

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

1067

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. C 1 p <i>Exempt 2-17-95 NLJ 94-362</i> <i>Exempt 5/31/01 NIS 00-136</i>	9/22/67	A
#3a memo	Greene to President TS 3 p	9/22/67	A
#3b rpt	Situation in Vietnam TS 3 p	[9/67]	A
#3c map	Situation in Vietnam S 1 p	[9/67]	A
~~#5a memcon~~	~~"Vietnam"~~ ~~S 3 p~~ <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-363</i>	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~#5b memcon~~	~~"The Middle East"~~ ~~S 3 p~~	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~#6 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, re: Nigeria~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> ~~C 1 p~~ [Duplicate of #32, NSF, Country File, Nigeria, Vol. 2]	~~9/22/67~~	~~A~~
~~#7 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m.~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> ~~C 2 p~~	~~9/22/67~~	~~A~~
#8 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>NLJ 93-243; opened 9/12/94</i>	9/22/67	A
#8a cable	New Delhi 025 <i>Sanitized NLJ 93-244; 9/12/94</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 5/30/01 NIS 00-227</i>	9/21/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #34, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7; Exempt 1981]	9/22/67	A
#9a rpt	Chronology S 1 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> [Duplicate of #34, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7; Exempt 1981]	~~undated~~	~~A~~

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 42, 9/15-20/67

Box 22

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#12a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Op #23a, NSF, CT, VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/22/67	A
#18a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i> ~~C~~ 2 p [Duplicate of #8a, NSF, Country File, Lesotho, Vol. 1]	9/19/67	A
#18b rpt	"Talking Points" <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i> ~~C~~ 3 p [Duplicate of #8b, NSF, Country File, Lesotho, Vol. 1]	undated	A
#18c rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i> ~~C~~ 2 p <i>Open 6/16/00</i> [Duplicate of #8c, NSF, Country File, Lesotho, Vol. 1]	undated	A
#18d photo	Bio Sketch <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i> C 1 p <i>Exempt 4/16/01 NS 00-287</i> [Duplicate of #8d, NSF, Country File, Lesotho, Vol. 1] <i>Sanitized 10/11/01- RAC 001-092-1-1</i>	1966	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 5:40 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> ~~S~~ 1 p	9/21/67	A
#20a cable	Belgrade 917 ~~S~~ 3 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i>	9/21/67	A
#21a cable	Paris 3803 ~~TS~~ 2 p	9/23/67	A
#22a cable	Duplicate of #21 <i>open 6/16/00 NLS 94-363</i>		
#25 memo	Rostow to President, 4:10 p.m. <i>Sanitized 7/28/02 NLS 94-367</i> ~~S~~ 1 p <i>Sanitized 4/22/02 NLS 98-459</i> <i>2/28/02 NLS 94-367</i>	9/21/67	A
#25a rpt	Intelligence Report ~~S~~ 1 p <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLS 94-366</i> <i>Exempt 4/16/01 NS 00-286</i> <i>Sanitized 4/22/02 NLS 98-459</i>	undated	A

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~~#26a cable~~	~~Saigon 6464~~ ~~S~~ 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-363</i>	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~#27a cable~~	~~Saigon 6459~~ " ~~C~~ 8 p	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
#28a rpt	Intelligence Report <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RLH 00-307</i> C 1 p <i>exempt 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i>	9/21/67	A
~~#33a cable~~	~~Seoul 6464~~ 1392 ~~TS~~ 4 p <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ 93-367</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#35b memo~~	~~Fowler to President~~ ~~C~~ 2 p <i>open 1-27-97 NLJ 96-305</i>	~~9/21/67~~	~~A~~
~~#37 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> ~~C~~ 2 p	~~9/21/67~~	~~A~~
~~#39 ltr~~	~~President to Ayub Khan~~ <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> ~~PCI~~ 1 p [Duplicate of #51a]	~~9/21/67~~	~~A~~
~~#40a cable~~	~~Saigon 6460~~ ~~S~~ 10 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-363</i> ~~[Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]~~	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
#45a memo	Wright to Rostow <i>Open 5/3/01 NS 00-136</i> S 3 p <i>Exempt 2-17-95 NLJ 94-362</i> [Duplicate of #128a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "5D(3), Allies: Troop Commitments; Other Aid (Alphabetically: Korea-U.K.)]	9/19/67	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 a.m. C 1 p <i>OPEN 5/31/96 NLJ 94-362</i>	9/20/67	A
~~#49 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 8:20 a.m.~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> ~~TS~~ 1 p	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~#49a cable~~	~~MACOOC 30673~~ <i>(dup. #136, NSF, Country File, Vietnam)</i> ~~TS~~ 3 p <i>HARVAN- Double Plus; Chronological " Box 260</i>	~~9/16/67~~ <i>open 6-4-70 NLJ 10-111</i>	~~A~~

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~#49b cable~~	~~CINCPAC 180740Z (dup #135 as above)~~ ~~TS 2 p open 9-30-96 NLS 94-183~~	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
#51a ltr	Duplicate of #39] <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>		
~~#52a rpt~~	~~Vietnam Political Situation Report~~ ~~S 2 p <i>Op #242, NSFCF, VN "8A2" Box 04</i>~~ <i>open 1-23-94 NLS 94-363</i>	~~9/20/67~~	~~A~~
~~#55 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m.~~ ~~S 1 p~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#55a memo~~	~~Oliver to President, re: Ecuador~~ ~~S 1 p~~ <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#58 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 3:30 p.m.~~ ~~TS 1 p~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#58a cable~~	~~Paris 3536~~ ~~TS 1 p~~ <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i>	~~9/18/67~~	~~A~~
~~#60a ltr~~	~~President to Restrepo~~ ~~PCI 1 p~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
~~#60b ltr~~	~~Restrepo to President~~ ~~PCI 1 p~~ <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/5/67~~	~~A~~
~~#66 memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ <i>Open 5/3/01 NLS 00-136</i> ~~S 2 p~~ <i>Exempt 2-17-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#66a ltr~~	~~President to King Faisal~~ <i>Open 12/18/00 NLS 00-238</i> ~~PCI 3 p~~ <i>Exempt 2-17-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/19/67~~	~~A~~
~~#72 memo~~	~~Rostow to President, 3:00 p.m.~~ ~~C 1 p~~ <i>Open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	~~9/18/67~~	~~A~~
<i>not open</i> ~~#72a memo~~	~~Rostow to President~~ <i>sanitized 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> ~~C 4 p~~ <i>Open 2/18/00 NLS 00-238</i>	~~[9/67]~~	~~A~~

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#72b memo	Katzenbach to President C 3 p <i>Dup #11x, 5 lbs of Hamilton, "AID-PL480" Box 7</i> [Duplicate of #105x] <i>open 5-6-94 NLJ 93353</i>	~~9/13/67~~	~~A~~
#72c rpt	"Morocco Presidential Finding" C 1 p [Duplicate of #105y]	undated	A
#72d rpt	"Statement of Reasons that P.L. 480..." C 2 p [Duplicate of #105z]	undated	A
#83a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report C 1 p <i>Dup #25a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i> <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-363</i>	~~9/18/67~~	~~A~~
#84 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> S 1 p	~~9/18/67~~	~~A~~
#84b memo	Bator to President <i>NLJ 91-442; opened 9/16/94</i> S 1 p	~~5/12/67~~	~~A~~
#84c rpt	"Tab A" S 1 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
#85 memo	Rostow to President, 6:20 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> TS 1 p	~~9/16/67~~	~~A~~
#85a cable	Paris 5542 TS 4 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-363</i>	~~9/16/67~~	~~A~~
#87a cable	Paris 3341 S 1 p "	~~9/16/67~~	~~A~~
#87b cable	Intelligence Information Cable <i>Sent. T. 7/12/61 NS/RAC 00 307</i> S 3 p <i>opened 9-14-95 NLJ 94-366</i>	~~9/15/67~~	~~A~~
#88 memo	Rostow to President, re: Zambia <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-362</i> C 1 p	~~9/16/67~~	~~A~~
#88a cable	Lusaka 350 C 2 p <i>open 11-13-95 NLJ 94-363</i>	~~9/16/67~~	~~A~~

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 42, 9/15-20/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#89 memo	Rostow to President, re: Italy <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> S 3 p	9/16/67	A
#89a memo	Rusk to President, re: Italy S 1 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i>	9/16/67	A
#89b memo	"Visit of Saragat" " C 5 p	9/67	A
#89d rpt	Bio Sketch ~~exempt 9-14-95 NLS 94-366~~ S 2 p <i>open 6/16/00</i>	9/67	A
#89e rpt	Bio Sketch ~~exempt 9-14-95 NLS 94-366~~ S 2 p <i>open 6/16/00</i>	9/67	A
#94a memo	Rostow to President, 1:00 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> C 1 p	9/15/67	A
#102 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i>	9/15/67	A
#102a ltr	President to Tito <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> PCI 3 p	9/15/67	A
#102b ltr	Tito to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-362</i> PCI 5 p	8/24/67	A
#103a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report S 1 p <i>Dup. #260, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/15/67 <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-363</i>	A
~~not open yet~~ #105 memo	Partial duplicate of #72a <i>poss. dup. #11, Files of Hamilton, "AID-PLY80" Box 7</i> ~~open 6-8-95 NLS 94-362~~		
#105b memo	Schultze to President <i>dup. #116 by Hamilton, "AID-PLY80" Box 7</i> C 2 p <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i>	9/14/67	A
#105e memo	Gaud, Schnittker to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> C 3 p <i>Dup. #116 as above</i>	2/2/67	A
#105g memo	Duplicate of #105b <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i>		

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#105h memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> ~~C~~ 1 p <i>Dup #11h, Files of Hamilton, "AID PL480" Box 7</i>	~~9/12/67~~	~~A~~
#105i memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> ~~C~~ 1 p <i>Dup #11i, as above</i>	~~3/2/67~~	~~A~~
#105j memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>"</i> ~~C~~ 5 p <i>Dup #11j, as above</i>	~~undated~~	~~A~~
#105l memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> ~~C~~ 2 p <i>Dup #11l, as above</i>	~~9/14/67~~	~~A~~
#105o memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> ~~C~~ 2 p <i>Dup #11o, as above</i>	~~9/13/67~~	~~A~~
#105p memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> ~~C~~ 1 p <i>Dup #11p, as above</i>	~~9/12/67~~	~~A~~
#105q memo	Gaud, Freeman to President ~~C~~ 3 p <i>Dup #11q, as above 93-352, 3/2/95</i>	8/8/67	A
#105s memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-8-95 NLS 94-362</i> ~~C~~ 2 p <i>Dup #11s, as above</i>	~~9/14/67~~	~~A~~
#105u memo	Gaud, Freeman to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> ~~C~~ 3 p <i>Dup #11u, as above</i>	~~12/22/66~~	~~A~~
#105v memo	Gaud, Schnittker to President <i>"</i> ~~C~~ 1 p <i>Dup #11v, as above</i>	~~3/2/67~~	~~A~~
#105x memo	Duplicate of #72b <i>open 5-6-94 NLS 93-353</i>		
#105y memo	Duplicate of #72c		
#105z memo	Duplicate of #72d		

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Pres file

Friday, September 22, 1967 -- 4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Moyers' reply to my last letter to him.

For reference, I attach the Fort Bragg speech.

Should I try to write something on Viet Nam and let you see it; or let others hold forth?

Draft _____

No _____

If you think I should try and if you like the result, we can decide later if NEWSDAY is the best forum.

My personal preference is silence. On the other hand, I know the importance of the battle for domestic opinion.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Harry F. Guggenheim, *President and Editor in Chief*


Bill D. Moyers, *Publisher*

Dear Walt:

OK, let's compromise. Why don't you bring up to date, in the present context, the Fort Bragg speech you delivered in 1961. Leeds is a step in the right direction, but not for daily newspaper consumption. If you could put Vietnam now in the context of what you said then -- about the nature of the struggle in the developing world and the necessity for dealing with an adversary on his ground and according to his rules --- I think I could get it into daily newspapers with a total circulation of five to ten million readers, and that would be a start.

Thanks for your fine words about my role; they are nice thoughts but I wonder.....

Sincerely,



Bill Moyers

Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The White House
Washington, D.C.
September 16, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

Friday, September 22, 1967
3:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Greene expands my request for a sitrep into an analysis of the three alternatives available for dealing with the DMZ situation which the JCS is now examining.

These will, undoubtedly, be coming to you fairly soon.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 9-30-91

Pres file

Friday - 12:30 pm
September 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Felipe Herrera will not be able to
attend the signing ceremony and
luncheon today.

He has sent you the attached letter
explaining why, and expressing his
regrets.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

9/21/67 letter
from Felipe Herrera



PRESIDENT

INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20577

4a
CABLE ADDRESS
INTAMBANC

September 21, 1967

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

A few moments ago Mr. Walt Rostow phoned to extend to me your kind invitation to attend the ceremony of the signing into law the legislation increasing the United States contribution to the Bank's Fund for Special Operations, to be followed by a luncheon with the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Inter-American System. I feel deeply honored by your thoughtfulness and hospitality. Unhappily, I am leaving today for Rio de Janeiro to honor a long-standing commitment to give a lecture and to receive a degree from the University of Bahia, to be followed by an official dinner given in my honor by the Brazilian cabinet. Therefore, much as I would like to be with you tomorrow, under the circumstances I feel it is impossible. I understand that in my absence some of my senior associates will be invited to represent the Bank.

I take this opportunity to reiterate my deep gratitude for your personal interest in our institution and in Latin America.

Respectfully yours,

Felipe Herrera

Friday, Sept. 22, 1967
12:00 noon

5
1

MR. PRESIDENT:

This conversation on the Middle East and Viet Nam between Gene and the Soviet Embassy Counselor is worth reading.

Profile

On Viet Nam he is correct: the most face-saving way for negotiations to begin, so far as Hanoi is concerned, is in Saigon.

We are sending his comments to Bunker for analysis and judgment.

It is not clear what Tcherniakov's authority was in floating this idea; but it is a quite remarkable conversation.

W. W. R.

Dist approval JPW 9/21/67 **Memorandum of Conversation**

9

DATE: September 20, 1967
1:00 p.m.
Embassy Residence

SUBJECT: Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Minister Counselor,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs

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EA AmEmbassy MOSCOW
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-363
By isp, NARA, Date 1-13-95

Under Secretary Rostow lunched with Counsellor Y. N. Tcherniakov at the latter's invitation on September 20, 1967, at the Residence of the Soviet Ambassador.

The conversation concerned several topics, and is reported in separate memoranda of conversation.

Mr. Tcherniakov opened the discussion on Vietnam by commenting that his views were "not altogether official.- rather personal," but that they represented the tenor of thought he found on his recent visit to Moscow.

He suggested that the most practical way to begin finding a peaceful solution there was through secret, private talks between the government in Saigon and the Vietcong. The Vietcong was very assertive about its independence of Hanoi, and claimed that the war would continue even if Hanoi stopped sending aid. He recognized the difficulties of coalition governments, and said no doubt there would be trouble, "even tragedies," if a coalition government were formed. But such troubles were better than war. He knew we felt that in a coalition with Communists, the Communists would always dominate. But it wasn't necessarily the prospect in Vietnam. Had we seen the

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recent statement of the N.L.F.? It stated a policy for an independent South Vietnam, and not really a Communist one. He thought the statement was encouraging.

Rostow said that of course his views would be carefully examined. We hoped that the recent election in South Vietnam would help prepare the way for some kind of political solution in South Vietnam. The election was bound to have a stabilizing impact. Tcherniakov asked if we thought the election had strengthened the hand of the military. Rostow replied that of course it gave the government a new mandate, but their majority was such as to require their combining with other elements. Tcherniakov asked whether we thought the military would accept civilians into the government. Rostow said we thought it entirely possible, and recalled General Thieu's comments about seeking peace.

In subsequent discussion, probing the practicality of this approach, Tcherniakov made these points: (1) under present circumstances, he thought peace could be reached in Vietnam without Chinese "consensus"; (2) it would be difficult to start with Hanoi, since it would be betraying an ally for Hanoi to stop aid to the Vietcong, just as it would be difficult for the USSR to stop aid to Hanoi, or for us to make a deal with the Vietcong if our Allies in Saigon disapproved. Therefore the place to start was in South Vietnam; (3) he thought there were only 50,000 regular North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, out of some 290,000 troops, although more if you counted volunteers; (4) North Vietnamese were treated as strangers and aliens in the villages and small towns of South Vietnam; (5) our enquiry about starting the process of negotiation with a Soviet-American understanding -- a halt in bombing for an equivalent Soviet act of deescalation -- was known and considered seriously in Moscow, but no one to whom he talked was willing to express a firm opinion on the issue -- "perhaps they were afraid," he remarked; (6) Tcherniakov did not demur, but did not agree either, to Rostow's point that it would be difficult to imagine a scenario to stop the fighting within South Vietnam without a concurrent agreement about arms and men from North Vietnam, and from the Soviet Union to Hanoi; (7) he agreed that both the Soviet Union and the US wanted an end to the war in Vietnam, and favorably noted the newspaper story about Tim Hoopes' testimony at his confirmation hearing. He was glad to know such views obtained "even in the Pentagon." Rostow remarked that on the contrary while Soviet

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intentions were often hard for us to understand, it was a common view in the government that the Soviets wanted peace in Vietnam, and on roughly the same terms we favored -- a situation like that in Korea and Germany -- but that it was difficult for the Soviets to obtain or force Hanoi's cooperation. This was the premise for the Secretary's proposals of early January, which had just been discussed again.

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

16222 56

Dist approved JPW 9/21

*Memorandum of Conversation*DATE: September 20, 1967
1:00 p.m.
Embassy Residence

SUBJECT: The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Yuri N. Tcherniakov, Minister Counselor,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political
AffairsCopies To: S IO
U NEA
M WH
G Sec/Def
S/AH

Under Secretary Rostow lunched with Counselor Y. N. Tcherniakov at the latter's invitation on September 20, 1967, at the Residence of the Soviet Ambassador.

The conversation concerned several topics, and is reported in separate memoranda of conversation.

After preliminary amenities, Mr. Tcherniakov asked what prospects we saw for a peaceful solution in the Middle East. Rostow answered that we thought the strongest base for going forward was a

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-363
By isp, NARA, Date 1-13-95

M:EV Rostow

(Drafting Office and Officer)

~~SECRET~~

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Security Council resolution based on the principles and ideas on which we had agreed at the end of the General Assembly. This had been the tenor of our recent talks with Tito and the Arabs, and with other governments. Mr. Tcherniakov said this was also the view of his government.

(At this point Mr. Tcherniakov switched the conversation to Vietnam. He led the way back to the Middle East at a later point.)

Mr. Tcherniakov enquired broadly about Israeli views on a settlement. Rostow commented that while we could not speak or negotiate for Israel, it was our impression that their official position on these matters had not changed in either direction -- that the Israelis would make great sacrifices for a condition of peace. Both men agreed that at this point the parties were in a state of negotiating from a distance -- making signals in their speeches and actions, and naturally quite strong ones. So far as Egypt was concerned, we did not think the problems of settlement should present serious difficulties, once the principle of the resolution on which we had agreed in July was accepted. There was the Gaza Strip of course, but that had never been Egyptian territory. Security arrangements would certainly be necessary. Nodding, Tcherniakov asked whether we thought a solution for Syria would be difficult. Rostow said we had originally thought not, but that the Israelis had been shocked by the fortifications they found on the Golan Hills. We were not clear whether demilitarization would be enough. Both men agreed that the armistice lines between Jordan and Israel would present serious problems.

Tcherniakov hoped that we would use our influence with Israel to obtain concessions in the process of peace-making. He said he was glad that both our governments were agreed that the starting point was to link troop withdrawals with an end of the claims of belligerency.

Rostow said he hoped we could begin on that general footing in the Security Council, and soon. The world was beginning to think that nothing could be accomplished through the U.N. It would be electrified if we sponsored a resolution together in the Security Council. Tcherniakov said that some period in the Assembly might be necessary,

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~~EXDIS~~

-3-

but he agreed that the nations had had a sufficient opportunity to express themselves on the Middle East in the General Assembly. "They have talked enough," he said.

Tcherniakov referred to the Gromyko-Goldberg agreement between the two governments at least four times, and concluded, referring back to the conversation about Vietnam, that if we succeeded in acting together in one place, it could help elsewhere. None of these local quarrels in small distant countries, he said, were worth a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but such episodes kept recurring.

(Rostow decided not to press for greater clarification about whether the language of the July draft could be negotiated further. Instead, he sought reiteration of the basic point -- that the agreement was still alive -- and notice that we might have some drafting changes to suggest.)

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~~EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-362
By CL, NARA, Date 4-12-95

6

Friday, September 22, 1967 -- 11:00 AM

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with John Aggey, Archbishop of Lagos (Nigeria)
1:00 PM today

This is a handshake meeting as a favor to the Speaker. Aggey is one of the highest ranking Catholics in Nigeria. As far as we know, he has no strong political views with respect to the current civil war in Nigeria between General Gowon's Federal Military Government and the rebel "State" of Biafra. (formerly eastern Nigeria).

If he does make a political pitch, it will probably be strongly in favor of Gowon.

I suggest you try to keep the conversation to issues other than Nigeria. Aggey will be delighted to hear your thoughts on Vietnam, the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc. If he insists on talking about the Nigerian situation, you may wish to make the following points:

- Our policy in Nigeria is to work for peace. We regard the civil war as a great tragedy for Nigeria, for Africa, and for the world.
- Our position on the question of recognition is absolutely clear: we recognize only the Federal Military Government.
- But we do not believe it is in our interests or in the interests of Nigeria for the United States to become involved in feeding the war from either side. We will not sell arms to either combatant and we regret that the Soviet Union has seen fit to do so.
- We earnestly hope that the Africans and/or other international groupings can work out some formula for negotiation whereby the two sides can move from the battlefield to the conference table. It is not for us to dictate the terms. But we are ready to encourage such talks if there is a real prospect that they can be brought about.

As you know, the OAU is now trying to mount a mediation mission to Nigeria. Surprisingly, Gowon has agreed to receive the mission. We and the British are doing what we can behind the scenes to encourage this venture. But we have to be awfully careful not to kiss it to death.

Hamilton/vmr

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - September 22, 1967 - 9:30 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Luncheon for the Latin American Foreign Ministers

You will not have time to speak individually with all the Foreign Ministers, but I recommend that you give special attention to the following as circumstances permit:

Costa Mendez - Argentina

Note the progress being made in Argentine economic recovery and commend his constructive role at Asuncion on economic integration.

Guevara Arce - Bolivia

Tell him you are following Bolivia's counter-insurgency efforts closely, reaffirm our willingness to help in appropriate ways, and commend him for recent successes against the guerrillas.

Magalhaes Pinto - Brazil

Mention your high regard for Costa e Silva and stress the importance of close US-Brazilian cooperation on regional and world issues. (He's an ultra-nationalist and is principally responsible for Brazil's unco-operative attitude on NPT.)

Carrillo Flores - Mexico

Commend him on his constructive role in LAFTA and express the hope that he will provide leadership in getting LAFTA to take, as soon as possible, the Common Market decisions postponed at Asuncion.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Eleta - Panama

Express understanding and regret over the difficulties they have encountered on the treaties and tell him that while we can go no further on substantive concessions, Bob Anderson is prepared to consider language clarifications.

Secane - Peru

Commend him on the austerity program he has presented to his Congress to get Peru's economy back on the rails and tell him that we are taking a fresh look at our offer of assistance in the light of his self-help program.

Iribarren - Venezuela

Reassure him that we are with Venezuela in the fight to put down subversion and congratulate him on recent successes against urban terrorists.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 22, 1967
8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Chet Bowles volunteers
a formula for trying to put the Russians,
Indians, and others over a barrel on
bombing cessation and negotiations.

I have forwarded it to Sec. Rusk
for his views.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 93-243
By gpl/jw, NARA, Date 7/21/94

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-227
By sj, NARA Date 5-16-01

September 21, 1967

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EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

Text of cable from Ambassador Bowles (New Delhi 025 - [REDACTED])

I am keenly aware of the efforts that you, Secretary Rusk and others are making to end the Vietnam war in a way that assures the freedom and independence of South Vietnam. I also know that the ground has been so fully covered that I hesitate to offer further suggestions from distance of ten thousand miles, yet I would like to take advantage of your comment in Washington that I should never be reluctant to forward ideas.

Thoughtful people in India believe that while prospects for direct U.S. agreement with Hanoi are not promising there is much to be gained by an attempt by the United States Government to find common ground with USSR and to persuade Soviets to make a more determined effort to promote a satisfactory and realistic solution.

To explore this ground I visualize highly private dialogue with USSR along following lines:

A. U.S.: We are keenly aware of ever present danger that Vietnam war may erupt into much bigger conflict. It is our sole desire to see war brought to an end as soon as possible and to establish political structure that will permit withdrawal of U.S. forces leaving behind stable, independent and, if people so wish, neutral government. However, under present circumstances we are frankly discouraged about prospects for agreement with Hanoi government on basis that would be acceptable not only to United States Government, but to major segment of American people and to Congress. What more can be done to achieve this objective?

USSR: First step is to stop bombing North Vietnam. Once you do this we are confident negotiations can begin which will protect interests of both sides.

B. U.S.: Have you concrete evidence that if we take this step, which will be sharply criticized by important segments of U.S. opinion, Hanoi will not only negotiate with us on serious basis but take complementary action to reduce scale of fighting? In Korea we started negotiations with North Koreans and Chinese in July 1950 and shooting continued for two more years at heavy cost.

USSR: We cannot give you tangible evidence that we can persuade Hanoi Government to offer quid pro quo concession. But we know these people well and are confident that response following cessation of the bombing with no public timetable will be affirmative.

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C. U.S.: If you are not repeat not successful in persuading Hanoi to take reciprocal action as a prelude to negotiations what will the USSR do? In other words, will your own policies vis-a-vis Vietnam be modified? If you cannot control Hanoi government response, can you at least tell us what USSR will do under these new circumstances?

On several occasions in recent months I have tested this approach in unofficial, personal talks with Indian officials. While naturally refraining from commitment in response to a hypothetical question, it is their view that if the United States stops bombing and if Hanoi Government fails to respond affirmatively with corresponding reduction of military action, the Government of India will publicly applaud the U.S. effort and focus pressure on Hanoi.

When I ask if they believed that USSR would likewise be expected to shift public and private pressures from Washington to Hanoi, it was general consensus that they would so respond. Moreover, they stressed that while we should place no public time limit on duration of bombing halt, it must be assumed that we would privately inform the USSR that we will not repeat not hold off indefinitely if Hanoi response is negative. This afternoon Defense Minister Swaran Singh, who will head Indian delegation to the United Nations, again expressed the view that even if Hanoi fails to respond to such an action, we would gain enormously in public support and understanding throughout the world.

I wonder if it would not be worth our while to pose this question not only in Moscow, but in Tokyo, Warsaw, Belgrade and other key capitals. Either way such an approach will enable us to improve our position. If the Soviets et al, having been challenged to produce results, persuade Hanoi to respond favorably, the situation will move to a more useful phase. Even if they fail, our move (i. e. , stopping of the bombing) will be welcome as proof of U.S. sincerity by USSR, Canada, Japan, India, U Thant, the Pope, etc. that have been pressing us to take this step and we could expect a significant switch in world opinion in our favor.

May I add that I am frankly concerned about assumption of some of our Chinese experts that China is so heavily burdened with internal problems that it will be unable to participate effectively in Vietnam war no matter what we do. Although this may be true, it is extremely dangerous to assume it. We have as an example the Korean war. In 1950 when Mao Government was only recently established in Peking, after 30 years of turmoil and civil war, and China itself was in an advanced state of confusion, Mao boldly entered the war.

Later the Chinese freely admitted that in sending half-million "volunteers" into Korea they acted not simply to support North Korea but to unify their own divided country against the foreign enemy. It is entirely possible and under certain circumstances even probable, that China may ultimately react in the same way in Vietnam.

Another factor we should not ignore is possibility of Soviet-Chinese rapprochement following the death or elimination of Mao. If and when a new government succeeds present Mao regime, Soviet Government will almost certainly make a major effort to establish working relationship with it. The most dramatic primary objective of such a detente on which they may find a common ground would be joint resistance to U.S. efforts in Vietnam. If this should occur, we could be faced with an extremely grave choice: military retreat or major war.

For these reasons I believe we must be prepared to take calculated risks towards a settlement now while China and the USSR are still at odds and the Chinese are handicapped by their own internal disturbances. I realize that there is no safe path. Our task is to select a policy which is least dangerous and most likely to move us a step closer to peace, or if that is impossible, to clarify our position beyond all shadow of doubt both at home and abroad.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-362
By CG, NARA, Date 4-18-95

[Signature]
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, September 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comment on Evron's Talk with Harry McPherson

On Evron's first point--suspicion in the Jewish community about our position before June 5--I should think these straightforward comments would suffice: (1) There was no question at any point before or during the war that we would have let Israel be seriously hurt or destroyed. (2) We made a serious effort to prevent the war. (3) Israel in the end did not ask us for help; it is to Israel's advantage and ours that it handled this problem entirely on its own. (4) These statements fairly represent thinking at the policy-making levels of our government and far outweigh all the later talk at professional levels about what our commitment to Israel was or wasn't.

On Evron's second point--that we are holding Israel at arms length until she changes her position toward the Arabs--I think we can make a categorical denial, but this would be worth discussing with Secretary McNamara. We have clamped down hard on all military shipments to the Middle East since the war. But we have repeatedly and, I think, quite honestly told the Israelis privately that since early July our aid freeze had been for one purpose only--not rocking the boat during the extremely touchy Congressional debate over military sales. We've reviewed the freeze several times (chronology attached) but each time accepted Secretary McNamara's judgment that we shouldn't move until the military aid bill was safe, though we did let \$3 million go to Israel to tide them over if they'd help on the Hill.

It is admittedly true that we do not want to make decisions on any new major military sales to Israel until we've worked out a comprehensive arms policy for the whole area. The Senior Interdepartmental Group has already requested a recommendation for you by 1 November. But I feel that is a separate issue beyond the freeze on past programs because you could not approve any recommendation that reneged on past promises to Israel. However, others may not agree with me, and if I'm wrong Evron may have a point.

Two things have irked the Israelis: (1) that our freeze applies to all items with a military application--even those which they want to buy commercially for cash like the Piper Cubs Evron mentioned to Harry;

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- 2 -

and (2) that no one in the USG will promise that the freeze will end when the aid bill passes.

As I see it, the way to dampen Israeli suspicions would be to do now some combination of the following: (1) quietly to lift the freeze on items to be bought for cash from commercial suppliers (probably less than \$20 million); and (2) to say secretly but officially that we will lift the suspension on other items from past deals in which USG money is involved as soon as (a) the aid authorization bill becomes law or (b) the aid appropriation is passed. Even (1) by itself would help. At the same time I would relax the suspension on a few comparable items for a couple of friendly Arab states.

This action would in no way pre-empt the basic policy study of our longer-term Mid-East arms policy. That would continue to concentrate on future arms transfers. This decision would affect only a limited number of long-approved transactions now frozen. Nor would this action undercut our line with the Congress that we continue to act with the utmost restraint.

You wouldn't want to do this without talking again with Bob McNamara. If you are concerned enough about mounting Israeli feeling, I would suggest putting this subject on our next Tuesday lunch agenda. I had planned to re-open the question at the first Tuesday lunch after the Congressional conference on the aid bill ended. But now that is going to hang over until early October, and the appropriations process will reach into November. We held the Israelis off with the \$3 million in early August on the assumption that we might be able to raise the freeze some time in early September (although we made no promises). Now that the pressure is mounting, it might be worth taking another reading.

W. W. Rostow

Put it on the Tuesday agenda _____
See me _____

P.S. I think Evron's mention of the "hold-up" on licenses for the \$3 million we have released is unfair. Actually, the Israelis themselves in making up their own list put on some items with a long lead time and have since asked to shift to some that are more immediately available. Whatever delay that may have caused is their fault since Defense accepted their list just as they wrote it.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-362
By CB, NARA, Date 4-18-95

92

CHRONOLOGY

- June 8 The NSC Special Committee with your approval
and decided to suspend all military shipments to
June 14 everyone in the Middle East and then refined
 guidelines for the bureaucracy.
- July 14 The NSC Special Committee considered a list
 from State-Defense recommending exceptions
 to the freeze. We accepted Secretary McNamara's
 judgment that it would be better to wait until after
 his testimony on the military aid bill.
- Early Mac Bundy with your approval agreed to release
August \$3 million worth of the items Israel most
 urgently needed on the understanding that Israel's
 friends would take up the cudgels against the
 Church amendment to the aid bill.
- Aug. 22 The Tuesday lunch group considered similar exceptions
 recommendation signed by Secretaries Rusk and
 McNamara, but decided not to move when Secretary
 McNamara revised his recommendation.
- Sept. 5-8 We discussed with State and Defense several positive
 statements we might make to General Weizman:
 (1) confirming that the Skyhawks would be delivered
 on schedule beginning in December; (2) promising the
 rest of the \$14 million credit you approved on 22 May
 as soon as the aid bill passed; (3) unfreezing all
 purely commercial-purchase items. We thought
 these words might take the heat off us for awhile,
 but Secretary McNamara recommended we stick
 to our position.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 20, 1967
Wednesday - 5:10 p.m.

Walt
Give me your
reaction + comment
9b
C

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Two matters from a long talk with Eppie Evron today.

(1) He is encountering a great deal of suspicion and doubt in the Jewish community about the Administration's position before June 5. He has tried to counter it, but he finds that people who have talked to State get a much more cautious view of what American policy was in the pre-war weeks; not enough sense of your commitment has gotten through. Eppie would like to know what he could say -- with firmness -- that would satisfy the people he talks to, and square with your needs. I would like to talk to you about this at your convenience.

(2) He is also encountering a series of obstacles throughout the government, that indicates a de facto policy of holding Israel at arm's length until she changes her position vis-a-vis the Arabs. Items are:


-- the cash sale of 18 Piper cubs, which State said needed no export license, is being held up in Commerce "for study."

-- the hold-up on licenses for the \$3 million in equipment and parts, and for the attack aircraft.

-- apparently the Army, which used to make training materials available to the Israelis, isn't doing so.

Eppie says these things in themselves have irritated Israelis, and that the irritation is compounded by the absence of any clear signal from the U. S. Government that they are part of a policy to cut the Israelis off until they become more flexible. The attached news stories indicate that there is such a policy, but according to Eppie it has not been spelled out to the Israelis.

I remember Dean Acheson saying in 1960 that the U. S. should have handled Castro, not by denunciation and threat, but by lousing up the customs and visa and commercial processes -- getting the point across by studied bureaucratic inaction and bumbling. Maybe that's what we're doing now. If that is the case, it's having an effect; and my antennae tell me that it ought not to be prolonged beyond the point where it becomes politically damaging.



Harry C. McPherson, Jr.

Attachment

Israel Firmness Bars Hopes for Mideast Peace

By WILLIAM R. FRYE
Special to The Star

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.—The United States, still working behind the scenes to advance a long-range Arab-Israeli peace settlement, is disturbed at what it sees as a hardening of the Israeli position, informed sources said today.

Other diplomats friendly to Israel said they, too, were concerned at the trend.

It may be embarrassing to defend Israel's position in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly, beginning Monday, they warned.

Until late in August, Arab states were widely blamed here for taking a rigid and extreme position on a Mideast settlement, and Israel was credited with considerable flexibility.

These postures are fast being reversed, it is felt here.

Firmness Noted

Sources friendly to Israel point to what they consider three conspicuous rigidities in Jerusalem's position:

1. Insistence that peace negotiations be held directly between Arab states and Israel, not through intermediaries. This would force the Arabs to recognize Israel, de facto, from the outset.

2. Refusal to negotiate on the future of the city of Jerusalem.

3. Refusal to readmit to Israeli-controlled territory more than a small percentage of the "new" Arab refugees who fled during the June fighting.

These stands are seriously complicating the effort to get a long-range peace settlement under way, it is felt.

Reject Latin Plan

In mid-July, Arab U.N. delegates unanimously rejected a Latin American peace plan, endorsed by the United States and the Soviet Union and presented to the Arabs by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.

As late as mid-August, extremists in the Arab bloc, notably Algeria and Syria, were considered to be still in the saddle.

But late last month, under persistent nudging by Yugoslav President Tito and Jordanian King Hussein, President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R. swung over to what is regarded as the moderate wing of the Arab league.

Position Readjusted

With this wing newly influential, a Khartoum summit meeting of Arab leaders in late August accepted much of the Latin peace plan, and proposed to seek a "political" (negotiated), adjustment with Israel.

This appeared to mean they would bargain for a withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from positions captured in June, not seek to drive the Israelis out in a new war.

Simultaneously, several Arab states, including Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Kuwait, put out feelers for renewed diplomatic relations with the United States.

They appeared to be turning to the west, rather than to the Soviet Union, for help in obtaining an Israeli troop withdrawal. Soviet arms shipments tapered off.

Israeli Line Hardens

At about this time, Israel appeared to harden. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who previously had pleaded eloquently for peace negotiations, denied there had been any moderation at Khartoum and insisted on a directly negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement.

He also rejected a compromise proposed by Tito, and scorned the Yugoslav leader for unwarranted interference in affairs which, Eban implied, did not directly concern him.

Israel refused to extend the deadline for return of Arab refugees to the west bank of the Jordan except for approximately 10 percent of the total whose applications had been already approved.

More than 150,000 destitute Arabs thus were added to the roll of homeless war victims. Previously, there had been well over 1 million refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war denied an opportunity to return.

Insistence by Israel that the reunification of Jerusalem under Israeli control is unnegotiable is not a new position. Israeli diplomats have taken this stand virtually from the beginning.

Israel's firmness is, however, a disappointment to Washington and London, informed sources say. Together with Ottawa and other capitals, they had publicly and privately urged Israel to reconsider.

Israel argues that there must be a final, definitive peace settlement this time, not just another improvised modus vivendi.

She refuses to withdraw her armies or consider readmitting refugees until the Arabs are willing to negotiate such a settlement.

Sept. 15 '67

Even. Star



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Jewish Telegraphic Agency

DAILY NEWS BULLETIN

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Vol. XXXIV - Fiftieth Year

Tuesday, September 19, 1967

No. 181

Israel Expects Skyhawks, But State, Defense Say Issue is Under Review

WASHINGTON, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Department of Defense officials said today, in comment on reports that Israel had been assured two squadrons of the Skyhawk jet attack bombers would be delivered to Israel this Autumn, that no decision had been made on the shipment of these planes.

State Department officials said that no shipment of the Skyhawks to Israel was presently contemplated and that there had been no change in the situation since Sept. 8 when Secretary of State Dean Rusk said the question of arms shipments to the Middle East was under review.

The Administration proclaimed an embargo on arms shipments to the Middle East on June 5 when the Arab-Israeli war broke out, but Defense Department officials said today that the United States might relax this embargo soon, permitting shipment of arms to Israel and possibly other Middle Eastern countries, including Jordan, but they stressed that the whole question remained under review.

Israeli sources here said today that the Government of Israel had contracted in the Spring of 1966 to purchase a number of combat aircraft from the United States and that there was no reason to believe that these aircraft will not be delivered in accordance with this agreement.

Israel, it was recalled, ordered the two squadrons of the Skyhawks at that time. It was understood that, because of American priority needs, the planes were not to be delivered until this Autumn.

Licenses May Depend on Israel's 'Flexibility,' State Dept. Hints

In a later development today, State Department sources said that export licenses for the jet bombers sought by Israel would not be automatically granted, but that they would depend on various political factors and on Israeli flexibility.

It was made clear that, among other considerations to be weighed, is the degree to which Israel accepts U.S. views on the occupied territories, particularly the west bank of the Jordan River and East Jerusalem. Another factor is the treatment of Arab refugees and their freedom to return to the west bank area. An additional consideration will be the Israeli attitude towards forthcoming United Nations decisions -- if the U.S. feels such decisions contribute to peace and justice for all the peoples of the Middle East.

Washington believes that, if the U.N. agrees on desirable resolutions to pacify Middle East tensions, by means of a step-by-step movement away from the present cease-fire status, then some "realistic" concessions may be required of Israel. The U.S. continues to be mindful of the need to avoid returning to the circumstances which prevailed prior to June 5, but officials today referred to another need -- for compromise by Israel, as well as by the Arabs.

(In Israel, all newspapers prominently featured reports from Washington that the United States would honor its commitment to deliver the Skyhawk bombers but there was no local comment. It was recalled that Foreign Minister Abba S. Eban told a press conference two weeks ago that he hoped the United States would supply the arms it had promised and that dialogue on the question was continuing. He said then that the facts in the matter would emerge later in the year.)

New Plant Will Meet All of Israel's Jet Aircraft Engine Needs

TEL AVIV, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- The cornerstone was placed today in the settlement of Beth Shemesh for a multimillion dollar plant to construct jet aircraft engines. The plant is the joint venture of Josef Schidlowski, head of SNMCA, the largest aircraft engine builder in France, and the State of Israel and has an initial capitalization of \$3,000,000. The new plant will not only meet all of Israel's jet engine requirements but produce for the export market. It will employ about 500 workers.

The Schidlowski firm builds turbo-jet engines for many types of aircraft including the French Fouga Magister, one of the planes with which the Israel Air Force is equipped. Mr. Schidlowski came here from Paris for the dedication ceremonies which were also attended by Government representatives.

Russians, Arabs Renew Attack on Israel as Emergency Assembly Session Concludes

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., Sept. 18. (JTA) -- The emergency special session of the General Assembly, which reconvened here today, adopted a resolution to pass the Middle East crisis on to the regular Assembly session which will convene tomorrow. The resolution, sponsored by Austria, Finland and Sweden, called on the regular Assembly to give the debate on the Middle East crisis "high priority." The measure was passed, as soon as the Assembly opened, by a vote of 94 in favor, none against, and two abstentions. Israel voted in favor of the resolution.

After the voting, various delegations took the floor to explain their votes, with the Arab states and the Soviet bloc maintaining their intransigent attitude against Israel.

Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko repeated his previous accusation that Israel had committed "a criminal conspiracy carefully prepared to ensure changes in the Middle East backed by imperialist powers in order to weaken the Arab regimes in the Middle East." He said of Israel that "her ruling circles are full of hatred towards anything which is progressive and latest developments have unmasked the plot of Washington, London and Bonn who are her staunch supporters."

The Soviet representative said that Israel's leaders do not intend to heed the voice of reason and withdraw from occupied territories. The Secretary-General's report on Jerusalem is "new proof" of Israel's defiance of the United Nations, he said. "Israel does not intend to pay attention to resolutions of the General Assembly which were adopted with a decisive majority," he added. He called Israel's reply on the question of Jerusalem "in open contempt of the U.N. and mockery of law and the U.N. Charter." The Soviet ambassador accused the United States and some NATO powers of protecting Israel which "twice in ten years committed aggression in the Middle East." Mr. Fedorenko concluded by reaffirming his support of the Arab countries in the next General Assembly.

United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg said he regretted that the Soviet ambassador showed harshness and tried to rewrite U.N. history. "The time has come," Mr. Goldberg said, "for healing and harmonizing our views on the Middle East and not for harsh words."

Israel Accuses Soviet on Middle East, Condemns Jordan Rule of Old City

Israel Ambassador Gideon Rafael, denounced the Soviet "propaganda assault" saying that it had been rejected twice by the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Soviet representative, he said, was turning a blind eye on the realities of the Middle East and the decisions of the U.N. "Repetition does not convert falsehood to truth," Mr. Rafael said. He accused the Soviet Union of grave responsibility for the situation in the Middle East, saying that its representative never discussed the question of the belligerency and hostility of its Arab allies towards Israel, but instead it inflamed Arab passions.

Ambassador Rafael said that "certain speakers in the Assembly this morning tried to exploit for political warfare the question of Jerusalem." He reviewed the actions of Jordan for the last 19 years, which destroyed Jewish places of worship, expelled its Jewish population and prevented access to holy places. He recalled Israel's call to King Hussein on June 5 to desist from starting a war against Israel, but to no avail.

Mr. Rafael repeated Israel's position that only an undivided Jerusalem "will assure religious freedom to all." He mentioned the decisions of the Khartoum Arab summit conference of no peace, no negotiations and no recognition of Israel as the proof for no change in the Arab attitude toward Israel.

The Israeli ambassador concluded by calling on U.N. members to open a new page in the history of the Middle East by urging the Arab countries to negotiate directly with Israel as "the only practical way."

Israeli, Jordanian Representatives to Talk Today on Further Repatriation of Arabs

JERUSALEM, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Israeli and Jordanian representatives will meet on Wednesday to make arrangements for resumption of the repatriation of residents of the west bank who fled to Jordan during the June fighting. Israel had previously approved the return of 6,500 refugees and their crossing of the Jordan was to have begun last Sunday. The Jordanians, however, requested a postponement at the last minute until Thursday.

Gen. Dayan Tells Israeli Troops Immediate Objective Is To Shift Cease-Fire to Peace Talks

JERUSALEM, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told the men and women of Israel's defense forces today that their country's immediate objective was to convert the present cease-fire into a permanent peace with the Arab world, including that part of the Arab world living within Israel's borders.

In a message for Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year, transmitted through the Chief of Staff, Gen. Itzhak Rabin, Gen. Dayan stressed that, to attain this objective, Israel must hold its new frontiers and deter its enemies from any thought that they could oust and destroy the Israelis by force.

"Israel," Gen. Dayan said, "is facing a crucial year and the tasks facing her are not easy. In the past, we knew how to guard our frontiers during border incidents. Now, our borders have changed, but there is no doubt we shall keep these as well."

Hadassah Hospital Is Providing Medical Services for West Bank Arabs

MIAMI BEACH, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- The Hadassah Medical Organization has agreed to treat cancer victims among the Arab refugees in Israeli-held territories. Prof. Kalman J. Mann, its director general in Israel, announced today in an address before the 53rd national convention of Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization.

Prof. Mann said that the medical organization entered into an agreement with the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA), at the request of the Israel Ministry of Health, to provide care for cancer patients on the west bank of the Jordan River -- for whom UNRWA is responsible. He said that Hadassah has already ordered a new 35 million volt betatron machine at a cost of \$250,000, to handle the new cases. He said that 200 Arab patients from East Jerusalem and the west bank area are now being treated daily at the Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center at Ein Karem. They comprise about 20 percent of the total number of patients treated in the outpatient department, he added.

Prof. Mann said that "new vistas" of medical education are now being opened to Arab doctors, nurses and para-medical personnel through training and clinical programs being provided for them by the Hadassah Medical Organization.

At a later session of the convention today, Rabbi Marshall T. Meyer, rector of the Seminario Rabbinico Latino-Americano in Buenos Aires, urged American Jews to engage in an alliance with "the hundreds of thousands of spiritually and culturally underdeveloped South American Jews" in order to "save them from assimilation."

Rabbi Meyer said that "North American Jewry is not taking Latin American Jewry seriously enough and the United States Government is not taking Latin America seriously enough." "There are 850,000 Jews south of the Rio Grande who are desperately in need of intellectual and spiritual leadership," he said. "...All of this in spite of the fact that they live in freedom and relative prosperity." He added that the "prime danger" facing the 500,000 Jews of Argentina was not anti-Semitism but "Jewish indifference and assimilation."

At the conclusion of the session, Mrs. Leonard D. Cohen of Westport, Conn., national chairman of the Henrietta Szold Award Committee, presented the 1967 award to Dr. Miachel E. Debakey, noted Texas heart surgeon, in recognition of his "fearless inquiries into the intricate workings of the human heart."

Ex-Chancellor Erhard of West Germany to Visit Israel Next Month

BONN, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard will go to Israel at the end of next month for a "private" visit as a guest of the Israeli Government, it was announced here today. He will be accompanied by his wife.

It was Mr. Erhard, when he headed the West German Government, who decided, in May of 1965, to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. Earlier, under the chancellorship of the late Dr. Konrad Adenauer, he showed himself a friend of Israel during his tenure as Minister of Economy. Prof. Erhard was also one of the German-leaders who helped work out the German-Israel reparations agreement, in 1952 and 1953 -- a pact under which Israel obtained \$800 million worth of material goods and services.

Eighty Outstanding Americans Call for Direct Arab-Israel Peace Talks

NEW YORK, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Eighty American leaders in science, education, literature, law, economics, art, architecture and public affairs called on the United States Government today to initiate within the United Nations, and outside the world organization, actions to induce the Arab states to enter into direct peace negotiations with Israel. Sixteen of the signatories to the statement are Nobel Laureates. One of the latter, Dr. I.I. Rabi, University Professor Emeritus at Columbia University, and winner of the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1944, transmitted the appeal today to President Johnson on behalf of all the signatories.

Calling Israel "a great human and creative source," the statement declared that, to preserve and encourage Israel, "is surely a major responsibility of the civilized world." "Enabled to develop in peace," the signatories stated, "Israel's contribution to the region and to the world may rival in fruitfulness and enduring quality that of the ancient state in the days of the Bible. Once peace settlements have been reached, it becomes possible to tackle the formidable human and development problems of the region, which have resisted solution until now."

"In fact and in principle," the statement declared, "Israel's security is bound up with our own. Without peace settlements entered into by Israel and each of the warring states, we are only storing up fuel for new outbreaks, with no assurance that a new encounter can be contained or restricted either to conventional weapons or to regional states. In the delimited atmosphere of a direct confrontation between the parties, insulated against the competitions and pressures of major or minor states, hard reality may prove more effective counsel and impetus for a settlement than the public debates of the past 20 years."

Five of the signatories had initiated the appeal, stating its purpose as "to support our Government and others seeking a settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, which is realistic and capable of stabilizing the area after 20 years and three wars." The five, who made the statement public today, were: Dr. Louis F. Fieser, professor of chemistry at Harvard University; Dr. Maurice Goldhaber, a member of the National Academy of Sciences; Dr. Robert Hofstadter, professor of physics at Stanford University and 1961 Nobel Prize winner; Dr. Rabi; and Dr. David Rittenberg, chairman of the biochemistry department at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons.

Arson Suspected in Fire that Damaged Synagogue in London Suburbs

LONDON, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Fire of undetermined origin caused damage of about 5,000 pounds sterling (\$14,400) yesterday when a conflagration gutted part of the ground floor and destroyed the entire roof of the Kingsbury Synagogue in Middlesex. The house of worship was in process of being rebuilt, and was scheduled for reopening early next year. A nearby resident told police she had seen two men running from the site as the fire broke out. Detectives are investigating the fire but have, as yet, reported no arrests. While the synagogue was afire, a small blaze also broke out at a Christian chapel in the vicinity.

Quebec Jewish Schools Seek to Qualify for Government Financial Aid

MONTREAL, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Negotiations will begin shortly to make Jewish day schools in Montreal eligible for Quebec governmental aid covering most of the per pupil costs of education in the schools under a new provincial law, Jewish education officials here said today. The new law permits private educational institutions to be affiliated with the "public" school systems, through coordination of activities and finances. Under the confessional system of elementary and secondary education in Quebec, "public" schools are either under Protestant or Catholic auspices.

Under the new law, qualified schools are eligible for provincial financing by public funds and school bus transportation for pupils living a mile or more from the school. The aid does not cover Hebrew or religious instruction in such private Jewish schools. However, only about five percent of teaching is in the non-secular category of Jewish day schools which provide Hebrew or religious courses, education officials said.

The Jewish People's Schools, the Jewish Peretz Schools, the Rabbinical College of Canada and the Beth Jacob School for Girls have applied to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal for affiliation and more schools are expected to follow suit soon. There are about 5,000 children attending Jewish day schools in Montreal. The Jewish day schools are following the pattern of the United Talmud Torah Elementary School of Chomedey, which reached an agreement earlier this month with the Protestant School Board of Greater San Martin.

Under terms of the law, qualified day schools will receive \$350 grants per pupil annually for elementary and secondary school levels. The requirement that Hebrew studies and religious instruction will still have to be financed by the parents is not a problem, according to Dr. Samuel Lewin, associate director of education for the Canadian Jewish Congress, because the principal financial burden stems from secular courses.

Chicago Community Raised More Than \$11 Million for Israel Emergency Fund

CHICAGO, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- This community has raised \$11,127 million for the Israel Emergency Fund and an additional \$5,841 million for Regular and Rescue Funds, Rabbi Ralph Simon, general chairman of the Chicago Combined Jewish Appeal announced to a meeting of volunteer workers.

Rabbi Simon said a person-to-person effort would be launched to complete the Appeal's regular campaign for \$6.5 million and to secure contributions again in 1967 to the regular campaign -- exclusive of the Israel Emergency Fund -- from all who contributed last year but had not yet done so this year.

David Silbert, president of Chicago's Jewish Welfare Fund, a partner in the Appeal, announced that \$10.9 million in cash had been sent to the national United Jewish Appeal since June 1.

Young Judaea Requests Sponsorship of Hadassah

NEW YORK, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Young Judaea, the oldest and largest Zionist youth movement in the United States, has formally requested the sponsorship of Hadassah, the Women's Zionist Organization of America, it was announced today by Bernard Weisberg, national director of Young Judaea.

The request was made because of the impending dissolution of the American Zionist Youth Commission, a partnership between Hadassah and the Zionist Organization of America, which had sponsored Young Judaea since 1941. Hadassah has expressed its willingness to become the sole sponsor of "an expanded and enlarged Young Judaea, including a structure on the young adult level," Mr. Weisberg said. Young Judaea has 10,000 members in the age-range from nine to 18 years.

Rubenstein, Leader of Jewish Bloc in Prewar Lithuanian Parliament, Dead

TEL AVIV, Sept. 18. (JTA) -- Funeral services will be held here tomorrow for Reuben Rubinstein, a prominent leader of Lithuanian Jewry before World War II, who died here this weekend at the age of 77. Mr. Rubinstein was head of the Jewish faction of the Lithuanian Parliament before World War II.

Mr. Rubinstein came to Palestine after the war. He was well known in this country as a Yiddish commentator on Kol Israel, the Government-operated radio network. In his commentaries, he reported and interpreted world and Israeli news to the large sectors of the Israeli population who understand Yiddish much better than Hebrew.

10

September 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have received seven messages of congratulations on Lynda's engagement from foreign governments and I expect we will receive more in the next week. In line with our previous handling of this type message, I suggest we give State a standard language message which they can use to answer these for you. We would, of course, monitor them from my office for any that might require a more personal reply.

Suggested Standard Reply

"My family and I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in extending congratulations on the engagement of my daughter Lynda.

It is indeed a happy moment for Mrs. Johnson and me and we wish to take this occasion to extend to you our warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Approve _____

See Me _____

One that I would suggest a more personal reply to is from Prime Minister Sato (attached), since he will soon be coming here for a visit.

Suggested Reply to Prime Minister Sato

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

My family and I deeply appreciate your thoughtfulness in extending congratulations on the occasion of my daughter's engagement. We look forward to meeting with you and Mrs. Sato during your forthcoming visit to the United States.

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Approve _____

Use above _____

See Me _____

We will send the originals of all exchanges to Bess Abell for Lynda's scrapbook.

W. W. Rostow

102
Tokyo,

September 13, 1967

Dear Mr. President,

My wife and I are delighted to hear the news of the engagement of your daughter, Miss Lynda Bird Johnson. May we extend, on this auspicious occasion, our warmest congratulations to you and Mrs. Johnson. We also wish the newly engaged every happiness.

Sincerely,

Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan

~~W W A~~
11

Pres file

Friday, September 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a message of good wishes to the Pope on the occasion of his 70th birthday, September 26. You will remember that you recent a message to the Pope on his illness, from which he appears to be at least temporarily recovered.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

RHU:em

11a

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

Your Holiness:

I take great pleasure in sending you my sincere good wishes and those of the American people on the occasion of your seventieth birthday.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Holiness
Pope Paul VI
Vatican City

12

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file

September 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is today's Situation
Report on Viet Nam politics.

W. Rostow Rostow

12a

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 22, 1967

DETENTION OF AU TRUONG THANH

Press reports of the manhandling of Au Truong Thanh by Vietnamese police have attracted Congressional and press attention here. The Embassy confirms the basic elements of the story reported in the press, namely that Au Truong Thanh has been called in for questioning by the Vietnamese police regarding alleged Viet Cong connections and regarding his application for travel to the U. S. The Embassy also confirms that excessive police methods were used in getting Thanh to police headquarters for questioning. There are late press reports indicating that the police chief, Gen. Loan, has apologized for the use of force with Thanh and that Thanh has been released. We have no confirmation of the latter report.

Bunker has told Thieu that the good image which the Vietnamese Government had created through its handling of the elections should not be tarnished by acts which needlessly left it open to criticism.

We have instructed Bunker to inform Thieu that the state of U. S. public opinion will not permit the U. S. Government to appear to condone the police's handling of Thanh. Bunker is also to make clear to Thieu that the Vietnamese Government's investigation of Thanh should be pursued quietly and with full regard for accepted legal practices.

In answer to press questioning today, the Department spokesman expressed the view that, without prejudging all aspects of the matter, it appeared that unnecessarily severe police measures were used.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-363

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

By 18, NARA, Date 1-13-95

WWR

13

See file

Friday, September 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a warm message to be conveyed through Governor Harriman to Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands who will be the guest of honor at a dinner of the Holland Society of New York on Monday, September 25. (Harriman will be the evening's main speaker.)

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

RHU:em

SUGGESTED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

I am delighted to take this opportunity, through our distinguished Ambassador at Large, Averell Harriman, to pass on my warmest best wishes to his Royal Highness, Prince Bernhard, at the Holland Society of New York's dinner in his honor. His untiring efforts to further international understanding are an inspiration to us all. His presence among you on this happy occasion symbolizes the close historical and sentimental ties which have always united our two countries and which, I am sure, will continue for generations to come.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~Missouri~~
14
Over file

Friday, September 22, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached for your signature is the instrument of ratification for the consular convention with France signed in Paris July 18, 1966. The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on September 18, 1967.

W. W. Rostow

RHU:mst

15

Pres file

Friday - September 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telegram to Diaz Ordaz on Hurricane Beulah

To deal with the heavy damage caused by hurricane Beulah in the Matamoros-Brownsville area, the local zone Commander of the Mexican 8th Military District, Lieutenant General Gomez Cueva, and Mr. George Hastings, OEP Regional Director and Federal Disaster Relief Coordinator, informally agreed to assist each other in disaster relief operations across the border as necessary. This meant, in effect, an open border, permitting disaster relief personnel and victims to be helped regardless of nationality or location. The understanding of the Federal authorities of both governments was obtained for this action.

The significance of the cooperation lies not so much in the amount of aid exchanged as in achieving for the first time an open border understanding to deal with an emergency situation.

You might want to send the attached message to President Diaz Ordaz.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Proposed telegram to President Diaz Ordaz

15a

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO MEXICAN PRESIDENT
DIAZ ORDAZ ON HURRICANE BEULAH

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to learn of the cooperative arrangements worked out by our respective regional, state and local agencies in the Brownsville-Matamoros area to alleviate the suffering caused by hurricane Beulah. It is another inspiring example of the friendship and unity which exists between our two peoples.

Lyndon B. Johnson

16

Friday - September 22, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Ambassador Crockett reports in the attached cable that President Somoza has finally decided to give public recognition to outside help -- including ours -- during the polio epidemic.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Report from Ambassador
Crockett, September 21.

UNCLASSIFIED

16a

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR CROCKETT IN MANAGUA, NICARAGUA,

(no. 425), dated September 21, 1967

SUBJECT: Recognition for U.S. Effort in Recent Polio Epidemic

1. Urcuyo, the Vice President and Minister of Public Health, has invited me to participate in a September 26 ceremony in which the Government of Nicaragua plans to give full recognition to all Nicaraguan and foreign persons and institutions which rendered assistance during the recent polio epidemic.
2. The English translation of the invitation is as follows:

"It gives me great pleasure to invite you to a solemn national appreciation ceremony that this Ministry will hold for national and foreign persons and institutions who helped the Government and people of Nicaragua in the fight against the recent polio epidemic, on Tuesday, September 26, at 10:30 a.m., at the Ministry of Public Health. Please confirm your attendance.

With highest consideration,

(signed) Dr. Francisco Urcuyo Mallano,
Vice President of the Republic and
Minister of Public Health."

1.7

September 22, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the cumulative figures for killed
and wounded that you requested.

W. W. Rostow

17a

U.S. FATALITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(January 1961 - September 16, 1967)

Killed	11,022
Wounded or Injured	
A. Died of wounds	1,310
B. Non-fatal wounds	
Hospital care required	44,324
Hospital care not required	<u>39,119</u>
Total Wounded	84,743

Of the 44,324 wounded who required hospitalization, approximately 90 percent, or 39,890, have been or are expected to be sufficiently recovered for return to duty after their period of hospitalization.

Therefore, of 84,743 wounded, 79,000 have returned or are expected to return to duty; that is, 39,119 plus 39,890.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, September 21, 1967 -- 6:30 PM

18

Plus file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho
(11:30 AM tomorrow)

This is a short, informal office call. No lunch or dinner is involved.

Nick Katzenbach's general briefing memorandum is at Tab A. State's suggested talking points are at Tab B. Biographic information on Jonathan is at Tab C.

Jonathan is the first Prime Minister of Lesotho (Les - soo - too), a tiny independent enclave completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Lesotho is firmly aligned with the West and generally votes with us in the UN except where it would involve trouble with South Africa, which could bankrupt her overnight at will. We have a few very small AID projects in Lesotho (\$43,000 worth), plus about \$100,000 in scholarship grants to her university. We also help with food through the World Food Program. Except for small amounts of PL 480, we can't do more as long as the Congress keeps enacting strict limits on the number of aided countries.

Jonathan will want to tell you about the problems of a country of blacks in the middle of apartheid. He knows that we can't help much under present circumstances, but he will ask you to remember him if and when conditions change. He will also tell you about his speech to the General Assembly on Monday in which he will call for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. (His line is strictly pro-talks. He doesn't lecture us; he urges both sides to find a way to the table.)

In addition to a general discussion of Vietnam, you may wish to make some of the following points:

- We know it must be terribly difficult to live with the fact of economic dependence on South Africa, but we hope that Lesotho can carry on necessary trade and economic cooperation while maintaining her independence and freedom of expression. We completely understand the necessity for Jonathan to temper his foreign policy in order to deal with the economic realities of his position.
- Our direct help to Lesotho will be limited to food for the foreseeable future. We will try to be as generous as possible.

- 2 -

- We will continue to keep Lesotho's interests in mind in using our influence in the World Bank and other international aid institutions.
- We congratulate Lesotho on its first anniversary of independence (October 4). She has already taken her place at the UN and elsewhere in the community of responsible nations.

W. W. Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 19, 1967

3528

Hamilton
C. Moore

18a

16097

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Tabaia Jonathan
of the Kingdom of Lesotho

I enclose material for your use when you receive Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho at 11:30 a.m. on Friday, September 22.

The Prime Minister is in the United States to deliver an address at the 22nd UNGA in New York and to make an informal call upon you. This will be the first time a Lesotho Prime Minister has met a President of the United States. Following the White House call, the Prime Minister and his party will be guests of Under Secretary Katzenbach for luncheon at the State Department. The normal protocol courtesies will be extended but on a subdued level. The official party will stay at Blair House for one night.

Prime Minister Jonathan has reaffirmed on several occasions certain basic policies enunciated a year ago, when Lesotho became fully independent. These include support for a non-racial society, universal adult suffrage, the perpetuation of the monarchy and, in the international field, the avoidance of hostilities in the settlement of disputes. In Lesotho, the Prime Minister faces a strong opposition party. His position is weakened because of serious differences that exist between him and his King. He is criticized by many at home and abroad for the close ties he maintains with the Republic of South Africa, which completely encircles Lesotho. In spite of these difficulties, it appears the Prime Minister is gaining support for his moderate program. In addition to being Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan holds the portfolios of external affairs, defense and security, and planning and development.

After addressing the 22nd UNGA next week in New York, the Prime Minister will proceed to the Peace Corps training center near San Diego to meet the first contingent of 90 volunteers which will leave for Lesotho in December.

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Group 4

Downgraded at 3-year intervals;
declassified after 12 years.

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By isp, NARA, Date 1-13-95


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The Prime Minister is highly gratified that you are able to receive him. It is his desire, rather than to raise substantive issues or make specific requests for assistance, to describe in his own words the problems of his small country, their causes and his hopes for alleviating them. He is intrigued by the PL 480 program, which has benefited many of the less developed countries. He understands why we are presently unable to enter into new bi-lateral agreements with any African countries. He may ask that you remember Lesotho for special consideration if and when United States aid can once more be made available as in the past.

Ambassador Symington will accompany Prime Minister Jonathan from Andrews Air Force Base to the Ellipse. At the White House, The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Palmer 2nd, the Country Director for Southern African Affairs, G. Edward Clark and Horace F. Byrne, Country Desk Officer will be present to assist with the informal greetings.

Biographies of Prime Minister Jonathan and the members of his party have previously been furnished Mr. Rostow's office for use in connection with the visit.


The Under Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Schedule.
2. Background Paper and **Talking** Points.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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BACKGROUND PAPER AND TALKING POINTS FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER JONATHAN OF LESOTHO

Lesotho is a poor country with few known resources. It suffers from serious over-population, a scarcity of arable land and, as a consequence, heavy dependence on the Republic of South Africa, which completely encircles it. In spite of these handicaps, Lesotho in its first year of full independence has adhered to its stated policies. As the duly elected head of a constitutional monarchy, the Prime Minister has consolidated his position in the face of a sizeable opposition by assuming the portfolios of foreign affairs, defense and security, and planning and development. He has firmly aligned his country with the West. The voting record of Lesotho at the United Nations, except on delicate issues such as apartheid and South West Africa, generally supports United States positions.

United States assistance to Lesotho, which began about a year before independence, has not been unsubstantial. It has been concentrated mainly in the following activities: In 1965-66, following three years of drought, \$1.5 million worth of grains was sent to Lesotho through the World Food Program. Another \$1.45 million is programmed for FY'68. A university near Maseru, supported co-operatively by and serving Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, has received scholarship grants of \$100,000 through AID for each of the last three years. A variety of small, self-help projects has been started with \$43,000 in AID funds. Except for the latter category no further assistance from AID is contemplated, owing to legislative restrictions. The Peace Corps will commence work in Lesotho this December with about 90 volunteers for which \$1.1 million has been allotted. An independence gift from the people of the United States in the form of a radio transmitter has been procured at a cost of \$100,000.

Lesotho continues to receive budgetary aid from the United Kingdom at an annual level of about \$9 million. There is little prospect this amount will be increased. Through private agencies and the United Nations Development Program, technical advisers have been made available to the government and local institutions in Lesotho. The Republic of South Africa furnishes employment each year at its mines and industrial centers for an estimated 200,000 Basuto males. Remittances and goods sent back by this labor force constitute a major factor in the

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-2-

economy of Lesotho. It is for this reason principally that Prime Minister Jonathan must be sensitive, if not always responsive, to the political and economic posture of South Africa, despite the vocal criticism this brings down on him from more radical elements in Lesotho and many black African states to the north.

Prime Minister Jonathan will speak next Monday at the UNGA on several major issues. On Viet Nam, he will make a plea first for a halt in the hostilities and then for a negotiated settlement. It is not clear what other questions he will discourse upon; however, as indicated above, his position will be generally consonant with that of the U.S.

TALKING POINTS:

1. South Africa-Lesotho Relations

Chief Jonathan will describe to you the seemingly insurmountable problems besetting the economic future of his country. He may make the point that only through substantial outside assistance can Lesotho hope to counter the political pressure on it from South Africa, owing to Lesotho's great dependence on the former for employment, markets and developmental funds.

Suggested Response

You may wish to say it is doubtful that outside assistance could greatly modify a pattern of trade almost entirely dictated by the geographical relationship of the two countries. This should not, however, affect Lesotho's desire or right to self-determination and expression.

2. Prospective U.S. Assistance

The Prime Minister knows of the legislative restrictions which make it impossible at present for the United States to enter into new bi-lateral aid agreements with any African states. He will ask you "to remember Lesotho" if the present restrictions on U.S. aid are removed. He may, in addition, mention the Oxbow irrigation and hydro-electric scheme. This project is one that has been discussed for years. It looks now as though South Africa, which would be a major beneficiary of the development, is taking a serious interest in getting the plans underway.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

Suggested Response

You may wish to express an appreciation for Lesotho's serious economic situation and signify that the United States will continue its interest in Lesotho's progress. As to the Oxbow scheme, you might point out that whereas the World Bank and South Africa are the logical sources of financing for such a project, U.S. private contractors will surely hope for the opportunity to bid on certain phases of the construction when the time comes.

3. Lesotho and the United Nations

The Prime Minister may explain his stance on some of the major issues coming up for debate at the 22nd UNGA, e.g., Viet Nam, Arms Control.

Suggested Response

You may wish to take note of Lesotho's record of voting during its first year of membership in the United Nations and express your satisfaction with Lesotho's stance, which has been generally favorable to the United States position.

4. Point You May Wish to Raise

To avoid a prolonged conversation on world affairs, you could:

a. recall that October 4 marks the first anniversary of the full independence of Lesotho and

b. congratulate the Prime Minister on administration of the internal affairs of his country, noting his success in adhering to a policy of non-racialism in spite of the pressures from South Africa and in maintaining a position of plausible neutrality in the divisive issues affecting many parts of Southern Africa.

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**Biographic Note: Chief Leabua Jonathan
Prime Minister**

Born: 1914 in Leribe District, Basutoland (Lesotho), son of the late Chief Jonathan Molapo of Leribe.

Education: Attended the Paris Evangelical Mission Society School in Leribe. Passed Standard VII but had to leave school when his father died.

Career: Chief Leabua Jonathan worked in South Africa from 1933 to 1937, when he was recalled by Chief Jonathan Mathealira of Tsikoane to assist in the administration of his Ward. Chief Jonathan remained in this position until 1950. In 1951 he was appointed the Assessor to the Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Patrick Duncan, who advised him to enter politics. Chief Jonathan nurtured an active interest in politics from 1952 to 1956 but did not become immediately affiliated with a political party. In 1956, he was elected to the District Council at Leribe, and from this position he was elected to the Basutoland National Council (also in 1956). While he was a member of the National Council, he served on the committee which drafted a new Constitution for Basutoland. In 1959, Chief Leabua Jonathan was instrumental in forming the Basutoland National Party (BNP), the first political party to challenge the only existing party in Basutoland -- the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). The BNP grew steadily until it won the General Elections in April 1965.

Before becoming Prime Minister of Basutoland in July 1965, Chief Jonathan traveled to London several times as a member of delegations which sought constitutional changes in the National Government. During these discussions it was agreed that Basutoland would be granted independence twelve months after the General Elections of 1965. In October 1965, Chief Jonathan was able to obtain associate member status for Basutoland in the Food and Agricultural Organization. He continued to secure more powers for his Government from Britain until final independence was granted to Lesotho on October 4, 1966.

The present visit is Chief Jonathan's second trip to the U.S.A. In November 1966, he accompanied the Monarch, King Moshoeshoe II, to New York at the time Lesotho became a member of the United Nations.

Sept 1967

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By yw, NARA, Date 6-8-00

Chief Leabua Jonathan

Family: Chief Jonathan is married and has seven children.

Interests: He is a devout Catholic. He speaks English and is an enthusiastic reader. His hobbies include gardening and farming.

18-d



BASUTOLAND (LESOTHO)

1966

JONATHAN, LEABUA. PRIME MINISTER.

25x6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SANITIZED
Authority RAC-NLS-DDI-092-1-1
By iss, NARA, Date 9-21-01



CONFIDENTIAL

Pres file

Thursday, September 21, 1967
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Henry Owen has been giving talks to some of the wounded men at Walter Reed and has come up with the attached interesting and serious proposal.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY 19 CN 9-30-91

19a

CONFIDENTIAL

September 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Speech to War Wounded

1. Problem: Visiting the paraplegic and amputee wards at Walter Reed, I'm struck by this thought: These men's lives have been permanently changed by the war in Vietnam. Whether they bear this life-long burden with pride or bitterness will depend, in part, on whether they believe that the sacrifice was worth while.

2. Proposal: The President should make a closed circuit television speech to war wounded throughout service hospitals in this country and (if satellites make this possible) in Japan and Hawaii.^{1/}

He should, in Lincoln's words to the 166th Ohio Regiment, impress upon them "the importance of success in this contest...not merely for today, but for all time to come", and thank them for what they have done.

The fact that the President had thought it worth while to do so, in a speech made directly and exclusively to them, would be something that most wounded and their families would draw comfort from over the years.

3. Background: I have talked to USIA (without indicating the project I had in mind) about whether a closed TV circuit could be set up that would reach from Washington to most service hospitals. They say that it's difficult, but probably feasible.

100
Henry Owen

1/ Men who can be returned to duty in 30 days are hospitalized in Vietnam. More seriously wounded are sent to hospitals in the US, Hawaii, and Japan.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MESSAGE
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12309,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY 18 ON 9-30-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-362
By CB, NARA, Date 4-18-95

20

Pres. file

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Thursday, September 21, 1967
5:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

You may be interested in Tito's
response to your latest message to
him.

It is clear that Tito did not
regard his formula as particularly
important but was essentially trying
to push the Arabs toward a decision
to play politics rather than war in
the next stage.

W. W. Rostow
Belgrade 917

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

20a

Thursday, September 21, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR TOBIN (Belgrade, 917)

SUBJECT: Delivery of President Johnson's Message to President Tito

President Tito received me this afternoon at his Belgrade residence where I handed him President Johnson's message dated September 19 on the Middle East. Present at the meeting were Tito's Secretary General, Vladimir Popovic, an interpreter and Embassy political counselor, who accompanied me. Tito read the message through without benefit of translation. He did not comment directly to me on any points as he read the message, but in an aside to Popovic he singled out with apparent amusement President Johnson's statement that the Yugoslav proposals fall short of U.S. -U.S.S.R. draft resolution.

Tito expressed thanks for the President's message and went on to say the matter is now before the United Nations. He recalled that he had visited Arab countries with the intention of moving things forward and with the hope that he could convince the Arabs of the necessity of seeking a political solution. He thinks he succeeded. Now the problem must be considered by others. One possibility, for example, might be to attempt to mesh Yugoslav non-aligned resolution and his proposals with the draft resolution agreed to by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He then proceeded to indicate that he had informed Arab leaders about the contents of the second message which President Johnson had sent to him just prior to the visit to the Middle East. Tito reported that the Arabs did not accept the US-Soviet draft resolution but were prepared to live with the proposals advanced by the Government of Yugoslavia, with the understanding, however, that these could form the basis of further discussions. Matters were then carried forward by diplomatic initiative undertaken by the Government of Yugoslavia. Responses to Yugoslav initiative indicate that there is a genuine desire in the world to reach a peaceful solution. Even the Arab countries have accepted this fact. It should be recognized that it was no easy task to convince the Arab leaders on this point.

Tito remarked further that he had told the Arab leaders that Israel is a reality. Although artificially created, it was established by the United Nations, accepted by many countries and now is a reality from which one must proceed. He was encouraged that the Arab countries had taken a peaceful position at the Summit Conference in Khartoum. A large degree of unanimity among Arabs was

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-363

By ing, NARA, Date 1-13-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

reached, with the exception of Syria which had not attended the Conference. According to Tito, the U. A. R. is the main protagonist of the moderate point of view. It would be a pity to let this present opportunity pass. The United States Government has great responsibilities in assisting to find a peaceful solution to the situation. Tito stressed that he did not sense any feeling of hatred toward the U. S. on the part of the Arabs during his Middle East visit. What is more, he added, Arab countries had hoped for a gesture towards them by the United States.

Tito confirmed that Arab leaders -- but not the masses -- now seem to recognize that it is necessary to take a different stand toward Israel. At the same time, the Arab leaders do not want to be humiliated. In contrast, Tito said he noticed that Israel has assumed a sharp negative stand toward proposals advanced by Yugoslavia. Tito said the Israelis, who are very clever, should have realized his voyage and talks were also useful to them, since he was attempting to point up the fact that it was necessary for both sides to look forward to what might happen in the next ten to twenty years. Since the Arabs will not always be what they are today, it is necessary for Israel to undertake concerted effort to establish appropriate conditions for co-existence in the future. Instead, Israel now seems to be hardening its position. While he did not like to make comparisons, he recalled that the Germans twice in this century attempted to conquer the world by force of arms but did not succeed. Israel seems to be attempting to dictate terms to the Arabs. It should be recognized that one cannot expect the Arabs to kneel before the Israelis at this time. A middle way toward recognizing the existence of Israel must be found and it is in this light that his suggestion for a Security Council or four-power guarantee of security and frontiers of states in the region was advanced.

Tito stressed that it was essential for four great powers to reach agreement on how to proceed from here, if a solution is to be found. If the four powers failed to agree, a discussion in the Security Council is apt to prove useless since it is anticipated that veto power would be utilized. Tito then once more returned to the posture of Israel and remarked with some bitterness that he could not understand them. He criticized Israeli demand for direct conversations, commenting that this would be like having vanquished dictated to by victors. Even proposals which might originate within the United Nations will be hard for the Arabs to swallow.

I responded that the United States Government appreciates the spirit in which his initiative was undertaken, especially his arduous trip to the Middle East. The United States Government is aware of its responsibilities in this situation, strongly believes that any proposed solution cannot be one-sided, and places a

great emphasis on the need for a solution accepted by the parties most directly concerned. I noted we appreciated Tito's efforts to enlighten the Arab leaders regarding the necessity of political solution at a critical moment. We all recognize the situation is complicated and that despite differences in current views, we must work objectively to attain agreement. It is not enough, however, merely to go back to the armistice situation existing prior to the outbreak of the hostilities, but to establish conditions for a long-term peaceful collaboration in the region. The United States Government believes that the current discussion in the U. N. can be helpful but at the moment does not foresee what particular action might be taken. With reference to his remarks on U. S. -Arab relations, I observed that the U. S. is hopeful as to the resumption of diplomatic relations and ultimately to constructive cooperation with all states of the Middle East. I made no comment whatever on his strongly colored condemnation of the current Israeli position. Tito closed the conversation by again noting the matter is now in the U. N. and "we will see what happens."

Comment: Tito's extemporaneous exposition seemed to be genuine reflection of his current state of mind. I sensed that while he believes he succeeded in moving the Arabs toward a peaceful settlement, his efforts have met with incomprehensible rejection by the Israelis and the lack of adequate response from the great powers. He seems skeptical that the current United Nations session will resolve the problem and almost resigned to the possibility that the present favorable chance of settlement will not be seized by the great powers. Rather than hinting at any further Yugoslav initiative, he seemed simply to be hoping against hope that something would turn up, he already having done his best. He made no mention of any further letter to the President on this subject.

Thursday, Sept. 21, 1967
5:30 p. m.

21

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the latest from Paris. No movement,
but the line is still open.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment (Paris 3803)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

21a
#3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

52817
SEPTEMBER 21, 1967
2:53 P.M.

Z 211740Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5712
STATE GRNC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 3803

In: c

NCDIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-363
By ing, NARA, Date 1-13-95

A & M SAW BO FOR NOE AND A HLF HOURS AT NOON TODAY. AFTER A FEW MINUTES OF PERSONAL CONVERSATION, M READ TO BO THE TEXT OF MY MESSAGE REPORTED IN PARIS 3765. BO ASKED FOR M'S NOTES AND M. HANDED THEM TO HIM. BO PROMISED TO RETURN THEM TOMORROW. BO THEN ASKED WHETHER THE WORDS WERE MINE OR M'S INTERPRETATION OF MY REMARKS. M REPLIED THAT THEY HAD BEEN AGREED WITH ME. BO THEN REPLIED (THE NOTES WERE A'S): "THIS CHANNEL IS VERY CONVENIENT FOR US. IF I HAVE A REPLY BEFORE SATURDAY EVENING, I SHALL CALL YOU (M). I SHALL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AFTERWARDS AS SOON AS I HEAR SOMETHING. BUT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE MOOD HANOI AS EXPRESSED IN OUR FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 19." BO THEN MENTIONED BOMBARDMENT OF HAIPHONG AND VINH BUT WITHOUT REAL CONVICTION AND ONLY VERY BRIEFLY.

M. THEN URGED BO TO SEE ME OR AT LEAST TO SEND BACK A "MILD" REPLY. A & M COULD VOUCH FOR ME. TO AMERICANS PERSONAL CONTACT WAS IMPORTANT. THOSE INTERESTED IN PEACE ON THE AMERICAN SIDE MUST BE GIVEN SOME SIGN OF A RECIPROCAL ATTITUDE FROM HANOI. BO REPLIED THAT HE COULD SEE PRIVATE AMERICANS AT HIS DISCRETION. FOR EXAMPLE HE HAD RECEIVED DAVID SCHOENBRUN AND WAS PLEASED TO HEAR FROM HIM THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS WERE ENTIRELY RECONCILED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DRV. BUT HE COULD NOT SEE ANY AMERICAN WHO SPOKE FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT OR REPORTED DIRECTLY TO THEM WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION AND HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED IT. (NOTE: FOR WHATEVER IT IS WORTH, A. HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT BO REQUESTED THIS AUTHORIZATION.) M. ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE ASKED WHETHER BO WOULD FIND IT EASIER TO SPEAK TO SOMEONE LIKE DOTY (FROM THE U.S. PUGWASH GROUP) WHO COULD THEN REPORT TO ME OR TO WASHINGTON. BO REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT CURE THE BASIC DIFFICULTY THAT HANOI IS RELUCTANT TO TALK UNDER DURESS WITH ANY OFFICIALLY CONNECTED AMERICAN. "THE AMERICANS ARE PLAYING A DOUBLE GAME. ON THE ONE HAND THEY ARE OFFERING US PEACE; ON THE OTHER THEY INCREASE THEIR BOMBING." AT THE SAME TIME HE REPEATED HIS DESIRE TO KEEP THE CHANNEL OPEN. "I WILL ACCEPT A COMMUNICATION AT ANY TIME. I WILL BE IN TOUCH AS SOON AS I HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY."

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 3803, SEPTEMBER 21

M. ASKED WHETHER THE CHANNEL WAS STILL USEFUL. BO REPLIED: "DO NOT WORRY (NE VOUS EN FAITES PAS). IF WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO COMMUNICATE VIA KISSINGER WE SHALL TELL YOU. (SI JAMAIS NOUS PENSONS QUE NOUS NE VOULONS PAS COMMUNIQUER PAR KISSINGER NOUS VOUS LE DIRONS.) IF WE EVER THINK THAT YOU SHOULD NO LONGER CONTINUE, WE SHALL TELL YOU WITHOUT HESITATION. (SI JAMAIS NOUS PENSONS QUE VOUS MEMES NE DEVEZ PAS CONTINUER, NOUS VOUS DIRONS SANS HESITER.) BUT WE WANT YOU AND KISSINGER TO CONTINUE."

M. NEXT RAISED THE ISSUE OF REPORTING TO THE ELYSEE. HE SHOWED BO HIS DRAFT REPORT (SENT BY SEPTTEL) AND INVITED COMMENTS. HE TOLD HIM OF MY DESIRE TO DELETE THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES. BO AGREED. BO'S ONLY SUGGESTION WAS TO GIVE THE TITLES OF THE PARTICIPANTS AT THE JUNE 16-18 PUGWASH MEETING WHERE THE IDEA OF THE HANOI TRIP ORIGINATED. HE SAID THAT IF THE REPORT IS GIVEN TO THE ELYSEE, IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT REPEAT NOT HIS INSTIGATION OR REQUEST.

CONCLUSIONS: (1) HANOI HAS HAD OUR ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR AT LEAST TWENTY FIVE DAYS AND MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 13 FOR SIX DAYS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE NEXT MOVE IS CLEARLY UP TO THEM. IF THE CHANNEL IS IMPORTANT TO THEM, IT IS UP TO THEM TO PUT SOMETHING INTO IT. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT I TELL M WHN I NEXT SEE HIM AT 14:30 TOMORROW THAT HE SHOULD TELL BO THAT WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR AN ANSWER FROM HANOI. UNTIL IT COME WE HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO SAY.

(2) A BELIEVES THAT FOR HANOI THE DECISION TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS MARKS A POINT OF NO RETURN AND THAT THEY MAY NOT BE FREE TO DO AS THEY WISH. EVEN IF THIS CORRECT, MY INSTINCT WOULD BE THAT THESE ARE DIFFICULTIES FOR HANOI TO OVERCOME.

(3) WITH RESPECT TO EXISTING RESTRAINTS, I WOULD RECOMMEND MAINTAINING THEM FOR SOME TIME LONGER TO GIVE HANOI A CHANCE TO REPLY OR AT LEAST TO PREVENT THEM FROM BLAMING THEIR REFUSAL ON U.S. ESCALATION.

GP-1. BOHLEN
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Thursday, Sept. 21, 1967
5:30 p. m.

22

MR. PRESIDENT:

Here is the latest from Paris. No movement,
but the line is still open.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ attachment (Paris 3803)

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

22a

#3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

52810

SEPTEMBER 21, 1967

2:53 P.M.

Info

Z 211740Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5712
STATE GRNC
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ PARIS 3803

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-363

By Willing NARA. Date 6-8-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 3803, SEPTEMBER 21

M. ASKED WHETHER THE CHANNEL WAS STILL USEFUL. BO REPLIED: "DO NOT WORRY (NE VOUS EN FAITES PAS). IF WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WE DO NOT WISH TO COMMUNICATE VIA KISSINGER WE SHALL TELL YOU. (SI JAMAIS NOUS PENSONS QUE NOUS NE VOULONS PAS COMMUNIQUER PAR KISSINGER NOUS VOUS LE DIRONS.) IF WE EVER THINK THAT YOU SHOULD NO LONGER CONTINUE, WE SHALL TELL YOU WITHOUT HESITATION. (SI JAMAIS NOUS PENSONS QUE VOUS MEMES NE DEVEZ PAS CONTINUER, NOUS VOUS DIRONS SANS HESITER.) BUT WE WANT YOU AND KISSINGER TO CONTINUE."

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GP-1. BOHLEN
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

23

Pres file

Thursday, September 21, 1967
4:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen, our friendly historian, has come up with two items from the work of Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. -- a distinguished historian who stuck to his knitting.

One is a passage from an essay called "The Martial Spirit," which discusses domestic problems during wars; the second is a passage from another essay from "A Yardstick for Presidents."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE MARTIAL SPIRIT

AMERICAN nationality has been a plant of gradual growth. Many elements served to retard its development. The first century and a half under British rule forged emotional bonds with the old country difficult to break when the colonists struck for independence. Later, the expanding size of the nation nourished regional and state allegiances—usually reflecting economic attachments as well—which sometimes surpassed allegiance to the common flag. In addition, the varied origins of the population created danger of disloyalty in periods of international friction because of ancestral blood ties and rekindled patriotisms. Finally, in recent times, appeared divisive ideologies rooted in Marxian conceptions of the class struggle.

George Washington, who led his people in war before leading them in peace, was fully aware of the perils to domestic unity in the hopefully named United States. The Farewell Address summoned his fellow citizens to subordinate private interests to those of their new fatherland and to join in dismantling the "batteries of internal and external enemies." He warned against sectional jealousies and ambitions, against the "insidious wiles of foreign influence" and even against political parties, which he regarded as breeding only mischief and discord. His successors in office, however, largely ignored these admonitions. Parties, indeed, proved to be an indispensable means of adjusting contending interests and mapping an acceptable middle course of action, and as the country grew older, the other dangers seemed also less real. Statesmen believed that, as Washington himself anticipated, "time and habit"

had now fixed the character of the government and attached the people unflinchingly to it. Partisan controversy, however fierce, signified a healthy state of the body politic; it would always stop short of jeopardizing the nation's existence.

How well justified were these suppositions? An inquiry into the extent and reality of national unity in American history might take various forms, but clearly there is no other test so decisive as the behavior of the country when confronted by an armed foe. Upon the outbreak of the struggle to preserve the Union Stephen A. Douglas, who had divided the Northern vote with Lincoln in the election of 1860, told his followers, "There can be no neutrals in this war, only patriots—or traitors." With this as the criterion, what has been the record of the American people in their major wars?

I

In an incandescent passage the historian George Bancroft, writing in 1858, declared of the War for Independence:

The hour of the American Revolution was come. The people of the continent with irresistible energy obeyed one general impulse, as the earth in spring listens to the command of nature, and without the appearance of effort bursts forth to life in perfect harmony. The change which Divine wisdom ordained, and which no human policy or force could hold back, proceeded as uniformly and majestically as the laws of being, and was as certain as the decrees of eternity.

The chroniclers of the winning side in a war always display a Freudian facility in glossing over past difficulties and divisions, and though the process is congenial to folklore, it does not make for good history.

Bancroft's view has, in fact, no support from people at the time. Jonathan Boucher, a Tory clergyman who fled Maryland for England after the initial hostilities, flatly denied in his *View of the Causes and Consequences of the American Revolution* (1797) "that the people of America, properly so called, were generally favourable to the revolt." Otherwise, he observed, the Whigs would not have resorted to the many harsh laws against those who refused to take the patriot oath of allegiance.

Lest such testimony be dismissed as grossly prejudiced, let witnesses from the other side be called to the bar. John Adams, who in after years frequently reverted to the subject, stated that colonial unanimity steadily declined after the first troubles over the Stamp Act in 1765, when the issue was reform without thought of revolution. As the breach with the mother country widened, many upon sober second thought came to fear the consequences of the growing radicalism. Even the members of the First Continental Congress in 1774 were split in sentiment, being "one third tories, another whigs, and the rest mongrels." Adams estimated that after the die was cast a third of the people—approximately 800,000 out of 2,400,000—still opposed the patriot cause, an opinion which led Thomas McKean, a cosigner of the Declaration of Independence, to rejoin that "more than a third of influential characters were against it." In addition to active antagonists there were the fence sitters, Adams's "mongrels"—persons who avoided a definite stand. Thomas McKean described them as "the timid and those who believed the colonies would be conquered, and that, of course, they would be safe in their persons and property from such conduct, and also have a probability of obtaining office and distinction." Others like John Ross of Philadelphia simply "loved ease and Madeira much better than liberty and strife."

The Tories according to their own lights were acting on principle. Their misfortune lay in being unwilling to take on a new loyalty fast enough. Included in their ranks was a considerable proportion of "influential characters": great landholders such as the De Lanceys and Philipses of New York, wealthy merchants like the Whartons of Philadelphia and the Chandlers of Boston, virtually all the crown officials in the colonies and many lawyers and other professional men. In South Carolina and Georgia they formed a majority, but they were also numerous elsewhere. "New York and Pennsylvania," said Adams in retrospect, "were so nearly divided, if their propensity was not against us, that if New England on one side and Virginia on the other had not kept them in awe, they would have joined the British." To quench this fire in the rear the patriots had recourse to mob violence and legal restraints, jailing

or banishing the more prominent Tories and confiscating their property. Before the struggle was over, perhaps two hundred thousand were exiled, voluntarily fled or died, a loss of substantial citizens comparable only to the flight of the Huguenots from France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes or of the Jews from Nazi Germany.

Domestic disunity was inevitable in a contest which was by its very nature both a civil and an international war. Further confusion arose from the fact that few of the colonial leaders had consciously aimed at separation. As late as four months after the bloodshed at Lexington and Concord, Thomas Jefferson, who was to pen the Declaration of Independence the next year, said that he "would rather be in dependence on Great Britain, properly limited, than on any nation on earth, or on no nation." And John Adams, who was to help edit Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, wrote some weeks afterward, "We cannot in this country conceive that there are men in England so infatuated as seriously to suspect the Congress, or people here, of a wish to erect ourselves into an independent state." Still later, in December, 1775, so ardent a partisan of freedom as Samuel Adams explained the slowness of the Second Continental Congress in taking action by saying, "We must be content to wait till the Fruit is ripe before we gather it." Even when the moment arrived, John Dickinson, whose *Farmer's Letters* a few years before had done so much to spur the movement of opposition, declined to sign the Declaration of Independence, though he subsequently sided with the revolutionists.

Probably in no later encounter with an external foe was so determined a body of opinion arrayed against the government. Valley Forge is rightly an imperishable symbol of American fortitude, but the sufferings of Washington's barefoot and hungry soldiers were uncalled-for. There was plenty of food in the country, and in Philadelphia not many miles away the redcoats were reveling on the fat of the land. Within the Continental army itself, as well as in seats of civil authority, actual disloyalty raised its head. Dr. Benjamin Church, director of the first military hospital, was in British pay. Chief Justice Metcalf Bowler of Rhode Island carried

on a treasonable correspondence with the British commander, Sir Henry Clinton. The valiant and trusted General Benedict Arnold conspired to turn over West Point and its outlying forts to the enemy. A true understanding of the fight for freedom must, as Carl Van Doren has shown with extensive documentation, take into account this hidden war as well as the open one. With independence at last won, however, the people might well have expected that a united country would support the government in any future conflict.

II

The first test came in the War of 1812. Though the number of British-born Americans had by then greatly declined and ingrained loyalty to another flag was no longer a factor of importance, the onset of the contest nevertheless revealed deep fissures in the public. The peace sentiment centered in New England and the Federalist party, bastions of the commercial and shipping interests mindful of their profitable prewar trade with Britain. John Adams, unlike most of his party in favoring "Mr. Madison's war," believed that, as on the previous occasion, one out of three persons opposed the struggle. The *Connecticut Courant*, viewing affairs with partisan bias, declared on March 7, 1815, after the hostilities had ceased, that more than two thirds of the people north of the Potomac had loathed it from the beginning and almost all of them at the end.

The war resolution passed the House 79 to 49 and the Senate 19 to 13, a majority of but three to two of the entire membership. Nonetheless, as Mathew Carey pointed out at the time, "War then became the law of the land. It was the paramount duty of all good citizens to submit to it." The intransigent Federalist minority in the House, however, issued an address denouncing it as "a party not a national war," undertaken by a "divided people." In New York and Boston, news of the declaration brought forth memorials and resolutions of protest, and the Massachusetts Senate pronounced the war "founded in falsehood" and "declared without necessity."

Flags were hung at half-mast in the Bay State metropolis, and both pulpit and press kept up the din of opposition. According

to the Reverend John S. J. Gardiner, rector of Trinity Church, "It is a war unexampled in the history of the world, wantonly proclaimed on the most frivolous and groundless pretences, against a nation from whose friendship we might derive the most signal advantages," while the *Boston Gazette* shrieked, "Any man who lends his money to the government, at the present time, will forfeit all claim to common honesty and common courtesy among all true friends to the country," and the *Connecticut Courant* at Hartford urged President Madison to resign forthwith. New Englanders, in fact, subscribed less than one out of every thirteen dollars that went into government loans.

As the conflict progressed, the peace party mounted in strength. New Englanders carried on a clandestine trade with the near-by Maritime Provinces for enemy manufactures, which were then marketed in other parts of the country. The Yankee governors uniformly declined to allow their militia to go into the field under federal command, and the Massachusetts Senate, hoping to check the growth of patriotic fervor, resolved that it was "not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military and naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast and soil."

Talk of seceding from the Union became rife, and in October, 1814, when the nation's morale was dashed by the burning of Washington, the Bay State legislature sent out the call for the famous Hartford Convention to confer on New England's grievances. With official delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island, the group, meeting for three weeks behind closed doors, disappointed the peace-at-any-price expectations. Instead, the cooler heads committed the rasher spirits to the view that "A severance of the Union by one or more States against the will of the rest, and especially in time of war, can only be justified by absolute necessity." But with the same breath the assemblage demanded certain amendments of the Constitution, one of which would have required a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress for declaring war or engaging in other belligerent acts except to repel actual invasion. A second convention was to be held in

case these proposals were ignored. This menacing movement quickly withered, however, when the news arrived of Jackson's victory at New Orleans and of the peace treaty at Ghent.

III

Before the next armed strife occurred, a series of disputes in Congress over the slavery question created an atmosphere of tension between North and South amounting to a war of nerves. Although the greatest of these crises, that involving South Carolina nullification, was peaceably weathered in 1833, fresh difficulties developed within a few years over the question of acquiring slaveholding Texas, which had recently won independence from Mexico. In 1844 the Democrats elected James K. Polk on an annexation platform, and the new state was already admitted to the Union when he took office the following March determined to obtain additional Mexican soil extending westward from Texas to the Pacific. To that end he precipitated hostilities by marching troops into a strip of land claimed by both countries and, when the Mexicans resisted, blamed them for starting the fray. "War exists," he told Congress on May 11, 1846, "and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of Mexico herself."

At once a storm of anger blew up from the Whig Congressmen, who denounced the war as "treason against God" instigated by Southern politicians for more slave territory. Northern editors added to the uproar. "None of the aggressors of Europe or Asia ever resorted to justificatory reasons which were so false and hypocritical as those alleged for our aggressions on Mexico," asserted the *Kennebec Journal* of Augusta, Maine. The Mexicans, agreed the *Xenia Torch Light* in Ohio, "are in the right—we are in the wrong. They may appeal in confidence to the God of battles, but if we look for aid to any other than human power, it must be to the infernal machinations of hell." A convention of New England workingmen resolved that "we will not take up arms to sustain the Southern slaveholder in robbing one-fifth of our countrymen of labor."

Many of the Northern churches, notably of the Congregational, Unitarian and Quaker faiths, took as vociferous a stand. The Boston

Unitarian clergyman, William H. Channing, declared that if he were to enlist it would be on the Mexican side. Three thousand Unitarians addressed an antiwar protest to Congress thirty-six yards long, only to be outdone by a Quaker remonstrance containing nine thousand signatures. Famous authors also spoke out. Thoreau spent a night in the Concord jail rather than pay a tax which might help the government wage the war. (The experience inspired him to write his flaming manifesto on "Civil Disobedience.") James Russell Lowell, choosing homespun satire as his weapon in the *Biglow Papers*, had Massachusetts cry to the South:

Call me coward, call me traiter,
Jest ez suits your mean idees,—
Here I stand a tyrant-hater,
An' the friend o' God an' Peace!

President Polk bitterly rebuked the divisionists in his message to Congress in December, 1846, asserting, "The war has been represented as unjust and unnecessary, and as one of aggression on our part upon a weak and injured enemy. . . . A more effectual means could not have been devised to encourage the enemy and protract the war." But his words had no effect. The legislatures of Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts and Maryland roundly condemned the "hateful" war, the Bay State body calling upon "all good citizens to join in efforts to arrest" it "in every just way."

After the Whigs carried the national House of Representatives in the fall of 1846, petitions and editorials urged Congress to stop the carnage by withholding appropriations. Though the Whig members flinched from going that far, they intensified their verbal barrage. Abraham Lincoln, a newcomer from Illinois in the House, helped to press the attack, while Ohio's Thomas Corwin in the Senate declaimed, "Were I a Mexican, I would welcome these invaders with bloody hands to hospitable graves." Little wonder that the *Washington Union*, the principal administration organ, fumed,

The floor of Congress is another section of the field of conflict. There the cause of Mexico is maintained with zeal and ability; . . . there the war is branded with every abusive epithet, and the President of our coun-

try, . . . before whose vigorous arm the invading enemy has fled into his stronghold, is denounced as a bloody tyrant and murderer.

Finally, in January, 1848, after a year and a half of field operations, the House formally resolved by a vote of eighty-five to eighty-one (Lincoln siding with the majority) that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the United States." But peace was already in sight, and a month later the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo brought the obstructionism to an end.

IV

"The Mexican War," asserted Abiel A. Livermore a few years later in his *War with Mexico Reviewed* (1850), "will be a standing topic of crimination and recrimination, through the present generation, if not during a longer time. It has sown our soil with dragons' teeth, and they will spring up armed men." He spoke no more than the truth, for the question of slavery in the former Mexican possessions deepened sectional animosities and started the train of events that culminated in 1861 in the South's attempt to dismember the Republic.

In the struggle to preserve the Union the North might have been expected to present a united front, but such was not the case. As the Southern states began to secede after Lincoln's election, many Northern spokesmen counseled a do-nothing policy. Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune*, the country's most influential paper, declared, "If the Cotton States shall become satisfied that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we shall insist on letting them go in peace." A national convention of workingmen at Philadelphia echoed, "Our Government never can be sustained by bloodshed but must live in the affections of the people." Other groups, though for different reasons, took a similar stand. Abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison and Senator Charles Sumner welcomed secession as a means of cleansing the North of any guilt for slavery, while businessmen, anxious about the stoppage of trade and the collection of unpaid Southern debts, also favored peaceful dissolution. Mayor Fernando Wood even proposed that New York constitute itself a

free city and continue relations with both the old Union and the new Confederacy.

But the firing on Fort Sumter in April, 1861, placed all these elements, including for a time Wood himself, squarely behind Lincoln's policy of armed coercion. There remained, however, a powerful pro-Confederate sentiment in the North, notably among the Democrats of the Ohio Valley states, where many of the inhabitants were of Southern birth or blood. As the war progressed, these irreconcilables or "Copperheads" carried on a defeatist propaganda in the press and on the stump, and a considerable number banded together in secret oath-bound societies such as the Knights of the Golden Circle, the Order of American Knights and the Sons of Liberty, groups which harbored military as well as political designs and sought to obstruct enlistments and the operation of the draft. One of their songs cruelly parodied a Northern recruiting song:

We are coming, Abraham Lincoln,
From mountain, wood, and glen;
We are coming, Abraham Lincoln,
With the ghosts of murdered men.
Yes! we're coming, Abraham Lincoln,
With curses loud and deep,
That will haunt you in your waking,
And disturb you in your sleep.

Clement L. Vallandigham, who later became "supreme commander" of these undercover bands, claimed in 1863 that they numbered half a million members—a figure undoubtedly inflated though accepted by the Judge Advocate General of the United States as approximately correct. "Judea," declared that official, "produced but one Judas Iscariot and Rome from the sinks of her demoralization but one Catiline; and yet, as events proved, there has arisen in our land an entire brood of such traitors all animated by the same patricidal spirit." Had the South not counted on their help, commented the *Dover* (New Hampshire) *Enquirer*, she would never have risked war with the Union.

The Copperheads wielded their greatest influence in 1863 when the fighting reached its most critical stage. In Indiana they kept the

legislature from adopting any prowar measures, forcing the patriotic Republican governor to act as best he could on his own authority, while in the President's own state of Illinois the House of Representatives demanded an immediate armistice and a negotiated peace. In Ohio, Vallandigham's state, the ex-Congressman was arrested for publicly assailing the war as "wicked and cruel" and waged "for the purpose of crushing out liberty and erecting a despotism." A military tribunal sentenced him to prison for the duration of the hostilities; but Lincoln, perhaps recalling how he himself had behaved during the Mexican War and wishing in no case to make Vallandigham a martyr, shrewdly altered the verdict to banishment to the Confederacy. While Vallandigham was still on Southern soil, the Ohio Democrats nominated him for governor, and escaping through the federal blockade, he conducted his campaign from across the border in Canada. Though defeated, he polled 187,000 votes, 40 per cent of the total, an ominous showing in an important state. He might have won but for two things: 39,000 of the 41,000 soldier ballots went against him, and the flagging morale of the civilian voters had been revived by the Union successes in July at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

Even as late as the national election of the next year the Copperheads continued active but with diminishing effect. The Republicans themselves had doubts about running the President again, and though they did so, Lincoln privately recorded his opinion toward the end of the summer that "it seems exceedingly probable that this Administration will not be reelected." The Democratic platform, influenced by Vallandigham whose presence at the convention the federal authorities carefully ignored, termed the war "four years of failure" and called for immediate negotiations to restore the Union. Their candidate, General George B. McClellan, however, repudiated these sentiments, leaving the country uncertain as to what course a Democratic regime would pursue. The outcome hung in the balance until the victories of Sherman, Sheridan and Farragut in September tilted the scales for the Republicans. Even so, Lincoln was returned by only 55 per cent of the popular vote, the Southern states, of course, not participating. Five months later

the Confederacy collapsed, and another chapter in wartime disunity came to a close.

V

The Civil War ended sectionalism as a danger to internal security; and in the years that followed, the unprecedented growth of industry and agriculture, the occupation of the last frontier and the tightening bonds of better means of conveyance and communication helped create an overarching unity which enabled regional and class differences to be arbitrated at the ballot box and in legislative halls. The English historian, Edward A. Freeman, visiting America in the 1880's, observed that "where the word 'federal' used to be used up to the time of the civil war, the word 'national' is now used all but invariably."

Peaceful relations with foreign powers buttressed the sense of national safety, fostering isolationist sentiments and the rise of an organized peace movement. The huge influx of immigrants introduced imponderables into the scene, but the newcomers adjusted quickly to their adopted country, and for a long time there occurred no war with their homelands to disturb their loyalty to the United States. With them also came the ideology of socialism directed against all wars as imperialistic adventures unless fought for the overthrow of capitalism. This half-century of peace after 1865 was only briefly interrupted by the Spanish War of 1898, an occasion which reminded old-stock Americans of how completely the former rift between North and South had closed. Confederate veterans rushed to enlist, and the nation happily sang, "He laid away a suit of gray to wear the Union blue."

Thus, when the World War of 1914 broke out, there were latent elements of domestic disunity but at first an almost universal agreement that the European strife was no business of the United States. "Peace-loving citizens of this country," asserted the *Chicago Herald*, "will now rise up and tender a hearty vote of thanks to Columbus for having discovered America." President Wilson early in his administration had resisted journalistic clamor to occupy Mexico by force in order to put down civil strife, and his Secretary of State,

Excerpts from "Paths to the Present", by Arthur Schlesinger, Chapter V, A Yardstick for Presidents.

It is the great Presidents, rather than any of the lesser figures, who call for principal attention, however. Why are they accorded pre-eminence?...

Each was identified with some crucial turning point in the nation's history: Washington with the implementation of the new Constitution; Jefferson with extending the national boundaries from the Mississippi to the Rockies; Jackson with the upsurge of the common man into politics; Lincoln with the saving of the Union; and Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt with momentous economic reforms and America's dominant role in international affairs. Lincoln excepted, they all succeeded in directing bloodless revolutions under the form of law - revolutions by consent.

All of them, moreover, took the side of progressivism and human betterment as understood in their day...

When they could not cure all the evils, they disposed of the most urgent and cleared the ground for a more comprehensive cure...

To their contemporaries these men appeared ahead of their times, but the price of success lay in not being too far ahead. None was radical in the fundamental sense. They were idealists without being doctrinaires, working pragmatically within the framework of the democratic tradition, seeking to reform in order to preserve...

Nor did any of them disdain the arts of political management, for as strategists in the public interest they had also to be good tacticians. Though this fact brought down on their heads the wrath of the pure-minded, the ultimate test of statesmanship, as James Russell Lowell remarked in his essay on Lincoln, is not "a conscientious persistency in what is impracticable," but, rather, "loyalty to great ends, even though forced to combine the small and opposing motives of selfish men to accomplish them". At this game of give-and-take some proved better than others. The advantage usually lay with those who had had thorough political schooling before entering the White House...

Washington aside, all the titans had their hearts set upon becoming President and, defying the adage that the office should seek the man, spared no effort to bring it about. Elected as political chieftains, they continued, moreover, to function in that capacity in the White House, one badge of their greatness being the ability to advance their country's interest at the same time as their parties'. Scratch any of these demigods and you find a party man - a fact which tends to be forgotten in later years when the heat of partisan strike has cooled and the men themselves have become wax images in school histories...

The great Presidents were also strong Presidents, magnifying the executive branch at the expense of the other branches of the government. "The President," wrote Woodrow Wilson while yet an academic student of public affairs, "is at liberty, in both law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can..."

Being masterful figures, they aroused bitter antagonisms both within and without their parties. In politics as in chemistry action induces reaction. The business interests resist innovation; politicians prefer to let well enough alone; Congress resents "executive encroachments"; the minority party makes a virtue of "viewing with alarm". Moreover, big Presidents often have big faults, and these seen at close range, are apt to assume distorted size. Washington no sooner took up his duties than he began to meet with torrents of abuse. As he himself observed, he was assailed "in such exaggerated and indecent terms as could scarcely be applied to a Nero, a notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket"... When he stepped down from office, an opposition sheet rejoiced that "the man who is the source of all the misfortunes of our country...is no longer possessed of power to multiply evils upon the United States."

The others fared no better and some fared worse. Jackson was pilloried as an "ignorant, reckless, vain and malignant tyrant" bent on amassing "all power in the hands of one man..." "No one at a distance," declared Representative George W. Julian in retrospect, "could form any conception of the hostility of the Republican members of Congress to Lincoln" at the height of the Civil War...

The twentieth century has merely regurgitated without enlarging the vocabulary of calumny. The present generation hardly need be reminded that against both Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were hurled the ancient charges of executive usurpation, of impractical idealism, of inordinate personal ambition and of seeking to rule or ruin. Presidents with thin skins who try to be "as big as they can" would do well to familiarize themselves with the trials of their predecessors...

Equally stereotyped was the journalistic antipathy to these Presidents when seeking office, the only real exception being Washington's two elections, which were uncontested...As Dean Frank Luther Mott of the University of Missouri School of Journalism has shown, the press after Washington's day favored the losing side in ten campaigns out of the twelve which nominees earmarked for greatness won. The majority of editors strove to defeat Jefferson in his first successful attempt and also Lincoln in his first try; they fought Jackson and Wilson both times each triumphed; and they opposed all four of Roosevelt's candidacies...

The task of being a great President strikes the onlooker as more rewarding to the nation than to the individual himself...A few, to be sure, found exhilaration in the ordeals of office, but all, it may be conjectured, discovered their abiding satisfaction in the verdict they expected history to render on their work...

Thursday, September 21, 1967
4:12 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the full monthly figures,
since 1965, on wounded in Viet Nam by
hospital required and not required.
The figures are given also by service.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

24

Rec. f. 62

Nonfatal Wounds
by Hospital Care Required and Not Required

Year/ Month	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Total DOD	
	Req'd	Not Req'd	Req'd	Not Req'd	Req'd	Not Req'd	Req'd	Not Req'd	Req'd	Not Req'd
1961	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	1
1962	40	34	-	-	1	-	-	3	41	37
1963	206	175	1	-	6	5	5	13	218	193
1964	481	410	-	25	23	14	18	68	522	517
1965	1,965	1,674	53	171	1,241	759	49	202	3,308	2,806
1966	10,030	8,544	224	497	6,186	4,124	86	402	16,526	13,567
1967										
<u>1965</u>										
Jan	53	45	1	1	2	2	1	4	57	52
Feb	127	109	-	1	2	1	3	11	132	122
Mar	35	29	1	2	3	2	1	6	40	39
Apr	42	37	-	3	22	13	2	7	66	60
May	52	44	-	-	37	23	3	13	92	80
Jun	80	68	2	4	50	30	7	31	139	133
Jul	89	75	2	8	101	62	2	8	194	153
Aug	56	48	1	3	231	141	13	54	301	246
Sep	118	101	6	19	181	111	2	7	307	238
Oct	307	261	3	7	140	85	4	16	454	369
Nov	582	495	25	82	169	104	3	10	779	691
Dec	424	362	12	41	303	185	8	35	747	623
<u>1966</u>										
Jan	481	409	5	11	229	152	6	25	721	597
Feb	1,041	886	12	25	389	260	2	9	1,444	1,180
Mar	989	843	26	58	605	404	6	29	1,626	1,334
Apr	837	713	17	39	445	297	21	101	1,320	1,150
May	1,048	892	13	28	522	347	6	26	1,589	1,293
Jun	1,051	896	14	30	457	305	5	21	1,527	1,252
Jul	589	502	27	60	670	447	5	27	1,291	1,036
Aug	708	604	22	49	635	423	5	24	1,370	1,100
Sep	717	610	27	61	723	482	6	26	1,473	1,179
Oct	638	543	22	48	539	360	7	32	1,206	983
Nov	1,174	1,001	12	26	445	296	8	36	1,639	1,359
Dec	757	645	27	62	527	351	9	46	1,320	1,104
<u>1967</u>										
Jan	1,134	966	28	44	655	608	5	16	1,822	1,634
Feb	1,381	1,177	41	66	586	545	13	44	2,021	1,832
Mar	2,018	1,719	50	78	1,224	1,136	20	69	3,312	3,002
Apr	1,561	1,329	53	85	977	908	11	40	2,602	2,362
May	2,034	1,733	117	186	2,174	2,018	27	91	4,352	4,028
Jun	1,574	1,341	86	136	926	861	5	17	2,591	2,355
Jul	1,435	1,222	123	194	1,262	1,171	14	50	2,834	2,637
Aug	1,199	1,021	86	136	1,106	1,028	6	22	2,397	2,207

NOTE: Based on an analysis of casualties during the period January 1965-October 1966 an estimate was derived that showed that about 90% of the wounded who required hospital care were returned to duty.

25

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, September 21, 1967
4:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

This report from [] to the FBI
[] is worth reading.

3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-367
By Sj, NARA, Date 2-8-02

VISIT OF STOKELY CARMICHAEL TO ALGERIA

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] the Algerian political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), had invited Stokely Carmichael to visit Algeria without first advising the Algerian Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Interior or the Algerian Presidency. [redacted] the Presidency as confounded about what to do with Carmichael when he appeared in Algiers, since it knew so little about him or his movement.

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] Carmichael [redacted] arrived in Algiers five days before the date announced to the public. He had been invited to Algiers by a member of the Executive Secretariat of the FLN, Mustapha Bouarfa, who headed the Algerian delegation to the recent Latin American Solidarity Conference in Havana, Cuba. The invitation was delivered personally by Bouarfa to Carmichael in Havana, but [redacted] was not certain whether he did so under instruction from the FLN or on other authority. Since his arrival in Algiers, Carmichael's visit has been directed exclusively by a special section in the FLN concerned with the covert supply and training of foreign liberation movements. Party officials normally involved in visits of foreign political personalities have been excluded from making arrangements for Carmichael.

3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(1)

[redacted] Carmichael's movement appeared to be an organization of considerable substance. It appeared [redacted] to have a solid revolutionary ideology which was well expressed, a developed urban guerrilla tactic, and an efficient administration.

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-459
By Sj, NARA, Date 3-15-02

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 21, 1967
4:05 p.m.

Herewith Amb. Bunker reports
his talk with the Canadian ICC
Commissioner. We shall have further
debriefing later.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 6464

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 48, NARA, Date 9-30-91

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

26a

September 20, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 6464)

Senator Symington and I had an extensive talk September 17 with Canadian International Control Commission Commissioner Dier who had just returned from a two week visit to Hanoi.

Dier said that while he was there he was able to talk to North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Day Trinh and to the North Vietnamese liaison officer and to the International Control Commission Lieutenant Colonel Ha Van Lau. Dier considers the latter's views significant as he has the confidence of the Prime Minister whom Dier did not see.

Dier gained the impression that the North Vietnamese are more confident of success than they were on his last visit two months before. They believe that their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose. He said they have a fixation about the possibility of an invasion and they fully expect that there will be an "Inchon type" landing.

Dier raised the question of negotiations in the context of the Canadian four-point proposal. He emphasized that the Cambodians are very sincere in advancing the Canadian proposal and are anxious to help. He said he got nowhere, however. The North Vietnamese rejected the Canadian proposal out of hand, describing it as "made in Washington." Foreign Minister Trinh asked Dier to convey to Canadian Secretary of External Affairs Martin that he should not meddle in Vietnamese affairs.

Dier asked Trinh what the Government of North Vietnam would do if the bombing were stopped. He received no answer. He mentioned the significance of the elections in the south. Trinh dismissed these as "an American farce."

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-363
By LP, NARA, Date 1-13-95

While in Hanoi, Dier also talked to the Soviet Charge who was cordial and stressed that Canadians get along well with Russians. Dier said he received the clear impression from the Charge that basically the Soviets would like to get out of the whole Vietnamese affair. He complained the heavy burden of their aid to North Vietnam diverted resources they could put to better use at home.

On the subject of conditions in Hanoi, Dier said that the center of the city had become a sanctuary for truck repair and maintenance because it was free of bombing. He said he noticed no signs of a power shortage. There are thousands of auxilliary generators and at no time was the power off for more than an hour while he was there. With respect to food supply, he was told by a doctor connected with the International Control Commission mission in Hanoi that there were signs of malnutrition showing up in small children.

Dier observed the destruction caused by a bomb, apparently jettisoned over Hanoi, which had fallen in the city and leveled seventeen buildings, killing sixty-nine people.

On the International Control Commission plane with Dier going to and returning from Hanoi there were three American women respectively from New York, New Jersey and California. He described them as middle-aged, intelligent and dedicated. He said they represented the "Voice of Women" (assume these were the three representatives of "Women Strike for Peace".) He said these women had been taken all over the country in North Vietnam, places that he was not allowed to go. As a result of their experience they apparently were more convinced than ever that our policy was wrong. Dier said that he took them to task for some of their views, pointing out that they were simply accepting the classical comunist-nationalist line, but he felt he had made no impression on them.

Dier said that within a few days he expected to have his notes in shape and would have more detailed information which he would pass on to me.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 21, 1968
2:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the letter to you from
the resigning Viet Nam volunteers,
with an account of their talks with
Amb. Bunker.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 6459

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 19, NARA, Date 9-30-91

27a

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

Saigon 6459

September 20, 1967

At 4:00 o'clock, September 20, Donald Luce, Director, International Volunteer Services, Vietnam, and Tom Fox, International Volunteer Services (Phu Yen Province refugee worker) called on Ambassador to present a letter signed by 49 International Volunteer Services personnel and addressed to the President (text below). Copies of the letter were distributed to press here earlier today. (Believe copy was provided Weintraub, New York Times, 19 September.) Ambassador accepted letter, said he would, of course, forward it immediately but expressed strong views on impropriety of making the letter public prior to receipt by the President. Luce's response was he didn't feel he could wait any longer on basis of large number of people who had knowledge of letter. In answer to question Luce said six International Volunteer Services personnel "so far" had either resigned or intended to do so. Most (including Fox) desire to remain in Vietnam with International Volunteer Services, claiming they do not intend to discuss policy.

Ambassador then discussed his meeting with Luce and representatives of other voluntary agencies (Vietnam Christian Services, the Vietnam Foster Parents Plan, American Friends Services Committee, and Luce of International Volunteer Services) on Thursday, September 14. During this meeting the agencies discussed only problems of relatively minor nature which could have been solved locally. These included alleged effort of the military to influence the priority of work by the agencies, lack of priority in air transportation, the case of an International Volunteer Services worker who was reprimanded for curfew violation when in fact he was on an important humanitarian mission and other problems of a like nature. The Ambassador had noted these problems and agreement was that he would meet with the group after he had looked into the matter. During the September 14 meeting, discussion centered on program support; however, Ambassador stated in answer to question that while every American had perfect right to his views, the voluntary agencies were here as guests of the Government of Vietnam who are fighting aggression. Under such circumstances, public statements in direct opposition to the policies of the Government of Vietnam should not be made by Americans who were here for the express purpose of helping the Vietnamese (at no time during the September 14 meeting did the International Volunteer Services discuss their deep disagreement with the Government of Vietnam and U. S. policy as indicated in the letter below.)

In discussing the letter to the President with Luce and Fox, Ambassador reiterated right of every American to hold independent views, complimented

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-363

By ing, NARA, Date 1-13-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS~~

the International Volunteer Services on their past performance, but expressed disappointment that Luce had taken to public forum with his views prior to any consultation at appropriate level here. Ambassador also pointed out the possibility that the Government of Vietnam might take strong exception to action thereby jeopardizing the position of the entire International Volunteer Services program.

Have not yet determined whether or not a sufficiently large number of International Volunteer Services people are sufficiently opposed to views expressed in a letter to counter in meaningful way (Lescaze, Washington Post reportedly is looking for International Volunteer Services people who do not agree with the letter.) It appears that while the letter expresses the opinion of considerable number of International Volunteer Services people, this view is not, repeat not, shared by the vast majority of voluntary agencies. (Only Foster Parents Plan, American Friends Services Committee and Vietnam Christian Services identify with the views expressed in the New York Times article and of these, the American Friends Services Committee and the Vietnam Christian Services do not identify with the more extreme statements.)

At regularly scheduled press briefing at 5:00 P.M. on September 20, no interest was expressed and no questions were asked regarding the letter although reporters have copies. In at least one case, reporter claimed to resent the New York Times' "exclusive" on previous portion of story and apparently did not intend to build it up.

Provided the Government of Vietnam does not react vigorously, intend to play press aspects in low key along lines certain Americans disagree with the Government of Vietnam and U.S. policy and have decided to resign from the International Volunteer Services.

Begin text of letter:

To: Lyndon B. Johnson, President, United States of America
The White House, Washington, D. C.

"Dear Mr. President:

"As volunteers with International Voluntary Services (IVS) working in agriculture, education, and community development, we have the unique opportunity of living closely with Vietnamese over extended periods of time.

Thus we have been able to watch and share their suffering, one of us since as early as 1958. What we have seen and heard of the effects of the war in Vietnam compels us to make this statement. The problems which the Vietnamese face are too little understood and their voices have been too long muffled. It is not enough to rely on statistics to describe their daily concerns.

"We present this statement, not as spokesmen for the International Volunteer Services, but as individuals.

"We are finding it increasingly difficult to pursue quietly our main objective: helping the people of Vietnam. In assisting one family or one individual to make a better living or to get a better education, it has become evident that our small successes only blind us to how little or negative the effect is, in the face of present realities in Vietnam. Thus to stay in Vietnam and remain silent is to fail to respond to the first need of the Vietnamese people--peace.

"While working in Vietnam we have gained a genuine respect for the Vietnamese. They are strong. They are hard working. They endure. And they have proven over and over their ability to deal with foreign interference. But they suffer in the process, a suffering greatly intensified by today's American presence. This suffering will continue and increase until Americans act to ease their suffering. It is to you, Mr. President, that we address ourselves.

"Our testimony:

"The effects: We do not accuse anyone of deliberate cruelty. Perhaps if you accept the war, all can be justified--the free strike zones, the refugees, the spraying of herbicide on crops, the napalm. But the Vietnam war is in itself an overwhelming atrocity. Its every victim--the dead, the bereaved, the deprived is a victim of this atrocity. We are usually far from the scenes of the worst brutality, however, more than enough still comes to our attention. Viet Cong terrorism is real, so are the innocent victims of U. S. bombing, strafing, and shelling.

"What we have seen: we have all seen or know about the human results of this war. Therefore we do not need to list an awful tally of atrocities. . . how Vietnamese react to these atrocities, however is little known.

"One week before the election Viet Cong indiscriminately sprayed mortars on the Delta City of Can Tho, hitting hospital wards, and demolishing poorly-constructed houses; the toll: thirty Vietnamese dead, 300 wounded (the more solidly-built houses of Americans prevented any American casualties). A small anti-Viet Cong rally was held the next day, but according to one resident, 'Many of the people here place the ultimate blame on the Americans. . . if the Americans weren't here in the first place this wouldn't have happened.'

"One day after the elections a Saigon paper (Than Chung -- banned the next day) ran two pictures of bomb destruction in North Vietnam with the following comment (translation: 'We can never accept the one-party system in North Vietnam but neither are we able to forget our blood ties with our fellow Vietnamese thereto just as we are unable to forget the Vietnamese caught in the mortar attacks on Can Tho and Thang Binh. . .')

"For the Vietnamese, victory at any price is no longer acceptable.

"We have flown at a safe height over the deserted villages, the sterile valleys, the forests, with the huge swaths cut out, and the long-abandoned rice checks. We have had intimate contact with the refugees. Some of them get jobs at American military establishments and do fairly well. Others are forcibly resettled, landless, in isolated, desolate places which are turned into colonies of mendicants. Others go to the Saigon slums, secure but ridden with desire and the compulsion towards crime. These are refugees generated, not by Viet Cong terrorism, but by a policy of the war, an American policy.

"Wrote one volunteer, 'Cai Be (in the Mekong Delta) has a very successful refugee program as measured by the criteria of the government but when measured by any human criteria it stinks. We have neatly arranged hamlets, good canals, military security, elections and dozens of other assets which win points in Saigon, but we don't have people living decent lives. . . these refugees are with few exceptions farmers, but they have been settled on plots of land so small that only the ingenious manage anything like a decent life. I say that the most ingenious refugees, without knowing a single person who is that ingenious. . . not only do (refugee camps) force these people into an existence which is marginal at best, they do incalculable violence to the customs and traditions of the Vietnamese people. . . . The government has not offered a new and better life, it has only exchanged one form of terrorism for another.' This is a situation created by a policy of war. But as one ranking American officer has said, 'Refugees are a Government of Vietnam problem.'

What we've heard: just as in the U.S., in Vietnam there is no consensus about how the war should be stopped. To relate what the Vietnamese think is difficult, but we can relate what they say.

In a refugee village one of us heard an old woman say these words (translation): "These days of sorrow are filled with napalm, hate and death. The rice fields turn brown. The New Year brings a cold, clutching fear."

A young Buddhist teacher, on the eve of her self-immolation, made her last attempt to express the anguish of the Vietnamese people: "You Americans come to help the Vietnamese people, but have brought only death and destruction. Most of us Vietnamese hate, from the bottom of our hearts the Americans who have brought the suffering of this war...the tons of bombs and money you have poured on our people have shattered our bodies and sense of nation." A Saigon Catholic youth leader, active for over ten years in the Youth Movement, said: "We are caught in a struggle between two power blocs, and we can never forget that. Many people told me you cannot trust Americans, but I never accepted it. Now I am beginning to believe it. You come to help my people, but they will hate you for it." At the Ong Ich Khiem Pagoda in Danang, the broken heart of last year's struggle movement, a Vietnamese friend paused at a shrine, by a wall covered with the photographs of young boys and girls. "Killed by Ky's Saigon troops during the struggle," he explained in restrained English, soldiers brought up to Danang by hastily-loaned American C-130's in the interests of "stability". A Vietnamese who teaches English scribbled out a poem over beers in a tiny dirt-floor restaurant.

Monsoon laughter, peace for this shattered land of troubled minds of corrupted men of human pyramids of blood-soaked rice of hungry faces of pitiless barb wire.

The tide of the war: as volunteers in Vietnam, we work with people, not statistics. War reported in statistics gives a false picture. We read the monthly totals of Hoi Chanh (open arms returnees), and then ask who these people are. Hard-core Viet Cong, suddenly disillusioned with a philosophy that has been their life and bread for years? No. They are marginal Viet Cong at best, if Viet Cong at all, all, looking for a little rest from this tired war and attracted by the dollar songs of the program. People who can be bought are not going to effect change in Vietnam. We read with anguish the daily body count of "enemy" dead. We know that these "enemy" are not all combat soldiers committed to one side. Many are old men, women, and young boys who ran when a helicopter hovered, who were hiding from the bombs in an enemy bunker, or who refused to leave their farms. We watch the development of the Pacification Program, from "strategic hamlet" to "revolutionary

development"(an American term: in Vietnamese it is called "rural building"), and see teams of cadre operating in the villages. Who are these cadre? Young men and women, often motivated by draft exemption and the security of a government job, with three months' training in concepts that take several years to master. To the villagers, these black-pajammaed "imitation Viet Cong" are more interference from the government, perhaps the source of another handout. Certainly they are not a step towards "capturing the hearts and minds" of the villagers. Yet, RD cadre have also lost their lives in this war.

A road opens up, another closes. While working in Vietnam, we much travel these roads. We have not seen any increase in security in the past year. In Saigon and in other cities, roads are secure but they are full of holes from the steady flow of American tanks and trucks.

A village lives peacefully under Viet Cong control. Government or American troops arrive to "liberate" the population. Violence ensues, refugees are created, but the Viet Cong vanish. If the military decides not to plow the village under (as was Ben S in operation Cedar Falls), the Viet Cong will come back and resume their authority.

Prostitution increases, corruption increases, crime in the streets increases, and more and more capable people join their compatriots -- either the Viet Cong or those on the American payroll. The former have dedicated themselves to a difficult and uncomfortable struggle, with no end in sight. The latter have sought the easier road: the American dollar, a comfortable life, outwardly compromising their own culture. Inwardly they have not. In their eyes the U.S. is the exploiter to be exploited.

An election is held to legitimize a government generally detested by the Vietnamese. Cries of fraudulence are everywhere but the U.S. ignores these cries in the person of Henry Cabot Lodge: "I think these elections were as good and orderly and wholesome as our own elections," he said after less than a week of observation. Some results: the banning of two Saigon papers (Than Chung, Sang) on the day after the election, the two papers which were the most outspoken against the Government and for peace during the campaign. "The elections are over," announced Vice President-elect Ky, after banning all press conferences without government approval. Repression continues.

While the U.S. has announced its dedication to the building of democracy in South Vietnam, it continues to support a government which jails pacifists and neutralists. The U.S. has repeatedly announced its support for self-determination, and yet assigns advisors to everyone from the top military command to the Department of Waterworks in Saigon. Credibility of leaders

is a problem in the U.S.; in Vietnam there is no credibility. Rumors say that the U.S. has a 99-year lease on Cam Ranh Bay. True? That is not important. It is what the Vietnamese think that is important. They have no illusions about why the U.S. is in Vietnam. Many feel that America is in Vietnam to stop Communism -- at all costs. In some ways defeating Communism fits Vietnamese interests vis-a-vis China, whom these people have fought for a thousand years. There is no love for China, even in the North. "A unified Vietnam," said a Saigon youth, "under Ho Chi Minh would not succumb to China." But they shudder when they see North Vietnam being forced to accept her support. Self-determination in the North, as well as in the South, is being compromised by the American policy.

Conclusions: The war as it is presently being waged is self-defeating in approach. U.S. programs are meant to gain the confidence and admiration of the Vietnamese people through the Vietnamese Government. "There is more anti-Americanism here today than there was before," said an IVS volunteer returning to Vietnam again after having spent three years here from 1963 to 1966.

The U.S. continues to support a power group which has proven for five years that it is unable to bring about unity and peace in South Vietnam. "When the Americans learn to respect the true aspirations in Vietnam," said a youth leader recently, "true nationalism will come to power. Only true nationalists can bring peace to the South, talk to the North, and bring reunification." Cried another youth leader, "Who is Nguyen Cao Ky? Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap have been fighting for Vietnam since before Ky was born. Why should they talk to him?"

What we recommend:

1. Even in our situation, normally far from the fighting, we have seen enough to say that the only monuments to this war will be the dead, the maimed, the despairing and the forlorn. The trend has been escalation.
2. Children, old people, and the sick -- not organized groups of armed men -- are the most likely victims of defoliation. We say stop the spraying of herbicides.
3. Bombing stands in the way of negotiations. We have seen the results of bombing in South Vietnam, and can imagine what it has done to the North. We say stop the bombing.
4. No satisfactory conclusion of this war will come until all parties are represented in peace parleys. A movement in South Vietnam calls for the

recognition of the National Liberation Front to be included in peace talks. We say recognize the National Liberation Front.

5. The U.S. continues to let self-interests stand in the way of self-determination in Vietnam. The U.S. must prove its commitment f compromise instead of waging an endless war of attrition. We say turn the question over to an international peace commission and be prepared to accept its recommendations.

By speaking of these questions, we have seriously jeopardized our positions in Vietnam. Some of us feel that we can no longer justify our staying for often we are misinterpreted as representatives of American policy. Others of us wish to stay and to continue to serve the Vietnamese. It is with sadness, therefore, that we make our view known. But because above all our first concern is for the Vietnamese, there is no alternative. It is their cry and ours; end this war.

(Signed) Don Luce '58

A list of 49 names was attached

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

28

Pres file

Thursday, September 21, 1967 -- 2:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

The distances are these:

Hanoi to DMZ 294 miles

Chicom Frontier to DMZ 358 miles

W. Rostow

Also a Japanese report on Hanoi is attached.
W

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 21, 1967

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs
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TEXT OF A CIA REPORT

(2 723 0654-67)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 00-307
By Sj, NARA Date 7-6-01

SUBJECT: Current Conditions in North Vietnam



TEXT OF THE REPORT:

"A foreigner (politically neutral) who passed through Vientiane, Laos, said that North Vietnam is in chaos. The morale of the North Vietnam regular troops is deteriorating and members of the militia are surrendering to South Vietnam in increasing numbers. The nation at large is hoping for peace. Nearly all of the military and industrial facilities in Hanoi, Nam Dinh and Haiphong have been destroyed by bombings. There are rumors that the United States and North Vietnam are negotiating for peace through the United Nations Supervisory Commission (sic. presumably International Control Commission)."

Thursday, September 21, 1967
11:25 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As you know, the prosperity of the Vietnamese cities is beginning to lap over into the countryside.

The marked passages in these two reports give you a feel for some of the rural effects.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 763
A-178 from Saigon, Sept 7, 1967

WWRostow:rlh

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SUBJECT: ECONOMIC BOOM: REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTS IN BA TRI

REF: A-730

1. BRIGHTLY COLORED SHIRTS ARE REPLACING THE MONOTONOUS BLACK PAJAMAS OF DELTA PEASANTS, IF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN BA TRI DISTRICT OF KIEN HOA PROVINCE IS TYPICAL. IN BA TRI CONSUMERISM IS IN FULL SWAY AS THE GOOD LIFE FILTERS OUT OF SAIGON AND INTO THE VIETNAMESE COUNTRYSIDE.

2. BASIC DATA ON THE BA TRI REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

PRIORITY AREA WERE FURNISHED IN REPAIR. THAT INFORMATION WAS COLLECTED BY AN OFFICER OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC OFFICE IN LATE APRIL. SINCE THEN THE COMMERCIAL PACE OF THE AREA HAS QUICKENED CONSIDERABLY. FOUR FACTORS ACCOUNT FOR THIS: THE RETURN OF APPROXIMATELY 14,000 PEOPLE IN JANUARY, 1967, TO THE DISTRICT TOWN'S COMMERCIAL BELT; PAVEMENT OF THE ROAD FROM BA TRI INTO THIS AREA; IMPROVED ROAD SECURITY FROM THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF BEN TRE TO BA TRI AND THE FACT THAT HIGH PADDY PRICES DURING THE LAST HARVEST SEASON PROVIDED A GOOD DEAL OF LIQUIDITY IN THE NEW LIFE HAMLETS.

3. IN APRIL THERE WERE FEW SEWING MACHINES IN THE PACIFICATION ZONE. NOW APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT OF THE HOUSEHOLDS HAVE ONE. CLOTH IS COMING DOWN FROM SAIGON AND IS BEING MADE INTO THE BRIGHTLY COLORED CLOTHING DESCRIBED ABOVE. TRANSISTOR RADIOS ARE NOT AN UNCOMMON POSSESSION. THE HONDA REVOLUTION HAS ALSO COME TO BA TRI. IN APRIL THERE WERE TWO OR THREE NEW MOTORBIKES IN THE DISTRICT. TODAY, THERE ARE OVER 50. ON PROVINCIAL ROAD 174 RUNNING NORTHWARD FROM

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-2- SAIGON 763, JULY 11, 1967

BA TRI THROUGH THE 13 NEW LIFE HAMLETS, THERE ARE 10 NEW LAMBRETTA TAXIS CARRYING GOODS AND PASSENGERS. THE NINE COMMERCIAL TRUCKS OF BA TRI DISTRICT TOWN ARE IN ALMOST CONSTANT MOTION CARRYING RICE, HOGS, FISH, ETC., TO SAIGON AND RETURNING WITH CONSUMER GOODS. THE ONLY GAS STATION IN THE AREA, OPERATED BY ESSO, REPORTS THAT SALES OF GASOLINE HAVE INCREASED FROM 15,000 LITRES IN MARCH TO A PRESENT AVERAGE OF 20,000 LITRES MONTHLY. RICE FARMERS CONTINUE TO GET GOOD PRICES FOR THEIR PRODUCE. STORED RICE FROM THIS YEAR'S HARVEST APPEARS TO BE A VERY EFFECTIVE FORM OF BANKING. THE THREE RICE MILLS IN BA TRI ARE DAILY BUYING FROM FARMERS IN THE RD AREA WHO ARE CONVERTING PADDY TO CASH AS THEY NEED IT. SECONDARY CROPS PROVIDE A SECOND SOURCE OF INCOME. WHILE THE AREA PEASANT IS PREPARING TO TRANSPLANT RICE FROM SEEDBEDS, HIS VEGETABLE PRODUCE IS BEING SOLD. BA TRI MARKET HAS A DAILY SELL-OFF OF GOOD QUANTITIES OF WATERMELON, CUCUMBERS, TOMATOES, MANIOC, GREEN BEANS, ETC. HOGS ARE SELLING AT PREMIUM PRICES. BA TRI'S LEADING HOG DEALER WHO WAS SENDING ABOUT 250 ANIMALS TO SAIGON EACH

MONTH EARLIER THIS YEAR NOW REPORTS MONTHLY SHIPMENTS OF 500 AND IS PAYING 10,300 PIASTERS PER 100 KILOS.

4. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FERTILIZER, PRODUCTION GOODS ARE NOT MOVING AS WELL AS CONSUMER GOODS. FERTILIZER IS SELLING AT REASONABLE RATES, E.G. ONE KILO OF UREA RETAILS AT 12 PIASTERS PER KILO. THIS COMMODITY IS SOLD IN ALL THE LITTLE SHOPS IN THE DISTRICT TOWN WHERE IT HAS BEEN REPACKED INTO ONE KILO BAGS SINCE MOST OF IT IS USED ON VEGETABLES. HOWEVER, ITEMS LIKE MARINE ENGINES AND WATER PUMPS ARE NOT EASY TO ACQUIRE. BA TRI HAS ONE SHOP WHICH STOCKS WATER PUMPS. THE OWNER, STARTING WITH AN INVENTORY OF 30 PUMPS 13 MONTHS AGO STILL HAS 20 LEFT AND IS ONLY SELLING AN AVERAGE OF FOUR PER MONTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS STRONG DEMAND FOR THIS EQUIPMENT, RESOURCE CONTROL PROCEDURES INHIBIT SALES. A PROSPECTIVE BUYER MUST HAVE APPROVAL FROM THE DISTRICT CHIEF.

5. IN SHORT, OPEN ROADS, GOOD AGRICULTURAL PRICES, AND THE

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-3- SAIGON 763, JULY 11, 1967

AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER GOODS ARE DOING AS MUCH AS ANYTHING TO PROMOTE "NATION-BUILDING". BA TRI NEEDS SAIGON AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD. LOCAL RESIDENTS WOULD BE LOATH TO BE CUT OFF AGAIN.

6. A COMPLETE REPORT FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM WHICH WILL DISCUSS OTHER ASPECTS OF THE REGULAR RD PROGRAM INsofar AS IT HAS AFFECTED THESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN BA TRI.

DECONTROL 1/1/70. BUNKER
BT

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TO : Secstate WASHDC

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AMEMBASSY/SAIGON

DATE: Sept. 7, 1967

FROM : Amembassy/Saigon

 SUBJECT : Provincial Economic Reporting - Tieu Can District,
Vinh Binh Province.

 REF : Saigon 763-*no copy*

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID MESSAGE

PASS WEHRLE

A. INTRODUCTION

The economic prosperity of Tieu Can District in the Delta's Vinh Binh Province is another solid example of the recent and gradual shift of the balance of trade in favor of the countryside. Prices of agricultural products are up over last year, prices of goods imported into the District have remained relatively stable, and the flow of goods between Tieu Can and urban centers has continued without too much harassment. Similar developments have been reported in Ba Tri District of Kien Hoa Province (see reftel).

There is one significant difference between the two areas. Ba Tri is an R.D. priority area with seven R.D. teams and two ARVN battalions. Its rather startling economic upsurge is the result of eliminating since January VC economic control in five productive villages near the district town, thus allowing these to participate in the increasingly apparent prosperity in GVN-controlled territory. Tieu Can's pacification program is, in comparison, quite modest. One R.D. team (and four PAT teams) operate there with security provided by Popular Forces and one Regional Force company. Of its five villages, the two most naturally productive, Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa, are VC controlled. Its

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by: ECON:JLGardner: cjh:9/7/67

Contents and Classification Approved by

ADEA:WDSHarp

Clearances: ECON:JWHolmes

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progress can be almost wholly ascribed to better agricultural prices, stable prices for manufactured goods and fairly good road and river security.

Located in the middle of Vinh Binh Province on the Bassac River, the District has a population estimated at 42,900 with 5,000 living in the district town. Its most important products are rice and pork. Other important export products are ducks, chickens, and duck eggs. Vegetable farming is still of the home garden type and is of little commercial value.

B. PRODUCTION AND INCOME

1. Rice. Tieu Can District has 19,517 hectares of rice land in GVN-controlled areas. During the 1966/67 season it harvested a total of 31,227 metric tons of paddy for a yield per hectare of 1.6 metric tons. About 19,000 tons were consumed locally with 11,000 tons being exported. During this period paddy sold for 12-13 piasters per kilogram, a jump of about 100% over the 1965/66 price of 6-7. The current paddy price (that paid to farmers) is now up to 17 piasters per kilo. Tieu Can farmers feel that this price will stay at this level and even increase more. Thus a good deal of production incentive exists.

The rice fields (about 11,000 hectares) in VC-controlled Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa are mostly owned by six men who now reside in the district town and no longer collect rents from their land. The reporting officer interviewed a rallier who had just arrived with his weapon. He reported that the VC have "distributed" land to the tenants in Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa and collect rice taxes in each at rates running from 30 to 60 percent. Rents in GVN-controlled villages average 25 percent.

The district has eight mills, of which three are in Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa.

2. Pork, Poultry, and Duck Eggs. During 1966, Tieu Can exported 1,400 hogs at an average price of VN\$5,000 each. Prices this year are closer to VN\$9,000. Also in 1966 the district shipped 4,200 chickens and ducks at an average of VN\$290 each. Actually the district made more money on duck eggs, its unique specialty. In 1966, it supplied Saigon with 700,000 of these for a gross income of VN\$2,100,000.

C. CONSUMPTION

Tieu Can District is importing more consumer goods. This increase is due to higher agricultural prices and is not a result of expanded production or pacification activities. Business volume has not increased significantly over last year. Gasoline sales are static and the amounts of agricultural products moving by truck this year to Phu Vinh, the provincial capital, will not, by all accounts, much exceed 1966 shipments. Therefore higher prices, for the same volume of production, account, in large part, for

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increased buying of consumer goods. In all likelihood if the productivity of Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa villages is reabsorbed into Tieu Can's commercial belt, a commercial expansion similar to that taking place in Ba Tri would result.

1. Motorbikes. Between August 1966, and July, 1967, the GVN issued about \$38 million worth of import licenses for motorbikes. During January and February, 1967, Hondas and Suzukis started showing up in the Delta. Tieu Can is no exception. District offices registered about fifty new bikes during these months.

2. Transistor Radios and Television Sets. A few shops are selling small transistor radios for the first time and they are selling fast. TV sets can't be bought locally but they are available in Can Tho. There are five public sets provided through VIS channels and ten new private sets, most of which are owned by Chinese merchants.

3. Fertilizer. Two types of fertilizer, urea and tri-calcium phosphate (TCP), are in plentiful supply. Four private dealers (Chinese) and the local co-op handle distribution. The four merchants (who retail other commodities as well) have combined monthly sales of 80-100 tons. The Co-op, on the other hand, has sold only 37 tons (20 urea, 17 TCP) since the beginning of March. Three of the private dealers are new to the trade, having entered as a result of the free access to wholesale supplies provision in the 1967 Fertilizer Agreement. Their combined monthly sales are 45-60 tons. About 30 tons of their sales represent increased monthly sales over last year. Urea retails at VN\$10,400 and TCP at VN\$4,400 per ton. These prices are somewhat lower than the retail prices projected under this year's fertilizer agreement. When that agreement was negotiated it was expected that the urea would be about VN\$11,000 per ton retail in Vinh Binh with TCP selling at VN\$5,500.

4. Waterpumps. Waterpumps are a key investment in the Delta rice economy. The fact that they can be easily modified to make them serve as marine engines and power generators trebles their utility for the Delta peasant. In Tieu Can it is estimated that 60% of farm families own at least one. Because of the multi-faceted nature of these pumps, their importation and sale is strictly controlled under the GVN's resource control program.

In 1966 there was only one pump dealer in Tieu Can who was selling an average of twenty pumps per month. Now there are four such dealers selling a combined total of 75-80 units monthly. A 3-hp pump wholesales at VN\$5,000 and retails at VN\$7,000. Wholesale and retail prices for 9-hp pumps are VN\$18,000 and VN\$18,500 respectively. Permission to purchase a 3-hp model can usually be gotten in a day. Larger models take longer because it is assumed that larger units are more useful to the Viet Cong.

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5. Other Items. As in Ba Tri, about 30% of the families in Tieu Can District have new sewing machines, usually of Japanese origin. The most prominent brand name is "Sincere". Gasoline sales, an important indicator of the volume of trade, have remained at an average of 12,000 litres per month for the past two years. The same is true of kerosene with monthly sales of 7,600 litres.

D. TRANSPORTATION

Almost all of Tieu Can's commerce moves on provincial road #34. When travelled along its southwesterly course, it leads to the Bassac River. Its longer northwestern section goes through Phu Vinh to the Mekong, a stretch of 30 kilometers. Thus Tieu Can is well situated in a transportation sense. This route is almost always open to commercial traffic. However, on the days of the reporting officer's visit (August 28-30), the Viet Cong closed the road by planting mines and announcing that they had done so. The obvious purpose was to harass commercial traffic just prior to the September 3 national elections.

E. CONCLUSION

Tieu Can District is experiencing the same beneficial economic effects which are becoming apparent in large parts of rural Vietnam as a result of the gradual switch in the balance of trade in favor of the countryside. Agricultural income is up, commercial traffic on the roads and waterways is relatively secure and consumer goods are more available. Tieu Can's pace could rival that in Ba Tri when the Viet Cong are eliminated from Tan Hoa and Hung Hoa villages.

BUNKER



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Thursday, Sept. 21, 1967
11:00 a.m.

30

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have had prepared statements by Asian leaders on:

- the U. S. presence in Viet Nam;
- U. S. and Allied objectives in Viet Nam ;
- consequences to Asia of a Communist victory in Viet Nam;
- U. S. bombing policy in North Viet Nam; and
- U. S. peace efforts in Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

Attachments

30a

STATEMENTS BY ASIAN LEADERS ON
THE UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN VIETNAM

34
" . . . Americans believe that human freedom is being challenged
and that that challenge must be met. "

Former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies
of Australia, April 4, 1965

"From the point of view of ordinary common sense and the instinct
of self-preservation, I cannot understand how anyone can say that
the Americans should go (from Vietnam). "

Former Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies
of Australia, April 5, 1965

"We are there because, like you, (the U. S) we believe it is right
to be there. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in
Washington, June 29, 1966

"Though the U. S. counterblow in Vietnam is a defensive action,
it has plucked up the courage of Communist-threatened Asian
countries and strengthened their confidence in American
leadership. "

The Republic of China's former Foreign
Minister, Sampson Shen, in the China
Daily News, March 31, 1965

" . . .you have our whole-hearted support for your firm stand on Vietnam. Your just resolution that Vietnam should be defended from the communist aggression under any circumstances will inspire and encourage millions of peace-loving peoples in small and weak countries under threat of communist aggression. "

Korean President Park Chung Hee in a
letter to President Johnson, July 29, 1965

"The Americans are in Vietnam to protect and defend Vietnam. So long as the independence and sovereignty of Vietnam are endangered, the Americans are right to be there. "

Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak
of Malaysia in an interview with UPI,
May 4, 1965

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe -- and is prepared to back up its concern with action. "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand,
May 18, 1967

"I find it honorable to say, in view of the resolution of the United States Government to help protect the freedom-loving peoples of Asia, that the least that the peoples of Asia can do is to fulfill

their own part, and that is, demonstrate their own love for freedom by fighting with their own men, with their own complement, and their own soldiers, for freedom. "

Philippine President Marcos, at Basa
Airbase, June 20, 1966

"Thanks to the wisdom and courage of the President of the United States. . . we are now succeeding in putting out a small fire. It was. . . a decision that will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration. "

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of
Thailand, before the Rotary Club,
Bangkok, January 27, 1967

STATEMENTS BY ASIAN LEADERS
ON U. S. AND ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

"We don't want to defeat the enemy in the sense of bringing him to the point of unconditional surrender. We don't want to destroy anything or gain any territory or power. All we want to do is stop him from overthrowing an independent South Vietnam. "

~~Former~~ Australian External Affairs
Minister Paul Hausluck, in a press conference, December 28, 1965

"We are there (in Vietnam) because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt before
Parliament, March 8, 1966

"The firm stand of the United States in the Vietnam war provides a ray of hope for safeguarding Asian freedom and world peace. American prestige is rising proportionately to President Johnson's firmness. " .

President Chiang Kai-shek of the Republic
of China, quoted in U. S. News and World
Report, April 28, 1965

"With Peiping's instigation and support, North Vietnam has stepped up its aggression against South Vietnam, thereby causing steady escalation of the conflict. In reply, the democracies have speedily poured in more manpower and materials to defend freedom

and to punish the aggressors. The United States has been shouldering the heaviest share of the burden in fighting the Vietnam war. "

Chinese Premier C. K. Yen, in a report to the Legislative Yuan, February 22, 1966

"... The Republic of China is proud to pledge its support to the resolute stand of the United States against aggression and in the preservation of peace and freedom in my part of the world. "

Chinese Premier C. K. Yen, at the White House, May 9, 1967

"...for the first time in our history, last year we decided to dispatch our combat troops overseas. . . because in our belief any aggression against the Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of Free Asia and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people. "

President Park of Korea, State of the Nation address, January 18, 1966

"The Vietnam war is criticized as a dirty American war. But the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and other countries are also participating in the war. Why should we sit idly by while

others think we have been drawn into a U. S. war. This is a war involving all of Asia. Therefore, we must show the world that Asians are trying to settle an Asian problem. "

Korean Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won,
in a press interview, October 5, 1966

". . . we have a duty to play our part in the collective effort to assist the people of South Vietnam in their struggle to maintain their independence. . . "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand,
in announcing that New Zealand would send
combat troops to South Vietnam, May 27,
1965.

"The American people have gladly shouldered an immense burden -- both in resources and human lives -- to help ensure for the South Vietnamese people the right to determine their own future free from external aggression. "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand,
April 11, 1967

"PHILCAG (Philippine Civic Action Group) has been dispatched to Vietnam to contribute to the mission of peace in that country and to encourage our United States ally to stay in Asia. It is to the

selfish national interest of the Philippines that the United States maintain its presence in Asia. The alternative is very difficult to contemplate. "

Philippine President Marcos, State of the Nation Address, January 23, 1967

"Cooperation between Thailand and the United States ... is based on the same objectives. They are the desire for the war in Vietnam to be ended as quickly as possible and in the best way possible, in order to safeguard the freedom and independence of nations that have been the victims of aggression. "

Thai Foreign Minister Thanat, quoted in Thai Government press release, July 28, 1967

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STATEMENTS BY ASIAN LEADERS
ON THE CONSEQUENCES TO ASIA OF A COMMUNIST
VICTORY IN VIETNAM

"The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. "

Former Prime Minister Menzies of
Australia, April 29, 1965

"It would be outside our character to leave the fighting to Americans in what we know are also our interests and causes. In the long run the threat to South Vietnam is a direct threat to Australia. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt before
Parliament, March 24, 1966

"We are of the view that the outcome of the Vietnam war will be a crucial factor in deciding whether freedom or slavery is to prevail. "

Chinese Premier C. K. Yen, in a report
to the Legislative Yuan, February 21, 1967

"It is the communists who are the aggressors and the source of all the trouble in Vietnam. But for the American intervention, South Vietnam would have been butchered and massacred by the Communists. "

Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, airport news conference, Kuala Lumpur, August 5, 1965

"I don't think you (the U. S.) should clear out of Asia until the Asian nations themselves either alone or jointly with the United Nations can establish peace in the area. For you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia. . . . "

Philippine President Marcos on Meet the Press, September 18, 1966

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now . . . It may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance. "

Philippine President Marcos in a report to the nation, October 3, 1966

". . . we could not ignore the request for additional aid from the South Vietnamese Government because the fight in Vietnam involves more than the Vietnamese people. The result of the struggle in

Vietnam could easily affect the freedom we enjoy. "

Philippine Foreign Secretary Ramos,
June 7, 1966

"Thailand. . . will be the next target of the Communists, as they have already proclaimed. This is why Thailand realizes the necessity to send military units to help oppose Communist aggression when it is still at a distance from our country. "

Thai Government statement, January
3, 1967

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STATEMENTS BY ASIAN LEADERS
ON UNITED STATES BOMBING POLICY IN
NORTH VIETNAM

"The purpose of the bombing has been not to destroy the regime in Hanoi or break the economy of North Vietnam, or to shatter the basis of the people's livelihood, but to damage or destroy those military installations and facilities which enable Hanoi to supply and support its own forces in the South and those of the Viet Cong. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in a statement February 1, 1966

"It has consistently been the view of the Australian Government that North Vietnam must not be permitted to remain a haven immune from military risk, from which military aggression against the south can be mounted with impunity. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in a statement February 1, 1966

"The bombing made it very much more difficult for the North Vietnamese to maintain and reinforce their armies in the South. During the last bombing pause in Vietnam in February -- which lasted for 96 hours -- the North moved supplies sufficient to keep two 10,000-man divisions going for more than four months. "

Australian Army Minister Malcolm Fraser, August 24, 1967

"The Communists will not come to the peace table unless you can show it does not pay to pursue the warfare they are pursuing now.

Any resolute steps by the American government will contribute more to the prospect for peace than otherwise. Bombing will only show the Communists that it is not easy to confront the combined forces of freedom. "

Premier C. K. Yen of the Republic of China, on "Meet the Press", May 15, 1967

"A suspension of the United States bombing of North Vietnam would obviously be a major part of that mutual scaling down of the fighting in Vietnam that we all want to see brought about. Unfortunately, there is little evidence so far that the North Vietnamese are willing to take part in a matching reduction in the hostilities. "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand, in an interview with UPI, March 13, 1967

"The bombing attacks are an indication of American determination to stay in Vietnam until the latter's safety from communist aggression is assured, a development which has heartened the free nations of Southeast Asia. "

Former Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal in AP interview, April 19, 1965

"I feel that it is necessary to intensify the bombing of important strategic targets in order to destroy North Vietnam's morale and initiative in sending reinforcements to help the Viet Cong in South

Vietnam. That is the way to compel it to hold peace negotiations. "

Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of
Thailand, news conference, August 21, 1967

STATEMENTS BY ASIAN LEADERS
ON UNITED STATES PEACE EFFORTS IN
VIETNAM

"The suspension of bombing was. . . part of a program of action designed to encourage North Vietnam to turn back from its course of increasingly open military intervention in South Vietnam. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in a statement, February 1, 1966

"We know that the United States will remain alert and ready to explore any indication of willingness on the other side to move towards a settlement on just terms. "

Australian Prime Minister Holt, in a statement, February 1, 1966

"(The Government) welcomes the statement of President Johnson, made on April 7, 1965, that the United States of America remains ready for unconditional discussions in the search for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. The Government also welcomes the pledge of the President that until peace is achieved the United States of America will try to keep the conflict from spreading. The Government of Ceylon earnestly hopes that the other parties that are chiefly concerned will be of the same mind, and that it will now be possible for discussions to commence with the least possible delay. . . ."

Official Ceylon Government statement, April 10, 1965

"The Chinese Communists are doing their utmost to frustrate any effort made by the United States to secure lasting peace of the world, and they will continue to do so because they are opposed to the very ideals of freedom and democracy to which the United States is dedicated. "

Premier C. K. Yen of the Republic of China, at the American University Club in Taipei, July 7, 1967

"The Shahanshah and the President agreed on the importance of avoiding a widening of hostilities and the need to continue the search for settlement on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Agreements which would also respect the rights of the Vietnamese people to determine their own destiny in freedom. "

From a joint statement by the Shah of Iran and President Johnson, August 23, 1967

". . . Hanoi still stands firm on its own four-point cease-fire formula, showing no willingness to negotiate. Under these circumstances the United States is in no position to swallow these Hanoi terms without first ascertaining how the independence of South Vietnam will be guaranteed after the truce. "

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, in the Japan Times, July 20, 1965

"The United States has repeatedly declared its readiness to enter into discussions without any pre-conditions, while the North Vietnamese authorities and the Viet Cong have maintained the attitude that so long as their claims are not recognized there can be no possibility of their agreeing to negotiations. I strongly desire that the Communist side, taking into consideration the appeals for peace made by so many of the world's nations and leaders, might show a more responsive and constructive attitude toward a peaceful solution. "

Former Foreign Minister Shiina of
Japan, before the U. N. General
Assembly, September 23, 1966

"There is no doubt that the United States Government is entirely sincere in wishing to see negotiations begin without pre-conditions. This is an approach which I share. "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand,
commenting on Ambassador Goldberg's
UN speech on U. S. attitudes toward nego-
tiations on Vietnam, September 23, 1966

"We shall cooperate with any move consistent with our national interests to get Hanoi to the conference table for unconditional discussions to insure a satisfactory settlement in Vietnam. "

Philippine Foreign Secretary Ramos
during a press conference, January 4, 1966