

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 a rpt	"Situation report in Vietnam" S 1 p <i>Open per NLJ 94-130 8-4-94</i>	7/31/67	A
#2a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p <i>Open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128</i>	7/31/67	A
#4 memo	Rostow, Bator to President, 5:10 p.m. S 2 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 1:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#9a rpt	"Estimating VC Irregular Strength," pp. 40-44 S 5 p <i>Open 5-6-74 NLJ 94-127</i>	undated	A
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 1:00 p.m. <i>Open 6-21-95 NLJ 93-318</i> S 2 p	7/31/67	A
#10a memo	Gaud to President <i>Open 9-16-93 NLJ 93-316</i> S 5 p	7/29/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i> S 2 p <i>(Dup of #3, File of JWR - VN-WR; Box 4)</i>	7/31/67	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i> C 1 p <i>(Dup of #90, NSF Name File, Rostow memos)</i>	7/31/67	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#15a cable	Belgrade 292 S 7 p <i>Open per NLJ 94-130 8-4-94</i>	7/30/67	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 8:10 a.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#16a cable	Canberra 448 S 4 p <i>Sanitized per NLJ 94-130 8-4-94</i>	7/31/67	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/31/67	A
#22a note	Intelligence Note 627 C 3 p <i>Open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130</i>	7/27/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 3:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/29/67	A
#26a cable	Ankara 460 S 2 p <i>Open 12-6-92</i>	7/28/67	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129</i>	7/29/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 36, 7/25-31/67

Box 20

RESTRICTION CODES

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#28a cable	Deptel 3999 to Tokyo S 2 p exempt 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/28/67	A
#29a memo	Gaud to President open 9-16-93 NLJ 93-316 C 5 p	7/28/67	A
#30 memo	[Duplicate in WHCF, CF, LE/FO 3-2] (Dup. of #28a, NSF, Subj File, Foreign Aid, Box 16) Rostow to President, 3:20 p.m. C 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/29/67	A
#30a memo	Marks to President open 4-5-94 NLJ 94-131 C 2 p	7/28/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 5:20 p.m. (Dup. of #70, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 7) open 9-14-95 NLJ 94-129 C 2 p	7/28/67	A
#34a cable	Deptel to Rawalpindi (Dup. of #70b, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol. 7) C 2 p open 2/14/95 NLJ 94-130	undated	A
#35 memo	Still closed Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. S 1 p SANITIZED 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132; Same Sami NSJ 019-020-1	7/28/67	A
#35a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 6 p Exempt 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128 [Duplicate of #55a, NSF, Country File, Panama, Vol. 9]	7/27/67	A
#36a rpt	"Situation report in Vietnam" open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130 S 1 p Dup. #19a, NSF, CF, VN, '8A1' Box 103	7/28/67	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 2:00 p.m. TS 1 p OPEN 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132	7/28/67	A
#40a cable	Bangkok 1083 S 4 p sanitized 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/28/67	A
#44a cable	Manila 836 S 1 p exempt 5-6-94 NLJ 94-129	7/28/67	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/28/67	A
#45a ltr	Leoni to President PCI 3 p exempt 5-6-94 NLJ 94-129	7/25/67	A
#45b memo	Hill to Bowdler C 3 p OPEN 6/30/95 NLJ 94-130	7/27/67	A
#46 memo	Bundy to President S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/28/67	A
#46a cable	SecState to Barbour (draft copy) S 4 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	undated	A
#48 memo	Still closed Rostow to President S 1 p OR SANITIZED 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129; Same Sami SPME SANI 8.18.05 NLJ 04-267 NSJ 019-020-1	7/28/67	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/27/67	A

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#51a memo	Rusk to President S 2 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/27/67	A
#51b ltr	President to Prime Minister S 3 p open 9-14-95 NLJ 94-129	undated	A
#53 memo [dup #1, Cuba, "Bunker File vol. 2" Box 19]	Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p SANITIZED 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132 more info released 4-6-97 RAC 001-D19-1-1	7/27/67	A
#53a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128, Name Sanitized 019-020-1	7/27/67	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m. S 1 p open 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132	7/27/67	A
#55a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 3 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128	7/27/67	A
#55b not open	Intelligence Memo S 3 p Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128, Name Sanitized 019-020-1	7/25/67	A
#57a rpt	"Situation report in Vietnam" S 1 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/27/67	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon S 1 p open 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129 [Duplicate of #19, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 2] [Exempt NLJ 89-203]	7/27/67	A
#60a cable	Lima 432 S 4 p Sanitized 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130 open 12/11/09 [Duplicate of #19a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 2]	7/25/67	A
#60b cable	Lima 443 S 3 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130 [Duplicate of #19b, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 2]	7/27/67	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. S 1 p open 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/27/67	A
#61a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128, Name Sanitized 019-020-1	7/26/67	A
#61b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128	7/26/67	A
#62a memo	Rusk to President open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130 S 1 p Dup # 30, NSF, Files of Special Comm. of NSC, "Yugoslavia" Box 8	7/26/67	A
#62b ltr	President to Marshal Tito open 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129 S 2 p Dup # 30, as above	undated	A
#64a cable	Saigon 1954 open 3-8-97 RAC 11124(49a)+NLJ 94-130 S 15 p [Duplicate of #9a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "8B(1)[A] Bunker Weekly Reports to the President] [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] more released 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/26/67	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. open 12-19-98 NLJ/RAC 08-77 (49) S 1 p SANITIZED 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129 [Dup # 119, NSF, CF, MEC "Sandstorm/3." Box 113]	7/27/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a cable	Amman 519 OPEN 6/19/93 NLJ 94-276 S 6 p exempt 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/26/67	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. S 1 p Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128 Same Sami SANITIZED 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132 NLJ 019-020-1	7/27/67	A
#67a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 10 p	7/26/67	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President G 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/27/67	A
#70a memo	Jenkins to Rostow TS 1 p SANITIZED 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129 [Duplicate of #70a, NSF, China, Country File, Vol. X] [Exempt 1979]	7/26/67 open 12/11/09	A
#71b memcon	"Middle East" S 6 p sanitized 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/24/67	A
#71c msg	Secretary to Gromyko S 3 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	undated	A
#73 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. G 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. C 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#77a ltr	President to Silva S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129 [Duplicate of #90b, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	7/26/67	A
#77b rpt	Talking Points S 5 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	undated	A
#78a cable	Canberra 373 C 3 p sanitized 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/26/67	A
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 4:05 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#79a cable	Tehran 444 open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130 S 3 p	7/25/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. S 1 p open 11-16-94 NLJ 94-127	7/26/67	A
#80a cable	Tel Aviv 251525Z S 2 p	7/26/67	A

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#83 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. PCI 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#83a cable	Manila 783 S 2 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/26/67	A
#84 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. C 1 p exempt 5-6-94 NLJ 94-129 <i>open 4-13-00</i>	7/26/67	A
#84a cable	Prime Minister to President C 1 p exempt 5-6-94 NLJ 94-129 <i>open 4-13-00</i>	undated	A
#85 memo	<i>Still closed</i> Rostow to President, 9:05 a.m. PCI 1 p 8ANITIZED 7/13/95 NLJ 94-132; <i>same same</i> NSF 019-020-1	7/26/67	A
#85a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p Exempt 3-2-95 NLJ 94-125; Exempt NLJ 019-020-1	7/25/67	A
#86 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#86a cable	Saigon 1871 S 5 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/25/67	A
#87 memo	Bator to President S 2 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/26/67	A
#89a ltr	Anderson to President C 2 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/25/67	A
#90a cable	[Duplicate in WHCF, Confidential File, FG 753, Box 1] Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-128 [Duplicate of #46a, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. X] [Exempt 1980]	7/22/67	A
#91 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/25/67	A
#91a rpt	Talking Points S 5 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	undated	A
#93a rpt	"Situation report in Vietnam" S 1 p Dup 219, NSF, CFVN, "8A1" Box 103 <i>open</i> 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/25/67	A
#96 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. C 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	7/25/67	A
#97a cable	Manila 738 S 1 p open 8-4-94 NLJ 94-130	7/25/67	A
#98a ltr	President to Chancellor Kiesinger PCI 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-129	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
58 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - 2:07 p.m. TS 1 p sanitized 3-4-03 NW/RAC 00-202	7/27/67	A
58a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1 p exempt 2-21-03 NW/RAC 00-203	7/27/67	A
95 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 12:25 p.m. - TS 1 p sanitized 3-14-03 NW/RAC 00-204	7/25/67	A
95a rpt.	Intelligence Summary - TS 1 p sanitized 3-14-03 NW/RAC 00-205	7/25/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 36, July 25-31, 1967

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Monday, July 31, 1967
6:00 p. m.

1
*Long
2. Pres file*

Mr. President:

Here is today's situation report
on political developments in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MW:hg

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-130

By CG NARA. Date 7-12-94

~~SECRET~~

1a

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

July 31, 1967

Thieu-Ky Campaign

The political action mechanism organized by Ky before he withdrew his presidential candidacy is reportedly continuing its independent activity. According to Thieu's principal campaign advisor, Ky is not contributing these assets to the joint Thieu-Ky campaign and relations between the two are again deteriorating. Thieu also believes Ky is monopolizing the publicity media at Thieu's expense. There apparently have been no further meetings of the ticket's campaign committee since July 19, and its work has recently fallen off in terms of effectiveness and spirit of cooperation. Meanwhile, Ky's backers have been complaining of the ineffectiveness of the Thieu organization and Thieu's lack of attention to campaign details.

In a conversation with Ambassador Bunker on July 29, Thieu made no complaints about the activities of Ky's political organization but merely went over the officially planned activities for the Thieu-Ky ticket as they now stand. He reacted favorably to Bunker's suggestion that some Viet Cong ralliers might be chosen as candidates for the Lower House election but said it would be difficult to find candidates who had sufficient education to run.

Buddhist Position Regarding Elections

Thieu told Bunker he thought the militant Buddhists would not try to disrupt the elections but would work underground advising people to vote against the military ticket. Other sources report that the militant Buddhists have decided not to protest the disqualification of the Big Minh-Tran Ngoc Lieng ticket and not to call for an election boycott. Moderate Buddhist leader Tam Chau and his followers have issued repeated appeals for full participation in the election by all Buddhists.

Campaign Plans of Tran Van Huong

According to Vo Long Trieu, Tran Van Huong's campaign manager, Huong still has no official representatives at the district level because fear of government reprisals is so strong at the district level that it is almost impossible to find men willing to act as Huong's representatives there. Trieu also claimed that police agents are harrassing his campaign workers. The Embassy comments that Trieu's complaints so far sound more like a campaign gambit than an expression of real concern.

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2

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 31, 1967
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Dick Helms' statement of the background and experience of the two men who have moved up in the CIA in the wake of Des Fitzgerald's death.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 7-22-91



~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

31 July 1967

EYES ONLY

2921
2a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-128
By CB, NARA, Date 2-22-95

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. This morning the appointment of Mr. Thomas H. Karamessines as Deputy Director for Plans to succeed the late Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was announced within the Agency. Mr. Cord Meyer has been named to the number two post, hitherto filled by Mr. Karamessines.
2. As I am sure you are aware, the section of the Central Intelligence Agency we are discussing is the operational directorate which has the mission of conducting clandestine work outside the continental limits of the United States.
3. Mr. Karamessines, aged 50, was my Deputy from 1962 to 1965 and Mr. FitzGerald's from 1965 to present. He first started in intelligence with the Office of Strategic Services and has been with this Agency since it was established by statute in 1947. He is a graduate of Columbia University and the Columbia Law School. He is thoroughly grounded in all aspects of the operational work for which the Agency is responsible, having served in several posts overseas as well as here.

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- 2 -

4. Mr. Meyer, aged 47, joined the Agency in 1951. He has been principally identified with work in the covert action field and has been the responsible officer in the complex area of support to private organizations with influence in the foreign field. During World War II, he served in the Marine Corps, was grievously wounded in the initial assault wave on Guam, and established an early reputation for himself post-war by helping lead the American Veterans Committee. He is a graduate of Yale University, summa cum laude, and was a Lowell Junior Fellow at Harvard for three years.

5. These officers should complement each other well and give us the best available leadership for this important part of the Agency's activities.



Richard Helms
Director

cc: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara

~~SECRET~~

Pres. file

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 5:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

We have acquired a copy of Sen. Fulbright's statement and resolution on "national commitments."

I am getting State's legal people to have an urgent look at it; and we shall be studying it.

W. W. Rostow

30

STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
JULY 31, 1967

Mr. President, I rise to speak on one aspect of the mounting problem created by the gradual erosion of the role of the Congress, and particularly of the Senate, in the determination of national security policy. And I intend to suggest to my colleagues a course of action which, although modest in scope, could constitute a first step toward arresting a trend of events injurious to the best interests of our country.

There is no need at this time to rehearse all the evidence in support of the view, held by most if not all members of this body, that the authority of Congress in many respects has been dwindling throughout the years since our entry into the Second World War. The very existence of the Special Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, chaired by the distinguished Senior Senator from North Carolina, currently attests to the concern felt by Senators on this score. In no area is the constitutional imbalance more striking and more alarming than in the field of foreign policy. As a result of the kind invitation of Senator Ervin, on July 19 I gave to his Subcommittee a rather lengthy statement entitled, "Congress and Foreign Policy," which I hope helped define the dimensions of the problem; I shall ask that the statement appear in the Record to follow and give more substance to these remarks.

Because the overall subject of the constitutional role of the Congress in both national and international affairs is now being scrutinized under such distinguished auspices, it would be neither wise nor proper at this time to prejudge the findings and offer recommendations applying to the whole field of inquiry. However, I believe that one facet of the problem in the foreign policy sphere can and should be singled out for prompt attention and action. I refer to the question of what constitutes a "national commitment" and I offer herewith a resolution stating simply that the term "national commitment" is understood to result from nothing less than formal action taken by the legislative and executive branches under established constitutional procedures.

A commitment thus defined engages the honor of the nation in support of a specific undertaking. Obviously, such a process and such a result should neither be invoked frequently nor arrived at lightly. And yet over the years we have found ourselves confronted with multiplying calls for swift and decisive action to be taken on the basis of alleged "national commitments." Admittedly, many of these cries for action have come from non-official sources. But all too often over a long period the executive branch has indeed acted and then sought to justify its intervention by dubious references to equally dubious prior commitments.

Much of the difficulty here, I believe, stems from a lack of precise thought and language rather than from any malign intent or influences. Even so, the possible consequences of involvement in combustible situations abroad in this day and age are too dangerous to permit any use of military power on the casual assumption that the nation is committed to act. Neither should we allow the honor of this country, which is at stake in its commitments, to be cheapened through constant and careless references to its involvement in specific situations.

We in governmental life frequently err by refusing to define our terms and by falling back on cliches which really have not been examined in years. In the field of foreign policy certain phrases reasonably descriptive of the world situation two decades ago are being used almost ritualistically without reappraisal of their relevance to current conditions. Other phrases have been so affected by constant misuse that their original meaning to the American public has been either twisted or entirely lost. The term "national commitment" clearly seems to have fallen into that latter category. In speaking today I am trying to recover and refurbish its original and true meaning from the cloud of confusion which has been created in large measure over the past two or three decades through the increasing conduct of foreign policy by executive agreement.

This resolution in no way tries to interfere with the day-to-day conduct of our foreign affairs. It does not attempt to restrict the constitutional responsibility and power of the President or to revoke any past decisions. It does not respond to any current crisis situation abroad, and it is not a measure directed against any single Administration in this century -- or against anyone at all.

In its essence, this resolution represents a conservative position which seeks to recover in some degree the constitutional role of the Senate in the making of foreign policy -- a role which the Senate itself has permitted to be obscured and diminished over the years. Just as we do not blame external forces for that cumulative loss of our traditional authority, I suggest to my colleagues that we will have only ourselves to blame if we do not reaffirm the power and responsibility given to this body by the framers of our Constitution.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution defining a "national commitment" be inserted in the Record at this point, to be followed by my statement of July 19 entitled "Congress and Foreign Policy," given before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION BY MR. FULBRIGHT CONCERNING
"NATIONAL COMMITMENT"

JULY 31, 1967

Whereas accurate definition of the term, national commitment, in recent years has become obscured.

Therefore, be it Resolved that it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government through means of a treaty, convention or other legislative instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS
OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
JULY 19, 1967

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY

In a statement to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on August 25, 1966, Secretary of State Rusk said: "No would-be aggressor should suppose that the absence of a defense treaty, Congressional declaration or U.S. military presence grants immunity to aggression." The statement conveys a significant message to any potential aggressor: that under no circumstances could it count on American inaction in the event of an act of aggression. The statement conveys an implicit but no less significant message to the Congress: that, regardless of any action or inaction, approval or disapproval, of any foreign commitment on the part of the Congress, the executive would act as it saw fit in response to any occurrence abroad which it judged to be an act of aggression. It is unlikely that the Secretary consciously intended to assert that Congressional action was irrelevant to American military commitments abroad; it seems more likely that this was merely assumed, taken for granted as a truism of American foreign policy in the 1960's.

I. The Constitutional Imbalance

The authority of Congress in foreign policy has been eroding steadily since 1940, the year of America's emergence as a major and permanent participant in world affairs, and the erosion has created a significant constitutional imbalance. Many if not most of the major decisions of American foreign policy in this era have been executive decisions. Roosevelt's destroyer deal of 1940, for example, under which 50 American ships were given to Great Britain in her hour of peril in exchange for naval bases in the Western Hemisphere, was concluded by executive agreement, ignoring both the treaty power of the Senate and the war power of the Congress, despite the fact that it was a commitment of the greatest importance, an act in violation of the international law of neutrality, an act which, according to Churchill, gave Germany legal cause to declare war on the United States. The major wartime agreements -- Quebec, Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam -- which, as it turned out, were to form the de facto settlement of World War II, were all reached without the formal consent of the Congress. Since World War II the United States has fought two wars without benefit of Congressional declaration and has engaged in numerous small-scale military activities -- in the Middle East, for example, in 1958, and in the Congo on several occasions -- without the formal approval of or even meaningful consultation with the Congress.

New devices have been invented which have the appearance but not the reality of Congressional participation in the making of foreign policy. I shall elaborate on these later in my statement and wish at this point only to identify them. One is the joint resolution; another is the Congressional briefing session. Neither is a satisfactory occasion for deliberation or the rendering of advice; both are designed to win consent without advice. Their principal purpose is to put the Congress on record in support of some emergency action at a moment when it would be most difficult to withhold support and, therefore, to spare the executive subsequent controversy or embarrassment.

The cause of the constitutional imbalance is crisis. I do not believe that the executive has willfully usurped the constitutional authority of the Congress; nor do I believe that the Congress has knowingly given away its traditional authority, although some of its members -- I among them, I regret to say -- have sometimes shown excessive regard for executive freedom of action. In the main, however, it has been circumstance rather than design which has given the executive its great predominance in foreign policy. The circumstance has been crisis, an entire era of crisis in which urgent decisions have been required again and again, decisions of a kind that the Congress is ill-equipped to make with what has been thought to be the requisite speed. The President has the means at his disposal for prompt action; the Congress does not. When the security of the country is endangered, or thought to be endangered, there is a powerful premium on prompt action, and that means executive action. (I might add that I think there have been many occasions when the need of immediate action has been exaggerated, resulting in mistakes which might have been avoided by greater deliberation.)

The question before us is whether and how the constitutional balance can be restored, whether and how the Senate can discharge its duty of advice and consent under continuing conditions of crisis. It is improbable that we will soon return to a kind of normalcy in the world, and impossible that the United States will return to its pre-1940 isolation. How then can we in the Congress do what the Constitution does not simply ask of us, but positively requires of us, under precisely the conditions which have resulted in the erosion of our authority? It is not likely that the President, beset as he is with crisis and set upon by conflicting pressures and interests, will take the initiative in curtailing his own freedom of action and restoring Congressional prerogative -- that would be too much to expect of him. It is up to the Congress, acting on the well-proven axiom that the Lord helps those who help themselves, to re-evaluate its role and to re-examine its proper responsibilities.

I have the feeling -- only a feeling, not yet a conviction -- that constitutional change is in the making. It is too soon to tell, but there are signs in the Congress, particularly in the Senate, of a growing awareness of the loss of Congressional power, of growing uneasiness over the extent of executive power, and of a growing willingness to raise questions that a year or so ago might have gone unasked, to challenge decisions that would have gone unchallenged, and to try to distinguish between real emergencies and situations which, for reasons of executive convenience, are only said to be emergencies.

Prior to redefining our responsibilities, it is important for us to distinguish clearly between two kinds of power, that pertaining to the shaping of foreign policy, to its direction and purpose and philosophy, and that pertaining to the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. The former is the power which the Congress has the duty to discharge, diligently, vigorously and continuously; the latter, by and large calling for specialized skills, is best left to the executive and its administrative arms. The distinction of course is clearer in concept than in reality, and it is hardly possible to participate in the shaping of policy without influencing the way in which it is conducted. Nonetheless, we in the Congress must keep the distinction in mind, acting, to the best of our ability, with energy in matters of national purpose and with restraint in matters of administrative detail.

Our performance in recent years has, unfortunately, been closer to the reverse. We have tended to snoop and pry in matters of detail, interfering in the handling of specific problems in specific places which we happen to chance upon, and, worse still, harassing individuals in the executive departments, thereby undermining their morale and discouraging the creative initiative which is so essential to a successful foreign policy. At the

same time we have resigned from our responsibility in the shaping of policy and the defining of its purposes, submitting too easily to the pressures of crisis, giving away things that are not ours to give: the war power of the Congress, the treaty power of the Senate and the broader advice and consent power.

II. The Legislative Function

Insofar as the Congressional role in foreign policy is discharged through the formal legislative process, the Congress by and large has been able to meet its responsibilities. Unfortunately, however, the area of foreign policy requiring formal legislative action has diminished greatly in recent decades and now contains virtually none of the major questions of war and peace in the nuclear age. Before turning to these critical questions, which go to the heart of the current constitutional crisis, a word is in order about the limited areas of foreign policy which are still governed by the legislative process.

Foreign aid provides the closest thing we have to an annual occasion for a general review of American foreign policy. It provides the opportunity for airing grievances, some having to do with economic development, most of them not, and for the discussion of matters of detail which in many cases would be better left to specialists in the field. It also provides the occasion for a discussion of more fundamental questions, pertaining to America's role in the world, to the areas that fall within and those which exceed its proper responsibilities.

In the last few years the Congress has shown a clear disposition to limit those responsibilities and has written appropriate restrictions, mostly hortatory, into the foreign aid legislation. Only as it has become clear that the executive is disinclined to comply with many of our recommendations has it been found necessary to write binding restrictions into the law. These mandatory restrictions, it is true, impose a degree of rigidity on the executive and constitute a regrettable Congressional incursion on matters of the day-to-day conduct of policy. Here, however, we encounter the overlap in practice between the shaping and conduct of policy and, in order to exert our influence on the one, where it is desirable, we have also had to exert it on the other, where it is not. Were the executive more responsive to our general recommendations -- as expressed in committee reports, conditional proscriptions, and general legislative history -- it would be possible for us to be more restrained in our specific restrictions.

The matter, at its heart, is one of trust and confidence and of respect of each branch of the government for the prerogatives of the other. When the executive tends to ignore Congressional recommendations, intruding thereby on Congressional prerogative, the result is either a counter-intrusion or the acceptance by the Congress of the loss of its prerogatives. Thus, for example, the persistent refusal of the executive to comply even approximately with Congressional recommendations that it limit the number of countries receiving American foreign aid has caused the Foreign Relations Committee to write numbers into its current bill, proposing thereby to make recommendations into requirements. The price of the flexibility which is valued by the executive is, or certainly ought to be, a high degree of compliance with the intent of Congress.

There are occasions when the legislative process works almost as it ideally should, permitting of the rendering of advice and consent on the matter at hand and also of the formation and expression of the Senate's view on some broader question of the direction of our foreign policy. Such was the case with the test ban treaty in 1963. In the course of three weeks of public hearings and subsequent debate on the floor, the Senate assured itself of the safety of the proposed commitment from a military point of view and at the same time gave its endorsement to the broader policy which has come to be known as "building bridges"

to the east. Similarly, the ratification earlier this year of the Soviet consular treaty, which, but for an unexpected controversy might have been treated as routine business, became instead the occasion for a further Senate endorsement of the bridge building policy.

III. Advice and Consent

The focus of the current constitutional problem -- one might even say crisis -- lies outside of the legislative process, in the great problems of war and peace in the nuclear age. It is in this most critical area of our foreign relations that the Senate, with its own tacit consent, has become largely impotent. The point is best illustrated by concrete examples. Permit me to recall some recent crises and the extremely limited role of the Senate in dealing with them:

At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, many of us were in our home states campaigning for re-election. On the basis of press reports and rumors we had a fairly accurate picture of what was happening, but none of us, so far as I know, were given official information until after the Administration had made its policy decisions. President Kennedy called the Congressional leadership back for a meeting at the White House on Monday, October 22, 1962. The meeting lasted from about 5 p.m. to about 6 p.m.; at 7 p.m. President Kennedy went on national television to announce to the country the decisions which had of course been made before the Congressional leadership were called in. The meeting was not a consultation but a briefing, a kind of courtesy or ceremonial occasion for the leadership of the Congress. At that meeting, the senior Senator from Georgia and I made specific suggestions as to how the crisis might be met; we did so in the belief that we had a responsibility to give the President our best advice on the basis of the limited facts then at our command. With apparent reference to our temerity in expressing our views, Theodore Sorensen in his book on President Kennedy described this occasion as "the only sour note" in an otherwise flawless process of decision making. It is no exaggeration to say that on the one occasion when the world has gone to the very brink of nuclear war -- as indeed on the earlier occasion of the Bay of Pigs -- the Congress took no part whatever in the shaping of American policy.

The Dominican intervention of April 1965 was decided upon with a comparable lack of Congressional consultation. Again, the leadership were summoned to the White House, on the afternoon of April 28, 1965, and told that the Marines would be landed in Santo Domingo that night for the express purpose of protecting the lives of American citizens. No one expressed disapproval. Had I known that the real purpose of our intervention was the defeat of the Dominican revolution, as subsequently became clear in the course of extensive hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I would most certainly have objected to massive American military intervention.

When, in the wake of the Dominican hearings, I publicly stated my criticisms of American policy, there followed a debate not on the substance of my criticisms but on the appropriateness of my having made them. The question therefore became one of the proper extent and the proper limits on public discussion of controversial matters of foreign policy. The word "consensus" was then in vogue and so extensive had its influence become that there seemed at the time to be a general conviction that any fundamental criticism of American foreign policy was irresponsible if not actually unpatriotic. This was the first of many occasions on which no one questioned the right of dissent but many people had something to say about special circumstances making its use inappropriate. No one, it seems, ever questions the right of dissent; it is the use of it that is objected to.

I tried at the time of the Dominican controversy to formulate my thoughts on Senatorial responsibility in foreign policy. I recall them here not for purposes of reviving the discussion of

those unhappy events but in the hope of contributing to the work of this Subcommittee. I expressed these thoughts in a letter to President Johnson, dated September 16, 1965, and accompanying the speech on the Dominican Republic which I made that day. The letter read in part:

"Dear Mr. President:

"Enclosed is a copy of a speech that I plan to make in the Senate regarding the crisis in the Dominican Republic. As you know, my Committee has held extensive hearings on the Dominican matter; this speech contains my personal comments and conclusions on the information which was brought forth in the hearings.

"As you will note, I believe that important mistakes were made. I further believe that a public discussion of recent events in the Dominican Republic, even though it brings forth viewpoints which are critical of actions taken by your Administration, will be of long-term benefit in correcting past errors, helping to prevent their repetition in the future, and thereby advancing the broader purposes of your policy in Latin America. It is in the hope of assisting you toward these ends, and for this reason only, that I have prepared my remarks.

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"Public -- and, I trust, constructive -- criticism is one of the services that a Senator is uniquely able to perform. There are many things that members of your Administration, for quite proper reasons of consistency and organization, cannot say, even though it is in the long term interests of the Administration that they be said. A Senator, as you well know, is under no such restriction. It is in the sincere hope of assisting your Administration in this way, and of advancing the objectives of your policy in Latin America, that I offer the enclosed remarks."

I developed these thoughts further in a speech in the Senate on October 22, 1965. It read in part:

". . . . I believe that the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations has a special obligation to offer the best advice he can on matters of foreign policy; it is an obligation, I believe, which is inherent in the chairmanship, which takes precedence over party loyalty, and which has nothing to do with whether the chairman's views are solicited or desired by people in the executive branch.

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". . . . I am not impressed with suggestions that I had no right to speak as I did on Santo Domingo. The real question, it seems to me, is whether I had the right not to speak."

Mark Twain said the same thing in plainer words: "It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horseraces."

There are some fundamental and disturbing questions about the way in which we endure controversy in this country, and they go to the heart of the constitutional matters which the Subcommittee is considering. No one objects to a little controversy around the edges of things, to quibblings over detail or to hollow mouthings about morality and purpose provided they are hollow enough. It is when the controversy gets down to the essence of things, to basic values and specific major actions,

to questions of whether our society is healthy or sick, fulfilling its promise or falling short, that our endurance is severely taxed.

Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America. Profound changes have occurred since democracy in America first appeared and yet it may be asked whether recognition of the right of dissent has gained substantially in practice as well as in theory." And, as to democracy in general, he wrote ". . . The smallest reproach irritates its sensibility and the slightest joke that has any foundation in truth renders it indignant; from the forms of its language up to the solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. No writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape paying this tribute of adulation to his fellow citizens." 1.

Until and unless we overcome the disability of intolerance, our democratic processes cannot function in full vigor and as they were intended to function by the framers of the Constitution. The vitality of advice and consent in the Senate is more than a matter of executive-legislative relations. It has to do with our national character and our national attitudes, with our tolerance of deep unorthodoxy as well as of normal dissent, with our attitudes toward the protests of students as well as the criticisms of Senators.

IV. Resolutions and "Consultations"

As I said at the beginning of my statement, two new devices have been invented -- more accurately, two old devices have been put to a new use -- for the purpose of creating an appearance of Congressional consultation where the substance of it is lacking. I refer to the joint resolution and the Congressional briefing session. Arranged in haste, almost always under the spur of some real or putative emergency, these resolutions and White House briefings serve to hit the Congress when it is down, getting it to sign on the dotted line at exactly the moment when, for reasons of politics or patriotism, it feels it can hardly refuse.

The Gulf of Tonkin resolution, so often cited as an unqualified Congressional endorsement of the war in Vietnam, was adopted on August 7, 1964, only two days after an urgent request from the President. It was adopted after only perfunctory committee hearings and a brief debate with only two Senators dissenting. It was a blank check indeed, authorizing the President to "take all necessary steps including the use of armed force" against whatever he might judge to constitute aggression in southeast Asia.

The error of those of us who piloted this resolution through the Senate with such undeliberate speed was in making a personal judgment when we should have made an institutional judgment. Figuratively speaking, we did not deal with the resolution in terms of what it said and in terms of the power it would vest in the Presidency; we dealt with it in terms of how we thought it would be used by the man who occupied the Presidency. Our judgment turned out to be wrong, but even if it had been right, even if the Administration had applied the resolution in the way we then thought it would, the abridgment of the legislative process and our consent to so sweeping a grant of power was not only a mistake but a failure of responsibility on the part of the Congress. Had we debated the matter for a few days or even for a week or two, the resolution most probably would have been

1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 265

adopted with as many or almost as many votes as it actually got, but there would have been a legislative history to which those of us who disagree with the use to which the resolution has been put could now repair. The fundamental mistake, however, was in the giving away of that which was not ours to give. The war power is vested by the Constitution in the Congress, and if it is to be transferred to the executive, the transfer can be legitimately effected only by constitutional amendment, not by inadvertency of Congress.

The Congress has lost the power to declare war as it was written into the Constitution. It has not been so much usurped as given away, and it is by no means certain that it will soon be recovered. On February 15, 1848, Abraham Lincoln, then a Member of the House of Representatives, wrote a letter to a man called William H. Herndon, contesting the latter's view that President Polk had been justified in invading Mexico on his own authority because the Mexicans had begun the hostilities. "Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation," wrote Lincoln, "whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose -- and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect after you have given him so much as you propose."

The Senate, I believe, is becoming aware of the dangers involved in joint resolutions such as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and earlier resolutions pertaining to Taiwan, Cuba and the Middle East. This awareness was demonstrated by the Senate's refusal to adopt the sweeping resolution pertaining to Latin America requested by the Administration shortly before the meeting of the American presidents at Punta del Este last April. That resolution, which would have committed the Congress in advance to the appropriation of large new sums of money for the Alliance for Progress, was neither urgent nor necessary; it was indeed no more than a convenience and a bargaining lever for the Administration. Its rejection had nothing to do with the Latin American policy of the United States; indeed, it was not the substance of the resolution but the unusual procedure which caused many of us to oppose it. Still less was the rejection of the resolution a matter of "pique" or "frustration," as was alleged by members of the Administration. It was rather a tentative assertion by the Senate that it has come to be doubtful about the granting of blank checks. I hope that it foreshadows further demonstrations on the part of the Congress of a healthy skepticism about hasty responses to contrived emergencies. I hope that it foreshadows a resurrection of continuing debate and of normal deliberative processes in the Senate.

No less defective than the joint resolution as a means of Congressional consultation is the hastily arranged "consultation" -- really a briefing -- either in committee or at the White House. There is indeed a psychological barrier to effective consultation on the President's own ground. The President is, after all, chief of state as well as head of government and must be treated with the deference and respect due him as chief of state as well as head of government and must be treated with the deference and respect due him as chief of state. One does not contradict kings in their palaces or Presidents in the White House with the freedom and facility with which one contradicts the king's ministers in parliament or the President's cabinet members in committee. That indeed is the value and purpose of our Congressional committee system. It permits us to communicate candidly with the President as political leader without becoming entangled in the complications of protocol which surround his person. I conclude, therefore, that any meaningful consultation with the Congress must take place on the Congress's own ground, with representatives of the President who can be spoken to in candor and who will speak to us in candor.

They do not always do that, and that is the next problem I would cite. Again and again, representatives of the executive have come before the Foreign Relations Committee to tell us in

closed session what we have already read in our morning newspaper. Again and again, they have come not to consult with us but to brief us, to tell us what they propose to do or to try to put a good face on something they have already done. One recent witness devoted a large part of his presentation to an endorsement of the idea of consultation without ever getting around to any actual consulting. At a recent meeting on the Middle Eastern crisis the Administration's witness was unwilling to answer either yes or no to the question of whether he was prepared to assure the Committee that the President would not take the United States into war in the Middle East without the consent of Congress.

Meaningful consultation would consist first of a presentation of provisional views on the part of the Administration and then of a presentation of the views of the members of the Committee, with the Administration witness performing the extremely important function in the second phase of listening -- listening with an open mind and with an active regard for the fact that, however little he may like it, the men he is listening to are representatives of the people who share with the executive the constitutional responsibility for the making of American foreign policy.

The problem is one of attitudes rather than of formal procedures. The critical question is not whether State Department officials dutifully report Administration acts to Congressional committees or telephone interested Senators to tell them that American planes are en route to the Congo. The question is whether they respond to Congressional directives and recommendations by asking themselves "How can we get around these?" or by asking themselves "How can we carry them out?". The latter, to be sure, can be awkward and irksome for the executive, but that is the kind of system we have. As the political scientist Edwin S. Corwin has written: "The verdict of history in short is that the power to determine the substantive content of American foreign policy is a divided power, with the lion's share falling usually to the President, though by no means always." 2. Our legitimate options are to comply with the system or to revise it by the means spelled out in the Constitution but not to circumvent it or subvert it.

"Consultations" which are really only briefings, and resolutions like the Tonkin Gulf resolution, represent no more than a ceremonial role for the Congress. Their purpose is not to elicit the views of Congress but to avoid controversy of the kind President Truman experienced over the Korean War. They are devices therefore not of Congressional consultation but of executive convenience. Insofar as the Congress accepts them as a substitute for real participation, it is an accomplice to a process of illicit constitutional revision.

Some political scientists do not even pretend that there is a role for Congress in the making of foreign policy in the nuclear age. They argue that the authority to declare war has become obsolete and that checks and balances are now provided by diversities of opinion within the executive branch. "This," in the words of the American diplomatic historian Ruhl Bartlett, "is an argument scarcely worthy of small boys, for the issue is not one of advice or influence. It is a question of power, the authority to say that something shall or shall not be done. If the president is restrained only by those whom he appoints and who hold their positions at his pleasure, there is no check at all. What has happened to all intents and purposes, although not in

2. Edwin S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1948, History and Analysis of Practice and Opinion (New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 208.

form and words, is the assumption by all recent presidents that their constitutional right to conduct foreign relations and to advise the Congress with respect to foreign policy shall be interpreted as the right to control foreign relations." 3.

V. Treaties and Commitments

So widespread are American commitments in the world, and so diverse are the methods and sources which are said to make for a commitment, that a great deal of confusion has arisen as to what is required to make a formal commitment to a foreign country. Does it require a treaty ratified with the consent of the Senate? or can it be accomplished by executive agreement? or by simple Presidential declaration? or by a declaration or even a statement made in a press conference by the Secretary of State? The prevailing view seems to be that one is as good as another, that a clause in the transcript of a press conference held by Secretary Dulles in 1957 is as binding on the American Government today as a treaty ratified by the Senate.

If treaties are no more than one of the available means by which the United States can be committed to military action abroad, as Secretary Rusk believes, if the executive is at liberty to commit American military forces abroad in the absence of a treaty obligation as in the case of Vietnam, or in violation of a treaty obligation as in the case of the Dominican Republic, why do we bother with treaties at all? As things now stand, their principal use seems to be the lending of an unusual aura of dignity or solemnity to certain engagements such as the test ban treaty and the outer space treaty.

In addition to the general denigration of treaties, there has developed a widespread attitude, at least on the part of what might be called the foreign policy "establishment," that it is improper for the Senate to reject treaties or attach reservations to them once they have been negotiated. The power of the Senate to accept, reject or amend treaties is of course acknowledged, but it is regarded not as a legitimate function but as a kind of naked power the use of which under any circumstances would be irresponsible. There seems to be a kind of historical memory at work here; Versailles, like Munich, has conveyed more lessons than were in it.

There appeared in the New York Times on March 10, 1967, an interesting and significant editorial commenting on questions that were then being raised in the Senate about the Soviet consular treaty and the outer space treaty. The Times commented as follows:

"A treaty is a contract negotiated by the executive branch with the government of one or more other countries. In the process there is normally hard bargaining and the final result usually represents a compromise in which everyone has made concessions. Thus when the Senate adds amendments or reservations to a treaty, it is unilaterally changing the terms of a settled bargain. The practical effect of such action is really to reopen the negotiations and force the other party or parties to re-examine their previously offered approval.

"Every time the Senate exercises this privilege it necessarily casts doubt upon the credibility of the President and his representatives and weakens the bargaining power of the United States in the international arena. The Senate's power to do this is unquestioned,

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3. Ruhl Jacob Bartlett, American Foreign Policy: Revolution and Crisis, Oglethorpe Trustee Lecture Series, Oglethorpe College, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1966, Lecture One, pp. 21-22.

but it is equally unquestionable that this power is best used only to express the gravest of concerns, especially in a period of crisis such as is posed by the Vietnam war and efforts to end it."

My attention was arrested by the assertion that a treaty, once negotiated by the executive was a "settled bargain." I had supposed that under our Constitution a treaty was only a tentative bargain until ratified with the consent of the Senate.

Returning to my earlier point, the recent crisis in the Middle East reveals the prevailing confusion as to what constitutes a binding obligation on the United States.

In the days preceding the recent Arab-Israeli war there was a good deal of discussion of American responsibilities in the Middle East marked by a prevailing assumption that the United States was "committed" to defend Israel against any act of aggression. As a signatory to the United Nations Charter, which incidentally was ratified by the Senate as a treaty, the United States is indeed obligated to support any action which the United Nations might take in defense of a victim of aggression. The cited sources of the alleged American "commitment," however, were not the United Nations Charter but a series of policy statements, including President Truman's declaration of support for the independence of Israel in 1948, the Anglo-French-American Tripartite Declaration of 1950 pledging opposition to the violation of frontiers or armistice lines by any Middle Eastern state, a statement by President Eisenhower in January 1957 pledging American support for the integrity and independence of Middle Eastern nations, a statement by Secretary of State Dulles in February 1957 stating that the United States regarded the Gulf of Aqaba as an international waterway, a press conference statement in March of 1963 by President Kennedy pledging American opposition to any act of aggression in the Middle East, and a reiteration by President Johnson in February 1964 of American support for the territorial integrity and political independence of all Middle Eastern countries.

The foregoing are all statements of policy, not binding commitments in the sense that a treaty ratified by the Senate is a binding commitment. If they were binding and if they were interpreted as requiring the United States to take unilateral action to maintain the territorial integrity of all Middle Eastern states, we would now be obligated forcibly to require Israel to restore all of the territory which she has seized from her Arab neighbors. We are, however, not so obligated. Our only binding commitment in the Middle East is our obligation to support and help implement any action that might be taken by the United Nations. In the absence of such action, we are not bound, not, that is, unless statements in Presidential press conferences are as binding upon the United States as treaties ratified by the Senate.

VI. Restoring Congressional Prerogative

The Foreign Relations Committee has been experimenting in the last two years with methods which it is hoped will help restore the Senate to a significant and responsible role in the making of American foreign policy. Principally, the Committee has made itself available as a public forum for the airing of informed and diverse opinion on both general and specific aspects of American foreign policy. We have invited distinguished professors, scholars, diplomats and military men to talk with the Committee on a wide variety of matters, including the Vietnamese war, American policy toward China, American relations with its European allies, American relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and even certain experimental subjects such as the psychological aspect of international relations. In the spring of 1967 the Committee heard testimony by such distinguished persons as George Kennan, Edwin O. Reischauer and Harrison Salisbury in a series of hearings on the "responsibilities of the United States as a global power."

It is by no means clear that public hearings of the kind which have been held in these last two years will prove to be a viable and effective means of bringing Congressional influence to bear on the making of foreign policy. The hearings have been, I emphasize, experimental. They do, however, suggest the possibility of a reinvigorated Senate participating actively and responsibly in the shaping of American foreign policy, in the articulation of the values in which we would have our foreign policy rooted and the purposes which we would have it serve.

I am reasonably confident that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, by making itself available as a forum of free and wide-ranging discussion, can serve valuable democratic purposes: it can diminish the danger of an irretrievable mistake; it can reduce the likelihood of past mistakes being repeated; it can influence policy both current and future; it can make a case for history and defend America's good name; it can help to expose old myths in the light of new realities; it can provide an institutional forum for dissenters whose dissent might otherwise be disorderly; and, by continuing discussion of crises like the war in Vietnam, it may help us shape the attitudes and insights to avoid another such tragedy in the future.

Free and open discussion has another function, more difficult to define. It is therapy and catharsis for those who are dismayed; it helps to reassert traditional values and to clear the air when it is full of tension. A man must at times protest, not for politics or profit but simply because his sense of decency is offended, because something goes against the grain.

On the Senate floor as well as in the Foreign Relations Committee, vigorous and responsible discussion of our foreign relations is essential both to the shaping of a wise foreign policy and to the sustenance of our constitutional system. The criteria of responsible and constructive debate are restraint in matters of detail and the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, combined with diligence and energy in discussing the values, direction and purposes of American foreign policy. Just as it is an excess of democracy when Congress is overly aggressive in attempting to supervise the conduct of policy, it is a failure of democracy when it fails to participate actively in determining policy objectives and in the making of significant decisions.

A Senator has the obligation to defend the Senate as an institution by upholding its traditions and prerogatives. A Senator must never forget the Presidency when he is dealing with the President and he must never forget the Senate when he is talking as a Senator. A Senator is not at perfect liberty to think and act as an individual human being; a large part of what he says and what he does must be institutional in nature. Whoever may be President, whatever his policies, however great the confidence they may inspire, it is part of the constitutional trust of a Senator to defend and exercise the advice and consent function of the Senate. It is not his to give away.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-129
By CLG, NARA, Date 6-6-95

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Presfile

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Francis and I, as instructed, have reviewed the draft cable from Sec. Rusk to Hillenbrand for delivery to Kiesinger.

Our observations are as follows:

1. The cable is now drafted with care. In good faith one could not take exception to it. On its face, it politely puts him on notice that the wrong decisions on the German defense budget might raise the question of putting additional U.S. NATO forces on a rotational basis.

2. Before dispatching it, however, you may wish to consider the following elements in the situation.

-- Kiesinger has already been made fully aware, through a number of channels, of how seriously you regard the German defense budget matter.

-- He may interpret the cable as an attempt to build a record, before the meeting with you, which would lay the basis for a decision in fact already made by us to cut or rotate more troops.

-- The cable is likely to leak or be leaked by some in Kiesinger's entourage who would like to make trouble between the U.S. and Germany. The meeting might take place against the background of German headlines saying: "Johnson threatens further troop cuts."

3. There is, therefore, a good case for your laying the facts of life out to Kiesinger personally and alone and doing so in the context of the direct personal relationship he is trying to build with you, as part of a broad discussion not merely of troops and money but of the nature of common U.S. -German interests on the world scene.

4. Given what we know of Kiesinger -- his anxieties, the political pressures on him, and his authentic desire to build a tie with you of mutual confidence and trust -- the question is this: Does the risk of not sending this cable as a warning shot across his bow outweigh the possibility that you might get more out of him by direct personal consultation on these issues; without this prior warning?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Since he has promised he would make no decisions on this matter until after he has talked to you, our vote would be for waiting and doing it in person.

However, if you judge it wiser to put him on notice before he comes, this is about as good and mannerly a cable as could be drafted.

We would be glad to discuss with you all the considerations that have led to this judgment, if you think it helpful.

W. W. Rostow

Francis Bator

W.W.Rostor:FBator:rln

~~SECRET~~

5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-129
By CG, NARA, Date 6-6-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 4:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As instructed, we are going out to Bangkok for an explanation of Thanom's press conference statement.

This volunteered report puts a bit better face on what he said; but he still left a handle for trouble with the press.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 1136

cc: Mr. George Christian

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Department of State

50
TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 BANGKO 01136 1311200Z

43

ACTION EA 19

INFO GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, NSA 02, L 03, INR 07, P 104,

CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, IO 21, AID 30, RSR 01, /158 W

P 1311127Z JUL 67

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BANGKOK 1136

SAIGON FOR AMBASSADOR MARTIN

SUBJ: CLIFFORD/TAYLOR VISIT

1. FOLLOWING EXCHANGE TOOK PLACE AT PRIMIN THANOM'S REGULAR PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING: QTE

QUES: AFTER HEARING REPORT ON NECESSITY FOR US TO USE OUR MILITARY FORCES IN COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION WORK, DOES US STILL FEEL IT NECESSARY FOR US (THAI) TO SEND COMBAT FORCES?

PAGE 2 RUMTBK 1136K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THANOM: THE PRESIDENT WISHES MORE COMBAT FORCES TO BE SENT TO VIETNAM, BUT WE EXPLAINED OUR NECESSITY TO USE THEM IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. HE WAS BRIEFED ON HOW WE ARE CARRYING ON COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION WORK AT PRESENT. WE HAVE HELD CONSULTATIONS AND WE ARE OF THE SAME VIEW--THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO END THE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. BUT WE HAVE ONE VIEW AND THEY HAVE ANOTHER, BUT THE OBJECTIVE IS THE SAME--TO END THE FIGHTING AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. BUT I CANNOT DISCLOSE WHAT THE TWO VIEWS ARE.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 BANGKO 01136 311200Z

QUES: DOES THAT MEAN US WILL NOT USE ARMED FORCE TO PUT
END TO WAR IN VIETNAM?

THANOM: I HAVE ALREADY SAID I CANNOT DISCLOSE ANY
DETAILS ON THIS SUBJECT. END QTE.

2. WIRE SERVICES, PARTICULARLY UPI IN VIEW OF EARLIER STORY
(BANGKOK 1092), MAY EXPAND THANOM'S STATEMENT QTE WE HAVE
ONE VIEW AND THEY HAVE ANOTHER UNQTE INTO ALLEGED BASIC

PAGE 3 RUMTBK 1136K ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DIFFERENCES. THANOM, OF COURSE, WAS SEEKING TO EMPHASIZE
PURPOSE OF CLIFFORD-TAYLOR VISIT WAS ONE OF EXCHANGING VIEWS.

3. BANGKOK POST YESTERDAY REPORTED AD HOC PRESS INTERVIEW
SATURDAY AS FOLLOWS: QTE THE PRIME MINISTER DECLINED TO GIVE
A DIRECT ANSWER ON WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN A US REQUEST FOR
AN INCREASE OF THAI TROOPS TO SOUTH VIETNAM. HE SAID INNER-
QTE INCREASING TROOPS IS ONE WAY TO SHORTEN THE WAR. I CANNOT
REVEAL DETAILS WHICH WOULD LET THE OPPOSITE SIDE (COMMUNISTS)
IN ON OUR SECRETS. END INNERQTE UNQTE. ORWICK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Monday
July 31, 1967 -- 3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a response to Dick
Neustadt's letter to you about Francis
Bator and his future work.

W. W. Rostow

6



July 31, 1967

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter about Francis Bator and your promise that some of his time and much of his work as Director of Studies will be available to the Government.

I'm sure that men such as Don Price, you, and Francis have a great contribution to make in bridging the gap between ideas and policy. We shall be looking to you all in the days ahead.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Richard E. Neustadt
Director, Institute of Politics
John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

15
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

66
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

100-100000
A-28-67
3/1/67
INSTITUTE OF POLITICS

LITTAUER CENTER
CAMBRIDGE 02138

July 24, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Now that Francis Bator's plans are public property, I want to tell you how grateful we are to you for giving us the opportunity to bring him here at this crucial stage in our School's development.

Dean Price and I are very sensitive to the importance of presidential staff work and to problems caused a President by changes in the White House staff. We both have been there! For many years this School has tried to find and help equip men for such critical jobs. If only the School's need were involved in Bator's case, we would not have asked him to leave government service now.

But as Francis no doubt has made clear to you, there are compelling personal reasons for his return to Cambridge -- after four years of weekend commuting. One always hesitates to make judgments on the personal affairs of others, but, for what it's worth, we think he has taken the right decision. That being so we saw no contradiction in strengthening our School by having him join us now. Rather our part of Cambridge than some other!

Besides, although I know it sounds like sugar on the pill, we think we can assure you that his work here will be of use to your Administration. As you know, he is a rare commodity. We believe that no one in his age-group around the country matches his combination of economic expertise, presidential-level policy-making experience, and sheer ability. With Francis as Director of Studies for our Institute, we think this School has a real chance of achieving a noticeable jump in the quality and relevance of academic contributions to government. With luck, Joe Califano's annual idea-canvass here may produce progressively richer results.

We quite understand that you may want Francis to consult and help with one problem or another from time to time. Obviously he will be his own master on such matters. But we do want you to know that his new "management" won't fail in sympathy for presidential needs. Clearly, consultative service is a proper role for our faculty members.

Despite these considerations, I know that the situation still adds up to loss of a valuable man from White House service -- as well as the

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INSTITUTE OF POLITICS

LITTAUER CENTER
CAMBRIDGE 02138

-2-

press problems a departure entails. All of us here will do everything in our power to minimize the latter, and, after the transfer is made, to assure that the benefits Francis brings us will not be confined to Harvard or Cambridge.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dick", with a horizontal line extending from the end.

Richard E. Neustadt
Director,
Institute of Politics

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Monday,
July 31, 1967 -- 3:35 p.m.

Long
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a response to Gen. Eisenhower. You will note I made reference to the pre-Strauss timing of Amb. Bunker's work in this field.

W. W. Rostow

7a

July 31, 1967

Dear General Eisenhower:


As always, your letter of July 28 was most helpful.

I know we have both long felt in our bones that the time when desalting would become economic for irrigation could be made a great constructive turning point in human history and, in particular, a basis for movement towards reconciliation in the Middle East.

Building on the work launched by Ambassador Bunker in October last year, as well as on earlier staff work, we are now quite far advanced in pulling together all the data and ideas accessible to the government, including the possibilities which may open up with the technology of the very large reactors.

Please feel free to continue to pass along your thoughts on this matter; for I am determined to find the right occasion to hold up before these troubled nations a vision of what they might do for their land and their people.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

7b

DDE

GETTYSBURG
PENNSYLVANIA 17325
July 28, 1967

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President:

I am more than delighted to have your letter on the subject of desalting sea water for the Mid-East by atomic power. I deeply appreciate your kindness. Additionally, it is good to know that the government has been active in improving techniques for this purpose and in uncovering avenues, aside from the purely diplomatic, through which mutual Arab-Jewish antagonisms might be notably lessened in that area.

For your personal information, I should like to assure you that my support of this kind of work is both disinterested and non-partisan. My involvement in the general subject goes back many years. On June 16, 1954 I wrote the following to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission:

"Why do we not get Dr. Oppenheimer interested in desalting sea water? I can think of no scientific success of all time that would equal this in its boon to mankind -- provided the solution could do the job on a massive scale and cheaply."

Aside from the various efforts, outlined in your letter, that the government is making toward attaining these goals, you might like to consider a few points that impress me as pertinent.

First, if the affected nations should look favorably on such a project, it might be desirable to create an international corporation for financing, building and operation. The desalination plants would be of such large-scale capacity that there would be produced -- once the several plants could be successively completed -- potable water at more than double the flow of the entire Jordan River system. Another great benefit would be the development of electric energy, far in excess of that necessary for pumping, which would attract industry to the region.

PERSONAL

PERSONAL

- 2 -

As information about such plans and potentials became known to the Mid-East populations, there would likely develop internal political pressures on their respective governments to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunities so presented. Cooperation would be facilitated.


Another reason for suggesting the building of plants of great size is because, I am told, in this way the cost can be reduced to levels economic for irrigation.

Obviously the building of plants, as well as power and water distributing systems, in an operation of this size would give employment to a large number of refugees. The thousands of productive acres thus made out of land, now nothing but desert, would permanently aid their resettlement.

Knowing from your letter that this whole subject is receiving the continuing attention of the government I shall not trouble you further on it, unless some fresh and pertinent information should come to my attention.

With assurances of warm regard and great respect,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Dwight D. Eisenhower", written in a cursive style.

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

PERSONAL

Monday, July 31, 1967
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith for your signature is
Sec. Rusk's draft response to
Sen. Dominick and his colleagues.

W. W. Rostow

~~1. Rusk~~
2. Pres file

Sa

July 31, 1967

Dear Senator Dominick:

I have received the letter of July 27, 1967, about the Congo, which you and certain other Senators have signed.

There need be no doubt about what the public was told concerning the arrival of three transport aircraft to the Congo. On the day before their arrival the Department of State made the following announcement:

"In response to a request from General Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States Government has despatched three C-130 transport aircraft and crews to Kinshasa.

"These aircraft will provide long-range logistic support for the Congolese Government in meeting the mercenary-led rebellion. They will be in a non-combatant status.

"The United States has consistently supported the territorial integrity of the Congo."

Your letter noted some of the missions flown by these aircraft. They have also evacuated wounded and refugees, including women and children, and have delivered food to areas in critical need.

The question of policing the world does not arise; there is no such thinking in American policy or in American practice. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and I have, on various occasions, made United States transport aircraft available to support the unity and stability of the Congo. From the time of its birth as a nation, in June 1960, the peace and unity of the Congo have been a deep concern of the international community. This concern has been reflected in U.S. aid programs carried on since 1960 and in many United Nations' resolutions which have had our support. Our recent action was in the spirit of and consistent with those U.N. resolutions.

The action taken by white mercenaries in early July created a crisis gravely threatening the unity of the country and the lives of large numbers of Congolese and citizens of other countries, including more than two thousand American citizens. Our Ambassador in the Congo and the Secretary of State advised me that prompt action was required if a high risk of a serious human tragedy was to be averted. Time was clearly of the essence; an immediate decision was required; doing nothing would have been the wrong decision. Had the tragedy which was averted in fact occurred, I believe you would have regretted a failure to take the action which we took.

The Congress was not in session when a decision was required, although Secretary Rusk did inform various leaders of the Congress that it was contemplated. The action taken in sending these three transport aircraft to the Congo was in full conformity with the responsibilities and duties of the President in the conduct of our foreign relations.

One of these aircraft has been withdrawn. The others will be withdrawn when the situation permits.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Peter H. Dominick
United States Senator
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:Dean Rusk:WWR:rlh

arrived 3:20pm.

86

LISTER HILL, ALA., CHAIRMAN
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

STEWART E. MCCLURE, CHIEF CLERK
JOHN S. FORSYTHE, GENERAL COUNSEL

July 27, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have viewed with serious concern the recent events that have transpired in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and are utterly dismayed by the unilateral action taken by the Executive Department in deploying American military aircraft, materiel and personnel into the area.

This action was taken without prior consultation with appropriate committees of Congress and the public was told that the purpose was to insure safety of Americans in the area. After the deployment, we were told that the action was motivated not for such purpose but by the need of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for logistical support.

It is our understanding that these aircraft and our personnel have engaged in more than 35 missions during which we have transported Congolese troops, vehicles, food and communications equipment around the Congo, and have transported aviation fuel for Congolese jet fighter aircraft manned by Ethiopian-trained pilots.

It is our considered judgment that we have no political commitments necessitating such action; that the United States should not interject its military aircraft and personnel into a local, internal dispute; that the safety of American civilian personnel could have been insured through use of civilian aircraft; and that we cannot police the world.


For the foregoing reasons, we, the undersigned:


(1) express our strong disapproval of your action in sending American military personnel, materiel and aircraft into the Congo;


(2) object most strenuously to the Executive Department's taking any such action without first consulting with and obtaining approval from the appropriate committees of Congress; and

(3) urge you most strongly to reconsider your decision and to order our military aircraft, materiel and personnel back to their appropriate bases.

Respectfully,


Peter H. Dominick
United States Senator


Carl T. Curtis
United States Senator


Clifford P. Hansen
United States Senator

page two
The President
July 27, 1967

Wallace F. Bennett
Wallace F. Bennett
United States Senator

Norris Cotton
Norris Cotton
United States Senator

Karl E. Mundt
Karl E. Mundt
United States Senator

James B. Pearson
James B. Pearson
United States Senator

Strom Thurmond
Strom Thurmond
United States Senator

John G. Tower
John G. Tower
United States Senator

Len B. Jordan
Len B. Jordan
United States Senator

Everett M. Dirksen
Everett M. Dirksen
United States Senator

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
United States Senator

George Murphy
George Murphy
United States Senator

Roman L. Hruska
Roman L. Hruska
United States Senator

Douglas B. Hickcock
Douglas B. Hickcock
United States Senator

Frank Carlson
Frank Carlson
United States Senator

John F. Williams
John F. Williams
United States Senator

Paul J. Farnin
Paul J. Farnin
United States Senator

9

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 1:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a recent Defense staff analysis of the strength of Viet Cong irregulars, including guerrilla forces but not main force Viet Cong units. It is based on population control estimates.

It yields a curve which differs from the official MACV figures. The MACV figures show a levelling-off since the third quarter of 1966, but not this kind of decline.

I think that these new curves make better sense because:

- the Viet Cong have less population under their control;
- the degree of Viet Cong control of population has been weakened;
- and there are widespread and continuing reports of Viet Cong recruitment and manpower difficulties.

We have been making our own estimates of Viet Cong strength, based on casualty statistics and recruitment estimates, rather than on population control. They show a striking correlation with these new independent estimates from Defense. "A" marks the high side and "B" the low side of the June 1967 strengths derived from our in-house estimates.

The point is: some statistical estimates now reinforce the non-statistical reports from all over South Viet Nam that the Viet Cong are not maintaining either the strength or the quality of their guerrilla units.

W. W. Rostow

RNG:WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


ESTIMATING VC IRREGULAR STRENGTH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-127

By pw, NARA, Date 5-3-94



Viet Cong irregular forces are organized into guerrilla, self-defense, and secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet Viet Cong organizations. Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terror and sabotage activities. The self-defense force is a para-military structure responsible for the defense of hamlet and village in areas controlled by the VC. These forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time basis. Self-defense forces conduct propaganda, construct fortifications, and defend home areas. The secret self-defense force is the clandestine VC organization which performs the same general functions in GVN-controlled villages and hamlets as do the self-defense forces in VC controlled areas. Their operations include intelligence collection as well as sabotage and propaganda.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The nature of the irregular force structure does not lend itself to the more precise measurements which can be made for conventionally organized military forces based upon identifications, command structure, and unit historical data. Even the captured Viet Cong records that are available for some provinces are obviously "estimates" rather than statistical tabulations of strengths for specifically identified irregular platoons and squads. Lacking precise accounting data, it is necessary to use an estimate to ascertain the overall strength of the VC irregular forces throughout SVN. These estimates consider the type of VC infrastructure, the density of population, scale of enemy military activity, and extent of VC control in the various districts, villages and hamlets comprising each province.

MACV's present estimates of the strength of the VC irregulars are derived from estimates provided by GVN province chiefs. During the past few months MACV, in coordination with GVN and other US agencies, has laid groundwork to obtain a more valid estimate of irregular strength by means of a combined collection program. Preliminary indications point to an increase in the number of irregulars to be carried in the order of battle. This will not, however, indicate that the actual irregular strength has increased, but rather that MACV has refined its knowledge of it. The new strength figures will be retroactively adjusted. The present MACV order of battle carries approximately 113,000 irregulars. DIA reports about 100,000 to 120,000 irregulars in SVN and the mean, 110,000, is frequently used for computations. A tabulation of irregular strength since the first quarter of 1965 (as carried by DIA) is shown in Table 1. The tabulated strengths suggest that either the VC irregular forces have remained almost constant or that the estimates have been revised infrequently.

TABLE 1

VC IRREGULAR STRENGTHS - DIA REPORTS
(Thousands of Personnel by Quarters)

	1965				1966			
	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>
VC Irregulars	90	90	110	110	110	110	110	110

Source: Table 101, OSD SEA Statistical Summary

This article presents two different sets of irregular strength estimates derived from applying two formulas to population control data. The resulting data may shed some light on possible trends in the VC irregular force strength.

Formula #1

The basis for Formula #1 was reportedly developed by the intelligence staff of the RVN Joint General Staff from VC planning factors (RVN document Ministry of Defense, J-2 High Command, RVNAF #2697/TTL/2/9.) The formula relies primarily on population control as a basis for estimating VC irregular strength.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 2

REPORTED VC PLANNING FACTORS FOR
IRREGULAR FORCE STRENGTHS

	<u>VC Controlled Area</u>	<u>Disputed Area (Undergoing Clearing or Securing)</u>	<u>RVN Controlled Areas (Secured)</u>
Guerrillas	1 platoon (30-40) per 1000 VC population (35/1000 VC controlled)	1 Squad (10-12) per 1000 VC population (11/100 VC controlled)	None
Self-Defense	1 platoon (30-40) per village ^{a/} (8.75/1000 VC controlled)	1 Squad per village ^{a/} (2.75/1000 VC controlled)	None
Secret Self-Defense	30 per village ^{a/b/} (7.5/1000 VC controlled)	15 per village ^{a/} (3.75/1000 VC controlled)	1-3 three-man crews per village ^{a/} (1.5/1000 VC controlled)
Total Irregulars per 1000 VC controlled population	51.25	17.5	1.5

^{a/} Average village population of 4000 is assumed.

^{b/} Planning factor for Secret Self Defense (SSD) in VC controlled areas appears to be at variance with definition furnished by MACV, which indicates that SSD operates only in GVN areas.

TABLE 3

REFINED FACTORS - FORMULA #1

	<u>VC Controlled</u>	<u>Undergoing Clearing</u>	<u>Undergoing Securing</u>	<u>Secured</u>
Irregulars/1000 VC Controlled (times)	51.25	17.5	17.5	1.5
% VC Control (gives)	90%	60%	30%	10%
Irregulars/1000 Total Population	46.1	10.5	5.3	.2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TABLE 4

VC IRREGULAR STRENGTH - FROM FORMULA #1
(000)

	1965									
	1964	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	Oct-
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Nov</u>
VC Irregulars	179.8	183.8	187.9	192.2	203.8	191.0	189.2	182.5	171.9	160.4

Table 2 shows the presumed VC planning factors upon which Formula #1 is based. For the purpose of relating the self-defense and secret self-defense of factors to MACV/GVN population control data, we have assumed an average village population of 4000. This yields the gross planning factors shown in parentheses for the two groups.

To calculate irregular force strength the gross factors in Table 2 are refined in Table 3 for application against the various categories of population control data reported in the monthly MACV Report of Population and Area Control. Application of the refined factors ("irregulars per 1000 total population") developed in Table 3 to the MACV population control data yields the VC irregular strength estimates shown in Table 4 and Graph #1. For example, Table 2 indicates that 17.5 irregulars are planned for each 1000 of VC controlled population located in areas which MACV reports in the undergoing clearing category. For purposes of Formula #1, we have assumed that 60 percent of the population reported in that category is under VC control; thus 60 percent of 17.5 yields a refined factor of 10.5 irregulars per total population undergoing clearing. Similar percentages of VC control have been assumed for the other categories, as shown in Table 3.

Rather than being stable, as suggested by the DIA statistics in Table 1, Formula 1 yields an increasing irregular strength which peaks at 204,000 in the 3rd quarter of 1965 and diminishes to 160,000 late in 1966. It is interesting to note that the estimate of 182,500 irregulars closely corresponds to a statement in a recently captured VC document which implies that VC irregular strength had declined to about 180,000 by mid-1966. The decline of irregular strength shown in Table 4 is primarily a function of the increasing amount of the population which reportedly came under GVN control during the period under consideration.

Any conclusions drawn from Formula #1 results in Table 4 should be tempered by the following considerations. First, the formula is based on supposed VC planning factors, but it is applied to MACV/GVN population control data and the VC probably do not view the population distribution in the same way as MACV. Second, uncontested areas have been ignored in arriving at the number of irregulars; however, the inclusion of these data would probably not change the results significantly.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Formula #2.

By abbreviating Formula #1 results are obtained which more closely approximate the DIA and MACV estimates. Formula #2 is developed from the same set of VC planning factors as Formula #1. This version assumes, however, that a platoon has only 30 persons and a squad 10. In addition, it only assumes that there is 1 platoon per 1000 population in VC controlled areas, a squad per 1000 population in disputed areas and 3-man cells in RVN controlled areas. This formula also ignores the uncontested areas and the same "% VC controlled" factors are applied. The Formula #2 factors are given in Table 5. Table 6 and Graph #1 show the results of applying Formula #2 to the MACV population control data. The trends suggested by these results are identical to those of Formula #1, but the magnitude of the numbers is very close to that of current DIA and MACV estimates. When Formula #2 and the MACV estimates are compared for May 1966 (the most recent revision of the MACV estimates) extremely good agreement is seen (112,760 for MACV and 112,045 for Formula 2.)

TABLE 5

VC MILITIA STRENGTH - FORMULA #2

	<u>VC Controlled</u>	<u>Undergoing Clearing</u>	<u>Undergoing Securing</u>	<u>Secured</u>
Irregulars/1000 VC Controlled (times)	30	10	10	9
% VC Control (gives)	90%	60%	30%	10%
Irregulars/100 Total Population	27	6	3	.9

TABLE 6

VC IRREGULAR STRENGTH - FROM FORMULA #2

	<u>1965</u>					<u>1966</u>				
	<u>1964</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>4th</u>	<u>1st</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>3rd</u>	<u>Oct-</u>
	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Qtr</u>	<u>Nov</u>
VC Irregulars	107.8	110.3	112.9	115.7	123.0	116.0	115.1	111.2	105.2	98.7

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-318
By lig, NARA, Date 5-16-95

W.W.R.
10
Lump
2. Pres file

Monday, July 31, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

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Mr. President:

At Tab A is the paper you requested outlining the effects of a \$2.5 billion foreign aid appropriation (compared with a \$3.3 billion request). Gaud has tried to hold the argument to a minimum; the facts speak quite eloquently for themselves. The paper has been approved by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

We don't know precisely how the Congress would get down to \$2.5 billion. The memorandum reflects Gaud's best guess of how they would distribute the misery -- not how he would like to see it distributed. The major effects of an \$800 million cut, each of which is discussed briefly in the memorandum, are as follows:

1. Even if Latin America does better than the rest -- which is likely -- we could not provide the \$100 million increase you discussed at Punta del Este.
2. Even a small cut in Supporting Assistance would rule out any increase in AID programs in Vietnam.
3. The bulk of the cut would have to come in Development Loans. (We would estimate a 44% cut in our D.L. request.) This would mean:
 - a 40% cutback in India. Much of this would come out of program loans for fertilizer. At a time when new IDA money is not in sight and the Europeans are ~~not~~ in a stingy mood, the cut in our contribution could well shake the whole consortium framework.
 - a 30% cut in Pakistan.
 - a 40% cut in planned aid to Turkey, probably forcing a delay in Turkey's "graduation" from AID loans, now scheduled for 1973.
 - a 30% cut in loans for Korea.
 - a cutback of over 50% in loans to Africa, reinforcing charges that the Korry Report was a smokescreen for American withdrawal.

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-- no more than \$20 million for Indonesia.

4. Military Assistance would also be sharply cut back -- probably on the order of 35% of our request. This would end credit sales altogether and require cuts of up to 30% in such countries as Greece, Turkey, Taiwan, and Iran.
5. Technical Assistance would probably be cut about 20%, eliminating the planned expansion of programs in health, agriculture, education and family planning.

These estimates reflect a careful judgment as to what we would have to do to live with cuts of this size. I think your priorities have been faithfully observed. The simple fact is a \$2.5 billion appropriation would, for the first time in AID history, make it literally impossible for us to move forward with planned programs in our major client countries. In other years, greater concentration and windfalls created by world events (e.g., the Indo-Pak war) have allowed us to squeeze out enough for the critical programs even though appropriations had been cut. This year is different.

I don't mean to say the world would end if we got \$2.5 billion. As realists, Gaud and the rest of us are aware that a cut of \$800 million is not unlikely. If the axe falls, we will push on as best we can. But it is certainly worth every effort we can manage to minimize the cut.

W. W. Rostow

EKH:VMR:MST

~~SECRET~~

M. A. Rostan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

10a

July 29, 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-316
By Wig, NARA, Date 8-20-93

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Consequences of a \$2.5 Billion Foreign Aid Appropriation

This memorandum is submitted in response to your request for information on the consequences of a \$2.5 billion foreign aid appropriation (covering both economic and military aid) for FY 1968.

The President's budget request was originally \$3.126 billion. After Punta del Este it was increased \$100 million to \$3.226 billion. Recently, both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee imposed on the Foreign Assistance Act the burden of financing the \$84 million U.S. share of NATO infrastructure and certain international military headquarters - items which the President had included in the DOD budget. The effect of this is to increase the over-all requirement to \$3.310 billion.

To reduce this to \$2.5 billion means a cut of \$810 million - just under 25%. Last year's budget request of \$3.386 billion was cut by \$451 million to \$2.935 billion, a 13% cut.

Roughly \$250 million of the total budget request represents relatively small items which will remain about the same regardless of the size of the total appropriation. Cuts will come in six fund categories. Our present rough guess as to how the Congress would apportion a cut of \$810 million among those fund categories in order to arrive at an over-all figure of \$2.5 billion is as follows:

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- 2 -

	Budget Request	(in millions of dollars) "Estimated" Cut	Resulting Appropriations
Alliance for Progress	643	-103	540
Development Loans	774	-344	430
Supporting Assistance - Vietnam	550	- 60	490
Supporting Assistance- Other	170	- 40	130
Technical Assistance	243	- 43	200
Military Assistance	680	-220	460

The \$540 million figure for the Alliance for Progress would constitute a 16% cut from the post-Punta del Este budget request of \$643 million. While it is \$32 million above the FY 1967 appropriation, it does not provide the extra Punta del Este \$100 million. Even so, this is a much lighter cut than the much more severe Development Loan cuts contemplated for Asia and Africa.

The \$430 million Development Loan figure represents a severe cut of 44% from our budget request of \$774 million. The appropriation for FY 1967 was \$500 million. But it is misleading to compare that figure with the \$430 million figure. Due to the suspension of aid to India and Pakistan following the outbreak of war in the fall of 1965, \$320 million of FY 1966 Development Loan funds were obligated for loans to India and Pakistan late that fiscal year to meet FY 1967 requirements. So that the \$430 million for FY 1968 is actually more comparable to \$820 million for FY 1967.

We carried over no Development Loan funds from FY 1967. But we estimate loan repayments, refunds and deobligations during FY 1968 at \$88 million. This plus \$430 million would give us a total of \$518 million of Development Loan funds for FY 1968. The following table shows our present plans and the levels we would have to go to at \$518 million:

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- 3 -

	(in millions of dollars)		
	Presently Planned Program	Cuts	Reduced Program
India	400	-152	248
Pakistan	165	- 50	115
Turkey	100	- 40	60
Africa	90	- 50	40
Korea	50	- 15	35
Indonesia	20	0	20
Philippines	16	- 16	0
Others	<u>21</u>	<u>- 21</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS	862	-344	518

The World Bank has estimated India's requirements at \$900 million of non-project aid and \$300 million of project aid. These requirements have been accepted by the consortium. The U.S. has regularly supplied 40% of India's requirements for non-project aid and has financed some projects. A level of \$248 million would eliminate all project aid and would come nowhere near enabling us to supply 40% (\$360 million) of the non-project aid. Such a drastic reduction in our support is likely to lead to cuts by others - this in a year in which India will get nothing from IDA because of the delay in IDA replenishment. As your PSAC Report pointed out, India is the most critical battleground for the War on Hunger. India is introducing miracle seeds and with a return to average monsoons is in a position to make a real agricultural breakthrough if she gets the fertilizer our program loans would provide.

A \$115 million aid level for Pakistan is less than our normal share of the consortium non-project loan requirement. It allows nothing for project lending. If aid continues at its present levels Pakistan has a good chance to be self-sufficient in food grains by 1970. Our failure to help Pakistan which has been following good self-help policies with

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- 4 -

good results would deprive us of a stunning example of a U.S. aid success story within the next decade.

A \$60 million program for Turkey compares with \$135 million in aid provided during FY 1967. Such a deep cut would undermine the consortium and reduce contributions from other countries. This would have to mean abandoning the economic reform package on which Turkey had been making outstanding progress and delaying Turkey's "graduation" from aid, now anticipated in 1973.

A cut in development loans for Korea coupled with a cut in supporting assistance would come at a time when we are committed to continuing economic assistance as part of the bargain for obtaining Korean troops in Vietnam. It would cast a pall over the international consultative group on which we are counting for contributions from other countries to Korea's remarkable economic development.

The program for Indonesia had already been recognized as too small to meet our share of the stabilization support in 1968. A \$20 million A.I.D. loan level compares with an expected foreign aid requirement of about \$250 - \$300 million in 1968.

Inasmuch as our development loans for Africa aggregated \$98 million in FY 1967, a \$40 million program for FY 1968 would give the Africans real reason to wonder whether our new Korry Report-based aid policy for Africa calling for emphasis on regionalism and multilateralism isn't just a fancy word for pull-out.

The \$100 million cut in Supporting Assistance consists of \$60 million from Vietnam and \$40 million from other programs. For Vietnam this means holding the line on major expansions of pacification/revolutionary development programs that the new U.S. team may propose, and postponing some development projects that could mean a great deal to the new Vietnamese Government. The \$40 million cut in other programs would have to come from Korea, Jordan, the Dominican Republic, Panama and the Congo - programs which are already very closely budgeted. Furthermore, these cuts would leave us with even less flexibility than we now have to meet new political and security problems in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. This is particularly true in view of the fact that we are requesting an appropriation of only \$31 million for the Contingency Fund.

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- 5 -

Technical Assistance already badly cut last year is heavily mortgaged to on-going activities. A reduction from \$243 million to \$200 million in these funds will prevent us from carrying on increased programs in agricultural development, education, health and family planning. These are the highest priority items in our economic aid program.

On Military Assistance, a cut of approximately \$220 million - 35% of our original request and about the same as the \$205 million cut of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week - would, as explained in my memorandum on the SFRC actions, hit very hard both the grant and sales programs. In sum, \$60 million for sales would be out. Grant programs for such forward defense countries as Taiwan, Greece, Turkey and Iran would have to absorb cuts of up to 30%. Modernization of the equipment of these countries would be virtually wiped out. And there would be serious political problems created by cuts in such smaller programs as the Philippines and Latin America.

Conclusion:

This analysis shows that

- an appropriation of \$2.5 billion is clearly not enough to do the job;
- it would have severe political and economic consequences and substantially weaken U.S. influence in the less developed world;
- it would cause others to do less as well and thus have a cumulative effect on the development business;
- it would make it impossible for us to reward good self-help performance and to sustain the momentum generated by past investment in foreign assistance;
- it would gut our War on Hunger effort.

We must do all we can to keep the appropriation at a level as close as possible to our budget request.



William S. Gaud

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. McNamara is away this week.

Do you wish a Tuesday lunch with Paul Nitze attending?

Yes _____

No _____

If yes, should Mac Bundy come for a review of Middle East issues?

Yes _____

No _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

On bombing and retaliation.

The Communists are using mortars as their equivalent to our bombing in the North. Like them, we have hit airfields, barracks, and military installations. These mortar attacks are particularly attractive to them at a time when Viet Cong capabilities have somewhat diminished to make conventional guerrilla attacks.

The question is, therefore, what additional targets might we add which hurt them and made military sense, in retaliation for their increased use of mortars.

I surveyed the possibilities over the week-end.

Here, in order of priority, are some possibilities.

-- Phuc Yen and Gia Lam airfields. These are MIG bases and Gia Lam is an international airport, similar to the one attacked near Saigon.

-- Red River bridge. A mile long. With special care should be attackable without significant civilian casualties. Fits the transport offensive now being mounted.

-- The three Hanoi radio stations. The military case is not strong; although they are the source of vicious propaganda throughout Southeast Asia, including Northeast Thailand. They are all out in the country and would involve virtually no civilian casualties. (I, personally, have always thought pretty well of these targets because radio Hanoi is a symbol of the regime's power and regional pretensions. Some of the intelligence people say they would miss the broadcasts as a source of information.)

-- Ministry of National Defense. They have struck quite close to the MACV compound. We're not sure they meant to attack. But an attack on the Ministry of National Defense would bring the war home to some of the military bureaucrats.

Hanoi TPP is ripe for re-attack when other conditions are ripe; but having been attacked before would not be a sign of our upping the ante in retaliation for mortar attacks on us.

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-2-

Finally, you should know the Air Force is presenting a plan to Bus Wheeler for cutting the transport lines more systematically around Haiphong and seeking to slow down supply movements more effectively. A quite serious and interesting proposal. No attacks on ships involved.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-129
By clg, NARA, Date 6-6-95

13
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Nick Katzenbach began the week by informing me that he has again been approached by Senator Mansfield who wishes to go to mainland China in the course of his trip to Tokyo in mid September.

Senator Mansfield says he would like to try to approach mainland China via Ne Win or Sihanouk. He asked Nick whether the State Department would "prohibit" him. At this stage, Nick confined himself to pointing out certain difficulties; said he would analyze with his colleagues the pros and cons; and did not "encourage or discourage" Senator Mansfield. Nick believes it is quite mad for Mansfield to think of going at this time of trouble in China. He believes he will not get permission to go and, therefore, he does not believe that the State Department should use up any of its limited capital with the Senator in flatly refusing.

As you know, Ne Win is in bad trouble with Peiping at the moment and could not help Senator Mansfield or anyone else.

Before taking the line indicated above, however, Nick wanted to know if you thought he should throw more weight against Senator Mansfield's making the effort to get a visa.

Nick feels he ought to get back to Senator Mansfield some time today.

W. W. Rostow

Have Nick follow his present neutral line,
while pointing out all the difficulties _____

State should strongly oppose Sen. Mansfield's
making the effort _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

The reason Elspeth's three suggestions for short-term action in the cities interest me is that they all involve the principle of enlarged participation and responsibility in our society, rather than simply enlarged expenditure for improved social infrastructure.

I have concluded from many years' work on economic and social development in areas outside the U.S. that participation and a sense of responsibility is the key to successful development.

In a talk I gave last year, when I was still at State, I concluded as follows:

"The more we examine the records of the past and the experience of the present in the adjustment to modernity, the more it becomes clear that the critical moment is not when men begin to share the material benefits of modernization. The critical moment is when men feel that they have become active agents in fashioning their own destiny.

"I have seen Andean villages where income per head could not have much exceeded \$75 a year but where, for the first time, their citizens had become engaged, with their own labor and at their own choice, in building a feeder road, a school, a church, or an irrigation ditch. Those people were, in a true sense, sharing a critical dimension of the good life. They knew that with their own hands and wills they were reshaping their own environment.

"On the other hand, I have seen men at much higher levels of income, semiemployed, living in urban slums, trapped by a lack of training or the inadequate pace of industrialization, with no way of shaping their future other than to be mobilized from time to time by cynical politicians in some mass demonstration.

"Closer to home, I know that many of my colleagues at work in our poverty program are convinced that the key to its success lies in creating a situation in which those we seek to help feel that at last they can take hold of their own destiny and move forward: The institutions designed to offer equality of opportunity in our highly dynamic society have failed to grip and support a significant margin of Americans."

This is why probably our most successful venture in stabilizing race relations has been military. There the negro:

- is engaged in a venture of national significance;
- is treated now on a basis of social equality;
- is rated as an individual -- on performance.

That is why an integrated National Service Corps could make sense, with tasks in:

- conservation;
- beautification;
- the cities themselves.

Someone like General Walt, who has worked with integrated military forces -- and has good publicity sense -- might head it, if he had a good staff under him.

Similarly, proposals for inducing the great corporations to set up big training programs make sense, even if subsidized by tax rebates and even if they have to include a good deal of basic education. Like the military and a National Service Corps, they would get these kids out of the centers of the cities into institutions where they are part of the society.

Finally, the rebuilding of the destroyed parts of Newark, Detroit, etc. might be put in the hands of local reconstruction and development boards, who would take responsibility for designing the new areas; insurance for business firms coming in; etc. Outside money would be needed, of course. But I remember what General Thang said about pacification in Viet Nam at Honolulu: 'If the government builds a school for a village, the village~~s~~ will not defend it against the Viet Cong. If they build with their own money, and labor, they'll fight to the death for it.'

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-129
By CLG, NARA, Date 6-6-95

~~SECRET~~

Monday
July 31, 1967 -- 8:20 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Tito responds construc-
tively to your message and emerges
clearly as a moderate in his approach
to the Arabs at this stage.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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11
ACTION EUR 25

INFO NEA 19, IO 21, SAH 02, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10,

NSA 02, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, RSR 01, ACDA 17,

TRSY 08, AS 01, AF 21, E 19, 221 W

P 300815Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BELGRADE 292

REF: STATE 13567

1. MEETING WITH TITO AT BRIONI JULY 29 LASTED ONE HOUR. THOSE PRESENT INCLUDED VLADIMIR POPOVIC (SEC GEN TO TITO), AN INTERPRETER, AND CONSELLOR DUBS, WHO ACCOMPANIED ME. TITO WAS CLEARLY PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE AND ITS SUBSTANCE. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION AND ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS PERSONAL GREETINGS TO THE PRESIDENT.

2. AFTER TITO READ PRESIDENT'S COMMUNICATION (WITHOUT

MIDDLE EAST

PAGE 2 RUFEDE 292/1 ~~SECRET~~
ASSISTANCE OF INTERPRETER), I NOTED THAT I WAS RETURNING NEXT WEEK TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION AND THAT THERE WOULD BE MUCH INTEREST IN HIS VIEWS ON (ME). REMARKS THAT FOLLOWED ARE REPORTED IN EXTENSO FOR REASONS THAT WILL BE APPARENT.

3. TITO SAID VIEWS REMAINED SAME AS THOSE EXPRESSED TO CHIEF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~PAGE 02 BELGRA 00292 01 OF 02 301001Z~~

JUSTICE WARREN. NO SOLUTION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT SPECIAL SESSION UNGA AND EVERYONE NOW HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTRIBUTE WHATEVER HE CAN TO REACHING SOLUTION. ONE COULD NOT EXPECT, HOWEVER, 80 MILLION ARABS TO CAPITULATE. NASSER'S RECENT SPEECH SEEMED TO INDICATE HE WAS SEEKING PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE AND THAT HE IS TAKING MORE REALISTIC APPROACH. HOWEVER, NASSER MUST CONSIDER ATTITUDES OF OTHER ARAB STATES SUCH AS ALGERIA, SYRIA AND IRAQ WHOSE POSITIONS HAVE HARDENED. (GOY) GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA HAS TAKEN POSITION THAT ARABS SHOULD ADOPT REALISTIC APPROACH TO SUCH PROBLEMS AS WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES, OPENING OF GULF OF AQABA TO NAVIGATION AND ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. TITO SAID NASSER HAD SHOWN APPRECIATION OF GOY'S VIEWPOINT. UNFORTUNATELY, SITUATION HAS ONCE AGAIN CHANGED FOLLOWING RECENT ARAB SUMMIT. YUGOSLAWS ASSUME THAT NASSER UNDER STRONG

~~PAGE 3 RUEFBE 292/1 SECRET~~

PRESSURES FROM OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. JUDGING FROM HIS RECENT SPEECH, NASSER CANNOT GO FURTHER AT MOMENT THAN DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. ACCORDING TO TITO, NASSER IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT OPENING OF NAVIGATION THROUGH GULF OF AQABA BUT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO ACQUIESCE IN ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. YUGOSLAWS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN TO ARABS THAT CESSATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY DOES NOT IPSO FACTO MEAN RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL.

4. TITO NOTED ME ISSUE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN MEETING OF EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS AT BUDAPEST. CONCLUSION WAS REACHED THAT ARABS SHOULD ADOPT REALISTIC APPROACH. AT SAME TIME, IT WAS AGREED THAT ARABS COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO CAPITULATE AND THIS EXPECTATION MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY OTHER SIDE. CONCLUSIONS OF BUDAPEST MEETING WERE CONVEYED TO ARAB COUNTRIES AND TO OTHERS. NOW, HOWEVER, A DEADLOCK SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN REACHED.

5. TITO URGED WESTERN COUNTRIES AND ESPECIALLY U.S. TO TAKE ARAB INTERESTS INTO ACCOUNT DURING FORTHCOMING (SC) DISCUSSIONS

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SECURITY COUNCIL

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Department of State

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PAGE 4 RUEURE 292/1 ~~SECRET~~

BUT NOT, OF COURSE, TO EXCLUSION OF ISRAELI INTERESTS. GOY HAD SPOKEN TO ARABS ABOUT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL. IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT NASSER IS MUCH MORE REALISTIC ON THIS PROBLEM THAN OTHER ARAB LEADERS BUT THAT HE IS NOT IN POSITION TO SPEAK OPENLY ON THIS QUESTION NOW. ON OTHER HAND, TITO HAS IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL ATTEMPTING TO PRESS RECOGNITION ISSUE BY USE OF FORCE. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE. ISRAEL AWARE THAT COUNTRIES REPRESENTED AT UN - WITH EXCEPTION OF ARABS - ACCEPTED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AND THIS FACT MUST EVENTUALLY HAVE ITS IMPACT ON ARABS THEMSELVES.

6. ACCORDING TO TITO, QUESTION OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ CANAL CANNOT BE TOO SIGNIFICANT ECONOMICALLY FOR ISRAELIS SINCE THEIR CARGOES COULD BE TRANSPORTED THROUGH CANAL BY USE OF FLAG SHIPS OF OTHER NATIONS. ISRAEL, HE SAID, SHOULD HAVE MORE CONSIDERATION FOR SITUATION IN WHICH ARABS NOW FIND THEMSELVES. TITO UNDERLINED THAT EVERY INFLUENCE MUST BE EXERTED ON ISRAEL TO REFRAIN FROM TAKING STUBBORN STANDS OR FROM TAKING ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT SITUATION.

7. CONCERN WAS EXPRESSED BY TITO OVER ANY POSSIBLE ATTEMPT

PAGE 5 RUEURE 292/1 ~~SECRET~~

BY ISRAEL TO EXTEND TERRITORY IT NOW OCCUPIES. ISRAEL'S ASPIRATIONS TO RETAIN TERRITORY IN GAZA STRIP, JERUSALEM AND JORDAN WOULD TURN PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST IT. TIME IS NOW WORKING MORE FOR ARABS THAN FOR ISRAEL. IT IS ESSENTIAL IN ANY EVENT THAT ISRAEL NOT START ANY NEW PROVOCATION.

8. TURNING TO QUESTION OF ARMS, TITO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT FAIR ON PART OF WESTERN PRESS TO QUESTION WHY SOVIETS SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ARABS SINCE ISRAEL NOW ARMED TO THE TEETH. ISRAEL NOT ONLY HAS MOST OF ARMS WITH WHICH IT INITIATED HOSTILITIES BUT CAPTURED ARMS AS WELL. ARAB DESIRE TO REARM IS THEREFORE UNDERSTANDABLE. IF YUGOS WERE ASKED FOR THEIR OPINION, THEY WOULD ADVISE ARABS TO REFRAIN FROM ENGAGING IN ANOTHER WAR MERELY TO SEEK REVENGE. WHEN I EXPRESSED USG'S CONCERN OVER CONTINUING BUILDUP OF SOVIET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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ARMS DELIVERIES, TITO SAID USSR WOULD HALT FURTHER DELIVERIES IF ISRAELI FORCES WITHDREW FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. TITO SAID HE KNOWS PERSONALLY THAT USSR NOT INTERESTED IN CONFRONTATION IN ME. WHEN I INTERJECTED THAT ARMS BUILDUP WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOURAGE ARABS TO UNDERTAKE SECOND ROUND UNLESS SOLUTION IS

PAGE 6 RUFUBE 29271 ~~SECRET~~

FOUND TO THIS PROBLEM, TITO REPLIED THAT NASSER HAS LEARNED HIS LESSON AND IS NOT EAGER TO RESUME WAR. ARMS DO NOT FIGHT BY THEMSELVES, TITO ADDED.

9. TITO SAID HE FELT IT WOULD BE MOST UNWISE TO PRESS ARABS TOO FAR NOW. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT SOLUTIONS COULD BE FOUND THROUGH DIPLOMATIC ACTION. YUGOS HOPE SOME FORM OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE CAN BE ESTABLISHED IN AREA, EVEN THOUGH IT RECOGNIZED THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARABS WOULD NOT BE OF FRIENDLIEST TYPE. NEVERTHELESS, IF ARABS PUSHED TOO FAR THEY MAY RESORT TO ACT OF DESPERATION. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ADVOCATES OF CONTINUING WAR WOULD WIN OUT. SECOND ROUND WOULD BE DIFFERENT FROM PAST ONE. WAR WOULD BE LED IN DIFFERENT WAY, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE OF LONG DURATION AND INVOLVE GREAT DESTRUCTION. JUDGING FROM NASSER'S RECENT SPEECH, HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE INCLINATION TO ENGAGE IN SECOND ROUND. ON CONTRARY, HIS EMPHASIS SEEMS TO BE ON INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION AND BUILDING UP OF ECONOMY. TITO SAID GOY WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO HELP ARAB COUNTRIES ECONOMICALLY.

GP-3. ELBRICK

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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11
ACTION EUR 25

INFO NEA 19, IO 21, SAH 02, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10,
NSA 02, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, RSR 01, ACDA 17,
TRSY 08, AS 01, AF 21, E 19, /221 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BELGRADE 292

10. TITO THEN NOTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED INVITATION FROM NASSER TO VISIT CAIRO AND HAD ACCEPTED. HE EXPECTS TO VISIT UAR AS WELL AS SYRIA AND IRAQ AFTER MIDDLE OF AUGUST, THAT IS, AFTER ARAB SUMMIT MEETING. IN GOING TO ME HE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO WORK TOWARD A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN SAME SPIRIT AS THAT EXPRESSED IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER.

11. IN DISCUSSING THIS TRIP, TITO LATER SAID SOME THOUGHT BEING GIVEN TO IDEA ~~THAT~~ GREAT POWERS OR SC OR TWO WORKING

PAGE 2 RUFUBE 292/2 ~~SECRET~~

TOGETHER MIGHT EXTEND GUARANTEE TO ISRAEL AGAINST ATTACK. TITO SAID HE INTENDS TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION WITH ARAB LEADERS. HE INDICATED THAT GUARANTEE OF THIS KIND WOULD ENABLE YUGOS TO CONVINCE ARABS THAT IT WAS NO USE TO THINK ABOUT CONTINUING WAR AGAINST ISRAEL. TITO ADDED THAT ARABS HAVE NO INTENTION OF DOING SO NOW BUT THAT GUARANTEE COULD HAVE IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 BELGRA 00292 02 OF 02 301121Z

12. I SAID PRESIDENT JOHNSON RESPECTED VIEWS OF PRESIDENT AND WOULD NOTE WITH INTEREST COMMENTS AND IDEAS WHICH HAD BEEN ADVANCED AND WHICH I WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY TO WASHINGTON. I COMMENTED THAT CERTAIN IDEAS WERE OF SPECIAL INTEREST AND THAT WASHINGTON MAY WISH TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THEM. USG WOULD BE REASSURED BY ASSERTION THAT PRESIDENT INTENDS TO TALK TO NASSER AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS ALONG MODERATE LINES THAT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED. USG RECOGNIZES THAT PRESIDENT ENJOYS SPECIAL POSITION WITH ARAB LEADERS AND THAT HE CAN BE HELPFUL IN CURRENT SITUATION. AT SAME TIME, I WISHED TO ASSURE GOY THAT IF THERE IS ANY POSSIBLE WAY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN ME, USG HAS EVERY INTENTION AND INTEREST IN DOING

PAGE 3 RUFUBE 292/2 ~~SECRET~~

WHATEVER IT CAN IN THIS DIRECTION. USG HOPEFUL THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES CAN BE RESTORED (ASAP) AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

13. RESPONDING TO CERTAIN COMMENTS BY TITO, I STRESSED THAT EVERYBODY AGREES THAT ISRAELI TROOPS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN. CONCURRENTLY, HOWEVER, ARABS MUST AGREE TO CESSATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY. THIS IS CRUCIAL ASPECT OF U.S. POSITION BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SOURCE OF BASIC PROBLEMS IN AREA. IF THIS ISSUE COULD BE RESOLVED, OTHERS MIGHT FALL INTO PLACE AND BE SOLVED THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. PROLONGED OCCUPATION OF ARAB TERRITORIES, I SAID, IS UNDESIRABLE SINCE THIS SERVES AS DAILY REMINDER TO ARABS OF THEIR HUMILIATION. HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE BE ESTABLISHED ONCE AND FOR ALL IN MINDS OF ARABS. I SAID I KNOW HOW GOY FEELS ABOUT QUESTION OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. NEVERTHELESS, ONE CANNOT IGNORE PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS OF ARABS PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES, ESPECIALLY BLOCKADE OF GULF OF AQABA WHICH SOME EXPERTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW VIEW AS ACT OF WAR. CERTAINLY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON WOULD AGREE WITH VIEW EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT THAT ISRAELIS MUST DEMONSTRATE FOREBEARANCE. MUST BE RECOGNIZED

PAGE 4 RUFUBE 292/2 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 03 BELGRA 00292 02 OF 02 301121Z~~

ON OTHER HAND THAT ISRAELIS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASY TO CONVINCE. IN ANY EVENT, USG APPRECIATES REALISTIC APPROACH WHICH GOY HAS TAKEN ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO ME AND HOPES THAT GOY CAN BRING ITS INFLUENCE TO BEAR IN ARAB WORLD.

14. COMMENT: TITO GAVE ME EVERY IMPRESSION OF WISHING TO BE RESPONSIVE AND HELPFUL WITH RESPECT TO SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION RAISED IN PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S LETTER. HE IS OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN CARRYING ON A DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT, AND I AM CERTAIN HE WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF ANY RESPONSE TO HIS REMARKS AND THOUGHTS BEFORE HE GOES TO SEE NASSER AND OTHER ARAB LEADERS. I THEREFORE HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE FORTHCOMING, ESPECIALLY SINCE HE MAY BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE MATTERS FORWARD A BIT IN ME. MOREOVER, FURTHER DIALOGUE WOULD HAVE ADDED ADVANTAGE OF ASSURING TITO PERSONALLY OF OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN YUGOSLAVIA AND SERVE TO UNDERCUT SUSPICIONS REGARDING U.S. INTENTIONS WHICH HAVE GROWN RECENTLY AS RESULT OF CERTAIN THEORIES BEING PEDDLED BY HARD-LINE ELEMENTS HERE. I FEEL HE HAS ALREADY BEEN GREATLY RELIEVED TO HAVE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL MESSAGE AS INDICATING

~~PAGE 5 RUFUBE 29272 SECRET~~

U.S. INTEREST IN CONTINUING GOOD RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA.

GP-3. ELBRICK

~~SECRET~~

16

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-129
By ab, NARA, Date 6-6-95

Pres file

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

Monday, July 31, 1967 -- 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report on the Clifford-Taylor talks with Prime Minister Holt and his principal Cabinet Ministers.

I agree with the recommendation that we must organize stronger public support, dramatizing not merely the effort in Viet Nam but in all of Southeast Asia and making more clear the fact of Asian support of our effort, from Singapore to Seoul.

We were looking yesterday without success for any written record of your conversation with Holyoake when he was here for the SEATO meeting in his role as Foreign Minister. Clifford and Taylor wished to have it for their trip to Wellington.

I concluded that you spoke privately to Holyoake and there is no written record. Is that correct?

W. W. Rostow

Canberra 448, July 31, 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
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PAGE 01 310516Z

3
ACTION SS 25

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, /025 W

O R 310125Z JUL 67 ZFF71
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY SAIGON
CINCPAC

~~SECRET~~ CANBERRA 448

EXDIS

PASS WHITE HOUSE

CLARK CLIFFORD, GENERAL TAYLOR AND I MET WITH PRIME
MINISTER HOLT AND HIS PRINCIPAL CABINET MINISTERS
SUNDAY. DISCUSSIONS, WHICH LASTED SEVEN HOURS,
COVERED ENTIRE RANGE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF SITUATION IN VIET-NAM.
TALKS WERE FRANK AND PRODUCTIVE. FOLLOWING ARE
PRINCIPAL GA REACTIONS TO PRESENTATION MADE BY

PAGE 2 RUHDA 448 ~~SECRET~~
CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR.

1.

(3(a)(3))

HOLT SAID HE THOUGHT TIME WAS ON OUR SIDE.

2. EXCEPT FOR [REDACTED] NO MINISTER

(3(a)(3))

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 310516Z~~

PRESENT FAVORED BOMBING OF DIKES OR BOMBING OR MINING
HAIPHONG HARBOR. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(3)

[REDACTED] BOMBING OF DIKES OPPOSED
ON GROUNDS WORLD OPINION WOULD BE STRONGLY CRITICAL
AND EFFECTIVENESS QUESTIONABLE, AND BROADER ATTACKS
ON OR MINING OF HAIPHONG HARBOR TOO RISKY IN TERMS
RUSSIAN AND CHINESE REACTION.

3. SEVERAL MINISTERS EXPRESSED NEED FOR GREATER
EFFORTS IN PROPAGANDA AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AREA.

~~PAGE 3 RUHAC 448 SECRET~~

MCAHON STATED AUSTRALIAN PRESS HAD BEEN VERY CRITICAL
OF ALLIED WAR EFFORT IN RECENT WEEKS WHICH, IF CONTINUED,
COULD WEAKEN AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SUPPORT. HOLT SAID
PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE SEEMS TO BE ON OTHER SIDE AND
STRESSED NEED TO INTENSIFY ALLIED EFFORTS. HE THOUGHT
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT GET MORE ACTIVE AND VOCAL
SUPPORT FROM ACADEMIC, BUSINESS AND OTHER OPINION
FORMING GROUPS. HE ALSO THOUGHT IMPORTANT TRY GET
PRESS TO LOOK AT PROBLEMS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SEA
AS A WHOLE RATHER THAN FOCUSING ATTENTION SOLELY ON
VIETNAM.

COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE SOUVANNA PHOUMA, SEVERAL GOA
MINISTERS SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY INCREASING EFFORTS
INTERDICT TROOP AND SUPPLY MOVEMENTS IN LAOS. THIS
MATTER, HOWEVER, WAS NOT PRESSED.

5. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 310516Z

[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(3)

6. HOLT SAID SECOND SUMMIT MEETING DESIRABLE, BUT APPRECIATED ADVISABILITY DEFER UNTIL AFTER FORTHCOMING VIET-NAM ELECTIONS. SENATE ELECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA IN DECEMBER MAY AFFECT GOA VIEWS ON TIMING OF SUMMIT MEETING, BUT THIS NOT PRESSED. HOLT FAVORS VENUE NEXT MEETING IN ASIAN CAPITAL, PREFERABLY BANGKOK OR SEOUL. SEEMED TO LEAN IN FAVOR OF BANGKOK. SUGGESTED POSSIBILITY CANBERRA SITE FOR THIRD MEETING.

7. HASLUCK SAID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT GOA MAINTAIN ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH CAMBODIA. CLIFFORD AGREED THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP WAS USEFUL AND HOPED IT COULD BE MAINTAINED. 1.3(a)(3)

PAGE 5 RUHDA 448 ~~SECRET~~
IN [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(3)

[REDACTED] HASLUCK SAID DURABILITY OF PEACE IN SEA, WHEN ACHIEVED, WILL DEPEND TO MAJOR DEGREE ON ATTITUDES OF CHINA AND SOVIET UNION. KEY TO FUTURE IN AREA, HE SAID, COULD BE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN US AND SOVIETS. THIS SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND IN PROSECUTION OF WAR AND PEACE SETTLEMENT.

9. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF NEED INTENSIFY ALLIED MILITARY EFFORT IN VIETNAM, HOLT MENTIONED SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH HE SAID MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN REGARD GOA CONTRIBUTION. BRITISH DECISION TO PULL OUT OF MALAYSIA/SINGAPORE FORCES AUSTRALIA TO RECONSIDER ITS ROLE IN THAT AREA. THIS IS CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR AUSTRALIA AND GOA WOULD WELCOME CONSULTATION WITH USG ON THIS MATTER. HE ASKED, QUOTE WHERE AND HOW CAN AUSTRALIA MAKE ITS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO AREA? UNQUOTE. IN ADDITION, HE MENTIONED HIGH LEVEL PRESENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (ABOUT 4.6 PERCENT OF GNP), BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IMPACT OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 510516Z

PAGE 6 RUHDAC 448 S E C R E T

IN ACE OF OVERALL B/P DEFICIT, HIGH AND INCREASING
AID COMMITMENTS (APPROACHING 0.8 PERCENT OF GNP),
AND NEED TO MAINTAIN HIGH LEVEL DOMESTIC
INVESTMENT AS FACTORS WHICH TEND TO LIMIT AUSTRALIA'S
MILITARY CAPABILITY. HOLT SAID HE DID NOT ENUMERATE
THESE CONSIDERATIONS AS ARGUMENTS AGAINST DOING
MORE IN VIETNAM, BUT AS FACTORS WHICH GOA AND USG
MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN ASSESSING FEASIBILITY AND
DESIRABILITY OF INCREASING AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT.
10. CLIFFORD SAID WANTED MAKE IT CLEAR THAT MORE
AUSTRALIAN TROOPS FOR VIET-NAM WAS DECISION SOLELY
FOR GOA. BUT HE STRESSED FACT THAT IF NATIONS CLOSER
TO AREA OF CONFLICT THAN US WERE ABLE TO DO MORE NOW,
US WOULD BE ABLE MAKE SUBSTANTIALLY LARGER
CONTRIBUTION. HOLT SAID GOA FULLY RECOGNIZED INTER-
RELATIONSHIP OF GOA CONTRIBUTION TO VIET-NAM TO US
ABILITY JUSTIFY ITS OWN EFFORT. HOLT SAID HE WOULD
LAY ENTIRE MATTER BEFORE FULL CABINET AT EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY. NO COMMITMENTS WERE MADE, BUT HE WAS
CLEARLY APPRECIATIVE OF VISIT AND FRNAK EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS AND INDICATED HIS DESIRE TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.
HOLT STATED AFTER MEETING THAT HE WAS DEEPLY
GRATEFUL TO PRESIDENT FOR SENDING MISSION
AND THAT HE CONSIDERED THE BRIEFING THE FULLEST AND
MOST SATISFACTORY UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIET-NAM WAR THAT HAD
BEEN GIVEN TO HIM AND GOA. I ALSO AM COMPLETELY PLEASED
WITH VISIT.
EXEMPT. CLARK

SECRET

EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

17
July 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a friendly, welcoming statement for our exhibit at the International Trade Fair in Brno, Czechoslovakia.

If you sign under the text, USIA will use that signature for facsimile reproduction under the Czech version of your greeting.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ND:gg

Welcome to the United States exhibit.

Our exhibit shows how scientific research and good management can bring improved products at lower costs to the consumer. Our universities, industrial laboratories and Government are all involved in the achievement of higher standards of quality. This exhibit shows some of the ways in which we are working to reach this goal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

18

July 31, 1967

Dear General Eisenhower:

As always, your letter of July 28 was most helpful.

I know we have both long felt in our bones that the time when desalting would become economic for irrigation could be made a great constructive turning point in human history and, in particular, a basis for movement towards reconciliation in the Middle East.

Building on the work launched by Ambassador Bunker in October last year, as well as on earlier staff work, we are now quite far advanced in pulling together all the data and ideas accessible to the government, including the possibilities which may open up with the technology of the very large reactors.

Please feel free to continue to pass along your thoughts on this matter; for I am determined to find the right occasion to hold up before these troubled nations a vision of what they might do for their land and their people.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325

19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


July 31, 1967

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter about Francis Bator and your promise that some of his time and much of his work as Director of Studies will be available to the Government.

I'm sure that men such as Don Price, you, and Francis have a great contribution to make in bridging the gap between ideas and policy. We shall be looking to you all in the days ahead.

Sincerely,



Mr. Richard E. Neustadt
Director, Institute of Politics
John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20

July 31, 1967

Dear Senator Dominick:

I have received the letter of July 27, 1967, about the Congo, which you and certain other Senators have signed.

There need be no doubt about what the public was told concerning the arrival of three transport aircraft to the Congo. On the day before their arrival the Department of State made the following announcement:

"In response to a request from General Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States Government has despatched three C-130 transport aircraft and crews to Kinshasa.

"These aircraft will provide long-range logistic support for the Congolese Government in meeting the mercenary-led rebellion. They will be in a non-combatant status.

"The United States has consistently supported the territorial integrity of the Congo."

Your letter noted some of the missions flown by these aircraft. They have also evacuated wounded and refugees, including women and children, and have delivered food to areas in critical need.


The question of policing the world does not arise; there is no such thinking in American policy or in American practice. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and I have, on various occasions, made United States transport aircraft available to support the unity and stability of the Congo. From the time of its birth as a nation, in June 1960, the peace and unity of the Congo have been a deep concern of the international community. This concern has been reflected in U.S. aid programs carried on since 1960 and in many United Nations' resolutions which have had our support. Our recent action was in the spirit of and consistent with those U.N. resolutions.

The action taken by white mercenaries in early July created a crisis gravely threatening the unity of the country and the lives of large numbers of Congolese and citizens of other countries, including more than two thousand American citizens. Our Ambassador in the Congo and the Secretary of State advised me that prompt action was required if a high risk of a serious human tragedy was to be averted. Time was clearly of the essence; an immediate decision was required; doing nothing would have been the wrong decision. Had the tragedy which was averted in fact occurred, I believe you would have regretted a failure to take the action which we took.

The Congress was not in session when a decision was required, although Secretary Rusk did inform various leaders of the Congress that it was contemplated. The action taken in sending these three transport aircraft to the Congo was in full conformity with the responsibilities and duties of the President in the conduct of our foreign relations.

One of these aircraft has been withdrawn. The others will be withdrawn when the situation permits.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Richard M. Nixon", written in a cursive style.

Honorable Peter H. Dominick
United States Senator
Washington, D. C.

Monday - July 31, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Bob Anderson has sent you the Third Annual Report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission for transmittal to the Congress, as required by the Commission's authorizing legislation (Tab A).

At Tab B is a suggested letter of transmittal to the Congress.

At Tab C is a suggested press release for your approval.

As in previous years, I am sending the report to you via Harry McPherson.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

- Tab A - Third Annual Report from Bob Anderson.
- Tab B - Suggested letter of transmittal to the Congress.
- Tab C - Suggested press release.

cc - George Christian

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-129
By cb, NARA, Date 6-6-95

22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Monday - July 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith an assessment of Fidel Castro's July 26 speech. He played up the rioting in this country with Stokely Carmichael on the speaker's platform.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

State's INR Intelligence Note
627, July 27, 1967.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence
Note - 627

July 27, 1967

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~~BATOR~~
~~BOWDLER~~
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~~DAVIS~~
~~GINSBURG~~
~~HAMILTON~~
~~JESSUP~~
~~JOHNSON~~
~~JORDEN~~
~~KEENE~~
~~KOMER~~
~~MOYERS~~
~~TAYLOR~~
~~WRIGGINS~~

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *tlh*

Subject: July 26, 1967: Castro Adds the US to His Revolutionary List

The "rebellion" of the American Negro was the one significant new theme in a speech otherwise noteworthy for its omissions and its repetition of familiar subjects. Castro's revolutionary anniversary speech was relatively brief (two hours and twenty minutes), and gave little hint of the strategy he will follow at the July 31 - August 8 conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO).

Special tribute to Stokely Carmichael. Castro began his speech by presenting "one of the most prestigious leaders for civil rights in the US," Stokely Carmichael. He showed Carmichael the same deference accorded to the representatives of the "the heroic people of South Vietnam." The subsequent sentence honoring "those who represent the highest revolutionary values" was clearly intended to include the American Negro leader. Toward the end of his speech, Castro again turned to the theme of US racial violence and read at length from US wire service dispatches on recent disturbances. He attempted to relate violence in the US to his thoughts on revolution in Latin America: "The convulsed condition of this hemisphere finds magnificent expression in what is happening in the United States itself. The US colored population, victim of discrimination and exploitation, is rising up more and more with astonishing valor and heroism to demand its rights and resist force with force."

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from annual substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-130
by CB NARA Date 7-12-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

The Cuban leader was careful, however, to state that although Cuba's sentiments were with the Negro sector in the US, Cuba was not to blame for their rebellion. In closing Castro expressed a "heartfelt embrace for the representatives of the US Negro people," paying Carmichael the ultimate honor of listing this slogan before his closing salutation to the Vietnamese people.

Domestic themes predominate. Perhaps the principal surprise of the speech, however, was its almost exclusive attention to domestic matters. The numerous LASO delegates and foreign journalists, artists, intellectuals, and protest singers present at the event were treated to nearly two hours of familiar rhetoric on the progress and plans of the Cuban revolution. Castro particularly emphasized the great hopes which he places on Cuba's youth, on his plans for continued stress on agricultural development and improved rural living standards, on a new plan to combine universal military training with compulsory secondary education, on the importance of work, and on the need for even greater military preparedness.

In an apparent reference to the Arab-Israeli war, Castro said that if Cuba were invaded it would never admit defeat or accept a cease-fire; he boasted that the Cuban armed forces and people were instead prepared to fight on, using guerrilla tactics if necessary, to make a military occupation of Cuba untenable. Although he hinted that in such a situation Cuba would receive help from abroad, Castro insisted that Cubans should get used to the idea that they would be fighting alone.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

What was not said. In view of the international attendance at the speech and the imminence of the LASO conference, Castro's omissions are interesting matter for speculation. He said little about LASO except that it had caused fear in the "imperialist" camp, said nothing about the Kossygin visit or the Soviet role in the Middle East, and made only perfunctory reference to revolution in Latin America. His mention of insurgency targets did not go beyond the minimal list of Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia. This could imply that Castro has been prevailed upon to lower the volume of his call for guerrilla warfare in "all or almost all" of Latin America. But it does seem clear that, whatever his reasons, the Cuban revolutionary has decided to keep open his options until the LASO conference itself has begun.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, July 30, 1967
3:50 P.M.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, a draft message to the commander of the Forrestal.

Pass the following personal message from the President to Captain John K. Beling, Commander of the Forrestal:

"I want you and the men of your command to know that the thoughts of the American people are with you at this tragic time. We all feel a great sense of personal loss. The devotion to duty and courage of your men have not gone unnoticed. The sacrifices they have made shall not be in vain."

W.W.Rostow

Sunday, July 30, 1967

Pass the following personal message from the President to Captain John K. Beling, Commander of the Forrestal:

"I want you and the men of your command to know that the thoughts of the American people are with you at this tragic time. We all feel a great sense of personal loss. The devotion to duty and courage of your men have not gone unnoticed. The sacrifices they have made shall not be in vain."

(Copies to intervening commands as appropriate)

Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Sunday, July 30, 1967 -- 2:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

State recommends that you send the following message to President Leoni offering assistance to the victims of last night's earthquake.

The Embassy reports considerable physical damage. The loss of life is estimated to run between 60 and 80. Countless are homeless. No Americans are known to have died with the possible exception of a naturalized Cuban.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Please accept my deepest personal sympathy and that of the people of the United States for the tragedy which struck your country last night. I have asked our Embassy in Caracas to consult immediately with your Government on ways in which the United States may be of assistance.

"Sincerely,

"Lyndon B. Johnson!"

W. W. Rostow

Dictated by Wm. Bowlder over telephone:rlh

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President: July 30, 1967

Herewith Sen. Rusk
responds briefly and well
to the Senators on the C-130's.
WWR

25a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1967

Mr. President:

Enclosed is my suggestion for an answer to Senator Dominick and the Republican Senators about the Congo. I am entirely ready to answer them on your behalf if you prefer.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Suggested Reply.

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Senator Dominick:

I have received the letter of July 27, 1967, about the Congo which you and certain other Senators have signed.

There need be no doubt about what the public was told about the arrival of three transport aircraft to the Congo. On the day before their arrival the Department of State made the following announcement:

"In response to a request from General Mobutu, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States Government has despatched three C-130 transport aircraft and crews to Kinshasa.

"These aircraft will provide long-range logistic support for the Congolese Government in meeting the mercenary-led rebellion. They will be in a non-combatant status.

"The United States has consistently supported the territorial integrity of the Congo."

Your letter noted some of the missions flown by these aircraft. They have also evacuated wounded and refugees, including women and children, and have delivered food to areas in critical need.

The question of policing the world does not arise; there is no such thinking in American policy or in American practice. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy and I have, on various occasions, made United States transport aircraft available to support the unity

and stability of the Congo. From the time of its birth as a nation, the peace and unity of the Congo have been a deep concern of the international community. United Nations resolutions soliciting help for the Congo remain in full force and effect.

The action taken by white mercenaries in early July created a crisis gravely threatening the unity of the country and the lives of large ^{numbers} ~~members~~ of Congolese and citizens of other countries, including more than two thousand American citizens. Our Ambassador in the Congo and the Secretary of State advised me that prompt action was required if a high risk of a serious human tragedy was to be averted. Time was clearly of the essence; an immediate decision was required; doing nothing would have been the wrong decision. Had the tragedy which was averted in fact occurred, I believe you would have regretted a failure to take the action which we took.

The Congress was not in session when a decision was required. The action taken in sending these three transport aircraft to the Congo was in full conformity with the responsibilities and duties of the President in the conduct of our foreign relations.

One of these aircraft has been withdrawn. The others will be withdrawn when the situation permits.

Sincerely yours,

arrived 3:20 pm.

25c

LISTER HILL, ALA., CHAIRMAN

WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
RALPH YARBOROUGH, TEX.
JOSEPH S. CLARK, PA.
JENNINGS RANDOLPH, W. VA.
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., N.J.
CLAIBORNE FELL, R.I.
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS.
GAYLORD NELSON, WIS.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, N.Y.

JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
WINSTON L. PROUTY, VT.
PETER H. DOMINICK, CALIF.
GEORGE MURPHY, CALIF.
PAUL J. FANNIN, ARIZ.
ROBERT F. GRIFFIN, MICH.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 27, 1967

STEWART E. MCCLURE, CHIEF CLERK
JOHN S. FORSYTHE, GENERAL COUNSEL

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

We have viewed with serious concern the recent events that have transpired in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and are utterly dismayed by the unilateral action taken by the Executive Department in deploying American military aircraft, materiel and personnel into the area.

This action was taken without prior consultation with appropriate committees of Congress and the public was told that the purpose was to insure safety of Americans in the area. After the deployment, we were told that the action was motivated not for such purpose but by the need of the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for logistical support.

It is our understanding that these aircraft and our personnel have engaged in more than 35 missions during which we have transported Congolese troops, vehicles, food and communications equipment around the Congo, and have transported aviation fuel for Congolese jet fighter aircraft manned by Ethiopian-trained pilots.

It is our considered judgment that we have no political commitments necessitating such action; that the United States should not interject its military aircraft and personnel into a local, internal dispute; that the safety of American civilian personnel could have been insured through use of civilian aircraft; and that we cannot police the world.


For the foregoing reasons, we, the undersigned:


(1) express our strong disapproval of your action in sending American military personnel, materiel and aircraft into the Congo;


(2) object most strenuously to the Executive Department's taking any such action without first consulting with and obtaining approval from the appropriate committees of Congress; and

(3) urge you most strongly to reconsider your decision and to order our military aircraft, materiel and personnel back to their appropriate bases.

Respectfully,


Peter H. Dominick
United States Senator


Carl T. Curtis
United States Senator


Clifford P. Hansen
United States Senator

page two
The President
July 27, 1967

Wallace F. Bennett
Wallace F. Bennett
United States Senator

Norris Cotton
Norris Cotton
United States Senator

Karl E. Mundt
Karl E. Mundt
United States Senator

James B. Pearson
James B. Pearson
United States Senator

Strom Thurmond
Strom Thurmond
United States Senator

John G. Tower
John G. Tower
United States Senator

Len B. Jordan
Len B. Jordan
United States Senator

Everett M. Dirksen
Everett M. Dirksen
United States Senator

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Howard H. Baker, Jr.
United States Senator

George Murphy
George Murphy
United States Senator

Roman L. Hruska
Roman L. Hruska
United States Senator

Bourke B. Hickenlooper
Bourke B. Hickenlooper
United States Senator

Frank Carlson
Frank Carlson
United States Senator

John J. Williams
John J. Williams
United States Senator

Paul J. Fannin
Paul J. Fannin
United States Senator

26

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-129
By cb, NARA, Date 6-6-95

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 29, 1967 -- 3:45 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an Egyptian asks a Turk to find out "What the U. S. is asking the UAR to do."

The comment on the U. S. and US SR is a growing theme.

With all your burdens, it may not seem so to you, but under your leadership in Asia and elsewhere we are slowly emerging as the chief world power.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

TELEGRAM

26a

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 ANKARA 00460 281821Z

42
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 281510Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC

02

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 460

EXDIS

REF: STATE 7611, 8065

1. FONOFF SEC GEN KUNERALP CALLED ME IN ON JULY 27 AND GAVE ME SUBSTANCE OF LATEST REPORT FROM TURK AMBASSADOR GUNVER IN CAIRO RE CONTACT WITH EL ZYYAT. (GUNVER'S ANALYSIS OF NASSER SPEECH JULY 23 REPORTED SEPTEL). KUNKNULP NOTED THAT FONOFF HAD PASSED US COMMENTS TRANSMITTED REFTELS TO GUNVER WHO THEN HAD ANOTHER TALK WITH EL ZYYAT.

PAGE 2 RUQMGU 460 ~~SECRET~~

2. EL ZYYAT EXPRESSED PLEASURE IN HEARING THAT US WISHED TO KEEP DOOR OPEN FOR FRIENDSHIP IN FUTURE AND WAS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING CONTACTS. HE REFERRED TO FAWZI APPROACH TO SECRETARY IN NEW YORK AND SAID SECRETARY HAD NEVER GIVEN FAWZI CLEAR INDICATION OF SUBSTANCE OF US VIEWS. HE ASKED, "WHAT DOES US EXPECT UAR TO DO AND WHAT IS US ASKING UAR TO DO?" UAR HAD NOT SO FAR BEEN ABLE TO ELUCIDATE US POSITION. REFERRING TO GREATEST SERVICE TURKEY AND "OUR FRIENDS" COULD RENDER, EL ZYYAT SAID "IF WE KNOW WHAT THEY EXPECT OF US, THEN WE WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO."

3. EL ZYYAT CONVEYED DEEP FRUSTRATION CONCERNING SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD UAR AND SAID IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT US WAS CHIEF WORLD POWER AND USSR WAS PLAYING SECOND FIDDLE.

NOT TO BE INTRODUCED

~~SECRET~~ WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By pc, NARA, Date 9-23-02

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

PAGE 02 ANKARA 00460 281821Z

HE OBSERVED THAT VIEWS OF SOVIET DEPFONMIN MALIK RE
SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HAS "SHOCKED" UAR BECAUSE
THEY HAD ~~IMINCED~~ IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THAT ARABS HAD TO
ACCEPT CESSATION OF STATE OF BELLIGERENCY.

GP-3 MARTIN

implied

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~~1 copy~~
2 Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 29, 1967 -- 3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Elsbeth got up early and did this memo on the urban race problem.

At the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4 are three concrete short-run suggestions which may -- or may not -- be helpful.

I came to work before she completed the memo. If you think she's on the right track, I can persuade her, I suspect, to complete and keep thinking about it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

TO: WWR
 FROM: EDR
 DATE: 29 July 1967
 TOPIC: Race, Riot and the National Interest

PROBLEM: Too obvious to belabor: we have failed for over 300 years meaningfully to relate the Negro to the goals and values of this society. Now, in the crunch of '67, we are confronted by:

- (a) a black segment of America largely inert, leaderless and benign but also largely dissassociated from the prototype suburban white middle class;
 - (b) a relatively small black minority, activist, nihilist, newly-organized and currently dedicated to blowing up the show.
- The problem is in the short-run to keep group (b) from succeeding and in the long-run to bring group (a) into the family.

CAUS ES: Like the problem, they fall into 2 categories:

Long-run causes:

- (1) Race: Negroes were the one wholly involuntary group of immigrants. Ripped initially from Africa, they arrived out of tribal, family, linguistic, religious context; bringing no culture with them except as individuals, they were denied the perpetuation of their African memories by the logistics of slavery. After a generation, only an occasional African name remained to show a ~~XXXX~~ pre-American past. The loss for the Negro by the end of the colonial period? His culture, dignity, religious beliefs, family or tribal identity. Alone of Americans' immigrant groups, the Negro was denied cohesion, pride and a sense of being part of a stream of history.

Since 1787 or 1863 or 1865 or 1953 we've done a lot. But we're far from being colorblind in '67. Tokenism is not integration; and, holed up in our suburban split-levels and Cape Cod colonials, we are intent on keeping it that way.

So I'd put race at the top of causal lists. A lot of the current poverty-talk is a fig-leaf on top of racial feelings. Nonetheless....

- (2) Poverty: White immigrants in this country traditionally moved up on two escalating devices: (a) education and (b) income. This mechanism allowed any child, at least in theory, to conduct the pursuit of excellence as far as his ability allowed him to go. For both the "Old Immigration" (pre1880) and the "New Immigration" (1880 to 1924) the 2 escalators were pretty effective. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Since the states controlled education, a child born in Mass. was luckier than one born in Miss...but in either case he was lucky only if he was white.

Quite aside from the varying quality of public education state by state and region by region, the Negro had an added problem: a racially-conditioned early-school leaving

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age. Those immigrant groups which eagerly grasped the public-school escalator as a path to income ~~XXXXX~~ ranged from the Puritan to the Jew, from the Irish to the Italian. The incentives varied: religion (doctrine of works), family pride, materialism, the boss's daughter, etc. etc. But for the most part the Negro lacked these incentives. Why stay in a bad school if it led nowhere? No ambitious father at home whipped the boy into scholarship; no supportive culture placed school-attendance as a summum bonum. No "my-son-the-doctor" syndrome developed among Negro mothers. Down to the 1950s, those "egrees" who achieved relative affluence and true upper-class status within the separate Negro caste could do little with the income their efforts had produced: Housing? Travel? The Good Life? Scarcely. A lavender Cadillac and a charge-account at the liquor-store were scarcely the success-symbols of white America but they became the Negro's by default.

So poor-education and poverty became the average Negro's companions. But the point is that he was a drop-out not just from school but from the entire white value-system of which education is so important a component. He had turned his back over time on the classic way upward for his fellow Americans and was thus locked into a low-skilled, low-income no-future bracket. And since he had never made it ~~XXXXXX~~ into what current jargon terms the power structure, there was no one loudly to protest his situation. Which brings me to...

(3) Leadership: Or perhaps lack of it. The heart of this matter is a paradox: we assumed after 1863 everyone who could vote was thus represented; yet the freed Negro had no voting tradition and even when he went to the polls ~~XX~~ rarely found himself represented by someone who put Negro needs and problems his on his priority-list. Thus, just as schooling had not produced the income it did for whites, so voting produced no power or influence for the Negro. The Irish and the Italians moved into politics as a quick way up; they moved into the police-force for the same reason. And once in office, in the back room, in uniform, the Irish and the Italians had achieved one of the goals for which they had made the migration in the first place. And to a certain extent they were thus anxious to protect the establishment which was giving them returns for their efforts.

The Negro was anti-establishment because he could not conceive becoming a part of it. Except as a waiter at the Metropolitan Club. Or a boxer, and later a baseball player. Or as an entertainer. But none of these exceptions constituted an establishment-role. Moynihan's distaste for a woman-dominated Negro ghetto is largely because it emasculates the boy and fits him for no responsible role as an adult. It was no accident that the Negro was for so long called "boy." Think of calling Patrick Henry or Benjamin Cardozo "boy." How many Senator Brooke's has this nation of nearly 200 million produced? *

Conclusion re long-run causes? We simply yanked the Negro out of Africa into slavery and ultimately into urban ghettos, destroying
*no pun intended, but the point is well-taken.)

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a good part of his institutional base and personal identity along the way. And now we wonder why there is trouble.

Short-run causes:

- (1) The sudden speed-up of history: During the last 20 years history has jumped the track from 33 to 78. Black nations crowd the UN; the Army runs an integrated war (Korea), and the Supreme Court decides that the old education-escalator has to be widened. All of this is hard enough for white Americans to absorb; its impact on the semi-educated American Negro (who even speaks a brand of English which often requires translation for the rest of us) has been confusing, exciting and disturbing.
- (2) The emergence of new Negro leadership: Compare Malcolm X to Roy Wilkins, Rapp Brown to Thurgood Marshall and you see what's happening, baby. The gradualists, the "house-niggers", have lost the headlines after all these years. TV has projected the image of middle-class white America into the ghetto, thus raising the demand-level for the first time to meaningful proportions; but the chance of attaining such levels within the lifetime of the Negro viewer remains slight despite history's speed-up. And who really cares about the kind of opportunities his kids may have when he knows his own life will be barely better? Not the Negro who has had hedonism bred into him in this country. So the Negro is willing to listen to the new leadership as never before.

This still doesn't mean that the American Negro as a whole has turned militant. The evidence is strongly to the contrary; to this extent the non-activist, non-violent Negro press is representative of the majority.

But no one should forget that the new leadership, for all its nastiness, is the first effort to endow blackness with status, negritude with dominance and resentment of whites with rectitude.

SOLUTIONS:

Long-run: Money. Slum clearance, instant renewal, vastly better schools, maybe family allowances or child allowances, better police forces, increased political representation, etc. In short, most of the Great Society programs plus more.

Short-run: Why not try fusing a part of the CCC with Bob McNamara's concept of national service and coming up with a National Corps or American Brigade or simply a beefed up Domestic Peace Corps? Open to both sexes, 17 on up, 18-mo or 2 year service, preliminary training period but Not just a job corps. Tasks? Conservation...ok

beautification (good to get Negroes out of cities for ~~XXXXXX~~ awhile) plus the vast job of making cities ~~XXXXXX~~ liveable. Some could do straight CCC tasks; others could do Peace Corps work. All would be paid-which in terms of the Negro unemployment rate is necessary. Whites could of course join too. Somebody good should run it with a suitable amount of fanfare.

Why not make a push now to get many more Negroes on urban police forces? In such numbers that the Black face ~~in~~ uniform becomes accepted.

Why not put pressure on local ~~XXXXXX~~ party leadership to get Negroes into precinct and other activities quickly?

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Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-129
By cb, NARA, Date 6-6-95

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, July 29, 1967
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith authoritative report
Kosygin-Miki conversation.

Negative on Viet Nam except
proposition that we should deal
directly with Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

29

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, July 29, 1967
3:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud reports on
where he is on foreign aid with Senate
and House Committees.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, MARA, Date 7-23-91

2905

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29a

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-316

By ing, NARA, Date 8-20-93

JUL 28 1967

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Relations Committee Action on the Foreign Aid
Authorizing Bill

Yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee, by a vote of 10-2, agreed to report favorably the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. Church's amendment to report the bill without recommendation failed by a vote of 7-7, with Church receiving support from Morse, Symington, Aiken, Mundt, Williams and Fulbright. Fulbright announced he probably will vote against the bill and that Sparkman will manage it. However, Sparkman told us this afternoon that Fulbright came to see him to say that he had changed his mind and that he will manage the bill. We do not know when the bill will go to the floor.

The press reports -- which indicate the bill was gutted -- are somewhat misleading. Economic assistance fared better in some respects than last year, and, depending on what happens on the floor, the damage after conference may not be too severe. The most serious problem is number of country restrictions. Military assistance, however, was hurt very badly -- primarily by a sharp reduction in funds, by elimination of DOD authority to make credit sales of items furnished from new procurement and to guarantee credit extended by private parties or the Ex-Im Bank, and by abolition of the credit sales revolving fund.

We are doing well in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It should finish its mark-up in a week or two. In the following summary of Senate actions, I will indicate comparable House Committee actions to date.

The Senate bill, in effect, authorizes \$2.9 billion for economic and military assistance -- about \$400 million below our adjusted appropriations request of \$3.3 billion. (The table on Attachment A sets forth the Senate Committee actions and the House Committee actions to date, compares them with our appropriations requests and shows the result of an assumed 50-50 conference compromise.) \$2.4 billion of

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-2-

the \$2.9 billion Senate Committee figure is for economic assistance (\$222 million below our appropriations request). The House Committee will come close to our full request. \$475 million is for military assistance. However, \$84 million of this is for NATO Infrastructure and International Military Headquarters costs -- items which we sought to transfer to the DOD budget but which both Committees insist be funded from military assistance. This leaves \$391 million against our request of \$596 million. The House Committee is authorizing \$566 million of the \$596 million.

The Senate Committee's military assistance cut hurts. \$60 million of the proposed program is for credit sales. The reduction leaves us without money for these sales and leaves the balance of the program about \$145 million short. Aside from five countries on the perimeter of the USSR and Communist China (Korea, Republic of China, Greece, Turkey and Iran), only \$148 million is allocated to all other proposed MAP programs. These other programs (including the Philippines, Indonesia, Latin America, Africa and administrative costs) cannot be wiped out completely. Thus heavy cuts -- about \$100 million, or about 20% -- would have to be absorbed by the 5 major programs.

Other Actions on Military Assistance

Church Amendment. The Committee adopted the Church Amendment by a vote of 12-6 (Sparkman, Mansfield, Lausche, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson). The amendment --

1. Repeals all authority to make credit sales of items furnished from new procurement.
2. Repeals the authority to guarantee credit extended by private banks, exporters, or the Export-Import Bank.
3. Transfers all assets of the credit sales revolving fund to the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury after December 31, 1967, and thereby deprives DOD of funds needed to pay outstanding obligations incurred as a result of past credit sales.
4. Repeals after December 31, 1967 the authority of DOD to receive disbursements from the Export-Import Bank which come due under past sales to the Bank by DOD of evidences of indebtedness (these sums are needed by DOD to pay obligations owed to suppliers on past credit sales); and also repeals the authority of the DOD to transfer collections received from foreign countries which are owed to the Bank as a result of disbursements already made by the Bank.

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-3-

In terms of its impact on the current budget, we would need to request approximately \$230 million more in MAP appropriations for FY 1968 in order to make disbursements for the period December 31 through June 30 to liquidate obligations previously incurred to suppliers and to the Export-Import Bank. Approximately \$500 million additionally would be needed in subsequent fiscal years to liquidate completely existing obligations.

The Committee action was purportedly directed at restraining but not eliminating sales to underdeveloped countries. In the Committee's view, adequate authority was left to make sales to developed countries who, in the judgment of the Committee, could obtain financing from commercial sources or the Export-Import Bank.

Thus, the Committee action still permits DOD to make sales from DOD inventories on terms of repayment of up to three years. However, this authority is virtually useless since (a) over 90% of current sales are made from new production; (b) three years does not provide adequate credit terms for underdeveloped countries; (c) the military departments could not be reimbursed by MAP funds and hence would have to wait three years in order to obtain funds to procure replacement items.

The Committee action also permits us to make sales from new procurement on a "dependable undertaking" basis, i.e., the purchasing country must put up the money at such times and in such amounts as we need it to pay suppliers. This authority is largely valueless with respect to underdeveloped countries, and its utility with respect to developed countries presupposes that commercial bank or Export-Import Bank financing is available at reasonable terms where credit is necessary, such as in the recent major UK loan. It is somewhat doubtful that adequate credit will be available to finance military exports even to the developed countries in view of the tight money situation, high current interest rates, the limitation imposed by the Interest Equalization Tax and pending efforts in other committees to curtail the authority of the Export-Import Bank. In this connection, it should be noted that a number of transactions with developed countries were financed at less than the current commercial rates of interest and that some of these transactions are not yet fully financed.

Finally, with respect to the underdeveloped countries the impact of the Church Amendment will be to prevent us from living up to existing commitments (e.g., we are committed to Iran for two more tranches of \$50 million each at a rate of interest between 5 - 6% on 5 to 7 year terms) unless the Export-Import Bank itself directly makes an unguaranteed loan agreement

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-4-

with the country concerned. We also would be unable to provide any credit sales assistance in the Middle East (Israel or other countries). Their budgetary situation is such that the articles would either have to be furnished as grant aid or the Export-Import Bank would have to lend the countries the necessary money without guarantee by the DOD of repayment.

In substance the Senate Committee bill authorizes us to provide assistance on a grant basis but not to provide it on terms of credit.

Africa. The Senate Committee bill tightens the current ceiling of \$25 million on grant defense articles to Africa by including military sales and training. Our proposed FY 1968 program subject to the ceiling totals \$53.6 million -- \$21.2 million of grant defense articles, \$4.4 million of training (about half of the articles and training is for Ethiopia) and \$28 million of military sales (\$14 million each for Libya and Morocco). The House Committee has not changed the ceiling.

Latin America. The Senate Committee bill reduces from \$85 million to \$50 million the existing ceiling on grants and sales to Latin America. The House Committee raised the ceiling to \$100 million.

Other Actions on Economic Assistance

Number of Countries - The bill limits us to 15 countries for Development Loans (our proposed program is 22); Technical Assistance to 40 (our proposed program is 41 plus 7 African countries that would receive about \$75,000 each in Self-Help Funds); and Supporting Assistance to 10 (our proposed program is 10). In each case the bill provides that countries may be added only after a finding by the President and approval by a concurrent resolution of the Congress. Existing law basically requires only a finding by the President.

These limits not only will give us trouble in our African program with Development Loans and Technical Assistance, but should there be a political emergency anywhere in the world, we will have no leeway in our Supporting Assistance program.

The House Committee has agreed to the Administration request to strike all the number of country restrictions.

Length of Authorization. We requested two years. The Senate bill gives us FY 1968 only and also cuts out the existing authorizations for FY 1969 for the Alliance and Development Loans. The House Committee is giving us two years across the board.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-5-

Transfers to the World Bank. Like last year, the Senate bill says that some of our Development Loan funds may be used only for transfer to the World Bank family. Last year it was 15% of our funds, this year 10%. The House Committee leaves us where we are today -- we may transfer up to 10%, but no funds are set aside.

Investment Guaranty Programs. Here the Senate bill denies just about every change or increase in authority we requested. It also cuts back our extended risk program from 75% coverage of investments to 50%. This change, if it sticks, would mean the end of the extended risk program, a program that is now very productive, especially in War on Hunger efforts. We mobilized strong private support on this one, but a motion yesterday in the Committee to restore the 75% figure failed to carry by 6-7.

The House Committee is giving us pretty much everything we want on our guaranty programs.

Policy Provisions. The Senate Committee struck out our proposed statement of policy and the statement of policy now in the Foreign Assistance Act; our proposed sections on the purposes of development assistance and self-help criteria; our proposed National Advisory Committee on Self-Help; and our proposed endorsement of multilateral and regional programs. The House Committee goes along with us most of the way, except that they also struck out the Self-Help Committee.

Other Provisions. The Senate bill denies a good number of our requests including additional supergrades for the Vietnam Bureau and the War on Hunger and Private Resources Offices. They also turned down the amendment to put our long-term overseas people in the Foreign Service Retirement System. The House Committee has not acted on the retirement question, but turned down the supergrade request.

* * * * *

On Monday Nick Katzenbach, Bill Macomber, Paul Nitze, Barefoot Sanders, Mike Manatos and I will meet to discuss Senate floor strategy.



William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Category	(In \$ Millions)			Appropriation Request	Average Reduction from Appropriation Request	
	Tentative HFAC Authorization	SFRC Authorization	Average Authorization			
Development Loans	785.0 ^{1/}	785.0 ^{1/}	785.0	774.0	--	296
Technical Assistance	243.0	210.0	226.5	242.8	-- 16.3	
Alliance for Progress	650.0 ^{2/}	578.0	614.0	643.0	- 29.0	
Loans	(540.0)	(478.0)	(509.0)	(533.0)	(- 24.0)	
Grants	(110.0)	(100.0)	(105.0)	(110.0)	(- 5.0)	
Supporting Assistance	720.0	600.0	660.0	720.0	- 60.0	
General	(170.0)			(170.0)		
Vietnam	(550.0)			(550.0)		
Contingency Fund	75.0	50.0	62.5	31.0	--	
Contributions to International Organizations	141.0	140.5	140.7	141.0	- 0.3	
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad	14.0 ^{3/}	14.0 ^{4/}	14.0	13.9	--	
Surveys of Investment Opportunities	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	--	
Administrative Expenses - AID	58.0 ^{5/}	55.8	56.9	59.3	- 2.4	
" " State	6/	6/	6/	3.4	--	
al Economic.	<u>2,691.5</u>	<u>2,438.8</u>	<u>2,565.1</u>	<u>2,630.4</u>	<u>-108.0</u>	
Military Assistance ^{7/}	565.9	391.0	478.5	596.0	-117.5	
TOTAL ^{7/}	<u>3,257.4</u>	<u>2,829.8</u>	<u>3,043.6</u>	<u>3,226.4</u>	<u>-225.5</u>	
Military Assistance (including \$84.1 million for NATO Infrastructure and International Military Headquarters)	650.0	475.1	562.6	680.1	-117.5	
Total (Adjusted)	<u>3,341.5</u>	<u>2,913.9</u>	<u>3,127.7</u>	<u>3,310.5</u>	<u>-225.5</u>	

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FOOTNOTES

- 1/ Total of \$785 million includes \$600 million FY 1968 authorization plus \$185 million existing FY 1967 authorization which was not appropriated in FY 1967 and is therefore available for appropriation in FY 1968.
- 2/ Plus \$0.7 million separate Partners of the Alliance authorization not requested by the Administration.
- 3/ Plus \$1 million in Israeli pounds for a girls' school in Israel.
- 4/ Plus \$3 million in Israeli pounds for two schools in Israel.
- 5/ HFAC has not yet acted on Administrative Expenses; \$58 million assumes an estimated cut of \$1.3 million.
- 6/ Permanent authorization for such funds as may be necessary.
- 7/ Not including NATO Infrastructure and International Military Headquarters.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-129
By ab, NARA, Date 6-6-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Saturday, July 29, 1967 -- 3:20 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Leonard Marks reports a USSR campaign against USIA's alleged sabotage of the 50th anniversary.

As you know, Dobrynin leaned rather hard on Sec. Rusk concerning Svetlana's book.

I recommend we just play it cool.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR

July 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

2900
300
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-131
By isg, NARA, Date 3-29-94

It has become apparent that the Russians have started a campaign directed against the USIA, accusing it of attempting to undermine the 50th Anniversary celebration of the founding of the Soviet Union, scheduled for October 1967.

There have been a series of articles in Pravda, Izvestiya and various youth publications which follow a similar line. The accusations also involve the State Department, CIA, Department of Defense and the President. The following quotation will illustrate the nature of the charge:

"The basic points in the American program of preparation for the USSR anniversary in general can be expressed in three points:

- "1. Discreditation of Soviet foreign policy,
- "2. The undermining of the unity of the Socialist countries thereby creating the political isolation of the USSR,
- "3. Discreditation of the political and economic system of the USSR.

"So, this time USIA has switched to our holiday. Among its projects that are being carried out are: conferences, symposia, sessions, question and answer periods, and seminars in anti-Soviet centers at the major universities in America. In particular, we are talking about Columbia, Stanford, Harvard, Princeton, and other universities."

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- 2 -

Soviet publications contend that:

"... And the entire movement is supervised by the coordinating committee on the general direction of psychological warfare under the direct command of the President of the USA."

Linked with this attack are references to the publication of a book by Svetlana Stalin to be published in October by Harper and Row.

With reference to the Stalin book, Arthur Schlesinger recently wrote me suggesting that the publication be deferred until 1968 to avoid a conflict with the 50th Anniversary celebrations.

I anticipate that future Soviet propaganda will attempt to link USIA to the book and accuse us of having it published to discredit the Anniversary. Incidentally, it is a common Soviet practice to accuse someone else of motives and tactics which they constantly employ.

The USIA has had no connection with this publication. We will not interfere with its contents, publication or method of distribution. No reply will be made to the Schlesinger letter.



Leonard H. Marks

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

31
Pres file

Saturday, July 29, 1967
1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Turkey has suffered a second major earthquake in a week. You may want to send the attached message of condolence. You sent a longer message last Sunday, at the time of the first disaster.

W. W. Rostow

Send message_____

No_____

See me_____

31a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SUNAY

His Excellency
Cevdet Sunay,
President of the Republic of Turkey.

Dear Mr. President:

My fellow Americans share my grief that a second major earthquake has struck Turkey within a single week. Our deepest sympathies are with you and your countrymen in these misfortunes.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Saturday, July 29, 1967
12 noon

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: People's Corps

You asked that we look into Sol Linowitz' idea of a "People's Corps" to see if it has merit.

Bill Bowdler has researched the proposal and finds that the town considers it unnecessary and inadvisable principally for these reasons:

- the concept is already being carried out on a considerable scale through a number of government and private programs.
- any effort to combine these under a single umbrella would pose tremendous problems of organization and funding.

By way of example of what is being done:

- the Peace Corps, which is a "People's Corps", by the end of this year will have 14,500 volunteers in 58 countries working in 384 different skills and specialties.
- the State-USA Exchange Program brought 8602 persons from 130 countries to the United States last year and sent 3013 Americans abroad. The two-way traffic included students, teachers, lecturers, researchers and specialists in different fields such as sports.
- The Institute for International Education, a private clearing house for placement of students and teachers, reports that during 1966 more than 83,000 students from 158 countries and territories attended 1755 institutions in the United States. The number of foreign faculty members was 9,200 from 108 countries. American students going abroad reached between 18-20,000, of which about 30 percent went to under-developed countries. American teachers going abroad totalled 3,954, with 50 percent of these going to under-developed countries.
- the Partners of the Alliance has recently started a volunteer technical assistance program, sending Americans to Latin America

and bringing Latinos to this country. So far 227 persons have been exchanged in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, health, business and industry, education, transportation and public administration.

- other private programs include the AFL/CIO's American Institute of Free Labor Development, the International Executive Service Corps, and the Council for Latin America's many faceted activities.
- on the government side there is AID's extensive technical assistance program and DOD's military training program.

The opinion of persons like Len Marks, Jack Vaughn and Bill Gaud is that we are better off to expand existing public and private programs as funds and competent recruits permit. I agree.

W. W. Rostow

July 3, 1967

PERSONAL

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

May I put before you an idea which might be relevant and timely?

Perhaps this is the time for the President to call for the creation of a "People's Corps" in which industry, labor, agriculture, the arts, the sciences -- in short, every occupation, profession and interest in our national life -- would join together in a program of person-to-person international aid and cooperation.

Under such a program businessmen would be enlisted to help businessmen in the developing nations, farmers to help farmers, scientists to help scientists, students to help students -- all joined in a great human undertaking reaching out to the peoples of the underdeveloped world.

Various things along this line, of course, are already being done through the Peace Corps, AID, the Alliance for Progress, and through various foundations, educational programs and private efforts (such as the International Executive Service Corps). But the "People's Corps" would be a great national undertaking in which Americans of all ages and callings, charged with a sense of humanitarian inspiration, could volunteer their time and energies in order to make available to the other

peoples of the world some of the benefits we have achieved in our time. This could perhaps be the most meaningful way to make clear the kind of people we are and the kind of world we seek.

If the suggestion seems to have any merit, I would be delighted to develop it further.

Sincerely,

Sol M. Linowitz

SML:rsg

July ²⁸27, 1967 - Friday
2:30 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith a suggested acknowledgement
of OAS Secretary General Mora's letter
reporting on Summit follow-up action in
science and technology.

W. W. ROSTOW

Attachment

July 28, 1967

Dear Dr. Mora:

Thank you for your letter of July 20 concerning follow-up action on the Punta del Este decisions.

I am pleased that the Organization of American States has moved ahead quickly with the Regional Program for Science and Technology. The new program will help to speed up progress in the development of the member states in this decade of urgency.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Jose A. Mora
Secretary General of the
Organization of American States
Pan American Union

LBJ/WGB:mmm

PAN AMERICAN UNION
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1967

My dear Mr. President:

The response which the Science and Technology Section of the Declaration of the Presidents of America has evoked in the Organization of American States has been remarkable. Seldom in the years in which I have had the honor of serving as Secretary General have I noted so great an enthusiasm or so strong a determination to move forward into action.

As you doubtless know, in the short time since the conference at Punta del Este the Council of the Organization and the Inter-American Cultural Council have acted to ensure the meeting at our headquarters, from July 17 to 24, of the Group of Experts called for by the Declaration. The Group is now in session, and I am deeply gratified that among its members is a person of the stature of Dr. J. R. Killian.

The expert group is considering a regional plan for scientific and technological development; it is studying the establishment or strengthening of multinational science centers; and it is drawing up recommendations concerning the organization and administration of the Special Fund for Science. The findings are to be presented at the next regular meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council for final action.

In the few years since the creation of a Department of Scientific Affairs in the General Secretariat, I have become aware of a growing interest

The President
of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

in, and recognition of, science and technology as major factors in the development of Latin America. The fact that the Organization of American States has acted promptly at all levels in initiating implementation of the Science and Technology Section of the Declaration of the Presidents of America is a clear demonstration of such interest.

It is my firm expectation that the recommendations to be made by the Group of Experts and the subsequent action thereon by the Inter-American Cultural Council will result in a positive contribution to the betterment of life in our hemisphere. The generous offer of the United States Government to provide funds for the initial science studies ensures that action will be initiated without delay. The offer is deeply appreciated by the other member states both for the material benefits which should derive therefrom and for the evidence it gives of the spirit of solidarity and cooperation with Latin America which animates the nation over which you so ably preside.

Sincerely yours,


José A. Mora
Secretary General

1967 JUL 21 PM 9 34

WWR 34
Profile

5:20
Friday, July 28, 1967 -- 2:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ammunition sales to Pakistan

At Tab A is a draft cable, approved by Katzenbach and Nitze, which further defines our policy on arms sales to India and Pakistan. Because of the current problems on the Hill, I thought you would want to review it.

You will recall that last April we announced a new arms policy for the Sub-Continent. Essentially, we:

- pulled our large military advisory teams out of India and Pakistan, replacing them with small attache-type offices;
- stopped all grant military aid to both countries, except for a little training;
- banned U.S. sales of military end items to either country;
- announced our intent to stop any third-country military sales to either country over which we had some control, unless such sales contribute to stabilization and/or decline in their military expenditures;
- agreed to make cash sales to both countries of spare parts for equipment we have previously supplied.

Neither country threw its hat in the air about this policy, but both accepted it with reasonable grace. The Paks immediately gave us a list of spare parts they want to buy. The Indians asked to buy some machine tools for an ammunition factory and some books and technical manuals about ammunition manufacturing. We agreed to the small Air Force and Navy spare parts requests for Pakistan, as well as the sale of machine tools to India. The decision now is whether to agree to the larger (\$9.2 million) parts request for the Pakistani Army and the technical data request from the Indians. After a careful analysis, Defense has concluded that the Pak Army request is reasonable, and that the release of information to India on ammunition-making will cause us no problems.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-129
By rip, NARA, Date 8-31-95 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Paragraph 1(a) of the cable raises one additional question -- should ammunition be sold under the "spare parts" rule? You know the arguments; if one is willing to supply a breech mechanism necessary to fire a rifle, he looks silly refusing to provide ammunition, which is just as necessary. This must be weighed against the fact that ammunition sales may present a tougher public relations problem than ordinary spare parts. After much soul-searching, Katzenbach and Nitze have decided to recommend that we agree to consider ammunition requests on a case-by-case basis.

On balance, I agree with the recommendation. These are cash sales -- not the credit sales the Congress is most upset about. They are to be made under an announced policy which has been greeted pretty favorably in the press and on the Hill. If we refuse to follow through, we will lose much of our influence on military policies and expenditures in Pakistan. We would also cost Ben Oehlert a large part of the initial fund of good will he needs in dealing with Ayub. I would advise you to approve the message.

We have not checked this move on the Hill. With arms sales a hot issue, the chances of a leak and a distorted story are no worse than even. If you think it necessary, however, I can ask Katzenbach to do some soundings with the appropriate people.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Have Katzenbach check on the Hill and then come back to me _____

O.K. on the spare parts, but tell the Paks we can't sell ammunition _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Hamilton/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Amembassy RAWALPINDI
Amembassy NEW DELHI

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
" TEHRAN
" BONN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-130
By CG, NARA, Date 2-13-95

1. This message states USG position on Pak and Indian ammunition and ordnance purchase requests and on Pak Army critical spares list:

a. We prepared consider ammo requests on case by case basis, subject essentially same criteria as apply lethal spares under current policy. We also prepared consider requests for release technical data to permit ammo production in Pak and Indian ordnance factories.

b. We have concluded review and costing Pak Army critical spares list. Our cost estimate is \$9.2 million (including \$3.4 million for spares for tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and other armored vehicles and \$2 million for army aircraft spares). We conclude these figures reasonable, given our estimate of slightly over \$10 million as likely cost total spares requirements for one year for U.S. origin equipment now in Pak Army, and now prepared receive purchase requests.

2. FOR RAWALPINDI: You authorized convey above to Defense Minister Khan. On ammo you should point out we will need considerable additional discussion on this subject. For example, Air Force list includes \$3.9 million for 2.7 inch rockets; we need to know by what amount this will be affected in view our readiness concur in related request dating from August 1966 for release of technical data for production 2.75 inch rockets at Wah. (MAAG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

(MAAG memo to STRICOM August 25, 1966). Also, Army ammo list now in our hands appears to be statement of deficiencies on basis force levels rather than indication of items desired to be purchased.

3. FOR NEW DELHI: You authorized inform government of India we prepared meet request for release of technical data related to domestic production certain types weapons and ammo (57 mm recoilless rifle, 75 mm pack (I pack Howitzer, 7.62 mm tracer ammo, and 57 mm and fuze fed 106 mm cartridges). See USMSMI letters November 28, 1966 and January 11, 1967.

We believe concurrence in these requests consistent with policy considerations that governed our favorable decision on machine tools for Ambajhari.

4. Addressee Posts should bear in mind that, if classified equipment or information is involved in releases, the requirement for obtaining a prior exception to NDPC policy must be fulfilled in order for the release to take place. Guidance on handling commercial transfers of technical data and/or licensing for manufacture items on Munitions List will follow.

END

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

L
Friday
July 28, 1967
4:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a reliable report that the first presentation of the Panama Canal Treaty draft (on the lock canal) to the Panamanian Foreign Relations Council went very poorly.

We don't know yet:

- whether these are final attitudes or accumulated irritation which will wear off;
- what Robles will do;
- or how much is simply anti-Eleta politics.

We'll keep you informed.

25X1A

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:sln

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-020-1-1
By Q, NARA, Date 12-17-01

~~1. Summary~~
2. Profile

Friday, July 28, 1967
4:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Here is today's report on
political developments in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MW:hg

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

36

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-130

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

By CG NARA. Date 7-12-94

July 28, 1967

Adding to previous public and private remarks in the same vein, Ky told a meeting of 300 pedicab drivers near Saigon yesterday that he would not hesitate to overthrow the next government if it fell into the hands of "bad and corrupt" elements.

We have notified Ambassador Bunker of our concern over such remarks, which feed press and public doubts about progress toward constitutional government. We are awaiting his action and reply.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, July 28, 1967 -- 2:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to examine this report on the scale and objectives of Soviet rearming of Arab states.

The first page consists of a summary.

At the paper clip is a table which confirms what Dobrynin told Kohler at lunch yesterday; namely, that Soviet resupply "was at a level much less than what the Arabs had lost to the Israelis."

This is true for:

- bombers;
- tanks;
- guns.

It is not true for fighters.

W. W. Rostow

SNIE 11-13-67, Cy 1
20 July 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-509
By CB, NARA, Date 5-26-95

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 28, 1967 -- 12:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

The cables say:

1. De Gaulle is increasingly operating a personal rather than governmental foreign policy.
2. His anti-Americanism grows worse as he estimates U.S. power and influence expands.
3. The French press is almost universally against him on his Canadian performance.
4. The Canadian performance has hurt him politically but how much, we can't say -- notably because it's vacation time in France.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 86-15
By rs/hip, NARA, Date 8-30-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, July 28, 1967 - 9:25am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk recommends for evening reading this thoughtful analysis of de Gaulle's somewhat disturbed frame of mind on foreign policy.

W. W. Rostow

REU-40, July 26, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 8304

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Research*³⁹²
Memorandum

REU-40, July 26, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: De Gaulle's Stepped-Up Anti-Americanism
and The Crisis of French Foreign Policy

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLG 85-80
By ref/isp, NARA, Date 8-30-91

During the last two months General de Gaulle has acted as if his foreign policy faced a crisis which might prove fatal to it. This paper analyzes the dimensions of that crisis as seen by de Gaulle and its implications for his future course of action.

ABSTRACT

It has been clear since the Israeli-Arab conflict that General de Gaulle has been profoundly disturbed by the implications of the Middle East crisis. For a time it appeared as if he were reacting to the failure of his own plan for four-power action in the crisis, or to the danger of an open conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, or to the prospect of an abrupt halt in that movement toward detente on which his European policy is based. More recently, however, it has become clearer that he has been less alarmed by the prospect that the Big Two might clash and more concerned by the prospect that they might decide to work together to impose their authority in troubled areas, such as the Middle East and Vietnam, and to reimpose it in Europe, where it has recently--to de Gaulle's satisfaction--been relaxing.

In the Middle East itself, de Gaulle has had to face the fact that his hope to maintain a balance of power in the area, whereby the local states could maintain their "independence" of the two blocs, vanished as a result of the recent conflict. Since Israel now looks to Washington, in his view, and most

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

- ii -

of the Arab states to Moscow, the area will now either be torn by the conflict of the Big Two or will be divided between them. De Gaulle's undisguised effort to demonstrate French partiality toward the Arabs is a frantic and forlorn attempt to try to restore the previous power balance in the area.

Far more ominous to de Gaulle than the fate of the Middle East is the prospect that the Soviet Union, after backing down, as he sees it, before the United States in the Middle East, and advertising its rout at Glassboro and at the United Nations, may now decide to reconfirm the "Yalta" status quo in Europe. He now fears that the USSR may abandon hope of success for its policy, complementary to de Gaulle's, of driving the US from Western Europe by encouraging France and West Germany to assert their "independence" of Washington. Instead, the General is concerned that Moscow may now accept continued American "hegemony" over Western Europe in return for reciprocal recognition of its own sphere in Eastern Europe, or at least for the consolidation of the East-West status quo. This, of course, would be checkmate to de Gaulle's policy of "detente, entente and cooperation" from the Atlantic to the Urals.

De Gaulle's answer to what he must view as an imminent threat has been to redouble his warnings about the danger of American "hegemony," a danger which he sees strengthened by Soviet weakness in relation to US strength. In particular, he is trying harder than ever now to convince the Germans that prospects for reunification can be preserved only if they follow France's path and reject US leadership, since the US is likely to sacrifice those prospects in order to maintain the American position in Europe. The effect of this on the Germans cannot yet be fully gauged. But for de Gaulle the matter is urgent. He seems to believe that if he fails now, prospects for weakening the hold of the two superpowers on the two halves of the continent which are under their

- iii -

shadows will dwindle away, and the nations of Europe will be as far as ever from attaining that "independence" (under general French leadership) for which he has fought.

During the last two months there has been a marked change in the tone and mood of French foreign policy if not in its basic substance. General de Gaulle's sharp switch from a "balanced" position in the Middle East to a strongly pro-Arab and even, it might be said, pro-Soviet line, and the stridently "anti-American" tone that has accompanied this shift, have led many to conclude that, whether from age or pique, the General's policy has become much more emotionally guided than before. While this may be true to some degree, it is nevertheless possible to tie these events together in a pattern which is consistent with French foreign policy as it has developed over the last several years. Thus analyzed, his sharp tone can perhaps be better understood as a sign of frustration, since all the bases of de Gaulle's foreign policy appear to have been placed in jeopardy by recent events.

De Gaulle's Fear. Several weeks after fighting had ceased in the Middle East, and after the first Kosygin visit to Paris, the French government made known that General de Gaulle viewed the world scene with profound pessimism and disquiet. At the time it was widely thought that he had been impressed by Kosygin's firmness and therefore feared a violent confrontation between the Big Two. Whatever de Gaulle may have felt then, it now appears that his concern is quite different: what he fears now is not Soviet firmness but Soviet weakness, not a Big Two confrontation but a Big Two agreement.

The exact nature of de Gaulle's alarm is admirably defined by an article in the July 15 issue of The Economist. This article calls on the United States and the Soviet Union to come to a basic agreement in these terms:

"But if Russia and America are not going to retire from the world, they will have to do the opposite. They will have to make sure they have a real grip on things. This means, at the very least, agreeing that there are certain parts of the world which are too important to both of them to be allowed to fall wholly under the control of either, or of anybody else. It means a pretty precise definition of their essential spheres of influence in these areas, and an agreement to make these spheres stick. It has already been done in Europe. It needs to be done in south-east Asia and the Middle East too...What it amounts to is the beginning of a loose, informal and indirect condominium over certain specified regions. Put it another way: it amounts to the beginning of a rudimentary form of international government." /Emphasis added/

It would be difficult to find a more precise description of de Gaulle's guiding nightmare than this. For years he has railed against the old Yalta agreements, which supposedly divided the world between the Big Two, and has warned against a new Yalta, which would seek to maintain that division; for years he has urged the nations of the third world to withdraw from Great Power competitions by maintaining "independence"; for years he has worked to loosen the two blocs in Europe and to bring about the fallback of the Big Two from Central Europe, in order to end the "condominium" which deprives the nations of Europe of their independence. All this policy has been called into question by the Middle East crisis--and by the reaction to it of the Big Two.

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The Middle East: Reabsorbed by the Big Two. In the Middle East itself, de Gaulle had tried for several years to keep a foot in both the Arab and the Israeli camps, in order not only to maximize French influence and status but also to help those countries maintain their "independence" from the two super-powers. De Gaulle must realize now that this policy has been destroyed. He is, of course, aggrieved that Israel took action which he had personally warned it not to take, especially since, in doing so, Tel Aviv seemed to show (as he interprets events) that American influence is stronger in Israel than his own. He cannot forgive either Israel or the United States for this, and his rancor against the Jewish state may persist for a long time.

But, much more seriously, the outcome of the conflict--as de Gaulle probably foresaw when he tried to restrain Israel--has been to place at least the "progressive" Arabs more firmly in Moscow's debt than ever, despite the somewhat equivocal Soviet role during the fighting itself and at the United Nations. For all de Gaulle's efforts, France simply has not the wealth, power, or position to offer the defeated Arabs an alternative pole of gravitation. The upshot of all this is that the Middle East, far from becoming "independent" of the cold war and the super-powers, is more firmly tied to them than ever. Israel looks to Washington; Cairo and its associates look to Moscow; no one is able now to play off the two super-powers against each other. Now only does this deprive France of its own chances of maneuvering in the area; it represents a major setback to the French policy of promoting the disengagement of one area after another from the control of the Big Two. Those, like The Economist, who believe that Big Two management of the world's troubled areas is the best guarantee of stability today may welcome the opportunity to move in this direction which the war has created; those, like de Gaulle, who see such "stability" as posing the greatest threat to the independence of their countries, are less hopeful.

The Soviet Union: Letting Down Its End of the Balance of Power. De Gaulle no doubt did not want a US-Soviet armed clash in the Middle East, but the behavior of the Soviet Union since June 5 must fill him with disappointment and alarm. In his view the Russians voted in the Security Council on June 6 for a ceasefire without provision for an Israeli withdrawal; successively watered down their position at the General Assembly convened by themselves in order to reach agreement with the United States--and were only stopped at the last minute by Arab intransigence; and, worst of all, went to the Glassboro summit after rejecting de Gaulle's own proposal for a concerted Big Four action in the crisis and despite the French belief--or wishful hope--that the Vietnamese conflict would prevent the Soviets from meeting President Johnson. De Gaulle, indeed, did his own small best to prevent Kosygin's going to Glassboro by making the seemingly illogical public declaration that the root cause of the conflict in the Middle East was American intervention in Vietnam. But even this did not "shame" the Russians into calling off the Big Two talks.

The French have reacted to this situation by abandoning what would have seemed to be their logical role--that of mediators--to take up not only the Arab cause at the United Nations and elsewhere but to embrace the Soviet position itself. France, with its many African associates, might have played a significant role in drafting a compromise resolution in the General Assembly. Far from that, it chose to support and lobby for the Soviet and Arab-backed Yugoslav resolution. Its lack of success in this respect was striking: only two Western or allied

- 3 -

European states voted for that resolution (Spain and Greece, neither of which was following a French lead), and only six of France's associated African states (of which Congo, Mauretania and Mali would have done so whatever France did), though several of the latter abstained on the Latin American resolution.

But this public advertisement of isolation presumably does not disturb de Gaulle unduly. His purpose was not only to show the defeated Arabs that they had friends other than the Communist bloc (though this is a forlorn policy for the present, as indicated above), but, much more important, to try to right the balance of power which Soviet weakness--as he sees it-- had upset. De Gaulle clearly reads the conflict as an American victory. In that circumstance, his balance of power instinct immediately draws him to the weaker side: that of the Soviet Union. Only thus, in his view, can the natural expansiveness of the greater power--the United States--be checked, as it must be if de Gaulle's policy of weakening both blocs is to have a chance of success.

Going beyond giving diplomatic support to the Russians, de Gaulle is taking every opportunity to point out that the world balance--on which the hopes of independence of all states except the Big Two depend--has been upset and must be righted. Hence, he has redoubled his attacks (by no means new in themselves) on American "hegemony." The Soviet danger, already slight in his view, is now obviously seen as entirely negligible; by definition the increased power position of the other hegemony is the more menacing. Indeed, de Gaulle would apparently deny that there can be several different threats of different magnitude at a given time; according to the logic of his present position, only the strongest is a threat to others, and it is so by definition, whatever its subjective intentions. That this menace happens to come from the United States now, according to this system, suits de Gaulle perfectly well, since, after all, France and the countries whose "independence" he most wants to protect are all members of an alliance system headed by the United States.

Europe: Threatened By A "New Yalta." The greatest threat that de Gaulle sees to his policy is not in the Middle East but in Europe itself. He no doubt now fears that the USSR, in its eagerness to reach an accommodation with the United States, may be inclined to abandon tentative detente dealings with France and instead to try to reconfirm the Yalta division of Europe, thereby giving up its--and his--hope of getting the United States out of Europe. The losers in such a transaction, in de Gaulle's eyes, would be France, West Germany and the states of Eastern Europe, all of which will remain, willy-nilly, in the camp or under the shadow of one or the other of the Big Two for as long as the Big Two are together determined to maintain the status quo.

De Gaulle has loosed this analysis full blast on the Germans. His strong public endorsement of the unification of Germany is meant to remind them that a new Yalta would mean their permanent division, that the US would willingly sacrifice German unity to maintain its own position in Europe, and that only by asserting their own national "personality," as France has done, can they establish those conditions which might eventually bring Moscow around to a deal with Western Europe, on the basis of the reunification of Europe and of Germany, rather than with the United States, on the basis of the continued partition of both.

- 4 -

As a postscript to this de Gaulle has no difficulty in arguing that the admission of the United Kingdom at this time to the European communities in Brussels would fasten the American grip on Western Europe once and for all, just when the continental countries must make their greatest effort to recover their independence or see it elude them for an indefinite future. De Gaulle did not need this situation to decide that he did not want the British in the EEC, but it has reenforced his objections to their coming in and allowed him to warn the Germans that the Iron Curtain would be riveted down--at their expense--if this should happen. This novel and peculiar argument, recently put forward by the French, appears less unreasonable and is more consistent with their over-all policy today than might at first seem to be the case if it is seen as referring to a Big Two deal rather than to a Big Two conflict. De Gaulle will not fail to ask the Germans and others whether the British, now so eager to enter "Europe," really oppose a Big Two condominium there or anywhere else in the world. He will allow the Germans to brood on that.

Conclusion. Through cold war and detente de Gaulle's foreign policy has rested on forging an alignment with the Federal Republic as the nucleus--in fact, the substance--of a Western European grouping that might deal with Moscow on European problems. In the present crisis de Gaulle more than ever is pursuing the same policy: indeed, there is no other he could follow, in terms of his objectives, except to retire upon the mountain top in the role of a prophet scorned. He is not ready for that, at least while he has hopes of the Germans. One danger he runs, of course, is that in his effort to remain the defender of German interests he may become a follower of those he intends to lead. But he hopes that the Germans will ask themselves how many post-de Gaulle French leaders, not to mention Americans and British, are as staunch defenders of German reunification as de Gaulle, or, rather, to put it more objectively, they may ask to what degree anyone else has made the goal of German unity as integral a part of their current foreign policy as de Gaulle has made it part of his. The Germans are not likely to adopt Gaullist language to describe the situation, but it remains to be seen how much of the Gaullist analysis they may embrace. This situation has been maturing at least since de Gaulle espoused detente instead of cold war in 1964 (a rather sudden and tactical conversion on his part, already with an eye to German attitudes). The pace has picked up since the new government took power in Bonn last December. The Middle East crisis has given it a new urgency in de Gaulle's eyes. The next word is with the Germans.

SECRET/EXDIS

Friday, July 28, 1967
9:20 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Martin reports that
Clifford and Taylor did a great job
in Bangkok.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 1083, 2 sections

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 7-23-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-130
By cb, NARA, Date 7-13-94

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 1033

EXDIS

1. THE VISIT OF CLARK CLIFFORD AND MAX TAYLOR BOTH IN TERMS OF ITS SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVE AND IN ITS POTENTIAL LONG-RANGE EFFECT WAS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT LAST OCTOBER, THE MOST SUCCESSFUL VISIT IN MY FOUR YEARS HERE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, I AM CERTAIN THE THAI WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THEIR TROOP CONTRIBUTION TO SOUTH VIETNAM-TO A LEVEL OF TEN THOUSAND AT LEAST.

2. IN THE OPENING SESSION WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, SCHEDULED FOR TWO HOURS BUT WHICH WENT ON FOUR FOUR HOURS, CLIFFORD


PAGE 2 RUMTBK 1033K/1 ~~SECRET~~

SET THE TONE, CLEARLY DELINEATING HIS ROLE AND THAT OF TAYLOR AS PERSONAL EMISSARIES DIRECTLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONVEY TO THE THAI LEADERS HIS MOST PRIVATE AND PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON HIS APPRAISAL OF WHERE WE ARE NOW, AND THE ALTERNATIVES THAT MIGHT BE OPEN TO US. HE WAS FOLLOWED BY TAYLOR WHO OUTLINED WITH GREAT CLARITY THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN VIETNAM, OUR THOUGHTS ON WHAT MIGHT BE PREFERABLE COURSES OF ACTION AND ON THE AUGMENTATIONS THAT PRUDENCE MIGHT DICTATE THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE TO ENSURE OPTIMUM CHANCE OF HASTENING THE END OF THE WAR.

3. CLIFFORD THEN REEMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WELCOME THE COMPLETELY FRANK AND CANDID VIEWS OF THE THAI LEADERS. ALTHOUGH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS PRINCE WAN AND GENERAL PRAPHAT, PHYA SRIVISAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER, AND POTE SARASIN WERE ALSO PRESENT, THE BURDEN OF THE EXPRESSION OF THAI VIEWS WAS CARRIED MAINLY BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND FONMIN THANAT. FAS WILL BE SEEN FROM COMPLETE NOTES WHICH WILL BE FORWARDED SEPARATELY, THE THAI ACCEPTED THE INVITATION TO SPEAK WITH CANDOR AND

PAGE 3 RUMTBK 1233K/1 ~~SECRET~~

FRANKNESS. THEIR MAIN THRUST INVOLVED A SERIES OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS ON THE BASIC DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SEEMED TO GOVERN OUR CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

 CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THESE VIEWS BUT AT THE SAME TIME WARNED OF THE OBVIOUS TECHNICAL MILITARY PROBLEMS INVOLVED AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS.

4. THANAT TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR A GREATER PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS THE OTHER ALLIES TO OFFSET THE WIDESPREAD CRITICISM DIRECTED ~~AT THE~~ AT THE WAR IN EUROPE, THE NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND IN THE UNITED STATES ITSELF.

PAGE 4 RUMTBK 1233K/1 ~~SECRET~~

5. IN THE COURSE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR WERE ABLE TO CARRY OUT WHAT WE BELIEVE WILL BE AN EXCEEDINGLY EFFECTIVE EDUCATIONAL JOB BY DESCRIBING THE VARIOUS MILITARY PROBLEMS ON THE GROUND IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH NECESSITATE INCREASED FORCES, THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE AIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NORTH, THE PROBLEMS OF RISK OF WIDENING THE WAR AS WELL AS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED STATES.

6. A LITTLE BEFORE SIX, SINCE WE HAD NOT DIRECTLY BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL THAI TROOP CONTRIBUTION, THANAT DID SO ALLUDING TO THE PRESIDENT'S CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM AND THE KING IN WASHINGTON. THE PRIME MINISTER DEALT AT SOME LENGTH ON THE INCREASING REQUIREMENTS OF COMBATTING THE INSURGENCY ~~GENCY~~ IN THE NORTHEAST. CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR RESPONDED BY POINTING OUT THE ADVANTAGES THAT MIGHT ACCRUE FROM A MORE RAPID END TO HOSTILITIES IN VIETNAM. ~~THE~~ EMPHASIZED SEVERAL TIMES THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION WHICH THEY ARE MAKING TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM WHICH IS NOT LIMITED

PAGE 5 UNIBK 1083K/1 ~~SECRET~~

SOLELY TO THE DETACHMENT BEING TRAINED FOR EARLY DEPLOY-
MENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. 3(a)(5)

CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR MADE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT WE RECOGNIZED FULLY THEIR VERY GREAT CONTRIBUTION. THE THAI RESPONDED IN MOST FAVORABLE AND SYMPATHETIC TERMS TO CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR'S EXPOSITION OF THE NEED FOR ALL OF THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER WHAT MORE ~~REPEAT~~ MORE THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE. THE THAI MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT ONLY CONTINUE TO MAKE THE CONTRIBUTION THEY HAVE BEEN MAKING IN THE PAST BUT WOULD ENDEAVOR TO MAKE WHATEVER ADDITIONAL CONTRI-
BUTION THEY COULD MAKE IN THE FUTURE.

7. THURSDAY EVENING CLIFFORD AND I CALLED PRIVATELY ON POTE SARASIN AT HIS HOUSE WHERE CLIFFORD SET OUT IN UNMISTAKE-

PAGE 6 UNIBK 1083K/1 ~~SECRET~~

ABLE TERMS THE DEPTH OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN.

8. I BELIEVE THIS MEETING BETWEEN CLIFFORD AND POTE CONTRI-
BUTED MATERIALLY TO THE MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY THE THAI WHEN WE RECONVENED AT 0930 THIS MORNING. AGAIN THERE WAS A MOST CANDID EXCHANGE WITH CLIFFORD CLEARLY EXPLAINING THE DIFFICULTIES THE PRESIDENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOUNTER IF HE WAS UNABLE TO INDICATE CLEARLY THAT THE OTHER ALLIES WERE CARRYING SOME PROPORTION OF THE ADDITIONAL TROOP REQUIREMENTS. CLIFFORD WELCOMED THE FRANKNESS AND CANDOR OF THE EXCHANGE, SAID HE AND TAYLOR WOULD REPORT FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE THAI. HE WAS ASKED OVER AND OVER AGAIN BY THE PRIME MINISTER, POTE AND THANAT TO ASSURE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE "THAI" RESPONSE WOULD NOT BE NEGATIVE".

MARTIN
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 1083

EXDIS

9. THE DOUBLE NEGATIVE MAY NOT BE AS ACCEPTABLE AS A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AFFIRMATIVE, BUT THERE IS NO MISTAKING THAI INTENTIONS. CLIFFORD AND TAYLOR REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAD NOT COME TO NEGOTIATE BUT TO INFORM THE THAI OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN AND TO CONVEY TO HIM SUCH ADVICE AS THE THAI MIGHT WISH TO GIVE. WE DID NOT THEREFORE LET THE MEETING DEGENERATE INTO A CATALOG OF THAI COMPLAINT ON PAST LACK OF PERFORMANCE. WE ALSO DID NOT ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE COST FIGURES. WE WILL START SUCH EXPLORATION WITH THE THAI AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL AND REPORT SOONEST. I AM PERSONALLY

~~PAGE 2 RUMTBK 1083K/2 SECRET~~

CONFIDENT THAT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE UNDER THAT AUTHORIZED FOR THE KOREAN CONTINGENT.

10. THE THAI REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR EXPRESSION OF NECESSARY CONCERN WITH THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF THIS ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION ON THEIR OWN ALREADY STRAINED BUDGETARY RESOURCES WAS NOT ~~REPEAT NOT~~ TO BE REGARDED AS ANY WAY IMPLYING A REQUEST FOR A "QUID PRO QUO".

11. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY COMMENTED ON THE UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO THIS KIND OF INTIMATE HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS. I REPEAT THAT I COULD NOT BE MORE PERSONALLY PLEASED WITH THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF THIS VISIT.

MARTIN
BT

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EXDIS

MMN

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Pres. file

Friday, July 28, 1967
8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bohlen analyzes de Gaulle's state of mind, his Canadian performance, and its first effects on French opinion. A summary of French press is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 1288, July 27, 1967
Paris 1285, July 27, 1967

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By MB, NARA, Date 7-23-91

WWRostow:rlh



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 PARIS 01288 271718Z

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Authority NLS 86-16

By rs/sep, NARA, Date 8-30-91

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EXDIS

DEPT. PASS AMEMBASSY LONDON, AMEMBASSZ BONN, AND AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

DE GAULLE HAS ALWAYS BEEN KNOWN AS A MAN OF STRONG AND DEFINITE VIEWS, WHICH HE HAS HAD NO INHIBITIONS IN EXPRESSING. HOWEVER, ALONG WITH THIS DE GAULLE UP UNTIL RECENTLY HAD ALWAYS HAD A SENSE OF MEASURE, OF TIMING, OF PLACE AND APPROPRIATENESS. IT HAS NOW BECOME INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT DE GAULLE HAS LOST THIS SENSE OF TIMING AND OF APPROPRIATENESS AND HIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES AND INDEED ACTIONS HAVE MORE AND MORE TAKEN ON A PURELY WILLFUL AND PERSONAL CHARACTER. ACCORDING TO OUR INFORMATION, DE GAULLE CONDUCTS COMPLETELY SINGLE-HANDEDLY FRENCH

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 1288 ~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLICY AND IS MORE AND MORE NEGLECTING OTHER ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. HIS STATEMENTS ON VIETNAM, WHICH HAVE TENDED MORE AND MORE TO FREE HIMSELF FROM THE NORMAL RESTRAINTS, HIS ACTION ON THE COMMON MARKET, AND FINALLY, THE RECENT AND MOST INCREDIBLE OF ALL, HIS BEHAVIOR IN CANADA, HAVE ALL REFLECTED THIS TENDENCY. IT WOULD SEEM THAT DE GAULLE IS SUFFERING FROM TWO ASPECTS OF OLD AGE: (1) A PROGRESSIVE HARDENING OF THE PREJUDICES -- OF WHICH HE HAD PLenty, AND (2) A GROWING INDIFFERENCE AND EVEN UNCONCERN WITH THE EFFECT OF HIS WORDS ON INTERNATIONAL AND FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION. THE FIXATION WHICH HE HAS ALWAYS HAD IN REGARD TO THE POWER AND SIZE OF THE UNITED STATES HAS GROWN INTO

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



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PAGE 02 PARIS 01288 271718Z

A COMPULSIVE OBSESSION. I HAVE ALWAYS HELD THE VIEW, AND STILL DO, THAT BASICALLY AND ORIGINALLY DE GAULLE'S ANTAGONISM TO THE UNITED STATES WAS BASED UPON HIS VIEW OF OUR SIZE AND POWER, COUPLED WITH THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDLINESS OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS FRANCE. THESE, IN DE GAULLE'S VIEW, CONSTITUTED THE CHIEF ELEMENTS OF A POWER WHICH WAS DANGEROUS IN REGARD TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF FRENCH ACTION. HOWEVER, AS I RECENTLY REPORTED

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 1288 ~~SECRET~~

(PARIS 808), AN ATTITUDE, WHATEVER ITS ORIGINAL MOTIVATION, IF CONSISTENTLY HELD AND ACTED UPON EVENTUALLY BECOMES A SUBJECTIVE OBSESSION. THIS IS CLEAR NOW IN THE CASE OF DE GAULLE'S VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE NOTED THAT ALONG WITH HIS POWERFUL INTRUSION INTO CANADIAN DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IN FAVOR OF THE FRENCH CANADIANS DE GAULLE FOUND TWO OCCASIONS TO MAKE RELATIVELY MILD CRACKS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS SIZE. I FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT NOW WE MUST DEFINITELY RECOGNIZE THAT ONE OF THE MOTIVATING FORCES OF DEGAULLE'S CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY IS HIS ANTI-AMERICAN OBSESSION AND I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN EXPECT THAT ALMOST ANYTHING HE SAYS IN THE FUTURE WILL CONTAIN SOME UNCOMPLIMENTARY REFERENCES TOWARD UNITED STATES. HIS PERFORMANCE IN CANADA HAS COME AS A DISTURBING AND UNSETTLING SHOCK TO FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION. VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE PRESS HAS BEEN OPENLY AND SEVERELY CRITICAL OF DE GAULLE PERSONALLY. CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS TONE IS AN EDITORIAL IN FIGARO THIS MORNING WHICH AFTER CRITICIZING DE GAULLE VERY SEVERELY, ENDS

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 1288 ~~SECRET~~

UP WITH "WHY"? THE PREVAILING MOOD AMONG SUCH FRENCH AS CAN BE MET IN PARIS AT THIS SEASON IS ONE OF INCREDULITY AND HUMILIATION BECAUSE DE GAULLE HAS VIOLATED WHAT THE FRENCH REGARD AS ONE OF THEIR CHIEF ATTRIBUTES, NAMELY THAT OF GOOD TASTE. ALSO, NO ONE HERE CAN UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHAT DE GAULLE WAS DRIVING AT.

NATURALLY IT IS THE EFFECT ON THE FRENCH DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE
L SNENE

WHICH WILL BE OF CHIEF INTEREST. IN ALL PROBABILITY THERE WILL

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 PARIS 01288 271718Z

BE MORE
REACTION THAN ACTION DURING AUGUST WHEN EVERYONE,
INCLUDING ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WILL BE ON VACATION, AND
IT IS YET TOO SOON TO STATE EXACTLY WHAT EFFECT THE CANADIAN FIASCO
WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE. HOWEVER, WHEN TOGETHER
WITH DE GAULLE'S POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CANADIAN FIASCO
WILL BE ONE MORE MAJOR ERROR OF DE GAULLE IN THE GENERAL PICTURE.
IT IS TO BE ASSUMED THAT EVEN THE MOST HARDENED GAULLISTS MUST
BE LEFT WITH A SENSATION OF FRUSTRATION AND BEWILDERMENT. IT IS
PERHAPS TOO SOON TO STATE THAT DE GAULLE IS "BECOMING SENILE",
BUT CERTAINLY THE RESTRAINT WHICH USED TO ACCOMPANY HIS ACTIONS
AND CHARACTERIZE HIS WORDS SEEMS TO BE SLIPPING VERY BADLY.
BOHLEN

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OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

416

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PAGE 01 PARIS 01285 271428Z

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INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY MONTREAL

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ PARIS 1285

SUBJ: FRENCH REACTIONS TO DEGAULLE'S RETURN FROM CANADA

1. FRENCH PRESS THIS MORNING WITHOUT EXCEPTION PINNED RESPONSIBILITY UPON DEGAULLE PERSONALLY FOR UNPRECEDENTED INTER-

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 1285 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
NATIONAL INCIDENT. OPINION RANGED FROM CONSTERNATION TO INDIGNANT CRITICISM, WITH EXPRESSIONS SUCH AS "IRREPARABLE MISTAKE", "FAILURE WITHOUT PRECEDENT", "MISTAKE AND A SCANDAL" AND "CATASTROPHE". THE MORE MODERATE EDITORIALS ASKED "WHY" BUT WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE SATISFACTORY ANSWER. THERE WAS UNANIMITY THAT DEGAULLE'S ACTION WOULD HURT GOVERNMENT BOTH INTERNALLY AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH OTHER ALLIES. PRESS REFLECTED FEELING THAT EVEN AMONG TOTALLY COMMITTED GAULLISTS, BELIEF IN DEGAULLE'S INFALLIBILITY HAS BEEN

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Authority TLG 86-16

By slj, NARA, Date 8-30-91



Department of State

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PAGE 02 PARIS 01285 271428Z

RUDELY SHAKEN. DEPTH OF REACTION WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN FRENCH TV REPORTERS WHO VISIBLY EMBARRASSED. RADIO-TELEVISION REPORTS MADE NO ATTEMPT DISGUISE OVERWHELMINGLY UNFAVORABLE PRESS REACTIONS WHICH IS RARE OCCURENCE ON GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED MEDIA.

26 PUBLIC REACTIONS FROM OPPOSITION POLITICAL FIGURES WERE UNIVERSALLY CONDEMNATORY. CENTRE DEMOCRATE'S LECANUET CRITICIZED GENERAL'S "OFFENSE TO RULES OF COURTESY", AND CALLED UPON CANADIANS TO REMEMBER THAT THERE ARE FRENCH WHO FAVOR FRENCH.

PAGE 3 RUFNCR 1285 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CANADIAN PROGRESS AND ALSO PRESERVATION OF CANADIAN UNITY. PDM ASSEMBLY LEADER JACQUES DUHAMEL SAID THAT DEGAULLE'S "STUPEFYING INTEREERENCE" WAS NO ACCIDENT BUT WAS PART OF HIS "FIXED IDEA OF ANTI-AMERICANISM". JACQUES MEDEDIAN, MAYOR OF NICE AND ALSO PDM DEPUTY, SPOKE OF GENERAL'S "MEGA-LOMANIA" AND ADDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE COMPULSORY RETIREMENT FOR AGED CHIEFS OF STATE. OTHER INDEPENDENT CENTER FIGURES (CORNUT-GENTILLE AND FORMER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE MARCILHACY) CONDEMNED DEGAULLE'S ACTIONS WITH MARCILHACY ADDING THAT NOT EVEN AGE PROVIDES EXCUSE FOR THEM. FEDERATION LEADER FRANCOIS MITTERAND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WOULD NOT COMMENT UNTIL DEGAULLE AND GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN THEIR INTERPRETATION BUT FEDERATION VICE-PRESIDENT CHARLES HERNU, BEFORE DEGAULLE'S DECISION TO CANCEL TRIP WAS KNOWN, WONDERED IN AN EDITORIAL WHETHER "PRINCES WHO GOVERN US REALLY POSSESS ALL THEIR FACULTIES." FOR FEDERATION DEPUTY ROLAND DUMAN (LEADER GRANTEE THIS YEAR) DEGAULLE'S BEHAVIOR IN "TOURING WORLD AND REAWAKENING NATIONALISM AS IF WE WERE IN 1848" IS "INADMISSIBLE AND INSANE" AND JUSTIFIES CALLING A SPECIAL SESSION OF ASSEMBLY TO HEAR GOVERNMENT'S

PAGE 4 RUFNCR 1285 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
EXPLANATIONS. FINALLY, GAULLIST CAMP WAS SILENT ALTHOUGH PRESS REPORTED THAT THE FIVE NATIONAL SECRETARIES OF UNR/UDT WHO MET WITH PRIME MINISTER YESTERDAY HAD "REALLY SAD FACES."

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 PARIS 01285 271428Z

30 COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING TOMORROW'S CABINET MEETINGS WILL BE
AWAITED WITH INTEREST. BOHLEN

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46
~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Pres file

Friday, July 28, 1967 -- 7:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here are four possible names for New York:

- Mennen Williams
- Kingman Brewster
- Clark Kerr
- Franklin Murphy (President, UCLA)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY rg ON 7-23-91

MEMORANDUM

43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

27
Friday, July 28, 1967 -- 7:55 a.m.

Rec'd 9:30a

Mr. President:

Here are four possible names for New York:

- Mennen Williams
- Kingman Brewster
- Clark Kerr
- Franklin Murphy (President, UCLA)

Walt Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY RG ON 7-23-91

~~SECRET~~

Friday, July 28, 1967
7:50 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Marcos details the political problems that led to his Clifford/Taylor decision.

W. W. Rostow

Manila 836

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 7-23-91

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - July 28, 1967

Mr. President:

Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera-Paris called me yesterday to ask for an appointment with you to deliver a letter from President Leoni. He said he was under instructions to deliver it to you and make some oral remarks. I gave him no encouragement but did not close the door. An advanced copy of the English translation is at Tab A.

What Leoni wants is revision of our Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP) to put Venezuela on a par with Canada and Mexico and permit higher imports of Venezuelan oil. He looks upon increased demand on Venezuelan production resulting from the Middle East crisis as further justification for his request.

We are not in a position to do what Leoni wants on the MOIP. You told him this at the Summit when you outlined the steps you were prepared to take:

- talks with Canada to restrict their deliveries.
- additional imports of asphalt.
- assistance in desulphurization technology.

We are moving forward on all three of these commitments as described in the report at Tab B. Tony Solomon tells us that Stu Udall has not moved faster toward carrying out the pledge on asphalt because of opposition of his staff and Congressman Mahon.

Because you can't oblige Leoni on what he is after, it is inadvisable for you to receive Tejera-Paris. Were you to see him, it would become known and expectations in Venezuela aroused. The government might even encourage such hopes. The resulting let-down of an unforthcoming reply would then be increased. Covey Oliver and Tony Solomon agree with this assessment.

I recommend that I tell Tejera-Paris that I have consulted you on an appointment and because of the pressure of business you asked that I receive him on your behalf.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tabs A and B.

You want to receive him _____. I should receive him _____. Speak to me _____.

456

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Bowdler
FROM: John Calvin Hill, Jr.
SUBJECT: Venezuelan Petroleum Problems

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-130
By ig, NARA, Date 6-28-95

In the course of the President's April 11 conversation with President Leoni at Punta del Este a number of commitments to actions were made by the President within the overall context of our desire to help Venezuela as much as ^{possible} by using more oil from Venezuela. These undertakings, and the current status of the related U.S. actions, are summarized hereunder:

1. To initiate talks with Canada to see whether or not we can get Canada to reduce its share in the growth rate of the United States market (thereby giving Venezuela an opportunity to share in such growth).

Action taken:

A series of meetings has been held with Canada, the most recent being to present a U.S. revision of an informal Canadian proposal. This latest U.S. revision was presented by Assistant Secretary Solomon to Canadian Ambassador Ritchie on July 26. We feel that our position and degree of flexibility is fully outlined to the Canadians. At the moment we are not able to anticipate their willingness to agree to voluntary limitations of exports at a suitable level. We must await their response.

The Canadians have been insistent in their desire to expand petroleum exports to the U.S., and the most that we can expect by limiting the Canadians is only a small increase in offshore imports rather than the decline which would otherwise occur. The Venezuelans, while understanding our strong efforts to keep the Canadians from forcing a cutback in imports from overseas, will not get significantly more imports as a result of our negotiations with Canada.

2. The President indicated that he had just signed an important proclamation relating to U.S. imports of asphalt, enabling the Secretary of Interior to certify to the need of additional imports thereof

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

outside the MOIP. The President indicated that the U.S. would like to increase its purchases of asphalt and that the matter would be kept under continuing review.

Action taken:

Following issuance of the proclamation, the Office of Emergency Planning has progressed with a detailed study of the U.S. asphalt requirements. Interior has under consideration implementation of the asphalt authority, and is awaiting the recommendations of the OEP study.

3. An undertaking to "see what we could do to get the sulphur out of Venezuelan oil".

Action taken:

a. The White House has established a Committee to coordinate technical economic research on the impact of air pollution problems under the chairmanship of HEW and CEA.

b. HEW to make available \$2.7 million from FY 1968 contingency funds for research, including desulphurization. Findings as developed will be made available to Venezuela. President Leoni recently called the attention of Ambassador Linowitz to the latter understanding, indicating that he was awaiting news.

c. Although not specifically discussed at Punta del Este, residual fuel oil was redefined by a Presidential Proclamation issued July 17 to include #4 fuel oil as a step toward air pollution abatement. The redefinition had been supported by the GOV. This redefinition, which has been welcomed by the GOV, could allow Venezuela to maintain substantially the same level of earnings it has been receiving by supplying the great bulk of imported residual and thus offset the potential loss caused by the fact that the residual Venezuela has been supplying can no longer be sold under anti-pollution regulations. It will not, however, result in the use of more oil by the U.S. Moreover, the GOV, in a statement welcoming this U.S. action, has expressed serious concern with regard to a discretionary provision of the Proclamation which gives the Secretary of the Interior authority to reimburse with import allocations US refiners who produce low sulphur residual. Venezuela fears this could redound to the benefit of non-Venezuelan crudes. Interior has told Venezuelan representatives

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

that the implementation of this authority would provide the mechanism for utilizing traditional Western Hemisphere, low gravity, high sulphur crude to produce the required low sulphur residual. Interior is preparing regulations which will be open to public comment prior to implementation.

4. Passing mention was also made by the President to an increase of refining capacity in Puerto Rico, where Venezuelan oil is used.

Action taken:

Import applications for supplies to these refineries are still under study by Interior.

5. The President was categoric in asserting to President Leoni that 1 to 3 above was just about all he could do at this time. A more fundamental revision of the MOIP to remove "discrimination" in favor of overland imports by extending equal treatment to Venezuela remains a major Venezuelan aspiration. President Leoni in a conversation with Ambassador Linowitz on June 26 asserted that the Middle East crisis had shown the vital importance of Venezuela's oil resources to the United States and hoped this would be taken into account in the continuing discussions and negotiations between Venezuela and the U.S. regarding petroleum. The Venezuelan Ambassador has inquired at the Department of State about the possibility of revising the MOIP in Venezuela's favor (he was given discouragement) and the Venezuelan press has also played up this theme. Venezuela has increased production by 300,000 barrels a day (about 9%) and President Leoni has stated that increases beyond that amount must be covered by long-term contract. Venezuela has no intention of increasing production on a crash basis only to find itself in economic difficulties after the crisis ends, as in 1956. President Leoni has used the current crisis to point out that Venezuelan production is just as strategically important to the US. as that of Canada and Mexico. We can therefore expect greatly increased pressure from Venezuela as and when the current crisis subsides, precisely at a time when domestic producers will also be resisting cutbacks.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-129
By CG, NARA, Date 6-6-95

44

Friday, July 28, 1967

~~1. copy~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Walt Rostow

FROM: McGeorge Bundy

I attach a cable of instructions prepared at my suggestion for Ambassador Barbour from the Secretary of State. This paper states our current policy for Israeli consumption, and if approved it will also serve as useful internal guidance here. It comes to you with Dean Rusk's personal clearance.

The ring of the paper is diplomatic but its message is very clear just the same. If the Israelis take a hard line, they will simply make things harder for us and for themselves in the long run.

Barbour participated in the drafting of the cable and he and I think it is consistent with your own thinking, though perhaps less pungently phrased than you would do it. Since a cable that is used for external and internal distribution has fairly wide circulation, this is probably just as well.

Approved ✓

Disapproved _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-130
By cg, NARA. Date 7-12-94

46

DRAFT CABLE TO AMBASSADOR BARBOUR, TEL AVIV, FROM THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Following is for your guidance in discussions with Government of Israel following your consultations Washington. We will take same line with Israelis here, as well as in New York and elsewhere:

1. USG commitment to and support of Israel's statehood remains firm as ever. We believe our role in recent Security Council and General Assembly sessions clearly attests to our steadfastness in this regard.
2. Public mood in US is one of widespread sympathy for Israel's cause in recent war and admiration for Israel's demonstrated courage and determination.
3. Underlying this mood is strong "pro-peace" sentiment coupled with sense of uneasiness that somehow, despite setback suffered by Soviets and their friends in area, Arabs will come back for second round.
4. It is of utmost importance to maintain momentum towards a political settlement. The longer the present situation remains frozen, the greater will become the danger that Israel's military victory will not produce commensurate political results.
5. We are convinced that achievement such results justifies some risk and large measure of flexibility on part of Government of Israel. United States has from own experience in recent wars learned long range benefits of being magnanimous in victory. We think Israel will similarly benefit if it takes

~~SECRET~~

similar approach. The American people would not understand effort to turn military victory into territorial gains. We appreciate the assurances of the Government of Israel in this respect, recognizing, of course, the need for security arrangements and the peculiarly difficult problems of Jerusalem. What is important is to emphasize continuously that the objectives are peace and security, not territorial gains.

6. This is consistent with our own basic commitment to seek Arab renunciation of state of belligerency, to assure freedom of navigation, and to uphold territorial integrity of all states of the area. Within this framework there are a number of issues on which USG and American public will be closely watching Israel's actions for evidence that the Government of Israel seeks truly magnanimous and stable peace which will not contain seeds of future conflict. Two areas in which Israeli policies over the years have occasionally troubled this country are Jerusalem and refugees. Should Israel now appear inflexible on these issues to the point of jeopardizing constructive political settlement, there could be gradual erosion of broadly based sympathy and support which Israel now enjoys in the US.

7. We fully recognize that achievement of a settlement does not depend on Israel alone. Recent Arab intransigence at the UN does not reflect any serious facing up to realities of the situation. Should settlement efforts fail, however, it is imperative that Israel have demonstrated its willingness to make every reasonable effort to avoid that outcome. Dangers in such a failure are obvious, including inter alia further consolidation Soviet position in area,

inability of US to recoup losses it has suffered, further decline of moderates in area and ultimately renewed threat of further hostilities. Israel and USG must make every effort to avoid this path.

6. One hope we now see for breaking out of vicious cycle lies in settlement with Jordan. It is essential, however, to recognize dangers this involves for Hussein, for Western position in Jordan and for Israel itself. We realize Israel disillusioned by Hussein's role in recent war. Whatever one's views of Hussein, however, we see no alternative which would not be infinitely worse. It is difficult to envisage how moderate regime could survive in Jordan in absence of settlement which respected the principle of Jordan's territorial integrity. Disappearance of moderate Jordanian regime would open vast new area for Soviet influence with correspondingly increased threat to Lebanon and Arabian Peninsula-Red Sea Basin-Persian Gulf bastion.

9. While Arab military defeat was blow to Soviets, it could backfire against Israel and the West unless a blow is now struck for peace. It is for this reason that we urge Israel to be flexible, patient, discreet and generous, particularly with respect to refugee problem and question of arrangements for Jerusalem which will take more than pro forma account of Jordanian and international interests in that city. Only such an approach will assure continued broad US and international solidarity with Israel as it pursues legitimate goal of stable national existence in difficult and dangerous days ahead. As Prime Minister Eshkol wrote to President Johnson on the first

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

day of war, "the hour of danger can also be an hour of opportunity." We urge Israel to rise to the challenge of this opportunity for peace, as it did to the challenge of war.

~~SECRET~~

July 28, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

I was much struck -- in your excellent address last night -- by the parallels between your formulation of domestic policy and those you have applied to foreign policy.

If and when the time comes to appeal to our people to stay the course both at home and abroad -- perhaps in the context of a tax increase -- you may wish to make these parallels explicit.

Specifically ---

1. At home your appeal is for law and order as the framework for economic and social progress. Abroad we fight in Vietnam to make aggression unprofitable while helping the people of Vietnam and all of Free Asia -- build a future of economic and social progress. The equivalent of domestic law and order on the world scene is that nations forego the use of violence across international frontiers.

2. The parallel can be done in greater detail. Abroad, you have formulated our policies under four headings which have domestic parallel as follows:

Abroad

- Deterrence of Aggression
- Economic and social progress
- U. S. partnership with regional organizations.
- Reconciliation among nations which now are postured in mutual hostility.

At Home

- Law and Order
- Economic and social progress
- Federal partnership with the States.
- Reconciliation among all groups in our own society.

3. I cite these parallels because it is a fact that we cannot play our part on the world scene unless we do so from a base of order and progress at home; and, equally, we cannot build order and progress at home in a world where U. S. withdrawal from its responsibilities result in an international environment of chaos and violence. It is unsafe

for our society -- at home and abroad -- to walk away from its domestic problems and responsibilities. It is equally unsafe for our society -- at home and abroad -- to walk away from its external responsibilities. Therefore, we must -- and we can -- find the energy, talent, and resources to work for order and progress at home and abroad which means:

- the cities;
- foreign aid;
- and seeing it through in Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:sln

~~SECRET~~

July 28, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mainland Violence and Social Disintegration

The accompanying map gives the picture of growing mainland violence. The most serious defiance of authority centers in the rich Yangtze Valley of central China. The gravity of recent troubles at Wuhan is indicated by official media's reference to "towering crimes" by persons in authority in the city's "Party, Government and Army" organs. Specification of the Army is new in the context of attacks on anti-Maoists. In none of the serious clashes reported in the past six weeks was there any evidence of Army efforts to suppress violence and restore order.

The Party apparatus, under attack for a year, has apparently ceased to function in several provinces and is ineffective in several others. The public security network, once impressively efficient, seems powerless in most areas. The Army rules in ten provinces, helps govern four others. Frequent rail disruptions continue.

It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the Cultural Revolution has disrupted rural society. [REDACTED] speak of rural cadres becoming passive through fear of making mistakes. There are fairly widespread reports of stealing, sabotage, absenteeism and general lethargy.

Despite disruptions and disintegration, the society is not yet on the verge of collapse. Eighty percent of the life is rural; the peasant knows he must work to eat, so he manages to do so. True civil war, however, is even more possible than it appeared last January. It looks like a very tough winter ahead for China.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

cc: Mr. Jorden

AJ:mm

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 04 269

By *isl*, NARA, Date 8-18-05~~SECRET~~3.3
(b)(1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, July 27, 1967 -- 7:45 PM

41
Lang
2 Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Foreign Aid Bill as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Foreign Relations Committee reported out the aid bill this afternoon. Bill Gaud wants you to know that -- contrary to what will probably be in the morning papers -- we came out rather better than expected. He will give you a detailed rundown tomorrow, but he thought you would like to know the following major points tonight:

1. The authorization ceilings recommended for economic aid totaled \$2.4 billion, only \$200 million under our appropriation request.
2. The MAP authorization was harder hit. In effect they cut us slightly over \$200 million, as well as abolishing the MAP Revolving Fund for arms sales, and revoking the authority which allowed Harold Linder to finance arms sales.
3. The effect of their cut in Development Loans is not real -- for complicated accounting reasons. There is still room within the authorization ceiling to get all the appropriation we have requested.
4. The real cuts are:
 - \$120 million in Supporting Assistance (which is largely spent in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia).
 - \$65 million in the Alliance for Progress.
 - \$33 million in Technical Assistance.

There was some sour music. The Committee apparently had at least one tie vote on whether to report the Bill with a favorable recommendation. (The final vote to report was 10-2 in favor.) Fulbright has announced that he will not manage the Bill on the Floor and that he may not vote for it.

Of course, Gaud's public position will be grave concern over the cuts, with a strong plea for restoration. He will also go all-out to soften the impossible number-of-countries limitation the Committee inserted. But in private he is less bloody than many people expected.

EKHamilton/vmr

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-129
By CB, NARA, Date 6-6-95

Thursday, July 28, 1967 -- 7:40 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Inside your government I have two constructive things to report.

1. Nick Katzenbach is now making SIG move, and is getting a first-rate foreign service officer in to help him -- Art Hartman. Today we reviewed Haiti and Bolivia. At your instruction, I had gotten solid work going on this and other Latin American insurgency problems; but it was good to see them reviewed at the Under Secretary level. We can expect, I think, steady initiative from now on. I have held back from doing it not because I'm shy, but I do not think this town works properly for the President unless State assumes its responsibilities. I now hope -- and begin to believe -- it will happen.

2. We had a first-class meeting of the Viet Nam group. All of us -- including the old sceptics Nick and Bill Bundy and Dick Helms -- are now convinced we are on a winning track. There is even agreement on the bombing of the northern part of North Viet Nam -- especially the transport system and electric power: Hanoi TPP is again ripe. But we all are conscious of these facts:

-- We have not successfully persuaded the Congress and the press of our conviction and the bases for it.

-- We fear that Viet Nam will get whip-sawed between two equally important imperatives in the Congress: your urban programs and foreign aid. On the whole, we guess Viet Nam will hold up in the short run better than these, but if we lose on the others, the anti-Viet Nam movement will gather strength.

-- Therefore, we all talked -- including Bus Wheeler -- about ways of making the case to the country for all three, in the context of the tax increase, rallying the 60% sensible, stable, bipartisan majority to stay the course.

-- We also talked about the situation in Communist China which is, essentially, breaking our way, and shared the conviction that what our country needs to do now is: hold steady.

I report this not because we solved any great problems for you today but because I felt better about the working of your government in foreign affairs than for some time.

WWRostow:rln

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, July 27, 1967
7:25 p.m.

51
1. ~~sup~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's final
recommendation on a reply to Wilson
on Canberras for Peru.

As you will note, Sec. McNamara
agrees with the substance of the message

W. W. Rostow

Reid had from Pres.
PM 7/28/67 - message
dispatched over special
line to P.M.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 7-23-91

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

2887
51a
July 27, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Wilson's Message on Sale
of Jet Bombers to Peru

Recommendation:

That you approve the suggested message to Prime Minister Wilson which reaffirms our negative reply on the sale of British Canberras to Peru.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Discussion:

In a message of July 26 Prime Minister Wilson requests that you reverse a negative response which we gave to the British Embassy on its plans to sell Canberra bombers to Peru. Since we helped finance the production of these aircraft, the British require our approval for a sale to a third country.

I am concerned that the sale of these bombers at this time in Latin America will have a serious adverse effect on approval by the Congress of your request for funds for the Alliance for Progress and the Inter-American Development Bank. The public and Congressional reaction would probably make it impossible for us to go ahead with plans to loan \$15 million to Peru to help Peru out of its present financial difficulty. Ambassador Jones initiated negotiations with President Belaunde yesterday on the program loan and made it clear at that time that Peru would have to hold the line on its military expenditures if it wanted financial assistance from the United States.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-130
By cb, NARA, Date 7-12-94

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

I believe we must hold the line and not approve the British sale to Peru.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Suggested reply

~~SECRET~~

516

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED MESSAGE TO THE PRIME MINISTER
FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have reviewed your request on the sale of Canberras to Peru with the greatest care. I appreciate your consulting with us on this matter and the cooperation we have had from your government on military sales to Latin America.

Congressional feeling on the acquisition of unnecessary military equipment by under-developed countries receiving economic assistance from us has reached such a point that the whole foreign aid program is threatened.

Peru is at present seeking substantial economic assistance. Were they to use scarce foreign exchange on military procurement at a time when we are furnishing dollars to tide them over financial difficulties, the Congressional and public reaction would be so strong that our ability to continue supporting the Alliance for Progress would be seriously endangered. *Earlier this week* ~~Yesterday~~ our Ambassador in Lima informed President Belaunde of our willingness to conclude a sizeable loan provided we could agree, among other things,

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-129
By lig, NARA, Date 8-31-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

on a total level of military spending, with special attention to costs of major equipment purchases such as aircraft.

President Belaunde understands that the purchase of French Mirage aircraft would make it impossible for us to go forward with the loan. Unfortunately the Canberras also fall within our general conditions to Peru about levels of military spending, and we could not successfully explain to Congress why under such circumstances we had given consent to sell Canberras to Peru.

I feel that I must do all that I can at this time to meet widely and deeply held Congressional objections to unnecessary arms expenditures by countries such as Peru. This includes equipment of United States origin. Certain influential Congressmen have for the moment expressed their concern about supersonic military aircraft, because it is the supersonic Mirage that has been the major problem. But I am sure that if I did consent to the sale of the sub-sonic but medium-range Canberra, Congressional reactions would be equally strong.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

For these reasons, and with full understanding of the embarrassing position in which the British aircraft representatives in Lima will find themselves, I must conclude that we cannot alter the negative decision on the proposed sale.

I realize that the United Kingdom Group will have to tell the Peruvians why the Canberra sale cannot go forward, and I have no objection to their doing so. While there is some added risk that the denial of Canberras might of itself trigger a Peruvian decision to spurn American assistance and buy Mirages, I have some doubt that this would occur. It seems to me that it is a risk which we will have to take, given our major problems with the Congress with our foreign aid programs.

Cleared in substance by Secretary McNamara (per Mr. Bowdler)

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, July 27, 1967 -- 6:30 PM



Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, are four replies to messages of condolence on the air crash which killed John McNaughton and his family.

The addressees are President Husain of India (Tab A), President Tsiranana of Malagasy (Tab B), President Ahidjo of Cameroon (Tab C), and President Kaunda of Zambia (Tab D).

W. W. Rostow

Approve  _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

E_{KH}/vmr

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. President:

I greatly appreciate your message of sympathy on the tragic air accident in North Carolina last week. The death of Secretary McNaughton and his family has been a severe blow to us, and we are most grateful to you and the Government and people of India for your thoughtfulness.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Zakir Husain,
President of India.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. President,

I was deeply touched by your thoughtful telegram of condolence following the tragic airplane disaster which resulted in the loss of Secretary of the Navy McNaughton, his family, and other American citizens. I am comforted once again to know that, despite the geographical distances between our two lands, our friendship and mutual understanding ^{are} ~~is~~ so very close.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Philibert Tsiranana,
President of the Malagasy Republic,
Tananarive.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Reply

Thank you for your kind message of condolence to me and to the bereaved families of the victims of the recent air crash, including John McNaughton, Secretary-designate of the Navy. The loss of so many lives, among them that of a valued government servant, was a national tragedy and your thoughtful message is greatly appreciated.

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Ahmadou Ahidjo,
President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon,
Yaounde.

52d

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

His Excellency

Kenneth D. Kaunda,

President,

Republic of Zambia.

I deeply appreciate your message of condolence on the tragic air crash in North Carolina which took the lives of so many American citizens. Your thoughtfulness in expressing the sympathies of the people and Government of Zambia is indeed a consolation to all of us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

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21

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

Thursday - July 27, 1967
6:00 pm



Mr. President:



This report gives a glimpse of one
aspect of Kosygin's visit to Cuba.

 Rostow

Attachment

CIA report 
 - 26-27 June.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 001-019-1-1
By its NARA, Date 7-6-01

SANITIZED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

Authority NLT 019-020-1-4By Q NARA Date 12-17-01

Intelligence Information Cable

IN -18708

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~XXX~~ USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
REPCINCLANT EXO, DD/1

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

T3(a)(4) c

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

DIST 27 JULY 1967

COUNTRY CUBA / SOVIET UNION
DOI 26-27 JUNE 1967
SUBJECT TREATMENT OF SOVIET CHAIRMAN ALEKSEI KOSYGIN IN HAVANA

SCHEIDT
BUDGET
CHICKEN
HAMILTON
JESSUP
JORDEN
KEENE
KORNER
MOYER
TAYLOR
WHIGGINS

ACQ

SOURCE

T3(a)(4) c

1. UPON THE ARRIVAL OF SOVIET CHAIRMAN ALEKSEI KOSYGIN IN HAVANA ON 26 JUNE 1967, FIDEL CASTRO'S ATTITUDE WAS AT FIRST SO CONTEMPTUOUS THAT HE REFUSED TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH KOSYGIN. PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY, HOWEVER, FINALLY FORCED CASTRO TO MEET WITH KOSYGIN.

(classification)

(dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

2/35

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

██████████ COMMENT: TASS REPORTED ON 28 JUNE THAT KOSYGIN AND CASTRO HAD MET THE DAY BEFORE FOR A "FRIENDLY TALK" AND A "FRANK EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA.")

1.3(a)(4)

2. ██████████ DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT.

5
4
3
2
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

Thursday, July 27, 1967
3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick informs us that he proposes to lift the travel ban on Algeria, Libya, and Sudan, at noon tomorrow (July 28th) because the legal basis for it has passed.

W. W. Rostow

54

~~1. [unclear]~~
2. Pres. file

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

July 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW ←
The White House

I don't see any difficulty with this and
there doesn't appear to be much choice. But
I think the President should know about it.

NK

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment:

Memo dtd July 27, 1967,
to the Under Secretary
from SCA, Barbara M. Watson,
Subj: Relaxation of travel
restrictions to Algeria, Libya
and the Sudan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADMINISTRATOR
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs

546

July 27, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S
O - Mr. Idar Rimestad

FROM: SCA - Barbara M. Watson *Born*

SUBJECT: Relaxation of travel restrictions to
Algeria, Libya and the Sudan - ACTION
MEMORANDUM

Discussion

On June 21 when we lifted the travel restrictions from certain countries in the Middle East, we reimposed a restriction on nine of the original fourteen countries because of "risks and dangers that might ensue from the inadvertent involvement of American citizens in domestic disturbances." Our reports from the field with respect to Algeria, Libya and the Sudan indicate that this justification no longer applies with respect to Algeria, Libya and the Sudan and we cannot, therefore, legally maintain our travel restrictions to those countries.

Our posts in the three countries have indicated unequivocally that conditions are safe for U. S. tourists and have agreed to a suggestion that the travel ban be lifted.

Our Embassy in Tripoli has been urging us for some time to lift the travel ban, and they have contacted Libyan Government officials who have indicated that they would like the ban lifted so long as the announcement does not single out Libya but includes it with other countries.

Although we do not have diplomatic relations with Algeria and the Sudan, we presently maintain a full staff in Algiers and Oran and Constantine and have some consular officials at Khartoum. The legal test as to whether travel may be restricted does not depend, of course, on the existence of

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diplomatic

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~ 2 ~

diplomatic relations. We permit travel, for example to Albania, Cambodia and Outer Mongolia ~ although we have no representation there ~ and we did not, in this recent Middle East crisis, restrict travel to Mauritania, although that Government broke with us completely.

Recommendation

That the travel ban for Algeria, Libya and the Sudan be lifted at noon on July 28, 1967.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

DATE _____

Clearances:

AF/AFN Mr. Root (subst.) *brd* AF/AFNE Mr. Loomer (substance) *LL*
NEA/ARN Mr. Houghton *LL* L/SCA Mr. Smith (substance) *LL*
(substance)

SCA:NLewin:mcg *LL*

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