

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

log 4

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1a memo	Bowdler to Rostow C 2 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>	9/14/67	A
#1b rpt	State Dept. Activities Rpt. S 1 p <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i>	8/22/67	A
#3d rpt	"Major Gains in Latin America..." <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i> C 4 p <i>(Dup. in Daily Backup, 9/14/67)</i>	9/7/67	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-201</i>	9/14/67	A
#5a memo	Rostow to Bunker <i>open 4/6/01 NLS/RAC 00-201</i> S 1 p	undated	A
#5b cable	Saigon 359 <i>open 8/23/01 NLJ/RAC 00-142</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i>	undated	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>	9/14/67	A
#10 ltr	President to Park " PCI 1 p [Duplicate of #31b]	9/14/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. " S 1 p	9/13/67	A
#12a cable	Paris 3257 TS 1 p <i>open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-361</i>	9/13/67	A
#12b cable	Paris 3288 " TS 2 p	9/13/67	A
#13a cable	Saigon 5825 <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i> S 10 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>(enc. dup #27, VN, 8 BB (1) Box 105)</i>	9/13/67	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>	9/13/67	A
#15a cable	Paris 3224 S 2 p <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i>	9/13/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 41, 9/11-14/67

Box 22

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES) *

20f

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#18a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i> S 2 p <i>Dup #27a, NSF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/13/67	A
#20f rpt	COMUSMACV, DTG 060425Z S 13 p <i>open 1/10/94 NY CBS7</i>	9/67	A
#22 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i> TS 1 p [Duplicate of #100, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7; Exempt 1978]	9/12/67	A
#22a rpt	"General Weizman's Presentation..." <i>open 6/5/02</i> TS 1 p	9/12/67	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-27-94 NLJ 93-345</i> C 3 p <i>Dup #12, Files of Hamilton, "AID-PL480" Box 7</i>	9/12/67	A
#23b memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 2 p <i>Dup #12b, as above</i>	9/12/67	A
#23c memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLJ 93-352</i> C 2 p <i>Dup #12c, as above</i>	8/14/67	A
#23e memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 1 p <i>Dup #12e, as above</i>	9/12/67	A
#23f memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLJ 93-352</i> C 2 p <i>Dup #12f, as above</i>	9/11/67	A
#23h memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-351</i> C 2 p <i>Dup #12h, as above</i>	9/11/67	A
#23i memo	Poats, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLJ 93-352</i> C 2 p <i>Dup #12i, as above</i>	9/5/67	A
#24a memo	Rusk to President, re: Japan <i>open 10-21-94</i> S 3 p <i>(dup in Drang Backup, 9/13/67) NLJ 94-361</i>	9/12/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, re: Greece C 1 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>	9/13/67	A

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3084

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#31 memo	Rostow to President, re: Korea S 1 p <i>open 5-30-95 NLJ 93-368</i>	9/12/67	A
#31a cable	Seoul 1238 <i>open 8-25-94 NLJ 93-367</i> S 3 p	9/9/67	A
#31b LTR	DUPLICATE OF #10 <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>		
#32 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>Sanitized NLJ/S & S</i> " " [Duplicate in President's Appointment File (Diary Back-Up), 9/15/67, Box 76]	9/12/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President <i>Sanitized 9-14-95 NLJ 94-360</i> S 3 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i> [Sanitized NLJ/S & S] (dup in Diary Backup, 9/12/67)	9/11/67	A
#34a rpt	"Visit of Indian Deputy PM Desai" C 7 p <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i> [Sanitized NLJ/S & S] (dup in Diary Backup, 9/12/67) (dup India vol 10, #1242)	undated	A
#34b rpt	Bio Sketch <i>more info released 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i> C 6 p <i>Open 7/26/00 NLJ 00-96</i> [Sanitized NLJ/S & S] (dup in Diary Backup, 9/12/67)	undated	A
#34c rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i> C 2 p. <i>Exempt 4/6/01 NSIPAC 00-144; exempt NLJ 019-022-2</i> (dup in Diary Backup, 9/12/67)	undated	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360</i>	9/11/67	A
#39a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report C 1 p <i>Dup #28a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 114</i> <i>open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361</i>	9/11/67	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. <i>open 4-13-00</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-Dec. 1967"]	9/11/67	A
#41a cable	From Kissinger <i>open 4-13-00</i> TS 2 p [Duplicate of #6a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-Dec. 1967"]	9/11/67	A

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4 of 4

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#43 memo	Rostow to President, 8:25 a.m. open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360 TS 2 p Dup of #7, Files of W Rostow, [VN: July-Dec 1967]	9/11/67	A
#44 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. OPEN 5/31/94 NLJ 94-360 S 1 p Dup. 5/16/94 NSF, VN. "Will Gables Back Channels, Incoming, outgoing" Box 258	9/11/67	A
#44a cable	Saigon 276 Dup. #12a, as above Same Sanitization 7/26/00 NS 00-96 S 1 p Sanitized 8-2-94 NLJ 94-361	9/11/67	A
#44b cable	Rostow to Bunker (CAP67804) Dup. #13 & 14a, as above S 1 p open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360	9/9/67	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan Sanitized 10-25-95 S 5 p Sanitized 8/1/00 NS 00-97 NLJ 94-360 [Duplicate in President's Appointment File (Diary Back-Up), 9/13/67, Box 76]	9/11/67	A
#45a memo	Rusk to President, re: Japan S 2 p open 10-21-94 NLJ 94-361 [Duplicate in President's Appointment File (Diary Back-Up), 9/13/67, Box 76]	9/4/67	A
#45c memo	Fowler to President, re: Japan S 1 p open 1-28-97 NLJ 96-305 [Duplicate in President's Appointment File (Diary Back-Up), 9/13/67, Box 76]	8/31/67	A
#45d rpt	"Talking Points with Japanese Officials" S 1 p open 1-28-97 NLJ 96-305	undated	A
#45e rpt	"Principles for US-Japanese..." S 1 p open 1-28-97 NLJ 96-305	undated	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 8:20 p.m. S 1 p open 10-25-95 NLJ 94-360	9/14/67	A
#46a cable	Paris 3383 S 2 p open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-361	9/14/67	A
#46b cable	Paris 3329 S 2 p open 11-8-94 NLJ 94-361	9/14/67	A

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1

Thursday, September 14, 1967
6:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bowdler's lucid
report on how Ben Stephansky came to
be appointed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By isp, NARA, Date 4-13-95 12~~CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY~~

September 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Designation of Ben Stephansky to be Deputy Ambassador
to the OAS

Ben Stephansky has been given the job of deputy to Sol Linowitz with the title of "Deputy United States Representative to the Council of the OAS". He will have the personal rank of Ambassador.

This is an in-house, State Department appointment, involving no formal Presidential or Congressional action. Under existing procedures for handling designations of personal rank Ambassadorships worked out by State and John Macy's shop, the name of the designee is included in State's night reading to the President. If State hears nothing from the White House after five days, no objection is assumed and the Secretary authorizes the designation. Stephansky's name was sent in the night reading of August 22. On September 7 the Senior Assignments Panel recommended to Secretary Rusk that he give Stephansky the rank. The Secretary approved on September 11 and sent Stephansky a letter of designation.

The designation has these antecedents:

- From the time he took the OAS-CIAP job, Sol Linowitz has been pressing to establish an OAS Mission comparable to Goldberg's UN Mission.
- ARA has resisted -- as it had done with efforts of some previous Ambassadors -- because an OAS Mission is not necessary. The OAS Ambassador has his personal staff of 5-6 people. The regional offices of the Bureau perform the substantive backstopping. In New York you need a Mission; in Washington with all the resources of the Department, it is unnecessary duplication.
- After it became evident that Sol was losing interest in attending COAS and CIAP sessions and increasingly asking his alternates (Allen and Barall) to cover these meetings, ARA went along with naming a "Deputy Ambassador" since neither Allen nor Barall carried enough weight to deal effectively with their Latin American counterparts.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY~~

-2-

- Sol tried to get me to take the job but I declined. He next turned to Harry Shlaudeman, but Harry went to work as Secretary Rusk's Special Assistant. Then the Bureau gave him the names of seven or eight FSO-1's, all of which he found unsatisfactory.*
- Ben Stephansky was acceptable to him, so ARA processed the designation.

I think Ben can and will do a good job as "Deputy Ambassador" to the COAS. As I indicated in my previous memo on him in connection with the replacement for Ralph Dungan, his principal weakness is his managerial ability. This is not a major requirement in this job.

I doubt that Ben will be as effective in CIAP, but he will be better than Sol -- and Barall, whom you know has a knack for rubbing the Latins the wrong way.

- - - - -

The lesson I draw from this is that the procedure for checking personal rank Ambassadorships with the President is too loose and should be tightened, at least for jobs involving US spokesmen in international organizations.

WGB
WGBowdler

* because they did not fit the "liberal" image he wants to project rather than their substantive competence.

~~CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY~~

PRESERVATION COPY

August 22, 1967

16

STATE DEPARTMENT ACTIVITIES REPORT

1. Goos Case - Today our Consul in Budapest was permitted to see Richard Goos, young American from Hamilton, Ohio, awaiting trial on the charge of assisting in the attempted illegal frontier crossing of a foreign (East German) national. Goos has an attorney and is in good health. The Hungarian Embassy has issued visas to Goos' parents who will be permitted to attend his open trial. We are keeping Goos' parents and interested Members of Congress informed.

2. Hill - The Senate Foreign Relations Committee today reported out the Amity Treaty with Thailand and the nomination of Ed Korry, Ambassador-designate to Chile.

3. Personal Ranks - The Secretary is considering according 1) the personal rank of Ambassador to Ben S. Stephansky, FSO-1, during his assignment as Deputy Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States; and 2) the personal rank of Minister to Jacques J. Reinstein, FSO-1, for the period of his assignment as American Civil Deputy Commandant, NATO Defense College, Rome.

4. Baghdad Conference Ends - The 6-day Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil ended yesterday. Apparently the moderate Arabs were successful in dampening some of the radicals' more extreme proposals. Nevertheless, the conference adopted recommendations calling for economic measures that could be damaging to western interests such as an oil embargo against "enemy countries", gradual nationalization of oil interests and the continued closure of the Suez Canal. Although they may be qualified in the course of the late August Foreign Ministers Meeting, they have aroused considerable concern among the pertinent US oil companies. We will discuss these problems tomorrow with company representatives.

5. Ocean Floor - The Maltese Representative to the UN has circulated a proposal asking that the General Assembly, at this session, consider a treaty which would establish an international agency with jurisdiction over the deep ocean floor; declare that the revenue from the exploitation of the resources of the ocean floor should go primarily to the developing countries; and propose that the ocean floor should be reserved for peaceful uses only. We have asked Amb. Goldberg to take steps looking toward satisfactory handling of the Maltese item, which could well acquire substantial support in the General Assembly.

6. Possible Pell Speech - Senator Pell told Foy Kohler today he is interested in making a speech next month in which he would put forth some principles concerned with the ocean floor as a basis for a new treaty. The Senator desires to be a Department spokesman. Foy said the issues are complex and we must study the problem much more before attempting to enunciate principles.

John P. Walsh
John P. Walsh

~~SECRET~~ Acting Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-361

By *18*, NARA, Date 10-14-94

Pres file

Thursday, September 14, 1967
3:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

On his own initiative Henry has edited his manuscript in the form of notes available for background use. You now have, therefore, two versions from which to draw and which George can make available on a background basis only.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE HOMEFRONT AT WAR

From Independence to Korea

War, like childbirth, brings pain soon forgotten.

In seven wars we have faced troubles, not only on the battle front, but at home. Popular history sometimes softpedals the troubles: Mounting opposition, thoughtful and distinguished dissenters, economic hardships, and repression.

Peace and victory tend to bring a romantic view of what went before. People soon forget that wars, when going on, are not always popular; that they involve painful dislocation at home; and that, as the conflict stretches on, discouragement over prospects for victory sometimes cuts deep into hope and determination.

War of Independence

Supported by about one half the population of the colonies, the rest being neutral or loyal to Britain, the Revolutionary War - at least during its more difficult phases - does not rank among our more popular wars.

Malone and Rausch report that Americans "began the war with the thought that victory would be quick and easy and...were slowly disabused".

Davidson tells us that resulting "privations of the war and defeat dispirited many, even among the leaders".

"In Virginia, the government was plagued by indifference and actual discontent throughout the war...Pennsylvania was so full of disaffection that it was the despair of the patriotic party...upstate New York had long been indifferent and Tories abounded."

Even in Boston James Warren wrote John Adams in 1778 that "I wish it were in my power to tell you that the number and influence of the Tories here were reduced, but I think they gain ground fast."

Anglican Churchmen stood out among leaders of the opposition: Rev. Samuel Seabury, who became the first post-war Bishop of the American Episcopal Church; Miles Cooper and Charles Inglis of New York; Thomas Chandler of New Jersey; and Jonathan Boucher of Maryland.

Other critics of the war were also men of substance: Joseph Galloway came from a wealthy family which owned large trading estates in Maryland; Daniel Leonard was one of the leading citizens of the Massachusetts Bay Colony; Jonathan Sewall came from an even more wealthy and aristocratic Massachusetts family.

Opposition was compounded by economic hardship. As the war stretched on, imports ceased from England, which had heretofore supplied most of the colonies' finished goods. Merchants, farmers (notably tobacco and rice planters), and fishermen suffered particularly from the cut-off of trade.

As the supply of goods and services dwindled, the supply of money increased; the war had to be financed somehow. The result was soaring inflation. Hardest hit were the clergy, town laborers, and artisans.

A leading critic of the war spoke for many when he said that if "the calamitous war would be stopped, agriculture, commerce, and industry would resume their wonted vigor...(and) everything would return to its pristine state of prosperity."

Force was used freely against those who thus opposed the war: The Reverend Seabury was captured and imprisoned; Cooper and Boucher narrowly escaped lynching; Galloway was forced to seek safety behind British lines; Leonard had to defend himself against angry mobs; and Sewall fled the country. Charles and Mary Beard tell us that:

"Mobs had tarred and feathered Tories, otherwise cruelly treated them, and wrecked their homes; henceforth the management of dissenters was to proceed more systematically. The most ardent of the known and active opponents of the Revolution were shut up in jail; the prison camp in Connecticut at one time held the former governor of New Jersey and the Mayor of New York. Others less belligerent, after being duly warned, were placed under surveillance..."

There was also opposition within the Revolutionary cause. Congressional criticism of Washington was strong; a serious effort was made by the Conway Cabal "to curtail the General's power and perhaps force him out of the field".

With the end of the war, all this was lost to sight. Popular legends soon obscured the fact that the home front, during most of the war, had been characterized by great hardship and dissent, in the midst of a conflict which many thought could not be won.

The War of 1812

In the first flush of enthusiasm, a majority of the country backed the war of 1812. Opposition was largely regional: Most of the 62 members of both Houses who voted against the declaration of war came from the Northeast. When the Presidential election of 1812 was fought on the war issue, a few months after its outbreak, President Madison won re-election.

As the war went on, however, opposition mounted, in the face of defeats and economic problems.

The war had depressed shipping and trade to the point of extinction. Inflation increased as the government

sought to finance military expenditures by issuing Treasury notes in large amounts. Its 1814 loan failed disastrously. The Boston Gazette warned:

"Any man who lends his money to the government at the present time will forfeit all claim to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends of the country."

Throughout New England, the war was increasingly attacked in the most extravagant terms; men and money were refused for its prosecution; the celebration of its heroes and victories was forbidden. A committee of the Massachusetts Senate suggested that the war "was waged without justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives".

Josiah Quincy cried out in Congress that the attack on Canada was less defensible than the conduct of Captain Kidd and West Indian buccaneers. William Ellery Channing thundered against the conflict in the pulpit, and some of William Cullen Bryant's first poems were directed against it.

Criticism also grew in the South and West. The reports of the Twelfth Congress are punctuated with such expressions as: "Mr. Randolph (John Randolph of Virginia, the leader of the 'pure' Republicans) spoke for about two and a half hours against the war." And when Robert Smith, Monroe's predecessor as Secretary of State, issued a public address against the war, Chief Justice Marshall wrote him a letter of warm approval.

Morrison and Commager sum up: "The truth seems to be that the war was unpopular throughout the country, after Hull's surrender (of Detroit) had shown that it would not be a walk-over."

When the Secretary of War denied funds to state militias which governors had refused to make available for the war, and the National Congress called for conscription and proposed to allow 18-year olds to volunteer, New England's cup overflowed.

Daniel Webster, in a speech so bitter that it was suppressed for 100 years, accused the administration of trying to demonstrate that the government "possesses over us a power more tyrannical, more arbitrary, more dangerous, more allied to blood and murder, more full of every form of mischief, more productive of every sort and degree of misery than has been exercised by any civilized government, with a single exception, in modern times".

Representatives of three New England states met at the Hartford Convention to protest. Although spurning secession, the Convention advised states to resist operation of the proposed conscription and volunteer bills -- and this while a British army was at the gates of New Orleans, with seemingly excellent prospects of getting in.

The roster of the Convention read like a Who's Who of contemporary wisdom and substance: judges, educators, preachers, legislators, authors, soldiers, merchants, lawyers. The names are those that still command respect in the region: Cabot, Lowell, Dwight, Lyman, Bigelow, Longfellow, Prescott, Otis, Bliss, Sherman, Ward, West.

To secure Presidential acceptance of the Convention's demand for Federal subsidy of state militias not committed to the war, the Governor of Massachusetts sent three commissioners to Washington -- to take the surrender, so he thought, of a beaten administration and a defeated country.

But the Treaty of Ghent was signed and Jackson won the battle of New Orleans, while the three Hartford Convention Commissioners were still on the highway to Washington. The New York National Advocate described the outcome:

"Missing: Three well looking, responsible men, who appeared to be traveling toward Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's Hotel in Baltimore, on Monday evening last, and have not since been heard of. They were observed to be very melancholy on hearing the news of peace..."

Mexican War

Again, the war was popular at the start. The vote for war was 174 to 14 in the House and 40 to 2 in the Senate. There was a rush to volunteer. The North American said "Our country has but one heart". The Whig opposition proclaimed that "doubt, division, and reproach will be unknown".

But the public mood changed dramatically as the conflict dragged on. Professor Smith tells us that:

"Heedless enthusiasm was consequently sobered, if not exactly chilled. By the end of September, 1846, Pakenham, the British Minister at Washington, reported that a growing distaste for the war could be seen each day. Large expenses had to be faced, and heavy losses of men seemed inevitable. Many believed that neither troops nor money enough could be raised; many, besides deploring the loss of precious lives, complained that needed laborers had already been drawn away; and many others asked themselves whether the outlay would be really worth while."

"When Congress adjourned (in 1846), it was in bad humor...Instead of glorying the war, Democrats now defended it feebly and a great many regarded it as a grave political blunder. The fall Congressional elections went heavily against them."

"In countless eyes the war itself soon lost its glamor."

Economic difficulties multiplied. Professor Smith again:

"Before such an (uncertain) outlook, businessmen shrank from large enterprises...The currency had been inflated by the paper issues of many banks. Stocks were selling far below the prices of twelve months before...The war bill precipitated a panic in Wall Street and soon business in the South and West was described as prostrate."

When the administration responded to these economic difficulties with some tough fiscal medicine, the North American exclaimed: "Our administration seems enamoured of ruin, and woos calamity for itself". The new laws were denounced as an "unspeakable outrage"; Gideon Wells (who was later to serve in Lincoln's cabinet) termed them an "insane project".

Intellectuals took the lead in opposing the war. Professor Kent of Harvard denounced it as "demoniacal". James Russell Lowell's poetry spoke of "plunder" and "sin". Herman Melville compared his countrymen unfavorably to cannibals.

In the Congress:

-- Senator Daniel Webster spoke of President Polk's "impeachable offense" in bringing on war.

-- Senator Corwin (Ohio) said that if he were a Mexican, he would welcome the Americans to a bloody grave.

-- Senator Berrien of Georgia accused his country of a "horrible crime".

-- Senator Henry Clay (Kentucky) attacked the President for conducting a blind war, without known aim.

Criticism came not only from the opposition Whigs but also from the President's own Party. Senator Calhoun thought the whole business illegal: As the Congress had not acted, "there is no war, according to the sense of our constitution". It was, he opined gloomily, entirely uncertain whether our army could reach Mexico City or secure a peace.

The press held similar views:

-- The New York Tribune urged that all troops be withdrawn: "Be prompt when you are wrong to back straight out."

-- The Boston Atlas declared that the course of the war showed "unsurpassed inefficiency...one unrelieved picture of wrong-doing, corruption, weakness, and blunders".

-- The National Intelligencer presumed "that our President and his Cabinet are by this time convinced that they have forfeited the public confidence..."

-- Other Whig journals assured Mexico that "her cause was just, that a majority of Americans detested the war, that our treasury could not bear the cost, that our government was incompetent...that our armies could not win the war, and that soon the administration would be rebuked and its policy reversed".

It was not surprising that the Mexican leader, Rejon, told the Spanish Minister that the key to his policy was the belief that the American people could not bear for any length of time the cost of the contest. "It was," he said, "only necessary to protract the war a little..."

The climax came when an administration resolution declaring the war to be just and necessary was defeated in the Congress, and a resolution condemning the war as "unnecessary and unconstitutionally begun" passed.

Or perhaps the climax really came somewhat later -- when peace was concluded, and the Chief Whig organ reprinted in its editorial column, without criticism, the judgment that it was "one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation", and the Whig party, tactfully drawing a veil over the past, chose a leading architect of victory, General Taylor, as its Presidential candidate.

The Civil War

Again, the outbreak of war was greeted with enthusiasm. Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers was quickly met. But that enthusiasm waned as the conflict went on.

The 1862 Congressional elections went heavily against the administration in the Midwest. A Republican leader explained:

"The people have furnished men and means in abundance for all purposes to conquer the enemy; but we have made no progress...and the people are desirous of some change, they scarcely know what."

In the spring of 1863, New York was convulsed by draft riots. Homes and offices were burned to the ground. Negroes were seized, hanged, and shot; pitched battles were fought between rioters and police.

Before a large contingent of troops quelled the New York riot, at least 1,000 people had been killed or wounded and \$1 million worth of property had been destroyed. These riots reflected economic discontent, as well as opposition to the war: Labor's wages fell far short of rising prices; those on fixed salaries were hit hard by inflation.

In the fall of 1863, Congressman Vallandigham almost won election as Governor of Ohio. This was the one man who had told his colleagues in the House:

"You have not conquered the South. You never will. It is not in the nature of things possible...Stop fighting. Make an armistice. Accept at once foreign mediation."

In December 1863, the House of Representatives tabled a resolution calling on the President to open negotiations with the South by only 98 to 59.

Confronted by this growing opposition, Lincoln went further than any of his predecessors in repressive measures:

-- He proclaimed that all persons discouraging enlistment, or offering aid and comfort to rebels, or suspected of disloyalty should be subject to martial law. Over 13,000 persons were arrested under this proclamation. Many went to military prisons for indefinite terms.

-- Early in the war, he authorized any officer in command to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in certain areas. When the Supreme Court denounced his act, Lincoln was unmoved. In 1862, he denied the privilege of habeas corpus to all persons imprisoned by military order. The next year he suspended habeas corpus throughout the Union, wherever state courts obstructed the draft.

In the summer of 1864, as Grant's casualties mounted, a group of prominent Republicans came together in a "Lincoln withdrawal" movement -- to force Lincoln to withdraw as a candidate for re-election, so that someone with a better chance of election could be nominated.

Supreme Court Justice Davis wrote that "the politicians, in and out of Congress...would put Mr. Lincoln aside, if they dared". The correspondent of the Detroit Free Press reported: "Not a single Senator can be named as favorable to Lincoln's renomination for President".

Among those who gave him most trouble were Senators Sumner of Massachusetts, Chandler of Michigan (chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce), Grimes of Iowa (chairman of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs); Roscoe Conkling (speaker of the House), Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania (chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee), and Ben Wade (chairman of the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War).

In late August 1864, Henry Raymond, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and editor of the New York Times, advised Lincoln:

"The tide is setting strongly against us... Were an election to be held now in Illinois we should be beaten... Pennsylvania is against us... and so the rest."

He advised the President that "the only salt to save us" was the appointment of a peace commission to negotiate with Jefferson Davis.

Many newspapers took a strong anti-Lincoln stand in their editorial columns: The New York Daily News, the New York Tribune, the New York Evening Post, the Chicago Times, the Detroit Free Press, the Cincinnati Inquirer, the Cincinnati Gazette, the Columbus Crisis, and the Indianapolis Sentinel.

On August 23, 1864, Lincoln recorded his belief "that this administration will not be re-elected" and that the winning candidate would be forced by his campaign pledges to conclude a defeatist peace.

In early September, as if to bear out his prediction, the Democratic Party nominated General McClellan for President on a platform which proclaimed:

"That...after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war...justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities... on the basis of a Federal Union of States."

Confederate General Ramseur wrote his wife: "We learn from gentlemen recently from the North that the Peace Party is growing rapidly -- that McClellan will be elected and that his election will bring peace, provided always that we continue to hold our own against the Yankee armies."

But then Sherman wired his decisive message: "Atlanta is ours and fairly won"; and the public view of military prospects changed decisively overnight. Lincoln's biographer records the result:

"The favorable turn of military events brought a scurry to the Lincoln bandwagon. Chase

made a peace mission to the White House, then took the stump for Lincoln. Henry Winter Davis (a leader of the 'Lincoln withdrawal' movement) toured Maryland on his behalf. Greeley ceased trumpeting for a negotiated peace...At a great Lincoln meeting in New York several leaders of the 'Lincoln withdrawal' movement occupied conspicuous places on the platform."

Lincoln won re-election handily. From then on, the only opposition that he faced was from the hawks who thought him too generous toward the South.

World War I

US public opinion was sharply divided on the issue of entry into the war, until Germany declared unrestricted submarine warfare January 29, 1917. After that public opinion swung strongly around.

Some limited Congressional opposition continued briefly. When President Wilson asked the outgoing Congress for authority to arm merchantmen in February, 1917, twelve Senators -- led by Senator Stone, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, filibustered the request to death. When the President asked the incoming Congress for a declaration of war in April, Senator Stone again led six Senators in opposing it.

After the declaration of war, only the far Left continued to resist. The view of IWW was clear: "This is a business man's war and we don't see why we should go out and get shot." The Socialist Party also opposed the war: In the New York City 1917 elections Morris Hillquit polled more votes than any previous Socialist; in Chicago, the Socialists polled 34% of the vote, in Dayton, 44%.

But these were the rare exceptions; generally speaking, public opinion, the Congress, and the press strongly supported the war.

Nonetheless, hysteria caused the passage of two sedition laws -- something both the Federal and Confederate governments had managed to avoid in the Civil War.

Under these laws, over 1500 people were arrested. Almost one hundred IWW leaders were packed off to long jail terms. When savage sentences were meted out to distinguished Socialists like Eugene Debs and Victor Berger, Wilson refused to commute or pardon.

Perhaps the most surprising victim was a "hapless film producer sentenced to ten years in jail for producing a film on the American Revolution called The Spirit of Seventy-six, because it might excite anti-British sentiments..."

There was also repression by private zeal. The most famous incident occurred when the IWW tried to stage a strike in mid-1917 at Bisbee, Arizona; vigilantes killed two of them and shipped the rest -- over 1,000 men -- in boxcars to a waterless New Mexico desert.

German-Americans suffered, too:

"Schools dropped German from their curricula, and even some universities abolished their German departments; German books were withdrawn from public library circulation and German publications driven under cover. Frederick Stock, distinguished conductor of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, was deprived of his baton; the patriotic mayor of Jersey City refused to allow violinist Fritz Kreisler to appear on the concert stage; and some universities revoked degrees they had conferred on distinguished Germans..."

Meantime, criticism of the administration's management of the war began to mount, as the hardships of war made themselves felt. Three episodes are worth mentioning:

1. In 1917, sharp Congressional opposition met the President's 1917 request for a draft law. This opposition was led by the Speaker of the House, the leader of the House, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs. The bill only passed after a sharp fight.

2. In early 1918, came a storm of protest about the administration's handling of war production during the winter of 1917-18. The unusual severity of that winter had momentarily crippled the railroads; soldiers in training camps had not been provided adequate clothing and shelter; while production of aircraft, artillery, small arms, and ships was lagging badly. Historian Charles Seymour tells us that:

"The distrust and discouragement that followed brought forth furious attacks upon the President's war policies, led not merely by Roosevelt and the Republican enemies of the Administration, but by Democratic Senators...The root of the whole difficulty, they contended, lay in the fact that Wilson had no policy. They demanded practically the abdication of the presidential control of military affairs..."

This criticism was led by Senator Chamberlain, Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, who proclaimed that "the military establishment of America has almost stopped functioning" due to "inefficiency in every bureau and every department of the government."

Wilson declared this "an astonishing and unjustifiable distortion of the truth", but some of the best names on the Eastern seaboard nonetheless joined in the attack -- including Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Lodge, who encouraged George Harvey to call Secretary of War Newton D. Baker "shockingly and dangerously unfit for his job". Behind all this lay a fair measure of economic discontent, as well as disappointment over war production. A historian of the period points out that:

"Some munitions makers did fatten on the war, but the real incomes of all manufacturers and property owners scarcely increased between 1913 and 1918, while seven-eighths of the new high-income taxes fell upon them. Below these groups, the white-collar workers and all others with fixed incomes suffered annoyances and even hardships

as their incomes failed to keep up with rising prices and they had to put up with wartime scarcities or substitutes. Here were the audiences for right-wing critics of the management of the war."

3. In the fall of 1918, resentment over wheat price ceilings boiled over. Midwestern farmers resented the government's holding down the price of wheat, while other prices and wages soared and Southern Democrats prevented comparable controls from being put on cotton. This contributed heavily to the Democrats' loss of the House and the Senate in the mid-term 1918 elections. That defeat, a few days before the end of the war, marked the climax in the steady erosion of Wilson's initial commanding wartime position.

The history of World War I suggests that, even in a war of rare popularity, mounting criticism, economic hardship, and internal repression are hard to avoid on the home front.

World War II

Before December 7, isolationist sentiment in the country was strong and well-led. Its spokesmen in the Congress included Senators Taft, Vandenberg, Champ Clark, Nye, Wheeler, La Follette, Shipstead, Walsh, Ellender, and Reynolds.

Even though, after Pearl Harbor, national unity in support of the war was virtually unanimous, there was one dramatic case of repression: The enforced internment of 117,000 Japanese-Americans (two-thirds of them American citizens), with loss of about 40% of their possessions -- without any evidence, then or later, of disloyalty. This episode eclipsed, in sheer size, anything that had happened in either the Civil War or World War I.

The main home front problems, however, were economic and social. Tensions created by a major military effort were evident on four fronts:

-- Youth: As mothers went to work, juvenile delinquency increased 56%. As war employment soared, the percentage of eligible young people attending high school dropped to 56%.

-- Race Relations: As labor moved from farm to factory, 5 million people migrated within the South; another 1.6 million left for the North. There a changing population pattern brought new tensions. The Detroit race riots of June, 1943, were only the most dramatic evidence.

-- Labor Disputes: Despite no-strike pledges there were nearly 15,000 work stoppages, involving loss of more than 36 million man days. When the United Mine Workers defied the government in striking in 1943, the Smith-Connally Act was passed over the President's veto; public feeling against unions continued to rise and many states passed anti-labor laws.

-- Inflationary Pressures: Post-Pearl Harbor prices rose 2% per month. Wartime food prices rose 50%. Rents went up only 4%, but this meant little to war workers moving into new areas, where there was no decent housing. Black marketing and overcharging grew in proportions far beyond OPA's policing capacity.

All this gave rise to a fair amount of criticism of the administration. Professor Freidel:

"Through the election of 1942, as the United States and its allies suffered unparalleled military disasters and the war administration in Washington seemed to compound confusion, the criticism rose to a crescendo."

In the 1942 elections the Democrats lost heavily in both the Senate and the House, where their majority eventually descended to two votes.

In his book on "Congressional Politics in the Second World War", Roland Young cites the reasons:

"By election time of 1942, the popular support of the administration so evident after Pearl Harbor was declining...There was public dissatisfaction over price control, rent control, and gasoline rationing; over the forty-hour week, strikes, and the wage rate being paid to defense workers; over the loss of farm labor to the city, the lack of farm machinery, and the ceilings on farm prices. In all there was dissatisfaction with the increasing social unbalance brought on by the war..."

Korean War

The trend in the Korean war showed the usual pattern: Initial enthusiasm, followed by a sharp falling off as the hardships and frustrations of war grew marked.

At the start of the war, as President Truman's biographer points out, the President's "decision to act promptly...drew an almost unanimous outpouring of praise for the President..." A Gallup poll shortly after intervention found 81% favorable, 13% against, and 6% without opinion. Professor Bailey records the early decline:

"Truman's courageous and decisive action at the time (late June 1950) won reassuring applause from both the public and Congress, quite in contrast with the noisy condemnation when the going got rougher... The stinging military defeat inflicted by the Chinese (late in 1950), far from arousing the American public, had precisely the opposite effect. Republicans, in particular, branded the conflict 'Mr. Truman's war'. A majority of the American people believed that not only was intervention a mistake but that the United States ought to pull out."

The results were evident in the November election: The Republicans won five seats in the Senate and twenty-five seats in the House.

In January 1951, a Gallup poll showed 66% for pulling out, 25% against, and 9% no opinion.

In April 1951, when General MacArthur was fired, a Gallup poll showed only 29% favoring the President, as against 69% for the General.

Cabell Phillips reports some other effects of that firing:

"Letters by the tens of thousands poured into the White House, Congressional offices, newspapers, and radio stations in every part of the land... Congressional Republicans...held emergency caucuses in the House and Senate Wednesday morning to vent their wrath against the President...Some Democrats in Congress defended their President but most... stood mute in dismay and indecision."

The trend downward continued into 1952. That spring, the President's popularity reached an all-time low of 26%.

Professor Bailey is right, when he says that at the time of the 1952 elections: "The American people, never noted for patience and long accustomed to quick successes, were in an ugly mood."

Part of this was due to the usual wartime economic difficulties. When President Truman had to reinstate wage and price controls, he was soon attacked by both business and labor; his conflict with both groups continued and deepened, as the war went on. Management and labor fought each other, as well. And the consumer-at-large was mad at everybody: management, labor, and the administration, which he blamed for painful shortages and controls.

But Professor Freidel explains a more basic reason for public concern about the war:

"President Truman's policy of fighting a limited war of containment continued to baffle and exasperate a considerable part of the American people. It went too completely against the American tradition of total victory; it was too hard to explain to much of the public or even to many of the soldiers fighting endlessly through the rice paddies and on the hilltops of Korea. This was true even though the President's policies bore promise of ultimate success."

The attacks on the administration's war policy were widespread:

-- Senator Taft branded Korea an "utterly useless war".

-- Senator Jenner said that "President Truman had sent United States troops into Korea for the specific purpose of having them defeated..."

-- Senator Wherry said that Dean Acheson "has the blood of our boys in Korea on his hands".

-- Eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees issued a joint statement in August 1951, which attacked the administration for having "squandered" the victory of our armed forces, failed for political reasons to exploit fully "American air and naval superiority in the Korean war", kept "the facts from the Congress and the people", -- all adding up to a "catastrophic failure".

Some generals in the field, unlike those in Washington, also opposed the administration's limited war objectives. These included not only General MacArthur but also Generals Courtney Whitney and Edward M. Almond, and General Van Fleet --

who argued that the war could be won by an all-out effort but "the Truman Administration got weak-kneed...and was wishfully wanting peace without prosecuting the war to win the peace".

At the same time, some elements of public opinion went all out, in the fevered atmosphere of wartime, in attacking the Left. The excesses to which McCarthyism gave rise were at least as great as those in any preceding war.

As the administration drew to a close, few could see ahead to the judgment that Clinton E. Rossiter would make in 1956: "I am ready to hazard an opinion, to which I did not come easily or lightly, that Harry Truman will eventually win a place as President, if not as a hero, alongside Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt."

For it was not as clear then as it is now that the war in Korea -- like the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and World Wars I and II -- would be remembered for its results, rather than the home front difficulties and dissension that marked its course.

Thursday, September 14, 1967
3:30 p.m.

3

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your Interview at 6 P. M. with Cyrus Sulzberger

I had Cy in to lunch today.

He is going to visit some countries in South America and West Africa. He will then go to Paris to settle down for a while.

He put the following proposition to me to pass to you:

- Would you be willing to talk about your views on South America and Africa for possible on-the-record use;
- After you had seen them, as taken down, you could edit them or decide you did not wish them printed;
- He would only publish them after he had left the country and was, *in* say, Caracas; he believes this might avoid embarrassment with some of the Washington press corps.

His argument is the following:

The public image is that you are overwhelmingly concerned with Viet Nam and the domestic political situation, with no serious margin of time and energy to give to the problems of Latin America and Africa. Some quotable observations on these two problems might be useful to him. *you.*

During lunch I took him, in some detail, through your innovations in Latin American policy. I also gave him your OAU speech to read before the 6 P. M. interview, pointing out that it was the first speech by an American President wholly devoted to Africa.

Whether or not you decide to accept his proposition -- which might not be a bad idea -- I suggest you emphasize the following points on Latin America and Africa, respectively, plus any you might choose from Tabs B and C.

LATIN AMERICA:

- The acceleration of Latin American progress since 1964;
- Heightened emphasis on Latin American initiative and responsibility, with U. S. as junior partner;

- Positive U. S. support for Latin American integration and multi-national projects;
- The new emphasis on agriculture and education.

With respect to AFRICA:

- Your awareness that African political and economic development will be a slow, long process requiring patience and understanding;
- Your commitment in Africa, as well as elsewhere, to self-determination and one-man one-vote;
- Our efforts to encourage elements of moderation and good sense in both black and white Africa;
- Our shift in aid policy towards the encouragement of African regional and subregional institutions and to regional development of power, education, telecommunications, etc. ;
- Despite crises in Nigeria and Congo, progress made by Ghana, the French West African states, and in East Africa, notably Tanzania and Kenya.

I attach:

- TAB A - Overall rates of growth in Latin America, 1961-67.
- TAB B - The summary we recently did on positive developments in Latin America since 1964.
- TAB C - The same for Africa.
- TAB D - A list of the African leaders whom you have personally met.

W. W. R.

Attachments

A

39

September 14, 1967

Per Capita GNP for Latin America *

1960/61	2.0%	}	av. 1.2 %
1961/62	1.1%		
1962/63	0.5%		
1963/64	3.6%	}	av. 2.3 %
1964/65	2.0%		
1965/66	1.3%		
1966/67	2.3%		

* This includes all of the Latin American countries except Cuba and Haiti.

32

B

3d B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 7, 1967

MAJOR GAINS IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE 1964

1. Democracy is stronger and political stability more secure.

- Eighteen Latin American countries have held free, democratic elections since 1964 and duly-elected governments have all taken office, five of them replacing unconstitutional regimes. Strong, new political leadership has emerged in these elections.
- Only three extra-constitutional changes have taken place since 1964 and none during the past year.
- We have overcome the 1964 crisis with Panama and negotiated treaties which provide new bases for a long-term settlement of old problems which meet the future needs of Panama, the United States and international commerce.
- Our action in the Dominican Republic, in collaboration with other American Republics, permitted the Dominican people to resume constitutional government under leaders chosen in free elections.

2. Castro has failed in his domestic program and Cuban-sponsored subversion has been checked.

- The OAS economic denial program, and Castro's own mismanagement, has kept the Cuban economy stagnated.
- In July 1964 the OAS made hemispheric isolation of Cuba almost complete. (It would be if Mexico complied with the sanctions.)
- Despite repeated efforts, Castro has made no headway in promoting guerrilla efforts.
- The guerrilla movements in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Guatemala and Nicaragua have been liquidated or reduced.
- Anti-guerrilla efforts in Bolivia are beginning to show success.
- Our military and police programs have helped countries make major gains in strengthening their internal security capabilities.

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17

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By ing, NARA, Date 4-13-95

3. Latin American economic growth has accelerated and self-help has increased.

- Average per capita GNP growth on an annual basis was 1.0% in the years 1960 to 1963, and 2.3% from 1964 to 1966.
- Government revenues have increased by some 25% since the beginning of the Alliance. Most of this increase has been in the past three years, 1963-66, when revenues increased by some 22%.
- Latin American exports have diversified and total exports are up almost \$2 billion.
- At the start of the Alliance it was expected that some 80% of the total gross investment would have to come from Latin American domestic savings. In fact, Latin America had bettered this -- at 87%.
- At the Meeting of Presidents, the Latin Americans agreed that economic integration is essential to their development into modern industrial societies and established a timetable for establishing a Latin American Common Market.
- The success of the Central American Common Market during the past four years shows what can be achieved through integration.
- There is a new sense of confidence and commitment by the Latin Americans in their own ability to achieve development goals largely through their own efforts and resources.
- The new confidence created by the Alliance has led to a steady rise in total US private investment in Latin America from \$242 million in 1963 to \$457 million in 1966.

4. Major gains have been made in institutional reform and development.

- A new generation of technicians and managers trained in modern methods have increasingly moved into positions of responsibility in government and industry, bringing reform and higher efficiency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- The Latin Americans have greatly increased the amount of their contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank, ^{reducing} ~~changing~~ the US-LA ratio from the original 11:1 to 3:1.

18 -

- The number of savings and loan institutions increased by some 25%, the number of savers has trippled and net savings risen sixfold.
- The number of credit unions increased from 800 to more than 2200, total membership doubled and total savings quadrupled.
- Sixteen countries have invited IRS teams to help them review their tax system and six countries have enacted major tax reforms.
- The Presidents at Punta del Este agreed to place major emphasis during the next decade on modernization of their agricultural and educational systems.

5. The mechanism of inter-American cooperation has been modernized and strengthened.

- The Alliance for Progress has moved from the trial-and-error organizational phase to one of sustained action through established institutions.
- CIAP has emerged as the principal instrument for reviewing individual country and over-all performance under the Alliance and for giving collective policy guidance to the Alliance.
- The reforms of the OAS Charter, adopted in February 1967, strengthen the future operations of the OAS, particularly in the economic and social fields.
- New countries have emerged -- Trinidad-Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana -- and the way has been opened for them to join the OAS.

6. Our commitment to the Alliance has been fully met and extended.

- Total U.S. economic assistance to Latin America in the fiscal years FY 1962 to 1964 on a commitment basis amounted to \$3309 million. From the years 1965 to 1967, it amounted to \$3934 million for a percentage increase between the periods of 19%.

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-4-

- Economic assistance to Latin America from international agencies (where our contribution is substantial) from FY 1962 to 1964 was \$1489 million, and from FY 1965 to 1967 was \$2134 million, an increase of 44%.
- There has been a steady increase in private involvement through Partners for the Alliance, the Council for Latin America and the International Executive Service Corps.
- At the President's direction, the State Department has made extensive use of private consultants in the educational, business and labor fields in the formulation of our policy toward Latin America, e.g., in preparing for the OAS Summit.
- The President has made clear that we view the Alliance as a long-term program and that we are determined to perservere with the Latin Americans in carrying it out.

20 -

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C

MEMORANDUM

3f C

~~THE WHITE HOUSE~~

~~WASHINGTON~~

~~Friday, September 8, 1967~~

WWR:

SUBJECT: The Positive Story in Africa

The 1960's are the shake-down years for African independence. There are only four African nations with as much as a decade of experience as sovereign states. With a few exceptions, the colonial powers left no durable patterns of power and responsibility into which the new local leadership could fit. Moreover, the transition to independence occurred during a period of continent-wide awakening to the possibility of economic progress. Added to the ferment produced by jockeying for position in the slowly-congealing power structure of independent nations has been the urgent insistence of every populace that its government carry out an economic revolution as well.

Combined with the racial problems associated with independence and the disrupting influence of the East-West controversy, this is a prescription for turmoil. And considerable turmoil has occurred.

But ^{there is} a most hopeful trend in Africa in the last three years -- one which in part reflects our own efforts. Stated in crudest form, it is a shift in political values from flamboyance, ideology and international adventurousness to inward-looking preoccupation with the harshly practical problems each country faces in its own backyard. Perhaps inevitably, Africa had her ^{ing} with the Nkrumahs and the glamor of the international stage. There will always be some temptation to forsake the knotty difficulties at home for the bright lights abroad.

Yet it is clear who is built for the long pull in Africa. It is the Nyereres, the Houphouet-Boignys, and the Senghors who are strong and getting stronger. The leader with a future is the leader who tackles the day-to-day problems of the common man -- enough food for his family, decent housing, and the rudiments of medical care. It is a cold fact, for example, that the Ivory Coast's 9% annual growth rate in GNP is more important and durable political phenomenon in Africa than the great inflow of Soviet arms into Somalia, just as the current efforts of Nkrumah's successors to put Ghand's economic house in order are much more lasting and important than any of Osegyefo's political and economic extravagances. And it is not Americans or Europeans who are making these judgments. It is the people of Africa -- the people who can enforce priorities with the discipline every politician understands and respects.

7-

This trend also shows signs of extending to regional and sub-regional cooperation, particularly economic cooperation. For example:

- the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed in 1963 and has sponsored fifteen Foreign Ministers' meetings and four summit meetings on the full range of African problems.
- the Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM) was formed in 1965 -- within the OAU framework -- to provide a forum for the Francophones.
- earlier this year the three states of East Africa signed a treaty establishing an economic community, with room for expansion to include Zambia.
- a customs union between five French-speaking nations was established in 1966, and the basis has been laid for a West African common market.
- African nations joined together to form the African Development Bank in 1964, and the Bank began operations in 1966. All of the more than \$200 million subscribed for the Bank's ordinary capital comes from African countries. (This is the only regional bank in the world that does not depend primarily on money from outside.)

In addition, countries which share river basins are thinking in terms of joint development with their neighbors; surveys are underway for a transportation network covering Central Africa and a power grid for most of West Africa; the World Bank has undertaken to play a special role -- welcomed by the African Bank -- in promoting regional and subregional development of shared resources.

Obviously, none of these hopeful developments obscures the tragedy of Nigeria, the chronic chaos in the Congo, or the dark portents of racial discrimination in the southern sixth of the continent. These problems will always be better fodder for headline-writers. But if one is to understand Africa, he must keep up with -- and encourage -- the hopeful forces at work behind the scenes. In the long haul, they will be at least as important as the setbacks -- and they have already borne impressive fruit.

8 -


Ed Hamilton

38

D

LIST OF AFRICAN LEADERS WHOM THE PRESIDENT
HAS PERSONALLY MET
(since becoming President)

Former King of Burundi - Mwambutsa IV

President of Zambia - Kaunda

President of Malawi - Banda (2 times)

Vice President of Liberia - Tolbert (3 times)

Emperor of Ethiopia - Haile Selassie (2 times)

President of Upper Volta - Yameogo

Prime Minister of Gambia - Jawra

Director General of the Royal Cabinet of Morocco - M'hammedi

President of Senegal - Senghor

King of Morocco - Hassan II

President of Rwanda - Kayibanda

President of Ivory Coast - Houphouet-Boigny

President of Malagasy Republic - Tsiranana

President of Somalia - Abdrizac

Crown Prince of Morocco - Moulay Abdallah

President Algerian National Assembly - Haj Ben Alla --

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroun - Ballo-Ondoua

Minister of State of Guinea - Saifoulaye Diallo

President, National Assembly, Ivory Coast - Phillipe Yace

Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone - Dr. Kanefa-Smart

Secretary of State for Presidency, Tunisia - Bahi Ladgham

Thursday, September 14, 1967
11:20 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

I thought you might like to have a printed copy of my Leeds speech, which is as much yours as mine.

W. W. Rostow

Handwritten note on booklet:

To President Lyndon B. Johnson
on whose shoulders, will, courage, and
vision the great transition depends.
With deep affection and respect.

/s/ Walt

14 September 1967

WWRostow:rlh

5

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

Thursday, September 14, 1967
11:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I received a telephone call from Dick Helms telling me that in his contacts with intelligence people in Southeast Asia before he went *to Saigon,* Sen. Symington was in a black mood, leaning towards a pull-out of Viet Nam at almost any price.

I then sent the attached message (Tab A) to Amb. Bunker who now describes (Tab B) his missionary work.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ -- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-201
By cbm, NARA Date 3-26-01

WWRostow:rlh

5a

~~SECRET~~-- EYES ONLY

From Walt Rostow to Ambassador Bunker, via CAS channels

As you know, Senator Symington is in a most difficult mood about Vietnam: vacillating between all-out bombing and get out at almost any price. He is worried about the resource and balance of payments burdens of the effort.

It goes without saying that anything you, Westy, and the others can do to stabilize his view of the problem and give him some soundly based evidence that there is light at the end of the tunnel would be greatly appreciated.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-201
By cbm, NARA Date 3-26-01

~~SECRET~~-- EYES ONLY

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FM CIA
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONL Y 141032Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 359

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR WALT ROSTOW

1. THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SENATOR SYMINGTON. AS HE IS A VERY OLD FRIEND AND FELLOW ELI, I AM HAVING HIM STAY WITH ME. I UNDERSTAND SOMETHING OF THE PROBLEM AND SPENT TWO HOURS WITH HIM THIS MORNING.

2. I FOUND THAT HE WAS DOUBTFUL THAT WE WERE MAKING PROGRESS HERE, FELT THAT WE SHOULD EXPAND OUR BOMBING OF MILITARY TARGETS, WAS QUITE CRITICAL OF BOB MCNAMARA, TENDS TO ENDORSE TESTIMONY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS AND ADMIRAL SHARP ADVOCATING EXPANSION OF TARGETS, AND BROUGHT UP HIS FAVORITE SUBJECT OF THE BURDEN ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE EFFORT HERE.

3. I GAVE HIM A THOROUGH BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION HERE AS WE SEE IT, EMPHASIZING THE FACT THAT I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE MAKING STEADY PROGRESS NOT ONLY IN THE MILITARY ASPECT OF THE WAR, BUT ALSO IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS AND IN PACIFICATION.

4. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT AFTER THE DECISION TO BUILD UP OUR TROOP STRENGTH, WHICH WAS MADE IN 1965, IT TOOK A YEAR TO BUILD THE ESSENTIAL LOGISTICAL BASE TO BACK UP OUR OPERATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE ONLY IN THE LAST YEAR THAT WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO GO OVER TO THE OFFENSIVE AND TO BRING HEAVY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ENEMY, THAT WE WERE STEADILY STEPPING UP THE PRESSURE AND THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES IS STEADILY IMPROVING. PROGRESS IN THE BUILD UP OF THIS PRESSURE HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY A DECLINE IN THE MORALE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIET CONG, AND THE NORTH VIET-NAM HAS BEEN FORCED TO ASSUME MORE AND MORE OF THE BURDEN OF THE WAY EFFORT. I POINTED OUT THAT A VERY CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF THE PROGRESS WAS THE HEAVY INCREASE IN VOTER REGISTRATION AND THE ACTUAL VOTES CAST IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AS COMPARED TO THE ELECTIONS FOR THE ASSEMBLY A YEAR AGO.

5. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ELECTIONS, I EXPLAINED THE QUITE REMARKABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VILLAGE AND HAMLET ELECTIONS IN MARKING THE BEGINNINGS OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT, AND THE PROSPECTS OPENED UP NOW FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED, DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED, FUNCTIONING, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

6. I ALSO BROUGHT UP THE PROGRESS TO DATE IN PACIFICATION, AND EXPLAINING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OPERATION AND THE PLANNING AND VAST AMOUNT OF TRAINING WHICH HAD GONE INTO IT AND WHICH IS NOW BEGINNING TO SHOW RESULTS.

7. I ALSO GAVE HIM A COPY OF THE BRIEFING PAPER I PREPARED FOR THE OBSERVER GROUP.

8. I FEEL ALL THIS HAS MADE SOME IMPRESSION ON HIM. I AM HAVING A SMALL DINNER FOR HIM TONIGHT INCLUDING WESTY, ADMIRAL SHARP, AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, GENERAL VIEN.

9. HE WILL BE GOING OUT IN THE COUNTRY TOMORROW, RETURNING SUNDAY, AND I SHALL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER TALKS WITH HIM. WE SHALL KEEP UP THE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS AND I WILL REPORT FURTHER AT THE END OF HIS VISIT.

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS

BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-142
By Sj, NARA, Date 8/3/01

6

Thursday - September 14, 1967
11:00 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Tomorrow Mexico celebrates its 157th anniversary of independence.

I recommend that you send President Diaz Ordaz the attached message of congratulations.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Attachment

(refer: 9/13/67 Read-Rostow)

62

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ ON MEXICO'S INDEPENDENCE DAY
SEPTEMBER 15, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

On the 157th anniversary of the independence of the Mexican nation,
I join my fellow citizens in offering warmest congratulations.

Mrs. Johnson and I look forward to having you and Dona Guadalupe
with us next month. Your visit will symbolize the mutual respect
and close friendship between our peoples. It will be another landmark
in our continuing cooperation as good neighbors. And it will further
strengthen the ties which unite our two nations.

Lyndon B. Johnson

7

Thursday, September 14, 1967
10:45 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the material on previous wars, which you asked for in the form of key facts, readily useable for background purposes.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The American Home Front in Past Wars

It is said that we are, for the first time, fighting a war (Viet-Nam) and at the same time, going through serious dissension and facing serious problems at home. Nothing could be further from the truth. A study of the American experience in wartime (1776-1953) produces five basic conclusions:

(1) wars begin with enthusiastic support, then criticism of the President and his administration steadily mount;

(2) the opposition includes many leading citizens -- in Congress, the press, the schools, and the pulpit;

(3) economic troubles explain much of the opposition;

(4) there is generally considerable suppression of the more unpopular forms of dissent;

(5) when the war is over, the critics find it was an act of statesmanship after all.

America's past wartime experiences are summarized on succeeding pages:

I. The Revolutionary War

Opposition

Only half the people supported the war -- the rest neutral or Tory.

Privations of war and defeats caused wide gloom.

Opposition leaders

Led by Anglican churchmen -- including Rev. Samuel Seabury, first postwar Bishop of the American Anglican Church. Also many wealthy families -- Galloway of Maryland, Leonard and Sewall from Massachusetts.

Economic problems

Imports from England stopped. Merchants, farmers (rice and tobacco), and fishermen suffered especially. Soaring inflation hit the towns -- laborers and artisans and clergy hard hit.

One leading critic said that if the war stopped, agriculture and industry would revive and "everything would return to its pristine state of prosperity."

Repression

Rev. Seabury and others were imprisoned. Some critics narrowly escaped lynching. Others fled to the British or abroad. At one time a prison camp held the former Governor of New Jersey and the Mayor of New York.

Conclusion

When peace and victory came, a romantic view of the struggle that many thought could not be won replaced the gloom and defeatism of the war years.

II. The War of 1812

Opposition

Majority of the country backed the war at the outset. But 62 members of both Houses voted against the Declaration of War.

Soon, New England's opposition mounted in face of defeats and economic problems. Men and money were refused for the war. Opposition spread to the South and West.

The Hartford Convention advised States to resist conscription -- while a British Army was at the gates of New Orleans.

The Governor of Massachusetts sent a three-man delegation to Washington -- to take the surrender, so he thought, of a beaten administration and a defeated country.

Opposition leaders

The "best" men of New England were in the forefront. Daniel Webster made a speech of criticism so bitter it was suppressed for 100

years. He spoke of a government "more tyrannical, more arbitrary, more dangerous, more allied to blood and murder, more full of every form of mischief, more productive of every sort of misery than has been exercised by any civilized government, with a single exception, in modern times."

William Ellery Channing condemned the war from the pulpit. William Cullen Bryant wrote poems against it. President Timothy Dwight of Yale toasted British victories. The list of critics reads like a "who's who" of New England at that time.

Economic problems

Shipping and trade were depressed. Inflation mounted. And the Boston Gazette warned: "Any man who lends his money to the government at the present time will forfeit all claim to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends of the country."

Repression

The government cut off funds for state militias in states whose governors refused use of the militia in the war. And mobs sometimes took a hand -- for example demolishing the plant of a newspaper in Baltimore that advocated peace.

Conclusion

As the war neared an end, it seemed that only President Madison and General Jackson still stood firm. That was enough.

The Treaty of Ghent was signed, and Jackson won the battle of New Orleans.

The three peace delegates from Hartford were described in the New York National Advocate as follows:

"Missing: Three well looking, responsible men, who appeared to be traveling toward Washington, disappeared suddenly from Gadsby's Hotel in Baltimore on Monday evening last, and have not since been heard from. They were observed to be very melancholy on hearing the news of peace..."

The Federalist Party, which had opposed the war, soon disappeared.

III. Mexican War

Opposition

War was popular at the beginning. The House voted 174 to 14, the Senate 40 to 2, for the war. The Whigs proclaimed that "doubt, division and reproach will be unknown."

The mood changed dramatically as the war dragged on. The elections of 1846 went heavily against the Democrats. Whig journals told Mexico that "her cause was just, that a majority of Americans detested the war, that our treasury could not bear the cost, that our government was incompetent...that our armies could not win the war, and that soon the administration would be rebuked and its policies reversed."

An administration resolution defending the war was defeated in Congress; a resolution condemning it passed.

Opposition leaders

Intellectuals took the lead -- Professor Kent of Harvard, James Russell Lowell, Herman Melville.

The press joined in. The New York Tribune urged withdrawal of U. S. troops. The Boston Atlas complained of "unsurpassed inefficiency."

Among politicians, Senator Webster spoke of President Polk's "impeachable offense." Senator Berrien called the war "a horrible crime." Henry Clay criticized the war and so did many of his colleagues.

Rejen, the Mexican leader, told a diplomat the key to his policy was the belief the American people would not continue to support the war. And so he held on.

Senator Calhoun raised the constitutional argument. Because Congress had not acted, he said, "there is no war, according to the sense of our Constitution."

Economic problems

Panic on Wall Street. Business failures and inflation widespread.

The North American said: "Our Administration seems enamoured by ruin, and woos calamity for itself."

Conclusion

A motion calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops was introduced into Congress. Then came the Battle of Buena Vista, and it was clear the U.S. was going to win. The resolution was smothered in the House.

With peace, a Whig journal gave the opinion that it had been "one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation. And the Whigs chose General Taylor as their presidential candidate.

IV. Civil War

Early enthusiasm, followed by discouragement.

1862 Congressional elections went heavily against the President's party. In December, a House resolution calling for negotiations with the South was tabled by only 98 to 59.

Summer of 1864 -- a group of prominent Republicans organized a "Lincoln withdrawal" movement. A Senator friend said of the President: "I fear he is a failure." Lincoln himself judged he could not be re-elected.

A Confederate General wrote his wife: "We learn from gentlemen recently from the North that the Peace Party is growing rapidly -- that McClellan will be elected and that his election will bring peace -- provided always that we continue to hold our own against the Yankee armies."

Loudest Congressional critics were mostly "hawks": Senators Sumner, Chandler (chairman of the Commerce Committee), Grimes (Naval Affairs Committee) and, in the House, the Speaker (Roscoe Conkling), Stevens of Pennsylvania, and Ben Wade (Committee on the Conduct of the War).

The Detroit Free Press reported: "Not a single Senator can be named as favorable to Lincoln's renomination for President."

Much of the press was "dovish" and critical: New York Daily News, New York Tribune, New York Evening Post, Chicago Times, Detroit Free Press.

Economic problems

Economic discontent and opposition to the war produced draft riots. In New York, at least 1,000 people were killed or wounded.

Repression

Those discouraging enlistment or offering aid or comfort to the rebels were subject to martial law. More than 13,000 people were arrested. Many went to prison. Habeas Corpus was suspended in many areas.

The fall of Atlanta produced a dramatic change of heart. A Lincoln bandwagon began to roll. Critics joined it.

No record of the reaction of the New York Times which only a few weeks before had said that all that could save us was selection of a peace commission to negotiate with Jefferson Davis.

V. World War I

Opposition

Country sharply divided until Germans began unrestricted submarine warfare. Even after, some Congressional opposition continued.

Wilson's request to arm merchantmen was killed by filibuster.

Six Senators voted against a Declaration of War.

The IWW said: "This is a businessman's war and we don't see why we should go out and get shot."

Draft Law passed only after a brisk fight.

Congressional criticism of Wilson and the war mounted, including demands that the President abdicate control over military affairs.

In 1918, Democrats lost heavily in Senate and House.

Opposition leaders

8 of the 12 S_e nators who filibustered against arming U.S. merchant ships were chairmen of Senate Committees (including the

Foreign Relations Committee). Five Senate committee chairmen opposed the declaration of war, again led by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee (Stone of Missouri).

The President's request for a draft was opposed by: the Speaker of the House, the Majority leader, and the Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee.

Repression

Two sedition laws passed. More than 1,500 people were arrested under them. Heavy sentences went to leading Socialists like Eugene Debs and Victor Berger. The producer of a movie on the American Revolution was sentenced to 10 years because his picture might arouse anti-British feelings.

A wave of anti-German feeling -- German dropped from schools, German books withdrawn from libraries, German artists refused permission to perform (including Fritz Kreisler).

Economic problems

Rising prices and wartime scarcities. Farmers bitter about the ceiling price on wheat.

Conclusion

Even in a relatively short war of rare popularity, criticism of the President, economic problems and internal repression are hard to avoid.

World War II

Opposition

Before Pearl Harbor, isolationist feeling was strong and well-led: Vandenberg, Taft, Champ Clark, Nye, Wheeler, Mundt, LaFollette, etc. Six members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were isolationists.

The Chicago Tribune, New York Daily News, and Hearst newspapers all opposed U.S. involvement.

Many business and labor leaders shared this view.

Many others too: writers, professors, clergymen.

In September 1941, Walter Lippmann called for "a clear decision to shrink the army..."

The attack on Pearl Harbor drowned out most of the critics.

Repression

Major case; the forced internment of 117,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry.

Economic problems

Juvenile delinquency rose 56%; high school enrollment dropped 56%.

Racial tensions increased; Detroit riots of June 1943, among others.

Labor disputes widespread and many states passed anti-labor laws.

Wartime food prices rose 50% and all prices rose 2% a month after Pearl Harbor. Black marketing was rampant.

Conclusion

Democrats lost heavily in House and Senate in 1942. Economic problems connected with the war were largely to blame.

VII. Korean War

Opposition

The usual pattern -- initial enthusiasm, then the falling off of support as hardships and frustrations increase.

At the start, a Gallup poll showed 81% in favor of President Truman's intervention, only 13% against.

But in January 1951, Gallup showed 66% of the people for pulling out and 25% against.

When General MacArthur was fired, only 29% favored the President against 69% for the General.

In 1952, the President's popularity had fallen to an all-time low: 26%.

Opposition leaders

Senator Taft called Korea an "utterly useless war."

One Senator (Jenner) said the President had sent troops to Korea "for the specific purpose of having them defeated..."

Eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee issued a joint statement in August 1951 attacking the Administration for having "squandered" the military victory and for keeping "the facts from the Congress and the people." The war was judged "a catastrophic failure."

Press criticism was widespread; U.S. News & World Report, the Luce publications, Chicago Tribune, Washington Times Herald, Hearst newspapers and a number of columnists.

Repression

No government action of significance. But the McCarthy era was born.

Economic problems

Wage and price controls were reinstituted and drew fire from business and labor. There were many shortages and wide resentment against controls.

Conclusion

As the Truman Administration came to a close, the only enthusiasm for resisting communist aggression seemed confined to the President and the troops in Korea.

Few could see ahead to the judgment made by Clinton Rossiter in 1956:

"I am ready to hazard an opinion, to which I did not come easily or lightly, that Harry Truman will eventually win a place as President, if not as a hero, alongside Jefferson and Theodore Roosevelt."

*1. copy
2. Pres file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Tan Siew Sin

SUBJECT: Malaysian Desire to See You on Fall in Rubber Prices

The price of rubber has recently reached a 17-year low. The Government of Malaysia is trying to give the impression that it is doing something about it. Without any discussion with us, they announced that their Finance Minister was coming to Washington to discuss with you, if possible, the "serious problem" posed by sales from our rubber stockpile.

This is nonsense. During the past 12 months we have cut our stockpile sales from 170,000 tons a year to the current 70,000 tons, all of which is used to meet U.S. Government contracts. These sales simply are not a significant factor in the current rubber market.

I do not believe you should see the Malaysian Finance Minister:

- (1) He will be asking that we totally suspend our disposal sales. He should be told "no," and I think it best that he get that answer from a lower level.
- (2) It is probable that the Malaysians will, at some stage, try to make us the whipping boy for their rubber problems. I, therefore, think it best that you avoid any personal involvement in this matter.
- (3) Finally, they are trying to meet a serious problem by chanting magic incantations. I think it is beneath the dignity of your office to get involved in this exercise in futility.

The State Department is in agreement, but I expect Malaysian Ambassador Ong will make strenuous efforts to arrange the appointment through the back door, once he finds the front door is locked. This memorandum is intended to "cut him off at the gulch."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By *ing*, NARA, Date 4-13-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

I recommend that you decline all efforts to arrange a meeting between you and the Malaysian Finance Minister.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See Me

My boys recommend that I see him

Approve —

Disapprove —

See me —

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

9

1. ~~to state~~

2. ~~Pres file~~

Thursday, September 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Message to Singapore Prime Minister Lee

September 16 is Lee's 44th birthday. Lee is coming here for a visit next month. The attached personal birthday message from you is intended to warm the atmosphere prior to his arrival. I recommend that you approve it. — *as state suggests*

W. W. Rostow

Att.

8/14/67

L

4a

PROPOSED MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I extend my heartiest congratulations to you on your 44th birthday. I look forward with great pleasure to meeting and talking with you during your visit here in October.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10

Pres file

SEP 14 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of September 8 and Ambassador Porter's report of his September 4 meeting with you. I want, without delay, to tell you how heartened and encouraged I am by the courageous and statesman-like way you are facing up to the free world's need for more troops in Viet-Nam.

I recognize the domestic problems you face in this regard. You can count on our understanding and cooperation in helping you deal with those problems. I look forward to hearing from you on your specific plans after you have considered the report from your Minister of National Defense, and of your views on how we can best help your country in its gallant determination to make its full contribution to the common cause.

With my high respects and warm regards.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the
Republic of Korea
Seoul

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By vis, NARA, Date 4-13-95

Sept. 14, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The dedication of the United States Naval Communication Station at North West Cape is a happy occasion for both our countries. The importance of the North West Cape region for defense communication purposes has been recognized since 1943, when a small group of U. S. radiomen with field equipment was established in the area. With the rapid advance of techniques in the post-war period, the station now being dedicated will play an important role in maintaining the peace which both our countries so strongly desire. Although the station has been built for the United States Navy, the agreement provides that its services will also be available to the Australian Armed Forces. In addition, the community of Exmouth is a unique experiment in bi-national living. The station is a symbol of Australia's welcome to United States forces and of the firm intention of the United States to play a continuing role in this part of the world in pursuit of peace. It reflects, above all, the warm and growing ties between our two nations as they again fight side by side on behalf of human freedom and work with others to bring to life the shared vision of a New Asia.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Harold E. Holt, M.P.,
Prime Minister of Australia,
Canberra

Mr. ~~Rostow~~

11a

~~L. Rostow~~
2. Profile

Wednesday, September 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Australian Prime Minister Holt

A major U.S. Navy Communications Station on the North West Cape of Australia is being dedicated on September 16. Ambassador Ed Clark is officiating and Prime Minister Holt will be the guest of honor at the ceremony.

Ed wants a message from you to Holt which can be read at the ceremony. The facility has been criticized in Australia, and Holt's attendance is a gesture of solidarity with us. Ed Clark feels a message from you will enhance public understanding of the importance of the facility.

I recommend that you approve the attached message.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

OK
L couldn't we put
some human feeling
in the message or
show some special
regards for Holt &
Australia

revised msg attached
to X'd to State
for dispatch "am
9/14/67

PROPOSED MESSAGE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The dedication of the United States Naval Communication Station at North West Cape is a happy occasion for both our countries. The importance of the North West Cape region for defense communication purposes has been recognized since 1943, when a small group of U. S. radiomen with field equipment was established in the area. With the rapid advance of techniques in the post-war period, the station now being dedicated will play an important role in maintaining the peace which both our countries so strongly desire. Although the station has been built for the United States Navy, the agreement provides that its services will also be available to the Australian Armed Forces. In addition, the community of Exmouth is a unique experiment in bi-national living. The station is a symbol of Australia's welcome to United States forces and of the firm intention of the United States to play a continuing role in this part of the world in pursuit of peace.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable

Harold E. Holt, M.P.,

Prime Minister of Australia,

Canberra.

revised

Wednesday, Sept. 13, 1967

7:10 p.m.

12

~~SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

These two cables keep you up to date on minor moves by Kissinger in Paris until it becomes clear he will have to deliver the message without a face-to-face interview with my special friend Bo.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachments Paris 3257 3288

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By ing, NARA, Date 4-13-95

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

ZNY TTTT
Z 131505Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5382 FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT

Info

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3257

CN 2951
Sept 13, 1967
12:31 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-361

By wp, NARA, Date 10-14-94

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

BO SAW M. ON SHORT NOTICE TODAY AT 12 NOON. I MET WITH M FOR TEN MINUTES AFTER THIS INTERVIEW WHICH LASTED THIRTY-FIVE MINUTES. SINCE M HAD TO GO TO MEETING WHICH WILL OCCUPY HIM ALL AFTER-NOON HE COULD GIVE ME ONLY THE FIRST OF THE CONVERSATION. IN EFFECT, BO SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE THREAT TO BOMB HANOI WAS MAINTAINED HE COULD NOT MEET WITH ME. HOWEVER, HE WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE ANY COMMUNICATION FROM ME THROUGH M ORALLY OR ON THE BASIS OF THIS MORNING, THAT IS A MESSAGE ON A PLAIN SHEET OF PAPER IN A SEALED ENVELOPE. M. HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BO MIGHT PREFER THE LATTER METHOD.

ACCORDINGLY WHEN I SEE M. AT 1700 TODAY I PROPOSE TO ASK HIM TO SEE BO FIRST THING IN THE MORNING. I SHALL TELL HIM THAT I HAVE ASKED FOR INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT DELIVERING THE MESSAGE THROUGH M. IN THE MEANTIME HE SHOULD GIVE BO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT (DRAWN FROM MY INSTRUCTIONS) IN ENGLISH AND FRENCH TOGETHER WITH A RENEWED REQUEST FOR A PERSONAL MEETING:

"HANOI' ATTITUDE WITH RESPECT TO THE KIND OF RESTRAINT WE HAVE EMPLOYED IN THIS CHANNEL IS BAFFLING. IF WE BOMB NEAR HANOI WE ARE ACCUSED OF BRINGING PRESSURE. IF WE VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT ANY SUGGESTION FROM HANOI IMPOSE A RESTRAINT ON OUR ACTIONS AND KEEP THIS UP WITHOUT TIME LIMIT WE ARE ACCUSED OF AN ULTIMATUM. IN FACT, THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL CONTAINED NEITHER THREATS NOR CONDITIONS AND SHOULD NOT BE REJECTED ON THESE GROUNDS."

I SHALL TELL M. THAT THE SENTENCES ARE DRAWN FROM MY INSTRUCTIONS. IF BO REFUSES TO SEE ME, I SHALL HAVE M. PASS ON MESSAGE EARLY TOMORROW AFTERNOON. IF YOU DISAPPROVE OF THIS PROCEDURE, I SHALL SIMPLY ASK M. TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE TOMORROW MORNING. PLEASE ADVISE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

GP-1. BOHLEN.
MSNL
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

W 18
2
TELEGRAM Department of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

DE RUFNCR 3288 2561910
ZNY TITTF
Z 131837Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5397 FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 3020Q
Recd: Sept. 13, 1967
4:10PM

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3288

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-361
By WJ, NARA, Date 10-14-94

I SAW M. AT 1700 PARIS TIME. SINCE I HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY TO PARIS 3243 AND PARIS 3257, I CONFINED THE CONVERSATION TO DEBRIEFING M. ON HIS MEETING WITH BO THIS MORNING.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SETTING UP THE MEETING MAY BE OF INTEREST. M. CALLED BO IN MY PRESENCE. A SECRETARY ANSWERED AND TOLD M. THAT BO WOULD BE VERY BUSY DURING THE DAY AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEE M. UNTIL LATE AFTERNOON. WHEN M. SAID THAT HE WOULD PREFER AN EARLIER MEETING, HE WAS TOLD TO CALL BACK IN TWENTY MINUTES. HE WAS THEN TOLD TO COME OVER WITHIN FIFTEEN MINUTES. THE MEETING LASTED THIRTY-FIVE MINUTES. THE FOLLOWING IS M'S ACCOUNT OF THE

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 3288 ~~TOP SECRET~~
MEETING DRAWN FROM VERY FULL NOTES WHICH I HAVE SEEN. I HAVE TOLD M HENCEFORTH TO TAKE FULL NOTES.

M. OPENED THE MEETING BY HANDING BO MY COMMUNICATION SENT PARIS 3242 IN A SEALED ENVELOPE. BO ASKED M WHETHER HE HAD SEEN THE MESSAGE. WHEN M. ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE, BO PUT THE MESSAGE INTO AN ENVELOPE WITHOUT SHOWING IT TO M. HE THEN SAID: "BECAUSE OF THE CONTINUED THREAT OF BOMBING HANOI WHICH HAS THE CHARACTER OF AN ULTIMATUM, A DIRECT MEETING WITH KISSINGER CANNOT TAKE PLACE". M. ASKED WHAT ASSURANCES HANOI WANTED. BO REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A U.S. PROBLEM. M. THEN ASKED WHETHER CONTACT THROUGH THE A-M CHANNEL SHOULD CONTINUE. BO REPLIED: "DEFINITELY YES. WE CONSIDER THAT WE WISH TO CONTINUE TALKING THROUGH THIS CHANNEL." M. THEN ASKED WHETHER IN THIS CHANNEL BO WOULD RECEIVE ANY COMMUNICATION OPEN OR SEALED. BO REPLIED: "I ACCEPT ANY COMMUNI-

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

- PARIS 3288, SEPT 13, 1967, NODIS

CATION OPEN OR SEALED". M. ASKED WHETHER IN ADDITION TO ANY OFFICIAL TEXT FROM THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BO WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE AN EXPLANATORY TEXT COMING FROM ME EITHER ORALLY THROUGH A & M OR IN WRITING IN A SEALED ENVELOPE. BO REPLIED, "ANY KIND OF MESSAGE WILL BE ACCEPTABLE. WE WANT TO KEEP THIS CHANNEL OPEN." M. THEN IMPROVISED THE QUESTION WHETHER I SHOULD SIGN SUCH COMMUNICATIONS TO AUTHENTICATE THEM. (THE OTHER QUESTIONS HE HAD PUT AT MY SUGGESTION.) BO LAUGHED AND SAID, "THIS THOUGHT HAD NEVER OCCURRED TO ME. I SEE NO NEED FOR A SIGNATURE; WE ACCEPT DOCUMENTS COMING THROUGH THIS CHANNEL AS AUTHENTIC. BUT IF KISSINGER WANTS TO SIGN A COMMUNICATION THIS IS UP TO HIM". (NOTE: I WOULD CONSIDER A SIGNED DOCUMENT A MISTAKE WHICH MIGHT EVEN INHIBIT ANY REPLY BO MAY WANT TO MAKE.) M. THEN ASKED WHETHER A. SHOULD RETURN PARIS. BO REPLIED THAT AS LONG AS I WAS IN PARIS HE SAW NO NEED FOR A'S PRESENCE. (THIS SUGGESTS THAT BO'S ESTIMATE OF M. MAY BE THE SAME AS OURS).

BO THEN TURNED TO THE BOMBING OF HAIPHONG. HE SAID THAT BOMBING WITHIN ONE KILOMETER OF THE CENTER OF TOWN IN EFFECT MEANT ATTACKING POPULATED AREAS. HE DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BOMBING OF HAIPHONG AND THE SENDING OF OUR MESSAGE OR THE CONTINUATION OF THE A-M CHANNEL. (IN FACT M WAS AFRAID THAT THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE US TO STEP UP THE BOMBING OF HAIPHONG.) BO STRESSED THAT PLAM VAN DONG HAD TOLD HIM PERSONALLY THAT RDV WOULD CONTINUE FIGHTING NO MATTER HOW BADLY IT WAS BOMBED. EVEN THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF HANOI WOULD NOT ALTER ITS DETERMINATION. HE URGED M. TO SEE A TV PROGRAM BY SCHOENBRUN IF HE HAD ANY DOUBT ABOUT HANOI'S ABILITY TO CONTINUE FIGHTING.

COMMENT: (1) IF M REPORTED CORRECTLY WE MAY BE EDGING UP TO SOME EXCHANGE. COMMUNICATING BY SEALED LETTER WOULD REDUCE A-M'S ROLE AND MIGHT ENABLE HANOI TO MAINTAIN VIS-A-VIS CHINA THAT NO "TALKS" WERE GOING ON. (2) MY RECOMMENDATION IS TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES OF PARIS 3257 TO SEE WHETHER ANYTHING COMES BACK THROUGH THIS CHANNEL AND I DETERMINE HOW EAGER BO IS TO RECEIVE OUR MESSAGE.

GP-1. BOHLEN.

BT

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, Sept. 13, 1967
5:05 p. m.

13

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Bunker's latest.

In addition to the account of post-election politics you will wish to note the marked account (pp. 7 - 8) of a good Vietnamese operation, and (p. 8) Bob Komer's efforts to move forward in the organization of pacification.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS attachment (Saigon 5825)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 10-3-91

Wednesday, September 13, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 5825)

Herewith my twentieth weekly telegram:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-361
By ing, NARA, Date 10-14-94

A. General

With the elections for President, Vice President, and the Senate behind us, cries of anguish have gone up from some of the defeated candidates. Eight of the defeated Presidential candidates issued a written statement declaring that the elections had been fraudulent and that the signers would request the National Assembly to invalidate the elections. Tran Van Huong and Ha Thuc Ky did not join in the declarations. In a second rather general declaration issued yesterday, six of the candidates (Phan Khac Suu, Hoang Co Binh, Truong Dinh Dzu, Tran Van Ly, Nguyen Hoa Hiep, and Vu Hong Khanh) again denounced the "dishonest practices of this Government," the failure of the Government ticket to receive more than 35 percent of the total vote in spite of the exertion of pressure and illegal practices, exhorting the people to speak out against this suppression and pointing out to the people and Government of the United States that the policy carried out in Vietnam must conform with the will of the Vietnamese people, that otherwise it will be doomed to "bitter and total failure." The prime beneficiary of concerted action by the defeated candidates would be Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran second, and I believe the other candidates have only limited interest in helping Dzu to further his personal ambitions.

Among the Presidential protesters, Dzu seems to be the most active. He ran a notice in the Saigon Daily News yesterday morning, "apologizing for having missed a meeting with Charles Doe and informs all foreign newsmen that he is available at any time, mornings from 9 to 12:30 at his law office and afternoons at his house from lunch time to 5:00 p.m. Thank you in advance." He apparently has little else to do.

In addition to complaints by the Presidential candidates, one has been filed by an Assembly Deputy, Trieu Van Tuc, and four by voters.

Some other protest voices have also been heard. Four student groups have jointly declared that the elections were "rigged and arranged by a foreign hand."

Militant Buddhist leaders told a meeting at the An Quang Pagoda on September 9 that the elections had been rigged, but their strongest condemnation was against the Government for having signed the new Buddhist Charter. I suspect that the Government will act to prevent any serious difficulties by such elements.

The press in general seems to be taking a more responsible view of the election results than have most of the defeated candidates. The general view taken by the press of the elections seems to be one of a job well done. A number of papers have commented on the need for national solidarity and for the losing candidates to form a loyal opposition. Thoi Dai very sensibly told the losers to either cooperate with the Government or form an opposition bloc.

It does not seem to us that the complaints, fifteen in all, have much substance, or that they provide adequate grounds for invalidation of the elections. However, the losers are not only dissatisfied, but are taking it hard and may give us some difficult moments before the election results are finally certified.

The Assembly meets today to announce the temporary results of the election. It will meet again in late September after court ruling on violations of the Election Laws have been submitted to it and the Central Election Council has examined complaints with respect to the conduct of the voting. The Assembly must vote by October 2 at the latest on the validity of the elections. While, as I have said, in our judgment it is very doubtful that the Assembly will be able to document to any degree of thoroughness the charges that the Presidential election was rigged, Deputies have not always voted in the past strictly on the basis of facts. In this instance, other pressures and interests could play a significant role in the way they vote. Ky were he so inclined could, for example, instruct 30 or so Deputies loyal to him to vote against validation in an effort to discredit or unseat Thieu or he could simply threaten to do so in an effort to exact concessions from Thieu. The eight Deputies who ran on the Upper House slate associated with Dzu could also pose a problem as could scattered oppositionists who do not have a stake in orderly Constitutional development.

Our initial reading of the mood of the Assembly is that the followers of Tran Van Huong and Ha Thuc Ky will not engage in any efforts to discredit the elections, partly because they hope to be represented in Thieu's government and because one of Ha Thuc Ky's Upper House slates has been elected. The combined strength of their followers in the Assembly is about 30 Deputies. The mood of the pro-Government of Vietnam democratic alliance bloc, the largest bloc in the assembly, is at this stage harder to gauge. Only two out of the more than 20 members of the bloc who ran for the Upper House did so successfully. Piqued by their failure and with an uncertain political future,

they might go along with the mood to throw out the elections.

We are taking the line with the Deputies that the question of validation is very serious and that unless there is extensive, substantial evidence that the election was rigged, the election of Thieu should be validated. We are also volunteering our impression, based on extensive observation not only by ourselves and our observers but observers from the other countries, that the election was an honest one and that if any cheating took place, it did not affect the outcome. In talking with Thieu yesterday, I impressed on him that a bit of judiciously applied Government of Vietnam pressure and persuasion would appear to be in order.

Only this morning in talking with Ky, I brought up the subject of the Assembly attitude toward the elections. He recalled that he told me before the campaign started that we should expect some protests and disorders after the elections, especially from the An Quang Buddhists and perhaps students also who had been stirred up by the Buddhists, and remarked that a student demonstration was taking place while we were talking.

He said that these demonstrations are confined to a relatively small group of so-called leaders in Saigon, but that the rest of the country was calm and quiet. He was quite confident it would remain so. He said that he understood fully the importance of responsible action by the Assembly in performing its function in regard to the elections and understood what the effect would be on opinion in the United States and elsewhere should it fail to act responsibly. He assured me that means were available to him and the Government of Vietnam to see that the members acted responsibly and he proposed to do so. This is reassuring in view of some rumors that have come to us that Ky, feeling that he had been snubbed by Thieu and dissatisfied with the way in which the latter was going about the formation of his Government, might use his influence to upset the results. He assured me that he had no intention whatever of taking any such irresponsible action.

In this immediate post-election period the first order of business has been to focus on the effort to put together the new Government. There is inevitably a period of maneuvering in which conflicting interest held in check during the campaign period begin to emerge. The Thieu-Ky relationship is being subjected to strain heightened, I fear, by the entourage of each in their attempt to promote their own interests and positions.

This has centered around differences of opinion between them regarding appointments to Cabinet posts and Ky's own responsibilities in the new Government. These problems were discussed at a meeting of the inner circle

of Generals with Thieu and Ky last Monday. The issues were not resolved then and it was agreed that another meeting would be held on Saturday, the 16th.

The post of Prime Minister is still open. Thieu informed me yesterday that he had offered the post to Tran Van Huong who had turned it down, Thieu said, on the ground that he did not want to serve with Ky. Thieu expressed some relief that Huong had refused since he believed that Huong would find it difficult to work as a member of a team. He is now looking for a capable civilian, a southerner, preferably a Buddhist, to fill the position. Ky is still insisting on Nguyen Van Loc whom Thieu does not feel has either the stature or the capacity for the job. We are inclined to agree with his estimate.

The other matter is Ky's own role and responsibility in the Government. He expressed to me this morning his keen disappointment that Thieu had not made any approach to him on this, and said that he had made it very clear when he accepted the Vice Presidential spot that he would not be content with being merely a figurehead for the next four years. If this were to be the case, he would return to the Air Force. I have constantly urged Thieu to be forthcoming in regard to his relationship with Ky and have said that I would expect that he would make good use of Ky's energy, abilities, and talents. I have suggested to him, for example, that Ky might be given responsibility for coordination of all of the pacification programs within the Government. Yesterday, I urged Thieu and this morning Ky to get together and work out this problem openly and frankly between themselves.

One of the difficulties has been that members of their entourages out of self-interest try to exacerbate the rivalry. We have a report that at a meeting of the inner circle last Monday, Thieu and Ky agreed that they would dismiss any member of their entourages found to be spreading rumors designed to deepen the rift between them. We are following this matter closely, using both persuasion and some judicious pressure and I have confidence that this can be worked out by the Vietnamese themselves just as the problem of the single military ticket was resolved last June.

Both Thieu and Ky are in agreement that the Government must be given a new face and that it must put forward a dynamic program which will enlist the enthusiasm and support of the people. In this connection, we are developing a statement of suggested policies and programs which we intend to put in their hands for use in preparation of a statement or declaration to the people of the new Government's program.

B. Political

After all the time and effort that went into the preparation and organization of the Presidential and Senate elections, it is not surprising that they have continued to dominate political developments during the past week.

As I reported on September 9, I delivered your warm and encouraging message to General Thieu the previous evening. Substantial portions of your message have been prominently displayed in the Saigon press. Thieu himself has no reservations about the desirability of a broadly-based Government with predominantly civilian representation, and is himself deeply involved in negotiations with his recent opponents to achieve this objective. He is fully aware of the complicated personal and political problems involved. In addition to the offer made to Huong, Thieu also said that he planned to sound out Phan Khac Suu on a post in the Government though he felt this would have to be pretty much in an honorary capacity because of Suu's physical and mental condition. In addition, Thieu told me he hopes to find, among supporters of Huong, Suu, and Ha Thuc Ky, representatives whom they might suggest for Government posts and who could be included.

The extent to which some of the defeated civilian candidates or their representatives can be brought into an acceptable relationship with the Government will inevitably be affected by the outcome of the election protests now before the National Assembly. One of the 15 protests which have by now been presented to the Assembly was signed by eight of the defeated candidates (Tran Van Huong and Ha Thuc Ky did not sign it). The protest complains that in late July Prime Minister Ky allegedly said he would overthrow any popularly-elected Government, that Generals Thieu and Ky improperly remained in office and exploited their offices directly or indirectly during the campaign for the benefit of their slate, that Generals Thieu and Ky held a reception the afternoon of September 2 after the official end of the campaign to propagandize for their slate, that Generals Thieu and Ky appeared on television the evening of September 2 under the pretext of calling for fair and clean elections, but actually to continue the campaign and that General Thieu's speech delivered on television September 2 was rebroadcast on September 3.

This is a relatively unimpressive set of charges. Ky's statements with regard to overthrowing an elected Government (even assuming that he was accurately quoted, which he disputes) were perhaps better left unsaid, but they hardly constitute violation of the Electoral Law. Thieu and Ky made various "non-political" trips during the campaign, but as they continued to serve at the head of the Government, it would be difficult to prove violation of the Electoral Law on this account. The September 2 reception was in honor of

the foreign observer delegations; all Presidential candidates and the heads of all Senate slates were invited to attend. The Thieu-Ky television addresses of September 2 (rebroadcast September 3) were made in their capacities as Chief of State and Prime Minister. In sum, these charges amount to complaints that Thieu and Ky were incumbents and enjoyed the advantages of incumbents.

While this protest is not substantial, the fact is that the National Assembly contains 48 members (out of a total membership of 117) who ran for the Senate but were defeated. The Vietnamese tend to be poor losers, and we are hearing a certain amount of grouching and complaints, particularly from Assembly members who lost their Senate bids. Moreover, some of the most active grumblers (they have not grumbled publicly so far) are those who in the past have been active supporters of Prime Minister Ky.

Six of the defeated civilian candidates (Phan Khac Suu, Hoang Co Binh, Truong Dinh Dzu, Tran Van Ly, Nguyen Hoa Hiep, and Vu Hong Khanh), in an effort to dramatize their protest letter already sent to the National Assembly, sought to hold a press conference September 7. However, the Government decided to apply the standard procedure of requiring seven days advance warning for a meeting of more than six persons and refused to grant permission for the press conference on the grounds that the request was not submitted sufficiently in advance. Accordingly, Phan Khac Suu, Truong Dinh Dzu, and Hoang Co Binh marched over to the steps of the National Assembly on September 7 and held an impromptu press conference, fully covered by the Vietnamese and foreign press, at which they denounced the elections as fraudulent. The police wisely did not interfere. The impromptu press conference dispersed peacefully and without incident.

The Senate election results have not been officially released, though we anticipate no changes in the outcome already reported. The principal political problems created by the Senate election results (apart from the slowness of the reporting, which has led to speculation that the results are being "cooked" by the Government to strengthen its position) are that the Buddhists are generally upset that they are under-represented, while 48 of the 55 National Assembly members who were candidates for Senator were defeated. The Catholics, who benefitted from better organization, will have at least 21 (but probably not more than 24) members in the Senate. This is well short of a majority of the 60-member Senate, but a group this size will be able to wield considerable influence. We suspect the Catholics will avoid giving the appearance of acting as a bloc in view of the resentment it would cause.

The Viet Cong are commenting on the elections in predictably derisive fashion, coupling radio commentaries on the recently-adopted National Liberation Front Program I described in last week's letter with a generalized denunciation of the election as a "farce." The National Liberation Front continues to allege that it is the "sole genuine representative" of the Vietnamese people in the South and that the new National Liberation Front program fulfills the aspirations of all inhabitants of South Vietnam. Hanoi and Viet Cong media dismiss as "clamor" General Thieu's statements that he is interested in holding peace talks and in making contact with Hanoi.

C. Military

General Westmoreland reports that the enemy strategy during August remained as outlined in his last assessment; however, the enemy's major tactical orientation shifted to terrorist/guerrilla/propaganda activities in an effort to disrupt and discredit the national elections. The enemy continued to maintain his threats in the Demilitarized Zone and western highlands and attempted to regain the initiative in these areas. His early August efforts in the western highlands were met and defeated by Joint General Staff reserves and ARVN regular forces. On the other hand, the anticipated enemy attack in the Demilitarized Zone has not yet materialized, primarily because of our successful application of intensive artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes. Intelligence indications particularly attest to the effectiveness of the B-52 raids in disrupting the enemy attack preparations. As in the last period, evidence continues in the coastal areas of the First and Second Corps to indicate enemy supply and manpower difficulties. This is also true in the Fourth Corps. Continued friendly offensive pressure in these areas has prevented any respite. The enemy attacks by fire against friendly installations have psychological victories. Friendly counter efforts are beginning to show more success as evidenced by the Marine capture of 140mm rockets in firing positions. Continued emphasis is being placed on more effective countermeasures.

It is encouraging to report another highly successful operation on the part of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. In the early morning hours of September 6, more than 1,200 Viet Cong tried to overrun Tam Ky, the capital of the northern province of Quang Tin. The objective of the pre-dawn attack was principally the province jail containing 800 prisoners and the Tam Ky Bridge three kilometers south of the city. The Vietnamese Security Forces had been maintained at a high condition of alert, but the most significant factor in the heavy defeat suffered by the enemy was the outstanding leadership displayed by

the Province Chief, Lt. Col. Hoang Dinh Tho. This experienced officer, a recent graduate of the US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, literally fought the battle on his own. Lt. Col. Tho left the besieged headquarters and personally led an aggressive counterattack with armored personnel carriers and elements of an infantry battalion. The armored personnel carrier unit drove around the enemy flank and cut the Viet Cong battalion in two. This rapid reaction involving the use of fast-moving forces executing a counterattack during hours of darkness is an example of the offensive spirit of ARVN units when properly led.

Total friendly casualties as a result of the attacks were 22 killed and 60 wounded. Two Browning automatic rifles were lost to the enemy and three individual weapons were damaged. Enemy losses were 217 killed, 64 individual weapons and 8 crew-served weapons captured, and 9 enemy captured. One of the latter was said to be a Viet Cong combat correspondent from Hoi An.

Pacification planning: Bob Komer and his people have been working hard to get the Government of Vietnam better focussed on pacification. General Westmoreland and he see the pending Vietnamese Armed Forces reorganization plan, for example, as a major step forward toward continuing local security for the pacification areas via increased emphasis on the vital Regional and Popular Forces. Bob has also been lobbying hard with the Government of Vietnam to get them to adopt our new scheme for a more effective attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure, using largely the police. While the elections have delayed Vietnamese responses, the omens are favorable.

Another step forward has been to achieve early US/Vietnamese agreement on Revolutionary Development planning for 1968. Heretofore, coordination has been less than perfect. This year our planners have been working side by side with Thang's people in the Revolutionary Development Ministry. Hence, Thang's plan for 1968, which he signed with Komer's concurrence last Tuesday -- backdating it to September 1 so that it would bear the authority of a government having full powers rather than lame-duck status -- is a combined Vietnamese/US product. The 1968 plan calls for a sizable increase in Revolutionary Development teams including 100 or so special civilian/military Revolutionary Development teams made up of Regional Force or Popular Force platoons for security and local officials for administration. We hope to get the Vietnamese Government working on almost twice as many hamlets in 1968 -- 2,000 versus the 1,100 involved in the 1967 program. This will further step up the momentum that I already can see developing in the crucial pacification campaign.

D. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index rose noticeably to 307, compared with 295 last week. Retail prices in Saigon moved up after three weeks of comparative stability. Most foodstuff prices, particularly protein foods and rice, moved up, caused largely by the rash of Viet Cong terrorist activities prior to the September 3 elections. The Imported Commodity Index is now 229, up from 225 last week. Wheat flour and sugar rose due to a seasonal increase in consumption associated with the mid-autumn festival. Some iron and steel products rose as low arrivals of these commodities were anticipated.

New minimum wage rates were established by the Ministry of Labor, retroactive to July 1, affecting about 20,000 workers (mostly women employed in the textile, handicraft, and other industries which have lagged behind as wages have moved upward).

A new law on employment of foreign workers became effective August 25, tightening conditions under which foreign workers may be employed and requiring the institution of training programs for Vietnamese workers. The intent of the law is to bar the entry of foreign workers who may compete with Vietnamese counterparts, but the temporary effect is likely to be to slow down the entry of even noncompeting specialists.

The International Monetary Fund representative to the National Bank of Vietnam has submitted a report on the inflationary situation. It notes that the money supply increased by 7 billion piasters in the first half of 1967 and projects an increase of only 6 billion piasters for the second half. The Joint Economy Office of the Mission will shortly issue a fall stabilization review which will carry projections through 1968.

Against a rather optimistic picture of the general stability of the economy must be set the worrisome continuation of price increases in foods, especially the perishable needs, vegetable and fruits that are becoming more important in the Vietnamese diet. Food prices have risen 75 percent since January 1, 1967 in Saigon. This problem will be attacked during the coming year by vigorous attempts to raise agricultural production.

E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period totaled 333. This may be compared with 166 during the same period last year, when a sharp drop also occurred, presumably in association with the 1966 Constituent Assembly elections. The year's total to date is 22,140.

F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending September 9 the enemy killed 129 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 505, and kidnapped 403. The dead included 15 Revolutionary Development workers, nine policemen, and two combat youth. Since January 1, 1967 the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,403 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 4,701, and kidnapped 3,484.

14

Wednesday
September 13, 1967 -- 11:30 am

Mr. President:

Congressman Wright Patman couldn't
make it because he had a bad cold.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Wednesday, Sept. 13, 1967
11:20 a.m.

15

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Before today's NSC meeting, you may wish to read this report of Sisco's briefing of NATO on the UN General Assembly.

On balance:

- They are with us on our general approach to the Middle East;
- They are against our pushing Vietnam in the Security Council.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-360
By lig, NARA, Date 4-13-95

15a

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-361

By ing, NARA, Date 10-14-94

Wednesday, September 13, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR CLEVELAND (Paris, 3224)

In a very useful NATO Council session this morning, Assistant Secretary Sisco briefed NATO members on UN issues, concentrating in particular on the Middle East and possible UN action on Vietnam. In view of NSC consideration of UN issues Wednesday, the following brief highlights may be useful.

Middle East

First, there was a large measure of common approach expressed by NATO members, in particular as it relates to the need to link withdrawal with the end of the state of belligerency.

There was remarkable near unanimity regarding the fundamental shortcomings of Tito's proposal, with a consensus.

In view of continuing Arab unwillingness to face up clearly to recognition of Israel to live in peace and security in the area, the hardening Israeli position, doubt that the Soviets will stand by the common ground achieved with the US on the resolution of language in the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, no high hopes were expressed that the General Assembly will be able to take constructive action. As a matter of principle, strong preference was expressed for continuing Security Council involvement, recognizing prospects of constructive action were limited as a result of attitudes held by the principal interested powers. In view of the unlikelihood of a meeting of the minds on fundamental principles, a number of NATO members look towards some procedural approach (for example, appointment of a UN mediator) as a possible way to make progress in the foreseeable future.

Expressions by a certain number of members reflected European concern over the closure of the Suez Canal and a desire for some action leading towards an early opening. As expected, the United Kingdom took the lead on this point. Italy made similar noises.

There was broad agreement that the future Soviet attitude is the key and endorsement of the US desire to continue consultations with the Soviets on the Middle East, and expression of hope, even though not optimistic, that the Soviets would hold firm to US-USSR language agreed to at the end of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly.

~~SECRET/LIMDIS~~

Vietnam

Regarding possible Security Council consideration, the reaction of others was characterized by "timidity and doubt."

While NATO members who presently are members of the Security Council, (United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark) expressed an "open mind," they at the same time voiced serious reservations regarding the possible risk of a resolution or amendment calling for cessation of bombing without reciprocity. Both the Danes and the United Kingdom took this line and the Canadians even more strongly, very much along the lines Martin expressed in Washington last week, that such a likely move would put Canada and the other Allies in serious difficulty. Combell (Canada) went so far as to provide the NATO Council with their vote count, saying seven members of the Security Council are unlikely to support inscription. The Danes (it was unclear whether the NATO Council representative was aware of our private demarche to Danes in New York) expressed strong preference for quiet discussions in the corridors and said his government's views will be made clear to Ambassador Goldberg in New York.

In short, most members who spoke (seven out of the fifteen NATO members) expressed appreciation of our desire to try to involve the UN particularly in light of Charter responsibilities, doubted we could succeed, and thought the certain risks clearly outweighed the dubious benefits. Some concern was expressed that forcing the Soviets hand in the Security Council on Vietnam might jeopardize possible cooperation with them on the Middle East. The most positive support for cooperation came from the Dutch who, while rehearsing the risks, said such a debate would nevertheless contribute to public understanding at home regarding American policy on Vietnam. Canada, France and Italy expressed a preference for a reactivated Geneva Conference rather than recourse to the Security Council.

Note for Gene Rostow: We will be repeating to you at the request of Sisco the full presentation he made on the Middle East and Vietnam in view of your discussions with the United Kingdom in London on Thursday. You will find the United Kingdom continues to be interested in some separate approach to reopening the Suez Canal which we did not encourage in the private discussion Sisco and Cleveland had with Under Secretary Hayman here. We continued to place emphasis on the possibilities of the appointment of a UN mediator at such time as the attitude of the parties make this possible. Also stressed with Hayman the undesirability of an early move to the Security Council in circumstances where the result is debate highlighting divisions rather than constructive action.

16
Pres file

Wednesday, September 13, 1967 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a remarkable speech by Gen. McConnell to the Air Force Association, and a heartwarming note to me from Bob Ginsburgh on top of it.

- Should I take steps to assure that Gen. McConnell's speech appears in the Congressional Record? _____
- If so, which Senator should be approached? _____
- Should I call it to the attention of Russ Wiggins? _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Walt:

16a

Attached are brief speeches delivered last night to the Air Force Association by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

They show that the Air Force has grown up.

They make me proud to be in the Air Force.

They are a convincing demonstration that the President has the whole hearted support of the Armed Services in his direction of the war.

In concluding, General McConnell added a statement that his remarks were unsolicited and were not prompted by the Secretary of Defense or the President.

W

166

GENERAL J. P. McCONNELL
CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. AIR FORCE

As we commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the United States Air Force as an independent Service, we should also remember that the beginnings of military airpower in this country go back exactly sixty years.

It is most fitting that we reflect with pride and gratitude on the accomplishments of the nation's pioneer airmen because their great record, especially during the two World Wars, helped bring about the establishment of the United States Air Force in 1947. But whether we go back twenty years or sixty, we find no parallel to the new airpower chapter that is being written in the skies over Vietnam today.

I will not dwell on the contributions airpower is making in this war. But I do want to use this opportunity to clarify one misconception concerning this conflict.

I have heard and read - as I know you have - recent commentaries which make it appear that there are fundamental disagreements on the conduct of the bombing campaign between the President and the Secretary of Defense, on the one hand, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the other. In my view this is an erroneous conception. To be sure, there have been differences of opinion, but the expression and consideration of different points of view are essential elements of our form of government. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to put

forward their opinions and recommendations - regardless of what these may be - to their civilian superiors, they would not be conforming with the requirements of law. And if the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense did not modify or disapprove some of these recommendations when, in their opinion, it served the best interest of the nation to do so, they would not be conforming with the law or the Constitution of the United States.

We, the Joint Chiefs, are given every opportunity to express our opinions and recommendations freely to the President, to the Secretary of Defense and before Congressional Committees. We do so in our capacity as military advisers and Service Chiefs, and the recommendations we make are based on our thorough evaluation of military requirements, with full realization that other factors are also involved and must be considered.

Our recommendations may not always be accepted to the full degree which we consider militarily desirable. But once the decisions have been made, it is the job of the military to implement these decisions to the best of our ability.

Speaking for the Air Force, I am proud to say that this is widely understood by our men, from generals to airmen. The many hundreds of men of all ranks to whom I talked during my various visits to Southeast Asia know what is expected of

them, and they perform their assigned duties loyally, professionally and effectively. They recognize that there are considerations other than military, and they abide strictly by the rules established by proper authority and do so with the unquestioning discipline that is the mark of the true professional.

Let us never forget that, in a democracy such as ours, it is the grave responsibility of the elected Commander in Chief to make the final decisions. He does so after carefully weighing the counsel he has obtained from the Congress and from his various advisers, including the military. I believe that a better understanding of this democratic process would be more helpful to all concerned.

I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss this matter before such a distinguished audience. This is not the first time - and surely not the last - that the Air Force Association has provided a forum for discussing subjects of national interest. And so, in conclusion, I want to express to the Air Force Association and its leaders my sincere appreciation for the invaluable service they have rendered to the Air Force and to the nation throughout the past twenty years. Their active interest and dynamic support have helped to make airpower one of the most vital assets in the protection and defense of our national security.

HONORABLE HAROLD BROWN
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

It is truly a great honor as well as a great pleasure for me to be with you tonight on this occasion which marks the 20th Anniversary of the United States Air Force as a separate service. The exhibits which we have seen are only one indication of how far airpower and the Air Force have come during the past twenty years -- in the development and use of technology, in effectiveness, and in support of our national objectives.

I would like to associate myself with the remarks the Chief of Staff has just made. In recent weeks there has been a good deal appearing in the press, and in other news media, about alleged divisions between civilian and military authorities in the government.

These allegations bother me. They bother me because our military leaders are cast in the role of irresponsible militarists on the one hand, or prophets in revolt on the other. Some charge our generals with going behind the backs of their civilian superiors to lobby with Congress, the press, and industry for a program of unlimited and indiscriminate bombing. Others argue that our military leaders have a sure solution to the conflict while civilian officials are uncertain, bemused, and inconsistent.

Both of these pictures seem to me to be completely baseless. I think I am in a position to know the truth about this. I am a civilian by education and experience. Yet two years as Air Force Secretary, and over 15 years before that in the field of national security, have given me close connections with the military, and with the Air Force in particular.

I have been in Vietnam and to Thailand twice during the last twenty months, and talked with hundreds of our pilots. I have spent a great deal of time with our commanders in the field. I spend most of nearly every day with senior Air Force generals at Headquarters. I find neither a clique of irresponsible militarists nor a set of supermen who have the only right way to succeed in a terribly complex and difficult war.

What I see is a group of professionals who understand how to apply airpower within the constraints which the larger picture imposes, and who have done so in a very precise and skillful way. I see a group many of whom are fighting their third war -- and in all three, airpower has played a vital role. I see men who understand the military picture and who appreciate the fact that this is not simply a military conflict. They know it has unique diplomatic, international-political, and other important components. They are thoughtful; they are loyal

to their military and civilian superiors; they have integrity.

Spike Momyer in Saigon, Jack Ryan in Honolulu, and J. P. McConnell in Washington are neither irresponsible advocates of the use of airpower nor men who pretend to have all the answers. They know their job. They make their recommendations on the basis of military and other factors as they see them, but recognize that the factors other than the immediate military situation not only enter the picture but in many cases can be overriding. They recognize that all factors -- the military factors, the intelligence estimates, the international and diplomatic situation -- must be balanced by the authorities constitutionally responsible for making the overall decisions. And when those decisions are made our airmen -- from the Chief of Staff through the pilots who fly and crews who maintain the aircraft -- carry them out promptly and with professional skill.

Our Air Force leaders and the people of the Air Force are not justly served by either of two implications. They are not justly served by the implication that our top officers oppose national policies and are right in doing so. Neither are they done justice by the implication that they oppose national policies but are wrong in doing so. In fact, our military leaders support national policies, and they carry them out superbly.

Because many of you have "felt the heat in the kitchen" -- to paraphrase President Truman -- you have the advantage of being able to put today's events and attitudes into their proper perspective. You had -- some still have -- a part in the hammering-out process through which decisions are made in our government. You understand this process and trust its inherent rightness. Those of you here tonight, therefore, can make a special contribution by assisting others to understand the real issues at stake as well as by helping those in authority to meet the difficult problems at hand. To do so is to do no more than you have always done -- and in the true tradition of our Air Force.

17

Pres file

Wednesday, September 13, 1967
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Moyers gently expresses his disappointment that we have not put him to work. Is there any message that I can send him which will activate him without raising the problems which trouble you?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Harry F. Guggenheim, *President and Editor in Chief*

Bill D. Moyers, *Publisher*

September 11, 1967

Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant
to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

I'm sorry the proposal did not strike you fellows affirmatively. Perhaps you saw Robert Kennedy's speech asserting that no one knows how we got into the war we are in, or Romney's complaint that we should never have been involved in the first place, or Gavin's quotation from 1984 (enclosed). More and more the opposition is going to argue that the game is not worth the candle, and the American people, who have a short memory, are going to forget why we opted for engagement in the first place. You can't win the argument over methods (the strongest power in the world pounding a rural society of 15 million into submission?) but you can't lose the argument, in my judgment, over the necessity of the President having taken the stand he took. Next year the opposition is going to do everything possible to wage the argument on its terms.

Sincerely,



Bill D. Moyers
Publisher

P.S. After dictating this I received the enclosed letter from a young Republican Congressman who wants to understand.

176

Congress of the United States

JOHN W. WYDLER
FOURTH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES:
SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

DISTRICT OFFICE:
150 OLD COUNTRY ROAD
MINEOLA, NEW YORK 11535
TEL.: CH 8-7676

September 7, 1967

Mr. Bill Moyers, Publisher
Newsday
550 Stewart Avenue
Garden City, New York 11530

Dear Bill:

It was a real pleasure having lunch with you the other day and I thank you for your hospitality. The encore will be my pleasure.

I have re-read the editorial entitled "Generals Can Be Wrong", this time with a lot more care. The points made are good and I agreed with the conclusion, but I still believe, however, that the main element lacking in present policy is the statement of an objective understandable to the American people. Most wars are "limited", but the end result should be something other than negative.

I believe the American people would show the necessary patience and be willing to make the necessary sacrifices if they believe the objective was worthwhile and obtainable. I agree with you that both these factors exist and the main problem seems to be one of articulation.

Once again, it was a pleasure chatting with you, and let me repeat my words of welcome to a fine community. I am proud to call you neighbor.

Kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,



John W. Wydler
Member of Congress

JWW:jp

170

An Independent in politics, he's for a peace candidate in '68 —maybe even himself, on Republican ticket

Story by Christopher Lydon

Photos by Ted Dully

JAMES GAVIN leaned across his desk in the simple, cinder-block office of the chairman of the board at Arthur D. Little, Inc., in Cambridge.

"Did you ever go back and read 1984 again?" he asked.

"You've never read it?" he exclaimed softly, in genuine and embarrassing surprise.

"Goodness sakes," he said, on the way to his bookshelf. "Here, I'll give you a copy right now. You must read this.

"We're there," he said, with only a flicker of a smile. "Besides George Orwell is a good writer. His *Homage to Catalonia* is terribly good, I think.

"Here is a war in Southeast Asia," he said, thumbing pages of his paperbound 1984, "that these people

in Great Britain are involved in—as well as others, Americans.

"They've long ago forgot why they're in the war. How they got in there isn't important. But their leader keeps telling them that it doesn't make any difference how they got in there: 'the fact is we're there.' To be sure that they're properly aroused and mentally conditioned for it, from time to time there are programs on television showing massive Orientals marching by, spewing out hatred for this country, you see. So the people respond and keep sending their sons off to it, and so on....

"This was written some years ago. It's a remarkable book, 1984." And he had said at the outset, "We're there."

continued

18

Wednesday,
September 13, 1967

Pres file

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report
on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS Attachment

182

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 13, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-361

By ing, NARA, Date 10-14-94

Thieu-Ky Relationship

We are getting numerous reports that the relationship between Thieu and Ky has deteriorated. Many of these reports are traceable to those in Thieu's and Ky's respective entourages who are trying to advance their own personal positions. However, in separate conversation with Bunker, both Thieu and Ky have expressed some concern regarding the attitude of the other.

Bunker and his staff are urging both sides to get together to work out their differences. Until these differences are resolved, they will render more difficult the problems of validating the election results, of forming a new government, and of moving ahead with government programs. Bunker is fully aware of the urgency of resolving these problems and we believe he is doing everything possible in this regard. We have also talked here to Ambassador Bui Diem, who is leaving for Saigon today. We think he will be a good influence on Ky, encouraging him to work with Thieu.

Election Complaints

The Assembly has forwarded to the Central Election Council the 15 formal complaints filed against the conduct of the presidential election. Several formal complaints against the conduct of the Upper House elections have also been filed.

An experienced government official, who is member of the Council, appears confident that the Council will recommend that the Assembly validate the presidential election results and that the Assembly would follow this recommendation. However, some allegedly pro-Ky Assembly members, as well as some Assembly members defeated in the Senate race, are reportedly tempted to try to invalidate the election results. Embassy officers are trying to counter this

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sentiment among Assembly Deputies, and Bunker is urging Thieu and Ky to work on Assembly members in favor of validation.

Formation of a Government

The Thieu-Ky differences are delaying decisions on the formation of a new government. Thieu has told Bunker that he favors a broadly based government, whereas Ky wants a government of technicians. Thieu's statement is undoubtedly partially for our consumption, but it also probably in part reflects Thieu's and Ky's differences over personalities.

Ky still apparently favors as Prime Minister his earlier Vice Presidential running-mate, Nguyen Van Loc, whom Thieu (and Bunker) considers inadequate. Several of the other key generals apparently are supporting Ky's choice. Thieu said he had offered the Primership to Huong but that Huong had declined because he felt that he could not work with Ky. So far, other good prospects for Prime Minister being considered by Thieu are not receiving support from other key generals. Thieu has told Bunker that the generals will discuss these matters again in the very near future.

September 13, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

In the attached, Glenn Seaborg requests your approval of his plans for travel to Europe from September 20 to October 2.

He will attend the Eleventh General Conference of the IAEA in Vienna, and also visit the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, and Belgium on atomic energy business.

W. W. Rostow

Att.- Ltr dtd 9/5/67
fm Chmn Seaborg

☒ Approved
☐ Disapproved
☐ See me

SMKeeny:jb:9-12-67
bcc: SMK file and chron
CEJ
WWR (2)
SMK comeback cy

~~9/13/67~~ 9/13/67

Walt -

Delighted - Would be glad to see Dr. Seaborg before he leaves or upon return. I have deep affection and great respect for this dedicated man whom I consider tops in this admin.

L.

SEP 13 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHAIRMAN
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

The President has approved the travel plans
you proposed in your letter to him dated
September 5, 1967.

Thank you again for your invitation, but I
will not be able to attend the IAEA Conference
with you.

W. W. Rostow

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bcc: SMK file and chron
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UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

September 5, 1967

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the White House memorandum of April 24, 1964, I am submitting for your approval my plans for travel to Europe this fall. The period of travel involved would be from about September 20 to October 2.

The Eleventh General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency is being held in Vienna, Austria, beginning September 26. In view of the current negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty and the strong role the IAEA will play in the safeguards and inspection function of this treaty, I believe attendance at this conference to be extremely useful in fostering harmonious relations among ourselves and representatives of the other 96 nations who comprise the membership of the IAEA. As in past years, I assume that I shall have the honor of serving as the U.S. Representative to the conference. It would be my hope that Commissioners Ramey and Tape could also attend the conference and serve as the alternate U.S. Representatives.


Prior to and after the meeting, it is my plan to visit several countries from which I have had long-standing invitations or which have recently undergone major organizational changes in their atomic energy program. It is my hope to visit and discuss the atomic energy programs in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Italy. In addition to holding discussions with their respective atomic energy officials, I would tour their research centers and would propose to give lectures on the transuranium elements. In addition, I plan to make a stop in Brussels for meetings with the new chairman

of the Commission of European Communities, Jean Rey, and his associates. This is the successor organization to Euratom with which we have long standing and continuing cooperative programs in the atomic energy field. I have also been asked by Ambassador Knight to be the luncheon speaker for the "America Day" celebration at the Ghent Fair in Belgium.

As I mentioned, I believe it important that some of my fellow Commissioners also attend portions of the Eleventh General Conference of the IAEA. In making our plans, we shall assure that a Commissioner and the General Manager or his deputy are in Washington throughout the period involved.

The approval of these proposed travel plans is respectfully requested. In accordance with your directive, I am also providing Secretary Rusk with a copy of this letter.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Glenn T. Seaborg", with a long, sweeping horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Glenn T. Seaborg

The President
The White House

cc: Secretary of State

~~Long~~
2. Pres. file

SECRET

Tuesday,
September 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Westmoreland has sent in his August assessment of the situation in Vietnam. I have had prepared a general summary of the message and one-page summaries for each Corps area for your use.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 9-24-91

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Summary of General Westmoreland's Monthly Assessment for
August, 1967

General

Enemy strategy during the period remained as before; however, his major tactical orientation shifted to terrorist/guerrilla/propaganda activities in an effort to disrupt the national elections.

He continued to threaten in the DMZ and western highlands. His early August effort in the western highlands was met and defeated by ARVN forces. The anticipated enemy attack in the DMZ has not yet materialized, primarily because of our intense artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes which disrupted his attack preparations.

He continues to have supply and manpower difficulties in the coastal areas of the First and Second Corps and in the Fourth Corps. Continued friendly offensive pressure in these areas has prevented any respite.

His attacks by fire against our bases have increased as he attempts to avoid contact and to achieve psychological victories. Friendly counter attacks are beginning to show more success as evidenced by the Marine capture of rockets in firing positions.

Significant pacification progress continues but, in general, the program is behind schedule relative to overall goals for 1967. The preoccupation of Vietnamese provincial officials with the elections temporarily delayed progress

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 48, NARA, Date 9-24-91

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206

FIRST CORPS

Objectives for the First Corps during August were to:

curb infiltration,

destroy enemy forces and bases,

prevent disruption of the elections,

and, protect vital areas.

Progress was excellent in all areas. Enemy base area neutralization and complete denial of artillery, rocket and mortar attacks on vital areas are continuing requirements.

US/Free World Forces

Thirteen battalion-size or larger operations were conducted.

1,254 of the enemy were killed and 1,269 probably were killed. 354 weapons, including 81 140mm rockets were captured.

Task force OREGON neutralized enemy base area 117, killing 397 of the enemy and capturing 158 weapons.

3,800 rounds of 175mm artillery interdicted the A Shau Valley.

Long range patrols made progress in locating enemy infiltration routes from Laos.

Air fields at Dong Ha and Ky Sanh are under repair as result of rain and enemy rocket/mortar fire.

Work continued on strong point obstacle system along the DMZ. Enemy action in the area continues to obstruct construction.

ARVN

ARVN morale was high -- desertions decreased and strength increased. 47 operations were conducted, with 653 enemy killed and 325 weapons captured.

Pacification progress was slowed by GVN preoccupation with pre-election activities. Slowdown is not considered critical.

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By ry NARA Date 9-24-91

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SECOND CORPS

Continued progress was made during August in defeating the enemy, extending Government of Vietnam control and fostering development of a viable economy.

US/Free World Forces

Military operations killed 1,452 and captured 344 of the enemy; prevented disruption of elections; reduced his ability to subsist on the land or to force requisitions upon the people; and denied him his primary objectives.

Major confrontations occurred in key areas of the western highlands and the coastal plains. Pressure was maintained throughout the Second Corps by ARVN, Regional Force and Popular Forces in numerous search and destroy, cordon and search, and road opening operations.

ARVN

ARVN forces show an increased capability to defeat the enemy. ARVN commanders show more initiative and imagination in conduct of operations.

The pacification program continues to grow; 377 Chieu Hoi ralliers returned in August as compared to 264 in July. Security, economic gains, and expanding Revolutionary Development activities are significant indices of progress.

The people are evidencing increased confidence in the Government of Vietnam. There is increasing optimism. Preparations for the national elections dominated civilian activity. More people are returning to their former homes. Infiltration is being controlled and the flow of goods has increased.

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E.O. 12356, SEC 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1983
By ES NARA Date 9-24-91

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THIRD CORPS

Operations focused on strengthening security in the countryside and defeat of enemy efforts to sabotage the national elections.

US/Free World Forces

Friendly forces took 400 prisoners. 12,500 acres of jungle were cleared along major routes and near population centers, a 36 percent increase over July. Several base areas were destroyed. Major lines of communication and population centers were secured so that North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong forces were unable to exert significant influence on the population prior to the national elections.

ARVN

Vietnamese Armed Forces operational effectiveness has improved. Ineffective officer leadership was a target for corrective action.

District operations and intelligence coordinating centers are beginning to produce hard intelligence on Viet Cong civil and military infrastructure.

There is increasing evidence that North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong main force units are avoiding significant contact. The loss of cadre and shortages of medicine, food, and ammunition have caused a decline of morale in enemy units.

Progress in the pacification program, though steady, remains far behind schedule. However, the Vietnamese public shows increased confidence in the Government of Vietnam's ability to win the war. The number of Chieu Hoi returnees continues to run ahead of last year (although they declined from 742 to 500 this month).

32 ARVN battalions completed the Revolutionary Development training program.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 18 NARA Date 9-24-91

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20e

FOURTH CORPS

There was continued improvement in small unit actions to provide greater security for Revolutionary Development teams and lines of communication. Regional Force and Popular Force units are displaying modest, though spotty improvement.

As a result, the Viet Cong were not capable of sustained disruptions of our lines of communication.

The over-all morale, combat effectiveness, and fighting spirit of the Vietnamese Armed Forces units in the Fourth Corps is good. We are carrying the conflict to the enemy.

169 Vietnamese Armed Forces battalion or larger size operations conducted.

19,000 ARVN soldiers were lifted in air mobile operations.

1,005 enemy were killed and 332 weapons captured.

10 enemy base areas were penetrated.

No attacks occurred against friendly civilian ships.

Pacification made progress but remained behind schedule in relation to 1967 goals.

Chieu Hoi returnees increased 80 percent over August 1966.

80 percent of the new life hamlets and 85 percent of the consolidated hamlets programmed for first semester were completed as of August 31.

Indications exist that the Viet Cong believe they are losing control of the population.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By 128 NARA Date 9-24-91

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From COMUSMACV, DTG 060425Z Sept 67

Subject: Monthly Assessment (U)

1. This is the second in my series of assessments of the situation here in Vietnam. I have expanded this month's message to include specific information on naval activity, air activity and the pacification effort. 204

(I CTZ)

2. Our primary objectives in the I CTZ during the month of August were five-fold. They were:

(1) To deny entry of NVA units into I CTZ,

(2) To deny NVA/VC forces located in I CTZ the use of base areas 101 and 117,

(3) To destroy enemy forces in I CTZ,

(4) To minimize enemy disruptions of the forthcoming national elections, and,

which vital installations could be subjected to

(5) To prevent enemy's occupation of areas from/ rocket, artillery and mortar attacks.

3A. Last month, 13 battalion size or larger operations were conducted in I CTZ. These operations accounted for 1254 enemy killed with an additional 1269 probable kills and the loss of 354 weapons. Weapons captured included eighty-one 140mm rockets. A prime example of a successful operation is Benton, a task force OREGON S&D operation in Quang Tin which successfully neutralized enemy base area 117 and accounted for 397 killed, 158 enemy weapons lost.

B. The special landing forces conducted three amphibious landings during the month. These took place in the "Street Without Joy," the Hai Lang National Forest area of Quang Tri, and the area south of the Song Cau Dai River in Quang Nam. Two special landing forces had a combined total of 49 days of operations ashore during the month. Our project delta operation (SAMURAI) which terminated in mid-August was a month long reconnaissance in force operation in western Quang Nam to detect and interdict enemy infiltration routes (particularly from Laos). Prisoners taken during this operation identified the organization responsible for the 15 July rocket attack on Danang Air Base and provided information as to unit location and routes of infiltration.

C. 711 Arc Light targets were struck in support of I Corps. Of these, 31 were in or north of the DMZ. The stepped-up Arc Light campaign in the DMZ has helped to counter the enemy threat around Con Thien and Gio Linh. Construction of 175 mm gun firing positions at the Ashau Valley Fire Support Base, located about 20 kilometers southwest of the Hue along Route 547, was completed by the end of July. The Fire Support Base was prepared to permit delivery of artillery interdiction

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Authority NLT-CBS 7

By pl/c, NARA, Date 6/25/96

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fires into the Ashau Valley. Commencing with the first fires on 2 August over 3800 rounds of 175 mm gun fire were delivered during the month.

4. A. ARVN morale remains high in combat units as is reflected by a decrease in desertions during the month and an increase in strength available for operations. In keeping with Phase 1 of the election plan, I Corps ARVN units increased the tempo of operations during August while continuing to support the RD programs. Forty-seven large ARVN operations were conducted, an increase of three over July, but the number of significant contacts decreased by approximately 50 percent. This decrease in enemy contacts is reflected in reduction in the total enemy killed during the month. Large and small scale operations were conducted in all provinces of the Corps area. These operations resulted in 653 VC/NVA KIA and yielded 325 captured enemy weapons.

5. A. The lines of communication and logistical posture in I CTZ remained responsive to support requirements during August. The airfield at Dong Ha required repairs from damage inflicted by enemy artillery and rocket fire. Heavy rains caused the deterioration and closure of the Khe Sanh Airfield on 24 August for an estimated six weeks while major repairs are made. Aerial resupply has become the primary means of resupply of forces in the Khe Sanh area until the airfield is reopened.

B. National Route 1, spanning I CTZ from north to south, remained open except for short periods. Increased enemy interdiction and harassment destroyed or damaged 17 bridges and 16 culverts on Route 1 and a total of 16 bridges and 22 culverts throughout I CTZ. Significant among the bridges sabotaged were two 165 ft spans of the Song Cau Do and two 63 ft spans of the Song Cau Lau Bridge on Route 1 south of Danang, with ten minor bridges through the Ai Van Pass north of Danang. 4,059 ft of bridging were repaired and 3,954 ft of new bridging were constructed. This latter included the new 2,000 foot "Liberty Bridge" crossing the Song Thu Bon leading to the An Hoa industrial complex. Included in the LOC efforts were the repair and upgrading of sections along 229 kilometers of primary highway, and secondary and access roads in preparation for the monsoon season.

C. Work continues in the strong point obstacle system along the DMZ. Route 561 is complete except for asphaltting which is 30 percent complete. Site C-2 has been cleared with 29 bunkers constructed and protective wire 69 percent completed. Work on the minefield installation has begun at Strong Point A-4 (Con Thien). Some 2,509 short tons of bombs have been transhipped to Dong Ha during this reporting period. Construction has been hampered by extensive enemy action in area of construction and by slippage in the receipt of construction materials. The 1st ARVN Division completed an estimated three percent of the necessary construction effort at C-1 before all work was halted to make troops available for security duties in connection with the national elections.

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6. A. The pacification program remained behind schedule in relation to goals set for 1967. Progress that is being made slowed considerably as most GVN officials were preoccupied with pre-election activities. The effect of this slow-down is not considered critical and most senior province advisors predict the major portion of the program will be completed by the end of the year.

B. VC attacks and terrorist activities increased appreciably throughout I CTZ during August. The major purpose apparently was to disrupt election plans and frighten voters. Despite the increase in VC activities, all provinces reported a high level of political activity and no slackening of interest in the election. The new total of 911,861 registered voters represents 15.5 percent of the national electorate. Public attention focused on the visits of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates to I CTZ. Though the originally scheduled visits aborted because of poor planning in Quang Tri, the rallies finally held in Danang and Hue on 27-28 August drew the biggest crowds to date anywhere in Vietnam. The Vietnamese information service conducted a widespread and apparently successful campaign to publicize the election and to encourage voter participation.

C. An estimated 10,000 new refugees were brought in during August as a result of military operations in Quang Tri, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai. However, the shortages of roofing and food, VC terrorism against refugees, and GVN preoccupation with the elections, seriously hampered refugee relief. Estimate thousands of refugees in I CTZ still lack the minimum of essentials. Priority action is underway to correct this situation.

D. The number of Hoi Chanhs rose from 192 in July to 236 in August, bringing the total for 1967 to 1726 returnees in I CTZ. The number for 1967 now surpasses the 1966 yearly total of 1564.

7. A. Along the DMZ/Ben Hai River Front, the enemy maintained essentially the same posture as during the previous month. There was evidence of reinforcement of units operating in Base Area 101, and some indication of a rudimentary capability to coordinate attacks in southeastern Quang Tri with actions along the DMZ.

B. Activities during the period continued to be highlighted by the employment of artillery and rockets against friendly forces and installations. Although the level of artillery fire received was about 20 percent below that of July, a sharp upturn in artillery and rockets was experienced at the end of the month. Ground activity was generally limited to probes and reconnaissance, with the exception of an ambush attempt which developed into two sharp contacts with an estimated enemy battalion along Route 9 north of Ca Lu.

C. Throughout the balance of I CTZ south of Route 9, the tempo of enemy initiated actions was accelerated. The period was characterized by LOC interdiction, carefully planned and rehearsed attacks on ARVN installations, and a continued employment of rockets and mortars. Noteworthy was the increased use of mortars in this portion of I CTZ contrasted with last month.

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D. The enemy's objective of creating maximum difficulties for the GVN prior to national elections was reflected by successful sapper operations against Trieu Phong and Tu Vang, in Quang Tri and the equally successful attacks on Hoi An and Provincial Jail in Quang Ngai. Increased acts of terrorism and use of propaganda accompanied the exploitation of sapper attacks noted above. Although these attacks have been largely successful, the assault on Huong Dien was repulsed with severe losses to the enemy because of the determined resistance and aggressive response of the ARVN garrison. The enemy's combat effectiveness in I CTZ south of Route 9 continues to be degraded by continuing shortages of food and medical supplies, restricted availability of ammunition, and high incidence of malaria. Interrogated prisoners reported general fear of air strikes, and to a lesser degree, artillery, as major factors in lowered morale.

(II CTZ)

8. A. In II CTZ during the month of August we made continued progress ^{toward} the attainment of allied objectives for defeating the enemy, extending GVN control, and fostering the development of the viable economy. Of special significance was the promulgation of the statute particulier on 29 August by the newly appointed minister for highlander affairs, Paul Nur. This major step toward integration of the highland people into the national political framework is expected to eliminate many areas of friction. GVN, ROK and US forces applied continuous pressure upon the enemy by defeating his military forces, preventing major disruption of the national elections, and reducing his ability to subsist on the land or force requisitions upon the people. The enemy has been denied his primary military, political and economic objectives and the security to the continued growth of the RD program has been provided.

9. A. Inflation is being controlled in the provinces and additional land has been brought under cultivation. Throughout II CTZ, the people have demonstrated an increased sense of confidence in the GVN. At district, province, and regional level, preparations for the national elections dominated the friendly and enemy activities. In Khanh Hoa Province, the people are beginning to return to their former homes as more area is recovered from VC domination. In Lam Dong Province, an optimistic attitude, due to increased security and an open highway 20, has resulted in a return of the population and a boom in the economy. Successful US and ARVN military operations in Kontum against a serious NVA/VC threat have brought an increase in optimism throughout the province. People are showing added confidence and renewed assurance. The flow of goods has greatly increased the availability of commodities in their local stores. The salt beds in the vicinity of Song Cas are being harvested for the first time in years.

B. The enemy had 1452 killed, 344 captured, and lost 4971 weapons to the ARVN, ROK, and US forces in August. He has been unable to regain the initiative or to initiate a significant victory. On 31 August, US forces were augmented by the arrival of the 2d Armd Cav Sqn, 1st Cav Regt. The Squadron will be employed in the western highlands to aid the 4th Inf Div in its mission of conducting an active defense of the western border.

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10. A. As evidenced by operations in Kontum and Binh Dinh, ARVN forces are displaying an increased capability to meet the enemy and defeat him. Our advisors indicate that many ARVN unit commanders are displaying more initiative and imagination in the planning and conduct of operations. While not universal, these observations are being made with greater frequency.

B. Early in the month, in an effort to gain a victory in the western highlands, the enemy initiated a series of concerted attacks in northern Kontum province. The most serious threat was posed by the 174th NVA Regt, infiltrated from the north in May, with the evident mission of destroying the CIDG Camp at Dak Seang. During the period 4 through 7 August, the 5th and 8th ARVN Bns and the 1st Bn, 42 ARVN Regt, with the assistance of tactical air and B-52 strikes, dealt a crippling blow to the enemy. By maintaining steady pressure, night and day, the ARVN forces killed 185 of the enemy at a cost to friendly forces of 12 KIA and 69 wounded. A later sweep of the area revealed numerous mass graves; elaborate regimental base camp containing 100 huts, offices and briefing rooms, some of which were equipped with modern plumbing. The 174th NVA Regt has since withdrawn to the Laotian Border to refit, replace losses, and retrain. The success of ARVN forces against hard core NVA units is indicative of encouraging improvement in the ARVN offensive capability.

C. The most significant contact of the month occurred on the 15th when two bns of the 1st ARVN Regt engaged the recently augmented 8th Bn, 18th NVA Regt. With the support of two airlifted infantry companies and a tank platoon from the 1st Cav Div, 73 enemy were killed while friendly losses were limited to three killed. In another action, still underway, elements of the 1st Cav Div made light initial contact with several VC who disappeared into a cave complex in the vicinity. Later, several Hoi Chanh emerging from the cave reported the presence of a group of 40 to 50 replacements for the 18th NVA Regt within the complex. To date, this action has yielded 33 KIA and 41 PW's with only one Cav trooper wounded.

D. Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa and Phu Bon Provinces have been the scene of operations by ROK forces against the 95th and 188th NVA Regts. Operation Hong Kil Dong, the third phase of which terminated on 26 August, has netted 637 enemy killed and 88 PW's at a cost to friendly forces of 27 killed and 68 wounded. These operations have reduced a major threat posed by main force enemy units. However, local force and terrorist groups remain active on the coastal plains.

11. Although major confrontations were limited to the key areas of the western highlands and the coastal plains, added pressure was maintained throughout II CTZ by employment of ARVN, RF and PF Forces in numerous search and destroy, cordon and search and road opening operations. Six road opening operations were conducted in August to eliminate or reduce VC tax extortion and to provide free passage for military and civilian traffic. The economy of Tuyen Duc and Lam Dong Provinces

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continues to benefit from the military operations designed to maintain highway 20 in an open status. ARVN, RF and PF units, supported by the 20th Cav and elements of the 23rd ARVN Div, began construction of bridges and fire bases to assist in opening highway 1 from Phan Rang to the II/III CTZ boundary. The opening of this highway and establishment of an uninterrupted link with the Saigon markets will contribute significantly to the overall economy and the security of the coastal provinces.

12. A. The pacification program continues to grow. Security, economic gains and expanding RD programs are the most significant indices of progress. In Binh Dinh Province, the 12 civil/military teams found to supplement RD cadre have completed their program in the first 12 villages and were moved early in the month. The improved security provided by military operations in Binh Dinh has permitted the cultivation of large areas of previously unused land. This fact, coupled with the increased use of fertilizer, will be the basis for an appreciable increase in rice production. In support of RD, previously established RD training programs for regional and popular forces continue with marked success. To date, 67 percent of the RF companies and 4 percent of the PF platoons have received RD training.

B. 377 Hoi Chanhs returned in August compared to 264 in July. The reason most often given by the Hoi Chanh for defection was the lack of food. This can be attributed directly to improved methods of resource control and herbicide operations. The use of herbicides denied the enemy 7,600 short tons of crops in VC controlled areas last month. Greater exploitation of Hoi Chanh talent is being accomplished through their use as members of RF/PF units, armed propaganda teams, RD cadre, and as scouts with ARVN and FWMAF. An armed propaganda team, recruited from among a group of M'Nonh Nontagnards who in Kne, is proving to be the most effective team to the highlands

Some momentum was gained in August by the increased use of the cordon and search technique. Operation Dragon, the 1st Cav Div's program to destroy infrastructure in Binh Dinh Province, has far exceeded the original estimates. Full implementation of the ICEX program throughout II Corps in the next several months is expected to accelerate this vital endeavor.

C. Throughout the past month the Vietnamese information service (VIS) was especially active in its effort to counter enemy propaganda and to educate the people on the importance and the mechanics of voting. Popular interest in II Corps focused on the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates. The senatorial races have not drawn interest other than in Phu Bon (where a highlander is running unopposed with the backing of the Vietnamese Province Chief). The interest and preoccupation of officials with the election has tended to divert their attention from some RD programs.

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13. A. In Binh Dinh Province the enemy has intensified his efforts to disrupt the expanding pacification program and to reestablish his dominance throughout the province. Having enjoyed little or no success in recruiting the local populace, the enemy has assigned NVA infiltrators to the ranks of depleted VC local force units. The NVA Div received replacements infiltrated from the north to rebuild its battered forces.

B. Captured documents and PW reports point to declining morale and welfare in the ranks of the enemy on the east coast. A recently captured document from the 95th NVA Regt indicated that, prior to being returned to North Vietnam, the wounded are cautioned not to disclose current problems such as shortages of men, weapons, food and the difficult situation of the SVN revolution in Phu Yen Province, "Continued military operations against enemy base areas, destruction of his crops through friendly herbicide operations, and the continued lack of success are gradually deteriorating the enemy's zeal and effectiveness along the coast.

C. Enemy activities were concentrated on the forthcoming national elections. Enemy and local force units were given the primary task of conducting propaganda, harassment, and sabotage in order to intimidate the populace. The importance which the enemy attaches to this mission was evident in his willingness to fragment some of his main force units into small elements to support his armed propaganda teams and otherwise further his efforts to disrupt the election. To counter this effort, civil and military security forces increased offensive and defensive operations designed to insure unimpeded access to voting facilities.

(III CTZ)

14. Our major objectives in the III CTZ during the month of August were the strengthening of security in the countryside and the defeat of the enemy effort to sabotage the national elections. Operations in support of these objectives included extensive road and jungle clearing, penetrations into known or suspected base camps and staging areas, search and destroy operations aimed at preventing VC infiltration of populated areas, and intensive night operations to interdict VC movements. Particular emphasis was placed on road and bridge repair and jungle clearing operations along major routes and near population centers.

15. A. Last month friendly forces took 400 PW's, the largest number captured since Operation CEDAR FALLS last January. A total of 12,500 acres of jungle were cleared during August, an increase of 36 percent over July. Operations resulted in the destruction of base areas including all of the Ong Dong jungle sanctuary and a large part of the Fil Hoi Plantation. Improved security along Route 13 south of Lei Khe, greatly strengthened the defenses of RF/PF outposts along the route and provided for the development of RD activities.

B. The US Regional Force Company Training Teams (REFCOTT) and Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) continued to show substantial progress by raising the RF/PF training and operational standards.

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C. Our overall security improved. Major lines of communication and population centers were secured to the degree that NVA/VC forces were unable to obtain any significant influence on the civilian population prior to the national elections.

16. A. RVNAF operational effectiveness in III CTZ is continuing its upward trend due to the training assistance now being provided by US units. Ineffective officer leadership was a target for corrective action. An example of immediate corrective action was the relief by the III Corps Commander of the Battalion Commander, 30 BN, 9th Inf, for failure to assist an RD Cadre Team in Phuoc Long Province on 27 August when it came under VC attack. Another positive factor is the new hard intelligence on VC civil and military infrastructure which comes from a dynamic and expanding system of District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICCs). Twenty of these centers are now operational.

B. The LLDB Camp at Tong Le Chon beat off a VC regimental sized attack on 7 August. This successful defense resulted in over 150 VC KIA (BC) and the capture of 62 small arms and 12 crew served weapons. On 19 August, the 553d RF Company, by effective night patrolling, discovered and prevented an intended mortar attack against Tan Son Nhut Airbase. The company captured three VC, two suspects, and one 8mm mortar with ammunition.

17. In spite of repeated VC interdiction of roads, 160 kms that are vital to the civilian economy were improved and over 2700 ft of vehicular bridging was installed during August.

18. Progress in the pacification program, though steady, remains far behind schedule in relation to the goals set for 1967. Moreover, preparations for the VN elections have caused a further delay in some areas. The increasing reaction, however, and apparent concern on the part of the VC to the program is an indication that it is making a significant impact. In fact, there is an apparent increase in confidence on the part of the Vietnamese public in the GVN's ability to win the war. The number of Chieu Hoi returnees continue to run ahead of last year (although this month they declined from 742 to approximately 500). In a related area coordination was completed with ARVN to provide an integrated effort in the division tactical areas. There is a general agreement that there should be a slow and steady expansion of existing secure areas with no new areas started until better results are obtained in areas now being worked. The fact that a total of 35 ARVN battalions have completed the RD training program in III CTZ should assist this integrated effort.

19. A. There is increasing evidence that NVA/VC main force units are avoiding significant contact in the III CTZ. Morale is on the decline in NVA/VC main force, local force, and guerilla units. Shortages of medicine, food, ammunition and a general disenchantment with jungle life are cited reasons. A letter sent by a VC in Duc Hoa District to the Long An Province Party Committee reported that morale

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in Duc Hoa District had been affected adversely because many cadre had been killed or captured during the allied sweeps in July and early August. A recent carrier from the 272d VC Regt reported that morale has suffered because most of the old, experienced soldiers had been killed or wounded, and the replacements were all mediocre NVA soldiers. Other factors commonly cited were increased air strikes, empty promises, and separation from their families. In addition, the attrition rate among infiltration groups while enroute from North Vietnam creates an in-country replacement problem for the NVA/VC, and has necessitated the recruitment of many women and children.

B. The enemy has, and is using, his formidable capability to deliver heavy rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle ordnance on friendly fixed installations. The attacks at Nha Be on 3 August and Lai Khe on 4 August are examples of his increasing reliance on artillery and mortars.

(IV CTZ)

20. Major emphasis in the IV CTZ during August was directed toward the disruption and defeat of enemy offensive actions during the pre-election period and the continued destruction of VC main and provisional units and their principal bases. We continued to improve the effectiveness of small unit operations in order to provide greater security for RD teams and for the development of RD. We continued to maintain and up-grade the security of our major lines of communication. Steady progress was made in each of these endeavors.

21. A. The results of the 7th ARVN Division's Operation CUU LONG 64, conducted in connection with the 9th US Division's Operation CORONADO II in Dinh Tuong Province from 27 July to 3 August, showed that the VC main and local force units in Dinh Tuong Province were seriously demoralized and had lost unit integrity. Units were reported to be short of ammunition and food supplies and had been forced to disperse to the extent that command and control had been lost. Individual soldiers had been ordered to hide their weapons and mingle with the local populace to avoid capture.

B. In August, 1005 VC were killed, 332 were captured and 302 weapons were confiscated. We took in 638 Chieu Hoi returnees (an 80 percent increase over August 1966, but in line with the past three months). Already this year our Chieu Hoi returnees are twice our 1966 total.

22. A. RVNAF conducted 169 battalion size or larger operations and 56,358 small unit operations in August in III CTZ. Twenty-five of the major operations were air mobile lifting more than 19,400 RVNAF troops. Ten VC base areas were penetrated resulting in over 130 VC killed and the destruction or capture of considerable equipment and supplies. Throughout the month, GVN units were able to maintain favorable kill and weapons captured versus weapons lost ratios. The overall morale,

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combat effectiveness, and fighting spirit of IV Corps units is good. We are carrying the conflict to the enemy.

B. Regional and Popular Forces are displaying modest and spotty improvement. There are, however, instances of their standing up better to VC attacks. They are engaging in more active patrolling and are conducting ambushes. Nine new RF companies are undergoing basic unit training. Three of these companies were organized from recent Hoa Hao returnees. The eighteen new RF companies and fifty PF platoons recently authorized IV CTZ will further enhance the RF/PF posture and our support of RD.

23. A. The VC were not capable of sustained disruption of our lines of communication. Highway 4, which runs the length of the delta and links the region with Saigon was interdicted 3 times in August. Two of these incidents were road destruction and the third was the partial destruction of a bridge. Quick reaction by ARVN engineers using US equipment restored the LOC's with little interruption.

B. The security status of the My Tho branch of the Mekong River and the Bassac River from the South China Sea to the An Giang Province border has improved from open to secure. The status of other major waterways of the delta remain unchanged. All airfields were operational except for Go Cong which is closed to all but light aircraft, but will be open for large aircraft the first week in September.

24. Pacification made progress but remained behind schedule in relation to 1967 goals. Eighty percent of the new life hamlets and eighty five percent of the consolidated hamlets, programmed for the first semester, were complete as of 31 August. The IV Corps Commander, with all Division Commanders and Province Chiefs in attendance, held a conference on 29 August during which he announced a goal of 100 percent completion of the new life and consolidated hamlets by 15 September 1967. Many RD teams began moving into second semester hamlets during August, and a gradual shift is expected to continue during the month of September. VC initiated three incidents against RD cadre. These incidents continue with the same frequency as in previous months but with less significance. The VC still consider the RD effort a thorn in their side, but their ability to deter its progress is gradually diminishing. Significant advances in the pacification program should be noted during the ensuing months.

25. A. During August the VC failed to gain significant military victories and failed to live up to their pre-election propaganda threats. There was an expected increase in enemy initiated incidents starting on the 26th of August. Most significant of these incidents was the shelling of Can Tho City, the US MACV Compound, the Province Chief's Headquarters, and the ARVN Military Hospital during the early morning hours of 27 August. There were 484 VC initiated incidents reported in August compared to 41 during July. The majority of the current VC incidents are not characteristically military in nature, but are harassments and terrorist activities.

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B. The enemy remains somewhat dispersed in company, platoon, and smaller size units throughout the IV CTZ, and usually avoids contact. He is experiencing a shortage of qualified cadre and difficulty in his recruiting and taxation efforts. There have been definite indications that the VC believe they are losing control of the opoulace. Captured documents indicate that the VC are criticizing their cadres for not being close to the people, for lack of leadership, and for tending to operate independently of COSVN.

(Naval Forces, Vietnam - NAVFORV)

26. A. The interdiction of enemy waterborne movement of supplies continues to be effective. Interrogations reveal no successful waterborne infiltration of supplies from external sources. Market time effectiveness was increased on 23 August with the commencement of operations at the radar site on Poulo Obi Island. Detection ranges of 40 miles are being attained, and the site has the capacity to vector friendly forces to intercept contacts.

B. The River Patrol Force (Game Warden continues to interdict enemy movement in the Rung Sat special zone(RSSZ) and Mekong River Delta, and provides limited support for ground operations and pacification projects. Game Warden is also responsible for security and inland mining countermeasures, of the Long Tau River Channel from the South China Sea to Saigon. The most important measure of the effectiveness of the security of the Long Tau Channel is that no attacks against civilian ships occurred during August. Although the enemy maintains some control over the adjacent land areas of the RSSZ, Ground operations by USN SEALs, US Army, Vietnamese Marine Corps and Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces continue in the RSSZ. A significant measure of the success of Game Warden forces in the Mekong Delta area is the increasing number of inhabitants gravitating toward areas of government control.

C. The Mav Thit Nicolai Canal was declared open to traffic on 8 August in a ceremony presided over by Premier Ky. The opening of the waterway reduces the transit distance from Bac Lieu to Saigon by approximately 50 percent. This will facilitate the transport of produce and cement clinker to Saigon. The route is not secure, however, and continued action by the VNN and JVN is required to provide safe transits.

D. NAVFORV psychological operations (PSYOP) continue to support RD. Newspapers, magazines, and printed propaganda material are disseminated to water craft inspected or boarded during Market Time and Game Warden operations. This program reaches approximately 10,000 people per day. The volunteer information inducement program, which provides for payment in money or goods for intelligence information, has been instituted with PSYOP serving as a carrier for the advertising campaign.

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E. During August the VNN logistics lift ships turned in their best operational performance to date. The average operational employment reached 48 percent for the month, with an employment of 50 percent realized during the last week of the month. Sanitation standards in the Vietnamese Navy Fleet ships have been unsatisfactory. Major emphasis on correction of this deficiency was instituted in late July and August.

F. The enemy has demonstrated the ability to mortar (NHA Be on 3 and 5 August) and overrun weaker bases (coastal group 16 on 7 August). Numerous reports of swimmer/sapper preparations have been received, but few incidents were initiated and there were none of a serious nature. With the exception of the ambush of a VNN unit in the Mang Thi Nho Lai Canal on 17 August, enemy activity against friendly craft on patrol can be described as harassing actions rather than serious attacks.

(Seventh Air Force)

27. A. This past month the US Seventh Air Force continued to support MACV objectives in-country by providing direct support of US/FWMAF ground operations. Seventh Air Force efforts included providing logistical support, locating and destroying the enemy and his resources, permitting his freedom of movement and encouraging him to rally to the GVN. Enemy returnees and prisoners indicate air strikes as a major factor in deteriorating morale. Successful utilization of combat skyspot and illumination resources are denying the enemy the sanctuary of darkness. Constant reconnaissance in-country requires the enemy to exercise every precaution in pursuit of his objectives and in most cases denies him success. During the month of August, VNAF resources and efforts provided more than 3,000 strike sorties accounting for 3,144 structures destroyed, 2,325 structures damaged, sampans destroyed and 33 secondary explosions.

B. The enemy continued to increase his efforts to resupply his forces in route package 1, the DMZ, and I CTZ. In defense of his efforts, substantial AAA resources are maintained in the area and an SA-2 threat north of the DMZ continues to influence B-52 operations. His willingness to press resupply under extremely hazardous conditions imposed by the air campaign shows his desire for a higher offensive level in the south. The primary media for resupply is trucks and the effectiveness of tactical air strikes against truck targets during daylight hours has caused the enemy to move almost exclusively at night. To counter this action, more than 50 percent of the sorties in route package I were flown at night. The results of night and other strikes were 585 trucks destroyed and 132 damaged out of a total of 4,180 sighted. 1,257 secondary explosions and 2,536 fires occurred from strikes on truck targets. In addition, pilots reported 551 secondary explosions and 1,562 fires resulting from strikes against truck parks and storage areas. The cumulative results indicate that significant quantities of materials were denied to enemy personnel awaiting resupply. The air campaign is imposing a positive control over the enemy offensive level. The enemy is accepting the hazards of supply because he

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is denied a favorable offensive posture in South Vietnam.

(Summary)

28. A. The enemy strategy during the period remained as outlined in my last assessment; however, his major tactical orientation shifted to terrorist/guerrilla/propaganda activities in an effort to disrupt and discredit the national elections. The enemy continued to maintain his threats in the DMZ, and western highlands and attempted to regain the initiative in these areas. His early August effort in the western highlands were met and defeated by JGS reserves and ARVN Regular Forces. On the other hand, the anticipated enemy attack in the DMZ has not yet materialized, primarily because of our successful application of intensive artillery, tactical air, and B-52 strikes. Intelligence indications particularly attest to the effectiveness of the B-52 raids in disrupting the enemy attack preparations. As in the last period, evidence continues to indicate enemy supply and manpower difficulties in the coastal areas of I and II CTZ and in IV CTZ. Continued friendly offensive pressure in these areas has prevented any respite. The enemy attacks by fire against friendly installations have increased as he attempts to avoid contact and to achieve psychological victories. are beginning to show more success as evidenced by the marine capture of rockets in firing positions. Continued emphasis is being placed on more effective countermeasures.

B. Significant progress continues in some area of pacification, but in general, the program is behind schedule in relation to the overall goals set for 1967. The preoccupation of GVN provincial officials with the elections has delayed progress even further, although this new delay probably will not be critical. The tempo of progress should increase now that the elections are over.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet on the Asian Bank

1. The current proposal is an attempt to put the Asian Bank on the same type of footing as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank -- that is, to give the ADB a soft-loan window. It already has \$1 billion in ordinary capital, for lending on World Bank-type terms (5-6%, 12-20 years.) This proposal will give it an additional fund for lending on IDA terms (0-3%, 30-50 years).

2. A soft loan fund is absolutely necessary if the bank is to finance projects in such areas as education, transportation, and some kinds of agriculture, where the projects' pay-out is slow and the client country is too poor to pay the standard bank terms.

3. The division of donor labor in the ordinary capital of the Asian Bank is as follows:

United States --	\$200 million
Japan --	200
Australia --	85
Germany --	30
Canada --	25
The Netherlands --	11
United Kingdom --	10
Italy --	10

There are also contributions of \$5 million each from Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden.

4. The current proposal is that we seek authorization for up to \$200 million in U.S. contributions as a minority share in the new soft-loan funds. The legislation would explicitly dictate that we could not spend a penny of our money until we have been more than matched by others. If we can't get \$200 million in matching ~~from~~ ^{from} others we will use only that part of our authorization which has been matched.

5. Assuming that we provide 49% of the soft-loan fund, its maximum size would be slightly more than \$400 million, of which more than \$200 million would come from others. After extensive Japanese and U.S. canvassing of other donors, we now have pledges of \$125 million -- \$100 million from the Japanese and \$25 million from the Canadians.

6. Thus, we have about \$75 million to go to have a full \$400 million fund. We now have no firm pledges for any of that amount. It is the combined judgment of your advisors that our best tactic for getting more pledges is to put some of our money out as bait -- with the clear understanding that it cannot be used unless and until others more than match it. We think this incentive will get the Asians pushing and make it hardest for the Europeans to refuse.

7. Our best immediate prospects for new pledges are the Dutch, who will probably kick in \$10 million or so, and the Australians, from whom we will seek something on the order of \$50 million. We hope to scrape up the rest from the British, the Germans, the Belgians and the Scandinavians.

W. A. Rostow
W. A. Rostow

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-360
By rip, NARA, Date 4-13-95

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Tuesday, September 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Weizman's Presentation

Sent to
Wed in 9/13/67

General Weizman today wound up two mornings of formal talks in the Pentagon on Israel's aircraft requirements for the next five years. The first reaction of all who attended was that, while details of any such presentation are debatable, his requests and tone were both modest.

The attached table shows how Weizman sees the Israeli air force developing 1968-73. His request from us boils down to: (1) complete on schedule (beginning in December) delivery of the 48 Skyhawks contracted for in March 1966; (2) sell an additional 27 Skyhawks; (3) sell 50 F-4 Phantoms. In short, he wants 77 more US planes from us roughly by the end of 1968.

He rests his argument on these main points:

1. Airpower will continue to be the decisive factor in Israeli strategy. Israel with its small population has mustered about all it can manage in ground forces.
2. If there is another war, Israel will face a tougher enemy: There will be greater Arab cooperation, and Israel won't be able to count on the luxury of fighting one enemy at a time. Arab airfields will be better defended, more numerous and more widely dispersed and hardened. The Arab air forces on Israel's borders alone will number around 900 combat aircraft by 1970, against a planned Israeli force of 350.
3. Israel still believes that it must maintain a force that will deter aggression. Weizman feels that one cause of the June war was that Israel's force was so close to the margin of visible superiority that it lost its credibility as a deterrent and allowed Nasser to miscalculate his chances.
4. If there is a next time, Israel will have to be prepared to absorb a first strike, since the Arabs are now painfully aware of the advantages of this strategy.

We told Weizman he could expect no answers while he was here, and staff work will now begin grinding out a recommendation for you. But I wanted you to have immediately the flavor of Weizman's presentation.

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W. W. Rostow

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September 12, 1967

GENERAL WEIZMAN'S PRESENTATION:

PLANNING FIGURES ON DEVELOPMENT OF ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967 - 1973

<u>Israel's attack force today</u>		<u>Interim target-- end 1968</u>		<u>Target 1971-1973</u>	
Mirage III-C	55	Mirage III-C	55	Mirage III-C	50
Vautour	15	Vautour	15		
Super-Mystere	21	Super-Mystere	20 ^b	Mirage M-5	100 ^c
Mystere	25 ^a	Mirage M-5	50	Skyhawk	75
Ouragan	41 ^a	Skyhawk (1966 agreement)	48	Phantom	50
Total	157 ^e	Skyhawk (new)	27	French F-1 with US J-29 engine	75 ^d
		Phantom F-4 (new)	50	Total	350
		Total	265		

- The Mysteres and Ouragans are 12-15 years old, and even in 1965 Gen. Weizman spoke of planning to retire them.
- Weizman would like to have the Super-Mysteres phased out before 1970.
- This assumes that France will release 50 M-5s already contracted for but frozen at present and that France might agree to sell an additional 50.
- This is a French plane still being tested, which the Israelis would assemble under license in Israel with a General Electric J-79 engine. These would not be operational before 1973.
- This compares with 196 of these types on 4 June.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DOD Directive 5200.30
By jc, NARA, Date 5-3-02

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