

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4a cable	Paris 5507 TS 1 p open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449	10/20/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p OPEN 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452	10/20/67	A
#15a cable	Paris 5472 TS 1 p open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449	10/20/67	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p OPEN 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452 [Duplicate of #39, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1) 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Attitudes"]	10/20/67	A
#19a cable	London 3141 S 1 p open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449 [Duplicate of #39a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1) 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Attitudes]	10/19/67	A
#23a cable	Saigon 8995 S 3 p open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449	10/19/67	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 7:05 p.m. S 2 p OPEN 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452	10/19/67	A
#24a memo	Fowler to President S 3 p open 1-27-97 NLJ 96-305	10/19/67	A
#27a memo	Intelligence Memorandum C 1 p open 10-24-95 NLJ 94-455	10/12/67	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. C 2 p OPEN 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452	10/19/67	A
#28b memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449	10/18/67	A
#28d ltr	Carlson to Burnham " C 1 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 46, 10/16-20/67

Box 24

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-445</i> S 1 p <i>dup #11a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 164</i>	10/20/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President, re: India C 2 p <i>open 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452</i> [Duplicate of #100, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 10]	10/19/67	A
#38a memcon	Rostow and PM Lee C 1 p <i>open 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452</i>	10/19/67	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454</i> <i>same as in NLJ 019-024-2</i>	10/19/67	A
#41a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>sanitized 10-24-95 NLJ 94-455</i> [Duplicate of #45, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1) 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Attitudes]	10/18/67	A
#41b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>sanitized 10-24-95 NLJ 94-455</i> [Duplicate of #46, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1) 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Attitudes]	10/18/67	A
#42 memo	Rostow to President, re: Laos <i>open 12/16/09</i> TS 3 p <i>SANITIZED 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452</i> [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Country File, Laos, "Visit of Prince Souvanna Phouma, 10/20-21/67"]	10/19/67	A
#44 memo	Duplicate of #42 <i>open 12/16/09</i>		
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 9:10 p.m. <i>open 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452</i> S 1 p <i>[Dup. of #129, NSF, CF, UK, Var 12, Brail]</i>	10/18/67	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, re: Congo <i>open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-458</i> C 1 p <i>dup. #3, Files of Hamilton, "AID-PL480" Box 1</i>	10/18/67	A
#50a memo	Gaud and Schnittker to President, re: Congo C 3 p <i>Dup. #3a, as above open 6-10-95 NLJ 93-458</i>	10/13/67	A
#50b memo	Gaud and Schnittker to President, re: Congo C 1 p <i>dup. #3b, as above open 10-27-93 NLJ 93-352</i>	10/2/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50c ltr	Gaud to Schultze C 1 p <i>open 7/10/96</i>	10/2/67	A
#50d memo	Gaud and Freeman to President, re: Congo PCI 1 p <i>Dup. #3d, Files of Hamilton, "AID PL480" Box 7</i>	2/20/67	A
#50g memo	Gaud and Freeman to President, re: Congo C 4 p <i>Dup. #3e, as above open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i>	12/23/66	A
#51 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i> TS 2 p [Duplicate of #23, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-December 1967"]	10/18/67	A
#51a rpt	"Some comments on..." <i>open 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i> TS 4 p [Duplicate of #23a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-December 1967"]	undated	A
#51b rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open 9-10-96 NLS 96-327</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #23a, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-December 1967"]	10/4/67	A
#51d rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open 9-10-96 NLS 96-327</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #23b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-December 1967"]	10/4/67	A
#51f rpt	Intelligence Report <i>open 9-10-96 NLS 96-327</i> PCI 1 p [Duplicate of #23b, NSF, Files of Walt Rostow, "Vietnam: July-December 1967"]	undated	A
#33a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 1 p	10/7/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/18/67	A

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#54a cable	Saigon 8875 <i>Sanitized 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449</i> S 11 p <i>(near doc # 18, NSF, CF, VN "8 BB(1)..." Box 105)</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>open 3-8-07 NLJ/CBS/D J RAG 11/39 (#232)</i>	10/18/67	A
#55a memo	Rostow to President TS 3 p <i>Duplicate, File of WWR, Box 7, "Bombing", #17a</i> <i>open 8/2/95 NY 94-452</i>	undated	A
#57 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p " " "	10/18/67	A
#57a memo	From Kissinger TS 4 p " " "	undated	A
#57b cable	Bucharest 566 C 3 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449</i>	10/17/67	A
#57c cable	Oslo 1739 S 2 p " "	10/18/67	A
#58a memcon	McNamara and Harman <i>Sanitized</i> S 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-273 (5/98)</i> [Duplicate of #72a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1979] <i>open 12/16/09</i>	10/18/67	A
#59 memo	Rostow to President, re: India C 3 p <i>SANITIZED 8/21/95 NY 94-452</i>	10/18/67	A
#59b memo	Freeman, Gaud, Schultze to President C 3 p <i>open 7-9-99 NLJ 96-215</i>	10/17/67	A
#59c memo	Freeman and Gaud to President C 5 p <i>open 7-9-99 NLJ 96-275</i>	10/10/67	A
#59e memo	Fowler to President C 2 p <i>open 1-27-97 NLJ 96-305</i>	10/17/67	A
#60a cable	USUN 1490 S 2 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449</i>	10/17/67	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>OPEN 8/2/95 NY 94-452</i>	10/18/67	A

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#63a cable	NATO 005 S 4 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i>	10/15/67	A
#66b cable	Saigon 8854 " S 2 p <i>#48</i> [Duplicate of #48b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "6E, Bombing Pause Discussion by US," Box 95]	10/18/67	A
#67b cable	Duplicate of #66b <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i>		
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 8-10-93 NLS 91-389</i> [Duplicate of #14, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Vol. 3 (Bowdler File)]	10/18/67	A
#68a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 6 p <i>sanitized 1-26-95 NLS 94-455</i> [Duplicate of #14a, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Vol. 3 (Bowdler File)]	10/17/67	A
#69a cable	Saigon 8778 <i>sanitized 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i> S 3 p	10/17/67	A
#71a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-445</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #129, NSFCFVN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	10/18/67	A
#73 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> C 3 p <i>Dup. #4, Files of Hamilton, "AID-PL480" Box 7</i>	10/17/67	A
#73b memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #46, as above</i>	10/13/67	A
#73d memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> C 2 p <i>Dup. #44 & 45, as above</i>	10/13/67	A
#73e memo	Gaud to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> C 5 p <i>Dup. #44e, as above</i>	10/2/67	A
#73g memo	Schultze to President <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-351</i> C 2 p <i>Dup. #49 & 49j as above</i>	10/13/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#73h memo	Gaud to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> C 3 p <i>Dup. #4h, Files of Ham. Hon, "AID-PL480" Box 7</i>	10/11/67	A
#73i memo	Gaud to President <i>open 10-27-93 NLS 93-352</i> C 3 p <i>Dup. #4h, as above</i>	8/8/67	A
#74a memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 5-19-95 NLS 94-458</i>	10/17/67	A
#81 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/17/67	A
#81a memo	Katzenbach to President	10/13/67	A
#81b memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i>	10/13/67	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open 4/10/01 NLS 00-277</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 5-7-93 NLS 94-81</i> [Duplicate of #73, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	10/17/67	A
#83a rpt	"Possible Line with Eban" S 1 p <i>OPEN 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/17/67	A
#84a memo	Rusk to President C 2 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i>	10/9/67	A
#84b rpt	"Proposed Schedule of Visitors" " C 2 p	undated	A
#84c rpt	"PM Boeynants of Belgium" " C 1 p	undated	A
#84d rpt	"President Tubman of Liberia" " C 1 p	undated	A
#84e rpt	"PM Egal of Somali" " C 1 p	undated	A
#84f rpt	"Ruler of Kuwait" " C 1 p	undated	A

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#84g rpt	"Chancellor Klaus of Austria" C 1 p <i>open 1-26-95 NLS 94-449</i>	undated	A
#84h rpt	"Acting President Suharto of Indonesia" "	undated	A
#84i rpt	"PM Demirel of Turkey" "	undated	A
#84j rpt	"Proposed Schedule of Visitors" "	undated	A
#85a memo	Hughes to Secretary " S 4 p [Duplicate of #48a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1) 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Attitudes" <i>Box 86</i>]	undated	A
#86 memo	Rostow to President, 5:25 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i> [Duplicate of #76, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1979]	10/16/67	A
#86a ltr	McNamara to Eban S 1 p <i>Open 5-26-98 NLS 96-273</i> [Duplicate of #76a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Sanitized 1979]	10/12/67	A
#87 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/16/67	A
#87a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow C 1 p " " "	10/16/67	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p " " "	10/16/67	A
#89a ltr	Holyoake to President S 3 p <i>EXEMPT 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/16/67	A
#89b ltr	"Aide Memoire" <i>Open 11/8/00 NLS 00-192</i> S 1 p <i>EXEMPT 8/2/95 NLS 94-452</i>	10/16/67	A

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#94 memo	Rostow to President (dup. #141, NSF Country File, Germany, Vol. 14) PCI 1 p. open 8/2/95 NLJ 94-452	10/16/67	A
#94a ltr	Brandt to Rusk (dup. #141b + 141d, as above) PCI 4 p. exempt 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449 <i>Open 11/8/00 NIS 00-192</i>	10/13/67	A
#94b ltr	Duplicate of #94a <i>Open 11/8/00 NIS 00-192</i>		
#95a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report S 1 p. Dup. #13a, NSF CF, IN "8A2" Box 104 <i>open 1-26-95 NLJ 94-449</i>	10/16/67	A

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#20 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - open 4/8/03 NLS/AC 00-266 TS 1 p	10/20/67	A
#20a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1p EXEMPT 4/8/03 NLS/AC 00-267	10/17/67	A
#51c rpt	Intelligence report - TS 1 p OPEN 12-6-02 NU/AC 00-268	10/4/67	A
#51 e rpt	Intelligence report - TS 1 p OPEN 12-6-02 NU/AC 00-268	n.d.	A
#66d rpt	Intelligence report - } duplicates in Files of WWR Box 7, "BIMBING" TS 1 p open NLT 96-38 1/14/02	10/18/67	A
#66e chart	Intelligence report - } open 1/14/02 NLT 96-38 S 1 p	10/18/67	A
#67d rpt	Intelligence report - [dup. of #66d] TS 1 p open 10/29/09	10/18/67	A
#67e chart	Intelligence report - [dup. of #66e] S 1 p open 10/29/09	10/18/67	A
#30 note	Walt Rostow to the President 10/19/67 2 pp open 11-24-99	10/19/67	C

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 46, "October 16-20, 1967" Box 23

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Friday, October 20, 1967 -- 7:10 p.m. *Profile*

Mr. President:

I have been expecting all day a paper from the State Department making recommendations for the Presidential delegation to the funeral of former Prime Minister Yoshida of Japan. It has not come because they have not yet established the date of the state funeral in Japan.

We may have to move rapidly tomorrow; and, therefore, Bill Bundy asked me to put up to you tonight their tentative thinking on a 3-man delegation: Senator Sparkman, Senator Hickenlooper, and General Matthew Ridgway.

As alternates, they suggest General Maxwell Taylor and Robert Murphy.

Both Senators Sparkman and Hickenlooper were associated with the negotiation of the Japanese treaty.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Friday, October 20, 1967 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

see file

Clark Clifford and I now make the following joint and agreed recommendations concerning the group to explore the problem of a pause and how that group should be managed.

1. The group. Given the way we propose to organize the enterprise, we believe a group of ten would be manageable. Clark now thinks that 5 would be too few to serve your purpose; and if the discussions took place without the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, with only Tom Johnson and myself present with you, the Cabinet table would not be too full. Here are the ten names on which we agreed:

Dean Acheson
George Ball
General Omar Bradley
McGeorge Bundy
Clark Clifford
Arthur H. Dean
Douglas Dillon
Abe Fortas
Robert A. Lovett
Robert Murphy

The names that we eliminated from the list are in the attached paper so that you will be in a position to alter our joint judgment.

Max Taylor is not on the list simply because we assumed his advice is available to you independently.

2. We propose as the best way to proceed that these men be invited down for dinner the night before with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, on the 8th floor of the State Department. Proposed would be a briefing to bring them up to date. If you are to get value from their judgment, they ought to be told what the military situation is by Buzz Wheeler, the political and negotiating situations by Bill Bundy and Sec. Rusk. They could then sleep on it and meet with you at, say, 10:30 to 1:00 the next day.

We believe that having them meet the night before with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara would ease any implications that the two Secretaries were being bypassed; and I know Sec. Rusk would much prefer not being in a position of having to express a view at a large meeting and believes, in fact, that the widening of advice to you is better conducted if he is not present. (Despite this, you may wish to have Secretaries Rusk and McNamara sit and listen with you at the meeting.)

Although we both prefer the idea of an evening briefing and a morning session, it could be done with a 10:00 a.m. briefing; and then a meeting with you at or after lunch.

Although we claim no higher wisdom for our choice of these 10, there are reasons, in some cases, which you might wish to hear from us.

W. W. Rostow

Names Eliminated From the List

Eugene R. Black
James A. Perkins
James Wadsworth
George B. Kistiakowsky
Roswell L. Gilpatric
Morris Liebman
Robert Anderson
James Rowe
John McCone

Friday, October 20, 1967
6:30 p. m.

3

MR. PRESIDENT:

This quite official Hanoi plant is worth careful reading.

Pres file

It is, in effect, a response to the K probe.

1. It confirms the distinction between "talks" and "negotiations."
2. It puts them in the position, if a cessation takes place, of demanding of us concessions if talks are to be "productive."
3. It protests too much on the strength of their position: I've never met a strong man that had to go around scratching the hair on his chest to prove his strength.
4. It plays on the "credibility gap" and other propaganda themes.

If we accepted this position as a basis for a cessation and talks they would judge it a sign of weakness and the talks would, in my judgment, not prosper.

W. W. R.

Attachment

3a

Friday, October 20, 1967

TEXT OF AP INTERNATIONAL WIRE SERVICE DISPATCH

Advance PMs Sat. Oct. 21
Burchett

EDITORS: The editor's note preceding this dispatch must be used if the dispatch is used.

EDITOR'S NOTE -- This dispatch was filed to The Associated Press by an Australian correspondent who reports for Communist newspapers from Communist countries from which most non-Communist newsmen are barred.

By WILFRED BURCHETT

HANOI, North Vietnam AP - There is no possibility of any talks or even contacts between Hanoi and the U.S. Government unless the bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam are definitively halted.

This is the position stated to me during conversations in the last few days with Premier Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, foreign minister and deputy premier, and other high-ranking government and party leaders.

Hanoi is in no mood for concessions or bargaining and there is an absolute refusal to offer anything - except talks - for a cessation of the bombardment. The word stressed is "talks," not negotiations.

During an informal talk, however, Trinh repeated that his statement to this correspondent last Jan. 28 - that talks could start if the bombing was halted - still held good. He said there could be "meaningful" talks. Whether they would be "fruitful" or "productive" depended on the United States.

The mood of Hanoi is one of toughness and confidence. Although leaders expect Hanoi and Haiphong will probably be destroyed and that the war may last many more years, they feel the worst is behind them, that the daily bombings are absorbed into the country's organism.

Despite the air assault on Haiphong and intensified attacks on bridges along the rail link with China, traffic continues to move out of Haiphong almost normally over pontoon bridges, and the rail link with China is still functioning, although

occasionally halted for a day or two. Many tens of thousands of Chinese are working along this line and elsewhere, keeping rail and road communications open and repairing bridges.

The fact that the mile-long Paul Doumer Bridge over the Red River at Hanoi was repaired in less than six weeks after the bombers knocked out one of its huge spans is regarded as proof that anything that is destroyed is speedily repairable.

Although meat and fat rations are meager, there is no evidence of any shortage of rice. And the fact that the bridge span was knocked out and Hanoi's only road and rail link with Haiphong was temporarily cut did not affect rationing or prices in Hanoi. Traffic along the main and subsidiary highways is heavier than during my last visit six months ago.

The relatively stable situation in the North, coupled with what is officially described as "a very favorable" military situation in the South, explains the new toughness and confidence that foreign visitors note in Hanoi at present.

A member of the Politburo, highest organ of the country's ruling Lao Dong or worker's party, laughed when I asked whether he was counting on the election year looming in the United States to influence negotiation possibilities.

"It is just as useless to us to count on maneuvers on the U. S. political scene as it is for Americans to count on Moscow-Peking divergencies or China's internal political situation to help them," he replied. "We have to rely mainly on our own forces, not on the American elections of 1968 or 1972 or 1976 or any other time. It is because of the victories of our compatriots in the South, their defeat of two American dry season offensives and the resistance of the North to 2 1/2 years of air attacks that we are getting more support and assistance than ever before."

One difficulty foreign diplomats have in persuading Hanoi to make any new peace gesture is what one of the leaders referred to as a "credibility gap" between what President Johnson says and does. Because of experience in certain earlier private and secret moves which no leaders with whom I talked would precisely specify, there has been deep skepticism about any public statements or private feelers coming from Washington through diplomatic and other channels.

Such skepticism was much less in evidence during my previous visits, but today it is noted by diplomats from Socialist and other countries accredited to or visiting Hanoi.

Several times the names of Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, special assistant to Johnson, are mentioned in the most unflattering terms as men in whose word no confidence is possible.

It is impossible to find any leader who believes the sincerity of Johnson's statements that he really wants to end the war on terms that would leave the Vietnamese free to settle their own affairs or that he does not intend a permanent U.S. military presence in South Vietnam.

It is repeated at every level that total independence with complete American withdrawal from South Vietnam is the unalterable aim of the Hanoi government and the Liberation Front for South Vietnam. They are prepared to fight 10 or 20 years to achieve this, and life is being reorganized on this basis.

Hanoi denies that this means export of communism to the South and insists it agrees with the Liberation Front that the South should remain a separate entity with a neutral, non-Socialist regime as advocated in the recently published new political program of the front, having its independent entity, with reunification a very long-range, step by step process.

Talks with government, party and military leaders reflected confidence that things are moving their way on all fronts, military and political, inside Vietnam and on the international front where, Trinh said, "the United States is more isolated every day, as chief delegates' speeches in the United Nations show, while we are gaining friends every day."

Hanoi has not been in a cockier mood since the bombings started, but this mood is not based on any expectation that the bombing may be halted soon.

End.

4

~~TOP SECRET/PENNSYLVANIA~~

Friday, October 20, 1967
4:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Kissinger brings
M and A closer to the facts of life.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Paris 5507

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 11-4-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

3
4a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action

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~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 5507

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

A VERY DISTRAUGHT M, A AND I HAD A LONG CONVERSATION AT THE AIRPORT. I WAS DELIVERATELY VERY HARD IN PAINTING THE WASHINGTON MOOD. I COVERED ALL THE POINTS OF YOUR 56516. I DWELLED PARTICULARLY ON THE SITUATION ALONG THE DMZ. I STRESSED THAT THE CURRENT RESTRICTIONS WERE AMONG SEVERAL THAT WE HAD IMPOSED ON OURSELVES THIS YEAR WITHOUT ELICITING A RESPONSE. THE CURRENT IMPATIENCE IN WASHINGTON WAS IN PART DUE TO THE FACT THAT WE HAD GONE SEVERAL TIMES THROUGH A PROCESS WHERE NEGOTIATIONS SEEMED IMMINENT AND THEN PROVED FUTILE.

A. REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK IT WAS QUITE FAIR TO CHARGE HANOI WITH FAILING TO RESPOND COMPLETELY. THEY HAD GIVEN UP THE DEMAND FOR A PUBLIC DECLARATION THAT BOMBING WOULD STOP. THEIR LAST MESSAGE WAS MUCH SOBERER THAN THE FIRST AND SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES FROM SVN. NEVERTHELESS HE THOUGHT IT URGENT THAT HE AND M SEE BO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS UP TO HIM AS LONG AS IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE USG HAD NOTHING TO SAY. IF THEY MET BO THEY SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FOUR POINTS WERE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO WASHINGTON: (A) THAT A BOMBING STOP BE FOLLOWED BY PROMPT NEGOTIATIONS, (B) THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS NOT BE INDEFINITELY DELAYED, (C) THAT NO ADVANTAGE WOULD BE TAKEN ON THE GROUND, (D) THE SPECIAL SITUATION ALONG THE DMZ.

M. HAD TO GO TO HIS LABORATORY AT THIS POINT. A. SAID THAT PERHAPS IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR HIM NEVER TO SEE BO ALONE. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME FUTILE TO APPEAL TO BO'S PERSONAL GOOD WILL. HE WAS A PROFESSIONAL ACTING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. HE WOULD CHANGE HIS POSITION ONLY IF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION WERE BROUGHT HOME TO HIM.

A. REPLIED THAT HE WOULD GO TO THE APPOINTMENT FIFTEEN MINUTES EARLY. A THEN CALLED BO. UNFORTUNATELY BOTH BO AND SUNG WERE AWAY AND WILL NOT RETURN TILL 2100. THEY WILL TRY TO SEEM HIM SHORTLY THEREAFTER.

GP-1 BOHLEN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-449

By lip, NARA, Date 12-23-94

5

Friday, October 20, 1967 -- 4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

In case Sec. Freeman calls you on this issue, I thought you would wish to have available the negative arguments as put to Freeman by Ed Hamilton.

I would note that Sec. Freeman played extremely fair with us in giving us advance notice and in hearing the negative arguments.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, October 20, 1967 -- 3:30 PM

WWR:

SUBJECT: Announcement of India wheat deal?

Secretary Freeman just called me to say that he is anxious to issue a public announcement of the President's decision to start talking to the Indians about a large PL 480 wheat program for the first half of 1968. He would not state the precise amounts involved. He would simply announce that he had been authorized by the President to begin negotiations looking toward a "very substantial" agreement. He wants to do this in order to give the domestic wheat price a quick transfusion.

I replied that Freeman obviously knows much more than I do about what the domestic wheat market demands. But in my judgment an immediate announcement is a very bad idea from a number of standpoints:

- it would severely reduce the President's flexibility to back away from this bargain at the last minute if his over-all domestic politics demand. (I assume that maintaining this flexibility is what he had in mind when he instructed us to start negotiations with the Indians on an ad referendum basis.)
- the announcement would sound like a major new Administration initiative abroad which would involve major amounts of money. In fact, of course, there is no additional budgetary cost. But I doubt that the heat of the current debate allows for such nice distinctions.
- it would take most of the edge off our negotiating position with the Indians. If Freeman is making gleeful announcements in a tone which implies "the more wheat the better," the Indians won't have much incentive to agree to the tough package of reforms we want to write into the agreement.

I went through these arguments with Freeman, indicating throughout that these were my personal views and that the choice was clearly up ^{to} the President. He acknowledged that there was something in what I said, but ^{he} that he wanted to give the wheat market a boost as soon as possible. I asked whether this week is really much better than, say two weeks from now when we will have the agreement substantially negotiated and the fiscal argument on the Hill may be somewhat less murderous. He replied that there was no special advantage to this week, but it is important to give the market a lift as soon as possible.

In closing, he said he would call the President and put the choice up to him. I agreed. (Throughout, this was an entirely friendly conversation.)


Ed Hamilton

6.

Friday, October 20, 1967
4:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Herewith some possible notes for your talk with Joe Alsop at 6:30 this evening:

1. As things get tougher, the men get separated from the boys. You wish to tell him two conclusions at which you have arrived:

-- In retrospect and at the present time, in the light of all the information available to you, there is nobody writing more soundly or intelligently about Viet Nam and Asia;

-- Your admiration for his steadiness at a time when there are wobblers all over the place is great.

2. You will be grateful for his assessment of where we are in the war and what the prospects are in the time ahead.

3. Your own feeling is that the best way to convey to our people this sense of progress is to have independent reporters like Alsop write about it; but does he have any advice for us on how to make more clear to our people that progress is taking place in a complex war without a fixed front?

4. As you know, the more you let Joe talk, the greater will be his pleasure at the session.

W. W. R.

Friday, Oct. 20, 1967
4:05 pm

7

MR. PRESIDENT:

This letter to the London Economist from
Bill Fulbright may have escaped your
attention.

Pres. file

W. W. R.

Attachment

Letters

Vietnam

SIR—I have read with interest your recent editorial (August 19th) on the Vietnamese war called "The Impatient Ones." *The Economist* is, I think, quite right in pointing to the dangers of bombing close to the Chinese frontier. It is also quite right in pointing to the deplorable failure of the South Vietnamese army to participate vigorously in what is supposed to be a war in defence of its home land.

What impresses me most about your editorial, however, is the equanimity with which you are reconciled to the sacrifice of two hundred American lives every week and the expenditure by the United States of \$25 billion a year. Being so admirably disinterested, you must find it difficult to understand that some of us in the United States are not so easily reconciled to the death in battle of over eleven thousand of our young men up to the present time and an uncertain number in the future. Similarly, you seem puzzled that a country so rich as the United States should lack enthusiasm for the annual expenditure on the war of \$25 billion, some part of which otherwise might be used for the reconstruction of our cities and the elimination of our slums.

What puzzles me most about your editorial, considering your enthusiasm for the war in Vietnam, is your failure to suggest that your own country send an army or at least a volunteer brigade to join the battle. Perhaps the omission was mere oversight, or perhaps *The Economist* doubts that the British public shares its warm enthusiasm for the war in Vietnam.—Yours faithfully, J. W. FULBRIGHT
United States Senate, Washington

SIR—It was, of course, Mr Kellner himself who invoked liberal principles and postulated the holding of elections in Vietnam. Although he ascribes to me (letters, September 16th) views I did not express, he does now agree, I think, that it is highly unlikely that any elections worthy of the name would ever be held in North Vietnam; if this is so, then his original letter rather loses its point.

There is implicit in his further remarks an assumption which is common among those who take Mr Kellner's side in this argument. It is that, while "western-style" democracy may be very fine and desirable in Europe and North America (and especially in Greece?), the Vietnamese are hardly more than a bunch of peasants who cannot be expected to know what is good for them and would oblige everyone if they would only forget any aspirations they may have in that direction.—Yours faithfully,

Harrow

R. S. MONTGOMERIE

Trade Unions

SIR—Your comment on the dispute at the Roberts-Arundel factory in Stockport (September 16th) was made redundant by the settlement reached on September 19th, which gave the unions a new demand, viz. the

to be accepted everywhere, but rather that if they display sufficient determination to be accepted they will be, and without regulation. That the unions should consider bargaining their relative independence away in return for state-sponsored recognition is a sign of their present weakness. The events in Stockport were an all-too-rare demonstration of the power that the unions today are in general too timid to employ, but which if exercised can solve their problems far more effectively than reliance on the machinery of the law.—

Yours faithfully,
Manchester, 14

COLIN BARKER

Soviet Jewry

SIR—The article "Don't take it out on the Jews" (September 2nd) was noteworthy but we feel most strongly that the real position of the three million Russian Jews deserves examination.

Since the revolution in 1917 the Jewish position has undergone dramatic changes. Until Stalin the community enjoyed comparative freedom and indeed encouragement, particularly on the cultural and religious planes. However, this was totally reversed during the middle of the Stalinist era.

Today we are faced with no Jewish schools, whereas in 1940 there were over a hundred such schools. Yiddish publications flourished, whereas now the Jewish literary picture is almost void. The Soviet government has not permitted the publishing of a Hebrew Bible since the revolution, and since then only 3,000 prayer books have appeared in 1958.

Most Christian and Moslem sects are permitted central organisations and external representation, even abroad: this is denied to Soviet Jewry.

In 1956, according to Russian statistics presented to the United Nations, there were some 450 synagogues in the USSR. By April, 1963, there were 96, and now in 1967 there appear to be some 60 synagogues which as yet have not been closed down by the authorities.

It is to be hoped that those who believe in freedom will not condone the enforced assimilation of Soviet Jewry.—Yours faithfully,

A. JOHN CURTIS
 JONATHAN LASS

Cambridge Committee for
 Soviet Jewry

London, W9

Race

SIR—In defending Duncan Sandys, Mr I. W. Fotheringham (letters, September 16th) states that black immigrants in Britain are indeed "misfits" since, for genetic reasons, they find our climate unsuitable. As classically illustrated by Duncan Sandys's remarks, our weather is the least objectionable aspect of the black man's lot in Britain.

Mr Fotheringham goes on to tell us that he personally will not be going to the Congo. However, history shows that climatic conditions did not deter others of his particular "breed" from going to black peoples' countries and imposing their alien rule and culture. Who are the "misfits" in Africa? the Caribbean? the South Pacific?

Duncan Sandys referred specifically to "half-castes" but, thanks to Mr Fotheringham's theories we can now deduce that our "generation of misfits" will, in fact, be 50 per cent less numerous than Duncan Sandys

Russia and China

SIR—Several times I have seen western press dealing with the claim that the Soviet Union is giving economic help to China. In my information, the situation is

At a meeting of Soviet and Chinese experts were received the Chinese. They recommended of heavy industry in Sinkiang agreed that in future China less on expert assistance from communist countries, and more resources. An accelerated "going Soviet experts was, so to say,

But after this meeting the attack on Mr Khrushchev was the experts too. Agitators were them to "build more quickly" work in factories done much and machines were destroyed. Aviation instructors were to teach pilots to fly in less than aircraft were destroyed and they wanted to push the figure hours. The Russian instructors too. The specialists were always by crowds of demonstrators. Their doors were full of unfriendly; they received mass lodgings; their children and very uneasy situation.

The situation became so difficult return home of the technician organised. It is interesting that years afterwards nobody wrote this brutal way of unilateral help of Soviet—and Czech experts.—Yours faithfully,
Prague

Teachers' Pay

SIR—Your correspondent mentioned (16th) that American teachers living on modest salaries \$7,000 per annum. Probably significant is the wide difference salaries between states, ranging per annum in Mississippi California.—Yours faithfully,
London, WC2

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THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE

Spencer House, 22, Abchurch Lane, London EC4N 3DF

Friday, October 20, 1967
3:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Former Ambassador Burden's
notes on Australia and U. S. policy
will interest you.

I am going to have a special
look taken at the potentialities of the
U. S. - Australian relationship over
the years ahead.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

WWRostow:rlh

Thursday, October 19, 1967

Ja

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM EMBASSY CANBERRA (1783)

The following is a summary of a letter to Ambassador Clark from former Ambassador Burden, who has been in Australia on business the last few weeks. Burden was invited by the Ambassador to offer his general views on the future economic development of Australia as well as on Australian military problems and the U. S. role therein. Burden points out his views are solely those of a private citizen and have no connection with the official organization with which he is or has been associated.

General: Australia is badly needed as an independent economic, political, and eventually military bastion of western policy in the Pacific. With intelligent, forceful policies developed by both countries and continuously implemented, Australia can become a much stronger force in the area than is generally realized. We should develop a more progressive policy toward Australia or we may lose an invaluable asset. The present is the crucial time to adopt and pursue policies which will bring the two countries closer together. Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from East of Suez is forcing Australia to reorient her policies economically, politically and militarily and the U. S. should take advantage of the situation.

Economic: The current surge of mineral, gas and oil discoveries is only the beginning of such developments which will have a profound effect on the country. These will lessen dependence on agriculture, improve the balance of payments and support a much larger population. However, large amounts of American and other foreign capital are necessary. Despite our balance of payments problem, every effort must be made to avoid U. S. Government restrictions on capital flow, as a dollar invested in Australia over the next decade is likely to be two or three times more valuable to the long term U. S. interests than a similar investment in Western Europe. While there is minor opposition to foreign investment, the government and industry generally welcome and realize the need for it. There is very little of the emotional resistance to U. S. ownership that one finds in Canada, for example. Australian industry badly needs trained executives as produced by U. S. graduate schools of business and the U. S. can help in this. There is a brain drain in this field as Australian business does not sufficiently appreciate the need for more effective executives here.

Military: Australia realizes she is dependent on foreign sources for sophisticated weapons systems, but some political defense officials (as opposed to military officers) are somewhat worried about being dependent on a single nation for major key items. But after the problem of French Mirage spare parts in Israel, perhaps the Aussies are having second thoughts about a "two-nation procurement policy." We should encourage this. The U. S. should keep in mind possible assistance to Australia in the field of atomic power, such as Operation Plowshare. With the British withdrawal and the uncertain future of Vietnam and other Asian areas, the Australian-U.S. alliance would do well to develop a naval-air base of consequence somewhere in Australia.

9

Friday, October 20, 1967
3:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Sometimes a simple thought is helpful; and this is my simple thought for today. Hanoi's mind works as follows:

The Americans have the power to bomb us; and that is costly to us.

On the other hand, we have the power to mount a tremendous campaign of propaganda and pressure on them; and that hurts President Johnson. The only legitimate trade-off, then, is no bombing for an end to the no-bombing campaign.

The only compensation that we are now prepared to give the Americans is that by a stoppage of bombing, they will get some of the present political and psychological pressure off their necks.

If this view is correct, the only way we can get something solid for a cessation of bombing is to prove that we can manage -- or live with -- the pressures at home and abroad.

W. W. R.

WWRostow:mz

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, October 20, 1967
3:15 p. m.

10

MR. PRESIDENT:

I had occasion to ask Bill Bundy about Dean Acheson, while raising with him the generation of Viet Nam materials for Cabinet member speeches.

Pres file

Bill reports:

-- He does not believe that Mr. Acheson harbors any ill-will over the "confrontation" on European policy, and he would be delighted to be called in again;

-- It is Bill's guess that Mr. Acheson believes we should not get out of Viet Nam; we should weather the political storms at home and only stop bombing if we receive appropriate recompense through the actions of the other side.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

by rg, NARA, Date 11-4-91

Friday, Oct. 20, 1967
12:30 p.m.

11

MR. PRESIDENT:

I was skeptical when I began reading this; but ended up interested and at least half persuaded; namely, that we finally got a Korean settlement out of the truce talks by some very tough bombing, including especially the destruction of dikes in North Korea.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Attachment

11a

17 October 1967

To: Rostow

From: Ginsburgh

Reproduced below are excerpts from the "official" history, The United States Air Force in Korea, by Robert Frank Futrell.

Although by no means conclusive, it is an interesting thesis which argues that:

- a. Airpower "won" the Korean War.
- b. Air pressure during the negotiations ultimately persuaded the communists to accept terms that they had previously rejected.
- c. The final straw that broke the communists' will was the destruction of irrigation dams and the consequent flooding of ricelands.

4. Irrigation Dam Attacks Speed Truce Negotiations


When the armistice negotiations began again at Panmunjom on 26 April 1953, the Communists revealed that they were not prepared to accept United Nations terms for ending the war. Both sides made some concessions early in May. The Communists agreed to neutral custody of prisoners of war in Korea pending repatriation, and the United Nations Command agreed to accept a neutral nations repatriation commission as the custodial agency rather than

a single state. The two sides could come to no agreement on the length of the "explanation" period or the final disposition of nonrepatriates.⁶⁴ As the truce negotiations faltered, General Clark informed the Joint Chiefs that FEAF would attack the hydroelectric generating facilities at Sui-ho and a target complex at Yangsi—both being legitimate military targets in the "sensitive" area along the Yalu.⁶⁵ Because of its flak defenses, the powerhouse at Sui-ho was a difficult target, but on 10 May Colonel Victor E. Warford, commander of the 58th Wing, led a formation of eight 474th Group Thunderjets in low at Sui-ho and put at least three delayed-action bombs through the roof of the target. Pilots said that the flak was the "most intense in all of North Korea," but the Thunderjets escaped damage. Tailrace activity at Sui-ho dam nevertheless indicated that two generators still continued to work.⁶⁶ Without great difficulty on the night of 10/11 May 39 Superfortresses attacked the Yangsi target complex outside Sinuiju City and effected 63 per cent destruction. On the night of 18/19 May 18 B-29's returned to complete the destruction of "one of the last large lucrative targets remaining in North Korea."⁶⁷

At Panmunjom on 13 May the United Nations Command presented suggested terms of reference for the neutral nations repatriation commission which defined the functions of the body in such a way as to ensure that prisoners of war could accept or reject repatriation. The Communists bitterly rejected these proposals and launched into tirades of propaganda. Having failed to make progress, the United Nations delegation temporarily recessed the truce talks on 16 May.⁶⁸ Fearing the possibility of another indefinite recess in truce negotiations on 14 May, General Clark pointed out to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military pressure which he could wage against the Reds without a change in his current directives. He could continue air attacks against sensitive targets along the Yalu, breach about 20 previously unattacked irrigation dams in North Korea, launch all-out air attacks against Kaesong after advising the Reds that they had violated the neutral status of the town by using it as a military concentration point, release North Korean prisoners of war who did not wish repatriation, and, in the autumn of 1953, United Nations Command forces could conduct a limited land and amphibious attack in the Kumsong area of east-central Korea.⁶⁹ General Clark mentioned that air operations might be launched against Manchuria and North China, but he made no recommendations on this delicate subject. Back in Washington President Eisenhower was willing to threaten the Red Chinese with extended hostilities. In conversations with Prime Minister Nehru during a visit to India beginning on 22 May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles emphasized that the United States wanted an honorable peace in Korea. If the stalemate continued, Dulles told Nehru, the United States had decided to attack the Communist sanctuary bases in Manchuria. Secretary Dulles hoped that his warning would reach Peking, and it doubtless did.⁷⁰

AIRPOWER ACHIEVES UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBJECTIVES

When he mentioned the North Korean irrigation dams on 14 May, General Clark revealed that he had heard about a target system which FEAF had been studying for nearly three months. If the FEAF air targets officers had not been seeking targets in context with an air pressure strategy they probably would never have noted the importance of North Korea's rice production. The first



clue as to the importance of the rice crop came from the movements of Red security troops into Hwanghae and South Pyongan provinces on the western coast of Korea during the spring and summer months. These security troops were guarding the region's rice production and securing the harvested grain for the Red military effort. Further research indicated that these two provinces annually planted 422,000 acres and produced 283,162 tons of rice. Most of the

rice went to feed Communist soldiers. FEAF intelligence officers reasoned that food was war materiel and they thought that it was just as legitimate to destroy a growing crop as to seek to destroy rice once it was harvested. Target researchers soon determined how air attacks could destroy the rich rice crops of the Haeju provinces. Rice production in this area depended upon impounded irrigation water from some 20 large reservoirs. By destroying the impounding dams, air attacks could release floods which would destroy a year's rice planting.⁷¹

The North Korean agricultural irrigation dams were an excellent target system, but many FEAF officers were troubled by the implications connected with the destruction of the irrigation dams. On 7 April several members of the FEAF Formal Target Committee doubted the wisdom of such a drastic operation, and General Weyland was reported to be "skeptical of the feasibility and desirability of destroying the North Korean rice-irrigation system." The Target Committee consequently refused to accept the operation, but it recommended that FEAF intelligence prepare a detailed study of the matter for General Weyland.⁷² The intelligence study developed convincing arguments to prove that air attacks against the agricultural reservoir system were suitable, feasible, and acceptable, but neither General Clark nor General Weyland thought that the time was opportune for such a severe operation as the destruction of the enemy's rice crop. Both believed that such an operation would be an ultimate in air pressure, to be used if the Reds broke off armistice negotiations. Even though he was unwilling to authorize attacks against the enemy's rice crop as such, General Weyland was willing to approve irrigation-dam attacks where resultant floodwaters would interdict the enemy's lines of communications.⁷³

In order to test the feasibility of the endeavor and develop attack techniques, General Weyland directed the Fifth Air Force to breach the Toksan dam, which was about 20 miles north of Pyongyang and backed up the waters of the Potong River. On 13 May four waves of 59 Thunderjets of the 58th Wing attacked the 2,300-foot earth-and-stone dam. At last light the dam seemed to have withstood the 1,000-pound bombs directed against it. Sometime that night, however, impounded waters broke through the weakened dam, and fighter-bombers found the reservoir empty the next morning.⁷⁴ "The damage done by the deluge," reported the Fifth Air Force, "far exceeded the hopes of everyone."⁷⁵ The swirling floodwaters washed out or damaged approximately six miles of embankment and five bridges on the important "George" railway and also destroyed two miles of the main north-south highway which paralleled the railroad. Down the river valley the floodwaters destroyed 700 buildings and inundated Sunan airfield. The floodwaters also scoured five square miles of prime rice crops.⁷⁶ "The breaching of the Toksan dam," General Clark jubi-

AIRPOWER ACHIEVES UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBJECTIVES

lantly informed the Joint Chiefs, "has been as effective as weeks of rail interdiction."⁷⁷

With one of the two main railway lines into Pyongyang unserviceable, General Weyland immediately scheduled two more dams for destruction in order to interdict the "Fox" rail line. He assigned the Chasan dam to the Fifth Air Force and the Kuwonga dam to Bomber Command. The Fifth Air Force commenced work promptly. Late on the afternoon of 15 May 36 Thunderjets of the 58th Wing dive-bombed Chasan with 1,000-pound ordnance but inflicted no significant damage. On 16 May 90 sorties in three waves of 58th Wing Thunderjets continued the dive-bombing attack. The last wave of the fighter-bombers scored a cluster of five direct hits and the hydraulic pressure of other bombs bursting in the water broke the weakened dam. Impounded waters surged southward to wash away 2,050 feet of embankment and three bridges on the "Fox" rail line. The parallel highway suffered slight damage, but secondary roads were washed out. The onrushing waters surged over field after field of young rice.⁷⁸ Bomber Command was tardy in beginning its attacks at Kuwonga and waited too long between strikes. Seven B-29's aimed 56 x 2,000-pound bombs against Kuwonga by shoran on the night of 21/22 May and scored four direct hits on the crest of the dam. The dam did not break, and the Reds had learned an effective countermeasure. They reduced the reservoir's water level by 12 feet, thus taking strain off the weakened dam and widening the thickness of the earth which the B-29's would have to breach. On the night of 29 May 14 B-29's scored five direct hits with 2,000-pound bombs. Had the water level of the reservoir been at its customary stage, this attack would have destroyed the dam. The Superfort attacks failed because the Reds had rapidly devised effective countermeasures, but the enemy had to drain Kuwonga's reservoir before repairing the dam. The Reds prevented flood damages, but they deprived adjacent rice fields of necessary irrigation water.⁷⁹

At the end of the Korean fighting General Weyland remarked that two particular fighter-bomber strikes stood out "as spectacular on their own merit." One was the hydroelectric attack of June 1952, and the other—"perhaps the most spectacular of the war"—was the destruction on the Toksan and Chasan irrigation dams in May 1953.⁸⁰ Although they displayed their usual fantastic rapidity in restoring rail lines, the Communists did not get the "Fox" and "George" lines back into service until 26 May.⁸¹ To the average oriental, moreover, an empty rice bowl symbolizes starvation, and vitriolic Red propaganda broadcasts which followed the destruction of the irrigation dams showed that the enemy was deeply impressed. In an effort to repair the damage, the Reds immediately mobilized 4,000 laborers at Toksan, but by their own admission the rebuilding of this dam required 200,000 man-days of labor. A United Nations Command covert agent who had been at Toksan said that the local population felt that the destruction of this dam caused more damage than any other United Nations air attack.

The Korean armistice agreement signed on 27 July 1953 marked the attainment of United Nations and United States military objectives in Korea. The truce terms established the authority of the Republic of Korea south of a northern border so located as to facilitate administration and military defense. Because of the latter consideration, the United Nations yielded the indefensible terrain of the Ongjin peninsula on the west but ran the new border far enough north of the 38th parallel in central Korea to interrupt the lateral communications lines which the Communists would require for renewed aggression. The demilitarized zone on each side of the new border and prohibitions against reinforcements of either side during the armistice were guarantees against re-

AIRPOWER ACHIEVES UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBJECTIVES

newed aggression, although the latter provisions would ultimately be violated by the Reds and would therefore be eventually denounced by the United States. And, finally, the Communists accepted what they had said they would never accept: the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. At one minute after midnight, on 23 January 1954, some 22,000 Chinese and Korean prisoners who were unwilling to return to their Communist-dominated homelands would be released to the Chinese Nationalist government and to the Republic of Korea. Political conferences at Panmunjom in the autumn of 1953 and at Geneva in the spring of 1954 would fail to secure Korean unity, but the United Nations' effort in Korea had not been in vain. The Republic of Korea was spared the Communist yoke, and the United Nations' courage in opposing naked aggression gave heart to all free countries of the world.

Why the Communists finally accepted the United Nations Command's terms for ending the Korean hostilities was a secret which would remain locked in the archives of Moscow and Peking. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would declare in January 1954 that the hostilities ended "because the aggressor, already thrown back to and behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods he had selected."¹²⁷ Although recognizing that the threat of air assaults and naval blockades against the Chinese mainland may have helped, United Nations commanders believed that the pressure of air attack within Korea had forced the Reds to accept the armistice terms. General Clark noted that the Communists yielded "only because the military pressure on them was so great that they had to yield. . . . In the end we got the cease-fire only because the enemy had been hurt so badly on the field of battle."¹²⁸ The FEAF, deputy for intelligence, General Zimmerman, explained in January 1954: "We established a pattern of destruction by air which was unacceptable to the enemy. The degree of destruction suffered by North Korea, in relation to its resources, was greater than that which the Japanese islands suffered in World War II. These pressures brought the enemy to terms."¹²⁹ General Weyland summed up his own view rather briefly in February 1954. "We are pretty sure now," he said, "that the Communists wanted peace, not because of a two-year stalemate on the ground, but to get airpower off their back."¹³⁰ Whether the Reds yielded because they feared an expanding air war, or whether they quit because of the pounding pressure of air attacks against their forces in North Korea, one thing was certain: airpower was triumphant in the Korean war.

12

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-452
By ig, NARA, Date 7-17-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - October 20, 1967
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Caribbean Development Bank

Pres file

In checking with Joe Barr about meeting with you, Bill Gaud and Nick Katzenbach on the Caribbean Bank issue, he elaborated his views as follows:

1. He recognizes that what Nick proposes -- a loan to the Bank from AID funds -- is outside the purview of Treasury and he is not in a position to object.
2. His private view is that it is a mistake to make the loan because it represents a new commitment. He thinks we are already over-extended with commitments to existing international banks and may find that we are not in a position to deliver. But this is for Bill Gaud to decide because it is his money.
3. What he wants clearly understood is that a loan to the Bank should not be regarded as a first step toward membership. Membership involves Treasury obtaining authorizing legislation and appropriations and they are not prepared to do this.

The foregoing raises the question of whether you still want the Barr-Gaud-Katzenbach confrontation. Barr is not officially objecting to the Katzenbach proposal provided no membership is contemplated. You can approve Nick's recommendation in that understanding and skip the meeting.

Joe is out of town until this evening. If you prefer a meeting, we could arrange one for tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Katzenbach's proposal
with Barr's understanding _____.

Prefer to have meeting _____.

See me

13

Pres file

Friday - October 20, 1967
11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

State tells us that President Diaz Ordaz is planning to issue the invitations to the Chamizal Ceremony in his own name since the ceremony is to take place in Mexican territory. Of the 1400 invitations, half are to be reserved for persons whom you wish to invite.

State is preparing a list based on these categories of persons:

1. Border Congressmen and Senators
2. Texas state and local officials
3. Leading El Paso Citizens
4. Persons involved in Chamizal settlement.

The list will be sent to us for review and approval.

We had originally thought that the invitations would be extended by each President to his respective guests. But President Diaz Ordaz wants it the other way. Do you feel strongly enough about this to make an issue of it?

Yes ____

No ____

See me ____.

W. W. Rostow

14

Friday, October 20, 1967
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting report
on basic Viet Cong problems in a
Delta province.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Friday, October 20, 1967

14a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Difficulties

The September report for Chuong Thien Province, in the Delta region, gives a very interesting account of the attitudes of the people toward the Viet Cong as related by a recent rallier. The following is a summary of this report:

According to Le Hong Huan, a recent rallier and former Secretary of the Labor Youth Group in a district of Chuong Thien Province, many Viet Cong cadres and troops are becoming disenchanted with the protracted war and with the hardships and suffering levied on themselves and their families because of their association with the Viet Cong. This problem was clearly indicated at a meeting of the Viet Cong Long My District Committee, Chuong Thien Province, held shortly after the September 3 Government of Vietnam elections. The Committee complained of the poor and unenthusiastic support given by the cadres toward achieving its goal in the anti-election campaign and concluded that, because of this, it was only able to carry out one-half of its projected anti-election goal.

Huan stated that there are many defections from Viet Cong ranks of which the Government of Vietnam has no knowledge because these people do not rally but merely quit and return to their previous occupations.

The problem of keeping people from moving to Government of Vietnam controlled areas still plagues Viet Cong planners. According to Le Hong Huan, the people living in Viet Cong-controlled areas are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the severity of the war and with Viet Cong policies in general. These people originally had a better life under the Viet Cong than they did under the old French landlords and, even with the hardships now inflicted upon them by the war, many still hesitate to move away and leave their land. Some people have become so angry and frustrated that they have killed themselves, while others show their resentment by only cultivating enough of their land to meet subsistence needs for their families.

Many of these people are suspicious of the Government of Vietnam because of the destruction caused by military operations and air and artillery strikes. However, the people have recently learned about some of the Government of Vietnam's refugee programs and of the humane treatment given to people wounded or injured in Government of Vietnam military operations. As a result, their attitude is becoming more friendly toward the Government of Vietnam.


Arthur McCafferty

~~TOP SECRET--PENNSYLVANIA~~

Friday, October 20, 1967
10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Kissinger does his
initial job; but he's got a problem
with the optimism of the two amateurs
M and A.

W. W. Rostow

Paris 5472

~~TOP SECRET--PENNSYLVANIA~~

WWRostow:rln

15
Pres. file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By hsg, NARA, Date 11-4-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

W 1d

15a

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action DE RUFNCR 5472 2931240
ZNY TTTT
P 201015Z OCT 67
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
Info TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6707
STATE GRNC
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~ PARIS 5472

CN-4438

Oct 20, 1967, 7:20 a.m.
1967

NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

FROM KISSINGER

M. MET ME AT THE AIRPORT IN A STATE OF ADVANCED EUPHORIA. ACCORDING TO HIM, THE LAST MESSAGE FROM BO MADE ALL THE FRUSTRATIONS WORTHWHILE. WHEN I ASKED HIM FOR THE CAUSE OF HIS OPTIMISM, HE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESCALATION AND BOMBING AND THE CHANGE OF TENSE IN THE LAST SENTENCE. I QUICKLY DISILLUSIONED HIM. I SAID THAT THE ISSUE WAS REALLY QUITE SIMPLE. IF HANOI WANTED TO NEGOTIATE IT SHOULD BE ABLE TO FIND SOME WAY OF EXPRESSING THIS FACT BY MEANS OTHER THAN SUBTLE CHANGES IN TENSE AND ELLIPTICAL REFERENCES FULL OF DOUBLE MEANINGS. WE HAD MADE A CLEAR CUT OFFER. IT HAD HAD NO RESPONSE. WE HAD ACCEPTED UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS. HANOI HAD INCREASED ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDING AN OFFENSIVE ALONG THE DMZ WHICH COULD IN NO WAY BE JUSTIFIED BY MILITARY NECESSITY. WASHINGTON'S PATIENCE WAS NEARING AN END. M SAID OUR RESTRICTIONS WERE A DIMINUTION OF AN ESCALATION. I REPLIED THAT IF THEY WERE LIFTED, HE WOULD SEE QUICKLY ENOUGH HOW REAL THEY WERE. I REMINDED HIM OF HIS OWN POSITIVE REACTION TO THE MESSAGE OF AUGUST 25. THIS HAD MEANWHILE BEEN CLARIFIED AND FURTHER STRENGTHENED. IT WAS NOW UP TO HANOI TO BE EXPLICIT ENOUGH TO PERMIT A CONVERSATION. M. SAID THAT HANOI BY ITS SILENCE HAD RATIFIED A'S NOTES OF THE CONVERSATION WITH PHAM VAN DONG. I REPLIED THAT NO SERIOUS PERSON COULD EXPECT THE PRESIDENT TO ACT ON THE BASIS OF SUCH CONJECTURES WHILE HUNDREDS OF SHELLS WERE BEING FIRED DAILY BY THE OTHER SIDE ALONG THE DMZ.

M. CLEARLY SHAKEN SAID THAT A WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE HIS PLANS AND RETURN TO PARIS ON THE FIRST AVAILABLE PLANE RATHER THAN FRIDAY AFTERNOON AS HE HAD PLANNED. WE CALLED A. IN ROME. I SPOKE FIRST. A. ALSO IN A EUPHORIC MOOD REPHIED TO MY REQUEST FOR AN EARLY RETURN: "YOU MUST HAVE VERY GOOD NEWS." I TOLD HIM THE OPPOSITE WAS MORE NEARLY THE CASE. I AM LEAVING NOW TO MEET A AT THE AIRPORT WHERE HE, M. AND I PLAN TO CONTINUE THE CONVERSATION. I SHALL STRESS THE POINTS OF YOUR 56516. I AM CERTAIN THEY WILL WISH TO SEE BO THIS AFTERNOON.

GP-1. BOHLEN
BT~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-449

By 110, NARA, Date 12-23-94

16

Pres file

Friday, October 20, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's
evaluation of Sen. Symington's
proposal.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

4004
16a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Symington's
Proposal of October 2

1. Senator Symington proposes a "cessation of all military action in South Viet-Nam as well as North Viet-Nam...in the earnest hope that this would result in prompt and meaningful negotiations." If the NVA and the VC continue hostilities after we stop, then, Symington says, we "would feel free to pursue this war in any manner of our own choosing."

2. Symington's proposal reflects a clumsily formulated hawk-dove position that we will see more of as frustration with the prolonged and limited effort makes allies of all those whose primary interest is a quick end to the war. But there are many dangers to this approach, and it would probably end up satisfying neither side:

- The odds are overwhelmingly against DRV acceptance of negotiations as a result of such a public offer, with its implied ultimatum and time limits.
- The only purpose of formulating cessation of military actions in this way would be to justify major escalation. Therefore, all those urging a cessation as the first step towards a settlement of the conflict would regard the offer as a phony and as an excuse for all-out attack on the North. Those advocating a wider war would use Hanoi's continued fighting to justify major escalatory steps.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

17

Friday, October 20, 1967
10:00 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You asked me to establish who the best man might be to make the positive case for our bombing of North Vietnam. I asked Bob Ginsburgh tactfully to explore this, and he has come up with the attached list.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

17a

20 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Some articulate, persuasive, balanced advocates of bombing:

Lt. General George S. Brown, Assistant to General Wheeler

- Formerly Executive to General Tommy White, military assistant to Secretaries Gates and McNamara DSC; World War II bomber pilot; Korean War - Director of Operations Fifth Air Force.

General Bruce K. Holloway, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF

- Formerly Deputy CINCSTRIKE; Commander, US Air Force in Europe; WW II - China - Group Commander.

Lt. General John C. Meyer, Director of Operations (J-3)
Joint Staff

- Formerly Deputy Director, Joint Staff; SAC, legislative Liaison; DSC; WW II fighter ace; Korean War - Group Commander.

Lt. General Glen W. Martin, Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, USAF

- Formerly Inspector General; Chief of Plans, Pacific Air Force; Assistant to Secretaries Symington and Zuckert; WW II - Europe and Pacific.

4

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

Biographies Attached

18
Friday - October 20, 1967
10:00 a.m.

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Welcoming Committee at El Paso

I would like to know your wishes regarding the composition of the welcoming committee who will greet you and President Diaz Ordaz on arrival at El Paso.

Attached is a list of suggested persons. The names from Governor Connally to the Mayor of El Paso meet protocolary requirements. Of the remaining names would you please check those whom you would add.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Suggested list for a
welcoming committee
at El Paso, 10/28/67.

18 a

Suggested List
for
Welcoming Committee
for Arrival of President Johnson and President Diaz Ordaz
at El Paso, Texas, 10:45 am, 10/28/67

The Honorable John B. Connally
Governor of Texas

Mrs. Connally

The Honorable J. F. Friedkin
United States Commissioner,
International Boundary and Water Commission.

Mrs. Friedkin

His Excellency David Herrera Jorden
Mexican Commissioner,
International Boundary and Water Commission.

Mrs. Herrera

Mr. William P. Hughes
Consul General of the U. S. at Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua

Mrs. Hughes

Mr. Roberto S. Urrea
Consul General of the United Mexican States at El Paso

Mrs. Urrea

The Honorable Judson F. Williams
Mayor of El Paso

Mrs. Williams

The Honorable Colbert Coldwell
Judge, County of El Paso

Mrs. Coldwell

Mr. E. R. Lockhart
President, El Paso Chamber of Commerce

Mrs. Lockhart

The Honorable R. E. Thomason, Sr.
Federal Judge

Mrs. Thomason

The Honorable D. W. Suttle
Federal Judge

Mrs. Suttle

The Honorable Ernest Guinn
Federal Judge

Mrs. Guinn

Mr. Raymond H. Dwigans
United States Collector of Customs

Mrs. Swigans

Mr. James J. Kaster
United States Postmaster

Mrs. Kaster

Major General George V. Underwood, Jr.
Commanding General, Fort Bliss, Texas

Mrs. Underwood

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Friday, October 20, 1967
9:30 a. m.

P file

19

MR. PRESIDENT:

The North Vietnamese Ambassador in Vientiane told Bill Sullivan the other day to keep our ears open for what Burchett would have to say in the period after he left Hanoi. He has been used before as a mouthpiece on a quasi-official basis. Here is the first take.

The British are going out to Phnom Penh to probe Burchett further.

Incidentally, our man K had a brief talk at the airport with M, confined to conveying a general mood of gloom and concern. He will see M and A at greater length today. The odds are that M has already rushed to B to convey the general atmosphere of K's arrival.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment (London 3141)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-452
By lip, NARA, Date 7-17-95

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

19a
Thursday, October 19, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BRUCE (London, 3141)

The Foreign Office today received a message from its ambassador in Phnom Penh reporting a conversation he had on October 18 with Wilfred Burchett and the Polish member of the International Control Commission, both of whom had returned the same day from Hanoi after a week's visit. Burchett and the Pole both insisted Hanoi is taking as hard a line as ever. However, Burchett also said that he had had talks with Pham Van Dong and Foreign Minister Trinh, who had said, "If the bombing stopped, they were willing to have meaningful talks though whether they were fruitful or not depended on the other side." The North Vietnamese added they would not deal with the President or the Secretary, whom they regarded as "crooks."

Murray (head of the Southeast Asia Department) did not want to make too much of this, but in view of Burchett's previous activities as a channel, he believed the matter was worth looking into further. He showed us a telegram Brown has sent Phnom Penh instructing Ambassador to probe Burchett further if in his view Burchett was expressing "categorical North Vietnamese view." Murray has asked Embassy Washington to inform the Department.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-449
By 1-28, NARA, Date 12-23-94

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, October 20, 1967
9:25 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith some authentic
Republican thinking about Vietnam
and the 1968 election.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-266
By cbm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~SECRET~~ October 20, 1967
EYES ONLY

21

To: Secretary Rusk

From: W. W. Rostow

The President wished you to have, on a personal basis, a copy of this memorandum by Mac Bundy.

~~SECRET~~ attachment
copy of 10/17/67 memo
to Pres from McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 11-4-91

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

October 20 1967

21a

To: Secretary McNamara

From: W. W. Rostow

The President wished you to have, on a personal basis, a copy of this memorandum by Mac Bundy.

~~SECRET~~ attachment
copy of 10/17/67 memo
to Pres from McG. B.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 11-4-91

216

~~SECRET~~

October 17, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam -- October 1967

I have talked today with my brother Bill, Bob McNamara, a knowledgeable Junior interdepartmental staff team, Dick Helms, and Bromley Smith. I am going to see the Vice President, Clark Clifford and Walt Rostow before the day ends, and when we talk I can make amendments orally to the following tentative conclusions.

Basically, I think your policy is as right as ever and that the weight of the evidence from the field is encouraging. I also believe that we are in a long, slow business in which we cannot expect decisive results soon. And while I think there are several things which we can usefully do to strengthen our position, my most important preliminary conclusions are negative. Because these negative conclusions define my affirmative recommendations, I begin with them:

1. At present I would be strongly against
 - (1) any unconditional pause;
 - (2) any extended pause for the sake of appearances;
 - (3) any major headline-making intensification of the bombing -- such as a renewed bombing of Hanoi;
 - (4) any large-scale reinforcement of General Westmoreland beyond the totals already agreed;
 - (5) any major immediate change in the public posture established by your Texas speech and recent supporting efforts by Cabinet Officers;
 - (6) any elaborate effort to show by new facts and figures that we are "winning."

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By NEJ/SS-316, NARA, Date 11-4-91

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

2. The argument which follows attempts first to spell out these conclusions in detail, and second to outline some things I would do now.

(1) No unconditional pause. The basic objection to an unconditional pause is simply that the odds are very heavy that you would have to resume, and that if the pause is truly unconditional, the circumstances of any such resumption would be very damaging to us both at home and abroad. Dean Rusk is absolutely right when he says that none of the advocates of such a pause have told us they would support a resumption, on any grounds (although Walter Lippmann acknowledged the impossibility of a permanent and unproductive pause a year ago). If we pause unconditionally, we impale ourselves on a terrible dilemma:

a. to accept continuing and visible reinforcement from the North without reply;

b. to resume on our own say-so, thus "destroying the hope of peace" by unilateral action.

(2) No extended pause for the sake of appearances. The argument against this kind of pause is somewhat different: it is that nothing which pretends to be a pause and has conditions attached to it is likely to have any useful effect whatever upon people like the New York Times. They will simply say once more that we have done it wrong, that we were insincere, and that we have proved again that we cannot be trusted by Hanoi. Since in fact Hanoi will not accept any such conditional or limited pause, we can only get the worst of both worlds by offering it. This means that any short standdown at Christmas or New Year's should be very carefully handled to prevent a false impression that we are quietly reopening a serious pause as we did -- in all good faith -- in 1965-66. We should not repeat the pattern of 1966-67.

There is one and only one condition on which I would order an extended pause -- it is that there should be a recorded and acknowledged diplomatic position like the one which we have been stating to Hanoi through the Harvard professor. A quick review of this exchange persuades me that it has been extremely well handled and that it is to our advantage to keep it going. If it leads to a nibble, and we should get grounds for a bombing suspension, we would have a clear predicate on which to base any necessary resumption if the truce were not productive

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

or if there were heavy reinforcement from the North. If, on the other hand, we get no response, we have certainly established a record which will show plainly that we were ready to stop the bombing on a still more forthcoming basis than any we have yet stated -- even in the Texas speech. To me this exchange is a valuable and cost-free exercise, because even without it, as the next paragraph shows, I would be in favor of leaving Hanoi alone. While the exchange continues, we must stay away from Hanoi, but in my judgment we should stay away from there in any case. My reasons follow:

(3) No headline-making intensification of the bombing -- and especially no more bombing in Hanoi. As you know, I think that the bombing of the North is quite intense enough as it stands. While I strongly support bombing of communications lines and supply depots -- tactical bombing -- I see no evidence whatever that North Vietnam is a good object for a major strategic campaign. Dick Helms told me solemnly today that every single member of his intelligence staff agrees with the view that bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area has no significant effect whatever on the level of supplies that reaches the Southern battlefields. Nor does any intelligence officer of standing believe that strategic bombing will break the will of Hanoi in the foreseeable future. This strategic air war engages our pilots and the pride of our air commanders; it also has a military life of its own, with its own claimed imperatives. But it does not affect the real contest, which is in the South. Its political costs are rising every week. We have everything to gain politically and almost nothing to lose militarily if we will firmly hold our bombing to demonstrably useful target areas.

The one great objection to this otherwise desirable restraint is that the top brass and their political friends disagree. I know you have thought in the past that we could not afford to break with them on this issue, but I believe that the balance of opinion is shifting rapidly against them and that it is more and more to our advantage to put a distance between ourselves and people like Symington, Rivers, Harvey -- and even Russell. They are overwhelmingly wrong, on all the evidence, and the belief that you are gradually giving in to them is the most serious single fear of reasonable men in all parts of the country.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

(4) No large-scale reinforcement beyond totals already agreed. I would hope that 525,000 would hold Westy through 1968. I would certainly try to meet this total early if that is now what he wants, because if there is to be hard fighting in the next fifteen months the sooner it comes the better. Indeed, my impression is that whatever we do, our casualties are likely to go up at the turn of the year because of operations now planned, and this seems to me one more powerful argument against an extended holiday pause.

(5) No immediate change in our public posture. The Texas speech is one of the most powerful you have given, and I think it is right in moving the emphasis a bit toward the whole of Southeast Asia and away from the details of Vietnam. I think we ought to do more of this later on, because as you know I think the strategic victory has already been won and is worth claiming. But I do not think the next month or two will be a good time for very extended additional argument. Neither Rusk nor McNamara states the matter quite the way you do, and you yourself need to save your breath until later.

(6) No elaborate effort to use new facts and figures to prove our case. There is a credibility gap and it really makes no difference that the press has done more to make it than we have. We do not gain with the mass of the people by what we report of progress in Vietnam. What we desperately need is that the newspaper men should begin to find progress for themselves. Joe Alsop, with all his weaknesses, is worth ten of our spokesmen. We should strive for a situation in which Reagan's charge begins to look plausible -- that we really are hiding our successes -- for whatever reason. It might cost us a few headlines and a few unbalanced television news reports to observe such a policy of reticence -- but it would help to set a new stage for the necessary efforts we shall have to make next year.

* * * * *

I turn now to the things I would favor. As you will see, they grow out of what I am against.

1. I would favor a careful and considered exposition of the argument against an unconditional pause sometime in the next month or two. I think the right man to do this would be Nick Katzenbach, and I

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 5 -

think the arguments should be fully developed and firm. Once we have made an absolutely fixed decision on this point, we will end some of the chatter and we will lay a base for looking at other less categorical alternatives.

2. I think we should have a careful staff study of the possibilities for continuous bombing in the North which avoids startling targets and has the public effect of deescalation without seriously lightening the burden on the North Vietnamese. My conversations today persuaded me that there is a very promising possibility here that we can have both the essence of the present real military advantages of bombing and much of the advantage of seeming to exercise a new Presidential restraint. I would hope that this alternative could have as careful and complete a review as any other in the immediate future.

3. I would continue the effort to expand the visibility of Vietnamese participation in all forms. I understand that Bunker and Westy are tired of Washington prodding on the subject of ARVN performance, but I also understand that there is some real enthusiasm both in the Pentagon and in Saigon for brigading a few Vietnamese battalions with U. S. forces in offensive action. I would give prompt and strong encouragement to this idea because nothing would do us more good than a few battlefront reports of truly shared combat.

4. All the evidence is that our present team in Saigon is much the best we have had. But they are not getting the very best people to help them even yet. I think you might make progress with the assignment of both Army and CIA officers if you were to press the Army people directly (not through Bob) and Dick Helms too to tell you whether they are using every possible incentive to get their very best professionals into the work of pacification, intelligence collection, province leadership, and other such traditional, unglamorous activities. My agents tell me that the Pentagon rewards the battalion commanders but that it is not really giving top priority to getting top men into other countryside jobs.

5. Finally, I would not listen too closely to anyone who comes from a distance and spends only one day looking at the evidence. What

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

I think I might do instead is to find a way of widening the circle of those who talk regularly about overall policy choices in this area. I do get a feeling that while a number of different people are working on a number of different angles, only a few are trying to keep the whole picture together, and those few are not your least-burdened men. My impression is that here, as in the Middle East, the best organizer of continued study is Katzenbach (whom I have not seen today) and you may wish to look for a way of sitting with him and his people every now and then.

McG. B.
McG. B.

SECRET

Mr. Rostow

22

October 20, 1967

~~1~~ 2 Pres file

Mr. President:

You will recall that when President Sunay was here from Turkey last April you gave him a weather station to integrate into Turkey's weather-watch system. This is now operational, and the formal turnover ceremony will be held at the end of this month. Since we have arranged this ceremony mainly to keep alive the memories of that visit, the attached letter from you would be appropriate to commemorate the occasion.

Attached is for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

October 20, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

It is a great pleasure for me now to present to you and the people of Turkey this Automatic Picture Transmission Weather Station which you and I discussed during your visit to Washington last spring.

I am pleased that we can help in developing further your country's already extensive weather-watching network. We hope that the speedy dissemination of accurate weather information throughout Turkey will bring far-reaching benefits to your people--in agriculture, in the fishing industry, in civil aviation and perhaps in ways we do not yet see.

This station--another practical application of today's astounding progress in scientific research--is one more step toward the goal of developing a world weather watch by 1971. I am delighted that the United States and Turkey can take this step together.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Cevdet Sunay
President of the
Republic of Turkey
Ankara

LBJ:State:HHS:tmt 10/20/67

23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967
7:20 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will be interested in Ky's
views. As always, they are quite
sharp.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 8995

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 123, NARA, Date 11-4-91

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-449
By ig, NARA, Date 12-23-94

23a
Thursday, October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 8995)

I called on Prime Minister Ky accompanied by Jordon and Habib, and found him in good health after several days of illness.

In discussing the prospects for formation of the new government and the program to be presented thereafter, he exhibited impatience with what he considered to be Thieu's overcautious approach. He said that Thieu had been taking too long to make his decision on the cabinet and getting it in place. He said that as far as he was concerned the problem was not that he was insisting upon Nguyen Van Loc as Prime Minister. It was up to Thieu to decide and then form the government as quickly as possible. He did not think it was necessary to wait until the end of the month to do so.

He said that time was being lost in which the government could be formulating its policy and presenting it to the people. He thought it was absolutely necessary that the government move quickly to announce those things which it had intended to do, selecting those areas in which success could be achieved within a short time, certainly within six months.

Ky said that he conceived of the primary tasks as involving the following:

A. Putting into effect those changes affecting the better mobilization of the armed forces, which had been already decided upon by the military leaders. These involved the lowering of draft age, the retention of military men in service beyond their normal tours, and bringing former military men with particular skills back into the service. The government should move immediately to meet its manpower targets to demonstrate both inside and outside Vietnam their determination to do their share. The decree was all ready for Thieu to sign but he has been procrastinating. Ky intended to talk to Thieu about it this day and to urge Thieu to move ahead aggressively on this and other fronts.

B. The government needed to implement plans for reorganization at province levels. He said that it was their intention to train a pool of province level officials, beginning about December 1, so that they would be ready to be deployed in the provinces by the first of the year. The plan involved selecting the best men from among those presently in the province leadership and from among new capable men so as to form a pool of about 150-200 of the best people. These would

then be broken down to groups of three to work as a team as Province Chief, Deputy Province Chief for Administration, and Deputy Province Chief for Security. Lines of authority to them would be improved so as to make them more directly responsible to the central government rather than to Division and Corps Commanders. Ky did not expect any undue interference in this process from the present military leadership at corps and division level.

C. The government had to push ahead dramatically in its campaign against corruption. More than anything, this would convince the people that the government was serious when it spoke of a new deal and greater progress.

D. The government should develop a major short-term program for improvements in the cities. He thought it was necessary to provide evidence clearly visible to the man in the street that the government was doing something about problems in their daily life. He wanted to use the military and was hoping to get American engineering support for cleaning up the cities, repairing the roads, and providing better public services.

Ky said that if the government is able to concentrate its attention on those things that could be accomplished within the next six months, people would increase their faith in the government and that this would provide the necessary strengthening of the government position throughout the country. He thought people should be promised only those things that were capable of being done efficiently and quickly. The sorts of things he had outlined above were those which could be easily done if the government would concentrate its efforts.

I asked him what he thought of the possibility of some move toward Hanoi. He said that he thought they would be in a better position to really get somewhere in this regard after about six months of the type of success of which he had been speaking. Unless they approached Hanoi from a position of accomplishment, there would be no response. He did not look with favor upon Thieu's suggestion to write a letter to Ho Chi Minh or to think in terms of bombing pauses. He didn't expect Ho Chi Minh would reply if Thieu were to write ten letters. Ky agreed that it was desirable to pursue the war while at the same time showing flexible readiness to seek a peaceful solution. But he felt that Hanoi would be recalcitrant until feasible progress had improved the climate in South Vietnam. He thought it was necessary to combine determination in the war, willingness to seek a peaceful settlement, and efforts to achieve progress in South Vietnam.

When asked about any possible approaches to the National Liberation Front, Ky said that he thought they could develop lines to the Southerners among the National Liberation Front. He was in favor of such direct approaches. It was not possible, at this time, to conceive of allowing the National Liberation

Front to function as a political party in South Vietnam, but he did not exclude this as a possibility for later on. He foresaw that the time would come when the Southerners in the National Liberation Front, who were not the same as the Northern Communists, would be prepared to make the compromises which would allow the government to work with them.

Ky said that once they were in a stronger position, which he expected would take about six months, they could deal with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front along the above lines. Until then, he did not favor bombing pauses, which would be only propaganda gestures, as he did not favor attempts at contact directly with Hanoi without indications that the situation was ripe.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/~~
~~SENSITIVE~~Thursday, October 19, 1967
7:05 p.m.

24

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Contingency Support For Sterling

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-452
By ing, NARA, Date 7-17-95

At Tab A is Joe Fowler's memo recommending an increase of \$100 million in the funds he has available for market operations to support sterling.

What it comes down to is this.

Today's increase in the discount rate is part of the last ditch British effort to hold the sterling rate. As you know, they moved strongly last year to support the pound: they deflated their economy, cut down foreign commitments and borrowed heavily abroad.

The program worked well through the first quarter of this year. They were able to pay off more than \$1 billion in debt. Then they ran into bad luck:

- disappointing exports, largely because of the recession on the continent;
- the Middle East crisis and the closure of the Canal;
- rising interest rates elsewhere while theirs were going down.

They began to lose reserves and had to draw heavily on their line of short term credits.

The increase in the bank rate is designed to draw funds back to London. The market's initial reaction was slightly disappointing because some expected a higher increase in the rate. But sterling is holding steady because of support operations.

Through selective and carefully timed actions, we have operated successfully in the market in the past to keep the rate from worsening on bad news or to strengthen it on good news. We do so at our own discretion but in cooperation with the British.

We now have \$160 million available for this purpose. Fowler recommends that you authorize him to make \$100 million more available out of

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

-2-

the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This would give the necessary leeway to have a maximum impact on the market -- either to continue defensive operations or to take advantage of favorable opportunities.

These funds are guaranteed against loss from devaluation. There is no balance of payments effect. If the funds are used, it would in effect amount to an increase in our lending to the U. K.

This is a contingency investment that could be used very effectively to support sterling. I believe Fowler's proposal makes sense. Deming, Okun, Daane and Fried who have gone into it carefully concur in the recommendation.

Your decision is needed as soon as possible so that our people in the exchange market will know how much ammunition they have and plan their operations accordingly from tomorrow on.

W.W. Rostow

Approve _____

No _____

See me _____

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

PRESERVATION COPY



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

OCT 19 1967

24a

~~SECRET - LIMITED DISTRIBUTION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Additional Assistance to the U. K. in Support
of Sterling

1. The austerity program imposed by the British last year brought sterling out of its summer crisis and very considerable gains were made in restoring British reserves and repaying short-term credits. This favorable picture prevailed through the fourth quarter of last year and into April of 1967. The British predicted a sizable balance of payments surplus for the year.

A sharp reversal took place in May, following poor April trade figures, accentuated by the Mid-East crisis. The British reserves suffered from some movement of Mid-East funds accompanied by other speculative flight from sterling and more fundamentally due to closure of the Suez canal and related aspects of the Mid-East crisis. In addition, the hoped for resurgence in U. K. exports did not take place, due in large part to the stagnation in Germany and slow downs elsewhere, including the U. S. in the early part of the year. Finally, interest arbitrage relationships were turned against the British as interest rates in the United States rose.

As a result, the British again find themselves with reserves depleted and large debts on their short-term lines of credit.

Their reserves at the end of September stood at \$2,733 million, down \$425 million from a year earlier and short-term credits drawn at \$2,072 million, up \$250 million from a year earlier. This \$2.1 billion of credits drawn is out of established short-term lines totaling \$2,690 million leaving about \$420 million remaining. Of the \$2,690 million in credit lines, \$1,750 million have been extended by the United States and the balance of \$940 million by other, largely European, countries. The worsening of the short-term credit position has to a large extent been offset by reestablishment of medium-term facilities with the International Monetary Fund, but these latter are not as readily available and publicity surrounding an IMF drawing could be counterproductive.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-305
By ig, NARA Date 12-26-96

V-6984 - 1

At present the United States has two credit lines, one a swap line by the Federal Reserve amounting to \$1,350 million of which \$800 million is drawn and a \$400 million agreement shared \$200 million by the Federal Reserve and \$200 million by the Treasury Exchange Stabilization Fund. Under this latter agreement the U. S. extends support by purchasing sterling generally in the market, subject to an exchange guarantee granted by the British. There is no fixed maturity at which the sterling will be resold to the Bank of England or the market. The Exchange Stabilization Fund also extends, on occasion, overnight assistance at month end.

2. The drain on the British position in the past few months, after the Mid-East crisis settled down, seems to be largely related to the fact that interest rates elsewhere, particularly in the Euro-dollar market, are more attractive than rates on sterling investments when the cost of forward cover is taken into account. In addition, their trade figures have not been a cause of encouragement. Given the other problems of sterling, this drain is unsustainable. The increase today in the Bank of England rate of 1/2 percent is designed to reestablish the interest relationship which existed earlier. It may well prove to be not enough and another 1/2 percent increase could be around the corner.

In response to an inquiry by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I have indicated the United States would not stand in the way of or retaliate to such a move. We could not, of course, make any promise as to the general trend of our own rates. The Bank of England had moved its rate down by 1-1/2 percent to 5-1/2 percent earlier this year (1/2 percent each in January, March and May). The United States reduced its rate by 1/2 percent in April.

3. We wish to take advantage of what may be a favorable psychological moment to assist in a strengthening of the exchange rate for the pound sterling or at the least to lend sufficient support to avoid a worsening of the outlook. To this end we would propose to engage in market operations by buying guaranteed sterling under the aforementioned \$400 million agreement of September 1965.

4. With your approval, we agreed to extend the further \$400 million assistance in September 1965. At that time we succeeded in obtaining additional pledges of assistance, known as the Basle agreement, from the European central banks. This

is the present credit line of \$690 million of which the British have now used \$540 million.

A further credit package in the amount of \$300 million, of which a group of foreign central banks would supply \$275 million, is being currently discussed to assist the U. K. to make a repayment due to the International Monetary Fund this December. It is not sure as yet, however, whether this additional credit will materialize. Therefore additional assistance by the United States may not be matched by others.

5. In connection with any current market operations, it would be helpful to have some more ammunition available now to reinforce their position. At present the Exchange Stabilization Fund has only \$50 million left unused from its pledge of \$200 million under the September 1965 agreement. The Federal Reserve has \$110 million left but, as noted, already has undertaken assistance of \$800 million under its swap line.

6. Following the weekend developments, I convened a meeting Tuesday morning of the ad hoc group we normally call on to consider the U. K. problems and our role in dealing with them. It included, in addition to Treasury personnel, Mr. Fried of your staff, Chairman Martin and Governor Daane of the Federal Reserve Board, Mr. Okun of the Council of Economic Advisers, Assistant Secretary Solomon of the State Department, and Mr. Charles Coombs of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who acts as our agent in the market. We reviewed the overall U. K. situation, the various alternatives open, the risk of devaluation, and the situation in the gold market. After pooling our information and views, this ad hoc group referred a general proposal along the lines of this paper to the Interagency Steering Group operating under the Chairmanship of Under Secretary Deming of the Treasury. That group met on Wednesday and considered the problem at some length.

In light of the above, I recommend that you authorize me to increase the Exchange Stabilization portion of the September 1965 agreement by \$100 million to \$300 million. Sterling purchased under this authority would, of course, have to be subject to guarantee so that no exchange risk would be incurred. There would be no adverse balance of payments effect from the transaction.

Henry H. Fowler
Henry H. Fowler

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Thursday, October 19, 1967
6:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Vice President has some
further thoughts on the Saigon delegation.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow



25a

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM

TO: Walt Rostow
FROM: William Connell

The Vice President suggests the following revised list for the U. S. delegation to the inauguration of President Thieu, ranked in order of preference:

1. George Meany, President, AFL-CIO

(If he cannot go, suggest I. W. Abel, President of the United Steelworkers of America. Prospective successor to Meany.)

(If he cannot go, request James Suffridge, President of the Retail Clerks International Union).

2. William Randolph Hearst
3. John Cowles, Jr., Publisher of the Minneapolis Tribune. He has been a bit wobbly on Vietnam, but last Sunday he had a strong supporting editorial.
4. Roy Wilkins of the NAACP
5. Governor Harold Hughes of Iowa. He is the Chairman of the Governors Conference, is a strong supporter of the President, and has some doubts privately about the wisdom of our course in Vietnam. We believe it would firm up a man who will be out on the stump as the candidate for Senator in Iowa next year.
6. Lt. Governor Mark Hogan of Colorado. He is young, in his thirties, probably the next Democratic Governor of Colorado, well-spoken, immensely popular, supports the Administration on Vietnam, and would be a spokesman for the ticket outside Colorado as well as in.

7. Arthur T. Flemming, President, University of Oregon. He is a Republican moderate. Is a dissenting (pro-Administration) member of the Board of the National Council of Churches.
8. Tony Dechant, President, National Farmers Union. He is an active and loyal supporter of the Administration, the only major farm leader who can be expected to be really helpful to the Administration next year.

cc: Marvin Watson

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967
6:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in:

1. Gene's memo to the Secretary on his Mid-West trip.
2. The text of the speech he gave.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

O. 12356, Sec. 3-4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *ry* NARA, Date 11-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S 18007

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26a
Rostow

October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: Eugene V. Rostow
SUBJECT: Travels in the Mid-West

My travels in the Middle West this week brought out these points:

(1) Your most recent press conference was a great success. People whose opinions ranged across the spectrum spoke warmly of the personal impression your vigor and candor created.

(2) Equally, there was a strong positive response to the discussion of Vietnam as a problem of national security, the balance of power, etc.

(3) Again, I found frequent suggestions that the President go back to the format of his famous rocking-chair interview on TV. The feeling is very, very strong that his formal TV speeches convey an unsympathetic impression, while people still remember his one informal TV conversation with enthusiasm.

I think we should make a major effort to persuade the President to return to this method in reaching the public soon and regularly.

In that connection, the Eric Hoffer broadcast had a tremendous impact. It should certainly be run again. One young professor at Kansas said he hadn't felt so sympathetic to the President since 1964.

(4) Substantively, I found no surprises. People listened attentively. They were polite. The questioning was serious, with a minimum of nonsense.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12306,
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY RS ON 11-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I don't think I made converts. But I think also that people felt we were genuinely trying to examine reality with them.

All in all, I think the Regional Conference method is a useful one, well worth pursuing and developing.

cc: U - The Undersecretary
Mr. W. W. Rostow (The White House) ✓

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday,
October 19, 1967 -- 6:15 pm

27

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms answers a
question you raised with him.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

by *18* NARA, Date 11-4-91



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

12 October 1967

743
27a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-455
By cb, NARA, Date 9-6-95

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. You raised with me an allegation in the 30 September Boston Globe which suggested that Congressman O'Neill had received information on Vietnam from this Agency. According to the Globe column, "The Washington Circuit" by Richard H. Stewart, O'Neill had sent a newsletter to his constituents, espousing a divergent policy on Vietnam and basing his conclusions on "... his own sources for information in State, Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency."

2. I have reviewed the O'Neill newsletter in question and find no reference to the Agency being involved.

3. According to our records, Mr. O'Neill has never received a substantive briefing from this Agency. Throughout the years our contacts with the Congressman and his office have been limited to routine constituent matters, the last occurring in December 1966. I have personally assured myself that there have since been no contacts whatsoever between O'Neill and any of this Agency's senior officers. I can find no evidence of contact between O'Neill and any member of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Rich
Richard Helms

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Thursday - 5:30 pm
October 19, 1967*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Caribbean Development Bank

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-452
By *ing*, NARA, Date 7-17-95

Herewith a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach recommending that you approve our expressing willingness to make a loan to the proposed Caribbean Development Bank if and when it is established -- probably not for another 12-18 months.

We encouraged the British, Canadians and British West Indians to study the feasibility of such a Bank. Our interest is largely political:

- To commit the British and Canadians to help in the economic development of the former British colonies.
- To keep the British involved in the Caribbean so that they don't pull out and force us to pick up their responsibilities in these islands.
- To use the Bank as a means for encouraging the islands to move toward federation which is the only long term solution to their political problems.

Nick understates Treasury's views on the proposal. Joe Barr is very much concerned over the impact which this new commitment would have in Congress, even though the money would come out of regular Alliance funds. He also is unhappy with the proliferation of international lending institutions.

US equity membership in the Bank is clearly out of the question at this time. But if we do not at least express willingness to make a loan to the Bank once it is set up (about \$10 million over a 4-5 year period is contemplated), the Bank idea will be dropped.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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-2-

The issue, therefore, is whether we pledge loan assistance to ensure establishment of the Bank and run the risk of Congressional criticism or avoid the risk and let a useful concept affecting stability in our back yard die aborning. The fuse on this one is short since the Caribbean Commonwealth countries are meeting next Monday and want to know our intentions.

I recognize that this is a closely balanced question. My inclination is to take the risk — *the Caribbean is awfully close to Rome.*

W. W. Rostow

Approve Katzenbach's
recommendation _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

Attachment

Katzenbach memo, 10/18/67.


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY
10/18/67

Mr. President:

Since signing this I have talked to Joe Barr. I understand Treasury's natural reluctance to see us make a commitment at a time when we are already in enough difficulties with the Congress. But what I am suggesting here is not Bank membership and legislation approved by the Congress. We would be using AID funds to make loans to this institution. We have made such loans to other similar institutions like the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. I don't think that we should pass up this opportunity to commit the British, the Canadians and leaders like Burnham to a project in an area of vital interest to the United States.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

3440
28-6

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: U. S. Development Loan to Proposed
Caribbean Development Bank

Recommendation:

That you authorize the Department to inform Prime Minister Burnham of Guyana, as spokesman for the several Caribbean governments, that:

-- the U. S. is not prepared, at this time, to consider membership in the proposed Caribbean Development Bank.

-- we are prepared to consider a development loan to such a Bank if and when it is established.

Approved _____ Disapproved _____

Discussion:

The United States has for some time been seeking ways to avoid further political fragmentation and instability in the Caribbean by encouraging a more comprehensive, regional approach to the economic and political problems of the area.

With this in mind, the U.S., together with the U.K. and Canada, supported the preparation of a report on the feasibility of establishing a regional financial development institution. This report, which was issued in August,

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-449
By ig, NARA, Date 12-23-94

PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

strongly favors the establishment of a Caribbean Development Bank with the area governments, the U.S., the U.K. and Canada as members.

I do not believe, however, that the Congress is presently in a mood to accept direct U.S. membership. This assessment was conveyed to the U.K. and Canada during informal discussions held last week in London. Up to that point, the U.K. and Canada had been prepared, on the assumption of U.S. participation, to become active members themselves. They are now likely to back off if they are not persuaded that the U.S. will at least eventually make some financial contribution to the enterprise.

To try to keep this useful initiative alive, I propose that you authorize me to convey U.S. interest in making a development loan to the Caribbean Bank, when and if it is established. We might at some later date re-examine the question of direct U.S. membership.

An exact formula for sharing the burden with the United Kingdom and Canada, the two other potential non-regional participants, would have to be worked out once the Bank is established. Our guiding principle, however, would be to contribute on a substantially coequal basis with the other two.

Any commitment to make a loan would of course depend on the future availability of funds, as well as negotiation with the new Bank of the conditions precedent to the loan. We have had a similar and successful loan relationship with the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.


Prime Minister Burnham has been asked by the Caribbean governments to seek the views of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada before the meeting of the Caribbean Heads of Government in Barbados starting October 23.

Enclosed are a background memorandum on this subject and a draft telegram implementing the proposed position if approved.

Enclosures:

Tab 1. Background
Memorandum.

Tab 2. Draft telegram.


Under Secretary

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28c

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UNDP Proposal for a Caribbean Development Bank

History

✓ Late in 1965, US, UK, Canada financed a study by independent economists of the Windwards, Leewards, Barbados.

April 1966, economists' report recommended a regional development bank.

May 1966, US, UK, Canada representatives met to discuss report. Agreed they would be willing to meet with island governments to hear their reactions to the report.

In July 1966, Caribbean Commonwealth governments met with Canada in Ottawa. Among resolutions approved was recommendation that study be carried out for the establishment of a regional financial institution which would be able to finance "projects of particular interest to the smaller areas, as well as projects which would benefit the region as a whole".

✓ November 2-3, 1966, US, UK, Canada met in Antigua with the governments of the Windwards, the Leewards, and Barbados. (The Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs represented the US.) With respect to a regional development bank, the US position was:

"to join, if invited, any group set up to develop a workable proposal for a Caribbean Development Bank along the lines of the Ottawa communique;

"to consider the possibility of providing financial support for a Caribbean Development Bank of this nature, if and when established."

The Windwards, Leewards, Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad, Jamaica, British Honduras requested UNDP to study the feasibility of a regional development institution and make recommendations for its establishment. US, UK, Canada expressed hope UNDP would make study.

April 1967, UNDP team gathered. UNDP and team met jointly and separately with US, UK, Canada representatives. Report distributed in August.

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-2-

In July 1967, NAC subgroup formed to consider subject and prepare US position. Subgroup met three times in August and early September. It has discussed:

- (1) Problems posed by the report itself, and
- (2) Possible alternative approaches for the provision of development capital for the area.

All US agencies involved agree that US must, in appropriate way, have role in development of these islands.

The UNDP Report

Recommends establishment of a full panoplied development bank, with US, UK, Canada as members.

Capital: \$50 million, of which \$25 million paid in.
60% from regional governments
40% from US, UK, Canada
(US paid-in share would be \$3.3 million.)

Also recommends \$20 million soft loan fund from US, UK, Canada.

Advantages:

Large self-help element. (For instance, Jamaica would contribute more than US.)

Proposal would lock in British for permanent participation equal to US.

For 13% participation, US would have full membership influence.

Regional administrative mechanism is indispensable. (The small islands do not have and will not have the technical or other competence required for satisfactory bilateral dealings. Moreover, external financing agencies can't gear up to deal with them individually.)

Regional approach is highly important to prevent further fragmentation of Caribbean.

NOTE: There is a possibility of a Puerto Rican capital contribution.

NOTE: The UNDP did not accept US urgings that advantages of alternative approaches be described and that alternatives be left open.

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-3-

Disadvantages:

US membership requires Congressional authorization. Are we at the saturation point for new regional banks?

Proposed bank would overlap in part with IDB.

Economic feasibility is as yet undemonstrated.

Proposed bank would, at best, be slow in coming into operation.

Availability of administrative competence is doubtful.

Alternatives:

1. An IDB regional "trust fund" to serve the area, or IDB associate membership arrangements. This alternative is of doubtful feasibility and would at best require a long time to bring about.
2. The offer of US "parallel financing", i.e. participation not in the bank or by loans to the bank, but rather by participating on an ad hoc basis in loan projects of the bank. This approach, like the above paragraph, would be regarded both by the islands and by the UK and Canada as totally negative and would sharply discourage very important regional and self-help aspects.
3. A bank, of which US would not initially be a member, but to which the US could make a loan or loans (as to The Central American Bank, CABEI). This alternative is most feasible and desirable.

Timing

Caribbean Commonwealth technicians, meeting in Guyana in mid-August recommended to their governments that they adopt the UNDP recommendations.

The British and Canadians are pushing hard on all fronts for early action. The British have suggested a tripartite London meeting, probably on October 10-11, to discuss this subject.

On October 22 there will be a Caribbean Commonwealth summit in Barbados, which will consider this subject, along with other aspects of Caribbean economic integration.

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9/28/67

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Please deliver following letter to Prime Minister Burnham soonest:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

This is in reply to your letter to me of September 6 asking, on behalf of the Caribbean governments represented at the August Georgetown conference, for United States views on the UNDP proposal recommending the establishment of a Caribbean Development Bank. My government has asked me to reply as follows:

The United States Government is actively interested in the economic development of the English-speaking Caribbean and supports, subject to further detailed conversations, the establishment of a bank along the general lines of the UNDP report. The United States Government is not able at this time to consider direct membership (and equity participation) in such a bank. It is prepared, however, subject to future availability of funds, to make a development loan to the bank, if and when it is established with the active participation of the United Kingdom and Canada.

The amount of the loan, and the conditions precedent to its release, can naturally only be determined after the bank has come into being. However, we would expect the loan to be in an amount substantially equal to the amounts contributed by the UK and Canada, respectively.

With respect to future meetings convened for the purpose of a detailed examination of the proposal, refinement of guidelines, and the subsequent drafting of a charter, the United States Government would be pleased to participate, if invited, on the understanding that its participation in the meetings not be regarded as an indication of possible future membership.

Sincerely yours,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NUJ 94-449

By ig, NARA, Date 12-23-94

Delmar R. Carlson
American Ambassador

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified

Pres file

Friday, October 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's report on the political situation in Viet Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

SECRET-EXDIS ATTACHMENT

29a

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

October 20, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ

94-449

By

NARA, Date

12-23-94

Bunker-Ky Conversation

In a recent conversation with Bunker, Ky was critical of Thieu for taking so long to make decisions on the Cabinet. Ky said it was absolutely necessary that the government be formed and that it move quickly to announce short-term objectives that could be achieved within six months.

Lower-House Elections

The Lower House campaign ends tomorrow and balloting takes place Sunday (5:00 p.m. Saturday to 4:00 a.m. Sunday EDT). The campaign has proceeded entirely on the local level, with few nationally known figures involved. Peace, corruption, and GVN inefficiency have been raised as issues, but less stridently and specifically than in the Presidential race. Voter turnout is expected to be lower than for the September 3 elections.

The elections offer a chance for groups excluded or under-represented in the new Senate to find a voice. Election by local constituency increases their chances somewhat. But the powerful blocs -- mainly Catholics -- may still win a disproportionate number of seats because of the large number of candidates in each constituency. (Earlier plans of a Buddhist election boycott have evidently been dropped, but the Buddhists have not so far organized behind specific candidates.)

The Southern regionalists may find the election hard going. Badly shaken by Huong's poor showing, they will have difficulty even securing as much representation as they had in the Constituent Assembly (about 12). Unless they do, "Southern" sentiment will be under-represented in the Lower House as it is elsewhere (the Upper House, the Cabinet so far).

The GVN has not openly endorsed any candidates. Some may have informal GVN support, but there appears to be no large-scale organized effort on the part of either Thieu or Ky.

Results of the elections are likely to be slow in arriving here. We should begin to have information on election mechanics -- voter turnout, VC incidents, balloting procedure -- by Sunday afternoon. Full election returns will probably not be known before Tuesday, though trends in key places such as Saigon should be clear before that.

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

30

Thursday, October 19, 1967
4:25 pm

Pers file

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a roster of names for your consideration in exploring the problem of a pause.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Dean Acheson	_____	_____	See attached memo
Eugene R. Black	_____	_____	
John J. McCloy	_____	_____	
Arthur H. Dean	_____	_____	
Gen. Omar Bradley	_____	_____	
James A. Perkins	_____	_____	
Robert A. Lovett	_____	_____	See attached memo
James Wadsworth	_____	_____	
George B. Kistiakowsky	_____	_____	A strongly committed advocate of a cessation of bombing.
Roswell L. Gilpatric	_____	_____	
Morris Liebman	_____	_____	Liebman doesn't fit the Eastern Establishment manner or vocabulary. And I'm told his presence in the first meeting of this group was judged an irritant by some of the others. On the other hand, he is a loyal hardliner.
Douglas Dillon	_____	_____	
George Ball	_____	_____	
McGeorge Bundy	_____	_____	

<u>Name</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Comment</u>
Abe Fortas	_____	_____	
Clark Clifford	_____	_____	
Robert Anderson	_____	_____	
James Rowe	_____	_____	
John McCone	_____	_____	

This list includes all of those on the Advisory Group you appointed in 1964, except:

Allen Dulles (too ill)

Arthur Larson (a Republican dove and not very bright)

Teodoro Moscoso (not his business)

Paul Hoffman (inappropriate as an international civil servant)

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967

30a

MR. PRESIDENT:

I could not get Bill Bundy today because he was either on the Hill giving testimony or making a speech. Clark Clifford had the following comments on Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lovett.

1. Mr. Dean Acheson

He is in a bad mood about the President and keeps coming back to an alleged affront. Clark also believes that we would have to be somewhat cautious in our conversations because he is inclined to talk. On the other hand, Clark believes he would respond to the President's request for his judgment and render it with integrity.

2. Mr. Robert Lovett

His health is poor; but his mind and judgment are clear and first-class. He would probably accept the invitation to consult and render his judgment in this matter.

I will check with Bill Bundy on Mr. Acheson, and with Mac Bundy on Mr. Lovett.

What I find missing from this list is some wise and thoughtful human being -- whether sophisticated in the details of foreign policy or not -- from beyond the Eastern establishment. I am sure you know some such trusted person from Texas or elsewhere beyond the Appalachians.

W. W. R.

DETERMINED TO BE AN AD-ADMINISTRATIVE
COPYING. CANCELLED BY 100-100-1
SEC 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S RECORD
MAR 16 1983.

BY RG CN 11-4-91

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967
3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's
account of his latest conversation
with Gen. Eisenhower.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *ty* NARA, Date 11-1-91



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

31a


18 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a memorandum for record of my meeting with General Eisenhower at Walter Reed Hospital today. His principal comments are indicated in the opening paragraph, the fifth paragraph and the last paragraph.

He is receiving medical care for a prostatic condition which is causing discomfort and requires some medication, but is not regarded as serious at this time. He was in good spirits and seemed to be in good health.

1 Att
as


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12812
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 10, 1983.

BY ry ON 11-14-91

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

316

18 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 18 October 1967

I met with General Eisenhower for an hour at Walter Reed Hospital this morning. (Because of the fog, our planned meeting yesterday was cancelled.)

General Eisenhower began with the comment that many of the people who see him -- neither "Hawks" nor "doves" -- are talking in terms of discouragement about the course of the war in Vietnam. They say that nothing seems to be going well and that, perhaps, it would be better to get out of it than to continue. I said I had planned to cover the trend of the war with him and that it differs considerably from their premise that nothing seems to be going well. I referred particularly to the overall trend of conflict in South Vietnam. Although some conflict continues in the main parts of the Second, Third and Fourth Corps (particularly in war zone areas) the populated rice-producing areas are becoming relatively secure, and the military action is moving back into the mountains and along the borders with Laos and Cambodia to a considerable degree. Also the most intensive fighting is in the northern part of the First Corps. This overall pattern is a good one, since it suggests that the main populated areas are becoming less involved in the combat of main units, and less subject to main force VC and NVA depredations. This trend is reinforced by the noticeable improvement in the last two and a half years in the percentage of SVN population under governmental control and in the rise in the numbers and percentage of adults registered and voting in the elections. I showed him a chart on this matter given me by Mr. Rostow. With regard to the second point, that of the discouragement of these people, this must therefore principally be a failure for the information to get across effectively.

General Eisenhower added that people have also commented to him that, as long as the Soviets and China can see this war waged with little cost to themselves and much to us, there seems little reason why they should want to see it end, since they think it is bad for us as

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLEA 77-148 #1

By cy/dd, NARA, Date 11-14-91

~~SECRET~~

a nation materially as well as psychologically, in addition to causing adverse world opinion. I confirmed that the Chinese have been adamant against an end to the war or a cease-fire on other than Communist terms. With regard to the USSR, although one can never be sure, they have given strong indication in many ways (including their discussions with the President, previously reported) that they would like to see an end to the war. I recalled that we are pressing them in various ways in this direction.

I next covered the matter of the effectiveness of the ARVN, utilizing General Westmoreland's comment on the Arnett story, together with a fact sheet furnished me by the Joint Staff. While some units are still poor -- generally because of poor leadership -- our military people are impressed by the average Vietnamese fighting man, and ARVN effectiveness is judged by MACV to have greatly increased in the past year. Their casualty figures, and the much higher casualty figures of the VC and NVA show that they are fighting hard. Morale is not impaired. Desertions are substantially down, and the High Command shows increased confidence deriving in part from their successful running of the country, and successful progress towards constitutional government.

I then covered the situation in the Con Thien area and reported the steps being taken by General Westmoreland to improve the situation there (two additional ARVN battalions, new Marine forces to relieve pressure in the rear and along lines of communication, shift of Army forces to the southern part of First Corps, additional U.S. artillery battalions, thinning out of forces in the forwardmost area, and concentrated priority air support in the DMZ area). General Eisenhower asked whether the North Vietnam forces were in the DMZ or north of it. I told him their units seemed to move through the DMZ every few months, conduct operations for awhile and then withdraw north. In addition, there are artillery and supplies both in the DMZ and north of it. He commented that if we are short of force in this important area we should be thinking about an additional corps for the area to move against the North Vietnamese and clean them out in a rapid operation. I told him that as of the moment, there was no further request from General Westmoreland for additional forces.

I next took up the progress of the air campaign against North Vietnam, drawing upon a copy of Mr. Rostow's memorandum of October 4th which he had furnished to me. I stressed two points -- that the VC/NVA are obviously limited, in terms of men and material,


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in how many battalion days of sustained combat they can mount per month in South Vietnam, and if they could provide more men and material they could intensify the combat; and second, that the unending stream of proposals and requests for stopping the bombing in the north is a strong indication that it is hurting them there. While the possibility exists that a cessation of bombing might be worked out if accompanied by a cessation of infiltration and artillery fire across the DMZ, a cessation of bombing by itself would give great advantage to the North Vietnamese, both in North Vietnam and in the military operations in South Vietnam.

I also took the opportunity to show General Eisenhower a map, and give him a rough outline, of the proposed "thin" ABM deployment for the United States.

As our meeting ended, General Eisenhower said that CBS has asked him to do a television hour explaining the war (giving a "rounded view of the war") and indicating what he thinks about the situation today. He would go back to such things as how our interests are involved, why the area should not be let go to the Communists, why we put in advisers, and increase them, why we introduced our combat forces, why we are bombing the north, etc. He said that, if he does this, he would want to keep the discussion quite factual using such statistics as how many murders and kidnappings the VC has perpetrated. He indicated that he would like me to provide him some factual material for this purpose, and I told him I would start getting it together. He said he was thinking of mid or late November as the time for such a talk.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Thursday - October 19, 1967 - 2:30 pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Program for the Diaz Ordaz Visit

We need your approval of the program for the Diaz Ordaz visit (Tab A). It has been carefully worked out with the Mexican Embassy and reflects the wishes of President Diaz Ordaz.

Your participation, and that of Mrs. Johnson is underscored in red on the program. I call to your attention three departures from the normal routine for state visits.

1. Following the arrival ceremony you and Mrs. Johnson would ride with the Diaz Ordazes to Blair House and be present while they are given the Key to the City. We thought this would be a nice gesture since there will be no parade.
2. At the end of President Diaz Ordaz's first working visit with you (Thursday, October 26, 5:50 p.m.), we plan a ten-minute ceremony in the Fish Room where Texas Tech will bestow honorary degrees on you and the Mexican President.
3. At the end of the second working visit (Friday, October 27, 5:30 p.m.) you and President Diaz Ordaz would stop by the Fish Room to witness the Rusk-Carrillo Flores signing of an Act approving a Boundary Commission minute which legally formalizes the transfer of Chamizal territory.

The Mexicans have told us they would like to release the Washington portion only of the program as soon as possible. If you approve, George Christian could do so tomorrow (October 20) at the morning briefing.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Program ____.

See me ____.

Approve release
at 11:00 a.m., October 20

See me ____

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NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PRESS

REVISION NO. 5
OCTOBER 18, 1967

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D. C.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL

TENTATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE STATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES OF HIS
EXCELLENCY GUSTAVO DIAZ ORDAZ, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES,
AND MRS. DIAZ ORDAZ

October 26-28, 1967

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26

<u>11:50 a.m.</u> EDT	His Excellency Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, President of the United Mexican States, and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and their party will arrive at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, aboard a Mexican aircraft.
12:00 Noon	Departure from Andrews Air Force Base by helicopter.
12:10 p.m.	Arrival at the President's Park (Ellipse). Transfer to limousine.
12:15 p.m.	His Excellency Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, President of the United Mexican States, and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and their party will arrive at the White House, where they will be greeted by the President of the United States and Mrs. Johnson, the Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Mrs. Greene, and other officials. Full military honors will be rendered.
12:45 p.m.	President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, accompanied by President and Mrs. Johnson, will depart from the White House.
12:50 p.m.	Arrival at Blair House. The Commissioner of the City of Washington, D.C., will present the Key to the City to President Diaz Ordaz. President and Mrs. Johnson will return to the White House.
1:30 p.m.	The Vice President of the United States and Mrs. Humphrey will give a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at

THURSDAY (Cont'd.)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26 (Continued)

- 3:05 p.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart Blair House and proceed to the Pan American Union.
- 3:10 p.m. . President Diaz Ordaz will address a Protocolary Meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States at the Pan American Union.
- ^{5:00}
~~5:50~~ p.m. President Diaz Ordaz will meet with President Johnson at the White House.
- ^{5:50}
6:00 p.m. Possible - Dr. Joseph M. Ray, President of Texas Technological University and ^{College} ~~Count C~~ ^{Governor}, Chairman of the Board of Trustees will confer honorary degrees upon President Diaz Ordaz and President Johnson.
- 8:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Johnson will give a State dinner in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at the White House.
- Dress; Black tie.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27

- 8:00 ~~Q~~ a.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will have breakfast with guests at the Embassy of Mexico, 2829 Sixteenth Street, Northwest.
- 10:30 a.m. President Diaz Ordaz will present a Mexican artifact to Officials of the Smithsonian Institution at the Embassy.
- a.m. President Diaz Ordaz will depart from the Embassy and return to Blair House.
- 10:00 a.m. Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from the Embassy and return to Blair House.
- 10:20 a.m. Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson will call on Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at Blair House.
- 10:30 a.m. Mrs. Johnson will take Mrs. Diaz Ordaz on a motor tour to observe playground equipment in Washington, D.C., which has been donated by the Mexican Government.
- 11:30 a.m. Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and Mrs. Johnson will return to Blair House. Mrs. Johnson will take her leave.

FRIDAY (Continued)

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27 (Continued)

11:30~~5~~ a.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from Blair House.

11:45 a.m. Arrival at the Lincoln Memorial where President Diaz Ordaz will place a wreath.

12:00 Noon Departure from the Lincoln Memorial.

12:10 p.m. Arrival at the Capitol. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will be escorted to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

12:30 p.m. President Diaz Ordaz will address a Joint Meeting of Congress in the House of Representatives.

1:30 p.m. The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk will give a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz in the Benjamin Franklin Room, Department of State.

3:30 p.m. President Diaz Ordaz will have a press conference at the Embassy of Mexico.

5:00 p.m. President Diaz Ordaz will meet with President Johnson at the White House. A joint communique will be issued.

5:30 p.m. Possible - Minister of Foreign Affairs Carrillo Flores and Secretary Rusk will sign an Act approving a minute of the International Boundary and Water Commission. (President Diaz Ordaz and President Johnson will witness)

7:00 p.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will receive Chiefs of Diplomatic Missions at Washington and their wives at the Embassy of Mexico, 2829 Sixteenth Street, Northwest.

7:30 p.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will give a reception in honor of President and Mrs. Johnson at the Embassy of Mexico.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28

8:25 a.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from Blair House and proceed to the South Lawn of the White House.

8:30 a.m. President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, accompanied by President and Mrs. Johnson will depart from the White House by helicopter.

8:40 a.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base.

8:45 a.m. EDT Departure from Andrews Air Force Base aboard the President's aircraft.
(Flying time: 4 hours)
(Time Change: 2 hours)
(Luncheon will be served aboard the aircraft.)

10:45 a.m. MDT Arrive El Paso International Airport.

Membership of Welcoming Committee.
(Will Governor join President in El Paso?)

11:00 a.m. MDT Depart Airport
Route Airport Highway to Expressway (I-10), turn North on Estrella; West on Montana; South on Mesa and West on Sixth or Paisano, South on El Paso to Santa Fe Bridge.
(5-1/2 Miles Highway - 3 - 4 Miles downtown).

11:35 a.m. MDT Santa Fe Bridge
Two Presidents^{cp} to West side of Bridge and view construction westward. Presidents greet Mexican Governors lined up across bridge on Mexican side.
Unveil boundary monument on east side of bridge.
Two Presidents view construction to east.

(Motorcade reformed to include local Mexican vehicles during ceremony).

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28 (Continued)

12:00 Noon	Two Presidents, First Ladies, two Foreign Ministers, enter cars, others go to buses. Motorcade departs Santa Fe Bridge. Motorcade goes South Avenida Juarez, East on 16th de Septiembre, North on Avenida de las Americas to the Mexican Chamizal Monument.
12:35 p.m.	Arrival at the south entrance of the Monument. Two Presidents, First Ladies and Foreign Ministers and their wives proceed to lounge inside Monument while other members of the official parties take their places in front of speakers' platform at lower level.
12:45 p.m.	Presidents and First Ladies go to speakers' platform to greet people. Foreign Ministers and wives follow. (Canopy over speakers' platform and guests seated on Monument.)
12:50 p.m.	National anthems.
12:53 p.m.	Mexican Foreign Minister introduces President Johnson.
12:55 p.m.	President Johnson speaks.
1:03 p.m.	Concludes speech.
1:05 p.m.	Mexican Foreign Minister introduces President Diaz Ordaz.
1:07 p.m.	President Diaz Ordaz speaks.
1:15 p.m.	Concludes speech. (Mexican Government informs us that Diaz Ordaz will speak approximately as long as President Johnson.)

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 28 (Continued)

- 1:17 p.m. Presidents descend from speakers' platform to sign Transfer Documents.
- (Desks for signing, pen set, etc. Pens to send later as souvenirs of occasion).
- 1:27 p.m. Presidents return to speakers' platform to wave goodbye. Together with their parties they return to their cars at the South entrance of the Monument.
- 1:35 p.m. Depart the south entrance and proceed to Cordova Island Bridge - Bridge of the Americas.
- 1:40 p.m. Presidents and First Ladies arrive at Bridge and walk to boundary line on the Bridge. First Ladies will dedicate Bridge by cutting ribbon. (American and Mexican Children will be assembled on bridge.)
- Presidents and First Ladies go to flagpole on Mexican side of Bridge and Mexican Flag is raised while bugler sounds "Call to the Color".
- Presidents and First Ladies go to flagpole on US side and US flag is raised while bugler sounds "To the Color".
- President and Mrs. Johnson proceed to US side of boundary monument and President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz go to Mexican side. Band plays national anthems (Mexican first).
- Presidents and First Ladies will bid each other goodbye at boundary monument.
- 2:00 p.m. President Diaz Ordaz and Party returns to Mexican side for return to Mexico City.
- 2:00 p.m. President Johnson and party proceeds to El Paso International Airport.
- 2:15 p.m. Depart El Paso, Texas.

Thursday, October 19, 1967, 2:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Hanoi Editorial Reaction to Rusk Press Conference

The wire services have picked up a Hanoi radio broadcast based on a comment printed by the North Vietnamese official communist newspaper Nhan Dan. The wire services state that North Vietnam rejected U.S. offers for peace talks and bombing pauses.

State Department experts think the wire services reports are much harder than the text of the newspaper comment which follows:

"Refuting the worn-out peace talks and the offer for a conditional bombing pause, repeated by Rusk at the news conference, Nhan Dan said:

'Dean Rusk wondered why these proposals had been rejected. The reason is simple: everyone has seen that these proposals are but sheer deception. Having realized that the root of the war in Vietnam is U.S. aggression, the world people, including the Americans, have urged that the root be pulled out, that the United States stop its aggression against Vietnam, cease definitively and unconditionally its bombing of North Vietnam, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, withdraw U.S. troops from South Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

It is clear that the newspaper text does not refer to the North Vietnamese Government but to "world people."

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ. 94-452
By ing, NARA, Date 7-17-95

War 34

Pres file

*10/19/67-2:45pm
President will
not be able
to see
Subramaniam*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967 -- 1:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with C. Subramaniam, former Indian Minister of Agriculture -- 5:30 PM today

Subramaniam was far and away the best Agriculture Minister in Indian history. He resigned his Ministry in protest against the Government position on a bitter domestic issue and then lost his seat in the February elections. He is now a private citizen waiting for a new opportunity to run for Parliament. He remains very interested in food and population problems.

Subramaniam needs no conversion to our view that the critical job associated with the bumper harvest is to make sure India uses it as an opportunity to move forward, not to fall back exhausted. In his meetings here, he has been spontaneously spreading the same self-help line recommended to you in the Freeman/Gaud/Schultze food aid proposal you received yesterday. The principal points are:

- keep producer prices high enough to keep farmers investing in fertilizer and new seeds so that harvests will continue to grow;
- accumulate substantial government-owned buffer stocks to run this price support operation;
- remove the barriers which now seal off each state as a separate, uneconomic food zone.

Subramaniam knows that we also feel these are the things that India most needs in the year ahead, but he does not know that we are thinking about a large food aid package to help them along. Even if you have decided that we will go ahead with the proposal now before you, it is probably not a good idea to spring it on Subramaniam who is not an official representative of Mrs. Gandhi.

You may wish to open by grilling him a bit on the harvest prospects (he is very bullish) and on preparedness of the GOI to take advantage of the life a good harvest will provide (he is hopeful, but worried). You may then want to make some of the following points:

- It's a tough season on the Hill for any kind of social program -- foreign or domestic.
- Our ability to get the Congress to go along with further aid to India will be a direct result of the kind of verbal ammunition we get from Indian performance. A big harvest will help. The economic recovery which should go with

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

it will help even more. It is critical to both of us that India squeeze every drop of economic momentum out of the bumper crop.

- But this is more than an economic problem. We must also accept the reality that we live in a world where political events affect our ability to do economic good. Everything India does which diverts from her main job of building her economy -- everything which can be presented as a foreign policy adventure -- makes it that much harder to sell the proposition that we should continue to provide her with nearly \$1 billion a year.
- The most important political necessity is some progress toward learning to live together with Pakistan. We know the bitter history of this dispute, but we fervently hope that these two great nations will gradually work out a formula for lasting peace and eventual cooperation.
- Even if all goes well in India, we may not be able to persuade the Congress to do what we like to do. But we will make a strong try. All we ask is India's help.

W. W. Rostow

Hamilton vmr

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, Oct. 19, 1967
11:50 a.m.

35

MR. PRESIDENT:

The first four pages of this show one major reason Hanoi is holding out.

Pres. file

W. W. R.

Attachment (10/18/67 Worldwide treatment of current issues")

- ... PROTESTS AGAINST VIET-NAM WAR
- ... MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SOUGHT
- ... NATO ENTERS A NEW ERA
- ... DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA - II

ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD

Media in various countries of Western Europe, South Asia, and Latin America reported planned local demonstrations sponsored by "peace" groups in conjunction with the "Viet-Nam week" in the U.S. Very little editorial comment has yet appeared in non-Communist newspapers.

The demonstration staged in Oakland made headlines in today's British press. A London editorial said the current anti-war demonstrations in this country would "harden" Hanoi's refusal to negotiate, but "fortunately ... would not divert President Johnson from his course."

Moscow reported the Oakland and New York manifestations and alleged that similar demonstrations were being held "all over the world." Hanoi gave heavy play to the "week of protest." It announced the formation of liberation front and North Vietnamese moral-support groups which, it said, have issued new anti-war appeals to the people of the U.S. and the world.

Headlines in Britain

Today's British press headlined the Oakland anti-war demonstration:

"U.S. POLICE CLUB DRAFT DEMONSTRATORS"

(Liberal Manchester Guardian)

"TEAR GAS HALTS U.S. ANTI-WAR PROTEST"

(Conservative Daily Telegraph)

The Times of London reported that "squads of police today broke up an anti-Viet-Nam demonstration... in Oakland, California. Dozens of demonstrators were felled by truncheons and more were incapacitated by tear gas."

"Will Harden Hanoi's Position"

The Daily Telegraph's editorial said the anti-war demonstrations would "harden" Hanoi's intransigence.

"Fortunately there is reason to believe that increasing criticism and organized protests in America against the Viet-Nam war, although they increase the strain in the White House and in the field, will not divert President Johnson from his course or seriously affect the war effort. Unfortunately, what they are doing is to harden the North Vietnamese government in its refusal to negotiate....

"Hanoi's latest hope is that civilian morale in America will crack under a small dent in affluent living and the irksome realities of responsibility, before the morale of the hunted, starving, outnumbered, battered and decimated Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.... The critics of President Johnson would sweep the country if they could suggest a convincing alternative policy....

"The sooner Ho realizes that he cannot win on American campuses and boulevards the war he is losing in Viet-Nam, the sooner will he come to the conference table."

A Times editorial concentrated on Congressional criticism. It said the decision of Australia and New Zealand to increase their Viet-Nam forces "will provide President Johnson with ammunition when dealing with Congressional criticism that the allies are letting America fight the war alone."

West Europe's Communist Press Support

In France, Communist Humanite advertised demonstrations to take place October 19 - 22 in Paris and in 20 departments of France. It said "hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen will consider it an honor to participate in the Saturday marches. Under our coordinated blows, the aggression will finally be extinguished and freedom will flourish in the land of Viet-Nam."

In Italy, Communist papers today 1) reported that "thousands" tried to reach the U.S. Embassy in Rome in order to demonstrate, 2) announced

that anti-U.S. demonstrations would be held October 20 - 22 in 12 areas, and 3) played up U.S. anti-war activities.

In Finland, Communist Kansan Uutiset reported that 21 organizations would be represented at a demonstration on October 21 in support of demonstrators in the U.S.

Non-Communist Treatment

Christian Democratic-left Giorno of Milan yesterday carried an account of the demonstration held Monday in London by American students and British anti-war marchers.

West Berlin's independent Morgenpost yesterday discussed U.S. public dissent in general terms. It called the U.S. "a nation split over the war in Viet-Nam, with criticism being backed by the public as never before. ... U.S. politicians who opposed the engagement in Viet-Nam are being carried away by the wave of war weariness."

In Belgium, "sympathy" demonstrations have been announced in five cities for the period October 20 - 25. In Brussels, a rally to be held by the newly-formed "Viet-Nam Coordinating Committee" on October 21 was to include a "debate" on the war.

Asian, Latin American Reports

South Korean papers today ran wire service accounts of anti-war demonstrations "sweeping the U.S."

Radio Pakistan reported demonstrations "throughout" the U.S. Jang of Karachi front-paged the death by immolation of a Los Angeles woman.

In India, Bombay papers first reported that a march on the American Consulate-General would be held October 21 to coincide with the Washington march, and then carried a new date of October 19.

In Brazil, nationalistic Correio da Manha of Rio reported that the National Student Union was coordinating a nation-wide Viet-Nam week October 16 - 21, and that students at Belo Horizonte would conduct a mock trial of President Johnson on October 19. The story made no mention of U.S. demonstrations in the same period.

In Chile, Communist Siglo announced that Uruguayan, Colombian, and Panamanian delegations would take part in a "continental youth solidarity meeting on Viet-Nam" in Santiago October 26 - 29.

Moscow, Hanoi Media

Moscow radio beamed a commentary to this country on the Oakland and New York demonstrations. It said "hundreds" of young Americans in the U.S. were throwing their draft cards away, that "hundreds of thousands of men and women of America" would "march against the Pentagon next Saturday," and that "all over the world, meetings and demonstrations are being held and protest petitions are being presented against the war."

Hanoi said newly-formed Vietnamese moral-support groups had issued anti-war appeals to the people of the U.S. and the world. Its wire service yesterday distributed three versions of a message addressed to U.S. protest groups from "the South Vietnamese People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People" which had just been formed.

Protest Movement "Highly Valued"

The message hailed "the National Mobilization Committee -- NMC -- and the Students' Mobilization Committee -- SMC" for their "drive from 16 to 21 October aimed at strongly manifesting your determination to demand that the U.S. Government put an end to its war in Viet-Nam. We highly value the American people's movement." It said the "solidarity" group would establish relations with interested South Vietnamese and with U.S. military personnel "who wish to return to their country or go to another place."

Other Hanoi messages were from the "Viet-Nam Peace Committee" to U.S. protest groups and "the Viet-Nam Women's Union" to American women who "have staged meetings and demonstrations before the White House and right into the Pentagon."

Hanoi said seven Americans had immolated themselves to protest the "dirty war."

Thursday, Oct. 19, 1967
11:45 a. m.

34

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a bright innovation at State which
will interest you.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Attachment

36a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

October 17, 1967

Walt -

You might be interested in a project known as the Open Forum Panel which S/P has set up, at the Secretary's request, to give middle and junior rank officers a chance to put forward fresh policy ideas, with some assurance that they may reach the Secretary. The enclosed announcement in the Newsletter and the Airgram to the field give the picture. The New York Times gave a full column to this innovation.

So far the Panel has received somewhat more than 100 ideas, of which it has passed on five to the Secretary, and rejected some 75. The balance are still being reviewed. Although nothing sensational has come out of it some of the ideas are of interest and the Secretary has personally taken considerable interest in the project. He met with the Open Forum Panel for 45 minutes last week.


Henry Owen

Enclosures:

1. Newsletter Announcement.
2. CA-2405, September 27, 1967.

AIRGRAM

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S/P-1-25		
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CA-2405

UNCLASSIFIED

121

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

FROM : Department of State

DATE:

SEP 27 1 31 PM '67

SUBJECT : Open Forum Panel - New Policy Ideas

REF :

1. Purpose: This Airgram describes the Open Forum Panel and requests addressee posts to ensure that all personnel are familiar with the program and are encouraged to submit new policy ideas directly to the Panel.

2. Background: Recently an Open Forum Panel was created within the Department to consider new policy ideas which might be submitted by individuals, including junior FSO's, throughout the Foreign Service and the Department. The Newsletter, of August 1967 (No. 76) carried the Secretary's special message on the subject.

The Panel is composed of ten officers who, working with the Policy Planning Council, consider the ideas submitted, screen them, and forward to the Secretary, via S/P, those which they consider worthy of his consideration. In each case the Panel suggests that the Secretary ask an appropriate action Bureau to study and make a recommendation on the proposal.

To date the Panel has received nearly one hundred ideas. The Panel has already acted on over fifty of them; five have gone to the Secretary.

S/P - F.Howe-25

3

FORM 4-62 DS-323

UNCLASSIFIED

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☐ In ☒ Out

Drafted by: CDave/FHowe:ws 9/20/67

Contents and Classification Approved by: S/P - Henry Owen

Clearances:

0 - Miss Byrne

SEP 27 PM 2 52

UNCLASSIFIED

2

Broad, "conceptual" suggestions are difficult to deal with and usually are not "new." Rather, what are helpful are suggestions for concrete and manageable courses of action.

3. Action: Principal officers are requested to circulate this airgram widely and take steps to encourage the sending of ideas.

Ideas are to be submitted directly to the Panel by the originating officer and, if desired, can be anonymous. They should comprise a direct proposal, followed by supporting discussion.

Ideas should be sent to:

Open Forum Panel
Room 7261
Department of State

KATZENBACH, ACTING

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27 SEP 77 PM 9

36c

WANTED: A Continuing Flow of New Ideas

TO THE OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT AND
FOREIGN SERVICE

The United States can play its proper role in world affairs only when our foreign policy meets new problems with new policies. Innovation and creativity should be encouraged at all levels of the State Department and the Foreign Service. We must be sure that new policy ideas are not put to one side because of their unorthodox nature, or because they are not considered immediately applicable. Discussion and analysis of such ideas, even if they prove unfeasible, can help to stimulate thinking and suggest alternative courses.

With this in mind, I asked the Policy Planning Council to seek out fresh ideas and thinking among officers, particularly those of middle and junior rank, who may have less easy access to senior policy-making officials. The response has been gratifying.

I hope that the flow will continue. To this end, an Open Forum Panel has been inaugurated, comprised of ten junior and middle rank officers, which will review all suggestions submitted and select those worthy of further consideration for transmittal to me via the Policy Planning Council.

I urge all of you at home and abroad who are concerned with the problems which we face over the next decade to avail yourselves of the Open Forum Panel.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

EDITOR'S NOTE: Ten officers have been selected to serve on the first Open Forum Panel. These Panel members, under the chairmanship of Fisher Howe, a member of the Policy Planning Council, will serve for six months:

William A. Bell, Jr. (INR/REU), Evan R. Berlack (L/EUR), Richard A. Dwyer (EUR/

SCAN), William E. Landfair (EUR/GER), Samuel W. Lewis (LA/BR), William Luers (INR/RSB), William H. Marsh (EA/VN), James R. Newcomer (O/FAPS), Francis J. Seidner (IO), and Larry Williamson (S/C).

Policy ideas and suggestions should be sent to the Panel at Room 7261, State Department.

Thursday, Oct. 19, 1967
11:45 a. m.

37

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the JCS takes a dim view of Senator
Symington's proposal.

W. W. R.

Pres. file

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (CM-27x 2697-67 19 Oct 67 - mem to Pres
"Implications of Proposal for Cessation of Hostilities")



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

37a

CM-2697-67
19 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Implications of Proposal for Cessation of Hostilities

1. Senator Symington's proposal would result in relinquishing our present clear-cut military advantages, provide the enemy an uninterrupted opportunity to reconstitute his support base and combat forces and halt current progress toward US objectives.

2. In North Vietnam, the importation and distribution system would be rehabilitated; men and essential war materials could move at will into and within North Vietnam, and into Laos and South Vietnam; port congestion would be relieved; key rail lines and highways would be returned to full capacity; transshipment facilities would be repaired, further dispersed and hidden; air defense units and heavy artillery could be moved south without interference; and units along the DMZ would be brought to full combat status.

3. In South Vietnam, military pressure on VC/NVA units would be relieved; units would be reconstituted and redeployed; base areas would be rehabilitated; unit positions would be strengthened and consolidated; supplies would be replenished; VC terrorism, psychological warfare, taxation and road interdiction would continue; revolutionary development progress would be limited to areas currently held; morale of South Vietnamese forces would suffer and desertion would probably increase.

4. If hostilities were resumed, Free World casualties would be higher and chances of a VC/NVA "spectacular" would be greater. In fact, it is improbable that any feasible post-pause increase in the scope and intensity of our combat operations could offset rapidly the advantages which the enemy would acquire during the proposed cessation of hostilities.

5. In summary, the enemy would receive a military and psychological reprieve and an uninterrupted opportunity to prepare himself for further pursuit of his objectives at a time and place of his choosing.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 85-58

By reg/isp, NARA, Date 11-14-91

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 113

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1967

No. 157

Senate

(Legislative day of Monday, October 2, 1967)

The Senate met at 10 a.m., on the expiration of the recess and was called to order by the President pro tempore.

Dr. Ralph John, president, Simpson College, Indianola, Iowa, offered the following prayer:

Eternal God, Thou in whose providence we find the time and substance of life, and before whom the nations rise and fall: Prompted by those who have gone before, and compelled by our own needs, we look to Thee for wisdom and strength sufficient for the demands of this place and age.

Frequently frustrated by the complexities of a world which recurrently defies simplification, and with hearts burdened by the errant impulses of a humanity which has not caught the vision of its common ground in Thy love, we ask Thy guidance for the living of these days. Make us perceptive in appraisal, courageous in advocacy, and above all, committed to Thy will and way. So may we claim our destiny as a nation, and Thy Kingdom, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, October 2, 1967, be approved.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair lays before the Senate the unfinished business, which will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2388) to provide and improve the Economic

Opportunity Act, to authorize funds for the continued operation of economic opportunity programs, to authorize an Emergency Employment Act, and for other purposes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, how does the time stand?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time is divided between the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. CURTIS] and the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK].

Mr. DIRKSEN. And how much time remains?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. An hour on each side.

The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Missouri on a nongermane subject.

A PROPOSAL LOOKING TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, yesterday, for some hours, there was discussion on the Senate floor about the war in Vietnam, with many Senators on both sides of the aisle recommending that the United States cease the part of the war in which this country has definite superiority; but no recommendations with respect to that part in which our superiority is clearly more in question.

In the Washington Post this morning, an editorial entitled "The Lesson of Con Thien" is especially interesting to me because I was in the Con Thien area a few days ago.

The editorial illustrates only too well "the perils and pitfalls and hard disciplines of limited war," now limited to the point where the already heavy casualties to U.S. forces are increasing; limited to the point where the prestige of this country is being affected, all over the world.

Nevertheless, as evidenced yesterday, some are now demanding that the war be still more limited.

I ask unanimous consent that this editorial be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. SYMINGTON. I have just returned from a trip to the Far East, Middle East, and Europe, having visited Japan, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Israel, Greece, Italy, and Great Britain.

A report of findings and conclusions will be made shortly to the chairmen of the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. In the meantime, however, one can only view with increased apprehension both the nature and the extent of the current worldwide commitments of the United States.

In Vietnam the pot has boiled over. In other countries where we have binding commitments, however, the water also is becoming very warm indeed.

In this connection, one notes the strange paradox of the brilliant military victory recently achieved by Israel against sophisticated Soviet weaponry nevertheless resulting in a much improved Soviet position in the Middle East; because both the United Arab Republic and Syria were left so weak militarily they can only hope to be rearmed by the Soviet on the latter's terms—said rearmament is proceeding rapidly, to the point where 70 percent of their air equipment losses have now been replaced.

The Soviet position is also improving steadily in the western Mediterranean. Today Algeria is probably the strongest Arab country in their orbit; and if there is any truth in the rumor that General de Gaulle plans to turn over to Algeria the great naval base of Mers el Kebir, the Soviets will obtain further significant leverage in that part of the Mediterranean.

Such a development would, in effect, turn the southern flank of SHAPE; and the original concept of NATO, already heavily damaged in the center by the withdrawal of France, would be weakened still further.

The resources of any country, even those of the United States, are not inexhaustible; and therefore these developments in the Middle East and Europe should also be considered as we in turn

consider future policies incident to Vietnam.

I have presented for many months my conviction that the United States is over-committed and overextended on a unilateral basis. We need a great deal of money to handle all these foreign commitments along with our growing problems at home, and we do not want to jeopardize the integrity of the dollar.

In addition, and most important, is the matter of American lives. In this latter connection, the campaign here to cease air attacks against North Vietnam is receiving full attention in the other countries. But all civilian and military people abroad confirm the sworn testimony before the Committee on Armed Services. All those with whom I discussed this matter warn that another cessation of the raids against North Vietnam would guarantee additional casualties in South Vietnam—13,500 Americans have already been killed, 85,000 wounded.

Instead of only another cessation in the air attacks against North Vietnam, therefore, I propose that this Government announce, as of a certain date, the cessation of all military action in South Vietnam as well as over North Vietnam; and also announce that there will be no reinforcements into the theater.

The Government would announce that these policies were being undertaken in earnest hope that their adoption would result in prompt and meaningful negotiations in the interest of a just peace.

At the same time, the United States should also announce that, if after this cessation of all military action in South Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam, the North Vietnamese, and Vietcong nevertheless continued hostilities, then the United States would feel free to pursue this war in any manner of its own choosing.

It would appear that the political objectives of the United States have now been achieved through the creation, by means of free elections, of the present Saigon Government; and the military objectives of this Government have never included the invasion of North Vietnam, the occupation of Hanoi, or the taking over of the Government of North Vietnam.

Concurrently with the above proposed announcement of U.S. policy, the Government of South Vietnam should announce its willingness to negotiate with anybody, and offer amnesty to members of the Vietcong.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the Washington (D.C.), Post, Oct. 3, 1967]

THE LESSON OF CONTHIEN

The story of Conthien is the story of the Vietnam War. There is the same sense of stalemate and seemingly senseless bloodshed, the grinding attrition to no apparent or decisive purpose, the cruel inhibitions on our fighting men. And there are the same, perfectly normal, strictly conventional military reflexes at work—reflexes which have confounded so much of the conduct of this essentially abnormal and unconventional conflict. Indeed, the story of Conthien is not just in the spectacle of brave men dug in under a heavy handicap. It is in the spectacle of a limited war threatening to become a wider war because of a temptation to forget that our war purposes are limited.

This is the lesson of Conthien. It is not Dien Bien Phu, or the Chosin Reservoir, or Verdun. Like almost everything else about Vietnam, it is without precise precedent. We can abandon it (which the French could not at Dien Bien Phu). It is not, by most estimates, of critical military significance. If it is rapidly acquiring political and psychological significance, that is in large part because we ourselves are making it a symbol of something—our resolve, our military prowess, our courage—which it need not be. All these have been amply attested to in Vietnam, and will be soon enough again. Nor does the honor of the United States Marines need vindication at Conthien. In a war of attrition, to use General Westmoreland's phrase, Conthien has played its part, for the Marines have taken the enemy's worst and returned it manifold.

Can it be that the sticking-point is mere territory? To accept this is to renounce a large part of what we have learned in the hardest kind of way in Vietnam about the conduct of "counter-insurgency" war. We are fighting to destroy enemy main forces, to help clear areas of guerrilla units, to expand security in populated areas—in short, to prevent the freedom of choice of the South Vietnamese from being foreclosed by force. None of this obliges us to conquer and hold a particular desolated strip of unpopulated territory.

A very good military case can be made, in fact, for the Marines pulling their base camps and prepared positions back out of range of heavy Communist artillery all across the DMZ. If the North Vietnamese bring their guns and rockets down into South Vietnamese territory, they can be dealt with on the ground without adding the new dimension to the war of a ground invasion of North Vietnam.

There is another compelling argument for doing so. Where the United States troops, and those of South Vietnam, take their stand in the northern slice of South Vietnam will very much determine where the so-called "barrier" against infiltration will be built. There is some military logic in having this defensive position also out of the range of Communist artillery over the border in North Vietnam.

Psychologically, this would seem to surrender a slim strip of South Vietnamese real estate to the North. In effect, however, we have been surrendering large chunks of the highlands and the War Zones to the enemy at one time or another all along. Search and destroy operations against mass concentrations of enemy troops and small patrols would still continue north of whatever positions the Marines might pull back to.

To state the case for pulling back is not to say flatly that this must be done. It may be that the Marines can hold out indefinitely and reduce their casualties by more effective counter-battery fire or deeper entrenchments. What would be indefensible, however, would be a prolonged defense of Conthien at the cost of heavy losses out of misplaced pride. Worse would be a stubborn defense finally impelling a ground attack over the border that would remove one more inhibition against a wider war.

If Conthien is to be a test of anything beyond the gallantry of our fighting men, it should be a test, not of our resolve, which does not need such testing but of our restraint. The lesson of Conthien lies in what it tells us of the perils and pitfalls and hard disciplines of limited war.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to come out of neither side.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AMENDMENTS OF 1967

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2388) to provide an improved Economic Opportunity Act, to authorize funds for the continued operation of economic opportunity programs, to authorize an Emergency Employment Act, and for other purposes.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, rather fortunately this amendment has been pending for some time and my basic statement has been available to Senators in their offices and on their desks. I realize that at this unusual hour, with committee meetings and other responsibilities of Senators, what I am saying here is largely for the Record.

I have offered this amendment because I am interested in the untrained having an opportunity for training and becoming productive members of our society. I believe that what I have proposed will do a far better job than the Job Corps.

My amendment is easily understood. It would repeal the Job Corps. In lieu thereof, we add \$195 million to the authorization for vocational and technical training under the 1963 act. This would double the amount of money going to each State for this purpose, if the amount provided in my amendment is authorized and appropriated.

Now, it stands out clearly and without dispute that this proposal would save \$100 million annually. In addition, the cost of operating the Job Corps is excessive. I think it is not subject to dispute that training in a vocational and technical school which is run by a State can be given at far less cost. I have estimated that it costs 2½ times as much to keep an enrollee in the Job Corps as it costs to keep a young man or young woman in a vocational or technical school that is a part of the State educational system.

When the Federal Government spends money for vocational education under the 1963 act, the States and localities have to match it; so for every sum of money spent increasing vocational and technical training by the Federal Government, as compared with the same amount of money given to the Job Corps, this expenditure would reach five times as many people.

Mr. President, here is a chance for the Senate to get rid of one bureau, reach five times as many people with better training, and save \$100 million annually.

One argument that pops up is: The very, very unfortunate people who are recruited for the Job Corps will not be reached by the State vocational and technical training courses. I say that argument is without foundation. I say they are not being reached by the Job Corps. The Job Corps is picking up a few

Thursday, Oct. 19, 1967

10:45 am

38

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Prime Minister Lee's view of a short
stop by the Vice President in Singapore.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, October 19, 1967
10:30 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

At Mr. William Bundy's suggestion, I raised with Prime Minister Lee this morning at breakfast the question of the Vice President's forthcoming trip to Asia. I began by informing him that the present plan was for visits only to Saigon, Kuala Lumpur, and Djakarta. I said we assumed that, with this visit here and the fact that he would have just returned to Singapore, he would prefer that the Vice President not come calling at that time.

He was first under the impression that he would not return until after the Vice President had passed through; and he suggested that perhaps the Vice President would like to drop in and meet the members of his Cabinet. When it was ascertained that he would be arriving home on November 2 and therefore would be in Singapore, he paused, considered the matter carefully, and said this: "If the Vice President overflowed Singapore from Kuala Lumpur to Djakarta, they would say that I could not wear this American tie at home. Therefore, if the Vice President would like to stop, I would be glad to receive him."

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-452
By rip, NARA, Date 7-17-95

39

Thursday, October 19, 1967
8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

I think Ernie Goldstein's
supplementary comment is well
taken.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1967
3:05 p.m.

CC: MLW

39a

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Marshall Wright's October 17 Romney Memorandum

I don't think that Marshall goes far enough in his analysis of the July 28, 1965 press conference.

It seems to me that the question and answer have to be taken within the context of what the President said earlier in the press conference. The operative word in both the question and answer is the word, "policy".

The President said at the outset of his conference the following:

"These steps, like our actions in the past, are carefully measured to do what must be done to bring an end to aggression and a peaceful settlement.

We do not want an expanding struggle with consequences that no one can perceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt our power, but we will not surrender and we will not retreat.

For behind our American pledge lies the determination and resources, I believe, of all of the American Nation."

The above quotation is a statement of policy and is perfectly consistent with our actions after the press conference.

I would agree with Marshall that this may not be the time nor the place to dignify Romney by dealing with the accusation. However, I do believe that we can rebut the Romney position by insisting that the question and answer be read in light of the President's earlier remarks.



E. Ernest Goldstein

40

Thursday, October 19, 1967
8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the compilation of
Vietnamese statements of potential
Republican candidates, you requested.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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40a

Following are some fairly recent and significant statements on Viet-Nam:

"I am confident you feel--as I feel--that Pres. Johnson merits the support of free men everywhere for his strong stand in Vietnam and for his manifest determination to defend and save human freedom from Communist aggression and so ultimately to win a more certain peace" (Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, Watertown, N.Y. on Aug. 22, 1965, as quoted by Richard Witkin in N.Y. Times of Oct. 4, 1967).

"I think the President is 100% right" (Gov. Rockefeller in Atlanta, Oct. 1, 1965, as quoted by Witkin, in N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1967).

Gov. Rockefeller on March 12, 1966 seconded the resolution of support for Pres. Johnson's policies on Vietnam when 38 Governors met at the White House.

"I have supported the President because he is our President and supported him as our leader in an action where American boys are giving their lives. I do not have the intelligence data or secret information to form the basis for making recommendations.... I don't think I have the right to use my public office to give opinions about which I am not informed" (Rockefeller in New York City, quoted by Richard Witkin in N.Y. Times of June 9, 1967).

Mr. Witkin reported (N.Y. Times, Oct. 4): "Gov. Rockefeller has been quietly letting it be known that he no longer wholeheartedly supports Pres. Johnson's policy in Vietnam Reliable sources said yesterday that the Governor was shifting toward a more moderate position Last Sunday Gen. Gavin, a strong advocate of a halt in bombing, named Rockefeller, as well as Sen. Hatfield, as the type of Republican he hoped to support next year It is known that Gen. Gavin...had a long meeting with Rockefeller here (N.Y. City) about two months ago."

"I think you win as swiftly as possible, that attrition over the long period of time will cost more in lives than a sudden strike for victory. Evidently we are not hurting them. I don't think anyone would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons. But the last person in the world that should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might If we ask American boys to fight and die for their country then we should do all in our power to aid them to win a victory as soon as possible. I'd like to see the end in 24 hours if it could be done" Gov. Ronald Reagan, as quoted in Newsweek for July 10, 1967).

"I do not believe the Government of the U.S. has been keeping the people informed to the extent as is the people's right" (Gov. Reagan quoted from Sacramento in N.Y. Times of Sept. 13, 1967).

Asked if he favored further stepping up of the conflict, Gov. Reagan replied: "Yes--to win the war as quickly as possible. There are still a list of targets that are not open to bombing by our forces, and I don't think that the full technological power of the U.S. is being used We are attempting to fight the enemy more on his own terms, the foot soldier with the hand gun and the rifle in his hand, and I don't think this is a war, or type of war, that the U.S. should engage in when there are forces like Russia and China, Asia generally, that can outman us" (further quotation from Sacramento story in N.Y. Times of Sept. 13).

Gov. Reagan favored leaving to the military what form further escalation of the war should take, saying: "I think the military men--that is what they are trained for, to tell you what the best methods of attack, what are the vulnerable targets, what is the vulnerability of the enemy, and that there have been indications that the military does not believe we have attacked the enemy properly, at its most vulnerable points" (further quotation from Sacramento story of Sept. 13).

Asked whether he would favor an invasion of North Viet-Nam, Reagan said the decision to invade should be left to the military and added: "If this would bring the war to a quicker end, then yes'." (William Chapman from Columbia, S.C. in Wash. Post of Sept. 30, 1967).

"You end the war by making it so uncomfortable for the enemy not to come to the conference table that he can't wait to get there" (same Chapman story in Wash. Post of Sept. 30).

A Charles Percy policy statement of July 2, 1966 urged an all-Asian conference to take first steps toward achieving an end to hostilities in Southeast Asia (referred to in Washington story in Chicago Daily News, August 13, 1966).

Sen. Charles Percy saw the Tet truce as offering "an urgent opportunity" to start negotiations for peace. He told the Chicago chapter of Sigma Delta Chi the U.S. should announce it will halt all bombing of North Vietnam the moment peace talks start and that it will continue to observe this bombing pause as long as the Communists bargain in good faith (Chicago story by D.J.R. Bruckner of Los Angeles Times in Wash. Post of Feb. 9, 1967).

Percy said the U.S. should put off resumption of hostilities indefinitely after the end of the Tet truce "so long as the other side does not start it up again. Let us wait and see what happens. If they show any signs, at the end of the truce period, of de-escalating the war, let us simply start a mutual de-escalation along with them" (same Bruckner story in Wash. Post of Feb. 9).

Percy accused the Administration of being "far too vague" in its previous offers to negotiate, failing to set a specific time or make a specific offer (same Feb. 9 story).

"I would really like to see the bombing limited more than it is right now, concentrated heavily on the infiltration routes, cutting off as completely as we can the feeding in of supplies to South Vietnam...but not worry as much about trying to take out a power station here, crippling the economy some place else If we bomb all over North Vietnam, we have constantly run the risk of involving innocent people, innocent civilians who have not been forewarned that there will be bombing in those areas" (Washington story by William Chapman in Wash. Post of April 24, 1967).

Asked what the U.S. can do when Asian countries decline to increase their troop commitments, Percy said: "We don't accept no for an answer on everything that happens in this country. The Administration has found itself adept through the years at arm-twisting. I can't conceive that when the stakes are as high as they are for our Asian nations that are surrounding this area out there that they can't put out a greater effort" (same Chapman story in April 24 Wash. Post).

"I have long felt it has been unrealistic for Saigon--and therefore ourselves--to propose negotiations with Hanoi without inviting the Vietcong to fully participate if we truly hope to see negotiations come about in the foreseeable future." Percy favored full participation of the Vietcong so that they might become "a legal political party competing peacefully at the polls and shunning violence" (Washington story by Warren Weaver in N.Y. Times of April 23, 1967).

"To ask Hanoi to end the re-supply and reinforcement of its forces in the South" (referring to President's recent peace proposal) "was unrealistic. An affirmative response was absolutely impossible under the existing circumstances." Percy was equally critical of politicians who call for "total victory" in Vietnam, describing this as a "simplistic attitude" (same Weaver story in Times of Apr. 23).

On the occasion of a Republican "staff report" on Viet-Nam, Percy joined with Sens. Javits and Scott in issuing a statement, "saying they supported the commitment to preserve the independence of South Vietnam but wanted to avoid a widening of the war that could lead to Communist Chinese intervention" (Washington story by E.W. Kenworthy in N.Y. Times of May 3, 1967).

"Each American escalation has been matched by the other side, has hardened the enemy's resolve, and has increased casualties among combatants and civilians alike. It is clear that neither Hanoi nor the Viet Cong will surrender unconditionally Therefore, it is incumbent on the U.S. to accelerate its diplomatic initiatives to bring the war to the conference table at the earliest possible date. ...One can assume they (Hanoi and Vietcong) would be willing

to talk if the U.S. proposes conditions allowing them to negotiate without great loss of face--something the Administration has not yet done. Meanwhile we should seek greater assistance from our Asian allies; we should avoid provoking the intervention of Red China" (statement prepared by Percy for Newsweek of July 10, 1967).

Percy Calls On U.S. To Restudy Bombing Near China Border. "I fear the Administration has embarked on a course which could greatly expand the war The American people do not want such a war and they do not want to take the risks of such a war" (from a Chicago address to broadcasters reported in N.Y. Times of Sept. 22, 1967).

Sen. Percy said Johnson had "failed to pursue every possibility for negotiations leading to a settlement of the war," criticizing Pres. Johnson's Sept. 29 speech (Washington story by John Finney in N.Y. Times of Oct. 3, 1967).

"The President's problem is with the vast majority who are dissatisfied with his performance in Vietnam, not with the 10 per cent who urge withdrawal (Johnson) fails to understand that widespread dissent indicates that something may be wrong with his policy, rather than with his critics" (same Finney story of Oct. 3).

Percy Leads 23 Senators In Asking Asian Help. The Illinois Senator said the time had come to emphasize to the free nations in Asia, including South Vietnam, that the American military commitment in Southeast Asia was "by no means open-ended" and that they must contribute greater economic and military aid to the effort. The resolution said "the armed forces of the U.S. should not continue to bear an ever-increasing proportion of the fighting in Vietnam" (Washington story by John Finney in N.Y. Times of October 6, 1967).

"There is ample reason to wonder if the people of South Vietnam still really want us" in their country. Without suggesting American withdrawal, he charged that the Administration's actions, including the recent oil storage dump

bombings, had increased the possibility of a major war with Communist China and the Soviet Union. (Gov. George Romney at Town Hall luncheon in Los Angeles preceding Governors Conference on July 5, 1966--Gladwin Hill in N.Y. Times of July 6).

"3. The failure to induce negotiations at this time should not result in massive military escalation. We should continue to seek meaningful negotiations. 4. We must learn from the lessons of this tragic war to avoid similar involvements in the future. 5. We must give our gallant fighting men our full support 6. We should help South Vietnam to get an effective program under way to help win the 'other war,' which because of its inherent nature is primarily their war. ... 8. If 'peace with amnesty' or some similar negotiated solution fails, we should continue to help the South Vietnamese win their 'other war' but keep from Americanizing it as we have done the military conflict" (Hartford speech, text from Wash. Post of April 8, 1967).

Gov. Romney Urges Saigon-NLF Talk. Romney said yesterday that he would "certainly favor" talks with the Vietcong if they would help split them from Communist North Vietnam. But he also noted that in the Hartford speech he had ruled out participation by the NLF in a coalition government in South Vietnam (Washington news story in Wash. Post of May 10, 1967).

"Bringing this tragic war to an honorable end requires the rejection of both unilateral withdrawal and massive military escalation. Nor can we substitute Americans in the pacification and nation-building job that the South Vietnamese themselves must do The same priority and intensity of effort must be given to the nonmilitary side of the Vietnam struggle as to the military The major challenge is to assure security plus real economic and social progress in the countryside through a successful pacification program. Only this can break up the guerrilla infra-structure in the South Here is the key to bringing the Communists to the negotiating table We need to get started with other nations on specific plans to provide for the enforcement of the provisions of a settlement and to guarantee the peace" (statement prepared by Romney for Newsweek of July 10, 1967).

"If continuance of our policy of escalation (of bombing) triggers a wider war, then the Administration must be held accountable The Administration has been guilty of 'over-reaction' in military terms with an accompanying and unfortunate growth of feeling among the American people that a purely military solution in Vietnam is possible The key to bringing the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese separately or jointly to the negotiating table depends on showing that the guerrilla infrastructure can and will be destroyed. It is time realistically to recognize that a solution of this conflict depends on the South Vietnamese doing their part of the job" (statement issued at Lansing on July 11, reported in N.Y. Times, July 12, 1967).

When Capitol Hill interns asked Romney, "Do you believe the Republican party can be the party of peace?" he replied: "There's no question in my mind the Republican party is going to pursue those programs that they believe will produce peace in Vietnam on a sound basis as soon as possible" (Washington story by Warren Weaver in N.Y. Times of August 17, 1967).

"To win on the basis of a limited military effort, we must pursue a course to get the South Vietnamese doing more than they are doing, to get them doing their part to win this struggle. The more we do, the less they do. It was a mistake to Americanize the military aspect of the conflict. It was a mistake to Americanize the total war" (same Weaver story of Aug. 17).

Romney refused to advocate a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, but said the bombing had "built up false expectations" and was based on "unsound thinking" that it could force the enemy to the bargaining table. "I don't think bombing is the answer, and I don't think he (Rep. Ford) thinks bombing is the answer, but if there's going to be bombing, we should bomb in a more effective way" (same Aug. 17 story).

Romney Says GOP President Would Be Better At Settling War. "I am convinced that new leadership could better succeed in finding new opportunities to settle the war... (With) a new Administration, there can be important differences in emphasis and approach and analysis" (Mackinac Island story by Warren Weaver in N.Y. Times of Aug. 21, 1967).

"In the public reaction toward Vietnam in the last couple of months there has been an increasing trend in the direction of the idea the war was a mistake and some way ought to be found to end it without focusing on military escalation" (same Aug. 21 story).

Romney Charges 'Brainwash' On War. "I just had the greatest brainwashing (in 1965) that anyone can get when you go over to Vietnam, not only by the generals, but also by the diplomatic corps over there, and they do a very thorough job" (in Detroit TV interview with Lou Gordon reported from Detroit in N.Y. Times of Sept. 5, 1967).

"I have changed my mind, in that particularly I no longer believe that it was necessary for us to get involved in South Vietnam to stop Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and to prevent Chinese Communist domination of Southeast Asia. I've indicated that I think it was tragic that we became involved in the conflict there, and if Eisenhower remained President I don't think we would have become involved in a land war in Southeast Asia" (same Sept. 5 story).

"We're there, we are involved, we have created the conflict that now exists between Communism and freedom there and this is the complexity and difficulty of the situation. And, furthermore, we have involved other nations in Southeast Asia" (same Sept. 5 story).

Romney Charges Public Is Misled. "If you want to get into a discussion of who's been brainwashing who, I suggest you take a look at what the Administration has been telling the American people. The information has not been adequate The people have been told repeatedly that with just one more step we would be able to handle the situation" and "that we would have the boys back home by the end of the year. That hasn't happened Since then we have Americanized the military effort. My fear is that we may Americanize the other war, too--the pacification effort." (Washington story by John Herbers in N.Y. Times of Sept. 7, 1967).

Romney Sees US Crisis Over Johnson's Credibility. Likening the Administration to "the little boy who cried wolf," Romney said it has "squandered its store of credibility. Its words are now suspect. It has crippled its own capacity to motivate people and to provide leadership"--citing domestic as well as foreign instances (AP story from Portland, Ore. in Wash. Post of Sept. 8, 1967).

Romney Renews Vietnam Charge. "The American people need a Government and a President we can believe (By brain-washing) I mean the same thing you (reporters) mean when you write about the credibility gap, snow jobs and manipulation of the news I believe that the full record clearly indicates that there has been a systematic continuation of inaccurate reports, predictions and withholding of information. This has kept the American people from knowing the facts about the Vietnam war and its full impact on our domestic and foreign affairs It's not easy to say this, but I believe the American people are as shocked as I am that we can no longer rely on the statements made by our government and our own leaders" (Washington story by Warren Weaver in N.Y. Times of Sept. 10, 1967).

Nixon Hits 'Appeasers' On Vietnam. Nixon called for an intensification of our military efforts--particularly air and sea action--"to shorten the war" and prevent the U.S. from becoming entangled in a drawn-out "Korea-type" engagement. The time has come for an economic blockade to cut off--through diplomatic means--the trade between North Vietnam and American allies. He opposed, however, bombing raids on "mass civilian" targets and thereby ruled out any indiscriminate attack on Hanoi (Washington story by Richard Harwood in Wash. Post of Feb. 11, 1966).

Nixon Advocates More GI's. "I am convinced that the war effort will be served by a substantial increase in the Americans available on the ground and by a substantial increase in the air capability if American casualties and casualties of the South Vietnamese and others engaged in this war are to be reduced Now that we have hit the oil supplies, we should not be inhibited by the fiction that targets in the Hanoi

area should not be hit," but he said American planes should avoid hitting dock areas because of the danger of hitting foreign shipping and thereby inviting other countries into the war. He said he was also opposed to a blockade of the port of Haiphong. There is, in Mr. Nixon's opinion, "no reasonable possibility of a negotiated settlement" (Saigon story in N.Y. Times of Aug. 8, 1966).

Nixon Joins Backers of Asian Peace Talks. "Geneva is a dead-end street. I think the Administration ought to get off that wicket. An Asian settlement rather than a Geneva settlement is the best way to end the war in Vietnam We would be well advised to welcome the initiative of free Asian countries without domination by the U.S." (Washington story by Joseph Loftus in N.Y. Times of Aug. 24, 1966).

Nixon Tells Legion of 'Five Offensives' To End Viet War. "This is the most unpopular war in American history But I say to you, defeating aggression in South Vietnam will have been America's finest hour The great problem in the world today" is ignorance as to what prompted the U.S. presence in the war. He blamed the Administration "and perhaps all of us, too," for failing to inform the world and the American public "why we are there."

Nixon called for: 1. economic moves against North Vietnam. "The least we ought to be able to do is convince our European allies to quit helping the enemy by trading with the enemy." He urged cutting off foreign aid funds for failure to comply with our request. 2. Military offensives using U.S. air power that would spare only the civilian targets in North Vietnam. "No military target should be off limits to the air power of America." 3. Diplomatic offensives using the offices of the emerging Free Asian conference nations to negotiate the end of the war. "We should withdraw the offer to go back to the Geneva Conferences." 4. Political offensives in South Vietnam aimed primarily at establishing long-range leadership capabilities among the rulers in Saigon. 5. "The last offensive is the need to unite the U.S." Unless the U.S. wins clear victory, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, Red China will emerge as the dominant power on the Pacific rim and "World War III will be inevitable," Nixon said. (Washington story by John Carmody in Wash. Post of Sept. 1, 1966).

"It is time now to take stock of what Manila accomplished. It is time to renew the debate on the Johnson Administration's policy in Vietnam (On mutual withdrawal, Manila) "states clearly that if North Vietnam withdraws its forces back across its border, and the violence thus subsides, we shall withdraw all American forces out of Vietnam, most of them 10,000 miles back to the U.S. The effect of this mutual withdrawal would be to leave the fate of South Vietnam to the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese Army..... We and our allies must amend the Manila Communique to spell out that any 'mutual withdrawal' is by no means limited to 'regular' North Vietnamese troops but also means the complete termination of logistical support for the Vietcong and pacification of Vietcong-occupied areas (Re Geneva) an unequivocal American statement should be issued declaring once and for all that the disastrous road to Geneva is permanently closed as a route for settlement of Asian problems. The statement should further (declare) that at any peace conference for settlement of Asian problems, the primary spokesmen for Asian interests will be Asian diplomats and the conference itself will be held under Asian skies Question: Will we, as the communique indicates, limit our military response to the fluctuating intensity of Communist aggression? Or, shall we move in the other direction, as Gen. Eisenhower recommends, and increase the intensity of our military effort to shorten the war and reduce American and allied casualties?

"The concessions for peace which Ambassador Goldberg has offered to diplomats at the UN General Assembly far exceed those which the President has relayed to the American people President Johnson has never given public backing to either direct negotiations with the Vietcong or the concept of a coalition government with the Communists. While President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have been telling the nation one thing about what is acceptable in the negotiations and after them, Ambassador Goldberg and the American delegation have been telling the diplomats at the UN quite another. The differences are not just in tone, but in substance.

"The Administration's current policy resigns America and the Free Asian nations to a war which could last five years and cost more casualties than Korea After the orderly tumult of an American election is over, it would be constructive for the President to call together leaders of both parties to pursue together the development of a clear

practical, bipartisan foreign policy that will end the war and provide the basis for a lasting peace" (text of Nixon's appraisal of Manila was published in the N.Y. Times of Nov. 4, 1966).

Richard M. Nixon, back from a month's tour of Asia, said yesterday he doubted that the U.S. bombing of MIG jet airfields in North Vietnam would increase the danger of Communist China's entering the war. "Red China does not dare have a confrontation with the U.S.," not because of lack of will but because of lack of military power, the former Vice President said

But he was critical of the Johnson Administration's actions to seek peace. "There have been so many offers of peace-feelers," he said, "that the enemy has the idea that by hanging on, their bargaining position will improve." Mr. Nixon urged the President to "make it clear what are the minimum conditions for peace and insist on them." He pleaded for Americans to unite behind the war effort. (Local item in N.Y. Times of April 25, 1967).

NOTE: Following the November 1966 election, Mr. Nixon for some months virtually refrained from issuing fresh statements on Viet-Nam policy. From his various overseas trips, the press for the most part gave only brief reports. The major discussion noted is Nixon's interview with Godfrey Sperling of the Christian Science Monitor, August 21, which is excerpted here:

"My difference with the administration is not that they have made a commitment there. We had to make one, to resist aggression in Vietnam and in the Pacific. If anything, the commitment should have been made earlier.

"I have consistently disagreed with the means toward the end of the administration's Vietnam policy. The President, by gradual escalation, has frittered away the advantage that massive pressure should have given us. Massive pressure is decisive only when used massively. When pressure is applied gradually, the enemy is able to sustain the pressure.

"The administration, in effect, has resigned America to a long war and a grinding war.

"I support the use of air and sea power--but not all of our power, I am opposed to the use of nuclear weapons. First, because they are not necessary. And, second, because it is not wise.

"I still don't believe the administration has responded in a way that meets the criticism of Gerry Ford. I talked to Gerry the other day, and he doesn't think so, either.

"What is needed is a strategic decision (to use massive power). And then we must carry it through.

"I see three great dangers in Vietnam.

"The first is that we pull out. This would be a disaster.

"The second is that through gradual escalation the administration's policy gets us into World War III. If in 1970 China achieves nuclear parity, plus a delivery capacity, then there is a real risk of World War III.

"Therefore we need a policy to shorten the war. It is time to fish or cut bait.

"We must have a policy of bringing the war to a conclusion before the time of ultimate danger is here--only two years from now. We need a policy which, both militarily and diplomatically, is directed toward this end." ...

Of the upcoming Vietnam elections, Mr. Nixon said:

"I'm getting a little tired of the breast-beating among some of the American politicians and pundits which, in effect, imposes on the people of South Vietnam a standard for their elections that very few countries would have achieved.

"Certainly the elections in Vietnam this year and in the foreseeable future are not going to be the same as those in the U.S. nor will they meet the standards in Britain.

"But when they talk of those in power acting to retain themselves in power, I suggest they look at de Gaulle in France, among others.

"Now when is some columnist or breast-beating purist going to make the solid point that the real choice in South Vietnam is between some election and no election at all?

"And that in North Vietnam there never has been and never will be an election of any kind.

"Therefore the South Vietnam election is a sign of some progress. At least, there is an election.

"It is high time," he emphasized, "that it be pointed out that we can't bring a country like Vietnam along 200 years in just two years' time. That is what we are trying to do."

He paused, then went on: "Now, having said this, I want to say that I deplore any election excesses. But I recognize that you can't change a people ... you can't indoctrinate a people ... overnight.

"Therefore for one to say that, if in Vietnam election standards don't meet our standards, we should get out, this, in effect, is saying that ... because their election is imperfect ... that we condemn them forever to the system which they have now elected to leave.

"Why doesn't someone speak up and point this out?"

SECRET

Pres file 41

Thursday, October 19, 1967 -- 7:55 am

Mr. President:

I believe these two intelligence reports of this morning give us as accurate a picture as we are likely to get of Hanoi's intentions if we stop bombing, and their basic view of the pressures that will force us to move their way.

W. W. Rostow

18 Oct 1967

18 October 1967

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WWRostow:rla

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : NLJ-019-024-2-1-5

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-024-2-1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

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PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-455

By C-7, NARA, Date 9-6-95

DIST 18 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

DOI

SUBJECT COMMENTS ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SITUATION

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ACQ

SOURCE

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1.

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WESTERN JOURNALISTS VISITING HANOI COULD SEE FOR THEMSELVES THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE ARE BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE A FEW INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE BECOMING WEARY OF THE WAR AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT END AT ALMOST ANY PRICE.

2.

NO NEGOTIATIONS WOULD

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(classification)

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TAKE PLACE AS LONG AS THE BOMBING CONTINUED. [REDACTED]

IT WILL BE

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NECESSARY TO DEFINE THE OBJECTIVES IN ADVANCE. THESE SHOULD BE THE RESTORATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM AS A WHOLE, AND THE DEPARTURE IN TOTO OF THE AMERICAN FORCES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. THEN ONLY WILL THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE BE FREE TO DECIDE ITS OWN FUTURE. NEVER WILL THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ACCEPT A DIVISION OF VIETNAM IN WHICH THE SOUTH WILL REMAIN UNDER THE "PROTECTION" OF THE AMERICANS. [REDACTED] HE REALIZED THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT YET PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUCH AN OUTCOME AND STILL HOPED FOR THE AGREEMENT OF HO CHI MINH TO A DIVISION OF VIETNAM WHICH WOULD ALLOW THEM TO MAINTAIN A FREE HAND IN THE SOUTH. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

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3. IN CONNECTION WITH VO NGUYEN GIAP'S ARTICLE, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS BENT ON

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(classification) (dissem controls)

CARRYING ON UNTIL FINAL VICTORY. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE NATURALLY NOT POWERFUL ENOUGH MILITARILY TO DRIVE THE AMERICANS OUT, BUT THAT AFTER A TIME..PERHAPS EVEN A LONG TIME, THE VIETNAMESE HOPE TO GAIN A POLITICAL VICTORY. [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

[REDACTED] HE BELIEVED IT IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THE MILITARY PROBLEM FROM THE POLITICAL ONE. IN ORDER TO HAVE A SATISFACTORY POLITICAL SOLUTION, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE VIETNAMESE TO HAVE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF MILITARY VICTORIES. THESE VICTORIES ARE ATTAINABLE IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG FORCES CONTINUED TO FRUSTRATE THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY, AS THEY HAVE BEEN DOING. IN THIS RESPECT, [REDACTED] DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN MILITARY LEADERS WILL RISK AN ASSAULT ON NORTH VIETNAM, EITHER FROM SOUTH VIETNAM OR FROM THE NORTH VIETNAM COAST. IF THEY DO INVADE NORTH VIETNAM THE AMERICAN FORCES WILL ENCOUNTER A GUERRILLA ACTION THAT WILL IMMOBILIZE AS MANY MEN IN THE NORTH AS ARE NOW FIGHTING IN THE SOUTH, SO THAT FOR ALL THEIR EFFORT, THEY CAN NOT BE VICTORIOUS. IF AMERICAN TROOPS ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY A LIMITED SECTION OF NORTH VIETNAM, THEY WILL BE SURROUNDED, ISOLATED AND DESTROYED.

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1.3(a)(4)

(classification)

(dissem controls)

4. [REDACTED] IN THE EVENT OF SUCH
AN INVASION BY THE AMERICANS, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD NOT
NEED TO CALL ON THE CHINESE OR THE SOVIETS AS NORTH
VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG FORCES ARE STRONG ENOUGH TO COPE WITH
SUCH A SITUATION.

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5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, CINCPAC, PACAF, ARPAC, PACFLT
[REDACTED]

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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• ROUTINE

IN -74161

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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EX-100 DD/1

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CITE

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 18 OCTOBER 1967

COUNTRY: NORTH VIETNAM 26Z

DCI: 14 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) REPRESENTATIVE
HEDGES ON ANY COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE EVEN IF
BOMBINGS CEASE.

ACQ:

SOURCE:

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1.

1.3(a)(4)

CHARGE OF

THE DRV EMBASSY IN DJAKARTA REITERATED

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

THE HANOI STANDARD CONDITIONS FOR ANY POSSIBLE TALKS, NAMELY THAT AMERICAN BOMBINGS OF NORTH VIETNAM CEASE.

2. WHEN [REDACTED] ASKED IF THE DRV WOULD THEN BE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE TALKS IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT RESPONDED TO INTERNATIONAL APPEALS FOR A BOMBING HALT, [REDACTED] HESITATED AND THEN STATED THAT THIS WOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP WHICH WOULD DISPOSE HANOI TO CONSIDER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS BUT WOULD REQUIRE EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BASIS OF A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS. [REDACTED] THIS SEEMED TO BE A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE POSITION OF WILLINGNESS TO TALK IMMEDIATELY UPON CONDITION OF A BOMBING HALT. [REDACTED] DID NOT REPLY DIRECTLY, BUT MERELY COMMENTED THAT PRESSURE WAS BUILDING UP WORLDWIDE AND IN AMERICA AS WELL AGAINST THE FUTILITY OF AMERICA CONTINUING TO "OPPRESS THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM". [REDACTED] THIS PRESSURE TO DATE HAD HAD LITTLE IMPACT ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF THE WAR. [REDACTED] MERELY OBSERVED THAT THE PRESENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COULD NOT FOREVER REMAIN IMPERVIOUS TO SENSIBLE OPINION IN ITS OWN NATION AND THROUGHOUT [REDACTED]

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(WHEN FILLED IN)

COPY NO. *John*

(classification)

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THE WORLD.

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT. THIS SEEMED TO INDICATE DRV RENEWED HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WILL BE DETERRED BY CURRENT INDICATIONS OF THE UNPOPULARITY OF THE WAR IN AMERICA, OR WILLINGNESS TO HOLD ON WITH A HARD LINE UNTIL NEXT YEAR'S AMERICAN ELECTIONS WHICH THEY HOPE MAY REVERSE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT POLICY.

1.3(a)

4. [REDACTED]

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5. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE (CHARGE ONLY), (CINCPAC POLAD EXCLUSIVELY, SAIGON (AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY)

1.3(a)

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~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967

Prerfile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the Prime Minister of Laos,
Prince Souvanna Phouma, October 20, 1967

Souvanna arrives tomorrow (from New York where he has attended the UN General Assembly) -- and comes directly to your office for a meeting, following which you are hosting a working stag luncheon for 13 people. Later, Souvanna will see the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, and Averell Harriman. He leaves the country Saturday evening on his way to visit Australia.

He is anxious to have a thorough discussion with you on the current situation in Southeast Asia and the chances for peace. He has been shaken by the accounts he has read of domestic opposition and needs reassurance that our commitment in Southeast Asia is firm. You might also wish to:

-- Assure him we seek no wider war and intend to try to keep the Viet Nam war within its current boundaries.

-- Express appreciation for his speech at the UN (October 13), in which he emphasized the UN's responsibility for peacekeeping.

-- Express concern about the rice crop (which was hurt by floods last year and droughts this year).

Souvanna will probably raise the following matters:

-- His concern at the effects on Laos of the continuing war (each year 1500-2000 Lao are killed in combat -- the per capita equivalent of 100,000 American combat deaths a year).

-- He may plead for decisive action to bring the war to an end. In the past, he has privately argued that we should increase the pressure on North Viet Nam by bombing the dikes and other civilian targets. In

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Authority ERUS.64-68.vol. 28 #311

By *jc* 12-15-09

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

New York he spoke at length with Ambassador Goldberg, urging a 15 day bombing pause on the basis that there was an obligation to try anything that might bring a settlement.

-- The Laotian need for additional military assistance because, in his view, Laos can no longer support the financial burden of both national defense and economic development. If he raises this point, I suggest that you reply that we are aware of his needs and are undertaking to provide for them.

A particular problem which Souvanna will probably raise with you is "the barrier". He is very fearful that "the barrier" will cause the North Vietnamese to be more aggressive in Laos, that it may lead us to commit U.S. forces overtly into Laos, and that we may use the barrier as an excuse to stop bombing North Viet Nam. Any of these actions, he thinks, would lengthen rather than shorten the war. He is absolutely opposed to any overt U.S. troop presence in Laos and has made it plain that he will have no choice but to publicly denounce any overt military presence as a violation of Laotian neutrality.

Ambassador Sullivan has discussed "the barrier" plan with Souvanna, obtained his agreement to the introduction into Laos of an Air-Delivered Detection System, and assured Souvanna that we have no intention of introducing "any manner of ground system into Laos." Souvanna has reserved the right to approve the precise location of the detection system before it is installed.

If he raises this matter, I think you will want to reaffirm Ambassador Sullivan's reassurances.

A special Caution. Our sensitive operations in Laos are something which Souvanna seldom discusses, even with his closest colleagues. Except when you are talking with him privately you should avoid mention of any operations in Laos unless Souvanna specifically raises them. Also, Souvanna does not expect, and would not be pleased by an expression of "gratitude" for his cooperation. In every instance, his cooperation has been obtained on the basis of Lao national interests. Souvanna does not consider that we are allies, but rather that harsh conditions force us to work together on some matters because "we are in the same boat".

Another caution concerns the PRAIRIE FIRE program in which we operate intelligence patrols in the Laotian Panhandle. Souvanna has made it very clear that he could never officially agree to these operations. So far as we are concerned in discussions with him, he wishes to pretend that this program does not exist.

Souvanna will be accompanied by his daughter, Princess Moune (pronounced MOON) -- a tough-minded woman and a principal figure in the Lao Foreign Ministry. At Souvanna's request, she will be present at your "stag" luncheon. Souvanna is also accompanied by his Minister of Finance, Sisouk (SEE sook), the second most powerful man in the government and Souvanna's heir-apparent.

The briefing book prepared by State is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 19, 1967

Marv -

The President may wish to consider
the attached recommendation for the
delegation to Saigon.

Pres. file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 28, 1973

By *Ng* NARA, Date *11-4-91*

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FOR ROSTOW FROM DELANEY

IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AFL-
CIO ON THE INAUGURATION DELEGATION. IT WILL ASSIST AIM TO
ESTABLISH CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE WORKER ORGANIZATIONS
HERE.
BUNKER

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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

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~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the Prime Minister of Laos,
Prince Souvanna Phouma, October 20, 1967

Souvanna arrives tomorrow (from New York where he has attended the UN General Assembly) -- and comes directly to your office for a meeting, following which you are hosting a working stag luncheon for 13 people. Later, Souvanna will see the Vice President, Secretary Rusk, and Averell Harriman. He leaves the country Saturday evening on his way to visit Australia.

He is anxious to have a thorough discussion with you on the current situation in Southeast Asia and the chances for peace. He has been shaken by the accounts he has read of domestic opposition and needs reassurance that our commitment in Southeast Asia is firm. You might also wish to:

-- Assure him we seek no wider war and intend to try to keep the Viet Nam war within its current boundaries.

-- Express appreciation for his speech at the UN (October 13), in which he emphasized the UN's responsibility for peacekeeping.

-- Express concern about the rice crop (which was hurt by floods last year and droughts this year).

Souvanna will probably raise the following matters:

-- His concern at the effects on Laos of the continuing war (each year 1500-2000 Lao are killed in combat -- the per capita equivalent of 100,000 American combat deaths a year).

-- He may plead for decisive action to bring the war to an end. In the past, he has privately argued that we should increase the pressure on North Viet Nam by bombing the dikes and other civilian targets. In

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS. 64-68. W. 28. #311

pc NARA Date 12-15-09

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS~~

New York he spoke at length with Ambassador Goldberg, urging a 15 day bombing pause on the basis that there was an obligation to try anything that might bring a settlement.

-- The Laotian need for additional military assistance because, in his view, Laos can no longer support the financial burden of both national defense and economic development. If he raises this point, I suggest that you reply that we are aware of his needs and are undertaking to provide for them.

A particular problem which Souvanna will probably raise with you is "the barrier". He is very fearful that "the barrier" will cause the North Vietnamese to be more aggressive in Laos, that it may lead us to commit U.S. forces overtly into Laos, and that we may use the barrier as an excuse to stop bombing North Viet Nam. Any of these actions, he thinks, would lengthen rather than shorten the war. He is absolutely opposed to any overt U.S. troop presence in Laos and has made it plain that he will have no choice but to publicly denounce any overt military presence as a violation of Laotian neutrality.

Ambassador Sullivan has discussed "the barrier" plan with Souvanna, obtained his agreement to the introduction into Laos of an Air-Delivered Detection System, and assured Souvanna that we have no intention of introducing "any manner of ground system into Laos." Souvanna has reserved the right to approve the precise location of the detection system before it is installed.

If he raises this matter, I think you will want to reaffirm Ambassador Sullivan's reassurances.

A special Caution. Our sensitive operations in Laos are something which Souvanna seldom discusses, even with his closest colleagues. Except when you are talking with him privately you should avoid mention of any operations in Laos unless Souvanna specifically raises them. Also, Souvanna does not expect, and would not be pleased by an expression of "gratitude" for his cooperation. In every instance, his cooperation has been obtained on the basis of Lao national interests. Souvanna does not consider that we are allies, but rather that harsh conditions force us to work together on some matters because "we are in the same boat".

Another caution concerns the PRAIRIE FIRE program in which we operate intelligence patrols in the Laotian Panhandle. Souvanna has made it very clear that he could never officially agree to these operations. So far as we are concerned in discussions with him, he wishes to pretend that this program does not exist.

Souvanna will be accompanied by his daughter, Princess Moune (pronounced MOON) -- a tough-minded woman and a principal figure in the Lao Foreign Ministry. At Souvanna's request, she will be present at your "stag" luncheon. Souvanna is also accompanied by his Minister of Finance, Sisouk (SEE sook), the second most powerful man in the government and Souvanna's heir-apparent.

The briefing book prepared by State is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

45

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Announcement that the Vice President will be your personal representative at the Vietnamese Inauguration ceremonies

The necessary governments have now been informed of your intention to send the Vice President as your representative to the Thieu inauguration, and there seems no reason why a public announcement cannot now be made. In view of the increasing press speculation, State recommends that the announcement be made as soon as possible, deferring until later the announcement of his visit to other Asian capitals and the names of the other members of the delegation to the Thieu inauguration.

A suggested text is attached, and I recommend that you approve it for release by George Christian at the 11:00 A.M. briefing on October 20.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See Me _____

MWright:hg

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 11-4-91

SUGGESTED TEXT

The White House announced today that, at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, the President has designated Vice President Hubert Humphrey to be his personal representative at the inauguration ceremonies for President-elect Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President-elect Nguyen Cao Ky to be held in Saigon on October 31, 1967.

Further details concerning the Vice President's forthcoming trip to Saigon and other members of the U.S. delegation will be announced at a later date.

46

Pres. file

*Rec'd back from Pres.
10/19/67*

Mr. President:

Roscoe Drummond brought to my attention the attached Gallup poll of January 1951. Dick Bowman, formerly of my staff, procured this copy.

66% of the American public wanted to pull out of Korea as fast as possible -- 25% wanted to stay -- 9% no opinion.

Today, according to the Harris poll, only 37% want to get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible -- with 69% opposed to the way the war is being handled -- but with 58% nevertheless supporting the war.

In Korea, the U.S. eventually achieved its objective with considerably less public support than you enjoy today.

Although frustration with the Korean War was one element in the Democratic defeat in 1952, it was Adlai Stevenson, not President Truman, who was defeated.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. To supplement Bob McNamara's conversation.

W

Growing Public Sentiment that American Entry into Korean Fighting Was a Mistake

EXCLUSIVE

Copyright, American Institute of Public Opinion

By GEORGE GALLUP

Director, American Institute of Public Opinion

PRINCETON, N. J., Jan 20—If American military and diplomatic leaders are convinced we should stay in Korea, they may face a difficult campaign to "sell" the American public on this plan.

The weight of opinion at present is strongly on the side of pulling out of Korea as fast as possible, in preference to fighting the increasingly large Chinese forces there.

This is evident from personal interviews which reporters for the Institute made during the first two weeks of January with a carefully-constructed cross-section of the American voting public.



Gallup

For every one who said we should continue the fight in Korea against the numerically superior enemy, nearly three said we should evacuate.

War correspondents have stated that the issue is one of either getting out of Korea as fast as possible or of staying as long as possible to harass the much larger Red Chinese forces there.

If the situation finally resolves itself to these alternatives, the choice expressed by the public is as follows:

"Now that Communist China has entered the fighting in Korea with forces far outnumbering the United Nations troops there, which ONE of these two courses would you, yourself, prefer that we follow:

"A. Pull our troops out of

Korea as fast as possible?

"B. Keep our troops there to fight these larger forces?"

Pull out	66%
Stay there	25
No opinion	9
	<hr/> 100%

* * *

Now Viewed as Mistake

The survey was completed just before Gen. J. Lawton Collins, U. S. Army Chief of Staff, declared that the United Nations army will "certainly stay in Korea and fight."

It may be that, for security reasons, the Pentagon and State Department are unable to take the public into their full confidence in outlining strategic reasons for staying in Korea or unfolding future plans.

As the situation stands now there is growing public feeling that American entry into the Korean fighting was a mistake.

This view represents a sharp reversal of opinion.

Last summer, when the going was tough in Korea but China had not come in, an overwhelming majority of Americans said we had NOT

made a mistake getting into the Korean war. ^{46a}

The trend since then is shown in the following table:

"In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United States made a mistake in deciding to defend South Korea, or not?"

	Latest Survey	Aug. 1950
Yes, we made a mistake	49%	20%
No, we did not	38	65
No opinion	13	15
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%

When the original decision to fight was first announced by President Truman on June 27, a survey of public opinion conducted by the Institute found 81 per cent approving the decision, 13 per cent disapproving and 6 per cent undecided.

* * *

Republicans More Critical

Republican spokesmen, even before the Korean war, were critical of the Truman administration's handling of our foreign policy in Asia.

In today's survey Republican voters show a somewhat higher percentage for pulling out of Korea than do Democratic voters:

PULL OUT OF KOREA?

	Rep- licans	Demo- crats	Inde- pendents
Pull out ...	71%	63%	64%
Stay there ..	22	28	23
No opinion .	7	9	13
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%

Sentiment for pulling out of Korea runs uniformly throughout the various education levels in the population, as the following table shows:

PULL OUT OF KOREA?

	Col- lege	High Sch'l	Grade Sch'l
Pull out ...	65%	66%	66%
Stay there ..	30	27	21
No opinion .	5	7	13
	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%	<hr/> 100%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 19, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Another name for consideration as a member of
the delegation to the Thieu Inauguration

The Vice President's office has suggested that you may want to consider Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., of Michigan, as a member of the delegation. As you know, Diggs is a strong supporter of our Viet-Nam policy, and recognizing him in this way might serve to undercut Zoltan Ferency's attempts to make trouble for us in Michigan.

W. W. Rostow

MWright:hg

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *kg*, NARA, Date 11-4-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

48

Pres file

Wednesday, October 18, 1967
9:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Joe Fowler has sent you a memo on the increase in the discount rate we expect the British to announce tomorrow.

The British had to make this move to ease the pressure on the pound -- which has been heavy.

Joe will have a memo for you tomorrow assessing the situation and possible action. Deming, Okun, Baane, Solomon and Fried are working on this with him.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-452
By lip, NARA, Date 7-17-95

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

49

~~Wednesday~~
~~Tuesday~~, October 18, 1967 -- 7:15 PM

Pres file

Mr. President:

I thought you might be interested to know that former Indian Agriculture Minister Subramaniam is in town through Thursday for an unofficial visit. He's no longer a member of the government, and there's no necessity for a meeting with you.

But he is clearly the ranking authority on Indian agriculture and the problems of food, population and economic growth in general. He could give you a good first-hand judgment of the prospects for India's bumper harvest. And he knows the politics of foreign aid on both sides.

The Indian Embassy has been after State to try for a meeting with you for Subramaniam. They have politely declined on the ground that your schedule is too tight. We're all satisfied to stick to that line if you want to, but I thought you would want to make that decision. (Madam Gandhi certainly wouldn't take it amiss if you saw Subramaniam as a private Indian citizen.)

W. W. Rostow

My schedule is too tight; keep holding him off _____

I want to see him; set up a meeting Wednesday or Thursday _____ ✓

Speak to me _____

R. Morris/vmr

10/18
11:30 P
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Pres file 50

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 18, 1967 -- 7:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Ed Hamilton notified 10/19/67

SUBJECT: PL 480 Sales to the Congo

In the attached, Messrs. Schnittker, Gaud and Schultze recommend a \$13.4 million PL 480 agreement with the Congo. State and Treasury concur. The specifics:

Commodities: Wheat flour -- 48,000 tons (equal to 67,000 tons of unmilled wheat)
Cotton -- 19,000 bales
Tobacco -- 3,000 tons

Credit Terms: Repayable in dollars, 20-year maturity with a 2-year grace period, 2 1/2% interest rate.

Budgetary Costs: These amounts are provided for in our export targets and budget estimates. No additional cost.

This food is frankly designed to tide the Congo over the current crisis. There are no new self-help terms attached. The mercenary problem has created a critical supply situation for the Congolese. Production and transport of agricultural products has fallen off badly. They haven't gotten as much copper out of Katanga as they had hoped, so their export earnings are likely to be quite a bit lower than planned. Despite all this, Mobuto has put into effect a comprehensive program of economic reforms -- including a devaluation. He badly needs this support to hold the line.

As soon as it is safe, we will send out an AID/Agriculture team to survey the self-help situation and will determine where we can usefully put more leverage.

Walt Rostow

Approve _____

I suppose that's all right

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 93-351

By 06, NARA, Date 5-25-95

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

OCT 13 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 93-351

By CB, NARA, Date 5-25-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed P. L. 480 Program for the Congo

In the attached memorandum Bill Gaud and John Schnittker request your authority to negotiate a \$13.4 million P. L. 480 agreement with the Congo. This agreement would provide wheat flour, cotton, and tobacco on twenty-year dollar credit. Credit terms would include interest at 2-1/2 percent after the two-year grace period, and the first payment of principal would be a token \$100,000.

We signed two agreements with the Congo in FY 1967. An agreement of October 3 provided \$9.2 million worth of wheat flour, corn, rice and tobacco. An agreement of March 15, amended in April, added \$9.4 million worth of wheat flour, cotton and rice -- all on the same terms as are proposed for this agreement. These additional commodities are designed to help meet the Congo's needs for FY 1968.

The Congo continues to have serious security problems which affect production and transport of agricultural products from the East and of copper from Katanga. Exports may thus be lower than anticipated earlier. The stabilization program instituted in June has progressed well and has been affected by the security problem less than was feared. Receipt of the commodities proposed for this agreement are included in the Government's stabilization plans.

On the dollar aid side, we signed a \$17 million program loan in June. A 1968 program loan -- perhaps \$12-\$15 million -- will be considered only after an IMF review of the Congo's stabilization program next January. While it would be highly desirable to combine negotiation of dollar aid and food aid for a coordinated package of updated self-help measures, conditions in the Congo make this almost impossible. The country's need for flour requires that we begin food deliveries as soon as possible, but the current security situation prevents the planned AID/USDA team from reviewing self-help activities at this time. That team now tentatively hopes to

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depart in December. The limited agricultural self-help provisions related to the earlier P. L. 480 agreements are being supported by the Congolese Government.

Although the 48,000 tons of wheat flour (the equivalent of about 67,000 tons of unmilled wheat) proposed for this agreement is too small by itself to affect U. S. wheat prices, it is already built in to our export targets and budgetary estimates.

I recommend that you approve this proposed agreement.

Charles L. Schultze

Charles L. Schultze
Director

Attachment

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 93-352

By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-93

OCT 2 1967

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Sales Program with the Congo

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a \$13.4 million increase in the \$9.3 million PL 480 dollar credit sale approved by you early in January and the \$2.5 million increase approved by you in the end of February. The proposed increase would add 48,000 tons of wheat flour, 19,000 bales of cotton and 3,000 tons of tobacco to the cotton, wheat flour and rice already approved. The same credit terms will apply; that is, 20 years credit, two-year grace, first payment of principal \$100,000, the balance in 18 equal annual installments, interest at 1 percent during the grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury have endorsed this proposal.

In our memoranda of December 23, 1966 and February 20, 1967 (attached), in which we recommended the current PL 480 sale, we outlined the Congo requirements for agricultural commodities, the U.S. interest in the Congo, the AID program there, and self-help efforts to improve that country's agriculture. No additional measures are currently being proposed. However, when the security situation permits we plan to send a joint USDA and AID team to the Congo to review self-help activities and to formulate any appropriate additional measures.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate with the Congo the sale of 48,000 tons of wheat flour, 19,000 bales of cotton and 3,000 tons of tobacco of which the current export market value is \$13.4 million.

September 25 1967

William L. Earl
Administrator
Agency for International Development

John A. Schmitt
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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50c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

OCT 2 1967

Honorable Charles L. Schultze
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C. 20503

Dear Charlie:

We are continuing to expedite the processing of P.L. 480 sales agreements proposed to the White House through your office. A proposal for the Congo is enclosed for immediate approval.

Under the new commitments procedure, we anticipate asking the President later this year to approve A.I.D. program assistance for the Congo. While we recognize the desirability of considering the two programs at the same time, it is not feasible in this case.

The supply situation in the Congo requires that we begin deliveries under a new P.L. 480 sales agreement without delay. New program assistance, however, should be deferred until the stabilization program can be evaluated. The \$17 million FY 1967 program loan was signed in June and letters of commitment for \$12 million have been issued. We expect to commit the balance toward the end of the year. We tentatively plan to establish the level of the FY 1968 loan in the \$12.6-15 million range only after a January IMF review of the stabilization program.

Sincerely yours,

W. S. Gaud

William S. Gaud

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 5 Declassified following signing of PL 480 sales agreement

50d

February 20 1967

To : The President

Subject: P. L. 480 sales Program with the Congo

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo a \$2.5 million increase in the \$9.3 million P.L. 480 dollar credit sale approved by you early in January. The proposed increase would add 15,000 metric tons of rice to the 30,000 bales of cotton and 22,000 metric tons of wheat flour already approved. The same credit terms will apply, that is 20 years credit, two-year grace, first payment of principal \$100,000; the balance in 18 equal annual installments, interest at 1% during the grace period and 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ % thereafter. The Department of State has endorsed this proposal.

The Congo asked for 50,000 tons of rice for the current fiscal year and 15,000 was supplied under the October 3, 1966 Agreement. Additional quantities have become available for limited programming under P.L. 480 to several countries including the Congo.

In our memorandum of December 23, 1966 (attached), in which we recommended the current P.L. 480 sale, we outlined the Congo requirements for agricultural commodities, the U.S. interest in the Congo, the AID program there, and self-help efforts to improve that country's agriculture.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate with the Congo the sale of 15,000 metric tons of rice valued at \$2.5 million.

/s/ William S. Gaud

Orville L. Freeman

Administrator
Agency for International Development

Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

50e

Memorandum

TO : The President

DECLASSIFIED

DATE: 12/23/66

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

FROM :

NJ 93-352

By ju, NARA, Date 9-17-93

SUBJECT: PL 480 Program with Congo (Kinshasa)

We recommend that you authorize us to proceed with negotiations with the Government of the Congo (Kinshasa) for a Title IV, PL 480 sales agreement as follows:

Commodity Composition:

U.S. Fiscal Year 1967

<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Approximate Maximum Quantity</u>	<u>Estimated Market Value</u>	<u>Estimated CCC Cost</u>
		----- (1,000) -----	
Cotton, upland	30,000 bales	\$3,347	\$5,370
Wheat flour	22,000 MT 1/	2,280	3,128
Ocean transportation (estimated)		582	582
Total		\$6,209	\$9,080

1/ Approximate equivalent of 30,000 MT of wheat

Credit Terms:

The credit terms will provide that payment for shipments in each calendar year will be made in 19 annual installments, the first of which shall become due two years after the date of last delivery of commodities under the agreement in any calendar year. The first annual payment of principal shall be for \$100,000. The balance of such principal amount due shall be paid in 18 approximately equal annual installments due on the anniversary date of the first annual payment. Interest during the period between the date of last delivery in each calendar year and the date of first payment shall be at the rate of one percent per annum. Applicable interest thereafter shall be at the rate of 2½ percent per annum.

The Department of State concurs in this recommendation.

Congo's Food Situation and Need for Commodities

Agricultural production in the Congo declined sharply after independence in 1960 due to many factors. The rebellion in 1964 was a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

major factor since the rebels overran many of the food producing areas and disrupted the movement of produce from the farms to the market. However, the decline began even before the rebellion when large numbers of Belgian technicians and private commercial interests left the country. With the departure of the Belgians the marketing mechanism was disrupted and the world-famous research stations were abandoned.

As a result of the above factors cotton production declined from almost 60,000 metric tons in 1959 to 6,000 metric tons in 1966. Rice production has fallen from the pre-independence level of over 100,000 metric tons to 20,000 tons in 1965.

It should also be noted that the Congo produces no wheat.

Provision of the wheat flour is intended to help meet domestic commercial requirements of 65,000 metric tons. The Government of the Congo is using \$1.8 million of its own scarce foreign exchange resources to purchase a further 16,400 tons of wheat flour in the U.S. Additional purchases by the GDRC in the spring and summer of 1967 would place a severe strain on its foreign exchange reserves during a period when the GDRC is expected to undertake its comprehensive monetary reform and new stabilization program. Annual requirements for raw cotton by the Congolese textile industry is estimated at 70,400 bales, of which about one third will be provided from domestic production. The latter is used by the mills during the period from November to March of each year. The 30,000 bales included in the proposed agreement will meet requirements for April-August 1967 prior to the time locally-grown cotton becomes available.

Congolese Self-Help Measures

Despite difficulties, the Congolese Government has taken significant self-help measures.

During the past year the Congo has succeeded in reducing the rebellions in the northern and eastern provinces to pockets of isolated resistance. This has allowed some of the Congolese, Belgians and other Europeans who fled these areas, to return to these former food producing areas and resume productive activity. These efforts will be largely responsible for an increase in agricultural exports in 1967 predicted by the IMF at over 25 percent.

The GDRC is developing a comprehensive agricultural plan with assistance from the EEC and FAO, which calls for Congolese commercial

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agricultural production to return to 90 percent of the 1958 production levels by 1972. If internal security can be maintained and the economic reforms successfully implemented, we believe that the production target for 1972 might well be increased. While, at this time, it would be premature to raise this issue with the GDRC, we plan to review agricultural production goals as early as possible following the institution of the reforms when an assessment can be made of their effect on agricultural production. We anticipate, however, that the projected reforms scheduled for March 1967 will provide adequate incentive for expansion of agricultural exports which have been hampered by the present unrealistic exchange rate. This growth should bring about an infusion into the money economy which, in turn, will stimulate food production.

Even though increased agricultural production will hinge on a successful economic reform, the Congo Government is undertaking related programs of importance. Agricultural education is being encouraged and the number of students studying agriculture at Lovanium University has increased from 16 in 1960 to 174 in 1966. Over 55 percent of local currencies reserved for country use from previous PL 480 agreements have been used to rebuild major communications lines and feeder roads to improve the transport of agricultural commodities to markets and export points.

U.S. Interest in the Congo

The proposed agreement is consistent with the basic U.S. objective seeking the establishment under a moderate central government of a unified and viable independent state friendly to the West which is capable of maintaining political stability, internal security, and a reasonable rate of economic and social development. This sales program complements commodity imports financed with AID Supporting Assistance funds to assist in providing economic stabilization, and to encourage economic reforms, including credit controls, monetary reform and restraints of budgetary expenditures. This far reaching program, which is considered essential to the recovery of the Congolese economy to pre-independence levels and to promote sustained economic growth, is currently being developed by the Government of the Congo with assistance from the IMF.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to begin negotiations with Congo (Kinshasa) for a PL 480 Sales Agreement for 22,000 metric tons of wheat flour and 30,000 bales of raw cotton.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

In negotiations, we plan to inform the Government of the Congo that we will carefully examine the details of the agricultural development plan when they are made known in order to assure ourselves that the Congo is encouraging programs which will bring about increased food production. In addition we plan to urge the Congo to:

(1) continue to use a large portion of the local currency proceeds from this agreement to repair bridges, roads, and other transport facilities in order to improve the transport of farm produce to markets and export points; (2) continue to encourage growth of both agricultural vocational schools and training in agricultural production at the University of Lovanium; (3) provide detailed information on its CY 1967 budget for joint review of those programs concerned with increasing food production.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

Administrator
Agency for International
Development

Secretary *S/ Orville L. Freeman*
Department of Agriculture

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Oct. 18, 1967
6:45 p. m.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You asked for the strongest case for continuing our bombing of North Viet Nam.

1. It is true that it can^{not} be demonstrated that the bombing of North Viet Nam reduces the supply capacity from North to South Viet Nam to a level which will cut off the flow of men and supplies from the North; nor can it be proved that the flow of men and supplies from the North is less than it would be if we stopped bombing, although this is a matter on which our judgments can honestly differ.

2. It can be demonstrated, however, that the bombing of North Viet Nam has imposed these costs on North Viet Nam for its aggression:

-- At little cost in civilian casualties and at acceptable costs in our loss rates, the bombing has severely curtailed North Viet Nam's industrial and agricultural production.

-- Therefore, there has been a radical increase in North Viet Nam's requirement for foreign aid in order to sustain her war effort and to sustain her economy at minimum levels (imports up from 2,100 metric tons per day in 1965 to 4,300 in 1967; Soviet aid up from \$100 million to \$700 million annually).

-- It has required the diversion of up to 600,000 workers to defend against or counter the effects of the bombing.

-- It has increased significantly the number of men and tons which must be dispatched from the North to get one man or one ton into South Viet Nam.

In addition, bombing across the DMZ has proved an absolutely essential element in reducing the enemy pressure across the DMZ. That pressure in all its forms now constitutes about half the total war in South Viet Nam.

3. If we stopped bombing North Viet Nam without compensatory action on the other side, these are the costs we would take:

-- They would be able to put men and supplies into the South at lower cost. The resources available to the North would be increased. All these resources

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-454
By tip, NARA, Date 10-4-95

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-2-

would, of course, not be immediately thrown into the war in the South; but it is virtually certain that they would be able to apply against the South some increase in pressure.

-- It would be a great deal easier for the men in Hanoi (and their allies who carry the aid burden) to prolong the war and continue the strain on South Viet Nam -- and the U.S. -- at lower cost to themselves.

4. To refresh your memory, I attach from a recent memorandum to you extracts from the CIA estimate on specific effects of the bombing of North Viet Nam.

W. W. R.

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51a

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Some Comments on: "ROLLING THUNDER: The 1967
Campaign Against LOC's"

1. Paragraphs 2 and 3 below indicate how a selective use of evidence from the CIA analysis conveys a somewhat different -- and more positive -- interpretation of the impact of the bombing campaign. Paragraph 4 indicates a number of questions which need to be considered. -- even though they may be unanswerable -- to place the impact of the air campaign in perspective. Paragraphs 5 and 6 indicate two areas in which the presentation of the analysis may be deficient.

2. The bombing has had the following measurable effects:

- ". . . has brought North Vietnam's small modern industry to a standstill." p 10
- "About 80 per cent of the central electric power generating capacity is currently out of operation." p 10
- "The country's only modern cement plant -- at Haiphong -- ceased production in April 1967. . . ." p 10
- "The country's only metallurgical plant . . . has ceased production for the same reasons." p 10
- "The only explosives plant has been out of operation for two years, and the production of apatite and coal, both previously exported in quantity, has been drastically reduced. One of the country's two textile plants has been heavily damaged, production in the small fertilizer and chemical industry has been curtailed, and the production of paper has been reduced by 80 per cent." p 10
- Dollar value of bombing damage: (p 12)

<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>Jan - Aug 1967</u>
68.7	112.4	158.4

- "Up to 600,000 persons are engaged in full-time or part-time work defending against or countering the effects of the bombing." p 12 (This is about equal to ARVN strength.)

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By rip, NARA, Date 10-4-95

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- "The movement of men and supplies has become more difficult and time-consuming, and a substantial volume of war and war-supporting material has been destroyed in transit." p 11 (Unfortunately, we have no good measurement of the impact.)

- "Since January 1965, destruction and damage to transport equipment has included 67 locomotives, 4,792 rail freight cars, 8,371 trucks, and 19,211 watercraft." p 29

- In the northern part of North Vietnam "most of the serious damage to the railroads is probably being repaired by the professional Chinese construction (and air defense) troops numbering 30,000 to 50,000." p 68

- In 1966, because of bombing and weather, NVN's rice crops was about 300,000 metric tons short. They may experience a similar shortfall in 1967. (This point is not specifically addressed in the analysis.)

3. As a consequence of these measurable effects -- plus those we cannot measure -- there has been a radical increase in foreign aid requirements to allow North Vietnam to continue the war and to sustain the economy at minimum levels.

- Soviet aid is up from about \$100 to \$700 million annually.

- "Imports into Haiphong have increased greatly, reaching an average of almost 5,200 tons a day in the second quarter of 1967 and averaging 4,300 tons a day during the first eight months of the year, compared with 2,100 tons per day in the first quarter of 1965.) p 33

4. Nevertheless, as the analysis states: "It is clear that logistics problems have not placed a relevant ceiling on force structures or levels of combat." It is perhaps true that "even a more intense interdiction campaign in the North would fail to reduce the flow of supplies sufficiently to restrict military operations." These conclusions, however, leave some important questions unanswered:

- If there is such an excess capacity in NVN's transportation system, why are they not utilizing it more fully?

- If there is such excess capacity, why has NVN gone to such lengths to repair its transport system and defend it against attack?

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- If the requirement for military supplies in the DMZ, Laos, and South Vietnam is only 85 tons a day and if this is substantially less than transport capacity, why don't the North Vietnamese double or triple the volume of supplies so that communist units in the South could double or triple the number of days a month they can fight?

- If NVN's total military and civilian requirements are only about 3,500 tons a day, why have they been importing at the rate of 5,100 tons a day for the last eight months?

- If total requirements are only 3,500 tons a day, why did NVN move 55,300 tons a day on its transport system in 1966?

5. The analysis also concludes that "Prospects are dim that an air interdiction campaign against LOC's leading out of Haiphong alone could cut off the flow of seaborne imports and isolate Haiphong." However, the analysis points out that:

- "Layover times of freighters at Haiphong averaged ten days in the first six months of 1966, but increased to nearly 17 days in the third quarter of 1966. . . Similarly, the large increase in imports in the second quarter of 1967 was followed by increased layover times that reached a peak average of 33 days for freighters clearing the port in August." p 37

- "Over the past 18 months, there has been a notable spillover of cargoes into areas adjacent to the port area at Haiphong. Vacant lots, parks, and even streets and sidewalks have been utilized for storage of cargoes." p 37

Furthermore, according to DIA, "air strikes have made it progressively more difficult for North Vietnam to move imports out of Vietnam." (TAB A) Reduced capacities of key lines of communication leading out of Haiphong have caused a shortfall of 1,700 short tons per day (according to our in-house mathematics, it should be almost 1,900 metric tons per day). Although DIA indicates that it would take only seven out of NVN's inventory of 300 lighters (250-ton capacity), the CIA analysis indicates that the extended delays already being experienced in unloading ocean freighters "are attributable primarily to poor port management and a possible shortage of lighter capacity." p 37. I do not see how CIA can then conclude that: "Attacks on transport routes around Haiphong almost certainly have not contributed significantly to the accumulation of goods in the port area." p 37. In my opinion, the bombing has been an important factor in port congestion in that:

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- It created the need for additional imports in the first place.
- Attacks on the LOCs leading out of Haiphong have compounded the management problems of clearing the port.

6. The analysis states: "Through service has been maintained on all major rail lines with the exception of the rail connections in the immediate Hanoi area and the heavily pounded Hanoi-Vinh line." The attached chart (TAB B), however, shows a different way of looking at the picture -- length of time rail lines are closed is down -- but number of days on which shuttle operations are required is up.

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~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

5/c

North Vietnam's Capability To Clear Imports from Haiphong

Air strikes have made it progressively more difficult for North Vietnam to move imports out of Haiphong, especially by road and rail. The waterway system can, however, be used to supplement land lines of communication.

So far this year, an average of 4,400 short tons per day (STPD) of imports has arrived in Haiphong. As of 3 October, road and rail interdictions had reduced the transportation clearance capacity to about 2,700 STPD. The 1,700 STPD shortfall can be cleared by coastal shipping to the south for subsequent movement through inland waterways, primarily toward Hanoi and Nam Dinh.

Following is the status of lines of communication from Haiphong:

Rail -- The rail line is not serviceable for through traffic from the port area. Initial analysis of 30 September photographs indicated that two spans of the Haiphong Rail/Highway Bridge were dropped as a result of attacks on the 28th.

Highways -- The interdiction of bridges on Route 5 to the west and Route 10 to the south has reduced highway capabilities, but the installation of pontoon bridges permits the movement of 1,700 STPD.

Waterways -- The capacity of the Lach Tray-Canal des Bambous waterway system from Haiphong remains at 1,000 STPD.

The 1,700 STPD shortfall caused by reduced capacities of key lines of communication west to Hanoi and southwest to Nam Dinh can be lightened along the coast to available river estuaries for subsequent inland movement via waterways. For example, the North Vietnamese inventory of 250-ton lighters (five-foot draft) is estimated at more than 300 craft. The 1,700 STPD shortfall could be moved out of Haiphong Roads and south along the coast by employing an average of seven of these lighters daily.

(Continued)

4 Oct 67

DIA Intelligence Summary

Page A-7

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-268
By Sj NARA, Date 12-5-02

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
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There are several Red River estuaries through which these lighters could move inland to make connection with Route 10 for transshipment by trucks or the Nam Dinh rail line for transshipment to Hanoi or south toward Thanh Hoa. The lighters could also continue on the inland waterways to Hanoi or Nam Dinh. All of the waterways are capable of accommodating 250-ton lighters from the coast to Hanoi and Nam Dinh. The most likely routes that would be used are the Song Tra Ly-Red River, the Cua Ba Lat-Red River, or the Day Giang-Red River. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-268
By Sj NARA, Date 12-5-02

STATUS OF MAJOR NORTH VIETNAM RAILROADS

PERCENT



LOU

Wednesday - 6:30 pm
October 18, 1967

52

Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Summary of the Arthur D. Little Article and the
AFL/CIO Concern

These are the highlights of the Arthur D. Little article on Mexico as an export market to the US:

1. Mexico exports about 80% raw materials and 20% manufactured goods to the US. Compared with our world-wide imports of 60% manufactured goods and 40% raw materials, it is clear that Mexico doesn't have the right product mix in its exports to the US.
2. Considering its 1500 mile border with us and low cost labor pool along the border, Mexico could increase its exports of semi-manufactured goods from the present 1% of the US total to around 10%.
3. Since US tariffs on semi-finished goods are considerably lower than those on finished goods, there are excellent opportunities for US and Mexican initiative to use the twin-plant concept: two plants, one in Mexico and one in the US operating under a single management.
4. The Mexican plant would handle the labor intensive operations and the US plant the highly technological, capital intensive finishing operation. Twin cities along the border (e. g., El Paso - Suarez) or in close proximity (e. g., Tijuana - San Diego) provide ideal facilities for the twin-plant concept.
5. Joint ventures along the border offers the American manufacturers closer communication, better operational control, improved manufacturing cost position, and participation in the profits of the Mexican plants. The potential for production of semi-manufactured goods in Mexico could run as high as \$400 - \$600 million a year.

What AFL/CIO fears is that the attractiveness of the twin-plant concept will result in US industry transferring its labor intensive operations to Mexico and creating increased unemployment among our semi-skilled and unskilled workers. They say this is already taking place on a small scale and could grow very quickly.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, Oct. 18, 1967
6:10 p. m.

53

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

I'm sure you know how you want to handle this evening's meeting; but this possible agenda may suggest something to you:

1. Ask Sect. Rusk to summarize briefly the history of the Paris channel and read aloud the last communication.

2. Ask Mr. Kissinger for any supplementary impressions and for his judgment and recommendation on the last message.

3. State the three major options open to us:

-- close out the Paris channel; resume full-scale bombing; and await a response from Hanoi consistent with your San Antonio formula;

-- close out the Paris channel; resume full-scale bombing; and initiate a pause at a later time;

-- move from the present state of the Paris channel to an early bombing pause.

You may wish to ask Sect. Rusk to summarize briefly his view of the pros and cons of these three courses of action without asking him to make a net recommendation.

4. You may then wish to go around the table asking the views of those present on which course they recommend and why.

5. In the light of that discussion you might ask Sect. Rusk to re-summarize the situation if he believes any new elements have been introduced.

6. You may then wish to adjourn with a smaller party, thanking Mr. Kissinger and telling him that he would receive his instructions in due course.

W. W. R.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-452
By ij, NARA, Date 7-17-95

Pres file

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, October 18, 1967
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked a number of interesting passages in Amb. Bunker's weekly report to you. My impressions are:

-- We are really fighting two campaigns, one in I Corps under pressure at the DMZ, which is now about half the total war; the other campaign in II, III and IV Corps, which is going well but slowly with reduced contacts and casualties on both sides. This comes out clearly in the population control discussion on page 5.

-- On the whole Thieu seems to be dealing with his political problems intelligently, although we may have a crisis over the Prime Minister yet.

-- The economic situation is improving markedly with a further drop in prices.

-- On the whole, the Vietnam enterprise is a going concern, if we can buy time for it in U. S. politics.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 8875

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

WWRostow:rlm

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date 11-20-94

Wednesday, October 18, 1967

54a

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 8875)

Herewith my twenty-fifth weekly telegram:

A. General

The political side, the past week, has been a relatively quiet one. While Thieu and Ky have been wrestling with the problems of forming the new government, the campaign for the Lower House has been picking up momentum. The list of candidates has been gradually whittled down from some 1,650 to about 1,200 or an average of a little under nine candidates for the 137 seats. The distribution, however, is uneven since there are, for example, some 217 candidates for the 15 Saigon seats. Our guess is that the voter turnout will be lower than in the Presidential elections with percentage somewhere in the low seventies. There is a build-up of interest, however, in the provinces outside of Saigon. Thieu told me yesterday that he thought the voter turnout in the provinces might turn out to be as high as 80 percent of the registration, but he believed that Saigon was suffering from a more jaded appetite for elections and anticipated a considerably lower percentage here.

General Thieu has been largely preoccupied with the problems of putting together the new government during the past week. While he confirmed to me on October 13 that his choice for Prime Minister remained Nguyen Van Loc and intimated this again yesterday when I saw him in company with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden, he made it clear that he has run into some opposition by some of the Southern Vietnamese to Loc's appointment. Loc has encountered some disfavor among some of these elements since, although a southerner himself, he supported Ky in the struggle with the southern bloc and is therefore considered something of a renegade. Thieu intimated that Loc might find difficulties in putting together a cabinet and he himself would have to make the appointments. He did not want to have the same old faces in the new government. It must show a new face to the people. Probably because of this situation, other names, including that of Nguyen Van Bong, Rector of the National Institute of Administration, and Truong Thai Ton have cropped up again in the gossip. I believe, however, that Thieu will go ahead with the Loc appointment since he has made this the touchstone of his relationship with Ky. I have told him that I feel strongly that this is the most important factor to keep in mind in the formation of the new government and that if he considers the appointment of Loc essential to this, we would support it. It is encouraging to note that Ky commented to the press on October 14 denying the existence of any disagreements between him and General Thieu. He specifically accused foreign newsmen of fabricating "these stories with the purpose of creating disagreement and dissension within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam." He stressed that "nothing can divide the Army."

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Authority: RAC 11139 (#232) + NLJ/CBS/D
By 114/RG/NARA, Date 3-8-07

Regarding the cabinet, it appears likely that Thieu will retain Tran Van Do as Foreign Minister, although perhaps with a good Deputy as Administrator; General Nguyen Van Vy as Minister of Defense; General Nguyen Duc Thang as Deputy to the Chief of the Joint General Staff, with authority over Regional and Popular Forces and Revolutionary Development training. I again mentioned to Thieu the high opinion we held for Nguyen Huu Hanh, present Minister of Economy, and my hope that he could be persuaded to continue in this post. Incidentally, Hanh, who has just returned from the United States, expressed to Bob Komer his extreme irritation at reports which had been circulated during his absence that he was a candidate for the post of Prime Minister, that he had American support, and that he had submitted to Thieu a proposed cabinet list. He attributed the circulation of these rumors to Ky and Loan and expressed strong resentment of what he considered an effort to undercut him. Like Thang, however, Hanh is inclined to be somewhat emotional and I hope that this tempest too will blow over. I also expressed our good opinion of Pham Kim Ngoc and suggested that he might be a very good choice as Minister of Agriculture; and that a suitable cabinet post for Dr. Phan Quang Dan would help broaden the base of the government. I also expressed the hope that Tran Van Huong could be persuaded to accept the Inspectorate position and Thieu indicated that it was his hope that Huong would accept the appointment and that it would be possible to have him elected Chairman.

In my talk with Thieu on the 13th, I noted that in his speech to the New Senate, he had referred to the need to emphasize the role of the political parties and to respect the right of the opposition as a political reality of democracy. I asked him how he envisaged the development of a party system here. He replied that he thought this would have to come in stages, given the present party fragmentation and the highly individualistic character of the Vietnamese. He thought the first step would be the formation of what he called "groupings" such as those now being developed by Tran Van Don and his associates and by Huyen Van Cao and Nguyen Gia Hien who have announced the formation of the National-Democracy-Society Bloc (Quoc Dan Xa). Thieu indicated that he rather favored the group being formed by Cao and Hien. He said also that Ha Thuc Ky and Tran Van Huong were considering another "grouping". He thought that after the Lower House elections and the organization of the National Assembly, these "groupings" would gradually take form and begin to attract other elements to them.

In answer to my query as to how he anticipated marshalling support for government policies in the new Assembly, he said he anticipated that when the government program was announced it would draw support of some of the groups being formed within the Assembly. This might be the beginning of the formation of a larger party and the same process might be followed in the formation of an opposition party or parties. He thought, however, the process could not be forced

and that it would take some time. He remarked that the new administration had been elected for a four-year term, which gave time to work toward the development of parties on a sound basis. To force the issue too rapidly could result in the formation of alliances with little stability. It would be preferable to see first how the "groupings" took shape and to work a little more slowly but perhaps more soundly toward the eventual coalescence into larger parties.

Regarding the Buddhist problem, which I have discussed at some length in previous weekly telegrams, Thieu told me he was continuing to work through intermediaries with both sides and felt that some progress was being made. He said yesterday that he hoped to be able to meet personally with the two main Buddhist factions perhaps today or tomorrow. I noted that the issue had been defused for the present. Tri Quang has been very quiet and the funeral in Can Tho on October 8 for the Buddhist nun who burned herself to death was very orderly and resulted in no serious problems. Buddhist protest activity elsewhere in the country, stimulated by the extremist An Quang Pagoda crowd, has been handled with suitable finesse by the local authorities. Thieu said yesterday that Tri Quang had remarked that the religious problem could be easily settled, but it was the political problem with which he was concerned; an observation, Thieu remarked, which indicates Tri Quang still harbors resentment against the government and has designs against it.

In my conversations with Thieu on October 13 and 17, we reviewed the prospects for further reinforcement of the Thai contingent in Vietnam and the announcements by Australia and New Zealand of the increase of their contingents.

Thieu said that naturally he was greatly pleased with the prospects of additional aid, but that the Government of Vietnam also must and would step up its own efforts. He said that additional manpower requirements for military needs in 1968 would come to 206,000 which included covering an additional 65,000 men for the armed forces, casualties, desertions, and other losses. In order to meet these requirements, it would be necessary to draft 18- and 19-year classes, to extend the service of those now in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, and to recall some men who had been demobilized. (General Westmoreland has pointed out the serious deficiencies developing in leadership, particularly in the rank of captain.) Thieu said he proposed to take these steps before the inauguration of the new government in order to avoid running into protracted debate in the new National Assembly. He added that active steps would have to be taken to root out corruption in the military and civil administrations and that reorganization of both the armed forces and of the civil administration must be tackled promptly. The new government would have to show through its efforts that it was determined to do its full part to shorten the war. He emphasized again yesterday the impatience of the people to see things move ahead and the fact that they were looking to the new government for action.

In my talk with Thieu yesterday, we referred to his statements about an approach to Hanoi and had a brief discussion on the matter. I shall report on this separately in more detail. Phil Habib explained that Secretary Rusk had wished him to say that our determination had been clearly expressed and would continue to be so expressed, but we also had kept all the doors to peace open and would continue to do so, but as of today there had been no response from Hanoi. Thieu responded that on their part they would like to show that even though this country is invaded, it is anxious for peace and wants to keep the door open. The question is how an approach is to be made. It is clear that his views are still indefinite. He sees two possible approaches:

A. An expression of desire for peaceful settlement and for direct discussions to achieve that end. If this produced a favorable response, Thieu would ask us to halt bombing. We would assume that reciprocal action would be forthcoming from the other side.

B. A halt in bombing to be followed immediately by a message to Ho proposing immediate talks.

The first of the two proposed alternatives seems to me clearly preferable. I told Thieu I would report his views immediately and would come back to him with our reactions. We emphasized the fact that it was important to have the very closest consultation and collaboration on any approach and that it was also important to avoid anything in the nature of an ultimatum. Thieu agreed on both counts and I am satisfied that he will not take action without close consultation and approval on our side.

Regarding the National Liberation Front, he made it clear again that he felt a change of administration offered an occasion to renew the offer of reconciliation. The Government of Vietnam had channels to the National Liberation Front and while a coalition was not acceptable, offers could and should be made to individuals, especially under the National Reconciliation Program. Thieu felt that the front perhaps was in a position to understand better than Hanoi the dismal prospects offered by continuation of the war, that its ability to maintain action for long periods has broken down, that it is unable to mount large scale attacks, had lost momentum and been obligated to disperse into smaller units resorting to harassment and terror as a substitute for the capability which they had previously possessed.

This past week we have particularly benefited from the opportunity to meet and talk at some length with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden. They have put forth very frankly the picture of Vietnamese developments as seen in Washington and have made clear to us, as no written message can, the problems you face at home. For our part, as I think this series of messages has shown, we are urging,

encouraging, pushing, persuading, and suggesting to the Government of Vietnam areas in which its performance should be improved. We continue to anticipate real progress, but, in all honesty, we must say that we don't think the progress can be as dramatic as we would like it to be. As I note below in the political section, we are encountering increased criticism in the Vietnamese press (uncensored since July and increasingly making use of its new freedom) that we are trying to dictate to the Government of Vietnam. We will need to pick the areas where we exert our influence fairly carefully in order not to overload the circuit. We shall be discussing priorities with Phil Habib and Bill Jorden this week. But we will do all that we can to get the absolute maximum of which the Government of Vietnam is capable under present circumstances and do our best to improve its future capabilities.

We also have with us a three-man, top-level delegation from the AFL-CIO, including Joseph Keenan, AFL-CIO Vice President and Secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Richard Walsh, AFL-CIO Vice President and President of the Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees; and Irving Brown, International Representative of the AFL-CIO. They are accompanied by George Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Labor Affairs. The purpose of the visit is to discuss a union-to-union aid program with officers of the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor. However, we feel sure we will get some strong statements of support for our whole Vietnamese policy position, which should be of real benefit.

B. Pacification

The modest but consistent upturn in population and hamlets under Government of Vietnam control, as shown by our new hamlet evaluation system, continued increasing. Secure population increased 92,500, upping the percent of total population secured to 69 percent. Sixty-four hamlets were added to the secure category while Viet Cong-controlled hamlets decreased by 51.

Approximately equal increases in secure population occurred in the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps. First Corps showed a 6,300 decrease, reflecting continued enemy large-unit activity in the northern provinces. In Quang Tri alone there was a decrease of 4,000. Enemy pressure in Quang Ngai resulted in the loss of 6,700 people from the secure categories of hamlets. In the Second Corps, Binh Dinh showed the greatest improvement with an increase of 23,300 people in the highest or "A" category hamlets. Around Saigon in the Third Corps, there was a gain of 25,800 people in secure hamlets in Gia Dinh Province and 7,600 in neighboring Binh Duong. Most notable improvement in the Fourth Corps took place in Vinh Long and Kien Giang Provinces. Nowhere in the Second, Third, and Fourth Corps was there any significant loss of population control.

Refugees -- The Senate Hearings and a concurrent set of adverse news articles seem to have given a negative cast to the growing U. S. /Government of Vietnam refugee effort out here. As in almost every other field, we still have a long way to go in cranking up the Government of Vietnam to adequately care for its refugees. But this should not be allowed to obscure the more important fact that we have come a long way, especially in the last six months. We and the Government of Vietnam have steadily increased the amount of dollars, piasters, commodities, and effort employed in refugee care. Once again, the problem is one of the press accentuating the negative and ignoring the positive. In this case, the chief culprit was UPI.

C. Military

The military situation was somewhat less active during the past week.

The enemy has failed in his objectives at Con Thien and paid a tremendous price in the process. General Westmoreland reported that during the past month the greatest concentration of conventional fire power in the history of warfare was applied to the enemy in this area. He attacked last week with one battalion, probably in order to save face, but was driven off. Shelling has been reduced, but Intelligence indicates that he is still trying to get in supplies and ammunition although further hampered by the flooding of the Ben Hai River.

The military situation was not particularly active in the rest of the country except for a heavy action yesterday half-way between War Zone C and D on the boundary between Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces, in which 61 U. S. and more than 100 of the enemy were killed. This appears to be a major base area, stockpiled with rice and ammunition.

A further dramatic development during the past week has been the capture of a large arms, ammunition, and medical cache by the Ninth Division east of Saigon at the boundary intersection of Bien Hoa and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. The hill included 75 MM. howitzers and recoilless rifles, 57MM. recoilless rifles, 60MM. and 83MM. mortars, 159 machine guns, nearly 1,000 small arms, large quantities of ammunition, and medical supplies.

Yesterday a group of North Vietnamese soldiers on the Bong Son Plain, Binh Dinh Province, Central Coast, flagged down a U. S. helicopter and surrendered. They led the Americans to another group of six North Vietnamese soldiers who surrendered. They were part of a group of 200 North Vietnamese whose base camp was subjected to U. S. air strikes, killing 50 and scattering the rest into the jungle. This is interesting because:

A. The group, on surrendering, displayed a psychological warfare leaflet dropped by American planes.

B. The incident reinforces statements of prisoners of war and in captured documents about hardships of North Vietnamese soldiers and weakened morale.

C. The flagging down of a U.S. helicopter with a white flag is more risky to the surrenderers and greater evidence of hardships and weakened morale than the occasional individual North Vietnamese Hoi Chanh or prisoner of war's surrendering on the battlefield. A clipping of Saigon news story is being pouched.

General Westmoreland has moved a brigade of the First Cavalry Division to Quang Tin Province so that Marines could be moved further north to counter the threat to Quang Tri.

D. Political

I have mentioned Prime Minister Ky's denial of any disagreements between him and General Thieu. According to a reliable CAS report, Ky on October 9 indicated that he envisaged for himself a major role in effecting reforms in provincial administration, while looking to the future Prime Minister to concentrate on economic and educational matters. Ky indicated that he saw a need to remove about 30 of the existing province chiefs and their staffs, replacing them with about 150 of the most highly regarded majors and lieutenant colonels in the Army, who would first be assigned to a four- or five-week training course in early December. This would, I feel, be a major shakeup, since there are 44 provinces in South Vietnam. It is encouraging to see Ky addressing himself to a major problem -- the quality of provincial administration -- which is directly related to the potential effectiveness of the whole pacification program.

I have referred to the fact that the Lower House elections campaign is attracting increased public interest as election day, October 22, approaches, especially in the provinces. By contrast to the Presidential and Upper House elections, when people in the provinces did not know the candidates at all well, in many cases they know the candidates for the Lower House and see in the outcome a direct relationship with their interests. On the whole, I get the impression the elections are going well. Of the more than 1200 candidates for 137 seats, almost 300 are government officials, about 200 are school teachers, 150 are military officers, 150 are businessmen, 125 are professionals (doctors, lawyers, etc.), about 100 are members of provincial and village councils, and 40 were members of the constituent assembly. Only about 70 are farmers, but this is typical of an under-developed country, where a "farmer" is a "peasant," having had little opportunity for education in the past.

Although 1200 candidates is a large number for the 137 seats, this represents a substantial reduction from the 1650 who originally filed for the elections. Many withdrew, and a number were challenged by local election councils. One candidate, an Army of the Republic of Vietnam captain, was assassinated by the Viet Cong in Long An Province on October 12. Of those challenged under the law, a total of 152 were reviewed by the Central Elections Council in Saigon, and 54 were found qualified to run. I have the impression that considerable care was exercised in this process. The people will in any case have a substantial range of candidates to choose from.

Following the inauguration of the Senate on October 11, which I mentioned in my twenty-fourth weekly telegram, the first working session was held on October 12. Deputies were appointed by consensus to assist the Acting Chairman, who is the eldest Senator and who has not previously presided over a legislative body, and the Acting Secretary General, who is the youngest Senator and a Montagnard whose knowledge of Vietnamese has some limits. Messages are being drafted to be sent to the nation as a whole, to the U. N., and to the parliaments of friendly nations. In addition, there was inconclusive discussion of a possible resolution calling on the government to amnesty a considerable number of prisoners in celebration of the election of the Senate. Finally, temporary committees on validation of the election of the Upper House and on rules were appointed. At the request of General Tran Van Don, who is one of the main candidates for Chairman of the Senate, we provided a copy of the U. S. Senate rules and procedures for the use of the Vietnamese Upper House. All in all, the Upper House is off to a good start, has a good and effective membership, and gives promise of turning in a good performance.

Stimulated in part by the Martin and Perry articles in Newsweek (discussed in my twenty-fourth weekly telegram) and in part as a result of greater press freedom since the abolition of press censorship in July, there has been a growing number of articles and editorials in the press critical of alleged U. S. infringement on Vietnamese sovereignty. While many of the articles refer specifically to the Martin and Perry articles, assuming them to have been officially inspired by the U. S. Government, other articles take off on other irritants in U. S. - Vietnamese relations. The critical themes focus on the following allegations:

A. The U. S. intends to decide on peace negotiations without consultation with the Vietnamese, despite the fact that it is the Vietnamese who should have the ultimate say in any negotiations.

B. The U. S. is increasingly following in the footsteps of the French in seeking to control all internal affairs of Vietnam.

C. U. S. policies cause the war to be prolonged by giving the enemy encouragement to continue the struggle and by sowing dissension among anti-Communist Vietnamese.

I do not believe anti-Americanism has reached a level of intensity which could be considered critical. We must expect, however, that such allegations are almost certain to be heard with increasing frequency with the development of open political activity, including an elected National Assembly, and with an uncensored press to originate and stimulate discussions on many of them. Statements by prominent Americans on Vietnam get extensive play in the Vietnamese

press, particularly those which are more critical of the Vietnamese. We have seen quite a few such statements from prominent Americans outside the Executive Branch of our government in recent weeks. It does only limited good to make clear, as we have, that these statements do not represent the views of the United States Government. The Vietnamese know very well that they have plenty of defects and shortcomings and have a long way to go before they have a government that functions to their own satisfaction. Understandably, they do not appreciate being criticized as sharply as they have been recently by some prominent Americans, and the articles critical of the U. S. in the local press are a reflection of this resentment. It is part of a natural and healthy process, but it adds a new dimension to our relations.

Considering the problem we have had with the American correspondents here and the critical articles they have written, which have, in turn, stimulated some of the adverse comments on the Vietnamese in the United States, it was ironic to read that R. W. Apple of the New York Times blamed the critical articles in the Vietnamese press on the Embassy. Apple, who has been a firm advocate of using U. S. leverage with the Government of Vietnam, claims that we make a practice of going in and hitting the Vietnamese hard on all manner of issues, stimulating Vietnamese irritation and sensitivity. We have commented publicly to the press, in response to questions, that our relations with the Government of Vietnam cover a wide range of common interests and that they are excellent.

Another reflection of our press problems was the effect created by an unfortunately sharply-edited UPI report of a Thursday night press back-grounder held at the Juspao Director's home on October 12. The UPI report alleged that there is extensive graft and corruption in the Vietnamese administration of the refugee program. The AID official briefing the reporters at the back-grounder acknowledged the validity of some of the correspondents' accusations that there was profiteering on the part of an unspecified number of district officials. The statements attributed to him by UPI and distributed in the U. S. on October 14 were not accurate, however. We released a statement on October 15 noting an intensification of our activities in the refugee field with the anticipated arrival of 20 experts in the field of refugee this week. A CBS television interview of October 13 and a longer and more detailed study of the refugee problem by UPI, now underway, should help to place this important problem in better perspective.

The attacks against prominent Chinese continued with an unsuccessful attempt made on October 11 on the life of Deip Van Hung (Chinese name is Yeh Wen Hsing), a member of the outgoing National Assembly and a candidate for the Lower House. The Chinese Ambassador, Hu Lien, told Ambassador Locke on October 3 that recent rash of attacks on the Chinese community is part of a Viet Cong effort, begun about a month ago, to infiltrate and control the Chinese community.

The Viet Cong radio and the Hanoi-controlled Vietnam News Agency reported the Second Congress of Viet Cong Heroes and Fighters was recently held in South Vietnam. The announcement is of interest as containing a reference to the Viet Cong forces as the "Peoples Liberation Armed Forces", possibly a new name which will become standard usage in the future. There is nothing new about the attacks on the armed forces and people of South Vietnam, whose tragic results are set forth below in the section on Vietnamese Killed.

E. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index dropped five points to 290 compared to 295 the preceding week, with prices of protein foods and vegetables declining due to increased arrivals on the market. The Imported Commodity Index rose from 218 last week to 219 this week, with most prices remaining stable.

The Government of Vietnam tax collection for September totalled more than \$1.5 billion compared to \$0.9 billion in the same period last year, an increase of 72.6 percent. Total tax collections in 1967 will probably exceed by one-half billion piasters the \$17.1 billion predicted for 1967. Income tax collections for the first nine months of this year have slightly doubled over those for the same period of 1966, and these taxes represent a significant 17.5 percent of all taxes collected by the Government of Vietnam.

As part of our anti-inflation program, tight piaster expenditures ceilings for 1967 were imposed on the various elements of the U. S. Mission late last year. The results of this piaster control program have been very gratifying: A Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, ceiling of \$42 billion was set -- we now estimate Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, piaster expenditures for 1967 will be only around 37 billion; a civilian piaster ceiling of \$16 billion was established. We now estimate expenditures of 16.7 billion piasters, only slightly above the ceiling in spite of unanticipated heavy spending for housing the greatly increased number of official U. S. personnel. Counting another 1 billion piasters for emergency handling of cargos during the port crisis, this means total U. S. expenditures for the year of less than 55 billion, compared to the ceiling of 58 billion.

Next year, we intend again to carry out an effective U. S. piaster control program, although total expenditures will have to increase by several billion piasters.

Government of Vietnam spending next year will increase substantially, largely because of increases in military and pacification personnel and because of the further expansion and intensification of the pacification program. This increase in spending will result in further inflationary pressures, though we think

they will be manageable. But it is essential that the Government of Vietnam take effective action to increase its tax revenues at a faster pace. We intend to press the government hard on this matter, and hope to see some results. In particular, I want to try to persuade Thieu and Ky to take action now to increase sharply taxes on gasoline and other petroleum products. This is the quickest and simplest way to provide some increased revenue. Automobile gas sells here for only 31 cents a gallon and is far too cheap for an underdeveloped country, let alone for a country at war.

An interesting item and an indication of progress is the fact that high profits earned by vegetable farmers in the Dalat area have enabled them to purchase modern agricultural equipment despite high credit costs. Two-wheel, Japanese-made tractors have been particularly popular. Eighty of the 100 Kubota tractors imported by the vegetable cooperative in Tuyen Duc Province have been sold. If credit restrictions were eased, the Government of Vietnam and AID area officials estimate tractor sales could reach 500 per year.

F. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 288, lower than the 1966 figure of 315 for the same period last year. The lower rate may in part reflect the continuing uncertainty on the Government of Vietnam side pending formation of the new government, which may have hampered activity designed to increase the flow of returnees. There is a question as to whether we will match in 1967 the spectacular rise that took place in the last two months of 1966.

However, the Government of Vietnam administration of the Chieu Hoi Program continues to improve without loss of momentum. Starting this week, the first 10 Army of the Republic of Vietnam reserve officers hired and trained to replace ineffective Chieu Hoi leaders will start work. A total of 25 of these officers will enter on duty this month, and an additional 25 next month. The total number of Chieu Hoi returnees so far this year is 23,906.

G. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 14, the enemy killed 103 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 143 and kidnapped 55. Among the dead were three Village Chiefs, 1 Village Council Member, Four Hamlet Chiefs, one policeman, and one newspaper editor. During the week the enemy killed 230 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,710 civilians, wounded 5,409, and kidnapped 3,737.

55
Wednesday, Oct. 18, 1967
5:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Not having time to draft myself, I asked Bob Ginsburgh to do for me a memorandum justifying a you-call-me negotiating posture. It contains, incidentally, for the first time a collection of all of the evidence on how the weight of the war has shifted to I Corps where, of course, our bombing across the DMZ is of critical importance.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE attachment

Pres file

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~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-452
By lip, NARA, Date 7-17-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vietnam War and Peace Strategy

This memorandum explores the option of adopting a you-call-me posture, resuming our full bombing program in the north, including Hanoi.

The disadvantages are these:

- Most importantly, it might eliminate the possibility -- small as it may be -- that Hanoi is interested in serious negotiations.

- It might "blow" the Paris channel leading to accusations that once again we had escalated at the very moment when serious negotiations were imminent.

- It would fail to gain us the support of those more moderate doves who could be brought back on board with a bombing pause.

On the other hand, following up on the Paris channel with a bombing pause at the present time does not seem especially attractive because:

- there has been very little movement via the Paris channel considering that we have been at it for two months;

- if we believe Hanoi's public posture, Hanoi is only prepared to negotiate their victory;

- we would be giving up in advance what Max Taylor calls our biggest blue chip;

- although Hanoi is losing, they have not yet lost; if their current strategy is to sweat out the war, hoping for a change forced by U. S. public opinion, a pause would (1) make it easier for them to last the course militarily and (2) lend added weight to the view that the U. S. will weaken;

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

- if Hanoi is not serious, we would lose in a few weeks' time most of the military advantages which have accrued from our sustained interdiction of the last six months (Bunker and Westy have persuasively argued the serious military disadvantages of any pause lasting more than 24 to 72 hours.);

- despite Hanoi's insistence on a cessation of bombing as a precondition for talks, classic communist doctrine exhorts them to exploit weakness and to retire in the face of strength in order to live to fight another day. In Korea, the communists finally accepted terms which they were offered two years earlier -- at a time when we were increasing our military pressure and threatening to use more;

- on the basis of past experience, we would find it politically difficult to resume the bombing until long after we were privately convinced that a continuation of a pause was unfruitful.

Hopefully, we are on the threshold of a greater awareness that we are making progress in this war. Within government, there is a growing appreciation that very extensive consequences flow from our bombing of the north even though we cannot reduce capacity so they can't get men and supplies through to the south. Recent articles (such as those by Baldwin and Max Taylor and forthcoming articles by Roscoe Drummond) should lead to greater public appreciation of progress in the south, plus the relationship of bombing to the over-all effort.

A bombing pause would reverse this trend.

A you-call-me posture would (1) clarify this trend, (2) clear up the confusion in the public mind -- and in Hanoi -- caused by making peace overtures while fighting, and (3) lead to a greater awareness that negotiations are not an end in themselves.

In recent months, the ground war in the south has become almost two separate campaigns -- the battles in I Corps and the campaign in the rest of South Vietnam. We are making major progress in II, III, and IV Corps -- which has been obscured by the intense battles around the DMZ.

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~~TOP SECRET -- SENSITIVE~~

In the last two years, in I Corps as compared to all of South Vietnam:


- small unit actions have increased from 35% to 65%;
- incidents have gone up from 20% to 35%;
- enemy killed in action from 25% to 50%;
- South Vietnamese casualties have mounted from about 20% to 40%;
- ARVN weapon losses from 20% to 30% and VC/NVA weapon losses from a low of 15% in June 1966 to 35%.
- enemy defections have decreased from 12% to 8%.

These factors argue for a continuation of the bombing, which is most directly relevant to the area of the most severe fighting.

Adoption of a you-call-me posture would require:

- informing Hanoi through the Paris channel that we were adopting such a posture;
- informing Thieu of this posture and urging him to speak accordingly in his inaugural -- simply expressing a desire for peaceful settlement and for direct discussions to achieve that end -- but no request for us to halt the bombing unless this produces a favorable response;
- a Presidential statement stating our posture;
- a decision as to whether we should take the initiative in "blowing" the Paris channel -- the tactics of such an initiative -- or the contingency defensive tactics if we wait for others to blow the channel.


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-327

By ip NARA Date 8-31-96

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