Mr. White (Subj) (AUTHORIZATION)

S/S - Mr. Kelly

P- Mr. Aronson (S/S) (BOYD SECRETARY)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EA/P - Mr. Armstrong (S/S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Refunds based on kickbacks from supplier to La Thanh which were deposited to his account outside Vietnam. Committee also has information on commissions paid by U.S. suppliers to Vinamyd (60% ownership in hands of La Thanh Nghe) on which AID is preparing bills of collection for improper payments. Further, Committee has documentary evidence that American Cyanamid has made deposits to Swiss Bank accounts of La Thanh Nghe and his brother La Thanh Trung who incidentally is partner with Nghe in Pharmacie Van Lang Doc Vien. In addition Committee has obtained information on transactions between U.S. suppliers and Viet-Nam Duoc Hoi (a company in which La Thanh Nghe is principal stockholder). (No refund being sought.)

3. Largest transactions involving La Thanh occurred in years 1963 and earlier.

Some already public knowledge as result successful criminal presentation of Olin Mathieson here. There are some past-1963 transactions, at least one as late as June 27, 1966. Some of these involved payments outside of Vietnam (either to La Thanh as agent for Vinamyd or La Thanh Trung or to Vinamyd or Trung as agent for La Thanh). Are checking on how payment made in other cases.

4. Would appreciate information as to what action GVN took re La Thanh as result of Olin Mathieson and other 1963 cases, whether La Thanh ever required to repatriate illegal payments, and whether he ever paid any fine or served any sentence. Would also appreciate information as to whether he or affiliates has repatriated any commission payments made outside country since 1963.

5. With public information already at hand and additional evidence such as above, there is little doubt that Committee can develop sensational public image of La Thanh Nghe if they wish. Another possible line of attack may be disclosure

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of fact that some pharmaceuticals found in VC caches have been traced back to La Thanh. Evidence on this aspect, however, is sparse, and only one case has been identified with La Thanh Nghe since August 1966.

6. We understand Nelson Committee may look into pharmaceutical imports into Viet-Nam financed by AID but probably only as part of general pharmaceutical survey.

7. Re possible Bui Diem involvement in hearings, information available here indicates company (records here mention CIEGECO as name of company concerned rather than COGIDO) of which he is major stockholder suspended May 1966 from import license list for fraudulent importation of substandard brickmaking machines. GVN customs fined company 2.8 million piasters, which company now paying off. Company is still suspended. We understand case received considerable local publicity in Saigon press but we are not aware of any here, although it may well be that Rowan intends make public re-hash. We have no specific knowledge here that committee will pick up this case.

8. Agree it would be desirable for you to speak to Ky and Thieu about this matter, if only to alert them thereby of what is coming. They should understand this is business of legislative branch U.S. Government, over which executive exerts minimal influence on matters such as these.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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10

Monday, July 24, 1967
9:00 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith True Davis reports on his talk with Sen. Symington concerning Inter-American Development Bank legislation.

No report yet on other conversation you instructed: Sec. Rusk and Sen. Hickenlooper. I'll check today.

W. W. Rostow

cc. Marshall Wright

WWRostow:rln



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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

2756

10a

July 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. W. W. ROSTOW

As the President asked, I visited with Senator Symington concerning the \$900 million authorization for the Inter-American Development Bank fund for special operations. I have continuously kept in touch with Senator Symington for some time on this matter and there is no change in his attitude towards any AID or multi-lateral institutions, which is undoubtedly well known to the President. His opposition is related to (1) the balance of payments impact of any of these programs, (2) no significant reduction in domestic spending programs, and (3) concern over the growing cost of the Vietnam conflict without an appreciable escalation of same.

I have further been in contact with all members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and feel the Bill will pass the Committee, 12 to 5, with two others doubtful which could go either way.

We will be completing a head count in the House this afternoon with reference to floor action on Thursday, July 20, and although I do not anticipate a large majority I feel the Bill will pass comfortably.

Best wishes!

True
True Davis

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11
Pres. file

July 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Ambassador Barbour at 12:30 p. m.
today.

We thought you ought to see Wally Barbour in order to get first hand his picture of how much negotiating room the Israelis may have. He came back feeling that they are prepared to make reasonable arrangements on the West Bank -- in the context of an overall settlement -- but show very little give on Jerusalem.

It is important for him to take away (a) your feeling that the Israelis will have to show some imagination and give on Jerusalem and (b) a sense of just how deeply you see us getting involved in the Jordan-Israel talks. You may want to begin by asking him how he sees these negotiations working out.

As you know, Wally did an outstanding job during the June crisis, so you may want to give him a pat on the back.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

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12

Sunday, July 23, 1967 -- 11:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

You asked us some time ago to prepare a reply to Chet Bowles on land reform, etc. Here it is, although you may now have reservations about dealing with the matter so formally.

You will recall that you have an appointment to see him on August 8.

W. W. Rostow

Dispatch letter

You send letter in this sense

No letter required

See me

WWRostow:rln

66-1192
12a

July 19, 1967

Dear Chet:

My sincere thanks for your recent letter and for your view on two key elements in the Viet-Nam situation. The question of land reform and the military manpower problem are both matters to which I and all of my advisers have been paying the closest attention.

Ambassador Bunker and Bob Komer have as one of their items of highest priority the speeding up of land reform. They tell me that they are putting great pressure on the Vietnamese to produce more in this critical field. Recently, the distribution of permanent titles to Government-held land has been accelerated. The Government has issued an order forbidding their troops to collect or help collect rents. Another decree has waived back rents on land while it is under Viet Cong control. I mention this because of the criticism you cited that back rents are being collected.

Moreover, an aerial survey is being conducted in large parts of the Mekong Delta. Results to date indicate that new photogrammetric techniques will break through historic bottlenecks in giving title to land by eliminating slow and costly ground surveys.

Finally, several special survey teams have been sent to look at land reform. The respected independent Stanford Research Institute has done highly useful work in this field. They are now back in Viet-Nam looking into a variety of suggestions, including yours, on land redistribution.

I am enclosing with this letter a brief survey of the land reform problem which you may find informative and interesting.

The military manpower question is one that we have been looking at with closest attention. As you know, Secretary McNamara has just returned from Viet-Nam, and I have been discussing this matter with him and General Westmoreland and others. The cautions which you mention are very much in our minds.

The fact is, however, that Hanoi does not have the kind of automatic capability that you suggest to increase their forces in the South to any level it chooses. The level of the enemy's military strength has remained fairly stable over the last six months or so. I think it would not be true if they had a choice. For we have known for a long time that Hanoi would like to carry out a destructive and crushing blow at our forces in the field. They simply have not been able to do it.

Nonetheless, the points you make are well taken and will continue to receive every consideration.

My thanks again for your frank expression of views. They are always welcome. I trust that you are being equally frank with our Indian friends as they face the wide range of problems that confront them.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

Enclosure

Honorable Chester Bowles
American Ambassador
New Delhi

LBJ:WJJorden:pas:7/19/67



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
New Delhi, India

128

May 18, 1967

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Although Viet-Nam is not my business and I know you are already over-burdened with free advice I would like again to take the liberty of expressing my private views directly to you on what I believe to be the critical situation which is developing there.

I do so, first, because many years of experience in Asia have given me some feeling for the forces which are shaping events there, and, second, because I feel that whether my views prove to be right or wrong they may be somewhat different from those which are normally aired within the Administration. I would like to make two points.

1. A few weeks ago I proposed to you a bold program of South Vietnamese land reform similar to the programs which have been so enormously effective in developing and maintaining political stability and economic dynamism in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. More specifically, I suggested that we bring to bear on the Saigon Government whatever pressures are required to persuade it to launch a program which would assure each rural family in South Viet-Nam twelve or fifteen acres of land. This could include those members of the Viet Cong who lay down their arms and sign an oath of allegiance before a certain date.

I recognize that there is opposition to such a proposal in Saigon and in Washington, not only on the grounds that it would upset some of our supporters in South Viet-Nam who are large land-holders, but also because it could not effectively be administered during war-time. However, as for the first objection the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-244
By , NARA, Date 3/4/94

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-2-

Nationalist debacle on the Chinese mainland demonstrated we cannot create a stable Asia by catering to those who have a vested interest in an unjust status quo. As for the second, I have pointed out that Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was launched under somewhat similar difficult circumstances; yet it was Lincoln's dramatic move which helped to give the Union cause meaning for a great many million people at home and abroad.

Since writing to you I have talked to several radio and newspapermen on their way home from Saigon who allege that when American and South Vietnamese troops take over a rural area from the Viet Cong in most cases the rights of the landlords are promptly restored, and in some cases there has even been an effort to collect a percentage of the crops as back rent.

I can say with the utmost conviction that if these stories are correct we can never succeed in "pacifying" the South Viet-Nam rural areas regardless of the size of our commitment or the dedication and ability of those who are carrying it out. The peasants of Asia want doctors, schools and roads; but even more they want the pride, dignity and economic justice that goes with land ownership.

2. My second point involves the matter of military manpower in Asia. In my view it is totally impossible to win a ground forces numbers game anywhere in Southeast or Eastern Asia. As I understand it, there are still 250,000 well-trained, well equipped North Vietnamese troops on the other side of the 17th Parallel which have not yet been committed. If new inputs of United States ground forces begin to turn the fighting sharply in our favor I am convinced that Hanoi will simply put in more and more of its own reserves to meet the challenge. And if eventually they run out of North Vietnamese soldiers it is inevitable, in my opinion, that they will then turn, however

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-3-

reluctantly, to the Chinese who will have no alternative but to send in whatever "volunteers" may be necessary.

Many of our Chinese experts assert that under no circumstances will the Chinese enter the war. From my own knowledge of Asia I cannot agree. Indeed, we should be reminded that Chinese experts provided similar assurances in the 1950's in regard to Korea. Yet in that instance tough Chinese soldiers were introduced in large numbers in spite of the fact that the new Peking Government had been fighting a civil war for thirty years and the country was still woefully divided and impoverished.

I also believe that the current assumption that the Soviet Union under no circumstances will support Communist China is open to very serious question.

Moscow's quarrel is not with China but with Mao Tse-tung. With a 6000-mile border and 700 million hungry Chinese leaning against it, any government in Moscow will grasp the first opportunity for a rapprochement with Peking. Under conditions of peace this might be consistent with our national interests. Against a background of expanding warfare in Viet-Nam it could lead straight to a world disaster.

At luncheon a few days ago Radivoj Uvalic, the able and well informed Yugoslav Ambassador in New Delhi, told me that his government was deeply worried by Brezhnev's recent speech in Bulgaria and reports from Moscow indicating that there is increasing support within the Soviet Government for a more moderate attitude towards China.

In closing let me stress that I strongly disagree with those who urge you to "get out of Southeast Asia." Indeed I have consistently and vigorously supported our official position on Viet-Nam here in India. In this regard, I am enclosing copies of three of my columns which I wrote for our American Reporter illustrating what I have been saying here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-4-

Nevertheless, I am deeply persuaded (a) that if we try to outdo the North Vietnamese in regard to inputs of military ground forces we are likely to find ourselves in a major war with China and perhaps Russia as well and (b) that we are in urgent need of an effective political gesture such as a genuine land reform program that will underscore for millions of people at home and abroad the basic values that are at stake.

Believe me, I understand the tremendous burdens you carry. Like many others I wish I could do more to ease them. In any event, I know you would want me to share these personal and private views with you frankly.

With my warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Chester Bowles".

Chester Bowles

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, July 23, 1967
11:50 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

From this account you can see
that our team in Saigon is trying hard
to work over the press.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 1675, Unclassified
July 22, 1967

WWRostow:rln

Jordan

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JUL 22 18 24

EHX251
PP RUEHEX
DE RUEHC 19888 2031755
ZNR UUUUU ZFH2
P R 220746Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3546
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC 2980
STATE GRNC
BT
UNLCLAS SAIGON 1675

DEPT PASS USAID WASHINGTON ATTN BOSLEY
FOR DONNELLEY FROM ADAMSON

1. FOLLOWING IS WEEKLY REPORT MISSION PRESS CENTER ACTIVITIES
NONMILITARY ASPECTS U.S. OPERATIONS VIETNAM, INCLUDING JUSPAO/
USAID AND JUSPAO/CORDS OFFICE OF INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN
SUPPORT OF PRESS CENTER.

2. WEEKLY HIGHLIGHT: AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S SPEECH BEFORE A DINNER
MEETING OF THE VIETNAMESE JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION RESULTED IN
HEAVY COVERAGE IN THE LOCAL PRESS. POST AND NEWS. AND ENGLISH

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1675 UNCLAS
ITION OF VIET-NAM PRESS PRINTED FULL TEXT. VERNACULARS SUMMA
RIZED IT, RUNNING HEADLINES STATING THAT " U.S. DOES NOT SUPPORT
NOR OPPOSE ANY CANDIDATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS".

3. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO SAW THE FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENTS:
NICK TURNER, NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING CORPS. LONDON SUNDAY
TIMES AND AUKLAND STAR; THEODORE WHITE, LIFE MAGAZINE; JOHN
DILLIN, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR; AND BERT QUINT, CBS NEWS.

4. ROGER PETERSON AND GEORGE ALLEN, ABC NEWS, RECEIVED BRIEFING
BY AMBASSADOR LACKE.

5. REGULAR THURSDAY ECONOMIC BRIEFING BY COOPER ATTENDED BY
SOUTHERLAND, UPI, ALLEN, ABC; ERLANDSON, BALTIMORE SUN; EEG-
HENRICKSON, AFTEMPOSTEN (OSLO) AND SWEDISH RADIO.

6. MISSION PRESS CENTER BRIEFINGS INCLUDED: BORGES, VISTAZO,
GUAYAQUIL, EQUADOR; TUANA, CURBELO AND HRILJAC, ONTECARLO TV,
MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY, MILIGAN, QESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING;
KRAMER, AP; COFFEY, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS; SANDERS, U.S. NEWS
& WO

LD REPORT; APPLE, NEW YORK TIMES; STEINMAN, NBC NEWS;
HARWOOD, WASHINGTON POST; MOSER, LIFE MAGAZINE; ERLANDSON,
BALTIMORE SUN; FRIED, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS; ARMBRISTER, SATURDAY
EVENING POST; WARD, LO DON DAILY TELEGRAPH; SOUTHERLAND, UPI;

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1675 UNCLAS

CHALLIS, BBC, SKAKKE, JULLANDSPOSTEN, DENMARK; TETLER, DANISH FREE LANCE? BUSCAROLI II BORGHESE, ITALY.

7. USAID INFORMATION ACTIVITIES INCLUDED PROGRAM BRIEFING FOR WINTERS OF COLLEGIATE PRESS? COHEN, FAIRCHILD PUBLICATIONS SKAKKE, JULLANDSPOSTEN (DENMARK); FOUHY CBS, DILLIN, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR? MURPHY, NBC? PEARSON, ABC AND KRAMER, AP.

8. PRESS RELEASES ISSUED ON FOLLOWING TOPICS: MORE AMA VOLUNTEER PHYSICIANS FOR VIETNAM ARRIVE: ECONOMIC PROGRESS? AND VOCATIONAL SCHOOL OPENED FOR SOLDIERS AND WAR VETERANS. INAUGURATION CEREMONIES OF VOCATIONAL SCHOOL COVERED BY JUSPAO MEDIA.

9. AT CORDS, BRIEFINGS AND INTERVIEWS INCLUDED ARMBRISTER, SATURDAY EVENING POST? LEINSTER, LIFE MAGAZINE? FENTRESS, TIME MAGAZINE; THEODORE WHITE OF LIFE. SKAKKE, LYLLANDSPOSTEN (DENMARK) ? ALTIERY, WESTERN TV STATIONS, HONOLULU? VAN PRAAGH, TORONTO GLOBE MAIL? AND JOHN UTT, STARS & STRIPES.

10 CORRESPONDENTS ASSISTED ON FIELD TRIPS INCLUDED GROUPS OF SIX SOUTH AMERICAN JOURNALISTS ON U.S. NAVY RIVER PATROL BOATS; MONTEVIDEO URUGUAY, TV TEAM TO BLEIKY FOR STORY ON MONTAGNARDS; ARMSTRONG, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, TO BAO LOC FOR HOMETOWNER STORIES? AMRBRISTER, SATURDAY EVENING POST, TO GIA DINH AND BIEN

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 1675 UNCLAS

HOA; CBS-TV CREW TO HUE AND VUNG TAU FOR REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT STORIES? LEINSTER, LIFE, TO LONG AN FOR VAN TAC VU (DRAMA) TEAMS; FRANKLAND, LONDON OBSERVER, TO IV CORPS? DILLIN, CRHISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, ON A TOUR OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS IN SAIGON? MORRISSEY ABC-TV, RETURNING TO CAN THO TO FILM USAID AND CORDS WOMEN AT WORK; KAZICKAS, FREE LANCE, TO CAN THO FOR CHEIU HOI STORY; BARKER, MELBOURNE HERALD, TO PHY YEN FOR REFUGEEES STORIES; AND DOE, PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN. TO VUNG TAU TRAINING CENTER.

11. CORRESPONDENTS ARRIVING IN COUNTRY DURING REPORTING PERIOD INCLUDED: EXEL, NEW ZEALAND PRESS ASSOCIATION; SCOTT, TIME MAGAZINE CASEY, DOCUMENTARY RECORDINGS, LOS ANGELES; OLIVER, UPI; NELSON, NONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN? BORGES, VISTAZO, GUAYAQUIL, EQUADOR? TUANA, CURBELO, HIRLJAC OF MONTECARLO TV, MONTEVIDEO, URUGUAY; VAN PRAAGH, TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, CANADA? BERTOCHINI, FAR EASTERN OUTLOOK MAGAZINE, SENG, REUTERS, SINGAPORE? WHITE, LIFE MAGAZINE? ROSS, NBC NEWS; STARNER, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW.

12. AS OF THIS DATE, THERE ARE 486 CORRESPONDENTS ACCREDITED TO MACV-212 AMERICANS, 102 VIETNAMESE AND 172 THIRD COUNTRY.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Sunday
July 23, 1967 -- 11:50 am.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a first response of
Mobutu on our raising with him our
concern about Tshombe.

W. W. Rostow

Kinshasa 1453, July 22, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-162
By CG, NARA, Date 6-9-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

14a *W/K*
#8

~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 19975
RECD: JULY 22, 1967
1:52 P.M.

Info

OO RUEHC
DE RUQSUC 1453 2031659
ZNY SSSSS
O 221655Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ KINSHASA 1453

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

NODIS

BOMBOKO TOLD BLAKE THIS MORNING THAT HE DISCUSSED MY DEMARCHE ON TSHOMBE (KINSHASA 1425) WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU LAST NIGHT. BOMBOKO SAID PRESIDENT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBILITY STRONG NEGATIVE REACTIONS IN CONGRESS TO TSHOMBE EXTRADITION AND EXECUTION. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT BELIEVES HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO GO AHEAD WITH EXECUTION. BOMBOKO SAID MOBUTU UNDERSTANDS US POSITION, PARTICULARLY POLITICAL PROBLEM POSED TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND WILL TAKE ALL THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN DECIDING FASHION IN WHICH TSHOMBE WILL BE DISPOSED OF. MCBRIDE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-163
By rip, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-137
By cbm, NARA Date 4-2-01

15

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, July 23, 1967 -- 11:45am

Mr. President:

Herewith two intelligence reports suggesting that Robles may delay biting the bullet on the Panama treaties.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

WWRostow:rln

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 17221

15a

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
DD/I EXO USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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declassification

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~~S E C R E T~~

221844Z

DIST 22 JULY 1967

COUNTRY: PANAMA

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-138

DOI: 21 JULY 1967


By cbm, NARA Date 4-2-01

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SUBJECT: REPUBLICAN PARTY POSITION ON RATIFICATION OF CANAL
TREATIES

PADA:

SOURCE:



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)
(C)

1. PR LEADERS HAVE NOT YET TAKEN A POSITION ON THE NEW CANAL TREATIES OR ON THE TIMING OF THEIR RATIFICATION. THEY ARE POSTPONING A DECISION UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED THE SPANISH TEXT AND THE PR LEADERS AND DEPUTIES HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THE TREATIES IN DETAIL WITH ONE OF THE NEGOTIATORS. PRESIDENT ROBLES HAS APPROVED A MEETING FOR THAT PURPOSE AND IT IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE SOMETIME DURING THE WEEK OF 24 JULY.

~~S E C R E T~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. SIMILAR MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH THE OTHER MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS. ROBLES HAS ASSURED PR LEADERS THAT HE WILL NOT AUTHORIZE THE SIGNING OF THE TREATIES UNTIL HE HAS HAD THE VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, AS WELL AS OF THE CABINET AND THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: ROBLES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THE TREATIES SIGNED IN TIME TO SUBMIT TO A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON 1 SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS ANY SERIOUS DISUNITY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT COALITION ON THE TREATIES, HE MAY WELL HAVE TO POSTPONE AT LEAST THE RATIFICATION UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS IN MAY 1968. THIS DECISION WILL DEPEND UPON THE RESULTS OF THE MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES WITH THE NEGOTIATORS.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. PR LEADERS ARE NOT IN FAVOR OF ROBLES' GOING TO WASHINGTON FOR THE SIGNING CEREMONY IN ANY CASE. THEIR REASONING IS THAT SUCH A TRIP IS UNNECESSARY AND WOULD GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF UNDUE PANAMANIAN DEFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, PANCANAL, CINCSO CINCLANT.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 17231

156

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
DDI EXO USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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GROUP 1
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222109Z

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

DIST 22 JULY 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-2
(C)

COUNTRY: PANAMA

DOI: 21 JULY 1967

NLJ 00-138
By CBM, NARA Date 4-2-01

SUBJECT: CONSIDERATION BY PRESIDENT ROBLES OF POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES
OF DELAYING TREATY RATIFICATION UNTIL JUNE 1968

PADA:

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

SOURCE:

[REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] CONCERNING TREATY PROBLEMS ON 21 JULY,

PRESIDENT MARCO ROBLES REMARKED THAT SOME OF HIS ADVISERS WERE [REDACTED] **EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs (C)**

SUGGESTING THAT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES BE DELAYED UNTIL
AFTER THE MAY 1968 ELECTIONS. HE SAID THIS IS AN INTERESTING
POSSIBILITY AND HE IS CONSIDERING IT, COMMENTING THAT A SPECIAL
SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY IN JUNE 1968 WOULD ENABLE HIM TO AVOID

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yr
(C)

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

THE POLITICAL BLACKMAIL OF POLITICIANS DEMANDING SPECIAL FAVORS IN EXCHANGE FOR ELECTORAL SUPPORT. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THE U.S. WOULD THEN BE IN THE MIDST OF A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN WHICH MIGHT AFFECT SENATE RATIFICATION, ROBLES BRUSHED THIS OFF, SAYING "LET THEM WORRY ABOUT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, WHICH THEY KNOW BETTER HOW TO HANDLE."

2. ROBLES DID NOT COMMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE OPPOSITION MIGHT WIN THE MAY 1968 ELECTIONS IN PANAMA. HE SEEMED TO TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANDIDATE WILL WIN.

3. ~~SECRET~~ COMMENT: ROBLES WAS TALKING VERY MUCH LIKE THE GAMBLER THAT HE IS REPUTED TO BE. HE HAS LISTENED TO EVERYBODY, BUT HAS CLEARLY NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND AND WILL MAKE HIS MOVE WHEN HE THINKS THE TIME IS RIGHT.)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

4. ~~SECRET~~ DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, PANCANAL, CINCSO, CINCLANT

~~REPORT CLASS SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, July 23, 1967 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith planning goes forward for a national convention of the united political front Thieu and Ky are organizing, which will meet in the first few days of August and, presumably, formulate a platform.

It is a good idea, especially because Thieu and Ky have real political problems, being:

- military;
- and northern.

In our own thinking we must be prepared to face the possibility of a Huong victory -- despite his lack of organization -- and how we would then hold the military steady and help Huong make the deals necessary to bind up his slate with the military in a national government.

At this distance, however, it still seems that Thieu-Ky should make it, in which case our problem will be how to broaden the government and give it more civilian dimensions.

W. W. Rostow

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~Unclassified, July 12, 1967~~
[Redacted] Secret

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY

IN 17113

16a

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO
DD/I EXO ONE

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GROUP 1
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
DIST 22 JULY 1967

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(c)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 21 JULY 1967
SUBJECT PLANNING FOR NATIONAL CONVENTION IN AUGUST OF
THE THIEU-KY UNITED POLITICAL FRONT

ACQ

SOURCE



1958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

1. (SUMMARY: PLANNING IS PROCEEDING FOR AN EARLY AUGUST 1967 NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE UNITED POLITICAL FRONT IN SUPPORT OF THE THIEU-KY PRESIDENTIAL TICKET. THERE HAS BEEN SOME RELUCTANCE AMONG HOA HAO LEADERS TO JOINING A "FRONT" AND THE FRONT LEADERSHIP MAY ADOPT THE MORE PALATABLE WORD IN VIETNAMESE, "BLOC".)

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAL 00-209
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-22-02

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
(classification) (dissem controls)

2. AS OF 21 JULY, PLANNING WITHING THE UNITED POLITICAL FRONT WHICH HAS BEEN FORMED TO SUPPORT THE THIEU-KY PRESIDENTIAL TICKET HAD PROGRESSED AS FOLLOWS, AFTER MANY ORGANIZED MEETINGS AMONG GOVERNMENT, CAO DAI, VIETNAM NATIONALIST PARTY (VNQDD) AND HOA HAO LEADERS:

A. THE PROVISIONAL CONTROL COMMITTEE OF THE FRONT GROUP WAS TO MEET ON 21 JULY TO PREPARE THE FORMAT FOR INVITATIONS TO FRONT DELEGATES' ATTENDANCE AT THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.

B. ON 25 JULY AN APPEAL FOR MEMBERS TO JOIN THE FRONT ORGANIZATION WILL BE LAUNCHED VIA PRESS AND RADIO. THIS APPEAL WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARDS INDEPENDENTS AND LEADERS OF VARIOUS SMALL SPLINTER GROUPS.

C. 1 - 3 AUGUST: A NATIONAL CONVENTION WILL BE HELD IN SAIGON.

3. THE FRONT LEADERSHIP EXPECTS THE FOLLOWING DELEGATE REPRESENTATION FROM THE DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE COUNTRY: 50 FROM I CORPS, MAINLY VNQDD AND INDEPENDENT POLITICAL PERSONALITIES; 50 FROM II CORPS; 75 FROM TRANS-BASSAC; 100 FROM BASSAC; 100 FROM THE EASTERN REGION; AND 50-100 FROM THE

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

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(classification) (dissem controls)

SAIGON METROPOLITAN AREA. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE CONVENTION WILL COST ABOUT THREE MILLION PIASTERS (US\$37,500), PRIMARILY FOR TRANSPORTATION CHARGES TO AND FROM SAIGON AND FOR SUBSISTENCE AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

4. THE ONLY PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRONT HAS BEEN THE RELUCTANCE OF THE HOA HAO LEADERS TO AGREE TO JOINING A FRONT (MAT TRAN) AS OPPOSED TO A BLOC (KHOD). HOWEVER, THE LEADERSHIP OF THE FRONT HAS AGREED TO A CHANGE IN ITS NAME TO THAT OF A BLOC, WHICH WILL HAVE LITTLE OR NO EFFECT ON THE DEGREE OF COOPERATION AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF THE FRONT. THE WORD "BLOC" IN VIETNAMESE IMPLIES A SLIGHTLY LESS-ORGANIZED GROUP WITH A LESS INTIMATE ASSOCIATION OR MEMBERSHIP AND A LESS AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO OVERALL OBJECTIVES.

5. THE MERE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT PARTY IS SPONSORING THE TWO SENIOR MILITARY CANDIDATES AS PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT IS NO SURE GUARANTEE FOR THIS TICKET. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE MANY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE MIDDLE TO UPPER ECHELONS OF THE VARIOUS MINISTRIES IN THE SAIGON AREA, PARTICU-

~~SECRET - NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~~~(classification)~~~~(dissem controls)~~

LARLY THOSE OF SOUTHERN ORIGIN, WHO ARE OPPOSED TO THE THIEU-KY TICKET AS REPRESENTING CENTRAL VIETNAM AND NORTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS GENERALLY OPPOSED TO A MILITARIST FORM OF GOVERNMENT. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER NGUYEN NGOC LOAN'S POLICE OFFICIALS HAVE ACCEPTED HIS GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE THIEU-KY TICKET, BUT THEY HAVE DONE SO WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR PERSONAL ENTHUSIASM. AS FAR AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE SUPPORT AT THE LOWER PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEVELS IS CONCERNED, THE DEGREE OF ORGANIZED CONTROL FROM THE SAIGON LEVEL IS NOT ENOUGH TO ASSURE A VOTE FOR THE THIEU-KY CANDIDACY IN MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. ALTHOUGH THESE EMPLOYEES CAN BE COUNTED ON FOR A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF SUPPORT, THEIR MERE EXISTENCE AND THE FACT THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS SPONSORING A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ARE NOT A GUARANTEE OF THAT CANDIDATE'S VICTORY.

6. (FIELD COMMENT: KY'S UNITED POLITICAL FRONT WAS ALSO THE SUBJECT OF [REDACTED] WHICH [REDACTED] IDENTIFIED SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF THE FRONT AND GAVE DETAILS ABOUT ITS FINANCING.)

EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

(C)

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

AMBASSADOR LOCKE, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL
WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF
STAFF J-2) DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL
SHARP AND POLAD)

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO DISSEM ABROAD~~
~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

GROUP I

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17
Pres file

Sunday, July 23, 1967 -- 11:15 am

Mr. President:


These three intelligence reports, bearing on Hussein, show:

-- He is more confident and feels under less time pressure in pursuing a moderate policy;

-- There are noises in Syria, including a reported suggestion from the Soviet ambassador that Hussein should be assassinated.

Given the role of the Soviets in Syria in triggering the mobilization in Sinai, we may want to consider telling Dobrynin that we have such a report and do not like it.

W. W. Rostow



3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

cc: mc George Bundy

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-218
By js, NARA, Date 1-14-2014

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 JUL 2 21 01

EHB495
RR RUEHCX
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R 221810Z JUL 67
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6462
RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
INFO RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 623
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 414
RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 492
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 103
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 284
RUDKKR/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 114
RUDKBT/AMEMBASSY RABAT 141
RUQMTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 99
RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHACTOUM 20
STATE GRNC

by PAULS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By lig, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 321

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF GA SESSION

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

IF SOVIETS CALLED EMERGENCY SPECIAL (GA) TO GET ENDORSEMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL OR TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH ARABS, THEY FAILED MISERABLY ON BOTH COUNTS.

SPECIAL SESSION ADJOURNED LATE JULY 21 MERELY BY ADOPTING PROCEDURAL (RES) WHICH REFERS MATTER BACK TO SECURITY COUNCIL AND KEEPS GA TECHNICALLY IN SESSION. ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE CORRESPONDENT,

RESOLUTION

PAGE 2 RUEHDT 321/1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WITH CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN MOSCOW, DESCRIBES OUTCOME AS SOVIET DIPLOMATIC DISASTER. THIS IS OVERSTATEMENT BUT THERE IS NO GAINSAING FACT THAT THEIR FAILURE TO ACHIEVE ANY GA ACTION IN MORE THAN A MONTH OF DILIGENT EFFORTS AND THAT GROMYKO RETURNS HOME WITH EMPTY HANDS IS POLITICAL SETBACK OF SOME MAGNITUDE.

SOVIETS

AS SESSION WINDS UP, ARABS/-- AT LEAST THOSE IN NEW YORK -- ARE DISTRESSED BY FACT THAT (SOVS) OPENLY SHOW THEY DISAGREE WITH BASIC ARAB REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ISRAEL AS STATE. SYMBOLIC OF SPLIT WAS FINAL VOTE ON PROCEDURAL RES WHICH FOUND SOVS AND ARABS ON OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FENCE IN ENDING A SESSION OSTENSIBLY CALLED TO ASSIST THEM.

PERHAPS MOST INTRIGUING QUESTION IS WHY SOVS PERMITTED SITUATION TO DEVELOP WHERE, DESPITE SOV PROPAGANDA ON WITHDRAWAL, IT WAS CLEARLY REVEALED USSR IS CLOSER TO US- (AND MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS) THAN TO ARABS IN RECOGNIZING LINK BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL AND ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST IN PEACE. BY VIRTUE OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO RECOMMEND TO ARABS FINAL VERSION OF RES DISCUSSED WITH US, SOVS APPEARED TO ABANDON STAND TAKEN BY KOSYGIN THAT WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI TROOPS MUST COME FIRST AND EVERYTHING ELSE CAN BE DISCUSSED LATER.

POSSIBLY FACT US - SOV SIMILARITY OF VIEW EMERGED SO OPENLY AND WIDELY WAS DIPLOMATIC FUMBLING. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT GROMYKO, WHO WITH DOBRYNIN (NEVER SOV UNION REP FEDORENKO) DID ALL THE NEGOTIATING WITH GOLDBERG, DID NOT QUITE GRASP UN RESES QUICKLY BECOME OPEN DOCUMENTS OPENLY ARRIVED AT. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE KREMLIN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS NEVER ADEQUATELY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THIS ASPECT OF PROBLEM. POINT IS THAT 122 UN MEMBERS LEFT IN NO DOUBT THAT DESPITE SOV PROPAGANDA SPEECHES ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, USSR PRIVATELY ENDORSES CONCEPT THAT RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXIST AS NATIONAL INDEPENDENT STATE FREE FROM WAR IS LEGITIMATELY TREATED ON A PAR WITH TROOP WITHDRAWAL QUESTION.

JAKOBSON (FINLAND) - PROTECT SOURCE - ONE OF NEUTRAL SPONSORS OF PROCEDURAL RES, TOLD BUFFUM HE CONFIDENT FROM HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOLDATOV (USSR) THAT USSR INTENTIONALLY SET UP SITUATION TO DEMONSTRATE THERE IS POLITICAL GAP BETWEEN ARAB AND SOV POSITIONS. HE SAID IN URGING JAKOBSON TO TABLE PROCEDURAL RES SOLDATOV COMMENTED THAT ARABS ~~WLD~~ OPPOSE THIS BUT JAKOBSON ~~SHD~~ NOT BE DETERRED THEREBY SINCE USSR ~~WLD~~ VOTE AFFIRMATIVELY. WE ALSO NOTED THAT IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATING PROCESS SOVS NEVER MADE SERIOUS

WOULD

SHOULD

EFFORT TO GET EVEN THIS PROCEDURAL RES MODIFIED ENOUGH TO SATISFY ARABS. THIS COMMENT MUST OF COURSE BE TEMPERED BY FACT THAT IN FACE ADAMANT ARAB OPPOSITION TO SUBSTANTIVE RES, SOVS DECIDED NOT TO ENCOURAGE TABLING SUBSTANTIVE TEXT.

INTENTIONAL OR NOT SOV STANCE AT LEAST PUT ARABS ON NOTICE -- RADICAL ARABS IN PARTICULAR -- THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT FROM USSR EVEN IN POLITICAL ARENA; WHATEVER THE REASON, WE SHOULD NOT FAIL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVT LEADERS IN ARAB STATES TO CALL ATTENTION TO IT IN ORDER LIMIT SOV EFFORT TO CONTRAST THEIR POSTURE IN AREA WITH OURS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.

ISRAELIS, OF COURSE, ARE DELIGHTED AT OUTCOME. THEY HAVE FROM BEGINNING PREFERRED NO RES BE ADOPTED, FEARING THAT EVEN IF RECOMMENDATION ON WITHDRAWAL THEIR FORCES WERE LINKED TO EQUIVALENT REQUIREMENT ON ARABS, THE PARA ON WITHDRAWAL MIGHT LATER BE EXPLOITED AGAINST THEM. DOMESTICALLY IN ISRAEL, FAILURE OF GA TO TAKE ACTION ON WITHDRAWAL, OR ON ORIGINAL SOV REQUEST FOR CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL AS AGGRESSOR UNDOUBTEDLY REGARDED AS TRIUMPH FOR ISRAELI DIPLOMACY. IN VIEW OF FACT THERE IS WIDESPREAD BELIEF AMONG UN MEMBERS THAT ISRAEL STRUCK THE FIRST BLOW, ISRAEL DID MUCH BETTER THAN MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG
BT

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RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 104
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RUQSKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 21
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BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 321

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF GA SESSION

PART OF REASON FOR THIS WAS WELCOME DEMONSTRATION OF MATURITY AND SOPHISTICATION ON PART SURPRISING NUMBER OF DELS. LATIN AMERICANS STAKED OUT NEW HIGH GROUND FOR THEMSELVES BY DEVELOPING AND HOLDING, FROM START TO FINISH, TO NEED FOR LINK BETWEEN BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED; I.E., NEED FOR WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL AND END OF STATE OF WAR BY ARABS. LA POSITION, HOWEVER, WAS CONSTANTLY JEOPARDIZED BY ACTIVE BACKSLIDING EFFORTS OF A HANDFUL LATIN DELS LED BY CHILE AND VENEZUELA. ONE BY-PRODUCT OF LA LEADING ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON RES WAS GROMYKO ATTACK IN CLOSING SESSION THAT LATIN

PAGE 2 RUEHDT 321/2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HAD BEEN PRESSURED BY US. SINCE THEY HAD IN FACT PLAYED QUITE INDEPENDENT ROLE, LA'S BITTERLY RESENTED THIS, EVEN THOSE LATIN WHO NORMALLY HAVE LEFTIST SYMPATHIES.

MYTH OF AFRO-ASIAN BLOC, OR EVEN AFRICAN BLOC, NICELY DISPELLED BY REPEATED EVIDENCE THAT OPINION THIS GROUP RANGED ACROSS ENTIRE SPECTRUM FROM TOTALLY PRO-ISRAEL TO TOTALLY PRO-ARAB. SEVERAL EFFORTS TO APPEAL FOR GROUP SOLIDARITY ABORTED AND MEMBERS GENERALLY VOTED THEIR OWN CONVICTIONS.

ALTHOUGH UN HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT PROPOSITION THAT ONE SIDE CAN CONTINUE ASSERT STATE OF BELLIGERENCE WHILE OTHER CALLED UPON TO ACT AS IF SUCH CONDITIONS DID NOT EXIST, WE BELIEVE THAT ANY SENSE OF EUPHORIA ON OUR PART OR ISRAELIS SHOULD BE AVOIDED. FIRST OF ALL, THIS WAS, ALTHOUGH WE AND ISRAELIS WORKED HARD, ESSENTIALLY MISCALCULATED SOV MOVE PLANNED AND LAUNCHED IN HASTE, NOT ISRAELI VICTORY. SECONDLY, WE DO NOT BELIEVE UN EITHER IN GA OR (SC) IS GOING TO BE EASY ON ISRAELIS FROM THIS POINT ON. ON THE CONTRARY, ARABS, WHO HAVE BEEN FURTHER HUMILIATED BY SOV MISCALCULATION,

SECURITY COUNCIL

SECTION 2, USON 21, page 2

~~PAGE 3 RUEHDT 321/2 S O N F I D E N T I A L~~

WILL GAIN SYMPATHETIC ATTENTION FOR RESISTANCE TO ANY ISRAELI HIGH-HANDEDNESS, AS JERUSALEM VOTES SHOWED. INDEED, JERUSALEM ISSUE WILL REMAIN ACHILLES HEEL OF ISRAELI POSITION IN NEXT ROUND IN SC. ANYTHING LESS THAN IMAGINATIVE AND MAGNANIMOUS POLICIES BY ISRAELIS IN TERRITORIES THEY OCCUPY, PARTICULARLY IN ECONOMIC AND REFUGEE FIELDS, CAN BUILD SITUATION WHICH WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR US IN SC AND CAN, WITHIN TWO MONTHS, COME BACK TO PLAGUE US IN 22ND GA. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE MUST ANTICIPATE INCREASING PROBLEMS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OURSELVES. WE COORDINATED CLOSELY WITH ISRAELI DEL AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THIS WAS RELATIVELY EASY WHEN ISSUE REVOLVED AROUND UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL ISRAELI FORCES, WHERE OUR VIEWS AND ISRAEL'S COINCIDED. BUT EVEN IN GA, CRACKS APPEARED, FOR EXAMPLE, ON JERUSALEM RES AND IN CONNECTION WITH OUR EFFORT ARRIVE AT COMMON GROUND WITH USSR ON SUBSTANTIVE RES. EVEN THOUGH WE WORKED OUT TEXT WITH SOVS WHICH WAS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED AS STRONGER THAN LA RES, ISRAELI PREFERENCE FOR GA TO END IN TOTAL INACTION AND DOUBTS ABOUT OUR FIRMNESS RESULTED IN SOME TENSION.

~~PAGE 4 RUEHDT 321/2 C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

AS WE PROCEED DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH OUR CONCEPT OF MAGNANIMOUS PEACE, ISRAEL MAY FOR UNDERSTANDABLE SECURITY REASONS SEE PROBLEMS DIFFERENTLY THAN WE AND FURTHER STRAINS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY DEVELOP.

FOR THESE REASONS, WE FEEL WE CAN TAKE SATISFACTION IN HAVING HELPED UNDERLINE NATURE OF SOV MISCALCULATION (OF WHICH THEIR OWN MOVE IN FINAL DAYS WAS AN ADMISSION) BUT CANNOT ASSERT ANY SAFE OR LASTING "VICTORY". INDEED, IT ~~WOULD~~ NOT SERVE OUR PURPOSES TO CROW OVER SOV DEFEAT OR OVEREMPHASIZE PUBLICLY SIMILARITIES BETWEEN US AND RUSSIAN VIEWS. DOING SO COULD MAKE EFFORTS TO TRANSLATE SIMILARITIES INTO CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION IN MIDDLE EAST MORE DIFFICULT.

WITH CONCLUSION FIRST ROUND OF SC MEETINGS AND SPECIAL GA, WE HAVE CLOSED MERELY FIRST CHAPTER IN LONG AND ARDUOUS STRUGGLE TO RESTORE STABILITY TO ~~THE~~ MIDDLE EAST.

IF DEPT CONCURS, WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS OF ADDRESSEES ON THIS ANALYSIS.

GP-3.

GOLDBERG
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

Sunday
July 23, 1967 -- 10:30 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Is this proposed schedule for
President Diaz Ordaz acceptable to
you?

W. W. Rostow

Acceptable _____

No _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

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1. The President has agreed to combine Diaz Ordaz Washington visit and Chamizal transfer ceremony. We anticipate visit schedule will follow tentative and is complete outline below.
2. October 25 - Assuming Diaz Ordaz desires address UNGA (such addresses are usually made in afternoon), this would tie in well and permit his participating in inauguration Center for InterAmerican Relations as well.

October 26 - Diaz Ordaz arrives in Washington - formal welcome at White House 11:30 A.M. followed by bilateral talks. Evening - black tie dinner hosted by President Johnson.

October 27 - Second Meeting between Presidents; Diaz Ordaz hosts formal dinner. (We understand Mexican President may prefer informal dinner. If so it might be held at Pan American Union which could accommodate larger group than Mexican Embassy).

October 28 - Both Presidents go to El Paso for Chamizal ceremony.

ARA/MEX:WDBoles:TGLEonhardy 8854

ARA - Mr. Sayre

S/CPR - Mr. King (indraft)
S/S -G - Mr. Low (by phone)
The WHITE HOUSE

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3. Plans for New York visit would have to be developed by Department with City, State and UN officials. Complete schedules for October 26 and 27 under study.
4. Second day schedule might include a.) speech before appropriate forum such as National Press Club. (Congress is not expected be in session. If it is we could try to arrange this as forum.)
b.) visit to secondary school in Washington, ^{off}possibly Howard University. c.) presentation by Mexican President of Mexican flora adaptable to Washington as part of Washington's "beautification" program. d.) tour of downtown area of Washington.
5. The Chamizal ceremony could be limited to formal transfer ceremony and speeches by each President, or also include tour of area improvements as a result of Chamizal settlement.
6. Ambassador should discuss above outline with FONMIN with view developing final plans as early as possible.
7. No press announcement is anticipated until final plans agreed upon. Every effort should be made prevent premature disclosure planning for visit.

End

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sunday, July 23, 1967

20

Pres file

Mr. President:

Although we're not yet certain of the extent of damage and loss of life caused by the earthquake in Turkey yesterday, we would like to send out a message of condolence as quickly as possible.

We received three messages from the Turks on our aircraft crash in Carolina last week.

The attached is sufficiently open-end to cover the situation.

Walt Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2824

20a

July 22, 1967

IN REPLY REFER TO:

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Recommended Sympathy Telegram to President
Sunay of Turkey. re Earthquake

Multiple press reports indicate that a heavy earthquake struck western Turkey on the afternoon of July 22. Reports vary as to the number of dead, but agree that the town of Adapazari (population about 40,000) southeast of Istanbul was badly hit.

President Cevdet Sunay, who made a state visit here in April, is reported to have cancelled a tour on the Black Sea coast to rush to the stricken area. We recommend a sympathy message to him from President Johnson.

The impact of the message might be heightened if it were sent commercially from the White House through the authorities in the major communications center nearest the disaster area (Istanbul). If you agree, we will telegraph a confirmation copy to the Embassy at Ankara to assure that the message is officially received.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Draft message to President Sunay of Turkey

NEA/TUR/JMHowison:hos

Clearances: AID/MR/DC - Mrs. King S/CPR - Mr. Carter

His Excellency
Cevdet Sunay
President of the Republic of Turkey
Care of Governor of Istanbul
Istanbul, Turkey

Dear President Sunay:

Press reports that Turkey has again been struck by a major earthquake have shocked and grieved us. From my own experience I can sense how heart-rending it must be for you to look into the faces of your fellow-citizens in the stricken area.

I have asked our Embassy in Ankara to let us know if there are ways in which we can help. Our hearts go out to the injured, the homeless and the bereaved.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

21

Saturday, July 22, 1967
9:35 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter from you
to Gen. Eisenhower on the desalting
issue.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 7-17-91

~~*Confidential*~~

July 21, 1967

21a
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-162

By CG, NARA, Date 6-9-95

Dear General Eisenhower:

I am grateful that you have kept the issue of desalting before me in connection with the Middle East settlement. I recall well that you presented the issue of water development in the Middle East strongly on the occasion of your address before the United Nations General Assembly in August 1958.

You may be interested in how our planning is proceeding in this matter.

First, Ellsworth Bunker, before he went to Saigon, initiated a major desalting project with the Israelis. We had hoped to extend it to an Arab state or states; but political conditions did not then permit. As a result of Bunker's work, however, we have some excellent technical and economic staff work in hand.

Second, we are quietly in touch with a team at the World Bank looking, in particular, at the possibilities of water development in connection with a possible Israel-Jordan settlement.

Third, our Water for Peace team is looking hard at the potentialities of the very large atomic desalting plants now on the drawing boards.

I am trying to find the right moment to introduce this element into the complex, dangerous and unresolved Middle East situation. You should know that we are trying to bring Jordan and Israel together in a bilateral negotiation. And it may be that, at the right moment, the availability of a dramatic desalting possibility could ease the way to a settlement for both countries.

I trust you will continue to make available to me your thoughts on this and other matters.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

~~Confidential~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-CBS 19

By is, NARS, Date 6-22-84

22

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

It may be useful if I set down for you some thoughts on the possibility of relative early negotiations to end the war in Viet Nam. I start, of course, on the assumption that this is a long shot; and, even more important, the only way to maximize the chance of an early end of the war is to proceed on the assumption that the war will last a long time.

Having said that, here are my thoughts.

1. The most important element that may be operating is the one on which we have least evidence; namely, the possibility that Hanoi now estimates that the U. S. election of November 1968 will not prove to be the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. On the basis of U. S. public opinion polls and the position of various Republican politicians -- perhaps underlined for them by the Russians -- they may now judge that, if the Republicans win, the military pressure on them will not decrease and might even increase. In that sense, Gen. Eisenhower's reported statement this morning and other hawkish Republican statements work our way. It is possible also that positions taken by certain dovish Senators who indicated that they are not prepared to accept Hanoi's terms, may also be helpful; for example, Senator Peil's talk in Paris with Mai Van Bo.

2. If this hypothesis is correct, they must rationally estimate the consequences of certain trends in the war not over an 18-month period, but over a period up to, perhaps, 5-1/2 years. Here are the trends they must then confront.

-- The slow decline of the Viet Cong manpower pool -- which has yielded stagnation or reduction in the size and effective strength of Viet Cong main force units and impairment of the Viet Cong infrastructure;

-- As a result of the Viet Cong manpower situation, the need to insert into South Viet Nam increased North Vietnamese regular forces to keep the total Communist war effort in the south from collapsing under the weight of U. S. and Allied forces;

-- The increase in effectiveness of our bombing operations in North Viet Nam, notably against electric power and the transport system into and out of Hanoi and Haiphong, accompanied by a decline in the effectiveness of their air defenses and a marked reduction in our loss rates in aircraft and pilots;

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

-- A rising requirement for foreign aid to Hanoi to compensate for the losses suffered through bombing -- a trend which is increasing the leverage of the USSR and the Eastern European countries in Hanoi;

-- Increasing anxiety about the difficulties inside Communist China and some lapping over into the Chinese population of North Viet Nam of the Red Guard movement.

3. I have spent some time reading literally hundreds of particular intelligence reports on the situation in the various provinces of South Viet Nam. They show, in different degrees, strain on Viet Cong morale and manpower; a weakening of military effectiveness; increased concentration on finding food and recruits rather than actual military operations; but no definitive break in the resilient Viet Cong structure.

4. Similarly, as nearly as I can assess, it, the bombing of North Viet Nam is hurting them, but not to the point of necessitating an early decision.

5. As recent public statements indicate (see, for example, attached) there is clearly a hard-line group in Hanoi prepared to persist; but the group may be growing, who believe that time is no longer their friend.

6. Therefore:

1. We should make every effort to increase the pressure on them: in the South and in the North.

2. Do not discourage the view that the Republicans may be even tougher: perhaps there are ways of quietly spreading this line in places it might get picked up -- Paris, Moscow, etc.

3. Be prepared if they should approach us soon rather than late; but not be surprised if an approach is delayed, because governments tend to operate on urgent situations rather than projected trends -- and they may have some time in hand before the situation becomes acute.

W. W. Rostow

FBIS 56 -- Denial of Lord Brockway Report
Hanoi in English to Southeast Asia 1000Z 21 July 67
W. W. Rostow:all

~~SECRET~~

22a.

DENIAL OF LORD BROCKWAY REPORT

HANOI IN ENGLISH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 1000Z 21 JUL 67 B

"(TEXT) IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED "A CLUMSY DISTORTION OF THE TRUTH," THE HANOI DAILY NHAN DAN WARNS THE WORLD AT LARGE AGAINST THE FALSE RUMORS SPREAD BY THE U.S. RULERS AND PRO-U.S. WESTERNERS WITH (WORDS KISTINCT) OF VIETNAM.

THE PAPER RECALLS THAT AT THE RECENT WORLD CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM CALLED IN STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN, DELEGATES FROM BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM ENERGETICALLY CONDEMNED THE U.S. AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM, REITERATED THE DETERMICATION OF THEVIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO RESIF U.S. AGGRESSORS, AND ONCE AGAIN CLEARLY EXPOUNDED THE CORRECT STAND CONCERNING THE DT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. THE LAUNCHED BY THIS CONFERENCE DEMANDS THAT THE UNITED YATES STOP ITS BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV COMPLETELY AND UNCONDITIONALLY AND END ITS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW ALL AGGRESXR TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

NEVERTHLEAN ACCORDING TO WESTERN REPORTS, LORD BROCKWAY, A BRITISH POLITICAL FIGURE ATTENDING THE CONFERENCE, STATED THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE LOWERED THEIR DEMANDS, THAT HE WOULD INFORM U.S. PRESIDENT JOHNSON ABOUT THIS, AND WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY BROWN, WHO IS WELL-KNOWN AS A BROKER FOR THE U. M PEACE TALKS SWCDLE. WHATEVER THE MOTIVE BEHIND HIS STATEMENT, THE ALLEGATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAVE LOWERED THEIR DEMANDS IS ONLY BENEFICIAL TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS BECAUSE IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH WASHINGTON'S T TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, MISLEAD PUBLIC OPINION, AND (DIVIDE) THE WORLD MOVEMENT IN SUPPORTMF VIETNAM.

NHAN DAN RECALLS THAT THE FOUR-POINT AND OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE PROCLAIMED BY PREMIER PHAM VAN DONG ON 8 APRIL 1965, PRESIDENT HO CHI MCH'S REPLYHO JOHNSON IN FEBRUARY 1967, AND DRV FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH'S ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS ASKED BY JOURNALKRED BURCHETT IN JANUARY THIS YEAR MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NLEASHED THE WAR OF AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM, IT MUY END P, IT MUST STOP THE BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV PERMANENTLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY. WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS OF ITS OWN AND FROM SOUTH VIETNAM, RE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, AND LET THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SETTLE THEC INTERNAL AFFAIRS THEMSELVES. THIS IFUNDAMENTAL CONTENT OF THE FOUR-POINT STAND OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT.

OUR STATE LEADERS HAVE ALSO DECLARED THAT IF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT REALLY WANTS TO TALK WITH THE DRV, IN THE FIRST PLACE THE UNITED STATEXUST STOP THE BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINY THE PERMANENTLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY.

NHAN DAN CONCLUDES BY PING: OUR GOVERNMENT'S D PEOPLE'S FD IS JUST, CORRECT, AND CONFORMING TO SENSE AND REASON. P IS A CLEAR-CUT AND UNCHANGING STAND. NO AMOUNTMF U.S. D RTION CAN SHAKE THE DETERMINATION OF OUR PEOPLE TO FIGHT UNTIL COMPLETE VICTORY.

21 JUL 1900Z JWG/JAC

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967
4:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Hussein sounds us out on a trip to Moscow.

I would guess that, in addition to the reasons given, he may think it would give him leverage over Israel in his negotiation.

But Hussein sounds a bit more realistic on Jerusalem on which he appears to be looking for Israeli give rather than a return to the status quo ante.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 431, July 22, 1967
NODIS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-139
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

WWRostow:rln

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

23a
4

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 19737
RECD: JULY 22, 1967
7:12 A.M.

Action

Info

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON
STATE GRNC

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-140
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 431

NODIS - SANDSTORM

LONDON FBR AMBASSADOR BURNS

DEPT - DELIVER TO ACTION OFFICER OPENING OF BUSINESS JULY 22

1. IN COURSE JULY 21 CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF KING MADE FOL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HIS CURRENT THINKING ON TACTICS FOR REACHING SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL:
2. HE HAS CONCLUDED ON BASIS REPORTS REACHING HIM FROM UN, GOJ AMB IN NEW DELHI AND HIS OWN CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMB TO AMMAN THAT THE US AND USSR POSITIONS ARE "NOT TOO DIFFERENT" [REDACTED] IN SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE HE SEES THE FEASI-

3.4(b)(1)

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 431 ~~SECRET~~

BILITY OF A US-USSR ACCORD TO IMPOSE ON THE ARABS, THROUGH THE UN, AN END OF THEIR STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL. WHILE THIS WOULD BREAK THE LOGJAM AND BE AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE PRESENT STALEMATE, HE WOULD PERSONALLY HOPE TO DO SOMETHING MORE IN THE WAY OF A SETTLEMENT THAN JUST END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. KING SEES POSITIVE VALUE FOR JORDAN OF MOVING TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS SO THAT KINGDOM COULD NEGOTIATE, AMONG OTHER MATTERS, A FULL PEACE SETTLEMENT INCLUDING MEDITERRANEAN OUTLET, OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS AND FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. HE OBSERVED THAT AS FAR AS BORDER ADJUSTMENTS WERE CONCERNED HE WOULD WELCOME THIS BEING DONE SINCE THE OLD ARMISTICE LINES WERE ILLOGICALLY DRAWN AND HAVE NEVER MADE ANY SENSE FOR EITHER SIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND HUSSEIN IS AWARE THAT IT WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR HIM TO GET TOO FAR IN FRONT OF THE OTHER ARABS IN SEEKING A SETTLEMENT. HE IS QUITE AWARE THAT NASSER MAY BE TRYING TO USE HIM AS A STALKING HORSE AND DOES NOT DISMISS THE POSSIBILITY THAT NASSER WOULD TURN AGAINST HIM WITH THE CHARGE OF COMMITTING TREASON TO THE ARAB CAUSE AT SOME FUTURE POINT. HE INTENDS TO TAKE SOUNDINGS TO DETERMINE WHAT SORT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- AMMAN 431, JULY 22

OF MOVE NASSER HIMSELF MIGHT BE WILLING TO MAKE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT.

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 431 ~~SECRET~~

3. SOV AMBASSADOR HERE HAS TOLD HUSSEIN OF DIFFICULTIES MOSCOW WAS HAVING WITH RADICAL ARABS AND SAID HE FULLY AGREED WITH KING'S EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE A SUMMIT CONFERENCE. HUSSEIN SAID TO EMBOFF HE WAS WONDERING IN THIS CONNECTION WHETHER THERE MIGHT NOT BE SOME BENEFIT IN HIS TRAVELLING TO MOSCOW FOR DISCUSSION WITH SOGENOH. HE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD ONLY TAKE SUCH A STEP IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH US. KING POINTED OUT THAT WERE HE TO MAKE SUCH A TRIP HE WOULD BE ONLY ARAB LEADER TALKING WITH ALL MAJOR POWERS CONCERNED WITH THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. THIS IN ITSELF WOULD BRING CERTAIN ADVANTAGES TO HIS POSITION AND INDIRECTLY TO OURS. HE WOULD SEEK TO CONFIRM WHETHER THE SOVIET POSITION TOWARDS THE AREA WAS AS REASONABLE AS DIPLOMATIC REPORTS TENDED TO MAKE IT APPEAR. FINALLY, HE THOUGH SUCH A TRIP MIGHT HAVE THE DISTINCT ADVANTAGE OF UNDERMINING THE RADICALS' PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP BASED ON EXCLUSIVE REALTIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

4. HUSSEIN MADE SEVERAL COMMENTS ON QUESTION OF STATUS OF JERUSALEM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE THE TOUGHEST POINT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. HE COMMENTED HE COULD SEE NO BENEFIT IN EVEN STARTING NEGOTIATIONS IF ISRAELIS ARE DETERMINED TO EXCLUDE JERUSALEM FROM THE DISCUSSIONS. MOREOVER, HE COULD BE

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 431 ~~SECRET~~

PUTTING ASIDE JORDANIAN CONSIDERATIONS, NO ARAB OR MOSLEM COUNTRY WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A SETTLEMENT. HE ADDED HE WOULD BE MOST SURPRISED TO FIND THE ISRAELIS READY TO SACRIFICE ALL PROSPECTS FOR A SETTLEMENT SOLELY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THEIR CLAIM TO JERUSALEM. ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL JERUSALEM WOULD BRING OUT THE WORST IN THE WAY OF RELIGIOUS RIVALRY AND FANATICISM AND WOULD PLANT THE SEED OF FUTURE CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

GP-3. DUNCAN

BT

~~SECRET~~

24

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967
4:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Dick Helms recommends this interesting analysis of the complex impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on politics in Eastern Europe.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Special Report, Weekly Review
Impact of Arab-Israeli Conflict on Eastern Europe
SECRET, No. 14
21 July 1967
SC No. 00779/67B

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-208
By cbm, NARA Date 6-29-01

WWRostow:rln

25

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967
4:00 p.m.

~~Handwritten signature~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

At your request we went out to Israel and elsewhere for an assessment of Nasser's week-end intentions.

Attached are:

1. The Israeli assessment.
2. A general CIA assessment.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-165
By cb, NARA, Date 9-12-95

WWRostow:rln

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Mr. Keston

25a

22 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Israel's View of Nasir's Intentions

1. Israel discounts the possibility of any early Egyptian resumption of large-scale hostilities.

2. "Egypt cannot resume the war on a large scale," [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] today in response to a query [REDACTED] that Nasir planned an imminent attack. In the Israeli view, the blow inflicted upon Egypt's armed forces precludes this possibility "for quite some time to come."

3. [REDACTED] such reports are "only" manifestations of two factors: a) the fact that 23 July is Egypt's revolution anniversary - - "It is difficult for an Arab to assume that Nasir will not act on this day, following his military defeat" - - and, b) Arab public opinion has not yet accepted the defeat and thirsts for revenge.

4. While Nasir cannot resume the war, he also cannot afford publicly to declare an intention of sitting down at a conference table to find a solution to the crisis so soon after the debacle, [REDACTED] Nasir, therefore, will be constrained to take up a position somewhere in between these two extremes. The Israelis expect that his speech tomorrow will be an expression of this position. They assume that it will include a declaration that the struggle continues, both against Israel and "imperialism," and that this will be accompanied by a denunciation of the UN, but they doubt that he will say anything "explicit or practical."

5. According to this report, Israel believes the "continuation of the struggle" could take the form of harassing operations, such as firing incidents along the ceasefire line or through the organization of a Palestinian underground movement designed to operate within the "occupied areas." There may, however, be a concurrent search for a modus vivendi in Egyptian-Israeli relations for the near future, especially with regard to a few burning issues like the resumption of traffic through the Suez Canal.

6. The report, in short, is a restrained and well-calculated assessment of Nasir's capabilities which indicates that the Israelis, for their part, are not disturbed by the alarmist reports of Egyptian intentions.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAL 00-209

By cbm, NARA, Date 3-22-02

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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EO 12958
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EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(S)

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2

25-b

22 July 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Nasir's Intentions

1. At your request during the evening of July 21 [redacted] were contacted concerning the report from the [redacted] that Nasir planned some military action against Israel by July 23. There are no indications of ambitious military preparations in Cairo, although the situation along the Canal remains tense and could flare up as it has in the past. [redacted] has not yet reported. We shall indicate its answer as soon as it arrives.

2. Nasir is likely to confine himself to speech-making on Sunday night, probably in the form of a pep talk. It may include bellicose elements and possibly allusions to newly acquired offensive weapons, as well as an expression of his determination never to give up the battle against Israel and its Western "collaborators."

3. Attached is the more reflective memorandum on Nasir's present position you requested yesterday.

[redacted]
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence

Attachment: a/s

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-213
By is, NARA, Date 6-3-04

E.O. 12958
3.3(b)(U+6)

~~SECRET~~

25c

~~SECRET~~
~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

21 July 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Nasir's Dilemma

1. Nasir still appears a captive of the uncompromising attitudes of his radical partners Algiers and Damascus; and of his dependence on Moscow's support. His room for maneuver is small, and he knows it.

2. Algiers and Damascus continually speak of a new application of force against the Israelis, with Boumediene pressing for a "guerrilla war" of the type that succeeded in Algeria. Nasir can neither envision his Egyptians as really successful guerrilla fighters against the Israelis, nor does he care to turn his country into a guerrilla battlefield--a situation which would eliminate his power base. In desperation he continues to carry on a propaganda battle against Israel and the US, emphasizing the old charges of US collaboration with Israel in the recent war.

3. His admission [redacted] that he cannot safely negotiate a peace with Israel emphasizes his inability to

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-209
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-22-03

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~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

regain the initiative as leader of the Arab world. The fact that Boumediene went to Moscow twice as the spokesman for the Arabs is indicative of Nasir's present weakness among the Arab states as well as his fear that if he went he would return relatively empty handed.

4. Nasir appears to be resisting the Algerian and Syrian sirens by issuing vague propaganda which emphasizes a future "liquidating of the aggression and removing of its consequences." In addition, he apparently believes a limited degree of harassment of the Israelis along the Suez Canal lifts the low morale of the army and improves the regime's image among the Egyptian people and other Arabs.

5. Meanwhile, the fact of Arab disunity and disarray is apparent to all. The inability to hold an Arab "summit" is obvious, and its possibility of success, even if held, is admitted to be "slim" by Nasir's spokesman Haykal over Cairo Radio.

6. Nasir's courses of action open to him at home appear as limited as his opportunities in the foreign policy field. Although he remains his country's leader, his room for maneuver is increasingly restricted by a disgruntled army, an increasingly difficult economic situation, and apparent infighting among his entourage, with some advocating closer ties with Moscow and others arguing for a slight shift to the West.

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

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~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

7. Nasir has reverted to an old "crisis" tactic of putting out "unofficial"--and easily repudiated--feelers to the US with the hope of eliciting some economic aid and political support. These approaches usually are accompanied by suggestions that he fears the Communists and that differences with the West, especially the US, are not basic and that a new accommodation can be achieved. On the other hand, he lets it be rumored that he is considering some type of closer relation with Moscow.

8. Nasir has not found a solution to his dilemma, and his frustration has inhibited his formulation of a policy. He appears to be waiting to see an opening to retrieve his losses. He realizes that his relationship with the Soviets ^{more} is/complex than ever before and that he cannot disengage because of his dependence on Moscow for military aid--now more important than ever before--as well as economic assistance. He can see no return to a balanced position between East and West so long as the US is regarded as Israel's mentor by the Arabs despite his oblique approaches to Washington. He will try to play both sides of the street, but his goals remain more in accord with Soviet objectives.

~~No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only~~

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967
2:30 p. m.

W. W. Rostow
~~W. W. Rostow~~
2. Pres file
26

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indonesia -- The Vice President's memorandum of July 14,
and Bill Gaud's comments thereon

The Vice President's memorandum argues that Indonesia should have a very high priority claim on our foreign assistance resources. Bill Gaud agrees, but points out that, for a variety of reasons, we face serious problems in meeting the commitments we have already made to Indonesia for this year. Moreover, there is every reason to think we will have even greater problems next year.

In other words, we are having trouble performing satisfactorily on what we have already agreed to do, and we are beginning to doubt if we have agreed to do enough.

To meet the immediate problem of our commitments during Calendar Year 1967, we must get at least 100,000 tons of rice for Indonesia. That will leave almost \$10 million of our current commitment unsatisfied. The solution that would best meet Indonesian needs is to use some of our FY 68 Indonesian money as a cash loan. That, however, is borrowing from Peter to pay Paul, for it leaves us more than ever short of the resources required to meet our commitments to Indonesia in CY 68. Basically, it looks as if we are going to have to find more resources.

Indonesian expectations of American aid vastly exceed anything we are going to be able to come up with. Whatever we do, they will be disappointed. It is essential, however, that the gap between what we give and what they expect not be so broad that their disappointment turns into despair and disillusionment.

There is a way out of this. We will keep digging until we find it.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

MW:hg

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 729 8303
By 19/ics, NARA, Date 7-19-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

26a

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUL 17 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Indonesia -- The Vice President's Memorandum
of July 14

I agree with the Vice President's point that the United States must give very high priority to supporting the Suharto Government's very encouraging economic stabilization efforts and, indirectly, its historic political reorientation of Indonesia.

A.I.D. funds were very limited in FY 67 because Indonesia was not in the original aid budget and Congress cut that budget deeply. However, we scraped together \$30 million, the maximum amount you authorized in February.

We are now faced with the problem that the United States has only fulfilled \$38 million of the approximately \$65 million 1967 U.S. pledge. We had counted on a large Indonesia demand for PL 480 cotton to make up the bulk of our aid. Indonesian demands for cotton fell off sharply when the new system of unrestricted Indonesian private imports of essential goods resulted in a flood of cheap textiles from Hong Kong. This has now been checked but the textile mills inventory of cotton will not be worked down sufficiently to renew PL 480 raw cotton imports until the spring of next year.

The way out of this dilemma lies in substantial PL 480 rice sales to Indonesia this summer and the resumption of PL 480 cotton sales along with rice in 1968. Some rice left over from the 1967-68 crop may become available this week. In order to get the additional rice we need for Indonesia this year we may have to use

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 7c 983-47
By rg/ur, NARA, Date 7-19-91

100,000 tons that otherwise would be sold to Vietnam under PL 480. Vietnam has an embarrassing accumulation of foreign exchange -- acquired through sale of plasters of our military forces -- and can easily afford to pay cash for part of its rice imports.

I also agree with the Vice President that our, "commitments should be made within a multilateral framework." Largely at our initiative, that framework has been established and is operating successfully. The Dutch chair the Intergovernmental Group (IGG) on aid and the French chair the group on debt rescheduling. The Japanese have committed \$60 million (compared with \$38 million committed from our \$65 million pledge) and the Dutch \$33.2 million (on better terms than ours). In both groups, heavy reliance has been placed on the IMF and the IBRD. The Fund is advising Indonesia on a successful and rigorous stabilization program and the Bank will this fall examine in depth priorities for the rehabilitation of Indonesia's economy. We plan to continue moving in a multilateral framework, with heavy reliance on the IBRD and the Fund.

Looking ahead to CY 68, we also run the risk of not having the resources to respond adequately to well-conceived requests of the Suharto government. The IGG agreed that the Fund-estimated \$200 million balance of payments gap for CY 67 should be filled by foreign assistance. Pledges have in fact been made to fill this gap (one-third from the United States). However, for various reasons, it is now possible that the Fund-estimated gap that will be endorsed by the IGG for CY 68 may be substantially higher, which would entail expectations of a U.S. pledge substantially in excess of our \$65 million pledge this year.

When calculating our FY 68 budget needs, we requested \$30 million Development Loans for Indonesia, which BOB reduced to \$20 million.

It will be difficult to squeeze much more than that out of the A.I.D. appropriation after Congress gets through cutting. If we are forced to use FY 68 A.I.D. funds to fill out the CY 67 shortfall in our \$65 million pledge, we will have no aid money to pledge against the CY 68 stabilization program.

We had expected to fill with PL 480 the balance of what we then thought would be a need about equal to this year's commitment. While the Indonesians should be able to accept cotton next year, there is little likelihood that PL 480 can absorb all of what may have to be an increased commitment in the light of the Fund's estimates for CY 68. Another factor will be that, while we would hope to maintain our present one-third share, this may have to go up somewhat if Indonesia's Fund-estimated needs are to be met.

We hope to sell the Indonesian Government on the introduction of some wheat, wheat flour and bulgar wheat rice substitute in the PL 480 program in 1968. But it will take some months of pilot tests and demonstrations to prove the acceptability of bulgar wheat, so we can't look to this for large amounts.

The conclusion is that we must get a minimum of 100,000 tons of rice this year for Indonesia, or we won't be able to meet either our pledge this year or next year's minimum needs.

William S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

27

~~1. Pres. file~~
2. Pres. file

Saturday, July 22, 1967

2:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith is today's situation
report on the political developments
in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET/EXDIS Attachment~~

*Mr. Rosten
Leahardt*

27a

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

July 22, 1967

New Developments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By sp, NARA, Date 7-20-94

Saigon 1601 gives the text of a letter from Foreign Minister Do to Secretary-General U Thant inviting UN observers to witness the September elections in Viet-Nam. Do said (Saigon 1600) the letter will be made public as soon as information was received of its delivery to U Thant. Invitations to observe the elections are also being sent to local diplomatic missions and to all countries in which the GVN has representation, and the GVN desires to invite parliamentary observers especially from troop-contributing nations and other friendly Asian nations.

COMMENT

This is the culmination of efforts we have been making to assure good election coverage and international acceptance. The propaganda usefulness of the invitation to U Thant would be enhanced by allowing U Thant a decent interval to reply before making the letter public. We are asking the Embassy to suggest this to Do.

~~SECRET-LIMDIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

1. sup
2. Profile

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967 -- 1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This highly rational discussion between the Soviet Ambassador in Jordan and Hussein is of a piece with Soviet behavior in New York, where they openly pressed a resolution at least as good from our point of view as the Latin American resolution.

It is much too soon to judge, but it may be that post-Hollybush they have emerged with a Middle East policy that is tolerably moderate.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

See also attached report indicating that they yesterday urged Morocco to "recognize the existence" of Israel.

W. W. Rostow

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

WWRostow:rlh

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RUQMBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 189
RUQVRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 83
RUQTDN/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 48
RUDTCR/AMEMBASSY LONDON 63
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 62
RUJDKMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 171
RUFNCR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 338
RUQMVL/AMEMBASSY TELAVIV 48
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By 158, NARA, Date 7-20-94

PRIME MINISTER BENHIMA TOLD ME EVENING JULY 21 GOM
HAD BEEN APPROACHED (APPARENTLY THAT MORNING)
BY SOVIET AMB URGING GOM "RECOGNIZE EXISTENCE" ISRAEL.
TASCA
BT

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

Saturday, July 22, 1967 -- 11:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

After discussion with Sec. Rusk, I called President Truman's aide Col. Adams. I told him that at the President's request we would be pleased to send a senior officer out to brief President Truman on the situation in the Middle East as the General Assembly ends and a new phase begins.

Col. Adams has just called me back. After talking with President Truman he reports

-- President Truman is exceedingly grateful for your thoughtfulness in making this offer;

-- He regrets he is simply not up to receiving such a briefing.

I told Col. Adams to let us know if and when President Truman would wish us to send a man out for this purpose. He said he would convey that continuing invitation to President Truman.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

30

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967
10:30 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Marcos' reaction to your message. It is, I believe, precisely what you aimed to get.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 7-18-91

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

Cy Taylor

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-163

By 18, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~SECRET~~ MANILA 668

EXDIS

SUBJ CLIFFORD TAYLOR TRIP
REF STATE 11575

1. I DELIVERED ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TO MARCOS AT NOON TODAY PURSUANT REFTEL. MARCOS MADE NO COMMENT DURING RECITATION, OTHER THAN FREQUENT NODS OF UNDERSTANDING, AND HAD ONLY TWO MAJOR POINTS TO MAKE UPON ITS COMPLETION. ON MAJOR ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT MESSRS. CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR SHOULD STOP IN MANILA ON AUGUST 2 HE REMAINED SILENT INDICATING HE WISHED TO THINK OVER FURTHER AND WOULD LET

~~PAGE 2 RUMJMA 158 A SECRET~~
US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. MARCOS' FIRST POINT WHICH HE SAID HE HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT SINCE HIS OWN TRIP TO VIET-NAM, WAS THAT HE FELT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FROM MANY POINTS OF VIEW TO HAVE CALL FOR NEW SUMMIT COME ONCE AGAIN FROM AN ASIAN NATION, JUST AS ORIGINAL CALL HAD ORIGINATED WITH GOP. TO HAVE US DO IT HE THOUGHT WOULD BE A MISTAKE. OF ASIANS HE BELIEVED THAI MIGHT BE THE BEST, WITH THANOM MAKING ANNOUNCEMENT KEYED PERHAPS TO SITUATION IN NORTHEAST THAILAND ON THEME OF NEW PERIPHERAL ACTIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY COMMUNISTS OURSIDE MAIN VIET-NAM THEATRE IN THAILAND, KOREA, LAOS AND BURMA. HAVING THAI DO THIS AS MEMBER. TOO OF (SEATO) WOULD BE IN HIS VIEW MOST APPROPRIATE.

GOVERNMENT OF
PHILIPPINES

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY
ORGANIZATION

3. I REMINDED MARCOS THAT CLIFFORD/TAYLOR SCHEDULE CALLED FOR FIRST STOP IN BANGKOK AFTER SAIGON AND SAID I WOULD PASS ON HIS SUGGESTION TO WASHINGTON AS MATTER FOR POSSIBLE DISCUSSION BY THEM WITH THAI LEADERS AT THAT TIME.

MANILA 668

~~PAGE 3 RUMJMA 158A SECRET~~

4. MARCOS' SECOND POINT CONCERNED UPCOMING (SEAARC) SOUTHEAST ASIA ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION MEETING FOR WHICH DATES OF AUGUST 4 OR 20 HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED (DJAKARTA 377). HE FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT CLIFFORD/TAYLOR TRIP NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS IN PUBLIC MIND LEST IMPRESSION BE CREATED THAT US ALSO PRESSURING FOR SEAARC AS WELL. SAID HE WAS CONSULTING OTHER SEAARC CAPITALS TO SEE IF POSTPONEMENT OF MEETING TO AUGUST 20 DATE MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE.

5. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE VERY SALUTORY EFFECT IN REMOVING TENSIONS AND CONFUSION WHICH HAD MOUNTED HERE OVER PAST 36 HOURS. SECRETARY RAMOS HAD CALLED ME EARLIER THIS MORNING ASKING FOR HELP IN MEETING PRESS QUERIES AND WILD STORIES CIRCULATING HERE, ESPECIALLY A VERY UNHELPFUL PIECE APPEARING MORNING BULLETIN (SEE SEPTTEL).

not yet available

6. MARCOS HIMSELF SEEMED MUCH MORE RELAXED AFTER RECEIVING THIS PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT. WHILE

~~PAGE 4 RUMJMA 158A SECRET~~

I CANNOT PREDICT HIS FINAL DECISION MY GUESS IS THAT IT WILL BE FAVORABLE TO CLIFFORD/TAYLOR VISIT. BUT UNTIL WE HEAR DEFINITELY THIS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO HANDLE IN TERMS OF FURTHER SCHEDULE ANNOUNCEMENTS, FIRM ITINERARIES AND PRESS TREATMENT.

7. I HAVE ARRANGED TO KEEP IN CLOSEST CONTACT WITH BOTH MALACANANG AND SECRETARY RAMOS WHO HAS BEEN KEPT FULLY INFORMED BY MARCOS. LATTER TOLD ME EARLIER TODAY HE WAS CHARGED WITH PREPARING REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S JULY 19 LETTER AND HOPED TO CONVEY IT THROUGH US RATHER THAN THROUGH PHIL EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. I HAVE ALSO EMPHASIZED TO RAMOS FACT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO KEEP PRESS TREATMENT IN LOW KEY (LAST PARAGRAPH REFTEL) AND WOULD WELCOME PHIL SUGGESTIONS ON THIS SCORE. ALSO URGED ON HIM NEED FOR SPEEDY DECISION IN ORDER PERMIT DIFINITE ANNOUNCEMENT ON WHETHER OR NOT MANILA TO BE INCLUDED IN CLIFFORD/TAYLOR

~~PAGE 5 RUMJMA 158A SECRET~~

ITINERARY AND FORESTALL NECESSITY FOR SAYING IF PRESSED THAT VISIT UNLIKELY IN VIEW EARLIER MARCOS VISIT TO VIET-NAM.

GP-3 WILSON

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

308

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

011575
02

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

87
Origin
SS
Info

ACTION: Amembassy MANILA

IMMEDIATE

JUL 21 10 20 PM '67

STATE 11575

EXDIS

1. To meet problems raised by your 583 and 626, you should deliver following oral message from President to President Marcos, as you see him to nail down arrangements for schedule. Substance of message should be that President ~~xxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxPresident~~ had received your report of Marcos' concern that Clifford/Taylor visit might be misunderstood. President had had similar fears, and Marcos is aware of low key in which question of additional troop contributions has been discussed in official statements here. ~~xxxxxx~~ Marcos should particularly note remarks by Secretary McNamara that of course we ~~xxx~~ all realized that each Manila nation was sovereign government ~~xxx~~ would have to reach its own conclusions.

~~XX~~ In light of these factors, announcement here has made every effort to stress real purpose of trip, which is consultation among Manila nations looking toward a possible future summit.

Page 3 revised by WH

Drafted by: EA: WPBundy:bmm 7/21/67	Tel. Ext. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: William P. Bundy S/S - Mr. McCall
--	-------------------	---

White House -Mr. Rostow (subs.)

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-163

~~SECRET~~

FORM DC-222 By wp, NARA, Date 7.20.94

~~SECRET~~

Unfortunately, press here has jumped to conclusion that troop requests are involved, and has persisted in this line despite our best efforts to prevent it.

President ~~regrets~~ ^{regrets} particularly that it became necessary for us to make public announcement Thursday here. Unfortunately, a local Washington Embassy, not the Philippine Embassy, had learned that there was a possibility of such a trip, and this had resulted in an Associated Press story which placed undue emphasis on the troop matter. In the face of widespread speculation, we came to the conclusion that withholding announcement would create an air of mystery that would make the problem more acute for ~~every~~ everyone, including Marcos.

The President continued to believe that the advantages which all of us derive from this type of consultation are very great. He believes Marcos shares this belief, and the indications from other capitals have been favorable. President is particularly sensitive to Marcos' personal situation, in light of November elections and pending PHILCAG appropriation. It is with these factors in mind ~~and~~ that we have suggested that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor visit Manila toward the end of the proposed trip. They will be ~~stressing~~ stressing all along the way that the basic purpose is consultation, and we know that other

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

governments will be playing it in the same way.

The President understands that President Marcos can best accurately assess his political problems. Therefore, since Marcos feels that visit complicates his situation our President believes this outweighs any benefits of consultation with Marcos. In view of fact that Marcos has just returned from seeing situation in Vietnam firsthand, we know he will understand Clifford and Taylor not stopping off in Manila.

The President would, of course, greatly value President Marcos' view on the full range of Viet Nam problems if and when he desires to give them.

2. If ~~KK~~ Marcos does decide that he desires visit you could go ~~XX~~ on to discuss possible schedule. Our best suggestion is Clifford and Taylor see Marcos alone afternoon ~~XX~~ August 2 and if Marcos wishes, they could see any Philippine/~~XXXXXXXX~~ leaders, including Members of Congress, he might suggest, being guided of course by President Marcos wishes in all that they ~~XXXXX~~ would say to other Philippine leaders. You should also note that we are making every effort to keep press treatment in low key and would welcome any suggestions he may have that score. Meantime, we ~~XXX~~ will, if forced by press, state unlikely visit to Philippines because of Marcos' recent visit to Vietnam.

GP-3 END

RUSK

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 22, 1967

Pres file
31

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Beginning to Normalize Military Aid to Greece

Immediately after the Greek coup, we suspended shipment of all major military aid items, partly to signal our genuine displeasure and partly to put us in a better position with our domestic liberals. Now Secretary Rusk believes we should resume limited shipments in response to the coup government's limited steps back toward constitutional government.

His main concern is to avoid damaging our basic relationship with Greece. First, Greece is a NATO ally, and mounting dissatisfaction with us has already encouraged some officers to talk about following De Gaulle's example. But more immediately important, Greece is one of the few nations we can still count on in the eastern Mediterranean. During the Arab-Israeli war, Greece alone provided staging areas for our evacuation aircraft and port facilities for the Sixth Fleet. [REDACTED]

3.3
(b)(1) [REDACTED] USIA facilities operated without restriction. Ambassador Talbot and the Secretary feel that continuing the complete suspension of major items any longer will provide the makings of a confrontation between us and this government and jeopardize our free use of these facilities without improving our ability to influence its return to constitutional processes.

He does not recommend taking the wraps off altogether. We still want to hold onto whatever leverage we can to press the regime down the course it has set for itself for revising the constitution, holding elections and putting the colonels back in the field. Therefore, he recommends that Phil Talbot be authorized when he returns to Athens next week to tell the government we are beginning to relax our restrictions and are ready to release certain items (listed in the attached, page 2, para. 4). He would also say, however, that further relaxation will depend on their staying on course.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-295

By is, NARA, Date 4-23-84

~~SECRET~~

If it were not for the Congressional debate on military aid, no one would hesitate to make this recommendation to you. However, in the aftermath of the coup, Luke Battle did promise to let a few of the most interested members know when we resumed shipments. While we have the authority to resume any time, we are morally committed to tell them what we're doing, and this obviously isn't the best time.

I believe we can make a convincing case that the foreign policy considerations should override our understandable distaste for doing business with a military regime in a country like Greece. Actually, this is a small step, and we will maintain tight control. We can't treat our NATO relationship lightly, and we don't want to push Greece in France's direction. And many of the more liberal members will be impressed by the importance of our position in Greece to Israel.

If you approve the Secretary's recommendation, Talbot would carry the message back to Athens, and State would quietly inform interested members on the Hill after Secretary McNamara's testimony Wednesday. Your alternative, of course, is to wait until you have the results of Congressional soundings before giving approval. You are the better judge; my own thought is that there might be some advantage where we have a good case in showing that we're not going to let Congress cow us.

Incidentally, you will be pleased to know that this recommendation comes to you not only from the Interdepartmental Regional Group for the Near East (which has functioned well since you set up the system last year) but also from the Senior Interdepartmental Group which met for the first time in quite a while to discuss this question.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Wait till we have Congressional soundings _____

See me _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Normalization of US-Greek Relations

We have had a number of interdepartmental discussions recently on the subject of normalizing our relations with the Greek Government. Both in the Regional Group under Assistant Secretary Battle and in the Senior Group chaired by Under Secretary Katzenbach, with Ambassador Talbot present on both occasions, certain steps in this direction have been agreed upon. I am in accord with the conclusions reached.

From the point of view of our relations with Greece, I consider the steps outlined below important to our interests. Ambassador Talbot is returning to Greece at the end of next week and should be able to tell the Greek Government something positive on this score shortly after he arrives.

Recommendation: That you approve the actions described below:

Foreign Policy Aspects

1. Since the April military coup we have withheld delivery on certain major arms to Greece and been quite cool in our relations with the Government with the idea not only of exhibiting disapproval of the methods by which the junta seized control but also, hopefully, of encouraging some return, however gradual, to more constitutional processes.

2. We now believe these tactics are no longer useful and that, if continued longer, may be counterproductive. The King has come to the same conclusion. Ambassador Talbot considers it quite possible the Greeks, although highly desirous of close relations with us, may adopt the same tactics by causing certain difficulties with some of our facilities there.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By id NLJ 09-278 and NLJ 03-304 (#93a)
NARA, Date 4-22-11

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

-2-

3.3
(b)(1)
3. We have in Greece facilities important to the Air Force, the Navy, [] and USIA; they have increased in value since the Arab-Israeli war. That war underlined the importance of Greece (along with Turkey and Iran) to U. S. interests.

4. We propose that Ambassador Talbot be authorized to inform the Greek Government of certain relaxations as set forth below, making clear that future actions in this regard will be related to progress in the restoration of constitutional processes: (a) a coastal minesweeper (\$2.9 million); (b) one F-104G trainer (\$1.5 million); (c) sidewinder missiles and related equipment which are excess to the needs of the Netherlands (no charge); and (d) 175mm cannons (8-\$1.05 million). These items were chosen (a) as having a clear NATO context and (b) as obviously not lending themselves to the suppression of civil disturbances.

5. We believe we should not release just yet either tanks, helicopters, or other heavy equipment. (With respect to FRG shipment of military assistance to Greece, particularly including tanks, we believe we should give the Germans the go-ahead signal in the near future but not just at this time.)

Congressional Problems

1. Although the timing of this action is not particularly favorable given this concern in Congressional quarters with respect to arms programs, both sale and grant, nevertheless, we believe we must proceed and that the over-all interest of foreign policy requires that we do so as soon as possible. We judge that although there will be some adverse reaction in Congress and elsewhere, it will not be great and can be reasonably contained by stressing the following:

a. This is a minimum step.

b. Greece, like Turkey and Iran, emerges as particularly important to the U. S. given the uncertainties in the Middle East and the Soviet thrust in that area.

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

-3-

c. It is essential that we maintain Greece as an active and functioning member of NATO under whose umbrella the arms programs are developed.

d. We must avoid pressing Greece in the direction of the French with their lukewarm and unhelpful posture in a NATO context.

2. If you approve the above course of action, we will undertake a certain amount of educational work on the Hill. How much can perhaps better be determined after the appearance on July 26 of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a hearing on military assistance programs.



Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

Friday, July 21, 1967, 7:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached, for your approval, is a brief condolence message to Chairman Traykov, Bulgarian Chief of State. His wife just died. State approves. It will probably be published in the Bulgarian press.

Francis M. Bator

OK

No

Speak to me

372

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CHAIRMAN TRAYKOV

**It is with deep regret that I have learned of the death
of Mrs. Traykov. I extend to you my sincere condolences.**

Lyndon B. Johnson

Friday, July 21, 1967
6:40 p. m.

~~1. memo~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

On your instruction, via Bill Bowdler, we have developed in State the attached scenario for gaining support for the Panama Treaties.

Your guidance would be helpful.

W. W. Rostow

1-Bowdler
2-PH.

33a



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 14, 1967

Limited Official Use

S/S 12323

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Program for Gaining Support for the
Panama Treaties

Preliminary soundings make it clear that major efforts will be required to obtain Senate ratification for the three Canal treaties recently negotiated with Panama. Under the overall supervision of Under Secretary Katzenbach supported by Assistant Secretary Macomber, we propose the following program for obtaining maximum support for these treaties:

1. Expedite the signing of the treaties and their publications. (We are inhibited from defending particulars of the treaties until they are made public). ACTION: State/ARA/L.
2. In the meantime, prepare and send responses to specific, critical inquiries already received from a number of Members of both Houses. ACTION: State/ARA.
3. In the meantime, also, arrange for Secretary Anderson to continue his efforts to privately persuade certain key Senators that the treaties are consistent with national interests of the United States and deserving of their support. We have particularly in mind Senators Dirksen, Hickenlooper, Russell and Holland. (Senators Fulbright and Mansfield, as a result of Secretary Anderson's testimony, are sympathetic to the treaties). ACTION: State/H.
4. Prepare a draft of a presidential statement for the signing ceremony. ACTION: State/ARA by July 22.
5. Prepare

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Limited Official Use

- 2 -

5. Prepare a scenario for the signing ceremony.
ACTION: White House by July 28.

6. Recommend to the President that prior to or simultaneously with the signing of the treaties, he invite the Leadership of both Houses and both parties to a White House briefing to be conducted by the President and Ambassador Anderson. A list of suggested invitees is attached.
ACTION: State/H. (An alternative would be for the Vice President to host this briefing in the Capitol.)

7. Prepare speeches in support of the treaties for use by Members of Congress. Arrangements should be made for a number of these to be delivered at the time the treaties are forwarded to the Senate. ACTION: State/DOD by July 30.

8. Prepare a paper containing key questions and answers on policy and treaty provisions for use with Members of the Congress and the public. Particularly strong material will be needed to justify (a) U.S. surrender of "sovereignty"; and (b) U.S. agreement to changes in financial arrangements.
ACTION: State/ARA by July 18.

9. Prepare draft statements for Secretaries Rusk and McNamara for public testimony in Senate hearings.
ACTION: State/DOD by August 12.

10. Similarly, prepare statements for government witnesses before Chairman Selden's Latin American Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee. He has currently scheduled hearings for July 25-26 on the treaties and the various hostile resolutions introduced in the House. ACTION: State/DOD by July 20.

11. Arrange for a high-level background session for the press on the same date as the Presidential or Vice Presidential leadership briefing and/or signing ceremony. ACTION: State/P.

12. Until the treaties are signed, we are inhibited from discussing with the general membership of the Senate the actual texts. However, once the treaties have been signed, an immediate

consultation

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Limited Official Use

- 3 -

consultation program will be launched designed to brief each member of the Senate personally on the contents of the treaties, as well as the advantage they represent to U.S. national interests; these briefings to be conducted by senior officials of State and Defense.


While the consultation program in the House will be more limited, arrangements will be made to brief the Leaders, Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Merchant Marine Committees, as well as especially interested individual Members now on those committees. ACTION: State/H and DOD.

13. After the treaties are signed State will brief private and professional groups including the Chamber of Commerce, AFL-CIO, Religious Groups, Veterans' Organizations, etc. Ambassador Anderson would be the best person to conduct the briefings. Governor Leber and General Porter will also be present to answer questions. A separate briefing for Veterans' Organizations on the strictly military and security aspects of the treaties will be subsequently conducted by DOD. ACTION: State/ARA, DOD.

14. An effort should be made to have Presidents Eisenhower and Truman issue statements at the time of the signing, or soon thereafter, supporting the treaties. ACTION: State/SR/PAN through Ambassador Anderson.

15. Arrange a number of lunches or evening cruises on the Potomac for Members of both Houses and Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Anderson, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Assistant Secretary Macomber, and other senior State officials.

As the individual Hill briefings progress and reactions become clearer, be in touch with the Vice President to inform him regarding significant trouble areas that may develop and work with him to correct the situation where possible.


Benjamin A. Read
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
List of invitees.

Limited Official Use

Limited Official Use

LEADERSHIP

SENATE

Mansfield	Dirksen
Hayden	Smith
Russell Long	Kuchel
Robert Byrd	Milton R. Young

HOUSE

McCormack	Ford
Albert	Laird
Boggs	Arends

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Fulbright	Hickenlooper
Sparkman	Aiken
Morse	Carlson

SFRCte - Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs

McCarthy

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Morgan	Bolton
Zablocki	Adair

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Limited Official Use

- 2 -

HFACTe, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs

Selden Mailliard

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE

Magnuson Cotton

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES

Garmatz Grover
Sullivan (Mailliard)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Russell (Smith) also Leadership
Stennis Thurmond

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Rivers Bates
Philbin (Arends)

(Also Senators Ellender and Holland because of their often expressed interest)

Limited Official Use

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 21, 1967
6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have redrafted State's draft of a new third page to the Marcos cable (attached).

I trust it says what you wish said.

Messrs. Clifford and Taylor remain at your disposal for guidance either tonight or -- better -- tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AL, NARA, Date 7-18-91

~~SECRET~~

34a

Page 3 of telegram to Manila

governments will be playing it in the same way.

But the President understands that only Marcos can assess accurately his political problems. Therefore, if Marcos feels that visit would seriously complicate his political problems and that this outweighs benefits of consultation, President will fully understand and arrangements can be made for Clifford and Taylor to bypass Manila, with quiet explanation that earlier return seemed justified and that Marcos had in any event just returned from seeing situation in Viet Nam at first hand.

The President would, of course, greatly value Marcos's view on the full range of Viet Nam problems as they might be conveyed to Clifford and Taylor.

2. If Marcos does agree finally to visit, you could go on to discuss possible schedule. We hope that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor could see Marcos alone on afternoon of August 2. This call would be main event of visit, but they are of course available to see other Philippine leaders, including members of Congress as desired, and would be guided by Marcos' wishes in all that they say to other Phil leaders at any time. You may also note we shall be making every effort to keep press treatment in low key, and would welcome any suggestions he may have on this score.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

~~SECRET~~

Page 3 of telegram to Manila

governments will be playing it in the same way.

Understands

But the President ~~insists~~ that only Marcos can assess

accurately
~~President therefore hopes that Marcos can agree to visit on~~
~~properly his political problems. Therefore,~~
schedule proposed. ~~If, however,~~ Marcos feels that visit would

seriously complicate his political problems and that this outweighs benefits of consultation, President will fully understand and arrangements can be made for Clifford and Taylor to bypass Manila, with quiet explanation that earlier return seemed justified and that Marcos had in any event just returned from seeing situation in Viet Nam at first hand.

greatly value Marcos' view

The President would, of course, ~~be pleased to host me~~
2. ~~FYI. It remains our hope that Marcos will agree, and in~~
on the full range of Viet Nam problems and they might be
~~discussion with him you should stress positive aspects of visit and~~
conveyed to Clifford and Taylor
~~unfortunate appearance if Manila omitted. End FYI.~~

3. If Marcos does agree finally to visit, you could go on to discuss possible schedule. We hope that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor could see Marcos alone on afternoon of August 2. This call would be main event of visit, but they are of course available to see other Philippine leaders, including members of Congress as desired, and would be guided by Marcos' wishes in all that they say to other Phil leaders at any time. You may also note we shall be making every effort to keep press treatment in low key, and would welcome any suggestions he may have on this score.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

34c

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 21, 1967--2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

The twelve o'clock meeting was held. Sec. Rusk, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor agree on balance that their mission should go forward. The costs of calling it off would be considerable: in Asia; quite possibly on the Hill; and in the impression it might make on Hanoi.

Moreover, as the discussion proceeded, a quite good scenario began to emerge as to how both the public and the private aspects of the mission might be handled.

I recommend, therefore, that you see Mr. Clifford and General Taylor either late today or early tomorrow morning, since they will need the bulk of tomorrow to get things organized for their departure Saturday night.

If you continue to have reservations regarding the trip, I would suggest that you see Mr. Clifford and General Taylor before finally making up your mind.

W. W. Rostow

P. S. Attached is a cable requiring your clearance before dispatch.

WWR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34d

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: COLLECT
 CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
Info

ACTION: Amembassy MANILA IMMEDIATE

STATE

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-94

1. To meet problems raised by your 583 and 626, you should deliver following oral message from President to President Marcos, as you see him to nail down arrangements for schedule. Substance of message should be that President ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ had received your report of Marcos' concern that Clifford/Taylor visit might be misunderstood. President had had similar fears, and Marcos is aware of low key in which question of additional troop contributions has been discussed in official statements here. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Marcos should particularly note remarks by Secretary McNamara that of course we ~~XXX~~ all realized that each Manila nation was sovereign government ~~XXX~~ would have to reach its own conclusions.

~~XX~~ In light of these factors, announcement here has made every effort to stress real purpose of trip, which is consultation among Manila nations looking toward a possible future summit.

Drafted by: EA: WPBundy:bmm 7/21/67	Tel. Ext. 4235	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: William P. Bundy
Clearances White House -		S/S-

CORRECTIC... MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE C... ALL COPIES BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/TIA, Room 6243

Page 2 of telegram to Manila

regret - sure
sure
be there
Frank

Explain - idiots
not want
Leaked
lie -
in light of his bed
since been there
no need to even

~~SECRET~~
 Classification

Pres *white*
judges

Unfortunately, press here has jumped to conclusion that troop requests are involved, and has persisted in this line despite our best efforts to prevent it.

regrets

President ~~xxxxxx~~ particularly that it became necessary for us to make public announcement Thursday here. Unfortunately, a local Washington Embassy, not the Philippine Embassy, had learned that there was a possibility of such a trip, and this had resulted in an Associated Press story which placed undue emphasis on the troop matter. In the face of widespread speculation, we came to the conclusion that withholding announcement would create an air of mystery that would make the problem more acute for ~~xxxxxx~~ everyone, including Marcos.

The President continued to believe that the advantages which all of us derive from this type of consultation are very great. He believes Marcos shares this belief, and the indications from other capitals have been favorable. President is particularly sensitive to Marcos' personal situation, in light of November elections and pending PHILCAG appropriation. It is with these factors in mind ~~x~~ that we have suggested that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor visit Manila toward the end of the proposed trip. They will be ~~xxxxxx~~ stressing all along the way that the basic purpose is consultation, and we know that other

CORRECTIC MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ALL COPIES
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243Page 3 of telegram to Manila~~SECRET~~
Classification

governments will be playing it in the same way. "

President therefore hopes that Marcos can agree fully to visit on schedule proposed.

2. In delivering this message, you may note orally that stop in Manila has been deliberately kept short. We hope that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor could see Marcos alone on afternoon of August 2. This call would be main event of visit, but they are of course available to see other Philippine leaders, including members of Congress as desired, and would be guided by ~~XXXXXX~~ Marcos' wishes in all that they say to other Phil leaders at any time. You may also note we shall be making every effort to keep press ~~XXXX~~ treatment in low key, and would welcome any suggestions he may have on this score.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1
Action
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O 21043Z JUL 67
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~~SECRET~~ MANILA 626

2

EXDIS

CLIFFORD/TAYLOR TRIP

REFS: A MANILA 583
B MANILA 600
C STATE 9863
D STATE 10594

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By , NARA, Date 7-20-94

1. UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN SOME DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH MARCOS IN CHANNELS OF WHICH I AM NOT AWARE, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE OWE HIM SOMETHING MORE OF AN EXPLANATION OF THE WASHINGTON ANNOUNCEMENT THAN APPEARS IN REF D. ANNOUNCEMENT STATES THE TRIP HAS BEEN ACCEPTED

PAGE 2 RUMJMA 142A ~~SECRET~~
BY PHIL HEAD OF STATE. IN FACT, AS STATED PARA 4 REF A, MARCOS HAD NOT REPEAT NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF FINALLY, AND HAD ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BEFORE DOING SO, WHICH WAS NOT REPEAT NOT FORTHCOMING PRIOR TO WASHINGTON'S ANNOUNCEMENT. HE IS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ON THESE MATTERS, AND SIMPLE EXPLANATION THAT SPECULATION COMPELLED IMMEDIATE ANNOUNCEMENT NOT CALCULATED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES TO CALM HIM DOWN. HE IS ALSO AWARE THAT VIRTUALLY ENTIRE STORY HAD LEAKED EARLIER IN WASHINGTON BEFORE HE HAD EVEN BEEN CONSULTED (REF B).

2. IT IS OF COURSE TRUE THAT ANNOUNCEMENT ITSELF COUCHED IN TERMS WHICH CORRESPOND VERY MUCH TO TENTATIVE THINKING OUTLINED BY MARCOS IN OUR CONVERSATION YESTERDAY. BUT THIS WAS STILL A LONG WAY FROM HIS ULTIMATE WORD. PERHAPS WHAT WE NEED AS A MINIMUM IS

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

-2- MANILA 626 210436Z JUL 67

A RATHER PROFUSE APOLOGY COUPLED WITH EXPLANATION THAT NEED FOR SPEED COMPELLED RAPID RELEASE OF ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED WITH MARCOS' VIEWS SPECIFICALLY IN MIND.

3. I WOULD MUCH PREFER TO APPROACH QUESTION OF

PAGE 3 RUMJMA 142A ~~SECRET~~
DEFINITIVE SCHEDULE AND ARRANGEMENTS AFTER BEING ABLE TO OFFER SOME SUCH EXPLANATION. I AM NOT SURE EVEN THEN WHAT MARCOS' REACTION WILL BE, BUT HIS UNDERSTANDING SEEMS TO BE ABOUT THE BEST WE CAN HOPE FOR AT THE MOMENT.

GP-3 WILSON
BT

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O AT 1:35 A.M. JULY 21.
PASSED WHITE HOUSE AT 1:35 A.M. JULY 21.

~~SECRET~~

348

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By [signature], NARA, Date 7-20-94

Manila 583, July 20, 1967 -- NODIS

1. I was unable to see Marcos until just before noon today to deliver copy of latest presidential letter on proposed Clifford-Taylor trip. Marcos' initial reaction to the proposal was very negative, his first comment being that this would come just at the time he would be working with leadership on passage of Philcag Bill and would "embarrass me very much politically." He suggested Manila simply be dropped from the itinerary.
2. He pointed out to Marcos that on schedule proposed by Department he would have almost two weeks for domestic maneuver on Philcag and that it would look very strange if visitors were to omit Manila while seeing all the other Manila powers. He thought this over for a few moments and backed off somewhat, grumbling that special session of Congress would still be in session (it lasts until August 18) and this would make things very difficult. Then he asked how we proposed to handle any public announcement on purpose of the trip. I told him I had nonprecise information on that as yet but assumed it would take general lines outlined in President Johnson's letter and in his press conference of July 18. I handed him a copy of excerpts from the latter contained State 8732 which Marcos read through carefully.
3. Finally he asked if it would be possible for official announcement from Washington to express reason for trip solely in terms of Clifford and Taylor following up McNamara report with trip to Saigon and other Manila capitals with view to laying groundwork for possible upcoming Summit, with no public mention of diverting additional troop support from allies at this time. He said he was fully aware that there would be all sorts of press speculation on latter score in any event but that it might ease his problem considerably if it were not alluded to officially in any public statements or announcements (beyond, presumably, same sort of cautious treatment already being given this subject by President and Secretary).
4. I said I could not answer His question at all without further Washington guidance but would pass on his views and ask for an immediate response. He indicated he would like an answer before committing himself finally on the matter and I promised to let him know as soon as possible.
5. I realize difficulties acceptance this Marcos suggestion could put us in both at home and elsewhere, but from our somewhat myopic viewpoint here it makes considerable sense. Without it I am afraid we will have real trouble with Marcos on this subject just at this time.

Wilson

~~SECRET~~

W.W.R. 35

Friday, July 21, 1967, 5:25 p. m.

2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. President:

In the attached, Messrs. Schultze, Freeman and Gaud recommend that you authorize an agreement for one million tons of PL-480 wheat for Pakistan. (The agreement would also contain small quantities of tallow, oil, cotton and dry milk.) This wheat was part of the package you approved as our pledge at the May meeting of the Pakistan Aid Consortium.

Schultze's memorandum (Tab A) gives a good summary of the case for the agreement and the things the Paks have agreed to do in return -- including buying most of their commercial wheat purchases from the United States.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Speak to me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EKH:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"A"

35a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUL 11 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Pakistan

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request authority to negotiate a \$109 million P. L. 480 sales agreement with Pakistan for 1,000,000 tons of wheat plus some additional commodities. This is essentially the P. L. 480 program you authorized as part of the pledge at the May Consortium meeting.

The Paks estimate wheat requirements for FY 1968 at 2.25 million tons. This agreement plus shipments under the May agreement will provide 1.25 million tons. Commercial purchases will provide at least 200 thousand tons more. Remaining P. L. 480 wheat requirements will be reviewed later in the year when we have a clearer picture of total import needs, U. S. supplies and other donor contributions.

The FY 1968 usual marketing requirement for wheat has been raised from 75 thousand tons to 200 thousand tons, reflecting increased purchases in FY 1967. Actual commercial purchases are expected to run above the mandatory 200,000. Pak officials have stated that they intend to purchase most of their commercial wheat in the U. S. and have already purchased 200,000 tons here for FY 1968 delivery. Usual marketing requirements for tallow and oil are also larger than last year's and provide for purchases in the U. S. to protect our traditional market.

Self help

The eight quite specific conditions of the May agreement continue to apply. Two more are added with this agreement to cover increased fertilizer and water requirements of new high yield seeds which the Paks will be using in large quantity. The outlook for Pakistan's agriculture continues bright with wheat production expected to rise from 3.9 million tons last year to 4.2 million tons within this year with plans for 5.0 million next year. The 1970 self-sufficiency target is a crop of 6.6 million tons.

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed P. L. 480 agreement.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment _____

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 12-4-15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"B"

JUL 5 1967

35b

To: The President
Subject: PL 480 Program for Pakistan

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12355, Sec 3.4

NY 94-349

By NARA, Date 11-13-95

You authorized us to announce at the May 31 meeting of the Pakistan Consortium that the U. S. was prepared to provide 1,000,000 tons of wheat under Title I, PL 480 as an initial agreement against FY 1968 requirements as well as some additional commodities. We indicated that we would present to you later a more precise assessment of commodity requirements and seek authority to begin negotiation of the agreement.

Accordingly, we recommend that you authorize negotiation of a PL 480 sales agreement for the following approximate quantities of commodities: 1,000,000 tons of wheat and/or wheat flour; 45,000 tons of tallow; 100,000 tons of edible vegetable oils; 20,000 bales of cotton (extra long staple); and 1,000 tons of nonfat dry milk. The estimated current export market value of the agreement is \$108.9 million. Twenty percent of the commodity value would be provided under Convertible Local Currency Credit terms and 80 percent under Local Currency terms.

Need for Program

Pakistan will need continued imports of foodgrain for the next two to four years in order to meet consumption needs and stabilize prices. If excessive foreign debt servicing obligations are to be avoided, a portion of these imports should be on concessional terms. The Pakistan Government estimates that it will need approximately 2.25 million tons of wheat imports in FY 1968. This proposed sale, plus a 250,000 tons agreement signed May 11, will provide 1,250,000 tons for arrival during the first half of the fiscal year. In addition to the foodgrains, Pakistan also needs to import substantial quantities of other agricultural commodities.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirements

Reflecting Pakistan's increased purchases of wheat in FY 1967 and its expected FY 1968 purchases we have raised required minimum wheat purchases to 200,000 tons. Commercial purchases above that level are anticipated, and the Pakistan Government has already arranged to purchase 200,000 tons of wheat from the U. S. for delivery in FY 1968. At the Consortium meeting, GOP officials stated that their government intended to make most of its commercial purchases of wheat in the U. S. The usual marketing requirement of 8,700 tons (3,200 tons from the U. S.) of tallow is increased by 200 tons and reflects increased commercial imports from the U. S. The usual marketing requirement of 17,500 tons (500 tons from the U. S.) of vegetable oils also represents an increase over the level of last year's usual marketings and takes into account increased commercial imports from the U. S. and other sources. (Confirmation of oil UMR awaits completion Third Country Consultations)

Self-help

Pakistan continues its sound self-help performance. As noted in our May memo to you, Pakistan plans to increase plantings with high-yielding Mexican wheat

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

seed from 250,000 to 2,000,000 acres in FY 1968. Fertilizer consumption is expected to rise from 200,000 to 385,000 nutrient tons. This year's crop of wheat is expected to increase from 3.9 to at least 4.2 million tons; next year the government hopes to produce 5.0 million tons. The amount required for self-sufficiency is about 6.6 million tons -- a target which the government intends to reach in 1970.

The PL 480 agreement signed on May 11, 1967 included eight self-help measures. In this agreement we plan to ask Pakistan to:

1. Reevaluate its future fertilizer needs in light of the greater requirements for phosphate of the new varieties of wheat and rice.
2. Continue to stress the tubewell irrigation program which has proven so successful in the past.


Recommendation

That you authorize us to negotiate the PL 480 sales agreement described above.

June 29 1967



 Administrator
 Agency for International Development



 Secretary
 Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

36

Pres file

Friday, July 21, 1967
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith is today's situation
report on the political developments
in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

SECRET/EXDIS Attachment

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

36a

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

July 21, 1967

New Developments

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-163

By lig, NARA, Date 7-20-94

Saigon 1536 reports a conversation between Ambassador Bunker and Ky on July 20. Ky said the working arrangement between him and Thieu was moving in an encouraging way. He said that he was meeting with the entire Directorate to consider broad policy questions relating to re-organization of the armed forces, pacification, formation of a Cabinet, and negotiations for a settlement of the war. Ky said that discussions were going well and that he would want to discuss these issues with Bunker when the Directorate had reached a more definite position. He indicated that a policy statement, presumably a Thieu-Ky platform, would be issued on August 3, the opening day of the presidential campaign. Bunker emphasized again that the U. S. could not countenance anything like a coup, and Ky stated categorically that there would be no coups.

Bunker comments that the Thieu-Ky relationship is developing in an encouraging way and that Ky's categorical statement

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

against any coup is also reassuring. Bunker had earlier instructed that the same word be passed through senior U.S. commanders to their Vietnamese opposite numbers. Bunker believes that there is no longer any doubt about our opposition to coups in high Vietnamese military circles.

The Central Election Council has completed its consideration of complaints against Upper House candidate lists. A Reuters report this morning indicates that the Council has approved 48 lists, or 480 candidates for the Upper House race. The Council rejected 15 slates including two led by militant Buddhists and another composed of trade union representatives. According to Reuters, the Council approved five tickets led by members of the Directorate and four tickets led by retired generals.

Comment

Ambassador Bunker's efforts to move Thieu and Ky into a good working relationship is continuing on a sound course. We are instructing the Mission to utilize the special channel to Ky to provide detailed advice regarding the formulation of a Thieu-Ky platform statement.

We do not yet know the grounds for the rejection of the 15 Upper House slates. At any rate the Election Council's findings must be reviewed and approved by the Assembly.

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

At lunch with Andy Goodpaster yesterday he emphasized it was his judgment that Gen. Eisenhower does not wish to press or embarrass you on the question of a desalting plant initiative for the Middle East; but he is greatly interested.

Andy suggests you may wish to draft a letter indicating your long time support for such an initiative, symbolized by Bunker's exercise; the staff work now going forward; and the problem of finding the right moment to take such an initiative.

Otherwise Andy is conscious you wish to keep Gen. Eisenhower fully informed. I briefed him on the Middle East, Viet Nam, foreign aid, etc.

With respect to foreign aid, he said he is sure Gen. Eisenhower is prepared to do anything you judge useful to hold the line against Congressional pressure.

W. W. Rostow

Draft letter on desalting, to Gen. Eisenhower_____

No_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rlh

~~to susp~~
2. Pres file

Friday, July 21, 1967
3:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two odd reports:

- 1. The UAR will undertake hostilities July 21-22.
- 2. Nasser will resign Sunday, on the anniversary of the 1952 revolution.

We shall be alert over the week-end. One way or another Nasser's likely to celebrate.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-165
By cb, NARA, Date 9-12-95

WWRostow:sln

Pres file

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg reports that the Arabs have said no. The Russian resolution has failed.

They hope to get a procedural resolution late today or tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Friday - July 21, 1967
2:00 pm

← sweep
2. Pass file

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on a communist cadre course taken by a Latin American communist at the Moscow "International School of Marxism-Leninism" from March 1966 to February 1967.

It throws interesting light on Soviet tactics in Latin America, including use of guerrilla warfare in selected countries.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

State Dept. Research (INR)
Memorandum (RSB-81),
July 19, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-271
By ijg, NARA, Date 5-5-95

40a

- ~~BATOR~~
- ~~BOWDLER~~
- ~~BUDGET~~
- ~~DAVIS~~
- ~~GINSBURGH~~
- ~~HAMILTON~~
- ~~JESSUP~~
- ~~JOHNSON~~
- ~~JORDEN~~
- ~~KEMER~~
- ~~MOYERS~~
- ~~TAYLOR~~
- ~~WRIGGINS~~

Research Memorandum

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

JUL 21 5 31

THIS REPORT IS INTENDED FOR YOUR PERSONAL USE ONLY RSB-81, July 19, 1967

NOT FOR FURTHER REPRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION OR CITATION IN LISTS OF INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS

To : The Secretary
 Through: S/S
 From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*

Subject: Soviet Cadre Course for Latin American Communists

The renewed emphasis by Fidel Castro on his support for revolutionary violence in Latin America has brought into sharper relief the differences between the Soviet Union and Cuba over the correct tactics to be followed by Latin American communists. A recent report of a cadre course attended by some 160 Latin American communists in Moscow helps to illuminate the methods advocated by the Soviets for Latin America. That report is examined in this memorandum.

ABSTRACT

Recently a report was prepared by a Latin American communist who attended a year-long cadre course for Latin American communists at the International School of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow from March 1966 to February 1967. The informant's reputation for reliable reporting is described as having been established over a period of several years, and his information provides useful insights into the Soviet view of the political situation in Latin America as well as the tactics the Soviets advocate for the area. It indicates that the Soviets are trying to compete with Cuba for the loyalty of young Latin American communists by advocating violent methods for use in a number of Latin American countries.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJL 94-163
 By CB, NARA, Date 3-29-95

GROUP 1
 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

The so-called via pacifica ("peaceful road") was advanced at the cadre school as the preferred method of taking state power in countries which have a large, strong communist party, legally established and supported by a large and well-organized working class. It was stated that these conditions existed in only four countries -- Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. In some other countries which did not enjoy all the conditions necessary for the via pacifica, namely "Central America and Ecuador," it would still be possible to pursue a peaceful policy, if local communist parties could gain the support of the peasant majorities in elections. Failing this, guerrilla warfare was to be tried. In a third group of countries, where there is virtually no chance for the successful operation of peaceful methods, armed violence based on the peasant mass--guerrilla warfare-- is the prescribed tactic. It was made clear by the instructors, however, that even in countries where violence was the more appropriate tactic, the via pacifica is to be used to prepare the way for guerrilla war.

The Soviet cadre instructors stated further that even in countries where the via pacifica was the operative policy, this road would ultimately lead to violence because the United States would try to prevent communists from taking over any Latin American government. The advantage of the peaceful road in this context is that it allows a communist party to pose as the champion of local nationalism and thus make overt US action against it appear to be

interference in the domestic political affairs of a sovereign state.

The subject of Cuba did not come up often during the cadre course, probably because the instructors wanted it that way. But whenever Cuba was discussed the instructors were careful to emphasize the Soviet desire for close relations with Fidel Castro and in a few select instances even suggested that Cuba could make a positive contribution to the communist cause. At the same time, the Soviet teachers tried to minimize the attraction which Cuba might have on young cadre students by completely ignoring the Cuban experience as a blueprint for a successful revolution and by alluding privately to the haphazard, unscientific policies of the Cuban leader and the damage which they had caused.

Program for Latin American Cadres

Peaceful revolution is a preferred way for communists to take power, but in Latin America it ultimately cannot succeed without the help of armed violence, as long as the United States is likely to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the area. This was the theme of a training course which approximately 160 Latin American communists attended at the International School of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow from March 1966 to February 1967. Communists from 15 Latin American countries attended the course, but Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic were not represented. The course focused on the proper methods communists should use to attain power, and the conclusions which it reached on this subject show that the Soviets favor a blend of peaceful and violent methods in Latin America, depending on the situations in different countries.

This information is contained in a report of a clandestine source who attended the Latin American course. This person is a young Latin American communist who is described as having a good education and a reputation for reliable reporting over the past five or six years. The report as a whole reflects a somewhat uncritical acceptance of what the Soviet cadre instructors said, and it contains vague or conflicting information on a few points. Nevertheless, it presents some interesting insights into the way the Soviets are trying to indoctrinate their Latin American cadres.

The International School of Marxism-Leninism^{1/} is a cadre school for communists from noncommunist countries. It opened its doors in 1962, as the Soviets saw the need to counter the missionary activities of the Communist Chinese among the communists of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the size of its enrollment makes it the most important training arm of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for nationals from noncommunist countries. It is interesting to note that Latin Americans have consistently been the largest group at the cadre school. Costs of studying at the cadre school are borne by the CPSU.

The cadre courses are designed to indoctrinate young communists in the Soviet brand of Marxism-Leninism and to teach them how to apply Soviet doctrine in their homelands. To that end, the students are taught communist revolutionary theory and tactics and their application in different areas, as well as the Russian language and

1. Also known as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union School for Foreign Communists and the Marxist-Leninist School for Cadres.

the history of the CPSU, in addition to more theoretical subjects such as economics and philosophy. The time which the cadres spend on this training ranges from one semester to two years, depending, presumably, on their background and positions.

Via Pacifica plus....

The special course for Latin Americans was devoted to the problem of how communists were to attain state power in the area. Peaceful revolution -- e.g., indoctrination of the masses through legal and illegal propaganda, formation of fronts with other left-wing groups, participation in elections, infiltration of noncommunist organizations and institutions, etc. -- the so-called via pacifica ("peaceful road"), was advanced as the preferred method of taking power in countries which have a large, strong communist party, legally established and supported by a large and well-organized working class. Soviet teaching favors this approach because it conforms to current Soviet doctrine and because the Soviets are able to influence city-based communist parties more effectively than guerrilla groups in the countryside which tend to look to Fidel Castro for inspiration.

Yet the teachers and students of the Latin American course agreed that even the "peaceful road" might ultimately lead to violence, because the United States would not permit communists to take over any Latin American government, whatever the means. The advantage of the via pacifica, in this context, is that it allows the local communist party to establish a legal position and to pose as the champion of local discontent and anti-Americanism, thus making overt US action against it appear to be interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. While the United States supposedly would not hesitate to send troops to suppress a communist-led armed insurrection, as it did in the Dominican Republic in 1965 -- the textbook example for the cadre course of direct US intervention in a Latin American country -- it would find it much more difficult to act directly against a communist party which had come to power through legal means.¹ It would rely instead on the local military to handle the situation, and this would lead to a civil war in which the communists and their allies would be strengthened by desertions from the armed forces. It was stated during the course

1. The Soviet instructors said that "extreme leftists," rather than the "soft-line" communist party, controlled the Dominican revolution, with some support from Cuba. The Soviet Union, they said, had little influence on the Dominican struggle.

that this was the scenario which would have been followed in Chile had the communist-supported candidate won the 1964 presidential election in that country, but it was not forecast what the outcome of the civil war would have been.

Where Peaceful Methods Are Possible

Having established the guidelines for action in Latin America, the cadre classes next discussed how these were to be applied in specific Latin American countries. It was concluded, that the countries of Latin America could be grouped into three general categories, according to their local conditions: (1) those countries where the via pacifica is the operative communist policy; (2) those countries where conditions are not yet ripe for wholly peaceable action but which may eventually become so; and (3) those countries which are so backward or whose governments are so repressive that the only hope for communists lies in armed struggle.

The instructors noted only four Latin American countries where the via pacifica was actually being followed: Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina. They saw some cause for satisfaction at developments in the first three countries, but they were critical of the Communist Party of Argentina because it had not been "sufficiently influential" to prevent the military seizure of power there. Because of the instability of the Argentine government, it was recommended that the Argentine party "prepare for armed intervention," meaning, apparently, intervention by the United States or further coup attempts by right-wing elements. The discussions on Chile revealed concern that the Chilean party was not exerting enough influence on President Eduardo Frei, even though the Chilean party was acknowledged to be the strongest and best organized in Latin America.

Guerrilla Action Necessary

The cadre course consigned the rest of Latin America, with a few exceptions, to the underdeveloped category. These are the countries which generally are socially and economically backward and lack a large urban working class; peasants, called campesinos, form the bulk of their populations. For some of these countries, notably "Central America and Ecuador," the possibility of following the via pacifica exists -- if the local communist party can get effective political support from the peasants. If a communist party has a good chance of winning an election with campesino backing, then a peaceful policy would be the correct one in the future. If, however,

after its best efforts the party fails to attain its objective by peaceful means, then the alternative of armed struggle based on the raw power of the peasant masses -- guerrilla war -- is to be taken up and carried out. This will be necessary in a number of countries because the campesinos do not possess the right to vote and thus cannot contribute politically.

The last group of countries which the course defined consisted of those in which the only chance of success for the communist cause lies in sustained guerrilla warfare. These are the countries of striking backwardness, namely Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala, or of singularly despotic governments, Haiti and Paraguay. In Brazil the combination of large underdeveloped areas and a tough government policy toward communism also makes the use of force more feasible.^{1/}

It was the consensus of the discussions that indigenous guerrilla movements led by communists could seize power in all of these countries but Haiti. In the case of the latter, its small size and the extreme harshness of the Duvalier regime make successful guerrilla activity impossible. Hence the initiative for the war against Duvalier must come from outside the country, i.e., from Cuba. It was also stressed at the cadre discussions that even in these countries, where violent methods were the primary ones, the via pacifica should be used to build up the strength of the communist parties before the guerrilla struggle began.

Out of the discussions and lectures on tactics in Latin America came a general assessment of where the communist movement stands in the area. This was that the Guatemalan, Chilean, Venezuelan, Colombian, and Bolivian parties are closest to achieving a successful revolution. Venezuela, it was noted, had suffered setbacks,

1. This statement is interesting in view of the antipathy of the Brazilian Communist Party toward guerrilla tactics. It is possible, of course, that Brazil was cited in some limited context, such as terrsin or the existence of rural discontent, which the source has ignored.

but with the active aid of Fidel Castro it still had a good chance to succeed.^{1/}

Cuban Problem Underplayed But Omnipresent

The disagreement between the Soviets and Cuba over the correct policy to be followed in Latin America was touched on very little during the course. The importance of communist unity, as well as the Soviet desire for close relations with Cuba was instead emphasized, and the necessary contributions which Cuba would make to the revolutions in Haiti and Venezuela were suggested. Nevertheless, the dispute did protrude periodically throughout the course.

This explains why the Soviet instructors were careful to admonish their auditors not to disseminate further the negative comments which they had made in private about Castro outside their parties lest they reach Cuban ears. It accounts for the extraordinary deference which the teachers showed the students and the emphasis which they laid on the primacy of the local communist parties. They stated repeatedly and piously that it was up to the local communist parties, which best knew local conditions, to decide what course of action would best facilitate the taking of state power. The CPSU, they intoned, was ready to provide whatever help was required, ~~including arms and guerrilla training, and there was an official in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee responsible for meeting the needs of each Latin American party, and only very rarely were requests for arms and guerrilla instructions turned down.~~

1. The Venezuelan, Dominican, and Uruguayan parties were not represented at the cadre course and probably for this reason the course did not spend much time discussing their situations. The absence of students from these parties did leave the Soviet instructors free to present their own version of events which concerned them, and this would seem to account for the rather inconsistent references to Venezuela which appeared in the cadre report. For example, Venezuela is mentioned in the paragraph above as having a chance for a successful revolution, if helped by Cuba, and the inference is that this revolution will be a violent one. But elsewhere Venezuela is omitted from that group of countries for which violent revolution is regarded as the best method. The report never does clear up this confusion, but it is the more moderate, peace-oriented wing of the Communist Party of Venezuela which the Soviets have been supporting. (See page 7, below.)

This stated Soviet solicitude for local party authority was clearly intended to stand in sharp contrast to Cuban interference in local affairs. In their occasional off-the-record references to Cuba, the Soviets said that Castro, by his training and support of extreme revolutionaries, is undermining the work of the domestic parties. They pointed to Venezuela as the prime example of the ruinous effects of Cuban meddling. There the Cubans were said to have undermined the authority of the regular communist party (PCV) by supporting guerrillas of the extreme left. According to the Soviet view, the guerrilla effort failed, because it was launched before the PCV had the chance to prepare the way with peaceful work. Guerrilla warfare cannot succeed without the help of the via pacifica. If Cuba really got behind the PCV and supported this kind of a policy, the Soviets claimed, victory in Venezuela could still be achieved.

Finally, it appears that the Soviet instructors managed to discuss Latin American tactics without any reference to Cuba -- the only real communist victory in the Western Hemisphere -- as a model, because the Cuban example does not correspond to the Soviet conception of how other parties can best seek state power and because it might raise the notion that the natural leaders in Latin America should be native Latin American communists who had successfully made a revolution. The Cuban experience with the Bay of Pigs invasion would also raise doubts as to how real the threat of US intervention is throughout Latin America, and the Cuban Missile Crisis would bring into question Soviet readiness to support Latin American communists in a pinch.

Contradictions Galore

The general impression that comes out of the cadre sessions is that the Soviets continue to advocate a mixture of peaceful and violent methods for use in Latin America, but that they are having a hard time adjusting their line to the situation as it actually exists in the area. Their basic problem is one of reconciling their own preference for the via pacifica under present conditions, the need to compete with Castro for radical support, and the necessity to maintain a semblance of communist unity in Latin America.

Castro has not made it any easier for them. He has shown nothing but contempt for any kind of bargaining with the governments of Latin America and he has cast aspersions on the revolutionary ardor of the Soviets for seeking out agreements with the "oligarchies." He has, moreover, attacked the Soviet-oriented Latin American communist parties for their stodginess and has said that city-based

party organization is unimportant and even detrimental to successful revolutionary activity. In his stated view a successful revolution can only come from guerrillas in the countryside, whether they are communists or not.

In the future, as long as the Soviets have to reckon with such recalcitrance on the part of Cuba, it is likely that they will try to keep a foot in the "peace" camp and one in the guerrilla camp. They will support guerrilla violence in private and in a vague way in public when they think it suits their purposes to do so, but they will also continue to encourage those elements in the Latin American parties which favor a cautious, essentially peaceful policy, while they themselves proceed with their "respectability" drive. In the case of Venezuela, for instance, which during the cadre course appeared to be marked out as a target for violent action, the Soviets have been backing with propaganda and money not the guerrillas but that part of the communist party which recently abandoned violence as a current tactic and expelled one of the most important guerrilla leaders from its ranks, and they have played host to a number of leaders from this group.

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 9:35 a.m.

Mr. President:

Arthur Goldberg just telephoned to say the situation is warming up and he would now rate slightly higher than this cable indicates the Soviets pushing the Arabs to accept one or the other resolution.

The Israelis prefer no resolution.

Either could be a great victory for peace in the Middle East if properly followed through in the Security Council.

You may wish to keep this handy during the day; for this is apparently the day of show-down in the General Assembly.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 305

USUN 305

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

WWRostow:rlh

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~~SECRET~~ USUN 305

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-163

By , NARA, Date 7-20-94

EXDIS

USUN 290

MID-EAST CRISIS

DOBRYNIN (USSR) TELEPHONED ME THIS NOON TO SAY HE
 WANTED TO CHECK WITH ME ABOUT THE WORDING OF THE FORMULAS
 I HAD DISCUSSED WITH GROMYKO YESTERDAY. WE MET AT UN
 SHORTLY AFTER LUNCH.

DOBRYNIN SHOWED ME TWO TEXTS. ONE "CALLED FOR"
 ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ONE PARA AND SAID RENUNCIATION OF CLAIMS
 AND ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH EXISTANCE OF INDEPENDENT NATIONAL
 STATES WAS "EXPECTED" IN OTHER. SECOND VERSION USED
 SIMILAR FORMULAS ON SUBSTANCE BUT USED TERMINOLOGY
 "IS EXPECTED" IN BOTH PARAS. BOTH VERSIONS USED
 WORDS "WITHOUT DELAY" IN EACH PARA.

AFTER LOOKING OVER TEXT I TOLD DOBRYNIN I HAD NOT
 USED EXPRESSION "CALLS UPON" IN CONVERSATION YESTERDAY
 AND FURTHER NOTED THAT HE HAD USED IT ONLY IN PARA ONE AND
 THAT THIS CREATED IMBALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO. HE SAID HIS
 PUSPOSE WAS TO CLARIFY WITH ME EXACTLY WHERE OUR POSITION STOOD.

I THEN WENT OVER WITH HIM CONVERSATION OF YESTERDUY BASED
 ON HIS NOTES (WHICH WERE ACCURATE)NAND MY OWN. AS A RESULT THE
 TWO VERSIONS ATTACHED AT END OF THIS TEL WERE COMPLETED AS
 ACCURATELY REFLECTING YESTERDAY'S INTENTION. (FINAL DRAFTING
 REFLECTED TWO SUBSEQUENT TELECONS AS WELL.) DOBRYNIN CONFIRMED
 BY TELEPHONE THAT GROMYKO AGREED THESE TEXTS, AND NOT RPT NOT
 ONES DOBRYNIN HAD EXPLORED WITH ME EARLIER, REPRESENTED WHAT
 WE HAD TALKED ABOUT. VERSION I IS THE TEXT IN WHICH DOBRYNIN
 APPEARED TO HAVE GREATEST INTEREST.

DOBRYNIN ALSO TOLD ME GROMYKO HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FAWZI
 (UAR) ABOUT THESE NEW FORMULAS AND THAT FAWZI THOUGHT HE MIGHT
 NEED MORE TIME TO CONSULT HIS GOVT. DOBRYNIN THEREFORE WONDERED
 IF WE WOULD CONSENT TO TWO OR THREE DAYS MORE TIME. I TOLD HIM
 WE WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT CONSTANT REQUESTS FOR DELAY WERE SIMPLY
 A BARGAINING TACTIC. ALSO THAT WE HAD HEARD OF POSSIBLE EFFORTS
 TO BRING JERUSALEM INTO SC AND WONDERED WHETHER THIS REQUEST
 FOR A FURTHER DELAY WAS NOT SIMPLY EFFORT TO COMPLICATE ISSUE
 WITH THAT OF JERUSALEM AGAIN. DOBRYNIN SAID USSR KNEW OF NO
 INTENTION TO HAVE EARLY SC MEETING ON JERUSALEM, WHICH HE
 RECONFIRMED AFTER TALKING TO GROMYKO. I TOLD HIM WE NEVERTHELESS
 HAD INDICATION SOME ACABS WERE THINKING OF THIS. I TOLD DOBRYNIN
 IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT SESSION MUST BE COMPLETED TOMORROW
 AFTERNOON AS AGREED OR AT LATEST ON SATURDAY MORNING.
 DOBRYNIN SAID HE WOULD INFORM GROMYKO OF THIS REACTION.

IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION RIAD (UAR) TOLD SISCO AND PEDERSEN UAR DEL HAD SENT TO CAIRO TODAY TWO VARIANT FORMULAS GIVEN THEM BY USSR, INDICATING ONE OF THEM USED "IS EXPECTED" PHRASES IN BOTH PARAS AND THAT SECOND PARA WAS BASED ON "INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE" CONCEPT. RIAD IMPLIED FAWZI THOUGHT TEXT HAD SOME MERIT BUT CAIRO WOULD TAKE DECISION. HE ALSO FORESAW DIFFICULTY WITH ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS. WE ARE UNCERTAIN EXACTLY WHAT TEXTS HE REFERRING TO, AS CONVERSATION PRECEDED AGREEMENT BETWEEN DOBRYNIN AND ME AS TO WHAT PROPER TEXTS WERE.

IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION SOV COUNS SHEVCHENKO TOLD A BELGIAN SOVS COULD SEE NO REASON NOT TO ACCEPT RES CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES AND RECOGNITION ISRAELI RIGHT TO EXIST, BOTH "WITHOUT DELAY". WHEN QUERIED WHETHER SOVS WOULD BE PREPARED TO BREAK WITH ARABS IN AGREEING SUCH RES, SHEVCHENKO REPORTEDLY MADE FUZZY REPLY, MAIN POINT OF WHICH SEEMED TO BE THEY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE BREAKING WITH ALL ARABS.

NEVERTHELESS OUR ASSESSMENT IS PROPOSALS WILL BE UNACCEPTABLE TO ARABS, THAT SOVS WILL NOT RPT NOT BE WILLING TO BREAK WITH ARABS, AND THAT WE ARE MOST LIKELY TO END GA SHORTLY WITH PROCEDURAL RES ALONG LINES BEING DISCUSSED BY FINLAND, SWEDEN AND AUSTRIA. //

FOL ARE THE TWO TEXTS:

VERSION I

THE GA,

HAVING EXAMINED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE ME,

CONSIDERING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE ME MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE,

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN;

2. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE UNDER THE UN CHARTER OF:

A. WITHOUT DELAY WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT OF THEIR FORCES FROM TERRITORIES OCCUPIED BY THEM IN KEEPING WITH THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR;

B. WITHOUT DELAY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY ALL MEMBER STATES OF THE UN IN THE AREA THAT EACH ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH;

3. REQUESTS THE SC TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE ME WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND UTILIZING A UN PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG-DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.

VERSION II

THE GA,

HAVING EXAMINED THE GRAVE SITUATION IN THE ME,

CONSIDERING THAT THE CRISIS IN THE ME MERITS THE ATTENTION OF ALL MEMBER STATES AND INDEED REQUIRES THE FULL PARTICIPATION OF ALL MEMBERS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE,

1. DECLARES THAT PEACE AND FINAL SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CHARTER OF THE UN;

2. AFFIRMS THE PRINCIPLE THAT CONQUEST OF TERRITORY BY WAR IS INADMISSIBLE UNDER THE UN CHARTER, AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL BY THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED BEFORE JUNE 5, 1967 IS EXPECTEDV

3. AFFIRMS LIKEWISE THE PRINCIPLE THAT ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ALL MEMBER STATES IN THE AREA THAT EACH OF THEM ENJOYS THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AND RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THEREWITH ARE EXPECTED;

4. REQUESTS THE SC TO CONTINUE EXAMINING THE SITUATION IN THE ME WITH A SENSE OF URGENCY, WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES AND UTILIZING A UN PRESENCE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN APPROPRIATE AND JUST SOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, IN PARTICULAR BRINGING TO AN END THE LONG-DEFERRED ONE OF THE REFUGEES AND GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS.

GP-3

GOLDBERG
BT

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

NNNNVZCZCD

42

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 21, 1967
8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is a report from Bunker which indicates that some solid progress may well be under way in harnessing Ky and Thieu for the campaign.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 1536, July 12, 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlh, NARA, Date 7-18-91

RUEHLG/CIA
RUEHIA/USIA
RUEPWS/NSA
P 210200Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3451
INFO RUHHHQ/ QCINCPAC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 1536

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

REF: SAIGON 1475

42a
DECLASSIFIED

Authority 90-262
By sp/ NARA, Date 7-19-91

1. I HAD A TALK WITH PRIME MINISTER KY LATE IN THE AFTERNOON OF JULY 20 AND WE WENT OVER SOME OF THE SAME GROUND THAT I HAD COVERED IN MY MORNING TALK WITH GENERAL THIEU (REFTEL).
2. KY GAVE ME ESSENTIALLY THE SAME EXPLANATION ABOUT THE VOTE IN THE ASSEMBLY SPECIAL COMMITTEE THAT THIEU HAD GIVEN ME (PARA 3 REFTTEL). KY THEN DESCRIBED THE EARLY MORNING MEETINGS WITH CORPS COMMANDERS ON JULY 18 ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED EARLIER BY BUI DIEM (SAIGON 1381). KY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME OF THE GENERALS HAD GIVEN CREDENCE TO THE RUMOR THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 1536 ~~SECRET~~

ACTION. HE SAID HE HAD TOLD THEM THIS WAS RIDICULOUS AND THEY HAD CALMED DOWN IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING. DURING THAT MORNING, ACCORDING TO KY, CHECKS WITH THEIR PEOPLE IN THE ASSEMBLY REASSURED THEM THAT THE VOTE WOULD BE SATISFACTORY. (COMMENT: THIS CONFIRMS BUI DIEM'S STATEMENT TO ME AT OUR SECOND MEETING THAT SAME MORNING.)

3. I MENTIONED TO KY THAT WE HAD HEARD THAT LOAN FELT THE AMERICANS WERE OUT TO GET HIM. I SAID THAT WE, OF COURSE, HAD NOTHING AGAINST LOAN HIMSELF ALTHOUGH AS I HAD MAYSELF SAID TO KY WE FELT THAT HE HAD BEEN OVERZEALOUS EARLY IN THE GAME AND THAT THIS HAD NOT HELPED THE SITUATION EITHER FOR THE GOVERNMENT OR KY. KY SAID HE HAD ENTIRELY AGREED AND HAD THEREFORE PULLED LOAN BACK AT THAT TIME.

4. WE THEN GOT ON TO THE MATTER OF WORKING ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN HIM AND THIEU. KY FELT THAT THIS WAS MOVING IN AN ENCOURAGING WAY AND SAID THAT HE WAS IN FACT AT THE MOMENT MEETING WITH THE ENTIRE DIRECTORATE TO CONSIDER BROAD POLICY QUESTIONS RELATING TO REORGANIZATION OF THE RVNAF, PACIFICATION,

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1536 ~~SECRET~~

FORMATION OF A CABINET, AND BROAD POLICY RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING WELL AND THAT WHEN THEY HAD REACHED A MORE DEFINITE STATE HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THEM WITH ME AND ALSO TALK ABOUT THE GENERAL DIVISION OF WORK ENVISAGED. HE SAID THAT A STATEMENT REGARDING THESE POLICY MATTERS WOULD BE ISSUED AUGUST 3RD, THE OPENING DAY OF THE CAMPAIGN. PRESUMABLY IT WILL CONSTITUTE A THIEU-KY PLATFORM.

- 5 DURING OUR TALK I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY TO KY WHAT I HAD EARLIER MADE CLEAR TO BUI DIEM, NAMELY, THAT WE COULD NOT COUNTENANCE ANYTHING EVEN RESEMBLING A COUP. KY STATED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 1536 ~~SECRET~~

FORMATION OF A CABINET, AND BROAD POLICY RELATING TO NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE GOING WELL AND THAT WHEN THEY HAD REACHED A MORE DEFINITE STATE HE WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS THEM WITH ME AND ALSO TALK ABOUT THE GENERAL DIVISION OF WORK ENVISAGED. HE SAID THAT A STATEMENT REGARDING THESE POLICY MATTERS WOULD BE ISSUED AUGUST 3RD, THE OPENING DAY OF THE CAMPAIGN. PRESUMABLY IT WILL CONSTITUTE A THIEU-KY PLATFORM.

5 DURING OUR TALK I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO SAY TO KY WHAT I HAD EARLIER MADE CLEAR TO BUI DIEM, NAMELY, THAT WE COULD NOT COUNTENANCE ANYTHING EVEN RESEMBLING A COUP. KY STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY COUPS HERE. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE YOUNGER MILITARY OFFICERS SO AS NOT TO LET THEM BE INFLUENCED BY ELEMENTS INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING A COUP ATMOSPHERE. HE SAID HIS ADVICE TO THEM WOULD BE TO EXPEND THEIR ENERGY FIGHTING THE ENEMY, NOT FRIENDS.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 1536 ~~SECRET~~

6. COMMENT: (A) THE ACCOUNTS OF THE EVENTS ON JULY 17 AND 18 BY THIEU, KY AND BUI DIEM SEEM GENERALLY CONSISTENT ALTHOUGH OBVIOUSLY AT VARIANCE WITH OPPOSITION ALLEGATIONS. THEIR COMMENTS ARE ALSO MODERATELY ENCOURAGING IN TERMS OF THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP BEING DEVELOPED BETWEEN THIEU AND KY.

(B) KY'S CATEGORIC STATEMENT THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY COUPS IS ALSO REASSURING. I HAD EARLIER INSTRUCTED GENERAL ABRAMS TO SEE THAT THIS SAME WORD WAS PASSED ALONG THROUGH HIS SENIOR COMMANDERS TO THEIR VIETNAMESE OPPOSITE NUMBERS. I BELIEVE THERE IS NO LONGER ANY DOUBT ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE ON THIS QUESTION IN HIGH VIETNAMESE MILITARY CIRCLES.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 8:15 am

Mr. President:

Herewith two items which indicate a split is beginning slowly to emerge between the UAR and the extreme Arab radicals -- Syria and Algeria.

1. A UAR delegate in New York expresses satisfaction at the expansion in US-UAR contacts and indicates that the UAR will be willing to go along with the Soviet compromise which would end belligerency. (In another cable Arthur Goldberg believes that the Soviets will not be able to swing this compromise with the Arabs as a whole.)

1.3 (a)(4) 2. The INR people at State analyze the [redacted] which I sent up yesterday, as indicating basically the split between the Algerian-Syrian view and that of the rest of the Arab world.

W. W. Rostow

1.3(a)(4) USUN 304, EKDIS, Confidential, July 20, 1967
INR memo, [redacted] Evaluation of Arab Radical Intentions (RCI 2225)
3 part [redacted] Report on the Arab Position, from Algiers: [redacted]
~~TOP SECRET~~ -- [redacted]

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

43a

02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

①

82
Action.
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Info

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN 304

1967 JUL 20 PM 10 28

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By ig, NARA, Date 7-20-94

EXDIS

UAR ATTITUDES

RAID (UAR) INFORMED SISCO AND PEDERSEN AT LUNCH TODAY THAT CAIRO PLEASED THAT WE HAVE DECIDED TO INCREASE OUR STAFF FROM SEVEN TO FOURTEEN AND THAT DON BERGUS IS GOING SINCE HE IS KNOWN AND WELL LIKED. RAID SAID THEY HAD NOT MADE ANY DECISIONS REGARDING THE SIZE OF THEIR GROUP BUT THAT IF AND WHEN THEY MAKE DECISION THEY WOULD WANT TO SEND SOMEONE TO WASH WHO WAS WELL KNOWN TO LUKE BATTLE. HE UNDERSCORED THAT US STILL HAD MANY FRIENDS IN EGHPT AND TRUSTED THERE COULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS. HE STRESSED TOO THAT THERE WAS REALLY NO NEED FOR AN INTERMEDIARY; THAT THE BEST WAY FOR EGYPTIANS AND AMERICANS TO COMMUNICATE WAS DIRECTLY AND IN PARTICULAR IN CAIRO NOW THAT DON BERGUS IS GOING.

TURNING TO GA, HE INFORMED US THAT GROMYKO HAD MET WITH FAWZI THIS MORNING AND HAD PUT TO THEM TWO FORMULATIONS "WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BY GROMYKO AND GOLDBERG" ON PREVIOUS EVENING. RIAD SAID THAT FACT THAT DISCUSSION HAD TAKEN PLACE HAD ENHANCED US POSITION IN ARAB EYES AND THAT UAR AT LEAST NO LONGER BELIEVED THE RUMORS SPREAD IN CORRIDORS THAT US WANTED NO RESULT WHATSOEVER FROM GA. RIAD IMPLIED HIS DEL FAVORABLE TO LANGUAGE (WHICH HE DID NOT DESCRIBE OTHER THAN TO REFER TO "IS EXPECTED" FORMULA) WHICH GROMYKO HAD DISCUSSED WITH THEM THIS MORNING BUT THAT THE DECISION RESTED IN CAIRO. MOREOVER, HE SAID UAR HAVING GREAT DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SYRIANS AND ALGERIANS. ALSO SAID THERE WOULD BE A QUESTION AS TO WHO WOULD PUT FORWARD PROPOSAL IF THERE WERE ONE.

RIAD SAID UAR HAD MAINTAINED OPEN CONTACT WITH AMERICANS HERE ON DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS OF FAWZI, WHO HAD RESISTED CRITICISM FROM OTHER ARABS IN DOING SO. HE SAID UAR AND US BOTH NEEDED EACH OTHER, PERHAPS IN DIFFERENT DEGREES, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO BOTH. HE SAID WE SHOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH AS MATTERS

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-US UN 304 JULY 21, 1967

DEVELOP IN CAIRO AND ELSEWHERE. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ANY BROKER BETWEEN US AND UAR; THIS WOULD ONLY COMPLICATE MATTERS AND REQUIRE PAYMENT OF "BROKER'S FEES". HE SAID BERGUS WOULD BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED OF VIEWS AND CURRENTS IN CAIRO.

RIAD DESCRIBED SUDAN ROLE WITHIN ARAB GROUP SINCE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT AS BEING A MODERATING ONE, SAYING OUR IMPRESSION THAT SUDAN WAS AMONG EXTREMISTS WAS NOT CORRECT. DESCRIBED NEW IRAQI GOVT AS A STRONG ONE, WITH A LEADERSHIP WHICH WAS MORE CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH UAR AND A LEADER WHO WAS A NATIONALIST AND PROGRESSIVE BUT NOT A LEFTIST. SAID NEW GOVT WAS MORE OBJECTIONABLE AS PREVIOUS ONE TO SYRIANS AND EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO PACIFY KURDISH PROBLEM. HE ASSENTED TO OUR DESCRIPTION OF ALGERIANS AND SYRIANS AS BEING THE MOST EXTREME AMONG ARABS.

IN SPITE OF SOME TOP-LEVEL SPEECHES IN THE PAST WHICH RIAD ADMITTED HAD CAUSED TROUBLE IN US, RIAD MAINTAINED UAR HAD OVER PAST YEARS GENERALLY EXERCISED MODERATING INFLUENCE AMONG ARABS AND WITH SYRIANS IN PARTICULAR ON ISRAELI PROBLE. SAID THEY HAD SPECIFICALLY TOLD SYRIANS EL FATAH-TYPE ACTIVITIES WERE NOT GOOD THEMSELVES NOR GOOD FOR GENERAL ARAB CAUSE WHEN ARAB WORLD WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY STRONG.

RIAD REFLECTED REAL CONCERN THAT ISRAELIS MIGHT CROSS SUEZ CANAL AND EVEN AKE PORT SAID. THOUGHT PRESENCE ISRAELI MIL BOATS AT CANAL WAS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBLE INTENTION AS WELL AS OF DESIRE TO BE ON CANAL ITSELF. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT IN SPITE OF NEW EQUIPMENT UAR AIR FORCE WAS NO MATCH FOR ISRAELIS. SAID THEY HAD EVEN HEARD ISRAELIS MIGHT TRY TO OPEN CANAL AND OFFER TO PUT SOME OF REVENUES IN BANKS FOR UAR AS THEY WERE DOING ON SOME OF SINAI OIL WELLS.

GP-3

GOLDBERG
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.4 (b)(1)

438

Intelligence Note

J.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

This document consists of 7 pages.
Number 1 of 8 copies, Series d

TO: The Secretary
FROM: INR - Thomas L. Hughes *by h.c.d.*
SUBJECT: Indonesian Evaluation of Arab Radical Intentions

2

The Indonesian Ambassador in Algiers provided his government on July 14 with an informed and reasoned analysis of Algerian and other militant Arab attitudes toward a resumption on hostilities against Israel (see attached text). The report preceded the July 15-17 meeting in Cairo between the Chiefs of State of the UAR, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Sudan but followed the meeting between Nasser, Boumediene and Husayn. This "summit" of the militant Arab states, and the subsequent visit to Moscow by Presidents Boumediene of Algeria and Arif of Iraq tend to confirm the Ambassador's judgments regarding divisions in the Arab world. It is less easy to assess the Ambassador's gloomy prediction that "unless something extraordinary happens" an Arab retaliatory move against Israel is likely by the beginning of 1968 at the latest and possibly as early as October 1967.

Conflicting Arab Views on a Summit Conference: The Indonesian Ambassador's report accurately summarizes the opposition of Arab radicals toward holding an Arab summit conference. Other sources confirm his statement that Algeria and Syria are firmly opposed to any summit conference without prior guarantees from Arab moderates that the conference will result in a decision to break all political and economic ties, including all exports, with the US and UK. The major Arab oil producers, except Iraq, are resisting this demand and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya have already resumed oil exports to countries other than the US and UK. King Husayn, meanwhile, has pressed for an immediate Arab summit at which he planned to make a plea for Arab agreement on minimum terms they would accept to reach a settlement with Israel. Husayn's talks with Nasser and Boumediene in Cairo July 10 were evidently unsuccessful in overcoming Algerian opposition to the summit conference and Husayn, as indicated by his subsequent talk with the Tunisian Ambassador may now have determined he must seek the best terms he can from Israel without the blessing of Nasser or the other Arab radicals.

There has been considerable wavering in Nasser's attitude toward an Arab summit, as well as the measures the Arabs should adopt to reverse the consequences of the Israeli victory. Nasser had earlier supported Husayn's call for a summit, hoping that the nationalist emotions aroused

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 94-390

By *mg*, NARA Date 7-29-96

~~TOP SECRET~~

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3.4 (b)(1)

RCI 2225

by the June conflict would oblige the Arab moderate leaders to rally to the UAR's support and to break their political and economic ties with the US and UK. As the probability of such action by the moderates has become increasingly unlikely, Nasser's enthusiasm for the summit has decreased although al-Ahram editor Haykal's July 14 column indicated that by that date the UAR still had not given up all hope of convincing the other Arabs to take a hard-line toward the West.

Algerian Militancy: The Indonesian Ambassador, we believe, has correctly assessed the aggressive position of the Algerians. Boumediene's ambitions to replace Nasser as the leader of Arab militants are increasingly evident. He has far less to lose than Nasser by urging an immediate resumption of hostilities. He would not be dismayed by the prospects of a counter-stroke by Israel across the Suez Canal; this might have the double advantage of (1) providing some favorable terrain for guerrilla activity against the Israeli army, and (2) further weakening Nasser's position as an Arab leader. He is less interested than the UAR in maintaining a facade of unity among the Arabs--in fact he probably sees advantages for his own position in North Africa if the myth of Arab unity can be put to rest. There is much evidence that Algeria is indeed preparing for a long war against Israel, partly in the context of a revolutionary struggle against "imperialism" in other areas as well.

The Indonesian Ambassador's report that Algerian troops (along with units of the Sudanese and Iraqi armies) are already stationed on the Suez Canal is well-founded. Boumediene is probably prepared to increase the size of the Algerian contingent, and might even be willing to station additional troops on the Israeli-Syrian border. (Recent reports that Algerian troops transited Beirut toward Syria, however, have proven false.) The Algerian army is well-equipped and reasonably well-trained, and is unscathed by the first round of the fighting. Boumediene, like Nasser, is intent on avenging the Arab disgrace. He may well believe that the Algerian army that managed to fight the French to a standstill for seven years could render at least as good an account of itself against Israel.

Chances for a "Second Round": As for the resumption of hostilities with Israel, Nasser, according to the Ambassador's report, appears to favor a more cautious policy than Syria or Algeria. Although smarting over the humiliation he has suffered from Israel's rout of the UAR forces in Sinai, Nasser will probably attempt to resist resumption of full-scale hostilities until his army and air force have been reorganized and re-equipped. On the other hand he is under pressure from the Syrians and Algerians to follow a more aggressive policy and Nasser may feel obliged to go along with his fellow radicals in order to prevent Damascus and Algiers from taking the initiative out of his hands. In this regard there is a Moroccan report that the Egyptians fear Algerian troops in the Suez Canal Zone might provoke clashes with Israeli forces on the east bank, thus obliging the UAR to resume the war before it is ready to do so.

Nasser must also contend with domestic extremists, particularly within his armed forces, who are anxious to wipe out the humiliation inflicted on them by Israel. UAR officers are reportedly restless and embittered over Nasser's transparent attempt to shift blame for the UAR defeat from his shoulders to those of the armed forces, as well as reported Soviet plans to station Russian military advisors down to tactical levels of the UAR armed forces. These disgruntled officers do not yet appear to have found a leader but an army coup attempt against Nasser cannot be ruled out should the military conclude that Nasser is unable or unwilling to act soon to compel Israel's withdrawal from Sinai. There have been reports, thus far unconfirmed, of Algerian plotting with disgruntled Egyptian junior officers to depose or assassinate Nasser should he prove an obstacle to Arab plans to retaliate against Israel in the near future. In order to preserve his leadership, both in Egypt and among the Arab radicals, Nasser may be obliged to agree to an early resumption of fighting.

Possible Guerilla Activities: A variant to full-scale resumption of hostilities would be the organization of wide-spread guerilla activities, which the Indonesian Ambassador reports as already taking place. We have no confirmation of this, except for some isolated sabotage inside Sinai. Guerilla activities or small-scale clashes along the canal may continue, despite the UN presence. Also, terrorist acts and sabotage by small units in occupied territory are a possibility. Although Nasser may hope to limit the scale of these activities, they may serve to increase the militancy of those calling for more extensive action against Israel.

Soviet Attitude: The Soviets see considerable advantage in maintaining Arab verbal hostility at a high level since this works toward reduced Western influence and may also lead to ~~alterations~~ alterations of the internal power balances in the Arab states that they consider desirable. However, the Soviets would be strongly opposed to the conversion of Arab verbal threats and bluster into practical plans to renew the war. They not only fear that renewed hostilities might lead to a direct confrontation between themselves and the US but also probably feel that such an Arab course of action might well evoke an Israeli attack on a scale that could topple the radical regimes in Egypt and Syria. Their appraisal of the risks of a new round of hostilities are undoubtedly more realistic than that of the Arabs.

Nasser, in particular, is under strong pressures from the Soviets not to resume hostilities but to rely on Soviet diplomacy to effect an eventual Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories. Nasser agreed to a Soviet proposal to try to get through the UNQCA a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal while referring basic Arab-Israeli problems, especially the question of terminating the Arabs' state of belligerency against Israel, to the Security Council for further discussion. Syria, and possibly Algeria, have rejected the Soviet proposal and it is not yet clear whether the

differences among Arab radicals over the Soviet proposal were entirely resolved at the radicals' "mini-summit" in Cairo this week.

There is a danger that Soviet influence would be insufficient to restrain an Arab attack if the extremists have their way. While their ability to influence Nasser is relatively great, Soviet leverage with the Algerians is more limited. Were the Algerians, for example, to precipitate an attack, it might be difficult to contain even if the UAR did not participate in the initial action. Further developments would depend on the Israeli reaction and the initial success of the Algerian thrust. Once major hostilities have started again, the Soviets would face even more difficult and dangerous choices than was the case in early June.

44

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 21, 1967 -- 7:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

At 2:00 a. m. last night the attached cable (Tab A) was telephoned to me. It had taken about 5 hours to get this flash to Amman, down to the Consulate at the Port of Aqaba and back.

Given the fact the ship was leaving Aqaba at noon today our time, and required time for unloading, I decided a response shouldn't wait until morning.

Since the shipment turned out to be small and essentially non-lethal, I took the responsibility of telling them to okay it. With the question answered and Bob McNamara's and Nick's recommendation and my previous discussion with you, I did not think it appropriate to awaken you on this matter.

If my judgment was wrong and you wish to reverse this decision, I believe we could still barely do it.

(Tab B)

As you will see from the outgoing, we stressed to the Jordanian government that there should be no publicity concerning this shipment.

The background cable, with its assessment of the cost to Hussein and our relations if the ship was not unloaded, is at Tab C.

W. W. Rostow

Flash to Sec State MAP-0710 Jul 67
State 10625, July 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

44a

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Z 210525Z JUL 67
FM USDAO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE FLASH

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAP-0710 JUL 67

REF: STATE 10447, DTG: 210005Z JUL 67

SHIPMENT CONSISTS OF 177 BOXES, WEIGHING 47,000, COMPOSED
PRIMARILY OF SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLE, RADIO TUBE AND PARTS,
MACHINE PARTS, AIRCRAFT PARTS AND TIRES, TOOLS, TRACK VEHICLE
TREADS AND BATTERIES. DOLLAR VALUE ESTIMATED LESS THAN
\$50,000. GP-4

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-350
By CB, NARA, Date 9-7-94

NNNN

FLASH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXDIS

44b

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 JUL 21 06 53

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 ZNY CCCCC
 Z 210628Z JUL 67
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 TO RUQMKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 2444
 RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
 STATE GRNC
 BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 10625

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NEJ 94-163
 By WJ, NARA, Date 7-20-94

EXDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

REFERENCE: AMMAN 415

1. WE ARE ENDEAVORING REACH OWNER TO INSTRUCT MASTER HELLENIC DOLPHIN UNLOAD AQABA 174 BOXES SPARE PARTS. AS WE MAY NOT REPEAT NOT REACH OWNER FOR SEVERL HOURS, DEFENSE ATTACHE SHOULD SO INSTRUCT MASTER OFFLOAD BOXES.
2. YOU MAY INFORM KING OUR ACTION.
3. YOU SHOULD STRESS WITH GOJ IMPORTANCE THERE BEING NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY THIS SHIPMENT.

GP-3. RUSK
BT

~~EXDIS~~

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 20 23 39

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ZNY CCCCC ZFH2
O 202145Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2962
INFO RUEKDA/DOD
RUEDPSA/CINCSRIKE
STATE GRNC
BT

44c

J. Burns

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 415

DOD FOR OSD/ISA, DA/DCSLOG, MSTIS

JOINT EMBASSY/DATT

1. GREEK REGISTRY HELLENIC DOLPHIN ARRIVED AQABA 1500 ZULU JULY 20 WITH 174 BOXES SPARE PARTS UNDER FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASES UBM AND UBN. SHIP'S AGENT SHOWED JORDAN ARMY PORT COMMANDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM STEAMSHIP COMPANY DATED JUNE 23 STATING THAT MILITARY CARGO WAS NOT RPT NOT TO BE OFF-LOADED AT AQABA BUT TO BE DIVERTED TO NEW ORLEANS OR NEW YORK. HELLENIC DOLPHIN SCHEDULED TO DEPART AQABA 1700 ZULU JULY 21. SHIP CARRIED COMMERCIAL CARGO WHICH NOW BEING OFFLOADED.

2. PRIME MINISTER CALLED EMBOFF AT 2000 ZULU UNDER INSTRUCTIONS

PAGE 2 RUQMKT 415A ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
FROM KING ASKING EXPLANATION AND REQUESTING THAT ARRANGEMENTS BE MADE AUTHMTRIZE SHIP UNLOAD CARGO IN QUESTION. CASE ALREADY THREATENING BECOME CAUSE CELEBRE WITH MANY PEOPLE IN AND OUT OF ARMY AWARE OF PROBLEM. HE INDICATED THIS WOULD BE VERY SERIOUS FOR KING IF NOT STRAIGHTENED OUT. DEPUTY OF GENERAL KHAMMASH ALSO CALLED DAO/MAP OFFICER AND ASKED IF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SHIP PERHAPS RELATED PERIOD HOSTILITIES ARE NOT OUTDATED.

3. WE HAD NO ADVANCE NOTICE THIS SHIP'S SCHEDULED ARRIVAL R CARGO. MATERIAL IN QUESTIMN LIMITED TO SPARE PARTS AND IS CLEARLY NON-LETHAL. REPERCUSSIONS THIS INCIDENT FOR BOTH KING AND US INTERESTS CAN OBVIOUSLY BE FAR RANGING. URGE IMMEDIATE ACTION AUTHORIZE UNLOADING THIS CARGO. RECOMMEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MASTER THROUGH SHIPPING COMPANY WITH SIMULTANEOUS ADVICE TO EMBASSY IN EVENT THOSE INSTRUCTIONS DELAYED. MEANWHILE WILL APPRECIATE INFORMATION ACTION BEING TAKEN TO PASS TO KING. PLEASE ALSO BRING FOREGOING TO ATTENTION AMBASSADOR BURNS CARE NEA/ARN.

GP-4. DUNCAN
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-163
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

Friday, July 21, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is simply to alert you to the fact that the Cubans have been gearing themselves for an operational capability to shoot down a U-2.

I queried Dick Helms on whether -- to avoid this -- we should switch over to a less vulnerable, more advanced reconnaissance aircraft.

He says such action would be premature. They are watching the activities described in this report closely. They believe we will know before the danger becomes real.

W. W. Rostow

WW Rostow :sln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI/RAC 00-208
By COM, NARA Date 6-29-01

~~Top Secret~~
cy 15
17 July 1967
SC No. 01427/67
"Possible Change in Cuban Policy
Toward US Reconnaissance Flights"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 21, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of the Navy's Navigation Satellite System

In the attached memorandum the Vice President forwards, for your approval, a recommendation initiated by the Navy and supported by all interested agencies, including Defense, NASA and State, as well as the Space Council that the Navy's Navigation Satellite System be made available for civilian use.

Subject to your approval, the Vice President would like to announce this decision in an address he is to make on July 29 at Bowdoin College. He would describe this development as a further dividend from our initiating the Research and Development program. The actual text would, of course, be coordinated with George Christian.

I recommend that you approve this recommendation. It will be well received by U.S. industry as further evidence of this Administration's interest in promoting our maritime interests.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By clg, NARA, Date 6-9-95

WWR:CEJ:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1967
10:00 a.m.

MEMORANDUM

FOR: The President

FROM: The Vice President *TLH*

46a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 10-10-95

On behalf of the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, I am pleased to forward for your approval the recommendation that the Navy's Navigation Satellite System be made available for use by nonmilitary ships, and that commercial manufacture of shipboard receivers be permitted on an unclassified basis. The recommendation was developed by the Department of the Navy in relation to Council initiatives to strengthen world-wide navigational aids for civilian use. It is fully supported by all interested agencies including the Department of Defense, NASA, and the Department of State, as well as the Space Council.

This all weather satellite navigation system was developed for the Polaris program in 1964 to enable our fleet units to pinpoint their locations anywhere in the world with extreme accuracy. This system was originally classified to protect our missile targeting capabilities. However, as a result of technological advancements, classification of certain capabilities of the original system is no longer necessary.

For the past year there has been an increasing interest in this system by the oceanographic community, offshore oil exploration companies, and other segments of U.S. industry interested in commercial use of the system for ships and for offshore installations requiring extremely accurate navigation or positioning. This recommendation is directed primarily to these domestic users.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

As to foreign users, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is considering the need, feasibility, and regulation of a navigation services satellite system. The USSR, France and Japan have expressed interest in developing their own capabilities in this field. We anticipate that there will be requests from abroad for purchase of U. S. receivers. The policy and procedures for responding to these requests are under consideration by the concerned agencies, including whether the receivers should remain on the Munitions List.

The system includes

- a ground station complex of four tracking stations at Wahiaha, Hawaii; Point Mugu, California; Rosemont, Minnesota; and Winter Harbor, Maine;
- satellites in polar orbits at altitudes of 600 miles launched by the U. S. Air Force;
- user equipment consisting of a receiver and associated computer.

The recommendation does not include a commitment by the Navy to maintain the system indefinitely for nonmilitary use. However, recognizing the need for strengthening our world-wide navigational capabilities, the Marine Sciences Council has requested the Department of Transportation to prepare for your consideration this fall a comprehensive plan for meeting future nonmilitary navigational requirements, with due consideration given to the role of land based radio systems and navigation satellites.

Subject to your approval, I would like to announce this dividend from our military R and D effort to our Nation's new marine sciences activities, during an address on July 29, 1967, at Bowdoin College. The details of the announcement would, of course, be coordinated with your Press Secretary.

Approved _____
Disapproved _____
See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

47

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By CB, NARA, Date 6-9-95

Dear General Eisenhower:

I am grateful that you have kept the issue of desalting before me in connection with the Middle East settlement. I recall well that you presented the issue of water development in the Middle East strongly on the occasion of your address before the United Nations General Assembly in August 1958.

You may be interested in how our planning is proceeding in this matter.

First, Ellsworth Bunker, before he went to Saigon, initiated a major desalting project with the Israelis. We had hoped to extend it to an Arab state or states; but political conditions did not then permit. As a result of Bunker's work, however, we have some excellent technical and economic staff work in hand.

Second, we are quietly in touch with a team at the World Bank looking, in particular, at the possibilities of water development in connection with a possible Israel-Jordan settlement.

Third, our Water for Peace team is looking hard at the potentialities of the very large atomic desalting plants now on the drawing boards.

I am trying to find the right moment to introduce this element into the complex, dangerous and unresolved Middle East situation. You should know that we are trying to bring Jordan and Israel together in a bilateral negotiation. And it may be that, at the right moment, the availability of a dramatic desalting possibility could ease the way to a settlement for both countries.

I trust you will continue to make available to me your thoughts on this and other matters.

Sincerely,



General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, July 21, 1967

48

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH WALT ROSTOW
FROM: McGeorge Bundy

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

~~1. Susp~~
2. Pres. file

SUBJECT: The Middle East as we Approach the Weekend

1. I foresee no major action issue before Monday so this memo is for information -- and a little advance notice for things that may come up for decision next week.

Walt passed me your message of approval on our plan to reply to Hussein. I will ask Nick to have another look at the question of the lawyer, but I think our second thoughts will be the same as our first--that the advantage of having a lawyer we can talk to outweighs the risk of guilt by association.

The Israelis are now telling us that they are not ready for serious talks (though they can handle opening feelers), and it looks as if it would take a little time to get this thing going in any event.

2. Arthur Goldberg tells me that the most recent effort to get an agreed resolution on substance has run up against an Arab stone wall. It was a good game to play out, and I think he handled it extremely well in the face of Israeli worries which were both foolish and foolishly expressed. He is talking this afternoon with the Russians about a procedural resolution, and it is conceivable that the General Assembly may wind up today--although its capacity for continued existence should not be underrated. (He has just called to say he and Gromyko agreed on a procedural resolution and the General Assembly will wind up today.)

3. As you may remember, we have a tentative plan (as we told the oil men, Nickerson and Rambin) to make a new statement after the General Assembly. If you agree, I think the best time for such a statement would be early next week, perhaps in the context of a press conference if you plan to have one. The State Department and I will be drafting over the weekend and we will hope to have a fresh draft for you on Monday.

4. With the end of the Assembly, we shall also wish to look again at the arms registration proposal. As you may remember, the first step in that scenario will probably be a letter to the Secretary General. The Department is slowly making progress toward acceptance of your decision for a plan which could include a unilateral U.S. decision to register shipments if others will not play ball. We all feel strongly that no move should be made until the General Assembly is out of our hair, and there are other diplomatic subtleties in the draft scenario, but it does look as if we will have such a scenario for your consideration early next week.

One element in this problem that you can judge better than the rest of us is whether an arms registration initiative limited to the Middle East would help or hurt in the arms sale row on the Hill. Some think that it might simply lead Reuss or McCarthy to try to extend the principle worldwide. Others think it would show us moving in a useful direction on a specific problem. Dean Rusk holds the latter view, but he and I agree that your judgment is best on this question, and you do not have to decide it until you see the full scenario and the opening shot to the Secretary General next week.

5. The next really tough issue may be arms for Israel. Wally Barbour reports that their losses are more serious than they are telling us on other channels, and there are some intelligence reports which suggest that Nasser or the Syrians may be tempted into some act of folly like a sudden air attack some time in the next weeks. We think the odds are against such an action, and still more strongly against any real Arab victory, but we all remember the lessons of May and June, and if the Israelis really come in hard for early airplanes, we would be right up against the hard set of bargaining questions which I have mentioned before.

The immediate problem is to get a clear fix on the situation (as well as our own available supplies). The Israelis still seem less concerned than some of our own people. Rusk and McNamara will be concerting a recommendation to you on this in the next few days. It may take the form of a proposal that we let the Israelis send a top air officer over here some time after Bob's military assistance testimony.

As a matter of information, I might add that the Israelis are now telling us that they could not support any U. S. arms shipment to Jordan in the current mood of their country. If and when we send the Israelis some stuff, we shall at a minimum have to move them off this new hard line.

Finally, I should report that there are a number of other signs of hardening Israeli positions up and down the line. Their intemperate reaction to Goldberg's skillful round with Gromyko, their edginess about the Jordanian negotiations, their increasing interest in solutions that would not return the West Bank to Jordan, and the evidence of political jockeying among their leaders (each tougher than the other) make me think that the time is coming for American words and actions which will have at least a constructive effect in knocking you off the top of the Israeli polls. The trick will be to achieve that result without any parallel impact at home.

~~1. Pres file~~
2. Pres file

July 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Congressional Queries on U. S. S. Liberty

State has had several Congressional telegrams insisting on knowing what level of the Israeli government expressed regret over the loss of American life on the Liberty.

Bill Macomber feels it would help you--and Israel--to answer these inquiries specifically. He is asking permission to quote from Presidential correspondence as follows:

1. "Specifically, a letter from Prime Minister Eshkol to President Johnson on June 9, the day after the attack, expressed the Prime Minister's 'grief and deep condolences at the tragic loss of life' and requested that his sympathy be conveyed to the bereaved families. The Prime Minister asked our Embassy to convey the Government of Israel's willingness to make retribution to the families of the victims if such retribution would be acceptable."

2. "A similar letter from Foreign Minister Eban to the President stated he was 'deeply mortified and grieved' by the incident."

Mac Bundy and I agree this makes sense, but we did not want to release your mail without your approval. There is some urgency since Bill likes to answer these telegrams quickly.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____
Disapprove _____
See me _____

Mr. Rostow

50

~~Handwritten signature~~
2. Pres file

July 21, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Ambassador Barbour

As you know, Wally Barbour is here for short consultations. Secretary Rusk and Mac think it's important that you see him (a) to get firsthand his feel for the mood in Israel and (b) to give him a sense of your thinking. It's also important for the Israelis to know he has seen you when he goes back.

Wally will be a crucial figure in working out whatever understandings we reach with the Israelis on our future arms relationship and the elements of settlement with the Arabs. He ought to have the clearest possible sense of the political connection you see between what we do for the Israelis and what they do to reach a settlement.

The Secretary is sending Wally off for a little rest over the weekend, but he'll be back in time for a Monday afternoon appointment and will be here through Tuesday. Mac would like to sit in and hopes that, if you want to see Wally, Marvin might set a time that leaves free the hour of John McNaughton's funeral (tentatively 1:00 p. m. Tuesday).

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him _____

7/24/67

Sorry, just too busy _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 44-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 20, 1967
6:55 p.m.

51
Pres file

Mr. President:

As Bob Ginsburgh notes -- and as you well know -- your predecessors have also faced difficulties and opposition.

This was during the tough guerrilla campaign in the Philippines.

W. W. Rostow

69712

52

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file

Thursday, July 20, 1967, 11:25 a. m.

Mr. President:

You will be pleased by the attached short public statement by Sergio Fenoaltea about why he resigned as Ambassador to the United States.

frans

Francis M. Bator

Attachment

ok

52a

CORRIERE DELLA SERRA

June 11, 1967

After the Resignation

AMBASSADOR FENOALTEA'S CLARIFICATION TO THE PRESS

Rome, June 10

Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea, back in Rome after his resignation from the post of Ambassador of Italy to the United States, has sent the following letter to the Director of "Ansa:"

"Since a lot of things have been written or said about my resignation, some of which were inexact and not a few silly, while I was abroad and wearing the mantle of Ambassador of Italy, which I could not and did not wish to rectify, I believe it to be my right to ask you - quite apart from any sort of polemic - to reveal the following: if I may:

"1. It has been said in an official communique and in Parliament that I resigned with reference to the declaration on Vietnam made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Senate on April 27. And it is true. What the actual point of the dissention might consist of has, however, not been made as sufficiently precise as I indicated in the explanation of my resignation. This lay in the fact that in such declarations¹ no reference was made to the responsibility of Hanoi for the Vietnamese conflict and in its continuation. It seems to me that aside from thereby presenting an unobjective report of the situation and as such, not guiding but leading astray public opinion, these declarations constitute a deviation from that which had been the position of the Italian Government which had been often definitively expressed by the President of the Council² and which I had been presenting and supporting in Washington.

"2. I must say that the basis of my preoccupation was not Vietnam but rather a certain way of carrying out relations between the US and Western Europe.

-
1. N.B. In his statement in the Senate Foreign Minister Fanfani indirectly criticised the United States saying that the resumption of the bombings has made negotiations more difficult.
 2. N.B. Expressions by Prime Minister Moro of an understanding for the American position in Vietnam.

I personally believe that anything which further separates Western Europe from the US damages not only the security of Europe but also its democratic stability, its progress, and also its unification. In the immediate future, I believe that in the dialogue with the US, a European representative cannot effectively uphold the rationale for Europe and for his country if he is not able to demonstrate a position, if not of solidarity, at least of understanding for the responsibilities of the US in Vietnam, where they are opposing an effort of violent cancellation of one of the lines of demarcation on which world equilibrium and peace are founded. I thus personally believe in a somewhat longer perspective, that a Europe separated from the US is deprived of the Atlantic buffer and that Italy would probably suffer the same fate as those other countries of Mediterranean Europe which are not precisely democratic and progressive.

"3. Finally, because I have been accused, nonetheless, by certain quarters of having been in the service of a foreign government, I will agree to affirming that I am certainly a friend of America, as is anybody in the world who recognizes the combination of force and idealism that is America's and the reality of liberty for everyone there. But since, as in the course of my long mission, I have always been obviously only a servant of my own country and a tenacious representative of its interests, so was this also the case in my final decision to put an end to my career. I was not guided by my friendliness for America, but my sentiments as an Italian patriot and as a citizen of Europe."

DOPO LE DIMISSIONI

Una precisazione alla stampa dell'ambasciatore Fenoaltea

Roma 10 giugno, notte.

L'ambasciatore Sergio Fenoaltea, rientrato a Roma dopo le sue dimissioni dalla carica di ambasciatore d'Italia negli Stati Uniti, ha inviato al direttore dell'Ansa la seguente lettera:

Poichè sulle mie dimissioni si sono scritte e dette parecchie mesatteeze, e non poche sciocchezze, che finchè all'estero e con la veste d'ambasciatore d'Italia non ho potuto nè voluto rettificare, credo di essere nel mio diritto pregandola — astenendomi da qualsiasi polemica — di rendere noto quanto segue.

1) E' stato detto in un comunicato ufficiale e in parlamento che io mi sono dimesso con riferimento alle dichiarazioni sul Vietnam fatte dal ministro degli esteri in Senato il 27 aprile. Ed è vero. Ma non è stato precisato in che consistesse il punto di dissenso, indicato nel motivare le mie dimissioni. Esso stava nel fatto che in tali dichiarazioni non si faceva parola delle responsabilità di Hanoi nel conflitto vietnamita e nella continuazione di esso. Mi parve che, oltre a dare per questo una presentazione della situazione non obiettiva e tale da non guidare ma da fuorviare l'opinione pubblica, quelle dichiarazioni costituissero una deviazione da quella che era stata la posizione del governo italiano quale più volte espresse fino ad allora dal presidente del Consiglio e che a Washington avevo presentato e sostenuto.

2) Debbo dire che al fondo della mia preoccupazione non sta il Vietnam, ma sta un certo modo di essere delle relazioni fra Stati Uniti ed Europa occidentale. Credo, personalmente, che tutto ciò che allon-

tana l'Europa occidentale dagli Stati Uniti nuoccia non solo alla sicurezza dell'Europa ma alla sua stabilità democratica, al suo progresso e anche alla sua unificazione. Nell'immediato, credo che nel dialogo stesso con gli Stati Uniti un rappresentante europeo non possa efficacemente sostenere le ragioni dell'Europa e del suo paese se non possa far valere una posizione se non di solidarietà almeno, appunto, di comprensione di quelle che sono le responsabilità degli Stati Uniti in Vietnam, dove essi fronteggiano un tentativo di cancellazione violenta di una delle linee di demarcazione su cui si fondano l'equilibrio mondiale e la pace. Personalmente credo poi, in una più lunga prospettiva, che in una Europa staccata dagli Stati Uniti e priva del soffio dell'Atlantico all'Italia toccherebbe probabilmente la sorte non precisamente democratica e progressiva di altri paesi dell'Europa mediterranea.

3) Infine, poichè da una certa parte sono stato accusato (nientemeno) di essere al servizio di un governo straniero, mi si consentirà di affermare che sono certo amico dell'America, come lo è chiunque nel mondo si renda conto che nella combinazione di forza e di idealismo che è propria dell'America è il presidio della libertà di ognuno; ma che, come nel corso della mia lunga missione sono sempre stato ovviamente soltanto un servitore del mio paese e un tenace assertore dei suoi interessi, così anche nella decisione finale che ad essa ha posto fine ciò che mi ha guidato non è certo amicizia per l'America ma i miei sentimenti di patriota italiano e di cittadino dell'Europa.

SERGIO FENOALTEA

Thursday, July 20, 1968
6:45 p. m.

L. Rostow
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Another gay note from Harold Holt with an engaging pair of enclosures.

This man is truly a comfort.

I attach a proposed reply.

W. W. Rostow

53a

PRIME MINISTER

CANBERRA

13 July 67

Dear Lyndon,

In case Ed Clark has not sent you a copy of the enclosed article, I do so -- believing that you should see it and would be glad to have it.

"The Australian" knocks very much more frequently than it boosts. The friendly, favorable appraisal of Ed's personality and his work as your Ambassador is therefore all the more welcome and significant.

The attached cartoon relating to my misadventure with your bathing trunks at Camp David may bring you a moment of amusement.

With warmest regards -

/s/ Harold

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-162
By CG, NARA, Date 6-9-95

33b

July 20, 1967

Dear Harold:

Your note, the interview with Ed Clark, and the cartoon lightened the day for me -- as your communications always do. I must say, your man Peter Smark caught Ed's qualities wonderfully well.

I have followed on the tickers your political problems with the bombing issue; and I am glad that my summary of impressions from the McNamara trip proved of good use to you -- if it did.

I trust the visit of Clark Clifford and General Taylor will prove helpful. They will be there with you at least as much to hear what you have to say as to report. But they are, as you know, two of the finest we have.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable Harold E. Holt
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

LBJ:WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - July 20, 1967
6:30 pm

Handwritten signature
2 Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a memorandum from Secretary Rusk (Tab C) recommending that you

- send a letter to President Costa e Silva asking him to postpone any commitment on Mirages until we can discuss later this year the delivery of F-5's.
- authorize Covey Oliver to deliver the letter personally and discuss with him the reasons behind the request.

Covey Oliver recommended this course of action following Ambassador Tuthill's conversation with the Brazilian Air Minister (Tab D) in which the Minister indicated that a deal was imminent.

I concur in the recommendation. I think we must make every effort to stop the Brazilians from going supersonic now.

So that Covey has a clear understanding of what he is to say in the oral presentation, I have prepared the talking points paper at Tab B.

The reason for sending Covey, rather than having Ambassador Tuthill handle it, is to increase the impact of the approach. Furthermore, Covey is in a better position to convey the mood in Congress on this issue. His fluency in Portuguese will enhance the presentation.

I recommend that you sign the letter at Tab A and approve the talking points at Tab B.

W. W. Rostow

Approve letter and talking points

OK for Covey Oliver to go

Prefer no letter

Prefer that Tuthill handle

See me

Attachments
Tabs A, B, C, D.

54a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-162
By cb, NARA, Date 6-9-95

July 20, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Dear Mr. President:

During your visit to Washington last January and at the Punta del Este meeting we had the opportunity to discuss the special role which our two countries of necessity play in this hemisphere.

It is in this spirit that I write you concerning a matter involving our governments which also has important consequences for cooperative efforts under the Alliance for Progress throughout the hemisphere. I refer to reported plans of the Brazilian Air Force to acquire French supersonic aircraft.

I recognize that the purchase of such aircraft is the exclusive business of your government. I recognize also why your professional military want to modernize their equipment.

As you know, my government agreed in 1965 to authorize the sale of F-5 aircraft to Brazil, with delivery in 1969. This date was subsequently extended to 1970 at the initiative of your government. As an interim measure, we made provision under our military grant and credit assistance programs in the past two years for the acquisition by the Brazilian Air Force of 48 T-33 and 40 T-37 jet aircraft. Our offer to deliver F-5's in the 1969-70 period still stands.

Despite our understanding on the F-5's, Ambassador Tuthill informs me that the Brazilian Air Force is considering negotiating the purchase of French Mirage aircraft. In other times, the acquisition of such aircraft would not have presented us with such serious difficulties.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Today it does, on all of our assistance programs, and I want you to know what these are before any final commitment is made.

I have asked Assistant Secretary of State Covey T. Oliver to go to Brazil to explain to you personally the serious repercussions which the purchase of Mirages at this time would have in the United States and on our effort to collaborate with Brazil and the other American Republics under the Alliance for Progress. He will also describe what we are prepared to do with respect to Brazilian acquisition of F-5 aircraft.

After you have had an opportunity to review these considerations with him and see what is at stake, I hope you will find it possible to postpone any commitment on advanced jet aircraft until later this year when the matter can be looked at in terms of what we can do to help meet the requirements of the Brazilian Air Force.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

1/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Arthur da Costa e Silva
President of the Republic
of Brazil
Brasilia

LBJ/ WGB :mm

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By CB, NARA, Date 6-9-95

542

Talking Points

1. The President has asked me to deliver this letter and discuss in greater detail the points raised.
2. The President understands why a country of the size and importance of Brazil wants to modernize its military aircraft. That is why he agreed to the delivery of F-5's to Brazil in 1969-70 and the sale of T-33's and T-38's in the interim.
3. We are prepared to authorize Northrop to begin contract talks after October 1. The lead time for delivery of the F-5 is about 20 months, so that Brazil could expect to receive the first planes after July 1, 1969.
4. The President wants you to know that he cannot advance the date for the contract talks or aircraft delivery because of public and Congressional reaction.

5. Arms races in other parts of the world resulting in crises (e. g. , Kashmir and the Middle East) have made the American people acutely sensitive to United States military involvement overseas and the furnishing of arms to other countries which could result in situations where we might be drawn in. This is reflected in the mood of Congress, especially in the context of foreign economic and military assistance legislation now pending before both Houses.

6. You will have seen the sharp reaction in the Congress to the sending of C-130's to the Congo on a humanitarian mission of helping liberate and evacuate hostages held by the mercenaries.

7. Last week the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- which normally is the most sympathetic group in the Congress on aid to Latin America -- passed an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill denying assistance to any Alliance for Progress country which acquires supersonic military aircraft from any source or by any means. We hope to defeat this amendment.

8. Furthermore the Export-Import Bank is now under Congressional fire for its role in financing sales of military equipment.
9. Congress showed its growing concern over military assistance last fall by placing a \$85 million ceiling on sales and grants of military equipment to Latin America.
10. The press has also zeroed in on this issue. One example is the series of articles in The New York Times last week on private arms merchants in the United States. Another is the editorial treatment given by The Washington Post to Peru's negotiations for French Mirages.
11. Against this background, the President believes that the acquisition by any Latin American country of supersonic aircraft at this time would have almost serious adverse effect on Alliance for Progress and Military Assistance Program appropriations for Latin America.

12. The President is fighting hard for an increase in our Alliance contributions to meet his pledge at the OAS Summit to seek additional resources to match Latin American self-help efforts on economic integration and in education and agriculture. Given the increased skepticism of the Congress toward Foreign Aid, this is a tough battle.

13. He is not sure that he can win. But he knows that if one or more Latin American governments go supersonic now, he will lose the increase and probably a good portion of the remainder. The Congress will also probably approve the prohibition of aid to those governments acquiring such aircraft.

14. He wants you to know of this situation so that you may take it into consideration in making your decision to purchase French Mirages.

15. He believes you share his strong desire that nothing be done that would impair the Alliance in any way.

16. That is why he has sent me with this appeal that you postpone any action on supersonics until after October 1 when, with the Congress in recess, we can discuss how best to meet Brazil's desires to modernize its Air Force.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

54c

July 20, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: BRAZIL: F-5 and French Mirage Aircraft

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed letter to President Costa e Silva which Assistant Secretary Oliver would then deliver personally and discuss with him.

Discussion:

In the past few days we have been informed that the Brazilian Air Force is trying to arrange the purchase of French Mirage supersonic aircraft. We have told the Brazilian Charge in Washington and the Brazilian Air Minister in Rio of our deep concern about these reports, but the Air Minister indicated that Brazil nonetheless intended to go ahead with the purchase.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-163
By inf, NARA, Date 3-20-95

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The Brazilian Government has been determined for some time to obtain supersonic aircraft, and we have been restraining them as part of our Hemispheric policy. It now appears that they are determined to make some firm arrangements without further delay. Although we do not believe we can change their basic decision, we believe we can influence them to buy United States F-5's rather than French Mirages, to buy them in 1969-70 and thereafter rather than immediately, to buy them in a small quantity with phased deliveries rather than several squadrons for immediate delivery, and to allocate a relatively small amount of their resources for the purchase rather than a large amount.

As you know, a Brazilian purchase of French Mirages would bring about a severe reaction in the United States, particularly in the Congress, and have far-reaching effects on all of our assistance programs on a worldwide basis. In addition, our bilateral relations with Brazil, as well as with other Latin American countries that would acquire Mirage aircraft, could be expected to suffer. Every effort must be made to forestall a Brazilian purchase of the Mirage.

To do this, Ambassador Tuthill believes that we must promptly reaffirm the understanding first reached in 1965 to make F-5's available to Brazil in 1969-70. While this also could lead to some negative reaction here, it should be far less serious than that following a Brazilian purchase of the French aircraft.

In order for this to be effective, we need to do two things at once: 1) Convince Costa e Silva of the seriousness of the matter, and 2) Inform Costa e Silva that you have authorized arrangements to be made, mutually agreeable to Brazil and the United States, for the delivery of F-5's in 1969-70. To accomplish this, I have

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-3-

had prepared the enclosed personal letter from you to President Costa e Silva, which Assistant Secretary Oliver would deliver personally and discuss with him.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Draft letter

used as tab A -

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

BATOR
BOWLER
BUDGET
DAVIS
GINSBURGH
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JOHNSON
JORDEN
KEENE
KORNER
MAYERS
MORRIS
RIGGINS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9

Action

55

Info

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-163

By isp, NARA, Date 7-20-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ RIO DE JANEIRO 475

REF: STATE'S 7702 AND 5336

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH AUTHORIZATION IN REFTELS, WE OPENED A REVIEW OF F5 ISSUE WITH THE MINISTER OF AIR MARCIO, HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, SAMPAIO AND HIS EXECUTIVE OFFICER, COL. PAULO COSTA. GENERALS LINVILL AND MOORE AND COLONEL MOURA ACCOMPANIED ME AND PARTICIPATED. OUR CONVERSATION LASTED APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR AND A HALF.

PAGE 2 RUESUA 475 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. I OPENED CONVERSATION BY TELLING AIR MINISTER THAT I FELT THE TIME HAD COME FOR A FRIENDLY AND FRANK DISCUSSION OF F5 ISSUE. I TOLD HIM BRAZILIAN CHARGE HAD BEEN CALLED IN BY DEPARTMENT ON JULY 17 AND ASKED ABOUT NEWSPAPER REPORTS CONCERNING BRAZILIAN INTENTIONS TO BUY MIRAGES. I SAID THAT THE CHARGE HAD UNDERTAKEN TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM HIS GOVERNMENT. I TOLD THE MINISTER THAT I WISHED TO REITERATE THE POSITION OF THE USG ON F5S AND HOPED MINISTER WOULD DISCUSS BRAZILIAN INTENTIONS RE F5 AND MIRAGES.

3. I TOLD MINISTER THAT IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS USG HAD ADVISED FOB THAT IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO LICENSE EXPORTS OF F5S TO BRAZIL FOR DELIVERY IN 1969 AND 1970. I STATED THAT THAT REMAINS US POSITION.

4. I TOLD MINISTER THAT USG WAS NOT, HOWEVER, IN POSITION TO MAKE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT NOW REGARDING DELIVERY OF F5S. I REITERATED THAT US POSITION WAS THAT CONVEYED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2- RIO DE JANEIRO 475, 182300Z, JULY 1967

PAGE 3 RUESUA 475 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ON MARCH 7 TO FORMER AIR MINISTER BY ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAYRE. I TOLD AIR MINISTER THAT I HOPED GOB WOULD AVOID FINAL COMMITMENT ON MIRAGES, LOOKING TOWARDS OPENING OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT LICENSES FOR F5S BEFORE END OF YEAR THUS ASSURING DELIVERIES IN 1969 -70.

5. AIR MINISTER THEN UNFOLDED DREARY HISTORY OF EFFORTS OF BRAZILIAN AUTHORITIES TO OBTAIN A MEANINGFUL COMMITMENT ON F5S. HE STATED THAT BECAUSE OF THESE DELAYS "MONEY THAT HAD BEEN PUT ASIDE FOR F5S HAS NOW BEEN SPENT". HE SAID MIRAGE PROPOSAL WAS ATTRACTIVE (A) BECAUSE OF TRIANGULAR FINANCING WHICH MEANT AIR FORCE WOULD NOT HAVE TO PUT UP THE MONEY; (B) BECAUSE OF EARLIER DELIVERY THAN LIKELY WITH F5S; (C) BECAUSE OF MOTIVATION OF BAF PERSONNEL - IE - EARLY AND POSITIVE RECEIPT. ON DELIVERY POINT HE STATED THAT HE DID NOT HAVE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FROM FRENCH IN WRITING, BUT WAS CONFIDENT MIRAGE DELIVERY WOULD BE EARLIER THAN F5S.

PAGE 4 RUESUA 475 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6. MINISTER STATED THAT BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE HAD HAD TROUBLE WITH USG NOT ONLY WITH F5S BUT WITH M16 RIFLE AND HUGHES HELICOPTERS AS WELL. HE STATED THAT IN CASE OF M16, AIR FORCE INTENDS TO CANCEL CONTRACT WITH COLT AND "TO PRODUCE AN ACCEPTABLE RIFLE OURSELVES". (COMMENT: WE ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT MINISTER'S COMVNT ON THIS POINT. BRAZIL HAS THE PATENT RIGHT TO PRODUCE THE BELGIAN FN BUT WE DOUBT THAT THEY COULD DO IT ECONOMICALLY.)

7. THERE IS NO QUESTION FROM THE WAY MINISTER DESCRIBED PRESENT SITUATION THAT HE CONSIDERED THE MIRAGE DEAL VERY CLOSE INDEED TO FINALIZATION. WHEN WE DISCUSSED VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE F5 HE KEPT RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF MONEY AND TO THE QUESTION OF TIME.

8. MINISTER STRESSED NEED FOR BRAZILIAN FLIERS TO BEGIN EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRAINING WITH MODERN AIRCRAFT. WE STATED THAT IF BRAZIL SIGNED CONTRACT FOR F5S THERE MIGHT BE SOME POSSIBILITY FOR US TO SEND DOWN A NUMBER OF T38S FOR TRAINING PURPOSES. BRAZI-

PAGE 5 RUESUA 475 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIANS SAID THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ASKED FOR THIS WITH CONSTANT NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM USG. WE RESPONDED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT BE DIFFERENT NOW, AND IT ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT IN A PACKAGE DEAL ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO PROVIDE EARLY TRAINING FOR BRA-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3- RIO DE JANEIRO 475, 182300Z, JULY 1967

ZILIAN PILOTS. BOTH THE MINISTER AND HIS AIDE, COL. PAULO COSTA, TOOK POSITION THAT BRAZILIAN AIR FORCE COULD ABSORB AIRCRAFT FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. THEY FELT IT QUITE POSSIBLE ULTIMATELY TO HAVE MIRAGES AND F5S.

9. DURING CONVERSATION THE MINISTER REMOVED FROM HIS POCKET A WELL WORN CLIPPING FROM A US NEWSPAPER, WHICH HE REFERRED TO AND WHICH APPARENTLY REPORTED THE DENIAL OF THE F-5 EXPORT LICENSE AND DISCUSSED THE ARMS RACE IN SOUTH AMERICA. HE ADDED THAT BRAZIL DEPLORED ITS INCLUSION IN THE SAME BREATH WITH OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS. HE REVIEWED BRAZIL'S SUPPORT FOR US PAST EMPHASIZING THAT BRAZIL HAD PROVIDED POLITICAL COVER FOR UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAD ALSO ACTED OUT OF CONVICTION TO HALT THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM.

PAGE 6 RUESUA 475 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10. THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS PERSONALLY CORDIAL, AND THE MINISTER CLAIMED THAT FACT BRAZIL PLANS TO PURCHASE TWENTY SUPERSONIC MIRAGES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED BY US AS A BREAK AWAY FROM THE UNITED STATES. HE POINTED OUT THAT ABSENCE OF AN AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL HAS PRODUCED A HETEROGENEOUS INVENTORY, AND THAT THIRD COUNTRY AND UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT HAVE LIVED SIDE BY SIDE IN BRAZIL IN THE PAST. IN THIS CONNECTION, MINISTER MENTIONED PERU'S PURCHASE OF EIGHT MIRAGES.

11. AT END OF CONVERSATION, I TOLD MINISTER THAT I HOPED TO SEE COSTA E SILVA NEXT WEEK. AT THAT TIME I PLAN TO RAISE A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS SUCH AS OVERALL AID PROGRAM, NUCLEAR MATTERS AND EDUCATION. I WOULD OF COURSE INCLUDE BOTH F5 AND M16. I TOLD HIM THAT I HOPED VERY MUCH MBRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE SHOW "EVEN MORE PATIENCE" BY REFRAINING FROM SETTLING ON MIRAGE DEAL BEFORE ALL POSSIBILITIES OF F5 COULD BE WEIGHED. MINISTER STATED HE WAS PREPARED CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS AT ANY TIME, BUT GAVE US VERY LITTLE HOPE THAT MIRAGE DEAL COULD BE AVERTED AT THIS LATE DATE. TUTHILL
BT

NOTE: HANDLED LIMDIS PER 5/20.

NOTE: ADVANCE COPY TO S/S-O, 7/18/67, 10:38 PM
PASSED WHITE HOUSE USIA 7/18/67, 10:38 PM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 20, 1967, 6:30 p. m.

WWR

Pres file
55

Mr. President:

The Crown Prince of Lichtenstein will be married on July 30. Claiborne Pell has been invited to the wedding, and leaves tonight. He has just called and asked if he could carry a personal message from you to the Crown Prince.

If you approve, I suggest we tell Pell he can pass on the following:

"Dear Prince Hans Adam:

Mrs. Johnson and I send you and your bride our warm best wishes for a happy and prosperous future."

Francis M. Bator

OK

No

Speak to me

FMB:mst:djw

~~SECRET~~/NODIS
SANDSTORM

Thursday, July 20, 1967
6:20 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's proposal --
agreed by Mac Bundy -- for a response
to Hussein -- which is urgently requested
from Amman.

It is designed to protect the U. S. ,
while still permitting us to follow the
negotiation closely; insert ideas; and
throw our diplomatic weight at the right
moment.

You may wish to discuss it with
Sec. Rusk before approval.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-162
By ct, NARA, Date 6-9-95

WWRostow:rln

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

56a

July 20, 1967

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
SAND STORM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Hussein has asked us to intervene to achieve a possible settlement with Israel and to discover their terms of settlement and their willingness to negotiate. He says he has Nasser's blessing (which we would have little confidence in) as long as he does not engage in direct negotiations or conclude a peace treaty. He clearly would like us to lean on the Israelis to secure an agreement with which he can survive.

The Israeli Government is prepared to discuss a settlement with the Jordanians and has suggested we convey to Hussein their willingness to engage in private talks with Hussein or with his representative. Our estimate of their position, which is not yet formal, is that there could be agreement on various elements of a viable settlement except with respect to Jerusalem where the two sides are very far apart indeed on an issue which both regard as crucial. The Israelis do not wish to deal through an intermediary, and clearly do not wish the intermediary to be the U.S.

While the prospects for settlement are not particularly good, everyone -- the U.S., Jordan and Israel -- has such enormous stake in success, that it may be possible to achieve. While time might moderate positions, Hussein's present political status is such that we cannot risk delay in starting the process.

We do not believe we can achieve a satisfactory foreign mediator or that the U.S. should presently play this role. Despite danger to Hussein from his Arab colleagues, we believe direct negotiation is the most feasible and productive course and one which would permit the U.S. to use our influence at appropriate stages to promote agreement without direct U.S. involvement in the total process.

We therefore propose that we respond to Hussein's request along the following lines:

1. The Israelis tell us they are prepared to discuss a settlement on a confidential basis. They wish direct discussions and suggest two on each side.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-140

By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
SAND STORM

2. We do not know the Israeli terms for a settlement and doubt that they have been formulated as yet.

3. We are inclined to believe that the possibility exists of working out a settlement of most of the issues and problems that would be involved. Jerusalem, however, will be very difficult and we do not know if there is any flexibility in the Israeli position except in respect to the direct administration of the Holy Places by religious authorities.

4. We do not know if an overall settlement will prove feasible, but we believe it would be worth the try. In any event, we are confident that the Israelis would protect the secrecy of their contacts with Hussein and the Jordan Government.

5. Hussein should keep in mind, however, that we do not trust Nasser, Boumediene and Atassi who are aware of Jordan's intentions and we doubt that Hussein should trust them.

6. Finally, Hussein would be asked how he contemplates staffing-out the negotiations. If he expresses uncertainty, as we expect, the suggestion would be made that private legal counsel would help. If he desired, we would assist him in finding a competent and discreet American firm. While this would marginally increase our involvement, it would lessen the imbalance of negotiating talent that would otherwise exist and permit us to make appropriate inputs at the staffing level throughout the negotiating process.

You will note that Paragraph 6 involves the use of a private American. This seems to us constructive since it provides a method for us to be involved in the process which is controllable and which allows us both a private and public role. The American lawyer will not be acting as an American official, but would be a person in whom we had great confidence.

I have discussed this approach with Mac Bundy, who agrees with it.



Dean Rusk

W. W. R

Thursday, July 20, 1967 -- 5:30 PM

~~1. copy~~
2. Pres file
57

Mr. President:

In the attached, Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive President Kayibanda of Rwanda on Monday, August 14. Kayibanda will be on his way to Expo-67. The recommended meeting would take no more than a-half hour and would not involve an arrival ceremony, luncheon or dinner.

I know this request is cruel and unusual punishment in a week when you are already scheduled to receive Chancellor Keisinger and President Houphouet-Boigny. However, Rwanda has been enormously useful to us in all the Congo crises, and very pro-U.S. otherwise. (It was a Rwandan airport which allowed the evacuation of Americans and other citizens from Bukavu when racial disaster threatened.)

I have a blood oath from State that we can get Kayibanda in and out in a-half hour. (He speaks French; translation will be required.) Thus, I would add a mild second to State's request.

W. W. Rostow

Set up half-hour meeting with Kayibanda on August 14 Monday 12:30 pm

Disapprove HH

Speak to me _____

Hamilton/vmr

2775

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Gregoire Kayibanda,
President of Rwanda

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive Gregoire Kayibanda, President of Rwanda, when he is in Washington on August 14. President Kayibanda will be here for one day in connection with a visit to Expo 67 in Canada.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

During the crucial early days of this month's mercenary mutiny in the Congo, Rwanda opened its airport at Kamembe for the evacuation of American officials and missionaries from the eastern Congo. Our C-130's now are using Kamembe to assist the central Congolese government. The Rwandan Government consistently has been pro-Western.

Your involvement would be confined to a brief office call. No luncheon or greeting ceremony would be involved.



Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WWR

58

Thursday, July 20, 1967 -- 4:00 PM

~~4. sup~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a congratulatory message to Emperor Haile Selassie on his 75th birthday (Sunday). It is more elaborate than most such messages because this is a major occasion in Ethiopia.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

Disapprove

Speak to me

Hamilton/mr

FROM PRESIDENT TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE OF ETHIOPIA

Your Imperial Majesty:

It is my great pleasure to extend warm congratulations on the memorable and happy occasion of Your Majesty's 75th birthday. Mrs. Johnson and I speak for all Americans in expressing warmest best wishes.

Your Majesty's entire life has been dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and to the progress of your own country. Your personal courage, your statesmanship, and your broad vision have earned the admiration of men everywhere. On this joyous 75th anniversary of your birth, I want to reaffirm the warm friendship between our two countries, and to offer Your Majesty my personal good wishes for many more years of fruitful and rewarding life.

Lyndon B. Johnson

50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - July 20, 1967
3:00 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

In the past few days, President Frei has suffered two body blows from his own Christian Democratic Party.

The Party's National Council on July 12 published an extraordinarily naive -- and unhelpful -- statement saying that:

- the Cuban-backed Latin American Solidarity Organization (Castro's vehicle for promoting "national liberation" movements) should be allowed to establish an office in Chile provided it does not stimulate violence.
- guerrilla warfare is a phenomenon resulting from underdevelopment and exploitation by national oligarchies and foreign interests, and not always attributable to Cuba.

The statement reflects the ascendancy of "left-wing" elements of the Party and their desire to strike a "liberal" stance in the face of goading by the Socialist-Communist coalition which has picked up voting strength in recent municipal and by-elections. Frei responded with a strongly-worded, public denunciation of LASO. This statement also helped reassure President Leoni and the Christian Democrats in Venezuela who were furious over the Chilean PCD declaration.

The second set-back is the capture of the Party national leadership by the "left-wing" during last weekend's National Assembly. Ralph Dungan reports that Frei, who has remained aloof from Party politics, did not intervene in the Assembly and the "moderates" were not a match for the more aggressive "left-wingers".

The new leadership will try to push Frei towards greater nationalization of important sectors of private enterprise. Anticipating this, Frei, in signing the new Agrarian Reform Law on July 16, made clear that he would not vary from his announced government program fostering the growth of the private sector.

Ralph Dungan concludes that Frei is so strong with the rank and file of his party that the new leadership will not be able to budge him from his policies if he is willing to take his case to the Party faithful.

W. W. Rostow