

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10 Tom Johnson
Bics
1026

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Subject: Presidential Statement on NPT

Adrian Fisher informs me that Secretary Rusk would like to make two minor changes in the Presidential statement that the Secretary approved last week.

- (1) He would like to change the first paragraph to read as follows in order to make the point that the US and the Soviets are submitting the draft treaty jointly in their capacity as co-chairmen on the ENDC:

→ "Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are ~~together~~ submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons."

- (2) He would like to delete the words, "without further delay," from the third paragraph on page two.

A corrected copy of the statement is attached.

Spurgeon
Spurgeon Keeny

Att. - a/s

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 10-2-91

Statement By The President
on Presentation to the 18-Nation
Disarmament Committee of
~~DRAFT~~ PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT
Non-Proliferation Treaty

102 c

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as
Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee are
~~together~~ submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the
dangerous spread of nuclear weapons.

For more than twenty years, the world has watched with in-
creasing apprehension as nuclear weapons have spread. Today, for
the first time, we have within our grasp a way to arrest this dangerous
development.

Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of this dread-
ful capability. We believe now -- as we did then -- that even one such
nation is too many. But the issue is not whether ~~one or five~~ ^{some} have
nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether all nations
will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. The issue
is whether all nations will recognize that we have reached a new moment
of choice. The issue is whether we will now choose to stop a further
drift into danger.

The submission of a draft treaty by the United States and the
Soviet Union brings us to the final and most critical stage of our effort.
The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, as well
as for negotiation by the Conference.

If we are to agree on a treaty, it must be one that is responsive
to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world -- great
and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear, highly
industrialized and less developed.

It must ~~enhance~~ ^{add to}, not diminish, the security of all.

It must encourage, not hinder, the development and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

It must provide adequate ^{protection} ~~assurances~~ against the corruption
of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am firmly convinced that we are today offering an instrument
to satisfy all these requirements. It can mitigate the danger of

that much
will meet

~~nuclear war. It can stimulate the peaceful development of nuclear energy. It can greatly improve the chances for nuclear disarmament.~~

If we now go ^{great} forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a gift of ~~great benefit~~ ^{those} to the generations who follow us. (C) Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and ~~our~~ grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience, in a world that needs all of its ~~vital~~ resources and talents to serve life, not death.

~~The world does not need -- and does not want -- more and more nuclear weapons in the hands of more and more nations. The world needs -- and has a right to -- sustenance and shelter and security.~~

^{I have given instructions to}
~~I have provided the United States representative, William C. Foster, with instructions which reflect our sense of urgency, our firm dedication to the task, and our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.~~ ^{end}

The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now has before it the opportunity to make a cardinal contribution to man's future safety and peace. ~~For I am convinced that men of reason will reject the idea that they are powerless to prevent the further uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons.~~

~~and to demand that they~~

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union ^{as Co-Chairmen of} ~~are together submitting to~~ the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee ^{are together submitting to the Committee} ~~on Disarmament~~ a draft treaty to stop the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons.

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The submission of a draft treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union brings us to the final and most critical stage of our effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, as well as for negotiation by the Conference.

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It must provide adequate assurances against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am firmly convinced that we are today offering an instrument to satisfy all these requirements. It can mitigate the danger of nuclear war. It can stimulate the peaceful development of nuclear energy. It can greatly improve the chances for nuclear disarmament.

If we now go forward to completion of a worldwide agreement, we will pass on a gift of great benefit to the generations who follow us. Failure to complete our work ~~without further delay~~ will be interpreted by our children and our grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience in a world that needs all of its vital resources and talents to serve life, not death.

The world does not need -- and does not want -- more and more nuclear weapons in the hands of more and more nations. The world needs -- and has a right to -- sustenance and shelter and security.

I have provided the United States representative, Mr. William C. Foster, with instructions which reflect our sense of urgency, our firm dedication to the task, and our determination to ensure that a fair and effective treaty is concluded.

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8/22/67

(B) *the treaty must reconcile the interests of nations with our common interest as a community of human beings on a small planet.*

102e
adequacy of nations and human beings

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

Today at Geneva the United States and the Soviet Union as ~~Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee~~ are together submitting to the Committee a draft treaty to stop the ~~dangerous~~ spread of nuclear weapons.

For more than twenty years, the world has ~~watched~~ with increasing apprehension as nuclear weapons have spread. ~~Today, for the first time, we have within our grasp a way to arrest this dangerous development.~~

In that time

came

in 1945

Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of this dread capability. ~~We believe now -- as we did then -- that even one such nation is too many. But the issue is not whether one or five have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether all nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. The issue is whether all nations will recognize that we have reached a new moment of choice. The issue is whether we will now choose to stop a further drift into danger.~~

(A)

Today, for the first time, we have within our grasp

reach

an instrument which

permits us to make a choice.

The submission of a draft treaty by the United States and the Soviet Union brings us to the final and most critical stage of our effort. The draft will be available for consideration by all governments, as well as for negotiation by the Conference.

The treaty

meets

~~If we are to agree on a treaty, it must be one that is responsive to the needs and problems of all the nations of the world -- great and small, aligned and non-aligned, nuclear and non-nuclear, highly industrialized and less developed.~~

increase

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It must provide adequate assurances against the corruption of the peaceful atom to its use for weapons of war.

I am firmly convinced that we are today offering an instrument to satisfy all these requirements. It can ~~mitigate~~ the danger of

reduce

greatly

nuclear war. It can stimulate the peaceful development of nuclear energy. It can greatly improve the chances for nuclear disarmament.

If we now go forward to ~~completion~~^{complete} of a worldwide agreement, ~~we will pass on a gift of great benefit to the generations who follow us.~~^{we shall} Failure to complete our work will be interpreted by our children and our grandchildren as a betrayal of conscience in a world that needs all of its vital resources and talents to serve life, not death.

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responsibility

(8-22-67)

If we shall demonstrate that despite all his problems, quarrels, and distractions - man still retains a capacity to design his fate, rather than be engulfed by it.

C

105F

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

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8/22/67

crit's 8/24

P file

103

Tuesday, August 22, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have amended the memo on McCarthy's African speech as you instructed -- with one exception. No matter how one cuts the numbers on visits by African heads of government, the totals for the last four years aren't as impressive as those for 1961-63. Most African countries became independent in the early 60's and wanted to show they were grown up by sending their leaders here. Thus, President Kennedy had 23 visitors compared with 20 since you took office. And a comparison with Eisenhower is meaningless because there were very few independent African countries before 1960.

You should also be aware that the total aid figure used in paragraph #2 refers only to development aid, not the Supporting Assistance poured into the Congo and the base rental paid to Morocco and Libya. This corresponds to what McCarthy is talking about.

Ed Hamilton

PRESERVATION COPY

1032

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What We Are Doing in Africa

Senator McCarthy's speech (ticker clipping at Tab A) charges that we don't pay enough attention to Africa except in crisis; that U.S. aid should be concentrated on long-term problems, particularly agriculture; and that we are too optimistic about African development. In reply, I would cite the following facts:

1. U.S. aid to Africa in FY 1967 -- excluding food -- totalled \$202 million, more than 14% above the 1966 level. The budget request now before the Congress (\$195 million) would support a continuation of that high level.
2. Total U.S. development aid to Africa has increased by more than 10% during the Johnson Administration as compared with the previous four years -- despite the steady decline in appropriations for development aid. (Total for fiscal 1964-67: more than \$1.4 billion.)
3. Food aid to Africa increased by 18% in 1967 and will rise by a further 11% in 1968 -- a total increase of 25% over three years.
4. AID is now financing more than 1,800 technicians in Africa working on health, agriculture and education, the long-term problems of development. This is a 20% increase over 1966. The 1968 request provides for a slight increase.
5. About 25% of the 1968 request would be used for agriculture projects, an increase of almost 50% in agriculture spending over the previous year.
6. Supporting Assistance, the AID account which finances non-developmental, crisis-related activities, is declining in Africa. It amounted to about \$22 million in 1967, more than \$1 million less than in 1966. It should take another drop in 1968.
7. The President has worked harder than any President in history to make sure that U.S. policy toward Africa is energetic, sensible and realistic:
 - he commissioned the first general study of African development ever undertaken in the U.S. government -- the Korry Report.
 - he gave the first speech entirely addressed to African development problems ever given by an American President (the OAU speech, May 26, 1966).
 - he sent his Under Secretary of State on the first tour of Africa ever made by an American official of his rank.

-- within the past year alone, he has received and exchanged views with President Senghor of Senegal, the King of Morocco, Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, President Banda of Malawi, President Kayibanda of Rwanda, and President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast. Within the next two months he will receive President Diori of Niger, General Ankrah of Ghana, and probably Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon and Nyerere of Tanzania as well. (Last three not announced; last two not finally approved.)

8. AID's attitude toward African development problems is evident in the following quote from the Agency's Congressional presentation for FY 1968:

-- "Economic problems and the development challenge moved even more to the foreground. . . (in Africa). . . with the difficult realities of the task becoming more widely and clearly recognized and the long-term nature of the development process becoming more generally accepted."

This isn't rampant optimism. It is recognition that many Africans are finally coming to realize that there is no future in grandiose posturing on the world stage or in gratuitous adventures against their neighbors. More and more, Africa is looking inward to the immense labors required to achieve political stability and economic growth. This doesn't make those problems any easier; nobody pretends that it does. But it is the first necessary step toward dealing with them at all. We are right to hail it as reason for hope.

9. The real barrier to U.S. promotion of African development has come from the Senate, not the President. Last year, over the strong objection of the Administration, the Senate placed a limit of 10 on the number of countries outside Latin America. A powerful counter-effort by the House conferees resulted in a provision which permitted the President to waive this limit when he found it in the national interest. The President made enough such waivers to allow loans to 24 countries, 14 of them in Africa. If he had not made these waivers, the United States would have been forced to refuse to finance worthy projects in 9-12 African countries. We have worked hard to get many of these countries into a position to propose sensible projects. Nothing could be more self-defeating than to cut them off now on the completely arbitrary ground that there are too many countries involved.

10. Yet the situation this year is even worse. The Senate version of the foreign aid bill effectively revokes the President's waiver authority and places an absolute limit of 15 on the number of countries to which loans can be made. This would mean refusing loans to at least 7 countries in which we now plan to lend -- most if not all of them in Africa. And what would we gain from this refusal? Only the "satisfaction" of knowing that we are lending in 15 countries rather than 22 -- a meaningless benefit from the standpoint both of African development and of U.S. foreign policy. The greatest immediate favor the Senate could do for African progress would be to instruct its conferees not to press to keep this limitation in the final Act.

Ed Hamilton

C

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

104

Tuesday, Aug. 22, 1967
4:00 p. m.

*dec'd
4:30*

MR. PRESIDENT:

It looks as if the USSR is willing to table the NPT with us on Thursday -- exact time of day not yet decided.

You may wish to decide if the attached draft statement (sent up sometime ago) is satisfactory.

It should, I believe, be read by Foster in Geneva and simultaneously released here.

We should know the time tomorrow.

W.R.

☒ Approve draft

☐ Disapprove

1040

*plus
superadded
by statement
drafted by
WGC & HOG-B
8/23/67*

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

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8/11/47

1046

1. susp
2. Pres file

Tuesday, August 15, 1967
10:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THROUGH GEORGE CHRISTIAN

Bill Foster recommends you put out the attached statement at the time, possibly later this week, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty is tabled in Geneva.

Secretary Rusk has cleared the draft.

I agree that a statement would be useful. It could be given out as a press release or you could read it for TV.

W. W. Rostow

_____ Put out as press release

_____ I will read it for TV

_____ See me

BKS:amc

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

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8/11/67



1042

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Submission by the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty to the Geneva Conference

I am enclosing for your consideration a draft statement which you may wish to give at the time the non-proliferation treaty is presented to the Geneva disarmament conference.

I discussed this with Mr. Walt Rostow prior to our meeting on Friday.

William C. Foster

Enclosure:

Draft statement

~~Confidential~~
- Presidential file
105

CONFIDENTIAL

August 22, 1967
Tuesday, 1:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your appointment with Governor Docking,
Thursday, 11:30 A.M.

Governor Docking asked to see you to report on his August 13-22 trip to Vietnam. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Win Brown who was recently appointed Special Assistant to Secretary Rusk to deal with State Governors on foreign policy problems.

Ambassador Bunker's personal message to you (Tab A) reports that Governor Docking is a firm believer in our Vietnam policy and had a highly successful visit.

Additional background on his visit, including his interest in the Vietnam rural development program, is given in a State memo (Tab B).

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-4-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 22, 1967

105a

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Governor Docking, accompanied by Brigadier General Fry, Commander of the Kansas Air National Guard, left late last night after a five-day-visit here.

I had an opportunity to talk with him yesterday afternoon and he came for dinner last night.

He and General Fry visited all four Corps areas and reported that they had had an excellent opportunity to familiarize themselves with both military operations and the pacification organization and operations in the field. They also had briefings here and expressed themselves as most appreciative of the mission's cooperation.

Governor Docking told me that everything he had seen here strengthened his view as to the correctness of our policy. He felt that we were very definitely making progress and saw nothing static in the situation.

He had an opportunity to talk with both the officers and the men in the field and expressed the highest praise for the morale and competence of our troops.

He also expressed admiration for the organization of our advisory and supporting role in pacification and its field operations. He reported that he found enthusiasm everywhere on the part of Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development personnel, both civilian and military, for the new setup.

In my talks with him, I had an opportunity to give him a general overall view of the situation as we see it here--military, political, and economic--and our feeling that with reinforcement of the success we have already attained we shall be able to accelerate the pace of progress.

I believe you will find that he is a strong supporter of your policies here.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-133

By 82, NARA, Date 7-28-94

BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR CALL ON THE
PRESIDENT BY GOVERNOR DOCKING

Governor Robert B. Docking, Democrat, of Kansas, is visiting Vietnam August 13-22, in accord with the President's general invitation to all the Governors to appraise the situation there at first hand. The Pentagon defrayed the expenses of the trip. Before he left Washington, the Governor was briefed at the Pentagon and in the Department; he had lunch with Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown and saw Governor Harriman.

A staunch supporter of the Administration's policies in Vietnam, Governor Docking, as the Chief Executive of an agricultural state, expressed special interest in observing rural development and pacification. Two of the divisions now serving in Vietnam were trained in Kansas, and a number of Vietnamese have studied in Kansas.

A recent message from Saigon indicates that the Governor is well satisfied with his trip. He has been afforded ample opportunity to see rural development (R & D) programs in all areas. He spoke with Ambassador Komer and with United States AID people. He has talked with many Kansans in the field. He visited troops of the First Infantry Division in the field, spent a night at the headquarters of II Corps in Pleiku, and saw the Commanding General of the Third Marine Amphibious Force and troops of the First Marine Division in the Danang area.

Governor Docking will deliver a major address on Vietnam on August 26 to the Young Democrats of Kansas, with emphasis on pacification and rural development. Last April, in a speech in Washington before the National Capital Democratic Women's Club he stressed that it was high time for all Americans to extend wholehearted support in Vietnam, that criticism was justified only when coupled with constructive alternatives, and that he was unaware of solid suggestions for a more effective approach to our responsibilities in Vietnam. This was also his central theme in several talks in Kansas in May and June.

Governor Docking believes that the colleges and universities of Kansas have a large potential to train Vietnamese in agriculture, rural development, civil and industrial engineering and related fields. He hopes to establish such follow-up programs in Kansas, to further our long-range aims in Vietnam, provided that he can secure adequate funds from AID for this purpose. He plans to discuss this subject further with AID, in the course of Wednesday, August 23 when he is debriefed in the Department, at the Pentagon, and in the Department of Agriculture.

Governor Docking comes from a distinguished banking family (biographic information is attached).

Attachment:

Biographic Information

105c

GOVERNOR ROBERT B. DOCKING

KANSAS

Biography

ROBERT B. DOCKING, Democrat, born October 9, 1925, in Kansas City, Missouri.

Holds BS Degree from the University of Kansas, 1948; Certificate of Graduation, Graduate School of Banking, University of Wisconsin.

He has a service record with Army Air Force, 1943-51, First Lieutenant.

Positions -- President, Union State Bank; Partner in Docking-Williams Insurance Agency; Assistant Treasurer and Director, Kansas Public Service Company; Secretary-Treasurer, Arkansas Valley Feeders, Inc.

In 1959 he was named young man of the year by the Kansas JAYCEES. His home is in Arkansas City, Kansas. Married to the former Meredith Gear of Elkhart, Kansas; they have two children, William age 15 and Thomas age 12.

Elected Governor of Kansas in November, 1966 and inaugurated in January, 1967. His father, George Docking, was first Democrat to win a second term. First father-son family tradition in Kansas gubernatorial history.

#####

~~SECRET~~Tues August 22, 1967
1:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the Shah -- 5:30 p. m. Tuesday and Wednesday

The Shah would like to see you alone. Since the main purpose of his visit is to develop your personal relationship, this makes sense. You have nothing to negotiate but lots to talk about. Some of these subjects may fall over into after-dinner chat or into your second session. But the following cover the full range of likely topics:

MIDDLE EAST

1. Arab-Israel. You want to see a peace that will last. You are ready to play a constructive role, but you can't force the Israelis to move. The leaders of the region have to face up to the need to end the state of war. Then maybe we can help find the terms of a settlement. You appreciate his constructive stand. What does he think chances for a settlement are? (He believes it's important to shore up Hussein.)
2. Regionalism. You think it's important for the Middle East to begin acting like a region. On your Pacific trip you saw what regional cooperation promises to do. Iran is a natural to help draw the Middle East together, because the Shah has broader contacts than most leaders. For instance, you understand the Shah, at his recent meeting with President Ayub and the Turkish Prime Minister, kept Ayub from tearing up CENTO.
3. Nasser. You know the Shah is concerned about radical Arab influence in the Persian Gulf. We are too. You hope Iran and her neighbors will cooperate in strengthening the Gulf as a little region all its own.

GLOBAL

4. U. S. -Soviet relations. You'd like to tell him a little about your meeting with Kosygin -- your reflections on how far the thaw goes.
5. Iran-USSR. You'd like to hear his experience with the Russians. (He has moved toward more open relations with Moscow but had second thoughts since the Middle East war. While we can't keep him from a business relationship with the USSR, we do want to urge caution. Congress gets upset.)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-298
By sig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

6. USSR-Middle East. You'd be interested in his estimate of the Soviet objectives. Moscow has made some gains but you doubt the Russians will pay the full bill to bail Nasser out. You're still certain Moscow's main aim is to drive us out of the area and undercut non-socialist governments.

7. Vietnam. You thank him again for Iran's medical unit. (He will appreciate any thoughts you want to confide on our position.)

U. S. -IRANIAN RELATIONS

8. Shah's independent policy. You frankly recognize that a new era is beginning in our relations and you welcome it. You are pleased that Iran's own income is increasing and that Iran's dependence on outside aid is decreasing. (AID phases out this year.) This is not the end of American participation in the Shah's development program. It's a chance for American private enterprise backed by the Export-Import Bank to enlarge its relations with all aspects of the Iranian economy.

9. Reform. You congratulate him on Iran's economic progress and would like to hear how his reform program is going.

10. Military aid. You know the Shah is concerned about the state of our military assistance. (There is \$100 million in credit still to go under our current sales understanding. This is a firm contract, which we would have to find a way to fulfill even if the Church Amendment stands. The Shah is mainly thinking beyond this.) You want to continue our military relationship and we'll do the best we can within the limits Congress sets. You'd like to tell him about Congressional attitudes because he'll be seeing members of the Foreign Relations Committee Wednesday afternoon and other members of Congress at the Vice President's luncheon on Thursday.

151

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday, Aug. 22, 1967
11:45 a.m.

107

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk's files show the following statement:

"During the last 12 months the President has seen 61 foreign visitors."

W. W. R.

8/22/67 The President called Mr Rostow and said Secy Rusk had told him the Pres had seen, or would see, 65 foreign visitors this year. Pres. asked Mr. Rostow to clarify if he meant he had already seen 65, or would in the course of the year. Jane in Rusk's office said that the paper he had gotten his figure from said that "the President had seen 61 foreign visitors in the last 12 months," that is Aug. 1966-67. Dorothy Territo's records, based on the President's diary, showed a number of additions, particularly during the President's visit to Bonn for the Adenauer funeral. mjdr suggested Mr. Smith talk to State (in this case Mrs. Jean Davis) and ask her to add the names to the list which was now on Rusk's desk (copy underneath this file kindly sent by Fran Hess). Which he did. Mrs. Territor suggested someone get together with State as to interpretation of what constituted a "visit!" Dick Moose has a note on this (via Carole).

S. Hildred

1072

August 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. DAVIS:

Here are the names for addition to the list of Presidential contacts, August 1966-67. All of them have been confirmed on the basis of President Johnson's records.

April 25, 1967, 45-minute meeting:

Prime Minister Wilson, Great Britain

April 25, 1967, luncheon

Prime Minister Krag, Denmark

Prime Minister Bœynantes, Belgium

Prime Minister Klaus, Austria

Prime Minister Werner, Luxembourg

Prime Minister Petrus de Jong, the Netherlands

Prime Minister Per Borten, Norway

Prime Minister Erlander, Sweden

Prime Minister Demirel, Turkey

Prime Minister Benediktsson, Iceland

151

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

1076

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1967

TO: MILDRED ZAYAC

FROM: Dorothy Territo

I realize this list is subject to State Department interpretation and would like to suggest that conversation might be helpful for us to learn their guidelines.

I have only one event -- the Adenauer funeral -- that Mr. Rostow might like to consider for additions. My records show that the President had a 45-minute meeting with Prime Minister Wilson and party on April 25.

Also, that the President lunched with the following persons (in addition to those listed) and had conversation for half an hour after lunch:

- Prime Minister Krag - Denmark
- Prime Minister Boeynants, Belgium
- Prime Minister Klaus, Austria
- Prime Minister Werner, Luxembourg
- Prime Minister Petrus de Jong, the Netherlands
- Prime Minister Per Borten, Norway
- Prime Minister Erlander, Sweden
- Prime Minister Demirel, Turkey
- Prime Minister Benediktsson, Iceland

~~Wilson and party on April 25~~

*Pres's
Library*

107C

Presidential Contacts with
Chiefs of State and Heads of Government
August 1966 - July 1967

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Occasion</u>
<u>August 1966</u>			
2-3	President Shazar	Israel	State visit to U.S.
21	Prime Minister Pearson	Canada	Meeting at Campobello Island
<u>September 1966</u>			
8-9	General Ne Win	Burma	State visit to U.S.
13-16	President Marcos	Philippines	State visit to U.S.
26-27	Chancellor Erhard	Germany	Official visit to U.S.
28	President Senghor	Senegal	Informal visit to U.S.
<u>October 1966</u>			
12-13	Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma	Laos	Informal visit to U.S.
19-31	Prime Minister Holt Prime Minister Holyoake President Marcos General Thieu General Ky King Bhumibol Prime Minister Kittikachorn Prime Minister Rahman President Park	Australia New Zealand Philippines Viet-Nam Viet-Nam Thailand Thailand Malaysia Korea	Manila Conference and attendant visits

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Occasion</u>
<u>December 1966</u>			
3	President Diaz Ordaz	Mexico	Amistad Dam visit
<u>January 1967</u>			
27	Pres.-elect Costa e Silva	Brazil	Informal visit to U.S.
<u>February 1967</u>			
9-10	King Hassan	Morocco	Official visit to U.S. re economic and military needs
13-15	Emperor Haile Selassie	Ethiopia	Official visit to U.S. re military require- ments
<u>March 1967</u>			
14-15	Prime Minister Chung	Korea	Informal visit to U.S.
20-21	Generals Thieu and Ky	Viet-Nam	Guam Conference
28-30	Prime Minister Maiwandwal	Afghanistan	Informal visit while in U.S. for medical treatment
<u>April 1967</u>			
3-4	President Sunay	Turkey	State visit to U.S.
6	Pres.-elect Somoza	Nicaragua	Private visit to U.S.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Occasion</u>
12-14	President Ongania	Argentina	Punta del Este
	President Costa e Silva	Brazil	
	President Frei	Chile	
	President Lleras	Colombia	
	President Fernandez	Costa Rica	
	President Balaguer	Dominican Republic	
	President Arosemena	Ecuador	
	President Mendez	Guatemala	
	President Lopez	Honduras	
	President Diaz Ordaz	Mexico	
	President Guerrero	Nicaragua	
	President Robles	Panama	
	President Stroessner	Paraguay	
	President Belaunde	Peru	
	Prime Minister Williams	Trinidad and Tobago	
	President Gestido	Uruguay	
	President Leoni	Venezuela	
14	Minister-President Pengel and Governor de Vries	Surinam	Paramaribo during return from Punta del Este
18-22	Prime Minister Holyoake	New Zealand	SEATO, ANZUS and Seven-Nation Conferences
24-26	President de Gaulle	France	Adenauer funeral in Bonn
	President Luebke	Germany	
	Chancellor Kiesinger	Germany	
	Prime Minister Moro	Italy	
<u>May 1967</u>			
9-10	Vice-President Yen	China	Informal visit to U.S.
25	Prime Minister Pearson and Governor-General Michener	Canada	Your visit to Expo '67

<u>Date</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Occasion</u>
<u>June 1967</u>			
1, 10-12	Prime Minister Holt	Australia	Informal visit to U.S.
2	Prime Minister Wilson	United Kingdom	Informal visit to U.S. re Mid-East crisis
8	President Banda	Malawi	Informal visit to U.S.
22	Prime Minister Moro	Italy	Informal visit during UNGA
23-25	Premier Kosygin	USSR	Glassboro
26	Prime Minister Maurer	Romania	Informal visit during UNGA
27-29	King Bhumibol	Thailand	State visit to U.S.
28	King Hussein	Jordan	Informal visit to U.S. re Mid-East situation

July 1967

18	President Asgeirsson	Iceland	Informal visit to U.S.
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August 1967

14	President Kayibanda	Rwanda	Informal office visit in U.S.
15-16	Chancellor Kiesinger	Germany	Informal visit to U.S.
17-18	President Houphouet- Boigny	Ivory Coast	Informal visit to U.S.
22-23	Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi	Iran	Informal visit to U.S.

Total Contacts - 66

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

11:25

~~1-Sub~~
2-Proc
108

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a
pleasant farewell message to
President Houphouet-Boigny.



Ed Hamilton

Approved

☒

ret'd 8/22

Disapproved

☐

Speak to me

☐

SUGGESTED FAREWELL MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY OF IVORY COAST

Mr. President:

Your visit has given me a most welcome opportunity to confirm our friendship and the sense of close and constructive association between our two peoples. In our talks together, Mr. President, I profited greatly from your insights into the major problems confronting the world today. I was deeply impressed with the scope of your vision and by your eloquent report of the many advances your own country has made. All Americans join me in saluting these achievements.

We have tried to carry on the work of nation-building on these shores as well. You will have noted changes since your last visit and, I hope, progress. I am confident that you will also have noted that which has not changed: our continuing dedication to freedom and justice for all of our citizens.

Mr. President, you have greatly honored us by your visit to the United States. Mrs. Johnson and I bid you and Madame Houphouet-Boigny a fond farewell and wish you a safe and enjoyable journey home.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

109

Tuesday, August 22, 1967
11:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Komer called for a general chat. He reports as follows:

1. In general, his sense of confidence is increasing daily; and it is shared by Westy and Ambassador Bunker.
2. Specifically, the Viet Cong recruitment figure is now estimated at no more than 3500 per month; it is difficult to find evidence of large-scale infiltration; and this view is beginning to be shared by the chief Intelligence Officer, General Davidson.
3. He has just returned from a visit to the delta where the chief U. S. Intelligence Officer -- notably conservative -- feels "extremely encouraged."
4. They are apparently massing for another offensive north of the DMZ. It is difficult to acquire precise bombing targets; but there is no reason to believe that Westy cannot handle whatever turns up.
5. As seen from Saigon, we are making progress against the "stalemate" argument. He will work hard on the men coming out for the election, including Rowly Evans, Joe Kraft, the CBS crew, and John Scali. He hopes to send them back with a sense that progress is being made in Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~
SENSITIVE

Tuesday, Aug. 22, 1967
9:35 a.m.

110

MR. PRESIDENT:

Chet Cooper reports:

The two Frenchmen have had their visa applications turned down by Hanoi.

They have cabled back that they have a message of great importance that they do not wish to deliver in Paris.

We should know Hanoi's reply in about 24 hours.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 89-111
By plw, NARA, Date 7/18/94

Tuesday, Aug. 22, 1967
9:30 a.m.

171

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I don't know how to rate the Chinese betting
man in Saigon against our Embassy reporters,
but these odds may interest you.

They show Thieu and Huong neck-and-neck.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 9-4-91

111a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Ambassador Locke DATE: August 11, 1967

FROM: Ed Lansdale

SUBJECT: Election Odds

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By ip, NARA, Date 2-7-96

Some days ago, you asked for any information that SLO could pick up about betting odds on the September 3 election, particularly in the local Chinese community. I tasked Cal Mehlert with this. He checked with friends in the community immediately, but was told that no betting was taking place. However, on August 10, his friends tipped him off that informal betting had started, mainly among Chinese who were associates in banking and brokerage houses. The more formal gambling on the election isn't expected to start until about August 25.

The information we now have is that, in the local financial center, among Chinese business associates (not far from the Embassy itself), the following are the going odds:

Thieu v. Huong	even money
Thieu v. Suu	10/8
Huong v. Suu	10/8
Thieu v. Dzu	10/5

Apparently, no other candidates are being considered in the betting at present. The inclusion of Dzu (whom some local political observers feel is a real dark horse possibility), is significant.

Mr. Mehlert's Chinese friends also said that Tran van Huong's organization is active in Cholon. Huong sent a representative, also of the Tran surname, to the Tran Family Association of Cholon to pray before the shrine of the Family Ancestors. Chinese who witnessed the ceremony, said that the gesture was highly appreciated by the clan. In addition, a lot of little old ladies of the Buddhist persuasion are out working for Huong among their lady and family friends.

Huong is also said to have told persons who had had properties expropriated by post-Diem governments that he would restore their properties. (Comment: It was inferred that help from MA Tuyen, former Congregation Chief, had been solicited with this approach.) The Hung Men (or Red Brotherhood), a Chinese fraternal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

association of many strata of society with roots far back in Chinese history, is said to be supporting Huong.

While there may appear to be little surface excitement over the elections in Cholon, there is in fact strong interest revealed when friends meet and families come together. Trieu-sen-Hoach is a Chinese-origin Vietnamese, member of the National Assembly, and candidate for the Senate on List 29. Hoach's father, aged and dim of sight, has set himself a program of visiting one street in Cholon each day. He makes his way slowly from shop to shop, greeting old friends, and lecturing them on the virtues of his son's List, and urging them to get out and vote for his boy.

No matter how much electioneering there may be, certain very simple non-political factors will influence voting among the uneducated in Cholon. The simplicity of the symbol will be important in the Presidential election. Truong-dinh-Dzu's White Dove is highly effective, for the old lady casting her ballot can merely be told to "Vote for the blind ticket." Huong's symbol is not so effective. The voter has to be told to look for a sun, and a man sowing rice, which doesn't really distinguish the ticket sufficiently from Suu's man plowing silhouetted against the sun. When it comes to voting for the Senate, many simple folks will merely take the first six ballots from the top of the pile.

Much political talk among these Chinese, however, is on something else. They are talking about the "boo-boo" made by Mme. Ky. She, as a means to help her husband's candidacy, recently visited two of the hospitals in the Chinese community, playing the role of a gracious "Lady Bountiful." While this visit was appreciated, it actually insulted -- by slight -- half of the community. There are four Chinese community hospitals, each representing an important Chinese congregation. She ignored two of them.

cc: Ambassador Bunker
General Westmoreland
Ambassador Komer
Mr. Calhoun
Mr. Hart
Mr. Jacobson

SLO:EGLansdale:rm

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

112
Tuesday, August 22, 1967
9:20 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary McNamara wishes to add the following item to our lunch agenda today: the question of whether we should seek a Senate vote in support of our Viet Nam policy in connection with the vote on the Defense appropriation.

He leans against this procedure, but will suggest an alternative.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 10-2-11

112

Monday, August 21, 1967

**Tentative Agenda for Tuesday Luncheon
1:00 P.M., August 22**

1. Vietnam

a. Bomb Targets in North Vietnam - Secretary McNamara
At the meeting last Friday night you requested additional targets be suggested for your consideration on Tuesday

b. Information on Vietnam - Secretary Rusk
This will be a description by Secretary Rusk of what State and Defense have done to organize the speed up of coordinated responses to press and Congressional allegations.

2. U.S. Armed Shipments to the Middle East - Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara

The two secretaries will ask you to approve their obtaining Congressional reactions to a relaxation of the current freeze on arms shipments as it applies to Israel and the moderate Arab States.

What they have in mind specifically is given in their joint memorandum which is attached.

3. U.S. Food for India - Secretary Rusk

This concerns the next action which is before you for decision. You have Ed Hamilton's memoranda on George Ball's proposal.

Bromley Smith

NOTE: Walt Rostow will be back in the morning and will attend the Luncheon. If he has further items for the Agenda, he will send them up in the morning.

att: log no. 3143

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, August 22, 1967 -- 10:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached memorandum Secretary Rusk asks that you receive Brazilian Ambassador Leitao da Cunha to deliver President Costa e Silva's reply to your letter of July 26 on supersonic aircraft.

The Ambassador is not expected back from Rio de Janeiro until sometime this weekend. Jim Jones tells me that you will probably be out of town by then. As long as we can assure the Ambassador of an appointment, there should be no problem in delaying the scheduling until your return.

I share Secretary Rusk's views that it is most important that you receive the Ambassador.

Walt Rostow

Attachment

Memorandum to Secretary Rusk

Approve appointment with date to be set after your return .

Disapprove appointment .

Speak to me .



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 21, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment with Brazilian Ambassador

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive Brazilian Ambassador Vasco Leitão da Cunha on Monday, August 28, or as soon thereafter as feasible.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

In July you sent a personal letter to Brazilian President Costa e Silva on the subject of supersonic aircraft (enclosure).

Ambassador Leitão da Cunha plans to return to Washington shortly before August 28 and to seek an appointment with you for August 28 in order to deliver President Costa e Silva's reply to you personally.

Ambassador Tuthill strongly recommends that you see Ambassador Leitão da Cunha. I support this

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 5

Declassified following August 18, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 5

By kg

, NARA, Date 9-4-91

~~SECRET~~

-2-

recommendation. Not only is the issue important in our relations with Latin America, but the meeting would strengthen the position of Ambassador Leitão da Cunha in relation to his own government, where his intelligent and courageous counsel is invaluable.

I'm afraid this is a "must".

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Copy of letter to President
Costa e Silva dated July 26, 1967.

~~SECRET~~

113b

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 26, 1967

Dear Mr. President:


During your visit to Washington last January and at the Punta del Este meeting we had the opportunity to discuss the special role which our two countries of necessity play in this hemisphere.

It is in this spirit that I have asked Ambassador Tuthill to explain to you personally the serious repercussions which the purchase of advanced jet aircraft at this time would have in the United States and on our effort to collaborate with Brazil and the other American Republics under the Alliance for Progress. He will also describe what we are prepared to do with respect to Brazil's desires for modernization of equipment.

After you have had an opportunity to review these considerations with him and see what is at stake, I hope you will find it possible to postpone any commitment on advanced jet aircraft until later this year when the matter can be looked at in terms of what we can do to help meet the requirements of the Brazilian Air Force.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Arthur da Costa e Silva
President of the Republic of Brazil
Brasilia

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 92-484
By gwl, NARA, Date 5-11-00

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the attached cable Bunker has given us his current assessment of the election outcome. His guess estimate now, as compared with a month ago is as follows:

	<u>Estimate of August 22</u>	<u>Estimate of July 29</u>
Thieu-Ky	1,800,000	2,275,000
Huong	1,000,000	1,400,000
Suu	875,000	590,000
Ha Thuc Ky	225,000	50,000
Truong Dinh Dzu	200,000	-----
Others	330,000	185,000

In terms of percent of the vote, his estimate is:

Thieu-Ky	35-45
Huong	25-30
Suu	20
Ha Thuc Ky	8
Others	10-15

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-298
By 120, NARA, Date 10-26-95

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (3721)

SUBJECT: Guess Estimate - Election Results

114a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By ip, NARA, Date 12-15-94

We have calculated the probable outcome of the Presidential election in several ways in recent weeks and tried to reconcile the varying estimates which resulted.

There is, of course, no reliable way of estimating the relative importance of such influences on the voters as regional preferences, desire for continued stability, anti-military feeling, and the belief that the way to avoid future trouble with the authorities is to vote for Thieu-Ky.

Thus, our guesstimate of the election results is still based as much on intuition as on fact, and we could well be very wide of the mark indeed.

Our first assessment forwarded by letter to Habib July 29 was based essentially on the size and estimated cohesiveness of various political, religious, and ethnic groupings such as the VNQDD, Dai Viet, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, Buddhists, labor organizations, Montagnards, Khmers, Chinese, etc. More recently we have also focused on the size and activity of campaign organizations and their apparent effectiveness as judged by our provincial reporter.

Our initial assessment, now nearly a month old, gave

Thieu-Ky	2,275,000 votes
Huong	1,405,000 votes
Suu	590,000 votes
Ha Thuc Ky	225,000 votes
The Minor Candidate	185,000 votes

(We assume that the voter turnout will be about the same as that for the September 1966 elections for the Constituent Assembly, i. e., about 80 percent of the registered voters. This means the total vote will be about 4.7 million out of a total of about 5.8 million registered voters.)

A more recent estimate, based very largely on the impressions of our provincial reporters, is that Thieu-Ky will poll in the neighborhood of 1.8 million; Huong something just over one million;

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

PRESERVATION

Suu about 875, 000; Ha Thuc Ky, 50, 000; Truong Dinh Dzu just over 200, 000; and the other candidates about 330, 000.

Thieu-Ky are the front runners, without serious question, at least so long as both Suu and Huong remain in the race. If the election is honest and both Suu and Huong stay in the running, we now estimate that Thieu-Ky will get between 35 and 45 percent of the vote. Huong probably will be in second place, though Suu seems to be stronger now than he was at the beginning of the campaign. We are inclined to give Huong between 25 and 30 percent of the vote. As matters now stand, we think Suu may draw about 20 percent of the vote, though he could do substantially better. Ha Thuc Ky might draw 8 percent and the minor candidates somewhere between 10 and 15 percent.

Recent developments in the campaign suggest that Truong Dinh Dzu is probably the strongest of the minor candidates. He is very articulate and seems to be effective with crowds; he has probably exploited the "peace issue" with more success than any other candidate. He also seems to have enough money to back his campaign efforts, and he enjoys the support of the Tam Dai Viet group which is turning out to be more widespread and effective than we had previously believed to be the case. We are therefore inclined to rate Dzu as the leading minor candidate.

Bunker

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

115

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By ing, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~SECRET~~

August 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Talking Points for the Shah -- 5:30 p.m. Tuesday and Wednesday

~~The Shah would like to see you alone. Since the main purpose of his visit is to develop your personal relationship, this makes sense. You have nothing to negotiate, but lots to talk about. Some of these subjects may fall over into after-dinner chat or into your second session. But the following cover the full range of likely topics:~~

MIDDLE EAST

1. Arab-Israel. ~~You want to see a peace that will last.~~ You are ready to play a constructive role, but you can't force the Israelis to move. The leaders of the region have to face up to the need to end the state of war. Then maybe we can help find the terms of a settlement. You appreciate his constructive stand. What does he think chances for a settlement are? (He believes it's important to shore up Hussein.)
2. Regionalism. ~~You think it's important for the Middle East to begin acting like a region.~~ On your Pacific trip you saw what regional cooperation promises to do. Iran is a natural to help draw the Middle East together, because the Shah has broader contacts than most leaders. For instance, you understand the Shah, at his recent meeting with President Ayub and the Turkish Prime Minister, kept Ayub from tearing up CENTO.
3. Nasser. You know the Shah is concerned about radical Arab influence in the Persian Gulf. We are too. ~~You hope Iran and her neighbors will cooperate in strengthening the Gulf as a little region all its own.~~

GLOBAL

4. U.S. - Soviet relations. You'd like to tell him ~~a little about your meeting with Kosygin~~ -- your reflections on how far the thaw goes.
5. Iran-USSR. You'd like to ~~hear his experience with the Russians.~~ (He has moved toward more open relations with Moscow but had second thoughts since the Middle East war. While we can't keep him from a business relationship with the USSR, we do want to urge caution. Congress gets upset.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. USSR-Middle East. You'd be interested in his estimate of the Soviet objectives! Moscow has made some gains but you doubt the Russians will pay the full bill to bail Nasser out. You're still certain Moscow's main aim is to drive us out of the area and undercut non-socialist governments.

7. Vietnam. You thank him again for Iran's medical unit. (He will appreciate any thoughts you want to confide on our position.)

U. S. -IRANIAN RELATIONS

8. Shah's independent policy. You frankly recognize that a new era is beginning in our relations and you welcome it. You are pleased that Iran's own income is increasing and that Iran's dependence on outside aid is decreasing. (AID phases out this year.) This is not the end of American participation in the Shah's development program. It's a chance for American private enterprise backed by the Export-Import Bank to enlarge its relations with all aspects of the Iranian economy.

9. Reform. You congratulate him on Iran's economic progress and would like to hear how his reform program is going.

10. Military aid. You know the Shah is concerned about the state of our military assistance. (There is \$100 million in credit still to go under our current sales understanding. This is a firm contract, which we would have to find a way to fulfill even if the Church Amendment stands. The Shah is mainly thinking beyond this.) You want to continue our military relationship and we'll do the best we can within the limits Congress sets. You'd like to tell him about Congressional attitudes because he'll be seeing members of the Foreign Relations Committee Wednesday afternoon and other members of Congress at the Vice President's luncheon on Thursday.

W. A. R. Rostow

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 22, 1967

Mr. President:

You know the Shah, but glancing
over the attached before dinner might
give you some thoughts for social talk.

Walt R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHAH/G-2

August 15, 1967

116a

VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN
August 22-24, 1967

Suggestions on Approaching Iranians
and Topics of Conversation

The Iranians consider themselves intellectually and culturally the most sophisticated nation in the Middle East and like to be dealt with as though they were Europeans. Most of them have great confidence in the Shah's goal of attaining a European standard of living for Iran within the next twenty years. They are proud of Iran's high economic growth rate (8-10 per cent) and take great satisfaction in Iran's new-found self-confidence in foreign affairs and their assertion of independence from Great Power tutelage.

Steeped in centuries of experience with Russian and British interference in Iran's internal affairs (and some would add American interference), the Iranians are hypersensitive to anything smacking of foreigners' lecturing them on how to run their country. In any given conversation the Iranian is apt to look for a hidden motive in an American's raising a question about Iranian developments unless it is done in a spirit of unmixed praise. The Iranians like compliments but flattery must be plausible and ideally would provide a conversational opening for the Iranian to expatiate on some Iranian achievement. It would be unwise to direct praise toward any particular Iranians other than the Shah and the Empress. Praise of any other Iranian is likely to be interpreted as American fostering of the personal ambitions of those praised.

Iranians are interested in most phases of American life. They particularly like to be "up-to-the-minute" on our advances in technological fields. The Shah and his party will be going on from Washington to Montreal, where hopefully they will visit the U.S. pavilion. They enjoy hearing about little known or unpublicized developments in any field but they are especially responsive to advances or plans which can be adapted for

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
Not automatically Declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-299

By mg, NARA, Date 12-15-94

PRESERVATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

use in Iran. "Water for Peace" and the "War on Hunger" are currently high on Iran's list of interests. On the personal plane, the Iranians are keenly interested in knowing what is "the latest" in clothing, hair styles, dance steps, gadgetry. Many are interested in sports, including especially horseback riding, skiing and tennis.

They are responsive to humorous anecdotes, even to polite forms of ribaldry. But they attach great importance to formal courtesies, and informalities, such as the use of first names, should be avoided at first. In general they enjoy the feeling that they are "registering" with Americans the Iranians' well justified reputation for charm, wit, sophistication and intellectual alertness.

Conversational topics to be avoided: They will be quick to resent any implication that Americans lump Iran with the other Muslim countries or with other "emerging" countries. They particularly do not like to be thought of in the same terms as Arabs or Turks. They will be embarrassed by talk about religion because the educated Iranian is likely to be contemptuous of pious Islam but cannot admit it to a foreigner. Queries about party politics in Iran should be avoided because the Iranian parliament is a one-party body, hand-picked by the Shah in an effort at "guided democracy." Freedom of the press is a similarly touchy subject.

Conversational topics to be encouraged: We can express genuine admiration for Iran's economic development and the Shah's "white revolution" program of reform, especially land reform, the anti-illiteracy drive, and the emancipation of women. Parallels between our "Great Society" effort and Iran's "white revolution" would be especially appropriate.

An expression of interest in Iran's history, archeology, poetry, decorative arts and gardening will bring forth a warm response from the Iranians. The Shah's forthcoming coronation in October 1967 would be a natural topic of interest for Americans but it should be borne in mind that foreigners are not being invited to attend the coronation which the Shah considers an Iranian occasion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is the press guidance we've worked out in advance with the Iranians.

We don't need -- or especially want -- to issue this at all. Our main purpose in negotiating it was to keep Iranian spokesmen within bounds. It might also serve as a useful outline for George to use in briefing after your talks.

We're giving this to you tonight to see whether you want any changes made on the basis of your talks today. We'll give it back to you tomorrow to discuss with the Shah if you wish.

Approve as is A

See me _____

Change as noted _____

Walt
Walt Rostow

W. R. Rostow

VISIT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN
August 22-24, 1967

PRESS GUIDANCE/CONTINGENCY
JOINT RELEASE

The Shahanshah and the President had very cordial and useful discussions covering a broad range of topics of common interest. Their talks reflected the long-standing friendly relations that exist between Iran and the United States. The President congratulated the Shahanshah on the progress of Iran's program of economic development and social reform and reviewed with the Shahanshah the scope for continued United States Government collaboration with Iran's development efforts. The two leaders also had a useful exchange of views on world food, water and illiteracy problems and the efforts of both countries to enrich the lives of their peoples.

The Shahanshah and the President reviewed the world situation and particularly the situation in the Middle East, and they agreed that a solution to the current tensions in the area should be sought in strict compliance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The two leaders agreed to remain in close touch about the Middle East situation. The Shahanshah also reaffirmed Iran's determination to sustain adequate modern defense forces to ensure Iran's national security.

The Shahanshah and the President also discussed problems of building peace in other parts of the world and the President informed the Shahanshah about efforts of the United States to achieve peace in Viet-Nam. The Shahanshah and the President agreed on the importance of avoiding a widening of hostilities and the need to continue the search for a settlement on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements which would also respect the rights of the Viet-Nameese people to determine their own destiny in freedom.

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2

The Shahanshah, in bidding farewell to the President and Mrs. Johnson, expressed his thanks for the warm and friendly reception accorded him. Both the Shahanshah and the President agreed that the considerations which have motivated Iranian and American cooperation are today more pertinent than ever.

Drafted by:	Cleared by:
NEA/IRN-Mr. Newberry	NEA/IRN-Mr. Eliot
	P-Mr. Waters
	WH-Mr. Saunders
	NEA-Mr. Rockwell
S/S-S, Lannon Walker, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155	

UNCLASSIFIED

~~1-100-1000~~
- Presidential file

118

Thursday (4:50 pm)
August 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is an interesting CIA cable on the results of bombing in the Hanoi area. CIA feels the report is reliable since it comes from a competent observer.

Bromley Smith


~~SECRET~~

118a

Thursday, August 24, 1967

1.5(cc)
3.4(b)(1)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT



SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-276
by cbm, NARA Date 7-3-01

The bombing of the Doumer Bridge across the Red River by U.S. pilots on August 11, 1967, was very accurate and the bridge will never be able to carry either heavy rail or truck traffic without major reconstruction. While the dropping of one span about 300 meters from the Gia Lam District was important, the crucial damage was done to the structure itself by the impact of at least three high explosive bombs hitting on the remainder of the bridge leading to Hanoi City. The impact of the explosions loosened or broke large rivets that are vital to the structural design of the bridge and completely dislodged many of the braces where the spans are connected.

After the raid on August 21, heavy smoke and fire were noted northeast of the city of Hanoi in the direction of the Yen Vien Railyard for at least three hours. On the August 22 raid, one bomb either hit or hit near the East German Hospital and killed one Vietnamese doctor. Another bomb fell one block south of the French Delegation and the impact shattered glass in unspecified buildings of the French compound. One U.S. aircraft was destroyed by a missile and the plane was seen falling in the Gia Lam District.

In the late afternoon of August 22, it took members of the International Control Commission, who had priority, between three and four hours to get from Hanoi City to Gia Lam by crossing the Red River by ferry, because of extremely heavy traffic. Only two ferries are operating and they can accommodate six to eight vehicles, depending on the size of the vehicles. The ferries are towed by small boats.

On August 22, most of Hanoi City and all of Gia Lam District were blacked out. On the Hanoi side, there

~~SECRET~~

were only a few lights in the Hai Ba District and no lights in the area surrounding the train station. A few scattered lights were seen along the Red River bank close to the Doumer Bridge on the Hanoi side. Gia Lam Airport was lighted.

On August 22, neither the Pont des Rapides Bridge across the Canal nor the recently-constructed metal bridge about 100 meters south was operating. One span of the new metal bridge was knocked out and dropped into the river. Immediately north of the Pont des Rapides there is a pontoon bypass which can probably support light trucks.

Monday, August 21, 1967
5:05 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

The attached letter from Prime Minister Ky was forwarded by Ambassador Bunker. It is addressed to the Vice President (as President of the Senate) and to the Speaker.

It is a long but rather eloquent explanation of Vietnamese politics and of the Prime Minister's attitude. It is a plea for understanding and tolerance. And it notes that the Vietnamese do not need "any lesson in honesty and patriotism from any quarter." It is clearly designed to meet Congressional criticisms.

I thought you would like to read it. I assume the Senate and House will give it appropriate exposure.

William J. Jorden

Att.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

119a
August 21, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (3644)

Following is the text of identical letters (except for the difference in titles) dated August 21 from Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky to Vice President Humphrey (as President of the Senate) and Speaker McCormack, which were sent to Ambassador Bunker on August 21 by the Prime Minister with the request that they be forwarded to the addressees. The Prime Minister states in his letter to the Ambassador that he has "deemed it proper to reaffirm to the American Congress the principles which inspire the conduct of national affairs by my Government as Vietnam is on the eve of acceding to democracy." No mention is made of publication plans. Signed originals follow by pouch.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President,

I take the liberty to write to you at a time when the events in my country occasion passionate debates in the Congress of the United States. Since the American and Vietnamese nations are together defending freedom, and are consenting to tremendous sacrifices, I deem it my duty to affirm again the principles which command the conduct of national affairs by my Government.

The defense of freedom in Vietnam requires more than our joint efforts at war, it involves first and foremost our mutual commitment to the achievement of democracy and social justice. Should we stray from that basic commitment, or should you misconstrue our purposes, our alliance would indeed be in jeopardy.

As my Government is nearing the completion of its term of duty, I sincerely feel that we have dispatched our task with honesty and effectiveness under most difficult circumstances. I take special pride in the fact that we have successfully started the

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By ijj, NARA, Date 12-15-94

PRESERVATION COPY

course toward democracy and equality for a society which was imprisoned within the deep walls of feudalism, corruption and intolerable social discrepancies. In spite of war, subversion and several grave crises, my Government has undertaken to organize five nationwide elections of vital importance within about a year's time: elections for the Constituent Assembly in September 1966, elections for hamlet and village administration in April-May 1967, Presidential and Senatorial elections next September, and elections for the Lower House next October. I do not know of any better way to warrant our determination to stay the course toward democracy. For it would be proper for all concerned to acknowledge the painful dilemma of our nation, torn between the dream to attain the integrity of democratic life and the necessity to fight for survival. We have lost many of our people, our soldiers, our cadremen in the past elections, and undoubtedly we shall lose many more in the coming weeks; we must devote a great deal of resources to the exercise of democracy which are badly needed on the battlefield; we run the risk of subversion and division at a time when the nation must unite in the face of the enemy. Yet we have all accepted the challenge without a shadow of reluctance.

It seems a cruel irony that some of our friends chose this very moment to voice doubt on our sincerity.

Perhaps the fact that my Government includes officers of the Armed Forces leads to misgivings, for I know of the inherent distrust toward military government in the advanced societies. But in our present historical context, the Vietnamese Armed Forces are of a very particular nature: 700,000 of our young men are under arms in a nation of 15 million people. Our Armed Forces are not composed of militarists or people inclined to the use of force or violence, but of all the generations of Vietnamese within the age of offering the fullest measure of service to their imperiled fatherland. They are the present and the future of our nation.

Furthermore, my Government did not seize power; it was a civilian government which, unable to resolve instability and division, passed on to the Armed Forces the burden of preserving the nation from collapsing. We then formed a mixed team of civilian and military leaders, decided that our term of duty was to be a

transitional one, and set out to establish the very rapid time table for the advent of representative government. We are now reaching the final stage of that time table.

Of course, two years are a very short period of time. We are convinced that we have engaged our country on the right path, but we are also aware that the tasks which we have begun, such as rural development, reorganization of the administration and of the Army, reinforcement of the national economy . . . need to be continued. That is why, in good conscience, we deem it our duty to run for offices in due democratic process. We hope that the people of Vietnam will entrust us with further responsibilities on the basis of our past performances. But should the people decide otherwise, we shall readily accept their verdict.

I am particularly sad to hear accusations that the Vietnamese Armed Forces will resort to coups in the event the election returns should be unfavorable to us. We have devoted the finest hours of the past two years to bringing about the first democratic institutions in our country, we shall not be the ones to destroy them. I have repeatedly warned our soldiers, our civil servants, our cadremen against rigging the elections in any manner, for I think that dishonest elections would deprive our country of democracy for a long period of time. In 1963, the people and the Army overthrew a dictatorial government which was issued from dishonest elections.

That a few press correspondents should misquote my word of caution against unfair elections and make it sound like a threat of coup was, after all understandable. But for a moment, I felt very discouraged to see some of the best friends of my country give credence to those inaccurate reports. Time and again, I have proved that I am capable of placing the interest of our nation above all possible personal ambition: the decision I made on the 30th of June to withdraw from the Presidential race and to seek the Vice Presidency instead, was another instance of my sincerity.

I see therefore no reason for attributing to ill faith on the part of my Government the difficulties that the candidates may encounter in their campaigning. My country is short on physical facilities, several of our airfields are still unsafe, and the wind

blows where it may ... in my opinion, a dignified attitude for those among us who ambition to be public servants by popular choice should be to endure those misfortunes and persevere in seeking the support of the electorate, and not to display resentment against the adverse conditions which prevail for our entire people. In the meanwhile, I am satisfied that our Government has done its very best to give all candidates a fair share of the means for campaigning. The same amount of money is allotted to all tickets. The Government television and radio allow equal time to all candidates in direct broadcast, and anybody in Vietnam can testify that those means are used at their fullest capacity by our opponents, the Vietnamese press is free, and, in part, quite viruently anti-Governmental; on the other hand the foreign press is at full liberty to cover the campaign and the forthcoming elections.

If by the standards of a country with a long experience in the exercise of democracy, and free from the predicaments of war and underdevelopment, our elections still present serious shortcomings, I am the first Vietnamese to deplore that situation. But I can say without any doubt in my conscience that my Government does not deserve any lesson in honesty and patriotism from any quarter.

I am afraid that persistent criticism without substantiated evidence on the part of some prominent American figures may, in the long run, impair the harmony of our joint efforts. The Vietnamese are a proud people, they will accept any amount of tribulations and sufferings, but their dead count as much as the dead from all the friendly lands, and they will admit no discrimination in all the mens supreme tribute to freedom and human dignity.

I see an urgent need, Mr. President, for all of us to keep an appropriate perspective in the partnership between nations, large and small, which are in pursuit of a common ideal; for intemperate reliance upon the physical scale of strength would be the negation of that very ideal.

Mr. President, may I ask you to convey my letter to all the distinguished members of the Senate of the United States.

I stand in profound respect for the great traditions of democracy and justice embodied in your institutions. I greatly

value the support of the Congress of the United States for the cause of Vietnam, and I am always ready to discuss in total candor with the distinguished Senators who wish to further examine the developments concerning the common endeavor of our two nations.

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky

End text.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

~~_____~~
2- Presidential file
120

Monday, 4:45 P. M.
August 21, 1967

Mr. President:

Replying to your letter about increasing the number of allied forces in Vietnam, President Marcos says he cannot now raise the Philippine contribution to the Vietnam war effort but will reconsider after the elections next November.

Marcos says a Summit Conference should be held no earlier than November and only if it would be possible to insure that the Conference would produce significant decisions.

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

120a

Monday, August 21, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM MANILA (1561)

Following is President Marcos' reply, dated August 18, to President Johnson's letter of August 17, regarding the Clifford/Taylor mission and the necessity to increase force levels in Vietnam.

"Dear Mr. President:

"Let me acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your most recent letter delivered to me on August 17, by the American Charge D'Affaires, Ad interim in Manila.

"I am most grateful for the understanding you have shown in the matter of the cancellation of the visit to the Philippines of Messrs. Clark and Taylor. It was a painful decision, but the circumstances offered me no other choice.

"My Government has taken note of the findings of Messrs. Clark and Taylor that there is a necessity for a substantial increase in our forces in Vietnam, and that most of the allied governments are seriously considering the possibility of taking steps in that in Vietnam, my Government has been quietly studying this problem.

"I sympathize fully with your position in desiring the augmentation of the allied forces in Vietnam, unfortunately, I feel the present time is most inopportune for the Philippines to consider raising her contributions to the war effort.

"There would be very substantial opposition to this move in the Philippine Congress. You are doubtless aware of the tremendous effort I had to exert in 1966 to secure the passage of the appropriation measure for the 2,000 men of the Philippine Civic Action Group (PhilCAG), as contingent of Army engineers with security troops, which, as you know, is our contribution to

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By 128, NARA, Date 10-26-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

the defense of South Vietnam. The temper of our Congress has not changed since then. So much so that this year, I have so far refrained from proposing similar legislation for fear it would be rejected.

"The situation is aggravated by the fact that 1967 is an election year in the Philippines, and my country's augmented participation in the Vietnam War might be seized upon by the opposition as an election issue. Since Vietnam is a very controversial subject in my country, as it is in yours, I feel that its undue projection in the campaign can only result in harm to my Administration. And if this causes the election of more oppositionists to the Senate, my problem would become even more complicated.

"Finally, and most important, my Government faces the problem of finances. The Philippines is not an affluent country: her foreign exchange reserves are low, her tax income barely able to meet her urgent needs for normal government operations, not to speak of equally pressing development projects. An increase in her efforts in Vietnam would be a serious drain on her meager resources, and this she can ill afford at the present moment.

"Nonetheless, I am determined to maintain the PhilCAG contingent in Vietnam at its present size. I have stated this publicly and I am assuring you so.

"Please rest assured also that after the elections in November I shall re-study your request to determine if circumstances have then so changed as to permit a more favorable consideration of the problem.

"Regarding the proposed second summit meeting of the Seven Nations Allied in Vietnam, I am glad you share the view that the same should be held at the initiative of and in an Asian State.

"While I would agree, in principle, to a second summit, my feeling is that it should be convened only for cogent and important reasons, such as, the taking of a truly important step or the enunciation of a major policy decision over Vietnam. The conovocation of a summit, as my country knows from experience, is a rather expensive

and complicated affair, and tends to unduly raise hopes and expectations a little too high. Hence, my feeling is that it must be able to produce some positive and significant accomplishment to justify its holding.

"Should a mere exchange of views and ideas be desired, then a meeting at the Foreign Ministers' level would suffice. And even if a major decision is sought, I believe a Foreign Ministers' meeting should precede any summit conference to thresh out all possible difficulties and facilitate agreement between the Chiefs of State and heads of Government.

"With the foregoing reservations, I think late November would be a satisfactory time.

"With my most cordial regards,

"Sincerely yours,

"F. E. Marcos"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1967

120b
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-298

By isp, NARA, Date 10-26-95

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of July 27 concerning the possibility of a visit by Mr. Clifford and General Taylor to discuss the Vietnamese situation.

Let me say at the outset that I accept fully the reasons which led you to believe that a visit by the Clifford/Taylor mission would not be helpful to you in your present political situation. You are of course the best judge of this, and I appreciate the importance, in particular, of your obtaining favorable action on a renewed appropriation for your present contingent in Viet-Nam.

At the same time, let me say frankly and personally to you that Messrs. Clifford and Taylor have just reported to me, and that their findings not only confirm the need for a significant increase in allied forces in Viet-Nam, but reveal that others who are contributing forces are taking very seriously the possibility of making additional contributions. In each case, as of course in yours, the governments will have to take into account particular timing and political factors. But I emerge with the feeling that the need to do more is accepted by all, and that more will in fact be done in the next few months.

As I told you in my earlier letter, summarizing the original findings of Secretary McNamara and his group, the fact is that we are making progress on present lines, but must maintain our momentum in the face of what appears to be an unremitting and possibly increasing effort from North Viet-Nam.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it

would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65,000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45,000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As you know, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.


Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

My hope is that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that you will be able to make an announcement as speedily as possible.

As to the question of a possible summit meeting, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found affirmative reactions in all capitals toward the possibility of such a meeting after the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government there. There also seems to be a common view that such a meeting should be at Asian initiative and in an appropriate Asian setting. My own mind runs in the direction of late November, and I should be most interested to have your thoughts, however tentative, on timing factors from your standpoint.

With my continuing admiration and warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

His Excellency
Ferdinand Marcos
President of the Republic of the Philippines
Manila

~~2. President's file~~ 1) P.R.
121

(7:00 PM)
Monday, August 21, 1967, 4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Tab A, for your approval, is a warm reply to Lester Pearson's message of sympathy (Tab B) on the Alaska floods.

Francis M. Bator

OK ✓

No

Speak to me

121a

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO CANADIAN P. M. PEARSON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The American people join me in sending you and your countrymen our warm thanks for your message of sympathy to the victims of the Alaska floods. We are also grateful for the generous offer of help conveyed by the Commissioner of the Yukon.

I know that the citizens and Governor of Alaska, to whom I will pass on your best wishes, will greatly appreciate your thoughtful concern.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

122

Monday, August 21, 1967
3:30 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report on Vietnamese politics. I call your attention to the voter registration figure in paragraph 1. The 5.8 million is half a million more than for the Assembly election last September. It is also more than a third of Viet-Nam's population (it would be about 65 million in the U.S. on a comparative population base). Not bad for a country at war.

William J. Jorden

Att.

SECRET-EXDIS Attachment

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

August 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By 48, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Campaign Developments

The final posting of voter lists reveals a total voter registration of over 5.8 million (compared with a total registration of almost 5.3 million for Constituent Assembly elections last September). All provinces show a gain of voter registration over last year, except for small decreases in three provinces and in Saigon.

The presidential candidates or their representatives spoke before about 3,000 people in Nha Trang on August 20. The meeting went well and the crowd appeared interested and receptive. Once again, Thieu and Ky were represented by local supporters. The major civilian candidates, Huong and Suu, were present.

The Upper House campaign has finally begun to take shape. However, even well-educated Vietnamese have expressed puzzlement as to how to choose among the 48 Senate lists. The Senate race has not so far been marked by any serious debate on issues. The peace issue is getting considerable discussion, but only in highly general terms.

Reaction to Javits' Proposal

The Embassy on balance believes that Senator Javits' proposal is not likely to get serious consideration from the Vietnamese Government or the Assembly. The Embassy notes that it is by no means clear that all civilian candidates favor postponement of the elections and that vast administrative preparations for the elections have been underway for more than two months, all geared to the September 3 election date. Thieu told Bunker it would be very unwise to postpone the election date.

Conversations with Thieu and Ky

Ky told Ambassador Bunker that he and Thieu plan an early press conference to repeat their determination that

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

-2-

the elections be fair and honest. Ky and Thieu said they would accompany the civilian candidates on some of their future trips. Thieu told Bunker that he was not sure that he would win the election and that he would support whatever government was elected. Thieu also said that he would make every effort to see that the elections were honest.

Thieu's campaign manager has indicated to an Embassy officer that Thieu and Ky would work well together. However, in discussing Thieu's views of the organization of the government after elections, Thieu's campaign manager's remarks, together with continuing reports that Ky is maintaining his own personal campaign organization, reflect a continuing division of opinion between the Thieu and Ky camps.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

123

Monday, August 21, 1967

**Tentative Agenda for Tuesday Luncheon
1:00 P.M., August 22**

1. Vietnam

a. Bomb Targets in North Vietnam - Secretary McNamara

At the meeting last Friday night you requested additional targets be suggested for your consideration on Tuesday

b. Information on Vietnam - Secretary Rusk

This will be a description by Secretary Rusk of what State and Defense have done to organize the speed up of coordinated responses to press and Congressional allegations.

2. U.S. Armed Shipments to the Middle East - Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara

The two secretaries will ask you to approve their obtaining Congressional reactions to a relaxation of the current freeze on arms shipments as it applies to Israel and the moderate Arab States.

What they have in mind specifically is given in their joint memorandum which is attached.

3. U.S. Food for India - Secretary Rusk

This concerns the next action which is before you for decision. You have Ed Hamilton's memoranda on George Ball's proposal.

Bromley Smith

NOTE: Walt Rostow will be back in the morning and will attend the Luncheon. If he has further items for the Agenda, he will send them up in the morning.

att: log 3143

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, August 22, 1967
9:20 a.m.

123a

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary McNamara wishes to add the following item to our lunch agenda today: the question of whether we should seek a Senate vote in support of our Viet Nam policy in connection with the vote on the Defense appropriation.

He leans against this procedure, but will suggest an alternative.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 69, NARA, Date 8-2-01

~~1- Suspense~~
2- misc. file
124

Monday, August 21, 1967
11:50 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Conflict

In response to your call for background material on the legal problem in Viet-Nam and the President's authority, the attached may be of use.

1. State Department paper on the Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam (key portion is Section IV, pages 11-15 (TAB A)).
2. Under Secretary Katzenbach's statement of August 17, 1967 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (TAB B).
3. Memorandum by the Acting General Counsel of the Defense Department (June 10, 1965) on the President's authority to commit combat forces in Viet-Nam (TAB C).
4. The Legal Adviser's Opinion: The Legal Basis for United States Forces in Viet-Nam (August 5, 1964) (TAB D).
5. A key portion of the legal report on The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam prepared by a special committee of the American Bar Association (May 1966) (TAB E).

William J. Jorden

Atts.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By AG, NARA, Date 9-9-91

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, August 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

The attached letter from Prime Minister Ky was forwarded by Ambassador Bunker. It is addressed to the Vice President (as President of the Senate) and to the Speaker.

It is a long but rather eloquent explanation of Vietnamese politics and of the Prime Minister's attitude. It is a plea for understanding and tolerance. And it notes that the Vietnamese do not need "any lesson in honesty and patriotism from any quarter." It is clearly designed to meet Congressional criticisms.

I thought you would like to read it. I assume the Senate and House will give it appropriate exposure.

Bill
William J. Jorden

Att.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

125a

August 21, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-299
By ip, NARA, Date 12-15-94

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (3644)

Following is the text of identical letters (except for the difference in titles) dated August 21 from Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky to Vice President Humphrey (as President of the Senate) and Speaker McCormack, which were sent to Ambassador Bunker on August 21 by the Prime Minister with the request that they be forwarded to the addressees. The Prime Minister states in his letter to the Ambassador that he has "deemed it proper to reaffirm to the American Congress the principles which inspire the conduct of national affairs by my Government as Vietnam is on the eve of acceding to democracy." No mention is made of publication plans. Signed originals follow by pouch.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President,

I take the liberty to write to you at a time when the events in my country occasion passionate debates in the Congress of the United States. Since the American and Vietnamese nations are together defending freedom, and are consenting to tremendous sacrifices, I deem it my duty to affirm again the principles which command the conduct of national affairs by my Government.

The defense of freedom in Vietnam requires more than our joint efforts at war, it involves first and foremost our mutual commitment to the achievement of democracy and social justice. Should we stray from that basic commitment, or should you misconstrue our purposes, our alliance would indeed be in jeopardy.

As my Government is nearing the completion of its term of duty, I sincerely feel that we have dispatched our task with honesty and effectiveness under most difficult circumstances. I take special pride in the fact that we have successfully started the

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

course toward democracy and equality for a society which was imprisoned within the deep walls of feudalism, corruption and intolerable social discrepancies. In spite of war, subversion and several grave crises, my Government has undertaken to organize five nationwide elections of vital importance within about a year's time: elections for the Constituent Assembly in September 1966, elections for hamlet and village administration in April-May 1967, Presidential and Senatorial elections next September, and elections for the Lower House next October. I do not know of any better way to warrant our determination to stay the course toward democracy. For it would be proper for all concerned to acknowledge the painful dilemma of our nation, torn between the dream to attain the integrity of democratic life and the necessity to fight for survival. We have lost many of our people, our soldiers, our cadremen in the past elections, and undoubtedly we shall lose many more in the coming weeks; we must devote a great deal of resources to the exercise of democracy which are badly needed on the battlefield; we run the risk of subversion and division at a time when the nation must unite in the face of the enemy. Yet we have all accepted the challenge without a shadow of reluctance.

It seems a cruel irony that some of our friends chose this very moment to voice doubt on our sincerity.

Perhaps the fact that my Government includes officers of the Armed Forces leads to misgivings, for I know of the inherent distrust toward military government in the advanced societies. But in our present historical context, the Vietnamese Armed Forces are of a very particular nature: 700,000 of our young men are under arms in a nation of 15 million people. Our Armed Forces are not composed of militarists or people inclined to the use of force or violence, but of all the generations of Vietnamese within the age of offering the fullest measure of service to their imperiled fatherland. They are the present and the future of our nation.

Furthermore, my Government did not seize power; it was a civilian government which, unable to resolve instability and division, passed on to the Armed Forces the burden of preserving the nation from collapsing. We then formed a mixed team of civilian and military leaders, decided that our term of duty was to be a

transitional one, and set out to establish the very rapid time table for the advent of representative government. We are now reaching the final stage of that time table.

Of course, two years are a very short period of time. We are convinced that we have engaged our country on the right path, but we are also aware that the tasks which we have begun, such as rural development, reorganization of the administration and of the Army, reinforcement of the national economy ... need to be continued. That is why, in good conscience, we deem it our duty to run for offices in due democratic process. We hope that the people of Vietnam will entrust us with further responsibilities on the basis of our past performances. But should the people decide otherwise, we shall readily accept their verdict.

I am particularly sad to hear accusations that the Vietnamese Armed Forces will resort to coups in the event the election returns should be unfavorable to us. We have devoted the finest hours of the past two years to bringing about the first democratic institutions in our country, we shall not be the ones to destroy them. I have repeatedly warned our soldiers, our civil servants, our cadresmen against rigging the elections in any manner, for I think that dishonest elections would deprive our country of democracy for a long period of time. In 1963, the people and the Army overthrew a dictatorial government which was issued from dishonest elections.

That a few press correspondents should misquote my word of caution against unfair elections and make it sound like a threat of coup was, after all understandable. But for a moment, I felt very discouraged to see some of the best friends of my country give credence to those inaccurate reports. Time and again, I have proved that I am capable of placing the interest of our nation above all possible personal ambition: the decision I made on the 30th of June to withdraw from the Presidential race and to seek the Vice Presidency instead, was another instance of my sincerity.

I see therefore no reason for attributing to ill faith on the part of my Government the difficulties that the candidates may encounter in their campaigning. My country is short on physical facilities, several of our airfields are still unsafe, and the wind

blows where it may ... in my opinion, a dignified attitude for those among us who ambition to be public servants by popular choice should be to endure those misfortunes and persevere in seeking the support of the electorate, and not to display resentment against the adverse conditions which prevail for our entire people. In the meanwhile, I am satisfied that our Government has done its very best to give all candidates a fair share of the means for campaigning. The same amount of money is allotted to all tickets. The Government television and radio allow equal time to all candidates in direct broadcast, and anybody in Vietnam can testify that those means are used at their fullest capacity by our opponents, the Vietnamese press is free, and, in part, quite viruently anti-Governmental; on the other hand the foreign press is at full liberty to cover the campaign and the forthcoming elections.

If by the standards of a country with a long experience in the exercise of democracy, and free from the predicaments of war and underdevelopment, our elections still present serious shortcomings, I am the first Vietnamese to deplore that situation. But I can say without any doubt in my conscience that my Government does not deserve any lesson in honesty and patriotism from any quarter.

I am afraid that persistent criticism without substantiated evidence on the part of some prominent American figures may, in the long run, impair the harmony of our joint efforts. The Vietnamese are a proud people, they will accept any amount of tribulations and sufferings, but their dead count as much as the dead from all the friendly lands, and they will admit no discrimination in all the mens supreme tribute to freedom and human dignity.

I see an urgent need, Mr. President, for all of us to keep an appropriate perspective in the partnership between nations, large and small, which are in pursuit of a common ideal; for intemperate reliance upon the physical scale of strength would be the negation of that very ideal.

Mr. President, may I ask you to convey my letter to all the distinguished members of the Senate of the United States.

I stand in profound respect for the great traditions of democracy and justice embodied in your institutions. I greatly

value the support of the Congress of the United States for the cause of Vietnam, and I am always ready to discuss in total candor with the distinguished Senators who wish to further examine the developments concerning the common endeavor of our two nations.

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

Air Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky

End text.

1- Suspense
2- Presidential file
126
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1967
Saturday, 3:40 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached note from Pat Dean conveys the personal thanks of Prime Minister Wilson for the discussion about Vietnam which you had with the Ambassador on Wednesday.

BKS
Bromley Smith

August, 1967

126a

Dear Mr. President,

I have been asked to pass on to you the Prime Minister's personal thanks for the very full and frank way in which you expressed to me your thoughts about Vietnam on Wednesday. The Prime Minister was most grateful and hopes that you will find it possible to continue to keep him abreast of any developments in your thinking. He realises, of course, that any intensification of the war gives rise to political problems for yourself as well as for us, but as you know the Prime Minister is much concerned to carry all those who matter in Britain with him in understanding American policy in Vietnam and as much advance knowledge as possible of your thinking is essential to him in this. The Prime Minister and his colleagues in London all naturally hope that signs will soon appear from the other side that will permit some de-escalation to take place.

I am asked to convey to you the Prime Minister's best wishes and to say that soon after he returns to London, he may wish to take up your kind suggestion of a talk about all this.

Yours Sincerely
Pat Dean.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298
By ing, NARA, Date 10-26-95

The President

of the United States of America

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, August 19, 1967; 12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT. Small PL 480 programs for Mali and Sierra Leone

Attached are two Freeman-Gaud-Schultze packages recommending:

1. (Tab A) About \$1 million worth (18,000 tons) of sorghum for Mali; repayment would be in local currency, 40% of which we would use to pay our operating expenses there.
2. (Tab B) \$390,000 worth of wheat and tobacco for Sierra Leone. (2,500 tons of wheat and 90 tons of tobacco) Repayment would be in dollars, with 5% down and the remainder spread over 19 years.

Self-help efforts in both countries have been reasonably satisfactory. We have delayed the Sierra Leone proposal while the political situation firmed up after a military coup in March. It is probably as stable now as it is going to get. The CCC has abundant supplies of all the commodities involved.

I recommend you approve.



Edward K. Hamilton

Approve Mali program ✓

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Approve Sierra Leone program ✓

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

127a

JUL 20 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement with Mali

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.1

NLJ 93-351

By 06 NARA, Date 5-25-95

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 local currency sales agreement for sorghum valued at \$1 million. The local currency set aside for U. S. uses (40%) will take care of our requirements for FY 1968, so that we will not have to purchase Mali Francs with dollars which ultimately could go to France. The balance of the currencies would be used for economic development projects (55%) and Cooley loans (5%).

Up until 1962, Mali had produced enough food to feed her own population. In 1963, Mali embarked on an adventure with the Communist world which left her economy a shambles. Under a moderate government for the past two years the economy is finally beginning to straighten out. With the assistance of the IMF and the French, austere but sensible policies are being instituted to restore the health of the economy. The policies include:

- Devaluing the currency by 50%.
- Balancing the budget both by reducing expenditures and by adding new revenue measures.
- Raising by 60% the prices paid for sorghum to induce the farmer to sell his output to the state rather than hoarding it.
- Restoring convertibility within two years through rejoining the West Africa monetary union.
- Promoting exports by increasing prices to producers, liberalizing trade restrictions, and reducing use of illegal channels.

We anticipate that over the long-term Mali will once again be able to meet its own urban as well as rural food needs. However, there will be a continuing short-run problem of inadequate food supplies in the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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
2

cities until the self-help policies begin to take effect. The proposed agreement would ease these temporary shortages, reinforce the reform measures, and provide needed local currency.

Since there is no history of commercial trade in sorghum between the free world and Mali there is no usual marketing requirement.

As to the political situation, Mali sided with the Arabs in the Security Council during the Near East crisis. However, State points out that such a public stance was in large part forced upon the government by the fact that the country is predominantly Moslem with close and valued ties to the Arab states. Outside of the U. N. forum, State argues, Mali's political and economic performance has been good and merits U. S. support.

I recommend that you approve negotiation of the proposed agreement.



Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1276

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

JUL 12 1967

Subject: Public Law 480 Grain Sorghum for Mali

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Mali, a PL 480 sale for approximately 18,000 tons of grain sorghum for local currency. The current export value of the sorghum is \$1,050,000. Forty percent of the local currency would be set aside for U. S. uses, five percent for Cooley loans, and 55 percent for economic development loans. The State Department concurs in this recommendation.

Need for Program. Mali suffered food shortages in 1965 and 1966 due to drought conditions and smuggling of grain into neighboring countries. 75,000 tons of sorghum will be needed this year; however, only 52,000 tons will be available from domestic production. The U. S. is providing 5,000 tons as emergency relief under Title II and we believe an additional 18,000 tons is essential to alleviate food needs this summer. This will help avoid food shortages which could be used by left-wing groups to sabotage the important monetary agreement with France which Mali recently signed.

Basis For No Usual Marketing Requirement. There are ordinarily no commercial sorghum imports into Mali from the U. S. or from other free world sources. Occasionally, Mali has bought sorghum from Niger. However, the same drought affecting Mali has eliminated the possibility of such imports this year. Accordingly, no usual marketing requirement to protect normal commercial grain trade with Mali is proposed.

Self-Help. Food production in Mali has been increasing about two percent annually since 1956. Population increase has been about 2.5 percent, thus resulting in some decrease in per capita food production.

The new monetary agreement with France will help increase food production. Mali has devalued its currency with IMF approval and both France and IMF are providing technical advice to balance the budget, reduce the trade deficit and eliminate inefficient state-owned enterprises. These measures will discourage smuggling and will provide production incentives for farmers by stabilizing prices for food crops and increasing availability of production supplies and consumer goods.

The sales agreement with Mali will provide for the following additional self-help measures:

1. Planning and budgeting for agricultural development will be given top priority.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-352

By fw, NARA, Date 9-19-93~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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
2. A substantial portion of the local currency allocated to Section 104(f) loans under this agreement will be used for agricultural development purposes.
3. Concentrate on training agricultural extension workers and on applying the results of agricultural research.
4. Improve the food marketing and distribution network.
5. Implement on a national basis the newly developed program of price incentives to grain farmers.
6. Provide for joint review of the Government's plans and programs for increasing food production.
7. Undertake such other measures as may be mutually agreed on for the purposes specified in Section 109(a) of the Act.
8. Submit regular statements of progress made in adopting self-help measures described above.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 agreement as described above.

July 7 1967



Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2437

1274

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUN 24 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Sierra Leone

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-351
By Cb, NARA, Date 5-25-95

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud request your authority to negotiate a P. L. 480 twenty-year dollar credit sales program for \$390,000 of wheat and tobacco.

Neither wheat nor tobacco is produced in Sierra Leone. Production of rice, the principal food crop, while increasing at 5 percent a year, has not met consumption needs and imports have been required. Research on rice production in Sierra Leone has been carried out and knowledge of how to increase production exists. The biggest problem is to get the information to the farmer. Thus the self-help provisions of the proposed sale concentrate on getting the government to set up a more effective extension service.

Sierra Leone will be required to maintain her usual commercial free world purchases of wheat (17,500 tons) and tobacco (1,165 tons).

Our program will provide some small relief to Sierra Leone's balance of payments which has become critical in recent months. A new military government took over in March and Gaud indicates it has acted responsibly, adhering to the existing IMF stand-by agreement.

The U. S. has been providing about \$1.5 million in technical assistance in recent years, which AID intends to terminate after 1968, in accordance with the Korry proposals. The U.K., IBRD, and the U.N. are the major sources of assistance.

I recommend you approve negotiation of the proposed agreement.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2437
127a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JUN 13 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: P.L. 480 Program with Sierra Leone

The accompanying joint memorandum from the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for International Development describes the need for a P.L. 480 sales program for Sierra Leone, usual marketing considerations and self-help features of the program. In considering approval of the proposal, you may also wish to refer to the following summary of the political situation in Sierra Leone.

A group of military officers called the National Reformation Council took power in late March to avert widespread disturbances following a close election. The Council has pledged to observe all of Sierra Leone's international obligations including continuing compliance with the monetary stabilization program of the International Monetary Fund. Some reductions in governmental outlays have been made. Senior civil servants have been placed in charge of the ministries. A former International Bank official is advising on economic policies. Opposition to the Council exists among displaced members of the parliament, some political leaders, and at the University, but it is not cohesive. The Council has announced its intention to return Sierra Leone to constitutional practices within a year via new elections. Sierra Leone so far remains uncommitted in the Middle East situation.


William S. Gaud

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By rg, NARA, Date 9-9-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 13 1967

1276

To: The President

Subject: PL 480 Program with Sierra Leone

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with Sierra Leone a PL 480 dollar credit sales agreement for 2,500 tons of wheat and/or wheat flour and 90 tons of tobacco of which the total current market value is \$390,000 (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment of 5 percent on delivery, and the balance over 19 years at 1 percent during the grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Imports of agricultural products make up a relatively large part of Sierra Leone's total imports. By financing the commodities in this proposal under PL 480, savings will be realized in foreign exchange, which is needed for agricultural and other economic development.

U.S. investment interests in Sierra Leone, encouraged by favorable concession agreements, have grown significantly since 1961.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirements

Under the proposed usual marketing requirement Sierra Leone will have to import commercially from free world sources 1,165 tons of tobacco (of which 80 tons, representing our normal sales in this market, must come from the U.S.) and 17,500 tons of wheat, which is the average imported from free world sources during the last three years.

Self-Help

Food production gaining 2.5 percent annually over the past decade, has increased more rapidly than population but not rapidly enough to match total demand increases. Production of rice, the principal food staple, has expanded from 338,000 metric tons in 1956 to 489,000 metric tons in 1966 - just over 2 percent yearly.

Sierra Leone officials recognize that greater emphasis must be placed on development of the agricultural sector, which until now received only 8 percent of development expenditure. FAO is now engaged in a comprehensive survey of agricultural resources planning. The previous Government signed a three-year contract with a consulting firm to prepare feasibility studies and possibly to manage projects to increase.

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
the production of cash crops. Projects already underway include a demonstration of swamp land rice production by the Nationalist Chinese and pilot sugar cane production in cooperation with a British firm.

The proposed sales agreement will include the following self-help measures:


1. Emphasize food production in the development plan and the government budget.
2. Accelerate the output of trained agriculturalists by giving adequate financial support to Njala University College and the Rural Training Institutes.
3. Intensify rice production by encouraging farmers to adopt improved and economically sound practices.
4. Provide for joint review of information on the Government's policy and specific program for increased food production at the time of the next Sierra Leone budget presentation.
5. Submit regular statements of progress made in adopting self-help measures described above.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.



Administrator
Agency for International Development

June 5 1967


Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

12
August 18, 1967
11:30

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: International Congress of Orientalists

The Congress of Orientalists, which invited you to give its opening address, concludes its meetings in Ann Arbor tomorrow. Some 700 of the foreign scholars in attendance, representing some 50 countries, are expected to spend Monday, August 21, and Tuesday, August 22, in Washington. Some wives will be present, most of them scholars in their own right.

In Mr. Rostow's memorandum to you of August 4 he suggested that if you did not address the Congress you might wish to receive this distinguished group of scholars at the White House on August 21. If this is not possible, you may wish to attend a reception given for the group by Dr. Dillon Ripley of the Smithsonian at the Museum of History and Technology on August 22 at 5:00 P.M.

You indicated that you wished to consider these two possibilities nearer the dates.

A footnote on the Orientalists: Governor Romney is scheduled to address the Congress tonight. We understand his main theme will be China and that he will come out for Peking's admission to the UN.

15/
William J. Jorden

Will receive scholars at
White House on August 21 _____

Will attend Smithsonian
Reception on August 22 _____

Will do neither X _____

See me _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

129

August 19, 1967

Mr. President:


Thank you so much for your recent letter. Ambassador Jones has given me a full report of your admirable efforts to strengthen the economy of Malawi. I hope that the American survey team dispatched to study the Vipya pulp scheme will provide a basis for sound judgment by private investors as to how best to help you with this vital enterprise.

I also want to thank you for your sympathetic understanding of the problems we have endured in some of our cities. We are doing everything possible to remove the underlying causes of lawlessness. We won't succeed overnight, but I am confident we will succeed.

It was a great pleasure for me to welcome you to Washington, Mr. President. I am very glad you enjoyed your stay.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Lyndon B. Johnson", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda
President
Republic of Malawi

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, August 18, 1967 at 9 PM

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a Rusk-Udall information memo on the oil import bargain we have worked out with the Canadians, designed to leave more room for Venezuela. (You will recall your conversation with President Leoni at Punta del Este.)

I have not, myself, been deeply in this. Tony Solomon, who has, assures me that it is a good bargain all around and will cause no trouble either with the independents or the St. Paul refineries which are especially dependent on Canadian crude. (Tony had a good session with Senators Burdick, Mondale, McCarthy and staff people representing the Vice President, and Senators Mansfield and Metcalf. Bill Connell, who was there, confirms this.)

This concerns me -
As part of the bargain, we would agree to a new loop (through Chicago) to the existing Canadian pipeline through Minnesota and Michigan. We will come to you for a Presidential permit when the Canadians come in with their application. (No sales would be made from this loop before 1970.)

We will try to keep publicity about the bargain to a minimum. The Canadians do not want to acknowledge a formal commitment to limit oil exports to us. Also, until we receive the pipeline permit request, and you have acted on it, we don't want to give any impression that it is all pre-cooked.

On the basis of a quick check this afternoon, and a reading of the earlier memos, I would share the Rusk/Udall/Solomon judgment that this is a reasonable package.

Francis
Francis M. Bator

Call me about this

C

copy sent for the 8/19

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Oil Import Program - Restraint on Canada

In our memorandum of February 15, 1967 we noted that the large growth of imports of Canadian oil into Districts I-IV in recent years has threatened a cutback in imports from our traditional offshore suppliers, particularly Venezuela. After six months of negotiations, we are now at the point of obtaining a Canadian commitment to restrain exports to Districts I-IV through 1971 to levels which will permit offshore suppliers to participate in the growth of the U.S. oil market.

The growth to be permitted Canada is ample, but very much less than they were intending to put into the market. We also insisted on and finally obtained the inclusion of a commitment to give priority of supply to the growth needs of existing customers, which would take care of the special situation of the St. Paul refineries, which are entirely dependent on Canadian crude oil supplies.

The Canadian commitment is conditioned upon United States Government approval for a new loop through Chicago of the existing Canadian crude oil pipeline through Minnesota and Michigan. The Canadians will agree that no sales in the Chicago area will be made from this pipeline loop before 1970.

If the Canadian Cabinet approves, we expect to receive the formal Canadian commitment next week. We will not give it any publicity. At about the same time, the Canadian pipeline company will submit an application for the border-crossing permit required for the Chicago loop. After receiving comment from the interested agencies, we will send it on to you for the usual Presidential permit. We have recommended that the Canadians make no announcement on the pipeline until the permit is received, perhaps in September.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 92-398

By ig, NARA, Date 3-5-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Prior to any announcements, we plan to consult with the Venezuelans and inform them of the action taken to protect their access to our oil market. Though it falls short of the Venezuelan aspirations for a country quota or quota exemption with the advantage of receiving the U.S. domestic oil price, this action achieves the objectives on which you assured President Leoni at Punta del Este.



Dean Rusk
Secretary of State



Stewart L. Udall
Secretary of the Interior

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~1-2-67~~
2- Pres
131~~SECRET~~Fri. August 17⁸, 1967
8:45 P.M.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-298

By ip, NARA, Date 10-26-95

Mr. President:

Attached is a heart-to-heart exchange between Wally Barbour and Moshe Bitan, Eban's "seventh floor" officer in charge of our business. It's the Israeli answer to Ambassador Goldberg's discussion of a possible UN resolution (Mac Bundy sent you a copy of Goldberg's memcon and the text of the resolution last Friday).

There are two interesting points:

1. We haven't succeeded in budging them an inch from their suspicion that we're backsliding from your five principles of 19 June.
2. The reason for this seems to be their notion now creeping into our conversations that the U.S. and Israel are headed toward a confrontation. Some Israelis remember 1957 when we eventually put the heat on them to withdraw, and they see our military aid suspension as evidence that we may be preparing a similar move this time. The ugliness of the threat in paragraph 11 suggests that they expect the worst.

In Mac's absence, I should tell you that he and I will be having preliminary discussions with Secretary Katzenbach and Co. early next week to begin shaping the overall **political** bargain we should shoot for in connection with the September arms talks. We will deal with this brewing "confrontation" in this context.



Harold H. Saunders

Mr. President:

I believe you should read the full text
of the attached.



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

131a

Thursday, August 17, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BARBOUR (Tel Aviv, 483)

1. Bitan at the behest of Eshkol and Eban has given me the substance of the instructions which have gone to Evron to respond to remarks regarding U.S. thinking on further steps in the United Nations as put to Evron in a conversation on August 10 with Ambassador Goldberg, Under Secretary Rostow et al. I had given Bitan for Eshkol and Eban a close paraphrase of State's 29238 reporting on that conversation which I considered a particularly clear and convincing exposition of our views. It was my hope that in thus supplementing Evron's report the strength and logic of our position might be enhanced with the Government of Israel and a helpful reply stimulated.

2. Unfortunately, the Israeli position is not helpful. As anticipated, the Israeli reaction is definitely negative.

3. Bitan expounded to me the Israeli thinking, which, he said is largely reflected in Evron's instructions but, he added, the Prime Minister and Eban wanted him to make doubly sure the depth of their concern is understood.

4. As he put it, the Israelis are prepared to discuss with us at this time, in the United Nations context, principles but not tactics. If principles are agreed, tactics are relatively easy to devise as developments occur. They particularly feel the necessity that we keep each other informed and Bitan expressed some unhappiness that they had not been told at the outset of exchanges with Tito. I protested that both Under Secretary Rostow and I had filled Israelis in on Tito as soon as possible. He did not pursue the matter.

5. Continuing, he said that as to principles the U.S. and Israeli positions coincide. Israel agrees with the five principles set forth by the President on June 19. However, we seem to be deviating from those principles in our interpretation of them. As to withdrawal, the President's statement refers to recognized boundaries and Israeli security. There is no mention of recognized boundaries in the draft resolution. In talking to Tito, we referred to possible consideration

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-299

By lig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

of international guarantees of Israel's security. No consideration should be given to such guarantees as it is not in the Israeli or U.S. interest to do so. International guarantees were in effect in May, 1967 and were violated. To return to that situation is not to progress toward a new situation of peace. Israel should be in a position to take care of its own defense without a UN presence or great power guarantees which would not be useful.

6. Bitan's next point was in regard to the Soviets. He said Israelis disagree with our apparent assessment that they are prepared to act moderately. The Government of Israel sees no signs of such moderation. They are skeptical that Soviet willingness to proceed with a draft resolution agreed with the U.S. at the end of the General Assembly reflects any meeting of minds between the USSR and U.S. positions. Israel regards the Soviets as merely determined to erode U.S. principles in favor of their pro-Arab attitude. The Government of Israel urges we not envisage starting any further UN consideration from this point but return to the original U.S. draft of June 20 which conformed to the President's five points.

7. Bitan then expatiated on the Israeli estimate of a more fundamental change he alleged is taking place in the U.S. attitude. He referred to Tito's comment that the Arabs would be humiliated by being forced to recognize Israel. It is basic to U.S. and Israeli policy that Israel is recognized and recognition is accepted. It's symptomatic of the degree of slippage that has taken place in the last 19 years that such acceptance should be questioned at this time. Israel insists that this situation change and is prepared to sit in its present position for 10 years, if necessary, to accomplish this end. Recognition is the only choice to avoid another war.

8. Returning to "Goldberg Draft Resolution," Bitan said Israel is "asking, begging" that the U.S. not start with this resolution but resubmit the original U.S. resolution of June 20. Israel abstained on the Latin American Resolution as a matter of tactics in the United Nations Parliamentary situation as it then existed. The Latin American Resolution was a necessary evil and it was important to defeat the Yugo Resolution. The Government of Israel now believes it should have voted against the Latin American Resolution.

9. Turning to specifics of the current US - USSR draft, Bitan particularly referred to paragraph two and the phrase relating to the "inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war, etc." He challenged this language. States aggressed against, like Israel, had, in the past, held the territory conquered by war where it is necessary to do so to defend themselves against further aggression. The Government of Israel considers it has the right to hold such territory which was used as a base for the attack on Israel until it is assured that such aggression will not occur again. Also, the President's statement, as to "recognized boundaries" is not included in the language of the present resolution, nor is there any reference to security against territory destruction and war which was likewise part of the June 19 Declaration. Again Bitan referred to the draft's mention of United Nations presence, a further difference from the U.S. draft of June 20. Perpetuating the United Nations in the area, he said, is not perpetuating a bridge to the Arabs but a wedge between the Arabs and Israel. The Palestine Conciliatory Commission he claimed, has shielded the Arabs from the necessity of agreeing to the Israel's existence and has perpetuated Arab intransigence. In short, insofar as the next steps in the United Nations are concerned, Bitan reiterated that if we must discuss tactics rather than principles, we should stick to the U.S. June 20 resolution. It is in U.S., as well as Israeli, interest to do so. The Soviets are talking to the U.S. as result of Israel's victory. The Soviets are in trouble in Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere. Hussein may also, in time, see it in his interest to talk to Israel.

10. Israel, Bitan summarized, is now in a better military position than it has been before, is not asking for guarantees nor for massive armaments, only enough of the latter to keep things as is, and will withdraw when it is convinced there will be no further aggression from the territories it occupies and not before.

11. Incidentally, as to a possible mediator, the Government of Israel considers it too early to consider at present. If, at the outcome of the Security Council or the General Assembly, a mediator is appointed, he should be without terms of reference, but merely with a mandate to do what he can to bring parties together.

12. In conclusion, and with some diffidence, although nonetheless forthrightly, Bitan said he was instructed to say on the behalf of Eshkol and Eban, that in their view, if we persist along what they regard as our current line, we could be on a collision course. They are attempting the current discussions with us to "persuade, not to argue," but, if necessary, they are prepared to pull out all the stops available to them to prevent the erosion of the principles enunciated in the Presidents Five Points and statement therein that the solution on all five is indivisible.

13. I remonstrated at this attitude, noting that the outcome of the Israeli collision with the U.S. should not be very attractive to the Government of Israel but adding that, in any event, there is no intention on U.S. part to deviate from the principles expressed by the President regardless of how the Government of Israel might interpret the course of our efforts implementation. I also said I hoped the Israelis would not consider it in their interest, despite the presently favorable situation they enjoy, to sit in Olympian grandeur and immobility in the mountains of Jerusalem in the expectation they could dictate the settlement in the Middle East without taking into account the interplay of interests of the other powers in world. No power, great or small, can operate in the complete isolation it might regard as optimum to its national concerns in the world today. Israel cannot expect to call the tune on the Middle East settlement as if its interests were the only factor involved in the area and the problem could be sealed off from the wider world influences.

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2- Presidential file

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Friday, August 18, 1967 -- 6:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL 480 Rice for Liberia

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Gaud and Schultze recommend a new PL 480 agreement providing 3,700 tons of rice to Liberia (Value: \$900,000). This agreement was provided for in the rice planning reflected in the rice agreements you approved last week for Indonesia and Vietnam.

The terms offered to Liberia would require all repayments to be made in dollars, with a 5% down payment and the rest spread over 20 years. These are relatively hard for PL 480. The Freeman-Gaud memo (TAB B) specifies the self-help measures we would hope to stimulate with this rice.

However, we should not give you the impression that Liberia has a good self-help record or that there is a strong self-help case for this agreement. Liberian President Tubman is staunchly pro-American and particularly strong on Vietnam, but he is anything but an economic reformer. The truth is that Liberia has always received a disproportionate share of our aid to Africa because of its historic ties with the United States. This is no exception. If we provide this rice, it will be to generate money to ease Tubman's current budget deficit. I very much doubt that it would yield significant progress in terms of economic self-help.

There is some relevant political history. Secretary Rusk told the Liberian Foreign Minister some time ago that we would almost certainly provide this rice. If we don't come through, the Liberians would have a quasi-legitimate case that the Secretary of State has gone back on his word. In addition, of course, Tubman would find it hard to understand the refusal in the light of his strong position on Vietnam. And he is already a little tender because you have received his neighboring colleagues Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny, Diori (September) and Ankrah (October), while he hasn't been invited to Washington.

On balance -- for political reasons alone -- I would go along with the Freeman-Gaud-Schultze recommendation that you agree to the program. It's a very small amount of rice, and we can manage it with no strain. But it is far from the perfect model of a solid food aid program.

Edward K. Hamilton

Go ahead with agreement ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-351

By cb, NARA, Date 5-25-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Program with Liberia

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Bill Gaud seek your approval to negotiate a \$900,000 dollar credit sale of rice to Liberia. This sale would involve about 3,700 tons of rice, part of the 22,000 tons earmarked for Africa from the upcoming crop. Five percent would be paid in cash upon delivery, the balance over nineteen years at 2-1/2 percent interest.

The primary purpose of this agreement would be to provide support to the Liberian budget. Although Liberia's need for rice on concessional terms is not critical, they have been expecting this sale and its proceeds are already identified in the Liberian budget. It would provide revenue to cover two percent of the total budget, twenty percent of development spending.

The Liberians have been told that they cannot expect to continue receiving this kind of aid after this year. AID-supported efforts to reduce operating expenditures and to improve tax administration should enable the Liberians to balance their budget without P. L. 480 support next year.

The self-help provisions detailed in the Gaud/Freeman memorandum are designed to get the Liberian Government to make a start toward much-needed improvements in their agricultural development program.

To protect the normal commercial marketings, one of the conditions is that Liberia import 36,000 tons of rice commercially from the free world, of which 34,000 tons must come from the United States.

Since the Liberians have expected this sale for some time, and in view of our historic ties to Liberia, I recommend you approve the proposed agreement.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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AUG 4 1967

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To: The President

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-352

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Liberia

By ju, NARA, Date 9-19-93

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 agreement with Liberia to provide approximately 3,720 tons of rice, of which the current export market value is \$0.9 million (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance over 19 years at 2½ percent interest. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

Although Liberia has recently taken several measures to increase rice production, about 40% of its requirements must still be imported. During FY 1967, consumption is about 40,000 tons more than they produce. The full effect of current efforts to increase production will not reduce import requirements substantially until later. Liberia has given the U.S. strong support in the UN and is the only African country to make a material contribution to the South Vietnamese war effort.

Basis for Usual Marketing Requirement

Under the proposed usual marketing requirement which is based upon the most recent 4 year average of commercial rice exports to Liberia from free world sources, Liberia will have to import 36,000 tons commercially of which at least 34,000 tons must come from the United States.

Self-Help

Liberia's self-help efforts have been concentrated in the area of financial stabilization under IMF guidance. However, decreasing food production and increased imports, caused in part by expanded employment in the mining sector, underline the need for more attention to agricultural development. Although the Liberian Department of Agriculture has not been very effective in planning and administering agricultural development programs and only 2% of the 1967 budget is allocated to this Department, the GOL has recently given a higher priority to agriculture. Despite its low level, the 1967 budget allocation is still 15% more than in 1966, and the GOL has been successful in encouraging concessionaires to begin large scale production of rice and other food crops. A new "rice zone" plan to increase acreage of this crop was initiated in 1967 and several hundred miles of new rural access roads are in the planning stage.

Little U.S. assistance is currently given directly to the GOL Department of Agriculture because of its inability to utilize such assistance effectively. However, about \$1 million, or 20% of total AID grant assistance to Liberia is in support of increased food production through such AID activities as access road construction and maintenance, agricultural education, pilot

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large scale food production by an American concessionaire, etc. The Peace Corps is planning additional help in the agricultural sector.

In spite of a disappointing record of accomplishment in agricultural development, Liberia does have a good potential for improvement. In the negotiation of this agreement we will seek commitments that the Government of Liberia:

- (1) Give priority to agricultural development, including food crops, in the Government's budget and development planning, as evidenced by an increase in the allocation of agriculture in the FY 1968 budget;
- (2) Place more adequate emphasis on practical and realistic detailed advanced planning for individual activities such as the rice zone production plan;
- (3) Give rigorous direction and administration to existing and new agricultural activities;
- (4) Give added emphasis to construction and maintenance of rural roads with priority on areas showing best potential for increased production and distribution of agricultural products;
- (5) Conduct studies of rice marketing to determine the effect of market mechanisms, including price policies, on production and the need for storage and processing facilities and other production incentives;
- (6) Strengthen systems of collection, computation and analysis of statistics to better measure the availability of agricultural inputs and progress in expanding production of agricultural commodities;
- (7) Provide the USG with information for joint review of GOL policies and programs for increasing agricultural production; and
- (8) Undertake such other measures as may be mutually agreed upon for the purposes specified in Section 109(a) of the Act. Specific recommendations for these additional measures are to be provided at the time of the joint review specified in 7 above and in any event within six months of the date of the sales agreement.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.

August 12 1967

/s/ William S. Gaud

Orville L. Freeman

Administrator

Secretary

Agency for International Development

Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

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Friday, August 18, 1967

6:00 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Letter to President Park

Attached is a re-run on your letter to President Park. The original text went out by cable. Ambassador Porter (bless him) came right back with suggested wording that is stronger.

Porter's main point was that he didn't want the Koreans to get the idea that we were ready to meet their requirements (additional civilian presence) while our requirements (more combat troops) were left for consideration only three or four months from now. Porter wants to push harder -- and faster -- than the original language implied.

This is a good change.

I pulled back the signed original which was about to go into the pouch. If you approve and sign this revised letter, we can pouch it but get the text immediately to Porter for delivery.

State and Defense have approved the revised language.

William J. Jorden

Att.

Approve letter _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-298
By *ijg*, NARA, Date 10-26-95

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1300

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-298
By ip, NARA, Date 10-26-95 August 17, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I express my appreciation for the courtesies extended to my emissaries, Mr. Clifford and General Taylor. They have been most complimentary in their comments on the reception given them by you and your colleagues. I am highly gratified at the frank and forthright discussions that took place, and am confident that they have contributed to an even closer relationship and understanding between our two countries.

I know that you and your colleagues have been giving careful and responsible thought to the question of increasing your forces in South Viet-Nam. In their visits, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found agreement in the belief that this is a critical time and that it is essential to maintain the momentum of our military efforts, even as we search always for some sign in Hanoi of a willingness to move toward peace. I believe strongly that it would have a great effect in Hanoi if it became clear that all of us, within our capabilities, were prepared to increase our efforts at this time, and you have of course noted the increase of 65,000 in South Vietnamese forces and our own announcement of an increase of 45,000 men.

Of even greater importance, is the effect that an increase of forces on the part of our allies will have on our ability to maintain and expand the contribution that this country is making. As Messrs. Clifford and Taylor informed you in advance, I have now requested an increase in taxes in the form of a ten per cent surtax which is made necessary by our expanding costs in Viet-Nam.

Let me say to you, quite frankly, that the action of the Congress and the attitude of our people on this question will be influenced to a great extent by the decision that you and our other allies make in increasing your forces.

My emissaries have reported on the discussions which they had with you as to the need to increase your forces. My hope is

that you will make the maximum effort in this regard, and that we can work out the details of an agreement as speedily as possible. Ambassador Porter, who has the full details on these matters, would be happy to consult with you about the type of contribution you and I discussed during my visit to Seoul last Fall. These particular proposals reflect the benefit of experience and analysis conducted since that time in a situation that has changed in many respects. If your Government were able to move in these areas, it would be of substantial immediate help, but Ambassador Porter will also be discussing with you additional combat forces.

As to the question of a possible summit meeting, Messrs. Clifford and Taylor found affirmative reactions in all capitals toward the possibility of such a meeting after the South Vietnamese elections and the installation of a new government there. There also seems to be a common view that such a meeting should be at Asian initiative and in an appropriate Asian setting. My own mind runs in the direction of late November, and I should be most interested to have your thoughts, however tentative, on timing factors from your standpoint.

In closing, let me repeat my deep thanks for all that was done for Messrs. Clifford and Taylor. We must stay in very close touch on all aspects of the situation, and you now of course have with you Ambassador Porter, who brings a deep first-hand knowledge of our relationship.

With my high respects and warm regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

LBJ:State:WJJorden:mm:8/14/67

LBJ:State:WJJorden:Amb Porter:pas:8/18/67-Retyped

Friday, August 18, 1967
4:00 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is the daily Viet-Nam
political report.

William J. Jorden

Att.

SECRET-EXDIS Attachment

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

13.5

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

August 18, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-259
By sig, NARA, Date 2-7-96

Campaign Developments

Presidential campaign developments continue to be encouraging. Presidential campaigners went to Qui Nhon August 17 and spoke to a crowd of about 4,000. The trip went smoothly, and there was considerable audience reaction to the speakers. Thieu and Ky were again represented by local supporters. Huong was represented by his vice presidential running-mate.

The Embassy notes that even when the major presidential slates are not campaigning personally themselves, their campaigns are fairly well organized throughout the country, at least at the provincial level and sometimes in districts and villages. These local campaign organizations are conducting public meetings fairly regularly.

Charges of unfair election practices and pressures by the Vietnamese Government continue to be heard, and the Embassy is inclined to believe that there are some shenanigans by local government officials. The Embassy continues to believe, however, that there is no general government plan to harass or to intimidate the civilian slates or their supporters. The Embassy also continues to believe that Huong's withdrawal is not imminent, even though Huong continues to threaten publicly to reconsider his candidacy.

AP this morning quotes Huong as approving Senator Javits' proposal for postponing the election for four weeks. According to AP, Huong said that "most of the tickets want to postpone the election." Huong added, however, that "if we postpone it too long the public might lose interest." Comment: To reopen the election date would create major difficulties.

Campaign Funds

The Embassy has reliable information that General Loan has borrowed \$625,000 from wealthy local Chinese contributors

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to subsidize the campaigns of pro-Thieu-Ky senatorial slates. There are reports that Huong is short of campaign funds. One untested source says Huong lacks funds because "his former campaign finance manager," Au Truong Thanh, absconded with \$125,000 when he decided to announce his own candidacy.

"Special Military Control Committee"

In response to General Westmoreland's recent query, Chief of Joint General Staff Vien recently indicated fairly clearly that plans for some kind of special military control committee existed. Westmoreland impressed on Vien the dangers involved in any such organization. There has been a potential press leak regarding a document which purports to describe this control mechanism and which we obtained from clandestine sources. We are investigating the matter urgently.

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(8/18/67)

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As proposed by Kissinger August 17 and accepted August 18

The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam based on the assurance that this will lead promptly to productive discussions etc.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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, NARA, Date 10-26-95

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-298

By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

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= Presidential file

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August 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talks with the Shah - 5:30 P. M. Tuesday and Wednesday

The main purpose of your meeting is once again to reassure the Shah that you regard him highly and believe the U. S. has a stake in the success of his kind of reform. But as you know, he is a thoughtful man and is looking forward to serious talk. He will be flattered by any confidences you can share on your talks with Kosygin, your thoughts on Vietnam, your interest in Ayub, your feelings about the Middle East, and even your analysis of our own urban problems.

The new factor in the U. S. -Iran equation since his 1964 visit is his increasing independence. After long dependence on U. S. aid and years of feeling that only the U. S. could protect him against Nasser and the USSR, the Shah for better than two years has been feeling his way toward a more independent policy.

No one cause prompted this shift. Our cutoff of military supply to Ayub during the Indo-Pak war upset him. He has watched the changing temperature of U. S. -Soviet relations, which has made him re-think his own relations with Moscow. Domestic pressures have forced him to appear less "the American puppet," especially as Iran becomes economically more self-sufficient.

As a result, he has eased into a limited relationship with the USSR. He has strengthened his relations with Pakistan and Turkey. He has supported the Yemeni Royalists and elements in South Arabia working against Nasser. He has -- almost alone among the Moslem states -- maintained a respectable relationship with Israel.

He is still feeling his way, and you may want to talk over the pitfalls in going too fast with the USSR. The Soviet role in the Middle East war has probably given him second thoughts, but your own experience with Kosygin might help him sort out the limits of working with the Soviets.

The other side of this coin for him is how heavily he can count on us for future arms supply. Under the current Memorandum of Understanding we are committed to provide another \$100 million in credit sales.

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Even if the Church Amendment stands, we would be able to meet that obligation if you told Harold Linder to make the loan without a Defense guarantee. But the Shah probably assumes that; his main interest is whether we will go on supplying him beyond the term of the current understanding (1970). While you can say that politically we want a continuing military relationship, we'll just have to wait to see where we stand with Congress. You may want to discuss your Congressional problem with him, since he will be seeing quite a few members of Congress.

More broadly, he will want to know what role we intend to play in the Middle East. One way to explain our position is to say, as you have in the past, that we don't walk out on friends, so we're not about to disengage. But then you might go on to describe the new spirit of regionalism you found on your Pacific trip and your hope that something similar might emerge in the Middle East. While we don't want to commission him for any special job, we do feel he could play an important role in making this happen.

After stating your views, you might be interested to hear from the Shah what role he thinks we can play in the area in the future. A number of our moderate friends tell us frantically that we must do something to preserve the anti-Communist balance in the Middle East, but when we get down to specifics they have little to suggest.

Because of your own personal interest, you will undoubtedly want to hear from the Shah himself about the progress of his reform program. Although AID will be phasing out its activities in the next year, more and more American businessmen are moving into Iran and it might be interesting to ask the Shah how, without a formal aid program, he thinks we can participate constructively.

You will want to read Secretary Rusk's two memos ("General" -- Tabs A and B of the attached briefing book). If you have time, I think you would find useful the "Background" tabs on Iran's relations with Communist countries (B); U.S. military aid (C); the Shah's domestic picture with charts on economic progress (D); and our Congress' attitudes toward Iran (K). We'll have a brief talking paper for you Tuesday.

Harold H. Saunders

August 18, 1967

MEMO TO MRS. TERRITO:

Walt Rostow and I have together drawn up the following list of names of people in the Departments and Agencies who might be approached with a view to obtaining their papers for the Johnson Library. We have included John McNaughton who was a Presidential level appointee.

Henry Owen
Henry Rowen
Alan Enthoven
John McNaughton
Max F. Millikan
Henry Kissinger
David Ginsburg
Abe Fineberg

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

Rostow
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Pres file

Friday, August 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: Mr. Waples

SUBJECT: Award of The Legion of Merit to the Prime Minister of Thailand

Attached is a recommendation from Secretary McNamara, with a concurrence from Secretary Rusk, that you award The Legion of Merit to Thai Prime Minister Thanom.

Thanom is, of course, one of our staunchest friends in Asia, and thoroughly merits the award.

The award has, however, taken on a special urgency. Thanom, through no fault of his own, has gotten himself publicly in the position of appearing to want an invitation to visit the United States this fall. Ambassador Martin in Bangkok is under instructions to disabuse Thanom of any expectation of such an invitation. To do this without giving Thanom a feeling of being rebuffed, Martin feels strongly that he needs this award without delay. I agree with him.

William J. Jordan

Atts.

MWright:hg