

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7 memo	Bundy to President S <del>2 p</del> OPEN 7/3/93 NLJ 94-295	8/11/67	A
#7a rpt	Draft Resolution exempt 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296 PCI 1 p Confidential per NLJ 94-296 open 5-19-00	undated	A
#7b cable	Deptel 19238 to Tel Aviv open 5-19-00 S <del>6 p</del> exempt 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296	8/11/67	A
#10 memo	Saunders to President C 1 p OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295	8/17/67	A
#13 memo	Smith to President C 1 p OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295	8/17/67	A
#14a cable	Saigon 3243 open 5-19-00 RAC S 11 p sanitized 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296 [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	8/17/67	A
#16 ltr	Saunders to President open 1-10-96 NLJ 94-298 S 1 p [Near duplicate of #131, Vol. 39]	8/17/67	A
#16a cable	Tel Aviv 483 open 5-19-00 NLJ 94-299/131a S 4 p exempt 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296 [Near duplicate of #131a, Vol. 39]	8/17/67	A
#18a cable	Rawalpindi 468 S 3 p open 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296	8/16/67	A
#19 memo	Hamilton to President S 3 p OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295	8/16/67	A
#19b memo	Rusk to President C 2 p open 1-24-97 NLJ 94-296	8/12/67	A
#19d rpt	Talking Points C 5 p " "	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 38, 8/11-17/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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#21a memo [dup # 152 vol. 39]	Ball to President <del>S</del> 3 p open 1-24-97 NLJ 94-296	8/15/67	A
#24 ltr	President to Thieu and Ky <del>PCI</del> 2 p open 7/3/95 NY 94-295	8/16/67	A
#25a ltr	Duplicate of #24 OPEN 7/3/95 NY 94-295		
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p open 1-19-96 NLJ 94-420	8/15/67	A
#28a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow " <del>S</del> 1 p	8/15/67	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p open 7/3/95 NY 94-295	8/15/67	A
#29a memo	Rusk to President <del>S</del> 1 p open 1-24-97 NLJ 94-296	8/15/67	A
#30a cable	Saigon 931 dup # 72 NSF, CF, VN, "with cables back-channels" 8294 NLJ <del>C</del> 1 p Incoming, Outgoing Box 258 same penitigation 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296 Open 5-19-00 RAC	8/15/67	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p OPEN 7/3/95 NY 94-295	8/14/67	A
#35a ltr	President to Holt <del>PCI</del> 3 p " " "	8/14/67	A
#35b ltr	President to Kittikachorn <del>PCI</del> 2 p " " "	8/14/67	A
#35c ltr	President to Thieu <del>PCI</del> 2 p " " "	8/14/67	A
#35d ltr	President to Holyoake <del>PCI</del> 2 p " " "	8/14/67	A
#35e ltr	President to Marcos <del>PCI</del> 2 p " open 5-19-00	8/14/67	A

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<del>#35f ltr</del>	<del>President to Park PCI 2 p OPEN 7/3/95 NJ 94-295</del>	<del>8/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. PCI 1 p <del>sanitized 2-15-96 NLJ 94-292</del> Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 00-274; SAME SANIT PER RAC 8/05	8/14/67	A
#38a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <del>sanitized 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297</del> Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 00-275	8/11/67	A
#38b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <del>sample 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297</del> Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 00-275	undated	A
<del>#39a rpt</del>	<del>Vietnam Political Situation Report S 2 p Dupl #7a, NSF, CF, VN. "8A1" Box 103 open 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296</del>	<del>8/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#40 memo	Smith to President C 1 p OPEN 7/3/95 NJ 94-295 [Duplicate of #93a, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7] [Sanitized 1981]	8/14/67	A
#46a memo	"US Efforts to Encourage Free & Fair Elections..." C 6 p OPEN 7/3/95 NJ 94-295	8/14/67	A
#47a memo	Hamilton to President S 1 p " " "	8/14/67	A
#48a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <del>sanitized 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297</del> Sanitized 5/21/01 NS/RAC 00-275	8/14/67	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President <del>same sanitization 2-15-96</del> S 1 p <del>opms-19-00 RAC NLJ 94-292</del> [Duplicate of #112a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67"] [Sanitized NLJ 90-263]	8/14/67	A
<del>#53e cable</del>	<del>Saigon 2972 open 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296 S 6 p [Duplicate of #34, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(1), 6/1-8/12/67 Elections"] [Duplicate of #67b]</del>	<del>8/12/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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#54 ltr	Bator to President <i>NLJ 92-93; opened 9/12/94</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	8/12/67	A
#58 memo	Hamilton to President <del>S 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295</i>	8/12/67	A
<del>#58a memo</del>	<del>Katzenbach to President</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 1-24-97 NLJ 94-296</i>	8/11/67	A
#58b rpt	Talking Points <del>S 3 p</del> " "	undated	A
#58c rpt	Bio Sketch <i>open 5-19-00</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>dup #89, NSF, CF, DN, SAT Box 103</i>	undated	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 1:15 p.m. <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295</i>	8/11/67	A
#59a memo	For Kissinger <i>NLJ 89-111; opened 9/12/94</i> <del>TS 1 p</del>	undated	A
#60b memo	Bundy to Rostow <del>S 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295</i>	8/11/67	A
#60d memo	Katzenbach to President <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 1-24-97 NLJ 94-296</i>	8/8/67	A
#61 memo	Jorden to President <i>OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	8/12/67	A
#61a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Dup #86, as above open 11-4-94 NLJ 94-296</i>	8/12/67	A
#62 memo	Jorden to President <del>C 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/3/95 NLJ 94-295</i>	8/12/67	A
#65a memo	McNamara to President <del>TS 3 p</del> <i>open 1-19-96 NLJ 94-301</i>	8/11/67	A
#65b rpt	"Table I" <del>TS 2 p</del> "	undated	A

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<del>#67a memo</del>	<del>Jorden to President- S 1 p OPEN 7/3/95 NY 94-295</del>	<del>8/12/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#67b cable</del>	<del>Duplicate of #53e OPEN 11-4-94 NLS 94-296</del>		
<del>#69 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. S 2 p OPEN 7/3/95 NY 94-295</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#71a cable</del>	<del>Tel Aviv 442 S 1 p OPEN 11-4-94 NLS 94-296</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77 ltr</del>	<del>President to Ankrah PCI 2 p OPEN 7/3/95 NY 94-295</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#78 cable</del>	<del>Saigon 2867 OPEN 11-4-94 NLS 94-296 S 2 p [Duplicate of #41, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(1), 6/1-8/12/67 Elections"]</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79 cable</del>	<del>Deptel 19258 C 2 p OPEN 11-4-94 NLS 94-296</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#80 cable</del>	<del>Saigon 2869 " S 3 p</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#81a rpt</del>	<del>Vietnam Political Situation Report OPEN 11-4-94 NLS 94-296 S 1 p Dup. #2a, NSF.CF.VN. "8A1" Box 103</del>	<del>8/11/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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82 memo	Rostow to the President - TS 2 pp <i>sanitized 9/12/02 NLT 00202</i>	8/11/67	A
82a memo	Draft NSAM - <i>sanitized 9/12/02 NLT 00202</i> TS 2 pp	[8/67]	A
82b chart	re NSAM 334 - <i>sanitized 9/20/02 NLT 00202</i> TS 1 p	n.d.	A

**FILE LOCATION**

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 38, August 11-17, 1967  
Box 21

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~~1- Suspended~~  
2- Presidential

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 7:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Disappearance of U. S. Citizen in Prague, Czechoslovakia

Charles H. Jordan, who represents the American Joint Distribution Committee, has disappeared in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Mrs. Jordan reported to our Embassy that her husband had failed to return to his hotel from a short walk in the center of the city on August 16.

Our Embassy officials have joined Mrs. Jordan in pressing the Czechoslovak police and Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry for information regarding Mr. Jordan's whereabouts.

The State Department is following this case very closely and has instructed our Embassy to report any additional information immediately.

The above is reported to you in the event that you receive a call from some member of the Jewish community who is naturally upset and anxious to be reassured that everything possible is being done to find out what happened to the representative of a Jewish assistance agency.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

~~1- Suspense~~  
2- Presidential file

2

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 6:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Further on German Poll Concerning U. S. -German Relations

Our Embassy in Bonn has now given us the exact question which was asked by a polling institute comparable to the Gallup Poll. The version is somewhat different than the one Chancellor Kiesinger gave you during your conversation.

The question as asked was:

"Do you consider it right or wrong to bring about in Germany better relations with the United States?"

The percentages the Chancellor gave you were correct. Those who answered that it was right to bring about better German relationships with the United States were:

	<u>yes</u>
January 1967	42%
February 1967	47%
May 1967	69%
June 1967	71%

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

*1- Summary  
2- Draft for file*

3

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 5:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Documents covering Debate Prior to Passage of Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution of August 7, 1964

Documents covering discussions prior to the passage of the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution are attached.

1. Memorandum of June 10, 1964, summarizing the debate which was then taking place inside the Government as to the advisability of proposing a Congressional resolution giving general authority for action which the President may judge necessary to defend the peace and security of Southeast Asia. This document proves that very serious consideration was given to a resolution before the Tonkin Gulf incident. (Tab A)

2. Agenda for August 4, 6:30 P.M. meeting with Congressional leaders (Tab B). Notes of this discussion are not available. The Legal Advisor of the State Department has been asked to hunt for the draft resolution as presented and as it was amended following the discussion with Congressional leaders.

3. Mac Bundy's memorandum of August 7 (Tab C) summarizing events of this period gives the most complete account of discussions with the bi-partisan leaders which is immediately available.

4. The announcement August 4 of retaliatory actions taken and the request that Congress pass a resolution "making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia." (Text Tab D). This statement was delivered following the Congressional Leadership Meeting.

5. Message to Congress of August 5 on Southeast Asia Resolution (Tab E).

6. Joint hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services--August 6. (Text of statements by Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk, Tab F).

7. Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, August 6. (Text of Secretary Rusk's statement, Tab G).

8. Senate and House Joint Committees report out favorably the Southeast Asia resolution, August 6.  
Senate begins floor debate August 6.

9. House begins floor debate August 7.  
Senate continues floor debate August 7.  
Summary of Congressional debate on resolution (Tab H)  
Text of the Senate's debate (Tab I)

10.10. House passes resolution August 7.  
Senate passes resolution August 7.

11. Statement on signing of Southeast Asia Joint Resolution on August 10 (Tab J).

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

~~1 - Suspended~~  
2 - Presidential

4

Wednesday, August 16, 1967, 7:30 p. m.

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Records of Presidential Foreign Policy Decisions**

A careful, systematic account is being kept in the White House of how critical decisions are made in the field of foreign affairs.

These records are not in the archives but are the President's working files which are kept in a vault adjoining the office of Walt Rostow in the West Wing. All the records covering the period when McGeorge Bundy was Special Assistant to the President are also in this working file.

The record of important decisions includes many documents. For example:

1. A memorandum requesting the President to hold a meeting
2. Agenda of the meeting, usually annotated
3. Pertinent intelligence estimates and cables
4. A paper or papers summarizing the subject matter and discussing the pros and cons of suggested courses of action
5. Summary notes of the discussion during the meeting
6. Action memorandum or draft cable implementing the decision.

An important decision usually involves numerous meetings before a final course of action is reached. The documentation becomes extensive, and the views of all are almost inevitably revealed in these papers.

All the documents listed above are part of the President's file. Reconstruction of the decision and the various positions taken can be written from the files. To preserve the confidential nature of the recommendations made to the President by his advisors, these files are for the President's use only. It is thus understandable why newspaper correspondents are unaware of the existence of such files.

Records of Tuesday luncheon meetings, National Security Council meetings and countless small meetings with the President are supplemented by the mass of information cables and memoranda which are read by the President. Also contributing to the record are the memoranda of conversations with foreign government officials.

Many additional records having a bearing on major decisions are part of the official records in the various Departments and Agencies. These records are available to the President and become part of the Presidential historical library.

Although senior foreign policy advisers to the President have said they are not keeping diaries and do not intend to write a history of the Johnson Administration, it is highly misleading to infer that records are not being kept of their advise and recommendations to the President.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

*Supplement*  
2 - President's file  
5/

Wednesday, August 16, 1967, 8:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement of Approved Loans to Brazil

In January of this year you authorized the negotiation of AID project loans in Brazil up to a total of \$90 million. Agreement has now been reached on two important projects: \$41.2 million for electric power and \$31.8 million for major highway maintenance and improvement.

Announcement of these two loans has been held up until we were satisfied on certain points involving the Brazilian Government's over-all economic/financial program. That program has now been reformulated.

The announcements about the two projects will be made tomorrow, August 17, on the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

*www*  
*1- [unclear]*  
*2- Presidential file*

Saturday, August 12, 1967  
4:15 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talk with Jim Lucas

Jim Lucas, veteran foreign correspondent for Scripps-Howard, has just returned from four-plus years in Viet-Nam. I understand you may be talking with him on Monday.

Jim Jones asked me to see Lucas because he understood he was disillusioned and had begun to turn against our position.

Lucas is an old friend from earlier Far East days (Korean War, etc.). So we had a very frank talk. Bill Leonhart joined us for part of the conversation.

I found Lucas to be tired physically and somewhat jaded on a story he had been covering for so long. But he was in no sense disturbed by our policy or our actions.

If he was concerned about anything, it was whether the American people are ready to see through this job which he thinks must be done. He was also depressed by the recent riots here at home.

On Viet-Nam, he had high praise for our people in the field -- military and civilian. He is especially high on the Marines with whom he has spent most of the last year or so. He is a close friend and admirer of General Walt; is not quite sure that General Cushman is of the same caliber but agrees he should have time to settle in.

We discussed the press corps in some detail. Jim thinks the quality is well down from a year ago, but is probably higher than it was in 1963-4.

When I asked him what he thought we should be doing that we are not, he answered: "More of the same. We have to keep the pressure on."

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY kg ON 9-3-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

He added:

"Americans should be proud of what we are doing in Viet-Nam. We have to be there. It is the right thing."

He even had good words to say about the Vietnamese Army -- which is unusual from a reporter.

Jim is a solid citizen. He has done an absolutely first-class job of reporting.

The above may be useful as background if you decide to meet with Mr. Lucas.

William J. Jordan

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7

Friday, August 11, 1967  
4:00 P. M.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: WALT ROSTOW

FROM: McGeorge Bundy *mb*

SUBJECT: The Middle East on August 11.

*Group -  
2. Pres file*

I have spent the enormous amount of time of one morning here catching up on the cables and memoranda and as I leave to take the family to Expo 67, I am impressed by how much better things go when I am out of town. Given the very difficult facts, I think your policy and its execution are in good shape.

Dean Rusk and Arthur Goldberg are coming in tomorrow to talk about our posture in the UN. They do not expect a Security Council before September and their basic recommendation will be that we should stick with the formula that Arthur worked out and discussed with the Russians in full, slightly modified to include the idea of a UN mediator, which both the British and we think well of. My impression is that it is Arthur who wants this meeting with you and that his purpose is to make sure that you and he are in full agreement. The Israelis have never liked the particular formulation that emerged from Arthur's talks with the Russians and are still nervous about any Moscow-Washington accommodation. I think Arthur may be afraid that the Friends of Israel may try an end-run to the White House. My own belief is that his position is very fair and that he is the best possible man to explain it both to the Israelis and to their friends in the US. If his resolution were accepted in the Security Council it would be a major diplomatic victory for you and it would provide an umbrella over the detailed bargaining that would have to follow. I attach a copy of Arthur's current resolution so that you can check it for yourself. In essence, it provides for (1) withdrawal; (2) acknowledgment by all of the right to all to national life; (3) justice for the refugees; and (4) innocent maritime passage. These are four of your five principles and the fifth--moderation in the arms race--belongs in a separate category for purposes of UN negotiation. To give you a preview of what Arthur will tell you tomorrow, I attach a summary of his most recent talk to Evron. You will see that he is our best lawyer on this subject.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By lig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

The situation in the Middle East and among the major interested powers moves very slowly--if at all. Each party seems to be waiting for something to turn up, and none is yet taking the lead in serious negotiations. George Brown is jumpy about Suez but he has no solid scheme for getting it open. Nasser is making feelers and is perhaps a shade more reasonable, than in June, but he has such a long experience of seeking something for nothing that there is nothing of substance in his moves so far.

Our most complex problems, as usual, are with our friends the Israelis, but even these are not urgent. I have briefed Walt separately on the small but touchy issue of a visit by General Weizmann and I assume he will discuss it with you this afternoon. In essence, the problem is that we simply cannot refuse to talk to the Israelis on these matters, and the fact is that I agreed in principle to a meeting (and even an August meeting) before the matter was first reported to you. So I think I had pretty good reasons for taking this course, but I will leave them to Walt to explain. Obviously, I can always be overruled, but quite aside from my own sentiments, I really don't think we would gain from such a decision. We have real things to strike bargains with the Israelis and the timing of one subordinate visit is not one of them. Those real issues are now being studied in State and Defense and they should be ready for your consideration toward the end of August. In essence, they all come down to one question: How much influence can we really have with the Israelis and how far do we want to use it? I find myself more and more cautious about the limits of what we can or should do, and I am quite sure we all need the time for reflection which the present stalemate gives us.

I will be back here early in the week of August 21, and of course can be reached by the White House operators in the time in between.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7a

DRAFT RESOLUTION

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-11-00

The Security Council,

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East, bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered at the 5th emergency session of the General Assembly and having taken note of the records of that session,

Considering that the crisis in the Middle East merits the attention of all member states and indeed requires the full participation of all members to achieve a just and lasting peace,

1. Declares that peace and final solutions to this problem can be achieved within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations;
2. Affirms the principle under the UN Charter of:
  - A. Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces from territories occupied by them in keeping with the inadmissability of the conquest of territory by war;
  - B. Without delay acknowledgment by all member states of the United Nations in the area that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith;
3. Determines to work directly with the parties and utilize a United Nations presence in order to achieve an appropriate and just solution of all aspects of the problem, in particular bringing to an end the long-deferred one of the refugees and guaranteeing freedom of transit through international waterways;
4. Requests accordingly that the Secretary General appoint a personal representative to assist him in seeking implementation of the present resolution in agreement with the parties concerned.
5. Decides to continue examining the situation in the Middle East with a sense of urgency and requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the consultations by the Personal Representative with the states concerned.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-11-00

P 110105Z AUG 67  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 0000  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0000  
USMISSION USUN NY 0000

~~SECRET~~ STATE 19238

(SUMMARY)

EXDIS

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, ROSTOW, SISCO, BATTLE, AMBS. BUFFUM AND PEDERSEN MET TODAY WITH EVRON AND YAISH TO FILL THEM IN ON US-UK TALKS AND TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE FUTURE COURSE IN UN ON BASIS TENTATIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION TRANSMITTED IN STATE 18566.

*attached*

AMB. GOLDBERG SAID HE FIRST WISHED TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN POINTS MADE BY EBAN TO BARBOUR (TEL AVIV 380) INCLUDING CERTAIN OF EBAN'S COMMENTS RE TEXT ON WHICH US-USSR ACHIEVED COMMON GROUND AT ESSGA ON UNDERSTANDING SOVIETS WOULD TRY IT OUT ON ARABS. GOLDBERG SAID WE AGREE WITH EBAN'S JUDGMENT THAT SC MEETING PROBABLY NOT LIKELY BEFORE SOMETIME IN SEPTEMBER; ARAB SUMMIT MEETING (IF IT TAKES PLACE) NEEDS TO BE CONCLUDED. SOVIETS ARE STOCKTAKING. WHILE EL FARRA (JORDAN) SEEMS ANXIOUS FOR EARLY SC MEETING, THIS NOT LIKELY UNTIL SYG APPOINTS INDIVIDUAL TO MAKE REPORT TO HIM. UK UNDER PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 02 STATE 19238~~

ON SUEZ CANAL.

GOLDBERG SAID WE AWARE ISRAELIS WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE; WE NOT ADVERSE TO THIS, BUT SUCH VIEW MUST BE TEMPERED BY FACT WE MAY NOT HAVE CHOICE, AND WE HAD BETTER GET OURSELVES READY FOR A NEW SC ROUND IN WHICH WE LIKELY TO FACE DIFFICULT INITIATIVES AND PROPOSALS. EBAN KNOWS HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO MAINTAIN SOLIDARITY AT ESSGA.

SOVIETS WILL STAY INVOLVED IN ME MATTER AND WILL BE FACING SUBSTANTIAL ARAB DEMANDS FOR ASSISTANCE. WHILE WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVES HAVE CHANGED, IF THEY SHOULD SHOW SIGNS OF REJECTING EXTREMISM IN AREA, THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED. WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT OR PRESSED SOVIETS; THEY HAVE COME TO US. ISRAELIS KNOW SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED RENEWED INTEREST AFTER ESSGA IN CONTINUING CONSULTATION WITH US ON MIDDLE EAST. WE HAVE INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO DO SO, AND WE ARE AWAITING REPLY FROM GROMYKO.

REFERRING TO EBAN'S CONVERSATION WITH BARBOUR, GOLDBERG SAID WE OWE EACH OTHER A FRANK EXPRESSION OF VIEWS REGARDING OUR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IN ALL CANDOR WE CAN UNDERSTAND IF ISRAELIS TAKE EXCEPTION, AS THEY APPARENTLY DO, TO THE COMMON GROUND ACHIEVED IN THE US-USSR VERSION OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION AND WOULD PREFER NO UN ACTION. WE CAN UNDERSTAND ALSO ISRAELI VIEW THAT THEY DO NOT WISH ANY EARLY ACTION IN SC, AND WE RECOGNIZE CASE CAN BE MADE FOR THIS POINT OF VIEW. HOWEVER, WHAT WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND ARE DIFFERENCES BASED ON ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN US-USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION. EBAN HAS SAID TEXT WAS AN EROSION IN THAT IT DID NOT MENTION NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT AND WENT TO TROOP WITHDRAWAL IN FIRST PLACE, LEAVING ONLY SECONDARY EMPHASIS ON PERMANENT SETTLEMENT AND SECURITY.

IN THIS CONNECTION, AMB. GOLDBERG POINTED OUT PRESENTATIONAL SEQUENCE IN US-USSR TEXT WAS PRECISELY SAME AS IN LA DRAFT WHICH BOTH US AND ISRAEL SUPPORTED. SOVIET-AMERICAN DRAFT SPOKE IN TERMS OF WITHDRAWAL AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RIGHT OF ISRAEL TO EXISTENCE, AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY AS ONE INTEGRATED "PRINCIPLE". IN THIS SENSE, IT IS STRONGER THAN LA DRAFT,

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~  
~~PAGE 03 STATE 19238~~

WHICH INCLUDED WITHDRAWAL AND END OF BELLIGERENCY NOT AS ONE INTEGRATED PRINCIPLE BUT AS SEPARATE BUT LINKED ELEMENTS.

A SECOND WAY IN WHICH US-USSR DRAFT WAS BETTER THAN EARLIER LA DRAFT IS THAT IT DID NOT CALL UPON ANYBODY TO DO ANYTHING. IT MERELY AFFIRMED A "PRINCIPLE". SOVIETS TRIED TO GET A SPECIFIC "CALL UPON" PHRASE IN IT, AND WE REJECTED IT. LAST LA DRAFT SIMILARLY SPOKE IN ACTION TERMS THAT WITHDRAWAL, ETC. "IS EXPECTED".

THIRD, LA RESOLUTION, IN PARA 2(B), TALKED IN TERMS OF ENDEAVORING "TO ESTABLISH CONDITIONS OF CO-EXISTENCE BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBORLIENESS",

WHEREAS US-USSR DRAFT WAS STRONGER AND BROADER IN SCOPE IN THAT IT RECOGNIZED RIGHT OF ISRAEL "TO MAINTAIN AN INDEPENDENT NATIONAL STATE OF ITS OWN AND TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY". MOREOVER, IT CALLED FOR "RENUNCIATION OF ALL CLAIMS AND ACTS INCONSISTENT THERewith" WHICH EMBRACES END OF BELLIGERENCY. THIS POINT MADE QUITE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS BY US. WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT LA DRAFT MENTIONED EXPLICITLY WORD "BELLIGERENCY" AND US-USSR TEXT DID NOT, IT IS CLEAR THAT RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY DOES NOT AND COULD NOT MEAN ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL AS A STATE, WHICH IS ADVANTAGE OF US-USSR DRAFT. NOT ONLY DOES LANGUAGE IN US-USSR DRAFT ENCOMPASS RENUNCIATION OF BELLIGERENCY BUT STATES EXPLICITLY THAT ISRAEL HAS RIGHT "TO LIVE IN PEACE AND SECURITY". IT CANNOT BE ARGUED THAT BELLIGERENCY IS NOT EMBRACED IN US-USSR FORMULATION. THIS PARAGRAPH ALSO MEANS, AND WE MADE THIS CLEAR TO SOVIETS, THAT BOTH GULF AND CANAL, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, MUST BE OPEN TO ALL VESSELS. WE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT WORD "ACKNOWLEDGEMENT" INVOLVES ACTS ON PART OF PARTIES WHEREAS WORD "RECOGNITION" IS A PASSIVE WORD. ALSO, WORD "RENUNCIATION" REQUIRES AN AFFIRMATIVE ACT.

IT NOT SURPRISING RUSSIANS FELT THIS FORMULATION WAS STRONGER THAN ORIGINAL LA DRAFT AS DID THE LA'S THEMSELVES. AMB. GOLDBERG HAD TOLD DOBRYNIN THAT IF SOVIETS FELT WORD "BELLIGERENCY" WAS "CABALISTIC", AND IF THEY DID NOT WANT SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO IT IN RESOLUTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING OUR FORMULATION. WHILE IT AVOIDED SPECIFIC MENTION OF "BELLIGERENCY", IT EMBRACED THIS CONCEPT AS WELL AS OTHER ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS CITED ABOVE. SOVIETS SAID THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT.

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TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 24 STATE 19233~~

THIS ALSO HELPS EXPLAIN WHY ONE OF GROUNDS ON WHICH A ABS REJECTED THIS FORMULA WAS THAT IT WAS STRONGER THAN ORIGINAL LA FORMULATION.

GOLDBERG THEN POINTED TO ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH IN US-USSR DRAFT WHICH SPOKE IN TERMS OF "GUARANTEEING FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS". GOLDBERG SAID SOVIETS WANTED ELIMINATION OF WORD "GUARANTEEING" AND WANTED PHRASE "SETTLEMENT OF" SUBSTITUTED. WE REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL.

SECOND PARA IN US-USSR DRAFT EXPRESSED A "PRINCIPLE" WHEREAS PARA 3 EXPRESSES NEED TO "GUARANTEE" FREEDOM OF TRANSIT, I.E., TO MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENSURE ENJOYMENT OF RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH AQABA AND CANAL.

GOLDBERG RECALLED THIS DETAILED EXPLANATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO EBAN AND ASKED THAT EVRON REPORT HIS COMMENTS FULLY SO THAT THERE COULD BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING REGARDING INTERPRETATION AND EFFECT OF US-USSR RESOLUTION.

GOLDBERG THEN SAID IMPORTANT THING WAS "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?". GOLDBERG WANTED TO DISCUSS THIS CANDIDLY AND VERY CONFIDENTIALLY "ON GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT LEVEL." WE HAVE TO PREPARE POSITION TO ASSURE WE MAINTAIN ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS PROTECTED DURING ESSGA. HE REMINDED EVRON OF DIFFICULTIES WE HAD IN KEEPING UK IN LINE, DIFFICULTIES CAUSED US BY FRENCH, EFFORTS WE MADE WITH PA'S AND AFRICANS, RISKS OF EROSION AT UN IN FUTURE.

WE, OF COURSE, WOULD WELCOME IT IF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WERE POSSIBLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, US-USSR RES SPOKE IN TERMS OF "WORKING DIRECTLY WITH PARTIES". IN REVIEWING HOW BEST TO GET THROUGH NEXT PHASE, WE HAVE TENTATIVELY CONCLUDED THAT BEST DEVICE WOULD BE FOR REPRESENTATIVE OF SYG TO BE APPOINTED BY SC, TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH PARTIES ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT, WITHIN GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES ON WHICH US AND USSR ACHIEVED COMMON GROUND. THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE WANT SC TO ISSUE COMMANDS TO ANY OF PARTIES AND TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION. WE WOULD NOT FAVOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO BE FREE TO MAKE FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS, REGARDLESS OF VIEWS OF PARTIES. HIS TASK IS TO GET AGREEMENT OF PARTIES. WE ARE DISINCLINED TO GIVE HIM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~PAGE 25 STATE 19 38~~

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BLANKET AUTHORITY WHICH WOULD TRY TO FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS UPON PARTIES. DRAFT RESOLUTION IS TO BE REGARDED AS TENTATIVE WORKING PAPER, (STATE 18566), ON WHICH MUCH MORE CONSULTATION IS REQUIRED WITH US GOVT.

GOLDBERG SAID WE ARE TALKING TO UK ON SAME BASIS AS ISRAELIS AND WITH NO ONE ELSE; SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE WORKING PAPER. IT DOES NOT HAVE FINAL TOP-LEVEL CLEARANCE IN USG, AND WE WANT ISRAELI VIEWS. DRAFT HAS BEEN PREPARED IN ANTICIPATION THAT SC MEETING OF SOME KIND IS PROBABLE IN SEPTEMBER. WE HAVE TO BE PREPARED WITH WORKING PAPER IN FACE EXPECTED INITIATIVES FROM OTHER QUARTERS.

GOLDBERG STRESSED THAT PARAS 3, 4, AND 5 UNDERSCORE INTENTION TO "WORK DIRECTLY WITH THE PARTIES" (PARA 3); TO WORK "IN AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED" (PARA 4); AND REQUESTS THE SYG "TO KEEP THE SC ADVISED OF THE PROGRESS AND THE RESULTS OF CONSULTATIONS BY THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE STATES CONCERNED" (PARA 5).

WE WOULD LIKE ISRAELIS EVALUATE WORKING PAPER WITHOUT UNDUCE PRESSURE AND IN TOTAL CONTEXT OF SITUATION. WE PRESENT THIS FOR CONSULTATION WITH ISRAELIS ON ASSUMPTION ARAB STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A TEXT, AT LEAST ALGERIANS, SYRIANS AND PROBABLY UAR. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED ACCEPT THIS DRAFT OR WHETHER FACT THAT ARABS DO NOT VOTE IN SC WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. IF ARAB POSITION REMAINS INTACT AS RESULT OF ADOPTION OF SUCH AN SC RESOLUTION, SO WOULD ISRAELI POSITION REMAIN INTACT. MEDIATOR WOULD WORK WITHIN CONTEXT OF BASIC PRINCIPLES CONTAINED US-USSR TEXT. WORKING PAPER SEEKS TO AVOID SPECIFIC SC PRONOUNCEMENTS ON SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENT. SC DOES NOT GET INTO JOB OF FASHIONING PEACE SETTLEMENT; WORKING PAPER HAS VIRTUE OF GIVING PARTIES MAXIMUM LATITUDE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES WHICH SAFEGUARD ISRAELI INTERESTS.

GOLDBERG SAID HE WOULD BE LESS THAN CANDID IF HE DID NOT SAY SC OPERATION WOULD BE DIFFICULT. BEST RESULT WE COULD HOPE FOR WOULD BE ADOPTION OF SUCH RESOLUTION WHICH GIVES ISRAEL AND ARABS OPPORTUNITY TO TALK OVER SITUATION, AT LEAST INDIRECTLY. DIFFICULT PROPOSITION WHICH WE MAY FACE IN SC IS EARLY ARAB

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TELEGRAM

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~~PAGE #6 STATE 19238~~

INITIATIVE ON JERUSALEM, ON WHICH US WOULD BE ALONE. IF THIS OCCURS, MATTER WOULD COME TO SC IN WORST CONTEXT, I.E., RESOLUTION CALLING ON ISRAEL TO RESCIND MEASURES TAKEN ON JERUSALEM. SUCH RESOLUTION WOULD BE ADOPTED. WHILE WE HAVE NOT TAKEN ANY FINAL DECISION, WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ABSTAIN ON SUCHM RESOLUTION AS WE DID AT ESGA AND GIVE EXPLANATION SIMILAR TO ONE WE MADE IN ESGA. THEN THERE WOULD BE A SUBSEQUENT SC ROUND ON SANCTIONS. IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO TELL HOW SC WOULD LINE UP ON SUCH PROPOSAL.

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO GET PIECE-MEAL SETTLEMENT, NOT PIECE-MEAL SETTLEMENT ON COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY BASIS AS ISRAELIS HAVE IN MIND, BUT RATHER ONE LIMITED ELEMENT. UK IS UNDER GROWING PRESSURE TO DO SOMETHING ON SUEZ. IT IS ALTOGETHER POSSIBLE THERE WILL BE PRESSURE TO FORCE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SUEZ SHORES ON BASIS OF AN ARRANGEMENT OUTSIDE CONTEXT OF TERMINATION OF STATE OF WAR. SUCH PIECE-MEAL APPROACH WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL.

CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH FULLER EXPLANATION OF REASON FOR US/UK TALKS ON UN ABOUT WHICH EVRON HAD QUERIED DEPARTMENT ON PREVIOUS DAY. EVRON TOLD HE SHOULD KNOW THAT WE SUGGESTED THESE CONSULTATIONS WITH UK SINCE WE WERE CONCERNED THEY MIGHT GO OFF ON A TANGENT AND ON COURSE WHICH WOULD CAUSE DIFFICULTIES BOTH FOR ISRAELIS AND US. WE WERE HOPEFUL THAT TALKS WOULD RESULT IN CLOSER UK COOPERATION WITH US ON MIDDLE EAST SINCE WE WERE CONCERNED WITH WEAKNESS IN UK POSITION AT ESGA.  
RUSK



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~~1- Presidential file~~  
2- Presidential file  
8

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 3:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Dominican Crisis Chronology

This is a chronology of the Dominican crisis with pertinent documents taken from your files:

1. 7:30 p.m., April 28, 1965, Wednesday  
Meeting with bi-partisan congressional leaders  
(Summary minutes of meeting, Tab A0)
2. 8:40, April 28, Wednesday  
Announcement of landing of 400 marines  
(Text of your statement, Tab B)
3. April 30, Friday  
Announcement that Communists are seeking to gain control  
(Text of statement, Tab C)
4. April 30, Friday  
OAS resolution adopted
5. May 1, Saturday  
Announcement of deployment of additional forces  
(Text of your statement, Tab D)
6. May 1, Saturday  
Dispatch of OAS Committee  
(Text of your statement, Tab E)
7. May 2, Monday  
Meeting with legislative leaders  
(Suggested agenda including highlights of crisis, Tab F)
8. Statement of actions taken to date  
(Text of your review of the crisis, Tab G)

Also attached are a statement by Senator Smathers at the Senate on September 1, 1965, (Tab H), and Senator Fulbright's statement of September 15, 1965, on the Dominican Republic, (Tab I).

15/

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

~~HKS~~ *fold*

1

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday, August 16, 1967, 6:30 P. M.

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Larsen reports on two years of progress in II Corps (Central South Vietnam). Completing two years of duty as Commanding Officer in II Corps, General Stanley R. Larsen reports, "there is an air of refreshing optimism in this area" which covers almost half of the land mass of South Vietnam and 20% of the population of South Vietnam. (see attached map).

Proof of his optimism lies in the following statistics:

	<u>Two years ago</u>	<u>Today</u>
Important roads open	none	90% (1650 km.)
Operating railroads	almost none	53% (365 km.)
Population under Viet Cong control	50%	11%

The North Vietnam Army has lost about 7,000 killed in action to about 80000 Americans killed in the Corps area in the past two years.

No North Vietnam Army Division or Regiment has launched a successful operation in the past two years.

The South Korean Divisions have contributed magnificently toward pacification efforts and are a distinct asset in the war effort, working well with the United <sup>States</sup> ~~Nations~~ and South Vietnamese commands.

In Phu Yen Province (see map) the Viet Cong controlled 75% of the rice growing land and 80% of the people in 1965. Now, the Province is nearly completely under the control of the Government of South Vietnam.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By rlg . NARA. Date 9-3-91

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In all the populated areas in the II Corps, there are now troops who are there to stay to ferret out remaining enemy units and to protect the liberated areas against the return of Viet Cong control.

Bromley Smith

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*ga*

(copy of General Larsen's memo) (11 August 1967)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Informal Statistical Progress Report on II Corps Tactical Zone, Vietnam, from August 1965 to July 1967

1. This memorandum is submitted in response to your suggestion this morning that I list for you statistics which show progress in the II Corps area of Vietnam during the last two years.

2. II Corps area represents 46% of the land mass of Vietnam, with 2.9 million population (20% of the South Vietnam population).

3. In August 1965, nearly half the population of II Corps was under VC domination. In July 1967, 89% of the population was under military control.

4. In August 1965, about 70% of the rice growing area was under VC control. Today, 95% of the rice land is under GVN control. These same statistics apply generally to the salt bearing areas.

5. Two years ago, none of the important highways was used unless a major military effort was launched to open one up for a limited number of days for a specific purpose. Today, 90% (1650 kms) of the important roads are open (40% are in green condition needing no protection for vehicles, and 50% in amber condition needing minimal convoy protection, but receiving almost no enemy opposition). Highway #1 is green for about 350 miles. Only the lower 20% is red, and this strip is in driveable condition, needs only 48 hours notice for opening and can be protected by five regional force companies. It has not been opened because at present there is no requirement for its use and the troops can be better utilized elsewhere.

6. A specific example of road opening success is that of Highway #19, between Qui Nhon and Pleiku, about 100 miles long. In 1965, many persons in authority doubted that a division could be supported in Pleiku because of the long and vulnerable logistics supply route. In the 20 months that this highway has been kept open, we have lost only one US soldier to enemy action. The daily supply tonnage over this road is often 2000 tons. A surface fuel pipeline is now under construction over the entire route.

7. Two years ago, almost none of the railroad was in operation. Today, 53% of the railroad, or 365 kms, are repaired and in use.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By 128 NARA, Date 9-3-91

8. For the past 18 months, the incident rate in II Corps has been the lowest in Vietnam and currently is running at about 1/4 that of I Corps and 1/2 that of III Corps.

9. In 1966, 46% of all Hoi Chans in Vietnam (Viet Cong returnees) were in II Corps. Currently, it is running about 32% of the total, but II Corps continues to enjoy the greatest number of Hoi Chans in Vietnam.

10. In 1966, II Corps took 38% of all the prisoners of war and, so far, in 1967, it has contributed 42% of all PW's. The national percentage of North Vietnam Army PW's to Viet Cong PW's is 1%. In II Corps, 8.8% of the PW's are North Vietnam Army.

11. There are 64 airfields throughout II Corps. Their location makes it possible to support by air, if necessary, a major combat operation logistically anywhere in this large segment of Vietnam.

12. In 1966, nearly half of all the enemy killed in action were accounted for in II Corps. During that year, all of the 11 North Vietnam army regiments in II Corps were attacked and were dealt heavy casualties. In the Highlands area, the North Vietnam army have lost about 7000 killed in action to about 800 Americans killed. No North Vietnam Army division or regiment has launched a successful operation in two years. The reverse has been true. Our forces have, in every instance, been able to catch the enemy main forces off balance and to attack them before they were ready. The North Vietnam Army can no longer adequately resupply their forces in the coastal areas, to include sufficient numbers of personnel replacements. The four North Vietnam Army regiments in the coastal areas are in poor condition, while the seven regiments in the highlands must return to safe haven areas to recoup for weeks, and very often months, between operations.

13. Our latest figures indicate that for every 1500 Viet Cong loss in II Corps, there are only 500 locally recruited replacements, and these are getting dangerously young. The remaining short fall must be made up by individual North Vietnam Army replacements. We do not believe that the North Vietnam Army are meeting their required personnel goals in II Corps. Evidence to support this, of course, is the fact that conditions in II Corps continue to get noticeably better each month.

14. There are two Vietnamese divisions in II Corps, plus one separate regiment. The 23d ARVN Infantry Division has only two regiments. Its zone is the southern half of II Corps and is larger than III Corps and nearly twice as large in area as I Corps. With the exception of occasional US and Korean operations in the area, this undersize division has kept its zone under control

by itself. There have been no crises in this area except around the southern town of Phan Thiet where one US battalion and two Vietnamese battalions are based indefinitely, and, together, in the past ten months have brought about 150,000 under Government of South Vietnam control.

15. The 22d ARVN Infantry Division has worked closely and continuously with the US 1st Air Cavalry Division for the past ten months and has contributed measurably to the outstanding successes in Binh Dinh Province. The recognizable improvement in the ARVN combat effort and leadership are encouraging to the US commanders who work with these units.

16. The South Korean divisions have contributed magnificently toward the pacification efforts in and around populated areas. They are a distinct asset in the war effort and they work closely and well with the US and ARVN commands.

17. The most successful National Priority Revolutionary Development area in Vietnam is in Binh Dinh where two years ago, practically the entire area was under Viet Cong control except for the city of Qui Nhon. This area now includes about 500,000 people.

18. The province which has shown the most improvement in two years is Phu Yen. The Viet Cong controlled 75% of the rice growing land and about 80% of the population in 1965. Now the Province is nearly completely under Government of South Vietnam control. A recent captured North Vietnam Army document admitted that, whereas two years ago they controlled 265,000 people, they now control 20,000.

19. In my judgment, the above statistics can be interpreted only one way -- that they show positive evidence of progress in II Corps. In all the populated areas there are now troops who are there to stay, to further ferret out the enemy, and to protect those liberated areas against the return of Viet Cong control. With the CORDS (Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support) offensive now getting underway, there should soon be even greater progress in Revolutionary Development support and in destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure. Though I cannot speak for the other Corps areas, I can say that today there is an air of refreshing optimism in the II Corps area.

STANLEY R. LARSEN  
Lieutenant General, United States Army

~~1 - [unclear]~~  
2 - [unclear]  
10

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ij, NARA, Date 6-22-95

August 17, 1967, 7:30 pm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Your Meeting with Archbishop Philip Saliba -- 12:30 p.m., Friday, 18 August

Archbishop Saliba represents a branch of the Greek Orthodox Church in the U. S. (about 250,000 heads of family) which looks to a Patriarch in Syria for its leadership. Because of his church's association with the Arab world and his own Lebanese ancestry, he wants to express the concern of his parishioners for the situation in the Middle East and particularly in Jerusalem.

This is an opportunity to help balance our books slightly with the Arabs. Because we refuse to force Israeli troops to pull back, they feel we've reneged on our commitment to the territorial integrity of all states in the area and have cast our lot with Israel. To show understanding and sympathy for well-meaning Arabs, you might make these points:

1. We want good relations with all Arabs who want to live in mutual respect with us -- even those who disagree with us.
2. You sympathize with those Arabs who yearn for a lasting peace. As you said on June 19th, this is our goal too. You hope he'll tell this to all his Arab friends.
3. We can't urge Israel to withdraw and there can't be a permanent peace until Arab governments agree to end the state of belligerency. Who would expect a commander to pull back his troops while his enemy says the war is still on? If they agree that the war is over, people can work out peace terms.
4. In Jerusalem, you believe all religions must have access to their Holy Places. We don't know yet exactly what administrative arrangements would be best. But you've made clear our view that no one party should settle the issue by itself.
5. You are deeply concerned about the refugees. Their welfare and future are the key to making any peace permanent.

Harold Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~1 - Suspense~~  
2 - Presidential file

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11

Wednesday, August 17, 1967  
7:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's Viet-Nam  
situation report.

*Bill*  
William J. Jordan

Att.

~~SECRET - EXDIS Attachment~~

Viet-Nam Situation Report

August 16, 1967

Campaign Developments

The presidential campaign appears generally back on the tracks, and conversations with Ky and with Thieu's brother reflect an encouragingly healthy attitude toward the campaign in the Thieu-Ky camp.

Nine presidential candidates proceeded on schedule to Bien Hoa on August 16 for their first joint appearance since the abortive Quang Tri episode. Thieu and Ky were not present. According to Reuters, Huong received the biggest response from a small and generally apathetic audience when he stated that a political solution to South Viet-Nam's troubles was more important than military victory. The Thieu-Ky representative stated that the military ticket, if elected, would immediately move to solve the problem of ending the war, but with conditions that would protect South Viet-Nam.

Huong gave a press conference on August 15 in which he continued to air charges on unfair election practices on the part of Thieu and Ky. Huong reiterated his threat to reconsider his participation in the elections if unfair practices did not end soon.

Bunker-Ky Conversation

Referring to continuing charges and counter-charges by presidential candidates, Bunker again emphasized to Ky that he and Thieu can afford to lean over backwards to run a campaign satisfactory to all candidates. Bunker counseled Ky to ignore criticisms unless they turned up legitimate complaints, in which case remedial actions should be taken. Ky said that he and Thieu had agreed to try to overcome mistaken impressions abroad about the elections by explaining what the Vietnamese Government has done and is doing to assure free and honest elections.

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Authority 76990-262  
By slj/tp, NARA, Date 9-4-91

Conversation with Thieu's Brother

Thieu's brother told an Embassy officer he is keeping in touch with various civilian candidates, particularly Huong. He agreed that the way must be kept open for broad civilian-military collaboration after the elections. He thought that personal relations between Thieu and Ky were satisfactory. The Embassy officer emphasized the importance of assuring a free election, including the appearance of equality of opportunity between government and civilian candidates. The Embassy officer suggested that Thieu or Ky should appear with the civilian candidates at least at some of their joint official appearances.

1- Suspense  
2- Presidential file

12

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 11:00 a. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message of Condolence to the Widow of Former Peruvian President

Manuel Prado, ex-President of Peru died in Paris this week. He had resided there since 1962 when he was forced out of office near the end of a six year term of office.

During President Prado's visit to Washington in September 1961, he addressed a Joint Session of Congress over which you presided. State Department recommends that you send the attached message of condolence to his widow.

I agree that this would be a gracious gesture.

Bromley Smith

Approve

Disapprove

BKS:amc

old. 5/5, 8/17/67, amc  
notified by Bromley's file

12a

DRAFT MESSAGE

Senora Clorinda Malaga de Prado:

With deep sorrow I learned of the passing of your husband, Dr. Manuel Prado. Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending heartfelt sympathy. The many friends of Peru in our country will long remember the constructive and dedicated work of Dr. Prado.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

1- See page 2  
2- President's file

13

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NODIS~~

Thursday, August 17, 1967, 10:15 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Bunker Delivers your Letter to Thieu and Ky

Following is a personal message from Ambassador Bunker to Walt Rostow which I am sending to you in Walt's absence.

"I thought the President's letter to Thieu and Ky excellent and came at just the right moment psychologically. I have sent a message accordingly to the State Department reporting on delivery.

" I also thought the President's speech at ceremony honoring six civilians who served in Vietnam was splended and put the situation here in just the right context. I am giving both Thieu and Ky copies and have arranged with our public information office for wide distribution here.

"Please tell the President that I think both his letter and speech will be of great assistance to us here."

151

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ij, NARA, Date 6-22-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL-NODIS~~

Thursday, August 17, 1967

WR Info  
and  
P file

14

Mr. President:

Ambassador Bunker's weekly cable emphasizes election developments but contains a hopeful report on how the South Vietnamese plan to reorganize their pacification program, (Page 3).

Bromley Smith

14a

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Thursday, August 17, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 11128  
By W/ics. NARA. Date 5-11-00

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 3243)

Herewith my sixteenth weekly telegram:

A. General

While the tempo of the war abated somewhat during the last week, the political campaign heated up largely due to the continuation of the controversy over the Dong Ha incident and to charges by certain of the candidates of harassment and of pressure on the part of some Vietnamese Provincial and District officials.

As a result, however, of Thieu's conciliatory attitude in the Dong Ha case and of two letters from the Commissioner of Special Administration Tuong to the Special Election Committee, the second one couched in moderate terms and outlining what the Government of Vietnam was prepared to do in assisting the candidates, the campaign, temporarily derailed, has gotten back on the track. Further investigation confirms the fact, I believe, that the Dong Ha incident arose chiefly from a series of unfortunate occurrences which led to misunderstandings between the candidates and the Government of Vietnam. Despite many contradictory statements and charges, I do not believe that the mixup was a premeditated action by the Government of Vietnam to humiliate the candidates as the latter alleged but was rather a combination of bad weather and poor planning, execution, and judgment by some Vietnamese officials, combined with impatience and suspicion on the part of the candidates who subsequently decided to exploit the issue for political purposes. Both sides acted with a certain degree of childishness, "face" became involved, and therefore neither side acted in a way designed to settle the issue easily. Although delayed longer than seemed reasonably necessary, the issue has been resolved and all of the candidates have resumed campaigning. In fact, representatives of most of them continued campaigning in the provinces while the controversy was going on in Saigon.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

All the candidates held press conferences on Monday and Tuesday of this week. Charges of harassment have been made by some of them, Huong making the most specific allegations in his conference yesterday. Certainly these charges should be investigated by the Government of Vietnam and if substantiated, action should be taken to eliminate such practices to the extent possible. In the absence of intimidation, some involvement on the side of the "ins" would generally be considered one of the accepted advantages of incumbency. We have evidence also that some officials will at least quietly support opposition candidates. We have been unremitting throughout the Mission in our contacts with the Government of Vietnam, both civilian and military, to emphasize the prime importance of keeping the elections free and honest. I have continually kept this in the forefront of my talks with Thieu and Ky and have pointed out to them the adverse reactions which have appeared in the U. S. press and in Congressional statements. I believe most of these criticisms stem from the acceptance of rumors as facts and a tendency to gauge the fairness of elections here against standards of perfection which do not prevail in the most advanced democracies.

Both Thieu and Ky have been greatly concerned by U. S. press and Congressional reactions. Ky told me yesterday that he and Thieu had decided to send communications to all of the Allied governments on what had been done and is being done by the Government of Vietnam to insure that the elections would be free, fair, and honest. What they have in mind, I think, is outlining substantially what was reported to you in previous cables, including such things as lifting of press censorship; instructions issued by the Minister of Defense to the Armed Forces to stay out of the elections and the written directive to Armed Forces commanders clearly stating rules governing participation of military personnel in election activity; General Thang's prohibition of political activity on the part of Revolutionary Development workers; instructions from Generals Thieu and Ky to Province and District Chiefs not to engage in politics; that pursuant to the Election Law, all candidates are being provided certain funds for their campaign; that candidates are being furnished transportation although this is not required by law; that all candidates are being given free time on Government radio and television; that invitations have been extended by the Government of Vietnam for observers to come for the elections to various organizations, friendly Governments, Parliamentary groups, and the international press.

I shall report in more detail in the Political section on the aftermath of the Dong Ha affair, on the charges of harassment, and on other developments in the campaign.

General Westmoreland, Ambassador Komer and I met yesterday with Prime Minister Ky, the Minister of Defense General Vien and General Thang, as the result of a request I had made to discuss our proposals on pacification, particularly Project Takeoff. General Ky had informed me that the Government of Vietnam was also contemplating some reorganization of its pacification program as well as of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. At the meeting yesterday he outlined to us what they had in mind. We will report these proposals in detail separately, but I might summarize them briefly:

A. Making the Province Chief the key individual in the pacification program at the provincial level; giving him adequate authority to manage all civilian and military activities in his province; upgrading the quality of Province Chiefs.

B. Reorganization and improvement of the Regional and Popular Forces.

C. Improvement of leadership. Ky stated that "we must purify the Army by asking poor officers to leave" and mentioned that General Vien had prepared a list of forty senior officers who would be asked to leave the Army.

D. General Thang would return to the Army as Deputy to General Vien and would control the political department, the Regional Force/Popular Force, and the Security Forces. General Thang will also control the training of the Revolutionary Development teams, and will improve the coordination between Revolutionary Development teams and the military at local levels.

E. Appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister with overall control of the pacification activities of the Ministries involved. Ky remarked that if elected, as Vice President, he would have little to do so he would deal personally with pacification.

F. A more direct attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure along the lines outlined by Ambassador Komer.

Ky mentioned specifically that General Thieu was sorry that he could not attend the meeting, but he had specifically endorsed these Government of Vietnam proposals which General Ky had outlined. General Westmoreland, Ambassador Komer and I felt that these plans for reorganization of the Armed Forces and the pacification program were constructive and along the lines we have been advocating.

#### B. Political

The Presidential campaign has grown bitter in the course of the last week, with the principal issue now being charges that the Government is trying to rig the election.

The aftermath of the "Dong Ha affair" was considerable. The decision to resume the campaign was probably due in part to our efforts. On the morning of August 12, before the candidates met, Embassy officers contacted three of the principal candidates and urged them to get on with the campaign. We stressed the danger of a revulsion of American opinion if the bickering with the Government continued.

Embassy officers made a special effort to persuade Huong because he was considered to be the ringleader of the effort to exploit the affair. Huong responded by saying he would try to find a way to resolve the problem and reopen the campaign. He later took full credit for the decision, saying that he had with great difficulty persuaded the other candidates to go on with the campaign.

When I saw how the situation was deteriorating, I took up the problem with both Thieu and Ky on August 11. I went over with them in some detail the U.S. press reports on the situation and the temper of the American opinion that had resulted. I emphasized the importance of getting the campaign back on the track. Both Thieu and Ky took the line that the Government was already doing more than the law required, and that as indicated in their August 8 press conference, they were prepared to work out solutions with the other candidates. I suggested both that Thieu and Ky go along on some of the trips and that they consider appointing an election coordinator. Ky said that he and Thieu would go on

some of the trips. However, both he and Thieu took the line that Administrator Tuong has the necessary authority to act as an election coordinator. I also asked Ky about press reports that the Generals were planning to set up an Armed Forces Committee to run the Government. Ky said that the report was absolutely untrue.

Possibly as a result of my conversation with him, Thieu responded to the candidates' statement on August 12 with a public statement of his own to the effect that "from now on the Government will make all-out efforts to help all slates in their electoral campaigns according to their requests."

The temperature of the campaign dropped only momentarily. In a joint August 13 television appearance, Truong Dinh Dzu again attacked the Government for its handling of the Dong Ha affair and charged that Government officials were using threats and pressure tactics to insure a Thieu-Ky victory. Dzu said that the elections cannot be fair and free unless Thieu and Ky resign and allow an interim Government to conduct the elections.

In a joint press conference the following day, Dr. Phan Quang Dan also said that Thieu and Ky should resign in order to assure a fair election. At the same press conference, Ha Thuc Ky told reporters that he considers Thieu and Ky have violated the Electoral Law by not resigning their Government positions to run.

Yesterday, Tran Van Huong made a full dress attack on the Government for allegedly using threats and pressures to intimidate voters and campaign workers. He held a very skillfully organized press conference in which he presented a bill of particular incidents of Government actions designed to rig the election. Huong's principal charges included such things as instructions to civil servants and military personnel to work for the Thieu-Ky slate, improper use of Government facilities by Thieu-Ky campaign workers, veiled threats against Huong supporters, and police harassment of Huong campaigners. Present and speaking as "witnesses" were three Assembly Deputies, all Huong supporters and members of the movement for the renaissance of the South Party.

Among other things, Huong said that if the Government fails to heed his "warning," he may "reconsider his candidacy." He also said that, contrary to his remarks in his August 3 press conference, he has now decided that he could not serve as Prime Minister in a Thieu-Ky Government. I am not sure, however, that this is his last word in the matter.

Both during the press conference and in a private conversation with an Embassy officer just before the conference, Huong was particularly bitter about an August 13 statement by General Nguyen Duc Thang. The statement was carried in the Vietnam press and quoted Thang as saying that the nation's future depends entirely on the Army. Thang also said that an elected Government is not necessarily an efficient government and "we should not have 100 percent confidence in an elected government." Huong told reporters at the press conference that if this is the way Ky and Thang feel, the civilian candidates are prepared to step aside and let the Army run everything. He told an Embassy officer just before the conference that Thang's remarks had discouraged all of the civilian candidates very much, and personally is determined that they will not be used as an instrument for the legalization of an illegal regime. I must confess that I was surprised at this ill-advised statement by Thang, who, though somewhat emotional has a high reputation for probity and good sense.

Despite his harsh charges of election rigging by the Government, Huong said several times in his press conference that he is going to Bien Hoa today to take part in the first joint Provincial campaign appearance since the candidates suspended such visits following the Dong Ha affair. Unfortunately, we understand that neither Thieu nor Ky will participate today. (As this is written we have an early report from Bien Hoa to the effect that all candidates are there with the exception of Thieu and Ky. The arrangements are good, and the meeting is proceeding smoothly. The crowd is estimated at about 2500.)

As I have mentioned, I have been urging both Thieu and Ky to go along with the other candidates as a gesture of good will and to show that the campaign is not stacked in their favor. So far they have preferred to do their Provincial campaigning

under the guise of "inspection trips," a tactic which further irritates the civilian candidates. (While the civilian candidates suspended their Provincial visits, Ky made a swing through the Delta, presiding at the opening of a waterway in Vinh Long, attending a distribution of rice seed and pumps in Sadeq, donating 1.5 million piasters to refugees, inaugurating Village Councilmen in Chau Doc, and distributing land titles in Binh Tuong. Thieu concentrated on the Second Corps, meeting with Hamlet and Village officials in Phan Thiet and speaking to graduating officers at the Nha Trang Naval Academy.)

The joint Provincial campaign appearances have now been reduced to eleven, plus three appearances in Saigon, by agreement of all candidates. The Provincial stops will include Bien Hoa, Qui Nhon, Gia Dinh, Nha Trang, Banmethout, Tay Ninh, Can Tho, An Giang, My Tho, Danang, and Hue. The civilian candidates demanded an Air Vietnam plane because the military aircraft are too uncomfortable, and the Government has agreed to reserve one for their use. The scheduled joint radio and television appearances have remained on schedule throughout and are continuing. Thus, the mechanics of the campaign at least seem to be back on the track.

While the campaign mechanics are apparently restored for the moment, the atmosphere of the campaign remains troubled. The charges of Government pressures and threats are widely believed. While I do not think Huong's withdrawal is imminent, it is a possibility. If he pulls out of the race, others will likely go with him. We are well aware of the impact such an action would have on American opinion. It would also have a very destructive effect here.

While the truth of Huong's charges is perhaps less important than their political impact, as I have said, I think it important that we know how much substance there is in them. We are doing what we can to check them out. Unfortunately, this is very difficult. We have other such reports, but like those which Huong has publicized, the stories of threats and pressures tend to be vague, unconfirmed, and to turn on the impressions of the people "threatened" as much as on what was really intended. Pressure can and does sometimes take very subtle forms here, though no doubt it is also often imagined where in fact it is not being exerted.

In any event, I am inclined to believe that most of the real incidents of pressures being exerted on voters and campaign workers can be explained by the zeal of the local officials rather than by directions from the central government. While we had some early reports, prior to the Thieu-Ky merger, that Ky had instructed his campaign managers to make full use of Government personnel and facilities, it is our impression that these instructions from Ky were in general not implemented, in part because of pressures from us and public opinion, in part because of the merger with the Thieu ticket. Our Provincial JUSPAO reports say that the Vietnamese Information Service is doing a good job of educating the voters about the election mechanics.

I am, therefore, inclined to think that as of now there is more smoke than fire in Huong's charges. This is especially true because one of the principal areas of the alleged incidents of pressures against Huong's campaign workers is Vinh Binh province; as it happens, the Province Chief in Vinh Binh is Huong's son-in-law, and both he and his Deputy for Administration are known to us as strong Huong supporters.

Unfortunately, the foreign press and the politically interested elements of the Vietnamese population are apt to accept Huong's charges and similar stories at face value.

Foreign observers such as a delegation from the Asian Parliamentary Union will help to counteract these impressions, provided they find that the election is honest. We will, of course, continue to urge on both the Government and the candidates the need for both an absolutely honest election and responsible campaigning.

Neither Thieu nor Ky responded to my suggestion that they appoint an Election Coordinator of wide acceptability and prestige who would be able to insure that such things as the Dong Ha incident would not recur. I am still pursuing this idea but I am not optimistic they will act on it. Yesterday I took advantage of a brief meeting with Ky to tell him again that our policy on the elections is to support no candidate, to oppose no candidate, and to strongly favor free and fair elections. I noted the great advantages of Government candidates and told him I believe he and General Thieu should lean over backwards to satisfy the legitimate requests and needs of the civilians in their campaigns.

While Ky seemed in a somewhat more philosophical frame of mind about the elections and the recent press attacks on his Government, his mood is not good. We have some confirmation of this from a CIA report which recounts an outburst by Ky to General Loan just after my August 11 talk with him. According to this report, Ky expressed anger at American pressure, described the civilian candidates as filth, and said he would not be content as Vice President simply to "sit in his armchair and do nothing." I am afraid that Ky remains depressed and quite disturbed by his "demotion" to second place on the Thieu ticket and by the barrage of criticism from all sides. I have advised him to bear with such criticism, which is an inevitable part of entering the political arena.

I reported last week the approval by the Government of the new Tam Chau Charter for the United Buddhist Association. Acting under the new Charter, Tam Chau's faction has elected new temporary officers. Tam Chau has been replaced as head of the Vien Hoa Dao (the action arm of the United Buddhist Association) by an unknown whom he presumably sponsored. The Supreme Patriarch is the head of the Cambodian Buddhist clergy, Lam Em.

The Tri Quang faction continued its attack on Tam Chau and the new Charter with a public meeting August 12 and a press conference on August 14. In the press conference, Tri Quang supporters again attacked General Thieu personally in very strong terms and accused him of a policy of trying to destroy Buddhism. They also made it clear that they will consider the elections meaningless unless Thieu and Ky resign, but they stopped short of a boycott call. Although there was talk of anti-Government demonstrations at the August 12 public meeting, the Communique issued at the August 14 press conference does not threaten any specific action against the Government, and spokesmen at the conference were careful to put the stress on protection of Buddhism and the United Buddhist Association Charter.

These events seem to leave the Buddhists as divided as ever, though there is some evidence that Tam Chau has lost support by his recent actions. This is because Buddhists who deplore Tri Quang's extremism also deplore actions which may further divide the Buddhist church. They see in Tam Chau's new Charter the threat of a permanent Government-inspired split in the church.

C. Military

General Westmoreland is beginning a new regular report through military channels, a monthly assessment. I find this a very useful document and commend it to your reading. (Note from Rostow Office: This is the report that was sent up to you last Saturday, August 12.)

D. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period totaled 389. This may be compared with 295 during the same period last year. The total number of returnees for this year now exceeds last year's overall total by 156. To date in 1967, 20,398 returnees have come into Chieu Hoi centers; the overall total for 1966 was 20,242. Since the beginning of the program in 1963, 68,429 returnees have rallied to the Government.

On August 10, the Viet Cong attacked the Chieu Hoi center in Hau Nghia province with rocket fire, killing 5 and wounding 53 -- all Hoi Chanh (returnees). All military administrative units in the area rushed aid within hours. This attack came on the heels of the reported assassination of a Chieu Hoi Chief in Vinh Long on August 9, possibly an indication of an intensified Viet Cong effort to discourage defections.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending August 12, the enemy killed 64 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 148, and kidnapped 85. The dead included three Revolutionary Development workers, two Provincial Chieu Hoi officials, three Hamlet Chiefs, and one policeman. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 1,860 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 3,431, and kidnapped 2,357.

F. Economic

Honolulu Conference: The AID Mission is engaged in preparations for a conference in Honolulu on August 25-30 which

will bring together top officials of AID/Washington and of the Mission in Saigon to review and plan U. S. assistance programs to Vietnam. Special attention will be given to ways and means of accelerating agricultural development and of building local development efforts on the base created by recent village and hamlet elections.

Rice: Rice stocks in Saigon and the rice deficit provinces have now gone above 260,000 tons -- the largest figure in many years, and probably the peak level to be reached in 1967. From now until the end of the year these stocks will be reduced as consumption requirements outpace import arrivals.

Inflation: Last week retail prices dipped significantly in Saigon for the first time in six weeks. Beginning in early July the increased cost of comestically produced food had caused a 17 percent increase in the Retail Price Index. Food prices had risen both because of seasonal factors and because of extensive Viet Cong destruction of the two main commercial roads -- Routes 4 and 20 -- leading into Saigon.

W.W.R.

~~1 - [unclear]~~ 15  
2 - President's file

August 17, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a warm farewell message to Kiesinger. It will be sent to him in New York just before he leaves. State approves.

If this is OK, we will release the message here after delivery.

Francis M. Bator

OK

ret'd from files 8/18/67

No

Speak to me

FAREWELL MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KIESINGER

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I ~~would~~ thank you once again for coming to visit us in Washington. I am grateful for your wise counsel and for the full and clear exposition of your views. It was good to be able to talk with you in such depth about the many questions confronting our two countries. Your friendship is a source of comfort to me.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in saying how much we enjoyed having you and Mrs. Kiesinger here. On behalf of the American people I send you and our good friends, the German people, warmest best wishes for the months ahead.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

August 17, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a heart-to-heart exchange between Wally Barbour and Moshe Bitan, Eban's "seventh floor" officer in charge of our business. It's the Israeli answer to Ambassador Goldberg's discussion of a possible UN resolution (Mac Bundy sent you a copy of Goldberg's memcon and the text of the resolution last Friday).

There are two interesting points:

1. We haven't succeeded in budging them an inch from their suspicion that we're backsliding from your five principles of 19 June.
2. The reason for this seems to be their notion now creeping into our conversations that the U.S. and Israel are headed toward a confrontation. Some Israelis remember 1957 when we eventually put the heat on them to withdraw, and they see our military aid suspension as evidence that we may be preparing a similar move this time. The ugliness of the threat in paragraph 11 suggests that they expect the worst.

In Mac's absence, I should tell you that he and I will be having preliminary discussions with Secretary Katzenbach and Co. early next week to begin shaping the overall political bargain we should shoot for in connection with the September arms talks. We will deal with this brewing "confrontation" in this context.



Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-298  
By lig, NARA, Date 11-1-95

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

16a

Thursday, August 17, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR (Tel Aviv, 483)

Bitan at the behest of Eshkol and Eban has given me the substance of the instructions which have gone to Evron to respond to remarks regarding U.S. thinking on further steps in the United Nations as put to Evron in a conversation on August 10 with Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Rostow et al. I had given Bitan for Eshkol and Eban a close paraphrase of State's 29238 reporting on that conversation which I considered a particularly clear and convincing exposition of our views. It was my hope that in thus supplementing Evron's report the strength and logic of our position might be enhanced with the Government of Israel and a helpful reply stimulated.

Unfortunately, the Israeli position is not helpful. As anticipated, the Israeli reaction is definitely negative.

Bitan expounded to me the Israeli thinking, which, he said is largely reflected in Evron's instructions but, he added, the Prime Minister and Eban wanted him to make doubly sure the depth of their concern is understood.

As he put it, the Israelis are prepared to discuss with us at this time, in the United Nations context, principles but not tactics. If principles are agreed, tactics are relatively easy to devise as developments occur. They particularly feel the necessity that we keep each other informed and Bitan expressed some unhappiness that they had not been told at the outset of exchanges with Tito. I protested that both Under Secretary Rostow and I had filled Israelis in on Tito as soon as possible. He did not pursue the matter.

Continuing, he said that as to principles the U.S. and Israeli positions coincide. Israel agrees with the five principles set forth by the President on June 19. However, we seem to be deviating from those principles in our interpretation of them. As to withdrawal, the President's statement refers to recognized boundaries and Israeli security. There is no mention of recognized boundaries in the draft resolution. In talking to Tito, we referred to possible consideration

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Authority NLS 94-299 (131a)

By jm/isp, NARA, Date 5-11-00

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

of international guarantees of Israel's security. No consideration should be given to such guarantees as it is not in the Israeli or U.S. interest to do so. International guarantees were in effect in May, 1967 and were violated. To return to that situation is not to progress toward a new situation of peace. Israel should be in a position to take care of its own defense without a UN presence or great power guarantees which would not be useful.

Bitan's next point was in regard to the Soviets. He said Israelis disagree with our apparent assessment that they are prepared to act moderately. The Government of Israel sees no signs of such moderation. They are skeptical that Soviet willingness to proceed with a draft resolution agreed with the U.S. at the end of the General Assembly reflects any meeting of minds between the USSR and U.S. positions. Israel regards the Soviets as merely determined to erode U.S. principles in favor of their pro-Arab attitude. The Government of Israel urges we not envisage starting any further UN consideration from this point but return to the original U.S. draft of June 20 which conformed to the President's five points.

Bitan then expatiated on the Israeli estimate of a more fundamental change he alleged is taking place in the U.S. attitude. He referred to Tito's comment that the Arabs would be humiliated by being forced to recognize Israel. It is basic to U.S. and Israeli policy that Israel is recognized and recognition is accepted. It's symptomatic of the degree of slippage that has taken place in the last 19 years that such acceptance should be questioned at this time. Israel insists that this situation change and is prepared to sit in its present position for 10 years, if necessary, to accomplish this end. Recognition is the only choice to avoid another war.

Returning to "Goldberg Draft Resolution," Bitan said Israel is "asking, begging" that the U.S. not start with this resolution but resubmit the original U.S. resolution of June 20. Israel abstained on the Latin American Resolution as a matter of tactics in the United Nations Parliamentary situation as it then existed. The Latin American Resolution was a necessary evil and it was important to defeat the Yugo Resolution. The Government of Israel now believes it should have voted against the Latin American Resolution.

Turning to specifics of the current US - USSR draft, Bitan particularly referred to paragraph two and the phrase relating to the "inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war, etc." He challenged this language. States aggressed against, like Israel, had, in the past, held the territory conquered by war where it is necessary to do so to defend themselves against further aggression. The Government of Israel considers it has the right to hold such territory which was used as a base for the attack on Israel until it is assured that such aggression will not occur again. Also, the President's statement, as to "recognized boundaries" is not included in the language of the present resolution, nor is there any reference to security against territory destruction and war which was likewise part of the June 19 Declaration. Again Bitan referred to the draft's mention of United Nations presence, a further difference from the U.S. draft of June 20. Perpetuating the United Nations in the area, he said, is not perpetuating a bridge to the Arabs but a wedge between the Arabs and Israel. The Palestine Conciliatory Commission he claimed, has shielded the Arabs from the necessity of agreeing to the Israel's existence and has perpetuated Arab intransigence. In short, insofar as the next steps in the United Nations are concerned, Bitan reiterated that if we must discuss tactics rather than principles, we should stick to the U.S. June 20 resolution. It is in U.S., as well as Israeli, interest to do so. The Soviets are talking to the U.S. as result of Israel's victory. The Soviets are in trouble in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere. Hussein may also, in time, see it in his interest to talk to Israel.

Israel, Bitan summarized, is now in a better military position than it has been before, is not asking for guarantees nor for massive armaments, only enough of the latter to keep things as is, and will withdraw when it is convinced there will be no further aggression from the territories it occupies and not before.

Incidentally, as to a possible mediator, the Government of Israel considers it too early to consider at present. If, at the outcome of the Security Council or the General Assembly, a mediator is appointed, he should be without terms of reference, but merely with a mandate to do what he can to bring parties together.

In conclusion, and with some diffidence, although nonetheless forthrightly, Bitan said he was instructed to say on the behalf of Eshkol and Eban, that in their view, if we persist along what they regard as our current line, we could be on a collision course. They are attempting the current discussions with us to "persuade, not to argue," but, if necessary, they are prepared to pull out all the stops available to them to prevent the erosion of the principles enunciated in the Presidents Five Points and statement therein that the solution on all five is indivisible.

I remonstrated at this attitude, noting that the outcome of the Israeli collision with the U.S. should not be very attractive to the Government of Israel but adding that, in any event, there is no intention on U.S. part to deviate from the principles expressed by the President regardless of how the Government of Israel might interpret the course of our efforts implementation. I also said I hoped the Israelis would not consider it in their interest, despite the presently favorable situation they enjoy, to sit in Olympian grandeur and immobility in the mountains of Jerusalem in the expectation they could dictate the settlement in the Middle East without taking into account the interplay of interests of the other powers in world. No power, great or small, can operate in the complete isolation it might regard as optimum to its national concerns in the world today. Israel cannot expect to call the tune on the Middle East settlement as if its interests were the only factor involved in the area and the problem could be sealed off from the wider world influences.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, 8:45 P.M.  
August 16, 1967

Mr. President:

Here is Win Brown's report on his recent meetings with seven Governors in addition to his session with the recent Democratic Governor's Caucus in St. Louis.

Brown reports that all of these Governors express support for your Vietnam policy.

Bromley Smith

1 - ~~Suspense~~  
2 - Presidential

17

17a

### Report on Visits to Governors

Since assuming my duties in late June as Special Assistant to the Secretary for liaison with the Governors of the several states, I have met with the Democratic Governors caucus in St. Louis to brief them on the Far East, and have met individually in Washington or in their capitols with the Governors of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, Washington, Oregon, Kansas and Kentucky.

The occasion for these meetings was varied. Governor Shafer of Pennsylvania, for example, asked me to come to Harrisburg to brief him and senior state legislators on the reasons for the Administration's opposition to a bill pending in the State legislature which would prohibit state purchases of imported steel.

Governor Breathitt of Kentucky wanted a briefing on Vietnam for a group of outstanding young people whom he was convening in Frankfort to interest them in Federal-State problems of concern to the State government.

Governors Smith of West Virginia and Docking of Kansas came to the Department to be briefed on trips they were taking to Brazil and Vietnam.

The other meetings, in late July, were at my initiative, in Olympia, Portland and New York.

All of the Governors welcomed the establishment of this new office and the opportunity for closer contact and more effective working relationships with the Secretary and the Department of State.

Governor Evans of Washington and Governor McCall of Oregon had present the heads of their principal government departments to discuss problems of interest, mainly in the field of trade.

In addition to such meetings, I have corresponded with several Governors, with respect to specific problems, for instance, Governor Hickel's continuing interest in a straight-baseline approach to Alaska's coastal boundaries. Another example concerns Governor Reagan's recent decision

to terminate AID funds for the Chile-California project. My office is also in close touch with the Governors' Washington Office of Federal-State Relations.

All of the Governors expressed support for the Administration's policy in Vietnam. Governor Rockefeller, for example, stated that he could not think of any valid alternative to the course being followed, and accordingly he felt the President was entitled to his support. Governor Smith has made several eloquent speeches of support in West Virginia.

Private groups of business and professional men and young people with whom I met in Seattle and Frankfort, however, while not expressing outright opposition to our Vietnam policy, were clearly very troubled. Their main questions were what real difference it would make to us if Southeast Asia did go communist, and if it did make a difference, was it serious enough to justify the cost in blood and treasure of our effort in Vietnam, especially in view of critical problems at home.

A number of the Governors spoke very highly of the briefings provided for them in recent months at the White House and expressed appreciation for the President's personal participation. All of the Governors feel greatly encouraged by the President's important new initiatives, since last December, to improve Federal-State relationships.

Next week I shall be in New England to visit Governors Hoff, Curtis and King.

Win Brown

1- Suspense  
2- Presidential

18

Wednesday, 8:30 P.M.  
August 16, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

You may wish to glance at this report of Ambassador Oehlert's first conversation with President Ayub. Ayub spoke of his difficulties and Oehlert countered that you also had to deal with some limiting factors."

**Bromley Smith**

Wednesday, August 16, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT (Rawalpindi, 468)

I presented my credentials to President Ayub at 9:30 a. m. August 16. Deputy Chief of Mission Cargo, Chief of Protocol, and President Ayub's Military Secretary were present. I took occasion to give him also President Johnson's congratulatory message on Pakistan Independence Day and present the autographed books and photograph from President Johnson.

Following the credentials formalities, which lasted not more than four or five minutes, I remained for private talk of about thirty-five minutes with President Ayub.

President Ayub read in my presence President Johnson's letter concerning me and expressed his appreciation for it. He then developed at some length his own feelings about Pakistan's relationships with the United States. President Ayub said that, based on his background and training and his beliefs, he was a strong friend and admirer of U.S. and so were his close advisors and associates. He welcomed very much and appreciated his personal relations with President Johnson. While almost all intelligent and responsible people in Pakistan share these feelings of friendship and admiration for the United States, he was to considerable extent inhibited in making frequent open expressions of these feelings because of emotional attitudes of people who did not share the viewpoint of the leaders. Ayub elaborated that Pakistan was in unusual if not unique situation of having on its borders three very powerful nations. He had always been, and is, desirous of maintaining very close relations with the United States and he considered U. S. had legitimate interest in developments in this part of world. As for three large neighbors, it was important to Pakistan, for basic reasons of self-preservation, to maintain relations with them on friendly, or at least acceptable, basis. As Chief of State, he had to think of possibility of invasion by one or more of these three. His purpose, therefore, was to seek security against possible attack. He recognized that no such possibility existed so far as U. S. concerned; U. S. could not undertake such action

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-296

By isp, NARA, Date 11-2-94

and there were moreover certain limitations imposed by geography. President Ayub said he wanted President Johnson to know that his own personal feelings and philosophy of relations with the United States had not changed even during difficult times of 1965. He hoped President Johnson would understand his difficulties both of a domestic character and with respect to his geographic and strategic situation. He asked me to assure President Johnson of his warm personal esteem and of his preference for his relations with the United States as compared to his relations with his three powerful neighbors.

I responded that I was sure President Johnson already understood both his domestic and his strategic problems. I added that I hoped he would understand that President Johnson too had to deal with some limiting factors. Ayub said he fully understood this and then repeated in shorter form essentially the same philosophy of Pakistan's position and his relations with his neighbors and the United States that he had previously outlined. In the course of this Ayub said he was keenly aware of the valuable help the United States had extended to Pakistan and that he was deeply and genuinely grateful for this.

I responded to President Ayub that he had been very generous in his statements of appreciation for United States assistance to Pakistan, but that the relationship of the two countries was one of mutual helpfulness. Pakistan had been of help to U.S. and U.S. Government was similarly appreciative and grateful for this. I noted again my hope that President Ayub was aware and would understand that U.S. Government also found internal opposition to some of its proposed policies and positions, and Ayub said he was well aware of this. I remarked also that it was perhaps natural that Ayub should have friendly feelings toward United States, feelings which we reciprocated, since we have common basic objectives and principles--respect for human dignity, attachment to democratic principles, belief in economic development under free enterprise and belief in the importance of religious faith. (I found President Ayub nodding in agreement.)

I took occasion to inform President Ayub that Secretary Rusk was extending invitation to Foreign Minister Pirzada to visit U.S., noting I had hoped deliver this invitation personally to Pirzada but that, in view of his departure just before my own arrival, the message would be conveyed to him in Beirut. I hoped Foreign Minister would be able accept invitation. I said that I was sure President Johnson would be happy to receive Pirzada. President Ayub responded that invitation was most gracious and that he appreciated it.

I also conveyed to Ayub President Johnson's message concerning U.S. position on Pakistan-sponsored resolutions in United Nations General Assembly session on Mid-East. Ayub said he fully understood and appreciated the position and asked me to tell President Johnson of his understanding of it.

When I arose to depart, President Ayub asked me to express to President Johnson his appreciation for sending an Ambassador who had close personal relations with President Johnson and with whom he could feel comfortable with the knowledge of the opportunities which would exist for direct communication of view points.

Ayub sent for some copies of his book, "Friends not Masters". As he was autographing these, he commented on Pakistan's defense position. He said Pakistan needed adequate material to put up a reasonable defense in the event of attack. "Even if you know you cannot win, honor and pride require that you try." Ayub said that Pakistan was in a desperate situation in 1965 when U.S. cut off military supplies. He said that he fully understood the reasons for this, although he could not say so at the time, relating in part to global policies and involvements of U.S. However, as result, Pakistan had to turn to wherever it could to replenish its supplies of military equipment. This included China, but he had always restricted Pakistan's relations with China to formalities required by their military assistance and he intended to continue to do this. Ayub said U.S. could be helpful in satisfying Pakistan's requirements for lethal spares. I commented that U.S. had in fact approved critical spares for Army, Navy and Air Force and that requests for ammunition would also be examined. (Ayub did not mention tanks specifically, although I have no doubt Pakistan's tank request was in his mind.)

As I departed, Ayub again made cordial expressions of welcome to Pakistan and said he hoped to see me often.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 16, 1967 -- 5:00 PM

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*B.H. Smith*  
1 - *Suspense*  
2 - *Presidential file*  
19

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast  
(Thursday, August 17, 1967)

Schedule

12:25 PM -- Arrival at Diplomatic entrance (no welcoming ceremony)  
12:30 - 1:30 PM -- Alone (advisers standing by in Cabinet Room)  
1:30 PM -- White House lunch

Papers

Tab A -- Secretary Rusk's briefing memorandum

Tab B -- State's suggested talking points

Substance

Houphouet-Boigny (Hoof-wet Bwan-ye) is the best-known and most influential politician in French Africa. He is a moderate on racial matters, an extreme anti-Communist (particularly anti-Chinese), and a committed advocate of economic development as Africa's first priority. (His own country's economic record is outstanding; it ranks with the best in the less developed world.) On matters of foreign policy, Houphouet-Boigny is very pro-Western and particularly friendly to us. If anything, he will urge you to take a stronger line in Vietnam, and his UN delegation was of great use to Goldberg in the Middle East crisis.

This is another informal visit tied to a trip to Expo 67. Houphouet wants to use it to establish a personal relationship with you of the sort he had with President Kennedy. (He made a state visit here in 1962.) It is not his style to push hard on the few bilateral issues now under discussion with the Ivory Coast. He will want to get your general assessment of Vietnam, Glassboro, the Middle East, etc. He would also be flattered if you asked for his thoughts. He may raise the following specific points (together with suggested replies):

1. Communism in Africa He will say that the Communists are still quite active in Africa, despite their many reverses, and that the West must give African countries an attractive alternative. (He may add or hint that our new aid policy which downgrades bilateral programs in favor of regional and multilateral operations has the effect of making the Western option less attractive.)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ijg, NARA, Date 6-22-95

You might say that:

- we maintain a strong and growing interest in African affairs, particularly economic development.
  - we believe regional approaches to basic economic problems (river basin development, power projects, transportation) are the most efficient vehicles of economic growth, and that regional institutions (African Development Bank, OAU) are the best means of encouraging them.
  - we are not looking for a way to pull out of Africa. But this is a democracy, and we must deal with a Congress preoccupied with very real domestic problems. Thus, we will not always get what we want in the way of foreign aid money.
  - how much we can do depends to a large extent upon how effective Africans are at concentrating their own efforts on their real problems -- hunger, ignorance, and disease.
2. Relations with Guinea He will say that continued U.S. aid to Guinea strengthens Communist influence in West Africa by strengthening the principal Chinese agent in that area, his arch-enemy Sekou Toure.

You might say that:

- we have cut back sharply on aid to Guinea since the "kidnapping" incident last Fall. (Toure reacted to Ghana's imprisonment of his Foreign Minister by placing our ambassador under house arrest and kicking out the Peace Corps.)
  - the small amount of aid we are still providing is designed to give Toure an alternative to complete dependence on the Communists. We continue to think this is worth doing .
3. Congo He will say that he is very worried about the effect on world opinion if Mobutu executes Tshombe, that he and other moderates have already tried to intercede with the Algerians, and that he hopes you will do your best in the same cause.

You might say that:

- we have already told Mobutu that we deplore the Tshombe kidnapping and that we strongly oppose his execution.

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- the real problem in the Congo is to solve the mercenary problem before it stimulates a racial bloodbath and/or the disintegration of the country.
- the best solution we can see is a negotiated departure by the mercenaries. (FYI: The Congolese Foreign Minister is now in Bukavu trying to do this.)
- the long-term future of the Congo depends on African efforts to support and maintain moderation in what will always be an important and troubled country. We hope Houphouet-Boigny will lend his support and prestige to this cause.

4. Bandama Dam This large hydroelectric project -- now at the drawing board stage -- is the apple of Houphouet's eye. The Italians will finance part of it. Harold Linder is committed to finance \$34 million worth if we get a favorable result from engineering surveys now underway. There is nothing much to be decided at this point, but Houphouet may want to describe the project to you, thank you for the Ex-Im Bank commitment, and, possibly, ask your reaction to the French taking part of the action.

You might say that:


- we were happy to make the Ex-Im offer. Frankly, we are not overwhelmed by the economic merits of the proposal, but this is a judgment only the Ivory Coast can make. We have no doubt that they can repay any loan made them.
- we would have no objection whatever to French financial partners, though we would want them to offer at least as favorable loan terms which we and the Italians extend.

You will also want to keep in the back of your mind that you have just authorized a new PL 480 agreement with the Ivory Coast for 4,000 tons of tallow (value: \$800,000).

Ed Hamilton

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19a



196

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Houphouet-Boigny  
of Ivory Coast, August 17, 12:30 p.m.

President Houphouet-Boigny is one of Africa's most able and seasoned political leaders. Born in 1905, four years before the final subjugation of his own Baule tribe, he has in his own life spanned both the full era of French colonial rule and the new order of independence. He is his country's first and only President and is now generally acknowledged as the leader of all tribes and factions. While fully capable of strong action, Houphouet has not developed the arrogance of power which was Nkrumah's downfall.

Undisputed leader of his own people, Houphouet is also architect and mainstay of the Afro-Malagasy Common Organization, a grouping of 14 generally moderate French-speaking states. He has pursued a Western-oriented foreign policy and has frequently exercised his influence with other Africans to our benefit.

Today Ivory Coast has proved itself to a remarkable degree. Political stability has been achieved, and enlightened encouragement of private enterprise, supported by a well-conceived program of public investment, has impelled a surge of economic growth unparalleled in West Africa. Yet Houphouet is profoundly disturbed by the rash of military coups and the lack of economic and social progress elsewhere in Africa. He is anxious lest the promise brought by independence fade and the new nations of Africa get off to a lastingly bad start. His fears are heightened by concern over the threat of Chinese Communist subversion.

Why Houphouet is Visiting the United States

Houphouet hopes to establish a close personal relationship with you and thus enlist your support on matters affecting Ivory Coast.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 94-296**  
By sig, NARA Date 11-29-96

Given our common opposition to Communism and concern with its subversive efforts throughout the world, Houphouet feels that we should intensify our cooperation in this sphere. He also believes that the nations of Africa could be offered a clear either/or choice between Communist and Free World aid. He is keenly aware that countries, like his own, upon which we have leaned heavily for support on issues of importance to us in the United Nations and elsewhere have often received less material support from us than have those, such as Guinea, which he believes have given comfort to our Communist enemies.

Houphouet is doubtless concerned lest our new aid policy for Africa result in a lessening of US aid to the group of countries with which he is most intimately involved, the former French states of sub-Saharan Africa. He feels that Ivory Coast has better development prospects than many countries which are on our so-called "development emphasis" list.

What We Hope to Achieve in This Visit

We hope to take the occasion of this visit to express our appreciation to Houphouet for his responsible leadership in Africa and his reasonable stands on world issues and, at the same time, to create a basis for closer collaboration with Ivory Coast on African problems.


*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Talking Paper

19c



Talking Paper for Your Meeting With  
President Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast

Points Which You May Wish to Raise

1. Thanks for Houphouet's Support. You may wish to commend Houphouet for his responsible foreign policy and express our appreciation for the support we have received from Ivory Coast on international questions of importance to us. In the United Nations, Ivorian assistance has been particularly helpful on the Chirep and Korean issues. At the time of the Stanleyville rescue operation, Ivory Coast, then a member of the Security Council, played a key role in working out a resolution satisfactory to the Africans and also acceptable to us. More recently, in the Special UNGA Session on the Middle East, Ivory Coast played an important part in organizing OCAM moderates to abstain on the Yugoslav resolution and vote for the Latin American resolution; this required resisting strong pressure from the French.

2. US Interest in Africa. You may wish to assure Houphouet that the US is deeply interested in Africa's welfare. We believe that economic and social progress is the key to stability and the best defense against Communist intrusion. In the long run, we are convinced that such progress can best be achieved through regional cooperation. We have therefore determined to give increasing emphasis to aid programs which, by involving and benefitting more than one country, will spur regional cooperation. We look to Ivory Coast for leadership in developing such projects.

We are, at the same time, maintaining full bilateral AID programs in a small number of countries with which we have special ties or which we feel show particular promise. The present absence of former French sub-Saharan countries from this group reflects no lessening of our interest in those countries or lack of confidence in their future. It does reflect a realistic appreciation of the high level of economic assistance which France has continued to make available to those countries and a conviction that they will also derive significant benefit from regional programs which we will be supporting.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI 94-296**  
**By isp, NARA Date 11-29-96**

Our new policy is not rigid. The list of development emphasis countries is subject to modification, and our mix of bilateral and regional programs will evolve as we gain greater experience. Although bilateral AID programs will be phased out in most African countries, such other programs as Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank lending, PL 480 and the Ambassador's Self-Help Fund will be continued on a bilateral basis. We remain alert to the dangers of Communist subversion and flexible in our ability to respond to situations of particular concern. In some cases this may mean giving special assistance to those who are not our best friends, so that they may have some alternative to total economic dependence on the Communist world.

You may wish to add that, to enhance the resources available to the less developed nations in general, the United States is now prepared to examine with others the possibility of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all industrial countries.

Points Which President Houphouet-Boigny May Raise

Beyond the general questions discussed in the covering memorandum, there are three specific matters which Houphouet may raise.

1. Export-Import Bank Loan for the Bandama Dam. He may wish to be reassured of EXIM's willingness to give sympathetic consideration to a \$35 million loan for this project should the further soil tests now being carried out show the project to be technically feasible and should revised cost estimates, based on these tests, be within 10% of earlier estimates (See background paper on this subject). He may also express concern over the stiff terms proposed by EXIM and inquire whether prospects for EXIM financing would be jeopardized by French participation in the project.

You may wish to reaffirm our hope to be able to help out on the Bandama project, if results of the testing are favorable, and assure Houphouet that there is, in principle, no reason why French

participation in the project should negatively influence EXIM's loan decision. If Houphouet does mention the terms, you might suggest that he take that question up with EXIM President Harold Linder, who will be calling on him at the Blair House on August 18.

2. Relations with Guinea. President Houphouet-Boigny may wish to discuss US aid to Guinea as well as the current detention in Ivory Coast of Guinea's Foreign Minister.

a. US Assistance. American aid provided for the purpose of giving Sekou Toure's Guinea an alternative to total dependence on the East has been seen by Ivorian leaders as a contribution to the shoring up of an unpopular, mischievous and anti-Western regime. You may wish to point out that, while we feel the rationale for our earlier aid to Guinea was a sound one, our AID program in Guinea has been substantially cut back since Toure's detention of our Ambassador last fall following the detention of the Guinean Foreign Minister in Accra.

b. Beavogui Detention. As the price of releasing Guinean Foreign Minister Beavogui, whom it has held in Abidjan since June 27, 1967, the Government of Ivory Coast is demanding release of an Ivorian fishing boat and its crew, seized off the coast of Guinea earlier this year, and a senior Ivorian civil servant, held prisoner in Conakry since 1965. (Details in background paper on this subject.) Although aware that detention of a foreign minister is a breach of diplomatic custom, Houphouet has come to believe that Toure can be dealt with in no other way and that his own conduct has justified such an extreme response. The Ivory Coast is probably open to any settlement which will guarantee simultaneous release of all detainees.

You may wish to tell Houphouet that we understand the antecedents of the present dilemma. Nevertheless we are deeply concerned by the international precedent of the

detention of a foreign minister and a permanent UN delegate, which has serious implications for other such representatives of foreign governments, including those of the United States and the Ivory Coast. We therefore strongly hope that a means can be found of effecting their very early release.

3. The Congo. Houphouet may initiate discussion of the situation in the Congo and may make a specific appeal to you to use your influence to help save Moise Tshombe, to whose support he has in the past committed his prestige. Houphouet and other moderate Africans have already appealed to Presidents Boumedienne and Mobutu on Tshombe's behalf. If Tshombe is executed, and perhaps even if he is extradited from Algeria to the Congo and imprisoned, the moderates will boycott the OAU summit scheduled to open in Kinshasa September 11.

You may wish to say in confidence that we have already told President Mobutu that we deplore the manner of Tshombe's kidnapping and strongly oppose his summary execution should he be returned to the Congo.

While the treatment of Tshombe is of serious concern, however, you may wish to point out that we should not let this divert us from helping the Congo to solve the more serious problem of stability. (This, incidentally, would create an atmosphere conducive to cool-headed discussion of the Tshombe problem.) The mercenary-led rebels now control Bukavu and the Congolese Army apparently is unable to stop them. Should they march on Katanga, as is feared, we foresee anti-white and anti-European actions which would not only cripple the Congolese economy but also seriously impede future development.

At this serious juncture, therefore, the United States is trying to assist Mobutu to restore order. We believe that the best solution would be the departure of the mercenaries to a point outside Africa.

The maintenance of moderate governments in Africa, however, is basically a problem for Africans to solve. It is our hope, therefore, that Ivory Coast can exert its influence now with other African nations, as well as with France, to assist the restoration of stability in the Congo. If the moderate Africans and the Free World stint in their efforts to assist Mobutu, it is likely that he will turn for support to more radical countries on his own continent and to the Communist world. Whatever Mobutu's deficiencies, he has up to

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now avoided radical solutions and radical allies, and a reverse of his policy at this time would be a severe setback for the Congo, for Africa and for the Free World.

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SECRET

Lunch Meeting with the President  
Wednesday, August 16, 1967, 2:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Bombing Policy. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
2. Roundup Kiesinger Visit. (The President: Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
3. Other.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By NA, NADA, Date 9-3-91

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**SECRET**

Wednesday, August 16, 1967  
1:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith George Ball's response to the Bill Gaud-Gene Rostow memorandum. You may wish to raise it at lunch today.

I am making a copy available to Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 9-3-91

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-296  
By isp, NARA Date 11-29-96

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August 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have reviewed the supplemental memorandum with regard to the India Food Aid Program, submitted by Bill Gaud and Eugene Rostow, and have the following comments.

The basic question emerged clearly from our Saturday morning discussion: should you stretch the concept of matching beyond what the average man (including the average Congressman) would ordinarily understand by the term in order to send an additional 1.5 million tons of grain to India?

In answering the question one must take into account a number of considerations:

a. Would Congress believe an assertion that other nations have met the matching test? If not, what effect would this have on your other programs?

b. Has the Indian political performance been such as to justify our stretching a point to provide them additional grain?

c. Have other donor nations been led to offer additional help on the assumption that, on the basis of their offers, we would now put up the remaining 1.5 million tons?

d. How seriously would India's development be prejudiced by the need to pay for all or part of the 1.5 million tons from its own resources?

You might wish to ask State and AID to submit answers to these questions. In appraising their answers I would suggest that the following considerations be kept in mind:

1. The question of providing grain should not be determined as though it were a humanitarian matter. It is not a question of

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-2-

whether Indians starve but of how the Indian Government uses its finite store of resources. We know that it is now using some of those resources injudiciously - for an inflated defense budget and some unrealistic development schemes. If they had the will to do so, the Indians should be able to fund the additional 1.5 million tons by simply cutting out some of the floss.

2. The Indians have been characteristically bloody-minded about the Middle East (their active support of Nasser) and about Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh's birthday telegram). They have certainly not earned the right to special consideration on the basis of performance.

3. I would not worry much about the reaction of other donor countries. We have carried this burden for a long time and they have done damn little.

4. A credible case has not been made that other donor nations have met the matching test by any qualitative standard. This becomes clear if one asks the following questions:

a. Could we expect Congress to agree that the World Bank's willingness to grant a one-year postponement of \$50 million of debt repayment is the equivalent, for purposes of "matching," to an American offer of \$50 million of wheat on PL 480 terms? The same question can be asked with regard to the "debt relief offers" of \$33.6 million made by the United Kingdom and \$14.5 million made by West Germany; in fact, 80 percent of what is represented as "matching" comes in the form of debt relief.

The critical point, it seems to me, is that, in view of India's hopeless repayment schedule, most of this debt will have to be rolled over any way, and this raises the point that has haunted us so long: since we have furnished help on a long-term basis while other countries have provided assistance on a shorter term basis, the Europeans constantly get credit for additional aid by extending old debts while we have to put up new money.

b. Should the Administration take the position that there has been matching when some items are clearly not additional and we cannot know whether others are additional until after the October Consortium meeting?

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-3-

I would be inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative, without meaning in any way to diminish the achievement of Gene Rostow and others in the Government who have certainly obtained concessions that donor countries would not otherwise have made.

Clearly there has been matching with respect to the first step of 96.7 million dollars, but most if not all of the rest is arguable and ambiguous and I heartily disagree with the implication in the Gaud-Rostow memorandum that we can rest any part of our case for matching on the ground that the Indian Government and the IBRD consider that contributions by others have "more than matched" our 190 million dollar offer. They are scarcely disinterested parties.

On the other hand, I would agree with Messrs. Gaud and Rostow that you are not legally bound by the fifty-fifty matching principle. The decision must be made in terms of what is the wisest course after all the issues have been balanced. I think Congress would accept your decision to go ahead with some additional food aid to India (I would stop short of the full 1.5 million tons). But if you decide to do this, I would recommend that you do not overstate what has been done by other donor countries although the Administration should certainly take credit for inducing other nations to grant aid and make concessions that would not otherwise have been forthcoming.

The realistic option, it seems to me, is either to provide no additional wheat or to offer perhaps one-half or two-thirds of the 1.5 million tons requested. This would make clear to Congress that you are not accepting the matching performance of other donor nations at face value but are discounting it on qualitative grounds. Nonetheless, it would be a generous offer and should go far toward enabling India to meet her food requirements while still protecting her development program.

*W. Ball*  
George W. Ball

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Wednesday, August 16, 1967 -- 12:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Senator Moss' group  
(6:00 PM today)

The Moss delegation (list attached) represented the Congress at the Third Anglo-American Parliamentary Conference on Africa, held in Bermuda in May. (You may recall that you received both the Moss group and the British delegation before they left for Bermuda.)

This is the liberal group of Africa-followers on the Hill -- as opposed to Senator Dodd and the old Katanga lobby. The Bermuda Conference was held before the Congo blew up, so that what they say today may be somewhat different from what they concluded in May. But their pitch will probably be roughly the following:

- More aid to Africa, perhaps with the observation that present aid concepts and vehicles can no longer be sold to the public.
- A strong stand on Rhodesia, South West Africa, and on the general racial conflict in southern Africa. They may add that we should disassociate ourselves from any British sell-out in Rhodesia.
- Special help to Zambia as the practical, working symbol of a non-racial solution in central Africa.
- Some responsiveness to African pressure at UNCTAD II in February, perhaps in the form of U. S. willingness to go along with trade preferences and more liberal commodity agreements.

You will want to hear them out, and perhaps to ask Joe Palmer to go into their recommendations in detail with them later. In addition, you may wish to make the following points:

1. What we can do for Africa will be a direct result of what the Congress does to the Aid Bill. We want to help as much as we can. But the immediate decision is not here; it is with the Congress.

2. The C-130 incident was an example of the problems we encounter with even a small, effective, and clearly necessary step in Africa. It showed how much missionary work needs to be done on the Hill. Any and all help on that front is appreciated.
  
3. The views presented will be carefully examined. The problems of Africa -- particularly the racial question in southern Africa -- are among the most grim and intractable in the developing world. We can use all the good ideas we can get. The group is to be congratulated for the time and effort it has already expended, and they can be sure of a careful hearing for any future thoughts.

Edward K. Hamilton

Third Anglo-American Parliamentary Conference on Africa  
May 4-8, 1967  
Bermuda

Senator Frank E. Moss  
Senator Edward M. Kennedy

Congressman Jonathon Bingham  
Congressman John Brademas  
Congressman John C. Culver  
Congressman Donald M. Fraser  
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr.  
Congressman William S. Maillard  
Congressman F. Bradford Morse  
Congressman Ogden Reid  
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal  
Congressman John V. Tunney

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 16, 1967 -- 10:50 AM

23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Check List for Presidential Backgrounding on Kiesinger  
Conversation

Central Point

- Very fine conversation, in great depth; intensive exchange of views on full range of problems on his mind and my mind; I think we established a real sense of communication and confidence.

Subjects

1. Defense and troop strength in Europe

- Newspapers emphasized; of course, important; but didn't take up more than a fraction of time.
- We agreed important NATO strength remain unimpaired; that we should try very hard to maintain present commitments and deployments, as agreed in Trilateral, as long as the Soviets don't cut back.
- K. described his economic difficulties and the various alternative choices being examined by the German Government. I gave him my reactions and suggested the kind of pressures some of them might create here.
- K. assured me no decisions had been taken or would be taken without the most intensive and detailed consultation.
- I said, if he could see his way to holding firm, I would hold the line on the basis of the Trilaterals despite the pressures on me.
- We agreed that continuing close consultation was essential, and that we must try to avoid reacting to mischievous newspaper stories, especially on this sensitive subject.
- I think we reached a good understanding of each other's situation.

2. NATO

- We agreed that maintaining and strengthening an evolving NATO -- with its integrated military structure -- was essential for the safety of the Atlantic area. I told the Chancellor that our commitment to the security of Europe was a first principle of American foreign policy.

2. Non-proliferation

-- Gave K. full account of recent history of our exchanges with Russians; emphasized need for moving ahead with this and further steps on arms control, for the safety of all of us; suggested his people discuss with Rusk any specific problems which remained.

3. Middle East

-- Gave him full history, including our efforts to keep Israelis from striking.

4. Glassboro

5. Vietnam

6. Relations with France

-- Chancellor gave full account of his conversation with deGaulle; he suggested deGaulle's attitude toward U.S. not as antagonistic as recent performance suggests; I told him we had no quarrel to pick with deGaulle; President never said a bad word about him in public; stable France very important to us; we fully understood need for French-German friendship; however, we hoped on certain specific issues where French policy particularly eccentric, the Germans wouldn't feel they had to go along with Paris.

7. European Unity

-- We agreed that increasingly coherent political Europe, with UK in, important for future of the world. America needs company in sharing burdens of world responsibility.

8. International Money

-- President emphasized need for success in London Meeting of Finance Ministers, late August, and then at Rio; hoped Germans could support us in getting a plan for a first-class reserve-asset to supplement gold and the dollar; K. was optimistic about successful outcome and promised that he would keep a close eye on negotiations.

9. Bridge Building

- K. gave a full account of his developing policies vis-a-vis the East (Romania, Czechoslovakia, etc.). He emphasized he thought this sort of bridge building, by Germany, Western Europe and the United States, was essential to create the kind of political atmosphere in which eventually possible to heal split of Europe and of Germany.
- President emphasized his own continuing efforts, despite Vietnam, to find areas of possible cooperation with Moscow and the Eastern Europeans.

10. Internal Problems

- K. spelled out in some detail his economic difficulties: recession, budget troubles, and what they are planning to do about them.
- President told Chancellor of internal difficulties this Spring: railroad strike, cities, budget troubles. They agreed that there must be better ways to earn a living.

11. German-American Friendship

- They agreed on the great need for Germany and the U.S. to stay close together on all issues. This is essence of alliance politics.

Francis M. Bator

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

24

August 16, 1967

Dear Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky:

I address you together, because at Honolulu, Manila, and Guam we did our work together.

I wish you to know how much you -- and the people of South Viet Nam -- have been in my thoughts these days. In my thirty-five years in political life, I have been through twelve elections -- some of which I won, but I have also known what it is to lose. I understand something of the emotions and the problems that go with what we call "election fever."

It has been interesting -- even exciting -- for me to see your young nation going through this competitive electoral process. Thus far, I have seen few problems I have not also seen in my own country, and known in my own experience.

I believe also that the picture of the South Viet Nam election is beginning to fall into perspective in the United States.

As you come to the final intensive days of the campaign, I am sure you will continue to ensure fairness and equity to all the candidates.

I should like you to know that our government -- and most of our people -- have no inclination to interfere with or dictate the choice of leaders now being made by the people of South Viet Nam, as they move forward on the path of self-determination. In any democracy, of course, differences of view are extensive and intensive, vigorous and visible. But you should be aware that our resolve to defend Viet Nam against aggression remains firm; and the support for this course will be strengthened -- here and elsewhere -- by the free and fair elections we know will take place on September 3.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-295


By sig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

*unc said this went  
to State 8/19*

As you know, the election itself is only one phase in the building of effective constitutional government. Whatever the outcome, other critical tasks lie ahead: the formation of a broadly based government; the holding of parliamentary elections; the development of good working relations between the executive and the legislative; and, above all, making your constitution work effectively.

But I am writing you now not to offer advice but simply to say that I am following events in Viet Nam with interest, sympathy, and great respect for you both, for your colleagues in the government, for all the candidates who are venturing now into democratic politics, and -- above all -- for the gallant people of your country.

Sincerely,



Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu  
Chairman, National Leadership Committee  
Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky  
Chairman, Central Executive Committee  
Republic of Viet Nam  
Saigon

Aug. 19

25

Mildred,

Att. is a copy of the Thieu/Ky letter  
with the President's signature.

It left here, for State, on August 19.

Alice

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

25a

August 16, 1967

Dear Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky:

I address you together, because at Honolulu, Manila, and Guam we did our work together.

I wish you to know how much you -- and the people of South Viet Nam -- have been in my thoughts these days. In my thirty-five years in political life, I have been through twelve elections -- some of which I won, but I have also known what it is to lose. I understand something of the emotions and the problems that go with what we call "election fever."

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4


NEJ 94-295

By sig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

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But I am writing you now not to offer advice but simply to say that I am following events in Viet Nam with interest, sympathy, and great respect for you both, for your colleagues in the government, for all the candidates who are venturing now into democratic politics, and -- above all -- for the gallant people of your country.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'Nguyen Van Thieu', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu  
Chairman, National Leadership Committee  
Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky  
Chairman, Central Executive Committee  
Republic of Viet Nam  
Saigon

26

*Pres file*

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Bus Wheeler suggests you sign the attached letter to Canadian Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap.

As Deputy Commander in Chief of NORAD -- a complex but essential joint enterprise with Canada -- he has been first rate.

I join Bus' recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

*8/17 Col Ginsburgh  
to pick up to give  
to Gen Wheeler to  
forward to C-in-C  
NORAD as req'd in  
Gen. Wheeler's ltr.*

WWRostow:rlh

August 16, 1967

26a

Dear Air Marshal Dunlap:

On the occasion of your retirement from active duty with the Royal Canadian Air Force, please accept my personal expression of appreciation for your exceptional accomplishments in the service of our two nations as Deputy Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command.

The United States of America has been honored by your selection to serve in this critically important position as the culmination of your long and distinguished military career. We have benefited immeasurably from the depth of experience and qualities of leadership which resulted in your appointment to the honored position of Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force, from which you were assigned to NORAD.

In meeting the awesome responsibilities inherent in carrying out the mission of NORAD, you have represented your country exceedingly well in the dual role of military professional and statesman.

My countrymen join me in thanking you, and in wishing you continued success and happiness.

Sincerely,

*[S] Lyndon B. Johnson*

Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap  
Deputy Commander in Chief  
North American Air Defense Command  
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado 80912

LBJ:WWR:mz



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

266

CM-2587-67  
15 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap, Retirement

1. On 25 August 1967 Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap will retire from the Royal Canadian Air Force.
2. During the period from 15 August 1964 to 24 August 1967, Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap has performed an outstanding service as Deputy Commander in Chief, NORAD. His exceptional knowledge, experience and ability have been of great value to all the Commanders in Chief of NORAD and to senior officials in both the Canadian and United States Governments.
3. In order to portray our appreciation to Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap, it is recommended that a letter of appreciation, substantially the same as that contained in the attached draft, be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, NORAD, by 23 August 1967 for presentation during the retirement ceremony on 25 August 1967.

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

My countrymen join me in thanking you, and in  
wishing you continued success and happiness.

Sincerely,

Air Marshal C. R. Dunlap  
Deputy Commander in Chief  
North American Air Defense Command  
Ent Air Force Base, Colorado 80912

D R A F T

26c

Dear Air Marshal Dunlap:

On the occasion of your retirement from active duty with the Royal Canadian Air Force, please accept my personal expression of appreciation for your exceptional accomplishments in the service of our two nations as Deputy Commander in Chief of the North American Air Defense Command.

The United States of America has been honored by your selection to serve in this critically important position as the culmination of your long and distinguished military career. We have benefited immeasurably from the depth of experience and qualities of leadership which resulted in your appointment to the honored position of Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Canadian Air Force, from which you were assigned to NORAD.

In meeting the awesome responsibilities inherent in carrying out the mission of NORAD, you have represented your country exceedingly well in the dual role of military professional and statesman.

Enclosure

~~1 copy~~  
2 Pres. file

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
6:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Call upon you by Thai Ambassador Nimmanheminda,  
12:30 p. m., August 16, 1967

Ambassador Sukich Nimmanheminda (pronounced KNEEmun-HAYmun, but I suggest "Mr. Ambassador") is leaving Washington on August 27, after four years of duty here. The purpose of his call is protocol -- to bid you a formal farewell. We do not expect him to raise any matters of substance.

You may wish to raise the following points:

(1) Our appreciation for Thai support in the common struggle in Viet-Nam (our extensive use of Thai air bases, the 2,300 man unit Thailand is sending to Viet-Nam, and about 40,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Thailand).

(2) Your satisfaction with Clifford-Taylor visit to Bangkok, and your hope that Thailand will be able to send more forces to Viet-Nam.

(3) Your continuing interest in and support of the Thai Government's counterinsurgency program in the Northeast.

(4) The determination of the United States to see the Viet-Nam struggle through to a successful conclusion. (The Ambassador will undoubtedly be questioned closely by Thai authorities on this, particularly in view of the recent high jinks on Capitol Hill.)

The Ambassador is 61. He has done a little bit of everything during his career -- businessman, scholar (a teacher at Chulalongkorn University), cabinet minister and politician. He has traveled widely in the United States and has made many speeches to college groups. He may become chief executive officer of the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat (SEAMES).

W. W. Rostow

MWright:hg

28

*Profile*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
6:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

These pictures came by satellite.

If they hadn't blown a fuse -- or something -- they might have gotten here from Saigon in hours.

The system may prove useful in the future.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-420  
By lip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

28a

15 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-420  
By kg, NARA, Date 10-26-95

Attached are the prints from which the blowups were made, which you received earlier today.

These were transmitted via satellite.

The copies sent by air are expected to arrive in Washington later today. If it had not been for a generator failure, you could have received the pictures three days ago.

This system is still in the R&D stage. The technique was developed by CBS Laboratories, using a precisely controlled high intensity laser beam. The data transmitted from Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam, arrives in the Washington, D.C. area within seconds via a two-hop link, using the Defense Communications Agency Relay Satellite System. The data are encrypted. The system now has the capability of transmitting 25 inches of a strip, like that attached, in one hour. General Steakley hopes to double the capacity in a month.

This system now makes it possible for the President to receive photography on "significant" targets within a few hours after the photos are taken.

A few cautions are in order:

- a. Capacity is limited.
- b. Equipment outages must be expected since the system is still in R&D.
- c. The satellites are not always in the necessary locations.

It would give the system a useful boost if you would casually mention to Mr. McNamara White House interest in this project.

4

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
4:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk wishes you to know of the Shah's interest in arranging a try at a Viet Nam settlement and his initial response.

It may arise next week.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ij, NARA, Date 6-22-95

WWRostow:rln

29a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meetings with the Shah of Iran: Viet Nam

The Shah has suggested to us that he might attempt to establish a new mechanism for arriving at a peaceful solution of the Vietnamese war. He has been thinking of bringing together a group of countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Japan and Cambodia, which would have access to the United States, the USSR and Communist China and might open new doors for discussions of a possible solution. Such a group would work discreetly and not make public proposals. The Shah may again raise this idea in his discussions with you.

We have told the Shah that we deeply appreciate his interest and concern and that we are interested in any effort by any government or group of governments to help achieve a peaceful solution. We have indicated that if the governments the Shah has in mind agree that such an effort would be worthwhile and if the effort would be discreet, we would be openhanded and frank in dealing with such a group. We have stressed that explicit approval by us of such an effort would be a kiss of death.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-296  
By isp, NARA Date 11-29-96

Tues., Aug. 15, 1967  
4:25 p.m.

30

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bunker responds to your  
messages about General Bradley  
and Harry Reasoner.

*Pres file*

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 931)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ON<sup>V</sup>

30a

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WHCA

1967 AUG 15 18 32

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R R YEKADS  
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FM CIA  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ EYES ONLY 151205Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 931.

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW FROM BUNKER

1. PLEASE GIVE THE PRESIDENT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:  
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT GENERAL BRADLEY'S VISIT.  
I AM DELIGHTED THAT HE AND HIS WIFE ARE COMING HERE AND THAT HE  
IS TO WRITE AN ARTICLE FOR LOOK. I AM SURE THIS CAN BE HELPFUL.

2. WESTY AND I WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO SEE THAT GENERAL  
BRADLEY HAS EVERY FACILITY HERE.

3. PLEASE INFORM THE PRESIDENT ALSO THAT I HAVE RECEIVED TODAY  
HIS MESSAGE ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF HARRY REASONER OF  
CBS NEWS. I SHALL OF COURSE BE VERY HAPPY TO SEE HIM. REGARDS.  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS  
BT

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 23006

By Julies, NARA, Date 5-11-00

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
11:00 a. m.

31

*Print*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Larsen's account of progress made in II Corps (see attached map) during the period when he was the U. S. Corps commander.

Of the four corps areas, progress has been most marked in II Corps; but the performance there indicates what a combination of Vietnamese, U. S., and allied forces can achieve.

I believe that, with your approval, General Larsen will call on you towards the end of the month. He is now on leave.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL attachments —

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(copy of General Larsen's memo) (11 August 1967)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Informal Statistical Progress Report on II Corps Tactical Zone, Vietnam, from August 1965 to July 1967

1. This memorandum is submitted in response to your suggestion this morning that I list for you statistics which show progress in the II Corps area of Vietnam during the last two years.

2. II Corps area represents 46% of the land mass of Vietnam, with 2.9 million population (20% of the South Vietnam population).

3. In August 1965, nearly half the population of II Corps was under VC domination. In July 1967, 89% of the population was under military control.

4. In August 1965, about 70% of the rice growing area was under VC control. Today, 95% of the rice land is under GVN control. These same statistics apply generally to the salt bearing areas.

5. Two years ago, none of the important highways was used unless a major military effort was launched to open one up for a limited number of days for a specific purpose. Today, 90% (1650 kms) of the important roads are open (40% are in green condition needing no protection for vehicles, and 50% in amber condition needing minimal convoy protection, but receiving almost no enemy opposition). Highway #1 is green for about 350 miles. Only the lower 20% is red, and this strip is in driveable condition, needs only 48 hours notice for opening and can be protected by five regional force companies. It has not been opened because at present there is no requirement for its use and the troops can be better utilized elsewhere.

6. A specific example of road opening success is that of Highway #19, between Qui Nhon and Pleiku, about 100 miles long. In 1965, many persons in authority doubted that a division could be supported in Pleiku because of the long and vulnerable logistics supply route. In the 20 months that this highway has been kept open, we have lost only one US soldier to enemy action. The daily supply tonnage over this road is often 2000 tons. A surface fuel pipeline is now under construction over the entire route.

7. Two years ago, almost none of the railroad was in operation. Today, 53% of the railroad, or 365 kms, are repaired and in use.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By Ag . NARA, Date 9-3-91

8. For the past 18 months, the incident rate in II Corps has been the lowest in Vietnam and currently is running at about 1/4 that of I Corps and 1/2 that of III Corps.

9. In 1966, 46% of all Hoi Chans in Vietnam (Viet Cong returnees) were in II Corps. Currently, it is running about 32% of the total, but II Corps continues to enjoy the greatest number of Hoi Chans in Vietnam.

10. In 1966, II Corps took 38% of all the prisoners of war and, so far, in 1967, it has contributed 42% of all PW's. The national percentage of North Vietnam Army PW's to Viet Cong PW's is 1%. In II Corps, 8.8% of the PW's are North Vietnam Army.

11. There are 64 airfields throughout II Corps. Their location makes it possible to support by air, if necessary, a major combat operation logistically anywhere in this large segment of Vietnam.

12. In 1966, nearly half of all the enemy killed in action were accounted for in II Corps. During that year, all of the 11 North Vietnam army regiments in II Corps were attacked and were dealt heavy casualties. In the Highlands area, the North Vietnam army have lost about 7000 killed in action to about 800 Americans killed. No North Vietnam Army division or regiment has launched a successful operation in two years. The reverse has been true. Our forces have, in every instance, been able to catch the enemy main forces off balance and to attack them before they were ready. The North Vietnam Army can no longer adequately resupply their forces in the coastal areas, to include sufficient numbers of personnel replacements. The four North Vietnam Army regiments in the coastal areas are in poor condition, while the seven regiments in the highlands must return to safe haven areas to recoup for weeks, and very often months, between operations.

13. Our latest figures indicate that for every 1500 Viet Cong loss in II Corps, there are only 500 locally recruited replacements, and these are getting dangerously young. The remaining short fall must be made up by individual North Vietnam Army replacements. We do not believe that the North Vietnam Army are meeting their required personnel goals in II Corps. Evidence to support this, of course, is the fact that conditions in II Corps continue to get noticeably better each month.

14. There are two Vietnamese divisions in II Corps, plus one separate regiment. The 23d ARVN Infantry Division has only two regiments. Its zone is the southern half of II Corps and is larger than III Corps and nearly twice as large in area as I Corps. With the exception of occasional US and Korean operations in the area, this undersize division has kept its zone under control

by itself. There have been no crises in this area except around the southern town of Phan Thiet where one US battalion and two Vietnamese battalions are based indefinitely, and, together, in the past ten months have brought about 150,000 under Government of South Vietnam control.

15. The 22d ARVN Infantry Division has worked closely and continuously with the US 1st Air Cavalry Division for the past ten months and has contributed measurably to the outstanding successes in Binh Dinh Province. The recognizable improvement in the ARVN combat effort and leadership are encouraging to the US commanders who work with these units.

16. The South Korean divisions have contributed magnificently toward the pacification efforts in and around populated areas. They are a distinct asset in the war effort and they work closely and well with the US and ARVN commands.

17. The most successful National Priority Revolutionary Development area in Vietnam is in Binh Dinh where two years ago, practically the entire area was under Viet Cong control except for the city of Qui Nhon. This area now includes about 500,000 people.

18. The province which has shown the most improvement in two years is Phu Yen. The Viet Cong controlled 75% of the rice growing land and about 80% of the population in 1965. Now the Province is nearly completely under Government of South Vietnam control. A recent captured North Vietnam Army document admitted that, whereas two years ago they controlled 265,000 people, they now control 20,000.

19. In my judgment, the above statistics can be interpreted only one way -- that they show positive evidence of progress in II Corps. In all the populated areas there are now troops who are there to stay, to further ferret out the enemy, and to protect those liberated areas against the return of Viet Cong control. With the CORDS (Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support) offensive now getting underway, there should soon be even greater progress in Revolutionary Development support and in destroying the Viet Cong infrastructure. Though I cannot speak for the other Corps areas, I can say that today there is an air of refreshing optimism in the II Corps area.

STANLEY R. LARSEN  
Lieutenant General, United States Army

Tuesday, August 15, 1967  
9:15 a. m.

32

*Profile*

MR. PRESIDENT:

I should like your permission to request the postponement for (say) two months of the assignment to Brussels of Mr. Harold Kaplan, so that he could be put to work under Bill Jorden. Harold Kaplan is a first-rate USIA press man on Viet Nam. He is now being assigned from State to handle the press for Harlan Cleveland at NATO headquarters.

It is clear that we are going to need in the weeks ahead -- until a stable post-election government is formed in Saigon -- a quick-reaction team to draft material for the Hill as well as for you. State simply can't move fast enough or flexibly enough. Bill Jorden is excellent at this; but he can't do it alone.

Kaplan knows the Saigon political scene intimately. Working with Jorden -- and with access to the White House stable of speech draftsmen, when not otherwise assigned -- Kaplan could give us what I believe we shall require.

W. W. R.

Request State and USIA to postpone Kaplan assignment to Brussels \_\_\_\_\_

Find another solution \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Pres file*

Tuesday, August 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Javits Memorandum on Viet-Nam

Bill Jorden just acquired a copy of the attached. It is a draft resolution which Senator Javits is reported to be sponsoring.

It would ask you to express to the Vietnamese Government the "high desirability of establishing a new polling date" and providing conditions for all candidates to contest the election on an equal footing.

It would also request you to appoint a bipartisan, blue ribbon commission to observe the elections and report back to you, to the Congress and the country.

Mike Manatos has been informed of the existence of this resolution. We hear that Javits is soliciting support in the Senate for his resolution which might be presented in the next day or so.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

DRAFT

JAVITS RESOLUTION

Whereas the primary basis for the presence of the United States in the military conflict in Viet-Nam is to provide the people of South Viet-Nam with an opportunity for self-determination; and

Whereas the September 3, 1967 elections in South Viet-Nam have been so compromised by actions, direct and indirect, of the present authorities as to conflict seriously with the possibility of free, fair and open expression of the national will; and

Whereas the success of the elections as an expression of self-determination represents a crucial test of the feasibility of realizing the objective of the United States commitment and; Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate, that --

It is the sense of the Senate of the United States that the President of the United States should formally represent to the Government of Viet-Nam the high desirability of establishing a new polling date and conditions for the national elections which will give an added opportunity for candidates of all shades of opinion to contest the election on an equal footing; and

Be it further resolved that the President of the United States is requested to appoint a bi-partisan, blue ribbon commission to go to Viet-Nam to observe the campaign and election process in order to report thereon to the President, the Congress and the people of the United States.

Tuesday, Aug. 15, 1967

34

MR. PRESIDENT:

I got the word this evening to:

Stew Alsop  
Roscoe Drummond  
Bill White

I'll get to others tomorrow.

W. W. R.

35

*Profile*

Monday, August 14, 1967

8 PM

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letters to Viet-Nam Troop Contributors

Attached are the drafts of letters to the heads of government of our allies in Viet-Nam (Australia, Korea, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, Viet-Nam). They are written to follow up the Clifford-Taylor Mission.

Secretary Rusk has approved. Clifford and Taylor were both consulted, and the letters contain their suggestions.

The letters raise the question of a summit meeting and express your preference for late November. This takes into consideration:

- Viet-Nam's House election on October 22; planned installation of new government on November 1;
- Philippine senatorial election on November 14;
- Visit of Laos Crown Prince here on November 9 and Prime Minister Sato on November 13-14;
- Soviet's 50th anniversary on November 6-7 (a coincidence between this and a summit has disadvantages);
- Australian partial Senate elections in early December.

You should know that Thieu and Ky have suggested a meeting of foreign ministers in Saigon in early October. This could lay the groundwork for a summit.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

Letters approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NEJ 94-295  
 By *ij*, NARA, Date 6-22-95

~~SECRET~~

35a

August 14, 1967

Dear Harold:

I express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I now have your long and thoughtful letter, delivered to me on August 3, giving your reflections on the visit and the issues discussed.

I fully appreciate the points you have made, and the various factors that you and your Cabinet will have to take into account in arriving at a decision. I particularly welcome your statement that you will be announcing on August 15 an 18 per cent increase in defense expenditure for this financial year. This continues the constructive trend toward greater responsibility of the last four years.

Australia's performance in foreign aid and in the allocation of resources to development continues to call for our admiration. Your recent decision to give 150,000 tons of wheat to India is a particularly helpful and timely act of responsible generosity.

With the full realization of the complexities of your problem, I do return to the hope that you and your Cabinet can make an early decision to send a two-battalion combat team. My emissaries have reported on the discussions which you had as to specific increases in your forces. My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-295  
By ljp, NARA, Date 6-22-95

Holt  
Australia

May I particularly point out some of the timing factors at this end? As you know, I have now put before the Congress proposals for a major tax increase and at the same time have announced our decision to raise our own forces in Viet-Nam by 45,000 men. In the next 3-4 weeks, the tax proposal will be in its most critical phase in the Congress, and I will certainly be pressed hard as to the plans that other nations may have to add to their forces in Viet-Nam, alongside the 65,000-man increase announced by the South Vietnamese themselves and our own decision. I simply cannot exaggerate the favorable effect it would have here if we were able to tell the Congress within the next month that your Government had reached a firm decision along the lines I have suggested above.

As to the impact of the British decision concerning Singapore and Malaysia, you and I have shared our thoughts fully on this subject, and I realize that you will be at the center of discussions on new arrangements that may be required over the next few years to pick up the slack that British reductions, and eventual withdrawal at a later time, may leave. I realize that you face general questions of allocation and concentration arising from this situation, but I would hope that these problems need not affect a decision of the scale I have suggested above. I need hardly point out that the Malaysia/Singapore defense problem, as it may exist by 1970 or thereafter, will be vitally affected by whether we have succeeded in achieving a favorable outcome in Viet-Nam.

Your letter shows once again that you are thinking the problem through to the fullest, and I am sure you will reach a constructive and responsible decision as you have always done in the past. I do only urge that you tackle the problem as rapidly as possible in our common interest and in order to keep the pressure on in Viet-Nam at this critical time.

As to the other matters you mention, I understand that Mr. McMahan's representatives have had fruitful meetings with our Treasury people, and we will do all we can to reach an early answer on this difficult problem. My special thanks to

you for your word of sympathy on our difficult racial violence problem, as well as your kind words on the Forrestal losses. This has been a time of sadness and concern in many respects, but I need hardly assure you that our resolve to go forward in Viet-Nam and in Southeast Asia will not be affected.

Finally, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor of course discussed with you the question of a summit meeting some time this fall, a matter which you and I have gone over frequently. The consensus they found in all capitals was in the direction of a meeting, arranged at Asian initiative and in an Asian setting, at some time after the South Vietnamese elections have been held and the new government has been created.

I want to ask you frankly what your own timing factors are with respect to possible dates from late October onward. Within the past week, the Assembly elections in South Viet-Nam have been moved from October 11 to October 22, and the new government will probably have inauguration ceremonies on November 1. This seems to make it most doubtful that we could have a useful summit before November at the earliest. Marcos has elections on November 14, and at the same time we have a long-planned and important visit by Prime Minister Sato of Japan.

I therefore lean to the latter half of November. From your standpoint, I particularly wonder whether you will be affected by your senatorial elections, which I understand come in early December. Are there dates that would be more or less convenient, or even impossible, for you from the standpoint of these domestic factors?

With my warm regards, and again my thanks for your full and frank letter.

Sincerely,

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

The Right Honorable  
Harold Edward Holt  
Prime Minister of Australia  
Canberra

35b

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-295

By ij, NARA, Date 6-22-95 August 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65,000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45,000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As Messrs. Clifford and Taylor informed you in advance, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.

Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

My emissaries have reported on the discussions which you had as to specific increases in your forces. My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible.

*Kittikachorn  
Bangkok, Thailand*

In essence, I fully share the view that you and several members of your Government expressed to Messrs. Clifford and Taylor as to the absolute necessity of continuing and intensifying all forms of military action both in South Viet-Nam and against North Viet-Nam itself. We are continuing to explore all the actions within our power, and will not hesitate to take those that promise a clear net military advantage.

Messrs. Clifford and Taylor have also given me the views of Your Excellency and your colleagues as to the possibility of a summit conference, and the various matters that should be discussed there. In all their visits, they encountered favorable reactions to such a conference at some time after the conclusion of the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government, and there appears also to be general agreement -- which we certainly share -- that a new summit conference should be convened as an Asian initiative and at an appropriate Asian location. My own tentative thoughts on dates run in the direction of late November, and I would be grateful for any thoughts you may have on timing. In any event, I think we should all be in close touch with each other shortly after the South Vietnamese Presidential elections in early September, which could be an immensely important event not only in the progress of the war but in creating the conditions for greater stability and progress in South Viet-Nam.

I am most grateful for all the courtesies that your Government extended to Messrs. Clifford and Taylor, and the opportunity for such a full and frank discussion seems to me invaluable.

With my high respects,

Sincerely,

*LBJ* Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency  
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn  
Prime Minister  
Government House  
Bangkok

35c

August 14, 1967

Dear General Thieu:

Clark Clifford and General Taylor have informed me of their useful discussions with you and your colleagues during their recent visit to Viet-Nam. They have also informed me of the conversations they have had with our other allies in Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and Korea. As you know they were unable to visit the Philippines at this time. I am writing you now to share with you the information they have brought back and to let you have my suggestions on future courses of events.

Mr. Clifford and General Taylor reported that the leaders of each of the countries they visited remain united in their determination to proceed with the war in South Viet-Nam in as vigorous a way as possible. The leaders believe that the pressure against Hanoi and the Viet Cong must be maintained and increased, and they all agreed in principle that additional contributions from all countries will be needed to bring a successful end to the war. No specific commitments were made, but the allied nations all agreed to examine urgently and most sympathetically the additional steps that they would be able to take to assist your government and people to defeat the communist aggressors. The decision of the South Vietnamese Government to increase its armed forces by 65,000 men was particularly heartening to them.

I have not presented to the Congress my proposal for imposing a surtax of 10% on the American people to help finance the war in Viet-Nam. We have also announced an additional 45,000 troops for commitment to the fight in South Viet-Nam. The response of our Asian allies in this struggle will be of great importance to me in persuading the Congress and the American people that these additional sacrifices are part of the common effort to defeat aggression.

Messrs. Clifford and Taylor also discussed with the leaders of our allies the desirability of another summit conference. All

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-295  
By *ij*, NARA, Date 6-22-95

*Thieu*  
*So. Viet Nam*

agreed that another conference before the end of this year is desirable, but felt that a specific decision on the timing and site should await the conclusion of the important elections to be held in South Viet-Nam.

In this regard my emissaries found in each country great interest in the forthcoming elections in your country. The leaders of our allies were unanimous in their belief that a broadly representative government chosen with wide participation by the South Vietnamese people in free and fair elections will have incalculable value in increasing support for South Viet-Nam among the people in the allied countries as well as throughout the world. I want you to know that such elections will be of tremendous importance to me also in maintaining and increasing support among the American people and in the Congress for increased assistance to your country in its valiant struggle.

I wish to express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I hope the views in this letter are useful to you and your colleagues and I would be glad to receive your views about any of the matters discussed.

With best regards to yourself and your colleagues and in continuing admiration of the bravery of your people, I am

Sincerely,

*Lyndon B. Johnson*

Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Thieu  
Chairman of the National Leadership  
Committee of the Congress of the  
Armed Forces  
Republic of Viet-Nam  
Saigon

35d

August 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65,000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45,000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As Messrs. Clifford and Taylor informed you in advance, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.

Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ky, NARA, Date 6-22-95

*Holyoake*  
*New Zealand*

My emissaries have reported on the discussions which you had as to specific increases in your forces. My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible.

As to the question of a possible summit meeting, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found affirmative reactions in all capitals toward the possibility of such a meeting after the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government there. There also seems to be a common view that such a meeting should be at Asian initiative and in an appropriate Asian setting. My own mind runs in the direction of late November, and I should be most interested to have your thoughts, however tentative, on timing factors from your standpoint.

I would be most grateful for your views as you reflect on your discussions with Messrs. Clifford and Taylor and on this wholly private letter.

With my warm regards and best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

*[S] Lyndon B. Johnson*

The Rt. Hon. Keith Holyoake, C.H., M.P.  
Prime Minister of New Zealand  
Wellington

LBJ:StateDept:Aug 14, 1967 :WJJorden:mm

35e

August 14, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of July 27 concerning the possibility of a visit by Mr. Clifford and General Taylor to discuss the Vietnamese situation.

Let me say at the outset that I accept fully the reasons which led you to believe that a visit by the Clifford/Taylor mission would not be helpful to you in your present political situation. You are of course the best judge of this, and I appreciate the importance, in particular, of your obtaining favorable action on a renewed appropriation for your present contingent in Viet-Nam.

At the same time, let me say frankly and personally to you that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor have just reported to me, and that their findings not only confirm the need for a significant increase in allied forces in Viet-Nam, but reveal that others who are contributing forces are taking very seriously the possibility of making additional contributions. In each case, as of course in yours, the governments will have to take into account particular timing and political factors. But I emerge with the feeling that the need to do more is accepted by all, and that more will in fact be done in the next few months.

As I told you in my earlier letter, summarizing the original findings of Secretary McNamara and his group, the fact is that we are making progress on present lines, but must maintain our momentum in the face of what appears to be an unremitting and possibly increasing effort from North Viet-Nam.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-11-00

*Macroe*  
*Philippines*

would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65, 000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45, 000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As you know, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.

Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible.

As to the question of a possible summit meeting, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found affirmative reactions in all capitals toward the possibility of such a meeting after the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government there. There also seems to be a common view that such a meeting should be at Asian initiative and in an appropriate Asian setting. My own mind runs in the direction of late November, and I should be most interested to have your thoughts, however tentative, on timing factors from your standpoint.

With my continuing admiration and warm regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Ferdinand Marcos  
President of the Republic of the Philippines  
Manila

LBJ:State:WJJordan:mm:8/14/67

35f

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

August 14, 1967

NEJ 94-295

By lip, NARA, Date 6-22-95

Dear Mr. President:

I express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65,000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45,000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As Messrs. Clifford and Taylor informed you in advance, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.

Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

My emissaries have reported on the discussions which you had as to specific increases in your forces. My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that

*Park*  
*Krea*

you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible. Ambassador Porter has the full details on these matters, and would be happy to discuss them with you. In essence, they conform to the type of contribution you and I discussed during my visit to Seoul last fall, and these particular proposals reflect the benefit of experience and analysis conducted since that time in a situation that has changed in many respects. If your Government were able to move in these areas, it would be of substantial immediate help, although we continue to hope that you will be in a position to examine the question of additional combat forces somewhat later in the fall.

As to the question of a possible summit meeting, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found affirmative reactions in all capitals toward the possibility of such a meeting after the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government there. There also seems to be a common view that such a meeting should be at Asian initiative and in an appropriate Asian setting. My own mind runs in the direction of late November, and I should be most interested to have your thoughts, however tentative, on timing factors from your standpoint.

In closing, let me repeat my deep thanks for all that was done for Messrs. Clifford and Taylor. We must stay in very close touch on all aspects of the situation, and you now of course have with you Ambassador Porter, who brings a deep first-hand knowledge of our relationship.

With my high respects and warm regards,

Sincerely,

*18/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

His Excellency  
Chung Hee Park  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul

Monday, At 14, 1967  
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is how the candidates will  
look to the voters on September 3.

They need a two-party system.

W. W. R.

Attachment

~~copy~~ note from  
ed Fausdale to WWR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

31  
Pres. file

Monday, August 14, 1967 - 5:40  
PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is  
a short departure message for  
President Kayibanda.

He leaves for home from New York  
tonight.



Ed Hamilton

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

312

FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT KAYIBANDA OF RWANDA

Dear Mr. President:

As you leave our shores, I want you to know how much I enjoyed our conversation this afternoon. I found your observations wise and constructive. It ~~is~~<sup>was</sup> a great comfort to me to have the benefit of your counsel, and to reinforce the strong bonds of friendship and mutual respect which unite our two countries.

My best wishes for a safe and pleasant journey home.

Rostow

38

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ/RAC 00-274**  
**By cbm, NARA Date 5-10-01**

~~f. s. s. p.~~  
2 Profile

Monday, August 14, 1967 - 5:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached represents one responsible viewpoint on possible terms of an eventual Arab-Israeli settlement. The sources of the report



and probably picture a somewhat harder line than may become the Israeli government position when it is finally thrashed out.

W. W. Rostow

Att:



SANITIZED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

ROUTINE 38a  
IN -30059

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO  
EXO, DDI ONE ORR

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



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~~SECRET~~

DIST 11 AUGUST 1967


1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY : ISRAEL  
DOI :   
SUBJECT : SITUATION REPORT ON TERRITORY ACQUIRED BY ISRAEL  
DURING RECENT MILITARY ACTION  
ACQ : 

*1st evaluation*

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)



1. JERUSALEM: THE CITY OF JERUSALEM IS CONSIDERED AN INTEGRAL

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*IDF view, not necessarily joint.*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-275

By cbm, NARA Date 5-10-01

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(dissem controls)

PART OF ISRAEL AND WILL NOT BE OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. THE SECURITY SITUATION IS ANNOYING BUT WILL BE BROUGHT UNDER CONTROL BY WHATEVER MEASURES MAY BE REQUIRED AND WILL NOT BE A MATTER OF MAJOR CONCERN. THE CURRENT PROBLEM IN THE "OLD CITY" IS MORE ECONOMIC IN NATURE. WHILE HOTELS ARE FILLED IN THE ISRAELI SECTION, THEY REMAIN ONLY 30 PERCENT OCCUPIED IN THE OLD CITY. THE MIDNIGHT CURFEW ALSO HAS DISCOURAGED TOURISTS FROM STAYING THERE. A MAJOR EFFORT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO ENCOURAGE USE OF THESE FACILITIES.

2. GOLAN HEIGHTS, SYRIA: NO CONCESSIONS CAN BE MADE WHICH WILL IN ANY WAY RESTORE THE SITUATION WHEREBY SYRIA WILL REGAIN HER FORMER STRATEGIC POSITIONS. THE MILITARY FORTIFICATIONS EVACUATED BY THE SYRIANS RE-EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO GUARANTEE HER SECURITY IN THIS AREA. NO U.N. PRESENCE WILL BE CONSIDERED EFFECTIVE IN THIS RESPECT.

3. THE SUEZ CANAL: ANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT MUST GRANT ISRAELI SHIPS FREE ACCESS TO THE SUEZ CANAL. GRANTING ACCESS TO ISRAELI SHIPS UNDER "FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE" WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. ISRAEL'S CASE REGARDING THE CANAL IS STRONGER THAN ITS POSITION ON OTHER ISSUES. ISRAEL BELIEVES THAT PRESSURES ON EGYPT ARE MOUNTING TO REACH A SOLUTION AND THAT ANY PROPOSAL LESS THAN FULL ACCESS

~~SECRET~~

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1.5(cc)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~  
(classification)NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY  
(dissem controls)

SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED. ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT GUARANTEES OF FREE ACCESS BUT WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ANY EFFORTS TO DELAY, SABOTAGE, OR OTHERWISE HAMPER ISRAELI SHIPPING IN THE CANAL WILL BE REGARDED AS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR ANY ACTION, INCLUDING MILITARY, THAT MAY BE NECESSARY. THE POSSIBILITY OF SABOTAGE TO ISRAELI SHIPPING, IF ACCESS PERMITTED, IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE SERIOUS. IF SUCH ACTIVITIES ARE UNDERTAKEN, THE ISRAELIS ARE CAPABLE OF RETALIATION TO A MUCH MORE SERIOUS DEGREE.

4. THE SINAI, AND GAZA: IF THE ISSUE OF THE CANAL IS RESOLVED, THE SINAI AND GAZA ITSELF CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION.. NO STRONG FEELING EXISTS REGARDING THE SINAI. WITH THE CANAL OPEN, THE PORT OF ASHDOD ASSUMES ITS TRUE ROLE AND THE WHOLE SINAI AREA BECOMES ONE OF LESSER IMPORTANCE.

5. THE WEST BANK: THE GREAT APPEAL OF THOSE WHO WISH TO HOLD THE WEST BANK LIES IN THE ELIMINATION OF THE NARROW CORRIDOR BETWEEN ISRAEL'S EASTERN BORDER AND THE SEA. KEEPING THE WEST BANK REPRESENTS SECURITY AND APPEALS TO THOSE WHO REGARD THE JORDAN RIVER AS A NATURAL BOUNDARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, WITH THE RETURN OF THE ARAB POPULATION, THE ISRAELIS WILL FIND THEMSELVES EVENTUALLY OUT-NUMBERED BY THE ARAB POPULATION. THE ECONOMIC COST OF

~~SECRET~~

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~  
(classification)

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REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT WILL BE TREMENDOUS. ISRAELI MERCHANTS ARE ALREADY COMPLAINING ABOUT THE INFLUX OF AGRICULTURE PRODUCTS AND THE RESULTING EFFECT ON THEIR MARKETS. THESE FACTORS ARE CAUSING "SECOND THOUGHTS" CONCERNING THE WEST BANK; AND , WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE LATRUN SALIENT AND JERUSALEM, THERE IS GROWING OPINION THAT THE REST OF THE AREA COULD BE RETURNED TO JORDAN IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] DISSEM : STATE CINCFSA CINCUSNAVEUR CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-275  
By cbm, NARA Date 5-10-01

38b

THE FOLLOWING IS FROM THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES DUTY OFFICER:

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

"We have been in contact with the sources of 

  
While some of their reporting is subject to some bias, we have no reason to suspect that they have deliberately reported inaccurate information."

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 14, 1967 (4:35 pm)

39  
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report  
on the Vietnamese political front.

*Bill*  
William J. Jordan

Att.

SECRET Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

August 14, 1967

Presidential Campaign Resumes

The civilian candidates' boycott of joint campaign tours has ended. The next appearance is scheduled for August 15. Most of the candidates appeared at a scheduled joint news conference today. There was some criticism of Thieu and Ky, but the general bitterness of recent days seems diminished.

Activity of Thieu-Ky Campaign

The activity of Thieu-Ky campaign organization has picked up. Funds have been distributed to local campaign workers in the Mekong Delta provinces.

Political Attitudes of Military

Ky is reported to have remarked that if the civilian candidates continue to attack him unfairly for not providing adequate election facilities, he might set aside or cancel the elections. His statement was apparently made in a fit of irritation after a meeting with Bunker about the difficulties being encountered in GVN election campaign arrangements. At the moment we do not take this threat seriously.

Meanwhile, we have also received a report containing the "Charter" for a Supreme Military Committee which the generals allegedly will use to continue to exercise power after the elections. Ky is designated committee chairman. The Charter is supposed to have been approved by the eight top generals concerned, who have also written a most disturbing declaration to be issued when and if the committee's existence is acknowledged. Ky and Thieu have categorically denied to Bunker that such a committee exists. Bunker is now considering this report, and we expect his comments momentarily.

Militant Buddhists call for Struggle

Militant Buddhist leaders appeared to call today for a new struggle against the GVN. They accused Thieu of trying to "destroy Buddhism" by approving a new Buddhist organization charter

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-296  
By ij, NARA, Date 11-2-94

undermining the unity of Vietnamese Buddhism. They compared Thieu's act to Diem's refusal in May 1963 to allow flying of Buddhist flags, which triggered the original Buddhist uprising. In their well-covered press conference, the militant Buddhists failed to call for an election boycott, as they told the Embassy Saturday they would do. However, they did join in demanding the resignation of Thieu and Ky to insure a fair election. They are obviously attempting to peg their opposition to the GVN on a religious issue which will stir the faithful in their behalf. Judging from remarks to Embassy officers, they are also taking heart from US congressional criticism.

*Freeman*  
*to President's Sec*  
40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 14, 1967, 4:30 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: P. L. 480 Program for Brazil

Secretary Freeman and Bill Gaud ask your authorization to negotiate a P. L. 480 sales agreement with Brazil involving 500,000 tons of wheat valued at \$36,000,000.

Charlie Schultze agrees--now that President Costa e Silva has agreed to postpone any decision on purchasing Mirage supersonic jets until next October.

Tuthill and Assistant Secretary Oliver fully support the recommendation to go ahead with the P. L. 480 Brazilian negotiations.

Both believe that the wheat negotiations can be handled separately from the present effort to work out a revised loan agreement which was suspended last month when the Brazilians did not meet our conditions for the disbursement of the remaining \$75,000,000 of our 1967 program. Our latest information is that the prospects are good for straightening out the program loan.

Local currency generated by the sale of wheat is to be used entirely in programs aimed at improving agricultural production and marketing.

Attached is a memorandum from Charlie Schultze giving further details as well as a joint memorandum from Secretary Freeman and Bill Gaud.

*/s/*

Bromley Smith

Approve  
 Disapprove  
 See Me  
BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By lip, NARA, Date 6-22-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3091

40a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

AUG 10 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program for Brazil

In my memo to you on the Peru Program Loan, I told you I was holding a request for a proposed Brazil P. L. 480 agreement pending clarification of the Mirage issue. I understand that Costa e Silva has now agreed to postpone any decisions on supersonic jet purchases until October, in response to your personal letter. I am therefore now submitting the proposed P. L. 480 agreement for your consideration.

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your approval to negotiate a P. L. 480 sales agreement with Brazil for 500,000 tons of wheat, valued at \$36 million. Repayment would be in dollars over twenty years with a ten percent cash payment upon delivery.

Brazil's wheat import requirement in 1967 is 2.2 million tons. The proposed P. L. 480 agreement would help Brazil to meet some of its needs above its usual marketing requirement of 1,350,000 tons. To assure that U. S. wheat exporters will continue to have an equitable commercial opportunity in Brazil, we have asked and received from the Brazilian government assurances that a 750,000 ton duty-free quota for wheat, recently dropped from Brazil's tariff schedule, will be restored in 1968.

The local currency generated from this sale will be used entirely in the agriculture sector for

- medium and long term credit to stimulate the use of improved seeds, limestone, fertilizers, and services,
- loans to cooperatives for improved marketing, grain handling and storage facilities,
- farm to market roads, community self-help projects and other priority agricultural development programs.

These local currency uses, plus the self-help commitments we will seek with this agreement, will contribute to Brazil's attempts to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. In particular, we will ask the Government of Brazil to meet the following self-help conditions:

- increase the proportion of its budget devoted to agriculture,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OMB la 10-20-75

By reg/la, NARA, Date 9-9-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- speed reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture,
- encourage crop diversification through increased price incentives,
- improve the environment for private enterprise in agricultural industries.

On balance, Brazilian self-help in agriculture has been good. The Brazilians have embarked on a program to increase production of basic crops to a level that would permit Brazil to help supply world food needs. The government has expanded agricultural credit and price supports. Price ceilings and controls have been removed from most major commodities.

The one negative development in an otherwise promising agricultural picture was the government's recent decision to increase income to the politically powerful coffee growers. This decision will slow down the government's diversification program. State/AID has expressed U. S. concern over this move and will press hard to minimize its negative impact.

As to the economy's overall performance, Brazil's stabilization program has faltered during the first few months of the Costa e Silva administration. As a result, the conditions for disbursement of the remaining \$75 million of our 1967 program loan were not met, and last month AID suspended further disbursements. However, Ambassador Tuthill and Covey Oliver believe that the prospects for a successful reformulation of the program loan agreement are good. Costa e Silva seems to have thrown his support to his Finance Minister, who has resisted pressures for excessive expansion of the money supply. Costa e Silva has also rejected pressures for increasing protectionist policies. He has recently shown a willingness to contain expenditures to hold down the fiscal deficit. Based on this favorable assessment of the situation, Tuthill and Oliver recommend that we proceed to negotiate the P. L. 480 agreement.

I recommend that you authorize negotiation of the proposed P. L. 480 agreement.

*Charles L. Schultze*

Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

406

To: The President

JUN 29 1967

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Brazil

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Brazil to provide approximately 500,000 tons of wheat, of which the current export market value is \$36 million (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 10 percent on delivery and the balance over 19 years at 2½ percent interest. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Brazil's overall food production for domestic consumption barely has kept pace with the population growth of 3.1 percent per year. President Arthur da Costa e Silva's new government is giving priority to the lagging agricultural sector in Brazil's development program, and has requested U.S. assistance in attaining its goals. With domestic wheat supplying only about 10 percent of consumption needs, wheat import requirements have increased from the 1955-59 average of 1.6 million tons to nearly 2.2 million tons in 1967. The purchase of part of the import needs for 1967 on PL 480 dollar credit terms will give needed assistance to Brazil's efforts to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency through productive use of the local currency generated, furthering United States and Alliance for Progress objectives.

The self-help measures which we ask Brazil to undertake will be closely related to commitments made by the Brazilian Government to the CIAP and the U.S. earlier this year, and will be reinforced in our negotiation of all other U.S. agricultural assistance to Brazil this year. This agreement will be our first major assistance agreement signed with the new government since it took office on March 15, 1967.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirement

The usual marketing requirement of 1,350,000 tons is based on the 1962-66 average of Brazil's commercial imports of wheat. So far in CY 1967 Brazil has purchased commercially 330,000 tons of wheat from the U.S.

Self-Help

The Brazilian Government currently is giving higher priority to agriculture in order to achieve a better balance between agricultural and industrial

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Agriculture ca 11/4/75  
Authority OMB ca 10/20/75 AFD ca 7/14/77  
By RG, NARA, Date 9-10-91

growth. More government assistance is being given to agriculture in 1967 through a price support program, expanded agricultural credit, legislation exempting farm inputs from import duties, price incentives for basic food-stuffs, and expanded agricultural research and extension activities.

In the negotiation of this agreement we will seek commitments that the Government of Brazil:

- (1) Increase the proportion of GOB budget allocated to the agricultural sector;
- (2) Expedite reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture along lines suggested in the newly enacted Administrative Reform Decree Law to provide better planning and coordination for national agricultural programs;
- (3) Make all local currency generated from this sales agreement available for use in the agricultural sector with currencies being used as follows, and with at least matching contributions from other Brazilian resources for these purposes:
  - (a) Approximately 20 percent for credit for loans to cooperatives through the National Bank for improving marketing, grain handling and storage facilities;
  - (b) Approximately 60 percent for medium and long-term "on farm credit" to stimulate the use of inputs such as seeds, limestone, fertilizers and services;
  - (c) Approximately 10 percent for construction of more farm-to-market roads and community self-help improvement projects;
  - (d) The remainder to be used to support other priority agricultural development programs now underway, including the expansion of institutions for adaptive research and the production of agricultural limestone;
- (4) Encourage the multiplication and distribution of improved seeds to farmers by promoting the private seed industry through reducing government monopoly controls and providing incentives to private industry.
- (5) Create a more favorable environment for private enterprise and investment in agricultural supporting industries, thus enabling more effective use of available managerial, marketing and technical know-how;

- (6) Strengthen price incentives to farmers, encouraging them to shift to the production of needed food crops any excessive land resources being used for crops in world surplus such as coffee, cotton and sugar;
- (7) (a) Accelerate implementation of the land reform distribution program in the priority zones;  
  
(b) Complete cadastral and resource surveys needed to provide an adequate tax base and the information essential for an orderly frontier settlement program;
- (8) Strengthen systems of collection, computation and analysis of statistics to better measure the availability of agricultural inputs and progress in expanding production and utilization of agricultural commodities;
- (9) Submit semi-annual progress reports on implementation of the above; reports are due January 31 and July 31.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.

June 26 1962

William J. Gaud  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

Quill R. Ferman  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Monday, August 14, 1967 -- 4:10 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will, I believe, wish to read this letter from John McCloy.

He underlines that the critical objective of the visit should be to achieve a sufficient meeting of the minds on detente, the future of the Alliance, etc., to lay the base for renewal of the Alliance in 1969.

He believes that the decline of de Gaulle and the disenchantment of the Germans with the French leadership gives us the opportunity.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

JOHN J. McCLOY  
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA  
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10005

August 11, 1967

Dear Walt:

I have been increasingly impressed by the importance of the coming talks with Kiesinger so much so that I am taking the liberty of writing you directly in the thought that you might convey some of my concern and some of my thinking to the President in preparation for the visit.

We are at a point of history where some very important decisions must be taken soon in respect of the Alliance and Germany, as an extremely important part of Europe, is one of the focal points on which a number of these far-reaching decisions have to be made.

The Alliance is coming up for review in 1969. Perhaps the review will be precipitated in 1968 by a formal notice of the renunciation of the Alliance by France. There are some in this country who are already advocating "some dilution of the Alliance" in the form of a detente with the Soviet Union. There are others who instinctively favor a return to a form of opportunistic isolationism on our part. There are those who feel that difficult as the prospect of reinvigorating NATO in the light of the French defection appears to be, that it is still the best clear chance for peace and security and for a reasonable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

deGaulle has not only defected from NATO, he is from all the signs seeking an outright reversal of the Alliance.\* On top of this, we have an equivocal position on the part of Germany -- equivocal due in part to a domestic political diversion which has taken the form of a pro-French -- pro-U.S. division in Germany. This division has become a bit

\*Maybe this is too strong, but it certainly is an outright neutralization of the Alliance.

overheated by a very strong and very virulent campaign on the part of France to convince the Germans that the only way they can prove their loyalty to the Franco-German treaty is to follow the French lead in its present anti-American phobia. There is also some equivocation apparent in respect to the German Government's attitude toward the East as has been evidenced by some recent speeches of Brandt and even in some of Kiesinger's.

A new phenomenon has entered into the picture in the form of the emergence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the Mediterranean as an aggressive political force there. It is clear that the Soviets intend to expand their position there if only to remove the sting of their miscalculation of the Israeli capacities. They intend to gain a position, if possible, which will enable them to influence the flow of oil from the area. They have seen the long-range potentialities of new pro-Soviet forces on the southern flank of NATO and astride the strategic nexus which the Mediterranean represents between the East and the West and between Europe and Africa. This only accentuates the pressing need for the Germans and the Americans to understand each other's objectives very clearly at this critical period in the history of the Alliance. The Soviets have not become benign merely because they seek to avoid a nuclear exchange. Their actions in the Middle East clearly demonstrate this.

On the other hand they have been hearing much from us on the subject of detente with the Soviet Union. This is not only in the nuclear field but in other areas as well. The article by Gilpatric in the Sunday TIMES will set them off again. What are our intentions? They are not going to be satisfied with general protestations any more than we should be. The Germans are great ones to insist on new assurances every week, but in the political world in which Europe moves, I have no doubt our position seems equivocal and disturbing too.

The important thing is to achieve, if at all possible, a real meeting of the minds as to what our respective

objectives really are and what steps should be taken to bring them about. What do we intend to do about the Alliance if France does withdraw? What are the actual steps Brandt has in mind to take in furtherance of his long-range objectives in respect of the East? What do we really wish the Germans would do in respect of France?

It is important also to understand what should be avoided at the meeting. I suppose all would agree that we should not start out by berating the Chancellor for the reduction of his forward budget. We should not, I repeat, not, attempt to replay the record of the Erhardt visit. I doubt that it would be wise to even bring up offsets again. We should not take the budget cut as a new excuse to move in on our own troop levels. If we did this so close to the 1969 date, I think the base for a convincing reconfirmation of the Alliance and NATO would be too dangerously narrowed. I should assume that the tripartite agreements carried us beyond the need for that. It was implicit in them that we would not proceed unilaterally toward the reduction of troop levels except in conjunction with each other and with a real discussion of what the strategic and tactical needs were. It was also agreed that the Foreign Exchange problem was a common problem. I would leave it at that assuming that both they and we intended to operate under those principles. This whole issue is one which is so dependent on what our long-range objectives in respect of Europe and the Soviet Union are that the time should be spent in exploring those objectives in real depth rather than threatening further troop reductions or bickering with them over the budgetary developments or the way they handled the deGaulle visit.

We have a real opportunity now with the decline of deGaulle's prestige to begin now to lay a base for a more meaningful discussion of our relations with Germany and Western Europe than we have had for some time. The disenchantment with deGaulle in Germany goes very deep and if we can show Europe that in spite of our domestic problems and with Viet Nam we are prepared to think

Page Four

seriously of our future relations with Europe, this will be impressive. At the same time we ask that they be aware of our problems and relations with the rest of the world. Neither Europe nor we can afford these days to be provincial in our thinking.

I hope this may be of some help.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "James D. Phillips", with a horizontal line underneath the name.

Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20500

MEMORANDUM

*Suspense*

42

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, August 14, 1967, 3:50 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is below, for your approval, the text of a message to Ambassadors Bunker, Locke, and Komer concerning the visit to Vietnam of Harry Reasoner of CBS News.

"From the President  
For Ambassadors Bunker, Locke and Komer

"Although I am aware there are many demands on your time and energies, I hope that each of you will find an opportunity to spend some time with Harry Reasoner of CBS News. I understand he will be arriving this weekend for a 3-week stay.

"I have always found him to be fair and balanced in his handling of the news. It would be most beneficial for him to get from you, at the outset of his visit, a clear picture of the progress we have made to date, and an understanding of how that progress relates to our objectives."

Bromley Smith

Approved ✓

*8/14/67*

See me \_\_\_\_\_

BKS (Mailed to Pres.)

43  
Pres file

Monday, August 14, 1967, 11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meetings of the National Security Council

The figures on National Security Meetings are as follows:

From November 1963 to August 1967 - 53 meetings

From January 1961 to November 1963 - 45 meetings

The average for the entire period <sup>from</sup> ~~for~~ 1961 is slightly above one NSC meeting per month.

During the first 34 months of your administration, 45 NSC meetings were held--the exact number of meetings held during the 34 months of the Kennedy administration.

During the Eisenhower administration the Council met each week, averaging about 50 meetings annually.

There is attached a list of the dates of NSC meetings since 1961 and the subjects discussed.

Because you use the Council differently from the way President Eisenhower used it, the number of NSC meetings is very misleading as an indicator of the amount of time you spend on national security problems.

151

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

## CALENDAR OF NSC MEETINGS

### February 1, 1961

1. Attendance at National Security Council Meetings
2. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security
3. Military Budgets and National Security Policy
4. Studies of Executive Branch Organization
5. National Security Policies Requiring Urgent Attention
6. Organization and Procedures of the National Security Council

### February 9, 1961

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U. S. Security
2. Discussion of Crisis Areas
3. National Security Policies Requiring Urgent Attention

### March 29, 1961

1. A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future

### April 22, 1961

1. U. S. Policy Toward Cuba
2. Strengthening the Basic U. S. Posture Toward the Communist World
3. The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations
4. Review of U. S. Space Program

### April 27, 1961

1. The Situation in Laos
2. U. S. Policy in Viet Nam
3. Emergency Freedom Fund
4. U. S. Policy Toward Cuba
5. Privileged Nature of NSC Discussions

### April 29, 1961

1. U. S. Policy with Respect to Laos
2. U. S. Policy in Viet Nam

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-3-91

May 1, 1961

1. U. S. Policy with Respect to Laos

May 2, 1961

1. U. S. Policy with Respect to Laos
2. The Geneva Test Ban Negotiations

May 5, 1961

1. U. S. Policy Toward Iran
2. U. S. Policy Toward Korea
3. U. S. Polity Toward Cuba
4. U. S. Policy Toward the Dominican Republic and Haiti
5. U. S. Policy Toward British Guiana
6. U. S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia

May 19, 1961

1. Military Considerations Involved in the Resumption of Nuclear Testing
2. U. S. Policy Toward Iran
3. U. S. Policy in Viet-Nam

June 13, 1961

1. Report by the President on the European Trip
2. Korea

June 29, 1961

1. Kuwait
2. Berlin
3. Laos

July 13, 1961

1. Berlin

July 19, 1961

1. Berlin

July 20, 1961

1. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee

August 8, 1961

1. Nuclear Testing

October 13, 1961

1. Future Meetings of the Council
2. Policy Toward Yugoslavia and Poland

November 2, 1961

1. Nuclear Testing

November 15, 1961

1. Briefing on Communist China
2. South Vietnam
3. Tribute to CIA Director Allen Dulles

December 5, 1961

1. Volta River Project

December 19, 1961

1. Reports on Paris Meetings

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1962

- Jan. 18 - (President informally addressed invited officers of the Government principally concerned with foreign affairs and national security of the U. S. )
- Feb. 27 - Nuclear Testing.
- March 28 - Geneva Negotiations.
- April 18 - Review of Proposed Nuclear Atmospheric Testing Program.
- June 26 - U. N. Considerations in U. S. Policy: Review of Plans for 17th General Assembly.
- July 9 - Soviet Long Range Attack Capabilities.  
- Space Policy and Intelligence Requirements.
- July 10 - (Continuation of July 9 Meeting)
- July 17 - East-West Trade Policy.
- Sept. 6 - Results of 1962 Nuclear Test Program to Date and Tests Proposed for Remainder of Program.
- Oct. 20 - Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba.
- Oct. 21 - Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba.
- Oct. 22 - Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba.

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1963

- Jan. 22 National Security Problems
- March 13 General Discussion of U. S. Policy in Latin America and Europe
- April 2 U. S. Policy Toward Europe and U. S. Policy Toward Cuba
- April 10 U. S. Policy Toward Laos
- April 20 U. S. Policy Toward Laos
- April 22 U. S. Policy Toward Laos
- May 9 Air Defense for India
- July 9 Instructions for Harriman Mission
- July 13 Chinese Communist Intentions
- Sept. 12 The Net Evaluation Subcommittee
- Oct. 1, Sale of U. S. Wheat to the USSR and Soviet Satellites
- Oct. 2 McNamara-Taylor Report on Vietnam
- Dec. 5 Soviet Military Capabilities

4536

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1964

Jan. 7 Assistance to Indonesia

Feb. 29 Presidential Statement on the A-11 Aircraft

Mar. 5 Secretary McNamara's Mission to Vietnam;  
OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache

Mar. 17 U. S. Policy Toward Vietnam

Apr. 2 U. S. Policy Toward Brazil

Apr. 3 Review of Current Foreign Policy Problems

Apr. 16 U. S. Trade Relations with the USSR and East  
European Communist Countries

Apr. 22 Visit of the Secretary of State to the Far East;  
U. S. Policy Toward Laos;  
Cutbacks in U. S. Nuclear Production

Apr. 29 U. S. Policy Toward Laos

May 2 Overflights of Cuba

May 5 Overflights of Cuba

May 15 Report by Secretary McNamara on Trip to Saigon;  
Report by Secretary Rusk on Most Recent NATO  
Meeting

June 6 Aerial Reconnaissance of Laos

June 16 FY 1965 Underground Nuclear Test Program

July 7 Briefing on Cyprus

July 28 Ninth OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting;  
Briefing on Geneva negotiations re Cyprus;  
Mainland Southeast Asia

Aug. 4 North Vietnamese Attack on U. S. Destroyers;  
Briefing on Cyprus

Aug. 4 U. S. Response to North Vietnamese Attacks on  
U. S. Destroyers

Aug. 11 Current Situation in the Congo

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1964 (Cont'd)

August 19	Cyprus
August 25	Congo, Cyprus, South Vietnam
September 1	Briefing meeting on Vietnam, campaign planning
October 17	Communist China

020

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1965

February 1	Vietnam, Jordan Arms, Soviet Underground, Nuclear Test
February 6	Vietnam Reprisals
February 7	South Vietnam
February 8	Bundy trip to Vietnam
February 10	Vietnam
February 18	Update from February 8, 1965 meeting and reviewing of US goals in Vietnam
March 26	Vietnam
April 5	South Vietnam
June 11	Vietnam
July 27	Vietnam
August 5	Vietnam

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1966

January 5	Peace Offensive re. Vietnam
January 29	Vietnam
May 10	Vietnam
June 9	The Problem of Indian Nuclear Weapons
June 17	Discussion of Operating RT Program
June 22	Discussion including Major POL Targets in the RT Program
July 14	Southwest Africa
July 19	The World Food Problem
August 4	Indonesia
September 15	Major Issues at the 21st UN General Assembly
October 15	Manila Conference
December 13	NATO

DATES AND SUBJECTS OF NSC MEETINGS HELD IN 1967

January 25	Southern Rhodesia
February 8	North Africa
April 26	Problems Ahead in Europe
May 24	Future of South Arabia
July 13	African Problems
August 9	Indonesia

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 14, 1967 -- 11:30

~~1 - 500P~~  
2 - Pres file  
44

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed congratulatory message to President Ayub of Pakistan on the 20th anniversary of Pakistan's independence. This should go out today, if at all possible.



Edward K. Hamilton

Approve

8/14/67

Disapprove

Speak to me

44a

MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT OF PAKISTAN

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of all Americans, I extend warmest congratulations and best wishes to you and the people of Pakistan on the twentieth anniversary of your national independence. The achievements of the past two decades are reflected in Pakistan's more and more bountiful harvests, her flourishing factories, and the rising living standards of her people. Your many friends and admirers around the world join you in celebrating the triumphs of the past and in looking forward to even greater accomplishments in the future.

Mrs. Johnson joins me, Mr. President, in sending our warmest personal regards on this historic day.

Lyndon B. Johnson

*WJ*  
~~1- confidential~~  
3- Presidential file  
45

Monday, August 14, 1967  
10:20 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

I believe you wanted a draft of a speech which might be made in the Senate on the Vietnamese elections.

The attached text should serve the purpose.

William J. Jordan

Attachment

45a

DRAFT SPEECH

SUBJECT: Elections in Viet-Nam

MR. PRESIDENT:

The United States has a very great commitment in Viet-Nam.

Our men are fighting and dying so that small country can be safe from outside attack. We are also pledged to help the people of Viet-Nam develop their own political institutions in their own way.

So it is not strange that in recent days -- in this body and in our press -- a good deal of attention should have been devoted to the electoral process now underway in Viet-Nam .

It is right that we should be interested.

It is right that we should be concerned.

And it right that we should express our opinions.

But given all the circumstances, Mr. President, I think it is also our duty to insure that our comments are based on fact and on reality.

Responsible comment that will help encourage the political process to move along democratic lines is one thing.

And I have no doubt that some of the comments I have heard and read in the last week -- comments based on the flimsiest of evidence -- have been a source of some cheer to the men in Hanoi.

For if they think there is a chance that we might pull out of Viet-Nam because a coming election is not purer than any election in this or other countries, then surely they are going to hang on just that much longer.

It is obvious that most of the comments made here are based on newspaper reports from Saigon. And it is equally clear that many of those reports contain rumors, misquotations, and in some case a naive acceptance of this or that opposition politician's statements as fact -- rather than as electioneering.

There is also, Mr. President, a tendency to measure the fairness of the Vietnamese electoral process by a standard of perfection. It is a standard that does not prevail, even in the United States. Certainly it is a standard that cannot reasonably be applied, especially in a young nation in the midst of a war for its survival.

Mr. President, it took the United States thirteen years from its revolution until it created a constitutional government. The Vietnamese elected a Constituent Assembly only last September. By March this year it had completed the nation's new constitution, and a thoroughly democratic document it is.

Now, only a few months after promulgation of the Constitution, the Vietnamese are about to select their executive and legislative leaders.

I think that is progress.

I think that kind of achievement deserves our congratulations and our good wishes.

Surely, it does not merit the kind of snide comments and cynical descriptions that some have been making.

I know, Mr. President, that our Government -- from President Johnson down -- have been stressing for more than one year and a half the necessity for the Vietnamese to begin building democratic institutions. Our officials, here and in Saigon, have repeatedly underlined the necessity for the electoral process to be free and fair and open.

Let me cite just a few of the things that the Government in Viet-Nam has done recently to insure that those goals are achieved.

-- One of our colleagues last week stated that press censorship was preventing a free political campaign. I note that press censorship of political statements was lifted more than three weeks ago. All one has to do is check the Saigon press to see that free reporting exists.

-- General Vien, Commander in Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, publicly stated that the Army would not have a candidate, that military men would stay out of the election, and that Armed Forces personnel should not electioneer and should vote as individuals. A written directive to that effect has gone out.

-- The election law provides stiff penalties for civil servants who engage in election frauds and pressure tactics.

-- The Chief of Military Security, General Loan, who has been blamed in many rumors for election pressures, was removed from his military post. He remains as National Police Chief, but I have seen no evidence that he has been conducting any campaigns in the countryside.

-- The Government has provided all candidates with funds for the campaign, as provided in the election law.

-- It has also agreed to provide transportation, to help arrange public meetings, and to insure the security of candidates -- none of which is required by the law.

-- All candidates have been guaranteed free time on the government radio and television. I note that all eleven presidential candidates appeared on TV in Saigon yesterday -- and four of them gave speeches on radio.

-- The Vietnamese Government has invited impartial observers to come and watch the electoral process and form their own judgment. Invitations went to the United Nations, to all governments having relations with the Republic of Viet-Nam, and to the world press.

Each of the individual complaints that we have heard can be answered -- have been answered for the most part -- with facts and with reason.

I would remind all my colleagues here of one inescapable fact -- that it was the present government in Saigon -- led by Generals --

that first launched this promising movement toward representative government. It was Chief of State Thieu and Prime Minister Ky who first said that Viet-Nam must have a constitution -- and that the constitution should be written by men freely elected.

They made that pledge in January 1966. And they carried it out.

They didn't have to do it. But they did.

Was it the act of men who so hungered for power that they could not abide civilian participation in government, that they would conduct a political campaign that was lacking in fairness and honesty.

I repeat -- they didn't have to raise this problem at all.

But they did.

And they have pledged -- publicly and privately -- that <sup>they</sup> /will support a new government whoever wins -- so long as it is the outcome of fair and free elections.

It is reported that some of the generals are plotting to retain effective power -- whoever wins the election.

I have seen no convincing evidence that this is true.

But it is possible that some misguided military do think this way.

I for one doubt, however, that any freely elected president -- whether he be a military man or a civilian -- is going to be willing to

abdicate his constitutional powers and do the bidding of a clique of generals.

Nor do I think that the people of Viet-Nam would willingly accept such an outcome.

Finally, Mr. President, I remind my colleagues that the Vietnamese are going to elect more than a President and Vice President. They are also going to select -- next month and the month after -- a Senate and a House.

If you read the constitution you know that this new legislature is going to have very great powers, indeed. And the legislative bodies are going to be almost entirely composed of civilians, whoever is elected president.

So let us not abandon hope for democracy in Viet-Nam before it is even born.

Let us not prejudge the outcome of a process in which the entire Vietnamese people have a great stake.

Let us be patient.

Let us encourage them to move down the path of democracy.

Let us help them -- not hinder them.

For their success will be our success -- and the success of free men everywhere.

1/6

~~1-2-1967~~  
2- Dec file

Monday, August 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is the memo you wanted laying out the various ways in which we have -- for 1-1/2 years -- been stressing to the Vietnamese the importance of free and fair elections and the development of democratic institutions.

It comes from classified sources, but I see no reason it cannot be declassified. I flag one problem: if this were too widely distributed, someone might use it as proof of regular U.S. intervention in Vietnamese internal affairs.

William J. Jordan

Att.

46a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 14, 1967  
9:00 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Efforts to Encourage Free and Fair Elections  
in Viet-Nam

Members of Congress, columnists, and editorial writers are suddenly stressing the importance of a free and fair electoral process in Viet-Nam.

President Johnson, his principal foreign affairs advisers, the Department of State, and the American Mission in Saigon all have long recognized the importance of encouraging the growth of democratic institutions in Viet-Nam. This subject has been a principal theme in our talks with Vietnamese, in and out of government, for the past year and a half especially.

This memorandum sets forth some of the numerous ways and occasions in which American officials have encouraged the development of representative government in Viet-Nam and have stressed the importance of carrying out elections in a fair, free and honest way.

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1. January 1966 - Prime Minister Ky announced his Government's plan to develop a constitution and to hold national elections to select a representative government. Ambassador Lodge and others had been encouraging the Vietnamese to take this step.

2. Honolulu Conference (Feb. 7-8, 1966) - Importance of free elections stressed throughout. In Honolulu Declaration, the Vietnamese Government pledged "to formulate a democratic constitution" and "to create on the basis of elections rooted in that constitution, an elected government." President Johnson encouraged Vietnamese leaders in this course and stressed the need for free and fair elections.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-295  
By lip, NARA, Date 6-22-95

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3. March-May 1966 - A time of political crisis brought on by the effort of militant Buddhists in Hue and Danang to overthrow the government. Ambassador Lodge and his staff repeatedly stated privately and publicly the U. S. Government's view that development of free political institutions was of greatest importance.

4. March-April 1966 - Vietnamese National Political Congress met to plan political evolution. U.S. Ambassador and staff were in almost daily contact with political leaders, government and non-government, advising on democratic procedures. Decree of April 14, announcing plans for election of a Constituent Assembly, reflected this advice.

5. May-June 1966 - Electoral Law Drafting Commission met. Ambassador and staff met regularly with commissioners urging need for democratic electoral plans. Hardly a day passed without some contact between U.S. officials and Vietnamese. Former repeatedly stressed the importance of a free and open electoral process. Ambassador Lodge met repeatedly with Chief of State Thieu, Prime Minister Ky and others. Technical advice on democratic electoral machinery was provided by officials and special consultants.

Some examples:

May 13 - Ambassador Lodge urged Prime Minister Ky to make every effort to hold Constituent Assembly elections in the Fall of 1966.

June 9 - Ambassador stressed to Prime Minister the great importance the U.S. attached to the Assembly elections.

July 13 - Prime Minister was reminded of the importance of widest popular participation in the elections.

July 22 - Ambassador underlined importance of widest possible participation in the elections and strict observance of election laws by all.

September 3 - Prime Minister was urged to take all necessary steps to protect voters from VC harassment and to encourage maximum voter participation on a free basis.

6. Constituent Assembly election held September 11 - Election closely observed by American Embassy, other embassies, hugh foreign press corps, and independent observers. Election was described as free and fair. VC terror failed to disrupt elections.

7. Constituent Assembly met to draft constitution - It was not a government "rubber stamp." U.S. officials used all appropriate means to underline with government and Assembly members the importance we placed on the development of democratic institutions.

8. Manila Conference (October 1966) - Vietnamese reported on democratic political progress. President Johnson and other leaders encouraged development of democratic institutions and urged that electoral process be honest and open. Vietnamese leaders promised early promulgation of constitution and "within six months thereafter to select a representative government." President Johnson and other leaders "concurred in the conviction that building representative constitutional government . . . was indispensable to the future of a free Viet-Nam."

9. During meetings of the Constituent Assembly, U. S. officials repeatedly encouraged democratic development.

Examples:

-- Secretary Rusk, in December visit to Saigon, emphasized to governmental and non-governmental leaders the importance of unobstructed progress toward constitutional government and for free and fair elections for representative institutions.

-- Ambassador Lodge told Chief of State Thieu (on January 19, 1967) that U.S. had a deep interest in the progress of the constitution and in free elections for a president representing a real choice by the Vietnamese people.

-- On Feb. 8, Ambassador Lodge again discussed with the Chief of State the importance of assuring broad civilian representation in the Vietnamese government.

-- Ambassador Goldberg, visiting Saigon in March 1967, discussed with Vietnamese officials and others the importance of developing representative political institutions in Viet-Nam.

-- William Bundy, in Saigon later that month, emphasized the importance of honest elections.

10. Guam Conference (March 20-21, 1967) - Prime Minister Ky gave President Johnson a copy of the completed Constitution. There was full discussion of the document and of the steps that would follow. President Johnson stressed the importance of avoiding destructive divisions among the military and between military and civilians and underlined the critical need for free, fair and honest political developments. Vietnamese leaders pledged the development of a "freely-elected, popularly chosen government."

11. In the post-Guam period, local elections were held over a period of weeks with substantial voter turnout. More than 14,000 local officials have been elected so far. By all accounts, these elections have been honest.

12. Constituent Assembly began to write electoral laws. U.S. Embassy made U.S. views clear. There were literally thousands of contacts with Vietnamese leaders and politicians in this period.

Examples:

-- April 6 - Ambassador urged Prime Minister Ky to work closely with the Assembly and to assure electoral laws that would provide for fair and free elections, equitable opportunities for candidates, and safeguards against electoral frauds.

-- Again in April, Chief of State Thieu was reminded of the importance of the coming elections and that conduct of the elections would affect Viet-Nam's international position.

-- On May 23, Embassy reported it had contacted all factions and made clear the importance of conducting free elections.

-- May 30 - Ambassador Bunker talked with Prime Minister Ky and emphasized the importance we placed on the constitutional process and on the elections in which we expected the free will of the people would be expressed.

-- June 20 - Ambassador Bunker again emphasized to Vietnamese leaders the importance of free elections.

-- July 1 - Vice President Humphrey repeated to a high Vietnamese official (General Chieu in Seoul) our deep concern with the development of democratic government and honest elections.

13. Secretary McNamara, under instructions from President Johnson, told Vietnamese leaders in July in unmistakable terms of the importance we attached to free and fair elections.

14. Clark Clifford and General Taylor, again on instructions from the President, stated repeatedly and frankly the importance for all concerned that the elections be free and honest.

15. Throughout the current evolution of political institutions in Viet-Nam, the United States has made its support for the establishment of representative government clear and unequivocal. Official statements have continually stressed to the government and all candidates that it is important "that all those concerned in the election recognize that the primary need is that the elections be fair and honest, so that the encouraging development of the political process can be maintained, and so that the Vietnamese people, including military leaders, unite behind whatever government emerges from the elections."

This public statement by the Department of State was repeated on June 30, July 28 and August 11.

In Saigon, on July 15, in a talk before the Vietnamese Journalist Association, Ambassador Bunker restated the position of the U. S.

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- 6 -

Government. He stressed that the U.S. "supports no single candidate and we oppose none." He also said that the world was watching the elections closely, that free and fair elections would demonstrate to the world that South Viet-Nam is its own master, and that the press has an important role to play in insuring success for the movement toward representative government.

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47

Monday, August 14, 1967 - AM

~~1- Susp~~  
2- Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a current situation report on the Congo. You may want to glance over it before your session with President Kayibanda.

Ed Hamilton

47a

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Monday, August 14, 1967 -- 11:15 AM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congo Situation Report

(For your meeting with Rwandan President Kayibanda -- 12:30 today)

1. The mercenaries remain holed up in Bukavu, the eastern Congolese city on the border of Rwanda. The Belgians think Schramme is thinking seriously about negotiating his departure through Rwanda. But there is also evidence that Schramme still expects reinforcements from the Portuguese colony of Angola. If more mercenaries do arrive, we expect very serious racial trouble.
2. A Congolese mob burned and looted the Belgian Embassy at Kinshasa this morning. Some windows were also broken at the American Embassy before Mobutu was able to intervene.
3. The Belgians have called a meeting in Brussels today to talk about evacuation of Europeans from the Congo (40,000 Belgians, 1800 U.S., if the entire country must be evacuated). Along with our ambassador, the British, Italian and French envoys will attend.
4. The Congolese have just asked McBride how we would view their breaking relations with Belgium. McBride is trying to discourage this, but he is afraid the decision may already have been made.
5. The Russians have made overtures in response to Mobutu's plea to the Security Council for military help. So far, they have only asked for details on what the Congolese need. Mobutu still seems inclined to avoid involvement with the Russians -- and he knows the problems it would cause here -- but he is keeping us carefully advised of his conversations, in part as a negotiating tactic in support of his outstanding request to us for B-26's, T-28's, pilots, and ammunition.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-295  
By ijp, NARA, Date 6-22-95

Edward K. Hamilton

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*1- Suspense*  
*2- Presidential file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

48

Monday  
August 14, 1967

Mr. President:

Here is a worrisome account of Prime Minister Ky's outburst to his staff which he knew would reach our ears.

Bromley Smith

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 14, 1967

TEXT OF CIA MESSAGE



1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

**SUBJECT: Prime Minister Ky's Intention to Demonstrate that he is still the Man in Charge, and his Displeasure at American Pressure**

As a close political adviser to Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky was leaving the latter's office at about 6:30 p. m. on August 11, shortly after Ky had met with Ambassador Bunker, he remarked to Ky that Director General of the National Police Brigadier General Nguyen Lgoc Loan was in an outer office waiting to see Ky. Minister of Social Welfare Nguyen Xuan Phong, Ky's campaign manager, and several others were also in the aide's room.

Ky was in good humor and responded that he needed to talk to Loan. After a few minutes of inconsequential conversation, Loan asked Ky to refrain henceforth from making sensational declarations while on trips to the provinces, or in statements in public or to the press, either local or foreign.

Ky suddenly became irritated and replied that it was his duty to speak his thoughts openly and that he had just finished explaining his position to Ambassador Bunker that afternoon. Ky said he had told the Ambassador that it was a waste of time for Ky to discuss such matters as campaign facilities with the various civilian Presidential candidates and that it was necessary instead to conserve everyone's efforts, including those of the Army and the population to fight the war. Ky then described the civilian candidates as "ordure" (dirt, filth, excrement), "traitors," and "destroyers of the national interest," and said that if they continued to group together and to attack him, it was very probable that he would set aside or cancel the elections.

Ky remarked that since everyone has said his position as Vice President will be to sit and take it easy, he is going

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to demonstrate to them that this is not true, that it is he "who decides, he who does everything," that his role is not to be discounted, and that he will not be content to "sit in his armchair and do nothing!"

When Ky finished these remarks, Loan remained quiet and appeared embarrassed. In order to save the situation, Ky's political adviser spoke up and stated that he felt Loan was perfectly right, noting that he, himself, had recently urged Ky to take the same course. The adviser went on to say that if Ky needed to present his ideas frankly, he should do so within the walls of his own office and among his close associates only. He added that it would be much better if Ky were to allow Nguyen Can Loc, the official representative of the Thieu-Ky ticket, to make his (Ky's) statements for him.

In recounting his meeting with Ambassador Bunker to some of his close associates, Ky commented that he felt under considerable pressure from the American government. Ky made it clear that he does not like to bow to American pressure, "particularly when he has done everything he can as regards fair and equal treatment of the opposing civilian candidates."

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Authority RAC 16195

By polico NARA. Date 5-11-06

Monday, August 14, 1967

49

*Pres file*

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Military Control Organization

Today's situation report on Viet-Nam politics noted a report that the generals have written a "Charter" for their planned Supreme Military Committee. The purpose of the committee is clear: to maintain military control over the government after the election.

It is, in effect, a scheme for "guided democracy" in which a half dozen generals would decide finally what was good and bad for the country.

Our text of the alleged "Charter" (22 pages) came from a usually reliable source in the Vietnamese military. CIA is checking on the authenticity of the document. They are also checking on whether it is merely a draft, or whether it has actually been adopted by the generals (including Thieu and Ky).

Ambassador Bunker notes that this plan is "completely at variance with Ky's statement to me on August 11 that any report of an intention to set up an inner military group to run the government could be flatly denied."

The Ambassador is clearly riled. He has said that if the report is verified, "I will plan to take this matter up in an appropriate way with Ky, since we cannot continue a relationship of confidence with him in such circumstances."

It is understandable that the military leaders should want a continuing role of importance in the affairs of their government and their country. It is quite another for them to plan to send down the drain much of the patient and constructive work of the past year and a half in the development of representative government. It is also shocking, if true, for the Prime Minister to lie to our Ambassador in this fashion.

I believe Bunker is in a mood to meet this one head-on and that he will do so in an appropriate way. We shall be following this closely.

W. W. Rostow

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