

40

Pres file

Tuesday - 6:30 pm
September 26, 1967

Mr. President:

The Peruvian Embassy asks whether you would be willing to appear as "honorary patron" -- together with President Belaunde -- on the program for the "Three Centuries of Peruvian Silver" which opens at the Smithsonian on November 29 and then goes to the Metropolitan in New York.

You agreed to do this in 1965 in connection with the Peruvian gold exhibition at the National Art Gallery.

I recommend that you consent to use of your name for this exhibit.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____.

cc - Marvin Watson

~~Mr Rostow~~

41

Pres file

September 26, 1967 - 5:30 pm

NOTE TO BROMLEY SMITH

The President wants the attached message to be sent immediately to President Diaz Ordaz.

Would you please see to it that it is passed to S/S for prompt handling.

I have already told ARA - Covey Oliver - about the message.

WGBowdler

Attachment

cc - WWRostow
W.H. Central Files

4/12

September 26, 1967

His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States

Dear Mr. President:

I am closely following the distressing reports on the floods in the lower Rio Grande valley which is causing so much damage to communities in Tamaulipas and Texas.

I know that federal, state and local officials from our two countries have been working closely in emergency measures to avoid loss of life and alleviate the suffering.

If there is anything additional you think we can do, I would want you to let me know immediately.

Regards.

Lyndon B. Johnson

42

Tuesday, September 26, 1967 - 4:30 PM

1007

Mr. President:

In the attached Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive Foreign Minister Pirzada of Pakistan on the afternoon of October 5 (Thursday) or sometime during the day on October 6 (Friday).

You may recall telling Ben Oehlert that you would try to see the Foreign Minister. I agree with Ben and the Secretary that it would be a very good idea.

W. W. Rostow

Set up meeting for afternoon of
October 5 (Thursday) _____

Set up meeting for October 6 (Friday) _____

No _____

Speak to me _____

EKHamilton/vmr

3570
42a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Pakistan Foreign
Minister Sharifuddin Pirzada to
See the President

Recommendation

That you receive Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada
on the afternoon of October 5 or during the day of
October 6.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion

Pakistan Foreign Minister Pirzada will be visiting
Washington, October 5-6 at my invitation. I understand
that Ambassador Oehlert prior to his departure discussed
this visit with you.

Mr. Pirzada has been Minister for Foreign Affairs
since July 20, 1966. During the latter part of August,
1967, he made an extensive tour of Arab states including
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the United Arab Republic.
He met Presidents Aref, Helou, Attasi, and Nasser and
King Hussain, presenting each with a personal message
from President Ayub. He will accompany President Ayub
on his visit to Moscow, September 25-30.

In view of the importance we attach to maintaining
and improving our friendly relations with Pakistan, I
recommend that an appointment with you be arranged for
the Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister will see me
at 12:00 noon on October 5 which will be followed by my
luncheon at 1:00 p.m. in his honor.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By ijg, NARA, Date 3-24-95

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - 3:30 pm
September 26, 1967

~~to send~~
2. Per file

Mr. President:

The tentative program for the Diaz Ordaz visit now stands as described in the attached schedule.

It reflects preliminary talks with the Mexicans.

Your participation is the usual one for state visits:

- arrival ceremony on the south lawn.
- welcome parade.
- two office calls, and communique.
- Diaz Ordaz's return reception.

In addition, there is the side trip to El Paso for the Chamizal ceremony.

Before proceeding further, I would like to know if you have any comments on the program as it now stands.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State Co 11/30/78

By sg/usp, NARA, Date 10-22-91

43a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TENTATIVE PROGRAM
FOR STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
OF HIS EXCELLENCY GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES,
AND MRS. ORDAZ
(October 26-28, 1967)

Thursday, October 26

11:50 am - EDT	President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz <u>will arrive</u> <u>at Andrews Air Force Base</u> aboard a Mexican aircraft.
12:00 noon	<u>Departure from Andrews Air Force Base</u> by helicopter.
12:10 pm	Arrival at the President's Park (Ellipse). Transfer to limousines.
12:15 pm	His Excellency Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, President of the United Mexican States and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and their party will arrive at the White House where they will be greeted by the President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson; the Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk; and other officials. Full military honors will be rendered.
12:45 pm	President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, accom- panied by President and Mrs. Johnson, will head a <u>Parade of Welcome</u> through Washington.
1:05 pm	Arrival at Blair House. The President of the Board of Commissioners of Washington, D. C. will present the Key to the City to President Diaz Ordaz. President and Mrs. Johnson will return to the White House.
1:45 pm	The <u>Secretary of State</u> and <u>Mrs. Rusk</u> will give a <u>luncheon</u> in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz in the Benjamin Franklin Room, Depart- ment of State.

Thursday, October 26 (Cont'd)

3:00 pm President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will go to Beltsville Agricultural Research Center escorted by Secretary and Mrs. Freeman (travel by helicopter).

5:00 pm President Diaz Ordaz will meet with President Johnson at the White House.

8:00 pm President and Mrs. Johnson will give a dinner in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at the White House.

Dress: Black tie.

Friday, October 27

8:00 am President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz attend breakfast at Mexican Embassy for Mexican area residents.

9:50 am President Diaz Ordaz departs Embassy.

10:05 am President Diaz Ordaz arrives at D. C. urban renewal site (to be selected.)

10:30 am Departs site.

10:45 am President Diaz Ordaz arrives at transportation demonstration project.

11:05 am Departs site.

11:20 am President Diaz Ordaz returns to Blair House (A separate program for this 1-1/2 hours is planned for Mrs. Diaz Ordaz).

11:35 am President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz depart Blair House.

11:45 am President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz arrive at Lincoln Memorial. (Wreath ceremony.)

12:00 noon Depart Lincoln Memorial.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

Friday, October 27 (Cont'd)

12:10 pm Arrival at the Capitol.

President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will go to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

12:30 pm President Diaz Ordaz will address a Joint Session of Congress in the House of Representatives.

1:30 pm The Vice President of the United States and Mrs. Humphrey will give a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz.

3:00 pm Protocolary meeting at the OAS. We understand that following brief address by President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, a reception will be held for OAS Ambassadors and wives.

5:30 pm President Diaz Ordaz will meet with President Johnson at the White House. A joint communique will be issued.

7:30 pm President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will give a reception in honor of President and Mrs. Johnson at the Embassy of Mexico.

Saturday, October 28

8:25 am President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from Blair House and proceed to the South Lawn of the White House.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 8 -
4

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28 (Continued).

8:30 a.m.	President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, accompanied by President and Mrs. Johnson will depart from the White House by helicopter.
8:40 a.m.	Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.
8:45 a.m.	Departure from Andrews Air Force Base aboard the President's aircraft. (Flying time: 4 hours.) (Time change: 2 hours.) (Luncheon will be served aboard the aircraft)
<u>10:45 a.m. MDT</u>	Arrival at El Paso International Airport, El Paso, Texas.
11:00 a.m.	Departure from the Airport. The motorcade will pass through downtown El Paso.
11:25 a.m.	Arrival at the new Santa Fe Street Bridge - greet assembled public.
11:35 a.m.	Departure from the Santa Fe Street Bridge. Motorcade passes through downtown Juarez.
11:55 a.m.	Arrival at Mexico's new Chamizal Monument.
12:00 noon	President Diaz Ordaz and President Johnson will enter the Mexican Monument where they will sign the Declaration of Approval, transferring land under the Chamizal Convention.
12:05 p.m.	President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and President and Mrs. Johnson will take their places at the Monument dais. The national anthems will be played and both Presidents will give addresses. (Remarks will be interpreted).

SATURDAY (Continued)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6 -

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28 (Continued)

1:05 p.m.

The Presidents and the First Ladies will depart from the Mexican Monument.

1:15 p.m.

Arrival at the new International Cordova Island Bridge.

The Presidents and the First Ladies and their parties will walk to the new international boundary on the bridge where they will raise the flags of Mexico and the United States and officially open the bridge.

The Presidents and the First Ladies will bid farewell.

President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and their party will return to the Mexican side of the bridge.

President and Mrs. Johnson and their party will walk to the United States side of the bridge.

* * * * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

Luncheon with the President

44

Tuesday, September 26, 1967, 1:00 p.m.

Agenda

1. Sect. Rusk-Gromyko Dinner. A Report and Evaluation. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)
2. Negotiating Track: Situation Report and Next Moves. (Under Sect. Katzenbach)
3. Bombing Policy. (Sect. McNamara and Under Sect. Katzenbach)
 - Ten Mile Circle?
 - New Target List
4. Thieu's Inaugural: November 1 (Under Sect. Katzenbach)
 - Should we push for a clear, firm, political offer to the NLF to run as a party under the Constitution? If yes, how hard?
 - Should Vice President lead delegation?
5. Asian Summit: Date. (Sect. McNamara and Under Sect. Katzenbach)
 - Should we explore last two weeks in November?
6. Middle East Arms Policy. (Sect. McNamara and Under Sect. Katzenbach)
 - Israeli complaints on minor items.
 - Policy towards Israel and moderate Arabs.
7. Other

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 709, NARA, Date 10-10-91

45

Tuesday, Sept. 26, 1967
9:55 a.m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Herewith Sect. Rusk's report to you of his dinner with Gromyko:

-- para. 2 on ABM's, etc., is mildly hopeful;

-- para. 3 on the Middle East is at least not unhopeful.

In addition, Gromyko indicated that they would be willing to have the space treaty signing ceremony on October 10. Sect. Rusk wishes to check this date with you before proceeding to talk to the British.

Nick may raise the matter at lunch.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET NODIS EYES ONLY attachment~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By ig, NARA, Date 4-5-95

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-402
By sig, NARA, Date 3-24-95

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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND ACTING SECRETARY

SECTO 5

OPENING DINNER WITH GROMYKO WAS LIMITED BOTH IN TIME AND SUBJECTS COVERED. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH CAME UP:

1. GROMYKO PRODUCED A SLIGHT REVISION TO ARTICLE III OF THE NPT AND SAID THAT IF THE TEXT OF THE ARTICLE AS NOW REVISED WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE US THE SOVIETS WOULD AGREE TO IT. I TOLD HIM

~~PAGE 2 RUEHCR 6206Q SECRET~~

THAT THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM ON ARTICLE III WAS NOT THE US BUT THE EURATOM COUNTRIES AND THAT WE WOULD WISH TO HAVE THEIR VIEWS BEFORE WE CAME TO A FINAL DECISION OF OUR OWN. GROMYKO WAS OBVIOUSLY INTERESTED IN MOVING THE NPT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE; I ASSURED HIM THAT THAT WAS ALSO OUR PURPOSE AND TOLD HIM THAT A NATO MEETING TOMORROW AND A COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING NEXT MONDAY MIGHT GIVE US A MUCH CLEARER VIEW AS TO HOW FAST WE COULD MOVE. HE AND I SEEMED TO AGREE THAT INDIA SEEMED LESS INTERESTED IN ASSURANCES OF PROTECTION AGAINST A NUCLEAR THREAT THAN WE BOTH HAD THOUGHT EARLIER. (TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE III COMING SEPTEL.)

2. I ASKED HIM WHAT THEIR PRESENT VIEW WAS OF DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE MISSILES. HE WAS QUITE FORTHCOMING AND INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM AND ACCEPTED OUR ASSURANCE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MISSILES. HE DID EVERYTHING BUT SUGGEST A DATE TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS. HE INQUIRED AT WHAT LEVEL WE WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER AND I SAID WE COULD MEET THEIR VIEWS ON THAT. ALTERNATIVES WERE DISCUSSIONS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF

~~PAGE 3 RUEHCR 62060 S E C R E T~~

AMBASSADOR THOMPSON IN MOSCOW, REINFORCED BY WASHINGTON, OR WITH MR. FOSTER IN GENEVA OR WASHINGTON, OR AT CABINET LEVEL. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY WILL NOT SET A DATE PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THEIR 50TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION IN NOVEMBER AND THAT WE HAVE A CHANCE TO PROPOSE MORE SPECIFICS ABOUT PLACE AND LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION IF WE WISH TO DO SO. HE DID NOT TAKE EXCEPTANCE TO MCNAMARA'S RECENT SPEECH OR OUR RECENT DECISION ON THIN ABM DEFENSIVES.

3. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH GOLDBERG PARTICIPATING, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE LARGELY A DISCUSSION OF STATUS OF THE PROVISIONAL DRAFT RESOLUTION WORKED OUT IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMED TO CLAIM THAT WE HAD RETREATED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT DECISION. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN AN ATTEMPT ON THEIR PART TO COVER THEIR OWN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SAME POSITION, ALTHOUGH NO MENTION WAS MADE BY GROMYKO OF TITO'S PROPOSAL. HE WAS BY NO MEANS INSISTENT UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS A PRELIMINARY BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE COULD BE ACCEPTED. IN THIS RESPECT THE TONE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS DIFFERENT THAN THAT OF KOSYGIN AT

~~PAGE 4 RUEHCR 62060 S E C R E T~~

GLASSBORO. GROMYKO INDICATED THAT THE TREND OF OPINION IN THE IMPORTANT ARAB STATES WAS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. HE DID LEAVE THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT PUBLICLY SUPPORT A POSITION WHICH MOST OF THE ARABS ARE UNWILLING TO BUY. ON OUR SIDE WE EMPHASIZED THE PRESIDENT'S 5 PRINCIPLES AND THE CRUCIAL POSITION OF THE REMOVAL OF THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE AREA.

4. THE ABOVE IS RATHER SMALL PICKINGS FOR A WHOLE EVENING BUT THE MIDDLE EAST TOOK UP MOST OF THE TIME. THERE WAS NO MENTION OF VIET-NAM IN THIS DISCUSSION BUT I EXPECT TO RAISE IT ON WEDNESDAY IF IT DOES NOT COME UP AT OUR DINNER WITH U THANT TOMORROW.

5. ON THE MISCELLANEOUS SIDE THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE EMBASSIES IN OUR TWO CAPITALS AND AN INDICATION FROM GROMYKO THAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO INAUGURATE THEIR CIVIL AIR FLIGHTS AS EARLY AS OCTOBER.

6. THE GENERAL ATMOSPHERE WAS REASONABLY RELAXED AS SUCH DISCUSSIONS GO BUT I WISH POINT OUT WE DID NOT REALLY GET INTO THE HARD CORE

~~PAGE 5 RUEHCR 62060 S E C R E T~~
OF MAJOR SUBSTANCE.

GP-2.

RUSK
BT

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DIS~~ ~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

W.W.R.
46
L. S. R.
2. Pres file

Tuesday, September 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Dinner for Prime Minister and Mrs. Otto Krag;
8:00 p.m., Wednesday, September 27

Krag is in the U.S. for the UN General Assembly -- and to improve his image at home. Biographic sketches of Krag and Mrs. Krag are at Tab A.

You have scheduled no substantive talk with Krag but if the opportunity arises during dinner, the following information might be useful:

Bilateral Relations: We have no serious problems with Denmark; it is unlikely that Krag will raise any bilateral issues.

Vietnam: In his UN speech last Friday, Krag endorsed a bombing halt followed by a reduction of military activities by both sides as the path to negotiations.

Middle East: Krag supports U Thant's suggestion to send a special representative to the Middle East.

East-West Relations: Krag's Wednesday noon speech at the Press Club will be mainly on bridge-building.

Europe: The Danes are very anxious to get into the Common Market and, therefore, will seek to minimize any difficulties with the French over where NATO is going. Krag strongly supports the NPT.

Greece: The Danes remain incensed over the military coup in Greece (the Greek Queen is the youngest daughter of the Danish Royal family). You may want to tell Krag about your recent talk with King Constantine.

* * * * *

You last met Krag in June, when he came for the UN Special Assembly on the Middle East. You last met Mrs. Krag in April 1966, when she accompanied her husband to a dinner dance you gave in their honor. You also gave them a state dinner on their previous American trip, in June 1964.

RHU:mst

W. W. Rostow RHU

ERL

4/6a

JENS OTTO KRAG

A strong supporter of Denmark's traditionally pro-NATO foreign policy, Krag has been Prime Minister since 1962, and, additionally, Foreign Minister since November 1966. (On October 1 he will hand over the Foreign Ministry to Hans Tabor, a professional diplomat, now Denmark's man at the UN; Krag will retain control in his own hands, however.) Krag's coalition government suffered losses in the November 1966 elections, necessitating collaboration with the far-left Socialist People's Party on domestic issues while continuing collaboration with conservative parties on foreign policy issues. An indication of Krag's political astuteness has been his ability thus far to manage both collaborations at no apparent cost to either his own Social Democratic Party or to traditional Danish foreign policy.

MRS. HELLE VIRKNER KRAG

One of Denmark's leading stage and screen actresses, and a director as well, Mrs. Krag married her husband while he was Foreign Minister in 1959. Now 41, she is his second wife. They have two young children.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, September 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Your meeting with George Brown - 10:00 a.m.,
Wednesday, September 27

Nick Katzenbach's memo is at Tab A.

Topics Brown May Raise1. Middle EastBrown will probably:

- say that Britain is hurting from the continued closure of the Canal. (They claim it costs them \$200 million for six months; we think that is too high.)
- urge that we try to reach some partial settlement that will at least open the Canal.
- perhaps go so far as to endorse the Yugoslav proposals as a starting point.

You may wish to answer that:

- we and the British must stick together; there should be no retreat from the principles you laid down on June 19.
- partial solutions such as the Yugo proposal will make it more difficult to end the belligerency.
- both of us should try to keep the Israelis from painting themselves into a corner.

2. Vietnam

before your meeting.

Rusk hopes you will read Brown's Tuesday UN speech (Tab B). He describes it as "gutsy and courageous".

3. Our ABM Decision

Brown may:

- express disappointment at our lack of consultation with NATO.
- say he fears effects of our decision on the arms race.
- say he thinks U.S. decision may endanger NPT.

You may wish to answer that:

- we are sorry British feel aggrieved. Bob McNamara, however, gave a full picture of our thinking on ABMs when the NATO Nuclear Planning Group met last April. We took Allied views into account.
- the Soviets know our decision is aimed at the Chinese. It should not escalate the arms race; in fact, it may put some pressure on the Russians to stop stalling. Our lines to Moscow are good.
- we can't see why our ABM should put the NPT in trouble. It should give Asian states greater assurance that we would be able to protect them against Chinese nuclear blackmail. This should give them less cause to go nuclear.

4. Byrnes Amendment

Brown will probably say he and Wilson understand the Congressional picture; while they are grateful for Bob McNamara's willingness to help on this one, they are worried about the future.

* * * * *

Brown will be accompanied by Pat Dean and Paul Gore-Booth (Permanent Under Secretary). I will stand by with Ed Fried and Harold Shullaw (State Country Director).

Walt Rostow



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

September 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Foreign Secretary
Brown, September 27, 10:00 a.m. —

Foreign Secretary Brown saw the Secretary in New York on Monday, September 25. Brown was preoccupied with the problems of Viet-Nam and the Middle East. He told the Secretary that in his conversations with Gromyko in New York the latter had been completely intransigent on Viet-Nam, merely reiterating calls for unconditional cessation of United States bombing and United States withdrawal. Brown thought, however, that Gromyko was more flexible on the Middle East and interested in a settlement, although the Soviets after two reverses were reluctant to get out in front.

On Viet-Nam Brown reiterated that the United Kingdom will continue to support United States policy. He expressed the hope, however, that the United States would carefully evaluate its bombing policy to see if it is essential to maintain its current pattern, having regard to the unfavorable impact it is having on public opinion. The Secretary expressed skepticism with respect to the impact of bombing on Hanoi or on Western public opinion, saying that our opponents on the Viet-Nam question moved easily from one position to another and without any recognition of the need for reciprocity. Brown fears that the forthcoming Labor Party conference (October 2-6) will be difficult on Viet-Nam.

On the Middle East Brown is anxious to see some movement toward a settlement. The continued closure of

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-402

By ip, NARA, Date 3-24-95

the Canal is costing Britain heavily in foreign exchange. After talking with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Brown believes the Yugoslavs might be prepared to modify the original Tito proposals to make them more balanced on the question of withdrawal and an end to belligerency.

The British Government, and Brown, have been unhappy at our announcement of an intention to deploy a limited ABM system. The British are particularly disturbed at what they regard as inadequate consultation with them and with our NATO allies prior to the announcement. They are also concerned about the Soviet reaction as well as the effects of the decision on progress toward a Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Byrnes amendment created a furor in Britain, but the British Government, assisted by Secretary McNamara's action on procurement of nine of the mine sweepers in question, has put the matter into a better perspective. Nevertheless this Congressional action has created real concern in the United Kingdom about other and more damaging possibilities, such as the Gross amendment.


Acting Secretary

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

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SECTO 9

PASS WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: FONSEC BROWN'S REMARKS ON VIETNAM AT UNGA

FOR POSSIBLE USE IN CONNECTION WITH BRITISH FONSEC BROWN'S
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON, THERE FOLLOWS PORTION BROWN'S
SEPT 26 UNGA SPEECH DEALING WITH VIETNAM (UNNECESSARY WORDS
OMMITTED): QTE I MUST NOW TURN TO ISSUE WHICH IS NOT FORMALLY
ON AGENDA BUT WHICH IS CERTAINLY ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS IN WORLD
TODAY AND WHICH MEMBERS OF ASSEMBLY CAN AND MUST HELP TO BRING

PAGE 2 RUEHDT 1011 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
SOLUTION--VIETNAM.

PAST YEAR HAS BEEN FILLED WITH KILLING AND DESTRUCTION
AND MARKED BY RANGE OF ABORTIVE ATTEMPTS BRING ABOUT PEACE.

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01011 270039Z

IT IS TRAGIC NORTH VIETNAM HAS DECLINED GRASP MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO NEGOTIATE WHICH HAVE BEEN OFFERED, AND STILL REMAIN OPEN TO THEM. THERE HAS BEEN NO REDUCTION IN FIGHTING. THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS TOWARDS SOLUTION. THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS OF ANOTHER SORT: FOR PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE SHOWN THEIR DETERMINATION FOLLOW CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES IN MIDST OF WAR, AND THEY WANT REGIME OF THEIR OWN CHOICE. BUT NEED FOR SOLUTION IS MORE URGENT THAN BEFORE.

"VIETNAM ITSELF CANNOT AFFORD LET WAR CONTINUE; AND NO MORE CAN ANY OF US, FOR CONFLICT DISTORTS RELATIONS BETWEEN US, AND HINDERS GROWTH OF PEACEFUL COOPERATION. IT IS DUTY OF ALL WHO HAVE INFLUENCE TO USE IT TO FIND WAY OF STOPPING FIGHTING, AND TO DO THIS SOBERLY AND IN FULL RECOGNITION OF THEIR

PAGE 3 RUEHDT 1011 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. USE OF VIOLENT AND EXCESSIVE LANGUAGE TOWARDS ANY OF PARTIES IN THIS CONFLICT CONTRIBUTES NOTHING TO SEARCH FOR PEACE.

"IN THIS SITUATION MY GOVT HOPE THAT ALL CONCERNED WITH CONFLICT WILL ACKNOWLEDGE NEED FOR COMPROMISE--NOT OF PRINCIPLES, BUT IN MOVING TO NEGOTIATION. WE WILL SUPPORT ANY INITIATIVE WHICH OFFERS CHANCE OF PROGRESS. WE HAVE WARMLY SUPPORTED PERSISTENT EFFORTS OF SYG, AND PLAN HE PUT FORWARD LAST MARCH. WE ARE READY MEET WITH GOVTS OF SOVIET UNION, INDIA, CANADA, AND POLAND AS PROPOSED BY PRES OF WORLD FEDERATION OF UN ASSOCIATIONS. IN SAME SPIRIT WE WELCOME DESIRE OF PERS-ELECT OF SOUTH VIETNAM TRY ONCE AGAIN TO BRIDGE GAP BETWEEN SAIGON AND HANOI.

"MUCH HAS BEEN SAID ABOUT BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. I JOIN WITH THOSE WHO WOULD DEARLY LIKE IT STOP. BUT I REGRET LEADERS OF NORTH VIETNAM HAVE NEVER SAID WHAT THEY WILL EITHER DO OR REFRAIN FROM DOING TO HELP PROCESS OF PEACE IF IT IS STOPPED. I AM CONSCIOUS, AS WE ALL MUST BE, THAT THERE ARE MILLIONS PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHO CRAVE FOR SHADOW OF KILLING AND MISERY BE

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PAGE 03 USUN N 01011 270039Z

~~PAGE 4 RUEHDT 1011 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
LIFTED FROM THEM.

"LAST YEAR, SPEAKING BEFORE THIS ASSEMBLY, I OUTLINED BASIS ON WHICH I BELIEVED SOLUTION TO CONFLICT COULD BE BUILT. THIS YEAR MR. GOLDBERG HAS SET OUT ELEMENTS OF SETTLEMENT ON BASIS APPROACHING MY OWN, AND I WELCOME HIS CLEAR EXPOSITION. IN MY VIEW FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES EMBODIED IN MY PLAN MUST STILL HOLD FIELD AND ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE ABLE RECOGNISE AND ACCEPT THEM.

"THERE MUST BE CEASE-FIRE. THERE MUST BE NEGOTIATIONS. FINAL SOLUTION MUST BE POLITICAL. AND THERE MUST BE INTERNATIONAL CONFIRMATION OF ARRANGEMENTS AGREED UPON BY COMBATANTS.

"I SEE NO REASON WHY BALANCED SETTLEMENT EMBRACING THESE PRINCIPLES SHOULD NOT BE ACHIEVED ON BASIS OF GENEVA AGREEMENTS. BOTH US AND NORTH VIETNAM HAVE SAID THIS BASIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM. I SEE NO REASON WHY POWER OF WORLD OPINION REPRESENTED BY ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT BE ALIGNED BEHIND THESE PRINCIPLES, AND BEHIND SUCH PLAN AS I OUTLINED LAST YAEER, SO COMBATANTS MAY

~~PAGE 5 RUEHDT 1011 CONFIDENTIAL LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
BE ENCOURAGED TOWARDS CONFERENCE TABLE. AND I SEE NO REASON WHY NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY, THOUGH ALL MUST ACCEPT THAT THEIR PROGRESS WOULD BE IMMEASURABLY EASED IF ALL HOSTILITIES HAD CEASED BEFOREHAND. I APPEAL TO ALL GOVTS REPRESENTED HERE WHO AGREE WITH ME TO MAKE THIS KNOWN, IN WHATEVER WAY THEY THINK BEST, TO THOSE ENGAGED IN CONFLICT WHO HAVE SO FAR IGNORED BOTH NEED AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEGOTIATION.
END QTE.

DECON UPON RECEIPT.

RUSK

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~~WWP~~

48

Pres file

Tuesday, September 26, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach recommending that you see Mariano Rumor, the leader of the Italian Christian Democrats, who will be in Washington October 16-18. Rumor is a likely future candidate for Prime Minister, with much influence in his party, and I think it would be a good idea if you could give him a little time.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

RHU:em

48a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for the Secretary of the
Italian Christian Democratic Party,
Mariano Rumor

Recommendation:

That you agree to receive Mr. Mariano Rumor during
his visit to Washington on October 16-18.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

You may recall that Secretary Rusk spoke to you in
May about Mr. Rumor's desire to see you when he visits
the United States this fall. He has now informed us
that he plans to be in Washington October 16-18, and
hopes very much that it will be possible for you to
receive him during that period.

Mr. Rumor is the leader of the majority party in
Italy and is a very likely future Prime Minister. In
consideration of the importance of the Christian
Democratic Party to the progress and stability of
democracy in Italy and to our own foreign policy
objectives, I recommend that you receive him while he
is here.

Mr. Rumor will call on Congressional leaders and
members of the Government while in Washington and is
planning an extensive round of calls in New York and in
California.



Nicholas deB Katzenbach

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49
Pres papers

Monday, September 25, 1967 -- 7:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President Diori of Niger (Tuesday, September 26)

Schedule:

11:30 AM South Lawn arrival ceremony, with military honors
and exchange of remarks

12 noon - Alone, with advisers standing by in Cabinet Room
1:00 PM

8:00 PM White House dinner

Papers:

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's general briefing memorandum.
At Tab B are State's suggested talking points.
At Tab C is biographic information on Diori.

Setting:

This is a regularly scheduled visit, not a stopover on the way to Expo. Diori has spent seven years trying to wrangle an invitation to meet an American President. He will spend two days here, followed by visits to the Peace Corps training center in the Virgin Islands; five days in Arizona, New Mexico, and California; a day in Chicago; and about a week in New York.

Diori is the first President of Niger, a large, sparsely-populated (2.6 million) arid country in West Central Africa, north of Nigeria. He has done an effective job of getting the nomadic herdsman who make up at least half of Niger's population to live in reasonable harmony with the sedentary farmers who make up the other half, despite great differences in tribe and tradition. In the process, he became the most obvious compromise candidate to be President of the two major organizations of French-speaking African states -- the Afro-Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) and the five-nation Entente. He doesn't yet swing as much weight as Houphouet-Boigny or Senghor, but he is less controversial than either, and rising in prestige.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-400
By ing, NARA, Date 4-5-95

We spend about \$1 million in aid to Niger each year -- primarily Technical Assistance -- and we have about 140 Peace Corps Volunteers there, mostly in agriculture and education. Diori is particularly fond of the Volunteers. (They have helped him quite a lot with his English, of which he is very proud.)

Substance:

Diori will not have a shopping list for you. He gets the bulk of his aid from France and is quite happy with this arrangement. He will be much more interested in Vietnam, Nigeria, and the Congo. You may wish to make some of the following points:

1. Nigeria Diori is one of the six African leaders named by the OAU to try to mediate the civil war in Nigeria. He is firmly committed to Gowon's Federal Military Government (FMG) and against the rebel "State" of Biafra. He was unhappy with us for refusing to sell Gowon arms and for publicly scolding the Russians for making arms sales. You might say that:

- Our paramount objective in Nigeria is peace. The civil war is a great tragedy for Nigeria, for Africa, and for the world.

- We recognize only the FMG; we have never wavered on this point.

- However, we do not believe it is in our interests or the interests of Nigeria to feed this civil war by selling arms to either side.

- We were very pleased that the OAU appointed President Diori and others as mediators. We stand prepared to support and encourage this effort in any way we can be helpful.

2. Congo Diori is very worried that Mobutu -- of whom he is not a great admirer -- will prove unequal to the challenge of the mercenaries, and that the Congo will dissolve into chaos which will spread throughout French-speaking Africa. He was mildly pleased that we sent the C-130's but he felt it made our position on arms sales to Nigeria even less tenable. You might say:

- We fully understand the threat posed by the mercenaries. We have spent \$550 million in the Congo since 1960 to promote unity and stability. We continue -- consistent with UN resolutions -- to support them within the limits of our means.

- We are still hopeful that Mobutu will find a way to get the mercenaries out of Africa without the racial disaster and political dissolution we all want to avoid.
 - We welcomed the OAU decision to take a resolute stand against the mercenaries and particularly their decision to rely on African ideas and resources to do it.
 - We see no contradiction between our decisions with respect to Nigeria and the Congo. The war in Nigeria is a true civil war. We regard it as an internal affair in which outsiders have no valid role other than to help bring about a cease fire. The problem in the Congo is a revolt of expatriate mercenaries which threatens to lead to racial disorder and irreversible chaos.
 - President Mobutu needs all the help he can get from the moderate Francophile leaders. We hope President Diori will use his influence to counsel patience, moderation and peaceful methods in this time of great trial.
3. U. S. Aid Policy Even though Niger is not much affected, Diori is concerned that our new policy will not allow us to support small regional projects which are important to developing individual countries but have no regional significance. You might say:
- We will examine the possibility of incorporating into regional schemes any projects President Diori thinks important to Niger.
 - Our new policy affects only AID programs; P. L. 480, Export-Import Bank, and the Peace Corps will continue to be available on a bilateral basis.
 - In addition, if the Congress grants our request, each Ambassador will have a small Self Help Fund (up to \$200,000) for small projects of special merit.
 - The new policy will not affect programs to which we are currently committed. In particular, we are now prepared to sign the remaining loan commitment (\$900,000) necessary for construction of the John F. Kennedy Memorial Bridge across the Niger River at Diori's capital of Niamey (Nee-am-may).

4. Middle East Diori thinks a settlement will come only when we and the Russians agree formally to guarantee it. He may urge you to push a scheme with Kosygin. Diori favors a deal involving Israeli withdrawal, the end of belligerency, recognition of Israel's right to exist, freedom of passage in international waterways, arms control, internationalization of Jerusalem, and creation of a new state on the West Bank. You might say:

- We believe the parties themselves must devise a solution. Nobody can impose one.
- If the Arabs moved on non-belligerence, our hunch is that the rest of the bargain could be worked out.

W. W. Rostow

Hamilton/vmr

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DIO/G-2

September 22, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By lip, NARA, Date 3-24-95

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

496

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with President Diori Hamani
of Niger, September 26, 12:00 Noon

Significance of the Visit

Niger is a Western-oriented country which has made steady, if unspectacular progress, under President Diori's leadership. Although his country is heavily dependent on France, Diori is anxious to learn more about the United States and understand our policies. He has looked forward for seven years to an opportunity to exchange views with an American President.

We believe that it is important to lend encouragement to a friendly voice of reason in Africa. This is all the more desirable since Diori is currently President of a 14-nation organization of francophone countries and is one of the six African chiefs of state involved in mediation of the Nigerian problem.

President Diori has appreciated our modest AID program (about \$1 million a year) and has developed great admiration for the selfless dedication of the Peace Corps Volunteers working in Niger (presently numbering about 140), some of whom have become his personal friends. Through assiduous study of English, under the tutelage of PCVs and US Embassy personnel, he has gained considerable knowledge and a certain fondness of things American.

The Country and the Man

Although Niger is poor and isolated, three-fourths desert and far from economic takeoff, President Diori is justly proud

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,
not automatically declassified.

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- 2 -


of the degree to which it has become a unified nation. Lacking geographic, cultural, or economic unity, Niger is a classic product of the arbitrary boundaries drawn by the European powers in their 19th century scramble for Africa. For President Diori, the first task of independence was to begin to make one people of the nomads of the North, the sedentary farmers of the South, and the half of the population which by tribe and tradition is oriented toward neighboring Nigeria. He has made considerable progress in this work and now likes to speak of Niger as a melting pot, "a crucible for cultures and civilizations."

Diori himself is a former school teacher who has directed the affairs of government in Niger since 1958, two years before independence. Open and unpretentious in manner, he is a practical, calm, realistic administrator. He has grown in stature with increased responsibility. In the past year, as President of both the 14-nation Afro-Malagasy Common Organization (OCAM) and the 5-nation Council of the Entente, he has emerged as a leader of continental standing.

The Issues

Niger is strongly oriented towards the West, and there are no specific bilateral issues on which its interests and those of the US are in serious conflict. President Diori is concerned, however, that Niger has something to lose and little to gain from our shift of emphasis to regional aid in Africa. He also feels that certain aspects of US commercial policy conflict with his goal of stabilized high prices for Africa's agricultural products. He is disturbed too by our refusal to sell arms to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. He may wish to discuss the Middle East conflict, which he believes can be resolved only by Great Power agreement, and the Congo, where he sees removal of the mercenaries as a matter of great urgency. He will also be interested in discussing our policy in Viet-Nam, which he supports in general but has doubts about in certain respects.


A more detailed Talking Paper is enclosed.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure:

Talking Paper

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49d

Talking Paper for Your Meeting with
President Diori Hamani of Niger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-402

By inf, NARA, Date 3-24-95

Points Which You May Wish to Raise

1. Recent OAU Conference. You may wish to commend President Diori for his responsible role at the recent Kinshasa meeting of the OAU (Organization for African Unity) and ask him for his assessment of the meeting's accomplishments.

2. Viet-Nam. If President Diori does not raise the issue himself, you may wish to brief him on Viet-Nam. While generally sympathetic to our actions and objectives there, he is regularly exposed, through press, radio, and personal contact, to General de Gaulle's view of the situation. He has expressed to our Ambassador some concern over the casualties suffered by the civilian population in the bombing of the North. He also recently told a Chinese Nationalist delegation that, in his opinion, the Government of South Viet-Nam and the US could achieve victory only by taking measures to improve the material lot of the South Viet-Nameese peasant.

3. US Race Relations. If there is a suitable opportunity to do so, you may wish to discuss the American racial situation with President Diori. Diori is a firm believer in non-violent solutions to political and social problems. While concerned about the pace of our progress toward racial equality, he has said publicly that he believes your administration is determined to do everything humanly possible to achieve this goal. From the French news sources which dominate Niger's media output, however, he is regularly subjected to a highly distorted and unfavorable picture of race relations in the US. Recent coverage creates the impression that the average Negro in our society no longer considers himself an American, rejects the war in Viet-Nam, and enthusiastically embraces violence as the only means to find redress for his grievances.

4. Proposed John F. Kennedy Bridge. You may wish to inform President Diori we are ready to execute a loan agreement amendment to provide an increase of \$900,000 in the AID development loan of \$1,800,000 made in 1964 for the John F. Kennedy Bridge across the Niger River at Niamey. Negotiations between the Government of Niger and the American contractor (Brezina Construction Co. of Rapid, South Dakota) should be completed shortly, and at that time construction may commence.

The proposed bridge, long a favorite project of President Diori, will replace the present ferry service. It will be the only bridge across the Niger in that area and will serve as a link in the country's main highway, the east-west road that joins Niger to Upper Volta.

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Points Which President Diori Hamani May Raise

1. US Aid Policy. US assistance is far less important to Niger than aid from France and the Common Market, averaging just over a million dollars a year as compared with about \$15 and \$8 million a year respectively for the latter two. Yet it has been appreciated, and President Diori has expressed concern that projects which he considers important to Niger's economic development, such as three USAID-sponsored young farmers' training centers, will not be continued or expanded as we shift our emphasis from bilateral to regional programs. (The bilateral USAID program for Niger is scheduled to end in FY 1969.)

He also fears that the poorer savannah countries in west Africa are too far behind the more developed coastal states to derive much benefit from regional programs and that our new policy will be of little benefit to Africa in those sectors, such as agriculture, where he feels programs are not easily amenable to regional organization. He may express impatience that the new regional aid which we have proposed for his area consists largely of studies, rather than projects for US financing.

You may wish to say:

a. While bilateral USAID programs are being phased out in a number of countries, PL 480 commodities, the Self-Help Fund, Export-Import Bank financing and assistance through the Peace Corps will continue to be available on a bilateral basis.

b. We are cognizant of the development gap between the coastal and inland states and, wherever possible, will tailor our regional assistance to help reduce this gap. We welcome President Diori's suggestions as to how this may be done.

c. We do intend to move as quickly as possible from studies to project implementation in our regional aid.

d. If Niger's neighbors show interest in the idea, we are ready to examine the possibility of turning Niger's young farmers' training centers into regional institutions.

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2. Trade Problems.

President Diori may say:

a. U.S. production subsidies result in excessive U.S. exports and hence low world prices for cotton and vegetable fats and oils. This hurts Niger and certain other OCAM exporting countries which cannot offer their farmers subsidies or cut production costs through large-scale mechanization.

b. The generalized preferences for all underdeveloped countries espoused by the US would only produce unwelcome Latin American competition for OCAM-country exports to the EEC.

You may wish to say:

a. We want to avoid any unfair competition with Nigerien, OCAM, or any other LDC exports, and our procedures for consultation are intended to provide for avoiding any such unfortunate result. We have been moving towards a freer U.S. agricultural and marketing system, and we are cooperating in international efforts to lower trade barriers against LDC products. Moreover, our food is important in alleviating hunger. Also, foreign production has been encouraged by the umbrella over world prices resulting from U.S. price supports.

b. We hope that as plans for generalized preferences develop, they will promise greater benefits to LDCs than are obtained through parochial trading systems.

(Further information on this subject is provided in a separate background paper.)

3. The Middle East. President Diori believes that only a settlement agreed upon and formally guaranteed by the great powers can achieve lasting peace in the Middle East. He may urge that we renew our efforts to come to terms with the Soviets on such a settlement. (Diori privately favors a solution embodying: an Israeli withdrawal; termination of the state of belligerency; recognition of Israel's right to exist; creation of a Palestinian state (presumably on the West Bank of the Jordan); freedom of navigation in all international waterways; arms control; and internationalization of Jerusalem.)

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You may wish to state our conviction that primary responsibility for solution of the problem rests with the parties directly involved. A solution cannot be imposed from outside. We feel that the key obstacle now is the unwillingness of the Arabs to renounce the rights of belligerency. Were they to do this, we believe there would be a good chance for settlement of the other outstanding problems. We would certainly be prepared to help to achieve this.

4. Nigeria. Niger fully supports the Federal Military Government's (FMG's) efforts to maintain the unity of Nigeria and bring secessionist "Biafra" back into the Federation (background provided in separate paper on Niger's foreign policy). The Niger Government has even helped the FMG procure arms and ammunition. President Diori may ask, as he has before, why the US refuses to sell arms to the FMG, when we have given military assistance to General Mobutu's government in what Diori sees as similar circumstances. He may express his concern that an FMG victory with Communist arms, which Nigeria sought and received after being turned down by the US and Britain, may have serious repercussions for all of West Africa.

You may wish to say:

a. We believe the present crisis in Nigeria is an internal matter. Although we recognize the FMG and do not recognize "Biafra", we have refrained from any action which could be interpreted as interference in Nigerian affairs or contribute to escalation of the conflict.

b. The Congo, on the other hand, faces an external threat. It is attempting to put down a rebellion not of Congolese, but of foreign mercenaries.

c. We particularly welcome the OAU's initiative in sending a consultative mission to Lagos and hope it may lead to an early end to the hostilities. We wish President Diori and the other distinguished members of the Mission every success.

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5. Congo. While supporting the present government in Kinshasa, Diori probably has little faith in Mobutu's leadership ability and fears that he is susceptible to the influence of Africa's radicals. He has expressed deep concern at the prospect of Soviet or Cuban military assistance to the Congo and feels that, to preclude this, the mercenaries must be gotten out as expeditiously as possible. He may ask whether the US is willing to give further military aid to General Mobutu if present efforts to arrange departure of the mercenaries fail.

You may wish to say:

a. We share President Diori's concern over the possibility of President Mobutu accepting military aid from the Soviets and Cubans. We have been greatly encouraged, however, by the resolute action taken by the OAU concerning the mercenaries, particularly their decision to rely on African ideas and resources, and we sincerely hope it will succeed.

b. The three C-130s which we made available to President Mobutu to help against the mercenaries, together with our normal military and economic aid programs, represent the limits of the assistance we can give to the Congo at this time. We believe African efforts to solve their own problems with their own resources are the most efficient and desirable way to advance African unity and eliminate outside interference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 25, 1967
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read these three
British cables covering George Brown's
conversations with Gromyko on: Viet
Nam, NPT, and the Middle East.

Pres. file

W. W. Rostow

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
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 128, NARA, Date 10-22-91

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2410

23 SEPTEMBER 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2410 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS AND SAIGON.

BY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAMS.

TALK WITH GROMYKO ; VIETNAM.

GROMYKO WAS UNYIELDING. WITHOUT THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING THERE WOULD BE NO PROGRESS; HE COULD NOT ANSWER FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BUT THE SITUATION WOULD BE MORE FAVOURABLE THEREAFTER; THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REGARDED ENQUIRIES ON WHAT WOULD FOLLOW A CESSATION AS IMPOSING CONDITIONS, AND A PAUSE WHICH ASSUMED A RESUMPTION OF BOMBING IF THERE WERE NO RESPONSE FROM HANOI AS AN ULTIMATUM. TO RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS QUOTE UNREALISTIC AND WE HAD BETTER NOT TALK ABOUT IT UNQUOTE. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE MUST ALSO KNOW THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD GET OUT OF VIETNAM. THERE WERE QUOTE SO MANY IF'S UNQUOTE IN AMERICAN STATEMENTS ON THIS POINT.

2. I SAW NO VALUE IN RAISING THE BEBLER PROPOSAL AND THEREFORE DID NOT MENTION IT.

3. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAMS.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 405 PARIS 389 AND SAIGON 14.

LORD CARADON

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 6-8-00

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(Mr Gilman)
(Mr Andros)
(HE)

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SP
MPT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY U.K. MISSION NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 2412

23 SEPTEMBER 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2412 OF 23 SEPTEMBER

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON ^{FOR} MOSCOW PARIS AND

UKMIS GENEVA.

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAMS.

TALK WITH GROMYKO: DISARMAMENT.

I ASKED MR. GROMYKO WHAT HE THOUGHT WERE THE LIKELY PROSPECTS FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS FAIRLY OPTIMISTIC THAT AGREEMENT WOULD BE REACHED ON ARTICLE 3 AND, THEREFORE, ON THE DRAFT TREATY AS A WHOLE. HE WAS VERY NEGATIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING OTHER AMENDMENTS (HOWEVER MODEST) IN THE DRAFT TREATY, SUCH AS THOSE PUT FORWARD BY MEXICO.

2. WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION WHETHER INDIA WOULD IN THE END ADHERE TO THE TREATY. GROMYKO WAS REASONABLY HOPEFUL.

3. SEE ALSO MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

F.O. PASS PRIORITY MOSCOW 407, PARIS 391 AND UKMIS GENEVA 85.

LORD CARADON

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CHANCERY GENERAL
Chancery Action
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By WJG, NARA, Date 6-15-00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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EXDIS

23 SEPTEMBER 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELNO 2409 OF 23 SEPTEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON MOSCOW PARIS CAIRO AND TEL AVIV.
FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

EXDIS

12

TALK WITH GROMYKO: THE MIDDLE EAST.

I HAD A GOOD TALK TO GROMYKO. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND RELAXED
THROUGHOUT OUR WHOLE INTERVIEW ON THIS AND OTHER SUBJECTS.

2...I FIRST ASKED HIM WHETHER WE COULD MAKE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS
OF WHAT HAD COME TO BE CALLED THE GOLDBERG/DOBRYNIN FORMULA
DISCUSSED IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN JULY. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT
MOST OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS WERE NOW MORE MODERATE IN THEIR
APPROACH TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM. THIS HAD BEEN EVIDENT AT THE
KHARTOUM CONFERENCE. EVEN THE ALGERIANS SEEMED TO BE BECOMING
MORE MODERATE. MOREOVER, THE RUSSIANS HAD NO SYMPATHY FOR THE
HARDER LINE SHOWN BY THE SYRIANS. BUT THE MAJOR QUESTION WAS
STILL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COUPLE
THIS WITH SOME INFORMAL AGREEMENT ABOUT RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL?
SO FAR AS THE JULY PROPOSALS WERE CONCERNED, IT WAS THE AMERICANS
WHOSE ATTITUDE SEEMED TO HIM TO BE GETTING HARDER. HE QUOTED AS
EXAMPLES:-

(A) THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI SHIPS USING THE QUEZ CANAL WHICH
HE CLAIMED HAD NOT BEEN A PART OF THE PROPOSALS DISCUSSED
IN JULY:

(B) THE AMERICAN POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL SEEMED LESS "CLEAR-
CUT" THAN BEFORE:

(C) JERUSALEM - ON WHICH THE AMERICANS STILL TOOK A HARD LINE.

3...I TOLD GROMYKO THAT I THOUGHT THAT THE AMERICAN LINE IN
GENERAL WAS MORE FORTHCOMING. BUT THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP WAS
TO BRING THE WHOLE QUESTION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

4...IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM ME, GROMYKO SAID HE THOUGHT THAT

/ THE IDEA

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines

By ju, NARA, Date 6-8-00

THE IDEA OF APPOINTING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS NOT AT PRESENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. I SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS WAS NOT A PROPOSAL FOR A "MEDIATOR" BUT FOR A "REPRESENTATIVE" WHO COULD VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST ON BEHALF OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, HEAR THE VIEWS OF ALL CONCERNED AND THEN SUBMIT RECOMMENDATIONS. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT THE ARABS WOULD STILL TAKE THE VIEW THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF A REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE PART OF AN OVERALL AGREEMENT. ON THE OTHER HAND HE FULLY AGREED THAT A SETTLEMENT COULD ONLY BE REACHED WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS RATHER THAN BILATERALLY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES.

5...WE HAD A BRIEF TALK ON THE TITO PROPOSALS WHICH GROMYKO SUPPORTED. I MADE OUR OWN VIEWS CLEAR.

6...ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIAN POSITION, AS DESCRIBED BY MR GROMYKO, HAS NOT ADVANCED, I THINK THEY WANT A SETTLEMENT PROVIDED THAT THEY KEEP STRICTLY IN LINE WITH THE ARABS. GROMYKO SEEMED TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING THAN I HAD EXPECTED IN THE LIGHT OF THE REPORTS WHICH WE HAVE HAD FROM GENE ROSTOW AND OTHERS.

7...SEE ALSO M A F TELEGRAMS (NOT TO ALL).

F O PASS MOSCOW 404, PARIS 388, CAIRO 95 AND TEL AVIV 409.

LORD CARADON.

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
6:00 p. m.

~~1 - [unclear]~~
2 - [unclear]
3 - [unclear]

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report indicates that the potential Thai crisis may have subsided -- at least for the time being.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (BANGKOK 1328)

cc: M1 Goldstein

~~SECRET~~

51a

Monday, September 25, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM UNGER (Bangkok, 1328)

This morning Deputy Chief of Mission Hannah and I called on Marshal Dawee so that we could dispose of some urgent business before his departure tomorrow morning for a three-week trip to Taiwan, Korea and Japan. After we had covered DYEMARKER and troop contribution questions, I asked for a few minutes alone with Dawee, raised the question of Praphat's pleas for a forced reshuffle and asked him where this matter stood.

Dawee said that things were quiet again and that Praphat was no longer planning to force a change. According to Dawee, it was Thanom's unwillingness to cover up the Surachit case which had precipitated Praphat's anger in the first place. Dawee said that he had had several frank talks with Praphat telling him not to make his reputation worse by pressing for a whitewash of Surachit who everybody knew had been involved in corruption. Praphat accepted Dawee's arguments even though grudgingly and Dawee appeared confident that for the time being at least the kind of action reported previously will not be undertaken.

He also pointed out to me a comment of Prime Minister Thanom some days ago when it had been suggested to him that some of the Ministers were getting along in years and not as effective as they might be and he had acknowledged that he was considering some changes. Although Dawee did not specifically say so, it was my impression that he was telling me this to point out that Thanom has, in fact, indicated some willingness to make some concessions to Praphat's discontent about certain Ministers. (We will try to follow up and find out through other sources who it is Thanom may have had in mind.)

Dawee also told me that Praphat had done a good deal of grumbling and growling about the Constitution and elections and that even Thanom had expressed some doubts on this score. He said that he had pointed out to both of them that it was for the Assembly to decide on these matters and that it would not be proper for them to intervene. He left me with the impression that plans for the promulgation of the Constitution stand about as we have understood.

Dawee said that an important element in Praphat's discontent and in some of the attitudes of other top officials was their uncertainty about the help they could expect from the U.S. to protect their own security at the same time they were making a contribution to Vietnam. If the U.S. can give affirmative responses on the

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-241

By abm, NARA Date 5-8-01

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

important requirements which the Thais have put forward, the kind of plotting which had threatened earlier could be effectively kept under control. As reported earlier, the hawks are one of the most important elements in the Thais' thinking in this regard.

Our conversation was very frank and easy, and, although Dawee was obviously painting himself as the great force for good sense and moderation in the Thai leadership, I think he gave me essentially a straight story. I told him it was thought he had done well in all respects and had been very wise to work so hard to head off a development which would have put real difficulties in the way of our cooperation. Thailand has built itself an excellent reputation over recent years for its steady course and seriousness and good sense and I was very pleased that he had managed to keep things on an even keel. He looked pleased with himself and we agreed to stay in close contact after his trip.


~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
5:30 p. m.

~~1. P file~~
2. P file 52

MR. PRESIDENT:



3.4(b)(1),(3)

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~ attachment

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-311
By Sj, NARA, Date 1-24-03

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-400
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-5-95

53

~~SECRET~~

Monday - 4:00 pm
September 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers

On all counts, the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers went well within the limits of what we thought possible.

The basic resolution was approved 20 to 0, with Mexico abstaining.

The resolution has all the points which the Venezuelans and we originally sought (copy attached):

- a strong condemnation of Cuba for acts of aggression in Venezuela and Bolivia.
- a request to free world countries to restrict their trade with Cuba and a recommendation to OAS members that they press this request individually or collectively.
- an expression of serious concern to the Communist countries that their support of Castro stimulates his subversive activities, and a recommendation to OAS members that they make joint or individual representations to manifest this concern.
- a call upon governments supporting the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization to withdraw their support of the organization because it fosters subversion.
- a recommendation to OAS Governments not to use ships in the Cuban trade and deny them bunkering facilities.
- a call on OAS Governments for tighter controls over subversive activities.

At Congressman Selden's request, Secretary Rusk tried to get in the notion of the OAS Secretariat keeping a list of private firms trading with Cuba, but this did not prosper.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

In the separate resolution, sponsored by Chile, Venezuela and Colombia, it was agreed to call attention in the UN to Cuba's subversive activities. Mexico went along with this decision.

The resolutions will not topple Castro but they provide OAS-sanctioned levers for pressuring our European friends and Soviet bloc countries to put the heat on him. Now we must get the Latins to pull these levers. Covey Oliver is working on this.

The resolutions also give Venezuela strong moral support which will be helpful to President Leoni domestically. To the extent that Cuba becomes a political issue here over the next 13 months, the resolution will help to show that we have been active in mobilizing additional collective action to squeeze Castro.

We may well find that Castro will persist in his guerrilla activities, despite getting his fingers burned. This raises the question of what further action can be taken to deter Castro. Bill Bowdler and I were discussing this over the weekend. We concluded that the next step might be measured retaliation by the aggrieved state against Cuba. There is authority for this in the 1964 resolution. Many aspects need to be sorted out. We plan to use the IRG-SIG mechanism to assess the advisability of this course.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

OAS Resolution

~~SECRET~~

III

WHEREAS:

The report of Committee I of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs states among its conclusions that "it is clear that the present Government of Cuba continues to give moral and material support to the Venezuelan guerrilla and terrorist movement and that the recent series of aggressive acts against the Government of Venezuela is part of the Cuban Government's continuing policy of persistent intervention in the internal affairs of other American states by fostering and organizing subversive and terrorist activities in their territories";

Committee II of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, responsible for preparing a report on events related to the so-called First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference, stated that the so-called First Latin American Solidarity Conference, held in Havana from July 31 to August 8, 1967, "represents a further step in the efforts of communism and other subversive forces in the hemisphere to promote, support, and coordinate guerrilla, terrorist, and other subversive activities directed against established governments" and gives "testimony once again to the efforts of the Government of Cuba to control and direct these subversive activities in our hemisphere";

During the course of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation the Government of Bolivia has presented evidence of intervention by the Government of Cuba in the preparation, financing, and organization of guerrilla activities in its territory;

The difficult social and economic conditions under which the peoples of Latin America live serve communism as a means for arousing the internal subversion that distorts the legitimate longings of our countries for justice and for change;

The affirmation that the democratic system is the proper path for achieving the desires of the Latin American peoples must be supported by suitable actions and programs that will promote the structural changes necessary for progress and for the strengthening of the system;

Economic cooperation among the American states to speed up and harmonize development is essential to the stability of democracy and the consolidation of the inter-American system in the face of the subversive aims of international communism;

Respect for and observance of human rights constitute a basic universal as well as inter-American juridical principle essential to the effective security of the hemisphere; and

In spite of this, in practice events occur that are incompatible with the system of protection and guarantee that all countries are obligated to establish in behalf of the individual,

The Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

RESOLVES:

1. To condemn forcefully the present Government of Cuba for its repeated acts of aggression and intervention against Venezuela and for its persistent policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Bolivia and of other American states, through incitement and active and admitted support of armed bands and other subversive activities directed against the governments of those states.

2. To request the states that are not members of the Organization of American States and that share the principles of the inter-American system to restrict their trade and financial operations with Cuba and sea and air transport to that country, especially transactions and transportation conducted through state agencies, until such time as the Cuban regime ceases its policy of intervention and aggression, and to indicate to them that the granting of state credits or credit guarantees to private firms conducting such transactions cannot be viewed as a friendly gesture by the member states of the Organization; and to this end to recommend to the member states that, individually or collectively, they reiterate this position to the governments of those states.

3. To request the governments that support establishment of the so-called Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAIAPSO) to withdraw their support or adherence from that organization, and also from the "Second Tricontinental Conference," scheduled to be held in Cairo in January 1968; to denounce these activities as contrary to the sovereignty, peaceful relations, and social and economic development of the peoples; and to declare that support by countries outside the hemisphere to activities conducive to subversion in Latin America jeopardizes solidarity among the developing countries, the increasing importance of which is particularly reflected in the efforts being made to reorganize international trade on more equitable bases.

4. To express to the states that are not members of the Organization of American States that support the Government of Cuba the serious concern of the member states of the Organization, inasmuch as that support tends to stimulate the interventionist and aggressive activities of the Cuban regime against the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and since the cause of peaceful relations will be jeopardized so long as those activities continue; and to this end, to recommend to the governments of the member states of the Organization that they carry out joint or individual representations directed to the states that support the Government of Cuba, to manifest this concern to them.

5. To recommend to the governments of the member states of the Organization of American States that they apply strictly the recommendations contained in the first report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of July 3, 1963, relative to the prevention of propaganda and of the movement of funds and arms from Cuba and other illegal sources to other American countries, as well as to the strengthening of controls on travel to and from Cuba in order to prevent the movement of subversive persons, and that they coordinate more effectively their efforts aimed at preventing such movements and shipments.

6. To recommend to the governments of the member states of the Organization that, in accordance with their domestic legislation, they adopt or intensify, as appropriate, measures of vigilance and control on their respective coasts and borders, in order to prevent the entry into their own territory, or the exit, of men, arms, or equipment coming from Cuba and intended for purposes of subversion and aggression.

7. To recommend to the member states of the Organization that, in accordance with their constitutional and legal provisions, they maintain, within their territory, the most strict vigilance over the activities of the so-called Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) and its national committees.

8. To recommend to the member states of the Organization the application, where necessary, of all the recommendations contained in the Report of the Special Committee to Study Resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, on the so-called First Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference and its Projections ("Tricontinental Conference of Havana"), dated November 28, 1966.

9. To recommend to the governments of the member states that they take such steps as they deem pertinent in order to coordinate, among neighboring countries, the measures of vigilance, security, and information set forth in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above.

10. To recommend to the governments of the member states that they decline to ship any governmental or government-financed cargo in any vessel that, following the date of this resolution, has engaged in the shipment of cargo to or from Cuba, and that, in addition, the governments of the member states take the necessary measures to prohibit the supply of fuel to any such vessel in their ports, with the exception of cases in which shipments are made for humanitarian purposes.

11. To reaffirm that the maintenance of order and of internal and external security is the exclusive responsibility of the government of each member state, without prejudice to its reiterated adherence to the principle of collective and mutual security for the preservation of peace, in accordance with the treaties on this subject.

12. To express concern that the growth rates of the developing countries of Latin America and the degree of their participation in international trade are not equal to the corresponding rates of growth and expansion of trade of the industrialized countries of the world, and that this situation could result in new and more acute social conflicts that Castro-communism could use to advantage to provoke or intensify subversion and violence and to upset the course of development of the hemisphere.

13. To reaffirm that the principal means of achieving security and prosperity in the hemisphere is development by peaceful and democratic methods, and that the subversion promoted by Cuba disturbs that process.

14. To reiterate its conviction that economic and social development can and should be achieved only within a system that respects democracy and human rights, and on the basis of actions and programs that will coordinate domestic efforts with international cooperation, to satisfy the undeferrable aspirations and needs of the peoples of the Americas.

15. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the Security Council of the United Nations the texts of this resolution and of the reports of Committees I and II of this Meeting of Consultation, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

54

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
3:45 p.m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Abe Feinberg called to say:

1. The hold-up on minor military items is becoming "politically embarrassing." He is not referring to aircraft or heavy items, but to small replacements.
2. He has been reliably assured that this is not a matter of "pressuring Israel for political concessions," but simply a matter of broad policy awaiting the resolution of the debate on military assistance in the Congress. But he urges that we loosen up a little.
3. The reason for the embarrassment is that the Jewish Telegraphic Agency has published a story about "pressure" which is circulating through the American Jewish community. He is anxious that you not lose political capital on a misinterpreted and minor matter.
4. He knew, incidentally, that it was on the agenda for discussion at our lunch tomorrow.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By ijp, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
3:00 p. m.

55

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a pretty full portrait of Israel's
frame of mind at the moment.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS attachment
(US/UN 950)

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

FROM US Mission, US/UN 950

September 23, 1967

SUBJECT: Israeli Views on Middle East

In a dinner conversation with me on September 19, Eban outlined current Israeli policy flowing from internal debate during the summer and a recent series of cabinet meetings. The essential points he made are set out below. Rafael and Harman were present on the Israeli side, and Sisco, Buffum and Pedersen on the U. S. side.

Eban said the most important thing was that they had decided to take current stands on the position of a security principle rather than on a territorial basis and to keep their options open for future negotiations. Implications that their position had hardened since last June was not true, he said. However, if Israel were compelled to state its specific policy publicly at this time they would have to be stated in a Maximalist position. Israel's general position was that in the absence of a situation of peace, Israel would have to maintain its positions on the basis of considerations of national security but in a peace agreement with Arabs they could be in a flexible negotiating position.

With respect to Egypt, Eban said their idea was that the border would follow the international frontier. There would be an international presence in the Straits of Tiran to assure freedom of navigation, possibly of major maritime powers in the Gulf or something on the shore. There would be a demilitarization of the Sinai. The Suez Canal would be open to ships of all nations on the basis of "declaratory assurances" (i. e. without some external presence). Demilitarization of the Sinai would be assured by some sort of international presence, possibly an enlarged United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization type of operation, and possibly including United Arab Republic and Israeli troops. The idea of demilitarization of the Sinai was difficult to achieve if the United Arab Republic stayed in the Gaza strip.

The Gaza Territory was also a security problem for Israel. Israel would like to have the territory without the population but did not see how that could come about. He intimated there may even be an exchange of territory along the international frontier in favor of Egypt in return for the Gaza Strip going to Israel. He thought Egypt might even be glad to be rid of the Gaza Strip. Another possibility apparently under consideration was some form of international authority of the Gaza Strip. (Eban noted this

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-276

By cbm, NARA Date 3-30-01

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

had been discussed in 1956 with the U. S. and that he had a memcon with Dulles in his files about it.)

On Syria, he said it was hard to contemplate an early peace agreement as long as the Syrian government retained its present complexion. There had been a discussion of a demilitarization arrangement on the Syrian Heights similar to the idea regarding Sinai. The conclusion, however, which he shared, was that this would not be safe and that some territorial adjustments would have to be made.

Regarding Jerusalem, the holy Moslem quarter would create perpetual emotional religious problems as long as it was under Israeli control. The Government of Israel therefore had in mind an arrangement which would put it under Moslem control and sovereignty. The rest of the city was now united, and Arab inhabitants were free to travel throughout Israel. There could be some arrangement which would insure free Jordanian access to and participation in the economic life of the city.

The West Bank presented particularly difficult problems. Incorporation of the West Bank into Israel, with its large Arab population, would completely transform Israel's national existence and reason for being. An Israeli demographic expert had estimated that at the present rate of population growth this would produce an Arab majority in Israel within 15 years. In any case it would cause a total reshaping of Israeli politics, as Arab votes were sought, and thus produce alterations in the structure of Israel that they did not desire. Neither could the Arabs be incorporated into Israel without granting them Israeli citizenship. This would not be permitted by the International community nor would it be acceptable to the Israeli people themselves.

Eban said they had also given thought to establishment of a separate, autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank. This also had serious drawbacks. The days of autonomous dependent regions had really passed.

Creation of a Palestinian state might simply increase irredentist desires. There would be yet another Arab state on the Arab scene. In a year or two it would ask for UN membership, and it would be admitted. Such prospects did not look attractive. On the other hand, now that the Israelis for the first time had an opportunity to visit areas of historic significance to them, it would be difficult for their citizens to understand

the government simply turning the area back. The sort of thinking they were therefore thinking of would include two elements: a. demilitarization of West Bank, with a UN inspection system, and b. some form of economic, customs or travel arrangements which would permit access to and larger cooperation with the area. He referred to the possibility of a free port on the Mediterranean for Jordan as a move in the same direction. I believe he also had in mind some border adjustments for security purposes, as he referred to Israeli security psychosis resulting from the fact the entire population was in range of Arab guns but he was not precise about what they might be.

Regarding the refugee problem, Eban made clear Israel was deliberately opening up travel from Gaza to the West Bank in hopes it would relieve population pressures in Gaza. He also said Israel was issuing a few small pilot projects for economic resettlement for a few refugees in order to demonstrate the feasibility of doing this within a reasonable length of time. He implied Israel would welcome international help for a much larger effort.

Regarding the General Assembly, Eban thought there would be a substantial Arab effort to obtain political backing for their position requiring Israeli withdrawal without compensating actions on their side. If this failed, the possibilities of direct settlement would be enhanced. He thought the objective in the Assembly should be to insure that no such decision were taken. He said specifically that appointment of a UN Representative without any precise terms of reference would be acceptable, but indicated the Government of Israel does not want to play this card yet.

In explaining Israel's insistence of a settlement directly committing parties in the area, Eban expounded Israel's considered assessment of events leading up to the current outbreak of fighting. One of their basic conclusions from this was that external restraints, including both the UN and direct support that could be expected in the interests of its security by Israel from various countries including France and U.S. and from maritime powers with respect to maritime rights, were weaker than both they and the United Arab Republic had calculated. In the future, therefore, security guarantees had to come from the area and to a much lesser extent from external force.

Their appreciation of the sequence of events was: (a) In the middle of May Nasser's objective was to apply pressures on Israel to prevent Israel from retaliating against Syrian Al Fatah raids. He had been spurred on to this by the Soviet Union which wanted to protect Syria and which gave the United Arab Republic false intelligence about Israeli troop concentrations on the Syrian border. Nasser's intention was to hold a corridor to Israel so that his troops were in direct confrontation with Israel. Israel knew as a fact that he was prepared to have UN Emergency Force stay in the straits of Tiran, Gaza, and Quintella.

(b) Nasser expected that the UN and other external pressures, particularly the U.S., would prevent him from going further. When Nasser proved unexpectedly weak, both in the Security Council and in saying the UN Emergency Force would have to be pulled out entirely, he changed his objective to restoration of the pre-1956 status, i. e. including blockade of the Gulf. He again expected international pressures to restrain him at that point. The inability of maritime

powers to agree on an effective course of action and general weakness of resistance to his moves then caused him to make the next decision.

(c) From about the 29th of May, the United Arab Republic objective changed to one of open move against Israel. He began to create the alliances with Jordan and to obtain the support of Iraq and countries as far away as Algeria for a final assault. Eban described the United Arab Republic policy from this point on as moving forward in a drunken fashion. Messages to troop commanders indicated clear offensive indications, and the United Arab Republic began to reconnoiter by Air Israel's key industrial and other facilities suitable for aerial attack. (He implied that Israel had a great deal of firm intelligence on this period both from captured documents and from intercepted telephone conversations at the time.)

Ambassador Harman expressed considerable sensitivity about arms supplies from U.S., saying he had been able to obtain the delivery of only about \$700 thousand of equipment out of the \$3 million total which they had already paid, and that there were considerable uncertainties about future plane sales. He said they would need 79 planes but not for delivery before the end of 1968. He stressed the importance to their logistics of "nuts and bolts" and said the military value of captured Soviet equipment had been considerably exaggerated in the press.

I conveyed to the Foreign Minister the substance of the message Sisco had brought up with him about the need for Israel to express itself and act with magnanimity and not be too rigid about the method of negotiating a settlement. I also urged them to continue to exercise leniency about a return of refugees from Jordan to the West Bank. Eban said they had decided to allow return to be extended but with a larger degree of control in Israeli hands. They would allow hardship cases and relatives to continue to return.

Goldberg

Monday, September 25, 1967 -- 12:30

56

Handwritten notes and initials.

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a brief message of congratulations to Congolese President Mobutu on the success of the Kinshasa meetings of the Organization of African Unity.

It should also help to keep him reasonable as he resumes work on the solution to the problem of the mercenaries. The ~~p~~message is personal -- we would not release it to the press.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Speak to me ____

EKH/vmr

5/6/68

Presidential Message of Congratulations to President Mobuto on
the Success of the Recent OAU Summit Meetings

Dear Mr. President:

My warm congratulations for the outstanding success of the Kinshasa meetings of the Organization of African Unity. Your leadership and your determination that the Fourth Summit of the OAU result in positive accomplishments were clearly reflected in the significant progress achieved. The attendance of U Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, which has been such a staunch friend of the Congo, was a particular tribute to the OAU, to your nation, and to yourself.

I want you to know, Mr. President, that my thoughts are with you in these days of trial, and that you have my best wishes for continued success.

Sincerely,

57

LOU

Monday - 12:00 noon
September 25, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Brazilian President Costa e Silva celebrates his 65th birthday on October 3. It is also the first anniversary of his election to the Presidency.

State recommends a message of congratulations. A suggested text is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____.

Attachment

57a

Suggested Text for Presidential Greetings
to President of Brazil Arturo Costa e Silva
on the Dual Occasion of his 65th Birthday and First Anniversary of his Election
on October 3

Today you celebrate your birthday and the first anniversary of your election as President of Brazil. Warmest congratulations and best wishes as you continue to guide the destinies of the Brazilian people.

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
11:20 a.m.

58

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will wish to read at least the summary
of this monthly appraisal of bombing of
North Viet Nam.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment ("An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Viet Nam (thru
15 Sept. 67 S-2508-AP4A") (CIA/DIA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-401
By Cb, NARA, Date 7-19-95

Monday, Sept. 25, 1967
11:15 a. m.

59

MR. PRESIDENT:

This is mainly interesting because of the more
mature North Vietnamese assessment of
U. S. politics.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment



cc: mr. Galtieri

Pres file

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 00-308
By sj, NARA Date 7-5-01
EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2001

Saturday, September 23, 1967

59a

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

TEXT OF CIA REPORT [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Text:

In early September 1967, North Vietnam [REDACTED] said, "The Democratic Republic of Vietnam will definitely commence negotiations as soon as the United States stops bombing North Vietnam. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam will under no circumstances enter into any conversation with the United States Government while bombing continues, but the bombing is the only obstacle to negotiations." [REDACTED] as to what would be talked about at such negotiations, [REDACTED] "Everything, but it is premature to discuss this while the bombing continues."

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

Discussing the effect of internal United States opposition to the Vietnam war, [REDACTED] that although the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was encouraged by the extent of internal United States opposition, the North Vietnamese Government has come to the realization that it ought not to over-estimate the effectiveness of such opposition. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has observed that opposition so far has had no effect on United States Government policy. [REDACTED] opposition can be counterproductive in that the head of a government does not wish to give the impression he is negotiating under pressure; nevertheless, [REDACTED] "It is up to the United States to make the first move by stopping the bombing."

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-310
By abm, NARA, Date 3-18-02

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

60

~~TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY -- SENSITIVE~~

Monday, September 25, 1967
9:00 a.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith what may be very near the end of the Kissinger exercise in Paris; although you will wish to consider the state of the play carefully.

I myself lean to recent Soviet advice that we try to develop a Saigon-NLF contact.

We shall also have to be facing soon the question of the bridges and thermal power plant in Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

Kissinger/Read Telecon, Sept 24, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-400
By ig, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~TOP SECRET -- EYEX ONLY -- SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By isp, NARA, Date 3-24-95

Kissinger/Read Telecon, Sept 24 (pm)

Bo called M at 1300 on Sept 23 and asked M to come over. M met with Bo for more than an hour, starting at 1800. Bo Read the following message to M, which M took down in his own notes and read back to Bo to check for accuracy:

"1. The whole world knows that the US has pursued a constant policy of escalation against North Vietnam.

"2. After Hanoi was bombed, US planes hit Campha and Haiphong. As regards Haiphong, US planes have bombed it several times in a row and very violently. In addition B 52's have violently attacked the DMZ and Vinh Linh Province.

"3. As a result every one agrees that the bombing has been intensified in recent weeks.

"4. Washington's explanation about the bombing of Haiphong cannot be received.

"5. These are the circumstances under which you have suggested contacts with Kissinger. I accept your expression of confidence in Kissinger, but at the moment when US is increasing its escalation, it was not possible for me to see him.

"6. Turning to more general topics, I have spoken to you of the two-faced policy of the US.

"7. What has happened has confirmed me in that opinion for the attitude of the US exhibits all kinds of contradictions. It is possible to highlight this by a few examples:

(a) Together with the message of August 25, Kissinger has let me know through you as intermediaries that the US has stopped bombing of Hanoi for 10 days; then for 72 hours, and now the US tells us that the bombing of Hanoi is suspended without time limit. What do you think of the assertion that the USG of its own free will has suspended the bombing without setting a time limit?

(b) In fact what has happened is the stopping of bombing of Hanoi but the intensification of bombing elsewhere as in Campha, Haiphong and Vinh Linh Province, where the bombing has the character of extermination and systematic destruction.

(c) To say that by stopping of bombing of Hanoi the US has wanted to create better atmosphere is not true.

"8. With respect to the August 25 message, the essence of the US position is to offer to stop bombing with conditions.

In a message delivered by sealed envelope the US has replied that the offer is without conditions while asserting that the message of August 25 is still valid.

"9. As far as you and A are concerned, I have received you any time you have requested. I listen to you. I accept messages from you. I transmit them. I report fully to Hanoi. I call you when I have something to say. I believe that this demonstrates our good will sufficiently. However, as I have pointed out earlier, we have no illusions about American policy. What do you think of all this?"
(end of message)

/(a)

In reply M said he would leave his role as messenger and state his own view that ~~xxx~~ each US message had been accompanied by new escalation. With respect to Haiphong M only knew what K had told him, which was confirmed by the press: the US attacks had as their targets communication links, not the systematic destruction of the town itself. Still, M had to admit, American actions had made discussion more complicated. (b) With respect to the suspension of bombing of Hanoi, first for ten days, then 72 hours, then without time limit - this was not so much a contradiction in the evolution of American policy as a revelation of conflicting tendencies. (c) With respect to the message of August 25, M wanted to find out whether a reversion by the US to the level of bombing in early August would permit the initiation of discussions. On the last point Bo replied that Pham Van Dong had already answered that question. (K later asked M to seek elucidation on this comment by Bo.)

Finally M put a question to Bo, which K had asked M to do at an earlier meeting but M had not found it feasible to ask until the meeting on Sept 23. M asked Bo to ascertain from Hanoi whether M and A had correctly understood Pham Van Dong's remarks to M and A in July on the following exchange, which M read to Bo. (That exchange follows: Dong: We want an unconditional end of the bombing. A: Does that include a public declaration by the USG? Dong: We would prefer a public declaration but understand it would be difficult to give, so we will accept a de facto stoppage. A: Would there be a six month delay until talks? Dong: There is no question of a delay. We know how to meet each other). M told Bo there had been a stenographer at the July talks. Bo said Pham Van Dong's reported statements to A and M differed from public DRV statements, but Bo would send the exchange to Hanoi and ask if it was a true representation of Dong's position.

Bo again enjoined M to use greatest secrecy.

M related the foregoing account of his meeting with Bo on Sept 23 to Kissinger at the Paris airport on the morning of Sept 24. Kissinger criticized M strongly for having dropped his intermediary role and given Bo his own (M's) feelings on the bombings. Since K suspected that M's answer to Bo was probably even less sympathetic to the US than reported by M in section (a) of his answer, K asked M to seek a meeting with Bo later on Sept 24 and give him the following message from Kissinger:

(1) I will transmit to the appropriate Washington officials later today the message you (Bo) gave M yesterday. (2) I see no point in trading charges and countercharges about past activities. In fact Washington has offered to stop bombing based on the assumption it would lead to prompt, productive talks. That offer remains open. It was made sincerely. If accepted, there will be no need to discuss escalation or bombing problems. (3) The exchange indicates that Washington and Hanoi have great difficulty understanding each other's thought processes. This makes direct US/DRV contact essential. Intermediaries, no matter how trustworthy, are not satisfactory substitutes. (4) American military actions during the past month reflect in part the extreme secrecy with which Washington has handled this exchange. The USG has considered it unwise to change decisions made prior to the report of M and A's trip to Hanoi, except in regard to bombing Hanoi itself, because it wanted to keep the circle of awareness of this exchange as small as possible to avoid premature public debate. (5) The difference in the positions of the two governments could be summarized as follows: Washington has indicated its readiness to stop bombing and has only asked to confirm its understanding of Hanoi's view that this would lead promptly to productive negotiations. Hanoi has implied that an end of bombing would in fact have this result. If this is indeed the view of both governments, the remaining obstacles to direct talks can be overcome. I am certain that the above correctly reflects US views. Could Bo confirm that it also reflects the view of Hanoi. [(6) If Hanoi gave any sign that this exchange would lead promptly to productive negotiations reciprocal action by the US would not be lacking.]"

This print
was dropped
before message
delivered to Bo

As noted on the preceding page, K also asked M to obtain Bo's clarification about the ~~comment~~ dealing with an answer by Pham Van Dong to the question of whether the resumption of the early August bombing levels would ~~xxxx~~ permit talks.

Comments by Kissinger: (1) K takes Bo's Sept 23 statement to constitute an answer to the US message of Sept 13. (2) It seems much less intransigent than the Sept 11 message; almost plaintive in tone. (3) It leaves the door wide open for a reply.

Note: Although Bo's reply again charges that the US proposal of Aug 25 contained conditions, those conditions are never

identified. K thinks they may be reading the end of the first paragraph in the Aug 25 message as constituting conditions and believes it would be useful once again to advise Bo that no such conditions were intended or posed. K and M believe Bo acted on instructions on Sept 23. Future Procedures: For sending messages to Bo: (1) hand carry by Kissinger (on weekends) or by Cooper or otherwise; (2) Cable Embassy Paris the text of the message and have K phone M to tell M to pick it up at Wallner's residence. K will encourage M to call K when M receives a message from Bo and deliver it to Wallner for transmission.

Late Item: From a phone call late on Sept 24, K learned that M had been unable to deliver K's message today, and M has an appointment with Bo at 8.30 am on Sept 25 to make delivery. Because of the ambiguity and conditional phrasing of K's point 6, K will ask M to drop that point from the message actually handed Bo tomorrow.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, September 25, 1967 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Our National Security Staff is now reorganized in the wake of the departure of Howard Wriggins and Francis Bator.

The attached sheet shows the assignments of responsibility.

Rather than having a single deputy, I regard the senior men as my deputies, each in his own field. Filing their materials through Brom Smith, they have proved they can operate smoothly when we are travelling or I am otherwise absent.

In a number of cases they have junior officers working with them, as indicated.

I think we are now set up to cope with the tasks ahead. Specifically:

-- Dick Moose is not only serving to help link George Christian's shop to State and Defense press operations, but also keeping an eye on quick responses to Congress by State and Defense.

-- Kaplan's shop, under Bill Jorden, is beginning to function on Viet Nam public relations issues.

-- We should be capable of quick responses, speech drafting, and other foreign affairs backstop work in the course of the campaign; although that we shall have to prove.

I would greatly welcome any thoughts you have at this stage about improving the work of the shop.

If you can spare the time, one of these days, it might be useful for you to meet with them and give them your philosophy and their marching orders for the year ahead.

Your meeting with them about eighteen months ago was not only memorable but inspiring.

W. Rostow
W. Rostow

Have Marvin Watson set up meeting_____

No_____

See me_____

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National Security Council Staff

Executive Secretary

Bromley Smith

Western Europe; Balance of Payments; International Trade Policy including East-West Trade

Edward Fried
Richard Ullman

Eastern Europe; USSR; UN

Nathaniel Davis

Africa (except North Africa); South Asia; Economic Assistance Policy

Edward Hamilton
Roger Morris

Latin America

William Bowdler

Middle East and North Africa

Harold Saunders
(an assistant being recruited)

Southeast Asia and Far East

William Jorden
Alfred Jenkins: Communist China
Harold Kaplan: Public affairs re Viet Nam
Marshall Wright

Scientific matters; weaponry, Arms Control, Atomic Energy and Space

Spurgeon Keeny
Charles Johnson

JCS Liaison

Colonel Robert N. Ginsburgh

CIA Liaison

Peter Jessup

Press and Congressional Liaison

Richard Moose

Communications and Operational Intelligence

Arthur McCafferty

Pres file

Monday, September 25, 1967 -- 8 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith some U.S. casualty figures for recent months by Corps areas.

You will note:

-- In August (as well as in June, April, February and January) the bulk of U.S. ^{marine} casualties were taken not at the DMZ but in other operations in I Corps.

-- Casualties in II and III Corps have been declining as the VC avoid contact and the proportion of the population under government control slowly rises.

-- U.S. forces are just beginning to engage in IV Corps.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

U.S. DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION
1967

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	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG
<u>DMZ*</u>								
NAVY	1	1	6	5	28	2	13	2
USMC	9	12	168	95	347	37	212	33
TOTAL	10	13	174	100	375	39	225	35
<u>OTHER I CTZ</u>								
ARMY	0	0	0	0	36	27	22	44
NAVY	12	9	5	11	22	17	9	13
USMC	125	154	145	185	277	267	137	182
USAF	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	137	163	158	196	335	311	168	239
<u>II CTZ</u>								
ARMY**	100	219	219	149	181	158	143	90
NAVY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0
TOTAL	100	219	219	149	181	159	147	90
<u>III CTZ</u>								
ARMY**	227	236	347	200	248	213	154	102
NAVY	4	3	3	0	5	0	7	0
USAF	2	0	0	0	1	0	3	0
TOTAL	233	239	350	200	254	213	164	102
<u>IV CTZ</u>								
ARMY	0	0	0	22	70	74	50	28
NAVY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	0	0	0	22	70	74	50	28
<u>OTHER S.E.ASIA***</u>								
ARMY	19	15	23	25	8	17	3	20
NAVY	0	3	5	2	2	2	9	16
USAF	21	10	15	16	8	15	15	5
TOTAL	40	28	43	43	18	34	27	41
<u>S.E. ASIA</u>								
ARMY	346	470	589	396	543	489	372	284
NAVY	17	16	19	18	57	21	38	31
USMC	134	166	313	280	624	304	349	215
USAF	23	10	23	16	9	16	22	5
TOTAL	520	662	944	710	1233	830	781	535

*DMZ PLUS QUANG TRI PROVINCE.

**ARMY GROUND DATA FOR SVN IS COUNTRY-WIDE. I CTZ FROM III-MAF SOURCES, IV CTZ FROM 9TH DIV CASUALTIES; REMAINDER APPORTIONED BETWEEN II & III CTZ BY JCS OPREP.

***SVN HELICOPTER PLUS OFFSHORE, NVN, AND LAOS AREAS.

SOURCES: OASD(C), JCS, USA HQ, USMC HQ, BUPERS.

OASD/SA/SEA PROGRAMS DIV.
September 22, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chinese Chaos and U. S. Interests

Ed Rice, our outgoing Consul General in Hong Kong, states in his "swan song" cable that he remains convinced that Mao cannot win and consolidate power. He reasons:

-- the Cultural Revolution has been pushed in ways which generate widening opposition;

-- the opposition lacks the structure which might make it susceptible to identification, attack and destruction;

-- prominent Maoists in Peking are primarily propagandists and agitators;

-- therefore, their proposals for building a governmental structure to replace that which they have been destroying are vague and deficient.

Rice raises the question whether the chaos produced in China by the Maoists is in our interest. He concludes that while we may hope for some benefit from this chaos, the Maoists' spirit of unreason and violence make China not only a bad neighbor but also the source of an infection which cannot be confined to China itself. At any rate, Rice believes it is against our interests to speak in public of any benefits to us from Maoist chaos.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-213
By *ju*, NARA, Date 1-13-93

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-212

By ju, NARA, Date 8-13-92~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 21, 1967

FROM: HONG KONG (1786)

SUBJECT: The Struggle in China

1. I wish, upon concluding my tour here, to venture the following comments bearing on the current struggle in China.

2. I remain convinced that Mao cannot win and consolidate supreme power. This conclusion is based on grounds which include the following:

(a) Although Mao is being cited as saying there is no reason for people to split into two irreconcilable organizations, the Maoist revolution has been pushed in ways which, while intended to eliminate his opponents, generate widening opposition;

(b) Despite use of the words "two irreconcilable organizations," the opposition apparently lacks the directing center and well-defined structure which might make it susceptible to identification, attack, and quick destruction;

(c) Leaders in Peking/^{who}are most clearly identifiable as Maoist, are primarily propagandists and agitators; and

(d) Consequently their proposals for building governing structure to replace that which they have been destroying are vague and deficient in accompanying practical guidelines.

3. Even if Mao were to eliminate opposition, the very nature of anti-revisionist measures that he could be expected to try to implement, would almost certainly prove disastrous -- as was Mao's Great Leap Forward -- adding to damage which his Great Cultural Revolution has already done to the country.

4. Quite evidently there are contending factions within what might loosely be called Mao's own camp. The extremists seek to push his revolution through to the end whereas their opponents would like to arrest China's descent towards anarchy and restore order. Neither side has been able to gain and hold a dominant position in Peking. Consequently directives issuing from Peking have not provided consistent guidance, and they have often taken the form of admonitions, unaccompanied by delegation of authority, to take steps which would be required to give them practical effect.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. Recently the People's Liberation Army has been instructed to undertake measures designed to damp down armed strife and was told it may in certain circumstances resort to force when persuasion fails. It remains to be seen whether these instructions will later be watered down, or maintained and further strengthened as may be required. If the latter proves to be the case it may mean a new alignment has emerged in Peking -- perhaps comprising civilians grouped around Chou En-lai and elements in the Army.

6. If the Army is really to restore order, further pursuit of the range of policies now associated with Mao's Great Cultural Revolution would have to be deferred if not abandoned. At this late date it is by no means sure the Army, even operating under clear and consistent directives which give it increased latitude to use force, could restore order.

7. This brings me to the question, so often raised, whether it is more to our interest to have internal stability or chaos in China, and the further question of how our interests may be affected by our officials raising the question in international forums or taking a position on it in public discussions.

8. The first of these related questions is inseparable from the objectives of those who seek to rule China. It would clearly seem preferable that the Chinese leaders who cherish aims antagonistic to our interests should be plagued by internal difficulties and that China should lack the capability to project its power abroad.

9. At the same time, the Maoist spirit of unreason and violence, which now is creating anarchic conditions in China, makes that country not only a bad neighbor but also the source of an infection which cannot be confined to China itself. The Maoist doctrine, spirit, and example of revolutionary violence can and do infect the susceptible elsewhere, Chinese and non-Chinese as well. Finally, it is the Maoists, urging opposition to everything we support and support for everything we oppose, who are our most bitter enemies. It does not follow that Mao's enemies would be our friends. But they include the advocates of more moderate policies towards the outside world; they also include the pragmatists whose policies have given Communist China its periods of progress and internal stability.

10. One thus may argue either side of this question, and one may hope for some benefits from the chaos the Maoists are creating without wanting to see them triumph. But I think there is little benefit to be derived and some danger to our own interests involved in so arguing in public or in international

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

forums. There is little use in doing so because non-Chinese will have a very limited ability to affect the outcome of the struggle in China, and any outside intervention may achieve results contrary to those intended. It may harm our interests if we seemed to suggest to foreign friends that we might consider it useful for a large proportion of mankind to live in anarchy and chaos, with all the suffering that would entail, and for the world's most populated land to be dominated by truculent men intent on promoting world revolution at the expense of its interests as one country in a world of nation states.

RICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, September 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Pres file

Mr. P. Y. Tang, a distinguished Chinese businessman, came in with the following analysis and recommendations:

1. He flatly predicts that there will be a party congress in Communist China in "some months"; perhaps next spring.
2. This congress will, in effect, set aside both Mao and Liu Shao-Chi and install Chou En-lai to "pick up the pieces," as he did after the failure of the Great Leap Forward.
3. The U. S. should begin to prepare to communicate with Chou En-lai, offering a deal. When probed, the central aspect of the deal was that we be prepared to assist Communist China, under a moderate Chou En-lai, with wheat.
4. With respect to specifics, he said:
 - the economic as well as social and political turmoil inside mainland China is now judged "intolerable";
 - we should press for as rapid momentum in Asian regionalism as possible, even though it is bound to move slowly, but urging and pressuring the Asians to take greater responsibility for themselves;
 - he left with me a copy of the attached memorandum on the relatively healthy state of Hong Kong.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

(cc: Al Jenkins, Wm Jorden, SS for distribution, SecDef, Richard Helms)

DECLASSIFIED + NLJ 92-213
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 6-8-00

RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN HONG KONG

First Half of 1967

64a

GENERAL CONDITIONS

The trade figures for the first half of 1967 indicate that Hong Kong's export-based economy continued its upturn in spite of the riots and disturbances staged by the local Communist agitators, which marred the greater part of the second quarter.

Manufacturing activities, except in the case of the two factories involved in labour disputes which started off the disturbances, went unaffected. Damage from the series of token strikes and stoppage of work was largely confined to Hong Kong's public transportation systems, particularly the bus companies, where the trouble makers resorted to intimidation of the workers, causing a serious curtailment of services. Tourist revenue was temporarily affected by misinformed or exaggerated press comments. Retail sales declined in the second quarter, as business stores dealing mostly in Communist China's merchandise fell off.

In general, under the difficult conditions that prevailed, Hong Kong's economic achievement during in the first half of the year exceeded expectations.

MONETARY MARKET CONDITIONS

Total bank deposits rose from HK\$8.4 billion (US\$1.45 billion) to a peak of HK\$9.0 billion (US\$1.56 billion) at the end of April, and then dropped back to HK\$8.2 billion (US\$1.44 billion) at the end of June, due largely to an increase in the note-issue of the issuing banks. Banks' prime lending rate remained at 7-1/2%, unchanged from the end of 1966. Total bank loans increased to HK\$5.9 billion in June from HK\$5.7 billion at the beginning of the year, and there was apparently no lack of credit available.

Some press reports, echoing misleading articles in the leftist newspapers in Hong Kong, took the reduction in bank deposits as evidence of a flight of capital from Hong Kong. An official estimate, made by the Financial Secretary in response to a question asked in a legislative session, placed the outflow of capital during the month of May at between HK\$175m and 200m (US\$30.4m - 34.8m), or only 1.6% to 1.9% of Hong Kong's total currency and bank deposits. A subsequent estimate, based on the June bank returns, placed the corresponding figure for the month of June at about HK\$177m, or also 1.6% of the total currency and bank deposits. According to a recent statement by Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the leading bank in Hong Kong, saving bank deposits showed a significant increase in July and figures for that month were better than any for the past twelve months, while non-saving deposits were steady, which would suggest that funds were returning.

Indications are, therefore, that the capital outflow, if there was indeed any net outflow, was but on a very insignificant scale. The limited fluctuations of the U.S. dollar rate at the free exchange market tended to support this. The rate, which rose to HK\$5.95 for US\$1 at one time, has come back to the 5.77-5.78 level, or less than 1% above the official rate of 5.74.

continued

TRADE

Trade figures issued by the Commerce and Industry Department give this comparison:

	<u>Jan. - June, 1967</u> HK\$ billion	<u>Jan. - June, 1966</u> HK\$ billion	<u>Percentage Change</u>
Domestic Exports	3.0	2.6	+ 18%
Re-exports	1.1	0.8	+ 38%
Imports	5.5	4.6	+ 19%
Total Merchandise Trade	9.6	8.0	+ 20%

Compared with like quarters of 1966, the aggregate value of exports increased by 15% in the first quarter, and by 21% in the second quarter this year. The rate of increase for 1966 was 14% over 1965.

In the first half of 1967, the U.S. took HK\$1,080m (US\$188m) or 36% of Hong Kong's overall exports, while Britain took HK\$523 (US\$91m) or 17% of Hong Kong's overall exports.

INDUSTRY

As Hong Kong regularly exports as much as 80% of its entire industrial output, the 18% increase in export value serves also as an approximate measure of the overall rise in Hong Kong's industrial production in the first half of 1967.

The textile mills, Hong Kong's principal industry, operated at near capacity. The value of textile yarn, fabrics and made-up articles produced and exported rose to HK\$452m in the first half of this year -- HK\$26m or 6% above the figure for the same period last year. That of clothing increased by 12% to HK\$1,026m from \$913m. Plastics and metalware industries achieved comparable increases in export value. The electronics industry, consisting mainly of subsidiaries of American companies, more than doubled its production of transistorised radios in the first quarter of this year to 2.97m sets (worth HK\$50m) from 1.38m sets (HK\$23m) in the same period last year. On the other hand, the building materials or steel rolling industry, which caters to the local market, met with difficulties as construction remained depressed. The latter is, however, a relatively minor industry in terms of production and employment. This continued strong overseas demand suggests that the efforts by the Hong Kong industry in recent years in improving the range and quality of its products are paying off.

A quarterly survey of industrial employment shows that 434,000 people were employed in registered industrial undertakings at the end of June, an increase of 2,000 as compared with the number employed at the end of the first quarter this year.

continued

GOVERNMENT BUDGET, TAXATION AND PRICES

Revenue in the first fiscal quarter ending on June 30 were 9% ahead of last year's. From the HK\$21m deficit figure for that quarter, it appears that the financial impact of the recent disturbances has been very limited. No change in the present corporation and individual tax rate at 15% is expected.

While import prices of Hong Kong's basic industrial materials and prices in general have been steady, the consumer price index (with 1963/64 as its base year) rose to 111 in June from 108 in last December, reflecting sharp increases in prices of food items in the second quarter.

Food shortage became increasingly acute as supplies from Communist China diminished from a value of HK\$247m in March to HK\$163m in June. The decrease is due to disruptions of railway and other transportations inside Communist China consequent upon the chaos and the internal struggle for power among the rival factions in that country. Additional sources of supply are being developed in countries ranging from Japan and South Korea to Australia and New Zealand. Prices are expected to ease as such supplies begin to arrive, or as more adequate supplies from Communist China are resumed.

GENERAL COMMENTS

The disturbances, which initially aroused some concern, do not present any threat to Hong Kong's security. A salient feature has become increasingly evident in the light of recent development. It is that the trouble makers are not given any support by the Peking authorities other than what may be called vocal support for propaganda purposes. Nor are the trouble makers themselves real supporters of Maoism, as they claim to be. They have turned out to be a small, isolated, undisciplined group with no clear-cut objectives which finds practically no support among the people of Hong Kong and, indeed, only public revulsion through their acts of lawlessness and violence.

Further evidences have lately come about to substantiate this. According to many arrivals from Communist China, posters purported to have been written by Mac supporters, were seen displayed in various places in Communist China condemning the Hong Kong Communists, saying "They are only trouble makers who have attempted to cause an international problem for China." In the minor incidents that occurred on the Hong Kong-Communist China border, caused by groups of people attempting to cross over to Hong Kong without permit, the regular troops belonging to the People Liberation Army usually stepped in to restrain them to prevent things from getting out of hand.

Public confidence did not waver even at the height of the disturbances during May and June, and has further been strengthened as these events unfolded themselves. While tension may continue for some time, the outlook is that local disorders of this nature will not be prolonged or intensified to the extent of damaging the economy. The confidence in Hong Kong's continued economic viability, and in its future stability, is evidently shared by a good many foreign firms, including Chase Manhattan Bank and Macy, which have recently undertaken to expand their operations here.

free file

~~SECRET~~

Monday, September 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mac Bundy's Revisions in the
Faisal Letter

We showed the Faisal letter to Mac Bundy as you requested, and he suggested three changes. I've written them on a copy of the original version (Tab B) so you can see them clearly.

Luke Battle has no problem with these changes, and Secretary Rusk had personally cleared the basic letter. Mac simply felt that these slight changes in wording would put us in a better position with Israel's friends if the letter ever fell into their hands. They would not change the substance of our position, which doesn't offer the Arabs much at this stage.

If you accept Mac's changes, you can sign the revised version (Tab A) and we will destroy the earlier one.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-400
By *ig*, NARA, Date *4-5-95*

6.5 a

September 25, 1967

Your Majesty:

In view of my continuing close concern with the difficult situation in the Near East, I particularly welcomed your thoughtful letter of September 6 and have carefully considered Your Majesty's views. Our warm personal relationship permits us to speak as friends, and I would like to reply in the same spirit of frankness and constructive concern which characterized Your Majesty's own message.

I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation. Your Majesty's own statesmanlike role at these meetings was a major contribution to this result.

I am especially encouraged by the decision to liquidate the long-standing Yemen problem. It will, I hope, mark the beginning of a return to stability in Southwest Arabia in which both your country and mine are so deeply interested. I congratulate Your Majesty warmly on this happy result of your long efforts, as well as on the progress already discernible in implementing the decision.

The decision to lift the oil embargo was also welcome. This action has removed a complicating factor in relations between the Arab countries and the West which was not of our making. American public opinion has reacted favorably to this evidence of Arab desire to return to business as usual.

The Khartoum decisions regarding an Arab-Israeli settlement are more difficult for us to evaluate. The final communique states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs may be willing to do. The Arab decision to turn away from a military solution is most welcome. But the absence of any statement on the key issue of belligerency leaves a major obstacle to settlement unresolved.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 00-238
By SPICB NARA, Date 3/1/06

Frankly, we do not see how one party can continue to invoke rights of belligerency while attempting to impose on the other obligations of a state of peace. An Israeli withdrawal, unaccompanied by appropriate assurances from the Arabs, would seem to us prejudicial to Israel's territorial integrity, in which we are as interested as we are in the integrity of each Arab state. Return to the unstable armistice existing before June 4, 1967, can hardly be in anyone's interest, since this very instability led to such grave consequences.

I believe what is needed is a more permanent settlement to which all governments in the area would in some manner be committed. Only this result will assure peace and progress for the region in which both the Arabs and Israelis must live together.

The draft resolution tentatively agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Emergency Session of the General Assembly, linking troop withdrawal to an end of belligerency and renunciation of attendant rights or claims by all the parties, could in our view be a useful basis for such a settlement. The United States Government has, however, no fixed position as to exactly how a settlement may be achieved. In this connection, when I spoke on June 19 of the need to recognize rights of national life, I of course meant the acceptance by each state of its neighbor's right to exist free from any menace of belligerency. I was not prejudging the question of formal recognition.

The United States Government played a central role in bringing about Israeli withdrawal in 1957, but at that time no such mutually accepted basis for coexistence was established. Those arrangements accordingly did not endure. I do not think it possible to travel the same road again. In our view, those who inhabit the area must themselves take the primary responsibility for finding a mutually acceptable basis on which coexistence is tolerable. This naturally applies to both sides, and we are, of course, ready to help when it is clear what concrete steps are envisaged.

I cannot stress too strongly to Your Majesty that our principles--which I outlined publicly on June 19--are designed to be both even-handed and beneficial to all parties concerned. We oppose

threats or use of force by both Arabs and Israelis. On the basis of these principles, we favor Israeli withdrawal and an end to military or paramilitary actions by either side. Above all, we see a vision of the better life which peace would bring to all the people of the Middle East.

Our position is not based on transient considerations, such as the attitude towards us of certain Arab states, but rather on an assessment of what we believe is required to prevent yet another round of warfare at some later date. We naturally hope that those Arab states that have broken relations with us will soon manifest an attitude towards us that will permit relations to return to normal. It is hard to have understanding without contact, and restoration of our relations with these Arab countries would be helpful. But we believe that realism and willingness to compromise by the parties directly concerned are the basic ingredients needed to end the present Arab-Israeli impasse.

In closing, I should emphasize to Your Majesty that I continue to value highly our close and friendly relations with you and your government. We will try at the coming session of the United Nations to help find some way to resolve the current difficulties. Meanwhile, I welcome our continuing personal exchanges as a means of strengthening our mutual understanding of the great difficulties which still lie ahead.

All best personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

His Majesty
Faisal ibn Abd-el-Aziz Al-Saud
King of Saudi Arabia

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 9/25/67

65-6

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By 128, NARA, Date 4-5-95

September 19, 1967

Your Majesty:

In view of my continuing close concern with the difficult situation in the Near East, I particularly welcomed your thoughtful letter of September 6 and have carefully considered Your Majesty's views. Our warm personal relationship permits us to speak as friends, and I would like to reply in the same spirit of frankness and constructive concern which characterized Your Majesty's own message.

I agree that the recent Khartoum conference marked notable progress for the forces of Arab moderation. Your Majesty's own statesmanlike role at these meetings was a major contribution to this result.

I am especially encouraged by the decision to liquidate the long-standing Yemen problem. It will, I hope, mark the beginning of a return to stability in Southwest Arabia in which both your country and mine are so deeply interested. I congratulate Your Majesty warmly on this happy result of your long efforts, as well as on the progress already discernible in implementing the decision.

The decision to lift the oil embargo was also welcome. This action has removed a complicating factor in relations between the Arab countries and the West which was not of our making. American public opinion has reacted favorably to this evidence of Arab desire to return to business as usual.

The Khartoum decisions regarding an Arab-Israel settlement are ~~encouraging but at the same time~~ more difficult for us to evaluate. The final communique states what the Arabs will not do but, except by indirection, is silent on what the Arabs may be willing to do. The ~~evident~~ Arab ^{decision to turn away from military} ~~desire for a peaceful~~ solution is most welcome. But the absence of any statement on the key issue of belligerency leaves a major obstacle to settlement unresolved.

Frankly, we do not see how one party can continue to invoke rights of belligerency while attempting to impose on the other obligations of a state of peace. An Israeli withdrawal, unaccompanied by appropriate assurances from the Arabs, would seem to us prejudicial to Israel's territorial integrity, in which we are as interested as we are in the integrity of each Arab state. Return to the unstable armistice existing before June 4, 1967, can hardly be in anyone's interest, since this very instability led to such grave consequences.

I believe what is needed is a more permanent settlement to which all governments in the area would in some manner be committed. Only this result will assure peace and progress for the region in which both the Arabs and Israelis must live together.

The draft resolution tentatively agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Emergency Session of the General Assembly, linking troop withdrawal to an end of belligerency and renunciation of attendant rights or claims by all the parties, could in our view be a useful basis for such a settlement. The United States Government has, however, no fixed position as to exactly how a settlement may be achieved. ~~[We are aware that no formal recognition of Israel by the Arab states is to be expected.]~~ In this connection, when I spoke on June 19 of the need to recognize rights of national life, I of course meant the acceptance by each state of its neighbor's right to exist free from any menace of belligerency. *I was not prejudging the question of formal recognition.*

The United States Government played a central role in bringing about Israeli withdrawal in 1957, but at that time no such mutually accepted basis for coexistence was established. Those arrangements accordingly did not endure. I do not think it possible to travel the same road again. In our view, those who inhabit the area must themselves take the primary responsibility for finding a mutually acceptable basis on which coexistence is tolerable. This naturally applies to both sides, and we are, of course, ready to help when it is clear what concrete steps are envisaged.


I cannot stress too strongly to Your Majesty that our ^{principles} policy--
which I outlined publicly on June 19--^{are} ~~is~~ designed to be both
even-handed and beneficial to all parties concerned. We
oppose threats or use of force by both Arabs and Israelis.
^{On the basis of those principles,} We favor Israeli withdrawal and an end to military or para-
military actions by either side. Above all, we see a vision
of the better life which peace would bring to all the people
of the Middle East.

Our position is not based on transient considerations, such
as the attitude towards us of certain Arab states, but rather
on an assessment of what we believe is required to prevent yet
another round of warfare at some later date. We naturally
hope that those Arab states that have broken relations with us
will soon manifest an attitude towards us that will permit
relations to return to normal. It is hard to have understanding
without contact, and restoration of our relations with these
Arab countries would be helpful. But we believe that realism
and willingness to compromise by the parties directly con-
cerned are the basic ingredients needed to end the present Arab-
Israel impasse.

In closing, I should emphasize to Your Majesty that I continue
to value highly our close and friendly relations with you and
your government. We will try at the coming session of the
United Nations to help find some way to resolve the current
difficulties. Meanwhile, I welcome our continuing personal
exchanges as a means of strengthening our mutual understanding
of the great difficulties which still lie ahead.

All best personal regards,

Sincerely,



His Majesty
Faisal ibn Abd-al-Aziz Al-Saud
King of Saudi Arabia



Department of State

TELEGRAM

65c

~~SECRET~~

Sanders

PAGE 01 JIDDA 00959 071502Z

42
ACTION Ss 25

INFO /025 W

P 071329Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2310

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 959

E X D I S

FAISAL LETTER

1. IN ABSENCE SAQQAF WHO IS ON LEAVE IN BEIRUT,
ACTING DEPUTY FOREIGN MIN MAS'UD ASKED ME CALL TODAY.
HE HANDED ME LETTER FROM KING FAISAL IN TAIF TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON. TRANSLATION PREPARED BY EMBOFF
FOLLOWS (NON-ESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED):

QUOTE HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IN LIGHT DECISIONS ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE
HELD IN KHARTOUM, SUDAN, BETWEEN AUGUST 29
AND SEPTEMBER 1, 1967, PERMIT ME, MR. PRESIDENT,
TO EXPLAIN MY VIEWS TO YOUR EXCELLENCY IN ALL
SINCERITY, SINCE I FIRMLY DESIRE PRESERVATION
AND STRENGTHENING OF EXISTING FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND SINCE YOUR EXCELLENCY
HAS ENCOURAGED ME TO PRESENT MY VIEWS ON COURSE
OF EVENTS WHENEVER I FIND REASON TO DO SO AND
ASSURED ME THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD GIVE THEM
MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-239

By CB, NARA Date 10-31-00

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JIDDA 00959 071502Z

PAGE 2 RUQVRA 959 ~~SECRET~~

ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE ISSUED WISE AND COURAGEOUS DECISIONS WHICH AS WHOLE INDICATE HOW WELL KINGS AND PRESIDENTS ARABS STATES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES APPRECIATE RESPONSIBILITY PLACED UPON THEIR SHOULDERS WITH REGARD THEIR PEOPLES AND FUTURE THEIR NATION FOLLOWING LATTER'S INJURY AT ZIONIST HANDS, IN DEFIANCE DECISIONS OF UN AND FLOUTING SPIRITUAL AND HUMANITARIAN VALUES PROCLAIMED IN ITS CHARTER.

IN REVIEWING DECISIONS OF CONFERENCE, TWO IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARREST OUR ATTENTION:

(1) RESUMPTION FLOW OF OIL TO ALL COUNTRIES OF WORLD.

(2) REMOVAL EFFECTS OF AGGRESSION! THAT IS, RETURN TO SITUATION EXISTING BEFORE JUNE 5, 1967. THIS MEANS IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ARAB STATES STUDY ANY PROPOSAL FROM WHICH FOLLOWING FOUR POINTS ARE EXCLUDED:

RECONCILIATION WITH ISRAEL, RECOGNITION OF HER, NEGOTIATION WITH HER, OR ANY THING PREJUDICIAL TO RIGHT PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO THEIR HOMELAND.

PAGE 3 RUQVRA 959 ~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT, IT WAS NOT EASY TO ARRIVE AT THIS COURAGEOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE STEP IN CONDITIONS, OF WHICH YOUR EXCELLENCY CAN APPRECIATE THE GRAVITY, WHERE A WAVE OF EMOTIONAL AGITATION HAD TAKEN POSSESSION OF ARAB PEOPLES AS RESULT OPEN ZIONIST AGGRESSION, AFTER PARALYSIS OF UN IN REACTING TO IT AND PUNISHING ITS PERPETRATORS, AFTER THE SILENCE OF THE WORLD'S

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PAGE 03 JIDDA 00959 071502Z

CONSCIENCE IN DETERRING IT AND DOING JUSTICE TO THOSE WHO FELL VICTIM TO IT, ALL OF WHICH MADE LEADERS OF ARAB COUNTRIES UNABLE STAND BEFORE VIOLENT POPULAR CURRENT BUT WERE OBLIGED CONFORM TO IT IN MANY OF THEIR ACTIONS.

PERMIT ME TO SAY, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT DECISIONS ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE WERE HIGHLY CONSTRUCTIVE. DOOR HAS BEEN OPENED FOR WESTERN CAMP TO RECONSIDER ITS HARDENED POSITION, SO AS ENABLE ITS FRIENDS AMONG ARABS TO PERSUADE HOT-HEADED ARAB PEOPLES THAT THAT THE WEST, AND THOSE WHO TRAVEL

PAGE 4 RUQVRA 959 ~~SECRET~~

IN ITS ORBIT, ARE NOT STANDING AGAINST THEM IN THEIR DISPUTE WITH ISRAEL, AND IN ORDER GIVE LEADERS ARAB COUNTRIES OPPORTUNITY PROCEED TO FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE STEP TOWARD PRODUCING JUST SOLUTION TO PROBLEM. I CAN DECLARE TO YOUR EXCELLENCY THAT SITUATION HAS NOW BECOME PROPITIOUS FOR ARRIVING AT PROMPT AND RAPID SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS, PROVIDED FOUR POINTS I SET FORTH ABOVE ARE LEFT ASIDE. BUT SHOULD SOLUTION BE DELAYED, PRESSURES WILL RETURN INTENSIFIED AND PERMEATE THE ENTIRE ARAB WORLD. THEN SOLUTION WOULD BECOME IMPRACTICABLE AND YOUR FRIENDS WOULD BE UNABLE CONTROL FEELING OF BITTERNESS AMONG ARAB PEOPLES TOWARD POSITION OF WESTERN CAMP CONCERNING THEIR CAUSE. OTHER SIDE WOULD SEIZE UPON THIS AS MEANS OF CONFUSING THOUGHTS AND SPREADING ANARCHY.

I FURTHERMORE CONSIDER THAT IT NOT IN INTEREST OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO REGARD ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN ARAB COUNTRIES TOWARD IT AS REASON STAND AGAINST ARABS ON ISSUE WHICH EVERY ARAB

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PAGE 04 JIDDA 00959 071502Z

PAGE 5 RUQVRA 959 ~~SECRET~~
CONSIDERS VITAL TO HIMSELF.

QUESTION OF YEMEN WAS DISCUSSED IN KHARTOUM
IN ANCILLARY MEETINGS BETWEEN MYSELF AND PRESIDENT
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER. TOGETHER WE ARRIVED
AT AGREEMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE THIS TIME TO BE
FINAL, GOD WILLING.

IN CONCLUSION I SEND YOUR EXCELLENCY MY
SINCERE WISHES FOR HEALTH AND HAPPINESS AND FOR
OUR FRIENDS PEOPLE OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ALL PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY.

YOUR FIREND,
FAISAL

1 JUMAD AL-THUNI 1387, CORRESPONDING TO
SEPTEMBER 6, 1967. UNQTE

2. SIGNED ARABIC ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED UNDER
COVER AIRGRAM FOR WHITE HOUSE RECORDS. GP-3. EILTS

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~~SECRET~~

64

Monday, September 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report
on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS Attachment

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

66a

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

September 25, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By , NARA, Date 3-24-95

Organization of New Government

Thieu told Bunker on Friday that he and Ky had agreed on the make-up of the new Government, including the selection of the Prime Minister. We have a separate reliable report that Thieu and Ky have agreed on Ky's former Vice Presidential running-mate, Nguyen Van Loc, as Prime Minister. Loc is undistinguished, but may represent the best agreement that Thieu and Ky can come to at this point.

Thieu also told Bunker that he intended to consult with the new Senators early this week on the organization of the Senate. He then intended to install the new Senate on October 5 or 6, just after the Assembly's validation of the presidential election. After the Senate is installed, Thieu plans to announce the Government's program and the Prime Minister-designate. The Lower House would then be installed on October 29 or 30, a week or so following Lower House elections. Finally, the new Government would be inaugurated on November 1.

Thieu said that during the period between the announcement of his designation and the inauguration, the Prime Minister-designate would be working with the "shadow" Cabinet on the government's program in order to have action programs in hand when the new Government is inaugurated. Thieu said he intended to have some programs put into effect immediately and which would begin to show results within the first six months, and other programs to be gotten underway for the longer term. Thieu was receptive to Bunker's offer of close consultation and assistance in the development of the new Government's program. We have had an exchange with Ambassador Bunker on this matter and have discussed our ideas at length with Ambassador Locke. We will be sending more detailed suggestions to the Mission shortly.

Buddhist-Student Agitation

The weekend witnessed small but well publicized student and militant Buddhist agitation in Saigon. About 200

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

-2-

university students (out of nearly 30,000 students in Saigon university) staged a relatively orderly demonstration yesterday to call for invalidation of the election results. Demonstrators also sent an open letter to the President demanding an end to U.S. interference in Vietnamese internal affairs and a cessation of bombing in the North. One American student took part in the demonstration, which was broken up without incident by the police.

The militant Buddhists held a press conference yesterday to denounce Thieu and to proclaim their support of those who wish to overturn the allegedly rigged elections. Dzu and another defeated presidential candidate participated. Dzu made a hard-hitting speech, calling Thieu a traitor and concluding with a rousing appeal to "get rid of Thieu Can Lao Assembly." During the question period, Tri Quang replied ambiguously to queries about launching a new "struggle" against the Government.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 23, 1967
4:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh made this
sensitive in-house document available
to me on a personal basis.

It reflects a real anxiety among
our best military; although they may be
over-impressed with the Fulbrights
and Galbraiths of this world.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-400
By ing, NARA, Date 4-5-95

WWRostow:rln



~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

67a

EYES ONLY

CM-2630-67
9 Sep 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

General H. K. Johnson, CSA
General J. P. McConnell, CSAF
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, CNO
General Wallace M. Greene, CMC

SUBJ: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

1. I have read with great interest and very substantial agreement the attached memorandum written by General DePuy regarding the aftermath of the war in Vietnam. Just the other day I related to you an anecdote concerning General Jacquot, a distinguished and very senior French general who at one time was CINCENT, as to the effects of the French Wars in Indochina and Algeria upon the morale and stability of the French Armed Forces. At that time, I expressed the apprehension that the American Armed Forces could lose the support of the American people in pursuing the war in Vietnam.

2. General DePuy's memorandum carries my thought a bit further, because I was thinking in terms of the present while he is thinking in terms of the aftermath of the Vietnamese war. Nevertheless, I think his points are well taken and should be earnestly considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-273
By ms, NARA Date 5-11-98

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment (1)
SACSA Memo of 8 Sep 1967

Copy to:
DJS
SACSA

When Enclosure is Detached
this document is downgraded
to CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~



THE JOINT STAFF

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

676

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR
COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

8 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: The End of the War in Vietnam and Its
Aftermath

1. Without debating the desirability of the matter I am convinced that the war in Vietnam will be brought to a close at US initiative sometime within the next 18 months. I am further convinced that a major effort in this direction will be mounted no later than the traditional Christmas cease-fire in December of this year.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services, and the country as a whole, should be greatly concerned about the after-taste. If US disengagement has the flavor of a military defeat, or even military frustration, it will take years to repair the damage to morale, the traditions, and even the concept for employment of military forces in the national defense.

3. We have lived through one such experience in the case of Korea. Without reopening the details of the debate which took place at the end of the Korean war, it can be said that public attention was not focused on the successful defense of South Korea but instead was focused on the restrictions and inhibitions on the use of military force. The after-taste which persists to this day was that the military operations had been frustrated and were therefore not successful. However, for reasons political and psychological, the war was terminated by the highest authorities in the land.

4. It is not difficult to visualize a similar denouement in Vietnam. The fact is, that the North Vietnamese have

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-273

By us, NARA Date 5-11-98

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DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

been clearly and unmistakably prevented from taking over South Vietnam by military force. We now are faced with the choice of describing this as a military success or a military failure. This is not an easy choice to make and it may even be impossible to make such a choice, but there are some powerful reasons why the matter should be addressed and carefully thought out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves and by the services individually and collectively:

a. Many brave lives have been spent and the families of those soldiers, sailors, air men and marines deserve to be told that these lives were not spent in vain - that they were spent in the process of achieving a very important national military objective - the very objective we set out to attain in the first place.

b. If the after-taste is not one of success from a military standpoint, one can foresee enormous problems in the post-war period in connection with the rationale for military forces. In short, there will be many who say that military forces are not able to cope with wars of national liberation and that therefore, such forces need not be maintained.

c. The organization, tactics and techniques of the military forces will be thrown open to question and doubt as a part of the same reaction which pertains to paragraph 4b above.

d. American military forces have a tradition of success on the battlefield from which stems much of their strength, discipline, and effectiveness. It would be tragic if this tradition were to be sacrificed through a misinterpretation of the military outcome of the war in Vietnam.

5. It is already clear that the pressures of an election year will cause partisans of various kinds to accentuate any differences, real or imagined, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Administration on the conduct of the war. However well-meaning these attempts may be, and disregarding the substance of the issues, there is a very real danger that the net effect will suggest a military failure where in fact there has been none.

6. What I am suggesting is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might find it highly desirable in the long range

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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~~EYES ONLY~~

interests of the United States and the armed forces to accentuate the positive in their discussions and testimony, not so much in terms of future prospects but in terms of concrete accomplishments already evident from both a strategic and tactical standpoint in Vietnam. In short, and given the limited nature of the war, the main military objective has already been accomplished.

7. I recommend that you discuss this with the Chairman so that he may, if he sees any merit in the proposal, in turn discuss it with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



W. E. DePUY
Major General, USA

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

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Saturday, Sept. 23, 1967
3:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

This report of a conversation between Bob Anderson and Ambassador Pachachi -- to which I referred the other day -- gives you the flavor of a number of Arab approaches which we will be exploring in New York in the days ahead. They are moving, but whether they are moving far enough to make a serious deal remains to be seen.

for file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Battle memo to Rusk 9/21/67 Amb. Pachachi's Conversation with Mr. Robert Anderson)

cc: Mr Goldstein

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date *10-24-9*

~~SECRET~~

Copy of memorandum to Secretary Rusk from Lucius Battle (Sept. 21, 1967) 68a

SUBJECT: Ambassador Pachachi's Conversation with Mr. Robert Anderson

Mr. Robert Anderson called me to report that Ambassador Pachachi of Iraq had called on him today for a full review of the Middle Eastern situation. During the special session of the General Assembly, Mr. Pachachi was the spokesman for a group of moderate Arabs with Mr. Anderson and others.

Mr. Pachachi, basing his comments on a meeting of his group (although UAR and others are not yet in New York) said that there was general concern because the Arabs did not believe they knew the position of the United States. The United States has not been explicit, they felt, in describing that position. There is some concern that this stems from U. S. support of the Israeli desire that nothing happen for a time since the Israelis are convinced that time is on their side. The moderate Arabs hope that our position is not also one of inaction as they consider that there must be an early settlement to the difficulties. If there is not an early settlement, U. S. -Arab relations will suffer considerably.

The moderate Arabs do not consider that their dialogue with the U. S. is adequate. They believe that there should be more contact with Ambassador Goldberg (which I urged during the last Assembly and urged today). Representatives of the group would like to meet with me, and I have agreed to get together with them the early part of next week in New York. Ambassador Pachachi was asked how far the Arabs were prepared to go at this time. He replied that they were willing to accept "almost complete rights of passage" in the waterways. There is no problem on Aqaba, and the Suez Canal could be opened to all but Israeli flagships. When Mr. Anderson expressed doubt that the Israelis would accept such an arrangement, Mr. Pachachi replied that, while he could not speak for Nasser, it was even possible that the Canal could be opened to Israeli flagships if necessary to obtain a settlement.

The Arabs are willing to guarantee all borders, but they must have retreat from occupied territories.

Withdrawal from Sinai could be coupled with a demilitarization arrangement.

They would accept demilitarization of the Syrian Heights under United Nations direction.

They will accept a unified Jerusalem provided there is some kind of administration by the Arabs (presumably the Jordanians) over the old Arab quarter.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

By ing, NARA, Date 3-24-95

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Pachachi remarked that the Russians will "go as far as the Arabs want them to go provided the United States will join." The Eastern Bloc is, according to Pachachi, largely pro-Israel in attitude and the Russians cannot ignore this feeling on the part of satellite countries.

The Arabs are willing to accept a declaration of the end of a state of belligerency in some form.

They cannot accept direct negotiations alone with the Israelis. They will accept, if necessary, negotiations with a third party in the room. They would prefer to have the Arabs in one room, the Israelis in a second room, and a representative of the third country in a room between the two. They admit, however, that there is some precedent for them to sit at the same table provided a third party is present.

COMMENT: The foregoing is the most forthcoming offer yet reported. As I told Mr. Anderson, it is possible that Pachachi will be more open with him than he would be with a Government official. I would suspect that Pachachi's position with Mr. Anderson will not be fully reflected in an official talk, but I will try to find out during the next few days. If the Arabs are willing to make a deal along the foregoing lines, this is very encouraging.

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~~SECRET~~

Saturday, September 23, 1967
3:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I am, of course, keeping my
mind open on mining Haiphong.

I thought you might like to read
this well-balanced argument for mining
(plus an earlier paper) by Bob Ginsburgh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 129, NARA, Date 10-10-91

~~SECRET~~

69a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

22 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Mining

In June, I concluded that although there is a wide range of uncertainty involved, there is a reasonable possibility that interdiction of ports and land LOCs could be decisive (Tab A).

That equation has now been modified by the following elements:

- CINCPAC has estimated the 1967 rate of imports at 8,300 tons per day instead of 5,000. In terms of the rationale of the previous analysis, this would mean that mining would have a greater impact than previously estimated.

- We have mounted an expanded effort to interdict NVN's land LOCs. It is obvious that this has caused NVN considerable difficulty, but we have no good estimate of how seriously NVN is hurting. We don't know really whether mining would now be more or less effective.

- The bad weather has begun to set in. This means (1) decreasing effectiveness in interdicting the land LOC alternates to the ports and (2) decreased effectiveness in hindering NVN attempts to overcome mining by lightering over the beach. However, bad weather -- involving high seas -- could hinder an NVN lightering effort almost as much as it would hinder our efforts to destroy the lighters.

On balance, I conclude that mining now would be somewhat less effective than it would have been had we begun in June. There is still, in my personal opinion, a reasonable possibility that mining would be decisive.

There are several other factors in addition to the absolute impact on the enemy's capability which ought to be considered and evaluated. I merely offer these as points to be considered, rather than using them as arguments for mining now.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-401

By cb, NARA, Date 9-19-95

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- Mining would probably be the best way of keeping pressure on NVN during the forthcoming bad weather when our bombing campaign is forced to slow down.

- Mining prior to a bombing pause would keep the pressure on Hanoi even during a bombing pause.

- Mining might have an important impact on Hanoi's evaluation of U.S. determination and persistence. Hanoi's estimate that the U.S. will change course is, in my opinion, the single most important factor in prolonging the war. If mining -- or any other action -- could disabuse Hanoi of that notion, it should receive the closest consideration.

- The present capability of an NVN lightering effort -- even without U.S. attempts to hinder the operation -- might put an upper limit on NVN's ability to compensate for mining.

- It is often argued that mining would be very risky but not very meaningful militarily. It is possible that if the mining were not meaningful militarily it would not really be very risky.

In all of the above, I have, obviously, not addressed the risks involved. An analysis of the risks would not be necessary unless the mining appeared to be productive. Thus, my point is simply that the mining seems to be a sufficiently worthwhile venture to require the most objective possible analysis of the attendant risks.

In the meantime, I recommend that we press on with our attacks on targets in the Haiphong area. There is still a possibility that a vigorous campaign to isolate Haiphong could make mining irrelevant.

4

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

13 June 1967

696

The Impact of Interdicting North Vietnam's Imports

At the present time, North Vietnam has a capacity to handle substantially more imports than are required to prosecute the war at the current level.

North Vietnam is currently importing at the rate of 5,000 tons per day (Tab A) against a capacity of 13,900 (Tab B). If we consider exports of 3,000 tons/day, NVN still has an excess import capacity of 5,900 tons a day.

Therefore, some people have concluded that closing the ports and interdicting road and rail lines would not be militarily effective because of the existence of this excess capacity.

Some proceed to argue that even if capacity could be drastically reduced, North Vietnam could tighten its belt and by curtailing non-essential military and civil consumption could continue to prosecute the war at the current level.

The attached analyses cast considerable doubt on these propositions.

In fact, they indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that interdiction of ports and land LOCs could be decisive. (Some unspecified amount of time would elapse while NVN lived off its stockpiles, however, unless the leadership chose to note the handwriting on the wall.)

There is, however, a wide range of uncertainty involved.

Estimates of minimum essential imports vary from 2,000 tons per day to 7,900 tons per day. Estimates of interdicted capacity vary from 3,900 to 4,100 per day, and higher capacities could undoubtedly be argued.

If NVN needs only 2,000 or 3,000 tons/day, an interdiction campaign would obviously not be decisive. It would be painful since imports of 3,000 tons/day would represent a reduction of 40% from current rate -- which already seems to cause an observable degree of pain.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-401

By CB, NARA, Date 1-19-95

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On the other hand, if minimum requirements were as high as 7,900 tons/day, an interdiction campaign which left the ports open might even be decisive. If the ports were not closed, import capacity would be 9,050 tons/day. Import requirements of 7,900 plus current exports of 3,030 would equal 10,930 -- and would exceed total capacity. However, if NVN ceased all exports, she would have a margin of 1,150 tons/day of excess capacity. It ought to be possible to reduce this margin at least to zero by interdicting supplies as they leave the port areas for distribution within NVN.

A more likely estimate of minimum requirements is 5,300 tons/day. This is only 6% greater than the current rate of imports. As indicated in Tab A this seems to be conservative despite the fact that it is considerably higher than previous estimates. If either of the estimated interdicted import capacities (3,900 - 4,100) are valid, an interdiction campaign would have a significant impact:

- Exports would cease (current rate 3,030).
- Imports would be 1,200 - 1,400 tons/day below the minimum essential.
- At the same time, additional minimum essential requirements would be generated as a result of the destruction caused by the interdiction campaign -- resulting in an even greater squeeze on NVN.
- It ought to affect the NVN leadership's calculation of their prospects -- and, hence, their will to persist.

R.N. Ginsburgh/13 Jun 67

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69c

North Vietnam's Minimum Essential
Import Requirements

This analysis concludes that in order to maintain its war effort and carry on essential economic activities North Vietnam will have to import at least at the rate of 5,300 metric tons per day.

There is a wide range of estimates, however, on North Vietnam's minimum essential import requirements as indicated in the table below --

- The "low base" uses the lowest annual rate in each category during the period 1964-7.
- The "1967 base" projects minimum imports at the rate for the first quarter of 1967.
- The "high base" adds to the 1967 rates the imports required to replace losses in production caused by destruction of the Haiphong cement plant and possible losses from destruction of fertilizer plants and miscellaneous facilities.
- The "CIA estimate" is that carried in intelligence memorandum 0649/67.
- The "revised" figures are derived as shown in succeeding paragraphs.

	<u>Thousands of Metric Tons</u>				
	<u>Low Base</u>	<u>1967 Base</u>	<u>High Base</u>	<u>CIA</u>	<u>Revised</u>
Petroleum	142	320	320	150	200
Fertilizer	140	292	620	-	391
Food	78	284	378	-	284
Timber	14	28	28	--	14
Cement	0	0	470	90	235
Military	200	200	200	200	200
Miscellaneous	162	432 (by sea) 252 (land)	666	330	600
Total	736	1,808	2,882	1,100	1,924
Tons/day	2,000	5,000	7,900	3,000	5,300

Tab A

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-461
By cb, NARA, Date 9-19-95

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For all practical purposes, the "low base" can be discarded on grounds that it is ancient history. A somewhat more valid argument can be made for the "high base" in that it represents the level of imports necessary if North Vietnam were to compensate for production losses. However, it tends toward the pessimistic side from NVN's point of view. A still better argument can be made for the 1967 base on grounds that under current conditions NVN would be importing only what is really necessary. However, this does not consider what NVN might be able to do if they really tightened their belts. The CIA estimate attempts to do just that. The CIA estimate, however, seems excessively optimistic about NVN's belt-tightening capability -- especially in terms of petroleum, food and fertilizer, cement, and miscellaneous imports.

It may be very significant that the "revised" estimate -- based on "requirements" rather than "supply" -- is within 6% of the current rate of imports.

Petroleum. The CIA estimate of 150 is excessively low. It is only 5% above 1964 imports. It is 10% below 1965 imports -- before the POL bombing campaign. Even the 1966 imports of 201 do not take full account of the bombing campaign which began in mid-1966. On the other hand, the 1967 rate may well be more than the minimum because NVN may be trying to build up its stocks in anticipation of possible U.S. attempts to interdict POL imports. An average of the 1966 rate (201) and the 1967 rate (320) would be 260. Based on an estimated current consumption of 18 thousand tons per month, annual requirements would be 216. Conceivably, this consumption rate could be decreased somewhat. Fragmentary reports on restrictive use of POL in NVN, however, would indicate that a reduction of as much as one-third in consumption would have a significant effect on NVN. Furthermore, this consumption rate does not take into account POL supplies which are destroyed by bombing, nor does it consider the additional POL requirements which would be generated by an intensified campaign against the land LOCs. Therefore, it seems conservative to estimate the minimum petroleum import requirement of 200.

Fertilizer. In 1966, NVN imported fertilizer in the amount of 227 thousand metric tons. In spite of these fertilizer imports, food production in 1966 was 300 thousand tons short. By 1967 the rate of fertilizer imports had reached 292. At present, NVN produces

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328 thousand tons of fertilizer. If this productive capacity were destroyed, NVN's requirement would be 555 to 620. If food is imported to make up the food deficit, the 1966 fertilizer import rate of 227 rather than 292 would seem to be a reasonable base point. If only half of NVN's fertilizer capacity were destroyed (164) and added to the 1966 rate (227), we would get a minimum fertilizer import requirement of 391.

Food. In 1966, NVN imported 78 thousand tons of food. In 1966, there was an estimated harvest short-fall of 300 thousand tons. This would generate an import requirement for 378. For the first quarter of 1967, however, food was only being imported at the rate of 284. If we are to be conservative, therefore, we should use 284 rather than 378. It should be noted, however, that this "conservative" estimate establishes a food and fertilizer requirement of 675, whereas the CIA combined requirement is only 330. If we assume a bumper rice crop, the CIA estimate would be reasonable. However, there are some indications that this year's harvest will be worse than last. Finally, although food is not at present "critical," NVN already seems to be operating at a subsistence level of food. Thus, it seems conservative to estimate the minimum food import requirement at 284.

Timber. Timber imports have varied from 14 to 32 with the current rate of 28. Arbitrarily, we use the lowest figure to get a minimum timber import requirement of 14.

Cement. Normally, NVN has exported cement. In 1966, NVN exported 99 thousand tons of an estimated production of 600. The Haiphong cement plant accounted for 95% of this capacity or 570. If this plant stays out of production, NVN would have to import 471 to maintain the 1966 rate of cement consumption. Undoubtedly, consumption could be reduced. If consumption were reduced 50%, NVN's minimum cement import requirement would be 235.

Military. We have used across the board the CIA estimate of 200. Increased attrition of military goods might well raise this requirement. Nevertheless, we estimate the minimum military goods requirement at 200.

Miscellaneous Economic Goods. In the first quarter of 1967, miscellaneous economic goods were being imported through the ports at the rate of 432 thousand tons. (In 1964, it was 162;

Tab A

3

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in 1966 it was 406.) Total imports through the ports were estimated at the rate of 1,356. If the ports accounted for 75% of imports, 452 would have been imported by land LOC. If the requirements for military goods (200) were transported by land, the import rate by land LOC would be 252. Thus, total miscellaneous economic goods at the first quarter rate would equal 684. The CIA estimated requirement is less than half -- 330. The "high base," however, estimated 866 (1967 rate of 684 plus an additional 182 to replace losses from attacks on production facilities other than cement). If we average the 1967 rate of 684 with 1966 miscellaneous economic goods of 516, we get a minimum miscellaneous economic goods requirement of 600.

Tab A

4

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69d

Transport Capacity of Major
Import Routes to Vietnam

	Annual Average ^a as of Apr 1967	CIA Estimate Interdicted Capacity	Revised Interdicted Capacity
Major Ports	5,500 ^b	0 ^c	550 ^d
Haiphong	4,500		450
Hon Gai & Cam Phu	1,000		100
Routes fm Kwangsi & Kwangtung ^e	5,000	2,300	2,000
Dong Dang Hanoi RR	3,000	800	600
Roads	2,000	1,500	1,400
Routes fm Yunnan ^e	3,400	1,600	1,550
Lao-Cai Hanoi RR ^f	700	700	560
Roads	1,200	900	840
Red River	1,500	0	150 ^d
<u>Total</u>	<u>13,900</u>	<u>3,900</u>	<u>4,100</u>

a Intelligence Memorandum 0649/67.

b The theoretical dry-cargo handling capacity at the docks and assuming that no exports would be handled. However, for the first quarter of 1967 dry cargo seaborne imports were running at the rate of 2,870 tons/day and exports at the rate of 3,030 tons/day for a total dry cargo rate of 5,900. In addition, petroleum was being imported at the rate of 900 tons/day. Thus, total imports and exports were 6,800 tons/day.
seaborne

c The CIA "estimate" simply assumed for purposes of analysis that actions to close the ports were 100% effective.

d The revised estimate arbitrarily assumes that actions to close the ports and the Red River would be "90% effective."

e The CIA estimate is based on an interdicted road capacity 25% less than uninterdicted capacity. The revised estimate assumes a reduction of 30%. The CIA estimates a reduction of 75% in uninterdicted rail capacity. The revised estimate assumes a reduction of 80%.

f Original capacity of the Lao Cai-Hanoi RR was estimated at 2,800. It is currently estimated at 700 (a 75% reduction).

Tab B

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-401
By CB, NARA, Date 9-19-95

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Saturday, September 23, 1967
2:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA estimates Soviet
1967 aid to Hanoi at \$700+ million rather
than \$1 billion, as in newspaper despatches

But our bombing is costing them
a good deal. They would be delighted to
have the war go on quietly and painfully
(for us) in the South without bombing the
North.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-401
By CS, NARA, Date 9-19-95

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

cc: *Mr Gledstein*

WWRostow:rlm

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NO FOREIGN DISSEM

70a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-406
By CC, NARA, Date 7-19-95

22 September 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Soviet Aid to North Vietnam

1. Press statements today commenting on Kosygin's announcement that the Soviets would increase their aid to North Vietnam included speculation that the Soviets were already supplying North Vietnam with a billion dollars of aid annually. We find this speculation high.

2. Our current figures are:

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965	200 (million)	85	285
1966	360	150	510
1967 (projected to end of year)	500+	200	700+

3. The Weekly plans an article on the general subject of aid to North Vietnam from all Communist countries for publication Friday, October 29.

4. The promise of increased military and economic aid is pretty much standard in these circumstances. The North Vietnamese official, Nghi, has also been recently in some of the East European capitals where he elicited similar pledges of aid. Nghi makes these tours regularly. The communique winding up his visit to Moscow in the early fall of last year, a visit which had produced a new Soviet-North Vietnamese agreement on economic cooperation, also pledged fuller assistance. It said that the North Vietnamese could be helped "in meeting the

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needs of its national economy and in consolidating the defense potential of the country, taking into account the requirements resulting from the new stage of the war in Vietnam."

5. There are other examples of declarations of this kind. What it comes down to is that we learn little about the quantity and quality of Soviet assistance from these official statements. What we know about this has to come from other sources.

E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence

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10

✓ Rostow

VIETNAM AID

MOSCOW (AP)-THE SOVIET UNION HINTED TODAY THAT ITS AID TO NORTH VIETNAM, ALREADY REPORTED COSTING ABOUT \$1 BILLION A YEAR, WILL BE INCREASED.

THE HIT CAME IN AN OFFICIAL REPORT ON A KREMLIN MEETING BETWEEN AN AID-SEEKING DELEGATION FROM HANOI AND PREMIER ALEXEI N. KOSYGIN.

THE REPORT SAID KOSYGIN AND NORTH VIETNAMESE DEPUTY PREMIER LE THANH NGHI "EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE SITUATION WHICH IS TAKING SHAPE IN VIETNAM IN VIEW OF A STEPPING UP OF AMERICAN AGGRESSION. THEY DISCUSSED PRACTICAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FURTHER ASSISTANCE TO REPEL U.S. AGGRESSION AND MEET REQUIREMENTS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY."

THE SOVIET UNION IS PUBLICLY PLEDGED TO ESCALATE ITS AID TO MATCH ANY RISE IN THE U.S. WAR EFFORT IN VIETNAM. THE MENTION OF "A STEPPING UP" SUGGESTED THAT INCREASED AID WAS BEING DISCUSSED.

THE REPORT SAID "THE MEETING WAS MARKED BY A SPIRIT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, CORDIALITY AND FRIENDSHIP."

932AED 9/22

1

PERCY

Saturday, Sept. 23, 1967
2:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Lord Attlee is seriously ill and is reported to be sinking. Attached, for your approval, is a draft of a Presidential statement to be made in the event of his death. State concurs.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

cc Mr Goldstein

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

71a

I have learned with deep sorrow of the death of Lord Attlee, one of the great leaders of the United Kingdom. His passing is a loss not only to his own countrymen, but to all men moved by democratic ideals and the spirit of freedom.

In a career of great distinction, he devoted his life to his country's service. As Deputy Prime Minister in the wartime National Government he powerfully contributed to the winning of the war. Afterwards, as Prime Minister of the postwar government, he made memorable contributions to the difficult task of reconstruction. When new perils required not only rebuilding, but rearming as well, he did not flinch at the prospect or at the sacrifices entailed. He was one of the pillars of the Western Alliance.

Lord Attlee was a strong defender and champion of democracy and freedom. As a political leader and a creative humanitarian, he earned the admiration and respect of the entire world.

We join in paying homage to a British statesman who was also a warm and valued friend of the United States. To his family, and to the British people, we extend our sympathy and condolences.

###

Saturday, September 23, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk recommends that you see George Brown on Wednesday morning if your schedule permits. He believes that he should have a good talk with Brown first, especially to calm him down on the ABM "lack of consultation."

With respect to the question you put to me via Marv Watson: the only "evidence" I have that seeing Brown might displease Wilson is Pat Dean's saying to me that Brown wished the request for a meeting with Brown to come from you because Wilson would "suspect that Brown had wangled the invitation." Earlier in the conversation, as I reported, Dean said Wilson and Brown's relations had "deteriorated."

You may wish to discuss all aspects of this matter directly with Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

Will see Brown Wednesday, Sept. 27, A.M. _____

No _____

See me _____

cc: Mr Goldstein

WWRostow:rlh

13
Saturday, September 23, 1967
12:35 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know:

1. The Eastern Europeans are fanning around the corridors of the UN saying that in a few days Hanoi will ask for "volunteers."

2. Arthur Goldberg reports that Gromyko is in "an ugly mood."

This could mean they are (along with their aid-to-Hanoi announcement) getting themselves into a position of maximum leverage before pushing a negotiating formula ; or that they will in fact be upping the ante.

We shall know more after Secretary Rusk sees Gromyko on Monday night.

W. W. R.

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Saturday, Sept. 23, 1967
11:00 a.m.

74

MR. PRESIDENT:

You will be interested in how Sen. Fulbright discusses Viet Nam policy with the French Ambassador in Washington.

It reveals clearly why Fulbright presses us towards the U. N.

As you know, the [redacted] is accurate. 3.4(b)(1)
Occasionally, my old tough schoolyard days come back, and I'd like to invite one of these fellows to meet me out behind the barn.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] attachment (Paris 3909) 3.4(b)(1)

Pres. file
SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-239
By cl, NARA Date 10-31-00

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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Action

RR RUEHC
DE RUFNCR 3909 2651355

CONTROL: 5625Q

Info

ZNY SSSSS
R 221816Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5783
STATE GRNC
BT

RECD: Sept. 22, 1967
6:01PM

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 3909

NODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJ: LUCET REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH FULBRIGHT

SOURCE SHOWED EMBOFF TELEGRAM DATED SEPT 17 FROM AMB LUCET
RE HIS SEPT 16 CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR FULLBRIGHT: SUMMARY
FOLLOWS:

1. FULLBRIGHT ASKED WHY FRANCE DID NOT SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF VIETNAM ISSUE IN UN FORUM. LUCET RESPONDED THAT PRINCIPAL REASON WAS THAT MAJOR INTERESTED PARTIES, I.E., CHINA AND VIETNAMESE, WERE NOT MEMBERS.
2. FULBRIGHT INDICATED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT. HE STRESSED THAT HE WOULD NOT FAVOR EXTENDED TREATMENT OF ISSUE NOR SUBSTITUTION OF NEW MACHINERY FOR THAT EXISTING. HE THOUGHT THAT OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE UN RESOLUTION SUPPORTED BY MAJOR POWERS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS.
3. FULBRIGHT DISCUSSED CURRENT SITUATION IN TERMS OF A "COMPLETE IMPASSE" AND INDICATED THAT RUSK AND WALT ROSTOW WERE "UNSHAKEABLE." "PRESIDENT LISTENS MORE TO GENERALS THAN MCNAMARA" WHO WAS IN DIFFICULT POSITION. FULBRIGHT CONTINUED TO DEVELOP-THESIS THAT DEBATE IN UN WOULD SERVE USEFUL VPURPOSE AS WOULD PRESIDENT WITH WAY OUT (Z ALIBI"). SENATOR DISCLAIMED ANY SPECIAL INFLUENCE WITH PRESIDENT BUT THOUGHT HE UNDERSTOOD HIM AFTER MANY YEARS TOGETHER IN SENATE.

HE FEARED THAT REPUBLICANS PERCY, HATFIELD & MORTON WOULD FOLLOW NIXON IN DEMANDING ALL-OUT WAR WHICH WOULD PUT PRESIDENT IN POSITION WHERE HE COULD WIN ELECTIONS "ONLY BY PLAYING CARD OF NEGOTIATION." "PRESIDENT WAS PARALYZED BY GENERALS." IF HOWEVER USSR, FRANCE, INDIA ANDPERHAPS UK VOTED FOR PACIFIC SOLUTION, PRESIDENT'S HAND WOULD BE STRENGTHENED.

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Authority NLT-001R-175-2-104(121a)
By Ch, NARA, Date 11-18-13

~~SECRET~~

-2- PARIS 3909, SEPTEMBER 22, NODIS/MARIA THREE

4. DEBATE WOULD HAVE ANOTHER ADVANTAGE, ACCORDING FULBRIGHT, IN THAT USG WOULD BE FORCED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND CLARIFY ITS POSITIONS IN WORLD FORUM. FRENCH AND OTHERS CORRECTLY ASK WHERE US IS HEADING. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH FUZZINESS IN US OFFICIAL STATEMENTS SINCE BALTIMORE SPEECH TWO YEARS AGO. AMB GOLDBERG WOULD BE CONSTRAINED TO BOW BEFORE WORLD PRESSURE, VOTE FOR SUCH RESOLUTION, AND GIVE ASSURANCES THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE OPENED.

5. LUCET EXPRESSED VIEW THAT BEST SOLUTION TO VIET NAM WAR WOULD BE FOR USG TO ANNOUNCE THE DATE OF DEPARTURE OF ITS TROOPS. LUCET REPORTED SENATOR FULBRIGHT AGREED BUT SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THAT INDIVIDUAL PRESTIGE OF PRESIDENT, SECSTATE AND ROSTOW AS TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT POSITION. FULLBRIGHT SAID THAT FRANCE AND RUSSIA SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE. HE INTENDED TO DISCUSS MATTER WITH DOBRYNIN WHO JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW.

GP-4. BOHLEN

BT

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Saturday, September 23, 1967
10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

I am having this memorandum of Henry Owen's staffed out over the week end, but you may want to read over the week end these three suggestions for dramatic Presidential foreign policy initiatives for 1968.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

cc: Mr Goldstein

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 10-10-91

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

25
9/24/67
Cy sent WJ
SK
EH

~~SECRET~~

September 21, 1967

Walt:

1. I wrote the attached memo with the President and the Secretary in mind as audience.
2. I asked the Secretary if he had any objection to my sending it to you. He said that he had no objection provided that I made clear he had not yet read it with sufficient care to reach a considered view on it but, at first glance, found some of the ideas interesting enough to be drawn to your attention.
3. All of these suggestions involve difficulties; each requires further study before a decision pro or con can be reached; none of them will get very far in the Government without high-level support.
4. I have some ideas about follow-up study, in case the President likes any of these ideas.
5. It is a menu, from which selections can be made, rather than a table d'hote. Three overseas trips may be too much for one year (though perhaps some of them could be combined).
6. This memo has only been to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the State Department.

W⁰
Henry Owen

Mr. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-402
By isp, NARA, Date 3-24-95

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-402

MEMORANDUM By 128, NARA, Date 3-24-95

SUBJECT. 1968 Presidential Foreign Policy Initiatives

1. Disarmament. If an NPT is concluded, we should try to use its signing to advance a wider cause: reduction of armaments. Failing progress on this front, an NPT will not likely restrain potential nuclear powers indefinitely.

We should propose that the NPT be signed at a ceremony, attended by heads of the governments which have been meeting at Geneva.

At this ceremony the heads of government would pledge themselves to renewed efforts to agree on concrete disarmament measures before the first NPT review Conference (which occurs five years after the treaty's coming into force). Such a formal high level pledge to work toward "vertical" non-proliferation should help to make the NPT more palatable to non-nuclear signers.

At such a joint signing, the President might call upon all signers to join the US in pledging themselves to dedicate a fixed percentage of any savings resulting from disarmament to economic development, in line with General Eisenhower's 1954 pledge and proposal.

Such a joint signing would also provide an opportunity for another Johnson-Kosygin talk.

2. Regional Asian Cooperation. We should talk out with the Japanese the pro's and con's of Foreign Minister Miki's repeated suggestion that the five developed Pacific countries (US, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) coordinate their economic aid programs in Southeast Asia. If these talks proceed favorably, we might further explore the possibility of a 1968 Summit meeting of these five countries in Japan. Such a meeting, after suitable preparation at the Ministerial level, might:

-- agree on the need for expanded post-Vietnam development aid to Southeast Asia; and

-- set up a permanent Ministerial Committee both to plan this aid and to seek more aid for this area from other developed countries.

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All this would advance and dramatize our constructive purposes in Asia, and thus help to place the Vietnam war in a proper perspective.

To avoid having such a meeting seem like a self-appointed "rich man's club," we might suggest to the Japanese that they try to get one of the groupings of Asian developing countries to which they belong to call for closer cooperation by the developed nations of the Pacific in meeting economic aid needs. The five could then come together in response to this call by Asian LDC's, rather than on their own initiative.

3. UNCTAD. The New Delhi Ministerial meeting of the UN Committee for Trade and Development (in February, 1968) could be the occasion for a Presidential visit (or message) which would underline our concern with the worldwide problem of under-development, thus balancing our concern with the problem of security and aggression.

We would want to be sure that the President, if he went to UNCTAD, would be well received despite the war in Vietnam. Ambassador Bowles judges that this would be the case, and that he would be greeted by large and friendly crowds.

Presidential involvement would only make sense, however, if we had something new and worthwhile to propose. Here are two possibilities:

(a) Food. We might follow up Secretary Rusk's reference to a World Food Reserve at last year's DAC Ministerial meeting by announcing that the US would be willing to participate in a global scheme for insuring selected crops in developing countries against natural disaster. Costs to the US would be less than the amounts we now spend in meeting emergency food needs without full participation by others. Such an insurance scheme (proposed by the Policy Planning Council) is now being examined by an inter-agency group under AID leadership.

(b) Trade. The US could state, in more specific terms, the new trade policy foreshadowed by the President at Punta d'el Este - offering a general, temporary preference for imports from all developing countries. The exact nature of such an offer could be better determined after the December OECD Ministerial Meeting, which will deal specifically with this question.

4. UN. In a major speech next fall, the President might propose to the 1968 General Assembly a four point, long range program for strengthening global international cooperation. Each of these four points requires further study within the US Government to test its merits; none of them is now ready for surfacing:

(a) As a follow-up to the President's 1964 call for a "turning point in the struggle...of man against nature", the US would invite all UN members to a Conference to promote international cooperation in coping with the perils of nature: hurricanes, typhoons, floods, earthquakes, etc. The Conference would seek agreement on specific measures of regional and wider cooperation in promoting (i) scientific understanding; (ii) precautionary measures, and (iii) disaster relief.

(b) The US would propose that all UN members agree that weather modification activities should be limited to peaceful purposes only, and that international regulations should be developed to govern any national weather modification activities which might affect the interests of other countries.

(c) The US would propose that all space powers agree to carry on manned and unmanned exploration beyond the moon only in coordination or cooperation with each other, via an International Space Agency, under UN auspices.

(d) The US would propose that resources of the ocean floor beyond the continental shelf be managed by an international authority. When technology permits practical exploitation, a percentage of revenues from this source should be dedicated to specified international purposes - e.g., the UN fund for helping developing countries. (The current US position, in this General Assembly and in recent discussions with the Congress, neither precludes nor foreshadows this proposal; this current position leaves the door open for the US to reach a decision as to the merits of this and other ideas about future management of ocean resources. Staff work to this end is now beginning. The time to act on such ideas will be in 1969, when the International Convention on the Continental Shelf becomes open to proposals for amendment, but such ideas could be foreshadowed in a Presidential speech to the 1968 GA.)

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 00-308
By sj, NARA Date 7-5-01

SECRET

Saturday, September 23, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I don't know whether paragraph 2 of
this Soviet comment is serious, but I
suspect paragraph 1 is correct.

W. W. Rostow



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

SECRET

cc: Mr. Goldstein

WWRostow:rla

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE 76a
IN

PAGE 1 OF PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~XXXXXX~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC

EXD DDI

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EO 12958

3.4(b)(1)-25

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SEP 22 15 38 Z

DIST 22 SEPTEMBER 1967

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DATE: DEC 2001

COUNTRY USSR

DOI AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT OFFICIAL'S COMMENT ON SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENT

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs

(C)

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
(C)

1. THE SOVIET UNION WEIGHED THE FEASIBILITY OF BUILDING AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM TO MEET THE U.S. MISSILE THREAT, BUT DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE TOO EXPENSIVE TO DEPLOY A SYSTEM ON THE SCALE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION.

2. THE USSR HAS DECIDED TO BUILD AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE WHICH WOULD BE CAPABLE OF MEETING THE LIMITED BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT THAT THE CHICOMS ARE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO CREATE.

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: SIMILAR REMARKS HAVE BEEN MADE

SEE THIS REPORT IS PRESENTED
AS AN INDICATION OF THE TYPE OF ABM STORY THAT MAY BE CIRCULATING

4. DISTRIBUTION: NONE.

~~SECRET~~ ~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/~~
(classification) (dissem controls) ~~BACKGROUND USE ONLY~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI/RAC 00-310

By CBM, NARA, Date 3-18-02

77

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Saturday, September 23, 1967 -- 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

In the light of Gene's conversation with the Soviet Counselor, this observation of Joe Kraft's is interesting. Also attached is a paper by Bill Colby of CIA, which also approaches Viet Nam from a "two-war" point of view, which we are considering in Nick's Viet Nam group.

Sec. Rusk's discussion on Monday night with Gromyko should establish whether this is in fact the approach which Moscow is going to take. If it is, the next big step will be what Thieu says in his inaugural address about bringing the Viet Cong into the political process under the Vietnamese constitution.

There are many questions here, but this is the first time I have seen the beginnings of a common framework of thought emerging from Moscow, Washington, and Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 3855
Memo by Colby, 22 Sept 1967

cc: Mr Goldstein

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-401
By cb, NARA, Date 9-19-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

77a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, September 23, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM PARIS (3855)

SUBJECT: Joseph Kraft

Columnist Joseph Kraft on his way back from the Far East came to see an Embassy officer on September 21. Kraft, who had spent the last couple of days in Moscow, said that in the Soviet capital he had met with the North Vietnamese Ambassador and the National Liberation Front representative. The former had told him that as a result of recent trips of Le Thanh Ngi, Soviet assistance to the North Vietnamese is presently running at a "rate of one billion dollars per year, or about twice as much as before."

Kraft thought that the most interesting recent development in Soviet-Vietnamese relations was the fact that Brezhnev received National Liberation Front representative Dang Quang Minh on September 18 and that this event was given extensive coverage on page one of Pravda. When the Embassy officer asked Kraft how he explained this and the fact that Brezhnev had referred in his statement to an "independent South Vietnam," Kraft speculated along the following lines: The North Vietnamese are interested in spreading the idea that there are two wars going on in Vietnam -- one in the North and the other in the South. The latter conflict concerns the National Liberation Front. This line, the North Vietnamese believe, will facilitate their task of obtaining Peking's acquiescence if North Vietnam ever decides to negotiate with the U.S. The North Vietnamese could claim negotiations would cover only U.S./North Vietnamese relations and not the war in the South. Latest Soviet moves which treat South Vietnam as a separate entity support this approach. In return, the Soviets have asked Hanoi to send a top-level delegation to the 50th Anniversary celebration -- preferably Ho or Dong -- which would assure the success of the celebration. The Embassy officer did not comment on this speculation.

Kraft has asked for an appointment with Bo on September 22.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94402
By lig, NARA, Date 3-24-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

CC: WJ

Wm Lombard
done 9/22/67

776

22 September 1967

There are two wars in Vietnam, the war against North Vietnam and the war in South Vietnam.

The war against North Vietnam includes the air bombardment, the fighting in the DMZ area, and the infiltration further southward.

The war in South Vietnam includes the guerrilla war, the Revolutionary Development Program to build strength in the countryside, and the political development of constitutional government in South Vietnam.

These two wars were one in 1965, when the guerrilla war in South Vietnam had grown to the stage of major battles between battalions, regiments and even divisional units. The allied military victories in South Vietnam during 1966 and early 1967 won this big war in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese response to defeat in the conventional war in South Vietnam was to open the conventional war at the DMZ, where they can still bring larger units to bear.

There is no stalemate in the war in South Vietnam. The purely military victories have been followed by the gradual mopping up process of the pacification campaign, reducing the guerrilla threat and expanding the Revolutionary Development campaign areas. It is matched by the progress made toward constitutional government, building the structure upon which national unity can be founded to link these islands of Revolutionary Development. It can be won if the United States has the will and determination to sustain its political and defense effort, despite occasional setbacks, over the time needed to produce these fundamental changes in the Vietnamese body politic.

There is no stalemate in the North Vietnamese war. There has been progress in raising the cost of North Vietnamese infiltration southward into South Vietnam. North Vietnam is being subjected to a steady increase of pressure at home through the bombing campaign. North Vietnamese attempts to push

the DMZ fight southward have been repulsed. Since we have no intention to occupy North Vietnam, it can continue a flickering frontier war at the DMZ until it recognizes that its hopes for success are gone and the cost in bombing is excessive. Its hope that American determination will flag in 1968, and its continuing the North Vietnam war at whatever cost until then, is no stalemate.

If we can present the picture in Vietnam in terms of these two wars in our communiques, in our statistics and in our casualties, we might more clearly bring out that, while gradual pacification in South Vietnam and graduated pressure against the North must be sustained, our presence there is not thereby stalemated.

W. Colby

Saturday, September 23, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have gone back to the drawing board on your request for figures on U.S. fatalities in South Vietnam, and I believe the attached card gives the information you desired.

I understand that one of the problems we had was in making clear the Returned to Duty category; i. e., we do not want to give the impression that they all may have returned to combat duty. In other words, the 39,890 who required some period of hospitalization and returned to duty were placed in the productive manpower base but not necessarily in a combat role.

W. W. Rostow

U. S. Fatalities in Vietnam
(January 1961 - September 16, 1967)

78a

Killed in Action	11,022
Wounded in Action	84,743
Of these:	
Died of wounds	1,310
Hospitalized and not returned to duty	4,434
*Returned to duty	79,009

*Note: 39,890 required some period of hospitalization
before returning to duty.

Friday, Sept. 22, 1967
7:00 p.m.

~~T. S. S. S. S.~~
2. P. file

79

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith another report on VC manpower
problems, in what will be a continuing series.

W. W. R.

Attachment

792

Friday, September 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Manpower and Other Difficulties as Reflected in
Intelligence Reports and Captured Documents

A. POLITICAL

An Xuyen Province (August)

The Chief of the Chieu Hoi Center stated that he attributed the lack of Viet Cong incidents in An Xuyen Province to the fact that the Viet Cong are changing from a military to a political struggle. He said that the Viet Cong are encouraging their families to return to Government of Vietnam--controlled areas to avoid allied air and artillery strikes and also to insure popular support for Viet Cong candidates in future elections.

B. MANPOWER

Phu Yen Province (August)

Since April 1967 the daily Viet Cong rice ration has ranged from one-half kilogram to as low or lower than one-fourth kilogram per cadre. The Revolutionary Development Program has effectively decreased the population in Viet Cong-controlled areas, thus adversely affecting agricultural production. The following quotation from a captured Viet Cong document graphically illustrates this problem --
"Previously we controlled 220,000 inhabitants in the Phu Yen liberated areas and 40,000 in areas of enemy control. This was a total of 260,000 out of the 360,000 inhabitants of the entire province. At present, because of enemy sweep operations and plans for resettling the people, we control only 20,000 inhabitants or one-tenth of the old figure. Because of this situation prompt action should be taken to smash the enemy's pacification plan and return the people to their former residences."

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-401
By CB, NARA, Date 9-19-95

Kien Hoa Province (June)

Viet Cong District Committees have ordered party chapters to recruit young men to reinforce the District Companies and the Provincial Main Force Units. Each district was ordered to recruit at least 20 men to support the Viet Cong 516th Battalion, the majority of whom must be forcibly recruited.

Manpower is a continuing problem for the Viet Cong. In Kien Hoa, the Viet Cong control over half the land area and 40 per cent of the population, but the Viet Cong are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit personnel. Most recruits are forced into Viet Cong training and then into units. Regular units suffered heavily during the first three months of 1967 and the constant air strikes are taking their toll. Recently, however, main force units have not engaged in any large-scale attacks and are probably trying to bring their units up to strength. They can easily draw on guerrilla reserves, but this has a disadvantage in that guerrilla operate more effectively in terrain with which they are familiar.

Ninh Thuan Province (June)

Lack of effective military operations and the need to move larger quantities of food and supplies to secret base areas highlighted Viet Cong problems during the month. The Viet Cong military summer offensive failed, and the fall-winter campaign, which began before the elections, does not appear to be any more successful. The Viet Cong were concerned that they maintain a strong support base in the Son Hai area. Apparently a large number of people have moved as a result of Government of Vietnam sweep operations in July. In one reported instance, the Viet Cong forcibly prevented some Son Hai families from moving to nearby My Nghia.

C. MILITARY AND OTHER

First Corps (1 August to 6 September)

A penetration agent reported on a study session in Quang Tri Province at which the Monsoon offensive plan was discussed. The plan stated that even if another 45,000 to 60,000 US troops were sent to Vietnam the allied forces would still not have enough strength to protect the First Corps tactical zone. The Monsoon Plan anticipated a casualty rate of 45 to 50 per cent of committed forces but estimated the Viet Cong would lose an equal amount if activities continued through a protracted period of two years or so.

Quang Ngai Province (June)

Since April 1967, operations by allied forces in Southern Quang Ngai Province have caused heavy casualties among the Viet Cong Forces, especially Local Forces companies. The remnants of district guerrilla units have required augmentation by new recruits in order to continue effective operation.

It is the opinion of many of these newly liberated persons that the Viet Cong will require a long period of reenforcing their units before being able to mount a significant attack on allied forces in the South of the Province.

The casualty rate among Viet Cong Forces has increased during June, creating manpower shortages which have not been remedied.

Gia Dinh Province (August)

The Viet Cong in Gia Dinh Province are reportedly having food supply problems, and from all indications they are not receiving the cooperation from the people necessary for any expansion of their programs.

Kien Giang Province (August)

There have been several reports during the month, plus other indications, that a morale problem is developing among some Viet Cong organizations, Middle and high-ranking cadres are reportedly growing tired of the fighting, of evading air strikes and of being unable to support their families or gain any tangible benefits from working for the Viet Cong.

Arthur McCafferty