

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	"Bombing Effort" <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> TS 1 p	8/22/67	A
#1b report	Cinacac Monthly Rolling Thunder TS <i>open 7-25-94 NLJ 94-300</i> 6 p	8-21-67	A
#7 memo	Hamilton to President C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/21/67	A
#7a memo	Ball to President S 2 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	8/18/67	A
#8a ltr	Draft Message to Kayibanda <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #12g, NSF, Country File, Rwanda, 8/14/67, Visit of President Gregoire Kayebanda]	undated	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/29/67	A
#9a memo	Schultze to President " C 2 p	8/24/67	A
#9b memo	Gaud, Freeman to President C 2 p <i>open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303</i>	8/21/67	A
#13 memo	Hamilton to President C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/24/67	A
#15 memo	Hamilton to President " C 3 p	8/21/67	A
#15a memo	Ball to President <i>open 9-4-97 NLJ 94-296</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #21a, Vol. 38]	8/15/67	A
#17 memo	Jorden to President <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> C 2 p	8/18/67	A
#19a memo	Hamilton to President " C 3 p	8/23/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24 memo	Bator to President PCI 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/31/67	A
#24b rpt	Text of message PCI 2 p <i>open 5-19-00</i>	undated	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon S 1 p SANITIZED 6/4/96 NLJ 94-298 <i>same same 5-16-01 NLJ 00-203</i>	8/31/67	A
#26a rpt	Intelligence Report (Dup. of #60c, Czech, Vol 1, Bx 179) S 9 p <i>Exempt 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204</i> Exempt 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204 <i>open 1/16/2020 per NLJ 16-1</i>	undated	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 a.m. C 3 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/31/67	A
#30a cable	Saigon 4452 same sanitization 2-15-96 NLJ 94-299 S 14 p <i>open 5-19-00 RAC</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	8/30/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/30/67	A
#36b rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p [Duplicate of #69b, NSF, Name File, Rostow Memos] [Exempt NLJ 84-279] <i>* #sanitized 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204</i>	8/30/67	A
#36c rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p [Duplicate of #69c, NSF, Name File, Rostow Memos] [Sanitized NLJ 84-279] <i>sanitized 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204 more released</i>	8/30/67	A
#36d rpt	Intelligence Report C 2 p [Duplicate of #69e, NSF, Name File, Rostow Memos] [Sanitized NLJ 84-279] <i>same same 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204</i>	8/30/67	A
#36e rpt	Intelligence Report C 2 p [Duplicate of #69d, NSF, Name File, Rostow Memos] [Exempt NLJ 84-279] <i>sanitized 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204</i>	8/30/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36f rpt	Intelligence Report S 4 p <i>Exempt 5-16-01 NLJ 00-204</i> [Duplicate of #69f, NSF, Name File, Rostow Memos]	8/30/67	A
#38a memo <i>not open</i>	Wheeler to Rostow <i>open 1-19-96 NLJ 94-301</i> S 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/29/67	A
#38b rpt	JCS Report S 5 p <i>open 1-14-96 NLJ 94-301</i>	undated	A
#39 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/30/67	A
#39a memo	Rusk to President S 2 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	8/30/67	A
#40a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report S 2 p <i>sanitized 2-15-96 NLJ 94-299</i> <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAL 00-276</i>	8/30/67	A
#42a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 3-24-95 NLJ 92-297</i> S 5 p <i>[dup in Daily Backup, 8/29/07]</i>	8/29/67	A
#42b rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open 3-24-95 NLJ 92-297</i> PCI 1 p <i>[dup in Daily Backup, 8/29/07]</i>	undated	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 5:20 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/29/67	A
#43a cable	Geneva 640 <i>open 5-19-00</i> S 3 p <i>exempt 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	8/29/67	A
#44a memcon	Rostow and Evron S 2 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/29/67	A
#47 memo	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. " C 1 p	8/29/67	A
#47a cable	Belgrade 636 C 2 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 a.m. sanitized 2-15-96 S 1 p Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-277 NLJ 94-303 (Dup in Diary Backup, 8/29/67)	8/29/67	A
#48a rpt	Intelligence Report S 3 p Sanitized 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297 (Dup in Diary Backup, 8/29/67) Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-276	8/29/67	A
#49a memo	Bowdler to Rostow Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-277 C 1 p sanitized 1-19-96 NLJ 94-420	8/28/67	A
#49c cable	Caracas 1226 sanitized 2-15-96 NLJ 94-299 C 2 p Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-276	8/26/67	A
#49f cable	La Paz 408 Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-276 C 1 p SANITIZED 6/4/96 NLJ 94-299	8/25/67	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298 C 1 p [Duplicate of #96, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7] (Dup. in Diary Backup, 8/29/67)	8/29/67	A
#54a memo	Rusk to President open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299 S 3 p (Dup. in Diary Backup, 8/29/67) (Duplicate in WHCF, CF, FO 3-2)	8/28/67	A
#54b ltr	President to Silva S 1 p open 1-11-94 NLJ 92-484 [Duplicate of #95c, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7] (Dup. in Diary Backup, 8/29/67) (Duplicate in WHCF, CF, FO 3-2)	7/26/67	A
#54c rpt	Talking Points open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299 S 3 p [Duplicate of #96a, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7] [Exempt NLJ 76-188] (Dup. in Diary Backup, 8/29/67) (Duplicate in WHCF, CF, FO 3-2)	undated	A
#55a memo	Poats to President open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303 S 2 p [Duplicate of #9, NSF, Komer-Leonhart File (1966-1968), "Moss Committee," Box 16]	8/28/67	A
#55b memo	Poats to Secretary S 7 p open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303	8/28/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#57 memo	Rostow to President, 5:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/28/67	A
#57a rpt	"Rural Population Control..." C 2 p <i>open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303</i>	undated	A
#57b table	"Rural Population Control..." " C 1 p	undated	A
#57c table	"Rural Population Control..." " C 1 p	undated	A
#57d map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	12/64	A
#57e map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	12/65	A
#57f map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	12/66	A
#57g map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	6/64	A
#57h map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	6/65	A
#57i map	"Vietnam" " C 1 p	6/67	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 3:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/28/67	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. <i>open 2-15-96 NLJ 94-302</i> C 1 p <i>(Dup in Diary Backup, 8/29/67)</i>	8/28/67	A
#64 memo <i>Some Sam 8-11-03 NW/KR 02-264</i>	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. <i>Sanitized 2-15-96</i> S 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-277 NLJ 94-302</i> <i>(Dup in Diary Backup, 8/29/67)</i>	8/28/67	A
#64a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sanitized 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297</i> S 4 p <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-276</i> <i>(Dup. in Diary Backup, 8/29/67)</i>	8/28/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a memo	Taylor to President <i>open 9-20-94 NLJ 92-374</i> C 2 p	8/25/67	A
#66a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 2 p <i>Dup. # 1a, NSF, CV, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	8/28/67	A
#68a cable	Saigon 4107 <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 7 p [Duplicate of #98, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections" Box 65]	8/26/67	A
#70a cable	Saigon 4057 <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #102, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	8/25/67	A
#70b cable	Saigon 4139 <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	8/26/67	A
#72d cable	Deptel to Saigon S 3 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	8/26/67	A
#75a ltr	Crockett to Bowdler <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #89c, NSF, Country File, Nicaragua, Vol. I, Box 63]	8/22/67	A
#76a cable	Deptel to Saigon S 2 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	8/25/67	A
#77 memo	Saunders to President C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/25/67	A
#77a memo	Schultze to President " C 1 p	8/14/67	A
#77b memo	Gaud to President C 3 p <i>open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303</i>	8/2/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77e table	OECD Consortium for Turkey C 1 p <i>open 10-6-94 NLJ 94-303</i>	undated	A
#78 memo	Saunders to President S 2 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/25/67	A
#80a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 2-15-96 NLJ 94-299</i> S 2 p <i>Dup #3a, NSF, CF, VN "8A1" Box 103</i>	8/25/67	A
#81 memo	Jorden to President C 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/25/67	A
#84 memo	Bowdler to President " C 1 p	8/25/67	A
#87 memo	Jorden to President S 1 p <i>open 1-27-93 NLJ 91-242</i> [Duplicate of #60, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. X] [Under review NLJ 91-241]	8/24/67	A
#90 memo	Bowdler to President <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> C 1 p	8/24/67	A
#93a cable	Saigon 3824 S 15 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>[dup #31, NSF, CF, VN, "8BB(1)", Box 105]</i>	8/23/67	A
#94a rpt	"TASS Issues..." S 2 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i>	undated	A
#95 memo	Smith to President <i>open 2-15-96 NLJ 94-302</i> S 1 p	8/23/67	A
#97a ltr	President to Bokassa PCI 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	undated	A
#98a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 2 p <i>Dup #4a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	8/23/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#99 memo	Rostow to President, 1:45 p.m. S 2 p open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298	8/23/67	A
#102 memo	Hamilton to President " C 3 p	8/23/67	A
#105a memo	Bunker to President, 8:23 p.m. channel incoming, duty log Box 268 C 1 p [dup. in Daily Backup, 8/24/67]	8/22/67	A
#106 memo [dup #115]	Rostow to President, 1:00 p.m. S 2 p open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298	8/22/67	A
#110 memo	Rostow to President, 9:35 a.m. S 1 p NLJ 89-111	8/22/67	A
#111a memo	Lansdale to Locke C 2 p open 2-15-96 NLJ 94-299	8/11/67	A
#113b ltr	Duplicate of #54b open 5-19-00		
#114 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298	8/22/67	A
#114a cable	Saigon 3721 S 2 p open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299	8/22/67	A
#115 memo [dup #106]	Rostow to President S 2 p open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298	8/22/67	A
#116 ^u rpt	SHAH/G-2 C 2 p open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299	8/15/67	A
#118a rpt	Intelligence Report Smartizal 7/12/01 NS/RAL 00-276 S 2 p paritized 3-24-95 NLJ 94-297 DUPLICATE IN VN Country FILE, Box 56, Memoir - Vol 2, Doc # 12a	8/24/67	A
#119a cable	Saigon 3644 C 5 p open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299	8/21/67	A
#120 memo	Smith to President PCI 1 p open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298	8/21/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#120a cable	Manila 1561 <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #75, NSF, Country File, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Exempt NLJ 88-130]	8/21/67	A
#120b ltr	Marcos to President PCI 2 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/14/67	A
#122a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> S 2 p <i>Dup. #5a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1" Box 103</i>	8/21/67	A
#125a cable	Duplicate of #119a		
#126^a ltr	Dean to President PCI 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i>	8/67	A
#127a memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 2 p <i>Dup. #17a, Files of Hamilton, "A10-PL480" Box 7</i>	7/20/67	A
#127b memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLJ 93-352</i> C 2 p <i>Dup. #17b, as above</i>	7/12/67	A
#127c memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #17c, as above</i>	6/24/67	A
#130a memo	Rusk, Udall to President C 2 p <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 92-398</i>	8/17/67	A
#131 memo	Saunders to President <i>open 11-29-95 NLJ 94-298</i> S 1 p [Near duplicate of #16, Vol. 38]	8/18/67	A
#131a cable	Tel Aviv 483 S 4 p <i>open 12-30-94 NLJ 94-299</i> [Near duplicate of #16a, Vol. 38]	8/17/67	A
#132 memo	Hamilton to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #18, Files of Hamilton, "A10-PL480" Box 7</i>	8/18/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#132a memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-356</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #18a, Files of Hamilton "AID-PL480" Box 7</i>	8/17/67	A
#132b memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> C 2 p <i>Dup. #18b, as above</i>	8/4/67	A
#133 memo	Jorden to President S 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLS 94-298</i>	8/18/67	A
#133a ltr	President to Park " PCI 2 p	8/17/67	A
#135 rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 2-15-96 NLS 94-299</i> S 2 p <i>Dup. #6a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A1," Box 103</i>	8/18/67	A
#136 rpt	Intelligence Report TS 1 p <i>open 11-29-95 NLS 94-298</i>	8/18/67	A
#137 memo	Saunders to President " S 2 p	8/18/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 39, 8/18-31/67

Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
5a memo	Arthur McCafferty to the President - PCI 1 p <i>sanitized 3-4-03 NLJ/PAC 00-278</i>	8/21/67	A
71a memo	Arthur McCafferty to Mr. Smith - TS 3pp <i>sanitized 3-4-03 NLJ/PAC 00-278</i>	8/26/67	A
45b memo	Raymond L. Garthoff to Foy Kohler - TS 7 pp <i>sanitized 3-14-05 NLJ 00-205</i>	3/31/67	A
89 memo	Bromley Smith to the President - <i>sanitized 5/6/02 NLJ 00-187</i> S 1 pp	8/24/67	A
89a memo	Bromley Smith to the Deputy Secretary of Defense - S 1 p <i>sanitized 5/6/02 NLJ 00-189</i>	8/25/67	A
89b memo	Paul Nitze to the President - S 1 p <i>exempt 10/25/01 NLJ 00-188</i> <i>sanitized 1/16/2020 per NLJ 00-27</i>	7/6/67	A
89c rpt	re Belgium - S 1 p <i>exempt 10/25/01 NLJ 00-188</i> <i>sanitized 1/16/2020 per NLJ 00-27</i>	[7/67]	A
89d rpt	re Netherlands - S 1 p <i>exempt 10/25/01 NLJ 00-188</i> <i>sanitized 1/16/2020 per NLJ 00-27</i>	[7/67]	A
89e memo	Charles E. Johnson to Bromley Smith - S 1 p <i>sanitized 5/6/02 NLJ 00-187</i>	8/24/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 39 August 18-31, 1967
Box 21

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

~~1 - Susp~~
2 - P's file
1

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967
3:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the first of a new series: a monthly report from CINCPAC on the bombing effort in North Viet Nam.

We have had prepared a one-page summary, which is the covering memo.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 9-3-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

SUBJECT: Bombing Effort in North Vietnam -- July

Admiral Sharp has pointed out the following:

11,000 sorties flown in July -- same as previous months.

Main effort against transportation systems -- 33% of attack effort against Northeast region compared with 3% in February -- with following effects:

- a. management and logistic problems
- b. reduced flow of imports into country
- c. degraded capability for sustained large-scale operations in South Vietnam.

Measurable results:

- a. 8 hours to travel 60 miles from Hanoi to Haiphong
- b. imports in Haiphong piled high, stockpiles growing -- difficulty distributing
- c. ship off-loading increased from 10 days in January to 30 days in July.

Overall bombing effort contributed to destruction of useful capacity or capability as follows:

Fixed electric power	85%
Transportation (including ports)	39%
Air defense (excluding anti-aircraft and SAMS)	46%
Industry	20%
Military support	75%
POL (including known dispersed)	65%

Restrikes against electrical power system -- resulted in serious curtailment of chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile plant operations.

Future intentions:

- a. maintain emphasis on isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong
- b. maximize efforts in Northeast to interdict support from Chicoms and material leaving ports
- c. increase pressure through use of increased authority for restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong and Chicom buffer zone.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-298
By lip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

16

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

Monday, August 21, 1967

CINCPAC MONTHLY ROLLING THUNDER SUMMARY, JULY, 1967

This report is the first in a series intended to provide an evaluation of ROLLING THUNDER Operations. Future reports will be submitted on a monthly basis in order to provide a continuing evaluation of CINCPAC's objectives, accomplishments and future intentions concerning ROLLING THUNDER Operations.

ROLLING THUNDER Operations conducted during the month of July, 1967, were in direct support of our primary objective, i. e., applying steadily increasing pressure against North Vietnam in order to cause Hanoi to cease its aggression in South Vietnam, while making continued support of the Viet Cong insurgency as difficult and costly as possible. In pursuing this objective, emphasis was placed on the isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong with particular application of effort in the northeast sector. A balance of effort was maintained throughout North Vietnam in order to continue interdiction of lines of communication in depth.

During July, over 11,000 sorties were flown. This is about the same level of effort as May and June. Of significance, however, was the improved sortie distribution among the various Route Packages made possible by the continued favorable weather during July.

Route Package 6-A received 14 percent and 6-B received 19 percent of the total attack sortie effort. In comparison, during February, at the height of the northeast monsoon, only three percent of the total effort was expended in Route Package 6-A and three percent in 6-B. At the same time, 64 percent was flown in Route Package 1 during February versus 37 percent in July.

The approximate percentage of effort expended in each Route Package during July was 38 percent for Route Package 1; eight percent for Route Package 2; seven percent for Route Package 3; nine percent for Route Package 4; five percent for Route Package 5; fifteen percent for Route Package 6-A; and eighteen percent for Route Package 6-B.

~~TOP SECRET/LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-300
By Wig, NARA, Date 7-14-94

The preponderance of the strikes during July were against the transportation systems with emphasis on the lines of communication in the northern regions of North Vietnam. These attacks caused multiple management and logistic problems, reduced the flow of imports into the country, and degraded North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-scale military operations in South Vietnam.

There is evidence of increased truck traffic from Haiphong along Route 5 and from the Chicom border along Route 1A. Much night-time activity has been reported. Visitors to Hanoi report seeing large numbers of oil trucks and cargo trucks loaded with POL drums. Truck traffic and convoys have been observed on Hanoi streets during the day with many trucks undergoing repairs under trees along the streets. As of mid-July it was reported that the auto trip over the 60-mile distance from Hanoi to Haiphong took eight hours because of detours due to damage from bombs and priorities to military traffic.

At the same time, the strikes on Railroad Number 3 (Hanoi-Haiphong) have contributed measurably to the shipping and port congestion at Haiphong. Imports were piled high throughout Haiphong and stockpiles are growing at interdicted points. This has resulted in an increase in ship off-loading time with the number of days in port increasing from a low of 10 days at the beginning of the year to approximately 30 days by the end of July.

As stated, the main effort has been directed at the vital railroad network radiating from Hanoi to the northwest (Railroad Number 1) and northeast (Railroad Number 2) to the Chicom border, north to Thai Nguyen (Railroad Number 5), Thai Nguyen to Kep (Railroad Number 9), south to Vinh (Railroad Number 4), and east to Haiphong (Railroad Number 3). During July, Railroad Number 3 was unserviceable through the 17th. This contributed to the dock congestion.

In addition, the increased tempo in armed reconnaissance along the other lines of communication further compounded distribution problems. To review the other railroad lines: Railroad Number 1 was unserviceable to through traffic five days and probably

unserviceable an additional 24 days; Railroad Number 2 was unserviceable to through traffic seven days, probably another ten days; Railroad Number 4, Hanoi to Vinh, was unserviceable the entire 31 days; Railroad Number 5 was closed three days, probably another 16 days; Railroad Number 9 was unserviceable July 1 - 17 inclusive, probably another three days.

In summary, the six lines were either unserviceable or probably unserviceable for 71 percent of the time.

In terms of vehicles destroyed and damaged in July, armed reconnaissance operations added significantly to the toll taken of North Vietnam's logistic capability. During July, 858 motor vehicles, 411 pieces of railroad rolling stock, and 671 water craft were damaged or destroyed, for a total of 1940 logistic capable targets.

Re-strikes against the North Vietnamese electrical power system during July have produced tangible, measurable results. It is estimated that the operation of North Vietnam's chemical, fertilizer, paper, and textile plants have been seriously curtailed by the power outage. However, reports have indicated that repairs to the main Thermal Power Plant in Hanoi are nearly completed. An increasing number of portable generators are being utilized throughout the city to furnish emergency power. The off-loading of ships in Haiphong port areas continues utilizing both ship and dockside generating equipment.

There were no ROLLING THUNDER 56 Alpha targets struck through July 21 since they had all been previously struck. Eight of the nine ROLLING THUNDER 57 Alpha targets were struck between July 22 - 31. In addition to the Alpha strikes in latter July, approximately 2500 armed reconnaissance sorties attacked other fixed targets in the POL, power, and military support systems, and thus contributed to the destruction of cumulative levels of useful capacity or capability for major target system as follows:

A. Fixed electric power	85%
B. Transportation (Including ports)	39%
C. Air defense (Excluding anti-aircraft and SAMs)	46%

D. Industry	20%
E. Military support	75%
F. POL (Including known dispersed)	65%

The line of communication segment extensions within the Hanoi 10 - 30 nautical mile circle, authorized in ROLLING THUNDER 57, exposed and made vulnerable approximately 100 "new" lines of communication-associated target elements. These targets are suitable for armed reconnaissance. This new authority partially eliminates the sanctuary status of lines of communication vehicles moving through this vital logistic system into the hub of Hanoi. Overall, the strike authority authorized by ROLLING THUNDER 57 enable an accelerated tempo of operations in the vital northeast quadrant of North Vietnam.

With the continued good weather, it was expected that the defensive reactions would increase in proportion to intensity of the attacks. This has not been the case. The peak defensive reactions experienced in the latter part of April and early May, particularly in MIG attacks and SAMs launched, did not recur during July. However, ground fire (anti-aircraft artillery) reactions have remained at approximately the same level as previously. Conversely, indications are that SAM and some anti-aircraft artillery forces may be in the process of relocation to provide more concentrated defenses around the "hard" targets.

In July, 37 aircraft (18 U.S. Air Force, 18 U.S. Navy, and 1 U.S. Marine Corps) were lost in North Vietnam, six to SAMs (5 Navy and 1 Marine Corps) but none were lost to MIGs. Three MIG-17's were destroyed in the air, with one additional MIG-17 and one MIG-21 possibly destroyed. The defensive environment in North Vietnam can be expected to adjust continually to meet varying attack patterns. Reactions may well be intensified against forces penetrating closer to the center of the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes. The diversification of the North Vietnamese radar networks, supported by movement, site hardening, and dispersal will continue to provide adequate warning to North Vietnam of our penetrating forces.

Photo reconnaissance (BLUE TREE) provided current photography on 98 percent of all CINCPAC ROLLING THUNDER Target List targets during the month of July. Near continuous surveillance of lines of communication in Route Package 1 was maintained during the period.

SEA DRAGON forces (shipping interdiction) maintained round-the-clock pressure against water-borne logistic traffic and coastal targets from the Demilitarized Zone to 20 degrees north latitude. Many of these targets were struck at night, thus maximizing the interdiction of lines of communication traffic leading south. The numbers of water-borne logistic craft detected during July were somewhat less than the previous month indicating a probable reduction in the availability of water-borne logistic craft and a reluctance by the enemy to expose his remaining assets to attack. In addition to the water-borne logistic craft interdiction efforts noted above, many coastal targets consisting of POL complexes, storage and transshipment points, truck parks, bridges, railroad facilities, and radar sites were damaged or destroyed.

Eight Walleye weapons were expended against railroad/highway bridges or bypasses during the month of July. Six of these were direct hits, resulting in moderate to severe damage to the four bridges struck. Due to the limited production availability of these weapons, expenditures have been somewhat curtailed.

As Destructor MK-36 weapons became available, they were employed along the major lines of communication between Hanoi and Haiphong, in the vicinity of Vinh, and in the Quang Khe and Dong Hoi areas. Efforts are being made to evaluate the effectiveness of Destructor MK-36's; however, it is anticipated that sufficient data on which to base an effectiveness evaluation may not be available until early October.

Future intentions for ROLLING THUNDER Operations are to:


- A. Maintain emphasis on the isolation of Hanoi and Haiphong;
- B. Continue major strike efforts against targets

assigned in ROLLING THUNDER 57 and the ROLLING THUNDER 57 addenda and other ROLLING THUNDER Target List targets;

C. Maximize the efforts in the northeast sector to interdict overland external support from the Chicoms and materiel leaving the ports;

D. Increase the pressure on North Vietnam through the use of the extended armed reconnaissance authorities in the restricted areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the Chicom buffer zone;

E. Maintain a balance of effort in all other Route Package areas.



Thursday, August 31, 1967
5:00 p.m.

2

MR. PRESIDENT:

In your conversation last week with Ambassador Lodge, the question of foreign observers to elections in other countries was raised.

Pres file

We asked INR to pull together anything they had on this subject for Lodge's use. The attached report went out to Lodge by cable yesterday.

You may be interested in seeing this listing previous observers' experience.

W. W. R.

Attachment

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Info

STATE

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM INR HUGHES

SUBJECT: US Observers at Foreign Elections

1. Herewith is country-by-country study of instances since World War II in which US sent official representatives to observe foreign elections.
2. USSR. Most striking example of official US observation of elections occurred in March 1958 when US sent three-man team to observe Supreme Soviet elections. Both USSR and Romania had accepted President Eisenhower's invitation to observe US electoral process during 1956 Presidential elections. USSR reciprocated with 1958 invitation. US representatives were Richard Scammon, political scientist, Governmental Affairs Institute; Cyril E. Black, professor of history, Princeton; and Hedley Williams Donovan, managing editor, Fortune magazine.
3. Greece. US participated officially in tripartite US-UK-French commission established to observe country-wide elections in 1946.
4. Organization of American States (OAS) has since its establishment in 1948 sent missions to Latin American countries to provide technical advisory services prior to elections and, on several occasions, has arranged for

Drafted by:

INR/REA-JHHoldridge

Tel. Ext.

3819

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

EMR INR-TLHughes

Clearence:

INR/OD; RKGerman

S/S-

White House-WJorden, (insubstance)

EA/VN-Mr. Rosenthal

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

groups ranging up to 30 persons from various OAS member states to be present during elections. Available data on these missions is as follows:

- a. Bolivia. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US, observed national elections of 1966.
- b. Costa Rica. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US in 1958 and 1966, observed Costa Rican elections in 1958, 1962, and 1966.
- c. Dominican Republic. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US, observed elections in Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1966.
- d. Nicaragua. Representatives of three OAS member states, including US, observed elections of 1963.

5. Earlier in this century, US on several occasions sent observers to elections in Caribbean area:

- a. Cuba. US sent observers to 1920 presidential elections at request of Cuban Government.
- b. Nicaragua. US "supervised" presidential elections in 1928 and 1932 and congressional elections in 1930.
- c. Panama. US "supervised" 1918 elections.
- d. Dominican Republic. US appointed three commissioners to observe elections in 1913 and in 1914 (over protest of Dominican Government). US also supervised March 1924 elections near end of period of US occupation.
- e. Haiti. Presidential elections held August 1915 under US auspices.

6. In addition, there have been several instances where US citizens participated in observing plebiscites or elections in dependent countries emerging into nationhood, either at request of controlling authorities or at UN behest.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

Classification

a. Sudan. US contributed one member to seven-member Sudan Electoral Commission, established under agreement between UK and Egypt, to observe 1953 elections.

b. Cameroons. US citizens were among the observers chosen from UN Secretariat staff by UN Secretary General and Plebiscite Commissioner to supervise conduct of 1961 plebiscites in Trust Territory of the Cameroons, then under UD administration.

c. Togo. Some Americans were among observers appointed by UN Secretary General for 1956 plebiscite in British-administered Togoland and for 1958 elections to legislative assembly in French-administered Togoland.

7. Finally, it may be of interest that while US did not participate directly in supervision of May 1948 elections in South Korea, such supervision was accomplished by nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea which had been set up for this purpose as result of US-sponsored resolution adopted by General Assembly in November 1947 calling for independence and free elections for all of Korea. North Korea refused to comply, and elections hence were possible only in South Korea.

Thurs., Aug. 31, 1967
1:15 p. m.

3

MR. PRESIDENT:

It's not that our speech-generating service is so brisk, but that our filing system is moderately efficient: herewith Senator Clark speaking favorably on the tabling of the NPT (marked with paper clip). We will be seeing if we can get another speech in the record before the Senate closes down.

Francis will be doing some backgrounding on recent constructive achievements in foreign policy; and so will I.

W. W. R.

I am additionally informed that Bob Hardesty got three such speeches in today's Congressional Record. They were given by Senators Pell, Anderson, and Brewster.

(Congr. Recd 8/25/67
No. 137

Attachment

~~1. Impress~~
2. Impress

6:50 PM

The Italians are planning to open a large INTELSAT earth satellite station at about the time of the Saragat visit to Washington (Sept. 18-19). Marks, Walt Rostow, John Leddy and I think it would be a good idea to have INTELSAT carry the Saragat welcoming ceremony live, direct to Italy. There would be no extra demands on your time (we would put appropriate remarks in your welcoming statement), and it would give us a good show on Italian TV at prime viewing time. Ambassador Ortona has told Leonard Marks that Saragat would like it so long as it does not take too much play away from the visit itself.

Francis M. Bator

1. OK to have Saragat's welcoming ceremony carried on satellite TV _____
- No _____
- Speak to me _____
2. Invite Pastore to the welcoming _____

DC: Mr. W. Rostow ✓
Mr. C. Johnson

~~SECRET~~
2- President, etc.

Monday, 10:35 Am.
August 21, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary McNamara authorized the announcement of the probable violation of the Chinese Communist border by two of our planes after talking to Secretary Rusk. The decision was based on the belief that it was best for us to announce the probable border violation before the Chinese Communists make public their version.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

5a

Monday, August 21, 1967 - 10:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The NMCC informs me that on the basis of messages from the aircraft carrier Constellation [REDACTED] [REDACTED], they are preparing to announce to the press that two U.S. aircraft violated the Chicom border this morning and were shot down in an engagement with Chinese MIGs.

3.4(b)(1),(3)

The carrier Constellation states that the two aircraft were exiting from a strike on the Duc Noi Railroad Yard at the time of the incident. The reason for their straying into the Chicom border area is not clear, but appears to be the result of faulty navigation, SAM evasive maneuvers, and attempts to circumnavigate to the north to avoid heavy thunder storm activity.

Before voice contact was lost with the aircraft, one of the pilots was able to get off a message indicating that they were engaged with enemy aircraft, and according to the position that they were tracked at, they were probably in the vicinity of the Chicom border at the time.

White House Situation Room

Arthur M. Coffey

Briefing Officer

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-278
By SJ, NARA, Date 1-29-03

Handwritten: [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

Monday, August 21, 1967
10:05 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

I was informed that you asked for three speeches for possible use on the Hill today, subject: The Vietnamese Election and the U.S. Press.

I have sent the attached four drafts to Barefoot Sanders with a request that he try to get them used.

I understood that Congressman Resnick was one possible user.

William J. Jorden

Att.

8/21/67

MR. SPEAKER:

There is a famous rumor mill in Saigon known as Radio Catinat (KAK-TEE-NAH), after the old name of one of the main streets in the Vietnamese capital. There is no radio station on it. But it broadcasts rumors faster than the most modern electronic gear. The trouble is that the modern electronic gear picks it up also and then we read about it here.

You only have to look at your morning paper, or turn on your radio or television set to realize that Radio Catinat is working overtime during Viet-Nam's presidential election campaign.

A number of stories have appeared here charging rigging of the elections in Viet-Nam, intimidation of candidates, willful government sabotage of the campaign, casual refusal of the Vietnamese Government to approve the candidacy of politicians who supposedly were a serious threat at the ballot box.

There were few specifics. Key facts were left out of the accounts. And when the facts were examined, the situation looked very different from the original reports.

One incident -- in which a planeload of presidential candidates were set down at the wrong airport and then found no cars to take them to the election rally -- is a case in point.

There was a strong cross-wind at the airport where they were scheduled to land. Should the pilot have taken a chance on setting down there and wiping out most of the opposition presidential candidates? We can image what the charges would have been then!

The fact is that one hour after the candidates had landed, transportation was available to take them to the rally. But by then they had taken off back to Saigon. This important fact was missing from all news accounts of the incident. Of course, the truth never caught up with the first impression.

The election rigging charge made the rounds, amplified in each rebroadcast with more adjectives and adverbs but unsullied by a few key facts that would have put the whole tempest back in the teapot where it belonged.

Vietnamese politicians have learned that rumors are not only easier to start than to stop. But they can have great political impact. The trouble is that exaggerated reports get in the way of the facts. And at a distance of 10,000 miles, it is hard to get a picture of what is really going on in the campaign. We should realize that everything said by a candidate for public office -- whether he is running in Viet-Nam or in the U.S. or elsewhere -- may not be the Gospel.

American reporters send thousands of words each day from Viet-Nam. Facts and rumors, or half facts and half rumors, are well

-3-

mixed in the process. American readers need an extra dose of our usual suspicion and an added measure of our normal sophistication. Otherwise we will find ourselves depending on Radio Catinat -- and that's not news.

#

66

MR. SPEAKER:

A few weeks ago, the opening of the electoral campaign in Vietnam brought on another attack of worry -- not to say jitters -- about our program and purposes in Southeast Asia. The fever flared up first in our press and then, inevitably, amongst ourselves.

Now this, Mr. Speaker, is understandable enough. We all know that these elections were and are a matter of considerable and legitimate concern to us. But now the fever has fallen somewhat. In the fact of outside aggression and domestic harassment, the Vietnamese are going ahead with their elections. This, I think, is as good a time as any to ask ourselves whether our reactions -- as pexpressed in the press and in this Body -- are not a matter of considerable and legitimate concern to the Vietnamese.

None of us knows, of course, how the Vietnamese will pass this great test. We are only dimly aware of how important it may be for their future. But we also are in a time of testing, Mr. Speaker, and it behooves us -- for it is a matter of some importance to our future -- to ask ourselves how we are facing up.

Must we not admit, in all honesty, that our first reactions were wildly exaggerated and ill-informed? The ball game had barely started before we heard cries of "foul." There were charges of rigging, of pressure, of dishonest practices. And these charges were quite

enough -- there was no need of evidence and none was presented -- to convict the government of South Viet-Nam.

So for a few days we wallowed in gloom and doom and presented a sorry spectacle to four allies in Southeast Asia.

A distinguished Washington newspaper, on the basis of a single, minor (and by all accounts unintentional) mishap, quickly predicted the elections would be a farce. Several of our distinguished colleagues went so far as to suggest, doubtless to the great glee of the hawks in Hanoi, that if elections in this devastated, divided and underdeveloped country were run less honestly than, say, in Massachusetts, or in Brooklyn, or in Cook County, Illinois, then we -- the greatest power on earth -- should simply renege on our promises, abandon our commitments, break faith with the young men who have given their lives so that South Viet-Nam might be saved from aggression and a measure of stability and hope might be brought to the new nations emerging on the periphery of Communist China.

Mr. Speaker, gentlemen, I suggest that this sort of thing is unworthy of us. It is unworthy of our great press to serve us up such nonsense. It is unworthy of us to swallow it and make the world wonder -- when world peace depends on it -- about our constancy and our resolve.

#

6c

MR. SPEAKER:

A wise friend of mine once advised me never to get into a quarrel with the press.

"The only way you can win an argument with a newspaper," he said, "is to own a bigger one."

Mr. Speaker, I am a prudent man, and I have never had the means to acquire a newspaper, large or small. So I have scrupulously followed my friend's advice.

There are times, however, when prudence conflicts with conscience, when a man cannot live with himself unless he speaks out. During these past few weeks I have felt that our newspapers -- not all of them, of course, but many of them -- our wire associations, our radio and television networks, were capable of an enormous disservice to this nation.

The President reminded us the other day that we are involved in a long and difficult enterprise in Southeast Asia, and that our patience, our persistence, our steadfastness would determine whether the immense effort we have undertaken, and the sacrifices of our young men, would in fact achieve what we have set out to do.

Patience, persistence, steadfastness, -- these are qualities of greatness, Mr. Speaker. In a democratic society they must be freely given, which means that they must be based on wisdom and understanding.

Has the American press helped us to understand what is happening in South Viet-Nam today?

Mr. Speaker, I have been told that, week in, week out, some five hundred reporters are accredited to our Mission Press Center in Saigon. Thanks to the facilities provided by our armed forces and our Embassy, these reporters can move freely over the face of that tormented country, holding a magnifying glass to every wart and wrinkle. For South Viet-Nam, Mr. Speaker, is indeed what Ward Just of the Washington Post called an "appallingly open" country.

What appalls me, Mr. Speaker, is not that the country is open -- for some measure of openness is precisely what the South Vietnamese have been fighting to achieve, for so many years. What appalls me is rather the confusion, the shallowness, the sensationalism we get from so many reporters in Saigon.

On one hand we hear that the South Vietnamese troops won't or can't fight -- and on the other that their casualties are generally higher than our own.

On one hand we hear that a dictatorial regime in Saigon is suppressing the opposition and rigging the elections -- and, on the other, that all the candidates are violently attacking the government and the South Vietnamese press is printing everything they say.

Mr. Speaker, the South Vietnamese are in a difficult and complicated process of developing a constitutional order within which the country's non-communist political forces can express themselves, can

influence events, can learn to work together for the common good. This process is important to us and we want to know how it is getting on.

Our press knows very well how to worry and disturb us. Has it been equally good at informing us? Our press has devoted much breathless and confused reporting to the Vietnamese elections. Has it given us any real insight into them?

It is time that it did.

#

6d

DRAFT SPEECH

I have been following with great interest the reporting in American newspapers about the elections in Viet Nam. I would like to run over briefly some of the charges that have been made. It is, to me, fascinating that American newspapermen and politicians can get so worked up over these charges.

It is charged that the elections are not fair because several candidates were disqualified and there is not a wide enough choice for voters.

Mr. Speaker, there are eleven candidates for the Presidency. Ten are opposition candidates. In this country, our voters usually have to make do with only two choices.

It is charged that the elections are not fair because one of the tickets is composed of military men.

Mr. Speaker, the American people have elected at least six professional military men President. I have never heard it proposed that military men be prohibited from running for office in the United States.

It is charged that the elections are not fair because one of the tickets includes the Chief of State and the Prime Minister. According to this charge, they should resign. Otherwise the election is not fair.

Mr. Speaker, how many members of this body intend to resign before they run for reelection? When did any American President resign in order to ensure that he would have no advantage over his opposition?

It is charged that the elections are unfair because some opposition candidates say that the Government is trying to rig the elections.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot recall an election in which there were not rumors of unfair tactics. The fact that such charges are made does not prove the elections are unfair. It only proves that the candidates are trying to win. Specific charges deserve to be investigated. But general and unspecific charges of unfair election tactics deserve to be treated with restraint.

It does not seem to me that there has been much restraint in the reporting of the election in Viet Nam. It does not seem to me that there has been much perspective. I would suggest that those who write and those who read the press despatches from Saigon do so with a good deal more realism and a good deal less boyish innocence.

8/21/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, August 21, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a new memorandum from George Ball on Indian food. George is now having qualms about his dismissal of U.S. assurances to other donors that we would accept debt relief as legitimate matching. He has read the communique issued after the April consortium meeting, in which we joined with the others in saying precisely that. He suggests that you may want to check into this history before making your decision.

To the degree that this point is relevant to your concerns, you should know that there is a great deal of history of this kind. We said we would count debt relief as matching:

- in Gene Rostow's testimony before the House (February 28)
- in the March and April meetings of the India Consortium (pursuant to a U.S. position approved by the President)
- in the Consortium communique issued after the Paris meeting (the one to which George refers).

I don't mean to indicate that this destroys George's argument. What we agreed to was that additional debt relief would be eligible for food matching. It remains true that we don't know how much of the current debt relief is additional to regular consortium contributions or what terms will be offered in rescheduling the debt. But there can be no question that we are on record in support of the general proposition that debt relief should be counted as the equal of new aid for matching purposes.

At Tab A is a copy of the package I gave you this morning, suggesting a possible alternative approach if you decide you still can't go along with the Rusk/Freeman/Fowler/Gaud recommendation.

Ed Hamilton

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

7a

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In my memorandum of August 15, 1967, with regard to the Indian grain situation, I listed among the relevant questions: "Have other donor nations been led to offer additional help on the assumption that, on the basis of their offer, we would now put up the remaining 1.5 million tons?"

Later in my memorandum I dismissed this question rather abruptly by the comment: "I would not worry too much about the reaction of other donor countries. We have carried this burden for a long time and they have done damn little."

I wrote my memorandum hastily just before leaving for New York, and, during the past two days, I have begun to wonder whether I may have treated this consideration too cavalierly. This morning on returning to Washington, I had a look at the language of the communique issued after the meeting in Paris and it suggests that we publicly agreed with the European governments that the matching test had been generally met.

I have not seen your instructions to Gene Rostow or his reporting telegrams and thus I do not know exactly what was said to the European governments, but the question is of sufficient importance that, before making the final decision, you may wish to ask Messrs. Rostow and Gaud for a memorandum setting out the facts necessary to determine whether there is a basis for concern on this issue.

In other words, what was the concept of matching that Gene Rostow, under instructions, conveyed to other donor governments,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By mg, NARA, Date 12-15-94

~~SECRET~~

-2-

and did they in good faith meet the standards of that concept? It is possible that Chancellor Kiesinger gave you some impressions on this question when he met with you. In any event, the issue is not one that should go unexamined, since it may have a real bearing on the degree to which we can expect cooperation from other donor nations on aid matters in the future.


George W. Ball

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 19, 1967
4:00 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

Nick Katzenbach and Joe Palmer recommend that you approve the attached message to Rwandan President Kayibanda, urging him to cooperate with a plan to evacuate the mercenaries from the Congo. It is not certain that the Congolese will continue to push the evacuation plan -- they have been acting up a bit in the last 24 hours. But if we can get them back on the track, it would be very much too bad if Kayibanda refused to allow the use of his airstrip to get the mercenaries out. (As of now, Kayibanda is balking.)

I recommend you approve. If the Congolese could pull off the evacuation, it would be by far the best and most peaceful solution to the mercenary problem. If they can't work it out, we are in for an indefinite period of extreme tension and danger of racial disorder.

Ed Hamilton

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-298
By lip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

8a.

Draft Message to President Kayibanda of Rwanda

Dear Mr. President:

It was a great pleasure to see you during your recent visit to Washington and I deeply valued the opportunity to exchange views with you on a number of subjects of importance to our two countries.

I am prompted to write you at this time because of our mutual concern about the situation in the Congo and our common interest in seeing an early end to the mercenary-led rebellion.

I have viewed with considerable hope the Congolese plan to permit the withdrawal of the mercenaries and Katangans to Rwanda, the evacuation of the mercenaries out of Africa and the eventual voluntary repatriation of the Katangans. I believe this plan is eminently designed to meet the objective which you and we both seek and we have therefore given it our full support.

If the plan can be successfully carried out, it would eliminate the mercenary presence, end the specter of further bloodshed and permit the resumption of normal activity in the Congo. Most important to you is that an unsettling situation on your border will be ended. We are convinced that if the rebellion is not ended as quickly as possible, the future effects in both Rwanda and the Congo could be very serious.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

The United States is, as you know, interested in the stability, security and development of central Africa. Therefore, even though we have no nationals among the mercenaries, we are prepared to cooperate with Rwanda, the Congo, Belgium, France, and other countries and international organizations to facilitate the implementation of this plan. Meanwhile, I would like to assure you that we will make every effort to assist in the feeding of the Katangans while they remain in Rwanda through the provision of available PL 480 foodstuffs.

Since time is of the essence, I strongly hope you will be able to give your approval to this plan so that this threat to the security and well-being of the area can be brought to an end.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow

9

*1. [unclear]
2. [unclear]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 29, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a recommendation from Agriculture and AID, concurred in by State, Treasury and BoB, that you authorize a \$2.2 million P. L. 480 sale to Ecuador for small quantities of wheat and tobacco.

Despite Arosemena's unhelpful performance at Punta del Este and doubts regarding the economic justification for P. L. 480 help, I favor this modest assistance:

- Arosemena has pulled back a considerable way from his Summit obstreperousness, joining with our Ambassador on August 17 in a public celebration of the 6th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.
- The local currency proceeds will be used to encourage much-needed improvements in agriculture -- a key Summit objective.
- Arosemena has made considerable progress during 1967 in getting Ecuador's budgetary and balance of payments situation straightened out.
- We have a stake in continued political stability in Ecuador which Arosemena has achieved while returning the country to constitutionality via elections scheduled for next June.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove ✓?

See me ✓

*ret'd
8/30/67*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-298
By 128, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

9a
AUG 24 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement with Ecuador

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-298
By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a \$2.2 million P. L. 480 sale to Ecuador for 15,000 tons of wheat and 582 tons of tobacco and tobacco products. (The tobacco has been added since the attached memo was written.) The dollar credit will be repayable in 20 years, with two years' grace after payment of five percent on delivery.

This agreement has little merit in terms of immediate need or self-help. Ecuador's foreign exchange position is reasonably sound, at least for the near term, and the Government's commitment to self-help is far from clear. However, there appears to be some political justification for a small P. L. 480 program.

This would be the first commodity aid to Ecuador since AID cancelled the balance of its 1967 budget support loan last December. At that time,

- The Government was unwilling to take revenue measures to reduce the large 1967 budget deficit.
- The services of an Internal Revenue Service technical assistance team were abruptly cancelled.
- Government financial support of agrarian reform was withdrawn.

Since then, the Government has made substantial progress in stabilizing its financial position.

- The budget deficit has been reduced through increased tax collections of 17%, and new tax measures have been enacted.
- The balance of payments position is much stronger as a result of several measures to reduce imports and expand exports.
- The Government has pledged funds for the agrarian reform program.

Although they are somewhat vague, the self-help efforts outlined by Freeman and Gaud are designed to encourage much-needed improvements in Ecuador's agricultural development program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Since the low point in our relations, when President Arosemena attacked the U. S. at Punta del Este last spring, he has gone out of his way to praise this country. Although the Ecuadorians continue to board and fine U. S. fishing vessels within their 200-mile limit, State and AID feel we should acknowledge the economic and political progress made and reaffirm our support by offering P. L. 480 assistance. No new AID lending is planned, however, until we are more convinced of the Government's commitment to a sound development program.

As part of this agreement, Ecuador would be required to buy commercially 44,000 tons of wheat from free world sources during calendar year 1967 and 442 tons of tobacco from the U. S. during fiscal year 1968.

Recommendation

Since this agreement is relatively small and since it appears to have some political benefits, I recommend your approval.



Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AUG 21 1967

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Ecuador

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-303

By 48, NARA, Date 9-26-94

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Ecuador to provide approximately 15,000 tons of wheat, having a current export market value of \$1.0 million (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance over 18 years, with 1 percent interest during the 2-year grace period and $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Ecuador has faced a chronic shortage of wheat, and scarce foreign exchange has been used to purchase it annually from abroad.

Since March 1966, Ecuador has moved from a de facto military government to a constitutional one. We believe that the United States must fully support Ecuador's effort to return to constitutionality. Moreover, the Government of Ecuador has made commendable progress during the past year in stabilizing its financial position -- progress which we wish to acknowledge and support.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirement

The usual marketing requirement of 44,000 tons is based on the 1963-66 average of Ecuador's commercial imports of wheat.

Self-Help

In 1967 the Government of Ecuador has increased tax collections by 17 percent over the comparable period in 1966, and enacted new taxes designed to raise 253 million sucres (\$12.65 million at 20 sucres to \$1.00) in 1967. These measures made possible an increased development budget 22 percent larger than in 1966. While narrowed, the budgetary gap has not been entirely closed. The proposed agreement would both recognize the government's self-help fiscal measures, and assist Ecuador's effort to increase agricultural output through use of the local currency generated.

Since the Ministry of Agriculture was established in 1964, its budget has been increased from 71 million sucres to an allocated figure of 230 million sucres in 1967. In addition, during the past 5 years total bank credit to the agricultural sector has more than doubled, increasing from 428 million sucres in 1960 to 905 million sucres in 1965.

During 1966 political instability and financial stringency limited the government's ability to pursue self-help measures. The same factors, together with unsatisfactory working relationships caused USAID to cut back and reorient its agricultural

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

assistance. However, the present government has now indicated that it will step up its agricultural diversification by transferring marginal banana acreage into the production of beef, rice, citrus, oilseeds and hard fibers. It has also pledged funds for loans through IERAC to settlers on state-owned haciendas, and for establishing an FAO/GOE training and research center. Funding is also expected for the establishment of water use and livestock pasture management and improved agricultural marketing systems.


In the negotiation of this agreement we will seek commitments that the Government of Ecuador:

- (1) Use all local currencies generated through the sale of commodities under this agreement for the development of Ecuadoran agriculture, with serious consideration given to allocating a large proportion to the support of agrarian reform;
- (2) Improve the Extension Service of the Ministry of Agriculture through provision of adequate fiscal support, training of staff, and strengthening working relationships between the Extension Service and the semi-autonomous research organization, INIAP, to assure dissemination of research results to farmers;
- (3) Encourage private sector investment in agriculture through various endeavors including establishment of an agricultural development organization;
- (4) Support comprehensive regional development impact programs in areas of immediate agricultural potential;
- (5) Stimulate basic changes in the market system for livestock, dairy products, and specific crop commodities; and
- (6) Urge increased production of selected commodities including rice and cattle.

Recommendation


That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.

August 8 1967



Administrator

Agency for International Development



Secretary

Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Supposed
2/1/67
10

Friday, August 25, 1967 *7:30 PM*

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

I understand that Senator Inouye is out of town and will be calling Monday for an appointment.

You may wish to hold this ready for the President when the Senator comes in.

William J. Jorden

Att.

10a

Friday, August 25, 1967
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit with Senator Inouye

You have agreed to a visit by Senator Inouye.

He is interested in making a speech on Viet-Nam. You asked me to prepare one for him. You may wish to give him the attached -- which concentrates on the "stalemate" argument and the elections.

William J. Jorden

Att.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

106

Friday, August 25, 1967
6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit with Senator Inouye

You have agreed to a visit by Senator Inouye.

He is interested in making a speech on Viet-Nam. You asked me to prepare one for him. You may wish to give him the attached -- which concentrates on the "stalemate" argument and the elections.

Bill

William J. Jorden

Att.

DRAFT 8/24

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have always believed that the Vietnamese Communists defeated the French, not on the field of battle, not at Dien Bien Phu, but in Paris.

And I believe today that Ho Chi Minh's last hope is to win in Washington what he cannot win in the hills and paddy fields of South Viet-Nam.

In this connection, I have just read some very disturbing words in The Economist of London. This outstanding journal has shown a deep understanding for our involvement in Viet-Nam and has strongly supported what our country is trying to do there. But in its latest issue it says the following:

"Maybe the Americans don't have what it takes after all. What it takes in Viet-Nam is patience: the patience to slog on with a defensive war, and to accept the restraints on military action that this sort of war calls for. If the Americans can command enough patience, they can do what they set out to do in Viet-Nam. ... The United States can fight the Viet-Nam war and go on raising its standard of living at the same time. That is the measure of its economic power. President Johnson has the money and men to carry on the war at its present level for a long time to come. In this sense, he almost certainly has more staying power than Ho-Chi Minh; and it is staying power that will count in the end."

But The Economist then raises the question whether we are not running out of that most essential element for success.

Mr. President, I think The Economist is wrong.

I firmly believe that we have what it takes -- and that we will see this conflict through to a successful end.

But I must admit that our South Vietnamese friends must be puzzled by some of the statements they have heard recently from a few Americans.

At the same time, I think Ho Chi Minh and his followers -- those who want to hang on and continue the war -- must have found some of these statements encouraging.

I see signs, too, that some of our other friends in Asia -- people whose future depends heavily on our help, on our power, and on our resolve -- have been worried by the scattered signs of wobbling and weakening.

Just the other day, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand, one of our closest allies, said:

"Our friends in the United States don't seem to have faith in themselves and, if they don't, how can others have faith in them? The United States offers a picture of confusion and self-doubt. America's position in international affairs is affected by domestic politics."

Mr. President, it is right and proper for those of us in this distinguished body to have thoughts and opinions on a problem as serious

as Viet-Nam. It is important for us to make those thoughts known -- to each other, to the Administration, and to the American people.

But in a matter of such consequence, we have a responsibility to base our opinions and our statements on the very best facts available to us.

It is easy, Mr. President, to look at a situation 10,000 miles away and to think that one knows what is happening. It is easy to pick up the latest rumor -- or to read a hastily written news story -- or to see a 30-second strip of film on television -- and to react immediately.

But given the stakes in this conflict, I think we owe it to ourselves -- and to our government -- and to our people -- to do better than that.

As I look back over the past few weeks to many of the things I -- and all of us -- have heard and read, I find two elements of the Viet-Nam situation that have been the subject of great attention. It seems to me that much of the discussion of these two subjects has produced considerable heat and very little light.

I refer to the military situation: is there a stalemate?

And the political situation: are the elections a fraud?

On the military side, let me say that I -- and many of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate -- have seen our share of war. But there are few, I think, who would qualify as expert witnesses or analysts of the war in Viet-Nam.

Many of the brave young reporters in Viet-Nam have also seen a good deal of this war. But they, too, hardly rank as specialists.

Who then are the experts?

I submit that a man like General Westmoreland is an expert. I regard the Army Chief of Staff, General Johnson, as an expert. I think there is no doubt that a man like Lt. General Stanley Larsen, our commander in the II Corps for the last two years, is an expert on the military situation in that area which represents almost half the land mass of Viet-Nam.

What do these distinguished experts say about the war? Do they think there is a stalemate?

Listen to the words of General Westmoreland speaking just last month:

"The statement that we are in a stalemate is complete fiction. It is completely unrealistic. During the past year tremendous progress has been made... We have opened up roads... We have invaded long-established base areas... The enemy had planned to take control of the two northern provinces... He has been stopped... The enemy planned to take over domination of the highlands. Again, he has been defeated... Greater population has been secured and taken away from communist domination... The ARVN troops are fighting much better than they were a year ago... The number of defectors coming in to the government has substantially increased..."

"I think to measure progress, one has to think in terms of objectives. Our objective in South Viet-Nam is to give the people freedom

of choice, to resist the aggression from the North, and to try to give the people protection from the terror and intimidation of the Viet Cong.

"On the contrary, the enemy's objectives have been to terrorize the people, to disrupt the revolutionary development program, to take over more of the population, to sabotage the road and lines of communication.

"He has failed in achieving his objectives. We have succeeded in attaining our objectives...

"The enemy has not won a single, significant victory during the past year, despite the tremendous effort he had put forth."

General Johnson, just back from his eighth trip to Viet-Nam, said recently:

"Everywhere that I went, I felt that there was significant progress being made. I think much of this progress is not reported -- partially because much of it is being done by the Vietnamese, and partially because we have an intensive focus on the activities of U.S. units out there."

"Somehow or other, we tend to concentrate on our catastrophies or disasters rather than on our successes. Our successes, I believe, far outweigh any disaster that has occurred..."

General Larsen, just returned from II Corps, has reported:

--half the population of the Corps area was under Viet Cong control two years ago; today, almost 90 per cent is under government control;

--two years ago, 70 per cent of the rice growing area was dominated by the VC; today, 95 per cent of the rice land is under Vietnamese control;

--two years ago, no important highway could be used without a major military effort; today, 90 per cent of the important roads are open -- 40 percent without any protection, 50 per cent with minimal convoy protection;

--two years ago, almost no railroads were operating; today, more than half the railroads are in use;

--a recently captured Viet Cong document admitted that whereas they control 265,000 people two years ago, they now control only 20,000.

I could go on, Mr. President, But I think the testimony of these distinguished military men who have followed developments closely speaks for itself.

It can be summed up very quickly: there is no military stalemate in Viet-Nam.

We and our Vietnamese allies and our other friends are moving steadily forward. And if we have the patience, we shall succeed.

On the political scene, there is a great readiness on the part of some Americans to write off the coming elections as meaningless. They are declared a "fraud" even before they are held.

Mr. President, it is easy to be arrogant and self-righteous about this matter.

It is easy to say that if this young country -- fighting a war to stay alive -- does not have elections that are 100 per cent pure, totally honest, and free from all blemish, then the political process has no meaning.

Mr. President, when I am told that the Vietnamese elections must not only be good but that they must be "better than ours," I can only reply that this judgment is nonsense.

We all know our own history well enough, I presume, to know that our elections have not always been pure and fair. Indeed, I can remember only a few elections in recent times in which there were not charges of unfair tactics or cries of "foul."

Now I think that the Vietnamese people deserve the right to express their political judgment freely and without coercion. I believe that the coming elections will be more fair and free than any of us dares hopes. And I note that that judgment is shared by our distinguished Ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker. He is a wise man -- and an acute observer.

I applaud the President's decision to invite a number of leading Americans -- including several distinguished members of this body -- to visit Viet-Nam and to observe the electoral process. I am sure we all look forward to hearing their observations when they return.

But I would say, Mr. President, that the real miracle here is that elections are being held at all. The encouraging thing is that the progress toward representative government has been so great in so short a time.

I remind my colleagues that two years ago, Viet-Nam did not have a democratic ^sconstitution. Today it does.

I recall that two years ago there was no popularly elected national assembly. Today, there is.

Moreover, in the coming months, Viet-Nam will have a Senate and a House of representative and popularly chosen men and women. And under the Constitution, those legislative bodies will have great powers.

I think that as we watch this heartening progress we owe it to the Vietnamese -- and to ourselves -- to be patient, to be sympathetic, to be encouraging. For they have begun to move down the path toward real freedom -- toward the goal we have tried to make possible.

That is what the vast majority of Vietnamese want for themselves. And I have enough confidence in those brave people to believe that they will achieve their goal -- not overnight, not in one election, but slowly, surely, steadily -- as we and other free men have moved toward our own goals.

And as they move forward, we can take pride in the fact that American courage, American sacrifice, American patience have helped to make it possible.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1967

5:35 pm

Mr. President:

Here are two more good editorials --
from Atlanta and Chicago -- criticizing
cuts in foreign aid and giving strong support
to the Alliance for Progress.

WGB
William G. Bowdler

11a

The Atlanta Journal

AUGUST 20, 1967

Continue Foreign Aid

IN THE rosy days following the end of World War II we had the idea that foreign aid liberally applied would mean peace forever.

We were not entirely correct. But we were correct inasmuch as foreign aid, wisely applied, saved a lot of the world from Communist advances, including Western Europe and Japan.

Today foreign aid remains a necessary arm of our foreign policy. Today, however, it also is obvious that not all the program has been good. There is disillusionment. As they debate the continuance of the foreign aid program in Washington there is reason to fear too much reaction because of the failures of the program, and not enough optimism because of its successes.

The program has had numerous successes, notably in Europe.

It has had some success in Latin America as well and the program must be generously supported in the future if for no other reason than to help Latin America nations rearrange their economies in order to make Red promises less attractive.

South America rather than Africa remains the dark continent to most of us. We know too little about it and Central America and the Caribbean.

It takes a Castro at our doorstep to remind us of our failures and to alert us to what our future in the Latin countries might be unless we take the proper steps.

What are those steps? Diplomacy is one and that includes public relations. Another is aid, whether by gift or grant, in order to help these people raise their living standards.

We hear a lot about our failures this year, including Castro.

But there are successes to match each failure and some left over to spare. In Latin America this includes many phases of the Alliance for Progress. It is to our enlightened self-interest to continue here, for we have made a good start and it will be stupid to starve successful programs which still are short of completion.

116

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS AUGUST 17, 1967

Give Latin Aid Priority

Asking for a deep cut in foreign aid, Sen. J. William Fulbright has proposed a system of priorities that would balance commitments abroad against domestic needs and the growing costs of the war in Vietnam. Not less important is making foreign aid do the most good in terms of this country's self-interest.

Toward this end the time is ripe to focus more of the effort on Latin America.

For all of their deficiencies and disappointments the programs of the Alliance for Progress meet a real need in Latin America, which more than any other region is wrapped up with our own destiny.

Indiscriminate reductions in funds for the alliance, as proposed by Fulbright in his 18 per cent cut in foreign aid, represent a failure to grasp the real meaning of "priorities." The facts are that the alliance has bolstered several authentic reform regimes in Latin America and that a new generation of leaders is coming into power that recognizes there can be no genuine progress without even greater changes in the region's political, social and economic makeup. They are gradually supplanting

the feudal thinkers to whom the alliance is a disguised form of communism. But without the alliance to lean on the emerging leaders cannot hope to succeed to any significant degree.

The alliance is six years old this week. Its scope was broadened earlier this year to embrace a Latin American Common Market—a long-term but indispensable goal that will be hard to attain even with adequate U.S. aid. The effect of the Fulbright cuts is to deny funds for the planning and development of the common market. Apart from nullifying President Johnson's pledge at Punta del Este, congressional economies in this area are shortsighted and mischievous.

Though the recently concluded meeting of the Organization for Latin American Solidarity in Havana made it clear that Fidel Castro is more of a nuisance than an immediate threat to Latin America, it does not warrant any relaxation in vigilance. If the progress already made in numerous Latin countries is arrested or reversed, the Castro guerrilla movement could gain menacing proportions.

to Bill Jordan
to send P covering memo

~~1 - Suspense~~
2 - for file

12

Thursday, August 24, 1967
1:30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You asked me to prepare a
speech draft for Senator Inouye.

I hope the attached text will
be useful to him.

William J. Jordan

Att.

12a

DRAFT 8/24

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have always believed that the Vietnamese Communists defeated the French, not on the field of battle, not at Dien Bien Phu, but in Paris.

And I believe today that Ho Chi Minh's last hope is to win in Washington what he cannot win in the hills and paddy fields of South Viet-Nam.

In this connection, I have just read some very disturbing words in The Economist of London. This outstanding journal has shown a deep understanding for our involvement in Viet-Nam and has strongly supported what our country is trying to do there. But in its latest issue it says the following:

"Maybe the Americans don't have what it takes after all. What it takes in Viet-Nam is patience: the patience to slog on with a defensive war, and to accept the restraints on military action that this sort of war calls for. If the Americans can command enough patience, they can do what they set out to do in Viet-Nam. ... The United States can fight the Viet-Nam war and go on raising its standard of living at the same time. That is the measure of its economic power. President Johnson has the money and men to carry on the war at its present level for a long time to come. In this sense, he almost certainly has more staying power than Ho Chi Minh; and it is staying power that will count in the end."

But The Economist then raises the question whether we are not running out of that most essential element for success.

q Mr. President, I think The Economist is wrong.

I firmly believe that we have what it takes -- and that we will see this conflict through to a successful end.

But I must admit that our South Vietnamese friends must be puzzled by some of the statements they have heard recently from a few Americans.

At the same time, I think Ho Chi Minh and his followers -- those who want to hang on and continue the war -- must have found some of these statements encouraging.

I see signs, too, that some of our other friends in Asia -- people whose future depends heavily on our help, on our power, and on our resolve -- have been worried by the scattered signs of wobbling and weakening.

Just the other day, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Thailand, one of our closest allies, said:

"Our friends in the United States don't seem to have faith in themselves and, if they don't, how can others have faith in them? The United States offers a picture of confusion and self-doubt. America's position in international affairs is affected by domestic politics."

Mr. President, it is right and proper for those of us in this distinguished body to have thoughts and opinions on a problem as serious

as Viet-Nam. It is important for us to make those thoughts known -- to each other, to the Administration, and to the American people.

But in a matter of such consequence, we have a responsibility to base our opinions and our statements on the very best facts available to us.

It is easy, Mr. President, to look at a situation 10,000 miles away and to think that one knows what is happening. It is easy to pick up the latest rumor -- or to read a hastily written news story -- or to see a 30-second strip of film on television -- and to react immediately.

But given the stakes in this conflict, I think we owe it to ourselves -- and to our government -- and to our people -- to do better than that.

As I look back over the past few weeks to many of the things I -- and all of us -- have heard and read, I find two elements of the Viet-Nam situation that have been the subject of great attention. It seems to me that much of the discussion of these two subjects has produced considerable heat and very little light.

I refer to the military situation: is there a stalemate?

And the political situation: are the elections a fraud?

On the military side, let me say that I -- and many of my distinguished colleagues in the Senate -- have seen our share of war. But there are few, I think, who would qualify as expert witnesses or analysts of the war in Viet-Nam.

Many of the brave young reporters in Viet-Nam have also seen a good deal of this war. But they, too, hardly rank as specialists.

Who then are the experts?

I submit that a man like General Westmoreland is an expert. I regard the Army Chief of Staff, General Johnson, as an expert. I think there is no doubt that a man like Lt. General Stanley Larsen, our commander in the II Corps for the last two years, is an expert on the military situation in that area which represents almost half the land mass of Viet-Nam.

What do these distinguished experts say about the war? Do they think there is a stalemate?

Listen to the words of General Westmoreland speaking just last month:

"The statement that we are in a stalemate is complete fiction. It is completely unrealistic. During the past year tremendous progress has been made... We have opened up roads... We have invaded long-established base areas... The enemy had planned to take control of the two northern provinces... He has been stopped... The enemy planned to take over domination of the highlands. Again, he has been defeated... Greater population has been secured and taken away from communist domination... The ARVN troops are fighting much better than they were a year ago... The number of defectors coming in to the government has substantially increased..."

"I think to measure progress, one has to think in terms of objectives. Our objective in South Viet-Nam is to give the people freedom

of choice, to resist the aggression from the North, and to try to give the people protection from the terror and intimidation of the Viet Cong.

"On the contrary, the enemy's objectives have been to terrorize the people, to disrupt the revolutionary development program, to take over more of the population, to sabotage the road and lines of communication.

"He has failed in achieving his objectives. We have succeeded in attaining our objectives...

"The enemy has not won a single, significant victory during the past year, despite the tremendous effort he had put forth."

General Johnson, just back from his eighth trip to Viet-Nam, said recently:

"Everywhere that I went, I felt that there was significant progress being made. I think much of this progress is not reported -- partially because much of it is being done by the Vietnamese, and partially because we have an intensive focus on the activities of U.S. units out there."

"Somehow or other, we tend to concentrate on our catastrophies or disasters rather than on our successes. Our successes, I believe, far outweigh any disaster that has occurred..."

General Larsen, just returned from II Corps, has reported:

--half the population of the Corps area was under Viet Cong control two years ago; today, almost 90 per cent is under government control;

--two years ago, 70 per cent of the rice growing area was dominated by the VC; today, 95 per cent of the rice land is under Vietnamese control;

--two years ago, no important highway could be used without a major military effort; today, 90 per cent of the important roads are open -- 40 percent without any protection, 50 per cent with minimal convoy protection;

--two years ago, almost no railroads were operating; today, more than half the railroads are in use;

--a recently captured Viet Cong document admitted that whereas they control 265,000 people two years ago, they now control only 20,000.

I could go on, Mr. President, But I think the testimony of these distinguished military men who have followed developments closely speaks for itself.

It can be summed up very quickly: there is no military stalemate in Viet-Nam.

We and our Vietnamese allies and our other friends are moving steadily forward. And if we have the patience, we shall succeed.

On the political scene, there is a great readiness on the part of some Americans to write off the coming elections as meaningless. They are declared a "fraud" even before they are held.

Mr. President, it is easy to be arrogant and self-righteous about this matter.

It is easy to say that if this young country -- fighting a war to stay alive -- does not have elections that are 100 per cent pure, totally honest, and free from all blemish, then the political process has no meaning.

Mr. President, when I am told that the Vietnamese elections must not only be good but that they must be "better than ours," I can only reply that this judgment is nonsense.

We all know our own history well enough, I presume, to know that our elections have not always been pure and fair. Indeed, I can remember only a few elections in recent times in which there were not charges of unfair tactics or cries of "foul."

Now I think that the Vietnamese people deserve the right to express their political judgment freely and without coercion. I believe that the coming elections will be more fair and free than any of us dares hope. And I note that that judgment is shared by our distinguished Ambassador in Saigon, Mr. Ellsworth Bunker. He is a wise man -- and an acute observer.

I applaud the President's decision to invite a number of leading Americans -- including several distinguished members of this body -- to visit Viet-Nam and to observe the electoral process. I am sure we all look forward to hearing their observations when they return.

But I would say, Mr. President, that the real miracle here is that elections are being held at all. The encouraging thing is that the progress toward representative government has been so great in so short a time.

I remind my colleagues that two years ago, Viet-Nam did not have a democratic sonstitution. Today it does.

I recall that two years ago there was no popularly elected national assembly. Today, there is.

Moreover, in the coming months, Viet-Nam will have a Senate and a House of representative and popularly chosen men and women. And under the Constitution, those legislative bodies will have great powers.

I think that as we watch this heartening progress we owe it to the Vietnamese -- and to ourselves -- to be patient, to be sympathetic, to be encouraging. For they have begun to move down the path toward real freedom -- toward the goal we have tried to make possible.

That is what the vast majority of Vietnamese want for themselves. And I have enough confidence in those brave people to believe that they will achieve their goal -- not overnight, not in one election, but slowly, surely, steadily -- as we and other free men have moved toward our own goals.

And as they move forward, we can take pride in the fact that American courage, American sacrifice, American patience have helped to make it possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, August 24, 1967

Mr. President;

The attached UPI ticker item quotes "Administration sources" that we are about to sign a new wheat agreement with India. I have checked with Gaud, Schnittker, and Gene Rostow to be sure that none of them has said anything that could be so interpreted. They all deny any knowledge of the source of the item. (Schnittker was questioned about the India food decision on Tuesday in an executive session of the House Agriculture Committee, but rigorously followed the party line.) If you approve, we will (if asked) deny this story and stick to the "we are reviewing the problem" line. I think it would be a mistake to issue a spontaneous denial.

O.K. to stonewall if asked _____

Issue a denial _____

Speak to me _____

Whatever line we take, we are going to have more and more press interest in this decision. ^{Mr.} Ghandi is in serious trouble about the food ration in Calcutta -- her house is now being picketed and there is lots of talk of riots. Rightly or wrongly, there will be enormous pressures to go to war in the newspapers and to hang the blame on you for what could be a genuine disaster in the world's hungriest city. John Schnittker leaves Monday for an Asian trip which includes India; we can expect his visit to generate even more attention to the problem, along with a barrage of sticky questions. Bowles is sending Secretary Rusk a cable a day pleading for authority to say something to the Indians, even if it is "no".

The thrust of this, in my judgment, is that we would be better off to give the Indians an answer soon -- even if it is negative -- than to wait. We are very near the point where suspense works against us.

Ed Hamilton

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-298
By lip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13a
UPI-51

(INDIA)

WASHINGTON--THE U.S. AND INDIA WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT SOON, POSSIBLY THIS WEEK, FOR SHIPMENT OF ANOTHER MILLION OR MORE TONS OF WHEAT TO INDIA UNDER THE FOOD FOR PEACE PROGRAM, ADMINISTRATION SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN HOLDING UP AUTHORIZATION OF UP TO 1.5 MILLION TONS OF WHEAT IN AN EFFORT TO PROD OTHER FREE WORLD NAT ONS INTO STEPPING UP WHEAT SHIPMENTS TO INDIA. SOME AMERICAN OFFICIAL FEEL THAT SOME OF THE OTHER NINE NATIONS IN THE SO-CALLED "INDIAN WHEAT CONSORTIUM" ARE NOT KEEPING UP THEIR END OF THE FOOD AID AGREEMENT.

8/24--GE1129A

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 22, 1967, 12:30 p.m.

~~2-Res file~~
5
14

Mr. President:

Attached is the memo you wanted concerning Senator McCarthy's speech on Africa. You should know that the final version of the speech is (1) much more complimentary to us than the AP report suggests, and (2) vastly improved -- due to hard lobbying from AID -- compared with the original draft which would have called upon you to scrap the current program and start over.

Tab
A

I will send in a copy of the speech as soon as I can get my hands on it.



Edward K. Hamilton

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

14a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What We Are Doing in Africa

Senator McCarthy's speech (ticker clipping at Tab A) charges that we don't pay enough attention to Africa except in crisis; that U.S. aid should be concentrated on long-term problems, particularly agriculture; and that we are too optimistic about African development. In reply, I would cite the following facts:

1. U.S. aid to Africa in FY 1967 -- excluding food -- totalled \$202 million, more than 14% above the 1966 level. The budget request now before the Congress (\$195 million) would support a continuation of that high level.
2. Food aid to Africa increased by 18% in 1967 and will rise by a further 11% in 1968 -- a total increase of 25% over three years.
3. AID is now financing more than 1,800 technicians in Africa working on health, agriculture and education, the long-term problems of development. This is a 20% increase over 1966. The 1968 request provides for a slight increase.
4. About 25% of the 1968 request would be used for agriculture projects, an increase of almost 50% in agriculture spending over the previous year.
5. Supporting Assistance, the AID account which finances non-developmental, crisis-related activities, is declining in Africa. It amounted to about \$22 million in 1967, more than \$1 million less than in 1966. It should take another drop in 1968.
6. The President has worked harder than any President in history to make sure that U.S. policy toward Africa is energetic, sensible and realistic:
 - he commissioned the first general study of African development ever undertaken in the U.S. government -- the Korry Report.
 - he gave the first speech entirely addressed to African development problems ever given by an American President (the OAU speech, May 26, 1966).

- he sent his Under Secretary of State on the first tour of Africa ever made by an American official of his rank.
- within the past year alone, he has entertained President Senghor of Senegal, the King of Morocco, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, President Banda of Malawi, President Kayibanda of Rwanda, and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Within the next two months he will receive President Diori of Niger, General Ankrah of Ghana, and probably Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Nyerere of Tanzania as well. (Last three not announced; last two not finally approved.)

7. AID's attitude toward African development problems is evident in the following quote from the Agency's Congressional presentation for FY 1968:

- "Economic problems and the development challenge moved even more to the foreground . . . (in Africa) . . . with the difficult realities of the task becoming more widely and clearly recognized and the long-term nature of the development process becoming more generally accepted."

This isn't rampant optimism. It is recognition that many Africans are finally coming to realize that there is no future in grandiose posturing on the world stage or in gratuitous adventures against their neighbors. More and more, Africa is looking inward to the immense labors required to achieve political stability and economic growth. This doesn't make those problems any easier; nobody pretends that it does. But it is the first necessary step toward dealing with them at all. We are right to hail it as reason for hope.



Ed Hamilton

ADDRESS OF SENATOR EUGENE J. McCARTHY

✓ Senate action on the foreign aid program emphasizes the need for continuing attention to the problems and the challenge of the emerging nations. I believe Africa is the one area where, because of our relatively recent and limited involvement, the possibilities of improving the situation are most apparent.

Our aid program began with the Marshall Plan. We have just observed the 20th anniversary of Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard University which began it all. The 1948-1952 European Recovery Program was a great success. It was a vast program of aid for a limited time to the industrialized economies of Western Europe. Although factories, fuel, and raw materials had been destroyed, a network of inter-industry relations and commercial and technical services was easily reconstituted.

✓ The conditions and ideological challenges that confront the aid program today have changed radically since its inception. Today we deal almost exclusively with the underdeveloped world. The emergence of these peoples is part of a process which is shaping the social, political, and economic institutions for the great majority of mankind. The underdeveloped countries are no longer the exclusive concern of the colonial administrator or the anthropologist; rather they are now the concern of the governments of the more advanced countries as well as of the historian and the economist.

We must respond properly to the new challenge. We cannot view the ascent of the developing nations in American terms, interpreting its tendencies, potentials, and characteristics within the framework of American political, social and economic experience. We must be on guard against the belief that, were it not for the machinations of the Communists and the mistakes of our diplomats, there would be a natural gravitation toward American ways, a spontaneous embrace of American ideas. If the scholarship of the last five years concerning economic development teaches us anything, it is that what is happening is far removed from our own experience.

M O R E

About the only time Africa engages the attention of the Senate, or the attention of our Government, is during a crisis. We must respond not only to crises. The question of priorities has no relevance here. We must give continuous attention to Africa.

✓ The Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee will hold educational hearings about Africa and United States relations with Africa. With this background, the Senate will, I hope, be able to make more informed judgments about the crises that will occur and also about how our government reacts to them, and may influence policy so as to prevent crises from developing.

Compared with the historical commitments of the United States in other parts of the world, our commitment to Africa is a tabula rasa. At the end of World War II, there were only four sovereign nations on that continent: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and the Union of South Africa. Today there are thirty-nine, and over twenty-nine of these nations have achieved independence since 1960.

✓ It is a continent where societies are attempting fundamental social change and the development of new economic systems--not Western or Communist--but African systems that will enable them to convert traditional, subsistence agricultural systems into modernized, industrial, market-oriented economies. The very old and the very new will be side by side there for many years before these nations fully realize their potential at home and in the world.

In its Summary Presentation to the Congress for fiscal year 1968, the Agency for International Development announced a new policy for Africa. Based initially on Ambassador Edward M. Korry's 1966 report, this overhaul envisions four major changes:

1. The reduction of regular bilateral programs from 30 to 10 by phasing our existing programs and not undertaking new ones. The 10 countries to retain bilateral programs are those "where development prospects are best or where there is a special United States interest or relationship"

M O R E

2. "As soon as possible ...," AID projects in other African countries" ... will be limited to support for regional institutions, regional projects and multidonor projects"
3. "As soon as possible...the possible transfer of funds to multilateral institutions for their use in providing capital and technical assistance."
4. A renewed and expanded emphasis on self-help by African governments.

It is encouraging that the Agency for International Development is experimenting with its policy to Africa. Because of our limited involvement there, our policy can be more flexible than in any other area of the world.

I am encouraged to see a concentration of our aid to ten so-called "development-emphasis" countries. The present practical possibilities of our aid program indicate that ten is a sensible number of countries for concentration. It is unfortunate, however, that AID named the ten countries, implying that our special "interests or relationships" are fixed.

Although we have been assured that we can change our concentration, this flexibility should be emphasized. For instance, AID listed Sudan as one of our "development emphasis" countries. At present we do not have diplomatic relations with Sudan, and while we continue to have concern about the Sudanese people and their problems, we cannot offer major assistance at this time.

Further, while discounting bilateral aid in the remaining African aid recipient countries, we must recognize that we still have interests throughout all of Africa which are political in the broadest sense. A new policy must not suggest disengagement from the continent, for that is not our intention.

I am wary of fashionable "isms" such as "regionalism" or "multilateralism" when used to describe a new policy. Initially, each sounds like the cure-all we have been awaiting. On closer examination, although they may represent

M O R E

improvements over our present policy in certain areas, neither "regionalism" nor any other single aid policy will bring the millenium for Africa during the next few decades, and it should not be presented as such.

✓ My intention is not to debunk regionalism, but rather to raise questions concerning its limitations and realistically to outline its possibilities.

The term "regionalism" is an unfortunate one. It implies the creation, on American initiative, of economic common markets and political alliances. The Honorable Sekou Toure, President of Guinea, told Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach in May that he regarded the regional emphasis in American aid to Africa as "neo-colonialism." His point was that Guinea, which does not adhere to the pro-French policies of most of her former French neighbors--and which suffered greatly from the abrupt French withdrawal after Guinea alone among the French African territories voted for independence in 1958--would be unintentionally pressured to return to the French orbit by the withdrawal of bilateral aid.

Another example is Somalia. Somalia shares a disputed border with both Ethiopia and Kenya. No Somali government, one of the most democratically elected and democratically run governments in Africa, could stay in office if it denied a concern for these neighboring countries. Yet Somalia desperately needs economic assistance to develop underground water resources to keep her people from starvation during the periodic droughts. Currently, though her leaders tend to be moderates, they are being pushed farther toward extremism. We should be realistic in recognizing such situations rather than get caught up in the dogmatism or semantics of regionalism.

✓ There are significant opportunities for a regional approach in response to African initiatives. Until 1965, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda were grouped in an East African Common Market in which railways, airlines, utilities; telecommunications, and monetary, fiscal and tax policies were either jointly operated or closely coordinated. The structure began to come apart because it represented an unpopular carry-over from the colonial period and because it was working to the comparative disadvantage of Uganda and Tanzania.

M O R E

Now, however, there is some reason for optimism. The three countries have decided to try to reestablish a degree of economic cooperation based upon recognition of the fact that all three must reach an acceptable level of industrial development. The three governments, in a treaty signed this past June, established an East African community and common market. It provides also for the establishment of a regional development bank.

Health is another area where the regional approach has been and can be used effectively. AID has had success in joining with the African organizations in an inoculation campaign against rinderpest in West Africa. Because of the migratory patterns of African livestock, this cattle killing disease was not a problem confined to one nation. Prior to the campaign, about 2,000 cows died annually in one area and 25,000 more were afflicted. Estimated annual losses exceeded \$1 million. Since the inoculations began, outbreaks of rinderpest declined from 2,352 cattle lost in one country, Cameroon, to none, and from 8,000 to 229 in Chad.

Measles and smallpox represent major causes of death among the people of Africa, with smallpox killing 25 percent and measles killing as high as 50 percent of the infant population. In order to save lives, AID has agreed to support plans to eradicate smallpox and to control measles in 19 west and central African countries. The regional approach is undoubtedly useful in such cases.

"Multilateralism" is another "ism" which has value, but which we must not regard as a cure-all.

There is here another semantic problem that needs clarification. A "multilateral" policy does not imply the transfer of funds to multilateral agencies. In fact, the revised aid policy calls for no loss of control of the expenditure of U.S. dollars or any change which would obscure the origin of funds to the aid program.

Rather, the "multilateral" element of our aid program seeks to help coordinate U.S. aid with that of other bilateral donors, international agencies, African recipients, and African regional sources.

M O R E

If the Congress is to adopt a sounder, more consistent and persistent approach to Africa, the Agency for International Development must be more realistic and less optimistic in its presentation to the Congress. The impression is left that for just a few dollars more, all of Africa's economic and political problems will be solved. Neither "regionalism" nor "multilateralism" nor "bilateralism" nor any amount of increased funds will solve Africa's immediate problems.

Despite difficulties, the United States can contribute significantly to African development.

Some opponents of foreign aid argue that the \$5 billion of non-military capital that flows from the advanced to the developing countries amounts to no more than 2 or 3 percent of the total output of the underdeveloped world and is, therefore, quite unimportant. Yet, when we remember that foreign aid amounts to nearly 30 percent of all capital formation in the underdeveloped world, it becomes a more significant program. If we remember also that without the supplement of foreign aid, the underdeveloped nations would be building only enough new capital to maintain their precarious standards against the demands of their increasing populations, the importance of foreign aid is established. The figures for the continent of Africa are even more significant for in Africa close to 35 to 40 percent of capital accumulation is due to foreign aid.

Not only can the United States contribute to Africa's development, but also because of our limited involvement there, we can experiment and innovate.

A significant portion of our aid should be used imaginatively for research on long term development and other problems in which we would not be competing with European countries.

An underdeveloped country cannot afford to take many chances. They are far too close to the edge of starvation and political turmoil.

A generation ago, Africa was a food-exporting continent; today, Africa is a food-importing continent. With a population that is expected to double within thirty years, Africa could face serious food shortages. Intensified research in the field of agricultural production would be most helpful.

M O R E

✓ Research into the development process would also be most helpful. It is time to take stock of our accomplishments. We have been giving aid to underdeveloped countries for almost twenty years, but to my knowledge the Agency for International Development and its predecessors have published only one major evaluative study of the effects of our aid program--Neil Jacobi's U.S. Aid to Taiwan, which appeared last year.

We should now ask for a series of comprehensive research studies on the effects of our aid both abroad and at home. The Agency should assemble a more detailed study of the economic effects of our foreign aid program in the United States.

A more realistic and a more objective approach by both the Congress and the Administration is called for in our response to the problems of the underdeveloped countries, particularly those in Africa.

Let us relate our policies to those of many African leaders. For example, Tom Mboya of Kenya, Chairman of the Economic Commission for Africa, said in February:

...development needs in Africa differ in so many ways from requirements in other developing parts of the world. These differences mean that a development program in Africa must be especially designed to solve our problems. Indeed, many of the global policies and institutional arrangements that now govern the distribution of development capital were created before Africa threw off the yoke of colonialism and in many ways are better fitted to the needs of the older developing nations. New policies and institutions may be needed to achieve more rapid development in Africa.

Similarly, Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania and traditionally one of the foremost advocates of African unity, offered a policy of self reliance in his Arusha Declaration on February 5, 1967. Many other African leaders--whether radical or conservative, English speaking or French--are facing up to their economic problems.

M O R E

✓ The complete development process--political, social, and economic--is a slow, often fearsome but also an irresistible and stirring process which will take many decades to complete. We are challenged by the emergence of these nations to demonstrate that we still stand by those men who pledged "...our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor" to establish the ideal of freedom.

MEMORANDUM

~~Supplement~~
2- Presidential file
15

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, August 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-258

By ing, NARA, Date 10-26-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: George Ball's Recommendation on Food for India

1. Ball's memorandum (Tab A) recommends that you:

- authorize 750,000-1 million tons now;
- tell the Congress that we do not accept at face value the debt relief offered by other donors. Therefore, we have discounted it in calculating how much more grain we can supply under the matching principle.

2. The advantage of Ball's plan is that we could move now and still have some protection from the charge that we had accepted debt relief as matching before we knew (i) on what terms debt would be rescheduled, and (ii) whether the debt relief would be additional to regular consortium contributions.

3. The problems with the Ball proposal are that:

- our discount would have to be arbitrary. There is no rationale for counting debt relief as 50% eligible for matching, as distinguished from 70% or 30% or 0%.
- it would discredit debt relief as a form of aid. Up to now we have joined the World Bank in pushing the Europeans to re-schedule India's enormous debt burden. As a practical matter, it is easier to get this kind of aid than to push large appropriation bills through parliaments. We are going to need it badly in the years ahead.
- it would be seen abroad as welshing on our commitments. It was made clear at every stage of the matching exercise that we would accept debt relief as matching -- in Gene Rostow's testimony, in the US position at the March consortium meeting, and in the consortium press release following the April meeting.
- It would make it impossible for us to supply any more wheat this year if the Indian situation becomes desperate. (The consensus among your advisers is that we probably will have to do more.)

4. After reading the Ball proposal, you asked that we put together a package of about 750,000 tons, supported by an air tight matching argument along the Ball line.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

5. The plain fact is that we cannot justify more than about 400,000 tons on a one-to-one matching basis without using debt relief. Nor is there any prospect for further matching contributions this calendar year.

6. Therefore, if we must decide now whether and how much we have been matched, I am afraid I can offer you no choices other than the ones you have already heard.

7. There is, however, one further alternative I would suggest as superior to Ball's, though still less attractive, in my judgment, than the earlier proposals. Essentially, you might:

- authorize a million tons now.
- tell the Congress that we do not know at this point precisely how much we have been matched, and we will not know until after the October consortium meeting.
- we don't want the Indians to starve and the subcontinent to dissolve into political chaos while we are determining precisely how much we have been matched.
- Therefore, we are going ahead with this tranche of grain on the explicit understanding that we will deduct from our consortium pledge any shortfall between the cost of this grain and the amount of "matching" funds we discover are ~~not~~ real and additional.

8. Advantage of this approach is that it puts off the decision on the precise amount and additionality of matching until the time when we are better equipped to make such a finding. It also protects us from any charge that we are spending one penny more than we believe has been matched. At the same time it would let us move the wheat now. It would put maximum heat on the Indians and the other donors to make sure ^{are} that the European consortium contributions ~~were~~ as generous as possible. It might even bail us out of a difficult situation at the consortium meeting, since the slashes in the Foreign Aid Bill will put us in a poor position to come up with a large consortium pledge in any event.

9. The disadvantage of this approach is that it might add the last straw to an already over-burdened camel. Consortium is in serious danger of falling apart. Everybody is tired; everybody is unhappy with the Indians; and everybody has budget problems. It is possible that the European reaction to our loading on this additional threat would be to wash their hands of the whole business. We could

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

expect George Woods and company to be pretty upset as well. In both cases, however, the reaction would be much less violent than what we could expect if we refused to accept debt relief as matching.

10. On balance, Mr. President, I am still in favor of the proposals you reviewed last week. But I understand and share your displeasure with the Indians. And I know that there are problems to which those of us who aren't elected are too apt to be insensitive. Thus, if we cannot go ahead with the earlier recommendation I would vote for the "we'll deduct it from our consortium pledge" approach instead of George Ball's plan.

Edward K. Hamilton

1. Tell State I want to go ahead with the Ball plan at 750,000 tons _____; at 1 million tons _____.
2. Tell State I want to take the "we'll deduct it from our consortium pledge" line at 750,000 tons _____; 1 million tons _____.
3. Go ahead with as much as we can claim has been matched without using debt relief (about 400,000 tons) _____.
4. Go ahead with 1 million tons as originally recommended _____.
5. Speak to me _____.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

August 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have reviewed the supplemental memorandum with regard to the India Food Aid Program, submitted by Bill Gaud and Eugene Rostow, and have the following comments.

The basic question emerged clearly from our Saturday morning discussion: should you stretch the concept of matching beyond what the average man (including the average Congressman) would ordinarily understand by the term in order to send an additional 1.5 million tons of grain to India?

In answering the question one must take into account a number of considerations:

a. Would Congress believe an assertion that other nations have met the matching test? If not, what effect would this have on your other programs?

b. Has the Indian political performance been such as to justify our stretching a point to provide them additional grain?

c. Have other donor nations been led to offer additional help on the assumption that, on the basis of their offers, we would now put up the remaining 1.5 million tons?

d. How seriously would India's development be prejudiced by the need to pay for all or part of the 1.5 million tons from its own resources?

You might wish to ask State and AID to submit answers to these questions. In appraising their answers I would suggest that the following considerations be kept in mind:

1. The question of providing grain should not be determined as though it were a humanitarian matter. It is not a question of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

whether Indians starve but of how the Indian Government uses its finite store of resources. We know that it is now using some of those resources injudiciously - for an inflated defense budget and some unrealistic development schemes. If they had the will to do so, the Indians should be able to fund the additional 1.5 million tons by simply cutting out some of the floss.

2. The Indians have been characteristically bloody-minded about the Middle East (their active support of Nasser) and about Vietnam (Ho Chi Minh's birthday telegram). They have certainly not earned the right to special consideration on the basis of performance.

3. I would not worry much about the reaction of other donor countries. We have carried this burden for a long time and they have done damn little.

4. A credible case has not been made that other donor nations have met the matching test by any qualitative standard. This becomes clear if one asks the following questions:

a. Could we expect Congress to agree that the World Bank's willingness to grant a one-year postponement of \$50 million of debt repayment is the equivalent, for purposes of "matching," to an American offer of \$50 million of wheat on PL 480 terms? The same question can be asked with regard to the "debt relief offers" of \$33.6 million made by the United Kingdom and \$14.5 million made by West Germany; in fact, 80 percent of what is represented as "matching" comes in the form of debt relief.

The critical point, it seems to me, is that, in view of India's hopeless repayment schedule, most of this debt will have to be rolled over any way, and this raises the point that has haunted us so long: since we have furnished help on a long-term basis while other countries have provided assistance on a shorter term basis, the Europeans constantly get credit for additional aid by extending old debts while we have to put up new money.

b. Should the Administration take the position that there has been matching when some items are clearly not additional and we cannot know whether others are additional until after the October Consortium meeting?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

I would be inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative, without meaning in any way to diminish the achievement of Gene Rostow and others in the Government who have certainly obtained concessions that donor countries would not otherwise have made.

Clearly there has been matching with respect to the first step of 96.7 million dollars, but most if not all of the rest is arguable and ambiguous and I heartily disagree with the implication in the Gaud-Rostow memorandum that we can rest any part of our case for matching on the ground that the Indian Government and the IBRD consider that contributions by others have "more than matched" our 190 million dollar offer. They are scarcely disinterested parties.

On the other hand, I would agree with Messrs. Gaud and Rostow that you are not legally bound by the fifty-fifty matching principle. The decision must be made in terms of what is the wisest course after all the issues have been balanced. I think Congress would accept your decision to go ahead with some additional food aid to India (I would stop short of the full 1.5 million tons). But if you decide to do this, I would recommend that you do not overstate what has been done by other donor countries although the Administration should certainly take credit for inducing other nations to grant aid and make concessions that would not otherwise have been forthcoming.

The realistic option, it seems to me, is either to provide no additional wheat or to offer perhaps one-half or two-thirds of the 1.5 million tons requested. This would make clear to Congress that you are not accepting the matching performance of other donor nations at face value but are discounting it on qualitative grounds. Nonetheless, it would be a generous offer and should go far toward enabling India to meet her food requirements while still protecting her development program.

W.B.
George W. Ball

~~SECRET~~

1- Supplement
5- Presidential file
16

Friday, August 18, 1967
6:20 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Observers for Viet-Nam Elections

As you suggested, we went out to Bunker with the proposal that the GVN invite observers from a list of about 25 U.S. organizations. We asked his opinion.

He thinks it would be useful. But he believes it would be better to trim the list to about a dozen. The GVN is swamped with outsiders -- many reporters, visitors from other countries, etc. Bunker thinks 12 would be manageable -- and serve our purpose just as well.

We have instructed him to take this up with the GVN. If they agree, invitations could be extended by the Vietnamese Ambassador here.

As regards a reduced list, I would suggest the following:

American Newspaper Publishers Association
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce
AFL-CIO
National Association of Manufacturers
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
National Council of Churches
American Legion
Veterans of Foreign Wars
American Bar Association
League of Women Voters
Governors' Conference
Mayors' Conference

A list of other organizations on the original list is attached.

William J. Jorden

Att.

Your list is O.K. _____

Prefer those checked _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RJ, NARA, Date 9-3-9

CONFIDENTIAL

American Society of Newspaper Editors

Sigma Delta Chi (Journalism Society)

National Newspaper Association

National Association of Broadcasters

(Note: The press and media will be widely
represented in Saigon.)

American Management Association

American Bankers Association

Jewish War Veterans

Catholic War Veterans

(Legion and VFW should cover veterans)

Farm Bureau

National Grange

NAACP

Urban League

National League of Cities

Association of Business and Professional Women

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~1-Sub~~
2- Pres
17

Friday, August 18, 1967
2:55 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Morse Proposal on De-escalation

You asked for a run-down on the proposal for de-escalation made by Congressman F. Bradford Morse (Rep. of Mass.).

In essence, the proposal is:

- (1) we approach the North Vietnamese through secret diplomatic channels;
- (2) we would agree to progressively limit our actions if they did the same;
- (3) our first step would be to stop all bombing north of the 21st parallel for 60 days;
- (4) in that period, they would take their first step;
- (5) if they did what they had promised, we then would stop bombing north of the 20th parallel;
- (6) their actions (known to us in advance) and our phased stopping of bombing by parallels down to the 17th would follow in sequence.

If at any stage, they didn't do what was promised, we would be free to resume bombing. Each step would have to take a form that was verifiable.

Comment:

This general plan -- and many other variants -- have been considered by the Administration, especially by those who work full time on Viet-Nam affairs.

It is certainly one approach that might be tried and to which Hanoi might at some point respond favorably.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

But the key element of the plan is missing.

That is: previous discussion with Hanoi in secret, and general agreement between us on a mutual program of cutting back military action -- i. e., our reducing bombing, their gradually cutting back infiltration of men and supplies.

We have tried repeatedly to get Hanoi to agree to just such secret discussions. We have said we are ready to take up anything they might propose in such talks. We have assumed that, if such talks should start, the kind of proposal Mr. Morse advances -- and many other approaches -- could be tried out.

Thus far, Hanoi has been totally unwilling to enter into any talks with us.

And, as Morse agrees, advance discussion and mutual understanding are absolutely necessary to the success of his proposal.

Incidentally, Morse is completely wrong when he says: "The Administration insists on publicly putting the Government of North Viet-Nam on the spot by insisting that she back down first."

That is not the Administration's position.

In fact, our position is just about what he suggests: secret talks first, then reciprocal steps by the two sides. And with agreement from Hanoi, we are ready to take the first step.

William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 18, 1967

~~Handwritten signature~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Gene Black called today to suggest that, if at all feasible, you ask President Saragat to consider a soft loan for the Prek Thnot Dam in Cambodia. The UN needs \$6 million to complete the \$22 million needed. The U.S. cannot participate in view of Congressional attitudes (the Senate is for, the House against it).

This would open the door to the possibility of getting the Mekong Coordinating Committee cooperating again.

W. W. Rostow

19
Attachment should go for Presidential
File (they only have copy of memo)

RB. notified: Under Sec. Ban's Ofc. (Treas.)
S/S
AID
Mr. Hamilton

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19a ✓
Pres. file
Wednesday, August 23, 1967 (6:45pm)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Contribution to the African Development Bank

In the attached, Messrs. Katzenbach, Barr and Gaud recommend that you:

- approve in principle a U.S. contribution of \$60 million -- \$20 million a year for three years -- to a new soft-loan fund of the African Development Bank. (We would place several restrictions on our money, mainly that it could be no more than 40% of the total in the fund; other donors would have to come up with the other 60%.)
- agree that we will not seek the necessary legislation this session.
- authorize our people to tell the President of the Bank that we will seek the legislation next session if he lines up other pledges and puts together a complete package by then.

Their summary memorandum to you is at Tab 1. At Tab A is a longer Barr memo describing the proposal in detail. At Tab B is a draft letter from Fowler to Mamoun Beheiry, the President of the Bank, pledging to go for legislation next session.

The Merits

This is very much like the Asian Bank problem you reviewed last week -- except that much less money is involved and your advisers are agreed that we should not go to the Congress this year. The other main difference is that the African Bank is a totally African institution; there is now no outside money in it at all. But, as with the Asian Bank, it is clear that the Bank should finance projects in such fields as agriculture and education where the direct payout is small and slow, and the client is often too poor to repay on terms as hard as the Bank has to charge for loans from its ordinary capital. And it is also clear that donations from others will be negligible without some prior indication of what we might be willing to do.

Beyond this, our attitude toward this Bank is the principal litmus by which many Africans will decide whether our new aid policy is a sincere attempt to build up regional and multilateral institutions in Africa or whether, as many of them believe, it is a smokescreen for U.S. withdrawal. As we phase out our small bilateral programs on grounds that we are shifting to

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-298

By ip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"regional and multilateral channels," we will have a major credibility problem if we haven't taken some steps to help the only well-established institution in Africa which meets that description. Your Foreign Aid Message was carefully limited to a pledge to "seek an appropriate means of responding" to the Bank's request. You are not formally committed to any action. But there is no question that the Africans will regard a further delay (the request is already a year old) as evidence of bad faith. This would not be the end of the world, but it would hurt us badly in terms of relations with Africa, and to some degree with poor countries elsewhere.

Handling Congress

After much soul-searching, your advisers have decided to recommend that you approve use of the \$60 million figure without a canvass on the Hill. Katzenbach and Barr are convinced that soundings would produce no real answers, and that the mere fact of such soundings would hurt the aid bill and the Inter-American and Asian Bank bills. They point out that Mr. Multer's delegation -- primarily from the Banking and Currency Committee which would handle this legislation -- visited Beheiry last spring and returned with a favorable attitude toward a U.S. contribution to the Bank. On the Senate side, such key people as Fulbright, Mansfield, and Sparkman were friendly to the idea a few months ago when Joe Barr took his soundings on IDA replenishment.

Nobody argues that this is conclusive evidence that the Congress would support the idea now. But there is a strong consensus that it would be worse to try to get a signal now than to lose a year. Thus, if it comes to a choice, your advisers would prefer to have you turn down the proposal for now rather than instruct them to mount a new operation on the Hill.

Recommendation

On foreign policy grounds there is a powerful case for going ahead, both to give substance to our aid policy in Africa and to give the Bank seed money to use in going after other donors. I also agree with Katzenbach and Barr that more soundings on the Hill now would only complicate the passage of related bills without getting us any real protection. If, in terms of the general state of your 1968 legislative program, you feel you can commit yourself now to legislation next year, I would recommend you approve the tripartite memorandum at Tab I.


If you feel you can't commit yourself now, you may want to consider authorizing a tentative commitment along the following lines:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- Our budget problem may be impossible by winter. We simply can't give a guarantee that a particular proposal will be in the President's legislative program.
- The best we can do now is promise to try to do our share in a soft-loan fund along these lines, the precise timing of our legislative proposal to be decided in the light of circumstances at the time a specific package is worked out.
- If Beheiry is willing to make this clear, we would not object to his using the \$60 million figure as the appropriate U.S. share in his talks with other donors.

I would not argue that this would give you anything like complete protection. It will be very difficult to avoid proposing legislation when and if the fund is constituted. But it would provide an emergency exit if you were forced to delay. And, most important for our position in Africa, it would be a cautiously positive response to Beheiry and his constituents.



Ed Hamilton

1. Approve Katzenbach/Barr/Gaud memo (Tab I) 
2. Use tentative commitment approach outlined above _____
3. Disapprove _____
4. Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

196

August 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: African Development Bank

In your Foreign Aid Message, you stated that we would "seek an appropriate means of responding" to the request made last year for U.S. participation in a soft loan fund to be administered by the African Development Bank. In your Economic Message you also stated our policy of supporting such regional development efforts. Thus far, however, we have not given any answer to the African Bank request.

The absence of any U.S. response has in effect stalemated the Bank's effort to put together a package of contributions to this proposed loan fund. Normally, we would want to obtain thorough Congressional soundings before making a response. However, State, Treasury, and AID have reviewed this matter carefully in light of all of our other plans in the foreign assistance area, and we are agreed on the following points:

1. Our bilateral aid programs for Africa have been designed on the assumption that we will be moving into participation in an African Bank fund; it therefore is important to our own plans for the Bank to get serious international discussions underway.
2. We cannot obtain legislation for an African Bank contribution this session, if only because there is not sufficient time to put together a package involving other contributors. Action in the next Congressional session is entirely feasible.
3. In view of the fights expected this year on the AID bill, the Inter American Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, it would be counter-productive to attempt full Congressional soundings on an African Bank proposal at this time. (In addition,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

since the African Bank includes the U.A.R., and other Arab North African countries, this is a particularly inopportune moment to discuss the Bank with the Congress.)

4. The Congressional group headed by Rep. Multer that accompanied Under Secretary Barr to Africa this Spring (the group that later met with you on this subject) was strongly in favor of U. S. participation in an African Bank fund, and can be expected to assist in mobilizing Congressional support for a suitable proposal next year. Earlier, very limited soundings on the Senate side also indicated a generally favorable reaction.
5. With essentially every other regional development effort coming up for U. S. action either this year or next, there would be some political advantage to having -- and some disadvantage to not having -- an African Bank proposal to submit to the Congress next year.
6. The appropriate U. S. participation would be relatively small -- about \$20 million a year for three years, conditioned upon (a) limitation of our share to about 40 per cent of the total fund, (b) complete "tying" provisions to protect our balance of payments, and (c) a strong U. S. voting position, including a right to prevent the use of our own contribution for a particular project. No authorizing legislation would be sought until 1968, and appropriations next year would be small.


We therefore believe it would be desirable to inform the Bank that we would be prepared to approach the Congress next year for authority covering a U. S. contribution along the lines indicated briefly in paragraph 6 above, and in more detail in the attached memorandum (Tab A). If you approve, the first step would be for Secretary Fowler to send the President of the Bank the letter attached in draft form (Tab B). (This would be transmitted in confidence, but we would have to expect that the U. S. response would leak out eventually in the course of international discussions.)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE


- 3 -

Secretary Fowler and representatives of other potential donor countries have been invited to attend the meeting of the Bank's Governors on August 21-26. Our response will get the most mileage if it is conveyed to the Bank by that time.


Under Secretary of the Treasury

CONCUR:


Under Secretary of State


Administrator, Agency for
International Development

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve our advising the African Bank that we would be prepared to approach Congress next year for authority covering a tied Special Fund contribution of up to \$20 million a year for three years, subject to appropriate contributions from other contributors and to other terms and conditions.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Attachment

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

19c

August 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: African Development Bank Special Fund

On Friday, May 12, Representative Multer and a group of other Congressmen who recently visited Africa with Under Secretary Barr reported to you on their views as to how the United States should proceed in giving financial support to the African Development Bank. In your Foreign Aid message this year, you stated, "... we will seek an appropriate means of responding to the recent request of the African Development Bank for U. S. participation in a special fund to finance worthy projects which are beyond the means of the Bank's Ordinary Capital."

The request for special fund assistance for the African Bank was made in November 1966 in an aide-memoire from Mamoun Beheiry, the Bank's President, to the United States and other potential donor countries. Since then, we have had an opportunity to appraise the request in the light of our other present and prospective obligations in the multilateral development field, e.g., IDA replenishment, replenishment of the Fund for Special Operations of the IDB, and special funds for the Asian Development Bank, and in the light of the legislative outlook in this field. Our conclusion is that we can and should support the establishment of a multilateral special fund for the African Bank. Our contribution should be modest, but will be of considerable importance in relation to our new aid strategy for Africa, in which we are phasing out country programs under the Foreign Assistance Act in favor of multilateral programs.

In line with this conclusion, I believe it is now time to give a favorable response to Mr. Beheiry, and to do so in sufficiently definite terms to permit him to seek contributions in specific amounts from other donors. Without a reasonably firm indication of what the United States might be prepared to do, it would be difficult for him to approach

other governments and to formulate a special fund proposal for action by donor governments. It would be especially desirable to formulate our response in time to communicate it to Mr. Beheiry before or at the Annual Meeting of the Bank's Governors August 21-26, which the U. S. has been invited to attend as observers.

International Negotiations Strategy. The broad strategy to obtain a true multilateral special fund should involve the following steps:

- First, we should advise Mr. Beheiry in what kind of special fund package we would be prepared to join with others -- our maximum amount, the share of over-all contributions that our contribution would have to represent, the fact that our contributions would be tied, the kind of controls we would want over the use of the funds. No public announcement would be made, but we should anticipate that details of our offer will leak out after Mr. Beheiry uses it as the basis for approaching other contributors.
- Second, after receiving our offer, Mr. Beheiry should consult other potential contributors individually to try to put together a package acceptable to us and the others. If successful without the necessity of having a negotiating and pledging conference, he would submit this package to all governments for final agreement and necessary legislative action.
- Third, if Mr. Beheiry finds it necessary, he should call a negotiating conference of donors at which an acceptable package would be worked out.

The essence of this strategy is that the African Bank management takes the initiative, rather than ourselves. We may assist, particularly in the late stages if difficulties arise, but our basic posture should be generally similar to our Asian Bank posture, i.e., we are prepared to cooperate, along with other donors, in responding to African initiatives.

Legislative Strategy. Our legislative strategy for seeking authorization for contribution to the Special Fund should be the one recommended by the Congressional group that reported to you on May 12: we would negotiate with the Bank and the other donors a package based on our estimate of what the Congress would approve, and then go to the Congress formally next spring for approval of the final deal. By submitting the complete package to the Congress after an international agreement had been initialed, the Congress would know exactly what amounts other countries will be putting up and on what terms and conditions. This technique has been the standard one -- it is being used currently in the case of IDB and IDA replenishment -- and has proven successful.

Special Fund Proposal. I believe the United States should be prepared to participate in a Special Fund with the following characteristics:

Amount of U. S. Contribution: up to \$20 million a year for a three year period. This would be consistent with the Congressional view that our participation should be modest in amount, and with earlier thinking within the government that a five-year program of U. S. contributions might total \$100 million. (If the volume of other countries' contributions were large enough to warrant it, we should be prepared in the course of negotiations to increase proportionately the amount we are ready to provide.) We would seek appropriations on the normal basis for contributions to international financial institutions, i.e., on a no year basis and with the funds remaining available until expended.

U. S. Share of Total Contributions: U. S. funds would represent a minority share of total contributions. As a negotiating position, we would advise Mr. Beheiry that we could accept a 40 percent share. At a later stage, we should be prepared, if necessary, to increase our share, although not beyond a minority position. Our \$20 million per year on a 40 percent basis would imply a total fund from all countries of \$50 million per year, or \$150 million over the three year period. (This compares with Mr. Beheiry's

initial suggestion of a \$215 million fund -- which we doubt he really expected to get -- and with the Bank's paid-in capital which will amount to \$107.5 million if and when fully paid over the next few years). There is, in fact, considerable doubt that the other contributors will be willing to provide as much as \$30 million per year to match our \$20 million. If others provided only \$50 million over three years instead of \$90 million, our 40 percent share would come to \$33.3 million and the total fund would be \$83.3 million. We would then have to consider whether or not to increase our share in order to permit a special fund totalling \$100 million at the outset (if we were to go to 50 percent this would amount to \$16.6 million per year for three years).

Form of Payment: Our contribution would be in the form of a letter of credit. Cash for loan disbursements would not flow until such funds were actually needed, hence budgetary impact would be postponed. (Small amounts of cash would be advanced to cover administrative expenses until interest and fee income are sufficient to meet them. Net income would first be used to restore these advances to the original capital of the fund and then for general lending purposes.)

Eligible Contributors: We would be prepared to participate along with any contributor which is a member of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies (This would exclude Communist China and East Germany).

Tying: Our contribution would be fully tied to U.S. goods and services for use on projects, and for a limited amount of technical assistance. (We are still studying whether or not a strong enough case can be made to permit a modest amount of local cost financing which would be tied through special letters of credit.)

Use of Funds: The Bank would make loans on concessional terms from the Special Fund for projects that cannot appropriately be financed from the Bank's regular capital. Emphasis would be placed on projects that support African regional development and those that contribute to agricultural development. Special attention would be given to the capital needs of the least developed countries of Africa. A limited amount of technical assistance on a grant basis could be authorized.

Voting Arrangements: We should be prepared to accept an arrangement in which the African Bank members would exercise not more than 50 percent of the votes in an Administrative Council for the Special Fund, and the non-member contributing countries would exercise not less than the remaining 50 percent of the votes in proportion to the size of contributions, provided all actions are taken by three-fourths majority vote. With 40 percent of special fund contributions, the United States would have 20 percent of total votes on special fund matters. We would then have to carry with us other contributors with 10 percent of the contributions (5 percent of the votes) in order to block any action. We should be aiming for a strong voice but not a veto power: this arrangement meets these criteria. (In the course of negotiations, we could agree to reducing the necessary majority to two-thirds and still retain a strong voting voice. We would then have to be joined by contributors having 27 percent of total contributions in order to block any action.)

We should also require a provision, for use only in special circumstances, that the Bank will, at the request of a contributor, not use the funds of that contributor for a particular project (i.e., a veto in special circumstances on the use of its own funds, without effect on the Bank's ability to proceed with the project using funds of others.)

There is a strong interest by the Congressional group in the question of membership in the Bank through equity subscriptions by the United States and other non-African countries. At the time the special fund agreement is negotiated, there should be a side agreement by the Bank Management that during the period in which the present special fund is being made available, the Bank will explore, in consultation with contributing countries, ways in which non-African countries that desired to do so could become members. Mr. Beheiry should understand that our present participation in the special fund is not conditioned on the ultimate outcome of such consultations, and that the United States has not taken a definite position on the question of equity membership for itself, if such membership should become possible for non-African nations generally.

Staffing: The special fund agreement should include an understanding that in the administration of such a fund the Bank would utilize to an appropriate extent qualified personnel from countries contributing to the fund.

These are the fundamentals of a U. S. position. Subsidiary issues will of course come up and have to be dealt with. If you agree that the proposal is in fact an "appropriate means of responding" to the Beheiry aide-memoire, Secretary Fowler would promptly write to the President of the African Bank that the United States is prepared to submit for approval by Congress a plan for U. S. participation in a special fund along the lines just described. The proposed text of a letter to Mr. Beheiry is attached (Tab B).

* * *

Under Secretary Katzenbach and AID Administrator Gaud concur in the approach outlined in this memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you authorize Secretary Fowler to inform the African Bank Management through the attached letter that (a) we would be prepared to join with others in a Special Fund to which we would contribute up to \$20 million per year for three years on a fully tied basis, representing 40 percent of total contributions by all contributors, such fund to finance regional development projects and to give special emphasis to national and regional agricultural projects and the needs of the least developed African countries, (b) we would need a voting power reflecting our substantial contribution, but we would

not seek a veto, (c) we would expect the Bank to consult with contributing countries during the initial period of existence of the Special Fund on the question of opening the Bank's capital structure to equity subscriptions by non-African countries. I would consult again with you and with Congressional leaders if major changes from this general outline became necessary in the course of negotiations.


Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

2. That you approve our proceeding with negotiation of a final package in the form of a Special Fund Agreement, having in mind submission of legislation embodying the Agreement to Congress next year.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____



Joseph W. Barr

19d



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Beheiry:

I greatly appreciate the invitation you have extended to my Government to send observers to the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank, to be held in Abidjan August 21-26. We shall be pleased to be represented in an observer capacity, and you will shortly be advised regarding the persons who will attend. As Governor of the international financial institutions of which the United States is a member, I can assure you of our great interest in the work of regional development banks. This interest is reflected in our strong desire that the African Development Bank be successful in its chosen tasks.

Upon his return from Africa in early April, Under Secretary Barr told me of the warm welcome he and the Congressional Group headed by Representative Multer had received at the Bank's headquarters. Since that meeting, rather intensive discussions have gone forward within this government concerning the multilateral Special Fund under the Bank's administration that was the subject of your aide-memoire of November 29, 1966. As you are aware, President Johnson said in his Foreign Aid Message this year, "...we will seek an appropriate means of responding to the recent request of the African Development Bank for U. S. participation in a special fund to finance worthy projects which are beyond the means of the Bank's Ordinary Capital." It is to convey such a response that I write to you today.

Before proceeding to substantive points, however, I would like to deal with two procedural matters. First, it is my understanding that you intend to be in contact with various potential contributors in an effort to arrive at a mutually

agreeable basis for establishing a Special Fund. For this purpose, it is necessary that you have some specific indication of the intentions of the United States, in order to give some meaningful idea of magnitude to the other governments. I would not think it necessary, however, for there to be any general public announcement of the proposal contained in this letter and in fact I feel there are ways in which such announcement could be counterproductive. We plan no public statement concerning this communication.

Second, I am certain you are aware that under our Constitutional arrangement, the proposals I make in this letter represent the position of the Executive Branch of the Government. No binding commitments involving funds can be entered into on our part unless and until appropriate legislation is passed by the Congress. You should, therefore, understand these proposals as representing the basis on which the Administration would be willing to seek legislation from the Congress at the session beginning in January 1968.

Subject to these few preliminary remarks, I am pleased to advise you that the Executive Branch can consider recommending to Congress participation in a multilateral special fund under the administration of the African Development Bank along the following general lines:

1. Amount of U.S. Contribution. We would be prepared, with Congressional approval, to make available up to \$20 million per year for three years as a United States contribution to a special fund. The three year period could commence as soon as an international agreement among the contributing countries and the Bank came into effect.
2. Sharing of Contributions. The United States would expect that any funds it contributed would represent not more than 40 percent of the total provided by all contributing countries, i.e., the other contributors as a group would put up 60 percent of the

total special fund. Contributions shared on this basis could permit a fund totaling \$150 million over the three-year period. We would be prepared to join with any other member of the United Nations or its specialized agencies in the sharing of these contributions.

3. Form of Payment. Our contribution would take the form of a letter of credit, which the Bank as administrator of the Special Fund could draw on for cash when needed to meet disbursements on financing operations. (Small cash advances to meet administrative expenses would be available until interest and fee income are sufficient to meet them, after which these advances would be reimbursed out of net income of the Special Fund.)
4. Procurement. In the light of the U.S. balance of payments situation, it will be necessary to specify that U.S. funds finance only goods and services from the United States.
5. Use of Funds. We would expect the Bank to make loans on concessional terms from the Special Fund for projects that cannot appropriately be financed from the Bank's regular capital. We would wish to see (a) emphasis placed on projects that support African regional development and those that contribute to agricultural development and (b) special attention given to the capital needs of the least developed countries of Africa. A limited amount of technical assistance on a grant basis could be authorized.
6. Supervision of Special Fund Activities. An Administrative Council, in which the African Bank would exercise not more than 50 percent of the votes and the non-member contributing countries would exercise not less than the remaining 50 percent of the votes in proportion to the size of contributions, appears to be a satisfactory device for supervising Special Fund operations, provided all actions are taken by a three-fourth majority vote.

As a separate matter, a contributing country should be able, in special circumstances, to request the Bank not to use its funds on a particular project, without effect on the Bank's right to proceed with the project using the funds of others.

7. Non-Regional Membership in the Bank. In connection with the creation of the Special Fund, the United States believes the question of equity membership by non-regional developed countries should be re-examined. We would wish to see the Bank undertake, without commitment as to ultimate outcome, to explore with interested countries during the period of contributions to the Special Fund the ways in which such countries might become members.
8. Staffing. We would also wish an undertaking from the Bank that it will, to an appropriate extent, utilize in the administration of the Special Fund qualified personnel from countries contributing to the Fund.

I believe that these points should provide you a basis on which to hold fruitful discussions with other potential contributor countries. Should it prove necessary to hold an international meeting under the Bank's auspices to negotiate a satisfactory agreement covering the Special Fund, the United States would be prepared to participate.

Very truly yours,

Henry H. Fowler

Mr. Mamoun Beheiry
President, African Development
Bank
Abidjan, Ivory Coast

W.M.R.

20

~~Long~~
2. Pres file

August 31, 1967; 7:00 PM

Sent up
9/1/67

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a warm birthday message to Belgian King Baudouin (he will be 37 on September 7). Our Embassy in Brussels has made a strong plea for a message (you did not send one last year), particularly since Baudouin regularly sends you birthday greetings.

If you approve, we will tell the Belgians we do not plan to release the message, but don't object if they do so.

Francis M. Bator

OK ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BELGIAN KING BAUDOUIN

20a

Your Majesty:

I deeply appreciated your thoughtful birthday message to me, and would like to reciprocate with warm congratulations on your 37th birthday. Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending you and your family our sincere best wishes for the coming year.

Sincerely,

Thursday, August 31, 1967
5:00 p. m.

sent up 9/1/67

MR. PRESIDENT:

In your conversation last week with Ambassador Lodge, the question of foreign observers to elections in other countries was raised.

We asked INR to pull together anything they had on this subject for Lodge's use. The attached report went out to Lodge by cable yesterday.

You may be interested in seeing this listing of previous observers' experience.

W. W. R.

Attachment

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

21a

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY

Index

STATE

FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE FROM INR HUGHES

SUBJECT: US Observers at Foreign Elections

1. Herewith is country-by-country study of instances since World War II in which US sent official representatives to observe foreign elections.
2. USSR. Most striking example of official US observation of elections occurred in March 1958 when US sent three-man team to observe Supreme Soviet elections. Both USSR and Romania had accepted President Eisenhower's invitation to observe US electoral process during 1956 Presidential elections. USSR reciprocated with 1958 invitation. US representatives were Richard Scammon, political scientist, Governmental Affairs Institute; Cyril E. Black, professor of history, Princeton; and Hedley Williams Donovan, managing editor, Fortune magazine.
3. Greece. US participated officially in tripartite US-UK-French commission established to observe country-wide elections in 1946.
4. Organization of American States (OAS) has since its establishment in 1948 sent missions to Latin American countries to provide technical advisory services prior to elections and, on several occasions, has arranged for

Drafted by:

INR/REA:JHHoldridge

Tel. Ext.

3819

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: **EME** INR-TLHughes

Clearances:

INR/OD:RKCerman

S/S-

White House-WJorden (insubstance)

EA/VN-Mr. Rosenthal

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

DS-322

PRESERVATION COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

groups ranging up to 30 persons from various OAS member states to be present during elections. Available data on these missions is as follows:

- a. Bolivia. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US, observed national elections of 1966.
- b. Costa Rica. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US in 1958 and 1966, observed Costa Rican elections in 1958, 1962, and 1966.
- c. Dominican Republic. Representatives from some OAS member states, including US, observed elections in Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1966.
- d. Nicaragua. Representatives of three OAS member states, including US, observed elections of 1963.

5. Earlier in this century, US on several occasions sent observers to elections in Caribbean area:

- a. Cuba. US sent observers to 1920 presidential elections at request of Cuban Government.
- b. Nicaragua. US "supervised" presidential elections in 1928 and 1932 and congressional elections in 1930.
- c. Panama. US "supervised" 1918 elections.
- d. Dominican Republic. US appointed three commissioners to observe elections in 1913 and in 1914 (over protest of Dominican Government). US also supervised March 1924 elections near end of period of US occupation.
- e. Haiti. Presidential elections held August 1915 under US auspices.

6. In addition, there have been several instances where US citizens participated in observing plebiscites or elections in dependent countries emerging into nationhood, either at request of controlling authorities or at UN behest.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy SAIGON

Classification

a. Sudan. US contributed one member to seven-member Sudan Electoral Commission, established under agreement between UK and Egypt, to observe 1953 elections.

b. Cameroons. US citizens were among the observers chosen from UN Secretariat staff by UN Secretary General and Plebiscite Commissioner to supervise conduct of 1961 plebiscites in Trust Territory of the Cameroons, then under UD administration.

c. Togo. Some Americans were among observers appointed by UN Secretary General for 1956 plebiscite in British-administered Togoland and for 1958 elections to legislative assembly in French-administered Togoland.

7. Finally, it may be of interest that while US did not participate directly in supervision of May 1948 elections in South Korea, such supervision was accomplished by nine-nation United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea which had been set up for this purpose as result of US-sponsored resolution adopted by General Assembly in November 1947 calling for independence and free elections for all of Korea. North Korea refused to comply, and elections hence were possible only in South Korea.

P. 100 file

Thursday, August 31, 1967 -- 5:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts, August 30-31, 1967.

William S. White telephoned on Wednesday, August 30, for a brief analysis of Prime Minister Wilson's Cabinet reshuffle. He wondered if it indicated some dramatic crisis in British economic affairs. I explained that it did not; and that it related to the political urgency of some significant revival in the British economy.

Frank Moraes, Editor-in-Chief, Indian Express, (accompanied by T. V. Parasuram, Washington correspondent for Indian Express newspapers) came in on an off-the-record basis. He asked about prospects in Viet Nam. I explained the position and then pressed him rather hard on the Indian position which he defended only weakly because he does not much believe in it.

Jack Sutherland, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, came in to probe the alleged split between Sec. McNamara and the JCS on bombing policy. I explained that there had been -- especially since Sec. McNamara's recent trip to South Viet Nam -- remarkable unity about the importance of bombing the north. The JCS and and Sec. of Defense -- and, indeed, the whole government -- were together on the proposition that bombing is important but no substitute for carrying forward the complex struggle in the south. I said if he wanted to write a true and original story, it would be on the remarkable way in which Sec. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler have worked together -- each with his own constitutional responsibilities. But, nevertheless, a most effective and mutually responsive team.

Robert Moskin, Foreign Editor, LOOK magazine, was in today. He is picking up from Warren Rogers the article on me.

Chalmers Roberts, The Washington Post, telephoned to inquire about the significance of the Yugoslav initiative. I told him that it was part of a process of consultation which might or might not lead to serious peace negotiations in the weeks ahead.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, August 31, 1967
4:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a redrafted talking paper -- on
Indian food -- with price references removed.

The question is: May we proceed as recom-
mended, to sound out Congressional opinion?

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

Or: Can we proceed without prior Congressional
soundings?

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

PROTOTYPE OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON WHEAT TO INDIA

Last February the Congress authorized shipment to India of up to 3 million tons of U.S. wheat, "provided it is appropriately matched" by contributions from other industrialized countries.

Last May our efforts to mobilize other donors -- and our painstaking measures to assure that their donations were large and real enough to fulfill the matching criterion established by the Congress -- brought us to the point where the United States agreed to send half this wheat -- 1.5 million tons. That action was taken in the light of more than \$96 million in contributions from other donors.

For the past few weeks, relevant senior officers of the U.S. Government have been engaged in a deep and detailed review of India's current food needs and the performance of other donors during the past three months. This review has included careful documentation of food production and consumption conditions in India, as well as a thorough assessment of our ability to help, consistent with the letter and spirit of the resolution.

On the basis of this review, the President has today authorized a new agreement of providing a further 1 million tons of U.S. wheat to India. This decision reflects the following facts:

1. The food situation in India continues desperate. Public stocks are at their lowest point in living memory. Private stocks are completely exhausted. Food rations in major cities are at subsistence level and are the object of increasing political unrest. The immediate future of the world's largest democracy is greatly threatened. Free and peaceful development of Asia hangs in the balance.

2. However, this is only the short-term outlook. Current reports on the monsoon rains suggest that two years of severe drought are over, and that, with luck, India can look forward to a record grain crop next crop year, with the fruits reaching Indian markets beginning in December of this year.

3. Since last May, India has received pledges from other industrialized nations totalling \$122.2 million in new aid which provides food, food related resources, or frees Indian foreign exchange to buy food. If it could be counted in full against the matching criterion, it would justify nearly 2 million tons in additional United States wheat.

4. However, in order to be meaningful, the new aid from other donors must be a real increment to Indian resources, and it must be additional to regular contributions to the India Aid Consortium. No one's interests are

served by a charade in which real American wheat is "matched" by meaningless financial transactions or by funds which would otherwise be provided through the Consortium anyway and are merely earmarked for this purpose.

5. In all frankness, we do not now know precisely how much of the \$122 million in new pledges meets these additional criteria. There is strong evidence that much of it does. If only about half of it does, we have a basis for providing 1 million tons of United States wheat.

6. We will not be able to make a precise estimate of how much of this aid is eligible for matching until the next meeting of the India Consortium, which will probably be held in October.

But starvation and threat of political chaos cannot wait. Therefore, the President has determined to authorize now a further 1 million tons on the expectation that at least half of the new contributions from others will in fact be proven real and additional to normal Consortium contributions.

However, in order to assure that this Government behaves in strict accordance with the terms of the Congressional resolution, the President has also determined that the size of the United States contribution to the Consortium will not be finally determined until it is clear how much of the new aid contributions meet these criteria. If there is any shortfall between the cost of the grain authorized today and the amount of real and additional aid supplied by other donors since last May, the United States contribution to the Consortium will have to be reconsidered.

These decisions are taken with full attention to the pressing short-term needs of India, on the one hand, and the President's determination to limit United States Government expenditures, on the other.

The review which underlies this decision continues. The razor-thin margin in India between relative stability and chaos demands that we maintain the closest and most careful attention to the situation as it develops. The need for more food during the year will be considered as necessary and as it appears that the matching criterion is being met.

Thursday, August 31, 1967, 3:50 p. m.

WW R
24
Sent up 9/1/67

2. Pres file

Mr. President:

You will recall, Harold Wilson sent you a message about their Jetstream Aircraft receiving full consideration in a U.S. Air Force competition currently under way. (Tab A)

I have cleared the following non-committal reply personally with McNamara:

"I have looked into the questions that you raised in your message of August 7 about the Handley Page Jetstream Aircraft. The Department of Defense has received the Handley Page bid, is familiar with the aircraft, and will give it full and fair consideration in light of the competition from other producers."

If you approve the above, State will ask David Bruce to deliver the message at 10 Downing Street.

Francis M. Bator

Approve ☒

Disapprove

Speak to me

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By lip, NARA, Date 10-26-95



BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

24a

7 August, 1967

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked by the Prime Minister
--- to pass to you the attached message.

Yours Sincerely
Patrick Dean

The President

of the United States of America.

246

TEXT OF MESSAGE

JETSTREAM

I am very gratified by the progress which has been made under the F.111 offset arrangement for the purchase by your armed services of equipment from Britain. You will remember that in my message of 17 February, 1966, I said that we hoped we could sell you communications aircraft: at that time it seemed likely that your first requirement in this field would be for an aircraft of the same type as our HS 125 Executive Jet. You were kind enough to tell me in reply that when the time came to replace your present communications aircraft, careful consideration would be given to the HS 125. In the event other requirements of the US Air Force have come to the top before this one and a competition for a casualty evacuation aircraft is now in its concluding stages. We entered the BAC 1-11 for this and I am sure that our entry was given very full and fair consideration, but I understand that we have not been successful this time. I understand that the next US Air Force competition is for a smaller and less sophisticated aircraft of a type for which the British Handley Page

/JETSTREAM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-11-00

JETSTREAM might be very suitable. This aircraft has already been ordered by a number of users and we think its economics will prove particularly attractive. I should therefore be very grateful if the JETSTREAM could receive the same consideration as you have told me will be given to the HS 125.

25

Pres file

Thursday
August 31, 1967 -- 12:40 pm

Mr. President:

Here are the extracts you wanted
on life in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

(8/31/67)

25a

"All industrial plants had been evacuated from urban areas. The 38 spinning plant outside of Hanoi was running at 20% of its original capacity. "

Bombing "has resulted in the large scale evacuation of the factories and population. "

"Since I have been unemployed since March (1967), I grow deeper in debt. With no income and no reasonable work, I have volunteered to work in the forest, but while waiting for action on my application, I have been without a cent of income. "

Nam Ha, Fruit Company, June 30, 1967. "Moreover, the war is spreading all over the country and no one can feel secure in his life. Who knows whether or not I will die in the next minute. "

Hanoi, June 29, 1967. "Due to the difficult war situation, nourishing food is lacking and medicines are rare. Our only solution is to try and bear it. "

Ha Bac, June 15, 1967. "As to the war situation, it is very hard. Living conditions are very poor because we have to reserve everything for the front. Our food is now composed of 70% rice and 30% wheat flour, and you know the nutritional value of wheat flour is very low. Living is very difficult. "

Huong Phuong, May 30, 1967. "Because we have been evacuated medicine is rather rare, and on the other hand, because of the war, food is not sufficient. Since we are engaged in a war, want is the common situation of everybody. "

Viet Bac, May 20, 1967. " An evacuated student: In general our activities and studies are getting more burdensome. "

Thursday, Aug 31, 1967
12:00 noon

Eyes only

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is how the [redacted] intelligence
services look at our Viet Nam policy.

W. W. R.

SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-203

By Sj, NARA Date 5-15-01

**EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)**

(log 3345)

1. Disposition
2. P file

26

EYES ONLY

3345

2611

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Czechoslovak Intelligence Report on Current U. S. Policy
on Vietnam

The following is a translation of a report on U.S. policy on Vietnam prepared in early May 1967 by the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service. This document is one of a series of weekly reports disseminated to the highest officials of the Czechoslovak regime and to Soviet advisors. In Moscow it is further processed for top-level Soviet officials. This particular report did not come from agent reporting but was based on information collected from so-called semi-legal sources.

1. Current developments in the Vietnamese conflict together with press reports reveal the U.S.A. to be not interested at the present time in negotiations on Vietnam which would involve compromise with North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Information secured from the State Department, Pentagon, and other U.S. Government offices clearly shows the U.S.A. to be willing to negotiate a solution only along the "Korean type," that is a truly permanent division of Vietnam into two parts and a guarantee of the non-socialist development of South Vietnam. President Johnson and most of his advisors are convinced that a solution can be found to this problem in which the Viet Cong would be denied any practical role in the public life of South Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 110-1
By CTD NARA, Date 11/5/18

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-2-

2. The Administration, together with Johnson, believes the most effective weapon in the Vietnam war today is pressure against North Vietnam. For this reason, military plans to escalate the war against North Vietnam are gradually being implemented. This orientation is also based on the conclusions reached at the Guam Conference that the United States is not now threatened with a military defeat in the south where she has sufficient manpower to occupy the country. In order considerably to lower the level of military operations in the south and to limit the activities of the National Liberation Front, however, it is necessary, according to American officials in Vietnam, to crush North Vietnam by military force. Our information indicates that the White House is not now opposed to these demands for escalation and that it is increasingly moving to the view that a purely military solution of the conflict is the only course.

3. According to information from well informed American newspapermen, Johnson reckons with ending the war within one year and is willing to reach this end by utilizing extreme military measures against North Vietnam. With respect to the conduct of the war, he is shifting almost completely to the views held by the generals in opposition to the McNamara line, with which Johnson had already disagreed about a year ago. McNamara allegedly decided the Vietnam problem cannot be solved militarily unless the U.S.A. is willing to occupy all of Vietnam for a long time, which he considers to be militarily and politically intolerable.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-3-

4. According to information from British Government circles, the U.S.A. expects to escalate military operations and Johnson has already even concurred with the proposal to mine Haiphong Harbor and establish a full blockade along the North Vietnamese coastline as a last resort. The United States assured the British Government, however, that it does not concur with Premier Ky's proposal to launch a ground attack against North Vietnam.

5. Attention is also being given to possible plans for a free belt around the de-militarized zone and for military involvement along the Cambodian and Laotian borders. Expanded combat operations by American forces on the territory of states bordering on South Vietnam would, according to American military authorities, effectively close North Vietnamese lines of communication into South Vietnam.

6. Pacification remains a permanent problem for the U.S. because the South Vietnamese cannot carry out even the least demanding pacification tasks. President Johnson is interested in assigning these tasks to special bodies comprising representatives from the U.S.' several Asian allies as well as to the South Vietnamese in order thus to prevent the pacification program from assuming a racial character.

7. Due to the recent events in the Chinese People's Republic and the resultant increase in tensions between the USSR and Chinese People's Republic, the U.S.A. now considers rather improbable a direct Soviet or Chinese

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-4-

military intervention in Vietnam. The dominating opinion at the present time is that if the right moment is selected for escalation, the USSR will confine itself to protests and the Chinese People's Republic will not be able immediately to react to this escalation for military-technical and political reasons.

8. The Joints Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, and the White House are currently discussing the possible effect on American-Soviet relations if, for example, attacks were made against North Vietnamese air bases occupied by Soviet aircraft or Soviet ships were strafed during attacks on Haiphong. There is concern about the negative effect these steps could have on negotiations with the Soviet Union on such questions as a non-proliferation treaty and the problem of deployment of anti-missile systems, in which the U.S.A. currently has a great interest.

9. The American attitude on escalation in Vietnam also confirms the view held by U Thant, who believes the U.S.A. will utilize American military superiority and will give preference to military over political solutions. U Thant believes the American preference for military operations is based on apprehension over the Saigon military government's instability, which would be increased by political negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam. Furthermore, in U Thant's view, political solutions would gradually lead to a compromise regime in South Vietnam, which is not in line with current U.S.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-5-

policy in Vietnam. Particularly since his return from Burma, U Thant has been pointing to the fact that, side by side with the uncompromising U.S. position, there also exists the fundamentally unchangeable North Vietnamese standpoint, which is one of unwillingness to retreat from the conditions laid down as a basis for a solution.

U Thant was surprised by the optimism expressed by North Vietnamese representatives who believe North Vietnam is able to meet an American military escalation. According to his view, North Vietnamese representatives base their optimism on assurances from the states of the socialist camp, including the Chinese People's Republic, that North Vietnam will receive military and political aid which will be adequate to meet a military escalation.

10. According to information from British government circles, Johnson believes North Vietnam insists on a bombing pause only for tactical reasons and is not interested in negotiations. North Vietnam apparently wants to use the bombing pause to improve the Viet Cong's position and to reinforce its combat operations in the south. Johnson is afraid that in this situation he might be confronted with an adverse popular reaction, as was Truman during the Korean war when peace negotiations were conducted in Panmunjong without results while combat operations and American military losses continued.

11. The United States resents the deep-rooted opposition shown by its West European allies towards American policy in Vietnam. This was clearly illustrated, for

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-6-

example, during Humphrey's April trip through Western Europe, especially in France, Italy and West Germany. After his first efforts failed, especially in Italy, Humphrey retreated from his former program of discussing this opposition and decided it was better merely to listen to this opposition but to ignore it in practical politicking.

12. On the other hand, however, according to unconfirmed information from British Government circles, pressure was again applied on British Defense Minister Healy during his recent visit to Washington to have Great Britain send military units to Vietnam. McNamara placed particular emphasis on a desire for British war ships. Healy rejected the American demands and continued to express his Government's negative attitude.

13. With respect to internal American reaction to the Vietnamese war, an important political problem is being created by United States participation in the war which is already more significant than some questions which played an important role during the last presidential elections. The means by which the war is being conducted, based on gradually increased military pressure on North Vietnam and simultaneous efforts to stabilize the military-political and economic situations in South Vietnam, can result in the war's prolongation for several years without ensuring solutions fully satisfactory to U.S. interests. The U.S.A. does not want to settle for such

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-7-

an outlook, and therefore there is increasing pressure to terminate military operations. Some popular expressions call for more decisive military operations to achieve military victory while others demand decisive efforts toward peaceful solutions. These diverse opinions have existed since the war began, but the military escalation and, in particular, the nearness of the presidential elections, have significantly intensified them. The forces favoring military escalation are becoming stronger.

14. Last year's congressional elections have already revealed a voter's preference for those candidates who advocate military escalation over those who advocate peaceful solutions and an American military withdrawal from Vietnam. It is therefore necessary to expect the domestic political situation in the U.S.A. to continue to develop in the near future in a way which will increasingly militate against peaceful negotiations in Vietnam.

15. This situation is strongly influencing Johnson's position. Between now and election time he will probably attempt to improve his position. He can do this best under current conditions by a decision to escalate the war. In addition to increasing military pressures on North Vietnam, however, he would logically also continue to display efforts toward peaceful solutions in order to paralyze public opposition in the U.S.A. and in order not to completely close the door to possible future peaceful solutions which may become necessary as an alternative.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

-8-

16. The United States Administration was forced several times in succession to consider the positive popular response to North Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives (December 1966, February 1967). The Government was forced to submit to considerable pressure from the American public, especially from the opposition within the Democratic Party which wanted to know why the U.S.A. was rejecting negotiations with the North Vietnamese. Despite some difficulty, Johnson was able to utilize the reciprocity theme and its rejection by the North Vietnamese as a means substantially to paralyze the pressures for negotiation and for a bombing halt.

17. According to information from diplomats from developing countries accredited to the U.S.A., North Vietnamese interests and those of the socialist countries in Vietnam are also being impaired by among other things continuing repetition of reports of Soviet-American co-operation on the Vietnamese question and the prejudicing of Vietnamese interests by the Chinese People's Republic's policies. Such information is repeated by responsible diplomatic representatives - especially those from Arab and African countries, who say they are echoing their governments' official views. These opinions are accepted also by many leftists in the U.S.A., and especially by the pro-Chinese oriented students.

Conclusion: An analysis of the Vietnamese crisis, the direction taken by U.S. policy in this matter and the domestic political situation in the U.S.A. indicate further U.S. inclination toward a military solution. The

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

-9-

main target will be North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the U.S. domestic political situation, mainly the elections in 1968, suggests growing demands by the American public for a speedy military solution in Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 AUG 31 AM 10 00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pur file

Thursday, August 31, 1967 -- 11:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

I talked with Sec. Rusk about making Adrian Fisher a Senior Advisor rather than a U.S. Representative on the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly.

He was firm on these two points:

-- The way the matter was handled between Goldberg and Foster' raised in Butch Fisher's mind the question of whether he was fully trusted;

-- He would regard a shift of his position from U.S. Representative to Senior Advisor as "a vote of no confidence"; and, being a sturdy and serious person, under those circumstances Fisher is likely to resign. Rusk (and all of us) has the highest regard for Fisher and would not like to see this happen.

I honestly do not understand how the matter has come to this point and why Fisher should have any reason to doubt the confidence of the President and the Secretary of State in him. I have known him as a mature, sturdy public servant who would be the first to understand the President's requirements in a matter of this kind. On the other hand, Sec. Rusk does not lightly make statements of this kind.

Sec. Rusk's recommendation was that we remove Robert B. Benjamin as an alternate representative; make Fisher an alternate; and thus open up another slot for someone of interest to the President. He said he would be willing to remove any of the others and specifically mentioned Benjamin because he has already served on the UN Delegation.

If you wish me to take the risk involved, I would be glad to talk quietly with Butch Fisher; but you should know Sec. Rusk's firm judgment in this matter.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 19, 1993.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY ry ON 9-4-91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, August 31, 1967

11:00 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: India Food

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ. 94-278
By 128, NARA, Date 10-26-95

After careful consideration, it seems to me that there are four criteria your India food decision should meet:

1. It should combine:

-- enough more wheat to avoid in India the most serious political unrest and human misery associated with food shortages -- or at least to counter the argument that disaster followed directly from U. S. parsimony, and

-- enough conditions and limitation to keep the pressure on the Indians to produce and the other donors to come across at the October consortium meeting in such a way that their matching debt roll-overs prove to be additional.

2. It should be consistent with our commitments to other donors through the matching exercise. (Specifically, I am afraid this means that we cannot now refuse to accept -- or decide to discount by some percentage -- debt relief as eligible for food matching.)

3. It should provide a matching argument which the average Congressman with other things on his mind can understand and accept (see Tabs A and B).

4. It should give you maximum protection from both the domestic political dangers:

-- the danger of maintaining wheat shipments to India while cutting expenditures for domestic food distribution programs; and

-- the partially conflicting danger of the political heat from falling U. S. farm prices and the charge that you are cutting P. L. 480 to take the costs of fighting inflation out of the hide of the American farmer.

I don't pretend to have a perfect solution. But I believe the following formula comes as close as we can:

1. Authorize one million tons of wheat now

2. Announce that we will be constantly reviewing the need for more, particularly in the light of our very difficult budget problem. (We could try here to establish the fact that when wheat prices are falling it does not help

the budget to cut P. L. 480 -- indeed, it hurts.)

3. On matching, take the line that we do not yet know with precision the extent to which we have been matched with additional resources? We shall only know after the October consortium meeting -- but even then, with a margin of uncertainty. But there is substantial evidence that we have been matched -- at least up to the cost of one million tons? -- and we don't want the Indians to starve while we make absolutely sure.

4. To assure that the principle of matching is preserved, the amount of our 1967 consortium contribution will not be final until we are certain how much of the aid and debt relief which has been generated since last May is real and additional to ordinary consortium contributions. (We would leave the strong implication that any shortfall between the cost of this wheat and the total of real additional aid will be deducted from our consortium contribution.)

5. Before the announcement, have Freeman, Katzenbach, and Gaud brief the Congressional leadership, the Chairmen, and ranking minority members of the foreign affairs committees, the agriculture committees and the appropriations committees. If there is a howl of protest, they should report back to you before making the announcement.

This solution would:

-- leave it open for you later either to ship more wheat or to cut back for domestic political reasons;

-- keep the heat on the Indians and the other consortium members; and

-- give you maximum protection -- though none too much -- with the Congress.

I think all your advisers would support this plan, though you may wish to check it with Secretary Rusk.

A final word, Mr. President.

With all its imperfections, this has been a remarkable exercise you have mounted. These are the results.

1. Australia entered and Canada confirmed the legitimacy of being in the food-aid business -- ending the notion once and for all that food aid was a question of U. S. surpluses.
2. France, Japan, Germany, Scandinavia, Belgium, the U. K., the Netherlands, and Italy accepted the legitimacy, in principle, of their contributing to food aid with either food production resources or money.

3. At a time of great difficulty in generating aid funds, we all managed somehow to keep enough foreign exchange flowing to permit India to continue the relaxation of bureaucratic controls.
4. We have embedded in Indian policy firmly a top priority for agriculture.
5. We have engaged the World Bank for the first time in the food aid business on the consortium principle and have a basis for keeping it there on that principle -- which guarantees reasonable burden-sharing in the future.
6. If you wished to proceed with the full 1.5 million tons for, say, domestic price reasons -- I believe a viable case could be made.

W. R.