

Friday, August 4, 1967
3:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is one action taken by
Defense today.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

7/a

98

WASHINGTON--ADD VIETNAM TROOPS (8)

BUT THE PENTAGON SAID LATER IN A STATEMENT "THE PUBLISHED REPORT THAT DRAFT CALLS ARE LIKELY TO EXCEED 35,000 A MONTH THE LAST QUARTER OF THIS YEAR IS INACCURATE. WHILE THE DRAFT CALLS FOR THE OCTOBER-NOVEMBER-DECEMBER HAVE NOT YET BEEN FINALLY DETERMINED, NO PLANS UNDER CONSIDERATION APPROACH THIS RATE."

CZ217PED 8/4

72

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, August 4, 1967
3:30 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith another interesting
report of your impact on Maurer.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

wwrostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlm, NARA, Date 7-24-91

SUBJECT: Views of Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer as the Result of his Meeting with President Johnson

1. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)(5)
C

2. Maurer believes that it is in Rumania's interest to develop relations with the United States in the economic, cultural, scientific, and political fields. He believes that his meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson was a good start in this direction and is satisfied with the discussions they held. Maurer informed the Party leadership of his talks with President Johnson and the same unanimous conclusion was reached.

3. Maurer found in the person of President Johnson a great realistic politician and believes that he made Johnson understand Rumania's position.

4. [REDACTED] it is interesting that the meeting between Maurer and President Johnson determined changes in Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu's remarks on the United States in his talk before the Grand National Assembly on 24 July 1967 and an entire paragraph on the United States was modified. Before the revision, the United States was treated harshly and accused as an aggressor, but ultimately, in the actual published version, Rumania manifested in an open manner her desire for collaboration between the two countries. Even the Vietnam conflict was treated in a more sober tone than has been the practice of late.

1.3(a)(4)

5. In connection with Vietnam, Maurer made the assessment that President Johnson is not alone responsible for the existing state of affairs and that, in fact, the mistake can be traced back to President Kennedy--and President Johnson inherited the problem. Maurer believes, however, that President Johnson, in trying to find a political solution to Vietnam, is giving too much weight to domestic considerations in the United States which are manifested through the pressures of some influential political, military, and economic groups. For example, on one hand President Johnson makes a proposal for peace

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-187
By inp, NARA, Date 2-13-95

and, on the other, he intensifies military actions--and this is a result of the pressures exerted by these different groups. In spite of this, Maurer believes that President Johnson is sincere in wanting peace in the world.

6. Regarding Vietnam, Maurer said it is difficult to find a solution there because the United States has gone too far in destroying North Vietnam--and the North Vietnamese have nothing more to lose. He compared North Vietnam with a Communist who has been beaten by the Siguranta (the State security organization during the Royalist regime) who, after having his nails pulled, eyes gored, nose and tongue cut, has nothing else to lose--so why give in.

7. In connection with Rumania, Maurer believes that in the next stage it is necessary for Rumania to take initiatives in expanding relations with the United States without, however, making great declarations of friendship on one side or the other. Maurer hopes that the United States will also turn in this direction and get down to concrete cooperation.

8. Rather illustrative of Rumania's situation is the following joke which Maurer related: "As Johnson was being driven down a road, his chauffeur stopped the car when they reached a fork in the road asking which way to turn. Johnson instructed the chauffeur to turn right, and right he turned. A few moments later, Kosygin reached the same fork in the road in his chauffeur-driven limousine. Asked the same question by his chauffeur, Kosygin told him to turn left, and left he turned. After a few additional moments, Nicolae Ceausescu found himself in the same spot. When his chauffeur asked him what to do Ceausescu said, after looking the situation over, "Signal to the left, but turn right."

73

Long
2. Pres file

Friday, August 4, 1967
3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation
report on political developments in
Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

WJJ;hg

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

73a

~~SECRET~~

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

August 4, 1967

Opening of Campaign

The presidential campaign officially began yesterday. In their opening campaign statements and press conferences, leading candidates said the following about negotiations and a peace settlement:

Tran Van Huong said (1) Hanoi's demand that the NLF be represented in negotiations is a "trap". He would not negotiate with the Front; the principal parties to negotiations must be North and South Viet-Nam. (2) The US and other allies should avoid the mistake the French made in not giving South Viet-Nam a part in the 1954 Geneva negotiations.

Phan Khac Suu noted the NLF is only a tool of Hanoi and there cannot be direct negotiations with it. Suu's running mate Dr. Dan said that "talks" should be opened at various "levels", of which the NLF is one, but formal negotiations must be undertaken only with North Viet-Nam. (Note: This clarifies somewhat a press report yesterday stating Dan had proposed negotiations with the NLF but failing to mention the latter part of Dan's remark about North Viet-Nam.)

Nguyen Van Thieu stated (1) peace cannot be attained overnight and must result from a strong military and political position. (2) Nevertheless, "ending the war" is one of the Thieu-Ky ticket's three primary campaign slogans.

The press conferences were well-attended and well-received by both the Vietnamese and foreign press.

Thieu and Ky Back Senate Lists

Thieu and Ky reportedly agreed on six senatorial slates to support in the campaign. The backing is supposed to include substantial financial support. The lists include several members of the Directorate, People's-Military Council, and National Assembly as well as noted economist Vu Quoc Thuc and retired general Tran Van Don.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By ij, NARA, Date 9-12-94

~~SECRET~~

Friday, August 4, 1967
3:00 p. m.

24
Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

I relayed your concern about the Israeli military visit to Mac Bundy. His judgment is firmly that it is the lesser of two evils: if we do not have such an exploratory visit, pressures are likely to grow promptly to expand Israeli military aid in the wake of Soviet military delivery to the Arabs.

He argues further that the visit has already been held off a month; and having it take place in the third week of August with the limited, explicit purpose of "canvassing needs" rather than making deals would buy you another valuable month, while keeping the friends of Israel quiet.

The meeting would be at the level of the State and Defense Departments, with all issues raised ad referendum to you for your later action, if any.

In short, Mac regards the meeting as a useful and reasonable insurance policy against pressures which he feels could mount rapidly on us.

Probably the major issue raised will be aircraft. We have already agreed to sell them forty-eight A-4 aircraft for delivery late in 1967 and early 1968. What would be discussed would be, essentially, delivery dates.

An alternative to scheduling the visit for the week of August 21 would be, in Mac's judgment, to release more of the \$14 million military credit, to which we are already committed, and from which we recently released \$3 million. In addition, we might clear certain cash sales for military consumables.

W. W. Rostow

Let State and Defense proceed with the visit _____

Inform Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara to turn it off _____

Come back with Mac Bundy's alternative of
increased drawings from \$14 million credit _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By CB, NARA, Date 4-3-95

cc: Mr George Bundy
H. Stumbers

75

Pres file

Friday, August 4, 1967 -- 2:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

General Omar Bradley called on me yesterday. He is going out to Viet Nam to write an article on the G-1's for LOOK. He will be accompanied by his wife, who is a professional writer, and Warren Rogers.

I told him of our concern that our people understand that things are, on balance, moving forward in this complex war, and that the Vietnamese are playing an important and improving role.

He said he would bear these concerns in mind as he designed his article.

He said that he is sure that what we are doing is right and necessary; and, although LOOK is anxious that his article be that of neither a hawk nor a dove, he informed LOOK that if he talks to the press he would, of course, make clear his position in support of you.

I told him that I would greatly value any observations he had when he returns.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

76
~~1 copy~~
2 Pres file

Friday, August 4, 1967
11:55 a. m.

Mr. President:

Bill Jordan maintains a useful, special tie to Bui Diem.

Here is his report of a conversation yesterday, on Bui Diem's return from Saigon.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlj, NARA, Date 7-24-91

WWRostow:rln

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW (EYES ONLY)

SUBJECT: Talk with Bui Diem

The Ambassador just returned from Saigon--with a bad summer cold, but otherwise in good spirits.

He was under instructions from both Thieu and Ky to convey good wishes to President Johnson and to assure him that the two of them are working together, determined to maintain the military unity they had promised.

Diem spoke quite movingly about their feelings toward our President. He quoted Ky as follows: "President Johnson is carrying many heavy burdens. He has so many problems to deal with. And yet, because of circumstances, he must worry about Viet-Nam every day even though we are at the other end of the world. We must try not to add any more to his worries. He is our friend."

Thieu and Ky are determined to stick together. Diem admits, however, that there is little love between them--and even less between some of their followers. But past bitterness has been smoothed over and the new ticket is working out.

Diem thinks there is little doubt that Thieu-Ky will win the election. But he has cautioned both men - and their supporters - not to fall prey to over-optimism. They have several important strikes against them--both are military men, neither is a Southerner, both are relatively young. Diem would not hazard a guess on what percentage of the votes the ticket would get; he thinks that with the campaign just getting underway, any estimates now would be meaningless. It is clear he believes the military ticket will get less support than Ky alone would have garnered.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-190

By CB, NARA, Date 4-3-95~~SECRET~~

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Diem thinks there is fairly strong Southern and civilian support for Huong and Suu. Surprisingly, he said he thought Huong had lost some ground in the last week or so and that Suu has gained strength, especially in Saigon.

There is an agreement between Thieu and Ky that the latter will have a decisive voice in future government policies and actions. The reported new military committee has Ky as its chairman and Thieu as a regular member. Diem thinks Ky will run the committee, not vice-versa.

Ky's plan for post-election action calls for a thorough reshuffling of the Government. The main emphasis will be on five ministries-- Defense, Pacification, Chieu Hoi and Information, Foreign Affairs, and Economy and Finance. General Vien is slated to become Defense Minister. Ky plans a thorough-going overhaul of the armed forces and General Thang will be responsible for carrying it out. Diem expects changes from top to bottom--probably most corps commanders and many division commanders will be replaced.

There will be problems of "face" in giving Thang this job because he is a relatively junior general. On the other hand, he is widely respected as honest and incorruptible. His base operations probably will be as Deputy Chief of Staff. A more senior general will be chief of staff.

Thang will also have responsibility for the security elements of pacification--ARVN as well as PF and RF. A civilian will be in charge of the action programs of RD--health, education, agriculture, etc.

Diem is likely to be called back to Saigon to work in the new government--either to revamp Viet-Nam's foreign ministry or to take charge of the confused information program.

Thieu and Ky followers have been busy preparing a political platform for the campaign. Diem said Thieu's preference was for statements of broad principles. He (Diem) had advised Ky to get in some specifics--particularly on land reform, education, and the like.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Ky hopes to be able to begin developing a national political party after the election. It will be based on the present coalition of forces that is supporting Thieu-Ky as well as those supporters who are successful in the Senate and House elections. Ky says that the main problem for this enterprise is going to be money and an appealing national program.

A friend of mine, Dan Duc Khoi, has just been moved into Ky's inner office by Bui Diem to help Ky with press relations. If anyone can give Ky good advice in this area, it is Khoi.

General Loan is still bitter with Ky because of the latter's withdrawal from the Presidential race. The same is true of Thang and General Tri. But Diem had long talks with all of them and the latter two, at least, seem mollified.

There is surprisingly wide interest in the coming elections. Diem says that the people in Saigon seem to talk about little else these days.

Diem asked what we were concerned about these days as regards Vietnamese politics. I told him:

- keeping the military on the tracks;
- making the election fair and honest;
- producing a government that is a good blending of civilians and military--and one that can get the job done.

Bill
William J. Jordan

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

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Profile

Friday, August 4, 1967 -- 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith two questions about the Clifford-Taylor meeting scheduled for 11:00 a.m. tomorrow, Saturday, August 5.

1. Should it be on or off the record? You may wish to have it off the record and then decide either:

-- to announce that the meeting had taken place; or

-- depending on what emerges, have them briefly meet the press.

2. Who should attend? I recommend Sec. Rusk and Under Sec. Nitze.

W. W. Rostow

Meeting on the record _____

Meeting off the record _____

Sec. Rusk to attend _____

Under Sec. Nitze to attend _____

W. W. Rostow to attend _____

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - August 4, 1967
11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

*4-3-95
2- Pres file*

Jack Tuthill delivered your letter to President Costa e Silva yesterday. The President agreed to hold off on the Mirages (Tab A).

Jack also asked him about the Castello Branco Scholarship. He seemed moved by the gesture and well disposed toward it (Tab B).

President Belaunde, after mulling over our conditions for the program loan -- which include holding the line on military expenditures and no supersonics -- has given his Finance Minister the green light to negotiate with us.

I think we have achieved our immediate objective of buying time on the purchase of supersonics by our Latin American friends.

W. W. Rostow

Call me on this

Attachments

Tab A - President Costa e Silva's response to your letter of July 26.

Tab B - Embassy Rio's report on reaction to Branco Scholarship proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1967

78a

Copy of RIO DE JANEIRO 816

From Ambassador Tuthill

SUBJECT: Conversation with President Costa e Silva re Supersonic Aircraft

1. I saw Costa e Silva today. Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto and Counselor Herbert Okun were also present.

2. I told President Costa e Silva that I had returned to Washington last week under instructions from the U. S. Government in order that I could be fully informed on problems which existed for the American government in connection with the economic and military aid programs and the purchase by Brazil and other countries of supersonic aircraft. Two days before seeing Costa e Silva I had discussed the matter in full detail with Andreazza, who is Minister of Transport but who is quite clearly one of Costa e Silva's authorized channels for discussions with me. At that time Andreazza stated that he felt the request for postponement of decision on supersonic aircraft for 60 days to be an acceptable request, and stated that he would recommend such a position to Costa e Silva. It was quite evident today that Andreazza had in fact done his duty. As soon as all of the basic points of the talking paper had been covered and after Costa e Silva had read President Johnson's letter, he said explicitly that he would agree to take no action until after October 1, 1967. He made it quite clear, however, that this was not an easy decision for him to make. He stressed the overall dangers of guerrilla activity in Latin America and the indications of an increased tempo in Brazil. He mentioned the bombing of the Peace Corps office two days ago as a symbol of this unrest. He stated



1.3
(A)(3)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-191

By ijg, NARA, Date 9-12-94

8/4/67

3. Costa e Silva also repeated his well-known concern at the tendency of some people in the United States to think of Brazil as just another Latin American country. He asked,



1.3
(A)(3)

4. Despite these concerns, however, Costa e Silva stated that he recognized President Johnson's political problems at the moment and he wished to be helpful. He said that he would write a personal letter to President Johnson outlining his thoughts and describing in some detail the nature and timing of his needs re equipment.

5. I felt it would be useful for President Costa e Silva to be able to read and to ponder over the talking points as approved by President Johnson. Accordingly, we prepared a slightly modified version of the talking points in order to remove one or two minor points which we felt might be unnecessarily irritating to Costa e Silva. A copy of this modified version was left with Costa e Silva and is being airmailed to the Department.

6. Costa e Silva noted particularly point 3 which states that the U. S. Government is prepared "to authorize Northrop to begin contract talks after October 1." He stated that he was unhappy to see that the first planes could only be received after July 1, 1969. He felt that the first deliveries should be not more than 20 months after the commencement of talks. In fact, this would only move the date back to June 1, 1969, but it was clear that he wants earliest possible deliveries. He indicated that French deliveries could be made much earlier.

7. Costa e Silva said several times that in any case the purchase of advanced equipment, including supersonic planes, did not represent a serious drain on Brazil's economy.



1.3
(a)
(3-5)

8/4/67

8. Throughout conversation, which lasted more than an hour, Costa e Silva was serious but always friendly. It was quite clear that he recognized the seriousness of the political issue in the United States, and he was anxious to avoid complicating problems for President Johnson. The seriousness with which he considers the question, however, and his determination to resolve it via modernization of the Brazilian forces was evident throughout. He wants to stick with the United States as his source of supply and training, but he will go elsewhere if this cannot be done.

9. Comment: I feel that President Johnson's letter and talking points enabled us to pull this out of the fire at last possible moment. Costa e Silva clearly responded to what he felt was President Johnson's personal interest in the matter and perceptive approach to it. It's now up to us after October 1.

Tuthill

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786

AMBASSADOR TUTHILL's MESSAGE FROM RIO (817, AUGUST 4, 1967
TO MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Castello Branco Scholarship Proposals

1. At the end of a long conversation with President Costa e Silva today, I raised our proposal of a Castello Branco Scholarship. I told Costa e Silva that President Johnson did not wish to move on this until he had the benefit of his views, but that if he did move, he only wished to do so on the basis of an agreed procedure which would achieve both a demonstration of respect for the former President of Brazil and an effective means of offering to qualified Brazilians further study in the United States.

2. Costa e Silva seemed very moved at the proposal. While he did not specifically say very much, it seemed quite clear that he was well disposed towards the general idea. He said that I should discuss the matter further with Foreign Minister Magalhaes and left the issue, I think, with a very favorable reaction. I will follow this up with the Foreign Office at an early date.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-12-94

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

79

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Greek King's Visit

King Constantine will be passing through the United States informally on his way to and from EXPO 67. He has asked whether it would be possible to call on you.

We had planned inviting him for a State visit next spring and Secretary Rusk still believes we should stick to that scheme. However, since he will be here and since this fall will be a tricky political period in Greece, the Secretary recommends that you have a small working lunch with no other ceremonies, much on the order of your lunch for King Hussein.

As Phil Talbot told you, the King faces a period of trying to keep the military regime from tightening its grip and gradually ease it out in favor of return to civilian government. The outcome of this process is by no means certain, and it would be worth your hearing the King's side of the story. As you know, the Greek coup has excited a large number of our Congressional liberals, and the question of sustaining our NATO relationship with Greece via military aid is increasingly sensitive on the Hill.

The date that best fits both your and the King's schedule is September 11, although this is a Monday.

If you agree in principle to see him, but find this date unacceptable, we would like your approval to seek another mutually convenient date.

W. W. Rostow

September 11 okay _____

Find another date _____

Turn him off _____

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By CG, NARA, Date 4-3-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saunders/Moose 8/4/67

Mr. Rostow

80

*1. sup
2. Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends that you see Ambassador Elbrick sometime before he returns to Belgrade. As you know, we are concerned about our relations with Yugoslavia and also hope to encourage Tito to play a constructive role with Nasser.

Ambassador Elbrick will be in the country until August 24 and is available at any time.

W. W. Rostow

Set up appointment ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR:ND:gg

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-190
By cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1967

80a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Appointment for
Ambassador Elbrick

Recommendation:

I recommend that you receive Ambassador to Yugoslavia C. Burke Elbrick to discuss his meeting with President Tito on July 29. At that time, he delivered your message to President Tito. He would also discuss the status of our bilateral relations with Yugoslavia.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Elbrick arrived in Washington on the evening of August 1 for consultations. He has planned to be here for the remainder of the week, but, of course, could return to Washington at any time from his leave address in New York to meet your convenience.

United States-Yugoslav bilateral relations received a setback in early June when President Tito associated himself with the allegation that Israeli successes in the recent Middle East hostilities were part of a general "reactionary" offensive sponsored by the United States and other western powers. In this connection, Tito's long and close association with President Nasser as leaders of the "nonaligned" group of states undoubtedly contributed to this subjective reaction.

President Tito's response to your message delivered on July 29 by Ambassador Elbrick was a favorable one suggesting

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-12-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

the possibility of a fruitful exchange of views toward a just and durable Middle East settlement. Additionally, President Tito confirmed the view expressed frequently in recent weeks by high-ranking subordinates that Yugoslavia attaches much importance to continuing good relations with the United States.

For the favorable development of United States-Yugoslav relations, it would seem desirable for Ambassador Elbrick to be able to convey your personal views upon his return to Belgrade. A meeting with you would lend real weight to Ambassador Elbrick's efforts to assure the Yugoslav leadership that the United States continues to want to promote good relations, cooperation and understanding with Yugoslavia.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By CB, NARA, Date 4-3-95

W.W.R.

81

Friday, August 4, 1967

2. Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Invitation to Finnish Prime Minister Paasio to Visit You on September 5

At Tab A Secretary Rusk recommends that you invite Prime Minister Paasio of Finland to visit you here on September 5, on his way home from EXPO '67. (We don't know whether Paasio would be able to accept. Even if he doesn't, Rusk thinks it would ^{still} be a useful move.)

Paasio is a moderate. We want to strengthen his hand in the new Finnish Government, which has three Communist ministers.

Jim Jones tells me your calendar is open -- but September 5 is the Tuesday after Labor Day. If you would prefer, we could suggest September 6 or 7, as the Prime Minister might well stay over an extra day or two if he had the chance to visit you.

Francis M. Bator

Sound out the Finns for September 5 _____

Sound out the Finns for September 6 _____

Sound out the Finns for September 7 ✓ _____

*if I'm here
L*

No _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2914
81a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Invitation to Prime Minister of Finland for Informal Visit to Washington on September 5, 1967.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the Department of State to invite, on your behalf, Rafael Paasio, Prime Minister of Finland, to make an informal visit to Washington following his visit to EXPO '67 on September 5, 1967 (the day after Labor Day).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

Rafael Paasio was appointed Prime Minister of Finland in May 1966, heading the first Social Democratic-led coalition Government since that Party was excluded from the Government under Soviet and internal Finnish Communist pressure in 1958. Paasio is a moderate. He has achieved cooperation with the Soviet Union, but without surrendering completely to Soviet and Finnish leftists' demands that the Social Democrats renounce their ties with the moderate Socialist International and that they support Soviet stands on such questions as nuclear-free zones, Viet-Nam, and West Germany. Although the coalition headed by Paasio includes three Communist ministers, the Social Democrats have succeeded in keeping Communist influence to the minimum possible.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By inf, NARA, Date 9-12-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

There are relatively few means by which the United States can influence Finland. American officials do not have the opportunity to review with Finnish officials bilateral policies at regular intervals. A Washington visit would give Paasio his first opportunity to express his views to us on the outlook for continued Soviet approbation of Social Democratic participation in the Finnish Government and other important questions.

Paasio is expected to visit the Soviet Union this autumn as head of the Finnish Social Democratic Party for discussions with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). These will be the first such discussions since World War II between a Western Social Democratic party and the CPSU. It would be useful for us, and possibly for Paasio, to demonstrate United States interest in Finland prior to his Soviet visit. A visit to Washington following a visit to EXPO '67 would also avoid the potential complications in Finnish-Soviet relations which could occur if Paasio were invited to make a special visit to the United States.

Finland is the only non-Communist European country whose dialogue with the Soviet Union is more frequent and more informal than it is with the United States. A visit to Washington would be an excellent opportunity for a considerable redress of this imbalance, and would be particularly appropriate as this year marks the 50th anniversary of Finnish independence. It should receive maximum publicity in Finland.

While we do not know whether Paasio would be able to accept an invitation, even were it regretted it would be a highly useful gesture in improving our relations with Finland and with the Paasio Government.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Rostow

82

~~SECRET~~

August 4, 1967

~~1. Insp~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Since it will bear on your consideration of the Israeli military visit I sent you a note on earlier this afternoon, I want to pass along word I have received that the Israelis may not want to come until the first week in September. Although they had pressed for the earlier date when talking to Mac Bundy, this later date would clearly be better for us and it is helpful that they now seem to have changed their minds.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By CB, NARA, Date 4-3-95

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-217
By cbm, NARA Date 3-26-01

83

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

The attached report, [redacted]

[redacted] paints a much gloomier picture of the mood in Jordan than we have had from the [redacted] in the past few days. Nevertheless, we take it seriously [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted]

I pass this on to you because I think the flavor is worth your having.

and important

My impression is that this report is an accurate/picture of emotions at work in Jordan; but not necessarily all the emotions. Nor is it a final indication of where policy will end up.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

3 August 1967

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-134

By SJ, NARA Date 5-17-01

Ba


Copy of Memorandum For: Mr. J. P. Walsh
Executive Secretariat
Department of State

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)



1. Situation in Jordan: People are in hopeless frame of mind, as they have been since war. Because no one has held out hope for them, they are creating, in desperation, the false hope that by continuing the fight they will see Israel defeated in the end. Logic plays no part in this process, but the man on the street is a creature of emotions always. Growing resistance on West Bank is seen as proof that the battle will go on. The United States Government is totally discredited as a firm ally of Israel. The Soviets enjoy some popularity, but there is growing recognition that Soviet words are much braver than their deeds.

2. Peace in the Area: There are few prospects for peace, and the passage of time makes them even less. The Jordanian people are absolutely unwilling to "face reality" in the western sense, i. e., that they, as losers of the war, must pay some price and make the best deal they can with the victors. The people are not turning against Hussein yet, but they will unless Hussein can change present situation by getting back the West Bank and Jerusalem without signing a peace treaty with Israel. If Hussein were to try to negotiate with Israel for Jordan alone, he would be "absolutely alone, nobody would support him and he would be killed as his grandfather was killed." If Hussein lined up support from other moderates like Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, etc., it would do him no good at all; his people would still turn on him. Even were he somehow miraculously to conclude a successful peace with Israel and survive, Nasser and the Syrians would turn on him, topple him, and swallow Jordan. The key to peace is and has been Nasser; if he takes the lead in seeking peace, Jordan could and would go along, and the more radical Arabs would be helpless.



3. USG Position: The time has passed when it would have been easy for the U. S. Government to recoup its prestige with the Arabs by uttering a few proper phrases. The U. S. Government has lost all credibility in the Arab mind, as careful, tightly reasoned statements on technical points, such as why the U. S. Government did not vote for the UN resolution on Jerusalem, are worse than wasted effort -- they are positively harmful because they make the U. S. Government look hypocritical and deceitful. The U. S. Government should make no mistake, it is hated in the Arab world; innate courtesy, apathy from the shock of defeat, and the memory of kindnesses by individual American

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friends lead most educated Jordanians to conceal this hate, but it is there.


4. Possible Solutions:

There is a power vacuum in the Near East now, with the big powers discredited and Nasser's stature diminished. The U. S. Government, if it wanted, could fill the vacuum and reverse the train of events, but the price would be high. The U. S. Government would have to make the Israelis leave the conquered territory, using whatever pressures are necessary, from arm-twisting to economic pressure to threat of armed intervention. Israeli arrogance in victory probably will not respond to any but the strongest measures.

If the U. S. Government coldly calculated the value to its self-interest of tiny Israel against 13 Arab nations, then it would make the right decision. Working quietly through the United Nations would not achieve the same effect. The Arab people must see clearly that the U. S. Government forced Israel to withdraw, while the Soviets, the UN, and everybody else were unable to do so. Then the U. S. Government could have its way with the Arabs: radical governments would fall or could be pushed, negotiations leading to a real peace with Israel would be not only possible, but entirely likely, and a new era could begin. The alternative to a major initiative by the U. S. Government or Nasser is a long period of struggle and suffering.

The Arab people will endure as it always has, while Israel, an unnatural creation, cannot endure. Great powers come and go, Twenty years ago Britain was great, now she is fading rapidly. So if America and the USSR are against us now, we find consolation in the knowledge that they will go, too. If there is a long period of relative stalemate, of course the Soviets will supplant the U. S. Government as the great power with any influence at all. That is 100% certain, and there is nothing the U. S. Government could do about it short of risking a confrontation, which is not in her self-interest.

5.



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

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6. Ambassador Burns has requested that the above views 
 be transmitted to Mr. John Walsh in the Secretariat for
appropriate distribution.

EO 12958
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84

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967
7:25 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The afternoon cable summary has some interesting items, which I have marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

Operations Center
Executive Secretariat
Department of State

Afternoon summary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date *7-24-91*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS.019.020.002/7

By jc NARA. Date 12-9-09

85

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 7:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

As instructed, I have checked Gen. Eisenhower's idea of trading Soviet "supplies" to Hanoi for a cessation of our bombing of the North.

1. Bus Wheeler is out of town; and I could not reach him on this issue.

2. Sec. Rusk believes that militarily it would be a good trade; but he wishes to think further about the implications for the balance of power and influence in Hanoi. He fears it might turn Hanoi over to the Chinese Communists. He is not sure, but wishes to consider the matter before giving a judgment. In addition, he would prefer to get some response from the Russians to his question: What would you do if we stopped bombing? In his last talk with Dobrynin he thought he detected some Soviet interest in the question and does not wholly rule out a response. It would be better if they put up a formula than if we put up a formula.

3. I raised the issue in Nick Katzenbach's small Viet Nam group which is now meeting regularly. Here are some of the reactions:

-- Nick thinks it might work, but only if it were followed pretty promptly by negotiations. Moscow would have to tell Hanoi: You said you would negotiate if bombing stopped; bombing will stop; but we can only get bombing stopped if we stop sending military supplies.

-- There was general agreement that we could get in trouble with the deal if North Viet Nam were to release some of its military manpower from dealing with bombing and put a massive assault across the DMZ. Under these circumstances the pressure to go back to bombing the North would be almost irresistible in the U. S.

-- Paul Nitze thought the deal was good but he does not believe in negotiations as a way to end the war unless -- as in Korea -- the negotiations simply confirm a situation which exists on the ground. He thinks that we are moving toward a situation where we can master the situation on the ground and are moving in that direction in particular in II and III Corps. But, following Bob McNamara's views, he believes we could dispense with bombing the North and still proceed on the ground in the South successfully. Therefore, he believes the deal is sound; although he also was troubled at what we would have to do if they switched military manpower to the South in a big way.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

-- Dick Helms saw no trouble in putting the proposition to Moscow and getting their reaction.

4. My own preliminary conclusion is:

-- We would, of course, have to get a fairly clear idea of what we mean by "supplies" and make sure that Eastern Europe did not pick up and send what the Soviets turned off. Do supplies, for example, include military trucks? Oil? How much oil?

-- The Chinese influence question is complex; and I would be inclined to let the Russians decide the answer. They know better than we what they would gain and lose in Hanoi influence by making this deal.

-- We would have to link the question to the issue of serious negotiations to end the war. In my bones I do not feel the deal would hold up for very long if the war continued at its present scale with violations of the DMZ and continued massive infiltration from the North.

5. I think we will want to have, before making such a proposition, a rather complete analysis from CIA as to precisely what the Soviets are sending into Hanoi. I shall make sure this is done.

5. My net recommendation is that we have a meeting to discuss this with you soon. It is not a bad idea; and it may be a good idea -- so good that Moscow, after checking with Hanoi, will not accept it. It certainly deserves careful staffing out and discussion.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

86

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

Thursday, August 3, 1967
7:05 p. m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

This highly private message
from Sec. Rusk to Amb. Bunker will
interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 7-24-91

MFG. 4-65 #2
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-791
By , NARA, Date 9-12-94

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

This is a highly personal message from me to you on the eve of the opening of the electoral campaign period in Viet Nam. Its purpose is to substitute for a stream of subsequent messages about clean elections which might otherwise flow out of Washington because of much nervousness here and the great sensitivity of this point. I will do my best to keep everyone from trying to show Ellsworth Bunker how to suck eggs. I just want you to know that I have complete confidence in your determination to do everything possible to ensure fair and clean elections and will not be heckling you on a day-to-day basis.

What may be helpful to you will be a special and frequent press roundup from here on this subject so that you will know reactions here and will in the process have some arguments in hand which you can use when needed with South Vietnamese. I will arrange for Bundy to provide you such a series.

Drafted by: S DRusk:ma	8/2/67	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission classification: <u> </u>	The Secretary
Clearances:				

S/S - Mr. Read

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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It was not surprising to me but very heartwarming to hear from McNamara, Katzenbach and others how quickly you have gotten on top of things and what general admiration and respect your American colleagues and the South Vietnamese have for the job you are doing.

Personal regards to you and Carol.

RUSK

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By CG, NARA, Date 4-3-95

87

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 4:45 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's latest, with some interesting specific examples of progress in revolutionary development (pp. 4-6).

On page 6 is reference to a marked phenomenon in South Viet Nam in recent months; namely, the rise of real income and the availability of consumers goods in rural as well as urban areas.

In my judgment it is time to begin a program of industrial production of consumers goods in South Viet Nam. It would be better to begin importing machinery rather than bicycles, transistor radios, etc. Moreover, as the construction boom levels off, we ought to take up some of the slack in small industries, including frozen fish, food processing, etc.

I shall be discussing this with Bill Leonhart and our AID man for Viet Nam, Jim Grant.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 2289

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

WWRostow:rln

SANTIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ

94-191

By WJP, NARA, Date 9-12-94

87a

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 2289)

Herewith my fourteenth weekly telegram:

A. General

At the end of last week I had talks with both Thieu and Ky on a variety of subjects but especially concerning various aspects of the forthcoming elections.

Ky said that he felt preparations were going ahead well and was pleased that unanimous agreement had been reached among all the candidates regarding use of radio and television facilities, transportation, and joint meetings throughout the country in which all candidates would participate. He remarked that a few protests, with some threats to boycott the elections, had been made by some of the Cao Dai and militant Buddhists whose tickets had been rejected. He did not, however, envisage a situation which could not be satisfactorily handled, and observed that members of the Cao Dai as well as Buddhists were scattered through all the tickets. He expressed some concern about the ability of voters to choose among the great number of Senate candidates and confirmed his intention to tie in about six Senate lists to the Thieu-Ky slate so that the voters could identify them as allied with their ticket. He expressed the hope that other candidates might follow a similar course.

I raised with both Thieu and Ky a suggestion that they encourage a number of qualified Viet Cong ralliers to present themselves as candidates for the Lower House elections, noting the advantages that this might offer in promoting the Government of Vietnam's National Solidarity Program. Both agreed that this was a useful idea and could provide further incentive to both the Chieu Hoi and Doan Ket programs. Thieu observed that there might be

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

a problem in finding qualified men since most of the ralliers were relatively uneducated, but said that he would nevertheless pursue the matter. He rather shared Ky's doubts that disgruntled Cao Dai or the extreme Buddhists would be able to create trouble which could not be readily handled. He thought instead they would work "underground" advising people to vote against the military ticket and probably favoring Phan Khac Suu as being a benevolent figure more favorable to their interests, with the added prestige of age and white hair. Thieu gave an interesting description of the importance of age not only in terms of political support, but also in pacification, and indeed the whole realm of bringing the country, especially the villages, into the modern age of science and technology. He stressed the importance of taking into account the prestige and influence of elders on the attitudes of the villagers. The Communists in the beginning had failed to recognize this and as a result had had numerous failures. Thieu said the most effective way for the Government to instill new ideas, for example with respect to pacification, was first to convince the elders who in turn would then be able to influence the younger elements to adopt them and put them into effect.

In response to my question about the platform and campaign plans for the Thieu-Ky ticket, he said they proposed to handle the campaign in a rather low-key fashion. Their ticket had certain inherent advantages, especially in meeting popular desires for stability, continuity, and security which the military element can best provide. At the same time, the Armed Forces would be considered among the strongest proponents of peace since they were the heaviest sufferers from war. He added that obviously a large measure of military support would accrue to the ticket also and they would not wish to appear to be exerting pressure on either the Armed Forces or Provincial and District Chiefs. He planned to state this clearly and publicly again.

In discussing the Senate lists, Thieu commented on the complexity of the problem for the average voter and confirmed Ky's statement about affiliating six slates with their own ticket. He stressed the importance of the Executive and Legislative branches working together in wartime. I noted that there had been a number of protests about Upper House lists which had been disqualified and observed that the U. S. press had been quite critical. Thieu said

he recognized this and that he was reviewing these protests personally. He said that so far his conclusion was that the disqualifications were justified on the grounds given.

A matter which has been of considerable interest to us has been the status of the Statut Particuler drafted by a congress of Montagnard representatives under the chairmanship of General Vinh Loc in order to meet some of the aspirations and concerns of the Fulro, most of whom are now in Cambodia, and other Montagnard tribes. Ky announced at the end of June that the Statut would be promulgated and the intention of the Government to set up a Ministry for Montagnard Affairs, but no action has been taken. I brought up the matter with both Thieu and Ky. Thieu said he was presently examining the Statut, that he thought it was in order and conformed to the Constitution and proposed to promulgate it in August at a ceremony in Pleiku or Banmethout. This should be helpful in stimulating the return of the approximately 2,000 to 3,000 Fulro now in Cambodia and giving the Montagnards generally a greater feeling of identity with the social structure of the country.

Through JUSPAO we have undertaken a very comprehensive project in support of the national elections and in getting out the vote. Materials have already been dispatched to the field for use and display. These will be disseminated during August in accordance with the phasing of our campaign plan. These include air/ground distributed leaflets (including to Viet Cong-controlled areas), posters, slogan banners, cartoon books, and adhesive stickers for auto bumpers which have never been used before in Vietnam and are being tried as an experiment.

The Government of Vietnam support plan calls for some 64 items (leaflets, slogan banners, posters) as well as slides for use in theatres. Some of these materials have already been received in the field.

JUSPAO has prepared 30 items of printed matter, loud speaker tapes, slides and film strips for distribution through the Ministry of Information. JUSPAO support is intended to educate the voter in regard to Election Laws and procedures and to

generate popular support for the elections in order to induce the maximum amount of qualified voters to register and vote.

Most of the reporting in my weekly messages has concentrated very largely on the major military, political, and economic developments and trends. Sometimes, however, local situations can give a clue to larger developments and can be illustrative of ways in which progress is being or can be made, as well as problems still being encountered. I thought it might be interesting to give a few examples.

The northern provinces of Quang Tin and Quang Ngai in the First Corps reported an unusual spurt of activity and successes by the Revolutionary Development teams in June. In Quang Tin this is the result of several factors: (a) replacement of the former Revolutionary Development Cadre Chief, who was using his position for personal gain, by a new Chief who has shown enthusiasm, energy, and determination in promoting new ideas; (b) steadily increasing pressure by the Province Chief on everyone involved in the Revolutionary Development program; and, (c) reduced threat of insecurity through the deployment of U. S. Marine units in the area. In both provinces the successes were directly proportional to team leadership, security, the interest and supervision of the Province Chiefs, and the advisory efforts of American military and civilian personnel.

In Quang Tin the new Cadre Chief promptly seeks to implement the suggestions of U. S. advisors, is constantly visiting Revolutionary Development teams, has arranged for awards and benefits for outstanding cadres, and is weeding out ineffective team leaders. Through information received from Viet Cong prisoners, four rice caches were turned over to the U. S. Marines for exploitation, numerous ambushes were set up, thirteen Viet Cong killed and captured.

The Revolutionary Development Committee recruited 94 new cadre members in June, fifteen of them Hoi Chanh who will be integrated into existing teams. In addition, the Revolutionary Development teams in Quang Tin have trained about 500 Revolutionary Development Peoples Group members and now have arms for fifty of them. Forty-five self-help projects have been

approved and thirty-five are under construction. Nearly 800 illiterate adults are attending classes given by Revolutionary Development cadres and more than 2,000 youths are meeting at least once monthly for campouts, games and songfests as part of the Revolutionary Development Youth Program. About 3,700 farmers are beginning to profit by the united efforts of the Revolutionary Development Farmers Association.

In Quang Ngai province progress has also been substantial. Particularly noteworthy has been the willingness of the people to give information to the Revolutionary Development teams. Propaganda courses given in four hamlets involving 537 people suspected of being sympathetic to the Viet Cong resulted in the participants identifying sixteen members of groups which had been actively aiding the Viet Cong. A total of 30 new unfunded projects and 17 new funded projects were initiated in June and have gone a long way to convince people that the Revolutionary Development teams and the Government of Vietnam are interested in their well being. In return, the people have provided more information on Viet Cong personalities in the hamlets. In 10 of 15 Viet Cong-initiated incidents against Revolutionary Development teams, the peoples' information enabled the teams to ambush the Viet Cong before they could enter the hamlets. Census information has identified families with relatives in Viet Cong ranks and family members have been persuaded to write letters which resulted in seven Viet Cong returning as ralliers. Increased intelligence efforts by Revolutionary Development teams resulted in the capture of 15 Viet Cong during June.

During the current year, Revolutionary Development teams have taught school to more than 2,000 illiterates. In June, 64 additional members of Revolutionary Development Peoples Group were being trained, bringing the total for the year to more than 600 in the province.

The isolated district of Ba Tri in the Delta province of Kien Hoa is a good example of what can be accomplished when adequate security is established. In January, 14,000 people returned to the district town's commercial belt; the road was paved from Ba Tri into the area; improved road security from the

provincial capital of Ben Tre enabled goods to move freely; and high paddy prices provided a good deal of liquidity to the new life hamlets.

In April there were few sewing machines in the pacification area. Now approximately 30 percent of the house holds have them. Transistor radios are not an uncommon possession. The motorbike revolution has also come to Ba Tri; in April there were two or three motorbikes in the district, today there are over fifty. On the provincial road running northward from Ba Tri through 13 new life hamlets, there are ten new lambretta taxis carrying goods and passengers. Nine commercial trucks of the district town are in almost constant motion carrying rice, hogs, fish, and other products to Saigon and returning with consumer goods. Rice farmers continue to get good prices for their produce and secondary crops provide an additional source of income. Vegetables are being sold in good quantities daily in the Ba Tri market. Fertilizer packed in one kilo bags is sold in all the little shops in the district town and is being used mostly for vegetables.

In short, open roads, good agricultural prices, and the availability of consumer goods are doing as much as anything to promote "national building."


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In another Delta province, Phong Dinh, Giai Xuam village, which I visited earlier this month, was attacked a few nights later by part of a Viet Cong battalion in the early hours of the morning. The attack was repelled by [redacted] and a Popular Force platoon, killing 3 Viet Cong. The [redacted] called for assistance which was provided quickly by the ARVN, our own "spooky" C-47 aircraft, and the Vietnamese Air Force. The Viet Cong were followed and engaged, 51 were killed, and 10 prisoners taken -- three 12 years of age, two 14, and five 17, certainly another indication that the Viet Cong are having increasing difficulties in recruiting.

I have cited these as examples of what can be done when there is good leadership, team work, organization, and proper motivation.

The other side of the coin is what happened last month in Vein Hoa province. Here the Viet Cong increased their

propaganda and harassment attacks against the Revolutionary Development pacification efforts, utilizing mainly small size units. Two unopposed attacks by the Viet Cong on Revolutionary Development teams in Nhon Trac district have succeeded in administering a serious psychological setback to the Revolutionary Development effort in this area which previously had been progressing well.



Obviously there is bound to be unevenness in any program as new, extensive and wide-ranging as Revolutionary Development. Cadres are being trained rapidly. Some teams are excellent, some fair, and some poor, but the latter I would say are distinctly in the minority. From time to time we shall have setbacks like the example I have indicated. But these we have to take in stride, repair the damage and get on with the job. The overall effort is moving ahead and I am confident that once we get through the elections, we shall be able to accelerate it.

A very useful South East Asia Coordinating Office for Revolutionary Development meeting was held yesterday, August 1, attended by Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan, Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland together with their principal advisers. Ambassador Locke and I also attended. We considered specifically the Cambodian situation, the forthcoming DYE MARKER operations, the PRAIRIE FIRE III concept, and SOUTHPAW.

With regard to Cambodia, it was agreed that the next step should be a carefully-documented and verifiable dissemination in world capitals as well as to the Royal Khmer Government and publicly of evidence of the use of Cambodian territory by the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army and that that use is reaching an intolerable level. Our recommendation is based on recognition that the quiet approach has not resulted in desired Royal Khmer Government movement to take action on the problem. We believe

that public dissemination would force Sihanouk to focus on a situation which threatens his territorial integrity, and would lay the necessary psychological and political groundwork for more forceful actions against Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army use should we reach the point where this becomes clearly imperative. We continue to believe that our approach to this problem should be governed by the basic consideration that we do not wish to expand the war across the border.

We have established a Cambodian Working Group of the South East Asia Coordinating Office for Revolutionary Development (SEACoord) to meet periodically to strengthen U.S. coordination of information and to formulate policy and action recommendations from the field.

The SEACoord group expressed considerable concern about the apparent absence of field coordination in the development of DYE MARKER operations. Consequently, it was agreed that a working group be established to develop a closer working relationship among Saigon-based officials and officials from Vientiane and Bangkok.

It was agreed that it was essential for the DYE MARKER system to supplement and improve the interdiction efforts already under way rather than supersede or downgrade them. This involves not only STEEL TIGER, TIGER HOUND, CRICKET, and PRAIRIE FIRE operations, but also

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(a)(5)

[REDACTED]

Ambassador Martin said that the changes in "policy guidelines for U.S. military assistance in Thai counter-insurgency" made by the Deputy Secretary of Defense decision on June 30 made it probable that Thai cooperation would be withdrawn. He pointed out that the Thai decision to cooperate in DYE MARKER was conditioned by the express understanding that the present degree of assistance to them would be maintained and suggested, therefore, that planning be adjusted to eliminate any use of Thai bases.

The PRAIRIE FIRE III concept was reviewed. It was agreed that in principle there were no objectives to Phase III provided that it was restricted to the existing PRAIRIE FIRE

operation area. Representatives of MACV and Embassy Vientiane will review specific details implicit in Phase III so that Ambassador Sullivan can assess the political implications of this operation in terms of its impact on the Royal Khmer Government.

When Secretary McNamara was here he received a briefing on the proposed SOUTHPAW operation. Subsequently, in a message to Secretary McNamara, General Westmoreland recommended that we receive authority to launch ARVN forces of one to three battalion strength for operations of short duration against enemy bases in Laos in areas near the border. Admiral Sharp has recommended against approval of this proposal. Ambassadors Martin and Sullivan concurred in Admiral Sharp's views. I endorsed in its entirety the formal SOUTHPAW recommendations as forwarded to the Secretary of Defense by General Westmoreland. I have already made known the importance I attach to operations in Laos designed to choke off or at least minimize North Vietnamese infiltration. I continue to believe that this is an essential part of our military effort here.

B. Political

The formal campaign opens tomorrow. In the countryside as well as here in Saigon, there are many banners and signs urging the people to register and vote. One slogan reads: "Only with independence are there elections, only with elections is there independence."

Thieu and Ky have kept in the public eye with a series of well-publicized ceremonies and inspection visits to the provinces. Tran Van Huong has also managed to be quite visible, mostly by means of frequent press interviews. Phan Khac Suu has relied mostly on his role as Assembly Chairman for pre-campaign public exposure, but he recently made a bid for more attention by calling on General Thieu to reduce the death sentence which a military court handed down on the youthful student slayer of a high school professor.

One interesting but not unexpected development is that Duong Van Minh (Big Minh) is throwing his support to Tran Van Huong. Huong and his people apparently arranged for Big

Minh to be interviewed in Bangkok by an ABC correspondent, then got the story translated and circulated it to the local papers. The local press carried the story this morning, many with a picture of Mrs. Minh calling on Huong before departing Saigon for Bangkok. Huong told an Embassy officer that he does not expect that Minh will be allowed to return before the election. Asked if he intends to use Minh in his Government if he wins the election, Huong said that he fully understands the need for military-civilian cooperation but did not say whether Minh would be in his Government.

The joint formal campaign schedule, as planned by the Central Election Campaign Committee (composed of representatives of all the candidates), includes a television appearance by all eleven Presidential slates tomorrow evening. Each slate will have five minutes. Four of the slates will also have ten minutes each on the radio tomorrow night, with the remaining seven getting radio time on the evenings of August 4 and 5. The Presidential slates will also have radio time on ten other evenings in the course of the campaign, each slate to have a total of 25 minutes. Each slate will have a total of three television appearances, for a total of 25 minutes each.

Personal appearances in the provinces begin August 6 with a visit to Quang Tri. The candidates will be able to visit 20 provinces, plus four joint appearances in the Saigon-Gia Dinh area. We understand that the major candidates, including General Thieu, will go on at least some of the joint trips to the provinces.

The Upper House campaign arrangements are somewhat confused. The sheer number of the candidates -- 480 on 48 slates -- makes joint public appearances in the provinces a logistic impossibility, or at least this is the view of the Central Election Campaign Committee. The Committee has, in fact, ruled out any public meetings with voters, though press conferences are permitted. The eliminated Senate slates, particularly those of the militant An Quang Buddhists and the CVT Labor Union, are continuing to express their dissatisfaction. Thanks to the lifting of censorship, their indignation is getting full coverage in the local newspapers.

Although at least one of Tran Van Huong's chief campaign managers continues to say that his workers in the provinces are being harassed by the police, the evidence now available to us suggests that the campaign will most likely be cleanly and fairly conducted. The absolute equality of radio and television time for all slates in fact goes further than we do in the United States in giving all candidates an even break. It seems likely, however, that a large number of the Province Chiefs will let it be known that they favor the Thieu-Ky slate. This will be enough in many rural areas to insure a heavy vote for the Government slate.

Many Vietnamese observers believe that the combined Thieu-Ky ticket is weaker than the old Ky-Loc ticket, in large part because of the disappointment of the Ky supporters. Important groups such as the Hoa Hao and the Catholic Greater Solidarity Force were all but fully committed to Ky; now they have not yet formally made up their minds to back the Thieu-Ky ticket. In part, their hesitation stems from the suspicion that Thieu and Ky will not stick together. It also reflects anti-military feeling, which is increased by the Thieu-Ky merger.

Perhaps an equally important reason for the hesitation of many groups is their hope of striking a better political deal with the Government slate. As I mentioned, the Thieu-Ky ticket intends to back six Senate slates. Most of the major political groups have one or more Senate slates, and they may be angling for Government support of their Senate candidates in return for their support to the Thieu-Ky ticket. Despite the hesitation and divisions of some major groups over the question of whether to back Thieu and Ky, we continue to expect that Thieu and Ky will win by a respectable margin.

Communist reaction to the coming elections is now somewhat clearer. The Viet Cong's governing body, the National Liberation Front Central Committee Presidium, has called for a boycott of the election. We do not believe that they have either the political or military strength to seriously disrupt the elections.

They have the military forces to hit selected targets very hard, but when the target is millions of voters and thousands of polling stations, they do not have the resources to be effective.

We have some reports, including press stories, that indicate the military intend to exercise their influence in the new regime through a modified Armed Forces Council. This would be a group of the senior generals, probably corresponding roughly to the present military membership of the Directorate. There is, of course, every reason to believe that the military do intend to continue to influence the Government, and it is not surprising that they should want to form such a Committee for the purpose. The Constitution, in fact, makes provision for an Armed Forces Council, the organization and regulation of which is to be prescribed by law.

The danger, of course, is that the military will seek to perpetuate the Government by a military junta and will not permit meaningful civilian participation in the new Government. Ky recently added to the fears of those who suspect that the generals merely intend to put a thin civilian facade on their present Government by a Military Committee. He was reported by the press, apparently accurately, as threatening a coup if the future Government proved to be "unworthy," corrupt or pro-Communist. I have already let Bui Diem and Ky know my strong views on any such possibility and I intend to reiterate them to Ky later today.

I have the impression that both Thieu and Ky are well aware of the need to set and maintain legal institutions and procedures, and I hope that Ky's remark was merely another unfortunate example of his penchant for off-the-cuff shockers which he really does not mean. I must say, however, that it appears certain that the military leaders were thinking very seriously of at least dissolving and probably arresting the Assembly on the morning of July 18. The absolute need for civilian support and participation in the Government is, thus, a lesson which they seem to have learned only in part.

Some of the Corps Commanders in particular have evidently not yet absorbed it.

It will require constant attention and some pressure from us to oblige the military to continue to expand the area of civilian participation and control in the Government, and to give meaning and influence to the new Constitutional bodies which make up the necessary checks and balances in the new Government. This will have to be a gradual process, and it cannot be realistically expected that it will be accomplished at one stroke by the September elections. Fortunately, most of the leading civilian politicians seem to understand this point, though they are not always willing to admit it.

C. Economic

Prices are up again, with the Retail Price Index moving from 282 to 293. This is 3.5 percent above last week and nine percent above the level of last month. Prices have now gone up 30 percent since the beginning of the year. An important reason for the increase this week was the frequent mining by the Viet Cong of Route 4 from the Delta. As a result of the minings, truckers hesitated to move and deliveries of hogs, fish, and chicken declined. Rice prices remained unchanged. The Price Index on Imported Commodities also moved up, from 203 to 209.

D. Chieu Hoi

The number of returnees reported this week was 518. This may be compared with 322 for the same period last year. The total number of returnees this year is now 19,505; last year at this time the total stood at 10,905.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending July 29, the enemy killed 52 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 39, and kidnapped 44. The

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

-14-

dead included one Revolutionary Development worker, one Hamlet Chief, and 8 policemen. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 1,728 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 3,201, and kidnapped 2,197.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

88

Thurs., August 3, 1967
4:00 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Andy Goodpaster called to report the following from General Eisenhower.

1. He suggests we make the following offer to Moscow: If you stop sending supplies to Hanoi, we will stop bombing the North. The General believes this might start a useful dialogue and is not unfair because the Russians send supplies which, in effect, compensate for our bombing attacks, and on which Hanoi is otherwise significantly dependent. The General's feeling was that the Chinese Communists could not make up for the supplies the Soviets would cease to send. (I did not tell Andy that Secretary Rusk has several times posed the question to Soviet representatives: What would you be willing to do if we stopped bombing the North?)

2. The General reported to Andy that he had received with gratification your letter on desalting. He will make no further move in this matter unless he has some new data or thoughts. In Andy's judgment, your letter was "helpful."

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-190
By cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95

Thurs., August 3, 1967
3:45 p. m.

84

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick reports as follows on his talk with Fulbright on his resolution.

1. Fulbright is concerned primarily with "military commitments of the U. S." He wishes to establish where we now have "commitments to use military force."

2. In Nick's judgment, Fulbright is primarily interested in raising again the question of the basis for our Viet Nam commitment.

3. Fulbright did mention, however, the nature of our commitment to "territorial integrity" in the Middle East. Are we committed to use military force to preserve the "territorial integrity" of Israel and the Arab states?

4. Fulbright said the sending of the planes to the Congo made Congress "jumpy" against the background of our military actions in Viet Nam and the Dominican Republic. He wishes to establish whether the President feels himself free to use military force; or whether Congress will be consulted before military force is used; and how Congress will be consulted.

W. W. R.

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 3:30 PM

70
L. Rostow
2. Pres. file

Mr. President:

As you know, Doc Morgan did yeoman service in getting the foreign aid bill out of committee largely intact. I think -- and Bill Gaud agrees -- that it would be a nice gesture if you were to call Doc and:

- thank him for reporting the bill with only \$200 million in cuts (compared with \$750 million in the Senate); and
- wish him well on the House floor, where he will have his hands full.

A copy of Gaud's rundown of the Committee action is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Write a good strong letter
L.

EKH/vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

90a

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

August 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: House Foreign Affairs Committee Action on the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill

The Foreign Affairs Committee finished mark-up today. Doc Morgan did a magnificent job for us. The bill contains almost everything we requested. However, Morgan told the press this morning, "I expect the toughest floor fight in the ten years I've been handling this bill."

The report is expected next week, but we have no indication yet of when the bill will come up for floor action.

The House Committee authorized all appropriation categories for two years at the levels we requested except for

- paper cuts for FY 1968 in Development Loans, the Alliance for Progress and the Contingency Fund
- a cut of \$30 million in Military Assistance and
- a cut in Administrative Expenses for FY 1969.

The Committee did one thing which was wholly unexpected and is sure to cause a real rumpus on the floor. It voted unanimously to make the existing PL 480 law a part of the Foreign Assistance Act. I am told this was done without notice to the Agriculture Committee.

The Committee also adopted a sense-of-Congress amendment calling for the suspension of aid to Middle East countries which broke diplomatic relations with us and for a review of aid policy in that area. It should give us no trouble.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 7-24-91


Two potentially troublesome amendments which were defeated in Committee are likely to come up on the floor:

- a Hays amendment prohibiting aid of any kind to Latin American countries which acquire supersonic military jets, and
- a Findley amendment to terminate most-favored-nation treatment for Poland unless the President can assure the Congress that Poland is not supplying military articles to North Vietnam.

If - and it is a big if - no substantial changes are made in the bill on the floor of either body, the major issues for the Conference will be:

- the number of countries to which various types of aid may be provided, and the procedure (if any) by which the number may be increased;
- the authority of the Department of Defense to make credit sales, to continue its existing revolving fund and to guarantee Ex-Im Bank and other financing;
- the amount of military aid;
- whether our extended risk guaranties are to cover 75% or 50% of the investments on which they are issued;
- the dollar limitations that are to apply to military aid to Latin America and Africa;
- whether 10% of our Development Loan funds can be used only for transfer to the World Bank, IDA or the Asian Development Bank, or whether such transfers may be made at our discretion;
- whether economic and military programs are to be authorized for one year or for two.

This list of issues assumes that the PL 480 amendment will not survive floor action in the House.


William S. Gaud

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-190
By CG, NARA, Date 4-3-95

91

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

As instructed, we shall set up a meeting on the Indian food problem.

Indian plans commercial purchases of grain from the U.S. of 425,000 tons in 1967 as compared with 111,000 tons last year. Moreover, since May, when we made known our view on the appropriate share in U.S. commercial purchases, India has planned to make 50% of its worldwide commercial grain purchases in the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

92

Thurs., Aug. 3, 1967
11:15 a. m.

Pres. file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Clifford-Taylor session
with Holyoake.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

(Wellington 214)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-191

By inf, NARA, Date 5-12-94

92a

~~SECRET~~


Copy of Wellington 214 EXDIS August 2, 1967

SUBJECT: Clifford/Taylor visit-meetings with Prime Minister and Cabinet

1. Mr. Clifford and General Taylor, accompanied by Ambassador on August 1, met twice privately with Prime Minister Holyoake and also with the full government Cabinet in formal session. Additionally, Mr. Clifford, General Taylor and the Ambassador met with the Cabinet in a quasi-formal, private luncheon.


2. In the first half-hour meeting with the Prime Minister, Mr. Clifford and Gen. Taylor summarized the present-tense reality of the Vietnam war in its military, economic and political dimensions. They expressed confidence and satisfaction but cited the Allies' need for more military personnel. The Prime Minister accepted the analysis and voiced sympathy with the U. S. position.

3. Mr. Clifford and General Taylor next asked the Prime Minister's views on certain measures of present and future strategy: the bombing of North Vietnam; possible troop action across the 17th parallel; possible extension of action to Laos and Cambodia; and a summit meeting of the Allies. The Prime Minister noted his obligation to Cabinet consultation;



4. Mr. Clifford then presented the American position on troops requirements. He noted that the United States was prepared to send the additional troops, but the Administration might find this political impossible if the Allies did not increase their own contribution. Mr. Clifford and General Taylor then emphasized they were leaving the matter of additional personnel to the decision of New Zealand, but trusted that the Government of New Zealand would study the troops increase issue in the light of Allied requirements.

5. The Prime Minister in general summation said that he could not commit his Government without proper study and Cabinet consultation.




8/2/67

6. The ensuing Cabinet meeting of one and a half hours opened with Mr. Clifford and General Taylor presenting the substance of the U. S. position as earlier given the Prime Minister.

Their presentation emphasized the following:

- a) The consultative character of their visit.
- b) A review of latest developments in Vietnam in terms of ground war, air war, guerrilla action, nation building and diplomatic endeavor.
- c) A soliciting of Cabinet opinion on specific questions of strategy: bombing the North; crossing the 17th parallel; moving into Laos and Cambodia; closing Haiphong harbor; a Summit Meeting.
- d) The commanding need for more Allied troops.
- e) President Johnson's political difficulty in committing more troops and raising taxes, should the Allied nations fail to increase their own troop contributions.
- f) The need to give priority to crushing "the head of the monster in Vietnam" thereby reducing the problem of Malaysia/Singapore security.

7. In response,



1.3
(a)
(3)

11. Immediately before close of the Cabinet meeting, Mr. Clifford stressed President Johnson's hope that New Zealand would keep in mind that any additional contribution by our Allies would lead to infinitely greater contribution by the United States.

12. The Cabinet tone was one of sympathy and fraternity without commitment.

13. An informal one-hour luncheon followed in which Mr. Clifford and General Taylor contrasted America's present international commitments with the insular traditions prevailing before World War II. They implied the continued American presence in Southeast Asia would require a similar commitment of free nations in that area, particularly in view of the announced British withdrawal.

14. Following the luncheon, Mr. Clifford, General Taylor and Ambassador Henning met for a 15-minute private meeting with the Prime Minister.

15. Mr. Clifford made two major requests of the Prime Minister:

a. Recalling Mr. Holyoake's warm relationship with President Johnson, he asked the Prime Minister to write the President a letter of personal response to the Clifford/Taylor visit.

b. Recalling a point reviewed at the Cabinet meeting, he said the Prime Minister would appreciate the President's problem in committing more troops and raising U. S. taxes should the Allies fail to add to their troop presence. He told the Prime Minister that the President was prepared to "bite the bullet" to save Southeast Asia, but that he would need Allied help.

16. The Clifford/Taylor presentation of the American case for a greater New Zealand effort was superbly done.

17. With uncommon sophistication they embraced every valid and sensitive area of decision. They placed the destiny of New Zealand with the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

18. I believe the controlling element in New Zealand action will be the Prime Minister's cautious and deliberate political pace. He will choose the time and character of any commitment.

Henning.

93

Thurs., Aug. 3, 1967
11:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This account of Gaullist politics shows:


-- general lack of enthusiasm in the
Gaullist majority;

-- Giscard's dilemma: he can bring down
the government, but if he does so, he is
unlikely to succeed De Gaulle.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



2 Aug 67)

1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-188
By ijg, NARA, Date 6-13-95

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

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IN 24062

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DD/I DIA NMCC/MC EXO (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

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SANTIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-187

By: isp, NARA, Date 2-13-95

COUNTRY FRANCE

DOI LATE JULY 1967

SUBJECT ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE SCHISM IN THE
GAULLIST MAJORITY

1.3(a)(4)
C

1.3(a)(4)
C

ACQ

SOURCE

1. THE DIVISION OF THE GAULLIST MAJORITY INTO TWO RIVAL GROUPS MAY BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE REFUSAL OF THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH THE MAJORITY GROUP HAS HAD A PARALYZING EFFECT ON GAULLISTS IN GENERAL AND ON THE GAULLIST PARLIAMENTARY BLOC OF THE UNION DEMOCRATIQUE DE LA CINQUIEME REPUBLIQUE (UD/VR - DEMOCRATIC UNION FOR THE FIFTH REPUBLIC) AS WELL AS ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT ITSELF. THE

1.3(a)(4)
C

1.3(a)(4)

C

(classification)

(dissem controls)

CONSTANTLY CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING, LEADER OF THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS, TOWARD THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND TOWARD HIS GOVERNMENT HAS CREATED A VERY REAL FEAR AMONG LOYAL GAULLISTS WHO FEEL THEIR ELECTORAL POSITIONS ERODED BY THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICANS. THE MINISTERS THEMSELVES, AND PARTICULARLY FINANCE MINISTER, MICHEL DEBRE, FEAR THE CRITICISMS OF GISCARD D'ESTAING AND HAVE A TENDENCY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE PRESENTING A PROJECT WHAT THE FORMER FINANCE MINISTER WOULD SAY ABOUT IT. WITH PRESENT FINANCE MINISTER DEBRE, THIS IMAGINARY CRITIQUE HAS BECOME ALMOST A MANIA. WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF, PERSONAL QUARRELS HAVE BECOME AN IMPORTANT FACTOR, AND IT IS A FACT THAT RELATIONS ARE STRAINED BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER, DEBRE, MINISTER FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS JEAN-MARCEL JEANNENEY AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT, JACQUES CHIRAC.

2. WHAT IS LACKING TODAY IN THE MAJORITY IS ENTHUSIASM. THE CREATION OF THE UD/VR AND THE NOMINATION OF FIVE GENERAL SECRETARIES APPROVED BY THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN ANY REAL IMPETUS TO THE GAULLIST MOVEMENT. COMMENT: 1.3(a)(4)(5) ACCORDING TO [REDACTED], THE SECRETARIES ARE: ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT, CHABAN DELMAS; FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER, [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)
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(classification)

(dissem controls)

ROGER FREY; MICHEL DEBRE; ELYSEE AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICER, JACQUES FOCCART; AND INDUSTRY MINISTER, OLIVIER GUICHARD.) THIS HAS DIS-ILLUSIONED THE GAULLIST MILITANTS AND EVEN THE GUALLIST LEADERSHIP IS WELL AWARE OF THE NARROW LIMITS OF ITS AUTHORITY AND OF ITS CAPABILITIES. UP TO THE PRESENT TIME, FEW PROJECTS FOR STRENGTHENING THE COHESION AND MORALE OF THE MAJORITY HAVE BEEN INITIATED AND THESE HAVE BEEN LIMITED IN SCOPE. FOR INSTANCE, THE OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, LA NATION, WILL APPEAR AFTER THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER IN A LARGER FORMAT AND A BULLETIN FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITEMS OF INTEREST ON THE MAJORITY WILL BE CREATED. 1.3(a)(4)
C

3. IN SPITE OF THE DIFFICULTIES PREVALENT IN THE GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR, THE PROBLEMS ARE NOT SERIOUS ENOUGH TO PROVOKE A MINISTERIAL CRISIS, ALTHOUGH GISCARD D'ESTAING PROBABLY COULD, IF HE SO DECIDED, BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, BEFORE ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITY

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1.3(a)(4)**C**

[REDACTED] (classification) [REDACTED] (dissem controls)

FOR A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS, GISCARD REALIZES THAT HE MUST UNDERTAKE SEVERAL TIME-CONSUMING POLITICAL TASKS. HE MUST RESIST ANY INCREASE IN THE STRENGTH OF THE CENTRE DEMOCRATE SINCE THE CENTRE AND HE COMPETE FOR THE SAME VOTERS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE MUST SEEK TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF A LARGE PART OF THE MODERATE RIGHT-WING VOTE WHICH NORMALLY VOTES GAULLIST AND ALSO BEGIN TO ESTABLISH A Foothold AMONG THE GAULLISTS THEMSELVES, SINCE IN THE EVENT OF PREMATURE LEGISLATIVE OR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, HE WOULD BE DEPENDENT, AS IN THE LAST LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, ON GAULLIST SUPPORT. MOREOVER, THE TIME TO PRECIPITATE A GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS IS NOT AT HAND FOR TWO IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL REASONS: FIRST, BECAUSE UNPOPULAR MEASURES, ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, AND DISLIKE OF DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY CREATE A GREAT RISK FOR ALL THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE ELECTIONS WERE TO TAKE PLACE BEFORE TOO LONG, THEY WOULD BRING ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF THE GAULLIST MAJORITY AND THE SEATS LOST BY THE MAJORITY WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE RECUPERATED BY THE GISCARDIANS. GISCARD D'ESTAING WILL BE OBLIGED TO WAIT UNTIL THE MAJORITY REGAINS A POSITION OF AUTHORITY FOR WHICH GISCARD D'ESTAING CAN CLAIM CREDIT IN THE EYES OF THE PUBLIC, OR UNTIL HE APPEARS IN THE EYES OF THE

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)**C**

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

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PUBLIC AS AN ALTERNATIVE. SECONDLY, THE MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENT REPUBLICAN GROUP, WHICH CONTINUE TO VOTE FOR THE MAJORITY, ARE DOUBTLESS DISPLEASED, DISAPPOINTED, AND WORRIED, BUT THEY DO NOT DARE PROTEST FOR FEAR OF PROVOKING A CRISIS AND NEW ELECTIONS. THEY WOULD NOT FORGIVE GISCARD D'ESTAING FOR A BREAK WITH THE MAJORITY AT ANY TIME IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MANY OF THEM APPEAR TO SUPPORT HIS EQUIVOCAL POSITION WHICH CONSISTS IN SUPPORTING A GOVERNMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CRITICISING IT STRONGLY. FOR THE ABOVE REASONS GISCARD D'ESTAING WILL NOT RISK A MINISTERIAL CRISIS BEFORE THE VOTE ON THE BUDGET IN THE FALL.

4. ACTUALLY WHAT SEPARATES GISCARD D'ESTAING FROM THE GAULLISTS ARE TWO FACTORS; FIRST, HE DISAGREES WITH DE GAULLE ON THE ROLE OF THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND SECONDLY, AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, ALTHOUGH GISCARD D'ESTAING SUPPORTS DE GAULLE'S POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE FOR FRANCE, HE IS CERTAINLY OPPOSED TO THE MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY OF DE GAULLE WHICH IS OPPOSITION TO THE DOMINATING POWER IN THE WORLD: THE UNITED STATES. THUS, GISCARD D'ESTAING PROBABLY WOULD COMPLETELY ABANDON THE MAJORITY IF DE GAULLE WERE TO SEVER HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN 1969.

5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

C

94

Thurs., Aug. 3, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

In view of the Shah's forthcoming visit,
you may wish to read this report of his
attitudes on the Middle East.

He and Demirel were also very sturdy with
Ayub in defense of CENTO.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

(Tehran 543)

~~SECRET~~ -- LIMDIS

Tehran 543, August 2, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-341
By ju, NARA, Date 5-27-92

94a

1. Shah says he, Ayoub and Demirel produced no special thoughts as to what their three countries can jointly do toward assisting in Arab-Israel settlement.
2. Ayoub apparently stressed importance to Pakistan of getting Suez reopened. Shah facetiously suggested Paks and Indians collaborate to this end, since both greatly affected. Ayoub proposed withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces ten miles from Canal but Shah gave me no indication three countries would take joint action in pushing such proposal. Individual countries might, however, take soundings elsewhere. Shah foresaw that crux of problem will be whether Israelis permitted to utilize reopened Canal.
3. Shah said King Hussein offered to come to Ramsar, but it was decided that would be politically unwise. Shah made clear this does not preclude Hussein's making an early visit to the three countries individually.
4. While Shah gave no indication subject was discussed at Ramsar, he himself has been giving much thought to reports that Hussein might make separate peace with Israel. He is convinced this would be dangerous for Hussein. In any case, it should not be attempted until every internal and external safeguard has been built up to protect King. To be possible at all, in Shah's view, Hussein would have to receive almost unbelievable concessions from Israelis, e.g., evacuation of West Bank including old city of Jerusalem.
5. Regarding Jerusalem, Shah made clear Iran and other Ramsar conferees have no choice but to take public position that Israel must be withdrawn from all battle-won territories, including old city. I pointed out my personal belief based on some 20 years dealing with Arab-Israel problem that possession of Jerusalem probably ranks highest on list of Israel's postwar aims. Expressed view that Davidic (Psalm 137*) about not forgetting Jerusalem is as ingrained in Israelis as is Mecca's being center of Islam. Shah said, of course, if some Jerusalem arrangement is made which is acceptable to King Hussein, countries like Iran might deviate from what otherwise is universal Moslem position. He also asked re possibility of international regime for old City.

~~SECRET~~

* correct number is 136

~~SECRET~~

-2-

6. According to Shah, Prime Minister Hoveyda reported (presumably also at Ramsar) that Soviets clearly are in no hurry to see Mid-East question settled. Shah's hunch is Soviets would hate to lose capability of exploiting Arab-Israel issues. Soviets, according to Shah, are not even pushing reopening of Suez. They told Hoveyda that Western European nations will suffer most and they must do the pushing.

7. Shah says he is trying to tell Israelis that their actions are too aggressive and Israel is losing friends. He is urging Israelis to make significant gestures showing their willingness to be conciliatory. Shah is, of course, thinking of dramatic moves such as offering to withdraw from Suez, Sinai, and/or even the old city (expecting, of course, some reciprocal move by Arabs). In Shah's view, Dayan's pronouncements are doing Israel incalculable harm.

8. Shah remains in accord with President Johnson's first five principles but he points out difficulty in translating them into course of action.

MEYER

SECRET

95

Pres file

Thursday, August 3, 1967--10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

The second C-130 is scheduled to depart Congo for Ascencion Island today at 12:30 p.m. local time.

The third is scheduled to come out on August 10.

W. W. Rostow

~~WWR~~

Pres file
96

Thursday, August 3, 1967 -- 10:00 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your Meeting with Ben Oehlert, Ambassador to Pakistan (12:30 today)

Oehlert leaves Tuesday for Pakistan, with stops in Hong Kong and Saigon along the way. He has survived the Washington briefing process well. He seems to learn fast, and the local Pakistani diplomats are happy with him.

Oehlert will take your instructions very seriously. You may wish to make some of the following points:

1. You have a close and frank relationship with President Ayub. It is very important that your lines of communication with him be open and easy. You won't always agree, but it is important that you are always able to talk to each other.
2. We are heading into a very tough year for the whole consortium framework through which we handle the pressing problems of South Asian development. Our AID money is in jeopardy. IDA replenishment is uncertain. The Europeans are pinching pennies.
3. There are two keys to hold together the consortium approach:
 - some progress, however glacial, toward an accommodation between India and Pakistan. Barring miracles, Kashmir will not be solved soon. But there must be some improvement in the environment and, above all, there can be no regression.
 - steady economic growth, particularly in agriculture. Pakistan has done very well in the last few years. She must keep it up.
4. It is terribly important for our ambassadors to India and Pakistan to work together as closely as possible. These are the two posts in the world where "localitis" is hardest to resist. (I have arranged for Oehlert and Bowles to come to dinner at my house tomorrow night. I hope this will be the beginning of a healthy personal and working relationship.)

You will wish to present Oehlert with the pictures, the book, and the letter to Ayub which Marvin is holding for the occasion.

Hamilton/vmr

W. W. ROSTOW

Mr. Rostow 97

~~1. Pres file~~
2. Pres file

August 3, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Military Visit

As part of his bargain last week to stave off a public outcry against our clampdown on military shipments to Israel, Mac Bundy agreed to try to arrange for the visit here of a top Israeli military officer to explain Israel's current and future military requirements. Secretaries Nitze and Rusk have agreed to the week of 21 August and recommend we go ahead. The purpose of this visit would not be announced, and we would again ask the Israelis to keep this low key.

We have known for some time that we would have to go through another exercise like this. It is impossible to reconcile Israeli requests with our military's view of Israel's actual needs without this sort of confrontation between the experts. Whatever we decide later on political grounds, talks like this are an essential first step.

On another level, this visit along with releasing \$3 million worth of equipment now is our payment for the time we've bought with the Jewish community. Mac asked me to tell you that he was grateful to you for approving that \$3 million on the phone for his gentlemen's agreement. He felt it was basically a paper transaction selling the same horse twice, since that \$3 million will come from the \$14 million credit you already approved back on May 23.

Once this visit is over and we have had a chance to digest its results, we'll come to the big decision on what we will and will not bargain about with the Israelis. We may have to do another small interim deal after the visit to buy a little more time for making up our minds, but any major supply agreement would depend on larger political considerations. After he has had a chance to sort out his thoughts and talk around a bit, Mac wants to come in and see you at your convenience toward the end of next week to discuss this. Meanwhile, he wanted you to know that he believes we have to go ahead with this visit. He assumes you have no objection since we have contained this pressure for about as long as possible now.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-133
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

97a

August 3, 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWR:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-190
By cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95

We should shortly be receiving the Rusk-Nitze memo recommending an Israeli military visit the week of 21 August. Mac does not believe that the President needs to approve this but does feel that he should be informed. Since I know the State-Defense recommendation is on its way, I think we can safely send the attached up to the President now to make sure we are on sound ground.


HHS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

98
Pres file
August 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Prime Minister Holt

Bob Furlonger, the Australian Charge, just delivered the attached letter to you from Prime Minister Harold Holt.

He expresses warm appreciation for the Clifford-Taylor visit. He promises to review Australia's position on more troops in light of our problems and our special close relationship.

The main purpose of the letter is to set forth the limitations within which he and his colleagues must operate. These include:

- rising defense costs;
- requirements for internal development;
- high foreign aid outlays;
- Britain's planned withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.

The key sentence in the letter is: "As I assured your emissaries, I do not mention these things to argue there is nothing more we can do."

I think a reply would be helpful, one that underlines our own problems here at home and stresses the special Australian role as our "major non-Asian partner." You will want to hear the report from Clark and Max first. But I believe a personal message from you reinforcing the arguments made by Clifford/Taylor will nudge the Prime Minister in the right direction.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-133
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

98a

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3rd August, 1967

My dear Mr President,

I attach a letter which the Prime
Minister has asked me to deliver to you.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. W. Furlonger'.

(R. W. Furlonger)
Chargé d'Affaires

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.4
By 18, NARA, Date 2-13-06

~~SECRET~~

Dear Lyndon,

78b

We found great value in the visit of Clark Clifford and Maxwell Taylor. They will have given you their account of the long discussions we had. My colleagues and I feel we have a much better understanding of the Vietnam situation in all the aspects we covered in our talks with them. We were encouraged to find our views of the courses we believe should be followed running so closely in line with your own.

Towards the end of our talk, Clark Clifford gave us a very frank and graphic account of your problems. He spoke of the higher costs you are running into, and the approach you have to make to Congress about your budget in consequence of your increased Vietnam expenditures. He told us of the need for more troops there, and how you would be helped if you could point to recognition of this need by your allies reflected in an increased contribution from them.

I am very conscious of the special position occupied by Australia in your presentation both inside and outside the United States of your Vietnam policies since we show up as your major non-Asian partner. We shall be very conscious of this factor as we go about the review we are now making against the background of our talks.

The size of defence expenditure in our own budget, and the recent British decisions, had already required us to make a searching examination. We face, in total, a complex situation. To take the budget first, we doubled our defence expenditure over the four-year period to 1966/67 and on the 15th August, we will be announcing an eighteen per cent increase in defence expenditure this financial year. As a percentage of gross national product we remain behind you and the United Kingdom in our defence expenditure - although we are narrowing the gap in relation to the latter - but we are not behind any others of the group of western countries of closest interest to us and you.

Although you have heard me on this before, one of the inescapable realities for us is our imperative of national development. With less than twelve million people on this island continent, we cannot neglect our need for growth and, in the terms of the future we dare not. I am sure our speedy and sustained growth to be in America's interest also. But this imposes great burdens on us in terms of capital and resources. No major country in the world is adding to its rate of population growth through immigration on the scale that we are. We withhold more from consumption for our investment needs than any Western country - about twenty-seven per cent of G.N.P. compared with sixteen and seventeen per cent in the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom. Only Japan heads us in this respect.

REPRODUCTION COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 05-80
By isl, NARA, Date 2-9-01

~~SECRET~~

You will know from our talks on the wheat aid programme and on the Asian Development Bank that we are active in the aid field. According to statistics of the Development Assistance Committee, we now rank second only to France in per capita aid provision, and continue on a rising curve while many other aid-giving countries have been showing a declining percentage.

Then there is our balance of payments problem, with the special twist given to it by our defence purchases. Our reserves have been falling over recent years and this year will see a further reduction. The ships, aircraft and other sophisticated hardware required by our forces mean large foreign exchange outgoings. You have helped us with defence credits and, while this reduces the rate of run-down of our reserves, it produces a run up of our liabilities. We are reaching the point where our defence expenditures overseas will be around thirteen per cent of our total export receipts.

As I assured your emissaries, I do not mention these things to argue there is nothing more we can do. Cabinet will be looking at that question. I mention them to demonstrate the complexity of our problem and so that you will have a full understanding of our situation.

There is one further issue which I mention just to flag it at this stage. It is too early to do much more but it has an important bearing on our capacity. That is the new situation we find ourselves in arising from the British decision to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia. What new decisions we may have to take, or new arrangements we should make, we do not yet know. There will have to be discussions about various possibilities and running over a period of time. But we face the question of how far we should concentrate effort in one area or another.

We have one other disadvantage complicating our position and that is the very different view taken on defence questions and Vietnam in particular by our political opposition.

My colleagues and I want to talk our situation over further among ourselves, and we will be doing so. We are scattered over the continent in this fortnight leading up to the resumption of Parliament. I shall let you know where we come out, but, in the meantime, please thank Clark Clifford and Maxwell Taylor for a visit which will have assisted our thinking so much.

Before I finish I mention the correspondence which has been passing between Henry Fowler and Bill McMahon following the talk we had at Camp David on the Interest Equalization Tax matter. They have made sufficient progress for us to send representatives of our Treasury and Reserve Bank to Washington this week for discussions of a technical kind with your officials and with Morgan Stanley and Co., our fiscal agents in New York. I am very appreciative of

the efforts you and your people are making to provide facilities for us to approach the U.S. market for loans exempt, in substance, from the tax.

Our sympathies have been with you in the grave problems created for you from the eruption of racial violence in some of your largest cities. We hope this proves to be only a passing phase which rapidly peters out.

Our sympathies have gone out to you, also, for the grievous loss of young American lives in the "Forrestal" tragedy.

May health and strength remain with you for your heavy burdens.

With my warm personal regards,

signed (Harold Holt)

PRESERVATION COPY

99

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
8:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's report to you on action today by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By NG, NARA, Date 7-24-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON

99a

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

August 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: House Foreign Affairs Committee Action on the Foreign
Aid Authorization Bill

The Foreign Affairs Committee finished mark-up today. Doc Morgan did a magnificent job for us. The bill contains almost everything we requested. However, Morgan told the press this morning, "I expect the toughest floor fight in the ten years I've been handling this bill."

The report is expected next week, but we have no indication yet of when the bill will come up for floor action.

The House Committee authorized all appropriation categories for two years at the levels we requested except for

- paper cuts for FY 1968 in Development Loans, the Alliance for Progress and the Contingency Fund
- a cut of \$30 million in Military Assistance and
- a cut in Administrative Expenses for FY 1969.

The Committee did one thing which was wholly unexpected and is sure to cause a real rumpus on the floor. It voted unanimously to make the existing PL 480 law a part of the Foreign Assistance Act. I am told this was done without notice to the Agriculture Committee.

The Committee also adopted a sense-of-Congress amendment calling for the suspension of aid to Middle East countries which broke diplomatic relations with us and for a review of aid policy in that area. It should give us no trouble.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RF, NARA, Date 7-24-84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-


Two potentially troublesome amendments which were defeated in Committee are likely to come up on the floor:

- a Hays amendment prohibiting aid of any kind to Latin American countries which acquire supersonic military jets, and
- a Findley amendment to terminate most-favored-nation treatment for Poland unless the President can assure the Congress that Poland is not supplying military articles to North Vietnam.

If - and it is a big if - no substantial changes are made in the bill on the floor of either body, the major issues for the Conference will be:

- the number of countries to which various types of aid may be provided, and the procedure (if any) by which the number may be increased;
- the authority of the Department of Defense to make credit sales, to continue its existing revolving fund and to guarantee Ex-Im Bank and other financing;
- the amount of military aid;
- whether our extended risk guaranties are to cover 75% or 50% of the investments on which they are issued;
- the dollar limitations that are to apply to military aid to Latin America and Africa;
- whether 10% of our Development Loan funds can be used only for transfer to the World Bank, IDA or the Asian Development Bank, or whether such transfers may be made at our discretion;
- whether economic and military programs are to be authorized for one year or for two.

This list of issues assumes that the PL 480 amendment will not survive floor action in the House.


William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
7:55 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

If you wish to know how the
Canadians talk to the Indians about
our Viet Nam position -- here it is.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-133
By cb, NARA Date 10-23-00

WWRostow:rla

101

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
7:50 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I hadn't realized that so much of
the world press had criticized
U Thant's last Viet Nam statement.
See pp. 1-4.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

- 101a
- ... U THANT'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM
 - ... LESSONS OF THE U.S. RIOTS
 - ... HAVANA "SOLIDARITY" MEETING
 - ... MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

U THANT AND THE VIETNAM WAR

Editorials in West Europe and East Asia took strong exception to U Thant's weekend speech in North Carolina, especially his remark that the Vietnam conflict was "a war of national independence."

Moscow and East European media reported that Mr. Johnson had expressed disagreement with the Secretary General's statements about the war. They said the President indicated the U.S. would "continue the escalation."

As the Taylor-Clifford party headed for Seoul, Japanese and South Korean papers said the ROK would find it hard to refuse more troops for Vietnam.

"Why U Thant Is Wrong"

In London, the conservative Daily Mail asserted that U Thant's comments about the war in his Greensboro speech seemed "to typify the kind of boss-eyed comment of those who, in the words of the Irish judge, are determined to lean neither towards partiality on the one hand nor towards impartiality on the other ..."

"The truth about the Vietnam war is that the leaders of North Vietnam, together with their southern column, the Viet Cong, seek to take over South Vietnam, whatever their 'explicit or implicit' objectives may be. And, on the other hand, the leaders of South Vietnam and of the U.S. do not seek to take over North Vietnam, explicitly or implicitly, or any other way: They do, however, wish to prevent the south from being taken over."

As for U Thant's statement that it was "a war of national independence," the paper declared that "one can only reply -- which Vietnamese?.... Have the South Vietnamese no right to 'national independence?'"

Under the heading "Why U Thant Is Wrong," a senior writer just back

from Vietnam said in the nationalist Daily Express of London that the West could not afford to lose in Vietnam, even though this meant supporting "an ugly and sour war."

"Britain's contribution so far is a pack of jungle-tracking dogs from Malaya and a good deal of largely unsolicited advice. The U.S., alas, is right in fighting for itself in South Vietnam, and in fighting for us too. And we, alas, are wrong in supporting that fight with words but not with arms."

Copenhagen's conservative Berlingske Tidende judged that U Thant's speech "bears the stamp of desperation.... His comparison of the Vietnam war with the American revolution... was, to put it mildly, an unfortunate simplification which is akin to distortion.... It must be bitter for a U.N. Secretary General to see a world plagued by the disagreements which the world organization should have rooted out."

The paper said that it was "particularly unfortunate that the denunciation of the Americans should be made at a time when Kosygin is attempting to bring forth a counter-gesture from Hanoi which might result in a realization of the U.S. offer to end the air war against North Vietnam."

Secretary General "Taking Sides"

Another Danish paper, conservative Jyllands-Posten of Aarhus, commented that "by taking sides so clearly" U Thant reduced the possibility of his acting as a mediator. It said that if he does not realize soon that the Secretary General must enjoy the confidence of both sides, the U.N. would have to "look for a new Secretary General who is willing to accept the natural limitations of the office."

In West Germany, pro-Christian Democratic Muenchner Merkur asserted that U Thant was "right" in stating that the national liberation front and Viet Cong were South Vietnamese organizations, but "even independent observers admit that the Viet Cong has little support among the people."

Furthermore, it said, North Vietnam supplies these organizations with weapons and "at least five regular North Vietnamese divisions are fighting in South Vietnam, with Hanoi generals conducting the operations."

Is this a war of national independence? What would U Thant say if five Bundeswehr divisions marched into the Soviet Zone?"

Tuesday's Paris and Tokyo papers carried reports of President Johnson's "rebuttal" of U Thant's views at his news conference. Earlier, Japanese papers had run summaries of the Greensboro speech, and Mainichi's New York correspondent reported that it was being taken to be an indication of the positions the Secretary General would take in the next General Assembly session in regard to Vietnam and U.N. membership for Communist China.

The Cloak of "Nationalism"

Kuala Lumpur's Straits Times asked whether "the Communist threat to Laos, Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia" was "also nationalism trying to assert itself."

"There is not a non-Communist country in the area (including U Thant's Burma) which is not confronted by the barrel of the Communist gun."

The paper noted that "Communist leaders of twenty-seven Latin American countries were gathering at Havana to discuss and support the creation of several Vietnams in the new world. What are the governments of these states supposed to do? What advice has the U.N. Secretary General to give them?"

Saigon's Hoa Binh said that "by putting the Viet Cong under the cloak of nationalism, U Thant has turned into heroes a gang of aggressors, pirates, and murderers, and has served as their spokesman without pay in the world forum..."

Indian and African Comment

In India, Calcutta's influential Amrita Bazar Patrika said the Secretary General had once again told the "blunt truth" about the basic issues involved in the Vietnam war.

"If U Thant has now felt compelled to come out openly with his exposition of the obstructionist tactics of the U.S., it is presumably because of the frustration he

has suffered in the course of his peace initiatives, each of which was sabotaged by the uncompromising attitude of the U.S. State Department and the Pentagon."

Ghana's independent Kumasi Pioneer disagreed with the contention that the conflict was one of national independence rather than Communist aggression. It said the Viet Cong were "local elements of international Communism, being backed to force a Communist government" on South Vietnam.

Taylor-Clifford Mission

With the Taylor-Clifford party due today in Seoul, Joongang, Seoul Shinmun, and Hankuk Ilbo said it was "difficult to refuse the U.S." but the ROK couldn't spare troops for Vietnam "because of the current threat to national security" from North Korea.

Kyunghyang Shinmun asserted that in spite of Korean and U.S. statements that no troop request would be made, it was still certain that "the primary objective is to explore ways to have the ROK send more troops."

Tokyo's Nihon Keizai reported from Seoul that the ROK would be hard put to dispatch additional troops, "but if the envoy makes a strong request, Korea, partly for economic reasons, would be unable to refuse."

The paper's Saigon correspondent reported "reluctance of the Vietnam war allies to increase their share of troops." He cited Saigon sources as observing that "the prospect of a protracted war is giving the allies a sense of uneasiness."

~~SECRET~~

Wed., August 2, 1967
7:00 p. m.

102

MR. PRESIDENT:

My reaction to this attack is that we should mount a heavy raid on selected port facilities at Haiphong. The attack should avoid heavily built up areas, but it should be heavy and concentrated.

It should be mounted soon so that it would be clear to them that we were linking it to their attack on our naval supply facility. It should remind them of how much restraint we have thus far used in their highly vulnerable ports which are now backed up with warehoused supplies that they have not been able to move over their transport system.

The attack should, of course, avoid ships.

I suggest this partly because they may be feeling a little too good in Hanoi at the moment after the FORRESTAL and our urban troubles. In my judgment, it would be wholesome to know we have a lot of reserve power and the will to use it if necessary.

I also think the Hanoi TPP should be re-attacked.

If you wish to proceed on this, you may wish to review the targets proposed in General Wheeler's shouldering-out concept.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-190
By cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-190

By CB, NARA, Date 4-18-95

Wed., August 2, 1967
7:00 p. m.

102a

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W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

102b

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Viet Cong launched a mortar attack shortly after noon (EDT) today on a U.S. Naval supply facility about seven miles Southeast of Saigon.

First reports indicate that four minesweepers, two patrol boats, and one helicopter were damaged. One of the minesweepers and one of the patrol boats received extensive damage. Two fuel tanks in the storage area were also struck.

Casualties reported thusfar are 21 U.S. wounded.

White House Situation Room

John J. Murray

Briefing Officer

URGENT*****

SECOND NIGHTLEAD VIETNAMESE (CHANGING DATE)

BY DEREK BLACKMAN

SAIGON, AUG. 3 (THURSDAY) (REUTERS)--THE VIET CONG
EARLY TODAY LAUNCHED A HEAVY MORTAR ATTACK ON A PORT COMPLEX JUST
OUTSIDE SAIGON CONTAINING A GASOLINE STORAGE AREA AND A U.S.
NAVAL BASE, AN AMERICAN MILITARY SPOKESMAN SAID.

FIRST REPORTS SAID TWO GASOLINE STORAGE TANKS HAD
EXPLODED UNDER THE IMPACT OF THE MORTAR SHELLS AND ONE
SHIP--UNIDENTIFIED--WAS ON FIRE.

(MORE) MJL 3: 16P

F
FIRST ADD SAIGON SECOND NIGHTLEAD VIETNAMESE X X X FIRE.

FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT SPED TO THE SITE AT NHA BE,
ABOUT SEVEN MILES SOUTHEAST OF SAIGON.

THE COMPLEX IS NEAR THE ENTRANCE TO THE LONG TAO
SHIPPING CHANNEL WHICH LINKS THE CAPITAL TO NHA BE,

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THE MORTAR ATTACK BEGAN AT FIVE MINUTES
AFTER MIDNIGHT.

A NUMBER OF THE SHELLS LANDED IN AN AMERICAN NAVY PATROL
BOAT BASE.

OTHERS SLAMMED INTO THE UNLOADING FACILITIES FOR CIVILIAN
OIL TANKERS WHICH PLY INTO SAIGN. THE TWO INSTALLATIONS
ARE ABOUT 1 1/4 MILES APART.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID REPORTS SO FAR INDICATED "CONSIDERABLE
DAMAGE" TO BOTH INSTALLATIONS FROM THE ATTACKS.

NIGHT FLYING HELICOPTERS HAD LOCATED THE VIET CONG FIRING
POSITIONS AND WERE HITTING BACK AT THE GUERRILLAS. HEAVY
ARTILLERY FIRE COULD BE HEARD FROM THE CENTER OF SAIGON AS
GUNS WERE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ATTACKERS.

IN FIGHTING WEDNESDAY, U.S. JET PLANES BATHED A FORCE OF
COMMUNIST TROOPS IN NAPALM NEAR DANANG, KILLING 40 OF THEM
DURING THE BRIEF ATTACK.

THE SPOKESMAN X X X PICKING UP SECOND
PARA (12:43P).

MJL 3: 23P

END REPTNS

Rostow

*we have put pressure
on NMCC for an official
report.*

BFS

102c

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting analysis, prepared at John Macy's request by Marshall Wright, Bill Jordan's new assistant, on what an "Ambassador in Manila will have to deal with." The last paragraph sounds an awful lot like Ed Clark.

W. W. Rostow

cc: John Macy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4b
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 79, NARA, Date 8-29-91

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

103a

SANTITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-190

By cb, NARA, Date 4-3-95


~~SECRET~~

August 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: What an Ambassador in Manila will have to deal with

We discussed the desire of John Macy's office (Lou Schwartz and Bob Cox) for information on U.S. /Philippine relations relevant to the selection of a new Ambassador. They insisted on a quick oral briefing. What follows is a reconstruction of the conversation. I will be delighted to make any additional points or changes of emphasis that you deem advisable.




1.3(a)(5)

~~SECRET~~

(3) Philippine/U.S. relations are still in a state of transition from colonial days. Although there is a strong residue of affection for the U.S. among the masses, ultranationalism is rampant in the elite. The U.S. and the American Embassy are the natural focus for ultranationalist suspicions and hostilities. The press, in particular, is dominated by the ultranationalists and has a very strong anti-American flavor. Regardless of who our Ambassador is and however properly he comports himself, he and his family will, beyond doubt, be subjected to vicious and personal press attacks. The position of the U.S. Ambassador in Manila is unique. He is part governor-general and part whipping boy. On the one hand the Philippines want to retain a special relationship with the United States. On the other hand, they bitterly resent their dependence upon us and any assertion by us of a special position. Our Ambassador in Manila is in the middle of this psychological cross-fire and gets hit from both sides.

The Problem




1.3(a)(5)

The United States has three major bases (Clark Air Force Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and Sangley Point Naval Base, and a number of smaller or leased installations. Although our Base Rights run for 24 more years (under a 1966 agreement) it is by no means inconceivable that the Filipino nationalists will put pressure on our use of the bases. The bases are central to our operations in Viet Nam and our longer range military effectiveness in Southeast Asia. The style with which our Base Rights are exercised now may determine our long-run access to these installations.

The future of U.S. /Philippine trade relations, the status of the American business community in the Philippines, and the future for American investments in the Philippines will all be determined in negotiation which will begin this fall. The negotiation looks to the replacement of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, which has, since independence, regulated U.S. /Philippine economic relations.

In the immediate future, the U.S. will undoubtedly be pressing for a larger Philippine contribution to the Viet Nam war, an issue of the greatest political sensitivity in the Philippines because of the activities of the ultranationalists.



(1.3(a)(5))

In the Philippines, power is concentrated in the presidency to a remarkable extent. Our Ambassador carries on most of the important business directly with the President. The ability to develop a close official and personal relationship with the President is essential. Marcos is the Philippines' most decorated war hero. He is an accomplished golfer (a 7 handicap). Mrs. Marcos is very powerful in the Administration. She has a strongly extroverted personality and makes no bones about enjoying gay and festive occasions, including dancing parties that go on until dawn. There is, in addition, a general Philippine fondness for banter and horseplay and our Ambassador will be expected to join in this atmosphere with evident enjoyment. Extensive travel throughout the Philippines is an important part of our Ambassador's duties, and is physically demanding, among other reasons, because Philippine hospitality on these occasions has, as an invariable concomitant, subsequent stomach disorders.

The American community in the Philippines is large. American private investment runs at \$550 million, and there is a big American business community in Manila. There are about 40,000 American military personnel in the Philippines and probably as many dependents.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

1.3(a)(5) [REDACTED] a Peace Corps of 700 volunteers, and substantial USIS and AID missions. The Ambassador will, therefore, need to be a man with considerable executive talent.

The Ambassador will need to know Asia. The main thrust of Philippine nationalism is to carve out a place for the Philippines in Asia. Filipino membership in SEATO, its role in Viet Nam, its participation in Asian regionalism, and its relations with its Asian neighbors are essential elements in Manila's policy. One who doesn't understand Asia can easily be trapped by history and superficialities into thinking of the Philippines as somehow less than completely Asian. But there can be no health in the U.S./Philippine relationship unless it is based on a mutual acceptance of the Philippines as an Asian state rather than an American protege. One who understands Asia will know this in his bones. One who does not understand Asia could easily destroy his utility in Manila before he learns it.

In short, the U.S. needs a paragon in Manila. He must be an adept politician. He must thoroughly understand the development process and be able to advise President Marcos in his efforts to re-vivify the Philippine public sector. He will have to work with a substantial U.S. military community in harmony. He will need to understand the problems of business and to deal with an influential American business community. He will preside over an impressive official U.S. community and will need to be a person of executive talent. He will need a substantial amount of personal charm to operate effectively in the Filipino atmosphere. He will need to be impervious to unfair and sometimes vicious press attacks, both of a personal and political nature. Most of all, he will need to be extremely tough-minded in grappling with a whole series of problems, which no one has been able to deal with effectively yet, but on which progress must now be made without delay as a matter of high national policy. He will need the sensitivity of a chihuahua, the stamina of a Great Dane, and the skin of a rhinoceros.

Marshall
Marshall Wright

cc: Bill Jorden

~~SECRET~~

Wed., Aug. 2, 1967
7 pm

104

MR. PRESIDENT:

Thru our Col. Ginsburgh, Gen. Wheeler was briefed on our anxiety concerning the "stalemate" theme.

Pres. file

Here is Gen. Wheeler's outgoing and Gen. Westmoreland's reply.

You will wish to note the sad and disturbing item in Westy's para. D.

W. W. R.

Attachments

Secret

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

RECEIVED

OK
W

104a

SSO CABLE - EYES ONLY - IMMEDIATE

11 AUG 67 22 19z

FM GEN EARLE G. WHEELER, CJCS

TO GEN W. C. WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV COMMUNICATIONS

GEN H. K. JOHNSON, CSA, SAIGON

INFO ADM U.S.G. SHARP, CINCPAC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-189
By , NARA, Date 1-15-96

DELIVER DURING WAKING HOURS

1. We are becoming increasingly concerned with news media and Congressional attitudes regarding the progress of the war. There have been a number of news stories recently which characterize the war as being "a stalemate"; this same belief has been expressed by prominent members of the Congress who have hitherto been supporters of the war effort. As a sample of the reporting a Senator recently wrote the following to Secretary McNamara:

"...it is beginning to appear that we are doing most of the fighting. According to a recent weekly casualty report, twice as many American soldiers were killed as South Vietnamese soldiers. Also, according to another report I have seen, in the six months ending in May, American casualties exceeded the number of Vietnamese drafted. It is most difficult to understand why we should exert a greater effort than South Vietnam. How can we explain to the parents of our men in Vietnam, why their sons are there being shot at and killed while reports tell of young South Vietnamese men enjoying life in Saigon and elsewhere?"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SSO CABLE - EYES ONLY - IMMEDIATE

PP#2

2. Manifold examples similar to the foregoing ^{have} ~~has~~ led to the thought that we might prepare a precise, factual, non-generalized case to explain why we think we are making progress rather than facing a stalemate in Vietnam. The proposal visualizes a province-by-province narrative based on province reports showing:

- a. The VC manpower problem.
- b. The decrease in Communist operational capabilities and
- c. Threat to the VC as shown by VC concentrations against Revolutionary Development activities.

I am not sure that a province-by-province approach is possible ~~against RD~~ but certainly a Corps tactical zone presentation ^{should be,} ~~is~~ ^{feasible.}

3. Reflecting on the above, it occurs to me that you might have a briefing of the above type prepared which you yourself would give to the Saigon press. To the subject matter outlined above, I would add such military items as the number of base areas neutralized and/or entered in each corps tactical zone, the opening of roads, railroads, waterways, etc. I think it would be good for you to brief the press yourself because such action would insure maximum impact on the ^{Saigon} press and, ^{hopefully,} ~~forwarded~~ helpful stories forwarded by them to their editors. Of course, before you gave such a briefing we would like to have the text in our hands back here so that we could insure being in step with you in answering questions from the Washington press and from editorial sources.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SSO CABLE - EYES ONLY - IMMEDIATE

PP#3

4. I would appreciate soonest your assessment of the feasibility and the desirability of undertaking a project of this sort.

5. For General Johnson: I am sure that you will be faced with a press conference soon after you return from South Vietnam. In fact, I surmise that you may be requested to report to the President and, thereafter, meet with the press. Forewarned is forearmed!

6. For CINCPAC: I would appreciate any comments you may wish to offer, either on this specific project or more generally as to how we can improve the tenor of press reporting on the war. Warm regards to all.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1046

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

2 AUG 1967

O 021238Z ZYH ZFF1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

BOOK COPY

TO GEN WHEELER CJCEWASH DC

GEN JOHNSON SAIGON (25TH INF DIV)

ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-189
By , NARA, Date 1-15-96

~~SECRET MAC 7180 EYES ONLY~~

REFERENCE: JCS 6105, DTG 012219Z AUG 1967 (S)

1. THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE ECHOES MINE WHICH HAS CAUSED ME TO INITIATE SEVERAL ACTIONS DESIGNED TO HELP CLARIFY THE SITUATION IN THE MIND OF THE PUBLIC. OF COURSE WE MUST MAKE HASTE CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO AVOID CHARGES THAT THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS CONDUCTING AN ORGANIZED PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, EITHER OVERT OR COVERT.

2. IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT A VOCAL SEGMENT OF THE NEWS PROFESSION IS EQUATING A LACK OF MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS SUCH AS CEDAR FALLS AND JUNCTION CITY WITH A STALEMATE AT BEST, OR A LOSS OF THE INITIATIVE ON OUR PART AT WORST. NOTHING COULD BE FARTHER FROM THE TRUTH, OF COURSE. EVERY INDICATOR BELIES EITHER STALEMATE OR LOSS OF INITIATIVE. IF THE ENEMY WAS EXERCISING EVEN MODEST INITIATIVE THE MORE THAN 30 LARGE OPERATIONS UNDER WAY AND MORE THAN 5,000 SMALL UNIT ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN EACH DAY WOULD HAVE MORE SUCCESS IN FINDING HIM. ENEMY UNITS CAN FEED AND SUPPLY THEMSELVES ENOUGH FOR ABOUT ONE DAY OF ACTION IN 30. THE ENEMY STRATEGY IS SMART AND ECONOMICAL, BUT BASICALLY DEFENSIVE. HE ACCEPTS MAJOR COMBAT OCCASIONALLY ALONG THE DMZ OR IN THE HIGHLANDS WHERE HE HAS BOTH SANCTUARY AND SHORT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

8

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS. ELSEWHERE HE REACTS AGAINST REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT AND GROWING CIVILIAN COMMERCE BY ATTACKING RD OPERATIONS AND SABOTAGING LOCS. HIS ONLY REAL INITIATIVE IS EXPRESSED IN LONG-RANGE ATTACKS AGAINST OUR BASE AREAS. THESE ARE INEXPENSIVE TO HIM IN RELATION TO THE PUBLICITY HE GETS.

3. IT IS TRUE THAT U.S. KIA HAVE NUMBERED MORE THAN RVNAF KIA IN NINE OF THE FIRST 30 WEEKS OF THIS CALENDAR YEAR. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING WHEN TWO FACTORS ARE CONSIDERED: 1) MOST OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR FORMATIONS OPERATING FROM SANCTUARIES AND WITH SHORT LOCS TO SUPPLY DUMPS ALONG THE DMZ AND CENTRAL HIGHLANDS BORDER AREA ARE OPPOSED BY U.S. FORMATIONS, AND 2) HALF OF THE ARVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS ARE COMMITTED TO THE GRINDING TASK OF SUPPORTING REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT.

8

4. MY PROGRAM TO BRING ABOUT UNDERSTANDING OF OUR STRATEGY AND TO ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS OF "STALEMATE", "LOSS OF INITIATIVE" AND "RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS" INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS:

A. I PLAN TO HOLD A BACKGROUND NEWS CONFERENCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND THE MATERIAL IS BEING PREPARED.

B. WE HAVE STARTED A SCHEDULE OF ON-THE-RECORD NEWS CONFERENCES TO WRAP UP THE OVERALL SITUATION IN EACH CTZ. THE FIRST OF THESE WAS CONDUCTED BY LTG LARSEN, COVERING THE II CTZ ON 27 JULY. HE DID AN EXCELLENT JOB. BG DESOBRY WILL COVER THE IV CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 7-12 AUGUST, AND LTG WEYAND WILL DO THE SAME FOR III CTZ DURING THE PERIOD 21-26 AUGUST AND LTG CUSHMAN WILL FOLLOW FOR I CTZ IN LATE AUGUST OR EARLY SEPTEMBER. INCIDENTALLY, FROM THESE WE PRODUCE HALF-HOUR TELEVISION SHOWS FOR THE INFORMATION OF OUR FORCES AND OTHERS

8

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

WHO WATCH TELEVISION.

C. WE ARE MAKING A CONTINUING EFFORT TO MOVE NEWSMEN TO THE SCENE OF RVNAF ACTIONS AND TO BRING KNOWLEDGEABLE FIELD COMMANDERS IN. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 1 AUGUST LTG WEYAND SPENT 45 MINUTES AT THE EVENING NEWS BRIEFING COVERING THE CURRENT COMBINED RVNAF/US ACTION IN DINH TUONG PROVINCE IN WHICH THE RVNAF MARINES DID SUCH AN OUTSTANDING JOB OF CLOSE-QUARTER COMBAT THAT THE BEST VC MAIN FORCE BATTALION IN THE UPPER DELTA WAS DECISIVELY DEFEATED.

D. GENERAL ABRAMS AND I ARE MAKING IT A POINT TO TALK PERSONALLY WITH MORE NEWSMEN AND TO TAKE AS MANY AS POSSIBLE ON FIELD TRIPS WITH US. MY SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS, COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD ALSO ARE DEVOTING A LOT OF TIME TO NEWSMEN. AS AN EXAMPLE, OF THE POINT I MADE AT THE BEGINNING OF PARA. 2, ABOVE, TODAY I TOOK WITH ME ON A FIELD TRIP ONE OF THE MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE AND EXPERIENCED SOUTHEAST ASIA CORRESPONDENTS. HE WAS BOTH CONCERNED AND FRUSTRATED BY INSTRUCTIONS FROM HIS HOME OFFICE TO SUBMIT A STORY ON HOW AND WHY OUR STRATEGY HAS FAILED. HE TOLD ME THAT HE DIDN'T WANT TO WRITE FICTION TO SUPPORT THE HOME OFFICE ASSUMPTION AND WAS AFRAID THAT ANY HONEST APPRAISAL HE SUBMITTED WOULD BE TWISTED AND RESHAPED BY VIEWS THAT SEEM TO BE PREVALENT IN THE CONFUSION THAT IS WASHINGTON.

E. WE ARE PREPARING VARIOUS BACKGROUND PAPERS ON SUBJECTS SUCH AS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AIR WAR NORTH AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RVNAF. THESE ALSO WILL BE ADAPTED FOR USE IN THE COMMAND INFORMATION PROGRAM. I PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON THE COMMAND INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

PROGRAM BECAUSE OF THE INEVITABLE IMPACT OF HALF A MILLION YOUNG AMERICANS RETURNING TO U.S. COMMUNITIES EACH YEAR.

F. WE ARE PREPARING A SCOREBOARD OF RVNAF OPERATIONS TO SHOW HOW THEY ARE DOING AND WHAT THE TRENDS ARE. THIS SHOULD BE USEFUL FOR ALL CONCERNED.

5. WHILE WE WORK ON THE NERVE ENDS HERE WE HOPE THAT CAREFUL ATTENTION WILL BE PAID TO THE ROOTS THERE--THE CONFUSED OR UNKNOWLEDGE-ABLE PUNDITS WHO SERVE AS SOURCES FOR EACH OTHER. IN THIS CONNECTION, LTG LARSEN, ENROUTE TO HIS NEW ASSIGNMENT AT FT. MONROE, AND BG DESOBRY, DEPARTING ON HOME LEAVE IN A WEEK OR SO, ARE RESOURCES WORTHY OF EXPLOITATION.

6. THE FEASIBILITY OF DEVELOPING THE PROVINCE-BY-PROVINCE NARRATIVE THAT YOU SUGGEST WILL BE STUDIED.

7. WE PREPARED AN OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF OUR GOALS AND PROGRESS OVER THE LAST YEAR FOR AMBASSADOR TAYLOR AND MR. CLIFFORD. THIS IS BEING DISPATCHED TO YOU BY FRONT CHANNEL.

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

Wed., Aug. 2, 1967
6 p. m.

105

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the late afternoon cable summary.

It contains a few interesting items.

W. W. R.

Attachments

105a

6:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Wednesday, August 2, 1967

EXDIS ADDENDUM

Regular distribution restricted to the
White House, The Secretary, Under Sec-
retaries, Deputy Under Secretary for Po-
litical Affairs and Executive Secretary

E A S T A S I A:

Ky and the Press - Prime Minister Ky told Ambassa-
dor Bunker that the press misquoted him when he had in
fact said that neither he nor the people would support
a corrupt regime elected fraudulently. Bunker suggested
to Ky that his problems with the press would be reduced
if correspondents were to clear direct quotations before
release. Bunker also asked Ky about press reports
stating the military would run the government behind
the scenes whatever the election results. Ky said it
was not intended that any inner group run the government.
(SECRET) Saigon 2282, 8/2 (EXDIS).

::::::::::

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By WJ, NARA, Date 9-12-94

105b

Group 1: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification " 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Wednesday, August 2, 1967

-1-

A F R I C A:

Mercenaries Win Battle - A unit of Congolese Army paracommandos were apparently ambushed by mercenary-led rebels 60 miles northwest of Bukavu. Consequently, the European community panicked and all consulates at Bukavu are taking steps to evacuate their remaining women and children nationals. Our Consulate reports that the mercenary commander is no longer Major Schramm, but is allegedly an unknown French Lieutenant Colonel. (CONFIDENTIAL) Bukavu 172 and 174, 8/2.

Nigeria Purchases Czech Jets - A Nigerian Defense Ministry official confirmed to our Defense Attache at Lagos that two L-29 aircraft have arrived in Nigeria and stated that Nigerian External Affairs Minister Ogbu has signed a contract at Moscow for at least four more. Due to our concern over the long range effects of Soviet Bloc aid to Nigeria, Embassy London has been asked to request the British to point out to Nigeria the very real dangers of Nigerian arms deals with the Soviets. (SECRET) USDAO Lagos 021200Z and State 14890, 8/2 (LIMDIS).

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By 108, NARA, Date 9-12-94

E U R O P E:

Reshuffle of UK Cabinet - Embassy London believes a cabinet shuffle to be highly probable. The two key changes would be Chancellor of the Exchequer Callaghan, who wants out of his difficult post, and Secretary of State for Defense Healy, who feels he has now finished the UK's defense reorganization and policy shifts. The Embassy also believes Wilson will try to retire some older ministers and promote younger people.
(CONFIDENTIAL) London 746, 8/2.

.....

N E A R E A S T:

Summit at Ramsar - Our Ambassador reports that, during the recently concluded summit between Turkey, Pakistan and Iran held at Ramsar, Iran, the Shah strongly impressed on President Ayub Khan the importance of CENTO to the security of the area and the importance of retaining ties with the West. In response to Ayub's assertion that the Arab defeat was a setback for the Moslem world as a whole, the Shah responded that it was a setback only for the demagogic Arab leadership.
(SECRET) Tehran 542, 8/2 (LIMDIS).

.....

Wed., Aug. 2, 1967
3:55 p. m.

106

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

There may be minor changes in this, but this is ~~the~~ the statement Defense wishes to make available this afternoon to the Pentagon correspondents already writing their stories on the Joint Committee Report.

W. W. R.

I have already suggested to Paul Nitze that the statement begin by being more directly responsive and stating: -- the Chicom nuclear program has been for long the subject of Defense plans and programs; and that the timing estimates of the Joint Committee are consistent with those in Sect. McNamara's statement of January 1967.

August 2, 1967

Secretary McNamara has long emphasized that the deterrent to nuclear attack upon the United States by any nation or combination of nations is our capability of destroying the attacker. He has emphasized that this capability must be provided regardless of costs and regardless of difficulties.

In his annual "Posture Statement" to Congress last January, the Secretary described this objective in these words:

"To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike."

Referring both to the Soviet Union and Communist China, he added:

"As long as deterrence of a deliberate Soviet (or Red Chinese) nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies is the overriding objective of our strategic forces, the capability for "Assured Destruction" must receive the first call on all of our resources and must be provided regardless of the costs and the difficulties involved. "Damage Limiting" programs, no matter how much we spend on them, can never substitute for an Assured Destruction capability in the deterrent role. It is our ability to destroy an attacker as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our ability to partially limit damage to ourselves!"

Applying this principle to the problem of a future Red Chinese attack, Mr. McNamara said: "China is far from being an industrialized nation. However, what industry it has is heavily concentrated in a comparatively few cities. We estimate, for example, that a relatively small number of warheads detonated over 50 Chinese urban centers would destroy half of the urban population (more than 50 million people) and more than one-half of the industrial capacity. Moreover, such an attack would also destroy most of the key governmental, technical, and managerial personnel and a large proportion of the skilled workers. Since Red China's capacity to attack the U. S. with nuclear weapons will be very limited, even during the 1970's, the ability of even a very small portion of our strategic offensive forces to inflict such heavy damage upon them should serve as an effective deterrent to the deliberate initiation of such an attack on their part."

The United States started development of a ballistic missile defense system in 1955. Technology and our understanding of such defenses have evolved rapidly. So far we have spent more than \$4 billion for a high-priority development program on ballistic missile defenses. We are continuing this effort at a level of about \$400 million a year on Nike-X. We also spend well over \$100 million a year on new approaches to ABM defense and on development of sophisticated penetration devices for our offensive forces.

A light ABM system which would give additional protection to MINUTEMAN missiles in their silos would also have the effect of offering protection against possible Chinese Communist irrationality. The advisability of installing such an ABM defense is under close and continuing review.

Although the Chinese have on occasion talked boldly about nuclear weapons, they have in fact conducted their ^{military} foreign policy with extreme caution. Close study of their statements indicates that they clearly understand the great destructive power of nuclear weapons. Specifically, they understand that it would be suicidal for them to use nuclear weapons.

The United States Strategic Defense Force deters an attack upon the United States by hundreds of Soviet missiles. This overwhelming power is similarly designed to deter a future Chinese attack by a handful of missiles.

The estimates of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on a possible timetable for development of Chinese nuclear weapons are consistent with the statement made by Mr. McNamara in his Posture Statement:

"With regard to an ICBM, we believe that the Red Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs are being pursued with high priority. On the basis of recent evidence, it appears possible that they may conduct either a space or a long-range ballistic missile launching before the end of 1967. However, it appears unlikely that the Chinese could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the mid-1970's, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of response, or substantial protection against attack."

Note that Secretary McNamara has referred to the possibility of the initial ~~launch~~

launching of an ICBM in 1967 and to the deployment of a "significant number" in the mid-70's. The Committee also addresses the interim step: the timing of the achievement of the first operational missile.

U.W.R

107

Wednesday, August 2, 1967, 12 Noon

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a warm farewell message to Icelandic President Asgeirsson, who leaves New York on Saturday, August 5. State approves.

Francis M. Bator

OK

No

Speak to me

FMB:LSE:mst

107i

DRAFT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ASGEIRSSON

Dear Mr. President:

Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you a pleasant journey home to Iceland. We were pleased that you were able to visit with us this summer, and hope that you enjoyed your stay in the United States.

I hope that you will pass on our best wishes to your countrymen.

Sincerely,

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
11:15 a. m.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have just had a long and useful telephone conversation with Bob McNamara on both the ABM issue and the question of Senators worried about stalemate.

1. With respect to ABM's, he has completed a first draft -- and plans to circulate on next Monday a second draft -- of a speech which would announce that we were going to proceed with a Chinese-oriented thin ABM system. The speech is scheduled for delivery September 17 at San Francisco before the UPI editors. As you know, the system would also have a capacity to protect to a significant degree our MINUTEMAN against Soviet attack. Although he has some reservation about the dates given for a CHICOM ICBM delivery capability against the U. S., the speech would, essentially, accept those dates.

2. He would prefer to hold to the mid-September date of delivery -- assuming you approve his recommended decision incorporated in the speech -- because there are two or three loose ends he would like to clear up on the technical side.

3. As for the press handling of this matter, he suggests that we use the unclassified version of his Congressional testimony published January 23, 1967. Starting on page 38 there is an extended passage describing the difference in our approach to the Soviet and the CHICOM capabilities. We should emphasize that we are working at highest priority to develop the technology of an ABM system and that deployment has in no way been delayed by decisions we have taken because the system is now in a development stage (in fact, Bob believes that the first production orders related to deployment could only rationally be given in December of this year, given the unresolved development problems).

4. I would add that in backgrounding on this matter tomorrow and in the days ahead, we should try to deflate the notion that we are in a hysterical race between a CHICOM development of an ICBM system and our development of an ABM system. The simple fact is that the CHICOMS have shown themselves systematically extremely cautious in military operations and extremely respectful of U. S. military power, including our nuclear power. They have talked an aggressive doctrine but behaved cautiously at the time of Quemoy Matsu; the Tibet engagement against India; the India/Pak war; and in Viet Nam. They obviously have some nuclear devices now which could be dropped from aircraft. They have not proceeded to do so. There is every reason to believe on the record that they will be deterred by our overwhelming retaliatory power. This does not mean that we shall not deploy, necessarily, a thin ABM system

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 989-150

By 19/100, NARA, Date 8-30-9

cc: geo. Christian

against them. It does mean that there is no reason for panic.

5. In any case, I believe you will wish personally to design the press handling of this matter in the government.

6. I also reported to Bob the mood of Senators Russell, Stennis, Byrd, etc. He said by all means we should prepare factual briefings for them; but the only way really to change their attitude would be to get them to go to Viet Nam. He doubts that Russell and Stennis would go; although you may wish to urge it upon them. But he thinks it might be useful if Symington could make another trip; and if Scoop Jackson and Margaret Chase Smith were to go and get the flavor of the current scene there in Saigon. Senator Tower might also go; but, Bob said, we have to be careful about him.

7. Bob is going from Jackson Hole to Aspen for the next three or four days. He can be reached any time, and he is wholly ready to come back to deal with this if you judge it helpful.

W. W. R.

109
Wednesday, August 2, 1967
10:00 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. I caught up with Clark Clifford a half-hour after he landed in Seoul this morning, our time.

2. I explained to him the kind of stories we are getting in the press and on ~~the~~ news media, and read to him in particular the alleged direct quote from him datelined Wellington which talks about "important decisions" having to be made.

3. He responded as follows:

-- He remembers no such statement being made either by Max Taylor or himself;

-- It is completely contrary to the line which they have taken systematically throughout the trip; namely, that in the wake of the McNamara trip they were conferring with the heads of governments of the troop-contributing nations to "get their views on the present and future in Viet Nam;"

-- They have been "inordinately careful" about press contacts, and felt that they had succeeded in not making any news;

-- He thought that the quotation imputed to him might have been put together from responses to a number of different questions, yielding a statement that bore no relation to what, in fact, he said in Wellington.

4. Clark asked me to report to you that he feels they have made "very definite and substantial progress" in the course of this trip thus far.

5. At Seoul, he was asked to comment on a report that "serious negotiations" were under way designed to bring a negotiated end to the war. He replied he had no information to this effect.

W. W. R.

cc: Geo Christian

PRESERVATION COPY

Wednesday, August 2, 1967
9:15 a. m.

110

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Posthumous Award of
National Security Medal to Desmond FitzGerald

CIA Director Helms recommends you approve the posthumous award of the National Security Medal to Desmond FitzGerald who, until his sudden death on July 23, 1967, was CIA Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. Helms states that Mr. FitzGerald's contributions to the national security are well within the criteria for award of the National Security Medal, the nation's highest medal which can be given to an officer or civilian in the intelligence profession.

I would add that FitzGerald was the kind of dedicated professional, loyal to policy guidance from outside the CIA, but imaginative and effective, whom we wish to encourage by recognition.

A list of others who have received this award is at Tab A.

A draft citation which might accompany the Medal is attached at Tab B, along with a biographic sketch (Tab C).

I recommend that you approve the award and present it to Mr. FitzGerald's widow at a small ceremony in your office. Alternatively, it could be presented to Mrs. FitzGerald by Mr. Helms.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Ceremony in my office _____

Have Helms present _____

See me _____

110a

RECIPIENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY MEDAL

From 1953 to Date

Smith, Walter Bedell, Director of CIA

Wenger, Joseph N., Rear Admiral, USN

***Lansdale, Col. Edward G., USAF**

***Roosevelt, Kermit**

Hoover, J. Edgar, Director, FBI

Friedman, William F., NSA (National Security Agency)

Donovan, William J., CIA, Maj. Gen. AUS, Retired

Murphy, Robert, Under Sec'y of State for Pol. Affairs

Dulles, Allen Welsh, Director of CIA

Bissell, Richard M., Jr., CIA

McCone, John A., Director of CIA

Rowlett, Frank, National Security Agency

Raborn, William F., Director of CIA, Vice Admiral, Retired

***awards not made public**

The President of the United States posthumously awards the National Security Medal to

Desmond FitzGerald,
Central Intelligence Agency,

in recognition of his outstanding contributions to the national security as set forth in this

CITATION:

As an American of high dedication to the principles upon which our Nation was founded, Mr. FitzGerald on two occasions left the practice of law to offer his unusual talents to his Government. Enlisting as a private in the United States Army in the early days of World War II, Mr. FitzGerald served gallantly and with distinction in the Asiatic-Pacific Theater until his separation as a major after the close of hostilities.

He again volunteered his services to the Nation when, at the outbreak of war in Korea, he became a member of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the following sixteen years, Mr. FitzGerald's exceptional competence and stimulating leadership won the confidence of his associates and established a standard of excellence to guide and inspire others who will follow in the intelligence service of our country. In achieving the remarkable accomplishments that have been of major significance to the United States during periods of world crisis, Mr. FitzGerald gave unstintingly of himself and his energies, of his courage and his imagination. His unchallenged

integrity matched only by his passion for anonymity set precedents difficult to follow but of high importance to our Government. Mr. FitzGerald's valuable contribution to the strength of our Nation's foreign intelligence effort upholds the finest traditions of the Federal service.

Desmond FitzGerald

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was born in New York City on 16 June 1910. He was graduated from Harvard College in 1932 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in history and literature and received an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1935. He became a member of the New York State bar and joined the firm of Spence, Hopkins, Walser, Hotchkiss, and Augell in New York, specializing in corporate work and labor law.

In 1942, Mr. FitzGerald enlisted as a private in the U. S. Army. He rose to the rank of Major before leaving the U. S. Army in 1946. He saw active duty in the China-Burma-India theater of operations, often behind enemy lines. He was a liaison officer with Chinese infantry troops in combat in Burma, then with the Chinese New 6th Army in China and later operations officer for G-2 Security for the Chinese Combat Command in Nanking, China. During his military service, Mr. FitzGerald was awarded the Bronze Star with cluster and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. He also received several decorations from the Republic of China.

After the war, Mr. FitzGerald returned to the New York law firm as a partner in 1946.

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950, Mr. FitzGerald took steps to rejoin Government service and in January 1951 entered CIA as an intelligence officer in the Far East Division. From October 1952 to June 1954, he was first Acting Chief and then Chief of its Far East activities. He then served in Japan and the Philippine Islands as chief of an operational element

between June 1954 and July 1956 -- when he returned to Washington to become chief of a senior staff unit with worldwide responsibilities. In 1958, Mr. FitzGerald became area director for Far East activities and held this position until 1963 when he was charged with responsibility for Latin American operations. In June 1965, Mr. FitzGerald was appointed as Deputy Director for Plans in charge of the operational aspect of CIA's responsibilities.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 2, 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWR
111
2. Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Food Aid for India -- Act II

At Tab A is a complicated memorandum from Gaud and Freeman -- supported by Rusk and Fowler -- recommending a new PL 480 agreement to supply India with a million tons of wheat, along with other minor odds and ends. The memorandum is complex because it is very hard as a technical matter (1) to define precisely what we mean by "matching", and, whatever our definition, (2) to be sure how much matching is actually going on. Your advisers have concluded that by any measure we now have enough matching to justify another one million tons of U. S. wheat.

The Matching Problem

You will recall that your India food message -- and the Congressional Resolution which followed -- spoke in terms of 3 million tons of additional wheat this calendar year if we got "appropriate" matching from other donors. By May, we had collected pledges totalling \$97 million in new food or food-related aid from the others. Therefore, you authorized a first agreement providing for 1.5 million tons of wheat, worth about \$95 million.

We now have a further \$122 million in aid pledges from other donors -- most of it in the form of debt relief. (See table at Tab B for breakdown.) Both the World Bank and the Indians argue that this is more than enough in matching pledges to justify releasing another 1.5 million tons, completing the full 3 million tons contemplated in the Resolution.

However, our matching proposal was designed to draw additional aid resources from the other donors -- resources that otherwise would not have been supplied to India. Neither we nor the Indians gain anything from earmarking aid as food-related which is clearly not over and above what these countries have traditionally provided through the consortium anyway. We just don't know how much of this "new" \$122 million is additional. (Indeed, we know that some of it definitely is not additional -- the British have told us outright that their contribution will be subtracted from their consortium pledge.) Until we see what our brethren do at the consortium meeting in October, we just won't know whether they are really providing something extra or whether they are simply putting new labels on old benefits.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 89-192
By *plup*, NARA, Date 3/25/94

Despite a hot debate, your advisers have not been able to agree on precisely how much more U. S. wheat we ^{can} provide now without threatening the matching principle. But they do agree that we can clearly justify at least a million tons. The acid test of additionality is how much new grain from non-PL 480 sources the Indians have come up with since our last PL 480 agreement was authorized. Any new grain from other donors is clearly eligible for matching. Any Indian purchases beyond what they had programmed in May reflect the Indian's belief that the new aid they have received has freed more of their foreign exchange for buying food. This is not a foolproof method of measuring additionality. The Indians may be diverting money from their development budget to buy food, or they may just be wrong about what the new aid will do for them. But our people doubt that much diversion is going on, and they point out that there are tremendous pressures on the Indians to be right about their foreign exchange situation.

Applying this test, we find that India has scared up 1 million tons in new grain from non-PL 480 sources since last May. They have a new Australian donation of 150,000 tons, 200,000 tons in the process of being donated by the Soviet Union and 650,000 tons in additional Indian commercial purchases. (There is some question about whether the Russians will come through, but the Indians have officially informed us that they will buy enough more themselves to cover any Russian shortfall.) Accepting the tough principle that the best proof of additionality is how much new non-PL 480 grain the Indians actually import, we can clearly justify another million tons from the U. S. This is what your advisers recommend.

The Need

The Congressional Resolution and the entire matching exercise are aimed at an overall target of 10 million tons of grain imports into India this year -- through food aid and commercial purchases -- without forcing India to slow down her development program. According to our latest estimates, she may be able to squeeze by with 9.5 million tons without mass starvation. Even with her greatly expanded commercial purchases (44% more than last year), this will require the full 3 million tons from us mentioned in the Resolution. The central Government's stocks are now down to about two weeks' supply and dropping. Food shortages are very important factors in touch-and-go political situations in several major states. The outlook for the next four months is bleak at best. Without our grain it is hard to see how Mrs. Gandhi could handle it without completely derailing the fertilizer imports and other development expenditures which will stimulate larger Indian crops in the future.

And the timing is urgent, as usual. The 1.5 million tons authorized in May will be fully delivered by the middle of September. Because of the closing of Suez and the strain on tanker supply, it now takes six weeks' leadtime to book ships, rather than 3-4. Thus, if the pipeline is not to break, we need a decision this week.

The Politics

The political case for food aid to India is neither better nor much worse than when you last reviewed it. The Indians played an irritating and often stupid role in the Middle East crisis. Internally, Mrs. Gandhi remains as weak and indecisive as ever; her party is having more and more difficulty maintaining its power in the states. Nobody is certain how long she can hang on. However, there is a powerful case that this makes food aid more rather than less imperative. If change is to come in India, it is very much in our interest that it be as peaceful as possible. But peaceful change is most unlikely in a context of starvation.

The major immediate political point is that if we do let the pipeline break, our relations with the Gandhi government -- and any successor -- will turn very sour indeed. And our public explanation of why we didn't come through (presumably because we don't think we have been matched) would not be supported by the World Bank or other "neutral" observers. We could also expect some trouble at home.

The Alternatives

You should know that this recommendation is the result of careful examination of four alternatives:

1. Do nothing until after the October consortium meeting.
2. Do a million tons now and worry later about the additional half-million tons required to meet the 3 million tons mentioned in the Resolution.
3. Do 1.25 million tons now, on condition the Indians buy the other 250,000 tons.
4. Do 1.5 million tons now, arguing that we have matching for at least 1 million tons and that we are not committed to 1-1 matching. (On this alternative, we would have at least 6-5 matching for the full year.)

No. 1 was dismissed as impossible in view of the urgent need and the dangers of delay. No. 3 was rejected as too time-consuming and too likely to force India to dip into development funds to pay for wheat. No. 4, strongly favored by State and AID, was rejected because Fowler and Freeman believe it would amount to abandoning the matching principle.

That left us with No. 2 as the lowest common denominator. Its principal drawback is that it leaves us with a further 500,000 ton requirement late this year for which we now have no matching prospects in sight. The choice between Nos. 2 and 4 (1 million tons versus 1.5 million tons) reduces to whether we want a 1.5 million ton package now with an unmatched component, or risk a half-million ton package later with no matching at all. You may wish to consider going ahead with the full 1.5 million now.

Indian Purchases from the U.S.

How much?

The Indians have taken the procurement lesson to heart. Their commercial grain purchases in the U.S. this year will be at least four times what they bought last year. And they are following through on their promise to buy at least half of all their commercial grain from us, beginning last May.

All of the self-help conditions we have worked out for the earlier agreement would also apply to this one.

Recommendation

I recommend you approve the Gaud-Freeman memorandum.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Gaud-Freeman memo (1 million tons) _____

I want to hear more; set up a meeting for me with Rusk, Freeman, Gaud, etc. ✓

No _____

See me ✓ *Get me someone to argue the other side - please*

SECRET

P.S. We started out to match to 190 million. We have matched somewhere between (say) 160 million and 215 million. We are taking the lower figures here. In fact, the exercise has been more successful than we could have hoped.
1/5/62

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AUG 1 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Food Aid for India

Proposal

We recommend that you authorize the early negotiation of a PL 480 sales agreement with India covering 1,000,000 metric tons of food-grains, up to 150,000 tons of soybean and cottonseed oil, 30,000 bales of extra long staple cotton, and up to 8,000 tons of nonfat milk. The value of the total package is about \$110 million. The grain, when added to the 1.5 million tons you authorized for release previously, will bring to a total of 2.5 million tons actually offered to India out of the 3.0 million tons proposed in the Congressional Resolution. This proposal was made conditional on appropriate matching of other donors in order to induce broad sharing in the Indian food burden.

Progress on Achieving Matching Objective

On May 4, 1967 we recommended that you authorize negotiation of a PL 480 sales agreement with India which included 1.5 million tons of grain. At that time, \$96.7 million had been firmly pledged in food aid and related debt relief by other countries. This was about one-half of the target to match the U.S. offer of 3 million tons of foodgrain valued in the Congressional Resolution at \$190 million.

In the interval, new food or cash offers were made by Australia (\$9.8 million), Belgium (\$1.2 million), and U.K. (\$4.8 million). Debt relief was offered by the U.K. (\$33.6 million), West Germany (\$14.8 million), and the IBRD (\$50 million). France offered \$8.0 million in food production resources. These offers total \$122.2 million (Tab A). Moreover, both Italy and the U.K. have expanded the list of commodities eligible for financing under prior loans in order to free foreign exchange for foodgrain purchases.

The Government of India informed us that additional food offers totaling \$218.9 million have been received since you offered 3.0 million tons of grain valued at \$190 million. The IBRD also concludes that the U. S. offer of \$190 million in grain has been more than matched by aid offers **by** others. However, you will recall that our conception of matching calls for food aid to be additional

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- 2 -

to regular economic aid, and, if not in the form of food, to be in a form which would free India's resources to buy enough food in world commercial markets to meet its 10 million ton import requirement without diversion of resources urgently needed for the development program. It is difficult at this time to determine to what extent this matching food aid is "additional". Firm figures on India's program needs and total consortium contributions for this year will not be available until after the October Consortium meeting.

The most solid evidence of the extent of additionality is the fact that India now expects food aid in kind and plans additional commercial grain imports totalling 1.0 million tons more than was accounted for when you approved the first-half matching release of 1.5 million tons.

Actual and Planned Grain Imports

India's current import program for the year would thus be:

	<u>MT</u>
PL 480	6,100,000
Other donors in kind	1,440,000
Indian cash purchases	1,452,000
	<hr/>
	8,992,000

Based on her need and the provision of aid in such form as debt relief, India has already authorized commercial purchases of food-

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- 3 -

grains to the extent of \$120 million. India estimates this sum will provide for a record 1,452,000 tons of grain. This is nearly 50 percent more than the 937,100 tons purchased commercially last year. India plans commercial purchases of grain from the U.S. 425,000 tons as compared with 111,000 tons last year. Furthermore, from the time of learning of your view on the U.S. share in commercial purchases, India has planned to make 50 percent of its worldwide grain purchases in the U.S.

Timing and Logistics

Closing of the Suez Canal has lengthened shipping time, increased rates, and tightened availabilities. Bookings cannot be assured unless action is taken about six weeks in advance as compared to 3-4 weeks normally. The grain covered by the recent 1.5 million ton agreement is scheduled for shipment on approximately the following schedule: 50,000 tons in June, 420,000 tons in July, 600,000 tons in August, and 430,000 tons in the first half of September. In view of tight shipping conditions, an additional U.S. grain authorization as recommended in this memorandum should be made available as early as possible to avoid a delay in shipment.

Government of India's central foodgrain stocks now stand at only about two weeks' consumption. The arrival schedule foreseen for the next several months will, at best, hold stocks at that slim margin. Any interruption of shipments could cause a breakdown in the national distribution program with serious political consequences. Problems of maintaining law and order would increase, some weaker state governments might fall, and relationships between the state and national governments would be further strained.

Prompt action is also of real importance to the U.S. It would enable India to purchase significant quantities of grain in the U.S. market during the present wheat harvest which would contribute to a strengthening of U.S. grain prices. We, therefore, propose to authorize the Indian Government to place orders, as we did last time, as soon as you approve this memorandum.

Cotton

The May 27, 1966 Agreement provides for a total of 700,000 bales of upland and extra long staple cotton during fiscal years 1966, 1967 and 1968. Funds provided in that agreement for cotton are sufficient to cover only 670,000 bales. The additional 30,000 bales of

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- 4 -

extra long staple cotton completes our commitment to provide 700,000 bales.

Agriculture Self-Help Performance

We must not lose sight of the fact that food aid is a stop-gap solution; India must press food production with determination. The good start which you hailed in your February 2 message to Congress has been maintained. The new Indian budget strengthens the priority to agriculture; fertilizer imports are increasing; new seeds are being widely used; an aggressive new Minister is giving needed vitality to the family planning program; and longer-term plans are being pursued.

Recent reports on the Indian crop year which ended in April give evidence that price incentives, fertilizer and new seeds may be taking hold. The rice production in south Indian states not affected by the second drought, exceeded the alltime high, and wheat production in the important "bread basket" states of Punjab and Uttar Pradesh also exceeded the previous record levels of 1964/65. The national crop was still ten million tons under that past high, but this pattern of increases in states spared by the severe regional drought is a good augury for the future.

Conclusions

We are not certain that the last 500,000 tons out of the 3.0 million ton food aid offer have been fully matched by assistance which is additive to development resources. No agreement has been reached by the agencies concerned as to the appropriate recommendation to you with respect to release of this balance.

There is complete agreement on the following conclusions:

- That by any standard matching has been secured for a further 1 million tons
- that the Indian food situation and world shipping stringencies suggest immediate action on the uncontestable portion of the program, leaving for later the presentation to you of views and recommendations on the balance

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
- 5 -


-- that authorization to procure the one million tons would support the U.S. wheat market at an opportune time.

Action Requested

That you authorize the negotiation of a new PL 480 agreement with India covering 1.0 million tons of foodgrains and other agricultural commodities including edible oil, extra-long staple cotton and non-fat dry milk. That you authorize the immediate issuance of reimbursable purchase authorizations for 600,000 tons in order that arrangements for purchasing and shipping can be made promptly.

The Departments of State and Treasury agree with this recommendation.


Secretary
Department of Agriculture


Administrator
Agency for International
Development

Approved: _____

Disapproved: _____

Date: _____

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FOOD AID OFFERS
(\$1 Million)

TAB A

	<u>Cash or Food</u>	<u>Food Production Resources</u>	<u>Debt Relief</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>I. First Step Matching</u>				
Austria	0.3	-	0.4	0.7
Canada	52.0	10.0	1.9	63.9
France	4.1	-	-	4.1
Japan	-	7.0	6.2	13.2
Germany	-	10.0	-	10.0
Scandinavia	-	4.8	-	4.8
Total	<u>56.4</u>	<u>31.8</u>	<u>8.5</u>	<u>96.7</u>
<u>II. Second Step Matching</u>				
Australia	9.8	-	-	9.8
Belgium	1.2	-	-	1.2
France	-	8.0	-	8.0
Germany	-	-	14.8	14.8
U.K.	4.8	-	33.6	38.4
IBRD	-	-	50.0	50.0
Total	<u>15.8</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>98.4</u>	<u>122.2</u>
<u>Total First & Second Step Matching</u>				
Grand Total	<u>72.2</u>	<u>39.8</u>	<u>106.9</u>	<u>218.9</u>

In addition Austria, Italy, Japan, and Netherlands have indicated that they will probably offer India fertilizers but amounts are not yet determined. Both Italy and the UK have also agreed to alter the criteria for utilization of prior loans to India so as to permit their more rapid utilization and thereby free foreign exchange needed for foodgrain purchases. Italy agreed to a new list of eligible projects and commodities in order to facilitate rapid draw down of a \$72 million balance remaining from prior year loan pledges. The UK has agreed to reallocate \$4.76 million originally earmarked for capital projects for general purposes.

110

1. copy
2. Profile

Wednesday - August 2, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a message from Tony Carrillo Flores relaying President Diaz Ordaz' thanks for the autographed Summit pamphlet you sent him.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

112a

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FROM Ambassador Freeman in Mexico City

Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores has requested me to convey to President Johnson the sincere appreciation of President Diaz Ordaz for the copy of the Declaration of Punta del Este which he received, which the President "will keep as a pleasing reminder of this transcendental event".

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113

August 2, 1967

← sup
2 Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report on political developments
in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

WJJ:mlc

~~SECRET~~

Situation Report in Viet-Nam

August 2, 1967

Activities of General Loan

113a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-191
By ij, NARA, Date 9-12-94

National Police Chief Loan continues to chafe at restrictions placed on his political activity by Ky and at being made the "scapegoat" for the backfiring of Ky's political heavy-handedness in June. Loan evidently blames some of the other generals and the Americans, claiming the latter really favor the civilian candidates in the election. He also claims to have proposed that Ky send him to Thailand during the campaign to preclude further charges of police interference in the election, but Ky has not yet agreed. However, in the same conversation Loan stated contradictorily that he will begin campaign activities on behalf of the Thieu-Ky ticket on August 3 whether he receives the order to do so or not.

We doubt that Loan's proposal to go to Thailand is serious. Despite recent political inactivity on his part, we expect Loan to take an active if more discreet part in the Thieu-Ky campaign. We are relying on Ky to keep Loan in line, and Ambassador Bunker has had this problem much in mind.

Militant Buddhist Stirrings

In a letter to General Thieu made public yesterday, Buddhist patriarch Thich Tinh Kiet accused him of sabotaging Buddhist unity by issuing a decree invalidating the statute of the present Unified Buddhist Association and substituting a new one. The new statute would favor the moderate Tam Chau Buddhists at the expense of the Tri Quang militants.

The letter is the first salvo in a possible pre-election campaign by the militant Buddhists against the Thieu-Ky ticket. They can be expected to create as much difficulty for the GVN as their strength permits, although their organization has still not recovered from the setbacks it suffered last year. The moderate Buddhists support the Thieu-Ky candidacy but are doing so quietly without the drama the militants can employ. Their position may suffer from Tam Chau's absence on a trip abroad for most if not all the campaign period.

~~SECRET~~

Huong Calls for Thieu-Ky Resignation

Presidential candidate Tran Van Huong called publicly on Thieu and Ky to resign their government positions during the campaign, lest a victory by them be irreparably marred if the voters thought the elections were unfair. Huong admitted they were within their legal rights to remain in office, but he obviously considers the matter a useful political issue which he can flog in his campaign.

Both Thieu and Ky have told Bunker they have no intention of stepping down and losing the advantages of incumbency. Bunker believes they have not taken more than normal advantage so far.

Partial Release

1.3(a)(4)

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Pres file

SECRET

Tuesday, August 1, 1967 -- 6:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

These three reports are from a new and interesting source. We shall begin to get a picture of Nasser's mind and condition. We shall only be able to assess the source's reliability with the passage of time.

I do think they will interest you; but, if you are pressed for time, here are the main points:



1.3(a)(4)

25X1C

2. Ail Sabri -- the Leftwinger in Nasser's camp -- will be pushed out.

3. The end of 1967 is as long as the break in diplomatic relations with the United States and the U.K. can be expected to continue.

4. To rebuild Egypt they will have to undo the nationalization of industry and give "personal initiative and individual enterprise a chance to rebuild Egypt."

5. The new budget has already radically cut expenditures for making trouble abroad.

6. In the second report Nasser discusses the lack of fiber of the Egyptian people and the weakness of his military leaders; and he blames Arab propagandists for giving Egypt a bad name.

7. In the third report Nasser is reported to be in poor medical shape with his diabetes much worse.

25X1A



W. W. Rostow

31 July 1967

31 July 1967

31 July 1967

WWRostow:rlm

1.3(a)(4)

Approved For Release 2000/09/19 : NLJ-019-020-2-9-1

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 019-020-2-9
By φ, NARA, Date 12-17-01

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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IN 21647

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

DIST 31 JULY 1967

1.3(a)(4)

C

COUNTRY: UAR

DOI:

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF DEPUTY UAR PRIME MINISTER ZAKARIYAH MUHIY AL DIN
ON HIS POWER STATUS WITHIN THE UAR

ACC:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)(5)

C

1. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MUHIY AL DIN SAID THAT UAR PRESIDENT NASIR HAS PROMISED TO ALLOW HIM TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT IN OCTOBER 1967, AT WHICH TIME HE (NASIR) WILL RETIRE TO BE ONLY PRESIDENT AND HEAD OF THE ARAB SOCIALIST UNION (ASU). MUHIY AL DIN SAID THAT HE AGREED TO THIS ON CONDITION THAT ALI SABRI BE LEFT OUT OF THE CABINET FORMED IN OCTOBER. COMMENT: SABRI IS A LEFTIST IN THE UAR

1.3(a)(4)

C

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-020-2-10
By [signature], NARA, Date 12-17-01

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

JAN 1995

1.3(a)(4)

C

POLITICAL SPECTRUM AND WAS APPOINTED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NEW CABINET FORMED 19 JUNE 1967.) MUHIY AL DIN SAID THAT IF NASIR TRIED TO IMPOSE SABRI ON HIM, HE WOULD "GO HOME" AND NASIR WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES AND REMAIN IN POWER TO COPE WITH SABRI AND HIS COMMUNIST FRIENDS ALONE.

2. MUHIY AL DIN SAID THAT RUSSIAN AID WAS INDEED BEING GIVEN WITH NO STRINGS ATTACHED, BUT THIS HAD THE EFFECT OF ALLOWING SABRI TO PUT HIS PRO-COMMUNIST FRIENDS IN IMPORTANT POSTS, WHICH IS THE BEST THING POSSIBLE FOR RUSSIA. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD THE UAR THEY WILL REPLACE ALL TANKS AND PLANES LOST IN THE WAR, AND KOSYGIN CONFIRMED IT TO SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER MAHJUB IN NEW YORK.

3. MUHIY AL DIN SAID HE HAD INSISTED THAT HE HAVE A PROMISE TO GET RID OF SABRI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, OCTOBER AT THE LATEST, BUT DID AGREE IN THE END TO KEEP HIM ON AS A MINISTER UNTIL OCTOBER. NASIR TOLD MUHIY AL DIN THAT HE COULDN'T DO EVERYTHING IN ONE DAY, AND THAT SABRI WAS ALREADY OUT AS THE HEAD OF THE ASU. MUHIY AL DIN ASSERTED THAT THE 14 TO 16-MAN CABINET HE INTENDS TO FORM IN OCTOBER WILL BE ALL OF HIS OWN MEN, WITH NO PRO-SABRI PEOPLE

1.3(a)(4)

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1.3(a)(4)

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IN IT.

4. MUHIY AL DIN SAID THAT THE END OF 1967 IS AS LONG AS THE BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (US) AND BRITAIN (UK). CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. HE ADDED THAT MAHMUD FAWZI, THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GET IN TOUCH WITH US OFFICIALS "SO AS NOT TO CUT ALL WIRES," AND THAT HE HAS ALREADY DONE THIS.

5. MUHIY AL DIN CANNOT SEE A "RED EGYPT", EITHER RUSSIAN OR CHINESE, BECAUSE BOTH ARE WORSE THAN THE WESTERN IMPERIALISTS. "WE HAVE TO CHANGE ALL OUR INTERNAL POLICIES, TO GIVE PERSONAL INITIATIVE AND INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE A CHANCE TO REBUILD EGYPT. THIS WILL INVOLVE UNDOING NATIONALIZATIONS BECAUSE THESE 'YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENTS' HAVE RUINED OUR ECONOMY. ALL NASIR DID WAS IMITATE THE TITO REGIME.

6. "I FEEL MYSELF TO BE THE STRONGEST MAN IN EGYPT NOW, AND NASIR CANNOT PLAY THE OLD SUKARNO GAME OF BALANCING OFF THE LEFT AND THE RIGHT BECAUSE ONE OF THEM MUST WIN. IT WILL BE THE RIGHT WHICH WILL WIN. WHY? HAPPILY, ABD AL HAKIM AMIR, FOR ALL HIS MISTAKES AND WEAKNESSES, DID ONE GOOD THING; HE DIDN'T ALLOW ONE COMMUNIST OFFICER OR SOLDIER TO PENETRATE THE ARMY." [REDACTED] COMMENT:

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1.3(a)(4)
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[REDACTED]
(dissem controls)

MUHIY AL DIN WAS PRESUMABLY SPEAKING OF FORMER HEAD OF THE UAR ARMED FORCES, FIELD MARSHAL AMIR.) " THE SAME THING IS TRUE OF THE POLICE, WHICH I HAVE EFFECTIVELY HEADED MYSELF SINCE 1952, DESPITE VARYING JOB TITLES; AND SO, I SHOULD KNOW. ALSO, THE MAJORITY OF THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE ARE PIOUS MUSLIMS WHO CANNOT HELP BEING ON OUR SIDE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS.

7. "THERE WILL BE NO MORE USELESS EXPENDITURES FOR SPECIAL SERVICES ABROAD; THE BUDGET FOR THE 'MUKHABARAT' HAS BEEN CUT FROM 133 MILLION POUNDS STERLING TO 13 MILLION POUNDS A YEAR FROM NOW ON."

[REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS PRESUMABLY REFERS TO UAR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

[REDACTED] THE EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN SPENDING 10 MILLION POUNDS STERLING IN LEBANON ALONE, SEVEN MILLION SUBSIDIZING NEWSPAPERS AND THREE MILLION FOR THE ARAB UNIVERSITY AND FOR SUPPORTERS LIKE KAMAL JUMBLATT.) "OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS THE MOST IGNORANT IN THE WORLD. WHEREAS THE ISRAELIS KNEW THE NAME OF EVERY EGYPTIAN ON RELIEF, AND HIS WIFE'S NAME TOO, WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW WHERE MOSHE DAYAN'S HOUSE WAS."

1.3(a)(4)
C

8. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY DEFENSE ATTACHE CINCMEAFSA

(ALSO SENT [REDACTED])

REPORT CLASS: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE
IN 2207 1442
PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE [REDACTED]

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DIST 31 JULY 1967


COUNTRY: UAR

DOI: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY UAR PRESIDENT NASIR ON TOPICS RELATED TO
THE RECENT HOSTILITIES AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE
AHEAD, THE UAR INTERNAL SITUATION AND ARAB UNITY

ACQ:

SOURCE:



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1. UAR PRESIDENT NASIR SAID HE WAS PROUD OF THE POPULAR SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM OUTSIDE EGYPT AFTER HE HAD PRESENTED HIS RESIGNATION. THE SHOCK OF DEFEAT WAS ALL THE GREATER ON THE EGYPTIAN AND OTHER ARAB POPULATIONS BECAUSE SINCE 1952 HE HAD ACCUSTOMED ALL HIS FOLLOWERS TO A CONSTANT STRING OF VICTORIES, WITH NEVER A DEFEAT. EVEN 1956 AND SUEZ HAD BEEN A VICTORY IN



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SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-020-2-10
By [Signature], NARA, Date 12-17-01

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE END, ALTHOUGH IT STARTED WITH A MILITARY DEFEAT. "IN THIS MODERN AGE WE DON'T KNOW HOW TO FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE WITH BLOOD. EGYPT NEVER HAD TO FIGHT FOR ITS FREEDOM." NASIR ADMITTED THAT POLITICS HAD KEPT HIM AWAY FROM THE ARMY FOR THE PAST FIVE OR SIX YEARS. ABD AL HAKIM AMIR WAS, NASIR SAID, A SINCERE MAN, BUT A WEAK ONE AND NOT NEARLY SEVERE ENOUGH WITH HIS COLLABORATORS. HIS ONE BIG ERROR HAD BEEN TO THRUST ABD AL AZIZ ASIDE AS COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE AND TO RELY ON MUHAMMAD SIDQI, WHO LIKE AMIR IS A SENSUALIST AND A DRUNK. [REDACTED] COMMENT: NASIR PRESUMABLY IS TALKING ABOUT THE FORMER HEAD OF THE UAR ARMED FORCES, FIELD MARSHALL ABD AL HAKIM AMIR. MUHAMMAD SIDQI IS CURRENTLY THE COMMANDER OF THE UAR AIR FORCE.

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2. NASIR BELIEVES "BLACK YEARS OF FIGHTING ARE AHEAD," BUT HE CONSTRUED FIGHTING MORE ALONG POLITICAL THAN MILITARY LINES. THE EVACUATION OF THE SINAI PENINSULA BY THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE ACHIEVED IN FAIRLY SHORT ORDER, HE BELIEVED, AS A RESULT OF A POLITICAL CAMPAIGN WHICH WOULD BE BEGUN AFTER THE 10 AUGUST ARAB SUMMIT IN KHARTOUM. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS PRESUMABLY MEANS THE BIG ARAB SUMMIT TENTATIVELY EXPECTED TO BEGIN IN KHARTOUM SOMETIME IN AUGUST, 1967.)

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

"WE CANNOT FIGHT ISRAEL AGAIN UNTIL ONE SOLE ARAB ARMY HAS BEEN FORMED, UNIFIED AND ARMED."

3. "OUR PEOPLE ARE NOT USED TO BEING DEPRIVED OF ANYTHING. MY REGIME GAVE TO MILLIONS THE POSSIBILITY OF BUYING SOME KILOS OF MEAT EVERY WEEK. BUT WHEN I SUPPRESSED MEAT SALES THREE DAYS A WEEK, THEY ALL COMPLAIN, NOT REMEMBERING THAT BEFORE 1952, DURING THE MONARCHY, THEY HAD NO MEANS TO BUY ANY MEAT ANY DAY OF THE WEEK. ALL OUR MEDIA OF INFORMATION MUST REMIND PEOPLE OF FACTS LIKE THESE."

4. "THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR DEFEAT WILL SOON APPEAR BEFORE A COURT MARTIAL. I WANT A PROFESSIONAL ARMY, WITH NO MORE LUXURIES FOR THE OFFICERS. MUHAMMAD PAWZI AND ABD AL AZIZ WILL ASSURE THE FORMATION OF A SERIOUS ARMY. AS FOR INTERNAL POLICY, I HAVE GIVEN ZAKARIYAH MUHIY-AL-DIN CARTE BLANCHE TO MAKE A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE." COMMENT: IN HIS USE OF THE TERM CARTE BLANCHE, NASIR WAS REFERRING TO 'MUHIY-AL-DIN'S CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR REFORM, WHICH BESIDES HAVING LARGE SCALE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC PLANNING, IS AUTHORIZED TO STUDY THE FILES OF ALL HIGH RANKING MILITARY OFFICERS TO SEE WHICH OF THEM SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR DERELICTION OF DUTY OR COWARDICE. THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN FUNCTIONING

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SINCE SHORTLY AFTER 9 JUNE 1967).

5. NASIR MENTIONED HIS ADMIRATION FOR KING HUSAYN: "WHAT HAS HE GOT LEFT, THE POOR MAN, BUT AMMAN, SALT AND SOME PARCELS OF SAND? IF US AND UK AID TO JORDAN DOES NOT CONTINUE, THE 'CONGRESS' (SIC) OF KHARTOUM SHOULD ASSURE HIM THE SAME INCOME."

6. "I AVOW THAT SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER MAHJUB WAS THE MAN OF ORIENTATION AND DECISION IN THE CAIRO TALKS LAST WEEK, AND THE SUDAN DRAFT CAN BE THE SOUND BASIS FOR A MORE SERIOUS AND SINCERE ARAB COLLABORATION. WE COMPLETE EACH OTHER, SUDAN AND EGYPT. WE HAVE NEVER FELT SO CLOSE AS IN THESE DAYS. IF DEFEAT GAVE US THIS, IT (THE DEFEAT) BECOMES MINIMAL FOR THE FUTURE."

7. WITH REGARD TO LEBANON, NASIR SAID THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO HAVE DONE MORE THAN IT DID DURING THE WAR, GIVEN ITS MOSAIC. THE MORAL APPROVAL OF LEBANON FOR THE ARAB STAND WAS IMPORTANT IN FORMING WORLD PUBLIC OPINION "AND I AM GRATEFUL." "FAWZI IN NEW YORK TOLD ME THAT HAKIM HAD WORKED DAY AND NIGHT FOR APPROVAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED DRAFT PROPOSAL AGAINST ISRAEL. NO MORE CAN BE ASKED OF LEBANON." [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS PRESUMABLY REFERS TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAHMUD FAWZI AND LEBANESE FOREIGN MINISTER GEORGE HAKIM, BOTH OF WHOM WERE IN NEW

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(classification) (dissem controls)

YORK FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.)

8. "WE COMMITTED BIG ERRORS IN POLITICAL TERMS. AN ANNOUNCER ON OUR RADIO ANNOUNCES JOYOUSLY THAT IRAQI TROOPS ARE GOING TO THE RESCUE OF JORDAN, AND AN HOUR LATER ISRAELI AIRPLANES SWEEP IN AND HIT THE IRAQIS. FROM NOW ON, WE MUST HAVE NO MORE FESTIVALS, AND MANY FEWER WORDS.

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9. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE ARMY DEFENSE ATTACHE CINCPACAFSA

1.3(a)(4)
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Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE

IN 21216

114c

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO XBOX XBOX CGS

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

DIST 31 JULY 1967

1.3(a)(4)
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COUNTRY: UAR

DOI:

SUBJECT: CURRENT STATUS OF UAR PRESIDENT NASIR'S HEALTH

ACQ:

SOURCE:

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1. EVERY TWO DAYS UAR PRESIDENT NASIR

HAS A BLOOD TEST TAKEN BY HIS PERSONAL PHYSICIAN, DR. AHMAD GHARIB. THE RESULTS OF THE TESTS HAVE SHOWN THAT HIS GLUCOSE LEVEL HAS RISEN TO 6.5 GRAMS ON AN ACETONE BASE,

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SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-020-2-10
By [signature], NARA, Date 1/8/02

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

JAN 1967

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[REDACTED]
(classification) (dissem. controls)

WHICH IS KNOWN TO BE MEDICALLY DANGEROUS NASIR IS PALE, NERVOUS, AND HAS LOST ABOUT 15 POUNDS. HE IS ON A STRICT VEGETARIAN DIET AND NO LONGER PLAYS HIS USUAL GAME OF TENNIS AT 1700 IN THE EVENING. [REDACTED] COMMENT. ACCORDING TO A PREVIOUS REPORT, [REDACTED] NASIR'S DIABETIC CONDITION WAS AT THAT TIME DIAGNOSED AS OUT OF CONTROL, WITH A GLUCOSE LEVEL OF 3.50 GRAMS ON AN ACETONE BASE. ACCORDING TO MEDICAL ADVICE AVAILABLE TO THIS OFFICE, THE GLUCOSE COUNT REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH ONE ABOVE IS INORDINATELY HIGH AND WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN THE ONSET OF DIABETIC SHOCK, PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF A PATIENT SUBJECTED TO THE TENSIONS AND STRAIN THAT HAVE BESET NASIR IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO RECENT REPORTED INDICATIONS THAT NASIR HAS SUFFERED A DIABETIC SHOCK.)

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2. NASIR VERY RARELY LEAVES HIS HOUSE NOW AND RECEIVES ONLY THOSE PEOPLE WHOM HE MUST. HE APPEARS TO HAVE WITHDRAWN INTO HIS FAMILY, DEPENDING INCREASINGLY ON THE COMPANY OF HIS CHILDREN AND WIFE. HE INVITES HIS MARRIED DAUGHTER OVER TO WATCH TELEVISION ALMOST EVERY EVENING. ALSO HE IS NOT READING AS MUCH AS HE USED TO. WHEN NASIR TALKS TO PEOPLE, HE TENDS TO AVOID MEETING THEIR EYES. HIS TONE OF SPEECH HAS BECOME MUCH MORE MILD, AND HE USES THE WORD "PLEASE", WHICH HE NEVER USED TO DO.

3. NASIR DID NOT INVITE THE ARAB HEADS OF STATE TO VISIT CAIRO IN MID-JULY. THEY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WERE COMING, AND HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO RECEIVE THEM.

AT THE END OF JUNE, NASIR WAS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF MAKING A SPEECH ON THE 23 JULY ANNIVERSARY. IN THE END HE CHANGED HIS MIND, BUT GAVE AN ORDER THAT WORK

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[REDACTED]
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(classification) (dissem controls)

WAS TO GO ON AS USUAL THAT DAY. ON HIS WAY TO THE UNIVERSITY AUDITORIUM TO DELIVER HIS SPEECH, HE HAD ONLY A MOTORCYCLE ESCORT AND THERE WAS NO PARADE.

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4. [REDACTED] DISSEM. STATE ARMY DEFENSE ATTACHE CINCPACAFSA [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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(classification) (dissem controls)

Partial Release
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~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 1, 1967 -- 5:45 p.m.


Mr. President:

These three reports are from a new and interesting source. We shall begin to get a picture of Nasser's mind and condition. We shall only be able to assess the source's reliability with the passage of time.

I do think they will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A



31 July 1967
31 July 1967
31 July 1967

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~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-020-2-11
By SP, NARA, Date 12-17-01

Tuesday, August 1, 1967
5:30 p. m.

116

Pres file

=
MR. PRESIDENT:

I have talked to Sect. Rusk about the message to Kiesinger and relayed to him:

- the reservations that Francis and I expressed;
- your own net feeling that you'd like a message -- if your advisers didn't think up too many negative arguments.

During further discussion it emerged that we both feared that if Hillenbrand sought out Kiesinger with a special message in the countryside where he's on vacation, the German press would be full of it.

Kiesinger gets back to Bonn about August 10.

Therefore, we recommend that we consider about that time a general pre-visit session in Bonn between Hillenbrand and Kiesinger in which the troop issue and others could be touched on, if you were then so minded. If this postponement of the issue is acceptable to you, we would get a draft to you for consideration in about a week.

W. W. R.

Week's postponement of issue acceptable _____

Dispatch message now _____

No message required before Kiesinger arrival _____

See me _____

117
Tuesday, August 1, 1967
5:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

As you may be aware, Senatore Pastore will publish on August 3 the attached report on the "Impact of Chinese Communist Nuclear Weapons Progress on United States National Security."

I have marked on pages 3 and 4 the two statements which will make headlines; namely, that the Chinese Communists "probably will achieve an operational ICBM capability before 1972. Conceivably, it could be ready as early as 1970-1971." Also "a low order of magnitude attack could possibly be launched by the Chinese Communists against the United States by the early 1970's."

This is going to give the ABM question a first-stage boost, of which the second stage will be, I am told, Congressman Rivers' investigation of the matter.

I do not know how far along you are with Bob McNamara in making a decision one way or the other on a "thin system." Obviously, it relates to these matters.

W. W. R.

Attachment (81-861 Report of Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Congress of the U. S. title as above. release 8/3/67)

WWR

118

Tuesday, August 1, 1967 -- 4:00 PM

~~WWR~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a proposed letter of introduction for Ben Oehlert. If you approve, you might present it to him at your send-off session now scheduled for noon on Thursday (August 3).

The Tarbela project, mentioned in the second paragraph, is a major triumph for Ayub -- something he has been trying to arrange for ten years. It was quite a breakthrough for our burden-sharing campaign in that we will finance only about 35% of the dollar costs; the rest will come from other donors. I think Ayub will be pleased to have it mentioned.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

August 2, 1967

118a

Dear Mr. President:

It is a special pleasure for me to present to you my good friend Benjamin Oehlert. I have asked him to be United States Ambassador to Pakistan because I want to send you a man who enjoys my personal confidence and is, in my judgment, worthy of yours. Ben knows my high opinion of you and the distinguished leadership you have given your country. You will find him a trust-worthy friend and an effective protector of our mutual interests.

Nothing has pleased me more, Mr. President, than the progress our two countries have made since your visit here in rebuilding the mutual trust which is so important to both of us. I was most encouraged last week, for example, to hear that financing had been arranged for the Tarbela hydroelectric complex on the Indus River. We are proud to join the World Bank and other nations in helping you with this great enterprise. I look forward to many more examples of close cooperation in the works of peace. It will be Ben Oehlert's constant purpose to maintain our personal lines of communication and strengthen the bonds between our countries. This is a purpose very close to my heart.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

S/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Mohammad Ayub Khan
President of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan
Rawalpindi

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-190
By CB, NARA, Date 4-3-95

LBJ:EKH:ms
(8/1/67)

Partial Release

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~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 1, 1967
3:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith two typical reports on the drab, difficult, deteriorated but not catastrophic state of Hanoi as of this summer.

W. W. Rostow

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[REDACTED] Aug 1, 1967
[REDACTED] Aug 1, 1967

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SANITIZED
Authority NLJ 019-020-2-12
By [Signature], NARA, Date 12-17-01

SANITIZED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE
IN 22810

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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID
DCI: EXO D/MS 2 USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CITE TDCS-314/11461-67

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DIST 1 AUGUST 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)


DOI OCTOBER 1966 - JUNE 1967

- SUBJ
1. SOME EVIDENCE OF WAR WEARINESS IN NORTH VIETNAM
 2. REPORTED GOOD HEALTH OF HO CHI MINH IN JUNE 1967
 3. GENERALLY QUIET CULTURAL REVOLUTION ACTIVITIES AMONG LOCAL CHINESE

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

(1. SUMMARY: ANTI-WAR FEELINGS, ALTHOUGH LOCALIZED.

HAVE BECOME A PROBLEM FOR THE NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) GOVERNMENT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-207
By cbm, NARA Date 3-26-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

THE TRADITIONAL CITY DWELLERS' ANTI-PATHY TOWARD RURAL LIFE HAS ALSO BECOME A PROBLEM IN THE EVACUATION OF HANOI. HO CHI MINH REPORTEDLY WAS SEEN BY JAPANESE CAMERAMAN TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AS OF JUNE 1967. THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNIST IN HANOI CARRIES OUT "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" ACTIVITIES ON A RELATIVELY QUIET BASIS.)

12958
4(b)(1)>25Yrs

2. ON 25 JULY 1967, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] STATED THAT NOT ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT CARRYING OUT THE PRESENT WAR UNTIL THE BITTER END. HE STATED THAT EVEN AMONG THE HIGH OFFICIALS IN THE GOVERNMENT, "A CERTAIN GROUP OF STAFF OFFICIALS" HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHETHER "NORTH VIETNAM CAN WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE U.S." [REDACTED] COMMENT. THE OFFICIALS WERE NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED.) AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE, HE SAID THAT IN AN UNIDENTIFIED VILLAGE NEAR THE COAST WHICH HAD UNDERGONE LAND REFORM, HE HAD ENCOUNTERED A CATHOLIC PRIEST WHO STATED FLATLY THAT HE WAS AGAINST THE WAR. ALTHOUGH THE PRIEST'S STATEMENT CAME AS AN OBVIOUS SURPRISE TO [REDACTED] AND

12958
4(b)(1)>25Yrs~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(classification) (dissem controls)

[REDACTED]

HIS OFFICIAL NVN INTERPRETER, THE PRIEST WENT ON TO SAY THAT FURTHER FIGHTING WOULD BRING NOTHING BUT MISERY AND DEATH TO THE PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT WANT THE VILLAGE TO BECOME A BLODDY GROUND IN THE EVENT A LANDING IS MADE BY THE U.S. TROOPS. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT THE LAND REFORM ALLOCATIONS HAD TRIGGERED A RUMOR AMONG THE VILLAGERS THAT THEIR AREA WAS REGARDED BY THE GOVERNMENT AS A POSSIBLE ENEMY INVASION POINT. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE ANTI-WAR FEELINGS OF THE PRIEST AND THE WAR WEARINESS OUTLOOK HELD BY OTHERS HAD BECOME A PROBLEM THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT MUST RESOLVE.

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

3. [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH EVACUATIONS FROM HANOI WERE PROGRESSING RELATIVELY SMOOTHLY, THE NVN GOVERNMENT WAS CONFRONTED WITH THE PROBLEM OF CONVINCING RESIDENTS TO LEAVE HANOI FOR THE SAKE OF THEIR OWN SAFETY. SUCH RESIDENTS CHOSE TO IGNORE THE EVACUATION ORDERS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY FELT THAT THEY, AS CITY DWELLERS, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUBSIST IN THE PROVINCES. HE SAID THAT THE NVN GOVERNMENT HAD MADE PATRIOTIC APPEALS TO HANOI RESIDENTS IN AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

THEM TO FOLLOW EVACUATION ORDERS. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT INTEND TO TAKE PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST RELUCTANT EVACUEES. [REDACTED] ADDED THAT THE NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE DEATHES RESULTING FROM U.S. BOMBINGS TOTALLED LESS THAN 10,000 DURING THE PAST ONE YEAR AND A HALF. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE IS NOW WAY OF DETERMINING SUBJECT'S BASIS FOR THIS STATEMENT.)

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

4. [REDACTED] SAID THAT DURING THE LATTER PART OF JUNE 1967,

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] SAW PRESIDENT HO CHI MIN "SOMEWHERE IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF HANOI..." [REDACTED] HAD STATED THAT PRESIDENT HO APPEARED TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH AND THAT HO'S COMPLEXION WAS GOOD.

5. [REDACTED] STATED THAT LOCAL CHINESE IN HANOI DID WEAR MAO BADGES AND CONDUCTED CLASSES ON THE TEACHINGS OF MAO. HOWEVER, LOCAL CHINESE WERE QUIET AND ORDERLY IN CARRYING OUT THEIR MAOIST ACTIVITIES. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THE FRONT ENTRANCE TO THE COMMUNIST CHINESE EMBASSY WAS ADORNED WITH A LARGE PICTURE OF MAO TSE-TUNG. IN THE RURAL AREAS, HE NOTED MANY NORTH VIETNAMESE FARMERS WEARING RED MAO BADGES BUT ADDED

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(C)

THAT THE FARMERS WERE IGNORANT OF THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE BADGES AND WERE MERELY WEARING THEM BECAUSE "THEY WERE
BRILLIANTLY COLORED."

6. DISSEM: CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC STATE ARMAIT
NAVATT AIRATT USFJ NSAPAC/J COMNAVJ NISOJ 5AF 6499SG 500MIG
USARJ DET4/FTD (ALSO SENT SAIGON). GP-1

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Tuesday, Aug. 1, 1967
12:30 p. m.

120

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Dick Helms' man, Bill Colby,
reports quiet but substantial progress in Laos.

The pressure of the road-watch teams,
married to jet aircraft, is one reason infiltra-
tion has shifted to the DMZ.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment
(log 2928)

Tuesday, August 1, 1967
10:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Fritz Hollings called me. Having spent a vacation in South Carolina next door to him two years ago, we are friends.

He reported as follows.

He is very worried about the mood on Viet Nam among the men whose support you really need in the Senate for Viet Nam.-- in particular, Senators Russell, Stennis and Byrd. He says the mood is affected by stories of the Marines getting ambushed in the DMZ, damage to the carrier, and a general feeling that we are on a treadmill in Viet Nam. Dick Russell's view is that we should "declare war or get out." Stennis', that we are vastly overcommitted and that we are fighting at the level "the enemy dictates."

He says this mood of frustration lies behind the support for Fulbright's resolution.

I said that there were two facts as seen from the Executive Branch:

-- In the wake of McNamara's trip we have never had the Saigon and Washington teams so completely agreed that in military terms we were making good progress; we could see a process under way that really gave light at the end of the tunnel; and, in fact, our greatest anxiety and caution was the Vietnamese election.

-- In substance, what was happening was that the manpower pool under the control of the Viet Cong in the South was being run down slowly but surely, and the North Vietnamese could not or would not put in enough forces across the DMZ or otherwise to divert effectively U. S. forces from maintaining effective pressure on the Viet Cong, along with the South Vietnamese, the Koreans, etc. The North Vietnamese have had to withdraw from I Corps units which had been fighting there for rest and refit after their engagements with Marines.

I concluded that in face we were on a winning track if we had the capacity to sweat it out.

He said it was extremely important that we conveyed all the evidence for this view to these key Senators.

W. W. R.

122

~~SECRET~~

Lunch with the President
Tuesday, August 1, 1967

Pres file

AGENDA

1. Congo (Secretary Rusk)
Timing of withdrawal of two remaining C-130's

2. Vietnam (Secretary Rusk)
 - International Policy: moves to strengthen support abroad
 - Negotiations: report on present situation
 - Press Policy: reporting of casualties

3. A Harriman Trip? (Secretary Rusk)
Secretary Rusk has been considering your suggestion that Governor Harriman might now usefully travel.

4. The Middle East (Mr. McGeorge Bundy)
Situation Report

5. Military Aid Legislation (Mr. Nitze)
Situation report on the Hill.

6. Other

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By kg. NARA, Date 8-26-91

Mr. Rostow

123

~~Stamp~~
2. Pres file

August 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment to the Shah

The Shah sent the attached message of sympathy on the death of the McNaughtons. I recommend you send the following reply:

"I am grateful for your kind and sympathetic words of condolence sent upon the death of Secretary McNaughton. Abilities like his are much needed in our quest for peace, and we will miss him. I know, too, that you understand as a leader what heartbreak it is when even a small number of your people suffer tragedy in moments of destruction like this. I deeply appreciate Your Majesty's expression of concern. "

W. W. Rostow

Approve

8/2/67

Disapprove

124

Pres. file

Tuesday - August 1, 1967

Mr. President:

We are still having trouble getting Somoza to publicize our aid in Nicaragua.

From this cable you will see that the Venezuelans have given full play to your message and our assistance.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Country Team message
from Caracas (577, 7/31/67).



Department of State

TELEGRAM

124a

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CARACA 00577 312339Z

91
ACTION ARA 19

INFO GPM 03, RSC 01, HEW 07, NSA 02, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SCS 02,
SCA 02, AID 30, USIA 12, PC 15, E 19, COM 08, FBO 01, O 02, PER 02, OC 09,
CCO 00, SP 02, SS 35, SC 01, NSC 10, SCI 05, RSR 01, /204 W

P 312305Z JUL 67Z JUL 67
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WAHDC PRIORITY

UNCLASSIFIED CARACAS 577

CARACAS COUNTRY TEAM MESSAGE

REF: CARACAS 561

SUBJECT: EARTHQUAKE ROUNDUP

1. MINISTRY INTERIOR AT 1520 TODAY CONFIRMED 94 DEAD AND 1530 INJURED IN CARACAS AND LITORAL AS RESULT SATURDAY QUAKE. TOLL EXPECTED TO CLIMB FOUR ADDITIONAL AMERICAN DEAD BEING REPORTED SEPARATE MESSAGE. ESTIMAT OF PROPERTY DAMAGE STILL UNDER WAY.

2. AMERICAN CONSULATES, VENEZUELAN ARMED FORCES, PEACE CORPS, AND MAJOR US OIL COMPANIES ALL CONFIRM NO DAMAGE IN INTERIOR.

3. MISSION PERSONNEL SUFFERED NO INJURIES BUT MANY FORCED EVACUATE DAMAGED BUILDINGS AND ESTABLISH QUARTERS ELSEWHERE. MISSION SITUATION SUBJECT REFERENCED TELEGRAM.

4. PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO PRESIDENT LEONI AND VENEZUELAN PEOPLE ISSUED BY MIRAFLORES CARRIED PROMINENTLY ON NATION'S RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS SUNDAY NIGHT AND IN ALL MAJOR DAILIES MONDAY. US DONATIONS 5000 KILOGRAMS EMERGENCY SUPPLIES, MEDICINES, TENTS, AND BEDDING HANDED OVER BY AMBASSADOR TO VENEZUELAN RED CROSS AT MAIQUETIA AIRPORT 3 PM TODAY. SEVERAL

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TELEGRAM

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PEACE CORPS PERSONNEL HELPING WITH CLEARING OPERATIONS CARACAS.

6. FROM 8:00PM SATURDAY UNTIL 3:30PM MONDAY VENEZUELAN
NAVAL OBSERVATORY REPORTED 33 TREMORS. THE FIRST AND LARGEST
HAD MAGNITUDE OF 6 WITH AN INTENSITY OF 8 ON MERCALI SCALE.
LAST ONE AT 1045 TODAY WITH MAGNITUDE OF 4.5 FELT IN EMBASSY
ARA. OTHER TREMORS WERE OF MUCH LESS INTENSITY.
BERNBAUM

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