

## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

178

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#1a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Tehran</del> <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i> <del>S 2 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#2a cable	Paris 5199 S 2 p <i>Sanitized 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i>	10/13/67	A
#2b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>SANITIZED 7/26/95 NLS 94-417</i>	10/14/67	A
#2c cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p " " " <i>Same Sani NLS 019-024-1</i>	10/14/67	A
<del>#4a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Seoul</del> <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i> <del>C 1 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4b cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Kuala Lumpur</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i>	<del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4c cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Saigon</del> <del>S 2 p</del> " "	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#4d cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Saigon</del> <del>S 1 p</del> " "	<del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#5a cable	London 2956 C 1 p <i>Sanitized 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i>	10/67	A
<del>#10 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m.</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 12-1-94 NLS 94-272</i> [Duplicate of #25, NSF, Country File, Latin America, General, Vol. 6]	<del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#10a memo</del>	<del>Katzenbach to President</del> <del>C 3 p</del> <i>open 12-7-97 NLS 94-270</i> [Duplicate of #25a, NSF, Country File, Latin America, General, Vol. 6]	<del>10/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#10b rpt</del>	<del>"For Handling Acquisition..."</del> <i>open 12/16/09</i> <del>C 3 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

238

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. <i>sanitized 2-24-93 NLJ 91-32</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 5-16-01 NLJ 00-189 more info released</i> [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	10/14/67	A
#12a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>exempt 3-27-97 NLJ 95-318</i> S 3 p <i>Exempt 7/26/95 NLJ 94-419</i> [Duplicate of #92a, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	10/13/67	A
#14 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 12-2-95 NLJ 94-420</i></del>	<del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#15a cable	<del>Saigon 8432</del> <del>TS 2 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-417</i></del>	<del>10/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 9:40 a.m. S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 7/26/95 NLJ 94-419 12-2-95 NLJ 94-420</i>	10/14/67	A
#16a rpt	Intelligence Report S 4 p <i>sanitized 7/26/95 NLJ 94-419</i> <i>Same seri NLJ 019-024-1</i>	10/67	A
#17b cable	<del>Westmoreland's Military Assessment</del> <del>S 16 p <i>open 7/10/96 NLJ CBS7</i></del>	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#18 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>open 8/11/95 NLJ 94-418</i> <del>S 3 p <i>open 5-12-95 NLJ 94-177</i></del>	<del>10/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#20a memo	<del>Katzenbach to President</del> <del>C 2 p <i>open 7-5-95 NLJ 94-417</i></del> [Duplicate of #12a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3D(1) 1/66-1/69, Prisoners of War (General Material," Box 81)]	<del>10/12/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#22a memcon	<del>Rostow and Evron</del> <del>S 2 p <i>open 8/11/95 NLJ 94-418</i></del> [Duplicate of #112a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7, Exempt 1981]	<del>10/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#23 memo	Rostow to President <i>sanitized 2-24-93 NLJ 91-32</i> S 1 p <i>Same seri NLJ 019-024-1</i> [Duplicate of #94, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	10/13/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

378

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#24 memo	Rostow to President <del>C</del> 1 p	10/13/67	A
#26a airgram	Rangoon A-54 S 7 p Exempt 1-26-95 NLJ 94-417	10/3/67	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President <del>S</del> 2 p OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418	10/13/67	A
#32a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <del>S</del> 1 p Open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-417 Dup. #114a, NSF, CF, W, "8A2" Box 04.	10/13/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. <del>S</del> 1 p Open 7/17/00 NY 00-191 [Duplicate of #76, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	10/12/67	A
#34a ltr	Rusk to Eban <del>S</del> 1 p Open NLJ 96-273 (5/98) [Duplicate of #76a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Sanitized 1979]	10/12/67	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, re: Cuba S 1 p Sanitized 12-2-95 NLJ 94-420 [Near duplicate of #17, NSF, Country File, Cuba, "WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3; Declassified NLJ 89-51]	10/12/67	A
#36a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p SAME SANITIZATION 7/26/95 NY 94-419 [Duplicate of #17a, NSF, Country File, Cuba, "WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3] (Sanitized 1992)	10/11/67	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, re: Puerto Rico <del>C</del> 1 p OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418	10/12/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President <del>S</del> 1 p " " "	10/12/67	A
#38a rpt	"Issues and Positions on a Mid-East..." <del>S</del> 2 p " " "	10/12/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

478

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#39 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 11/7/00 NLS 00-191</i> [Duplicate of #78, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7; Exempt 1981]	10/12/67	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NLS 94-418</i> [Duplicate of #17a, NSF, Country File, Jamaica, Visit of PM Shearer]	10/12/67	A
#41a cable	Saigon 8347 <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i> S 10 p <i>[near dup #19, NSF, CF, VN, "8 BB(1)" Box 105]</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>[duplicate #22a, NSF, CF, VN, "8 BB(1)" Box 104]</i>	10/12/67	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>sanitized 5-16-01 NLS 00-189</i> [Duplicate of #82d, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	10/12/67	A
#43a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>possible dup of #1A, Intelligence File, Sani [East Berlin] Box 3.</i> PCI 2 p <i>EXEMPT 7/26/95 NLS 94-419</i> <i>Exempt NLS 019-024-1</i>	10/12/67	A
#46a memo	McCafferty to Rostow S 3 p <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NLS 94-418</i>	10/9/67	A
#52 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p " " " [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "10/12/67"]	10/12/67	A
#54b ltr	McMahon to President C 1 p " " "	10/3/67	A
#55a rpt	"Delegation to 10/30 Vietnamese..." C 3 p <i>OPEN 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i>	undated	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NLS 94-418</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "10/12/67"]	10/12/67	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, re: Cuba S 2 p <i>some sanitization 4-3-97 NLS 95-316</i> <i>more info released 12-5-95 NLS 94-420</i> [Duplicate of #57, NSF, Country File, Cuba, <i>some sanitization 7-20-01 NLS 001-019-2-26</i>	10/11/67	A

FILE LOCATION

WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3]  
[Sanitized NLJ 89-51]

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

578

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#59a note	Intelligence Note 774 <del>S</del> 6 p <del>OPEN 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</del> [Duplicate of #57b, NSF, Country File, Cuba, WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3]	<del>9/29/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#59b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p <del>SAME SANITIZATION 7/26/95 NLS 94-419</del> [Duplicate of #57d, NSF, Country File, Cuba, WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3] (sanitized 892) more info released 7-20-01 NLS 001-019-2-27	10/9/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President <del>S</del> 2 p <del>OPEN 8/1/95 NLS 94-419</del>	10/11/67	<del>A</del>
#65 memo	Rostow to President <i>sanitized 2-24-93 NLS 91-32</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #99, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	10/11/67	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>sanitized 12-2-95 NLS 94-420</i> <i>same san NLS 019-024-1</i>	10/11/67	A
#67a memo	Rusk to President <del>C</del> 4 p <i>open 7-5-95 NLS 94-417</i>	10/10/67	<del>A</del>
#70a rpt	<del>Vietnam Political Situation Report</del> <i>OPEN 1-26-95 NLS 94-417</i> <del>C</del> 2 p <i>Dup. # 15a, NSF, CF, VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	10/11/67	<del>A</del>
#73 memo	Rostow to President, 8:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 12-2-95 NLS 94-420</i> <i>same san NLS 019-024-1</i>	10/10/67	A
#73a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <del>EXEMPT 7/26/95 NLS 94-419</del> <i>Sanitized 5/21/01 NLS/RAC 00-265</i>	10/10/67	A
#73b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>SANITIZED 7/26/95 NLS 94-419, same san NLS 019-024-1</i>	10/10/67	A
#74a memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-8-94 NLS 93-319</i> <del>C</del> 5 p <i>Dup. # 4a, NSF, Files of Hamilton, "Foreign Ad-General," Box 5</i>	10/10/67	<del>A</del>
#75a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 7-5-95 NLS 94-417</i> <del>C</del> 1 p	10/3/67	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

678

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#76 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>PCI 1 p OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418</del> [Duplicate of #113, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7]	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76a memo</del>	<del>McPherson to Rostow</del> <del>PCI 1 p OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418</del> [Duplicate of #113, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7]	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76b memcon</del>	<del>Eban and Anderson</del> <i>Open 11/7/00 NY 94-418</i> <del>C 5 p</del> [Duplicate of #113a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1978] <i>Exempt 1-26-95 NY 94-418</i>	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77a memo</del>	<del>Komer to Rostow</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>Open 4-17-95 NY 94-456</i> [Duplicate of #1a, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Komer, Robert W."]	<del>10/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#77b memo</del>	<del>Komer to President</del> <del>S 4 p</del> <i>Open 4-17-95 NY 94-456</i> [Duplicate of #1b, NSF, Files of W. Rostow, "Komer, Robert W."]	<del>10/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#79a cable</del>	<del>Paris 4737</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 1-26-95 NY 94-418</i>	<del>10/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#84 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418</i> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, "October 10, 1967"]	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#85 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418</i>	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#85a memo</del>	<del>Rusk to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>Open 7-5-95 NY 94-417</i>	<del>10/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#86 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>OPEN 8/1/95 NY 94-418</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

178

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#86a memo	<del>Rusk to President</del> <i>open 7-5-95 NLJ 94-417</i> <del>C 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #6a, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	<del>10/9/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#87 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 8/1/95 NLJ 94-418</i>	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#88 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <i>exempt NLJ 91-368</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 11/7/00 NLJ 00-191</i> [Duplicate of #94, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2]	<del>10/10/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#88a cable	<del>Jidda 1356</del> <i>open 11/7/00 NLJ 00-190</i> <del>S 8 p</del> [Duplicate of #94a, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2]	<del>10/5/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#88b cable	Jidda 1357 S 3 p [Duplicate of #94b, NSF, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Vol. 2] <i>Exempt 1-2695 NLJ 94-417</i>	10/5/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 45, 10/10-15/67

Box 23

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

878

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#14a memo	Intelligence report - S 2 pp <i>Sanitized 3-14-05 NW/RAC 04-53</i>	10/13/67	A
#46f report	Addendum B - <i>open 10/28/09</i> TS 3 pp <i>[Dupl. #32F - NSF CF - Vietnam bx 66 "Z41 - I Corps + DMZ"]</i>	<i>n.d.</i>	A
#46g map	Intelligence rpt - <i>open 10/28/09</i> S 1 p <i>[Dupl. #32g - NSF Country File, Vietnam bx 66 "Z41 - I Corps + DMZ"]</i>	<i>10/10/67</i>	A
#46i rpt.	Addendum C - <i>open 10/28/09</i> TS 1 p <i>[Dupl. #32i - NSF Country File, Vietnam bx 66 "Z41 - I Corps + DMZ"]</i>	<i>n.d.</i>	A
#51 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-54</i> TS 1 p	10/12/67	A
#51a cable	Intelligence report - <i>Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-55</i> TS 3 pp	10/11/67	A
#61 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1 p <i>Sanitized 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-54</i>	10/11/67	A
#61a cable	Intelligence report - <i>Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-55</i> TS 2 pp	10/11/67	A

## FILE LOCATION

National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 45, October 10-15, 1967  
Box 23

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



1  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sunday October 15, 1967  
2:15 PM

*Pres. file*

Mr President:

Herewith several further cables concerning the Vice President's trip which would extend it somewhat.

Your clearance on the cables concerning the Vice President's trip would be helpful to set the machinery going after you have made any modifications you may wish to make.

WWR



# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE BY CHECKING  
[ ] CHARGE TO

1a

~~SECRET~~

Classification

Origin

Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy TEHRAN IMMEDIATE  
AmEmbassy TUNIS IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

Subject: Vice Presidential Visit

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-417  
By C6, NARA, Date 1-20-95

1. The Vice President has been designated official US representative at inauguration GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon October 30 - November 1. Following inauguration, Vice President proposes make abbreviated version of Far East Swing which had been planned last June. Stops would include only Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta. From Djakarta, Vice President would be going on to Tehran November 6.

2. FOR TEHRAN: Vice President would propose arriving late afternoon November 6 and would leave for Tunis early morning November 9. Ascertain from GOI if such a visit convenient at this time. Visit would be largely ceremonial and non-substantive. We would see a schedule emphasizing Iranian social and economic progress but with sufficient time for rest built into it. Please forward results from

Walker:

Tel. Ext.  
5381

Classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Read

NEA - Little

AF - Palmer

Vice President's Office - Mr. Van D.

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FORM DS-322

PRESERVATION COPY



Page 02 of telegram to Tehran & Tunis -NODIS-

~~SECRET~~

*Classification*

demarche by immediate cable.

3. FOR TUNIS: Vice President would propose/arrive ~~arriving~~ Tunis  
mid-morning November 9 and depart for Washington early afternoon,  
November 10. Please forward your suggestions for program by  
immediate cable.

END

PRESERVATION COPY



2  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON *Pres file*

Sunday Oct. 15, 1967  
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

The marked passages in these three items are mildly interesting especially the emphasis on the Chinese role in Hanoi and the alleged arrival of a high level mission from Peking on Oct. 7 in Hanoi.

It is possible we shall have a message in Paris this coming week via the week-end courier who appeared to operate Hanoi, Prague, Paris.

But we shall see.

W.W.R.





Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

2a

PAGE 01 PARIS 05199 132225Z

8

ACTION SS 70

INFO 1070 W

R 131815Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6546  
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 831  
USMISSION NATO 009

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-417  
By cb, NARA, Date 1-20-95

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 5199

LIMDIS

SUBJ: VIEWS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN HANOI

REF: PARIS 5125

1. DURING FOLLOW-UP CONVERSATION OCT 12 ON SOVIET ATTITUDES  
ON VIETNAM, [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(3)  
LET EMBOFF READ TELEGRAM FROM HANOI OF WHICH PORTION CITED REFTEL.

PAGE 2 RUFNCR 5199 ~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM REPORTED RECENT CONVERSATION OF FRENCH DELEGATE GENERAL  
DE QUIRIELLE WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO DRV. REACTIONS OF DE  
QUIRIELLE WERE NOT REPORTED. SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID FOLLOWING:  
(A) REFERRING TO INCIDENT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE'S STATEMENT  
AT CHICOM NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION, SOV AMB COMMENTED "CHINESE  
DID NOT HELP THEMSELVES BY THIS INCIDENT." (SOURCE COMMENTED  
THAT CHINESE HAD RECENTLY BEEN PUTTING "GREAT IDEOLOGICAL PRESSURE"  
ON HANOI AND REMARK WAS MADE IN THIS CONTEXT.)  
(B) REFERRING TO HANOI'S POSITION BETWEEN CHINA AND USSR, SOV  
AMB SAID USSR "DID NOT WANT PUT HANOI IN POSITION OF HAVING TO  
MAKE CHOICE."

SECRET

OVER





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 PARIS 05199 132225Z

(C) SOV AMB THEN DISCUSSED WAR, PICTURING IT AS GOING WELL FOR COMMUNIST SIDE. HE SAID SAMs WERE PROVING EFFECTIVE, THAT ONE SAM HAD KNOCKED OUT THREE US PLANES, THAT HE THOUGHT US NOW HAD TO COUNT ON 10 PER CENT LOSSES IN SORTIES. HE ADDED THAT WAR GOING WELL ENOUGH THAT NEXT DRY SEASON US WOULD NOT BE ABLE TAKE OFFENSIVE. (SOURCE COMMENTED THAT HE DISCOUNTED GOOD BIT OF THIS.)

(D) AFTER DISCUSSING NEW FLN PROGRAM (REFTEL), SOV AMB SAID HE DID NOT SEE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS STARTING SOON. HE

PAGE 3 RUENCR 5199 ~~SECRET~~

CONCLUDED THAT PERSONALLY HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF US BOMBING CEASED THIS WOULD SOON LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS.

PROTECT SOURCE. BOHLEN

~~SECRET~~

28

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~EXC~~ ~~DDI~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR ~~DDI~~ ~~DDI~~ CIA/NMCC

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

1.3(a)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY SOVIET BLOC/NORTH VIETNAM/CHINA

DOI JULY-OCTOBER 1967

OCT 14 17 59Z

SUBJECT 1. TRANSPORT PROBLEMS IN SOVIET BLOC AID SHIPMENTS TO  
NORTH VIETNAM.  
2. CHINESE INFLUENCE IN HANOI.

ACQ [REDACTED] FIELD NO.

SOURCE [REDACTED] 1.3(a)

1. EIGHTY PERCENT OF ALL AID TO NORTH VIETNAM FROM THE  
SOVIET BLOC IS SHIPPED BY SEA WHILE THE REMAINDER IS SENT BY RAIL  
THROUGH CHINA. [REDACTED] (THIS PERCENTAGE FIGURE IS  
PRESUMABLY BASED ON TONNAGE AND INCLUDES BOTH MILITARY AND  
ECONOMIC AID, [REDACTED])

1.3(a)

[REDACTED] OTHER EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT ON THE BASIS  
OF TONNAGE ABOUT 48 PERCENT OF ALL SOVIET BLOC AID GOES BY SEA.)

2. IN JULY 1967 THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS REFUSED TO GRANT  
TRANSIT PRIVILEGES TO SOVIET AIRCRAFT BEING FLOWN TO HANOI AND TO  
CONSIDER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AIR CORRIDOR FOR SUCH AIR MOVE-  
MENTS, THUS FORCING THE SOVIETS TO SHIP THE AIRCRAFT BY SEA.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)

SANITIZED  
Authority: NLT 019-024-1-1  
By: [signature], NARA, Date: 1-7-02

APPROVED FOR RELEASE JUN 1995



IN

1.3(a)(4)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(classification) (dissem controls)

THE TYPE OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED, WERE PRESUMABLY MIG-21S.

1.3(a)(4)

WHILE THERE HAS BEEN SPORADIC DISRUPTION OF INDIVIDUAL SOVIET RAIL SHIPMENTS BY THE CHINESE, THERE IS NO OTHER RECENT EVIDENCE OF DENIAL OF TRANSIT RIGHTS TO THE SOVIETS OR THE CANCELLATION OF FLIGHTS DUE TO CHINESE INTRANSIGENCE.)

3. ~~THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON HANOI SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.~~ DESPITE MASSIVE SOVIET AID, PARTICULARLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, THIS SUPPORT IS NOT DECISIVE WITH HANOI BECAUSE THE CHINESE STILL HAVE A CONTROLLING INFLUENCE ON HANOI'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES.

4. ~~THE SOVIETS ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE US OVER ACCESS TO HAIPHONG BY SOVIET VESSELS AND ARE VERY GLAD THAT THIS HAS NOT HAPPENED.~~

AT SOME UNSPECIFIED TIME IN THE PAST THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ISSUED AN ORDER TO SOVIET CONVOYS TO SHOOT THEIR WAY THROUGH ANY BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG BUT TO AVOID EXTENDING HOSTILITIES IN ANY OTHER SPHERE.

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

IN

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE ORIGINAL BLOCKADE-BREAKING ORDER HAD BEEN  
GIVEN TO A SINGLE CONVOY BUT IT WAS EXTENDED TO SUBSEQUENT  
CONVOYS.) COMMENT:

1.3(a)(4)

NO  
MERCHANT VESSELS GOING TO HANOI FROM THE BLACK SEA OR THE SOVIET  
FAR EAST ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN CONVOY.)

1.3(a)(4)

5. DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE (AMBASSADOR  
BUNKER ONLY), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)



● ROUTINE

IN 71992 2c

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

<del>XXXXXXXX</del>	DIA	NMCC	<del>XXXXXX</del>	<del>XXXX</del>	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	CIA/NMCC	<del>XXXX</del>	<del>XXXX</del>	DDO	<del>XXXX</del>	CRS
STATE/DIR	NIC(HENDRICKSON ONLY)	FBI	D/NE	DDI	EXO	PER	PER	XGOS	XRX	XMR	XRTA		

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.**

**CITE**

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM / ROUMANIA / COMMUNIST CHINA / INDONESIA

DOI 28 SEPTEMBER TO 11 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT ROUMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER SECRET VISIT TO HANOI TO SEEK

NEW FORMULA FOR ENDING VIETNAM WAR IS FOLLOWED BY VISIT FROM

HIGH-RANKING CHINESE COMMUNIST OFFICER

ACQ

FIELD NO.

**SOURCE**

1.3(a)(4)

TO STATE: NO DISTRIBUTION EXCEPT TO THOMAS L. HUGHES

TO DIA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARROLL

TO NMCC/MC: EXCLUSIVE FOR ARMY ACSI, GENERAL YARBOROUGH;  
NAVY DNI, ADMIRAL FLUCKEY; AIR FORCE AFCIN,  
GENERAL THOMAS

TO NSA: EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER

1.

**1.3(a)(4)**

ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER MAURER MADE A SECRET VISIT TO HANOI

28 SEPTEMBER TO 1 OCTOBER 1967. AS OF 11 OCTOBER THIS VISIT WAS STILL

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

JUN 1995

NLS 019-024-1-2

1-7-02

(classification)

(dissem controls)

BEING KEPT SECRET IN HANOI.

1.3(a)(4)

THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO PERSUADE THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) TO CHANGE ITS HARD ATTITUDE IN LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION TO THE VIETNAM WAR. ~~THE ROMANIANS PROPOSED THAT THERE BE A JOINT RESOLUTION OF SEVERAL NATIONS OPPOSING THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM, ASKING THAT THE BOMBINGS BE STOPPED ON CONDITION THAT THIS BE FOLLOWED BY TALKS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DRV.~~

1.3(a)(4)

TOP OFFICIALS IN THE HANOI GOVERNMENT WERE NOT UNRESPONSIVE TO THIS PROPOSAL; THAT IS, IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO STOP THE BOMBING, THE DRV WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS CONDITIONS FOR MEETING, INCLUDING PULLING OUT OF ALL FOREIGN TROOPS. MAURER ALSO HAD VISITED CHINESE COMMUNIST PREMIER CHOU EN LAI. CHOU HAD NO OBJECTION TO A POSSIBLE MEETING BUT WAS RATHER SKEPTICAL AS TO SUCCESS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED THE UNITED STATES WOULD NEVER STOP THE BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM.

2. ON 7 OCTOBER A CHICOM MILITARY PLANE WITH SEVERAL HIGH RANKING OFFICERS ARRIVED FROM CHINA TO HANOI. THE OFFICERS WERE QUARTERED IN THE PALACE, WHICH IS VERY UNUSUAL; ALL FOREIGN GUESTS ARE ALWAYS RECEIVED IN THE STATE GUEST HOUSE. THIS VISIT WAS ALSO KEPT SECRET. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE SOME CONNECTION WITH MAURER'S EARLIER VISIT.

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)



(classification) (dissem controls)

3. THERE WERE AT THIS TIME ALSO SOME RUMORS THAT HO CHI MINH IS VERY ILL. MAURER WAS RECEIVED BY PHAM VAN DONG ONLY.

1.3(a)(4)

4. [REDACTED] UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY U THANT'S PRESS RELEASE THAT HANOI IS WILLING TO NEGOTIATE HAS NEVER BEEN EITHER CONFIRMED OR DENIED BY THE HANOI GOVERNMENT.

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THIS REALLY REPRESENTS ANY BASIC CHANGE IN THE DRV'S NEGOTIATING POSITION NOR WHETHER POSSIBLY THE DRV FOREIGN MINISTER MADE ANY FURTHER SECRET CONCESSIONS OR PROVISOS IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ROUMANIANS.)

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY) CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP AND POLAD ONLY) (ALSO SENT ASIGON FOR AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY)

1.3(a)(4)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)  
5  
4  
3  
2  
1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Sunday, Oct. 15, 1967  
10:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Here is the account of the press  
backgrounder in Saigon which lead  
to the unfortunate item on refugee  
camps on UPI.

It's hard to cope with such purposeful  
distortion, but they are going to make  
an effort, as you see.

WWR





Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

3a

PAGE 01 SAIGON 08544 141920Z

51

ACTION EA 19

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, SAL 01, SS 35, NSC 10, P 04, IGA 02, AID 30,

RSR 01, RSC 01, 103 W

P 141300Z OCT 67  
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8881

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAIGON 854

REF: STATE 53631

1. UPI ITEM QUOTED REFTEL IS UNFORTUNATELY CUT VERSION OF LONGER MORE BALANCED UPI SAIGON REPORT OF REGULAR THURSDAY NIGHT PRESS BACKGROUNDER HELD AT JUSPAO DIRECTORS HOME ON OCTOBER 12. IT DOES NOT REPEAT NOT REFLECT ACCURATELY EITHER THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EVENINGS DISCUSSION OR THE TONE OF THE ORIGINAL STORY FILED FROM SAIGON BY UPI CORRESPONDENT WHO WAS ONE OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY-FIVE JOURNALISTS IN ATTENDANCE.

2. THEME OF BRIEFER GEORGE GOSS, REMARKS, WHICH DIRECTOR INDICATED WERE, AS USUAL, ATTRIBUTABLE ONLY TO "US OFFICIALS."

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 8544 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:

3. GVN AND CORDS ARE ENGAGED IN A UNIQUE EFFORT WHOSE ACCOMPLISHMENTS, AND LACK OF ACCOMPLISHMENT, SHOULD BE MEASURED WITH FOLLOWING FACTS IN MIND: RARELY, IF EVER, HAS A GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTED TO SHELTER, FEED, AND RESETTLE A

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 SAIGON 08544 141920Z

LARGE NUMBER OF DISPLACED PERSONS EVEN AS A SHOOTING WAR RAGED WITHIN ITS BORDERS. THE GVN'S EFFORTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY A GRAVE SHORTAGE OF TRAINED PERSONNEL, AND THE LIMITATIONS ON AVAILABLE LAND FOR RESETTLEMENT IMPOSED BY MILITARY ACTIONS AND LACK OF SECURITY. US OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT, IN THE FACE OF THESE DIFFICULTIES, THE GVN HAS BEEN REMARKABLY RESPONSIVE AND RESPONSIBLE TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM. DR. NGUYEN PHOC QUE, THE SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, IS A DEDICATED, HARDWORKING, HONEST OFFICIAL WHO, WITH US SUPPORT, HAS MANAGED TO OVERCOME A SURPRISING NUMBER OF THE SHORTCOMINGS TO BE FOUND IN ANY AGENCY AS YOUNG AS HIS.

4. AT NO TIME DID THE BRIEFER MAKE THE STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THE UPI LEAD, OR THOSE WITHIN QUOTES REFERRING TO "CORRUPT OFFICIALS" AND COMMODITIES. SUCH CHARGES WERE,

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 8544 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
HOWEVER, RAISED BY SEVERAL NEWSMEN PRESENT DURING Q&A THAT FOLLOWED THE EVENINGS MAJOR PRESENTATION. BRIEFER ACKNOWLEDGED THE VALIDITY OF SOME OF THE CORRESPONDENTS ACCUSATIONS OF PROFITEERING ON THE PART OF AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF DISTRICT OFFICIALS, AND THE APPARENT LACK OF TOTAL SUCCESS OF THE CURRENT CONTROL SYSTEM. WHILE DOING SO, HE ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THESE UNDENIABLE CIRCUMSTANCES BACK INTO THEIR PROPER CONTEXT.

5. UPI'S REPORTER STORY INCLUDED NEGATIVE POINTS BUT WHEN COMPOUNDED BY FURTHER EDITING IN NEW YORK NET EFFECT WAS TO REMOVE THE CONTEXT AND LEAVE A LESS THAN ACCURATE, UNBALANCED ACCOUNT.

6. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT NONE OF OTHER CORRESPONDENTS PRESENT, INCLUDING AP, HAVE FILED STORY AS NEGATIVE AS UPI VERSION.

7. WE ASSUME THAT OTHER STORIES FROM BACKGROUNDER WILL SET RECORD STRIGHTER, AS WILL CBS INTERVIEW FILMED WITH GOSS OCTOBER 13.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE





Department of State

TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 SAIGON 08544 141920Z

8. IN ADDITION, UPI/SAIGON HAS ACCEPTED OUR SUGGESTION THAT THE REFUGEE PROGRAM IS WORTHY OF LONGER, MORE SERIOUS ATTENTION THAN THEY HAVE ASSIGNED A REPORTER, HAS STARTED ON A STORY AND WILL SPEND THE NEXT THREE DAYS INTERVIEWING CORDS AND

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 8544 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
GVN OFFICIALS AND VISITING REFUGEE CAMPS AND RESETTLEMENT AREAS.  
THE RESULTING STORY SHOULD SERVE AS AN ANTIDOTE TO THE PREVIOUS  
ITEM.

9. TEXT BACKGROUNDER BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL. BUNKER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

4

SECRET

*Pres file*

Saturday, October 14, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith for your approval the cables covering  
the Vice President's proposed trip to Asia in  
connection with the Thieu inaugural.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Amend \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 10-18-91

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL/XXXXXX NODIS~~  
Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

4a

Origin  
Info

ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL  
AmEmbassy MANILA  
AmEmbassy BANGKOK  
AmEmbassy CANBERRA  
AmEmbassy WELLINGTON  
AmEmbassy LONDON  
AmEmbassy OTTAWA  
AmEmbassy BONN

INFO: AmEmbassy SAIGON

STATE -

~~CONFIDENTIAL/XXXXXX NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-417  
By clg, NARA, Date 1-20-95

1. You may inform host government on confidential basis at your discretion that Vice President will represent President Johnson at President-elect Thieu's inauguration and National Day ceremonies in Saigon October 30-November 1. In doing so, you should ask who will represent host government.
  2. For troop contributing countries: As appropriate, you should indicate that Vice President's schedule will allow time only for ceremonies and for brief visits to US troops and installations. Thus, while Vice President could be available for brief bilateral conversations if host government believes such conversations would be important, his schedule will not permit any multilateral discussions such as a seven nation meeting.
- END GP-3

Drafted by: EA/VN:RHM:lem	Tel. Ext. 4535	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - William P. Bundy
------------------------------	-------------------	--

S/S -  
White House

Office of the Vice President -  
Mr. Van Dyk (draft)

~~CONFIDENTIAL/XXXXXX NODIS~~



## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
Classification48  
FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin	ACTION: AmEmbassy KUALA LUMPUR	IMMEDIATE
	AmEmbassy DJAKARTA	IMMEDIATE
Info	AmEmbassy SINGAPORE	IMMEDIATE

STATE \_\_\_\_\_

~~NODIS~~

SUBJECT: Vice Presidential Visit

EYES ONLY FOR THE CHARGE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-417  
By Cb, NARA, Date 1-20-95

1. The Vice President has been ~~as~~ designated official US representative at inauguration GVN President Nguyen Van Thieu in Saigon October 30-November 1. Following inauguration, Vice President proposes make abbreviated version of Far East swing which had been planned last June. Stops would include only Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta. From Djakarta, Vice President would be going on to Tehran November 7.
2. For Kuala Lumpur: Vice President would propose arriving Kuala Lumpur early afternoon November 1 from Saigon and would leave for Djakarta afternoon November 3. You should immediately consult with appropriate levels Malaysian Government in order to ascertain if visit by Vice President these dates and approximate times would be convenient. You should inform them that the Vice President will be arriving

Drafted by: EA:JRBurke:iem 10-14	Tel. Ext. 4709	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EA - William P. Bundy
----------------------------------	----------------	--

EA/MS - Mr. Bean  
EA/IND - Mr. Underhill  
White House -

S/S -

~~SECRET/NODIS~~OFFICE of the Vice President -  
Mr. Van Dyk (draft)~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
Classification

PRESERVATION COPY

Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassies KUALA LUMPUR, DJAKARTA, SINGAPORE

~~SECRET/NODIS~~  
Classification

from Saigon inauguration and that visit would be largely ~~ceremonial~~ ceremonial and non-substantive. We would see a schedule somewhat along the lines of that which had been tentatively worked out for July, with emphasis on social and economic progress and Asian regionalism. It is emphasized, however, that sufficient time for rest should be built into it. / (Proposal for visit has been discussed with Ambassador Bell in Washington, and he concurs.)

3. For Djakarta: You should immediately approach appropriate levels Indonesian Government and inform them Vice President would like to pay visit to Indonesia beginning ~~with~~ afternoon November 3 and concluding on morning November 6 approximately. Ascertain from Indonesian authorities if such a visit convenient at this time. In so ~~ix~~ doing, you may inform them that visit is substitute for one ~~originally~~ originally scheduled last July. Please forward results your demarche by immediate cable. (Proposed visit has been discussed with Ambassador Green and he concurs.)

4. For Singapore: Present exclusion Singapore from Vice President's ~~itinerary~~ ~~itinerary~~ due essentially to fact that Lee will have just returned from visit to the US and will have had opportunity to meet and talk with Vice President here. Possibility exists, of course, that on basis of talks with Lee, Vice President may decide brief visit Singapore between Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta. If this develops, schedule will be rearranged accordingly. There is at present no repeat no need to raise possibility of visit with Singapore Government.

END

PRESERVATION COPY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET/XXXXXX NODIS~~  
Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info

STATE

~~XXXXXX NODIS~~

SUBJECT: US Delegation to GVN Inauguration

1. Vice President will represent United States at General Nguyen Van Thieu's inauguration accompanied by delegation drawn from the Congress. Composition and size of delegation and remainder of party not yet known.
2. Vice President would like to depart US October 27 aboard special aircraft and overnight in Honolulu. On October 28, after receiving CINCPAC briefing, he plans proceed Saigon via Guam or Clark to arrive evening October 29. He would plan to spend October 30 in Saigon at inauguration ceremonies. He would like to spend October 31 visiting troops and pacification centers leaving Saigon as early as possible on November 1 after attending that ~~part~~ part of National Day observance at which his presence is essential. Other members of US delegation would remain in Saigon through November 1 and would return to U.S. independently from Viet-Nam.
3. Request you <sup>propose</sup> ~~XXXXXX~~ schedule for Vice President's Saigon visit within

Drafted by:

WHMarsh

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by:

EA:JPBurke:EA/VN:~~XXXXXX~~:jem

EA - William P. Bundy

EA/VN - Mr. Miller

H - Mr. Schnee (subs)

S/S -

S/CPR -

White House -

Office of the Vice President -

~~SECRET/XXXXXX NODIS~~

Mr. Van Dine (draft)

PRESERVATION COPY

4c  
FOR OC/T USE ONLY



Page 2 of telegram to AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE~~SECRET/XXXX NODIS~~  
Classification

time frame set forth para 2 and submit soonest for his consideration. In addition to essential ceremonies and courtesy calls on General Thieu, General Ky, Foreign Minister Do, President of Upper House (if elected), etc., Vice President would like balance of schedule to be prepared with the following in mind:

(a) meeting with appropriate trade union leaders, intellectuals, editors, and political figures;

(b) field trips to areas of demonstrable progress (where attendant publicity could make beneficial contribution to current US public debate over Viet-Nam policy), such as: USMC/USA areas of operation near DMZ; area of substantial achievement in RD; refugee center; Chieu Hoi center (perhaps scheduling talk with ex-COSVN rallier Lt. Col. Chuyen); visits to ~~xx~~ riverine force and to most effective ARVN and FWMAF units, etc. Emphasis on social, economic and Asian regional efforts.

4. You may inform General Thieu and other appropriate officials that Vice President is to be President's special representative at inauguration. We would, ~~xx~~ however, prefer to withhold public announcement until Saigon schedule is firm and ~~xx~~ onward ~~itinerary~~ ~~itinerary~~ has been put into final form.

5. Member Vice President's secret service detail already en route to Saigon and will be consulting with you.

6. We will keep you informed as further details become available. Please provide your proposed schedule and comments on urgent basis.

END

PRESERVATION COPY

CORRECTIONS MADE ON THIS ORIGINAL MUST BE MADE ON ALL COPIES  
BEFORE THE TELEGRAM IS DELIVERED TO OC/T(A), Room 6243

## OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Classification

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE

Info

STATE

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Although official invitation has not yet been received from GVN through Embassy here, understand that it will be addressed to Vice President and Mrs. Humphrey. Department concerned from point of view of safety Mrs. Humphrey accompanying Vice President to Viet-Nam. Appreciate your best judgment this point taking into account opinion Special Agent Burke, who should already be in Saigon, and your estimate potential ~~xxx~~ embarrassment to GVN should Mrs. Humphrey not accompany.

END

GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-417

By CB, NARA, Date 1-20-95

Drafted by:

EA:JRBurke:jem 10-14

Clearances:

Tel. Ext.

4709

Telegraphit transmission and

classification approved by:

EA - William P. Bundy

EA/VN - Mr. Miller

S/S -

White House -

~~SECRET/NODIS~~Office of the Vice President -  
Mr. Van Dyk (draft)

PRESERVATION COPY

Saturday, Oct. 14, 1967  
6:15 p. m.

*Pres file*  
5

MR. PRESIDENT:

This cable from London tersely summarizes Singapore Prime Minister Lee's main concern in his trip to the U. S. The extra paragraph at the end of your briefing paper suggests a possible response to this key question.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment



23 Oct. 1967

Copy of LONDON 2956

For Bundy

5a

1.3(a)(3)

1. [redacted] have both made a point in the last several days of discussing with Bill Brubeck Lee Kuan Yew's U. S. trip. Their comments reflect discussion with Lee, who has talked at great length [redacted]

1.3(a)(3)

[redacted] about his concerns on U. S. trip.

1.3(a)(3)

2. Lee is very anxious to talk to you, particularly about Congressional attitudes. [redacted] believe Lee would be most effective in impressing key Congressmen with the depth of area concern about Communist subversion and the importance of continuing U. S. security role.

1.3(a)(3)

[redacted] also believes talk between the President and Lee re Congressinnal attitudes would be useful.

1.3(a)(3)

3. [redacted] emphasize Lee's worry about the durability of U. S. commitment in Southeast Asia after Viet Nam, i. e., in the 1970's. They believe it very important to reassure Lee on this score. They also believe it helpful if Lee can meet some of the younger political leaders who, in his eyes, are likely to be useful and important contacts over the next decade.

BRUCE

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-417  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-20-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, October 14, 1967 -- 5:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

*Pres file*

Monday, October 9, 1967

Marquis Childs telephoned me on Monday, October 9, concerning the Otepka story in the Stl Louis press. He asked if he should do an article attacking Otepka as a McCarthyite. I did not encourage him to do so, but turned the conversation into a philosophical discourse into the meaning of the passing of Che Guevara.

Thursday, October 12, 1967

Jack Leacacos, The Plain Dealer, Cleveland, came in for another long session on his book. I discussed in particular the special relationship that has been built up between the President, on the one hand, and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, on the other.

Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond came in to receive the material on bombing which you had approved. I turned them over to Bob Ginsburgh who worked with them for some time. They should be equipped to do an intelligent and helpful series of articles.

Friday, October 13, 1967

Endre Marton, AP, called. After clearance by you, reported by George Christian, I gave them the following limited statement for quotation: "I have not read the Otepka document which is part of a privileged hearing, as I understand it. But, since 1951, I have been continuously under security clearance from various government agencies."

Don Oberdorfer, Knight newspapers, came in. He is going out to Vietnam. He is going to concentrate, out there, on the condition of the VC. I promised to give him some background information. At this time, however, he is writing an article on the public opinion in the U.S. with respect to Vietnam. He said this is the critical front. What were my views? And, in particular, did the policy of the President towards Vietnam change with changing public opinion and the polls? I said that your policy towards Vietnam was fixed a long time ago. You were constantly exploring new ways of fighting the war or bringing peace. There was no tactical rigidity but I doubted that your basic approach to Vietnam would change; and I was certain that it was guided by your judgment as to what was right to do and nothing else.

We then discussed the public attitudes. I expressed the faith and hope that as people came in the heightened context of a Presidential election year to face their choices in Vietnam, we would stay the course as a people and this fact would be reflected in the position of both major political parties. He expressed the thought that your speech at San Antonio and Sec. Rusk's press conference had halted an erosion. He hoped we would continue to take the offensive.

Seymour Topping, came in to meet me, in his new role as Managing Editor of The New York Times. He had two themes:

-- Why don't we stop bombing unconditionally and rally the country, if necessary, by proving that Hanoi would not negotiate.

I explained to him some of the complexities in any such decision, using the key elements in the San Antonio formula as the basis.

-- He tried to convince me that the news columns of The New York Times "were completely independent" of editorial policy.

I expressed some skepticism but also expressed the hope that under his leadership this would prove to be the case. More in sorrow than in anger, I said it was sad ~~that~~ for someone who had respected The New York Times all his life, to feel its news integrity was being corrupted because of a judgment on a current issue.

I used the occasion to talk about other aspects of your foreign policy, beyond Vietnam; and arranged that he would come in again to discuss some of the larger purposes and achievements of your Administration in foreign policy.

Saturday, October 14, 1967

I had lunch with Joe Alsop, at his suggestion, at the Metropolitan Club. He gave me an extremely vivid account of progress in Vietnam. It is his belief that by June of next year at the latest we will see in the coastal provinces of I, II and III Corps such obvious progress that "even The New York Times will not be able to deny it." The Delta will improve but more slowly. It is wholly possible that the VC infrastructure of most of the country will "roll up like a carpet in this time period." He is not sure what the North Vietnamese will do in the face of this situation which is perfectly real to them: they may try protracted negotiation, tied up with a stoppage of bombing in the north; they may try to put in more North Vietnamese troops across the DMZ; or they might negotiate to end the war. He is strongly against a stoppage of bombing which, in ways which cannot be put into statistics, ~~at~~ in his view, certainly limiting the pressure significantly that Hanoi can apply in the south.



Tom Lambert, Los Angeles Times, telephoned to ask if there was anything useful he could do about the Otepka matter, which he regards as ugly. He said he had persuaded the Los Angeles Times not to run the story. He said Sen. Strom Thurmond will have a release on Monday which will make a snide remark about this problem. He said that if I ever have any suggestion as to how he can help, just let him know.

I thanked him.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7  
Saturday, October 14, 1967

5:00 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

VIA MARVIN WATSON

I had Dr. Walter Judd in this afternoon, as directed by Marv Watson. He did three things:

- he gave me his impressions of Viet Nam, from which he has just returned;
- he made a concrete suggestion for rallying opinion in the U. S. ;
- he expressed three anxieties about the state of opinion in the U. S.

1. Dr. Judd's impressions

This was his seventh trip to Viet Nam. He came back absolutely convinced that the war is being won. This derived not merely from his briefings and contacts in the field with American officers and men, but also from talks with missionaries and others out in the countryside who in fact gave him evidence that justified greater optimism than that felt by Westy and his staff. He listed his reasons for optimism in an extremely orderly way under military progress: U. S. and ARVN; progress in the countryside; political progress.

The details were interesting; for example, a case where we listed 171 North Vietnamese killed by body count, whereas the local missionary in close touch with the people found out that the villagers had counted 700 dead Communist troops. Another example, their discovering that the North Vietnamese who are coming in to fight are not as effective as the Viet Cong. It takes them three months to get there. Half of them have malignant malaria by the time they arrive.

2. The great danger

He said that the tragedy is that while we are clearly winning the war in Viet Nam, we may be losing it in the U. S. The men in the field, from privates to generals, understand that the war is of critical importance to the U. S. and that things are moving their way; but we have to think of a new approach back home. His operational suggestion is essentially one that we are already considering; namely, that we get the men in Saigon to brief the American people just as they briefed him and they briefed the President. You should introduce this presentation by saying, "I simply wish the American people to know what

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 10-18-91

the President knows and why he has confidence that we are moving forward." Then the best briefing team in Saigon would present the military data; data on the position of the Viet Cong; the progress in the countryside; the progress in politics. He said Bunker and Westy would undoubtedly be good, but we should be aware there are some brilliant young colonels who do the briefing out there most effectively and with conviction. He added that he thought the San Antonio speech was the best speech made by the President on Viet Nam, and Rusk's press conference was "superb." But inevitably some in the country feel that the President and the Secretary of State must be presenting a brief for their vested positions. The people trust the military, and objective military briefings, plus that of civilians like Ambassador Bunker, could be extraordinarily important in giving our citizens confidence that the war is moving our way.

I told Dr. Judd we were thinking along similar lines.

### 3. Three anxieties

First, that if the war goes on too long, the American people might not be able to sustain its strains under the conditions of limited war. A democracy finds it difficult, leading a normal civilian life, to cope with a war like this. We don't have a George Creel or an OWI. We don't have rallies. He has no prescription, but this is his concern.

Second, that the scale of the war, if it is protracted, could do fatal damage to South Vietnamese society. He did not get the feeling that such was the case on the spot, but he feels that the danger could exist if the war were protracted excessively.

Third, he feels that our caution and intent to keep the war limited may lead the Russians to over-commit themselves in Viet Nam and lead to a confrontation because they misjudge American determination.

I told him that we shared his first two concerns; that a "surgical solution" to this kind of war was extremely difficult to devise technically; and that, on the whole, we remained confident that the Russians understood and would not extend their commitment beyond protecting North Viet Nam.

4. I also told Dr. Judd of Senator Douglas' committee, and urged him to join up to give it vitality. He had, incidentally, one very good suggestion; namely, that we organize the Vietnamese veterans to speak out. He found, at Iowa University, that the 20 veterans who believed in the war were going about their business as students; but one sorehead was making a lot of costly noise. The veterans who believe in the war should be told that their duty is not wholly done. I suggested this might be a task for the Douglas committee.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

5. I am sure the President will find Judd heartening, convincing, full of vivid detail. I believe I have correctly reported all his major thoughts and recommendations. It would mean a great deal if the President could see him; but you can judge whether heartening him to go forward and carry the message to the country and expressing your appreciation to him is worth your time.

Dr. Judd is leaving Monday night for the Middle West, so that an appointment with him would have to be fitted in on Monday, Oct. 16.

W. W. R.

Will see Judd on Monday Now confirmed by Marvin Watson's office for  
11:30 a. m. on Monday, Oct. 16

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Saturday, October 14, 1967  
4:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen files another  
interesting domestic idea.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jos Califano  
Harry McPherson

WWRostow:rln

8a

MEMORANDUM

October 13, 1967

SUBJECT: Cities and the Marshall Plan: A New Look

1. Introduction. This memorandum suggests that a program for the cities can be devised which would:

(a) be patterned, in some respects after the Marshall Plan;

(b) be new and have large impact, without costing more money in the next few years.

2. Proposal: The President should send a Message to the next Congress which would:

(a) propose a multi-year program to achieve greater ghetto equality with the rest of the country (possibly by 1976, the country's 200th birthday) with specific future targets for housing, education, jobs, etc.;

(b) encompass all the Federal programs that will be directed to these targets, even though these programs are to be considered by separate Congressional committees, financed through separate appropriations, and administered by separate agencies;

(c) state that the President is appointing a single person to coordinate these programs - much as Messrs. Byrnes and Vinson had over-all responsibility for the domestic economic front during and after the war;

(d) announce appointment of an Advisory Council - including representatives of the Conference of Governors, the Conference of Mayors, private industry, and ghetto groups - to advise the Coordinator and to ensure that projected Federal efforts are matched by commensurate State and City programs, effective private investment, and ghetto self-help.

The targets should be fixed at levels likely to be attained if present spending levels are maintained for the next few years and then increased (on the assumption that the war will have ended by then).



3. Precedent. The Marshall Plan worked not only because of substantial aid expenditures (after all, we had already been giving large sums to Europe before the Marshall Plan) but also because it added these new elements:

(a) It fixed a specific goal - European self-support, and translated this over-all goal into specific targets for different fields: agriculture, industry, exports, etc.

(b) It pulled together different types of aid for Europe into one coherent program in order to achieve these goals.

(c) It committed the US and the receiving countries to a multi-year effort in carrying out this program.

(d) It placed these programs under central direction in the US Government.

(e) It gave the recipients substantial responsibility for shaping and executing the program, and created a new organizational framework to this end.

4. Advantages. The reasons it was done this way in the Marshall Plan may be relevant to the cities.

The problem in both cases is how to provide relatively limited external resources in a way which will activate the larger total effort required.

This problem can only be solved if the proposed effort is presented in a way which dramatizes its promise, and thus makes it politically attractive for others to support and take part. This purpose is served by:

(a) Fixing ambitious (and hence necessarily distant) goals. These goals help people to see what can be achieved, and thus help to supply motivation and direction for needed effort.

(b) Presenting all types of aid as parts of a single package - and a multi-year package at that. This makes clear the magnitude of the intended external contribution, and thus increases the incentive for others to match it.

(c) Providing central direction for the program. This increases confidence that different elements of the program will be effectively coordinated and directed to its central purpose.

(d) Setting up machinery which enables others to influence the program. This increases the likelihood of their making an effective contribution.

## 5. Objections.

(a) Fixing future goals involves a lot of extra work and difficult projections. Why bother?

Answer: Clear future targets are needed to give hope to people in the ghettos; to provide a goal for planning and action by the executive branch and by state and local authorities; and, above all, to provide an objective around which civic support and interest can be mobilized.

(b) Why fix the goals for 1976? This is too long-range.

Answer: What better way to celebrate the country's 200th birthday than by translating the Founding Fathers' concept of an equal right to the pursuit of happiness into reality? Only within this time framework can goals be set which are both realistic and ambitious. A program limited to what can be done in the coming wartime year will look like pretty small pickings.

In addition to the 1976 goal, however, lesser goals can be proposed for interim years - way-stations on the road to the ultimate goal.

(c) Our system of government doesn't permit effective commitment to a multi-year program.

Answer: It is true that the process of multi-year authorization and annual appropriations provides no assurance that the money will be forthcoming for future years. But the more the legislative history underlines

the commitment to a multi-year effort, the greater the likelihood of follow-on funding. This was our experience in the Marshall Plan.

(d) The Congress might be horrified by the cumulative totals involved in a comprehensive multi-year city program, even though no increase in present spending was being sought.

Answer: If this is the Congressional reaction, there might well be a public backfire, as in the case of the rat control bill. For the proposed program would strike most voters as more sensible and business-like than piecemeal and short-term approaches. It would thus be widely welcomed by the press, the responsible business community, the churches, etc. - as well as by the urban groups themselves.

<sup>WJ</sup>  
Henry Owen



Limited Official Use

Saturday - 2:30 p.m.  
October 14, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a progress report from Secretary Rusk on implementation of the OAS Summit decisions.

While the achievements during the six months since Punta del Este are not dramatic, it is clear that there is steady progress.

One item not covered is the ETV pilot project in El Salvador. Negotiations are in progress on an experimental program for primary and secondary public schools.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Rusk's memo to you,  
October 14.

3916

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

9a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

October 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Third Progress Report on Implementation  
of the Inter-American Summit Decisions

This is the third in a series of reports to keep you informed on progress in implementing the decisions of the Inter-American Summit. There have been a number of significant developments since my memorandum of July 14.

I. UNITED STATES INITIATIVES AND CONGRESS

In addition to the U.S. initiatives reported in subsequent paragraphs under divisions corresponding to those of the Summit Action Program, several measures in support of Latin American efforts to implement Summit decisions have required Congressional action or have been the subject of consultation with appropriate members and committees of the Congress. With your signing on September 22 of legislation authorizing U.S. contributions of \$300 million per year for the next three years (a \$50 million annual increase) to the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations, one of your major proposals for U.S. support of LA initiatives has moved closer to fulfillment. Your other proposal for an additional \$100 million for Alliance for Progress funds in FY 1968 to assist expanded programs in agriculture and education has been cut in half by both houses and is currently in conference. This decrease will, of course, affect our overall assistance capability in Latin America,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
Exempted from automatic decontrol.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

but unless there are further cuts, we anticipate increasing our activities in the fields of education and agriculture.

We are consulting Congressional leaders on the extension of procurement for AID-financed projects to all Alliance countries. If these consultations are encouraging, we shall recommend that you announce the new policy soon after passage of the Foreign Assistance Act.

II. LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION

A. Temporary Sub-Regional Arrangements: As indicated in the July 14 progress report, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela announced at the June IA-ECOSOC meeting their intention to form a sub-regional common market. Since then these countries have held further meetings and developed plans for an Andean Development Bank which will support this integration movement. Bolivia has indicated it will join this group.

B. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA): The LAFTA Foreign Ministers met in Asuncion, Paraguay in August-September to consider specific measures to convert LAFTA into a common market (Summit Action Program - Chapter I, paragraphs 2 and 4). Although the Ministers did not reach unanimous agreement on key measures to implement the Action Program provisions, they did approve, in principle, the Andean Common Market and they established a joint LAFTA-Central American Common Market (CACM) Coordinating Committee to speed the process of merging the two blocs into the Latin American Common Market. The most encouraging aspect of the meeting was the surprising degree of acceptance of the concept of automatic tariff cuts and other measures for intra-regional trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the Ministers were unable to agree on the crucial question of differing preferential treatment for the least developed and for the medium sized countries. As a result, the least developed

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 -

countries vetoed the key trade liberalization measures which were otherwise acceptable to them. This action was not surprising, however, since it was the Ministers' first attempt to tackle the complex problems assigned to them by their Presidents at Punta del Este. LAFTA officials are presently working to resolve the differences, in preparation for the Ministers' next meeting expected in early 1968.

C. Central American Common Market (CACM): Since the July 14 progress report, the Central American countries have taken actions to assure closer ties with Panama (Chapter I, paragraph 3). In August, they ratified a protocol giving Panama membership in the Organization of Central American States (ODECA) Councils of Labor and Social Welfare, Public Health, and Tourism. Also in August, the CACM Economic Council invited the Government of Panama to enter negotiations for progressive entry into CACM. In a declaration of renewed faith and confidence in CACM, the Economic Council urged the member governments to complete ratification of all outstanding CACM agreements.

D. Financing Integration: In accordance with a decision at the June IA-ECOSOC meeting, government representatives of the Latin American OAS countries (with the U.S. as an observer) began on September 29 to study the financial implications of the move to a Latin American Common Market. The representatives reached agreement on a working procedure and timetable for presentation of their report to their governments prior to the next IA-ECOSOC meeting in the spring of 1968.

E. Individual Country Initiatives: Colombian President Lleras formally established in August a coordination committee which will be responsible for directing Colombia's movement into the Latin American Common Market. President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico has on a number of occasions emphasized Mexico's commitment to integration; his government is currently exploring ways to increase Mexico's ties with CACM. The computer which the United States will contribute

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 4 -

to help LAFTA carry out the necessary studies to convert itself into a common market has been ordered and we expect to deliver it next year.

III. MULTINATIONAL ACTION FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

Page Communications Engineers, Inc. has completed a study of existing telecommunications in Latin America and of future needs. The study was ordered by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The IDB now plans to initiate a study which will develop a design for a telecommunications network. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) is expected to provide \$1 million to help finance this study. The IDB is also seeking UNDP participation for other multinational projects.

IV. MEASURES TO IMPROVE LATIN AMERICAN TRADE

A. IA-ECOSOC Developments: As instructed by IA-ECOSOC, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) has drafted statutes for the establishment of an Inter-American export promotion center. The drafts will be considered by a group of government experts this month and then submitted to the IA-ECOSOC for approval.

IA-ECOSOC also instructed CIAP to convene an ad hoc committee of banana producing countries to develop a joint approach to the European Economic Community on eliminating the EEC's trade restrictions on bananas. The committee met in September and made recommendations to be considered by CIAP and given to the special Latin American committee of ministers who are to make representations in Europe on this and other trade issues.

B. International Coffee Agreement: Intensive work has started on renegotiating the International Coffee Agreement. At the August meeting of the Coffee Council,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 5 -

agreement was reached on recommended revisions of basic export quotas, the most important issue for producing countries. Progress was also made on enforcement procedures, but there is still one difficult bilateral problem to resolve with Brazil on soluble coffee exports to the United States. A final vote on these matters was deferred until November 20, at which time the Council will also take up the question of production controls and the proposed Diversification Fund which you supported at Punta del Este.

C. International Cocoa Agreement: After years of long and arduous negotiations agreement was reached in October among major cocoa producers and consumers on the basic elements of an international cocoa agreement to stabilize cocoa prices. A negotiating conference is scheduled for later this year to work out the text of the Agreement.

D. Trade Preferences: As a result of our initiatives at meetings in May and June, the OECD Special Group on Trade with Developing Countries has prepared a report outlining the principles on which a system of temporary, generalized tariff preferences might be based. This report will be taken up by OECD Ministers later this fall with the prospect of achieving a consensus on a policy statement for presentation at the UNCTAD meeting in New Delhi next February.

As you pointed out to the other Presidents at Punta del Este, action by the U.S. on preferences requires legislation. Therefore, careful consultations on this subject were necessary. In July, Assistant Secretary Anthony Solomon described our approach to the issue in considerable detail at a public hearing before the Boggs Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy. We will be consulting with key Senators and Congressmen as well as industry and labor groups on the substance of the OECD report, but no final commitment to an operational plan (if we succeed in working one out) would be needed until late 1968 or early 1969.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 6 -

V. AGRICULTURE

We have begun to carry out our intention, announced at the Summit, to increase Food for Freedom programs in Latin America. Several programs are now in the planning and negotiating stages.

Exploratory talks are continuing between the Executive Branch and Congressional leaders on the proposed extension of the screw worm eradication program southward to the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Mexico.

Our presentation to Congress for FY 1969 will emphasize expanded programs in agriculture and education. A sharp increase is expected in sector loans, which will relate self-help measures in these areas to the allocation of increased U.S. funds.

VI. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Three major initiatives within the framework of the OAS are underway to implement the Action Program sections on Education, Science and Technology. Enumerated in subsections A, B and C below, these plans will take final form as program recommendations to be considered by the ministerial level meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council tentatively scheduled for January 1968.

A. Science and Technology: The group of expert scientists and educators from twelve OAS countries met in Washington in July and agreed on a long-range program of multinational scientific and technological activities to be carried out by "centers of excellence" in Latin America. The initial program design, based on consultations with leading scientists throughout the area, is tentatively projected at \$15 million over the first eighteen months. A working group is recommending that a special fund be

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 7 -

established by contributions from participating countries on a matching formula of one-third from Latin America and two-thirds from the United States.

In accord with your statement of U.S. willingness to join with the Latin American nations in exploring a regional program for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, AEC Chairman Seaborg visited six South American countries in July and discussed the possibility of expanded U.S. assistance and cooperation in this field, particularly on a regional basis. A regional program prepared by AEC will be submitted as a U.S. proposal to the panel of experts on Science and Technology.

In the field of Marine Science and Technology, Panel III of the U.S. inter-agency Ad Hoc Committee on International Policy in the Marine Sciences has submitted a memorandum containing 13 recommendations for Latin American regional programs to the Marine Sciences Council for approval. These include a recommendation that the U.S. broaden and accelerate the concept of a fish protein concentrates demonstration project in Latin America to take advantage of the potential impact of existing programs and private sector interest. It is expected that these proposals will also be submitted, in whole or in part, for the consideration of the OAS panel of experts in Science and Technology.

B. Educational Development Program: The Education Committee established by the Inter-American Cultural Council is developing the concept of an inter-American educational development program to be organized and financed in much the same manner as the regional science program. The group has suggested that the program begin at an annual level of \$10 million. Pursuing the objectives set forth in the Action Program, it would seek to stimulate national efforts to improve and expand education, promote inter-American cooperation in educational matters, and encourage Latin American integration.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 8 -

C. Educational Television: The first meeting of a group of experts in educational television held in August produced the basic outline of a regional program built around a multinational training center. Field studies now underway will be evaluated by the experts at their meeting in early November and their final recommendations will be submitted as part of the regional Education Development Program (B above).

D. Individual Country and Bilateral Initiatives: Immediately upon his return from the Summit, President Frei of Chile signed a decree establishing the National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research. The commission will advise the President on the planning and development of an integral policy for the promotion of both pure and applied science. Consideration of such a commission predates the Summit, but the timing of the decree indicates that the Action Program resolutions on science and technology gave added impetus for prompt adoption of the proposal.

In the spirit of the Summit decisions on the promotion of science and research, the Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in Chile will be formally inaugurated on November 6. This observatory is being developed and managed by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy (AURA), a nonprofit U.S. corporation; it is being supported by the National Science Foundation. As you and President Frei announced jointly on April 13, the principal instrument planned for the site is a 150 inch optical telescope, the largest in the southern hemisphere; its design and construction will be a combined effort of the University of Chile, the NSF and the Ford Foundation. The facilities of the Cerro Tololo observatory will be made available to astronomers of the U.S. and all the countries of Latin America.

During Dr. Seaborg's visit to Brazil in July he received a request from the Brazilian Center for Physics Research in Rio for a Californium-252 source for research

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 9 -

use at the Center; arrangements are now being made for the transfer of the source without charge to the Brazilian institution and it should arrive in November.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday - 2:30 p.m.  
October 14, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's memorandum reporting on Congressional consultations on the sale of F-5 aircraft to Latin America.

I see no alternative but to do what he recommends. Our chances of getting the Peruvians to reverse field are slim. The odds are better with Brazil.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Nick Katzenbach's memo to you,  
October 13.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-272  
By sig, NARA, Date 11-16-94



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-270  
By isp, NARA Date 1-7-97

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sale of F-5 Aircraft to Latin America

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize us to go ahead with the various steps set forth in the scenario enclosed with my memorandum of October 5 on the sale of F-5 jet aircraft to South American countries.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you authorize Ambassadors Tuthill and Jones to state in their discussions of the F-5 that they are acting under your personal instructions.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

I requested on October 5 that you authorize us to consult with appropriate committees of the Congress regarding the sale of jet fighter aircraft to Latin America. That consultation has been concluded with the following results:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2.

On balance, the House Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee is favorable. Congressmen Selden and Mailliard criticized us for being too cautious and slow on this matter. They believe we should have acted several months ago.

The Senate American Republics Affairs Subcommittee was neutral to unfavorable. Fulbright asserted that the \$40 million loan offer to Peru coupled with a commitment by Peru not to buy Mirages was Peruvian blackmail. Church was not favorable but nevertheless recognized that we had a problem. Morse was friendly but noncommittal. The others present, Hickenlooper, Lausche and Clark were also noncommittal.

Congressman Reuss was vigorously opposed to our sale of F-5s. On the other hand he does not favor automatic termination of aid to Peru if Peru buys Mirages. Widnall was noncommittal but thinks we are trying to solve the problem in the right way.

Senator Sparkman, on behalf of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, did not see the need to consult that committee.

Defense Department consultation with the Armed Services Committees evoked no adverse reaction.

In general, we have confirmed the support we thought we would have. Those which we expected to be opposed expressed their opposition but not as strongly as we might have expected. Several of the opponents recognize the nature of the problem. Thus, we can expect some congressional criticism, which will probably be shortlived, and it will be countered by favorable congressional statements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3.

A decision by you has become especially urgent because the Brazilians are now negotiating with the French. The Brazilian Air Force apparently desires to announce a purchase of Mirages on Air Force Day, October 23.

In authorizing Ambassadors Tuthill and Jones to talk to the Brazilian and Peruvian Presidents, it would be helpful if they could state that they are acting on instructions from you. I request that you authorize us to so state in our instructions to them.

*Richard L. Tuthill*  
Under Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

108

SCENARIO

For Handling Acquisition by Major South American Countries  
of F-5 Aircraft

I. Background

A. Brazil. Brazil has been given assurances that U.S. manufacturers will be permitted to discuss, after October 1, 1967, sale of F-5 aircraft to Brazil for delivery after July 1, 1969. No details on quantities of planes, or terms and conditions of sale were included in the assurances. Our planning has been on the basis that:

1. U. S. Government role would be limited to granting export license for a squadron of 12 to 18 planes at this time with the possibility of a second squadron later.

2. Negotiations would be between manufacturer and Brazilian Government.

3. Financing would be arranged through commercial channels without any participation by U.S. Government or any of its agencies.

4. Sales might be made through manufacturer's Canadian subsidiary with Canadian Government assistance.

B. Other Commitments. The United States Government commitments to cooperate with other large South American Governments on aircraft modernization are as follows:

Argentina  
Chile  
Peru  
Venezuela

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NW 94-270 (#256)

By isp/jc NARA. Date 12-15-09

1. Argentina. ". . . We have assured Brigadier Favre (Chief of Staff of the Argentine Air Force) that we do not object to the sale of F-5 or comparable aircraft to your government beginning in 1970, subject of course to the economic ability of Argentina to finance such a major purchase . . ." DEF 2707, 241954Z May 65. (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister Suarez.)

In addition, the U.S. is committed to sell 25 A-4B's to Argentina. These aircraft are part of the sale of 50 A-4B's which were deferred because of Southeast Asia requirements. They will be available for delivery in July 1968.

2. Chile. Various high-level Chileans have been told by various high-level U.S. officials that we had agreed with certain other Latin American countries not to sell the F-5 until 1969 and the U.S. planned to hold to this decision. They were also told that we would consider the question of F-5 if and when we received a 3 to 5 year tri-service acquisition plan. We have not received such a plan to date. The Chileans, no doubt, have assumed that they are included with the others in terms of availability of the F-5 in CY 1969.

3. Peru. "\*\*\* U.S. willing to sell 16 F-5's for delivery in CY 1970 to replace Hawker MK4. If helpful in your negotiations, you may inform GOP there may be possibility of advancing delivery to CY 1969 \*\*\*" DEF 4245, 182255Z June 65. Our Ambassador informed GOP accordingly.

4. Venezuela. "\*\*\* I am prepared to make them (F-5's) available for delivery in CY 1969 following the satisfactory conclusion of the above necessary credit arrangements". DEF 3948, 152125Z June 1965 (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister of Defense.) The credit arrangements in question were concluded.

The immediate problem is Peru, which has reportedly contracted for 14 Mirage aircraft, of which two are trainers, at a cost of \$28 million. The trainers are to be delivered in 1967.



## II. Proposed Actions

A. Congressional Consultations. Assistant Secretary Oliver should review informally with the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate and of the House, and with Chairmen Fulbright and Morgan, and Senator Church, our overall security policy for Latin America as approved by IRG/ARA on September 20 and amended by the SIG on September 28. In this context he should discuss the F-5/A-4B issue. (See attached talking points.)

It is recognized that the foreign aid legislation may be adversely affected if consultation takes place while this legislation is pending in Congress. However, there are two overriding considerations:

1. The possibility of turning the Peruvians around on Mirages is probably not 50-50. Further delay in making firm proposals to Peru will make it even less likely. Once the Mirage system is introduced, it will also be acquired by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and probably Colombia. Such acquisitions involving as they do the acquisition of missiles also will have the most serious consequences for the Alliance for Progress and arms control.

2. Congress may feel we have acted in bad faith once it becomes clear that we developed a firm policy during August and September 1967 and did not consult in a timely manner.

B. Negotiations with Peru. As soon as Congressional consultations are completed, we should authorize Ambassador Jones to inform President Belaunde that we are prepared:

1. To negotiate a \$40 million program loan, and
2. To authorize the manufacturer to discuss the sale of F-5 aircraft.

11

Saturday - 2:15 p.m.  
October 14, 1967

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

One of the rewarding aspects of cooperating with Mexico is that they know how to be appreciative. This is reflected in their response to your assistance during the recent floods.

President Diaz Ordaz sent you a cable expressing thanks (Tab A) which I understand you already know about.

I asked our Embassy to send us the press clippings to see how they treated your offers of aid. From the sampling of clips at Tab B, you will see that it got good coverage.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Message from President Diaz Ordaz. (10/4/67)

Tab B - Samplings of press clippings out of Mexico.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~  
Eyes Only

Saturday - 12:30 pm - October 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: "Che" Guevara

*Pres file*

Attached is a memorandum from Dick Helms describing the detention and execution of "Che" Guevara.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] sent from Havana to "Che" in January and February 1967 showing that the Bolivian guerrilla movement was a Cuban show designed to spark a movement of "continental magnitude". Several high ranking members of the Bolivian Communist Party were called to Havana to convince them that it would be an error to present the Bolivian operation as a national movement. These messages also indicate that the French pro-Castro communist theoretician Jules Debray was sent to Bolivia to contact "Che" Guevara in late February. He was arrested in March.

EO 12958  
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] we gather that Cuban officials accept the fact that "Che" is dead and may be trying to recover the body. The communist-leaning President of the Chilean Senate, Salvador Allende, has sent a message to President Barrientos asking for the remains. This request, and one by the family, -- "Che's brother went to Bolivia to claim the body -- probably led Barrientos to make the announcement that "Che" had been cremated. The Bolivians do not want an independent autopsy to show that they executed "Che" and they are intent on not permitting the remains to be exploited by the communist movement.

The death of "Che" and Debray's dramatic public reversal of plea from innocent to guilty in the court case represents a serious blow to Castro. Both his leading guerrilla fighter and guerrilla theoretician have fallen in Bolivia. We do not know how he will react. Against the possibility that he might try to recoup lost prestige by some dramatic act against United States interests in Latin America -- such as bombing of one of our Embassies or kidnapping of diplomatic personnel -- we have instructed our missions to be on the alert and take necessary precautions.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment - 13 October Helms memo.

Saturday, October 14, 1967, 11:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Rus file*

SUBJECT: Interview with John P. Leacacos at 1:00 P. M.,  
Saturday, October 14

John Leacacos, Washington correspondent of the Cleveland Plain Dealer newspaper is writing what he hopes to be an authoritative account of how U. S. foreign policy is made and carried out. Several staff members have talked to him at length about this subject. He has displayed a friendly attitude toward your Administration.

You may wish to take the opportunity to say some nice things about the way Secretary Rusk is doing his job. Comparisons with other Secretaries of State could be made since Leacacos is writing primarily about how State does its work.

You might point out how fortunate it is for the country in this period that we have a Secretary of State and a Secretary of Defense who work closely together. The cohesiveness of our foreign policy is outstanding--in part due to the fact that Secretary McNamara thinks of our military force as an instrument to advance our foreign policy objectives. Therefore, we have two Secretaries working closely together with the President rather than going off in different directions.

W. W. Rostow

~~WWR~~ BKS:amc

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 14, 1967  
10:00 a.m.

14  
Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA argues and presents  
evidence against the single odd report  
Castro will attack Guantanamo.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-420  
By ig, NARA, Date 10-26-95

WWRostow:rln



~~SECRET~~

*Post*

*14a*

13 October 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT : Cuban Intentions Regarding the US Naval Base at Guantanamo

REFERENCE: CIA [REDACTED], 11 October 1967

1. We have carefully reviewed all information--past and present--pertinent to the question of Cuban intentions regarding the US naval facility at Guantanamo, and believe Fidel Castro would not take the drastic steps described in the referenced CIA [REDACTED] report unless he has suddenly become mentally unstable.

2. With the exception of his adventurist activity in Latin America, Castro has trod a cautious, calculating path in his foreign relations; he has not adopted fool-hardy policies, but rather has almost always carefully considered the probable results of his planned foreign actions. Recent statements by Castro, as well as by [REDACTED] lead us to the conclusion that Castro is soberly aware of the extent of the support he could expect from the USSR in the event of a military confrontation with the US--particularly one initiated by Cuba.

3. For example, [REDACTED] reported earlier this month that:

"The Cuban leaders see in the Soviet lack of action during the recent Middle East crisis confirmation that the USSR will not come to the aid of Cuba in case of an attack by a foreign power."

E.O. 12958  
3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 04-53  
By lis, NARA, Date 10-30-04

~~SECRET~~

Castro publicly revealed his feelings on this matter in his speech of 26 July 1967 when he emotionally said:

"We will not speak about the foreign support which realistically we must admit could come from countries lying several thousand miles from us. In the face of the threat of an invasion, we must get used to the idea that we are going to fight alone."

4. Moreover, in an interview with a Czechoslovak correspondent in August, Castro said, "Does anybody believe that we are a military threat to the US? We don't even contemplate chasing the Americans out of Guantanamo."

5. Periodic overhead photography--the latest reconnaissance mission to cover the Guantanamo area was flown on 10 October--as well as day-to-day [REDACTED] have given no indications of any changes in the defensive alignment of the Cuban military forces stationed in the Santiago-Guantanamo area. An island-wide, joint services exercise has been under way in Cuba for the past several days. Such complex military exercise activity is not out of the ordinary. Several times a year such exercises are held, targeting against expected US invasion-paradrop-bombing actions. We have seen nothing [REDACTED] which departs from similar exercises in the past.

6. A hypothetical case could be made that Moscow might encourage the Cubans to launch an attack against the Guantanamo base as a means of diverting Washington from the Vietnam situation. Our considered judgment is that Moscow would not lightly engage in such an effort unless it was certain of controlling the situation. The "independent" Castro would seem to be an unlikely choice, if one should even assume that Moscow is prepared to play such a dangerous game.

~~SECRET~~

125

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, October 14, 1967  
9:45 a.m.

*Pre file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker and Westy file  
their case for minimum holiday stand-  
downs: Christmas, New Years, Tet.

This assumes, of course, no  
response either to your San Antonio  
formula or other decision about a  
bombing pause by highest authority.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 8432

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 10-29-91

October 13, 1967

Copy of SAIGON 843.

Subject: Holiday Cease-fire      Refs: A. State 168637 (Apr. 3, 1967)  
B. JCS 3879

1. In anticipation that proposals will be forthcoming shortly for military stand-downs over the Christmas, New Year's, and Tet holidays, General Westmoreland and I have discussed and agreed upon a recommended U. S. position for a holiday military posture. We agree also that the official U. S. position should be determined earliest, and no later than the end of October. The basis for urgency in this matter hinges upon the critical significance of not being pre-empted by either Hanoi or the National Liberation Front, and thus placed in the adverse political/psychological position of countering their proposals.

2. It is essential that all concerned be positively apprised of the risks attending a military stand-down, however brief it might be. The record clearly attests to the fraudulent manner in which the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army have executed past cease-fire accords. As a result of more than 1,000 enemy-initiated incidents during the three stand-downs last year, US forces suffered 30 casualties at Christmas, 41 over New Year's, and 176 during Tet. The enemy used the stand-down to prepare assaults on U. S. and allied positions. One such attack following Christmas inflicted 92 casualties (27 of them killed in action) in one single U. S. unit. The most enduring aspect of those cease-fires stemmed from the massive logistics resupply activities of the enemy. With truck and sea traffic running 25 times the pre-cease-fire rate, the North Vietnamese Army moved 23,000 tons of material into the DMZ area and Laos during the Tet stand-down; enough to sustain one division in combat for nearly 8 months. An estimated 10,000 tons was similarly positioned during the shorter Christmas stand-down. Just how much of this material was used in the recent rain of fire on our Marines in the North is open to conjecture.

3. We have no reason to presume that the enemy will approach future holiday cease-fires with any greater integrity than he has in the past. General Westmoreland and I both agree that militarily it is obviously preferable that there should be no cease-fire periods during the forthcoming holidays. We realize, also, however, that precedent and current public pressures may well make some action with respect to the Christmas and Tet holidays necessary. In this event we recommend the following as the maximum acceptable schedule for holiday cease-fires:

A. For Christmas, a 24-hour period with justification based on religious considerations.

B. There is no adequate justification for a New Year's cease-fire. If nevertheless imposed, it should not exceed 24 hours.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-417  
By CL, NARA, Date 1-20-95

C. For Tet, a 48-hour cease-fire is recommended, with a maximum fallback position of 72 hours.

4. Rules governing cease-fire period military operations during the three holidays last year proved to be inadequate with respect to proscription of enemy resupply activities. As a result, State and JCS extended our prerogatives by references A and B to respond to substantial military resupply activity detected in North Viet Nam south of 20° north latitude during the Buddha's birthday stand-down on 23 May. We conclude that we should make future rules even more binding. Future agreements, if such become necessary, should impose a total freeze on logistics and force repositioning on both sides. This prohibition would be applied to all movements of military personnel and materiel regardless of where they might occur either in-country or into country in both North and South Viet Nam and their contiguous waters. Violations observed by an intensive reconnaissance program would be subject to immediate military response. With minimal pre-stocking, we can live with these terms for at least 48 hours, and perhaps as long as 72 hours.

5. All remaining military provisions detailed in reference B are considered to provide sufficient latitude for security purposes. We do propose, however, to apply up to 50% of our normal airstrike effort in North Viet Nam against targets along the Laos transshipment routes.

6. We believe it important that a 31 October deadline on the establishment of a U.S. position be met in order that it might be coordinated with the Government of Viet Nam and permit appropriate announcements by the two governments in advance of any public offers from the opposition.

BUNKER

###



~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 14, 1967  
9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a Soviet evaluation of  
our position and intentions in Vietnam.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

6 October 1967

WWRostow:rln

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-024-1-3  
By Q, NARA, Date 1-7-02

# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SPA 16a

COUNTRY	USSR/Vietnam	REPORT NO.	[REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)
SUBJECT	Current Soviet Evaluation of the War in Vietnam	DATE DISTR.	6 October 1967
		NO. PAGES	4
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Up to 10 September 1967		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	FIELD REPORT NO.		

SERIALIZED  
 INDEXED  
 FILED  
 OCT 12 1967  
 CIA

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: [REDACTED] The following is a translation of a Soviet document published in Moscow in September 1967 [REDACTED] 1.3(a)(4)

SUMMARY: This document appears to be based on overt information on the Vietnam situation which has been published from July to early September 1967. It interprets current events with a Soviet bias, and concludes with the assertions that outside help will continue to sustain North Vietnam, while the U.S. escalates the air war to convince North Vietnam that the price of continuing the war is too great. The document predicts that the U.S. will expand the war into Laos and Cambodia.

1. The elections for president and vice-president which were held in South Vietnam on 3 September of this year, in accordance with the new constitution of the country adopted in April of this year, did not solve the basic problem of South Vietnam -- the transfer of power to a civilian government and elimination of the dictatorship of the military junta. This is particularly evident from the distribution of votes at the elections. Thus, less than 40 percent of all votes were given for the candidates of the military junta, Thieu and Ky. The civilian candidate -- the lawyer, Dzu -- came in second place after them; he advocated peaceful aims.

SERIALIZED  
 AUTHORITY NLS 019-024-1-4  
 BY [REDACTED] DATE 1-7-02

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE JUN 1995

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

-2-

2. The struggle between the military and the civilian factions has become more acute, especially in connection with the elections of members to the Lower House of Parliament to be held in October of this year. The rivalry within the ruling military junta has also become more intense, including that between the elected President Thieu and Vice-President Ky, since each of them tries to concentrate the whole power in his hands.
3. All this indicates that the Americans will not be able to stabilize the political situation in South Vietnam so that they may concentrate all their efforts on the solution of military problems.
4. The instability of the puppet regime, the lack of decisive military successes in the struggle against troops of the National Liberation Front (NLF) on the territory of South Vietnam, and the vain attempts to achieve a major reduction in the movement of troops and materiel from North Vietnam to South Vietnam by delivering regular air attacks against important objectives and communications are a matter of great concern for U.S. leaders.
5. The continuing increase in the armed forces in Vietnam has resulted in increased losses of personnel and combat equipment, and in growing costs of the war, but it has not provided any prospects for the successful termination of the conflict in the near future.
6. Many political and military leaders of the U.S. who are in favor of a political settlement of the war have understood this. However, the Johnson administration, the majority of members of Congress, and the leaders of both parties continue to follow the course of achieving military-political aims by further escalation of the war.
7. After the visit of U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara to South Vietnam (5-11 July 67) for the purpose of studying the course of the war at first hand, President Johnson held a number of conferences, during which plans for the further escalation of the war in Vietnam were discussed and approved.
8. These plans were based on suggestions from U.S. armed forces commanders in the Pacific and South Vietnam and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they provided for an increase in American forces, an expansion of the scale of combat actions against NLF forces, and an escalation of the air war against North Vietnam.
9. In accordance with these plans the U.S. command is planning to transfer to South Vietnam in the near future up to 45,000 to 50,000 men, and to bring the total strength of its troops up to 500,000 by the end of the year.

10. In addition, U.S. leaders have made an attempt to increase the participation of its allies in the war. For this purpose special emissaries of President Johnson -- General Taylor, as consultant on military questions, and Clifford, chairman of the Advisory Council on Foreign Intelligence Matters -- visited Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand at the end of July of this year. According to preliminary data, the Taylor-Clifford mission has not produced the desired results.
11. The main efforts of U.S. leaders have recently been concentrated on expanding the scale of the war against North Vietnam in accordance with the so-called "special plan", which is based on the concept that the war in Indochina can be won only by carrying out decisive operations against North Vietnam. Therefore, the "special war plan" provides for the destruction of important military-economic and hydrotechnical objectives and installations by American planes, the mining of North Vietnamese ports, including Haiphong, and the establishment of a tight blockade in the Tonkin Bay by forces of the 7th Fleet.
12. According to American data, out of 5,000 major targets on the territory of North Vietnam, 3,500 have by this time been subjected to air attacks; this includes 50 barracks, 50 missile launch installations (SAM), 50 large bridges, 35 supply and equipment bases, 10 electric power stations, 10 fuel depots, 5 ports and 5 airfields.
13. In August of this year President Johnson made the decision to expand the list of targets for air attacks by 300 additional objectives, including those in the areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and the zone bordering on China.
14. In making such a decision, the President and his close advisers assume that their selection of targets for air attacks will make it possible to increase military pressure on North Vietnam without serious risk of an expansion of the conflict.
15. Johnson's decision concerning the latest, extremely dangerous degree of escalation of the air war against North Vietnam has been fully supported by Republican Party leaders and by U.S. military leaders. In particular, in the speeches made in the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness of the U.S. Armed Forces, which discussed the air war against North Vietnam in August of this year, all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific, Admiral Sharpe, insisted on an escalation of aggression against North Vietnam, stating that it is an essential means of maintaining and consolidating military superiority and initiative in South Vietnam. In its recommendation to President Johnson, the Subcommittee suggested resorting "within reasonable limits"

to military actions which would have a direct or indirect influence on the determination and capability of North Vietnam to continue the struggle. Specifically, the Subcommittee recommended, above all, isolating the port of Haiphong, disrupting completely the transport lines between North Vietnam and China, isolating the area of Hanoi from the rest of the country, and destroying or putting out of commission all objectives which play an important role in the military efforts of North Vietnam.

16. During August of this year, targets in Hanoi and its surroundings were subjected to the most severe bombing attacks (11, 12, 21, 22 and 23 August), as a result of which the only railroad and motor vehicle bridge across the Red River, large fuel depots, a knitwear factory and residential sections of the city were destroyed. The municipal power plant was seriously damaged. Strikes were also delivered against objectives in Haiphong and against a railroad line connecting Hanoi with China.
17. The delivery of regular attacks against objectives in Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as against major installations on railroad lines connecting Hanoi with China and with the port of Haiphong, was intended by the U.S. command as a means to limit the movement of military equipment and other materials delivered by the Soviet Union and China to North Vietnam. In addition, it was planned to create additional economic difficulties in North Vietnam by incapacitating the major enterprises of the country, located in the area of the capital, as well as to produce a moral effect on the population.
18. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. military leaders, especially Defense Secretary McNamara, understand that even after the destruction of all important objectives, including ports and airfields, North Vietnam will still be able to receive help from outside and, consequently, the determination to continue the armed struggle will be retained. In the opinion of the U.S. command, North Vietnam may discontinue its help to South Vietnam only in the event it should consider the struggle as hopeless, or should find it too costly to continue rendering such aid.
19. The latest escalation of the air war, according to this plan, must be regarded as an attempt of the U.S. to suggest to North Vietnamese leaders that North Vietnam will have to pay a very high price for rendering aid to the South Vietnamese patriots.
20. With the beginning of the dry season (September-October) one should expect a further expansion of the air war against North Vietnam and an intensification of combat actions against NLF troops on the territory of South Vietnam. It should be kept in mind that the U.S. government and U.S. command may decide to expand the area of combat actions and spread the war to the areas of Cambodia and Laos bordering on South Vietnam, for the purpose of achieving their aims.



October 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Herewith General Westmoreland's assessment for September. I have had prepared summaries for each of the Corps areas.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

17a  
Tuesday, October 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Activities Report for September

S u m m a r y

With the exception of activities along the DMZ, enemy strategy and tactics remained relatively unchanged over most of the country during September. A single event was the successful conduct of the Republic of Vietnam national elections on September 3. Although terrorist, rocket and mortar attacks inflicted much higher casualties than during earlier elections, the record 83 percent turnout of voters attests to the fact that disruption attempts by the enemy failed. The comprehensive and thoroughly coordinated security blanket spread by Vietnam police/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces/U. S. /Free World Marine Forces forestalled all major assaults and greatly restricted the activities of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese.

The most serious development of September was the attack by fire campaign launched from the DMZ and adjacent areas at our Marine positions in the north. After reaching a high rate of 1,127 rocket-mortar-artillery rounds per day on September 25, the pace dropped off sharply and remained insignificant through the end of the month. Concurrently, there were indications of enemy withdrawal from his forward positions in the DMZ. The early heavy rains, our concentration of ordnance, and logistics implications are considered to have been chiefly responsible for the decrease in fire and withdrawal. Sizeable North Vietnamese forces continue to pose a threat to Quang Tri City. The deployment of one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division to Southern First Corps, directed on September 2, will enable the Marines to move additional forces north to reduce this threat.

The other significant development during September was the upgrading of enemy activity in Phu Yen Province. The 173rd Airborne Brigade, deployed to Phu Yen for Operation Bolling, will be retained in the area until the Republic of Korea and Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces can stabilize the situation.

Elsewhere in Vietnam our task has been to seek out an enemy that continues to avoid direct confrontation with major friendly units. The attacks against the Nationalist Chinese Embassy and individual Nationalist Chinese personages, and an increase in activity directed at Navy rivercraft constitute the more notable shifts in the generally low level of enemy activity.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By hrg, NARA, Date 10-21-91

The recent spate of press comments notwithstanding, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces effectiveness and aggressiveness shows perceptible improvement. Close U. S. training efforts and expanding measures to resolve corruption and leadership problems should stimulate more apparent progress in this area during the next few months.

As expected, there was limited progress in pacification programs, in large part because any Government of Vietnam provincial officials were in a post-election "wait and see" mood and were not supplying the impetus necessary for success.

In the First Corps, poor security and the onset of the monsoon further hindered Revolutionary Development progress. Nevertheless, at the end of September, 24 New Life hamlets and 29 Consolidated hamlets had been completed.

In Second Corps, the Revolutionary Development effort suffered a setback on Phu Yen Province as a result of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese attacks on hamlets which were making good progress. The fact, however, that the people of these hamlets want to return and rebuild and to maintain their loyalty to the Government of Vietnam is heartening.

In Third Corps, the hamlet construction program undoubtedly will remain behind schedule for the rest of 1967. Nevertheless, many intangible factors, e.g., changes in public attitudes, improving morale, and increasing commercial traffic indicate that progress is being made against the Viet Cong.

In Fourth Corps, Revolutionary Development activity began to accelerate after the elections although, in general, Revolutionary Development and civic action programs are behind schedule.

The somewhat slow nationwide rate of progress, however, should not obscure the fact that the election success marks a uniquely important step towards the ultimate and successful end of pacification efforts and a meaningful dialogue between the Government of Vietnam and its people.

SECRET

## FIRST CORPS

Primary objectives in First Corps in September were to deny entry of enemy units into the zone, destroy enemy forces in the zone, minimize disruption of national elections, deny enemy access to areas from which rocket, artillery, and mortar fire could be launched against vital installations and provide security for construction of the Strong Point/Obstacle System near the DMZ.

US/Free World Military Assistance Force operations accounted for 1,707 enemy killed and 264 weapons captured. Our forces suffered 391 killed.

Construction of the Strong Point/Obstacle System has been slowed by enemy activity in the DMZ area and by early arrival of the monsoon season. The enemy directed over 7,800 rounds of artillery, mortar, and rocket fire at our forces facing the DMZ during September, with the principal target being Con Thien. This is more than double the amount received during August. A combination of our heavy air, artillery, and naval gunfire along with an active defense and adverse weather conditions dissuaded the enemy from mounting a major attack.

ARVN forces were committed to security of polling places early in the month, and were generally successful in this mission although there were instances of enemy harassment and some ARVN positions overrun. ARVN units have demonstrated again that they can be successful against Viet Cong and accounted for 1,331 enemy killed and 317 weapons captured in 34 battalion-size or larger operations.

Pacification progress was slow during the month due in part to the elections but also the security problems in some areas. Assassinations declined from 198 in August to 122 in September but abductions rose for the fourth straight month.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

## SECOND CORPS

Objectives in Second Corps during September were to destroy enemy forces in the zone, deny the enemy access into the zone, minimize disruption of the national elections, and protect the people.

Despite a vicious enemy anti-election campaign, 91 percent of those eligible to vote did so. The enemy thus was frustrated in his attempt to prove that the people were apathetic or hostile toward their government.

A strong enemy threat developed in Phu Yen Province as North Vietnamese forces moved into hamlets near Tuy Hoa and dug in with the apparent intention to stand and fight. Simultaneously, more forces filtered down from the mountains to exert pressure on ARVN positions. The enemy appeared motivated by the approaching rice harvest and by his desire to disrupt our successful pacification efforts there. Korean and ARVN forces accepted the challenge and punished the enemy severely, while three US battalions moved into the rear of the enemy. Enemy losses in these engagements were 370 killed. Friendly forces lost 75 killed.

There is a noticeable, though gradual, increase in aggressiveness of the ARVN forces, especially when operating with US or Korean forces.

The pacification effort suffered a serious setback in Phu Yen Province as a result of the enemy attacks discussed above, but the people displaced by these attacks are being returned at their own request and the job of rebuilding is under way.

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

### THIRD CORPS

Objectives in Third Corps during September were to defeat enemy efforts to sabotage the national elections and to open large, previously inaccessible areas to friendly forces.

Approximately 80% of the eligible electorate participated in the elections, a dramatic defeat for the enemy. Large areas, previously inaccessible to friendly forces, are now being opened up by jungle clearing and mobile riverine force operations. These operations are expected to have an increasing impact on the attainment of our objectives as cover, concealment, security and resources are denied the enemy in key populated areas.

To date, a total of 75,000 acres of jungle have been cleared (including 31,000 along key highways and 33,000 in important enemy base areas).

On September 22, the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment completed its deployment to Third Corps and is now operating with the 9th US Infantry Division, thus broadening the base of free world support of operations in South Vietnam.

Success of the elections dominated pacification events in Third Corps, but otherwise pacification progress was spotty. Morale and welfare of the people have been improved by increased road security, and the New Life Development Program has recently provided equipment for four junior technical high schools. Over 60,000 textbooks were provided. On the other hand, the hamlet construction program is far behind schedule and undoubtedly will remain so for the rest of 1967.

The enemy failed to achieve a single significant victory in Third Corps during September, and his apparent policy of avoiding contact with large forces continues.

SECRET

SECRET

#### FOURTH CORPS

Objectives in Fourth Corps during September were destruction of Viet Cong main and provincial units and their principal bases, furtherance of the pacification effort, upgrading security, and improving defenses of our major airfields.

The enemy situation in Fourth Corps continues to deteriorate slowly. Viet Cong efforts against the national elections were virtually unsuccessful as evidenced by a turnout of more than 85% of the registered voters.

Continued Government of Vietnam pressure has affected the Viet Cong's ability to significantly deter the pacification effort and interdict the major highways and waterways. The Viet Cong have not had a major victory this year in Fourth Corps and intelligence sources confirm they are experiencing morale problems. Agent reports indicate they have not been able to overcome their shortage of qualified cadre and their recruitment problems continue to increase.

With the present US/Government of Vietnam force level in this corps area, gains should continue at a slow to moderate pace. Morale, combat effectiveness and fighting spirit of ARVN forces continue to be good.

Pacification programs remain behind schedule; however, activity began to accelerate after the national elections.

No major Viet Cong attacks were initiated in Fourth Corps during the month, but harassment tactics continued although these dropped appreciably after the elections. Of the 728 Viet Cong-initiated incidents occurring during the months, 320 happened during the period 1 - 4 September.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 10, 1967

178

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

SUBJECT: Military Assessment for the Month of September

The first week of last month was marked by enemy terrorist rocket and mortar attacks designed to intimidate the people of South Vietnam in order to disrupt the national elections. A determined people answered that challenge unmistakably.

Again the enemy has been defeated in his efforts to gain a major victory. Our combined forces are holding the line in some of the bitterest fighting of this conflict along the DMZ, and are seeking to protect the people and destroy the enemy throughout the country.

In order to gain and hold the people we must be able to afford them stability and protection. It is in the area of pacification and in the development of South Vietnam's civil and military leaders that we must progress.

First Corps

During the month of September our primary objectives in the First Corps were to deny entry of North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong units into the zone, destroy enemy forces, minimize disruption of the national elections, deny enemy access to areas from which vital installation could be subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, and to provide security for the strong point obstacle system construction. The 3rd Marine Forces conducted twelve battalion size or larger operations during September. These operations accounted for 1,707 enemy killed, 29 detainees, and 264 weapons captured, while forces of the 3rd Marine Forces suffered 391 killed and had 2,813 wounded. Special landing forces conducted four operations in Quang Tri and Quang Tin Provinces. These operations successfully prevented the enemy from accomplishing three major objectives last month; the large-scale assault on Con Thien, disruption of national elections, and the extensive procurement of food by the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division. Kingfisher Forces continued to develop the alternate plan for implementation of dye marker. Construction has proceeded with Bunker, minefield, and wire construction taking place. All construction has been slowed by rain and enemy activity. Progress on Route 561 is negligible due to high water.

During September, 85 arc light strikes were conducted in support of the First Corps; 78 were against targets in the DMZ area. This increase in arc light strikes was necessary to counter the build-up of enemy artillery in and north of the DMZ. The A Shau Valley road was rendered impassable by air strikes.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT/CBS 7  
By gpl/c, NARA, Date 6/25/96

Last month began with most Army of the Republic of Vietnam units committed to close-in security for voting places. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam, in conjunction with Free World forces, were successful in accomplishing the security mission, although there were numerous incidents of the Viet Cong blockading secondary roads and trails to polling places and a few incidents of harrassing fire on slated polling locations. Troops in the First Corps conducted 34 large-scale operations during September as compared to 47 in August, but these operations and the successful defense of friendly installations resulted in a significant increase in enemy casualties (1,331 killed, 128 detainees, and 317 weapons captured).

The enemy has generally been able to avoid large unit contact with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam units except on terrain of their choosing.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam units have demonstrated again that they can be successful in combat against the Viet Cong. Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Regional Forces/Popular Forces inflicted heavy casualties on enemy forces conducting attacks on compounds and installations. There were, however, several instances where the enemy succeeded in overrunning Army of the Republic of Vietnam positions.

Leadership remains the most important area requiring improvement. Army of the Republic of Vietnam morale remains good; although the desertion rate for September increased, reversing the August trend.

Interdiction and harassment declined appreciably from August. Nine culverts and 15 bridges were damaged or destroyed. Repairs of the Song Cau Lau and Nam O bridges progressed with minimal difficulties. 1,026 feet of new bridging and 1,280 feet of bridge repairs were made. Moderate progress continued on upgrading Route 1. Efforts were intensified to upgrade Route 561 to all weather class from Route 9 to Con Thien. We had 26 inches of rain in this area in September.

Logistical support and sealift assets remained generally adequate during the month. However, a backlog of cargo for northern First Corps ports has developed a definite upward trend which is expected to continue throughout the monsoon season. Additional landing craft have been requested.

Dye marker materials have been stockpiled both at Dong Ha and Danang in sufficient quantities to meet the requirements of the construction forces. Frequent interruptions as a result of enemy activity and early seasonal rains created a loss in construction time that will be most difficult to compensate for in view of the impending monsoon.

Progress in pacification during September was slow (particularly in the southern provinces) because of the elections, lagging Government of Vietnam interest, the onset of the monsoon, and security problems in some areas. Quang Ngai's efforts suffered a major setback when the Viet Cong occupied eastern Tu Nghai, the most important Revolutionary Development campaign area, for ten days following an attack upon the provincial capital. It probably will take several months to recover from this setback. Quang Tin showed a slight improvement in morale because of the successful defense against an enemy attack on Tam Ky on 6 September. In Quang Tri, the good election turnout and recent military successes have helped the Government of Vietnam's image. Revolutionary Development in Thua Thien is progressing on schedule. The aggressiveness and interest of Army of the Republic of Vietnam units supporting Revolutionary Development in the northern province is a major factor affecting this progress. Although still behind schedule, the Revolutionary Development program in the First Corps continued to show progress with a total of 24 New Life and 29 Consolidated Hamlets completed to date. Ninety New Life Hamlets and 35 Consolidated Hamlets are under construction. The number of Hoi Chanh declined steeply from 236 in August to 71 in September. Viet Cong assassinations declined from 198 in August to 122 in September, but the number of abductions rose for the fourth straight month to 335.

Last month Third Marine Forces Civic Action included distribution of food (338,000 pounds), medical and dental treatments (147,000), assistance in the construction of schools, wells, dispensaries and rice drying courts.

#### Enemy Actions in First Corps

The enemy maintained major elements of two divisions in the eastern portion of the DMZ with the primary concentration in the vicinity of Con Thien-Gio Linh.

The enemy made maximum use of his heavy weapons along the DMZ, directing over 7,800 rounds of mixed artillery, rocket and mortar fire at units and installations in that area. This is the largest number of rounds received during a monthly period since the enemy's introduction of artillery last March, and is more than double the volume received during August. The principal target and center for enemy ground activity during September was Con Thien. A combination of heavy air, artillery and naval gunfire with an active defense and adverse weather conditions dissuaded the enemy from mounting a major attack.

Elsewhere in First Corps during the first week of September, the enemy attacked the installation at Red Beach (Danang) and the Danang Airbase with rockets. Quang Tin Province was the scene of major engagements. Operation Swift exacted a heavy toll of casualties on elements of the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division

SECRET



in Que Son valley, and Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces decisively repulsed a coordinated attack on installations in and near Tam Ky City. Following these engagements, the tempo of enemy activity dropped off sharply.

Intelligence indicates that the enemy is devoting a maximum effort toward the resupply and reorganization of his forces prior to the monsoon season. An indication of the enemy requirement for food is the continued presence of the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division in eastern Quang Tin Province, ostensibly to gather rice from the harvest which started in late September. Interrogation of returnees and prisoners continues to point up enemy shortages of food, medical supplies, and ammunition. Almost all reports point up a high incidence of malaria and a general lowering of morale.

### Second Corps

Our objectives in Second Corps tactical zone for the month of September were to destroy the enemy forces in the zone, deny the enemy access to South Vietnam through Second Corps, minimize disruption of the national elections, and protect the people.

Two events occupied center stage, the Presidential elections and the North Vietnamese Army pressure on Tuy Hoa. Despite a widespread and vicious anti-election campaign by the Viet Cong designed to destroy the free expression of the people, 91 percent of those eligible in Second Corps risked death or injury to vote on 3 September. The communists were thus completely frustrated in their attempt to use the election to prove that the people of South Vietnam were apathetic or hostile toward their government. Near Tuy Hoa, the North Vietnamese Army moved into outlying hamlets and dug in with the apparent intention to stand and fight. Simultaneously, more forces filtered down from the mountains to exert direct pressure from the west on Army of the Republic of Vietnam positions guarding the approaches to the Tuy Hoa complex. We believe that the enemy is motivated by his appetite for the approaching rice harvest and by his strong desire to disrupt the increasingly successful Revolutionary Development effort there. South Korean and Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces accepted the challenge and fought well, punishing the enemy severely. Meanwhile, three U. S. battalions pounced on the mountain redoubts from which the North Vietnamese Army had come and began a squeeze on the center.

Second Corps initiated a program to provide an eagle flight of two gunships and five troop ships to the Phu Bon Province chief for a 30-day trial period. These aircraft were placed on ground alert in Cheo Reo with the 752nd Regional Forces company to provide an immediate reaction capability. This program has been so successful that expansion to other highland provinces is anticipated.

SECRET

The 22nd and 23rd Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions continued normal operations during September consisting of search and destroy and security operations and continued support of the revolutionary development program. In addition, operations were initiated in Phu Yen as mentioned earlier. Numerous contacts were made by elements of the 47th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment with enemy forces in this area. On September 17, after conducting an air assault to a location 12 kilometers southwest of Tuy Hoa, the 3rd and 4th battalions of the 47th Regiment made contact with an estimated enemy battalion. In this contact one Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalion commander was killed and another battalion commander wounded while 11 men were killed and 59 wounded. The U. S. advisor estimated that 35 to 40 enemy were killed. (30 body count officially reported)

Since September 19 the two Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions have participated in operations in coordination with Operation Bolling in the Tuy Hoa Basin.

During September, Army of the Republic of Vietnam units conducted nine battalion and 13 multi-battalion operations. Sixteen were search and destroy and six were road clearing or security missions. These operations resulted in 485 enemy killed, 143 detainees, and 164 weapons captured. Friendly losses were 241 killed, 584 wounded and 31 missing (Army of the Republic of Vietnam).

There is a noticeable, though gradual, increase in the aggressiveness of Army of the Republic of Vietnam forces, especially where operating directly with major Free World Marine Force units or where there is a major Free World Marine Force reinforcement capability such as in Binh Thuan. We are stressing combined operations of this type.

Free World forces continue to provide the arena in which the vital work of nation building may proceed. All of our forces initially were preoccupied with providing an outer shield for the elections. In a series of operations after the elections, beginning with several sharp Republic of Korea/North Vietnamese Army engagements and continuing with operations Bolling and Do Kay Bee 3, combined forces this month challenged the strong North Vietnamese Army threat to Phu Yen. By mid-month a three nation, multi-battalion attack was launched in the area west of Tuy Hoa. One battalion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade conducted search and destroy operations in the hills to the west while the other battalion from the 173rd and one battalion from the 1st Cavalry Division struck south and east, pounding the anvil provided by the 3rd and 4th battalions, 47th Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiment, anchored in the valley. Meanwhile, south of the Song Ba Dai Giang River, the 28th Republic of Korea regiment with three Regional Force companies assisting conducted successful search operations in the hamlets, flushing out numerous enemy who had been eying the rich rice harvests there. The results of the September operations west of Tuy Hoa were 370 enemy killed, 43 detainees, and 97 weapons captured. Friendly forces lost 75 killed and 192 wounded.

~~SECRET~~

Elsewhere in Second Corps the enemy continued to elect to break into small groups whenever threatened and to melt away wherever possible. Operations such as Join Hands in the Cay Giep mountains during the period 6-15 September, another joint-combined operation consisting of Vietnamese, Marine, Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and U. S. Forces supported by the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy, found no major formations willing to stand and fight. Nevertheless, significant gains were registered throughout Second Corps from the relentless pursuit and destruction of small enemy groups and persistent, carefully planned local cordon and search operations. These and other operations in September resulted in a highly favorable balance representing modest, but measurable, progress.

Highway 11 from Phan Rang to Dalat and highway 20 from Dalat to the Second/Third Corps boundary have been green since the first of September, an increase of 226 kilometers of green road in Second Corps. Although there was no net change this month in usable railroad, three work parties initiated restoration work on two sections of railroad to be completed by May, 1968, which will open the railroad from Phan Rang to Bong Son. On 16 September, the 1st Cavalry assumed full responsibility for the security of 87 kilometers of highways 14 and 19 from Kontum City to the vicinity of Mang Yang Pass.

Our modest but steady military progress must be balanced against a general slump in the political sphere and pacification program. There appears to be a post-election "wait and see" attitude among the province officials. The threatened "clean-up" of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and corrupt officials will cause this general attitude to persist. Hopefully, after the installation of the newly elected government in Saigon, the province chiefs will again concentrate their efforts on the execution of Government of Vietnam programs.

The Revolutionary Development effort suffered a serious setback in Phu Yen Province as a result of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army attacks on hamlets which were progressing well. No hamlets were heavily damaged and the security situation has deteriorated to the extent that numerous Revolutionary Development teams have been unable to complete their tasks effectively. As a result of combat operations in Phu Yen 3,704 homes were destroyed, leaving approximately 20,000 people homeless in Tuy An, Tuy Hoa and Hieu Xuong districts. At their own request, they are being returned to their homesites. Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development is providing food stuffs and building materials for needed repairs and new construction, and the job of rebuilding is underway. Twenty-one hamlets were brought under Government of Vietnam control in September for a new total of 1,221. An additional 366 hamlets are being secured.

Combating the infrastructure continues to progress as intelligence collection procedures improve and the techniques of cordon and search utilizing police field forces are applied. We are encountering some problems, however, with incompetent provincial officials.

SECRET

The strength of Regional Force/Popular Force units is now at 80 percent but their performance is spotty. To improve their effectiveness, a training assistance program has been implemented by U. S. units to improve Regional Force/Popular Force operational capabilities and to enhance their leadership capabilities at squad, platoon, and company levels. Complete implementation of the program will be accomplished in October. On September 1 an increase for Calendar Year 68 of 17 Regional Force companies and 30 Popular Force platoons was authorized, bringing the total authorization to 253 Regional Force companies and 1,100 Popular Force platoons. In order to expand and support the pacification effort in 1968, the Commander, Second Corps has expressed a need for the following additional forces: five Army of the Republic of Vietnam infantry battalions, one Army of the Republic of Vietnam Ranger battalion, two Army of the Republic of Vietnam Artillery battalions, 56 Regional Force companies, and 88 Popular Force platoons.

Civic action continues to play an important part in the pacification effort. It was a pleasure to note, for example, that in mid-September an Army of the Republic of Vietnam engineer battalion in Cam Ranh built a bridge for the people in Ding Lac Valley with supplies procured with the help of Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development and the U. S. advisor. A ski jump type spillway was opened on September 9 in Ninh Thuan Province at the Da Nhim Hydroelectric Plant. This spillway will permit irrigation of 10,000 additional hectares during the dry season. In Lam Dong the Highland Tea Cooperative continues to deliver to Saigon and Army of the Republic of Vietnam on their 410-ton contract. A new tea factory is under construction which, when completed, will be a boon to the economy of this area.

The enemy is considered to have low morale not from food shortages but from heavy losses sustained in recent months in engagements with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea, and U. S. forces. In Phu Yen, enemy morale has been better due to limited offensive success. In Binh Dinh, however, both the 18th North Vietnam Regiment and the local infrastructure has suffered losses at the hands of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Korea, and U. S. forces.

The enemy's most important economic objective for September was to seize a substantial portion of the rice harvest from the southern and coastal provinces in order to sustain himself during the remainder of 1967 and early 1968. Should he fail, increasing numbers of enemy can be expected to return to Government of Vietnam control through the Chieu Hoa program. In some areas the enemy is attempting to grow his own rice, working increasingly at night to avoid aerial observation. A trend to levy taxes has been noticed throughout the area due to the current food shortage. The enemy is making continuing efforts to cause inflation in Government of Vietnam population centers by interdicting lines of communication with taxation points and by sabotage of roadways and bridges. This effort has been generally unsuccessful.

The B-3 front continued active reconnaissance from the Chu Pong mountains to the middle of Plei Trap Valley. No major ground contact between enemy and friendly forces has occurred since early August. The 174th North Vietnamese Army Regiment has apparently withdrawn across the border into Laos and now presents less of a threat to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps in Kontum Province. In Pleiku Province, the enemy has continued to prepare the battlefield in the lower Plei Trap Valley. A continuing threat is presented to the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Duc Co, Plei Djereng, and Plei Mrong. The B-3 front is estimated to have a strength of some eight maneuver battalions in the Kontum area and 12 battalions near Pleiku in various states of combat effectiveness. The overall enemy goal in the highlands is to cause wide deployments of Free World Marine Forces and Army of the Republic of Vietnam units and to inflict unacceptably heavy casualties upon them. In the southern provinces, enemy activity during early September was directed toward disruption of the Government of Vietnam elections by employing propaganda, terrorism, intimidation and small unit attacks on hamlets and villages. Having failed to disrupt the elections, the enemy has confined himself to small attacks on hamlets, friendly installations, and lines of communication. In the coastal regions there are indications that the enemy may be preparing for a concentrated campaign during the monsoon to regain control of Binh Dinh Province.

At the beginning of September, the enemy tried to create a climate for fear to deter the people from voting. To their embarrassment the campaign to disrupt the elections backfired; the enemy found that instead he had hardened voter resolve to exercise their democratic rights. Subsequent to the elections, the enemy has concentrated on regaining some of the credibility he lost from his failure to carry out pre-election threats. This period has been characterized by increased attacks on U. S. personnel and installations in areas such as Khanh Hoa Province, where a Viet Cong attack by a claymore mine on the Neptune NCO Club in Nha Trang killed one U. S. and one Vietnamese national and wounded 45 other U. S. and Vietnamese personnel.

### Third Corps

Our objectives in the Third Corps tactical zone during the month of September were to defeat the enemy efforts to sabotage the national elections and open large, previously inaccessible areas to friendly forces. Approximately 80 percent of the eligible electorate participated in the elections, a dramatic defeat for the enemy. Large areas, previously inaccessible to friendly forces, are now being opened up by jungle clearing and Mobile Riverine Force operations. These operations are expected to have an increasing impact on the attainment of our objectives as cover, concealment, security and resources are denied the enemy in key populated areas.

~~SECRET~~



Friendly progress was highlighted by the adoption of two new operational concepts. Concept of massing available Army aviation assets (five-seven assault helicopter companies) in support of a single division for a one-half day period was initiated. This permits the simultaneous tactical deployment of much larger forces in order to fix the enemy, achieve surprise, and increase the probability of containing and destroying his forces. The rapid fire concept, also initiated this month, involves the tactical deployment of combined reconnaissance teams (three U. S. and three Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel per team) to locate Viet Cong forces, followed by platoon-sized teams to capture and fix the enemy forces, and finally the commitment of a larger Mobile Reaction Force to disrupt or destroy the enemy forces. The first of these operations terminated on September 21 and resulted in 38 Viet Cong killed in action, six prisoners of war, and quantities of captured weapons and material.

To date, a total of 75,400 acres of jungle have been cleared (including 31,752 acres along key highways and 33,026 acres in important Viet Cong base areas). This program neutralizes Viet Cong base camps and contributes significantly to the local security of populated areas and the ability of the people to travel in safety between these areas.

There are now 2 operating District Operations Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DOICC). These centers assimilate and evaluate hard intelligence and coordinate reaction forces that are directed against the Viet Cong infrastructure. In Binh Duong Province on September 17, the Phu Hoa DOICC, acting on intelligence, apprehended 11 infrastructure members and one Army of the Republic of Vietnam deserter.

On September 22, the main body of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment completed its deployment to Bear Cat where it is controlled by the 9th Infantry Division. The arrival of this unit will contribute materially to broadening the base of Free World support.

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 533rd Regional Forces Company, the same company which only last month prevented a mortar attack against the Tan Son Nhut Air Base complex, captured three Viet Cong officers. These prisoners revealed information that subsequently led to the discovery and capture of two weapons caches seven kilometers south southwest of Tan Son Nhut.

On September 30 two Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions conducted airmobile operations into the iron triangle. Contact was established three times during the day. This operation is indicative of an increase in the aggressiveness and desire of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to get on with the job.

SECRET

Two Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalions recently completed the U. S. /Army of the Republic of Vietnam battalion refresher training being conducted by eight U. S. brigades and the Australian Task Force. Nine additional battalions are presently in the program.

The coordinated and combined efforts of engineer troops in Third Corps have succeeded in maintaining all major highways open for both military and civilian traffic.

Recent troop and jungle clearing operations have improved the security along highway 20 in Long Khanh Province so that it now supports a significant amount of produce-bearing traffic bound for major population centers. The ability to move these goods freely contributes significantly to the general morale and welfare of the people. On September 25 the Cau Noi Ferry service across the Vam Co River on Route 5A was restored. This project was a combined U. S. /Government of Vietnam effort that will provide an important boost to the economy.

The success of the national elections dominated events in Third Corps. Otherwise, pacification presented a spotty picture for the month. On the one hand, there has been a continued improvement in the overall morale and welfare of the South Vietnamese people through increased road security, expanding educational facilities, health programs and the planned resettlement of refugees. On the other, the hamlet construction program for Third Corps remains far behind schedule and undoubtedly will remain behind schedule for the rest of 1967.

In other areas of pacification, however, progress is more encouraging. For example, the new life development program has recently provided equipment for four junior technical high schools. Over 60,000 textbooks were distributed in the Third Corps during September. In Binh Tuy Province, a 240-gallon per minute water treatment plant was established. This plant provides potable water to the towns of Ham Tan and La Gi. The jungle clearing operation conducted in an area adjacent to Route 2 provided a housing and farming area for the resettlement of refugees while concurrently denying the Viet Cong a source of tax revenue and personnel replacements.

In operations during September the enemy failed to achieve a single significant victory. His apparent policy of avoiding contact with large forces continues. Although to a lesser extent than in August, he continued to demonstrate his capability to deliver mortar fires on fixed installations. On the 16th and 17th of September, respectively, the Dong Tam Base Camp and the 1st Brigade Command Post, 25th Infantry Division, were attacked with mortar fires that inflicted light casualties (all wounded in action) and light material damage.

In September there was a sharp increase in the number of ralliers in Phuoc Tuy and Binh Tuy Provinces and Vung Tau (36 in August versus 102 in September). Rallier reports from these provinces indicate serious Viet Cong food shortages

and declining morale. The total number of ralliers, however, decreased to 380. This is a continuation of a trend that was noted last month. This decrease may be attributed to the onset of the rice-growing season and a "wait and see" attitude following the recent national elections.

A particularly illuminating report that reflects on the general welfare and morale of infiltrating personnel resulted from the capture of a 17-year old North Vietnamese soldier on September 26. The soldier had spent six months infiltrating to South Vietnam. His group arrived with only 20 percent of its departure strength (100 of an original 500) and many of these, including the prisoner, were sick with malaria and malnutrition. The soldier spent the next five months recuperating in a Viet Cong/North Vietnamese hospital in South Vietnam. During the six days that immediately preceded his capture his rations consisted of six potatoes.

A recent report, later confirmed by a prisoner of war statement, reports serious morale problems in the Phu Loa battalion. Intelligence indicates war weariness, lack of food, supplies and replacements, and a fear of death.

Casualties were down 20 percent from August, generally in line with a lower Viet Cong activity level.

#### Fourth Corps

The objectives in the Fourth Corps tactical zone for the month of September continued with emphasis on the destruction of Viet Cong main and provincial units and their principal bases; furtherance of the Revolutionary Development effort; upgrading the security and preventing interdiction of the major lines of communication; and improving the defenses of our major airfields.

Progress continues in improving the defenses of the airfields at Can Tho, Binh Thuy, Soc Trang and Vinh Long. Day and night aerial observation of the areas and approaches to the airfields, the conduct of firefly missions nightly over these areas, and the construction of permanent and temporary revetments for aircraft protection continues. Each airfield has established a joint command post where all internal defense, ambushes, patrols, harassment and interdiction fires and reaction operations are coordinated and controlled.

The enemy situation in Fourth Corps continues to deteriorate slowly. The Viet Cong propaganda and operational efforts against the national elections were virtually unsuccessful as evidenced by a turnout of more than 85 percent of the registered voters. Continued Government of Vietnam pressure, particularly against Viet Cong main force units and base areas, has affected their ability to significantly deter the pacification effort and interdict lines of communication. The Viet Cong have not had a major victory this year and intelligence

sources confirm that they are experiencing morale problems. With the present U. S. /Government of Vietnam force level in Fourth Corps, gains should continue at a slow to moderate pace. The overall morale, combat effectiveness, and fighting spirit of Fourth Corps units continue to be good.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units conducted a total of 146 major unit operations of battalion size or larger, a 15 percent decrease from last month. These operations were, however, of a longer average duration. Small unit operations numbered 56,864, the highest number reported to date. Twenty-nine airmobile operations were conducted with a total of 33,970 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces troops being airlifted. Cuu Long 63, a bilateral U. S. /Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces airmobile operation conducted in Base Area 470 as part of Coronado V, resulted in 70 Viet Cong killed in action, 52 Viet Cong captured and 33 weapons captured. There were 23 additional operations penetrating seven other Viet Cong base areas resulting in 118 Viet Cong killed in action, 129 captured and 55 weapons captured. A 4.1 to 1 friendly killed versus Viet Cong killed ratio and 2.5 to 1 weapons captured versus weapons lost ratio compare favorably with previous months.

Progress was made toward improving and maintaining the security of major highways and waterways in the Delta. During the month, National Highway 4 remained open to two-way commercial traffic with only brief interruptions caused by the destruction of the An Cu bridge in Dinh Tuong Province and four cratering incidents on Route 4. The following changes in line of communication security have occurred in the past 40 days: Highway 4 from Fourth/Third Corps boundary to My Tho was changed from amber to green, inter-provincial Route 40 from Vi Thanh to Highway 4 was changed from red to amber, inter-provincial Route 23 from Sa Dec to Cho Mai was changed from red to amber, the Mang Thit-Nicholai Waterway was changed from red to amber, the My Tho River was changed from amber to green, and inter-provincial Route 30 from Kien Von to Hong Ngu (Kien Phong Province) changed from amber to green. The Cho Gao Canal in Dinh Tuong Province and the Dong Kien Canal in Kien Phong Province were reported for the first time and are carried as green lines of communications. All airfields within Fourth Corps are operational. No airfields or major lines of communication were closed by the annual flood in September.

Pacification programs remain behind schedule; however, Revolutionary Development activity in each of the provinces began to accelerate after the national election period. Red teams continued to be shifted from first semester to second semester hamlets and by September 30 approximately 60 percent of the shift was completed. There have been no reported Viet Cong attacks on first semester hamlets. The Viet Cong initiated five incidents against Revolutionary Development cadre resulting in five Revolutionary Development cadre, five Regional Force soldiers and three civilians killed and 21 Revolutionary Development cadre and two Regional Force soldiers wounded.

~~SECRET~~

A joint US/Government of Vietnam team, headed by Government of Vietnam Brigadier General Hon, completed an inspection of Revolutionary Development activities in all Fourth Corps Provinces. This team reviewed each Province's potential for completing the current 1967 program and previewed the 1968 plans to insure continuity of effort and purpose. The efforts of this team are expected to give added impetus to the pacification effort in Fourth Corps.

The overall effectiveness of Regional Forces and Popular Forces units remains satisfactory. The number of Regional Forces and Popular Forces desertions average approximately 990 per month, 50 percent less than last year's rate. The Popular Forces desertion rate is about double that of the Regional Forces. A study has been initiated to identify the reasons for this. In an effort to increase the effectiveness of Regional Forces and Popular Forces units, a program of instruction for in-place training of these units is being developed.

The general enemy situation deteriorated slightly as compared with July and August. Although the Viet Cong increased their activities markedly during the election period, they were unable to fulfill their plans for disruption of the elections. The rate of incidents reached a high point on September 3 and dropped appreciably following the elections. Of the 728 Viet Cong-initiated incidents occurring during the month, 320 of these happened through September 4.

Coordinated Army of the Republic of Vietnam 7th Division and U. S. 9th Division operations conducted in Western Dinh Tuong Province relieved enemy pressure directed against Highway 4. Documents captured during the period revealed a four-phase Viet Cong plan of operation in Dinh Tuong Province. One phase of this plan, interdiction of lines of communication, was accomplished only to a limited degree; phases Two, Three, and Four (attacks on rear areas, armored cavalry units and infantry units) were not accomplished.

No major Viet Cong ground attacks were initiated but harassment tactics, such as shelling of the district towns of Phong Phu, Thuan Nhon and Ke Sach in Phong Dinh Province and Song Ong Doc in An Xuyen Province, continued. Agent reports indicate that the Viet Cong have not been able to overcome their shortage of qualified cadre and that recruitment problems continue to increase. Losses sustained by the Viet Cong totaled 944 killed, 300 captured, and 377 weapons lost compared to August losses of 1005 killed, 332 captured, and 302 weapons lost. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi program totaled 778. In addition to the Chieu Hoi, there were 152 Hoa Hao soldiers who returned to Government of Vietnam control.

~~SECRET~~



Naval Activity

MARKET TIME continued to provide effective interdiction of enemy waterborne logistics along the coast of South Vietnam. Blocking forces prevented exfiltration of enemy combatants during ground operations in First Corps. On September 3, a MARKET TIME patrol spotted for USS Boston and USS DuPont and obtained 16 secondary explosions from enemy artillery positions in Quang Tri Province.

The USS Hunterdon County was temporarily deployed to the First Corps on September 18 for a period of three weeks in order to evaluate the effectiveness of River Patron Boat Operations in the environment of the northern portion of South Vietnam. Game warden, seal teams and helicopters combined with Vietnamese Navy units in numerous effective operations. On the lower Bassac River on Tan Dinh Island which is used by the enemy as a base area, a seal team destroyed approximately 75 bunkers, 170 houses and 120 sampans and captured many documents, boat motors and weapons. Seal teams, with assistance from helicopters, small craft and seventh fleet destroyers, conducted shallow draft operations in Kien Hoa and Vinh Binh Provinces. Shallow draft operations are sustained abduction/intelligence gathering missions in enemy base areas and secret zones. A seventh, and last, helicopter fire team was activated at Can Tho on September 26.

The Riverine Assault Force conducted Operation Coronado V in Long An, Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. Coronado V combined Navy assault units with the 2nd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, to carry the fight to the enemy in areas inaccessible by land. A four-day operation in Dinh Tuong Province resulted in 210 enemy killed, 23 detainees and 559 bunkers destroyed. U. S. losses were 15 killed and 128 wounded.

Seventh Air Force

In-country, the preponderance of the air effort was allocated to direct support of U. S. /Free World Forces ground operations. The remaining capability was used to provide logistical support to these forces, to locate the enemy and his resources, to limit his freedom of movements and to encourage him to rally to the Government of Vietnam.

A total of 10,447 tactical air sorties were flown in-country during the month of September, of which 7,340 were close air support missions for U. S. /Free World Forces ground operations. Over 14,000 tons of ordnance were expended against enemy troop concentrations, base areas, fortifications and installations resulting in 265 secondary explosions. 4,127 military structures destroyed, another 2,737 damaged and 525 sampans destroyed.

Included in the overall effort were 734 combat Skyspot sorties flown to deny the enemy the use of night time as a sanctuary. In addition, 297 immediate

~~SECRET~~

Flareship Support requests were honored by US Air Force/Vietnam Air Force Flareships. These illuminated battlefields and provided flaring for tactical air strikes in all Corps of the Republic of Vietnam.

Constant pressure was placed on the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army in the movement of its forces by the more than 7,350 visual reconnaissance sorties flown alone. This extensive surveillance program produced 1,938 significant sightings. Additionally, 1,669 reconnaissance missions were flown during the month. The resultant vital data was used to locate the enemy and his operating areas for the subsequent development of targets.

Inclement weather hampered herbicide operations for the greater part of the month; nevertheless, 406,000 gallons of defoliant were dispensed.

Airlift figures were equally impressive with over 295,182 passengers and 65,896 tons of cargo being airlifted throughout South Vietnam. Both figures were over the average for the first nine months of the year.

More than 3,000 Vietnamese Air Force strike sorties were flown. Results were 1,451 military structures destroyed, 915 damaged, 140 sampans destroyed and 41 secondary explosions. Vietnamese Air Force further accounted for 868 visual reconnaissance sorties and the airleft evacuation of 801 friendly casualties.

Objectives of the 7th Air Force out-country air campaign in September continued to be the destruction or disruption of selected war supporting and militarily significant targets in North Vietnam, and the impediment of enemy infiltration and insurgency activities moving through North Vietnam and Laos. As was expected in this monsoonal transition period, adverse weather conditions throughout the areas of tactical operations hampered effective operations.

On September 12, Operation Neutralize was initiated to locate and destroy enemy field artillery and anti-aircraft sites and their associated storage areas. The search function of Neutralize is being conducted within weapon range of Dong Ha, Con Thien, and GioLinh, and is carried out by photo reconnaissance missions, photography, and visual reconnaissance. As of September 30, 1,153 Air Force and 607 Marine and Navy strike sorties had been flown in support of the operation. Results of the operation included 47 field artillery positions destroyed or damaged, 15 37/57 mm anti aircraft positions destroyed, 274 secondary explosions and fires, and an estimated 124 killed by air.

The weight of the B-52 effort for the entire month of September was predominantly against targets of enemy troop concentration and gun

~~SECRET~~

emplacements in the southern portion of North Vietnam, in the Demilitarized Zone, and in the northern portion of South Vietnam. Four strikes (15 sorties) were executed to interdict transportation routes in the A Shau Valley. There were 22 strikes (204 sorties) executed against 7th Air Force operation Neutralize targets.

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, October 14, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres. file*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Singapore Prime Minister  
Lee Kuan Yew

The Lee visit is similar to Ne Win's visit of last year. Like Ne Win, Lee is a prickly and fiercely independent national leader whose attitudes are influenced by his part in the anti-colonial struggle. For years, Lee regarded the U.S. with suspicion, and sometimes hostility. In the past few years, however, his attitude toward us has mellowed greatly and his trip to the U.S. more or less symbolizes the fact that our relations are now good.

Lee is an unusual type. He is highly intelligent, a very capable administrator, a first-class Cambridge-educated lawyer, a highly skilled national political leader, and a man with few interests except his work.

Why He Is Here

The British withdrawal from Southeast Asia and Lee's increasing confidence in our purposes has led him into two related beliefs: (1) Our success in Viet-Nam and our continuing support to regional economic development is vital to Southeast Asia, and (2) the nations of the area must use the time we have bought for them in Viet-Nam to strengthen themselves so that they can stand on their own feet. On this trip, Lee wants to get to know not only the American leaders of today, but of the 70's. He wants to reassure himself that we have the stamina to see Viet-Nam through and the subtlety to play the vital but diminishing role that he sees for us in Southeast Asia as the region develops its own resources.

Lee is Singapore, and I suggest you talk with him privately.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-177  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-19-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

### Specific Topics

1. Vietnam. Lee is for us. However, Singapore is largely populated by Chinese and it is politically impossible for Lee to be as forthcoming in public as he would like to be. He has made some surprisingly helpful statements in the past year or so and a quiet acknowledgment of his understanding would not be amiss. However, Lee would probably react negatively to any pressure from us regarding his public statements in the U. S. He understands the situation, and will doubtless go as far as he thinks he can without cutting his own political throat.

He will be deeply interested in your view of the opposition in this country, and how you are handling the situation.

2. Southeast Asian Regional Cooperation. Lee is a convert. Eugene Black convinced him that regionalism makes sense and that our quiet support for it is useful. Singapore is a charter member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations -- members are Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand), and hopes to see concrete economic benefits from it. You can draw him out on this, as well as whether he thinks ASEAN can, in time, make a direct contribution to the security of Southeast Asia.

3. Indonesia. Singapore's stake in the economic revival of Indonesia is enormous. Lee is not too sure of the future stability of Indonesia, but is totally in favor of our policy of multilateral aid.

4. Malaysia. Lee and the Tunku simply do not get along. It is, however, a family quarrel and the participation of outsiders is not welcome. Lee is not likely to raise this issue, but, if he does, our position is that the Singapore-Malaysian relationship is something for the two of them to work out.

5. British Withdrawal. Lee fought mightily to head off the British decision, but now accepts it and is concentrating on taking up the economic slack that will result in Singapore when the British pull out of their Singapore bases. He has said publicly that he would be willing to have our ships and aircraft use the Singapore facilities on a commercial basis. We have looked hard at this and are not much attracted. If he raises it, I suggest you refer him to Secretary McNamara.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

6. Overseas Chinese. Lee believes that the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia must seek their future as citizens of the country in which they live, rather than as Chinese. At one time he suspected that we considered all overseas Chinese as a "Fifth Column". Should this subject come up, you should leave him in no doubt that we share his view.

7. Singapore Itself. Lee and his government have done an outstanding job. Although there is a large unemployment problem, the living standard is the second highest in Asia and there is a spectacular welfare program (by 1972 half the population will live in public housing). He is in complete political control.

8. Communist China. Lee sees the future threat from China as subversion, not military aggression. It is his awareness of this threat which makes him anxious that the nations of Southeast Asia build healthy societies without delay.

The briefing book from State, a good one, is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Briefing Book

P.S. The biggest thing you can do with Prime Minister Lee is to say this: You are fighting to see Vietnam through and to develop a long-range U.S. - Asian policy which would permit Asia to develop in freedom. It is a hard battle. You have faith that the American people have the capacity to pull it off. BUT they cannot and will not be able to see Vietnam through and stay with Asia for the long pull unless Asians have the courage to speak out and tell Americans why it is critically important that Americans do so. What he says in the U.S. he must decide in the light of his own views and the politics of his country. You would not in any way wish to press him. But he and other Asian leaders have the fate of U.S. policy towards Asia in part in their hands, but what they say and what they do.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~

19

*Pres file*

Friday, October 13, 1967 -- 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am told you asked Covey Oliver if it were true the Bolivians had cremated the body of Che Guevara. CIA has told State that that is the case.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 13, 1967  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here is Nick's evaluation of the  
problem posed for us by the East German  
Film on U.S. prisoners of war in North  
Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 10-21-71

2002  
20a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-417  
By 48, NARA, Date 6-16-95

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: East German Film on U.S. PWs in  
North Viet-Nam

Averell Harriman, Dix Donnelley, Paul Warnke and I have taken a hard look at the NBC and "Life" purchase of East German films on American PWs in North Viet-Nam. The facts are these:

NBC plans to use approximately 6-8 minutes of the film on next Monday's (the 16th) evening news. Averell Harriman has talked to NBC officials who readily agreed to show us the pictures and to consult with us in advance. They have accepted our guidance and assured us that they will handle the subject constructively.

"Life" plans to use stills (attached) in its October 16 issue. They have asked us for comments, and Averell will provide a statement--emphasizing the propaganda nature of the films--to be included in the article.

My own judgment is that there is little we can do to prevent the importation and showing of these films. The Department of Justice, Governor Harriman and Warnke all concur in this judgment. Since the purchase was from the East Germans rather than the DRV, we have no recourse to the Trading With the Enemy Act. Other less formal means of influencing "Life" or NBC would probably not work because:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-


- Any attempt to persuade them to drop the projects would almost certainly become known, with consequent bad publicity.
- The East Germans are obviously offering the film to a wide variety of outlets, and it is virtually certain that these--or comparable--films will be available to American audiences through channels which we cannot control.

Underlying the problem is the intense desire of next-of-kin for any shred of information about the prisoners. The existence of the PW films is virtually impossible to conceal. (We have heard, for example, that "Paris-Match" and "Stern" have also purchased portions of the films.) The prisoners' families have made clear in similar cases in the past that their relief at seeing the men overshadows any concern about public display. Further, the publicity may influence Hanoi to improve treatment of the prisoners.

I believe the best solution open to us is to elicit the cooperation of the networks, and appeal to their sense of responsibility and sensitivity to criticism. (They have already made clear their worries about reports in the New York Times and elsewhere describing "trafficking" in Communist propaganda--reports based on material we supplied.)

Meanwhile, we will offer guidance--some of which they will accept--to NBC and "Life" in the editing and presentation of the films, as well as Averell Harriman's commentary.

Attachment.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



*W R*

21

Friday, October 13, 1967 -- 5:30 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL 480 Report to the Congress

*Pres file*

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed transmittal letter covering Agriculture's Report on PL 480 programs during 1966.

The Report is routine. It emphasizes the key points: self-help, population control, multi-national assistance. On the domestic matters, it covers all the themes of your PL 480 policy, assuring domestic plenty, building future foreign markets, and feeding the starving while they build the capacity to feed themselves.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/RM/vmr

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress a report of programs carried out under the Food for Peace Act during calendar year 1966.

This report marks a year in which the productivity of American agriculture and the generosity of the American people have done much to help others to help themselves. Food and fiber valued at \$1.5 billion were provided to needy people in more than one hundred countries. Since 1965 the United States has provided almost \$16 billion in farm products to 116 countries which together contain almost half of the world's population.

To millions, this sharing has meant survival in the face of drought or other natural disaster. To countless children it has meant freedom from the weakness, disease, and mental retardation which are the tragic consequences of malnutrition.

In 1966, however, United States food aid programs entered a new and more critical stage. The world's food problem was growing -- not diminishing. Despite our efforts, serious food shortages threatened many countries. The problem of feeding rapidly growing populations was compounded by serious drought in India and Pakistan -- the worst drought on the South Asian subcontinent in this century.

The world faced two related problems:

- to stimulate agricultural production in the food-deficit countries so that they will eventually be able to grow their own food, or to buy it through the normal channels of world commerce; and
- to provide direct food shipments sufficient to ward off starvation and severe malnutrition during the interim period until the deficit countries achieve self-sufficiency.

After a long and careful study, the United States undertook to carry its share of the burden in a worldwide War on Hunger. I sent to the Congress a special message on Food for Freedom, proposing that the United States lead an all-out effort to reverse the dire trend in the race between world population and world food supply. The response of the Congress gave us the tools to wage that war.

There are six main elements of the new strategy.

Emphasis on self-help. The War on Hunger must be fought and won within the countries where hunger exists. Our food aid and other forms of assistance must go primarily to those who do the most to help themselves. The key to victory over hunger is self-help.

Policy for a non-surplus era. In the past, our food aid programs have been based on the existence of food surpluses in the United States. These surpluses are gone. Until the less-developed countries are able to provide for themselves, our domestic farm programs must be geared

to ensure that we produce enough to meet pressing foreign needs as well as the demand here at home.

Population programs. Rapid population growth can make the dream of plenty a nightmare of famine. This is an enormous problem. It is clearly a matter for the conscience of each family and each nation. We will never dictate an answer, nor intrude on the decision others must take for themselves. But many countries have voluntarily decided that the time has come to confront the population challenge directly and realistically -- using the best measures man's wisdom can devise. We stand ready to respond to the requests for help from these nations in formulating and carrying out effective population programs.

Integration of all U. S. assistance programs. Relief from immediate suffering is only part of the War on Hunger. It gives precious time and strength for a larger task. The developing countries must use this time to gather the resources and skills to improve their agricultural production so that they can ultimately stand on their own feet. This is the goal of our technical and economic assistance. Clearly, our food aid must be closely related to these other forms of help in a single, carefully integrated approach to the whole of the food problem.

Increased private investment. We have learned the hard lesson that there is no easy or simple answer to the scourge of poverty and hunger. No single program, no single plan, and no single government holds the key. We must marshal the sum of our experience. We must bring to bear more and more the capital and know-how of private enterprise -- both in the United States and in the developing nations themselves.

A multi-national effort. The food deficit is a world problem. Developed nations must join in an international undertaking to combat hunger and modernize agriculture. The United States cannot shoulder this responsibility alone. In meeting the world's food needs, the common interest lies in common effort. In sum, we propose to enlist the very best talent -- private and public, of all nations, rich and poor.

As I have stressed, our own food aid is only a part of a wider attack on the causes of hunger. We have already made effective use of this new approach in the Food for Freedom agreements signed this year. In the new program with India, for example, our food assistance complements India's own strenuous measures to increase agricultural production. This year we have also made a special effort to encourage help to India from other developed nations.



We seek new agreements with other countries in the same spirit. Our goal is to achieve both self-help in the developing countries and close integration of our own aid with the assistance of other wealthy countries.

The developing nations are helping themselves. Given a critical margin of capital, technical skill, and interim food shipments from the advanced countries, the threat of mass hunger will eventually diminish. Over the past twelve years, PL 480 has meant the difference between life and death for millions all around the world. That challenge and that momentous obligation are still with us.

I know that Americans have the dedication, the patience, the skills, and the wisdom to see the job through. Working together with rich nations and poor, all equally determined that mankind will conquer its oldest enemy, we will win the war on hunger.

---

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 13, 1967  
4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of my lunch today with Minister Evron. Harry tells me that after lunch Evron feels a bit easier.

*Pres. file*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 179, NARA, Date 10-21-91

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-418

22a

~~SECRET~~

By WJ, NARA, Date 7-27-95 October 13, 1967

# MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Minister Evron asked to see me today. The only time available was lunch, so we dined together at my office.

1. He said he had prepared to come in a state of agitation and crisis because of the discussions yesterday with Sec. McNamara; but, just before lunch they had received Sec. McNamara's letter to Minister Eban, which eased the situation they thought they faced yesterday. It had been immediately forwarded to Jerusalem and they would await a response.

2. He described the "shock" of their discussion yesterday with Sec. McNamara in which they had understood him to be requesting formal Israeli support now for the shipment of military spare parts to Jordan. He said this was politically impossible and explained why.

3. I explained at length Sec. McNamara's position, underlining that he was not insensitive to Israel's political problems but was laying before Minister Eban a situation and a fact which Israel could not ignore or evade:  
offer

-- The Russians had given Hussein a most attractive/for military equipment on the basis of a "single supplier";

-- The U. S. could not accept sole responsibility for dealing with this problem when it arose.

He said he now understood the problem and the proposal made by Sec. McNamara.

I took the occasion of lunch to make as strongly as I could the point that it would be impossible for the U. S. to have an Israel policy without a Middle East policy; and a Middle East policy without having a global policy including a policy of seeing our commitments through in Southeast Asia. I underlined that I had heard nothing more dangerous in recent months than the doctrine that we could somehow look after Israel's arms requirements while living with the Church amendment and all it implied.

Evron agreed that this was correct and then went on to say the following: If we are to work together, as we must, on issues like Middle East arms supply, we ought to try to work out a more lucid common strategy for the whole region. He did not mean we would always agree in detail. Israel did some things with which we disagreed and vice versa. He underlined the beginnings of Israel's uneasiness as starting with the Goldberg-Gromyko

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

draft resolution, which they saw and on which they were "permitted to comment only at virtually the 12th hour." He suggested that we use the occasion of Eban's presence in the country for the frankest possible talks so that our tactical problems could be handled within the framework of a fairly lucid common strategic approach to the Middle East and Middle East settlement.

I took the occasion to get out Eban's aide memoire of 30 August 1967 -- emphasizing that this was a personal view, not that of the President or the Secretary of State -- and emphasized my judgment that it was a most dangerous illusion for Israel to believe that it in fact could rely for its security on its own without reference to "external factors." The recent Middle East crisis required not merely Israeli feats of arms but a U. S. policy that kept the Soviet Union from engaging in the Middle East and which kept a working majority in the UN General Assembly. An Israel surrounded by hostile Soviet-dominated Arab states would be no answer to its problems no matter what the U. S. arms supply might be; nor would an Israel which had lost its support in the world community.

He noted these comments with some sympathy.

He concluded by saying that he was sure that in the week ahead the friends of Israel in the U. S. would make a maximum effort to get the Church amendment removed.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

23

27

f


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Friday - 4:00 pm  
October 13, 1967

Mr. President:

1.3  
(a)(4)



This removes any doubt that "Che"  
Guevara is dead.

Walt Rostow

SANTITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-024-1-5  
By gp, NARA, Date 1-7-02

24

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 13, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I received a call from Amb. Waller informing me that Hasluck has received a message from the Australian Prime Minister as follows: "The best dates for an Asian summit meeting, so far as Australia is concerned, are November 28-December 1. Either Bangkok or Seoul would be acceptable as a location."

I shall inform Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-418  
By ijg, NARA, Date 7-27-95

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



P file

Friday, October 13, 1967  
12:45 p. m.

25

MR. PRESIDENT:

In view of your negative judgment on the Executive Order covering PL 480, I believe you should look at this proposal.

I'm for it, because:

-- a broad plan is needed;

-- this does not involve any dilution of your control over particular decisions;

The point is, we need a map of the problem, bringing domestic and foreign policy considerations together and looking ahead.

Tony Solomon will make sure the job is done.

Ed Hamilton will ~~maintain~~ monitor from our side.

This kind of State Department inter-departmental leadership should be encouraged.

W. W. R.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

attachment Log 3700

cc: Charles Schultz  
Ed Hamilton

3960  
25a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1967


S/S-17629

MEMORANDUM TO WALT ROSTOW

Subject: P.L. 480 Program

Following up yesterday's National Security Council meeting, I spoke to John Schnittker today and suggested that a task force be established under Tony Solomon to look at the P.L. 480 program over the next 12 months. I think it is possible to do a better job of marrying foreign and domestic political needs than we have yet done in this program, but it will require both knowledge and inventiveness to do so. My impression is that occasional bureaucratic infighting at lower levels, coupled with misunderstanding about the nature and facts of the other fellow's problems, have inhibited an adequately imaginative program and forced us to a series of ad hoc political decisions in many parts of the world. I think Tony has both the background and political ingenuity to put together a better program if he gets full cooperation from the other departments -- and I'm sure he will if Agriculture agrees to proceed in this fashion.

I think what we need on the P.L. 480 program is an orderly overlook which will make it much easier for the President to make the political decisions which will come up over the next 12 months. I do not think I need to take it into SIG if we can proceed with this task force -- except, perhaps, for information.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

P. J. Lee

Friday, Oct. 13, 1967  
12:30 p. m.

26

MR. PRESIDENT:

Much in this conversation between Sato and Ne Win will interest you, notably the remarks on Viet Nam and Sato's respect for Ne Win -- somewhat to his surprise.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

Friday, October 13, 1967 -- noon

27

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Attached is a proposed farewell  
message to General Ankrah of Ghana. He  
departs from New York tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_

EKH/RM/vmr

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL ANKRAH OF GHANA

27a

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hope you have enjoyed your visit to the United States. It was good to get your personal views on the important questions which concern us both. I found your comments wise and constructive.

Your visit gave all Americans a deeper appreciation of the selfless work you and your colleagues of the National Liberation Council are doing to build a new life for the people of Ghana. We are confident of your continued success. We are very proud to be among the friends and supporters of the new Ghana.

Mrs. Johnson and I wish you and Mrs. Ankrah a fond farewell and a pleasant journey home.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

EKH/RM/vmr

Friday, Oct. 13, 1967  
12:00 noon

28

MR. PRESIDENT:

This exchange of questions and answers  
between Dr. Conant and Cabot Lodge  
will interest you.

*Pres file*

Sect. Rusk, Sect. McNamara, Amb. Lodge  
and I are meeting at 3:15 p. m. today to  
discuss the Douglas Committee.

W. W. R.

Attachment



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

28a

Personal

October 10, 1967

PERSONAL

Dear Walt:

The enclosed memorandum of my conversations with Dr. Conant is to me extraordinarily interesting since it shows things about Viet-Nam about which he was in doubt.

You and I both agree that he is an extraordinarily intelligent person. How then is it possible that he should have been in doubt?

I have my own theories about this, as I am sure you have too.

In this connection, please note his view of what the commitment should be under IV b and my reply under IV c.

Warm regards.

Very sincerely yours,

*Henry*

Henry Cabot Lodge

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

Personal - ~~unclassified~~ 286

Memorandum Regarding My Several Conversations with Dr. James B. Conant Concerning His Joining the Committee for Peace with Freedom in Viet-Nam.

---

I.

When I first telephoned on October fifth, Dr. Conant said he was much inclined to join the proposed citizens Committee and was "in sympathy" with it but he wished to ask two questions as follows:

"Is there any military reason why we could not give up bombing North Viet-Nam if we doubled our manpower on the ground?" Conant stressed that we could not ignore the feeling in favor of "stopping the bombing."

A second question was:

"If the U. S. pulls out, will the Vietnamese with whom we have been dealing be massacred?"

He asked me to call him on Monday in New York City.

II.

On Monday, October ninth, I phoned and made the following statement in reply:

A. From a short-run military standpoint it should be said that as long as the enemy is bringing truck loads of ammunition and howitzers down from North Viet-Nam and is using these munitions to fight our Marines, one cannot argue against trying to stop the enemy by bombing.

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY MA ON 10-25-61

There would be a greater public outcry if we did nothing to prevent these guns and ammunition coming down from the North than there is against the bombing.

Bombing is hard to consider separately. If bombing is to stop, NVN must agree to cease its attacks on Marine and ARVN units in DMZ. Otherwise they'll be slaughtered.

B. In the longer view the following emerges:

If the enemy is to be allowed to bring in arms and ammunition in unlimited amounts, the doubling of American troops would, under the conditions described in Dr. Conant's question, tend to double the American casualties since a chief measure to impede the flow of enemy munitions would have stopped.

C. Also, the question raised by Dr. Conant is not exclusively a military question, just as the war is not exclusively a military war. The war is partially military and partially nation-building and an exclusively military victory, such as we had in World War II, is inconceivable in Viet-Nam. The fighting in the DMZ is exclusively military, but in the rest of Viet-Nam the military serves as a shield behind which the work of nation-building goes on. Nation-building includes pacification -- counter-terror work best done by non-military fighting men -- i.e., constabulary and police type fighters -- who fight where they live. After these civilian fighters have done their job, political, economic and social programs must start.

D. Having in mind nation-building, we do not need more American troops; what is needed is for the Vietnamese to become more efficient at pacification since pacification is -- and must be -- their responsibility.

E. The importation of 500,000 more American soldiers under the conditions stipulated by Dr. Conant would not only increase American casualties but would also lead to a greater degree of friction and anti-Americanism.

F. It would also create problems as regards inflation and the Vietnamese economy generally, <sup>which</sup> would be difficult in the extreme.

G. Finally, one million men in a country the size of Viet-Nam would make the war completely "our war" with all the far-reaching implications which this event would have -- in Viet-Nam and in the U. S.

H. Making the war "our war" would destroy our biggest single psychological asset, which is our non-colonial status. The Communists constantly assert that there is no difference between us and the French and so far this charge has fallen flat. We have taken great pains never to govern, never to give orders, always to work through persuasion. We tried--successfully-- to interest them in constitutional government. Then, when they got interested, they took the initiative and provided the impetus. This is the method which works. The colonial method fails. If the Vietnamese were

to feel overwhelmed by the American presence and adopt a "let George do it" attitude, it would be a catastrophe.

III.

As regards Dr. Conant's second question, there is no doubt that if we pulled out of Viet-Nam before she is ready to stand alone many thousand South Vietnamese who had stood with us would be massacred.

We agree that this is a powerful point and we intend to give it publicity.

IV.

a. After Lodge had made his statement, Dr. Conant told Lodge that he had decided that he would be "very glad to join the Committee." Conant added that Lodge had convinced him that "certain previous doubts which he held were not well founded and authorized Lodge to make this fact known to McGeorge Bundy and John J. McCloy.

b. Conant said that he understood that the Committee would take "an intermediate position" -- between abandonment of Viet-Nam on the one hand and all-out war on the other -- and he assumed that Lodge would be involved with the Committee on matters of substance. Lodge explained to Conant why, as a Government official, he could not be a member of the Committee.

c. Lodge further explained that the Committee, without getting into the minute details of the Viet-Nam war, would concern itself with three general areas: reasons for being in Viet-Nam; U. S. accomplishments in Viet-Nam; historical and cultural background of Viet-Nam without which the present cannot be understood.

d. The fact that abandonment of South Viet-Nam would produce a massacre of hundreds of thousands of non-communist South Vietnamese is a point Dr. Conant wants highlighted and Lodge assured him that this very pertinent fact will soon be reflected in Committee papers.

Henry Cabot Lodge



Limited Official Use      Friday - 10:30 am  
October 13, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Message to Prime  
Minister Shearer

State recommends that you send the attached  
farewell message to Jamaican Prime Minister  
Shearer. It would be delivered to him in New  
York before he flies to Kingston tomorrow,  
October 14.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment

Proposed farewell message  
to Shearer.

29a

PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL FAREWELL MESSAGE TO THE  
PRIME MINISTER OF JAMAICA HUGH SHEARER

(To be sent 2:30 p.m. - October 14 to USUN, New York)

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your visit has made a significant contribution to strengthening the ties of understanding and cooperation between our two countries.

For my part, I have valued the opportunity to discuss matters of mutual interest. I want you and the Jamaican people to know that as you build a prosperous and progressive new nation and assume greater responsibility in Caribbean and in world affairs, you have the good will and support of the Government and people of the United States.

In departing the United States, you take my warm farewell and the affection of the American people.

Lyndon B. Johnson.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

For 11 AM Meeting

30

Friday, Oct. 13, 1967  
10:15 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

At breakfast this morning, Sect. Rusk and Arthur Goldberg agreed that we should shift off our present position on to a draft like the attached. This draft, while stating certain broad principles would, operationally, take the issue of negotiations out of the hands of the U. S. and USSR and put it in the hands of a mediator. There is quiet agreement that the mediator would be Ambassador Jarring, now Swedish Ambassador to Moscow.

The reasons are the following:

1. The Soviet Union has been trying to achieve an interpretation of our earlier Joint Resolution which would lean heavily favorable to the Arabs, unfavorable to Israel; that is, it would lean heavily on troop withdrawals and will have everything else fuzzy.
2. Arthur, on the other hand, has been trying to get everything so clear beforehand that in fact it would pretty nearly constitute a settlement.
3. In the face of this situation, Sect. Rusk and Arthur want to put in the attached new resolution which calls for no act at the beginning; reiterates your 5 points; contains basic language incorporating Arab as well as Israeli principles; but throws the work into the hands of a mediator.
4. The resolution would be introduced not by the U. S. but by some other party; perhaps the Finns and Swedes would float it, or the British.
5. Arthur would have the task of talking with the Russians about this and explaining that this resolution, in effect, is a way of doing what they have urged; namely, to have a resolution which each party could, for the time being, interpret in his own way until they became gripped of a negotiating process via an intermediary.
6. Your 5 principles are put into this draft because Riad, the Egyptian, has said that they "have no objection" to your 5 principles. We think the Israelis will buy this; and it may be that the Arabs will also, because they have been saying that the U. S. position has been "hardening;" but we shall see.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-418

By ij, NARA, Date 7-27-95

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-2-

My own feeling is that if we were to pursue the US/USSR resolution on Arthur's track of making it explicit, this could only be done if the US/USSR were, in fact, the mediators in this crisis, getting into all details, and especially into the sequence of negotiation of the various issues in the Middle East. It may be the part of wisdom to get the U. S. and USSR out of that position, working on the flanks of a mediator, if we can get a consensus on this procedure.

With respect to detail, it is unlikely that the "arms race" phrase will survive; and the paragraph on the second page beginning with "affirming" may be either modified, or go.

W.W.R.

PRESERVATION COPY

10/13/67

30a

The Security Council.

Having further considered the grave situation in the Middle East,

Affirming that the Security Council has an obligation to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security,

Bearing in mind the resolutions adopted and proposals considered by the Fifth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, and the resolutions adopted and action taken by the Security Council in considering this matter.

Considering that the Charter calls upon all member states to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors;

Recalling the Charter requirement that a member state act in accordance with the following principles:

1. That the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members;
2. That member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
3. That they shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any states or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the Charter;

Declaring that these principles require for their full implementation a context of peace, based on the recognized right of national life for all states, justice for refugees, free and innocent maritime passage, limits on a wasteful and destructive arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all,

Affirming, in light of the foregoing, that none of the states in the area should maintain forces on the territory of another state against its will or persist in refusing to withdraw them, or claim the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerency against another state or persist in refusing to recognize its sovereign existence and right to live in security.

1. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to work with the parties concerned with a view to assisting them in the implementation of this resolution and establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

2. Requests the Secretary General to keep the Security Council advised of the progress and results of the efforts of the representative.



October 13, 1967

*Pres. file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Labor Leader David Sullivan's Observations  
on Vietnam

This is a summary of a report addressed to you by Mr. David Sullivan, General President of the Building Service Employees' International Union, on his findings as an observer of the recent Vietnamese national elections:

Mr. Sullivan expressed his deep gratitude for the opportunity to serve you and the nation in this special capacity.

He is convinced that on the basis of his first-hand observation, the elections were fairly conducted -- even though they were carried out on patterns unfamiliar to American voters.

He shares the concern of Vietnamese labor leaders with whom he spoke that the new government in Saigon must not permit the Communists -- who now realize that they cannot win militarily -- to win a political victory. In this connection, he suggested:

an expansion of our pacification efforts and our encouragement of the Saigon Government to increase their efforts at pacification.

An accelerated social and economic welfare program with educational opportunities for even the poorest Vietnamese and a wide distribution of the economic benefits resulting from our large military presence and expanding local industry.

American military and civilian officials, as well as American businessmen, keep constantly in mind the need to improve the lives of Vietnamese civilians in the interests of democracy.

Regarding Vietnam's labor movement, Mr. Sullivan:

- Said he was impressed with the Vietnamese labor leaders and the role of the unions in building dispensaries for their members and in helping the impoverished generally.
- Noted the importance of a labor movement that is loyal to democratic principles, and, to this end, reported that a delegation of AFL-CIO union leaders will go to Vietnam to discuss what Americans can do to assist the expanding Vietnamese movement.
- Expressed the belief that American military and civilian personnel should do all they can to aid the growth of a free trade union movement in Vietnam, including reminders to Vietnamese leaders of the importance of such a labor movement.
- Said we should follow the example set in Germany elsewhere after World War II and permit Vietnamese civilian workers at U. S. military and other installations to organize unions, and that American personnel should recognize those unions in collective bargaining.

In conclusion, Mr. Sullivan praised the American servicemen in Vietnam, expressed the view that some press reports are unduly pessimistic, and agreed that we should do our utmost to make certain that the facts are made available to the American people. Since his return, he has reported his findings to George Meany and to the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and has given numerous interviews to radio and press outlets -- including trade union newspapers and journals -- and has spoken to various groups on the situation in Vietnam as he found it.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, October 13, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation  
report on political developments in  
Viet-Nam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

MWright:hg

~~SECRET~~

32a

## Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

October 13, 1967

### Formation of the Government

Discussions within the military leadership and among Thieu's and Ky's supporters are continuing on the question of Cabinet appointments. These discussions appear to be difficult and time-consuming, with strong differences of views held on the various personalities being considered. For example, although Ky's choice, Nguyen Van Loc, still appears to be the leading contender for Prime Minister, southern regionalist pressure against Loc appears to be growing. The key generals met on October 11 and 12, presumably to discuss question of Cabinet formation among other things. Bunker hopes to be able to see Thieu today to discuss the current situation.

### Upper House Activities

Thieu gave a good speech at the installation ceremonies for the new Senate on October 11. He stressed the themes of building democracy, restoring peace, and reforming society. The Senate met again on October 12 for an organizational session and made considerable progress.

### Lower House Election Campaign

American officials observing the Lower House election campaign in Bien Hoa province near Saigon report that a vigorous campaign is under way. These observers note that there are numerous candidates of education and ability in the race.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-417  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-20-95

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 13, 1967

*Pres file*

FOR MRS. ROBERTS

Jaunita:

Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim  
Maiwandwal of Afghanistan is entering  
Andrews Air Force Base Hospital tonight  
for surgery. I recommend that the  
President send the Prime Minister some  
flowers or whatever is appropriate in these  
cases. State agrees.

W. W. Rostow

RM/vmr

34

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
7:40 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Bob McNamara has sent over the attached draft letter which he wants to send to Eban confirming their understanding. In Bob's view it allows him, in sentence marked 1, to ship to moderate Arabs, including Jordan, and, in sentence marked 2, he has positive Israeli support for all shipments except to Jordan.

I recommend that you think about this over night.

W. W. Rostow

(Penned note: The Israelis are having a fit tonight; but after talks with Bob and Abe (who called me), I think we can work it out.

~~SECRET~~-SENSITIVE

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-191  
By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00



~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

34a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

12 October 1967

The Honorable Abba Eban  
Foreign Minister, Government of Israel  
c/o Embassy of Israel  
1621 22nd Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008

Dear Mr. Minister:

As I agreed in our discussion this afternoon, I have reviewed with my colleagues the question of when and how we might resume the shipment of the military materiel and supplies that you have currently on order from American sources. We have concluded that we are able now to release the existing backlog of spare parts, components and other items. We have also concluded that we will be able to proceed on schedule with the shipment of the 48 A-4H aircraft now on order together with the requisite support materiel.

As I explained to you, it must be anticipated that any resumption of arms shipments to countries in the Middle East will result in immediate Congressional inquiry. Our ability to respond to such inquiries in a manner that will avoid controversy is crucial to our efforts to preserve our legislative authority to make credit sales in the future to you and to other countries. In response to such inquiries we plan to state that we have ~~reviewed~~ <sup>advised</sup> with officials of your Government our intention to resume some arms shipments in discharge of existing commitments to the moderate Arab states. We will also state our understanding that your Government does not regard as contrary to its interests the resumption of such arms shipments to moderate Arab states that were not participants in the recent hostilities.

I will look forward to discussing with you further the other and more long-range problems about which we talked this afternoon.

Sincerely,

*Israel*

*Committee*

*reply*

*Appropriate  
consultation*

*and note  
#2 of your letter*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-273  
By *us*, NARA Date 5-11-98

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Limited Official Use

Thursday - 6:30 pm  
October 12, 1967

*Pres. file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chamizal Memento

We have examined several alternatives for a Chamizal memento for the principal participants in the Chamizal ceremony and have come back to a medallion as the best solution.

A good design is attached. The obelisk is a replica of the boundary marker placed along the length of the United States-Mexican frontier. The quotations are paraphrases of statements made by you and President Diaz Ordaz. We had to telescope the quotes in order to make them fit the medallion. Yours is taken from this quotation:

"We approached the council table with respect  
for each other's rights and determined to achieve  
a just and lasting settlement."

(From your 1964 Chamizal speech.)

If you approve the memento and the design, I will have Jim Jones make production arrangements. We will, of course, obtain President Diaz Ordaz' approval of the paraphrase of his statement.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_


Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_.

Attachment

Design of medallion.

35a





*Pres file*~~SECRET~~

Thursday - 6:30 pm  
October 12, 1967

Mr. President:

This CIA report on Castro's alleged intention is far-fetched, but I thought you should know about it.

I have seen nothing else to indicate that the Cuban economic situation is so grim or Castro's state of mind so frantic as to resort to so silly an action.

We have alerted the Pentagon to the report.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

CIA field report  
dated 11 October

[REDACTED]

1.3  
(a)(4)

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-420  
By isp, NARA, Date 10-26-95

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-419

By WJP, NARA, Date 7-21-95

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Intelligence Information Cable

• PRIORITY

IN-69850  
-69878

36a

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC ~~XXXXXXXX~~ SDO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMCC  
REPCINCLANT EXO DD1

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE

OCT 12 16 32Z

DIST 11 OCTOBER 1967

1.3(a)(4)

COUNTRY CUBA/USSR

DOI

SUBJECT INFORMATION ON ALLEGED CUBAN  
INTENTION TO INVADE GUANTANAMO

LEWIS  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
FRIED  
GINSBURGH  
HAMILTON  
JESSUP 1.3(a)(4)  
JOHNSON  
JORDEN  
KEENE  
LEONHART  
ROCHE  
SAUNDERS  
TAYLOR

ACQ

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

1.3(a)(4)

1.

1.3(a)(4)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

2.

1.3(a)(4)

FIDEL CASTRO IS PLANNING A SUDDEN INVASION OF GUANTANAMO BASE BY CUBAN FORCES WHO, AS PART OF THE ATTACK, WILL EMPLOY ROCKETS AND/OR MISSILES. [REDACTED] INFORMANT GAVE NO DATE FOR THE ALLEGED INVASION. 1.3(a)(4)

3. THE THINKING OF CASTRO AND A VERY LIMITED GROUP AROUND HIM IS THAT THE INVASION WILL PROMPT AN IMMEDIATE COUNTER-ATTACK BY THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IN TURN WILL FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO BRING UNSPECIFIED PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE UNITED STATES.

4. THOUGH CASTRO RECOGNIZES THAT MANY WILL DIE ON BOTH SIDES, HIS PURPOSE IS TO FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE A STRONGER POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES. FURTHERMORE, CASTRO THINKS THAT THE GESTURE OF THE INVASION, WHICH COULD BRING DISASTER TO CUBA, WILL SERVE TO INSPIRE WIDESPREAD REVOLUTIONARY EMULATION THROUGHOUT THE REST OF THE CONTINENT.

5. CASTRO'S THINKING IS TAKING THIS DIRECTION, ACCORDING TO

[REDACTED] INFORMANT, NOT ONLY AS A REACTION TO THE RECENT ATTITUDE

1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)



1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

OF THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD CUBA BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION IN CUBA IS NOW CATASTROPHIC. THE PROSPECT IS THAT IN 1968 THE SITUATION WILL DETERIORATE EVEN MORE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION.

6.

1.3(a)(4)

7.

COMMENT: WHILE THERE IS NO OTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CONFIRM CASTRO'S INTENTIONS AS REPORTED ABOVE, ANOTHER

SOURCE REPORTED

ON 10 OCTOBER 1967 THAT A "TOTAL MILITARY ALERT" COMMENCED ON THE ISLAND ON 7 OCTOBER 1967.

1.3(a)(4)

8. DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1  
•

(classification)

(dissem controls)

5  
4  
3  
2  
1  
1.3(a)(4)

*Pru file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - 6:00 pm  
October 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Puerto Rico - Dominican Republic Cooperation

We have talked to Governor Sanchez Vilella about his idea of establishing a joint Puerto Rico-Dominican Republic Commission to furnish technical assistance, and promote trade between the two islands.

I find that this is something which has been under discussion for several months between Puerto Rican and Dominican authorities with participation of our Embassy in Santo Domingo.

Negotiations have moved far enough along so that a general announcement could be made, provided you and President Balaguer are agreeable. The draft announcement, which still must be discussed with Governor Sanchez and President Balaguer, is attached.

Governor Sanchez contemplates starting the program with technical assistance furnished and financed by Puerto Rico. Commercial, industrial and investment cooperation would follow. The Governor also wants eventually to relocate marginal Puerto Rican industries to Santo Domingo where labor costs are lower. This is a touchy subject which he does not want to mention publicly now. Eventually he would also like to refine Dominican sugar in Puerto Rico but he realizes that legal and policy considerations make this out of the question in the foreseeable future.

I believe that Puerto Rico has much to contribute to the Dominican Republic. It is in our interest for Puerto Rican expertise and resources to help in the development of neighboring Caribbean islands. You gain by associating yourself with Governor Sanchez in extending Puerto Rican assistance to the Dominican Republic.

We must first check with President Balaguer to see if he is prepared to make the announcement. If he is, I recommend you join in the trilateral announcement, subject to further review of the text.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-418 7-27-95  
By *ijp*, NARA, Date

Approve \_\_\_\_\_  
Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
See me \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

Attachment



37a

PROPOSED ANNOUNCEMENT

Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, President of the Dominican Republic, Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States, and Dr. Roberto Sanchez Vilella, Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, announced today that a Joint Dominican - Puerto Rican Economic Commission would meet on \_\_\_\_\_ in Santo Domingo to begin technical planning to develop closer and mutually beneficial economic relations between their peoples.

The Commission, whose functions have been under study for several months, will operate through the auspices of the Cooperacion Desarrollo Economico del Caribe in Puerto Rico (assume Balaguer will wish insert parallel reference to DR agency) and will be composed of representatives from those government agencies directly concerned with the development and coordination of economic affairs.

In making the announcement, the conviction was expressed that strengthened economic cooperation between the governments and peoples would contribute not only to their own economic and social development but also to the progress of the entire Caribbean area, within the framework of the ideals envisioned by the Alliance for Progress. The work of the Joint Commission will in no way replace or duplicate the present activities in the Dominican Republic of international organizations or agencies of the

United States Government. The leaders expressed their desire that those organizations and agencies would cooperate and assist, as appropriate, in this joint undertaking.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-418By mg, NARA, Date 7-27-95*Purple* 38~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US and Soviet Positions on Mid-East Resolution

We have had a series of talks with the Soviets this week on where we go in the UN. Arthur Goldberg--and apparently Dobrynin--thinks we've hit a dead-end. Since Secretary Rusk wants to discuss this with you soon, here is a preview of the argument.

A more detailed rundown of issues and positions is attached, but the key question is whether we make any concessions in order to revive the US-Soviet draft resolution of July.

The problem is that, despite our July agreement on the wording of that resolution, we and the Soviets were interpreting it differently. They want a loose resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal which states Arab obligations loosely enough that they can be disregarded.

Arthur told Dobrynin Tuesday that we are prepared to go ahead with the July draft subject to consultations by both us and the Soviets with the principal parties and provided we have a clear understanding on what the resolution means and what would be required in the way of affirmative acts by the parties. He said it must be clear that the resolution means that (a) Arabs renounce belligerency and that (b) if belligerency ends, the Canal would be open.

The question we haven't solved yet is whether there's a half-way position between Arthur's hard line and moving to our fall-back position of a general resolution using language from the UN Charter and appointing a UN representative to see what he can work out.

Most of us feel we ought to try to salvage something from our July understanding with the Soviets, although we recognize that any dilution of our July position would bring us into a head-on clash with Israel. Also, we have to consider that the Israelis say we've already gone too far in committing ourselves in essence to withdrawal to 4 June boundaries. Only the Israelis are content to see time run on.

I will be having breakfast with Secretary Rusk and Arthur tomorrow, and we will try to report to you later in the morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-418  
By ij, NARA, Date 7-27-95

38a  
October 12, 1967

ISSUES AND POSITIONS ON A MID-EAST RESOLUTION

I. Should we press urgently for a UN resolution?

A. Most of us believe, as Secretary Rusk said this morning, that "time is not working for a peaceful settlement." We don't want to miss a chance for settlement while positions are still fluid. Even the Arabs are in a hurry because they know that the longer Israel sits on the West Bank the harder it will be to dislodge her. The USSR wants to look as if it's helping the Arabs. The UK is the itchiest of all since the Canal's continued closure is costing Wilson--and Britain--a great deal.

B. Only Israel is in no hurry. Eban feels the Arabs won't face up to reality--and the necessity to accept and deal with Israel--until they realize no one else will solve their problems for them. Eban feels they'd be readier to negotiate if the UN failed to provide an answer.

II. Is the US-USSR draft resolution acceptable?

A. The Arabs and the Soviets now want to change the language to be tougher on the Israelis. For instance, they'd like to call for withdrawal to lines of June 4th rather than to negotiated final boundaries.

B. Goldberg told Dobrynin we considered the July draft acceptable provided we could agree in advance on interpretation. He said this is as far as we could go. (The Israelis objected strongly to that.) If the USSR was going to allow the Arabs to change the language, we should be allowed to reconsider too.

III. How much do we have to nail down before we go to the Security Council?

A. Despite our desire to move ahead, we can't see passing any resolution which can be interpreted later to suit each party's policy. Ambassador Goldberg told Dobrynin that the major powers must agree before passing a resolution on what it means. The main Mid-East belligerents must share this understanding, including the fact that ending belligerency means opening the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping.

B. The Arabs and Soviets want to avoid specific interpretation. They argue that we're trying to write a peace treaty before we'll let a resolution go through the Security Council. They're probably trying to

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

get away with a resolution they can cite as calling for Israeli withdrawal while they get away with as little response as possible. But they do have a point when they say, "Why should we give up our hole card--ending belligerency and opening the Canal--before we're sure the Israelis will come to terms on issues that are basic to us, like refugees?"

IV. How can we be sure both parties accept the UN principles when passed?

A. We and the British currently agree that the necessary follow-up to pre-agreed interpretation would be some affirmative act by the Arabs to show that they were really renouncing belligerency. Among other things, Goldberg would require pre-agreement that Tiran and the Suez Canal would both be opened to Israeli shipping. Gene Rostow has indicated to the Soviets that we would consider a two-step process by which there was general acceptance of the principles of withdrawal and the end of belligerency as guidance for negotiation but no actual withdrawal until negotiations ended.

B. The USSR and the Arabs believe the question of opening the Canal should be left to a later stage of the negotiations along with the refugees and that we should not try to pin these points down before passing the resolution. Nasser sees the end of belligerency as his ace in the hole and neither he nor Faisal understands why the Arabs should give this up before they get satisfaction on some of their basic aims like a refugee settlement.

V. Should we shoot for direct negotiation or settle for a mediator?

A. Israel publicly rejects mediation and maintains that the only believable sign that the Arabs are terminating the state of belligerency will be their willingness to sit down and talk with the Israelis. Privately Eban would be willing to accept a UN mediator without a specific mandate but believes there's no point in going to this "fall back" position until we've ascertained whether the US and USSR can come to terms or not. The Arabs, of course, refuse to negotiate directly with Israel.

B. The US-UK believe a UN mediator will be necessary in any case to work out the details of carrying out a resolution. But we also recognize that, if we fail to reach a common interpretation of a resolution with the USSR, we may have to settle for a very general resolution quoting more general principles from the UN Charter and throw the matter to a UN representative.

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary McNamara's Agreement with Eban

Bob feels he worked out the following procedure with Eban:

1. We will proceed immediately on the items which Israel now has on order and which have been held up by our military aid freeze. At the same time, we will proceed with parallel shipments to moderate Arab states (excluding Jordan).

2. We will deliver the Skyhawks from the 1966 contract on schedule, beginning in December. This requires a decision before the weekend to arrange shipping.

3. Secretary McNamara will write Eban a letter explaining the above and expressing his (McNamara's) understanding that Israel does not object. (This will have to be delicately worded.)

In addition, Bob made a hard pitch to the Israelis to get to work on the aid bill conferees.

This is for your information. I will send you the formal recommendation from Secretaries Rusk and McNamara (they did not want to sign until after today's meeting) spelling out the equipment we would be moving. They will presumably want to consult on the Hill once they have your tentative OK to this course of action.

McNamara warned Eban that, while we are not moving shipments to Jordan now, we may well in about a month.

W. W. Rostow

This sounds all right \_\_\_\_\_  
I'll hold my decision till I have the formal paper \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-191  
By CB, NARA Date 08-00

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - 5:00 pm  
October 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 12:00 noon appointment with Jamaican Prime  
Minister Hugh Shearer

Herewith is Nick Katzenbach's memorandum and briefing book  
for the Shearer visit. All you need to review is the memorandum.

As Nick points out, we have no major bilateral issues with Jamaica.  
The Prime Minister is likely to raise several matters which he  
regards as important. These are for the most part complaints  
about what the Jamaicans regard as insufficient generous treat-  
ment by us.

The talking points paper at Tab A of Nick's memorandum lists  
these complaints and suggests how you might handle them.

The only comment I have on the talking points is with regard to  
Jamaica's desire for larger AID concessional lending. Rather  
than look to us for more assistance, they should be working with  
Canada, the UK, and the other former British territories on ways  
to pool their resources to help themselves. In this context, it  
would also be useful to point out that if Jamaica were to join the  
OAS, it would have access to Alliance for Progress sources.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-418  
By lig, NARA, Date 7-27-95

WGB:mmm

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
4:40 p.m.

41  
Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker reports a relatively quiet week.

You will be particularly interested in the military sections (pages 7-9) and in the sharp drop in the Saigon retail price index (page 9).

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 8347

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 10-21-91



Thursday, October 12, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 8347)

Herewith my twenty-fourth weekly telegram:

A. General

This past week has been relatively calm on the political scene as both government and opposition recovered from the comparatively intense struggle over validation of the Presidential election.

Some echoes remained from the struggle in the form of still unresolved demands from the extremist Buddhist led by Thich Tri Quang for cancellation of the July charter of the Unified Buddhist Association, in the arrest and subsequent drafting into the army of a number of students opposed to the validation of the elections, and in the continued house arrest of Truong Dinh Dzu, one of the defeated civilian candidates.

Nevertheless, tension seems to have gone out of the situation, with Tri Quang's decision on October 10 to abandon his "sit-in" in the park in front of the Presidential Palace, the last active evidence of the unrest of the past several weeks disappeared from the scene. The police barricades and the barbed wire have disappeared, and the atmosphere is definitely much more favorable for constructive progress than has been the case for some time. All of these developments are discussed more fully in the political section below.

The Upper House held its opening session the morning of October 11. Following a short introductory speech by Senator Vo Van Truyen, 71, the eldest member of the senate and its temporary president, General Thieu spoke to the senators and the members of the diplomatic and press corps attending the session.

Thieu's speech was brief but, on the whole, it was very much to the point and I think suitable to the occasion. As he himself said, he was not attempting in this speech to set forth the full program of his government and he implied that this would come later. He seemed in this speech primarily to want to establish the basic tone for his administration and in this he was, I think, successful. He placed particular emphasis on the foundations being laid for democracy, on the supremacy of the constitution, the responsiveness of the government to the needs of the people, the importance of observing the rule of law and impartial administration of justice. He stressed willingness to enter into negotiations at any time with the north and said that he would welcome peace initiatives of a constructive nature from whatever sources.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-417  
By CB, NARA, Date 1-20-95

With respect to his program in South Vietnam, he emphasized strengthening and reforming the armed forces, providing security for rural areas, raising the standard of living in urban areas and educating the people throughout the country to understand their civic duties. Above all, he emphasized the need to eliminate corruption and establish sound, effective government machinery. On the whole, he avoided specifics and it was clear that his speech was general in outline.

I have drawn a rough comparison between Thieu's speech and the suggestions that we have made to him with respect to content of this speech and more particularly subsequent speeches such as his inaugural address and possibly a "state of the nation" address. It is noteworthy that he chose in this speech not to say anything about national reconciliation nor did he anywhere refer to Ky. Other omissions were his failure to mention manpower mobilization, to place special emphasis on youth or to express gratitude to the allies. Although these omissions are of interest, I think it probable he will deal with these aspects in his later, more major speeches for in closing, Thieu made it clear that this speech was not a definitive statement on national policy.

No announcement has yet been made of the new prime minister, although the press continues to believe that Nguyen Van Loc will be nominated to the position by General Thieu. There is still a certain amount of jockeying around going on, but I believe Thieu will stick to his statement to me of September 30 and nominate Loc. I will be seeing Thieu later in the week and will review the matter further with him. It has now been officially announced that Thieu and Ky will be inaugurated October 30, by which time the entire cabinet will presumably have been selected.

As you may have seen from Saigon 7987, the Newsweek issue of October 9 has been banned from commercial sale in South Vietnam. The issue contains an article attributed to Merton Perry which is sharply critical of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, entitled "Their Lions, Our Rabbits." The Newsweek bureau chief, Everett Martin, and Perry have told us that the headline originated in the New York Editorial Office of the magazine. Perry tells us that the article as a whole was heavily edited in a direction which significantly eliminated qualifications and explanatory material in the article he wrote. I must say that I consider Perry's article and its editing by the Newsweek editors an example of highly irresponsible journalism. General Westmoreland's investigation has proven the falsity of his most sensational statements and although the article itself has some minor qualifications, it gives to my mind a highly erroneous impression of the state of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. I am afraid this article is a reflection of Perry's attitude toward everything in Vietnam. He attended recently one of a series of small informal dinners I have been having for the press and gave me the impression of being thoroughly disenchanted with everything here and I doubt whether it is possible for him to report objectively.



Because of this Perry article and also because of earlier threats to the Newsweek office in Saigon stemming from an article by Martin in the September 25 issue ("Vietnam Last Chance?"), Martin has recommended to New York that no protest be made to the Government of Vietnam on this ban. Martin also called us October 9 and asked us not to raise the issue with the Government of Vietnam unless he is directed otherwise by his home office.

The article by Martin in the September 25 issue of Newsweek aroused little apparent interest in Saigon at first, and we had thought the issues he raised were dying a natural death. As you may have noted, Martin suggested a series of measures which would have put the U.S. much deeper into the internal affairs of the Vietnamese Government, in a manner which would have raised serious questions as to whether the Vietnamese have any effective sovereignty in their hands. Unfortunately, in response to considerable press and private criticism of the article, Martin wrote a long letter to a number of Saigon editors which was published October 8. The letter is more pointed than the article, calling for the Government of Vietnam and the U.S. as sovereign powers, to come to "written terms that spell out the boundaries of each other's rights". An extended summary of the letter is in Saigon 8015. Specifically, Martin called for the integration of the U. S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces in Vietnam, making it clear that he has in mind having Americans serve under Vietnamese command in some cases and Vietnamese under American command in others.

As you know, we feel that negotiations of a status of forces agreement is not practical during hostilities and that if possible the problems and restrictions of such an agreement should be avoided at this time. Primarily, we have considered the utility of a joint command arrangement on a number of occasions and have felt it would not be feasible except in certain instances of small specialized units. As I have previously reported, we are experimenting with various forms of integrated U. S. and Vietnamese Armed Forces operations with the purpose of raising the level of training and effectiveness of the Vietnamese units and to practice the principle of economy of forces for the U. S. units. It is unfortunate that Martin has stirred up these issues at this time, since several of the newly-elected senators are on record as favoring negotiations of a status of forces agreement. Martin's article and his subsequent open letter to the press may result in further and unfortunate attention being focused on the matter.

When I saw Thieu on October 4, I raised with him the question of establishing adequate salary levels in the executive and military branches of the government. I pointed out to him that today government salaries simply are not well enough paid to attract the best talent in Vietnam, or adequate to reward those top officials who carry out their responsibilities honestly and well. I added that we have learned in the United States that a government cannot function well unless senior officials are paid adequately. This is now far from

the case in Vietnam. Under present circumstances, the low level of salaries for senior officials is damaging to morale, and incentive to corruption, and a crippling barrier to improving government performance.

I suggested that the forthcoming setting of Senate and House salary levels offers a unique opportunity to simultaneously increase the salaries of key top-level Government of Vietnam and Army of the Republic of Vietnam officials as well. I left with him tables which we had prepared for him setting forth a suggested range of civil executive salaries and a second table covering military personnel down through the rank of colonel. Since the proposed pay increase would apply to a relatively small number of people, the total economic cost would not be great. I said I realized that there were political problems involved in an executive pay increase. However, I felt by coupling this measure with increased emphasis with what is expected of senior officials in terms of integrity and performance, and by setting in motion a thorough civil service reform and pay revision at all levels of government, such a measure would be publicly accepted as both necessary and desirable.

In a talk Bob Komer had with Thieu on October 6, devoted principally to pacification, he seized the opportunity to emphasize again the chance to get an executive pay raise for top officials and officers at the time when the salaries of the new Congress were set.

#### B. Pacification

We are planning an all-out effort to increase rice production, especially in the Delta, a key element in our 1968 pacification and nation-building plans. Chief reliance will be placed on giving the farmer a good price for his paddy, opening more roads and waterways, bringing in better rice seed, more fertilizer and agricultural machinery, and providing more credit. Bob Komer came back from the Delta yesterday reporting that the key Delta crop will probably trend upward this winter, thus breaking the long decline since 1963.

#### C. Political

Hopeful elements, both positive and negative, marked the political scene during the past week. On the positive side, the Senate was inaugurated October 11. The Cabinet will probably be formed during the next week or so. It may include one or two less effective figures on the civilian side, as a consequence of political bargaining during the struggle over validation of the Presidential election. However, the Cabinet will be the instrument of an elected President, subject to the pressures that can be brought to bear by an elected National Assembly. If individual Cabinet members prove ineffective, they can be replaced, since they are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the President.

Another hopeful sign, although on the negative side, was the end of the Buddhist political protest on October 10, when the extremist leader, Thich Tri Quang, and a handful of his immediate entourage, abandoned their "sit-in" in the park in front of the Presidential Palace. Some of the more moderate figures sympathetic with Tri Quang's An Quang Pagoda Group had told us of various schemes they had to get Tri Quang out of the park and out of the political dead-end he seemed to have worked himself into. His demands for a flat cancellation of the July Buddhist charter were clearly unacceptable, public support was simply not forthcoming, even support from the usually sympathetic Foreign Press Corps was slipping away, two fiery suicides had no noticeable effect, and simple but effective police measures to isolate him from crowds made it clear that he could stay indefinitely in the park without making any significant impact. The indifferent attitude of passers-by, moving along a main thoroughfare not 100 feet from where he and the other monks sat, must have been a continuing reminder to him that he was not making his mark. Finally, no force was required to get Tri Quang out of the park. He quietly left under his own power. At what was, for him, an unusually subdued press conference at An Quang Pagoda October 10, Tri Quang made clear that he had abandoned his "sit-in" and expressed confidence that the government would take action on the charter issue. That his confidence was not misplaced was indicated by a communique issued the afternoon of October 10 by the moderate Thich Tam Chau faction, temporarily suspending application of the July Buddhist charter in order "to create a favorable occasion for understanding and union of Buddhist groups." This is essentially the tactic which General Thieu described to me in my meeting with him October 3 (discussed in Paragraph 35 of my twenty-third telegram).

General Thieu's brother, Nguyen Van Kieu, told us the evening of October 10 that he had been actively consulting during the past few days with the Buddhist groups. He indicated that an understanding has been reached among the various groups to prepare a new charter to be presented for approval to an all Buddhist Congress. Kieu said that it was on the basis of this understanding that the An Quang extremists were able to withdraw from the "sit-in" in front of the Palace. This is consistent with the communique issued by the Buddhist moderates October 10. I think Thieu deserves a good deal of credit for his skillful handling of the situation.

Contributing to the general air of relaxation of tensions was the release from detention of opposition leader Truong Dinh Dzu on October 4. Dzu had been held only five days, and his arrest seems to have been clearly timed to get him out of the way during the climax of the validation struggle on October 2. He is still under house arrest and is not currently in a position to project himself into the political arena.

Also as a postscript to the elections and the struggle over validation, the police have moved in on student oppositionists, broken up their attempts to hold unauthorized meetings and press conferences, and arrested 40 of them. Of those arrested, 17 were found to be of draft age and were mobilized into the Army. The remainder were admonished and sent home. While this measure may seem a bit draconian, it may well have the desired effect of encouraging young students who have been deferred from military service to buckle down to their studies instead of engaging in undesirable and unhelpful political activities.

The Lower House elections campaign formally got underway October 6 and will continue until October 21. A few election posters are to be seen around Saigon and some of the larger cities, and door-to-door type campaigning has begun. Public interest, not surprisingly, seems to be less than it was for the Presidential and Upper House elections. These are essentially local elections for national office, with the bulk of the contests being decided on the basis of personalities and, to some extent, random voting among the average of nine candidates per seat. The results of the elections, according to the election law, will be announced by local election councils in each of the 53 constituencies on October 26. The councils, presided over by a local judge and composed of candidates and voters representatives and prominent local personalities, are unlikely to be the focus of any significant struggle over the results, as was the case with the Presidential elections.

Continuing where they left off on September 3 in their campaign against the Presidential and Upper House elections, the Viet Cong, in a radio broadcast October 6 predictably called for the "smashing" of the Lower House elections. The broadcast urged citizens to "resolutely protest and boycott the Lower House elections farce." Emphasizing that the elections will be "fraudulent" and "undemocratic" as well as meaningless. This is so much whistling in the dark. Public interest may well be less than it was for the other elections, but there is likely to be a very substantial voter turnout. I am confident that it will be shown once again that the Communist claim that they "control" most of the territory and people of South Vietnam is meaningless. As was demonstrated September 3, the Communists simply do not have the capability of attacking or disrupting the activity of more than a handful of South Vietnam's 8,000 polling places.

During the past week there has been a spate of press reports on disciplinary measures taken by Prime Minister Ky against dishonest officials. On October 4 Prime Minister Ky authorized reprimands and court action to be taken against seven officials in Keim Gian Province (three former province chiefs, one former deputy province chief, and two chiefs of provincial services) for abuses of their positions. He also ordered that the chief of the special branch of the police in Vung Tau be brought to justice for having constructed two residential houses without proper authorization. On October 5 it was announced that Ky had reprimanded the province chief and the deputy province chief of Binh Duong

for ineffective performance. These activities are consistent with recent public statements by Ky that, as Vice President, he hopes to assume major responsibility for the elimination of "corrupt elements".

In a generally related development, October 4, about 300 Revolutionary Development Cadres demonstrated in front of the Quang Ngai Province Headquarters to protest the corrupt practices of provincial financial officers. They abducted the finance chief and his assistant, shaved their heads, and released them. The demonstrators then marched through the town and dispersed peacefully. The finance chief had been long rumored to be corrupt, and this was probably an over-zealous attempt by the Revolutionary Development Cadres to live up to criteria II of the XI point criteria, "Getting Rid of Corrupt and Undesirable Officials." The action of the cadres may cause disciplinary problems, for certainly they should not have taken the law into their hands, but it is still encouraging to see such signs of popular determination not to tolerate corruption and bad government.

The spats of recent killings in the Chinese community in Saigon-Cholon continued, with the murder of the principal of a local high school and the murder of the editor of a strongly anti-Communist Chinese language newspaper on October 7. Strongly anti-Communist Chinese have been the victims of the attacks in all cases, and a determined campaign of terror among the Chinese seems to be underway.

#### D. Military

General Westmoreland has given me some interesting and pertinent information on the following subjects:

##### a. Recent situation in the demilitarized zone

It is immediately apparent that the enemy strategy of the past several weeks concentrated on achieving a major victory in the demilitarized zone. Con Thien became the focal point of his attack and its destruction was scheduled as his highest priority. Despite his shelling of our positions along the DMZ, the enemy was not successful in this venture and while no accurate assessment of his casualties can be made, it becomes fairly obvious that he suffered greatly in the exchange of fires. As the reports indicate, our situation has improved measurably. The enemy fires have been forced to subside; there is indication that he is withdrawing at least a portion of his forces from the DMZ area and, generally, the victory has been denied. General Westmoreland reports that the margin of success on our part is attributable to the massive effort launched against the hostile concentration in and around Con Thien and into the DMZ and its adjacent areas. In short, one of the greatest massings of firepower in support

of a single division position in the history of warfare was launched against the enemy in a period of about two weeks. This included B-52 strikes, artillery fires, tactical air bombing, and naval gunfire support. Our casualties in northern Quang Tri Province over the heaviest period of the attack were not exorbitant when placed in proper perspective. For instance, during the period of the bitter fighting in the DMZ area (1-24 September), there were 196 killed and 1,917 wounded (834 evacuated). However, by comparison, in 1966 during the two months when it was necessary to drive the enemy out of positions in Quang Tri Province, we incurred 126 killed and 488 wounded in July and 115 killed and 448 wounded in September. It is also interesting to note that from June 1 through September 23, the 3rd Marine Division fighting in the DMZ area suffered 564 killed and 5,183 wounded. While the 1st Marine Division (not in the DMZ area) suffered a comparable 484 killed and 3,788 wounded for the same period.

b. Effectiveness of rail interdiction in North Vietnam

Despite the approaching northeast monsoon, air strike efforts continue to focus, to the maximum extent possible, on the rail facilities in the north. The objective of the rail campaign continues to be the denial to the North Vietnamese of an effective rail system and the associated facilities needed for the processing of imports from China to Hanoi. Since May 18, the North Vietnamese costs for the transshipment of needed supplies has steadily grown as a result of the rail interdiction campaign. In May, 1967, 152,000 short tons (which equates to approximately 50,000 truckloads) required transshipment to bypass all interdictions and outages on the northeast railroad. In August, 1967, 259,000 short tons (which equates to approximately 86,000 truckloads) required transshipment and from September 1-20, 171,000 short tons (which equates to approximately 57,000 truckloads) required transshipment. Recent photography discloses a large concentration of equipment and supplies along Route 4 in North Vietnam, about seven kilometers west of Dong Dang near the Chinese border. The equipment included 532 trucks and 13 field artillery pieces. A nearby built-up area contained some 85 medium-fixed storage/support buildings and extensive open storage. Concentrations of this size have not been previously noted in this North Vietnamese border area and could represent an effort to overcome transportation difficulties, caused by recent interdictions of the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line, by diverting rail cargo to highway transport. The effectiveness of recent disruptions of rail facilities in the Haiphong area is indicated by reports of noticeable congestion in that port city. There is reported open storage on roads and under trees in parks in the city of Haiphong. Sources indicate that most of the port work is accomplished during hours of darkness, and that there is a general appearance of deterioration of the effectiveness of port processing.



c. Enemy line of communication efforts in Southern Laos

The intensity of the Route Package 1, Tally Ho interdiction campaign, in concert with the Third Marine Forces campaign at the DMZ, has effectively denied the enemy the capability to maintain lines of communication through the DMZ into South Vietnam. This, coupled with the approach of the northeast monsoon season, is causing an increased effort on his part to maintain, improve, and protect lines of communications through southern Laos. During the next several months, these will be the principal avenues of supply to his forces in the south. Recent reconnaissance of the primary line of communication routes in this area reveals much evidence of extensive enemy engineering efforts in preparation for increasing resupply activity during the next several months. These include bridge construction, road grading and graveling with heavy equipment at many different points, trellising and corduroying at an increasing pace to counter the U. S. air offensive against them. There is substantial evidence of stock piling at or near border crossing points, such as south of Mu Gia Pass and at Route 137 into southern Laos. Bypasses and river cable crossings are constructed/repared rapidly, pack animals are being used for transshipment, and large work gangs have been observed at strategic repair points. Automatic weapons positions are being located at key points to protect resupply traffic and repair gangs, with corresponding increased in enemy troop activity. Such evidence of enemy extreme efforts in this area indicates his deep concern in maintaining a rate of logistic flow into South Vietnam. Air efforts will continue heavy interdiction in this area according to plan, to counter enemy actions in this direction.

E. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index dropped 11 points, from 306 last week to 295 this week, largely reflecting lower rice prices. These, in turn, were affected by the plentiful supply of U. S. remilled long-grain rice as well as the arrival of some new local group long-grain rice from neighboring Long An Province. Meat and fish, which are in plentiful supply, were also less expensive. The imported commodity index dropped to 218 this week, compared to 220 last week. Declines were registered in most of the commodities in the Index except for wheat, flour and iron and steel products.

The sale of fertilizer tripled during the month of September, compared to the month of August. The sharp increase was due in part to the new pricing schedule whereby discounts are given to buyers who pick up imported fertilizer at the port and provide their own transportation.

F. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 256, compared to 226 in the same period last year. This is lower than the figures for the last few weeks, but it appears to reflect a somewhat lower level of military activity. The year's total of returnees to date is 23,618.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 7, the enemy killed 91 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 125, and kidnapped 104. Among the dead were one deputy province chief, one district official, one village chief, four hamlet chiefs, one school teacher, and one Revolutionary Development worker. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,661 civilians, wounded 5,266, and kidnapped 3,682.

Thursday, Oct. 12, 1967  
4:30 p. m.

42

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Amb. Lodge reports Governor Guy's  
Oct. 5 further reflection on his experience  
in Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

*Pres file*

Attachment

42a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1967

TO: Walt Rostow

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H. C. Lodge*

SUBJECT: Reports from Observers to Vietnamese  
Elections

I have received a letter from Governor William L. Guy of North Dakota dated October 5 which says:

"The United States Foreign Service is doing an exceptional job in guiding and helping the South Viet Nam government to its feet. I believe our presence there as observers strengthened the South Viet Nam people's determination and moderated the raucous cries of the critics. It is obvious that the communist world has made South Viet Nam the focal point of confrontation with the free world. We can not afford to back down."

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 00-189

43

Thursday, Oct. 12, 1967  
4:25 p. m.

By Sj, NARA Date 5-14-01

MR. PRESIDENT:

Dick Helms wishes you to be aware of this  
[REDACTED] report of bad security breaks

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

*Pres file*

W. W. R.

SECRET-EYES ONLY attachment

*Pres. file*

Thursday - 4:00 pm  
October 12, 1967

Mr. President:

State was not contemplating inviting Ambassador-designate Tobriner to your appointment with Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer tomorrow. I think it would be a nice gesture for him to be invited to participate. With your permission, I will extend an invitation.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Thursday - 3:00 pm  
October 12, 1967*Pres file*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Parade for the Diaz Ordaz Visit

Mexican Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores has asked whether the customary parade for a state visit would be advisable. The inquiry reflects President Diaz Ordaz' concern over how it will look on television back home if the crowd is not as large and enthusiastic as the one in Mexico City for your visit.

We have been quietly looking into the possibility of turning out a respectable number of people along the parade route. The prospects are not good. It would seem better to drop the parade from the Washington program and concentrate on a more elaborate El Paso reception where we can do so much better.

President Diaz Ordaz will understand if we follow this course.

W. W. Rostow

Drop parade \_\_\_\_.

See me \_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 11-30-78By lg/sp, NARA, Date 10-22-41

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
2:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I have had prepared this  
retrospective study of North Vietnamese  
operations at the DMZ, plus evidence on  
present dispositions and future intentions.

I think it will interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 18, NARA, Date 10-21-91

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

October 9, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW:

Each of the last three summers the communists have planned and initiated major offensives;

- In 1965, they hoped to cut South Vietnam in two.
- In 1966, their objective was more modest -- occupy and control of the northern part of South Vietnam.
- In 1967, they merely hoped to (1) divert our forces from support of RD/pacification and (2) inflict a "miniature Dien Bien Phu" on our forces.

All of these offensives failed. They achieved the greatest degree of success this year -- when their objectives were most modest. Although Con Thien did not become a Dien Bien Phu, their strategy was partially successful in diverting forces that would otherwise have been used for in-country initiatives. However, their offensive was costly and it did not stop -- but only slowed -- our progress within South Vietnam.

The most significant aspect of this latest DMZ offensive was the heavy use of artillery fires. He began deploying artillery to the DMZ area in March, and at the peak in September had more than 100 artillery pieces which he could bring to bear in the DMZ area.

Enemy tactical operations during this period went through three phases. The first phase probably began in late February - early March and was characterized by a build-up of North Vietnamese units and heightened tactical activity in the eastern part of the DMZ. This may have hit a peak in May with heavy fighting throughout the area resulting in numerous casualties on both sides.

From late May through July there was a partial withdrawal of these units. In early August a new build-up began.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-418  
By 128, NARA, Date 7-27-95

PRESERVATION COPY

By mid-September, NVN strengths had probably reached a peak involving about 30,000 men -- the equivalent of three divisions supported by two regiments of artillery.

One measure of activity is shown by the comparison of fires delivered and received:

	<u>Fired by USMC</u>	<u>Fired by Enemy</u>
May	17,887	4,405
June	20,430	3,464
July	25,799	5,401
August	38,703	2,189
September	28,087*	7,302

Enemy fires were at their peak from 19 - 21 September and again on 25 September when they reached an all-time high. It was almost as though they had been ordered to use up all their ammunition, because from the 26th on there was a rapid decrease in their fire.

By 27 September, major elements had begun a withdrawal to the North. Most of the 324 B Division has withdrawn into the DMZ and at least two regiments have crossed back into North Vietnam. These units could probably be given new equipment and replacements and be ready for recommitment in two months. Since they remain in the general area, they could probably be recommitted immediately, if necessary.

The failure of the NV to achieve their 1967 summer objectives can be attributed to some combination of extremely bad weather, B-52 strikes, counter-battery fire, tactical air, naval gunfire and aggressive small unit Marine activity.

Meanwhile, we have detected a southward movement of the 325 C Division. This division could be used immediately in the Con Thien area, but we have no information on its mission.

---

\* The decrease of artillery fire by Marines was due to the integration of artillery fires with tactical air support and B-52 bomber support. During September, over 700 sorties were flown in the DMZ area by B-52's delivering approximately 20,000 tons of bombs on enemy weapons positions, staging areas, and unit locations.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY


~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

In any event the North Vietnamese have the capability to resume infantry activity at the previous high level if they are willing to accept the costs. We do not know, however, if they can resume the previous high level of artillery fire because we have no information on artillery casualties, guns and ammunition destroyed or the extent to which weather and air strikes may have interdicted their ammunition supply.

Bob Ginsburgh

and

  
Art McCafferty

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

468

A



46c

~~SECRET~~

Addendum A

US Deployments to the First Corps Area

A progressive buildup of US forces in the First Corps area has been under way since April 11 of this year as a result of the continued enemy threat in the DMZ and Quang Tri province.

On April 11, there were 73,761 combat Marine personnel and 4,167 combat Army personnel in the area. As of October 11, there were 76,728 combat Marine personnel and 22,198 combat Army personnel.

The Army units involved in this deployment have been:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Apr 11	196th Brigade	Tay Nian	Chu Lai	4,500 Approx.
Apr 24	3rd Brigade of 4th Division	Pleiku	Chu Lai	4,500 Approx.
May 8	1st Brigade of 101st Airborne Division	Phan Rang	Chu Lai	5,000 Approx.
May 8	2nd Brigade of 11th Cavalry Division	Lang Bien	Chu Lai	1,500 Approx.
Sept 1	1st Squadron of 1st Cavalry Regiment	United States	Chu Lai	1,500 Approx.
Oct 3	3rd Brigade of 1st Cavalry Division	Binh Dinh	Chu Lai	3,100 Approx.

As can be seen, these units moved into the Marine positions in the Chu Lai area and permitted the diversion of Marine units into the northern two provinces of First Corps and the DMZ area to meet the threat there. At present, III MAF has the 3rd Marine Division deployed in the northern two provinces, Quang Tri and Thau Thien, with a total of five Infantry Regimental Headquarters and 13

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 779 NARA, Date 10-21-91

SECRET

Infantry Battalions, plus artillery and other support. In the DMZ area (including Quang Tri province in this area) there are 10 Infantry Battalions and seven plus Artillery battalions. The attached map shows the present disposition of all Free World Forces in the First Corps area.


The effect of this has been to permit continuation of TAOR and pacification efforts around Chu Lai, with Army units, and provide sufficient force to counter enemy buildups. At the same time, although it has undoubtedly slowed operations in other areas through decreased troop levels, General Westmoreland has weighed carefully each move and has only diverted that force necessary for the job.

SECRET



# FWAF-US GROUND-AIR UNITS IN I CORPS AREA

SECRET



SECRET

11 OCTOBER 1967

DECLASSIFIED

EO 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan 5, 1998

By 10y NARA Date 10-12-91

32



46f

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

Addendum B

PAVN Operations in the DMZ Area

The first phase of PAVN tactical operations in the eastern half of the DMZ area began in late February-early March and came to an end on approximately July 15. This phase was characterized by a build-up of PAVN units, increased tactical activity, and a subsequent reduction of forces.

By the end of July there were again indications of preparations for another phase. At that time, and continuing into early August, reconnaissance by elements of major North Vietnamese units reflected the intensification of enemy interest in Con Thien. Other enemy activity noted during the latter half of July consisted of continued small-scale political and military operations by elements of the 27th Independent Battalion in Gio Linh and artillery-associated action, as reflected in forward observer reports, in the eastern DMZ area.

Such small-scale activity continued until the end of July, with the exception of the 29th and 30th when three battalions of the 803rd Regiment were reflected in contact with US Marine forces which had entered the DMZ on a sweep operation.

Through mid-August reconnaissance of the Con Thien area continued, and references to moving supplies and building fortifications were frequently noted in communications. At the same time, communications indicated the movement back in the DMZ area of the 812th Regiment, which had moved out in June-July, possibly replacing the 29th Regiment which began its outward movement in early August. At the same time, the 7th Battalion, 90th Regiment was operating to the east of Con Thien, while the 803rd was to the north and northwest, virtually encircling Con Thien.

During the last ten days of August, enemy reconnaissance in the Con Thien area increased, as did references to possible artillery-associated activities.

Indications of a possible phased campaign in the DMZ area were noted in communications as early as mid-August when the 803rd was observed discussing a "new mission" which was to begin on August 22. In early September several references to N-day, the Vietnamese equivalent for D-day, revealed that N-day probably referred to September 1 and that PAVN offensive actions may have been keyed to a time-table. A further indication of the possible time-table aspect of the campaign was noted in mid-September when the 90th Regiment reported that the front would hold training classes in October "after the present phase of activity."

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority N13.141.021.04/a  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 10-28-09

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

All this enemy activity culminated in the heavy attacks on Con Thien during the period September 16-25, after which there were indications that the units had begun a northward movement. During this period there were numerous indications that the enemy had suffered heavy casualties (See Addendum C), and by the end of September the only active element which appeared to have remained in the DMZ area was one company of the 803rd which has continued reconnaissance in the area to the northwest of Con Thien.

Tactical communications also indicated that artillery observers associated with an unidentified artillery element in the DMZ area, which had been highly active during the month of September, may have been withdrawn by the end of the month. Artillery-associated communications of the possible 270th Regiment continue to be observed, although such activity has been sporadic since late September.

An analysis of recent communications of North Vietnamese entities in the area of the DMZ indicates that a major reorganization of Communist forces there is now under way.

The present disposition of enemy forces can be seen on the attached map. A portion of the DMZ Front remains in an area near the North Vietnamese coast, just north of the DMZ and continues to communicate with one regiment, and possibly as many as four. In addition, the headquarters of the 325C Division has moved south from Dong Hoi into the eastern DMZ area and may indicate that Communist offensive activity is not ending.

The purpose of this reorganization is not yet clear. It is likely, however, that the enemy will maintain its pressure against US and South Vietnamese units near Con Thien or may be splitting their forces in an attempt to harass and threaten friendly units and installations in various places along the DMZ.

Continuing reorganization of PAVN communications in the DMZ area, as well as the apparent regrouping of the PAVN units have been noted over the past week. This activity included the relocation of the bulk of the DMZ Front Headquarters westward, leaving a small DMZ Front element in the eastern sector; the deployment of the possible Headquarters, 325th C Division to the eastern area; the indicated involvement of the headquarters with PAVN forces in the Con Thien area; and the withdrawal of certain PAVN units from the battle zone.

An October 10 message directed one unit, located south of Con Thien, to "plan to strike as we discussed" and mentioned 122-mm rockets. Another

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~




TOP SECRET/TRINE

unit, subordinate to the 27th Independent Battalion, in a report summarized its September military and political activities and stated that its October plans included utilization of ambush and snipers to strike on a small scale, especially along the western side of Route 1.

TOP SECRET/TRINE

# DISPOSITION OF ENEMY FORCES IN DMZ AS OF 5 OCT 67



DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: NJS 141.021-01/2  
By: Jc, NARA, Date: 10/28/09

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE

46k

C

460  
~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

Addendum C

Although we are not able to estimate numbers of casualties suffered by the North Vietnamese units in the DMZ area during September, the following extracts from intercepted communications indicate their casualties were heavy.

On September 21 attacks on Con Thien by at least two battalions of the PAVN 90th Regiment were reflected in PAVN tactical communications. Subsequent to the attacks on September 21, tactical communications revealed that "40 dead remain behind," and a subordinate of the 90th Regiment was ordered to "bury 60 dead."

On September 23 the 8th Battalion was reported to be preparing for combat, and cadre of the 9th Battalion were reconnoitering Routes 73 and 74. On September 24 the 8th Battalion reported casualties possibly suffered by the entire regiment as 82 dead and 205 wounded. The 90th Regiment was reported as 700 under-strength.

Strikes by B52 aircraft have been mentioned several times in recent DMZ tactical communications. On September 29 the 90th Regiment, 324B Division reported that Storehouse "X3," possibly located in the vicinity of Hai Cu, had been struck resulting in the death of one man. Three men were killed and supplies were lost when the last group of the 8th Battalion, 90th Regiment was bombed while crossing the river to go north. Also, two unidentified detachments were bombed on September 29 at an unlocated ferry landing. On September 30, B52's reportedly struck an unlocated "area 202."

~~TOP SECRET/TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority N13.141.021.011/2  
By je, NARA, Date 10-28-09

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
2:10 p.m.

*1. ~~copy~~*  
*2. Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to  
Dr. Elson, as requested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

October 12, 1967

47a

Dear Dr. Elson:

I was happy to receive your letter which included further observations on your recent visit to Viet Nam.

Once again, I want to thank you for undertaking what I know was an arduous journey and a most demanding task. You should know, however, that your fellow countrymen benefitted from this unselfish service and from the close and careful observations of you and your colleagues.

I enjoyed your additional comments and I am glad you shared them with me. It would be most useful if your observations and your insight into some of the more difficult aspects of this most important effort could be shared with as wide a circle of our fellow citizens as possible.

I would be pleased if you would send me a copy of your study book on Viet Nam when it is issued.

Meantime, I send you my warm regards and my gratitude for your understanding and your support.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B. Johnson

Dr. Edward L. R. Elson  
The National Presbyterian Church  
4123 Nebraska Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20016

LBJ:WJJ:WWR:mz



~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
10:20 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

The memo is the work of  
George Carver of CIA -- one of the  
two or three best minds we have on  
Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

(See memo to president Oct 9, 1967, from W, W, "Rostow, w/attachment  
W. W. Rostow in Conflict: Factors Bearing on the Issue of Negotiations."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 79, NARA, Date 11-6-91

Thursday, October 12, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

49

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

MR. PRESIDENT:

General Burchinal is our SHAPE commander and one of the three or four men who might succeed General Buzz Wheeler.

Here he presents with lucidity and some pride the account of how we moved out of France; for a retreat is the hardest of all maneuvers to conduct well.

I agree with Bob Ginsburgh that the Preface and Conclusions are worth reading.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (cy 13 S-67 4387 Hq USEUCOM Freloc final report (Phase I)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 10-21-91

50

Thursday, Oct. 12, 1967  
9:20 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

A further round-up of reactions on the  
San Antonio speech.

W. W. R.

Attachment