

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
5:55 p. m.

60

MR. PRESIDENT:

There is no mystery about Gavin's going to Saigon.

Secretary McNamara talked it over with Westy. They both thought it a good idea.

Secretary McNamara's reasoning was as follows:

- his view of Gavin is even lower than yours;
- but Gavin is a very, very old friend of Westmoreland's, and, in Bob's view, Westy -- as well as the whole working environment of Viet Nam -- is bound to have some restraining influence on Gavin.

Westy intends to give him the fullest possible exposure to hard facts, from which it will be difficult for Gavin to walk away afterwards.

There is no reason, in Secretary McNamara's view, that his connection with the invitation should become known.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

DETERMINED TO BE UNCLASSIFIED  
MARKING CANCELED PER  
SEC. 1.3 AND ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD OF  
MAR 16 1983

BY kg ON 10-4-91

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
5:15 p.m.

61  
*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith

1. Amb. Locke's notes on the observers, as dictated to us by Bill Stinson from Hawaii.
2. The material you requested for the 6:00 p.m. meeting.

W. W. Rostow

3:15 p.m., Tuesday, September 5, 1967

61a

Dictated by Bill Stinson from Hawaii

1. Without qualification I believe the observer trip a great success. All observers commented favorably on the election. No observer saw evidence of cheating. All observers commented favorably on the briefing, organization of the trip, and care taken of them.
2. Gov. Hughes and Gov. McCall have issued excellent statements to the Associated Press. All observers favorably impressed by the mechanical aspects of the election and policy procedure and the mechanical protection against fraud, some commenting publicly on this. Particularly, Barr, Munroe, Hughes, McCall, Guy commented on these. Munroe commented they are more airtight than most places in the U.S. Many observers questioned opposition leaders and poll watchers and opposition candidates, particularly Knight, Patterson and McCall and Guy and Hughes and Young and none were told by these watchers of any ~~illegality~~ irregularity. The only incident at the polling place in Hue was a Saigon newspaperman who tried to vote in Hue and was refused, which favorably impressed the observers. Murphy and Guy were impressed by the fact people wounded by bombing at polling place Tuy Hoa returned to vote after receiving treatment. Observer had not realized extent of terrorism in Viet Nam and remarked on courage of people going to polls in face of terrorist threat and wondered whether we would go to polls under such conditions in the U.S. Observers were permitted to divert from prepared schedule to one of their own and their right to do this was plainly stated several times. Some took advantage

of this right, particularly Guy diverted to <sup>Nha</sup> Trang ~~(A)~~ so he could tell people he left a fixed schedule and was favorably impressed by the polls at this unscheduled stop. Also, McCall, Patterson, Smith and Knight (newspaper contingent) have all said publicly they have encountered no evidence of rigging. Patterson told me privately he didn't see how there could be rigging on any large scale with the procedure used, the observing situation, and without anyone noticing it. Patterson and Smith spoke unfavorably of the closing of two newspapers on election day. But both thought elections fair on the whole. And understood reason given for newspaper closing. Guy was continuously followed by a TV team from North Dakota and it was the tardiness of that team in arrival in Tuy Hoa that delayed Guy and Murphy, thus accounting for their not being at the polling booth that was bombed at the time they were scheduled to have been there.

3. I have personally talked to Sen. Hickenlooper, Muskie, Murphie, Hughes, McCall, Knight, Barr, McKeldin, Lucey, Rudin, ~~and~~ Antell, ~~Rudin~~ Gullander, James, Knight, Murphy, Patterson, Smith, Scerra, Sullivan, Young, and Elson and none of them repeat any unfavorable information shedding doubt on the election. All thought it came off well under the circumstances. I have not talked with McGannon but understand he is favorably impressed. (McGannon left in Viet Nam and I think went on to Paris.)

4. All observers more favorable on the war than when they came.



McKeldin came to Saigon, against being in Viet Nam, with a letter to the President asking for withdrawal from the conflict. After the visit in Saigon he had changed his position and withdrew his letter. Knight came were against the war but now has at least a better understanding of the war. All observers believe the press has done a poor job of presenting the war to the American public. Some have been openly critical of the polls of the press, including Young, Gullander and Knight. I understand Knight became so disgusted with John Apple's arrogant attitude when Apple was arguing with Senator Muskie at dinner <sup>for</sup> ~~between~~ the press and ~~an~~ observers, that he left the table. Knight knows Apple's grandfather and I understand he was going to have a "Dutch uncle talk with Apple." Smith said that the press in Saigon must give attention to its own public relations and that it doesn't realize this. I believe the observers are all convinced we are not in a stalemate and are making progress. Both Patterson and Knight are opposed to committing large number of U.S. troops to the Delta because of the cost in lives. Knight remarked that pacification was slow and hard and that if we could cut off the Delta from the rest of the country and continue to win elsewhere, the VC would eventually dry up there. Of course, he is wrong about the Delta but it is an interesting comment from a man who came here favoring a pull out from Viet Nam. Patterson spoke highly of the briefings. Said he is a supporter of the President and asked the President give same briefing to the American people.

Muskie said he noticed improvement since he was here two years ago. All of the clerical crew were favorably impressed. Lucey being strong with you all the way. Elson speaking publicly of being impressed by the capability of a country at war holding such an election; and Rudin being complimentary of the entire trip, and particularly of the high quality of the military leaders and State Department personnel. He said that State Dept personnel are far superior to their image with the people.

5. I spoke to the leader of the Malaysian observer group. He told me he was favorably impressed by the election, and that the Australian and New Zealand delegations were likewise favorably impressed. I note from the press that the Japanese and Indian observers also spoke favorably of the election.

6. Scammon did not come to Hawaii but after the election briefed, and immediately before the observer group departed Amb. Bunker mentioned to the group that Scammon was an old hand at observing elections and would be glad to answer questions. This gave Scammon an opportunity to speak favorably of the election and to mention the Dominican Republic election and other observer elections.

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~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

This is a CIA station report from Saigon on the election, which has some excellent material in it which you may wish to use in your 6:00 p.m. briefing of the press.

It includes some interesting information on Dzu on pages 4-5.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-367  
By Sj, NARA, Date 2-8-02

VIETNAM STATION REPORT NO. 46/67 (26 AUGUST - 3 SEPTEMBER 1967)

A BARE AND BLESSED PLURALITY

62a

THE FINAL FIGURES ARE NOT IN YET ON THE VOTING FOR PRESIDENT, AND NONE OF THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED IN THE SENATORIAL RACE. BUT EVEN IF WE DID HAVE ALL OF THE FIGURES, IT IS TOO EARLY TO MAKE A DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT ON THE MEANING OF THE 3 SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, BECAUSE AS MUCH IS UNKNOWN AS IS KNOWN. WHAT FOLLOWS, THEN, IS MORE A SIGH OF RELIEF THAT EVERYTHING TURNED OUT SO WELL THAN THE WISE PRONOUNCEMENT OF A DISPASSIONATE JUDGE.

THE OBSTACLES TO THE CONDUCT, PROPER OR IMPROPER, OF ANY ELECTION AT ALL IN THIS WEARY, DISCOMBOBULATED COUNTRY ARE SO ENORMOUS AS TO BE LITTLE UNDERSTOOD. IN A COUNTRY WHERE GROUND TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN MOST MAJOR CITIES AND

PAGE 2 SAIGO 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

TOWNS REMAINS UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF HOSTILE INTERDICTION, IT WAS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE ELECTORAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN 44 PROVINCES AND SIX AUTONOMOUS CITIES (DANANG, SAIGON, HUE, CAM RANH, DALAT, AND VUNG TAU). ALL TOLD, THIS MEANT THE SETTING UP AND STAFFING OF 8,808 POLLING PLACES.

EACH OF THE 11 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND 48 SENATORIAL SLATES WAS THEORETICALLY ENTITLED TO AN OBSERVER AT EACH POLLING PLACE, AND THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS COMMITTED TO PAYING FOR THEM; FORTUNATELY, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF OBSERVERS WAS KEPT WELL BELOW THE THEORETICAL MAXIMUM. EACH POLLING PLACE HAD TO BE PROVIDED WITH AN AMPLE STOCK OF BALLOTS FOR ALL OF THE CANDIDATES AND SLATES -- 460,200,000 BALLOTS IN ALL, IN ORDER THAT EACH VOTER COULD BE HANDED A HEFTY SHEAF OF 59 ON ENTERING. THIS MEANT MOVING ABOUT A THOUSAND TONS OF MATERIAL, OFTEN TO PLACES TOO SMALL TO FIND EXCEPT ON VERY LARGE-SCALE MAPS. AS A MEASURE OF THE PROBLEM, EACH OF THE EIGHT DISTRICTS OF BINH DINH PROVINCE (302,260 REGISTERED VOTERS) HAD TO BE PROVIDED WITH TWO 2 1/2 TON TRUCKS TO DISTRIBUTE THE BALLOTS AND COLLECT THEM AFTER VOTING. [REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE 3 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

THE PRE-ELECTION CAMPAIGN EFFORT WAS NO SMALL AFFAIR EITHER. EACH PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE AND SENATORIAL SLATE HAD THE RIGHT TO HAVE PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE A NUMBER OF LEAFLETS AND POSTERS EXTOLLING THE CANDIDATES' VIRTUES AND PUBLICIZING THEIR SYMBOLS (USED AS IDENTIFICATION FOR THOSE MANY VOTERS WHO COULD NOT READ). ALL OF THIS AMOUNTED TO AN ADDITIONAL 144,720,000 PEICES OF PAPER, ENOUGH TO KEEP THE LANDSCAPE CLUTTERED AND THE SEWERS CLOGGED FOR SOME TIME. SURPRISINGLY, MOST OF THE POSTERS, LEAFLETS, AND BALLOTS GOT WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO, THANKS IN PART TO THE WONDROUS EFFICIENCY OF AMERICAN AIR SUPPORT.

THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY DID EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO MAKE THE ELECTIONS FAIL. FORTUNATELY, ALL THEY COULD DO WAS NOT VERY MUCH AS OPPOSED TO THE MASSIVE EFFORT OF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT (WITH, OF COURSE, AMERICAN POWER IN THE BACKGROUND). BETWEEN 1800 HOURS, 2 SEPTEMBER, AND 0800 HOURS, 4 SEPTEMBER, THE VC KIDNAPPED 278 CIVILIANS, WOUNDED 160, AND KILLED 23 IN SOME 274 ATTACKS OF VARIOUS KINDS (THESE ARE MINISTRY OF SECURITY FIGURES).

[REDACTED] VINH LONG [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

PRESERVATION COPY



"ELECTION DAY BROKE CLEAR AND BRIGHT, AFTER A WET AND STORMY NIGHT. PART OF THE PRECIPITATION CONSISTED OF RIFLE AND MORTAR ROUNDS, GRENADES, AND MINES ..... WHEREAS, DURING LAST YEAR'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, LARGE CROWDS HAD BUILT UP AT THE POLLS ONE HOUR BEFORE THEY OPENED, THIS YEAR FOUND PEOPLE STAYING AWAY IN A WAIT-AND-SEE POSTURE..... THOUGH OFFICIAL SOURCES STATED THAT ALL ROADS WERE OPEN AND THAT TRAFFIC WAS FLOWING AS USUAL, THE BUSES WERE NOT ON THE ROADS UNTIL THE MORNING HAD MATURED. BY 1000 HOURS, HOWEVER, MUCH OF THE WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE HAD EVAPORATED AND THE PEOPLE WERE COMING TO THE POLLS IN MOUNTING NUMBERS....." IN ANOTHER PROVINCE, LONG KHANH, A VILLAGE WHICH HAD FOUR INHABITANTS WOUNDED WHEN IT CAME UNDER MORTAR FIRE IN MID-MORNING, LATER REPORTED A 97 PERCENT TURNOUT AT THE POLLS.

IF THE VC FAILED TO MAKE MUCH OF AN IMPRESSION ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION, THEY WERE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN OBSERVERS SENT OVER BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON. GOVERNORS MURPHY OF CALIFORNIA AND GUY OF NORTH DAKOTA VISITED A POLLING PLACE IN TUY HOA CITY WHERE AN EXPLOSION SEVERAL HOURS EARLIER HAD KILLED THREE AND WOUNDED

[REDACTED]

PAGE 5 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

APPROXIMATELY 40; THEIR REACTION TO THE NEWS THAT SOME OF THE WOUNDED LATER RETURNED TO VOTE WAS DESCRIBED AS "FAVORABLE."

OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE WERE THE RESULTS IN IV CORPS, THE DELTA, WHERE ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF THE POPULATION OF THE COUNTRY LIVES (INCLUDING 1,694,944 REGISTERED VOTERS OUT OF A COUNTRYWIDE TOTAL OF 5,853,251). HERE, THE MAIN BURDEN OF SECURITY IS CARRIED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES, SINCE AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS ARE LIMITED TO ONE INFANTRY BRIGADE.

[REDACTED] "GENERAL 1.3(a)(4)  
VOTER REACTION APPEARED TO BE THAT OF PARTICIPATING IN SOME FESTIVE OCCASION ..... WE ARE IMPRESSED BY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GVN EFFORT TO ENSURE ORDERLY ELECTIONS IN THE DELTA, AND CONSIDER THE ELECTIONS A RESOUNDING VOTE OF CONFIDENCE BY THE PEOPLE FOR ..... THE CLOSEST THING TO ORDER AND STABILITY THAT THEY HAVE SEEN IN QUITE SOME TIME."


AS OF 1800 HOURS, 4 SEPTEMBER, THE 83 PERCENT OF THE VOTERS WHO TURNED OUT SEEM TO HAVE GIVEN THE MILITARY THIEU/KY TICKET A PLURALITY OF ABOUT 35 PERCENT. (UNOFFICIALLY, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THIS MAY LATER DECLINE TO ABOUT 32 PERCENT.) THE PROBABLE SECOND-RUNNER, WHEN ALL OF THE RESULTS ARE IN,

[REDACTED]  
BT  
[REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

VIETNAM STATION REPORT NO. 46/67 (26 AUGUST 3 SEPTEMBER 1957)  
WILL BE A DARK HORSE, TRUONG DINH DZU, WHO HAD BEEN EXPECTED  
TO TRAIL FORTH OR FIFTH. TWO FAMILIAR OLD FACES, BOTH IN  
THEIR 50'S, TRAN VAN HUONG AND PHAN KHAC SUU, APPEAR TO BE  
COMING IN THIRD AND FOURTH. SOME QUICK ARITHMETIC INDICATES  
THAT, IF DZU, HUONG, AND SUU HAD BEEN ABLE TO UNITE, THEY  
MIGHT HAVE WON. AN EQUALLY SUPERFICIAL PROGNOSIS FOR THE  
FUTURE IS THAT, WHILE UNABLE TO UNITE IN RUNNING, THEY MAY  
FIND IT EASIER TO GET TOGETHER IN NEGATING EFFORTS OF THE  
NEW REGIME TOWARD CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS. WE SHALL BE WATCHING  
CAREFULLY FOR INDICATIONS OF A UNIFIED CIVILIAN OPPOSITION.

WHILE WE NATURALLY TAKE SATISFACTION OF THE ELECTIONS'  
OUTCOME, IT BY NO MEANS SIGNALS AN END TO VIETNAM'S DIFFI-  
CULTIES; RATHER, IT PRESAGES PROBLEMS OF A NEW SORT, IN SOME  
WAYS AS DIFFICULT OR MORE SO TO DEAL WITH AS THOSE WE HAVE  
FACED IN THE PAST. THE NEW LEGISLATURE HAS TEETH, AND NOTHING



**PRESERVATION COPY**

PAGE 2 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

IN THE COMPORTMENT OVER THE PAST YEAR OF ITS FUTURE MEMBERS INDICATES THAT THEY WILL BE AFRAID TO BITE. OPERATING AS THEY WILL BE WITHOUT ANY FRAMEWORK OF ORGANIZED POLITICAL PARTIES, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT WHAT SORT OF AN INFLUENCE THE LEGISLATORS WILL EXERT ON THE FUTURE OF THEIR COUNTRY. AT THIS POINT, THERE IS NO REASON FOR PESSIMISM, BUT RAMPANT OPTIMISM WOULD BE EQUALLY UNJUSTIFIED. WHAT IS CERTAIN IS THAT THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM DOES DEPEND ON A WISE AND FORCEFUL EXERCISE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER BY THIEU (WHO HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY SHOWN HIMSELF TO BE FORCEFUL), AND ON THE NEW PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO WORK IN CLOSE HARMONY WITH HIS VICE PRESIDENT (WHICH HE HAS NOT PREVIOUSLY DONE, EITHER). OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE WILL BE THE ABILITY OF THE TWO EXECUTIVE LEADERS TO ADAPT THEMSELVES TO WORKING WITH THIS NEW PHENOMENON, TO BOTH OF THEM TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR, A TUMULTUOUSLY INDEPENDENT-MINDED LEGISLATURE. DZU: ALL THINGS TO ALL MEN

OF ALL OF THE CIVILIAN CANDIDATES, IT WAS TRUONG DINH DZU WHO SEEMS TO HAVE ANNOYED THIEU AND KY THE MOST DURING THE RECENT CAMPAIGN. AT ONE POINT, KY EXCLAIMED THAT, IF THAT [REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE 3 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

"ANIMAL" DZU WERE ELECTED, HE (KY) WOULD BUILD A CAGE FOR HIM. SINCE DZU NOW OFFICIALLY HOLDS 17.4 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL VOTE, AND MAY END UP WITH ABOUT 22 PERCENT, THE CAGE MAY HAVE TO BE A BIG ONE.

IN THE 50 YEARS SINCE HE WAS BORN IN BINH DINH, DZU HAS MANAGED TO GET AROUND QUITE A BIT, AND HAS NEVER BEEN ACCUSED OF BEING BASHFUL. HE WAS EDUCATED IN FRANCE; VISITED THE UNITED STATES; BECAME A DISTRICT GOVERNOR OF ROTARY INTERNATIONAL; JOINED SOCIETIES FAVORING FRIENDSHIP WITH AMERICANS, JAPANESE, FRENCH, AND CHINESE; AND PARTICIPATED IN BOTH THE BUDDHIST AND CONFUCIANIST ASSOCIATIONS. IN THE PERIOD BEFORE THE ELECTION, HE CLAIMED <sup>CIA</sup>~~US~~ SUPPORT, [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] HE ALSO TOLD [REDACTED] THAT HE WAS BACKED BY A LARGE AMERICAN FIRM, PACIFIC ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS. HIS SON REPORTED THAT DZU HAD BEEN SOLICITING HELP IN THE UNITED STATES, WHERE HE HAD HAD PROMISES FROM "SOME PROFESSORS," AND WAS ALSO GOING TO GET HELP FROM ESSO, WHICH HAD OFFERED HIM THE SERVICES OF A PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICER. DZU HIMSELF STATED THAT HE HAD AN EXCELLENT CHANCE OF BEING ELECTED BECAUSE THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN [REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE 4 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

HIM 150,000,000 PLASTERS FOR HIS CAMPAIGN. AMONG HIS COMPATRIOTS, HE HAS CLAIMED SUPPORT FROM THICH THZ QUANG AND THE EXTREMIST ~~BU~~BDHISTS, THE CATHOLICS, THE HOA HAO, THE CAO DAI, AND THE VIETNAMESE LABOR CONFEDERATION.

DZU'S RALLYING CRY IN THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN "PEACE" AND THE SYMBOL OF HIS TICKET IS THE "WHITE DOVE". THE FIVE SENATORIAL SLATES WITH WHICH HE IS ASSOCIATED BEAR THE NAMES "PEACE ON EARTH," "PEACE AND PROSPERITY," "PEACE AND CONTENTMENT I, II, AND III." HIS FULL-PAGE CAMPAIGN AD PUBLISHED THE DAY BEFORE THE ELECTION WAS CONINED ENTIRELY TO THE PEACE ISSUE, AND OUTLINED A PEACE PLAN WHICH INCLUDED THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM, A TOTAL CEASE-FIRE SOUTH OF THE 17TH PARALLEL; TALKS WITH "OUR ALLIES," HANOI, AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT; AND THE RECONVENING OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

IN AND OF THEMSELVES , DZU'S PROPOSALS ARE NOT OBJECTIONABLE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE VC HAVE REGARDED DZU'S PLATFORM WITH SUCH FAVOR THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN HIM THEIR SUPPORT. FROM TAY NINH, FOR EXAMPLE, [REDACTED] REPORTS THAT "THERE HAD BEEN SUBSTANTIAL VC PROPAGANDA IN THE PROVINCE ORDERING THE PEOPLE TO

J.3(a)(4)

PRESERVATION COPY



PAGE 5 SAIGON 1592 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

NOTE FOR THE DZU-CHIEU TICKET AND IT IS ASSUMED THAT THIS PROPAGANDIZING HAD SOME EFFECT....." WHATEVER THE CAUSE, DZU-CHIEU WON IN TAY NINH BY 39,947 VOTES TO THIEU-KY'S 30,830. A SIMILAR REPORT FROM KIEN GIANG TOLD OF A VC DISTRICT COMMITTEE MEETING ON 14 AUGUST AT WHICH A VC OFFICIAL EXHORTED THE PERSONS ATTENDING " TO PROPAGANDIZE EARNESTLY ..... " THAT THE VOTERS CAN UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AND CAST THEIR BALLOTS FOR" DZU.

ALL OF THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT DZU IS A COMMUNIST OR EVEN A NON-COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WITH THE VIET CONG. BUT A MAN WHO CAN RUN AS A STRONG NATIONALIST ON A TICKET OF PEACE AND VIOLENT ANTI-MILITARISM, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIMING THE SUPPORT OF [REDACTED] STANDARD OIL, CERTAINLY GIVES EVIDENCE OF A SUPPLE, SUBTLE CHARACTER, ONE HARDLY KNOWS WHAT TO EXPECT OF HIM.

1.3(a)(4)

IN SUM, THE ELECTION WAS A SUCCESS. IT WAS SUCCESSFUL PARTLY BECAUSE IT WAS NOT TOO REPEAT TOO SUCCESSFUL; THE MILITARY TICKET WON (WHICH WAS GOOD), BUT NOT BY A MAJORITY (WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN BAD). TO CONCLUDE, WE MIGHT QUOTE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO PROMINENT AMERICAN OBSERVERS. GOVERNOR HUGHES OF NEW [REDACTED]

PRESERVATION COPY

PAGE 5 SRIGEN. 15922 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

JERSEY. "I'VE SPENT ANOTHER DAY WITHOUT SEEING EVIDENCE THAT WOULD LEAD TO THE PRESUMPTION OF FRAUD OR WRONGDOING. IT WAS A VERY INSPIRING DAY .....I WAS AMAZED AT THE ELECTION ACTIVITY.....I SAW 150 PEOPLE BEING INSTRUCTED IN HOW TO VOTE..... YOU COULDN'T GET EIGHT PEOPLE TOGETHER LIKE THAT IN JERSEY..... AND, FINALLY, WHITNEY YOUNG OF THE URBAN LEAGUE: "I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE INTEREST AND ENTHUSIASM ..... HERE WE WERE IN A CITY (PHAN THIE) THAT HAD JUST HAD ROCKETS THROWN IN, AND THERE WERE PEOPLE PARADING ..... I'VE BEEN MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE FAIRNESS OF THE PRESS THAN THE FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTION."

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]  
BT

PRESERVATION COPY

63

Tuesday - September 5, 1967 - 5:00 pm

Mr. President:

Sol Linowitz is hosting a reception for the U.S. employees of the OAS tomorrow evening, Wednesday, September 6.

This is the first such recognition given this group and Sol asks whether you would send a message to be read to them.

A suggested draft is enclosed.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Draft message.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_.



63a

September 6, 1967

I welcome this opportunity to salute the citizens of the United States who are working with and for the Organization of American States.

I want to tell each of you how proud we all are of the fine way you carry forward this nation's commitment to hemispheric unity.

At no time in history has this commitment been honored with greater success than today. And your own unbridged dedication helps make this so.

As members of a great and growing international civil service, you have recognized that only from willing cooperation among all nations can come a world in which war and want are replaced by peace and prosperity.

As co-workers in hemispheric unity and progress, you are helping to build the New America.

So as we pay tribute to you today, we praise a group of fellow-Americans who have served the best interests of their land, and thereby advanced the well-being of our neighbors -- and the purpose of all mankind. We also extend our gratitude to your devoted colleagues from other member nations who share your hard work and high ideals for the future growth and greatness of our peoples.

In this Decade of Urgency, you are together showing what can be done when men and women join hands and hearts for the common good.

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

WH Central Files

Juanita Roberts  
Will Sparks  
Loyd Hackler  
Mary Hooper  
Bill Bowdler  
Eliska Hasek

cc:

Statement sent to: Honorable Sol M. Linowitz  
American Ambassador  
Organization of American States  
Department of State, Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WRS:EH:WGB/mm

September 5, 1967

DUE: ASAP - EVENT: SEPTEMBER 6, 1967 - Requested by Amb Linowitz



64  
Tuesday - September 5, 1967 - 5:00 pm *Pres file*  
2

Mr. President:

On August 30 you received a telegram from the Costa Rican Minister of Health thanking you for the loan of 16 vaccination guns ("pistols of peace", he calls them), loaned through the Defense Department, for a mass immunization program. (Tab A).

Neither we nor State were aware of this aid until the cable arrived. The loan of the equipment was arranged by the Brother's Brother Foundation, a Cleveland, Ohio philanthropic organization, with DOD.

State recommends a short acknowledgement of the message (Tab B).  
I concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove     

#### Attachments

Tab A - Telegram from Costa Rican Minister of Health.

Tab B - Acknowledgement of telegram

Send City to Bureau  
SS

Topo Alajuela 20/0000  
El Estero

6/12

1967 AUG 30 AM 6 34

ITT-1/30TH AUGUST 1967

SANJOSE CR 75 29 1832 VIA ITT

ETATPRIORITE PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTONDC

COSTARICA EXPRESSES GRATITUDE FOR LOAN THROUGH US DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

OF 16 PISTOLAS DE LA PAZ THEY HAVE BEEN USED WITH HEALTH MINISTRY

AND BROTHER'S BROTHERS FOUNDATION IN IMMUNIZING DURING AUGUST

ONE MILLION COSTARICANS AGAINST EPIDEMIC DISEASES WE BELIEVE OUR

GOVERNMENTS SHOULD UNITE IN THE USE OF THE PISTOLAS OF PEACE IN

PREFERENCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE TO THE USE OF THE GUNS OF WAR

DR ALVARO AGUILAR PERALTA MINSALUD



54/b

Suggested Presidential Acknowledgement  
to Message of August 30, 1967 from Costa Rican Minister  
of Public Health Dr. Alvaro Aguilar Peralta in San Jose, Costa Rica

His Excellency  
Dr. Alvaro Aguilar Peralta  
Minister of Public Health  
San Jose

I appreciate your message of August 30. I am gratified that my Government, acting through the Department of Defense, was able to be of assistance in your impressive vaccination campaign by providing pistols of peace. My congratulations to all who participated in the vaccination program.

Lyndon B. Johnson

## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

65

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967 -- 4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Asian Bank Legislation

Gene Black has now completed his consultations on the Hill over whether to send up the Asian Bank legislation this session. His report is at Tab A.

Black found the weight of opinion in favor of sending up the bill this session. Fulbright said he would be pleased to have the bill come up now, and that he would vote for it -- in part because he feels that this is the kind of aid we should increase to make up for slashes in the Foreign Aid Bill. Mansfield was enthusiastic. Black also got pleasant noises from Senators Cooper and Aiken, the Speaker, Mr. Boggs and Mr. Widnall. He had a nice -- but non-committal -- time with Dirksen. The only clearly negative signal he got was from Symington who said he simply couldn't vote for anything which cost money in the face of the deficit.

Black met with Gerald Ford after he wrote his memorandum. Black says that Ford was as forthcoming as possible without quite committing his vote. Ford said he was leaning more and more toward multilateral aid, that the Asian Bank struck him as the right way to go about it, and that from Black's description, this particular proposal sounded like a good one. He asked whether sending the bill up now would mean an appropriation request this fiscal year. Black ducked that one and had Rud Poats call Ford later with the answer -- Memcon at Tab B. (In essence, (1) we won't ask for an appropriation in CY 1967; (2) we probably won't ask for one in fiscal '68; (3) in any case, there will be no budgetary expenditures in FY '68 and almost none in FY '69.) Ford told Poats he thought our approach was sensible and implied that it would help the authorizing bill if we didn't ask for money until FY '69.

There are three more people Black should see: Senator Hickenlooper and Congressmen Patman and Morgan. Black is certain of Patman's support, reasonably confident of Morgan's, and 50-50 on Hickenlooper. Black will see all three when they come back to town, but he doesn't think you should wait until then to make a decision because of the opportunity (described below) presented by the visit here of the Japanese and the President of the Asian Bank next week.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~By wp, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Messrs. Katzenbach, Barr and Poats (for Gaud) have reviewed Black's findings. I think we have largely -- though not completely -- eliminated the difference on whether to send the bill up now:

- Black, Katzenbach and Gaud/Poats believe we have established that there is some hope for the bill this year and that, in view of the importance of keeping faith with the Asians, we should send it up now. They do not conclude from Black's canvass that the bill will have an easy time, either in Committee or on the Floor. They do believe, however, that we should send the bill up and push it as far as it looks as though we can win it. If we haven't got the votes, we can let it die in Committee; the mere fact that you sent it up would do considerable good with the Asians, and they feel it would not hurt you badly on the Foreign Aid Bill.
- Joe Barr does not oppose this recommendation. But he wants you to know that he would be happier if this proposal were of the "classic" variety represented by the Inter-American Bank, where we have signed and sealed pledges from other donors and a full-blown set of articles of agreement under which the money would be administered. (You will recall that our philosophy here differs from the usual pattern in that our legislation is designed as bait for other donors, with the stipulation that none of our funds may be used until we are more than matched by others.) If we could make major progress toward a "classic" proposal between now and January, Joe would be for holding the legislation until then. But he accepts the State/AID judgment that we probably can't get any further movement without some bait.

In short, Joe has backed up most -- but not quite all -- of the way. He still doubts that the bill can pass this session. But he will work for it in good faith if you decide to send it up.

The urgency of this decision follows from the fact that if you approve sending the bill with a message next week we can add a little ceremony which will dramatize the Asian initiative behind it. Most of the Japanese cabinet will be here for their annual meetings with our cabinet, and the President of the Asian Bank will be in town. If you approve, we could have press backgrounder on the morning the message and the bill are sent attended by Black, the Japanese Foreign Minister, and the President of the Bank. This would get maximum mileage out of the event, both in Asia and at home.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

Recommendations

I would vote that you approve sending the bill up next week. I wouldn't argue that Black's canvass insures passage, but I think it does give enough protection to start on the "we-will-push-it-as-far-as-we-can-win-it" philosophy. We've already got enough momentum to get pledges to the Special Fund of \$100 million from Japan and an unspecified amount from Canada. If the drive fails, it should clearly be the Congress and not the President that is holding up the peace initiative in Southeast Asia. And failure doesn't mean loss of a floor vote; if we don't have the votes in either house, we can always let the bill hang over in Committee until next session.

We need your decision very soon if we are to line up the Japanese to join in our send-off. (We also hope to use this event as a lever to get the Japs to up the ante from their present pledge of \$100 million.)

W. W. Rostow

Plan to send the bill and message next week while Japanese  
here (Thursday or Friday, September 13-14) \_\_\_\_\_

Set up a meeting with Katzenbach, Barr, et al \_\_\_\_\_

Do nothing now \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65a



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

656

August 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-364

By lig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

Subject: Report on Consultations with Congressional Leaders  
on Asian Bank Special Funds

On Tuesday and Wednesday, August 29 and 30, I visited key members of the Congress who were in Washington, and discussed our proposal for Asian Bank special funds. In accordance with your instructions I described the proposal and sought their comments on it, particularly their reaction to early submission of a Bill. The results were as follows:

Senator Fulbright said the substance of our proposal sounded just fine. You may recall I described the proposal in some detail to the Foreign Affairs Committee last May and have kept Senator Fulbright abreast of developments since then. He volunteered to me that he was perfectly willing to have the Bill come up now and that if it did he would support it. He said he felt this sort of proposal was now more important than ever--especially in view of the reduction in the foreign aid bill. He noted it would be important to have Senator Hickenlooper's support for this proposal. (I plan to see Senator Hickenlooper when he returns to Washington. When I sent a description of this proposal to him last spring he promised to give it very sympathetic consideration).

I met with Speaker McCormack and Hale Boggs together. They both said they would support the ADB proposal. Boggs wanted to know why we were proposing to contribute up to some 50% of the total and I explained it would be very difficult--if not impossible--to get other countries to do much more than match our \$200 million.

Senator Cooper said he was all for the ADB proposal which he felt was a good project. He noted this was a difficult time for consideration of even this attractive a proposition, and said much would depend on Senator Fulbright's attitude. He expressed the hope we could do more things aimed at peace in Southeast Asia.

Congressman Widnall recalled with pleasure his trip to Asia with me to sign the Asian Bank charter and stated unequivocally he was very much in favor of the special funds proposal. He also noted this was a tough time to get support for the Bill. He promised to canvass his Republican friends for their views and give me his findings. He did not advise against sending up a Bill.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


- 2 -

I had a good talk with Senator Aiken. Like most of the others he noted the unfortunate timing of a new aid proposal right now. But he said he was in favor of multilateral aid and felt the sentiment was steadily increasing for this form of aid. He suggested we not bring up the subject publicly until September 11 when Congress reconvenes.

Senator Symington told me that he would have to vote against the bill. He said that he was most reluctant to take this position as there were many things he liked about the Asian Bank. He noted the great unmet needs in this country and then spoke at length of his long standing and oft' stated opposition to soft loans. But he said he would be very quiet about his opposition to this proposal and would make no speeches against it.

Senator Mansfield promised to support the proposal and said he saw no reason not to send it up. He expressed strong support for the Asian Bank and our efforts to support regional cooperation in Asia. When I explained that we would put up as much as 49% of the total Special Funds, Mansfield said he thought we might be criticized for this high a percentage. But said he would support the Bill even with this feature.

Senator Dirksen was extremely nice to me. When describing the Mekong program to him, I mentioned retired General Raymond Wheeler's role in the project and he said what a good friend he was of Wheeler's and how hopeful he was for this project. He did not criticize any aspect of the Special Funds proposal and said he was personally very sympathetic. He said he wanted to discuss the Bill with you in the next few days. I suggest that you call him unless he brings this up with you.

  
Eugene R. Black

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65c



OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

65d  
September 1, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Eugene Black  
The White House

SUBJECT: Conversation with House Minority Leader Ford  
on Asian Development Bank Special Funds

At your request I called Congressman Ford to answer the question he posed to you: does the Administration plan to seek the first year appropriation of ADB Special Funds in FY '68 or in FY '69?

I told Mr. Ford that the Treasury will manage the bill and I was speaking in the absence of the Treasury officials directly concerned but I believed I could say that the Administration hopes to avoid seeking a supplemental in FY '68 for these funds but has reserved decision on this pending clarification of what other countries' timetables will be and, particularly, whether it would seriously delay raising the matching funds from other countries if the United States appropriation were made in July 1968 instead of the Spring of 1968. I pointed out that Japan and Canada, which have apparently firm intentions to provide funds beginning with their fiscal years starting next April, would be several months ahead of us in making firm commitments if the U.S. appropriation is for FY '69. However, some of the other countries operate on a different legislative and fiscal schedule and may be looking to the United States for firm action before making serious decisions. By next January we should have a clear understanding of whether it is important enough to make a firm commitment in the Spring to warrant asking Congress to appropriate the funds in FY '68 rather than FY '69. In either case there would be no budgetary expenditure impact in FY '68 and very little in FY '69 because of the time lag in completing the mobilization of Special Funds and subsequent Bank consideration of projects and contracting.

Mr. Ford said he thought this was a sound and sensible approach. He indicated, without pressing the point, that he thought the appropriation bill would have easier sailing if it were for FY '69.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Poats', written in a cursive style.

Rutherford M. Poats  
Acting Administrator

~~SECRET~~

66  
Tuesday - September 5, 1967  
3:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Presfile*

SUBJECT: Insurgency in Bolivia

During the past few days there have been two significant developments in Bolivia's efforts to deal with communist guerrillas:

1. Bolivian security forces have discovered caches of documents belonging to the guerrillas. These include passports, identity cards, codes and photographs. The documents have been turned over to us for analysis. A preliminary reading from CIA shows rather conclusively that "Che" Guevara travelled to Bolivia via Spain and Brazil in late 1966 using false documents. The other passports and ID cards are expected to give the identity of additional Cubans active in the Bolivian guerrilla movement. I will send you the CIA report as soon as received.
2. After a series of defeats at the hands of the guerrillas, the Bolivian armed forces on August 30 finally scored their first victory -- and it seems to have been a big one. An army unit caught up with the rearguard of the guerrillas and killed 10 and captured one, as against one soldier killed. Two of the dead guerrillas are Bolivians and the rest either Cubans or Argentines. CIA believes that several of the captured false passports they are now analyzing may have been used by the Cubans to get to Bolivia.

The Bolivians want to use the information on "Che" Guevara in the trial of Regis Debray, a young French Marxist intellectual, who is close to Fidel Castro and strongly suspected of being on a courier mission when he was caught in guerrilla territory in Bolivia last April. It is not in our interest, or the Bolivians', to have the U.S. appear as the sole authenticating agent for the documents. Tomorrow in the 303 Committee we will consider how best to handle the authenticating aspect.

The victory of the Bolivian army over the guerrillas should do much to bolster the morale and determination of the Bolivian troops and their officers. The second Bolivian Ranger battalion which we have been training since June will give them added capability to pursue the guerrillas. The new unit will go into operation late this month.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5  
By UUG NLJ/NACI2-428: FRUS 64-66, Vol. 314167  
NARA, Date 11-25-2013

~~SECRET~~

57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this incisive and constructive set of comments by Dr. Dan, the Vice Presidential candidate with Suu, after the election.

We have no idea as to whether the good doctor has any administrative ability but he is clearly one of the men we would like to see Thieu bring into the government.

There are passages in this you may wish to read to the press on a background basis at 6:00 pm today. I will provide an extra copy in the folder of materials I am getting up for that session.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4939

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-364  
By lig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-365  
By lig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

67a

Copy of SAIGON 4939 Sept. 5, 1967

Dan

1. Embassy Officer called on Dr. Phan Quang/the afternoon of September 5. Dan was in excellent spirits and his usual witty, optimistic self. He said he was planning to take a week or so off in Vung Tau or Dalat in the very near future.
2. Dan began by saying he thought the election had been very free. There had been some instances of rigging, most notably in Gia Dinh, but Dan was sure that this was at the initiative of the province chief and not on orders from Thieu or Ky. Election fraud, Dan concluded, had been insignificant factor in the Thieu/Ky victory, and he strongly doubted that Huong or Dzu could have conducted such an honest election had they been in power.
3. Dan went on to say that he did not plan to take part in any attempt to discredit the election. Suu, Ha Thuc Ky, Huong and Dzu, on the other hand, are planning to protest results and hope to get the National Assembly to declare the election invalid. Danger exists that Deputies in Assembly loyal to these presidential candidates might muster enough votes to seriously discredit the election even if they don't succeed in getting it declared invalid. Dan said throwing out this election would be senseless, unjustifiable and disastrous act. He urged that we use whatever influence we have with National Assembly Deputies to assure that this doesn't happen.
4. Embassy Officer asked Dan why Suu, who has played such a constructive role during the past year, would associate himself with an attempt to create political chaos. Dan replied that Suu is old, senile and at times hysterical. Dan recounted story of the morning of election day when Suu called him to say that Thu Duc district chief in Gia Dinh had publicly announced the withdrawal of Suu from the Presidential race and removed Suu ballots from all polling places. Dan rushed to Thu Duc, visited several polling areas as well as the district chief, and found everything in order. Suu, Dan said, had simply overreacted to a wild rumor, as is his wont. (Throughout the conversation, Dan was not particularly charitable towards Suu and at one point claimed that they would have done much better if order of the slate had been reversed.)
5. Dan then gave his analysis of the election results. He said he had known all along that Thieu and Ky were inevitable winners. How could they lose with government machinery at their disposal and 10 civilian opponents? Dzu's strong showing is not all that surprising. There had been only two slates with unique platforms on the issue of war and peace. One was Pham Huy Co, who advocated victory at any cost, even if it meant stationing 5 million US troops in South Viet Nam. The other was Dzu, who advocated peace at any price.

PRESERVATION COPY -



Co's position proved to be very unpopular, and he got only 1% of the vote. Dzu's platform, on the other hand, was the only one acceptable to the Viet Cong. Thus, Dan claimed, the Viet Cong decided to throw its weight behind Dzu, and at the last minute put out the word to people living under their influence. All one has to do is look at the areas where Dzu polled well, Dan maintained, to confirm that he benefitted from the Viet Cong. "Kien Phong, Camau, Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia -- why, in some of these provinces Dzu didn't even have a campaign apparatus," Dan exclaimed.

6. Dan went on to say that Dzu's vote in fact is a very encouraging development. Assuming that of the 17% of the total vote Dzu received, 2% was Tan Dai Viet, then 15% was Viet Cong. "This is really a good sign," Dan added, "and proves the Viet Cong really don't have much popular support. They are well organized, yes, but if we nationalists close ranks, we could defeat them easily." Elaborating further on his theory that VC vote went for Dzu, Dan claimed the fact that I Corps Buddhist vote went for Suu was proof that Buddhists are not Communists.

7. Commenting further on election results, Dan said he was happy Huong had been beaten "because he is a real regionalist"; and Dan was even happier that the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister Ky will be reduced. Ky is brash and irresponsible, Dan said, while Thieu is reflective, reserved and polite. Dan praised Thieu's behavior during the campaign, and said he had taken criticism well, and not once had Thieu engaged in any mud-slinging.

8. Looking to the future, Dan expressed great hopes for the new, constitutionally elected government. Dan said he would work with Thieu and mentioned several other oppositionists whom he thought would be willing to cooperate with the new government, among them Ha Thuc Ky and Nguyen Van Truong. As for Suu and Huong, their political careers are finished and "we should put them in the national museum together with Tran Van Ly, Nguyen Hoa Hiep and Vu Hong Khanh." On no account, Dan insisted, should Dzu be invited into the government. Instead, Dan suggested, Dzu should just be allowed to discredit himself, something he's sure to do if allowed enough time.

9. Dan said he doubted that efforts to discredit the election would really succeed and he was equally skeptical that Buddhists would try to launch any protest demonstrations. After all, Dan pointed out, at least two of the upper house slates they favored are likely to be elected (List 10 headed by Pham Ba Cam and list 13 headed by Tran Van Don); and thus they should be able to make their influence felt in peaceful, constructive way. Dan concluded on a cautious note observing that, despite his own personal optimism and good will, the course of events during the next few weeks and months depends largely on the way Thieu himself decides to play his cards.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

10. Comment:

a. We believe Dan's attitude is very helpful and while he seems to be angling for a position in the future government, his remarks appear to reflect a sincere belief that the election was, on the whole, honest.

b. We agree with Dan that some danger exists that the National Assembly will attempt to annul the election. In our discussions with National Assembly Deputies, we plan to point out that any rash moves on the National Assembly's part or excessive emphasis on minor instances of fraud could have very damaging consequences for the country's future. We will also explain that we of course recognize that legitimate complaints should be aired in Assembly debate in accordance with election law.

BUNKER

PRESERVATION COPY -

68.

*Pres. file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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12:55 p.m.

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W. W. Rostow

Salgon 4939

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*cc: George Christian*

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 94-364

By cs/wip, NARA, Date 1-12-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-365  
By 118, NARA, Date 12-19-94

68a

Copy of SAIGON 4939 Sept. 5, 1967

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PRESERVATION COPY-

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

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BUNKER

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
12:15 p.m.

69  
*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk may wish to raise at lunch today the question of the proposed Soviet compromise Article III.

We intend to lay it before the North Atlantic Council at a meeting tomorrow, Sept. 6.

Sec. Rusk may wish to take the occasion to outline the situation now surrounding the NPT and the likely time table of events.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-344  
By CG, NARA, Date 6-7-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh



COPY

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Washington

~~SECRET~~

September 5, 1967

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: Adrian S. Fisher, Acting Director

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your lunch with the President today.  
Draft Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article III Proposal.

69a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-343  
By isp, NARA, Date 9-13-94

The Soviets have proposed a compromise Article III dealing with safeguards which represents movement from their earlier position. The key to their suggested language is their willingness to have non-nuclear weapons states enter into safeguards agreements with the IAEA "either individually or together with other states as provided in the statute of the IAEA" and the statement that the "exclusive purpose" for which IAEA safeguards are to be accepted is "verification of the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this treaty."

These two factors appear to indicate that the Soviets are prepared to permit arrangements under which IAEA could make use of the EURATOM system in performing the task of "verification" under such an Article. The Soviets also appear willing to have an Article III which permits the EURATOM countries to negotiate with IAEA through EURATOM.

The new Soviet article also contains a two-year implementation period after the treaty's entry into force within which agreements with IAEA could be negotiated.

We have told the Soviets that, while we are anxious to resolve the Article III problem before the non-proliferation treaty is discussed in the U. N. General Assembly we would now have to obtain the views of our allies on the Soviet compromise proposal. We now propose to discuss the matter at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council to be held tomorrow, September 6.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, September 5, 1967  
9:30 a. m.

70

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith:

1. Ambassador Bunker's account of the Scammon backgrounder which you directed;
2. The UPI reports of statements made by the observers in Honolulu;
3. Representative McCarthy's report to his office and to Buffalo Evening News of the election.
4. Embassy Saigon's full man by man report on the observers' reactions, which I understand was read to you at 5:00 a. m.
5. Ellsworth Bunker's warm and grateful response to your message of last night.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

(Saigon CAS 144)  
(UPI 282-A 019A)  
(Saigon 4841)  
(Saigon 4895)  
(CAS Saigon 145)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJ / RAC 00-139  
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-18-01



71

Wednesday, September 5, 1967  
8:20 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith all of Thieu's statements  
about peace, made during the campaign.

So far as I can see, he never once  
forgot his "ifs."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

#### 16 August Press Conference

This may not have been his first reference to negotiations during the campaign which started on the first of August, but on 16 August he indicated his willingness to meet with Hanoi leaders but not directly with the Front.

#### 25 August Press Conference

When questioned about his reported proposal for a pause in the bombing, he said he would first indicate to Hanoi by the ICC or through other channels that "we have a good will and want to talk." He said that if Hanoi showed a willingness to talk and provided they show some sort of gesture towards this end he would then institute a bombing pause. "I am ready to halt bombing for one week to show my good will." When asked if he expected any opposition from the U. S., he said he did not. He said extension of bombing beyond a week "depends on good will and sincerity of Hanoi." He was asked if informal talks as opposed to negotiations would be possible with the NLF. Thieu said, "If they come to Saigon, I will talk to them." Asked if he would guarantee safe passage in and out of Saigon, Thieu said "sure."

#### 26 August Campaign Appearance - My Tho

"I do not think that it is easy to obtain peace. . . if I am elected . . . I will send Hanoi a message demonstrating my good will in suggesting a settlement. If Hanoi accepts and wants me to display some gesture of good will as a condition for negotiations, I will recommend a bombing pause of one week. But if Hanoi continues its infiltration, then we will have no choice except to continue to fight."

#### 22 August Interview - Saigon Press

Thieu said that he thinks the North Vietnamese regime may collapse if it prolongs the war. In view of that danger, the North Vietnamese will agree to negotiations. They have nothing to lose. They need only to pull back behind the 17th parallel. He seems to indicate that it will take two years to bring Hanoi to the negotiation table.

### Undated Press Report

A recent press report quotes Thieu as saying that "when Hanoi is convinced it cannot win politically or militarily, they will accept peace talks."

### 3 September Press Report

At the polls, Thieu repeated his campaign promise to send a message to Hanoi suggesting peace talks. "If they reply with good will and ask another gesture of good will, I will call for a one week pause of the bombing in the North."

### 3 September Interview

Thieu told reporters that if he was elected he would launch "a peace offensive." "If there is any response, I will propose a week's pause in the bombing. If there is no response, there will be no pause."

Tuesday, September 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You asked Bill Jorden for a report on the percentage of vote Thieu and Ky received related to total vote and to total valid vote.

He reports as follows:

Total vote	4,868,266
Invalid votes	194,856
Total valid vote	4,673,410
Vote for Thieu/Ky	1,638,902

Thus, Thieu/Ky received:

35.07% of the total valid vote

33.6% of the total vote

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-365

By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Tuesday, September 5, 1967

73  
Pres file

Put in folder  
for Pres. for  
use at 6pm  
meeting with  
Pres 9/5/67

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 4958)

SUBJECT: Post Election Priorities in Vietnam

If Thieu and Ky win the election, which now seems apparent, I believe we should use our influence immediately after the election to have them do the following:

A. Seek to mobilize broad-based popular support by:

1. Appointment of prominent civilians, including some leading opposition candidates or supporters in the new government. The Prime Minister should be a respected civilian with support of an important political element. For example, Tran Van Huong and Dr. Dan should be offered positions in the new government, or asked to suggest candidates for certain positions in return for their support. The focus should be on individuals with the idea of quality as well as popular support.
2. Association in some way with the new government (not necessarily as officials) of representatives of various religious and political groups (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Northern and Southern Catholics, moderate Buddhists, VNQDD, MRS, Youth, etc.) as a basis for establishing a broadly representative political party supporting the government and in the Assembly, capable of combatting the Viet Cong politically.
3. Adoption of a progressive program and identification of that program with that of a former national hero, so as to give the new government an idealistic appeal or philosophy which will compete with that declared by the Viet Cong. Specifically we might suggest to the new government the name of Nguyen Hue (Emperor Quang Trung) who in the Eighteenth Century became a great military leader, arising from the peasantry, at a time when the nation was divided, had been at war for 20 years, and was torn by corruption; who united the country and drove out the Chinese; who embarked on a program of (a) elimination of corruption, (b) introduction of social justice, (c) land reform, (d) decentralization of control to the provincial level, (e) education of the masses in the villages, (f) general conscription, (g) a national census and universal use of I. D. cards, (h) religious tolerance. (See "A Modern History of Vietnam" by Nguyen Phut Tan, pages 145-152). Nguyen Hue was from Central Vietnam and may not be a "hero" to the Delta Vietnamese, but at the moment we have no better suggestion of an historical revolutionary leader.

B. Work on a more continuous, although informal, basis with the U.S. Mission. Specifically, have regular (either weekly or semi-monthly) lunches between

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

PRESERVATION COPY

senior Vietnamese officials and their U.S. counterparts. Also, similar regular lunches and informal meetings should be arranged by other official U.S. and counterpart Vietnamese dealing with particular areas of interest, such as pacification or economic matters.

C. Adopt a program which would include the following:

1. Public recognition of (a) the necessity of every Vietnamese contributing to the war effort to the best of his ability, and (b) the necessity of laws and decrees resulting in the most effective utilization of manpower, including amendment of the Draft Law to reduce the induction age to 18, and to extend term of service, at least of key commissioned and noncommissioned officers, for one year; change of draft policy to begin drafting at the younger instead of the older ages; and recognition of the necessity of further amendments to exempt key civilians after an adequate manpower study has pinpointed the categories necessary to be exempt.

2. Reaffirmation of ongoing programs relating to the Armed Forces, including programs to (a) urgently promote the MACV program for improvement of ARVN (which includes improved merit promotion system for officers and noncoms and a military inspectorate), (b) eliminate corrupt and inefficient leaders, (c) expand the Regional Force and Popular Force and adopt MACV recommended system of U.S. advisory teams, operating with Regional Force and Popular Force for six-month periods, (d) encourage greater integration with U.S. forces or joint operations, and (e) reorient the concept of pacification role of ARVN, Regional Force, and Popular Force in accordance with MACV suggestions from static "support of Revolutionary Development" concept to mobile, area security concept, with night patrolling, and adopt inspection and grading system to insure implementation of concept.

3. Making the Province Chief the "key" man in pacification, giving him operational control over all military and paramilitary forces engaged in pacification in the provinces, over resources for development programs in the provinces, and over technical cadre (agricultural, engineering, education, public health, public works, etc.) based in the provinces, except possibly cadre specially trained for selective economic production programs properly administered from Saigon. He should appoint the District Chiefs, who should be under his control. He should report to the Corps Commanders on military matters and directly to the Central Government (or to civilian deputies of the Corps Commanders) on civil matters. All Province Chiefs should be reappraised and only top men retained, and an inspection, training and rating system should be established.

4. Centralizing all rural development efforts in non-Revolutionary Development hamlets (education, agriculture, public works, public health, etc.) under one coordinated control in the same manner in which they are now centralized under the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in Revolutionary Development hamlets; funding resources at the provincial level for non-Revolutionary Development hamlets in the same manner in which they are presently funded for Revolutionary Development hamlets, so that

coordinated programs can be established in each village with flexibility and with resources quickly available; establishing the principle that Village Councils should determine their own programs and priorities, and that District and Provincial government should review these programs and be responsive to village needs by sending cadres to advise on programs and resources to implement programs, the villages furnishing the labor; also making changes in Ministry organization to insure that a large proportion of total workers are in the provinces, and to insure that most of the provincial workers spend most of their time in the field, rather than headquarters.

5. Construction of an adequate number of screening and detention centers in the provinces and permanent prisons on islands on a priority basis. Also, the passing of laws to insure (a) it is a crime to be a Viet Cong civilian cadre, (b) spelling out the nature and degree of the crime, the penalty is stiff, (c) trials can be had quickly in detention centers by military court in what would normally be no more than one hour per trial, and (d) convicted cadre will be sent to the island prison, normally for long terms (unless they are accepted as Hoi Chanh by fingering their Viet Cong associates). Judges will be at least three per detention center, will be provided from among Army men with legal training, and, if not enough, more will have to be conscripted.

6. Paying higher salaries to selected Government of Vietnam officials, including the military, particularly those officials able to control corruption or in a position to be tempted by corruption. This should be accompanied by declaration against corruption, appointment and proper implementation of inspectorate with adequate powers to prosecute corrupt officials, and adoption of new laws, if necessary, against corruption by public officials.

7. Reaffirmation of National Reconciliation Proclamation and Chieu Hoi program; adoption of a program to employ Hoi Chanh, including amendment of security clearance procedures; formation of National Reconciliation Commission under the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi to be composed of prominent Vietnamese to recommend actions to implement the National Reconciliation Program.

8. Granting to the villages power to enforce land rental laws and laws prohibiting collection of back rents on land taken from Viet Cong control or for tenants who have escaped from Viet Cong control; protection by the Government of tenancy in contested areas where security is expanding; also, promulgation of laws designed to insure tenure of renters; also, offers to purchase land which will then be resold to those living on the land; also, land tax.

9. Adoption of the whole of the "Operation Take-Off" pacification program, parts of which have been hereinabove enumerated.

10. Establishment of U.S. joint control over expenditures of counterpart piasters by reinstituting sign-off by U.S. advisors at provincial level, and U.S. retention of control of all U.S. resources until finalization.

11. Revitalization of the veterans program to provide for care and training of the injured veterans, establishment of two veterans hospitals and land resettlement of veterans and their widows and orphans.

12. Commitment to effective measures to increase receipts from domestic taxes and tariffs and revision of present monetary policies, laying basis for increased economic development efforts. Development efforts should be focused on increasing agricultural output, particularly on programs for increased production of rice and pork, and, in this connection, (a) wholesale price of U.S. rice should be increased to 21 piasters per kilo, so as to increase prices received by peasants for their paddies, and (b) government restrictions on commerce should be reduced where not essential to denial of vital goods to the Viet Cong.

We are establishing a committee of all appropriate Missions agencies to (a) further refine the suggestions we can make for a governmental program, and (b) devise a written statement of platform and principles which the new government can publicly adopt. We believe this should be ready for government consideration by the third week in September so that it can be announced by the new government in early October. Insofar as the platform is concerned, we may wish to contact the governmental leaders earlier so as to avoid their premature publication of a different platform.



24

Tuesday  
September 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You asked Bill Jorden for a report on the percentage of popular vote that went to successful presidential candidates in U. S. elections. His report is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

74a

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Percentage of Popular Votes Received by Winners in  
U. S. Presidential Elections

(Note: Popular vote statistics are incomplete  
and unreliable before 1824.)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WINNER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF POPULAR VOTE</u>
1824	Adams	31.9%
1828	Jackson	56%
1832	Jackson	54.5%
1836	Van Buren	50.9%
1840	Harrison	52.9%
1844	Polk	59.6%
1848	Taylor	57.3%
1852	Pierce	50.8%
1856	Buchanan	45.6%
1860	Lincoln	39.8%
1864	Lincoln	55.2%
1868	Grant	52.7%
1872	Grant	55.6%
1876	Hayes	57.9%
1880	Garfield	48.3%
1884	Cleveland	48.5%
1888	Harrison	47.8%
1892	Cleveland	46%
1896	McKinley	51%
1900	McKinley	51.7%
1904	Roosevelt	56.4%
1908	Taft	51.6%
1912	Wilson	41.9%
1916	Wilson	49.3%
1920	Harding	60.8%
1924	Coolidge	54%
1928	Hoover	58.1%
1932	Roosevelt	57.4%
1936	Roosevelt	60.8%
1940	Roosevelt	54.7%
1944	Roosevelt	53.4%
1948	Truman	49.5%
1952	Eisenhower	55.1%
1956	Eisenhower	57.4%
1960	Kennedy	49.7%
1964	Johnson	61.1%

Thus, in the last 36  
presidential elections in  
the U.S., 11 men have  
been elected with less  
than 50% of the popular  
vote.

75  
*Pres file*

Tuesday, September 5, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Some Notes on Truong Dinh Dzu

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-364  
By sig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

Dzu is 49. He was born in South Viet-Nam, graduated from the University of Hanoi with a law degree. He practiced law in the South during World War II, was admitted to the Saigon Bar in 1949.

He has never held political office. His greatest achievement was his election as President of the Saigon Rotary Club (1959-1960). He was one of the Governors of Rotary International (1961-62).

Dzu enjoyed excellent relations with the Diem regime in the 1950's. His law partner was Mrs. Nhu's brother, and Dzu reportedly handled the Nhu family's legal affairs.

His relations with Diem and Nhu deteriorated in the late 1950's when Dzu began to have political ambitions and to speak out more and more critically of the Government. In 1961, he claimed he was going to run against Diem in the election that year, but he backed out -- claiming that Rotary business kept him too busy.

In March 1963, he was arrested charged with passing bad checks, though some claimed his political indiscretions were the real reason.

He did not reappear on the political scene after 1963 until a year ago. After the death of Diem, Dzu was active in legal affairs. He became known as "Mr. Fix-it" in Saigon. Two Americans charged with financial misdealing charged that they had paid Dzu large bribes to get them off. He denied the charge.

The Government announced it was looking into these charges and others. But no results have been announced. There were reports that the Saigon Bar Association was reviewing his activities and was considering disbaring him.

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Some people in Saigon have claimed that he announced his candidacy for the presidency in order to escape further investigation and legal action against him.

There are rumors -- no solid evidence thus far -- that his campaign was financed in part by the Viet Cong and also by French interests.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

76  
Presple

Monday, September 4, 1967 -- 4:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. McNamara reports as follows on the Kenworthy story.

It would have been impossible for this story to have come from the Pentagon because:

- Kenworthy does not cover the Pentagon and does not have Pentagon contacts;
- He did not talk to Sec. McNamara;
- The other senior officers of the Pentagon were with<sup>out</sup> exception away for the Labor Day weekend.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Monday, September 4, 1967  
3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith drafts to Lodge and Bunker.

Also attached is a humdinger of a testimonial  
from Congressman Wolff who was out there on  
his own.

W. W. Rostow

Bangkok 1690

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 10350,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 18, 1953.

BY AS CH 9-13-91

WWRostow:rlm

77a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 4, 1967

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE IN HONOLULU

Would you be good enough to convey this message to the group of observers whose visit you have organized and managed with your usual distinction and effectiveness.

"On behalf of the American people, I thank you all for performing a notable and arduous public service in going to Viet Nam and observing their presidential election.

"You went as individuals and you will, of course, make known your reactions and judgments, as some of you have already done. I would, however, be greatly interested to hear directly from you and account of your experiences and reflections.

"I would, therefore, be grateful if those of you who find it possible and convenient could join me at the White House on September 6 at 11:00 a.m. for half an hour or three quarters of an hour. After taking some pictures and having an informal exchange of views, you undoubtedly would wish to meet the press. After the Cabinet meeting which I have scheduled for noon, I would be pleased if you would all join me for a lunch which I have already scheduled for another group of distinguished Americans.

"Let me underline that I will fully understand if the press of your responsibilities requires you to forego this invitation."

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 11652  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S RECORDS  
MAR. 18, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY 29 ON 9-13-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 4, 1967

VIA CAS CHANNEL

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON

I would say to you what I have just been saying to a group of the press on a background basis; namely, that the successful elections yesterday in South Viet Nam are a tribute to your vision and good judgment.

You have done it again.

I hope you will convey my gratitude and respect to your whole civilian and military team.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ / RAC 00-139  
By Sj, NARA, Date 9-18-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 4, 1967  
2:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Since you will be seeing Lodge, you may wish to read his report on a conversation with an anti-Gaullist French general.

Amb. Bunker's comment is attached.

We are digging into the question of ChiCom rice flows to Hanoi.\*

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 4867

Salgon 4868

~~SECRET~~

*\*P.S. A. requested quick  
CIA comment just came  
in and is attached.  
W.*

WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By Lip, NARA, Date 6-23-95



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-365  
By 1-8, NARA, Date 12-15-94

FOLLOWING IS A REPORT BY LODGE

1. OF ALL THE FRENCH GENERALS NOW LIVING WHO SERVED IN VIEN-NAM DURING THE INDO-CHINA WAR THE MOST INTELLIGENT IS PROBABLY GEN VANUXEM. HE LIVED HERE NINE YEARS AND STILL HAS MANY FRIENDS AND CONNECTIONS. HE HAS BEEN VERY BADLY TREATED BY DE GAULLE WHOSE POLICIES HE STRONGLY DEPLORES. HE VALUES HIS ASSOCIATIONS WITH AMERICANS IN WORLD WAR II AND IS WARMLY IN FAVOR OF GOOD FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. HE TOLD ME THE FOLLOWING:

2. FOR YEARS NOW THE CHINESE COMMUNIST SHIPMENT OF RICE TO NORTH-VIET NAM HAS ARRIVED ON TIME LIKE CLOCKWORK AND ALWAYS IN THE AGREED AMOUNTS. NOW, HOWEVER, THE AMOUNTS ARE LESS AND THE RICE IS ARRIVING AT IRREGULAR INTERVALS.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 4867 ~~SECRET~~  
CHINESE RICE IS UTTERLY INDISPENSABLE TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WAR EFFORT. THIS THEREFORE COULD BE VERY BIG.

3. VANUXEM SAYS THAT WE HAVE NO GOOD CARDS TO PLAY WHEN IT COMES TO NEGOTIATIONS. THE ONLY CARD WE HAVE - WHICH IS TO STOP THE BOMBING - IS "PURELY NEGATIVE." OUR SIDE SHOULD, THEREFORE, OCCUPY SOME LAND IN NORTH VIET-NAM AND THAT WILL GIVE US A "POSITIVE" CARD TO PLAY AND GREATLY INCREASE THE CHANCES OF BRINGING THEM TO NEGOTIATE.

4. VANUXEM IS CONVINCED THAT HE COULD RECRUIT "A CORPS OF THREE DIVISIONS" OF FRENCHMEN TO FIGHT IN VIET-NAM. MANY FRENCHMEN, HE SAYS, BELIEVE THAT THE US IS FIGHTING A WAR WHICH IS JUST AS MUCH IN THEIR INTERESTS AS IT IS IN THAT OF THE US. MANY ALSO KNOW VIET-NAM, ARE ATTACHED TO IT AND WOULD WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A VENTURE.

GP-1. BUNKER  
BT

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-365  
By 108, NARA, Date 12-15-94

REF: SAIGON 4867

1. VANUXEM'S VIEWS AS EXPRESSED TO LODGE REGARDING SHIPMENTS OF CHINESE RICE TO NORTH VIETNAM ARE INTERESTING AND HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT IF TRUE. WE WILL BE TRYING TO VERIFY THIS REPORT ALTHOUGH RELIABLE INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT IS HARD TO COME BY.

2. HIS VIEWS REGARDING POSSIBLE LAND INVASION OF NORTH VIET-NAM WARRANT COMMENT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD CONTEMPLATE, FOR WHATEVER REASONS OF BARGAINING ADVANTAGE, AN OVERT OCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY BY FREE WORLD OR SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES IN THIS AREA, TO SAY NOTHING OF ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD, WOULD BE INCALCULABLE, AND IT WOULD INVOLVE US IN WHAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE A BOTTOMLESS PIT. AS I HAVE SAID BEFORE, WHAT IS REALLY NEEDED IS THE EFFECTIVE CHOKING OFF OF INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH, NOT TO BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN A LAND WAR IN NVN SEEKING TO DESTROY ITS SOURCE WITH ALL THE RAMIFICATIONS THIS COURSE WOULD HAVE.

3. EQUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE IS HIS SUGGESTION THAT A FEW DIVISIONS OF FRENCH MERCENARIES BE ORGANIZED TO FIGHT IN VIET-NAM. THE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES OF THE FORMER COLONIAL POWER IN EITHER SOUTH OR NORTH VIET-NAM WOULD ADD THE FINAL CURSE TO OUR PRESENCE HERE AND CONFIRM UNSPOKEN VIETNAMESE FEARS STIMULATED BY THE VIETCONG THAT OUR INTEREST REALLY IS TO REESTABLISH A COLONIAL DOMINION HERE.

4. THESE COMMENTS ARE PRETTY OBVIOUS TO CLOSE OBSERVERS OF THE VIET-NAM SCENE, WHETHER HERE OR IN WASHINGTON, BUT I THINK THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR VIEWS ON VANUXEM'S SUGGESTIONS.

BUNKER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

4 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President,  
The White House

SUBJECT: General Vanuxem's Comments to  
Ambassador Lodge

REFERENCES: A. Saigon Embassy Telegram 4867 (NoDis)  
B. Saigon Embassy Telegram 4868 (NoDis)

1. General Vanuxem was one of Marshal de Lattre's most dashing and colorful young colonels and made a great military name for himself during the Franco-Viet Minh War, principally as the commander of Group Mobile 3 operating in the Red River delta. A fine military officer, he is not noted for political sophistication. He is bitterly anti de Gaulle and believed to have had ties with the OAS.

2. On the rice issue, China has and continues to supply North Vietnam with rice. In recent years China has been the major source of North Vietnam's rice imports. The full extent of such deliveries in the past and at present is not known--only sketchy material is available on seaborne and rail cargoes from China to North Vietnam. It is possible that transport disruptions and other activities associated with the cultural revolution have upset delivery timetables or reduced deliveries. Chinese exports elsewhere, however, have been affected very little.

3. This year we have noted a striking increase in North Vietnam's import of foodstuffs from Communist countries. During the first half of 1967 about 220,000 tons was delivered, compared to about 30,000 tons in the first half of 1966. If China has reduced its rice shipments, other Communist countries may be making up for such losses by growing deliveries of other grains and foods. Imports, however, are only a

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ / RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

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small part of food supplies in North Vietnam. Food allocations in North Vietnam do not appear to have been cut in recent months. Reports indicate, however, the substitution of other grains for part of the rice ration. We have received no unusual reports of food deficiencies in North Vietnam.

4. Even if Vanuxem could raise a three division force of French Mercenaries, which we doubt, it would be hard to envisage a military unit whose introduction into the Vietnam conflict would have more unfortunate political consequences. Any US employment of French mercenaries would be a propaganda windfall of major proportions for Hanoi and would be an act our South Vietnamese allies would almost certainly consider politically unacceptable.

5. Any significant land invasion of North Vietnam would greatly increase the risk of direct Chinese intervention in the Vietnam conflict with major ground forces.

6. In short, we are very much in accord with Ambassador Bunker's comments as expressed in Reference B.

  
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/EXDIS

Monday, September 4, 1967  
12:55 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Komer's response to  
some of the Moss Committee criticisms.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4420  
(Corrected copy)

cc: Amb. Leonhart

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 5-13-81



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

79a

Corrected Copy, Saigon 4420, August 15, 1967

Text of Cable from Ambassador Komer

The following represents my thoughts on rebuttal to the Moss Subcommittee attacks. Their use in public responses necessarily depends on Washington judgment as to how directly to engage with Moss:

First, all the latest mass criticism, like those in previous reports, can fairly be labeled as focussing almost exclusively on minor blemishes to the exclusion of major accomplishments. In broad perspective, AID programs in Vietnam have been remarkably successful in achieving the overall aim of keeping war-torn economy afloat, in keeping the South Vietnamese people fed, and in helping prevent runaway inflation. On the last score one need only compare Korean war experiences of 700 percent retail price inflation during the first year and 2400 percent during the three years before armistice with the U.S./South Vietnam ability to hold Saigon retail prices to less than a 300 percent rise in the over two and a half years since January 1, 1965.

Similarly, licking the Saigon port bottleneck was a classic success which makes the Moss nitpicks look pale indeed. Department of Defense and AID can provide plenty of details.

As to the chief Moss theme that U.S. officials avoid rocking the boat rather than pressing vigorously for needed reforms, Moss is speaking both from ignorance and from his room with a rather narrow view. In fact, the U.S. mission has had to choose judiciously which issues to press on the Government of Vietnam. Our sense of priorities are rather different from his. Moreover, the present Government of Vietnam has been far more responsive to U.S. advice and pressure on key issues than were those of Diem or Minh or Khanh during 1955-64.

On pacification, I don't know what Moss will bring forth. I do know that he and his staff spent so little time on pacification during the last brief visit as hardly to justify a report. Nor did anyone with whom they spoke provide ammo to support "lagging and floundering" in pacification. Indeed his only concern was over militarization of pacification under the new reorganization, and when Ambassador Bunker explained the facts to him, he had no retort.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-365

By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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Thus, the best tack would be to ask Moss for specifics before he issues a pacification report. I have attempted to make the above points in a friendly letter to Moss, which can be used as Washington sees fit. Hence I suggest anticipating a Moss blast on pacification by inquiring promptly at high level as to his concerns and then publicizing the relevant facts and figures before this report comes out. Just tell us what target to shoot at and we'll let fly.

On land reform, let's face the fact that the Government of Vietnam performance is unimpressive. But neither is land reform a burning issue in Vietnam. Of 11 presidential slates only one (Suu/Dan) seems to have stressed it at all. But we have ginned up a new land reform package and now have another variant proposed by Professor John Montgomery from Harvard, who has been consulting out here. We'll try these on the Government of Vietnam right after the election.

Ambassador Bunker concurs in the above, and shares my views on tactics.

82  
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 4, 1967 -- 12:45 pm

Mr. President:

Herewith final returns on the Vietnamese election in terms of valid ballots cast. The only surprise is that in the end Suu pulled a bit ahead of Huong for third place.

I am convinced that to understand this election one must start by assuming that something like 22% of the votes were cast virtually at random; that is, people voted at risk to associate themselves with the Constitutional process but ~~he~~ had no idea at all about the Presidential candidates themselves. Put another way, anyone who ran could get about 2% of the total vote.

That means the proportion of the vote that went to Thieu-Ky, among those who were actually picking candidates, was nearer 46% than 36%. And there is similarly an upward discount factor to be applied to the other three major candidates.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-364  
By 178, NARA, Date 6-23-95

WWRostow:rla



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## SITUATION REPORT

September 4, 1967  
1130Vietnamese Elections

The total provincial returns reported by the GVN from all electoral districts (valid ballots only) are as follows:

Slate #1	Suu/Dan	502,712	10.7%
Slate #2	Ky/Dinh	346,573	7.4%
Slate #3	Binh/Khinh	129,429	2.7%
Slate #4	Dzu/Chieu	800,285	17.1%
Slate #5	Huong/Truyen	464,638	9.9%
Slate #6	Co/Sinh	185,506	2.2%
Slate #7	Ly/Duong	91,887	1.9%
Slate #8	Hiep/Truyen	159,498	3.4%
Slate #9	Thieu/Ky	1,638,902	35.7%
Slate #10	Khanh/Dang	148,652	3.1%
Slate #11	Quat/Chan	285,328	3.1%

This makes a total of 4,673,490 votes. The difference between this figure and the established total vote of 4,868,266 is 194,776. Presumably, this represents the number of invalid ballots and is about 4% of the total votes cast (the percentage of invalid ballots last year was around 5%).

The percentage of the vote for each major candidate remains about the same, as reported in the previous Situation Report, though Suu has now pulled ahead of Huong for third place.

No returns from the Senate race are yet available.

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SECRET/EXDIS

Monday, September 4, 1967  
12:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's solid  
analysis of the election and post-election  
problems.

He sees it almost precisely as we  
see it in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4885

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WWRostow:rln

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3 4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-13-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

September 4, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 4885)

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election Returns: Preliminary Comment on  
Election Returns

The Results: As of 4 am, September 4, with 42 of the 50 electoral jurisdictions having reported, Thieu-Ky had 35 percent of the vote. Truong Dinh Dzu was in second place with 17.4 percent, followed by Huong (11.7 percent), Suu (9.7 percent) and Ha Thuc Ky (7 percent). As expected, Thieu-Ky did especially well in II Corps, particularly in the Highland Provinces. They also did quite well in the populous IV Corps, taking every province except Kien Phong. Dzu was strongest in III and IV Corps. He won by a plurality in Kien Phong, Nau Nghai, Ding Duong and Tay Ninh.

Suu did best in I Corps where he took Hue and Danang and also did quite well in Quang Nam. Thieu and Ky did not do particularly well in I Corps although returns from Quang Ngai, which have not yet come in, may alter this picture somewhat.

Suu and Huong did surprisingly poorly in IV Corps. (Suu got 90,391 votes; Huong 119,227; Dzu 303,436; Thieu 495,572.) Huong made his most impressive showing in Saigon where he won by plurality of 137,962 votes as against 135,527 for Thieu and 87,670 for Dzu.

Factors Behind the Thieu-Ky Victory:

Thieu-Ky were the best known of the candidates. Ky in particular is known in the countryside, where he is sometimes referred to as Mr. Moustache. The campaign was evidently neither long enough nor intensive enough for the other candidates to erase his advantage.

Thieu-Ky benefited from the traditional attitude toward those in authority. The tendency on the part of many voters is to cast a "stay-out-of-trouble-vote," that is, they do what they believe the authorities want them to do in order to avoid possible future difficulties. This vote is probably a good deal smaller than it was a few years ago, but it is still significant, particularly in rural areas.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-365  
By rip, NARA, Date 12-16-94

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As anticipated, a number of ethnic and religious groups voted more or less as units for the present regime. This is because their leaders believe the present Government offers the best hope of continued benefits for their particular group. Included in this category are the Montagnards, the Khmers, the Northern Catholics, the Tam Chau Buddhists, a large chunk of the Hoa Hao (though Dzu cut into the Hoa Hao vote), and the military. Expected to be in this category but notable for their defection were the Chinese. The Chinese vote apparently went more for Huong than for Thieu-Ky, possibly because they still remember the Ta Vinh affair.

Those who fear change and hope for a continuation of the relative stability of the Thieu-Ky regime gave their support to the Thieu ticket. (These voters in many cases would also fall under those included in the paragraph above, however.)

The civilian candidates split the vote. By failing to unite behind one or two candidates, they contributed heavily to the Thieu-Ky victory. (Should be noted, however, that it would take the combined Dzu, Huong, and Suu vote to better the Thieu-Ky mark.)

With the exception of Dzu, the civilian candidates did not exploit the issues with the greatest appeal. For the most part they took a responsible stance on the peace issue, stressing the need for peace in honor and guarantees for independence. This turned out to be less attractive, or at least less understandable, to many voters than the simplistic peace appeal of Dzu. The civilian candidates also failed to exploit the corruption issue effectively. Instead of exposing some particular instances of blatant governmental corruption, they stuck to vague (and safe) generalizations about the prevalence of corruption. Their main targets, the government's conduct of the campaign and the Buddhist charter, probably had little voter appeal.

#### Factors Behind the Dzu Showing:

Dzu put the peace issue forward in the rawest and most uncomplicated form. To the unsophisticated and the war weary, this probably had a powerful appeal.

Dzu probably got most of the protest vote. Those who wanted to register their dissatisfaction with the status quo were probably attracted by Dzu's harsh and often clever attacks on Thieu-Ky and the present government. Much of the anti-military vote that would otherwise have gone to Huong and Suu went to Dzu because he was more vehemently anti-military than they were. Within the protest vote was perhaps an element of hidden anti-Americanism, i.e. by voting against Thieu-Ky and for peace. Also there may have been some desire to vote against the "old" civilian candidates (Suu, Huong, etc.) and for new blood.

There may have been some Viet Cong influence at work. In III Corps there is considerable congruence between areas of heavy Viet Cong influence and areas where Dzu pulled a large vote. During the campaign Dzu told Lansdale that he had heard the Viet Cong were telling people to vote for him. We have very little to go on here, however, and we will need to get more information before hazarding any firm judgement on the extent of Viet Cong support for Dzu.

Tan Dai Viet support is probably more important than previously thought. Dzu's strong showing in Quang Ngai, for example, is evidently the result of Tai Dai Viet backing.

Dzu seemed to have a very well financed campaign. There have been some allegations, as yet quite unconfirmed, that he got help from the French. The source of his campaign funds could have been his own bank account and that of his businessman running mate, however.

#### Election Irregularities

We have reported previously on the charges of pressures and unfair campaign tactics in the period preceding the election. Most of these proved unsubstantiated or a direct result of the fact that Thieu and Ky are the incumbents and used the normal incumbents' advantages fully.

The balloting itself went off with virtually no significant irregularities so far as we are now aware. The observers were in fact much impressed with the careful and strictly honest procedures that they witnessed.

We understand that Dzu is charging that the election was a "nationwide fraud," and that he will try to get the Assembly to declare the election invalid. As far as we know, however, his chief charge (in addition to those made during the campaign) is that there were not enough ballots at some of the polling stations. Shortages of some ballots reportedly did delay balloting at some polling stations, but only temporarily.

It seems clear now that unless some new evidence of extensive fraud should be uncovered--which we consider unlikely--the election must be considered to have been clean. The irregularities of which we are aware could not have significantly altered the outcome of the election.

#### Probable Reactions

Dzu's strong showing plus the fact that Thieu-Ky got only 35 percent and ran relatively well in the cities as well as in the countryside will tend to convince many skeptics here that the election was honest. We are already beginning to get that kind of reaction.

As noted above, Dzu is evidently going to make an effort to get the election declared invalid. His unsavory past, his personal attacks on Ky, his unstructured peace appeal (which Thieu-Ky probably view as tantamount to surrender to the Viet Cong), and his present stance probably make it impossible for him to contribute constructively to the formation of the new government. We judge that Dzu cannot and should not be included in the government.

With the front-running civilian thus eliminated, the prospects for a true government of national union are undeniably reduced. At the same time, we are inclined to think that the outcome of the election may also make it easier for Thieu-Ky to persuade the other civilian candidates to take positions in the new cabinet. On the evening of September 3, Vo Long Trieu in fact intimated to an Embassy Officer that Huong has not really closed out the possibility of serving in a Thieu-Ky government. Much will depend on how Thieu-Ky approach the other civilian candidates on this matter. It may also depend in part on how fast they act. We understand that Dzu has already said that he is seeking the help of the other civilian candidates in rejecting the election results.



The margin by which Thieu-Ky won the election is adequate as a mandate, but it is certainly not overwhelming. The vote for Dzu in particular should suggest to Thieu-Ky that they need the help of certain other civilian candidates if they are to have sufficient popular backing for their government.

#### Significance of the Election

We should not lose sight of the difficulties under which this election was held. Vietnam is a nation at war, divided, underdeveloped, and with a very long tradition of authoritarian government. Viet Cong propaganda and terror reached a new high in an effort to disrupt and discredit the election. The election was also carried out under such intense international scrutiny that the candidates were sometimes tempted to play to world opinion more than to their own people. (This is the probable reason for the great emphasis on the conduct of the election as an issue). Considering the difficulties, the election can only be described as a significant achievement.

The election should also be viewed as an important step toward government by law. Opposition was tolerated to a greater extent than ever before in Vietnam. Freedom of the press and of speech were unprecedented. This was a most valuable lesson for all concerned in the need to tolerate dissent and the limits within which responsible opposition can operate.

The election also marks a further move toward civilianization of the government. This process began with the enlargement of the directorate last year and the formation of the Peoples Army Congress; it continued with the election of the Assembly, and the writing of the constitution. Now Thieu and Ky will have to deal with an important civilian arm of the government, the new legislature. With good luck and careful management it could soon be a working civilian-military partnership under the constitutional frame.

The new regime will be faced by many old and new problems. The Viet Cong are still here, even though their claim to represent the people of South Vietnam is much reduced. Corruption and authoritarian attitudes are still embedded in the government and the society. Thieu-Ky will still have to prove to their people and the outside world that the election was not merely a device to legalize their regime, that the new government

is not merely "more of the same." It will take time and care to shake down the new institutions. The Thieu-Ky relationship will have to be worked out.

An immediate problem is to prevent Dzu from stirring up a great deal of bitterness. He must have a hearing, and he must not be allowed to make a martyr of himself. This will involve persuading the government to continue to take no premature legal action against him. It will also include an effort to convince Thieu-Ky that it is in their interest to continue to have a free press. Most important, it will at the outset require a genuine effort by them to include the leading civilian candidates or their representatives in the new government. (We will, of course, be attempting to influence all concerned in that direction.)

If there are plenty of old and new problems, there is also reason for encouragement. The way is at least open for the building of a broad political base for the new government. A real dialogue with a real loyal opposition in the new legislature now appears possible in the near future. More important, the way is more open for peace. Peace has been openly discussed in a free election campaign. The new government has the popular mandate and the prestige which only an election could give it; hopefully these facts will bring Hanoi nearer to abandoning its aggression in favor of negotiations.

82

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, September 4, 1967 -- 11:40 a.m.

*Pres file*

Lunch Meeting With the President  
Tuesday, September 5, 1967 - 1:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Post-Viet Nam Election Issues, Problems, Possibilities. (Sec. Rusk)

- International
- Inside South Viet Nam: priorities, including Locke visit.
- Greek-type offer to the National Liberation Front.

2. Bombing Policy. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

- backlog of authorized targets due to bad weather
- review of the remaining 50

3. The State of the Kissinger Exercise. (Sec. Rusk)

4. ABM's. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

Reply to attached cable from Amb. Thompson and next steps in Washington.

5. Handling of Election Observers in Washington. (The President)

6. Other.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By 109, NARA, Date 9-13-01

WWRostow:rlm

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

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5

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

31 AUG 67 16 21 Z

ACTION: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

STATE 30165

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-95  
By CB, NARA Date 7-25-00

SUBJECT: US-Soviet Strategic Arms Control Talks

1. Consideration being given to announcement in a few weeks of US decision proceed with "thin" ABM deployment, providing continental coverage against Chinese strategic missile attack, coupled with more intensive defense of MINUTEMAN ICBM force.
2. We wish make early further effort to engage Russians in talks, hoping to have agreement on initiation of such talks prior to our announcement of thin ABM deployment decision. (We plan, at the least, to notify Soviet Government immediately prior to such announcement, at same time reaffirming our strong continuing interest in US-Soviet strategic arms control talks.)
3. There have been tenuous indications from unofficial Soviet contacts that question of holding talks may be under reconsideration following Glassboro. Some Soviet contacts, principally Vorontsov, have suggested that more concrete proposal by US would facilitate decision in Moscow. Most recently, as noted in Geneva 640 (repeated septel to Moscow), Shustov recommended posing such talks in context dialogue on preventing surprise attack, and responded

G. 2M:RLGarthoff Dep 8-30-67

2579

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

XXXXXX G - Foy D. Kohler

Clearances

U - Mr. Katzenbach *NAL pres* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EUR - Mr. Leddy *22 p/c* S/S - Mr. Walsh  
ACDA - Mr. Fisher DOD - Mr. Warnke The Secretary (in draft)  
*WR AF pres*  
White House - Mr. Rostow *pro BDK*

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FORM 8-65 DS-322  
VJM

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Classification

affirmatively to suggestion that letter from Secretary McNamara to Marshal Grechko might be useful. (This latter suggestion stems from earlier informal conversation reported in Geneva 2993 of March 24.)

4. We would appreciate your views on best manner in which to proceed. Do you believe it would be fruitful approach Soviet Government at this time on basis reiteration your demarche of March 23, either with or without indication of likely US limited ABM deployment decision? Would chances of favorable Soviet reply be materially increased by additional indication our readiness make more concrete proposal at time such talks commenced? (At such time, we could note there would not appear to be any purpose in our attempting make more concrete proposal in absence of clear indication of Soviet intent proceed with discussion.) While we assume Marshal Grechko would not be proper or best channel for discussion this matter, would you see value in attempting to advance consideration of this question through military channels? If agreement had been reached schedule talks, would be desirable make public disclosure that fact at time of public announcement thin ABM deployment decision in order reinforce US dedication to seeking meaningful curbs on strategic arms race. What would Soviet reaction be, and how best could it be dealt with, if we had again proposed talks and (a) they had agreed to schedule such talks, or (b) they had not yet responded, at the time of our announcement of deployment decision? Finally, we would appreciate your general observations on best way to gear our continuing interest in strategic arms control talks with announcement of limited deployment decision.

5. Your views and comments desired soonest.

GP-1

END

RUSK

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DS-322A

CONTINUATION SHEET

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

826

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-365

By *ij*, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Action

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DE RUEHCR 896FD 2451010  
ZNY SSSSS

Info

O 021000Z SEP 67  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5857  
STATE GRNC  
BT

336

SEP 2, 1967, 7:04 AM

~~SECRET~~ MQSCOW 896

*Ratow*

NODIS

REF: STATE 30165

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS

1. IMPLICATION OF REFTEL IS THAT DECISION ANNOUNCE LIGHT DEPLOYMENT ALREADY MADE OR AT LEAST WILL PROBABLY BE MADE EVEN IF SOVIETS AGREE SCHEDULE TALKS. IF THIS IS THE CASE I STRONGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOT MAKE FURTHER APPROACH TO SOVIETS UNLESS WE CAN TELL THEM FRANKLY THAT ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE. OTHERWISE THEY WILL HAVE GOOD CASE FOR CHARGING BAD FAITH AND CANCELLING TALKS WITH GREAT DAMAGE TO OUR POSITION BEFORE WORLD OPINION. IF NOT POSSIBLE TELL THEM OUR INTENTIONS NOW, BELIEVE WE SHOULD PROCEED PROMPTLY WITH ANNOUNCEMENT AT SAME TIME EXPRESSING OUR DESIRE PROCEED WITH STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL TALKS. WHILE OUR ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT SOVIET

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 896FD ~~SECRET~~

AGREEMENT TO TALKS WE COULD STRESS THAT THEY ARE ALREADY CARRYING OUT DEPLOYMENT.

2. IF WE CAN GIVE FIRM INDICATION OUR INTENTION MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT I BELIEVE WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO TAKE UP THE MATTER INFORMALLY WITH BOTH GROMYKO AND DOBRYNIN, PARTICULARLY IF I COULD TELL THEM THAT IF THEY SCHEDULE TALKS WE WILL BE PREPARED PRESENT MORE CONCRETE PROPOSAL.

3. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT WE SHOULD GO FURTHER AND PUT FORWARD PROPOSAL NOW. WE KNOW SOVIET MILITARY OPPOSED AND IN ABSENCE OF SPECIFIC PROPOSAL THEY CAN CONJURE UP ALL KINDS OF PITFALLS IN ARGUING AGAINST TALKS AS WELL AS ARGUMENT THAT US NOT SINCERE AND MERELY WISHES OBTAIN INFORMATION ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

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-2- MOSCOW 896, 021000Z SEP 67

PLANS. (DOBRYNIN INDICATED TO ME CIVILIANS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO COUNTER MILITARY ARGUMENTS ON THIS HIGHLY TECHNICAL SUBJECT.) ALSO IN EVENT SOVIETS CONTINUE FAIL TO OPEN TALKS WE WILL BE IN MUCH STRONGER POSITION WHEN OUR DECISION DEPLOY ANNOUNCED IF WE HAD PUT FORWARD SERIOUS PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE IF SPECIFIC PROPOSAL MADE SOVIETS WILL IN FACT AT LEAST AGREE TO DISCUSS IT.

4. SINCE SOVIET MILITARY POSITION CLEAR, BELIEVE ATTEMPT TO

PAGE 3 RUEHCR 896FD ~~SECRET~~

ADVANCE CONSIDERATION THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS LIKELY BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE.

5. RE LAST QUESTION REFTTEL, FROM SOVIET POINT OF VIEW PUBLIC EMPHASIS THAT DEPLOYMENT NECESSITATED BY CHICOM DEVELOPMENTS HAS BOTH PROS AND CONS. FROM OURS I AM INCLINED TO VIEW WE SHOULD AVOID TAKING ANY OFFICIAL POSITION ON THIS AS UNCERTAINTY WOULD BRING MORE PRESSURE ON SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE. MIGHT BE HELPFUL STATE THAT OUR BASIC POSITION BASED ON DETERRENCE, WE RECOGNIZE INTEREST OF SOVIETS THAT DETERRENCE BE MUTUAL AND THAT WE ALWAYS STAND READY TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR BOTH SIDES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY AT LOWEST PRACTICAL LEVEL.

GP-1

THOMPSON

BT

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*Pres. file*

Monday, September 4, 1967  
11:35 a. m.

Mr. President:

This defensive move by the Viet Cong with respect to their political program suggests they feel Saigon is gaining the political initiative.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4809

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1992  
By LG, NARA, Date 9-13-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

83a  
September 4, 1967

Text of Cable from Saigon 4809

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER

SUBJECT: New Viet Cong Program

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-365  
By ing, NARA, Date 12-15-94

In a surprise move which in timing and substance appears to be a defensive reaction to the South Vietnamese elections, the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam issued on September 1 a completely refurbished political program.

Although the old National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam program of December 20, 1960, has long been outmoded and overtaken by events of the past seven years, there was no prior indication that a revised platform would be announced at this time. Hanoi and the Front apparently felt compelled to revise the program in order to counter the political momentum the Government of South Vietnam is gathering in the constitutional and electoral process which culminates in the September 3 national elections.

Content: The program broadly covers every aspect of policy in South Vietnam and militantly pledges determination to continue the war until "total victory." In the 1967 program the U.S. replaces the Diem regime of 1960 as the chief villain. The portion devoted to internal South Vietnam policies is much expanded; foreign policy and questions of reunification remain essentially unchanged.

The statement (as carried by Hanoi's Vietnam News Agency, September 2,) stresses that the main purpose of the revised program is to "further broaden the bloc of great national unity." The Government of Vietnam constitution and elections are condemned as tricks of the U.S. The Front is proclaimed as the sole genuine representative of the heroic South Vietnam people, holding four-fifths of South Vietnamese territory and two-thirds of the population. Principal tasks of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam are now listed as:

- a. unite the people,
- b. defeat the U.S.
- c. overthrow the Government of Vietnam,

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- d. establish a democratic, neutral, peaceful Vietnam,
- e. proceed toward reunification.

These steps reflect a modification of the old program wherein overthrow of Diem was the first aim in 1960 followed by creation of a broad government and implementation of general policy goals. Unification of all groups was expressed in 1960 as a general endeavor rather than a specific (and by implication unfulfilled) objective as in the present statement. The present program appeals for a "great national union;" it sweepingly invites all groups and individuals to join the Front, and vows that the Front will fight on until the U. S. and satellites withdraw their troops and allow the South Vietnamese people to solve their problems alone.

Specific internal policies focus on reaction to Government of Vietnam developments. The political platform flatly pledges:

- a. not to recognize the Government of Vietnam National Assembly,
- b. to abolish the Government of Vietnam constitution and laws,
- c. to hold free elections for a new assembly which will draft a constitution, and
- d. to create a "National Union" government. All civil liberties (freedom of press, speech, etc.) are promised the people.

Economic and social policies are somewhat expanded over the 1960 model without substantive difference. Less emphasis is placed on reducing land rent and more placed on confiscation and reallocation of property.

Military policy is based on the familiar three-pronged doctrine (political, military, proselytism) using main forces, regional troops and guerrillas in combined tactics for these purposes.

Policy towards minorities remains founded on elimination of discrimination, and the establishment of autonomous zones.

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-3-

A new social plank pledges to respect freedom of religion and to seek equality among creeds. This appears to be a clear gesture toward the Buddhists.

A completely new addition is a prisoner of war policy and a Front "Chieu Hoi" appeal to the Government of Vietnam and U.S. troops to desert to the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam which will pardon crimes and provide equal jobs and rewards to ralliers.

The Front states it will treat U.S. and satellite ralliers kindly and return them to their families "when conditions permit." Captured U.S. and satellite troops "will be treated as captured puppet troops."

On foreign policy the program reaffirms the 1960 tenets of neutrality, peaceful coexistence, respect for other countries, refusal of military alliances, etc. The reunification plank is practically unchanged with slightly more emphasis placed on step-by-step process.

The program ends with the same contradiction as in 1960 by stating the Front "actively supports" national liberation movements (including an addition, the "just struggle of black people in the U.S. . . .") on one hand while blithely pledging to safeguard world peace on the other.

Comment: More sophisticated and broader in appeal than in 1960, the new program appears to be an attempt to refurbish the Front's tarnished image in the eyes of the South Vietnamese people and the world. Timed on the eve of the September 3 national elections and specifically pledging to eliminate the political accomplishments of the Government of Vietnam over the past year, it also appears aimed at retrieving the political initiative and discrediting the constitutionality of the new government in Saigon.

The great stress on the need for further broadening of the Front may reflect concern within the Viet Cong that it is losing political momentum. It is also an admission that the Front has not yet been successful in uniting all groups opposing or passive to the Government of Vietnam, and may reflect Viet Cong intentions to woo losers in the elections. Ironically, the new Front program borrows several elements from the Government of Vietnam, notably the process of constitutional evolution and national reconciliation, both of which the 1960 program incorporates much more explicitly the substance of Hanoi's four points

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-4-

of 1965 as regards settlement of the war, especially the key third point on the status of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam. As in the 1960 platform, there is no hint in the current statement that the war might be settled through negotiations or accommodation by the Front.

Although the present program is introduced with grandiose claims of sweeping achievements in the years since 1960, it does not detail accomplishments in terms of specific policies projected in the old program. It simply alleges that the broad achievements of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam have proved that the line and policy area correct and assures its followers that they are in a victorious initiative. It seems likely, however, that this inspirational language will not disguise from its people that the Front is in fact holding out only the prospect of more desperate struggle and a dusted off, repolished version of the same goals for the future as were promised seven long years ago.

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84

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 4, 1967 -- 10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Your guidance is required in response to this query from Lodge. In effect, he asks if he should report in to you or go directly home to Beverly from Andrews.

Our choices are:

- Have no one in, and leave things where they stand.
- Have Lodge in to report the experiences and attitudes of the group and its members.
- Have them all in, including Lodge.

In the latter case, you may wish to send a message via Lodge to the group in Hawaii, along the following lines:

"On behalf of the American people, I thank you all for performing a notable and arduous public service in going to Viet Nam and observing their presidential election.

"You went as individuals and you will, of course, make known your reactions and judgments, as some of you have already done. I would, however, be greatly interested to hear directly from you an account of your experiences and reflections. I would, therefore, be grateful if you could join me at the White House on Sept 6 (for a meeting, reception, lunch, or dinner), directly after your arrival in Washington from Honolulu."

We now expect the Lodge party to arrive at Andrews at approximately 9:00 a.m., Wednesday morning, Sept. 6.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 10, 1983.

BY 29 ON 9-13-91

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EYES ONLY

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O 040553Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 040514Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB LODGE SAIGON 084

NO NIGHT ACTION

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW.

UNLESS I HEAR FROM YOU TO THE CONTRARY I PLAN TO GO DIRECTLY  
FROM ANDREWS TO BEVERLY. I WILL TELEPHONE YOU IMMEDIATELY  
UPON ARRIVAL.  
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EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-139  
By 31, NARA, Date 9-18-01

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Schedule for Observers  
(All times EDT)

Arrive Guam	11:10 AM Sep 4
Dept Guam	12:10 AM Sep 4
Arrive Hickham	7:30 PM Sep 4
Dept Hickham	10:45 PM Sep 5
Arrive Travis (Calif)	3:25 AM Sep 6
Dept Travis	4:25 AM Sep 6
Arrive Andrews	9:00 AM Sep 6

Any changes to this tentative schedule will  
be communicated to us as the plane progresses.





Department of State

85a  
**TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 04631 011334Z

42  
ACTION SS 25

INFO /025 W

R 010600Z SEP 87  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5817

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 4631

EXDIS

1. FOLLOWING HIS ARRIVAL IN SAIGON, ROGER HILSMAN GAVE POLITICAL COUNSELOR FOLLOWING REPORT OF TWO-HOUR CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DCM (NGUYEN TU VU) IN PHNOM PENH ON AUGUST 24. HILSMAN SAID HE HAD NOT PERCEIVED ANYTHING REALLY NEW IN THE TALK BUT HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE REPORTED IN CASE THERE WERE SOME FACTORS OF WHICH HE WAS NOT AWARE.

2. HILSMAN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE AUSTRALIANS, CANADIAN COMMISSIONER NUTTING, AND THE CAMBODIANS THAT THE NVN DEPUTY WAS IN FACT THE REAL POWER IN THE NVN EMBASSY.

3. HILSMAN SAID HE HAD DESCRIBED HIS CURRENT WORLD TRIP TO THE DCM IN TERMS OF AN EFFORT TO LOOK AHEAD TO THE WORLD SITUATION IN THE 1970'S. HE DESCRIBED HIS VISITS TO THE USSR AND THE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 4631 ~~SECRET~~

EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. DCM ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR WAS. HILSMAN DESCRIBED IT AS REFLECTING A GENUINE INTEREST IN DE-INTERNATIONALIZING OF THE WAR. SOVIETS AND EASTERN EUROPEANS HAD STATED THAT AS A FIRST STEP THE U.S. SHOULD STOP THE BOMBING OF

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WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION  
~~SECRET~~ OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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PAGE 02 SAIGON 04631 011334Z

NORTH VIETNAM UNCONDITIONALLY. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE NVN WOULD THEN TAKE ANY SUCCEEDING STEPS, THEY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT HANOI COULD BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW ITS REGULAR NVA DIVISIONS FROM SVN.

4. IN LENGTHY DISCUSSION THIS SUBJECT HELSMAN SAID <sup>DCM</sup> ~~HE~~ NEVER MADE REFERENCE TO PRIOR REQUIREMENT OF U.S. FORCE WITHDRAWALS FROM SVN. HE ALSO NEVER DENIED NVA FORCES WERE IN SVN ALTHOUGH ON THE OTHER HAND HE NEVER STATED THAT THEY WERE THERE. IN REPLY TO HELSMAN'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER NVN WOULD WITHDRAW ITS REGULAR DIVISIONS, DCM SAID QUOTE FOR OUR PART WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE 14 MILLION PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, WHO STAND WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, WILL BE ABLE TO BRING THE STRUGGLE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WITHOUT DIRECT MILITARY HELP FROM NORTH VIETNAM UNQUOTE.

5. IN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBLE CESSATION OF U.S. BOMBING DCM

PAGE 2 RUNJIR 0631 SECRET

SAID THAT TALKS COULD FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. HELSMAN ASKED IF THIS COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE U.S. FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN AND DCM SAID YES.

6. HELSMAN EXPRESSED THE VIEW TO DCM THAT HE WOULD THINK HANOI AND NLF WOULD NOT SEE LONG TERM ADVANTAGES ON THE MILITARY SIDE, AND THAT PURSUIT OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, INCLUDING NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD OFFER ADVANTAGES FOR THEM. WHY, THEREFORE, DO THEY NOT PURSUE THIS COURSE? DCM REPLIED HE DID NOT HAVE THE COMPETENCY TO RESPOND TO THIS QUESTION AND WOULD REFER IT TO HANOI.

7. HELSMAN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN IN STRONG TERMS TO DCM ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE U.S. HE SAID THAT HE FEARED NVN WAS COMPLETELY MISINTERPRETING VOICES OF DISSENT IN THE U.S. HELSMAN POINTED OUT THAT HE DIFFERED WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY, BUT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD NOT CONCLUDE FROM SUCH DIFFERENCES THAT THERE WAS ANY CHANGE IN U.S. DETERMINATION. HE ADDED THAT INCREASING U.S. CASUALTIES WERE IN FACT STIFFENING U.S. RESISTANCE AS WAS U.S. BOMBING OF NVN ON THEIR SIDE. HELSMAN

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THEN SAID THAT THE LOGICAL STEP FROM BOTH SIDES WAS TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS. HE CONCLUDED THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT IN THE U.S. THE HAWKS AND DOVES ARE POLARIZED AND THAT THE IMPORTANT DEBATE WAS

~~PAGE 1 RUMJER 04631 SECRET~~

AMONG THE GREAT MAJORITY WHO HOLD DIFFERING VIEWS BUT WHO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR OUR POSITION IN VIETNAM. HILSMAN ASKED THAT THE FOREGOING BE REPORTED TO HANOI AND DCM SAID HE WOULD DO SO.

8. HILSMAN SAID HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION FROM THIS CONVERSATION WAS THAT THERE WAS NO CURRENT GIVE IN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VIEW ON NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN IF SOME OF THE FOREGOING LOOKED LIKE A SHIFT, WHEN INTERPRETED IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER STATEMENTS, HE PERSONALLY DOUBTED THAT THIS WAS THE INTENT. HILSMAN EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE DPM WAS VERY POSSIBLY NOT IN A POSITION TO SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY FOR HIS GOVERNMENT.

9. COMMENT: (A) WE NOTE THAT THE ABOVE VIEWS BY NGUYEN TU VU APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WITH AND RECONFIRM HANOI DIPLOMATIC STATEMENTS OVER PAST SIX MONTHS WHICH GIVE APPEARANCE OF SLIGHT ADJUSTMENT IN NVN TACTICS IN HOPES OF ENDING BOMBING. EXAMPLES HAVE BEEN VARIOUS REMARKS BY NGUYEN DUY TRINH (APRIL HOC TAP ARTICLE, MAY INTERVIEW WITH JAPANESE NEWSMEN AND INTERVIEW WITH AUSTRIAN PAPER VOLKSTIMME). (B) THIS LINE, WHICH APPEARS TO BE A FURTHER REFINEMENT OF THE TRINH BURCHETT JANUARY 28

~~PAGE 2 RUMJER 04631 SECRET~~

INTERVIEW, DRAWS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE CONFLICT IN SVN AND THE AIR WAR IN THE NORTH. HANOI EXPRESSES READINESS TO TALK AFTER BOMBING STOPPED AND DOES NOT SEEM TO EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY WITHDRAWAL OF NVA TROOPS FROM SVN. THE QUESTION OF US TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS NOT MADE A PRIOR REQUIREMENT. (C) ABOVE SUBTLE MODULATION IN NVN STANCE, INTIMATING SOME TACTICAL GIVE, ALLOWS HANOI TO SEEK BOMBING HALT WHILE MAINTAINING COMMITMENT TO THE VIET CONG TO CONTINUE THE WAR IN THE SOUTH. THIS LINE ALSO SUGGESTS A GREATER ROLE FOR THE NLF AND KEEPS THE NEGOTIA-

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 04631 011334Z

TIONS ROAD OPEN. FYUYEN TO VU CONVERSATION WITH HILSMAN ADDS ONE MORE SMALL PIECE OF EVIDENCE TO SPECULATION THAT THIS VARIATION ON TALKS-FOR-BOMBING-HALT FORMULA IS PREDICATED ON FURTHER SEPARATING PROBLEMS OF WAR IN THE SOUTH FROM THOSE IN THE NORTH, THUS LEAVING HANOI WITH NUMBER OF OPTIONS OPEN WITH RESPECT TO WAR IN THE SOUTH, WHILE ENDING THE BOMBING IN NVN. (D) WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S COMMENTS ON FOREGOING.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

August 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM TO: EUR - Mr. Leddy

FROM: H - William B. Macomber, Jr.

This morning Senator John Sherman Cooper called me to say he had been invited to have lunch today with the Chargé d'Affaires of the Soviet Embassy. He indicated that the purpose of his call was to notify me of his prospective luncheon, and said that he would make available to the Department a report on what was said.

Immediately following the luncheon, Senator Cooper dictated, and transmitted to me, the attached.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-365

By WJ, NARA, Date 12-15-94

cc: Office of Security  
Attention: Mr. Muhonen

H:WBMacomber, Jr:jac:rfs

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



To: August 30, 1967, I talked with *Tchervinnikov* *85c*  
Charge d'Affaires of the Russian Embassy at the Embassy. On Friday, August 25th, he had called my office and asked me to have lunch with him. I had met him briefly at my house in Washington, where he had come with Mr. Theodore Weintal, but I did not talk to him on that day about any political matters. I was at the Russian Embassy from 1:00 o'clock to 2:15 PM.

He opened the conversation by saying that he had recently returned from Moscow, where he had gone on leave for approximately 30 days. He said it had not been a vacation, because he had worked at the foreign office every day and had spent the evenings, when not at the foreign office, talking to private citizens, officials, and "statesmen", that he had little time for his family, and had come back to Washington quite tired. He went on to say that the dominant theme in his conversations with the above groups had, at their initiative, been the war in Vietnam; that the Russian people do not want war, remembering the scars of World War II; and now, as Russia was showing improvement in economic field, in education, in science, etc., war was even more feared.

*JML* He said that he was Chargé at the time of the Middle East crisis and that he knew of the care and precision which the U.S.S.R. had communicated and worked to avoid any engagement in the crisis. In response to my question that did not that experience indicate clearly that the United States desired to make no war against the Soviet Union, and that was the President's position, he answered in the affirmative. But he went on to say that there is always a possibility that a mistake or events that could cause misunderstanding could create dangerous situations. *and the President*

*JML* Vietnam, he noted, was such a dangerous situation. He said if the bombing of North Vietnam were ended that dangers between the Soviet Union and the United States would be avoided and many things would fall in place. I make it clear that he did not say, and I did not ask him, if the Soviet Union would go to war over Vietnam. I asked him that in the case that the United States should cease bombing of North Vietnam, would it lead to negotiations. His answer was that he felt sure that the cessation of bombing would have led to negotiations some months ago, but that North Vietnam had hardened its position and he could not say. I asked him then if the submission of the matter of Vietnam to the United Nations would lead to negotiations, or would it lead to the reconvening of the Geneva Conference. He said that he did not believe so because the war was an internal matter in Vietnam and he did not think an international matter could solve it. *and*

*JML* I then said to him that what he was proposing was that the United States cease bombing and without any assurance that North Vietnam would negotiate, or that the United Nations or the Security Council would assume jurisdiction and try to settle the war. I said also that we were supplying the South Vietnamese and I assume the Soviet Union would continue to supply the Vietcong. He responded by saying that the Soviet Union had not provided supplies to the Vietcong, except small rifles and machine guns; that its supply of sophisticated weapons had been to North Vietnam, a socialist ally to whom it was committed and a country whose territory was under attack by the United States. He said that in the event the United States ceased bombing of North Vietnam there would be no necessity for the Soviet Union to provide supplies to the North Vietnamese, and that the supplies to the Vietcong were at a minimum. He thought in such a situation fighting would go on in South Vietnam, but it would eventually dry up.

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NEJ 94-365  
By *sig*, NARA, Date *12-15-94*

I asked him if he believed Communist China would intervene in the war. He said that Communist China had large influence in North Vietnam, but he could not say whether or not it would intervene, but again the bombing created danger. He said that while the Soviet Union did not know exactly what was going on in Communist China, its estimate was as follows:

Mao and his associates, while great revolutionaries, could not succeed in the economic development of China; there is a younger group Chinese, many of whom have been educated in Russia, who are able economists, and scientists, and who could lead in the development of China; Mao and his associated were unwilling to yield to this group and that the struggle might go on for years.

I asked him if there was any opinion in Russia that China might attack Russia. He at first said no, but then said there was danger of trouble along Russia's eastern border with China. He said the Chinese would like nothing better than to provoke a war between the United States and Russia, and he did not believe that the United States was sufficiently aware of the possibility of such provocation by China. He noted that a Chinese submarine might sink an American vessel simply to provoke a war. He further stated that he did not believe the United States government was sufficiently aware of the danger of irresponsible use by the Chinese of nuclear weapons it has developed.

In summary, it is my opinion that his chief concern about the war in Vietnam was that it might in some way engage the Soviet Union with the United States, and that it was the bombing that caused this danger. He was very open throughout our talk, but I said nothing to him that I have not noted in this statement. Before going to the Soviet Union Embassy I called Assistant Secretary of State Macomber and told him of my proposed visit and that I would report my conversation, which I am doing.

*John Macomber*

JSC:mk  
August 30, 1967

cc: Mr. of State

Mr. Macomber

Mr. Macomber

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

AUG 30 1967 15200

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Rostow 8

Subject: Possible Shifts in the Communist Position on the Front's Role

We were struck with the statement on the Front's greater flexibility made by Yuri Tcherniakov, Minister-Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, in his August 28 conversation with Mr. Bundy. Tcherniakov said that "his study of NLF statements in Moscow had indicated to him that the NLF had become much more flexible, notably in some January interviews with Burchett and with some Eastern European journalist. In his view, those interviews demonstrated that the NLF, in stating its five points, was no longer talking in terms of being treated as the 'sole' representative of the South Vietnamese people, but was much more flexible as to its status and as to the nature of the future government of the South and its orientation, i.e., that they were receptive to other groups being fully represented and to the government taking a neutral posture."

Reviewing statements made publicly and privately by the Front and Hanoi since January 1, 1967, on the issues raised by Tcherniakov, we find that while the public posture remains unchanged the private position has undergone some revision.

On Representation

1. Public statements from the Front and Hanoi since January 1 provide little basis for concluding that the Communists have retreated from the claim that the Front is "the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people," nor do they cast any light on long-standing ambiguities with respect to this claim. Although the Front has consistently stated that it must negotiate on matters concerning the South it has continued to leave ambiguous the question of whether other South Vietnamese representatives might also be present. Some of the 1967 statements indicate that the US must recognize the Front as the "sole" genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people, but other statements have either omitted this phrase or used it simply as their description of the Front.

2. However, in a recent US-conducted interrogation a long-time VC-Communist cadre (whose testimony on other points suggests that he is well-informed) said that the Front has changed its position and that, although in 1965 it believed it should be the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, it is now "more realistic." Referring to an April 1967 cadre conference on current policy, he said that the cadres present "felt that both sides would have to accept compromises in their publicly declared positions."

3. Added interest is given to this testimony by indications from Hanoi's private statements that Hanoi itself may be more flexible on this

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-365

By 128, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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- 2 -

issue and is at least interested in exploring in some detail the difference between its position and that of the US on the role of the Front. On July 24, omitting any of the usual preliminaries about how the US would have to deal with the NLF on all questions concerning South Vietnam, Pham Van Dong, speaking to Aubrac and Marcovich, said simply that the NLF would have to be "present" when South Vietnamese matters are discussed. The second strong hint of flexibility is contained in Loan's August 19 request to Algard that he "find out" if the US is willing to accept the Liberation Front as a political factor. This query, at the very least, suggests that Hanoi may have been seeking further elucidation of the position, expressed to Loan by Algard on August 5, that the US would accept the NLF either as a part of the Hanoi delegation or as a separate group.

#### On the Future Government of the South and its Orientation

1. No statement from Hanoi or the Front, public or private, has suggested any change in the Communist position on a future coalition government, which in any case has always ostensibly been a very liberal one, stressing the inclusion of representatives of a broad spectrum of groups, organizations, social classes, etc.

2. However, the "neutral" character of this future government -- also a long-standing theme -- has been given much greater emphasis by the Front and Hanoi in 1967 than was the case in 1966 and 1965.

#### Conclusions

Although Tcherniakov's own claims as to the drift of Vietnamese Communist public statements are borne out only with reference to the "neutral posture" issue (and this is a matter of greater emphasis rather than new content) there is other evidence to support his suggestion of increased flexibility. This evidence applies most convincingly to the question of representation in negotiations. It is possible that, if indeed the Communists are exploring a more flexible posture, this is the first question to which they would turn their attention as one that in their minds should precede the question of the composition of a future government and the modalities for its achievement.

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*Profile*

Monday, September 4, 1967 -- 10:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a proposed State Department draft of a low-key statement to be made today, either by State or by George Christian.

I am sure that you wish to wait a bit before any major pronouncements are made by senior officials of the government.

We might consider adding a sentence like the following, although the point has been made in most dispatches:

"It is an important and heartening fact that of the total population of South Viet Nam of voting age, 76% registered to vote; and, of these, 83% actually voted. The results, therefore, reflect the views of more than 60% of the voting population -- a figure similar to that in the United States in the Presidential elections of 1960 and 1964 and better than the ten previous Presidential elections in the United States."

W. W. Rostow

State Dept. draft approved \_\_\_\_\_

Approved as modified \_\_\_\_\_

State Dept. should handle \_\_\_\_\_

George Christian should handle \_\_\_\_\_

State Dept. should handle \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DRAFT STATEMENT

The large turnout in the face of a massive Viet Cong effort to disrupt the elections is a further manifestation of the courage of the South Vietnamese people. It also demonstrates their desire to establish democratic government.

We note the general consensus of the American and other foreign observers that the election was conducted remarkably smoothly and fairly in light of the wartime conditions and Viet Cong harassment.

The results of the election are not yet final. However, the people of South Viet-Nam have expressed their choice and deserve our support. They are determining their own future, and an elected government, constitutionally based, is a major step forward.

*Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1967  
Monday 6:30 am

Mr. President:

•. Vietnam election reports are attached

1. CIA summary of latest returns

Thieu-Ky have 35.1% of votes tallied  
Dzu is second with 17.4%

2. Message from Ambassador Bunker  
giving his first comments on the  
election.

3. United Press morning story  
Thieu-Ky overwhelmingly elected  
Dzu charges fraud

*Bromley Smith*  
Bromley Smith

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CO YEKADS  
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FM CIA  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 040345Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 080

NO NIGHT ACTION

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW.

1. I HAVE ARRANGED WITH SCAMMON TO GIVE BACKGROUNDER TO THE PRESS AT NOON TODAY. HE WILL ALSO BE GLAD TO DO A PIECE ON TV FOLLOWING BRIEFING WITH TELEVISION PEOPLE IF THEY WANT HIM, WHICH I IMAGINE THEY WILL.
2. SCAMMON, HERZBERG, AND PENNIMAN CAME TO SEE ME LATE YESTERDAY AFTER CLOSING OF POLLS AND REPORTED THEY HAD OBSERVED POLLING SAIGON, TAY NINH, AND SEVERAL OTHER PLACES AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT POLLING EXTREMELY WELL ORGANIZED, ORDERLY, AND IN THEIR WORDS "A VERY MOVING EXPERIENCE."
3. IN MY MESSAGE YESTERDAY, I MENTIONED THAT WE RATHER EXPECTED A SOMEWHAT SMALLER PERCENTAGE OF VOTING TO TOTAL REGISTRATION THAN LAST YEAR. BUT TO FIND THAT 83 PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS HAVE CAST THEIR BALLOTS IS AN ENCOURAGING AND HEARTWARMING EXPERIENCE. IN THE FACE OF DESPERATE EFFORTS BY THE VC TO DISRUPT THE ELECTIONS. I THINK IT IS A REMARKABLE PERFORMANCE AND AN EXAMPLE OF COURAGE AND DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, DEMONSTRATING THEIR INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND IN ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IT IS THE BEST ANSWER THAT COULD BE GIVEN TO THE DOUBTERS AT HOME AND ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD.
4. NOW WE MUST GET ON WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT AND THE MANY OTHER THINGS THAT NEED TO BE DONE. WE WILL BE SENDING IN OUR VIEWS SHORTLY.
5. PLEASE SAY TO THE PRESIDENT ALSO THAT I THINK HE IS ENTITLED TO TAKE GREAT SATISFACTION IN THIS JUSTIFICATION OF HIS FAITH AND OF HIS DETERMINATION IN STAYING THE COURSE HERE.
6. REGARDS.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

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~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

PRESERVATION COPY

ELECTION 9/4 NX

DAY LD

BY DANIEL SOUTHERLAND

SAIGON (UPI)--CHIEF OF STATE NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND PREMIER NGUYEN CAO KY WERE OVERWHELMINGLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TODAY BY AN 83 PER CENT TURNOUT OF VOTERS WHO DEFIED FIERCE TERRORISM TO DEAL COMMUNIST INFLUENCE A STUNNING SETBACK.

THEY IMMEDIATELY FACED A GATHERING POLITICAL STORM THAT THREATENED TO BUFFET THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT BEFORE IT GETS A TOEHOLD ON DEMOCRACY.

THIEU CELEBRATED VICTORY BY GOING DEEP SEA FISHING WITH AN ARMED GUARD. HIS CLOSEST CIVILIAN CHALLENGER CHARGED THE THREE-STAR GENERAL "WON BY FRAUD."

THE ACCUSATION BY SAIGON LAWYER THUONG DINH DZU, WHO TRAILED THIEU BY A 2-1 MARGIN BUT WAS THE SURPRISE VOTE-GETTER OF THE ELECTION, FOLLOWED ANNOUNCEMENT BY FORMER PREMIER TRAN VAN HUONG, THE THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, THAT HE AND ASSOCIATES WOULD FORM AN OPPOSITION GROUP TO THE NEW REGIME.

THERE WERE ALSO REPORTS MILITANT BUDDHISTS WERE ABOUT TO DECLARE THEY WOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THIEU AND KY AS LEGITIMATELY ELECTED.

THIEU AND KY, THE TWO GENERALS WHO HAVE RULED SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE 1965, APPARENTLY WON BY THE 45 PER CENT MARGIN THIEU HAD PREDICTED.

IT WAS A BIG VICTORY FOR THE "EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY" BACKED STRONGLY BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON.

UNOFFICIAL RETURNS WITH NEARLY THREE-FOURTHS OF THE 4.9 MILLION VOTES COUNTED SHOWED THESE TOTALS: THIEU 1,570,374; DZU 709,569; HUONG 431,429.

THE BIG LOSERS IN THE NATION'S FIRST FREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, WHICH ALSO CHOSE A 60-MAN SENATE, WERE THE COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED VIET CONG WHO FAILED

TO DETER VOTERS DESPITE THEIR BLOODIEST TERROR CAMPAIGN OF THE WAR.

THE TURNOUT WAS A STUNNING POLITICAL SETBACK FOR THE GUERRILLAS WHO KILLED, WOUNDED AND KIDNAPED MORE THAN 2,500 CIVILIANS IN A FREE-WHEELING FRIGHT WAVE TO SCARE VOTERS AWAY FROM THE POLLS.

DURING THE HOURS THE POLLS WERE OPEN, SQUADS OF TERRORISTS ATTACKED EIGHT PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND BOMBED DOZENS OF POLLING PLACES, INCLUDING SEVERAL IN SAIGON, KILLING OR WOUNDING AT LEAST 273 VOTERS, ELECTION OFFICIALS AND POLL WATCHERS.

IN ONE VILLAGE VOTERS WOUNDED BY A BOMB BLAST STAGGERED TO THEIR FEET, BOUND THEIR WOUNDS AND PAINFULLY CAST THEIR BALLOTS IN A SHOW OF FORTITUDE THAT "AMAZED" SEN. GEORGE MURPHY, R-CALIF., ONE OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 22 APPOINTED ELECTION OBSERVERS.

THE BOMB EXPLODED IN THE TUY HOA POLLING PLACE ONLY 10 MINUTES BEFORE MURPHY AND NORTH DAKOTA GOV. GUY S. WHITE WERE TO ARRIVE. THEIR PLANE ARRIVED THREE HOURS LATE.

"HALF OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERE WOUNDED DRESSED THEIR WOUNDS AND, BY GOD, THESE PEOPLE GOT UP AND VOTED," MURPHY SAID. "ANY PLACE WHERE YOU FIND ENTHUSIASM LIKE THAT SHOULD GET THE BEST WE CAN GIVE THEM."

THE 21 OTHER OBSERVERS INDICATED THEY FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF CROOKED VOTING AND WERE PLEASED WITH THE ELECTION'S CONDUCT. THEY MADE NO GROUP EVALUATION, HOWEVER, AND SAID THERE WOULD BE NONE OR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION.

~~THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THE THIEU-KY MILITARY TICKET WOULD WIN~~

THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THE THIEU-KY MILITARY TICKET WOULD WIN OVER THE 10 CIVILIAN HOPEFULS BECAUSE OF STRONG MILITARY AND CIVIL SERVICE BACKING.

THE BIGGEST SURPRISE, EVEN GREATER THAN THE 33 PER CENT TURNOUT, WAS THE SHOWING OF DZU, THE SELF-STYLED "PEACE" CANDIDATE WHOSE SYMBOL WAS A WHITE DOVE.

LITTLE KNOWN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, HE SWEEP PAST HUOI AND PHAM KHAC SUU, CHAIRMAN OF THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH LAST YEAR WROTE THE NATION'S CONSTITUTION.

SUU HAD JUMPED QUICKLY TO SECOND PLACE BUT FELL TO FOURTH AS OUTLYING PROVINCES REPORTED IN.

DZU, LOUDEST CAMPAIGN CRITIC OF THIEU, CALLED HIM "DISLOYAL" DURING THE CAMPAIGN. THIEU RESPONDED BY SAYING DZU BELONGED IN A CAGE AND CALLED HIM A "DOG" AND A "HORSE."

INTERVIEWED TODAY BENEATH A BROILING SUN ON THE STEPS OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING WHERE THE VOTES WERE TABULATED, DZU CHARGED THIEU AND KY "WON BY FRAUD."

HE SAID, "WITHOUT FRAUD THEY COULD NEVER WIN. WITHOUT FRAUD, WE WOULD HAVE WON BECAUSE WE HAVE THE PEACE PROGRAM."

DZU SAID HE WOULD SHOW THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY EVIDENCE OF "NATIONWIDE FRAUD." POST-ELECTION COMPLAINTS ARE TO BE FILED WITH THE ASSEMBLY, WHICH MUST STILL GIVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE ELECTION. IT COULD DECLARE IT VOID AND ORDER A NEW ONE.

IF THIEU AND KY ARE DECLARED WINNERS AS EXPECTED, THEY WILL BE INSTALLED IN OFFICE SOMETIME EARLY IN OCTOBER. BOTH WILL HAVE TO GIVE UP THEIR MILITARY OFFICES.

ON OCT. 22 A PERMANENT 137-MEMBER ASSEMBLY, OR LOWER HOUSE, WILL BE CHOSEN. THE TWO-HOUSE LEGISLATURE WILL EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE BUDGET AND TAXES. BY A THREE-FOURTHS VOTE IT CAN DECLARE A LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTED GOVERNMENT AND FORCE AN ELECTION FOR A NEW ONE.

THIEU AS PRESIDENT WILL NAME A PRIME MINISTER TO FORM A GOVERNMENT. AMERICAN OFFICIALS HAVE QUIETLY TRIED TO PERSUADE HUONG TO ACCEPT THE JOB BUT AIDES SAID HE ANGRILY REFUSED TO "LEGITIMIZE" THE MILITARY TICKET.

CM/YM/FM509AED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 4, 1967

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE IN HONOLULU

Would you be good enough to convey this message to the group of observers whose visit you have organized and managed with your usual distinction and effectiveness.

"On behalf of the American people, I thank you all for performing a notable and arduous public service in going to Viet Nam and observing their presidential election.

"You went as individuals and you will, of course, make known your reactions and judgments, as some of you have already done. I would, however, be greatly interested to hear directly from you an account of your experiences and reflections.

"I would, therefore, be grateful if those of you who find it possible and convenient could join me at the White House on September 6 at 11:00 a.m. After an informal exchange of views, you undoubtedly would wish to meet the press. After the noon Cabinet meeting, I would be pleased if you would all rejoin me for a lunch which I had already scheduled with another group of distinguished Americans.

"Let me underline that I will fully understand if the press of your responsibilities requires you to forego this invitation."

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 10, 1983.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

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Pres file  
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Sunday, September 3, 1967  
6:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 6)

Attached is a CIA graph based on 516,000 votes from 10 Vietnam's 50 electoral districts.

The breakdown is:

<u>Candidate</u>	<u>Vote</u>	<u>Percentage of Vote</u>
Thieu/Ky	157,900	30%
Sun/Dan	97,400	19%
Dzu/Chieu	80,402	16%
Huong/Truyen	43,872	9%
Quat/Chan	31,358	6%
Ky/Dinh	29,670	6%
Others	65,600	14%

There are no figures yet available on the Senate race.

I am compiling a separate report covering typical comments from observers, American and foreign.

William J. Jordan

Attachment.

WJJ:slh

90

Sunday, September 3, 1967,  
3:15 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 5)

The situation at 3:00 P. M. is:

Latest unofficial returns give Thieu 335,938 votes. Huong and his runningmate have about 185,000.

UPI is saying flatly that Thieu "was elected President of South Vietnam". Most press reports are noting that the "big losers" in the election were the Viet Cong who tried to disrupt the election with terror campaign of major proportions.

A source high in the Vietnamese government has given the following personal estimate of the outcome:

Thieu will carry II, III and IV Corps. Huong will carry Saigon. Two provinces in I Corps will go to Ha Thouck; the other I Corps will go to Suu.

I am sending separately the Embassy estimate of observer reactions as they know them.

William J. Jorden

WJJ:sln

11

Sunday, September 3, 1967, 1:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 4)

The situation at 1:00 P.M. is:

Thieu is maintaining a strong lead. Unofficial totals gave him 240,000. Huong has about 150,000. The others remain far behind.

We estimate there are 7,650,000 Vietnamese eligible to vote. With the 4,800,000 turnout, that is almost 63% of the eligibles. This result is better than in ten of the past twelve Presidential elections in the United States where comparable statistics are available. It was topped only in 1960 and 1964.

The press quotes our observers as saying that the elections were "more free than fraudulent." 18 of the 22 have said the election machinery was well organized.

William J. Jorden

WWJ:amc

Sunday, September 3, 1967, 12:50 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 3)

The situation at 12:00 Noon is:

The final voter turnout is even better than earlier reports indicated. 4,868,266 Vietnamese cast their ballots. That is 83% of the registered voters. (the turnout last September was 80.8%)

One major difference is the city vote--Saigon 76%, up from 66%; Gia Dinh 79%, up from 73%; Dalat 81%, up from 73%.

The totals with 83% of the registered voting and roughly 70% of those eligible having registered, the overall result compares favorably with most American elections in the last 30 years, and even with our best year, 1960, when 63.5% of those eligible voted.

Thieu and Ky have a sizeable lead at this point with 182,000 votes (unofficial).

Huong is second with about 150,000. However, Huong is leading in Saigon with 126,000 to Thieu's 115,000. The other civilians are running well behind.

You will enjoy a comment made by Senator Murphy who nearly ran into a Viet Cong booby trap at Tuy Hoa.

The Viet Cong set off an explosion which killed two Vietnamese and wounded 30. After visiting the site Murphy said:

"Half of the people who were wounded pressed their wounds and, by God, these people got up and voted. Any place where you find enthusiasm like that should get the best we can give them."

William J. Jorden

WJJ:amc



73

Sunday, September 3, 1967, 11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 2)

The situation at 11:00 A. M. is:

Late reports confirm the high turnout--roughly 80%. The surprise was the big turnout in Saigon--76% of registered voters compared with 60% in the Assembly election last September.

Saigon report shows Huong running well ahead with almost 20,000 votes thus far. Mr. Dzu, Saigon lawyer who ran a vigorous campaign against the Government, is second with 12,400. Thieu and Ky are slightly behind with 12,300.

Reports from the rest of the country still fragmentary.

Viet Cong terror was particularly high in I Corps. Four hamlets in one province were overrun by Viet Cong early in the morning. Vietnamese troops reacted quickly and liberated the hamlets. Voting went ahead normally.

Reports from the Delta indicate a high turnout although six province capitals and eleven district capitals were mortared.

William J. Jorden

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, September 3, 1967  
11:00 a.m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith our well-poised Ambassador  
in Saigon responds to your suggestion  
about Scammon and reports the situation  
as of election day.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 9-16-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

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FM CIA  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY 030521Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 977  
NO NIGHT ACTION  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

1. I AM SORRY OUR CONVERSATION EARLY THIS MORNING GOT INTERRUPTED BUT I RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE. PLEASE SAY TO THE PRESIDENT I LIKE HIS SUGGESTION AND THINK THAT A BACKGROUNDER BY SCAMMON AND HIS COLLEAGUES COULD BE USEFUL.

2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS WITH BARRY ZORTHIAN THIS MORNING AND HE ALSO FEELS THIS COULD BE USEFUL. HE MAKES THE POINT, WITH WHICH I AGREE, THAT WE WANT TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF OVERSELL TO THE PRESS. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE PUT A LOT OF WORK ON THEM HERE DURING THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.

3. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, I BELIEVE BACKGROUNDER SUCH AS SUGGESTED COULD BE USEFUL AND I AM SURE SCAMMON WITH HIS EXPERIENCE COULD MAKE IT INTERESTING. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES ARE IN TAY NINH TODAY AND I PLAN TO SEE THEM WHEN THEY RETURN LATE THIS AFTERNOON, AND ALSO TALK WITH SCAMMON ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF DOING TV INTERVIEW FOR SHOWING IN U.S.

4. YOU MIGHT ALSO SAY TO THE PRESIDENT THAT I THINK THE VISIT OF THE OBSERVER GROUP HAS BEEN VERY USEFUL EXERCISE. THEY HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN GETTING AROUND THE COUNTRY AND, OF COURSE, HAVE BEEN SOUGHT OUT BY OUR PRESS. I THINK THIS HAS BEEN A GOOD THING ALSO, FOR MANY OF THEM HAVE BECOME AWARE OF, AND SOME OF THEM SHOCKED, BY THE ONESIDED AND BIASED REPORTING OF MUCH OF THE PRESS HERE.

5. THE VOTING IS IN FULL SWING. I ANTICIPATE A SOMEWHAT SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS WILL BE RECORDED AS COMPARED WITH THE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS LAST YEAR. THIS IS DUE TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES APPEARING ON THE BALLOT AND TO A HIGHER INCIDENCE OF TERRORISM ON THE PART OF THE VC. INCIDENTS HAVE CONTINUED TODAY AFTER THE OPENING OF POLLING. I ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHALL HAVE A GOOD TURNOUT BY OUR STANDARDS, IF NOT UP TO LAST YEARS 80 PER CENT. WE ARE PLANNING TO GIVE YOU A STEADY FLOW OF REPORTS ONCE THE RETURNS BEGIN TO COME IN.

6. REGARDS.

350

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-138  
By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

EYES ONLY

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY



75

Sunday, September 3, 1967, 10:15 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam Election (Report No. 1)

The situation at 10:00 A.M. is:

It appears at least 80% of the registered voters will vote. AP reports unofficially that 81% cast their ballots. The official report, two hours before closing of the polls at 4:00 P.M. Saigon time, was that almost 4,000,000 had voted. That is 68%.

Fragmentary returns give Thieu and Ky about 14,500 votes. The closest rival is Huong who has 8,500.

U.S. observers are all now back in Saigon.

During the voting, they were distributed as follows:

- 8 in Hue
- 5 in Can Tho
- 2 in Tuy Hoa
- 1 in Ban Me Thuot
- 1 in Vung Tau
- 4 in Saigon

Senator Muskie was on his own and traveled around Saigon and Gia Dinh.

Reports continue to roll in on Viet Cong terror attacks. But it appears they were not successful in preventing a significant number of Vietnamese from voting.

William J. Jorden

WJJ:amc

Mr. Sefton

~~SECRET~~

96

Pres file

Sunday, September 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is a cable from Saigon reporting views of the election observers.

Ambassador Locke will be sending a summary of the mission's conclusions late tonight (early Monday Saigon time).

The press reports that "most of the U. S. observers and 120 from 24 other nations voiced one similar sentiment:

"For whatever discrepancies there might have been, the fact that elections took place at all makes them significant."

One Dutch observer found no evidence of fraud. He thought a Thieu victory was a foregone conclusion, but he said the elections "obviously were better than any held in Eastern Europe, Indonesia or Spain".

William J. Jorden

Attachment.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-364  
By 48, NARA, Date 6-23-95

WJJ:sln

~~SECRET~~

96a

~~SECRET~~

FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECRETARY OF STATE, WASH, DC

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-365  
By ijg, NARA, Date 12-15-94

SUBJECT: American Observers in Vietnam

The observers were dispersed as follows to observe the balloting:  
Hue: Hughes, McCall, Antell, James, Munroe, Knight, Patterson and  
Elson; Can Tho: Sullivan, Smith, Gullander, Barr and McKeldin;  
Ban Me Thout: Scerra; Tay Hoa: Guy and Murphy; Saigon: Hickenlooper,  
Lucy, McGannon, Rudin, Young and Muskie.

Hue, Can Tho and Saigon groups (with exception of Muskie who  
toured Saigon-Gia Dinh on his own) participated in the Government of  
Vietnam schedule arranged for all foreign observers for election day.  
Arrangements for other groups were made by the mission including those  
for the three election experts: Scammon, Hersberg and Penninan who  
visited Tay Ninh, Long Xuyen and polling places in the Saigon area.

Initial indications are that all the trips worked out well and that  
the observers were generally favorably impressed. The nine observers  
who visited Hue went to four voting locations of their own choice. They  
remarked that the size of the turnout, effective conduct of elections, and  
seriousness with which both electoral officials and voters regarded whole  
process were very impressive.

Observers talked with representatives of candidates (Thieu, Ha Thuc,  
Ky, and Sun tickets), all of whom reported that no irregularities had  
occurred. (One representative replied crowded conditions in polls had  
made it impossible for anyone to attempt influence voters.) Observers  
also impressed when accompanying Vietnamese journalist denied ballot  
because absentee voting authorization not properly validated by home  
precinct.

The observers in Hue found that most polling locations were uncrowded  
because voters had appeared in greatest number during the early morning  
hours. The observers timed voters, who averaged three and one-half  
minutes in complete passage through polls.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

The arrangements made by Thua Thien Province Chief Lt. Col. Khoa were excellent, affording observers and approximately 75 press representatives a fully unhindered opportunity to examine voting locations and talk with any voter or official at will. Khoa excused himself at one military voting location to fall in line behind First Division Troops and modestly cast his own ballot, which also seemed to impress the observers.

The observers took a break from 98 degree heat at a luncheon for all foreign observers and press which was hosted by I Corps Commander, General Lam. During the day reports of a nearby enemy activity directed against voting provided a remainder of the wartime situation.

Senator Murphy and Governor Guy visited seven or eight polling places in and around Tuy Hoa, Capital of Phu Yen Province, including one at the Hien Xuong District where an explosion several hours earlier had killed three and wounded approximately 40. Both observers were clearly impressed with foolproof mechanics against fraud; Senator Murphy pointed out that there are few such safeguards in the U. S. Governor Guy added (in joint interview filmed for local North Dakota television) that he was struck by the sight of a civilian election official refusing to let soldiers vote because their registration list had not arrived at polling station. On visit to Hien Xuong, where they examined explosion damage, saw bloodstains on school house steps and learned that some of the wounded had returned to vote, heightened their favorable reactions.

Election experts Scammon, Hershberg and Pennington appeared enthusiastic about their experience which they described as impressive and moving. They visited a large number of polling stations in three areas and apparently found little which they could criticize and much to praise.

We do not yet have detailed reactions from the other group but will report further as we learn them.

The entire group scheduled for MACV and Komer briefing tomorrow morning (September 4), followed by election roundup briefing in the afternoon prior to their departure now scheduled for 6:00 P. M.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

September 3, 1967

VOTING RECORD - VIETNAM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

<u>Corps</u>	<u>City or Province</u>	<u>No. of Voters</u>	<u>As Percentage of Registered Voters</u>	<u>No. of Voters 1966</u>	<u>As Percentage of Registered Voters Sept. 1966</u>
I	Hue (City)	45,090	82%	41,201	85.9%
	Danang (City)	93,532	81%	80,382	81.2%
	Quang Tri	90,789	85%	92,680	89.7%
	Thua Thieu	148,149	81%	165,457	88.1%
	Quang Nam	135,182	85%	112,945	89.3%
	Quang Ngai	165,188	82%	141,237	84%
	Quang Tui	88,013	93%	83,390	92.1%
II	Cam Rauh (City)	21,962	90%	13,823	91.5%
	Dalat (City)	28,274	81%	23,436	73.3%
	Binh Dinh	271,460	90%	180,441	90.7%
	Binh Thuan	63,327	94%	61,835	72%
	Darlac	67,842	87%	58,375	80%
	Kontun	42,611	83.7%	37,712	82.7%
	Khanh-Hoa	141,707	85%	137,972	84%
	Lam Dong	23,431	87%	17,757	80.6%
	Ninh Thuan	63,327	94%	56,628	94.3%
	Phu Bon	24,531	91%	18,370	97.5%
	Phu Ten	101,079	87%	80,559	94.3%
	Pleiku	51,168	72%	49,951	83.5%
	Quang Duc	14,357	90%	13,796	82.8%
	Tuyen-Duc	36,804	88%	33,204	84.1%
III	Saigon (City)	583,242	76%	517,210	66.5%
	Jung Tau (City)	30,861	86.2%	30,902	83.1%
	Gin Dinh	445,118	79%	388,422	73%
	Bieu Hoa			135,817	83.8%
	Binh Duong	89,207	79%	71,152	80%
	Binh Long	24,269	86%	22,249	84%
	Binh Tuy	23,831	83.2%	21,755	89.2%
	Hau Nghia	51,612	81.3%	40,943	79.1%
	Long Au	62,912	83.5%	42,855	69.7%
	Long Khanh	51,787	84.6%	43,677	87%
	Phuoc Long	18,983	90%	17,106	92.3%

VOTING RECORD - VIETNAM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

<u>Corps</u>	<u>City or Province</u>	<u>No. of Voters</u>	<u>As Percentage of Registered Voters</u>	<u>No. of Voters 1966</u>	<u>As Percentage of Registered Voters Sept. 1966</u>
III	Phuac Tuy	44,912	88.4%	36,702	89.4%
	Tay Ninh	112,527	86%	94,446	85.3%
IV	An Giang	185,171	83%	188,710	83.4%
	An Xuyen	35,703	85%	34,263	84.6%
	Ba Xuyen	86,778	84%	92,761	85.6%
	Bac Lieu	66,634	82%	54,378	75%
	Chan Doc	155,942	90%	151,548	84.9%
	Chuong Thieu	52,984	82%	34,548	74.1%
	Dinh Thong	94,379	84%	75,775	70.5%
	Go Cong	35,612	92%	29,619	89.1%
	Kien Giang	111,032	84%	100,877	82.6%
	Kien Hoa	109,974	76%	95,117	82.5%
	Kien Phong	95,346	80%	90,174	93.3%
	Kien Tuong	15,233	87%	13,599	86.9%
	Phong Dinh	109,974	75.5%	92,312	77.4%
	Vinh Binh	80,607	85%	92,942	85%
	Vinh Long	122,575	83%	161,802	87%

VOTING RECORD - VIETNAM PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

SUMMARY

	<u>Voted</u> <u>Sept. 1967</u>	<u>As % of</u> <u>Registered</u>	<u>Voted</u> <u>Sept. 1966</u>	<u>As % of</u> <u>Registered</u>
I Corps	765,983	84%	717,292	87.2%
II Corps	990,062	87%	735,359	86.9%
III Corps	1,632,693	79.5%	557,604	83%
IV Corps	1,429,568	84.3%	161,302	83.1%
Saigon	583,242	76%	517,210	66.5%

WJJ:sln

78

*Pres file*

Sunday, September 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached are some of the comments from various election observers, including a few foreigners.

William J. Jorden

Attachment.

WJJ:slh



Comments of Viet-Nam Election Observers

90a

Sen. Murphy - "I have no reservations about calling this a free and fair election. I'll have little patience with anyone who starts telling us it's rigged. "

Gov. Guy - "There may have been instances of fraud that will be dug up, but the election I have seen has been carried out with greater detail and checks and balances than many of our own. "

Eugene Patterson - "Despite its imperfections, I feel it was far, far better to have had the election than to not have had an election at all. "

Whitney Young - "We have problems in Mississippi, too. After all, what do you expect? How can you tell anyway? "

Gov. McCall - "I can't speak for the rest, but it is my impression that few in the group would write this off as a sterile exercise. "

Gov. Hughes - "I am tremendously impressed by the obvious enthusiasm. This is a good start on the road to democracy. "

Dave Sullivan - "A credit to the people themselves. "

Warren Gullander - " I can't find anybody who says 'yes' when you ask if his candidate has been mistreated. "

Dr. Elson - "One point should be made strongly. That is that we observers are not detectives. We were here to focus on a historical event in perspective. We're not here to nit-pick. "

Stanford Smith - "The most important thing is what happens after the election regardless of who wins, particularly as to whether the government lives up to its promises of freedom of the press. "

John Knight - "We were not assigned here as election inspectors. Observing is a very broad term. "

Ambassador Weir (N. Z.) - "An election that would do New Zealand proud.

Amb. Shen (China) - "Under Asians standards, a relatively free election. "

Indian journalist - "A good beginning. "

99

Sunday, September 3, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You may wish to send some such cable to Ambassador Bunker late this evening when more returns are in.

I believe you should wait until tomorrow to send a message to Thieu - Ky.

We also can consider tomorrow whether it would be wise and appropriate to have a note of thanks waiting in Honolulu when the observers get in - say late Monday night our time.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

WWR:slm

972

FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

When we talked in my office before you left for Saigon, I asked of you three things: that you look after your health; that you draw together the ablest team this nation could provide; that you serve as midwife to the best election of which South Vietnam was now capable.

We both know this election is only one step on the road to stable and effective constitutional government; and in the days ahead you will be dealing with dangerous and delicate problems.

Our common tasks are clear enough to help the Vietnamese consolidate a broad based government; and to build on the election and that government programs of accelerated momentum in Vietnam, and in international diplomacy, while stabilizing and enlarging support for our policy here at home.

But as Sunday September 3 ends in Washington, it seems clear to me that you have amply fulfilled my third injunction; and I wish you to know of my gratitude.

Since it is clear you have also fulfilled my second injunction by building the best team we could have in Saigon, it remains only for me to remind you of the first.

140

Purple

Saturday, September 2, 1967 -- 4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

As instructed, George Christian, General Taylor, William Jorden, several others, and I met to plan action in the wake of General Taylor's memorandum to the President of August 25. With respect to the first point -- better coordination among allied nations of information policy -- action has been taken. Under a competent USIA chairman, representatives of the 7-nation group fighting in Viet Nam will meet regularly on information problems and policy.

With respect to the setting up of two-man teams, there was agreement on the following points:

- The senior civilian should be a well-known figure.
- The groups should go out from the White House as "Presidential representatives."
- The meetings should be off-the-record.
- Based on General Taylor's experience, an effort should be made to assemble at one meeting key editorial writers, editors, TV executives, etc. from a district to economize time, and thus be able to cover the country in six to eight meetings.
- Arrangements should be made so that representatives come out by invitation of some local figure prepared to organize the group.
- The material for the group will be organized and kept up to date in the new Kaplan operation working under Bill Jorden in my shop.
- It will be necessary to coordinate this operation with other similar efforts; e.g., Sec. Rusk's meeting with the Editorial Board of the Baltimore Sun.

A major unresolved question discussed was whether one team (say, Amb. Lodge and Gen. DePuy) could do the job on the road, or whether we would need several. If several were organized, they could operate on a regional basis; that is, Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast. Names other than Lodge and DePuy were: Clark Clifford, Gen. Taylor, Bill Bundy, Philip Habib, Gen. Walt, Gen. Krulak, Gen. Kinnard, and Gen. Larsen.

With respect to substance, it was agreed:

-- The groups would spend a good deal of time answering questions.

-- They would also press certain fundamental themes, of which the following were the principal ones mentioned:

-- Why we are in Viet Nam.

-- The war is being won: no stalemate.

- -- The war can only be lost in the U.S. Hanoi cannot win in the field.

-- Bombing: reasons for and results from.

-- The improved performance of the Vietnamese military.

-- The meaning of Viet Nam to Asia; economic development; regional cooperation; and progress -- all based on confidence that U.S. will see it through in Viet Nam.

-- The consequences -- to Asia and the World -- of an American pullout or "retreat to enclaves."

-- The relationship between our policy in Viet Nam and the outcome of the turmoil in China.

With respect to timing, everyone agreed that we should set the teams in motion as soon after the Vietnamese election as the dust settles and we feel we have our feet on the ground politically there.

An additional point of substance was raised and discussed: Should we -- in addition to mounting this team or teams -- set up a senior panel (one leading figure plus one each on military, political, economic, and pacification matters) which might perform the following related functions:

-- Brief top level groups -- Senators, Governors, important conventions, etc.

-- Appear as a senior government group regularly on TV in a Viet Nam Report.



After you have read this memorandum, we shall require your guidance. I suggest that you may wish to meet with General Taylor, George Christian, Bill Jorden, Mr. Kapiian, and myself -- and it might well be helpful to have along Clark Clifford, who has given some thought to this matter.

This memorandum has been cleared by Christian, Taylor, and Jorden.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 2, 1967  
4:25 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Lodge's proposed statement -- If he is forced to make one -- in Hawaii on the way home.

We have some improvements to suggest (see Tab A); but it may be wise to see what transpires in the next twenty-four hours before deciding what our guidance to Lodge should be.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

CAS 21056Z

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-139  
By Sj, NARA, Date 9-18-01

101a

Saturday, September 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LODGE (CAS, 21056Z)

I assume the press will interview observers upon arrival in Hawaii and that it may, therefore, be necessary for me to say something for quotation, although I do not plan to do so unless it is necessary.

I, accordingly, will submit a line for me to take with the press assuming events in Vietnam justify such a line. I hope you will send me your comments before my departure from Saigon, 6:00 P.M. local time, Monday. I would not necessarily use all of the proposed statements but only such parts as seemed appropriate.

Begin Statement

A. "I am of course not speaking for anyone except myself.

B. "Observing an election is difficult in any country but in Vietnam there was at least the advantage that Vietnam has a National Election Law and thus a greater degree of uniformity than exists in the United States where the differences in standards and practices between the different states are great. Also in Vietnam the state pays for many candidates' expenses, which we don't do.

C. "The fact that in every polling place at least twenty people were involved in counting the ballots was one of the many assurances against rigging which impressed me. Four copies of the count are made, one of which is publicly posted immediately.

D. "The fact that those making election bets were estimating odds of 50-50 on the Thieu-Ky slate was another indication that no significant amount of corrupt practices was to be expected. Professional betters are notably realistic.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NJL/RAC 00-139  
By SJ NARA, Date 9-18-01

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E. "It looks as though this election is all right. We must remember that Vietnam has no history of democracy such as we have, but instead a history of centuries of authoritarian rule. We must also remember that this election was held in the middle of a war - and advanced democracies like France and England suspended elections altogether when they were at war. There was also a particularly high rate of terrorism. In the light of these considerations the Vietnamese Elections must be called remarkable.

F. "This Election marks a forward step in the evolution of Vietnam. Constitutional government should mean greater stability. This undercuts the Viet Cong. It also should mean that Vietnam will be better able to deal with other countries in anything having to do with peace. Constitutional government should therefore help the conduct of the war and increase the chances of peace all of which is in the interests of the United States."

End Statement

I plan to hold a meeting of the observers in Honolulu at 6:00 P.M., Monday local time. Several observers have indicated that they wish such a meeting. Suggestions will then be made that our thanks be extended by Senator Hickenlooper as senior official member to the Government of Vietnam and to Ambassador Bunker. I believe there is greater risk in not having a meeting than in having it.

I plan to say that of course all observers are absolutely free to talk to the press either at Honolulu or at home and to submit their views to the President. If they do make any written statements I will request that they furnish me a copy.

I have also asked that our three State Department experts report their findings at this meeting.

DRAFT , 9/3/67

SUGGESTED LODGE STATEMENT

Watching a nation being born is a unique and exciting experience.

Whatever else may be said, I think we would all agree that we have been privileged to witness an historic event -- an event important for the Vietnamese people and for us all.

I am speaking, of course, only for myself -- not for anyone else.

Observing an election is difficult in any country. It is particularly difficult in a country at war.

And all of us were conscious that we were watching an electoral process in a country with no long tradition of democratic experience.

We were very much aware, too, that the Viet Cong were doing everything in their power to disrupt this election, to terrorize and intimidate the people. While their propaganda tried to minimize the importance of the election, their deeds spoke more loudly of their real concern.

As you know from the turnout of voters in all parts of the country, the efforts of the Viet Cong were a dismal failure.

It is too soon after the event to try to pass judgment. The votes are still being counted and tallied. There is provision in the electoral law for filing complaints and for investigating and judging those complaints. It will be a little time before the results are finally certified.

Let me say, however, that on the basis of what I have seen in this past week, the election marks a forward step in Viet-Nam's political evolution. I hope -- and I think all Americans hope -- that a popularly elected, constitutional government is going to mean greater stability in Viet-Nam. It should mean a greater capacity to deal with the aggressors and their followers. It should also mean that Viet-Nam can play a stronger role with other countries in the search for an honorable and just settlement.

We would hope that all the elements that have contested this election will now work together to make their country stronger and better able to deal effectively with the tremendous problems that they face together.



*Pres file*

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, September 2, 1967  
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some election and post-  
election thoughts from Thieu's brother.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4779

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 9-16-91

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ

94 365

By ig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

102a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

September 2, 1967

Salgon 4779

1. In luncheon conversation with Political Counselor, September 2, Nguyen Van Kieu, General Thieu's brother, discussed election prospects and planning for the post-election period.
2. Kieu thought that the Suu-Dan ticket would run ahead of Huong-Truyen, followed by Ha Thuc Ky, Nguyen Hoa Hiep, and Truong Dinh Dzu. He ascribed Suu's recent overtaking of Huong to support from some major Buddhist elements, including the An Quang group, and to support in the countryside which he claimed was the result of quiet word being passed by the Viet Cong. Kieu seemed confident that his brother's ticket would win but he thought that its percentage would not be as large as perhaps had been earlier expected.
3. Kieu said he had been busy keeping in touch with various civilian leadership groups, particularly supporters of Huong and the Buddhists. He acknowledged there was some possibility of troubles fomented by the extremist Buddhists after the elections, but he thought on balance this was unlikely. He considered Thien Minh to be the leader of the hard core in this respect and thought Tri Quang was advocating a more moderate course among the An Quang group.
4. Kieu launched immediately into a discussion of plans for broad post-election collaboration among the various groups competing in the election. He believed, from his most recent talks with the Huong camp, that there was still a possibility that Huong might accept the premiership in the event Thieu is elected and personally appeals to him to join in a "new team." Kieu suggested that if Huong did not accept, Huong might propose to Thieu that Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Luu Vien be appointed. Kieu said that if this were done, it would be handled publicly in such a way as to make clear that Vien was picked by Huong in order to draw the maximum political support behind him. In response to Kieu's question, Political Counselor agreed that Vien was a highly respected and capable southerner who was accepted by many different elements and that Huong's sponsorship would give him greater strength as a representative of the civilian-southern element.
5. Kieu was confident that Thieu and Ky would continue their collaboration and said it was his brother's intention to create a team at the top representing a broad political base and capable of working effectively together. He agreed it was desirable that other civilian elements be offered leading positions in the government and mention was made of Phang Quang Dan and Ha Thuc Ky. Kieu said that as an old Dai Viet who knew Ky extremely well, he was doubtful that genuine collaboration could be expected from him. He considered Ky a

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fanatical Dai Viet, interested largely in strengthening his own closely-knit party organization. He agreed it was useful, however, to encourage such groups to work with other elements for the good of the country.

6. Looking ahead to the future operation of the government, Kieu said he personally favored setting up some "brain trust" groups to consider the formulation of policies and programs for the new government. He hoped that such groups could also meet regularly and informally with selected American colleagues to discuss their ideas at an early stage in order to encourage mutual cooperation and eliminate possible misunderstanding. Political Counselor said he thought this would be highly desirable, etc.

7. Kieu hoped that the government of Viet Nam, U.S. Government, Republic of Korea and Republic of Cambodia could develop closer collaboration in the information field. He agreed that it was also important to improve government of Viet Nam information activities in other Asian and European countries in particular. Political Counselor suggested that one of the important programs to be given new life under the new government would be that of national reconciliation, since an elected and broadly representative government would be in a position to give meaning to this program. Kieu agreed.

8. Kieu said that if the election went in favor of General Thieu, he (Kieu) planned to return to Taipei only to close out his affairs and would return to Saigon permanently. He said he would make a swing around Bangkok, Seoul, and Tokyo before returning in order to talk with leaders and friends in those places, as well as in Taipei. He spoke vaguely of assuming a role as personal advisor to his brother. Kieu said that General Thieu was exhausted by the strain of the last weeks and planned to go away election day for 2 or 3 days of complete rest.

9. Comment: It continues to be difficult to evaluate degree to which Kieu influences his brother, but it appears at least that he has been busy keeping in touch with other civilian elements and seeking to preserve the possibility of peaceful collaboration after the elections. His comments regarding the prospects for such collaboration and the attitude of the An Quang Buddhists are undoubtedly optimistic. It seems probable from his and other comments that Thieu, if elected, will seek to work for as broadly based a coalition as he thinks feasible.

10. In separate conversation September 2 between Lansdale and General Hieu, latter said he intended to follow pacification very closely and personally. He also confirmed his intention to make use of General Thang's talents, giving him full responsibility for rural forces and popular forces, as one of the major

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elements in pacification. Lansdale stressed importance of Thieu making genuine effort to work closely and sincerely with Ky and others.

BUNKER

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SECRET/EXDIS

Saturday, September 2, 1967  
1:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of the observers  
at the end of their second full day.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 4786

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 5-16-97

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

103a

Saturday, September 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 4786)

SUBJECT: American Observers to Vietnam

At the end of the second full day in Vietnam the observers preliminary views were beginning to take shape.

In general most observers state they are withholding judgment until they see more and until after the elections themselves. At the same time many have indicated that they are favorably impressed so far, apparently more favorably than they had expected to be.

A number of the observers seem to have had a slight overdose of the difficult correspondents and are reacting negatively to it.

Whitney Young told several correspondents at the Ambassador's reception that he considers that the press has been very biased in reporting on the campaign and on the election preparations. Young pointed out that from their reporting he had not been aware of all the campaign activity by opposition candidates. He had not realized the extent of the Viet Cong pressures against the elections and thought that, "I would only see Thieu/Ky posters everywhere."

Elson, Murphy and Munroe were among others commenting critically on attitude of correspondents. Dr. Elson used such terms as "rude", "cynical" and "arrogant" in expressing his reaction. Senator Murphy felt that behavior of a number of the correspondents was completely out of line. Munroe felt American people have very inaccurate picture of the Vietnamese situation due to distorted and exaggerated press reports.

Observers have continued assiduous efforts to get as broad a picture as possible of election scene and have undertaken numerous interviews to get to source of charges of election rigging.

Governor Hughes had one hour interview with Tran Van Huong on evening of September 1, (He was followed by Congressmen Wolff and McCarthy who also had long interview with Huong.).

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-365

By ig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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Senator Muskie has seen Au Truong Thanh, Vo Long Trieu and Dzu. He had asked for appointment see Big Minh's exrunning mate Tran Ngoc Lien but did not actually make it although appointment was arranged. He also has seen Thon That Thien of suspended "Guardian".

Stanford Smith has also seen Thien and the editors of Thoi Dai who has frequently taken critical line of the Government of Vietnam.

One of the busiest of the groups in interviewing opposition figures has been John Knight who has confined his reactions, so far, as saying that he is keeping an open mind.

Patterson has also been particularly active in his contacts.

The reaction of the observers to their various trips to the Provinces has been almost universally favorable. It is particularly pleasing that many have commented with obvious satisfaction on the opportunity they have had to move about freely and to talk with anyone they pleased.

Mayor McKeldin who has visited both First Corps and Saigon area has commented to an Embassy Official that he has been favorably impressed by competence of the Government of Vietnam officials he has met, and as a consequence has a somewhat more favorable attitude toward our involvement in Vietnam.

A similar reaction was expressed by Governor McCall who departed from his scheduled itinerary to visit Phan Rang as he "had been pressed by others not to go to prearranged places." He said he and his group had been impressed by the fact that the Vietnamese were at a higher level of development in the elections than he had expected.

Today, September 2, the majority of observers are following the Government of Vietnam schedule with calls on Thieu, Ky and Suu. (Ambassador Bunker, of course, is present at these calls.) In addition, the schedules included the Special Commissariat for Administration (Election Committee) briefing. Tour of election

preparations in Saigon and military briefings.

Observers have moved in and out of schedules as desired and all seems to be going smoothly.

This evening, observers attended Thieu/Ky reception at Independence Palace to which Presidential Candidates were invited.

. On basis of their present plans for Election Day, it now appears that nine observers will be in Hue, five in Can Tho, two (Murphy and Guy) in Tuy Hoa, one (Scerra) in Ban Me Thuot, one (Rudin) in Vung Tau and four in Saigon.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

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