

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 3:05 p.m. ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#3a cable	Jidda 959 <i>open 7/26/00 NLS 00-91</i> ~~C~~ 2 p	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~
#4a memo	Edmunds to Wheeler <i>open 5-6-98 NLS 96-273</i> ~~C~~ 2 p	~~9/5/67~~	~~A~~
#4b rpt	Tab A (Attachments to #4a) ~~C~~ 2 p "	undated	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 2:55 p.m. ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 4-14-94 NLS 91-368</i> [Duplicate of #102, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2]	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#5a memcon	Rostow and Black <i>open 4-14-94 NLS 91-368</i> ~~C~~ 2 p [Duplicate of #102a, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2]	~~9/8/67~~	~~A~~
#6 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67803) ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#7 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67797) ~~S~~ 4 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#8 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67799) ~~C~~ 3 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#9 cable	<i>open 7/26/00 NLS 00-91</i> Rostow to President (CAP67800) (<i>dup. #27, NSF, Country File</i>) ~~S~~ 2 p <i>* Clifford Taylor Sigs. 8/67, Correspondence w/Vietnam Surgs & Box 24</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#10 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67807) <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i> ~~S~~ 1 p [Duplicate of #14]	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. (<i>dup #26, NSF, CF, Vietnam</i>) ~~S~~ 1 p <i>"Memo to the President" [vol 4]</i> <i>sanitized 2/25/02 NLS 94-367</i>	~~9/9/67~~	~~A~~

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 40, 9/1-10/67

Box 22

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2 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#12a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>(dup #70a as above)</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-14-95 NLJ 94-364</i> <i>sanitized 4/6/01 NIS/RLC 00-128</i>	9/7/67	A
~~#14 memo~~	~~Duplicate of #10 open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364~~		
#16 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p	9/9/67	A
~~#17 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ ~~S 2 p open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364~~	~~9/8/67~~	~~A~~
~~#17b memo~~	~~Rusk to President~~ ~~S 2 p open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365~~ ~~[Duplicate of #23a]~~	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#17c rpt~~	~~Talking Points~~ ~~S 5 p open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365~~ ~~[Duplicate of #23b]~~	~~[9/67]~~	~~A~~
~~#17e rpt~~	~~KCG/B-5~~ ~~S 3 p open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365~~ ~~[Duplicate of #23c]~~	~~9/6/67~~	
~~#17g rpt~~	~~KCG/B-2~~ <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> ~~S 4 p~~ ~~[Duplicate of #23d]~~	~~9/6/67~~	
~~#17o rpt~~	~~KCG/B-7~~ <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> ~~S 3 p~~ ~~[Duplicate of #23k]~~	~~9/6/67~~	
#19 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67785) <i>x 176a, open 1-20-95 NLJ 94-365</i> S 2 p <i>Dup #29,29b NSF,CF,VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/8/67	A
~~#21 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ ~~S 2 p open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364~~	~~9/8/67~~	~~A~~
#23 memo	Rostow to President, re: Greece S 2 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/8/67	A
~~#23a memo~~	~~Duplicate of #17b open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365~~		

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3 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#23b memo~~	~~Duplicate of #17c~~ <i>open 1-2-95 NLJ 94-365</i>		
~~#23c rpt~~	~~Duplicate of #17c~~ "		
~~#23d rpt~~	~~Duplicate of #17g~~ "		
~~#23k memo~~	~~Duplicate of #17o~~ "		
#24 memo	Oliver to President <i>open 7/26/00 NS 00-95</i> S ~~1 p~~ <i>Sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	9/7/67	A
#25a rpt	"Vietnam Political Situation Report" <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> S ~~2 p~~ <i>Sup. #29, 29b, 1762, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/8/67	A
#26 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67780) C ~~3 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/8/67	A
#27 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67779) " S ~~1 p~~	9/8/67	A
#28 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67778) " S ~~1 p~~	9/8/67	A
#29 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67783) S ~~2 p~~ <i>Sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> <i>Sanitized 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 00-139 (same)</i>	9/8/67	A
#30 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67775) <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i> S ~~2 p~~	9/8/67	A
#31 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67776) " C ~~2 p~~	9/8/67	A
#35 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67764) " S ~~2 p~~	9/7/67	A
#36 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67749) S ~~17 p~~ <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>[dup #29, 30, NSF, CF, VN, "8 BB(1), Box 105]</i>	9/7/67	A
#37 ltr	President to Chairman Thieu <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i> PCI ~~1 p~~	9/7/67	A

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4 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#39a rpt~~	~~"Vietnam Political Situation Report"~~ ~~S~~ ~~2 p~~ <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i>	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#40 cable~~	~~Rostow to President (CAP67762)~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i> ~~C~~ ~~1 p~~	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#41 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 5:55 p.m.~~ ~~TS~~ ~~1 p~~ <i>open 6-21-94 NLS 94-154</i>	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#41a memo~~	~~Intelligence Memorandum~~ ~~TS~~ ~~5 p~~ <i>open 6-9-94 NLS 94-153</i>	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#42 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m.~~ ~~C~~ ~~3 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/7/67~~	~~A~~
~~#43 memo~~	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. <i>Unempt 2/28/02 NLS 94-367</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #105, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	9/6/67	A
~~#44 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m.~~ ~~C~~ ~~1 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~
~~#44a memo~~	~~Hamilton to Rostow~~ <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-751</i> ~~C~~ ~~2 p~~ <i>supp #14, Files of Hemi Hon "AID-PL480" Box 7 under</i>	~~9/5/67~~	~~A~~
~~#44b memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ ~~C~~ ~~1 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~8/29/67~~	~~A~~
~~#44c memo~~	~~Schultze to President, re: Ecuador~~ // ~~C~~ ~~2 p~~	~~8/24/67~~	~~A~~
~~#44d memo~~	~~Gaud, Freeman to President~~ ~~C~~ ~~2 p~~ <i>open 7-9-99 NLS 96-275</i>	~~8/21/67~~	~~A~~
~~#45 cable~~	~~New Delhi 2835~~ ~~C~~ ~~3 p~~ <i>open 1-20-95 NLS 94-365</i>	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~
~~#46 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ ~~S~~ ~~1 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~

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5 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#47a rpt~~	~~"Vietnam Political Situation Report"~~ <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> ~~S 2 p~~ <i>Dup. #31, 31b, NSF, CF, VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~
~~#50a rpt~~	~~CINCPAC Summary~~ ~~TS 5 p~~ <i>open 9-30-96 NLJ 96-183</i>	~~9/6/67~~	~~A~~
~~#52a memo~~	~~Secretary to Saigon~~ <i>open 7/26/00 NLS 00-95</i> ~~S 1 p~~ <i>sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
#52b memo	Secretary to Saigon S 2 p <i>sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i>	undated	A
~~#53a cable~~	~~Seoul 1120~~ <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ 93-367</i> ~~S 2 p~~	~~9/5/67~~	~~A~~
~~#58 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ ~~TS 3 p~~ <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	~~9/5/67~~	~~A~~
#59 memo	Rostow to President <i>Sanitized 9-20-01 NLS/RAC 00-139 (same)</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-14-93 NLJ 91-368</i> [Duplicate of #104, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2] <i>& #229, Country File Jordan Vol. 4)</i>	9/5/67	A
#59a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>dup. #229a as above</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i> <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i>	9/5/67	A
#59b rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Exempt 2-13-01 NLJ 00-93, dup. #229b as above</i> S 3 p <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i>	undated	A
#59c cable	Jidda 896 <i>Open 7/26/00 NLS 00-95</i> ~~S 5 p~~ <i>sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> [Duplicate of #104a, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2]	9/5/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President <i>(dup #46. see below)</i> ~~S 1 p~~ <i>open 0/28/02 NLJ 94-367</i>	9/5/67	A
#62a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 11 p <i>sanitized 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i> <i>(dup #46a, NSF, CF, Vietnam, "memo to the President [Vol. 4] Box 57</i>	9/3/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 40, 9/1-10/67

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6 of 11

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#65 memo	Rostow to President ~~C~~ 3 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~
#65b memo	Black to President ~~C~~ 2 p	8/30/67	~~A~~
#65d memo	Poats to Black PCI ~~2 p~~ <i>OPEN 7/10/96</i>	9/1/67	~~A~~
#66 memo	Rostow to President ~~sanitized 2-24-93 NLJ 91-32~~ S 1 p <i>sanitized 2-13-01 NLJ 00-94 more released</i> [Duplicate of #106, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	9/5/67	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i> ~~C~~ 1 p <i>(dup. in diary backup, 9/5/67)</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~
#67a cable	Saigon 4939 ~~C~~ 3 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> [Duplicate of #68a] [Duplicate of #20, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"] <i>(dup. in diary backup, 9/5/67)</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~
#68 memo	Duplicate of #67 <i>open 1-21-00 NLJ 94-364</i>		
#68a cable	Duplicate of #67a <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>		
#69 memo	Rostow to President <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-344</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>[DUP #144, NSF, MRP NON PROLIF TREATY, "VOL 2" 3426]</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~
#69a memo	Fisher to Secretary <i>open 9-16-94 NLJ 94-343</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>(dup. in diary backup, 9/5/67)</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~
#70 memo	Rostow to President <i>(dup. #48, NSF, CH, VN, "Memos to the President [Vol 4])</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>sanitized 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i> <i>open 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 00-139</i>	9/5/67	~~A~~ <i>Box 22</i>
#73 cable	Saigon 4958 ~~S~~ 4 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> [Duplicate of #16, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	9/5/67	~~A~~

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7 of 11

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#75 memo	Rostow to President ~~C~~ 2 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/5/67	A
#77b cable	President to Bunker ~~C~~ 1 p <i>sanitized 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i> <i>open 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 00-139</i>	9/4/67	A
#78 memo	Rostow to President [<i>dup #32, NSF, VN, 808(1) Box 150</i>] ~~S~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/4/67	A
#78a cable	Saigon 4867 ~~S~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	9/3/67	A
#78b cable	Saigon 4868 " ~~S~~ 1 p	9/4/67	A
#78c memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-128</i> ~~S~~ 2 p <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i> <i>(dup. #12c, NSF, Country File, VN, "Memoranda to President, Vol 3" Box 57)</i>	9/4/67	A
#79a cable	Saigon 4420 ~~S~~ 2 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	8/15/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLJ 94-364</i>	9/4/67	A
#81a cable	Saigon 4885 <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i> ~~S~~ 6 p <i>44845</i> [Duplicate of #40, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	9/4/67	A
#82a cable	Deptel 30165 to Moscow <i>Open 7/26/00 NLS 00-46</i> ~~S~~ 2 p <i>sanitized 1-2-95 NLJ 94-365</i> <i>[dup in Diary Backup, 9/5/67]</i>	8/31/67	A
#82b cable	Moscow 896 ~~S~~ 2 p <i>[dup. in Diary Backup, 9/5/67]</i>	9/2/67	A
#83a cable	Saigon 4809 ~~C~~ 4 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	9/4/67	A
#84a cable	Saigon 84 <i>open 9-20-01 NLJ/RAC 00-139</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>sanitized 1-12-95 NLJ 94-365</i>	[9/67]	A

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8 of 11

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#85 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. S 3 p	9/4/67	A & C
~~#85a cable~~	~~Saigon 4631~~ ~~S 4 p~~ open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
~~#85b memo~~	~~Macomber to Leddy~~ " ~~S 1 p~~	~~8/30/67~~	~~A~~
~~#85c rpt~~	~~JSC report~~ " ~~PCI 2 p~~	~~8/30/67~~	~~A~~
~~#85d memo~~	~~Hughes to Secretary~~ " ~~S 2 p~~	~~8/30/67~~	~~A~~
~~#87a cable~~	~~Saigon 80~~ open 4/6/01 NS/RAC 00-138 ~~S 1 p~~	~~[9/67]~~	~~A~~
~~#94a cable~~	~~Saigon 977~~ Dup. #222, NSF, CF, VN, "WH Cables Backchannels" ~~C 1 p~~ Incoming, Outgoing Box 258 Sanitized 8-2-94 NLS 94-133 open 4/6/01 NS/RAC 00-138 Same sanitization 1-12-95 NLS 94-365	~~9/3/67~~	~~A~~
~~#96 memo~~	~~Jorden to President~~ ~~S 1 p~~ open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364	~~9/3/67~~	~~A~~
~~#96a cable~~	~~From Saigon~~ ~~S 2 p~~ open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365	~~[9/67]~~	~~A~~
~~#101 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 4:25 p.m.~~ open 9/20/01 NLS/RAC 00-139 ~~Dep #36 VN Vol 3 S 1 p~~ Sanitized 1-2-96 NLS 94-364 Box 57]	~~9/2/67~~	~~A~~
~~#101a cable~~	~~Lodge 21056Z~~ Dup. #2526, NSF, CF, VN, "WH Cables Backchannels Incoming, Outgoing" Box 258 ~~S 2 p~~ Sanitized 1-12-95 NLS 94-365	~~9/2/67~~ open 9/20/01 NLS/RAC 00-139	~~A~~
~~#102a cable~~	~~Saigon 4779~~ ~~S 3 p~~ open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365 [Duplicate of #66, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	~~9/2/67~~	~~A~~

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9 of 11

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#103a cable	Saigon 4786 ~~S~~ 3 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i> [Duplicate of #62, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(2), 8/13-9/5/67 Elections"]	9/2/67	A
#104 memo	Rostow to President, 12:55 p.m. ~~S~~ 1 p <i>(dup in Daily Backup, 9/5/67) open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	9/2/67	A
#104a cable	Deptel 30020 to Saigon <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i> ~~S~~ 4 p <i>(dup. in Daily Backup, 9/5/67)</i>	9/2/67	A
#105 memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. <i>Dup #24, NSF, CF, VN, "NH"</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Cables Back Channels Incoming, Outgoing "Box 258"</i> <i>Sanitized 1-2-96 NLS 94-364 open 2-13-01</i>	9/2/67	A
#105a cable	Saigon 935 <i>Dup #23, 24a, as above</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Sanitized 8-2-94 NLS 94-133</i> <i>open 2-13-01</i>	9/2/67	A
#107a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Open 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> ~~S~~ 2 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/2/67	A
#108 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. <i>exempt 2/25/02 NLS 94-367</i> S 1 p	9/1/67	A
#108a cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 4 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/1/67	A
#108b cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/1/67	A
#108c cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/1/67	A
#108d cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 2 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/1/67	A
#108e cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sanitized 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i> S 2 p <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i>	9/1/67	A
#112 memo	Rostow to President, 3:40 p.m. ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	9/1/67	A

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10 of 11

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#112a memo	Saunders to Rostow ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~8/30/67~~	~~A~~
#112b memo	Walsh to Rostow ~~C~~ 1 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i>	~~8/28/67~~	~~A~~
#112c memo	Wine to E. Rostow ~~C~~ 3 p <i>"</i>	~~8/16/67~~	~~A~~
#114 memo	Rostow to President, 3:35 p.m. ~~S~~ 1 p <i>open 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
#114a cable	Ankara 976 <i>Sanitized 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i> ~~S~~ 2 p <i>Open 7/26/00 NLS 00-95</i>	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
#114b memo	Oehlert to Rostow ~~C~~ 2 p <i>open 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i>	~~8/25/67~~	~~A~~
#114c memo	Khan to Oehlert ~~PCI~~ 1 p <i>"</i>	~~8/21/67~~	~~A~~
#115 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p <i>exempt 2/28/02 NLS 94-367</i>	9/1/67	A
#115a memo	Rostow to President TS 3 p <i>exempt 2/28/02 NLS 94-367</i>	8/31/67	A
#119a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 13 p <i>Sanitized 7-14-95 NLS 94-366</i> <i>Search 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i>	8/30/67	A
#121 memo	Rostow to President ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Dp #28, NSF, CF, VN, "with cables back channel incoming outgoing" Box 258 Sanitized 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i> <i>Open 2-13-01</i>	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
#121a cable	Saigon 906 ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Dp #28a as above Sanitized 1-12-95 NLS 94-365</i> <i>Open 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-138</i>	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
#121b cable	CAP67744 ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Dp #28b as above open 9/20/01 NLS/RAC 00-139</i> <i>Sanitized 1-2-96 NLS 94-364</i>	~~9/1/67~~	~~A~~
#122a rpt	"Vietnam Political Situation Report" S 2 p <i>Dp #332, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/1/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 40, 9/1-10/67

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#87c	Intelligence report - PCI 1 p <i>Exempt 4/4/01 NS/RAC 00-140</i>	9/4/67	A
#116 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 3:00 p.m. - TS 1 p <i>exempt 12/13/01 NLJ/RAC 00-141</i>	9/1/67	A
#116a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1 p <i>exempt 12/13/01 NLJ/RAC 00-141</i>	9/1/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 40, September 1-10, 1967
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SEP 10 16 27

FROM WALT BOSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE WH72471

Pres file

SEP 10 PM 12:59

SUNDAY

UNCLASSIFIED

HEREWITH A BRIEF COMMENT ON BUNKER'S FACE THE NATION OF
TODAY AND (FROM PARAGRAPH 3) MORE ON THEIR'S RESPONSES.
TEXT OF SAIGON 5555.

1. TRANSCRIPT AND TAPE AMBASSADOR BUNKER APPEARANCE
CBS-TV. "FACE THE NATION" SCHEDULED U.S. TELECAST SUNDAY,
SEPTEMBER 10 AVAILABLE WASHINGTON FROM PRODUCER PRANTISS
CHILDS WHEN FINAL EDITED VERSION COMPLETED. PLEASE SEND
POST COPIES SOONEST.

2. REPLIES FOLLOW GENERAL LINES OF PREVIOUS PRESS STATE-
MENTS AND BRIEFINGS VARIOUS VIETNAM SUBJECTS.

3. BUNKER STATEMENT ON POSSIBILITY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
BEFORE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ONLY MATTER OPEN TO
UNUSUAL PRESS PLAY. STRONG ELECTION SHOWING OF PEACE
CANDIDATE DZU: LAWYER DZU IS NOT ALONE, ALL VIETNAMESE
WANT PEACE INCLUDING ME. I PROPOSED PEACE PLAN DURING CAMPAIGN.
MORE PEOPLE BACKED ME (AND MY PLAN) THAN DZU. THE VOTERS,
HOWEVER, DON'T WANT PEACE AT ANY PRICE. THEY DON'T WANT
TALKS WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT OR HAVING THEM
BY THEIR SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

4. ROLE OF VIETCONG IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: THEY CAN
ONLY ACT AS MEMBER OF HANOI DELEGATION. WE COULD NEVER
NEGOTIATE WITH VIET CONG AS REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, LEGAL GOVERNMENT OR POLITICAL ENTITY.
THE GOVERNMENT IS READY TO TALK TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE FRONT,
HIGH OR LOW LEVEL, IN LINE WITH THE POLICY OF RECONCILIATION.
THIS INDIVIDUAL DISCUSSION COULD ACT AS BRIDGE TO FURTHER
NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ELECTRONIC ANTI-INFILTRATION FENCE: HAS NOT HAD OPPOR-
TUNITY TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY THAT IT SHOULD INCLUDE POLITICAL
MATTER OF COVERING THE BORDER OF LAOS. IT IS THE DUTY
OF FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO OBSERVE THEIR NEUTRALITY. HE GIVES
NO SUPPORT TO SUGGESTION THAT A POLICY OF "HOT PURSUIT" OVER
BORDERS OF LAOS BE ADOPTED.

FROM QUICK COPY

5. ROLE OF GENERAL KY IN NEW GOVERNMENT: THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VICE PRESIDENT ARE CLEARLY DEFINED IN THE CONSTITUTION. HE HAS WORKED WITH ME FOR TWO YEARS. HE CAN CONTINUE TO HELP ME IN MY FUNCTIONS. FEELS HE CAN WORK EFFECTIVELY WITH GENERAL KY. IN CONNECTION WITH KY'S FRIENDS AND ASSOCIATES IN GOVERNMENT, DOES NOT CARE ABOUT THE INDIVIDUAL, IS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE CAPACITY AND VIRTUE OF A MAN.

7. NEED FOR MORE U.S. TROOPS: I HAVE EXPRESSED MYSELF MANY TIMES ON THIS. IF WE HAVE MORE TROOPS WE CAN SHORTEN THE WAR. THE PROBLEM OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM IS THE PROBLEM OF TROOPS. IF A PEACE IS OBTAINED SOME TROOPS WILL BE NECESSARY TO INSURE THE PEACE. HE DOES NOT NOW KNOW HOW MANY.

8. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM REORGANIZATION: HOPES TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR BOTH COMBAT, CIVIC ACTION AND PACIFICATION. FIRST WORK WOULD BE WITH REGIONAL FORCES AND POPULAR FORCES. IN FULFILLMENT OF PACIFICATION MISSION, IT IS A MISTAKE TO SAY ONLY U.S. TROOPS ARE FIGHTING THE WAR AND THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARE LESS. IN MORE SECURE AREAS SOME MILITARY PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS WILL BE REPLACED BY CIVILIANS NOW BEING TRAINED IN REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PROGRAM.

9. BOMBING THE DIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM: SUCH TARGETS DO NOT FALL INTO THE CATEGORY OF EITHER AIDS TO INFILTRATION OR MEANS OF PRODUCING WAR PRODUCTS. THEY SHOULD NOT BE STRUCK.

10. LARGE CATHOLIC REPRESENTATION: FEELS THERE IS NO PROBLEM OF CATHOLICS BEING OVER REPRESENTED IN ANY PART OF GOVERNMENT. THE STRONG CATHOLIC BLOC SHOULD NOT SERVE AS A MEANS FOR THE BUDDHISTS TO MAKE TROUBLE.

11. NEW GOVERNMENT: TO HAVE CIVILIAN PRIME MINISTER. DOES NOT KNOW WHO WILL BE SELECTED: THERE IS NO POLITICAL PARTY STRONG ENOUGH NOW TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. LOOKS FORWARD TO HAVING THIS BY NEXT ELECTION: THAT FOUR YEARS WILL BE ENOUGH TIME FOR POLITICAL PARTY TO DEVELOP. AT PRESENT MAIN PROBLEM IS FORMING ANTI-COMMUNIST COMBINED FRONT IN THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. I AM IN FAVOR OF OPPOSITION AS LONG AS IT SUPPORTS THE ANTI-COMMUNIST STRUGGLE OF THE GOVERNMENT...DOESN'T KNOW IF ANY OF HIS ELECTION OPPONENTS WILL BE IN CABINET, BUT LOOKS FORWARD TO HAVING MEN WHO HAVE POLITICAL BACKING.

12. PANEL CONSISTS OF JOSEPH KRAFT, PUBLISHERS' NEWSPAPER SYNDICATE (WASHINGTON POST), TOM BUCKLEY, NEW YORK TIMES, ROBERT SHAPLEN, NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, AND NBC NEWSMEN DEAN RELIS, WITH DAVID BURRINGTON AS MODERATOR.

DTG:101452Z SEP 1967

FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

Saturday Sept. 9, 1967
4 p.m.

2
—

MR. PRESIDENT:

At last a truly usable CIA assessment
of achievements in Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (log 3486)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 9-12-91

~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Saturday, September 9, 1967
3:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a letter to you from King Faisal, which reports that the oil will be moving; but is pretty stiff-backed on any relation with Israel.

Although it sounds like a stone wall, there is maneuver room for a formula which would include:

- an end to belligerence; and
- a refugee settlement.

W. W. Rostow

Jidda 959

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-364
By ij, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

"His Excellency President Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America

3a

Dear Mr. President:

In light of decisions at the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartoum, Sudan, between August 29 and September 1, 1967, permit me, Mr. President, to explain my views to Your Excellency in all sincerity, since I firmly desire the preservation and strengthening of existing friendship between our two countries, and since Your Excellency has encouraged me to present my views on the course of events whenever I find reason to do so, and assured me that Your Excellency would give them most serious attention.

The Arab Summit Conference issued wise and courageous decisions which as a whole indicate how well Kings and Presidents of the Arab States and their representatives appreciate the responsibility placed upon their shoulders with regard to their peoples and the future of their nation following the latter's injury at Zionist hands, in defiance of decisions of UN and flouting spiritual and humanitarian values proclaimed in its charter.

In reviewing decisions of the conference, two important decisions arrest our attention:

1. Resumption of flow of oil to all countries of the world.
2. Removal of effects of aggression: that is, return to the situation existing before June 5, 1967. This means it is possible for Arab States to study any proposal from which the following four points are excluded:

reconciliation with Israel, recognition of her, negotiation with her, or anything prejudicial to the right of Palestinian people to their homeland.

Mr. President, it was not easy to arrive at this courageous and constructive step in conditions, of which Your Excellency can appreciate the gravity, where a wave of emotional agitation had taken possession of Arab peoples as a result of open Zionist aggression, after paralysis of the UN in reacting to it and punishing its perpetrators, after the silence of the world's conscience in deterring it and doing justice to those who fell victim to it, all of which made leaders of Arab countries unable to stand before the violent popular current but were obliged to conform to it in many of their actions.

Permit me to say, Mr. President, that decisions at the Arab Summit Conference were highly constructive. A door has been opened for Western

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-91

By cb, NARA Date 7-25-00

camp to reconsider its hardened position, so as to enable its friends among Arabs to persuade hot-headed Arab peoples that the West, and those who travel in its orbit, are not standing against them in their dispute with Israel, and in order to give the leaders of Arab countries an opportunity to proceed to further constructive steps toward producing a just solution to the problem. I can declare to Your Excellency that the situation has now become propitious for arriving at a prompt and rapid solution acceptable to the Arabs, provided the four points I set forth above are left aside. But should the solution be delayed, pressures will return intensified and permeate the entire Arab world. Then a solution would become impracticable and your friends would be unable to control the feeling of bitterness among Arab peoples toward the position of the Western camp concerning their cause. The other side would seize upon this as a means of confusing thoughts and spreading anarchy.

I furthermore consider that it is not in the interest of the United States of America to regard the attitude of certain Arab countries toward it as a reason to stand against the Arabs on an issue which every Arab considers vital to himself.

The question of Yemen was discussed in Khartoum in ancillary meetings between myself and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Together we arrived at an agreement which we believe this time to be final, God willing.

In conclusion, I send Your Excellency my sincere wishes for health and happiness and for our friends, the people of the United States of America, all progress and prosperity.

Your friend,

Faisal
September 6, 1967"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 9, 1967
3:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

These comparisons of voting in
Viet Nam and Arkansas -- also U.S.
1960 and 1964 -- are rather fun,
especially the comparisons between
the Thieu-Ky vote and Sen. Fulbright.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 112356 Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1983
By *[signature]*, NARA, Date 10-4-91



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

5 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WHEELER

THRU: GENERAL BROWN

SUBJECT: Election Statistics

1. Attached at Tab A is a table containing information on comparative election results for Vietnam 1967, US 1960, US 1964 and Arkansas 1962. Some of the interesting points are discussed briefly below:

a. Although the GVN total population is approximately 17,000,000, another pertinent figure for computing participation is the number of personnel of voting age living under GVN control. As stated in Note 3, this figure is not accurately available, however, assuming the estimate used here to be reasonable, 83% of the latter personnel went to the polls -- and these represent 57% of all eligible voters in SVN. This compares to 64% of the eligible voters who participated in the 1960 US elections and 63% in 1964. Only 25% of eligible voters in Arkansas voted in the 1962 Senatorial election.

b. ~~The Thieu/Ky ticket polled 49% of all eligible voters in SVN (regardless of status of GVN control). When only those eligible voters estimated under GVN control are considered, they represent 28%. Senator Fulbright represents 17% of the eligible voters in Arkansas.~~

2. On the whole, the statistics on the election held in SVN compare reasonably well to US standards and appear to be outstanding when compared to the 1962 Arkansas records. To highlight this point, the following is extracted from the attached table.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ. 96-273
By us, NARA Date 5-11-98

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	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Arkansas</u>
Percent of total population voting	<u>29%</u>	17%
Percent of eligible population voting	<u>57%</u>	25%
Percent of registered population voting	<u>83%</u>	52%
Percent of total population for Thieu/Ky/ Fulbright	<u>10%</u>	<u>11%</u>
Percent of eligible voters for Thieu/Ky/ Fulbright	<u>19%</u>	17%
Percent of registered voters for Thieu/Ky/ Fulbright	<u>28%</u>	<u>36%</u>

A. C. EDMUNDS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-273
By iss, NARA Date 5-11-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-6

	Vietnam 1967		US 1960		US 1964		Arkansas 1962	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Total Population	16,810,000	100	180,684,000	100	192,120,000	100	1,875,000	
Under GVN Control	10,756,000	63 ^{1/}	-	-	-	-	-	-
Eligible Voters	8,500,000 ^{2/}	50	107,597,000	60	112,184,000	58	1,232,000 ^{11/}	66
Registered Voters	5,853,000 ^{3/}		- - - - see note 10/		- - - - -		601,991 ^{12/}	$\frac{32\frac{8/}{9/}}{49\frac{9/}{9/}}$
Actual Voters	4,868,000 ^{4/}	$\frac{57\frac{6/}{7/}}{83\frac{7/}{7/}}$	68,838,000	$\frac{38\frac{8/}{10/}}{64\frac{10/}{10/}}$	70,645,000	$\frac{37\frac{8/}{9/}}{63\frac{9/}{9/}}$	313,000	$\frac{17\frac{8/}{9/}}{25\frac{9/}{9/}}$
Actual Ballots	4,735,000 ^{5/}	$\frac{56\frac{6/}{7/}}{81\frac{7/}{7/}}$	-	-	-	-	-	○
Voted for Thieu/Ky	1,639,000	$\frac{19\frac{6/}{7/}}{28\frac{7/}{7/}}$	-	-	Voted for Fulbright		214,867	$\frac{11\frac{8/}{9/}}{17\frac{9/}{9/}}$

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tab A

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 1/ June figures.
- 2/ Estimate of those of voting age, based upon total population SVN
- 3/ On a pro rata basis (63% of 8,500,000) a figure of 5,350,000 eligible voters under GVN control was computed. Since this is less than the total number of registered voters (5,853,000), the latter figure was used for the number of eligible voters under GVN control. Since this assumes that everyone who was eligible and lived in areas under GVN control, was registered, there are obviously some errors in this figure.
- 4/ Represents voters who were counted at polls
- 5/ Represents ballots actually counted (accounts for lost, destroyed or spoiled ballots)
- 6/ Percent of eligible VN population
- 7 Percent of eligible voters living under GVN control
- 8/ Percent of total population
- 9/ Percent of eligible voters
- 10/ Accurate figures on voter registration for the entire United States are not available for either 1960 or 1964. Eight states do not require registration except in districts and cities of over a stated population. One state does not require registration. Four states require registration but maintain no records. Two states, including Arkansas, consider payment of poll tax as registration. This information has been corroborated by the Bureau of the Census.
- 11/ 1960 figures
- 12/ Number paying poll tax
- 13/ Voted for Senator Fulbright

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 9, 1967
2:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this conversation between Gene Black and a Saudi Ambassador, which suggests a number of things but, among them, a U.S. emissary to the Middle East just to listen and hold their hands (para. 6).

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 91-368
By kg, NARA, Date 4-12-94

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 91-368

By , NARA, Date 4-12-94

5a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Eugene Black telephoned me on Thursday, September 7, 1967, to the following effect.

1. He had lunch with Amb. Yassin of Saudi Arabia. Yassin is part of the Saudi mission to the United Nations, although not their top spokesman. He stated that he is soon returning to the Saudi Foreign Office. Mr. Black, who had met him before at a meeting with David Rockefeller, describes him as pleasant, highly intelligent, easy to be frank with.

2. Responding to an earlier suggestion of Mr. Black's, Yassin showed interest in the concept of a Middle East Development Bank which the Arabs would initiate and which might focus, in the first instance, on providing development projects in which refugees might be absorbed. He said that, of course, nothing could be done right now. He showed interest in a pamphlet on the structure of the Asian Development Bank, which Mr. Black made available to him. He said he would report the matter to his government which he thought might be interested. The Saudi government may send a man to London to talk with Mr. Black about this.

3. Yassin said that the moderate Arabs felt that the U.S. was so engaged in Viet Nam that it was disinterested in the Middle East. Mr. Black sought to disabuse Yassin of this view. He described not only the care with which Middle East developments are being followed in general, but the planning going forward on an exploratory basis with respect to the possibilities of river development, the application of desalting via atomic energy, etc. Yassin expressed gratification at this word.

4. Yassin floated the idea that Israeli withdrawal might be accompanied by the installation of a UN presence in occupied territory. Mr. Black said that this sounded similar to Tito's proposition. He did not know whether it would be acceptable.

5. Yassin then suddenly asked: What would be the reaction if Nasser were to announce that he was going to open up the Canal? He noted that the U.S. had an interest in opening up the Canal. Mr. Black interjected that others had an even greater interest: the Russians, the Indians, the Pakistanis, and now the Saudis. The latter had undertaken at Khartoum a financial obligation in support of the Egyptians. The extent of that support and its duration depended now on how soon the Canal could be opened.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Yassin acknowledged this new Saudi interest. He went on to say that if asked whether Israeli ships might go through the Canal, the Egyptians might reply: Yes, if Israeli forces are withdrawn from the Sinai. He asked how Mr. Black felt about this proposition. Mr. Black took the view that he doubted the Saudis or Israelis had reason to trust Nasser's word. They might accept a proposition that they would agree to withdraw when an Israeli ship was cleared through the Canal.

6. Yassin then came to his major proposal which was that the President might send a high-level emissary to the Arab countries simply to indicate U.S. interest in their problems and their views. The emissary might also stop in Israel. Mr. Black asked what would the emissary hear beyond the familiar Arab demand for "withdrawal." Yassin replied that he would certainly hear that but he might hear other things of interest and, in any case, an American willing to listen would be a good thing. It would be a helpful gesture even if nothing came of it; but something might come of it. Mr. Black asked whether the emissary should stop in Algeria and Syria. Yassin replied that a stop with Boumediene would be a waste of time; and that a stop in Syria was useless because the present government "won't last long."

7. Mr. Black asked what I thought of the idea. I said it required thought, among other reasons because it might easily be interpreted as a U.S. initiative as an intermediary. I said that I would report the idea to my colleagues for their consideration.

8. At several points Yassin said that the one thing that was absolutely impossible in the Arab world was direct negotiations with Israel. No Arab government could now survive such negotiations.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Harold Saunders
Mr. Edward Hamilton
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Benjamin Read, State

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364

By ip, NARA, Date 7-13-95

1967 SEP 9 19 00

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67803

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

67 SEP 9 PM 3:10

SATURDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPT 9

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF GREETING TO OAU SUMMIT
MEETING TO BE HELD IN KINSHASA BEGINNING MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11.

BEGIN TEXT:

MY DISTINGUISHED FRIENDS:

MY THOUGHTS AND GOOD WISHES ARE WITH YOU AS YOU CONVENE
IN KINSHASA FOR THE FOURTH ANNUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE ORGANIZATION
OF AFRICAN UNITY. I KNOW THAT YOUR GATHERING WILL STRENGTHEN
THE SPIRIT OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN AFRICA WHICH IS SO
IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF ALL MANKIND.

WE IN THE UNITED STATES SHARE YOUR INTEREST IN PROGRESS
FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA. ACTING TOGETHER IN SUCH
BODIES AS THE OAU, THERE IS NO WORTHY GOAL BEYOND YOUR
GRASP. MAY YOUR DELIBERATIONS THIS WEEK ADD FURTHER TO
THE GROWING VITALITY OF YOUR GREAT CONTINENT'S EFFORTS
TO MOBILIZE HER RESOURCES IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE
WORKS OF PEACE.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

SINCERELY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END TEXT.

APPROVED: -----

DISAPPROVED: -----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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1967 SEP 9 16 01

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67797

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-365
By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

67 SEP 9 PM 12:09

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

BUNKER'S ACCOUNT OF THE CONVERSATION WITH THIEU WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE DELIVERY OF YOUR LETTER WILL INTEREST YOU.

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMB BUNKER (SAIGON 5550)

1. WHEN TRANSMITTING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THIEU LAST EVENING, I HAD OCCASION FOR AN HOUR'S TALK WITH HIM. HE WAS IN RELAXED, EASY MOOD AND EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. I NOTICED THAT WHEN HE READ THE THIRD PARAGRAPH, WHICH REFERRED TO THE CREATION OF A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT, HE HESITATED AND I SENSED A SLIGHT SENSITIVITY ON HIS PART. (IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT I HAD MENTIONED TO HIM ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE IMPORTANCE OF BROADENING THE BASE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ENDEAVORING TO INCLUDE SOME OF THE OPPOSITION AND WHEN GENERAL LANSDALE ASKED HIM THE DAY BEFORE THE ELECTION ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF HIS GOVERNMENT HE LAUGHED AND SAID "GO AHEAD AND GIVE ME A LECTURE ABOUT A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT. THIS IS WHAT THE AMERICANS TALK TO ME ABOUT.") AFTER A MOMENT'S HESITATION, HE SAID, "I THINK WE CAN RELEASE THE COMPLETE TEXT AND I WILL DO SO TOMORROW."

2. HE WAS APPARENTLY PLEASED WITH HIS APPEARANCE YESTERDAY MORNING ON "MEET THE PRESS". HOWEVER, WHEN I REMARKED THAT I UNDERSTOOD IT HAD BEEN ARRANGED THAT HE AND KY WERE TO APPEAR TOGETHER, HE REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT CUSTOMARY NOR TRADITIONAL THAT ANYONE SHOULD APPEAR ON SUCH A PROGRAM WITH THE CHIEF OF STATE. CONSEQUENTLY, IT WAS AGREED THAT HE SHOULD APPEAR ALONE. (COMMENT: KY'S ABSENCE FROM HIS SLATED APPEARANCE HAD BEEN THE SOURCE OF RUMORS THAT THIS WAS ANOTHER INDICATION THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM ARE NOT GOING WELL). HE SAID THAT THE QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM BY THE PANEL HAD BEEN EASIER THAN THOSE WHICH ZORTHIAN AND I HAD TRANSMITTED TO HIM AND KY ON THURSDAY.

3. I ASKED WHETHER HE WAS MAKING PROGRESS IN PUTTING THE GOVERNMENT TOGETHER, AND HE SAID THAT IT WAS STILL IN THE FORMATIVE STAGE WITH A NUMBER OF ASSIGNMENTS STILL OPEN.

PRESERVATION

4. WITH REGARD TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S POST, HE WAS INCREASINGLY OF THE VIEW THAT DR. NGUYEN LUU VIEN HAD THE MOST DESIRABLE QUALIFICATIONS. HE WAS A SOUTHERNER, WHICH WAS ESSENTIAL, WAS HONEST, HIGHLY RESPECTED, AND COMPETENT. THIEU BELIEVED THAT VIEN WOULD HAVE HUONG'S SUPPORT, IN FACT THAT HUONG WOULD PREFER HIM TO SOME OF THE YOUNGER MEN WHO HAD BEEN HIS SUPPORTERS. THIEU SAID THAT KY WAS STILL IN FAVOR OF LOC, BUT THAT WHILE LOC WAS INTELLIGENT, HE HAD NEITHER THE COMPETENCE NOR THE PRESTIGE FOR THE POST. I GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT THIEU HAD PRETTY WELL MADE UP HIS MIND ON VIEN.

5. HE THEN ASKED MY OPINION OF TRAN VAN DO IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. I REPLIED THAT WE HAD HIGH REGARD FOR DR. DO'S PERFORMANCE AS FOREIGN MINISTER, THAT WE FELT THAT HE HAD REPRESENTED VIET-NAM ABROAD WITH CONSIDERABLE DISTINCTION, AND WE WOULD LOOK WITH FAVOR ON HIS CONTINUING IN THIS POST. THIEU AGREED WITH THIS ESTIMATE, BUT FELT THAT DO HAD BEEN WEAK IN ADMINISTRATION. NGUYEN HUU CHI, WHO HAD BEEN HIS DIRECTOR OF CABINET, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS OBSERVER AT THE U.N., WAS A BUDDHIST AND HAD PLACED A NUMBER OF HIS BUDDHIST FRIENDS IN POSTS AROUND THE WORLD. HE THOUGHT THAT IF DO WERE TO CONTINUE IN THE POST, HE WOULD NEED A DEPUTY WHO WAS A GOOD ADMINISTRATOR AND WHO COULD HANDLE FOREIGN OFFICE PERSONNEL PROBLEMS.

6. I THEN SAID IF DR. VIEN WERE TO BE GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S POST, I THOUGHT IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT GOVERNOR HANH SHOULD CONTINUE AS MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY AS WELL AS GOVERNOR OF THE NATIONAL BANK. I HAD HIGH REGARD FOR HIS ABILITY AND FELT THAT HE HAD TURNED IN AN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE. WHILE I WAS AWARE THAT HANH HAD REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO CONFINE HIS ACTIVITIES TO THE BANK, I FELT THAT THIEU SHOULD PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO CONTINUE AS MINISTER. THIEU AGREED AND SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT HANH COULD BE PERSUADED TO CONTINUE.

7. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT WAS NEEDED IN THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND CHIEU HOI AND THAT I UNDERSTOOD CHANGES WERE CONTEMPLATED. THIEU AGREED THAT THE MINISTRY WAS VERY WEAK AND IT HAD BEEN PLANNED (WHICH KY HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED TO US) TO ASSIGN GENERAL TRI TO II CORPS AND HAVE GENERAL VINH LOC TAKE OVER THE MINISTRY. VINH LOC, HOWEVER WAS DISINCLINED TO TAKE THE POST AND THEY WERE, THEREFORE, LOOKING FOR SOMEONE ELSE. THIEU EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE MINISTER OF CHIEU HOI SHOULD BE A SOUTHERNER WHO SPEAKS THE LANGUAGE OF THE VIET CONG. HE FELT THAT THIS WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT IN PROPAGANDA ADDRESSED TO THE VIET CONG AND IN PERSUADING THEM TO RALLY. I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT AMBASSADOR BUI DIEM MIGHT MAKE A COMPETENT MINISTER OF INFORMATION. HE SAID THAT THIS HAD NOT OCCURRED TO HIM, BUT HE WOULD GIVE THE SUGGESTION CONSIDERATION AND THAT IT MIGHT BE WELL TO SPLIT

THE TWO MINISTRIES. HE HAD THOUGHT THAT DR. PHAN QUANG DAN, SUU'S VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE, MIGHT MAKE A GOOD MINISTER OF CHIEU HOI BUT HE HAD THE DISADVANTAGE OF NOT BEING A SOUTHERNER. I SAID I THOUGHT HE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER DR. DAN INSTEAD FOR THE POST OF MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE SINCE DAN HAD EXPRESSED A GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN LAND REFORM DURING THE CAMPAIGN AND SEEMED TO HAVE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS ABOUT IT. THIEU SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS AN INTERESTING SUGGESTION AND THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY GIVE IT CONSIDERATION.

SUNKER

8. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE HAD MADE PROGRESS IN APPROACHING THE OPPOSITION AND HE SAID HE WAS MAKING APPROACHES TO SOME OF THEM THROUGH THIRD PARTIES. HE INTENDED TO OFFER HUONG A POST IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE DID NOT HOWEVER THINK HUONG WOULD BE SATISFACTORY AS PRIME MINISTER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW EITHER OF HIS HEALTH OR AS A GOOD WORKING MEMBER OF THE TEAM. HUONG WAS VERY POSITIVE IN HIS VIEWS, STUBBORN IN HOLDING TO THEM, AND NOT GOOD AT COOPERATING WITH OTHERS. HE SAID AGAIN THAT HE FELT SURE HUONG WOULD SUPPORT VIEN, WHOM HE LIKED AND RESPECTED, FOR THE POST OF PRIME MINISTER. THIEU ALSO EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HA THUC KY WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO WORK WITH. HE WAS AMBITIOUS, DIFFICULT, AND NOT A GOOD TEAM WORKER. THIEU SAID HE PLANNED TO SOUND OUT SUU ON SOME POST IN THE GOVERNMENT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE PRETTY MUCH IN AN HONORARY CAPACITY BECAUSE OF SUU'S PHYSICAL AND MENTAL CONDITION. HE FELT, HOWEVER, THAT AMONG THE SUPPORTERS OF HUONG, SUU, AND HA THUC KY, THERE WERE REPRESENTATIVES WHOM THEY MIGHT SUGGEST FOR GOVERNMENT POSTS AND WHO COULD BE INCLUDED.

9. I ASKED THIEU HOW HE ENVISAGED HIS WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH KY. HE SAID IF THEY HAD A STRONG PRIME MINISTER HE AND KY TOGETHER WOULD BE LARGELY CONCERNED WITH POLICY, WITH THE WAR EFFORT, WITH PACIFICATION, AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE BIG JOB OF REORGANIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THIS NEEDED A THOROUGH GOING OVER, INCLUDING THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ROLE OF PROVINCE CHIEFS AND THE SELECTION OF MANY NEW CHIEFS. HE FELT THAT THE POST OF PROVINCE CHIEF SHOULD NOT BE CONFINED TO THE MILITARY, BUT THAT COMPETENT CIVILIANS ALSO SHOULD BE APPOINTED TO THE POST. THE POST OF PROVINCE CHIEF WAS A VITALLY IMPORTANT ONE, ESPECIALLY IN PACIFICATION, AND GREAT CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN SELECTING THEM. THIEU SAID HE THOUGHT THE WHOLE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE REVAMPED AND STREAMLINED AND THAT THIS WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING. HE SAID THAT HE ALSO WANTED TO FORM AN ADVISORY GROUP OR BRAIN-TRUST TO ADVISE HIM AND KY ON MATTERS OF POLICY AND ORGANIZATION. HE WANTED TO INCLUDE IN THIS GROUP PEOPLE WHO KNEW MEMBERS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, WHO

COULD DEAL WITH THEM, AND WITH WHOM HANOI AND NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT WOULD BE WILLING TO DEAL. HE FELT THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF SUCH OLDER, COMPETENT MEN WHO HAD FORMERLY BEEN ON GOOD TERMS WITH MEMBERS OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT AND THE NLF, AND WITH WHOM THE LATTER WOULD DEAL WHEREAS THEY WOULD NOT WITH SOME OF THE YOUNGER TURKS.

10. I ASKED THIEU HOW HE VIEWED THE CHARGES OF THE OPPOSITION AND THEIR DEMAND FOR INVALIDATION OF THE ELECTIONS. HE SEEMED QUITE RELAXED ABOUT IT. HE SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY COOL OFF. HE THOUGHT THE COMPLAINTS THEY HAD FILED WERE RATHER UNSUBSTANTIAL AND THAT NONE OF THEM WOULD STAND UP BEFORE THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL OR THE COURTS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO LEADING CANDIDATES WAS 800,000 VOTES AND FRAUD IN GREATER THAN THAT AMOUNT WOULD HAVE TO BE PROVED BEFORE NEW ELECTIONS COULD BE ORDERED. I ASKED HIM HIS VIEW OF WHAT HAD ACCOUNTED FOR DZU'S LARGE VOTE AND HE SAID HE THOUGHT FOUR ELEMENTS WERE INVOLVED. DZU WAS ARTICULATE AND A GOOD SPEAKER AND HIS CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD GAINED VOTES FROM THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE GOVERNMENT, HIS EMPHASIS ON PEACE ALSO HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE, A LARGE AMOUNT OF MONEY HAD BEEN EXPENDED FOR HIS CAMPAIGN FROM SOURCES WHICH THIEU DID NOT KNOW, BUT RUMORS HAD VARIOUSLY ATTRIBUTED TO THE CIA, THE FRENCH, DOVES IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THE VIET CONG. THE FOURTH ELEMENT WAS SUPPORT OF THE VIET CONG AND THERE APPEARED TO BE DEFINITE EVIDENCE NOT ONLY THAT DZU RAN STRONGEST IN PROVINCES WHERE THE VIET CONG WAS MOST INFLUENTIAL, BUT ALSO THAT IN SOME AREAS THE VIET CONG HAD ORDERED THE VOTERS TO BRING BACK OTHER BALLOTS AS PROOF THAT THEY HAD VOTED FOR DZU.

11. I SUGGESTED TO THIEU THAT IT MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE TO CALL IN THE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES TO TALK OVER THE SITUATION WITH THEM. IT SEEMED TO ME THERE WERE TWO CONSTRUCTIVE COURSES HE MIGHT FOLLOW: SUGGEST THAT THEY AGREE TO PULL TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT TO BACK THE WAR EFFORT AND PERHAPS FORM A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION, OR THEY MIGHT CONSTITUTE THEMSELVES A LOYAL OPPOSITION, ASSISTING THE NATIONAL EFFORT THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISMS. BECAUSE OF THE DESPERATE ELEMENTS IN THE OPPOSITION, THIEU FELT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO FORM A COHESIVE WORKING TEAM, BUT AGAIN SAID THAT HE WAS IN TOUCH WITH THEM THROUGH THIRD PARTIES.

12. THIEU INFORMED ME THAT THERE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT MEETING OF THE GENERALS ON SEPTEMBER 9, IN WHICH HE AND KY WOULD TAKE PART. (COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THIEU DID NOT VOLUNTEER FURTHER INFORMATION I JUDGE THAT THE MEETING MAY CONSIDER MATTERS RELATED TO THE FORMATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THUS HAVE A BEARING ON THE THIEU-KY RELATIONSHIP.)

BUNKER

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SATURDAY

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67799

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-364
By lip, NARA, Date 7-13-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEPTEMBER 9, 1967

HEREWITH A MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL BRADLEY. I DID NOT PUT INTO IT -- BECAUSE IT WAS MEANT AS A WHOLLY PRIVATE REMARK -- GENERAL BRADLEY'S PREDICTION ABOUT THE LENGTH OF THE WAR. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE -- IF WE MAINTAIN PRESENT TRENDS IN THE FIELD AND HOLD THE FORT AT HOME -- THAT THEY CAN HOLD OUT FOR MORE THAN A YEAR AND A HALF. I AM SURE THAT THE GENERAL DOES NOT WISH THIS PREDICTION TO BE CIRCULATED WIDELY.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY CALLED ON ME FRIDAY AFTERNOON, SEPTEMBER 8, TO TELL ME SOMETHING OF HIS RECENT TRIP TO VIET NAM, WHICH WILL FORM THE BASIS FOR AN ARTICLE APPEARING IN LOOK MAGAZINE IN NOVEMBER.

1. IN GENERAL, HE EMERGED WITH A SENSE OF GREAT OPTIMISM, WHICH WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE ARTICLE. HE SAID, IN FACT, HE MUST "FIGHT TO KEEP FROM EXPRESSING OVER-OPTIMISM." HE TALKED TO ME IN TERMS OF QUITE SPECIFIC THINGS HE HIMSELF SAW AND HEARD WHICH YIELDED THIS RESULT, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF GENERALIZATION.

2. HE WAS GREATLY IMPRESSED WITH THE WHOLE LOGISTICAL STRUCTURE: PORTS, BARRACKS, HOSPITALS, BASES. HE UNDERSTOOD HOW LONG IT TAKES TO DEVELOP SUCH INSTALLATIONS AND WAS CONSCIOUS THAT THE U. S. FORCES ARE ONLY NOW ROUNDING INTO PEAK STRENGTH AND EFFECTIVENESS; FOR EXAMPLE, TWO DIVISIONS AND TWO BRIGADES HAVE BEEN IN VIET NAM LESS THAN A YEAR.

3. HE AND MRS. BRADLEY TALKED TO LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF U. S. PERSONNEL. MRS. BRADLEY HAS UNDERTAKEN TO WRITE PERSONALLY TO MORE THAN 500 FAMILIES OF MEN TO WHOM SHE TALKED. OF ALL THOSE THEY SAW, ONLY FOUR EXPRESSED ANY DISSATISFACTION, OR FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND AND FULLY TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT; ONE WAS A MAN DISSATISFIED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT WITH WHICH HE HAD TRAINED; AND GENERAL BRADLEY ARRANGED FOR THIS TO BE DONE. THREE EXPRESSED SOME UNCERTAINTY AS TO U. S. OBJECTIVES IN THE WAR IN VIET NAM.

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4. ON THE WHOLE, HE FOUND MORALE SUPERB AND CITED A NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF SPLENDID MEN WHOM HE MET, ONE A NEGRO SERGEANT WHO WAS AWARDED A SILVER STAR FOR REMARKABLE LEADERSHIP UNDER FIRE.

5. THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT IN HIS MIND THAT THE WAR IS NOT STALEMATED. WE ARE MOVING FORWARD. HE CITED MANY SPECIFIC INDICATIONS; FOR EXAMPLE:

-- A YEAR AGO IN THE I CORPS AREA, PATROLS HAD TO BE IN COMPANY STRENGTH; NOW THEY COULD OPERATE SAFELY IN SQUADS;

-- U.S. FORCES HAVE LEARNED NEW TACTICS TO DEAL INTELLIGENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH VC TACTICS: PATIENCE (AND LONGER-RANGE RIFLES) IN DEALING WITH SNIPERS; DECEPTIVE TACTICS TO TRAP VC AMBUSHES; IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE OF ALL KINDS, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE FROM VILLAGERS AS SECURITY BECOMES MORE RELIABLE; ETC.

6. HE GAVE MANY EXAMPLES OF MANPOWER AND MORALE DIFFICULTIES AS SEEN BY LOCAL COMMANDERS, AS WELL AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS:

-- IN THE DELTA A UNIT WHICH ENGAGED OUR FORCES BURIED THEIR WEAPONS AND RAN AWAY; 43 WEAPONS WERE DUG UP.

-- A 14-YEAR-OLD BOY BROUGHT IN INTELLIGENCE AS TO THE LOCATION OF A VC COMMANDER. HE WAS PICKED UP AT 4 A. M. HE THEN INFORMED HIS CAPTORS WHERE 24 OTHERS WERE, AND THEY WERE PICKED UP.

-- A CAPTURED NORTH VIETNAMESE PH. D., WHOSE RESIDUAL BASIS FOR CONFIDENCE CONSISTED SIMPLY IN THE FAITH THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD CRUMBLE POLITICALLY, AS HAD FRANCE.

-- REPORTS OF A GROUP OF 700 THAT STARTED INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, BUT ENDED UP AS 300.

-- ANOTHER GROUP OF 70 THAT ENDED UP 30.

-- THE CAPTURE OF VC BOYS OF 12 AND 14 IN VC UNITS RECENTLY BROUGHT IN UPON THREAT OF DEATH TO THEIR FAMILIES.

-- THE WILLINGNESS OF FORMER VC-CONTROLLED VILLAGERS TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE GOVERNMENT ONCE SECURITY IS ESTABLISHED.

-- THE VC EVACUATING A VALLEY NEAR THE COAST AND BURNING THE CROPS AS THEY HEADED INTO THE HILLS.

-- THE WIDESPREAD UNWILLINGNESS OF THE VC TO ENGAGE OUR FORCES OR THE ARVN, LEADING TO SOME QUESTION ON GENERAL BRADLEY'S PART THAT THEY ARE AS FULLY UP TO STRENGTH, IN SOME CASES, AS CARRIED IN OUR ORDER OF BATTLE.

GENERAL BRADLEY EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT BEING SELECTIVE IN THIS, BUT GETTING SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF A TYPICAL KIND WHICH REFLECT, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, THE TRUE SITUATION.

7. HE RECEIVED AN EXCELLENT BRIEFING AND WAS MUCH IMPRESSED WITH THE KOREANS. HE VISITED THE PHILIPPINE MODEL VILLAGE FOR REFUGEES. THIS IS AN EXCELLENT PROJECT. 491 REFUGEE FAMILIES ARE BEING LOOKED AFTER. 500 CHILDREN ARE IN SCHOOL. ALTHOUGH THE OPERATION IS SMALL, HE WENT BECAUSE WESTY WANTED TO ENCOURAGE THE FILIPINOS TO DOUBLE THEIR FORCE IN VIET NAM.

8. HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE VIETNAMESE FORCES WERE IMPROVING IN THEIR PERFORMANCE AND, ESPECIALLY, IMPROVING IN THEIR CONFIDENCE. HE THOUGHT THE 21ST DIVISION FIRST-CLASS. IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT THE VIETNAMESE CORPS COMMANDERS -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMANDER OF II CORPS -- WERE GETTING TOUGH AND EFFECTIVE IN ROOTING OUT OFFICERS WHO WERE CORRUPT OR WHO WOULD NOT FIGHT THEIR MEN EFFECTIVELY. HE VISITED THE VIETNAMESE NCO SCHOOL. THEY CONDUCTED A FIELD PROBLEM WHILE HE WAS THERE, EXACTLY AS THEY WOULD HAVE DONE IN THE UNITED STATES. HE CHECKED IN THE DELTA AND FOUND THAT INDEED THIS WAS A NATIONAL SCHOOL AND THE NEW NCO'S FROM ALL OVER THE COUNTRY WERE BEING TRAINED THERE.

9. HE FOUND AMONG SENIOR OFFICERS -- EVEN STRONG REPUBLICANS -- A DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE SUPPORT BEING GIVEN TO THE MEN IN THE FIELD BY THE PRESIDENT.

10. HE EMERGED CONVINCED THAT WE WERE WELL ON THE WAY TO WINNING THE WAR. THE ONLY SERIOUS PROBLEM WAS TO KEEP A BASE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EFFORT IN VIET NAM. HE HIMSELF WAS PREPARED TO DO ANYTHING JUDGED USEFUL BY OTHERS TO THIS END.

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FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67800

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HEREWITH PRESIDENT PARK'S REPLY TO YOU ON TROOPS, ETC. 1967 SEP 9 18

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WISH TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH APPRECIATION THE RECEIPT OF YOUR EXCELLENCY'S LETTER DATED JULY 15, 1967 INFORMING ME OF THE FINDINGS OF DEFENSE SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S VISIT TO VIETNAM AND ALSO YOUR LETTERS DATED JULY 23 AND AUGUST 17, 1967 RESPECTIVELY, WHICH WERE SENT TO ME BEFORE AND AFTER THE VISIT TO KOREA OF MR. CLARK CLIFFORD AND GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR.

IT IS GRATIFYING TO NOTE THROUGH YOUR LETTER THAT THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM HAS MADE A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT NOT ONLY ON THE MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FRONTS BUT ALSO IN PACIFICATION PROJECTS AND OTHER FIELDS. I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFULNESS IN SHARING WITH ME THE FINDINGS OF SECRETARY MCNAMARA'S VISIT TO VIETNAM AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE CLIFFORD-TAYLOR MISSION, WHICH WERE MUCH HELPFUL IN GRASPING ACCURATELY THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM.

AS YOU POINTED OUT IN YOUR LETTER, THERE IS AS YET NO SIGN THAT OUR ENEMY IS PREPARED TO REALIZE THE FUTILITY OF THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS, AND THERE STILL LIE AHEAD MANY HARDSHIPS ON OUR PATH TO ATTAINING A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM ISSUE. IN THIS REGARD, I AM IN FULL ACCORD WITH YOUR OPINION THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR THE ALLIES IN VIETNAM TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL EFFORT.

I WISH TO PAY A HIGH TRIBUTE TO YOU FOR YOUR EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS TO LEAD THE WAR IN VIETNAM TO A COMPLETE AND A SPEEDY VICTORY, AND I FULLY UNDERSTAND YOUR VIEW THAT AN ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES BY OTHER ALLIES, IN RESPONSE TO THE INCREASE OF FORCES BY THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE DECISION BY THE UNITED STATES TO INCREASE ITS FORCES IN VIETNAM, WOULD HAVE A VERY IMPORTANT EFFECT ON OUR WAR EFFORTS.

I HAVE GIVEN A VERY CAREFUL THOUGHT TO WHAT EFFORT WE ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE AT THIS STAGE AND HOW TO MAKE IT. SUCH THOUGHT, HOWEVER, IS INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY VARIOUS RESTRICTIVE FACTORS ARISING FROM OUR SPECIAL DOMESTIC SITUATION, AND FOR THIS REASON, IT WOULD NEED SOME TIME BEFORE A FINAL CONCLUSION COULD COME OUT. OF THIS SITUATION I EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR PORTER A FEW DAYS AGO.

WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL DISPATCH OF OUR FORCES TO VIETNAM, I HAVE ALREADY INSTRUCTED MY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE TO EXAMINE AND REPORT ON THE POSSIBILITY AS TO WHAT SIZE OF FORCES AND HOW WE WOULD BE ABLE TO

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By ck, NARA Date 7-25-00

CONTRIBUTE IF WE ARE TO MAKE SUCH AN ADDITIONAL DISPATCH OF FORCES TO VIETNAM. MY DECISION NATURALLY WILL BE BASED ON SUCH REPORT. AS PRE-REQUISITE TO THIS, HOWEVER, I AM FACED WITH TWO IMPORTANT PROBLEMS WHICH I MUST SOLVE. ONE PROBLEM IS THE APPREHENSION WIDELY ENTERTAINED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC HERE THAT OUR CAPABILITY FOR KOREA'S OWN DEFENSE MIGHT BE JEOPARDIZED IN CASE ADDITIONAL KOREAN FORCES ARE SENT TO VIETNAM. THE OTHER IS ANOTHER APPREHENSION THAT, IN VIEW OF THE MARKED INCREASE OF INFILTRATION BY COMMUNIST ARMED AGENTS FROM THE NORTH, WE ARE NOT YET PSYCHOLOGICALLY ACCOMMODATED TO FEEL SECURE UNLESS SOME EFFECTIVE COUNTER-MEASURES ARE TAKEN IN THIS FIELD IF WE ARE TO SEND ADDITIONAL FORCES TO VIETNAM. THE VERY ELIMINATION OF SUCH APPREHENSION ENTERTAINED BY THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN KOREA WILL HELP CREATE A FAVOURABLE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH I WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF SENDING ADDITIONAL FORCES TO VIETNAM. I BELIEVE THIS SPECIAL SITUATION OF OURS HAS BEEN REPORTED TO YOU BY YOUR AMBASSADOR IN SEOUL AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO HIM THEREOF FULLY.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM GREATLY HEARTENED, AS NO DOUBT YOU ARE, BY THE FACT THAT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN VIETNAM HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT SMOOTHLY AND SUCCESSFULLY DESPITE THE PERSISTENT DISTURBANCE AND SABOTAGE BY COMMUNIST AGENTS. SUCH PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL, I BELIEVE, MARK A MILESTONE TOWARDS SOLVING THE VIETNAM ISSUE.

AS TO THE TIMING OF THE NEXT SUMMIT MEETING OF THE NATIONS CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO VIETNAM, OF WHICH YOU MENTIONED IN YOUR LETTER, I AM OF THE VIEW THAT SUCH A MEETING, ALTHOUGH IT HAS TO BE DECIDED BY A MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, WOULD BE MORE PROFITABLY CONVENED A WHILE AFTER THE NEWLY-FORMED GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM HAD A SUFFICIENT TIME TO GET ON FULL GEAR FOR NORMAL AND EFFECTIVE FUNCTION. FURTHER CONTACTS ON THIS MATTER WILL BE MADE WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DUE COURSE OF TIME.

WITH MY HIGH RESPECTS AND WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY YOURS,

(SIGNED) PARK CHUNG HEE

PRESIDENT UNQUOTE

2. SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED. PORTER

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By ing, NARA, Date 7-13-95

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67837

SENT: 4:26 P.M.

~~SECRET~~

SEPT. 9, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

1. SECRETARY RUSK SAYS AMB. GOLDBERG UNDERSTANDS FULLY YOUR VIEW OF THE UN VIET NAM INITIATIVE, BECAUSE AFTER MY TALK TO HIM HE EXPLAINED IT. MOREOVER, GOLDBERG'S SOUNDINGS SUGGEST UK, CANADIAN, AUSTRALIAN, AS WELL AS SOVIET OPPOSITION OR GRAVE RESERVATIONS.

SECRETARY RUSK SUGGESTS WE COMPLETE THE SOUNDINGS AND THEN REPORT TO MANSFIELD, ETC. GOLDBERG PROPOSES ANOTHER BREAKFAST TO WRAP IT UP WHEN SOUNDINGS ARE COMPLETE.

SISCO -- WHO AGREES -- TELLS ME COMPLETION OF SOUNDINGS MUST WAIT UNTIL DANES ARE CONSULTED IN NEW YORK. TABER'S APPOINTMENT AS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY SLOW THIS UP TO END OF NEXT WEEK OR EVEN CARRY OVER TO FOLLOWING WEEK.

2. I SHALL HAVE THE AIRFIELD AND HAIPHONG ONE-PAGE PAPERS SOMETIME DURING MONDAY MORNING.

3. SECRETARY MCNAMARA WILL HAVE HIS BARRIER PAPER BY END OF BUSINESS MONDAY. AS YOU THOUGHT LIKELY, IT WAS KRAFT'S SAIGON LEAK THAT FORCED HIS HAND AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE.

4. COVEY OLIVER INFORMED. HE WILL CALL YOU.

5. WE WILL HAVE PL-489 PROPOSALS TUESDAY.

6. WE ARE CHECKING NEW DELHI REACTIONS TO RELEASE OF MILLION TONS.

7. MESSAGE TO BUNKER CONCERNING PRIOR CONSULTATION ON ANY THIEU BOMBING PAUSE HAS BEEN DISPATCHED.

8. HISTORY OF KISSINGER EXERCISE WILL BE SENT IN SEPARATE MESSAGE.

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SATURDAY

11
Pres file

Saturday, September 9, 1967
2:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara's response to Sen. Clark on the idea of a blue-ribbon commission to study the ABM question.

In brief, he wants no part of it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

September 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW ←
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Joe Clark's Proposal for a Blue-Ribbon
Commission to Study the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Defense Question

Senator Clark sent me a letter outlining essentially the same ideas as expressed in his letter to the President. I am enclosing a copy of my reply. As you will note, I agree with Henry Owen that such a commission would not serve a useful purpose.

I don't think that any commission, even on the broader basis suggested by Henry Owen is a good idea right now. However, if a commission were to be appointed, I definitely agree that it should consider the broader question of strategic offensive and defensive forces, and not just whether we should deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile or not.

Robert S. McNamara

Enclosure

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

11b

August 23, 1967

Honorable Joseph S. Clark
United States Senate

Dear Joe:

Your letter of August 8 asked my opinion of your idea of a blue-ribbon commission to deal with the question of anti-ballistic missile deployment. If I understand you correctly, you feel that such a commission would a) fill an essential need for a careful and objective evaluation of the course the United States should follow, and b) be the only way of dealing with mounting public pressure for immediate ABM deployment.

We both recognize, of course, the public's right (within the bounds of national security) to be fully informed on this issue, as well as the government's responsibility to make sure that they are. I have tried to meet that responsibility in the past, and will continue in the future, but it is not an easy task because the ABM issue itself is complex. Indeed, it is not even feasible to address the ABM in isolation. Rather, it is only one part of the larger issue of our over-all strategic posture involving the rest of our offensive and defensive forces, our civil defense, and the corresponding elements on the side of potential enemies, both now and in the future.

As far as a careful and objective evaluation is concerned, the subject of our strategic posture has always been uppermost in my mind as Secretary of Defense. To make sure that we do justice to this absolutely vital area, I have recruited for my own office the best men I can find in the country; I draw on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all the Services; I have authorized studies and analyses by the most highly qualified organizations; and of course I rely heavily on the whole intelligence community.

In addition, and as important as anything else, we work on this problem on a sustained and continuing basis -- day in and day out, week in and week out, year in and year out. The issues are analyzed, debated by proponents of every view, and reanalyzed, each time improving our understanding and insight in a way which I am afraid could never be approached by any one-time effort, no matter how brilliant the participants.

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In view of this, I am inclined to believe that a blue-ribbon commission is not necessary, though I do appreciate your interest and your support in this matter.

Sincerely,

(sgd) Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense

COPY

~~SECRET~~

Per file

Saturday, September 9, 1967
2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a recent report on life in Haiphong,
with quotable passages marked.

In general, [redacted] visitors
report morale high, food sufficient, etc., etc.
[redacted] direct family reports
of this kind indicate that it is much tougher.

3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

[redacted] 3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-367
By Sj, NARA, Date 2802

12a
Thursday, September 7, 1967

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-138
By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

A resident [REDACTED] who returned [REDACTED] in late August, 1967, from Canton where she had a reunion with her family, including a daughter who arrived in Canton from Haiphong in July, 1967, and a grandson who also fled from Haiphong to China in mid-August, stated that according to these members of her family there was no electricity nor water service in Haiphong. (Source comment: These refugees were not questioned about the specific dates the stoppages occurred nor the emergency measures put into effect.)

1.3(a)(4)

According to these two members of her family, the electric dynamo station at Lac Vien and Minh Khai Streets, Haiphong, had been completely destroyed in a recent air attack. (Source comment: The informant did not question her relatives about the specific date of the incident.) The refugees stated further that other recent air attacks against Haiphong had resulted in the destruction or heavy damage of the Haiphong Cement Works, the sardine factory at Cua Can, the battery factory near the railroad bridge, the wool factory at An Duong, and the dockyards at Ha Ly. The refugees reported also that the Haiphong customs godowns had suffered heavy damage as well as the Paul Bert Quarters of a cadre training facility in recent attacks.

The refugees stated (but did not say they had personally witnessed the incident) that during one recent air attack against Haiphong, in early August, the crew of an anti-aircraft position in the city had panicked before American aircraft were actually over the city and had fired their weapons at ground level instead of skyward, killing and wounding a large number of civilians gathered near a square on Saigon Street close to the Chinese Communal House.

According to the refugees, living conditions in North Vietnam were extremely hard. Families were being allowed to purchase only two rice bowls and one towel per family every six months. These essentials were only sold upon submission of the family's registration booklet. In the event of breakage to a rice bowl, the broken pieces had to be shown in evidence before authorization could be obtained to replace them. Each family was further allowed only one half a bar of soap every three months.

[REDACTED]

The refugees stated that vegetables were rare and expensive. Although meat was available, the price had reached a level beyond the means of most, with some people complaining they had not tasted pork in a year; pork was being sold at 13 Dongs a catty. The price of rice at the official rate was set at .30 Dongs per catty; rice on the black market, however, commanded a price of three Dongs per catty. The official rice ration was approximately 15 kilos per person per month, but this was cut by 50 percent with flour from the Soviet Union. No cooking oil or sugar was seen on the market. It appeared that the North Vietnamese Government was acting leniently towards the black market, since the refugees had heard of no profiteer having ever been punished for this activity. Cheap cotton cloth from the Soviet Union had recently been brought in and was not rationed. Despite its poor quality, according to the refugees, the people were happy to have it and it sold well.

September 9, 1967

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

to name
12

Herewith short history of Kissinger exercise.

1. In early June small Pugwash group met in Paris. With knowledge and endorsement of Soviet participant, Kissinger agreed Marcovich should go to Hanoi to discuss an A-B proposal; that is, a bombing pause based on prior Hanoi commitment to reciprocal action to follow bombing pause. Marcovich was joined by Aubrac, a French Communist and old friend of Ho.
2. The two men were in Hanoi July 21-26. Pham Van Dong made a number of flexible noises to them. He said the two men could subsequently communicate with him via Bo in Paris.
3. After reviewing the Hanoi conversations, Kissinger was empowered to present new formula which he did on August 17. After first asking for vias and receiving a negative response they gave Bo the formula for transmission on August 25. *IT was probably transmitted August 27.*
4. I have a very detailed chronology from August 17 to the present which I shall make available on your return.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 989-111By ref/isp, NARA, Date 10-3-89

Sept. 9, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

14

1. Secretary Rusk says Amb. Goldberg understands fully your view of the UN Viet Nam initiative, because after my talk to him he explained it. Moreover, Goldberg's soundings suggest UK, Canadian, Australian, as well as Soviet opposition or grave reservations.

Sect. Rusk suggests we complete the soundings and then report to Mansfield, etc. Goldberg proposes another breakfast to wrap it up when soundings are complete.

Sisco -- who agrees -- tells me completion of soundings must wait until Danes are consulted in New York. Taber's appointment as Foreign Minister may show this up to end of next week or even carry over to following week.

2. I shall have the airfield and Haiphong one-page papers sometime during Monday morning.

3. Sect. McNamara will have his barrier paper by end of business Monday. As you thought likely, it was Kraft's Saigon leak that forced his hand at his press conference.

4. Covey Oliver informed. He will call you.

5. We will have PL-480 proposals Tuesday.

6. We are checking New Delhi reactions to release of million tons.

7. Message to Bunker concerning prior consultation on any Thieu bombing pause has been dispatched.

8. History of Kissinger exercise will be sent in separate message.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364
By mp, NARA, Date 6-23-95

UNCLASSIFIED

September 9, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

INFORMATION GEORGE CHRISTIAN

15
Pres file
Sent Rostow
via wire
WH 70467

Herewith brief report ^{of response on} Thieu ~~responds~~ "Meet The Press" on bombing pause.

~~1. Following is summary subjects covered "Meet the Press" program recorded Saigon by NBC-TV for telecast U.S., Sunday, September 10 with answers guest General Nguyen Van Thieu.~~

1. Bombing pause: If Hanoi demands gesture of goodwill in efforts to reach peace, will ask for one week pause.

2. Hanoi rejection of peace moves: Not so sure they will. In any event must express to Hanoi and to the world the good will of South Vietnamese and our desire for peace. There is no time factor in offer. Hanoi can accept anytime.

work
16

Friday, September 8, 1967 - ~~7:30 PM~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meetings on the Asian Bank legislation

You instructed us to set up two meetings next week:

- first, one with the Administration people involved in the issue of whether to send up the bill (Black, Katzenbach, Barr, Gaud); and
- subsequently, one with Senators Fulbright and Dirksen, Congressmen Morgan and Patman, and all of the other legislators who could help.

If you decide to send up the legislation, I would recommend that you do so next Thursday or Friday so that we can dramatize the Asian initiative it reflects by having the Japanese Foreign Minister and the President of the Asian Bank present at our press briefing. They will both be in Washington those two days. Thus, I would recommend you have the meetings as soon as possible next week, perhaps the first on Monday and the second on Tuesday or Wednesday.

Jim Jones tells me your schedule is clear for 6:30 PM on Monday. May we set the Executive Branch meeting for that day and time?

Yes _____

No _____

Set it for _____

May we tentatively schedule the meeting with legislators for 6:30 PM Tuesday? (Jim says this time is also free as of now.)

Yes _____

No _____

Set it for _____

Hamilton/vmr

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Greek King--Monday, September 11

King Constantine is here privately after an official visit to Canada, so we've planned no ceremony in connection with his call. Your lunch at 1 p. m. --after a half hour's talk alone--will be basically the Tuesday lunch group like our session with King Hussein. He asked for this meeting.

Constantine has one main subject on his mind. He fears his younger military may stage a second phase of the April coup to oust the last semblances of civilian government--including him, if he doesn't go along. We expect him to ask you how much help we'd give him if he ends up in that sort of confrontation.

Secretary Rusk's memo (Tab A) spells this out in more detail, but essentially our line is this: While we don't like the coup government any more than he does, we think the way for both of us to handle it is to work with it and try to nudge it back toward constitutional government. The consequences of a confrontation would be bad for all of us, so what we want to talk about is how to avoid it. If it comes, we can't honestly say what we'd do until we see what the situation is. We think our interests and the King's are similar. We don't want civil war; we want constitutional government; we don't want US-Greek relations disrupted. But what we can do is limited.

In that context, you might want to discuss our suspended military aid. We'll have Congressional problems if we release any more now, but you might want to get a sense from the King himself what role this aid would play, if any, in staving off a confrontation. If he makes a convincing case, we would have a better argument on the Hill, since even the hostile members see the King as the main rallying point for forces pressing for return to constitutional government. Phil Talbot feels the King will suffer if he doesn't bring back promise of some release. You may want to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and the King at lunch, if he presses you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By ijp, NARA, Date 6-23-95 ~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

Cyprus is the other important subject that may come up. Greek Prime Minister Kollias and Turkish Prime Minister Demirel are meeting this weekend, with Cyprus high on the agenda. The Greek coup government does show more signs than any civilian predecessor of trying for a settlement. And the Turks report "encouraging sounds" in preparation for this summit meeting. Yet if Ankara is ready to talk they (and Phil Talbot) are still not overly sanguine. Greece has so far given no real preview of a specific deal that would meet Turkey half-way. You'll want to ask the King for the latest information on the Kollias-Demirel talks. You might urge him to face up to the problem and get this settled--particularly while the military regime can take the heat for any concessions.

Apart from military aid, he may ask for something like \$15 million to help rebuild from a series of earthquakes last spring. We see this mainly as a gimmick dreamed up by the coup government to get a small program loan. We are out of the aid business in Greece and ought to stay out. But the Greek government keeps pressing. We've offered Export-Import Bank loans and ought to stick to that response.

We're considering a state visit for the King and Queen next spring. But we want to hold off mentioning that until we see how he comes out of this fall's political push and whether he can keep the pressure on the junta for return to constitutional government.

Of the attached briefing material, you need read only Secretary Rusk's memo (Tab A). But if you have time, you'd find helpful the papers on the looming confrontation (Tab B) on Greece's domestic situation (Tab C) and on US public attitudes toward the coup (Tab D). We'll have a talking paper for you Monday.

W. W. Rostow

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176

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By 10, NARA, Date 12-15-94

September 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with King Constantine
of Greece

King Constantine is coming to Washington at his request. While the main purpose of his visit is to explain the aims of the Greek Government which came to power in the April 21, 1967 coup and to obtain U. S. understanding and support for the Government, at the same time he will seek Presidential assurances of U. S. backing in any confrontation he might have with the Greek junta. The King views his role as one of continuously pressing the coup leaders in the direction of a return to democratic processes. He also believes that his standing with the junta, as well as Greek-U. S. relations, will be enhanced by the resumption of U. S. military assistance to Greece. The very fact that you have agreed to receive him will strengthen his position with the Government.

We share the King's view that he can play a constructive role in encouraging the Greek Government in the direction of constitutionalism. However, we believe we should caution him against pushing the regime to the point of provoking a confrontation, since we do not want to see armed conflict in Greece and would not wish to intervene militarily in his behalf. We realize that walking such a narrow line is a difficult course to follow, and believe that the visit offers the occasion to reassure the 27-year old King of our recognition of the importance of the monarchy as well as our appreciation of his vital role in returning the country to constitutionalism. On military assistance, we believe that you should inform the King that full resumption of MAP is out of the

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Group 3

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question at this time because of strong public and Congressional sentiment against such a move; however, we are prepared to consider releasing a few of the items now currently suspended. In this way we can bolster the King's position vis-a-vis the coup leadership as well as prevent our own relations with the Greek Government from becoming frozen.

In sum, we believe that the visit of the King can serve a useful purpose in making clear our profound desire for continued close relations with Greece as well as our belief in the necessity for an early return to constitutional government. It also provides an opportunity to reassure the King of our support for him and at the same time to discourage him from moving into a confrontation with the junta.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Talking Points.

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17c

Talking Points

Our goals in your luncheon meeting with the King are to

- (1) indicate our strong desire for continued good relations with Greece,
- (2) assure the King of our appreciation of the importance of the monarchy to Greece and of the constructive role he has played since the Greek coup,
- (3) express the concern of the American Government and people at the suspension of democratic processes in Greece and our strongest hope that they will be restored, and
- (4) impress upon the King the need to avoid chaos or civil war in Greece.

In this connection, you may wish to point out the following:

1. Bilateral U.S. - Greek Relations

a. We continue to consider Greece as an important NATO ally, and are thankful for the cooperation accorded to us by the Greek Government during the mid-East crisis;

b. We fully appreciate the difficult role played by the King since the April 21 coup in encouraging the Greek Government to moderate its policies and to take steps leading towards a return to constitutionalism, without at the same time undermining his own relationship with the government leaders or provoking them to a final confrontation.

c. The American Government and people were deeply troubled by the overthrow of the constitutional government of Greece and the arrest of large numbers of political prisoners. It was in this context that we suspended shipment of major military items to Greece

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

and placed our entire MAP to Greece under review. We believe that by moving steadily to restore constitutional processes and by early release of all or most of the political prisoners, the Greek Government could more fully develop its traditionally close relations with the United States and the American people.

2. Foreign Affairs

a. Cyprus - The King will expect some acknowledgment of his efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations by pushing for high-level Greek-Turkish government negotiations on Cyprus; you may wish to praise the King's efforts in this respect and particularly his success in achieving a meeting of Greek-Turkish Prime Ministers September 9-10. You may also wish to reaffirm our support for constructive efforts aimed at solving this disruptive issue, an issue which by disrupting Greek-Turkish cooperation weakens free world defenses in the Mid-East at a time of intensified Soviet activity in the area.

b. Vietnam - You may wish to discuss briefly the current situation in Vietnam.

c. NATO - While expressing our regret that the question of the Greek political changes has become a subject of dissension within the NATO alliance, you may wish to point out that it was inevitable that the coup would provoke an unfavorable reaction among some members of the alliance. However, we believe this reaction could be largely overcome by concrete evidence of a return to democratic processes in Greece.

d. Yugoslavia - We consider it unfortunate that the traditionally good relations between Greece and Yugoslavia have been adversely affected by the change of government in Greece, due in part to the extreme sensitivity on the part of the Yugoslavs to recent world events. It might be helpful if the Greeks might take some steps to reassure exaggerated Yugoslav fears of

Greek intentions toward it, particularly since such fears strengthen the position of those conservative Communist elements opposed to liberal trends in Yugoslav development.

3. Economic

Express our satisfaction that the Greek Government has taken steps to encourage foreign investment by removing bureaucratic and other obstacles to such investment and our hope that Greece will move forward on the economic front.

Points King Constantine May Raise

1. Resumption of Full United States Military Assistance to Greece

a. The King will probably ask for full resumption of military assistance to Greece.

b. You might respond that while it is our desire to release some of the items now under suspension, the continuing adverse public and Congressional opinion in the United States over political developments in Greece has made it difficult to do so. However, we are exploring the possibility of releasing a limited number of items at this time. You might add that as soon as the Greek Government gives further concrete evidence that it is moving towards constitutionalism and the release of the political prisoners, the U.S. Government would be disposed to consider resumption of delivery of the suspended items.

2. Assistance for the King in the Event of a Confrontation with the Junta

a. It is likely that the King will ask for assurance of United States support in any confrontation he might have with the coup government, including possible evacuation of himself and his family if their lives were

endangered.

b. You might respond that it is our profound hope that a confrontation between the King and the junta be avoided, since such a confrontation might plunge the country into chaos. While we firmly believe that the King should continue to press the junta towards a return of constitutionalism, he should not push matters to the point of a confrontation. If, despite the King's best efforts, a confrontation resulted over a refusal by the junta to move towards a restoration of democratic processes on a key issue and where the King's acquiescence would seriously undermine his position and influence, we would reflect in our public posture our support of a return to constitutionalism. However, there could be no United States military intervention. Possible movements of units of the Sixth Fleet to Greek waters, for political purposes only, would have to be decided at the time in light of existing circumstances.

Should the King's life and that of his family be endangered in such a confrontation, we would exert our influence on behalf of the safety of the King and his family. However, because of the risks involved to the individuals concerned, we would not attempt to evacuate the Royal family against the wishes of the junta.

You might wish to reiterate the point that we support the efforts of the King in furtherance of the peaceful return of Greece to democratic processes. At the same time, we are convinced that achievement of this objective would be undermined by a confrontation.

3. Cyprus

a. The King may ask for United States participation in the Greek-Turkish dialogue to bring about a solution to the Cyprus question, noting that the two sides are close together and need only a push from outside to reach a final agreement.

b.. You might respond that we continue to believe that the Cyprus problem can be solved only by agreement among the parties concerned. Therefore, we do not believe that our participation at the present time would be helpful. However, we do not preclude such participation at a future date if we were convinced that we could play a constructive role, and if both parties desired it.

4. Request for Economic Assistance

a. It is possible that the King may request you to support a program loan of \$70 million for Greece to assist with the reconstruction of earthquake damaged areas.

b. You might respond that while the United States Government could not provide a program loan, the Export-Import Bank would be prepared to consider applications for financing soundly conceived and economically desirable projects as well as to continue its supplier credit guarantee facility for purchases of U.S. capital equipment on appropriate credit terms.

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KCG/B-5

September 6, 1967

17e

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

POSSIBLE KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

Background of King-Junta Relationship

The coup of April 21, 1967 took King Constantine completely by surprise. Although he made an initial effort to contact his key military commanders to resist the coup, when it became apparent that the coup leaders had won over or effectively neutralized all major military commands, and that resistance on his part might plunge the nation into a civil war, the King reluctantly accepted the coup as a fait accompli. However, although he agreed to preside over the first Cabinet meeting of the new government, he refused to sign the royal decree suspending certain articles of the Constitution which therefore went into effect without his signature.

The King's relationship to the coup leaders remains tenuous. While constantly exerting pressure on the junta to move towards constitutionalism, he has been reluctant to push too hard lest he provoke an actual confrontation. Consequently, he has given in on a number of disagreements with the junta where he felt basic principles were not at stake. However, he has encouraged Army generals not identified with the coup to reassert their authority within the armed forces, and he has attempted to gauge the loyalty of the key military commanders whose support would be crucial in any confrontation with the coup leaders.

For their part, the coup leaders at the present time consider the King a necessity both because of the legitimacy he accords the new regime as well as because of his strength among the senior

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-365

By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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officers. In addition, the King is widely believed to have the support of the U. S. Government, and the coup leaders believe that any move against the King would antagonize the U. S. However, there are indications that at least some of the junta members consider the monarchy a needless luxury which should eventually be eliminated.

Possible Causes of a King-Junta Confrontation

Although there are several possible developments which could provoke a King-Junta confrontation, the most likely would ensue following some action by the coup leaders making clear that they do not intend to return to democratic processes. Examples of such action would be their rejection of the revised constitution now being prepared by a committee of jurists, or by their taking steps to oust the civilian Prime Minister and establishing a true military dictatorship under Colonel Papadopoulos or another junta figure. In either case the King would probably challenge the coup leaders, either by demanding their resignations or even arresting them. In such an event the coup leaders would probably attempt to depose the King.

Requests for U. S. Assistance

Immediately after the April 21 coup, the King raised through Ambassador Talbot the question of U. S. assistance to evacuate him and his family in the event his position became untenable. After consideration at a high level in the State Department, it was decided that if it became impossible for the King to remain in Greece, the U. S. Government would assist in evacuating the Royal Family, although not secretly (as requested by the King) but following notification to the Greek authorities. At the same time, we reiterated our conviction to the King that if at all possible he should endeavor to remain in Greece where he could continue to exert leverage for an eventual return to constitutionalism.

Within a few days, the danger passed, and the King did not formally request evacuation assistance. However, in the months since the coup the King has on a number of occasions raised with Ambassador Talbot the question of possible U. S. assistance in the

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event a King-Junta confrontation took place. Among the suggestions made by the King have been the following: (1) a landing by U. S. marines near Athens, not for combat reasons but as a "show of force" along the lines of the Lebanon landing in 1958; (2) the positioning of units of the Sixth Fleet in Greek waters prior to or during a confrontation, as a gesture of support for the King; (3) a sympathetic U. S. public posture towards the King in the event of a confrontation, including a U. S. statement reaffirming U. S. support for the King's efforts to return the country to constitutionalism, and (4) evacuation of the King and his family in the event their lives were in danger.

In his conversations with the King, Ambassador Talbot has consistently discouraged His Majesty from counting on active U. S. intervention in the event of a confrontation with the junta, particularly in the form of troop landings, although the Ambassador has not precluded the possibility of some kind of U. S. psychological support for the King. However, Ambassador Talbot has repeatedly expressed to the King the U. S. view that while he should continue to encourage the government to move towards constitutionalism, he should not provoke the coup leadership into a confrontation which could possibly lead to armed conflict and chaos.

Drafted by: NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
Cleared by: NEA/GRK - Mr. Dunn
NEA - Mr. Rockwell
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155

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KCG/B-2

September 6, 1967

173

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

GREECE'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SITUATION

Political

The Greek Government which came to power through a military coup April 21, 1967, appears to be firmly in control and to date there has been no overt resistance by the Greek public. Although it has modified or relaxed some of the more obnoxious restrictions imposed at the outset of the coup, the new regime is definitely of an authoritarian character. Key articles of the constitution remain suspended, political activity is prohibited, censorship of domestic publications continues (despite a recent Government pledge to abolish censorship), and meetings of more than five persons are banned. Violators of government laws and regulations are tried by military courts established throughout the country and punishment is swift and severe. Purges of officers considered unreliable were carried out in the Navy and Air Forces and there has been a wide-scale removal of heads of various governmental and semi-governmental agencies.

Late in May, under pressure from the United States as well as King Constantine, the government appointed a 20-member committee composed of eminent jurists and professors to revise the Constitution and submit it to the government within six months for approval prior to the holding of a plebiscite. The coup leaders have avoided publicly announcing a timetable stating precisely when the country would return to parliamentary democracy, although King Constantine has informed us privately that the Cabinet had promised him to restore democratic processes within two years at the most.

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By ig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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It is probable that the coup leaders themselves are uncertain as to when they intend to return the country to constitutionalism. They probably also have not agreed among themselves on precisely what form that constitutionalism would take. The King, supported by Prime Minister Kollias, has taken the lead in urging the government to bring about a return as promptly as possible. The three coup leaders--General Pattakos, Colonel Papadopoulos, and Colonel Makarezos--have, in varying degrees, opposed an early return to democracy lest the goals of their "revolution" be undermined by a premature return to normal political life.

In their public statements, the coup leaders have repeatedly called for a "purification" of Greek society, but have been vague in defining precisely what this purification entails. What does seem clear is that the coup leaders lack political sophistication, as demonstrated by their ineptness in stripping a prominent Greek actress of her citizenship and sentencing a highly distinguished former Foreign Minister to five years in prison for holding a social gathering of more than five persons. In recent weeks Colonel Papadopoulos has been emerging as the "strong man" of the junta, although even he appears to be subject to pressure from certain extremist junior officers strongly opposed to a return to constitutionalism. The coup leaders share a deep disdain for almost all Greek politicians, whom they consider venal and corrupt.

As the time approaches for a completion of the constitutional revision, the true intentions of the government with regard to the restoration of democracy should become clearer. Should the coup leaders repudiate their promise to hold a plebiscite or refuse to take other steps in the direction of constitutionalism, a confrontation with the King would be likely, perhaps as early as this autumn. Also possible is a split within the coup group itself over this key question.

Although to date there has been no organized opposition to the coup government, with the passage of time such resistance must be anticipated. There is evidence that the initial acceptance of the coup by a Greek citizenry exhausted by years of political demagoguery

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and irresponsibility has begun to wane as the government has failed to meet the expectations--often unrealistic--of various segments of the population. Dissatisfaction with the government will undoubtedly increase if, as expected, there is a worsening of the economic situation. One danger in such a development is the possibility that the leadership of any resistance movement might fall into the hands of the Communists, who are better organized than any other group to wage underground resistance.

Economic

The Greek economy has been growing in recent years by an impressive 8 per cent annually and per capita GNP now exceeds \$700. This growth reflects both Greece's own efforts and \$1.9 billion in U. S. economic assistance since 1946. It should be noted to Greece's credit that the U. S. grant economic aid program to Greece officially terminated in 1962.

While there are now signs that the rate of economic growth has begun to slow down, the growth rate nevertheless is expected to amount to between 5 and 6 per cent during 1967. The slow-down in growth reflects an anticipated readjustment to the serious structural problems resulting from the rapid but uneven expansion of the past several years. In addition, the uncertainties arising from the coup and the Middle East crisis have contributed to a worsening balance of payments situation as indicated by a decline during 1967 of \$43.8 million in Greece's official gold and hard currency holdings to a total of \$258.9 million on July 31, 1967. However, the decline in official assets has been partially offset by transferring \$30.1 million from the special fund of gold sovereigns. The pressure on foreign exchange reserves has come from a growing trade deficit that has been only partially offset by invisible earnings which have been less than anticipated during 1967 as the result of a decline in receipts from tourism and workers remittances.

In view of the political and economic uncertainty prevailing before and immediately following the coup, the present government initially followed stabilizing policies designed to reduce prices and encourage savings. Expansionary steps are now being taken to liberalize reserve requirements and the discount rate and to encourage

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certain types of construction.

The government believes it can both stimulate the private sector to be the driving force behind Greek economic development and eliminate the glaring inequalities between classes. While the government has yet to implement these policies, it has begun to eliminate bureaucratic red tape and to speed up arrangements for foreign investment. It has approved and encouraged several investments by American firms, including an \$825 million capital investment program over 12 years with Litton Industries to develop Crete and the Western Peloponnesus, as well as manufacturing proposals by Union Carbide and Goodyear Rubber.

While it is believed that the negative factors affecting the Greek economy may be of short duration, the present government has yet to prove its ability to carry out its stated economic policies and to create the necessary climate of stability and confidence to attract both domestic and foreign investment.

Drafted by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Dunn NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
Cleared by:	AID/NESA/NE - Mrs. Fitzmaurice AID/NESA/DP - Mr. Ward NEA - Mr. Rockwell
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155	


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
GREECE

Gross National Product


COMPOSITION
1966 (Estimated)



GROWTH
(1962=100)




PER CAPITA
COMPARISONS
(1965 US Dollars)




GREECE

Production Indexes

AGRICULTURE
(1957-59 = 100)



INDUSTRY
(1958 = 100)



17k


GREECE

Balance of Payments

(Million US Dollars)


GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

*Includes IMF Gold Tranche




SELECTED INVISIBLE RECEIPTS

- Tourism
- Emigrant Remittances
- Workers Remittances
- Shipping



FOREIGN TRADE




172

GREECE

Government Expenditures

(Million US Dollars)



GREECE


1966 Foreign Trade (Million US Dollars)

IMPORTS (c.i.f.)


\$1130

Excludes ships transferred
to Greek flag
(93 million dollars in 1966)

COMPOSITION




DIRECTION




EXPORTS (f.o.b.)

\$406

COMPOSITION



DIRECTION




17m

GREECE

Domestic Prices and Money Supply

(Index 1958 = 100)



172

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CG/B-7

September 6, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-365

By msj, NARA, Date 12-15-94

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE

September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

EVALUATION OF LIKELY U.S. DOMESTIC AND CONGRESSIONAL
REACTION TO KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

Background.

Although the American press and public generally deplored the overthrow of representative government in Greece by the April 21 coup, there was some initial hesitation to condemn the new Greek regime before all the facts were available. Some of the early, positive moves of the government such as the formation of a committee to revise the constitution, the reform of the corrupt Greek Orthodox Church leadership, and the business-like attitude towards foreign investment, served to neutralize to some degree the naturally unfavorable impression caused by the basically authoritarian character of the new regime. Congressional opinion generally coincided with public sentiment during this initial period; while dismayed, Congress too tended to wait to let the government "prove" itself.

Present Attitudes towards Government

In recent weeks, however, the image of the Greek junta in the United States has worsened. The continued imprisonment of large numbers of persons without trials (including Andreas Papandreou), the delay in reestablishing the promised degree of press freedom, and the additional arrests for political reasons, have all combined to impress on public opinion the dictatorial nature of the current Greek government. In particular, certain inept moves by the junta, such as divesting the popular Greek actress Melina Mercouri of her citizenship and the arrest and harsh sentence of a distinguished former Greek Foreign Minister, have held the government up to general public ridicule and scorn. As a result, public sentiment against the

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junta has intensified. Members of the academic community, whose personal sympathies and ideological convictions coincide in the case of Andreas Papandreu, have been particularly outspoken. They are followed by a large body of public sentiment, including a segment of the Greek-American community, although the bulk of the Greek-Americans seem still to be apathetic or maintaining a tentative attitude towards the present political situation in Greece. Finally, some of the most vociferous anti-coup opinion in the United States has emanated from Congressional representatives, especially Senators Clark and Pell and Rep. Donald Fraser.

Attitude Towards King

Attitudes toward the King do not appear to follow along the same lines as those toward the Greek Government. Even among the harshest critics of the government there is a tendency to regard the King as a constructive force and as one of the best hopes for steering the regime into a more constitutional course. It follows that public and Congressional attitudes towards the King will depend in large part on how the King conducts himself towards the regime.

Opinion in Event of Confrontation

It further follows that a confrontation between King and regime would in all probability elicit sympathy for the King. That would clearly be the case if the King and coup leaders should clash over the intransigence of the coup leaders on an issue in which the restoration of democracy were involved. But sentiment would probably still favor the King even on a question of less clear principle, as for example, control of the Army.

Assuming that the King should break with the junta on an issue which cast him in the role of the defender of democracy, there would undoubtedly be considerable popular and Congressional acquiescence and even demand for providing him with psychological and political support, such as an official U. S. Government pronouncement in his favor. There would probably also be general approval, again public and Congressional, of a humanitarian effort to evacuate him and his family in extremis. On the other hand, there would be little support from the public and probably none from the Congress for any U. S. military intervention in a Greek crisis.

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Reaction to Ouster of King

Should the junta make a successful move against the King, there would undoubtedly be irresistible pressure--notably from Congress--to cut off all aid, military and otherwise, to Greece. There probably would be strong pressure from Congress and the public for an official public condemnation of the junta. But even though the ouster of the King would confront the U. S. with the question of recognition of the regime, it is doubtful whether Congressional leaders would demand a break in relations with Greece. It is likely that some NATO countries would try to have Greece read out of their organization and that some Congressional leaders would view such an effort with equanimity. But it is unlikely that Congress would go beyond the demand for a cut-off of all aid to Greece.

Drafted by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
	NEA/GRK - Mr. Mitchell
Cleared by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster
	NEA - Mr. Rockwell
	H - Mr. Kiselyak
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155	

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OO WTELE
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67737

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT MARCOS HAS A BIRTHDAY ON SEPTEMBER 11.
I SUGGEST YOU APPROVE THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE:

"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

LADY BIRD AND I SEND OUR WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON
YOUR BIRTHDAY, AND OUR BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED GOOD HEALTH
AND SUCCESS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

OUR WARM REGARDS ALSO TO IMELDA.

SIGNED,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DTG: 082240Z SEP 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12325, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-12-91

67 SEP 8 PM 7:26

FRIDAY

BACK FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-365
By ig, NARA, Date 12-16-94

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1967 SEP 8 22 59

FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67785

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SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

67 SEP 8 PM 7:04

FRIDAY

FOLLOWING IS VIET NAM POLITICAL SITUATION REPORT FOR TODAY.

THIEU-KY RELATIONSHIP

BUNKER SAW THIEU AND KY YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THEIR APPEARANCE THIS WEEKEND ON "MEET THE PRESS". AT THAT TIME THEY SEEMED QUITE RELAXED ABOUT THE BROADCAST AND UNDERSTOOD ITS IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF AMERICAN OPINION. THEY GAVE NO HINT, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THIS MORNING, THAT KY WOULD NOT APPEAR WITH THIEU ON "MEET THE PRESS". THE EMBASSY HAS CONFIRMED BY PHONE THAT KY WILL NOT APPEAR ON THE PROGRAM. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THIEU DID NOT WANT KY TO APPEAR WITH HIM.

THIEU AND KY TOLD BUNKER NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN MADE ON THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT THAT THEY WERE MOVING AHEAD WITH CERTAIN OTHER CABINET APPOINTMENTS. BUNKER SAID THAT HE DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER AT THAT TIME BECAUSE IT INVOLVES SOMEWHAT DELICATE QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO MEN.

WE CONTINUE TO GET REPORTS OF A GROUPING OF KEY GENERALS ORGANIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESOLVING INEVITABLE FRICTIONS BETWEEN THIEU AND KY. THESE REPORTS INDICATE THAT KY DOMINATES THIS GROUP. HOWEVER, THERE ARE ALSO INDICATIONS THAT SOME FIELD-GRADE OFFICERS ARE DISSATISFIED OF THE CREATION OF THIS GROUPING, PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE PERSONALITIES IN IT AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THE MILITARY SHOULD STAY OUT OF POLITICS.

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PROBLEM OF DZU

THIEU AND KY TOLD BUNKER THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT DZU HAD HAD SUBSTANTIAL FUNDS FROM UNKNOWN SOURCES. THEY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT DZU RAN STRONGEST IN AREAS WHERE VC STRENGTH WAS GREATEST. SEMI-OFFICIAL VIET-NAM PRESS HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE POLICE HAVE UNCOVERED EVIDENCE THAT THE VC INSTRUCTED VOTERS TO CAST BALLOTS FOR DZU. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT THE GVN THROUGH THIS AND OTHER MEANS IS TRYING TO FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHERS WILL COOPERATE WITH DZU.

NEW UPPER HOUSE

IN ITS PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW UPPER HOUSE, EMBASSY SAIGON COMMENTS THAT, ALTHOUGH CATHOLICS TOOK A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE UPPER HOUSE SEATS, MANY OTHER GROUPS HAVE SOME REPRESENTATION. THE MOST IMPORTANT GROUPS EXCLUDED ARE THE SOUTHERNERS WHO SUPPORT HUONG OR DZU AND THE NORTHERN BUDDHISTS. THE EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THE SENATE IS LIKELY TO BE INDEPENDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, THOUGH INCLINED TO COOPERATE WITH IT ON MANY ISSUES. IT IS LIKELY TO BE STRONGLY ANTI-COMMUNIST AND PROBABLY CONSERVATIVE ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

IN A CONVERSATION WITH A SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICER, FOREIGN MINISTER DO ATTRIBUTED THE CATHOLICS' NOTABLE SUCCESS TO THEIR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE. HE SAID THIS WAS A REAL LESSON FOR THE BUDDHISTS. DO SAID THAT THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS WOULD BE QUITE DIFFERENT SINCE ITS MEMBERS WOULD BE ELECTED FROM INDIVIDUAL CONSTITUENCIES AND THEREFORE REPRESENT A MUCH BROADER SPECTRUM OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. DO NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL AND SENATE ELECTION RESULTS NARROWED THE SELECTION OF A PRIME MINISTER TO PERSONS WHO WERE BUDDHIST, CIVILIAN, SOUTHERNER, AND COMPETENT AND EXPERIENCED. HE ASSUMED THAT HE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

DTG 082200Z SEP 1967

GROUPS: 600

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PRESERVATION

Friday, September 8, 1967

Pres file

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

Mr. President:

President Park celebrates his fiftieth birthday on September 30.

The following text of a congratulatory message is submitted for your approval:

"Dear Mr. President:

I extend to you my heartiest congratulations on the occasion of your fiftieth birthday, and send my very best wishes for your good health and good fortune as you lead the Korean people into a bright and prosperous future.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364
By Wig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

September 8, 1967

Pres file 2!
sent to Rusk
via wire
CAP 67781

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith, following your instruction, a draft cable from you to Ed Clark.

QUOTE. I was greatly cheered by your report of conversation with Holt. We shall, of course, maintain secrecy about his intentions.

Please tell him, on the next appropriate occasion, how much strength I derived from his last visit with me and from his messages. And tell Holt -- and his colleagues, also -- how grateful I am for their friendship and confidence. They should know that our people here will follow our leadership on Viet Nam so long as they are convinced that the peoples of Asia and the Pacific are doing their part.

So far as Viet Nam is concerned, you might tell Holt that:

1. We were cheered by the election and the response of our observers to it; but we know the scale of the task ahead, notably in building a broad-based government and a majority coalition under that government. We would be grateful for any insights or suggestions that the Australians may have on the political situation and prospects in Saigon.

2. We shall be using our margin of influence on the new government to accelerate programs of pacification, land reform, improvement of the ARVN, to reduce corruption, etc.

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-2-

3. As Holt is no doubt aware, the barrier, which Bob McNamara referred to on Thursday, combines a conventional fixed installation with the emplacement of a series of sophisticated gadgets that should make infiltration more difficult and expensive; but we have no illusions that it will, in itself, cleanly cut off infiltration across the DMZ and Laos. Moreover, it will not be brought in until much later in the year and will undoubtedly take some months to shake down and become effective. We believe it is worth trying but do not regard it as a panacea.

4. Thieu has been careful about making his peace offers contingent on a "sign of good will." We think he is right and expect that he will be in touch with us before he makes any major move in this direction, either towards Hanoi or the NLF.

I look forward to seeing you when you return. UNQUOTE.

WWRostow:rlh

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Friday, September 8, 1967

22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

*sent to Rusk
via wire*

Mr. President:

Philippine President Marcos has a birthday on September 11. I suggest you approve the following personal message:

"Dear Mr. President:

Lady Bird and I send our warmest congratulations on on your birthday, and our best wishes for continued good health and success in the years ahead.

Our warm regards also to Imelda.

Signed

Lyndon B. Johnson"

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

23

via phone 9/9/67
to Rauch(cy also is
response)~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Greek King--Monday, September 11

King Constantine is here privately after an official visit to Canada, so we've planned no ceremony in connection with his call. Your lunch at 1 p.m. -- after a half hour's talk alone -- will be basically the Tuesday lunch group like our session with King Hussein. He asked for this meeting.

Constantine has one main subject on his mind. He fears his younger military may stage a second phase of the April coup to oust the last semblances of civilian government -- including him, if he doesn't go along. We expect him to ask you how much help we'd give him if he ends up in that sort of confrontation.

Secretary Rusk's memo (Tab A) spells this out in more detail, but essentially our line is this: While we don't like the coup government any more than he does, we think the way for both of us to handle it is to work with it and try to nudge it back toward constitutional government. The consequences of a confrontation would be bad for all of us, so what we want to talk about is how to avoid it. If it comes, we can't honestly say what we'd do until we see what the situation is. We think our interests and the King's are similar. We don't want civil war; we want constitutional government; we don't want US-Greek relations disrupted. But what we can do is limited.

In that context, you might want to discuss our suspended military aid. We'll have Congressional problems if we release any more now, but you might want to get a sense from the King himself what role this aid would play, if any, in staving off a confrontation. If he makes a convincing case, we would have a better argument on the Hill, since even the hostile members see the King as the main rallying point for forces pressing for return to constitutional government. Phil Talbot feels the King will suffer if he doesn't bring back promise of some release. You may want to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and the King at lunch, if he presses you.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By lig, NARA, Date 6-23-95~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

Cyprus is the other important subject that may come up. Greek Prime Minister Kollias and Turkish Prime Minister Demirel are meeting this weekend, with Cyprus high on the agenda. The Greek coup government does show more signs than any civilian predecessor of trying for a settlement. And the Turks report "encouraging sounds" in preparation for this summit meeting. Yet if Ankara is ready to talk they (and Phil Talbot) are still not overly sanguine. Greece has so far given no real preview of a specific deal that would meet Turkey half-way. You'll want to ask the King for the latest information on the Kollias-Demirel talks. You might urge him to face up to the problem and get this settled - particularly while the military regime can take the heat for any concessions.

Apart from military aid, he may ask for something like \$15 million to help rebuild from a series of earthquakes last spring. We see this mainly as a gimmick dreamed up by the coup government to get a small program loan. We are out of the aid business in Greece and ought to stay out. But the Greek government keeps pressing. We've offered Export-Import Bank loans and ought to stick to that response.

We're considering a state visit for the King and Queen next spring. But we want to hold off mentioning that until we see how he comes out of this fall's political push and whether he can keep the pressure on the junta for return to constitutional government.

Of the attached briefing material, you need read only Secretary Rusk's memo (Tab A). But if you have time, you'd find helpful the papers on the looming confrontation (Tab B) on Greece's domestic situation (Tab C) and on US public attitudes toward the coup (Tab D). We'll have a talking paper for you Monday.

Walt Rostow

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23a A

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with King Constantine
of Greece

King Constantine is coming to Washington at his request. While the main purpose of his visit is to explain the aims of the Greek Government which came to power in the April 21, 1967 coup and to obtain U. S. understanding and support for the Government, at the same time he will seek Presidential assurances of U. S. backing in any confrontation he might have with the Greek junta. The King views his role as one of continuously pressing the coup leaders in the direction of a return to democratic processes. He also believes that his standing with the junta, as well as Greek-U. S. relations, will be enhanced by the resumption of U. S. military assistance to Greece. The very fact that you have agreed to receive him will strengthen his position with the Government.

We share the King's view that he can play a constructive role in encouraging the Greek Government in the direction of constitutionalism. However, we believe we should caution him against pushing the regime to the point of provoking a confrontation, since we do not want to see armed conflict in Greece and would not wish to intervene militarily in his behalf. We realize that walking such a narrow line is a difficult course to follow, and believe that the visit offers the occasion to reassure the 27-year old King of our recognition of the importance of the monarchy as well as our appreciation of his vital role in returning the country to constitutionalism. On military assistance, we believe that you should inform the King that full resumption of MAP is out of the

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Group 3

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-365

By ig, NARA, Date 12-19-94

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question at this time because of strong public and Congressional sentiment against such a move; however, we are prepared to consider releasing a few of the items now currently suspended. In this way we can bolster the King's position vis-a-vis the coup leadership as well as prevent our own relations with the Greek Government from becoming frozen.

In sum, we believe that the visit of the King can serve a useful purpose in making clear our profound desire for continued close relations with Greece as well as our belief in the necessity for an early return to constitutional government. It also provides an opportunity to reassure the King of our support for him and at the same time to discourage him from moving into a confrontation with the junta.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Talking Points.

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Talking Points

Our goals in your luncheon meeting with the King are to

(1) indicate our strong desire for continued good relations with Greece,

(2) assure the King of our appreciation of the importance of the monarchy to Greece and of the constructive role he has played since the Greek coup,

(3) express the concern of the American Government and people at the suspension of democratic processes in Greece and our strongest hope that they will be restored, and

(4) impress upon the King the need to avoid chaos or civil war in Greece.

In this connection, you may wish to point out the following:

1. Bilateral U.S. - Greek Relations

a. We continue to consider Greece as an important NATO ally, and are thankful for the cooperation accorded to us by the Greek Government during the mid-East crisis;

b. We fully appreciate the difficult role played by the King since the April 21 **coup** in encouraging the Greek Government to moderate its policies and to take steps leading towards a return to constitutionalism, without at the same time undermining his own relationship with the government leaders or provoking them to a final confrontation.

c. The American Government **and** people were deeply troubled by the overthrow of **the** constitutional government of Greece and the arrest **of** large numbers of political prisoners. It was in **this context** that we suspended shipment of major military **items** to Greece

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By ing, NARA, Date 12-19-94

PRESERVATION COPY

and placed our entire MAP to Greece under review. We believe that by moving steadily to restore constitutional processes and by early release of all or most of the political prisoners, the Greek Government could more fully develop its traditionally close relations with the United States and the American people.

2. Foreign Affairs

a. Cyprus - The King will expect some acknowledgment of his efforts to improve Greek-Turkish relations by pushing for high-level Greek-Turkish government negotiations on Cyprus; you may wish to praise the King's efforts in this respect and particularly his success in achieving a meeting of Greek-Turkish Prime Ministers September 9-10. You may also wish to reaffirm our support for constructive efforts aimed at solving this disruptive issue, an issue which by disrupting Greek-Turkish cooperation weakens free world defenses in the Mid-East at a time of intensified Soviet activity in the area.

b. Vietnam - You may wish to discuss briefly the current situation in Vietnam.

c. NATO - While expressing our regret that the question of the Greek political changes has become a subject of dissension within the NATO alliance, you may wish to point out that it was inevitable that the coup would provoke an unfavorable reaction among some members of the alliance. However, we believe this reaction could be largely overcome by concrete evidence of a return to democratic processes in Greece.

d. Yugoslavia - We consider it unfortunate that the traditionally good relations between Greece and Yugoslavia have been adversely affected by the change of government in Greece, due in part to the extreme sensitivity on the part of the Yugoslavs to recent world events. It might be helpful if the Greeks might take some steps to reassure exaggerated Yugoslav fears of

Greek intentions toward it, particularly since such fears strengthen the position of those conservative Communist elements opposed to liberal trends in Yugoslav development.

3. Economic

Express our satisfaction that the Greek Government has taken steps to encourage foreign investment by removing bureaucratic and other obstacles to such investment and our hope that Greece will move forward on the economic front.

Points King Constantine May Raise

1. Resumption of Full United States Military Assistance to Greece

a. The King will probably ask for full resumption of military assistance to Greece.

b. You might respond that while it is our desire to release some of the items now under suspension, the continuing adverse public and Congressional opinion in the United States over political developments in Greece has made it difficult to do so. However, we are exploring the possibility of releasing a limited number of items at this time. You might add that as soon as the Greek Government gives further concrete evidence that it is moving towards constitutionalism and the release of the political prisoners, the U.S. Government would be disposed to consider resumption of delivery of the suspended items.

2. Assistance for the King in the Event of a Confrontation with the Junta

a. It is likely that the King will ask for assurance of United States support in any confrontation he might have with the coup government, including possible evacuation of himself and his family if their lives were

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endangered.

b. You might respond that it is our profound hope that a confrontation between the King and the junta be avoided, since such a confrontation might plunge the country into chaos. While we firmly believe that the King should continue to press the junta towards a return of constitutionalism, he should not push matters to the point of a confrontation. If, despite the King's best efforts, a confrontation resulted over a refusal by the junta to move towards a restoration of democratic processes on a key issue and where the King's acquiescence would seriously undermine his position and influence, we would reflect in our public posture our support of a return to constitutionalism. However, there could be no United States military intervention. Possible movements of units of the Sixth Fleet to Greek waters, for political purposes only, would have to be decided at the time in light of existing circumstances.

Should the King's life and that of his family be endangered in such a confrontation, we would exert our influence on behalf of the safety of the King and his family. However, because of the risks involved to the individuals concerned, we would not attempt to evacuate the Royal family against the wishes of the junta.

You might wish to reiterate the point that we support the efforts of the King in furtherance of the peaceful return of Greece to democratic processes. At the same time, we are convinced that achievement of this objective would be undermined by a confrontation.

3. Cyprus

a. The King may ask for United States participation in the Greek-Turkish dialogue to bring about a solution to the Cyprus question, noting that the two sides are close together and need only a push from outside to reach a final agreement.

b. You might respond that we continue to believe that the Cyprus problem can be solved only by agreement among the parties concerned. Therefore, we do not believe that our participation at the present time would be helpful. However, we do not preclude such participation at a future date if we were convinced that we could play a constructive role, and if both parties desired it.

4. Request for Economic Assistance

a. It is possible that the King may request you to support a program loan of \$70 million for Greece to assist with the reconstruction of earthquake damaged areas.

b. You might respond that while the United States Government could not provide a program loan, the Export-Import Bank would be prepared to consider applications for financing soundly conceived and economically desirable projects as well as to continue its supplier credit guarantee facility for purchases of U.S. capital equipment on appropriate credit terms.

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KCG/B-5

September 6, 1967

234

B

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

POSSIBLE KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

Background of King-Junta Relationship

The coup of April 21, 1967 took King Constantine completely by surprise. Although he made an initial effort to contact his key military commanders to resist the coup, when it became apparent that the coup leaders had won over or effectively neutralized all major military commands, and that resistance on his part might plunge the nation into a civil war, the King reluctantly accepted the coup as a fait accompli. However, although he agreed to preside over the first Cabinet meeting of the new government, he refused to sign the royal decree suspending certain articles of the Constitution which therefore went into effect without his signature.

The King's relationship to the coup leaders remains tenuous. While constantly exerting pressure on the junta to move towards constitutionalism, he has been reluctant to push too hard lest he provoke an actual confrontation. Consequently, he has given in on a number of disagreements with the junta where he felt basic principles were not at stake. However, he has encouraged Army generals not identified with the coup to reassert their authority within the armed forces, and he has attempted to gauge the loyalty of the key military commanders whose support would be crucial in any confrontation with the coup leaders.

For their part, the coup leaders at the present time consider the King a necessity both because of the legitimacy he accords the new regime as well as because of his strength among the senior

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94 365

By 48, NARA, Date 12-19-94

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officers. In addition, the King is widely believed to have the support of the U. S. Government, and the coup leaders believe that any move against the King would antagonize the U. S. However, there are indications that at least some of the junta members consider the monarchy a needless luxury which should eventually be eliminated.

Possible Causes of a King-Junta Confrontation

Although there are several possible developments which could provoke a King-Junta confrontation, the most likely would ensue following some action by the coup leaders making clear that they do not intend to return to democratic processes. Examples of such action would be their rejection of the revised constitution now being prepared by a committee of jurists, or by their taking steps to oust the civilian Prime Minister and establishing a true military dictatorship under Colonel Papadopoulos or another junta figure. In either case the King would probably challenge the coup leaders, either by demanding their resignations or even arresting them. In such an event the coup leaders would probably attempt to depose the King.

Requests for U. S. Assistance

Immediately after the April 21 coup, the King raised through Ambassador Talbot the question of U. S. assistance to evacuate him and his family in the event his position became untenable. After consideration at a high level in the State Department, it was decided that if it became impossible for the King to remain in Greece, the U. S. Government would assist in evacuating the Royal Family, although not secretly (as requested by the King) but following notification to the Greek authorities. At the same time, we reiterated our conviction to the King that if at all possible he should endeavor to remain in Greece where he could continue to exert leverage for an eventual return to constitutionalism.

Within a few days, the danger passed, and the King did not formally request evacuation assistance. However, in the months since the coup the King has on a number of occasions raised with Ambassador Talbot the question of possible U. S. assistance in the

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event a King-Junta confrontation took place. Among the suggestions made by the King have been the following: (1) a landing by U. S. marines near Athens, not for combat reasons but as a "show of force" along the lines of the Lebanon landing in 1958; (2) the positioning of units of the Sixth Fleet in Greek waters prior to or during a confrontation, as a gesture of support for the King; (3) a sympathetic U. S. public posture towards the King in the event of a confrontation, including a U. S. statement reaffirming U. S. support for the King's efforts to return the country to constitutionalism, and (4) evacuation of the King and his family in the event their lives were in danger.

In his conversations with the King, Ambassador Talbot has consistently discouraged His Majesty from counting on active U. S. intervention in the event of a confrontation with the junta, particularly in the form of troop landings, although the Ambassador has not precluded the possibility of some kind of U. S. psychological support for the King. However, Ambassador Talbot has repeatedly expressed to the King the U. S. view that while he should continue to encourage the government to move towards constitutionalism, he should not provoke the coup leadership into a confrontation which could possibly lead to armed conflict and chaos.

Drafted by: NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
Cleared by: NEA/GRK - Mr. Dunn
NEA - Mr. Rockwell
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155

~~SECRET~~

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By WJ, NARA, Date 12-19-94

GREECE'S DOMESTIC POLITICAL/ECONOMIC SITUATION

Political

The Greek Government which came to power through a military coup April 21, 1967, appears to be firmly in control and to date there has been no overt resistance by the Greek public. Although it has modified or relaxed some of the more obnoxious restrictions imposed at the outset of the coup, the new regime is definitely of an authoritarian character. Key articles of the constitution remain suspended, political activity is prohibited, censorship of domestic publications continues (despite a recent Government pledge to abolish censorship), and meetings of more than five persons are banned. Violators of government laws and regulations are tried by military courts established throughout the country and punishment is swift and severe. Purges of officers considered unreliable were carried out in the Navy and Air Forces and there has been a wide-scale removal of heads of various governmental and semi-governmental agencies.

Late in May, under pressure from the United States as well as King Constantine, the government appointed a 20-member committee composed of eminent jurists and professors to revise the Constitution and submit it to the government within six months for approval prior to the holding of a plebiscite. The coup leaders have avoided publicly announcing a timetable stating precisely when the country would return to parliamentary democracy, although King Constantine has informed us privately that the Cabinet had promised him to restore democratic processes within two years at the most.

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It is probable that the coup leaders themselves are uncertain as to when they intend to return the country to constitutionalism. They probably also have not agreed among themselves on precisely what form that constitutionalism would take. The King, supported by Prime Minister Kollias, has taken the lead in urging the government to bring about a return as promptly as possible. The three coup leaders--General Pattakos, Colonel Papadopoulos, and Colonel Makarezos--have, in varying degrees, opposed an early return to democracy lest the goals of their "revolution" be undermined by a premature return to normal political life.

In their public statements, the coup leaders have repeatedly called for a "purification" of Greek society, but have been vague in defining precisely what this purification entails. What does seem clear is that the coup leaders lack political sophistication, as demonstrated by their ineptness in stripping a prominent Greek actress of her citizenship and sentencing a highly distinguished former Foreign Minister to five years in prison for holding a social gathering of more than five persons. In recent weeks Colonel Papadopoulos has been emerging as the "strong man" of the junta, although even he appears to be subject to pressure from certain extremist junior officers strongly opposed to a return to constitutionalism. The coup leaders share a deep disdain for almost all Greek politicians, whom they consider venal and corrupt.

As the time approaches for a completion of the constitutional revision, the true intentions of the government with regard to the restoration of democracy should become clearer. Should the coup leaders repudiate their promise to hold a plebiscite or refuse to take other steps in the direction of constitutionalism, a confrontation with the King would be likely, perhaps as early as this autumn. Also possible is a split within the coup group itself over this key question.

Although to date there has been no organized opposition to the coup government, with the passage of time such resistance must be anticipated. There is evidence that the initial acceptance of the coup by a Greek citizenry exhausted by years of political demagoguery

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and irresponsibility has begun to wane as the government has failed to meet the expectations--often unrealistic--of various segments of the population. Dissatisfaction with the government will undoubtedly increase if, as expected, there is a worsening of the economic situation. One danger in such a development is the possibility that the leadership of any resistance movement might fall into the hands of the Communists, who are better organized than any other group to wage underground resistance.

Economic

The Greek economy has been growing in recent years by an impressive 8 per cent annually and per capita GNP now exceeds \$700. This growth reflects both Greece's own efforts and \$1.9 billion in U. S. economic assistance since 1946. It should be noted to Greece's credit that the U. S. grant economic aid program to Greece officially terminated in 1962.

While there are now signs that the rate of economic growth has begun to slow down, the growth rate nevertheless is expected to amount to between 5 and 6 per cent during 1967. The slow-down in growth reflects an anticipated readjustment to the serious structural problems resulting from the rapid but uneven expansion of the past several years. In addition, the uncertainties arising from the coup and the Middle East crisis have contributed to a worsening balance of payments situation as indicated by a decline during 1967 of \$43.8 million in Greece's official gold and hard currency holdings to a total of \$258.9 million on July 31, 1967. However, the decline in official assets has been partially offset by transferring \$30.1 million from the special fund of gold sovereigns. The pressure on foreign exchange reserves has come from a growing trade deficit that has been only partially offset by invisible earnings which have been less than anticipated during 1967 as the result of a decline in receipts from tourism and workers remittances.

In view of the political and economic uncertainty prevailing before and immediately following the coup, the present government initially followed stabilizing policies designed to reduce prices and encourage savings. Expansionary steps are now being taken to liberalize reserve requirements and the discount rate and to encourage

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certain types of construction.

The government believes it can both stimulate the private sector to be the driving force behind Greek economic development and eliminate the glaring inequalities between classes. While the government has yet to implement these policies, it has begun to eliminate bureaucratic red tape and to speed up arrangements for foreign investment. It has approved and encouraged several investments by American firms, including an \$825 million capital investment program over 12 years with Litton Industries to develop Crete and the Western Peloponnesus, as well as manufacturing proposals by Union Carbide and Goodyear Rubber.

While it is believed that the negative factors affecting the Greek economy may be of short duration, the present government has yet to prove its ability to carry out its stated economic policies and to create the necessary climate of stability and confidence to attract both domestic and foreign investment.


Drafted by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Dunn
	NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
Cleared by:	AID/NESA/NE - Mrs. Fitzmaurice
	AID/NESA/DP - Mr. Ward
	NEA - Mr. Rockwell
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155	

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
GREECE

Gross National Product


COMPOSITION
1966 (Estimated)



GROWTH
(1962=100)





PER CAPITA
COMPARISONS
(1965 US Dollars)



GREECE


Production Indexes

AGRICULTURE
(1957-59 = 100)INDUSTRY
(1958 = 100)

GREECE

Government Expenditures

(Million US Dollars)




GREECE

Balance of Payments

(Million US Dollars)


GOLD AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

*Includes IMF Gold Tranche




SELECTED INVISIBLE RECEIPTS

- Tourism
- Emigrant Remittances
- Workers Remittances
- Shipping



FOREIGN TRADE



GREECE


1966 Foreign Trade (Million US Dollars)

IMPORTS (c.i.f.)


\$1130

Excludes ships transferred
to Greek flag
(93 million dollars in 1966)

COMPOSITION




DIRECTION




EXPORTS (f.o.b.)

\$406

COMPOSITION




DIRECTION



GREECE

Domestic Prices and Money Supply

(Index 1958 = 100)



September 6, 1967

23K

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-365
By 118, NARA, Date 12-19-94

VISIT OF KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE
September 11, 1967

BACKGROUND PAPER

EVALUATION OF LIKELY U.S. DOMESTIC AND CONGRESSIONAL
REACTION TO KING-JUNTA CONFRONTATION

D

Background

Although the American press and public generally deplored the overthrow of representative government in Greece by the April 21 coup, there was some initial hesitation to condemn the new Greek regime before all the facts were available. Some of the early, positive moves of the government such as the formation of a committee to revise the constitution, the reform of the corrupt Greek Orthodox Church leadership, and the business-like attitude towards foreign investment, served to neutralize to some degree the naturally unfavorable impression caused by the basically authoritarian character of the new regime. Congressional opinion generally coincided with public sentiment during this initial period; while dismayed, Congress too tended to wait to let the government "prove" itself.

Present Attitudes towards Government

In recent weeks, however, the image of the Greek junta in the United States has worsened. The continued imprisonment of large numbers of persons without trials (including Andreas Papandreou), the delay in reestablishing the promised degree of press freedom, and the additional arrests for political reasons, have all combined to impress on public opinion the dictatorial nature of the current Greek government. In particular, certain inept moves by the junta, such as divesting the popular Greek actress Melina Mercouri of her citizenship and the arrest and harsh sentence of a distinguished former Greek Foreign Minister, have held the government up to general public ridicule and scorn. As a result, public sentiment against the

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junta has intensified. Members of the academic community, whose personal sympathies and ideological convictions coincide in the case of Andreas Papandreu, have been particularly outspoken. They are followed by a large body of public sentiment, including a segment of the Greek-American community, although the bulk of the Greek-Americans seem still to be apathetic or maintaining a tentative attitude towards the present political situation in Greece. Finally, some of the most vociferous anti-coup opinion in the United States has emanated from Congressional representatives, especially Senators Clark and Pell and Rep. Donald Fraser.

Attitude Towards King

Attitudes toward the King do not appear to follow along the same lines as those toward the Greek Government. Even among the harshest critics of the government there is a tendency to regard the King as a constructive force and as one of the best hopes for steering the regime into a more constitutional course. It follows that public and Congressional attitudes towards the King will depend in large part on how the King conducts himself towards the regime.

Opinion in Event of Confrontation

It further follows that a confrontation between King and regime would in all probability elicit sympathy for the King. That would clearly be the case if the King and coup leaders should clash over the intransigence of the coup leaders on an issue in which the restoration of democracy were involved. But sentiment would probably still favor the King even on a question of less clear principle, as for example, control of the Army.

Assuming that the King should break with the junta on an issue which cast him in the role of the defender of democracy, there would undoubtedly be considerable popular and Congressional acquiescence and even demand for providing him with psychological and political support, such as an official U. S. Government pronouncement in his favor. There would probably also be general approval, again public and Congressional, of a humanitarian effort to evacuate him and his family in extremis. On the other hand, there would be little support from the public and probably none from the Congress for any U. S. military intervention in a Greek crisis.

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Reaction to Ouster of King

Should the junta make a successful move against the King, there would undoubtedly be irresistible pressure--notably from Congress--to cut off all aid, military and otherwise, to Greece. There probably would be strong pressure from Congress and the public for an official public condemnation of the junta. But even though the ouster of the King would confront the U. S. with the question of recognition of the regime, it is doubtful whether Congressional leaders would demand a break in relations with Greece. It is likely that some NATO countries would try to have Greece read out of their organization and that some Congressional leaders would view such an effort with equanimity. But it is unlikely that Congress would go beyond the demand for a cut-off of all aid to Greece.

Drafted by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Owens
	NEA/GRK - Mr. Mitchell
Cleared by:	NEA/GRK - Mr. Brewster
	NEA - Mr. Rockwell
	H - Mr. Kiselyak
S/S-S:RGHoudek, Rm. 7237, Ext. 4155	

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SECRET

Friday - September 8, 1967
9:30 a.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM W. W. ROSTOW

Free file

Ecuadorean PL-480 Loan: Special Factors Involved

When we informed Covey Oliver of your decision on the PL 480 loan to Ecuador, he expressed deep concern.

I told him to prepare a memorandum to you giving his reasons why he considers it important to make the loan. This is his message to you:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 9-12-91

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

246

~~SECRET~~

September 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


Subject: Ecuadorean PL-480 Loan: Special
Factors Involved

I am working very hard on trying to turn the Ecuadorean President's attitude toward the Alliance for Progress around. I cannot promise success, but I have fair hopes. Your Ambassador there has been active and helpful, and I have spent about three hours with the AID Director there on this topic while he was here.

The Ambassador, the Director and I believe that there is a reasonably good chance that if handled as a good teacher would handle a lagging and defensive pupil, we might bring President Arosemena up from the bottom of the Alliance class to the median level. (The Ambassador has written me (Eyes Only) that if allowed to drift and sour even more, this man might do something foolish, such as declaring a prominent Embassy official persona non grata. This latter should not be taken as a threat but as an indication of the President's basic psychological problem: he was a late starter on what the Alliance is all about, and he has yet to catch up with the other Presidents in understanding.)

Another factor, very important in Latin ways of looking at things, is that my able predecessor pretty well made what the Ecuadoreans consider a commitment about this PL-480 loan--at least it seems that he did not spell out to the Ecuadoreans all the steps involved in getting final approval.

A new Ecuadorean Ambassador will be presenting credentials to you on September 12. The denial of the loan will make it hard for me to carry on my special course for Ecuadoreans with him, as I had expected.


Covey T. Oliver

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-95
By cb, NARA Date 7-25-00

~~SECRET~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

Friday, September 8, 1967

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

Mr. President:

Today's situation report on

Vietnamese politics follows:

*Resfile
sent to Ranch
via wire*

~~SECRET EXD15~~

256

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 8, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-365

By mg, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Thieu-Ky Relationship

Bunker saw Thieu and Ky yesterday to discuss their appearance this weekend on "Meet the Press". At that time they seemed quite relaxed about the broadcast and understood its importance in terms of American opinion. They gave no hint, as reported in the press this morning, that Ky would not appear with Thieu on "Meet the Press". The Embassy has confirmed by phone that Ky will not appear on the program. The Embassy believes that Thieu did not want Ky to appear with him.

Thieu and Ky told Bunker no decision had yet been made on the Prime Minister, but that they were moving ahead with certain other Cabinet appointments. Bunker said that he did not pursue the matter at that time because it involves somewhat delicate questions between the two men.

We continue to get reports of a grouping of key generals organized for the purpose of resolving inevitable frictions between Thieu and Ky. These reports indicate that Ky dominates this group. However, there are also indications that some field-grade officers are dissatisfied of the creation of this grouping, partly because of the personalities in it and partly because they feel the military should stay out of politics.

Problem of Dzu

Thieu and Ky told Bunker that there was no question that Dzu had had substantial funds from unknown sources. They also pointed out that Dzu ran strongest in areas where VC strength was greatest. Semi-official Viet-Nam Press has announced that the police have uncovered evidence that the VC instructed voters to cast ballots for Dzu. The Embassy comments that the GVN through this and other means is trying to foreclose the possibility that others will cooperate with Dzu.

New Upper House

In its preliminary assessment of the new Upper House, Embassy Saigon comments that, although Catholics took a disproportionate share of the Upper House seats, many other

~~SECRET EXD15~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

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groups have some representation. The most important groups excluded are the Southerners who support Huong or Dzu and the Northern Buddhists. The Embassy believes that the Senate is likely to be independent of the government, though inclined to cooperate with it on many issues. It is likely to be strongly anti-communist and probably conservative on social and economic issues.

In a conversation with a senior Embassy officer, Foreign Minister Do attributed the Catholics' notable success to their effective organization and discipline. He said this was a real lesson for the Buddhists. Do said that the Lower House elections would be quite different since its members would be elected from individual constituencies and therefore represent a much broader spectrum of Vietnamese society. Do noted that the Presidential and Senate election results narrowed the selection of a Prime Minister to persons who were Buddhist, civilian, Southerner, and competent and experienced. He assumed that he was under consideration.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By WJ, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL LINDIS~~

RECEIVED
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SENT: 2:40 P.M.

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67 SEP 8 404 PM 2:44

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA397
OO WTZ10
DE WTE 1960

FROM WALT ROSOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67780

Per file

~~CONFIDENTIAL LINDIS~~

SEPTEMBER 6, 1967

SINCE YOU WILL BE MEETING DESAI AT NOON ON TUESDAY THE 12TH, I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WISH TO READ THIS CABLE FROM CHET BOWLES, WHICH CONFORMED TO THE GENERAL VIEW INCLUDING GEORGE WOODS' AND MINE.

"I ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE FORTHCOMING VISIT OF DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER MORARJI DESAI TO THE U.S. THIS WILL BE HIS FIRST VISIT TO THE U.S. IN HIS PRESENT POSITION AND IS ONE OF A NUMBER OF VISITS TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES HE HAS NOW EMBARKED ON IN THE PRESENT INTERVAL BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS, THE OTHER COUNTRIES BEING JAPAN, FROM WHENCE HE HAS JUST RETURNED, AND BRITAIN AND CANADA WHICH HE WILL COVER IN THE TRIP NOW BEING PLANNED.

MORARJI HAS EMERGED AS THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF STEADY PRAGMATIC THINKING AT THE UPPER LEVELS OF THE INDIAN CABINET, HE HAS BEEN, BY FAR, THE MOST EFFECTIVE SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE PARLIAMENT AND HAS BEEN ABLE TO DOMINATE THE PROCEEDINGS WITH AUTHORITY AND ASSURANCE, GAINING THE KIND OF RESPECT MRS. GANDHI THUS FAR HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ACHIEVE.

PRESERVATION COPY

EVERYONE KNOWS THAT MORARJI WOULD LIKE TO BE PRIME MINISTER, AND ALMOST EVERYONE KNOWS ALSO THAT HE DISAGREES WITH MRS. GANDHI ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT MATTERS, PRINCIPALLY INVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY. HOWEVER, HE HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED A LOYAL ATTITUDE, REFUSING TO AIR HIS DIFFERENCES WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND CONDUCTING HIMSELF IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE HIGH ETHICAL AND MORAL STANDARDS ON WHICH HE HAS ALWAYS PRIDED HIMSELF. DESPITE HIS FREQUENT PRICKLY CHARACTER AND OCCASIONAL HOLIER-THAN-THOU ATTITUDE, MORARJI IS PERHAPS THE ONE FIGURE LEFT OVER FROM THE NEHRU ERA WHO COMMANDS THE FULL RESPECT OF THE INDIAN PUBLIC AND WHOSE PERSONAL PROSITY AND HIGH PRINCIPLES ARE UNQUESTIONED. SHOULD THERE BE A SERIOUS CRISIS IN INTERNAL INDIAN AFFAIRS (WHICH WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE BUT WHICH CANNOT BE COMPLETELY RULED OUT IN VIEW OF THE DIVISIVE FORCES AT WORK BOTH AT THE CENTER AND IN MANY OF THE STATES), HE MIGHT VERY WELL PROVE TO BE THE RALLYING POINT FOR THE COHESIVE FORCES IN INDIA TO WHOM WE AND THE REST OF THE FREE WORLD WOULD BE LOOKING TO HOLD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER.

ON SPECIFICS, I THINK THAT YOU AND THE OTHERS HE WILL BE SEEING WILL BE ABLE TO TALK FRANKLY TO MORARJI AND RECEIVE FRANK ANSWERS IN RETURN. HE WILL NOT AGREE WITH EVERYTHING YOU SAY TO HIM, BUT HIS DISAGREEMENTS WILL BE CLEAR AND OPEN.

ON FOREIGN POLICY, MORARJI BELIEVES VERY FIRMLY THAT THE HOPE OF A STABLE ASIA RESIDES IN A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL UNDERSTANDING WITH JAPAN IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPHERE. HIS RECENT VISIT TO JAPAN, IN WHICH HE PURSUED THIS IDEA, WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL AND HAS ALREADY BROUGHT CONCRETE RESULTS IN TERMS OF INCREASED JAPANESE AID. MORARJI DID NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA'S ACTIONS IN THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND I THINK YOU WILL FIND HE HAS A MUCH CLEARER NOTION OF WHERE INDIA'S REAL INTERESTS LIE IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD THAN OFFICIAL INDIAN ACTIONS WOULD LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE. ABOVE ALL, MORARJI IS AWARE OF WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IN VIETNAM AND OF THE IMPORTANCE TO INDIA OF THAT EFFORT.

I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SPELL OUT THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH CHAGLA'S AND MRS. GANDHI'S POORLY THOUGHT OUT POSITIONS CAUSE US, BUT WITH A SENSITIVE REGARD FOR HIS OWN INTENSE LOYALTIES EVEN ON SUBJECTS WHERE HE PERSONALLY AGREES WITH US. IF WE HIT MRS. GANDHI DIRECTLY, WE WILL DEFEND HER EVEN THOUGH HE BELIEVES SHE IS ENTIRELY WRONG.

AS FINANCE MINISTER, IN ADDITION TO BEING DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, MORARJI HAS SOUGHT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST INFLATION AND TO BRING ABOUT SOME ORDER IN THE INDIAN BUDGET. HE WILL BE INTENSELY INTERESTED IN SOUNDING OUT THE PROSPECTS FOR AMERICAN AID, AND HE WILL URGE STRONGLY THAT FULL ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE BRIGHTENING ECONOMIC PROSPECTS RESULTING FROM THIS YEAR'S FAVORABLE MONSOON TO GIVE INDIA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS MUCH OF A BOOST AS POSSIBLE. TO THE EXTENT THAT HIS PLEADING OF INDIA'S CASE MIGHT MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OR OUR CONSORTIUM ATTITUDES, I HOPE HE WILL BE GIVEN FULL OPPORTUNITY FOR A HEARING.

THERE ARE CLEAR INDICATIONS THAT INDIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH FOOD POLICY ARE BEGINNING TO RECOGNIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY THE ANTICIPATED GOOD CROP FOR SUCH CONSTRUCTIVE CHANGES AS THE LOOSENING OF ZONAL RESTRICTIONS, THE CREATION OF BUFFER STOCKS, AND THE OTHER MEASURES WE HAVE BEEN URGING FOR SOME TIME AS NECESSARY COMPLEMENTS TO THE AGRICULTURAL STRATEGY WHICH HAS TAKEN HOLD HERE IN THE PAST TWO YEARS. I WOULD HOPE THAT MORARJI CAN BE EXPOSED TO A GOOD DOSE OF OUR THINKING ON THESE MATTERS COUCHED IN TERMS OF INDIA'S OWN INTERESTS. THE NEED FOR HIGH SUPPORT PRICES TO MAINTAIN AND FURTHER ENCOURAGE NEW PRODUCTION TECHNIQUES SHOULD ALSO BE STRESSED.

I BELIEVE THAT MORARJI WILL BE SEEKING A SIMPLIFICATION AND A LOOSENING OF SOME OF THE RESTRICTIVE FEATURES OF OUR AID ADMINISTRATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE MATTER OF LIMITATIONS PLACED ON NON-PROJECT LOANS. HE WILL WANT US TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO MAKE OUR AID MORE FLEXIBLE AND MORE EASILY ADAPTED TO INDIAN NEEDS, BUT HE WILL UNDERSTAND ARGUMENTS BASED ON OUR OWN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION, AND I BELIEVE HE WILL BE READY TO ENGAGE IN A JOINT SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DEVICES TO ACCOMMODATE BOTH PARTIES.

LIKE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT AND OFFICIALDOM WITH WHOM WE HAVE BEEN TALKING THESE PAST WEEKS, MORARJI IS AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS CURRENTLY AFFECTING THE U.S. AID PROGRAM AND THE INTENSE DIFFICULTIES AND PRESSURES UNDER WHICH THE PRESIDENT IS OPERATING. AS A REALISTIC STATESMAN, MORARJI KNOWS WHAT IT IS TO DEAL WITH PARLIAMENTS, AND AS FINANCE MINISTER, HE IS AWARE OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE U.S. THIS WILL BE A CRITICAL AND PERHAPS DECISIVE YEAR FOR INDIA AND FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH INDIA. MORARJI DESAI'S VISIT AFFORDS US AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO LAY A SOLID BASE OF UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION."

DTG: 081700Z SEP 67

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67779

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NHJ 94-364

By , NARA, Date 7-13-95

for file

67 SEP 8 PM 1:56

FRIDAY

SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

EQUADOREAN PL-480 LOAN: SPECIAL FACTORS INVOLVED

WHEN WE INFORMED CONVEY OLIVER OF YOUR DECISION ON THE PL480 LOAN TO ECUADOR, HE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN.

I TOLD HIM TO PREPARE A MEMORANDUM TO YOU GIVING HIS REASONS WHY HE CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE THE LOAN. THIS IS HIS MESSAGE TO YOU:

I AM WORKING VERY HARD ON TRYING TO TURN THE ECUADOREAN PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS AROUND. I CANNOT PROMISE SUCCESS, BUT I HAVE FAIR HOPES. YOUR AMBASSADOR THERE HAS BEEN ACTIVE AND HELPFUL, AND I HAVE SPENT ABOUT THREE HOURS WITH THE AID DIRECTOR THERE ON THIS TOPIC WHILE HE WAS HERE.

THE AMBASSADOR, THE DIRECTOR AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE THAT IF HANDLED AS A GOOD TEACHER WOULD HANDLE A LAGGING AND DEFENSIVE PUPIL, WE MIGHT BRING PRESIDENT AROSEMENA UP FROM THE BOTTOM OF THE ALLIANCE CLASS TO THE MEDIAN LEVEL. (THE AMBASSADOR HAS WRITTEN ME (EYES ONLY) THAT IF ALLOWED TO DRIFT AND SOUR EVEN MORE, THIS MAN MIGHT DO SOMETHING FOOLISH, SUCH AS DECLARING A PROMINENT EMBASSY OFFICIAL PERSONA NON GRATA. THIS LATTER SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN AS A THREAT BUT AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM: HE WAS A LATE STARTER ON WHAT THE ALLIANCE IS ALL ABOUT, AND HE HAS YET TO CATCH UP WITH THE OTHER PRESIDENTS IN UNDERSTANDING.)

ANOTHER FACTOR, VERY IMPORTANT IN LATIN WAYS OF LOOKING AT THINGS, IS THAT MY ABLE PREDECESSOR PRETTY WELL MADE WHAT THE ECUADOREANS CONSIDER A COMMITMENT ABOUT THIS PL-480 LOAN-- AT LEAST IT SEEMS THAT HE DID NOT SPELL OUT TO THE ECUADOREANS ALL THE STEPS INVOLVED IN GETTING FINAL APPROVAL.

A NEW ECUADOREAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE PRESENTING CREDENTIALS TO YOU ON SEPTEMBER 12. THE DENIAL OF THE LOAN WILL MAKE IT HARD FOR ME TO CARRY ON MY SPECIAL COURSE FOR ECUADOREANS WITH HIM, AS I HAD EXPECTED.

~~SECRET~~

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SEPT 1:38 P.M.

67 SEP 8 PM 1:44

28 / FRIDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67778

1967 SEP 8 17 38

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By ing, NARA, Date _____

SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

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SUBJECT: TROOPS FOR VIET-NAM: GOOD NEWS FROM KOREA

ON SEPTEMBER 4 KOREAN PRESIDENT PARK TOLD ANBASSADOR PORTER THAT HE FULLY AGREED WITH YOUR MESSAGES CONCERNING THE NEED FOR MORE TROOPS. PARK HAS ORDERED AN EARLY REPORT FROM HIS MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON HOW MANY TROOPS CAN BE RAISED IN KOREA FOR SERVICE IN VIET-NAM. PARK ADDED THAT HE, HIMSELF, WOULD JUDGE WHETHER THE PLAN SUBMITTED TO HIM "MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SITUATION." (PORTER BELIEVES PARK IS DETERMINED TO MEET YOUR REQUEST FOR MORE TROOPS. PERHAPS UP TO ANOTHER DIVISION.)

PARK STRESSED HIS NEED FOR HELP IN MEETING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE KOREAN CONTRIBUTION IN VIET-NAM. THE PUBLIC AS WELL AS IMPORTANT POLITICAL ELEMENTS ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE INCREASING BELLIGERENCE OF THE NORTH KOREANS. PARK NEEDS TO MEET THIS WORRY BY SHOWING THAT THE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IS BEING EFFECTIVELY HANDLED AND THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES ARE KEEPING FACE WITH THE NEEDS FOR MODERNIZATION. (PORTER TOLD PARK THAT YOU APPRECIATE THE NEED TO DEAL WITH PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION IN CONNECTION WITH MORE TROOPS AND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO ASSIST HIM IN DEALING WITH HIS PROBLEMS.)

PORTER BELIEVES THAT PARK WILL HAVE TO HAVE SOMETHING OF HIGHLY VISIBLE BENEFIT TO THE KOREAN ECONOMY AND ARMED FORCES. PORTER DOUBTS THAT THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTICS PACKAGE (MENTIONED DURING YOUR VISIT TO SEOUL) MEETS THE NEED. THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF HOW WE HELP THE KOREANS HELP US IN VIET-NAM IS NOW UNDER STUDY. PORTER WILL BE COMING IN SOON WITH SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.

IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE NO LEAK OF THE PROSPECTS FOR ADDITIONAL KOREAN ASSISTANCE, FOR THAT WOULD GREATLY COMPLICATE AND SLOW DOWN THE WHOLE PROCESS.

FINALLY, PORTER WISHES TO ENCOURAGE PARK'S SENSE OF DIRECT CONTACT WITH YOU ON THESE MATTERS. WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH STATE AND DEFENSE WHETHER THIS IS BEST DONE BY WRITTEN OR AN ORAL MESSAGE. WE WILL BE COMING TO YOU WITH A RECOMMENDATION.

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FROM WALT ROSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67783

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FRIDAY

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FRIDAY

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SUBJECT: STATE DEPARTMENT AFTERNOON CABLE SUMMARY

EAST ASIA

1. THAI ARMED FORCES STUDY

AMBASSADOR MARTIN REPORTS THAT THE THAI ARMED FORCES HAVE INITIATED A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF THEIR LONG-RANGE REQUIREMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CONSIDERING THE FEASIBILITY OF SENDING AN ADDITIONAL GROUND FORCE TO SOUTH VIETNAM. THE AMBASSADOR COMMENTS THAT THIS WILL DELAY THE PUBLIC COMMITMENT OF ADDITIONAL FORCES UNTIL THE PLAN CAN BE STUDIED.

2. OKINAWA SITUATION

EMBASSY TOKYO REPORTS A GROWING NATIONAL CONSENSUS, SUPPORTED BY THE OPPOSITION AND MEDIA, WHICH CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE REVERSION OF OKINAWA AND U.S. RETENTION OF BASES WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WITHOUT FREEDOM OF USE. PRIME MINISTER SATO IS NOT PLEASED AND HAS TRIED TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN'S SECURITY. FOREIGN MINISTER MIKI IS EXPECTED TO SEEK A READING OF U.S. ATTITUDES DURING HIS SCHEDULED VISIT TO HELP SATO DECIDE HOW TO HANDLE THE OKINAWA PROBLEM.

3. DZU'S PLANS

PEACE CANDIDATE DZU INFORMED EMBASSY SAIGON THAT THE EIGHT CIVILIAN CANDIDATES PLAN TO APPEAL THE ELECTION RESULTS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. SINCE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE ASSEMBLY WOULD ANNUL THE ELECTION, DZU SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS LEGAL STRUGGLE AND PREPARE HIMSELF FOR THE NEXT ELECTIONS.

PRESERVATION COPY

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-139
By SL NARA, Date 4-18-01

NEAR EAST

4. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

[REDACTED] WE HAVE INFORMED EMBASSY AMMAN THAT WE ARE STILL NOT IN A POSITION TO MOVE ON SUSPENDED GRANT MILITARY ASSISTANCE DUE TO PENDING ACTION ON THE FOREIGN AID BILL.

5. POSSIBLE GREEK INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

EMBASSY ATHENS HAS RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE GREEK MILITARY JUNTA MAY OFFER TO TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER DEMIREL A MODIFIED ACHESON PLAN FOR CYPRUS, INCLUDING A SOVEREIGN TURKISH BASE ON THE ISLAND. THE EMBASSY COMMENTS THAT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS WOULD ACCEPT SUCH A SOLUTION.

AMERICAN REPUBLICS

6. US-BRAZIL RELATIONS

IN AN OFF THE RECORD INTERVIEW WITH CARL ROWAN, BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MAGALHAES PINTO SAID THAT BRAZIL HAS LOST FAITH IN THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. PINTO ADDED THAT THE U.S. HAS SPENT TOO MUCH TIME WORRYING ABOUT SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND TOO LITTLE TIME TRYING TO PRODUCE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
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By ip, NARA, Date 7-13-95
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EXDIS

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SENT 10:07 AM
TO RANCH

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67775

~~SECRET EXDIS~~ (CANBERRA 1044)

HERewith HOLT FORESHADOWS HELP IN VIET-NAM AND COMMENTS ON
THE ELECTION.

PLEASE PASS PERSONALLY TO PRESIDENT

1. I WAS CALLED LAST NIGHT TO HOME OF PRIME MINISTER
HOLT FOR GENERAL DISCUSSION OF VIET-NAM SITUATION.
HASLUCK AND BUNTING ALSO PRESENT. HOLT BEGAN BY
SAYING HE WAS QUITE PLEASED WITH REPORTS HE HAD RE-
CEIVED ON VIETNAMESE ELECTIONS. THEY HAD GONE BETTER
THAN HE HAD EXPECTED AND WE SHOULD ALL BE ENCOURAGED
ABOUT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS THERE. HE THEN REVIEWED
AGAIN FOR ME AUSTRALIA'S CONCERN OVER MALAYSIA-
SINGAPORE AREA AND AGAIN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT
AND FRUSTRATION OVER BRITISH ACTIONS AND PARTICULARLY
THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PLANS. HE HAD THOUGHT
WHEN HE LAST LEFT LONDON THEY WOULD NOT MAKE SUCH
STATEMENTS.

2. HE STRESSED AGAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S FEELING THAT
THEY COULD NOT UPSET THEIR PRESENT BALANCE OF MILITARY
FORCES WITHOUT KNOWING JUST WHAT WOULD BE REQUIRED OF
THEM. HE SAID THEY NEEDED MORE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR
THINKING AND WISHES OF OUR GOVERNMENT REGARDING
STABILIZING SEA AREA FOR FUTURE. HE THEN TURNED TO
BUDGET MATTERS AND RISING COSTS OF DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
PURCHASED FROM US. HE SAID THEIR BUDGET PROBLEMS HAD
GOTTEN SOMEWHAT OUT OF HAND AND THEY FACED SOME RESULT-
ING PROBLEMS. WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT IS PLEASED WITH
PURCHASES AND WITH BOTH LETTER AND SPIRIT OF ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR THEM, THEY HAVE RESULTED IN FINANCIAL PROBLEMS.
TREASURER MCMAHON WILL BE IN WASHINGTON OCTOBER 4 AND
WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO TALK TO OUR OFFICIALS ABOUT
POSSIBILITY OF SPREADING PAYMENTS OVER LONGER PERIOD
TIME. THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT PAYMENT AND
RESULTING INCREASED INTEREST WOULD NOT BE MADE IN FULL.
THERE WOULD MERELY BE ATTEMPT TO SPREAD COSTS INTO
SUBSEQUENT BUDGET YEARS. HE SAW THIS AS PURELY
TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENT.

PRESERVATION COPY

3. TURNING AGAIN TO VIET-NAM, HE SAID HE WANTED PRESIDENT TO KNOW THAT GOA WAS NOT UNMINDFUL OF HIS PROBLEMS AND HIS HIGHEST REGARD AND AFFECTION FOR OUR COUNTRY. WE ARE WITH HIM. THEY ARE NOT MERELY SITTING HERE WAITING FOR SOMETHING FAVORABLE TO HAPPEN BUT ARE WITH HIM ALL THE WAY. THEY WANT TO BE USEFUL AND RESPONSIBLE ALLIES. WANT HIM TO KNOW THAT AFTER LONG AND HARD DISCUSSIONS IN CABINET, THEY WILL COME THROUGH WITH ADDITIONAL HELP IN VIET-NAM. WILL PLAN TO MAKE "SUBSTANTIAL COMMITMENT" OF TROOPS AND OTHER ASSISTANCE ALONG LINES OF OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR MEETING SUCH REQUIREMENTS IN VIET-NAM. THEY THOUGHT ACTION THEY PLAN WILL BE PLEASING TO PRESIDENT AND HIS ADVISORS AND WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN SHOWING AMERICAN PEOPLE THERE IS FIRM FRIEND AND ALLY IN THIS PART OF WORLD.

4. AS TO TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT, HOLT SAID THEY WERE MOST ANXIOUS THAT THERE BE NO STATEMENT OR SPECULATION ON OUR SIDE ABOUT INCREASED GOA COMMITMENT IN VIEW FORTHCOMING ELECTION IN CALIFORNIA (SEPTEMBER 30) AND COMING SENATE ELECTIONS (WHICH HE SAID WOULD DEFINITELY TAKE PLACE LATE NOVEMBER). HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THESE ELECTORAL PROBLEMS THAT NOTHING BE SAID PUBLICLY UNTIL AFTER LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS COMPLETED IN VIET-NAM AND NEW GOVERNMENT AUSTRALIA WOULD WANT TO BE IN PUBLIC POSITION OF RESPONDING TO REQUEST OF THAT GOVERNMENT WHEN IT WAS FUNCTIONING.

5. HOLT SAID HASLUCK WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON EARLY OCTOBER (WE WILL CONFIRM DATE LATER) AND HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO SEE SECRETARY RUSK. HASLUCK WOULD INFORM RUSK FULLY GOA PLANS.

6. HOLT'S ATTITUDE AND WAY I WAS RECEIVED MOST GRATIFYING AND REASSURING AND I WAS LEFT WITH CONFIDENCE THAT THEY PLAN TO BE AS COOPERATIVE AS THEY FEEL THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES ALLOW IN MEETING VIET-NAM NEEDS WHICH WE HAVE OUTLINED TO THEM. CLARK

DTG: 081327Z SEP 67

~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67776

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WHCA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364

By 48, NARA, Date 7-13-95

1967 SEP 8 14 57

SENT RANCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10:57 Am

SEPTEMBER 8, 1967

SECRETARY RUSK REQUESTS YOUR APPROVAL FOR FIVE INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS WHO ARE PLANNING TO COME TO THIS COUNTRY THIS FALL DURING THE TIME OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION. I AM POUCHING HIS MEMORANDUM TO YOU, BUT BECAUSE TWO OF THE VISITORS WILL SOON BE ENROUTE, I THOUGHT I SHOULD PUT THIS DECISION TO YOU AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

THERE ARE A TOTAL OF THIRTEEN CHIEFS OF STATE OR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT NOW KNOWN TO BE COMING TO THE UNITED STATES DURING THIS PERIOD. OF THESE ONLY FIVE APPEAR TO WARRANT YOUR TIME. THERE MAY BE OTHERS LATER ON, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXERCISE THE GREATEST RESTRAINT IN CONSIDERING THESE.

AN OFFICE MEETING WOULD SUFFICE FOR THREE OF THESE VISITORS. IN THE TWO OTHER INSTANCES, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU ALSO PROVIDE A SMALL LUNCHEON FOR REASONS WHICH EXPLAINED BELOW.

WE HAVE CHECKED THESE DATES AGAINST YOUR CALENDAR AND FIND THEM CLEAR, EXCEPT AS NOTED. IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THERE ARE POSSIBLE CONFLICTS, IF YOU WILL APPROVE THE MEETINGS IN PRINCIPLE, WE CAN REVISE THE DATES SUBJECT TO YOUR FINAL APPROVAL.

YOUR APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED:

PRIME MINISTER JONATHAN OF LESOTHO

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22

ALTHOUGH LESOTHO IS THE SMALLEST AND PERHAPS MOST INSIGNIFICANT OF THE AFRICAN STATES, PRIME MINISTER JONATHAN HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO VISIT WASHINGTON. UNDER JONATHAN'S LEADERSHIP LESOTHO HAS SUPPORTED THE US AT THE UN ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES, (E.G., THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT) AND HAS RESISTED COMMUNIST OVERTURES AS WELL AS SOUTH AFRICAN PRESSURE. IF YOU RECEIVE OTHER UN VISITORS, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN A REFUSAL TO JONATHAN.

APPROVE OFFICE VISIT-----

SPEAK TO ME-----

PRIME MINISTER BORG OLIVIER OF MALTA WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4

ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE FOR BORG OLIVIER TO MEET WITH YOU IN NOVEMBER, 1966 BUT THESE WERE CANCELLED DUE TO YOUR ILLNESS. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN A STAUNCH FRIEND AND A

PRESERVATION COPY

MEETING WITH HIM WOULD FURTHER OUR GOOD RELATIONS BY
STRENGTHENING THE PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS WHICH HE REPRESENTS.

OFFICE-VISIT APPROVED----- SPEAK TO ME -----

PRIME MINISTER SHEARER OF JAMAICA

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13

SHEARER IS EMERGING AS ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING LEADERS IN THE
CARIBBEAN. HIS EXPERIENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS LIMITED,
HOWEVER, AND A SHORT MEETING WITH YOU WOULD BE OF INESTIMABLE
VALUE IN CLARIFYING HIS THINKING ON IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES. I UNDERSTAND YOU MIGHT BE OUT OF TOWN OCTOBER 13. IF SO,
SHEARER COULD COME A DAY OR TWO EARLIER.

APPROVE OFFICE VISIT-----

SPEAK TO ME-----

PRIME MINISTER SOUVANNA PHOUMA OF LAOS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 20

BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING USEFULNESS OF SOUVANNA'S CONTINUED
AGREEMENT TO OUR SPECIAL BARRIER ARRANGEMENTS IN LAOS IT IS ESPEC-
IALLY IMPORTANT THAT YOU CONTINUE A CLOSE, PERSONAL DIALOGUE
WITH HIM. ACCORDINGLY, I RECOMMEND THAT YOU HOST A SMALL LUNCHEON
IN ADDITION TO AN OFFICE VISIT. THE GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE IS
OCTOBER 19-21 AND WE COULD ADJUST THE DATE OF SOUVANNA'S VISIT
ACCORDINGLY.

APPROVE OFFICE VISIT-----
LUNCHEON-----

SPEAK TO ME-----

PRESIDENT AHIDJO OF CAMEROON

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23

AHIDJO IS A YOUNG AFRICAN LEADER OF GREAT POLITICAL SKILL. HE HAS
PREVAILED AGAINST THE RADICAL AFRICAN POINT OF VIEW TO PROVIDE
A PRO-WESTERN SLANT TO CAMEROON'S FORMAL NON-ALIGNMENT. DURING
HIS RECENT STATE VISITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE YUGOSLAVIA HE
REFUSED TO BE USED AS A TOOL OF ANTI-US PROPAGANDA. AFTER A
CONTINUOUS PERIOD OF SMOOTH RELATIONS WITH US, THE CAMEROONIANS
FEEL A BIT NEGLECTED. AHIDJO IS KEENLY AWARE OF YOUR RECEPTION
OF BANDA, HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY AND DIORI. BECAUSE IT WILL MEAN
AS MUCH FOR AHIDJO TO HAVE LUNCH WITH YOU AS TO COME AT ALL,
I RECOMMEND THAT YOU DO SO.

IF YOU WISH TO AVOID SCHEDULING THIS MEETING ON MONDAY, IT
COULD BE DONE ON TUESDAY INSTEAD.

APPROVE OFFICE VISIT-----
LUNCHEON-----

SPEAK TO ME-----

FOR YOUR REFERENCE IN CONSIDERING THE ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING
VISITORS ALREADY SCHEDULED DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION:

PRESIDENT SARAGAT, ITALY	SEPT. 18-19
PRESIDENT DIORI, NIGER	SEPT. 26
PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW, SINGAPORE	OCT. 17
PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ, MEXICO	OCT. 26-28

DTG 081328Z SEPT 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPS 830

PRESERVATION COPY

Pres file

Friday, September 8, 1967

Mr. President:

The Danish Ambassador called today to tell me the following.

1. Prime Minister and Mrs. Krag will be coming over to the United Nations General Assembly. They will be in Washington September 26-28. On September 27 Krag will be speaking at a National Press Club meeting. The Danish Ambassador was instructed to inform me that Prime Minister Krag feels that he has "misused U. S. hospitality." You, in particular, and the U. S. Government, in general, have given him more time than he deserves. There is no problem he wishes to raise with the Administration or with you. He and his wife will stay at the Danish Embassy in Washington as private persons.

2. He wanted you, as a matter of courtesy, to know he will be here; but, knowing the burdens upon you and the extraordinary courtesy you have always showed to him, he wishes you to know you should feel perfectly free to ignore his presence in Washington in those days.

Somehow I suspect you would like to have them in for a drink or something; but it is clearly your move and he has sent a message -- with, I am sure, sincerity -- worthy of the gentleman he is.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 7, 1967
5:50 p.m.

L. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's report
on his latest briefing of Gen. Eisenhower.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb: 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 9-12-91



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

33a

6 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is the memorandum for record of my meeting with General Eisenhower this morning. I passed on to him your thinking on major problems as you indicated it to me on Saturday. He was deeply appreciative, particularly with respect to the Russians and the Vietnamese war, and the recent press reports of controversy involving the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Two points that he emphasized were, first, that the approach to the water problems in the Middle East should be a single plan, as regards the Jordan River and nuclear desalinization plants, and that our strategy for Vietnam should continue to reject the "enclave" concept.

He seemed to be in excellent physical condition, and was in excellent spirits.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority per declassification of attachment
By rgldh, NARA, Date 10-3-91



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

336

6 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 6 September 1967

I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office in Gettysburg this morning.

I first brought to his attention the points about which the President talked to me on Saturday afternoon. The first pertained to the role the Russians might play in working toward a cessation of bombing in North Vietnam and concurrent satisfactory action on the part of the North Vietnamese during talks opened at that time. Such talks would, of course, have to be productive and there could be no cheating in the form of increased infiltration. I added that the President had noted that, while the Russians have given indications of wanting to see the Vietnamese war resolved, he will, of course, in fact watch them very closely to see whether their statements are borne out in what they actually do. General Eisenhower was keenly interested. He commented that this report suggested the Russians were being more responsive than had been indicated immediately following the Glassboro meetings. I commented that the Russians must, of course, recognize their vulnerability to attack by the Chinese communists, using the Vietnam war as an issue, against Russian leadership of the world communist movement. This would tend to make them very cautious in applying any pressure to the North Vietnamese. I also recalled to him the question Secretary Rusk had put to the Russians, "If the United States were to stop the bombing, what would you, the Russians, be prepared to do?" General Eisenhower found this a very interesting approach. I next showed him the copy of extracts of statements indicating the impact of bombing in North Vietnam (dated 8/31/67)(copy attached).

I then reported the President's comments that, despite the recent reports in the press indicating controversy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the bombing, the President in fact considered that relations with them are harmonious and sound -- and that there are in fact only some 40 out of more than 300 targets recommended by the Chiefs on which approval for attack had not yet been given. I added that it is my impression that the President has great respect for the advice he is receiving

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Authority NLE MR 77-148 #6
By ry/dck, NARA, Date 10-3-91

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from the Chiefs, and feels that their attitude toward his decisions and responsibilities is cooperative and constructive. Certainly the Chiefs are not trying to undercut the President's position, nor take initiatives opposing or attacking his policies. General Eisenhower welcomed this report. He reverted to his view that much of the problem relates to past timing, i. e., the rate at which important targets were authorized for attack.

I next reported that the President had stressed his strong conviction and desire that General Eisenhower should be kept fully informed not only of the facts relating to major national problems with which the President is concerned, but also the thinking of the President and the administration on these problems. General Eisenhower indicated that he appreciated being kept informed, and reiterated his view that the proper course is to pass any reactions or suggestions that he has confidentially to the President.

I next covered with General Eisenhower the memorandum furnished me by Secretary Udall for this purpose on "Water for Peace" in the Middle East (copy attached). He was especially interested in the provision that the problem of providing water should be attacked via a single plan in two phases -- the first the development of the Jordan River in an optimum way without regard to damage to any nation's rights or plans, and the second the generating of new water supplies to meet the needs of the initially sacrificed nations. He put strong emphasis on the need for a single water plan -- if the two phases are not completely and irreversibly connected from the beginning, the result is likely to be squabbling over the Jordan River phase of the plan which would, as in the past, frustrate the whole effort. An inherent part of his thinking is that the project should be of such magnitude, that the proposal would be bound to gain the attention of the Arab people, who would then exert a pressure on their governments. I commented on recent indications that the Arabs may be trending toward a more moderate position. Even Nasser was at least talking more in these terms at the recent Arab summit meeting. General Eisenhower told me that, even since my call to him a few days ago reporting the President's views, he has been advising his friends that the President welcomes further discussion on this matter and it should be kept on a bipartisan basis.

I next showed General Eisenhower a chart (copy attached) given to me by the President indicating the number of convictions of organized crime and gambling figures as a result of FBI investigations. The key point brought out by the chart is that, in terms of actual results

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achieved, the trend is clearly upward -- by a factor of 3 between 1964 and 1967.

I next covered a number of specific items, most of which relate to previous discussions by phone with General Eisenhower. The first item was on our actions in behalf of our prisoners held by North Vietnam and the Viet Cong. I left with him public statements contained in a recent White House press release and in a State Department information sheet furnished to our posts abroad. I also told him of the "Joint Personnel Recovery Center" established by General Westmoreland, of coordinating responsibilities assigned to Mr. Warnke in OSD, and of typical diplomatic efforts through third countries and with the international Red Cross in behalf of our prisoners.

I next referred to recent aircraft losses in North Vietnam, and told him that analysis does not indicate any new factor -- rather it is the type of loss rate to be expected from increased attacks in this highly defended area.

I next reviewed the general trend of military operations in South Vietnam, referring to the report given by General Johnson on his recent return (which I had covered by phone a week or so ago). Also I covered the revolutionary development report for July, contained in a long message recently received. Finally, I described the current status of development of the anti-infiltration system which is to go into operation in the November-December period in the terrain areas close to the 17th parallel extending westward from the coastal plain of South Vietnam into the personnel and vehicle infiltration routes in Laos.

In further discussion relating to the Vietnamese war, General Eisenhower emphasized that he sees no merit in an "enclave" strategy, and has so advised various people who have written to him on this subject. He said he thought the South Vietnamese government should constantly stress to its people that the Americans were there simply to help them achieve independence, and when this has been achieved, the Americans will leave. We discussed briefly the significance of Dzu's unexpectedly large vote in last Sunday's elections. I told him that this is still being analyzed. However, it seems significant to me that Dzu's total amounted to some 17% -- in other words nearly 83% went to other candidates. The total Thieu, Huong and Suu vote was in excess of 50%.

Finally, General Eisenhower and I discussed at length a number

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of aspects relating to racial problems, riots in the cities and severe social and welfare problems, and unemployment and lack of education among the Negro population. He cited data regarding the age and educational level of those who have participated in the riots, which he has been studying. I told him of some of the key points of discussions I have recently had on the subject with academicians and others expert in these fields incident to our coverage of demographic, economic and social factors at the National War College. I told him my own study suggests the effectiveness of studying these problems over a time span of a generation or two, covering the period in which the large-scale movement from southern rural areas into the central cities occurred and looking forward for a generation to determine what can be seen, and what can be done, in terms of improved education, employment and individual status and responsibility. He indicated agreement that it is perhaps better to have these problems out in the open rather than festering and building up explosive suppressed resentment.

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A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

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(8/31/67)

"All industrial plants had been evacuated from urban areas. The 38 spinning plant outside of Hanoi was running at 20% of its original capacity. "

Bombing "has resulted in the large scale evacuation of the factories and population. "

"Since I have been unemployed since March (1967), I grow deeper in debt. With no income and no reasonable work, I have volunteered to work in the forest, but while waiting for action on my application, I have been without a cent of income. "

Nam Ha, Fruit Company, June 30, 1967. "Moreover, the war is spreading all over the country and no one can feel secure in his life. Who knows whether or not I will die in the next minute. "

Hanoi, June 29, 1967. "Due to the difficult war situation, nourishing food is lacking and medicines are rare. Our only solution is to try and bear it. "

Ha Bac, June 15, 1967. "As to the war situation, it is very hard. Living conditions are very poor because we have to reserve everything for the front. Our food is now composed of 70% rice and 30% wheat flour, and you know the nutritional value of wheat flour is very low. Living is very difficult. "

Huong Phuong, May 30, 1967. "Because we have been evacuated medicine is rather rare, and on the other hand, because of the war, food is not sufficient. Since we are engaged in a war, want is the common situation of everybody. "

Viet Bac, May 20, 1967. " An evacuated student: In general our activities and studies are getting more burdensome. "

Extension of the Water for Peace Concept
to the Middle East Situation

General Problem

The present unsettled conditions in the Middle East can be attributed in large measure to the inadequacy of water and existing water resource development facilities in the Israel-Jordan-Syria area adjacent to the Jordan River.

The Jordan River and its major tributary, the Yarmouk which forms a segment of the border between Jordan and Syria, cannot meet the designs therein of the three nations. The total average annual flow of the rivers may be as much as 500,000 acre-feet shy of recent estimates of the quantities required to meet projected future water needs.

Israeli plans for use of Jordan River water center on the upstream diversion and conveyance to coastal areas and to the northern Negev Desert. Practically all planned use of Jordan River water in Israel is outside the basin of origin.

Syria and Jordan contemplate use of Jordan River water on the lands in the Jordan Valley adjacent to the river. Syrian use would be made on lands lying to the east of the river above Lake Tiberias. Jordan usage would be made on lands below Lake Tiberias to both the east and west of the river down to the terminus of the Jordan River at the Dead Sea. During the recent hostilities, Israel occupied all of the Jordanian land lying to the west of the river.

Many plans for development on the Jordan have evolved over the past three decades. Some plans involved optimal development and use of available waters on a regional basis without regard to national boundaries. Other plans envisioned partial development by, and use within, a single country. The regional plans failed to be implemented because of the inability of the nations involved to reach amicable distributions of the water supply and associated costs. Several national plans have been partially implemented, most notably by Israel, but such physical development as has occurred has also created international irritations occasionally leading to armed conflict.

It can be taken for granted that to be acceptable to all affected countries, any plan for development of the waters of the Jordan River must include generation of a new water supply sufficient to assure that each country will have available a supply equivalent to its maximum presumed right to and plan for use of Jordan River water.

Three sources of new water supplies that should be considered include:

1. Augmentation of natural supplies through weather modification..
2. Importation of water to the Jordan River basin by transbasin diversion.
3. Desalting of saline surface and/or underground waters.
4. Waste water reuse and improved efficiency.

Political Factors

There is an urgent requirement that the more than 1,000,000 Moslems displaced by the 1948, 1956, and recent hostilities be relocated from the present refugee camp environment to an environment that will permit them to lead a productive life. It is understood that most of these displaced persons were formerly engaged in agrarian endeavors in Palestine. This suggests that relocation to an area where agricultural enterprises predominate would present the most favorable promise of success.

Both Israel and Jordan realize the necessity for successful relocation of the displaced persons, and both nations could be expected to support rational plans to achieve this objective--Israel because of an obligation to provide compensation for the lands formerly occupied by the displaced; Jordan because the displaced persons are largely subjects of the Kingdom.

The most obvious areas to relocate such a large number of agriculturally oriented people are in extensive and fertile Jordan River valley or in the arable higher plateaus adjacent to the valley. Apparent barriers to relocation in that area include the inability to

develop an agricultural base without irrigation and the corollary paucity of developed water to support extensive irrigation.

Obviously, relocation based upon development of irrigated agriculture will involve not only careful planning but extensive construction of physical works. Both require significant periods of time to complete. After nearly twenty years of delay and concurrent expansion of the displaced person problem, however, any permanently effective solution would require comparable time periods for completion.

Planning and financing assistance supported by the United States as an extension of the President's "Water for Peace" concept might well be the catalyst that would bring the Israelis and Jordanians together in a mutual effort to help solve this pressing displaced persons problem.

Summary of Alternative Water Resource Development Schemes

The solution of the Jordan River water problem and the displaced persons problem lends itself to a comprehensive solution that can be logically implemented in two stages.

The first stage would be the development of the Jordan River to meet its maximum capability, and the second stage would be the supplementing of the naturally available Jordan River supply with water from new sources. The assurance of following through with the second stage is imperative to acceptance of the first stage.

Neither Israel nor Jordan can be expected to reach unanimity on any plan that does not include positive assurance that near-term development of the Jordan by either will not prejudice the long-term availability of water for the other. Once that assurance has been had, the planning and construction of the first stage could proceed.

The required water needed in addition to the natural runoff of the Jordan River has been estimated to be in the range of up to 500,000 acre-feet. The combination of maximum planned development by Israel and Jordan exceeds the available supply by 300,000 to 350,000 acre-feet annually, and Syrian plans contemplate additional annual use of about 100,000 acre-feet.

Weather Modification

There is every reason to believe that some of this additional water need can be provided by weather modification procedures to increase precipitation in the high elevation headwaters of the Jordan River in Syria and Israel. The Dan, Hasbani, and Banias Rivers, which rise at elevations of about 4,000 to 9,000 feet and subsequently join to form the Jordan River, together produce about 500,000 acre-feet of runoff annually. Experimental random seeding operations by Israel indicate that precipitation can be increased in this area by up to 20 percent. Successful seeding of that magnitude could therefore be expected to generate about 100,000 acre-feet of new water annually at modest cost. The actual seeding operation, however, would probably have to be conducted with the knowledge and mutual consent of the nations of Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordan, since it might conceivably affect all four.

Transbasin Diversion

The Litani River which rises in and flows through Lebanon to the Mediterranean Sea provides a physically practical source of imported water supply for the Jordan River. Such a diversion, however, would require the highest order of water statesmanship on the part of Israel, Jordan, and Syria, as well as adoption of a truly humanitarian posture by Lebanon.

The Litani River has been developed to harness its hydroelectric potential and to provide a measure of flood control. It has been estimated that between 550,000 and 600,000 acre-feet of Litani River water is surplus to Lebanese demands for beneficial consumptive use from that River and would be available for export. It is reasonable to presume either that compensation for power production foregone or replacement power would be a prerequisite to any diversion that adversely affected the hydroelectric potential of the Litani River.

If politically and economically feasible, the importation of water from the Litani River could provide all of the additional water supply now projected to be needed in the Jordan River.

Desalting

The additional water required to fulfill the objectives of the several nations with plans for use of Jordan River water can be supplied by

desalting. The total annual deficiency of 500,000 acre-feet would require a desalting capability of approximately 500 MGD.

This capacity would most probably be best developed at several plants located on the Mediterranean Sea, or by a combination of plants on the coast and at interior locations. The interior plants could be utilized to desalt saline ground water or irrigation return flows prior to entry to the Dead Sea.

Desalting plants located on the Mediterranean seacoast could provide the water supply, in excess of Jordan River capability, to the coastal areas of Israel and to the lands of the northern Negev. They would also lend themselves to economic water exchange plans, under which the Jordan River water would be used within the Jordan River Valley, with the requirements outside the valley satisfied by desalting plants.

There is a possibility that saline ground water exists in the northern Negev Desert area in quantities sufficient to justify a desalting plant in that area also. Maximum efficiency in this case could be obtained by blending the desalted water with other low quality supplies including irrigation return flows.

Projections of power requirements in the Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon region suggest that dual purpose water and power plants would be a more complete and economic approach than single purpose water plants. This is especially true if use is made of waste flare gas from oil explorations. It is estimated that the use of flare gas as a heat source, if it can be made available for this purpose, would provide a reduction in desalted water cost of as much as 40 percent over conventional fossil or nuclear fuel fired plants.

Waste water reuse and improved efficiency

As mentioned earlier, the Jordan River terminates in the Dead Sea where the salinity level is more than twice that of sea water and is therefore lost for further beneficial use. The recovery of minerals from the Dead Sea is a major factor in Jordan's economy, and the export of recovered potash amounts to 30 percent of Jordan's total foreign sales. Depletion of the flow from the less saline Jordan River would enhance rather than degrade this resource. For this reason the maximum practical reuse of the waters of the Jordan

River is warranted. Also, as indicated earlier in the discussion of desalting possibilities, such reuse could be carried far beyond the normal by blending with desalted water.

From projections of water requirements and accompanying irrigated acreage, it is apparent that much more effective use of water is made by Israel than by Jordan. Undoubtedly, even greater efficiency can be achieved by Israel if appropriate economic and social incentives are present. Because Jordanian agricultural practices are not as well advanced, there is reason to believe that, with improved efficiency, either the total water need can be less than projected or the amount of land that can be developed can be greater than projected.

It is not rational to presume, however, that sophisticated and efficient water use practices can be implemented in a short time, either for existing or proposed developments.

Recommendation

Two major factors contribute to the international unrest in the Middle East, (1) the inability of the Jordan River to meet the combined demands of the countries of Israel, Jordan and Syria, and (2) the more than 1,000,000 refugees and displaced persons resulting from hostilities since the Israeli war of liberation in 1948 and subsequent disorders.

Because these problem factors are so closely interwoven, a comprehensive solution to either will have an impact on the other. It is suggested that rather than solve the problems separately, a single plan be developed that would not only augment the water supply of the Jordan River but also permit the relocation of the essentially agrarian oriented refugees to a productive agricultural life.

A two-phased approach is called for. The first phase would encompass an immediate start in developing the Jordan River to the optimum for utilization in the most urgent areas and manner without regard to whether such development would do damage to any nation's assumed rights to or plans for use of that supply. This would include the expedited construction of urgently needed storage and distribution systems. The first phase should not be delayed for conciliation of varying views on the physical components of the second phase.

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The second phase would involve generating new water supplies to meet the less immediate and foregone demands of the initially sacrificing nations.

Obviously, this scheme would require positive assurance that both phases will in fact be accomplished. Such assurances require the underwriting of a third party with the influence and affluence to guarantee that both phases will indeed be accomplished.

The concept embodied in the President's program for "Water for Peace" is admirably suited to bridge this gap between continued international dissension and affirmative international cooperation.

The contribution by the United States should embrace the provision of technological assistance of a supervisory or managerial nature in planning, designing and constructing the physical works, and assurance of the political and financial support required to guarantee accomplishment in full of both phases of the recommended plan. The latter contribution could consist of low interest loans or similar financial incentives as required to engender multinational support for and ability to participate in the plan.


It must be recognized that there are many associated problems which are not dealt with herein. These include the timing of developments for the several nations, division of costs and cost repayment, and provision of financial assistance to those countries or areas receiving a more expensive water supply than might result from development of claimed rights to Jordan River water. While these problems will have to be faced forthrightly, it is beyond the scope of this recommendation to delve deeply into them.

It is recommended that you explore the feasibility of advancing this plan, as may be appropriate.

Department of the Interior
August 24, 1967

**CONVICTIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME
AND GAMBLING FIGURES
AS RESULT OF FBI INVESTIGATION**

FISCAL YEARS 1963-1967



*More than 330 others currently awaiting prosecution



Limited Official Use

Thursday - September 7, 1967
2:00 p.m.

34
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that you receive the Latin American Foreign Ministers for a short informal visit at 12:30 p.m. on Saturday, September 23.

The Ministers will be in town for an OAS meeting to consider Venezuela's complaint against Cuba.

When the Ministers met here in July 1964 for another OAS conference on Cuba, they made a brief courtesy call on you.

Your involvement with the Foreign Ministers need not go beyond a courtesy call unless you want to do something extra. In that case you might want to host the lunch which Secretary Rusk is planning for Friday, September 22.

W. W. Rostow

Approve courtesy call
on September 23

_____.

Prefer luncheon on
September 22

_____.

Speak to me

_____.

Limited Official Use

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Call by the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the other American
Republics, Saturday, September 23 at
12:30 P.M.

Recommendation:

That you receive the Foreign Ministers of the other
American Republics for a short informal visit at 12:30 P.M.
on Saturday, September 23, 1967.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The final sessions of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the problem of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere will be held at the Pan American Union September 22 and 23, with the personal attendance of virtually all of the Foreign Ministers. Although the United States Government is not technically the host since the Meeting is being held at OAS headquarters, it would be desirable for you to receive the Foreign Ministers for a brief courtesy call as you did on the occasion of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation in July 1964. I plan to host a luncheon for them on Friday, September 22.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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