

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a memo	Eban, Harman, Evron, Rostow, Saunders <i>Open 11/8/00 NSC-194</i> S 6 p Exempt 12-12-94 NLJ 94-453	10/23/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i> [Duplicate of "86a, NSF, Country File, Ceylon, Vol. I]	10/24/67	A
#8 memo	Rostow to President TS 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/24/67	A
#8a cable Not open yet	Saigon 9433 TS 4 p <i>Open 8/3/95 NY 94-450</i>	10/24/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, re: Philippines S 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i> [Duplicate of #176, NSF, Country File, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Exempt NLJ 86-140]	10/24/67	A
#9a cable	Manila 464 <i>Open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #176a, NSF, Country File, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Exempt NLJ 86-141]	10/24/67	A
#9b cable	Manila 465 <i>Open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #176b, NSF, Country File, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Exempt NLJ 86-141]	10/24/67	A
#11b memo	Brown to Secretary <i>Open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i> S 2 p	10/23/67	A
#16 ltr	President to Kosygin PCI 4 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/23/67	A
#17b ltr	Duplicate of #16 <i>Open</i>		
#20 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>Open 4-6-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/24/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 47, 10/21-24/67

Box 24

RESTRICTION CODES

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#20a ltr	AEC to Rostow S 2 p <i>OPEN 7/10/96</i>	10/10/67	A
#20c memo	Katzenbach to Rostow S 2 p <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/20/67	A
#20e ltr	Helms to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 10-24-95 NLS 94-455</i>	10/20/67	A
#20f ltr	Wheeler to Rostow S 1 p <i>open NLS 96-273</i>	10/18/67	A
#20i ltr	Hornig to Rostow S 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/20/67	A
#20j cable	USUN 1524 S 3 p <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/18/67	A
#20o rpt	"Notes for Discussion of Nuclear..." C 6 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	undated	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, re: Haiti <i>sanitized 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i> S 1 p <i>same sanitization 8-14-97 NLS 95-189</i> [Duplicate of #17, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos] <i>Box 62</i> [Exempt 1979] <i>same sanitization 5-15-02 RAC 001-062-2-2</i>	10/24/67	A
#24a rpt <i>sanitized 8-14-97 NLS 95-189</i> <i>more info released</i> <i>SSO4 NLS/RAC 03-36 APPROX</i>	Intelligence Report S 2 p [Duplicate of #17a, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos] <i>Box 62</i> <i>same sanitization 2-28-08 NLS/RAC 03-36 ISCAP APPROX</i>	undated	A
#24b memo <i>sanitized 8-14-97 NLS 95-189</i> <i>more info released</i> <i>SSO4 NLS/RAC 03-36 APPROX</i>	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p <i>same sanitization 2-28-08 NLS/RAC 03-36 ISCAP APPROX</i> [Duplicate of #17b, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos] <i>Box 62</i>	9/22/67	A
#25a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>exempt 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i> S 2 p <i>open 5-19-00</i>	undated	A

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#25b ltr	Eshkol to President <i>Open 11/8/00 NLS 00-154</i> PCI 4 p <i>exempt 12-12-94 NLS 94-453</i> [Duplicate of #28d]	10/23/67	A
#28 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/24/67	A
#28a memo	Katzenbach to President S 3 p <i>Sanitized 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/24/67	A
#28b cable	Deptel to Tel Aviv (work copy) <i>Open 11/9/00 NLS 00-193</i> S 8 p <i>exempt 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/24/67	A
#28c cable	Partial duplicate of #28b		
#28d ltr	Partial duplicate of #25b <i>Open 11/8/00 NLS 00-194</i>		
#29 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>Sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i> <i>same San NLS 09-024-3</i>	10/29/67	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/23/67	A
#30a memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/21/67	A
#30e rpt	Talking Points C 4 p <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	undated	A
#30e rpt	Bio Sketch C 2 p <i>exempt NLS 09-024-3</i>	10/19/67	A
#45a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i> S 1 p <i>Dup #100, NSF, CFVN, "8A2" Box 101</i>	10/23/67	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. PCI 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/22/67	A
#48a draft	Goldberg to Kosygin S 7 p <i>open 1-9-95 NLS 94-450</i>	10/22/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52a cable	Saigon 9088 <i>open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i> C <i>6 p</i> [Duplicate of #10a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1G(3), 9/67-10/67, Elections"]	10/20/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President <i>sanitized 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i> S 1 p 1 p	10/21/67	A
#53a ltr	Hanoi Desp. 10 <i>exempt 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i> C <i>3 p</i> <i>Open 11/8/00 NS 00-193</i>	9/30/67	A
#56a cable	Wheeler to Rostow S 2 p	10/21/67	A
#56b cable	Saigon 9181 S <i>1 p</i> <i>open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i>	10/21/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President TS <i>1 p</i> <i>open 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454</i>	10/21/67	A
#58a cable	Paris 5545 TS <i>2 p</i> <i>OPEN 8/3/95 NLJ 94-450</i>	10/20/67	A
#60a cable	Intelligence Information Cable exempt 3-22-97 NLJ 95-818 S 5 p <i>sanitized 5-16-01 NLJ 00-195</i> [Duplicate of #59a, NSF, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. 4]	10/20/67	A
#61b memo	State to President, re: Laos C <i>3 p</i> <i>open 1-9-95 NLJ 94-450</i>	undated	A
13 memo	Rostow to President TS- 1 p. <i>exempt 5/03</i>	10/24/67	A
13a cable	intelligence cable TS- 2 p. <i>exempt 5/03</i>	10/23/67	A
34 memo	Rostow to President TS- 1 p. <i>exempt 5/03</i>	10/23/67	A

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CIA Report 10/10/67
report ^{predicting} increased mil. activity

2

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Tuesday, Oct. 24, 1967
10:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Before seeing Eban at 5:30 this afternoon, you may wish to read this account of my conversation yesterday with him. The key points are marked.

Free file

W. W. R.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date 11-5-91

~~SECRET~~

26
October 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Abba Eban, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs
Avraham Harman, Ambassador of Israel
Ephraim Evron, Minister of Israel
W. W. Rostow
Harold H. Saunders

Time: 11 a.m., October 23, 1967, in Mr. Rostow's office.

Mr. Eban began by alluding to the sinking of the Israeli destroyer over the weekend. In his view, it raised the questions of both Egyptian motivation and Egyptian technological proficiency. He said the Israeli government found itself asking some of the same questions which had been faced after 23 May: What is the extent of Soviet involvement? Do the Egyptians feel they are operating under the cover of Soviet protection?

Eban said the Israelis had felt the Egyptians were pursuing a "conservative policy" on the cease-fire. However, there could be no question that the sinking was a "classic act of war." Israel would prefer to deal with this incident as a matter between them and the Egyptians.

Mr. Rostow reminded Mr. Eban that this was not the first Egyptian-Israeli military engagement since the cease-fire and that there had even been a previous naval engagement. Mr. Rostow said that our intelligence suggests that the Israeli destroyer was within ten miles of the Egyptian coast. Mr. Eban said his information was that it was more like 13.5 or 14 miles away. Mr. Evron, who had been called out to the phone momentarily, returned with the word that the Soviet Deputy Defense Minister had just arrived in Cairo. Mr. Rostow concluded this part of the conversation by saying he hoped that the Foreign Minister's discussion with the President would range more widely than the weekend's naval engagement.

Moving on to Soviet intentions, policy and position, Mr. Rostow said we had some intelligence reports which suggest that the Soviets have urged the Arabs to try for a political settlement but have said the Arabs could count on some unidentified Soviet support if the Israelis made a political settlement impossible.

Mr. Eban characterized Soviet policy as follows: The USSR is not looking for peace, although it is not looking for war either. It uses the Middle East as an arena for pursuing its global interests, many of which relate to the U.S. Its objectives are to make the Arab-Socialist countries more Socialist, to draw other Arabs away from their western ties and to divide the Western allies.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-194
By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00

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- 2 -

Speaking on the Soviet position in the Middle East, he felt that the Soviets have lost ground in the last few months. They did not come through on their commitments in June. The Arabs are now more interested in the U.S. (and the UK) than before because they see the West as essential to their own development and to their ability to arrive at a settlement with Israel. The total result has been a weakening of the Soviet position, despite all the superficial difficulties that the West suffers. Mr. Rostow agreed in general except for the weakening of the British pound. Mr. Eban said that even the British Foreign Minister tended to down-play this. Mr. Rostow agreed that in general we had been drifting in a positive direction.

With that, the conversation shifted to the question of who gains from the passage of time. Mr. Rostow agreed that some time had been on the side of a basic settlement but that our Government differs with the Israelis in feeling that the continued passage of time is not in a linear sense on the side of permanent peace. Mr. Eban felt that time "in the sense of weeks and months--not in the sense of years--is on the side of a realistic settlement."

Mr. Eban, commenting on how time's passing had affected Egyptian attitudes, said he believed that Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad now understands the need for a stable peace structure, is prepared to distinguish between Gaza and Egyptian territory and feels that the range of problems between Israel and the UAR is relatively limited and boils down to the question of an Israeli flag through the Suez Canal. One question he said the Israelis are not quite sure of is whether the UAR could conceive of a bilateral settlement with Israel or whether it would have to link its settlement with others this time.

Mr. Eban said he hoped we could soon move from the "tactical to the strategic plane." He saw the discussions in New York as a "watershed to be got over without prejudice or damage to future positions." He felt that if the Arabs could see that no one else would make a settlement for them, they would be face to face with a sharp picture of their alternatives; (1) to accept the present situation with a vague vision of one day being able to eliminate Israel; or (2) to settle down and find out what terms are available to them. If they chose the second course, the UAR "has reason to know" that they could get back Egyptian territory under the right circumstances.

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- 3 -

Mr. Rostow felt that the Arabs at Khartoum had moved broadly in the direction of political settlement and were mainly struggling for modalities. Mr. Eban said he was certain that what we and the Israelis meant by "political settlement" was somewhat different from what the Arabs meant.

Speaking of settlement terms, Mr. Eban said that, while the Israelis were not unanimous on the way the map should look after a settlement, they were unanimous on two points:

1. Juridically, this settlement must move from the impermanent arrangements of the past twenty years to a permanent basis;
2. Since they hoped to draw the map "with finality" this time, they must be sure that it is drawn to "maximize territorial security."

"We can not go back to June 5 lines in peace or war," Eban said. Israel has not decided how different the new lines should be. That will depend on how arrangements on the West Bank work out. Israelis are sure, however, that they can not tolerate a "divided jurisdiction" in Jerusalem, although they can go a long way toward accommodating non-Jewish interests there. Israel would hope to eliminate Egyptian influence in Gaza.

When Mr. Rostow said our Government feels there is a great difference between "minor and major modifications" in the lines, Mr. Eban came back with, "What your Government may consider minor may seem major to us." He spoke of the Syrian Heights and Gaza as "major."

On the West Bank, he said that Israel still had not decided what the proper relationship between "security and demography" should be. They had not decided whether to deal with the Palestinian Arabs "from within or from without." If Hussein presented himself for a settlement, Israel would have to decide. The nature of the settlement will depend on whether there is a context of negotiation and peace. The longer Hussein stays away, the greater will be the pressure in Israel to explore with the leaders of the West Bank the possibility of a separate Palestinian existence. He cited the example of Cypriot leaders who have given up their interest in enosis now that they have tasted independence. He said the same forces operate on the West Bank, but before West Bank leaders aspire to an independent existence, they insist on knowing whether Israel feels Hussein will be coming back or not.

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Mr. Rostow asked whether the dialogue with Hussein had continued. Mr. Eban said the main discussion had been over whether and when to meet. Israel would like to discuss such things as the benefit of long-term economic relationships but found this impossible until the two sides could talk.

When Mr. Rostow asked how the Israelis view the situation in Cairo, Mr. Eban described it as the characteristic Middle Eastern one of "stable instability." However, whereas he had thought earlier in the summer that Jordan's position was worse, now he felt that the UAR is suffering more heavily than Jordan, both politically and economically.

Mr. Eban said we should not forget that things are not standing still in Israel. There are numerous "wildcat committees" studying the "integrity of the homeland." He mentioned a convention beginning tomorrow and consisting of a good portion of the Weizmann Institute and Hebrew University. These groups are suggesting to the Israeli Government that it should not discard lightly the possibility of retaining all of Palestine and working out some dignified relationship with the West Bank Arabs. Taking the long view, they felt this would be more to Israel's advantage than any agreement calculated to improve the short term atmosphere. When he was asked whether this would not mean that some time is working against the Israeli government, he concluded by saying that, despite these pressures, if Hussein were to present himself for a settlement today, the Government of Israel would probably decide to give the West Bank back.

The discussion turned to King Hussein's intentions. Ambassador Harman interjected that Hussein's posture had been one of "active belligerency." When Mr. Rostow asked him how Israel viewed Hussein's position on infiltration, Harman said that either Hussein knows what is going on and does not stop it, or he can not. He says Israel has evidence that infiltrators have "wandered around openly in Jordan and have received help from Jordanian soldiers." Mr. Evron said that even the Jordanian Director of Military Intelligence had been involved. In the same vein, Ambassador Harman said that King Hussein must know what his representative in New York is doing.

Mr. Eban said that "Hussein no longer evokes the same feeling from Israelis" as he did before the war. Israelis blamed the Jordanians for three serious developments: (1) It was Jordanian gibes that provoked the Egyptians to move into Sharm-el-sheik; (2) it was the defense pact of 30 May that "made the war inexorable", (3) it was Jordan's actions on June 5 that killed all faith in him.

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- 5 -

There is in Israel what Mr. Eban described as "casualty psychology." The Israelis, having suffered, are not about to let their sacrifices be in vain. Mr. Rostow cautioned against Israel's letting itself be lured by the false short-run stability that hard-headedness might bring. Too hard a policy might in the long run make Israel's objective of achieving peace impossible. Mr. Rostow asked, for instance, why Israeli forces were on Tiran Island. Mr. Eban answered that "nature abhors a vacuum." The Egyptians had been on Tiran Island as far back as 1950 and Israel had a memorandum from the USG conveying Cairo's assurance that this would not prejudice Israeli freedom of passage through the Straits. More important, however, Mr. Eban said that if the Israelis moved out, the Saudis would probably move in. It is central to Israel's position that it can not leave its right to free passage on such a "fragile lease." Arrangements for free passage there must be "concrete."

Mr. Rostow spoke of his anxiety about the Israeli feeling--conveyed in the aide memoire given to Ambassador Goldberg--that they had learned in June the importance of being self-sufficient. Mr. Rostow said he felt it was dangerous to ignore that the US had held back the USSR and continued responsible for maintaining a Middle East policy that would limit the Soviet position. He said bluntly that, although he does not know whether the Secretary of State or President would agree with his view, he objected to an Israeli position which said that whether we give arms to moderate Arabs or not is our business, not theirs. Our recent discussions on ending the military aid freeze left him "troubled" because of the seeming failure to recognize Israel's interest in our maintaining a position with the Arabs.

Mr. Eban said that his only concern in the recent discussions over our military aid freeze was that his Government not be put in a position of endorsing American military shipments to Governments like that of Saudi Arabia which we might consider moderate but which had just called for the destruction of Israel.

On the broader point, Mr. Eban noted the "harsh facts" Israel faced in May and June. He acknowledged "fully and gratefully" the US ability to "neutralize the USSR." But Israel found that, on questions involving Israel and the Arab states, the US operated under certain inhibitions, both domestic and international. He felt he was only expressing a US interest in Israel's ability to defend itself so the US would not have to answer the question of what to do if Israel were overrun.

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- 6 -

Mr. Rostow asked about plans for the refugees. Mr. Eban said that his Government hoped to have a "blueprint" in November and hoped to consult with us on it. He said Israel had found out that the numbers of refugees were not so great as had originally been imagined. Also, resettlement was not just an agricultural matter because many of the refugees envisioned themselves as moving into an industrial job. Nevertheless, he said the problem is so vast that it would require an international and regional solution in which Israel would participate. He felt it would be essential to involve a consortium of interested countries to supplement UNWRA. He noted the irony that this year's UNWRA report had for the time "confessed" that many of the refugees had already been integrated into Arab economies.

Mr. Rostow suggested that the refugee problem offered a focus for regional cooperation. He mentioned that the financial arrangements made at Khartoum were a start on regional Arab economic cooperation and said he felt it was important to link this somehow to the refugees as a stepping stone to more permanent regional development cooperation.

In concluding, Mr. Eban stressed the importance of our making a decision on Israel's aircraft requests soon because the production line for the peculiar configuration of Skyhawk Israel is interested in closes down early in November.

H.S.

Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

1. ~~message~~
2. Pres file

October 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ceausescu Message

On October 20, a Romanian-American named Anghel N. Rugina gave Nat Davis of my staff a "message" from Ceausescu to you. The background is this:

Rugina went to Bucharest this September to a Centennial celebration of the Library of the Romanian Academy. He is a professor at Northwestern University and Chairman of the Board of Economic Advisors to the Governor of Massachusetts. Ceausescu received Rugina on September 26 -- probably as a gesture to the Rumanian-American community. During the meeting Rugina asked Ceausescu if he "would be prepared to send a message" to you. Ceausescu responded with a few comments about Romania's need for trade and desire to have American business concerns help in the construction of industrial plants. (Rugina's account of the exchange is at TabA.)

Obviously, Rugina is interested in publicity. He wanted us to issue a White House press release on his call. When turned down, he made some remarks about the Governor's office in Massachusetts wanting to make a statement about his trip to Washington. I doubt if the Governor's office is as anxious to do this as he thinks, but there is some possibility of minor publicity in Boston.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Christian

EXCERPT FROM ANGHEL RUGINA'S
REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO ROMANIA
September 25 - 30, 1967

3a

A Special Message to President Johnson

At this point I asked him whether he would be prepared to send a message to the President of the United States. Ceausescu answered in the affirmative. "Mr. Rugina," he said, "if you have a chance to communicate with President Johnson, this is what I have to say at this moment -- in addition to customary official greetings and best wishes for him personally, for his family and for the American people.

"I want to know where are those 'bridges to the East' that President Johnson likes to talk about in terms of a new foreign policy? We here in Romania are looking for real bridges of doing business with the United States. But up to now not even one single pillar of those desirable bridges has come to the surface. We do not want any propaganda; we want action. We are interested in dealing with American businessmen and manufacturers on the basis of mutual benefit. The Romanian Government is willing to discuss and grant any support and certain privileges to Americans and American corporations that want to establish a business or plant in Romania.

"If there is good will, interest and mutual trust, I am sure there must be some way that the 'bridges to the East' can become a reality and an instrument for better understanding and better relations between our two countries. The help is needed now and not at some hypothetical future date when we may not need it. We do not ask for special favors but rather an opportunity to do honest business and earn our share of benefit from the comparative advantage. In this respect, as I said before, we cannot understand why American businessmen are not interested in trading with Romania. I hope that I make clear our position."

In essence this is the verbal message Ceausescu directed to the President, to the best of my recollection.

4

Pres file

Tuesday, October 24, 1967
5:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft response to
the good letter from Mr. Voit to you.

W. W. Rostow

rlh

4a

October 24, 1967

Dear Mr. Voit:

At a troubled time, when our men are fighting, the President receives many letters. Occasionally there is one which strengthens his hand and lifts his heart. You should know that your letter of October 18 was a source of comfort and reassurance.

There is no course other than that which we are following compatible with our nation's interest, its values, its good name before the bar of history. It is good to know that there are citizens who understand this.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B Johnson

Mr. Richard L. Voit
Wolfe, Hubbard, Voit & Osann
One North La Salle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

10/20/67
C. 002

RICHARD RUSSELL WOLFE
HONORE C. HUBBARD
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TELEPHONE 983-7961
AREA CODE 818

October 18, 1967

H

The President
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Any responsible, thinking person must approve of your stand
on Viet Nam.

I am a Republican and this is the first time I have written to
you.

You are under a great deal of pressure, pressure applied by
highly placed people to admit defeat in our bombing of North Viet Nam.
A vociferous minority on the streets cries the same chant.

Do not weaken--do not give in. We are at war, and in war
the enemy recognizes only one thing: pressure.

Keep up the pressure and North Viet Nam will either disengage
themselves or indicate a willingness to talk.

In the latter event you realize, of course, in South Korea we
had more casualties after the peace talks began than before they started.
Let us not get booby trapped into that situation again.

Let the history books say that you and your country remained
resolute in the hour of testing. May God give you strength.

Yours respectfully,

Richard L. Voit

RLV:edb

Richard L. Voit

5

Tuesday, Oct. 24, 1967
5 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know:

1. The Israelis apparently struck heavily the two Egyptian refineries at Suez. This is probably their definitive act of retaliation against the loss of the destroyer (see attached tickers).

2. As I said on the phone, the Egyptians are calling for a Security Council meeting, which we hope will be tomorrow rather than tonight.

3. This gives you a chance not only to lean on Eban on the necessity of their struggling for peace, but letting it be known quietly that that was your message to him: there is no future for Israel or the Middle East in this kind of mutual violation of the cease-fire.

W. W. R.

FBIS 79
80

ap 125
129
13

UPI 80
81
82
132
133

Reuters (see all fighting)

6

Tuesday, October 24, 1967 -- 4:30 PM

Mr. President:

Attached is a proposed farewell
message to President Ahidjo of Cameroon.

Pres file

He leaves tomorrow from New York.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/RM/vmr

FAREWELL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT AHIDJO OF CAMEROON

Dear Mr. President:

I hope you have enjoyed your visit to the United States. It was a great honor to have you with us again.

I was especially pleased by our frank discussion of the problems which concern us both. I also want to repeat my strong view that what you are building in Cameroon represents the promise of the future for Africa.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you farewell and a pleasant journey home.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday, October 24, 1967 -- 4:30 PM

7

[Handwritten signature]
B. Pres file

Mr. President:

The Ceylonese Ambassador has asked ~~me~~ to see you briefly to present a silver casket of tea commemorating the 100th year of the tea industry in Ceylon. (The Ceylonese gave Queen Elizabeth one of these caskets last month.)

This is partly an advertising gimmick. Tea prices are now at a 20-year low, and the Ceylonese are feeling the pinch. They plan a publicity campaign in the United States beginning November 6. The presentation to you would not be used directly in the campaign.

State recommends -- and I agree -- that you try to do this for the Ceylonese if your schedule permits. We can't very well refuse a five-minute ceremony to receive their gift. If you are terribly pressed, however, we could ask the Vice President to do the honors.

Walt Rostow *

I'll do it _____

Have the Vice President do it _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-453
By cb, NARA, Date 4-11-95

* I'm about as ashamed to ask your time for this as anything I've sent up in a year and a half!

W

~~TOP SECRET/PENNSYLVANIA~~

8
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By CL, NARA, Date 4-11-95

Tuesday, October 24, 1967
4:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith, with his usual lucidity,
Amb. Bunker handles Thieu on his
inaugural formula on negotiations and
a pause.

Thieu accepts the idea of no pause
without a prior understanding along
San Antonio lines.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 9433 ~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

8a
Tuesday
October 24, 1967

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 9433)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-450
By ing, NARA, Date 7-21-95

I saw General Thieu at 9:00 a. m. on October 24 to discuss further efforts in the direction of negotiations and a peaceful settlement. I spoke to him along the following lines:

"My authorities in Washington have expressed their appreciation for the information you furnished me last week about a possible message to Ho Chi Minh following your inauguration. We agree fully with your view that it would be advisable to avoid the kind of message that would either be read in Hanoi as an ultimatum or elsewhere in the world as purely a propaganda move. We believe that serious peace initiatives by the newly elected government in Vietnam can be an important contribution to the allied position directed toward peace, and we are therefore gratified that you are giving serious thought to how your campaign pledges can be pursued and a more flexible position on the peace issue developed.

"We consider that it is vital for us to continue our close consultations on this subject. As our consultations proceed, we hope that you will limit the discussion of this important matter to the smallest possible circle of trusted advisors. We will do the same. I would appreciate knowing the persons with whom you will normally be discussing these subjects, and assume that General Ky and Foreign Minister Do will be among them. On my side, Ambassador Locke and Mr. Calhoun will be kept informed by me.

"You may have seen the recent article filed by Wilfred Burchett from Hanoi, but I have brought with me a copy of the full text in case you have not. This article seems to us an important public indicator of Hanoi's position. A North Vietnamese representative in another capital told a third-country diplomat only a few days before its publication to watch closely for it. We therefore believe it has special significance and clear authority from Hanoi. As we interpret the article, it represents a clear rejection of any possibility for cessation of the bombing except on the original terms of the January 28 interview between Foreign Minister Trinh and Burchett. These terms provided that the bombing should be stopped permanently with only vague possibility of talks and with no indication of military restraint on Hanoi's part. This new article clearly conveys the present hard mood of the leaders in Hanoi.

"For your personal information, you should know that reliable third-country intermediaries have been in contact with Hanoi during the past six weeks using the

~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA

kind of formula expressed by Ambassador Goldberg and President Johnson and including also the possibility of a lesser reduction in hostilities combined with preliminary contacts. These efforts reached a clearly negative conclusion at the same time as the Burchett article was published, with the Hanoi representative finally indicating an unwillingness even to talk further with the intermediaries. This private contact has completely confirmed our impression of a clearly negative position on the part of Hanoi toward any acceptable formula for stopping the bombing and probably more broadly toward any avenue to peace at the present time.

"We have been considering the alternatives mentioned by you last week in the light of these developments. We believe that your first alternative should be the only one used at this time. Our understanding of this alternative is that you would limit yourself to general statements on peace in your inaugural address and would confine your message to Ho Chi Minh to an expression of desire for a peaceful settlement and for direct discussions to achieve that end. If this produced a favorable response, you would then ask us to halt the bombing and we would assume that reciprocal action would be forthcoming from the other side. Since we believe the Burchett article will be read in a negative sense by most responsible opinion throughout the world, we believe that an offer to Ho along the lines of your second alternative, a halt in the bombing to be followed promptly by a message to Ho proposing immediate talks, would be widely regarded as only a propaganda gesture. We are sure that you would wish to avoid this reaction and we are furthermore inclined to believe that such a message in present circumstances might well be interpreted in Hanoi as a sign of weakness. In considering the alternative courses which you suggested, we have concluded that the first alternative would put your government in a favorable light internationally as well as within Vietnam, since it would highlight the contrast between Hanoi's intransigence and Saigon's reasonableness.

"My authorities in Washington would like to know immediately your reactions to these comments and your own plans for handling this important matter. We are considering what further action might be taken in this situation and would of course want to take your views into account in determining them. I plan also to talk with General Ky about this matter in the very near future."

Thieu said he agreed entirely that the first alternative proposed by him in our conversation October 18 was preferable. He said he plans to speak in general terms in his inaugural address October 31, expressing a desire for peaceful settlement, his readiness to talk with Hanoi leaders and to keep the door open. If there is a favorable response and indication of Hanoi's willingness to take reciprocal action, then he would seek a bombing pause.

Thieu said he would like our advice on a number of aspects of his course of action. Following his inaugural address he would plan to send a letter to Ho appealing to the latter's conscience, stating that the Vietnamese people have suffered for many years from war and it is in the interest of all of the Vietnamese people that the two of them should meet and talk about what might be done to end hostilities. Thieu added that the letter would be couched in terms which would not be construed as either an ultimatum or as escalation. He said he would make clear that as far as he is concerned the doors will remain open.

Thieu said several questions arise. First is the method of transmission of the letter. He saw several possibilities: (1) to send it through the ICC; (2) to have it transmitted through Prime Minister Sato who had offered his assistance during his October 21 visit; (3) to use the Government of Vietnam's own channels through North Vietnamese representatives in other capitals. Thieu wondered whether other personalities might be of assistance or be better than one of the foregoing channels. He seemed to have no strong preference among them, and would like to have our advice.

A second question related to how and when other countries should be informed of this communication. Thieu anticipated Ho would reject this letter and move to exploit it publicly as propaganda to strengthen the morale of North Vietnamese forces and population. From his own viewpoint, Thieu thought its principal value would be to establish publicly the new Government's desire for peace and its flexibility in achieving this aim. Thieu seemed to have no pronounced preference for public release by the Government or awaiting publication by Ho, and he wished our views.

Thieu agreed entirely that knowledge of these matters would be restricted very closely on both sides. He seemed to agree that Prime Minister Ky and Foreign Minister Do should be involved on the Government side, although he was not explicit on whom he would consult.

Comment: I plan to talk with Prime Minister Ky later today on this subject and will report any views he may have. It seems to me that Thieu's ideas are very much in line with our own and I would appreciate early instructions from the Department on the points on which Thieu asked our advice.

The general tenor of Thieu's letter sounds eminently reasonable and I shall attempt to get a copy of his draft as soon as he has one worked out. On the matter of channels for transmitting the letter to Ho, I do not see any overriding considerations arguing for one means or another. I am inclined to see some

advantage in having it done through the Government's own channels direct to North Vietnamese representatives in a third country, since this would be consistent with our own earlier direct contact with North Vietnamese representatives and would be a logical way to try and open a dialogue. It does of course invite a refusal to accept such a letter but this would probably be true no matter what channel is used.

I agree with Thieu that in the present Hanoi mood, Ho Chi Minh will probably reject the letter and seek to exploit it for his own internal purposes. It would seem advantageous for Thieu to leave publication to Ho's initiative since this would underline the sincerity of his approach and not make it look like a propaganda gesture. If Ho does not release it over a period of time, however, it may be necessary for Thieu to make a public move since the press is fully aware of his plans and will be pressing him to see whether he has sent such a communication.

For this reason, I think it would be best to keep open the possibility that after a certain lapse of time, Thieu would indicate publicly that he has sent such a letter, and ultimately would release its text if he has not had a reaction from Hanoi which would argue otherwise.

Department will be the best judge of what other countries, if any, should be kept informed at this stage, and whether there are other possible channels for transmitting Thieu's letter which might be better than those suggested by him.

9

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 74-453
By CL, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 24, 1967 -- 3:55 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith:

1. Marcos complains to Locke, claiming we equipped only two rather than five engineer battalions.

2. Bill Jorden puts the matter in perspective and advises that no hasty action required.

I am having the matter looked into carefully.

Since your conversation with him is involved, I thought you'd wish to know about it right away.

W. W. Rostow

Manila 464
Manila 465

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

SECRET

Tuesday, October 24, 1967

9a

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE (Manila 464)

In a private conversation with Philippine President Marcos, he said to me:

A. When he was promised in the U. S. equipment for five engineering battalions then, and probably five later, this was intended to mean new battalions and was not to include the three battalions which had previously been equipped by the U. S. This was made clear in private conversation between him and you.

B. Later the U. S. Government took the position that the first five battalions to be equipped included the three previously equipped so that new equipment for only two, not five, was secured.

C. He has been embarrassed by this but has "covered up" publicly, indicating the U. S. has furnished the equipment. When Speaker Laurel assailed the U. S. in Assembly, claiming Philippines "short-changed," Marcos told him to stop his criticism, that perhaps equipment was not then available.

D. He feels you are not aware of the situation and that misunderstanding developed at other levels. He has considered writing you a personal letter, but preferred for me to get word to you. He wants to know what happened.

I told President Marcos I had no information about the matter, but would try to find out.

I discussed the history of the first five battalions with U. S. Charge D'Affaires in Manila, Jim Wilson. He said:

A. At the time of the agreement there were three U. S. equipped engineering battalions in the Philippines. These were not "engineering construction" battalions, which take far more heavy equipment than plain "engineering" battalions.

B. Our Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group Chief and Philippine Chief of Staff had gone over equipment lists prior to your meeting with Marcos and had agreed on what was necessary for five "engineering construction" battalions. This was furnished in full, but the equipment furnished consisted of a) full equipment for two new battalions; b) construction equipment necessary to convert the three plain engineering battalions into three engineering construction battalions.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-450
By CL, NARA, Date 1-4-95

~~SECRET~~

C. So far as Wilson knows, the agreement with respect to the first 5 battalions as then understood by Philippine military chiefs, was an agreement to furnish 2 completely new construction engineering battalions and to upgrade the 3 existing plain engineering battalions to construction engineering battalions. Ambassador Blair had explained all this some months ago to Ambassador Roumaldez, President Marcos' brother-in-law, but the Embassy cannot be sure whether or not Roumaldez in fact explained it in full to President Marcos, although, subsequently, Marcos had stated publicly he was satisfied that the commitment had been met.

It may be that President Marcos mistakenly believes that the original 3 battalions remained the same and that he only received equipment for 2 new battalions. Or it may be he recognizes the facts, but believes the agreement was to leave the 3 original battalions as plain engineering battalions and to fully equip 5 new and additional construction engineering battalions. He did not mention any difference between plain engineering battalions and construction engineering battalions and I doubt that he recognizes that these distinctions figured in the arrangement. I believe he feels simply that he started with 3 equipped battalions, that he was to get 5 more, which makes 8, and that he ended with 5 and was therefore "short-changed".

I believe President Marcos resents what he believes was a failure of the U. S. to live up to an agreement he thinks he made personally with you. I believe we should correct the mistake if one has been made, or explain the fact to President Marcos personally if his understanding is wrong. I am sure President Marcos expects me to take this up personally and directly with you and it is possible that no one in his own government knows he spoke to me about this, as he did so privately, even though numerous of his Cabinet Ministers and U. S. Charge Wilson were waiting in an adjoining room presumably to discuss other matters with him and me.

President Marcos also discussed several other matters with me which are covered in detail in Manila 3760. The most important was the sending of additional help to Vietnam. The President will introduce the new appropriation for Philcag after the elections are over. He will also give additional help. He cannot politically send troops, and I told him I was sure we could not pay for an Operation Brotherhood in Vietnam, which was his choice (additional to, not in place of, Philcag). I believe we can get one, or perhaps even more, Army engineering battalions (which General Westmoreland prefers to another Philcag), for which he will seek appropriations in the Assembly, if we build for him some roads in the Clark Field area which could, in his opinion, be justified by military considerations. He believes the roads would benefit Clark Field and also increase mobility in the Huk Territory. Foreign Secretary Ramos is coming to Vietnam on the 29th, at which time I hope to have detailed discussions between him and General Westmoreland on the nuts and bolts of the battalions we want and the roads he wants. Embassy Manila is informed and agreeable to this meeting. I, of course, have not committed U. S. Government in any way.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 24, 1967

96

FOR WALT ROSTOW

TEXT OF CABLE FROM WILLIAM JORDEN (Manila 465)

You will be receiving promptly a message from Ambassador Locke to the President regarding "misunderstanding" about equipment for Philippine army construction battalions. Think you will wish to reassure President that this matter not as critical as might seem at first blush. .

Marcos talked with me about same matter. I assured him that I would look into it on return to Washington but I thought there had been no reference to "new" battalions. President Johnson had said we would supply equipment for five battalions this year and would consider doing same for five next year. We had done both. Marcos seemed fully satisfied that we would check in good faith and did not push question. Certainly there is no "misunderstanding" on part of Americans or Filipinos who worked out details of the equipment deal. In my opinion, President Marcos is (1) looking for excuse for not doing more for us in Vietnam; (2) on edge because of rough political campaign underway here; (3) possibly feeling us out on whether equipment for another three battalions may not be in the cards. Assure you this is not of such urgency that it cannot wait until my return. President said he wanted to see me again before departure and if that works out I will do all possible to reassure him as to facts.

You will of course wish to ascertain whether our President's recollection of this agrees with Marcos concept which might have developed in private talk. But ensuing negotiations between Filipinos and U. S. strongly supports view that understanding was as described above.

Separate message from Locke through State channel describes other aspects of his talk with Marcos.

He is right: Combat troops probably not politically possible--except as element of U. S. forces and that has obvious drawbacks. On basis of "volunteers" for U. S. forces we could probably get two divisions, but that has "mercenary" flavor and other deficiencies.

If we play our cards right, another Philippine Civic Action Group or engineering battalion is possible. In my opinion, Marcos would accept some compromise that would recognize his political problems and our common needs.

He badly needs some kind of regular briefing on situation in Vietnam--including growing evidence of problems on the other side. Jim Wilson agrees

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-450
By CLG, NARA, Date 1-4-95

this would be desirable and hope something can be worked out with Ambassador Bunker and Westmoreland. A monthly visit to Manila by Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, J-2 would be valuable, with possible occasional visit by Westmoreland.

Regarding reference discussions with Secretary Ramos on this matter (paragraph 5 of cable to State), this is not the best way to approach matter. Any serious talk about this should be done in Manila or Washington, preferably former. We will get nowhere on this unless it is with Marcos and his Defense Department.

Talk of U.S. construction contractors is a non-starter, road building is one thing Filipinos are doing very well on their own.

Take paragraph on Huks with a grain of salt. There are other reasons for not cracking down.

I have been operating on assumption that full report on my return on experiences here and Vietnam and observations thereon was preferred course. If you wish fuller report on these matters earlier, please inform. This has been damn profitable trip. Regards.

10

Tuesday, October 24, 1967 -- 3:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Rosen file

Buzz Wheeler informs me that he has already put the bite on the Chiefs, concerning two-bit targets, at a meeting yesterday.

He understands the point well and is setting up new screening procedures for targets.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

11

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 24, 1967
3:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Free file

Win Brown's analysis and reflections
on the Governors' conference may interest
you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(1)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 46, NARA, Date 11-5-91



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Subject: Ambassador Brown's Commentary
on the 59th Annual National
Governor's Conference

Attached are two reports prepared by Ambassador Brown upon his return from the 59th Annual National Governor's Conference. His report at Tab (1) summarizes his involvement in the consideration of a resolution on Vietnam and consideration of the exposition, "Hemis Fair 1968".

At Tab (2) Ambassador Brown analyzes "the reason for and significance of the failure of the conference to consider a resolution on Vietnam." I believe you will find this to be of special interest.

SHR

Benjamin H. Read

Attachments:

As stated.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

116
16202

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 2 pages;
Page 1 of 2 Copies; Series 4.

IN REPLY REFER TO:

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1967

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *W*

FROM : S/GOV - Winthrop G. Brown *W*

SUBJECT: The 59th Annual National Governors' Conference.
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

By separate memorandum I have reported the events of my attendance at the National Governors' Conference. This memorandum is my best appraisal of the reason for and significance of the failure of the Conference to consider a resolution on Vietnam. The appraisal is based upon conversations which Mr. Manell and I had with numerous Governors and Governors Daniel and Bryant before the vote and talks with three key Democratic and two key Republican Governors, as well as with Governor Daniel, after it.

1. The underlying cause for failure to act is the deep division and frustration in the country about the war in Vietnam, which, as it drags on, and as the election approaches, brings it more and more into the arena of partisan politics.

2. The vote against consideration of the resolution was not a vote of lack of support for the war. (Babcock and Reagan, for example, are hawks and Volpe and Love have made their support of the war clear). It was rather a straight political maneuver. The major Republican Governors were so preoccupied with keeping their options open so as to be able to see more clearly the course of events and mood of the people before taking a firm position, that they put these personal considerations above the national interest. They were supported by all the other Republicans except one out of party loyalty and the binding

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interval; not
automatically declassified

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-450
By CB, NARA, Date 1-4-95

~~SECRET~~

2

effect of a Republican caucus vote. Volpe and Babcock, for example, were clearly unhappy about the impression likely to be created by the vote and told me that they would do their best to make clear to their constituents that it did not show lack of support for the war.

3. The management of the matter could have been better. We were told that at the outset some Democratic Governors were too eager and high pressure. Governor Volpe, who was sympathetic to consideration of the issue, told me that he first got a copy of the proposed resolution from the press. (Incidentally, he considered the first draft to be a very tough endorsement of the President's policy). The misdirection of the telegram to Price Daniel did not help. Republicans were suspicious that once the rules were waived to permit consideration of the second, milder, draft, the Democrats would seek to make it tougher by majority vote, which Volpe said was permissible under the rules.

4. Many Republican Governors are unhappy at the action they took. Some Democratic Governors feel that they have a new issue with which to attack their adversaries, namely, the charge of being afraid to stand up and be counted on an issue of vital national importance. Governor Connally was eloquent in stressing the responsibility of Governors, as leaders, to inform the public of their views. And it was ironic, at dinner after the reunion, sitting at a Republican Governor's table, to hear the entertainer say that she had been three times to Vietnam to sing to the troops, and was going again this Christmas, that the troops knew what they were fighting for, that they were wholly dedicated to that cause and deserved whole-hearted support from home. After which she brought the whole audience to its feet in a standing ovation by a sonorous rendition of the "Battle Hymn of the Republic".

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
interim; not
automatically declassified

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

110

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IN REPLY REFER TO:

MEMORANDUM

October 23, 1967

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S *[Signature]*

FROM : S/GOV - Winthrop G. Brown *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: The 59th Annual National Governors' Conference.
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

During the conference aboard the SS Independence, and on the Virgin Islands, Mr. Manell and I got to know better a number of Governors whom we had visited in their capitols and met a large number of others. We attended all working sessions, and got a better understanding of their main problems and concerns.

We were able to be helpful in three particular respects:

1. Early in the voyage Governor Connally of Texas asked me to get him the text of a memorandum prepared in the government, sketching the trials and criticisms suffered by all the war Presidents in the country's history, which he said the President had shown him. He wanted this in preparation for a debate among the Governors on a resolution to be submitted in support of the Administration's stand in Vietnam. We obtained the text through the efficient cooperation of the Department's Operations Center and got it to the Governor in good time. (He made use of it in a brief, but stirring and excellent, talk at the closing session of the conference).

2. On October 17 Governor Rampton of Utah, and Governor Price Daniel, the new Director of the Office of Emergency Planning, asked me, on an hour's notice, to prepare a draft

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2

resolution of support on Vietnam, which would state the Administration's position in language likely to attain full approval by the conference as a whole. Both Governors declared themselves well satisfied with the draft which we prepared, a copy of which is attached as Tab A. It was, however, vetoed in the Resolutions Committee by Governor Romney, who took the position supported by the other Republican Governors, except Governor Rhodes, that any resolution on Vietnam would introduce policies into the Governors' Conference. Another resolution on Vietnam was presented at the closing session of the conference. Governors Rampton and Connally moved suspension of the rules to allow consideration of this resolution (text attached as Tab B). This required a three-fourths vote. After heated exchanges, and devisive argumentation, it was lost, 26 to 18, despite a stirring and excellent talk by Governor Connally in which he called on his colleagues of both parties to rise above party and do what was right and necessary in the country's interest.

3. An international exposition, "Hemis Fair 1968", will take place in San Antonio next May. At the suggestion of Governor Connally, and upon the invitation of San Antonio and the Fair officials, the National Governors' Conference resolved to convene a World Governors' Conference in San Antonio at the same time. Representative Governors from states in the Western Hemisphere, the countries participating in the Fair, and countries having a system similar to ours (for example, Japan) will be among the principal participants. We met with Governor Connally, and other Governors on the relevant committee, and with staff members of the conference at their request to help shape their plans for this unusual international undertaking. A memorandum prepared for me by INR on this subject was most helpful.

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3

Resolutions proposed by Governor Terry of Delaware to limit importation of chemicals and textiles were defeated both in the Resolutions Committee and in the full conference.

At the end of the meeting I returned to Washington. Mr. Manell remained on board ship to further contacts with those Governors remaining on board, and the staff, and to work with the staff on plans for the International Governors' Conference in San Antonio.

Attachments:

Tab A - Draft Resolution of Support on Vietnam

Tab B - Text of Resolution on Vietnam, Presented at Closing Session of Conference

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11d

Tab A

Draft Resolution on Vietnam

Whereas, the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability with honor and integrity is vital to the national interests of the United States of America as well as to the interests of other nations and has historically been a cardinal objective of United States foreign policy; and

Whereas, in pursuit of this objective and during four administrations, the United States has faithfully and consistently honored its commitments to other nations, including Vietnam, to help them to defend themselves against outside aggression by force; and

Whereas, the National Governors' Conference has twice previously affirmed its support for United States fulfillment of these commitments; and

Whereas, the United States has at the same time sought and still seeks to bring the conflict in Vietnam to an honorable conclusion under terms consistent with its commitments and vital national interests;

Now therefore be it resolved: that the National Governors' Conference reaffirms to the President, the American public, the service men and women of the military forces of the United States and our allies, its resolute support of our commitments and responsibilities in the world, including our support of the military defense of Vietnam against aggression and our continuing search for a meaningful solution for assuring peace and stability in the area.

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11e

TAB B Text of Resolution on Vietnam, Presented at
Closing Session of Conference

Whereas, this Nation is involved in an armed conflict in southeast Asia which is the daily concern of every American; and

Whereas, 500,000 American youth are immediately involved in that conflict, at daily peril to their lives; and

Whereas, as Americans, above partisanship, and beyond any question of approval or disapproval of the strategic and tactical decisions which are not our responsibility, we stand united in our fight for the freedom and self-government of the people of South Viet Nam; and

Whereas, we are anxious that none of our enemies abroad misconstrue our tolerance for dissent in this free society as a weakening of our national purpose;

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Governors of the United States in conference assembled that we stand committed to the successful conclusion of the struggle for freedom in Southeast Asia, by peaceful negotiation if we can, and by victory in battle if we must; and

Be it further resolved that we encourage our national leadership to persist in our search for peace, and to persevere in our struggle for victory.

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Tuesday, October 24, 1967
12:05 p. m.

12

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have checked Saigon by phone.

No senior U. S. official said anything about
a bombing pause.

They can't find out who -- if anyone -- did.

But McCloskey at the State 12:00 briefing
will say: "No responsible U. S. official"
said any such thing.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Tuesday, Oct. 24, 1967
11:50 a.m.

14

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Bob Ginsburgh's account of
General Meyers and his views.

Pres file

He is now a part-time consultant to Raytheon.

W. W. R.

Attachment

14a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

24 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Major General Gilbert L. Meyers, USAF (Retired), served as the Deputy Air Commander in Vietnam from 1 July 1965 to 31 August 1966. He retired in October 1966. His retirement was not caused by disagreement with the bombing policy -- despite some rumors to that effect. He chose retirement rather than accepting another Pentagon assignment.

General Meyers' statement to the Stennis Committee contains nothing particularly new (Tab A). It is similar to the views he expressed in March 1967 (Tab B).

General Meyers argues that it does not make sense to apply air power on a graduated, controlled response basis because --

- it gives the enemy time to take corrective action,
- it dilutes the impact of airpower by piecemeal attacks,
- it has resulted in attacks on low-value scattered targets rather than on concentrated lucrative targets.

His view is what you would expect from a field commander whose concern is fighting a war but who has no responsibility for the broader political and international context. From a purely military viewpoint, most military men would agree that airpower is most effective when employed for mass, concentrated effect.

For years to come the historians will probably debate these issues: Would a swifter, more concentrated application of airpower have been militarily more effective? Would the enemy be in worse shape now? Would a faster escalation of bombing have resulted in a wider war? These are unanswerable questions.

One thing is clear: The policy of gradually increasing pressure could have resulted in ending the war at a lower level of violence -- a fundamental objective of our Vietnam policy.

2

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

Sowell, managing editor, radio station WLAC, Nashville, Tenn.

VIETNAM—HOW NOT TO UTILIZE AIRPOWER

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, a year ago last December, when in Vietnam, I became deeply impressed with the knowledge—no surprise because of his vast experience—of one of the finest men it has ever been my privilege to know, Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers, U.S. Air Force, retired.

I ask unanimous consent that this experience in the form of his record, be printed at this point in this Record.

There being no objection, the document was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Department of the Air Force, Office of Information, Public Information Division]

MAJ. GEN. GILBERT L. MEYERS

Brig. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers assumed command of the 836th Air Division, MacDill Air Force Base, on 1 April 1963. Prior to his assignment here, he had commanded the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Myrtle Beach AFB, S.C., since 3 October 1960. Before that, he was commander of the 4530th Combat Crew Training Wing at Williams AFB, Arizona.

A veteran of more than 27 years service with the Air Corps and Air Force, he is a graduate of the Canadian National Defense College at Kingston, Ontario; the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Ala.; and the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Va.

General Meyers entered military service in July 1936 at Fort Snelling, Minn. He attended pilot training at Randolph and Kelly Fields, Texas, from July 1937 to June 1938. His first assignment after completing pilot training was with the Eighth Pursuit Group at Langley Field, Va.

During the early part of World War II he accepted the first P-47 Thunderbolt fighter for use by the Army Air Corps. Later he had the job of familiarizing General John K. Cannon, the man for whom Cannon AFB was named, with the aircraft's flying characteristics.

Serving with the 368th Fighter Group, his was the first Air Force unit to land in France after Normandy. After the German surrender, General Meyers served with the Fifth Air Force in the Far East and landed at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, only days after the unofficial Japanese surrender.

In 1946 he assumed command of the First Fighter Group when it was the first jet fighter unit in the Air Force. In 1948 he was assigned to Williams AFB for a year and a half where he served as Commander of the primary training group and as Deputy Wing Commander. In 1950 he went to Korea for two years as Fifth Air Force Director of Operations during the Korean Conflict.

His other post-war assignments include: Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations, Headquarters TAC, Langley AFB, Va.; Vice Commander of the Ninth Air Force, Pope AFB, N.C.; and Deputy Director for Requirements, Headquarters USAF; and Commander of the 27th Tactical Fighter Wing at Cannon AFB, N.M.

Among the awards and decorations he has received are the Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal with seven Oak Leaf Clusters, Bronze Star and the Croix de Guerre from France, Luxembourg and Belgium.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Recently, General Meyers testified before the Senate Military Preparedness Subcommittee; and anyone who wants to leave, for a minute, the conclusions of the armchair strate-

gists in favor of the opinion of one in the field who directed this air war under all these rules, restrictions, regulations, and other instructions, will be interested in his short, concise, and entirely extemporaneous statement as presented to the subcommittee. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that his statement be inserted at this point in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. YARBOROUGH in the chair). Without objection, the statement will be printed at this point in the Record.

The statement is as follows:

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. GILBERT L. MEYERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, RETIRED, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE 7TH AIR FORCE IN VIETNAM

Senator STENNIS. Do you have a prepared statement?

General MEYERS. I do not, sir, but I would like to make some opening remarks.

Senator STENNIS. Whether or not they are prepared in writing, you certainly may make some opening remarks and I hope you do.

General MEYERS. First I would like to say that I am very pleased to have an opportunity to talk with you gentlemen. You are obviously dealing with a subject which has been very close to my heart. Having spent about 16 months in Vietnam, naturally I am extremely interested in what is going on over there to this day.

I think that in any review or look at the Vietnam war, first you must look at the strategy or the policy which is being pursued over there, and my understanding, of course, is that we have three stated objectives. These objectives I think have been given to the committee many times, and in the interests of saving time, I will not repeat them.

I do not think that any military man that I have ever talked to has any quarrel with the objectives as presented. They are very straightforward, and easily understood, and I think capable of achievement.

I think where the great difference of opinion occurs is how these objectives are being carried out; specifically, how airpower is being used in North Vietnam to implement these objectives.

Associated with the objectives, there is another policy that does not come out as loud and clear as the three stated objectives. If you look at the way airpower has been employed in Vietnam, it is very obvious that this policy exists. This policy is the application of the air effort on a graduated controlled response basis. Initially, as we went into this war conflict, our targets were just across the DMZ. We were trying to create pressure on the enemy, and hopefully by doing so he would come to a decision that he could not win the war, and would agree to some sort of negotiated settlement.

GRADUATED PRESSURE GIVES ENEMY TIME

This policy of graduated pressure has a lot to do with how the air is being employed and the effectiveness of the air campaign in Vietnam. It gives the enemy time to take corrective action on many of the targets that we have struck and nullify the results of our attacks.

For example, consider the interdiction program against bridge targets on his lines of communications. It became obvious to him of course that this was a target complex that we were going to destroy. But because we did it piecemeal over a long period of time, he was able to put the material that he needed to repair the bridges in place, so that when the bridge was destroyed, he would cut down the time that the bridge was out of use.

In addition to that, he put cables across the rivers and the inlets so that he would have a means of crossing. Ferryboats were put into position so that they could be

utilized immediately. By giving him this opportunity to organize his resources, he could cut down the effect of the destruction of a given target.

HIT POWER FACILITIES ON PIECEMEAL BASIS

Another specific along the same line. Our attack against the power facilities in North Vietnam. Again this was done on a piecemeal basis. It has been said that there are about 2,000 portable generators that have been brought into Vietnam to replace the loss of these permanent facilities.

Obviously, these generators did not exist initially, but because of the long period of time we spent destroying them, these replacement items were provided, so the impact of the destruction of these facilities was lost.

This graduated application of airpower I think has a major impact on the effectiveness of the airstrikes in the north. That is the point that I would like to get across to the committee, and I do not think it has been emphasized, at least in the press reports that I have read.

The targeting, of course, in North Vietnam is also very pertinent to the effectiveness of our air efforts up there. The target systems that we have gone after in the past have been limited in scope because of this graduated pressure policy that we were pursuing, and many of the good, more lucrative targets in the north were not attacked.

HAIPHONG NO. 1 TO MILITARY MAN

I understand that additional targets have now been released. Of course to the military man, the No. 1 target in North Vietnam is the port of Haiphong. This port represents to North Vietnam what the industrial capacity of Germany and Japan represented to them during the World War II time period.

North Vietnam is basically an agrarian country. They do not have the industrial capacity to produce the wherewithal to fight a war. As a result of this, they must import these necessities. A great deal must of necessity come through the port at Haiphong. It has been estimated to be somewhere between 75 and 85 percent of the total North Vietnam imports enter through this port. The remaining percent enters through the northeast railroad and road nets from China.

DOESN'T MAKE SENSE

It just does not make sense to me that we would put thousands of sorties into North Vietnam on armed reconnaissance when the material we are trying to destroy is located in a very vulnerable position as it is off-loaded from the ships in the port of Haiphong. Why do we leave the equipment unmolested in these ports, and then attempt to relocate and destroy it as it moves down hundreds of miles of jungle trails? This is a very difficult thing obviously for our pilots to accomplish. Obviously a port is a very vulnerable facility, because the material has to be distributed after it is unloaded and stored. It is a very lucrative military target, and that is the point in time to bring your airpower to prevail against the material, not after it has been scattered all over the country of North Vietnam.

DEMONSTRATION AT THE PENTAGON

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, the agencies and representatives of Government who dealt with the demonstrators against the war in Vietnam at the Pentagon are due credit and praise, in my opinion, for the manner in which they discharged their responsibilities.

The troops and their officers, the U.S. marshals and all who faced the protesters displayed admirable firmness as well as restraint in their enforcement

chinery. The jungle atmosphere adds to these problems.

General Meyers, who made comments before and after the four presentations, with film clips, voiced a common complaint that many important targets—such as the points where the North Vietnamese offload their supplies—have not been bombed. The expanded text of his remarks begins below.

"Our airmen in Southeast Asia are true professionals," General Meyers said. "I am sure they don't like it, but they fully understand the restraints and the reasons for their application. They perform their mission under the most excellent air discipline I have even seen."

With John F. Loosbrock, Editor of AIR FORCE/SPACE DIGEST, acting as moderator, the panel faced a long session of questions from the audience. Highlights from some of the replies:

• GENERAL MEYERS: "If you place the damage on a dollar value basis, obviously, this would probably be one of the most costly wars we have ever fought. . . . Ho Chi Minh can go on forever fighting the way he is because he is using limited resources."

• GENERAL MEYERS: ". . . it is very important that a unified command be established in Southeast Asia. I think that the whole war effort would be much more effective and much better coordinated if this were done."

• GENERAL SIMLER: "We have a radar technique that works with fighters where the fighter is not dependent upon its own systems. The accuracy is very

acceptable. . . . The B-52 is doing some outstanding work so far as precision bombing is concerned."

• COLONEL TAYLOR: "In practice, I try to have a picture [of a pinpoint target, such as a bridge] in the hands of the Seventh Air Force in, basically, forty minutes. This includes unloading the aircraft, the film processing, interpretation. Dissemination depends on how far you have to deliver. But we need it much faster. We need it when it happens: Instant intelligence."

• GENERAL SIMLER: "I think we have come to the point in aerial warfare where we can't have an all-purpose aircraft. I think that is a false concept."

• GENERAL MEYERS: "You can't put everything into one airplane. It just can't be done. If you do, you end up with an airplane that is good at nothing."

• COLONEL HOLT: "If I were to concentrate, I would concentrate on putting something on an airplane that would do the air-to-ground job better than what we have at the moment."

• COLONEL WILSON: "We have little or no visual damage assessment (VDA) on night reconnaissance missions. . . . There is no real way that we could assess. . . . We had good results at night using both moonlight and flares."

• COLONEL TAYLOR: "I was loaded with what we called the GIBS—the guy in the back seat. Most all of these lads came out of the Air Force Academy. They were fantastic. These kids are tremendous, and they are carrying the mail like I have never seen it carried before. I am truthfully impressed."—END

The limited interdiction campaign we are conducting over North Vietnam has been very successful considering target limitations, but it could be even more effective if restrictions continue to be reduced. The claim that hitting more targets would increase the risk of broadening the war in Southeast Asia has little validity . . .

Why Not More Targets in the North?

By Maj. Gen. Gilbert L. Meyers, USAF (Ret.)

Now a consultant for the Raytheon Co. and System Development Corp., General Meyers was Deputy Commander of the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam from July 1965 to August 1966. He was Air Force Director of Operations during the Korean War.



IN CARRYING out our air responsibilities in Southeast Asia, we find that two different and distinct types of air war occur: the air war in the North and the air war in the South. These different wars result from two separate command headquarters designating targets to be attacked, and the enemy's capability to defend against air attacks in the two areas.

Control of air strikes against targets in the South rests with the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), who passes the strike requirements to the

(Continued on page 77)


Commander, Seventh Air Force, for execution. The targets designated for attack are generally associated with direct or close support of friendly ground forces. The enemy's capability to defend against our air attacks in the South is very limited. Small arms and .50-caliber machine guns are the only weapons presently being used. Such weapons do not pose a serious threat to the attacking aircraft, and consequently our aircraft losses are very low. In those cases where an aircraft is shot down and the pilot is able to eject successfully, the majority of the pilots are picked up by helicopter.

Our air strikes against targets in North Vietnam are the responsibility of the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), following approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the targets are selected and approved, CINCPAC places his requirements for strikes on the Seventh Air Force in Vietnam and the Seventh Fleet operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. The targets are usually related to the interdiction program which is designed to limit the flow of supplies and personnel into South Vietnam. In contrast to the relatively ineffective air defense capabilities in South Vietnam, in the North an entirely different situation prevails.

The Air Force and its sister services, the Navy and Marines, have the mission of making North Vietnam pay a heavy price for its support of its forces and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. To accomplish this mission, a "limited" interdiction campaign is being executed in North Vietnam. The lines of communication over which supplies and personnel must move to reach South Vietnam are under constant air attack. In order for the North to support their forces and the VC in the South, many times the amount of supplies needed in the South must be put into the pipeline in order for it to get through to the combat forces. The reason is obvious—airpower is attriting these supplies as they move from North to South. This supply network also must sustain his air defense forces, his porters, road and railway repair crews, as well as military security forces along the way.

Although severely handicapped by target restrictions, our objective of limiting the flow of men and supplies has been more successful than some people suppose. The number of trucks, railway cars, bridges, barges, and boats destroyed or damaged grows daily. Unfortunately, we have no way of accurately determining the total degradation to the North Vietnamese logistics net; however, the fact that the North Vietnamese are working frantically on a worldwide basis to get the bombing stopped, plus the fact that they have *not* mounted a sustained offensive in over a year, substantiates the effectiveness of our interdiction efforts.

This war is unique in many ways and bears little resemblance to our air operations during World War II and Korea. Never have pilots been so tightly controlled as to type and location of targets to be attacked. Every mission briefing could be summarized as follows: "Do exactly what you have been told to do—no more—no less." Very little is left to individual initiative or judgment. A great deal of emphasis is placed on bomb-delivery accuracy to reduce to an absolute minimum




Prime targets for USAF pilots in North Vietnam are highway bridges. Reconnaissance photo shows bridge after strike. Approaches to bridge were also cratered by bombs.

the number of civilian casualties. This is the way airpower is being applied in North Vietnam; like a skilled surgeon applies his scalpel—precisely and carefully against military targets—and only on those military targets which have been approved for destruction.

Although I am convinced that the air campaign in the North has been very successful, considering the limitations imposed on our efforts, I am also sure that more effective results would be possible if the present target restrictions continue to be reduced.

We are conducting a "limited" interdiction program in North Vietnam. Some of the most important targets—those points where supplies and equipment are being offloaded and prepared for transshipment—have not been attacked. For example, the port at Haiphong, through which flows the principal war-making potential for the North Vietnamese nation; and which performs the same function for that nation as the industrial and manufacturing facilities of Germany and Japan during World War II, has not been destroyed. No interdiction program can be successful when a target such as this falls in the "do-not-attack" category. Due to the nature of port operations, supplies and equipment are highly concentrated, and therefore extremely vulnerable to air attack. Why do we refrain from attacking this materiel, when it is concentrated and forms a very lucrative target, and then later expend tremendous efforts trying to relocate and destroy this same materiel, as it passes over hundreds of miles of jungle-covered roads and trails on its way to South Vietnam? You are all familiar with the answers which have been given to questions such as this. I think it might be appropriate to review the reasons given to determine if they really follow a logical pattern.

(Continued on following page)



Night missions pose a difficult problem in the war against the North. Here pilot checks F-4C before night flight.

It has been said that increasing the number and type of targets to be attacked would increase the risk of broadening the conflict in Southeast Asia. I am sure this is true to a degree. But how much additional risk is involved has never been stated. Until the risk factor is quantified, the statement can only be interpreted as an assertion with very little validity.

I assume any expansion of the war could only result from increased participation by Red China or Russia. Any such postulation is difficult to justify, in view of the deterioration of relations between these two countries. It seems to me that the internal problems which presently confront Communist China will require heavy commitments of her military resources, in order to maintain law and order and to curb major defections within the country. There appears to be a good possibility that China will, very shortly, cease to be an effective source of supply for North Vietnam. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to visualize that Communist China has any desire or surplus military capability to devote to the Vietnam War.

In the Soviet case, there appears to be a limit to the amount of military assistance which can be provided to North Vietnam, due to her geographical location with respect to that country. In the past a good deal of the Russian aid shipments have passed through China. Apparently this is no longer possible, according to public statements made by the Soviets. If the port at Haiphong is denied to them for surface shipments, they have no practical way of providing additional military assistance.

In weighing the factors I have just covered, there appears to me to be *less risk* involved in selecting more remunerative targets in North Vietnam than we have been willing to accept in the past, in developing the war to its present state.

Our humanitarian concern over the number of civilian casualties which might result from attacks on targets located close to urban residential areas is another reason given for limiting air strikes in the North. Although I also share this concern, I find it very difficult to differentiate between civilians and military when they both perform military tasks. For example,

the North Vietnamese government has repeatedly stated that all elements of the civil population have been issued weapons, to be used against attacking aircraft. Moreover, announcements have also been made to the effect that all human resources within the country have been mobilized to support the war effort. We know that large numbers of civilians, both men and women, have been used to repair roads, bridges, and other transportation facilities destroyed or damaged by our bombing efforts. Many of these so-called civilians have been formed into work gangs and moved many miles from their homes to perform these tasks. Under these circumstances it is my belief that civilians must accept the same risks which are associated with military operations.

There are obviously some bona fide civilians in North Vietnam, and in their case I think we should take every reasonable precaution to prevent unnecessary loss of life. Although regrettable, it is almost inevitable that some civilians will lose their lives in spite of our best efforts. I believe the Chief, General McConnell, in his usual salty style, handled that question in fine fashion when he told a press conference three weeks ago that he couldn't understand why there is such a hue and cry when civilians are unintentionally killed in North Vietnam in the bombing of military targets, or when US aircraft in the South make a mistake, while no one gets particularly excited when the Viet Cong indiscriminately slaughter civilian South Vietnamese.

We seem to have developed a double standard as far as civilian lives are concerned; we ignore those which occur in South Vietnam and make a big issue out of our own honest mistakes in the North.

While on the subject of the loss of lives, I would like to cover one other point which is directly related to the way our airpower is being used in North Vietnam. General Westmoreland, the US Commander in Vietnam, in a recent discussion on whether our bombing efforts should be stopped prior to the start of negotiations, made this comment: "... from my point of view, the most important reason for this bombing campaign is that it *saves American and Vietnamese lives on the battlefield* as well as those of our free world allies."

If this is true, it necessarily follows that any improvement in the effectiveness of our bombing efforts would save even more lives on the battlefield. I am convinced that if the present restriction on the more meaningful military targets is lifted, the loss of lives will be significantly reduced for two reasons. First, there will be less opposition in the battle area because our interdiction efforts will be more successful. Second, the war will end in a shorter period of time, and thereby reduce the exposure of our military forces to a combat environment.

As Secretary McNamara said recently, our selection of targets changes from time to time. Perhaps we can look forward to shifts in targeting policy as the war progresses and pressures vary. Let's hope so. We may yet have a chance to prove unequivocally that airpower is the decisive force in this war.—END

Tuesday, October 24, 1967
11:45 a. m.

15

MR. PRESIDENT:

You asked for a fresh look at these ten names.

Those we left out are attached.

Pres file

W. W. R.

Attachment//

23

15a

2408

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, October 20, 1967 -- 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

Rec'd 7:30p

Clark Clifford and I now make the following joint, and agreed recommendations concerning the group to explore the problem of a pause and how that group should be managed.

1. The group. Given the way we propose to organize the enterprise, we believe a group of ten would be manageable. Clark now thinks that 5 would be too few to serve your purpose; and if the discussions took place without the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, with only Tom Johnson and myself present with you, the Cabinet table would not be too full. Here are the ten names on which we agreed:

Dean Acheson?
George Ball
General Omar Bradley
McGeorge Bundy
Clark Clifford
Arthur H. Dean
Douglas Dillon
Abe Fortas
Robert A. Lovett
Robert Murphy
Max Taylor - Cabot Lodge

Call
Hill
C

The names that we eliminated from the list are in the attached paper so that you will be in a position to alter our joint judgment.

Max Taylor is not on the list simply because we assumed his advice is available to you independently.

2. We propose as the best way to proceed that these men be invited down for dinner the night before with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, on the 8th floor of the State Department. Purpose would be a briefing to bring them up to date. If you are to get value from their judgment, they ought to be told what the military situation is by Buzz Wheeler, the political and negotiating situations by Bill Bundy and Sec. Rusk. They could then sleep on it and meet with you at, say, 10:30 to 1:00 the next day.

We believe that having them meet the night before with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara would ease any implication that the two Secretaries were being bypassed; and I know Sec. Rusk would much prefer not being in a position of having to express a view at a large meeting and believes, in fact, that the widening of advice to you is better conducted if he is not present. (Despite this, you may wish to have Secretaries Rusk and McNamara sit and listen with you at the meeting.)

Although we both prefer the idea of an evening briefing and a morning session, it could be done with a 10:00 a.m. briefing; and then a meeting with you at or after lunch.

Although we claim no higher wisdom for our choice of these 10, there are reasons, in some cases, which you might wish to hear from us.

Walt Rostow

Names Eliminated From the List

Eugene R. Black
James A. Perkins
James Wadsworth
George B. Kistiakowsky
Roswell L. Gilpatric
Morris Liebman
Robert Anderson
James Rowe
John McCone

16

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By cl, NARA, Date 4-11-95

October 23, 1967

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I fully share the concern expressed in your letter of October 20 about the continued tense atmosphere in the Near East and the lack of progress toward a political settlement in that area. I cannot, however, subscribe to your assessment of the causes or to your inaccurate description of United States policy.

The explosive nature of the situation was dramatically underscored by the news of the sinking of an Israeli destroyer in the eastern Mediterranean by an Egyptian patrol boat equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. This act of war was the most serious of a series of threats and counter-threats, acts of terrorism, and hostile deployments of armed forces during recent weeks. The situation calls for the best efforts of both of us and of others to secure strict observance of the existing cease-fire and to exercise restraint in the provision of arms to the countries in the Near Eastern area.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States has for many years followed a policy of restraint in the arms field, a policy which has been even more restrained since the hostilities of last June. However, the continued flow of massive quantities of Soviet arms to certain States in the area has created a situation very difficult for others to ignore. While we have sought and will continue to seek to limit the arms race, the continued flow of Soviet arms will necessarily bring about some response by various countries in and out of the region. We may well have to resume shipments of arms ourselves to some of the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In these circumstances I would again propose that the Soviet Government agree with us that arms supplies to the Near Eastern countries

should be registered with the United Nations. I would be glad if we could go on from there toward an agreement on an effective arms limitation program which would diminish the dangers and permit the countries of the Near Eastern area to use their limited resources for their much needed economic development. I assure you that we are prepared to undertake immediately serious discussions towards this end.

As for political settlement, my Government has been doing its part for peace in every forum, at every level and at every hour, both before and since the outbreak of hostilities. We have consistently upheld the principles which I stated publicly and repeated to you at Glassboro:

- First, the recognized right of national life;
- Second, justice for the refugees;
- Third, innocent maritime passage;
- Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race;
- and
- Fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

We were guided by these principles when our representatives in New York worked out jointly with your representatives, toward the close of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, alternative drafts of a resolution which would bring about force withdrawals, an end to the state of belligerency between Israel and its Arab neighbors and establishment of a stable basis for peace in the Near East. We were prepared to have either of those drafts presented and adopted by the Emergency General Assembly, but, as you know, this was not possible because of objections from certain Arab countries. We have attached no new conditions or new interpretations, nor have we weakened our adherence to any understandings with your government or other governments. On the other hand, we have been surprised that your representatives in New York have been circulating to delegations at the current General Assembly drafts, the texts of which do not conform to those agreed in the Emergency Session. I believe it is desirable that our representatives in New York continue their consultations to try

to clear up any misunderstandings. We should ascertain whether we do not in fact agree on underlying policies.

I believe that the opportunity is before us to move forward. Recently representatives of some of the Arab States have stated to our representatives that an acceptable resolution of the Security Council can be formulated on the basis of the five principles of peace set forth in my statement on June 19. This could be implemented by a special United Nations representative working with the parties on the basis of such a framework. My representatives in turn have made it clear that this would be an acceptable way to make progress toward peace in the area.

The same Arab representatives have said that the best way to achieve the objective of securing an acceptable Security Council resolution would be for the non-permanent members of the Council to proceed promptly to draft a resolution along these lines. My representatives assured the Arab states concerned that we would of course cooperate wholeheartedly in their effort. We have confirmed that position both to the President of the Security Council and to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in New York.

Mr. Chairman, I stated to you at Glassboro that the first and greatest principle of peace is that every nation in the area has the fundamental right to live free from claims and acts of war and belligerency and to have this right respected by its neighbors. I welcome your statement of belief in this principle. Equally, there need be no doubt of the United States position that troops must be withdrawn. But there must also be, as I made clear in my statement of June 19 and again directly to you at Glassboro, recognized rights of national life, guarantees of the freedom of innocent maritime passage in international waterways, limitation of the arms race, a solution to the refugee problem and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area.

Mr. Chairman, in a context of peace, no state is justified in either refusing to withdraw its forces from the territory of another state or claiming the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerence against another state.

On this common basis, which we believe is acceptable to the great majority of the world community at the United Nations, there should be no difficulty in fashioning a resolution which will promote negotiations through the good offices of the United Nations in order to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
A. N. Kosygin
Chairman of the Presidium of the
USSR Council of Ministers
Moscow

LBJ:State:WWR:mz

~~SECRET~~

17
Pres file
Tuesday, October 24, 1967 -- 11:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

As indicated in the attached note from Ben Read, herewith the draft agreed between Sec. Rusk and Arthur Goldberg. You will note that Arthur succeeded in persuading the Secretary to delete a statement of continued adherence to the provisional agreement in July.

If they wish to come back and wrestle with us on the language of the various drafts and their interpretation, I believe we must be ready.

I judge it better, however, if we can go for the simpler proposal for a resolution appointing a mediator.

You will note that the Secretary would like to have the original delivered by Foy Kohler to Amb. Dobrynin at lunch today at 1:00 p.m., if this text is acceptable.

W. W. Rostow

Letter to Chairman Kosygin

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 762 89-110
By rg/isp, NARA, Date 11-13-91

WWRostow:rlh



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1967

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Arthur Goldberg and the Secretary have agreed on the attached draft of the letter to Kosygin.

The Secretary thought you would want to show it again to the President. When you do he would like it noted that we deleted the words in parentheses in the following sentence in the fourth paragraph from the end: "My representatives assured the Arab states concerned that (while we continue to adhere to our understanding of the provisional agreement we reached with your government in July,) we would of course cooperate wholeheartedly in their effort." The Secretary thinks the point is adequately covered in the paragraph beginning with the words "We were guided by these principles ..."

If you agree, please ask the President to sign an original and Foy Kohler will deliver same to Ambassador Dobrynin when he lunches with him tomorrow at 1:00 p. m.

BWR
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7729 89-112

By rg/lsp, NARA, Date 11-13-91

~~SECRET-NODIS~~

October 23, 1967

17b

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I fully share the concern expressed in your letter of October 20 about the continued tense atmosphere in the Near East and the lack of progress toward a political settlement in that area. I cannot, however, subscribe to your assessment of the causes or to your inaccurate description of United States policy.

The explosive nature of the situation was dramatically underscored by the news of the sinking of an Israeli destroyer in the eastern Mediterranean by an Egyptian patrol boat equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. This act of war was the most serious of a series of threats and counter-threats, acts of terrorism, and hostile deployments of armed forces during recent weeks. The situation calls for the best efforts of both of us and of others to secure strict observance of the existing cease-fire and to exercise restraint in the provision of arms to the countries in the Near Eastern area.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States has for many years followed a policy of restraint in the arms field, a policy which has been even more restrained since the hostilities of last June. However, the continued flow of massive quantities of Soviet arms to certain States in the area has created a situation very difficult for others to ignore. While we have sought and will continue to seek to limit the arms race, the continued flow of Soviet arms will necessarily bring about some response by various countries in and out of the region. We may well have to resume shipments of arms ourselves to some of the Arab countries as well as to Israel. In these circumstances I would again propose that the Soviet Government agree with us that arms supplies to the Near Eastern countries

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By gib NARA, Date 1/09/02

should be registered with the United Nations. I would be glad if we could go on from there toward an agreement on an effective arms limitation program which would diminish the dangers and permit the countries of the Near Eastern area to use their limited resources for their much needed economic development. I assure you that we are prepared to undertake immediately serious discussions towards this end.

As for political settlement, my Government has been doing its part for peace in every forum, at every level and at every hour, both before and since the outbreak of hostilities. We have consistently upheld the principles which I stated publicly and repeated to you at Glassboro:

- First, the recognized right of national life;
- Second, justice for the refugees;
- Third, innocent maritime passage;
- Fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race;
- and
- Fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

We were guided by these principles when our representatives in New York worked out jointly with your representatives, toward the close of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, alternative drafts of a resolution which would bring about force withdrawals, an end to the state of belligerency between Israel and its Arab neighbors and establishment of a stable basis for peace in the Near East. We were prepared to have either of those drafts presented and adopted by the Emergency General Assembly, but, as you know, this was not possible because of objections from certain Arab countries. We have attached no new conditions or new interpretations, nor have we weakened our adherence to any understandings with your government or other governments. On the other hand, we have been surprised that your representatives in New York have been circulating to delegations at the current General Assembly drafts, the texts of which do not conform to those agreed in the Emergency Session. I believe it is desirable that our representatives in New York continue their consultations to try

to clear up any misunderstandings. We should ascertain whether we do not in fact agree on underlying policies.

I believe that the opportunity is before us to move forward. Recently representatives of some of the Arab States have stated to our representatives that an acceptable resolution of the Security Council can be formulated on the basis of the five principles of peace set forth in my statement on June 19. This could be implemented by a special United Nations representative working with the parties on the basis of such a framework. My representatives in turn have made it clear that this would be an acceptable way to make progress toward peace in the area.

The same Arab representatives have said that the best way to achieve the objective of securing an acceptable Security Council resolution would be for the non-permanent members of the Council to proceed promptly to draft a resolution along these lines. My representatives assured the Arab states concerned that we would of course cooperate wholeheartedly in their effort. We have confirmed that position both to the President of the Security Council and to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in New York.

Mr. Chairman, I stated to you at Glassboro that the first and greatest principle of peace is that every nation in the area has the fundamental right to live free from claims and acts of war and belligerency and to have this right respected by its neighbors. I welcome your statement of belief in this principle. Equally, there need be no doubt of the United States position that troops must be withdrawn. But there must also be, as I made clear in my statement of June 19 and again directly to you at Glassboro, recognized rights of national life, guarantees of the freedom of innocent maritime passage in international waterways, limitation of the arms race, a solution to the refugee problem and respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area.

Mr. Chairman, in a context of peace, no state is justified in either refusing to withdraw its forces from the territory of another state or claiming the right to assert or pursue a state of belligerence against another state.

On this common basis, which we believe is acceptable to the great majority of the world community at the United Nations, there should be no difficulty in fashioning a resolution which will promote negotiations through the good offices of the United Nations in order to bring about a just and durable peace in which every state in the area can be assured security.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
A. N. Kosygin
Chairman of the Presidium of the
USSR Council of Ministers
Moscow

LBJ:State:WWR:mz

18 ✓
Tuesday, October 24, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith formal report by State
on their contacts with Cong. O'Neill.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

180

October 20, 1967

MEMO TO: S/S - Mr. Read

FROM: H - William B. Macomber, Jr. *WBM*

A report on the only conversation that one of our Congressional Liaison officers has had with Tip O'Neill on Vietnam is attached.

In addition, our records show that the Congressman attended a number of Wednesday morning briefings by senior Department officials during which Vietnam was extensively discussed. I was present through all those briefings, and on no occasion did any of our speakers suggest lack of support for our policies.

H:WBMacomber/jac

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

186

October 20, 1967

TO: S/S - Mr. Read

FROM: H - John P. White *John P. White*

SUBJECT: Congressional Consultation with Congressman
Thomas P. O'Neill

In connection with your request for a report of my meeting with Congressman Tip O'Neill of Massachusetts regarding press reports of his support for the Gavin proposal, I called on him September 14 to discuss this matter. The Congressman said that about a week prior to my seeing him he had observed in his weekly news letter that Gavin's proposal had real merit to it and that he had arrived at this conclusion as a result of many conversations with several of our top military men who he believed were in a position to know. He was surprised that the press picked it up because he said, like to many others in the Congress, he had mixed feelings about what was happening in Viet-Nam, he was not satisfied that we were doing all we should and, from all he has been told by supposedly military experts, we were bogged down in a stalemate.

After much discussion in which I pointed out that we are not in a stalemate -- that a good deal has been done both militarily and politically indicating the impressive accomplishments of carrying out elections and establishing democratic institutions under the most difficult of war-time circumstances -- Mr. O'Neill agreed that there was, of course, much that we had been able to do but expressed the opinion that it was misunderstood.

In closing he said, "I want you to know that I have not abandoned our policy in Viet-Nam, I know we should be there, I do have misgivings about how we are

fighting

fighting the war, but I have not left the Administration, I have no intention of leaving the President and I will be with him whenever he needs me."

H:JPWhite:cc

19
Pres file

Tuesday, October 24, 1967

Mr. President:

Kay Graham has sent me the attached cable from Messrs Perry and Martin of her Saigon bureau regarding Newsweek's hatchet-job on the ARVN. You will recall that we were told that the Newsweek editors here had significantly altered the story filed from Saigon. Perry and Martin flatly deny that their story was distorted back here.

It is quite possible, of course, that Martin and Perry told a rather different tale to Zorthian and General Sidle in Saigon than they tell in the attached cable to their bosses. The fact remains that Kay Graham and Newsweek have them on the record here, and I thought you should know about it.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. I should like your permission to make available to Mrs. Graham the attached sober evaluation of the improvement in the Vietnamese military over the past several years. It is quite a contrast to the shallow journalism of NEWSWEEK.

W. W. R.

yes —

no —

See me —

19a
THE WASHINGTON POST COMPANY

1516 L Street Northwest, Washington, D. C. 20005

KATHARINE GRAHAM
President

October 19, 1967

Dear Walt:

I got a message given to Chal Roberts by the President saying Newsweek editors had distorted the story in our October eighth issue about the quality of the ARVN--according to our Saigon bureau.

I enclose the following cable from Perry and Martin out there in response to a query of ours. You will know whether he wants to know the gist of the contents or not.

Sincerely,

Kay

Mr. Walt Whitman Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure

OCT 19 1 03 PM '67

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(FOLLOWING RECVD VIA NEWSWEEK TIE-LINE 11:52A)

WASH POST

MRS KAY GRAHAM: FOLLOWING RECD FROM SAIGON TODAY--

SAIGON, OCT. 19 -- PROLANSNER REGARDING THE ARVN STORY, THE WHITE HOUSE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ALLEGATIONS ARE ABSOLUTELY NOT RPT NOT TRUE. IN FACT, WHAT EYE POINTED OUT TO THE TWO OFFICIALS EYE TALKED TO ABOUT IT, ZOPHTIAN AND GEN. SIDLE, WAS THAT HAD IT NOT BEEN NECESSARY BECAUSE OF SPACE TO SHORTEN THE ARTICLE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH TOUGHER THAN IT WAS, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF WESTMORELAND PERSONALLY AND IT WOULD HAVE INCLUDED MANY, MANY MORE EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTION AND INCOMPETENCE. EYE DID SAY THAT MY FILE HAD INCLUDED AYE PARAGRAPH WHICH, IN AYE WAY, WOULD HAVE SOFTENED THE LIONS AND RABBITS QUOTE BY SAYING THAT THE INDIVIDUAL VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS ARE AS GOOD AS ANY IF PROPERLY LED AND MOTIVATED. BUT THE ABSENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH IN NO RPT NO WAY DISTORTS THE MEANING OF THE LIONS AND RABBITS QUOTE NOR DOES ITS ABSENCE PUT THE LIONS AND RABBITS QUOTE OUT OF CONTEXT.

NO NO NO: THE ARTICLE WAS RIGHT ON THE MONEY. AS EYE POINTED OUT IN AYE MESSAGE TO OZ, IN WHICH EYE FURTHER DOCUMENTED THE POINTS MADE IN THE LEAD, GEN. SIDLE, IN FACT, ADMITTED THAT WHAT WAS PRINTED WAS TRUE BUT THAT EYE SHHOULD HAVE "WRITTEN

IT AYE LITTLE HAZIER." HELL, MY FEELING IS THAT THERE IS
ALREADY ENOUGH "HAZE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS WAR, MOST OF IT
CREATED BY THE WESTMORELANDS WHO WILL NOT FACE FACTS. THE FACT THAT
NEWSWEEK IS WILLING TO STRIP AWAY SOME OF THE HAZE IS GRATIFYING,
NOT ONLY TO ME, BUT TO MANY MANY OTHER PEOPLE OUT HERE. THE
RESPONSE TO THAT ARTICLE AMONG MILITARY MEN AS WELL AS CIVILIANS --
AMERICAN AND VIETNAMESE -- IS OVERWHELMINGLY IN NEWSWEEK'S
CORNER. EYE AM PROUD MY NAME IS ASSOCIATED WITH STORY.
REGARDS PERRY

RPLANSNER REUR 34 THE INFORMATION PEOPLE OUT HERE ARE
UNDER GUN TO PUT BEST LIGHT ON ARVN. SO THEY GAVE PERRY COMPLETE
TREATMENT AND THEN HAD TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR BOSSES WHY THEY
FAILED. CHIEF MACV IN FOR OFFICER GOT ME UP WITH CALL ASKING WHETHER
IT WAS RIGHT TO SAY THAT PERRY FILED MUCH MORE ON ARVN THAN APPEARED.
EYE SAID THAT WAS ALWAYS TRUE. ZORTHIAN WHO HAD READ PERRY'S
FILE (SOMEONE READS ALL CABLES) REMARKED THAT NEW YORK TOUGHENED
UP THE STORY AND EYE AGREED BECAUSE IT DID APPEAR WITH NONO SQUI-
VOVATION TO WHICH WE DID NOT NOT OBJECT. EACH TIME EYE SAID THAT
THE STORY REPRESENTED ACCURATELY PERRY'S FILE. EVERYONE THOUGHT
THE HEADLINE WAS VERY TOUGH, WHICH IT WAS, BUT IT WAS EXCELLENT
AND LOGICAL CHOICE FOR UUSS CONSUMPTION EVEN THOUGH IT RUFFLED
FEATHERS OUT HERE. FROM THESE CONVERSATIONS THE REPORTS GOING
BACK TO WASHINGTON HAVE NONO DOUBT BEEN CREATED, BUT WE HAVE NOT NOT
BACKED DOWN ONE INCH HERE OR BEEN CRITICAL OF THE MAGAZINE'S
HANDLING WHICH WE THOUGHT WAS EXCELLENT. REGARDS

MARTIN

###

10/00/67 1054A DG

19c
~~SECRET-NOFORN~~

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: Assessment of the RVNAF

BACKGROUND:

1. The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) have been fighting almost continuously since they were formed in 1954 and 1955 from the Vietnamese component of the French Forces in Indo-China. Some of these Vietnamese units and individuals have been fighting since World War II. By early 1965 the RVNAF was close to defeat. The North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong Main Forces clearly were moving in for the kill. Since that time, bolstered by the presence of the US and other Free World Military Forces, the South Vietnamese forces have been rebuilding their morale and effectiveness while continuing to expand. Faced with a critical shortage of good leaders, and confronted daily by a determined enemy, their task has been difficult. The tendency is to compare them with US Forces. However, the only fair and rational approach to an evaluation of the South Vietnamese forces is to compare their condition today against their effectiveness two years ago when they were close to disorganization and defeat.

2. During the first six months of 1965, the RVNAF were defeated in battalion or larger actions at the rate of 1 or 2 per week. During the first six months of 1967 they did not suffer a single such defeat. In 37 heavy engagements during this recent period, their ratio of battlefield losses versus the VC and NVA were 7 to 1 in their favor. In the first half of 1965 the RVNAF was able to inflict casualties on the enemy at a rate of 1,980 Viet Cong per month - in 1967 that rate has risen to 3,586 per month. This means that battlefield performance measured in enemy losses is up 81% since 1965. When we consider that during the same period the strength of the RVNAF was increased by only 18%, we must conclude that their combat effectiveness is improving. They are fighting better.

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DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968
By ry NARA, Date 11-14-91

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3. The above is not meant to imply that all is well or that all the important problems have been overcome. The central problem has been - is today - and will be for a long time to come - a shortage of well-trained, well-motivated, aggressive and dedicated leaders. This problem is not susceptible to a rapid solution.

ASSESSMENT:

4. Among the standard indicators of the morale and effectiveness of a military force is the number of weapons captured from the enemy as compared to the number of weapons lost to the enemy. (TAB A). During the 2 1/2 year period ending in mid-65, the RVNAF had been losing more weapons to the enemy than it captured. The Allied ratio is now 4.7 weapons captured for each weapon lost, and COMUSMACV reports that the RVNAF alone is capturing twice as many weapons as it loses.

5. The ratio of enemy to friendly battlefield losses is a general indication of force effectiveness. TAB B shows the overall ratio in South Vietnam -- that is all friendly against all enemy. On this chart, the peak in 1962 shows that the enemy suffered 6 battlefield losses for each friendly battlefield loss. Recently, the South Vietnamese and US ratios have been reasonably close, with the US advantage not more than 15%. This graph is especially interesting as, in a sense, it charts the progress of the war. The favorable loss ratios of 1962 gave way to the slump of 1964 and early 1965. Since then the trend has been up, and the RVNAF contribution to the upward trend closely parallels that of the allied forces.

6. Another indicator of effectiveness is the number of soldiers who are missing in action. TAB C shows the actual number of South Vietnamese soldiers who were missing in action in each quarter and who were probably captured or left on the battlefield. The South Vietnamese soldiers obviously are less prone to surrender than they were in 1965. Or, of equal significance, they are successfully maintaining unit integrity during battle - in short, they are winning instead of losing the bulk of their battles.

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7. A traditional indicator of the morale and effectiveness of any military force is the number of desertions from its ranks. TAB D shows the desertion rate per 1000 men in uniform computed monthly. Within the past year the number of desertions in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces has dropped significantly. In fact they are running at roughly half of the desertion rate in 1965.

8. The claim is sometimes made that the US forces are doing the fighting and Vietnamese forces are not. This claim is not borne out by statistics, displayed at TAB E. The peak at the end of 1965 on this chart shows that the Vietnamese forces were suffering losses at a rate 2 1/2 times that of US forces. Now they are taking losses per 1,000 men in uniform at approximately 70% of the rate of US forces. This applies not only to the territorial forces - the RF and PF - but equally to the regular forces - the ARVN. In absolute numbers the total RVNAF losses are about the same as those of US forces.

9. TAB F compares combat deaths in actual numbers. The top half of the chart is 1965 and the bottom half 1967. Only the first 6 months of each year are portrayed. In early 1965 the US had very few combat troops in South Vietnam, and the small number of US losses were mostly advisors. The total of allied losses have not quite doubled since 1965, while VC/NVA losses have approximately quadrupled.

10. The RVNAF annual combat death rate is 1.4% of its current military strength, or 3% of the current South Vietnamese manpower pool. The enormity of this loss to South Vietnam is better understood if these loss rates are hypothetically applied to the US military and manpower resources. TAB G graphically portrays what the hypothetical impact would be.

11. Beginning in late 1966 the South Vietnamese Army has increasingly been oriented toward the Revolutionary Development or Pacification Program. TAB H shows that of 154 infantry battalions, 61 were on combat operations in mid-September. The number of battalions committed to the different missions varies from week to week; however, more battalions were available for combat operations a year ago. The big change has been in the assignment of 54 battalions to full time support of Revolutionary Development. A year ago, only 10 to 20 battalions were deployed part time on this mission and these battalions were also used for other tasks. The figures shown in parenthesis are

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for September of 1966. Additionally, the Vietnamese Army must spend a considerable amount of its time and forces on the defense of fixed installations, including their own bases, political centers such as province and district towns, industries, public utilities, roads, railroads and even their own dependents. There are 34 battalions deployed on security missions. This does not seem to be a very large figure when one recalls that there are 44 province and 233 district capitals which, for political and psychological reasons, must be protected against VC attack. The amount of force required varies with the threat, but these 277 administrative centers are a major security burden by themselves and they are just part of RVNAF's security problem.

12. Notwithstanding these responsibilities and the diversion of one-third of the force to pacification, the Vietnamese Army has maintained a high level of large unit actions with remaining forces. TAB I shows that there has been an offsetting increase in small unit operations. Furthermore an increasing proportion have been conducted at night. (TAB J). However, the relatively small number of contacts associated with small unit operations indicates there is still a long way to go in aggressiveness and small unit leadership.

SUMMARY (TAB K)

13. The RVNAF lost 10,441 weapons in the first six months of 1965. They have reduced this loss rate to about 40% of what it was. Their battlefield losses, not counting desertions, were slightly less in the first half of 1965 than in the 1967 period. Significantly the overwhelming preponderance of the losses in 1965 were from desertions, which reflects the low state of morale that existed at the time. Today morale is substantially improved over what it was and it is expected to continue to improve. It is evident that the RVNAF has come a long way since 1965. Those who claim that it is increasingly ineffective are clearly wrong. Yet all will agree they have a long way still to go. MACV, together with the Vietnamese High Command, have been working very hard on this problem. Jointly they are conducting a comprehensive program for increasing the effectiveness of RVNAF. This program consists of some 44 separate sub-programs.

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
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MACV reports indicate that these programs are in general moving ahead satisfactorily. All programs are adequately funded and supported consistent with MACV and CINCPAC's requests.

14. There are, of course, problem areas, but these are known and action is being taken to correct them. For example, there are still problems in the selection and promotion of outstanding officers, particularly in the Regional Forces. Pay, as General Thieu indicated during his campaign, is felt to be too low and a pay raise will probably be one of his first concerns after his inauguration. Overall, training is still not attaining the standards desired, and MACV is still working on distribution problems to overcome the equipment shortages in the RF/PF which on-site inspections revealed.


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RATIO OF VC/NVA ARVN WEAPON LOSSES




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RATIO OF VC/NVA ARVN WEAPON LOSSES



1967

RVNAF MIA/CAPT



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
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
By RG, NARA, Date 11-15-91

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RATE OF SVN DESERTIONS PER 1,000 STRENGTH
(REGULAR, REGIONAL, POPULAR AND CIDG)






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 DA Memo: Jan. 5, 1988
 By 19 NARA Date 11-5-91

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196



1967

10,600 RVNAF COMBAT DEATHS EQUAL A LOSS RATE OF:
1.4 % OF CURRENT MILITARY STRENGTH

3.0 % OF CURRENT MANPOWER POOL

50,894

IF US LOSSES WERE 1.4 % OF CURRENT MILITARY STRENGTH

IF US LOSSES WERE 3.0 % OF CURRENT MANPOWER POOL

255,000

US MILITARY PERSONNEL KILLED WORLD WAR II

247,344

194
9

DISTRIBUTION AND MISSION OF RVN BATTALIONS BY CORPS

15 SEPTEMBER 1967

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>COMBAT OPERATIONS</u>	<u>SECURITY</u>	<u>RD SUPPORT</u>	<u>TRAINING</u>
1ST CORP	34	13	7	14	
2D CORP	29	14	7	8	
3D CORP	51	17	13	17	4
4TH CORP	40	17	7	15	1
TOTAL	154 (157)	61 (107)	34 (43)	54 (*)	5 (7)

() NUMBER OF BATTALIONS IN 1966

* RD SUPPORT COMBINED WITH
SECURITY MISSION IN 1966

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DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 128 NARA Date 11-15-91

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19K

NUMBER OF RVNAF OPERATIONS

THEN AND NOW

	<u>1965</u> <u>JAN - JUN</u>	<u>1967</u> <u>JAN - JUN</u>
LARGE UNIT OPERATIONS (BN OR LARGER)	1945	1472*
SMALL UNIT OPERATIONS (AVG PER MONTH)	85,000	110,000

* 1/3 OF AVAILABLE BATTALIONS COMMITTED TO PACIFICATION)

192

19m

SMALL UNIT ACTIONS
RESULTING IN CONTACT AT NIGHT

	Night Contacts		Total Contacts		Total Actions (Day & Night)	
	<u>US</u>	<u>RVN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>RVN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>RVN</u>
1965						
3d Qtr	194	527	575	1,293	8,179	256,261
4th Qtr	727	514	1,738	1,175	25,383	257,679
1966						
1st Qtr	504	332	1,206	681*	42,142	241,811
2d Qtr	398	305	1,568	681*	43,727	290,635
3d Qtr	499	396	2,070	1,107	39,862	315,768
4th Qtr	284	497	1,752	1,254	47,678	342,923
1967						
1st Qtr	240	502	1,819	1,208	80,733	318,611
2d Qtr	427	761	2,703	1,493	113,207	341,053
Period 9-23 Sept	71	73	387	187	18,269	59,640


* As recorded

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EO 12356, Sec. 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By mg NARA, Date 11-15-91



THE RVNAF THEN AND NOW

1967 JAN-JUN


1965 JAN - JUN

WEAPONS
LOST
10,441




514,300

PERSONNEL
LOST
14.9%




WEAPONS
LOST
4,161



609,300

PERSONNEL
LOST
8.6%



197

October 24, 1967

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project CABRIOLET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-453

By sig, NARA, Date 8-14-95*Pres file*

The Atomic Energy Commission has requested (Tab A) specific execution authority for Project CABRIOLET in response to the decision you made last May to reschedule CABRIOLET for the fall of 1967, to authorize the preparation of the test, and to reserve the specific authority for conducting the test.

The views regarding this test of the members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests have been obtained:

- (1) The Under Secretary of State (Tab B) recommends postponement due to the criticality of the NPT negotiations and the current state of international and domestic public opinion but points out that this will raise a serious problem with the Joint Committee and eliminates the Colombian Canal option.
- (2) The Secretary of Defense (Tab C) considers the timing of the test to be primarily a foreign policy matter and supports the Department of State position.
- (3) The Director of Central Intelligence (Tab D) sees no objection to the test from an intelligence viewpoint and points out that the USSR is making steady progress in their peaceful-use program.
- (4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Tab E) conclude that CABRIOLET should proceed because further delay could adversely affect U.S. national security because the Plowshare cratering experiments contribute to improved military technology.
- (5) The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Tab F) recommends disapproval for largely the same reasons as the State Department but also adds that CABRIOLET would be meaningless unless it is followed by other cratering experiments that would create even greater strains on the integrity of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
- (6) The Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Tab G) recommends that the entire Plowshare excavation program be deferred with a substantial savings in fiscal years 1968-1969, totalling 24 to 27 million dollars.
- (7) The Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Tab H) cannot recommend proceeding at this time pointing out that political considerations that

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document as ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~

- 2 -

led to postponement of the test in February are even of greater concern now and that the political risk involved in conducting CABRIOLET in the absence of an internationally acceptable basis for nuclear excavation is very great. However, he also suggests that if CABRIOLET is deferred at this time, consideration should be given to deferring the remainder of the nuclear cratering program.

In addition, Ambassador Goldberg (Tab I), although not a member of the Review Committee, recommends postponement of CABRIOLET at least until after conclusion of the General Assembly on December 19; and recommends a policy review of the question of conducting any excavation experiments until the Limited Test Ban Treaty is appropriately amended.

In order to meet a readiness date of November 16, 1967, the AEC will need approval by November 2 to permit assembling of the explosive and its emplacement. In view of the pressure of the timetable and the important political implications of your decision either way, you may wish to have a meeting of the principals with Bob Anderson, the Chairman of the Atlantic-Pacific Inter-oceanic Canal Study Commission, present for further discussion even though their views are on record. (Tab J)

* Bob is most concerned over the delays in the experimental excavation program and has requested an opportunity to discuss the decision with you if there is any likelihood that you might not approve the test for execution at this time. He is holding up a reply to a letter from Senator Pastore that expresses the Joint Committee's concern over the delay in Plowshare excavation experiments and requests specific information on the future schedule for such experiments.

* Bob Anderson called this morning. He said a five-minute telephone call would do.

W. Rostow Rostow

Authorize execution _____.

Defer the test at least until after conclusion of the present UNGA _____.

Defer all future nuclear excavation experiments and recapture the funds _____.

Arrange a meeting of all concerned _____.

Arrange a meeting with Robert Anderson _____.

See me _____.

~~SECRET - RESTRICTED DATA~~