

62

Thursday, October 5, 1967  
10:25 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the message, redrafted,  
as requested, for both the Prime  
Minister and the Foreign Secretary.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

62a

October 5, 1967

From the President

To the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary

I want you both to know how heartened I was by your success in holding the line so well at Scarborough. With what I confront every day, it wasn't hard for me to reconstruct what you faced. I think you understand how much it matters that the government of the country which means most to me, aside from my own, is lending its support for what we all know is right, despite the storms around us.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By WJ, NARA, Date 10-24-95

68  
Thursday, October 5, 1967  
10:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

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W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file  
shaga*

62a

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-403

By Julian NARA. Date 9-25-00



64  
*Pres file*  
Thursday - 9:00 am  
October 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Disaster Assistance to Mexico

The helicopters you sent to Acapulco will wind up operations today and return to the US tomorrow.

Before taking this decision, Charge Dearborn checked with Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores who gave the OK.

Carrillo Flores told Dearborn that a high ranking officer of their Defense Secretariat would go to Acapulco to express President Diaz Ordaz' thanks to the helicopter team. President Diaz Ordaz will also send a message of appreciation to you.

W. W. Rostow

(refer: Mexico's 1469,10/3/67)

65

Pres file

Thursday - October 5, 1967  
9:00 am

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of President Diaz Ordaz

At your request, Secretary Rusk spoke to Congressman Mahon about Texas Tech's interest in bestowing honorary degrees on you and the Mexican President during the state visit.

The Congressman said the University was willing to make the presentations in Washington. This procedure overcomes the scheduling problem and President Diaz Ordaz' wish not to visit a university campus.

We could handle the award ceremony by including it in the Diaz Ordaz return reception at the Mexican Embassy -- which would give it a nice touch -- or during one of the two sessions which he will have with you here.

Before sounding out the Mexicans on this addition to the program, I wanted:

1. Your approval for adding the awards ceremony to the program

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Your preference on the locale of the ceremony

At Mexican reception \_\_\_\_\_

During GDO's calls here \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_.

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-4  
By Sj, NARA Date 5-16-01

66

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 5, 1967 --

*Free file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Situation Report: Selling Wheat to Pakistan

As you look ahead to decisions on the full range of food aid, I thought you would want to know the specific considerations we have to take into account in a case like Pakistan's.

The Paks calculated their food import requirements for FY 1968 at 2.25 million tons of wheat. We have already provided 1.25 million. They purchased another 200,000 tons. They're getting 66,000 tons from Canada and Australia. That leaves 734,000 tons for them to get.

Of this 734,000 tons, we have told them we will provide 500,000 tons under PL 480. As you instructed, we have offered to provide half of the final 234,000 tons if the Paks would match it with cash purchases. This means we sell them 117,000 tons for about \$9 million.

When the instruction to sell the 117,000 tons went to Ben Oehlert, he cabled back his deep concern. (His cable is at Tab A.) The AID economists share his feelings. The argument goes like this:

- The Paks have already bought 200,000 tons, and they have squeezed their foreign exchange budget to the bone. (Pakistan's foreign exchange now stands at \$166 million -- enough to finance five weeks of imports. Most countries are very uncomfortable with anything less than enough foreign exchange for four months' imports.) In the last two years they have tripled their cash food buying in world markets.
- Their wheat reserves are dangerously low. Their target is a reasonable 950,000 tons. They are now at 300,000 tons. With scheduled imports -- including our 734,000 tons, if they get it all -- they will only raise reserves to 500,000 tons by June 1968.
- If we play our cards well, we have a good chance of a big package of wheat for Pakistan -- purchases and PL 480 -- for the whole of calendar 1968. The total might run over 3 million tons (\$195 million). With that kind of bait, we might get them to agree to a much higher level of purchases, starting within the next three months. If we use the time between now and the abundant new Pak harvest (December) wrangling about this small portion, we may lose the opportunity for the large deal which would really help our domestic wheat price and our balance of payments.

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- 2 -

- The Paks will need every penny of foreign exchange to back up the import reform planned for January 1968. AID and the IMF have encouraged this reform. The Paks badly need to devalue. They need to simplify import controls to let market forces work freely and take up slack in the economy. They also need to provide more incentives for exports. The hard fact is that our forcing even a small additional outlay (the \$9 million we're asking them to spend on our wheat) might strengthen the factions in the GOP who oppose reform so that the January package would be cancelled.
- Finally, we must look at the wheat bargain in terms of our overall negotiating position with the Paks.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
EO 12958 3.4(b)(6)>25Yrs  
(S)

Despite these concerns, Oehlert is carrying out the instruction we have given him to try to work out a sale and will see Ayub Friday morning. We have given him firm instructions along the lines you directed (Tab B). Judging from Ben's effectiveness so far, we just might do it -- however adamant the Paks (below Ayub) seem, and however reluctant Ben and people here in town are about this particular deal. Ayub might well conclude that even a big sacrifice now -- and helping you when you need it -- will pay dividends in the long run.

Meanwhile, we have been playing the same tune with the Pakistan Finance Minister who is now in Washington. I told him Wednesday about the staggering load you carry with the budget, and how important even small wheat sales are to your ability to go on financing programs in the poor countries.

We certainly have to look carefully at this whole range of questions before we come to you for food decisions. I am not convinced, for example, that Pakistan should devalue right now. I have commissioned a study to examine this problem in a new light. Maybe the Paks will just put us off until 1968, taking only 617,000 tons now with a promise to buy the 117,000 in next year's deal. They just might take that risk with their food stocks.

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
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- 3 -

I take your time with all this because it is reasonably typical. I've got the "sell wheat" message loud and clear, and I think the bureaucracy is getting it too. But I thought you would want to know what kinds of judgments are involved. I will have papers to you within the next few days looking toward a NSC meeting on the whole food outlook. The meeting is now scheduled for next Wednesday (October 11).

W. W. Rostow

EKH/RM/vmr



16a



~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

66b

MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR OEHLERT (PAKISTAN)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-405

September 29, 1967

By lip, NARA, Date 3-29-95

1. It is now clear to me that if we are to bring Pakistan to make a commercial purchase of U. S. wheat this can be done only if I make direct approach to President Ayub. I am of course prepared to seek an appointment to do this as soon as possible following Ayub's return from the Soviet Union on October 4. I fully understand the rationale behind my instructions to seek a commercial purchase and recognize that final judgements on such instructions can be made only in Washington. In good conscience, however, I believe I should point out the effect which this action could have on U. S. economic objectives in Pakistan and more broadly the possible influence it might have on our critically important political interests here.
2. By now you must have seen our joint message Rawalpindi 1058 which summarized adverse implications for GOP if it necessary dip further into foreign exchange to finance part of wheat import requirement beyond 500,000 tons proposed in State 38941. As you know, Pak Foreign Exchange position is on the precarious side (their current reserves will finance only about five weeks' imports).
3. Import liberalization in Pakistan is a major U. S. economic objective and we have pressed Paks toward a major move in this direction when they announce their new import policy next January. If they can sufficiently ease import licensing controls, market forces can work freely and pick up slack in economy. Under-utilization of capacity can be replaced by incentives for exports with resulting greater earning capacity.
4. Even assuming Paks apply cash to only 117,000 tons, with matching increment added to PL 480 agreement, this to us small amount of around ten million dollars in foreign exchange looms large in Pak financial eyes. All indications we get from GOP officers suggest they will defer any cash purchases at this time because of their fears over availability sufficient foreign exchange to support their planned liberalized import policy. (Anticipated \$140 million U. S. commodity loan this FY is, of course, an extremely important factor in this equation.) As of now the import liberalization advocates in M. M. Ahmad's Planning Commission are still having their way. This is good. However, by deferring further imports above 500,000 tons, they are taking a risk both with respect wheat supply next Spring, as well as total anticipated

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- 2 -

availability upon which to embark January policy. It is a risk which would appear be out of proportion and would be unnecessary if we could pick up whole 734,000 ton need under PL 480 and let Paks out of this bind.

5. What worries me most is the inconsistent position which we are taking with our closest friends in the GOP. We are urging them to conserve their resources for essential economic reforms and then persuading them for a second time to take an action which will deplete their reserves. Our AID relationships have always been the steadiest aspect of our relations with the GOP because they are based on confidence on both sides that we are both sincerely interested in Pak development. My concern is this relationship may now suffer.
6. You may feel that, on balance, we still should hold out for some cash purchase. In that case, my suggestion would be that we up our PL 480 figure now to pick up half the 234 thousand ton shortfall, I.E., immediate negotiations for 617 thousand tons wheat, telling the Paks that they may defer the remaining 117 thousand purchase if they wish but that they should not expect it to be picked up next year under PL 480. We would of course be seeking an unwritten but clearly understood commitment that any additional amounts necessary until next harvest would be purchased commercially from U.S. This procedure -- which I am not recommending -- would preserve the structure of our original position but would ease somewhat the burden on the Paks.
7. Let me repeat that I understand that the final judgement must be made in Washington, and if instructed, I shall proceed to take up the question with President Ayub.

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16c



66d

CABLE TO AMBASSADOR OEHLERT (PAKISTAN)

October 5, 1967

1. As suggested your 1103, we have not forced commercial purchases issue with Pakistan officials here and are awaiting your report on conversation with Ayub in your meeting October 6.
2. In conversation with Uquaili yesterday (septel) Walt Rostow described enormous problems President faces in trying to sustain whole Aid program and stressed importance to U. S. of commercial purchase now being discussed.
3. Full consideration being given your 1058 and 1074. Proposal para 6 of your 1074 for 617,000 ton PL 480 offer may help later. At this time, however, you requested to stick to 500,000 ton offer as layed out State 38941, which remains your basic instruction.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-405  
By 120, NARA, Date 3-29-95

67

*Pres. file*

October 5, 1967

Mr. President:

Senegal President Senghor will be 61 October 9th.

Attached is a proposed message of pleasant greeting.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to Me \_\_\_\_\_

67a

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO SENEGAL

PRESIDENT SENGHOR

Dear Mr. President:

Mrs. Johnson joins me in expressing our warmest personal regards on the occasion of your birthday. We share with all Americans the fervent hope for your continued well-being and for the growing prosperity of Senegal under your wise leadership.

Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-403  
By 48, NARA, Date 10-24-95

68

Thursday, October 5, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Phil Habib of State is planning to go to Saigon next week for a look at the political situation. It has been recommended that Bill Jorden accompany him. I think these two old Viet-Nam hands can do a useful job. Two tasks are of immediate importance:

(1) Help the Vietnamese in designing a really first-class inaugural address for Thieu -- one that will both appeal strongly to the Vietnamese people and have a positive impact on world opinion. Phil and Bill both know some of the people who will be working on this and they can weigh in effectively behind the scenes.

(2) Get Thieu and Ky and others stirred up about beginning to form a broadly based and representative national political party. This is going to be essential if Viet-Nam is to develop any kind of orderly political progress.

Also, as you know, Bill has long experience with the press, and I would like him to take a hard look at the situation in Saigon. What is wrong with the press corps? What's wrong with our own information setup? What can be done to improve things? Bill can give us a better fix on this than anyone I know, and it is badly needed.

On his way back from Saigon, I would ask Bill to stop for a few days in Manila. I have a strong feeling that there is real deterioration there, and we just haven't had a good picture of developments from the Embassy. Through his American and Filipino friends, I am sure Bill can give us a far better picture than we now have of what is happening, why things seem to be going sour, and what if anything we can do about it.

If you approve, I would suggest that Bill leave here on or about the 12th (next Thursday) and return in two weeks. You may also have additional matters you want him to take a look at, either in Viet-Nam or the Philippines.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Jorden trip as \_\_\_\_\_  
outlined

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

69  
Thursday, October 5, 1967  
*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Possible Sale of Surplus Rubber Stockpile  
to the Malaysians

As you know, Malaysian Finance Minister Tan Siew Sin has come to Washington in the hope of seeing you in connection with the rubber problem (prices dropped again to a 19 year low). We indicated such a meeting was not desirable unless it could produce positive results.

The Malaysians at first suggested suspension of our stockpile sales, but Bill Bundy told them this was out of the question. They then indicated an interest in buying our stockpile surplus and taking on themselves the responsibility of how and when it would be sold on the market.

For the past week informal and very tentative discussions of this idea have been held. At a meeting this afternoon, we should get a good feel of whether the Malaysians are serious and whether a deal is feasible.

I thought you should know that these talks are going on. If anything concrete develops, we will lay out the issues for you.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:MMW:mst

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Thursday - October 5, 1967

40  
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Purchase of Supersonic Aircraft

The Peruvians have contracted to buy French Mirages despite our repeated warnings of the consequences. The story broke publicly in the New York Times yesterday morning.

Peru's action -- unless we can turn it around -- threatens a supersonic aircraft race among the larger South American countries. It also means serious trouble for us with Congress on MAP and Alliance for Progress appropriations. For Peru it will result in no program assistance at a time when Belaunde is in critical need of help for his stabilization and development programs.

Belaunde finds himself in this bind because of his weak political position. The military looms large in the political structure and they have been pressing hard for modernization of old equipment. The opposition-controlled Congress has played politics by authorizing, on its own initiative, a substantial amount for military purchases. Belaunde was unable to block Congressional action, and he has not felt strong enough to order his military to drop the Mirage deal.

There is a possibility that we can turn this situation around if we do two things:

- renew our offer to negotiate a \$40 million program loan which you authorized last May (Belaunde was then unable to meet our conditions. Now, with increased taxes, spending limitations, IMF standby and devaluation, he is close to doing so, provided he stops the Mirage deal.)
- tell Belaunde what we told Costa e Silva last July -- that we would allow Northrop to sell them F-5's for delivery in 1969-70.

Covey Oliver and Bill Gaud recommend that you approve negotiation of the program loan based on the substantial economic self-help measures taken by Belaunde since May (Tab A). On the basis of previous reviews of the loan package, BOB and Treasury have no problem with the substance of the proposal.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ

By 108, NARA, Date 11-19-91

A condition for the loan would continue to be no Mirages. I believe there is a chance of Belaunde making the military backtrack if he can:

- demonstrate that their action is depriving the nation of vital economic assistance.
- offer them the alternative of F-5's by 1969/70.

Before proceeding further in our offer of F-5's in Latin America, the SIG believes that we should touch base with Congress. SIG proposes:

- a frank discussion of our military policy toward Latin America.
- a detailed explanation of how little of Latin American military expenditures goes into hardware (most goes for salaries and allowances).
- the serious consequences for the Alliance for Progress if we do not provide a reasonable alternative to limited modernization of military equipment, specifically F-5's.

SIG (Katzenbach, Nitze, Gaud and myself) has approved the scenario and talking points paper at Tab B for the handling of the F-5 issue. Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk concur. Everyone recognizes that consultation on selling F-5's may adversely affect foreign aid legislation while the bill is pending in Congress. However, the consequences of doing nothing about the Peruvian purchase, or offering our own supersonics behind Congress's back are far more severe.

I am convinced that unless we help Belaunde reverse the action taken by his military, we will be in deep trouble in Peru, and our ability to support the Alliance for Progress seriously weakened.

I strongly recommend that you authorize consultations with Congress along the lines of the scenario paper and that subject to the results of



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-3-

these talks, you approve renegotiation of the program loan on the basis of the conditions in the Gaud memo.

W. W. Rostow

1. Approve consultation  
with Congress \_\_\_\_\_  
  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
  
See me \_\_\_\_\_.
  
2. Approve program loan  
renegotiation, subject  
to Congressional talks \_\_\_\_\_  
  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
  
See me \_\_\_\_\_.

**Attachments**

Tab A - Oliver/Gaud recommendation.

Tab B - Scenario and talking points.

3790

1102

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program Loan for Peru

On May 30, 1967, you authorized the negotiation of a \$40 million program loan to Peru from FY 1967 funds on the condition that the Peruvians make a major effort to increase tax revenues by \$157 million. Additional conditions were that the Peruvian Government agree to limitations on military expenditures in the 1968 budget, refrain from buying expensive supersonics, reach a standby agreement with the IMF, and not impair the status of the International Petroleum Company. The Peruvian Executive was able to obtain Congressional approval of some tax measures (about \$90 million) before the Congress adjourned in late May. Subsequently, I requested your approval of an offer of a \$15 million program loan to assist the Belaunde Government during a difficult period in which it would be seeking Congressional approval of the remainder of the tax package, with the understanding that all other conditions of the original loan offer continued to apply. While discussions of this proposal were being carried on, Peru experienced a major balance of payments crisis, which precipitated a devaluation and opened up new opportunities for U.S. influence on Peru's economic and military spending policies. I am therefore now requesting you to authorize me once again to reactivate with the Peruvians a \$40 million program loan proposal, subject to some changes to meet the new situation.

The Peruvian Government devalued the sol on September 1 and constituted a new cabinet after the resignation of the government officers concerned with the devaluation. Since the devaluation the exchange rate has moved from 26.82 soles to the dollar to the range of 37-38, or about 40 percent. This is a sizeable change, painful to the Peruvians, and it took considerable courage to carry it out, particularly in view of the fact that it had to be done in opposition to those who proposed to resolve Peru's deepening foreign exchange crisis by means of instituting a system of exchange controls. The Peruvian Central Bank has not yet intervened in the exchange market, awaiting instead for market forces to determine an equilibrium rate.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 90-12

By glt/iep, NARA, Date 6-14-00

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- 2 -

The Government of Peru entered into a standby agreement for \$42.5 million with the IMF on August 18 and has since drawn \$22.5 million. This fulfilled one of our conditions for program assistance. Peru also requested permission to draw the remaining balance, and in addition wishes to negotiate a new standby for a larger amount.

The new cabinet which took office after devaluation is now discussing the changes in the 1968 budget which will be necessary. The new Premier, Edgardo Seoane, in a major speech to the Congress on September 19, endorsed the taxes on property, net worth and income which had been submitted by the previous cabinet in an effort to raise new taxes and comply with a major condition of our loan offer. Seoane also cited the need to come to an early agreement with United States mining companies on large new investments in expanding copper production.

It is clear, however, that additional tax action is necessary for the 1968 budget, and Seoane's position on this is not yet clear. He and other key members of the government are undoubtedly still assessing their budgetary problem in the aftermath of the devaluation, weighing their strategy in light of further pressure they can expect from powerful groups clamoring against any tax increases. An offer by the United States of a \$40 million loan at this time will give him and others in the government strong incentive to raise the level of tax action required and get it through Congress. In fact, Ambassador Jones and Assistant Secretary Oliver believe that our loan offer may be the indispensable element making this possible if the offer is made now, before it is too late. The first tranche of \$20 million would be disbursed after assurances were received on the conditions discussed below and would assist the GOP in dealing with a serious 1967 budgetary problem. It would be made clear that a major condition of disbursing the second \$20 million tranche of the loan would be further tax action to reduce the 1968 budget deficit (which we believe may be on the order of \$100 million) to manageable proportions in the context of a financial program worked out with the IMF, the IBRD, as leader of the Consultative Group for Peru, and the U.S.

Disbursement of the loan also would be contingent upon the government making an effort to limit military spending. While military expenditures as a percentage of central government expenditures declined from 19.4% in 1960 to 14.5% in 1966, the opposition controlled Congress voted a large increase in the regular military budget for 1967 and later added substantial multi-year authorization for purchases of new equipment, bringing the 1967 share back up to 19.4%. We have told the Peruvians that the 1967 increases are in conflict with what we are trying to achieve on the economic side.

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- 3 -

We will seek to have the Peruvian government agree to limit military spending to substantially less than has been authorized in 1967 and to continue with such a lower spending level in 1968. In any event, we would consider that any increase in the 1968 military budget in real terms would disqualify Peru for disbursement of the second tranche of the program loan.

The devaluation has the effect of reducing the dollar-purchasing power of the equipment authorizations voted this year by the Congress and it is likely that the military will seek to have some or all of this reduction restored by future appropriation bills. We will seek the Government's agreement to try to hold such adjustments to substantially less than the full effect of the devaluation. In this regard, as in the case of our attempts to limit the overall military budget, Belaunde's fears of a military coup before the end of his administration in mid-1969 will hamper our ability to achieve our objectives.

Although the Peruvian Congress did force nationalization of the sub-soil rights of IPC, the Jersey Standard subsidiary, President Belaunde has acted to protect IPC's overall status, and negotiations are continuing on a solution to this problem. A continued understanding that IPC's status will not be impaired would be a condition of the program loan. On a separate issue of interest to a major U.S. company, the GOP has signed a concessional contract with the IIT subsidiary which satisfactorily resolves that long-standing issue.

We will tell President Belaunde that this offer of U.S. assistance is conditional on his assurance that Peru will not acquire supersonic jet aircraft (Mirages) from France or other countries. Prevention of Mirage sales in Peru would delay the introduction of a sophisticated aircraft with greater military capability into Latin America. We believe the Peruvian Air Force already has contracted to purchase Mirages and that the risk is high that it will insist on going through with the deal. The program loan offer, however, would give Belaunde an argument to use with the military in view of Peru's obvious financial problems.

Earlier, the Peruvian military expressed a preference for F-5's over any other aircraft. We do not wish at this time though to make a hard offer of F-5 sales as an alternative to Mirages, believing that such negotiations would soon become public. Therefore, we propose to inform Belaunde now only that the U.S. is prepared to see Peru begin negotiations with the Northrup Aircraft Co. on F-5's as soon as

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- 4 -

possible this year. This position would be consistent with the policy we are following with respect to Brazil. If this indication to Belaunde is not sufficient to get the military to reverse its position on Mirages now, as it would not know the terms of F-5 availabilities, program loan negotiations would have to be delayed. We wish to be able to make a conditional offer of the loan, however, and see how far we can get, putting the burden on the Peruvians.

In sum, we believe that an offer of U.S. assistance in the critical period now facing Peru is justified on financial grounds and by the need to seek early influence over Peruvian plans for tax action and military expenditures. Successful negotiation of the program loan also would help the Country Team deal with a range of other matters, including the status of IPC, Peruvian actions regarding Latin American integration, and treatment of U.S. fishing boats within Peru's 200-mile limit. An indication of U.S. support for the Belaunde Government at this time also would decrease the possibility of a military coup in future months and subsequent bitter attacks by Belaunde against the U.S. If the Mirage sale cannot now be killed, the U.S. at least would have indicated its willingness to help Peru.

With respect to the U.S. balance of payments, the loan will be administered in the same way as stated in my original request. That is, United States assistance dollars will be used exclusively for the purchase of goods and equipment in the United States. Financial incentives for selected groups of commodities will be agreed on with the Peruvian authorities which will make AID dollars attractive for importers, thereby improving the U.S. market position.

RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that, in accordance with the framework and on the terms described above, you authorize negotiations with the Government of Peru for U.S. economic assistance of \$40 million.

*William S. Gaud*

William S. Gaud

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1967

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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms Policy and the Sale of F-5  
Aircraft in Latin America

The SIG has just completed a review of our Latin American arms policy and worked out a procedure for dealing with the touchy F-5 problem.

The principal SIG conclusions are:

- We have been fairly successful in limiting the spread of sophisticated weaponry in Latin America. But we are rapidly reaching the point where--at least on aircraft--we will have to agree to sell U.S. equipment or resign ourselves to the entry of France as a major arms supplier in Latin America.
- We must continue to encourage the Latin American military to take on a greater role in counter-insurgency.
- We must continue to encourage them to take part in OAS and UN peace-keeping operations.
- We must take a hard look at our own military presence in Latin America. Specifically, can we reduce the number of people we have there?

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority PLJ 91-406  
By plj, NARA, Date 6-14-00

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-2-

-- On F-5s, we are all agreed that we should do nothing until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill about our reasons for authorizing discussions of commercial sales to certain Latin American countries.

We realize that this is a difficult time in terms of the Congress. But we see no way to put off moving now. Nor--barring any extreme Congressional reaction--do we see any way to avoid talking with the Latin Americans. As you know, we are committed to the Brazilians. Further, the Peruvians are apparently well on the way to a final Mirage deal (one squadron) with the French. In short, if we don't act in the next week or two, Peru will certainly go ahead and will probably be followed by others.

On Peru, we believe we should be prepared to authorize the sale of F-5s if they will cancel the French deal. We will also have to be prepared to negotiate a \$40 million program loan. Bill Gaud wants to go ahead with such a loan if our other conditions are met.

At Tab A is a scenario of the steps we propose to take. At Tab B are talking points we would use in our Congressional consultations. (We plan to talk with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, the Armed Forces Committee, and key Congressional leaders. Bill Macomber, Covey Oliver and perhaps Paul Nitze would do most of the work on the Hill.) Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara have approved both papers.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with the consultations. Once we know more about reactions on the Hill we will come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Latin Americans about aircraft sales.

Go ahead with consultations \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me before you do anything \_\_\_\_\_

  
Under Secretary



70c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCENARIO

For Handling Acquisition by Major South American Countries  
of F-5 Aircraft

I. Background

A. Brazil. Brazil has been given assurances that U.S. manufacturers will be permitted to discuss, after October 1, 1967, sale of F-5 aircraft to Brazil for delivery after July 1, 1969. No details on quantities of planes, or terms and conditions of sale were included in the assurances. Our planning has been on the basis that:

1. U. S. Government role would be limited to granting export license for a squadron of 12 to 18 planes at this time with the possibility of a second squadron later.

2. Negotiations would be between manufacturer and Brazilian Government.

3. Financing would be arranged through commercial channels without any participation by U.S. Government or any of its agencies.

4. Sales might be made through manufacturer's Canadian subsidiary with Canadian Government assistance.

B. Other Commitments. The United States Government commitments to cooperate with other large South American Governments on aircraft modernization are as follows:

Argentina  
Chile  
Peru  
Venezuela

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-270  
By ijg, NARA, Date 9-20-94

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



1. Argentina. ". . . We have assured Brigadier Favre (Chief of Staff of the Argentine Air Force) that we do not object to the sale of F-5 or comparable aircraft to your government beginning in 1970, subject of course to the economic ability of Argentina to finance such a major purchase . . ." DEF 2707, 241954Z May 65. (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister Suarez.)

In addition, the U.S. is committed to sell 25 A-4B's to Argentina. These aircraft are part of the sale of 50 A-4B's which were deferred because of Southeast Asia requirements. They will be available for delivery in July 1968.

2. Chile. Various high-level Chileans have been told by various high-level U.S. officials that we had agreed with certain other Latin American countries not to sell the F-5 until 1969 and the U.S. planned to hold to this decision. They were also told that we would consider the question of F-5 if and when we received a 3 to 5 year tri-service acquisition plan. We have not received such a plan to date. The Chileans, no doubt, have assumed that they are included with the others in terms of availability of the F-5. in CY 1969.

3. Peru. "\*\*\* U.S. willing to sell 16 F-5's for delivery in CY 1970 to replace Hawker MK4. If helpful in your negotiations, you may inform GOP there may be possibility of advancing delivery to CY 1969 \*\*\*" DEF 4245, 182255Z June 65. Our Ambassador informed GOP accordingly.

4. Venezuela. "\*\*\* I am prepared to make them (F-5's) available for delivery in CY 1969 following the satisfactory conclusion of the above necessary credit arrangements". DEF 3948, 152125Z June 1965 (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister of Defense.) The credit arrangements in question were concluded.

The immediate problem is Peru, which has reportedly contracted for 14 Mirage aircraft, of which two are trainers, at a cost of \$28 million. The trainers are to be delivered in 1967.

## II. Proposed Actions

A. Congressional Consultations. Assistant Secretary Oliver should review informally with the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate and of the House, and with Chairmen Fulbright and Morgan, and Senator Church, our overall security policy for Latin America as approved by IRG/ARA on September 20 and amended by the SIG on September 28. In this context he should discuss the F-5/A-4B issue. (See attached talking points.)

It is recognized that the foreign aid legislation may be adversely affected if consultation takes place while this legislation is pending in Congress. However, there are two overriding considerations:

1. The possibility of turning the Peruvians around on Mirages is probably not 50-50. Further delay in making firm proposals to Peru will make it even less likely. Once the Mirage system is introduced, it will also be acquired by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and probably Colombia. Such acquisitions involving as they do the acquisition of missiles also will have the most serious consequences for the Alliance for Progress and arms control.

2. Congress may feel we have acted in bad faith once it becomes clear that we developed a firm policy during August and September 1967 and did not consult in a timely manner.

B. Negotiations with Peru. As soon as Congressional consultations are completed, we should authorize Ambassador Jones to inform President Belaunde that we are prepared:

1. To negotiate a \$40 million program loan, and
2. To authorize the manufacturer to discuss the sale of F-5 aircraft.

As one of the conditions of U.S. cooperation, Peru must cancel any arrangements it may have for acquisition of Mirage or similar aircraft.

A firm commitment to Peru that we will permit the U.S. manufacturer to negotiate as soon as possible after October 1 will give Peru the same commitment we have already given Brazil.

C. Press Briefings. The policy paper "U.S. Regional Policy Toward Latin American Security Forces" should be sanitized and used as a basis for briefing key editorial writers, editors, etc.

Such briefings should also take place in October but after Congressional consultations.

D. Authorization to U.S. Manufacturer

1. As soon as the two Congressional Subcommittees have been consulted, we should inform Brazil and Peru that we have authorized the U.S. manufacturer to initiate negotiations with Brazil and Peru.

2. At the same time, our Ambassadors in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela should be authorized to notify these governments that we are prepared to permit the U.S. manufacturer to sell F-5 aircraft. Since they have recently acquired reasonably modern jet fighter aircraft, however, we should encourage them to delay acquisitions as long as possible.

E. Other Countries. At the same time, we will notify the governments of Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom of our policy and purpose of actions with regard to the F-5. This is necessary because we have made representations at various times to each of these countries to forestall sales of supersonic aircraft to Latin America. We have also committed ourselves to keep them informed of any change in our policy.

70 d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR  
CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION

On Sale of the F-5 Aircraft to Selected Latin American  
Countries

A. The Problem

1. We have come to a critical point in our military policy toward Latin America on which we want to consult the Congress.
2. It involves the acquisition of modern fighter aircraft by the larger South American countries.
3. For the past two years we have succeeded in getting them to hold off purchases of this expensive equipment. Now we confront a situation in which certain countries will obtain the expensive and highly sophisticated supersonic Mirage weapons systems from the French unless we can make a reasonable counter-offer of Northrop F-5's, a less expensive fighter of lower performance capability and more suitable in counterinsurgency situations.
4. The seriousness of the situation is magnified by the inter-relationship between:
  - purchases of unnecessary military equipment.
  - our continued ability to provide economic assistance to governments which make such purchases.
  - the political and economic viability of governments caught in this squeeze.

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NEJ 94-270**  
**By ijg, NARA, Date 9-30-94**

- the consequences for the Alliance for Progress and Latin American economic integration of curtailment of U.S. aid and the reaction it will produce in the country concerned and elsewhere in the hemisphere.

5. We can make no counteroffer and let nature take its course with these consequences:

- Peru and Brazil will almost certainly acquire Mirages and touch off a supersonic aircraft race.
- the inter-action political-economic forces described in 4 will be set in motion.
- the French will make an important penetration into key Latin American establishments and we will lose influence with the Latin American military.

6. Or, we can make a counterproposal which we hope the Latin Americans will accept. If they do, we can negotiate sales:

- closer to the lower scale of their appetite for hardware, and
- more in line with their capacity to finance;
- and we will avoid or minimize most of the adverse consequences of Mirage purchases.

B. Peru as an Example

1. Belaunde represents a new generation of democratic, progressive, technically-oriented leaders caught in the classical Latin American bind of an uncooperative, opposition-controlled Congress and a strong military impatient with indecisive civilian government.

2. He needs large-scale assistance to carry out his stabilization and development program and has asked for our help.

3. We are prepared to give it under certain conditions involving commitments affecting his military establishment.

4. But the military leaders are determined to modernize their World War II and Korean War vintage equipment, and the opposition-controlled Congress, on its own initiative, has given the armed forces the money to do it.

5. The Peruvian Air Force has negotiated with the French for delivery of Mirages. Acquisition of these planes will inevitably touch off an expensive supersonic aircraft race involving most of the other larger South American countries, with the consequences already mentioned.

6. In the case of Peru, these consequences would probably mean:

- the economic situation would rapidly deteriorate, forcing Belaunde to curtail his Alliance-oriented development plans.
- a sharp swing away from the present free, private enterprise economy, friendly to U. S. investment, toward tight government controls with strong nationalistic overtones.
- Belaunde may be forced out of office in the process by a military tired with civilian inability to provide effective government.

7. If Belaunde is to persuade his military chiefs not to proceed with this transaction he needs our support in two ways:

a. Alliance for Progress assistance to carry out his stabilization and development plans.

b. A counteroffer on aircraft that we will permit Northrop to sell him F-5's for delivery in 1970.

8. Without this bargaining power, he will not be able to gain military acceptance of our conditions. Peru will go supersonic with French Mirages. We will not be in a position to give him the economic assistance he wants. The economic situation will quickly deteriorate. Constitutional government in Peru will be in jeopardy. The Alliance will suffer a serious setback. And we will get the blame.

### C. Our Military Policy

1. Underlying the entire range of our policies toward Latin America is the general political objective of maintaining a friendly, cooperative attitude by the Latin Americans.

2. Latin American military forces are still a major cohesive element in the political structure of most countries, and U. S. interests are served by retaining the good will of present and future military leaders.

3. A major political objective of the U. S. is to encourage the Latin American security forces to foster social/economic development and to support constitutional government and modern democratic societies.

4. Our strategy should assure that Latin American countries possess the capability to maintain internal security of our southern flank in a period in which Communist-supported "wars of national liberation" constitute the principal threat to Latin American security. Civic action remains an important instrument in achieving this objective, as well as our politico-economic objectives in Latin America, and should be encouraged within reasonable limits.

5. Our strategy must recognize that the larger Latin American countries also feel they have a military role to play on the world scene. We should aim at inducing Latin American countries:

a. To assess their security roles realistically in the light of the world situation;

b. To prepare rational plans for forces and equipment corresponding to such roles and to what is realistically available to them, and

c. To adjust their concepts of "professionalism" to fit these factors.

6. Our strategy recognizes that the likelihood of a general war with massive attacks on South American maritime lines of communications is relatively low in the threat spectrum, and maintenance of forces for this purpose is similarly of low priority.

7. a. We should cooperate with Latin American countries in carrying out the strategy in paragraph 4, including advisors, training and the provision of equipment on a credit basis. If the country cannot afford the necessary equipment, assistance should be on a grant basis.

b. Our cooperation with respect to paragraph 5 would be limited to advice, training, and credit if feasible.

c. In either case, the emphasis would be on providing the minimum essential equipment and using our influence to prevent the diversion of scarce resources to non-essential purposes.

8. Latin American expenditures on hardware are small compared to their overall budgets and the amounts other countries spend on military hardware. (Cite figures.)



D. How We Intend to Proceed on F-5 Aircraft

1. In 1965 we told the larger South American countries that we would be prepared to see the sale of jet fighter aircraft of the F-5 type in 1969/70 to replace the jet fighters in existing inventory.

2. Given the 20 month lead time for deliveries of F-5's, we intend to tell Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Venezuela that we are prepared to authorize Northrop to sell aircraft on these conditions:

a. Direct negotiations between U.S. manufacturer and the Latin American Governments;

b. Financing arranged through commercial or other non-U.S. Government sources;

c. Acquisition limited to one squadron (12-18 aircraft), depending upon individual country needs, financial capabilities, and other factors which may be pertinent. (We recognize that one or two countries may seek a second squadron later.)

WWR

71.

Pres file

Thursday, October 5, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft birthday message to President Luebke of Germany who will be 73 on October 14. You have sent him your good wishes on every birthday since 1964.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR  
RHU:em  
RHU

71a

DRAFT MESSAGE

Dear Mr. President:

Mrs. Johnson and I want to join your many good friends in Germany and abroad in sending you warm wishes on your 73rd birthday. We wish you many long years of good health and continued service to the German people.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

72

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
8:45 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy's report  
on his dealings with Percy, which  
I summarized earlier this evening.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Late Note for the President's Evening Reading

During the day, we learned that Senator Percy plans to introduce a "sense of the Senate" resolution, probably tomorrow, on the subject of additional Asian contributions in Vietnam. We have had the text read to us by the Senator.

After the usual wheezes, the operative paragraphs say:

- a. The US must not go on bearing an increasing part of the burden in South Vietnam.
- b. Asian countries should do a lot more in military and other respects.
- c. The President should make a "greater" effort to get Asian countries to do so.

Independently, Paul Nitze -- acting at Secretary McNamara's direction -- and William Bundy have been in touch with Percy. Both have told him that your Administration has been making every effort all along on this matter and in particular has at least four pending additional military contributions in advanced stages of negotiation. Both Nitze and Bundy told Percy that the introduction of his resolution might have a significant adverse effect on the internal political situations of these countries, since it could well be interpreted as US pressure. Bundy added that the resolution, as worded, appeared to call for troops from the Republic of China, and that Percy

must be well aware that there were major policy reasons against this.

With both Nitze and Bundy, Percy seemed a little taken aback by these practical arguments, but equally determined to go ahead with his resolution -- which of course follows a long-standing oratorical line of his. He did assure both Nitze and Bundy that he did not really mean at this point to press the matter to hearings or a vote, and he categorically assured both that he would not in fact press for hearings without further consultation with the Executive Branch.

In line with our reaction to the resolution, we have responded to Senator Gale McGee -- who specifically raised the matter with us -- that we would strongly urge his not joining in sponsorship. We have asked him to pass the word to any others who may be approached by Percy, and to make it clear that the Administration regards the proposed resolution as counter-productive to its own serious efforts in this area. Needless to say, the paragraph about your making "greater" efforts would alone make the resolution unwise and untrue.

At the Secretary's direction, Bundy will be going back to Percy with further points about the size of the Lao and Thai efforts in their own internal security, plus the fact that the percentage of non-American forces in Vietnam is in fact greater than it was in Korea. But the resolution remains another grass fire, and we shall have to keep applying the water.

EA: W. P. Bundy:bmm 10/4/67

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
8:20 p.m.

2  
*Russ file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the two drafts you  
requested.

Sec. Rusk thinks a private  
message to Prime Minister Wilson is  
a good idea. He has already sent one  
to George Brown.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



73a

October 4, 1967

From the President

To the Prime Minister

I want you to know, old friend, how heartened I was by your success in holding the line so well at Scarborough. With what I confront every day, it wasn't hard for me to reconstruct what you and George faced. I think you understand how much it matters that the government of the country which means most to me, aside from my own, is lending its support for what we both know is right, despite the storms around us both.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-403  
By 48, NARA, Date 10-24-95

726

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1967

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Walt told me of his conversation with you this morning.

You should know how greatly I respect the skill and dedication with which you are seeking the road to peace and how much I value your support. Both are a source of comfort and strength to me.

Sincerely,



Professor Henry A. Kissinger  
Center for International Affairs  
Harvard University  
6 Divinity Avenue  
Cambridge, Massachusetts

~~TOP SECRET~~

74  
Pres. file  
Wednesday, October 4, 1967 -- 6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

On the basis of this piece of monkey business, Sec. Rusk recommends no meeting until we have the follow-on report referred to in the last sentence.

Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara will hold themselves available; and you can either have a brief session tonight at, say, 7:00 p.m. to take stock of this affair; or, leave it over until morning.

W. W. Rostow

Short meeting at 7:00 p.m. tonight \_\_\_\_\_

Hold till morning \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-403  
By lig, NARA, Date 10-24-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Kissinger/Read Telecons October 4, 4:15 p.m.

M called K to say that M had taken the communication received by K in the mail this morning for confirmation of paragraph (b). Bo had read the document and said that he had still not received word from Hanoi about the accuracy of M and A's understanding of his July talk with Pham Van Dong, so Bo could not comment at this time on the formulation eventualities (b) and (c).

Bo did confirm the accuracy of the opening paragraph of the communication, the formulation of eventuality of (a) and the paragraph of description of eventuality (a), except Bo said he had not used the words "solemn engagement". M took strong exception with Bo, saying that M's own notes and clear recollection of their October 3 conversation on this point were very clear. M said to Bo that if he (M) was capable of such misunderstanding M's usefulness was at an end. Bo energetically denied that M's utility was at an end and expressed the view that the channel was of definite continuing utility. Bo and M discussed what phrase should be used in place of "solemn engagement" without reaching a firm conclusion.

When M reported the above conversation to K, K said that he was aware of M's meticulous care in keeping notes of conversations and that in light of this fact Bo's backing away from the phrase "solemn engagement" would be viewed here as a serious substantive change. K told M that he should understand that this change will make it extremely difficult for us to take actions based on communications in this channel, and it was K's personal view that it would have been better to receive no communication than one in which a key point had been retracted.

4:30 p.m.

M called K to say he had phoned Bo with K's initial reaction as reported above, and Bo had instructed M to come over to see Bo immediately. K asked M in addition to the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ

94-405

By WJ, NARA, Date 3-29-55

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA~~

-2-

point stated above to confirm with Bo tonight K's understanding that the formulation of eventuality (a) and the part of the explanation of eventuality (a) which Bo had confirmed could be interpreted to mean that a US accredited person could meet with Bo prior to cessation of bombing if a decision on cessation had been made and communicated to the DRV. K asked M to make Bo understand that there must be no jockeying for position on these matters at this time in view of the seriousness with which we view the changes noted above. K expects to hear from M on his present meeting with Bo by 5:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
5:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

This report is interesting and probably true; although with the Soviet bill building up over \$700 million a year, there may have been just a bit more pressure than suggested.

W. W. R.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By 48, NARA, Date 10-24-95

~~SECRET~~

Attached: Intell. Note 785, dated Oct. 3, 1967

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NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

# U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

RECEIVED  
N. S. C.  
OCT 4 8 43 AM '67  
*Intelligence*  
*Note* - 785  
October 3, 1967

BOWLER  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
FRIED  
HENSEN  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
KERN  
KEERY  
LEONHART  
ROCHE  
SAUNDERS  
TAYLOR

To : The Acting Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes  
Subject: Moscow and Hanoi on the Conduct of the Vietnam War:  
Agreement to Disagree

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-405

By 48, NARA, Date 3-29-95

A secret Romanian report provides insight into differing Soviet and DRV views on the Vietnam war. The information in this report is at least second hand and may reflect Moscow's interest in demonstrating to Bucharest that it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other socialist states. Nevertheless, the account contained in this report appears plausible.

Soviets Advise Pham Van Dong. According to this report, based on materials prepared by the Romanian Embassy in Hanoi, Pham Van Dong's visit to the USSR in early April was devoted to a discussion of North Vietnam's aid needs and to a discussion of the political aspects of the Vietnam war. To meet the DRV's needs, supplementary military and economic aid was extended by the USSR. During their discussion with Pham Van Dong, Brezhnev and Kosygin stated that a military solution in Vietnam is impossible and advised the DRV to seek a means for ending the war. In offering this advice, the Soviet leaders assured Dong that the USSR would continue to supply aid, despite its differences with Hanoi on the wisdom of continuing the fighting. The report suggests that the Soviets have on several occasions expressed their reservations on this question, but that

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

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downgrading and  
declassification

Hanoi has resisted Soviet advice and that Moscow has gone ahead providing aid despite its reservations.

Advice, Not Pressure. It is highly plausible that the Soviets would feel that the DRV should show a greater degree of flexibility. Moscow's attitude is probably conditioned by a higher regard for what can be achieved by diplomacy as well as a concern that a continuation of the war enhances the risks of Soviet involvement. The Soviet leaders probably calculate that their major aid contributions to the DRV war effort entitle them to advise North Vietnam on how to conduct its diplomacy. Nevertheless, as this report indicates, the Soviets have not used their aid as a means of pressuring Hanoi to accept their views. As the Soviets themselves almost certainly recognize, such pressure would be self-defeating, costing Moscow much of what it has gained politically as a result of its reinvolved in Indochinese affairs after the ouster of Khrushchev in late 1964.



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

76

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
5:00 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The reputation of generals in history depends on one or two key decisions they make right or wrong amidst the fog of battle. So with Ambassadors.

Ellsworth's account of the situation he faced just before the validation vote and what he did( at the beginning of this report) indicates you picked the right man.

The rest of the report will also interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Attached: Saigon 7619

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 118, NARA, Date 10-21-91

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

76a

Wednesday, October 4, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 7619)

Herewith my twenty-third weekly telegram:

A. General

The political pot which was simmering the week before boiled over last week with the approach of the Assembly vote on validation October 2. Political infighting, attempted extortion, and blackmail reach a high crescendo. Some of the groups, notably some members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc, formerly supporters of General Ky, carried their efforts right down to the wire. Factors in these maneuvers were the prospective loss of jobs and income on the part of Assembly members, disaffection among the forty-eight Assembly members who were defeated candidates for the Senate as well as three defeated Presidential candidates, also Assembly members, and claims of broken promises and lack of support during the campaign.

On the afternoon of September 28, four members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc, who were members of the Special Election Committee of the Assembly, and whose spokesmen were Le Phuoc Sang and Colonel Dam Van Quy, sent for a CAS contact and informed him that they wished me to transmit to General Thieu as a condition for voting for validation of the elections the following demands:

- A. Ky to have the right to name the Prime Minister and three other Cabinet members (Sang and Quy indicating that they would expect Cabinet posts);
- B. Ky to control the reorganization of the Armed Forces and the administrative organization;
- C. Each member of the Democratic Alliance Bloc to receive 300,000 piasters.

They were considerate enough to add that they would wait until noon the next day for my answer. On Friday morning, through my liaison contact with Ky, I had the above information relayed to him saying that I thought he would want to be aware of this attempted blackmail to which, of course, I had no intention of responding; and that I was sure he was aware what the repercussions would be should this become public knowledge.

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 11136  
By *gules* NARA Date 9-25-00

Bui Diem came to see me Friday evening to say that he and General Ky were very concerned about the situation. While Ky had talked to some of the Democratic Alliance Bloc members, he thought it important that General Thieu should talk to them also. The Democratic Alliance Bloc had expressed concern about Thieu's feelings toward them and were apprehensive on two accounts: (A) that he might take some reprisals against them; and, (B) that he might attempt to fill up the Government with Dai Viet members. I recalled to Bui Diem that Ky had twice given me definite assurances, and as late as three days before, that the members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc would vote for validation and that I need have no cause for concern. I was, therefore, relying on him. I told Bui Diem of the blackmail attempt on the part of Sang and Quy and their colleagues and asked him to inform Ky that if the members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc persisted in their threat to vote against validation, I intended to make public this attempt at blackmail. I added that they were playing a dangerous game in carrying this right down to the wire and I wanted it understood that they could not play fast and loose with us. I said that if Ky thought Thieu should talk to members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc, he should say so to Thieu himself, but that I would undertake to see Thieu Saturday morning and urge him to get together with Ky on the problem.

I talked with Thieu the following morning and told him of Ky's concern about the attitude of Democratic Alliance Bloc members, that I thought it was of critical importance that certainly a large majority of the Bloc should be lined up in support of validation and urged him to get together with Ky and the Bloc members. He promised to get in touch with Ky and did so immediately after my leaving him, and that afternoon he and Ky together met with all the Democratic Alliance Bloc members. Thieu talked exceedingly well and persuasively to them. I think this may have been the turning point in lining up a substantial number in support of validation.

During a meeting which took place concurrently at Independence Palace, attended by Thieu, Ky, General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff, and General Khang, Third Corps Commander, Khang took Ky aside and told him privately that he did not know whether Ky had allowed the validation crisis to develop for his own political advantage, but if he had then he would have only himself to blame if the situation got out of hand, and he would lose the support of the Armed Forces. Ky angrily denied having engineered the crisis for his own political advantage. Khang said he believed Ky and he had no evidence to the contrary, but he felt that he should let Ky know that such rumors were circulating and the military would not condone such activity. Ky's explanation to me was that he did not wish to talk with members of the Democratic Alliance Bloc without Thieu's permission since if, in spite of his efforts, things should go wrong, he would not want Thieu to feel that he had doublecrossed him. I am inclined to take Ky's word and as I

have previously reported, I think there is good evidence that he and Thieu are working together well.

Thieu kept on talking with other members of the Assembly all through Saturday and into the early hours of Sunday. All through the day Sunday, he also got in touch with individual members. The vote was taken shortly before midnight Monday, when the Assembly validated the election by a vote of 58 for, 43 against, and 5 invalid ballots. The struggle for validation, and the efforts of students and Buddhists to influence the Assembly through demonstrations, I shall touch on in greater detail in the political section.

I will suffice it to say here that the chief result of the demonstrations was to snarl up the traffic. While the press displayed considerable interest in them, the general public attitude was manifested in distinct apathy and lack of interest. This was also true of the demonstrations in Hue and Danang. Both Thieu and Ky have expressed the view that Tri Quang and his militant Buddhists have lost a great deal of influence since the struggle movement of 1966. Then they had the support of some elements of the Armed Forces, now the latter have kept completely aloof from the politics and the religious questions involved. In my view, there was nothing in any of the demonstrations to warrant what seems to me the exaggerated attention given to them by the American press, especially the UPI report that these represented the most serious disturbances in the last four years. This was certainly a fantastically exaggerated evaluation, unfortunately typical of a good deal of the reporting here.

I reported last week that I had transmitted to Thieu suggestions for a Government program which he might incorporate in a State of the Union message at the time of the inauguration. The document is headed Democracy, Peace, and Social Justice. We have felt, however, that it is highly important that he should address the country before then with a shorter, more dynamic, hard-hitting speech to arouse the enthusiasm of the people for their new government, call for their support, and outlining a program of specifics. Taking as a base the longer document, Ambassador Locke has prepared an excellent short version. I have put this in General Thieu's hands. He has said that it has come at an opportune moment, for he wants to make such a speech at the time of the installation of the new Senate, which has now been set for October 12.

While the struggle over validation of the elections has quite understandably engaged the energies and attention of General Thieu and General Ky, they have not lost sight of the next step down the road, which is the appointment of a Prime Minister and designation of a Cabinet to work with the new National Assembly.

On September 30, when I saw Thieu, he told me that he and Ky have agreed that the Prime Minister will be Nguyen Van Loc, Chairman of the People's Army Council, a lawyer, and essentially Ky's nominee. Loc is rather colorless in personality, a considerable contrast with Ky. However, he has been active on the Board of the Bar Association, has a good reputation, and is well and favorably disposed to the United States. It was also announced officially on October 2 that General Nguyen Duc Thang, former Minister of Revolutionary Development, has been named Deputy Chief of Staff of the Joint General Staff, with responsibility for the Regional and Popular Forces. General Nguyen Bao Tri, Minister of Information, will temporarily fill in for General Thang in the Ministry of Revolutionary Development until a permanent replacement is named.

Thieu said this morning that he and General Ky have prepared a list of names of the most competent available people whom they hope to include in the Cabinet. He remarked that unfortunately competence is in short supply and it was not a very large list.

I have reported previously that Thieu has three times offered the post of Prime Minister to Tran Van Huong, and that Huong each time has declined. He now proposes to offer Huong a post in the Inspectorate (the Constitution provides that one-third of the members be appointed by the Executive and one-third each by the Senate and Lower House). Thieu feels that Huong will be most prestigious member of the Inspectorate and as such it can be arranged that he be elected Chairman. If Huong can be induced to accept this, I think it would be an excellent thing for the new Government.

I believe that there is a feeling of general relief on the part of the public that the problem of validation of the elections is out of the way and that there is a spirit of hopefulness that the new Government will carry on more vigorous programs in all fields, military, economic, and social, and take decisive action to end the widespread corruption.

Preparations are going ahead for election of the Lower House on October 22. Thieu expressed to me the view that there would be considerable interest in the elections in the provinces where the candidates are well known to the local population, but he expects a falling off in interest in the more sophisticated centers, especially Saigon, where he believes many people have become punchdrunk with a plethora of elections.

In connection with our own relations with the new Government, I believe that these may be more sensitive and perhaps in some ways more difficult than they have been with the present military government. During the past week, ten separate

editorials dealt with the theme of American interference in Vietnamese affairs. For example, the military-oriented Tien Tuyen newspaper, replied to an article by Everett Martin appearing in the September 25 Newsweek, criticizing what it called his "brazen proposals." I imagine that we shall have to be more alert to Vietnamese pride and sensitivities and apply pressure and leverage in more subtle ways. This may require greater patience on our part, but in the end I am sure will be more productive of results.

In the midst of the alarums and excursions over the validation of the elections (and simultaneously with a Buddhist demonstration at the other end of the street), we dedicated our new Embassy Chancery the morning of September 29. It was a beautiful day with soft white clouds against a blue sky, and the brilliant sunshine that always sets the flag off so well. It is a most attractive and convenient building which has been commented on most favorably by many Vietnamese. As you intended it would be, it is a fitting symbol of our determination to stay the course in Vietnam. In my brief remarks at the ceremony, I renewed our dedication to the goals we share with the leaders and people of Vietnam: a permanent end to aggression, a just and durable peace, regional security, order, and expanding economic progress. I noted that this building stands as a symbol of our commitment to the Vietnamese people, but no less impressive are hundreds of smaller buildings, schools, hospitals, and other structures which we have built in time of war and dedicated to the cause of peace. In his remarks, General Thieu commented on the beauty of the building and the fair prospects in the longer range for international cooperation in Southeast Asia. However, he spoke also of more immediate problems, including the need to make clear to the Communists that they face a widely-respected, sovereign government in Vietnam which will play a major part in international discussions related to Vietnam. He also spoke of the need to increase the effort being made to gradually make South Vietnam economically self-sustained.

General Thang reassigned: Climaxing two months of jockeying over the vigorous General Thang's future role, he on October 2 formally turned over the Revolutionary Development Ministry to General Tri as caretaker till the new Government is formed. Thang is taking up a newly-created Joint General Staff slot and Deputy Chief of Staff, where he will be in charge of Regional Forces and Popular Forces as well as the Revolutionary Development teams.

Bob Komer finds Thang genuinely excited about the possibilities of his new job. According to Thang, he will have much more influence than he would have had as Deputy Prime Minister. He will probably run the Regional Force/Popular Force (as a 300,000-man territorial security force), 30,000 Revolutionary Development cadre, the political warfare directorate (to which all military province and district chiefs will be assigned), and the military security service (which he

intends to use to help clean up corruption in the provinces). I regard this as a very promising development, which will surely benefit the pacification effort by bringing the biggest local security forces under a vigorous and pacification-minded chief.

General Westmoreland and I are pleased with the rapport between Komer and Thang. They agree on raising the 1968 Revolutionary Development hamlet goals from 1,100 to more like 2,000, on raising the Revolutionary Development budget from three billion piasters this year to five billion, and to assigning highest pacification priorities to Fourth and Third Corps where the people are. Thang also intends to give personal attention to selecting good province and district chiefs and then giving them special training for these difficult jobs. Now that he controls them, Thang favors gradually drawing together Regional Forces/Popular Forces and Revolutionary Development teams into a much larger and better-trained pacification force.

Shaping the next Government of Vietnam budget: As a means of increasing our leverage, I have proposed to Thieu and Ky a joint review of the 1968 budget. Since we subsidize much of it via counterpart, we are entitled to a larger say in how it is spent Ministry by Ministry. Vietnamese sensibilities being what they are, we may encounter difficulty. But I intend to push on this.

The big victory and the great task by General Vo Nguyen Giap: Careful reading of an article entitled "The Big Victory and the Great Task" by General Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's Deputy Premier and Minister of National Defense, which appeared in both the Lao Dong (North Vietnam's Communist Party) newspaper and the North Vietnamese military newspaper on September 14-16, leads us to believe that there has been a serious and fundamental change in the strategy of the insurgency which merits careful and concentrated analysis.

Giap calls for a continued military and political offensive, and drops the earlier Le Duan/Central Office for South Vietnam call early 1966 for "major victory in the shortest possible time." He says that "in protracted struggle our people are able and determined to gain time." He sees, in the prolonging of the war and in the U.S. need to develop a democratic system in the South, circumstances which provide opportunities for a further intensification of the political struggle, exploiting divisions in Government of Vietnam circles to overthrow the administration.

What we may expect in the way of military operations can to some extent be discerned in Giap's presentation of the "fighting methods adopted by the



Liberation Armed Forces' Main Force units." His "principle of combat" calls for three things -- annihilating the enemy, protecting targets the United States wants to hit, and preserving and improving forces. He states that "only by.. protecting targets and preserving our force can we create conditions to annihilate the enemy." We read this as reflecting a determination to cut losses; but it does not mean that military offensive will be dropped. Giap calls for intensified guerrilla operations and sophisticated concentrated strikes, and makes a great point of the superiority of Viet Cong tactics over the tactics of United States' forces -- particularly artillery (rocket) units, engineers, and special crack units -- to carry out raiding operations and sabotage against carefully selected strategic targets such as logistic and air bases, command posts, and lines of communication. He reports that the tactics (surprise, etc.) of the crack units within the Main Forces are being passed on to guerrilla and Regional Forces as well, i.e., the use of a small force against a larger force for hit and run tactics.

Giap has listed some difficult requirements. Time will tell whether the Viet Cong can effectively develop coordinated strikes and guerrilla warfare, waged by Main Force and Local Forces with better weapons against professionally selected strategic targets, and whether they can combine this with an intensified political struggle effort to promote and exploit divisions and war weariness among the South Vietnamese people. Giap makes much of the claim that United States' forces have bogged down, failed to win the initiative, and are being pushed into a dispersed, defensive ("passive") posture.

All of us here believe he can and will be proven wrong.

#### B. Political

As I have mentioned, the long struggle over validation of the Presidential election ended October 2 just before midnight, when the provisional National Assembly voted, by a margin of 58 to 43 (five other ballots were invalid) to validate the election of Generals Thieu and Ky. The vote followed three days of intense debate in the National Assembly which were preceded and paralleled by demonstrations and protests in the streets of Saigon and by rather abortive attempts at the same sort of thing in Danang and Hue. The demonstrations were organized and participated in by a small number of University students (about 300), by the extremist Buddhists associated with An Quang pagoda and under the leadership of Thich Tri Quang, and by several of the defeated civilian Presidential candidates, notably Truong Dinh Dzu.



The protests and demonstrations succeeded in drawing considerable public attention to the point of view of the demonstrators, but as I have said they did not attract mass support and in the last analysis probably had little effect on the outcome. General Ky has remarked that the days of coup d'etats in Saigon are over. Perhaps the day when student and Buddhist protests could topple a government are also over. For many residents of Saigon the protests and demonstrations mainly meant the creation of large traffic jams, which may also have helped to discredit the protestors in the mind of the public.

A large portion of the credit for the efficient but correct way in which the police handled the demonstrations must go to Thieu and Ky. They relied on the civil police to maintain order and to unblock traffic. The civil police were stiffened by military police and by police field forces in helmets and battle gear only when the situation clearly threatened to get out of hand, as in the case of the student demonstrations near the National Assembly September 30. The Director General of National Police, General Loan, who has not always shown much political discretion in police matters in the past (notably the arrest of Au Truong Thanh on September 22, which I discussed in my twenty-second weekly telegram), behaved with great circumspection and considerable deftness during the past week. Arrests were held to a minimum, force was used only when destruction of property occurred or the authority of the Government was directly challenged, and the demonstrators were allowed considerable freedom to let off steam.

In connection with the Buddhist protest (described in further detail below) General Loan was observed on one occasion, sitting on the curb, with one arm around one of Thich Tri Quang's assistants and with a can of beer in the other hand engaged in earnest conversation. Loan made public on October 2 an appeal to the Buddhist monks and nuns, urging them to cease all forms of public gatherings and processions in the interest of national security and the welfare and health of those concerned. He noted in his appeal that the processions have "upset the life of Saigon's 2 1/2 million inhabitants."

Even though some of the opponents of validation accepted the results with bad grace (Phan Khac Suu did not vote, as he was an interested party, but he announced afterward that "if I had voted, I would have rejected the election.") We can already sense considerable relief in the atmosphere. All streets are open again, there is only a normal police guard at the National Assembly, and only a small guard near the small cluster of 5 to 10 Buddhist monks who are maintaining their vigil across the street from the Palace in their protest against the July Charter of the Unified Buddhist Association.

One unfinished bit of business left over from the period of demonstrations was the incident that took place the morning of October 2, when two CBS newsmen were beaten by the police while they were covering a student demonstration. No Embassy officer was present on the occasion, and there is conflicting evidence as to what happened. Demonstrations were banned as of October 1, but the students announced their intention to defy the police ban and to demonstrate anyway. The press was at the Student Union in force the morning of October 2, even before the students. The students gathered by about 9:30 and accompanied by the press began to march toward the Assembly. The police first called on the youths to disperse. When the students did not do so, the police charged them, swinging their clubs and beating two of the students. The press and cameramen were right in the midst of the fray, covering the story close up. CBS cameraman Keith Kay and reporter Bert Quint pushed forward to get a good picture of a girl being beaten by the police. The police objected to the pictures, but Kay persisted. The police then struck Kay and Quint several times, forcing them to move away. Kay and Quint both required some medical attention for cuts and bruises, though neither was hurt seriously. I called Quint later in the day to express my concern that he had been hurt. He appeared pleased at the attention. I understand that CBS will make a formal protest to the Government of Vietnam and to the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, with a copy of the latter protest to the Department of State. I am not prepared to apportion blame in connection with this incident. The police, as I noted above, displayed considerable care and discretion throughout the week, but after a week of more or less continuing tension, they may have been a bit edgy. The journalists clearly pushed the way into the midst of an incident and persisted in photographing the police beating a girl student.

The police issued a statement on October 2 in which General Loan was quoted as ordering police officers and agents to apply a great deal of restraint towards press correspondents while carrying out their duties. However, General Loan also reminded press correspondents that they should abide by the law and avoid causing difficulty for the police.

Bui Diem also called me personally about the incident, to protest against the behavior of the CBS correspondents and at the same time to express his regret that the incident occurred. He assured me of their desire to facilitate the work of the press and extend special treatment within limits of law and order but asked that the press should also do their part in trying to cooperate with police. I assured him that it was our desire, too, to avoid such incidents and that I knew Zorthian urged the correspondents to behave responsibly. Unfortunately, however, in the excitement of events these things do occur but certainly have no significance beyond the event.

SECRET/NODIS

I trust with this exchange of protests and statements, the incident is closed. Incidentally, one of our Embassy officers came close to being struck by a nightstick wielded by a police agent while observing the police preventing opposition politicians from holding an unauthorized press conference September 29. The policeman obviously did not know the Embassy officer from a press correspondent, and the officer wisely did not stay to discuss the matter but moved quickly off. All in a day's work.

Although clearly related in timing to the struggle over validation of the Presidential elections, the Buddhist protest activity responds to rather different motivations and will probably be with us much longer. In the background is the continuing factional cleavage between the extremist Buddhist leader, Trich Tri Quang, and the moderate Buddhist leader, Thich Tam Chau. In July, General Thieu, acting on a request from Thich Tam Chau as leader of the Buddhist Institute (Vien Hoa Dao), promulgated a new Charter that in effect strengthened the factional position of Tam Chau. Tri Quang had protested the issuance of the new Charter, but did not make a major issue of it until September 28, when a delegation of some 500 Buddhist monks and nuns from An Quang pagoda came to the Presidential Palace (Independence Palace) to submit a petition calling on the Government to revoke the July decree establishing a new Buddhist Charter. General Thieu invited Tri Quang into the Palace, but when he refused, Thieu wisely went out to meet him. Their "conversation", conducted over loudspeakers in front of the crowd, with aircraft and helicopters occasionally passing overhead, was not particularly productive. Thieu suggested that all Buddhist groups get together and draft a new stature, which he would then promulgate. Tri Quang brushed this aside as only "words" and kept calling for "action." The "conversation" broke up without much accomplished, and subsequent meetings between Thieu and Tri Quang have been equally unproductive.

Tri Quang and a handful of his supporters took up "residence" under the trees in the park facing the Presidential Palace following the meeting with Thieu September 28 and have been there, off and on, ever since. He evidently feels that his presence there is a reminder to Thieu that action must be taken. Tri Quang's position, demanding revocation of the July decree, was further supported September 30 by some 250 monks and nuns, who sat down on the pavement in front of the Palace for most of the day, holding banners denouncing the July Charter. The afternoon of October 1 some 100 monks and nuns joined Tri Quang for Buddhist prayers and chants, all the while holding up the same banners in Vietnamese and English (the latter for the benefit of the foreign press) they had displayed the day before. There have been considerable crowds of the curious, numbering up to

500 at times, looking on, but, beginning October 2, the police have politely but firmly prevented crowds from gathering near the Buddhist monks in the park, while leaving the monks alone. As noted above, General Loan on October 2 called on the Buddhists to halt their protest in the interests of national security and the health and welfare of those concerned.

In my conversation with General Thieu October 3, he said he has talked to Thich Tam Chau and some of his people. He has also talked to Thich Thien Hoa, a Southern Buddhist who is a member of the Tri Quang faction. Thieu said he is trying to get Tam Chau to agree to do one of two things: either (1) publicly to ask the Government of Vietnam to suspend the July Charter, provided that Tri Quang gives a guarantee that he will sit down and talk to the Tam Chau faction on the religious issues only, not mixing in politics; or (2) to get both factions to sit down to discuss the problem, together with the understanding from Tam Chau that when they did so, he would ask for suspension of the July Charter. Thieu has tried to persuade Tam Chau that if he takes this step, he can get the support of the moderates and the Southern Buddhists and not be outpointed by Tri Quang. Above all, Thieu has emphasized the fact that it is important that the Buddhists accept the position that this is a Buddhist religious problem, not political, and as such should be settled by Buddhists. He told me this morning that he hopes to persuade Tam Chau to make one of the two proposals mentioned above publicly in order to emphasize his willingness to be conciliatory toward Tri Quang.

Thieu believes that the present Buddhist restiveness can be controlled and will not get out of hand. He pointed out that the Government of Vietnam has been able to control the situation in Saigon and that the militants have been unable to create any demonstrations or disturbances of significance in Hue or Danang. In his opinion Tri Quang is becoming increasingly isolated, though Tri Quang must be given some face-saving device if he is to abandon his vigil in the park in front of the Palace and return to his pagoda, as Thieu believes Tri Quang is anxious to do. I commented to Thieu that I thought his approach was constructive and I fully endorse it. I assured him we did not want to get involved in this matter and that we have no influence with or interest in Tri Quang.

On the whole, I think that Tri Quang is in a weak position on this issue. He is demanding, in effect, a humiliating surrender from the Government which he almost certainly realizes it cannot agree to without damaging its political position. He has suffered politically as a consequence of the Assembly validation of the Presidential elections, which he had joined the opposition in denouncing. His public support, both in the press and in the size of the crowds he has been able to attract, has been visibly declining. From the beginning he has clearly considered the possibility of stimulating firey suicides by his supporters as a means of

attracting renewed support. Early in the morning of October 3, a 28-year-old Buddhist nun in Can Tho, south of Saigon, committed suicide by fire, though this might have been a spontaneous act. I doubt firey suicides will solve Tri Quang's problem, as I think these will have less impact here, at least, than they did in 1963. You are in the best position to judge what effect they may have in the U.S., but I think that similar suicides in 1966 attracted comparatively little attention. The novelty wears off.

As something of a conclusion to the struggle over validation of the elections, the Judicial police on September 29 arrested lawyer Truong Dinh Dzu, probably the most outspoken of the Government's opponents and a sparkplug of the student and Buddhist activities against validation. Dzu was specifically charged with having made remarks insulting to Vietnamese judges and the system of justice as a whole, growing out of his conviction September 15 on bad check and other charges. The arrest was duly reported in the press but attracted relatively very little attention, and I gather from the press also attracted relatively little attention in the United States. Mrs. Dzu, in an open letter of October 2, alleged that her husband has been on a hunger strike and that she has been unable to visit him. However, we understand that she has now been permitted to visit him and that, while he is still officially fasting, he is eating and drinking on the side. As a political matter, since validation of the elections, Dzu is not a major issue for the Government. However, the Vietnamese judges and courts evidently feel that he is so openly contemptuous of Vietnamese justice that he cannot be ignored. I feel this is a matter which we can leave to the courts to handle.

The Lower House election campaign will begin October 6 and run to October 21, the day before elections. The original list of 1,650 candidates for the 137 seats has been reduced to 1,240 in the second posting on October 1, as a result of findings that some candidates were not qualified and as a result of some withdrawals. Regarding the withdrawals, representatives of the Hoa Hao religious group and of a few, small political groups have told us that they are withdrawing their candidates because they do not think the elections will be honest. This is essentially a further expression of their disappointment over the Presidential and Senate election results. One of the minor party leaders said he had seen a list of the candidates selected by the Government to win, but when one of our Embassy officers expressed interest in seeing the list, the party leader was unable to produce it. With an average of nine candidates for each seat, it seems obvious that some candidates, at least, have decided that they have little chance of winning and have decided to withdraw, making unsupported allegations against the government to cover their withdrawal.

Terrorists acts against the Chinese community in Saigon-Cholon have continued. In addition to the bomb attack on the Chinese embassy September 19 and the attempted assassination of the Embassy press attache the same day, four local Chinese have been assassinated, the last on October 3. There is still no clear indication why the Chinese community has come under attack at this particular time, although the increased publicity currently being given to closer relations between the Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of China may be a major factor. The Viet Cong, possibly supported by Communist China, may have decided that the time has come to warn local Chinese against looking to Taiwan for support and assistance.

#### C. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index continued to inch upwards, rising to 306 during the past week, compared to 304 the previous week. The prices of fish, shrimp, duck eggs, firewood, and white calico rose, affecting the Index most directly. Pork and chicken prices were down in response to recent sales of frozen pork and chicken by the Government. Rice prices remained stable. The Imported Commodity Index moved up to 220, compared to 217 last week, with steel products rising slightly in price.

A prospective shortage of rice in Central Vietnam is indicated by the end of October, based on projections of consumption and stocks. USAID is attempting to have the Government of Vietnam restrictions on coastal shipment lifted or, alternatively, to have ocean-going vessels loaded with rice in Saigon for shipment to this region. Rice from abroad could not be delivered quickly enough to Central Vietnam to relieve the prospective shortage.

#### D. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period rose to 380, compared to 266 during the same period last year. This is also well above last week's total of 357. The year's total to date is 23,332.

#### E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending September 30, the enemy killed 43 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 64 and kidnapped 32. The dead included one Revolutionary Development worker, four police, one Deputy District Chief, one Hamlet Chief, and the Chairman of a Village Council. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,570 civilians, wounded 5,141, and kidnapped 3,578.



Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Two short items based on telephone calls:

1. Henry Kissinger called to express his distress at the New York Times article. He has not seen Nelson Rockefeller in six months. He then talked to him about pacification. Although Emmett Hughes is working on Rockefeller to change his Vietnam position, Kissinger is doubtful that he will in fact change his position. In any case, if his advice is asked he will urge Rockefeller not to change his position. I asked Henry what his own position was. He said: "I have supported the President; I will support the President; whatever comes of my present activities, the President can be absolutely sure there will be no public discussion from me." He added that he thinks you (and I) have been "very noble" in holding the line on what is right for the country.

I said that his remarks were appreciated; that I would pass them along; but as for myself, I was raised in the view that it was a man's duty to hold a position in a storm if he believed in it; and I couldn't be more comfortable about it.

2. Pat Dean called to convey to you through me the message that he had just received from George Brown. They had expected to lose the vote on Vietnam in the Scarborough Conference by 1.5 million. It was an important triumph to hold the loss to 100,000. The President should "not worry". The British Government might have to be a little circumspect for a while in its statements about Vietnam, but there would be absolutely no change in the policy.

Pat Dean added that his information was that George Brown's speech to the conference at Scarborough "swung many votes."

W. W. Rostow

*cc: Mr Goldstein*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *ju*, NARA, Date 9-25-00

Wednesday, October 4, 1967 -- 4:00 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pirzade*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Pirzada --  
5:30 p. m. Thursday, October 5.

This is Pirzada's first visit to Washington as Foreign Minister. He was invited down from the General Assembly by Secretary Rusk. He's a diligent, apolitical minister. He's intensely loyal to President Ayub.

Pirzada is coming mainly to get acquainted and for a general exchange of views. He lunches with Secretary Rusk Thursday, and goes up to meet the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Chief Justice Friday.

He's fresh from accompanying Ayub on a trip to Moscow (September 25 - October 4). What Ayub got from the Soviets will probably be the springboard for your talk. These talking points should cover the ground.

---The Middle East. Ayub probably told Pirzada to give you a run-down on the latest Soviet thinking on The Middle East. The joint communique from Moscow paid lip service to immediate Israeli withdrawal. But Ayub has been more realistic in private. Pirzada may urge you on Ayub's instructions to revive the US-Soviet draft resolution on The Middle East. It now appears that Nasser and Hussein are ready to accept that formulation, combining Israeli withdrawal with Arab renunciation of belligerency. Ayub and Hussein have now both been in Moscow urging the Soviets to revive the resolution.

Secretary Rusk has been saying in New York that the US-USSR draft resolution is a good starting place for continued discussion. He and Arthur Goldberg, however, have been pointing out the importance of thinking through the practical steps that would be necessary to follow-up passage of such a resolution. The Israelis will not settle for mere words, and neither we nor the Soviets can afford to risk misunderstandings over the meaning of such a resolution. This seems a reasonable line for you to take if Pirzada raises the subject.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-403

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95



Pirzada might say Pakistan is under heavy pressure to raise in the UN the question of Israel's non-compliance with The Special Session resolutions on Jerusalem. You could answer that we regret Pakistan did not work with us last summer on this matter. We were not unsympathetic to the general intent of the resolutions. We oppose any unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem by either side. But we recognize that a change has taken place. No nation --- Moslem, Jew, or Christian --- wants to see the barbed wire go up again in that city. We all have to work together to achieve a just and lasting settlement.

---Arms Supply. Ayub may have told Pirzada to give you a gentle reminder of their pending request for arms assistance, especially if the Soviets didn't promise them hardware, or at least agree to cut arms aid to India. Pakistan has asked for (a) our approval of their tank purchases from a third country, and (b) a direct deal on replacement aircraft. You may want to tell Pirzada that we're studying these requests. But he and Ayub should understand you now face great Congressional and public sensitivity on arms supply in general.

---Indo-Pakistan Relations. The arms question should lead right into this. Pirzada may complain about India's failure to live up to the Tashkent Declaration. He may say Ayub has pushed through a significant cut in Pakistan's defense budget --- despite stiff opposition at every level. But there's been no response by the other side. (The Paks have cut defense spending 19% from their '65-'66 war budget. The Indians have held about even in the same comparison, and haven't gone up at least. For both, defense is running at 20% of the budgets.)

You might reply that we think the defense cut is a good and really essential step in the right direction. We're convinced that the security and welfare of both countries are best served by lessening the tension between them. The Indo-Pakistan quarrel makes very serious problems for us, particularly in the Congress. It creates a terrible drain on the limited resources which both countries need so much to help their peoples build a better life. That's why we're heartened by any sign of better relations. For instance, we were glad to learn of the recent agreement between India and Pakistan to discuss the restoration of telecommunications.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You might ask Pirzada what the Soviets told Ayub about their attitude toward an improvement of Indo-Pakistani relations.

---Vietnam Ayub reportedly made a speech in Moscow calling for a political settlement "without external interference." You might ask Pirzada what was said about Vietnam during Ayub's visit to Russia. You'll want to reemphasize to him our basic objectives in Southeast Asia.

---Aid. Pirzada is not likely to ask about this. Pakistan's Finance Minister is in town now to talk about these issues at various levels (I had a good session with him Wednesday). If Pirzada mentions aid, you'll want to say you're especially pleased with Pakistan's economic progress. We'll continue to do our best to help in every way. But you know Ayub will appreciate too the enormous burden you're shouldering with our budget deficit, and the struggle we're having in Congress over foreign assistance. In the hard decisions that lie ahead, you'll want Pakistan's help and understanding, just as we've been ready to help and understand in their problems.

---Non-Proliferation. If Pirzada raises this, it will be in terms of Pakistan's concern for tight control of India, and security guarantees to non-nuclear powers. You might say, we understand their concern. We've been second to none in working for a truly effective treaty which would reconcile the legitimate security needs of all nations. The encouraging thing is that we're still doing serious talking with the Soviets.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

79  
*Pres file*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 94-403  
By *phl/np* NARA, Date 9-25-00

Pirzada might say Pakistan is under heavy pressure to raise in the UN the question of Israel's non-compliance with The Special Session resolutions on Jerusalem. You could answer that we regret Pakistan did not work with us last summer on this matter. We were not unsympathetic to the general intent of the resolutions. We oppose any unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem by either side. But we recognize that a change has taken place. No nation --- Moslem, Jew, or Christian --- wants to see the barbed wire go up again in that city. We all have to work together to achieve a just and lasting settlement.

---Arms Supply. Ayub may have told Pirzada to give you a gentle reminder of their pending request for arms assistance, especially if the Soviets didn't promise them hardware, or at least agree to cut arms aid to India. Pakistan has asked for (a) our approval of their tank purchases from a third country, and (b) a direct deal on replacement aircraft. You may want to tell Pirzada that we're studying these requests. But he and Ayub should understand you now face great Congressional and public sensitivity on arms supply in general.

---Indo-Pakistan Relations. The arms question should lead right into this. Pirzada may complain about India's failure to live up to the Tashkent Declaration. He may say Ayub has pushed through a significant cut in Pakistan's defense budget --- despite stiff opposition at every level. But there's been no response by the other side. (The Paks have cut defense spending 19% from their "65"- "66" war budget. The Indians have held about even in the same comparison, and haven't gone up at least. For both, defense is running at 20% of the budgets.)

You might reply that we think the defense cut is a good and really essential step in the right direction. We're convinced that the security and welfare of both countries are best served by lessening the tension between them. The Indo-Pakistan quarrel makes very serious problems for us, particularly in the Congress. It creates a terrible drain on the limited resources which both countries need so much to help their peoples build a better life. That's why we're heartened by any sign of better relations. For instance, we were glad to learn of the recent agreement between India and Pakistan to discuss the restoration of telecommunications.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You might ask Pirzada what the Soviets told Ayub about their attitude toward an improvement of Indo-Pakistani relations.

---Vietnam Ayub reportedly made a speech in Moscow calling for a political settlement "without external interference." You might ask Pirzada what was said about Vietnam during Ayub's visit to Russia. You'll want to reemphasize to him our basic objectives in Southeast Asia.

---Aid. Pirzada is not likely to ask about this. Pakistan's Finance Minister is in town now to talk about these issues at various levels (I had a good session with him Wednesday). If Pirzada mentions aid, you'll want to say you're especially pleased with Pakistan's economic progress. We'll continue to do our best to help in every way. But you know Ayub will appreciate too the enormous burden you're shouldering with our budget deficit, and the struggle we're having in Congress over foreign assistance. In the hard decisions that lie ahead, you'll want Pakistan's help and understanding, just as we've been ready to help and understand in their problems.

---Non-Proliferation. If Pirzada raises this, it will be in terms of Pakistan's concern for tight control of India, and security guarantees to non-nuclear powers. You might say, we understand their concern. We've been second to none in working for a truly effective treaty which would reconcile the legitimate security needs of all nations. The encouraging thing is that we're still doing serious talking with the Soviets.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
3:00 p.m.

*80*  
*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith today's report on the  
Vietnamese political situation.

W. W. Rostow

*cc Mr Goldstein*

rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By SM, NARA, Date 10-15-81

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

October 4, 1967

1. Buddhist Agitation. Tri Quang continues his "vigil" outside the Palace, but the Embassy reports little popular interest in his cause. Police Chief Loan requested that Buddhist monks and nuns cease immediately all forms of public gatherings and processions in the interest of national security. Prime Minister Ky also issued a communique requesting the monks and nuns to return to their pagodas and urging a peaceful solution to the Buddhists' internal problems.

Thieu explained to Bunker that he is trying to get the Buddhists to settle the problem among themselves. Thieu believes Buddhist restiveness can be controlled, but that Tri Quang may have to be given some face-saving device if he is to return to his pagoda (which he is reportedly anxious to do). Bunker told Thieu this approach seemed very constructive but noted that we do not intend to get involved in this matter and that we have no influence with or interest in Tri Quang. Bunker feels that validation of the election has taken much of the steam out of Tri Quang's political efforts.

2. Lower House Candidates. The final posting of candidates for the Lower House listed 1240 candidates for the 137 seats. 1650 persons filed originally; of the 464 persons whose candidacies were rejected at the local level or who withdrew, 152 subsequently appealed to the National Election Council. The Council upheld 54 of these appeals and rejected 98.

In the Bunker-Thieu conversation noted above, Thieu said the GVN is actively preparing for the Lower House elections. He expects an overall turnout below that of the Presidential elections, since the public may now be somewhat jaded with elections. Bunker stressed the importance of an active GVN campaign to stir up voter interest.

3. General Thang. The semi-official Viet-Nam Press reported that General Thang has been named Deputy Chief of Staff, JGS, with responsibilities for Regional and Popular Forces. This confirms earlier reports that Thang would take this position, and is encouraging in that Thang has decided to stay on. It can also be interpreted as showing that Ky is maintaining his influence in military inner circles.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-405

By ing, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

4. Release of Dzu. The Embassy reports Dzu was released today. His arrest September 29 was probably to get him out of the way during the validation proceedings, though charges against him are still pending.



~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
11:45 a. m.

81  
*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This response from Bunker to  
my (attached) back channel message  
indicates we may get some move-  
ment.

W. W. R.

Attachments: 2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By MC, NARA, Date 10-15-91

~~SECRET~~

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FM CIA  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 041133Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 743

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, WALT ROSTOW

REF: CAP67857

1. I AGREE WITH PRESIDENT'S JUDGMENT THAT SOME INFORMAL BACK-  
GROUNDERS ON LIKELY DIRECTION OF THIEU'S PROGRAM WOULD BE HELPFUL.

2. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE GIVEN THIEU DOCUMENT CONTAINING IDEAS  
AND SUGGESTIONS TO INCORPORATE IN HIS PROGRAM, AND WHICH HE  
WOULD PLAN TO ANNOUNCE IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS. THIS DOCUMENT  
IS HEADED "DEMOCRACY, PEACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE". TEXT HAS BEEN  
FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON (SAIGON 7153).

3. AS I HAVE MENTIONED IN MY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT TODAY,  
WE HAVE FELT THAT IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT HE ADDRESS THE COUNTRY  
BEFORE THEN WITH A SHORTER, MORE DYNAMIC, HARDHITTING SPEECH TO  
AROUSE THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE PEOPLE FOR THEIR NEW GOVERNMENT,  
CALLING FOR THEIR SUPPORT, AND OUTLINING A PROGRAM OF SPECIFICS.  
WE HAVE, THEREFORE, PREPARED A SHORTER STATEMENT FOR HIM,  
WHICH I PUT IN HIS HANDS YESTERDAY, HE HAS SAID THAT THIS HAS  
COME AT AN OPPORTUNE MOMENT, FOR HE WANTS TO MAKE SUCH A  
SPEECH AT THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW SENATE, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN  
SET FOR OCTOBER 12.

4. THIEU HAS GONE OVER BOTH DOCUMENTS AND HAS TURNED THEM  
OVER TO HIS "BRAINS TRUST" WHO ARE PREPARING HIS STATEMENTS.  
AS SOON AS I CAN GET FROM HIM AN IDEA OF WHAT HE INTENDS TO  
INCLUDE AND EMPHASIZE, WE WILL ARRANGE FOR BACKGROUNDERS  
HERE.

~~SECRET~~ VIA CAS CHANNELS

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATATATAT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 01-1  
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-25-01

816

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1967

VIA CAS CHANNELS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTOW

Although we know from your recent messages that Thieu is now turning to forming his cabinet and program, it is the President's judgment that some informal backgrounders on the likely direction of his reform program would be immensely helpful.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-134  
By inf, NARA Date 4-8-96

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 4, 1967  
10:45 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This cable, pages 2-3, gives you  
a feel as to where Hussein and Nasser  
are going -- or trying to go.

W. W. Rostow

Amman 1692

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 10-15-91

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, October 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BURNS (Amman 1692)

I met with Hussein late afternoon on October 1 to give him our reading of the current Israeli position on negotiations, and our general reaction to the Arab position taken at Khartoum. After completing the presentation of points on negotiations, I recalled to Hussein his comment to me some days ago that he doubted the Israelis were interested in negotiations with him and noted that obviously they were interested.

Hussein expressed appreciation for the department's views, but made no direct comment pro or con negotiations. Later in the conversation, however, he referred to the report given him by Hatem Zu'Bi (Government of Jordan's Minister of National Economy) about Zu'Bi's meeting in Rio with Mr. Rostow. According to Zu'Bi, Mr. Rostow had said Washington had expected after the Khartoum Conference that Hussein would take "some initiative." The King interpreted this to mean the United States Government expected the King to enter direct negotiations with the Israelis. The King indicated that if this interpretation were correct, he was unhappy that the United States Government was trying to pressure him into direct negotiations. I replied that I had had a report of Mr. Rostow's meeting with Hatem Zu'Bi and it was clear from this report that Mr. Rostow had not specified direct negotiations. There were forms of initiative other than direct negotiations. Mr. Rostow had indicated that an initiative was desirable, and I reminded Hussein I had said the same thing to him after Khartoum. Mr. Rostow had said that when King Hussein decided he wanted to go forward, our influence and our good offices would be available in behalf of a fair and durable agreement. When the King told us his ideas about procedure, we would respond. Regarding direct negotiations, the message I had just read him had specifically indicated that we were not trying to decide for him, nor were we taking the responsibility for advising him, on how to proceed. Such decisions were for the King alone to make.

The King then said he was glad to have this opportunity prior to his departure to Moscow to review with me his September 30 Cairo discussions and his talking about next steps aimed at a solution of the present Arab-Israeli impasse.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-405

By lip, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hussein stated he had secured Nasser's agreement to discuss in Moscow a draft United Nations' resolution, to be introduced at the Security Council, hopefully by the US and the USSR. This resolution would be similar to the US-USSR draft resolution, presented to the Arabs last July, which had provided for a linking of Israeli withdrawal with Arab agreement to end their state of belligerency against Israel, as well as for a role for a United Nations' representative to work out details to implement this resolution. Nasser had asked only that the original US-USSR draft be rephrased to make it appear as if it were not precisely the same document which the Arabs had, to Nasser's regret, rejected last summer. Nasser fully agreed that in order to ensure renewed US-Soviet support all substantive points of the US-USSR draft must be retained. (Nasser and Hussein did not compose a new draft. According to Royal Protocol Chief Rifa' I, the Jordanians were writing one, which Nasser had agreed to buy sight unseen. When I saw Hussein the drafting task had not been completed.)

Hussein stated the Egyptians had cautioned him that the United States Government had already made it clear that it would insist on certain interpretations of the general provisions in any draft resolution which it might support. These interpretations included: (A) Israeli withdrawal would be to agreed, I. E., negotiated, boundaries; (B) border rectifications were to be negotiated for the West Bank and Syrian heights; (C) internationalization of both Gaza and Jerusalem; (D) demilitarization of Sinai, and presumably at least part of the West Bank; (E) opening of Tiran and Suez to Israeli ships; (F) the United Arab Republic Foreign Minister would have to stand up in the General Assembly and announce the United Arab Republic's acceptance of the resolution. (Hussein said he had been informed that Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad had told Ambassador Goldberg that he would do this only after Eban had announced to the General Assembly that Israel would withdraw. I said if the Security Council passed a resolution acceptable to the United Arab Republic and Jordan, it would seem to me an advantage for the United Arab Republic and Jordan to register their acceptance immediately, no matter what any one else did.)

Hussein said the Egyptians had received this information on United States Government stipulations from Yugoslav and Iranian sources. He added that he had been given to understand that President Johnson had listed several if not all of the above specifics in a message to President Tito. Although the United States position on internationalization of Jerusalem was well-known, some of the other specifics were news to Hussein and greatly disturbed Hussein and the Egyptians, who interpreted as deliberately



tailored to meet Israeli desires and at the same time to humiliate the Arabs. Hussein said he and Nasser felt, too, that neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to shoulder the responsibilities they would have to shoulder if a just and durable peace were to be achieved. I replied that I could not agree with this analysis. As for the reported US stipulations, I would ask Washington for direct and authoritative information in this regard for relay to Hussein on his return from Moscow.

I asked the King what President Nasser's present attitude was concerning the opening of Suez to Israeli ships. The King replied that Nasser viewed the opening of Suez as a question tied to an overall solution of the Palestine problem, not just to the ending of belligerency. The King indicated he agreed with this view. I said that if this was their attitude then perhaps the Arabs should consider working up a resolution which would in effect tackle the solution of the so-called Palestine problem, since it seemed clear to me that the Israelis were not going to withdraw from the Canal area unless their ships could pass through: the King said he considered nevertheless that a rephrased version of the US-USSR July draft was the first and indispensable step to any larger solution.

At the conclusion of my interview with Hussein, he said that if a political solution could not be worked out through the UN, he and Nasser would be left with two alternatives--either to negotiate directly with the Israelis "which would be tantamount to a complete capitulation to the Israelis" or to shift direction to the long-term objective of regaining the occupied territories by force. Hussein said that what he sought was a just and honorable peace, and he implied that although he could be flexible about how this was to be achieved, never would he or any Arab "capitulate to the Israelis." If peace were to be achieved, said Hussein, US and Soviet support for a Security Council resolution such as he had outlined would be requisite.

WWR.  
82

Wednesday, October 4, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may recall that when you were in Germany for Adenauer's funeral you met Prince Otto von Bismark, senior heir to the Iron Chancellor, and in the course of a casual conversation with him, you asked him to drop in if he found himself in Washington.

The Prince now plans to be here on November 5-6. McGhee feels that there is no need to see him, but notes that although he occupies no official position, "he is a charming man, widely respected and very friendly to us." State sees no important political reason for your seeing him; nor do I.

W. W. Rostow

I will see him \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

  
RHU:ERF:mst



~~TOP SECRET~~

24

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-404  
By CG, NARA, Date 7-20-95

October 4, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, the CIA analysis of the air campaign against lines of communication -- which I held up so you would have along with it my own view of how the problem should be posed.

In a subsequent talk with Bob McNamara, I further narrowed our differences.

As you can see from what follows, the way I put the case at the meeting yesterday is wholly consistent with the evidence of the report. The problem is that the analysis in the report is split into two arguments which are never coherently related:

- 1. We have not and cannot reduce capacity so they can't get men and supplies through to the South.
- 2. Very extensive consequences flow from our bombing of the North.

That split in analysis is why men like Dick Helms accept the report but oppose cessation of bombing. I hope that what follows is a basis for reconciling and unifying judgments within the government.

As indicated in the attached more detailed comments, the bombing campaign has achieved the following:

- At little cost in civilian casualties and at acceptable costs in our loss rates, the bombing has severely curtailed North Vietnam's industrial and agricultural production.

- Therefore, there has been a radical increase in North Vietnam's requirement for foreign aid in order to sustain her war effort and to sustain her ~~war~~ economy at minimum levels (imports up from 2,100 metric tons per day in 1965 to 4,300 in 1967; Soviet aid up from \$100 million to \$700 million annually).

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- It has required the diversion of up to 600,000 workers to defend against or counter the effects of the bombing.

- It has increased substantially the number of men and tons which must be dispatched from the North to get one man or one ton into South Vietnam. We don't know just how much but we do know that it has (1) caused them to resort to the shorter routes across the DMZ and (2) contributed to their abandoning large-scale operations within South Vietnam.

Although I have some personal reservations on whether the North Vietnamese could, if they wished, do as much more as ~~the~~ analysis indicates, I basically agree that bombing cannot reduce their capacity to support the South to the extent that they would be forced to abandon the war in the South.

There remain two significant, but unanswerable, questions:

- Is the present level of communist effort in the South what they consider their optimum strategy or is it the best they can or are willing to mount in the face of the bombing?

- What would they do if we stopped bombing?

Although we can't predict what the North Vietnamese would do, we can say that:

- They would be able to put men and supplies into the South at lower cost.

- The resources available to them would be increased, which would enable them to put more into the South or make life in the North easier, or both.

- It would be a lot easier for them to sweat out the war.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

84a

Some Comments on: "ROLLING THUNDER: The 1967  
Campaign Against LOC's"

1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 below indicate how a selective use of evidence from the CIA analysis conveys a somewhat different -- and more positive -- interpretation of the impact of the bombing campaign. Paragraph 4 indicates a number of questions which need to be considered. -- even though they may be unanswerable -- to place the impact of the air campaign in perspective. Paragraphs 5 and 6 indicate two areas in which the presentation of the analysis may be deficient.

2. The bombing has had the following measurable effects:

- "... has brought North Vietnam's small modern industry to a standstill." p 10

- "About 80 per cent of the central electric power generating capacity is currently out of operation." p 10

- "The country's only modern cement plant -- at Haiphong -- ceased production in April 1967. . ." p 10

- "The country's only metallurgical plant . . . has ceased production for the same reasons." p 10

- "The only explosives plant has been out of operation for two years, and the production of apatite and coal, both previously exported in quantity, has been drastically reduced. One of the country's two textile plants has been heavily damaged, production in the small fertilizer and chemical industry has been curtailed, and the production of paper has been reduced by 80 per cent." p 10

- Dollar value of bombing damage: ( p 12)

<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Jan - Aug 1967</u>
68.7	112.4	158.4

- "Up to 600,000 persons are engaged in full-time or part-time work defending against or countering the effects of the bombing." p 12 (This is about equal to ARVN strength.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-406

By CLG, NARA, Date 1-19-95

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

- "The movement of men and supplies has become more difficult and time-consuming, and a substantial volume of war and war-supporting material has been destroyed in transit." p 11 (Unfortunately, we have no good measurement of the impact.)

- "Since January 1965, destruction and damage to transport equipment has included 67 locomotives, 4,792 rail freight cars, 8,371 trucks, and 19,211 watercraft." p 29

- In the northern part of North Vietnam "most of the serious damage to the railroads is probably being repaired by the professional Chinese construction (and air defense) troops numbering 30,000 to 50,000." p 68

- In 1966, because of bombing and weather, NVN's rice crops was about 300,000 metric tons short. They may experience a similar shortfall in 1967. (This point is not specifically addressed in the analysis.)

3. As a consequence of these measurable effects -- plus those we cannot measure -- there has been a radical increase in foreign aid requirements to allow North Vietnam to continue the war and to sustain the economy at minimum levels.

- Soviet aid is up from about \$100 to \$700 million annually.

- "Imports into Haiphong have increased greatly, reaching an average of almost 5,200 tons a day in the second quarter of 1967 and averaging 4,300 tons a day during the first eight months of the year, compared with 2,100 tons per day in the first quarter of 1965.) p 33

4. Nevertheless, as the analysis states: "It is clear that logistics problems have not placed a relevant ceiling on force structures or levels of combat." It is perhaps true that "even a more intense interdiction campaign in the North would fail to reduce the flow of supplies sufficiently to restrict military operations." These conclusions, however, leave some important questions unanswered:

- If there is such an excess capacity in NVN's transportation system, why are they not utilizing it more fully?

- If there is such excess capacity, why has NVN gone to such lengths to repair its transport system and defend it against attack?

2  
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- If the requirement for military supplies in the DMZ, Laos, and South Vietnam is only 85 tons a day and if this is substantially less than transport capacity, why don't the North Vietnamese double or triple the volume of supplies so that communist units in the South could double or triple the number of days a month they can fight?

- If NVN's total military and civilian requirements are only about 3,500 tons a day, why have they been importing at the rate of 5,100 tons a day for the last eight months?

- If total requirements are only 3,500 tons a day, why did NVN move 55,300 tons a day on its transport system in 1966?

5. The analysis also concludes that "Prospects are dim that an air interdiction campaign against LOC's leading out of Haiphong alone could cut off the flow of seaborne imports and isolate Haiphong." However, the analysis points out that:

- "Layover times of freighters at Haiphong averaged ten days in the first six months of 1966, but increased to nearly 17 days in the third quarter of 1966. . . Similarly, the large increase in imports in the second quarter of 1967 was followed by increased layover times that reached a peak average of 33 days for freighters clearing the port in August." p 37

- "Over the past 18 months, there has been a notable spillover of cargoes into areas adjacent to the port area at Haiphong. Vacant lots, parks, and even streets and sidewalks have been utilized for storage of cargoes." p 37

Furthermore, according to DIA, "air strikes have made it progressively more difficult for North Vietnam to move imports out of Vietnam." (TAB A) Reduced capacities of key lines of communication leading out of Haiphong have caused a shortfall of 1,700 short tons per day (according to our in-house mathematics, it should be almost 1,900 metric tons per day). Although DIA indicates that it would take only seven out of NVN's inventory of 300 lighters (250-ton capacity), the CIA analysis indicates that the extended delays already being experienced in unloading ocean freighters "are attributable primarily to poor port management and a possible shortage of lighter capacity." p 37. I do not see how CIA can then conclude that: "Attacks on transport routes around Haiphong almost certainly have not contributed significantly to the accumulation of goods in the port area." p 37. In my opinion, the bombing has been an important factor in port congestion in that:

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- It created the need for additional imports in the first place.
- Attacks on the LOCs leading out of Haiphong have compounded the management problems of clearing the port.

6. The analysis states: "Through service has been maintained on all major rail lines with the exception of the rail connections in the immediate Hanoi area and the heavily pounded Hanoi-Vinh line." The attached chart (TAB B), however, shows a different way of looking at the picture -- length of time rail lines are closed is down -- but number of days on which shuttle operations are required is up.

~~TOP SECRET~~

85

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

October 4, 1967


*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1968 Underground Nuclear Test Program (CROSSTIE II)

The Atomic Energy Commission has submitted for your approval the AEC-DOD underground nuclear tests proposed for the second quarter underground nuclear test program (CROSSTIE II). This program has been reviewed by the agencies represented on your Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and they have no objection to your approval of the recommended AEC-DOD program.

6.1  
(a)



The 16 tests recommended include Project CABRIOLET. However, AEC understands that it will have to obtain your specific approval in advance for the conduct of Project CABRIOLET.

I recommend that you authorize the AEC to go ahead with the proposed program. If you agree, I will sign the attached memorandum to Chairman Seaborg.

\_\_\_\_ Approved  
\_\_\_\_ Disapproved  
\_\_\_\_ See me

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-62  
By *is*, NARA, Date *1-19-05*

85a

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-5

By cbm, NARA, Date 9-14-01


MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN,  
U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: Second Quarter FY 1968 Underground Nuclear Test  
Program (CROSSTIE II)

Reference is made to the request contained in your letter to the President of September 15, 1967, on behalf of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense for approval of the underground nuclear tests planned for execution in the second quarter of FY 1968 (CROSSTIE II).

The testing program proposed in your letter, which consists of 15 tests sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission and one Department of Defense experiment, is approved. The conduct of Project CABRIOLET included in the 16 recommended tests is, of course, subject to specific approval as set forth in my memorandum of July 6, 1967.

6.1(a)



W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~





~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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856

This document contains 2 pages  
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
The President  
The White House

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 00-250**  
**By cbm, NARA Date 3-29-01**

Dear Mr. President:

The purpose of this letter is to present for your approval the underground nuclear test program planned for execution in the second quarter of FY 1963. This program has been designated CROSSTIE II.

The CROSSTIE I test program has been conducted essentially as planned. Two experiments previously planned for execution in the first quarter, LANPHER and SAZERAC, have been deferred due to fabrication and technical difficulties. These events are included in the program proposed for the second quarter. One of the approved first quarter tests, ZAZA, is currently scheduled for execution late in September. If a delay should become necessary, that event could slip into the second quarter. For this reason, it has been included in the proposed CROSSTIE II program.



6.1(a)

One Department of Defense experiment is proposed for the second quarter. The Department of Defense will also conduct a major add-on experiment, DRILL STEM, in conjunction with the AEC advanced technology event, RUSSET. A description of the individual experiments proposed for the second quarter is provided in Enclosure 1.

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Two of the test events planned for the second quarter, GASBUGGY and FAULTLESS, will be conducted off the Nevada Test Site. GASBUGGY, the gas stimulation experiment being sponsored in cooperation with the Department of Interior and the El Paso Natural Gas Company, will be conducted at a depth of about 4000 feet at a site approximately fifty-five miles east of Farmington, New Mexico. FAULTLESS, the Central Nevada Supplemental Test Site seismic calibration event, will be conducted in the Hot Creek Valley approximately 65 miles northeast of Tonopah, Nevada, and approximately 165 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada.

Specific approval of the PLOWSHARE cratering experiment, CABRIOLET, will be requested in a separate letter. Mr. Rostow's memorandum of July 6, 1967, which provided approval in principle for the FY 1968 underground test program advised that specific approval of such tests would be required.

With the exception of the PLOWSHARE cratering experiment, CABRIOLET, each of the experiments described in Enclosure 1 is designed to be fully contained. As in the past, all tests will be subject to thorough review by the agencies concerned and will be executed only with the expectation that they can be conducted within the requirements and constraints of the limited test ban treaty.

[REDACTED]

(a)(1)

A proposed authorization to expend these nuclear materials and conduct the second quarter test program is provided in Enclosure 2.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) Wm. I. Seaberg

Chairman

Enclosures:

1. Cy 1A CROSSTIE II Events
2. Cy 1A Draft Endorsement

bcc: Cy 2A&3A, W. W. Rostow w/cy 2A&3A each Encl.

~~SECRET~~


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85c


This document consists of 5 pages  
No. 2 of 29 Copies, Series A

CROSSTIE II EVENTS

~~SECRET~~ **SANITIZED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-6  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-14-01



<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
ZAZA	September - October
COGNAC	October
WORTH	October
STACCATO	November
COBBLER	November
KNOX	December



GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~SECRET~~



~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

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Enclosure 1

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -





<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
LANPHER	October
SAZERAC	October
HUPMOBILE	December

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -



Event  
Name

Approximate  
Date

STILT

December

AXE

December



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	Event Name	Approximate Date
	RUSSET	December
	[REDACTED]	

e. Site Calibration


[REDACTED]	Event Name	Approximate Date
	FAULTLESS	November
	[REDACTED]	

The objective of this experiment is to establish the seismic response and propagation pattern in the area surrounding the Central Nevada Supplemental Test Site.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

II. PLOWSHARE Tests


	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
	GASBUGGY	November
	CABRIOLET	November


The objective of experiments in this category is to further the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives.

GASBUGGY will investigate the feasibility of increasing gas production from a tight gas reservoir using a nuclear explosive. The gas quality and the seismic effects of the detonation will also be studied. This joint industry-government experiment is being done by the AEC in cooperation with El Paso Natural Gas Company and the U. S. Department of Interior (Bureau of Mines).

CABRIOLET is a nuclear excavation experiment planned for execution at the Nevada Test Site. It is designed for the purpose of obtaining data on cratering effects in hard, dry rock and to study the resulting distribution of radioactivity.

III. DOD Tests

	<u>Event Name</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
	DORSAL FIN	December



~~SECRET~~

**SANITIZED**  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 01-5  
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-14-01

85d

DRAFT ENDORSEMENT

This document contains 1 page.  
No. 2 of 29 Copies, Series A

Memorandum for  
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

I hereby approve the conduct during the second quarter, FY 1968,  
of 14 Atomic Energy Commission tests and one Department of Defense  
test as described in your letter of \_\_\_\_\_.

6.1(a)

[REDACTED]

\_\_\_\_\_  
The President

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~  
~~RESTRICTED DATA~~

This document contains restricted data as defined  
in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmission  
or the disclosure of its contents in any manner to  
an unauthorized person is prohibited.

Enclosure 2



~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read this account  
of a conversation between Amb. Bunker  
and Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 7538

~~SECRET~~

cc: Mr. Goldstein

WWRostow:rlm

86  
*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 10-15-91

86a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Tuesday, October 3, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 7538)

I met with Thieu at 9:30 am. today (October 3) and found him in good spirits following yesterday evening's good news that the Assembly had validated his election as President. Thieu told me he had been in the palace until 1:30 this morning and thus wound up a very busy three days. He told me that after my talk with him on Saturday, he continued seeing various people with respect to the Assembly debate all that day, in fact until after midnight that night. On Sunday and Monday he kept in touch with various key individuals on the telephone. Happily it had all come out well.

Thieu said the Government of Vietnam is going ahead actively with preparation for the Lower House elections. In his opinion, the turnout in the provinces should be good because of local interest in the candidates, but he is not so certain about Saigon, whose appetite he thinks somewhat jaded after so many elections. He expects that overall the turnout may be below that of the Presidential elections but that has to be expected. I said that I was glad to hear he anticipated that the elections would go well and stressed to him that it is important that the Vietnam Information Service get on with an active campaign to stir up voter interest.

Prime Minister, what the plans were with respect to Cabinet formation: He said that he hopes to form the Cabinet by mid-October and is still planning on holding the inauguration on November 1. It is also still his plan to have the new Cabinet work as a shadow Cabinet from mid-October on so that they can have the advantage of working with the present Cabinet for several weeks prior to taking office. With respect to the Senate, Thieu says he intends to install the new Senate on the 10th or 11th of October. He is holding talks with the newly-elected members now looking toward the organization of the Senate.

I then switched to the subject of the Buddhists and referred to our conversation on this subject on Saturday. I reminded him that at that time I told him I had no advice to give but that I thought his approach to the problem was moderate and constructive. I said I did want to make it clear again that we have no contact with Tri Quang and have no special interest in him.

Thieu then explained to me what he is trying to do to reach a settlement of the present problem. He has talked to Tam Chau and some of his people. He

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-405  
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

has also talked to Thich Thien Hoa (possibly the most prestigious Sudist member of the Tri Quang faction) and, through third parties, to some of the other moderate "centrists" around Tri Quang. He said that he is trying to get Tam Chau to do one of two things, either (a) publicly to ask the Government of Vietnam to suspend the new Charter provided that Tri Quang gives a guarantee that he will sit down and talk to the Tam Chau faction on the religious issues only and not mixing in politics; or, (b) to get both factions to agree to sit down to discuss this problem together with the understanding from Tam Chau that when they did so he would ask for suspension of the new Charter. Thieu has tried to persuade Tam Chau that if he takes this step he can get the support of the moderates and Sudists and not be outpointed by Tri Quang. Above all, Thieu has emphasized the fact that it is important that the Buddhists accept the position that this is a Buddhist religious problem, not political, and as such should be settled by Buddhists.

Thieu believes that the present Buddhist restiveness can be controlled and will not get out of hand. He pointed out that the Government of Vietnam has been able to control the situation in Saigon and that the militants have been unable to create any demonstrations or disturbances of significance in Hue or Danang. In his opinion, Tri Quang is becoming increasingly isolated.

At the same time, Thieu realizes Tri Quang has to be given some face-saving device if he is to abandon his vigil in the park in front of the palace and return to the An Quang Pagoda which he is anxious to do. Thieu believes that if Tam Chau will agree to one of the two approaches suggested above that this will give Tri Quang the concession he needs so that he can say that his vigil has not been in vain.

I told Thieu that I felt this approach of his was very constructive and I could fully endorse it. I said once again that we do not want to get involved in this matter, that we have no influence with or interest in Tri Quang.

Comment: Although the problem of finding a means of settling the present Buddhist dissatisfaction over the Charter will remain a source of concern for the Government of Vietnam until it is ultimately settled, I have the feeling that validation of the elections will take much of the steam out of the present Buddhist efforts. Validation deprives Tri Quang and his followers of the political situation that they have sought to exploit.

87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Your meeting with Australian Treasurer William McMahon stirred him into action. As a result, the Australians intend to make a public statement on additional troops for Viet Nam on October 17 or 19.

McMahon asked that the attached letter be carried to you without delay.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Letter dated 10/3/67  
from Mr. McMahon

cc: Mr. William Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw, NARA, Date 6-14-00



87a  
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3rd October, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr President

Shortly after I saw you yesterday I spoke to Mr Holt on the telephone and conveyed to him the substance of what you said to me about additional allied contributions in South Vietnam.

Mr Holt asked me to inform you that he expected to make a public statement in the House on Tuesday, 17th October, or, at the latest, on the Thursday of that week.

The reasons for choosing this day were, first, that it would be tactically unwise to make a statement immediately after the Capricornia by-election which was held last Saturday; second, he will be speaking to Mr Holyoake, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, between the 2nd and 4th of this month and clearing our lines with him; and finally, that a statement of such importance should, in accordance with normal procedures in Australia, be made in the House of Representatives. As the House will be in recess from 5th October until 17th October, the Tuesday would be the earliest date on which the statement could be made.

The Prime Minister has also asked me to let you know that it is our present intention to maintain a presence in Malaya. The size and disposition of this contribution will depend on the size of our forces in South Vietnam and the duration of operations there.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-2

By 8j, NARA Date 5-14-01

Sincerely  
William McMahon  
(William McMahon)

The President,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON D.C.

Tuesday  
October 3, 1967  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Attached is our second try at the casualty statistics for 1967 which you requested of Mr. Rostow. I hope this better meets your requirements than the first try.

Art McCafferty

88a

# CASUALTIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

for 1967

	<u>Killed</u>			<u>Wounded</u>		
	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>Difference US to GVN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>Difference US to GVN</u>
January	512	887	-375	3456	2035	+1421
February	658	771	-113	3853	2125	+1728
March	943	1118	-175	6314	2786	+3528
April	710	935	-225	4964	2490	+2474
May	1232	1026	+206	8380	2830	+5550
June	828	771	+57	4946	2118	+7064
July	781	666	+115	5471	1935	+3536
August	535	852	-317	4604	2281	+2323
Total	6199	7026	-827	41988	18600	+23388

The great differences in the wounded figures are because the South Vietnamese report only the seriously wounded, while the U.S. reports all wounds, including the minor, that receive attention by medical personnel.



89.  
~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

Lunch Meeting With the President  
Tuesday, October 3, 1967, 6:00 pm

*Pres file*

AGENDA

1. Middle East, etc.: The View in New York. Sec. Rusk.  
A report.
2. NATO Nuclear Committee. Sec. McNamara.  
A report.
3. Negotiations. Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)  
-- the Paris track and the ten-mile circle (see marked passage, Tab A)  
-- the Shah's proposal: a response
4. Westmoreland DMZ Recommendations: Report on follow-up.  
(Sec. McNamara)  
Check list at Tab B.
5. NPT: U.S. Position on Article III. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
6. Delegation for Vietnamese Inaugural, November 1. (Sec. Rusk)
7. Other.

*W. A. W.* Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

~~TOP SECRET~~ -- SENSITIVE

By 124, NARA, Date 10-15-41



<sup>SWR</sup>  
Kissinger/Read Telecon, 9:00 a.m., Sept. 30, 1967

M and A called on Bo at 9:00 a.m. on September 30 and spent two hours with him. The atmosphere was friendly and cordial throughout and Bo gave them tea.

M and A told Bo that they had been in touch with K, and K had had further discussions with his Washington friends. M and A noted that K and the USG had put a proposal and questions to the DRV through the Bo channel to which there had been no substantive responses. The US August 25th offer without conditions remained open. M and A noted that K's Washington friends were interested in learning whether Bo had received an answer to the point Bo had raised on September 25 about the possibility of "preliminary discussions."

Bo replied that he had an answer to the latter point. Bo said that he could not talk directly to a US validated individual even in a preliminary way because "too much had happened since July." M and A got the impression from Bo that he feared that "preliminary discussions" would simply be a ruse on our part to get into substantive talks with the DRV while the bombing continued.

When Bo referred again to the "conditions" contained in the US position, M and A asked him to point out what conditions he was referring to. Bo said in the first paragraph of the US August 25 proposal the words "with the understanding that" really amounted to a condition on our part, as did the words "productive" and "prompt". He indicated there were other "complications" with the proposal.

M and A referred to the forthcoming sentences in President Johnson's September 29 speech which repeated US willingness to stop the bombing "when this will lead promptly to productive discussions" the assumption that the DRV would "not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation" during the discussions. Bo said he had not had

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-405  
By WJ, NARA, Date 3-29-95

a chance to study the President's speech, but he was glad that they had brought this portion of the speech to his attention, because the French press headlines made the US position sound conditional.

They discussed the Viet-Nam statements in the U.N. debate to date, and Bo said the DRV was highly displeased with George Brown's speech but pleased with the French and Canadian statements in New York. Bo added jocularly that he "claimed some credit" for the French position. Since M and A did not know the content of the French or Canadian positions and Bo did not elaborate, there was no discussion about what features of the GOC or GOF positions Bo was referring to.

Bo expressed the thought that the "present political trend" in the US was favorable to the DRV.

**At one stage of the discussion M and A found the opportunity to underscore the point that the US had made no commitments regarding its future actions.**

A asked whether Bo had received an answer to the September 23 inquiry regarding the accuracy of A's notes of his discussion in Hanoi with Pham Van Dong on the point that there would be "no question of a delay" between the end of bombing and talks both sides knew how to meet each other.

A again vouched for the care and accuracy of the notes of his conversation with Dong. Bo said he had not had an answer to this inquiry which he had made on September 23, but he expected an answer early next week. Bo did say that if there was a halt in the bombing "Kissinger should put on his hat and come to Paris immediately." When A and M asked for clarification of the conflicting reports of the DRV position regarding the delay between a bombing halt and talks as reflected in September 26 AFP column and a September 28 Le Monde article,

-3-

Bo said he hoped that the answer he would get from Hanoi to the question regarding the Dong/Aubrac exchange would clarify this issue.

M and Bo arranged to meet again on Wednesday, October 4. Bo repeated the point he had made before: he was available at any time to M and A to talk to them, meet with them, discuss matters with them, and report to Hanoi on their discussions. He said he would advise them as soon as he had received anything from his government.

Comment: Kissinger believes Bo and M and A fail to understand that the "preliminary discussions" we visualize would be confined to strictly procedural matters relating to the timing of the end of the bombing and place, time and arrangements of the substantive talks to follow.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

3696  
896

CM-2668-67  
28 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Situation in the DMZ Area and Program 5  
Accelerated Deployments (U)

1. (U) The following information is provided in response to your oral request of 27 September 1967, as to actions being taken or anticipated for improving the situation in the DMZ area.

PART I - Actions by General Westmoreland

2. (TS) General Westmoreland has undertaken the following actions to improve the situation in the DMZ. He has induced the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) to share the burden of constructing and manning the strong points north of Dong Ha. In response, the JGS moved two ARVN Airborne battalions to Quang Tri last week. This now makes a total of five of the eight general reserve battalions assigned to the I Corps area. The III Marine Amphibious Force has been directed to move additional forces north of the AI Van Pass to take the pressure off forces from the rear and along the critical lines of communication. To compensate for this move, Army troops will take over all of Quang Tin, Quang Ngai and part of Quang Nam Provinces. Further, III Marine Amphibious Force has been directed to thin out forces in the forward areas near Con Thien and the Trace as soon as minimum defensive installations can be constructed in that area. III Marine Amphibious Force has been reinforced by two US Army 175mm battalions, one 105mm battalion, and one AAA battalion to augment his organic fire power in the DMZ area. General Westmoreland further augmented the III Marine Amphibious Force with two truck companies and an assault helicopter company to improve the tactical and logistical support of his forces in the DMZ area.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-273

By js, NARA Date 5-11-78

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 1 year

intervals; not

automatically declassified

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3. (TS) General Westmoreland's indicated desire to thin out forces north of Route 9 after suitable defenses are prepared in the Con Thien area and to hold Route 9 in force stems from a desire to minimize friendly casualties in the DMZ area and to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy through the use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire attack. It is in this area that our forces are butted up against the DMZ and are, therefore, at a serious tactical disadvantage. The enemy is permitted to reap full benefits from his sanctuary north of the DMZ secure from our maneuver. We must face him on frontal terms. We cannot get behind him to cut him off from his supplies or to overrun his artillery. The thinning out process is not, in any way, a retreat or withdrawal. A careful and thorough public affairs program is essential, to ensure that the public does not misinterpret it as such.

PART II - Proposals by General Westmoreland for Assistance  
by Higher Authority

4. (TS) General Westmoreland has proposed that additional assistance can be provided by higher authority on several items. Actions being taken or anticipated on these items are as follows:

a. Item: Provide an immediate surge in B-52 sorties to maximum sustainable rate, with a goal of 1,200 sorties per month as soon as possible.

Action: The Joint Staff investigation has revealed that a capability exists to increase immediately ARC LIGHT sorties to 900 per month. General Westmoreland's request for 1,200 ARC LIGHT sorties per month is now being studied by the Joint Staff. CINCPAC is querying CINCSAC as to 48 hour ARC LIGHT surge capability. CINCPAC also is requesting views of Ambassador Sullivan as to political feasibility of approving overflight of Laos to reduce flying time per sortie and, in the longer term, improve the sortie rate capability, tactic and axes for attack in the DMZ area. Appropriate recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense soon.

b. Item: Investigate feasibility of employing 2,000 pound and larger bombs in B-52s.

Action: With modification to internal bomb racks, the B-52 can carry eight MK-84 2,000 pound bombs. The modification takes approximately three hours, and kits to modify six aircraft are available at Andersen AFB,

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~TOP SECRET~~

Guam. Additional kits are available in CONUS. There are no 2,000 pound bombs at Andersen or U-Tapao at this time. Inventory of assets is now underway. Definitive information will be provided by 1700 hours, 29 September 1967.

c. Item: Request CSAF and CNO conduct earliest tests to determine optimum spacing of MK-36 weapons, and maximum resistance to concussion to preclude sympathetic detonation. Thereafter, if feasible, make a liberal allocation of MK-36 weapons for use in the DMZ.

Action: Minimum safe separation distance between misplaced Destructors MK-36 to preclude sympathetic detonation has been established as 100 feet on land and 50 feet in water. The CNO has requested CINCPACFLT to obtain and provide all specific information obtainable concerning the recent 7th AF mission on which detonations of the weapons occurred early after delivery. Subsequent to investigation of all pertinent aspects of the mission, including preparation, loading and testing of the fuses, a new series of tests may be required. Both the analysis and new testing are being given priority attention. In the interim, additional seedings of Destructors MK-36 are planned by CINCPAC and will be executed.

d. Item: Augment naval gunfire assets in DMZ area.

Action: SEA DRAGON forces, consisting of one cruiser and two destroyers, have been diverted to augment naval gunfire assets in the DMZ area. Additional available CTF 77 forces as required have been authorized to further augment the naval gunfire operations in the DMZ. Other possible actions to augment naval gunfire operations in the DMZ area are currently being studied.

e. Item: Provide earliest delivery of flash and sound units.

Action: Department of the Army, on 25 September 1967, issued a warning order for one battery, 2d Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Artillery, to be deployed temporary change of station for a period of 90 to 180 days to South Vietnam. This battery reinforced will be airlifted to South Vietnam about 15 October 1967.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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f. Item: Accelerate to the extent practicable the arrival of programmed tactical units.

Action: See Part III below.

g. Item: Approve increases in RVNAF as recommended to the Secretary of Defense in July.

Action: On September 27, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the FY 68 ARVNAF force structure recommended by General Westmoreland to the Secretary of Defense in July, and are forwarding it to the Secretary of Defense recommending his approval.

h. Item: Accelerate the issue of M-16s to ARVN units as recommended.

Action: The allocation of M16/M16A1 rifles for ARVN is under active consideration by the Joint Material Priorities and Allocations Board in response to a CINCPAC recommendation to allocate 108,710 rifles during FY 68 with an immediate requirement for 5,000 rifles. Various production and distribution problems, including a strike at the Colt factory in July and introduction of chrome-plated barrels, are involved. Accelerated deliveries of M16/M16A1 rifles will involve diversion of rifles now intended for US forces. Additional information has been requested from CINCUSARPAC by 1 October 1967, and it is anticipated that recommendations as to additional allocations for ARVN can be submitted to the Secretary of Defense by 10 October 1967.

i. Item: Intensify R&D effort in field of target acquisition of concealed artillery pieces.

Action: The operational type radar AN/MPQ4A is presently being used in the DMZ for target acquisition purposes. An intensification of the R&D effort for target acquisition, including sensors of all types, has been a requirement of the Services for years, but few effective sensors have achieved reality. Among pioneering devices currently under development is the AN/TPQ-28 Counter Mortar Radar set which is expected to become operational about August 1969. Additional high resolution camera equipment and rapid photo processing capability for camouflage detection is being provided.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

PART III - Program 5 Accelerated Deployments

5. (TS) The bulk of the combatant units in Program 5 were originally scheduled to close in-country during February/April 1968. For SVN, this included the 101st Airborne Division (-), the 11th Infantry Light Brigade, and one tactical fighter squadron to close during February 1968, and four separate infantry battalions to close during April 1968. An Air Force TFS is scheduled to close in Thailand during February 1968. Ground maneuver units originally in Program 4 and not yet closed in SVN include the 198th Infantry Light Brigade (3 battalions) and two separate airborne battalions. These latter units are scheduled to close during October 1967.

6. (TS) The following is an analysis of the actions that have been taken, or are under active consideration, to accelerate the deployment of Program 5 forces:

a. ARMY

(1) The Army has reviewed the capability to accelerate deployments of the 101st Airborne Division (-) and the 11th Infantry Light Brigade. Three battalions of the 101st Division will be deployed by air in December, an acceleration of one month. Additional accelerations are still under study and a determination cannot be made until 22 October 1967.

b. NAVY

An analysis undertaken by the Navy indicates that 1,661 Navy personnel now scheduled to deploy after 1 March 1968, will be accelerated to the January/February 1968 time-frame. The majority of these personnel would be used in support functions. Most of the remaining Navy personnel involve conversion of ships or construction/conversion of boats, and are capable of only limited acceleration and at high cost.

c. AIR FORCE

No additional acceleration of Air Force approved Program 5 forces is required.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

d. MARINE CORPS

All Marine Corps Program 5 forces, with the exception of a fixed-wing reconnaissance squadron, will be deployed prior to 1 January 1968. This includes 600 personnel in combined action company augmentation now scheduled to deploy after 1 January 1968.



HAROLD K. JOHNSON  
General, USA  
Acting Chairman, Joint  
Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

90

*Pres file*

Tuesday, October 3, 1967 -- 5:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Cabot Lodge just called to report the following.

He has had many fine reactions to the President's speech of last Friday night -- some "from surprising quarters."

The President came through as "serious, competent, intelligent -- just the way he is."

Some politicians can be "cute" and get away with it. The President should never put a screen between himself and the people.

The President has set just the right tone in that speech. I hope he stays with it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



Tuesday - October 3, 1967 - 4:30 pm

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

On September 26, the Nicaraguan Government held a ceremony to express thanks to all those who helped in their polio campaign.

Ambassador Crockett sent the attached clippings (Tab A) covering the portion of the ceremony in which he was given the certificates for the American groups which participated.

Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa will deliver the special scroll made for you. A photo (with translation) ~~will~~ included with the clippings. (Tab B).

The Nicaraguan Vice President had this to say about our aid in his address:

"We Nicaraguans, who are carrying out official functions, can not let this occasion go by without expressing our gratitude to the men of science who came to help us with their knowledge, and here I want to take special note of our profound gratitude to the Government and people of the United States of America which at all times gave us unconditional solidarity and help. I also want to record our permanent feeling of gratitude to that great President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, who always with open heart extended a frank, friendly and generous hand to the Nicaraguan people in their moment of sorrow."

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Press clippings from Nicaraguan newspapers -- Novedades and La Noticia -- September 27, 1967.

Tab B - Photo, with translation, of the scroll to be delivered by Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa..

*only available  
back to Pres!*

9/a

Translation of Photo Copy Sent by Ambassador Crockett  
of Special Scroll to be delivered by Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa to  
President Johnson

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
and  
MINISTER OF HEALTH  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA

in the exercise of his faculties

CONSIDERING:

That the high personality of His Excellency

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

from his high office, as President of the United States  
of North America, interested and preoccupied himself  
with the poliomyelitis epidemic which the nation suffered;

CONSIDERING:

That these demonstrations increased the friendly relations and  
ties between both countries;

AGREES:

To extend this

TESTIMONY OF GRATITUDE

as a just and sincere homage of the People and Government of  
the Republic of Nicaragua to the People and Government of the  
United States of North America.

Given in the City of Managua, D.N., Republic of  
Nicaragua, the 26th day of September, 1967--"Year of Ruben Dario".

/s/ Francisco Urcuyo Maliano  
Vice President  
and Minister of Public Health of Nicaragua.

92

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
4:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a possible draft for use  
in the Senate.

W. W. Rostow

92a

October 3, 1967

Draft Speech for the Senate

Let us draw back a minute and consider what we have heard in the last few days.

A number of distinguished members of the Senate have been expressing the view that our bombing of North Vietnam should stop. They have accompanied this view with assessments of the military situation, the political situation, the diplomatic situation in the most complicated crisis this nation has faced since 1945.

I think we ought to stop and ask ourselves a few questions:

-- Is the information available to us on which to form a judgment better than that available to the President of the United States?

-- Have we been elected Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, or to be representatives of our states to this Senate?

-- What is the effect of what we say on half a million Americans who are fighting in Southeast Asia?

-- What is the effect of what we say on the men in Hanoi who are conducting this war against South Vietnam?

This is how I -- for one -- would answer these questions.

My information is not as good as that of the President of the United States. And if there is one thing we all know it is this: A man's judgment is no better than his information. Of course, we have a right to our own thoughts, our own ideas, our own judgments. But I should think that if we have a question to ask or a suggestion to make about our military and diplomatic policy, we would wish to make it first to the President; to know his views;



to know the reasons for them -- before we held forth for all the world to hear.

I would also wish to know the views of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. They have held their posts for almost seven years now. They have advised two Presidents over a period when we have seen -- and seen through successfully -- some of the greatest crises in modern history.

There is no man in this chamber who has borne that kind of tested professional responsibility.

I do not believe we should assume that our judgment and advice are necessarily wiser than theirs.

Now as for our men in the field and their military commanders, right up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those men and those commanders have taken a situation in 1965 which was as close to disaster for all of Southeast Asia as a situation could be -- and in two years they have denied victory to the enemy and created a situation where the people of Vietnam and the people of all of Asia are convinced that they will see it through; that victory is not only possible, but it is a likely enough prospect for them to stake their lives and their futures on freedom rather than on Communist domination. They have created a situation in Vietnam where two thirds of the people are now securely protected by the government and where as high a proportion of the total population could vote in a presidential election as could vote in a presidential election in the United States.

You gentlemen are asking me to set aside the judgment of our military leaders. You are asking me to deny an important arm of support to our men in the field without any compensating advantage. I tell you: I'm not prepared to do that. My constituents would not wish me to do that. And I don't believe this country is prepared to do that.

Now for Hanoi.

Let me remind you what the President said the other night as to why Hanoi persists in fighting this war.

"Why, in the face of military and political progress in the South, and the burden of our bombing in the North, do they insist and persist with the war?

"From many sources the answer is the same. They still hope that the people of the United States will not see this struggle through to the very end. As one Western diplomat reported to me only this week -- he had just been in Hanoi -- 'They believe their staying power is greater than ours and that they can't lose.' A visitor from a Communist capital had this to say: 'They expect the war to be long, and that the Americans in the end will be defeated by a breakdown in morale, fatigue, and psychological factors.' The Premier of North Vietnam said as far back as 1962: 'Americans do not like long, inconclusive war... Thus we are sure to win in the end.'"

I have talked to a great many people, some of whom have known personally those who now rule in Hanoi -- or who have studied them for years. I don't know a single one who would challenge the President's assessment.

A recent visitor from Saigon gave me the text of an interrogation of a North Vietnamese prisoner who was captured earlier this year. Here is part of the text: "Source comments on how American war protests sustain Communist morale. Source states that among several factors which sustain a high Communist troop morale and an optimism for ultimate victory is the existence of an anti-war movement among the American public. This fact is used as propaganda throughout Vietnam and among the troops, and source believes that it is very effective. Source had known of the anti-war movement through the BBC as well as The Bulletin (a newspaper issued by the National Front for Liberation). The Bulletin reported that the Gallup poll reveals that only 58% of the people in the U.S. are in favor of President Johnson's Vietnam policies and that the remaining people demand an end to the war. Source believes that increasing American casualties, increased taxes and inflation will step up the anti-war movement. He points to Bertram Russell and U.S. Senators like (I won't mention his name) who are creating conflict within the U.S. Government."

The interrogator's comment was this: "The great majority of their sources who believe that the Communist side will win the war cite the American war protests as one of the main reasons."

We are a democracy. We are the people's representatives in a democracy. We have rights and duties which are not identical with those of the President and those who, under his direction, operate the Executive Branch of our Government.

But, by God, we also have responsibilities; and it is about time that we gave some thought to those responsibilities.

We ought to think twice before we assume that our information is better than that available to the President of the United States; that our judgment is better than the best professional judgment he can assemble; that we can play fast and loose with instruments of support for our men in the field. And, once in a while, too, we should think about that old-fashioned phrase: "giving aid and comfort to the enemy." f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

93  
*Pres file*  
Tuesday, October 3, 1967 -- 3:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Stu Symington called me today. The nut of what he had to say is that there is great "anxiety, vexation and deep bitterness" in the Israeli government about our military aid policy. They are convinced we are holding things up to put pressure on them. He says the conference on the military aid bill is no excuse.

The situation is political dynamite. He intends to take the floor of the Senate soon to insist on our resumption of military aid to Israel. He says there would be no opposition to military aid also to the moderate Arabs.

If necessary, he said he could easily get a special bill through the Congress supporting military aid to Israel in the face of the very large shipments of Soviet arms which continue.

W. W. Rostow

*sent LOR to Sec State + Sec McNamara  
"literally eyes only"*

WWRostow:rlh

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority NSC Dec 8-3-81

By 16/02/91, NARA, Date 10-22-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

94

*Pres file*

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
12:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Roscoe Drummond  
makes more explicit what he would  
like to do about bombing policy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

94a

# Publishers Newspaper Syndicate

1377 National Press Building      Washington, D. C. 20004  
Area Code 202 638-3760

ROSCOE DRUMMOND  
GEOFFREY DRUMMOND

Oct. 2, 1967

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington DC

Dear Walt:

In connection with our chat Saturday - what I am trying to get at is this: Suppose the President asked ~~for~~ a total, down-to-the-roots re-examination of bombing policy. Suppose he asked for no conclusions in the first stage of that re-examination. I would like to be able to give readers every single ~~piece~~ of fact, within reason, which would necessarily go into such a presentation.

It is my conviction that such an offering of fact might do more than anything else right now to strengthen and stabilize U.S. opinion behind the war.

Specifically:

Why are we bombing? What are its military and political purposes?

Is it achieving its purposes? How well? What are the objective facts and factors behind the conclusion that the purposes are being achieved?

How effective is the bombing in holding down the flow of troops and supplies into South Vietnam? What is it doing to the North Vietnamese war effort? Are



there other ways to strike at the enemy supply routes?

Is the bombing of industrial targets the best way to persuade Hanoi to negotiate?

Haven't most of the targets been pretty thoroughly bombed and, if so, is more bombing worth the ~~cost~~ even in military terms?

What are the objective facts which would bear on the question of whether the ~~war~~<sup>air</sup> war should be expanded in an effort to immobilize Haiphong through which North Vietnam gets so much of its war materiel? What are the gains?

What pro and con factors, including internal chaos, do you list in assessing the risk of Red China coming into the war? If we think we are taking only a very limited risk of bringing China into the war when we bomb within a few miles of the frontier, how should we measure the risk of Russia coming into the war if we immobilize the port of Haiphong?

Why is the bombing restricted? What is the thinking behind the restrictions?

I know that some of these questions overlap. I hope you will add others so that no major aspect is overlooked.

My premise in this matter is that good information is often more persuasive than good argument.

As Always,

*Roscoe*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
12 noon

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

With respect to Don Hornig's note on the Aldabra base, the birds, and the scientists, Bob McNamara and Denis Healey are looking into the "scientific problem". You will hear from Bob when he has formed a judgment.

The problem may be not scientific, but the pressures of the bird-lovers' lobby.

W. W. Rostow

*cc Mr Goldstein*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 28, 1967

95a

Mr. Rostow,

Marie Fehmer brought down attached for  
your review before sending in to the President.

LN

rec'd  
9-28-67  
10:30 am

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

95b

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95

Wednesday, September 27, 1967  
4:50 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT


SUBJECT: PSAC Concern re Air Base on Aldabra Island

Attached is a memorandum from your Science Advisory Committee concerning the proposed UK-US air base on Aldabra Island in the Indian Ocean.

It is agreed by all competent observers that Aldabra Island is a unique biological treasure house which might be lost forever by the construction of the air base. The Committee strongly recommends that no commitment be made to the UK until:

- 1) A competent study of the scientific situation is made available, and
- 2) The possibility of the base being on Farquahr Island (which appears to meet the strategic needs) has been studied objectively.

More specifically, the Committee recommends that you instruct the DOD to make no commitment to the UK without your explicit concurrence.

  
Donald F. Hornig

Attachment

DOD to make no commitment without Presidential concurrence:

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

cc: W. W. Rostow w/attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group I - Excluded  
from automatic down-  
grading and declass-  
ification.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Wednesday, September 27, 1967  
4:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Airbase on Aldabra

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By 48, NARA, Date 10-24-95

Your Science Advisory Committee has just learned that a final commitment may be made in the immediate future to the British to build jointly with them a major airbase on Aldabra in the Indian Ocean. We believe that this final decision should not be taken without further investigation since it will probably result in the permanent loss of a truly unique biological scientific laboratory. If we go ahead, it will almost certainly become a major issue with the international scientific community and may very well become a cause célèbre among the conservationists.

In accord with the national policy of encouraging the British military presence east of Suez, the DOD has encouraged UK plans for establishment of a major airbase in the Indian Ocean. The site preferred by the UK is Aldabra Island, located 260 miles northwest of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean. This plan depends on the US assuming 50 percent of the construction costs, currently estimated at \$78,000,000.

Aldabra Island is a biological treasure house whose uniqueness was first noted by Charles Darwin. His recommendations that the natural state of the island be preserved were accepted by Great Britain and have been universally honored for 100 years. The island is the only home and breeding ground of a dozen species of rare and unusual birds, land tortoises, and of numerous species of plants and small invertebrate animals found nowhere else in the world. This ecosystem, isolated for many millions of years from the rest of the biological world, is rivalled only by the Galapagos Islands--which were declared an international natural preserve by a treaty between the UN and Ecuador in 1958.

Responsible scientists and conservationists, at home and abroad, are convinced that implementation of present plans will destroy the unique attributes of this unspoiled ecosystem, with ultimate loss of its biological treasures. Operation of the airbase requires assurance that birds will be

GROUP I -Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

cleared from the flight paths of jet aircraft and a massive slaughter seems likely. Pollution of the lagoon by shipping and refuse is inevitable--as are its usual consequences. Accordingly, the Royal Society in England, as well as the National Academy of Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution, have protested construction of the proposed base.

While we recognize that the demands of national security must be paramount, a policy of your Administration, which we strongly support, has been to halt the despoliation of our natural resources, to keep as much of our country and our planet in its natural state as possible, to prevent the needless extinction of plant and animal life species, and to preserve the opportunities to study and enjoy the beauty and wonder of the physical and biological worlds. The proposed action, in contrast, would be viewed by many as callous and unmindful of the long-range human values which the Administration has sought to protect. Moreover, on the basis of information provided to your Science Advisory Committee by representatives of the DOD, it appears that Farquahr Island could serve the purpose, although at greater expense. In any case, it is unclear that this action will indeed serve to assure the UK military presence in the Indian Ocean for a significant period.

In view of the permanent and irreparable loss to mankind which this action might cause in this unique isolated environment, your Science Advisory Committee recommends that:

1. A firm decision on Aldabra should not be made until:

a. We have seen a competent scientific appraisal, indicating that it is definitely possible to protect the natural life and special ecological features of this island to a significant degree. Such a study might be conducted by the Royal Society of London, the National Academy of Sciences, or the Smithsonian Institution.\*

b. An objective investigation has been made of the possibility of constructing a base at Farquahr Island instead of at Aldabra Island.

---

\*We understand that a Royal Society study group has just returned from Aldabra. Their conclusion is that the island is an even richer treasure ground than had been thought and that its use as an air base is "unthinkable."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

2. Unless the outcome of the study on Aldabra is satisfactory, serious consideration should be given to cancelling our participation in this project on Aldabra.

3. In any case, a formal commitment to the UK to proceed with Aldabra should not be made without your specific approval.

*Donald Hornig*

Donald F. Hornig, Chairman  
Charles H. Townes, Vice Chairman  
Ivan L. Bennett, Jr.  
Lewis M. Branscomb  
Sidney D. Drell  
Michael Ference, Jr.  
James C. Fletcher  
Marvin L. Goldberger  
Philip Handler

William R. Hewlett  
Gordon J. R. MacDonald  
George E. Pake  
Kenneth S. Pitzer  
Frederick Seitz  
Charles P. Slichter  
Lewis Thomas  
F. H. Westheimer  
Herbert F. York, Jr.

cc: W. W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
10:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I have sent over this draft letter  
from you to Thieu and Ky for consider-  
ation by Sec. Rusk et al.

Until they move in this direction,  
I believe our effort in South Viet Nam will  
be operating on quicksand.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO: Ben Read

FROM: Walt Rostow

FOR THE FOLLOWING DISTRIBUTION:

Secretary Rusk  
Under Secretary Katzenbach  
Asst. Secretary Wm Bundy

96-a  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95

What do you think of a letter like this from the President:

W. W. R.

DRAFT 10/3/67

Dear Chairman Thieu and Prime Minister Ky:

I was pleased to hear today that the Assembly has validated the recent nationwide elections. This action paves the way for continued progress down the path toward representative and Constitutional government, and in particular, frees you to concentrate on the formation and policies of the new government.

The political progress of South Vietnam has been remarkably rapid and this achievement has won the admiration of millions of men and women who believe deeply that the Vietnamese people must have a chance to build their own nation and their own institutions in their own way.

I have been following closely the evolution of political life in your country. Your people and your friends have an enormous stake in its success.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

We all know how vigorously the Liberation Front has been trying to frustrate the creation of a constitutional political order in South Vietnam. Even without their subversion and terror, the job of creating new and representative political institutions would be difficult enough. We have all watched many breakdowns in efforts of this kind -- in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

There are useful lessons to be learned from such failures, as well as from earlier efforts which have succeeded. I am sure you will want to consider both as you and your colleagues and your people move forward along the path you have courageously chosen.

One lesson to be learned is that the political life of any nation must be its own. Political institutions cannot be transplanted from one setting to another with much hope of success.

However, it has seemed to me that certain essentials appear time and time again in the records of those societies which have managed to develop democratic structures successfully and sustain them.

One of the most obvious elements that appear in such societies is the development of broadly based national political parties capable of reaching out to the majority of people and developing within themselves the compromises and co-operation necessary for effective democratic government.

We had some experience with this in our early days. We started, as you know, with a very weak national government. This presented

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

General Washington with many difficulties in his conduct of our war of independence, and it was a government that functioned rather poorly in the early years of peace.

We wrote and adopted a constitution in 1787 and this strengthened the hand of the executive branch of government. However, our political life in the first 12 years under that Constitution was marked by factionalism in the Congress, and even within the Executive itself.

Only in 1800, when two great national political parties began to emerge, did we find the basis for effective unity and mutual loyalty within the Executive as well as a framework of common interests that permitted the Executive to work effectively with the Congress.

Other democratic nations have arrived at a similar solution where constitutional government has proved durable.

As I see the problem of Vietnamese politics from a distance, there are four major requirements that have to be met in the days before us. First the government itself -- led by yourselves -- must organize a program of action around which the maximum number of South Vietnamese can rally with hope and conviction. Second, the government must draw to the execution of that program men of talent representing as many elements in Vietnamese life as possible. Third, good working relations must be built up between the government on the one hand and the Senate and Assembly on the other. As I know very well

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

from 35 years of experience, the legislative and executive branches do not always see eye to eye in a democratic system. But there must be enough common agreement to permit the government to do its job. Fourth, you must begin to prepare now to defeat the Communists at the polls. We must expect the Communists to try to organize an anti-government front, as they did in other cases where violence failed. I am sure that the overwhelming majority of South Vietnamese are anti-Communist; but if they are politically fragmented, the danger would exist that a well organized, Communist-led front could undo all that the Vietnamese people and their allies have achieved in defeating the Communist military aggression.

These are the particular reasons which lead me to the judgment that the organization of the widest based national political party now possible in South Vietnam is worth your urgent consideration.

If South Vietnam were not under vicious attack from without and within, you could, perhaps, let time and experience shape your nation's political institutions gradually and slowly. But the defense of your nation's independence has required a very high order of courage, vision, and statesmanship throughout these difficult years; and that requirement continues.

I know you will understand that these are the thoughts of a friend not only of your nation, but of yourselves. I know well that if we have

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

come thus far forward in the struggle, it is, in substantial part, because of your patriotism and because of your commitment to stay together and together to see this phase of your nation's history through.

Only you and your government can decide whether the advice I have given should and can be carried out. [But\* I would wish you to know that if you choose to go down this road, we would be pleased to help you in any way that we can.] But I did wish you to have my thoughts on this fundamental matter.

Sincerely,

\*To be added in oral statement by Ambassador Bunker.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET/PENNSYLVANIA/SENSITIVE~~

99  
Pres file

Tuesday, October 3, 1967  
10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read carefully this latest Paris item.

This is the first movement we've had. What it means, I cannot say. We'll have to await arrival of the piece of paper.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 10-15-91



W 1d- 97a

TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

Telecons between Kissinger and Read  
9:00 p.m., October 2 - 7:30 a.m.,  
October 3, 1967

October 2, 1967  
(a.m.)

- Kissinger phoned M to read to him some of the editorial comments in the NYT and other US papers about the forthcoming nature of President Johnson's September 29 speech. By way of contrast K also read to M from the Schoenbrun articles which indicated the extremely tough and unyielding DRV position regarding negotiations. K told M that his colleagues in Washington were getting increasingly impatient because so little had come back from the DRV through this channel. K gave M this information for M's background use during M's scheduled meeting with Bo on October 4, and K did not request M to do anything with this information prior to that meeting.

October 3, 1967  
(p.m.)

- On his own initiative M went to see Bo and spent an hour and a half with him on the afternoon of October 2, although Bo reported that he was extremely busy (perhaps with a visiting delegation). M told Bo that he had taken it on himself to ask for the appointment to pass on information received from Kissinger because M considered it of such importance. He then told Bo of K's report of growing impatience in Washington and the feeling on the part of K's Washington colleagues that they had received almost nothing from Hanoi through the M and A channel. At some point in the conversation M wrote down a message to Kissinger from Bo on a piece of paper, which Bo corrected in Bo's own handwriting. M considered the text to be so important that he was unwilling to describe its content clearly to K on the phone but the essence of the message, as K understood it was as follows: Talks between DRV/US officials could start almost immediately after the end of the

**DECLASSIFIED**

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA~~

Authority ML 89-112

By Rg/lsp, NARA, Date 10-23-11

-2-

bombing, although the DRV could not give further assurances to this effect. M drew a distinction between "talks between officials" and formal negotiations, and K infers that the former encompasses preliminary discussions concerning procedures, agendas, etc., but he cannot be certain. Bo (for the first time) told M to report to Bo immediately by phone Kissinger's reactions to Bo's message.

M thought the matter of sufficient importance to fly to Rome immediately after his talk with Bo to discuss the situation with A, and M and A called Kissinger jointly from Rome to describe the foregoing. A concurred in M's unwillingness to describe the message in more detail by phone and they informed K that late on October 2 they had airmailed the message to K in Boston from Rome. K advised M and A that he was unwilling to give his reactions by phone until he had had a chance to study the message in full.

M will keep his scheduled meeting with Bo on October 4. (A has gone to Lebanon on business for 6 days.)

~~1. Susp~~  
2. Pres. file

UNCLASSIFIED

Tuesday, October 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Shah

The Shah sent you the following message expressing his sorrow over the floods in Texas:

"I have learned with deep regret of the heavy wave of destruction and widespread damage wrought by the floods of Hurricane Beulah in the state of Texas, and I wish to express to you my heartfelt together with sincere wishes for the early rehabilitation of the victims of this calamity. MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI"

I recommend you send the following acknowledgment:

"Thank you for your words of concern for the tragic natural disasters that have occurred in Texas. You have understood our distress, and your kindness is deeply appreciated. LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

W. W. Rostow

Approve 

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED



October 3, 1967

99

*Profile*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have had a quick check made of the telegrams which have come in thus far in response to your San Antonio speech.

105 of these endorse your position and 47 express disapproval. The sample is perhaps too small to justify any sweeping generalization, but the following points seem worthy of mention:

- 1) The favorable telegrams represent a very broad geographic pattern. Every sector of the country is represented, with California and the mid-West in the lead. The tone is generally moderate. There is a fair sprinkling of Republicans and of people who declare themselves non-partisan. A few "pros" express themselves in favor of stepping up the bombing, but in general they simply endorse your stand.
- 2) The unfavorable telegrams are less well distributed geographically; there is a heavy concentration on New York and California. I am struck by the high proportion of rather violent and abusive telegrams in this category. I am also struck by the fact that all the "antis" (leaving aside those who simply express opposition, without explaining why) seem to be doves.

W. W. Rostow

WWR/HK/mdr 10/3/67

100

October 3, 1967

*Pres file*

VIA CAS CHANNELS

FROM WALT ROSTOW FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER, SAIGON.

President pleased you are taking long weekend.

Weekly can wait.

I'll keep an eye on the Red Sox.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, October 3, 1967

101  
Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Prime Minister  
Giorgio Borg Olivier ("Borzh-oh-ly-ee-ay")  
of Malta, 5:30 p.m., Wednesday, October 4

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's good talking points memo.  
Biographic material is at Tab B. Some facts on Malta are at Tab C.

We have no important bilateral issues with Malta.

Our decision to participate in the Malta trade fair (page 2  
of the State memo) is worth flagging. They haven't been told  
yet. Borg Olivier will be very pleased to hear this directly  
from you.

\* \* \* \* \*

I will be standing by with Ed Fried. State is sending Jim  
Symington and Walt Stoessel (Deputy Assistant Secretary, European  
Affairs).

W. W. Rostow

1812

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with Maltese Prime  
Minister Giorgio Borg Olivier,  
5:30 p.m., Wednesday, October 4.

Borg Olivier, who is both Prime Minister and Foreign  
Minister, is in the United States to address the General  
Assembly (he will go back to New York after he sees you).

Talking PointsTopics You May Want to RaiseGeneral

- Sorry I wasn't able to see you last November,  
but my doctors argued they had an urgent claim  
on my time. (You had to cancel a meeting with  
Borg Olivier last year because of your operation.)
- I understand that your son Peter has just entered  
school in the United States (Iona Preparatory  
School in New Rochelle, New York). We wish him  
success and hope he will like our country.
- As you know, I have just appointed Hugh Smythe  
as our Ambassador to Malta. Smythe has my con-  
fidence, and I know he will do a good job.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-405

By 1-8, NARA, Date 3-29-95~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- We will all miss Ambassador Feldman. He has worked hard for good Maltese-U.S. relations.

#### Malta's Economy

- Feldman has reported on your economic problems. We have taken steps to help out.
- Our Sixth Fleet has increased its visits to Malta; at your request, we agreed to put two U.S. ships into the Malta Drydocks (Malta's key industry) for overhaul.
- I'm happy to tell you that the United States will participate in the Malta Trade Fair next year. (The Maltese have tried to get us into the Fair for some time. This will be their first word that we have decided to participate.)

#### Topics Borg Olivier May Raise

##### NATO

(Malta is not a member of NATO but is protected by Alliance guarantees. The Maltese recently asked that NATO study Malta's security position as the UK reduces its forces on the island, and suggested closer liaison between Malta and NATO. The PM may ask for U.S. support for these proposals.)

##### You May Want to Say:

- We have always thought Malta important to the Alliance. The Middle East crisis showed we were right.
- We support your proposals for closer Malta/NATO relations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

The European Economic Communities

Borg Olivier may ask for US support in working out an arrangement with the EEC.

You May Want to Say:

- We oppose preferential trading arrangements with the EEC, but would not oppose Maltese association if it is a step toward full membership within a reasonable period of time.

U.S. Private Investment

The PM may ask if there is anything you can do to encourage U.S. private investment in Malta.

You May Want to Say:

- American firms--including the Hilton and Sheraton Hotels--have already invested.
- I understand that a number of companies are now studying investment possibilities.
- I hope that the Investment Guaranty Agreement we signed with you last November will help.

\* \* \*

Borg Olivier will be accompanied by Frederick Amato-Gauci (Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Office) and George Borg, his personal secretary. Jim Symington and Walt Stoessel (European Deputy Assistant Secretary) will be there from State.

Biographic sketches on Borg Olivier and Amato-Gauci are at Tab B. A short background paper on Malta is at Tab C.

*Malcolm R. K. [Signature]*  
Acting Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

101b

DR. GIORGIO BORG OLIVIER ("Borz-oh-liv-ee-ay")  
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER OF MALTA

Malta's outstanding national leader, Borg Olivier was Prime Minister during 1950-55 and again since 1962. He led the Maltese delegations which negotiated independence from Britain in 1964. He and his Nationalist Party won a renewed mandate in the first post-independence elections, September 1966.

Now 56, Borg Olivier comes from a distinguished Maltese family long devoted to public service. A Doctor of Laws from the University of Malta in 1937, he began his political career two years later by winning election to the Council of Government. Deputy Leader of the Opposition in 1947, he emerged in 1950 at the age of 39 as leader of his party and of the Maltese people.

Although somewhat shy and reserved, he is unmatched among Maltese leaders in intelligence, competence, or political shrewdness. Despite divisions within his Nationalist Party, he is its unquestioned leader, and will probably be able to hold it together so long as he remains Prime Minister.

In 1966 he had a bad case of pneumonia. Although his health is still precarious, he continues to put in long hours. His wife's severe emotional instability is another drain upon him. They have three children, a daughter and two sons; his elder son, Peter, has just come to the U.S. to study at the Iona Preparatory School, New Rochelle, New York.

FREDERICK AMATO-GAUCI ("Am-ah-toe-Gauch-ee")  
Permanent Secretary, Maltese Ministry of  
Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs

Since Berg-Olivier is both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Amato-Gauci, the top civil servant in the Foreign Ministry, is Malta's number two man in foreign policy. Now 50, he has been in government service since 1936. He is friendly and sound, and he understands Malta's problems. He does not, however, appear as firm in his pro-Western views as the Prime Minister. Well educated, with a quiet sense of humor, he speaks excellent English and is strongly attached to both British and Italian institutions. His political sympathies are said to lie with the Opposition, but as a civil servant, he is very discrete about them. He is loyal to his chief, and enjoys Borg Olivier's confidence.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 01-2

By sj, NARA Date 5-7-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

107C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## BACKGROUND PAPER--MALTA

Malta achieved its independence from the United Kingdom in 1964 and became a member of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. It is a small, over-populated island country; its 315,000 people are of highly mixed ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The Catholic religion is one important common denominator. Malta's strategic location in the center of the Mediterranean is its most important natural resource.

Under defense and financial assistance agreements covering the period 1964-74, the UK remains responsible for Malta's defense and is providing \$140 million in economic aid. Britain is carrying out a staged reduction in its forces on the island; this is contributing heavily to Malta's serious unemployment problem. Maltese leaders have been seeking to develop alternative means of maintaining the national income. The Royal Navy dockyard has been converted to a commercial establishment for merchant ship repair, and a few light industries have been established. The Government is striving to attract more industrial investment from the US and elsewhere, and is actively promoting tourism.

Malta is a parliamentary democracy in the British tradition. The two main contenders for power are the Nationalists, headed by Dr. Borg Olivier and backed by the Catholic Church and other traditionalist elements, and the Malta Labor Party, which has strong trade union ties and exploits anti-clerical sentiment. The Nationalists are strongly pro-West and pro-NATO. The Labor Party makes a political issue out of the presence of foreign forces and of Malta's ties to NATO; it also exploits the unemployment problem. The economic development and unemployment problems are in fact the most serious problems confronting the government.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-405  
By *sig*, NARA, Date 3-29-95

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1967

102

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Malagasy President Tsiranana will be 57 on October 18th. He's a moderate and one of our best African friends. He never misses a chance to express his friendship, including a recent message of regret over the tornadoes in Illinois.

I support State's recommendation that you send a simple but warm birthday greeting.

A proposed message is attached. It would be released only if Tsiranana wanted to.

*Walt* Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See Me \_\_\_\_\_

1020

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO MALAGASY

PRESIDENT TSIRANANA

Dear Mr. President:

All Americans join me in sending you our congratulations  
and very best wishes on the occasion of your birthday.

We are deeply proud, Mr. President, of your warm  
friendship for the United States.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

103

Tuesday, October 3, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Press file*

SUBJECT: Visit of Japanese Prime Minister

You agreed to a visit by Prime Minister Sato for the dates November 14 and 15.

The State Department recommends the following schedule of events:

Arrival ceremony	--	11:00 a.m. on November 14
Office call	--	Immediately following arrival
White House dinner	--	Evening of November 14
Office call	--	11:00 a.m. on November 15

State's thinking on the second office visit is that Sato will be going to the National Press Club as a luncheon guest on the 15th, and there should be some mutual agreement on the Bonins and Ryukyu Islands matters about which he will certainly be questioned by the press. State's hope is that a morning call will permit full understanding on both territorial questions and on Japan's assumption of greater regional responsibilities. These could be released in a communique or press release before Sato's Press Club appearance. In any case, he would then be in a better position to field any questions.

If, however, we wish Sato to avoid getting into questions at the Press Club on this sensitive matter, it might be better to schedule the second meeting in the late afternoon of the 15th. He could then say, in response to questions, that the matter was still under discussion and he would prefer not to discuss it until he had met with you again.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule approved as listed \_\_\_\_\_

Schedule second office call  
after Press Club appearance \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 10-28

~~SECRET~~



Tuesday - October 3, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your appointment with Ambassador Korry

This is a courtesy call. Ed Korry wished to see you for a few minutes prior to departure for Santiago next Tuesday.

I recommend you give him the letter to President Frei which you have signed (original attached).

You also might let Ed know the importance you attach to the Latin Americans moving ahead with their Summit commitments on a Common Market and ask him to do all he appropriately can to get Frei to continue giving strong leadership to the movement.

Ed may raise the possibility of early approval of a \$15 million program loan and a \$23 million agricultural sector loan.

Last December you authorized ad referendum negotiation of a \$35 million program loan and sector loans totalling \$30 million in education and agriculture. President Frei put off the program loan talks because the high price of copper made this assistance seem unnecessary at the time.

The education loan was the first to be negotiated and you approved it last June. A smaller program loan (made necessary by the sharp drop in copper prices) and the agricultural loan are ready for submission to you. But Charlie Schultze is holding them up pursuant to your instructions on new commitments.

Covey Oliver will accompany Ed Korry.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Your signed letter to President Frei

105  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1967

Mr. President:

Cameroonian President Ahidjo wrote you expressing sympathy for the victims of Hurricane Beulah. Ahidjo is coming to see you October 24th.

A proposed message is attached.

*Walt* Rostow

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

See Me ☐

*for review  
2 Pres. file*

105a

Proposed Message to President Ahidjo, of Cameroon

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your thoughtful message of condolence to me and to the Texas families stricken by hurricane Beulah. Your sympathy and that of the Government of Cameroon are much appreciated.

I look forward to seeing you soon here in Washington.

Lyndon B. Johnson

106

Monday, October 2, 1967 -- 8:15 PM

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Chet Bowles has sent you some extraordinary photographs taken by the Indians on the Sikkim "border".

They really show the eerie quality of these clashes at the top of the world.

W. W. Rostow

R. Morris/vmr



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
EMBASSY  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
New Delhi, India

106a

September 22, 1967

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested in seeing the enclosed photographs taken by Indian Intelligence just prior to the recent fighting on the Sikkim border. It is, as you can see, a real jaw-to-jaw confrontation.

The barbed wire fence, which the Indians were erecting and which led to an outbreak of fighting when the Chinese tried to tear it down, is clearly evident in some of the photos.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles

Enclosures

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*107*  
*Pres file*

Monday, October 2, 1967 -- 8:00 PM

Mr. President:

Attached is a proposed reply to Zambian President Kaunda. Kaunda wrote you asking for help in:

- getting two vessels to establish a Zambia-Tanzania shipping line on Lake Tanganyika
- building a munitions plant.

The proposed letter approves the vessels, but turns down the munitions plant.

We should help the lake project. Zambia and Tanzania badly need such a route. (It will benefit the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda as well.) We ought to be able to swing it easily. Ex-Im has agreed to look into financing the vessels with five to ten-year loans, of the sort we've used before to sell Zambia aircraft and locomotives.

The munitions plant isn't a bad idea. Clearly it's better than Zambia's buying the arms from any seller. Kaunda has also asked Britain and Sweden for help on the plant. He has no reply yet.

Kaunda is sending his Foreign Minister and a member of his Presidential staff to Washington this week to push the plant request. Kamanga, the Foreign Minister, is coming from New York on Thursday. We've been told he'll hand Nick Katzenbach a follow-up letter to you from Kaunda on munitions.

State and Ex-Im think -- and I agree -- we have to say a firm "no" now to the munitions plant. The proposed reply tells Kaunda the main reasons why: our commitments elsewhere plus public and Congressional concern on munitions exports in general.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_ EKH/RM/vmr

27

PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA

Dear Mr. President:

I was very pleased to learn that Zambia and Tanzania have decided to establish a shipping line on Lake Tanganyika. As you pointed out, this project will benefit not just these two countries but also your other neighbors bordering on the lake.

We will be glad to assist the Governments of Zambia and Tanzania in contacting appropriate firms in the United States for the purchase of vessels to be used on that route. As soon as plans and specifications for the vessels have been drawn up, I suggest they be given to Ambassador Good, whom I have asked to carry forward with this project. My Government will also consider the possibility of financing the sale of these ships.

I can appreciate your desire, Mr. President, to establish an arms and ammunition factory in Zambia. I understand that your representatives will be in Washington this week to explore the matter. Appropriate officials of the United States Government will, of course, be happy to do so. However, I know you are aware of our heavy commitments around the world, as well as the strong public and Congressional sentiment concerning exports of arms and munitions from the United States. Although we will certainly keep your security needs under constant review, I regret we cannot at this time assist Zambia in such a project.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-403  
By lig, NARA, Date 10-24-95



Ambassador Good will report to me on the formulation of plans for the lake vessels. It is good to know the locomotives financed by the Export-Import Bank have helped to meet some of Zambia's transportation problems. We will do our best to assure that progress is made quickly on this further forward step.

It is always a special honor and pleasure to hear from you, Mr. President. Your leadership and courage are inspirations to us all.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

EKH/RM/vmd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 16, 1967

107.6

Text of Cable from Ambassador Good (Lusaka 350)

Subject: Letter from President Kaunda to the President

Here follows text of letter to the President handed to me September 9 by President Kaunda:

"I take this opportunity to approach you, Mr. President, once again because in the past my country, Government and myself have rushed to you for aid in times of great need. This time I have two matters on which I seek your immediate help.

"The first is that both Tanzania and Zambia have agreed to pioneer the establishment of a shipping line on Lake Tanganyika. This will obviously serve the immediate needs of Zambia. Perhaps I should mention here that this is not a selfish move to leave out our other neighbors, namely the Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), Burundi and Rwanda. In fact we have already taken the initiative in the direction of establishing a jointly-owned shipping line. However, our needs are such that we must act at once and this is why Tanzania and Zambia are going ahead to do this. I know that the right thing would have been for me to make this an ordinary business deal, but again we desperately need two boats urgently and this is why I ask for help.

"May I here conclude by saying the following:

A. Zambia and Tanzania will pay for these boats.

B. We need your personal, as well as your Government's support, to get through the business of getting to know where in the United States we can get these boats on the same terms as we got the diesel locomotives which are, by the way, doing a wonderful job here.

C. May I emphasize the urgency of the matter.

"The next matter, in many ways of equal importance, is that I would like to see my Government build up an arms and ammunitions factory here in Zambia. The range of weapons I am thinking of is anti-personnel, anti-tank and anti-aircraft. What I would like to know is whether your Government can help us in principle to build such factories and once this is agreed to we could then go into details.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By rw, NARA, Date 9-25-00

"Mr. President, I appreciate that you are a very busy man, so allow me to repeat that I am encouraged by the way you have responded to our call in the past." End text.

Comment: Respecting the munitions plant, I explained to Kaunda that, while my knowledge of U. S. law was deficient, I suspected this would be difficult for the United States Government to consider and asked whether others had been approached. He said he had written both British and Swedish Prime Ministers with no reply yet. As previously reported the Anglo-American Corporation is putting up an explosives factory but, Kaunda explained, Harry Oppenheimer of the Corporation adamantly refused to move beyond explosives to munitions manufacture.

We have good reason to be quickly responsive to his first request. I hope the Department will press Commerce to explore the relevant manufacturers. If there is interest in pursuing the matter, it would be wise for a Company representative to visit the area as soon as possible. In the meantime, we are getting specifications for ships from the Ministry of Transport. Kaunda tells me no other country has been approached on this project as yet.

###

CONFIDENTIAL

108

Monday, October 2, 1967  
2:40 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

These two documents from  
Gene Locke will interest you.

Should I give the first to  
Bill White ?

W. W. R.

Saigon, September 25, 1967


The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Enclosed herewith are two documents: one an interrogation report of a prisoner of war who was a training cadre at Hanoi University from June, 1964, until his infiltration of South Viet-Nam in January-April, 1966; the other a letter from sampan operators in the Delta commending police and Riverine forces for their work in keeping the river open against the Viet Cong.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,



Eugene M. Locke  
Deputy Ambassador

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

108b

ADMIRAL....THE FOLLOWING WAS EXTRACTED FROM THE INTERROGATION OF A NVN WHO MAJORED IN PSYCHOLOGY AT A UNIVERSITY IN THE USSR, WHERE HE RECEIVED THE EQUIVALENT OF A Ph.D. DEGREE. HE ALSO HAS TAUGHT AT HANOI UNIVERSITY AND WAS INFILTRATED TO SVN AS A TRAINING CADRE. SOURCE COMMENTS ON HOW AMERICAN WAR PROTESTS SUSTAIN COMMUNIST MORALE. SOURCE STATES THAT AMONG SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH SUSTAIN A HIGH COMMUNIST TROOP MORALE AND AN OPTIMISM FOR ULTIMATE VICTORY IS THE EXISTENCE OF AN ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT AMONG THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. THIS FACT IS USED AS PROPAGANDA THROUGHOUT VIETNAM AND AMONG THE TROOPS, AND SOURCE BELIEVES THAT IT IS VERY EFFECTIVE. SOURCE HAD KNOWN OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT THROUGH THE BBC AS WELL AS THE BULLETIN (A NEWSPAPER ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR LIBERATION). THE BULLETIN REPORTED THAT THE GALLOP POLE REVEALS THAT ONLY 59% OF THE PEOPLE IN THE U.S. ARE IN FAVOR OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S VIETNAM POLICIES AND THAT THE REMAINING PEOPLE DEMAND AN END TO THE WAR. SOURCE BELIEVES THAT INCREASING AMERICAN CASUALTIES, INCREASED TAXES AND INFLATION WILL STEP-UP THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT. HE POINTS TO BERTRAM RUSSELL AND U.S. SENATORS LIKE "GRUNING", WHO ARE CREATING CONFLICT WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER COMMENTS THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THEIR SOURCES WHO BELIEVE THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE WILL WIN THE WAR CITE THE AMERICAN WAR PROTESTS AS ONE OF THE MAIN REASONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5. 1988

By kg NARA Date 10-18-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - K13

# INTERROGATION REPORT

1080

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 849TH SUPPORT GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY	: NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)	NIC REPORT NO	: 693/67
SUBJECT	: American War Protests Sustain Communist Morale	NIC CASE NO	: 090/1/67
DATE OF INFO	: To January 1967	DATE OF REPORT	: 15/7/67
DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION	: July 1967 (G - N) SAIGON, Vietnam	NO. OF PAGES	: 2
		REF	: None

SOURCE: NGUYEN HUU NGHIA, was born in 1933 in VINH LONG Province, SVN, of the poor farmer class. He was active in the VIET MINH until he regrouped in 1954. He was assigned to "land reform" tasks and completed the NVN 10th Form (US 12th Grade) at an Advanced Cultural School at BACH MAI outside of HANOI. From late 1959 to June 1964, he majored in psychology at the LOMONOSOV University in the USSR, where he received the equivalent of a Ph. D. Degree. His Russian proficiency has not been accurately established but he possibly reads well and speaks fair to good Russian. He has been an official LAO DONG Party member since July 1960. He was a training cadre at the HANOI University from June 1964 until his infiltration of SVN in January - April 1966. He was captured in January 1967 in BINH DUONG Province and arrived at the NIC on 22 June 1967. (Further details are forthcoming in Source's P.I.R.).

## SUMMARY

Source stated that the American-VN war protest are greatly publicized among the Vietnamese populace and troops and are "very effective" propaganda, which helps to sustain Communist morale toward ultimate victory.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By rf, NARA. Date 10-18-91

DISSEMINATION:

US ONLY

EXCLUDED (CIC)

CLASSIFICATION

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

ATTACHMENTS:

None



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

- 1. Among several factors which sustain a high Communist troop morale and an optimism for ultimate victory, is the existence of an "anti-war movement" among the American public. This fact is enhanced and propagated throughout the Vietnam populace and among the troops, and Source believes that it is "very effective". Source had known of the "anti-war movement" through the BBC, the VOA as well as through all Communist media. He had read of the movement in the "Bulletin" issued by the NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM in SVN. This "Bulletin" is not meant for all the people but for special cadres to study and to subsequently exploit in propaganda. Source further quoted the "Bulletin" as showing that the Gallop Pole reveals that only 58% of the people in the US are in favor of President Johnson's Vietnam policies, and that the remaining people demand an end to the war. Increasing American casualties, increased taxes and inflation will step-up the anti-war movement. Johnson's prestige and that of the US is declining. Leading intellectuals like Bertram Russell and Jean Paul Sarthe are active against the war and US participation in it. US Senators like "Gruning" are creating conflict within the US Government, and the war protest will increase.
- As a psychologist, educator and a proselyting Communist cadre, Source believed that informing the people and the troops, of the American anti-war movement is "very effective". As human beings they feel that they are not alone and are encouraged to carry on with their struggle.
- Source cited the anti-war movement in France during the French-Vietnamese war. It started slowly, gained momentum and size and influenced the final outcome of the war. Source believes that the US anti-war movement will play a similar part in the current war.

NIC COMMENT. The great majority of the NIC Sources, who believe that the Communist side will win the war, cite the American war protests as one of the reasons why they will finally win the war.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KIN

108d



KIEN-HOA SECTOR

ADVISORY TEAM 93

MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO SAN FRANCISCO 96359

24 August 1967

To: Chief-Of-Staff, COMNAVFORV  
From: Lt. J. E. Harrell, NILO BEN TRE

Subj: Letter of Appreciation,

1. Sir, enclosed is the Vietnamese copy and translated copy of the letter of appreciation sent to the Province Police Chief by the Water Taxi Association. I hope it is of value to you.

Sincerely,

*J. E. Harrell*  
J. E. Harrell  
Lt. USMC

National Police Service.

KIEN-HOA.

Control Resources Service.

Subject:- Patrons of Motorizing sampans operating on the HAM-LUONG River To express their appreciation To policemen and PBR sailors operating on the HAM-LUONG River (KIEN-HOA)

I have the honor to inform to you that on June, 15, 1967 a number of patrons of motorizing sampans operating on the HAM-LUONG River came to BEN-LO police station to hand over to the chief a letter in which they, on the behalf of all persons who have motorizing sampans in Ho'-Cay, Thanh-Luu, Huong-Hy, Don-Nhon districts, as well as Merchants traveling by motorizing sampans, expressed their gratitude to policemen and sailors of PBR's operating on the Ham-Luong River of KIEN-HOA province.

Since PBR Forces have continuously launched regular patrols on the Ham Luong River the VC no longer stop their sampans to collect taxes, capture or terrorize passengers, therefore they volunteered to sign their names on the letter and they would like to convey their letter of gratitude to U.S PBR Forces through the National Police Service.

KIEN HOA June, 15, 1967.

NGUYEN-VAN-NGAI.

Chief of control resources office.

The following is their letter

THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.  
KIEN HOA PROVINCE.

7.

KIEN HOA, June, 15, 1967.

To Commander of U.S. PBR Forces operating on The Ham-  
Luong River.

To The Chief of National Police Service.

Subject: Patrons of Motorizing sampans to express their appreciation  
to U.S. PBR Forces operating on The Ham Luong River.

Dear Mr. Commander!

Dear Mr. Chief of National Police Service

We, all patrons, workers of Motorizing sampans and Merchants  
traveling on The Ham-Luong River every day have the honor to convey  
to you our gratitude for PBR activities, the fact that we have  
been provided with security is due to PBR activities day and night.

It is not too long ago, The VC set up their check points along  
the river to collect money from us and we were forced to  
support the so called The South Vietnam Liberation Front with rice,  
and medicine especially anti-biotic, sometimes motors such as  
motors for sampans.

Under the VC pressure, we had to obey them, we were forced  
to help them. We had to increase the price of goods to cover  
the losses that the VC took from us, and endured their illegal  
taxes (at least 10 percent).

Since the day, there have been PBR activities on The Ham Luong  
River, the VC heartless actions were put to an end and we have  
had peace of mind in our daily work, we are no longer threatened  
by their pressure and their retaliation (for example the patron of  
HUNG PHAT motorizing sampan was captured and liquidated).



A number of patrons was forced to witness the execution). Especially now the VC cannot collect taxes from us.

We feel <sup>no</sup> resentment when we are searched by LBR Forces because we realize their actions, and their purpose is to cut off VC supplies and annihilate them. We are very satisfied with LBR Forces and pledge to stand by them. We will point out VC (economic & financial cadres) and camouflaged commo. liaison VC cadres living among villagers. We will especially provide information on VC concentration anywhere along the river side.

We have high respect for VN policemen and LBR sailors because they have good manners and are very polite when they search our texts and they do not take bribes.

We wish the above activities to be continued and increased for ever to protect us, villagers, honest people living in lovely coconut tree areas of the South from VC sabotage.

We would like to convey our warm wishes and gratitude to policemen working on LBRs and LBR sailors through your police station, Mr. Chief!

Dear Mr. Commander!

Dear Mr. Chief of National Police Service!

May we avail ourselves of this opportunity to renew to you, excellency, the assurance of our highest consideration

\* The names listed below are patron's names and their signatures

I/ THANH-THU - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

NGUYỄN-VĂN-BA, patron of CONG-THAT-LOI Motorizing Sampan

NGUYỄN-VĂN-LIÊN — AN-HUÊ —

TRƯỜNG-VĂN-ĐĂNG — HUNG-LHAT —

TRƯỜNG-VĂN-ĐĂNG — DUC-THANH —

Đo Hùng phát : Trương-vân-Dũng  
Đo Đại thành : Trương-vân-Dũng  
Đo Hồng phát : Lê-vân-Tử.  
Đo Trương Giang : Phan-vân-Ba  
Đo Phước Thiển : Phan-vân-Trần  
Đo Tân Phước Thành : Nguyễn-vân-Sáu.

## II Đường Giồng Lũng-Trúc Giang.

Đo Vạn Thành : Huỳnh-vân-Mười.  
Đo Ai-Huê I : Huỳnh-Thi-Kiểm.  
Đo Ai-Huê II : Phan-vân-Chân.  
Đo Nhôn Hoa : Huỳnh-Thi-Mỹ.  
Đo Thiệp Lợi : Nguyễn-vân-Vũ.

## III Đường Cai Quao-Trúc Giang.

Đo Vĩnh Phước : Huỳnh-như  
Đo Phước Chung : Đỗ-vân-Giai.

## IV Đường Hồ Cay-Trúc Giang.

Đo Trương-phát : Trương-Tử.  
Đo Nam Hiền : Lê-vân-Hiến.

## V Đường Đôn Nhân-Trúc Giang.

Đo Vĩnh Phước I : Nguyễn-vân-Dê  
Đo Vĩnh Phước II : Nguyễn-vân-Ba.  
Đo Liên Trung : Nguyễn-vân-Lân  
Đo Thuận Lợi : Huỳnh-vân-Dĩnh.  
Đo Liên-Dung : Trần-ngọc-Thanh.  
Đo Thiệp thành : Nguyễn-vân-Yên  
Đo Cửu Thiệp : Nguyễn-vân-Sư.

## VI Đường Ba Trĩ-Trúc Giang.

Đo Công Thành : Võ-vân-Phú.

LÊ-VAN-TU, patron of DUC-THANH motorizing sampans.

PHAN-VAN-BAY - TRUONG-GIANH -

PHAN-VAN-TRON - PHUOC-THIEN -

NGUYEN-VAN-SAGI - TAN-PHUOC-THANH -

II GIONG-TRON - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

HUYNH-VAN-MUOI, patron of VAN-THANH motorizing sampans.

HUYNH-THI-KIEM - AI-HUU I. -

PHAN-VAN-CHAU - AI-HUU II. -

HUYNH-THI-KY - SON-HOA.

NGUYEN-VAN-VINH - HIEP-LOI.

III CAI-QUAO - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

HUYEN-NHU, patron of VINH-PHUOC motorizing sampans.

DO-VAN-GIAI - PHUOC-CHUNG -

IV MO-CAY - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

TRUONG-TU, patron of TRUONG-THAT motorizing sampans.

LÊ-VAN-HIEN - NAM-HIEN -

V DON-NHON - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

NGUYEN-VAN-DE, patron of VINH-PHUOC I motorizing sampans.

NGUYEN-VAN-BA - VINH-PHUOC II -

NGUYEN-VAN-LAU - LIEN-TRUNG -

HUYNH-VAN-DINH - THUAN-LOI -

TRAN-NGOC-THANH - LIEN-DUNG -

NGUYEN-VAN-YEN - HIEP-THANH -

NGUYEN-VAN-SU - CUU-HIEP

VI BA-TRI - TRUC-GIANG waterway.

VO-VAN-PHU, patron of CONG-THANH motorizing sampans.



1083

Saigon, September 25, 1967

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Walt:

Enclosed herewith are two documents: one an interrogation report of a prisoner of war who was a training cadre at Hanoi University from June, 1964, until his infiltration of South Viet-Nam in January-April, 1966; the other a letter from sampan operators in the Delta commending police and Riverine forces for their work in keeping the river open against the Viet Cong.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Eugene M. Locke  
Deputy Ambassador

**SECRET**

Monday, October 2, 1967  
1:55 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The marked passages in the attached cable summarize the Shah's idea for six Asian countries, led by Iran, to act as our intermediary with Hanoi.

We'll have Sec. Rusk's view by tomorrow's meeting.

W. W. Rostow

**SECRET**

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 91-343  
By ju, NARA, Date 2-1-93

# INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

2 W H 109a

~~SECRET~~

Action

OO RUEHC  
DE RUQTAN 1443/1 2742110  
ZNY SSSSS

30Q

1967 OCT 1 PM 7 43

Info

O 012100Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-341

By W, NARA, Date 5-27-92

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 1443

NODIS

REF: STATE 47002

1. AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 1 HIS MAJESTY GAVE ME ACCOUNT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS, MOST RECENT OF WHICH WAS WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE ON SEPTEMBER 30. DURING THIS LATTER TALK CERTAIN IDEAS WERE FORMULATED. HE ASKS THAT THESE BE CONVEYED TO THE PRESIDENT AND WOULD APPRECIATE BEING INFORMED OF THE PRESIDENT'S VIEWS.

2. WHILE IN PARIS IN EARLY JUNE ON HIS WAY TO CANADA HIS MAJESTY SAW THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND BROACHED TO HIM THE IDEA THAT FIVE ASIAN NATIONS IN ADDITION TO IRAN MIGHT PERHAPS GET TOGETHER TO FIND

A WAY TOWARD ACHIEVING PEACE IN VIET NAM. HE HAD IN MIND THE FOLLOWING NATIONS: JAPAN AS ONE OF THE LEADING COUNTRIES OF ASIA; INDIA WHO COULD CERTAINLY NOT BE THOUGHT OF AS SUPPORTING THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT; PAKISTAN WHICH MIGHT EVEN IN SOME WAYS BE REGARDED AS FAVORING CHINA; AFGHANISTAN WHICH IS SOMEWHAT IN THE ME CLASS AS INDIA OR PAKISTAN; AND FINALLY CAMBODIA, A COUNTRY WITH A DEEP INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM AND VERY FAR FROM BEING ALIGNED WITH THE U.S. ON THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM. HIS MAJESTY ASKED THAT THE SOVIETS LET HIM KNOW EITHER IN PARIS OR PERHAPS IN CANADA WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE OPPOSED TO THIS IDEA. IF THE SOVIETS WERE NOT OPPOSED, THE SHAH SAID HE WOULD THEN TALK TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SAME LINE.

3. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR REPEATED TO HIS MAJESTY THE STANDARD RUSSIAN LINE ON VIET NAM BUT SAID THAT HE WOULD SPEAK WITH HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE IDEAS THE SHAH HAD MENTIONED.

4. AFTER HIS RETURN TO TEHRAN FOLLOWING CANCELLATION OF THE JUNE VISIT TO CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, HIS MAJESTY SAW THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE HERE AND THE LATTER ONCE AGAIN REITERATED THE USUAL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 - TEHRAN 1443 (SECTION 1 OF 2) 10/1/67

RUSSIAN VIEWPOINT. HIS MAJESTY SAID AGAIN WHAT HE REALLY WANTED

TO KNOW WAS WHETHER THE RUSSIANS OPPOSED THE KIND OF THING THAT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN PARIS. HE RECEIVED NO ANSWER BEFORE GOING TO THE UNITED STATES.

5. THE PRESIDENT PROVIDED HIS MAJESTY A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION ON PEACE POSSIBILITIES. TWO DAYS AFTER RETURNING TO TEHRAN THE SHAH CALLED ON THE RUSSIAN CHARGE. THE SHAH DECLARED HE DID NOT REPEAT NOT HAVE A SPECIFIC MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PASS. HOWEVER, IT WAS HIS OWN CONCLUSION FROM HIS TALKS IN WASHINGTON THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO STOP THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM IF IT COULD RECEIVE IN RETURN FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE SIGN THAT NORTH VIET NAM WOULD PROVIDE A "PROMPT AND PROMISING" REACTION. THE SHAH REVIEWED ALSO FOR THE RUSSIAN CHARGE THE GENERAL U.S. POSITION INCLUDING THE MUTUAL IRANIAN-US ATTITUDE CONTAINED IN THE COMMUNIQUE FOLLOWING THE SHAH'S MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT.

6. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CAME YESTERDAY TO SEE THE SHAH ON A ROUTINE CALL AND WHEN VIETNAM CAME UP IN THE DISCUSSION AGAIN STATED

THE RUSSIAN POSITION, I.E., AGGRESSION MUST STOP, NO COUNTRY COULD ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WHILE UNDERGOING BOMBING ATTACKS, ETC. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THAT WHATEVER STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TOWARD PEACE IS A MATTER ENTIRELY WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIET NAM. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR REFERRED TO HO CHI MIN'S LETTER OF JANUARY 1967 AS THE BASIS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE POSITION. THE NLF DOES NOT INSIST ON INTEGRATION OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH. THEY SUPPORT FREE EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

7. FINALLY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR REMARKED TO HIS MAJESTY, "YOU AND OTHER PEOPLE WHO WANT PEACE SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS." HIS MAJESTY DECLARED THAT SUCH EFFORTS ALWAYS SEEMED TO BE ONE-SIDED. NORTH VIET NAM CANNOT EXPECT ONLY THE OTHER SIDE TO UNDERTAKE STEPS TOWARDS PEACE WHILE NORTH VIET NAM DOES NOTHING. HE TOLD THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THAT THEY MAY THINK THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE THAT IT WILL BE BEATEN IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS. BUT THE CONTRARY IS ALSO POSSIBLE. THE ADMINISTRATION MAY BE RE-ELECTED AND CONTINUE STRONGLY ITS PRESENT POLICIES. HOW CAN THE U.S. BE EXPECTED TO STOP BOMBING OF NORTH VIET NAM WHILE THE LATTER

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 - TEHRAN 1443 (SECTION 1 OF 2) 10/1/67

CONTINUES SENDING ARMS AND INFILTRATORS TO KILL U.S. SOLDIERS?

8. THE SHAH THEN EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AN IDEA WHICH HAD OCCURRED TO HIM; IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HANOI TO OFFER A PRE-CONDITION TO CESSATION BY THE U. S. OF THE BOMBING. THE U.S., ON THE OTHER HAND, CANNOT STOP WITHOUT SOME GUARANTEE FROM HANOI THAT THERE WILL BE A STOPPAGE OF ARMS MOVEMENTS AND INFILTRATION. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR SIX ASIAN COUNTRIES TO MAKE PROPOSALS TO BOTH SIDES WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SECURING FROM NORTH VIET NAM A GUARANTEE TO RESPOND TO THE CESSATION OF BOMBING WITH CESSATION ON ITS PART OF ARMS DISPATCH AND INFILTRATION TO SOUTH VIET NAM. ALL COUNTRIES ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED WITH ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, SINCE PEACE IS INDIVISIBLE. BUT THE COUNTRIES OF ASIA ITSELF, INCLUDING THE SIX HIS MAJESTY HAD MENTIONED, HAVE A SPECIAL AND URGENT CONCERN. TO MAKE PROGRESS THROUGH THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SEEMS VERY DIFFICULT, BUT PERHAPS SEVERAL NATIONS WORKING TOGETHER AS HIS MAJESTY HAD SUGGESTED MIGHT VERY QUIETLY BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.

9. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THEN ASKED, WHY DO YOU NOT SEND A

MESSANGER TO HANOI?

10. BEFORE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, THE SHAH WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH THE PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO THESE IDEAS. HE BELIEVES THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ALL SIX COUNTRIES BE INVOLVED, A GUARANTEE BY HANOI GIVEN ONLY TO IRAN COULD BE TOO EASILY DISAVOWED, WHEREAS ONE GIVEN TO THE SIX WOULD BE BINDING. NORTH VIETNAM MAY BE UNWILLING TO MAKE A PROMISE TO THE UNITED STATES BUT MIGHT NOT FIND THE SAME DIFFICULTY WITH ONE GIVEN TO THE SIX COUNTRIES. OBVIOUSLY THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE SIX AND AGREEMENT ON A COMMON PURPOSE. (HIS MAJESTY HAS NOT REPEAT NOT MENTIONED HIS IDEAS TO ANYONE OTHER THAN THE SOVIETS, NOR HAS ANYONE IN HIS OWN GOVERNMENT BEEN INFORMED.) HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE SIX GOVERNMENTS INFORM HANOI THAT THEIR OBJECTIVE WAS TO WORK OUT A PEACE BASED ON THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. THE SHAH WOULD PROPOSE, THEREFORE, TO SEND TO HANOI BEFORE REPEAT BEFORE CONSULTING WITH THE OTHER FIVE COUNTRIES AN EMISSARY TO SOUND OUT NORTH VIETNAMESE REACTION TO HIS IDEAS. HE REASONS THAT IF THE VIETNAMESE DISAPPROVE THESE IDEAS IN TALKS WITH A SECRET IRANIAN EMISSARY, THEY MIGHT STILL BE BROACHED AGAIN AT SOME TIME

BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

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1967 OCT 1 PM 6 30

00 RUEHC  
DE RUQTAN 1443/2 2742125  
ZNY SSSSS  
O 012105Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
STATE GRNC  
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~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 TEHRAN 1443

NODIS

IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, IF THE EMISSARY WERE TO BE SENT AFTER TALKS WITH THE SIX, IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO PREVENT PUBLICITY. ONCE THE SHAH'S PROPOSAL WAS PUBLICLY REJECTED BY HANOI, THEN IT COULD NOT BE REVIVED LATER.

11. HIS MAJESTY STRESSED AGAIN HE WOULD NOT PROCEED WITHOUT WASHINGTON'S APPROVAL. HE HAS TOLD THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR THIS.

12. COMMENT: FOREGOING PARAGRAPHS CAREFULLY REVIEWED WITH SHAH TO ASSURE THEY ACCURATELY REPRESENT HIS VIEWS. HOWEVER, AFTER WE

PAGE 2 RUQTAN 1443/2 ~~SECRET~~  
HAD AGREED ON TEXT OF REPORT, HE MADE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS: SHOULD WASHINGTON APPROVE HIS IDEA, HE WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSE INFORM SOVIETS OR HANOI THAT U.S. HAD ACCEPTED FULLY THE PATTERN OF NEGOTIATIONS HE HAS OUTLINED. RATHER HE WOULD INDICATE THAT HE WAS SEEKING VIEWS OF BOTH SIDES AND THAT IF BOTH CONCURRED HE WOULD PLAN PROCEED WITH DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER FIVE STATES. ON REFLECTION THIS APPEALED TO SHAH AS "SENSIBLE BARGAINING POSITION."

13. IT IS APPARENT FROM ABOVE ACCOUNT THAT SHAH HAS PROFOUND DESIRE BE HELPFUL IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE. IF WASHINGTON PERCEIVES USEFUL GERM IN APPROACH HE HAS SUGGESTED I BELIEVE SHAH WOULD BE PREPARED CONSIDER PERMUTATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS HE HAS SUGGESTED. THACHER

BT

~~SECRET~~

110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 2, 1967  
1:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Unless you order to the contrary,  
State plans to let Bunker proceed as  
indicated.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 10-18-91



INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

Wit

110a  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Action

Info

RR RUEHC  
DE RUMJIR 7141 2710815  
ZNY CCCCC  
R 280305Z SEP 67  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7761  
STATE GRNC  
BT

6885Q

September 28, 1967, 4:57 A.M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 7141

NODIS.

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

1. FOR REASONS OF MORALE AND IN ORDER TO REDUCE REQUESTS FOR HOLIDAY LEAVES, WHICH IT IN INTERESTS OF MISSION TO KEEP TO MINIMUM, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WISE TO PERMIT WIVES TO COME HERE FOR THANKSGIVING, CHRISTMAS, AND NEW YEAR HOLIDAYS.

2. WE WOULD APPLY SAME GROUND RULES AS BEFORE I.E. NO CHILDREN, NO ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATIONS, OFFICERS MAKE THEIR OWN TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS. BUNKER  
BT

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION E.O. 12356  
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY *rg* ON 10-28-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 2, 1967  
1:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

This report from the Delta suggests  
the October 22 Assembly election is  
being taken seriously.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

111

*Per file*

111a

Monday, October 2, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon, 7345)

SUBJECT: Lower House Elections in the Delta

There are encouraging signs that the Lower House elections in the Fourth Corps are being taken seriously and that competition will be keen. In contrast to the attitude of cynical skepticism frequently voiced prior to the Constituent Assembly election last year, many people seem to feel that the Lower House will exert considerable influence and that a seat is therefore a meaningful prize. Candidates also appear to be somewhat more sophisticated in their assessments of the political situation than last year. Although a good deal of back-biting can still be heard, it is generally conceded (even by their opponents) that many candidates are people of considerable experience and ability.

Candidates include all religions and ethnic groups in the Delta. Many have held jobs of substantial responsibility, including the former Province Chiefs or Deputy Province Chiefs of Kien Phong, Phong Dinh, Kien Giang, Kien Hoa, and Vinh Binh. New political alliances -- or at least associations -- may be in the making as well: in Kien Giang, for example, two candidates appear to be banking on support of the new-elected Village and Hamlet officials. One is a recently-elected Village Chief and the other has been in charge of the training program for the newly-elected village and hamlet officials.

Many candidates are complaining about the short period of time allotted for official campaigning (October 6 - 21). A number have, in fact, been politicking unofficially for some time. There are signs Government of Vietnam officials also feel the pinch of time; the first meeting of the Phong Dinh Local Campaign Committee, for example, is set for October 1, the very day of second and final posting of candidates' names. Local Campaign Committees must determine how the campaign is to be conducted including such matters as size and number of leaflets, banners, and other partisan campaign material, all of which must be produced locally. There is some concern that materials in some cases will not be ready in time.

It is too early to assess the degree to which Government of Vietnam officials will be motivated to ensure a large voter turnout. It would seem natural in this fifth election in 13 months to see some lessening of official zeal. However, fact that campaigns are centered in the province and that many prominent local personalities are competing should generate substantial local enthusiasm for most provinces.

15

*Pres file*

Monday, October 2, 1967 -- 9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Following is a favorable note on your San Antonio speech from  
Adm. Sharp.

"Your magnificent speech in San Antonio was an inspiration to us all. It symbolizes our great national determination and should stimulate all Americans into a new dedication of effort. The forces in the Pacific Command are proud to serve in the campaign for freedom which you have so ably charted. Warm personal regards and deepest respect."

W. W. Rostow

*cc. Mr. Goldstein*

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, October 2, 1967  
8:00 AM

113

*Prin file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Embassy Saigon has telephoned the following information to the working group at the Operations Center:

The Assembly recessed until 8:00 AM EDT.

The Assembly has upheld 6 of the 11 criteria and rejected 5 (these are the criteria used by the special committee when it decided to recommend invalidation).

100 men are to be present for the overall vote.

Only 50 voted on the criteria.

The Embassy still doesn't know whether the final balloting will be secret.

The Embassy is cautiously optimistic that the vote will be around noon.

The DAB will vote in favor of validation.

The city is quiet.

The Monks are still in front of the palace.

*W. W. Rostow*

]



114

*Pres file*

Monday - October 2, 1967

Mr. President:

The flood disaster which hit the lower Rio Grande Valley provides an opportunity for Ray Telles' Border Development Commission and Joe Friedkin's Boundary and Water Commission to develop with their Mexican counterparts a joint program to rehabilitate the area and undertake works which would avoid, or at least minimize, a recurrence.

Congressman Gonzalez has sent you the attached cable proposing such a program.

May I tell Telles and Friedkin to prepare, in cooperation with OEP and other interested agencies, a program for you to consider? It would make an excellent topic for you to discuss with President Diaz Ordaz and announce during his state visit.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment

Cable from Congressman Gonzalez,  
9/28/67.

11.4a  
↑  
07 SEP 1961 12 56

VA044 GOVT PD

BX WASHINGTON DC 28 1124A EDT

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT:

I BELIEVE THAT IN THE DISASTER OF HURRICANE BEULAH, AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT IS NEEDED BY THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO TO RESTORE AND REVITALIZE AFFECTED AREAS.

I SUGGEST THAT THE JOINT UNITED STATES MEXICO BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION WHICH IS ALREADY IN BEING BE ASSIGNED THE TASK OF

FIRST, COORDINATING EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY HOUSING TO THOSE WITHOUT HOMES, PROVIDING SUCH MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENSE PERSONNEL AS ARE NEEDED TO EQUIP AND OPERATE SHELTER AREAS, AND

SECOND, COORDINATING OF EFFORTS TO CLEAN UP AND MAKE LIVEABLE RESIDENTIAL AND BUSINESS AREAS AND RESTORING VITAL SERVICES.

THIRD, I SUGGEST THAT THE JOINT COMMISSION BE ASSIGNED THE TASK OF SURVEYING AND ASSESSING DAMAGE IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND RECOMMENDING A PROGRAM OF RECONSTRUCTION. SUCH A PROGRAM MIGHT INCLUDE NEW AND INTEGRATED BASIC SERVICES SUCH AS WATER, GAS, AND POWER AS



WELL AS JOINTLY DESIGNED OWNED AND BUILT BRIDGES AND  
SIMILAR SERVICES THAT CAN BE SHARED. FINALLY, I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST  
THAT A NEW INTERNATIONAL BANK BE DEVELOPED TO PROVIDE NECESSARY  
FINANCING FOR RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION. THIS BANK WOULD  
RECEIVE ITS FUNDS FROM BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND PROVIDE LONG TERM LOANS  
FOR REBUILDING CAPITAL DEVELOPMENTS BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATELY  
OWNED.

MR. PRESIDENT, I BELIEVE THAT IN THE FACE OF THIS DISASTER  
COMMON TO BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO A COMMON EFFORT  
FOR RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION IS NECESSARY. I BELIEVE THAT

IF THE JOINT UNITED STATES-MEXICO BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION  
IS ASSIGNED THE TASKS OUTLINED ABOVE A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR  
BUILDING THE KIND OF BORDER YOU AND PRESIDENT DIAS ORDAZ HAVE  
ENVISIONED CAN BE REALIZED. SINCERELY

HENRY B GONZALEZ MEMBER OF CONGRESS.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Monday, October 2, 1967

151  
*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

These three items tell us:

- 1) Thieu still thinks he will get a pro-validation vote;
- 2) The questions Secretary Rusk put to Bunker yesterday on alternatives if the vote goes against validation.
- 3) The Vietnamese government's (and Bunker's) proposed course of action in case the vote goes against validation.

*W. A. R.* Rostow

JORDEN

RECEIVED  
WHCA

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

115a

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DE YEKADL 6492R 2740455  
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FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
CNO  
AFSSO USAF  
DIA/ISIC  
NIC  
STATE (RCI)  
SSO-ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
JCS  
SSO ACSI DA  
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
CIA-CCI  
ZEM

**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 01-3**

By Sj, NARA Date 7-11-01

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~  
(ADVANCE)

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI 2 OCTOBER 1967  
SUBJECT VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE BLOC LEADER ON VALIDATION ISSUE

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 OCTOBER 1967)

SOURCE

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

1. DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE BLOC (DAB) LEADER [REDACTED] STATED  
[REDACTED] THAT DAB MEMBERS AND CERTAIN OTHERS HAVE  
AGREED TO VOTE FOR VALIDATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION BUT WISH  
TO DO SO BY MEANS OF A SECRET BALLOT.

PRESIDENT-ELECT THIEU, [REDACTED] HAS SAID THIS METHOD  
IS ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] PLANNED TO HOLD A DAB CAUCUS MONDAY MORNING AND [REDACTED] AN ASSEMBLY  
VOTE COULD COME BY NOON, ALTHOUGH A LATER VOTE WAS ALSO POSSIBLE.  
WHEN THE 1 OCTOBER SESSION ENDED, THE PRO-VALIDATION DEPUTIES WERE  
CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC AND FELT THAT ABOUT 60 PERCENT OF THE  
DEPUTIES HAD BEEN LINED UP FOR A FAVORABLE VOTE. HOWEVER,  
THE OPPOSITION IS DISCIPLINED, WHEREAS THE PRO-VALIDATION GROUP IS  
NOT. THE 2 OCTOBER MORNING SESSION WILL BE DEVOTED TO  
DISCUSSION OF A REPORT PREPARED BY THE ELECTION COMMITTEE ON IRREGU-  
LARITIES AT POLLING PLACES.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR  
LOCKE, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, AMBASSADOR  
KOMER) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD)  
REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~

PRESERVATION COPY

# TELEGRAM Department of State

047004

~~SECRET~~

Classification

ACTION: Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

30 SEP 67

STATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. We know you are considering the contingency of the Assembly's invalidation of the Presidential election, and wish to have your views urgently. We believe we might face two chief possibilities:

- a) The military leadership would seek to continue junta rule indefinitely, including probably the dissolution of the Assembly;
- b) The existing laws governing such a situation could be upheld whereby the Assembly and the Directorate would face the need to prepare a new presidential election;
- c) There may, of course, be other alternatives.

2. These **alternatives offer** unpleasant and undesirable prospects. To accept **continued junta rule** indefinitely would almost inevitably lead to civil disorder, giving Tri Quang, Suu, Dzu and student leaders the issue **they seek**. The Government might retain the ability to control the situation through the police and armed forces, but this would probably require strong repressive action. Moreover, it would

Drafted by:

The Secretary

2030

Tel.:

Telegraphic transmission and

Clearances:

EA-PCHabib/EA/VN-REIM

Approval approved by:

The Secretary

EA - Mr. Bundy

S/S - Mr. Brown

~~SECRET~~

Classification

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-405

By 48, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

be virtually impossible for us to defend this course of action with domestic and international opinion in view of our strong commitment to the establishment of constitutional representative government.

3. On the other hand, to side with the rule of law could well run against the junta's instincts and place us in direct confrontation with the military leadership. It could thus lead to disruption of government programs and to considerable instability, both because the military would not easily accept another election and because the civilian politicians are not likely to show greater cohesive leadership than at present.

4. Another alternative would be for the Directorate to return the question to the Assembly for reconsideration, perhaps with a series of questions on which precise answers are required. For example, it might be that precise information might lead to use of Articles 53 and 54 of the Presidential Election Law without <sup>invalidation</sup> ~~revocation~~ of entire election.

5. Still another alternative would be to proceed with the election of the Lower House on October 22 while the Directorate and the Assembly determine what to do about presidential election.

6. I am sure you fully understand the gravity of the issues for American and international opinion as well as for Vietnam. I hope our concerns will prove to be needless and that Assembly will validate elections. If this does not occur, we shall be faced with urgent decisions about alternatives and our reactions to them.

END

~~SECRET~~



TELEGRAM

Department of State

00 RUEHC

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Action

DE RUMJIR 7349/1 2741130

ZNY SSSSS

O 011120Z OCT 67 ZFF-4

Info

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7952.

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STATE GRNC

1967 OCT 1 AM 9:00

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 7349

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 47004

1. I HAVE, OF COURSE, BEEN GIVING VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD FOLLOW SHOULD THE ASSEMBLY INVALIDATE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND I'VE HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH MEMBERS OF MY STAFF ON THIS SUBJECT. THE FOLLOWING SETS FORTH MY BEST JUDGMENT ON THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND HOW WE SHOULD ACT TOWARDS THEM:

2. YOU WILL RECALL THAT GENERAL THIEU TOLD ME ON SEPTEMBER 29 (STATE 7319) THAT IF A VOTE WERE TO GO AGAINST HIM HE THOUGHT THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL WOULD ASK FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSEMBLY'S VOTE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 7349 ~~SECRET~~

AND MIGHT THUS OBTAIN VALIDATION. I WOULD THINK THIS IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE THE COURSE THEY WOULD PURSUE. IN THIS CONNECTION I HAVE CAUSED ARTICLE 56 OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW TO BE BROUGHT TO THIEU'S ATTENTION. AS WE NOTED IN SAIGON 7292, ARTICLE 56 OF THE ELECTION LAW STATES THAT THE ASSEMBLY CAN ANNUL THE ELECTION ENTIRELY "IF IT FINDS THAT IRREGULARITIES CONFIRMED BY THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL, OR BY A RULING OF A COURT, COULD OPEN TO QUESTION THE HONESTY OF THE VOTING AND AFFECT THE GENERAL RESULTS OF THE ELECTION" THIS IS THE ONLY PROVISION OF THE LAW UNDER WHICH THE ASSEMBLY COULD PROCLAIM ANNULMENT OF THE ENTIRE ELECTION EVEN THOUGH IT HAS SOUGHT TO ARROGATE ITSELF BROADER POWERS TO DO SO BY THE FREE INTERPRETATION IT HAS CHOSEN TO GIVE ARTICLE 113 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 50 OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW, THE ARTICLES WHICH GIVE THE ASSEMBLY GENERAL POWER TO CONTROL THE PROPRIETY OF THE

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~~SECRET~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 74-405

By inf, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 7349, OCTOBER 1, SECTION 1 OF 2

ELECTIONS. AS ALSO NOTED IN SAIGON 7292, THE CENTRAL ELECTION COUNCIL REPORTED THAT IT WAS UNABLE TO CONFIRM ANY OF THE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGED IN COMPLAINTS FILED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 7349/1 ~~SECRET~~

WITH IT. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM LOGICAL, IN THE EVENT OF ANNULMENT, FOR THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE TO ASK FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSEMBLY VOTE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IN VOTING FOR ANNULMENT THE ASSEMBLY EXCEEDED ITS POWER AS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW.

3. ADMITTEDLY, THE ACTION OF THE ASSEMBLY IN THIS INSTANCE IS NOT A LEGISLATIVE ACTION AND THUS THE RIGHT OF THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE TO CALL FOR A RECONSIDERATION IS IN SOME DOUBT. NEVERTHELESS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I AM INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT UNLESS A MAJOR GROUP LIKE THE DEMOCRATIC-ALLIANCE BLOC IS DETERMINED TO BLOCK IT, THE ASSEMBLY WOULD AGREE TO RECONSIDER.

4. BETWEEN THE INITIAL VOTE AND RECONSIDERATION IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THIEU AND KY TO MOVE FIRMLY TO ASSURE THE NECESSARY SWITCH OF VOTES. SHOULD KY FAIL TO COOPERATE TO ASSURE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC-ALLIANCE BLOC IS BROUGHT INTO LINE, THE SECOND VOTE IS LIKELY TO FAIL.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 7349/1 ~~SECRET~~

5. SHOULD THE ASSEMBLY CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO VALIDATE THE ELECTION, OUR BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT THE FOLLOWING PATTERN OF EVENTS WOULD FOLLOW: A) THE SENATE IS ALREADY DULY ELECTED AND CONFIRMED AND THIEU HAS INDICATED TO ME THAT HE INTENDS TO INSTALL THE SENATE ON THE 5TH OR 6TH OF OCTOBER (SAIGON 6624). I BELIEVE HE WOULD DO THIS. B) I ALSO THINK THAT GVN WOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE ELECTIONS FOR THE LOWER HOUSE AND WOULD PUSH AHEAD AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TOWARD INSTALLING THE NEW ASSEMBLY, THEREBY ABOLISHING THE PRESENT ASSEMBLY. C) IN CONSULTATION WITH THE NEW ASSEMBLY THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT COULD THEN DETERMINE ON THE FUTURE COURSE TO FOLLOW. IT SEEMS LOGICAL THAT IT WOULD AT THAT TIME DECIDE ON A DATE FOR NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND WE MIGHT HOPE THAT AT THE SAME TIME

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-3- SAIGON 7349, OCTOBER 1, SECTION 1 OF 2  
THE ASSEMBLY WOULD SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO WRITE A  
NEW AND MORE REALISTIC PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW AVOID-  
ING THE MANY PITFALLS IN THE PRESENT LAW (COMMENT:  
THE MILITARY IN FACT HAVE THEMSELVES TO BLAME FOR THE  
WEAKNESS OF THE PRESENT LAW SINCE THEY DELIBERATELY  
ENCOURAGED THE PROVISIONS PERMITTING MULTIPLE CIVILIAN

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 7349/1 ~~SECRET~~

CANDIDATES IN A DESIRE TO DIVIDE THE CIVILIAN VOTE.)  
D) IT WOULD SEEM WISE, AND I BELIEVE WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE  
THEM, TO SET A NEW ELECTION DATE SOME MONTHS AWAY IN  
ORDER TO LET THE COUNTRY QUIET DOWN AND RECOVER FROM THE  
PLETHORA OF FIVE ELECTIONS IN 14 MONTHS WHILE ENGAGING IN  
A CRITICAL AND BITTER WAR.

6. THE NEW SENATE WHICH THIEN EXPECTS TO INSTALL THIS  
COMING WEEK SHOULD BE A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT ON  
THE PRESENT ASSEMBLY. ITS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDES EXCELLENT  
INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM THIEN IS ALREADY BEGINNING CLOSE  
CONSULTATION AND THERE IS REASON TO HOPE THAT IT WILL EXERT  
A CONSTRUCTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF  
EVENTS. HOPEFULLY, ALSO THE LOWER HOUSE WHEN ELECTED  
WILL PROVE TO BE MORE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTERESTS  
OF THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE FOR THE MEMBERS WILL BE ELECTED  
BY CONSTITUENCIES AND THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE WILL DEPEND  
ON RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR TOWARDS THEIR CONSTITUENTS.  
PRESUMABLY THEY WILL THUS BE LESS RESPONSIVE TO THE  
POLITICAL CONNIVING OF THE VARIOUS CLIQUES IN SAIGON.  
ADMITTEDLY, THE PRESENT ASSEMBLY WAS ALSO ELECTED  
BY CONSTITUENCY BUT MANY OF THE MEMBERS (PARTICULARLY  
THE TROUBLEMAKERS) ARE MEN WHO NOW HAVE NO POLITICAL  
FUTURE AND ARE GUIDED ONLY BY SELKSH AND TO SOME EXTENT  
VENGEFUL MOTIVES.

7. THE FOREGOING IS A HOPEFUL PREDICTION AND I AM WELL  
AWARE THAT THINGS SELDOM IF EVER FOLLOW SUCH A SMOOTH  
COURSE IN VIETNAMESE POLITICS; HOWEVER, IT IS A PATTERN  
WHICH I BELIEVE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO TRY TO  
FOLLOW AND IT IS CERTAINLY ONE WHICH I THINK WE SHOULD

BUNKER

BT

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

1967 OCT 1 AM 9 18

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7953

STATE CRNC

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SAIGON 7349

NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

ENCOURAGE. AFTER ALL, THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, WHICH WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE IN POWER SHOULD THE ELECTIONS BE ANNULLED, IS THE GOVERNMENT WHICH HAS MADE POSSIBLE THE GREAT STRIDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY, WHICH VIET-NAM HAS TAKEN IN THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. IT SEEMS TO ME ILLOGICAL THAT THAT SAME GOVERNMENT WOULD NOW WANT TO JETTISON ALL THAT IT HAS ACHIEVED.

8. THERE MAY OF COURSE BE PRESSURE FROM CERTAIN MILITARY QUARTERS TO THROW OUT THE WHOLE CIVILIAN STRUCTURE AND RETURN TO FULL MILITARY RULE BUT UNLESS THIS REACHES PROPORTIONS WHICH RESULT IN A SPLIT AMONG THE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 734972 ~~SECRET~~

GENERALS AND A QUASI-COUP SITUATION, I WOULD NOT FORESEE THAT THE MILITARY WOULD FOLLOW SUCH A COURSE. MOREOVER, THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT MANY OF THE MILITARY BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS AND I BELIEVE THAT WITH THE LEVERAGE WE POSSESS WE CAN PREVENT A REVERSION TO FULL MILITARY RULE. I ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY LEADERS ARE INTELLIGENT ENOUGH TO REALIZE THAT SUCH A COURSE COULD WELL JEOPARDIZE THE WHOLE FUTURE OF THE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO VIET-NAM.

9. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT I BELIEVE THE SITUATION IN THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, OR MORE SPECIFICALLY AMONG THE SENIOR GENERALS, WILL NOT BE STRAINED IN THE EVENT OF AN ANNULMENT. IT WILL BE. I WOULD ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE LOSER IN SUCH AN EVENT WILL BE KY. THE SENIOR GENERALS AT THE END OF JUNE DECIDED ON THE THIEU-KY TICKET AND ACCEPTED KY'S WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE. THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPECT

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-2- SAIGON 7349, OCTOBER 1 SECTION 2 OF 2

THAT THE TICKET WOULD HOLD TOGETHER AND ACHIEVE THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT WAS FORMED, VIZ. TO ASSURE A VICTORY OF THE MILITARY TICKET AT THE POLLS IN SEPTEMBER

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 7349/2 ~~SECRET~~

UNDER CONDITIONS THAT WOULD NOT BE FURTHER DISRUPTIVE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OR THE COUNTRY. KY'S COOPERATION THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC. IF NOW, WHEN HE PUTS THE POWER TO PREVENT IT, HE LETS HIS FOLLOWERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC-ALLIANCE BLOC DESTROY THE ELECTION IN A POWER PLAY TO ADVANCE HIS SELFISH INTEREST, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE GENERALS WILL HAVE LITTLE SYMPATHY WITH HIM.

10. THERE ARE OF COURSE OTHER ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES IN ADDITION TO THE TWO DISCUSSED ABOVE. ONE IS SITUATION YOU MENTION IN PARAGRAPH 1 (B) OF YOUR MESSAGE WHEREBY THE ASSEMBLY AND THE DIRECTORATE WOULD UNDERTAKE IMMEDIATELY TO PREPARE FOR NEW ELECTIONS. THIS IS SOMETHING WE SHOULD AVOID. FOR REASONS SET FORTH ABOVE I THINK WE MUST DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER INVOLVEMENT OF THE PRESENT ASSEMBLY IN ELECTIONS AND POSTPONE ALL SUCH QUESTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION BY THE NEW ASSEMBLY.

11. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE ASSEMBLY WILL FIND, UNDER ARTICLE 53 OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW, THAT THERE WERE IRREGULARITIES IN ENOUGH POLLING STATIONS TO JUSTIFY NEW ELECTIONS AT THOSE STATIONS. IF SO, ARTICLE 54

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 7349/2 ~~SECRET~~

REQUIRES THAT SUCH NEW ELECTIONS MUST BE ORGANIZED WITHIN TWO WEEKS IN THE LOCALITIES CONCERNED "USING EXISTING ROLLS OF VOTERS AND THE SAME LISTS OF CANDIDATES." THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE, RAISING QUESTIONS SUCH AS WHETHER THE GVN WOULD BE ABLE TO CONDUCT NEW ELECTIONS IN SUCH A SHORT TIME, WHETHER CANDIDATES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO CAMPAIGN AGAIN IN SUCH LOCALITIES, AND WHETHER DZU SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM JAIL FOR THE OCCASION. SUCH A POSTPONEMENT AND RE-RUN OF ELECTIONS COULD BE DISRUPTIVE OF PUBLIC ORDER AND RESULT IN CONTINUED PROBLEMS OF OPPOSITION UNREST AND THREATENED VIOLENCE. PRESUMABLY, HOWEVER, IF THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD APPLY ARTICLE 53 AND ELECTIONS SHOULD BE RE-RUN IN CERTAIN LOCALITIES IT WOULD MEAN THAT ULTIMATE VALIDATION WOULD ONLY BE DELAYED AND WOULD NOT BE IN

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-3- SAIGON 7349, OCTOBER 1 SECTION 2 OF 2

DOUBT. I DOUBT THAT THE ASSEMBLY WILL APPLY ARTICLE 53, BUT IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT. IN ANY EVENT, IF THE EVENTUALITY SHOULD ARISE, I BELIEVE GVN COULD HANDLE THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO SEE IT THROUGH.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 7349/2 ~~SECRET~~

12. WITH RESPECT TO THE DANGERS OF CIVIL DISORDER, WITH VARIOUS OPPOSITIONIST ELEMENTS TRI QUANG, SUU, DZU AND STUDENT LEADERS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION TO STIR UP TROUBLE, MY FEELING IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN CONTAIN THIS THREAT INITIALLY THROUGH NECESSARY POLICE MEASURES AND THAT SUBSEQUENTLY MUCH OF THE IMPACT OF ANY SUCH OPPOSITION EFFORTS WOULD BE DISSIPATED BY PROMPT GOVERNMENT ACTION SHOWING INTENT TO MOVE AHEAD WITH INSTALLATION OF THE ASSEMBLY AND ULTIMATELY TO HOLD NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. SO FAR THE DEMONSTRATIONS HAVE BEEN HANDLED WITH CONSIDERABLE SKILL AND A MINIMUM OF DISORDER. BOTH THIEU AND KY HAVE EXPRESSED TO ME THEIR CONFIDENCE THEY CAN HANDLE ANY UNREST THAT MIGHT DEVELOP.

13. I, TOO, SINCERELY HOPE ALL OF OUR CONCERNS WILL PROVE UNNECESSARY AND THAT THE FOREGOING WILL BE NOTHING MORE THAN AN INTERESTING EXERCISE IN SPECULATION. ALTHOUGH I WOULD STILL HESITATE TO PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THE VOTE IN THE ASSEMBLY, VIETNAMESE POLITICS BEING WHAT THEY ARE, I DO HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE SITUATION IS BRIGHTER TODAY AND IN THE ABSENCE OF UNFORESEEN NEW DEVELOPMENTS THE CHANCES OF VALIDATION ARE FAIRLY GOOD.

GP-1

BUNKER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

After signature, please return this copy to Mr. Keeny. ✓

116

~~SECRET~~

October 2, 1967

Mr. President:

~~1. Prop~~  
2. Prop file

In the attached memorandum, Paul Nitze requests that you approve the Nuclear Propulsion Plant for the aircraft carrier CVAN 68 as a program of highest national priority so that it can be assigned a DX industrial priority rating. This request has been cleared with the Bureau of the Budget.

If you approve, the agencies that have programs on the highest national priority list or are otherwise concerned will be informed of the action by the attached NSAM.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

Tab A - Nitze memo 9/14

Tab B - NSAM

Approved ✓ 10/2/67

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

SMKeeny:jb:9-29/10-2-67

bcc: SMK file and chron

WWR (2)

CEJ

➤ SMK comeback copy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines (Feb. 24, 1983)  
By kg, NARA, Date 10-25-

WWR

1162

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO.

TO: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of Commerce  
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
Administrator, National Aeronautics and  
Space Agency  
Director, Central Intelligence Agency  
Director, Bureau of the Budget  
Director, Office of Emergency Planning

SUBJECT: Nuclear Propulsion Plant for CVAN 68

In response to the recommendation by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President, under authority granted by the Defense Production Act of 1950, today established the Nuclear Propulsion Plant for CVAN 68 as being in the highest national priority category.

/s/ W W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

SMKeeny:jb:9-29-67

bcc: SMK file and chron

WWR (2)

CEJ

SMK comeback copy

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

500 D/R 5200.10 (#8)

Authority NSC 79F00059

By rs(dh), NARA, Date 10-25-91



Monday - October 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Commemorative Gift for Chamizal

*Pres file*

This memorandum is to ask whether you wish to have a special commemorative gift made to mark the formal Chamizal transfer on October 28.

The Mexicans are planning to strike a medallion: in gold for you, and for other high US officials, and in silver for more general distribution.

In 1964 you and President Lopez Mateos had medals struck for the occasion. The drawing for our medal is at Tab A.

Our Boundary & Water Commissioner has prepared the sample plate and plaques accompanying this memorandum for you to consider. The black glass plate with gold overlay would be for President Diaz Ordaz and members of his party. The silver and bronze plaques would be for upper and medium level officials. The black glass ash tray would be for general distribution to the several hundred minor officials and employees who have worked on the Chamizal.

Other possibilities for the gift are:

- a medallion, as the Mexicans are preparing.
- a replica of the Chamizal boundary marker with appropriate inscriptions (Tab B).
- a small wooden block with a gold, silver and bronze plaque with the US and Mexican seals and an appropriate quote from you and President Diaz Ordaz.

My preference would be either a medallion or the small wooden block and plaque.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer Boundary & Water Comm. samples \_\_\_\_.

Prefer medallion \_\_\_\_.

Prefer replica of boundary marker \_\_\_\_.

Prefer wooden block and plaque \_\_\_\_.

Attachments - Tabs A and B.


- Sample plate and plaques.

cc: Jim Jones





b  
117b



118

*Pres file*

October 2, 1967

Mr. President:

For sheer malicious  
amusement I commend the  
marked passages on pp. 2,  
3, 4, 5, 6, 12.

W. W. R.

118a

**American Foreign Policy in the 20th  
Century Under an 18th-Century  
Constitution**

By  
**J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT**

Reprinted from  
**CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY**  
Vol. XLVII, No. 1, Fall, 1961

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# CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

VOLUME 47

FALL, 1961

NUMBER 1

## AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 20TH CENTURY UNDER AN 18TH-CENTURY CONSTITUTION\*

*J. William Fulbright†*

In a world beset by unparalleled forces of revolution and upheaval, we Americans are confronted with the painful and urgent duty of re-examining the functional adequacy of some of our most hollowed and hitherto unquestioned institutions. The question we face is whether our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century, is adequate for the formulation and conduct of the foreign policy of a 20th-century nation, pre-eminent in political and military power and burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.

I raise this question with a feeling of sadness and more than a touch of historical nostalgia. The delicate and complex structure of federal decentralization, and of checks and balances on the national level, have served this heterogeneous nation well in its *internal* life, restraining us from hasty and ill-conceived actions and protecting us from the tyranny of both individual men and fervent majorities. Except for the tragic Civil War of a century ago, we have had a remarkably successful history. The system has proven durable and has served as a framework within which we have been able to provide a good life for most of our people.

I emphasize that this system has served us well in our *internal* life, and if our life as a nation were essentially domestic and not irrevocably linked to the life of the other peoples on this planet, no questions would have to be raised. At least since 1917, however, and for perhaps a good deal longer, our internal and external affairs have become increasingly interwoven; meanwhile, the ability of this nation to preserve the value system which constitutes the core of our national interest

\* This article was delivered as the sixth Robert S. Stevens Lecture at Cornell University on May 5, 1961.

† See contributors' section, masthead, p. 69, for biographical data.



has come to depend principally upon our ability to cope with world-wide revolutionary forces.

The dynamic forces of the 20th century—communism, fascism, aggressive nationalism, and the explosive awakening of long quiescent peoples—are growing more and more unmanageable under the procedures of leisurely deliberation which are built into our constitutional system. To cope with these forces we must be able to act quickly and decisively on the one hand, and persistently and patiently on the other. We must make decisions which are painful and some which do violence to our fundamental values. We must do these things if we are to survive in a world that obstinately refuses to conduct its affairs under Anglo-Saxon rules of measured and orderly procedure.

My question, then, is whether we have any choice but to modify, and perhaps overhaul, the 18th-century procedures that govern the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy. More specifically, I wonder whether the time has not arrived, or indeed already passed, when we must give the Executive a measure of power in the conduct of our foreign affairs that we have hitherto jealously withheld.

The source of an effective foreign policy under our system is Presidential power. This proposition, valid in our own time, is certain to become more, rather than less, compelling in the decades ahead. The pre-eminence of Presidential leadership overrides the most logical and ingenious administrative and organizational schemes. The essence of our "policy-making machinery" and of the "decision-making process"—concepts of current vogue in the academic world—is the President himself who is neither a machine nor a process, but a living human being whose effectiveness is principally a function of his own knowledge, wisdom, vision, and authority. It is not within our powers to confer wisdom or perception on the Presidential person. It is within our power to grant or deny him authority. It is my contention that for the existing requirements of American foreign policy we have hobbled the President by too niggardly a grant of power.

Our institutional arrangements for foreign affairs were drafted in the late 18th century by men who assumed that these affairs would be few and insignificant. The Founding Fathers considered, for instance, that the Department of State would quite possibly wither away from disuse. Nonetheless, these men, deeply imbued with the philosophy that no man is beyond the corrupting influences of power, carefully restricted the authority of the President by the prerogatives of "advice and consent" vested in the Senate, and by the still broader limitations of the legislative process as a whole. As foreign policy has become

increasingly merged with domestic policy, and as its conduct has increasingly involved the expenditure of vast sums, Congressional authority, particularly that of the House of Representatives, has been accordingly enhanced. It is exceedingly difficult—if not impossible—to devise unified policies oriented to a clear and definite conception of the national interest through a system in which power and responsibility for foreign policy are “shared and overlapping.” Policies thus evolved are likely to be ill-co-ordinated, short-ranged, and often unsuccessful, while the responsibility for failure is placed squarely on the President, neither “shared” nor “overlapping.” As President Kennedy said recently: “Success has many fathers; failure is an orphan.” He might have added that every President finds himself the involuntary proprietor of a vast, unruly orphanage.

The President already enjoys far greater authority in foreign affairs than in domestic policy, but it is still authority that falls short of his responsibilities. The President, according to the Supreme Court in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*,<sup>1</sup> is vested with “delicate, plenary, and exclusive powers” in the conduct of foreign affairs. While it is not for me to query the juridical basis of this dictum, I do not think that it is accurate in fact.

The pre-eminent *responsibility* of the President for the formulation and conduct of American foreign policy is clear and unalterable. He has, as Alexander Hamilton defined it, all powers in international affairs “which the Constitution does not vest elsewhere in clear terms.” He possesses sole authority to communicate and negotiate with foreign powers. He controls the external aspects of the Nation’s power, which can be moved by his will alone—the armed forces, the diplomatic corps, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all of the vast executive apparatus. As Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the President has full responsibility, which cannot be shared, for military decisions in a world in which the difference between safety and cataclysm can be a matter of hours or even minutes. The President is the symbol of the nation to the external world, the leader of a vast alliance of free nations, and the prime mover in shaping a national consensus on foreign policy. It is important to note, however, that while this responsibility is indeed very broad, his authority is often infringed upon or thwarted in practice by unauthorized persons.

Each new President, on taking office, inherits a complete foreign policy in being, with roots as far back in the past as Washington’s Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. He must preserve, imple-

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<sup>1</sup> 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

ment, and—in our own time—frequently reshape these broad lines of policy, taking care not to violate the deep psychological bases of our “national character,” or what Walt Rostow calls the “national style.”

The President's power is informally but effectively checked by the workings—or, more precisely, the non-workings—of the sprawling administrative apparatus of government, with its complex subdivisions and overlapping jurisdictions. The Department of State, it is estimated, participates in a vast number of inter-departmental committees dealing with problems of foreign policy. The road between a Presidential directive and its practical implementation is long and tortuous. The complexity and seemingly built-in inertia of the bureaucracy make it much easier and much safer on the operative level to continue time-honored routines than to embark upon new initiatives. It is much easier and much safer to pursue policies which proved to be successful ten years ago, but which have been made obsolete by recent events, than to try to meet recent events by novel and perhaps risky policy changes.

In a statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau summed up the situation in these words:

The executive branch of the government is constituted in such a way, particularly with regard to the conduct of foreign policy, as to make it virtually impossible to pursue consistently a dynamic foreign policy which takes the initiative away from the enemy and which is mobile enough to answer effectively sudden challenges which may confront us.

Calling for drastic simplification of the processes of bureaucracy, Professor Morgenthau declared:

I think it is not by accident that Mr. Dulles to a great extent disregarded the institutional processes of foreign policy formulation and reached many important decisions without reference to them. It is the only thing he could have done when he was confronted with a task which required immediate decision.

The principal subordinate of the President in the foreign policy process is, of course, the Secretary of State. The Office of the Secretary of State, unlike its counterpart in most parliamentary democracies, is scarcely defined in institutional terms. The Secretary is the creature of the President, with as extensive or restricted powers as the President may choose to give him. The President can take his counsel from whomsoever he chooses. President Wilson, for example, relied heavily on Colonel House, who held no official position, and virtually ignored Secretary Lansing, whom he neither liked nor trusted. President Roosevelt relied little on Secretary Hull and was in great measure

"his own Secretary of State." Under President Eisenhower, on the other hand, Secretary Dulles seemed at times to be exercising those "delicate, plenary, and exclusive powers" which are supposed to be vested in the President.

The lack of clear institutionalization in the office of the Secretary of State, as well as the absence of a continuing corps of high-level professionals in the Department of State, in sufficient numbers and quality, *add* a most deplorable element of disorder and amateurism to the inherent defects of an overly complex bureaucracy.

The overriding problem of inadequate Presidential authority in foreign affairs, however, derives not from the internal relationships within the executive branch, but from the "checks and balances" of Congressional authority in foreign relations. While Congress has many powers under the Constitution, having to do with foreign affairs, these powers do not enable the Congress to initiate or shape foreign policy, but to implement, modify, or thwart the proposals of the President. These powers, moreover, are widely dispersed within Congress, distributed among autonomous committees each under a chairman who owes little if anything in the way of political obligation to the President.

Besides the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the principal centers of foreign policy power in Congress are the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees in each House. The Appropriations Committees are particularly sensitive to the preservation of their prerogatives against executive incursions, with the result that it is all but impossible to secure funds on a long-range basis. The Mutual Program, one of the keystones of our foreign policy, is put in jeopardy annually by the lengthy ritual of hearings, debates, and amendments to the President's proposals. The Secretary of State and other high officials are obliged to expend prodigious amounts of time and energy in shepherding their programs through the glacial legislative process. For any given program, an Administration spokesman must usually appear four times before Congressional units, before the authorizing Committees of each House and then before the two Appropriations Committees.

The appropriations process in Congress, moreover, is governed by a basically faulty attitude. The central consideration is invariably *money* rather than *policy*. The annual debate on foreign aid is focused on the single question: How much money ought we to spend? Instead the truly vital question should be: What kind of policy ought we to have? It is policy that should be determined first, and this determination should provide us with the rationale by which it is decided how much we ought

to spend. As Professor Morgenthau said when he testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1959:

If you ask me how much money we ought to spend, I couldn't tell you. I would say we ought to spend sufficient money to keep India going. This might be twice as much as we are willing to appropriate or half as much. I wouldn't know. . . .

These difficulties are further compounded by the premium which our political system places on localism and parochialism. Foreign policy is scarcely ever the crucial factor in the election of Congressmen. The rise of a successful politician to power in the United States bespeaks an impressive measure of skill in two areas: the ability to satisfy the domestic needs and desires of a substantial portion of our citizenry, and the ability to manipulate political machinery with shrewdness and deftness. At no point in his rise to powerful office does the typically successful politician find it imperative to school himself in the requirements and problems of foreign policy. Indeed his preoccupation with local matters and with political machinery is virtually *bound* to prevent him from acquiring any breadth or depth of knowledge in the field of foreign affairs.

With their excessively parochial orientation, Congressmen are acutely sensitive to the influence of private pressure and to the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our foreign relations. Walter Lippmann, as astute an observer of the political process as we have in American journalism, contends that public opinion consistently lags a generation behind in its attitudes and assessments of international relations. The tyranny of public opinion, says Lippmann, imposes upon our policy-makers a "compulsion to make mistakes." The poet Yeats was not wholly wrong when he laid down this harsh pronouncement on public opinion: "The best lack all conviction—the worst are filled with passionate intensity."

These views may be overstated, but they are not wholly without merit, and I point to them in order to stress the point that public opinion must be educated and led if it is to bolster a wise and effective foreign policy. Only the President can provide the guidance that is necessary, while legislators display a distressing tendency to adhere to the dictates of public opinion, or at least to its vocal and organized segments.

I return now to my basic question: Are our formal political institutions basically inadequate for the requirements of our foreign policy? Harlan Cleveland, former Dean of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse and now Assistant Secretary of State for

International Organization Affairs, stated the problem succinctly when he commented: "We know in our hearts that we are in the world for keeps, yet we are still tackling twenty-year problems with five-year plans staffed with two-year personnel with one-year appropriations."

And there is wisdom for the present in Abraham Lincoln's words:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate for the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act *anew*. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country.

The question I put, without presuming to offer solutions, is whether in the face of the harsh necessities of the 1960's we can afford the luxury of 18th century procedures of measured deliberation. It is highly unlikely that we can successfully execute a long-range program for the taming, or containing, of today's aggressive and revolutionary forces by continuing to leave vast and vital decision-making powers in the hands of a decentralized, independent-minded, and largely parochial-minded body of legislators. The Congress, as Woodrow Wilson put it, is a "disintegrated ministry," a jealous center of power with a built-in antagonism for the Executive.

I have no objection to this arrangement in its own terms, and I wish that the conditions of tranquility in which this system flourished were still in existence. They are not, however, and I submit that the price of democratic survival in a world of aggressive totalitarianism is to give up some of the democratic luxuries of the past. We should do so with no illusions as to the reasons for its necessity. It is distasteful and dangerous to vest the executive with powers unchecked and unbalanced. My question is whether we have any choice but to do so.

Another aspect of the question of the appropriateness of our institutional structure for the effective formulation and conduct of our foreign policy is the dual role which the President of the United States is compelled to fill. He is both head of state and head of government, both King and Prime Minister. If he fails to fulfill the requirements of either of these roles with skill and success, he seriously jeopardizes his effectiveness in the other. President Truman was in many respects a forceful and imaginative head of government, but his failure to make his own person a living symbol of the unity and dignity of the nation contributed to the unbridled partisanship of the early fifties which did grave damage to both his foreign and domestic policies. President Eisenhower, on the other hand, was an exemplary head of state, a virtual personification of the American ideal, but his failure to exercise the *full* measure of his powers



and duties as "Prime Minister" was the cause of basic failures and omissions in our foreign policy. President Roosevelt was relieved, because of his physical afflictions, from some of the ceremonial duties required of other Presidents, with the result that he was probably a more effective head of government for this very reason.

Perhaps it is too much to ask one man to formulate and execute national policy, both foreign and domestic, and at the same time to preside benignly over the opening of the baseball season, to present an award to the outstanding boy scout of the year, to crown a beauty queen, and to participate enthusiastically in very ceremonial aspect of our national life.

In neither the parliamentary nor totalitarian systems of government is the Executive called upon to exercise this dual function. While the President's time is consumed and his efforts diluted by innumerable diversions of ceremony, such world leaders as Macmillan and Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung are able to focus the full weight of their formidable talents and energy on the charting of national policy. I believe we should find some way to relieve the President of the burdens and diversions of ceremony. I do not know exactly how, or even whether, this can be done, but I submit that we should try to devise some means of divorcing the duties of the King from those of the Prime Minister.

Let me consider briefly some of the contrasting techniques of policy formation utilized by both friendly and hostile foreign powers.

The outstanding characteristic of the British parliamentary system, by contrast with our own, is the single line of power and responsibility for the initiative, execution, and control of national policy that runs from the Prime Minister and the Party leadership through the Cabinet and Parliament. With a disciplined party majority in the House of Commons, a British Prime Minister can count upon solid legislative support in virtually all aspects of policy. The Cabinet itself is collectively responsible to Parliament and must give regular accounts of its stewardship through weekly "question hours."

Besides the immense advantages of unified control and responsibility, the Prime Minister is free of the burdens of ceremony and ritual, which are admirably borne by the Queen. The Prime Minister need not take even the time to deliver his own "state of the union message." The Queen performs this service in her annual "Speech from the Throne."

The Prime Minister has final responsibility for the formulation and conduct of British foreign policy, and, unlike the President, he has commensurate authority.

In comparing the powers of the Prime Minister and the President

of the United States, the President would appear to have two advantages. He has, first of all, a fixed term of office, no matter how unpopular he may be with Congress or with the voters, he has the constitutional right to retain his office and exercise its powers until the next quadrennial election. The second *apparent* advantage is that the President is supreme within his Cabinet, which has no constitutional status and need not be consulted at all by the President.

Both of these advantages lose a good deal in practice. While the Prime Minister is technically subject to a Parliamentary expression of "no confidence," any Prime Minister who enters office with a safe party majority is, to all intents and purposes, as sure of his five years in office as the President is of his four. And if the Prime Minister is more restricted by the views of his Cabinet colleagues, he is nonetheless usually in a position to exercise preponderant influence in Cabinet deliberations. The Prime Minister's most significant advantage over the President is the extent of his control over Parliament, which, far from being a co-equal partner, is for legislative purposes virtually an assembly under his control.

British foreign policy on the operational level has two distinct advantages over its American counterpart: a Foreign Secretary who occupies an institutionally defined and constitutionally sanctioned office and a professionalized Foreign Office with built-in procedures for continuity of administration regardless of changes of government.

While the American Secretary of State is directly responsible to the President and to no one else, serves only at his pleasure, and may be overridden by the President at any time, the British Foreign Secretary is usually a major political figure in his own right with a long experience and thorough knowledge of the Parliament, ranking high in his party, and being constitutionally responsible to the Cabinet and Parliament as well as to the Prime Minister. The power exercised by the Secretary of State essentially depends on the personality and will of the President. No British Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, has been or could be relegated to quite the ignominy that Lansing suffered under Wilson, or could exercise such great authority as did John Foster Dulles. There are, of course, variations. Anthony Eden played a decidedly secondary role under Churchill, much as Hull did under Roosevelt, but the office and position of Foreign Secretary remain relatively stable.

A change of Administrations in the United States is accompanied by a radical re-staffing of the top policy positions in the Department of State. The result is a periodical infusion of officials often inexperienced

in the exercise of governmental power and responsibility. In Britain, on the other hand, a high degree of administrative continuity and professionalism is assured by the existence of a Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who serves as the head of the corps of permanent officials, including the Foreign Service, and who holds office regardless of changes of government. The Permanent Under-Secretary is always at the right hand of a new Foreign Secretary to advise him in the intricacies and prospects of current issues and in the assembling of information and documentation, and to caution him against courses of action which might depart from historic policies or lead the nation into unwarranted or dangerous commitments.

By contrast with Great Britain, the United States suffers from chronic amateurism among the men who bear the chief burdens of decision-making and foreign policy execution. Many of our policy makers have acquired wisdom and vision in the conduct of foreign affairs, but it has all too often been by on-the-job training. Under present circumstances, the conduct of our foreign policy requires an infusion of rigorous professionalism. The trials and errors of untried leaders were of little moment to the affairs of an isolated republic in the 19th century. In the mid-twentieth century, the errors and vacillations of amateurism can quite readily lead to irretrievable, indeed cataclysmic, disasters.

Further light may be thrown on the inadequacies of American foreign policy procedures by an attempt to penetrate the Alice-in-Wonderland façade of Communist institutions with a view to locating the true centers of power in Moscow and Peking.

While the elaborate structure of Soviet "institutions" is replete with checks and obstacles, by contrast with which the American Constitution is a monument of efficiency, these inconveniences are evaded by the simple and effective expedient of overriding institutional obstacles wherever they interfere with the dictates of policy, which is practically everywhere.

The institutions of the state in both the Soviet Union and Communist China are subordinate at all levels to the parallel institutions of the Communist Party, which in turn are subordinate to the will and dynamic personal interaction of a few powerful men exercising undefined and virtually unlimited powers.

The centralization of power in the Presidium of the Communist Party is the overriding characteristic of the Soviet system. Such policy decisions as are deemed appropriate are reported to the representative organs of the Party and state, either for information and propaganda purposes or for the formality of automatic approval. The Presidium

in fact is a self-perpetuating body of individuals who, though nominally "elected" by the Central Committee, hold their positions by virtue of their administrative ability, their prowess in the internal political struggles and intrigues of the Kremlin, and their loyalty to the current dictator.

The operations of the Presidium, unlike those of a Western Cabinet, must be understood almost entirely in personal rather than institutional terms. The overriding objective in the shaping of policy, both foreign and domestic, is to get the job done, and if machinery or legal tape poses obstructions, it is ignored or overridden.

From his vantage point at the apex of both party and government hierarchies, reinforced by his unmeasurable personal authority, Khrushchev exercises virtually unrestricted control of Soviet foreign policy. He does not rule in the high-handed fashion of Stalin, being by nature gregarious, extroverted, and garrulous, and he appears to have delegated substantial authority to trusted subordinates. Mikoyan, for example, is Khrushchev's closest adviser in foreign affairs. In addition to his pre-eminent political power in a totally centralized system, Khrushchev has also proclaimed himself to be chief of state, a ceremonial dignity which he finds convenient in his visits to foreign countries.

One would suppose that these all-encompassing powers and duties would impose upon Khrushchev a far heavier burden of detail and ceremony than those which afflict the President of the United States, but such is not the case. For reasons which are not wholly clear, Khrushchev finds ample time to reflect at leisure on the goals and means of Soviet policy. Walter Lippmann reports that during his recent Soviet visit, he was received by Khrushchev for an interview that lasted eight hours, during which time the Chairman was troubled by no interruptions and appeared to be completely relaxed and free from the distractions which plague our high officials.

The evidence is thus impressive that while the Soviet leader has virtually unlimited authority to act vigorously and decisively, to change courses with dispatch, and to focus the vast resources of the Soviet Union on any objective which he deems pre-eminent; he also has the time and the temperament that allow him to think and talk at length and to chart long-range policy goals.

What is true of the Soviet Union and Khrushchev appears to be even more true of Communist China and Mao Tse-tung. Like its Soviet counterpart, the Chinese Communist Party has absorbed the elaborate institutions of state, and pre-eminent power is lodged in the Party Politburo, the equivalent of the Soviet Party Presidium. Within the

Politburo there is a standing committee composed of the highest ranking members of the larger body. The leadership of this inner core consists of Mao Tse-tung, First Secretary of the Party, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the Republic, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the Government. These three men, and especially Mao, hold in their hands the real nucleus of power in Communist China.

Mao feels that his all-important position in policy formulation requires freedom from administration and ceremonial tasks. In 1959 he gave up the office of Chairman of the Republic and he now holds no position in government, allowing himself ample time for the consideration and reflective thinking that he regards as the essential prerequisite to sound policy formulation. In recent years he has apparently made very little attempt to intervene in matters of detail and has for the most part left the execution of programs to his trusted subordinates.

Confronted with adversaries who are thus able to focus unrestrained personal power and vast resources on the advancement of a grand design that, if realized, will mean the destruction of free institutions in the United States and throughout the world, the President of the United States is obliged to organize and lead the defense of the free world through the use of institutions and processes that were designed for a radically different world of almost two centuries ago. I do not contend that we should abandon these institutions, for their preservation constitutes the very core of our national interest. Nor do I offer at this juncture a blueprint for the overhaul of our national policy machinery. I do contend, however,—very urgently—that the American people and their leaders must give prompt and serious thought to the need for major changes in the cumbersome procedures of our foreign policy formulation.

As the leader of a beleaguered community of free nations, the United States is under the most pressing compulsion to form wise and far-sighted policies, oriented to a clearly conceived concept of the national interest and implemented by carefully devised and firmly co-ordinated specific lines of action. The essence of this compulsion is the conferral of greatly increased authority on the President, coupled with relief from many of his ceremonial duties. The President alone can act to mobilize our power and resources toward the realization of clearly defined objectives and to wean the American people and their representatives from the luxuries of parochialism and self-indulgence that they can no longer afford. The enhancement of Presidential power is, as I have said, a disagreeable and dangerous prospect. It is seen to be a compelling necessity, however, when set against the alternative of

immobility, which can only lead to consequences immeasurably more disagreeable and dangerous.

Even in the 1830's, De Tocqueville was able to say:

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient . . . a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the presence of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual, or to an aristocracy."



119

~~1. Summary~~  
2. Pres file

Monday  
October 2, 1967

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Portrait by a Venezuelan  
Artist**

Our Ambassador in Venezuela, Maurice Bernbaum, has been given a large portrait of you (see picture at Tab A) by a local artist, Rafael Salas Yepex. He thought it so good that he hung it in the main lobby of the Embassy in Caracas.

In view of the unusually fine quality of this particular work, State recommends that you send the artist a letter and autographed picture (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - Presidential portrait by artist Rafael Salas Yepex of Venezuela.

Tab B - Suggested Presidential letter to the artist, with an autographed picture.

119a


October 2, 1967

Dear Senor Sales:

I was most pleased to receive from  
Ambassador Bernbaum a color photo-  
graph of the oil portrait which you did  
of me and which you so graciously  
presented to our Embassy in Caracas.

Please accept my personal thanks and  
my best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style. The "LBJ" is written in a larger, more prominent script than the name "Lyndon B. Johnson".

Sr. Rafael Sales Yepes  
Caracas  
Venezuela

LBJ: WGB:mm  
10/2/67

120

*Pres file*

Copy for Mr. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Rene Maheu, Director-General of UNESCO  
(11:30 a.m., Tuesday, October 3)

Bill Benton requested this meeting, your first with Maheu. Maheu has been head of UNESCO since 1961, and is a candidate for re-election next year. We can work with him, although we regard him somewhat as an empire-builder, pushing for considerable increases in UNESCO's budget. Maheu has overwhelming support for re-election, and there is no other candidate in sight.

Talking Points

1. Tell Maheu we support his re-election. (Secretary Rusk recommends you do this.)

2. Praise UNESCO's work in education and educational exchange. (This is the area where we think UNESCO works best, and we are not anxious to encourage a proliferation of activities into areas now handled by FAO, WHO and other UN agencies concerned with economic development.)

3. Express pleasure at Mr. Maheu's and UNESCO's participation in the Conference on the World Crisis in Education, which begins this week in Williamsburg. (Doug Cater plans to send you a separate memorandum on making 1969 International Educational Year, which Maheu might propose at Williamsburg.)

4. Point out the importance of maintaining Congressional support for UNESCO's budget. It is important to limit budget increases, and to justify them with demonstrably effective programs.

5. Express hope that UNESCO will move ahead to help equip a National Technical Center in Phu-tho, Vietnam. (This project costs only \$1 1/2 million in UN funds, but UNESCO involvement in the Revolutionary Development Program is important. UNESCO and the Government of Vietnam signed a Plan of Operation this August and the revised project is pending final UNESCO approval.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By RG, NARA, Date 10-18-91



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Subjects Maheu Might Raise

1. Literacy. Maheu may ask us to coordinate our bilateral literacy programs with UNESCO and give \$10 million through funds-in-trust for pilot projects.

Suggested Reply. Affirm the importance of literacy programs, but note that they must be balanced against other needs of the developing countries. Rather than funds-in-trust, say we prefer to channel our voluntary contributions through the UN Development Program (Paul Hoffman's Special Fund).

2. A Fund for Florence and Venice. Maheu may ask our support for a voluntary campaign to raise \$10 million for Florence and Venice.

Suggested Reply. Point out that American voluntary agencies, including the committee headed by Mrs. Kennedy, have contributed over \$4 million for humanitarian assistance and the restoration of art libraries and architecture.

3. Communication Satellite. Maheu may propose using a communication satellite for an Educational Development Project in India or Brazil.

Suggested Reply. We would be happy to cooperate in a study of the feasibility of a pilot project.

4. Populorum Progressio. Inspired by the Pope's Encyclical, Maheu has proposed a "Peace Conference" to seek radical solutions for the Advanced-Developing Country relationship.

Suggested Reply. A single conference on so broad a range of issues might be unmanageable. UNCTAD will reconvene in several months; and GATT, the UN Economic and Social Council, the Alliance for Progress, OECD and others are working hard on this problem.

\* \* \*

Maheu will be accompanied by Benton, Frankel (CU) and Sisco (IO) of State, and Nat Davis of my office. Maheu's biography is at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ND:gg

CONFIDENTIAL

120a

# BIOGRAPHIC NOTES ON RENE MAHEU

- 62 years old.
- Born at Saint Gaudens, France.
- Taught philosophy at Cologne, London and Morocco.
- French Cultural Attache in London from 1936 to 1939.
- Feature Service Director of the France-Afrique press agency in Algiers from 1943 to 1944.
- Since 1946 a career official in UNESCO.
  - UNESCO Representative at the UN - 1955-1958
  - Acting Director-General - 1961 - 1962
  - Director-General - 1962 -

121

*Pres file*

Monday, October 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is a briefing memo  
from State for your meeting with  
William McMahon.

W. W. Rostow

Att.



1212

McMAHON, William

AUSTRALIA

Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party

Mr. McMahon replaced Mr. Holt as Treasurer when the latter became Prime Minister in January 1966. He previously had been Minister for Labor and National Service since 1958. William McMahon had previously also held the portfolios of Navy and Air, Social Services and Primary Industries since 1951. A practicing lawyer until his war service from 1939 to 1946, McMahon was first elected a Liberal Member of the House of Representatives in 1949 and in 1951 was one of three young and promising Parliamentarians raised to ministerial rank. Skillful in debate, energetic, with a keen, well-trained mind, McMahon is said to have made a splendid record in the handling of his portfolios. He is said to be very well disposed toward the U.S., and traveled extensively in this country and in Europe following his discharge from the army in 1946. He has also made a study of some U.S. legislation, including the Smith Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Internal Security Act of 1950, his interest being stimulated by the Australian Government's anti-Communist program at that time. In 1956, while serving as Minister for Primary Industries, McMahon was elevated to senior cabinet rank.

Born in Sydney on 23 February 1908, McMahon was educated in Sydney and on his release from the army returned to Sydney University to obtain his degree in economics. His service in World War II included the post of staff major under the command of Lt. Gen. Sir John Northcott and later under the command of Lt. Gen. Sir Leslie Morshead. McMahon was married in 1965. His recreations include music and golf.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines  
By fw/vrg, NARA, Date 10-17-00

(Sept. 1966)

121b

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Australian Treasurer  
William McMahon - Monday, October 2 - 1:00 p.m.

### Why He Is Here

Mr. McMahon is taking advantage of his travel to meetings in Rio de Janeiro to confer with officials in Washington. His desire to call on the President while he is here stems from the close relations between Australia and the United States. He is believed to aspire to eventual top leadership of the Australian Liberal Party. He last visited Washington in October 1966, and also called on the President at that time.

### What He Wants to Talk About

Mr. McMahon will be most interested in talking to the President about the problems that most concern Australian and American foreign policy, with Viet-Nam at the top of the list. He may mention negotiations now nearing conclusion between Treasury, the Export-Import Bank, and the Australian Government for access to sources of finance not involving the Interest Equalization Tax. He will be talking to Secretary Fowler about this matter. He also will call on Secretary McNamara with whom he is expected to raise the possibility of a stretch-out on financing arrangements for military equipment purchases, including the F-111.

### U.S. Objectives

Within Australian Cabinet circles, Mr. McMahon is known as favoring considerably stronger measures in Viet-Nam, including escalation of the bombing. The President may wish to give his assessment of the current situation in Viet-Nam and to express our hope that the efforts of Australia and the United States, together with others, will soon prove fruitful.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 94-405

By Julip, NARA, Date 9-25-00



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

3740

1216

1 - Jordan  
2 - Ret.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Australian Treasurer  
William McMahon

The President has agreed to receive Australian Treasurer  
William McMahon, Monday, October 2 at 1:00 P.M. Enclosed are  
a briefing memorandum for the President's use and a biographic  
sketch.

*Carroll Bran*  
for Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Briefing Memorandum.
2. Biographic sketch.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY *sf* ON 10-18-91

~~SECRET~~

Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassification

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BOSTON'S OFFICE

1967 OCT 2 AM 11 07



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

121d

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-405  
By inf, NARA, Date 3-29-95

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Meeting with Australian Treasurer  
William McMahon

The President has agreed to meet with William McMahon,  
Treasurer of Australia, Monday, October 2 at 1:00 P.M.

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~~SECRET~~

Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1212

McMAHON, William

AUSTRALIA

Treasurer and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party

Mr. McMahon replaced Mr. Holt as Treasurer when the latter became Prime Minister in January 1966. He previously had been Minister for Labor and National Service since 1958. William McMahon had previously also held the portfolios of Navy and Air, Social Services and Primary Industries since 1951. A practising lawyer until his war service from 1939 to 1946, McMahon was first elected a Liberal Member of the House of Representatives in 1949 and in 1951 was one of three young and promising Parliamentarians raised to ministerial rank. Skillful in debate, energetic, with a keen, well-trained mind, McMahon is said to have made a splendid record in the handling of his portfolios. He is said to be very well disposed toward the U. S., and traveled extensively in this country and in Europe following his discharge from the army in 1946. He has also made a study of some U. S. legislation, including the Smith Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the Internal Security Act of 1950, his interest being stimulated by the Australian Government's anti-Communist program at that time. In 1956, while serving as Minister for Primary Industries, McMahon was elevated to senior cabinet rank.

Born in Sydney on 23 February 1908, McMahon was educated in Sydney and on his release from the army returned to Sydney University to obtain his degree in economics. His service in World War II included the post of staff major under the command of Lt. Gen. Sir John Northcott and later under the command of Lt. Gen. Sir Leslie Morshead. McMahon was married in 1968. His recreations include music and golf.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

By fulrg, NARA, Date 10-17-00

September 1966

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

MR ROSTOW

Sent 11:58

1967 OCT 1 15 58

VZCZCEEA483  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 2109

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67853

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12333, Sec. 1.4  
NY 94-404  
By cb, NARA, Date 7-20-98

~~SECRET~~

1967 OCT 1 PM 12:15  
SUNDAY

THIS EARLY MORNING CIA SITREP FROM SAIGON IS ABOUT AS GOOD A  
FEEL AS WE'RE LIKELY TO GET UNTIL THEY RECONVENE AT 9 PM  
OUR TIME TONIGHT.

1. WHILE UNCERTAINTY STILL PREVAILS OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE  
PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (PLA) DEBATES ON VALIDATION OF THE  
RESULT, PROPONENTS OF VALIDATION HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR  
PROSPECTS WERE CONSIDERABLY BRIGHTER ON THE MORNING OF 1 OCTOBER.  
PREMIER KY HAD FINALLY, IF NOT FORCEFULLY, URGED HIS DEMOCRATIC  
ALLIANCE BLOC DEPUTIES TO SUPPORT VALIDATION AND  
PRESIDENT ELECT THIEU HAD AT LAST APPEALED BOTH TO THE PATRIOTISM  
AND COMMON SENSE OF RECALCITRANT DEPUTIES AND TO THEIR  
OPENLY EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR SOME FINANCIAL QUID-PRO-QUO.

2. THE MILD EUPHORIA OF ONE PRO-VALIDATION DEPUTY HAD WANED  
SOMEWAT BY MID-AFTERNOON AS SIGNS OF DISCORD, UNHAPPINESS, AND  
VASCILLATION CONTINUED IN THE PRO-VALIDATION CAMP, WHILE OPPONENTS  
OF VALIDATION SEEMED TO REMAIN UNIFIED IN THEIR ACTIONS.  
THE PLA HAD BY ITS NOON RECESS COMPLETED THE HEARING OF  
COMPLAINTS OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES, ACCEPTING 7 MINOR ONES AS  
TECHNICALLY VALID. IN ITS AFTERNOON SESSION BEGINNING AT 1500  
HOURS, THE PLA IS REVIEWING INDIVIDUAL VOTER LISTS FOR FRAUD OR  
IRREGULARITY. A FINAL VOTE ON VALIDATION IS POSSIBLE TONIGHT  
BUT MAY WILL BE DEFERRED TO THE LAST POSSIBLE DEADLINE, TOMORROW.

3. CIVIL AND COMBAT POLICE HAVE THE INDEPENDENCE PALACE AREA  
COMPLETELY CORDONED OFF AND THERE ARE NO LARGE CROWDS IN THE VICINITY.  
SAIGON ITSELF REMAINS QUIET

~~SECRET~~

DTG 011503Z OCT 67



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-403

By lip, NARA, Date 10-24-95

Mr Rostow  
Sent 12:01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCSEA486  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 2110

1967 OCT 1 16 01

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67834

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIET-NAM: SITUATION

ASSEMBLY HAS RECESSED FOR THE NIGHT. IT WILL RECONVENE AT 9 P.M. OUR TIME TONIGHT.

OF MORE THAN 30 FORMAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE ELECTION, THE ASSEMBLY ACCEPTED SEVEN AS VALID. AMONG THE LATTER WERE: 1) KY'S THREAT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT; 2) THIEU'S TV SPEECH AFTER THE CAMPAIGN ENDED; 3) TWO COUNTS OF BALLOT SHORTAGES; 4) TWO COUNTS OF ILLEGAL MOVEMENT OF BALLOT BOXES; 5) ONE REPORT OF A VOTER WITH THREE ELECTION CARDS.

THE ASSEMBLY WILL RECONVENE TO DISCUSS TECHNICAL IRREGULARITIES--MISTAKES IN VOTE TALLIES, INVALID BALLOTS, ETC.

THE BEST GUESS IS THAT THE ASSEMBLY MAY REACH A FINAL VOTE ON ELECTION VALIDATION SOMETIME AFTER MIDNIGHT. BUT THEY COULD GO RIGHT DOWN TO THE WIRE--NOON TOMORROW OUR TIME.

BUNKER STILL THINKS THE FINAL VOTE WILL BE TO VALIDATE--BUT THE MARGIN MAY BE VERY NARROW. IT WILL DEPEND ON HOW HARD THIEU AND HIS PEOPLE WORK OVERNIGHT--AND HOW FAR KY WANTS TO PUSH HIS CAMPAIGN TO PROVE HE IS INDISPENSABLE.

DTG 011529Z OCT 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESERVATION COPY

1967 OCT 1 PM 12:08  
SUNDAY

124  
1967 OCT 1 15

*Pres file*

67 OCT 1 PM 12:16

SUNDAY

VZCZCEEA484  
OO WTE18  
DE WTE 2108

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH70498

UNCLAS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW.

FOLLOWING TWO MESSAGES DETAIL DAMAGE IN MEXICO FROM  
"BEULAH".

MESSAGE 1.

1. HIGHLIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN AFTERMATH OF HURRICANE "BEULAH" IN MEXICO, ACCORDING TO MEXICAN PRESS, WAS REPORT SEPT 29 BY HYDRAULIC RESOURCES MINISTER JOSE HERNANDEZ TERAN ON VARIOUS FLOODED AND FLOOD-THREATENED AREAS OF COUNTRY.
2. TERAN REPORTED HIS MAIN CONCERN AT PRESENT WAS RAGING SALSAS RIVER IN GUERRERO STATE WHICH WAS DUMPING 20,000 CUBIC METERS OF WATER PER SECOND INTO EL INFIERNILLO DAM AND ALMOST AS MUCH INTO AS YET UNCOMPLETED LA VILLITA DAM. A NUMBER OF VILLAGES BELOW LATTER ARE BEING EVACUATED AS PRECAUTION AGAINST ITS POSSIBLE COLLAPSE.
3. HYDRAULIC RESOURCES SECRETARY SAID THREAT OF GENERAL FLOODING OF MATAMOROS AREA APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN RELIEVED BY EMERGENCY ENGINEERING MEASURES TO LOWER RIO GRANDE BUT WARNED THAT "THE WATER LEVEL IS STILL HIGH AND THIS, TOGETHER WITH STRONG NORTH WINDS, COULD CAUSE SOME DIKES TO BREAK. IN THIS CASE, NEW AREAS COULD BE INVUNDATED AND SITUATION OF MATAMOROS COULD ONCE AGAIN BECOME CRITICAL."

4. OTHER AREAS STILL THREATENED BY FLOOD WATERS ARE LOCATED IN STATE OF GUERRERO, LERMA RIVER BASIN AND AREA OF LAKE CHAPALA IN JALISCO AND MICHUACAN STATES BUT OTHER WISE HIGH WATERS WERE REPORTED TO BE RECEDING ALL OVER MEXICO. TERAN DESCRIBED DAMAGES WHICH FLOODS AND HIGH WINDS HAD CAUSED IN MANY PARTS OF COUNTRY AS THE MOST SERIOUS IN COUNTRY'S HISTORY. AN ESTIMATED 200,000 PERSONS IN 12 STATES HAVE BEEN MADE HOMELESS, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, BY HIGH WATERS BUT LOSS OF LIFE HAS BEEN VERY LIGHT DUE TO EARLY WARNINGS AND STRENUOUS EVACUATION EFFORTS.

5. SIX U.S. HELICOPTERS, SENT TO ACAPULCO BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON AT REQUEST OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ, WERE AT WORK YESTERDAY AND TODAY EVACUATING STRANDED PEOPLE IN STATE OF GUERRERO AND DELIVERING EMERGENCY FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES. MEXICAN GOVERNMENT HAS 54 AIRPLANES AND 13 HELICOPTERS ENGAGED IN SAME OPERATIONS.

6. ALMOST EVERY MEXICAN GOVERNMENT AGENCY, ACTING UNDER PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS, IS NOW ENGAGED IN AIDING STRIKEN POPULATION AND IN REPORTING THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY HURRICANE AND HIGH WATERS WHICH FOLLOWED. AMONG MOST ACTIVE ARE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC WORKS MINISTRIES WHICH ARE ENGAGED IN RESTORING COUNTRY'S BADLY DAMAGED HIGHWAY SYSTEM TO USE AND REESTABLISHING BROKEN TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS. ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT ROADS, THAT LINKING MEXICO CITY TO ACAPULCO, IS REPORTED OPEN AGAIN WITH SEVERAL DETOURS ESTABLISHED AROUND FALLEN BRIDGES.

7. A FREAK DEVELOPMENT RESULTING FROM EXTRAORDINARY HIGH WATER IN CUERNAVACA AREA WAS ABRUPT APPEARANCE OF NEW RIVER IN MIDDLE OF A TENNIS COURT IN THAT CAPITAL OF STATE OF MORELOS. ENGINEERS, WHO HAD TO KNOCK DOWN A WALL TO LET STREAM FLOW OUT OF COURT, ESTIMATED ITS FLOW AT 230 CUBIC METERS PER SECOND.



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1. THERE FOLLOW SUMMARIES OF REPORTS BY SOME AMERICAN CONSULATES AND CONSUL GENERALS SUMMARY REPORT OF HURRICANE AND/OR FLOOD DAMAGE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS.

2. MERIDA: HURRICANE DESTROYED ABOUT 50 PERCENT CORN CROP AND ESTIMATED 100 MILLION PESOS HENNEQUEN LEAVES ARE AFFECTED BY SERIOUS BLIGHT. THOUSANDS OF BEEHIVES DESTROYED AND HONEY PRODUCTION CUT SHARPLY. DIKES OF SALINAS OF THE NORTHEAST BROKEN AND SALT PRODUCTION TEMPORARILY STOPPED. MANY FISHING CRAFT EAST COAST WRECKED BUT FISHING FLEET NORTH COAST SUFFERED NO HEAVY LOSSES. ON COZUMEL ISLAND TWO LARGEST HOTELS WRECKED BUT BACK IN SERVICE MID-OCT. HEAVY IMPORTS OF CORN WILL BE REQUIRED FORTHCOMING YEAR. GENERAL RESULT OF STORM WILL BE ADDITIONAL SEVERE IMPOVERISHMENT OF LOWER ECONOMIC SECTORS OF POPULATION.

3. NAZATLAN: SERIOUS FLOOD DAMAGE DURING PAST TWO WEEKS. NATARIT FLOOD AREA FOOD STOCK DWINDLING, BUT NOT YET CRITICAL SOME FOOD BROUGHT BY GOVERNMENT HELICOPTERS AND TRUCK.

4. TAMPICO: EXCEPT FOR LOW LYING AREAS TAMPICO PRACTICALLY NORMAL. UTILITIES AND SCHOOLS OPERATING AS USUAL. COTTON CROP PROBLEM MUST BE LOOKED AT SEPERATELY. LOCAL COTTON ASSOCIATION ESTIMATES 50 PERCENT OF AREA PLANTED NOW LOST AS RESULT EXCESS RAINFALL. REMAINDER WILL REQUIRE COSTLY WEED AND INSECT CONTROL. SOME COMPANIES MAY BE UNWILLING INVEST FURTHER IN THIS YEAR'S CROP. ALTHOUGH PROPERTY DAMAGE SMALL AND NO LOSS OF LIVES REPORTED, SOME PEOPLE SEE ECONOMIC SITUATION AS FOREBODING WITH MONEY IN CIRCULATION THIS AREA CUT BACK 300 TO 500 MILLION PESOS UNDER NORMAL EXPECTATIONS.

5. TIJUANA: NO KNOWN DAMAGE WHATSOEVER FROM HURRICANE AND/OR FLOODS.

6. HERMOSILLO: DAMAGE AND FLOODING NEGLIGIBLE. NO REPORTED DEATHS OR INJURIES. ALL FACILITIES, INSTITUTIONS, SUPPLIES NORMAL.

7. GUADALAJARA: SOME FLOODING IN LAKE CHAPALA AREA IN JALISCO. AREA AROUND LA BARCA, JALISCO AND BRISENAS, MICHOACAN SUFFERED SOME CROP DAMAGE NOT CONSIDERED MAJOR AT THIS POINT. FOOD AND WATER SUPPLIES SO FAR ADEQUATE. TRANSPORTATION IN MOST AREAS NORMAL.

8. NUEVO LAREDO: NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE SUFFERED FROM HURRICANE, ALTHOUGH SOME BAD FLOODING LOW AREAS POOR QUARTERS OF NUEVA CIUDAD GUERRERO. EXTENT DAMAGE NOT YET KNOWN.

9. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM OTHER CONSULATES WILL BE SENT AS RECEIVED.

FREEMAN

DTG 011445Z OCT 67

GPS 982 INI 982

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY