

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ/RAC 00-277**  
By SJ, NARA Date 7-3-01

48

*Per file*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 29, 1967 -- 11:00 am

Mr. President:

This [REDACTED] report on the Vietnamese situation, as seen from Cambodia, is worth reading.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

1. It suggests a decline in NLF morale and supplies.
2. In particular, they are probing for both rice and Cambodian-French arms and ammunition.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED] EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

August 28, 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

48a

Tuesday, August 29, 1967

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLIJ/RAC 00-276**  
**By cdm, NARA Date 7.3.01**

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] was impressed with the deterioration in National Liberation Front morale and supply situation.

National Liberation Front leaders no longer consider any major military headquarters inside Vietnam south of Saigon safe. South of the Central Vietnam Highlands, large-scale operations are being directed from safe headquarters in Cambodia. Judging by the rapidity with which he was able to arrange meetings with several top National Liberation Front leaders, they appeared to be staying in Phnom Penh itself in July 1967. (CIA Comment: In mid-June 1967 the Cambodian government authorized the opening of a National Liberation Front diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh, in exchange for the Front's recognition of Cambodia's existing borders. Prior to that time, several high-ranking National Liberation Front officials have periodically visited Cambodia.)


The Front leaders themselves admitted that harassment of their supply sources by American troops and the increasing ability of the peasantry to market produce in Saigon and other large centers had made their food and medicines resupply difficult. Military equipment from North Vietnam was slower and more sporadic in reaching their units in the Vietnamese Delta. Captured equipment was now harder to come by, and their ability to purchase arms and rice from the Saigon blackmarket had declined considerably.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

An anti-Communist Cambodian Army officer told

[redacted] that Cambodia already had more than enough arms and ammunition for its own needs. His implication, [redacted] was that the additional equipment might be destined for Viet Cong forces in the Vietnam Delta.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] (CIA Comment: According to other recent reporting, [redacted] Cambodia is not receiving Viet Cong-bound shipments of arms and ammunition. There is also no evidence now available to indicate present stocks of arms and ammunition in Cambodia are in excess of legitimate Cambodian military needs.)


1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] National Liberation Front quest for more ammunition and supplies continues. From

SECRET

these reports, most all of the National Liberation Front leaders are now located in Cambodia.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)



In discussions [redacted] in July  
and August [redacted] North Vietnamese  
representatives appear to be speaking more and more authoritatively  
on behalf of the National Liberation Front and not consulting Front  
officials as to the latter's opinions.

*Long*  
*2. Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, Aug. 29, 1967  
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bill Bowdler reports some useful activities against Communist guerrillas in Latin America.

The Bolivian documents may help us at the Foreign Ministers' meeting.

*W. B. K.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

49a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 28, 1967


SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ / RAC 00-277  
By sj, NARA Date 7-5-01

NOTE FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Guerrilla Activities in Latin America

This past weekend was a highly successful one for the Venezuelan security forces.

As the two cables at Tab A indicate, they bagged three key urban terrorist leaders and another Cuban infiltrated in the July, 1966 expedition.



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

CIA is speculating --

that the Cubans in mid-1966 may have started on a new strategy of sending special teams to selected countries to serve as cadres for the development of guerrilla movements.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs

The 12-15 Petkoff group which landed in Venezuela in July 1966 seems to have been one. The group infiltrated into Bolivia late last year may turn out to be another.

Recent reports from Ecuador (still unconfirmed) about a guerrilla training camp in a remote area may prove to be a third.

WGB  
William G. Bowdler

PRESERVATION COPY

496

A



Department of State

49c  
**TELEGRAM**

(A)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 01 CARACA 01226 261734Z

53

ACTION ARA 19

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ/RAC 00-276**  
**By com, NARA Date 7-3-01**

INFO GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10, NSAE 00, L 03, INR 07, P 04,  
CIA 04, DOO 01, SP 02, SS 35, AID 30, PE 75, EUR 25, RSR 01, 175 W

P R 261533Z AUG 67  
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2839  
INFO USCINCSO UNN  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO UNN  
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO UNN  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA UNN  
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA UNN  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO CITY UNN  
AMEMBASSY LAPAZ UNN

☒ BATOR  
☒ BOWDLER  
☒ BUDGET  
☒ DAVIS  
☒ GINSBURGH  
☒ HAMILTON  
☒ JESSUP  
☒ JOHNSON  
☒ JORDAN  
☒ KEENEY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CARACAS 1226

SUBJECT: SECOND POLICE RAID NETS ADDITIONAL BRAVO TERRORISTS.

REF: CARACAS 1210.

1. POLITICAL POLICE (DIGEPOL) YESTERDAY AFTERNOON FOLLOWED MORNING'S SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN CHACAO (REFTEL) WITH RAID ON TERRORIST HIDEOUT IN PETARE. PROLONGED GUNFIGHT ENSUED RESULTING IN DEATHS OF TWO MORE MEMBERS DOUGLAS BRAVO'S URBAN TERROR APPARATUS.

PAGE TWO RUESRS 1226 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. THREE EXTREMEISTS KILLED DURING DAY (ONLY ONE WAS KILLED IN MORNING RAID) HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS FELIX JOSE FARIAS (COMANDANTE CLAUDIO), LUIS FERNANDO VERA BETANCOURT (COMANDANTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 CARACA 01226 261734Z

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

PLUTARCOI, AND FABRICIO ELEAZAR ARISTIGUIETA (EL LOCO FABRICIO). FARIAS AND VERA WERE KEY BRAVO LIEUTENANTS AND LEADERS OF HIS URBAN TERROR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR ASSASSINATIONS AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTS IN CARACAS. [REDACTED] FARIAS APPEARED IN PHOTO SIDE-BY-SIDE WITH BRAVO IN LAST WINTER'S "SUCEOS" SERIES ON VENEZUELAN RURAL GUERRILLAS ILLUSTRATING MOVEMENT OF EXTREMEISTS ELEMENTS BACK AND FORTH FROM RURAL TO URBAN ACTIVITIES. ARISTIGUIETA REPORTEDLY FIRED BULLETS WITH KILLED FONMIN'S BROTHER IN MARCH. MORNING CHACAO RAID ALSO NETTED THREE PRISONERS, ONE A WOMAN, BELIEVED MEMBERS OF THE CASTROITE URBAN APPARATUS. [REDACTED]

3. MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ALSO ANNOUNCED YESTERDAY ARREST OF ADOLFO MEINHARDT LARES. IT NOT YET CLEAR IF HIS ARREST CONNECTED WITH EITHER CHACAO OR PETARE OPERATIONS. MEINHARDT IS TOP EXTREMEIST LEADER ARRESTED DURING BETANCOURT ADMINISTRATION, LATER RELEASED TO EXILE IN LONDON, AND WHO RECENTLY RE-ENTERED VENEZUELA. AT TIME OF ARREST, HE WAS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

PAGE THREE RUESRS 1226 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
BRAVO URBAN TERROR ORGANIZATION [REDACTED]

4. DEATH AND CAPTURE THESE EXTREMEISTS LEADERS IN ADDITION TO AUGUST 11 KILLING OF TERRORIST COLLEAGUES MICHINAUX REPRESENT SIGNAL GOV VICTORY AGAINST HIGHLY DANGEROUS BRAVO URBAN TERROR UNIT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BULK OF SPECIAL URBAN DETACHMENT, WHOSE ORIGINAL MEMBERSHIP ESTIMATED AT THIRTY [REDACTED], IS STILL AT LARGE.

BERNBAUM

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

49d

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PAGE 01 CARACA 01227 272127Z

87

ACTION ARA 19

INFO SSC 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, GPM 03, SC 01, RSC 01, USIA 12, H 02, NSC 10,

NSAE 00, L 03, INR 07, P 04, CIA 04, DOD 01, SP 02, SS 35, SAH 03, AID 30,

RSR 01, /138 W

O R 271945Z AUG 67  
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2840  
INFO USCINCSO UNN  
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 243  
AMEMBASSY RIO DE JANEIRO 193  
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 025  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 141  
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 161  
AMEMBASSY LAPAZ 047  
AMEMBASSY MEXICO 301

☒ BATOR  
☒ BOWDLER  
☐ BUDGET  
☐ DAVIS  
☐ GINSBURGH  
☐ HAMILTON  
☐ JESSUP  
☐ JOHNSON  
☐ JORDAN  
☐ KEENE  
☐ KOMER  
☐ MOYERS  
☐ TAYLOR  
☐ WRIGGINS

UNCLASSCARACAS 1227

SUBJECT: GOV CAPTURES CUBAN WITH URBAN TERROR GROUP.

REF: CARACAS 1210.

1. AT A SPECIAL PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY INTERIOR MINISTER LEANDRO MORA ANNOUNCED THAT ONE OF PERSONS CAPTURED IN AUGUST 25 DIGEPOL OPERATIONS AGAINST DOUGLAS ROYNO'S URBAN TERROR UNIT WAS CUBAN ARMY SERGEANT MANUEL

PAGE TWO RUESRS 1227 UNCLAS  
ESPINOZA DIAZ.

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# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 CARACA 01227 272127Z

2. ESPINOZA IDENTIFIED SELF AT CONFERENCE, STATING THAT AFTER SPEICAL GUERRILLA TRAINING COURSE IN CUBA, HE ENTERED VENEZUELA AT CHICHIRIVICHE ON FALCON COAST IN JULY 1966, WITH GROUP HEADED BY LUBEN PETKOFF.

HE SAID HE "BELIEVED" MOST OF THOSE INVOLVED IN LANDING (12 TO 14 MEN) WERE ALSO CUBAN.

3. MINISTRY OFFICIALS WENT ON TO STATE ESPINOZA CAPTURED IN DIGEPOL CHACAO RAID FRIDAY MORNING IN WHICH FELIX JOSEFARIAS KILLED. CUBAN REPORTEDLY SPOKE FREELY UNDER INTERROGATION AND GAVE INFORMATION WHICH LED TO FRIDAY AFTERNOON OPERATION IN WHICH LUIS VERA BETANCOURT AND FABRICIO ARISTIGUETA KILLED. ACCORDING TO MINISTRY SPOKESMEN, ESPINOZA CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN "UNHAPPY" SERVING WITH GUERRILLA MOVEMENT IN VENEZUELAN AND HAD WANTED TO RETURN TO CUBA. HE ADMITTED PARTICIPATING IN AUGUST 24 ROBBERY OF BANCO MIRANDA BUT STATED HE HAD BEEN "FORCED" TO TAKE PART.

4. LEANDRO MORA REFERRED TO ESPINOZA AS ANOTHER PROOF OF CUBA'S REPEATED AGGRESSIONS AGAINST VENEZUELA.

PAGE THREE RUESRS 1227 UNCLAS  
AGGRESSIONS WHICH REPRESENT PLANNED ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH TOTALITARIAN REGIME IN VENEZUELA. HE SAID "HOUR HAS COME FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH VENEZUELA BY APPROVING MEASURES AT MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH WILL PUT AN END TO FIDEL CASTROS INTENT TO COMMUNIZE OUR COUNTRY."

BERNBAUM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMDIS


Copy of La Paz 408 25 Aug 1967

**SANTIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLI/RAC 00-276 + NLI 4-299**  
**By com, NARA Date 7-3-01**

1. CWO Robert H. Quinn, Assistant Army Attache, and Lt. Col. Manuel Cardenas, Deputy G-3 of Bolivian Army, are arriving in Washington August 27 with important documents discovered by Bolivian Armed Forces, linking guerrilla operation to Cuba and specifically to Che Guevara. In Washington, couriers will make delivery to Defense Intelligence Agency.

2. General Ovando showed the material first to Military Group

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)



3. Bolivian Armed Forces, and specifically General Ovando, appear to understand the necessity of using this evidence to support the case against Cuba in the 12th Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Unfortunately, recent experience has shown tendency of Bolivian Armed Forces to mislay, wrongly evaluate, or not share valuable intelligence, e. g., failure to answer Bolivian Foreign Minister's requests for evidence (reported in La Paz 404).

4. I recommend, therefore, that we provide evaluation of documents to the Government of Bolivia through General Ovando as original source and suggest to him that the documents be turned over to the Bolivian Embassy in Washington for safekeeping and presentation at the 12th Meeting of Foreign Ministers by the Bolivian delegation. This will obviate unnecessary handling with risk of loss or leakage and will keep the evidence constantly available to Bolivian officials who are seriously interested in presenting strongest possible case of Cuban subversion.

Henderson

50  
~~1. copy~~  
2. Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Tuesday, August 29, 1967 -- 10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Don Hornig left with me the attached recommendation that you send a greeting to the tenth anniversary session of the Pugwash meetings, in Sweden, September 3-10. (Tab A)

State strongly opposes your doing this (Katzenbach, Kohler, Thompson: see Tab B).

On balance, I am also against your involvement.

The balance of the Pugwash meetings is left of center: it does not pretend to be an even-handed gathering. It is a useful way of maintaining certain kinds of informal contacts with Communist scientists and administrators. The non-U.S. Western scientists who attend are generally softminded and vulnerable to anti-U.S. positions.

The sensible U.S. scientists who go can best do their job of informal contacts without the glare of an official blessing.

Nevertheless, I wished you to have the option and to consider Don's case.

W. W. Rostow

Send draft message \_\_\_\_\_

No Presidential message ✓

See me \_\_\_\_\_

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WWRostow:rlh

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

50a

August 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW



Walt--

I am forwarding through you the attached memorandum for the President suggesting that he send a message to the forthcoming Pugwash meeting.

I have asked Nick Katzenbach for his view on desirability of sending the message, but he has not yet replied.

Since I am leaving today for Sweden to attend a Nobel Foundation Symposium, I would like to leave this in your hands. If you agree with me, please send the memo forward; if you want State's view, please check with Nick Katzenbach.

Donald F. Hornig

Att.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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August 26, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

**Subject:** Presidential Greetings for Pugwash Meeting  
September 3-10, 1967, in Sweden

The US delegation to the forthcoming meeting of the Committee on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash), which will be held in Ronneby, Sweden, September 3-10, 1967, has asked for a Presidential greeting.

This meeting will mark the tenth anniversary of the Pugwash movement which has brought together an international group of distinguished scientists and other scholars to discuss science and public affairs with particular reference to arms control and aid to developing countries. This meeting will have a very large attendance including a strong and responsible US delegation with such individuals as Jerry Wiesner, Frank Long, and Fred Seitz. The Prime Minister of Sweden will open the meeting and there will probably be greetings from other heads of state.

You sent a greeting (attached) to the meeting held in India on January 27, 1964, but have not sent one since then. State has always been somewhat unenthusiastic about giving official recognition to Pugwash since its statements have not always been in keeping with US policy. I believe, however, that on balance it would be desirable to go ahead. Expressing a friendly interest in the work of an organization which represents a good cross-section of the international scientific and intellectual community interested in world affairs would help improve your image in the intellectual world.

I recommend therefore that you approve the attached message of greetings to the Pugwash meeting in Sweden.

## Attachments:

1. Proposed Presidential Message  
for Pugwash meeting 9-3-67
2. Presidential Message given  
at Pugwash meeting 1-27-64

  
Donald F. Hornig

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
See me \_\_\_\_\_

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Tab A



50c

D R A F T

Presidential Message of Greetings  
to the  
Committee on Science and World Affairs  
(PUGWASH)

Ronneby, Sweden, Sept. 3, 1967

It is my pleasure to extend greetings to the Committee on Science and World Affairs as it celebrates 10 years of international activity and makes plans for programs in the years to come.

In this world which depends so much on science for the new opportunities that will shape the future, scientists have special roles to play as citizens. They must study and make clear to the rest of us the ways in which science and technology can be used for the benefit of mankind. They must also take advantage of the ties which exist among scientists internationally to bring about increased international understanding of the problems which face us all. The old problems remain: war; poverty; ignorance. But new problems constantly arise and scientists must address themselves to these also. Environmental pollution, depletion of natural resources, the population explosion, inadequacy of the world's food supply, are only a few of them.

The Committee on Science and World Affairs has distinguished itself by its international character, by its devotion to the quest for world peace, and by its interest in the application of science and technology to the problems of developing nations. I profoundly hope that COSWA will continue its efforts on the old problems and be prepared to study the new ones as they arise. No group knows better than the scientists that the world on which we live is one world.

5001

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO 12th PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON  
SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS, JANUARY 27, 1964, UDAIPUR, INDIA

I am pleased to extend my greetings to another Conference on Science and World Affairs. You have addressed yourself to the problems of disarmament and a stable peace. I share with you the belief that these are the central issues of our time.

During the past year, we have made a start towards the goal of a peaceful, disarmed world in which all the nations can feel secure and can develop their own way of life.

My predecessor, John F. Kennedy, worked very hard for the limited test ban treaty which most nations of the world have now signed. He had my full support in this -- we both believed our most important task is to learn to live together in peace. Reducing the possibilities of nuclear destruction is essential to that task. The treaty was an important first step and must be followed by others.

During the coming fiscal year, the United States will cut back the production of enriched uranium by 25 percent and will shut down four plutonium production reactors. We have also made other significant cuts in our projected military budget. It is my hope that similar measures will be adopted by other nations and that such national actions be followed by international agreements on disarmament measures. I am confident that these agreements would help to decrease the fear and mistrust between nations.

I have followed the proceedings of your earlier Conferences. They are a serious attempt to achieve new solutions to old problems. I look forward to new ideas in this field. In your last meeting, a suggestion was made to exchange officers between the military establishments in certain areas of Europe. Let me assure you that this suggestion as well as any other new ideas will be studied thoroughly by me and by this government in our continued effort to achieve workable disarmament.

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AUG 26 1967

Dear Don:

This is in reply to your memorandum of August 16 to Mr. Katzenbach, who had in opportunity to focus on the issue but in the press of time preparing to leave the city was unable to reply in person.

Departmental policy to disassociate the U. S. Government from Pugwash activities has been based on a rather consistent record of their following the Soviet line on international political questions. In our view any value that Pugwash may have rests on its role in bringing together scientists on an informal basis to discuss the role that science can play in world affairs. In the past the most useful suggestions have been in areas where the principal inputs have been largely technical.

I believe that it would be a mistake to change our present policy and send a Presidential message of greetings to the next Pugwash meeting in September in Sweden, as suggested in your memorandum of August 16. I feel that such a message would associate American scientists, at least in the eyes of foreigners, too clearly with the U. S. Government.

It is open to question whether a message in present world circumstances and addressed to what is as much a political as a scientific body would indeed be helpful to the President's image here or abroad.

The Honorable  
Donald F. Hornig,  
Special Assistant to the President  
for Science and Technology.

I appreciate your memorandum and the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely yours,

Foy D. Kohler  
Deputy Under Secretary  
for Political Affairs

RECEIVED

1957 JUN 11 AM 11:00

Office of the Under Secretary

S/S  
A True Copy

PRESERVATION COPY

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Tuesday  
August 29, 1967 -- 9:45 am

51  
1. ~~Sup~~  
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith is a report from State  
on reactions to your Alliance for  
Progress anniversary remarks.

This year there were more Latin  
American initiated celebrations with  
higher level participation than I can  
recall. It is an indication of the grow-  
ing realization in Latin America that  
the Alliance is theirs.

W. W. Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 25, 1967

1-*Handwritten*  
2-*ditto*

51a

S/S 14830

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reaction in United States and Latin America  
to Alliance for Progress Anniversary

The presence of the President and the Vice President at the Pan American Union reception was commented upon extremely favorably within the Washington inter-American community, and the President's remarks there were noted favorably throughout the hemisphere.

While the Washington Post gave best United States coverage to the ceremonies themselves, many important newspapers -- including the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, the Washington Star, the Chicago Daily News, and the Atlanta Journal -- published editorials favorable to the Alliance and in opposition to Senate reduction of Alliance funds. Information on Alliance achievements provided to the media resulted in favorable news articles throughout the nation.


Assistant Secretary Oliver appeared on the NBC television program "Today" to discuss the Alliance, and Ambassador Linowitz spoke in Mexico City on the occasion of the sixth anniversary.

Especially noteworthy were Latin American reactions to the President's remarks at the Pan American Union. In Mexico, for example, our Ambassador reports that prominent front-page coverage of the President's statement "helped balance news of the Senate's refusal to restore cut funds to the Alliance, which made banner headlines. . ." In Peru, several radio stations carried the entire USIA-provided tape of the President's talk. In Brazil, Rio's important afternoon daily O Globo frontpaged the story, headlining "Johnson Guarantees Total Support to Alliance."

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In official statements and editorial comment there were some scattered indications of disappointment and cynicism, but the balance was clearly positive. A repeated theme was the importance of self-help and local initiative.

Particularly encouraging in this regard was the Latin American initiative and high-level participation in anniversary ceremonies organized collaboratively in most capitals. Presidents Robles of Panama, Arosemena of Ecuador, and Barrientos of Bolivia spoke personally at appropriate events, and vice presidents and ranking ministers attended many others.

  
John P. Walsh  
Acting Executive Secretary

Tuesday, August 29, 1967

~~WWR~~  
52  
1. ~~summary~~  
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a get-well message to Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal. He underwent surgery for intestinal blockage on Sunday. He is recovering but he may be in the hospital for as long as three weeks.

W. W. Rostow

Approved

☒

8/30/67

Disapproved

☐

Speak to me

☐



524

SUGGESTED MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER MAIWANDWAL

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I was deeply distressed to learn of your illness. I know how difficult and bothersome these things are. You have my very best wishes for a speedy and comfortable recovery.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

CONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is the first draft of a proposed scenario for the Diaz Ordaz visit scheduled for October 26-28. The scenario reflects President Diaz Ordaz's wishes for special activities while here.

We have not included a return dinner by President Diaz Ordaz because your practice has been to attend return receptions but not dinners. Were you to depart from this pattern, it would cause problems for you with other Chiefs of State.

Mexican Ambassador Margain has told Covey Oliver that he would like to start joint planning of the program.

If the proposed scenario meets with your approval for planning purposes, Covey can use it as the basis for the discussions. Whatever he and Ambassador Margain come up with will, of course, be ad referendum.

W. W. Rostow

Approve scenario for planning purposes ✓

8/30/67

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

Att: dr. program for Oct. 26-28, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 126, NARA, Date 9-4-91

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VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO

THURSDAY - October 26, 1967

- 12:00 EDT - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz arrive at Andrews AFB, Maryland, and chopper to Elipse
- 12:15 - Welcome at White House by President and Mrs. Johnson, Secretary and Mrs. Rusk, Ambassador Symington, and Dean of Diplomatic Corps Full military honors.
- 12:45 - Presidents head a parade in Washington with military band escort
- 1:15 - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz arrive at Blair House
- 1:45 - Secretary and Mrs. Rusk host a luncheon in the Benjamin Franklin Room for President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz
- 3:15 - Presidents and wives motor together to Smithsonian Institution for presentation of Pre-Columbian antiquity, followed by visit to Lincoln Memorial for wreath laying ceremony.
- 4:00 - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz visit Pre-Columbian Exhibit at Dumbarton Oaks, accompanied by Mrs. Johnson and U.S. and Mexican officials and wives
- 4:45 - Mexican party returns to Blair House
- 5:00 - Two Presidents meet for discussion
- 8:00 - President Johnson hosts black tie dinner for President Diaz Ordaz at the White House

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536

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO

ALTERNATIVE SCHEDULE IN CASE

CONGRESS IN SESSION

FRIDAY - OCTOBER 27, 1967

- 8:30 - Under Secretary Katzenbach, Ambassador Symington, and Assistant Secretary Oliver call, and breakfast with President Diaz Ordaz
- 9:30-10:45 - Cabinet and other high officials who have recently visited Mexico or been closely involved in relations with Mexico call
- 11:00 - Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey, Assistant Secretary and Mrs. Oliver accompany President Diaz Ordaz and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz on visit to Library of Congress. Mexican and U.S. officials, with their wives, attend.
- Welcome at Library by Librarian of Congress
- Tour of Library, including special Mexican exhibit in the Hispanic Foundation, Mr. Cline, Director
- 12:15 - Party crosses to Capitol, where they are greeted by a Congressional escort.
- 12:30 - President Diaz Ordaz addresses a joint meeting of the Congress in the House of Representatives
- Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, Mrs. Humphrey, Mr. and Mrs. Oliver and parties in gallery
- 1:30 - Vice President hosts a luncheon for President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, Mexican party, and Senators and Representatives who have participated in recent Interparliamentary meetings.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

- 3:30        - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz visit Pan American Union to meet Ambassadors to OAS and wives.
- 5:30        - Presidents meet to continue their discussions.
- Joint Communique issued
- National Park Service provides tour for ladies.
- 6:30        - Mexican President and party and wives return to Blair House
- 7:30        - President Diaz Ordaz hosts return reception

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO

534

ALTERNATIVE SCHEDULE IN CASE

CONGRESS NOT IN SESSION

FRIDAY - OCTOBER 27, 1967

- 8:30 - Vice President Humphrey, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Ambassador Symington, and Assistant Secretary Oliver call and breakfast with President Diaz Ordaz and other Mexican officials
- 9:30-10:45 - Cabinet and other high officials who have recently visited Mexico or been closely involved in relations with Mexico call
- 11:00 - Mrs. Johnson and Asst. Secretary Oliver and Mrs. Oliver accompany President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, with other Mexican and U.S. officials and wives, on visit to Library of Congress
- Welcome by Librarian of Congress
- Tour of Library, including special Mexican exhibit in the Hispanic Foundation, Howard F. Cline, director
- 12:00 - Same parties tour National Gallery of Art (or President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz attend Protocolary OAS Meeting)
- 1:00 - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz lunch at Pan American Union hosted by OAS, accompanied by Mexican party
- 3:00 - President Diaz Ordaz speaks at National Press Club, and replies to questions submitted in advance in writing, accompanied by Mexican and U.S. officials
- Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and Mrs. Johnson, and other ladies, visit Museum of History (e.g., dresses of Presidents' wives)
- National Park Service provides tour for ladies

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

- 5:30        - Presidents meet to continue their discussions
- Joint Communique issued
- 6:30        - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and Mexican party  
                      return to Blair House
- 7:30        - President Diaz Ordaz hosts return reception.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO

SATURDAY - OCTOBER 28, 1967

- 8:30 A.M. - Presidents and wives leave White House via helicopter for Andrews AFB, Maryland
- 8:45 - Presidents and wives airborne for El Paso, Texas (flight time: about 4 hours) - informal lunch
- 12:45 EDT)  
10:45MD T) - Presidents arrive El Paso International Airport (National anthems and welcome by U.S. and Mexican officials)
- 11:00 - Motorcade through downtown El Paso
- 11:25 - Presidents debark to view Chamizal area at new Santa Fe Street bridge and greet assembled public
- 11:35 - Motorcade proceeds through downtown Juarez
- 11:55 - Motorcade arrives at Mexico's new Chamizal Monument
- 12:00 - Presidents enter Mexican Monument where they sign Declaration of Approval transferring lands under Chamizal Convention
- 12:05 - Presidents and Distinguished Guests take seats at Monument Dais (National anthems and addresses by both Presidents, with translation)
- 1:05 - Motorcade proceeds to new international Cordova Island bridge
- 1:15 - Presidents and parties walk to new international boundary on bridge, where they raise flags and open bridge
- Presidents embrace in farewell, President Johnson and U.S. party walking to helicopters at U.S. end of bridge and President Diaz Ordaz and party returning to Mexican end of bridge.
- 1:30 - President and Mrs. Johnson airborne.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-298

Tuesday, August 29, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By inf, NARA, Date 10-26-95

Pres. file

Mr. President:

You have agreed to receive Brazilian Ambassador da Cunha at 12:15 pm today.

At Tab A is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk on the appointment.

The Ambassador will deliver President Costa e Silva's reply to your letter of July 26 (Tab B) on supersonic aircraft. You will recall that as a result of your letter, Costa e Silva agreed to hold up on the Mirage deal until after October 1.

We have not seen the reply. It will probably:

- reiterate his decision to take no action on acquiring French Mirages until after October 1.
- point out what a tough political decision this was.
- emphasize his interest in modernizing Brazil's military equipment, especially with F-5 aircraft and M-16 rifles.

I agree with the Secretary that you might use as many of these talking points as seems necessary:

- reaffirm your appreciation of the importance of this matter to Brazil, and of President Costa e Silva's response.
- point out the problems we are having in the Congress on military assistance.
- note our desire to be responsive to Brazil's needs as soon as we can.
- refer to Ambassador Tuthill's indication that contract talks on F-5's can commence as soon after October 1 as feasible.
- point out that all of the present production of M-16 rifles are needed by the forces in Vietnam and that Secretary McNamara has this matter under periodic review.

W.W.Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 28, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Brazilian Ambassador Vasco  
Leitão da Cunha, August 29, 12:15 p.m.

You have agreed to receive Brazilian Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha on August 29 at 12:15 p.m. He will be accompanied on his call by Assistant Secretary Covey T. Oliver.

Ambassador Leitão da Cunha will deliver to you a personal letter from Brazilian President Arthur da Costa e Silva on the subject of military assistance, including supersonic aircraft. He will be prepared to discuss the matter and provide supplementary information.

The letter will probably emphasize Costa e Silva's deep interest in modernizing Brazil's military equipment, with particular reference to F-5 aircraft and M-16 rifles, which Brazil is seeking to purchase through commercial channels and for which United States export authorization would be required. He may reiterate his decision to take no action on acquiring French Mirage aircraft until after October 1, 1967, but make it clear that this was not an easy decision for him.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-299

By 128, NARA, Date 12-15-94

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Ambassador Tuthill believes your letter and accompanying talking points (enclosed) were effective in persuading Costa e Silva to take no action on the Mirage aircraft until after October 1, and that it is now up to the United States to take action. At this time, however, we are not in a position to make commitments beyond those already made, which are outlined below.

In your letter you spoke of "later this year when the matter can be looked at in terms of what we can do"; the talking points state that we "are prepared to authorize Northrop to begin contract talks after October 1 ... so that Brazil could expect to receive the first planes after July 1, 1969." In reply, you may wish to reaffirm your appreciation of the importance of this matter to Brazil and of the statesmanlike attitude of your friend President Costa e Silva, pointing out that the problem of armaments in Latin America is a matter of great concern to you and is currently agitating the United States Congress. You want to be responsive to Brazil's needs and intend to do so as soon as possible. At present we do not believe that you are in a position to go beyond what was said in your letter to Costa e Silva and the accompanying talking points. You may wish to convey tactfully that contract talks need not commence immediately after October 1, the exact timing depending on the situation, but that in any case we do not intend to be laggard in responding.

With regard to M-16 rifles, they are urgently needed for our forces and those of our allies in Southeast Asia, but we wish to be responsive to Brazil's request and will try to meet it as soon as we can.

~~SECRET~~

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-3-

Secretary McNamara has promised to review the status of this matter every ninety days, but deliveries will probably not start for some time.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

Letter to Costa e Silva dated  
July 26, 1967, with accompanying  
talking points.

~~SECRET~~

546

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 26, 1967

Dear Mr. President:


During your visit to Washington last January and at the Punta del Este meeting we had the opportunity to discuss the special role which our two countries of necessity play in this hemisphere.

It is in this spirit that I have asked Ambassador Tuthill to explain to you personally the serious repercussions which the purchase of advanced jet aircraft at this time would have in the United States and on our effort to collaborate with Brazil and the other American Republics under the Alliance for Progress. He will also describe what we are prepared to do with respect to Brazil's desires for modernization of equipment.

After you have had an opportunity to review these considerations with him and see what is at stake, I hope you will find it possible to postpone any commitment on advanced jet aircraft until later this year when the matter can be looked at in terms of what we can do to help meet the requirements of the Brazilian Air Force.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency  
Arthur da Costa e Silva  
President of the Republic of Brazil  
Brasilia

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-484  
By fw, NARA, Date 1-11-94

~~SECRET~~

540

TALKING POINTS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-299  
By 17, NARA, Date 12-15-94

1. The President has asked me to deliver this letter and discuss in greater detail the points raised.
2. He understands why a country of the size and importance of Brazil wants to modernize its military aircraft. That is why we agreed to the delivery of F-5s to Brazil in 1969-70 and the sale of T-33s and T-37s in the interim.
3. We are prepared to authorize Northrop to begin contract talks after October 1. The lead time for delivery of the F-5 is about 20 months, so that Brazil could expect to receive the first planes after July 1, 1969.
4. We cannot advance the date for the contract talks or aircraft delivery because of public and Congressional reaction.
5. Crises in other parts of the world (e.g. Kashmire [sic] and the Middle East) have made the American people acutely sensitive to United States military involvement overseas and the furnishing of arms to other countries. While this criticism has not been directed against Brazil, it has been reflected in the mood of Congress, especially in the context of foreign economic and military assistance legislation now pending before both Houses.

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.



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-2-

6. The President recently had a conversation with Senator Fulbright in which the Senator said that he was in favor of doing away with foreign assistance.

7. An amendment has been introduced in the House Foreign Affairs Committee--generally the Congressional group most favorably disposed towards aid for Latin America--to the Foreign Aid Bill denying assistance to any Alliance for Progress country which acquires supersonic military aircraft from any source or by any means. We hope to defeat this amendment.

8. Furthermore, the Export-Import Bank is being criticized by Congress for its role in financing sales of military equipment.

9. Congress showed its growing concern over military assistance last fall by placing a \$85 million ceiling on sales and grants of military equipment to Latin America. An effort is being made in Congress to reduce this ceiling even further.

10. President Johnson thinks that, in such a situation, the acquisition by any Latin American country of supersonic aircraft at this time would have the most serious adverse effect on our ability to continue our assistance to Latin America. What is at stake is the future of the Alliance for Progress. The same is true for the Military Assistance Program.

11. The President is fighting hard for an increase in our Alliance contributions to meet his pledge at the OAS Summit to seek additional resources. Given the increased skepticism of the Congress toward Foreign Aid, this is a tough battle.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

12. He is not sure that he can win. But he knows that if one or more Latin American governments decide to buy supersonic aircraft now, he will lose the increase and suffer a deeper cut in appropriations. The Congress will also probably approve the prohibition of aid to those governments acquiring such aircraft.

13. He wants you to know of this situation so that you may take it into consideration in making your decision to purchase Mirages.

14. He knows from his talks with you last April that you share his strong desire not to impair the Alliance in any way.

15. That is why he has asked me to make this appeal that you postpone any action on supersonics until after October 1 when we can discuss how best to meet Brazil's desires to modernize its Air Force.

~~SECRET~~



Monday, August 28, 1967  
7:15 p.m.

55

~~1. Summary~~  
2. Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Rud Poats comments on the Moss Sub-Committee Reports on Vietnam and attaches a copy of a memorandum which he sent to Secretary Rusk summarizing the report and actions taken (and not taken) in connection with it.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

55a

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

August 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-303  
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-26-94

SUBJECT: Moss Sub-Committee Reports on Vietnam

The House Government Operations Committee made public today three reports on the follow-up visit to Vietnam of the Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations during the first four days of July. We were not afforded an opportunity to comment on the reports in draft and received advance copies only a few hours before they were given to the press Friday for Monday release.

In a covering letter to the Secretary of State and in the preambles to each set of recommendations, the Committee urges a firmer stand by the United States Government in demanding cooperative action by the Vietnamese Government. Although many of the criticisms and recommendations deal with relatively minor technical matters, all are covered by the repeated warning that "without substantive GVN actions in a number of areas... prospects for success are minimal, the feasibility of continued United States involvement is questionable and could lead to a re-assessment of the United States' position."

I attach a memorandum to the Secretary of State summarizing the report and providing some background on the matters covered and current negotiations aimed toward completing some of the unfinished business of concern to the Committee.

We have taken the following actions:

1. The U.S. Mission was urged last week to press to an immediate conclusion the negotiations on refund claims, dollar-piaster conversion rate and tying of part of the GVN-financed import program to U.S. procurement. We expect to have good news on some of these issues momentarily, and propose to announce agreements when they go into effect, hopefully during September.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

2. The Mission will be asked to obtain GVN agreement to disclose the previous deposit of \$50 million by the GVN in the United States and earmarking of this fund for procurement of U.S. goods and services for agreed post-war development projects.

3. A.I. D. issued on Saturday the attached comment on the Sub-Committee reports for publication today.

4. A similar holding statement (attached) was furnished the State Department Press Officer for use if queried, pending determination of whether a more explicit rejoinder should be issued at this moment. No question was asked.


5. A summary of the Sub-Committee reports and the text of the letter have been cabled to Saigon.

6. We have asked Komer for an immediate report on pacification and land reform development to be used in possible White House comments and Congressional visits.

7. Negotiation and administrative action will be pursued vigorously by A.I. D., State and Defense on all the technical recommendations of the reports to the extent feasible.

I believe it would be far better to wait until we can report major accomplishment from the current negotiations -- after next Sunday's election -- rather than issue a rejoinder to the specifics in the reports today. We do not dispute that many of the administrative changes and impositions of U.S. control which the Committee recommends would be desirable from the U.S. viewpoint. In fact, the reports may help us get GVN agreements on some of these. We do feel, however, that the strong-armed actions demanded are in many cases proposals to shoot an ant with an elephant gun.

A.I. D. will assist State in developing a press backgrounder meeting the criticisms in the letter on the elections, land reform and pacification.

  
Rutherford M. Poats  
Acting Administrator

Attachments

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

55-b

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

August 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-303  
By ip, NARA, Date 9-26-94

SUBJECT: Moss Sub-Committee Reports on Vietnam

This memorandum summarizes the three reports of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-Committee of the House Committee on Government Operations which were submitted to you with a covering letter dated August 27 from Chairman John Moss and ranking minority member Ogden Reid. The memorandum also will provide some background on the Committee's attitude and on current negotiations with the Vietnamese Government relevant to the Committee's criticisms.

Chairman Moss and Congressman Cohelan of the Passman Sub-Committee, accompanied by staff of the Moss Sub-Committee, spent about four days in Vietnam at the beginning of July. They commended the AID Mission on improved management of the commercial import program and Saigon Port; in an oral debriefing upon return they also were complimentary except for reservations about the new U. S. Mission pacification organization.

In each report, immediately preceding their specific recommendations, there is an identical strong demand for action by the U. S. Government to induce GVN action on each matter covered; they apply to all recommendations the warning that "without substantive GVN action --- the advisability of continued U. S. involvement is questionable and could lead to a re-assessment of the United States' position."

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORTS AND COMMENTS ON  
THE COMMITTEE'S CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) "The Port Situation in Vietnam"

A seven page report shows the Port of Saigon to be drastically improved as compared with the situation at the time of the Sub-

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Committee's last report in October 1966. In fact there is no delay in movement of goods -- military, AID project, or commercial cargoes -- through the Port today, as a result of many actions taken by MACV, the AID Mission and the GVN. Nevertheless the Committee finds fault and proposes corrective measures in five particulars, four requiring MACV action and one AID Mission action.

Comment:

All the recommendations are of relatively secondary importance, but the agencies concerned will pursue them where feasible. We do not, however, believe that they are sufficiently important to warrant the harsh preamble quoted above.

(2) "The Commercial (commodity) Import Program for Vietnam"

This report notes that six of the nine recommendations of the October 1966 Sub-Committee report have been carried out, but these three have not:

(a) Prompt development of Vietnamese market analyses to permit imposition of controls on the amounts of particular commodities to be licensed for import. While questioning the feasibility of ever being in a position to anticipate the Vietnamese market demand more intelligently than Vietnamese businessmen or to impose precise quantitative controls, AID did agree to undertake studies which might provide general guidelines as to the quantities being financed by AID. A contract with the A. D. Little Company was concluded on June 8, 1967 but only now is the work beginning. The Sub-Committee criticizes this delay, resulting from our insistence on competitive invitations to qualified firms, negotiating difficulties regarding unreasonable contract terms demanded by A. D. Little, and subsequent difficulties by A. D. Little in obtaining and retaining staff. The A. D. Little staff has now been at work in Vietnam for several weeks.

(b) Investigation by AID on the background, qualifications and integrity of all 2200 Vietnamese importers. Our position right along has been that this blanket action was infeasible except where we had indications warranting investigation of irregularities. The AID Mission already is deeply involved in the Vietnamese Government's import licensing processes and conducts investigations of importers records which are far more intensive than in any other AID program.

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-3-

The AID agreements with the GVN obligate the GVN to police the eligibility and compliance of its importers with AID and GVN rules. The AID Mission recommends suspension of importers who violate rules but AID does not replace the GVN as the licenser of importers.

(c) Application to previously licensed importers of the same requirements as are imposed on newly licensed importers. The AID Mission and the GVN have opposed this recommendation. We will consider compromise formulas.

The Sub-Committee made two new findings:

(a) The GVN is not requiring its importers to "buy America" when they use dollars of the National Bank of Vietnam, as distinguished from the AID dollars, in their imports; consequently, more than 90% of the Vietnamese-financed imports are being bought from non-U.S. sources, primarily Japan, Hong Kong, and Western Europe. The AID Mission has negotiated several agreements which reduce GVN dollar reserves and earnings of dollars (largely derived from U.S. military piaster purchases), such as collecting 100% of the piaster proceeds of a recent PL 480 rice sale for U.S. uses and pre-payment of three outstanding ICA loans. The GVN also has deposited much of its foreign exchange holdings in U.S. banks and has set aside \$50 million of its holdings for procurement of post-war development goods and services from the United States only. The latter point is not cited in the report because it is confidential. We are proposing that it be made public in response to the Committee's criticisms. The AID-financed imports are either from the United States or bought with bartered goods or tied letters of credit.

The Vietnamese Central Bank Governor and Minister of National Economy has offered to direct some GVN-financed procurement to U.S. sources if we can provide a list of commodities not financed by AID which can sensibly be bought in the United States. No definitive result has come of this offer, partially because of the inability of AID and Commerce to identify with sufficient specificity, commodities which the GVN can economically buy in the U.S., in addition to those already financed for export by AID. A cable proposing prompt action on this matter through the use of a tied letter of credit to purchase some of the U.S. Government piaster requirements was sent to Saigon Saturday, but the Ambassador concluded that he could not add this proposal to the negotiating package at the moment.

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The Mission is now hopefully about to conclude very sensitive negotiations (EXDIS) which would further reduce GVN dollar earnings and the U. S. gold drain by nearly \$100 million. However, AID would offset this loss of dollar earnings to the GVN by increased AID commercial import financing and development project assistance (at no gold drain cost to us) so as to maintain GVN reserves at approximately the previously agreed level.

We need your support in pressing for tying of some of the GVN dollar expenditures to U. S. procurement, which would provide the best answer to the Committee's justifiable criticism.

(a) Excessive imports of textiles, paper and sweetened condensed milk. The Mission and GVN have taken action on these matters, making the routine adjustments necessary to protect the domestic Vietnamese industries.

(3) "Illicit Practices Affecting the U. S. Program in Vietnam"

The report notes improvements made to tighten surveillance against abuses but finds inadequate corrective measures in these fields:

(a) Excessive profit provided by some suppliers to Vietnamese importers who have the dual role of importer and sales agent. The Committee has confused the facts on this issue to leave the impression that the U. S. Government is suffering. In fact, our actions of earlier this year have produced large savings to AID by eliminating AID-financed dollar commission payments to non-U. S. agents.

(b) Black-market in currency and PX goods. The Committee noted improvements but urged additional efforts by MACV.

(c) Slow procedures for suspension of suppliers and importers who violate AID regulations. Additional actions have been taken in this field in recent months which are not reflected in the Committee's report.

(d) AID's failure to establish an escrow account from which to draw immediate GVN refunds for transactions violating AID regulations. The AID Mission has attempted to negotiate refund claim settlements which would obviate the need for trying to impose this escrow account with unilateral drawing rights for the United States. The further accumulation of claims and the slow pace of negotiations

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-5-

on them led Congressman Moss to put through an amendment to the AID legislation last week expressing the sense of Congress that a \$10 million escrow account should be negotiated immediately. We hope to be able to report shortly the payment of the outstanding claims, now in excess of \$7 million, and eliminate this amendment in the House-Senate conference.

(e) Failure to obtain confiscated dollars and MPCs. The U.S. Government legal opinion is that dollars and MPCs are bearer notes which are not the property of the U.S. Government. The Committee asks that we set aside legal technicalities and demand that the GVN turn over the seized currency as a matter of cooperation with the U.S. Government. (This is not basically an AID concern but we have collaborated with State, DOD and Treasury in considering this issue.)

#### MATTERS NOT COVERED IN THE REPORTS

The covering letter to you states without elaboration a sweeping criticism of "the lack of meaningful progress and reform in the lagging and floundering pacification program; in dealing with the problems of refugees, inflation and land reform; in the conduct of the elections; and in overall administration with its entrenched and inefficient bureaucracy." However, the Sub-Committee's reports on these matters have not yet been completed.

Pacification: The Committee obtained testimony from Bob Komer and talked with Ambassador Bunker and others. In a debriefing on return from Saigon, Congressman Moss was highly critical of the "militarization" and "excessive Americanization" of the pacification effort.

Land Reform: The Sub-Committee sent a GAO team to Vietnam early this year to gather the facts on the land tenure situation and US/Vietnamese programs in this field. The GAO team orally expressed understanding and general endorsement of the U.S. approach on tactics, which include a strong and specific set of proposals to the newly elected government immediately after the election. A separate paper is being prepared on this subject.

Refugees: GVN execution of refugee assistance programs has fallen behind in I CORPS. We have continually added American and other foreign staff and in my view, CORDS is already running the risk of excessively Americanizing this element of the GVN-CORDS' (pacification) program. An on-scene examination by our AID/Washington refugee officer has just been completed and is being considered in the current program

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planning meeting of the Saigon and Washington staffs in Honolulu.

Inflation: We have achieved remarkable success in blocking run-away inflation. The commercial import program, whose technical flaws the Committee criticizes, has been a vital instrument in maintaining the economic and psychological base of the Allied war effort. Price increases in domestic goods such as rice and pork have had a positive effect in raising peasant income and thereby improving prospect for pacification success in the Delta.

Elections: We have no indication of Moss's specific views on this subject.

GVN administration: The Government is weak and much of its bureaucracy is inefficient and demoralized. The election should help re-envigorate the public service. Further pay raises and better protection of local officials from VC assassination and intimidation are essential. More consistent enforcement of anti-corruption measures, from hamlet to Saigon, are continually urged by the U. S. Mission. Training and manpower planning programs also are being addressed to the fundamental problems of GVN ineffectiveness.

#### IMMEDIATE ACTIONS ON THE REPORT

The U. S. Mission was urged last week to press to an immediate conclusion the negotiations on refund claims, dollar-piaster conversion rate (EXDIS) and tying of part of the GVN-financed import program to U. S. procurement (EXDIS). We expect to have good news on some of these issues momentarily, and propose to announce agreements when they go into effect, hopefully during September.

The Mission will be asked to obtain GVN agreement to disclose the previous deposit of \$50 million by the GVN in the United States and earmarking of this fund for procurement of U. S. goods and services for agreed post-war development projects.

AID issued on Saturday the attached comment on the Subcommittee reports for publication today.

A similar holding statement (attached) was furnished the State Department Press Officer for use if queried, pending determination of whether a more explicit rejoinder should be issued at this moment. No question was asked.

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
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-7-

A summary of the Sub-Committee reports and the text of the letter to you have been cabled to Saigon.

We have asked Komer for an immediate report on pacification and land reform development to be used in possible White House comments and Congressional visits.

Negotiation and administrative action will be pursued vigorously by AID, State and Defense on all the technical recommendations of the reports to the extent feasible.



Rutherford M. Poats  
Acting Administrator

Attachments

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FOR NOON PRESS BRIEFING, MONDAY, AUGUST 28, 1967

If asked about the Times and Post stories on the Moss Subcommittee Report and Moss' letter to Secretary Rusk, suggest you say that we have just recently received the reports concerned and that AID and State are studying them and will have further comment later. You should refer to the attached AID statement released Saturday.

If the question arises, it might further be observed that the subjects of lagging land reform and pacification which are mentioned prominently in press stories this morning are mentioned only by subject matter in the Moss letter to the Secretary and that we have not yet received the reports on these subjects from the Moss Subcommittee.

AA/VN, WGStoneman  
8-28-67

53d

# Comment on the Moss Sub-Committee Reports on Aid to Vietnam

For Release in Monday Morning Newspapers and thereafter

In answer to press inquiries, a spokesman for the Agency for International Development said:

"We appreciate the Moss Sub-Committee's recognition of the great improvements which have been made in the management of the AID program of commercial import financing in Vietnam, in the operations of the Port of Saigon and in measures to prevent illicit practices. The commercial import program has accomplished its objective of sustaining the economic base of the war effort and preventing run-away inflation which could frustrate our entire U.S. effort in Vietnam.

"Some of the unfinished business cited by the reports is among the many subjects of current negotiations between the two governments. In these continuing actions, as in the past, we will take into account the constructive recommendations of Chairman Moss's Sub-Committee on Foreign Operations."

Monday, Aug. 28, 1967  
6:15 p.m.

56

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a reply to Drew Pearson,  
which you requested by this evening.

W. W. R.

8/29/67  
Mr Pearson will be back in  
DC on Sept 1, therefore, letter  
sent to home address

August 28, 1967

56a

Dear Drew:

It was so good of you to think of me out there in Hawaii as my birthday approached.

It is a source of strength for the President to know that wise old Washington hands like the Chief Justice and yourself look with sympathy and understanding on the burdens that come to rest here.

On the other hand, a good many of my predecessors have seen harder times; and I enter my sixtieth year with determination and hope and an abiding sense that we as a nation will find our way through to solutions of our great problems at home and abroad.

I will, of course, consider most seriously the suggestions you pass along on policy towards Viet Nam. But, as you know, the geography of Viet Nam does not lend itself well to a limited area defense; and the surprisingly high registration figures for the election -- along with other information which I would be glad to make available to you when you are back in town -- suggest that the proportion of the population secured by the government is expanding quite rapidly.

But I mainly wanted you to know the comfort your letter gave me.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Drew Pearson  
Care of Hotel Hana-Maui  
Hawaiian Islands

LBJ:WWR:mz



56-b

⑦ HOTEL

*Hana-Maui*

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

*Rec'd  
Aug 28*

Aug. 25, 1967

Dear Mr. President,

H  
This should reach you about the time of the year when you come within ten years of catching up with me (most of the time you are eleven years behind). But this letter is not to pull seniority, in which I don't believe anyway, but to wish you a happy birthday at a time when some other people are running you down.

I know that the Chief Justice, with whom we have been spending a few weeks, is also writing you a letter, but he probably won't put in the letter some of the things he has said to me.

He feels very keenly the difficulties which face you and the intolerance of your critics, among them Bobby, whom he feels has taken advantage of you at a time when you are in trouble.

"Pregnancy does not begin with a full blown child," the Chief remarked this morning. "And this war did not begin with the President. It began with Eisenhower, and then grew under Bobby's brother. It seems to me that he is completely disloyal to his party and his President at a time when his President is at a disadvantage."

The Chief went on to recall that he was Governor of California during the war years at which time Roosevelt had not consulted him once, whereas you had consulted the Republicans continually, and more than any other president.

"The senate voted the Gulf of Tonkin resolution with a gesture of 'here you take the war; it's your responsibility.'", the Chief remarked this morning. "Now they are carping at the man to whom they gave the responsibility."

The Chief is not happy about the war, but unlike so many others, he recognizes your problems, and he has some ideas toward solving them.

PRESERVATION COPY

HOTEL

*Hana-Maui*

HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

2.

He suggests: 1, bringing American troops into smaller areas which can easily be defended; 2 letting the South Vietnamese protect their own people in the rest of the country; 3, let the newly elected president of South Vietnam propose an indefinite moratorium on bombing the north; 4, during that moratorium get the neighboring Asiatic countries, from Burma to Indonesia and India, to pressure Hanoi for peace.

I know you have explored almost every avenue toward peace, but something like this might be worth exploring.

This letter, however, is chiefly to wish you a happy birthday and the hope that the next anniversary will find you and the world in a much more peaceful condition.

Please excuse this lousy typing, but I'm my own secretary on a rather decrepit machine.

Sincerely your friend,



Drew Pearson



~~SECRET~~

*Profile*

Monday, August 28, 1967 -- 5:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This analysis of rural population control in Viet Nam in recent years is interesting and heartening.

It conforms to the sharp rise in voting registration as an indicator of increased government control over the Vietnamese population, and underlines a major cause of Viet Cong manpower shortage.

Specifically, it shows:

1. An increase in government control in rural areas of 1.2 million in the last six months; 1.8 million in the last year; 3.1 million since mid-1965.
2. The Viet Cong controlled population is down by more than a million since mid-1965. In mid-1965 it was 24% of the total population (including cities); it is now 14%.
3. If the six Vietnamese cities are added in (whose population has increased from 1.7 million to 2.7 million, between 1965 and 1967) the total under secure GVN control has increased from 6.6 million in mid-1965 to 10.8 million in mid-1967.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-298  
By isp, NARA, Date 10-26-95

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57a

#### GVN RURAL POPULATION CONTROL PROGRESS

GVN population control figures continue to show increasing government control of population residing outside of the six autonomous cities (see Table 1). Although the absolute control levels are subject to question the trend over time may be accurate: as of June, 8.1 million Vietnamese (57.5%) reportedly resided in secure areas (excluding the six autonomous cities), compared to 6.9 million (52.1%) in December 1966 and 6.3 million (47.9%) in June 1966. These figures suffer from several recognized deficiencies, including politically-motivated distortions by field reporters, frequent revisions of population bases, sensitivity to rural-urban population migration, and misleading category labels. But they are the only long-term time series available, and an analysis of the trends seems worthwhile.

To simplify presentation of the trend we have computed a single index measure of GVN province control as follows:

<u>GVN Rating Category</u>	<u>GVN Aligned Population as Percent of Category Total</u>
Secure	100%
Undergoing Securing	60%
Contested	30%
VC-Controlled	0%

The last line of Table 1 shows the total GVN-aligned population computed in this way. This statistic shows the same steady upward trend as the Secured population category; by June 1967, 9.4 million people or 67% of the SVN rural population could be considered aligned with the GVN.

The computer printed maps following Table 1 graphically depict rough geographical variances in the GVN-aligned population index: the darker the area, the higher the index. The favorable trend shown in Table 1 is clearly reflected. Some specific trends show fairly clearly:

(1) GVN control throughout I Corps and Northern II Corps (VC MR5) deteriorates from June 1964 to June 1965. The GVN gradually regains control from December 1965 to the present, with an overall jump of one whole step (of 5 steps each of which is 20% population control) for practically the whole region between December 1966 and June 1967. The exception is the DMZ where the alignment index drops to the 41-60% range in June 1967.

(2) Back in June 1964, the highest alignment index anywhere around the Saigon area was the 41-60% shown to the northeast of the city. VC control was very high (indicated by dot (.) and plus (+) symbols signifying alignment index ranges 0-20% and 21-40% respectively) to the west and south. GVN control of 81-100% was established by June 1965 to the northeast, but the area west of the city never does attain over 60%.

(3) GVN alignment of 61-80% was gradually established along the Mekong River by December 1965, with 81-100% (blackest area) shown in the north in the Chau Doc - An Giang area thereafter. The southern Delta is a real low spot for GVN control, never reaching more than 60%. A regression is shown between December 1966 and June 1967 in this area to the 21-40% range.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-303

By ip, NARA, Date 9-26-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(4) The area north and east of Vung Tau in Phuoc Tuy province reaches a high point in December 1966, but a significant regression appears in the June 1967 map to the 40-60% range.

(5) The Kontum area at the Laos - Cambodia - SVN border seems to change hands frequently. VC control is high in June 1964; GVN control is high from December 1964 to December 1965; GVN control drops in June 1966; GVN control is very high (81-100%) in June 1967.

These maps were produced by SYMAP, a computer technique developed at the Harvard University Computer Graphics Laboratory. Each density level represents a degree of GVN rural population alignment, running from darkest (over 80% GVN-aligned) to lightest (less than 20%). The maps can also be read as VC control maps with heaviest VC control reflected in the lightest areas and least VC control in the darkest areas. They are not area control maps. The density (blackness) of any given spot on the map is determined by the control indexes of all provinces whose geographical center points fall within a radius of a few inches. Thus War Zone C, about as unsecure an area as there is in SVN, is colored entirely black in June 1967. The reason for this misleading result is that the alignment index for Tay Ninh province is very high (93%) because the population is concentrated in the reportedly secure areas of the province. The points on the map which lie in the war zone are colored black since they are near the center of a province (Tay Ninh) with an index between 81 and 100%. If some other province center were closer, the points would have been colored to reflect that province's index, even though the war zone falls in Tay Ninh province geographically.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

576

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TABLE 1

RURAL POPULATION CONTROL BY CATEGORY <sup>a/</sup>  
(End of Month (000) in Thousands)

	June 1964	Dec 1964	June 1965	Dec 1965	June 1966	Dec 1966	June 1967
Secured	4226.0(32.7)	4268.8(33.3)	4953.0(38.3)	5916.1 (45.4)	6272.1(47.9)	6869.1(52.2)	8078.5(57.5)
Undergoing Securing	2610.6(20.2)	1843.5(14.4)	986.9(7.6)	794.7(6.1)	779.3(5.9)	693.1(5.3)	829.4(5.9)
Contested <sup>b/</sup>	3424.8(26.5)	3601.3(28.1)	3521.7(27.2)	2880.4(22.1)	2716.6(20.7)	2795.8(21.2)	2768.5(19.7)
Uncontested <sup>c/</sup>	116.3(.9)	60.1(.5)	33.6(.3)	86.0(.7)	130.5(1.0)	163.2(1.2)	-----
VC Controlled	2546.0(19.7)	3048.8(23.7)	3440.4(26.6)	3357.4(25.7)	3207.5(24.5)	2649.8(20.1)	2365.2(16.8)
Total Population	12923.7	12822.5	12935.6	13034.6	13106.0	13171.0	14041.6
Total GVN-Aligned Population (Weighted) <sup>d/</sup>	6819.8(52.8)	6455.3(50.3)	6601.7(51.0)	7257.0(55.7)	7554.7(57.6)	8123.7(61.7)	9406.7(67.0)

<sup>a/</sup> Excludes population of the 6 autonomous cities.

<sup>b/</sup> Formerly Undergoing Clearing.

<sup>c/</sup> Dropped as a category 1 Jan 67.

<sup>d/</sup> Computed as 100% of Secured, plus 60% of Undergoing Securing plus 30% of Contested population..

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-303  
By ing, NARA, Date 9-26-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LEGEND:


PERCENT GVN-ALIGNED  
RURAL POPULATION



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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-303  
By ijp, NARA, Date 9-26-94

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




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
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
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NEJ 94-303  
By *inf*, NARA, Date 9-26-94





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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-303


By *ing*, NARA, Date 9-26-94

DECEMBER 1966


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NJ 94-303  
By ing, NARA, Date 9-26-94

DOWN  
VIETNAM

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
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50 MILES  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



572



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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-303  
By ing, NARA, Date 9-26-94

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, August 28, 1967  
4:30 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob McNamara has asked for my urgent comments on his draft speech, which would include announcement of thin ABM system.

After talking with Joe Califano, I believe Bob should refer to cost estimates to head off over-dramatic speculation and indicate the thin system is manageable without excessive diversion of resources from domestic needs. I would appreciate your guidance on this major point.

I also have a number of technical points to make -- mainly to reduce inevitable points of abrasion between Bob and his critics to either side.

W. W. R.

Budget point should be made \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 2 89-150  
By rg/ipp, NARA, Date 9-10-81

59

*Profile*

Monday, August 28, 1967  
4:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

I don't know whether it foreshadows  
a creative peace or disaster, but this  
account of the chemistry of postwar  
Jerusalem will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

A-53, July 25, 1967  
from Tel Aviv

# AIRGRAM

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RM/R	REP	AF
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A-53

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amman, Beirut, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Rome, USUN

JUL 28 3 55 PM 1967

FROM : Amembassy TEL AVIV

DATE July 25, 1967

SUBJECT : Impressions of Post-War Jerusalem

REF :

Second Secretary John Leonard recently took a day's leave in Old Jerusalem, his first visit of any duration there since the Six Day War. Leonard was a frequent visitor to the Old City before the War and has many friends there. We believe his impressions, enclosed, will be of interest to the addressees.

DALE

Enclosure: "Impressions of Post-War Jerusalem," by John D. Leonard

Decontrol in July 24, 1968

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☐ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

POL:HHStackhouse/osv

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

1967 JUL 28 PM 5 58

COPYFLO-PBR

*See...*

SUBJECT: Impressions of Post-war Jerusalem

The reporting officer would like to record the following impressions of Post-war Jerusalem.

Atmosphere - Walls are crumbling and Jerusalem is being transformed into what it always was -- a united city. The truly unforgettable manifestation of this change is the great mass of Israeli visitors who daily inundate the hitherto forbidden Old City. An aura of excitement still prevails amongst the crowds. Although the number of Israeli visitors will presumably subside as their religious, inquisitive and bargaining instincts are satisfied, the anticipated influx of foreign tourists and pilgrims can be counted upon to maintain Jerusalem as a festive town for a long time to come.

Attitudes - When describing attitudes of a municipal population comprising Arabs and Jews, Armenians and Greeks, Moslems and Christians, Orthodox and secular Jews, University professors and Coptic monks, generalizations can only be few and far between. What is painfully evident, however, is the widespread state of shock and mental confusion still suffered by the Old City inhabitants. The sudden collapse of entire worlds of propaganda and the concomitant confrontation with flesh and blood Jews en masse has assumed for most very much the nature of a dream, more specifically, of a nightmare. While few would deny that these real live Jews fail to fulfill their bloodthirsty caricatures, this fact does little to dull the pain. For most of the Arabs the only sedative is that miracle drug called "internationalization". Many others, particularly the youth, manage to avoid drawing conclusions through recourse to the "second round" formula: Hussein will return!

The Arab Jerusalemites are not the only ones whose psyche has been disturbed by the June 5-10 earthquake. For their Jewish counterparts and for all Israelis who daily converge on it the amazing capture of Old Jerusalem has transfigured what could have been but another brutal page in the Arab-Israel conflict and rendered it a historic moment in Jewish History. For **them**, whether religious or otherwise, the return to integral Jerusalem has **meant** a collective return to the highway of destiny. For them, the Rock of Israel has once more revealed His faithfulness to His People.

With respect to many of the Israeli visitors, particularly those of Western origin, this initial encounter with the Old City and its population has also had more disquieting overtures: it is their first face-to-face encounter

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with the Orient and their first conscious realization that they are part of it and it is now more than ever part of them. Oriental Jews are generally much more at home in the Walled City than their Ashkenazi brethren and it is common to see Arabic-speaking Jews conversing at cafes and street corners with the inhabitants.

Problems - For the Israelis to succeed in really fusing Old and New Cities it will be necessary to tackle both psychological and material problems simultaneously. These are weighty and their resolution will require dynamism, determination and magnanimity. They have gotten off to a good start with the daring decision to lower the barriers soon after the fighting ceased. As a result of this, Arab and Jewish Jerusalemites now know each other as human beings, not as propaganda creations. The inevitable incidents have not yet occurred. In the person of Mayor Teddy KOLLEK, in the nationwide sentiment that Jerusalem is something unique, and in the absence of any hatred for the Arabs, the Israelis hold important assets for approaching the task in an imaginative and constructive manner.

They will need all this -- and money too -- in order, first of all, to restore economic activity soonest to the Old City where a large proportion of the population, poor by any standards prior to the War, today suffers severely the effects of unemployment. The Israelis can not permit to continue for long the unfortunate contrast between affluent Israeli visitors and poor Arab residents. Jobs must be found and wages equalized. The opening of Histadrut ranks to Old City workers is a most important step in this direction. A return to regularized tourism employing the human and material resources of the Old City will also go far towards correcting the present economic imbalance. While it could presumably affect relatively few in numbers, there is no question but that a favorable Israel decision on the question of compensation for property lost in 1948 would afford a great psychological boost to the municipal fusion.

On the human level, it is incumbent upon the Israelis to show the Arab residents that they regard them with respect and treat them with dignity. Second-class citizenship will not suffice. This means, amongst many things, a full incorporation of Arabs into municipal political and social life and recognition and use of Arabic as an official language.

Holy Places - With the exception of the Orthodox who confine their visits to such specifically Jewish sites as the Western Wall and the numerous



cemetaries, the bulk of the Israeli visitors display a highly catholic interest in the Old City's Christian and Moslem shrines. What this has meant in practice is the mobbing of these Holy Places by tens of thousands of visitors who possess precious little knowledge of either Christianity or Islam and whose conduct has given rise to a spate of stories about "Jewish disrespect and sacrilege." Bearing in mind, on the one hand, the myriads of Jewish visitors involved and their ignorance concerning ecclesiastical decorum, and, on the other, the traditional anti-Jewish predispositions of so many of the Christian and Moslem story tellers, this development should dismay no one. Nor does an investigation of the situation which reveals no real cause for alarm. Other than the disquieting factor of their sheer numbers and their readiness to discuss out loud in Churches their impressions at the strange sights, the Israelis behave no differently, neither for better nor for worse, than more traditional visitors to the Old City. While Israeli women tourists closely ape their European and American sisters in dress unsuited for the occasion, many of them are armed with useful shawls and kerchiefs. As the sheer novelty of such visits wears off (there are few Israelis who visit Christian and Moslem shrines in Israel) and as Christians clerics and Moslem qadis adjust themselves to a Jewish presence in the City of David the more prosaic aspects of protecting the dignity of the Holy Places should resolve themselves. It would undoubtedly facilitate matters if the Defenders of the respective Faiths would show greater readiness to truly welcome the Israeli visitors. In so doing the Christians, at least, would be merely practicing what they preach: LOVE THY NEIGHBOR AS THY SELF.

POL:JDLeonard

~~SECRET~~

Monday, August 28, 1967  
3:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Soviet Objections to Transit of Arctic Straits: Information

Two weeks ago the Coast Guard icebreakers EAST WIND and EDISTO started on a voyage around the Arctic ice pack. Weather permitting, they planned to pass north of Soviet islands above Siberia and all controversial straits.

Wednesday the icebreakers radioed us that Arctic ice would force them south, obliging them to go through the Vilkitsky Strait (past the most northerly point in mid-Siberia).

The Soviets claim sovereignty over the strait, which is 18 miles wide, and say we must ask 30 days in advance for permission to pass. We regard the strait as international waters, and believe the doctrine of innocent passage would apply in any case.

The Russians have reminded us of their rules. We have told them that our ships were forced south by weather, and that we trust our icebreakers will not encounter difficulty. We have instructed the icebreakers to heave to and wait for instructions if they are actually stopped. We would not try to force the straits, and will turn back if the Soviets oblige us to.

Ambassador Thompson thinks the Soviets will not make an incident. While this may be optimistic, we believe serious trouble is unlikely even if they stop us.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-298  
By ing, NARA, Date 10.26.95

~~SECRET~~

61

*Pres file*

Monday, August 28, 1967  
2:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Moyers asks permission to  
help us on the Viet Nam issue.

W. W. Rostow

Tell him to proceed \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

Harry F. Guggenheim, *President and Editor in Chief*

Bill D. Moyers, *Publisher*

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Walt:

The everlasting debate on Vietnam is raging around methods: the bombing, the DNZ, etc. In the midst of the fury few people are really talking about the fundamentals of why we are there in the first place. First causes are often neglected when means become the center of controversy, and, ironically, most people are neglecting the situation the President inherited in November, 1963.

But as John F. Kennedy himself said a few months before his death:

"For us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but of Southeast Asia."

And as Ted Sorenson told President Johnson in January 1964:

"The commitment to preserve Vietnam was not made by Democrats --- but we are not free to abandon it."

And as Arthur Schlesinger said on page 536 of his history of the Kennedy Administration:

"Whether we were right in 1954 to undertake this commitment will long be a matter of interest to historians, but it had ceased by 1961 to be of interest to policy makers. We became every succeeding year more imprisoned by it. Whether the domino theory was valid in 1954, it had acquired validity seven years later. Kennedy used to mutter about our 'overcommitment in Southeast Asia; but he had no choice now but to work within the situation he had inherited."

Isn't it time to remind the country of just what the President faced when he took office? I think such an effort to do so would bring major issues back into focus. But it can't be done in a speech, and it can't be done by someone still in the Administration, and it certainly cannot be achieved in one column or a Max Frankel story in the New

p. 2

York Times.

I think that I could do it in a way that would be convincing and receive wide attention --- in a major magazine piece or through our syndicate which could place it in newspapers with a circulation well over 15 million people. It would have to be a thoughtful, analytical piece, written by one who was there and thus with authority (I have resisted dozens of offers to write my "inside account" of my experience at the White House, and I shall continue to do so; but this is not what I contemplate in this piece. This, I believe, could help the President --- largely because of the timing and the author.)

And I want to help him. For the past six months I have been relatively quiet because it was important to convince the staff of Newsday that they were getting a publisher not a propagandist (like most journalists, they are a cynical lot, and they greeted my appointment here with fear and unusual suspicion, but all that has turned out well.)

I have been waiting for the right time and the right place to take a public position that would be helpful. Now, when everyone is cutting and running, is the time. It does no good to stand up and say: "I support the President because he was good to me." The best way to help, it seems to me, is to come out swinging at a critical point on policy, and the kind of article I am talking about --- reminding the people of the circumstances he faced, the courage he demonstrated in meeting them, and the consistency of his stand with what went before him --- would accomplish this purpose.

I don't want to do this unless you and he think it worthwhile, and I couldn't do it without your cooperation, for it would mean spending a couple or three days there refreshing my memory and reviewing some of the original material of the time span in which all this occurred; I would, of course, submit the draft for clearance before it would be used, and for judgment as to whether it should be used at all.

When the price gets high, people forget what they are buying. This has happened, and the country needs to be reminded of what it is we had to do and are trying to do.

My only motive is to help. Let me know what you think.

Sincerely,



Bill Moyers

August 28, 1967  
2:30 p.m.

62  
In file

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William Jordan

Harold Kaplan, in Brussels, is having transport problems. He cannot arrive in Saigon until the observer group gets there.

I see great advantages in having the press man accompany the group from here, which will give him a chance to know them, and them to know him.

Bob Levine is a first-class man. He was the Deputy Information Officer in Saigon for two years. He is smart, has a good personality, and can do the job.

I have him standing by ready to go if you approve.

I have talked with Walt Rostow and George Christian, and they concur.

Approved  
8/28/67

William J. Jordan



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~*Pres file*

Monday, August 28, 1967 -- 11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an interim report on your assignments of this morning.

-- Dick Helms will file a personal, interim report to you on the effects of bombing in North Viet Nam.

-- Sec. Rusk will take in hand personally the briefing of Morgan, Moss, Reid, and others on pacification and land reform.

-- Bus Wheeler will file with us an interim report on the state of the barrier. In brief, the conventional fixed barrier section is moving forward on schedule; the munitions and control arrangements appear to be going forward well; Bob McNamara and Bus Wheeler will be going this week to see a munitions exhibition at Eglin Field; they may not exactly meet their November 1 deadline but are not badly off target.

-- By the end of the day we shall have a system for monitoring the responses to Congressional Record and ticker, tied in with State and Defense, with Dick Moose responsible for keeping me informed.

-- Although we may decide to send Kaplan along with Lodge and the election observers for the next week, he will be the key man on Viet Nam, working with Bill Jordan.

-- Bob McNamara and Bus Wheeler are working on new military approaches to the war on the ground in the south. Bus has gone out to Westmoreland on this point. It may come up at tomorrow's Tuesday lunch.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-302  
By 129, NARA, Date 9-28-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*To send*  
~~Monday~~, August 28, 1967  
~~P.D.~~ 10:30 A.M.

64

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

3.4(b)(1)

This is an interesting but indecisive [REDACTED] report on attitudes in Hanoi.

It alleges:

1. Pham Van Dong would like to negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible. He believes North Viet Nam is being hurt so badly that it is danger of choosing between collapse and letting the Chinese intervene massively.

2. Ho Chi Minh agrees that the war is going badly, but prefers to hold off peace talks until early 1968.

3. Two factors allegedly influencing Ho are:

- the promise of increased Soviet aid;
- the possibility of increased post-election political instability in South Viet Nam.

4. As the CIA comments indicate, there is some uncertainty about the accuracy of this report; but it may contain elements of truth.

W. W. R.

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SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 02-264  
By is, NARA, Date 7-31-03



SECRET

Monday, August 28, 1967

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1) TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1) [REDACTED]

CIA comments that in view of the fact that [REDACTED] has been known in the past to embroider information for his own and his Government's purposes and the additional possibility that North Vietnamese officials are feeding him information for their own purposes, it is difficult to separate fact from speculation or misinformation in the report.

Begin text:

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1) The group of officials in the North Vietnamese regime who have generally tended to take a more open-minded position toward the possibility of negotiations with the American Government to end the Vietnam War recognized in mid-August 1967 that chances for early peace talks were very slim. The North Vietnamese Ambassador to Indonesia, Pham Binh, who has been of this clique, sent word to Suharto's [REDACTED] for secret talks on the Vietnam problem, [REDACTED] that his (Binh's) optimism before departing for consultations at Hanoi in July 1967, had proven unjustified; before leaving Djakarta, Binh had told [REDACTED] he was hopeful that talks might occur in August or September 1967.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1) An Indonesian Embassy Official in Hanoi relayed to [REDACTED] the explanation that Pham Van Dong, chief figure in the so-called moderate clique, firmly believes that the war is going

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so badly for the North Vietnamese that if it is not ended in a matter of months, North Vietnam would need massive Chinese intervention to prevent total collapse within eighteen months. Pham Van Dong and his sympathizers fear entry of Chinese combat troops almost as much as they do American troops; they have been concerned that only North Vietnam is suffering from further prosecution of the war; they believe North Vietnam's negotiating position will deteriorate further as America has stepped up its military pressure; outside help from Russia and China to North Vietnam is sorely limited and North Vietnamese civilian and military manpower is sorely pressed. Therefore, Dong's view was that the sooner negotiations could commence and relieve the military pressures on Hanoi the better for the North Vietnamese. This was a difference of viewpoint from Ho, however, not an open break. Dong has bowed to Ho Chi Minh's insistence that the war effort be continued.

Ho, who is as fully in control of the Hanoi regime as ever, agrees with Dong that the war is going badly and costing North Vietnam heavily at present. He sees the winter months, however, as a chance to improve the military position in the South somewhat, to increase supplies to Viet Cong elements in South Vietnam, and then to make a bid for peace talks from a greater position of strength shortly after the new year. He is confident that the North Vietnamese situation will improve over the next few months to permit this.

One factor influencing Ho is the change in the Soviet attitude. The Russians, who were earlier suspected by Ho Chi Minh of wobbling in their support of a militant Hanoi position, have now strongly urged Ho not to negotiate at least until early next year. They have promised Ho an additional two hundred million U.S. dollars worth of military and economic aid for Calendar Year 1968 if Ho fights on; if he does not, they threatened to cut off the aid. Their position is now almost as militant as that of Peking. The Soviets, however, have stated that they wish to have Ho continue fighting until early 1968 and then they will reassess the situation.

This conforms with Ho's own views, and the Pham Van Dong moderates also recognize that post-election political

instability could occur in South Vietnam and that increased Soviet aid would help the war effort greatly. They are skeptical whether either factor or both would offset increased American military strength and North Vietnamese declining resources. Ho's decision, however, stands, and both he and Pham Van Dong are relieved that there will be less necessity to rely exclusively on Communist China. Ho's Chinese top advisors, of whom five out of seventeen have been killed during recent war action and bombings, advocate indefinite continuation of the war. So does the pro-Chinese element in the North Vietnamese politburo, who would agree to negotiations only as a ruse to gain time for a renewed war effort.

(Source Comment: The Soviet reasons for wanting the war to continue until early 1968 are obscure unless they plan another military diversion in some other part of the world and want many American troops pinned down until then. The best way to increase the influence of the Pham Van Dong "peace-minded" clique and to convince them to strengthen their arguments with Ho in favor of negotiations is for the Americans to increase the pressure on Hanoi and prove that Ho is wrong in expecting military improvement before early next year.)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

(CIA Comment: [redacted] has maintained frequent contact in Djakarta with Pham Binh and has been at least indirectly in touch with Pham Van Dong and other North Vietnamese officials over a period of several months. His description of Pham Van Dong as a relatively peace-minded North Vietnamese leader and of existence of a "moderate" clique may be overdrawn but probably not consciously on [redacted] part. He himself is fairly hawkish on Vietnam especially for an Indonesian, and it is more likely that Pham Binh and Pham Van Dong have consciously exaggerated their possible slight differences in view with Ho to impress the Indonesians. [redacted] was adamant, however, in insisting that the information on increased Soviet aid to Hanoi came from North Vietnamese officials themselves, whatever their motives for so advising him.

It is extremely doubtful that North Vietnamese officials would discuss with any foreigners the extent of disagreement

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

within the policy-making group at the top of the regime; it is equally improbable that they would reveal Soviet attitudes and conditions in granting aid or give precise information on the amount of aid. On the other hand, it is possible they have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] determined to continue the war and that the Soviets have agreed to support them with additional aid. Other information on the status of Soviet/North Vietnamese aid negotiations indicate, however, that the aid agreements for the first six months of 1968 is still being negotiated and has not yet been signed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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