

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/31/67	A
#1a cable	Deptel to Bucharest (work copy) S 7 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i>	undated	A
#2a cable	JCS IN 72393 S 4 p <i>open NLS 96-273 5/98</i> [Duplicate of #89a, NSF, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. 8]	10/67	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President <i>open NLS 019-0244 (12/01)</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i>	10/31/67	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/31/67	A
#5a note	Intelligence Note 861 C 3 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i>	10/30/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, re: Nepal <i>open 3-18-14 RAC</i> S 4 p <i>sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i> [Duplicate of #118, NSF, Country File, Nepal, "Visit of King Mahendra to Washington, 11/67"]	10/31/67	A
#7b memo	Katzenbach to President, re: Nepal S 1 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i> [Duplicate of #118a, NSF, Country File, Nepal, "Visit of King Mahendra to Washington, 11/67"]	10/31/67	A
#7d rpt	Talking Points, re: Nepal S 4 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i> [Duplicate of #118b, NSF, Country File, Nepal, "Visit of King Mahendra to Washington, 11/67"]	undated	A
#7f rpt	Bio Sketch S 3 p <i>open 3-18-14 RAC</i>	undated	A
#7g rpt	Bio Sketch " " C 2 p	undated	A
#10a cable	Vice President to Rostow <i>sanitized 5/25/01 NS/AAL 00-269</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/31/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 48, 10/25-31/67

Box 24

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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#10b cable	Vice President to Rostow C 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i> <i>Name Same NLS 019-024-4</i>	10/30/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open 11/8/00 NLS 00-197</i> S 1 p	10/31/67	A
#12a cable	Saigon 3854 <i>exempt 12-3-96 NLS 94-451</i> S 6 p <i>Open 7/12/01 NLS 00-198</i>	10/27/67	A
#12b cable	Saigon 3854 <i>exempt 12-3-96 NLS 94-451</i> S 2 p	10/27/67	A
#12c cable	Saigon 3879 <i>exempt 12-3-96 NLS 94-451</i> S 3 p <i>Sanitized 7/12/01 NLS 00-198</i>	10/28/67	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/31/67	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/31/67	A
#17a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>Sanitized per RAR 10/2/01</i> S 4 p	10/31/67	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i>	10/30/67	A
#21 cable	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/30/67	A
#23a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>Open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i> S 1 p <i>Dup. #62, NSF, CF, VN, "8AD" Box 104</i>	10/30/67	A
#24 cable	Rostow to President <i>Open 11/8/00 NLS 00-197</i> S 2 p <i>Exempt 12-12-94 NLS 94-453</i>	10/30/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/30/67	A
#26a memo	Caspers and Rostow <i>Open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i> C 2 p	10/30/67	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 48, 10/25-31/67

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#27 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67904) S 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/29/67	A
#28 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67905) S 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/29/67	A
#29 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67906) S 2 p "	10/29/67	A
#30 cable	Rostow to Bowles S 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-18-95 NLS 94-453; Annosam NLS 019-024-4</i>	10/28/67	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President <i>open NLS 019-024-4</i> TS 2 p <i>sanitized 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i>	10/28/67	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 10-31-95 NLS 94-454</i>	10/29/67	A
#36a ltr	PM Yew to President PCI 2 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/27/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p "	10/27/67	A
#38a memo	Rusk to President C 2 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i>	10/27/67	A
#41a memcon	Rostow and Wakaizumi C 3 p <i>OPEN 4-18-95 NLS 94-453</i>	10/27/67	A
#44a rpt	"Specific Rejections..." TS 2 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i>	1967	A
#47a cable	USUN 1754 S 4 p " "	10/26/67	A
#49a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 4-10-95 NLS 94-451</i> S 2 p <i>Dup #72, NSFICF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	10/27/67	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 2-9-93 NLS 92-135</i>	10/27/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 48, 10/25-31/67

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#50a memo	Rusk to President S 4 p <i>Sanitized 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/27/67	A
#50b rpt	"US Military Strength..." S 1 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	6/30/67	A
#50c cable	Deptel to Tokyo (work copy) S 4 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/21/67	A
#50d cable	Deptel to Tokyo (work copy) S 4 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/21/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Sanitized 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454; Amosani NLJ 019-0244</i>	10/26/67	A
#53a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>Exempt 4-5-01 NLJ/RAC 00-270; exempt NLJ 019-0244</i>	10/26/67	A
#54a memo	McNamara to President TS 1 p <i>open 7-17-97 NLJ 96-239</i>	10/25/67	A
#54b memo	Wheeler to McNamara " TS 2 p	10/23/67	A
#54c cable	Deptel to Saigon (draft) " TS 2 p	undated	A
#55a cable	Bucharest 604 S 6 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/25/67	A
#59a memo	Rusk to President S 4 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/26/67	A
#63a cable	Intelligence Cable TS 2 p <i>Sanitized 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451; Amosani NLJ 019-0244</i>	undated	A
#67 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454</i> S 3 p [Duplicate of #31, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3L(1), 3/65-11/67, NVN Leadership Activities]	10/26/67	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 48, 10/25-31/67

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#69 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/26/67	A
#70a cable	Ottawa 504 S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 92-398 7-8-99</i>	10/23/67	A
#71a memo	Read to Rostow S 2 p <i>open 3-17-93 NLJ 92-398</i>	10/26/67	A
#71b memcon	"Law of the Sea" " C 1 p	6/7/67	A
#71c memcon	"Law of the Sea" " C 2 p	5/22/67	A
#73a cable	Manila 3760 S 4 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i> [Duplicate of #175a, NSF, Country File, Philippines, Vol. 4] [Exempt NLJ 86-141]	10/24/67	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #13, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Pres. Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos] [Exempt 1979]	10/25/67	A
#75a memo	Helms to Rostow <i>exempt 3-4-93 NLJ 00196</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #13a, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Pres. Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos] [Exempt 1979]	10/25/67	A
#75b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 5 p	10/25/67	A
#75c memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 8 p	10/20/67	A
#76a cable	Saigon 9529 S 10 p <i>open 4-16-95 NLJ 94-451</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>Encar dup #17a, NSF, CF, VN 8 BB "B" K 105]</i>	10/25/67	A

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#79 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President u C 3 p	10/25/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President exempt 10-31-95 NLJ 94-454 S 1 p <i>Exempt 5/25/01 NIS/RAC 00-269 i exempt NIS 04-0244</i> [Duplicate of #82, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	10/25/67	A
#82a memo	Intelligence Memorandum exempt 3-4-03 NLJ 00-196 S 3 p [Duplicate of #82a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1979]	10/24/67	A
#91 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A
#91a cable	Deptel to Kinshasa (work copy) S 2 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/24/67	A
#92 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A
#92a memo	Rusk to President S 1 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/23/67	A
#92b rpt	"Draft UN Assurances..." u S 1 p	undated	A
#92c rpt	"Draft US Declaration to be..." S 2 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	undated	A
#92d rpt	"Report on Foster Consultations..." S 3 p <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i>	10/20/67	A
#93 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A

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#94a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 4-10-95 NLJ 94-451</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #8a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	10/25/67	A
#96 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p [Duplicate of #12, NSF, Country File, Mexico, "Visit of Pres. Diaz Ordaz, Background Memos"] [Sanitized 1979]	10/25/67	A
#100a ltr	President to PM Holyoake PCI 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A
#100b ltr	PM Holyoake to President S 3 p <i>exempt 12-12-94 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/16/67	A
#100c memo	Aide Memoire <i>open 12/16/09</i> S 1 p <i>exempt 12-12-94 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/16/67	A
#101a ltr	President to PM Holt PCI 1 p <i>open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/25/67	A
#101b memo	Waller to President TS 1 p	10/6/67	A
#101c memo	PM Holt to President TS 3 p <i>exempt 12-12-94 NLJ 94-453</i>	10/6/67	A
#104 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 4-18-95 NLJ 94-453</i> [Duplicate of #91, NSF, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. 8] [Sanitized 1983]	10/25/67	A

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1

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By CB, NARA, Date 4-11-95

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

The gut of this long cable is that Sec. Rusk and Under Sec. Katzenbach believe it would be a good idea for Harriman to visit Bucharest on his return journey from Pakistan.

If Maurer accepts, Averell might stop in certain other East European countries.

I see no harm in this and some possible good.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

1a

~~SECRET~~

Ambembassy BUCHAREST (PRIORITY)

STATE

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-451
By CG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

REF: Bucharest 604

1. Your excellent account of interview with Maurer has been studied with great interest.
2. Please make appointment with Maurer as soon as possible and during that discussion, express, on behalf of the President, appreciation of Maurer's account and gratitude for his own valuable observations. You should express the President's personal satisfaction at Maurer's having accurately conveyed to the North Vietnamese leaders the interest of the USG in working for a settlement of the Viet Nam problem on the basis of full freedom for the South Vietnamese to determine their own destiny. The President also welcomed Maurer's telling the North Vietnamese that he found the

S/AH: DIDavidson/Isham;tvb 7541

S/AH - Governor Harriman

WH -

INR/REA-Smyser

The Under Secretary

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

EA - W.P. Bundy

S/S -

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

US goal as expressed to him by the President and Secretary of State of a solution within the basic framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords, provided a real basis for discussions. The President believes, that to the extent Maurer succeeded in impressing these basic truths upon the North Vietnamese leaders he performed a very significant service and one in the interests of all nations.

3. Please inform Maurer that Governor Harriman, who is charged with directing the US effort to bring about a peaceful solution in Viet Nam, will be in Pakistan in late November to head the US delegation at the dedication of the Mangla Dam. If Maurer agrees that it would be useful to have further frank and private talks on the Vietnamese situation as a follow-up to his talks with the President and the Secretary of State, Harriman would arrange to visit Bucharest on his return journey. Impression that Harriman visit connected with Maurer's trip might be minimized since Harriman also considering visiting one or two other East European nations such as Yugoslavia. FYI: If Maurer welcomes Harriman visit it is important for us to know whether he regards Harriman visit to other East European capital or capitals as necessary or desirable. END FYI.

4). You should emphasize the importance USG attaches to

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#3

Ambassy BUCHAREST

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

Maurer's conversations with the North Vietnamese and the Chinese and therefore press him for the most detailed and precise accounts of those matters which he has already discussed with you. Unless you think it counter-productive you should enquire about possibility of obtaining further amplification from other Rumanian officials who accompanied him. You should point out our need to be able to differentiate between the North Vietnamese and Rumanian positions as they were revealed in their talks. For example, as reported reftel, Maurer explained Rumanian position as requesting North Viet Nam to declare categorically that in case bombardment ceased unconditionally and forever North Viet Nam would be willing to start negotiations for a solution within the framework of the 1954 Geneva Accords. According to Maurer the NVN replied in a sense which essentially agreed with Rumania, i.e., if bombardment ceased they would be prepared to enter negotiations. The precise wording of the reply is obviously of great significance to the USG. Did Hanoi ask for cessation of bombardment? Did Hanoi use the words permanently or unconditionally? Did Hanoi differentiate (as it has in the past) among contacts, talks and negotiations and which word did they use to describe the discussions that would take place after the stopping of the

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

bombing? Was it clear that the stopping of bombing would be followed by talks within a short time? What indications were there of the matters that would be taken up at the talks? What was Hanoi's reaction to Maurer's request that it "categorically" declare its readiness to begin talks after the stopping of the bombing? FYI Usual DRV formulation is that talk "could" follow bombing halt. End FYI

5. Other specific points on which we hope Maurer will be willing to furnish further information include:

- a) Whether the expectation that fighting will continue in South Viet Nam concurrently with negotiations is Rumanian or North Vietnamese and, if NVN, the reasoning behind their expectation.
- b) Whether NVN agreed with Rumania that basic provisions of '54 Geneva Accords provided real basis for discussions. If so, can Maurer provide any specific indication of how North Vietnamese view basic provisions?
- c) What did Hanoi indicate as its conception of conditions under which South Vietnamese people could decide their own destiny?
- d) What "special ties" between South Viet Nam and the

5

Amembassy BUCHAREST

~~SECRET/NOBIS~~

US did North Viet Nam see as possibly emerging as result of talks ending conflict?

d) What is the basis for Maurer's distinction between the NVN leaders who use their own brains and those who make judgments under Chinese influence? What underlies his judgment that Chinese influence on North Viet Nam "from war viewpoint" is diminishing? What "elasticity" in position of USG does Maurer suggest would strengthen independent elements in North Viet Nam?

e) What further information can Maurer provide as to North Viet Nam's views on reunification of Viet Nam?

g) To what extent did North Viet Nam leaders authorize Maurer to give report to USG?

6. You should enquire whether, since Maurer's conversations in Hanoi, Rumanians have received any indication of Hanoi's reaction to the President's September 29 San Antonio formulation. In connection with this enquiry you should state that the President has instructed you to inform Maurer of two important points:

a) There can be no doubt as to the magnitude of NVN infiltration into South Viet Nam. Through the capture of hundreds of prisoners, thousands of documents, the

Amembassy BUCHAREST

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

interrogation of numerous defectors from the NVN army and other means of intelligence collection the USG can state categorically that there are now in South Viet Nam at least 50,000 regular soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army formed into at least 80 battalions. Furthermore, the USG estimates on the basis of reliable evidence that NVN infiltration has averaged approximately 5,000 men per month over the last two years. Finally you should note that continued artillery and other attacks upon US positions in South Viet Nam just below the DMZ are being made solely by regular units of the NVN army which are not included in the figures given above.

b) The President, in making his assumption that the North Vietnamese would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation while discussions proceed, was entirely not assuming North Viet Nam would cut off/its support to its forces in the South while the armed struggle was continuing. At the same time USG would feel if ~~but rather stating his assumption that NVN sought to take~~ ~~would not take~~ advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support

7

Ambassy BUCHAREST

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of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from north of IMZ or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would not be acting in good faith.

7. You should close by again noting USC gratification at the highest levels for Rumanian contribution and enquire what further role Maurer anticipates for Rumania.

END

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Tuesday, October 31, 1967
7:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This Indonesian evaluation of the evolution of the war and its present situation is worth reading to the very end.

W. W. Rostow

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JCS IN 72393 (DTG 272330Z Oct 67)

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 28, NARA, Date 11-6-91

~~SECRET~~
Message JCS IN 72393 (DTG 272330Z Oct 67)

DECLASSIFIED 2a
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-273
By us, NARA Date 5-11-98

Translation of an Indonesian document, dated 12 September 1967,
(acquired in Manila 18 October 1967):

1. S-NFD) Developments in Hanoi tend to show that once the new government takes over in South Vietnam, new era in Vietnam war will begin. Same impression has been noted by number of foreign observers in Hanoi. On basis of Indonesian Embassy's own observations and exchange of views with other foreign observers, the Indonesian Embassy staff in Hanoi has gained following impressions:

a. Until recently, Hanoi's view on war was based on the belief that United States would not undertake all-out, large-scale military offensive because Washington's real intention was to make North Vietnam realize it could never win in South. This attitude was fully exploited by the North and the Americans pay dearly for it. The Americans have adopted this attitude not out of love for the South but because of circumstances.

b. War has cost the Americans millions of dollars in manpower and equipment; yet, after more than two years of fighting, they have not gained any hope of solving the issue. Public opinion in United States is against American involvement in Vietnam. In addition, protests and criticisms from other countries have contributed to unpopularity of President Johnson's policy on Vietnam. The Hanoi regime put it this way: Johnson has placed himself in such a situation that the American people and their allies seem to have lost confidence in him, an unfavorable situation to one who must run for re-election next year.

c. Hanoi believes that external factors have forced the US to adopt an attitude which has been to Hanoi's benefit. The attitude is reflected in concern that more undertakings in Vietnam may provoke Communist China to enter the war; the not remote possibility of unfriendly relations among United States, Russia, and other communist countries. All these factors were exploited by Hanoi to its advantage.

d. In escalating war to the North, the Americans have adopted varied tactics not used before and other strategies were put into action in Vietnam. Despite all these, the Americans took restricted steps in bombing North Vietnam areas other than strategic points. As Secretary McNamara put it: "The escalation was an increased effort to reduce enemy infiltration and not to invade, conquer, or destroy North Vietnam to risk expansion of the war with all its consequences." The Americans suffered tremendously as a result of this less positive offensive policy. Despite large number of bombs dropped in North Vietnam, the US was unable to stop enemy infiltration or deter movement of supplies to the South. The US prohibition on bombing of strategic points near the North

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Vietnam-China border has made possible continuous flow of supplies through Red China.

e. But despite the restrictions, the bombing impact on civilians has been considerable. The people have lost their feelings of security; they live in constant fear although they pretend to be brave and nonchalant. In addition, escalation of bombing has increased damage and military casualties. The flow of supplies to the South has been reduced to the minimum as a result of destruction by bombing. Communication facilities have suffered great damage. (Attention invited to apparently conflicting statements in this paragraph and in d, above.)

f. Another effect of escalation was decrease in Viet Cong attacks and forcing VC to avoid maximum armed clashes in places where they were not sure of winning. Bombing has also caused destruction to militia and reserves. From Indonesian Embassy's observation, the Americans although slow, are becoming wiser.

g. From Indonesian Embassy's reliable contacts in Hanoi, it has been learned that Hanoi is becoming very concerned about situation and is hoping the Americans will not act too boldly. Another concern is possibility of "liberating" the North which may enter heads of people in Pentagon and which may permit American pilots to bomb all points including restricted zones. This step will totally destroy Hanoi's reserves and potentials. As a result of the bombings, Hanoi has been forced to reduce its supplies to South by 40 per cent and manpower infiltration reduced to 25 per cent. The "multiple cuts" (sic) which the Americans seem to be using as tactics in their bombing raids have brought Hanoi's activity to a standstill. This type attack was recently used in harbor areas of Haiphong and Cam Pha where bombings have had tremendous impact and caused serious damage.

h. As a result of continued bombings and destruction of communications and reserves, counteraction has been reduced immensely. North Vietnam has over 7,500 antiaircraft guns and some 36 SAM Missile sites. Former attrition rate of aircraft downed was 4 per cent per raid; now it has been reduced to about 1.5 per cent, which indicates North Vietnam's ground defenses have been partially reduced. Further effect of the bombing was Hanoi's evacuation of its MIGs to bases in China. Before, Hanoi was the proud owner of 145 MIG planes, but now it has about 75 planes left and a good part of them are based in Communist China. The small number of planes stationed in North Vietnam airfields probably are not operational because of shortage of fuel, landing fields, and spare parts caused by the bombings. These aircraft were previously supported by heavy antiaircraft guns and SAM missiles but now supporting units have been reduced and can no longer operate effectively. The MIG planes stationed in Communist

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China cannot be depended upon because their operational range is reduced and effectiveness badly cut. Before they can be effective, these aircraft have to refuel in North Vietnam after leaving their China base and have to refuel before returning there. In recent talks, a friendly military source told the Indonesian Embassy staff in Hanoi that Hanoi is short of ammunition, that "they don't have enough bullets to shoot attacking planes." He said supplies to South have to be cut as they need most of them in North Vietnam. As a result, operations in South have been reduced. From another source, it was learned Hanoi has sent appeals and instructions to Viet Cong in South to refrain from unnecessary operations and activities. In solving food shortages, Viet Cong were instructed to be lenient and friendly to peasants. This instruction was issued because VC had been using brute force to get help and food from peasants. An exodus of peasants to cities, as has been happening lately, will be fatal to Viet Cong guerrilla activities in following ways:

(1) Supplies in past were provided by the North while food came mainly from the peasants. Now, peasants are not helping VC with food. Food must now come from North, but since North cannot provide, VC position will be weakened.

(2) Exodus of peasants to South will mean an increase in ranks of South Vietnamese and these peasants could be indoctrinated to be used later against VC and Liberation Front.

(3) Presence of these peasants in villages was convenient for VC, since they used them as shields; now the VC will lack this shield in battle.

2. (S-NFD) From the Indonesian Embassy's observations, conversations and information obtained from other sources, it is believed that situation in Hanoi has changed and the change is favorable to the Americans. A good part of North's potential and manpower has been smashed; flow of supplies from and through Red China is now restricted, thus, cutting off VC operational capability in South where VC logistic support depended mostly on North. Now, Hanoi more than ever, is looking and depending on Russia, not only for foodstuff but also for military supplies and equipment. Hanoi's communication network has been partially if not heavily paralyzed by bombing and, whatever help from either China or Russia will experience delays. Hanoi, however, is now turning to Russia for help and this gives Russia a stronger position toward war in Vietnam. If Red China played a dominant role before, now the situation has changed and Russia will be wielding the stick. This change will also strengthen Moscow's position in the Comintern (sic) and may lead to adoption of a firmer attitude toward China. And more so, it will strengthen Moscow's position with regard to Washington. All these (factors) will have impact and bearing on solution

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of Vietnam war. However, it is still too early to predict, and it is not yet certain that Russia will completely take over China's role as major supplier to Hanoi. So far, Russia, in addition to economic supplies, has given Hanoi military equipment in form of guns, rockets mortars, mines, MTBguns -- light and heavy armament. Le Thanh Nghai will soon lead a delegation to Moscow to appeal for more military aid. If Russia becomes number one supporter of Hanoi, then any solution to Vietnam war will have to be based on Russian interest in this part of the world.

* * * *

Comments of preparing officer: (C-NFD) Original text undoubtedly was in Indonesian and was translated into present English version. Where meaning was ambiguous or obscure, attempts were made in editing to place text in clearer language without altering intended meaning of original. It was not always clear in original report what portion of information originated in Hanoi and what portion represents comment or interpretation by source and/or his superiors.

~~SECRET~~

3
Pres file
Tuesday, October 31, 1967
6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith text of President
Thieu's inaugural address, with
key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 10084

WWRostow:rlh

October 31, 1 7

3a

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER TO THE PRESIDENT

SAIGON 10084

SUBJECT: President Thieu's Inaugural Address

Following is the Vietnamese Government translation of inaugural address delivered by President Nguyen Van Thieu on October 31:

"My fellow Countrymen:

"Three months ago, in order to continue to serve the ideals of freedom and democracy, and restore peace and prosperity to all of you, we stood for election, with a program consisting of three main objectives; to set up democratic institutions, to find a solution to the war and to improve social conditions.

"On September 3, you placed your confidence in us through a free, democratic, fair, and honest election and gave us the great and heavy responsibilities of leading the country at this extremely critical time.

"Today in taking office, amidst this sacred atmosphere, in communion with our ancestors, and our heroes, before the entire nation I solemnly pledge to:

- Safeguard the Fatherland,
- Respect the constitution,
- Serve the interests of the nation and the people, and
- Do my utmost to fulfill the responsibilities of President of the Republic of Vietnam. These pledges I consider as tenets which will strictly guide all of my thoughts and actions, and those of the entire executive machinery which you have entrusted to me.

"Today, we are entering the fifth year since the 1963 revolution. During this time, the country has experienced many difficulties and changes, which have consumed a great deal of energy. Nevertheless, these four long years full of challenges in fighting and building, have been useful to us in choosing a path which we definitely must follow in order to move forward, and begin a new phase filled with greatness and promise. By greatness and promise, I mean the glories and the difficulties which await us. I think that today is not only the first day of an ordinary executive term. Moreover, this does not mark a victory by an individual or a group of individuals in order to consolidate their political ambitions. To achieve this day, our armed forces and people have made many sacrifices; and our allies have contributed a great deal of efforts.

"Thus today must be a day commemorating the ideology of freedom; today marks the fruits of the efforts towards democracy. It also symbolizes the solid alliance among allied countries working for common security and progress for the entire world.

"My fellow countrymen, amidst these great and hallowed ideas to which I have just referred and on the basis of the mandate which you have given to me, may I voice the firm resolve of our entire nation to realize a national policy which includes the three following guidelines: democracy building, restoration of peace, and social improvement. With such a policy, we are determined to defeat the following three enemies: totalitarianism, war, and injustice and backwardness in order to make our country democratic, peaceful and progressive.

"In the present heroic struggle for self-defense, our Republic of Vietnam has always shown itself to be a freedom and peace loving nation. Our policy is to be ready to have friendly relations on the basis of equality with every country which respects Vietnam's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

"We are grateful to all nations which give us material and moral support in our difficult struggle for self-defense and in our efforts to rebuild the country.

Our policy toward our neighboring countries is to have a good relationship, to respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity and to solve every problem through understanding, reciprocal assistance and mutual respect.

"We are ready to cooperate with all friendly nations so that the peace and security of every nation can be guaranteed; on the other hand, we are ready to contribute, according to our capabilities, to the well-being and prosperity to the world.

"After more than 20 years of sufferings, mournings and destruction caused by war, our people, more than anyone else, long for an early restoration of peace.

"To realize this legitimate aspiration, our Government has always sincerely welcomed, and responded favorably to, all peace proposals regardless of their source. Moreover, we ourselves have put forth many proposals aimed at solving the Vietnamese problem in a peaceful manner.

"Today, entrusted by the entire people with the important responsibility of leading the Nation, I once again confirm that I will make a direct proposal to the North Vietnamese Government to sit down at the conference table in order that the governments of the South and the North can directly seek together ways and means to end the war. I will open wide the door of peace and leave it wide open to the North Vietnamese authorities in order to seek a peaceful solution to end the war which has caused sufferings to the entire Vietnamese people. This will only be achieved when the North Vietnamese Government realizes that their aggressive war no longer pays off.

"Many times we have made it clear that we want nothing more than the withdrawal of the North Vietnam's aggressor troops and an end to their subversion and terrorism in South Vietnam. Peace will then be restored immediately.

"As regards the 'National Liberation Front', it should not be a preliminary condition to peace talks (sic). As in the 1954 regroupment following the Geneva Conference, elements of the 'Front' can now make a choice: those who believe in Marxism can freely return to the North, and those who share our ideals of freedom and democracy can remain in the South and cooperate with us.

"Up to now, we have welcomed more than seventy thousand returnees who have recognized that the present war is not a struggle for independence as alleged by the Communists and who have decided to return to the national community so as to serve the people and rebuild the homeland. They have been treated as equals, and have been given positions suitable to their abilities. They enjoy the same rights as any other citizen in the framework of the 'National Reconciliation Policy' which we are carrying out, and which will certainly succeed.

"However, as you know, thus far peace has been only a frail and remote hope, because the North Vietnamese Regime has obstinately refused every peace settlement. In their aggressive ambition, they conceive that peace can only be realized by our surrender. For this reason, I want to make clear to the North Vietnamese Government and its tools in the South that we are firmly determined to safeguard freedom and democracy. I want them to understand that they cannot use military strength to destroy these ideals, and that they will not win this war. I sincerely hope that I might meet them at a conference table in order to seek a common solution to end this war, to terminate the sufferings and mournings of the peoples of both North and South Vietnam which are due to the ambitions of these few North Vietnamese Communist leaders who obey a foreign ideology by implementing ruthless dictatorial measures.

"We are not alone in our just struggle for self-defense. Nearly 40 friendly countries are actively helping us. At the same time as the American Government and people provide us with their powerful assistance, the governments and people of the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines also contribute their resources. The sacrifices of their servicemen, fighting side by side with the Vietnamese servicemen on the battlefields, thus bring many important military successes constantly improving the situation and dissipating the Communists' aggressive ambitions.

"Our Government and people will always remain grateful to friendly countries which have helped us resist aggression, safeguard our freedom, and reconstruct our country.

"As for our armed forces, cadres and civil servants, of every branch and level, they are also valiantly and efficiently fighting the enemy on the battlefield or in other areas of endeavor.

"During the past two years, our armed forces killed over 149,000 enemy by body count, captured more than 23,000 prisoners, and seized over 54,000 weapons of various types. In two years, 55,000 Viet Cong rallied to our Government.

"You have certainly heard of the glorious victories of the combined operations in the First Corps area, at Pleime in the Second Corps area, at Phuoc Qua in the Third Corps area, and Operation 'Cuulong Dan Chi' in the Fourth Corps area. Concurrently with efforts to destroy the enemy, noteworthy efforts have been made in Revolutionary Development and rural reconstruction during the past two years: 1,978 hamlets have been built and consolidated, gathering 3,498,000 people, 4,777 classrooms, 46 maternities, 1,200 kilometers of roads, 169 bridges, 127 water wells, 401 kilometers of canals, and 101 dikes, have been built in rural areas. Electricity has been installed in twenty localities and 42,000 peasants have been trained in farming and animal husbandry to increase production.

"You have seen that our military administrative and civic cadres have made great efforts and sacrifices. Those undeniable sacrifices and efforts have made and are making history and have given us this day the promise of a better future.

"Dear fellow countrymen, the assistance of friendly countries is necessary and valuable, but we should not forget that the present struggle is above all our own struggle. Therefore, we must mobilize our entire people for the common struggle of the nation to safeguard freedom and national sovereignty. In the present phase of the war, both the army and people must be conscious of the necessity of contributing their blood and sweat in the common struggle. All of us must further increase our efforts in order to take initiative in the task of deciding the nation's future. We cannot depend entirely on outside assistance. The increase of our entire people's efforts in this struggle will undoubtedly shorten the way to peace, a genuine, lasting peace, that can ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Vietnam in independence, freedom and democracy. You would certainly agree with me that if the enemy is still strong it is because we are not yet stronger than he and peace has not been attained for the same reason. A peace forced upon the weaker party is a surrender. I am determined not to accept a surrender. Therefore, to find a solution to the war, the first condition is to be strong in every respect. The goal of our war of self-defense and that of the Communists' aggression cannot be reconciled unless we prove to the aggressors that they cannot realize their ambition.

"Our all-out defense efforts do not mean that we like war and intend to destroy the population on the other side of the demarcation line. On the contrary, these efforts are made not only to restore peace in Vietnam but also to check the danger of Communist aggression, maintain stability in Southeast Asia and build a durable peace for Asia and the world.

"If I require from you greater efforts for defense, it is not because I advocate a military solution as the only way to defeat the Communists, and overlook political, economic, cultural and social weapons. However, military strength is the preliminary condition for us to safeguard and strengthen all efforts in the above-mentioned fields in which we are striving and will succeed.

"Only by understanding the situation in this way will we be able to appreciate what we have to do in the future and the part that everyone has to contribute towards victory.

"As you know, what I want to do is to settle the war which is the cause of sufferings and which has been ravaging our beloved country. At the same time, I will try to improve the democratic regime through the participation of the entire population in national affairs. I will also try to carry out social reforms aimed at liberating the human being and bringing the nation on the road to progress.

"As I have said to you on an earlier occasion, we will have to push forward to the utmost every effort in the field of military and political activities. The entire population will thus have to accept more sacrifices and make additional efforts. Since this is a struggle for the existence of the nation, we cannot entirely rely on the assistance from our friendly nations. We must first do our best in a spirit of national union.

"First, the armed forces must constantly be improved and reinforced.

"This improvement must be realized in both the morale of the troops and in their material lives -- in order to increase potential for defense, pacification and Revolutionary Development activities.

"This task has been intensively pushed forward since early this year and has already achieved much. The reinforcement of the armed forces and recent partial mobilization is only one of the measures intended to increase the strength of the armed forces, maintain the initiative in the battlefield, ensure security, intensify Revolutionary Development activities, and destroy the enemy sub-structure more efficiently.

"However, a strong and valiant army on the battlefield and in rural areas needs the moral support of the people and a strong popular organization in the rear and in the cities. I mean that, in the rear, we must not only understand but also share the great sacrifices of the combatants and the conditions of rural people so that they will not be grieved and feel that wartime hardships only prevail on the front and in rural areas.

"I appeal to all those who are living in well-being and prosperity not to forget our war-torn country, to restrict their luxurious lives and contribute to the relief of suffering peoples.

"A strong rear force must be organized to protect cities, relieve the heavy duties of the combatants and, at the same time, to adequately cope with the war-time conditions.

"In brief, to meet requirements of the war situation, to associate the rear and front lines in the efforts of a people engaged in a total war, to avoid the repetition of a shocking contrast between rural and urban areas, we cannot require of the rural areas more hardships, greater sacrifices. Rural people are already sharing the heaviest war burden with regard to resources and manpower. This is the reason why people in the capital and other cities should make greater efforts and sacrifices. The firmer the situation in the rural areas and the frontline, the more stable the situation will be in the cities and the rear.

"Thus, although under different circumstances, the efforts and sacrifices of all people throughout the nation will be made on a firm and national basis.

"In return for the efforts and the sacrifices which I ask from you, my fellow countrymen, I am determined to achieve what the Government has the duty to do for the people so that we can progress from initial confidence and enthusiasm to a close cooperation between the people and the Government, a voluntary acceptance of efforts and sacrifices, and complete participation in the national struggle.

"I believe that this is the indispensable condition to defeat the enemy, and we must honestly recognize that this has not been done sufficiently. It is my determination to build democracy and reform society and I have expressed to you my views on this question on a previous occasion. In the task of building democracy, although we have made great progress and established democratic institutions from the highest national level to the villages and hamlets, we have to make even greater efforts to complete the formation of the constitutional institutions as soon as possible.

"As for reforming society, the establishment of a new order based on social justice, in order to raise the standard of living as well as the education level of the population, is the preliminary condition for the realization of a progressive society as well as for raising our country out of its present underdeveloped state.

"The national policy of rural development which is being carried out with vigor, and a plan for industrial development, are the backbone of this vast undertaking. These two tasks require both short-term and long-term plans, whose details will be presented to you when I introduce to you the new Cabinet. However, at this very moment, I think that a number of urgent measures to launch the execution of national policy must be taken forthwith.

"I am referring to a number of tasks whose necessity has been recognized by all, and which a large number of our citizens of good will have mentioned, but which have not yet been accomplished:

1. On the diplomatic front, we will intensify our efforts to make our position clear to the world, and obtain the support of international public opinion for our cause.

2. In the social field, we must protect more efficiently the morals of our people. All forms of deprivation must be ended. Security and public utilities for city dwellers, especially for the population of the capital, must be guaranteed and improved.

3. In the economic field, we shall strive to protect the standard of living of the population, control inflation and regulate supplies. These tasks will not be easy because of Communist subversion and sabotage, and maneuvers of profiteers; but the Government, with the cooperation of the population, will make every effort to obtain tangible results.

4. Nationwide order and discipline should be strengthened. The law should be strictly obeyed. At schools, discipline should be enforced. Every citizen must understand the necessity of law and order and must do his best to cooperate with the Government in this regard.

5. Together with a preparatory military training program, the Government will create favorable conditions for students and civil servants so that they may participate efficiently in social works and devote all their capabilities to the service of the country.

6. An austerity program will be promoted in order to reduce glaring differences between the dangers and privations on the front line as well as in the countryside and blatant luxury in the cities.

7. Finally, as I have mentioned to you on an earlier occasion, in our broad aims to reform society, the major preoccupation of the Government having high priority in the first months is the eradication of corruption in the Governmental machinery and in the armed forces. This has to be carried out with justice, impartiality, and in broad daylight.

"We have also to improve the workings of the Governmental machinery -- its organization, its procedures and its spirit of service to the people.

"The urgent measures which I have just mentioned to you must have your cooperation. Although they are only the first steps and relatively minor tasks in comparison with our overall program, they are the beginning of a journey towards a promising future.

"Fellow countrymen, from the moment I take the oath of office, I belong to you. My preoccupations are your preoccupations. My determination to carry out my tasks should have also your determined support.

"In leading the Nation, I shall ask for advice from the men of talent and from the revolutionaries who have struggled for the country. I shall learn the good things from abroad, without forgetting the essence of national wisdom.

"At the helm of the executive, I shall accept the control of the people through the intermediary of the legislature. I shall welcome all contributions of ideas wherever they may come from. I shall also be ready to accept all responsible and constructive criticisms.

"I shall not use demagoguery to lead the people into error, and shall be close to the people to know the people's real aspirations.

"I shall rely on your eyes to see more clearly and on your concerns to gain better knowledge.

"In brief, I need the help of all the people, and I consider national affairs to be the affairs of common concern to all the population. Successes will also be those of the whole nation.

"Fellow countrymen, today, at the dawn of a new era, a new page of history has just been opened. I earnestly hope and I have confidence that the forthcoming pages of history will inscribe the glorious achievements of our country.

"History never belongs to one man, or to a group of men; it belongs to the whole nation. Consequently, historical achievements cannot be accomplished by one man or a group of men, but by all the nation.

"I therefore invite you all to stand up, to contribute your share to the national struggle and to reconstruction, in a spirit of full cooperation between the Government and the people.

"Our future is decided by ourselves. Each of us has to show himself worthy of being a citizen of heroic and immortal Vietnam.

"Differences always exist among men in society, but if we know how to harmonize ourselves, all our differences can be satisfactorily resolved.

"If we know how to unite, to accept responsibility and sacrifices, we will succeed in all our undertakings. I fervently ask all citizens to harmonize and unite.

"Let all of us pray for peace and prosperity to come soon to our beloved Vietnam."

4

SECRET - BUTTERCUP

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
6:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know that, as an exercise, I did this draft BUTTERCUP message in conformity with the initial suggestions coming from Ambassador Bunker and the CIA station in Saigon. In making it available to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, I made it quite clear that it did not have your blessing; and there may, in the end, be wisdom in a message which stops with prisoners and improved communications.

Nevertheless, I thought you might want to see what such a message might look like.

W. W. R.

SECRET - BUTTERCUP attachment

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLI 019-024-4-1
By JP Date 1-8-02

5

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By Cb, NARA, Date 4-11-95

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

This analysis conforms to my own view; Kosygin's statement of October 30 indicates that the Russians are looking for a negotiation inside South Vietnam. (See paragraph top of page 2)

I would make a substantial bet they are fully briefed on Buttercup.

I only wish that certain members of the U. S. Senate were as sensible about this as Mr. Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

INR 861, October 30, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Art
Intelligence
Note - 861 *5a*

October 30, 1967

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: Kosygin on Vietnam: Support for the NFLSV,
Delphic Obscurity on Peace Terms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-451
B7, *cb*, NARA, Date 3-20-95

Roston

The USSR has publicly renewed its support for the platforms of Hanoi and the NFLSV and has again underlined the distinction between the DRV and the NFLSV as separate factors to be dealt with in reaching a peace settlement. This reaffirmation of Moscow's position is contained in an undated rejection, broadcast on October 30, by Kosygin of a proposal that the Geneva conference be reconvened.

Rejection of a Geneva Conference Now. Kosygin's statement was in reply to a proposal on September 5 by Ales Bebler, President of the World Federation of UN Associations, that the two Geneva co-chairmen and the three members of the International Control Commission meet to discuss the Vietnam war. Kosygin asserted that such a meeting was impossible as long as US bombs "are falling on Vietnam and without the participation of the DRV and NFLSV representatives...." In rejecting such a narrow meeting at this time, however, Kosygin was careful not to preclude the convening of a conference of all the Geneva signatories at some future date. The Soviets, in contrast to Peking, continue to regard the 1954 and 1962 Geneva conferences as a framework in which a Vietnam settlement can at some point be achieved.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Emphasis on the Autonomy of the NFLSV. In publicizing Kosygin's reply, Moscow has again underscored the status of the NFLSV as a coequal of Hanoi.* Since September 16, when Brezhnev was presented a copy of the new Front program, Moscow has gone to great lengths to describe the Front as an independent entity with which the US must negotiate in order to end the war in the south. Thus, on six separate occasions, the Soviets have, by distinguishing between the DRV and the NFLSV, clearly emphasized the autonomous and equal character of each.

Varying Descriptions of DRV and Front Statements. Kosygin's reply to Bebler continues the Soviet practice of carefully obscuring the distinction between conditions necessary for negotiations to begin and the terms of a final settlement. Kosygin wrote to Bebler that "the path indicated in the statements of the DRV government" and the "new program" of the NFLSV "is sensible and acceptable for a settlement in Vietnam." Gromyko on September 22 termed these the "correct bases for settling the Vietnam question." Kosygin on September 23, on the other hand, merely asserted that these statements "have opened prospects for a peaceful political settlement of the Vietnam question."

*For an earlier discussion of this point, see Intelligence Note-792, "Moscow Enhances Its Public Support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam," October 5, 1967 ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

"Bright Prospects" for Peace or Preconditions? In replying to Bebler, Kosygin referred again to "prospects for achieving peace and calm in Vietnam." This time, however, these prospects could open up only after the US fulfilled certain conditions: the US must cease bombing and all other hostile acts against the DRV, withdraw its troops and those of its allies from Vietnam, "recognize the NFLSV," and "not hinder the Vietnamese people in settling their own affairs." Kosygin's and Gromyko's statements have left unclear whether Moscow considers US acceptance of these points to be necessary preconditions to negotiations or the approximate terms of the final settlement of the Vietnam problem.

Intentional Obscurity. It appears that this obscurity in Soviet public statements is intentional. The Soviets have left it to Hanoi to determine how the diplomacy of the war is to be conducted. Moscow has not committed itself to any position which could embarrass the Vietnamese communists now or in the future and perhaps also wants to preserve freedom of maneuver vis-a-vis Hanoi. The USSR will probably continue to cloak its public statements in ambiguities in order to avoid a commitment to positions not already espoused by Hanoi and the NFLSV.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
6:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This talk -- if you choose to give it -- would give you a good occasion to go to State on Thursday morning and then proceed to join the advisers at, say, 10:15 a.m.

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rlh

4158
6a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Invitation to Address the Third Annual
Foreign Service Day Conference

RECOMMENDATION:

That you deliver a welcoming address at the opening of the Third Annual Foreign Service Day Conference on November 2, at 9:45 a.m.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

DISCUSSION:

The Third Foreign Service Day Conference will take place this year in the Department of State on November 2 and 3. An annual event, the Conference again reunites retired and active Foreign Service and Department officers for two days of briefings and discussions on foreign policy matters. This year, in addition, retired and active personnel from the United States Information Agency and the Agency for International Development will participate.

This Conference has particular interest in that it brings together active and retired officers from Government agencies with a major role in foreign affairs. All participants have devoted a large share of their lives to the implementation of United States foreign policy.

Enclosed is a copy of the program which has been drawn up for the two-day Conference. Also enclosed are suggested remarks for the occasion.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Program.

Suggested remarks.

THIRD ANNUAL
FOREIGN SERVICE DAY
CONFERENCE
November 2-3, 1967
International Conference Area

November 2nd

8:30-9:30 Registration, International Conference Lobby
Late registration may be accomplished in Room 1052-A

9:30 Call to order - Opening of Ceremonies - Long Distance
Award
(West Auditorium)
Ambassador George V. Allen, Chairman
Director, Foreign Service Institute

9:45 Welcome by High-Level Official

10:15 Coffee Break

10:30 Long Range Objectives of Foreign Policy
(International Conference Room)
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Member, Policy Planning Council

11:15 A Look Ahead
Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Administration

12:30 DACOR Lunch (By reservation, space available basis)
or Executive Cafeteria of Department

3:00 The Foreign Service
(International Conference Room)
John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign
Service, Honorary Chairman, Foreign Service Day

4:00 Viet-Nam - East Asian and Pacific Affairs
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary, East Asian
and Pacific Affairs

8:00 Lecture - DACOR
(West Auditorium)
Nicholas deB Katzenbach,
Under Secretary of State

(Over)

November 3rd

9:30 The Middle East
 (International Conference Room)
 Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary, Near East
 and South Asian Affairs

10:30 Coffee Break

11:00 First Session of Concurrent Seminars

 1. Problems in Africa, Room 1105
 Joseph Palmer, 2nd, Assistant Secretary
 for African Affairs

 2. Problems in Latin America, Room 1107
 Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary and
 U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress

 3. USIA, Room 2925 (East Auditorium)
 Leonard H. Marks, Director, United States
 Information Agency

 Tour of Foreign Service Institute

12:30 Luncheon -
 American Foreign Service Association
 (John Quincy Adams Room)
 American Foreign Service Wives' Association
 (Mayflower Hotel)

3:00 Second Session of Concurrent Seminars

 1. The Communist World, Room 1105
 Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary
 for Political Affairs

 2. Problems in Europe, Room 1107
 John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary
 for European Affairs

 3. AID, Room 2925 (East Auditorium)
 Rutherford M. Poats,
 Deputy Administrator

 Tour of Operations Center

4:15 Briefing (Tour d'horizon)
 by The Secretary of State

6:00 Reception by The Secretary of State
 (John Quincy Adams Room)

THIRD ANNUAL
FOREIGN SERVICE DAY
CONFERENCE
November 2-3, 1967
International Conference Area

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 Information Agency

 Tour of Foreign Service Institute

12:30 Luncheon -
 American Foreign Service Association
 (John Quincy Adams Room)
 American Foreign Service Wives' Association
 (Mayflower Hotel)

3:00 Second Session of Concurrent Seminars

 1. The Communist World, Room 1105
 Foy D. Kohler, Deputy Under Secretary
 for Political Affairs

 2. Problems in Europe, Room 1107
 John M. Leddy, Assistant Secretary
 for European Affairs

 3. AID, Room 2925 (East Auditorium)
 Rutherford M. Poats,
 Deputy Administrator

 Tour of Operations Center

4:15 Briefing (Tour d'horizon)
 by The Secretary of State

6:00 Reception by The Secretary of State
 (John Quincy Adams Room)

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SUGGESTED REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE
OCCASION OF FOREIGN SERVICE DAY

Foreign Service Day can hardly be called a longstanding tradition. This is only the third occasion when you have been together for this purpose.

But the annual event is becoming well established. I hope, and believe, that it will grow in importance, consistent with the scope and complexity of our foreign relations.

For many years in our history, foreign affairs played a secondary role in our national life. The U.S. did not count heavily outside this hemisphere. We were glad to be able to give prime attention to building up our own country.

At the beginning of this century, our interests in overseas problems quickened, - and with it the need for professional representatives abroad.

In 1903, and 1915, the Congress passed laws to meet this need - first in the consular and then in the diplomatic service.

Some of our ablest career diplomats -- men like Joseph Grew, William Phillips, Sumner Wells, Christian Herter and Allen Dulles -- began long and distinguished careers in this period.

In 1924, these diplomatic and consular services were combined under the Rogers Act and the present Foreign Service of the United States was created. Men like Bob Murphy and Loy Henderson are products of this combined service.

But a professional career service, whether in foreign or domestic affairs, requires more than an Act of Congress.

It requires years of experience and study.

It requires intelligent and devoted individuals, who are willing to stay the course -- even when their merits aren't universally recognized.

The vast majority of men and women of the Foreign Service whom I know are hard-working public servants, devoted

to their tasks, living in far away and difficult regions, where their families face real problems of health and education. They do so from dedication to their country and their chosen career.

But a proper career service needs even more. It requires a sense of pride. Men and women worthy of the term "professionals" must have high standards of training and of conduct. They must be determined to uphold the finest traditions of their group. This is true in law, in medicine, in politics, and in the armed services. It is equally true in the Foreign Service and in the family of other services which represent our nation abroad.

Above all, a career service must have goals which are important and which command the support of both its members and the country at large.

The goal which you share with your countrymen is clear:

The building of a durable peace.

It is a goal for which you and many other Americans have made large sacrifices in recent decades.

Great progress has been made, as a result.

But much remains to be done - in meeting the problem of aggression in Vietnam and the wider problem of poverty and hunger in other developing countries. We will meet these challenges - as we met others before. And, as in the past, you will have a large part to play in this great task.

But we must also look to longer range needs:

- the need to build a better life for all mankind;

- and the need to concert efforts of the whole

family of man to this end -- effort which will overcome

artificial barriers of nationalism and ideology, in seeking to create a world order in which all have a part to play, and in which all can benefit.

We are devoting every effort to bring this good day to pass.

The position of the US in world affairs today was unsought. History has taken us out of our comfortable past and given us great power. With that power go obligations to play our part in shaping the future - obligations that we cannot escape. We have no choice but to play our role to the best of our ability, determination and generosity.

In doing so, we need the ablest and most dedicated Foreign Service we can develop.

The retired officers who are present today have shown the way.

The active officers carry the torch.

To those others, who still contemplate a career in the Foreign Service, I say: It is a hard career. But if you choose it, you will have the satisfaction of knowing that you are helping to determine whether the bright promise of the future -- for our country and for all mankind -- can be fulfilled.

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967 -- 6:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Visit of King Mahendra (Muh-hen-drah) of Nepal
Wednesday, November 1

Schedule:

11:30 AM Arrival Ceremony, South Lawn (exchange of remarks)
11:50 AM Parade from White House to Blair House
5:00 - 5:45 PM Alone (Advisers standing by in Cabinet Room)
8:00 PM White House Dinner

Papers:

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's briefing memo.
At Tab B are State's suggested talking points.
At Tab C is biographic information on the King and Queen.

Setting:

Nepal is a small buffer state between India and China. The King wants to be sure that the great powers continue to give public support to Nepal's independence. Next to India, we are the largest supplier of aid -- mostly in the form of excess Indian rupees. It is particularly important to the King that we give evidence that we are interested both in his security problem and Nepal's economic development.

The King was last here in 1960, shortly after he had summarily dismissed his Parliament and begun to rule largely by royal decree. This caused some sour noises here during the 1960 visit. Carol Laise Bunker reports that the King is anxious to explain why he feels he must rule in this way, as well as his plans to move toward a "guided democracy" of the Ayub variety. In the meantime, he will want your assurance that we support the monarchy. His politics contain the usual plotting and counterplotting of a dynastic court. We don't know of any real threats to his position, but he may want to have his hand held a bit.

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Authority: MLJ.001R.150.002/16
By je, NARA, Date 3-18-14

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- 2 -

His more serious worry is that something may happen to upset the balance which keeps him from being gobbled up by either of his huge neighbors. He is always afraid that the Chinese might try to annex Nepal in the same manner as Tibet. But he also fears that the Indians could do some annexing of their own to preempt a Chinese take-over. Again, our role in this is not really decisive, though it's significant to Peking and New Delhi that we recognize and support Nepal's sovereignty. That support makes good sense from our point of view mainly because it discourages Indian-Chinese friction along at least one potentially disputed section of their long common border.

Substance:

There are no important bilateral issues. The King particularly wants to see you alone to give you his view of Nepal's political problems -- foreign and domestic -- and to be sure that the interest and support of the U. S. will continue. He will probably also want to talk about the major international issues of the day -- particularly Vietnam and the Middle East -- as well as the likely trends of U. S. policy in Asia outside Vietnam. What we do with regard to India and China is as important to Nepal as what we do directly with the Nepalese.

The State briefing paper suggests the King will come at you with a shopping list of aid requests. Our latest word is that he will only say a few broad words on aid and refer to a detailed aid request they have just handed us. In either case, you will want to reply that we will give his requests careful consideration, despite our aid problems on the Hill. (FYI: We have supplied about \$110 million in economic aid to Nepal over the last 15 years -- about half in Indian rupees. Our programs are now running about \$11 million, of which more than \$8 million is in excess rupees. Our programs are heavily concentrated in agriculture, education, and malaria eradication.)

Talking Points:

1. Nepal's security: You might open by asking for the King's views on the long-term prospects for Nepalese security. He may give you an extended lecture on his northern border problems, his complicated relations with India, and the importance to peace in Asia that Nepal stay independent. The implication will be that we should give him more help, both economic and military. You might reply that:

-- We will continue to support the independence of Nepal.

-- We will try to maintain our economic aid program despite the mood of the Congress.

SECRET

- We particularly admire his emphasis on agriculture as the first priority for public investment.
 - Maintaining aid programs in Nepal, as everywhere else, is heavily dependent on self-help performance. He has done well; we hope he will do even better.
2. Karnali Dam This is a huge (\$1.6 billion) project which would produce as much electric power as is now produced in all of India. It has been under study for seven years. The study was done by Paul Hoffman's UN Special Fund at the specific request of President Eisenhower. The study's results are mixed -- it is a decent project if the Indians will buy most of the power, but they would have to invest a lot of money to get in shape to use it. If the King raises it, you may want to say that we are reviewing the study and will let him know our reaction. (In any case, it is such a huge project that many nations would be required to finance and build it.)
3. U. S. Policy in Asia He may ask whether the current mood of the Congress -- as reflected in cuts in the foreign aid bill -- means that the U. S. must change its basic policy line toward Asian development, particularly in India. You might reply that:
- We continue to believe that economic progress is entirely necessary to our interests in Asia.
 - In money terms alone, we are spending upwards of \$30 billion a year to support and defend Asian security. This is an accurate reflection of our interest.
 - There are some second thoughts in the Congress about putting \$1 billion a year into India when we have many pressing needs at home. This is an honest question which will be much debated in the months ahead.
 - We will do our best to hold the line, but we can't do it without solid evidence of Asian resolve to help themselves. Americans haven't lost faith in Asian development, but it must compete with other worthy demands on limited resources. How well it does depends on Asian performance.
4. Middle East He may ask you to push the Israelis to accept a formula calling for their withdrawal (he has called the Israeli action "aggression") in return for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist.

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- 4 -

5. Vietnam The King has been sympathetic to us in private. ("We are glad you are there.") In public, he has favored a settlement on the basis of the 1954 accords, cessation of bombing, and a broader peace-making role for the UN.

W./W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-451
By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with King Mahendra of Nepal:
November 1; 5:00 p.m.

What Mahendra Wants

This will be a crucial meeting for Mahendra. He wants to be assured that you support him and his policy of gradual, evolutionary modernization at home, and neutrality abroad. In particular, he wants to be reassured that we don't look at Nepal only in the context of our Indian interests, and that he can count on us to support Nepalese political and economic independence against all comers--not just Communist China.

He will have a long list of requests for help in agriculture, communications, family planning, hydro-power and military assistance. He also will probably ask for support in strengthening the Nepalese presence in the Northern Districts bordering Tibet.


I believe it would be best for you to finesse most of his requests by telling him we are ready to take a hard look at any specific proposals his Government makes.

What We Want

We want to show the King that we are interested in Nepal and its problems, and that we continue to support his country's independence. We are particularly anxious to encourage the King to resist Chinese pressures.

Mahendra will probably be relatively uncommunicative in large groups, but he generally loosens up in more private meetings. He has asked to see you alone.

Talking points are at Tab A.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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TALKING POINTS

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

Points You May Wish to Raise

- We firmly support the continued independence of Nepal,
- We sympathize with your efforts to resist Chinese pressures; we hope Nepal will treat Chinese blandishments with great caution, and will cooperate with India in resisting Chinese penetration.
- And we would like Nepalese support, or at least benevolent neutrality, for positions on such important international issues as Vietnam and the Middle East.

Points the King May Raise

1. Economic Assistance

Nepal places its major development emphasis on agriculture. We expect the King to ask for a long-term loan to the Food Corporation; a fund to cushion the effect on the politically powerful landlords of purchases under the Land Reform program; grain warehouses and food storage and processing facilities; ground water surveys and tube-well projects; and help in procuring and operating STOL (short take-off and landing) aircraft.

You May Wish to Say

-- We appreciate Nepal's considerable and growing agricultural self-help efforts. While we cannot commit ourselves now, we will be glad to consider any specific proposals Nepal may make.

2. Family Planning

The King will probably ask for help with Nepal's family planning program.

You May Wish to Say

-- Family planning is a delicate area for us. Nepal should take the lead. But we would be interested in looking

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at specific proposals on how we might help. We are prepared to send additional personnel to Nepal to assist in developing such proposals. (AID now has two junior people assigned to the project.)

3. Northern Districts

Nepal has long neglected its districts in the High Himalayas bordering Tibet. The inhabitants are from the same racial stock as the Tibetans and formerly moved back and forth freely across the frontier. The King is alarmed at a growing Chinese propaganda effort to wean the frontier inhabitants away from loyalty to Kathmandu. The King wants us to help him strengthen the Nepalese presence in the area through construction and improvement of trails and communications, by strengthening local cadres of area development officers, and by helping Nepalese efforts to improve animal husbandry on which the people are so dependent. (He does not want Americans or other foreigners to go into the region, lest this provoke the Chinese to more overt action.)

You May Wish to Say

- We recognize the risks of an unchecked Chinese penetration of the northern districts. Nepal should develop specific approaches and projects closely tied in with and related to its country-wide development plans.
- Given Nepal's shortage of technically trained personnel and material resources, and the difficulties inherent in almost any operation in the High Himalayas, Nepal should carefully weigh the feasibility and desirability of carrying out each program.
- We will give serious consideration to whatever specific projects or programs the GON may present to us.

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4. Karnali Hydro-electric Project

The King will seek your assistance in persuading India to move ahead with talks with Nepal on at least the first phase of the proposed \$1.6 billion hydro-electric development of the Karnali River basin in western Nepal. Aside from Nepal, India is the only potential customer, and her participation in the project is essential.

You May Wish to Say

- We are aware of your interest in this project. Our desire to be helpful has been demonstrated by our efforts in 1960 to have the UN Special Fund undertake a feasibility study and by our local currency support for the study. The study has only recently been published, so we will want to review it carefully. I understand that the conclusions highlight how vast and complicated a project Karnali would be.
- We are as yet, however, unconvinced that the project would justify such a tremendous allocation of resources. Financing would be a serious problem since income from the project could not repay the foreign exchange costs.
- After we have finished our review of the feasibility study, we will look at the proposal again.

5. Military Assistance

The King may request some additional military assistance (our MAP ended in FY 1967 but late deliveries will run through FY 1969). He may ask for only a few items, or he may reinstate former requests for large amounts of arms and ammunition.

You May Wish to Say

- Congress has imposed severe restrictions on our world-wide military assistance programs. These restrictions would complicate any effort to reinstitute our military assistance program for Nepal.

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-- We are ready to study any specific requests you may submit, but action will depend on the nature and quantity of items requested, the availability of funds, and our appraisal of Congressional attitudes.

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King MAHENDRA Bir Bikram Shah

NEPAL

King of Nepal

Keenly conscious of his kingly duties to his people and to his two hundred-year old dynasty, an avid hunter by avocation as well as a poet with published collections of verse, the 47-year old Mahendra is the sole remaining Hindu king in the world. A near-absolute monarch of the Shah dynasty, Mahendra habitually keeps his own counsel and appears to have no influential advisors, although surrounded by sycophantic palace courtiers. Half-God, half-King in the eyes of his people, Mahendra is the paramount tangible symbol of Nepalese nationhood and national identity.

Privately educated by tutors while a virtual palace prisoner of the Rana regime for the first thirty years of his life, King Mahendra has overcome his educational deficiencies to a considerable degree and has traveled widely since his accession. He has become adept during his twelve-year reign at manipulating the various political forces at work in Nepal while he seeks ways to bring his country into the benefits and atmosphere of the Twentieth Century without at the same time destroying the monarchy. His sense of political awareness, his understanding of his people, his ability to handle, disarm, and divide Nepalese politicians, and an insight into the interplay of international forces besetting Nepal have all helped maintain him firmly on the throne.

Somewhat cold and regally aloof in public, Mahendra warms up in private conversations and can become even congenial, responding well to talk of his role as King, hunting and dogs, and subjects of literary and cultural interest. Although invariably polite, the King does leave on most listeners an impression of being taciturn and noncommittal. He is also quite sensitive to his own high position and quick to resent any fancied downgrading. In conversation one is usually uncertain whether the King's gestures of assent mean anything more than an expression of understanding. The King is believed to find it distasteful to say "no"; almost equally distasteful to say "yes."

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GROUP 3:

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

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By JK, NARA, Date 3 18 74

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The King's somewhat dualistic nature is in line with the characteristics attributed to someone born under the sign of Gemini (as he is). He is both conservative and progressive; he is both predictable and unpredictable. He maintains a remoteness and distance, which, combined with his faithful adherence to religious forms and practices, projects the general image of being above intrigue and market place tactics, but he does, in fact, give close attention to the play of issues and forces and pulls the strings that activate his Ministers.

Two principal threats hang like clouds over the stability of Mahendra's rule. The external threat is from the increasingly irrational and bellicose Chinese Communists who occupy Nepal's 650-mile long northern frontier with Tibet. The King and his people, however, while appreciating the existence of a danger from the north, at least equally fear being swallowed up by their southern neighbor, India. Dependent on India for more than 90 percent of Nepal's foreign trade, with the rich flat agricultural Terai bordering India always at Indian mercy, the King cannot forget that twice in his time India has fomented revolt in Nepal. In 1950, the Shah dynasty benefited from a revolution which ousted the Rana Maharajas who had ruled in the name of the King. In 1961-1962, another (but unsuccessful) insurgency was mounted from Indian soil, this time by the Nepali Congress Party against King Mahendra himself. Jealous of Nepalese independence, wary of undue influence from north or south, Mahendra plays classic buffer state politics. His ancestor and founder of the Shah dynasty, Prithvi Narayan Shah, described Nepal as a succulent root between two boulders; if either boulder should move, Nepal would be crushed. King Mahendra does not want either boulder to move.

Although Mahendra is firmly seated on his throne for the short run, the modernizing forces at work within his country are unsettling to a classic, feudal society. The resulting ferment is gradually eroding the conservative political, economic, and social bases of his power. A wise man, the King realizes Nepal must modernize, and is endeavoring so to channel economic and social development as to minimize the impact of these developments on his own power.

As a result, while the monarchy in Nepal may leave something to be desired, if held up against a democratic ideal, it remains the most important unifying force for unity and stability in a country whose geographic, ethnic, and linguistic barriers constantly work against national integration and economic development. The apparent alternatives to the monarchy as typified by Mahendra are much less desirable.

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Although the King banned all political parties in 1960 when he resumed power, the Communist Party continued as a clandestine organization, and represents the most likely potential challenge to the monarchy. Split though it is into pro-China and pro-USSR factions, the CPN has at least a functioning organization which the other, democratic, parties have lost.

Personally, the King is a man of simple tastes and relatively austere habits. He smokes, has an occasional social drink, enjoys his brief trips outside Nepal to other countries. Left a widower with six children in 1950, in 1952 he married his late wife's younger sister, Ratna, who became his Queen. Unlike his father, he has always declined to have the two wives that he would have been permitted by Nepalese custom, and his present marriage appears a happy one. The Queen is said to have as much influence as anyone over the King, although there is no evidence that she participates in affairs of state. The six children borne him by Princess Indra were the Princesses Shanti, Sharada, and Shobha; the Crown Prince Birendra (now studying at Harvard), and Princes Gyanendra and Dhirendra who are still in school. The King has several sisters, a younger brother, Prince Himalaya, and a half-brother, Prince Basundhara.

Since his accession to the throne, Mahendra has made numerous state and official visits abroad. Among his state visits were those to the USSR (1958), the United States (1960), the U.K. (1960), Communist China (1961), India, Japan, and more recently to France (1966) and the Netherlands (April 1967). He has also attended the United Nations and represented his country at the 1964 Cairo Conference, where he defended Israel's right to exist.

While twelve years on the throne have made Mahendra self-confident of his own judgments (perhaps overly so), he does at times have misgivings and suspicions of other nations' intentions in Nepal, even those of the United States. Well aware of the importance of India to us, he from time to time feels we look at Nepal through Indian eyes and hence are not sufficiently solicitous of Nepal's status as an independent state. Our efforts should be to keep him confident of our support of him and the monarchy as long as he continues to move his country in the direction of political, economic, and social reform.

79

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Queen RATNA Rajya Lakshmi Devi Shah

Nepal

Queen of Nepal

Shy, gracious, and unassuming, Queen Ratna is far more attractive in person than her pictures would indicate. Although quiet and somewhat retiring in public, she nevertheless is reputed to have a strong influence over the King, which has led to the observation that she is "the steel hand in a velvet glove."

The Queen is King Mahendra's second wife. His first consort, the present Queen's older sister and the mother of the King's six children, died in 1950. Mahendra married the present Queen in December 1952 after overriding the strong objections of his father, King Tribhuvan, who did not want him to marry again into the powerful Rana family, preferring that he take an Indian wife (the Ranas had ruled Nepal from 1846 to 1951 as hereditary prime ministers). The royal couple appear happily married. The Queen, who is childless, has sought to be a real mother to her sister's children.

Seventh of eleven children of General Hari S. J. B. Rana, Queen Ratna was born in Kathmandu in 1928 and educated privately. Although her education was limited, she has an inquiring mind and is reportedly quite intelligent. Her command of English is adequate, although she has less than perfect mastery of the tongue. She is a devout Hindu.

She is interested in music (including American jazz), literature and sports. A fine marksman, the Queen has at times accompanied her husband on his hunts, and will be in Alaska with the King this trip. Social welfare activities are of particular interest to her, and Queen Ratna is the chief patron of several Nepalese organizations dedicated to children's welfare and to improving the status and educational opportunities of Nepalese women. All the activities sponsored by her, however, are run by others, and she reportedly knows little about their day-to-day workings.

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Authority NJ.001R.150.002/5
By jc, NARA, Date 3-18-14

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The Queen is not an easy conversationalist, possibly because she does not feel completely at home in English. However, she is a good listener and laughs easily. Suggested topics of conversation include: Her travels (she has accompanied the King on almost all of his trips abroad, including his State Visit to the U. S. in 1960; she has also traveled extensively in Europe and has visited the USSR and several Asian countries). Her family life (it is necessary to remember that the royal children are not her own). The various women's and children's organizations in which she takes an interest.

NEA/INC:EHSherman:ehs

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

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Pres file

Tuesday - 5:30 pm
October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

On the plane to El Paso, you asked me to arrange for a highly decorated Mexican-American to be added to the honor guard for White House functions.

I relayed your message to Colonel Smith, who said that he would see that your wish is carried out.

W. G. Bowdler

cc - Walt Rostow

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Tuesday - October 31, 1967
12:30 pm

Presfile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Tuesday Luncheon: Peru

At today's luncheon Secretary Rusk may raise the problem of the deteriorating political and economic situation in Peru and what we can do about it. Both State's Intelligence Bureau and CIA see the possibility of a military takeover in the next few weeks if Belaunde continues his do-nothing attitude and public confidence in him keeps on slipping.

How Peru got into this Situation

During the past 18 months, increasing Government budget deficits and excessive use of foreign credits by both the public and private sectors accelerated the underlying inflationary tendencies and triggered mounting speculation against the Peruvian currency. These economic difficulties were intensified by a breakdown in the tenuous political relationship between the opposition-controlled Congress and the Executive, leading to an impasse that prevented Congress from meeting for 39 days in August and September.

The Government finally was forced to allow a devaluation on September 1. This devaluation of nearly 50% could provide a basis for certain beneficial adjustments to take place in the economy. However, because of the Government's inability to put into effect necessary economic and financial measures to complement the devaluation and cope with its effects, a general atmosphere of drift in national leadership has developed. This has produced a crisis of confidence between the Government and the Peruvian people which is aggravated by a sudden rise in the cost of living.

The military is increasingly nervous over this drift and deterioration. We are getting more frequent reports that the military is ready to oust Belaunde in order to introduce a strong economic recovery program and prevent public unrest from snowballing.

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Authority 72 J 90-10 appeal
By 23/10/91, NARA, Date 11-14-91

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What We have Tried to Do

We have been urging Belaunde to take corrective fiscal and budgetary measures for the past 18 months. You will recall that we offered him a \$40 million program loan last May, conditioned on certain self-help actions. At that time, the Mirage question was only a cloud on the horizon, but we warned him about it. He found our conditions too stiff; in fact they were not any more onerous than those accepted by Chile, Colombia and Brazil for program assistance.

Belaunde by July had taken sufficient self-help measures for us to offer him \$15 million, with the remaining \$25 million of our original offer to come after he had met the pending conditions. In the meantime, our information on Peru's mirage acquisition had hardened, so we were more precise in making this a condition. Belaunde's reaction to this offer was that the conditions were too steep for the amount of money involved.

Early this month we made a third offer to Belaunde: \$40 million, based on virtually the same economic conditions and no Mirages. This time Belaunde said that the Mirage deal was a fact and not subject to change. If we made it a condition, then Peru would forego the program loan.

Where We Go From Here

If we allow matters to drift, we can expect a military coup in Peru. This would trigger a series of reactions -- e. g., holding up aid to Peru, Peruvian military intransigence on Mirages, Brazilian military pressure to acquire Mirages, and sharp Congressional reaction -- which could seriously undermine your Alliance for Progress effort.

The key issue at this stage is the Mirages. If we can devise some way for Peru to cancel the contract or resell the aircraft to a third country, the road is open to give Belaunde the aid he needs. This kind of support from us translates itself into public confidence which can enable Belaunde to climb out of the present quagmire.

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What I find disturbing is that neither our Embassy nor State are applying imagination and energy to finding a formula for heading off the catastrophe. We need to be doing two things:

- contact key political and military leaders in Peru to urge patience and flexibility and asking them for their views on how to get around the impasse.
- develop formulas to offer the Peruvians to get them to cancel the Mirage contract or resell the Mirages to a third country.

We have urged Covey Oliver to work along these lines (Bill Bowdler has given him two possible formulas).

W. W. Rostow

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
12:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Vice President
responds on Ron Nessen, to my out-
going back channel message.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 11-6-91

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EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/00-269

By cbm, NARA Date 5-14-1967 OCT 31 02 07

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FM VICE PRESIDENT

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT W. ROSTOW

NESSEN BEING STRAIGHTENED OUT RE HIS MALAYSIAN SPECULATION.
STORY APPARENTLY INVENTED OUT OF WHOLE CLOTH. PRICE OF HIS MISREPRE-
SENTATION MADE CLEAR. WE TRYING TRACE SOURCE OF REPORT.

GP-1
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EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~VIA TO SAIGON

October 30, 1967

CAP 67914

For the Vice President from Walt Rostow

NBC Today Show carried Ron Nessen statement this morning that you are proceeding to Malaysia to raise more troops for Vietnam. President suggests you get hold of Nessen and make clear purposes of your Malaysia trip, underlining cost to all of misrepresentation.

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-024-4-5
By φ, NARA, Date 1/7/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11

Tuesday, October 31, 1967 -- 11:30 AM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is
a condolence message to Congolese
President Mobutu on the death of his
infant child.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

RPM/vmr 10/31/67

11a

Proposed Condolence Message to President Mobutu

Dear Mr. President:

Mrs. Johnson and I were deeply grieved to learn of the loss of your newborn child. We want you to know that you and Mrs. Mobutu are in our thoughts and prayers at this sad time.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Lt. General Joseph D. Mobutu
President of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Leopoldville

RPM/vmr 10/31/67

12
X?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/BUTTERCUP~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967
10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Attached, as background for lunch today, are three documents:

1. A clean, re-type of the basic message from Tran Bach Dang.
2. A full account of the experience of the courier Truong Binh Tong from the time he left Saigon until his return.
3. The results of a 7-hour debriefing of the courier, which helps to illuminate some aspects of the basic document and the attitude of its author.

W. A. Rostow

Saigon 3854
Saigon 3855
Saigon 3879

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-197
By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00

~~SECRET~~

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126

ATTACHMENT 1

SAIGON 3854

27 October 1967

Forwarded herewith is a translation of note from Tran Bach Dang to Truong Binh Tong, dated 19 October, and translation of the "Report of the Meeting with Tran Bach Dang."

"The matter of exchanging prisoners of war go to Saigon and report to the representative of the American Ambassador:

(1) It is true that I received authorization from the NFLSV Presidium to seek contact with Americans for the purpose of exchanging a number of prisoners of war. I instructed Sau Ha to go to Saigon to find a person to get in touch with the American Embassy in Saigon. I especially emphasize that during this trip Sau Ha's only purpose was as I have just stated.

(2) I think that at the present time it is not an impossibility to exchange prisoners of war or hold meetings between the two sides to establish the basis for resolving greater matters.

However, considering the way the Americans operate at present, I feel the time is not right (inopportune) (in French) as the Americans are not acting in good faith in regard to large political matters.

I am particularly incensed at their attitude toward Sau Ha. In the letter they explain, but the explanation is totally worthless. They knew that he was my man with authorization to do that job, yet they detained him and even tortured Sau Ha in order to capture other people, and I think that was an act of provocation showing contempt for the other party.

The question is exchanging prisoners of war and after that continuing to other, larger matters, but despite that they combined a political measure with the contemptible artifices of a common intelligence agency. Based on those facts, I could conclude that the Americans do not really show good faith.

I am a member of the Presidium of the NFLSV. I cannot accept any form of dialogue whatever under these conditions. If I were to communicate, even though it is through you as intermediary, I would be the representative of the NFLSV, a resistance organization which is defeating the American aggression. I emphasize that.

If the Americans do want to talk, they so far have addressed an adversary, taking a ridiculous, petty attitude which cannot clear the way for a serious talk. [Translator comment: Original text contains strikeovers]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-198
By 51, NARA Date 6-29-01

~~SECRET~~

-2-

However, the question could be considered, and I emphasize the word could, if these two conditions are met:

(1) Immediately release Sau Ha and all those involved in the Sau Ha case who are detained by the police and guarantee their security. Naturally, if these people resume activity and through negligence are re-arrested, nothing will be said. On the other hand, their release must not be in appearance only. In the case of Sau Ha the Americans must guarantee his safe return to the liberated zone and not task him with any mission.

(2) Give good treatment to all prisoners of war, particularly the following people:

Mr. Chin K
Mrs. Le Thi Reing
Mrs. Do Duy Lien
Mrs. Mai Thi Vang
Mrs. Le Thi No
Mrs. Le Quang Vinh
Mr. Le Hong Tu
Mr. Le Minh Chau
Mr. Truong Thanh Danh
Mr. Ky Sau Tang, etc.

So far as the NFLSV has always had an extremely clear prisoner of war policy. Specifically, not a single American prisoner of war has been struck a single blow, and the same holds for the puppet prisoners of war. To find out just ask American prisoners of war. We have voluntarily released dozens of American prisoners of war, and since 1960, hundreds of thousands of puppet prisoners of war without a single condition at all. In this regard, I say truthfully, only if the Americans strive much harder can they be our equal in that which is call la loi da la jungle. (sic)

I have just received an electrical message from the current affairs of the NFLSV Presidium. It has reviewed and agreed with the opinions of the question of prisoner of war exchange which I communicated to you yesterday afternoon and evening.

There is one additional point:

As for you, you may be an intermediary whenever necessary. Specifically, this means if the Americans accept the two first conditions which I have presented, you will come back and meet me in order to carry my reply concerning the exchange of a number of prisoners and give it to the representative of the UOMS. Embassy in Saigon. I emphasize, you may only act as an intermediary. I think at this time an NFLSV representative is not necessary.

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-3-

Moreover, as you were arrested by the opposition you are not qualified for that role.

As an intermediary you must have the following pledges:

(1) You must pledge to the Americans that in accordance with my instructions you are not allowed to conduct any activities, since in your present circumstances, carrying out activities would not be advantageous and might even be harmful to other people.

(2) The Americans must pledge to use you in the role of intermediary and not to intimidate or pressure you like a prisoner.

On the other hand, if this does not succeed, your fate is up to the. I hope you do not bring shame to our people and to yourself.

II ITEM 2 -- Answers to a number of questions.

A. Possibilities for a political solution.

The viewpoint of the National Liberation Front (NLF): As has been stated many times, the people of Vietnam are resisting in order to defend themselves. Naturally, they are fighting with the Americans who have wealth and many weapons. It's not that we are not having difficulties. However, to be practical, starting with a few thousand advisors, the Americans today have had to bring half a million troops to Vietnam; and there may be even more. This proves that the Americans are not defeating us. Our determination is to defeat their aggression. And just this year, when the Americans have escalated the war to a very high degree, we can see our victory more clearly than ever before. However, we have never felt there is only one solution to the South Vietnam issue, that it could only be resolved by war. We feel that there is also the possibility of other methods of solution. But at this time the conditions are not really ripe for these other methods of solution, such as talks between the two sides. The principal reason is that the U. S. Government has not yet drawn the essential conclusion from the situation. They still hope to use the term "talks" as a propaganda gambit; or they continue to consider themselves as being the more powerful side in talks. Yet, the actual balance of force on the battlefield, as well as in the political purview, at present is completely contrary to their assessment. The Americans are clearly losing in Vietnam. The political situation in the United States is daily becoming less favorable for the U. S. policy in Vietnam. I know that the Americans are puzzled and in a dilemma. What hopes do the Americans have left? They are hoping that with tanks, airplanes, bombs, and artillery they will defeat us. Perhaps those working in U. S. intelligence operations, who are less subjective than military leaders, are well aware that, if they continue by using these things,

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-4-

the Americans will not get anywhere. Understand the Vietnamese war according to conventional standards is no understanding at all. The Americans want the bombing of the North to block the aid to South Vietnam. Without worrying about disclosing secrets, I can say that aid is now greater than ever before. And, if it is felt that the upheaval in China is a blow to the fighting strength of South Vietnam, this is a complete chimera. We are receiving most sufficient, I emphasize most sufficient, foreign aid from China and the Soviet Union: and we can continue fighting for many more years.

If the Americans are hoping to unite the populace through the present national government, nothing could be more ridiculous. The prestige of people like Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky is so weak that they are even afraid of Duong Van Minh, Au Truong Thanh, Truong Dinh Dzu, etc. If the recent election had been truly democratic, I'm certain that they would not have received a single vote.

On this issue, I feel that the Americans have been bold, and were overly daring when they continued to use Thieu and Ky, and even Mr. Lãm Em /Translation note: Thich Lam Em/ I have utmost admiration for their having done this!!!

Politically, and I'm being truthful, with such actions the Americans will never be able to come up with anything to compete with the political prestige of the NLF. I think that the Americans should be more realistic.

They can place many hopes on and be pleased with general declarations, such as the type made by Ba Tra. However, ask yourself, does anyone believe the statements of Ba Tra? It's not even certain that Ba Tra himself was telling the truth when he made such general statements as "it's only patriotic if one sides with the national side."

Actually, even the Americans are fully aware of that: So, what significant effect will the Americans achieve by continuing like this forever?

In summary, I feel that, as long as the Americans adhere to the crude viewpoints just cited, there can be no mention of a proper political solution.

----The opinion of the NFLSV in regard to talks.

As I have said, we do not reject any possibility, no matter how small, for bringing peace to our country. Naturally, in the struggle of our people we did not open fire then establish as the objective a cease-fire. The problem is to decide the reason for the war and resolve the basic causes of the war.

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-5-

The viewpoint of the NFLSV embraces the following points:

(1) It must be recognized that South Vietnam is an independent, sovereign state. I emphasize: South Vietnam is a state. (Le sud Vietnam est un e'tat independant et souverain)(written in French) of course, Vietnam, composed of the South and North, is one united nation. Naturally, under the present political conditions it cannot yet achieve that unity.

(2) The Americans must end the war, pledge to withdraw their troops and to dismantle their military bases.

(3) The future regime of South Vietnam must be a democratic one and the foreign policy will be neutralist.

(4) Internal governing must be the affair of the South Vietnamese. Without these conditions there cannot be talks.

There is no matter more important than those just mentioned, namely: Who is to talk with whom? Before, when we were fighting the French, there was an odd circumstance. That is, the French fought the Vietminh yet held talks with Bao Dai. Now the government also wants to get up a similar situation.

Talks to resolve the matter of peace based on the 4 above mentioned conditions can only take place between the Americans and the NFLSV. That is a matter of principle, because the Americans are fighting us. Naturally, I differentiate between three kinds of talks.

(1) Talks to end the war in the South, with the conditions as just mentioned -- that is talks between the Americans and the NFLSV.

(2) Talks between the American government and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to resolve the relationship between those two nations, and the relationship between those two nations and South Vietnam.

(3) Talks to resolve the matter of internal affairs of South Vietnam. This third kind naturally is not between the Americans and the NFLSV, but between the NFLSV and the political forces outside the front. Who will participate in these talks? This is a matter to be settled later among the various political forces in the South. But first I must say this: No matter, the NFLSV will not lower itself to sit on a level with Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky. To sit with those people would be dishonorable. We could consider the representative qualifications of such people as Phan Khac Suu, Au Truong Thanh, Truong Dinh Dzu and a number of others, but, absolutely never, I emphasize, any form of contact, in regard to any matter with Thieu/Ky. We can accept in the American delegation people called

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-6-

representatives of the national government, but absolutely not Thieu/Ky. Until now the Americans have wanted to hear the official voice of the Front. Actually, the Front has proclaimed its stand many times. So now an authoritative personage of the Front speaks frankly to the Americans. I do not speak for myself because in principle we work collectively.

Whether this matter is considered seriously or not depends upon whether the American Government assesses the situation objectively or not. If the gambit of talks is used to conceal bad intentions the two sides will never come together. We are prepared to fight the Americans for as long as it takes. Even the people in Saigon, the intellectuals, the people with wealth and property cannot tolerate your regimes, and the people in general will never drop their weapons if these regimes are maintained. I advise the Americans to be frank. Actually they face only the prospect of defeat in South Vietnam. The matter now is to choose the manner of defeat according to policy of the NFLSV, in the future, all relations between an independent South Vietnam and American can be constructed on a different and good basis. I can speak frankly, we need American aid. The cultural and economic interests of America in South Vietnam can have their appropriate places if the political and military ambitions are uncompromisingly revised. In the present international situation surely there is no nation, including the Communist nations, which wants to cut off all relations with other nations, including the Western nations, much less South Vietnam which will be a democratic nation with a neutralist policy. These are absolutely realistic points of view.

In summary, this is a large political matter. We do not have nor do we want to have the intention to bargain at all.

For the last time, I emphasize that we are winning. And if we do not assume for ourselves an excessive role, then the Americans should also more correctly assess themselves. Only that way can we sit down together for discussions. Record carefully the points I have made to you in the past two days, or try to remember them exactly, and when you go to Saigon, present them to the Americans faithfully. Do not be afraid of offending."

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SAIGON 3879

28 October 1967

12c
3
SANTIZED
E.O. 12858, Sec. 3.6
NLI 00-198
By sj, NARA Date 1-29-01

Reference: Saigon 3855

1.5(c), 3.4(b)(1)

1. Major part of 7-hour debriefing of Truon Binh Tong [redacted] on 27 October dealt with elements his conversation with Dang which amplify or assist evaluation of substance and intent of reference letter text. No third party was present at these conversations, which held in tent in Chief of Station, Vietnam (COSVN) VIP reception area. Dang placed no restrictions on what Tong could relate to case officer concerning former's verbal remarks. Remarks were made in context of clarifying to Tong passages in dictated text whose meaning uncertain to him. Tong noted that, whereas dictation of first part of letter (on prisoner of war exchange) required less than one hour on evening of 11 October, he and Dang spent approximately six hours on 12 October on second (prospects for peaceful solution) and third (National Liberation Front views on talks) parts. Tong said this balance of effort reflected significance attached by Dang to latter parts. Dang did not dictate from copy or notes and his delivery was smooth and unhalting except for pauses in which he amplified specific points. Questioned on Dong's capability for dictating this type of communication without notes, Tong stated that he is acknowledged to be exceptionally articulate. Tong also referred to cable sent by Zone 4 to Dang 12 September on occasion Tong's abortive attempt to reach COSVN. Having been informed that Tong was carrying U.S. "proposal for regular liaison," Dang was able to plan in advance content of message he dictated to Tong on 12 October.

2. Impression Dang made on Tong is that he has positive and conciliatory attitude despite apparently sharp passages in text. Tang said that aggressive wording should not be over-emphasized and that Dang hopeful text would be studied with cooperative spirit. Tong ascribed twofold motive to initiative undertaken by Dang. The first was genuine concern with securing the release of a number of cares now under arrest whose past services to Front and party had been noteworthy. The second was a desire to develop an opportunity to meet with U.S. in order to obtain understanding of the views and position of the National Liberation Front on the war.

3. As background to reference to National Liberation Front "difficulties" in third sentence of Section II, Dang commented on the heavy loss of human and material resources in the war, including economic and industrial assets in North Vietnam (steel mills, Haiphong port installations) which had taken years to build. Possible destruction of Red River dikes was a source of major concern, and emergency evacuation aircraft were standing by. In the south loss of life was the principal sacrificed.

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-2-

4. The phrase "we can see our victory more clearly than ever before" represented, according to Tong, a true personal conviction in Dang rather than statement made simply for effect. Confidence is not, however, based in expectation that Americans can be "wiped out" but in National Liberation Front's ability to prolong war to point where Americans "will lose patience." Tong said he observed this conviction not only in Dang but also in escort troops. Optimism results in part from professed military successes, in part also from "very good Soviet aid of types not seen before" (no specifics). In contrast to earlier condition of troops, who often lacked food and ammunition, there are now no shortages of either. Tong noted improved attitude toward Soviet Union which in period 1964-65 had been criticized within National Liberation Front for rapprochement with U.S. However, due to pressure from Socialist bloc and Communist parties in other countries, Soviet Union had stepped up aid to National Liberation Front, thus improving Soviet image JDTNG VE (sic). Tong said he had viewed several Russian entertainment film during stay at COSVN reception station whereas none had circulated among Viet Cong in previous years. Dang mentioned that COSVN discussed Sino-Soviet rift at leadership meeting early this year and took position that rift not as major a problem as "halting the bombing of North Vietnam." The one who helps is automatically right irrespective of other issues between the two countries.

5. Concerning the "essential conclusion" which the U.S. has not drawn from the war, Tong said he had not queried Dang on this point as it was clear to him that it meant U.S. realization that it is losing the war. Without this "conclusion" the Americans will choose to fight and the National Liberation Front will do likewise. Tong cited a statement of Dang regarding the letter's assertion that the Americans "still hope to use the term 'talks' as a propaganda slogan or continue to consider themselves the more powerful side in talks." Tong recalled that Dang did grant that "despite both sides declaring a willingness to fight to the end, they have a genuine desire for talks." However, U.S. failure objectively to assess its strength in the war results in the "dilemma" of not acting in accordance with its wishes.

6. The basis for the statement that "those working in U.S. intelligence operations are less subjective than military leaders" is a standing Viet Cong slogan ascribing to intelligence the role of objectively assessing and reporting the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, which necessarily entails reliance on fact and not opinion.

7. In reference to "the upheaval in China" Tong said he would not be violating security to report that Dang criticized China as radical, overly aggressive and incorrect in its line. Dang made no prognosis of the outcome of the upheaval and said it was an internal matter for the Chinese, to which the National Liberation Front would be indifferent as long as aid from China increases. Dang also stated that the National Liberation Front is subject to

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-3-

conflicting recommendations from China and the Soviet Union. The former insists that the National Liberation Front "fight to the end" while the latter encourages talks. However, the National Liberation Front has its own position which is that the "side which started the war can end it" and it is not influenced by these countries' recommendations.

8. On the question of the four points "embraced by the National Liberation Front," Tong acknowledged that they implicitly or, in the case of the third, explicitly referred to future events and were not to be read as "conditions" in the sense of requiring implementation or execution prior to talks. "Agreement in principle" to these points would constitute a basis for talks. "Pledge" of troop withdrawal in point two anticipates that as a gesture of goodwill, the U.S. would promise that a specified number of troops would be withdrawn in a set time interval. Tong was questioned on the subject of the implementation of these "conditions" and reaffirmed that they were to be understood as requiring "agreement in principle."

9. The statement that talks based on these points "can only take place between the Americans and the National Liberation Front" was intended by Dang as an interrogative thrust to determine whether the U.S. is in fact willing to talk with the National Liberation Front on ending hostilities in South Vietnam, which talks would not require the participation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). According to Tong the three combinations of talks listed by Dang are not alternatives to one another but necessary and sequential steps in the National Liberation Front's view. He clarified an apparent ambiguity in the second combination which could imply that talks between the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would also affect the National Liberation Front's posture in South Vietnam. Tong said that the actual meaning is that U.S. - Democratic Republic of Vietnam talks could result in agreements which lead to withdrawal of their respective troops from South Vietnam but not resolve matters reserved to National Liberation Front-U.S. talks.

10. It should be noted that above, though possibly useful in helping analyze Dang letter to U.S., Tong is very clearly working on behalf of Dang and National Liberation Front. His comments and description of intimate dialogue between him and Dang may well contain distortions. Should soon be able to clarify some of those points per follow-up debriefing [redacted] 1.5(c), [redacted] after which Station's interpretation Dang's message will be 3.4(b)(1) forwarded.

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13

Lunch Meeting With the President
Tuesday, October 31, 1967, 1:00 pm

Pres file

AGENDA

1. Instruction to Amb. Alexis Johnson on the Ryukyus and Bonins. (Sec Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

See Tab A

2. The Vice President: A Singapore Stop? (Sec. Rusk)

Tab B

3. Large-Scale Destruction in Quang Nhia Province. (Sec. McNamara)

4. Buttercup. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

Reply to Amb. Bunker's proposals. See Tab C

5. Other.

Peru
Mansfield Resolution. Goldberg Senate FRC appearance.
Bombing.

Walt Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *kg*, NARA, Date 11-6-91

~~SECRET~~

14

Tuesday - October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

*1. sent
2. Pres file*

Another person deserving a pat on the back for the Chamizal settlement is Bob Sayre. He began working on the project with Tom Mann in 1962 and has seen it through to a successful conclusion. He participated in negotiations with the Mexicans and handled the complicated legislative aspects.

I suggest you send him the attached letter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

14a

October 31, 1967

Dear Bob:

The Chamizal settlement represents a triumph for American diplomacy.

I know how much you helped Tom Mann in working out the settlement formula and in steering the implementing legislation through the Congress.

I am most grateful for your contribution in making Chamizal an inspiring symbol of our close friendship with Mexico.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Robert M. Sayre
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Inter-American Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday - October 31, 1967

15
Free file

Mr. President:

I understand that Lynda and Chuck have decided against Jamaica as a honeymoon spot.

I suggest you send Prime Minister Shearer the following message:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

During your visit here earlier this month you generously offered to find a suitable place in Jamaica for my daughter Lynda and her fiance to spend their honeymoon. Ambassador Beale brought back your suggestion of "Ciboney" at Ocho Rios.

After looking at several possibilities, Lynda and Chuck have decided to go to another area.

They join me and Mrs. Johnson in expressing deepest gratitude for your thoughtful invitation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Rostow

16
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By cl, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to let you know his personal feelings about your seeing King Hussein. He had hoped to mention this at lunch today, but there wasn't time.

He appreciates your desire to keep these visitors to a minimum and concurs in your not trying to have Hussein to lunch if you feel that makes too heavy a load. However, he does feel it's important for you to see Hussein while he is here. Therefore, he would like your permission to extend an invitation for an office meeting.

Hussein will land in New York November 2 and will come to Washington November 6. He will see Arthur Goldberg in New York, and Secretary Rusk would talk to him here before he saw you. Hussein is set to speak to the Press Club and to meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to add my own endorsement. Hussein is uncertain about our position, and a talk with you would significantly reassure him. We'll have precious little to maintain our ties with him, since Congress will make military and economic aid difficult. Yet he is the Jordanian most likely to negotiate peace with Israel. A peace settlement would be such a great achievement that I think he warrants this investment of your time.

I gather Jim Jones is tentatively holding 5:30 p. m. on November 8 open pending your decision.

W. W. Rostow

I'll see him at 5:30 p. m. on the 8th _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-453

By CG, NARA, Date 4-11-95~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, October 31, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Robert Anderson's Report from Cairo

Bob Anderson saw Kaissouni (Nasser's top economics minister), Mohieddin (most frequently mentioned now as Nasser's likely successor) and Nasser himself. He has another meeting with Nasser on Thursday. These main points emerge:

--They believe the US is entirely aligned with Israel. They cite our close coordination with Israel in the UN and our resumption of military shipments as evidence. They believe Israel will do whatever we say. They admit charges of our involvement in the June war were mistaken.

--They want a political peace, but the terms have to be acceptable to the Arab people, not just to the leaders. The alternative is long and continuous warfare.

--No Arab leader would survive direct negotiations with Israel. No Arab government would settle until all agree.

--They would prefer the great powers to impose a settlement.

--They could accept only these terms: (1) the restoration of all territory that had been taken by the Israelis, (2) the settlement of the refugee question, and (3) the auspices of some international body which would obviate the necessity of direct negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs. A single mediator at the table would not be adequate cover. Nasser could not allow Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip. He would allow an Israeli flag vessel through the Canal if the refugee problem were settled, although he couldn't guarantee that some radical wouldn't shoot at it. He thought demilitarization of some territory possible.

--They think it important to restore diplomatic relations with us "as soon as things are a little better." They were "prepared to go more than halfway."

In conclusion, Bob judges that Nasser is still master of the political situation and that there is little committee rule. Nasser appears in good health.

W. W. Rostow

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-270
By cbm, NARA Date 7-6-01

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEN/SECSTATE WASHDC
ZEN

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF TWO
EYES ONLY SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MESSAGE AS DICTATED (BUT NOT READ)
BY MR. ROBERT ANDERSON AFTERNOON 31 OCTOBER IN CAIRO:
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE (EYES ONLY) ATTENTION OF THE PRESIDENT
FROM ANDERSON.

1. I ARRIVED SUNDAY NIGHT AND HAD TWO HOURS CONVERSATION WITH
DR. KAISOONI ON MONDAY MORNING. ZAKARIYAH MOHIEDDIN SENT WORD
THAT HIS FATHER HAD DIED ON SUNDAY AND WOULD SEE ME
ON TUESDAY. I MET WITH ZAKARIYAH THIS MORNING AT 10 AM UNTIL
12 AND WITH PRESIDENT NASSER FROM 12:30 UNTIL 2:15.

2. ALL THREE MADE THE EMPHATIC STATEMENT IN THE BEGINNING THAT
THEY BELIEVE THAT THE US IS ENTIRELY ALIGNED WITH ISRAEL AND THAT
PERHAPS WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT OF SOME SORT TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE
MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT ALONG LINES THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH
ISRAELI AMBITIONS. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE OBJECTIVE.
EVEN WHEN THEY ARE TOLD THAT WE ARE TRYING TO TAKE A POSITION
WHICH WOULD RESOLVE A NUMBER OF ISSUES AND ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE,
THEY COUNTER BY SAYING THAT OUR ACTIONS AND OUR
WORDS THUS FAR ONLY LEAD THEM TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY PEACE
SETTLEMENT MUST BE WON ALONG THE LINES OF THE ISRAELI AMBITIONS.

3. I ASKED PRESIDENT NASSER IF HE WOULD TELL ME SPECIFICALLY WHAT
HAD LED HIM TO THIS CONCLUSION. HE REPLIED BY GIVING A RECITAL OF
OUR STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS, SAYING THAT
WE WERE CONSISTENTLY IN CONTACT WITH THE ISRAELIS AND SAID "I
RECEIVED A TELEGRAM JUST THIS MORNING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER
RIAD, REFERRING TO HIS CONVERSATION WITH MR. GOLDBERG IN WHICH THIS
FACT IS FURTHER CONFIRMED." HE DID NOT TELL ME THE DETAILS OF
THIS TELEGRAM OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT MR. RIAD STATED THAT WE WERE
ACTIVELY SOLICITING VOTES AGAINST THE INDIAN RESOLUTION BECAUSE
IT CONTAINED ELEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT PLEASING TO THE ISRAELIS.
ZAKARIYAH SAID TO ME THAT "I MAY ACCEPT YOUR STATEMENT THAT YOUR
GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO BE OBJECTIVE BUT YOU COULD NOT CONVINCE
ORDINARY ARABS THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE
ISRAELIS THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ONLY SUPPORT PEACE ON
ISRAELI TERMS." ALL THREE BITTERLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE
RECENT ANNOUNCEMENT SUPPLYING ARMS TO THE ISRAELIS AND MADE
VERY LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE
OF ARMS AND INSIST THAT WE ARE ONLY ARMING AN ALREADY STRONGER
ADVERSARY WHO HAS EXPANSIONIST PLANS. NASSER REMINDED ME THAT HE
TOLD ME IN 1955 THAT ISRAELIS WOULD PIECE BY PIECE ATTEMPT TO
EXPAND THEIR COUNTRY FROM THE NILE TO THE TIGRIS. HE SAID THIS
PROCESS HAS BEGUN AND THE US IS ASSISTING.

4. THE QUESTION OF RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR COUNTRIES ONLY AROSE BY INFERENCE WHEN ZAKARIYAH STATED "IT
IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR TWO COUNTRIES AS SOON AS THINGS ARE A LITTLE BETTER."

5. I ASKED PRESIDENT NASSER IF HE WOULD SPELL OUT FOR ME WHAT
HE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE. HE REPLIED BY SAYING THAT ABOVE EVERYTHING
ELSE THEY WANTED A POLITICAL PEACE BUT THAT IT HAD TO BE ONE NOT
ONLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB LEADERS BUT TO THE ARAB PEOPLE, THAT
NO LEADER COULD SURVIVE IF THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT WERE
SUCH THAT THEY COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED ON A MINIMUM BASIS BY THE
ARAB PUBLIC. HE STATED THAT THIS HAS NOW SPREAD NOT ONLY TO THE
ARAB COUNTRIES PER SE, BUT TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOT

EXPAND THEIR COUNTRY FROM THE NILE TO THE TIGRIS. HE SAID THIS PROCESS HAS BEGUN AND THE US IS ASSISTING.

4. THE QUESTION OF RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES ONLY AROSE BY INFERENCE WHEN ZAKARIYAH STATED "IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AS SOON AS THINGS ARE A LITTLE BETTER."

5. I ASKED PRESIDENT NASSER IF HE WOULD SPELL OUT FOR ME WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS POSSIBLE. HE REPLIED BY SAYING THAT ABOVE EVERYTHING ELSE THEY WANTED A POLITICAL PEACE BUT THAT IT HAD TO BE ONE NOT ONLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB LEADERS BUT TO THE ARAB PEOPLE, THAT NO LEADER COULD SURVIVE IF THE TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT WERE SUCH THAT THEY COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED ON A MINIMUM BASIS BY THE ARAB PUBLIC. HE STATED THAT THIS HAS NOW SPREAD NOT ONLY TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES PER SE, BUT TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES WITH MOSLEM POPULATIONS BECAUSE OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM.

6. HE SAID THAT ANY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN A SINGLE ARAB LEADER OR THE ARABS COLLECTIVELY AND THE ISRAELIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT NO ARAB LEADER WOULD SURVIVE AN EFFORT ALONG THIS LINE. HE BELIEVED THAT A SINGLE MEDIATOR SITTING AT SUCH A CONFERENCE WOULD NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY. I ASKED HIM IF THIS MEANT THAT WHATEVER NEGOTIATIONS TOOK PLACE WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF SOME INTERNATIONAL GROUP SUCH AS THE UN AND HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. THIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME VIEW AS ZAKARIYAH. ZAKARIYAH TOOK PAINS TO SAY THAT HE KNEW THAT HE WAS CONSIDERED A MODERATE AND THAT HE WAS IN FACT AND HAD BEEN FOR YEARS BUT THAT MODERATION DID NOT MEAN ACTING ADVERSELY TO HIS OWN COUNTRY OR ACTING IN A MANNER WHICH COULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARAB POPULATION.

7. NASSER THEN SAID THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT PEACE ON NO OTHER TERMS THAN THOSE WHICH INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING: (1) THE RESTORATION OF ALL TERRITORY THAT HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE ISRAELIS, (2) THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE QUESTION AND EL THE AUSPICES OF SOME INTERNATIONAL BODY WHICH WOULD OBLIATE THE NECESSITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE ARABS.

8. I ASKED HIM IF IT WERE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR EACH COUNTRY TO SETTLE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS, THAT IS, TERRITORY BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL, JORDAN AND ISRAEL, SYRIA AND ISRAEL. HE REPLIED BY SAYING AT KHARTOUM THAT THEY HAD AGREED THAT NO ONE WOULD SETTLE UNTIL ALL OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES WERE AGREEABLE. HE STATED SPECIFICALLY THAT HE COULD NOT ALLOW THE ANNEXATION OF THE GAZA STRIP ALTHOUGH ECONOMICALLY IT WAS A LIABILITY BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD ALIENATE HIM FROM EVERY OTHER ARAB COUNTRY. I ASKED WHETHER UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR SOME GROUP TO BE SELECTED AT THE UN WHO WOULD WORK OUT A DOCUMENT ALONG POLITICAL LINES AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH BOTH THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS OR EVEN IN PARTICIPATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS WHICH WOULD BE AN OFFICIAL UN DECLARATION BUT WHICH AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY THE OPPOSING SIDES WOULD THEN BE SIGNED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF ISRAEL SO AS TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACTUAL UNDERTAKING BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES IN ADDITION TO BEING A UN DOCUMENT. THIS, HE SAID, OFFERED POSSIBILITIES AND HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK IT OVER.

GP-1

BT

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] FINAL SECTION OF TWO
EYES ONLY SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE WHITE HOUSE

9. WE DISCUSSED TRANSIT THROUGH THE WATERWAYS AND NASSER STATED THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT TRANSIT OF ISRAELI VESSELS THROUGH SUEZ IF AT THE SAME TIME THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WAS DISPOSED OF. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBLE WAY FOR HIM TO GUARANTEE THAT SOME RADICAL INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP MIGHT NOT FIRE UPON AN ISRAELI SHIP IN TRANSIT. HE STATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO WAY EVEN IN OUR COUNTRY TO GUARANTEE AGAINST RADICAL GROUPS FIRING UPON OUR OWN NATIONALS OR OTHERS IF THEY WERE SUFFICIENTLY INFLAMED.

10. I TOLD NASSER THAT IF HE MEANT BY THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE QUESTION THAT THE REFUGEES HAD TO BE ALLOWED AN OPTION TO RETURN TO PALESTINE OR RECEIVE COMPENSATION, I THOUGHT THAT HE HAD PROPOSED AN IMPOSSIBILITY. HE REPLIED BY SAYING THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE BUT WAS NOT NECESSARILY INDISPENSABLE TO PEACE. HE DID SAY THAT SOME DISPOSITION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM HAD TO BE CO-EXISTENT WITH TRANSIT THROUGH THE SUEZ.

11. I ASKED HIM WHETHER IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF SHIPS TRANSITING THE CANAL WOULD ALL FLY THE UN FLAG IN ADDITION TO THEIR OWN AND HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BUT THAT HE STILL COULD NOT GUARANTEE THE BEHAVIOR OF HIS RADICALS.

12. EACH OF THE THREE BEGAN THEIR DISCUSSIONS BY SUGGESTING THAT SOME KIND OF A SETTLEMENT IS POSSIBLE BY THE MAJOR POWERS IMPOSING THEIR WILLS, THROUGH COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN ON BOTH THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL. I TOLD NASSER AND THE OTHERS THAT IT WAS MY SPECULATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THIRD PARTY GUARANTEES IN THE FUTURE BUT WOULD REQUIRE SOME FORM OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION HOWEVER ARRIVED AT BY THE ADVERSARY PARTIES.

13. I ALSO ASKED THAT IF CERTAIN TERRITORIES WERE CONSIDERED BY THE ISRAELIS TO BE "NECESSARY FOR THEIR SECURITY" ALTHOUGH LYING IN JORDAN OR SYRIA OR THE UAR, IF THEY MIGHT BE SUFFICIENTLY DEMILITARIZED AND IF SUCH DEMILITARIZATION WOULD BE ACCEPTED ON THE ARAB SIDE. WHILE NASSER DID NOT ANSWER CATEGORICALLY, HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT THIS WAS ACHIEVABLE.

14. WE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY DISCUSS THE OCCUPANCY OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM. ONE THING THAT SEEMED TO SPARK BOTH THEIR INTEREST AND TO CREATE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND SOLUTION WAS THE INQUIRY AS TO WHETHER OR NOT ONE OR MORE PEOPLE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN WORKING WITH THE OPPOSING SIDES COULD DRAFT WHAT WOULD BE KNOWN AS AN UN DOCUMENT BUT THEN SIGNED BY BOTH SIDES SO AS TO SPECIFICALLY CREATE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THEM. I AM ASSUMING THAT THIS IS WHAT NASSER WANTS TO "THINK OVER" AND DISCUSS WITH ME FURTHER. I HAVE ANOTHER APPOINTMENT WITH HIM ON THURSDAY AT 12:30. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE KNEW I WAS GOING TO IRAQ AND ASKED IF I COULD COME BACK THROUGH CAIRO ON RETURN FROM IRAQ TO THE US AS HE "WOULD LIKE TO HAVE SOME TIME TO THINK THINGS OVER."

15. IT IS QUITE APPARENT TO ME THAT NEXT TO ISRAEL THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERED A MAJOR ANTAGONIST TO THE ARABS, AT LEAST IN THIS COUNTRY. THEY DO NOT REGARD US AS OBJECTIVE AND THEY SO READ EVERY PROPOSAL THAT WE MAKE, TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO ALLY IT WITH ISRAEL'S AMBITIONS. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE KEEP CLOSE CONTACT WITH AND CONSULT WITH HIGHLY PLACED ISRAELIS AND THAT WE DISCUSS MATTERS WITH ARABS ONLY WHEN IT IS NECESSARY AND DO NOT CONSULT THEM AS WE CONSULT THE ISRAELIS.

16. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALL THREE OF THEM HAVE

15. IT IS QUITE APPARENT TO ME THAT NEXT TO ISRAEL THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERED A MAJOR ANTAGONIST TO THE ARABS, AT LEAST IN THIS COUNTRY. THEY DO NOT REGARD US AS OBJECTIVE AND THEY SO READ EVERY PROPOSAL THAT WE MAKE, TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO ALLY IT WITH ISRAEL'S AMBITIONS. THEY BELIEVE THAT WE KEEP CLOSE CONTACT WITH AND CONSULT WITH HIGHLY PLACED ISRAELIS AND THAT WE DISCUSS MATTERS WITH ARABS ONLY WHEN IT IS NECESSARY AND DO NOT CONSULT THEM AS WE CONSULT THE ISRAELIS.

16. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALL THREE OF THEM WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY HAD A GREAT DESIRE TO RE-ESTABLISH FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THAT THEY "WERE PREPARED TO GO MORE THAN HALF WAY."

17. I STRONGLY MADE THE POINT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE NO LONGER AGREEABLE TO DEPENDING UPON ASSURANCES OF THIRD PARTIES WHETHER THIS BY NATIONS OR THE UN AND THAT THIS TIME THEY WANTED SOME CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS. BOTH ZAKARIYAH AND NASSER STATED THAT "ALL YOU HAVE TO DO IS TO TELL THEM WHAT FORM THE AGREEMENT OUGHT TO TAKE AND WHAT IS FAIR AND THEY WILL A BIDE BY IT." I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO, THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT THIRD PARTY GUARANTEES INCLUDING OURS. ZAKARIYAH SAID "IT IS STRANGE THAT YOU WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE ENGLAND, FRANCE AND ISRAEL TO CEASE THE CAMPAIGN OF 1956 AND TO AGREE UPON AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AND THAT NOW THE MOST POWERFUL NATION IN THE WORLD SAYS THAT IT CANNOT INFLUENCE THE DECISION OF THE ISRAELIS, WHILE IN THE MEANTIME YOU ADD TO THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH." IT IS THIS KIND OF COMMENT WHICH GIVES MORE THE FLAVOR OF THEIR FEELING THAN PERHAPS THEIR REAL THOUGHT ABOUT DETAILS WHICH MIGHT GO INTO A SETTLEMENT.

18. I TOLD THEM THAT THE FEELINGS OF OUR COUNTRY HAD BEEN DEEPLY HURT BY THE FALSE ALLEGATIONS THAT WE HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE ISRAELI CONFLICT. THEY ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS A MISTAKE AND NASSER TOLD ME THAT THEY CAME TO HIM FROM KING HUSSEIN WHO REPORTED THAT HE SAW LARGE VOLUMES OF PLANES COMING FROM THE DIRECTION OF A CARRIER ON THE JORDANIAN RADAR. I EXPLAINED THAT THEIR PEOPLE HAD TO BE TOLD THAT THIS WAS NOT CORRECT. NASSER STATED THAT HE HAD DONE SO AT KHARTOUM AND THAT HEYKAL HAD DONE SO IN THE EGYPTIAN PAPERS. I SAID THAT I DOUBTED THAT HEYKAL'S EXPLANATION WAS SUFFICIENT SINCE IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION A RETRACTION OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST THE US AND THAT I HOPED HEYKAL WOULD GO FURTHER IN FUTURE ANNOUNCEMENTS. PRESIDENT NASSER STATED THAT HE REGRETTED THAT SO MANY "LITTLE THINGS" SUCH AS STATEMENTS AND CONVERSATIONS HAD SO DISRUPTED OUR RELATIONSHIPS WHICH BASICALLY OUGHT TO BE OF COMMON INTEREST. ALL OF THE POINTS COVERED BY THE THREE INDIVIDUALS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME. BOTH ZAKARIYAH AND KAISOONI MADE SPECIFIC QUALIFICATIONS OF THEIR STATEMENTS, SAYING THAT FINAL DECISION IS UP TO PRESIDENT NASSER. I GATHERED FROM THIS THAT THERE IS LITTLE IF ANY COMMITTEE RULE AND THAT NASSER IS PRETTY WELL THE MASTER OF HIS POLITICAL SITUATION AS IT EXISTS. HE APPEARS TO BE IN GOOD HEALTH, WAS RELAXED BUT GRIM IN HIS CONVERSATION. HE STATED THAT THE ALTERNATIVE WAS EITHER SOME KIND OF A POLITICAL PEACE WHICH THE PEOPLE OF THE ARAB WORLD COULD ACCEPT WITH HONOR OR A LONG AND CONTINUOUS WARFARE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE NOT ONLY THE COUNTRIES ADJOINING ISRAEL BUT MOSLEM POPULATIONS WHEREVER THEY EXISTED. HE SAID THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE FELT THAT HE ENJOYED THE RESPECT OF HIS COUNTRYMEN, HE WOULD NOT ENJOY THEIR RESPECT NOR WOULD ANY OTHER LEADER IF THEY "CAPITULATE" OR "SURRENDER" TO ISRAELI DEMANDS. I WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER MY CONVERSATION ON THURSDAY.

GP-1

BT

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

Monday, October 30, 1967
7:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an appraisal of our bombing
of North Vietnam through 16 October;
that is, before the latest strikes on Hanoi.
Key passages are underlined and marked
with paper clips.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-454
By sig, NARA, Date 10-4-95

An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam
(Through 16 October 1967)
October 1967
S-2547/AP4A
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency and
The Defense Intelligence Agency

WWRostow:rlh

18a

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, October 30, 1967
7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith for your background is
the historical file of where we are in
this new contact called Buttercup.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 11-6-91

WWRostow:rlh

19
Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, Oct. 30, 1967
6:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith a draft speech on bombing, etc., that:

- responds to Harry McPherson's memo;
- incorporates Joe Alsop's main points.

Walt
W.W.R.

Attachment

*ask
Harry to put this
in shape at once
C*

19a

DRAFT/RNG/30 Oct

There is, we all know, widespread debate in our country about Vietnam. The debate centers on one central question: how to bring peace at the earliest possible time to Vietnam and to Southeast Asia.

On that objective we are united.

On how to achieve it there is debate.

One of the most controversial issues of that debate is the bombing of North Vietnam.

Hanoi has persuaded many Americans that the bombing is the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement. Hanoi has stated that if we stopped the bombing, talks could -- and I emphasize could -- begin. The question is would talks really begin? If so, what would the talks lead to? Would talks -- if they took place -- lead to a peaceful and honorable settlement? Or is this simply Hanoi's formula for a U.S. surrender?

Some Americans say simply: Let's try it and see. The real war is the tough, frustrating, slow struggle in the South, on the ground, in the villages, and in the Saigon government. The air war is irrelevant. It diverts our attention from the real tasks we face in the South. It isn't hurting the enemy much. But it makes it difficult for the enemy to make a settlement. Therefore, let's stop the bombing of North Vietnam without conditions and see what will happen.

Before accepting such a proposition in order to see what will happen, we have to analyze what has happened -- and what might happen.

First, we must remember that the bombing is only one of the inter-related elements of our over-all strategy. Other elements are the war in the South, pacification/revolutionary development, and the political and economic development of South Vietnam.

Secondly, these elements together are designed to achieve one simple goal -- the independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack.

Thirdly, the purposes of bombing are limited but they contribute to that simple goal.

As I stated to the Tennessee Legislature in March, there are:

"Three purposes in the selective bombing of military targets in North Vietnam:

"(1) To back our fighting men by denying the enemy a sanctuary.

"(2) To exact a penalty against North Vietnam for her flagrant violations of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

"(3) To limit the flow or to substantially increase the cost of infiltration of men and materiel from North Vietnam."

Very deliberately, we adopted a strategy of gradually increasing pressures designed to offer the enemy an incentive to settle at the lowest level of violence and damage. We wished no wider war. We did not seek

to destroy the regime in North Vietnam. We did not wish to inflict -- and we have not inflicted -- unnecessary civilian casualties and damage.

The first air strikes were made in early March 1965. The campaign began with a relatively low level of effort in the southern part of North Vietnam.

Gradually, we expanded the scope, area, and intensity of the bombing. Not until the fall of 1965, however, did we bomb the targets in the vital Hanoi-Haiphong area northward.

In all of 1965, our airmen flew 25,000 attack sorties against North Vietnam. In 1966, they flew 81,000 sorties, and this year more than 90,000 have already been flown. This represents a major effort. In fact, for the last twelve months, the sortie rate has been fifty per cent greater than the average maintained during the Korean War.

This has not been without cost to us. We have lost some 650 attack aircraft -- and about 100 other aircraft -- to North Vietnam's air defenses -- which represent a greater concentration of fire power than has ever before been encountered in air warfare.

North Vietnam's major air defense effort is perhaps one of the best indicators of the importance with which Hanoi views the bombing.

Yet, our loss rate has steadily decreased from 5.1 per thousand attack sorties in 1965 to 2.8 in 1966 to 2.3 this year. In comparison, we lost 10 aircraft per thousand sorties in World War II and more than five per thousand in Korea.

At the same time, we have persisted in keeping our purposes limited and our actions restrained. We have attacked only those elements in North Vietnam which most directly support their war effort. We have scrupulously avoided attacks on population, on dikes, on food, and on nonmilitary civilian activities.

Never before have so many bombs been dropped with so few civilian casualties. Even so, most of those civilians who have been inadvertently killed were engaged directly in the support of the war in the South. The total of all civilians who have been inadvertently killed is certainly far below the number of South Vietnamese who have been deliberately murdered by communist terrorists in the South.

At the same time, the bombing has been achieving the limited purposes it was designed for.

The bombing has denied North Vietnam a sanctuary.

The bombing is exacting a heavy penalty against North Vietnam for continuing the war. Currently out of operation are 80% of its central electric power generating capacity, the only modern cement plant, the only metallurgical plant, and the only explosives plant. Production of coal and apatite (previously exported in quantity), fertilizer, chemicals, and paper have been drastically reduced. In 1966, because of weather and the indirect effects of bombing, North Vietnam's rice crop was 300,000 metric tons short.

As a consequence, there has been a radical increase in North Vietnam's requirements for foreign aid in order to sustain her war effort and her economy at minimum levels. Imports are up from 2,100 metric tons a day in 1965 to 4,300 in 1967.

Bombing has also required a diversion of up to 600,000 workers to defend against and counter the effects of bombing. It has caused the damage or destruction of about 5,000 freight cars, 8,000 trucks, and 19,000 watercraft.

Bombing has increased substantially the number of men and tons which must be dispatched from the North to get one man or one ton into South Vietnam. It has apparently caused them to resort to the shorter supply routes across the DMZ and contributed to their abandonment of major-scale operations within South Vietnam.

Yet, despite this demonstrable impact, some persist in arguing that the bombing is irrelevant or inconsequential.

It is obvious that we have not and probably cannot reduce North Vietnam's capacity so they can't move men and supplies into the South. This was never our objective. We never expected that the bombing would be able to halt this flow. It is obvious, however, that the bombing has hurt North Vietnam seriously.

We do not really know how successful we have been in limiting the flow of men and supplies to the South, because we do not know whether

the present level of communist effort in the South is what they consider their optimum or whether it is the best they can, or are willing to, mount in the face of the bombing.

This much we do know.

In recent months more than half the casualties on both sides have been taken in the fighting in the First Corps; that is, in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The fighting last year drove the enemy from his main interior bases. He is fighting to prolong the war from bases in the sanctuary north of the 17th parallel. I have no doubt that without the bombardment of North Vietnam we could ^{not} have held Con Thien and the other essential outposts near the DMZ which protect the northern provinces. In the rest of South Vietnam, fighting, on the whole, has somewhat diminished, and quite substantial progress is being made in bringing the population under government control.

We simply cannot predict what more the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. Nevertheless, we can say that if we stop the bombing:

- a. They would be able to put men and supplies into the South at lower costs.
- b. The resources available to them would be increased, which would enable them to put more men into the South or make life in the North easier, or both.
- c. It would be a lot easier for them to "sweat out the war."

After the most searching examination of all the evidence, I have reluctantly concluded that a unilateral cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam would lengthen the war.

Therefore, we cannot stop the bombing of North Vietnam until we have some indication -- some decent hope -- that the other side intends to move toward peace rather than merely to the conduct of war on more advantageous terms.

This is the basis for the formula I stated in my talk at San Antonio. We are prepared to stop the bombing of North Vietnam. But the responsibilities of the President and Commander-in-Chief require that we assure that such a stoppage is promptly followed by productive talks whose objective is peace. It also requires that we do not put our fighting men and our Allies at a military disadvantage by so doing.

What then is Hanoi's real purpose in referring to talks and negotiations? We have the answer in their own words.

Recent statements -- private as well as public -- make clear that at this moment Hanoi has no such intent. As the Premier in Hanoi is quoted as saying recently:

"There is no possibility of any talks or even contacts between Hanoi and the United States government unless the bombardment and other acts of war against North Vietnam are definitively halted." By "definitively" we know they mean "permanently."

That is as flat a no as you can get to a decent, reasonable proposition.

We also have the answer to Hanoi's intent in their own words in captured documents.

From captured documents we learned that last year they confirmed their decision not to negotiate, at least until victory had been won.

But this "victory" that was stated to be the absolutely essential prelude to talks, was defined in a peculiar way. It was to be -- and I quote -- "the annihilation of a brigade, or at least a battalion of American troops." In other words, what was sought was a sort of Dien Bien Phu, which the Hanoi leaders evidently expected to create a favorable negotiating climate. No such "victory" has yet been won. But I would have you note, very carefully indeed, that the Hanoi leaders long ago concluded that they would not negotiate before such a "victory" -- before this hoped-for annihilation of a whole American unit, which they believed, following analogies from their own past, would paralyze this country with fear and terror.

But the leaders in Hanoi did not stop there. They looked even further ahead, to the new phase that would open when they had won their hoped-for "victory," and had, therefore, begun to negotiate. This phase was characterized -- and, again, I quote -- as "fighting while negotiating." The documents make it abundantly clear that a great deal more importance was attached to the fighting than to the negotiating. And the documents also make it clear that the phase of "fighting while negotiating" was, therefore, expected to lead to "complete victory," meaning the subjugation of South Vietnam.

Such then is the enemy's actual policy concerning the right timing of negotiations, and the right way to proceed after negotiations have been opened.

Why are they adopting this rigid position? We know it is not because things are going well for them in the South. The Viet Cong are losing gradually the manpower base for their operations and are finding it increasingly difficult to replace their fighting men.

Things are not going well for them in the North. We know for certain that the bombing imposes a heavy burden.

We cannot know for certain all the reasons why they are not yet ready for peace.

But one part of the answer is certainly this: they believe the political debate in the United States will lead this nation to surrender. They believe that we will stop bombing without any understanding as to what will then follow. They believe that this nation's impatience with the inevitably slow pace of a guerrilla war will break our will.

They saw it happen in Paris.

They are still hoping it will happen in Washington.

They are not now prepared for peace because they believe that their will, their capacity to endure and persist, are greater than that of the United States.

What, then, is the quickest road to peace? After examining with the greatest possible care and with complete openness of mind all the alternatives, I believe the answer is: to continue firmly with our present policy.

We shall do so until we have some reason to believe that a cessation of bombing -- or a cessation of any other military activity -- might lead to a serious effort to achieve peace.

In a democracy like ours, the President must take his position -- in accordance with his constitutional responsibilities -- and explain it. He must be prepared for debate and disagreement. He must understand and accept that a vital and intelligent people like ours is going to probe and argue and criticize that this course is better than that. This is particularly true at a time when our men are engaged in combat; when the stake is the road to peace; and when the circumstances are as complex as these.

I cannot and I shall not ask you to diminish your concern; to abandon thought and debate and suggestions on this vital matter.

But I can, and must, ask you two things:

-- to remember that the critical front in this war, so far as Hanoi is concerned, is no longer in Vietnam; it is in American political life;

-- and to remember that 500,000 of our finest men are fighting to honor a commitment made because three American Presidents and the Congress of the United States believed those commitments were vital to the interests of our nation.

Monday, October 30, 1967, 5:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

We have been unsuccessful in tracking down the source of the report by George Sherman in last Tuesday's Washington Star that we had decided to sell arms to Israel and the moderate Arabs.

There is considerable evidence that the story leaked from the Hill. Assistant Secretary Battle briefed some members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee one week before the story appeared in print. Battle's briefing included a reference to an agonizing dilemma. These words appeared in Sherman's story. In addition, Sherman told State Department news spokesman McCloskey that he knew Battle had briefed several members of Congress.

The fact that Sherman's story was incorrect as to any U.S. arms sales to Jordan, is further evidence that the source heard the generalized briefing by Battle rather than the specific briefings which were given later to certain Senators.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLI 94-453

By CG NARA, Date 4-11-95

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Sent 6:12 PM

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1967 OCT 30 ²³¹²
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67917

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 30, 1967

HERewith THE VICE PRESIDENT REPORTS QUITE CHEERFULLY ON
HIS VIETNAM IMPRESSIONS.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

WILL BE SENDING IN A MORE DETAILED REPORT LATER, BUT WANTED
YOU TO HAVE MY FIRST, PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING MY DISCUS-
SIONS TODAY WITH THIEU AND KY. DETAILED SUBSTANCE OF THE DIS-
CUSSIONS IS INCLUDED IN SEPARATE CABLES.

I AM ENCOURAGED NOT ONLY BY THE EVIDENT PROGRESS I HAVE SEEN OVER
FEBRUARY, 1966, WHEN I WAS LAST HERE, BUT BY THE EXPRESSED DETER-
MINATION OF BOTH THIEU AND KY TO MOVE STRONGLY NOT ONLY
MILITARILY BUT IN BUILDING A RESPONSIVE, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

BOTH FEEL THAT THE VIET CONG CAN HOLD OUT NO LONGER THAN OUR
NOVEMBER, 1968, ELECTIONS BUT WILL FIGHT STRONGLY, IF IN SMALLER
UNITS, UNTIL THEN.

THIEU AND KY BOTH WERE CONCERNED AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE WITH
U.S. PUBLIC OPINION. I ASSURED THEM OF OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT,
EVEN IN THE FACE OF UNFAVORABLE OPINION.

BOTH MEN WERE HIGH IN PRAISE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER, WHO FROM ALL
INDICATIONS IS DOING A MAGNIFICENT JOB HERE.

I VISITED AMERICAN RIVERINE FORCES IN THE DELTA THIS MORNING
AS WELL AS A REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING CAMP. I WAS
IMPRESSED BY THE SPIRIT AND MORALE BOTH OF OUR OWN MEN AND OF
THE VIETNAMESE. BILL HEARST AND JIM SUFFRIDGE ARE DOING AN
EXCELLENT AND HARD-WORKING JOB AS YOUR REPRESENTATIVES.

WILL CABLE AGAIN BEFORE DEPARTURE WEDNESDAY.

~~SECRET~~

OTS 302247Z OCT 67

FROM QUICK COPY

Pres file

OCT 30 PM 6:38
MONDAY

October 30, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Chairman Seaborg has reported to you on the U. S. participation in the international scientific symposium in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of Madame Curie, in Warsaw, during the week of October 16. He gave one of the principal addresses on the subject of the Future Outlook for the Applications of Nuclear Science, in which he covered the full range of thinking of our scientists and technicians on what the future of the atom looks like.

Chairman Seaborg reports a complete absence of political invective in any aspect of the meeting and the most cordial treatment of our delegation by the Poles, indicating to him that the Poles are eager to find some means of developing greater ties with the West. Also, he reports friendly meetings with ranking scientists from the USSR. He states his conclusion that they desire closer contacts and relationships with their scientist counterparts in the U. S. and are hindered by their political superiors.

Chairman Seaborg was also impressed by the high quality of the small but very active nuclear research and development program being carried on in Poland.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

Monday, October 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's report on
the political situation in Viet-Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

23a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report
October 30, 1967

Formation of the Government

Thieu told Bunker October 27 that Nguyen Van Loc was making progress in forming the Cabinet. Thieu seemed confident that Loc would succeed, and indicated that he would appoint Loc as Prime Minister immediately after his own inauguration. The present government would then resign but stay on until the new government was formed. In discussing specific Cabinet appointments, Thieu said he expected Tran Van Do to stay on as Foreign Minister. He also confirmed that Tran Van Huong, defeated presidential candidate, had agreed to join the new government's Inspectorate.

Militant Buddhist Activity

In the same conversation, Thieu acknowledged that the militant Buddhists might seek to stir things up over the next several days in connection with inaugural and national day ceremonies. However, he told Bunker that he was continuing to try to encourage moderate elements on both sides of the Buddhist controversy to work out an agreed solution between themselves with a minimum of government involvement.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-451
By CLG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

1967 OCT 30 19 28

EEA514
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2334

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67915

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON DENIES U.K. WILL PULL TROOPS
OUT OF EUROPE IF DE GAULLE VETOES U.K. ENTRY INTO COMMON
MARKET.

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THERE IS NOT A WORD OF TRUTH IN
THE FANTASTIC STORIES THAT HAVE BEEN FLYING ROUND EUROPE THIS
WEEKEND ABOUT POSSIBLE REAPPRAISALS OF FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY, IN THE LIGHT OF A HYPOTHETICAL FRENCH
VETO ON OUR MEMBERSHIP OF E.E.C. I WILL NOT DIGNIFY THESE BY
ANALYSING THEIR ORIGINS BEYOND SAYING THAT THEY DERIVE FROM A
SERIES OF MISREPRESENTATIONS AND IN CERTAIN CASES DOWNRIGHT
FALSEHOODS PUT OUT AFTER A TOTALLY INFORMAL SEMINAR-TYPE
DISCUSSION BETWEEN ALUN CHALFONT AND A GROUP OF BRITISH
CORRESPONDENTS. MOST OF THE WILD IDEAS ORIGINATED WITH THE
CORRESPONDENTS AND I HAVE SELDOM SEEN A MORE BLATANT EXAMPLE
OF A MINISTERS TRUST BEING ABUSED.

I WAS PARTICULARLY SORRY TO SEE THE SCANDALOUS ALLEGATION
THAT YOU AND I HAD BEEN IN SOME KIND OF CONSULTATION BEFOREHAND
ABOUT ALL THIS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 00-197
By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00

BLACK FROM QUICK COPY

OUR POSITION IN THIS MATTER IS OF COURSE, AND WILL REMAIN, AS GEORGE BROWN AND I HAVE STATED IT PUBLICLY, MOST RECENTLY IN GEORGE'S FULL STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE, LAST THURSDAY, MADE WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE UNITED CABINET. TO SUM IT UP, WE ARE NOT TAKING NO FOR AN ANSWER AND WE ARE NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF ALTERNATIVES, STILL LESS OF FUNDAMENTAL REAPPRAISALS OF BRITISH POLICY. I INTEND TO MAKE THIS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR IN MY SPEECH TOMORROW IN THE HOUSE.

WE OF COURSE LEFT KIESINGER IN NO DOUBT OF OUR POSITION DURING THE EXTREMELY USEFUL AND FORTHCOMING EXCHANGES WE HAD WITH HIM LAST WEEK. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN THE HELPFUL STATEMENT HE MADE AT THE END OF HIS VISIT, BEFORE LEAVING LONDON. WE NATURALLY MADE CLEAR TO HIM ALSO HOW VITAL IT IS FOR THE GERMANS AND OURSELVES TO REACH SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THE OFFSET PROBLEM. BUT WE DID THIS FIRMLY IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR DESIRE FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MAKING CLEAR WHAT AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IT REPRESENTED IN OUR GENERAL ECONOMIC APPROACH. AS WE SAID TO HIM, WE SHOULD BE MUCH BETTER PLACED TO DEAL WITH COUVE'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE BRITISH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IF WE DID NOT HAVE AN OFFSET BURDEN OF THE CURRENT ORDER. BUT ALL THIS, OF COURSE, HAS NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH THE REPORTS OF OUR ALLEGED ATTITUDE WITH WHICH THIS MESSAGE IS CONCERNED.

I AM SURE THAT YOU AND YOUR PEOPLE DID NOT GIVE ANY CREDENCE TO WHAT A GERMAN SPOKESMAN HAS RIGHTLY DESCRIBED AS A LOT OF RUBBISH. BUT, IN VIEW OF THE REPORTS LINKING YOUR NAME WITH THESE STORIES I FELT I OWED IT TO YOU TO LET YOU HAVE THIS SHORT PERSONAL MESSAGE.

WARMEST REGARDS,

HAROLD WILSON

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

L
DTG 30/1902Z OCT 67.

EXTRACT FROM QUICK COPY

Monday, October 30, 1967
12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

These foreign reactions to the anti-war demonstrations at the Pentagon are, on the whole, heartening. (pages 4-7)

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

25

Pres file

25a

ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS GIVEN "SECOND LOOK"

New editorials reviewing last weekend's anti-war demonstrations in the U.S. and elsewhere indicate that the world press by and large considered the protests to have been ineffectual. Commentators taking a "second look" at the episodes made these points:

- 1) The demonstrators failed to offer useful alternatives to U.S. Viet-Nam policy.
- 2) Official restraint in dealing with the marchers had favorably impressed the world.

However, a Bangkok paper criticized the Administration for failing to maintain a "dialogue with U.S. intellectuals and writers, professors and students."

"Who is Doing What to Whom?"

The independent weekly London Economist, out today, proposed that "last week's anti-Viet-Nam war demonstrators should ask themselves a question Lenin asked -- 'Who is doing what to whom?'..."

Opponents of the American intervention in Viet-Nam use two different arguments. The first does not stand up to a moment's serious examination. This is the argument that the Americans are there to further their own selfish and presumably material interests...

"The alternative is to say that the Americans went into Southeast Asia for unselfish reasons -- but that they got their calculations horribly wrong. The first thing to note about this interpretation is that it puts the Americans on the right side of the who-whom question... Secondly, this interpretation still leaves the critics with the job of saying what makes them think that the Americans' original calculations were wrong..."

"Demonstrations Failed"

Yesterday's independent Die Presse of Vienna reported from Washington that "the bombing of targets in the center of Hanoi is evidence that the recent anti-war demonstrations in the U.S. failed in their purpose.

"Government officials as well as many independent observers appear convinced that these demonstrations have hurt rather than helped the anti-war movement. This is assumed chiefly because the organizers were unable to control their own demonstrations. Parents as well as juvenile participants now recognize with relief that major bloodshed was prevented only by the authorities and by the establishment which the demonstrators assailed."

Yesterday's independent Telegraaf of Amsterdam concluded that "time will tell who is right, but most certainly it will not be the demonstrators, who cannot see and judge the scope and background of this horrible tragedy," the Viet-Nam war.

The correspondent of independent Algemeen Handelsblatt of Amsterdam and liberal Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant called the Washington demonstration "counterproductive... What happened here this weekend was the best thing that could have happened for President Johnson."

Independent Het Parool, Amsterdam, said the demonstrations should not be "overrated." It asserted that "American power is the best guarantee for the free world, and anti-Americanism -- from the extreme left to the extreme right -- is a danger."

"No Sign of Weakness"

Trouw of Amsterdam, an opponent of U.S. Viet-Nam policy, declared that the demonstration was "an expression of legitimate opposition... The fact that this opposition is possible in the U.S. is no sign of weakness, but rather is an example of the real power of democratic privileges and freedom in the U.S."

An editor of Switzerland's prestigious Neue Zuercher Zeitung, recently returned from South Viet-Nam, wrote Wednesday:

"Little was heard about Communist long-term aggression during last weekend's protests. It was striking that zealous people far from the scene of action acted and talked differently from those with more immediate experience and responsibility... Those who, from their cloud-land of illusion or demagoguery, exhort America to withdraw, are delaying peace."

"More Violence in Japan"

In Japan, conservative Tokyo Shimbun compared the "orderly" demonstration in Washington and its "minor scuffles with the police" with the "violence and confusion that characterize demonstrations in Japan... There is no need for bloody struggles. The fact that they gathered from all over America should be reason enough to let the whole nation hear and see their assertions." The paper judged that the American students' sentiment that they did not want to die in what they considered to be a "purposeless war" showed that they were "not extreme and vacuous ideologists."

Yesterday's conservative Evening News of Manila said the President's ability to maintain a "cool" attitude in the face of anti-war demonstrations and adverse public opinion, "not to mention the prevailing stance of tenacity in the U.S. Congress, attests to the sincerity and earnestness of President Johnson's words.

"The long, tedious process of policy making in the White House gives more than ample ground for the assumption that President Johnson's decision to widen the scope of U.S. offensive and defensive operations was based on a body of comprehensive and expertly evaluated military and diplomatic intelligence."

Bangkok: "Dialogue Inadequate"

Wednesday's Bangkok Post strongly deplored the demonstrations in Washington and in other capitals as having "considerably weakened the position of the U.S. Administration on Viet-Nam in the eyes of the world... It is important that the present drift in U.S. public opinion against the war in Viet-Nam is stopped or effectively dealt with..."

"Isn't it true that the present U.S. Administration's dialogue with U.S. intellectuals and writers, professors and students, has never been weaker than it is today? In fact, the Administration in Washington has not only failed to tap the latent sources of American idealism in order to strengthen the cause of freedom and justice, but has also apparently failed to convince the outside world that the Administration is, as a whole, fully united in its determination to continue to fight for its goals in Viet-Nam."

"Protests Should be Aimed at Hanoi"

The Times of India's Washington correspondent wrote Tuesday that "the demonstration was not as large as expected. Nevertheless, it was noisy and dramatic enough... North Viet-Nam seems to count on the support of the anti-war group in breaking the U.S. will to fight."

"The fact, however, is that no U.S. President can afford to halt the war or to beat a retreat from Viet-Nam without at least a face-saving negotiated peace. Any move which tends to engender a hope in Hanoi that Washington would act otherwise helps to prolong the war... For LBJ, the problem is not as simple as some advocates of a cessation in the bombing make out."

Rio de Janeiro's conservative O Globo observed yesterday that "anti-war demonstrations all over the world... are addressed to Washington, but the address should be Hanoi... The situation is clear: One side is disposed to negotiate and the other is not. Is there any logic, beside the false Communist one, in demonstrating against the side that wants peace and not protesting against the one that does not want it?"

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By CG, NARA, Date 4-11-95

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 30, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*sent to Rostow
Pres file*

Following memorandum of conversation may interest you. You may wish to keep in the back of your mind the idea in paragraph 2. I gather from Casper that Kiesinger is quite relaxed about the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the present time.

26a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, October 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Pres file

Mr. and Mrs. Walther Casper came to lunch at my house on Sunday, October 29. There was some opportunity for private conversation between him and me as follows.

1. He said that, before he had come to the U. S. for a short visit to see EXPO 67 and conduct private business, he had dined with Chancellor Kiesinger. The Chancellor took the occasion to send, through me, his warmest greetings to the President. He told Casper that he now felt that he had a deep understanding with President Johnson whom he regarded as his friend.

2. Thinking of the President's political problems in the months ahead, he asked Casper to convey the following: Kiesinger would be glad to organize a heads of government meeting in Europe in the months ahead, perhaps on the occasion of the completion of work on the non-proliferation treaty. Subject, of course, to the President's view, he, Kiesinger, judged that a meeting in Europe on the occasion of a constructive, peaceful achievement, would be helpful to the President. Casper added it might be nice if, after such a meeting, the President were to spend a week end with Kiesinger at his country placeⁱⁿ Tuebingen where the Chancellor finds refreshment much as the President does at the Ranch.

3. Casper says that Kiesinger is now determined to support British entry into the Common Market. In this he has the support of his whole Cabinet of both parties. In addition, he has the support of both Rainer Barzel and Helmut Schmidt, the leaders of the two major parties in the Parliament. He is aware that the French are going to slow down the operation and negotiate very hard. Since the other members of the Six cannot "invade France" on this issue, it will, in Kiesinger's view, take perhaps two years of hard, tough bargaining with the French. The others, including the U. K., must generate the stubbornness to see it through on those terms.

4. Karl Carstens is now to be made the head of the Office of the Chancellory -- a post of great influence. This means that the advice coming directly to the Chancellor will be pro-NATO and pro-U. S. The Chancellor has no illusions, according to Casper, about de Gaulle.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

5. In general he said that in his dealings with the U.S. the Chancellor would not come asking for constant reassurances about Berlin or early reunification. He would like to deal with the U.S. as a partner, discussing with the President world problems and world perspectives. Kiesinger understands that the reunification of Germany can only take place on the basis of a total change in the world situation. He is groping for a way to be able to talk informally with the President at regular intervals.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

27

1967 OCT 29 15 42

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DE WTE 2315

Profile

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67904

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 29, 1967

HEREWITH -- ONCE AGAIN -- THE VICE PRESIDENT ASKS PERMISSION FOR ONE DAY SINGAPORE VISIT AFTER DJAKARTA.

1. PRIME MINISTER LEE ASKED AMBASSADOR CARTER DURING COURSE OF FAREWELL TO CONVEY TO VICE PRESIDENT HIS REGRET THAT SINGAPORE WAS NOT ON MR. HUMPHREY'S ITINERARY. HE LEFT CARTER WITH CLEAR IMPRESSION VISIT WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST WELCOMED AND THAT HE WAS NOT CONCERNED THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY ON HIS OWN OFFICIAL VISIT TO U.S.

2. VICE PRESIDENT PREPARED PROCEED SINGAPORE FROM DJAKARTA MORNING NOV. 7, DEPART SINGAPORE MORNING NOV. 8. (LEE'S ETA SINGAPORE NOV 2 WOULD GIVE PM TIME TO RECOVER FROM HIS TRAVELS) IF AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH STILL IN WASHINGTON, WOULD APPRECIATE HIS, DEPARTMENT'S, AND EMBASSY SINGAPORE'S VIEWS.

3. IF DEPT. AND WHITE HOUSE CONCUR AND EMBASSY SINGAPORE SEE NO CONFLICT REQUEST CINCPAC BE ASKED INFORM LEE THAT VICE PRESIDENT WOULD BE HAPPY VISIT SINGAPORE AFTER DJAKARTA IF PRIME MINISTER WOULD FIND IT CONVENIENT. LEE WILL BE IN HAWAII UNTIL NOV 1 ACCORDING TO HIS PRESENT PLANS.

DTG: 29/1505Z OCT 67

~~SECRET~~

BOX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By CG, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~SECRET~~

28
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLI 94-453

By cb NARA, Date 4-11-95

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1967 OCT 29 16 30

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EEA504
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DE WTE 2316

FROM: WALT ROSTON
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67903

Free file

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 29, 1967

HERewith GOLDBERG LINES UP WITH THE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION.

FROM GOLDBERG TO THE SECRETARY USUN 1789

CONFIRMING OUR TELECON, I STRONGLY BELIEVE WE SHOULD EMBRACE MANSFIELD RESOLUTION AND REACT POSITIVELY TO IT. RESOLUTION IS SUPPORTED BY 55 MEMBERS, WHICH THEREFORE COULD ONLY BE STALLED OR DEFEATED BY OVERWHELMING EFFORT FOR WHICH ADMINISTRATION WOULD BE SHARPLY CRITICIZED. OUR POSITIVE REACTION COULD BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF OUR PAST AND CONTINUING EFFORTS TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO INVOLVE UN CONSTRUCTIVELY IN VIETNAM PROBLEM AND PRINCIPAL OPERATIVE PARA OF CONGRESSIONAL RES CAN BE INTERPRETED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AS IT BEING FINAL DETERMINANT OF BEST TIMING AND MOST PROPITIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH TO PURSUE MATTER FURTHER HERE AT UN. I AM PREPARING MY TESTIMONY ALONG ABOVE LINES, AND I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW IT WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON ON SUNDAY A.M. IN VIEW MY TIME SCHEDULE HERE, I HAVE INFORMED MACOMBER THAT BEST TIME FOR ME WOULD BE EARLY MONDAY A.M. SO THAT I CAN GET BACK HERE PROMPTLY FOR SC CONSULTATIONS BY NOON ON MONDAY.

DTG: 291506Z OCT 67

~~SECRET~~

GROUPS: 210 IMI 210

CLIP FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3A
NIJ 94-453
By CL NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~SECRET~~

Mr Rostow

EEASUS
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2318

1967 OCT 29 19 09

2:09 PM

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67906

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

OCTOBER 29, 1967

HERewith THE OPERATIVE PASSAGE OF A PROPOSED MESSAGE TO BEN OEHLERT INSTRUCTING HIM ON HOW TO ANSWER AYUB'S REQUEST THAT WE LET PAKISTAN BUY 100 AMERICAN-MADE TANKS FROM ANY THIRD COUNTRY WILLING TO SELL THEM--PROBABLY ITALY, GERMANY, FRANCE, OR IRAN. THESE ARE REPLACEMENT TANKS WHICH FIT WITHIN THE ARMS GUIDELINES WE ESTABLISHED AFTER THE INDO-PAK WAR. (AYUB ACTUALLY WANTS TO BUY 200 TANKS, BUT WE ARE TRYING TO SLOW HIM DOWN A BIT.) THE DEAL WOULD COST US NO MONEY AT ALL; OUR ONLY DECISION IS WHETHER TO CAST OR NOT TO CAST OUR VETO ON SALES OF U.S. EQUIPMENT ORIGINALLY FURNISHED AS MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

THE PROPOSED MESSAGE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY KATZENBACH AND NITZE. IT DOES NOT COMMIT US TO APPROVE ANY DEAL. IT TELLS AYUB THAT WE WOULD UNDERSTAND IF HE WENT AHEAD AND NEGOTIATED WITH POTENTIAL SELLERS OF U.S.-MADE TANKS TO SEE WHAT KIND OF BARGAIN HE CAN WORK OUT. IT WARNS HIM THAT WE CANNOT GUARANTEE APPROVAL OF ANY PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE CONGRESS IS REVIEWING THE WHOLE SUBJECT OF MILITARY AID. IT SAYS ONLY THAT WE WOULD "CAREFULLY EXAMINE" ANYTHING HE AND ANY PROSPECTIVE SUPPLIER COME UP WITH. IT ALSO CONTAINS AN FYI WARNING TO OEHLERT TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO EXCEED HIS MANDATE BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION ON THE HILL WITH REGARD TO ARMS AND THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES.

OEHLERT SEES AYUB TUESDAY MORNING. HE WANTS TO HAVE SOME KIND OF ANSWER ON THIS QUESTION--WHICH HAS BEEN PENDING FOR MONTHS--IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. I VOTE WE SEND THE PROPOSED INSTRUCTION. IT COMMITS US TO NOTHING BEYOND OUR PRESENT ANNOUNCED ARMS POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA, AND IT IS THE LEAST WE CAN GIVE AYUB TO DISSUADE HIM FROM NEGOTIATING A LARGE TANK SALE WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT WOULD BE A REAL PROBLEM FOR US, BOTH IN PAKISTAN AND IN THE CONGRESS.

REX FROM QUICK COPY

BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSED MESSAGE.

YOU MAY TELL AYUB THAT WE WILL UNDERSTAND IT IF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN DECIDES TO CONSULT DISCREETLY WITH POSSIBLE SOURCES OF TANKS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT AND WHAT KIND OF DEAL IT CAN MAKE WITH ONE OF THEM.

YOU SHOULD REMIND AYUB AGAIN THAT CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC CONCERN MAKES THE WHOLE SUBJECT OF MILITARY SUPPLY AN EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ONE. YOU CAN TELL HIM THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED EXAMINE CAREFULLY ANY REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF 100-TANK SALE WE MIGHT RECEIVE FROM GERMANS, FRENCH OR ITALIANS. HOWEVER, YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WITH THE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES CONCERNED AND THAT WE CANNOT GUARANTEE EITHER OUR CONCURRENCE OR THAT A LEAK WHICH MIGHT CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE. EVEN FOR SUCH CONSULTATION WE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE SURE THAT ANY REQUEST SERVED THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR MILITARY SUPPLY POLICY. TO DO THIS, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT: (A) NUMBER OF TANKS RECEIVED OR ON ORDER FROM RED CHINA HAS NOT RESULTED IN NET INCREASE PAK ARMOR AND THAT NO FURTHER DELIVERIES FROM THIS SOURCE EXPECTED; (B) GOP NOT PLANNING PURCHASES OF TANKS FROM OTHER SOURCES (E.G., FRANCE OR SOVIET UNION); (C) FOR EACH U.S.-CONTROLLED TANK ACQUIRED, ONE OBSOLETE TANK WOULD BE SCRAPPED FROM PAK TANK INVENTORY; AND (D) PAKISTAN ADVISE US OF WHAT IF ANY MAJOR ARMS ACQUISITIONS OF OTHER KINDS IT FORESEES IN REASONABLE FUTURE AND JUSTIFICATION THEREFOR.

END OF TEXT

APPROVE MESSAGE-----

DISAPPROVE-----

SEE ME-----

DTB: 291737Z OCT 67

GROUPS: 600 IMI 600

~~SECRET~~

REPROX FROM QUICK COPY

1967 OCT 28 19 13

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VZCZCDSI727
OO YEKADLC
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FM WHITE HOUSE
TO AMEMB NEW DELHI
ZEN

~~SECRET~~ VIA [REDACTED] CAP67892 NO NIGHT ACTION
FOR AMBASSADOR BOWLES, NEW DELHI FROM WALT ROSTOW

28 OCTOBER 1967

AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT MEETS WITH KING OF NEPAL WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON OUR TIME. QUESTION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN NEPAL LARGELY DEPENDENT ON CONTINUED USE OF U.S. - OWNED INDIAN CURRENCY TO SUPPORT U.S. AID PROGRAMS. IN MY JUDGMENT, PRESIDENT SHOULD BE IN POSITION WEDNESDAY TO SPEAK KNOWLEDGEABLY OF PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUING AND EVEN INCREASING THOSE PROGRAMS. HE PROBABLY WILL NOT GET INTO SPECIFICS WITH KING, BUT SHOULD HAVE FREE HAND TO DO SO IF NECESSARY.

RECOGNIZE THERE IS LONG HISTORY TO THIS PROBLEM AND THAT INDIANS MAY HAVE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS. I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT AT A MINIMUM WE NEED A CLEAR, REASONED ANSWER ON THIS MATTER FROM HIGH POLITICAL REPEAT POLITICAL LEVEL GOI BEFORE WEDNESDAY MEETING. KNOW YOU APPRECIATE DIFFICULTY OUR ACCEPTING INDIAN VETO ON USE OF TINY PORTION U.S. - OWNED RUPEES TO MAINTAIN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN COUNTRY WHOSE DEVELOPMENT AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT TO INDIA AS TO US.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR A REPLY AT YOUR EARLIEST CONVENIENCE. APOLOGIES FOR THE RUSH, BUT FEEL SURE YOU AGREE THAT PRESIDENT MUST BE PREPARED FOR MEETING. BEST PERSONAL REGARDS

195

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-024-4-7
By Q, NARA, Date 1-7-02

October 28, 1967
11:50 a.m.

Per file

Mr. President:

I recommend you approve the following farewell message to President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz:

"Lady Bird and I have enjoyed having you and your family with us. Our only regret is that the visit was so short.

We shall always remember the fiesta mexicana you gave us last night. Washington will never be the same.

As you go back to your capital city you carry the affection and admiration of all the American people.

With warm good wishes to you and Dona Guadalupe.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Bill Bowdler

10/28/67
Approved by the President
in route to Paris and sent
by Commissioner Friedkin
after ceremony via commercial
channels. See attached cable
WTSB

October 28, 1967
9:50 a.m.

32

Pres file

Mr. President:

Since you will be speaking first at the Chamizal Ceremony,
it will not be possible for you to endorse President Diaz Ordaz'
announcement that the channel be named after Lopez Mateos.

I suggest that you let President Diaz Ordaz make the
announcement of the name and say that you have agreed to it.

Is this O.K. ?

☒ YES

☐ NO

Bill Bowdler

BB/cg

33

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Saturday, October 28, 1967 -- 7:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Before you leave for El Paso, you should know:

1. We received yesterday a reply from our first NLF contact on which Dick Helms' people had been working in Saigon for many, many months.
2. It is now being carefully translated, but here are the elements, as I recall them without benefit of even a rough text in front of me.
 - It starts with prisoners, for that was the origins of the exchange.
 - It asks that one man held by the GVN be released and a list of others be "well treated."
 - It then moves on to discussion of a settlement of the war.
 - Almost like a Planning Council paper, it says there are, essentially, three negotiations to be envisaged: a negotiation on the political settlement within South Vietnam; a U.S.-Hanoi negotiation; and a negotiation, which is pushed some distance down the road, between the North and the South.
 - It states the four points with, superficially, a softening of the critical point, because it does not demand that the NLF be the sole voice speaking for South Vietnam.
 - Here is the hooker: It states vehemently that under no circumstances will they deal with Thieu-Ky and Company. They want the political negotiation to begin between the NLF and the U.S. They name Dzu and a few others as the kind of South Vietnamese they are willing to work with.
 - In tone it is very tough in the sense that it says we must recognize that they are winning the war.
 - The intermediary, whom we released to make contact at a Viet Cong headquarters area, reports his judgment that the message was checked in Hanoi.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 019-024-4-8
By *[signature]* Date 1-8-02

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

Again, this is a document that was read aloud to me yesterday, which has not been carefully translated yet. We shall, of course, be studying it over the weekend.

My first reflections are:

-- It is the first piece of paper we have received from the other side which goes directly to the heart of the matter which is political settlement inside South Vietnam.

-- It comes, as we always thought a truly serious probe would come, while the war proceeds, including a full-scale bombing of North Vietnam.

-- It raises the gut issue of what we are fighting for in South Vietnam by posing the question of Thieu-Ky. (My first reaction is, for what it is worth, that we shall have to stand firmly by constitutional process in South Vietnam and find out if, when we and they have been fully tested, they are prepared to accept a role as a political party under the constitution when they lay down their arms.)

The intermediary is now being put through a polygraph test in Saigon to establish whether his story, the details of which are quite interesting, is true.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

34

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

28 OCT 1967

Pres. file

*sent by wire
to the President
at the Ranch -
info George Christian*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

For some time we have observed Soviet tests consistent with the development of a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS). The most recent tests seem to confirm intelligence evidence that the Soviet is moving in that direction.

The Committees of Congress have asked for briefings from the Defense Intelligence Agency; we have provided those briefings. We anticipated that there would be leaks to the press and some of those leaks are beginning to appear.

We think, therefore, that we should initiate a statement on the Soviet tests rather than waiting to have the information dragged from us. Attached is the statement we propose to release. I wanted you to have a copy before it is put out.

Robert S. McNamara

DRAFT PRESS RELEASE

Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System

In order to protect our intelligence-gathering methods, we have acted with great care over the last seven years in discussing information collected by the intelligence community. However, we have not hesitated to release intelligence data when we have thought that it was in the best interests of the nation to do so.

One example of this is the information on the Soviet Union strategic nuclear force. Through my annual posture statements to Congress, and at various other times, we have declassified information on the Soviet strategic force in order to help explain nuclear issues of major importance to our people and our allies.

Similarly, we have publicized unprecedented amounts of information on U.S. strategic forces. Of course this gives information of value to the potential enemy. But our deterrence rests not only on our capability to destroy any attacker but also on the enemy's knowledge that we have that capability and that we have the will to use it.

I would like today to discuss with you certain intelligence information which we have collected on a series of space system flight tests being conducted by the Soviet Union.

As you know, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) normally does not go into orbit but rather follows a ballistic trajectory from launch point to impact point. It reaches a peak altitude of perhaps 800 miles on this trajectory.

As long as two years ago, we observed that the Soviets had initiated tests involving a different type of trajectory of much lower altitude.

Information we now have causes us to accept the likelihood that in those lower altitude tests the Soviets were working on something we have called a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS).

Unlike the ICBM which follows a ballistic trajectory, the vehicle launched in a Fractional Orbital Bombardment mode is fired into a very low orbit about 100 miles above the earth's atmosphere. At a given point -- generally before the first orbit is complete -- a rocket engine is fired which slows down the payload and causes it to drop out of orbit. The payload then follows a re-entry path similar to the re-entry of a ballistic missile.

Even now it is impossible to be certain of what these tests represent. It is conceivable that the Soviet Union has been testing space vehicles for some re-entry program. It is also possible that the Russians are conducting

tests of some sort of post-strike reconnaissance system. But we suspect that the Russians are pursuing the research and development of a FOBS. If this turns out to be true, it is conceivable that they could achieve an initial operational capability during 1968.

Some years ago we ourselves examined the desirability of the FOBS and there was agreement among civilian and military leaders that the system offered no advantages to the United States. While development of it could be initiated at any time for relatively rapid deployment, our analyses conclude it would not improve our strategic offensive posture and consequently we have no intention of revising the decision made years ago.

Like any other weapons system, the FOBS offers both advantages and disadvantages over traditional ICBMS. In our opinion, the disadvantages far outweigh the advantages.

The main advantage is that some trajectories of a FOBS would, because of the low altitude of their orbits, avoid detection by some early warning radars, including our BMEWS. A second is that the impact point cannot be determined until ignition of the rocket engine that deboosts the payload out of orbit -- roughly three minutes and 500 miles from the target. While the vehicle is in orbit, it may be difficult to determine whether it is a weapon or a satellite. Also, the flight time is as much as 10 minutes shorter than an ICBM.

For these possible advantages, severe penalties are paid in two critical areas -- accuracy and payload. The accuracy of the Soviet ICBM modified to a FOBS weapon would be significantly less and the payload of the FOBS vehicle would be a fraction of the ICBM.

The FOBS weapon would not be accurate enough for a satisfactory attack upon United States Minutemen missiles, protected in their silos. Perhaps the Soviets might feel it could provide a surprise nuclear strike against United States' soft land targets such as bomber bases.

However, several years ago, anticipating such a capability, we initiated the deployment of equipments to deny this capability. For example, we have Over-The-Horizon Radar, possessing a greater capability of detecting FOBS than does BMEWS, and giving us more warning time against a full-scale attack using FOBS missiles than BMEWS gives against a heavy ICBM launch.

Our "deterrent" rests upon our ability to absorb any surprise nuclear attack and to retaliate with sufficient strength to destroy the attacking nation as a viable society. With three-minute warning, 15-minute warning or no warning at all, we can still absorb a surprise attack and strike back with sufficient power to destroy the attacker. We have that capability today; we will continue to have it in the future.

35

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-454
By ij, NARA, Date 10-4-95

~~SECRET~~

October 20, 1967

Pres file

from walt rostow

to The President at the Ranch

This routine item in today's Defense Intelligence Report will interest you.

"Intelligence obtained from three widely-separated areas of South Vietnam points up various problems plaguing several enemy units. In I Corps area reports indicate Communists experiencing low morale and supply shortages. Messages on 26 October from subordinate units of 27th North Vietnamese Independent Regiment located south of Con Thien reported personnel problems and a vulnerability to "psychological operations" exploitation. It was indicated that two companies had a number of seriously wounded and that malaria and "paralysis" were affecting others. In Quang Tin Province, captured documents disclosed that 21st North Vietnamese Regiment of 2d Division had been reorganized and that most of its personnel were recruits; many poorly motivated and lacked combat abilities. In Long Khanh Province, a rallier from 3d Battalion, 274 Viet Cong Regiment, reported his battalion strength at 312 men but that they were dispersed because of B-52 strikes in area. This dispersal and food shortages had reduced unit's capability to conduct offensive operations. He also said that only one-third of battalion -- mostly cadre -- were eager to fight and that others wanted to rally but did not have the opportunity."

~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1967

36
Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE **P**RESIDENT (The Ranch to hold for President's arrival)

This message from Prime Minister Lee will interest you. You will wish to guide us concerning its use, as suggested in final paragraph.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By cb, NARA, Date 4-11-95

36a

Friday, October 27, 1967

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, LOS ANGELES,
CALIFORNIA

Department of State for William Bundy, Assistant Secretary

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew handed me the following message for the President as he boarded the plane at Los Angeles for Honolulu this morning.

His Excellency,
President Lyndon B. Johnson

Dear Mr. President:

On leaving America at the end of my visit, my wife and I would like to thank you and Mrs. Johnson for the warm reception and, more meaningful, the considerable time and attention you gave me.

My journey has been at a grueling pace, partly of my own choosing.

There are so many preconceived ideas, among Americans, on Vietnam, and political battle positions have already been taken by so many of your own opinion formulators, I reacted instantly with an irresistible urge to give them the truth as I saw it.

I am for a policy of great resolution and immense restraint. Such a policy can and will win in the end, if the American people show indomitable determination, infinite patience, and prove that their feeling for the fate of Asians is no less than that for their own fellow Americans.

Your Ambassador, Frank Galbraith, was present in all my talks and discussions with students, academicians, corporation executives, press and television. He is witness that however ineptly and/or inadequately, I did want and did try, to get across my message to all these groups.

I don't believe now, having spoken to so many in executive positions in Washington, that it is the arrogance of power which makes the American Administration do what it is doing. In fact, I fear the problem is that there is arrogance, alas, so natural with ancient peoples, but without power to match

yours just yet. This gives us time. We in non-communist Asia must use this time to consolidate our positions. The relative peace and stability of your effort in Vietnam provided as a by-product to us, must be turned to our advantage so as to avoid our being churned up by similar techniques of terror, subversion and international propaganda as in Vietnam.

This message is dictated in haste, just before I leave Los Angeles. Perhaps, because it is hurried, it is more candid than the carefully weighed, polished and re-polished composition. What it lacks in literary style, I hope, is made up for by being unequivocal.

My best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Lee Kuan Yew

I asked Lee about his wishes regarding publicity of this message and his own intentions in this regard. He said he would be using it in parts and slightly different form as he went along. He suggested we use it with care and selectivity where it would do most good (for example, with some Senators and columnists) rather than as press release.

Friday, October 27, 1967
5:30 pm

MR. PRESIDENT:

I understand that President Diaz Ordaz's interest in getting President Lopez Mateos' name pinned to some part of the Chamizal settlement is that he wants to associate Lopez Mateos with responsibility for having traded off part of Mexican territory to us in the Chamizal settlement.

You could accommodate him on this by agreeing to name the new channel, which is being built for the Rio Grande, the Kennedy-Lopez Mateos Channel. This will not be completed for another year and a half, by which time it is safe to assume that President Lopez Mateos, who has been in a coma for several months, will have passed on.

W. W. R.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Friday, October 27, 1967 -
3:40 p. m.

38
Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

As a result of your conversation with Bob Anderson, Secretary Rusk is requesting your authorization to give Anderson the following answer for Nasser if Nasser asks about restoring relations with us: We're willing, provided (1) they take the initiative; (2) they agree in principle to compensate us for properties damaged in June; (3) they retract their false charges of our participation in the June war; and (4) they agree to respect the normal rights of legation.

I think this is a fair position for us to take. We obviously don't want to rush headlong into Nasser's arms. On the other hand, we still have an interest in giving him a window to the West. We could maintain a minimal relationship by just having a Charge in Cairo for the time being.

Anderson leaves New York at 10:00 a. m. tomorrow.

Attachment

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 74-453
By cl, NARA, Date 4-11-95

The President indicated to WWR that he did not, repeat not, wish Mr. Anderson to be regarded or used as an informal intermediary between the U.S. Government and the UAR.

PRESERVATION COPY

4116
38a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 27, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-451
By CLG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

Subject: Terms of Possible Resumption
of Diplomatic Relations with
the United Arab Republic

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to inform Mr. Robert Anderson that, if approached by the UAR with respect to resumption of relations with the United States, he respond in an affirmative manner indicating our willingness to proceed based on clear understandings between us.

Discussion:

In a recent conversation between the Foreign Minister of the UAR and Mr. Robert Anderson, Mr. Anderson asked the Foreign Minister (Mr. Mahmoud Riad) whether the UAR desired a resumption of relations with the United States. Mr. Riad replied affirmatively. Mr. Anderson said that he understood that the United States would expect the UAR to correct the public impression that the United States had been engaged in hostilities against them and that there would have to be some understanding in principle with respect to compensation for properties destroyed in the last days of the United States presence in Cairo. Moreover, since the initiative for the break had come from the UAR, the United States would probably expect the UAR to make the first move toward a resumption.

Mr. Riad indicated that he would be willing to come to see me in Washington to discuss this matter provided that any announcement to be made was made simultaneously without specifying where the initiative came from. Mr. Riad appeared to have no difficulty in finding a way to correct the erroneous charges with respect to United States involvement in the recent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

war. Mr. Muhammad Haikal, a newspaper editor who is Nasser's semi-official spokesman, has by recounting the events of June 5 without mentioning the United States partially corrected the record. Nasser himself admitted in his presentation to the Arab heads of state in the Khartoum meeting that the charge was based on a misunderstanding of facts.

We believe Mr. Anderson should press for a more thorough correction of the record, possibly by other Haikal articles. We do not want to go too far, however, in stating conditions for resumption of relations. Our experience world-wide has usually not been very satisfactory in imposing concrete conditions in such situations. The extent to which Mr. Anderson is able to press President Nasser depends on the atmosphere at the time of the meeting. In no case should his conversation be considered final and binding but should be on the basis that he will report back to you the attitudes of President Nasser.

There is an advantage to the United States in having normal diplomatic relations with the UAR. These relations do not necessarily involve an initial appointment of an Ambassador but could be based upon resumption at the level of Chargé d'Affaires.

Mr. Anderson will be visiting Cairo in a few days and may well have the matter raised with him. I suggest that he be told that if President Nasser or others in the UAR raise the matter, he should reply that we would be willing to proceed along the lines discussed by him with Mr. Riad; i.e., the UAR takes the initiative (although we would be prepared to have a simultaneous statement of resumption), agreement in principle on compensation, and appropriate correction of the false charges against us. It must be understood before resumption that there will be a scrupulous regard on both sides to the normal rights of legation that are basic to the conduct of relations between two governments. This should include recognition that the diplomatic missions of both countries are entitled to protect their property, personnel, and rights of the country represented as well as to present the views of that government to the host government.



Dean Rusk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - October 27, 1967
3:30 pm

39
Pres. file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 5:00 pm Meeting today with President Diaz Ordaz

You and President Diaz Ordaz will have two papers to approve:

Joint-Communique and Presidents' Action Program.

Attached at Tab A is the draft communique. Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores have reviewed it and recommend approval. I concur.

Chamizal Proclamation

Both you and President Diaz Ordaz have seen the Proclamation in draft (Tab B). President Diaz Ordaz has no problem with our draft except for the names of the three new bridges linking El Paso and Ciudad Juarez.

We had suggested naming them, going from west to East:

1. The Paso del Norte Bridge. This is the bridge at the western end of the project. The name would commemorate the settlements on both sides of the river which were called Paso del Norte.
2. The Friendship Bridge. This would be the middle bridge which the two Presidents will not visit. It would commemorate the spirit of the Chamizal Settlement and the continuing friendship between the two countries.
3. The Bridge of the Americas. The Mexican street leading to this bridge is known as the Avenue of the Americas. Since this is the main two-way highway bridge between the United States and Mexico at El Paso, this was thought to be an appropriate name.

The Mexican President tentatively agreed to the name of the Paso del Norte Bridge. He wants to name the third bridge after Presidents Lopez Mateos and John F. Kennedy or two other appropriate Mexican-American historical figures. He would prefer a name other than "Friendship" for the middle bridge since we already have Friendship Dam.

A possible formula might be as follows:

1. The western bridge is on Avenida Juarez in Ciudad Juarez. We could agree to name this bridge "The Lincoln-Juarez Bridge".
2. An alternative for the middle bridge might be to call it "The Chamizal Bridge" in honor of the settlement.
3. Since the eastern bridge is a two-way bridge, it might be more appropriate to name it "The Paso del Norte Bridge".

I suggest you try this formula out on President Diaz Ordaz. After you reach agreement on the names, we will revise as necessary the descriptive language for inclusion in the Proclamation.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Draft Joint Communique & Presidents' Action Program.

Tab B - Chamizal Proclamation

39a

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ
OF MEXICO
October 26-28, 1967

SUGGESTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Johnson, the President of the United Mexican States, accompanied by Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, is paying a state visit to the United States.

The two Chiefs of State expressed greatest pleasure in having another opportunity to renew their cordial personal relationship and to resume informal talks held during their previous visits and at the Punta del Este meeting of American Presidents in April 1967.

President Diaz Ordaz expressed to President Johnson his sincere thanks for the friendly reception and for the warm welcome of the Congress, government officials, and individuals whom he has met, which he said reflect the traditional friendship between the peoples of the United States and Mexico.

The two Presidents engaged in wide-ranging talks in which they reviewed matters of common interest, as indicated

below, and they expressed satisfaction over the high level of mutual understanding reached during the last few years in relations between the two countries. President Johnson explained the policy of his Government with respect to important international problems affecting world peace and security. For his part President Diaz Ordaz, after listening to him with great interest, said that Mexico, as a loyal member of the United Nations, is ready to offer within the framework of the world organization its cooperation in order that the problems now existing and those which might arise may be solved in accordance with the high principles of the Charter of San Francisco.

The two Presidents took note of the highly successful mutual assistance arrangements to undertake flood relief operations entered into in late September by state and local authorities along the border which saved many lives.

President Diaz Ordaz reiterated his thanks to President Johnson for the cooperation of the Government of the United States in rescue operations within Mexico. The Presidents noted that the flood waters were of unprecedented quantities and that the flood

control system of the joint International Boundary and Water Commission had minimized the damage. They were pleased, moreover, that in addition to developing a broad program to raise living standards along the border, the recently created U.S.-Mexican Commission for Border Development and Friendship facilitated relief operations by communicating with federal and local agencies.

The Presidents agreed that the Alliance for Progress, whose goal is the same as that of the Mexican Revolution, has been a useful instrument, and can, as agreed at Punta del Este, be even more useful in the future in promoting, with social justice, the development of the Continent. President Diaz Ordaz expressed the importance within Mexico, since their inception several decades ago, of some national programs which the Act of Punta del Este includes, such as supervised agricultural credit for low income farmers, low cost housing, and the advances in higher education. He expressed satisfaction that Mexico, as an Alliance Partner, is contributing to the training of thousands of students and technicians from other Latin American countries. The

Presidents noted with pleasure that, in furthering the educational development of the Hemisphere, the Benito Juarez-Abraham Lincoln scholarships were now in operation and that more than 80 Hemisphere youth would benefit in 1967.

With reference to the meeting of hemispheric presidents at Punta del Este, President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed his conviction that the Latin American common market will foster the economic and social development of the area in a more rapid and balanced manner, and that this is primarily an effort to be carried forward by the Latin American countries themselves. For his part, President Johnson reiterated firm support for this promising Latin American initiative.

Also with regard to the meeting at Punta del Este, the Presidents reiterated their conviction that individual and joint efforts of the American states are essential in order to increase the income of the Latin American countries resulting from their traditional exports and to avoid frequent fluctuations in the prices of these commodities, as well as to promote new exports. Therefore, their

*We agreed at Punta del Este to
strengthen consultation &
- 5 - continue to try to*

9
respective governments would make continuing efforts in carrying out concrete measures which were agreed in this respect during the Punta del Este meeting and particularly in strengthening the system of inter-governmental consultation to make them increasingly effective.

The Presidents were gratified at the steadily increasing levels of trade which makes the United States the best customer of Mexico and Mexico the best market for products of the United States in Latin America. They noted that the United States-Mexico Joint Trade Committee continues to provide a forum for discussion of trade problems. They agreed on the importance to the developing countries of access to the world market for their exports. President Diaz Ordaz noted recent proposals in the United States Congress which, if adopted, would restrict entry into the United States of some products exported by Mexico. He expressed his Government's concern regarding the adverse impact such restrictions would have on Mexico. President Johnson reiterated his desire for a

continued high level of trade and stressed his opposition to protectionist restrictions.

The two Chief Executives expressed their satisfaction on the signing of a Fishing Agreement which was effected today through an exchange of notes. Mexico and the United States uphold different points of view regarding the problem of the extent of territorial waters, but these differences do not now exist with regard to fisheries jurisdiction. President Diaz Ordaz wished to underline his satisfaction that this problem has been resolved in accordance with the law recently passed by the Mexican Congress extending to twelve miles the exclusive fishing zone. In conformity with this law, United States fishing vessels will be able to continue through 1972 traditional fishing in the zone between nine and twelve miles from the Mexican coast which up to now has been open to all fishing vessels. The exclusive United States fishing zone will be opened to Mexican fishing vessels in the same way.

The Presidents commended the statesmen and negotiators whose vision and high sense of responsibility made it possible for the two Governments to reach a settlement over the Chamizal. They remarked that a settlement of this nature, freely arrived at and fair to both countries, was all too exceptional in relations between neighboring countries. In their presence, the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the Secretary of External Relations of Mexico signed a document approving for their respective Governments, as of 12:01 a.m., October 28, Minute 228 of the International Boundary and Water Commission demarcating the new boundary line between El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, under the Chamizal settlement. In accordance with the Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963, that new boundary line will become effective as of that moment. Tomorrow, October 28, the two Presidents will fly to El Paso and Ciudad Juarez and, at the invitation of President Diaz Ordaz, they will visit Ciudad Juarez for a ceremony at the Mexican memorial to the Chamizal settlement.

As a result of their discussion the two Presidents agreed that further inquiry and action should be taken with respect to several important matters affecting both countries. These are set forth in a separate release entitled, Presidents' Action Program.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ
OF MEXICO
October 26-28, 1967

PRESIDENTS' ACTION PROGRAM

1. The Work of the International Boundary and Water Commission

They noted that since their visit in December 1966 to the Amistad Dam site on the Rio Grande, joint construction had advanced rapidly, and that the Commission can begin to store water before the flood season of 1968. They noted that recently the two Governments had approved a project for the relocation and channelization of the Tijuana River in the States of California and Baja California, and an expansion of the international sanitation plant for the two Nogales on the Arizona-Sonora border. They recalled President Johnson's meeting with President Lopez Mateos in February 1964 at which time the Commission had been instructed to submit studies relating to any portions of land that might have become separated from the country to which they belonged, so that the Rio Grande could be made once again the boundary between the two countries

from El Paso and Ciudad Juarez to the Gulf of Mexico. Upon being informed that the Commission is well advanced in the surveys needed and that the studies are under way with a view to their early completion, the Presidents agreed to ask the Commission to submit these studies, as completed, to the two Governments. They further instructed the International Boundary and Water Commission to complete as soon as practicable its studies of the recent record flood on the lower Rio Grande, and to recommend to the two Governments such modification of the international flood control project as may be necessary to control and contain floodwaters of this unexpected magnitude.

2. U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship

The Presidents discussed the work of the Commission which they had agreed to create in April, 1966, to study cooperatively the improvement in the standard of living of communities along the border. The Presidents reviewed the minutes of the first joint meeting of the Commission in Mexico City on October 19-20 of this year in which the two Sections reviewed plans for beautification projects

and increased tourism, joint city planning between adjoining cities, increased job opportunities on both sides of the border, cultural centers open to nationals of both countries, health and vocational educational facilities, and other programs which will permit the neighboring communities to work together to accelerate their progress. The Presidents instructed the two Sections of the Commission to give priority attention to a program of social and economic rehabilitation of the lower Rio Grande Valley.

The two Presidents expressed common interest in considering the establishment of parallel national parks on the international border. The first location to be considered is the reservoir to be formed by the international Amistad Dam being constructed jointly by the two Governments on the Rio Grande. The U.S.-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship will consider other potential locations, such as the Big Bend area of the Rio Grande.

3. Cooperation in the Development of Water Resources

The Presidents spoke of the remarkable exchange of information on water resources management that took place

at the Conference on Water for Peace held in Washington last May. They reiterated their intention to continue to keep pace with modern science and techniques in the collaboration between the two countries for the development of their respective water resources. President Diaz Ordaz remarked on the fact that this cooperation is exemplified in the Mexican project now under construction utilizing United States technology for the desalting of ocean water for the city of Tijuana, Baja California. The two Presidents reviewed with satisfaction the progress report on the work of the United States-Mexican Study Group, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is investigating the feasibility of a joint nuclear project to desalt water of the Gulf of California for use in the States of Arizona and California in the United States and Sonora and Baja California in Mexico. The Presidents requested the Study Group to submit its recommendations to the two Governments by mid 1968. The Presidents spoke of the continued efforts of the two Governments to control salinity in the two great international rivers that their countries share.

They reaffirmed the agreement reached by them on April 15 of last year concerning the need for prior consultation before either Government undertakes any projects that might adversely affect the other.

4. Elimination of the Screwworm Fly

The Presidents agreed in principle that the present barrier in Northern Mexico to control and eventually eliminate the screwworm fly should be extended to the narrow Isthmus of Tehuantepec. They proposed that an agreement be negotiated as soon as possible to implement this program which would materially benefit large areas in Mexico which are not now protected against this pest and would reduce the danger of its reappearance in the United States.

5. Expansion of Cultural Exchange

To further extend the exchange of persons from all walks of life between the two countries, the Presidents agreed that a new cultural agreement should be negotiated. This would provide guidelines for the types of cultural interchange and foster continued understanding of and training in the two countries. They observed that in 1968

Mexico would host the nineteenth Olympiad and in that same year the HemisFair would take place in San Antonio, Texas. These types of events were viewed as important incentives to continued high levels of tourism, which permit the peoples of their two countries to maintain personal and friendly relations.

6. Stability for Coffee Prices

To provide conditions of stability in the coffee trade at price levels both remunerative to producers and fair to consumers and to obtain dependable income for coffee-producing countries, they agreed that the International Coffee Agreement should be extended with such amendments as may be required to improve enforcement procedures, to bring production into line with consumer requirements, and to ensure equitable trading conditions.

7. Movement of Articles of Archeological Significance and Historical Value

The Presidents agreed to explore possible methods of controlling the unauthorized movement of articles of archeological significance and historical value between their two countries.

8. Control of Narcotics

The Presidents noted with satisfaction the continued cooperative efforts between the enforcement agencies of both countries in the field of controlling the international trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and resolved to continue this cooperation.

9. Border Trade

The two Presidents reaffirmed the decision to encourage expansion of legitimate border trade and instructed their respective Governments to conclude their studies as soon as possible so that further action may be initiated.

Pres file

Friday, October 27, 1967
2:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, Bob Ginsburgh
reports for October 23-26:

- plane losses by cause;
- physical results achieved, as presently known;
- an interim assessment of military effects.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

40a

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

27 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

In the last four days we have lost 14 aircraft over North Vietnam:

Date	Type	Target	Cause		
			Ground Fire	SAM	Unknown
23 Oct	F-105	Kep Airfield	X		
	F-4E	Haiphong RR Yard	X		
	F-4B	Phuc Yen		X	
24 Oct	F-4B	Phuc Yen			X
	F-105D	Phuc Yen	X		
25 Oct	A-4E	Phuc Yen			X
	F-105	Hanoi Bridge (Doumer)	X		
	A-4E	Van Dien Supply Depot			X
	A-4E	Hanoi Thermal Power			X
	F-8E	Hanoi Thermal Power			X
26 Oct	F-105	Hanoi Bridge Canal des Rapides		X	
	F-105	" " " "		X	
	F-105	Unknown		X	
	F-4	MIG Cap	X		
14			5	4	5

We have achieved the following results:

Target	Aircraft Lost	Damage	Assessment
Phuc Yen Airfield	4	11 MIGs destroyed or damaged on ground 4 in the air, field is unserviceable -- no operational aircraft.	The deployment of 3-4 MIGs to China has reduced NVN's in-country inventory to 4-5. 2-3 airfields are serviceable --

Target	Aircraft Lost	Damage	Assessment
Kep Airfield	1	Limited damage has been temporarily repaired.	2 limited serviceable. Primary jet operations will probably be restricted to Gia Lam.
Hoa Lai	0	All ordnance on target. 1 secondary explosion	Restrikes will be warranted as NVN restores fields and uses them to stage China-based aircraft.
Hanoi Thermal Power	2	3 WALLEYES hit generator hall. All conventional bombs on target. Lights are out again.	Repair time from previous strikes was longer than expected -- it ought to take even longer this time.
Hanoi (Doumer) Bridge	1	600 feet of bridge out, 2 spans down, 1 span severely damaged.	Dropping of these 2 bridges again should cause Hanoi at least as much difficulty and require at least as much time to repair -- seeding the waters with MARK 36 destructors makes by-pass more difficult.
Hanoi (Canal) Bridge	2	Bridge is down.	
Van Dien Supply	1	Severe damage to 7 buildings. Superficial damage to 3.	Previous strikes on Van Dien targets created high noise level. Attacks on these targets maintain pressure on supplies and their movement in and out of Hanoi-Haiphong area.
Van Dien Vehicle	0	1 MIG in the air -- 2 buildings burning, several others damaged.	
Lang Dang RR Yard	0	40 pieces of rolling stock destroyed or damaged.	"
Haiphong RR Yard	1	All bombs on target, smoke precluded damage assessment.	"

g
ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

P file

41

Friday, Oct. 27, 1967
2:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may be interested in this memorandum of conversation with a young Japanese who called on me this morning. Knowing him well, I believe that he is, indeed, working with Prime Minister Sato, and the message is reasonably direct.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

Friday, October 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Mr. Kei Wakaizumi, a young Japanese professor deeply involved in security problems, whom I have known well since April 1965, called on me this morning.

1. He said he was one of a small group of personal advisors to Prime Minister Sato. He wished to speak to me about the issues of Okinawa and the Bonins, which are absolutely critical to the future of Japanese political life and the U. S. -Japanese alliance.

2. He then read aloud from a written statement which he described as "personal." He did not leave the statement, but it said, essentially, the following:

The problem that the U. S. and Japan confront is to strike a balance between the immediate and obvious strategic importance of Okinawa to the United States and the long-run advantage to the U. S. of the Japanese-U. S. alliance.

The American case for continuing to hold on to administrative rights in Okinawa and the Bonins was strong. They were important for our Southeast Asian operations. We had poured a great deal of money into the bases. In the face of the real, if marginal, long-run usefulness of the bases and the uncertainty of Japan's future policy, a good argument could be made for the status quo.

On the other hand, there was a good case for early reversion. In the long run, the Japanese-U. S. alliance was more important to the security structure of the Pacific than the base itself. In the face of the unprovable possibility that pressure on this issue would destroy both the basis for U. S. administration and the alliance, there was a good case for beginning to move towards reversion of Japanese administrative rights.

3. Therefore, he believed, personally, that, on balance, we should move towards an early reversion agreement, counting on the willingness of Japan to assume a more "reasonable role" in its security arrangements with the United States and in support of Asian security.

4. He then went on to say that Prime Minister Sato hoped that there could be agreement that "the early reversion of Japanese administrative rights in Okinawa and the Bonins will be considered by the two governments." In connection with such a formula, these were three questions on Prime Minister Sato's mind:

10/27/67

-- Should a special U. S. -Japanese organ be created to consider this problem, or should we use existing diplomatic arrangements?

-- Could there be an indication of when reversion might take place?

-- Should we separate the issue of the Bonins from Okinawa, or treat the problem as a whole?

5. He concluded his exposition by saying that it was a Japanese tradition that a visitor should not go home empty-handed, but that he also should come with a gift. He said he would be interested to know what "gift" Prime Minister Sato could bring President Johnson.

6. I replied:

-- We were conscious of Prime Minister Sato's interest in movement on the question of Okinawa and the Bonins in the course of his visit here;

-- Staff work was going forward within the government, but the President had not fixed his position;

-- Obviously, the question related in the short run to the timing of the war in Viet Nam and, in the longer run, to the obligations that Japan was prepared to assume with respect to the security problems of Japan itself and free Asia in general;

-- I underlined Secretary McNamara's view that for the long pull the present unilateral security relations with Japan would not be politically viable in the United States over any considerable period of time;

-- As for the help Japan could give the United States at this difficult stage, I said that there were two major ways to assist: First, to state publicly what the Japanese and other Asian governments are willing to say privately; namely, that our defense of South Viet Nam was critical to the security of Asia and was buying time for a new Asia, capable of taking a larger hand in its own destiny, to organize itself. Second, given the pressures on the U. S. AID budget, Japan could be enormously helpful by enlarging its assistance to: Viet Nam; Indonesia; India and Pakistan; and the soft-loan window of the Asian Development Bank.

7. I talked at some length about the economic strains imposed on the United States by the war in Viet Nam, and argued the legitimacy of Japan's helping substantially and right now to mitigate those strains in monetary and aid affairs.

10/27/67

8. He then raised the possibility of Japanese help in peace-making. I explained the San Antonio formula to him; why, given the present shape of the war, the "no taking advantage" assumption was necessary; and that there seemed to be no present willingness of Hanoi to negotiate an end to the war. I gave him a copy of the San Antonio speech to take back with him. I added that of course no one wished a peaceful settlement more than the President; and that if Prime Minister Sato had any constructive suggestions, I am sure the President would be interested to hear them.

9. Speaking most solemnly, Mr. Wakaizumi said that he would report exclusively to Prime Minister Sato what I had said.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, October 27, 1967
1:00 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Mansfield Resolution: Sitrep.

I am informed by Ben Read that:

1. Arthur Goldberg feels quite strongly that we should accept the Mansfield resolution, reserving the timing of a UN Viet Nam effort and the conditions to ourself. He believes it preferable to the Morse resolution; and feels we will get "run over" on this matter by the Senate.
2. Secretary Rusk takes a position 180° different.
3. Secretary Rusk is telephoning Arthur Goldberg to see if he can be gotten in line for the planned confrontation with the Senate Leadership in Senator Mansfield's office.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, October 27, 1967 -- 12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

I talked with Sec. Rusk.

1. He tells me he did approve the breakfast proposal; although in a talk with Sen. Mansfield last night he found him "very rough."
2. I told him how you wished to have the matter handled. He said he had to give two speeches in Indianapolis on Monday and might find it hard to make an early appointment with Mansfield.
3. I told him that the matter was urgent, and that if he could not do it with Arthur, perhaps Nick could.
4. He said he would arrange it.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

44

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/PENNSYLVANIA~~

Friday, October 27, 1967
12:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This compilation of North
Vietnamese (DRV) rejections of direct
contact indicates a clear policy --
if nothing else.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 11-6-91

Specific Rejections by the DRV of Opportunities
to Talk with US representative during course of
PENNSYLVANIA Channel

44a

- August 21, 1967 - Hanoi rejects visa application by intermediaries.
- August 31, 1967 - Hanoi rejects visa denial appeal by intermediaries.
- September 7, 1967 - DRV Rep requests authority to see US validated person.
- September 11, 1967 - DRV message: "It is only after the unconditional stopping of bombing and all other acts of war, that it would be possible to engage in conversations."
- September 13, 1967 - DRV Rep said a direct meeting with US validated person "cannot take place" because of the continuing threat to bomb Hanoi."
- September 20, 1967 - DRV Rep turned down intermediaries' invitation to meet US validated person.
- September 21, 1967 - DRV Rep said he could see private Americans at his discretion, but he could not see any American who spoke for the USG or reported directly to the USG without Hanoi authorization.
- September 23, 1967 - DRV message: "... at the moment when US is increasing its escalation, it was not possible for the DRV Rep to see (the US validated person)".
- September 25, 1967 - DRV Rep said Prime Minister Pham Van Dong had made clear there could be no formal discussions between the US and the DRV as long as any level of bombing continued in the North. He said that he did not know if preliminary discussions with a US validated person fell under such prohibition and would seek clarification from Hanoi.

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/PENNSYLVANIA~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-451
By CG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

-2-

September 30, 1967 - DRV Rep said Hanoi had instructed him not to talk directly to a US validated person even in a preliminary way because "too much had happened since July".

October 2, 1967 - DRV approved message: "If the US really wished to talk, let them stop first without conditions the bombardment of the territory of the DRV."

October 4, 1967 - DRV Rep denied having said that Trinh's January 28 statement constituted a "solemn engagement" to talk after the unconditional end of bombing.

October 4, 1967 - DRV message to intermediaries: "If the US really wants to talk it is necessary first to stop without conditions the bombing and all other acts of war against the DRV."

October 17, 1967 - DRV message: "At a time when the US continues escalation we can neither receive (the US validated person) nor comment on the American views transmitted through this channel. The position of the government of the DRV is perfectly clear. It is only when the US has ceased without condition the bombardments that talks can take place."

October 20, 1967 - DRV Reps to intermediaries: "There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again. Our position is perfectly clear. We stand on the Trinh interview with Burchett of January 28."

45

Friday - October 27, 1967
10:30 am

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chamizal Visit

The last act in tomorrow's program at El Paso-Ciudad Juarez will be the inauguration of the Cordova Island Bridge.

This involves the cutting of a ribbon which Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will do, and the raising of the United States-Mexican flags.

We understand that President Diaz Ordaz, assisted by his military honor guard, will raise the Mexican flag.

Do you want to raise the American flag assisted by your honor guard, or do you prefer to have the honor guard do it while you stand by them?

W. W. Rostow

Prefer raise
flag myself _____

Prefer have honor
guard raise flag _____.

cc - Jim Jones
Jim Cross

46

~~1. Sup~~
2. Pres file

Friday - 9:30 am
October 27, 1967

Mr. President

Our Boundary and Water Commissioner,
Joe Friedkin, deserves a pat on the back
for the fine job that he has done in carry-
ing out the Chamizal settlement.

I recommend you sign the attached
letter. We will see that it gets to him
after the Chamizal Ceremony is over.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

46a

October 28, 1967

Dear Joe:

This must be a day of great personal pride and satisfaction for you. I know how hard you have worked on the Chamizal settlement.

Your handling of boundary questions and control of the rivers has helped strengthen the excellent relations we enjoy with Mexico. I am grateful to you and all the members of your staff for a job well done.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Honorable Joseph F. Friedkin
Commissioner
United States Section
International Boundary and Water
Commission
United States and Mexico
El Paso, Texas

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
(prepared 10/27/67
for delivery on 10/28/67).

47

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 27, 1967
9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of constructive
Kuznetsov-Goldberg dinner Wednesday
night in New York.

*to [unclear]
2 Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

USUN 1754 -- 2 sections

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By reg, NARA, Date 11-6-91

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-451

By CG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

NODIS

DEPT PAST TO WHITE HOUSE AND MOSCOW (IMMEDIATE)

AT DINNER GIVEN FOR KUZNETSOV BY AMB. GOLDBERG FOLLOWING SIGNIFICANT POINTS EMERGED. SISCO, BUFFUM AND PEDERSEN ALSO PRESENT ON US SIDE; FEDORENKO AND SHEVCHENKO FOR USSR. DOBRYNIN BOWED OUT DURING COURSE OF DAY GIVING AS REASON PRESSING BUSINESS WITH STATE DEPT. CONVERSATION WAS FRIENDLY, BUSINESS-LIKE, AVOIDED ENTIRELY PAST DIFFERENCES OVER TEXT AND INTERPRETATION, AND FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE.

1. KUZNETSOV STRESSED SOV CONCERN OVER SITUATION IN THE AREA, AS REFLECTED IN INCIDENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS, AND SOV DESIRE TO COOPERATE WITH US IN SC ACTION THAT WILL MOVE MATTER TOWARDS PEACEFUL RESOLUTION. INDISCUSSING DANGERS CURRENT SITUATION HE SAID SOV GOVT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ISRAELIS ARE PLANNING TO TAKE FURTHER MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ARABS, AND IN PARTICULAR THAT THEY MIGHT MAKE ATTACK ACROSS SUEZ CANAL. (INTERESTING THAT HIS CONCERN RELATED TO UAR WHILE IN JULY IT RELATED TO SYRIA).

2. GOLDBERG POINTED OUT THAT US EVEN BEFORE HOSTILITIES BROKE OUT AND AT ALL TIMES SINCE HAS BEEN USING ITS INFLUENCE TO COUNSEL RESTRAINT ON PART OF ALL CONCERNED. GOLDBERG SAID THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS CONNECTION IF SOVS IN THEIR PUBLIC DECLARATIONS WERE AS EVEN-HANDED AS US HAD BE IN CALLING UPON ALL PARTIES TO DISCONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES. GOLDBERG MADE SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SC MEETING OF LAST FEW DAYS. IN THIS MEETING US SAID THAT VIOLATION OF CEASE FIRE COULD NOT BE COUNTENANCED BY ANY OF PARTIES. ON OTHER HAND SOV STATEMENTS IN SC WOULD SEEM TO IGNORE MILITARY ACTIVITIES ON PART OF UAR WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTED TO TENTION IN THE AREA. IT WAS HELPFUL FOR SOVS TO VOTE FOR THE RES BUT IN ADDITION TO VOTING FOR RES IT IS NECESSARY FOR BOTH USSR AND US TO USE THEIR RESPECTIVE INFLUENCES PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN INTEREST OF MAINTAINING PEACEFUL

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 - USUN 1754, 10-26-67 (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

CONDITIONS. KUZNETSOV DID NOT REPLY TO THIS PRESENTATION ALTHOUGH HE IMPLIED ACCEPTANCE OF VALIDITY OF OUR ARGUMENT BY EMPHASIZING THAT USSR HAD VOTED FOR A RES WHICH ENCOMPASSED VIOLATIONS BY BOTH SIDES.

3. KUZNETSOV THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHAT OUR THOUGHTS WERE ABOUT FACILITATING PROGRESS AT UN TOWARDS A RESOLUTION ON ME PROBLEM. IN RESPONSE TO KUZNETSOV INQUIRY GOLDBERG STATED THAT THERE WAS NO POINT IN REVIEWING OR RENEWING PAST DIFFERENCES AS TO SOV AND US DISCUSSIONS AY ESSGA. GOLDBERG SAID THAT SOVS KNEW OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER BUT THAT THE IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION NOW WAS HOW TO PROCEED AT PRESENT JUNCTURE IN PURSUIT OF WHAT SHOULD BE COMMON OBJECTIVE, NAMELY JUST, DURABLE AND PERMANENT PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. GOLDBERG EMPHASIZED THAT PROBLEM WAS NOT MERELY GETTING WORDS INTO UN RES BUT RATHER OBTAINING COOPERATION OF PARTIES WITHOUT WHICH SUCH PEACE COULD NOT BE MAINTAINED. KUZNETSOV AGREED AND THEN RENEWED HIS INQUIRY AS TO WHAT OUR VIEWS WERE NOW AS TO HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED AT UN. ANB GOLDBERG THEN MADE PRINCIPAL PITCH IN FAVOR OF US AND USSR GETTING TOGETHER PROMPTLY ON BASIS OF DANISH TEXT, WHICH HE FELT WAS EVEN-HANDED AND CONSISTENT WITH US AND USSR COMMON VIEWS EXPRESSED LAST JULY AND WOULD ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE WHICH WE ASSUMED WE AND SOVS SHARE IN COMMON, TO GET BOTH SIDES TO COOPERATE IN EFFORTS OF UN REP TO ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

4. KUZNETSOV IN TURN SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT US AND USSR COULD USE INDIAN DRAFT AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE SC ACTION. HE ALSO ALMOST BY WAY OF PASSING ADDED THAT US- USSR DRAFT OF ESSGA (AND THIS TIME HE DESCRIBED IT IN TERMS OF VERSION ONE) COULD BE DISCUSSED BUT TOUCHED ON THIS ONLY LIGHTLY AND CONCENTRATED ON INDIAN DRAFT. KUZNETSOV REFERRING TO RECENT HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGE BETWEEN US, SAYING THAT WHATEVER DIFFERENCES OF VIEW THERE WERE, THEIR LETTER AND OUR RESPONSE WERE MUTUAL INDICATIONS THAT WE BOTH WISHED TO WORK TOGETHER IN TRYING TO ACHIEVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESULT IN SC. HE MADE NO REAL PITCH TO RETAIN JUNE 5 DATE MENTIONING POSSIBILITY OF REFERENCE TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL "FROM TERRITORIES IT HAD OCCUPIED." IN RESPONSE TO GOLDBERG STATEMENT THAT UAR HAD NOT RECENTLY TALKED ABOUT DATE TO US, KUZNETSOV REPLIED THAT UAR HAD "MENTIONED" DATE TO THEM. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT WHILE SOVS AND ARABS WILL SEEK ITS INCLUSION, SOVS WOULD AGREE TO ITS EXCLUSION. WE ALSO BELIEVE UAR WOULD NOT MAKE THIS BREAKING POINT, ALTHOUGH JORDAN FEELS MUCH MORE STRONGLY.

GP-1

GOLDBERG

NOTE: NOT PASSED WHITE HOUSE AND MOSCOW BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM - Department of State

7

~~SECRET~~

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DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE AND MOSCOW (IMMEDIATE)

5. GOLDBERG'S RESPONSE WAS AFFIRMATIVE AND POSITIVE BUT EXPLICIT THAT DANISH DRAFT RATHER THAN INDIAN SHOULD BE BASIS FOR JOINT DISCUSSION ON GROUND THAT IT MOST CLOSELY APPROXIMATED PRESIDENT'S FIVE POINTS AND ALSO PAST JOINT CONVERSATIONS. KUZNETSOV DID NOT PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF DANISH DRAFT, THOUGH EXPRESSED WHAT IS UNUSUAL FOR KUZNETSOV, A STRONG PERSONAL DISLIKE FOR TABOR, WHOM HE SAID HE DISTRUSTED BECAUSE HE HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS MISREPRESENTED HIS POSITION TO OTHER DELS, PARTICULARLY ARABS, IN LAST FEW DAYS.

6. GOLDBERG EXPRESSED COMPLETE WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVS AND SUGGESTED THAT THESE MIGHT RESUME THURSDAY MORNING TO DISCUSS ALL DRAFTS. KUZNETSOV WHILE AGREEING THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD GO ON EXPRESSED PREFERENCE TO SEE FIRST IF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD COME UP WITH DRAFT ON THURSDAY. KUZNETSOV HOWEVER EXPRESSLY RESERVED OPTION OF US AND USSR GETTING TOGETHER ON BASIS OF WHATEVER TEXTS, HAD BEEN THROWN INTO NON-PERMANENT GROUP HOPPER. GOLDBERG SAID HE WAS SURE AND KUZNETSOV AGREED THAT WHATEVER TEXT OR TEXTS WHICH EMERGED FROM NON-PERMANENT MEETING, AGREEMENT OF US AND USSR WOULD BE NECESSARY AND THAT ANY TEXT TO BE HELPFUL SHOULD HAVE AS A MINIMUM ACQUIESCENCE OF PARTIES. WHILE KUZNETSOV DID NOT DEMUR OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT SOVS HOPE THAT INDIANS WILL DRAG LAS ALONG ON THEIR DRAFT AND SET STAGE FOR FINAL NEGOTIATION ON BASIS OF TEXT MOST FAVORABLE TO THEM AND TO ARABS. IN THIS CONNECTION KUZNETSOV CONFIRMED THAT INDIAN TEXT HAD BEEN CLEARED BY ARABS. OUR IMPRESSION ALSO IS THAT IF INDIANS AND LAS DISAGREE ON TEXT SOVS WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH US SERIOUSLY DAVISH TEXT.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1754/2 FROM USUN OCTOBER 26, 1967 (NOD1S)

7. KUZNETSOV SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US TO ACHIEVE CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION IN INTEREST OF PEACE IN ME. SAID THESE INSTRUCTIONS HAD JUST RECENTLY BEEN RENEWED. GOLDBERG SAID OUR INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT CONSISTENT WITH AMERICAN POSITION AS STATED BY PRESIDENT ON JUNE 19 AND EXPRESSED AT GLASSBORO TO AGREE WITH SOVS ON BASIC POLICY AND TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT PROMPTLY ON SC RES WHICH COULD HELP MOVE PARTIES TOWARD PEACE.

8. GOLDBERG STRESSED PROBLEMS WHICH EXISTED IN ARAB GROUP AND NECESSITY PAYING ATTENTION PRINCIPALLY TO STATES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, NOTABLY UAR AND JORDAN. KUZNETSOV AGREED.

9. WE FOUND THE MEETING A VERY SATISFACTORY ONE, AND IMPORTANCE ATTACHED BY KUZNETSOV TO EXCHANGE AT HIGH LEVELS CAME THROUGH LOUD AND CLEAR.

10. CONFIRMING SECRETARY-SISCO TELCON, WE WILL MAKE CLEAR TO EBAN THIS MORNING SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES WE FEEL COULD ENSUE AND ADVERSE EFFECT ON ISRAELI POSITION HERE IF FURTHER MILITARY ACTION IS TAKEN BY THEM IN FURTHER RETALIATION OVER ELATH SINKING.

GP-1
GOLDBERG
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED WHITE HOUSE OR MOSCOW BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~

October 27, 1967
Friday

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached for your signature is a
letter of thanks to Ambassador
Livingston Merchant for the
Atlantic Council's new book,
"Building the American-European
Market: Planning for the 1970's."

W. W. Rostow

RHU

RHU:em

48a

OCT 31 1967

Dear Ambassador Merchant:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the Atlantic Council's handsome new book, "Building the American-European Market: Planning for the 1970's."

The distinguished Americans and Europeans whose thinking is reflected in this volume may be assured that their efforts will have a wide and appreciative audience both in government and in private life. The Council Reports, and the statements which introduce them, will be read with profit by all who work to make real the vision of an Atlantic Community.

The problems to which your colleagues have addressed themselves are fundamental: the relationships between the United States and Western Europe, between West and East, and between the developed and the developing nations. It is clear that we and our friends in Europe can work effectively together toward wise and constructive solutions of these common problems.

Once again, we have reason to be grateful to the Atlantic Council. To you and your colleagues I should like to send my commendation, and my best wishes for the future of your important efforts.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable Livingston T. Merchant
The Atlantic Council
of the United States
1616 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

LBJ:RHU:em (10/27/67)

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED STATES

1616 H STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

486
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October 18, 1967

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JOHN FRICIA M. WILLIAMS

The Honorable
Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Last year General Norstad, my predecessor as Chairman of the Atlantic Council, sent you the report of our Geneva conference on Atlantic Cooperation and Economic Growth and you kindly replied on June 21, 1966 commending the Council for this effort, expressing interest in creative initiatives by both the Government and private enterprise and assuring him that the paper would be staffed out in the Government.

Throughout this program we have had the wholehearted and valuable cooperation of the White House, State, Treasury, Commerce and other agencies of the Government.

The story of our efforts to date in this field and many recommendations for future policy and action are contained in the enclosed book just published for the Council, "Building the American-European Market: Planning for the 1970's." We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce and other key members of the Administration.

We are increasingly convinced that the development of transnational ties of business and investment along wise and constructive lines can advance the national as well as the corporate interest of all concerned. In my judgment it should also facilitate closer political as well as economic ties.

Sincerely,

Livingston T. Merchant

Livingston T. Merchant

Friday,
October 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation report
on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

SECRET-EXDIS Attachment

49a

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report
October 27, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-451

By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

Formation of the Government

Thieu has told Bunker that the announcement of the new Cabinet might be issued on inauguration day or immediately thereafter. He confirmed that Nguyen Van Loc was currently trying to form a Cabinet. This represents a further delay in announcing the formation of the new government, but does suggest that progress is being made.

Thieu's Inaugural Speech

In a conversation with Thieu concerning his inaugural address, Bunker stressed the importance of giving the American people a better understanding of what the new government would be doing and what the role and achievements of the Vietnamese armed forces were. Thieu was receptive and asked for a memorandum covering these points. Bunker will be following up.

In addition to his inaugural address, we understand that Thieu plans:

- On October 31, a written proclamation describing the GVN's platform and priorities during the first few months.
- A message to the armed forces outlining their role in the pacification program.
- Within a few days of his inauguration, a massive leaflet drop over South Viet-Nam describing his government and urging the Viet Cong to rally to it.
- A second leaflet to be dropped over North Viet-Nam urging the people to persuade their government to take steps toward peace. Thieu hopes this leaflet will condition the North Vietnamese for his subsequent message to Ho Chi Minh.

New Government Actions

The Vietnamese Government in the past 48 hours has issued a decree calling for partial mobilization (e.g. lowering the

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-2-

draft age, extending terms of military service, etc.). Press reports this morning indicate that the government has also put on trial on charges of corruption a former province chief. Bunker has been encouraging Thieu and Ky to take such measures even before Thieu's inauguration, and these moves are most encouraging.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

Friday, October 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: The Ryukyu-Bonin Islands and the Sato Visit

As you know a major subject during Prime Minister Sato's visit in mid-November will be the future status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.

The situation is very fluid in Japan on this subject just now, and Ambassador Johnson is anxious to receive your approval of a U.S. position for purposes of negotiating the Sato visit communique.

Essentially, Sato does not want a fight with us on this issue. He is willing to follow our lead within reason, but he needs to know approximately what we are willing to do before he can give the lead in turn to the Japanese. He needs that lead at this point.

At TAB A is a memo from the Secretary of State requesting your approval of a negotiating position in the form of draft language for the Sato visit communique (TAB B).

At TAB C is a proposed telegram to Tokyo explaining our position.

The Secretary's memo sets forth the issues clearly. I believe it is not essential that you read TABS B and C at this time.

I recommend that you approve the Secretary's recommendation in TAB A.

Secretary McNamara has reviewed and approved that recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

TABS A, B, C

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See Me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-135
By fw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

WWR:AJenkins:pas:10/27/67

~~SECRET~~

50a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

October 27, 1967

~~SECRET/NO DIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit of Prime Minister Sato

Recommendation:

That you authorize negotiations with the Japanese Government of draft communique language embodying:

a) A commitment to enter into early negotiations for the return of the Bonin Islands (permitting, however, United States retention of the whole island of Iwo Jima as a military base); and,

b) Interim measures relating to the Ryukyu Islands which would not commit us to return these islands,

on the understanding that these commitments would be subject to final approval by you and Prime Minister Sato at your November 14-15 meetings.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The major issues we anticipate during the visit of Prime Minister Sato will be twofold: First, Japanese willingness to shoulder a greater share of the political and economic burdens of regional responsibility; and second, our response to Japanese desires for forward movement on reversion of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

SANTIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

By Clr, NARA, Date 3-30-85

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In preparation for the Sato visit, I stressed to Foreign Minister Miki in mid-September the actions we sought from Japan as a contributing partner in the region and our inability primarily for security reasons to make a commitment at this time on the return of the Ryukyus. At Miki's request, I said we would give serious consideration to reversion of the Bonin Islands in the near future but in this event Iwo Jima would have to be treated as a special case.

The Japanese have responded very positively to my talks with Miki. Both Sato and Miki have come out with strong statements of support on our Vietnam policies, particularly on the bombing issue, and Sato during his two trips through Asia has begun to exercise the regional leadership we seek from Japan. Furthermore, the Japanese leaders have made concerted efforts to dampen down expectations for immediate reversion of the Ryukyus, stressing the key relationship of our military position on Okinawa to their own and regional security.

Ambassador Johnson informs me that he expects Sato to be helpful on both increased assistance to Southeast Asia and on our balance of payments problem, if we can be responsive to his desire for forward steps on the Ryukyus and particularly the Bonins to help stem reversionist pressures. Sato faces increasingly heavy political and public demands to obtain substantial progress in the resolution of these issues. His failure to obtain any significant response from us will be politically damaging to him and could lead to serious problems in our relations with Japan as well as with the local populace in the Ryukyus. In the Ambassador's views, the key factor will be our willingness to enter into negotiations for return of the Bonins and he has requested earliest guidance on this matter before undertaking further talks with Miki. On the other hand, the Japanese recognize the complex problems inhibiting immediate reversion of the Ryukyus, although they need to be able to show evidence of forward motion in this area. We are

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~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

therefore proposing (1) interim steps which would not involve any further commitment on our part to Ryukyu reversion, but would slightly change the public formula on reversion and would provide for further identification of the Ryukyuan people with Japan and (2) agreement to subsequent periodic review of the status of the islands in light of the related security problems.

At present the United States has few military installations in the Bonins. Military personnel as of June 30, 1967 totaled 77 (33 Navy and 44 Air Force), plus 3 United States civilians and 55 foreign-national civilians employed by the Navy. The principal installations are: (1) a naval facility on Chichi Jima used to support patrolling operations in the Philippine Sea; (2) a stand-by airfield on Iwo Jima capable of supporting major operations; (3) a smaller airfield on Marcus Island; (4) a weather reporting facility; [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(5)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer to retain administrative rights over the Bonins for contingency purposes and until the political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is resolved. As a fall back position, they would agree to return all the Bonin Islands except Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, and to consult with the Japanese on the military utility of these two islands to Japan and the United States. Since most of the Bonin Islanders now residing in Japan had lived in Chichi Jima, retention of this island would create serious problems in Japan. Retention of the naval facility in Chichi Jima under the Security Treaty provisions and of the whole island of Iwo Jima as an emergency stand-by base could, however, serve to meet our contingency requirements. To emphasize that return of the Bonins represents a step toward shared responsibility for the region, it is also proposed to seek Japanese agreement to assume larger defense responsibilities in the area, while agreeing to our retention of other stand-by facilities as required.

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- 4 -

Retention of Iwo Jima as a military base is also recommended because of anticipated adverse public reaction in this country to its return. However, the Japanese in preliminary talks with us have strongly resisted our retention of Iwo Jima and suggested instead a United States memorial park on Mount Surabachi. Ambassador Johnson is concerned that retention of Iwo Jima could significantly detract from the value of Bonins reversion unless we can make a strong case on security grounds.

Secretary McNamara has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation made above. If you approve this recommendation, we also propose to undertake immediately the necessary consultations with the Congressional leadership to obtain its reaction before final approval is given to the draft communique during the Sato visit.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

506

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE BONIN ISLANDS

(Includes Volcano Islands)

30 June 1967

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NJ 94-451
 By Cb, NARA, Date 3-30-95

	All Personnel	Military	U.S. Citizens	Foreign Nationals
<u>NAVY</u>				
Chichi Jima	91	33	3	55
(Naval facility --				
ASE Support	24)			
(Weather Station	8)			
(Commissary	1)			
<u>AIR FORCE</u>				
Iwo Jima Air Base	44	44		
(Communications	8)			
(Weather Squadron	3)			
(Transportation	1)			
(Airfield Maintenance				
Squadron	32)			
<u>TOTAL</u>		77	3	55

*Civilian figures as of 31 March

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~~SECRET~~

AmEmbassy TOKYO

INFO: HICOMRY
CINCPACDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-451
By CL, NARA, Date 3-30-95

STATE

EXDIS

Following is text draft language for para 7 joint communique
re Ryukyus and Bonins:

QTE. DRAFT JOHNSON-SATO JOINT COMMUNIQUE

QTE. The President and the Prime Minister gave
careful consideration to the status of the Ryukyu Islands
and the Bonin Islands in the light of the security situation
now pertaining in East Asia and the mutual interests of their
countries in strengthening the security of this region. They
recognized that the US military bases in the Ryukyus continue
to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and
other free nations of the region. They agreed at the same
time that the early ~~restoration~~ restoration of the Bonin
Islands to Japanese ~~and~~ administration was now feasible in
terms of the mutual security interests of the US and Japan.

EA/J:RLSneider/pmh 10/21/67 6051

The Secretary

DOD - Secretary McNamara
L/EA - Mr. Aldrich
S/S -EA - Mr. Bundy
White House -~~SECRET~~

2

AmEmbassy TOKYO

~~SECRET~~

They further agreed that the two Governments enter immediately into consultations on specific arrangements for the ~~xxx~~ early return of these islands without detriment to the security of the region. The Prime Minister noted that when the Bonin Islands return to Japanese administration, Japan would assume primary responsibility for defense of the area. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. would retain Iwo Jima for the present as a military base.

QTE. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for this decision of the President, and stated that the return of the administrative rights over these islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the ~~xxx~~ framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

QTE. The President and the Prime Minister further recognized the understandable desire of the Ryukyuan people and the people of Japan to be reunited. Accordingly, they

~~SECRET~~

agreed that the two Governments should jointly review periodically the status of these islands in the light of this desire and of the mutual interest of both countries in maintaining and strengthening the security of the East Asian region. Looking forward to the day when restoration to Japan of administrative control over the Ryukyu Islands is considered to be in the mutual security interests of both their countries, the two leaders agreed that measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan people. To this end, the President and the Prime Minister agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between Okinawa and Japan and toward minimizing the stresses

4

AmEmbassy TOKYO

~~SECRET~~

which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan. It was agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and the United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest. UNQTE.

GP-3

END

50d~~SECRET~~

Ambassy TOKYO

INFO: HICOMRY
CINCPACDECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12336, Sec. 3.4
NLI 94-451By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

STATE

EXDIS

1. We have now taken further careful look, in light Japanese proposed draft communique, at key issues anticipated during Sato visit here. They remain as set forth during Miki talks in September, namely Japanese desire for substantive progress toward settlement of the Ryukyu and Bonin territorial problems, and our desire for Japan to assume in more concrete terms a greater share of the financial burden for regional assistance in East Asia and for redressing imbalance of bilateral balance of payments. Both issues in turn must be viewed in perspective of our fundamental objective of having Japan assume an increasing share of responsibility for East Asia, primarily in the political and economic spheres, but also for military defense of its own area.

EA/J:RLSneider/pmh 10/21/67 6051

The Secretary

DOD - Secretary McNamara
L/EA - Mr. Aldrich
S/S -EA - Mr. Bundy
White House -~~SECRET~~

2

AmEmbassy Tokyo

~~SECRET~~

2. Since the Miki visit, we have noted encouraging recognition by the GOJ of its regional responsibilities and recognition of relationship between Ryukyus settlement and its own and broader regional security. Sato's trips through Asia, helpful statements by Sato and Miki on Vietnam, and GOJ public efforts to place Ryukyu issue on realistic security basis have been in right direction. We hope and expect Sato will be ~~best~~ prepared during visit here to talk in more concrete terms re GOJ plans for increased assistance to SEA and on balance of payments problems, although we recognize limits to GOJ fiscal commitments imposed by need for Diet action. Assistance to Vietnam, particularly increased technical assistance and investment in local industry, would be particularly helpful as would willingness to at least match US contribution to Special Funds ADB.

3. On basis of these encouraging signs of Japanese responsiveness on need for greater sharing of responsibilities in Asia, we are prepared take meaningful step forward toward resolution the territorial issues. While final decision on these and other issues obviously must be contingent upon

3

AmEmbassy TOKYO

~~SECRET~~

talks between President and Prime Minister Sato, we would therefore like to move ahead with draft language on para 7 draft communique re Ryukyus and Bonins to develop agreed language for reference to President and Sato. Septel follows with our proposed language for ~~mixx~~ discussion with FonOff. Comments follow:

4. Re Bonins, and other western Pacific islands exclusive of Ryukyus covered in Article 3 of Peace Treaty, we are prepared to enter into negotiations for return of administrative rights subject following GOJ undertakings:

a. Assumption of responsibility for asseting in maintaining current facilities and over period of time for ~~exp~~ expanding ASW and other defense operations in area;

b. Agreement to US retention of all of Iwo Jima as a military facility which required as emergency stand-by facility;

c. Agreement, as Miki stated, to make effective use of this action to stem pressures for immediate reversion of Ryukyus.

5. Re Ryukyus, as explained to Miki, we are not prepared to

4

AmEmbassy TOKYO

~~SECRET~~

make any rpt any specific commitment on reversion at this time. We found GOJ draft language in combination with proposed ~~its~~ interim measures taking us too far down the road to such a specific commitment on reversion. GOJ language in addition has some harsh undertones which may be only linguistic problem but nevertheless could cause real problems. Believe our proposed language which incorporates three basic elements, reversion formulation on basis of QTE mutual interest UNQTE, periodic review of status of the islands, and forward looking interim measures, meet GOJ desire for QTE step forward UNQTE. Combination of these actions with return of Bonins we/^{hope}will provide manageable basis for handling Ryukyu problem.

~~from Septel follows with draft communication language~~

GP-3

END

57

Friday, October 27, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

We have taken up your changes with President Diaz Ordaz, and he has accepted all the modifications:

1. We dropped the paragraph on important international problems.
2. We revised the sentence on the Alliance for Progress and the Mexican Revolution to read: "The Presidents agreed that the Alliance for Progress, foreshadowed by the remarkable economic and social progress of Mexico, made possible by its Revolution, has been a useful instrument, and can, as agreed at Punta del Este, be even more useful in the future in promoting, with social justice, the development of the continent."
3. The complicated paragraph on intergovernmental consultation, we changed to read: "We agreed at Punta del Este to strengthen intergovernmental consultation in this field; we shall continue to do so."
4. On the paragraph relating to fisheries, President Diaz Ordaz asked that the following sentence be added: "The two Presidents were pleased to note that this agreement has put an end to a 30-year-old difference on fisheries jurisdiction."
5. With these modifications, is the communique satisfactory?

Yes _____

No _____

W. W. Rostow

52

Friday - October 27, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Activities with President Diaz Ordaz - Friday,
October 27, 1967

Your involvement with President Diaz Ordaz today is as follows:

- 5:00 pm - Second meeting in your office during which
Communique will be reviewed and approved.

- 5:30 pm - Rusk-Carrillo signing of Chamizal Act in
either the Fish Room or Rose Garden
which you and President Diaz Ordaz will
witness.

- 7:30 pm - President Diaz Ordaz gives return reception
for you.

President Diaz Ordaz's schedule of activities is at Tab A.

The only substantive aspects of today's activities is the Communique. State tells us that President Diaz Ordaz made several changes in the draft which I sent you last Wednesday. Covey Oliver and Tony Freeman are meeting with the Mexicans this morning to take up these changes. They expect to have a draft for you and President Diaz Ordaz to review by noon.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - President Diaz Ordaz's schedule.

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ

Program
for
Friday, October 27, 1967

- 8:00 am - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will have breakfast with Mexican residents at the Embassy of Mexico, 2829 Sixteenth St., N. W.
- 10:30 am - President Diaz Ordaz will present a Mexican artifact to the people of the United States, which will be received by Officials of the Smithsonian Institution, at the Embassy.
- 11:15 am - President Diaz Ordaz will depart from the Embassy and return to Blair House.
-
- 10:00 am - Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from the Embassy and return to Blair House.
- 10:20 am - - Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson will call on Mrs. Diaz Ordaz at Blair House.
- 10:30 am - Mrs. Johnson will take Mrs. Diaz Ordaz on a motor tour to observe playground equipment in Washington, D. C., which has been donated by the Mexican Government.
- 11:30 am - Mrs. Diaz Ordaz and Mrs. Johnson will return to Blair House. Mrs. Johnson will take her leave.
-
- 11:35 am - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will depart from Blair House.
- 11:45 am - Arrival at the Lincoln Memorial where President Diaz Ordaz will place a wreath.
- 12:00 Noon - Departure from the Lincoln Memorial.

Diaz Ordaz Visit

Program, Friday, 10/27/67(Continued)

- 12:10 pm - Arrival at the Capitol.
- President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will be escorted to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
- 12:30 pm - President Diaz Ordaz will address a Joint Meeting of Congress in the House of Representatives.
- 1:30 pm - The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk will give a luncheon in honor of President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz in the Benjamin Franklin Room, Department of State.
- 3:30 pm - President Diaz Ordaz will have a press conference at the Embassy of Mexico. Following the press conference, President Diaz will return to Blair House.
- 5:00 pm - President Diaz Ordaz will meet with President Johnson at the White House. A joint communique will be issued.
- 5:30 pm - Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carrillo Flores and Secretary Rusk will sign an Act approving a minute of the International Boundary and Water Commission at the White House.
- 7:30 pm - President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz will give a reception in honor of President and Mrs. Johnson at the Embassy of Mexico, 2928 Sixteenth Street, N. W.

~~SECRET~~

53

Thursday, October 26, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This is the first suggestion we have
had that the Soviets were not consulted
before the attack on the Israeli destroyer.

W. W. Rostow

[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)
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~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

Approved For Release 2000/09/19 : NLJ-019-024-4-10-3

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-024-4-10
By GO NARA, Date 1-7-02

54

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967
6:40 p.m.

from file

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. McNamara files a statement of JCS opposition to any holiday standdown of military operations in Vietnam in the time ahead.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 76, NARA, Date 11-6-91


~~TOP SECRET~~54a

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

25 October 1967MEMO FOR The President

In the attached memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you be made aware of their opposition to any holiday standdown of military operations in Vietnam.

I will consult with the Secretary of State and submit my recommendations to you.



Robert S. McNamara

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-329
By iss, NARA Date 6-23-97

~~TOP SECRET~~Sec Def Cont Nr. X- 6625



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

4094
546
JCSM-567-67

23 October 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Holiday Standdowns in Vietnam (U)

1. ~~(TS)~~ Reference is made to:

a. American Embassy Saigon message to the Department of State, 8432/130935Z October 1967 (JCS 42411), in which the US Ambassador to South Vietnam submitted a recommended US position for a holiday military posture for Christmas, New Year's, and Tet 1967-68.

b. CINCPAC message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC 200132Z October 1967 (JCS 54974), in which CINCPAC strongly recommends no cease-fire or standdown of military operations during any holiday period.

c. JCSM-25-67, dated 18 January 1967, subject: "US Policy for TET 1967 (U)," and previous memorandums in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed the Tet and other standdowns because of the high military cost to US, Republic of Vietnam, and allied forces resulting from the relaxation of military pressures on the enemy.

2. ~~(TS)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff are opposed to any stand-down during Christmas, New Year's or the Tet period.

3. ~~(TS)~~ Past experience with holiday standdowns supports the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that a heavy price must be paid for any psychological or political advantages which might accrue to the Free World. In the past, these standdowns have resulted in increased casualties to US and allied forces. Similarly, increased casualties can be expected to result from a future standdown. These casualties cannot be justified on the basis of the value attached to traditional or religious observances.

4
Copy of 35 Copies each
of 2 pages series "A"

~~TOP SECRET~~

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downgrading and 12 year
interval; not
automatically declassified

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-329

By iss, NARA Date 6-23-97

6578
Sec Def Cont Nr. X-----

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. ~~(TS)~~ A standdown of any kind in our operations for even so much as 24 hours is disadvantageous to our forces; longer standdowns are substantially more advantageous to the enemy, whose ability to exploit them is greatly increased as the respite afforded him is prolonged. In this regard, we are particularly concerned with the military implications of the total freeze recommended by Ambassador Bunker. The enemy has already demonstrated that his logistic and replacement activities can be accomplished clandestinely, whereas our forces require an uninterrupted flow of logistic support and personnel which cannot be concealed. A total freeze on logistics, force repositioning, and rotation and replacement of personnel would place the US/GVN/FWMA forces in an untenable position if, for any reason, the standdown were extended.

5. ~~(TS)~~ Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States urge the Republic of Vietnam and its allies to announce, as soon as possible, their intention not to standdown for Christmas, New Year's, or Tet, or any other holiday period.

6. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views be made known to the President, and they recommend that the proposed joint State/Defense message attached as the Appendix hereto, which reflects their views, be passed to the Department of State for concurrence and dispatch.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

•Attachment

2
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX

DRAFT

54c

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 96-329
By us, NARA Date 6-23-97

ACTION	AMEMB SAIGON CINCPAC	PRIORITY	130935Z is JCS IN 42411
INFO	JCS COMUSMACV AMEMB VIENTIANE	PRIORITY PRIORITY PRIORITY	200132Z is JCS IN 54974

STATE

LIMDIS

JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE

Subj: Holiday Cease-Fire (U)

Refs: a. AMEMB SAIGON 8432/130935Z Oct 67.
b. CINCPAC 200132Z Oct 67.

1. (S) We agree that there is no military justification for
a cease-fire or standdown of military operations during holiday
periods. We are convinced that the political and psychological
value of our proposing or agreeing to a standdown for Christmas,
Tet, or any other holiday, is not worth the heavy price that
must be paid. Our experience is that the communists have
flagrantly exploited previous cease-fire periods and US/RVN/FWMA
forces have suffered greater casualties as a result.
2. (TS) Under any circumstances, we see a commitment to a
total freeze on all movements of military personnel and materiel
in both NVN and SVN as being of far greater disadvantage to
us than to the enemy. He can conceal his logistical activities;
we cannot. He would surely realize that we cannot stand a
logistical freeze of any appreciable length and would probably
call for an extended freeze for the political value to be
gained from our having to reject it. He would know that we
would have difficulty obtaining release from such a commitment
even though he violated it. We are convinced that it would be

~~TOP SECRET~~
JCSM 567-67

~~TOP SECRET~~

extremely disadvantageous for us to support a total freeze 1
on logistics and force repositioning by both sides. 2

3. (TS) Our intention not to standdown military operations 3
for Christmas, Tet, or any other holiday season, and the 4
overriding military necessity therefor, should be made 5
known before any proposals for such standdowns are made by 6
Hanoi, the NLF, or anyone else. Accordingly, President 7
Thieu should be consulted along these lines at an early 8
opportunity. If he agrees, announcement should be made in 9
Saigon. Please send proposed text as far in advance of 10
announcement as possible. It is assumed here that GVN will 11
coordinate with our other allies in Saigon. GP-3. 12

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967
6:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

At last Prime Minister Maurer reports to you via our Ambassador on his trip to Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow.

This is worth reading, and, perhaps, letting Gov. Harriman follow up on his trip to Pakistan.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Buckner 604

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 11-6-91

~~SECRET~~

55a

Wednesday, October 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Text of Cable from Ambassador Davis (Bucharest 604)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-451
By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

Without my having found a suitable opportunity to make an informal approach to Acting Foreign Minister Macovescu, Prime Minister Maurer, on a half hour notice summoned me at 11 a.m. October 25 to inform me about his recent trip to Hanoi. Macovescu and an interpreter were the only others present for the interview which lasted two hours.

The Prime Minister began by referring to his discussions with Secretary Rusk and President Johnson during the time of the Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly on the Middle East crisis, in particular regarding Vietnam. He described his conversation with the President on this subject concisely and accurately, from what I know based on the memorandum of conversation. Maurer emphasized the President had made the central point of the South Vietnamese being able to decide their own destiny; i. e., if they wanted to adopt Communism, let them or vice versa; if they wished to unify with North Vietnam, let them or vice versa. The only U. S. interest in the South Vietnamese Government was to aid them in response to a request to help it defend the country against North Vietnamese infiltration and support of the war in the South.

The Prime Minister continued that in light of his discussion with the President, and Secretary Rusk, and in view of the developing situation, it had been decided he should go to Hanoi to consult with the North Vietnamese leaders to express the views of the Romanian Government. He summarized these views, which he presented to Hanoi, as follows:

The world wants to see the end of the Vietnamese war, not only public opinion but governments. There was unity in the U. S. Government on the Vietnam question. Witness his separate conversations with the President and Secretary Rusk, and he described to the North Vietnamese the U. S. Government position as outlined by them. The Romanians believed that under the present circumstances, prospects were opening up for discussions with the possibility of the discussions leading to a peaceful solution. Certainly the solution would not come immediately after sitting down at a negotiating table. But if the talks were conducted in a constructive and realistic fashion with the aim to provide the Vietnamese people with the right to decide their own destiny, to take into account the dignity and prestige of each state and to create conditions for establishment of normal relations and stability between Vietnam and the U. S., then the possibility of a solution existed. Romania believed it beneficial for all

~~SECRET~~

socialist countries to have good relations with the U. S. Although there were certain aspects in the policy of the U. S. with which Romania could not agree, this was also true in reverse. Despite differences, the U. S. and Romania had good relations.

Maurer then said that after this exposition to the Hanoi leaders, they discussed the possibilities of starting negotiations. Maurer had explained the Romanian position as follows:

The U. S. must stop immediately, unconditionally, and once and for all the bombing of North Vietnam.

North Vietnam must declare its agreement to start negotiations with the U. S. on elimination of the conflict. Certainly at this time armed action in South Vietnam would not cease.

It is one thing to mobilize and demobilize a force such as the U. S. has in South Vietnam. The U. S. could leave within three days and come back again within three days.

But if the Popular Forces in South Vietnam demobilized, then remobilization would require much more time. So talks would start with armed action in South Vietnam continuing. The aim of negotiations would be to put an end to these armed actions. They would cease effectively when the discussion would lead to mutually acceptable decisions and details could be discussed further.

At this point, I broke in to ask whether Maurer was saying that initial discussions would center on the cessation of military actions to be followed by political discussions.

The Prime Minister replied he did not separate these questions then or now. Military actions can cease only when both sides find a satisfactory political solution. As long as no guarantees existed that South Vietnam could decide its own destiny, there was no reason for them to put aside weapons. So, Maurer continued, he had requested the North Vietnamese friends to declare categorically that, in case the bombardment ceased unconditionally and forever, they would be willing to start negotiations because the U. S. position, as explained to him by President Johnson and Rusk, for a solution within the framework of the Geneva Agreements of 1954, provided a real basis for discussions.

According to Maurer, the Vietnamese replied in a sense which essentially agreed with the Romanians; i. e., if bombardment ceased, they would be prepared to enter negotiations. To my question whether the Vietnamese would

state a readiness to negotiate before or after the bombardment ceased, Maurer replied that he did not discuss the details. It was possible the Vietnamese could make this statement before or after. This was up to them.

Maurer commented that his discussions with the North Vietnamese had covered many aspects, but he would emphasize only those of interest for us to know.

A. They had reviewed the capacity of North Vietnamese resistance in case the war goes on. From all points of view, military, economic, political and social, "I can tell you North Vietnam can carry on a long-term struggle." This affirmative North Vietnamese assertion is well known throughout the world.

G. North Vietnamese leaders are aware they cannot and could not try to humiliate us. Discussions should be conducted in such a way that actual recognition of the South Vietnamese people to decide on their destiny should have the agreement and support of the U.S. Besides, the North Vietnamese do not look upon settlement of the South Vietnamese problem as necessarily leading to immediate reunification. It would depend upon what South Vietnam would decide.

C. Maurer received the strong impression from the North Vietnamese that they had an interest in the Romanian position on relations with the U. S. The North Vietnamese listened with great interest "to our explanation that friendly relations with the U. S. do not contradict the objectives of socialism throughout the world, but under certain conditions can contribute to socialism. Here I am betraying all my secrets." Maurer said he had told the North Vietnamese the Romanians are able to buy modern technology from the U. S. and the benefits it brought to Romania. This was good, not only for economic but political relations.

D. In sum, Maurer asserted that he found in North Vietnam a "position much more rational than he found a year ago in talks of much the same content." He asserted this position was not determined by a diminution of North Vietnamese military capacity. It was no secret the fighting capacity of North Vietnam is growing, and would continue to grow because of more important aid from socialist countries.

Maurer then said he would like to add some other aspects as he saw them in conjunction with his desire to put at the disposal of the U. S. the most complete information possible to help the U. S. Government with its judgment. Remarking he was not telling us a secret, he said that to a great extent the hard stand of Hanoi was influenced by the hard line of China. In the Romanian view, this Chinese influence in Vietnam at the present moment "from the war viewpoint" is diminishing. North Vietnamese leaders are judging much more "with their own brains" because other socialist countries have increased their aid and North Vietnam no longer is so dependent on the Chinese. Certainly, Maurer added, within the North Vietnamese leadership there are people whose ideas are closer to the Chinese and others not so close.

Asking rhetorically "why do I tell you this, " Maurer replied because all these things should be taken in conjunction together, and the U. S. should take action to support those who use their own brains and not those who use the brains of foreigners for judgment. "It seems to me that a certain elasticity in the position of the U. S. would strengthen the position of independent elements in North Vietnam."

In sum, Maurer asserted, it seemed to him the possibility of a political solution to this problem appears to be opening. Sine qua non conditions were full liberty and freedom for the South Vietnamese people to decide alone their own destiny, whatever this decision would be, whether Communist or non-Communist, whether reunification or continuing division. Thus, the Romanians consider they have done their utmost to try to bring about an end to the conflict.

At this point, I asked whether North Vietnam had accepted this principle of full liberty of the South Vietnamese people to decide their own destiny. Maurer replied "Yes -- absolutely yes." He asserted that from their common discussions there emerged quite clearly acceptance of the principle that the South Vietnamese should decide their own destiny and indeed there emerged the possibility of diplomatic relations and special ties between the U. S. and the South Vietnamese state as a result of talks ending the conflict.

This shows the North Vietnamese leaders do not see the aim of the solution as reunification.

I referred to his comments on the hard stand of the Chinese and asked what he could tell me of his talks in Peking. In answering, Maurer said he was telling us all elements so leaders in the U. S. could make their best judgment. He was confident that the U. S. would do its best to find a political solution. Maurer then said in his talks with the Chinese there were mainly two things of use to us.

A. The Romanians had presented arguments to the Chinese on the necessity of improving relations with the U. S. They had given a long list of reasons and arguments, "because I saw from my conversations with the President the interest of the U. S. to have better relations with China." This seemed to the Romanians to serve the cause of peace and indeed an essential element. "We tried to convince the Chinese of this."

B. Vietnam. In their discussions on this problem, Maurer said, the Chinese did not alter their position as they had not on point A above. They stuck to their well-known positions. "However -- because there is a however," Maurer stated, that after they had concluded talks with the Chinese where they had reached no mutual understandings on these two points, the Chinese themselves expressed a desire to have such exchanges of views periodically once or twice a year. This desire the Chinese had not expressed before in any earlier talks.

Referring to his knowledge of the Asian mentality and especially that of the Chinese, Maurer commented that though the Chinese had not changed their views one iota on these two issues, they had asked for future exchanges of views on these problems and "that means something in our arguments and reasons arrested their attention." They showed more marked interest in them than on any previous occasion. Maurer did not expect any other reply from the Chinese as it is difficult for them to answer yes or no within 24 hours. More time was needed. The turmoil and conflict now going on in China made changes even more difficult. But Romanians had noted this change (i. e., Chinese interest in periodic exchanges of views) for the first time, and it was a good omen.

At this point, I asked whether the President's San Antonio speech on Vietnam had been available to him during the course of his discussion in Hanoi. Maurer replied in the affirmative, saying it had come over the radio during the course of their discussions the last day. I then had an interpreter read the President's two sentences in regard to cessation of the bombardment of North Vietnam as quoted in Secretary Rusk's opening statement of his news conference on October 12 and asked whether the North Vietnamese had reacted to this to the Prime Minister. Maurer replied negatively, saying the President's statement came by radio on the eve of his departure and the North Vietnamese had no definitive text.

Maurer then said that he wished to make clear his view on a central problem which in his opinion is looked upon in an erroneous way in the U. S. A. He said he did not, of course, discuss with the North Vietnamese leadership North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. However, he would like to convey his own impressions. North Vietnam, of course, denied sending men into South Vietnam. According to Maurer's impressions, this is not quite true though he might be wrong. He knows they're sending supplies to South Vietnam; also weapons, munitions, medicine, food and possibly specialists and technicians for training. His impression is that North Vietnamese troops, even if they are to be found, are few. So when President Johnson speaks about an obligation not to take advantage of the cessation of the bombardment, he is referring to things which are not based on reality and cannot be followed by North Vietnam. For example, North Vietnam could not cease to support the struggle in South Vietnam because a struggle is going on. At any rate, the U. S. is doing the same thing for South Vietnamese armed forces. Maurer repeated, according to his view, North Vietnamese troops as such are few if any and that during a cessation of bombing, North Vietnam would continue to supply South Vietnam struggle with food and munitions and indeed some of the aid socialist countries give to North Vietnam. He concluded that President Johnson's formulation does not seem satisfactory as it proposes a unilateral condition.

I explained our point of view and the necessity of some indication from Hanoi of reciprocity if we should cease bombardment. I cited our experience when on past occasions we had ceased the bombardment of North Vietnam. Maurer showed himself well aware of our position, but said he thought more than that could be done. The U. S. is a great and powerful nation and could do more with their possibilities without risking failure. "Possible military disadvantage would be compensated by political advantage." In Maurer's opinion, there had never before existed so many favorable conditions for reaching a political settlement.

I then asked his impressions of the Soviet position. Maurer said he had talked with Kosygin en route to the Far East, but that on the way back, in the absence of Kosygin, Breshnev and Podgorny, Suslov and Polyansky had been authorized by the Soviet Government to conduct their talks with Hanoi and Peking. The Soviets had expressed agreement with the Romanian position saying they looked at things in the same way, but emphasized the decision must remain with Hanoi. Maurer added that, moreover, he had stressed to the Soviet leaders that an increase in economic and military aid by socialist countries to North Vietnam is apt to assure greater liberty to Hanoi. According to Romanian judgment, this would make Hanoi less dependent on the Chinese.

Maurer summed up by saying his thoughts were very clear. Negotiations would start. The U. S. would put forward a list of proposals unacceptable to North Vietnam and Hanoi would do likewise. Then the other nations desirous of seeing an end to the conflict would try to push the two sides together. "This is our hope and our desire." Friends of both sides would compel each to give a little here and there and both sides would be compelled to listen to them. Thus, in the end, a solution could be found.

I thanked Maurer for his information saying it would be kept in confidence and to this end it would help if there were no publicity in Romanian news media about our meeting. Maurer replied he had been on the point of bringing up this subject since he would appreciate that his telling us these things, even though they might be known to the Chinese and Hanoi, could cause acute embarrassment to him and to the Romanian Government if it became known.

56

Pres file

Thursday, October 26, 1967 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

State has recommended that we treat the Soviet Anniversary reception this year exactly as we treated the annual celebration.

Nick Katzenback will be the senior American present. State recommended that Nat Davis, who follows the Soviet account here, accept. I gather that the Douglass Caters had already accepted by the time we got guidance from State.

It occurred to me that, in view of your relationship to Kosygin, you might wish to consider the question of whether your Special Assistant for Foreign Affairs should turn up.

I have sworn off receptions; but, if you felt it was an extremely minor but proper gesture, I would appear.

W. W. Rostow

Cater is enough_____

Go_____

See me_____

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, Oct. 26, 1967
4:30 p. m.

57

MR. PRESIDENT:

As the attached indicates, there is now agreed advice and recommendation to you concerning how the question of our signing Protocol II of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty should be dealt with this afternoon with President Diaz Ordaz. It is recommended that you inform him that we intend to sign Protocol II with a statement of our understanding of the scope and effect of the treaty.

As you can see (para. 3) your advisors prefer that no public announcement be made at this time; although some sympathetic communique language is suggested.

The reason for this position is basically that this has not been regarded as an urgent item of business and, therefore, there have been no consultations with the Congress. Since the only problem with the Treaty is centered on assuring that the JCS are satisfied with the language that we will use in interpreting the Treaty, we expect to encounter no difficulties on the Hill. And it is Foy Kohler's judgment that if our intention leaked, there would be no major problem on the Hill.

On the other hand, the recommendation is unanimous that no definitive public announcement be made now. You may wish to handle this alone with President Diaz Ordaz to minimize the possibility of a leak.

Remembering your concern about the JCS, I have assured by a telephone call to Buzz Wheeler personally, that he is firmly aboard the formulation before you.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

p. s. A copy of the Treaty, opened at Protocol II, is attached.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State for 11/30/78

By rglisp, NARA, Date 11-12-91

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This document consists of 3 pages
Number 2 of 5 copies, Series A



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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OCT 26 1960

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

I believe the President of Mexico will ask you whether the United States is prepared to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, better known as the "Treaty of Tlatelolco". I recommend that you tell him that the United States intends to sign Protocol II.

Signing Protocol II with appropriate interpretative statements is in our view the best way of protecting our transit rights in Latin America for ships and aircraft with nuclear weapons. We believe that the most satisfactory method of achieving an effective interpretation on transit rights is to accompany our signature to Protocol II with an interpretative statement which would be circulated routinely to all signatories, including the 20 Latin American nations which have already signed. We may also wish to inform certain Latin American Governments in advance of the interpretative statements we would plan to make accompanying our signature of Protocol II. We believe the negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that our interpretation is the correct one, but we want to do what we can to assure that this interpretation is not contested by important Latin American Governments.

By signing Protocol II, we would agree first, to respect the status of denuclearization of Latin America and second, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on the territory of Contracting Parties. The second obligation would limit to some extent our flexibility of

GROUP 1 - Excluded from
automatic downgrading and
declassification.

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Authority State let 3/8/78
By glen NARA, Date 11-12-91

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-2-

response with nuclear weapons in Latin America. However, we do not believe this limitation to be unreasonable in light of the agreement of the Contracting Parties not to acquire nuclear weapons. With an interpretative statement, we believe the United States' interests will be protected. The circumstances present in Latin America are such as to justify a departure from our past policy concerning limitations on our freedom of response with nuclear weapons.

There are three other questions which would be dealt with in an interpretative statement to be made at the time of signature. These would be designed to make clear our views on peaceful nuclear explosive devices, on the territorial extent of our Protocol II obligations, and on a definition of territory as it applies to sea and air space. An interpretative statement is now being worked out within the Government and need not be discussed with President Diaz at this time.

Recommendations:

1. That, if asked by the President of Mexico, you might reply along the following lines: "I congratulate you, Mr. President, on an achievement of which your Government can be justly proud. This is the signature by 20 Latin American governments of the first treaty establishing a nuclear free zone. The American people join with me in saluting this unique achievement. We hope this treaty will be a milestone toward world-wide agreement to a non-proliferation treaty and further steps of disarmament. We have followed your efforts with great expectation and have given careful thought and much study to the treaty. We intend to provide you and the other Contracting Parties with a statement of our understanding of the scope and effect of the treaty, and on this basis we intend to sign Protocol II."

2. That, if you are asked when the United States will sign, you might state: "I am as anxious as you are to move forward on this important treaty as promptly as possible."

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-3-

3. That, preferably, no public announcement be made of our intention to sign Protocol II at this time since we are not yet actually ready to sign it. If the subject of Protocol II is discussed privately, the communique should read: "the two Presidents discussed the nuclear free zone treaty. President Johnson congratulated President Diaz on this outstanding example of Latin American statesmanship and stated that we are giving our most sympathetic consideration to signing Protocol II."

4. That, if you are asked whether we will sign Protocol I, you might state: "Our serious difficulties with Protocol I have already been made known to your Government." /FYI - The United States cannot sign Protocol I because to do so would require denuclearization of our territories in Latin America, including Puerto Rico. END FYI/

These recommendations are concurred in by the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke.

Dean Rusk

DEAN RUSK

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967
4:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may wish to read this
information item before your talk
with President Diaz Ordaz this
afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1967

58a

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the forthcoming meeting with President Diaz Ordaz of Mexico, we would like to call to your attention the present status of the exciting nuclear-powered desalting study being conducted by the United States, Mexico, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

While the study is not expected to be completed until the middle of 1968, the following preliminary conclusions are significant. They are:

1. It is technically feasible to build a nuclear dual-purpose desalting plant with a capacity of 1 billion gallons per day and 2000 megawatts of electric power.
2. The time needed for planning, constructing, testing, and placing such a plant in operation is about 10 years.
3. Economic data concerning the 1 billion gallons per day plant have not been completed so cost estimates cannot be presented at this time.
4. The current needs for water in the area of consideration far exceed the 1 billion gallons per day which might be produced from a first plant. No problems are expected on marketing power from the first few plants.

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Thursday, October 26, 1967
4:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk recommends
a postponement of the Asian Summit to
February or March 1968.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rlm, NARA, Date 11-6-91

We understand that the above preliminary conclusions are being communicated by the Mexican team members to President Diaz Ordaz through the Mexican Foreign Office.

We expect the report of the study effort to be printed in June 1968. Based on the preliminary results we anticipate that a more detailed follow-on study by an architect-engineer firm will evolve, similar to those conducted in connection with the Metropolitan Water District project (California) and with the Government of Israel.

We believe that the study nearing completion between our two governments will provide a significant milestone in the continuing search for commodities basic to the welfare of man, and, should a project evolve for the construction of large plants serving the regional needs of the arid region of Mexico and the United States, it would represent a major technological achievement which could provide hope for many millions of people around the world.

Respectfully,

(Signed) Glenn T. Seaborg

Glenn T. Seaborg
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission

(sgd) Stewart L. Udall

Stewart L. Udall
Secretary of the Interior

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20501

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

59a

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

October 26, 1967

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~By CG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Dates for a Possible Summit Meeting of
the Manila Nations.

Recommendations:

A. That, unless there should develop strong pressures for a summit meeting in late November/early December from the South Vietnamese or other governments, you now tentatively decide that the USG will look toward a date in early 1968.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

B. Specifically, that you authorize the Vice President to discuss the matter quietly with President Thieu and the senior delegates of other Manila powers at the South Vietnamese inauguration, indicating that this is your tentative view but listening carefully to see if there are any strong pressures for an earlier date.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

During the Clifford/Taylor trip, the general sentiment in all capitals seemed favorable to a summit meeting in late November or early December, and Messrs. Clifford and Taylor adopted a sympathetic posture toward this possibility. It was of course fully understood that the new South Vietnamese Government would have to be installed, and that the date would take careful working out. A general consensus appeared to be developing that Seoul would be the best location, and the Thai and Koreans subsequently met together and virtually announced as much.

Since then, a number of key judgments have moved in the

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-2-

direction of postponing the date until February or March 1968. Recent reported reactions have been as follows:

a. President Thieu has not expressed any recent view, but the absence of any expression, in itself, suggests that he is in no hurry.

b. Ambassador Bunker last week recorded his clear view that the new GVN will not have had time to organize itself properly by mid-November and that the required preparations for a summit meeting would divert it from the key priority tasks which we all regard as critical to continued and increased progress in South Viet-Nam. Ambassador Bunker also expressed doubt whether there was anything really new that could be decided or stated at a summit in the November/December time frame. Conversely, he thought that, by next February, the new GVN should have begun to show clear indications of its effectiveness and support, and that a summit conference in that time period could usefully dramatize successes and indicate policies to deal with remaining problems.

c. Although Prime Minister Holt had earlier been strongly inclined to the November/December period, he is now reliably reported as believing that the best time for a meeting would be late February. We have not heard from New Zealand, but surmise that their view would be similar.

d. The Koreans and Thai have notably not been pressing for an early summit, and the Australians tell us that Thanat of Thailand has told them that the Koreans and Thai, in private conversations, had looked toward a date "early next year."

e. We have no real word from the Philippines, but our Embassy believes that a summit before the renewal appropriation on the Philippine force in Viet-Nam could have significant disadvantages in Manila.

In my own judgment, Bunker's arguments have great weight. Thieu has been very slow in forming his government and may not

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even have a cabinet by the time of his inauguration. He also faces the fact that the new Assembly must settle down and must approve the 1968 budget, if the Constitution is observed literally by the end of the year. It seems abundantly clear that all parts of the GVN will have their hands and plates full in the first two months of the new set-up.

Moreover, recent developments of which you are aware make it extremely unlikely that any useful initiative toward peace could be framed or put forward at a summit meeting. This would mean that a summit meeting would be essentially a statement by the GVN of what it was doing and hoped to do, and the story in late November and early December is unlikely to be strong or dramatic. I share the general feeling that what we want now is deeds, not words, and that even the words should come from the GVN, standing alone, to the maximum possible extent. While Bunker does not specifically mention this factor in connection with summit dates, my own reading is that the new and potentially constructive spirit of nationalism in Saigon would be most sensitive to any appearance of group decisions or of the new GVN "reporting to the board of directors" before it has laid out its own programs and started to carry them out.

In sum, I now see what seem to me overwhelming arguments in the foreign policy sphere against a November/December date. I realize, of course, that you must judge the relative convenience of such a date as compared to a date in February or March; I would suppose that Congressional pressures will remain great through November and early December, but they may be equally so in early 1968.

In any event, if you were to decide in the direction of the November/December period, we would have a tough uphill job to persuade others and to get the arrangements properly made for a successful meeting. This, however, is wholly secondary to the arguments of substance that I believe weigh against the November/December dates.

In my judgment, the issue now requires at least a tentative decision on your part, particularly with the Vice President

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-4-

meeting Thieu and such senior delegates as Hasluck, the Korean Prime Minister, and others, in Saigon next week. I have phrased my recommendations in terms of feeling out to see whether there is any remaining strong pressure for the November/December time period, and not in any sense irrevocably committing the U.S. Government at this stage. You could make a final decision in the light of the reports and judgments of the Vice President after his Saigon visit.



Dean Rusk

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