

~~Mr. Smith~~

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2- President Mr.

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August 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Mr. Malcolm A. Tarlov

You may recall that Walt Rostow earlier sent you a long account of Mr. Tarlov's visit to Israel. We have had the State Department go over it in detail, and they will be in touch with Mr. Tarlov about some of the details which he reports.

However, you may wish to acknowledge directly with the attached letter.

Harold H. Saunders

Att: suggested reply to Malcolm A. Tarlov by Pres.

August 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Tarlov:

Thank you for writing me about your recent visit to Israel and Austria. Your letters were full of the flavor of the fast-moving mood in Israel, and I am grateful to you for sharing your reflections in such detail. In fact, I found your impressions so interesting that I have passed them around among senior officers in the Department of State, who have a special interest in the Near East. Now that they have reflected on your report, I gather they may be in touch with you on some of its details.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Malcolm A. Tarlov,
National Commander,
Jewish War Veterans of the
United States of America
1712 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

LBJ: HHS:lw

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July 26, 1967
Wednesday - 2:15 p.m.

FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW

For appropriate reply and handling.

Marvin Watson

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 25, 1967

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MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a letter to the President from Malcolm A. Tarlov, National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans, reporting on his recent trip to Israel and Austria. Regarding Israel, Tarlov reports that he believes the question of Jerusalem is not negotiable and that any Israeli official who attempts to negotiate at this point, will be out of office. He believes that the balance of the territory acquired in the war is negotiable.

He reports on the great amount of captured military equipment which he saw. He also says that the Israelis are using psychological warfare by showing captured Egyptian soldiers, the lack of destruction, and the advanced economy of Israel. He reports that Israel captured 150 Russian officers.

He states that the President is truly a great hero in Israel. He says that the Israelis feel that American support is the only support upon which Israel can rely. He states that DeGaulle is a great disappointment to the Israelis. He says that there is strong resentment against Russia's role. He points out that there is more pity than censure of King Hussein, and that there is hope that Hussein might be persuaded to recognize Israel in time. He says that there is a difference of opinion in the Israeli government as to Nasser, some thinking that he is the best Israel can hope for, and others feeling that he is a world menace.

He reports that General Dayan is not idolized by Israelis as is the case in this country, but rather the hero is General Rabin. He also reports that Eban is not popular in Israel.

On Austria, he reports that he met with Chancellor Klaus. Klaus is very much against the partition of Jerusalem, but not necessarily sympathetic to the Israeli cause because of his concern over the communist neighbors of Austria.

Marvin

PRESIDENTIAL COPY

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JEWISH WAR VETERANS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1712 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N. W., WASHINGTON, D. C. 20009

July 25, 1967



OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COMMANDER
MALCOLM A. TARLOV

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President:

At the suggestion of Mr. Markman of your office, I am presenting a brief but relatively comprehensive report on my recent three-day visit to Israel and also a brief statement about my visit with Chancellor Klaus in Vienna, Austria. Please bear in mind, sir, that these statements are, for the most part, my own impressions, and I hope that you will take them as such.

ISRAEL

There is little question in my mind that the official position of the Israeli government, as expressed by many of the high officials with whom I met, will make any change in the current status of the entire city of Jerusalem very difficult. The opinion seems to be that for the first time Jerusalem is a peaceful and quiet city, open to people of all races and creeds. There has always been a great deal of Israeli resentment against the exclusion of Jews from the holy places in the old city. Officials in Mr. Eshkol's administration are particularly incensed by the Jordanian treatment of Jewish holy places and, most particularly, the Jewish cemeteries in the former Jordanian territory. An item particularly horrifying to these officials is the fact that the Intercontinental Hotel, owned by Pan-American Airways, a U. S. corporation, is built on the site of a Jewish cemetery, a cemetery containing the grave of Henrietta Szold, long-time Zionist heroine who was born in Baltimore and is considered the founder of Hadassah. There is even some talk of requiring that the Intercontinental be torn down. There certainly seems little chance that it will be used by the Israeli citizens or by any other Jewish people because of its location.

The balance of the currently held territories is negotiable; at least, it seems so to me. The Israelis are seriously doubtful that they can either administer, protect, or use all of this territory. Of course, there is strong feeling that there must be free, unfettered passage through the Straits of Tiran and Israel will insist upon the freedom of passage through the Suez Canal.

The one area which again could cause some difficulty, should negotiations take place, is the strip jutting into the Sinai which has been used to threaten Israel on several occasions, most recently on June 4th, when the Egyptian seventh armored division moved in.

Israeli public opinion is not as flexible as the official position, in my opinion, on Jerusalem. It is at least identical, if not stronger, with the general opinion summed up as being "that any governmental official who gives up any part of Jerusalem will be gone within twenty-four hours." Israelis are also inclined to feel that all the territory should be retained since it was "captured with their blood." However, I have little doubt the public opinion is currently motivated by the fact that the memories of the six-day war are still fresh, and I do believe a more realistic view will prevail in the near future.

I was taken on a tour of fields and fields of captured equipment, primarily from Jordan and Egypt, with some additional Syrian materiel. This equipment consisted of tanks of all kinds, including many Pattons, half-tracks, and motorized transports of all kinds. Many Jordanian and Egyptian trucks, jeeps, and half-tracks are currently in use throughout Israel, and many Israeli soldiers are carrying U.A.R. hand firearms, whether for show or officially, I am not sure. I was also quite amazed to find that captured Egyptian soldiers were being taken on two-man tours of the Israeli territory under guard, some in mufti and some in uniform, so that they could be released and return to Egypt and indicate that there was no destruction to any great degree in Israel, and that the Israelis truly had an advanced economy.

Of interest was a remark made to me by a government official that there were approximately 150 Russian officers captured. One seriously wounded general was immediately released in order to avoid additional international complications to those already current. This is not general knowledge in Israel since I did not hear this in any of my discussions with any military personnel or officials of the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, you surely must be aware that for a non-Israeli, you are the hero of Israel, and that a recent opinion poll showed that general public opinion parallels the official position. As noted, Mr. Eban, in his visit to this country during the last weekend in May, had tacit approval from you that our country would not interfere in the peace terms and not force Israel to "lose the peace after winning the war." Israeli government people with whom I spoke, both in the Defense Department and in the Foreign Office, were well aware of your strong support for the State of Israel and were most thankful for it.

In general, the man on the street feels that American support is the only support upon which Israel can truly rely. The persistent fear for the future is the loss of American support for a final peaceful settlement. Obviously, Israelis are most grateful for financial support from Jews all over the world, and particularly American Jews who responded so generously.

The biggest disappointment to the government and to the public is General DeGaulle and the official French position. There is a great feeling officially in Israel that this position was motivated by DeGaulle's strong need to break all ties with the United States, the statement being made on several occasions that DeGaulle may not be anti-Israel but may be opposed to anything supported by the United States. Regarding France, despite their knowledge that the French people resent DeGaulle's position, there will be no change so long as DeGaulle is alive. It is interesting to note that the French Ambassador to Israel made a public speech, while I was there, in which he traced the historical pattern of diplomatic representatives who have had to take positions on behalf of their governments, which they did not necessarily approve. While he did not specifically refer to this situation, it was obvious that he was indicating his displeasure with DeGaulle's position.

There is, of course, officially and unofficially, strong resentment against Russia's role, and a much firmer recognition of what you have said and we have been saying for many months that Russia and the Communist world is attempting to gain by force what it has not been able to gain politically throughout the world. There is a definite public opinion, as there has always been an official position, that United States support for the South Vietnamese government parallels very closely the position in Israel. I stress again that I found no official, and very little public, resentment of the fact that the United States did not militarily become involved. The official position being that as long as the United States remained militarily aloof, there was no danger of Russia being involved. The Israelis were not concerned militarily about any or all of the Arab enemies. There is a smattering of public opinion that the United States, if it had acted faster in the matter of the Straits of Tiran, could have prevented the war, but the official posture is that the final results make it obvious that any postponement of the military effort could have only hurt the State of Israel.

It is interesting to note the prevailing attitude that King Hussein of Jordan is "more to be pitied than censured." It was the strong belief of the government of Israel, as indicated to me at 8:00 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, on June 5th in Washington, and again two weeks ago by Mr. Eban and Ambassador Harman in New York, that Jordan was expected to accept Israel's first offer, through General Bull, to remain out of the conflict

and thus avoid any attack from Israel; and that later the same day about Noon, Israeli time, King Hussein would accept the offer again issued through General Bull to make a more or less face-saving military gesture. The official people in Israel are aware of the fact that the U.A.R. commanders of Jordanian troops may have been responsible for the action, despite Hussein's reluctance. There is some official hope that Hussein will, as rumored, be the first to break the solid Arab front against Israel and that if this is done, other moderate Arab leaders will follow suit. Many of the people in the street in Israel, recalling Hussein's grandfather, are hopeful that he will once again become either their friend or at least not as strong an enemy as he seemed to indicate he was in his last-minute treaty with Nasser.

It is interesting again that the feeling on the current disposition of Nasser is also not unanimous. On this score, in conversations with public relations officers from the Department of Defense and from the Foreign Office, there was a divergence of opinion. The Defense Department feels that Israel is better off with Nasser in power since they know what they have, "an incompetent, bumbling egotist," and they do not know what they will get as a replacement, while the Foreign Office, I believe rightly, feels that Nasser is a world menace and hope that he will be deposed in the not too distant future. However, in my view, this is not a serious split in official Israeli thinking.

Finally, on the State of Israel, it was not surprising to note that the American Jewish idolization of General Dayan is not shared by most Israelis, both in the official government, obviously politically motivated to some extent, and in the public eye. I have the distinct impression that if Dayan were proposed by the opposition party as premier, he would have a great difficulty receiving any substantial number of votes. It is recognized that Dayan was necessary for morale purposes on June 2nd, when he assumed the defense portfolio, but General Itzhak Rabin, the long-time Chief of Staff, is responsible as the architect of the military effort. General Rabin is probably the most popular military hero of the day, followed not too distantly by General Hod, General Yoffe, whose tank corps took Sharm el Shekh, and General Chaym Herzog. The people of Israel also do not share the American, and especially the American Jewish, high regard for Foreign Minister Eban. I believe that this is due to his personal aloofness and the fact that he is a South African rather than a native-born Sabra or a refugee from European terrorism. Eban is respected but he is certainly not admired and is not a political figure.

Briefly, my impressions, after three days in Israel, are that the Israeli people are relatively unconcerned about the future, providing that American support in peace efforts continue. The people have the strong feeling that this is not

necessarily the final round and their opinion, as expressed to me by General Avrom Yoffe, the tank corps commander, is that Israel tries to be ready for the next one and forgets fighting the last one. They have some resentment at the feeling of the people of the world that this was a "picnic" and wish the world to know that it was not an easy war and, in percentage terms, it was quite costly. They are aware of the comparison between their losses and their population as contrasted with American population and bandy the figure that the figure would be comparable to 65,000 American casualties. It is amazing to me, as to everyone who has had a chance to study the situation, that Israel could mobilize as swiftly as it did, but as an intelligence officer said, "Israel is a twelve-month army, usually on eleven-month military leave."

AUSTRIA

Through the offices of Ambassador Lemberger of Austria, I led a delegation of five members of the Jewish War Veterans to Vienna for three days of discussion with the Department of Education and the Ministry of Justice, as well as with Chancellor Klaus. We discussed the potential growth of Nazism in the Bavarian section of Austria, and also what we feel to be Austria's failure to recognize its culpability for the Nazi era.

Generally, the discussions were interesting but not particularly useful, except for the period that I spent with Chancellor Klaus. The Chancellor held a state luncheon for me to which most of the members of the Cabinet were invited. Other official government officers, our delegation, and two representatives of the Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen of Great Britain, were around the table with the Chancellor, with the benefit of an interpreter.


During the conversation, the Chancellor asked if I minded discussing the Middle Eastern situation since I had just returned from there. He was most interested in my impressions, and in the course of the discussion, he volunteered some strong viewpoints on the old city of Jerusalem. Chancellor Klaus indicated that he, as an individual, stressing this was not the official position, although I have been informed that Klaus is indeed the official position of Austria, felt that the city of Jerusalem should remain united and since it is currently under Israeli control, it should remain that way. I did not get the impression that he was strongly pro-Israel in this respect but rather pro- one government control over the city of Jerusalem. He indicated that Austria had lived through a period of internationalization, knew its perils, and the fact that it was not workable. He said that he personally did not approve of any effort to internationalize Jerusalem and, while he would reluctantly accept internationalization of some of

the holy places if necessary, he hoped that also could be avoided. Chancellor Klaus stressed the fact that he was a devout Catholic and that it took a great deal of soul-searching for him to arrive at this decision.

I indicated to the Chancellor that Israel was gratified for Austrian support in the recent United Nations General Assembly session, and he responded that this also took a great deal of thought since they were only sixty kilometers from Communist territory on two sides and would naturally have a great deal of reluctance, militarily, to taking a position against the Communist world. I have the opinion that Austria's position was strengthened by Rumania's actions in the General Assembly. Chancellor Klaus did not indicate this but in conversations with the Israeli Ambassador and Mr. Simon Wiesenthal, the head of the Nazi Documentation Center, I learned that they had a long and difficult job to convince the Chancellor to accept this position. My estimate is that Wiesenthal's opinion has the greatest weight in this matter since there is a great deal of fear in Austria for Wiesenthal's ability through his public forum to bring the wrath of the world down upon Austria for its failure to adequately prosecute Nazi criminals and adequately purge its own government of Nazis.

Mr. President, I trust that this information will be of interest to you and possibly of some value. If I can provide you with any further information, obviously I will be most pleased. As I indicated at the start of this report, Mr. Markman received most of the information verbally on July 24th and suggested that I make this written report to you.

Respectfully,



Malcolm A. Tarlov
National Commander

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August 14, 1967

Mr. President:

Lieutenant General Spike Momyer, Air Force Commander in Vietnam, is in Washington for the Stennis Subcommittee hearings. He is scheduled to testify Wednesday morning, the 16th.

While he is in Washington, you may wish to have him report to you on the progress of the air campaign against North Vietnam's transport system.

Bromley Smith

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


April 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Tarlov:

Thank you for writing me about your recent visit to Israel and Austria. Your letters were full of the flavor of the fast-moving mood in Israel, and I am grateful to you for sharing your reflections in such detail. In fact, I found your impressions so interesting that I have passed them around among senior officers in the Department of State, who have a special interest in the Near East. Now that they have reflected on your report, I gather they may be in touch with you on some of its details.

With kind personal regards,

Sincerely,



Mr. Malcolm A. Tarlov,
National Commander,
Jewish War Veterans of the
United States of America
1712 New Hampshire Avenue N.W.
Washington, D. C.

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Saturday, August 12, 1967
7:30 P. M.

Mr. President:

This is General Westmoreland's
detailed Military Assessment for
July in readable form.

Clark Clifford and Gen. Taylor
have copies.

Bromley Smith

Pres file

August 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR CLARK CLIFFORD

The President asked us to send you this afternoon the following documents which are attached:

1. General Westmoreland's military assessment for July.
2. An extract from Ambassador Bunker's fifteenth weekly message dated August 9, 1967.
3. A message sent by the President to Secretary McNamara when he was in Saigon July 9.
4. The text of the Bunker message just received summarizing Saigon's view of the election.

The President suggested that in your television appearance tomorrow you deal firmly with the current charges about the Vietnamese election. He asked that you consider using material from your own report concerning what you told the Vietnamese about the elections.

It is my understanding that Bill Bundy will be briefing you tomorrow, Sunday, but you may wish to read the enclosed material prior to that time.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

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Friday, August 11, 1967

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Military Assessment for July

The assessment for the month of July is broken down into the four Corps Tactical Zones from North to South to give what I hope is a better feel for what is happening here.

First Corps

My primary objective in the First Corps during the month of July was to deny entry of North Vietnam Army Units into South Vietnam and to destroy as much of the enemy's force, including artillery, as possible. This was accomplished.

We destroyed enemy forces and logistical installations in base areas 116 and 122 and established a fire support base for the interdiction of the A Shau Valley by 175 mm guns. Efforts to establish and improve the strong point obstacle system along the demilitarized zone were continued while conducting search and destroy operations in and south of the demilitarized zone. To fulfill these objectives, ten major ground operations were conducted, four major operations were continued, and five amphibious operations were conducted. In addition, vital base areas were defended and patrols, numerous ambushes, and small unit actions were carried out.

All objectives were fulfilled except a sweep of base area 114 and prevention of the enemy 122 mm rocket attack on Da Nang Airbase.

Progress in First Corps Tactical Zone is best indicated by the heavy enemy losses: a confirmed 3,877 enemy killed, 2,062 weapons captured. The number of enemy killed by Army of the Republic of Vietnam was the second highest level of the year, 12,906 by body count. In two major contacts during the period, two enemy battalions, the 800th and 808th, were rendered ineffective.

Large caches of enemy supplies were captured as a result of Free World Military Assistance Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations, including one enemy sea-going trawler containing sufficient weapons and munitions to support three Viet Cong battalions. Five enemy battalions in lower Quang Tri/Thua Thien suffered severe losses in July; and are having recruitment problems and are believed to be considerably under strength.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By reg NARA Date 9-3-91

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The majority of the prisoners of war have identified themselves as infiltrators from North Vietnam rather than local recruits. Interrogation of prisoners of war and returnees taken South of route 9 reveal a definite shortage of food and medical supplies. To add to their problems, we captured, evacuated, or destroyed 135 tons of rice last month.

From 2 to 14 July, seven marine battalions in Operation Buffalo were employed to counter the enemy threat from the demilitarized zone. Significant in this engagement was the enemy's use of large quantities of mortar/artillery/rocket fire. (1,393 mortar rounds, 1,455 artillery rounds, and unidentified rocket rounds). Cumulative results for this operation included 159 U.S. killed and 885 U.S. wounded. The enemy suffered 1,281 killed.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam units conducted 13 large operations and 5,494 small operations. Of the large operations, six were combined and four were heliborne. These operations, in all five provinces, resulted in 759 Viet Cong/North Vietnam Army killed, 270 enemy weapons captured. Army of the Republic of Vietnam losses were 64 killed and 254 wounded. The overall morale and fighting spirit of First Corps units is good. The conflict is being carried to the enemy, especially in the 1st division tactical area. Army of the Republic of Vietnam units have been able to maintain a favorable kill and weapons captured versus weapons lost ratio; however, Army of the Republic of Vietnam contacts with the enemy are not decisive since total destruction of the enemy units is not achieved. Accordingly, over a period of time the enemy is able to reconstitute and rebuild.

On 10 July the remaining closed section of national route number 1 from Mo Duc to Second Corps Tactical Zone boundary was opened thus permitting commercial and military vehicles to traverse the entire 387 kilometers from the demilitarized zone to Second Corps Tactical Zone boundary. This is the first time this highway has been opened for this distance since 1965. Moderate progress continues on the upgrading of both route number 1 and number 9. During July,

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540 feet of new bridging were completed while 1,350 feet were repaired and upgraded. During July, 132 kilometers of highway were repaired which facilitates the movement of military and civil traffic. In addition to road improvements, emphasis is continuing on expanding and improving air transport. At present there are 21 airfields open to C-7A aircraft, 17 to C-123's and 10 to C-130's.

Revolutionary Development and civic action made progress but remained behind schedule. There are 89 new life hamlets and 40 consolidated hamlets undergoing construction in the I Corps Tactical Zone during July fourteen South Vietnamese Army battalions, one Regional Force battalion, twenty-seven Regional Force companies and 182 Popular Force platoons are presently in direct support of the Corps Tactical Zone Revolutionary Development Program. Viet Cong incidents and attacks on Revolutionary Development remained at the June level but friendly casualties were half the average of the last quarter. In areas where military operations have been conducted, higher morale and increased effectiveness are apparent.

The elements of three enemy divisions along the Demilitarized Zone continued to make incursions south of the Demilitarized Zone. The enemy maintains an estimated 45 maneuver battalions of the North Vietnamese Army, Main Force and Local Force Viet Cong in I Corps Tactical Zone.

During July, the enemy increased his use of mortar, artillery and rockets against friendly forces, firing a total of 6,965 rounds as compared to 4,009 rounds fired during June. Two thirds of the enemy artillery was fired in northeastern Quang Tri Province. In spite of detailed planning and aggressive patrolling in the previously established rocket belt around the Da Nang airfield complex, the enemy successfully infiltrated and fired the longer range 122 mm rocket against the airfield, causing a significant loss of personnel, aircraft, and damage to facilities. Enemy efforts, except in the Demilitarized Zone, have been devoted primarily to unconventional warfare avoiding significant action whenever possible.

Along the Demilitarized Zone/Ben Hai River Front, confrontation is characterized by exchanges of artillery fire and sporadic ground fighting which is intense and usually of short duration. The enemy has

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concentrated his effort in populated areas with emphasis on those actions which, if successful, have a potentially high propaganda value. One such attack involved the partial destruction of a large South Vietnamese Army convoy; another, the seizure and opening of the Joi An provincial jail; and a third was the rocket attack on Da Nang. The enemy buildup north of the Demilitarized Zone during the latter part of June and early July caused me to concentrate large forces in this area to counter the threat. Throughout July the North Vietnamese Army continued to maintain pressure all along the northern I Corps Tactical Zone border.

The objective in II Corps Tactical Zone was to prevent enemy infiltration into the Corps Tactical Zone, destroy the base areas of enemy regular forces, open lines of communication, and expand security of the population. Seventeen of the twenty-three Military Advisory Command of Vietnam designated enemy base areas were penetrated, resulting in 54 enemy killed, 16 prisoners and 1,500 tons of rice captured or destroyed. Penetration of these areas forced the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army to keep on the move, to commit a significant portion of their military forces to food production, and for the movement of supplies.

In the II Corps Tactical Zone steady though not dramatic progress is discernable in virtually every segment of our endeavor. The South Vietnamese Army in up to four battalion strength worked in close harmony with the U. S. units involved in Operation Greeley in the Kontum-Dak To area. Employing a force of four brigades, Operations Francis Marion and Greeley frustrated enemy intentions through constant search and destroy actions.

For the month of July the cost of continued conflict remained unfavorable to the enemy; 1,536 killed compared with 272 friendly losses. This assumes even greater significance when one considers that the enemy is encountering increasing difficulty in recruiting within II Corps Tactical Zone. His will to fight appears to be waning gradually as witnessed by the loss of 363 prisoners of war and 107 crew served weapons for the period.

In the coastal provinces, resupply by the enemy to his beleaguered formations is tenuous over extended and insecure lines of communications. His condition there is worsened by systematic

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destruction of his bases which has resulted in reduced food and supply stockages. Prisoners of war from the 3d and 5th North Vietnamese divisions were unanimous in stating that food is scarce, sickness a problem, and morale is low.

An increase in confidence and aggressiveness of Army of the Republic of Vietnam units, plus improvement in their effectiveness is noted. During July, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units conducted 30 airmobile operations which lifted 10,163 troops. This is an increase of 3,605 over the then all time high of 6,558 troops involved in airmobile operations during the preceding month.

For July, Government of Vietnam forces devoted 575 battalion days to search and destroy operations and 275 to security operations. Whereas the latter decreased approximately 50 percent compared to June, search and destroy operations increased approximately 70 percent.

The 9th Republic of Korea and Capital Republic of Korea infantry divisions in Phu Yen Province enjoyed notable success in terms of large personnel and equipment losses inflicted primarily on the North Vietnamese 95th regiment, and on thwarting accomplishment of enemy objectives in Phu Yen Province. During August, Republic of Korea forces will expand their coastland security operations by seeking out elements of the North Vietnamese 18th regiment in Khanh Hoa Province. The latter unit has manifested no inclination to change its thirteen month old objective of avoiding combat. It has received no reinforcements since arrival in South Vietnam and has a high rate of malaria.

During July continued improvement in opening of roads has permitted increased use of land lines of communication to support military operations and the civilian economy. At present, 1,615 kilometers (89.8 percent) of the major roads are in a green or amber condition. Route 1 is open from Phan Rang North into Quang Ngai Province. Route 19 is open from Qui Nhon west to the Cambodian Border, with 10 miles west from Qui Nhon having been paved in July. Route 14 is open from Dak to South to the Third Corps Tactical Zone boundary. Route 21 is open from Ban Me Thuot east to Ninh Hoa.

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Route 20 is open from the Third Corps Tactical Zone boundary to Dalat, and Route 11 from Dalat to Phan Rang.

In July, a C-130 airfield with steel surface at Phu Hiep was opened. Providing 41 C-130 airfields in the Corps; a new C-123 airfield was opened in Binh Tanh. A total of 79 fields are now open to C-7A's, 60 to C-123's and 41 to C-130's in the Second Corps.

Revolutionary development is progressing with security improved to some degree. However, Viet Cong attacks on revolutionary development teams is a continuing threat as evidenced by 26 Viet Cong armed attacks during July. Army of the Republic of Vietnam's operational competence is being engendered by increased emphasis on training. During July 2 South Vietnamese battalions completed revolutionary development support training. Thus far, 24 of 30 battalions have received revolutionary development support training with the six remaining battalions scheduled to complete their revolutionary development support training by ^{mid} September. In support of revolutionary development as of this date are 8 Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions, 123 regular force companies, and 728 popular force platoons.

The enemy has been without a major victory in the Corps during the past two years. He seeks to tie down a large force and inflict maximum casualties on Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Forces in the central highlands. His objectives include the destruction of the revolutionary development program, disruption of the September elections, and maintenance of a presence and influence in heavily populated areas. It appears the enemy hopes to draw major friendly forces away from the coastal areas of the Second Corps and redress the losses he has sustained in those areas. This strategy has been unsuccessful to date.

In the coastal provinces of Khanh Hoa and Phu Yen, the enemy, although continuing a defense posture, sabotaged roads, railways, pipelines in a modest scale and conducted small unit attacks against regular force/popular force posts and revolutionary development cadre. His aim appears to be maintenance of the tactical integrity of his forces, while awaiting favor and opportunities to expand control over the population and resources in the rich lowland districts. In the western highlands the morale and overall condition of enemy units are good. This assessment stems from the fact that his sanctuary base

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areas in Cambodia and Laos lie close to established supply routes. Food, medical supplies and ammunition are available in adequate quantities. North Vietnamese killed in action and prisoners of war in Kon Tum and Pleiku Provinces have been described by their captors as well equipped, well fed, and in good physical condition.

Third Corps

Our Monsoon objectives were to disrupt and defeat enemy offensive actions; harass and, if possible, destroy main force elements; maintain continuous pressure on Viet Cong regional and local force units; increase the tempo of the revolutionary development program; neutralize enemy base areas; increase Army of the Republic of Vietnam effectiveness and improve security within the national priority area. During July, those objectives were fulfilled.

A review of events in the Third Corps supports the observation that it was a month of heartening progress both in terms of our success in attaining planned objectives, and the enemy's failure to attain his planned objectives. A notable example of the latter was seen in a Central Office of South Vietnam order which assigned a number of missions for the 5th battalion, Military Region IV, to accomplish during July. None of the missions were accomplished. The Viet Cong spring-summer campaign began 29 May and July was expected to be a period of maximum effort with the objectives of disrupting and discrediting the revolutionary development program, overrunning and destroying Government of Vietnam and allies posts, interdicting allied lines of communication and defeating allied offensive attacks. Their efforts to achieve significant results, including the two rocket attacks which caused relatively light damage, were unsuccessful. Positive progress is indicated in most areas of Third Corps. The cooperations and response accorded U.S. Advisors by Senior Corps Tactical Zone Commanders is favorable; this together with the increased Government of Vietnam attention to inadequate leadership has improved unit effectiveness. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi program were triple those of July 1966, indicating increasing morale and control problems within Viet Cong Ranks.

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- 8 -

Enemy losses for the month (KIA, PW, Hoi Chan) totalled 2,941. An increasing number of Viet Cong village and hamlet units are under-strength. In July combined 199th Brigade and 5 Ranger group operations in Gia Dinh Province greatly restricted Viet Cong activity in areas immediately adjacent to Saigon. No Viet Cong units larger than squad size moved in the area. The Commanding Officer, Viet Cong, Military Region IV requested permission from his superiors to move from Nha Be district because allied activity made it hazardous for Viet Cong units there.

South Vietnamese army units are continuing to improve in all areas.

Improvement in overall combat effectiveness was highlighted by several commendable Vietnamese actions: The South Vietnamese army's 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry at Tan hung by the South Vietnamese 2d and 3d Battalion, 46th infantry and the 3d Marine Battalion in operation Coronado; by the 613th Regional Force Company at Buong Sa on Route 2; by the 2d and 3d Marine Battalions in Operation Paddington; and by the 3d and 4th Marine Battalions in Operation Coronado II.

Vietcong base areas 303, Southern 1/3 of 355, Southern 2/3 of 356, Southeastern 2/3 of 357, 358, 365 and 369 and 370 were neutralized to the extent that they are no longer enemy sanctuaries and can be entered by allied units in company size strength.

Last month, South Vietnamese Army's troop behavior and relationships with the civilian community improved significantly. There were 4 programs initiated to improve Regional Forces, Popular Forces, South Vietnamese Army and Revolutionary Development team effectiveness: five intelligence centers were established at district level to attack Viet Cong infrastructure; A program for each US Brigade to train one South Vietnamese army Battalion every eight weeks was begun with approval of Commanding General, III Corps Tactical Zone; ten US mobile advisory teams were formed to advise Regional Force and Popular Force and two experimental Revolutionary Development augmentation teams were placed on site.

The principal land route 1 and 22 (Gia Ray to Tay Ninh, 1A, 4, 5, 13 (Saigon to Loc Ninh, 15 and 20 remained open with minor interruptions. Routes 1 and 4 were used frequently at night by military convoys, jungle clearings of the Ong Dong jungle and route 20 was 50 percent completed and Viet Cong tax collection on route 20 in 111 Tactical Zone was neutralized. Three additional Regional Force/Popular Force posts were constructed on this route in the area of air transport. There are 43 airfields opened to C-7A aircraft, 34 to C-123's and 27 to C-130's.

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- 9 -

Revolutionary Development activities in III Corps Tactical Zone for the month of July included the completion of six new life hamlets bringing the total of completed hamlets to 17 with 49 more under construction. Throughout III Corps Tactical Zone there are at present 17 South Vietnamese Army battalions, 75 Regional Forces companies and 245 Popular Forces platoons supporting Revolutionary Development activities either directly or indirectly.

The enemy, particularly the Viet Cong, increased their activity in the populated area west of the Ho Bo woods, carried out 21 assassinations and 51 attacks against police or Regional Force/Popular Force posts and launched two attacks by fire using 122 mm rockets against U.S. base camps at Phuoc Vinh and Phu Loi. They continued interdiction of the route between Song Be and Bu Dop.

Major unit operations within the IV Corps Tactical Zone continued to be orientated to the destruction of the Viet Cong main and provincial units and principal bases. The main battle seems to be concentrating in the key provinces of Dinh Toung, Dinh Long, Vinh Binh and Phong Dinh. This has been brought about by South Vietnamese Army concentration on Highway 4, the Mang Thit-Nicolai area, and the Revolutionary Development effort in Phong Dinh along the base. The South Vietnamese Army campaign plan and major Revolutionary Development efforts and Viet Cong interests appear to be on a collision course which should lead to more decisive events in both Military and Revolutionary Development in the future.

The general situation in the IV Corps Tactical Zone remained favorable during July. For the most part, the Viet Cong were dispersed and attempted to avoid contact; there were 130 major units operations of battalion size or larger size during July. There were eight operations conducted in enemy base areas. Operations such as Coo Long 63 in the Binh Dai base in Kien Hoa province have reduced the coastal areas of Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh to transient storage points. Defoliation of coastal bases continued to expose previously undetected enemy installations and allows increased interdiction by air and naval gunfire.

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- 10 -

There were a total of 54,292 small unit operations in July which resulted in 166 contacts. Although the number of small unit operations have continued to increase, their effectiveness remains difficult to judge because many are not observed by US Advisory elements. Although the kill ratio was a favorable 4.9 to 1, the total number of Viet Cong killed, 641, is the low monthly total for 1967.

The total number of Viet Cong initiated incidents continued to drop with 541 incidents recorded for the month of July compared to 619 in June. Although there has been steady progress and Revolutionary Development goals are about to be achieved, it can be expected that the Viet Cong will make a major effort to preclude such actions in the future. Another example of progress occurred in Chau Doc on 10 July. Three hundred seventy two irregular troops, who had previously been sympathetic to the cause, turned themselves in to Government Vietnam officials under the provision that they be organized into Regional Force forces. This incident points out the increased esteem being gained by South Vietnamese Army forces within the IV Corps Tactical Zone.

The performance of South Vietnamese Army continues to improve. The 7th South Vietnamese Army division is just completing an eight day operation in Dinh Tuong. One of the longest sustained South Vietnamese Army operations in the past two years. This division demonstrated a higher degree of flexibility than in the past in reacting to intelligence. The 9th South Vietnamese Army division over the past three months has shown a much greater desire to operate than in the past: As a result of the 9th South Vietnamese Army division activity the Revolutionary Development effort has been able to make progress. The 21st South Vietnamese Army division has shaken the lethargy resulting from its initial participation in the Revolutionary Development program, has reorganized, and is now in a position to produce results. South Vietnamese Army Senior Commanders seem to be more confident and optimistic than in the past. This is evident in their official estimates and in their desire to operate more often.

The status of major highways in the IV Corps Tactical Zone remained contested.

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-11-

The security status of the Mang Thit River was upgraded from Red to Amber due to the Government of Vietnam efforts to secure the area and open the Mang Thit River - Nicolai Canal complex to commercial traffic. Other major waterways of the Mekong Delta remained unchanged during July. Air transport is supported by 31 airfields open to C-7A aircraft, 20 to C-123's and 13 to C-130's

Revolutionary Development activities in IV Corps Tactical Zone are supported directly or indirectly by 15 South Vietnamese Army battalions, 52 Regional Force companies and 87 Popular Force platoons. The Viet Cong have placed emphasis on disrupting the Government of Vietnam Revolutionary Development and Pacification Program thinking it denies them freedom of movement and population control; although there has been no significant change in the progress of Revolutionary Development during July the reaction of the Viet Cong in IV Corps Tactical Zone against the program is evidence of its effect on Viet Cong control in the area.

In Kien Hoa Province, the Viet Cong remained strong and this province is a source of manpower and supplies. The 516th Provincial Mobile Battalion remains strong and virtually unharmed. Until operations such as Coronado V are conducted in Kien Hoa, this province will continue to serve as a Viet Cong source of strength. My estimate is that the position of the Viet Cong in the IV Corps Tactical Zone continues to deteriorate; all signs indicate that the combat strength of the Viet Cong combat elements continues to decrease, recruiting has been increasingly difficult, and that the major Viet Cong elements have had to disperse and avoid contact.

SUMMARY

The enemy appears to be continuing his strategy of (1) posing threats with main forces in an effort to draw friendly military strength from the critical populated areas, (2) seeking to cause increased attrition rates on friendly military forces while avoiding major contact, (3) enticing friendly forces into a posture where he can achieve a major tactical victory to enhance his political stature, attacking the South Vietnamese Pacification Program with particular emphasis on the Revolutionary Development cadre teams in order to destroy the Government of South Vietnam influence in the countryside. The credibility of the threat in the Demilitarized Zone and central highlands

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-12-

continues to require sizeable containment forces. Through the use of economy of force measures and superior mobility, we have been able to provide security in the critical population centers at an acceptable level. The maintenance of constant pressure on the enemy in these populated areas, especially the coastal lowlands, has caused growing weakness in the enemy military structure and as his coercive power declines, popular resistance to his increasing demands for support is rising; however, in the contested areas the population as a whole continues to adopt a wait and see attitude, providing willing support to neither side. The enemy reaction to friendly success in thwarting his strategy has been an increased use of attacks by fire. The enemy employment of 140 mm and 122 mm rockets continues to provide the greatest threat to critical installations; however, increased emphasis on offensively oriented security operations and on locating rocket units and their supply routes is expected to reduce the risk.

The Government of South Vietnam Pacification Program for 1967 is now gaining momentum, its implementation having been quite slow until after TET. In July, despite increased Viet Cong emphasis on disrupting the work of the Revolutionary Development cadre teams, several important gains were made. Several of the Revolutionary Development teams had completed their work in first semester hamlets and had begun movement to their second semester areas. Four additional South Vietnamese Army battalions had been assigned to direct support of Revolutionary Development and all of them had a rating of satisfactory in Revolutionary Development training. The Military Advisory Command of Vietnam Action Program would give increased thrust to pacification support was completed and disseminated to the field. An organization was formed to integrate and manage a combined U. S. and Government of Vietnam attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure.

In summary, our past month's operations reflect continuous and steady progress toward accomplishment of our overall objectives in South Vietnam.

SECRET

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wed Aug 9/67
Amb. Bunker weekly

-8-

53-

C. Military

I referred earlier to what seemed to me misrepresentations and unjustified criticisms of the state of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Some of these go to the extent of intimating that they are not only ineffective, but are unwilling to engage the enemy. The facts seem to me to be just the opposite. The record will show an increasing number of important engagements in which the Vietnamese forces have performed effectively. General Westmoreland's comments on this are to the point. In a memorandum to me yesterday, he said:

"In my view the recent improvement of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces combat effectiveness can be measured in terms of their willingness to carry the fight to the enemy, and to close with and destroy him in sharp, violent contact. They have demonstrated the well-disciplined attributes of professional soldiers, and a vastly improved ability to use their supporting arms and combat support. They have maneuvered with notable success and closed with the enemy. They have participated successfully with U. S. forces in multi-battalion operations."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ/CBS10

By regis, NARA, Date 9-4-91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

The following are some instances of recent engagements which show the improved performance of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces:

A) An example of ARVN willingness to close with and destroy the enemy took place in Quang Tri province 12 kilometers east of Dong Ha near the Demilitarized Zone the second week of July when the ARVN 2/1 Infantry Battalion attacked an estimated enemy battalion, killing 146 enemy. The 2/1 Infantry Battalion suffered 10 killed and 80 wounded.

B) Another example took place in the Fourth Corps Tactical Zone, four kilometers northwest of My Tho where the 7th ARVN Division conducted a search and destroy operation from July 26 to August 4, 1967. The 7th ARVN Division suffered 16 killed and 93 wounded in this action while the enemy lost 234 killed, 217 detained, 30 weapons and 35,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.

C) Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) are standing and fighting major engagements. The latest was in Binh Long province, 14 kilometers southwest of An Loc where, on August 7 at 12:35 a.m., the Tong Le Chon Special Forces CIDG Camp was attacked by approximately two battalions of the 165th North Vietnamese Army Regiment. The Infantry attack was preceded by an estimated two hundred rounds of mortar fire and supported by automatic weapons. A C-47 aircraft and tactical air supported the friendly elements. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the outer perimeter but was forced to withdraw. They lost 115 killed and a considerable quantity of weapons and equipment. Friendly forces suffered 21 CIDG killed and 70 wounded, four of which were US Special Forces personnel.

D) The determination and skill of the ARVN also is exemplified by a recent action of the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry in Binh Long province, ten kilometers east of An Loc. At 2:15 a.m., July 11, the 2nd Battalion, 141 North Vietnamese Army mounted a coordinated attack against the ARVN 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, using small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and grenade launchers. Concurrently, five bridges were blown and

secondary attacks were launched by enemy forces against the U.S. 1/26th Infantry and a Regional Force compound south of An Loc. The enemy attempted to isolate and destroy the ARVN 2/9 Infantry. Violent attacks by the North Vietnamese Army battalion were repulsed by the ARVN defenders using small arms, artillery, flare and gunship support, and tactical air support. By 3:30 a.m. the battered enemy had to break contact to regroup. The enemy's final attack came at 5:00 a.m. Bitter hand-to-hand combat took place. At first light, 112 North Vietnamese Army dead were counted within the camp and in the wire barrier around the compound. The North Vietnamese Army Battalion Executive Officer was among the five prisoners taken. The ARVN 2/9 Infantry suffered 14 killed and 48 wounded.

E) On July 25, an ARVN battalion and company supported by artillery and tactical air strikes killed 34 enemy soldiers 24 kilometers northwest of Hue. Three ARVN soldiers were wounded. Elements of another ARVN battalion supported by another company, also supported by tactical air and artillery, engaged an unknown size enemy force on the same day 26 kilometers northwest of Hue. Three ARVN soldiers were wounded and 204 enemy soldiers were killed.

F) At midnight August 3, Operation CORONADO II terminated in Dinh Tuong province in the Fourth Corps after a week of joint deployment by US Infantry, ARVN, and US Navy units. Results were: friendly, 50 killed (8 US), 165 wounded (33 US); enemy, 235 killed, 647 detainees, and 17 weapons captured.

G) The 9-day-old ARVN search and destroy operation in Dinh Tuong province, Operation CUU LONG, terminated on August 4. Results were: friendly, 15 killed, 93 wounded; enemy, 47 killed, 128 detainees, and 8 B-40 rockets captured.

This is only a partial list and there are setbacks of course. But as General Westmoreland has said, the results of many battles in recent months demonstrate a marked and unmistakable improvement in Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces combat effectiveness and a growing pride in their ability to cope with the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong.

52d

Following is a message sent by the President to Secretary McNamara when he was in Saigon the first week in July:

"I would like you to see Ky and Thieu, either separately or together--as you and Ambassador Bunker may judge wise--and tell them in my name:

(1) I am glad that they have honored their commitment volunteered to me at Guam for the military to stay together in the election process and I count on them continuing; and

(2) It is absolutely essential to my ability to continue to back the struggle for South Vietnamese independence and self determination that the election be conducted with complete honesty and fairness, and that this honesty and fairness be apparent to all.

Since I have always dealt with them together, I think it would be good if this message were delivered to them together."

53e

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-296
By ing, NARA, Date 11-2-94

FROM: American Embassy Saigon

TO: Secretary of State - Washington

SAIGON 2972

August 12, 1967

1. This telegram will supplement SAIGON 2869 in summarizing our view of election to date insofar as charges against the GVN and Thieu-Ky ticket are concerned. It may be useful in answering criticism in the United States. In sum, we believe that since the Ky-Thieu merger, the elections have proceeded freely and fairly, gauged by the standard of United States elections, which is a very tough standard to apply to a nation without a democratic tradition, with limited administrative capability, with an insecure countryside, and in the middle of a war.

2. Claims of unfairness stem primarily:

a. From rumors, misquotes, acceptance of opposition candidate statements which even in the United States would be made to serve their own interests, and news stories based on rumor and not on hard facts; and

b. A tendency to gauge the fairness of the elections against the standard of perfection, which does not prevail even in the United States, and which cannot reasonably be expected anywhere, particularly in a nation at war and without democratic traditions.

3. The GVN has done the following things to insure free and fair elections:

a. Press censorship has been lifted and freedom of expression is clearly being carried out.

b. General Vien, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces, publicly stated that the Armed Forces would not have a candidate, would stay out of the elections, and that members of the Armed Forces would not electioneer and would vote as individuals. In addition he sent a written directive to Armed Forces Commanders, clearly stating rules governing participation by military personnel in election activity.

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preservation copy

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

c. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development (RD), at a graduation exercise at the Vung Tau school, stated that no RD workers would engage in the political campaign and each would vote as an individual.

d. Generals Ky and Thieu called province and district leaders into town and told them they should not pressure populace to vote for any particular candidate. They were not to engage in politics. The election law provides for stiff penalties for civil servants who engage in election fraud and these penalties have been publicized.

e. General Loan was relieved as Chief of Military Security, although he still remains as Chief of National Police. He has been told to stay out of election campaign by Ky, and so far as we have evidence, he is doing so.

f. All candidates are being given money to campaign by the GVN, pursuant to the election law. The Government is printing their posters and leaflets free of charge.

g. All Presidential candidates are being furnished transportation by the GVN, a benefit not required by the law.

h. All candidates are being given free time on government radio and television.

i. Invitations have been extended by the GVN for observers to come for the elections to:

- (1) The UN,
- (2) Governments having relations with the GVN,
- (3) Several parliamentary organizations, and
- (4) The international press.

j. There are a variety of safeguards provided in the electoral law such as poll watchers and elaborate provisions for monitoring the elections by the National Assembly.

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

4. Complaints about a threat to "free" elections have been:

a. General Ky's supposed statement that he would pull a coup if civilian candidates win. General Ky has publicly and categorically denied that he made this statement, claims he was misquoted, says he will support a newly elected government.

b. The Dong Ha incident. This is explained in SAIGON 2869. It is interesting to observe that:

(1) Arrangements for the campaign are a responsibility of the election campaign committee, which is composed of representative selected by the candidates themselves;

(2) The election law requires only that the election campaign committee "organize talks between electors and their candidates" but does not specify providing particular facilities;

(3) In this case the GVN had lunch for the candidates set up, rounded up a crowd to hear them, and made arrangements apart from transportation, none of which was required by the law, and all of which in the United States would be handled by each candidate's own campaign organization as his own responsibility; and

(4) Generals Thieu and Ky have indicated their desire to do anything within reason to see that the campaign arrangements are more smoothly made in the future.

c. Turn down of Big Minh and Au Truong Thanh as Presidential candidates.

Regardless of how we might have decided the question:

(1) The action was taken by the elected assembly, not Thieu or Ky;

(2) The basis for elimination of both candidates was violation of legal requirements, whether we think the requirements were properly interpreted or not;

(3) Minh and Thanh were not "singled out," as several other candidates were also eliminated;

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

(4) The "French citizenship" cause of Big Minh's elimination (his VP candidate's citizenship) was also used to eliminate another candidate, Tran Van Thoan; and

(5) Eleven candidates remained in the race, giving the people an adequate choice. In the United States, candidates are also sometimes eliminated from the race for various legal reasons such as age, residence requirements, conviction of felony, holding of other office, etc., varying from state to state. There is also a "peace candidate" now, Mr. Dzu, so the voters are not denied this choice by elimination of Thanh.

(NOTE: Most of the candidates have expressed their support for a peaceful settlement and have talked of negotiations, bombing pauses, etc.)

d. General Loan's appearance in the balcony of the General Assembly at the time of the vote on the Thieu-Ky slate. This might have been considered as pressure by some of the delegates, and may have influenced their votes. But there is no evidence that Loan used any threats; the public has a right to appear in the balcony, just as in the United States, where it frequently uses this right to attempt to exert silent (or even sometimes vocal) pressure; and Loan has not engaged openly in political activities since that time so far as we know.

e. Rumors that the Armed Forces had formed a Council that would "run the government" no matter who is elected.

The formation of any such Council and such intent of the Armed Forces have been categorically denied by Thieu and Ky. Of course, the Constitution itself provides for a military council to advise the government on military matters.

f. Failure of Thieu and Ky to resign their positions to run for office.

Some of the candidates (Huong, for example) admit they are not required to do this by law, but that elections would not be "fair" unless they did because they have, as incumbents, an "unfair" advantage. Admittedly all incumbents have a natural advantage, but:

(1) They do not give this up in the United States;

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

(2) The President and the Vice President of the United States do not resign to run for re-election, and

(3) Resignation might be interpreted as a failure to live up to their responsibilities and, even if manageable in this case, could be a bad precedent for later times when the interim was not so manageable.

g. Claims of surveillance and pressure by police and activities of province and district chiefs.

The significant thing about these claims is that:

(a) They are greatly reduced from the claims existing before the Thieu-Ky merger, and

(b) Complaining candidates have generally been unable or unwilling to cite specific instances, and

(c) On a recent boat trip in Sadec Province Ky, when confronted with this charge by reporters, stopped at the nearest village, asked if anyone knew him (which no one did), asked who they were going to vote for (they had not decided) and asked if anyone had pressured them to vote for any particular candidates, and they said "no." There will undoubtedly be some involvement by public officials, regardless of direction or lack of direction from the top. We even have evidence that some officials will at least quietly support opposition candidates. But public officials become involved in election campaigns in the United States. And in the absence of intimidation, some involvement on the side of the "ins" would generally be considered one of the accepted advantages of incumbency.

5. We shall of course continue to stress the absolute importance of free elections and the effect of any appearance of rigging on the United States public. And of course we wish to avoid all things that could be construed as marring free elections, whether such construction is justified or not. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to believe the opposition will be satisfied. It seems to us that our attitude in response to the press should be:

a. The standard for free and fair elections should be reasonable and not more rigid than in the United States. If ballots are fairly cast and counted, and intimidation is not used, the elections can be considered free.

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

b. The results of the elections are not a foregone conclusion and a result that gives Thieu and Ky less than a substantial majority will be additional evidence in the situation here -- where many people vote for the Government as protection -- that undue pressures were not exerted.

c. In a country such as this, we cannot expect great administrative efficiency, particularly on something so new as elections. We should not ascribe every mistake to malice, rather than to inefficiency -- its more probable cause.

d. An important development -- generally ignored by the press -- is the diffusion of power between the executive and a new legislative branch, which under the Constitution will have even greater power than the US Congress. The present Constituent Assembly has shown independence. The large number of citizens running for the Senate (680 originally, now 480) shows the confidence of many people that the Legislative Branch will be important.

6. We recognize of course that we must continue to watch the elections closely and that there is no guarantee at this time that some improper practices may not crop up. We will keep the closest surveillance on practices and endeavor to insure that the elections are free and honest.

BUNKER

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Rostow 54
1- Summary
2- Presidential file

August 12, 1967; 7 PM

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's Kiesinger visit memo. You may want to think about it over Sunday, before the strategy meeting on Monday afternoon. With the exception of the U.S. troop-cut issue (page 6), I believe the approach of the memo is sound. It is entirely consistent with the strategy suggested in the memo I sent you yesterday. (The talking points are a bit long and complicated; I will give you a concise set following the same line on Monday.)

On the troop-cut question, the Rusk memo proposes compromise language worked out between Rusk and McNamara. It tends to beg the issue -- and that may be the right way to handle it. But I would vote otherwise. It leaves you open to a later Kiesinger charge that you didn't level with him, which could come to haunt us. At your meeting on Monday, this is the central policy issue on which we will need your instruction. The underlying arguments are spelled out in my memo at Tab B (the original of which you saw on Friday).

At Tab C, I attach a copy of my Friday memo on our general approach to Kiesinger.

At Tab D, is a short Rusk memo on the European atmosphere.

Sorry to load you down with this on the weekend, but I understand that your Monday will be exceptionally hectic.


Francis M. Bator

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-93
By DPW, NARA, Date 7/18/94

cy of att. is in BKS
"material to President"

W J J
~~*Handwritten signature*~~
2- Presidential file
15

Saturday, August 12, 1967
6:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Congress of Orientalists

As you know, the International Congress of Orientalists is meeting in Ann Arbor -- the first gathering in the United States in the 150-year history of the organization.

It will bring about 1,600 top world scholars, including 850 from the United States, together. In the area of Asian studies, this is the cream of the crop.

The plenary session is tomorrow (Sunday). A message of greeting from the President would be warmly received. A suggested text is attached.

I understand the Congress will get a greeting from Secretary General U Thant (who backed out of participation at the last minute -- presumably because of the Soviet, Czech and other Communist states' withdrawal.)

William J. Jorden

Att.

Send message _____

No message _____

See me _____

58a

DRAFT

W. Norman Brown
President, International Congress of Orientalists
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

To distinguished scholars of the Orient:

I extend a warm welcome to the United States. In the long history of your distinguished organization, this is your first gathering on American soil. I am confident that your discussions and exchanges of views will be most profitable and intellectually stimulating.

Our knowledge of the Orient has increased remarkably over the past few decades. That we owe in significant part to the work of the members of the Congress of Orientalists and your wise and able predecessors. Our debt is real and our gratitude profound.

I wish you continued success in the years ahead, years in which Asia will play an increasingly important role in all of our affairs.

Lyndon B. Johnson

for WWR
Suspense
Presidential file

Saturday, August 12, 1967
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is a copy of the "sanitized"
version of Ambassador Bunker's cable.

I will see that copies get to some key
members of the journalistic fraternity, as you
suggested.

Should Mike Manatos and others have
copies for selective use on the Hill?

William J. Jorden

Att.

Copies to Manatos _____

Others _____

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Elections in Viet-Nam

Claims of unfairness and fraud have been levelled against the electoral campaign now underway in Viet-Nam. Commenting on these claims, Ambassador Bunker in Saigon notes the following:

These charges stem principally:

from rumors, misquotes, acceptance of opposition candidates' statements (which even in the United States would be designed to serve their own interests), and news stories based on rumor, not hard facts; and

from a tendency to gauge the fairness of the elections against a standard of perfection, which does not prevail even in the United States, and which cannot reasonably be expected anywhere, particularly in a nation at war and without democratic experience and traditions.

The Government of Viet-Nam has done the following to insure free and fair elections:

1. Press censorship has been lifted and freedom of expression is clearly being carried out.

2. General Vien, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces, publicly stated that the Armed Forces would not have a candidate, would stay out of the elections, and that members of the Armed Forces would not electioneer and would vote as individuals. In addition he sent a written directive to Armed Forces Commanders, clearly stating rules governing participation by military personnel in election activity.

3. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development (RD), at a graduation exercise at the Vung Tau school, ordered that no RD workers would engage in the political campaign and said each should vote as an individual.

4. Generals Thieu and Ky called province and district leaders into town and told them they should not pressure the people to vote for any particular candidate. They were not to engage in politics. The election law provides for stiff penalties for civil servants who engage in election fraud and these penalties have been publicized.

5. General Loan was relieved as Chief of Military Security, although he still remains as Chief of National Police. He has been told to stay out of election campaign, and he appears to be doing so.

6. All candidates have been given money by the Government for their campaigns pursuant to the election law. The Government is printing their posters and leaflets free of charge.

7. All Presidential candidates are being furnished transportation by the Government, a benefit not required by the law.

8. All candidates are being given free time on government radio and television.

9. Invitations have been extended by the Vietnamese Government for observers to come for the elections to the United Nations, Governments having relations with the GVN, several parliamentary organizations, and the international press.

10. A variety of safeguards are provided in the electoral law such as poll watchers and elaborate provisions for monitoring the elections by the National Assembly.

The main complaints about a threat to free elections have been:

1. General Ky's supposed statement that he would pull a coup if civilian candidates win.

General Ky has publicly and categorically denied that he made this statement, claims he was misquoted, says he will support a newly elected government.

2. The Dong Ha (or Quang Tri) incident.

A plane carrying some of the candidates flew to Quang Tri where they were to address the voters. A strong crosswind convinced the pilot that a landing would be dangerous. He went to the nearest field (at Dong Ha) about 9 miles away. No one was present to meet the candidates. A convoy sent from Quang Tri arrived 15 minutes after they had left for Da Nang. There is no evidence of a

premeditation on the part of the Government. The incident was a combination of bad weather, poor planning, execution and judgment by some local officials, combined with impatience and suspicion on the part of the candidates.

It should be noted that:

(a) Arrangements for the campaign are a responsibility of the election campaign committee, which is composed of representative selected by the candidates themselves;

(b) The election law requires only that the election campaign committee "organize talks between electors and their candidates" but does not specify providing particular facilities;

(c) In this case the local authorities had lunch ready for the candidates, rounded up a crowd to hear them, and made arrangements apart from transportation, none of which was required by the law, and all of which in the United States and elsewhere would be handled by each candidate's own campaign organization as his own responsibility; - and

(d) Generals Thieu and Ky have indicated their desire to do anything within reason to see that the campaign arrangements are more smoothly made in the future.

3. Rejection of Big Minh and Au Truong Thanh as Presidential candidates.

Regardless of how others might have decided the question:

(a) The action was taken by the elected assembly, not Thieu or Ky;

(b) The basis for elimination of both candidates was violation of legal requirements, whether we think the requirements were properly interpreted or not;

(c) Minh and Thanh were not "singled out," as several other candidates were also eliminated;

(d) French citizenship, which caused the elimination of General Minh's vice presidential candidate (and therefore the full ticket), was the basis for elimination of another presidential candidate (Tran Van Thoan); and

(e) Eleven candidates remained in the race, giving the people a wide choice. In the United States, candidates are also sometimes eliminated for various legal reasons such as age, residence requirements, conviction of felony, holding of other office, etc., varying from state to state. There is also a "peace candidate" now, Mr. Dzu, so the voters are not denied this choice by elimination of Thanh. Indeed, most of the candidates have expressed their support for a peaceful settlement and have talked of negotiations, bombing pauses, etc.

4. General Loan's appearance in the balcony of the General Assembly at the time of the vote on the Thieu-Ky slate.

This might have been considered as pressure by some of the delegates, and may have influenced their votes. But there is no evidence that Loan used any threats; the public has a right to appear in the balcony, just as in the United States, where it frequently uses this right to attempt to exert silent (or even sometimes vocal) pressure; and Loan has not engaged openly in political activities since that time so far as is known.

5. Rumors that the Armed Forces had formed a Council that would "run the government" no matter who is elected.

The formation of any such Council with such intent has been categorically denied by Thieu and Ky. Of course, the Constitution itself provides for a military Council to advise the government on military matters.

6. Failure of Thieu and Ky to resign their positions to run for office.

Some of the candidates (Huong, for example) admit they are not required to do this by law, but that elections would not be "fair" unless they did because they have, as incumbents, as "unfair" advantage. Admittedly all incumbents have a natural advantage, but:

(a) They do not give this up in the United States or elsewhere;

(b) The President and the Vice President of the United States do not resign to run for re-election, and

(c) Resignation might be interpreted as a failure to live up to their responsibilities and, even if manageable in this case, could be a bad precedent for later times when the interim was not so manageable.

7. Claims of surveillance and pressure by police and activities of province and district chiefs.

The significant thing about these claims is that:

(a) they are greatly reduced from the claims existing before the Thieu-Ky merger, and

(b) complaining candidates have generally been unable or unwilling to cite specific instances, and

(c) on a recent boat trip in Sadec Province, Ky, when confronted with this charge by reporters, stopped at the nearest village, asked if anyone knew him (which no one did), asked who they were going to vote for (they had not decided) and asked if anyone had pressured them to vote for any particular candidates, and they said "no." There probably will be some involvement by public officials, regardless of direction or lack of direction from the top. There is evidence that some officials will at least quietly support opposition candidates. But public officials become involved in election campaigns in the United States. And in the absence of intimidation, some involvement on the side of the "ins" would generally be considered one of the accepted advantages of incumbency.

U. S. officials, in talking with Vietnamese leaders and officials, have continually stressed the absolute importance of free and fair elections. They will continue to do so. Meantime, it should be borne in mind that:

1. The standard for free and fair elections should be reasonable and not more rigid than in the United States or other older countries. If ballots are fairly cast and counted, and intimidation is not used, the elections can be considered free.

2. In a country such as Viet-Nam, one cannot expect great administrative efficiency, particularly on something so new as elections. We should not ascribe every mistake to malice, rather than to inefficiency -- its more probable cause.

3. An important development -- generally ignored -- is the diffusion of power between the executive and a new legislative branch, which under the Constitution will have even greater power than the US Congress. The present Constituent Assembly has shown independence. The large number of citizens running for the Senate (480) shows the confidence of many people that the Legislative Branch will be important.

57

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 12, 1967
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is a copy of the "sanitized"
version of Ambassador Bunker's cable.

I will see that copies get to some key
members of the journalistic fraternity, as you
suggested.

Should Mike Manatos and others have
copies for selective use on the Hill?

B. J.

William J. Jorden

Att.

Copies to Manatos _____

Others _____

512

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Elections in Viet-Nam

Claims of unfairness and fraud have been levelled against the electoral campaign now underway in Viet-Nam. Commenting on these claims, Ambassador Bunker in Saigon notes the following:

These charges stem principally:

from rumors, misquotes, acceptance of opposition candidates' statements (which even in the United States would be designed to serve their own interests), and news stories based on rumor, not hard facts; and

from a tendency to gauge the fairness of the elections against a standard of perfection, which does not prevail even in the United States, and which cannot reasonably be expected anywhere, particularly in a nation at war and without democratic experience and traditions.

The Government of Viet-Nam has done the following to insure free and fair elections:

1. Press censorship has been lifted and freedom of expression is clearly being carried out.

2. General Vien, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces, publicly stated that the Armed Forces would not have a candidate, would stay out of the elections, and that members of the Armed Forces would not electioneer and would vote as individuals. In addition he sent a written directive to Armed Forces Commanders, clearly stating rules governing participation by military personnel in election activity.

3. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development (RD), at a graduation exercise at the Vung Tau school, ordered that no RD workers would engage in the political campaign and said each should vote as an individual.

4. Generals Thieu and Ky called province and district leaders into town and told them they should not pressure the people to vote for any particular candidate. They were not to engage in politics. The election law provides for stiff penalties for civil servants who engage in election fraud and these penalties have been publicized.

5. General Loan was relieved as Chief of Military Security, although he still remains as Chief of National Police. He has been told to stay out of election campaign, and he appears to be doing so.

6. All candidates have been given money by the Government for their campaigns pursuant to the election law. The Government is printing their posters and leaflets free of charge.

7. All Presidential candidates are being furnished transportation by the Government, a benefit not required by the law.

8. All candidates are being given free time on government radio and television.

9. Invitations have been extended by the Vietnamese Government for observers to come for the elections to the United Nations, Governments having relations with the GVN, several parliamentary organizations, and the international press.

10. A variety of safeguards are provided in the electoral law such as poll watchers and elaborate provisions for monitoring the elections by the National Assembly.

The main complaints about a threat to free elections have been:

1. General Ky's supposed statement that he would pull a coup if civilian candidates win.

General Ky has publicly and categorically denied that he made this statement, claims he was misquoted, says he will support a newly elected government.

2. The Dong Ha (or Quang Tri) incident.

A plane carrying some of the candidates flew to Quang Tri where they were to address the voters. A strong crosswind convinced the pilot that a landing would be dangerous. He went to the nearest field (at Dong Ha) about 9 miles away. No one was present to meet the candidates. A convoy sent from Quang Tri arrived 15 minutes after they had left for Da Nang. There is no evidence of a

premeditation on the part of the Government. The incident was a combination of bad weather, poor planning, execution and judgment by some local officials, combined with impatience and suspicion on the part of the candidates.

It should be noted that:

(a) Arrangements for the campaign are a responsibility of the election campaign committee, which is composed of representative selected by the candidates themselves;

(b) The election law requires only that the election campaign committee "organize talks between electors and their candidates" but does not specify providing particular facilities;

(c) In this case the local authorities had lunch ready for the candidates, rounded up a crowd to hear them, and made arrangements apart from transportation, none of which was required by the law, and all of which in the United States and elsewhere would be handled by each candidate's own campaign organization as his own responsibility; and

(d) Generals Thieu and Ky have indicated their desire to do anything within reason to see that the campaign arrangements are more smoothly made in the future.

3. Rejection of Big Minh and Au Truong Thanh as Presidential candidates.

Regardless of how others might have decided the question:

(a) The action was taken by the elected assembly, not Thieu or Ky;

(b) The basis for elimination of both candidates was violation of legal requirements, whether we think the requirements were properly interpreted or not;

(c) Minh and Thanh were not "singled out," as several other candidates were also eliminated;

(d) French citizenship, which caused the elimination of General Minh's vice presidential candidate (and therefore the full ticket), was the basis for elimination of another presidential candidate (Tran Van Thoan); and

(e) Eleven candidates remained in the race, giving the people a wide choice. In the United States, candidates are also sometimes eliminated for various legal reasons such as age, residence requirements, conviction of felony, holding of other office, etc., varying from state to state. There is also a "peace candidate" now, Mr. Dzu, so the voters are not denied this choice by elimination of Thanh. Indeed, most of the candidates have expressed their support for a peaceful settlement and have talked of negotiations, bombing pauses, etc.

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(a) They do not give this up in the United States or elsewhere;

(b) The President and the Vice President of the United States do not resign to run for re-election, and

(c) Resignation might be interpreted as a failure to live up to their responsibilities and, even if manageable in this case, could be a bad precedent for later times when the interim was not so manageable.

7. Claims of surveillance and pressure by police and activities of province and district chiefs.

The significant thing about these claims is that:

(a) they are greatly reduced from the claims existing before the Thieu-Ky merger, and

(b) complaining candidates have generally been unable or unwilling to cite specific instances, and

(c) on a recent boat trip in Sadec Province, Ky, when confronted with this charge by reporters, stopped at the nearest village, asked if anyone knew him (which no one did), asked who they were going to vote for (they had not decided) and asked if anyone had pressured them to vote for any particular candidates, and they said "no." There probably will be some involvement by public officials, regardless of direction or lack of direction from the top. There is evidence that some officials will at least quietly support opposition candidates. But public officials become involved in election campaigns in the United States. And in the absence of intimidation, some involvement on the side of the "ins" would generally be considered one of the accepted advantages of incumbency.

U. S. officials, in talking with Vietnamese leaders and officials, have continually stressed the absolute importance of free and fair elections. They will continue to do so. Meantime, it should be borne in mind that:

1. The standard for free and fair elections should be reasonable and not more rigid than in the United States or other older countries. If ballots are fairly cast and counted, and intimidation is not used, the elections can be considered free.

2. In a country such as Viet-Nam, one cannot expect great administrative efficiency, particularly on something so new as elections. We should not ascribe every mistake to malice, rather than to inefficiency -- its more probable cause.

3. An important development -- generally ignored -- is the diffusion of power between the executive and a new legislative branch, which under the Constitution will have even greater power than the US Congress. The present Constituent Assembly has shown independence. The large number of citizens running for the Senate (480) shows the confidence of many people that the Legislative Branch will be important.

MEMORANDUM

~~Secret~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

58
~~1-2~~
2. Press file

Saturday, August 12, 1967; 1:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Rwandan President Kayibanda
(12:30 PM, Monday, August 14)

This is a straight courtesy call as Kayibanda (Kie-yih-bond-ah) makes his way home from Expo. No lunch or dinner is involved.

At Tab A is Katzenbach's general briefing memorandum. His suggested talking points are at Tab B, and biographic information on Kayibanda is at Tab C.

Rwanda is a tiny, very backward former Belgian protectorate in East Central Africa between the Congo and Tanzania. Kayibanda is pro-Western and very friendly to us in particular. We bailed Rwanda out of a deep economic hole in 1966 with a \$1 million grant, and have since provided small amounts of food and technical assistance. Kayibanda will want to thank you, and to push their new request for help in financing two T-28 fighter aircraft.

You may wish to make the following points:

- We are most grateful to Rwanda for allowing free use of the airfield at Kamembe (Kah-mem-bay) during repeated turmoil in neighboring sections of the Congo. (This Rwandan airstrip -- the only one large enough to take our C-130's and other large craft -- has given us our only dependable access to the key Congolese city of Bukavu. Rwanda has permitted us to use it constantly to fly in supplies and evacuate whites.)
- We very much hope the Congolese situation will settle down soon so that the nations of Central Africa can get on with the critical job of building their economies, particularly agriculture.
- (If Asked) We think first-priority needs in Rwanda are for development imports, not fighter aircraft. Even if we felt otherwise, the Congress has put very strict limits on the amount of military aid we can supply and the number of countries where we can operate MAP programs. We just can't help with the fighters.

As you know, mercenaries now occupy Bukavu. If they begin to move toward Rwanda, Kayibanda may want to go into the Congo situation with you in detail. I will give you a current Congo sitrep Monday morning.



Edward K. Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-295
By ing, NARA, Date 6-22-95

~~Secret~~

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Gregoire
Kayibanda of Rwanda, August 14, 1967

Your meeting is in response to President Kayibanda's request to pay a courtesy call. He will be in Washington for one day, August 14, following a brief visit to Expo '67.

Since gaining its independence in 1962, the Republic of Rwanda consistently has maintained a pro-Western political posture. Despite considerable Belgian aid the country's economic development, however, has been deteriorating. In many forms, this deterioration is due to a basic Rwandan desire "to be left alone."

In 1964, 1965, and most recently during July and August of this year, the Republic of Rwanda has allowed its airfield at Kamembe--which services the key eastern Congo town of Bukavu--to be used for the evacuation of American citizens and the staging of Central Congolese Government activities against rebel and other dissident elements. I believe that a special effort should be made to express to President Kayibanda our gratitude for his country's friendliness and consistently generous offer of the facilities of Kamembe airfield.

Should President Kayibanda wish to discuss the matter, you might explain to him that the Congress has

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-296

By sig, NARA Date 11-29-96


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2

imposed certain limitations on the extension of foreign aid to African countries such as Rwanda. At the same time, however, we wish to make clear to the Rwandan President that any US aid which could be considered in a regional framework would have to be non-military in nature. Further, in Rwanda's own interest, we believe that President Kayibanda should not over-expend from his own budget for military purposes.

I enclose suggested talking points on questions for discussion with President Kayibanda. Enclosed also, for your information, are biographical information concerning President Kayibanda, his photograph, and the part of President Kayibanda's schedule covering his call on you.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

1. Talking Points
2. Biographic Information
3. Photograph
4. Schedule

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586

Suggested Talking Points

Topic President Kayibanda Will Raise

Request for More US Government Aid

The President will describe Rwanda's deteriorating economic situation and ask for further American assistance, mindful to thank us for the aid which we already have extended. President Kayibanda may ask for our help in obtaining two T-28 aircraft for his country's defense establishment.

I recommend that you say:

We share his interest in seeing Rwanda become capable of sustaining economic growth and resisting external and internal aggression. We consider that Belgium, however, due to its historical relationship with Rwanda, should continue as the primary donor of economic and military assistance.

Background

The US has provided balance of payments and budgetary assistance in support of the IMF-sponsored Rwandan economic stabilization program and monetary reform undertaken in April 1966. This took the form of a \$1 million grant to finance the importation of trucks, tires, textiles, and grey cloth. No additional US credits to Rwanda are forthcoming. Within the stabilization program the US also furnished wheat flour (5,000 metric tons), edible oil (1,000 metric tons), and non-fat dry milk (100 metric tons) under the PL 480 program, at a cost of \$1.5 million. The local currency generated under these two programs has been allocated to the 1967 Rwandan ordinary and capital budgets.

AID has undertaken a limited project program in Rwanda. We have assisted in establishing a new water supply system for the capital of Kigali, provided commodities and technical assistance to the Rwandan police forces, and have financed training for Rwandan students in the US. The US is

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-296

By ijg, NARA Date 11-29-96

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financing the paving of 2.5 miles of Kigali's main streets and laboratory equipment and one professor for the University of Rwanda.

In FY 1968 the AID program in Rwanda will be limited to the continuation of three projects--Public Safety, Special Self-Help, and Public Service Training--and the utilization of unexpended funding from the FY 1966 Commodity Import and PL 480 programs. The US also will continue the PL 480 program. The bilateral AID program will be terminated after FY 1968. Under the new AID policy for Africa, however, we are prepared to consider feasible regional programs proposed by Rwanda and would encourage President Kayibanda's efforts in this regard. Under the Middle Africa Transport Survey, we will study the regional transport network linking nine central African countries including Rwanda. The study, which will suggest improvements in the regional transport system, should be completed within six months. We are awaiting Rwanda's reply to our offer to send Peace Corps volunteers to that country.

We are not in favor of an escalating arms race in Africa, and are unable to assist the Rwandan Government with the additional military aircraft which it has expressed its interest in obtaining. Similarly, we do not agree that Rwanda should expend a disproportionate amount of foreign exchange on defense, especially when other parts of the economy appear far more deserving of developmental funds.

Topics You Might Raise

I suggest you work into your remarks the following elements:

1. Express appreciation for Rwanda serving as a safe-haven for American citizens during the recent, and previous, Congo crises. Convey our appreciation also for Kamembe airfield being offered to the Congolese Government for staging operations.

2. Note that you were greatly impressed with what you learned of President Kayibanda's July 1 National Day

speech, in which he set forth his proposed solutions to the economic problems existing in Rwanda. You might wish to add that, since his country's independence in 1962, President Kayibanda has very much been a symbol of his country here in the United States and that the American people were pleased indeed to learn that President Kayibanda, who had paid a courtesy call on President Kennedy in 1962, again was returning.

3. Express how delighted you are with the work of Rwandan Ambassador Kabanda and express your apologies concerning the unfortunate discharge of a bullet into the wall of Ambassador Kabanda's residence this past June by an unknown person.

4. Thank President Kayibanda for his continuing assistance and sympathy toward the US position at the United Nations.

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58c

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Gregoire Kayibanda
President of the Republic of Rwanda

Gregoire Kayibanda was born May 1, 1924, at Musambira, Rwanda.

His background is as a teacher and journalist. In the latter capacity, he became a leader of the political organization which rallied the Hutu people (87% of Rwanda's population) to overthrow the former Tutsi lords in 1959. Following fighting between the two ethnic groups from November of that year until July of 1960, Kayibanda became Prime Minister and Minister of Education.

Kayibanda has been President of his country since its independence in July 1962. He is a clever politician who adequately has coped with minor rivalries among members of his PARMEHUTU political party. He is obsessed with fear that the Tutsi people, whom his group ousted from power, may endeavor to return to control in Rwanda.

In 1962, President Kayibanda traveled to the United States and met President Kennedy in an informal appointment. Kayibanda has expressed his sympathetic understanding of the Negro problem in the United States and has stated privately that it is highly regrettable that the situation has played into the hands of anti-American propagandists.

Although firm, Kayibanda is a quiet and simple man. He is not interested in the social and protocol aspects of his position when at home and generally lives in a modest residence in his home town, Gitarama, rather than staying in his large official residence in Kigali. His stone house, in fact, is without either electricity or telephone. He is married and has several children. Greatly influenced by his education under the White Fathers, Kayibanda is a Roman Catholic with deep religious feelings. He desires to see a lessening of the Church's influence, however, in schools and politics.

President Kayibanda speaks Kinyarwanda and French, but no English.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-11-00

58d

Program Covering President Kayibanda's
Call on the President

12:00 noon EDT Arrival at Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland.

12:10 p.m. EDT Departure from Andrews Air Force
Base, Maryland, by helicopter.

12:20p.m. EDT Arrival at the President's Park
(Ellipse), Washington, D.C.

12:25 p.m. EDT Arrival at the Diplomatic Entrance
of the White House, where President
Johnson will greet President Kayibanda.

12:30 p.m. EDT President Kayibanda will meet with
President Johnson at the White House.

59

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, August 11, 1967
1:15 p.m.

Mr. President

Herewith Sec. Rusk's personal draft
of the message which we would permit
Dr. Kissinger to give in Paris to his
contacts for delivery to Pham Van Dong.

Sec. Rusk seeks your modification
or approval.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-295
By lig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

You may give your contacts the following message and ask that they deliver it to Pham Van Dong:

The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam if this will lead promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the US and the DRV looking toward a resolution of the issues between them.

You should say further to Messrs. Marcovich and Aubrac that the United States is prepared to negotiate either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping secret the fact that negotiations are taking place. Accordingly, the DRV may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing while secret negotiations are in progress.

We would assume that, while discussions proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the DRV would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. Any such move on their part would obviously be inconsistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues between the US and DRV which the negotiations are intended to achieve.

The US is ready to have immediate private contact with the DRV to explore the above approach or any suggestions the DRV might wish to propose in the same direction.

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Authority 89-111
10/18/94, NARA, Date 10/18/94

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
NODIS

REPRODUCTION COPY

Kissinger
Paris

60
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1967

Walt:

I have designed this in such form
that, if you feel like it, you could
show it to the boss.

McG. B.

McG. B.

*left w/Pres
8/11/67*

60a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1967

Walt:

I have designed this in such form
that, if you feel like it, you could
show it to the boss.

McG. B.

McG. B.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1967

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608
~~1. sup~~
2. Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

When you talk to the President this afternoon on "see me" items, one of them will be his continuing doubt about the visit of General Weizmann, now planned for September 11.

As you know, the President has never signed on to this, but the painful fact is that I told Evron we could plan for it. I simply did not see any way in which we could avoid a discussion of military questions with the Israelis and Washington is much the best place for such an exchange from our point of view. Bob McNamara can keep a close grip on the exchange if it is here.

Moreover, the Weizmann visit carries no implication that decisions will be made while he is here. It is explicitly understood to be an occasion for an exchange of views and of assessments--and of course a statement of Israeli needs. The Israelis do hope, of course, that existing agreements--especially on A-4F aircraft--will be reconfirmed while Weizmann is here. They may also press for accelerated delivery, but they recognize that we have never agreed to that and that Vietnam is a real factor on our side.

The boss may think I have gone too far in accepting the notion of a Weizmann visit, but I bet he would have had a mass meeting with the Friends of Israel on the White House lawn if I had not, and they would have been quite justified. There simply is no way we can refuse even to talk to the Israelis about this problem, and we are quite lucky that the visit is as far away as it is. The President's first doubts related to the date of August 21, and scheduling problems have now delayed that by three weeks. I think we have a bargain and I sure hope that the President will let us keep it. Otherwise, I'll have to move to Cairo.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NHJ 94-295
By lig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

McG. B.
McGeorge Bundy

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


August 11, 1967

60c

WWR:

I know Mac has written
you a memo on the Israeli
military visit.

You'll probably want to
have the attached in hand when
you see the President, even
though your earlier memos
cover the ground.


H. H. S.

Att: file # 3035

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~
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August 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Israel's Military Posture

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to inform the Government of Israel, in response to its request, that we will receive an Israeli military team in Washington to discuss Israel's assessment of the present Arab threat to its security and of its requirements for new military equipment, as a basis for later United States consideration of equipment requests from Israel.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Government of Israel has requested that we receive a team of high-ranking Israeli Defense Force officers in the near future. The purpose would be to hear at first hand Israel's assessment of the present threat to its security and its military equipment needs, arising inter alia out of its own war losses, particularly in aircraft, and the post-hostilities Soviet resupply of the United Arab Republic and other radical Arab states. On the basis of this assessment, the Israelis would hope for an early and favorable United States response to their military requirements.

Our own tentative assessment of Israel's security position is as follows. We do not believe the Soviets desire a resumption of Arab-Israeli fighting, with the grave risks for them which that would involve. Their

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By ing, NARA Date 11-29-96

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overriding aim, in our view, is to consolidate and use their position with the radical Arabs to undermine Western influence in the moderate Arab world and to undermine the moderate Arab governments themselves. We therefore judge their recent military resupply effort to be politically rather than militarily motivated.

At the same time we do not believe that the Soviets can fully control their clients in the area. Boumediene, in league with the Syrians, is apparently making a bid to replace Nasser as leader of the radical Arabs. This in turn puts pressure on Nasser not to be outdone by the Algerians and Syrians, who are calling for continuation of the war. We cannot exclude altogether the possibility, suicidal as it might seem, of a radical Arab military strike against Israel. Bob McNamara has asked for a United States Intelligence Board and JCS estimate of the threat to Israel and Israel's present capability to withstand an attack. Since Algeria and Syria have also spoken of waging guerrilla rather than conventional warfare against Israel, the United States Intelligence Board has been asked to cover this contingency as well.

I fully recognize that a decision on the provision of new arms to Israel requires the broadest and most careful consideration, and must take into account both the mood in this country with respect to arms shipments to areas of conflict and the relationship of such a decision to our larger political objectives for a Middle Eastern settlement. I am concerned, however, about the potentially dangerous future. It is important, I feel, that we not appear indifferent with

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- 3 -

respect to Israel's military situation. I think we should hear its military assessment, even though we must frame our response in terms of the overall situation. I therefore propose that we receive the military team early in September, with the understanding that we will not yet be prepared to make commitments. We would expect the visit to be informal and would seek to avoid publicity.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~SECRET~~
EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 12, 1967
3:15 p.m.

Pres. file

61

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report on
Viet-Nam politics.

In this connection, I applied a small blow-
torch to State last night. I told them to get on to
Saigon, underline some of the things that were
being said here (in the Senate, etc.) and get the
message to the civilian candidates. They should
know that they were slowly but surely washing their
country down the drain. If they didn't want that,
they ought to think seriously about their current
actions. The Embassy picked up the ball and
conveyed the message diplomatically with
obviously positive results.

BJD

William J. Jorden

Att.

~~SECRET-EXDIS Attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-295

By *sig*, NARA, Date *6-22-95*

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

61a

VIET-NAM POLITICAL SITUATION REPORT

August 12, 1967

The presidential campaign appears to be back on the tracks. The civilian candidates have ended the boycott they declared earlier in protest against GVN handling of their tour to Quang Tri. They have privately attached some conditions to their resumption of activities (travel, security, etc.), but the Embassy reports these should not be too difficult for the GVN to fulfill.

The Embassy made clear yesterday to major civilian candidates the damage caused here by the campaign boycott. Huong claimed to have worked hard to get it lifted, but Suu said Huong was one of the main troublemakers seeking to milk the incident for maximum political advantage. Huong complained of unfair GVN campaign tactics but said he was staying in the race regardless. Suu, on the other hand, praised GVN efforts and called the Quang Tri issue a minor matter.

In connection with Suu's friendly comments, there is a rumor in Saigon that there is a deal between him and General Ky -- Ky to help Suu with his campaign, Ky to be Prime Minister if Suu wins. This is most unlikely. Suu will probably run third. But Ky may be encouraging him to keep him in the race -- and thereby keep the civilian vote split.

Several candidates including Huong have obviously been exploiting developments both locally and in the foreign press. The Embassy comments that Huong may have been thinking of leading a new "struggle" movement a la the 1963 movement against Diem. This may be exaggerated, but it illustrates the kind of intense political maneuvers being carried on as the campaign progresses.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-296
By sig, NARA, Date 11-2-94

SECRET-EXDIS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 12, 1967
2:15 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

We have learned that David Schoenbrun (radio and TV commentator) flew to Hanoi yesterday on the ICC plane.

This will be negative. Schoenbrun has consistently opposed our policy in Viet-Nam, advocating withdrawal.

He will be a visiting professor at Columbia starting this Fall.

We can expect nothing good to come from his Hanoi visit.

WJ
William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-295

By *mg*, NARA, Date 6-22-95

Friday, August 11, 1967 - 6 PM

~~WARR~~ 62

~~Loop~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a congratulatory message to the Prime Minister of Somalia. We expect the Somalian Parliament to approve him very shortly.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

Hamilton/vmr

63a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My congratulations and best wishes on your designation as Prime Minister and on the vote of confidence given to you and your Government by Members of the National Assembly. I look forward to working with you in the cause of peace and prosperity for all the peoples of Africa and the world.

I should also like to take this opportunity to reaffirm the friendship of the American people for the people of the Somali Republic.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

His Excellency

Mohamed Hagi Ibrahim Egal,

Prime Minister,

Government of the Somali Republic.

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Friday, August 11, 1967
10:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk forwards this
moving letter which, I am sure,
will be a source of strength to
you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

64a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you would be interested in reading the enclosed excerpt from a letter written by the Reverend Clair Morrow to his son. It appeared in the Calvary Presbyterian, a church paper published in South Pasadena, California.

Faithfully yours,



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Excerpt.

The President,
The White House.

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COPY

May 24, 1967

Lieutenant Commander Richard D. Morrow
VA-196
FPO San Francisco, California.

Dear Dick:

By the time you receive this you will be flying off the deck of your carrier and heading for North Viet-Nam where you will be bombing strategic military targets. You **are** in greater danger than any of the pilots that have preceded you.

If I did not believe that our government **has determined** to honor its pledge to defend the freedom of small countries **whenever and wherever** asked, I would be fighting mad. **If I** did not believe that you are a part of a selfless effort to protect a people from a ruthless enemy that **has** intimidated, terrorized, and **killed** in South Viet-Nam for a generation, I could not stand it. If **America** stood by in aloofness and mouthed pious phrases, extolling the virtues of freedom and yet did nothing to help, I would feel I was a part of a terrible hypocrisy. The fact that we have failed to do this on **previous** occasions is beside the point. What other reason is there? We **have** no territorial ambitions. History proves that point. We have no ideas **of world** domination. Had we wanted that we could have had it following **World War II**. The only reason left is to help an oppressed and **suffering people**. **If this** is not our reason, then we have no business being **there in the first place**. I only **wish** the issues were more clear cut and **not clouded by politics**

and convenience; based more forthrightly on what is right rather than what is expedient.

Perhaps the irony of it all is that the vocal minority here at home, critical of their government, and loudly demonstrating to embarrass their government, have the right to do so because you, and those associated with you, are defending that right. I would not call them traitorous, simply misinformed and misled. No matter how hard they are making your job we can only pray as the Master prayed, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do."

Not for one moment do I take this "tour of duty" lightly. Last week on a TV newscast I saw three American pilots who had been shot down and captured. This film clip, **taken** and released by the Communists, showed plainly **the** maltreatment they **had endured**. I could not help but think of our Lord as He stood before Pilate **and the** howling mob, beaten, bleeding and ready to die.

I write because these facts are **well known** to you and I simply want you to know that I, too, am well aware of the **possibilities**. Why not face **frankly** what we both know? I shall pray daily **for** your protection, and for those associated with you. I shall pray **fervently** every day for peace; just and honorable peace in which all people **may** live in safety and freedom. **For no** one is safe and no one is free — **really** — until

ALL are safe and free. When will we ever learn that the evil in men's hearts is a reality, and has to be curbed by force? Force without justice becomes tyranny, but justice without force is ridiculous.

If you should be taken prisoner, and have to suffer as the pilots in the film clip obviously have suffered, you will know that I suffer, too. As a matter of fact, the very knowledge of such a possibility causes us all to suffer — daily. I guess freedom was never won nor preserved for the many without a lot of suffering on the part of the few.

Love,

Dad.

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~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Friday, August 11, 1967
10:32 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is a summary of choices
of targets you requested from
Bob McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

*It has been sent to Sec Rusk
for comment*

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RLG*, NARA, Date 9-3-91

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

65a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 August 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Recommendations on Additional Fixed Targets in North Vietnam

At my request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a summary of attacks against fixed targets in North Vietnam as of 9 August 1967 and their recommendations with respect to additional targets that they believe should be authorized for strike. The table below and the remainder of this memorandum summarize their views and set out by category the respects in which my recommendations differ from those of the Chiefs.

Summary of Attacks Against Fixed Targets in North Vietnam - as of 8/9/67

	JCS List	Operating Target List
Authorized for Strike: Struck	186	259
Not Struck	8	30
Total Authorized for Strike	194	289
Additional Targets Rec. by JCS for Strike:		
a. In "Chinese Buffer Zone"	5	12
b. Classified by JCS as of "Small Value"	0	7
c. Ports	3	3
d. Lesser Targets in Populated, Highly Defended Areas-POL	1	9
Cohen	0	26
e. More Signif. Targets in " " "	4	5
f. Airfields - Gia Lam & Bac Mai (1-1/2 mi fr. Hanoi:	2	2
Phuc Yen and Cat Bi	2	2**
g. Other: Vien Dien Depot*)		
Ke Sat Kwy Bridge)		
Kinh No Veh Maint. Shop*)	2	4**
Hanoi Transformer*)		
Total Recommended by JCS	19	70
Not Now Rec by JCS: Inactive or Insignificant	3	27
Other - Mining	6	6
Misc.	20	35
Total Not Recommended by JCS	29	68
Total Targets	242	427
Total Fixed Targets Struck: On Oper. Target List	259	
Other Targets Listed		
Bombing Encyclopedia	1625	
Total	1884	

* Restrike

** Recommended by SecDef

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-301
By cb, NARA, Date 1-16-96

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

At the outset, it should be noted that the Chiefs have shifted from their previous JCS list to what is now called an "Operating Target" list. This "Operating Target" list includes the 242 targets previously included on the JCS list and 185 additional targets.

Of the 427 targets on the "Operating Target" list, 289 are currently authorized for strike. 138 targets are not authorized for strike. Of this total, however, the Joint Chiefs do not now recommend that 68 be authorized for strike. They do recommend that strikes be authorized against the balance of 70 targets.

I believe that air strikes should now be authorized against 6 of these 70 additional targets. The reasons underlying my conclusions can be explained in the following several categories:

Targets in Buffer Zone

As shown on Table I, out of the 70 new targets recommended by the Joint Chiefs, 12 fall within the buffer zone along the Chinese border. The closest is within 6 miles of the border and the most distant is 21 miles from the border. The targets consist of 1 railroad spur, 1 railroad siding, 1 railroad bridge, 8 highway bridges and 1 barracks/storage facility with an 800-troop capacity. Air strikes against these targets present a serious danger of intrusion of Chinese air space. In my opinion, strike authorization should be deferred at least until we can evaluate the political and military impact of the strikes recently authorized against 10 more significant targets within the buffer zone area.

Targets Described as of Small Value

7 of the targets recommended by the JCS are specifically identified as of "small value." For example, 1 of them, a tire plant 3 miles SW of Hanoi, has an annual capacity of 10,000 tires. I do not believe that targets such as this, turning out less than 30 tires per day, warrant the risk of American lives.

Targets in Ports

3 of the targets recommended by the Chiefs are the ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha. Strikes against these port facilities involve severe risks of damage to foreign shipping. As Admiral Sharp stated in his testimony yesterday before the Stennis Subcommittee:

"Senator Jackson: You cannot hit the docks without hitting the ships?

"Admiral Sharp: It would be pretty difficult to hit them and guarantee that you would not hit one of the ships "

Hanoi and Haiphong Targets

26 of the targets recommended by the Chiefs are letter targets, located in Hanoi and Haiphong or their immediate vicinity, which were not on the "JCS Target List." They include 2 railroad yards, 1 railroad siding, railroad causeway, 2 railway bridges, 4 highway bridges and 1 vehicle repair

facilities, 1 transshipment supply depot, 3 barge repair facilities and 5 warehouse and storage depots and 1 transformer.

1 Hanoi railroad yard (JCS 21), 1 Haiphong RR bridge, and 3 warehouses (JCS 58, 59 and 62), characterized by the JCS as "important targets", are also in the immediate Hanoi or Haiphong area.

The inevitable toll in American lives and civilian casualties from strikes in these thickly populated and heavily defended areas leads me to recommend that none of these 31 targets now be authorized for strikes.

POL Targets

8 of the targets recommended by the Chiefs are POL locations or facilities, 6 within 10 miles of Hanoi and 2 within 2 miles of Haiphong. The total storage capacity represented is under 4,200 metric tons, or less than 18% of the average monthly import volume of 24,000 metric tons. A ninth POL target recommended by the Joint Chiefs is the Haiphong transshipment facility previously struck and largely inoperative. Here again, I do not believe that American pilots and planes should be sent to attack targets of this relative unimportance.

Airfields


The military elements of Bac Mai airfield and the communications elements of Gia Lam airfield are included in the balance of 8 recommended by the Joint Chiefs for inclusion on the authorized list. These fields are, respectively, 1-1/2 miles and 1 mile from Hanoi. Gia Lam is the international airport. I recommend that because of the danger of high civilian casualties, high risk of loss of U.S. pilots, and relatively low current military value, strikes against these fields not be approved at the present time.

Targets I Recommend for Authorization

Phuc Yen Airfield, 13 mi. north of Hanoi, is a major MIG base. MIG operations from the base have recently increased. I recommend it be struck. Cat Bi is a "MIG-capable" field, 3 mi. southeast of Haiphong to which the MIG operations might be moved if Phuc Yen is attacked; therefore I propose that it too be struck.

The remaining 4 targets, shown as item g on Table I, could, in my opinion, be authorized for strike following completion of the air campaign against the targets recently authorized. Admiral Sharp stated in his testimony before the Stennis Subcommittee that these recent authorizations would keep his pilots busy for at least the next two weeks. You may want to consider, therefore, authorizing strikes against these 4 targets, to take place no sooner than one week after completion of the strikes authorized on 9 August 1967.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to the Secretary of State so that he may send you his comments on my recommendations and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Robert S. McNamara

~~TOP SECRET~~

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TABLE I - Additional Targets Recommended by JCS for Strike

<u>Target</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
a. In Chinese Buffer Zone		
Man Dong RR Spur	8 mi. from China	1500 ft. of track
Lang Son RR Siding N	8 mi. " "	1600 ft. of track
Lang Con RR Bridge NW	21 " " "	150' long - 3 spans
That Khe Hwy Bridge	14 " " "	470' long - Route 4
Cao Bang Hwy Bridge N	12 " " "	490' long - Route 3
Cao Bang Hwy Bridge S	12 " " "	375' long - Route 3
Lac Na Hwy Bridge	6 " " "	250' long - 11 concrete spans
On Hwy Bridge	20 " " "	175' long - 3 spans
Chieng Chang Hwy Bridge	15 " " "	144' long - Steel girder
Long Khap Hwy Bridge	17 " " "	320' long - 4 spans
Loc Binh Hwy Bridge	17 " " "	370' long - 5 spans
Ban Muc Bks/Stor	17 " " "	800 troop capacity
b. Classified by JCS as of "Small Value"		
Haiphong Concrete	In Haiphong	Capacity unknown
Hanoi Concrete	5 mi. NW of Hanoi	Annual capacity: 10,000 cu. mtr.
Hanoi Concrete	2 " " "	Asbestos - cement materials
Hanoi Engineering	In Hanoi	Lathes and grinders
Van Dien Battery	4 mi. S of Hanoi	Wet cell batteries
Haiphong Battery	In Haiphong	" " "
Hanoi Rubber	3 mi. SW of Hanoi	Annual cap.: 10,000 tires
c. Ports		
Haiphong	In Haiphong	Handles 80% of ocean shipping
Hon Gai	25 mi. E of Haiphong	1500 STPD vs. 3800 in Haiphong
Cam Pha	40 " " "	1300 " " " "
d. Lesser Targets in Populated, Heavily Defended Areas		
POL - Hanoi	6 mi. N of Hanoi	1851 metric tons
Duong Xa	8 " E " "	430 " "
Phu Thi	7 " NE " "	630 " "
Bang So	9 " SSW " "	273 " "
Hanoi-Thi Cam	5 " W " "	393 " "
Phu Dong	5 " NE " "	350 " "
Co Nhue Vien	6 " W " "	260 " "
Haiphong	In Haiphong	Tank/drum fabrication
Haiphong	" "	Restrike of transship point
Haiphong RR Yard	" "	Major yard serving Haiphong
" " " - W	1 mi. W of Haiphong	" " from port
Van Dien RR Siding	4 mi. S of Hanoi	Serves Hanoi-Vinh RR
Cuo Duong RR Causeway	7 mi. N " "	210' long
Hanoi RR Bridge	5 " NE " "	760' long - 9 steel spans
Phu Lo RR Bridge	8 " N " "	210' long - 3 spans
Haiphong Hwy Bridge	In Haiphong	390' long - 11 spans
Haiphong Hwy Bridge	" "	310' long - 4 spans
Haiphong Hwy Bridge - SSE	" "	520' long - 5 spans

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 94-301

By CB, NARA, Date 1-16-96

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

<u>Target</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Kien An Hwy Bridge	In Haiphong	658' long - 9 spans
Bac Mai Motor Pool	3 mi. S of Hanoi	39,000 sq. ft. vehicle repair
Hanoi Veh Repair	2 " SW " "	130,000 " " " "
Hanoi Veh Depot	In Hanoi	Repair and storage
Hanoi Veh Repair	" "	Moderate size
" " "	" "	" "
Hanoi Veh Dep - Giap	" "	" "
Loi Dong Transship	4 mi. W of Haiphong	Transship and supply
Haiphong Shipyd - Thuong	NW Haiphong	Barges and small craft repair
" " - Lack	SW "	Barge repair
Hanoi Shipyard	3 mi. SE of Hanoi	Barge and ferry construction
Haiphong Whse - W	In Haiphong	94,600 sq. ft. import storage
Kinh No Storage	4 mi. N of Hanoi	179,000 sq. ft.
Haiphong Storage SE	1 mi. S of Haiphong	48,000 sq. ft. import storage
Hanoi Storage Gia Thuong	3 mi. NE of Hanoi	Military storage
Hanoi Storage Bac Mai	3 mi. S " "	" "
Haiphong Transformer	2 mi. W of Haiphong	Junction from Uong Bi

e. More Significant Targets in Populated, Heavily Defended Areas

Hanoi RR Yard	In Hanoi	24% of national capacity
Van Dien Supply	5 mi. S of Hanoi) 1,273,000 sq. ft. - 12% of
Hanoi Supply Depot - S	In Hanoi) national capacity - JCS estimate
" " " - N	2 mi. WNW of Hanoi) "432" civilian casualties
Haiphong RR Bridge	1 mi. W of Haiphong	300' long

f. Airfields

Gia Lam	2 mi. ENE of Hanoi	Major MIG base
Bac Mai	1 mi. SSW " "	Transport base
Phuc Yen	13 mi. N " "	Major MIG base
Cat Bi	3 mi. SE of Haiphong	MIG capable

g. Other

Vien Dien Depot*	5 mi. S of Hanoi	Truck repair
Ke Sat Hwy Bridge	18 mi. SE of Hanoi	285' - 3 steel spans
Kinh No Veh Main*	7 mi. N " "	289,000 sq. ft.
Hanoi Transformer*	7 mi. N " "	Defer strike until repaired

* Restrike

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, August 11, 1967
10:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach
forwards some data showing the
handsome expansion ~~in~~ ^{from} our commercial
exports of ~~foreign~~ products to
recipients of PL 480.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By hgy, NARA, Date 9-3-91

2995

66a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The Henry Wilson Mission

Enclosed are some statistics developed to brief Henry Wilson on the cash purchases of PL-480 recipients from the United States. You will notice the very large increases in 1966 and estimates for 1967.

I understand that Wilson plans to give you his own assessment soon.



Under Secretary

Enclosures

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESERVATION COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY 19 ON 10-29

Commercial sales of U.S. farm products to countries that are principal recipients of food aid under P.L. 480, calendar years 1961-66:

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>
	(Million dollars)					
<u>Far East</u>						
India	37.4	28.2	22.5	5.7	14.2	^{1/} 10.8
Pakistan	2.5	3.8	^{1/} 16.9	2.8	^{1/} 3.7	22.4
Korea, S.	9.3	17.4	11.8	31.5	18.4	31.0
Philippines	48.7	31.9	48.4	37.7	45.0	66.0
Taiwan	17.9	20.4	19.9	36.1	27.9	43.4
	<u>115.8</u>	<u>101.7</u>	<u>119.5</u>	<u>113.8</u>	<u>109.2</u>	<u>179.5</u>
<u>Other</u>						
Algeria	21.9	10.2	6.9	13.8	5.2	28.9
Congo	3.5	5.4	2.4	1.9	1.5	5.8
Ghana	7.2	10.5	7.1	8.4	7.1	8.0
Morocco	13.3	9.3	6.9	^{2/}	.9	4.4
Tunisia	2.7	6.4	1.4	1.6	1.2	3.0
Israel	15.2	17.0	37.4	41.3	38.1	50.4
Turkey	.6	3.1	^{2/}	.4	5.6	9.4
Greece	11.2	4.0	13.1	9.7	11.0	15.6
Bolivia	2.3	1.5	.7	5.5	.9	2.6
Brazil	5.2	19.4	17.1	3.8	6.0	11.3
Chile	7.1	14.8	6.7	6.8	10.4	9.0
Colombia	8.4	9.9	12.1	13.3	11.4	11.8
Peru	10.3	10.2	11.1	19.2	24.6	18.4
	<u>108.9</u>	<u>121.7</u>	<u>122.9</u>	<u>125.7</u>	<u>123.9</u>	<u>179.2</u>
Grand total	<u>224.7</u>	<u>223.4</u>	<u>242.4</u>	<u>239.5</u>	<u>233.1</u>	<u>352.8</u>

^{1/} Adjusted for comparability with Census trade data.

^{2/} Less than \$100,000.

Commercial Food Grain Imports, India and Pakistan

66c

INDIACalendar Years

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
	(1,000 Metric Tons)				
<u>1/</u> Wheat, U.S.					<u>2/</u>
Quantity	--	32.8	97.5	51.4	325.5
Dollars (millions)	--	2.1	6.3	3.3	21.1
Rice, U.S.	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>59.7</u>	<u>6.0</u>
Total	--	32.8	97.5	111.1	331.5
Wheat, other countries	155.9	255.6	172.6	152.2	<u>2/</u> 381.3
Rice, other countries	<u>182.6</u>	<u>312.0</u>	<u>497.0</u>	<u>673.8</u>	<u>3/</u> 492.0
Total	338.5	567.6	669.6	826.0	873.3
Percent U.S.	0	5	13	12	28

PAKISTANFiscal Years

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
	(1,000 Metric Tons)					
<u>1/</u> Wheat, U.S.						<u>4/</u>
Quantity	--	--	--	75	100	230
Dollars (millions)	--	--	--	4.9	6.5	14.9
Wheat, other countries	116	55	50	42	622	--
Percent U.S.	0	0	0	64	14	

1/ Includes barter.

2/ India has indicated that it will buy another 100,000 MT from both the United States and Australia.

3/ India is in the market for an additional 140,000 MT of rice.

4/ Represents grain purchased or to be purchased under a CCC credit. There is a possibility that Pakistan will add 100,000 to 200,000 tons to this, depending on how its crops develop.

66d

Wheat Imports of Certain Far East countries

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
	(1000 metric tons)				
<u>TAIWAN</u> (fiscal years)					
U.S. commercial	2	15	74	115	264 ^{2/}
Australia commercial	6	2	141	144	40
Canada commercial	4	11	17	3	---
Total commercial	12	28	232	262	304
Percent U.S.	17	54	32	44	87
U.S. titles I and IV	285	205	268	148	46
<u>KOREA, S.</u> (fiscal years)					
U.S. commercial	46	78	23	27	350 ^{2/}
Canada commercial	---	14	---	2	---
Australia commercial	---	42	---	---	---
Total commercial	46	134	23	29	350
Percent U.S.	100	58	100	93	100
U.S. Title I	593	509	400	239	150

^{2/} Preliminary

66e

WHEAT IMPORTS OF CERTAIN FAR EAST COUNTRIES

		(1,000 metric tons)				
Pakistan: (fiscal years)	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
US commercial	---	---	---	75	100	230
Australia commer.	116	55	50	42	524	---
China commercial	---	---	---	---	98	---
Total Commer.	116	55	50	117	722	230
Percent US	0	0	0	64	14	---
US Title I	1424	1477	1598	1094	830	1250
Australia (gift)	---	---	---	11	---	---
Canada (gift)	20	41	60	50	169	50
Total aid	1444	1518	1658	1155	999	1300
Percent US	99	97	96	95	83	96

Philippines: (calendar years)

US commercial	213	167	238	374	175
Canada Commercial	180	174	124	65	---
Australia commer.	16	5	41	41	---
France commercial	---	---	---	1	---
Total Commer.	409	346	362	440	175
Percent US	52	48	66	85	100

21 Preliminary

31 Represents what has been exported or scheduled for export

41 Less than 1,000 metric tons

668

Wheat Imports of Certain Far East Countries

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
INDIA (cal. years)			(1000 metric tons)		
U.S. commercial	--	33	98	51	325 <u>3/</u>
Canada commercial	--	--	1	--	50
Australia commercial	<u>156</u>	<u>256</u>	<u>172</u>	<u>152</u>	<u>331</u>
Total commercial	156	289	271	203	706
Percent U.S.	0	11	36	25	46
U.S. Title I	3897	5058	5979	6463	3180
Canada aid	19	107	237	911	700
Australia aid	--	--	152	142	300
USSR aid (gift)	--	--	--	--	200
Other (gift)	--	--	--	41	16
Total aid	3916	5165	6368	7557	4396
Percent U.S.	99+	98	94	86	73

3/ Represents wheat imported or scheduled for import

President's file

22

August 11, 1967

4:05 pm

Mr. President:

We are getting to Clark Clifford and General Taylor the Bunker telegram on the military activities and the Westmoreland assessment.

Bunker's election telegram which Bill Jorden covers in his attached memorandum will be sent to all our diplomatic missions by the State Department for Ambassadors' use with foreign government officials.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

67a

Saturday, August 12, 1967, 2:10 p.m.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnamese Elections

I am attaching the text of a cable just in from Ambassador Bunker. It is long but full of meat. It covers the electoral problem in orderly fashion -- the main allegations and Bunker's views.

This should be useful in dealing with Congressional and press questions. I plan to rewrite this in an unclassified version, mainly to eliminate attribution to Bunker and any suggestion of United States intervention in the electoral process except our support for free elections.

A related point:

Clark Clifford and General Taylor will be on Face the Nation tomorrow (Sunday). They will almost certainly be asked some questions about the election. They could sidestep them, but I don't think they should.

Bill Bundy will be briefing them for the TV show, and I plan to ask him to make the text of this cable available to them so they can cope with the main questions and allegations.

Bill

William J. Jorden

Att.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-295

By hig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

676
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-296
By ip, NARA, Date 11-2-94

FROM: American Embassy Saigon

TO: Secretary of State - Washington

SAIGON 2972

August 12, 1967

1. This telegram will supplement SAIGON 2869 in summarizing our view of election to date insofar as charges against the GVN and Thieu-Ky ticket are concerned. It may be useful in answering criticism in the United States. In sum, we believe that since the Ky-Thieu merger, the elections have proceeded freely and fairly, gauged by the standard of United States elections, which is a very tough standard to apply to a nation without a democratic tradition, with limited administrative capability, with an insecure countryside, and in the middle of a war.

2. Claims of unfairness stem primarily:

a. From rumors, misquotes, acceptance of opposition candidate statements which even in the United States would be made to serve their own interests, and news stories based on rumor and not on hard facts; and

b. A tendency to gauge the fairness of the elections against the standard of perfection, which does not prevail even in the United States, and which cannot reasonably be expected anywhere, particularly in a nation at war and without democratic traditions.

3. The GVN has done the following things to insure free and fair elections:

a. Press censorship has been lifted and freedom of expression is clearly being carried out.

b. General Vien, Defense Minister and Commander in Chief of Vietnamese Armed Forces, publicly stated that the Armed Forces would not have a candidate, would stay out of the elections, and that members of the Armed Forces would not electioneer and would vote as individuals. In addition he sent a written directive to Armed Forces Commanders, clearly stating rules governing participation by military personnel in election activity.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

c. General Thang, Minister of Revolutionary Development (RD), at a graduation exercise at the Vung Tau school, stated that no RD workers would engage in the political campaign and each would vote as an individual.

d. Generals Ky and Thieu called province and district leaders into town and told them they should not pressure populace to vote for any particular candidate. They were not to engage in politics. The election law provides for stiff penalties for civil servants who engage in election fraud and these penalties have been publicized.

e. General Loan was relieved as Chief of Military Security, although he still remains as Chief of National Police. He has been told to stay out of election campaign by Ky, and so far as we have evidence, he is doing so.

f. All candidates are being given money to campaign by the GVN, pursuant to the election law. The Government is printing their posters and leaflets free of charge.

g. All Presidential candidates are being furnished transportation by the GVN, a benefit not required by the law.

h. All candidates are being given free time on government radio and television.

i. Invitations have been extended by the GVN for observers to come for the elections to:

- (1) The UN,
- (2) Governments having relations with the GVN,
- (3) Several parliamentary organizations, and
- (4) The international press.

j. There are a variety of safeguards provided in the electoral law such as poll watchers and elaborate provisions for monitoring the elections by the National Assembly.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

4. Complaints about a threat to "free" elections have been:

a. General Ky's supposed statement that he would pull a coup if civilian candidates win. General Ky has publicly and categorically denied that he made this statement, claims he was misquoted, says he will support a newly elected government.

b. The Dong Ha incident. This is explained in SAIGON 2869. It is interesting to observe that:

(1) Arrangements for the campaign are a responsibility of the election campaign committee, which is composed of representative selected by the candidates themselves;

(2) The election law requires only that the election campaign committee "organize talks between electors and their candidates" but does not specify providing particular facilities;

(3) In this case the GVN had lunch for the candidates set up, rounded up a crowd to hear them, and made arrangements apart from transportation, none of which was required by the law, and all of which in the United States would be handled by each candidate's own campaign organization as his own responsibility; and

(4) Generals Thieu and Ky have indicated their desire to do anything within reason to see that the campaign arrangements are more smoothly made in the future.

c. Turn down of Big Minh and Au Truong Thanh as Presidential candidates.

Regardless of how we might have decided the question:

(1) The action was taken by the elected assembly, not Thieu or Ky;

(2) The basis for elimination of both candidates was violation of legal requirements, whether we think the requirements were properly interpreted or not;

(3) Minh and Thanh were not "singled out," as several other candidates were also eliminated;

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

(4) The "French citizenship" cause of Big Minh's elimination (his VP candidate's citizenship) was also used to eliminate another candidate, Tran Van Thoan; and

(5) Eleven candidates remained in the race, giving the people an adequate choice. In the United States, candidates are also sometimes eliminated from the race for various legal reasons such as age, residence requirements, conviction of felony, holding of other office, etc., varying from state to state. There is also a "peace candidate" now, Mr. Dzu, so the voters are not denied this choice by elimination of Thanh.

(NOTE: Most of the candidates have expressed their support for a peaceful settlement and have talked of negotiations, bombing pauses, etc.)

d. General Loan's appearance in the balcony of the General Assembly at the time of the vote on the Thieu-Ky slate. This might have been considered as pressure by some of the delegates, and may have influenced their votes. But there is no evidence that Loan used any threats; the public has a right to appear in the balcony, just as in the United States, where it frequently uses this right to attempt to exert silent (or even sometimes vocal) pressure; and Loan has not engaged openly in political activities since that time so far as we know.

e. Rumors that the Armed Forces had formed a Council that would "run the government" no matter who is elected.

The formation of any such Council and such intent of the Armed Forces have been categorically denied by Thieu and Ky. Of course, the Constitution itself provides for a military council to advise the government on military matters.

f. Failure of Thieu and Ky to resign their positions to run for office.

Some of the candidates (Huong, for example) admit they are not required to do this by law, but that elections would not be "fair" unless they did because they have, as incumbents, an "unfair" advantage. Admittedly all incumbents have a natural advantage, but:

(1) They do not give this up in the United States;

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

(2) The President and the Vice President of the United States do not resign to run for re-election, and

(3) Resignation might be interpreted as a failure to live up to their responsibilities and, even if manageable in this case, could be a bad precedent for later times when the interim was not so manageable.

g. Claims of surveillance and pressure by police and activities of province and district chiefs.

The significant thing about these claims is that:

(a) They are greatly reduced from the claims existing before the Thieu-Ky merger, and

(b) Complaining candidates have generally been unable or unwilling to cite specific instances, and

(c) On a recent boat trip in Sadec Province Ky, when confronted with this charge by reporters, stopped at the nearest village, asked if anyone knew him (which no one did), asked who they were going to vote for (they had not decided) and asked if anyone had pressured them to vote for any particular candidates, and they said "no." There will undoubtedly be some involvement by public officials, regardless of direction or lack of direction from the top. We even have evidence that some officials will at least quietly support opposition candidates. But public officials become involved in election campaigns in the United States. And in the absence of intimidation, some involvement on the side of the "ins" would generally be considered one of the accepted advantages of incumbency.

5. We shall of course continue to stress the absolute importance of free elections and the effect of any appearance of rigging on the United States public. And of course we wish to avoid all things that could be construed as marring free elections, whether such construction is justified or not. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to believe the opposition will be satisfied. It seems to us that our attitude in response to the press should be:

a. The standard for free and fair elections should be reasonable and not more rigid than in the United States. If ballots are fairly cast and counted, and intimidation is not used, the elections can be considered free.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

b. The results of the elections are not a foregone conclusion and a result that gives Thieu and Ky less than a substantial majority will be additional evidence in the situation here -- where many people vote for the Government as protection -- that undue pressures were not exerted.

c. In a country such as this, we cannot expect great administrative efficiency, particularly on something so new as elections. We should not ascribe every mistake to malice, rather than to inefficiency -- its more probably cause.

d. An important development -- generally ignored by the press -- is the diffusion of power between the executive and a new legislative branch, which under the Constitution will have even greater power than the US Congress. The present Constituent Assembly has shown independence. The large number of citizens running for the Senate (680 originally, now 480) shows the confidence of many people that the Legislative Branch will be important.

6. We recognize of course that we must continue to watch the elections closely and that there is no guarantee at this time that some improper practices may not crop up. We will keep the closest surveillance on practices and endeavor to insure that the elections are free and honest.

BUNKER

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Friday, August 11, 1967
3:45 p.m.

68

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the kind of good result from a
small effort we like to see.

I shall have Bill Jordan follow up.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Djakarta 715)

68a

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, August 11, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR GREEN (Djakarta, 715)

SUBJECT: Visit to Demak Project

My visit on August 7 to the Demak Project in Central Java in company with Manpower Minister Awaluddin, AID representatives and others, provided impressive evidence of what can be achieved by our Title II programs both economically and politically.

We arrived at the completion of Phase I (supported by 600 tons of US corn and 54 tons of cooking oil); and I announced US willingness to support Phase II program which involves roughly one and one-half times as much in US commodity input.

Demak is an extensive coastal plain inhabited by 500,000 persons. Though the plain is intersected by rivers, these invariably flood during the rainy season and during the dry season, they sink to a level where, unless the ancient canal system completely neglected since Dutch days is cleared of sludge, all surrounding areas are left parched, cracked, and unproductive. Alternating floods and droughts have left people destitute, causing seasonal surges of beggars and vagrants into adjoining cities of Semarang and neighboring areas. In the areas so far unaffected by our Demak program, inhabitants are scrounging at the bottom of the dried-up canal beds in search of drinking water or fishing fruitlessly in occasional stagnating pools. There were a few stands of scrawny corn and cassava, but local officials informed us these are unlikely to yield any crops unless, unexpectedly, there are rains between now and November. No outright starvation is reported but malnutrition is prevalent and starvation almost certain unless rains occur before the end of November.

The completed Phase I of the Demak provided startling contrast to the foregoing. In the Phase I area, water is coursing through 67 kilometers of canals cleared of 300,000 cubic meters of sludge by 17,000 workers. Although the crops are so far unaffected by this irrigation system which opened only two weeks ago, Manpower Minister Awaluddin and local officials estimate that there can now be double

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 719 83-44

By 12/12/91 NARA, Date 9-10-91

PRESERVATION COPY

cropping of 16,000 hectares of rice land, plus sizeable additional yields of corn, cassava, vegetables and fruits. Their estimate of 50,000 additional tons of rice next year in this area is unquestionably high and this performance would also require sizeable additional inputs of fertilizer, etc. However, there is no question but that relatively small inputs of Title II commodities may yield each year additional crops worth several times that capital investment.

Indonesian officials also emphasized the political impact of this program which has given hope and pride of achievement to all involved. Villagers have on their own constructed secondary and tertiary canals to bring water through villages and to their land holdings. The Governor of Central Java, whom I called on in Semarang, said that our project was mainly responsible for the absence of beggars and vagrants in his city which is the capital of Central Java. The local Bupati (administrative leader of Demak) who hosted a large luncheon in our honor, told me of the close cooperation between local officials and those of the Department of Public Works, Manpower, Agriculture, and the Army Civic Mission (latter used in connection with river dredging). Such cooperation was everywhere evident, including excellent storage facilities for our commodities maintained by the police and Army.

I believe the foregoing explains the enthusiasm General Suharto displayed in our July 5 discussions for expanding Title II program. I urge that we continue to support the expansion of this obviously important and successful program.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESERVATION COPY

67
Friday, August 11, 1967
1:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Chancellor Kiesinger has several times indicated that he would like to have a discussion on the "world situation" and come to understand your overall view, in addition to discussing the particular outstanding issues in U. S. -German relations. Although this may sound like somewhat empty philosophizing, I believe it may be worthwhile for you to discuss this with Sect. Rusk before Kiesinger arrives and design the kind of clear and well-structured statement you made to Kosygin in Hollybush, which clearly linked specific issues to a general point of view.

The reason is that Kiesinger would like to understand better how our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, Asia, etc., relate to his more immediate concerns with NATO, Eastern Europe, etc.

Specifically, I would suggest that you make the following fundamental points:

1. U. S. policy aims to contribute to the building of stable peace.
2. We have some hope that changes will take place in the Soviet Union and Communist China over a period of time which will make it easier to achieve peace; but we cannot count on self-restraint from Communists at this time in history. Therefore, we are determined:
 - to maintain an integrated NATO;
 - to make sure that aggression does not succeed in Asia and elsewhere;
 - to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent.
3. From this base of demonstrated and stable strength, we hope to persuade the Soviet Union that its wisest course is to pursue a policy of moderation and peace in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, and to engage in measures of arms limitation and control which would increase the security of the U. S. and its allies as well as the security of the USSR.
4. Working with our friends in Western Europe, we hope to make this policy of moderation attractive; and, therefore, we have worked hard on specific limited moves of cooperation or parallel action; the latter, for example, in the Indo-Pak crisis of 1965 and the Middle East crisis.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-295
By ig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

5. With respect to German unity, American support is serious -- not merely verbal. The creation of stable peace and the final liquidation of the Cold War requires a peaceful and secure end to the division of Germany and Europe.
6. Against this background we are also trying to build islands of peace and progress in Latin America, Asia, and elsewhere. Like Western Europe, we hope to see these regions organize themselves as regions and deal with the U. S. as partners.
7. But we cannot do these things alone. The American people and the Congress are prepared to play their part in these policies of deterrence, development, and peace. But it is increasingly clear that they cannot bear these burdens without our allies carrying a fair share of the costs and sacrifices. One of the great dangers in the world right now is that Europeans will take the U. S. role for granted.
8. That is why we attach such importance to the German role in:
 - NATO, including the German defense budget;
 - a follow-on financial agreement going beyond the period covered by the Tripartite agreement;
 - the forthcoming monetary discussions among the Ten;
 - foreign aid;
 - etc.
9. This approach would be strengthened if -- on a personal basis -- you were to tell Kiesinger something about your talks with Kosygin.

W. W. R.

Friday, Aug. 11, 1967
10:45 p.m.

72

MR. PRESIDENT:

As I close up shop this evening, I would make one comment on the day: dropping a span of that bridge the first time around was a quite extraordinary military feat. There is nothing harder to take out than a bridge; and it was done with a handful of aircraft -- in fact, the first flight did the job.

If it turns out that civilian casualties were as low as they now appear to be, you may wish to indicate through Bus Wheeler to the men involved your respect for the operation.

W. W. R.

Friday, August 11, 1967
10:30 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the Israelis inform us that Rabin
will succeed Harman in the fall.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Tel Aviv 442)

Free file

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2
WH 71a

Action

Info

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMLV 442 2231000 ~~SECRET~~

2 2 8 1 Q
AUGUST 11, 1967
6:18 A.M.

ZNY SSSSS
R 110945Z AUG 67
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 442

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-296

By 48, NARA, Date 11-2-94

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

1. BITAN (FONOFF) TOLD ME AUGUST 10 HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED BY PRIME MINISTER TO REQUEST THAT I INFORM YOU AND THE PRESIDENT THAT CHIEF OF STAFF YIZHAK RABIN HAS BEEN SELECTED AS NEXT AMBASSADOR TO WASHINGTON. CHANGE IS EXPECTED TO TAKE PLACE IN LATE FALL OR EARLY WINTER WHEN RABIN WILL RETIRE FROM ARMY.
2. USUAL FORMAL REQUEST FOR AGREEMENT WILL BE MADE IN DUE COURSE BUT PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN DESIRED THAT YOU AND PRESIDENT HAVE THIS ADVANCE INFORMAL INFORMATION. APPOINTMENT HAS NOT YET BEEN SUBMITTED TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT BUT WHEN IT IS OR EVEN PRIOR THERETO PRIMIN APPREHENSIVE OF LEAK OR AT LEAST SPECULATION AND DOES NOT WANT FIRST INTIMATION HIS DECISION TO REACH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT IN THAT MANNER.
3. BITAN ADDED THAT RABIN IS NOT ONLY A CAPABLE INDIVIDUAL ENJOYING GREAT POPULARITY HERE BUT IS PARTICULARLY A CHOICE INVOLVING UTMOST CONFIDENCE IN HIM BY PRIMIN AND FONMIN EBAN. IT APPRECIATED THAT TRANSITION OF RABIN FROM MILITARY TO DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES WILL BE ABRUPT BUT THEY BELIEVE HE WILL MAKE A GOOD AMBASSADOR. BITAN SAID FURTHER THAT IT POSSIBLE RABIN WILL SUBSEQUENTLY ENTER POLITICAL LIFE AND THAT HE IS REPRESENTATIVE OF YOUNG ISRAEL.
4. RABIN IS A QUIET, MODEST APPEARING INDIVIDUAL BUT AT THE SAME TIME IS FORCEFUL. HE IS A NATIVE BORN ISRAELI AND ALTHOUGH HIS COMMAND OF ENGLISH IS QUITE GOOD IT IS SOMETIMES HESITANT. HIS APPOINTMENT WILL OF COURSE REPRESENT A DEPARTURE FROM ISRAELI PAST PRACTICE OF ASSIGNING TO WASHINGTON COSMOPOLITAN INDIVIDUALS OF EUROPEAN ORIGIN AND HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS MAY TEND TO CHANGE PATTERN ISRAELI EMBASSY OPERATIONS TO SOME EXTENT. HOWEVER, AS REPRESENTATIVE YOUNG GENERATION ISRAELIS WHO ARE INCREAEENGLY COMING TO FORE IN POLITICAL LIFE HERE, HE WILL HAVE ADVANTAGE OF BEING SYMBOL OF FUTURE LEADERS OF ISRAEL.

GP-3 BARBOUR

~~SECRET~~

Friday, August 11, 1967
9:55 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Jorden's draft of a proposed speech before noon today in the Senate.

Nick Katzenbach is dealing with both a Bunker response to the Bingham document and will mount a backgrounder this morning.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Mr. President:

A number of our colleagues -- in this body and in the House -- have been expressing some concern about the coming elections in Viet-Nam.

And some of the concern has taken the form of strong criticism -- of this or that aspect of the campaign now underway.

Mr. President, we politicians are supposed to be hard-headed and realistic. But I find, in some of the criticism I read, a notably lack of these qualities.

Viet-Nam is not a placid township in upperstate New York or a quiet county in Illinois. It is not an old and established state with a long democratic tradition.

And It is not, Mr. President, a humble puppet that will jump through the hoop at our bidding. Nor do I think we would want it to be.

Viet-Nam is a country at war.

It is a country that is trying desperately to lay the first foundation-stones of a democratic system.

It is a country that is creating its own institutions in its own way.

It is groping for the right way to do things, the way that will satisfy most of its own people.

It is making mistakes. And it is going to make some more.

And when it stops making mistakes, we can all go there and learn a few lessons.

What are the complaints of our learned colleagues who are not happy about the electoral process in Viet-Nam?

I can only gather that they are unhappy that full-fledged democracy has not suddenly been born in the troubled countryside of Viet-Nam.

They seem to expect the Vietnamese to do in a few months what we and others have been trying to do for nearly two centuries -- not always with unblemished success.

They pay no attention to the amazing fact that the Vietnamese people are having any elections at all.

They do not recognize the astonishing feat of the Vietnamese in writing a thoroughly democratic constitution in the midst of a vicious war.

They say nothing about the political vitality of a country that can produce eleven leading citizens to contend for the presidency -- and 480 men and women who are ready to put their reputations -- and even their lives -- on the line to run for their new Senate of 60 members.

And, finally, they ignore the fact that the Vietnamese Communists -- recognizing the threat these elections represent to their purposes -- have sworn to do all in their power to disrupt or prevent them.

What are the complaints some of our colleagues feel so deeply about?

First, they complain of an alleged statement by Prime Minister Ky that he would carry out a coup if the elections produced a government he didn't like.

I have read reports of that statement, Mr. ^{President}~~Speaker~~, on page 1 of several newspapers.

A few days ago, I read his denial of the statement on page 11 of one newspaper. Another that carried the original allegation didn't see fit to report his denial.

General Ky said that any future government must work for the poor people of Viet-Nam -- and that any government that fails to work on their behalf would surely be opposed by the people.

Speaking of himself and General Thieu, he said:

"If we were elected this time and failed to carry out our plans for a social revolution, I'm sure that the people -- including the armed forces -- would ask us to go home."

Now, we may not appreciate that approach to the legitimacy of elected government. But it is no less inflammatory than some of the statements of Thomas Jefferson or John Adams when our nation was being born.

In any case, most of us have learned to pay more attention to what Prime Minister Ky does than what he says. I recall violent protests on this floor when a year or so ago he spoke about invading North Viet-Nam. He said it -- but he didn't do it.

And I suspect his statement on a future government was more electioneering than cold hard threat. Because he knows perfectly well

what the reaction would be here -- in Viet-Nam -- and elsewhere -- to a coup against an elected government.

Second, our friends complain that some generals -- unnamed generals, to be sure -- are plotting to rule South Viet-Nam whatever the election produces.

It may be true that a few generals have this notion in mind. But could they succeed against a government fairly and honestly elected? Would the Vietnamese people sit still for it? I doubt it. And I doubt that any Vietnamese who has shown the courage and the patriotism to seek high office in free elections would be willing to meekly accept any such arrangement.

Finally, the critics refer to the recent incident at Quang Tri when some presidential candidates were unable to meet with the voters as scheduled.

What was the "incident" at Quang Tri?

A government plane flew several candidates to the northern province for a scheduled joint campaign meeting. The meeting had been well publicized. Hundreds of people had gathered to hear the politicians speak.

The plane made a pass at the dirt runway. There was a vicious cross-wind. The pilot judged that a landing was unsafe. So he flew to

the nearest safe airport only nine miles away.

I hesitate to think, Mr. President, what some of the critics would be saying today if he had gone ahead and tried to land -- and had cracked up, killing some or most of the candidates.

There was some confusion of the unplanned landing. A convoy was sent out from Quang Tri by the authorities to pick up the candidates. But they had decided to leave before it arrived. An offer of U.S. transportation by the base authorities was turned down.

And somewhere along the line, the candidates recognized a political issue when it stared them in the face. They knew this was something they could use to attack the government. And they used it.

Is it so strange, Mr. President? Is it unheard of? And is it something that American politicians must "view with concern?"

How many men in this chamber have failed to keep a political date because a plane had engine trouble? Or an airport was socked in? And how many of us have complained when a local reception committee didn't perform well?

If the Quang Tri incident is the best the critics can find to attack the Vietnamese elections, they are in bad shape.

It is interesting, Mr. President, that the source of most of the criticism comes from newspaper reports from Saigon.

It is interesting because every development in this election campaign, however minor, is being reported in the most intimate detail. The largest press corps in the world is following every twist and turn -- and sending it back for our information every day.

There is no censorship of those reports -- as there is in so many places in the world.

And just a few weeks ago, the Vietnamese government lifted all censorship from its own press so that the statements and activities of all candidates would be freely and fully reported.

That, I suggest, is not a bad record for a young country -- one unused to democratic practices -- and one that is in the midst of a war for its very survival.

But that is not all.

The Government in Saigon formally requested the Secretary General of the United Nations on July 20 to send observers to Viet-Nam to watch the elections. That request, unfortunately, was turned down.

The Vietnamese have asked the large diplomatic corps to send its people anywhere in the country they like to observe the electoral process.

Are these the actions of a government that is determined to carry out elections by every illegal and unfair means? Is it the way a political machine works that is trying to steal an election?

If it is, it is the first in history.

We cannot claim that these elections will be the most honest and upright in all recorded history. But I have a strong feeling that they are going to be better--more honest--and certainly more carefully watched--than most of us have any right to expect.

Our only intervention in this process has been to stand up openly for honest and fair elections. We have stated our position publicly. Our Ambassador in Saigon has time and time again reinforced this position in his talks with Vietnamese leaders.

Mr. President, the very fact that elections are being held before the eyes of the entire world is something of a miracle. It is also a mark of the progress that is being made in Vietnamese life.

And it is just this kind of progress that we have hoped for--prayed for -- and fought for. It is the kind of progress we should now welcome with open arms and happy hearts.

#####

Friday, August 11, 1967
9:45 a. m.

73

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres. file

Unless you decide to the contrary, today I will be off on leave for two weeks starting tomorrow morning; although I plan to be here for the Kiesinger (Aug. 15-16) and the Shah's (Aug. 22-23) visits.

We shall be at Norfolk and I can get here literally within an hour. The White House telephone board (and everyone else) will have my telephone number. The senior members of the shop will be filing their papers directly to you via Brom Smith; that is --

Bator
Bowdler
Hamilton
Jorden
Saunders

Ed Fried will be over about August 15 to overlap for two weeks Francis Bator and learn the business.

In addition, our JCS liaison man -- Bob Ginsburgh -- will be on duty and available.

One outstanding piece of business: a successor to Bunker on Middle East water. I spoke with Dave Ginsburg, who is thinking it over and will suggest names. Mac Bundy will talk with Abe Feinberg, who gets back from Israel over the weekend, and he will also keep in touch with Dave Ginsburg on this.

W. W. R.

Friday, August 11, 1967 -- 8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

JSC 12 Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge.

The big Hanoi bridge was apparently attacked with success last night.

The first attack flight reports that 4 3,000 lb bombs hit near the center of the bridge.

The second attack flight reports the center span down.

There were 24 attack aircraft and 8 flack aircraft (F-105).

Several aircraft damaged; none lost.

No report on whether civilian damage was inflicted.

Will follow up.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

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DRAFT STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER UPON LEAVING WHITE HOUSE

Pres file

I have been discussing with the President the progress in the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty at Geneva. In particular, I have been discussing with him the fact that I have been advised that it is possible that we may, very soon, be able to submit a draft non-proliferation treaty for the consideration of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva. For that reason, I am returning to Geneva in the hopes that we can work out the final solution of the problems concerning the tabling of a non-proliferation treaty before the Committee.

August 11, 1967

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Pres. file

August 11, 1967

Mr. President:

Yesterday, General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff, returned from a trip to Vietnam.

I am told that he comes back with the most optimistic reports.

Recommend that you have him give you his report in person. After meeting with him, you might wish to unleash him on the White House Press Corps.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

77

Profile

August 11, 1967

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was very pleased to receive your recent letter. Under Secretary Katzenbach has given me a full account of his extensive conversations with you and your associates during his visit to Accra. Your letter and his report confirm my impression that Ghana is pressing forward with the critical business of progress for her people.

I want you to know that I appreciate how difficult many of these steps are for you. The courageous decision to devalue your currency is a particular case in point. I am told that this step, together with the other measures in your economic stabilization program, have already resulted in growing interest in Ghana on the part of foreign investors. I very much hope this trend will continue.

General Conway has also reported to me on his conversation with you. I understand that he discussed with you the rigorous legal and budgetary limitations on our military and related assistance programs. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with you on this matter in the near future.

Your remarks about regional cooperation were particularly welcome. We too were greatly heartened by formation of the West African Economic Community. I think all of Africa's friends in the world were also encouraged by your response to President Mobutu's request for aid in the current difficulties in the Congo. Ghana's action is bound to strengthen the sense of mutual alliance among African nations. We in the United States could not wish for any more constructive evolution in African affairs.

Your interest in international affairs beyond Africa's borders has also been most constructive. I was pleased to note that our two UN delegations were in harmony during the Special Session of the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis. I also note with appreciation your interest in our efforts to bring a just


DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-295
By lig, NARA, Date 6-22-95

peace to Vietnam. We continue to make every effort to move the conflict from the battlefield to the negotiating table. So far, despite our very best efforts, we have received no response whatever. Like you, I deeply hope and trust that we can make progress in this area in the months ahead.

I understand that Americans are to have the pleasure of your company in October. If your schedule permits a stop in Washington, I would very much like to see you and to discuss the many vital matters with which we are both concerned. Ambassador Williams will be in touch with your office to work out the details. Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to the pleasure of meeting you.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency
Lieutenant General J. A. Ankrah, O.O.V., M.C.
Chairman, National Liberation Council of
The Republic of Ghana
Accra

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-296

By ig, NARA, Date 11-2-94

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

SAIGON 2867

August 11, 1967

I saw Ky late the afternoon of August 11, and took up the same matters I had discussed earlier with Thieu.

Ky made many of the same points as Thieu, emphasizing that the government was doing more than was required and was prepared to work out solutions with the candidates, as had been indicated at their August 8 press conference. Ky, in referring to the candidates, said they might actually prefer not to travel in the provinces and to do their talking from Saigon. He said that if they were serious and responsible, then they should have discussed the problems directly with Thieu and Ky and they could have been worked out. Instead, the candidates had excluded the Government of South Vietnam representative from the campaign committee, and written the August 8 letter and issued their communique, none of which had been correct. With respect to the letter, Ky said that he would not sign a reply himself but that Administrator Truong had been instructed to send a letter on behalf of Thieu and Ky to say what the government was prepared to do.

In discussing the developments in Quang Tri, Ky said that it was up to the local campaign committees rather than the Government of South Vietnam to make arrangements. I remarked that it was too bad that Thieu and Ky had not gone along on the trip as there could have been no complaint then. Ky admitted it would have been better and said that their representative, Nguyen Van Loc, was supposed to have gone but that he understood that Thieu had told him the evening before not to go. I asked Ky whether he and Thieu planned to go on some other trips, and he said that they would do so.

I then raised with Ky the possible desirability of a high level Government of South Vietnam election coordinator such as Deputy Prime Minister Vien, along the lines of my earlier talk with Thieu. Ky replied that Tuong has sufficient authority and had in fact ordered all the arrangements that were so carefully made through the Province Chief at Quang Tri. I commented that it was too bad that General Lam also had not been available as this had had a bad effect.

In order to impress Ky with the seriousness of the American reactions to recent developments here, I read him the text of the election appeal made by a group of prominent Americans and the statement by the Congressmen as contained in State 19045. In this connection, I asked him

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about the report of an armed forces committee to run the government which had had much adverse editorial comment. Ky said this report was completely untrue and added that it was merely a series of meetings that the usual group of top generals had held to discuss reorganization of the armed forces and pacification matters prior to discussion with Westmoreland, Komer and me. He said that they had put off this meeting with us since they had more preparatory work to do. He said there was absolutely no intention to set up any inner military group to run the government after the elections and this report could be flatly denied.

I also mentioned to Ky some of the reports from the civilian candidates that there were various harassment measures being taken. Ky referred to press accounts that he had been campaigning in Sa Dec and putting pressure on the local authorities to get out to vote for him. He said that accompanied by CBS and NBC and other press representatives he had stopped at a village and had asked the villagers who they were going to vote for and they replied they didn't know. He then asked them whether they knew who he was. The villagers had simply said, "no." Ky said that if reports of pressures on the part of Province Chiefs come to his attention, he will act on them. He considered, however, that most of them were rumors, such as the report of pressures by the police in Hue where in fact the Police Chief belongs to Ha Thuc Ky's Dai Viet Party. Ky also said that he hoped I had noticed that ban was being kept here in Saigon and was being kept quiet.

Ky concluded by saying that he was confident that everything would be gotten back on the tracks. I reverted to my earlier advice to him as an "elder" regarding handling of the press. Ky said yes, he remembered, and perhaps the best thing for him to do was just to keep his mouth shut. I agreed with him.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Friday, August 11, 1967

TEXT OF STATE CABLE 19258

Pres file

Deliver immediately to Ambassador Locke and Calhoun

Confirming telephone conversation with the Duty Officer, we face an urgent problem today in the House of Representatives where Bingham and others will be making sharply critical speeches based on elements in the Bingham statement summarized in paragraph 2 of State 18985.

The Bingham statement makes three charges:

A. Statements attributed to Ky threaten seizure by military coup if election should produce results unacceptable to him. The implication is that only a Thieu/Ky victory will be acceptable to authorities now in power.

B. The apple story of last Friday that senior officers have taken first steps toward "Military Affairs Committee" which would formulate the national policy in much the same way as Armed Forces leadership has done for more than two years. Added to this is the statement attributed to "one General" that democracy is coming too soon to Vietnam, that the Army must remain powerful and that: "We are willing to go along with the voting, but things must come out right."

C. The "unfortunate incident" at Quang Tri where candidates were allegedly not furnished facilities to meet with voters. The statement says this "must be viewed with suspicion" and that the Government must assume responsibility that all candidates be given opportunity of meeting formally scheduled campaign commitments.

We urgently need your comment by Noon today on these matters for possible Congressional debate here this afternoon. This comment should correct or supplement the following points we believe would be appropriate for rebuttal speakers:

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NEJ 94-296
By *ing*, NARA, Date *11-2-94*

A. The Ky statement, as accurately reported, contains no such implication. Both Thieu and Ky have now categorically said that if the elections result in civilian victory, they will accept it.

B. The report on the alleged "Military Affairs Committee" has no significant foundation so far as we are aware. We believe all actions by the military in this regard are consistent with the Constitutional concept of an Armed Forces Council that would operate solely in military arena and under the control of Constitutional authorities. As to statements attributed to "one General", Thieu and Ky statements covered in A above refute these.

C. The incident at Quang Tri has been clearly and repeatedly explained as a case of weather interference with landing at the scheduled point. Both Thieu and Ky have made clear that there was no intent not to grant appropriate facilities, and have repeatedly stated that the Government of Vietnam is prepared to furnish such facilities.

Above is our first outline, and we can flesh this out from your earlier reporting cables. What we need is your present endorsement that these represent valid conclusions in the present situation. We would also like some summary statement of your views as to the Government's conduct in respect to free elections.

Ambassador Bunker should personally endorse your reply unless this is seriously inconvenient.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-296

Saigon 2869, August 11, 1967

By inf, NARA, Date 11-2-94*Pres file*

1. Dong Ha incident. Full account of Quang Tri Dong Ha affair and developments flowing from it have been reported in course of past few days. Texts of candidates communique contained Saigon 2767; candidates August 8 letter, Saigon 2885; Government of Viet Nam's August 11 letter, Saigon 2868. Reports of Ambassador's conversations with Thieu and Ky on subject transmitted Saigon 2886 and 2867. In brief, it appears incident arose chiefly from unfortunate circumstances which led to misunderstandings between candidates and Government of Viet Nam. Despite many allegations and charges, it does not seem mix-up was a premeditated Government of Viet Nam act to humiliate candidates as latter allege but was rather contributions of bad weather and poor planning, execution and judgment by certain Government of Viet Nam officials, combined with impatience and suspicion on part of candidates who have subsequently decided exploit issue for obvious political purposes. Neither side has acted in way designed to resolve issue easily and permit resumption official campaign but it does not appear at this time that it will lead to withdrawal of candidates from race. Both Thieu and Ky expressed confidence today that matter would be worked out, but Tuong letter does not seem to afford likely basis for satisfying candidates desires. We have counseled moderation on both sides and urged that this affair not be allowed to block campaign effort and ultimate free and fair elections. Private campaigning by several candidates or their representatives is continuing. In short, your characterization of Dong Ha incident is accurate in so far as we know the facts. It might be added that General Thieu in his August 8 press conference specifically said that any request from the candidates for assistance in transportation and facilities would be met. He said that if there were errors in the government handling of campaign arrangements would accept the blame, and he stated his willingness to work with the other candidates to make the campaign a success.
2. Ky comments re military coup. Ky has explained to Ambassador that he was misquoted and that what he said was that he was convinced Vietnamese people would not accept an illegal or fraudulently elected government and that he would not either. We believe conclusion stated reference telegram that Thieu and Ky have indicated they will accept election results is warranted from number of statements they have both made to Ambassador in recent conversations. Ambassador has specifically told Ky that we cannot countenance any coups and Ky stated that there will not be any coups.
3. Report on alleged "military affairs committee." We agree that allegations have no significant basis in fact so far as can be ascertained. Thieu and Ky have both said this to Ambassador. Constitution does provide for armed forces council to operate in military arena but this is presumably not the council referred to. As interpreted by Ky today in conversation with

~~SECRET~~

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-2-

Ambassador, group is presumably the military members of the Directorate who meet regularly to consider matters relating to reorganization and improvement to Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces, pacification and related subjects. Ky stated there is no inner group which will seek to control government after elections as called and said this story could be flatly denied.

4. Conduct of elections. Following is requested summary statement of our views on government conduct in respect to free elections. Both General Thieu and General Ky are on the public record with pledges to conduct free and fair elections, and they have made similar statements to Ambassador. They have both called on all officials concerned to make sure that the elections are indeed fair and free. Ky in particular took advantage of several meetings of provincial officials involved with the elections to make this point. Press censorship has been lifted, and Vietnamese journalists have not hesitated to print articles that are very critical of the government and quite favorable to some of the civilian candidates. TV and radio arrangements have been very good and completely free. The candidates got what they asked for, and there have been no complaints. The government has also assisted the candidates by giving them a large sum of money which they are free to spend as they see fit on their campaign. These arrangements are most unusual in any country, and they certainly go well beyond anything that the American government has ever considered doing for opposition candidates. It must be admitted that in the pre-campaign period, Ky did a number of things that suggested the election would be unfair and unequal. The reaction to these efforts was very strong, and was engaged in an effort to prove that he would not take unfair advantage when the merger of the Thieu and Ky slates took place. Since that time, the Government record has been good in general. We do not feel that the evidence to date suggests that the government has treated the other candidates unfairly or that Thieu-Ky are determined to win the election by fair means or foul. Certainly they do want to win, and they are making full use of the normal advantages of the incumbent -- such things as non-political inspection trips and ceremonies, and gestures to various segments of the population, are taking place. But we find it hard, for example, to criticize Ky for presiding at ceremonies where land titles are handed out to peasants as part of the land reform program, and we think that few honest critics would do so. That is about the worst that he has done since the formal campaign began. There are also charges of secret orders to province chiefs and military commanders to insure that the votes go to the Thieu-Ky ticket. These are very difficult to evaluate. To our knowledge there is no hard evidence of such orders. In large part it appears to be more a matter of influence and the natural tendency here to try to placate the authorities. This tendency will certainly help the Thieu-Ky ticket, but Thieu-Ky can hardly be blamed for it. It is a legacy of centuries of authoritarian rule and will not be banished overnight by any regime.

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5. Ambassador Bunker concurs in substance of foregoing.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

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Pres file

Friday, August 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is the daily situation
report on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

SECRET Attachment

81a

~~SECRET~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

August 11, 1967

Campaign Impasse Continues

Ambassador Bunker has talked to Thieu and Ky about resolving the dispute between them and most of the civilian candidates over GVN provision of campaign facilities.

Ky publicly refused yesterday to give civilian candidates a written guarantee of facilities they demanded after last Sunday's Quang Tri fiasco. Ky indicated he regards the demand for a written guarantee as a political move. He did state, however, that the GVN was ready to supply them everything necessary for the campaign. This echoes Thieu's August 8 press conference statement that if there are errors he would accept the blame. The candidates continue to boycott the joint campaign tours, ignoring two planes set aside for them yesterday by the GVN to take them to DaNang.

The Embassy comments that the seven civilian candidates who signed the letter to the GVN are probably getting more and better publicity by agitating this issue than they could by visiting the provinces. This plus certain remarks by Ky, and the GVN refusal to provide a written reply have inflamed the issue out of proportion to what the facts of the case warrant.

General Minh Criticizes Thieu-Ky, Backs Huong

Exiled General "Big" Minh stated in Bangkok yesterday that Thieu and Ky would win but the elections would not be fair. He also said he personally considered Huong the best candidate. Huong has previously claimed to have Minh's backing, but this is the first time Minh himself has made it public. The Embassy doubts this gives Huong's campaign a significant boost.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-296
By ing, NARA, Date 11-2-94

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August 11, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-FY 1968

The Department of Defense, with the concurrence of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission, has submitted for your approval a proposed dispersal plan for the weapons in the approved FY 1967 nuclear weapons stockpile. The Department of Defense requires your authorization to disperse these weapons in support of current war plans.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

34(6)(5) It provides about the same level of support for allied units in Europe as in the present FY 1965-66 plan and increases the dispersal authorization to the Pacific by approximately 5% as requested by the Joint Chiefs. This increase in the Pacific was recommended by the Secretary of Defense pending the outcome of studies of the weapons requirements for the entire Pacific area now going on.

For some time we, in cooperation with the Bureau of the Budget, have been working with the Department of Defense to improve the procedure for planning and authorizing the dispersal of nuclear weapons in order that it will bring the dispersal authorization into a better phased relationship to the budget process and to the stockpile authorization action. A procedure has now been worked out whereby the Secretary of Defense in November of each year will submit to you a deployment plan concurrent with the nuclear weapons stockpile approval request. This plan would present the actual deployments as of the end of the previous fiscal year and contain planning figures by area and type of weapons as of the end of the next two ensuing fiscal years. The Presidential authorization will establish levels in terms of the total to be dispersed overseas, the subtotals by areas of the world and totals by type of weapons within each region. As at present, the Secretary of Defense would have the authority to exceed these control levels by area and type of weapons by 10% to meet unforeseen contingencies. He could not, however, exceed the level you establish for the total number overseas.

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Weapon Stockpile Information

SANITIZED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 00-202
 By Sj, NARA, Date 9/13/02

I believe that this new procedure will make the dispersal authorization more meaningful and will help the Secretary of Defense to do an improved job of forecasting, planning and controlling the deployment of nuclear weapons. His staff has assisted in developing the concept of the new procedure and endorses it.

I recommend that you approve the proposed FY 1967-68 dispersal plan and authorize me to sign the attached draft NSAM. This NSAM both records your approval of the proposed plan and establishes the new procedure for the development of the next plan which will be due next November to take effect as of July 1, 1968.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.


TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

SUBJECT: Nuclear Weapons Dispersal Authorization for FY 1967-FY 1968

The President has noted the request for nuclear weapons dispersal authorization for FY 1967 and FY 1968 as contained in the Department of Defense memorandum dated May 26, 1967, and as corrected by the DOD memorandum dated July 5, 1967 to the holders of the May 26 memorandum, and has taken the following actions in connection therewith:

1. The Department of Defense is authorized to:
 - a. Disperse nuclear weapons in the United States without limit.

b.



3.4(b)(5)

Such dispersals will be subject to the yield restrictions and policy regarding permissive action link devices

- c. Continue to disperse nuclear weapons and to provide nuclear weapon support to non-U. S. forces in accordance with the current dispersal authorizations which have been approved and which are tabulated in the column "Non-U. S. Forces - Authorized FY 1966" (Column C) of Appendix B to the May 26, 1967 Department of Defense memorandum.

3.4(b)(5)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-202
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-13-02

~~TOP SECRET - FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~

Weapon Stockpile Information

2. The President has noted that the Department of Defense has concurred in a recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the dispersal authorization for the Pacific Theater be increased over the current dispersal authorization by approximately 5%. The President has accepted the recommendation of the Department of Defense in this matter. The President understands that the Pacific Theater requirements will be given further review during consideration of the next dispersal authorization request.

3. In connection with his action of the FY 1967-FY 1968 dispersals, the President has directed that in the future dispersal authorizations should be handled as follows:

a. A deployment plan will be submitted annually by the Secretary of Defense approximately in mid-November of each year concurrent with the nuclear weapon stockpile approval request.

3.4(b)(5) b. Presidential authorization will establish levels in terms of (1) total overseas, (2) total by area, and (3) total by type of weapons (e.g., strategic offensive, tactical air,) within each region. The Secretary of Defense will have authority to exceed control levels (2) and (3) by to meet unforeseen contingencies.

c. The plan will contain actual deployment figures for the end of the previous fiscal year, deployments previously authorized, and proposed deployments for the same two fiscal year period as covered by the stockpile request.

d. Authorized deployments will be those planned as of the end of each fiscal year. The Secretary of Defense will have reasonable flexibility to manage and alter quantities during the course of the year to cover unavoidable peaks in deployment due to logistical factors. Plans for contingency deployments included in the Presidential authorization will be shown separately with adequate explanations.

e. The plan will include, on a highlight basis, the rationale for and major changes in the deployment plans.

4. The initial plan on the revised basis should be submitted by November 15, 1967 and should have the concurrence of the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission.


W. W. Rostow

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS DISPERSAL -- BY COUNTRY/COMMAND

3.4(b)(5)



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-202
By Sj NARA, Date 9-13-02

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954

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and photograph
I have examined a map and identified a point 100 feet north of the bridge on the East Bank. It is not repeat not a built up area. This does not mean there were no civilian casualties; but it does mean there were very few if the point has been correctly identified.

8/11/67 gave Mr Watson to pass to President