

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67845) <i>Open 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-308</i> S 2 p <i>Sanitized 10-6-95 NLJ 94-401</i>	9/30/67	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400</i>	9/30/67	A
#12a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> S 1 p <i>Dup. # 19, 19b, 20a, NSF, CFVN, "8A2" 30X104</i>	9/29/67	A
#14 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67825) S 1 p <i>Sanitized 5/30/01 NS 00-240</i>	9/28/67	A
#16b memo	Johnson to Dep. Sec. of Defense <i>Open NLJ 96-273 5/98</i> S 6 p	9/28/67	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President, re: Panama S 1 p <i>Open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-401</i>	9/28/67	A
#19a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow TS 2 p <i>Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400</i>	9/28/67	A
#20 memo	Rostow to President, 9:20 a.m. " S 1 p	9/28/67	A
#20a cable	USUN 1055 <i>Open 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-309</i> S 4 p <i>Sanitized 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402 [dupl # 153a, 154a - UN Agency File, 10/8]</i>	9/28/67	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-308</i> C 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400</i> <i>Open 12/16/09</i>	9/28/67	A
#21a cable	Saigon 635 <i>Sanitized 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> C 1 p <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-308</i> <i>Open 12/16/09</i>	9/28/67	A
#21b cable	Rostow to Bunker <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAC 00-308</i> C 1 p <i>Sanitized 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400</i>	9/27/67	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open 10-6-95 NLJ 94-401</i>	9/27/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 43, 9/21-30/67

Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28a cable	Saigon 7060 Sanitized 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402 S 11 p Open 6/16/00 RAC 11135 [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10], Encl dup #23, NSF, CF, VN 8881, Box 125]	9/27/67	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President, 4:15 p.m. Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400 S 1 p	9/27/67	A
#32a memo	(dup. #6, NSF, Subject File, "Radio Free Europe") Intelligence Memorandum S 11 p Sanitized 6-9-94 NLJ 93-384 (dup. #6a, as above) Sanitized (more info) 4/9/02 NLJ/RAC 00-310	9/25/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. S 1 p Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400	9/27/67	A
#34a rpt	"The Arms at Khartoum" Open 6.23.98 S 4 p exempt 11-21-94 NLJ 94-400	9/26/67	A
#36a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402 S 2 p Dup. #21a, NSF, CF, VN, 8A2 Box 104	9/27/67	A
#42a memo	Rusk to President C 1 p Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402	9/16/67	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, 9:55 a.m. S 1 p Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400	9/26/67	A
#45a cable	USUN 991 S 2 p Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402	9/26/67	A
#47a memo	Katzenbach to President S 2 p Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402 [Duplicate of #132a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	9/26/67	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. PCI 4 p Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400	9/25/67	A
#49b memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Niger C 2 p Open 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402	9/22/67	A
#49d rpt	Talking Points with Pres. of Niger C 5 p	undated	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#49f rpt	Bio Sketch <i>exempt per RAC 5103</i> C 2 p <i>exempt 4/9/02 NLJ/RAC 00-310</i> <i>EXEMPT 8/1/95 NLJ 94-406</i>	undated	A
#49g photo	Included with Bio Sketch <i>exempt 4/9/02 NLJ/RAC 00-310</i> C 1 p <i>EXEMPT 8/1/95 NLJ 94-406</i> <i>exempt per RAC 5103</i>	1965	A
#50a cable	UK Mission 2410 <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> C 1 p <i>Open 6/16/00</i> [Duplicate of #133a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	9/23/67	A
#50b cable	UK Mission 2412 <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> C 1 p <i>Open 6/16/00</i> [Duplicate of #133b, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	9/23/67	A
#50c cable	UK Mission 2409 <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> C 2 p <i>Open 6/16/00</i> [Duplicate of #133c, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	9/23/67	A
#51a cable	Bangkok 1328 <i>Open 5/21/01 NLJ 00-241</i> S 2 p <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> <i>exempt NLJ 91-524</i> [Duplicate of #189a, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7 Box 284]	9/25/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President, 4:00 p.m. S 2 p <i>Open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-400</i>	9/25/67	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 3:45 p.m. " C 1 p	9/25/67	A
#55a cable	USUN 950 <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLJ 94-402</i> S 5 p <i>Open 4/5/01 NLJ 00-276</i> [Duplicate in NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7 Box 140] [Exempt 1978] [Dupl # 88, 89 - UN Agency File 1618]	9/23/67	A
#59a rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 8/1/95 NLJ 94-406</i> <i>Same sanitization 4/9/02 NLJ/RAC 00-310</i>	9/23/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#60 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. TS 1 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/25/67	A
#60a telecon	Read and Kissinger TS 4 p <i>open 4-4-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/24/67	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, re: China C 1 p <i>open 1-15-93 NLS 92-213</i>	9/25/67	A
#63a cable	Hong Kong 1786 C 3 p <i>open 8-19-92 NLS 92-212</i>	9/21/67	A
#64 memcon	Rostow and Tang <i>Open 6/16/00 NLS 92-213 & Guidelines</i> C 1 p <i>sanitized 1-15-93 NLS 92-213</i>	9/25/67	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/25/67	A
#65a ltr <i>open 3/06</i>	President to King Faisal PCI 3 p	9/25/67	A
#65b ltr	President to King Faisal PCI 3 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/19/67	A
#65c cable	Jidda 959 <i>Open 11/7/00 NLS 00-237</i> S 4 p <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/7/67	A
#66a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 4-4-95 NLS 94-400</i> S 2 p <i>Dup 302a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	9/25/67	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President, 4:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLS 94-400</i>	9/23/67	A
#67a memo	Wheeler to Johnson, McConnell, Moorer, Greene S 1 p <i>open 5-15-98 NLS 96-273</i>	9/9/67	A
#67b memo	DePuy to Joint Staff Director S 3 p	9/8/67	A

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#68a memo	Battle to Rusk <i>open 4-4-95 NLS 94-402</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #7a, NSF, Country File, Iraq, Vol. I Box 138]	9/21/67	A
#69a memo	Ginsburgh to President S 2 p <i>open 10-6-95 NLS 94-401</i>	9/22/67	A
#69b rpt	"The Impact of Interdicting..." S 2 p <i>open 10-6-95 NLS 94-401</i>	6/13/67	A
#69c rpt	"North Vietnam's Minimum..." " S 4 p	undated	A
#69d rpt	"Transport Capacity of Major..." " S 1 p	undated	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President, 2:55 a.m. " S 1 p	9/23/67	A
#70a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NLS 94-406</i>	9/22/67	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 a.m. <i>sanitized 11/7/00 NLS 00-239</i> S 1 p <i>exempt 11-21-94 NLS 94-402</i>	9/23/67	A
#74a cable	Paris 3909 <i>exempt 4-4-95 NLS 94-402</i> S 2 p <i>open 11-18-13</i>	9/22/67	A
#75a memo	Owen to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 4-4-95 NLS 94-402</i>	9/21/67	A
#75b memo	"1968 Presidential Foreign Policy..." " S 3 p	undated	A
#76 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. <i>sanitized 7/12/01 NLS/RAC 00-308</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-6-95 NLS 94-401</i>	9/23/67	A
#76a rpt	Intelligence Information Cable S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 8/1/95 NLS 94-406</i> <i>sanitized (more info) 4/9/02 NLS/RAC 00-310</i>	9/22/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 43, 9/21-30/67

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 10:40 a.m. C 1 p open 10-6-95 NLS 94-401	9/23/67	A
#77a cable	Paris 3855 <i>open 4-4-95 NLS 94-402</i> C 1 p	9/23/67	A
#79a memo	McCafferty to President PCI 3 p open 10-6-95 NLS 94-401	9/22/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. PCI 1 p open 10-6-95 NLS 94-401	9/25/67	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NS/RAL 00-300</i> PCI 1 p sanitized 10-6-95 NLS 94-401	9/25/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 43, 9/21-30/67

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. - TS 1p <i>sanitized 34-03 NW/RAL 00-311</i>	9/25/67	A
#52a cable	Intelligence Report - TS 1p <i>exempt 34-03 NW/RAL 00-312</i>	9/25/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 43, September 21-30, 1967, Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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~~SECRET~~

SENT

1967 SEP 30 14 57

10:57 PM

EEA473
OC WTE19
DE WTE 2092

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS7845

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 30, 1967

FOLLOWING CIA REPORT INDICATES KY AND THIEU APPEAR TO BE WORKING JOINTLY FOR VALIDATION VOTE IN THE PROVISIONAL ASSEMBLY. MY GUESS IS THAT KY IS TRYING TO DEMONSTRATE TO THIEU HIS POLITICAL POWER AND RIGHT TO SHARE APPOINTMENTS. THERE ARE 116 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY (117 BUT ONE RESIGNED). ABOUT 90 WILL BE THERE FOR THE VOTE WHICH MAY NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL MONDAY. IT IS A BIT OF POLITICAL RUSSIAN ROULETTE; BUT THUS FAR, IN THE END THEY HAVE DONE THE RIGHT THING. AND THAT IS STILL THE EMBASSY'S ESTIMATE.

1. PRESIDENT ELECT NGUYEN VAN THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT ELECT NGUYEN CAO KY MET WITH ABOUT 50 MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE BLOC (DAB) OF THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (PLA) AT 1400 HOURS ON 30 SEPTEMBER AT KY'S OFFICIAL RESIDENCE ON CONG LY STREET IN SAIGON. THIEU AND KY CAME IN THE SAME CAR ALONG WITH MINISTER OF SECURITY LINH QUANG VIEN. VIEN HAD ARRANGED THE MEETING THAT MORNING AT THE REQUEST OF DAB LEADER LE PHOUIC SANG.

2. SANG TOLD THIEU AND KY THAT HE AND HIS BLOC HAD WORKED CONSCIENTIOUSLY FOR THE GOVERNMENT DURING PAST MONTHS, WITHOUT ANY REWARD. HE SAID THAT NOW THEY WERE NOT MAKING ANY DEMANDS, BUT THAT THEY FELT SLIGHTED AND THEIR FUTURE DIM. HE SAID THAT THEY FELT THIEU LOOKED ON THEM AS ENEMIES BUT THAT THEY HAD IN FACT WORKED FOR HIS BENEFIT AS WELL AS THAT OF KY. SINCE KY, IN HIS ROLE OF PRIME MINISTER, WAS THE EXECUTIVE, IT WAS ONLY NORMAL THAT THE DAB BE IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH KY AND WORKING WITH KY; THE SAME SORT OF CLOSE CONTACT WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED BETWEEN THE DAB AND THIEU AS CHIEF OF STATE. THEREFORE THIEU WAS NOT CORRECT WHEN HE ACTED AS THOUGH THE DAB OPPOSED HIM. THE DAB LOOKS TO THIEU, AS IT LOOKS TO KY, FOR RECOGNITION OF THEIR PAST AND PRESENT SERVICES. SANG MENTIONED ALSO THAT THE DAB TOOK IT BADLY, AND AS EXAMPLE OF THIEU'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEM, WHEN HE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM WHILE AT THE SAME TIME CONTACTING DEPUTIES NGUYEN VAN NGAI AND LY QUI CHUNG WHO ARE IN OPPOSITION BLOCS.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-308

By Sj, NARA Date 7-5-01

3. THIEU REPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT MET NGAI OR CHUNG "DIRECTLY" AND DENIED THE RUMOR THAT HE HAD PAID THEM TO VOTE FOR VALIDATION. THEFU SAID A FEW GENERAL WORDS ON THE NEED TO WORK FOR THE COUNTRY, BUT DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY TO ANY OTHER OF SANG'S REMARKS, NOR MAKE ANY PROMISES.

4. KY TOLD THE DEPUTIES THAT WHILE ONE COULDN'T TELL DEPUTIES HOW TO VOTE, HE THOUGHT A VOTE TO INVALIDATE WOULD THREATEN GRAVE CONSEQUENCES AND HE THUS HOPED THEY WOULD SEE FIT TO VOTE FOR VALIDATION. HE FURTHER COMPLIMENTED THEM ON THEIR PAST EFFORTS, BUT MADE NO PROMISES IN CONNECTION WITH SANG'S WISH THAT THESE EFFORTS BE "RECOGNIZED".

5. AS A RESULT OF KY'S STATED DESIRE THAT THEY VOTE FOR VALIDATION, SANG TOLD THE DEPUTIES THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE IT AS THEIR DUTY, EVEN THOUGH THEY HELD VIEWS OPPOSED TO VALIDATION, TO VOTE FOR VALIDATION.

6. THE GROUP OF DEPUTIES THEN RETURNED TO THE ASSEMBLY, WHERE THE ASSEMBLY IS HEARING THE REPORT OF THE ELECTION COMMITTEE, CONSISTING OF PRESENTATION OF THE VARIOUS CHARGES OF ELECTION IRREGULARITY WHICH HAVE BEEN FILED. THIS PRESENTATION MAY LAST ALL OF 30 SEPTEMBER WITH THE ASSEMBLY DEBATE AND VOTE COMING ON 1 OCTOBER. ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT SUU IS HOWEVER OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO RUSH THINGS AND GET TO A VOTE EVEN TONIGHT SINCE HE FEELS HE HAS THE VOTES AGAINST THE ELECTIONS NOW. SANG ON THE OTHER HAND WILL TRY TO DRAG THE PROCEEDINGS OUT HOPING THAT THE PROVALIDATION VOTE WILL GAIN AS TIME PASSES. (SOURCE COMMENT: AS OF LATE AFTERNOON 30 SEPTEMBER SANG BELIEVED THERE WERE ABOUT 60 VOTES IN THE ASSEMBLY FOR VALIDATION.)

6. (FIELD COMMENT: AT 1715 HOURS ON 30 SEPTEMBER A MEMBER OF THE PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY DIE VIET PARTY STATED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THIEU, KY AND MEMBERS OF THE DAB, THE VALIDATION QUESTION IN THE ASSEMBLY WAS GOING MUCH BETTER ALTHOUGH THE OUTCOME WAS STILL UNCERTAIN. BY LATE AFTERNOON HE ESTIMATED THE CHANCES FOR VALIDATION AT 50-50. THE VOTE ON THE VALIDATION WILL PROBABLY NOT BE HELD UNTIL 1 OCTOBER WHICH HE VIEWED AS A GOOD SIGN SINCE IT WILL GIVE MORE TIME TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR VALIDATION

DTG 301417Z SEP 67

EEA472
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2091

Sent
RECEIVED
WHCA

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70492

1967 SEP 30 14 47

10:47 AM

UNCLAS

SEPTEMBER 30, 1967

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM W. V. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: OUR HELICOPTERS IN MEXICO

NMCC REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT ALL SIX HELICOPTERS SENT TO ACAPULCO ARE OPERATIONAL:

--3 ARE WORKING FROM TOWN OF IGULA, SOME 83 MILES FROM ACAPULCO, IN THE MOST CRITICAL FLOOD AREA.

--1 IS LIFTING SUPPLIES FROM ACAPULCO TO NEARBY COMMUNITIES.

--1 WAS USED YESTERDAY BY THE GOVERNOR OF GUERRERO STATE TO SURVEY THE FLOODED AREA AND VISIT ISOLATED COMMUNITIES.

--1 HELD AS A SPARE.

THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IS PROVIDING TANK TRUCKS TO POSITION FUEL WHERE THE HELICOPTERS CAN GET AT IT WITHOUT RETURNING TO THEIR BASE.

OUR EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY REPORTS THAT OUR HELICOPTER AID IS GENERALLY FRONT-PAGED IN THE LOCAL PRESS. THE PROMINENT DAILY EL NACIONAL HEADED ITS REPORT: "IN A NOBLE GESTURE OF GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS, PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON YESTERDAY OFFERED HIS COOPERATION TO PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ."

DTG: 301415Z SEP 67

GP3: 210 IMI 210

PRESERVATION COPY

3

Saturday, September 30, 1967
12:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge reports
Gov. Hughes' Vietnam reaction.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Goldstein

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

3a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H.C. Lodge*

SUBJECT: American Observers of the
Vietnamese Elections

Another expression of opinion concerning the Vietnamese elections from one of the American Observers has come to me from Governor Richard J. Hughes of New Jersey who, in a letter to me, says:

"I returned from this trip with a high respect for the courage of the Vietnamese people and with a confirmed belief in the honesty of the September 3 elections. A collateral advantage was to reassure myself as to the high morale of the Americans who are serving in Vietnam, including both civilian and military. I have always been very proud to be an American, but am prouder still after the experience of this trip."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1967

Pres file~~from~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Covey Oliver realizes Arisomena has "flunked his course." The Embassy in Quito is instructed to "go off and play golf for a while" so far as aid is concerned.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By ip, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Mr. Bowdler
Mr. Goldstein

WWRostow:rlh

5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 30, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT
INFORMATION TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN

Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond came in to see me with the following proposition: That they be provided the information which would ~~per~~ permit them to do a series of articles explaining precisely, on the basis of facts, why the Administration believes bombing north of the 20th parallel is important. They are inclined to believe that it is important. They feel, however, that the reasons which have led to this judgment have never been fully and rationally laid out.

I presented in broad terms the reasons we believe such bombing has an important effect, including diversions of manpower; increased aid requirements; piling up of ships and supplies at the ports; generalized pressure without, however, heavy civilian losses; etc. They said these were precisely the kinds of factors they would like to be able to document with concrete evidence.

I have complete confidence in their good faith.

If you agree that this proposal should be accepted, you will wish to consider who should organize their briefing.

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 12, 1983.

BY rg ON 10-8-91

6

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCEEA454
OO WIE18
DE WIE 2864

RECEIVED
WHCA

21 SEP 29 13 19

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : JIM JONES FOR THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67834

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW
ATTENTION: JIM JONES

HEREWITH COMMENTS ON HARRY MCPHERSON'S SUGGESTED REVISIONS
OF LAST NIGHT.

1. THE FIRST PASSAGE WAS CUT DOWN BY BUSBY, ETC., FOR
TWO REASONS:

- IT SOUNDED AN INITIAL UNCERTAIN NOTE;
- TO CUT LENGTH OF SPEECH AS INSTRUCTED.

THE ESSENCE OF THE POINT IS IN THE PHRASE "MEMORIES OF
COLONIALISM AND THE PRESENT FACTS OF POVERTY AND INJUSTICE."

IF YOU JUDGE POINT NEEDS ELABORATION I SUGGEST, AFTER FIRST
SENTENCE, THE FOLLOWING:

"AS IN OTHER WARS WE HAVE FOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION
THERE ARE MANY SINCERE AND PATRIOTIC AMERICANS WHO QUESTION
THE PURPOSES AND DOUBT THE WISDOM OF THE COURSE WE ARE
FOLLOWING.

"DOUBT AND DEBATE ARE ENLARGED BECAUSE THE PROBLEM OF
VIETNAM IS COMPLEX. IT IS, IN PART, AN INSURGENCY THAT
FEEDS ON MEMORIES OF COLONIALISM AND THE PRESENT FACTS
OF POVERTY AND INJUSTICE. IT IS ALSO A POWERFUL AGGRESSION
THAT IS SPURRED, NOT BY IDEALISM, BUT BY AN APPETITE FOR
CONQUEST.

61 SEP 29 PM 8 26

FRIDAY

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12356
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 18, 1983.

BY rg ON 10-25-91

"VIETNAM IS THE ARENA WHERE COMMUNIST EXPANSIONISM IS THE MOST AGGRESSIVELY AT WORK IN THE WORLD TODAY -- WHERE IT IS CROSSING INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS; WHERE IT IS MAIMING AND MURDERING, KILLING AND KIDNAPPING; WHERE IT IS RUTHLESSLY ATTEMPTING TO BEND FREE PEOPLE TO ITS WILL.

"INTO THIS MIXTURE OF SUBVERSION AND WAR, OF TERROR AND HOPE, AMERICA HAS ENTERED -- WITH ITS MATERIAL POWER AND MORAL COMMITMENT.

2. ON CAREFUL READING, THE LANGUAGE SUGGESTED BY HARRY RAISED THESE QUESTIONS:

-- WOULD WE RESIST ARMED AGGRESSION, EVEN IF WE HAD A TREATY, ONLY IF WE JUDGED AT THE TIME OUR OWN SECURITY IN SOME NARROW SENSE, WERE INVOLVED?

-- ISN'T ARMED AGGRESSION ANYWHERE A THREAT TO OUR OWN SECURITY -- AS HARRY'S PRESENT DRAFT SUGGESTS WITH THE PHRASE "INTERDEPENDENCE"?

-- WOULD NOT ONE OF THE MAJOR COSTS OF PULLING OUT OF VIET-NAM BE THE EFFECT ON OUR ALLIANCES ELSEWHERE; THAT IS, THE EFFECT ON THE "STRUCTURE OF ORDER" WE HAVE BUILT?

-- ARE THERE NOT SOME AMERICANS WHO DON'T CARE MUCH ABOUT ASIA BUT WHO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR WORD MUST BE GOOD IN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA?

-- IS IT WISE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO USE THE LANGUAGE OF "JUDGING" HIMSELF AND HIS PREDECESSORS?

NEVERTHELESS, I THINK HARRY IS CORRECT IN RECOGNIZING THAT THE POINT HE WANTS DRIVEN HOME NEEDS SHARPENING HERE; AND I PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING REVISION OF PRESENT DRAFT PASSAGES.

TO FOLLOW PARAGRAPH ENDING "AGGRESSIVE FOREIGN POWERS".

"BUT IN EXPRESSING THESE DEEP NATIONAL FEELINGS EVERY AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAS HAD TO ANSWER A SHARPER QUESTION. BEFORE RECOMMENDING THAT AMERICAN FORCES FIGHT AND DIE TO RESIST AGGRESSION, HE HAD TO FACE THIS ISSUE:

'IS THE AGGRESSION A THREAT -- NOT ONLY TO THE IMMEDIATE VICTIM - BUT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE WORLD OF WHICH WE ARE A PART?

"THE SENATE ALSO HAD TO FACE THIS ISSUE IN GIVING ITS CONSENT TO THE NETWORK OF TREATIES WHICH ARE THE BASIS FOR SUCH ORDER AS WE HAVE IN THIS DANGEROUS AND DISORDERLY WORLD.

"AND THAT SPECIFICALLY IS THE QUESTION TO WHICH DWIGHT EISENHOWER AND JOHN KENNEDY AND LYNDON JOHNSON HAD TO RESPOND IN FACING THE ISSUE OF VIETNAM."

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE TUNKU, HARRY IS CORRECT: THE PRESS CONFERENCE PARAPHRASE IS MORE RELEVANT THAN THE DIRECT QUOTE, ALTHOUGH IT LOOKED QUEER. THE PARAPHRASE IS OK. WE CAN MAKE IT MORE CONCRETE BY INSERTING THE DATE, JAN 18, 1966.

4. "TELLS" SEEMED BETTER THAN "SUGGESTS" WHICH SOUNDS WEAK FOR A MOMENTOUS MATTER OF THIS KIND; BUT IT IS A QUESTION OF TASTE. OTHERWISE, I LIKE HARRY'S EXTRA SENTENCE AND DRAFTING OF THIS POINT.

5. I ACCEPT HARRY'S EXTENSION OF THE POINT ABOUT PROGRESS IN THE WAR SINCE 1965.

6. I ACCEPT HARRY'S LANGUAGE ON NEGOTIATIONS: "IN THE MEANTIME" RATHER THAN "THEREFORE."

7. I LIKE HARRY'S PERORATION JUST FINE. IT SEEMS TO SOUND THE NOTE YOU WERE AFTER ON THE PHONE LAST NIGHT. TO AVOID A MIXED METAPHOR, I SUGGEST, HOWEVER: "WHO KNOW THE BULLY'S CHALLENGE MUST BE MET WHEN IT IS MADE."

DTG: 291149Z SEP 67

CONFIDENTIAL

838 - 838

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~WHR~~
7

Friday, September 29, 1967 - 1:00 p. m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The following, for your approval, combined farewell and Independence

Day message to Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho:

Begin text:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I want you to know how very much I enjoyed our good talk. I was deeply impressed by the wisdom and dedication you bring to the challenging problems of building a new and independent nation. Lesotho will certainly be in our thoughts in the months and years ahead. We are proud to count ourselves among your friends.

I know that your return to Maseru will be doubly joyous as you celebrate the first anniversary of Lesotho's independence. All Americans join me in extending warmest congratulations to you and the people you lead so well.

Lyndon B. Johnson

End text.

Propose sending combined message Monday, October 2.

Approve message ☒

Disapprove ☐

Speak to me ☐

*9/30/67 - Marie Schner telephoned
President's okay*

Pres file

*sent Ranch
via wire*

WWR 8

Friday, September 29, 1967 - noon

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

Pres file

The following, for your approval, is proposed Independence Day message to General Gowon of Nigeria:

sent Rostow via wire

Begin text:

Dear General Gowon:

All Americans join me in extending warm greetings to you and to the people of Nigeria on the seventh anniversary of Nigerian independence. It is our sincere and fervent hope that peace will soon return to your great country and that the years ahead will bring progress and prosperity.

Lyndon B. Johnson

End text.

Message is short and formal in order to maintain our hands-off posture with respect to Nigerian civil war. Independence day is Sunday, October 1. Message will be delivered only if Nigerian internal situation remains unchanged.

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Hamilton/vmr

Friday, September 29, 1967 -- 11:00 AM

9
Pres file

Mr. President:

During your meeting with Afghan Prime Minister Maiwandwal last March you offered to send experts to advise the Afghans how to make themselves self-sufficient in agriculture.

The team (led by Dr. Dean Peterson of Utah State) has completed its work with a solid report and recommendations.

State believes we can achieve greater impact -- technically and politically -- if you transmit the report personally to Maiwandwal. It would give us a chance to put in another word for self-help.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/RM:vmr

92

October 2, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I recall our good talk last March about the need to increase agricultural output in Afghanistan, and particularly your desire to make your country self-sufficient in the production of wheat. I was happy to agree to send American agricultural experts to Afghanistan to consult with your specialists and recommend how you might best reach these goals.

I am now very pleased to transmit to you the report on "Agricultural Development in Afghanistan" by the United States Agricultural Team. The report contains detailed and specific recommendations which we think your Government will find useful.

As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, I believe that providing food for the world's growing population may be the greatest challenge facing our own and future generations. We must have confident leadership and careful planning. I hope this report will help you and the people of Afghanistan in your own contributions to this vital task.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal
Prime Minister of Afghanistan
Kabul

LBJ:EKH:RM/vmr

Enclosure

LOU

Friday - September 29, 1967

10:00 am

TO: The President

FROM: W. W. Rostow

*sent Ranch
via wire*

This letter from President Diaz Ordaz, following up on Carrillo Flores' oral request, arrived this morning:

"Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your continued and generous concern over the damages which several regions of Mexico have suffered in the past few days.

As far as humanly possible, we have managed to bring the situation under control in the Lower Rio Bravo. However, I am still very much worried by conditions in a number of towns in the State of Guerrero. Therefore, in acceptance of your most generous offer, it would be of great help to us if your government would provide us with five helicopters to use in aid and rescue work among the flood victims in the State of Guerrero.

Sincerely,

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. "

Six helicopters are now operating from Acapulco.

LOU

Sept 29, 1967 11

For The President from Walt Rostow

Attention: Jim Jones

sent to Ranch
via wire
CAP 67834

Herewith comments on Harry McPherson's suggested revisions of last night.

1. The first passage was cut down by Busby, etc., for two reasons:
 - it sounded an initial uncertain note;
 - to cut length of speech as instructed.

Per file

The essence of the point is in the phrase "memories of colonialism and the present facts of poverty and injustice."

If you judge point needs elaboration I suggest, after first sentence, the following:

"As in other wars we have fought since the Revolution there are many sincere and patriotic Americans who question the purposes and doubt the wisdom of the course we are following.

"Doubt and debate are enlarged because the problem of Vietnam is complex. It is, in part, an insurgency that feeds on memories of colonialism and the present facts of poverty and injustice. It is also a powerful aggression that is spurred, not by idealism, but by an appetite for conquest.

"Vietnam is the arena where Communist expansionism is the most aggressively at work in the world today -- where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is maiming and murdering, killing and kidnapping, where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

"Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America has entered -- with its material power and moral commitment.

2. On careful reading, the language suggested by Harry raised these questions:

-- Would we resist armed aggression, even if we had a treaty, only if we judged at the time our own security in some narrow sense, were involved?

-- Isn't armed aggression anywhere a threat to our own security -- as Harry's present draft suggests with the phrase "interdependence"?

-- Would not one of the major costs of pulling out of Viet-nam be the effect on our alliances elsewhere; that is, the effect on the "structure of order" we have built?

-- Are there not some Americans who don't care much about Asia but who recognize that our word must be good in Europe and Latin America?

-- Is it wise for the President to use the language of "judging" himself and his predecessors?

Nevertheless, I think Harry is correct in recognizing that the point he wants driven home needs sharpening here; and I propose the following revision of present draft passages.

To follow paragraph ending "aggressive foreign powers".

"But in expressing these deep national feelings every American President has had to answer a sharper question. Before recommending that American forces fight and die to resist aggression, he had to face this issue:

Is the aggression a threat -- not only to the immediate victim - but to the United States and to the peace and security of the world of which we are a part?

"The Senate also had to face this issue in giving its consent to the network of treaties which are the basis for such order as we have in this dangerous and disorderly world.

specifically

"And that is the question to which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to respond in facing the issue of Vietnam."

3. With respect to the Tunku, Harry is correct: the press conference paraphrase is more relevant than the direct quote, although it looked queer.

The paraphrase is OK. *we can make it*
~~I shall try to make it~~ more concrete by inserting
the date, *Jan. 10, 1966.*
~~if I can find it in time, and telephone it to Jim Jones.~~

4. "Tells" seemed better than "suggests" which sounds weak for a momentous matter of this kind; but it is a question of taste. Otherwise, I like Harry's extra sentence and drafting of this point.

5. I accept Harry's extension of the point about progress in the war since 1965.

6. I accept Harry's language on negotiations: "In the meantime" rather than "therefore."

7. I like Harry's peroration just fine. It seems to sound the note you were after on the phone last night. To avoid a mixed metaphor, I suggest, however: "who know the bully's challenge must be met when it is made."

12

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Friday, September 29, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

*sent Ranch
via wire
9/29/67*

Following is today's situation report on
Vietnamese politics.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 10-9-91

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

12a

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 29, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-402

By sig, NARA, Date 3-24-95

Validation of Elections

The Embassy indicated by phone this morning that the Assembly's special committee had not yet voted on the validation of the presidential elections. Embassy and press reporting indicates that considerable sentiment exists within the committee for recommending that the elections be invalidated. The Embassy continues to believe, however, that the full Assembly will validate the elections.

Bunker has stressed to both Thieu and Ky the potentially serious impact on United States support for Viet-Nam of irresponsible action to invalidate the elections. Both Thieu and Ky have indicated that they are now in touch with key Assembly members and groups, and that the elections would be validated.

Dzu Arrest

The Embassy confirms press reports that Dzu has been arrested. By phone this morning the Embassy indicated that it has transmitted a long report on the Dzu situation. This report should arrive during the day.

Militant Buddhists Agitation

Tri Quang continues his vigil outside the presidential palace after meeting inside with a GVN delegation to discuss the Buddhist Charter question. These discussions evidently have made little progress so far. The Vietnamese Government is maintaining its position that the two main Buddhist factions led by Tri Quang and Tam Chau, should meet to adopt a replacement for the Buddhist Charter promulgated by the Government in July. Tri Quang continues to insist that the Government withdraw the July Charter. Tri Quang has indicated that he and small groups of monks will remain in front of Independence Palace until he gets satisfaction. The palace area remains cordoned off. The Government appears to be handling this problem with commendable restraint so far.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13

September 29, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following memorandum to you from Clark Clifford (requested by me) should be of some comfort to you tonight. It represents his full notes on President Eisenhower's briefing of President-elect Kennedy on Laos and Southeast Asia on January 19, 1961.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Dev, NARA, Date 4-30-91

*from To the President
From 25 Retow*
TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: CLARK CLIFFORD

September 29, 1967

*13a
The following memorandum to you from Clark Clifford (requested by me) should be of some comfort to you tonight. It represents his full notes on President Eisenhower's briefing of President-elect Kennedy on Laos and Southeast Asia on January 19, 1961.*

Memorandum of Conference on January 19, 1961
between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy
on the Subject of Laos

The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room with the following men present: President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of Treasury Robert Anderson, and General Wilton B. Persons.

With President-elect Kennedy were the new Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the new Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the new Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon, and Clark M. Clifford.

An agenda for the meeting had been prepared by Persons and Clifford. The subjects on the agenda had been recommended by the parties present at the conference and were arranged under the headings of "State", "Defense", and "Treasury." The first subject under the heading of "State" was Laos.

President Eisenhower opened the discussion on Laos by stating that the United States was determined to preserve the independence of Laos. It was his opinion that if Laos should fall to the Communists, then it would be just a question of time until South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma would collapse. He felt that the Communists had

designs on all of Southeast Asia, and that it would be a tragedy to permit Laos to fall.

President Eisenhower gave a brief review of the various moves and coups that had taken place in Laos involving the Pathet Lao, Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and Kong Le. He said that the evidence was clear that Communist China and North Vietnam were determined to destroy the independence of Laos. He also added that the Russians were sending in substantial supplies in support of the Pathet Lao in an effort to overturn the government.

President Eisenhower said it would be fatal for us to permit . . . Communists to insert themselves in the Laotian government. He recalled that our experience had clearly demonstrated that under such circumstances the Communists always ended up in control. He cited China as an illustration.

At this point, Secretary of State Herter intervened to state that if the present government of Laos were to apply to SEATO for aid under the Pact, Herter was of the positive opinion that the signatories to the SEATO Pact were bound. President Eisenhower agreed with this and in his statement gave the impression that the request for aid had already come from the government of Laos. He corroborated the binding nature of the obligation of the United States under the SEATO Pact.

President Eisenhower stated that the British and the French did

not want SEATO to intervene in Laos, and he indicated that they would probably continue to maintain that attitude. President Eisenhower said that if it were not appropriate for SEATO to intervene in Laos, that his next preference would be the International Control Commission. He was sure, however, that the Soviet Union did not want the ICC to go into Laos. President Eisenhower stated that if this country had a choice as to whether the task should be assumed by SEATO or the ICC, that he personally would prefer SEATO.

Secretary Herter stated that we possibly could work out some agreement with the British, if they could be persuaded to recognize the present government in Laos. The chances of accomplishing this, however, appeared to be remote.

Secretary Herter stated, with President Eisenhower's approval, that we should continue every effort to make a political settlement in Laos. He added, however, that if such efforts were fruitless, then the United States must intervene in concert with our allies. If we were unable to persuade our allies, then we must go it alone.

At this point, President Eisenhower said with considerable emotion that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia. He said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the area. He stated that we must not permit a Communist take-over. He reiterated that we should make every effort to persuade member nations of SEATO or the ICC to accept the burden with us to defend the

freedom of Laos.

As he concluded these remarks, President Eisenhower stated it was imperative that Laos be defended. He said that the United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could not. He added that "our unilateral intervention would be our last desperate hope" in the event we were unable to prevail upon the other signatories to join us.

At one time it was hoped that perhaps some type of arrangement could be made with Kong Le. This had proved fruitless, however, and President Eisenhower said "he was a lost soul and wholly irretrievable."

Commenting upon President Eisenhower's statement that we would have to go to the support of Laos alone if we could not persuade others to proceed with us, President-elect Kennedy asked the question as to how long it would take to put an American division into Laos. Secretary Gates replied that it would take from twelve to seventeen days but that some of that time could be saved if American forces, then in the Pacific, could be utilized. Secretary Gates added that the American forces were in excellent shape and that modernization of the Army was making good progress.

President-elect Kennedy commented upon the seriousness of the situation in Laos and in Southeast Asia and asked if the situation

seemed to be approaching a climax. General Eisenhower stated that the entire proceeding was extremely confused but that it was clear that this country was obligated to support the existing government in Laos.

The discussion of Laos led to some concluding general statements regarding Southeast Asia. It was agreed that Thailand was a valuable ally of the United States, and that one of the dangers of a Communist take-over in Laos would be to expose Thailand's borders. In this regard, it was suggested that the military training under French supervision in Thailand was very poor and that it would be a good idea to get American military instructors there as soon as possible so the level of military capability could be raised.

President Eisenhower said there was some indication that Russia was concerned over Communist pressures in Laos and in Southeast Asia emanating from China and North Vietnam. It was felt that this attitude could possibly lead to some difficulty between Russia and China.

This phase of the discussion was concluded by President Eisenhower in commenting philosophically upon the fact that the morale existing in the democratic forces in Laos appeared to be dis-

appointing. He wondered aloud why, in interventions of this kind, we always seem to find that the morale of the Communist forces was better than that of the democratic forces. His explanation was that the Communist philosophy appeared to produce a sense of dedication on the part of its adherents, while there was not the same sense of dedication on the part of those supporting the free forces. He stated that the entire problem of morale was a serious one and would have to be taken into consideration as we became more deeply involved.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-240
By Sj, NARA Date 5-16-01

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

cc 240
14

1967 SEP 28 23 40

EEA443
CC WTE12
DE WTE 2855

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS7325

~~SECRET~~

SEPTEMBER 28, 1967

SUBJECT: PANAMA

██████████ INFORMATION ON A POTENTIALLY MAJOR
DEVELOPMENT IN PANAMANIAN POLITICS WHICH COULD OVERCOME
THE PROBLEMS PRESIDENT ROBLES FACES IN GETTING SUPPORT
FOR THE TREATIES.

EO 12958
3.4(h)(1)-25Yrs
(S)

ARNULFO ARIAS, THE ONLY POLITICAL FIGURE WITH MASS FOLLOWING
AND ARCH RIVAL OF ROBLES, HAS DECIDED NOT TO RUN IN THE MAY
1968 ELECTIONS AND SAYS HE WANTS TO WORK WITH ROBLES
IN THE SELECTION OF A "NATIONAL UNITY" CANDIDATE.
ARIAS GAVE AS ONE OF THE REASONS HIS DESIRE TO REMOVE
THE CANAL TREATIES FROM PANAMANIAN POLITICS. ROBLES IS
REPORTED TO BE INTERESTED.

ALL KINDS OF JOCKEYING IS GOING ON BETWEEN ARIAS AND THE
MEMBERS OF ROBLES' COALITION. THE NAMES SURFACED
SO FAR OF POSSIBLE "UNITY" CANDIDATES ARE GOOD MEN WITH
WHOM WE CAN WORK. BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL JUST HOW
THIS INITIATIVE WILL JELL. WE CAN EXPECT SMOOTHER SAIL-
ING ON THE TREATIES IF THE SUCCESSION QUESTION IS RESOLVED
IN THIS FASHION.

AMBASSADOR ADAIR WILL BE TRYING TO ENCOURAGE ARIAS AND
ROBLES TO THE EXTENT THAT AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR CAN
DISCREETLY DO SO.

MEANWHILE, ROBLES SEEMS TO BE MARKING TIME ON THE TREATIES
WHILE THE DISCUSSIONS ON PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION GO ON.

LTG 232301Z SEPT 67

~~SECRET~~

NPS 251 1X1 250

ALSO FROM QUINCY COPY

*Pres file**sent to ~~Rad~~
President
WH 70481*

Thursday - 3:00 pm
September 28, 1967

TO: The President
FROM: Rostow
SUBJ: Helicopters for Mexico

Six UH-1D ("Huey") helicopters now
~~in process of~~ being loaded on C-130's
at Fort Bragg. They will depart
Bragg for Tampico between 6:00 pm
today. During night choppers will be
reassembled and be ready to start rescue
operations at first light tomorrow.

16

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, September 28, 1968
10:50 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Paul Nitze forwards
Gen. Johnson's response to Westy's
program.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By eg, NARA, Date 10-9-91



~~TOP SECRET~~
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

September 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Attached for your use is the memorandum of
the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the
DMZ, which we discussed by phone.

Paul H. Nitze

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~
WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3696

166

CM-2668-67
28 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Situation in the DMZ Area and Program 5
Accelerated Deployments (U)

1. (U) The following information is provided in response to your oral request of 27 September 1967, as to actions being taken or anticipated for improving the situation in the DMZ area.

PART I - Actions by General Westmoreland

2. (TS) General Westmoreland has undertaken the following actions to improve the situation in the DMZ. He has induced the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) to share the burden of constructing and manning the strong points north of Dong Ha. In response, the JGS moved two ARVN Airborne battalions to Quang Tri last week. This now makes a total of five of the eight general reserve battalions assigned to the I Corps area. The III Marine Amphibious Force has been directed to move additional forces north of the AI Van Pass to take the pressure off forces from the rear and along the critical lines of communication. To compensate for this move, Army troops will take over all of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and part of Quang Nam Provinces. Further, III Marine Amphibious Force has been directed to thin out forces in the forward areas near Con Thien and the Trace as soon as minimum defensive installations can be constructed in that area. III Marine Amphibious Force has been reinforced by two US Army 175mm battalions, one 105mm battalion, and one AAA battalion to augment his organic fire power in the DMZ area. General Westmoreland further augmented the III Marine Amphibious Force with two truck companies and an assault helicopter company to improve the tactical and logistical support of his forces in the DMZ area.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-273

By iss, NARA Date 5-11-98

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

~~TOP SECRET~~

3. (TS) General Westmoreland's indicated desire to thin out forces north of Route 9 after suitable defenses are prepared in the Con Thien area and to hold Route 9 in force stems from a desire to minimize friendly casualties in the DMZ area and to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy through the use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack. It is in this area that our forces are butted up against the DMZ and are, therefore, at a serious tactical disadvantage. The enemy is permitted to reap full benefits from his sanctuary north of the DMZ secure from our maneuver. We must face him on frontal terms. We cannot get behind him to cut him off from his supplies or to overrun his artillery. The thinning out process is not, in any way, a retreat or withdrawal. A careful and thorough public affairs program is essential, to ensure that the public does not misinterpret it as such.

PART II - Proposals by General Westmoreland for Assistance
by Higher Authority

4. (TS) General Westmoreland has proposed that additional assistance can be provided by higher authority on several items. Actions being taken or anticipated on these items are as follows:

a. Item: Provide an immediate surge in B-52 sorties to maximum sustainable rate, with a goal of 1,200 sorties per month as soon as possible.

Action: The Joint Staff investigation has revealed that a capability exists to increase immediately ARC LIGHT sorties to 900 per month. General Westmoreland's request for 1,200 ARC LIGHT sorties per month is now being studied by the Joint Staff. CINCPAC is querying CINCSAC as to 48 hour ARC LIGHT surge capability. CINCPAC also is requesting views of Ambassador Sullivan as to political feasibility of approving overflight of Laos to reduce flying time per sortie and, in the longer term, improve the sortie rate capability, tactic and axes for attack in the DMZ area. Appropriate recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense soon.

b. Item: Investigate feasibility of employing 2,000 pound and larger bombs in B-52s.

Action: With modification to internal bomb racks, the B-52 can carry eight MK-84 2,000 pound bombs. The modification takes approximately three hours, and kits to modify six aircraft are available at Andersen AFB,

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Guam. Additional kits are available in CONUS. There are no 2,000 pound bombs at Andersen or U-Tapao at this time. Inventory of assets is now underway. Definitive information will be provided by 1700 hours, 29 September 1967.

c. Item: Request CSAF and CNO conduct earliest tests to determine optimum spacing of MK-36 weapons, and maximum resistance to concussion to preclude sympathetic detonation. Thereafter, if feasible, make a liberal allocation of MK-36 weapons for use in the DMZ.

Action: Minimum safe separation distance between emplaced Destructors MK-36 to preclude sympathetic detonation has been established as 100 feet on land and 50 feet in water. The CNO has requested CINCPACFLT to obtain and provide all specific information obtainable concerning the recent 7th AF mission on which detonations of the weapons occurred early after delivery. Subsequent to investigation of all pertinent aspects of the mission, including preparation, loading and testing of the fuses, a new series of tests may be required. Both the analysis and new testing are being given priority attention. In the interim, additional seedings of Destructors MK-36 are planned by CINCPAC and will be executed.

d. Item: Augment naval gunfire assets in DMZ area.

Action: SEA DRAGON forces, consisting of one cruiser and two destroyers, have been diverted to augment naval gunfire assets in the DMZ area. Additional available CTF 77 forces as required have been authorized to further augment the naval gunfire operations in the DMZ. Other possible actions to augment naval gunfire operations in the DMZ area are currently being studied.

e. Item: Provide earliest delivery of flash and sound units.

Action: Department of the Army, on 25 September 1967, issued a warning order for one battery, 2d Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery, to be deployed temporary change of station for a period of 90 to 180 days to South Vietnam. This battery reinforced will be airlifted to South Vietnam about 15 October 1967.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

f. Item: Accelerate to the extent practicable the arrival of programmed tactical units.

Action: See Part III below.

g. Item: Approve increases in RVNAF as recommended to the Secretary of Defense in July.

Action: On September 27, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the FY 68 ARVNAF force structure recommended by General Westmoreland to the Secretary of Defense in July, and are forwarding it to the Secretary of Defense recommending his approval.

h. Item: Accelerate the issue of M-16s to ARVN units as recommended.

Action: The allocation of M16/M16A1 rifles for ARVN is under active consideration by the Joint Material Priorities and Allocations Board in response to a CINCPAC recommendation to allocate 108,710 rifles during FY 68 with an immediate requirement for 5,000 rifles. Various production and distribution problems, including a strike at the Colt factory in July and introduction of chrome-plated barrels, are involved. Accelerated deliveries of M16/M16A1 rifles will involve diversion of rifles now intended for US forces. Additional information has been requested from CINCUSARPAC by 1 October 1967, and it is anticipated that recommendations as to additional allocations for ARVN can be submitted to the Secretary of Defense by 10 October 1967.

i. Item: Intensify R&D effort in field of target acquisition of concealed artillery pieces.

Action: The operational type radar AN/MPQ4A is presently being used in the DMZ for target acquisition purposes. An intensification of the R&D effort for target acquisition, including sensors of all types, has been a requirement of the Services for years, but few effective sensors have achieved reality. Among pioneering devices currently under development is the AN/TPQ-28 Counter Mortar Radar set which is expected to become operational about August 1969. Additional high resolution camera equipment and rapid photo processing capability for camouflage detection is being provided.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PART III - Program 5 Accelerated Deployments

5. (TS) The bulk of the combatant units in Program 5 were originally scheduled to close in-country during February/April 1968. For SVN, this included the 101st Airborne Division (-), the 11th Infantry Light Brigade, and one tactical fighter squadron to close during February 1968, and four separate infantry battalions to close during April 1968. An Air Force TFS is scheduled to close in Thailand during February 1968. Ground maneuver units originally in Program 4 and not yet closed in SVN include the 198th Infantry Light Brigade (3 battalions) and two separate airborne battalions. These latter units are scheduled to close during October 1967.

6. (TS) The following is an analysis of the actions that have been taken, or are under active consideration, to accelerate the deployment of Program 5 forces:

a. ARMY

(1) The Army has reviewed the capability to accelerate deployments of the 101st Airborne Division (-) and the 11th Infantry Light Brigade. Three battalions of the 101st Division will be deployed by air in December, an acceleration of one month. Additional accelerations are still under study and a determination cannot be made until 22 October 1967.

b. NAVY

An analysis undertaken by the Navy indicates that 1,661 Navy personnel now scheduled to deploy after 1 March 1968, will be accelerated to the January/February 1968 time-frame. The majority of these personnel would be used in support functions. Most of the remaining Navy personnel involve conversion of ships or construction/conversion of boats, and are capable of only limited acceleration and at high cost.

c. AIR FORCE

No additional acceleration of Air Force approved Program 5 forces is required.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. MARINE CORPS

All Marine Corps Program 5 forces, with the exception of a fixed-wing reconnaissance squadron, will be deployed prior to 1 January 1968. This includes 600 personnel in combined action company augmentation now scheduled to deploy after 1 January 1968.



HAROLD K. JOHNSON
General, USA
Acting Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - 10:00 am
September 28, 1967

*Pres file
sent Rumb via wire*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Panama

CIA has obtained information on a potentially major development in Panamanian politics which could overcome the problems President Robles faces in getting support for the treaties.

Arnulfo Arias, the only political figure with mass following and arch rival of Robles, has decided not to run in the May 1968 elections and says he wants to work with Robles in the selection of a "national unity" candidate. Arias gave as one of the reasons his desire to remove the canal treaties from Panamanian politics. Robles is reported to be interested.

All kinds of jockeying is going on between Arias and the members of Robles' coalition. The names surfaced so far of possible "unity" candidates are good men with whom we can work. But it is too early to tell just how this initiative will jell. We can expect smoother sailing on the treaties if the succession question is resolved in this fashion.

Ambassador Adair will be trying to encourage Arias and Robles to the extent that an American Ambassador can discreetly do so.

Meanwhile, Robles seems to be marking time on the treaties while the discussions on presidential succession go on.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-401
By CG, NARA, Date 9-19-85

~~SECRET~~

Thursday - 9:30 am
September 28, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your offer of assistance
to President Diaz Ordaz

Ambassador Freeman transmitted your message to President Diaz Ordaz yesterday morning.

Last night Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores called to express the President's appreciation and to take you up on your offer of additional help. He said that Diaz Ordaz would like to have the loan of 5 helicopters to assist the flood-stricken victims in the State of Guerrero.

State and DOD are now working on making them available today.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, September 28, 1967
9:25 a.m.

19
Pre file

Mr. President:

I have not yet received Acting Sec. Nitze's and Acting Chairman Johnson's responses to Westy's cable of recommendations yesterday -- promised to me for 9:00 a.m. -- but I think you will wish to read Bob Ginsburgh's independent check list; although Bob feels you will wish to defer to the formal recommendations coming from DOD.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 10-9-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

19a

28 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

1. General Westmoreland's message on the DMZ situation is sober and well balanced. His recommendations are reasonable and should be implemented to the extent feasible.

2. Recommend that the President:

a. Leave the decision to General Westmoreland -- unless he requests guidance -- on whether or not to anchor the main defensive line on Route 9.

b. Take no steps to allocate additional tac air sorties to the DMZ area. General Westmoreland has the necessary authority and he and General Monoyer have already allocated more sorties than they have been able to use.

c. Direct the employment of the B-52's immediate surge capability to the maximum sustainable rate within current resources.

d. Delegate to CINCPAC and CINCSAC, acting jointly, authority to conduct B-52 raids up to 17° 10'.

e. Authorize achievement of a 1200/month sortie rate for the B-52's as soon as possible.

f. Direct the deployment of a sound and flash unit to SVN by air as soon as possible (perhaps by mid-October).

g. Query MACV and CINCPAC to see whether any additional naval gunfire units could be made available (beyond those just authorized by CINCPAC) and whether they could be usefully employed.

h. Query SecDef and JCS as to:

(1) Possibility of accelerating the arrival of programmed tactical units (some acceleration is possible).

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-400

By 118, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) Possibility of accelerating issue of M-16s to ARVN.

i. Direct SecDef and JCS to keep you informed on

(1) Studies to use larger bombs on B-52s.

(2) Effectiveness studies on use of MK-36 destructors.

j. Query SecDef, and possibly Sec AF and Dr. Hornig, on feasibility of intensifying research and development for target acquisition.

k. Direct the JCS to have plans prepared for mounting commando (or larger) type raids against artillery sites in NVN. Request their recommendation as to whether plans should be implemented.

l. Direct JCS to assume for planning purposes that they will subsequently receive authorization to conduct a shallow airborne/ amphibious invasion as soon as feasible next spring or summer (objective to avoid a similar situation a year from now).

m. Direct SecDef and Sec State to review jointly the possibility of stationing additional B-52s in Thailand and the desirability of authorizing overflights of Laos.

7
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Thursday, September 28, 1967
9:20 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk's report of a private conversation with Gromyko -- much in the same vein as a briefer conversation reported to you on Tuesday.

W. W. Rostow

USUN 1055

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-400
By 208, NARA, Date 4-5-95

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NODIS

SECTO 16

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY FROM
THE SECRETARY.

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH GROMYKO (TWO OF US ALONE)
TONIGHT, THE FOLLOWING MATTERS WERE MENTIONED:

1. I ASKED GROMYKO WHETHER HE HAD ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION
ON WHAT HE HAD SAID ABOUT OUR LAST MEETING ABOUT ABM'S.
ITOLD HIM THAT I WAS SURE THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT ME TO
REPORT FAITHFULLY EXACTLY HOW GROMYKO SAW IT. SPECIFICALLY,

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 6865Q ~~SECRET~~

WAS THERE ANYTHING THAT GROMYKO COULD SAY ABOUT THE TIMING OF
NEGOTIATIONS? HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAVE BEEN GIVING THE MATTER
A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT, THAT THEY CONSIDER IT IS A QUESTION
WHICH NEEDS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT, THEY ACCEPT OUR ASSURANCE
OF OUR READINESS TO TALK ABOUT BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
MISSILES, AND CAME CLOSE TO STATING TPAT THEY DID EXPECT TO
ENTER INTO SERIOUS TALKS WITH US ON THE SUBJECT. HE SAID
IT WAS JUST NOT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO INDICATE ANYTHING ABOUT
TIMING. PUTTING GROMYKO'S REMARKS ALONGSIDE OF DOBRYNIN'S
REMARK ON THE SAME SUBJECT, I WOULD GATHER THAT THE RUSSIANS
ARE FORMULATING A POSITION IN THE EXPECTATION OF TALKS BUT
ARE NOT YET READY TO TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SETTING
A DATE AND STARTING A PROCESS OF DISCUSSION. I DOUBT WE
SHALL GET MUCH MORE FROM THEM, AT LEAST FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL
WEEKS.

2. I TOLD GROMYKO THAT I WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS VIETNAM
IN GREAT DETAIL AND THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH OUR POSITION.
I TOLD HIM THAT WE CONTINUE TO BE IN OCCASIONAL CONTACT WITH
HANOI THROUGH PRIVATE CHANNELS AND THAT WE HAD EXERCISED

PRESIDENT COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-309
By cbm, NARA Date 7-3-01

PAGE 3 RUEHCR 686 ~~SECRET~~

SOME RESTRAINT IN OUR OWN OPERATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH CONTACTS. I DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL AND HE DID NOT ASK ME FOR ANY DETAIL. HE SUMMARIZED THEIR POSITION IN FAMILIAR TERMS, INSISTING UPON A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF WHAT THE RESULTS OF SUCH A CESSATION WOULD BE. HE DID NOT EVEN STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT THERE WOULD BE TALKS. HE BRUSHED ASIDE ANY THOUGHT OF RECIPROCAL MILITARY ACTION ON NORTH VIETNAM. HE SHOWED NO INTEREST IN DISCUSSING THE MATTER AND IT WAS NOT PURSUED IN FURTHER DETAIL. HE DID NOT RESPOND AS TO WHAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO IF WE STOPPED THE BOMBING.

3. WE THEN HAD SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT CHINA. I ASKED HIM, WITH A LIGHT TOUCH, IF HIS PEOPLE IN MOSCOW THOUGHT THAT WE WERE IN SOME SORT OF CONSPIRACY WITH PEKING. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT AMUSED BY THE QUESTION AND ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT IF MOSCOW REALLY BELIEVED THAT SUCH WAS THE CASE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE MENTIONED IT TO US DIRECTLY. WE HAD SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT ELEMENTS OF FUTURE COMMON INTERESTS, BASED ON NATIONAL STATE INTERESTS DESPITE IDEOLOGY, AS WE LOOKED TO THE PROSPECT OF A BILLION CHINESE ARMED WITH

PAGE 4 RUEHCR 6865 ~~SECRET~~

NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAID THERE WERE SUCH POTENTIAL COMMON INTERESTS BUT DID NOT PURSUE THE MATTER.

4. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HE CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET VIEW WAS BASED ON THE TENTATIVE DRAFT WHICH WE AND THEY WORKED OUT AT THE END OF THE EMERGENCY GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE THINKS THERE ARE POINTS OF INTERPRETATION ON WHICH THE TWO OF US DO NOT SEE EYE TO EYE. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT THEY WERE MOVING AWAY FROM THAT POSITION TO THE TITO PROPOSALS. HE SAID, OF COURSE, THE TITO PROPOSALS WERE MORE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS AND WOULD BE ENTIRELY ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH PROPOSALS COULD NOT PRODUCE AN ANSWER. THE PRINCIPAL POINTS OF INTERPRETATION TO WHICH HE ALLUDED WERE (1) THE TYPE OF RESPONSE EXPECTED FROM THE ARABS IF SUCH A RESOLUTION WERE PASSED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND (2) THE SUEZ CANAL. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN OPENING OF SUEZ TO ISRAELI FLAGSHIPS BUT HE SAW NO PROSPECT THAT EGYPT WOULD AGREE. I DOUBT, THEREFORE, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL PUBLICLY SUPPORT ISRAELI PASSAGE OF SUEZ PENDING ARAB AGREEMENT. ONCE AGAIN HE LEFT THE IMPRESSION.

PAGE 5 RUEHCR 68650 ~~SECRET~~

THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT SO MUCH CONCERNED NOW WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE ALGERIANS AND WERE PREPARED TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION WITH WHICH NASSER AND THE SO-CALLED MODERATE ARABS COULD LIVE EVEN IF SYRIA AND ALGERIA OBJECTED. HE AGREED THAT ALGERIA'S DISTANCE FROM ISRAEL MADE THE ALGERIANS RATHER BRAVE. AS A LITTLE BARGAINING PRESSURE, HE UNDERLINED TWICE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST TO US-SOVIET RELATIONS, CLEARLY INVITING CONCESSIONS ON OUR SIDE IN THE ARAB-SOVIET DIRECTION. WE AGREED THAT THE STATE OF BELIGERENCY MUST BE REMOVED BUT THAT THE PROBLEM WAS TO FIND A FORMULA WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE THE RESULT WITHOUT HUMILIATING THE ARABS. THAT WILL TAKE SOME DOING. IT WAS LEFT THAT WE WOULD BE IN FURTHER CONSULTATION WITH THEM ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST TO SEE IF WE COULD NOT CLARIFY AND TIGHTEN UP THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COMMON APPROACH WE ESTABLISHED IN THE EMERGENCY GENERAL ASSEMBLY. AT NO TIME WAS THERE ANY THREAT OR BLUSTER ON HIS PART.

5. GROMYKO SPOKE TO ME ABOUT REPORTS THEY HAD HEARD ABOUT OUR BUILDING A NUCLEAR MINE FIELD ALONG THE TURKISH BORDER.

~~PAGE 6 RUENCHR 6365-9 SECRET~~

THIS WAS A SUBJECT WHICH THEY RAISED MORE THAN A YEAR AGO WITH BOTH US AND TURKEY AND HE SAID HE HAD NOT HAD A VERY CONCLUSIVE REPLY FROM EITHER GOVERNMENT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT IT AND THAT I WOULD LOOK INTO IT TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANY MORE THAT OUGHT TO BE SAID. HE SAID THAT IF THESE REPORTS WERE TRUE, THIS WOULD HAVE A VERY NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON OUR RELATIONS.

6. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ABOUT ARTICLE 3 OF THE NPT, AS WELL AS PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN BRINGING IT TO SIGNATURE AND THE HANDLING OF THE SUBJECT BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. DETAILS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. IT WAS AGREED THAT FOSTER AND DOBRYNIN WOULD TALK FURTHER ABOUT THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS AND THAT WE WOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT ARTICLE 3 AFTER THE MEETING OF THE MINISTERS OF EURATOM NEXT MONDAY.

7. IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSION AFTER DINNER, MOST OF THE TIME WAS SPENT ON A FUTILE ARGUMENT ABOUT PROCEDURE ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION.

~~PAGE 7 RUENCHR 6365-9 SECRET~~

8. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION, GROMYKO INDICATED THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROCEED WITH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW CULTURAL AGREEMENT, POSSIBLY IN DECEMBER.

9. IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION WITH THOMPSON AND STOESSEL, DOBRYNIN SUGGESTED THAT GROMYKO'S INDICATION ON MONDAY THAT THEY MIGHT BE READY TO INAUGURATE CIVIL AIR OPERATIONS IN OCTOBER WAS PROBABLY A BIT OPTIMISTIC. HE THOUGHT THAT AEROFLOT LIKE PANAM WOULD NOT BE KEEN TO START OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND THAT PERHAPS GROMYKO HAD IN MIND AN INAUGURAL FLIGHT THIS FALL WITH REGULAR OPERATIONS TO START NEXT SPRING. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY INSURANCE.

I COULD NOT DETECT ANY PARTICULAR CHANGE IN MOOD ALTHOUGH I FOUND NOTHING ENCOURAGING IN HIS ATTITUDE ABOUT VIETNAM. THE EVENING AS A WHOLE WAS REASONABLY RELAXED WITH NO POLEMICS.

GP-1.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, September 28, 1967
9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Amb. Bunker's response to the message you instructed me to send yesterday*. He seems to despair of getting at material well reported from Saigon. I suspect we shall have to work from both ends.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(attached)

Saigon 635 CAS Channels

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS-019-023-001/3
By jc, NARA, Date 12-11-09

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FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 635

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

1. PLEASE TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT I CAN WELL UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM HE IS HAVING WITH THE PRESS AND TV AT HOME, AND WE SHALL MOVE IN ON IT RIGHT AWAY. I AM MEETING WITH WESTY, GENE LOCKE, AND BOB KOMER TODAY AND WE SHALL LAY OUT A CRASH PROGRAM TO GET INFORMATION IN YOUR HANDS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. MY PRESENT THINKING IS THAT WE SHOULD GIVE YOU FIRST, AND AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, A GENERAL ROUNDUP OF PROGRESS BEING MADE ON ALL FRONTS, INCLUDING PACIFICATION, POPULATION CONTROL, VC MANPOWER PROBLEMS AND MORALE, ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN RURAL AREAS, ARVN REORGANIZATION AND IMPROVED PERFORMANCE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, ETC.

3. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS YOU SAY, THE U.S. PRESS HERE CONCENTRATES ON THE DMZ (IS ANOTHER DIEN BIEN PHU IN THE MAKING?); THE THIEU/KY SPLIT (ACTUALLY THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THEY ARE WORKING TOGETHER BETTER THAN THEY HAVE FOR SOME TIME. CERTAINLY, THIS WAS MY IMPRESSION IN TALKING WITH BOTH OF THEM LAST TUESDAY); ELECTION IRREGULARITIES (THE MOST RESPONSIBLE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES, HUONG, HA THUC KY, AND DAN, HAVE TAKEN NO PART IN THE CHARGES. THEY ARE PROMOTED PRINCIPALLY BY DZU, WHOM EVERYBODY KNOWS IS A CROOK, AND BY SUU, WHO IS SENILE AND BEING USED); NEWSPAPER CLOSINGS (THESE HAVEN'T CAUSED A RIPPLE HERE, NOBODY SEEMS TO REGRET THEM, BELIEVING THE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD GOOD CAUSE TO ACT).

4. I REGRET TO SAY THAT IN A LARGE SEGMENT OF THE PRESS HERE, THERE IS AN OBVIOUS SKEPTICISM, A BIAS AGAINST THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THEREFORE A TENDENCY TO PLACE THE WORST INTERPRETATION ON ACTS OF THE GVN. I HAVE BEEN GIVING MUCH ATTENTION PERSONALLY TO THE PRESS, BOTH IN BACKGROUND MEETINGS, INDIVIDUALLY AND HAVING THEM IN FOR DINNER INFORMALLY IN SMALL GROUPS IN ORDER TO TRY TO FOCUS ON THE IMPORTANT THINGS THAT ARE TAKING PLACE HERE AND TO RE-ESTABLISH OUR CREDIBILITY. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS PRACTICALLY UNIVERSAL DISBELIEF OF OUR FIGURES ON ENEMY CASUALTIES. I HAVE YET TO FIND A SINGLE REPORTER WHO BELIEVES IN THE OBJECTIVITY OF OUR BODY COUNT. WE MUST COUNTER THIS BY BEING IN A POSITION TO RELEASE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WHICH CORROBORATE THE FIGURES WE GIVE OUT. SOME OF THIS IS CONDITIONED BY WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO HAVE BEEN OFFICIAL OVER-OPTIMISM IN THE PAST. CONSEQUENTLY WE ARE TRYING TO BE OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC IN DEMONSTRATING THAT WE ARE MAKING STEADY, THOUGH NOT SPECTACULAR, PROGRESS, AND THAT WE ARE DEFINITELY MOVING AHEAD.

GP-1

450

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NWJ.019.023.001/4

By R NARA Date 12-11-09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ / RAC 00-308

By Sj, NARA Date 7-5-01

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TO AMEMB SAIGON
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EYES ONLY VIA [REDACTED]
TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON, EYES ONLY, FROM WALT ROSTON

SEPTEMBER 27, 1967

THE PRESIDENT REQUESTS YOU, WESTY, FOR POWER TO
SEARCH URGENTLY FOR OCCASIONS TO PRESENT SOUND EVIDENCE
OF PROGRESS IN VIET NAM.

PRESS AND TV HERE ARE DOMINATED BY LMZ, THIEU-KY SPLIT,
ALLEGED ELECTION IRREGULARITIES, NEWSPAPER CLOSINGS,
DEBATES ON BOMBING, ETC. WE MUST SOMEHOW GET HARD EVIDENCE -
OUT OF SAIGON ON STEADY IF SLOW PROGRESS IN POPULATION
CONTROL, PACIFICATION, VC MANPOWER PROBLEMS, ECONOMIC
PROGRESS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, ARVN IMPROVEMENT, ETC.
ALL ARE HAPPENING. LITTLE COMES THROUGH DESPITE WHAT
WE KNOW TO BE MOST SERIOUS EFFORTS OUT YOUR WAY.

PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS IS AT PRESENT STAGE
A CRITICALLY IMPORTANT DIMENSION OF FIGHTING THE WAR
123

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

~~W. W. R~~

22

Pres file

Thursday, September 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1966 Report to the Congress on the
Trade Agreements Program

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft Presidential letter to cover your annual report to the Congress on trade agreement activities. An annual report to the Congress on this subject is required by the Trade Expansion Act.

A copy of the report is at Tab B. It is a straightforward account of our activities in the trade field and should create no problems.

W. W. Rostow

(If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A.)

No _____

Speak to me _____



ERF:mst

H.M.R.
22a

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit the eleventh annual report on the Trade Agreements Program. This report is required by section 402(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, covering calendar year 1966.

1966 was another remarkable year for international trade. World trade during the year rose by 9.5%, bringing great benefits to all the nations of the free world. The United States shared fully in this growth. Our foreign trade set new records, adding to the strength of our economy and to the income and welfare of our people.

The United States played a major role during 1966 in efforts to improve conditions of world commerce and to stimulate the growth of trade. The drive to conclude the Kennedy Round -- the most ambitious multilateral attempt to reduce trade barriers ever undertaken -- was the most important of these efforts. This negotiation was successfully concluded on June 30, 1967 and will pay dividends for us all.

We have had two decades of unprecedented growth in world trade which contributed greatly to the economic progress of this country and of our trading partners. We must maintain this momentum.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House
LBJ:ERF:mst - 9/28/67

23

September 28, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

CAP 67123

Jim Webb asks that I make this letter and draft message promptly available to you.



OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

~~NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION~~
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

23a

September 28, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

It has not been possible for me to locate immediately the 1946 correspondence I had with the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative John Taber, for the period after the election of the Republican 80th Congress when he adopted the policy of bringing in outside experts and insisting that they participate with the Director of the Budget in preparing the President's budget recommendations. There are a number of letters by President Truman as well as my own.

This was the period when we had the first "battle of the budget" and Senator Robert Taft was quite active on the Senate side. My recollection is that I had an exchange of letters with Taber which made it clear that I would not budge from a position that under our Constitutional system and the provisions of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, there could not be his requested dilution of the responsibility of the President for the preparation and submission of the budget. Also, I took the position that if agency officials recognized that representatives of the Appropriations Committee were sitting with the Director of the Budget in his final determinations, even if the stated purpose was so that they would understand the budget and the reasons for the President's recommendations, the department and agency officials would, in fact, move around the end and the discipline of the President and the Budget Director would be weakened. I pointed out that the very purposes which Mr. Taber wished to achieve would be frustrated -- that additional pressures to increase appropriations would be generated.


It was very popular in those days for many in and out of Congress to attack the President and the Government as spendthrift, which fitted in with the image Taber and other Republicans were trying

to create along the line that Congress would have to take charge and run the Government until Mr. Dewey could be elected President. In fact, they expected the power would remain with the Congress even with Dewey as President.

As I have reported to you from my contacts with important Democrats, and my impressions gathered from various parts of the country, I am sure things are moving in your direction and that many responsible Democrats and independent leaders will be coming more and more to support you. This will strengthen your leadership position as to Vietnam and also as to the important domestic needs of this country. The enclosed few brief paragraphs are submitted with the above in mind.

With deep devotion and high regard,

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "James E. Webb". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

James E. Webb
Administrator

Enclosure

DRAFT MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

OR

LETTER TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE

On January _____ I submitted to the Congress a budget for the United States which represented my careful evaluation of the needs the Government must face up to for the fiscal year beginning six months later, July 1. The House of Representatives did not act promptly to legislate on the needs of the various departments and agencies, with the result that when the fiscal year 1968 began on July 1, 1967, _____ number of departments would have been forced to close down for lack of any funds without an interim Congressional action under which they could continue on a temporary basis. The House of Representatives passed such a resolution on June _____, as has been customary in the past, but there are still as of this date _____ number of agencies whose fiscal requirements have not been acted on for a year that is already one-third behind. The consequent lack of certainty is destroying the foundation for efficient management.

The resolution under which a large part of the Government is operating on this temporary and uncertain basis will expire September 30. It is almost unbelievable under these conditions that a

responsible legislative body would fail to act in time to ensure continuation of orderly government or would introduce into this situation which has been caused by delays in the House of Representatives itself conditions which violate one of the most important basic statutes on which the power of the Congress itself rests in appropriation matters.

The budget and accounting act of 1921 fixed on the President, as the only fully responsible Executive who could be found under our Constitutional system, the responsibility for submitting at the beginning of each session a complete work and money program to Congress for its consideration. Before 1921 each Department went to the Congress independently, producing a chaotic situation which the Congress was in no position to meet through a responsible legislative process. The system set up in 1921 has provided a means over many years for Congress to deal with the complex needs of government. To violate this well-established system by demanding that the President revise his budget, not in accordance with his own judgment but in accordance with some arbitrary, politically- or partisanly-oriented objective set in the heat of one particular legislative battle, will do irreparable harm to the future ability of the House of Representatives to discharge its proper functions in our government. If the House can take such an action, so can the Senate. I cannot see where this advances the true interests of the country.

I am not prepared to be a party to this abandonment of long-established legal and orderly procedures, partly because I do not want to see the House of Representatives do great harm to itself.

The budget which I submitted in January represented my best judgment at that time as to the needs of our country. I have always been prepared to give great weight to the result of the legislative process. I have used the Presidential veto sparingly. Time and again as conditions have changed I have indicated that I would initiate or accept reductions made after careful consideration and in the light of the judgment of the Congress as to those things which are of the greatest urgency. Always, in accepting reductions made in my budget by the Congress I have first weighed them against the need in the affected areas for continuity without the tremendous losses caused by stop and go decisions.

My pending request for an increase in taxes to meet the urgent needs of the country was submitted after the budget went to Congress because conditions changed. My efforts to reduce expenditures in the Executive Branch by executive action have been vigorous and effective. I have recognized the need to reduce expenditures just as I have recognized the need for a tax increase.

I believe the country would be better off ~~if~~ ^{IF} it could go forward with the budget I submitted last January. I regret that under present conditions this is not possible. I have taken more steps to reduce the levels of expenditures than much of the House debate recognizes, and I have accepted the reductions made by the Congress when these were based on a realistic appraisal of the needs of the country. I will continue to do this, and I urge that questions related to an increase in taxes and the orderly process of legislation on appropriations be separated from the need for a continuing resolution to carry on government beyond September 30.

Members of the House need to be reminded, I believe, that this country will not tolerate a cessation of government brought about by a legislative body that failed or refused to act on the budget in a timely way before the beginning of this fiscal year and now seeks to use the desperate situation it has created to impose provisions destructive of the orderly processes of our government.

* * * * *

~~SECRET~~

24
Pres file
September 28, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Thai Prime Minister Thanom's Official Visit

You agreed on September 15 to invite Prime Minister Thanom to visit the U.S. early next year. You also agreed to the announcement of the visit in October or November.

February 12-18, 1968, appears to be a convenient time for the Thanom visit. I recommend that you authorize Ambassador Unger privately to extend the invitation for a visit during that week.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 29, NARA, Date 10-9-84

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith the draft as edited according to your instructions by
Busby, Katzenbach, Nitze, and myself.

It is now 2023 words.

Busby and Katzenbach requested that you make a conscious decision
on the question of our ~~casualty~~ casualty figures. They recognize the
advantage of giving the figure on wounded returned to duty; but they
question whether the President rather than the Pentagon should handle
this matter.

Neither Sec. Rusk nor State Department nor the Intelligence
community could nail down the statistics of casualties imposed in the
North versus election terrorism in the South. Our common view was
to drop that item.

Reedy liked the speech very much but thinks the Tonkin resolution
should not be used. The others believe its use is OK in this context.

Led by Busby we all felt that what was needed now was the clear
strong assertion of the President's position and commitment rather than
complex argumentation. For what it is worth, we all felt pretty good
about the draft at the end.

DETERMINED TO BE IN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PEN 12534
SEC. 1.3 AND 1.4 HISTORIC MEMO OF
MAR. 10, 1968.

BY 119 10-27-91

25a

This evening I want to speak to you about the dominant issue of this day -- the struggle in Vietnam.

Vietnam is the arena where Communist expansionism is most aggressively at work in the world today -- where it is armed; where it is crossing international frontiers in violation of international agreements; where it is maiming and murdering, killing and kidnapping; where it is ruthlessly attempting to bend free people to its will.

The problem of Vietnam is a compound:

-- of an insurgency that feeds on memories of colonialism and the present facts of poverty and injustice;

-- and a powerful aggression that is spurred, not by idealism, but by an appetite for conquest.

Into this mixture of subversion and war, of terror and hope, America has entered -- with its material power and moral commitment,

* * *

Why?

Why should three Presidents and the elected representatives of our people have chosen to defend this Asian nation ten thousand miles from American shores?

We cherish freedom -- yes. We cherish self-determination for all people -- yes. We abhor the political murder of any state

by another, and the bodily murder of any people by gangsters of whatever ideology. And for twenty-seven years -- since the days of Lend-Lease -- we have sought to strengthen free people against domination by aggressive foreign powers.

And over these years every American President has had to answer a basic question:

-- Is unopposed aggression a threat -- not only to the immediate victim, but to the ultimate peace and security of the world of which we are a part?

-- Would our own security be at stake if the structure of order which America has supported over these 27 years were to erode?

That is the question to which Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson had to respond in facing the issue of Vietnam.

That is the question to which the Congress responded when the Congress declared in 1964 that

"the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

Those who tell us now that we should abandon our commitment

-- that securing South Vietnam from armed domination is not worth

the price we are paying -- must also answer this question. And the test they must meet is this: what would be the consequence of letting armed aggression against South Vietnam succeed. What would follow in the months and years ahead? What kind of world are they prepared to live in a decade from tonight?

For those who have borne the responsibility for decision during these past ten years, the stakes have seemed clear -- and high.

President Eisenhower said in 1959:

"Strategically, South Vietnam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Vietnam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom..."

And President Kennedy said in 1962:

"...withdrawal in the case of Vietnam and the case of Thailand might mean a collapse of the entire area." A year later, he reaffirmed that "We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to

withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

This is not simply an American view. Let me call the roll of those who live in the region -- in the great arc of Asian and Pacific nations -- and who bear responsibility for the fate of their peoples.

President Marcos of the Philippines:

"Vietnam is the focus of attention now... it may happen to Thailand or the Philippines, or anywhere, wherever there is misery, disease, ignorance... for you to renounce your position of leadership in Asia is to allow the Red Chinese to gobble up all of Asia."

Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand:

"The American decision will go down in history as the move that prevented the world from having to face another major conflagration."

Prime Minister Holt of Australia:

"We are there because while Communist aggression persists the whole of Southeast Asia is threatened."

President Park of Korea:

"For the first time in our history, we decided to dispatch our combat troops overseas... because in our belief any"

aggression against the Republic of Vietnam represented a direct and grave menace against the security and peace of Free Asia, and therefore directly jeopardized the very security and freedom of our own people. "

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia:

"It is the Communists who are the aggressors and the source of all the trouble in Vietnam. But for the American intervention, South Vietnam would have been butchered and massacred by the Communists. "

Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand:

"We can thank God that America at least regards aggression in Asia with the same concern as it regards aggression in Europe -- and is prepared to back up its concern with action. "

Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew:

"I feel the fate of Asia -- South and Southeast Asia -- will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam. "

I cannot tell you -- with certainty -- that a Communist conquest of South Vietnam would be followed by Communist subversion and unendurable political pressure throughout Southeast Asia. I cannot tell you -- with certainty -- that a Southeast Asia dominated by Communist power would bring a third World War much closer to terrible reality. One could hope that it would not be so.

But all that we have learned in this tragic century tells us it would be so, I believe it would be so. And, as President of the United States, I am not prepared to gamble the security -- indeed, the existence -- of this nation merely on hope and wishful thinking.

I am convinced that by seeing this struggle through now, in Vietnam, we are reducing the chances of a larger war -- perhaps a nuclear war.

I would rather stand in Vietnam, in our time, and by meeting this danger now, reduce the danger for our children and grandchildren.

* * *

* * * *

I want to turn now to the struggle in Vietnam itself.

There are questions about this difficult war that must trouble every thoughtful person. Let me put some of these questions -- and give you the best answers I know.

First, are the Vietnamese -- with our help, and that of their other allies -- making progress? Is there forward movement?

The reports I see make clear that there is steady progress and forward movement.

Certainly there is positive movement toward constitutional government. Thus far the Vietnamese have met the political schedule they laid down in January 1966.

The people wanted an elected, responsive government. They wanted it enough to brave a vicious campaign of Communist terror and assassination to vote for it. And, on November first, a legitimate elected government will be inaugurated and an elected Senate and legislature installed. Their responsibility is clear: to answer the desires of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination and peace, for an attack on corruption, for economic development and social justice.

There is progress in the war itself -- dramatic progress.

The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from many of their major interior bases. The military victory almost within Hanoi's grasp in 1965 has now been denied. The grip of the Viet Cong on the people is being broken.

Since our commitment of major forces in 1965, the proportion of the population living under Communist control has been reduced well under 20%. Today about two-thirds of the people in South Vietnam live in secure areas -- and in the contested areas, the tide continues to run with us.

But the struggle remains hard. The South Vietnamese have suffered severely, as have we -- particularly in the First Corps area, in the North, where the enemy has mounted his heaviest attacks, and where his lines of communication to North Vietnam are shortest. Our casualties in the war have reached 11,000 killed in action, and 85,000 wounded. Of those wounded, we thank God that 79,000 have been returned, or will return to duty.

I know there are other questions on your minds; for instance:

"Why not negotiate now?" The answer is that we and our South Vietnamese allies are wholly prepared to negotiate now.

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh tomorrow.

I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their Foreign Minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative to any spot on this earth to talk in secret with a spokesman for Hanoi.

I am ready to have the issue of Vietnam dealt with by the United Nations.

We have made this very clear to Hanoi -- directly and through third parties.

We have informed Hanoi again and again that the United States is willing immediately to stop aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussion.

But Hanoi has not accepted any of these proposals.

It is by Hanoi's choice -- not ours, not the world's -- that war continues.

Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they persist with the war?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see the struggle through to the end. As one Western diplomat recently in Hanoi put it: "They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose." A visitor from a Communist capital said, "They expect the war to be long and that the Americans will in the end be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in the end."

Are the North Vietnamese right about us?

No. They are wrong. It is the common failing of totalitarian regimes, that they cannot understand the nature of our democracy;

-- ~~that~~ they mistake dissent for disloyalty;

-- ~~that~~ they mistake restlessness for a rejection of policy;

-- ~~that~~ they mistake a few committees for a country.

They are no better suited to judge the strength and perseverance of America, than the Nazi and Stalinist propagandists were. It is a tragedy that they must discover these qualities in the American people through a bloody war.

And, soon or late, they will.

Therefore, we shall continue to seek negotiations -- confident that reason will at last prevail; that Hanoi will realize that it cannot win; that it will turn away from fighting and toward building for its own people.

* * * *

Since World War II this nation has met and mastered many challenges -- Greece and Turkey, Berlin, Korea, and Cuba.

We met them because brave men were willing to risk their lives for their nation's security. And braver men have never lived than those who carry our colors in Vietnam at this hour.

The price of these efforts has been heavy, indeed. But the price of not having met these challenges and seen them through would have been vastly greater.

We know it. Our friends know it. And our enemies know it, too.

And so we shall press forward.

Two things we must do -- two things we shall do.

First, we must not mislead our enemy.

Let him not think that debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For they won't.

Let him not think that protest will produce surrender. Because it won't.

Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he won't.

Second, we will provide all that our brave men require to do the job that must be done.

They have our prayers -- and our heartfelt praise -- and our deepest gratitude.

For, because of them -- because of their sacrifice -- because of their devotion -- our nation and our world are safe.

26

Wednesday, September 27, 1967, 7:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

**SUBJECT: Meeting with National Security Council Staff
Thursday, September 28 at 10:00 A. M.**

Following are several points you may wish to make during the meeting with the members of the National Security Council Staff:

1. How can you help me most?
 - a. Look at every recommendation headed my way as I must look at it--from every angle--domestic, Congressional, financial, religious, racial, etc.
 - b. Calmly keep on full steam, ignoring the unsettling effect of the current hue and cry in the press and on the Hill.
 - c. Keep trying daily to get through to the bureaucracy and understanding of the objectives and decisions of this administration.
2. What do I expect from you?
 - a. Fast responses despite long working hours.
 - b. Quick adjustment to new situations such as foreign crises.
 - c. Straight forward briefs and staff comments on issues arising in your areas of responsibility.
 - d. Anonymity.

If there is time, you may wish to:

- a. Ask individual staff members for comments they wish to make.
- b. Give a short summary of how you look at our current national security situation.

Walt

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Wednesday, September 27, 1967 -- 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know that perhaps as many as 200 Russians are involved with the North Vietnamese SAM system at Phuc Yen airfield, according to CIA.

Neither Nick nor I would alter our present target decision; the Russians, if there, have accepted the risks of their trade.

But I did wish you to know of the report, since it did not come to my attention until after Tuesday's decision.

Today we have been busy trying to assure Phuc Yen wasn't struck just as your friend Maurer (Roumania) arrived. Complicated war.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-401
By cb, NARA, Date 9-19-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Pres file

Wednesday, September 27, 1967
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker reports on
politics and plans.

It is clearly going to be hard to
get evident forward motion until the
November 1 inaugural.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 10-21-91

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

28a
Wednesday, September 27, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 7060)

Herewith my twenty-second weekly telegram:

A. General

The political scene has quieted down somewhat during the past week, simmering rather than boiling.

Truong Dinh Dzu and Phan Khac Suu have attempted to keep their protest movement alive. At a press conference held on the steps of the National Assembly on September 21, at which they were joined by Vu Hong Khanh and Pham Thai, they announced that two groups, the Front Struggling to Carry Out Democracy and the Movement of People Struggling for Democracy, had joined forces to protest and ask the Assembly to annul the elections and organize new ones. They also sent an open letter to me claiming to represent twenty-seven Upper House slates and 70 percent of the voters protesting that the election was fraudulent and contrary to the people's aspiration for the construction of true democracy and requesting "the U.S. Government to cease intervention in internal Vietnamese affairs with the purpose of validating a fraudulent and undemocratic vote." Since the letter is insulting in tone and was disseminated to the press before I had a chance to see it, I do not intend to reply to it.

Last Sunday, a group of approximately two hundred students (out of some 30,000 at Saigon University) claiming to represent Saigon, Van Hanh and Can Tho Universities, calling itself the "United Students Assembly," staged a relatively orderly demonstration at which they distributed an open letter to you. The letter alleges interference of the U.S. in Vietnam internal affairs from the Geneva Conference to the present time, calls for immediate cessation of interference in Vietnamese affairs, ending of the war, and limiting assistance to the economic, social and cultural spheres. The group proceeded from the National Assembly to the Central Market where they began tearing down and burning Government banners and trying to put up their own. The police moved in very quietly, breaking up the crowd without violence. The students gradually moved off in small groups.

Earlier in the day, a small demonstration was also staged by about ten Buddhists in the Central Market. The police did not interfere and it broke up quickly.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 11135
By *gallies*, NARA, Date 6-8-00

We have reports of efforts by some of the student leaders to enlist Buddhist support for demonstrations in case the Assembly should validate the elections. Their plan would be to enlist students in the major cities in an effort to topple the Government, set up a temporary Government and organize new elections. A CAS report claims that Tran Van Chieu, Dzu's running mate, has promised the students three million piasters (U.S. \$37,500.00 at the official rate of 80 to 1) for their program to protest the elections. This would tend to confirm General Thieu's statement to me that student protests had been paid for by the losing civilian candidates.

So far, the militant Buddhists have not agreed to participate with the students and have confined their protests largely to condemning the action of General Thieu in signing the new Buddhist Charter. However, the An Quang Buddhist faction held a press conference, participated in also by Truong Dinh Dzu and Vu Hong Khanh, on September 24 in the An Quang Pagoda before a large and partisan crowd. While the meeting was devoted largely to criticism of General Thieu, opposition was also expressed to the "rigged elections," and demands made that the Assembly reject the elections and that new elections be organized by a transitional government.

None of these activities have created much of a stir. My impression is that public interest in efforts to stir up opposition to the elections has waned and has turned more rather to the formation of the new Government.

Several actions taken by the Government seem to indicate a very significant lack both in a sense of timing and in any awareness of the importance of public relations. These have included the suspension of two newspapers, Saigon Ao for one month, and Thoi Dai for an indefinite period. A third instance was the inept police handling of the arrest (or invitation to police headquarters for questioning) of An Truong Thanh, former Economics Minister and disqualified "peace" candidate. I shall refer to these in greater detail in the political section.

I have said to both Thieu and Ky that whatever the merits of these cases, the timing and the method employed was very unfortunate and gave the foreign press especially the opportunity to question whether the Government was really interested in democratic processes. Ky informed me yesterday that he had told the police to leave Thanh alone although they were in a position to arrest him at any time since they had tape recordings of his Communist connections.

All of these instances have aroused relatively little interest here. Apparently there has been much wider interest in the reporting of them in the foreign press.

The problem which has given us most concern and largely overshadowed all other political activity during the past week has been the attitude of members of the National Assembly toward validation of the elections. We have had reports of disaffection among members of the Assembly based on a variety of reasons. A sizeable number have been nursing hurt feelings because of their defeat in the Senatorial elections, while others, members of the pro-Ky Democratic Alliance Bloc, claim they have been ignored by Ky since the elections, and some claim that they did not receive from him the promised assistance during the campaign itself. Other members of the Assembly are running for the Lower House and fear has been expressed that they may be absent when the Assembly acts on validation. It seemed apparent that Thieu and Ky held the key to responsible action by the Assembly and I have, therefore, taken up the matter with them urgently during the past week. I emphasized to both that together they have a great responsibility to be sure that the Assembly acts in a responsible manner. I reminded them that U.S. reaction to invalidation would be most adverse and could, in fact, create major difficulties for continued U.S. support for Vietnam. I saw them both again yesterday and urged prompt action on their part.

Thieu said that he was well aware of the problem and that he and Ky have been both working on it. He had talked to a number of key members of the Assembly and was having General Linh Quang Vien check on all the Assembly members on where they stood as individuals on the vote. Thieu said that he was keeping in close touch with Ky on the whole matter and was confident that the vote would come out all right. He emphasized that what was needed was not a bare majority but an impressive vote to affirm support of the elections.

In my talk with Ky later in the day, I reviewed with him the number of alarming reports we had had which indicated that there were serious divisions in the Assembly, and in conversations which I and members of my staff have had we have found many Vietnamese apprehensive about the outcome. I pointed out to him, as I had previously, how serious the effects of invalidation could be, not only internally in Vietnam, but also with respect to the difficulties such an action would create for continued U.S. support. Ky said that he and Thieu had talked over the matter subsequent to my conversation with Thieu in the morning and they had agreed that Ky would meet with members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc to discuss the vote and to bring them into line. He has invited all the members of the Bloc to have lunch with him at his home today. Since this group contains some fifty members out of the 117 members of the Assembly, if Ky brings them into line, the results are virtually assured.

Ky seemed in good spirits and quite confident. He reminded me that he had said before that I could be sure the Democratic Alliance Bloc would vote for validation. He said that in earlier discussions with various Bloc members, he had pointed out to them that a vote against the elections made no sense, that they would lose everything by doing it. He told them, just as he had told the Buddhists, that coups are outdated. He repeated that there was no need to worry, that there were plenty of ways to assure an adequate vote.

I believe that Thieu and Ky are now fully aware of the need to go to work on the Assembly members and to try to assure an impressive vote for validation of the elections.

I mentioned in my last week's report that we had developed within the Mission a suggested Government program which I planned to present to General Thieu, designed to make clear to the people that the Government is theirs, dedicated to the promotion of their welfare and to the resolution of their problems. I put this in General Thieu's hands last week and he told me yesterday that he had studied it, liked the presentation we had made, and had turned it over to his "brains trust" to incorporate the ideas we had presented in his platform.

The document is headed Democracy, Peace and Social Justice. We have presented it as a dynamic thirteen-point program designed to achieve democracy, peace, social justice, and the development of the nation. The points are:

- A. Democracy, the evolution of the Constitutional and party processes;
- B. The search for peace;
- C. Social justice, and the elimination of corruption;
- D. Manpower resources, and their full utilization;
- E. Pacification, including reorganization of the Armed Forces to give new emphasis to security, strengthening of the role of the province chiefs and enhancing the role of the village councils and hamlet chiefs in planning village-oriented new life development;
- F. Military forces and veterans, including reorganization of the military, relieving of corrupt and ineffective officers and concern for the care and welfare of war veterans;
- G. Administrative reform;

H. Agriculture, including steps to increase production and many other measures to improve the lot of the rural dweller;

I. Industry, including planning now for the economic independence of Vietnam;

J. Economic stability, including exercise of fiscal prudence, increasing tax on luxury goods, modernization of the tax administration;

K. Building our cities, providing adequate housing, water, electricity, sanitation, and transportation for the almost half of the Vietnamese people now living in cities and towns. Initiation of self-help urban renewal so as to provide low-cost housing and recreational facilities;

L. Education, increasing efforts to train teachers and providing adequate school facilities;

M. Youth, the most precious resource of the country. The Government pledges to serve youth and to be open to youth, assuring an important place in the Government for young men and women, and establishment of a new and expanded Ministry of Youth.

Finally, all South Vietnamese are called upon to join the new Government to support these dynamic programs.

On September 29, the new Embassy building will be dedicated and we will be open for business there on October 9. In keeping with the wartime situation here, the dedication ceremony will be austere. Thieu, Ky and Do will head a fairly large guest list and Thieu has agreed to speak briefly during the dedication. While, of course, we cannot win the war with bigger and better Embassy buildings, the new Chancery will result in the U.S. image being enhanced in the eyes of the local population.

Pacification: One payoff from unifying pacification under MACV is that Bob Komar, with General Westmoreland solidly backing him, is making our weight felt much more than before in Government of Vietnam pacification planning. Our aim for 1968 is to tie in pacification better to our overall military strategy and to press on the Government of Vietnam a program both more commensurate with the increased resources available and better able to fill in behind our increasing military success. For example, the 1967 program was built around

1,100 hamlets -- not a very impressive number considering that only about 5,000 of Vietnam's 12,600 hamlets are yet regarded as secure. Owing to a late start in 1967 and diversion of energy to the elections, even the 1,100 hamlet goal may not be met.

Building on the stronger base we now have -- with 491 Revolutionary Development teams in the field, planned improvements in the Regional Force/Popular Force, 54 ARVN battalions assigned to support pacification, and a better functioning Revolutionary Development Ministry, we are urging the Government of Vietnam to pacify 2,000 hamlets in 1968. This is ambitious, but not overly so if we can get more Regional Force/Popular Force into the pacification act, as is contemplated under the pending reorganization. Minister Thang's initial reaction has been quite favorable.

We are also pressing for a better sense of area priorities. With the heavy fighting in northern First Corps, nobody can expect too much in the way of pacification progress -- local security is too tenuous. Instead, Third and Fourth Corps, where most of the rural population lives in the rice bowl of South Vietnam, deserve higher priority. Komer thinks that Thang and the Joint General Staff will adopt pacification priorities in the order of Fourth, Third, Second and First Corps. We have further identified 23 key provinces. Within these, we will concentrate our effort in specific "campaign areas," to which adequate security forces will be assigned. Thang has also agreed to seek a larger Revolutionary Development budget of five billion piasters compared to this year's three billion; because of the late start, even this won't all be spent.

With expanding security, commitment of more and better Vietnamese forces, nearly double the number of Revolutionary Development teams, 66 percent more funds, and a much-improved organization, pacification should move ahead a good deal faster in 1968 than this year, which in turn is proving rather better than 1966.

U.S. Navy contribution to the war in South Vietnam: A new push has been added to the war in the Mekong Delta. It is called the Mobile Riverine Force. With new and specially configured ships and assault boats, the Navy is providing a highly-mobile floating base from which Army forces may be launched to track down and encircle an elusive enemy. Once a nemesis to offensive military operations, the profusion of rivers, canals, and streams of the Delta has now been turned to our advantage. As the enemy is located, Army forces are landed from heavily armed and armored river craft. The boats then take up positions in the adjacent waterways to seal off enemy escape routes. Army artillery is barge-mounted and accompanies the troop units. The Viet Cong have lost some 2,000 men killed or detained since June to the Mobile Riverine Forces.

Unique in the annals of warfare, this joint Army-Navy application of force is raising the cost of the war to the enemy in an area in which he has long enjoyed an advantage. The mobile Navy resources which now support one brigade will be increased during the coming year to provide a two-brigade capability.

This is but another means by which the United States Navy is contributing to the war in Vietnam. To the Mobile Riverine Force must be added the significant Seventh Fleet Air and Dea Dragon operations in the north; the Market Time activities which, for all practical purposes, have halted enemy infiltration along the 900 miles of South Vietnam coastline; and the Game Warden operations which are increasingly denying the enemy use of the inland waterways through police and customs enforcement roles. These naval activities are making significant contributions to the overall campaign to support the Republic of Vietnam in its struggle for freedom.

B. Political

As I have noted above, the issue of the validation of the Presidential elections has largely overshadowed all other political activity this week. At the root of the problem is the procedural requirement, established in the Presidential Elections Law, that the National Assembly shall validate the election, by a simple majority. Since 48 of the 55 Assembly members who were candidates for the Senate failed in their election attempt, they are in a depressed and bitter mood, and it is this group, egged on by defeated Presidential candidates Phan Khac Suu (Chairman of the National Assembly) and Truong Dinh Dzu, that poses the greatest threat to validation of the elections.

Although, as I noted in last week's letter, General Thieu has decided not to announce selection of a Prime Minister until after validation of the elections on October 2, and he is continuing to canvass available candidates for the post. Last week, for example, he contacted Tran Van Huong, one of the defeated civilian Presidential candidates, and for the third time offered him the post of Prime Minister, Huong, we understand, once again refused, but was pleased to have been approached on this matter. When I talked to General Thieu on September 26, he told me that the candidates for Prime Minister he is currently looking over with particular care are Nguyen Van Loc, a lawyer and General Ky's nominee for the post; Nguyen Huu Hanh, Commissioner General for Economy and Finance; Tran Van Do, Foreign Minister; Nguyen Luu Vien, currently Deputy Prime Minister; and, somewhat surprisingly, Nguyen Van Tuong, Special Commissioner for Administration. Thieu was at some pains to discuss the pressure he is under

to accept Nguyen Van Loc. He indicated that General Ky has told him that as a matter of personal pride and prestige he would very much like to have Loc named Prime Minister. Thieu indicated that the senior Generals have also urged him to take Ky's feelings in this matter into consideration.

Thieu recognizes that Ky has been affected by being placed in the No. 2 position and feels that giving into him on the Loc appointment might help to improve their relationship. Thieu said that he recognized that it is essential that he maintain good relations with Ky and that they must work together. I emphasized my full agreement with him on how essential it is that he and Ky have a good working relationship. I said that I thought this more important even than the question of who was Prime Minister. If he felt that the Loc appointment was necessary in order to achieve this relationship, then we would be sympathetic to his problem.

In the vital Revolutionary Development field, Ky told me September 26 that General Nguyen Duc Than will be an assistant to General Cao Van Vien at the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, responsible for retraining and deployment of the Regional and Popular Forces. Until a new Government is established and a Minister for Revolutionary Development is appointed, General Nguyen Bao Tri, Commissioner General for Information and Chieu Hoi, will temporarily fill in for Thang.

I have mentioned the detention of former Minister of Economic Affairs, Au Truong Thang on September 22, a curious and bizarre episode, though one which I know has caused you some problems in the U.S. In the background of this affair is Thanh's long-standing reputation as a leftist and possibly a Communist during his student days in France. In fact, Truong Dinh Dzu, who is certainly no friend of the Government of Vietnam, told an Embassy officer recently that he considered that Thanh was still a member of the French Communist Party. During recent interrogations of Ba Tra, an admitted member of the Saigon Communist organization arrested last May, Ba Tra is reliably reported to have stated that Thanh tried to recruit him into the Saigon Communist organization in 1965. General Loan, Director General of the National Police, accordingly decided to interrogate Thanh personally with regard to Ba Tra's statement. Loan went to Thanh's house the evening of September 21 with a small police escort, but Mrs. Thanh refused to let them in. Loan went off in search of reinforcements, and Mr. and Mrs. Thanh, evidently concerned at what might follow, called up a number of American, British, and Japanese correspondents, alleging that Thanh was about to be arrested. When Loan returned with some 35 - 40 police, the Thanh home was full of journalists.

Loan ordered them out, had a chat with Thanh, and asked him to come to his office the following day. The morning of September 22, Thanh was followed by police as he left home and was seized and handcuffed when he left his car at his own office. The police then took him to Loan's office by force in spite of his protest that that was where he was going anyway. Loan subsequently apologized publicly for the manner in which Thanh was arrested. Thanh was afterwards treated well, and was released the following morning. There are no charges pending against him.

While the manner in which Loan handled the matter was inept and showed little appreciation of the importance of public relations, the Government of Vietnam has a legitimate basis for questioning Thanh and most Vietnamese recognize this and wasted little sympathy for Thanh. Unfortunately, Thanh is clever and he has exploited the foreign press so effectively that the press has given him stature as a sort of martyr.

On September 21 the Government of Vietnam ordered suspension for one month of the vernacular Saigon Daily, Saigon Bao on charges of carrying an editorial of a nature "insulting to agencies of the Government." We have examined the translated text of the editorial in question and note that it is indeed scandalous and offensive. However, I pointed out to General Thieu September 22 that such action by the Government simply is not understood in the U.S., with our tradition of press freedom. General Thieu replied that he understood the problem and stated that the Government of Vietnam wanted to maintain a free press. However, he pointed out that the country is at war, and the press has to take this into account and act in a responsible manner. He felt (quite correctly) that since the election a portion of the Saigon press has acted in a highly irresponsible way, has been warned several times, but has continued efforts to create dissension and division between Government, military, and civilian elements of the population. This was not the end of press suspensions, for on September 26 General Thieu ordered suspension of the Saigon Daily Thoi Dai for carrying the false report that the Central Elections Committee had found irregularities in connection with 85 percent of the votes cast. Thieu's concern over the dangerous effect such a report could have on the Assembly's attitude on validation is understandable, but his way of handling it is no less regrettable.

We were considerably put out by the resignation of six officials of the International Voluntary Services group in Vietnam and by the intemperate and inaccurate letter they sent to you and simultaneously released to the press. Arthur Gardiner, former Director of our AID Mission here and now Director of International Voluntary Services, arrived in Saigon September 27 to look into the question in depth and to take whatever action is necessary. I was heartened

to receive a letter September 23 from Verday C. Ly, Acting Chief of International Voluntary Services since the resignation of Mr. Luce, the former Chief, in which several of the ranking officials of International Voluntary Services made clear they do not agree with the way the resignations were handled and regret the harm caused to the organization and the Vietnamese people. The International Voluntary Services leaders still on the scene here say their people as a whole want to continue their useful work, and they have asked us for our support. We are looking to Mr. Gardiner to make the decisions on this matter, but if he recommends that the organization continue to work here under responsible leaders, I am prepared to agree that they continue as before, for they have been doing much excellent work.

With so much interest focussed on the validation of the Presidential elections, it would be easy to lose sight of the steady development of positions among the Senators-elect who will make up the new Senate, probably due to be installed in the office the first week of October. It has been encouraging to observe the calm but systematic way they have been getting in touch with each other, looking into improving their political organization, developing their thinking on national problems, and seeking to assist their friends and proteges who are candidates for the Lower House in the elections of October 22. On the whole, this is a very good group of Senators, representing some real and new talent, and I think they will turn in a good performance.

Except for the heavy fighting at the Demilitarized Zone, there has not been extensive military activity during the past week. We were pleased to welcome the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment (the Queen's Cobras), 2200-strong, who arrived in South Vietnam on September 21. They will operate with the U.S. 9th Infantry Division, initially northeast of Saigon. It is excellent to have this tangible evidence of Thai contribution to the war effort here in the country.

C. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index rose slightly to 304 during the past week, compared to 301 last week. Retail prices in Saigon rose slightly, with pork, chicken, and shrimp accounting for most of the increase. The rise in prices of these protein foods was due to larger purchases in connection with the celebration of the mid-autumn festival on September 18. Rice prices were steady or decreased slightly. The Imported Commodity Index continued to decline, moving down to 217, compared to 221 last week. The declines are attributed to tightness of credit, plentiful stocks on hand, and low sales. Cement prices rose sharply because of a delay in new arrivals.

With the increase in rice prices this year and the unlikelihood of a repetition of last year's Mekong flood, there is reason to believe that rice production, particularly in the Delta, will be higher this crop year. Experienced observers partially confirm this by reporting good crop prospects in certain provinces. However, a closer examination reveals important negative factors. Manpower shortages have cut further into areas cultivated and lowered the quality of cultivation on land that is planted. The abnormally low Mekong River level and the lower than normal mid-summer rainfall in the Delta should have at least marginal effects in reducing production. Finally, the rice deficit in war-ravaged First Corps will probably grow next year, with more peasants abandoning their land and migrating to refugee camps.

D. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period rose to 357, compared to 189 during the same period last year. This is very near last week's total of 355. The year's total to date is 22,852.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending September 23, the enemy killed 52 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 227, and kidnapped 59. The dead included two Revolutionary Development workers, two Hamlet Chiefs, and one Village Agriculture Commissioner. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,527 civilians, wounded 5,077, and kidnapped 3,846.

29

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday, September 27, 1967
5:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Because of its importance and length, I thought you would wish to read Gen. Westmoreland's recommendations on the DMZ, without retyping.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By EG, NARA, Date 10-9-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

29a

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FM CJCS WASH DC
INFO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC
MR KATZENBACH STATE DEPT WASH DC
MR BUNDY STATE DEPT WASH DC
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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GEN JOHNSON ACTG CJCS WASHINGTON
INFO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JAG-830024

By cylics, NARA, Date 10-25

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 9056 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF THREE

REF: A. CJCS DTG BWTWRRZ SEP (TS)

B. CINCPAC DTG 252341Z SEP (TS)

1. I AM CONCERNED OVER THE SITUATION NEAR THE DMZ ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, THE CASUALTIES WHICH OUR FORCES HAVE BEEN TAKING ARE HIGH AND OUR ABILITY TO SUPPRESS ENEMY FIRES INTO OUR POSITIONS HAS NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE. SECONDLY, THE GRAVE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT THE DMZ SITUATION WILL BE VIEWED OUT OF PERSPECTIVE. IN THE LATTER REGARD, I RESIST A PELL-MELL APPROACH THAT COULD HAVE A DAVAGING IMPACT UPON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. DURING THE PERIOD 1-24 SEP 67, WE HAVE INCURRED 196 KIA AND 1917 WIA (834 EVAC) HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY ARTILLERY, ROCKET, AND MORTAR FIRE. THIS IS A HIGH PRICE TO PAY FOR HOLDING THE ENEMY ALONG THE DMZ FRONT. HOWEVER, BY COMPARISONBN IN 1966 DURING THE TWO MONTHS WHEN IT WAS NECESSARY TO DRIVE THE ENEMY OUT OF POSITIONS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, WE INCURRED 126 KIA AND BRIL WIA IN JULY AND 115 KIA AND BRRI WIA IN SEP. I POINT THIS OUT TO EMPHASIZE THAT OUR SERIOUS LOSSES ARE NOT SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER THIS MONTH, BUT THE FACT THAT THEY ARE BEING SUFFERED WHILE IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE HAS AN UNFORTUNATE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT.

BEN ALTHOUGH ALL OF THE CURRENT ARTILLERY FIRE IS BEING DELIVERED FROM POSITIONS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI RIVER, SOME OF THE ROCKETS AND ALL OF THE MORTARS ARE FROM POSITIONS SOUTH OF THE RIVER. ALSO, WE KNOW THAT THE ENEMY HAS SIGNIFICANT MANEUVER FORCES SOUTH OF THE RIVER. ON TWO OCCASIONS, SINCE AUTHORITY WAS OBTAINED TO MOVE INTO THE SOUTHERN DMZ, SWEEPS TO THE RIVER WERE MADE TO CLEAR THE AREA. BOTH OF THESE WERE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS BUT WITH HEAVY CASUALTIES BECAUSE OF THE EXPOSURE OF THE TROOPS TO FIRE FROM ENEMY POSITIONS NORTH OF THE RIVER, THAT COULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED, OR TAKEN BY GROUND ATTACK. OUR FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS THAT OUR POSTURE SOUTH OF THE DMZ IS DEFENSIVE, AND, AROUND CON THIEN, RELATIVELY STATIC. TO SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE WITHOUT GOING ALL OF THE WAY TO ELIMINATE POSITIONS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI WOULD INVITE HEAVY CASUALTIES ON A REPETITIVE BASIS. TO MAKE A MAJOR COMBINED ATTACK FROM THE SEA AND ACROSS THE DMZ TO ELIMINATE THE ENEMY POSITION IS UNDOUBTEDLY OUT OF THE QUESTION UNTIL MAY OR JUNE, BECAUSE OF WEATHER, EVEN IF POLITICAL OBSTACLES COULD BE OVERCOME. LIMITED OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF THE RAID TYPE FROM OUR CURRENT POSITIONS ACROSS THE DMZ AGAINST ARTILLERY LOCATIONS SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT AND, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD INVOLVE MANY DIFFICULTIES, I AM TASKING CG, III MAF AND CMDR, SEVENTH AF TO PREPARE PLANS FOR SUCH OPERATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT THE SITUATION REQUIRES IT, AND POLITICAL CLEARANCE IS GRANTED. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT ANY OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS NORTH OF CON THIEN WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONDUCT AND SUPPORT BECAUSE OF THE POOR WEATHER AND PROSPECT OF HEAVY RAIN DURING THE NEXT FOUR MONTHS.

PRESERVATION COPY

~~BRN~~ CONFRONTED WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION, IT IS MY JUDGMENT THAT WE SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE FORCES NORTH OF ROUTE 9 UNLESS WE SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE. FOR THIS REASON, I DIRECTED THE CURTAILMENT OF THE INSTALLATION OF DYE MARKER; HAVE PUT RESOURCES EARMARKED FOR THAT PROGRAM INTO THE IMMEDIATE HARDENING OF COMBAT BASES AND STRONG POINTS NORTH OFBN AND ALONG ROUTE 9; HAVE INITIATED THE EMERGENCY CONSTRUCTION OF AN AIRSTRIP AND LOGISTICAL BASE NEAR QUANG TRI CITY, OUT OF RANGE OF ARTILLERY FY FOM ACROSS THE BEN HAI; HAVE INDUCED THE JGS TO SHARE THE BURDEN OF CONSTRUCTING AND MANNING THE STRONG POINTS NORTH OF DONG HA IN RESPONSE TO WHICH TWO ADDITIONAL ARVN ABN BNS WERE MOVED TO QUANG TRI LAST WEEK MAKING A TOTAL OF FIVE OF THE EIGHT GENERAL RESERVE AOK BNS ASSIGNED TO I (CTZ); HAVE DIRECTED GEN CUSHMEN TO MOVE ADDITIONAL FORCES NORTH OF AI VAN PASS TO TAKE THE PRESSURE OFF OUR FORCES FROM THE REAR AND ALONG THE CRITICAL LOC; HAVE ACCELERATED THE IMPROVEMENT OF PORT CAPACITY NEAR HUE AS A FALL BACK FROM CUA VIET; AND DIRECTED GEN CUSHMAN TO CONSIDER THINNING OUT HIS FORCES IN THE FORWARD AREAS NEAR CON THIEN AND THE TRACE AS SOON AS MINIMUM DEFENSIVE INSTALLATIONS CAN BE CONSTRUCTED BEHIND THESE POSITIONS FROM WHICH SURVEILLANCE AND PATROL OF THE AREA CAN BE CONDUCTED. I WILL DISCUSS WITH GEN CUSHMAN TOMORROW THE BEST LINE ON WHICH TO ANCHOR HIS POSITION.

Corps
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SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION PURPOSES ONLY

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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MR KATZENBACH STATE DEPT WASH DC

MR BUNDY STATE DEPT WASH DC

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN JOHNSON ACTG CJCS WASHINGTON

INFO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

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~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 9056 EYES ONLY SECTION TWO OF THREE

5. TO ENABLE GEN CUSHMAN TO SHIFT FORCES NORTHBN I HAVE DIRECTED HIM TO HAVE THE AMERICAL DIVISION TAKE OVER ALL OF QUANG TIN, QUANG NGAI AND PART OF QUANG NAM PROVINCES. I HAVE DIRECTED GEN ROSSON TO BE PREPARED TO MOVE FORCES INTO QUANG NGAI TO INSURE THAT THE RECENT MAJOR GAINS IN THAT AREA ARE NOT LOST BY THE ORIENTATION OF III MAF TO THE NORTH, OR DIRECTLY INTO DANANG TO FREE A MARINE REGIMENT. I AM PLANNING TO PUT THE 198TH BRIGADE INTO QUANG NGAI IN OCTOBER AND, AT THAT TIME, WILL DETERMINE WHAT MISSION WILL BE ASSIGNED TO THE 1ST BRIGADE OF THE 101ST. I AM FULLY PREPARED TO SUPPORT A NORTHWARD DISPOSITION OF III MAE FORCES, IF REQUIRED. HOWEVER, SUCH MOVES MUST BE CAREFULLY EVALUATED TO INSURE WHAT IS NECESSARY TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION NEAR THE DMZ, AND LET SLIP OUR OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE MAJOR HEADWAY AGAINST ENEMY FORCES IN OTHER AREAS WHERE WEATHER IS FAVORABLE, ESPECIALLY DURING THE DECISIVELY IMPORTANT NEXT SIX MONTHS. THIS IS OF MAJOR CONCERN TO ME.

6. IN MY JUDGEMENT, OUR BEST POSTURE IN QUANG TRI IS TO ADOPT THE THINEST PRACTICABLE CONCENTRATION NORTH OF ROUTE 9, HOLD ROUTE 9 IN FORCE AND INFLICT MAXIMUM CASUALTIES ON THE ENEMY BY AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE ATTACKS.

7. CG, III MAF HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY TWO U. S. ARMY 175MM BATTALIONS, ONE 105MM BATTALION, AND ONE AAA BATTALION TO AUGMENT HIS ORGANIC FIRE POWER IN THE DMZ AREA. I CAN INCREASE THIS IF REQUIRED BUT DOUBT THE WISDOM OF DOING SO UNTIL OUR ABILITY TO ACQUIRE TARGETS HAS IMPROVED. THIS WEEK, I FURTHER AUGMENTED III MAF WITH TWO TRUCK COMPANIES AND AN ASSAULT HELICOPTER COMPANY TO IMPROVE THE TACTICAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF HIS FORCES IN THE DMZ AREA.

8. GEN MONYER WAS TASKED ON 6 SEPTEMBER TO GIVE FIRST PRIORITY AMONG ALL OF HIS MISSIONS, TO THE ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY POSITIONS NORTH OF THE BEN HAI. AS A RESULT, OPERATION NEUTRALIZE WAS INITIATED ON 11 SEPTEMBER. THE PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION IS TO LOCATE THE ENEMY ARTILLERY AND STORAGE AREAS NORTH OF THE DMZ AND TO ATTACK THEM WITH TACTICAL AIR AND B-52'S. III MAF, SEVENTH AF AND MACV INTELLIGENCE ASSETS WERE POOLED FOR AN INTENSIVE SEARCH, USING ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES INCLUDING HIGH AND LOW LEVEL PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE BY FAC AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT. LUCRATIVE TARGETS ARE PASSED TO TACC FOR IMMEDIATE STRIKE BY TACTICAL AIR AND AREAS OF CONCENTRATION ARE NOMINATED FOR B-52 STRIKES. SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER, 798 AIR FORCE, 405 MARINE AND 311 ARC LIGHT SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN THE

NEUTRALIZE AREA (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE MARINE SORTIES FLOWN IN AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ). WEATHER HAS BEEN A SERIOUS DETRIMENT TO THE OPERATION. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN DAYS OF UNWORKABLE WEATHER, SIX DAYS OF PARTIALLY WORKABLE WEATHER AND ONE DAY OF COMPLETELY WORKABLE WEATHER. ON DAYS OF POOR WEATHER, COMBAT SKY SPOT MISSIONS ARE FLOWN ON ALTERNATE TARGETS IN THE AREA. BDA HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY WEATHER BUT SEVEN OCCUPIED FIELD ARTILLERY POSITIONS HAVE BEEN REPORTED DESTROYED, ONE DAMAGED, EIGHT OCCUPIED AAA POSITIONS DESTROYED AND 93 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS. GEN NOMYER WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AVAILABLE UP TO TWO-HUNDRED AIR FORCE AND MARINE SORTIES DAILY FOR THIS ATTACK. DIVERTS FROM THE OTHER RP AREAS WILL INCREASE THE TOTAL. HOWEVER, A QUANTUM INCREASE IN TACTICAL SORTIES WITHOUT MORE PRECISE TARGETING IS NOT PRACTICAL AT PRESENT, AND THE SATURATION POINT HAS BEEN REACHED ON RADAR CONTROLLED STRIKES WHEN WEATHER PRECLUDES VISUAL CONTROL. I HAVE ASKED NOMYER TO CONSIDER THE FEASIBILITY ON MOVING ANOTHER WSQ77 TO THE AREA.

9. SINCE 1 SEPTEMBER APPROXIMATELY 90 PERCENT OR 626 B-52 SORTIES HAVE BEEN FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF THE DMZ POSITIONS (THIS INCLUDES THE 311 SORTIES FLOWN IN NEUTRALIZED). ALTHOUGH FACTUAL BDA IS LIMITED, THERE ARE INDICATIONS FROM COLLATERAL SOURCES THAT SOME OF THE STRIKES HAVE HIT ENEMY POSITIONS IN THE DMZ AREA, AND THE ASSUMPTION MUST BE MADE THAT HE HAS INCURRED HEAVY CASUALTIES. I INTEND TO CONTINUE TO PLACE TOP PRIORITY ON THIS AREA WITH ALL AVAILABLE SORTIES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I COULD EMPLOY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ANY SURGE CAPABILITY THAT SAC CAN MUSTER OF THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF ACHIEVING 1200 SORTIES PER MONTH, WHICH I REQUESTED IN APRIL. ALSO, THE INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF 2,000 POUND AND LARGER BOMBS SHOULD BE EVALUATED, AND RACKS INSTALLED IN B-52'S TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH BOMBS, IF CONSIDERED FEASIBLE.

NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION PURPOSES ONLY

319

~~TOP SECRET~~

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MR KATZENBACH STATE DEPT WASH DC

MR BUNDY STATE DEPT WASH DC

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN JOHNSON ACTG CJCS WASHINGTON

INFO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

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~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 9056 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF THREE

10. IN AUGUST, I REQUESTED THAT CINCPACFLT INCREASE THE AVAILABILITY OF 8" AND 5"54 SUPPORT OF I CTZ. I AM PREPARED TO EMPLOY ANY ADDITIONAL ASSETS THAT ARE MADE AVAILABLE AND WELCOME THE SUPPORT OF THE SEA DRAGON ATTACKS ON THE COASTAL POSITIONS IMMEDIATELY NORTH OF THE DMZ. THE CONTROL AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO THESE FIRESBN MENTIONED BY CINCPACFLT, WILL BE RESOLVED PROMPTLY.

11. A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE CONDUCT OF MAXIMUM AIR, ARTILLERY AND NAVAL GUNFIRE ATTACK ON THE ENEMY POSITIONS IS OUR INABILITY TO ACQUIRE POSITIVE TARGETS. WE ARE EMPLOYING ALL OF THE TECHNICAL MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO SUPPLEMENT VISUAL ACQUISITION WHICH HAS BEEN HAMPERED BY THE BAD WEATHER OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS. HOWEVER, NO EFFORT SHOULD BE SPARED ON THE R & D FRONT TO MOVE AS A MATTER OF HIGHEST PRIORITY IN THE AREA OF TARGET ACQUISITION ACROSS THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF SENSORS -- RADAR, IR, LASER, AND SONIC. I HAVE HAD DR. MCMILLAN WORKING ON THIS HERE AND IN WASHINGTON AND CANNOT OVERSTATE ITS IMPORTANCE. ON 7 AUG, I REQUESTED AN ARMY FLASH AND SOUND UNIT BUT TO DATE IT HAS NOT ARRIVED.

12. ON THE 22D OF SEP, 100 MK-36 WEAPONS WERE LAID IN THE BEN HAI RIVER IN RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST OF 2. AUG. NINE MINUTES AFTER THE LAST MK-36 WAS LAID, 34 DETONATIONS WERE OBSERVED BY AN O-2 FAC, WHO HAD CONTROLLED THE STRIKES. THE DETONATIONS OCCURRED IN THE CENTER PORTION OF THE TARGET AREA AND BEGAN APPROXIMATELY 32 MINUTES AFTER THE FIRST MK-36 HAD BEEN DROPPED. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT FURTHER CONTROLLED TESTS BE CONDUCTED IN CONUS TO DETERMINE THE OPTIMUM SPACING OF MK-36 BOMBS, AND TO FURTHER EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF SYMPATHETIC DETONATION. PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF SUCH TESTS, A MASSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF MK-36'S IS NOT CONSIDERED ADVISABLE BY LTG MOMYER.

13. NOT IMMEDIATELY RELATED TO THE DMZ POSTURE, BUT NONETHELESS HAVING AN INFLUENCE ON IT, IS THE MILITARY DESIRABILITY OF CLOSING HAIPHONG HARBOR. I BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE A SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE ENEMY'S ABILITY TO SUSTAIN HIS FORCES ON THE BEN HAI.

14. IN CONCLUSION, I AM AWARE OF, AND DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH, THE GRAVITY OF OUR LOSSES IN THE DMZ AREA. MOVES WITHIN MY AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THE SEVERAL PROBLEMS ARE UNDERWAY. ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

TO REMOVE THE SEVERE PROBLEMS AND SHORTAGE
CAN BE PROVIDED BY THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS BY HIGHER AUTHORITY:

- A. PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE SURGE IN B-52 SORTIES TO MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE RATE, WITH A GOAL OF 1200 STRIKES PER MONTH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- B. INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY OF EMPLOYING 2000 POUND AND LARGER BOMBS IN B-52'SBM
- C. REQUEST CSAF AND CNO CONDUCT EARLIEST TESTS TO DETERMINE OPTIMUM SPACING OF MK-36 WEAPONSBN AND MAXIMUM RESISTANCE TO CONCUSSION TO PRECLUDE SYMPATHETIC DETONATION. THERE AFTER, IF FEASIBLE, MAKE A LIBERAL ALLOCATION OF MK-36 WEAPONS FOR USE IN THE DMZ.
- D. AUGMENT NGF ASSETS IN DMZ AREA.
- E. PROVIDE EARLIEST DELIVERY OF FLASH AND SOUND UNITS.
- F. ACCELERATE TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE THE ARRIVAL OF PROGRAMMED TACTICAL UNITSBM
- G. APPROVE INCREASES IN RVNAF AS RECOMMENDED TO SEC DEF IN JULY.
- H. ACCELERATE THE ISSUE OF M-16'S TO ARVN UNITS AS RECOMMENDED.
- I. INTENSIFY R & D EFFORT IN FIELD OF TARGET ACQUISITION OF CONCEALED ARTILLERY PIECES.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE FOR TRANSMISSION PURPOSES ONLY

650

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

30
Pres file
Wednesday, September 27, 1967
5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge forwards
John Knight's two Viet Nam articles
which you may not have seen.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

3627 30a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

You expressed an interest in receiving any views about the Vietnamese elections which were expressed by any of the American observers.

Accordingly, I transmit herewith a letter from John S. Knight enclosing two articles which he wrote.

Respectfully yours,


H.C. Lodge
Henry Cabot Lodge

The President of the United States
The White House

Enclosures

306

JOHN S. KNIGHT
PRESIDENT AND EDITOR



AKRON BEACON JOURNAL

AKRON, OHIO 44309

TELEPHONE 253-1111

September 18, 1967

Dear Cabot:

On a recent journey to Vietnam you mentioned that you would like to see anything that we might write about our trip.

I have written two pieces and enclose them for your perusal and possible interest.

May I express my appreciation of the many courtesies extended to us during the trip.

Cordially,

John S. Knight

es

Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
275 Hale Street
Beverly, Massachusetts

Wednesday - 5:00 pm
September 27, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is the latest report (as of last night) on the flood relief operations in the Lower Rio Grande Valley.

- Army helicopters had:
 - flown 116 flight hours in rescue operations of Mexicans.
 - transported 1,628 Mexican flood victims and 52 medical evacuees.
 - airlifted 205,000 pounds of Mexican food to Mexican sites.
- Coast Guard helicopters transported 419 Mexican flood victims and 2,600 pounds of cargo.
- The Volunteer Border Relief has provided assistance to 500 families at Reynosa and 1,000 families at Matamoros.
- At Rio Grande City, 100 Mexican children are staying at the Immaculate Conception Convent, and another 5,000 Mexican refugees at school facilities and 2,000-3,000 in private homes.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--EYES ONLY~~

Wednesday, September 27, 1967
4:15 p.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of an issue which has within it:

- important Congressional implications; and
- possibly, as indicated on pages 10-11, significant political implications.

It now lies before Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara but I wanted you to know of it well in advance, among other reasons because men like Frank Stanton, Roy Larsen, etc., could well approach you directly.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-400
By 128, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~SECRET EYES ONLY~~

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

Monday, September 25, 1967
4:05 p.m.

32a

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty,
A Summary

The future of Radio Free Europe has been under consideration for several years. McGeorge Bundy convened a special study group in 1966 which consisted of Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Dr. William Griffith of MIT, Richard Salant of CBS, and the current Ambassador to Switzerland, John S. Hayes. This paper, among other tasks, reviewed the work of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and found that the value of these assets had not diminished and would continue to have a role in an era beyond the cold war. This opinion was unanimous.

The matter became more critical after the Katzenbach Committee was forced to reach some decisions regarding covert support to various U.S. voluntary educational, philanthropic and cultural endeavours. This committee and Secretary Rusk recommended that the 303 Committee examine this problem because of its unique complexities. Since that time, Messrs. Rostow, Nitze, Kohler, and Helms, as well as Marks and Schultze, have given considerable time to looking at this problem from all angles.

Some nine possible solutions were examined; these included the status quo, conversion from non-profit to profit-making corporations, reincorporation abroad, relocation abroad, support by a public private mechanism, support from a public private mechanism specifically designed to foster private international broadcasting and other communications, overt funding by USIA (or another agency of the Executive Branch), transfer to VOA/USIA, and termination. All were eliminated in 303 discussions except for the three possibilities:

- a. continued financing by CIA;
- b. financing through a public private mechanism to be established by Congress;
- c. transfer to USIA.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-310 & NLJ 93-384
By cm, NARA, Date 3-18-02

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It was these three approaches that were tackled on a priority basis by William Trueheart of State and an inter-agency group. The conclusion reached in this solid study was that there were really but two realistic choices: either continuation as now constituted or termination. Some basic conclusions from this report are quoted:

"A special Radio Study Group (RSG), with representatives from State (Chairman), White House, Bureau of the Budget, Defense, USIA, and CIA, was directed to conduct this further study and make recommendations.

"The RSG has concluded that RFE operations should be continued on substantially the present scale. RFE broadcasts make and can continue to make a significant contribution to U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe in promoting and encouraging internal pressures for reform and political liberalization (de-Stalinization) and for the attenuation of Soviet influence and control. Further, we believe that the broadcasts are not incompatible with a policy of bridge-building; indeed, meaningful improvement in East-West relations is probably dependent in the long run on the kind of internal changes which RFE seeks to foster. The unique element of RFE broadcasts--detailed reporting and comment on internal developments--could not be duplicated by VOA without substantial changes in VOA operating principles and the risk of unacceptable diplomatic consequences. Nor do we believe that VOA could realistically be expected, partly but not wholly for budgetary reasons, to maintain the massive news-gathering and research operations on which effective programming of the RFE sort depends.

"The case for continuing RL is less clear because it is impossible to obtain relatively reliable data, such as we have for RFE, on the size and make-up of the RL audience. We do know that the massive Soviet jamming operation makes listening difficult at best. As against this, the RL target is incomparably more important than that of RFE, audience access to foreign information other than by radio is very much less, and developments in the Soviet Union could make retention of RL's capability of substantial importance. The Soviet jamming effort (at least 160 jamming centers) itself attests to the effectiveness, at least potentially, of the broadcasts and argues against

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according the windfall which termination would represent. On balance, we believe that RL operations should also be continued on substantially the present scale.

"Both RFE and RL represent important U.S. assets, in terms of rare talent, specialized organization and base facilities, which it has taken over 15 years and some \$350 million to develop. Once dispersed, they could be recreated only with immense difficulty, if at all. We believe that this in itself is a powerful argument for continuing the operations for the time being.

"On the other hand, RFE and RL should not be regarded as permanent enterprises. The situation in the target countries may over time so develop as to make the broadcasts superfluous.

"If the radios are to be continued, we see no satisfactory alternative to continued CIA financing. Our judgment and that of those we have consulted--including some who have earlier advocated other solutions--is that normal Congressional appropriation procedures would almost certainly result in a fairly rapid phase-out of the operations, whether the radios were being funded through a public-private mechanism or as a line item in the USIA budget. In the process, appropriations for VOA might suffer as well. Even if this were not so, the extensive and annual public debate, in which it would be necessary inter alia to explain and defend the mission of RFE/RL as distinct from VOA, would directly jeopardize the position of the radios in certain host countries and could lead to serious diplomatic complications with the target countries. The public appropriation procedure, in short, would firmly fix the image of the radios as official instruments of the U.S. Government and, in our view, this image would not be significantly blurred by the device of the public-private mechanism, at least in foreign eyes.

"It will not be feasible to deny government support of the radios, and we propose that such support (without identifying CIA explicitly as the source) be officially acknowledged. There would be certain advantages, e.g., in handling Communist protests over the broadcasts, if open acknowledgement could be avoided. We believe, however, that to take a "no comment" stance in response to queries about government support would very likely undermine the credibility of the Katzenbach Report

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as a whole. On the other hand, official acknowledgement can be accompanied by an unambiguous assurance that RFE/RL are the only activities covered by the statement of policy in the Katzenbach Report which will continue to be subsidized in substantially the same way after December 31, 1967. There is the subsidiary advantage that future government support being acknowledged, i.e., not covert, an exception to the Katzenbach policy is not involved." Mr. Halms, however, is on record as follows: "To contend that, since government support is being openly acknowledged, no exception to the Katzenbach policy is involved, would in my opinion be construed as an evasion of the issue. It would invite questions as to source and specific amounts. The failure to answer would provoke editorial criticism and a continuing attempt to get at the whole truth...I believe our best course is to face the situation directly by making an exception under the terms of the Katzenbach report, and by admitting that it has in fact been made." Needless to say, the solution recommended in the report (if successful) would make life happier for the State Department and Mr. Katzenbach.

"We believe that there is no reason to expect that the press will seek to exploit the acknowledgement in a major way. Government support for these operations is not "news". Moreover, neither operation has come in for serious press criticism in the past, except for charges of deception in connection with the mass-media solicitation of individual contributions by RFE. (We concur in previous recommendations that such solicitation be discontinued but we also agree that fund-raising within the business community should be continued, in part to substantiate the private nature of the organization.)

"Protests from target countries will be somewhat more difficult to handle, once government support is acknowledged. However, it is believed that the United States can continue to take the position in diplomatic exchanges that RFE and RL are private operations, pointing out that many private organizations receive government financial support without thereby becoming instruments of the government. Host countries should be able to use the same line in response to target country protests or press criticism. Nevertheless, if government support is acknowledged, there will be added importance in insuring that any needlessly provocative themes are avoided.

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"Acknowledgement of U.S. Government support is not expected to make any substantial difference in RFE and RL credibility with their audiences. Most listeners have probably assumed such support all along and if anything acceptance of the radios may have been enhanced thereby:

"Continued CIA financing is of course dependent on approval by the Senate and House "watch-dog" committees. They have not been consulted and we have no basis for estimating their likely reaction.

"Should continued CIA financing be ruled out, then we believe the operations should be terminated. The problems associated with normal appropriation procedures, taken with our estimate of the practical life expectancy of the operations, convince us that the game would not be worth the candle.

"In the event of termination of either radio, every effort should be made to retain technical facilities, frequencies and personnel for the VOA. As the report of the technical sub group indicates, certain of the technical installations and frequencies would be valuable to VOA in improving its service and in providing a backstop in the event of loss of facilities elsewhere. Important savings might also be made in future construction costs. These benefits would, of course, be contingent on satisfactory arrangements with the host countries for VOA use of the facilities.

EO 12958 3.4(h)(6)>25Yr
(C)

 We believe also that the German Government, for the reasons mentioned earlier, would be reluctant to agree to additional USIA facilities on German soil. As regards personnel, any major use of RFE/RL personnel would probably be contingent on a VOA decision to expand its programs to the target areas as well as to change its broadcast policies so as to permit somewhat more freedom in dealing with internal developments. This raises much broader problems affecting the world-wide operations of VOA which are beyond the scope of this study.

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"We have considered whether it would be possible to obtain a quid pro quo for the termination of RFE and RL. While the target countries would undoubtedly regard cessation of the broadcasts as a concession, we see no way of using them as direct bargaining counters in present circumstances. On the other hand, the kind of broad negotiations directed at detente, in which the question of terminating the broadcasts might indirectly play an important role, are not in the offing.

"Finally, we recommend that the question of the future of RFE and RL be reviewed periodically, perhaps annually. Such reviews should take into account, as the present study has done, (a) the continuing need for the radios, (b) the outlook for retention of base facilities, and (c) the feasibility of transferring technical facilities and staff to VOA and/or of obtaining compensating concessions from the Communist countries in the event of termination."

The Bureau of the Budget dissented from this report on the grounds that the following considerations were not adequately assessed:

- a. The alternative of an enriched VOA should be more adequately developed...
- b. The recommendations of the committee should be assessed in the light of (1) implicit disclosure of CIA funding; (2) attendant political repercussions at home and abroad; and (3) probable congressional reactions to funding acknowledged activities in the CIA budget.
- c. The case for continuing Radio Liberty under acknowledged U.S. Government financing is even less convincing than the RFE case and should be decided separately.

The Department answered this dissent, saying that even if the concept of an enriched VOA was not "developed", it was thoroughly considered and the program review groups for the following areas had reported as follows:

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"The Polish Program Review Group reported as follows:

'Within the present charter of VOA it could not duplicate the type of reporting on internal policy affairs broadcast by RFE.'

"The Czechoslovak PRG reported:

'We do not see how the official U.S. Government radio station can ever take over some of the specific objectives of RFE--unless we were at war with the country being broadcast to....The U.S. objective, like RFE's, is awakening and creating political consciousness among the citizens of Czechoslovakia. As it stands now, it does not appear that VOA could effectively absorb RFE.'

"The Hungarian PRG reported:

'Department of State and USIA guidances, as well as the USIA mission document and the VOA charter would have to be specifically amended and changed to permit VOA direct approach to Hungarian internal affairs...We do not believe that such an overall policy change is either advisable or desirable.'

"The Rumanian PRG reported:

'The key difference--and the principal RFE function which VOA cannot and should not undertake--is RFE's open criticism of the domestic situation in Romania and suggestions for improvement.'

"The Radio Liberty PRG reported:

'Theoretically, it would not be impossible for VOA to duplicate most of the objectives and themes of RL, using the same facilities and personnel...The U.S. would be giving up a current asset--and one with considerable potential value for years to come--without receiving a quid pro quo from the Soviet government.'

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"The second way in which the Study Group addressed the possibility of an 'enriched country-oriented VOA' was through inquiries to our missions in target countries. In a relevant comment from Embassy Moscow, Ambassador Thompson concluded that status quo should be maintained for the time being and that 'public disclosure (of U.S. Government support) would be unfortunate but believe risk must be taken.'

"The third approach to the 'enriched VOA' alternative was technical...The subgroup report brings out that 'the entire shortwave system of the VOA is being used at maximum capacity for broadcasting to the European area at the present time during reasonable listening hours.' Hence additional broadcasting during such hours would require additional transmitters.

"A fourth consideration is that enrichment of VOA programs would also require VOA to absorb at least some substantial part of the RFE/RL news-gathering, research, and program personnel and facilities. Embassy Bonn believes that 'if the RFE/RL executive and professional staffs became U.S. Government employees, the FRG would certainly view the status of the organizations as having basically changed.'

"More basic than any of the foregoing is the question whether VOA world-wide broadcasting policies, evolved over the years, should be changed--quite apart from the practicality of doing so. The Study Group thought this question went well beyond its mandate.

"Apart from the question of the 'enriched, country-oriented VOA', the BOB dissent boils down to a questioning of the majority view on the public reaction to acknowledging U.S. Government support and Congressional reaction to continued CIA funding. The former is a matter of judgment; the latter can only be assessed by consultation with the Congress--which the Study Group assumed would be the first order of business if the basic recommendation is approved."

However, Budget Director Schultze has expressed serious doubts, both orally at the 303 Committee meeting on 20 September 1967 and later on paper, about the proposal to acknowledge government support and continue CIA financing of both RFE and RL, with or without a public exception to the policy developed by the Katzenbach Committee. He believes the principal disadvantages of this course of action are:

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- The CIA funding will be obvious; it is the only source of covert funding for this type of activity.

- Continued CIA funding of an acknowledged activity will create serious problems in Congress:

-- Congress has already eliminated all funding for RFE and RL after December 31, 1967, except termination costs.

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(C)

-- Russell and Mahon are strongly opposed to CIA funding of activities that are not wholly covert. [REDACTED]

-- We should be very careful not to start the practice of having CIA finance activities simply because Congress won't provide funds otherwise.

- Public acknowledgement of continued covert U.S. Government financing will cast doubt on the credibility of the whole Katzenbach policy.

- Though there has been considerable speculation about CIA funding, the acknowledgement of support would be given a big play in the press and will provide ammunition to attack the Administration.

There are two alternatives to the proposed course of action which would avoid the dangers cited above and keep open our options on Radio Free Europe. The options are:

1. Terminate Radio Liberty and, before December 31, prefund RFE for an 18-21 month period. Mr. Schultze believes the case for RL is weak and termination would simplify the problem. Pre-funding RFE would require the approval of Russell and Mahon, but they are more likely to agree to this one-shot action than to continued CIA funding. No exception to the Katzenbach policy would be required. We would have time to develop a plan either to provide alternative means of overt support or to fold the valuable RFE activities into USIA in connection with the 1970 budget.

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EYES ONLY

2. Terminate RL and seek an open appropriation to USIA to support RFE. The main disadvantages of this lie in the risk of congressional turndown, the inevitable congressional comparisons between VOA and RFE and the effect of open support on the target countries and the countries where the transmitters are located.

The 303 Committee, in discussing these opinions on 20 September 1967, recommended that Secretaries Rusk's and McNamara's views be sought and the matter brought to your attention.

As I see it, this is basically a political decision with some far-ranging repercussions regardless of the way the issue is decided. We have built up a \$350,000,000 asset; it has been and is a useful instrument; by terminating, we will indeed lose something. By continuing as is, with CIA funding, certain credibility risks exist.

As we see it, the risks of termination are as follows:

- a. We would be surrendering without any quid pro quo a proven instrument for affecting the rate of change in Soviet and Eastern European societies.
- b. We would, in other words, be making a unilateral concession to the other side.
- c. There could be a Western European reaction in which they could construe the termination of RFE/RL as an acceptance of Communist domination of Eastern Europe after 17 years of opposition.
- d. Within the United States, certain blocs within both Democratic and Republican parties would consider the termination as outright appeasement. Certain ethnic minority groups of Eastern European origin with powerful regional strength in Pittsburgh, Chicago and Detroit, etc., and a political voice through such congressmen as Pucinski and Zablocki could be both vociferous and intemperate.
- e. There is more than a possibility that Richard Nixon or another Republican candidate, in casting about for issues, could go flat-out against bridge-building. The liquidation of RFE/RL could provide some gunpowder for such an attack.

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f. Last but not least, a decision to liquidate might well be taken quite personally by such individuals as Michael Haider of Standard Oil, Crawford Greenewalt, Frank Stanton, Roy Larsen, and Roger Blough. These men have had long association with this effort and, we have reason to believe, feel strongly about it.

Continuation as recommended with continued CIA financing entails the following hazards:

a. If the State Department scenario is followed in which the United States government admits covert funding, it is definitely open to the charge: How can you call this an open subsidy if you won't reveal how much and from where? Both the press and Congress may find this unpalatable.


b. If it is claimed by the government that, yes, this is an exception to the Katzenbach ruling, the press could lean heavily on this and the only truthful answer is that no other solution has been found.

c. Any large-scale press play--something very difficult to forecast--may directly affect the present satisfactory attitudes of the Portuguese, Spanish and Germans, who control as host governments the leasing and transmitting site facilities. An open disclosure by itself could adversely affect the attitudes of these governments.

We have desisted from initial feelers among members of Congress because we felt this issue was sufficiently subtle so that you would prefer to design the strategy and name the strategists yourself.

Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have been briefed on this problem by Mr. Kohler and Mr. Nitze and are presumed ready to discuss the matter with you.

A decision is needed sooner rather than later because of the size of the enterprises, the interested parties, the money involved, and the deadline of December 31, 1967.


Peter Jessup
Executive Secretary
303 Committee

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EYES ONLY

33

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, September 27, 1967
1:25 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

As this file indicates, Bob Komer has run somewhat afoul of Congressman Moss.

Bill Leonhart raises some questions in para. 4.

Without a professional feel for the Congress, my instinct is for the White House to keep out of it and let the storm in a teacup die down.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 49, NARA, Date 10-9-91

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

1. Walt -- the attached correspondence reflects an unfortunate misunderstanding between Congressman John Moss and Bob Komer. We received it today.
2. By way of background: Bob's cable on Moss Committee criticisms (Saigon 4420) mentioned a "friendly letter" he had sent Moss. We asked for the text and Bob subsequently sent copies to Washington. It now seems there was also a letter from Bob to Ogden Reid (apparently sent on an old-boy basis but which we probably couldn't have done much about had we known).
3. Reid let Bob down and made his letter available to Moss on September 18. Moss may have over-reacted to his letter from Komer but it is the note to Reid which seems to have set him off. He still has a report on the pacification program scheduled for release in about three weeks.
4. Moss has also sent copies of the correspondence to Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Bunker. I would like to leave to your judgment whether the President would want to know about this. If so, would he prefer to leave the business of mollifying Moss to Bunker and Komer or to have an attempt at feather-soothing done from this end? In the latter case, should Rusk lead (Bill Macomber?) or regular White House liaison (Barefoot Sanders?), or this office?

Bill
William Leonhart

Attachment:

Exchange of letters between
Congressman Moss and RWK.

CONFIDENTIAL

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
DOCUMENT, EXEMPTED FROM E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.6 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 10, 1993.

BY *RG* ON *10-28-91*

JOHN E. MOSS, CALIF., CHA.
PORTER HARDY, JR., VA.
JOHN S. MONAGAN, CONN.
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, MASS.

NINETIETH CONGRESS
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

OGDEN R. REID, N.Y.
DONALD RUMSFELD, ILL.
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.

CAPITOL S-3741

336

FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B371-B
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 20, 1967

9/25

Mr. William L. Leonhart
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Leonhart:

Enclosed are copies of correspondence exchanged
with Ambassador Robert W. Komer on pacification
programs in South Vietnam. I thought these letters
might be of some interest to you.

Sincerely,



JOHN E. MOSS
Chairman

JEM:paj

Encls.

JOHN E. MOSS, CALIF., CHAIRMAN
PORTER HARDY, JR., VA.
JOHN S. MONAGAN, CONN.
TORBERT H. MACDONALD, MASS.

NINETIETH CONGRESS

OGDEN R. REID, N.Y.
DONALD RUMSFELD, ILL.
ROBERT DOLE, KANS.

CAPITOL 5-3741

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B371-B
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 21, 1967

Ambassador Robert W. Komer
Embassy of the United States of America
Saigon, Vietnam

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Your letter to me dated August 29, 1967 on the propriety of views I expressed to Secretary of State Dean Rusk relating to the pacification program in South Vietnam was offensive. Furthermore, your note to Congressman Ogden Reid, ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, Committee on Government Operations, was insulting. Both of these communications reveal a lack of understanding of the role of a Congressional investigative committee.

The statement in your letter that, "It is only fair to say that you and the staff did not express vigorous reservations to us out here during your stay," is not accurate. I take strong and vigorous exception to that statement, Mr. Ambassador, since it is simply not true. During the period of my stay in Vietnam my colleague, Congressman Jeffery Cohelan, and I spent most of our time with you and other senior and operating officials of the mission discussing the problems relating to pacification. This was done not only in Saigon but in Bien Hoa and in Nha Trang. Additionally, senior pacification representatives met with us and selected staff members in Saigon for a detailed discussion of problems in the pacification area. We also met at length with General Creighton Abrams and Mr. Wade Latham. You probably do not realize that while Congressman Cohelan and I were thus engaged, other members of my staff were looking into other matters that engaged the interest not only of Congressman Reid but of other members of my subcommittee for over a year and a half. The staff of the subcommittee has therefore acquired what I consider a substantial expertise in these matters.

Mr. Ambassador, throughout all my meetings I expressed my strong objections to the recent changes as well as my grave concern for the lack of meaningful progress in this area. Though you cite the fact of elections in 1037 villages and 4616 hamlets as indication of progress, may I remind you there are over 2500 villages and 12,500 hamlets in South Vietnam.

I have consistently questioned the creation of the CORDS organization. Everyone we talked with reassured us on the fact that the OCO organization was making progress and expressed doubt as to why it had to be changed.

I have stated my views in unequivocal terms that U. S. representatives and officials in Vietnam should take a firmer stand in order to convince the Government of Vietnam that they must vigorously press for necessary social and economic reforms and that the cooperation of that government is essential if the confidence of the people of the United States in U. S. involvement in Vietnam is to be retained.

I am not charging a total lack of progress in pacification. Your letter notes the number of cadre teams currently in the field and that there is a favorable trend. If I am hesitant to accept this statement as being factually accurate, it is understandable since the program through the years has been constantly changed and new and glowing promises predicted for its success. The progress I look for should be on a more broadly based record than can be presently substantiated.

I appreciate your offer to keep the committee informed and to satisfy any doubts which may have arisen as a result of our most recent trip to Vietnam. I can only assure you that this subcommittee will continue to maintain a very thorough surveillance of programs and operations in Vietnam.

Sincerely,

JOHN E. MOSS
Chairman

JEM:paJ



EMBASSY
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

August 29, 1967

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RECEIVED
SEP 6 1967
JOHN E. MOSS

Dear Congressman Moss:

I was quite non-plussed to see from your recent letter to Secretary Rusk that the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee is "deeply concerned about the lack of meaningful progress and reform in the lagging and floundering pacification program." Since the subcommittee and staff were able to undertake only a very limited investigation of pacification because of their many other inquiries during their recent brief visit to Vietnam, I hope that before drawing any firm conclusions you will allow us out here to explain in more detail what we and the GVN are trying to accomplish. Indeed, we would welcome another visit by the subcommittee or staff for the purpose.

It is only fair to say that you and the staff did not express any such vigorous reservations about pacification to us out here during your stay. Instead you showed concern over possible "militarization" and "Americanization" of the pacification program. I had hoped that we had reassured you adequately on both scores. We have no intention of attempting to take over the GVN's pacification program, which we regard as their business. We can only support and advise. Moreover, after four months' experience with the new U.S. civil/military team, I can assure you that civilians remain in the key positions of responsibility under the U.S. military commands for all pacification support. For example, about half the Senior Provincial Advisor positions are filled by civilians—even though the bulk of their staffs are military. So are all of the key deputy slots at the corps level. I personally manage the entire pacification advisory program as General Westmoreland's deputy, and the Saigon staff responsible for pacification is headed by another civilian, Wade Latham. It includes many more civilians than military. We are in no danger of being submerged or militarized. You can depend on it.

As you know, progress in pacification depends critically on adequate security in the countryside, which is now being provided in greater measure because of growing military success. One major 1967 breakthrough is that a high and increasing proportion of the Vietnamese armed forces, including 55 regular army battalions, is now directly involved in providing all-important security for the pacifiers. We also now have some 450 59-man RD teams and 109 Montagnard teams, a substantial improvement over 1966. Our new Hamlet Evaluation System indicates a continuing favorable trend in pacification and in the population coming under government control. During 1967


2.

to date, local officials were elected in 1,037 villages and 4,616 hamlets in the countryside.

For these and many other reasons Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, and I are all increasingly pleased with the slowly growing momentum in pacification. While it still has many flaws, the GVN's 1967 program is far superior and achieving far greater results than it did in 1966, when it really first got underway. I am unaware of a single category in which there has been overall regression, although progress is still slower than we would like, and there are setbacks as well as successes. We are confident that the GVN with our help will do still better in 1968.

Hence I urge, as one who has always sought to be helpful to the committee, that you allow us an opportunity to satisfy any subcommittee doubts before issuing your report. We are eager to be of service, and would be delighted to have you spend more time with us.

Sincerely,



R. W. Komer
Ambassador

cc: Congressman Ogden Reid, Jr.

Hon. John E. Moss
The House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.



FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY FOR COMUS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND
VIETNAM

RECEIVED

SEP 18 1967

JOHN E. MOSS

to. Congressman Reid

It is really quite hard on us out here who are trying to do a job which needs doing to get whacked about "lagging and floundering." You didn't come along on the last trip, but I can assure you that in their all too brief time in Vietnam the Chairman and staff had mighty little time available to spend on pacification, and heard little to warrant such a claim. What happened?

Warmly,

R. W. Komer

Attach.

DATE: August 29, 1967

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, September 27, 1967
1:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith our Hal Saunders makes
an interesting analysis of Arab minds as
revealed by the transcript of the
Khartoum conference.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By ij, NARA, Date 4-5-95

WWRostow:rlh

cc: Mr Goldstein

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

September 26, 1967

THE ARABS AT KHARTOUM

The objective they defined. They proved themselves to be looking for a limited deal to get the Israelis out of occupied territory. They understand our position correctly--we want an overall peace settlement and an end to the Palestine problem once and for all--but they could not agree to go that far. Nasser called our position "not a political solution" but "political surrender." They talked of a "political solution" as the terms of withdrawal--not as the terms of peace. They rejected flatly Shugairi's opposition to a limited settlement--and by inference, ours.

Their appraisal of the situation: How realistic?

--Military. There was general candor about Arab inability to win back occupied lands by force, at least for the next year or two. Nasser frankly admitted he had underestimated the Israeli air force--and by implication backed away from the charge that US aircraft participated in Israel's attack. They viewed military rebuilding only as the backdrop for political action. They honestly felt that neither pride nor negotiating tactics would permit them to face Israel powerless.

--Economic. Nasser said Hussein could only hold out another 4 months and he, another 6 before they'd have to accept any US or Israeli terms to get the West Bank back and the Canal open.

--Soviet help was not mentioned. Obviously the Arabs are not expecting a full-scale Soviet bail-out.

--Israeli policy. They recognize that time is running against them on the West Bank. They admit that the longer Israel keeps it, the less likely they are ever to get it back.

--Their leverage. They still figure the Canal is their ace. They quickly agreed that shipping oil is more important to them as a means of keeping them afloat than as leverage.

Elements of unrealism in their appraisal

--Nasser still sees the US as behind all ills that have befallen him and believes that the US can deliver the West Bank. Or if not the US, at least some combination of the great powers in the UN. No one but Hussein even hinted that this might not work and that the Arabs had to get down to making the deal themselves.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

--While recognizing Israel's capacity to sit tight, they said not a word about terms Israel might accept. They still don't appear to have accepted the fact that Israel is something they have to deal with, even though they don't have to recognize it.

Individual viewpoints of the leading participants

President Nasser emerges as a man who really doesn't care about the Palestine issue per se, except as it affects his posture as an Arab leader. He shows no passion for destroying Israel or regaining all of Palestine, as some of the others do. He is under no pressure to get the Sinai back, and he appears not even too worried about the Canal as long as others make up his lost revenues.

This squares with the facts that (a) he so long avoided a confrontation over Israel and (b) he got into this showdown only when he began getting reports that he'd forfeit his claim to Arab leadership if he stood by a third time (first, Samua; second, 7 April Israeli-Syrian air battle) without helping an Arab country threatened by Israel.

The main enemy for him is not Israel but the US. His point of departure in describing the crisis was the US effort to circumscribe the UAR's power, beginning a couple of years ago. Now he sees surrender to the US--more than to Israel--as the main issue. Conversely, he hardly mentions the USSR.

This view of the world reveals how little he has progressed beyond the anti-colonialism of his own revolutionary experience. He has been a little smarter than some other members of the revolutionary generation, but he seems incapable of grasping the vision of development and regional progress that we're holding out. He can't see that as anything but surrender to the US. At this point, though other Arabs still look to him as top man, he is an obstacle to Egyptian progress.

Nasser was on the ropes. The real testimony to this was not just his economic and military appraisals--which were bleak enough--but his collaboration with Faisal. It was a fairly obvious deal for Nasser to back resumed oil shipments to the US and UK in return for economic aid. But agreeing to withdraw from Yemen must have been a bitter price to pay for aid. On top of that, Faisal and the other rich Arabs even cut the amount he said he needed.

* * *

King Hussein emerges as a voice of reason without the weight to persuade others to act on his convictions. His inability to make much of a dent reveals the sense in which Arab moderation-- in the Arab-Israeli context--was defeated at Khartoum.

The themes he tried were quite realistic: (1) Let's not delude ourselves about united military action when we can't count on the Syrians. (2) The Arabs have isolated themselves from world opinion; the objective of destroying Israel just doesn't sell outside the Arab world. (3) The Arabs can go back to the old policies or try a new start with Israel, including such arrangements as Jordanian access to the Mediterranean. He voted for a new start, "I believe that withdrawal of Israeli forces must be a part of a general, honorable and just solution. It should not be limited to the events after June 5th." But each time he suggested one of these ideas he pointedly deferred to the group's judgment and refused to fight to the end for any of them.

This may have been as far as he could go, and it may have been tactics. But it may also suggest that he's unwilling to go it alone with Israel when the chips are down. It's interesting that he urged general Arab action leading to a political solution as preferable to unilateral action, which Nasser urged on him. "I feel that if we act unilaterally we will get nowhere," he said. Even at that, his delegation beat down Shuqairi's recommendation specifically to prohibit unilateral action. So while Hussein appeared to prefer general action, he didn't want to be tied down. He obviously preferred not to be out on a limb by himself--or to be pushed out in front to see what he could get--but he wanted a free hand just in case.

* * *

King Faisal comes out as the man of few words who held the upper hand and drove a hard bargain where his interests were at stake. In contrast to Nasser's verbosity, Faisal knocked Syria and Sudan out of the running for bail-out aid in two curt sentences. He obviously got what he wanted out of the conference, but appears the live-and-let-live type. He and Nasser appear to have made a deal even down to pre-arranging their presentations at the conference (Yemen's withdrawal, ending propaganda and resumption of oil pumping in return for aid), for one part of the conference appears to be a neat bit of staging with Nasser and Faisal each speaking the other's lines.

* * *

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- 4 -

Prime Minister Mahgoub of Sudan, partly as executive chairman of the conference but partly perhaps to bolster his own prestige, emerged as the main proponent of Arab harmony. Apart from apparently sponsoring the Nasser-Faisal deal, within the conference room on several occasions he cooled the argument, and at one point, even brought Nasser back into line.

He was one of the few to address our position directly. He was not as radical as his president, al-Azhari, who was one of the few besides Shuqairi to speak for the destruction of Israel. But he made clear his view on the limits of the Arab position: "As for the end of the state of belligerency, this means that we in fact accept the existence of Israel and its right to use the canal. These are things which are unacceptable as the price of withdrawal and if you all accept this, I personally cannot."

* * *

President Helou of Lebanon said little but joined Hussein slyly in fighting a delaying action on reviving the United Arab Command, mainly to isolate Syria. He also helped to nail down the decision that Syria should not receive special aid and to keep the more radical recommendations of the Arab economic ministers at Baghdad from being considered seriously at the summit.

* * *

President Aref of Iraq emerged as a rambler with almost nothing of substance to contribute.

* * *

Chairman Shuqairi of the Palestine Liberation Organization was heard at length but not listened to. The heads of state vigorously rejected his position that the Arabs should try to negotiate settlement of the whole Palestine question. They made clear their limited objective of making a deal for Israeli withdrawal. Ironically, Shuqairi lumped himself with the US as one of the parties shooting for an overall settlement, but he was shouted down.

W.A.
Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, September 27, 1967 -- 8:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres files

You asked me to get validation from the intelligence community of population control data in South Viet Nam.

The attached memorandum and chart represent an unforced consensus representing: CIA, State, and Defense.

As compared with data with which you are familiar, they chose not to allocate the contested population to either side. The contested proportion of the population has dropped from 40% at the end of 1964 to 20% now.

If we allocated it to both sides, the over-all figures would be somewhat more optimistic than the data I originally gave you; but I recommend that, at this time, you use this script and this chart *(after checking in Saigon)*

Clark Clifford (whom I brought into the problem) and I agree that by bringing the intelligence community along -- and this is their product -- we minimize the likelihood of leaks, complaints, allegations of White House pressure, etc.

There are three steps ahead:

- check this much in Saigon;
- work up a fuller package for release in Saigon and backup briefing here (under way);
- get the whole intelligence community to work out a package of other charts on the war, which you -- and all others -- can use, here and in Saigon (under way but slower).

In short, I believe we are on our way to getting the whole town to work together on this problem, in which you and I (and Art McCafferty) have been a bit lonely.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

You and I share a problem.

We have got to find a better way of explaining to the American people how the Viet Nam war is going.

This is a difficult thing to do. It is difficult primarily because there is no front line in a guerrilla war by which the public can gauge shifts in the fortunes of war. We must use more sophisticated indicators, and each of these tell only a part of the story, and not always very well even then.

I am personally convinced from all of the people I talk to and the facts and evidence at my disposal that we have made substantial progress in the last two years. By no means can we afford to be complacent, because there is still a long road ahead, but all of the information available to me indicates that we do have something to show for the effort and sacrifice we have been putting into this war.

Let me try to share with you one of the bases for this conviction.

I believe that the VC are losing their control of the people in South Viet Nam. That is what this war -- or any guerrilla war -- is really all about.

Since the beginning of the U. S. military build-up in early 1965, there has been a substantial increase in the number of people living in areas of relative security in South Viet Nam.

In fact, since the end of 1964, there has been roughly a 50% increase.

At the same time, the Viet Cong's population control has decreased by about 30%.

This situation is reflected on this chart which shows that the South Vietnamese government's control of population has increased from about 40% to 65% -- and Viet Cong control has decreased from about 20% to about 15%.

Now let me make my own feelings clear as to the meaning of these numbers. First, I believe the trend in government control of the people of Viet Nam is substantially valid. Second, the reasons for the improvement in population security are important: people in large numbers -- over 1.2 million since December 1965 -- have left their villages in contested areas in order to move to Government of Viet Nam controlled areas where they could be safe. Further, several hundred thousand have left contested

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Authority NLS-CBS 19

By ms, NARS, Date 6-22-84

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areas and poverty areas to move to the cities and larger towns where they could find jobs. This flow is continuing at a rate of about 40,000 to 50,000 a month. Thus, the statistics do not mean that 4 million people in the past 2-1/2 years have given their allegiance to the Government of Viet Nam, nor that the war will be over when all of the people are secure. We and the elected leaders of Vietnam know that we have a monumental nation-building task ahead of us, and only progress in that task will mean lasting and final victory. Third, and finally, the numbers are meaningful -- particularly to the Viet Cong. They mean fewer people to pay their taxes, raise food for them, and man their army -- and we have overwhelming data from captured soldiers and documents that the Viet Cong are feeling the pinch. One Viet Cong document in early 1966 complained about the loss of one million people from the rural areas to the Government of Viet Nam-controlled urban areas. Another document in late 1966 noted that 400,000 people had been added to the Government of Viet Nam control in one area. Still another document acknowledged loss of Viet Cong control of 130,000 people in one province alone.

Progress is continuing. Government pacification and Revolutionary Development programs have produced positive results in terms of population control. More than 1,500 rural hamlets, containing more than 1.5 million people, have been brought under government control since the beginning of 1965. Several hundred additional hamlets currently are being developed by government pacification cadre and will probably be added to the secure category by the end of the year. There will be some back-sliding in areas which we control, and this program is still not moving as fast as we would like. But they are moving and we are making net gains.

Besides the population control statistics, Viet Cong documentation, and observers' reports, we have the results of three elections in Viet Nam in the past two years -- a fantastic feat in itself. In May 1965, 3.8 million people voted of 4.2 million registered voters in the municipal and provincial elections. In September 1966, 4.3 million voted of 5.2 registered voters in the Constituent Assembly elections. In September 1967, 4.8 million voted of 5.3 million registered voters in the presidential and upper house elections. Now, when we compare these voter and registration statistics with the total adult population of Viet Nam, the results are strikingly similar to the population control results. The trends are the same. Voters are up 40% in the last election over the first, and Government of Viet Nam population control is up 30% in the same time period.

So what we have seen is that there has been an enormous reversal of fortune during the past two years in South Viet Nam.

In 1964 and early 1965, the Communists were winning the war. Today they are losing.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

In 1964 and early 1965, the Communists looked forward to a steady enlargement of their base in the population. Today that base is shrinking.

This is what you and I have somehow failed to communicate to the American people.

Why? One reason, clearly, is that the slow, steady reconstruction of a nation is far less dramatic than combat -- and combat continues.

Nor can I hold out to you any hope that the level of violence will diminish until Hanoi has come to understand that it cannot win.

So long as Hanoi believes that there is no need to compromise or negotiate -- so long as Hanoi believes that we lack the patience, the will, the unity to see this thing through -- just so long will the Communists continue to send their troops and their political cadres to their destruction in the South.


So it is true, in a sense, to say that we cannot see when this war will end.

What we can see, what we can even, however imperfectly, measure is the steady progress of a South Viet Nam which now knows that it is going to live.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

South Vietnam

Population Control and Elections



34

Pres file

Wednesday, September 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report
on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS ATTACHMENT

36a

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 27, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-402
By lip, NARA, Date 3-24-95

Validation of Elections

Yesterday Bunker expressed to Thieu our concern regarding the prospects for the validation of the presidential elections. Bunker emphasized that Thieu and Ky had a great responsibility in this matter and that the U. S. reaction to invalidation would be most adverse. Thieu said that he was well aware of these problems and that he and Ky were working on the Assembly leaders. Thieu said he thought the vote for validation would be satisfactory. In this connection, we understand that the Central Election Council has reported to the National Assembly that none of the complaints against the presidential election filed with the Council have been substantiated. Nevertheless, the Assembly's election committee, which will review the Council's findings before the Assembly acts, is an unpredictable group. Regardless of the action by this committee, the Embassy believes the full Assembly will validate the elections.

Organization of the New Government

In the same conversation Thieu indicated quite clearly that Ky was pressing very hard to have Nguyen Van Loc appointed as Prime Minister. It was clear from Thieu's remarks that the other Generals were pressing him to take Ky's feelings into account in this matter. Bunker stressed the importance of a good working relationship between Thieu and Ky. Bunker said that if the Loc appointment was necessary to achieve such a relationship, we would be sympathetic to this problem. Thieu also said that he had sent Bunker's draft platform memorandum to his "brain trust", asking them to incorporate the Mission's ideas into the draft of his own platform.

Buddhist-Student Agitation

Some student protest activity was reported from DaNang yesterday, involving a partial and largely unsuccessful boycott of classes and the dissemination of leaflets. In Saigon

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-2-

a Buddhist newspaper published an open letter to Gen. Thieu, demanding that he restore the previous Buddhist Charter. The letter also requested that Thieu receive a petition from a delegation of 500 monks and nuns in front of Independence Palace. The Embassy understands that the Saigon Mayor may refuse the Buddhists permission to send the delegation to Independence Palace.

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W. W. R.
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Pres file

Wednesday, September 27, 1967

Mr. President:

At his Press Club speech this noon, Prime Minister Krag said the following:

"Vietnam is not a European problem, but is so grave that my topic today would be insufficiently covered if I failed to mention Vietnam. If the United States could convince North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union that the United States has no wish whatsoever for territorial gains, for acquiring bases or for stationing forces there permanently, much would be gained. I hope the United States will succeed in that. It is always difficult to stop an open military conflict. It calls for courage, vision and resolve on the part of the leading statesmen in the countries directly and indirectly involved in the conflict. And it also calls for concessions on both sides. He who takes the decisive step by which to bring the fighting to an end, to get negotiations started and to ensure durable peace in South East Asia will inscribe his name in the books of history. To find a solution to the settlement of this conflict is an art of great statesmanship. To find it on terms that will bring independence and happiness to the Vietnamese people is a political task of vast dimensions. To find it requires leadership, courage and vigorous action. War reflects the failure of political endeavours. To provide a basis for lasting peace and for stopping war is a great political deed. It takes two parties to do it. These parties would win undying fame if they found the narrow path to the end of the war and the entry of armistice into Vietnam. I do not consider it realistic to get negotiations started without stopping the bombing of North Vietnam. If the United States cannot be assured of a simultaneous de-escalation of military activities from the North, it would have to run a limited risk by stopping the bombing for some time and wait for reciprocity. I think that such an attempt would be well worth its prize."

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

RVH

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~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~
PENNSYLVANIA

Tuesday, September 26, 1967 -- 9:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft speech on Viet Nam.

You should read it in light of Nick's attached memorandum which makes the case for waiting for Hanoi's answer.

Bo will see M. and A. on Saturday.

If you decide to accept Nick's argument, I would not recommend revealing our latest formula (pp. 6-7).

If you decide to proceed with the speech, you will wish to have Gen. Eisenhower's assent to using the quotation on page 11.

The general question will also arise: Should the speech wait until next week, to see what comes through -- or not -- on Saturday.

If we don't surface the specific formula (pp. 6-7), the speech won't hurt -- and might help -- in Hanoi.

But you will wish to have Sec. Rusk's judgment.

Incidentally, the figures (p. 3) have the blessing of CIA, Defense, and State. But I'll report further on that tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority 72 89-111

By rg/lf, NARA, Date 10-23-11

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- NODIS -- PENNSYLVANIA

WWRostow:rla

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1967

PERSONAL

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Negotiations with North Vietnam.

This memorandum attempts to answer the question you posed at luncheon. It represents my own views and I do not know whether or not the Secretary would agree.

I. The Kissinger Exercise.

The significance of the Paris-Kissinger exercise lies in the fact that it is the closest thing we have yet had to establishing a dialogue with North Vietnam. It takes on particular significance in my view because, since last February, every attempt to get into communication with the North Vietnamese has been brutally and immediately rebuffed. This has been true in Moscow in April and in Vientiane in June. By and large it has also been true of indirect communication. While Kissinger has not talked yet directly to Bo, he did succeed in establishing a dialogue with him, through intermediaries and written messages, and Bo's attitude has been consistently to keep the channel open and to encourage dialogue.

To refresh your recollection briefly, the sequence has been as follows:

- (1) Our basic message was delivered to Bo on August 25.
- (2) On September 11 Bo delivered a formal reply,

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Authority ML 9 89-112

By sg/yp, NARA, Date 10-23-91

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

repeating the standard Hanoi position and arguments, but pointedly declared he was anxious to keep the channel open.

(3) On September 13 we formally replied arguing that our proposal did not involve "conditions".

(4) On September 23 Bo replied, apparently to our message of September 13, complaining about our intensified bombing which Bo gave as the reason for his refusal to see Kissinger.

(5) On September 25 Kissinger replied defending our bombing policy partially on grounds of secrecy. On September 25 Bo also stated the following:

"Bo replied that the DRV Prime Minister had made it clear that there could be no formal discussions between the US and the DRV as long as any level of bombing continued in the North, but, Bo added, preliminary discussions between Bo and Kissinger might not fall under such prohibition. Bo said he would let him know whether such preliminary discussions were possible within a few days." (underscoring added)

We should hear towards the end of the week whether or not there can be "preliminary discussions" between Bo and Kissinger. I find it significant that the phraseology "preliminary discussions" was employed by Bo. Preliminary to what? It would seem to me that these discussions could only be preliminary to formal discussion which could take place if our offer was accepted. Kissinger, if he talks to Bo, should pressure the modalities of formal discussions: time, place, date, possibly agenda.

This seems to me the easier because of the statement today from Hanoi that North Vietnam would be prepared to open

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~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

"serious and significant talks" three or four weeks after the United States halted its bombing without formulating any conditions. (The three to four weeks is clearly negotiable in the light of other information if we can get into preliminary discussions.)

We know that Bo has been in constant communication with Hanoi. His demeanor has indicated that to a large extent he was acting under instructions. We know that we are dealing with a divided government in North Vietnam, and it is at least a reasonable inference that our offer has sufficient appeal for them not to reject it out of hand as they could have done by refusing further communication, and which they have done in the past. This hypothesis seems to me supported by the public statement from Hanoi today which, if nothing else, is certainly the most forthcoming statement they have made on the subject of negotiations.

If you are seriously considering a bombing pause to test Hanoi's intentions, it seems to me particularly important that the Paris channel not be abruptly ruptured. One thing that we have learned is that once communication is broken off, it takes considerable time to turn it on again. And it seems to me that the most effective pause would be one which followed some kind of dialogue -- "preliminary discussions" -- of the type contemplated by Bo.

II. Relationship of Pause in Bombing and Discussions.

Virtually every time we have had a contact, direct or indirect, with Hanoi, they or their spokesman have cautioned that an escalation of bombing would prejudice the condition of discussions. This was true with respect to the Polish operation, the Moscow operation, and the current Paris operation. Whether or not there is any merit or substance


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to the Hanoi statements the simple fact is that there have been actions widely regarded as escalatory which coincide with our efforts to enter into negotiations. It is entirely possible -- I think probable -- that these actions were seized upon as excuses by Hanoi. But it is not possible to prove that point and there is sufficient plausibility in their position to cast doubt in the minds of other governments and a substantial segment of American public opinion as to the sincerity of our efforts. Since I know that our efforts have been sincere and since I think these are merely excuses, I would like to eliminate all possible doubt with respect to the Kissinger negotiations. If Bo refuses to see Kissinger, then I see no problem with resuming the normal level of bombing in Hanoi. If Bo agrees to see Kissinger, I think it important to continue the circle at least until we see whether the Kissinger channel is leading towards prompt and productive discussions.

I do not believe that Hanoi is presently likely to enter into serious discussions. But I think that it is important in terms of both circumstances and public relations that we test that possibility to the hilt. I do not think we pay a heavy price in delaying hitting again a very small percentage of the targets in North Vietnam. We know that destruction of those targets this week or next week can have absolutely no significance in terms of the conduct of the war. There is an outside chance that it could have some impact on the search for peace. And I would play along with that chance -- which I acknowledge to be very small indeed -- because the consequences are so great.

Respectfully,



Acting Secretary

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HANOI "Sources" on Viet-Nam Talks
PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1800 GMT 26 SETP 67 E
(BY BERNARD-JOSEPH CABANES)

(Text) Hanoi--North Vietnam would be prepared to open serious and significant talks with the United States, to use the words employed by U.S. Delegate to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg, three or four weeks after an unconditional halt in U.S. acts of war against the North, Hanoi sources said today.

A source said: In order to (?begin) talks, we only ask the Americans to halt, without formulating any conditions, their bombings and other acts of war against North Vietnam, because it is not possible to talk in the midst of the bombings.

This statement echoes a key phrase in a speech made earlier this month by North Vietnam Premier Phan Van Dong. However, it comes after the speech made in the United Nations by Mr. Goldberg last week seeking clarification of Hanoi's position.

The sources stressed, however, that if Washington simply announced that it was halting the bombings for a certain period, no talks would be possible, because the halt would be conditional. However, without conditions, the talks would take place, the sources said. The sources indicated that Hanoi would make no spectacular public statements or gestures following Mr. Goldberg's speech. There are two reasons for this:

North Vietnam (?feels) that its position is now well known. Further repetition of its views might be interpreted as a sign of weakening resistance. But their resistance is not weakening, as shown by a recent long article by Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap affirming his (words indistinct).

The sources add that Mr. Goldberg's speech also betrays U.S. concern at its unfavorable military situation in South Vietnam. The United States is also aware that its diplomatic relations are being (word indistinct) by the continuation of the war, the sources state.

In this difficult situation, the United States, without going so far as to accept an unconditional halt to the bombings, has been obliged to use ambiguous phrases which finally add up simply to a restatement of its demand for a reciprocal gesture from Hanoi if Washington agrees to stop the bombing, a demand North Vietnam has already rejected.

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RUSTOW'S OFFICE

1967 SEP 26 PM 8 24

Dra1 September 26, 1967 8 pm

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It is right that from time to time I share with you my thoughts about Viet Nam. Our men are fighting there. Our resources are committed there. Our nation's word is pledged there.

I have asked myself some questions which I know are also on your minds. And I will give you the best answers I know.

First, are the Vietnamese -- with our help and the help of their other fighting allies -- making progress towards the common goal? Is there a stalemate or is there forward movement?

Most of the reports I see make clear that there is progress and forward movement.

There is positive movement towards constitutional government -- however imperfect these first steps may seem. Historians will judge it something of a miracle, I believe, that the Vietnamese have thus far met the political schedule they laid down in January 1966. The people of South Viet Nam want constitutional government; and they are achieving it,

step by step. On November 1st a legitimate elected government will be inaugurated; and, I am sure, its leaders will follow a program of action which responds to the desires of the Vietnamese people for self-determination and peace, for an attack on corruption, and for movement forward in economic and social development.

There is progress also in the war. The campaigns of the last year drove the enemy from some of his major interior bases. Between 1964 and 1966 they tried for victory inside South Viet Nam. Now they seek not military victory but the prolongation of war itself. By massing troops in the demilitarized zone, they seek to divert our forces from pacifying the countryside and to continue to inflict casualties on our men. They are continuing to send forces South to strengthen Viet Cong units which can no longer be maintained from the shrinking population base controlled by the Viet Cong.

In the months ahead we shall be taking new steps to make such

infiltration still more costly and difficult than it already is.

Meanwhile, there is steady, heartening progress within South Viet Nam. The proportion of the population securely under government control has increased steadily since we made our fundamental commitment in mid-1965. Conservatively estimated, that proportion has risen from about 45% to about 65% since that time. The proportion under Communist control has declined from about 20% to about 15%. Those in the contested areas have also declined sharply. This positive trend is reflected in the registration and voting figures of the successive elections which have taken place over this period.

But the struggle remains hard. The Vietnamese have suffered severe casualties, civilian as well as military. We and their other allies are also suffering heavily as the battle proceeds.

American casualties have reached a level of about 11,000 killed in action and about 85,000 wounded; although it is good to know that, of the

wounded, approximately 79,000 have been or are expected to be returned to duty.

I wish I could name for you the day the war will end. But I cannot.

What I can tell you is that every responsible adviser available to the President -- military and civilian, in Saigon and in Washington -- reports solid and steady progress; and their judgment is borne out by the statistics of the conflict, by captured enemy documents, and by the flow of defectors from the Communist camp.

I know there are other questions on your minds.

There are some who ask: Why not negotiate now? The answer is, of course, that we are wholly prepared to negotiate now. I am ready; this government is ready; our South Vietnamese allies are ready. But with whom do we negotiate?

I am ready to talk with Ho Chi Minh tomorrow.

I am ready to have Secretary Rusk meet with their Foreign Minister tomorrow.

I am ready to send a trusted representative to any spot on this earth to talk in secret with a spokesman for Hanoi.

I am ready to have the issue of Viet Nam dealt with by the United Nations.

We have made this very clear to Hanoi. We have done it directly. We have passed the word through third parties. We have made efforts in dozens of capitals and on hundreds of occasions.

But either we get no response or we get a firm "no."

But we shall continue to try -- hoping always that reason will at last prevail; for one of these days Hanoi will realize that it cannot win and that its destiny lies not in taking over South Viet Nam by force but in joining the other nations of Southeast Asia in raising the welfare of the people who live in North Viet Nam.

Others ask: Why not draw back, protect the cities and the populated areas in enclaves, and reduce our side of the war?

The answer is that this would turn back to the Viet Cong important parts of the rural population. It would also permit the Viet Cong safely to concentrate their forces at points of their own choosing and decimate the Vietnamese forces and their allies. It was precisely this strategy which led to the defeat of the Kuomintang in Mainland China. And we can see at the demilitarized zone what happens when the enemy feels secure and can choose the time and place and rhythm of battle.

Every responsible military adviser available to the President agrees that an enclave strategy in Viet Nam is a road to disaster; and I am convinced that they are correct.

Others ask: Why do we not stop the bombing of North Viet Nam and see if the other side might then talk?

I have recently informed Hanoi that:

"The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombard-

ment of North Viet-Nam with the understanding that this will lead promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam looking toward a resolution of the issues between them. While discussions proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the United States would assume that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. "

I think you will agree that there could be no fairer proposal than that.

The answer I received was negative. Hanoi is not yet ready for peace.

Why is this so? Why in the face of military and political progress in the South and the burden of our bombing in the North do they persist?

From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see the struggle through to the end. As one Western diplomat recently in Hanoi put it: "They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose. " A recent visitor from a Communist capital concluded: "They expect the war to be long

and that the Americans will in the end be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors." As the North Vietnamese Premier said as far back as 1962: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars -- and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win in the end."

This is not the first time in our history that Americans have been put to such a test of nerve, and will, and endurance. In every war in our nation's history there were long dark passages. Intellectuals and political leaders, preachers and journalists, cried out for peace at almost any price.

In the Revolution, James Warren wrote to John Adams in 1788 describing the situation in Boston: "I wish it were in my power to tell you that the number and influence of the Tories here were reduced, but I think they gain ground fast."

In the War of 1812 historians record: "The truth seems to be that the war was unpopular throughout the country," once it appeared "that it

would not be a walk-over. "

In the Civil War, a Confederate General wrote his wife in 1864:

"We learn from gentlemen recently from the North that the Peace Party is growing rapidly -- that McClellan will be elected and that his election will bring peace, provided always that we continue to hold our own against the Yankee armies. "

And so it has been at other times of testing.

But, in fact, most Americans have never been "summer soldiers. "

It is fundamental, however, that as we face the future we be crystal clear as to why we are determined to see this through. There are two reasons.

First, the word of our nation was pledged in 1955 -- in the SEATO Treaty -- that we would act to meet the common danger in the face of armed attack on South Viet Nam. There is armed attack on South Viet Nam.

Second, we undertook that pledge because the vital interests of

the United States were judged to be at stake in protecting Southeast Asia from being taken over by the Communists.

Speaking for the Eisenhower Administration, Secretary of State Dulles said in March 1954:

"Southeast Asia is astride the most direct and best-developed sea and air routes between the Pacific and South Asia. It has major naval and air bases. Communist control of Southeast Asia would carry a grave threat to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, with whom we have treaties of mutual assistance. The entire Western Pacific area, including the so-called 'offshore island chain', would be strategically endangered."

Five years later, President Eisenhower expressed his own feelings and the opinion of his Administration when he spoke directly of Viet Nam.

"Strategically," he said, "South Viet-Nam's capture by the Communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced

by a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 million people (--now 17 million--) would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom..."

Recognizing our deep interest in Southeast Asia, the United States Senate on February 1, 1955, approved the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty by a vote of 82 to 1. One Senator after another -- including many still in the Senate -- stated his understanding that the defense of Viet Nam was an integral part of the defense of Southeast Asia, and that the defense of Southeast Asia was vital to the interests of the United States.

When President Eisenhower on January 19, 1961, reviewed with President-elect Kennedy the situation for which he was about to assume responsibility, he stated: "If Laos is lost to the Free World, in the long run we will lose all of Southeast Asia." And the fate of Laos is clearly bound up with that of South Viet Nam.

On July 17, 1963, President Kennedy said, speaking of Viet Nam,

"We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

There are some who argue that three American Presidents have been wrong. They believe that this view -- of the connection between the fate of Viet Nam and the fate of Southeast Asia -- is out-of-date. They argue that we might let Viet Nam go and Laos; but that somehow independence and freedom could sustain themselves in that critical part of the world, important in itself and as the gateway to the Indian subcontinent.

I can tell you -- from face to face talks -- that no responsible statesman in Asia shares that judgment. There is none who would contest the judgment of former Prime Minister Menzies of Australia: "The takeover of South Viet Nam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and Southeast Asia."

And so it is clear that the war we are fighting to defeat aggression in Viet Nam -- to permit those 17 million people the right peacefully to determine their future -- is also a war that will determine the future shape of Asia -- where two-thirds of humanity lives.

This is no empty abstraction. Asia is, in fact, beginning to determine its own future; and it is doing so precisely because it believes we shall see it through in Viet Nam.

In fact, we can now see the domino theory operating in reverse. Heartened by our commitment and our progress in Viet Nam, the nations and peoples of Asia have begun to build the foundations of their long-run prosperity and their security. The disintegration and piecemeal takeover which might have happened have given way to confidence and cooperation among them -- for the first time in the long history of Asia.

Asians have in a very short time:

-- set in motion the Asian Development Bank;

-- invigorated the work in the Mekong Valley;

-- begun to formulate new regional plans in education, transport,
agriculture, and communications;

-- initiated regular consultations among the central banks.

Politically nine Asian nations have set up the Asian and Pacific
Council; five have formed the Association of Southeast Asia Nations.

In short, there is new life, new energy, a new spirit of cooperation
in the Asia of today. This large and vastly important part of the human
race is on the march. They have a dream of progress -- and they are
making it come true.

And the Asian leaders and their governments recognize that it would
not be so if the United States did not believe deeply in the importance of
Asia -- if the United States were not standing firm in Viet Nam.

Many leading Asians have said that the allied commitment to Viet Nam
has bought time for the rest of Asia. And they are determined to use that time
well.

As the distinguished Prime Minister of Singapore said not long ago:

"...if we just sit down and believe people are going to buy time forever after for us, then we deserve to perish."

But Asians are not sitting down and waiting. They are planning, and working, and moving ahead.

They do not deserve to perish; they will not perish.

This, then, is where we are in Viet Nam -- and why we are in Viet Nam.

But there is another, deeply important reason for our role. It has to do with our vision of the world -- and with our goals as a nation.

Twenty-two years ago, the biggest and most destructive war in history came to an end.

Even before the guns fell silent, we Americans had a clear idea of the kind of world we wanted. And we knew that it required us to be part of -- not apart from -- that world.

And so -- together with most other nations -- we pledged ourselves
"to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
breaches of the peace..."

We quickly found, however, that the noble aims of the United Nations
Charter would not be achieved automatically. Hopes were not enough.
Good intentions were not a sufficient guarantee.

Wishing for a world at peace -- for a world free from aggression --
for justice in the affairs of men and nations -- would not make it so.

For some men still coveted the territory of others.

Some still wanted to control the minds and the lives of their neighbors.

The temptation to use force to achieve these goals had not been
buried in the rubble of World War II.

We could have walked away from a devastated Europe.

We could have pulled out of a war-torn Asia.

We could have -- but we didn't.

Because we knew that to do so would only have postponed --
not prevented -- the day of reckoning.

We were determined not to make the mistake of the 1930's --
the mistake of thinking that we could live in comfort and security and pay
no attention to the rest of the world.

In Europe, we helped forge the shield of NATO -- a shield that has
protected Western Europe for two decades.

We designed the Marshall Plan to help revive the economic life of
free Europe.

In Asia, we invested heavily in defeated Japan and in the victims of
Japanese aggression.

Through that wide arc of the world that runs from northern Europe
through the Mediterranean, on to Southeast Asia, and northward to Japan
and Korea, the American promise sounded loud and clear:

Stand fast; stand free; and we shall stand at your side.

These two decades have not been easy for us -- or for others.

Time and time again, our motives were questioned and our will was tested.

Friends and enemies alike wondered: Will the Americans back out when the going gets tough? Won't they take the easy way and withdraw? Do they really want to help others so far from their homeland?

But when the time of testing came, our word was good.

The people of Berlin found it was good when Stalin tried to strangle their city.

The people of Greece and Turkey found it good when threats to their nations rose.

The people of South Korea found it good when invading armies swept in from the North.

Today, the people of South Viet Nam are finding it good as they struggle to build a nation in their own way.

We did not give our pledges lightly.

We did not give them only out of compassion and generosity.

We gave them because it was right -- because it was in our own true interest.

It takes little imagination to picture the kind of world we now would be living in if we had not been a partner of Europe in the 1940's -- if we had not helped defend Korea in the 1950's -- if we were not now fighting to preserve some reasonable order and stability in Southeast Asia.

The price of these efforts has been heavy, indeed. But the price of not having done them would have been vastly greater.

We know it. Our friends know it. And our enemies know it, too.

And so we shall press forward.

We will keep our word.

We will do what must be done.

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Pres file

Tuesday - 6:30 pm
September 26, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith a cable from Inter-American Bank President Felipe Herrera thanking you for your statement in signing the IDB Bill last Friday.

Felipe and his colleagues were stung by the Selden amendment. Your expression of confidence in the Bank has helped to tone down their resentment..

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

9/26/67 telegram from
Felipe Herrera in Rio
de Janeiro.

37a

Message Sent to the President by Felipe Herrera, the President
of the Inter-American Bank, from Rio de Janeiro
on September 26, 1967

" September 26, 1967
Rio de Janeiro
INTAMBANC.

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House

While attending the World Bank and Fund annual meetings
in Rio, I have been informed through the kind intermediary
of the United States Embassy in this City of your remarks
at the ceremony of the signature of the bill authorizing the
increase in the United States' contribution to the Fund for
Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank.

I sincerely appreciate your positive and constructive remarks
regarding the activities of our multilateral institution in favor
of economic and social development of Latin America. I also
greatly appreciate your kind reference to the Bank's President.

Respectfully yours,

Felipe Herrera,
President of the
Inter-American Development Bank. "