

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, September 2, 1967
12:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This cable on post-election priorities in Viet Nam will interest you. Along with a lengthy cable on how best to exercise U.S. leverage in Saigon, it represents solid results of Nick Katzenbach's committee.

We shall be discussing these issues and their priority with Gene Locke next week.

I am preparing, personally, a scenario to keep the political initiative -- assuming we soon get a solid government in Saigon post-election.

W. W. Rostow

Sate to Saigon 30020

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364
By 128, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

September 2, 1967

104a

To Amembassy Saigon 30020

For Ambassador from Under Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Post-Election Priorities in Viet Nam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By isp, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Below is text of draft working paper on post-election priorities. We know you are terribly busy, but we would appreciate your prompt comments before seeking final high-level approval here. The paper is designed to serve as guidelines for our relations with newly-elected Vietnamese leaders in immediate post-election period.

1. The newly-elected Vietnamese government can be expected to focus on only a few major problems in its early months. In order to contribute to the new government's capability and to assist it in gaining the confidence of the South Vietnamese people, the United States must limit drastically the number of program goals which it presses the new government to carry forward. The establishment of a limited number of priority programs for pursuing at the top level with the Vietnamese government will not affect the continuing lower-level advisory and assistance efforts with Vietnamese officials. These lower-level efforts should continue as effectively as possible. Nevertheless, careful scrutiny must be maintained by the U.S. mission to ensure that routine, day-to-day U.S. advisory efforts do not cut off the high priority program objectives.
2. The following criteria have been used to establish a suggested list of priority program objectives:
 - a. U.S. pressure and/or resources can measurably affect program implementation within a few months;
 - b. The program objectives have a significant domestic U.S. and international impact; and
 - c. They genuinely contribute to building the Vietnamese political structure and to gaining popular confidence in the new government.
3. In addition to recommending a list of priority program objectives, specific measures within those program objectives are suggested to make up an "impact program" which can be implemented within the first few months of the new government's tenure. Another proposed feature of the "impact program" would be to have the newly-elected president or his prime minister, in announcing the "impact program," indicate that he was submitting it to the National Assembly

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for its support. Another possibility might be for the new president to announce the "impact program" before a joint session of the new Assembly. (Note: We have not included revolutionary development or Project Takeoff in priority program objectives set forth below on assumption government of Viet Nam reorganization of revolutionary development in effect is under way and that revolutionary development program will remain ongoing program of high priority. We will leave it to Mission to determine how "project Takeoff" should be factored into "impact program.")

4. While our Mission could be working on this "impact program" with the new president immediately after the elections are validated, its announcement would presumably have to await the president's inauguration, probably in early October. While it might be preferable in theory to await the convening of the new Lower House, this will not occur at least until early November, and constitutionally the present Assembly assumes the functions of the Assembly after the inauguration of the President and until the new Assembly is convened. The newly-elected Upper House might be installed by the time the President is inaugurated or shortly thereafter. In sum, the proposed "impact program" could be launched sometime during the first two weeks in October even if real legislative action on it cannot begin until early November. This would take full psychological advantage of the new government of Viet Nam's inauguration and assure maximum domestic U.S. impact while the U.S. Congress is still in session.

5. Priority program objectives:

a. Broadening the government. This would include revamping and broadening the Cabinet, appointing competent civilian leaders from among the defeated candidates to appropriate government positions, developing constructive and effective relationships with the Assembly and organizing political parties.

(1) "Impact" proposals. (a) The President will appoint a broadly based government. (b) The President will ask the Assembly to prepare a political party law as one of the first items of its business to be promulgated within three months. The law should leave room for participation by a peaceful Viet Cong, perhaps under another name.

b. Improvement of the armed forces. This would include fairer and more effective dependent, survivor and disabled veterans' benefits, lower draft age, improved merit promotion system, and more effective punitive measures for soldiers who mistreat the civilian populace.

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-3-

(1) "Impact" proposal. The new President will call on the military leaders to propose an improved merit promotion system for officers and non-commissioned officers which can be launched within three months. The proposal will also include a military Inspectorate aimed at ensuring proper treatment of civil populace by soldiers, as well as other actions already in train, such as higher pay scales for regional forces/popular forces.

b. Reduction of corruption. This would include the dismissal and appropriate punishment of corrupt civilian and military officials at all levels, the establishment of an Inspectorate to carry out the program, and the adoption of legislation providing for appropriate punishments for using public office for private gain.

(1) "Impact" proposal. The new President will establish, in conjunction with the Assembly, the Inspectorate provided for in the Constitution and will appoint a prominent civilian, perhaps a defeated candidate, to head it. (The U. S. Mission should work very closely with the Inspectorate, should press for joint inspections when U. S. funds or programs are involved, and should relate in appropriate cases U. S. programs to the Vietnamese government's performance, based on the Inspectorate's findings.)

d. National reconciliation and Chieu Hoi. This would include a meaningful revitalization and implementation of the national reconciliation and Chieu Hoi programs.

(1) "Impact" proposal. The President will reaffirm the national reconciliation proclamation of April 19, 1967 and the Chieu Hoi program of April 17, 1963, specifically assuring that the constitutional government belongs to all of the South Vietnamese people, that those who lay down their arms on the enemy side will have their political and economic rights restored. The President will also announce the formation of a National Reconciliation Commission under the Minister of Information and Chieu Hoi to be composed of prominent Vietnamese and to recommend actions to implement the National Reconciliation program. One of the Commission's most important and urgent tasks will be to make recommendations to the government within three months regarding the political future of the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Force if they agree to give up armed force.

e. Peace initiatives. This will require careful study and full consultation with the Manila Powers, and will be dealt with separately.

f. Land reform and economic development. This will include continuing economic stabilization measures as necessary but with more emphasis on economic development planning for the future.

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(1) "Impact" proposal. The President would announce the appointment of a full-time Economic Development Planning Commission, whose duties would include early preparation of a development program. He would also announce for immediate implementation land reform measures, consistent with Mission's forthcoming discussion with government of Viet Nam, such as: the forgiveness of back rents and taxes on land retaken from Viet Cong control or for tenants who have escaped from Viet Cong control to return to their land; calling for the government to protect existing tenancy in contested areas where security is expanding; and asking that village authorities be given expanded administrative and taxing responsibilities in land affairs as security is re-established. (The latter measure may require Assembly action.)

g. Manpower and mobilization. This would include measures to rationalize Vietnamese personnel resources, including the development of proper ratios as between regular, paramilitary, and police forces.

(1) "Impact" proposal. The President will ask the Minister of Defense for recommendations within three months to regularize deferments. (Other elements of this proposal would include measures recommended in Ambassador' Locke's forthcoming manpower study proposals.)

/s/ Rusk

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Saturday, September 2, 1967
9:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

The action you instructed was
taken.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 935 (CAS CHANNEL)

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-94
By cl, NARA Date 2-9-01

WWRostow:rln

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FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 020457Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 935

NO NIGHT ACTION

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW.

PLEASE INFORM THE PRESIDENT THAT I HAVE ALREADY TRANSMITTED HIS
MESSAGE PRIVATELY AND INDIVIDUALLY TO MESSRS. GUY, HUGHES,
MURPHY, AND YOUNG.

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~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~ ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-94
By CB, NARA Date 2-9-01

PRESERVATION COPY

Saturday, September 2, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Deputy Ambassador Locke's Visit to Washington

Gene Locke will be returning to Washington with the election observers.

He brings a number of items for discussion here -- the Mission's "Blueprint for Viet-Nam," a study of Viet-Nam's manpower problem and recommendations, etc.

His visit should provide an opportunity for getting our story across to the press and public. This can be done in press conferences, back-grounders, calls on the leadership and key Congressmen on the Hill, appearance on a national TV program, etc.

If he calls on the President (which I would recommend), he could then meet the press in the West Lobby or Rose Garden. This would be a chance for him to summarize his views of where we stand in Viet-Nam.

We should get a cable off to him tomorrow to indicate that he should prepare for the above. I would appreciate your guidance.

W, W. Rostow

I will see Locke _____

Arrange press conference
afterward _____

Make appointments with key
Congressional leaders _____

Try to encourage a TV
interview (Meet the Press,
or the like) _____

Arrange backgrounder for
White House press corps _____

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 11652,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR 10, 1983.

BY *kg* ON *9-16-71*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 2, 1967

107

Mr. President:

Here is the latest CIA report on the high level of Communist terror in South Vietnam.

No significant reduction in voter turn-out is expected despite the terror.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWR:BKS:jah

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No. 1262

107a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Intelligence

2 September 1967

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Vietnam Elections Situation Report No. 1

SUMMARY

The CIA Station in Saigon advises that the VC have apparently learned a lesson from last year's fiasco when they advertised that they would smash the Constituent Assembly elections and actually did very little. This time they are promising less and doing more. The number of significant incidents of Communist violence is now at least three or four times normal and well above last year's pre-election level. Significant enemy-initiated activity has increased during the week throughout South Vietnam. While none of this recent activity has had the impact of the earlier shelling of Can Tho, the assault on Quang Ngai, or the attack on Thang Binh District headquarters, recent terrorist actions do show the enemy's capability to hit the people. To date, however, we have seen no evidence that this terrorism is likely to cause a significant reduction in voter turn-out.

* * *

1. Saigon: The Combined Security Committee has a report that VC cadre operating in the Saigon area will shell the city on the night of 2-3 September. An artillery attack will start at 0500 hours on 3 September (1700 hours, 2 September Washington time) against sensitive installations in the Capital, especially polling booths. In support of the attack VC special mission cadres will set off explosions simultaneously at numerous polling places in order to prevent election participation.

2. In the past 72 hours, there have been twelve terrorist incidents in the Saigon area, resulting in 1 VC dead, 2 US dead, 18 VN wounded and 3 US wounded. Eight of these incidents, including four involving US personnel, took place during the night of 1-2 September. All US personnel killed and one of the US wounded were in Cholon area, which US personnel had been warned to avoid.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-19-01

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3. General: In I Corps, all major population centers except Quang Tri were attacked during the past week. There was a sharp increase in attacks by fire along the coast of II Corps; propaganda, terrorism, and sabotage were evident in III Corps, and indiscriminate mining of roads and shelling of civilians was the rule in IV Corps. In the period 26 through 31 August, there were 324 incidents compared to the weekly average for 1967 of 478 but a better indicator of the intensity is the level of activity as measured by the increase in assaults, attacks by fire, kidnapping, and mining.

4. I Corps: In the past 24 hours I Corps reported the kidnapping of a hamlet chief, 12 subchiefs, and 52 civilians near Hoi An for the third group abduction in the area. Also in the Hoi An area, a resettlement camp was mortared resulting in one killed, one wounded, and the destruction of 50 houses.

5. In II Corps, a polling place was attacked and burned at Song Cau with three wounded. Near Tuy Hoa a base camp was attacked and an artillery position was mortared. The Dien Khanh District headquarters, Khanh Hoa Province was attacked by an unknown number of enemy with hand thrown charges killing two civilians and wounding 30. The Du Long District Hqs. and MACV Team No. 39, Ninh Thuan, received small arms and mortar fire killing one civilian and wounding 9.

6. In III Corps, terrorism and sabotage in the past day included detonation of a bike bomb in Ben Cat, Binh Duong Province, wounding 17 civilians and two ARVN. In Hau Nghia, Binh Long, and Bien Hoa Provinces, highways 1, 13, and 15 were interdicted by mining of bridges and culverts.

7. IV Corps reports a civilian bus detonating a mine in Dinh Tuong with casualties of 10 civilians killed and 15 wounded. Also in Dinh Tuong two bridges were destroyed along highway 4. In Vinh Long, Tra An District town was mortared with 15 civilians wounded.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY 108a

IN **SANITIZED**

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

XXXXXXXXXX DIA ARMY NAVY AIR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CIA/NMCC
STATE/OIR NMCC/MC NIC (HENDRICKSON) DD/I EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ / RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 3 - 8 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT ROAD CONDITIONS AND BOMBING EFFECTS IN THE VICINITY OF HANOI

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

TO STATE : NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC : EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YAREBOROUGH;
NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

SUMMARY. DURING THE PERIOD 3-8 AUGUST 1967, MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE EXCORTEED TO CITIES IN THE VICINITY OF HANOI TO WITNESS THE BOMB DAMAGE. ALL OF THEIR TRAVELING WAS DONE AT NIGHT BY AUTOMOBILE. THE ROADS OVER WHICH THEY TRAVELED WERE IN A BAD STATE OF REPAIR AND IN MANY PLACES COULD NOT BE USED BY A

(classification)

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PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

VEHICLE LARGER THAN A SMALL TRUCK. A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL SAID THAT ROADS IN THE AREA SURROUNDING NAM DINH CITY WERE SO BAD THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS TO MOVE FROM PLACE TO PLACE. END OF SUMMARY.

1. IN EARLY AUGUST SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE TAKEN ON GUIDED TOURS OF BOMBED CITIES IN THE HANOI VICINITY. THE FIRST TRIP TOOK PLACE ON 3 AUGUST WHEN THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS WERE DRIVEN FROM HANOI TO THE TOWN OF SON TAY NORTH WEST OF HANOI ON ROUTE 11A. THEY WERE ACCOMPAINED ON THIS TRIP BY COLONEL HA VAN LAU WHO HAD BEEN THE SENIOR NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE AT THE RECENT STOCKHOLM PEACE CONFERENCE. THE TRIP WAS MADE AT NIGHT. ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI THE GROUP PASSED TEN SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS WITH MISSILES WHICH WERE APPARENTLY STOPPED FOR REPAIRS TO THE TRANSPORTERS. IN THE AREA FROM 11-20 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI ON ROUTE 11A THERE WERE NUMEROUS CONVENTIONAL AAA INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE ROAD. ABOUT 22 KILOMETERS FROM HANOI THE ROAD WAS BADLY CRATERED NEAR A DAM WHICH APPEARED TO BE INTACT. THE GROUP WAS TAKEN TO BAT LAI VILLIAGE, QUANG QAI DISTRICT, HA TAY PROVINCE WHICH THEY WERE TOLD HAD BEEN BOMBED WITH CLUSTER BOMB UNITS ON 26 JULY AND 1 AUGUST. NINE PERSONS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN KILLED AND 29 WOUNDED. THE VILLAGE WAS QUITE REMOTE AND HAD NO APPARENT

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1.3(a)(4)

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PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

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MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

2. ON THE NIGHT OF 5 AUGUST THE GROUP WAS DRIVEN FROM HANOI TO NAM DINH CITY. THEY WERE ACCOMPANIED ON THIS TRIP BY PHAM VAN BAC, WHO IS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATION TEAM IN HANOI AND ALSO A JUDGE IN THE CITY OF HANOI. THE ROAD BETWEEN HANOI AND NAM DINH WAS IN A VERY BAD STATE OF REPAIR BECAUSE OF BOMB DAMAGE AND IN SOME PLACES IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRIVE BESIDE THE FORMER ROADBED. THE GROUP SAW MEDIUM SIZED TRUCKS WHICH HAD BECOME STUCK TRYING TO PASS BOMB DAMAGE ON SOME OF THE STEEP CURVES BESIDE THE FORMER ROADBED. THE FOLLOWING MORNING PHAM VAN BAC DISCUSSED ROAD CONDITIONS WITH THE TRIBUNAL GROUP AND SAID THAT THE ROADS IN THE NAM DINH AREA WERE IN VERY BAD SHAPE AND THAT IT WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE SAM MISSILE TRANSPORTERS TO GET FROM PLACE TO PLACE.

3. THE TRIBUNAL GROUP VISITED NAM DINH CITY ON 6 AUGUST. THEY WERE TOLD THAT 35-40 PER CENT OF THE TOWN HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY BOMBING AND THE GROUP AGREED WITH THIS ESTIMATE AFTER OBSERVING THE CITY.

DESCRIBED THE TOWN AS "EMPTY" AND 1.3(a)(4) SAID ALL LARGE HOUSES HAD EITHER BEEN DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. THE REMAINING INHABITANTS LOOKED TIRED AND DEPRESSED.) PHAM VAN BAC SAID THAT THE TOWN HAD A PEACETIME POPULATION OF 93,000 BUT DID NOT

1.3(a)(4)

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PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

1.3(4)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

SAY WHERE THE FORMER INHABITANTS HAD BEEN RELOCATED. BAC SAID THAT 106 RESIDENTS OF NAM DINH HAD BEEN KILLED BY BOMBS IN 1965 AND 1966 AND THAT 34 HAD BEEN KILLED IN 1967. [REDACTED] DESPITE VIETNAMESE CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY, [REDACTED] THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS PRIVATELY CONCLUDED THAT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES HAD NOT BEEN HEAVY IN NAM DINH.)

1.3(4)(4)

4. ON THE NIGHT OF 8 AUGUST THE GROUP, STILL ACCOMPANIED BY PHAM VAN BAC, WAS DRIVEN FROM PHU LY CITY TO NINH BINH CITY. THE ROAD BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES CROSSES TAAM SONG DAY RIVER TWICE AND AT BOTH CROSSINGS THE BRIDGES HAD BEEN BOMBED OUT AND PONTOON BRIDGES WERE IN USE. AT THE FIRST CROSSING ABOUT 15 KILOMETERS FROM NINH BINH THE PONTOON BRIDGE WAS TWO LANE AND TRAFFIC WENT THROUGH WITH LITTLE DELAY. HOWEVER, THE PONTOON BRIDGE AT THE CROSSING ABOUT 10 KILOMETERS FROM NINH BINH WAS ONE LANE AND REPRESENTED A CONSIDERABLE BOTTLENECK.

5. THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD 3-8 AUGUST WHEN THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS WERE TRAVELING BY CAR AT NIGHT THEY FREQUENTLY PASSED LABORERS WORKING ON THE ROADS. THEY WERE TOLD BY PHAM VAN BAC AND COLONEL HA VAN LAU THAT SPECIAL "SHOCK BRIGADES" HAD BEEN CREATED TO HANDLE ROAD DAMAGE. THESE BRIGADES ARE MADE UP OF PERSONS WHO LIVE IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY OF KEY ROADS AND THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO BE AVAILABLE FOR ROAD REPAIR WORK IMMEDIATELY AFTER A BOMBING ATTACK.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

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PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STAFF: A (NMCC/MC) ~~GRAND~~ ~~ARMY~~ ~~NAVY~~ ~~AIR~~ (CIA/NMCC) ~~FIG~~ ~~ONE~~ (OCR) ~~SDO~~ ~~FIG~~
NIC (HENDRICKSON) 44 DD/T EXO-11-F11

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CITE

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

NLJ / RAC 00-138

By *cbm*, NARA Date 3-29-01

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DCI 11 - 23 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT BOMBING OF THE CAU LONG BIEN BRIDGE IN HANOI ON 11 AUGUST AND THE
EFFECT OF THE CLOSING OF THE BRIDGE ON TRANSPORTATION IN HANOI

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

TO STATE : NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL

TO NMCC/MC : EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;

NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY

AIR FORCE AECN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARRIER

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1. ON 11 AUGUST THE CAU LONG BIEN BRIDGE CONNECTING HANOI AND THE GIA LAM AREA ACROSS THE RED RIVER WAS BOMBED. THE BRIDGE CROSSES AN ISLAND IN THE RED RIVER AND ABOUT FORTY METERS OF THE BRIDGE SURFACE BETWEEN THE ISLAND AND GIA LAM WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED WHILE ANOTHER THIRTY METERS OF THE SURFACE WAS SEVERELY TWISTED. THERE ARE 13 SETS OF BRIDGE PIERS BETWEEN THE ISLAND AND THE GIA LAM SIDE OF THE RIVER AND THE PIERS ARE ALTERNATIVELY SINGLE, THEN DOUBLE, THEN SINGLE, ETC. COUNTING FROM THE ISLAND SIDE TOWARDS GIA LAM THE TWO PIERS IN THE FOURTH LINE (C THE SECOND DOUBLE SET OF PIERS) WERE DESTROYED BY THE BOMBING. ONE OF THE TWO PIERS WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND THE OTHER IS VISIBLE ABOVE THE SURFACE OF THE WATER BUT DOES NOT REACH THE BRIDGE. AS OF 22 AUGUST THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAD MADE ANY EFFORT TO REPAIR THE BRIDGE ITSELF ALTHOUGH WORKMEN HAD REPLACED THE POWER AND ELECTRIC LINES CROSSING THE BRIDGE WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED WHEN THE BRIDGE WAS BOMBED.

2. SINCE 11 AUGUST TRAFFIC CROSSING THE RED RIVER AT THE BRIDGE HAS BEEN HANDLED BY TWO OLD FERRY BOATS, EACH TOWING A BARGE-LIKE BOAT. THESE FERRIES CARRY PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS AS WELL AS VEHICLES UP TO AND INCLUDING MEDIUM SIZED TRUCKS. BACKLOGS OF TRUCK TRAFFIC OF AS MANY AS 40 VEHICLES WERE OBSERVED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER DURING THE PERIOD 11 - 22 AUGUST, BUT THE BACKLOGS NEVER APPEARED TO HAVE REACHED A REALLY SEVERE STAGE AND USUALLY DISAPPEARED DURING THE DAY. THE FERRIES WERE HAVING SOME TROUBLE MANEUVERING BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF TOWING BARGES AGAINST THE RIVER CURRENT; THEY FREQUENTLY WENT UPSTREAM AND LET THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER AID

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THEM IN CROSSING. TWO OTHER OLD FERRY BOATS WERE TIED UP ALONG THE RIVER BANK BUT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE IN USE. SMALL CRAFT TRAFFIC ACROSS THE RIVER DID NOT NOTICEABLY INCREASE AFTER THE BRIDGE WAS CUT.

3. SOURCE COMMENT: ULTIMATE SOURCE WAS FRANKLY SURPRISED THAT NO APPARENT EFFORT WAS MADE TO USE SMALL BOATS OR SAMPAN TYPE CRAFT TO TRANSPORT PEOPLE ACROSS THE RIVER. HE WAS ALSO SURPRISED THAT THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY MAJOR BLOCKAGE OF TRUCK TRAFFIC. HE VISITED THE HANOI WATERFRONT ALMOST DAILY BETWEEN 11 AND 22 AUGUST AND DID NOT DETECT ANY SIGNS OF EFFORTS TO BUILD ALTERNATE MEANS OF CROSSING THE RIVER, SUCH AS PONTOON BRIDGES. SEVERAL VIETNAMESE NOTED THAT THE RIVER IS QUITE HIGH AT THIS TIME OF YEAR AND THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO BUILD AND MAINTAIN A PONTOON BRIDGE.

4. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

REPORT CLASS [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT. ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, NMCC/MC, NSA, NIC.

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(classification) (dissem controls)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

PRIORITY 108c
IN **SANITIZED**

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

XXXXXXXXXX DIA ARMY NAVY AIR XXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX SDO ONE OCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX CIA/NMCC
STATE/DIR NMCC/MC NIC (HENDRICKSON) DD/I EXO

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 5 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT OFFICIAL NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIEFING FOR FOREIGNERS ON NORTH VIETNAM'S DIKE
SYSTEM AND ALLEGED AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE DIKES

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

TO STATE : NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC : EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;
NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

SUMMARY. ON 5 AUGUST 1967 PHAM MY, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VICE MINISTER OF
HYDROLOGY, DESCRIBED THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIKE SYSTEM TO THE MEMBERS OF
A VISITING FOREIGN DELEGATION. MY CHARGED THAT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(classification) (dissem controls)

BOMBING THE DIKES FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. HE CLAIMED THE VIETNAMESE HAVE DEVELOPED A SYSTEM FOR RAPIDLY REPAIRING THE DIKES AND ARE BUILDING PARALLEL DIKES IN KEY AREAS IN PREPARATION FOR INCREASED AMERICAN ATTACKS ON EXISTING DIKES.

1. ON 5 AUGUST THE NORTH VIETNAMESE VICE MINISTER OF HYDROLOGY, PHAM MY, BRIEFED A VISITING FOREIGN DELEGATION ON THE NORTH VIETNAM DIKE SYSTEM. MY SUPPORTED HIS BRIEFING WITH CHARTS AND PHOTOGRAPHS AND WAS BOTH CONVINCING AND OBVIOUSLY VERY SERIOUS THROUGHOUT THE MEETING. HE BEGAN HIS TALK WITH A SHORT BRIEFING ON THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DIKE SYSTEM, NOTING THAT PRIOR TO THE MID-1950S IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR RICE GROWING AREAS OF THE RED RIVER DELTA TO BE INUNDATED FOR PERIOD OF UP TO THREE YEARS. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM BEGAN IN THE MID-1950S AND THE PRESENT DIKE SYSTEM DEVELOPED AT THE SAME TIME. THE DELTA AREA AND THE SURROUNDING PLAIN WHERE THE DIKE SYSTEM IS CONCENTRATED NOW CONTAINS NINE MILLION PEOPLE AND THE POPULATION DENSITY VARIES FROM 600 TO 1500 PER SQUARE KILOMETER. EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE RICE GROWING AREA IN NORTH VIETNAM IS NOW ARTIFICIALLY IRRIGATED AND THIS IS POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DIKE SYSTEM. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WELL AWARE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE DIKES TO AIR ATTACK AND ARE MAKING AN EFFORT TO INSURE THAT THE SYSTEM WILL BE SECURE AGAINST SUCH ATTACK. THE AMERICANS HAVE BEEN BOMBING THE DIKES FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS AND THE CURRENT VIETNAMESE EXPERTISE FOR REPAIRING DAMAGED DIKES HAS DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF THIS BOMBING. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE INSTITUTED A SYSTEM WHEREBY REPAIR MATERIALS AND LABOR BRIGADES ARE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY IN MANY KEY AREAS. THEY ARE THUS ABLE TO BEGIN REPAIRING THE DIKES ALMOST AS SOON AS THE AIRCRAFT LEAVE THE SCENE. THEY HAVE ALSO STARTED

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IN

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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CONSTRUCTION OF SMALLER DIKES PARALLEL TO KEY DIKES BUT ON HIGHER GROUND SO THAT ANY MAJOR BOMB DAMAGE TO KEY DIKES WILL AFFECT ONLY A SMALL AREA AS THE WATER RELEASED WILL AGAIN BE CONTAINED WHEN IT REACHES THE LEVEL OF THE PARALLEL DIKE.

2. MY CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE 55 AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS SPECIFICALLY AGAINST DIKES IN 1966 AND THAT THERE HAVE BEEN 36 SUCH ATTACKS SO FAR IN 1967. THESE ATTACKS HAVE BEEN DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE REGIONS NEAR THE TRA LY RIVER IN THAI BINH PROVINCE AND THE NINH CO RIVER IN NAM HAN PROVINCE. BOMBS OF UP TO 3,000 POUNDS HAVE BEEN USED IN THESE ATTACKS. MY EXHIBITED TO THE GROUP BEFORE AND AFTER PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH HE SAID SHOWED CERTAIN DIKES DAMAGED BY BOMBS AND THE SAME DIKES AFTER THEY HAD BEEN REPAIRED.

3. COMMENT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BRIEFING WAS PROBABLY A PART OF AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE VISITORS THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CONDUCTING A PROGRAM TO DESTROY NORTH VIETNAM DIKES. NEVERTHELESS, THE INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTENDED THE BRIEFING WAS CONVINCED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE GREATLY CONCERNED OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONCERTED AMERICAN AIR ATTACK AGAINST THE DIKE SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY DURING THE COMING HIGH WATER SEASON.

4. NO FIELD DISSEM.

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SANITIZEDCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM
DOI 28 JULY - 23 AUGUST 1967
SUBJECT AVAILABILITY OF ELECTRIC POWER IN NORTH VIETNAM

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-138
By clm, NARA Date 3-29-01

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES
TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL
TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACST, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;
NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;
AIR FORCE AFCEIN, GENERAL THOMAS
TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WERE IN NORTH VIETNAM FROM 28 JULY UNTIL 23 AUGUST 1967. THEY WERE IN HANOI FOR MOST OF THIS PERIOD BUT MADE TRIPS TO THE COUNTRYSIDE DURING THE PERIOD 3-9 AUGUST. DURING THEIR TIME IN

(classification) (dissem controls)

IN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

(classification) (dissem controls)

HANOI ELECTRIC POWER WAS CUT OFF ONLY TWICE AND BOTH STOPPAGES TOOK PLACE ON 21 AUGUST AFTER THE BOMBING. ONE STOPPAGE WAS FOR ONE HOUR AND THE SECOND WAS FOR ONLY ONE HALF HOUR. NORTH VIETNAMESE WITH WEOM TRIBUNAL MEMBERS TALKED ON 21 AUGUST SAID THE STOPPAGES WERE A RESULT OF BOMB DAMAGE TO POWER LINES RATHER THAN HITS ON THE THERMAL POWER PLANT.

TEAM MEMBERS TALKED WITH CABANES, THE FRENCH PRESS AGENCY REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI, ON 21 AUGUST AND CABANES SAID THAT HE PASSED THE THERMAL POWER PLANT AFTER THE BOMBING THAT DAY AND THE PLANT DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN HIT.)

2. THE MEMBERS OF THE TRIBUNAL TEAM WERE REPEATEDLY TOLD BY VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS INCLUDING SUCH PERSONS AS DR. PHAM NGOC TEACH, THE NVN MINISTER OF HEALTH, THAT ALL OF THE VIETNAMESE PROVINCES OUTSIDE HANOI ARE HAVING PROBLEMS WITH THEIR ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLIES.

3 FIELD DISSEM: NONE

4. COMMENT: ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, NMCC/MC, NSA, NIC.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/DIR DIA NMCC/MC ~~STATE/DIR~~ ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC ~~STATE/DIR~~ NSA OCR ~~STATE/DIR~~
STATE/DIR NIC (HENDRICKSON) DD/I EXC ~~STATE/DIR~~ ONE ~~STATE/DIR~~

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-138
By cdm, NARA Date 3-29-01

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI 11 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT PHAM VAN DONG INTERVIEW WITH MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL
TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IN HANOI, 11 AUGUST 1967

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

TO STATE : NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

TO DIA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL

TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;

NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY;

AIR FORCE AFCIN, GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA : EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WHO RECENTLY
VISITED HANOI HAD A MEETING WITH PHAM VAN DONG ON 11 AUGUST. THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS
WERE QUITE DISAPPOINTED WITH DONG'S EVASIVENESS IN HANDLING DIRECT QUESTIONS AND

5
4 WITH HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL HIS CLAIMS THAT THE WAR WOULD BE
3
2 WON IN THE LONG RUN. DONG SPOKE ONLY OF WINNING THE WAR, ALTHOUGH HE PREDICTED THAT
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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

1.3(a)

(classification) (dissem controls)

MUCH WORSE TIMES WERE IN STORE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. HE CLAIMED THAT VIETNAMESE PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER ESCALATION BY THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. THE SUBJECT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR WAS NOT MENTIONED.

2. THE INVESTIGATING TEAM LEADER AYBAR SPECIFICALLY ASKED DONG IF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE WAS INFLUENCING THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ASKED KOSYGIN THE SAME QUESTION. DONG REPLIED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE BUSY FIGHTING THEIR OWN WAR AND WERE NOT BEING INFLUENCED BY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WERE AIDING THEM. [REDACTED] THIS OBVIOUS HEDGING ON A SERIOUS QUESTION DISAPPOINTED AYBAR.)

1.3(a)(4)

3. DONG WAS ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS. DONG REPLIED THAT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS WERE NOT NEEDED. HE WAS THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS STATEMENT ALSO APPLIED TO VOLUNTEERS IN THE MEDICAL FIELD. DONG SAID, "YES FOR THE TIME BEING BUT THIS COULD CHANGE."

4. DONG BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR AIDING SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER VICTORY OVER THE AMERICANS. HE SAID SUCH AID WOULD BE GIVEN IN STAGES AS REQUESTED AND REQUIRED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. [REDACTED] DONG'S APPARENT REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE PRESENT MASSIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT TO THE WAR EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS PARTICULARLY GALLING TO THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS.)

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5. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

6. [REDACTED] COMMENT. ADVANCE COPIES SENT ELECTRICALLY TO EXO, STATE, DIA, NMCC/MC, NSA, NIC.

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Friday, September 1, 1967
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen's excellent response to your question about war-time problems in the past.

It is full of useful, usable, and comforting quotations.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

American wars have given rise to two types of problems on the home front:

-- Criticism of the war itself.

-- Concern with domestic problems, seemingly accentuated by the war.

I. The Revolutionary War

Supported by only one half of the population of the colonies, the rest being neutral or loyal to Britain, few American wars have been less popular.

Philip Davidson^{1/} tells us that Pennsylvania "was so full of disaffection that it was the despair of the patriotic party...In Virginia, the government was plagued by indifference and actual discontent throughout the war...Upstate New York had long been indifferent and Tories abounded". Even in Boston James Warren could write John Adams in 1778 that "I wish it were in my power to tell you that the number and influence of the Tories here were reduced, but I think they gain ground fast."

Nor were opponents of the Revolution men of little note. Anglican churchmen led the pack. The Rev. Samuel Seabury, the most prolific of these critics, was so widely respected nonetheless that he was made the first post-war Bishop of the American Episcopal Church. In retrospect, it has become clear that God favored our cause, but this was not the only view heard in most pulpits at the time.

As the war stretched into seemingly endless stalemate, economic problems mounted on the home front.

Imports ceased from England, which had heretofore supplied most of the colonies' finished goods. Merchants, farmers (notably tobacco and rice planters) and fishermen suffered particularly from the cut-off of trade.

^{1/} "Propaganda and the American Revolution," Philip Davidson

As the supply of goods and services dwindled, the supply of money increased; the war had to be financed somehow.

The result was soaring inflation.

Hardest hit were the clergy, town laborers, and artisans; workers went on strike; a leading critic of the war spoke for many when he said that if "the calamitous war would be stopped, agriculture, commerce, and industry would resume their wonted vigor...(and) everything would return to its pristine state of prosperity."

The over-all picture, during most of the Revolution, was thus one of great hardship and turmoil, in the midst of a war that was not generally popular and that many thought could not be won.

II. War of 1812

Domestic opposition to the War of 1812 was evident from the start. Out of 160 members of both houses of the Congress, sixty-two voted against the declaration of war.

As the war went on, that opposition mounted. A committee of the Massachusetts State Senate suggested that the war was "waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that ambition and conquest are its real motives..."

Josiah Quincy cried out in Congress that the attack on Canada was less defensible than the conduct of Captain Kidd and West Indian buccaneers.

Political opposition was compounded by economic hardship. The war had depressed shipping to the point of extinction. The government at Washington was rushing toward both bankruptcy and inflation - issuing treasury notes in large amounts, despite the disastrous failure of its 1814 loan.

The Boston Gazette warned any soft-minded financiers who might be tempted to come to the rescue of their

country: "Any man who lends his money to the government at the present time will forfeit all claim to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends of the country."

All this came to a head when the President tried to halt trading with the enemy. Federalist candidates swept Republicans from office throughout New England.

The President prudently withdrew the embargo, but then a new bone of contention arose: The Secretary of War refused to provide funds for support of state militias not committed to the war, while the National Congress called for conscription and proposed to allow 18-year olds to volunteer.

Daniel Webster responded with a speech so vehement that its publication was suppressed for nearly 100 years: He spoke of a government "more tyrannical, more arbitrary, more dangerous, more allied to blood and murder, more full of every form of mischief, more productive of every sort and degree of misery than has been exercised by any civilized government, with a single exception, in modern times."

Representatives of three New England states met at the Hartford Convention to air their grievances. The Boston Sentinel sounded its keynote: "...The tyrannical oppression of those who at present usurp the power of the Constitution is beyond endurance. And we will resist."

The roster of those attending reads like a who's who of wisdom and substance: judges, educators, preachers, legislators, authors, soldiers, merchants, lawyers. The names are still those that command respect in the region: Cabot, Dwight, Lyman, Bigelow, Longfellow, Prescott, Otis, Bliss, Sherman, Ward, West.

It was these men, in Convention assembled, who solemnly advised the states to resist operation of the proposed conscription and volunteer bills - and this while a British army was at the gates of New Orleans.

To secure the President's acceptance of the Convention's demands, three commissioners were sent to Washington - to take the surrender, they thought, of a beaten administration and a defeated country.

But Jackson won the battle of New Orleans while they were on the highway, and the New York National Advocate described the outcome:

"Missing: Three well looking, responsible men, who appeared to be traveling toward Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's Hotel in Baltimore, on Monday evening last, and have not since been heard of. They were observed to be very melancholy on hearing the news of peace..."

III. Mexican War

But the domestic difficulties of 1812 look mild, compared to those which attended the entry of Texas and Upper California into the Union.

The war was popular at the start, and the Whig opposition proclaimed that "doubt, division, and reproach will be unknown."

But the public mood changed dramatically as the conflict dragged on: "When Congress adjourned (in 1846), it was in bad humor...Instead of glorying in the war, Democrats now defended it feebly and a great many regarded it as a grave political blunder. The fall Congressional elections went heavily against them...In countless eyes the war itself soon lost its glamor."^{1/}

Intellectuals took the lead: Professor Kent of Harvard was one of the war's milder critics in denouncing it as "maniacal."

The National Intelligencer drew the moral: "We presume that our President and his Cabinet are by this time convinced that they have forfeited the public confidence..."

^{1/} "The War with Mexico," Justin H. Smith

Whig journals now assured Mexico that "her cause was just, that a majority of Americans detested the war, that our treasury could not bear the cost, that our government was incompetent...that our armies could not win the war, and that soon the administration would be rebuked and its policies reversed."

"Be prompt when you are wrong to back straight out," urged the New York Tribune, demanding the recall of all our troops from Mexico.

Senator Corwin of Ohio said that if he were a Mexican, he would welcome the Americans to a bloody grave. Congressman Giddings spoke of a war "in violation of the Constitution, against the dictates of justice, humanity, the sentiments of the age in which we live and the religion which we profess." Herman Melville compared his countrymen unfavorably to South Seas cannibals. Henry Clay declaimed: "This is no war of defense."

Opposition came not only from the opposition Whigs but from within the ranks of the Democratic Party. Calhoun strongly opposed the President's war message. Hostilities had occurred, he conceded, but as the Congress had not acted, "there is no war, according to the sense of our Constitution." He gave way to gloom: It was entirely uncertain whether our army could reach Mexico City or secure a peace. It did.

But more than opposition to the war convulsed the home front.

Economic conditions were parlous. In the face of war-engendered uncertainties "businessmen shrank from large enterprises...The currency had been inflated by the paper issues of many banks. Stocks were selling far below the prices of twelve months before...The war bill precipitated a panic in Wall Street and soon business in the south and west was described as prostrate."

When the administration responded with some tough fiscal medicine, the North American exclaimed: "Our administration seems enamoured by ruin and woos calamity for itself."

The climax came when an administration resolution declaring the war to be just and necessary was defeated in the Congress, and a resolution condemning the war as "unnecessary and unconstitutionally begun" passed.

Or perhaps the climax really came somewhat later - when American forces achieved their objectives, peace was concluded and the chief Whig organ then reprinted in its editorial column, without criticism, the judgment that it was "one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation," while the Whig party, tactfully drawing a veil over the past, chose a leading architect of victory, General Taylor, as its Presidential candidate.

IV. The Civil War

Here, too, the outbreak of war was greeted with enthusiasm on the home front. Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers was quickly met.

But here, too, enthusiasm waned as the conflict went on.

A Republican leader noted: "The people have furnished mens and means in abundance for all purposes to conquer the enemy; but...we have made no progress in putting down the rebellion...and the people are desirous of some change, they scarcely know what."

The 1862 Congressional elections went heavily against the administration in the mid-West. The Illinois House of Representatives passed an anti-war resolution by a large majority, and the Indiana legislature refused appropriations for raising troops.

Meanwhile, large economic changes were causing real hardships. The new tariff and banking system was widely criticized for discriminating against the rest of the country in favor of the Northeast. Manufacturing and farming had been greatly stimulated. But labor had shared little in the new prosperity. Its wages did not keep pace with rising prices.

And Congress laid duties on luxuries, occupations, incomes, the earnings of corporations, and almost every other available object. Even so, greenbacks proliferated, leaving those on fixed salaries in dire straits.

This economic discontent, as well as opposition to the war, was reflected in draft riots: Homes and offices were burned to the ground; Negroes were seized, hanged, and shot; pitched battles were fought between rioters and police. Before a large contingent of troops quelled the New York riot, at least 1,000 people had been killed or wounded and \$1 million worth of property had been destroyed.

Congressman Vallandigham told his colleagues: "You have not conquered the South. You never will. It is not in the nature of things possible...Stop fighting. Make an armistice. Accept at once foreign mediation."

This was the man who, in 1863, not only gained the Democratic nomination for Governor of Ohio but won two-fifths of the votes cast in the general election.

A month later, in December, 1863, the United States House of Representatives tabled a resolution calling on the President to open negotiations with the South by only 98 to 59.

All this came to a head in the spring of 1864, as Grant's offensive against Richmond brought heavy losses.

Large peace meetings were held in major cities of the North. Every week seemed to add a new journal or leader to Lincoln's opponents; many moved cautiously toward the fence.

In August 1864, the Chairman of the National Republican Committee wrote Lincoln that "the tide is setting strongly against us...Were an election to be held now in Illinois we should be beaten...Pennsylvania is against us..."

Later that month, Lincoln recorded his belief that he would be defeated in the election, and that the new President would be forced to suspend the war.

In early September, as if to bear out his prediction, the Democratic Party nominated General McClellan for President on a platform which proclaimed that "after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war...justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities...on the basis of the Federal Union of States."

This language appealed to a public opinion that seemed willing neither to abandon the Union nor to support much longer the sacrifices needed to preserve it.

But the fall of Atlanta a month later produced a startling change. Leaders, full of pessimism a few weeks before, could now recall that they had clearly foreseen a Union triumph all along and led a great rush of the faithful back to the fold.

V. World War II

Troubles on the home front during World War II reflected less political disagreements than the costs and tensions created by a major military effort. These were evident on four fronts:

-- Youth: As mothers went to work, juvenile delinquency increased 56%. As war employment soared, the percentage of eligible young people attending high school dropped to 56%.

-- Race Relations: As labor moved from farm to factory, 5 million people migrated within the South; another 1.6 million left for the North. There a changing population pattern brought new tensions. The Detroit race riots of June, 1943, were only the most dramatic evidence.

-- Labor Disputes: Despite no-strike pledges there were nearly 15,000 work stoppages, involving loss of more than 36 million man days. When the United Mine Workers defied the government in striking in 1943, the Smith-Connally Act was passed over the President's veto, public feeling against unions continued to rise, and many states passed anti-labor laws.

-- Inflationary Pressures: Post-Pearl Harbor prices rose 2% per month. Wartime food prices rose 50%. Rents went up only 4%, but this meant little to war workers moving into new areas, where there was no decent housing. Black marketing and overcharging grew in proportions far beyond OPA's policing capacity.

The outcome of the 1942 elections reflected resulting public dissatisfaction over price control, rent control, and gasoline rationing; over the 40-hour week, strikes, and the wage rates being paid to defense workers; over the loss of farm labor to the city, the lack of farm machinery, and the ceilings on farm prices - plus a series of military setbacks abroad.

And all of which only goes to show that the home front can be very troubled, even during a war in which public opinion supports the war with rare unanimity.

VI. Korean War

The problems which dominated the home front during this period are too recent to need more than summary recall. They can be grouped under two headings:

1. The War. Dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war was widespread. It seemed an endless stalemate. Few said that we should withdraw, but most had strong ideas as to how its conduct could be improved. All this came to a head when General MacArthur was fired: A Gallup poll showed only 29% favoring the President, as against 69% for the General. Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, records the sequel: "Letters by the tens of

thousands poured into the White House, Congressional offices, newspapers, and radio stations in every part of the land. Individuals and groups bought newspaper space to condemn the outrage. Preachers thundered about it from their pulpits. Legion posts, service clubs, and PTA passed angrily worded resolutions. Figures labeled 'Truman' and 'Acheson' were burned in effigy on college campuses and in town squares...Congressional Republicans...held emergency caucuses in the House and Senate Wednesday morning to vent their wrath against the President. Later on the Senate floor, William E. Jenner of Indiana roared:... 'Our only choice is to impeach President Truman'...Some Democrats in Congress defended their President, but most...stood mute in dismay and indecision."

2. Economic Problems: The Korean War came at a time when the economy was less strong than it is today. President Truman was forced to reinstitute limited wage and price controls, and for this he was soon attacked by both business and labor. His conflict with both groups continued and deepened, as the war went on. Management and labor fought each other, as well. And the consumer-at-large was mad at everybody: management, labor, and the administration, which he blamed for painful shortages and controls.

It is not surprising that, against this background of dissatisfaction with the war and resentment of its economic effects, the President's popularity had reached an all-time low of 26% by the spring of 1952.

When the administration came to a close later that year, there were few who could see ahead to the judgment that Clinton E. Rossiter would make in 1956. "I am ready to hazard an opinion, to which I did not ^{come} easily or lightly, that Harry Truman will eventually win a place as President, if not as a hero, alongside Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt." For it was not as clear then as it is now that the Korean War would find its way - along with the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War and World War II - to the list of conflicts remembered not by their turbulent effect on the home front but by their more lasting results abroad.

110

Handwritten:
~~1. Summary~~
2. Press file

Friday, September 1, 1967, 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

In the attached, Secretary Rusk recommends that you agree to a short picture-taking session on September 14 with the President of the European Parliament (Alain Poher) and 12 of his colleagues.

This is not essential, but it would be a nice gesture if you have the time. The European Parliament is not a powerful body, but we have hopes that it someday will be. A few minutes with you would demonstrate our support.

W. W. Rostow

Marvin to set up appointment ✓

No _____

Speak to me _____

ERF:LSE:mst

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

110a

August 31, 1967

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: **Appointment to Greet
European Parliament Delegation**

Recommendation:

I suggest that you meet briefly for a greeting and picture-taking session with Alain Poher, President of the European Parliament, and twelve fellow European Parliamentarians when they are in Washington on September 14. The Delegation is visiting the United States for a few days at the invitation of the Vice President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The European Parliament is the legislative branch of the European Communities. As its President, Poher ranks ahead of the Presidents of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. While the Parliament has little formal substantive power it serves as the forum for democratic control in the Communities. Your greeting the Delegation on September 14 would be appropriate, since both President Kennedy and you received former President Gaetano Martino in Washington in 1963. Therefore, although we have informed Poher that you would not be able to receive him, I do believe that a brief meeting to exchange greetings and to take photographs would be an adequate and necessary demonstration of our recognition of the importance of the European Parliament.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

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Friday, September 1, 1967 -- 4:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

On being informed of your India wheat decision, Amb. Nehru expressed great relief ("thank God"); and asked me please to convey to you his deep personal gratitude as well as that of his country.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, September 1, 1967
3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Although I believe that formally your sign-off is not required on the \$125,000 proposed by the State Department for Jewish refugees, the matter should go to you for decision.

The issue is briefly described in the attached memorandum to me from Hal Saunders and in the longer memorandum to me from John Walsh.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364
By ijg, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-364

By Wig, NARA, Date 6-23-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WWR

SUBJECT: Contribution for Jewish Refugees

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has asked us for about \$500,000 to cover the cost of maintaining those Jews who fled from Arab countries in the immediate aftermath of the June fighting. This would represent the cost of maintaining an average of 1500 refugees for an average period of 90 days. Most of the refugees involved are Jews who fled from Libya and are now in Italy.

Gene has approved a proposal by Jim Wine, Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant for Refugees, for contributing \$125,000. This would be half the cost of maintaining these refugees to date. He recommends leaving half of past expenditures uncovered and the future uncertain in order to stimulate contributions from other governments who have been approached. He would not close the door on another contribution later.

He recommends that our contribution may be made through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees rather than directly to the AJDC. He feels that this would help to internationalize the problem and encourage contributions from others. It also has the advantage of political neutrality.

This money would come out of the \$5 million emergency fund for refugees of the Middle East war. We have already given \$2 million for the Arabs through UNRWA and have contributed another \$100,000 to the International Red Cross, which is handling the return of refugees to the West Bank. Therefore, this small contribution to the Jewish refugees is quite in balance. And I understand, as might be expected, our contribution will do us a lot of good on the domestic political scene.

I do not think we need to go to the President with this at all. Mac Bundy insisted when this emergency fund was set up that all decisions for disbursing its money be referred to the White House because we wanted to maintain control over the big decision about how to handle UNRWA in the future. We did not have in mind referring reasonable small contributions like this to the President.

Therefore, I think your signoff with Gene's is quite adequate. They would like to move on this quickly in order not to dissipate any of the good feelings that may come from among the Jewish community here.

Approve _____
See me _____

Hal
Hal Saunders

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY



15013

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 28, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Jewish Refugees

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum approved by Under Secretary Rostow authorizing the grant of \$125,000 to UNHCR to be used for Jewish Refugees from Arab countries. If you concur, we would proceed with the indicated contribution.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

Acting Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-365
By *ig*, NARA, Date 12-15-94

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

112c

S/R

August 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: M - Mr. Eugene Rostow

FROM: S/R - James Wine JW

SUBJECT: Proposed Grant of \$125,000 to UNHCR to be used for Jewish Refugees from Arab countries.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-365
By isg, NARA, Date 12-15-94

DISCUSSION

1. In a letter of July 24, 1967 to me (Tab A), the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) requested a grant of \$497,500 from the President's \$5 million reserve of contingency funds for emergency assistance to the Middle East. The funds requested were to be used by the AJDC for the care and maintenance in Italy of an average case load of 1500 Jewish refugees from Libya for an average period of ninety days. We have reviewed the cost estimates and they are accurate.

2. Three questions are presented: First, whether we should contribute to these emergency refugee costs; second, if so, whether we should contribute the full cost or only a portion; and third, whether we should use the AJDC or the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the vehicle for our contribution.

3. Of the approximately 100,000 Jews in Arab countries before hostilities, about 7,000 have fled, mostly for Europe. About 3,000 Jews fled Libya for Italy in destitute circumstances. About 2,700 left Tunisia for France, most of whom took with them their liquid assets. The remaining 1,300

Group 4
Downgraded at three yrs.
intervals. Declassified
12 yrs. after date of
origin.

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- 2 -

left Aden, Lebanon, Morocco and the UAR for scattered European destinations and do not constitute a massive problem in any one country. Italy, with its 3,000 Libyan Jewish refugees, thus has the most concentrated care and maintenance task. Recognizing this, Italy agreed to grant temporary asylum to all Jewish refugees from Libya on the AJDC's assurance that Italy will not have to meet the costs for their support. I believe it is appropriate for the United States to assist these Jewish victims of the war just as we are assisting Arab victims. As you know, we have contributed \$100,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross, \$2 million in goods and services for Arab refugees and displaced persons. We will undoubtedly contribute more for this purpose. Moreover, assistance to political refugees is a responsibility that the United States has traditionally accepted. Our assistance totals over \$2 billion since the end of World War II.

4. I do not believe that we should meet the full amount of the costs of maintaining these refugees in Italy. As in our other refugee activities, we should look to other countries to bear a fair share. The UNHCR has sent letters to The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United States Government (our letter attached - Tab B), advising these countries, that, while he has no program funds available for this purpose, he is willing to serve as a channel for contributions to Jewish refugees from Arab countries. I believe that we would be shouldering our share of the responsibility at this time if we paid approximately half of the actual costs to August 30, or \$125,000. Leaving a gap between needs and our contribution may encourage other nations to join in this effort.

5. I see a number of advantages to making our contribution to the UNHCR rather than to the AJDC. Using the UNHCR creates, at least to a limited extent, a sense of international responsibility and encourages contributions from other countries which could far less easily contribute to the AJDC.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

The UNHCR is politically neutral; a contribution to the High Commissioner is far less subject to attack from Arab or North African countries.

6. If the recommendation contained herein is approved, we should indicate to the UNHCR ~~that~~ this grant was made as a result of the plea by the AJDC for United States Government support of its assistance to the Jewish refugees who fled to Italy. The High Commissioner could then channel his assistance through the AJDC if ~~he~~ saw fit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve a contribution of \$125,000 from the President's reserve for emergency relief to the Middle East to be made to the UNHCR for the care and maintenance of Jewish refugees who have fled Arab countries as a result of the Middle East conflict.

APPROVED *Sub*

DISAPPROVED _____

DATE Aug. 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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112d

**THE AMERICAN JEWISH
JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE, INC.**

60 EAST 42 STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 TEL.: (212) 687-6200, CABLES: JOINTDISCO NEW YORK

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July 24, 1967

Dear Ambassador Wine:

Thank you very much for having given me and Mr. Karasik the opportunity to meet with you on Friday.

This letter will serve to recapitulate the problem which I then put before you on behalf of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, and to request the urgent and favorable action of the Secretary of State.

As a direct result of the recent hostilities in the Middle East, there has taken place the brutal killing of innocent people in Libya, for no other reason than that they were Jews. As a consequence a large scale flight of the Jewish inhabitants of Libya has taken place and is still in process. These unfortunate people who have been forced to flee from a country in which Jews have lived for over two thousand years have left with meagre possessions, and only 20 Libyan pounds in cash which the government allowed them to take out. They are direct victims of the Arab-Israeli war.

Our best estimate is that there are about 2400 of these refugees present in Italy. Of these some 1600 are completely dependent upon the Joint Distribution Committee for their support and shelter. Of the approximately 800 Jewish refugees in Italy not now dependent on the JDC, there are already clear indications that the support of many of these, from Italian friends or relatives, will be coming to an end during the next month or so, and they will also be dependent on the JDC. We have reasonable information that hundreds of additional refugees will be reaching Italy out of approximately 2500 Jews who still remain in Libya.

Refuge for these victims in Italy is possible only because of, and is conditioned on, the assurance of the JDC to the government of Italy that the government will be guaranteed against any cost for the support of these refugees.

The Italian Government has made available two refugee camps. The Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration has made available the third. In these there are housed about 725 of the refugees dependent upon JDC. The remaining 875 (as of July 19) are being provided for by the JDC in private pensions.

We ask that the Secretary of State, in accordance with the President's statement of June 27, 1967, allocate funds for the support of these war victims.

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The JDC also receives smaller amounts from the Conference on


The entire operation of the JDC in Italy is on a deficit basis, the JDC having no reserves for this kind of disaster relief. The entire operation for a 90-day period will cost about half a million dollars. We have made every effort to find sources of funding for this operation, but to date have been unable to obtain any commitment whatsoever therefor.

I attach a copy of the report of Mr. Lillo Arbib, former President of the Jewish Community Tripoli, which, in detail, discusses the events in Tripoli between June 5 and June 19, and describes the immediate and violent impact of the Middle East hostilities on the Jewish population in Libya.

I also attach a memorandum which gives further detail on the problem with which the JDC is faced in Italy.

We urgently request an allocation of funds sufficient to cover the costs of this program of relief to these innocent victims of war, out of the President's emergency fund of \$5 million, described in the President's statement of June 27.

Sincerely yours,



Samuel L. Haber
Asst. Executive Vice Chairman

SLH:FW

enc.

Ambassador James W. Wine
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for Refugee and Migration Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

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THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
REFUGEESLE HAUT COMMISSAIRE POUR
LES REFUGIESPalais des Nations
GENÈVE

2 August 1967

Dear Jim,

I have had one or two talks recently with Charlie Jordan regarding the problem of Jewish persons from North Africa moving to Italy. I imagine you are informed about this development. During the talks which I have had, it would appear that the number of people now concerned is making the cost of the operation rather heavy, even for AJDC, to bear. I understand that more than 2,500 persons have arrived in Italy and that the bill for their care and maintenance and other associated costs there may reach a total of a half million dollars.

I believe AJDC has made an appeal to the State Department for assistance to meet this heavy financial burden.

For my part, I wish you to know that if, as in the past, you desire to channel any contribution which the State Department decided to make for this purpose through my Office, I would be happy to cooperate in this important matter.

*with warmest personal regards.**Sadrudin*

Sadrudin Aga Khan

The Honourable James Wine,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State,
Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington DC 20520

J. W. _____

J. T. A. _____

P. B. _____

G. A. E. _____

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 1, 1967
3:35 p.m.

113
for file

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this account
on the American observers in Viet Nam.

We should consider having someone
call the New York Times and the AP and
simple let them know that the evidence we
have is that their representatives are not
objective reporters but political operatives.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 4658

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ML 90-263

By kg/isp, NARA, Date 10-3-91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 90-262
By RG/tp, NARA, Date 10-3-91

113a

Copy of SAIGON 4658 1 Sept. 1967

SUBJECT: American Observers to Vietnam

1. Observer visit appears to be progressing well so far. August 31 in the afternoon, Murphy, Gullander, Scerra, Barr, proceeded to Danang from which central point they have been able to cover election preparations and activities in a number of localities in I Corps. They return to Saigon in the early afternoon today, September 1. Antell and James went to Nha Trang, where they have remained overnight and from which they are travelling to Qui Nhon and Pleiku to observe election preparations prior to returning to Saigon.

2. Others have been in the Saigon area and on various short trips to localities in III and IV Corps. Places visited have included Phu Cuong, Cao Lanh, Phan Thiet, My Tho, Bao Trai, and others. Several observers are moving more independently, notably Senator Muskie, who made arrangements on his own for meetings with the press and attending joint presidential press conference August 31. Mayor McKeldin is in Danang today, and after the morning in Saigon, Archbishop Lucey and Senator Hickenlooper are in Can Thao this afternoon.

3. Most observers are expected to return to Saigon by late this afternoon (Sept. 1) to view the final election rally of the campaign, to be held in front of City Hall, and thereafter attend the Ambassador's reception. Saturday and Sunday the majority are following the Government of Viet Nam schedule, but several are expected to take separate trips and all Corps areas should be covered.

4. Reactions so far are fragmentary and obviously preliminary. On the basis of these, however, observers appear to be pleased at the opportunity to move about freely, and they seem to be undertaking their task with determination to be as objective as possible. In addition to discussions with Province Chiefs, local election committee members and similar contacts, at least two of the observers, Governor McCall and Rabbi Rudin, have even stopped people on the street asking them if they had been pressured to vote for any particular candidate. Apparently they have received consistently negative replies.

5. Some of the more critical members of the press have been at pains to get to the observers. Also, some of the observers themselves have been anxious to talk to critical correspondents and have done so. Correspondents have accompanied almost all of the groups and in some instances appear to have overplayed their hand in attempting to influence the observers. For example, the escort officer for Rabbi Rudin, reported that members of Group IV,

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-2-

including Rabbi Rudin, Governor McCall and Mr. Patterson,, were considerably irritated yesterday, August 31, by accompanying reporters (Buckley of New York Times and Arnett of AP) who tried to convince them that the election would be fraudulent. The attitude of the observers was that so far they had not seen anything which would indicate that the elections would be rigged. The same officer reports that Whitney Young has said that unless he sees some indications of election rigging or pressure he is going to start asking reporters why they haven't been reporting elections correctly.

6. Arrangements are being made when requested and to the extent possible for observers to meet candidates. With individual arrangements, and Thieu/Ky reception on Saturday (to which candidates are invited), most observers desiring to meet candidates should have had an adequate opportunity to do so prior to election day. We will report on these contacts. Knight and Sullivan visited Huong campaign headquarters today, where they had an opportunity to talk with senatorial candidates. The latter gave a pat recital of complaints, and neither Knight nor Sullivan appeared impressed. Buckley of New York Times and AP Stringer were present.

7. Congressman Wolff and McCarthy have arrived. We are assisting them in various ways, but they are moving independently of the observer group.

Bunker

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114

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 1, 1967
3:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in this report by the Turkish Foreign Minister on Ayub's views.

Also attached is our new Ambassador's report on his first encounter with Ayub.

W. W. Rostow

Ankara 976
Letter 8/25/67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-364
By isg, NARA, Date 6-23-95

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

1142
Friday, September 1, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR HART (Ankara, 976)

With the injunction it was for my ears only, Foreign Minister Caglayangil volunteered to me privately on August 28 the following account of his latest contacts with Pakistani leaders at the recent Regional Cooperative Development meeting at Islamabad on August 10.

He had a very frank give-and-take with President Ayub and felt he had moved him a slight bit away from his earlier negative position regarding CENTO. Caglayangil had pressed the question of why Ayub wanted to see a "distance develop" between Pakistan and the United States. If Ayub felt it was because of disappointed expectations connected with the 1965 war with India, this was not sufficient reason. Turkey herself had experienced misunderstandings with the U.S. over Cyprus but the Turks had not let this prevent continuation of cordial relations. Why did Ayub insist on close relationship with Red China? Did he think if, God forbid, a third World War broke out, Red China would win it? If so, then Pakistan should turn to Red China, if it thought Russia would win, it should turn to Russia. Turkey did not think so and had cast its lot definitely with the West.

Ayub attempted to reply that public opinion in Pakistan made close relations with the U.S. difficult. Caglayangil retorted that he, as Head of State, should lead public opinion, not follow it. In fact, the Government of Turkey was worried that Ayub's leadership might be slipping when he kept insisting that he could not resist such currents.

Caglayangil parenthetically asked me if I had heard that Bhutto, who had been denouncing CENTO in Pakistan recently came to Ayub and said, "I spoke out against CENTO for political

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-95

By cb, NARA Date 7-25-00

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

PROCESSED

reasons, but you yourself should not abandon this organization." Caglayangil felt Bhutto was still pulling the strings of public opinion in Pakistan, as ambitious and unscrupulous as ever, a wealthy man who knew how to flatter the mob.

In excusing his relationship with Red China, Ayub surprised Caglayangil by displaying a phobia over U.S. intentions toward Pakistan. He even accused the U.S. of encouraging a separatist movement in East Pakistan. Caglayangil immediately voiced incredulity asking how separation could advance the interests of the U.S. Ayub gave no clear answer.

I asked Caglayangil whether the fact that American economic aid to Pakistan had been resumed at a level approximating that which directly preceded the Pakistan-India war had been mentioned by Ayub. Caglayangil replied he had mentioned U.S. aid but primarily to complain of various restrictions built into it which he had found onerous.

I remarked that such a frank exchange with President Ayub showed there must be an unusual personal relationship and Caglayangil replied that indeed this was the case and they had talked without restraint.

Caglayangil was very happy to hear from Secretary Rusk that Pirzada had accepted the invitation for discussion in Washington. He wished Ayub would go and in fact, for my information, had urged him to take this initiative so as to talk things out. Ayub was noncommittal.

In response to my query regarding his relationship with Pirzada, he said he was doing the best he could but Pirzada unfortunately was "neither a man of good-will nor was he intelligent;" to that extent he was worse than Bhutto.



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Rawalpindi, Pakistan

August 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Thought you might be interested in the enclosed copy of a letter just received from President Ayub in connection with my presentation of credentials. Please do show it to the Boss if you think he would like to see it.

I don't know whether there is any significance in this or not, but I note that he says "This visit, though somewhat brief. . ." In fact, the total visit was approximately 42 minutes, of which only five were the formal presentation and the rest was spent alone in private discussion. The Chief of Protocol commented to our DCM and me after the meeting that its length was "unprecedented," and President Ayub's Military Secretary made a very similar observation to our DCM and my Staff Aide during the meeting.

Things are still very novel to me as a neophyte, but I think I am beginning to get things sifted out and I know already that this is going to be a fascinating assignment. I only hope that I can justify the President's confidence.

Subject to some occurrence I do not now anticipate, I do not plan to seek an audience with President Ayub until shortly before his departure on his Moscow trip, at which time I hope to discuss with him, among other things, the then current Israeli situation, within, of course, the

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-365
By ms, NARA, Date 12-15-94

RESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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guidelines which the Department will furnish me. He is scheduled to leave here on September 25.

With warm personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.
American Ambassador

Enclosure:

Copy of President Ayub's
letter of August 21, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

From:
Field Marshal
Mohammad Ayub Khan,
N.Pk., H.J.

President's House
Dacca

August 21, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Thank you very much for your letter dated the 16th August, 1967.

I was very glad to meet you when you came to present your credentials. This visit, though somewhat brief, provided an opportunity all the same to exchange views with you. I have no doubt that my message and views would be faithfully conveyed by you to President Johnson. I might add that I have already written to President Johnson conveying my deep thoughts to him for the gift of the two lovely books of photographs and the pamphlet on his political philosophy received through you and also how glad I have been to meet you as his Ambassador in whom he has great trust. I have also assured President Johnson that you will receive every consideration and courtesy from all concerned in Pakistan in the execution of your duties.

I am glad to hear that you have kindly taken the trouble to send an autographed copy of my book "Friends Not Masters" to Eugene Black.

I trust that you have by now settled down in your new charge.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ M. A. Khan

His Excellency
Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.,
Ambassador of the U.S.A.,
57-A, Satellite Town,
Rawalpindi

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94 365
By ig, NARA, Date 12-15-94

Friday, September 1, 1967, 12:45 p.m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Henry Wilson's Letter on PL 480 Potential

W.W.R. 117
Lamp
2. Pres file
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *19*, NARA, Date *10-4-91*

You asked for a quiet pricing-out on Henry Wilson's commodity recommendations. The total value of the commodities he lists would be about \$212 million. But I should also report the following:

1. Wilson's proposals are not additional to what USDA now has programmed. All of the agreements on Wilson's list are now well along in the bureaucratic process and will be proposed to you for final approval within the next 2-3 months. Two of them -- India and Ecuador -- are before you now, though the recommendation on India is for 1 million rather than Wilson's 1.5 million tons. The half million tons for Pakistan may not come to you before November or December.
2. The \$212 million worth of commodities in Wilson's letter represent less than half of the \$550 million worth of PL 480 sales agreements Agriculture projects we will sign in the rest of calendar 1967. The current estimate for total CY 1967 PL 480 sales is \$1.1 billion. Add in about \$400 million in PL 480 donations and you get the current projection of a total 1967 PL 480 program of \$1.5 billion.
3. This projection reflects a hard push from Agriculture to move commodities as fast as possible consistent with the self-help standards you have established, and which are being strictly enforced.
4. Agriculture is pushing oil particularly hard. Circular cable has been sent to every post in the LDC world asking if they can find a way to provide some oil. This reflects a disastrous drop of about 1/3 in oil prices in the past 12 months (from about \$350 a ton to less than \$250), and the prospect of the largest soybean crop in our history.

Thus, I am afraid Henry's suggestions do nothing but give you a preview of what will be presented to you for decision within the next two or three months. The truth is that Agriculture is already pushing as hard as possible. We will be fortunate to reach the totals they now project.

EKH:mst

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

117a

BOARD OF TRADE
OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO

HENRY H. WILSON, JR.
PRESIDENT

August 29, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I had lunch with Orville Freeman yesterday and discussed among other matters the problems of agricultural prices.

I have secured from within the industry figures on proposed additional shipments pursuant to Title I of P. L. 480.

I asked Secretary Freeman whether these sums to the following countries would inhibit progress within these countries toward self-help.

After some investigation he responded to me that these possibilities would be completely within current rules and estimates.

The possibilities are as follows:

Wheat

India	1,500,000	metric tons
Bolivia	114,000	metric tons
Chile	120,000	metric tons
Ecuador	15,000	metric tons
Ceylon	80,000	metric tons
Guinea	11,000	metric tons
Morocco	300,000	metric tons
Paraguay	35,000	metric tons
Peru	30,000	metric tons
Pakistan	500,000	metric tons

Vegetable Oil


Pakistan	100,000 tons
India	70,000 tons

Probably additional oil could **appropriately** be shipped to other places **such** as Iran.

Secretary Freeman **agreed** that the cost to the government would be much less were these **items** purchased directly from the **private** trade for export rather than taken under loan and **thereafter exported**.

The difference as to wheat would be 25-30¢ a bushel and as to vegetable oil 1¢ per pound.

Respectfully,



Henry H. **Wilson, Jr.**

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

118

Friday, September 1, 1967, 11:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The National Security Act of 1947 outlines the responsibility to you of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the following words:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense."

We are digging out the Congressional Debate of 1947 which we will be sending to you later.^{es}

Attached is the copy of the Act itself. The above quoted language is on page 25. The language on the functions of the Council is on page 2.

BKS

for W. W. Rostow

Friday, September 1, 1967
9:30 a. m.

1163

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

If you wish to have a feel for the process which is making the curves -- which I showed you yesterday -- move favorably, read this CIA field report on the VC in July.

Beneath the surface of the somewhat "desperate" (p. 2) terrorist attacks is (p. 5) a process in which: "the people are leaving the VC, the VC are being forced to leave the people."

The report also notes, however, (p. 7) that "the VC organization is effective and VC forces retain a formidable capability to inflict death and destruction."

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (TDCS-314/13052-67 30 Aug 67)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-CBS 19
By ics, NARS, Date 6-22-84

Ret'd to: W. JORDEN

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 41966

PAGE 1 OF 13 PAGES

STAT ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC
EXO

TI Contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C.
SI the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

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TDCS-314/13052-67

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DIST 30 AUGUST 1967


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-138
By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI JULY 1967
SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN
SOUTH VIETNAM DURING JULY 1967

VIETNAM, SAIGON FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE



—BATOR
—BOWDLER
—BUDGET
—DAVIS
—GINSBURGH
—HAMILTON
—JESSUP
—JOHNSON
—JORDAN
—KEENE
—TAYLOR

[Handwritten initials]

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SUMMARY: THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM THE VIET CONG (VC)
CONTINUE TO FACE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EVERYWHERE, EXCEPT SOME
PARTS OF IV CORPS, FOOD AND MANPOWER ARE IN SERIOUSLY SHORT
SUPPLY. TAX COLLECTION IS AN INCREASING PROBLEM IN ALL AREAS.
POPULAR SUPPORT CONTINUES TO DECLINE. THIS IS ACCELERATED
BY THE VC'S INCREASED USE OF TERROR AND REPRESSION TO FORCE

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• [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
(classification) (dissem controls)

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SUPPORT. LOSS OF POPULATION FROM VC CONTROL CONTINUES TO REDUCE THE MANPOWER AVAILABLE FOR TROOPS, LABOR SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARY, AND TILLERS OF THE FIELDS. DESPITE SUCH EROSION, HOWEVER, THE VC STRUCTURE REMAINS STRONG AND DANGEROUS, WITH FAIR TO GOOD MORALE IN THE UPPER LEVELS. THEY LAUNCHED VERY FEW SIZEABLE MILITARY ACTIONS IN JULY, HOWEVER, FOCUSING THEIR RESOURCES ON ATTACKS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS AND ON HARASSMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) AND REFUGEE CENTERS, AND LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THERE APPEARED TO BE AN ELEMENT OF DESPERATION IN THEIR INCREASING RESORT TO INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. THE CHIEF NEW DEVELOPMENT IN JULY WAS THE GREATLY INCREASED ATTENTION DEVOTED TO THE APPROACHING NATIONAL ELECTIONS. THIS CONSISTED ALMOST ENTIRELY OF PLANNING, PROPAGANDIZING, AND SPREADING THREATS OF DEATH TO THOSE WHO SUPPORT THE ELECTIONS. SOME MINOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES WERE NOTED DURING THE MONTH.

END SUMMARY.

VC PROBLEMS:

1. FOOD SHORTAGES WERE VERY SERIOUS IN JULY IN ALL BUT IV CORPS, AND EVEN THERE THE VIET CONG (VC) WERE HARD PRESSED

[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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IN 41966

TDCS -314/13052-67

PAGE 3 OF13 PAGES

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IN SOME AREAS TO COLLECT ENOUGH FOOD. IN I AND II CORPS A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF MILITARY MANPOWER HAS BEEN DIVERTED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND COLLECTION OF FOOD FROM THE PEASANTS; FOR EXAMPLE, ONE BATTALION OF THE 95TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT IN PHU YEN PROVINCE HAD 15 PERCENT OF ITS MEN DETAILED TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. THE FOOD SHORTAGE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO POOR MORALE AND TO DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS AN ABSOLUTE SHORTAGE OF GRAIN CAUSED BY DECREASED PRODUCTION AND INCREASED DEMAND, BUT THIS HAS BEEN COMPOUNDED BY SERIOUS DISLOCATION OF THE VC SUPPLY SYSTEM. ALLIED SWEEPS HAVE BROKEN UP VC SUPPLY ORGANIZATIONS, AND ALLIED UNITS ARE OCCUPYING KEY LOCATIONS ON SOME OF THE ESTABLISHED COMMO-LIAISON ROUTES. IN NINH THUAN A NUMBER OF CADRES WERE REPLACED BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SECURE SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE MAIN LOGISTIC SUPPORT AREA TO SECRET OPERATIONAL BASES. MEDICAL SUPPLIES, ESPECIALLY ANTIBIOTICS, ARE SHORT IN ALL AREAS.

2. THE VC ARE SUFFERING FROM A SHORTAGE OF TAX INCOME ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. RAISING TAX LEVELS HAS SERVED TO MAKE COLLECTION ALL THE MORE DIFFICULT, AND LOCAL UNITS

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ARE INCREASINGLY RESORTING TO TERRORISM TO ENFORCE PAYMENT. IN SEVERAL DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN "EXECUTED" FOR NON-PAYMENT OF TAXES.

3. POPULATION CONTROL AND LOSS¹ OF POPULAR SUPPORT ARE GROWING PROBLEMS. ALLIED SUCCESS HAS MADE PEOPLE IN MANY AREAS RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE WITH THE VC. TO ENFORCE COOPERATION, THE VC HAVE FREQUENTLY RESORTED TO TERROR AND INTIMIDATION, WHICH HAVE INCREASED THEIR UNPOPULARITY. THE KHANH HOA PROVINCE COMMITTEE FOUND ITSELF IN AN UNHAPPY DILEMMA: IT DECIDED IT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TROOPS TO COUNTER ALLIED OPERATIONS AND MAINTAIN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION, BUT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT ANY ADDITIONAL TROOPS BECAUSE OF THE UNAVAILABILITY OF FOOD. IN IV CORPS, VC HAVE COMPLAINED OF LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT BOTH IN CONTESTED AREAS AND VC AREAS.

4. MORALE IN THE LOWER ECHELONS IS POOR NEARLY EVERYWHERE. HIGHER-LEVEL CADRES AND MAIN-FORCE TROOPS ARE GENERALLY IN BETTER SHAPE AND A FEW INSTANCES OF HIGH MORALE ARE REPORTED. FOOD AND MEDICAL SHORTAGES AND, ESPECIALLY, THE AWESOME POSER OF ALLIED MILITARY FORCES CONTINUE TO DEPRESS

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MORALE.

5. PERHAPS THE MOST IMMEDIATELY CRITICAL PROBLEM IS THE SHORTAGE OF MANPOWER, WHICH IS TO A LARGE EXTENT AN OUTGROWTH OF THE PROBLEMS ALREADY DISCUSSED. ALTHOUGH DECLINING POPULAR SUPPORT MEANS FEWER VOLUNTEERS, THE PHYSICAL EXODUS OF PEOPLE FROM VC-HELD TERRITORY MEANS AN ABSOLUTE DECREASE IN AVAILABLE MANPOWER FOR ALL PURPOSES--TROOPS, AGRICULTURAL, LABOR, AND MILITARY SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. IN ONE DRAMATIC EXAMPLE, IN (*PORTION GBLD-BEING SVCD) PHONG DISTRICT OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE, 900(*BEING SVCD) FAMILIES REMOVED THEMSELVES TO A RELATIVELY SAFER RURAL DEVELOPMENT AREA.

6. ~~IT HAS RECENTLY BECOME APPARENT THAT WHILE THE PEOPLE ARE LEAVING THE VC, THE VC ARE BEING FORCED TO LEAVE~~

THE PEOPLE. ESPECIALLY IN I AND II CORPS, SUSTAINED ALLIED PRESSURE HAS DRIVEN A LARGE PART OF THE VC FORCES FROM THE POPULOUS COASTAL PLAINS TO THE SAFER BUT SPARSELY INHABITED MOUNTAIN JUNGLES. THIS IN TURN COMPLICATES THEIR RECRUITMENT AND FOOD-SUPPLY PROBLEMS.

7. THE VC ARE TRYING TO MEET THEIR MANPOWER PROBLEMS BY CALLING ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN. YOUTHS DOWN TO 14 YEARS

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TDCS-314/13052-67

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OF AGE ARE BEING TAKEN INTO THE ARMED FORCES. EVEN NORTH VIETNAM (NVN) HAS RESORTED TO LOWERED AGE STANDARDS FOR THE REPLACEMENTS IT SENDS SOUTH. SEVERAL RECENTLY INFILTRATED 16-YEAR-OLDS HAVE BEEN CAPTURED. RECENTLY SEIZED DOCUMENTS REVEAL THAT IN ONE AREA THE VC HAVE ORDERED THAT 50 PERCENT OF THE GUERRILLAS MUST BE WOMEN. IN ANOTHER AREA THE MINIMUM WAS SET AT 33 PERCENT. SOME PROVINCES REPORT FURTHER CUTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE STAFFS TO RELEASE MORE MEN FOR MILITARY SERVICE.

8. THE MANPOWER-REPLACEMENT PROBLEM WAS REPORTED AS BEING SERIOUS EVERYWHERE IN THE THREE NORTHERN CORPS AREAS EXCEPT IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE. IN QUANG TRI THEY CAN GET INFILTRATORS FROM THE NORTH WITH RELATIVE EASE, BUT REPORTS SAY THAT EVEN THERE THE QUALITY OF THE REPLACEMENTS IS DECLINING. IN POPULOUS IV CORPS, FIVE PROVINCES HAVE REPORTED SERIOUS MANPOWER PROBLEMS. KIEN HOA REPORTS NO

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SHORTAGE FOR LOCAL REPLACEMENTS BUT SAYS THE PROVINCE CAN
NO LONGER EXPORT MANPOWER AS IT HAS IN THE PAST.

9. HOWEVER, DESPITE THESE CONTINUING AND, IN SOME
CASES, GROWING PROBLEMS, ~~THE~~ VC ORGANIZATION IS EFFECTIVE AND
~~THE VC FORCES RETAIN A FORMIDABLE CAPABILITY TO INFLICT~~
~~DEATH AND DESTRUCTION.~~

VC ACTIVITIES

10. JULY WAS A RELATIVELY ROUTINE MONTH FOR VC ACTIVITY.
THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, WAS HERALDED
BY THE VC PROPAGANDIST AS A GREAT OCCASION TO BE MARKED
BY MAJOR MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTIVITY, BUT IN THE EVENT
IT WAS NOT DIFFERENT FROM ANY OTHER DAY. IN BINH THUAN PROVINCE,
FOR EXAMPLE, THE VC PROPAGANDIZED THAT THERE WOULD BE POSTERS
AND VC FLAGS EVERYWHERE ON THE 20TH AND THAT THE DAY WOULD
BE CELEBRATED WITH "GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS" AGAINST GOVERNMENT
OF VIETNAM (GVN) INSTALLATIONS. IN FACT, ONE BULLDOZER WAS
DESTROYED AND ONE SMALL, UNSUCCESSFUL ATTACK LAUNCHED, BOTH
ON THE 19TH. ON THE 20TH, NOTHING HAPPENED. IN GENERAL,
PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED TRENDS CONTINUED THROUGH THE MONTH,
THE ONLY MAJOR CHANGE BEING THE INCREASING ATTENTION GIVEN

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TO ANTI-ELECTION PLANNING AND PROPAGANDA AS THE 3 SEPTEMBER ELECTION DATE DREW NEARER.

11. EVERY PROVINCE BUT CHAU DOC REPORTED A GREAT DEAL OF ANTI-ELECTION ACTIVITY, MOSTLY IN THE FORM OF PROPAGANDA DISPARAGING THE ELECTIONS AS A "FARCE," STRESSING THE FUTILITY OF VOTING, AND SUGGESTING--SOMETIMES BY EXPLICIT THREATS--THAT SUPPORTING THE ELECTION INVOLVED SERIOUS RISK OF BEING KILLED. BIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THERE WERE SOME INSTANCES OF VC SEIZURE OF FAMILY RECORD BOOKS AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS TO PREVENT VOTING. IN VINH LONG PROVINCE IT WAS NOTED THAT NEARLY ALL VC PLANS AND DIRECTIVES WERE PREFACED BY THE PHASE "FROM NOW UNTIL THE ELECTIONS," INDICATING THE IMPORTANCE ASSIGNED TO THE ELECTIONS BY THE VC LEADERSHIP.

12. MILITARY ACTION BY THE VC/NVA FORCES WAS GENERALLY LIMITED TO SMALL ACTIONS. IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, HOWEVER, THEY MANAGED TO SCORE TWO "SPECTACULARS" OF THE KIND MOST USEFUL IN BOOSTING THEIR OWN MORALE AND PRESENTING THE WORLD WITH A PICTURE OF ALLIED VULNERABILITY. ON 14 JULY THE VC, UNDER COVER OF A MORTAR ATTACK, SEIZED THE HOI AN JAIL AND RELEASED THE PRISONERS. ABOUT 870 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

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CADRE PRISONERS MADE GOOD THEIR ESCAPE, PROVIDING THE VC A MUCH NEEDED SUPPLY OF TRAINED MANPOWER. ON THE SAME NIGHT, AN NVA ARTILLERY UNIT HIT DANANG AIR BASE WITH 48 122MM ROCKETS, KILLING EIGHT, WOUNDING 175, AND CAUSING DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT AND FACILITIES ESTIMATED AS HIGH AS 85 MILLION DOLLARS. IN BINH LONG PROVINCE ON 11 JULY THE ENEMY LAUNCHED AN ILL-CONSIDERED REGIMENTAL-SIZED OFFENSIVE AGAINST A BATTALION OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) 5TH DIVISION AND TOOK HEAVY LOSSES. THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE COUNTRY, THE VC/NVA GUERRILLAS AVOIDED LARGE-UNIT CONTACTS AND LIMITED THEIR INITIATIVES TO HIT-AND-RUN MORTAR AND ROCKET ATTACKS, ASSAULTS ON SMALL OUTPOSTS, AND SMALL ATTACKS ON LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

13. TERRORISM INCREASED IN MOST AREAS, POSSIBLY REFLECTING AN INABILITY TO CONDUCT LARGER OPERATIONS. THESE ATTACKS TENDED TO CONTINUE THE INDISCRIMINATE CHARACTER NOTED THE PREVIOUS MONTH: PEOPLE WERE KILLED SEEMINGLY AT RANDOM BY MINES, BOOBY TRAPS, AND MORTAR FIRE. THERE WERE A FEW GROUP "EXECUTIONS" OF PEOPLE WHO WERE ACCUSED OF SOME SORT OF ANTI-VC CONNECTIONS. IN NAM HOA DISTRICT OF THUA THIEN

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PROVINCE, 14 SELECTED PEOPLE, INCLUDING A 4-YEAR-OLD CHILD, WERE ASSASSINATED. IN ONE SUCH CASE IN GIA DINH PROVINCE, SIX PEOPLE WHO WERE KILLED FOR INVOLVEMENT WITH GVN INFORMER ACTIVITIES WERE LATER FOUND NOT TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED.

14. REPORTS FROM SEVERAL WIDELY SCATTERED PLACES INDICATED THE VC ARE STRIVING TO INCREASE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND ACTIVITY IN THE CITIES, BUT THERE WERE FEW SIGNS OF ACHIEVEMENT IN THIS REGARD DURING JULY. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN NEARLY A YEAR, VC-EMPLANTED GRENADES WERE FOUND IN DANANG CITY, BUT BOTH WERE DISARMED BEFORE EXPLODING. KIEN HOA PROVINCE REPORTED THE ORGANIZATION OF A "RESIGNED-TO-DEATH" CLASS FOR GIVING INDOCTRINATION AND TRAINING FOR SUICIDE ATTACKS ON GVN TARGETS.

15. THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THE VC CONTINUED TO GIVE HIGH PRIORITY TO COUNTERING GVN PACIFICATION PROGRAMS. AS PREVIOUSLY, THEY LAUNCHED NUMEROUS PHYSICAL ATTACKS ON REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) TEAMS, OFTEN SELECTING THOSE TEAMS WHOSE PROGRAMS WERE MAKING THE GREATEST PROGRESS. SOME PROVINCES, ESPECIALLY IN IV CORPS, HAVE NOTED INCREASED SOPHISTICATION IN THE ANTI-RED PROPAGANDA. A NUMBER

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OF TECHNIQUES, INCLUDING SONG AND POETRY-WRITING CONTESTS, ARE USED IN AN EFFORT TO TURN THE HAMLET-DWELLERS AGAINST THE TEAMS AND TO DEMORALIZE OR SUBVERT THE TEAM MEMBERS.

16. AGENT REPORTS, DEFECTORS, AND DOCUMENTS TELL OF VC DISTRESS OVER THE GROWING EFFORT OF THE CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) PROGRAM. IN ADDITION TO CONDUCTING EXTENSIVE MADE ATTACKS ON PROPAGANDA, THE VC HAVE/MORTAR / CHIEU HOI AND REFUGEE CAMPS, KILLING AND WOUNDING A NUMBER OF INHABITANTS, AND THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL HOIHXANH (RALLIERS). ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES.

17. THERE ARE REPORTS FROM ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS OF VC MILITARY UNITS BEING BROKEN UP INTO SMALLER GROUPS AND RECEIVING TRAINING IN SAPPER ACTIVITY AND SMALL-UNIT TACTICS. IN PG CORPS, VC UNITS HAVE BROKEN INTO SMALLER GROUPS IN ORDER TO EVADE FRIENDLY FORCES, AND OBSERVERS SAY THEY SEEM TO BE ASSUMING A SUPPORT ROLE FOR NVA FORCES. THIS WAS DONE

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EARLIER IN I CORPS, WHERE IT REPORTEDLY CAUSED VC RESENTMENT AGAINST THE HVA.

18. AN GIANG PROVINCE REPORTS A "DONG KHOI" (MOVE OUT ALL FORCES) CAMPAIGN DESIGNED TO UNITE ALL VC FORCES UNDER A MILITARY COMMAND SECTION AND MAKE ALL CADRES WORK HARDER FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN. THE DETAILS OF THIS REPORTED POLICY ARE OBSCURE, BUT IT APPEARS TO INVOLVE AN INCREASED RELIANCE ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN PLACE OF POLITICAL MOTIVATION. BINH THUAN PROVINCE REPORTS THAT 60 NVN POLITICAL CADRES, WHO CAME DOWN IN MAY, HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO HELP DIRECT ACTIVITIES OF DISTRICT AND VILLAGE COMMITTEES. MANY OF THE BINH THUAN VC ARE LIKELY TO LOOK UPON THEM AS CARPETBAGGERS. THIS PROVINCE HAS ALSO RE-ORGANIZED THREE OF ITS DISTRICTS IN AN EFFORT TO RECOVER FROM THE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY ALLIED MILITARY OPERATIONS.

19. ON 1 JANUARY 1967, THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) ISSUED A DIRECTIVE THAT CADRES FROM VARIOUS LEVELS WOULD BE SENT DOWN TO LOWER LEVELS TO STRENGTHEN THEM [REDACTED] = TDCS-314/05040-67 SUBSEQUENT REPORTING INDICATED COMPLIANCE WITH THE DIRECTIVE IN A NUMBER OF PROVINCES, IN-

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Ans, Sep 1, 1967, 9:15 AM 120
~~Thursday, August 31, 1967, 5:30 P.M.~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presentation of National Security Medal to Widow
of Desmond FitzGerald

Last month you approved the posthumous award of the National Security Medal to Desmond FitzGerald who, until his sudden death was CIA Deputy Director for Plans.

Mr. FitzGerald's widow and his immediate family will be returning to Washington on September 12.

I recommend that you present the award to Mrs. FitzGerald at a small ceremony in your office. Alternatively, it could be presented to Mrs. FitzGerald by Dick Helms at a ceremony at CIA headquarters.

W. W. Rostow

☒ Ceremony in my office

☐ Have Helms present

☐ See me

WWR:BKS:amc

121

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, September 1, 1967
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's reply
to my cable of last night on the UPI
report (attached).

W. W. Rostow

*He's obviously not wasting the
opportunity for good general
missionary work.*

~~SECRET~~

Saigon 906 (CAS channels)
CAP 67744 (CAS Channels)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-94
By cb, NARA Date 2-9-01

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FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 906

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW.

1. APPRECIATE HAVING FULL TEXT OF UPI REPORT ON OBSERVERS.
2. PLEASE SAY TO HIGHEST AUTHORITY THAT I EXPECT TO SEE SENATOR MURPHY AND MESSRS. JAMES AND ANTELL LATER TODAY AT RECEPTION I AM GIVING FOR OBSERVERS, AND WILL CONGRATULATE THEM ON THEIR STATEMENTS AND ON THEIR PERCEPTIVENESS REGARDING SITUATION HERE AND IMPORTANCE IT CAN HAVE AT HOME.
3. I THINK WE GOT OFF TO A GOOD START YESTERDAY. AT MORNING BRIEFING SESSION, I STARTED OFF WITH OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF SITUATION AS WE SEE IT HERE. WHILE I SPOKE FROM NOTES, GROUP ASKED ME TO GIVE THEM EQUIVALENT WRITTEN STATEMENT WHICH THEY COULD TAKE BACK WITH THEM, BELIEVING IT WOULD BE USEFUL AT HOME. I SHALL TRY TO DO THIS BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE.
4. CALHOUN AND DUNLOP FOLLOWED WITH BRIEFINGS ON DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND THOROUGH EXPLANATION OF GVN ELECTORAL LAWS AND PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE CAMPAIGN AND THE ELECTIONS. ALL MEMBERS AFTER EXPRESSED TO ME THEIR PERSONAL APPRECIATION OF BRIEFINGS. YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND TODAY, THEY HAVE BEEN

PAGE 2 SAIGON 906 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS
OUT IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE COUNTRY ON INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EXPEDITIONS.
WE ARE GIVING THEM COMPLETE FREEDOM AND FLEXIBILITY AS TO THEIR
PROGRAMS AND THIS SEEMS TO BE MUCH APPRECIATED. I AM PLEASED
WITH DEVELOPMENTS SO FAR.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS

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~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 00-138

By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01

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TO AMEMB SAIGON
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~~SECRET~~ CAP67744 VIA CAS CHANNELS EYES ONLY BUNKER
FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER

HIGHEST AUTHORITY WISHES YOU TO HAVE FULL TEXT OF UPI
REPORTS AS OF THIS EVENING ON THE OBSERVERS.

IN LIGHT OF THAT REPORT HE SUGGESTS THAT YOU GO OUT
OF YOUR WAY TO CONGRATULATE MESSRS. JAMES AND ANTELL,
AS WELL AS SENATOR MURPHY, ON THE PERCEPTION OF
THEIR REACTIONS TO THE SITUATION AND THE STRENGTHENING EFFECT
OF THOSE REACTIONS ON THE SITUATION BACK HOME.

SAIGON--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 22 ELECTION OBSERVERS TOOK
SOUTH VIETNAM'S POLITICAL PULSE TODAY AND GOT A FEEL OF THE
WAR AT THE SAME TIME.

DRESSED IN JUNGLE BOOTS, FATIGUES AND SPORT SHIRTS, THEY
FANNED OUT INTO THE PROVINCES IN FIVE GROUPS TO FIND OUT
HOW THE SOUGH VIETNAMESE WILL ELECT A PRESIDENT, VICE-
PRESIDENT AND SENATE ON SUNDAY. THEY WERE LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF
ELECTION FRAUD.

TWO OF THE GROUPS ENCOUNTERED THE WAR ALONG THE WAY.
THE OBSERVERS GOINT TO DANANG WATCHED FROM THEIR PLANE AS
U.S. JETS AND WARSHIPS POUNDED THE NORTHERN COAST. A FLIGHT OF
HELICOPTERS CARRYING ANOTHER GROUP INTO THE MEKONG DELTA WAS
RE-ROUTED AROUND ANOTHER AIR STRIKE.

AFTER 24 HOURS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, THE OBSERVERS--WHO
INCLUDED NEWS EXECUTIVES, POLITICIANS AND RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL
RIGHTS LEADERS--HAD VARIED OPINIONS ON THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL
CLIMATE.

"I AM TRYING TO GET THE FEEL OF THE ELECTIONS, BUT THE IMPRESSION
THIS WHOLE THING HAS MADE ON ME SO FAR IS DEPRESSING,"
SAID OREGON GOV. TOM MCCALL, A REPUBLICAN.

THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF POLLING BOOTHS AND ONLY A HANDFUL
OF OBSERVERS," SAID SEN. EDMUNDS. MUSKIE, D-MAINE. "HOW CAN WE
GET ANY KIND OF IMPRESSION IN DEPTH? THE BEST WE CAN DO IS TO
TALK TO A LOT OF PEOPLE AND SEE WHATEVER WE CAN."

"I HAVE BEEN VERY IMPRESSED WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS
IN ACTION, SAID JAMES X. ANTELL OF TULSA, OKLA., PRESIDENT OF
THE JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. "I THINK IT'S GOING TO BE A
VERY FAIR ELECTION."

MOST OF THE OBSERVERS SAID THEY COULD NOT PASS JUDGMENT
ON THE VALIDITY OR FAIRNESS OF THE ELECTION AFTER ONLY ONE DAY.
THEY SAID THEY HAD MORE QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED.

AFTER A MORNING OF BRIEFINGS BY U.S. MILITARY AND EMBASSY
OFFICIALS, THE CANDIDATES HEADED FOR PROVINCIAL CAPITALS
AND POLLING PLACES FOR THE SEPT. 3 ELECTION.

SEN. GEORGE MURPHY, R-CALIF., SAID THAT SINCE HE HAS BEEN IN
VIETNAM "I HAVE HEARD NO CRITICISM OF THE ELECTIONS. "I THINK
THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE FOR CAMPAIGNING ARE EXCEPTIONALLY
FINE."

THE 10 CIVILIAN TICKETS RUNNING AGAINST THE MILITARY TICKET
OF CHIEF OF STATE NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND PREMIER NGUYEN CAO KY
HAVE REPEATEDLY CHARGED THE GOVERNMENT WITH ATTEMPTING TO RIG
THE ELECTION.

AT CAO LANH IN THE MEKONG, DELTA, MCCALL'S GROUP WAS HUSTLED
THROUGH THERAIN AND MUD, TO BE OUT BY 5 P.M.--"VIET CONG TIME"
ACCORDING TO THEIR AMERICAN GUIDE.

AT NHA TRANC, ELDON JAMES, PAST COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN
LEGION, SAID "I DOUBT VERY MUCH IF EVEN IN AMERICA A PERSON WOULD
FIND AS MUCH PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE ELECTIONS AS THE VIETNAMESE
PEOPLE HAVE."

MORE TOURS OF POLLING PLACES AND PROVINCIAL CAPITALS ARE
SCHEDULED FOR SATURDAY BEFORE THE OBSERVERS TAKE UP THEIR
POSITIONS AT THE POLLS ON ELECTION DAY SUNDAY

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NLJ/RAC 00-139
By SJ, NARA, Date 9-18-01

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Friday, September 1, 1967

1. Susps
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is the daily situation
report on the Viet-Nam political situation.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS Attachment

~~1. Susp~~
2. Pres file

September 1, 1967

Mr. President:

You have agreed to receive the Brazilian National War College group tomorrow, Saturday, September 2 at 11:00 a.m. It consists of 64 students and faculty.

I am meeting with them immediately before their visit with you for a general briefing and question and answer period.

In case you decide to go beyond a simple greeting, I have prepared the attached talking points.

W. W. Rostow

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
BRAZILIAN WAR COLLEGE GROUP

1. It is a special pleasure to meet with so distinguished a group of Brazilians. The fact that our respective National War Colleges exchange visits is symbolic of the close ties which link our two countries.

2. Brazil and the United States have a long tradition of working together in regional and world problems. This tradition has existed because we share common ideals and objectives in our hemisphere and beyond. The size and resources of our respective countries place us in a position of leadership.

3. Above all, we seek peace and the right of peoples to determine their own destiny. This is why:

-- our soldiers fought side by side in World War II;

-- we have employed our forces in peace-keeping missions
in Africa and the Near East.

-- we worked together two years ago to stem violence in
the Dominican Republic and help the Dominican people hold
free elections.

4. We also share a sense of responsibility in helping others help themselves. The Alliance for Progress rests on this common purpose.

I am confident that as Brazil moves toward greater prosperity, it will
assume a larger role in ^{hemispheric development.} ~~assisting its neighbors~~

5. Two weeks ago I met with a group of young boys and girls from Brazil and other Latin American countries to celebrate the 6th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. On that occasion I said:

"If what we do under the Alliance for Progress is to really last, we must make this commitment to ourselves and to all of Latin America: We will persevere. There is no limit to our commitment. We are in this fight to stay all the way." I would repeat that pledge to you.

6. I have made a similar pledge to a nation half-way around the world fighting to preserve its freedom and to uphold the principles of self-determination and non-intervention -- which are also basic tenets of our inter-American system.

7. There is much confusion and misinformation on what our objectives are in Vietnam.

-- We are not there to expand the violence and increase the suffering of the Vietnamese people.

-- We are not there to gain real estate or expand our sphere of influence in Asia.

-- We are not there to test the will and resources of the Communist nations.

8. We are there to help a people resist aggression and defend the principles which we almost take for granted in the Americas. We are there because we are convinced that the defense of those principles begins wherever they are trampled by would-be aggressors.

9. In seven hours the people of South Vietnam will go to the polls to elect a President and a Senate. This is another measure of the progress being made in the campaign to build democratic institutions in South Vietnam while waging the battle to preserve its political independence and territorial integrity.

10. With a two-year perspective we can see the gains made in Vietnam.

- Militarily the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have been checked. They now know that victory by arms has been denied them.

- Politically the steady process of institution building has moved through the drafting of a constitution, to municipal elections, and now national elections.

- Economically the country -- despite the war effort -- is moving forward with programs for stabilization and development.

11. Our policy is to persevere:

- with the Alliance for Progress;

- with our domestic programs for correcting discrimination and neglect;

- with the defense of basic principles in Southeast Asia.

12. We ask of our friends and allies understanding of what we pursue and why.