

Thursday, Oct. 26, 1967
3:30 p. m.

60

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the State Department unanimously recommends a brief letter of acknowledgment to Senator Mansfield, inviting him to an early breakfast meeting at the White House.

I gather that the sentiment is rolling fast in the Senate for some sort of a UN resolution; and we may have to decide shortly whether to roll with it or make a determined effort with the Leadership to persuade them it is counter-productive.

W. W. R.

Attachments

~~4-11-67~~
2. Pres file

60a

October 26, 1967

Dear Senator Mansfield:

The resolution introduced by you and a number of co-sponsors on October 25 has come to my attention, and I appreciate your letter of October 9 informing me of your earlier intentions concerning the resolution.

If you, Wayne Morse, and George Aiken would care to discuss the resolution in detail, the efforts we have already made to get the UN to play a more active role in Viet Nam and the difficulties involved, let me know and I will set up a mutually convenient early breakfast meeting with Arthur Goldberg, Dean Rusk, and myself.

Sincerely,

not sent

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:STATE:WWR:mz



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1967

IN REPLY REFER TO:
18403

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Senator Mansfield and 36 other Senators (press reports indicate as many as 55 co-sponsors) of both parties introduced today a resolution requesting the President to take the initiative to bring Vietnam before the Security Council for debate. The text is much less far-reaching than the one which Mansfield circulated to all other members of the Senate and to the President with a covering letter dated October 9, 1967.

We recommend a brief letter of acknowledgment by the President to Senator Mansfield proposing that he ask the Senator, Arthur Goldberg and Secretary Rusk to an early breakfast meeting at the White House to discuss the resolution, past efforts by the Administration and the difficulties involved. Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Ambassador Goldberg and Assistant Secretary Macomber concur in this recommendation.

Robert C. Ford
Benjamin H. Read *for*
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Suggested Presidential letter to Senator Mansfield
2. Vietnam Resolution introduced today by Mansfield
3. Vietnam Resolution circulated by Mansfield on October 9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY *RG* ON *11-6-91*

Dear Senator Mansfield:

The resolution introduced by you and a number of co-sponsors on October 25 has come to my attention, and I appreciate your letter of October 9 informing me of your earlier intentions concerning the resolution.

If you, Wayne Morse and George Aiken would care to discuss the resolution in detail, the efforts we have already made to get the UN to play a more active role in Vietnam and the difficulties involved, let me know and I will set up a mutually convenient early breakfast meeting with Arthur Goldberg, Dean Rusk and myself.

Sincerely,

____ CONGRESS

____ SESSION

S. RES. _____

(Note.—Fill in all blank lines except those provided for the date and number of resolution.)

60c

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. ~~Mansfield, Aiken, Byrd (W. Va.), Carlson, Brooke, Proxmire, Griffin, Inouye, Williams (N. J.), Ribicoff, Pell, Brewster, Young (N. Dak.), Yarborough, Ervin, Metcalf, Young (O), Taft, Lodge, Boggs, Hart, Fulbright, Bayh, McCarthy, Symington, Mondale, Javits, Long (Mo.), Nelson, Cooper, Lausche, Proxmire, Harris, Morton, Case, Pastore, Jordan (Idaho), Randolph~~

submitted the following resolution; which was _____

RESOLUTION

~~Resolution~~

Whereas the question of the Vietnamese conflict is a matter of which the Security Council of the United Nations is seized by action previously taken by the Council in connection with a letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States dated 31 January 1966 submitting a resolution seeking a settlement of the hostilities, and

Whereas, more than 100 members of the United Nations through their Chiefs of State or Foreign Ministers or Permanent Representatives have expressed their deep concern with the continued hostilities and their desire for a peaceful and honorable settlement of the Vietnamese conflict, therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States consider taking the appropriate initiative through his representative at the United Nations to assure that the United States resolution of 31 January 1966 or any other resolution of equivalent purpose be brought before the Security Council for consideration.

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October 25, 1967

60d

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

Mr. President:

This is U. N. week and the General Assembly is talking a great deal about Viet Nam while the Security Council is endeavoring to do something about the situation in the Middle East.

In this U. N. week, celebrating the anniversary of the world's peacekeeping agency, the largest North Vietnamese airfield at Phuc Yen has been bombed. The military targets of any consequence left untouched in North Viet Nam can now be counted on the fingers of two hands, possibly one. Just as the military targets are decreasing in number, so are the alternatives and options which could lead the way to negotiations and a possible honorable settlement of the conflict. There have been countless proposals advanced, many of which I have endorsed: proposals such as the distinguished Senator from Kentucky, Mr. Cooper's suggestion to confine the bombing to the 17th parallel and the so-called Ho Chi Minh trail in that region; General De Gaulle's proposal for a generalized neutralization of all of Southeast Asia; a return to the Geneva Accords of 1954; the building of a barrier across the 17th parallel and many others.

I am, today, introducing a Senate Resolution which would seek to bring the question of Viet Nam before the U.N. Security Council, for discussion and debate, and a possible recommendation. This proposal is not original with me by any means. The initiator of Senate consideration of a U. N. approach is the distinguished Senator from Oregon (Mr. Morse). He has been talking about it for several years and, as a matter of fact,

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for the past several months, he has pressed a draft resolution which seeks to have the United Nations dispose of the matter. The draft resolution is now before the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is my view that while the United Nations Security Council has a significant role to play, it may not be able to resolve this issue, if for no other reason than that several of those critically involved in Viet Nam are not members of the U. N. I do know, however, that a formal discussion of this issue can be brought about by the Security Council and that all those directly and indirectly concerned in the war, whether members or not can be invited to appear before the Council. In that way, perhaps, it may be possible to begin to mark a path which could lead to an honorable settlement.

Initiation, not resolution, is the key word as far as the Security Council is concerned.

Some will say, as they invariably have since the President first directed an exploration of the matter many months ago, that this is not the time to propose a resolution of this sort. All I can say is that with our casualties in excess of 100,000 and increasing and with no end in sight in the struggle in which we are engaged that any time is a good time and now, most especially, during this anniversary week when the very rationale of the U. N. is clouded by the conflict in Viet Nam.

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If the Ambassadors of the United States and the U.S.S.R. at the United Nations can introduce and push resolutions on the Middle East, what reason can there be for evading the question of Viet Nam? Can it be said that Viet Nam is not a threat to the peace of the world? Can it be said that Viet Nam is not the foremost question of the hour insofar as this country and its people are concerned? Certainly the least that can be expected is that the Ambassador of the United States at the United Nations shall undertake an initiative based on the resolution on Viet Nam which he presented in January 1966 at the direct request of the President of the United States and that the roll be called on the members of the Council on the question of taking up this resolution or some equivalent resolution.

Mr. President, it is high time that we find out and that the world finds out where the members of the Security Council stand on this question. What is the Security Council waiting for? What are we waiting for? The only way to find out is for a resolution to be brought to a vote, if necessary, and that the nations stand up and be counted. If there is to be an end of the conflict, there must be a beginning in the use of the machinery for peace. I think that the nations of the U.N. Security Council must face up to this matter at once.

Over 50 nations have discussed the bombing of North Viet Nam and the great majority have advocated that there be a cessation. Over 100 nations have expressed their concern with the situation in Viet Nam in one way or another in the U. N. General Assembly.

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Words mean little or nothing if they are not followed by acts and, in my opinion and in the opinion of those who have joined in sponsoring the resolution which has just been introduced, it is time for the U.N. to face up to its responsibility on the question of Viet Nam. It is time for the member-states of the Security Council to carry out the responsibilities which are imposed on them by the solemn treaty commitments of Article I of the Charter.

I repeat, Mr. President, just as the military targets of significance in North Viet Nam are becoming fewer so, too, are the options for peace becoming more difficult to find.

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

60e

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

October 9, 1967

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In recent weeks, at least 30 members of the Senate--members of both parties--have expressed themselves as desirous of United Nations participation in the effort to terminate the conflict in Viet Nam. As you know, I share this sentiment and have so expressed myself many times.

Because of the extent of the interest in the Senate, I have thought it advisable to elaborate on the question of a U. N. initiative, as I understand it. In this connection, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a letter which has been sent to all members of the Senate. You may be interested, too, in the enclosed statement which is my reaction to the increasing international pressure for a termination of the bombing of North Viet Nam which is coming from the Soviet Union and many other nations.

Respectfully yours,

Mike Mansfield

cc: Ambassador Goldberg
Secretary Rusk

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

60F

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

October 9, 1967

Dear :

In the past few months, some thirty Senators have expressed the view that the United Nations might play some role in finding peace in Viet Nam. I have been among the thirty. It has been and still is my hope that the Security Council might serve to spur negotiations (whether under its own aegis or in a reconvened Geneva Conference or some other appropriate forum) which might lead to an honorable settlement.

In my judgment, much might be gained and nothing is to be lost in a sustained attempt to get the U. N. Security Council to consider Viet Nam. At worst, an open defeat of specific moves in this direction can hardly be more opprobrious than rumors and allegations that the United States is preventing negotiations. Even if we cannot muster the votes or are estopped by a permanent member's veto, I believe we have a responsibility to pursue whatever means may be proper and open to us in the Security Council, if for no other reason than to make clear our willingness to lay our position on Viet Nam formally on the line.

The appropriateness of a U. S. initiative in the United Nations in connection with Viet Nam is underscored by Article I of the Charter. The fact is that U. N. members have bound themselves by Treaty commitment:

"...To take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace...and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes...."

Obviously, this responsibility falls with particular weight upon the Permanent Members, including the United States.

At one time, this nation did make a start towards raising the Vietnamese question in the Security Council. In a letter to the President of that body on January 31, 1966, on instructions from the President, Ambassador Goldberg requested the calling of an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the situation in Viet Nam. In a supplementary letter, he submitted a draft resolution on Viet Nam.

A meeting of the Security Council was called for the next day, and two items were listed on the Provisional Agenda for the meeting. The first was the adoption of the provisional agenda (which is invariably the first item to be considered at a Council meeting). The second was the letter from the United States representative.

The vote on the adoption of the provisional agenda was taken on February 2, 1966. The results were 9 in favor, 2 opposed, and 4 abstentions. Although one of the negative votes was that of the Soviet Union, the agenda, nevertheless, was formally adopted. That is because the adoption of the agenda is a procedural question on which decisions in the Council are made by a vote of any nine of the fifteen members. The Soviet negative vote, therefore, did not act as a veto.

However, instead of next calling up the draft resolution of the United States (that is, the second item of the agenda or the U. S. letter on the question of Viet Nam) the Council adjourned indefinitely for informal consultations. These consultations proved ineffective; some of the Council members even refused to participate in them. Since that time, the Security Council has not explored, in formal debate and under public scrutiny, the issues of Viet Nam.

Insofar as the Council is concerned, then, the status of the Vietnamese problem has long been that of one item in an extensive list of "Matters of which the Security Council is Seized" under the title, "Letter dated 31 January 1966 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council." In analogy with Senate procedure, the item is on the Calendar, waiting to be called up.

The text of the proposed U. S. resolution which lies in this situation is as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in Viet-Nam,

"Mindful of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security,

"Noting that the provisions of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 have not been implemented,

"Desirous of contributing to a peaceful and honourable settlement of the Conflict in Viet-Nam,

"Recognizing the right of all peoples, including those in Viet-Nam to self-determination,

"1. Calls for immediate discussions without pre-conditions at _____ on _____ date, among the appropriate interested Governments to arrange a conference looking towards the application of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 and the establishment of a durable peace in South-East Asia;

"2. Recommends that the first order of business of such a conference be arrangements for a cessation of hostilities under effective supervision;

"3. Offers to assist in achieving the purposes of this resolution by all appropriate means, including the provision of arbitrators or mediators;

"4. Calls on all concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of this resolution;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to assist as appropriate in the implementation of this resolution."

It is this U. S. introduced resolution which was permitted to go dormant after having been motioned up almost two years ago and which we have since made no formal effort to revive. Initially, the principal reason for leaving it in limbo, as I understand it, was to avoid jeopardizing the efforts of the Secretary-General who, in his diplomatic capacity, was quietly trying to bring about negotiations through other channels. This effort and other secret approaches at the time were believed to hold more promise for peaceful settlement than formal consideration of the problem by the Council.

However, it is now almost two years later. In the interim, a range of alternative approaches to peaceful settlement has been pursued with great vigor but with singular lack of results. All the while the war in Viet Nam has intensified and the options for opening negotiations for peaceful settlement have grown fewer. In these circumstances, it seems to me that the United States has an obligation to itself and, under the

Charter--commitments to the people of the world, to resume the formal effort (which we began almost two years ago and then dropped almost as soon as we began) to get the question of Viet Nam before the U. N. Security Council.

In my judgment, the United States resolution which was submitted in January 1966 is still valid as a vehicle for this purpose. However, an alternative draft resolution could be offered by the United States, or by another country, for the purpose of opening consideration of the problem of restoring peace in Viet Nam.

If we choose to resume the initiative, the United States representative has only to ask for a meeting on the resolution on Viet Nam of 1966 and the item would be taken from the list of matters of which the "Security Council is seized" and included on an appropriate provisional agenda. The question of the adoption of the provisional agenda would then arise at a meeting of the Security Council, and it would be determined without vote if no objection were raised. In the event of objection, adoption would require the vote of any nine members. In short, if there are any nine members of the Council willing to have the Security Council face up to Viet Nam, the Council can begin the attempt to open the door to peaceful solution.

Of late, there have been rumors and innuendoes to the effect that "we do not have the votes" and so, therefore, we have not moved on the matter. It seems to me, however, that if there are not nine members of the Council prepared, at this late date, to acknowledge in concert this most serious threat to the world's well-being, it is high time for this nation to clarify by a recorded vote--win or lose--who is willing and who is not willing to bring the U. N. into the effort to restore peace in Viet Nam.

If the Security Council elects to do so, moreover, it can invite parties to the Vietnamese conflict, even though they are not members of the United Nations, to participate in discussions of the question. Again, the precedents clearly indicate that an invitation of this kind involves a procedural decision and, hence, requires any nine votes for adoption. Indeed, there are several cases in which invitations to participate in Security Council proceedings have been extended to non-U. N. members notwithstanding a negative vote of a permanent member. The precedents include the extension of two invitations to Communist China in 1950 (one of which was opposed by both the United States and the Republic of China and the other by the Republic of China) during the Korean Conflict. Precedents include even an invitation to an individual to appear and to speak in the Security Council after his diplomatic credentials had been thrown into doubt. (Dr. Jan Papanek, the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations at the time of the coup was invited, despite the negative vote of the Soviet Union.)

In short, the Charter and procedural practices of the U. N. clearly make possible a formal initiative on Viet Nam in the Security Council. While there have been of late, apparently, corridor-explorations by the United States of the possibilities of resuming the approach of almost two years ago, as yet, no specific procedural steps have been taken.

Needless to say, an initiative along these lines by the United States appears to me to be most desirable. May I say that I would not expect consideration of Viet Nam by the Security Council to be a substitute for direct negotiations by the parties involved or for the Geneva Conference or, for that matter, the personal diplomacy of the U. N. Secretary-General and other third parties. Nor am I sanguine in the expectation that this approach will necessarily be more fruitful than the others which have already been tried without avail. We cannot know what the results will be until the attempt is made. In my judgment, it would have been a worthwhile effort even if consideration by the Security Council served only to clarify the various positions of those directly and indirectly involved in this conflict by bringing them together in face-to-face and open discussions.

In closing, let me emphasize that I write to you not to seek an endorsement of any particular approach to the problem of Viet Nam. Each of us has his own views even as we share, I know, a deep concern and a deep desire for the prompt restoration of peace. I write you only to elaborate, as of possible interest, certain procedural and other ramifications which would be deeply involved in the event of a resumption of a U. S. initiative on Viet Nam in the Security Council.

With best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Mike Mansfield

P. S. I am sending along a copy of a statement made on Sunday which also bears upon the matter.

Regards,

MM

FOR RELEASE SUNDAY AM -- OCTOBER 8, 1967

PRESS RELEASE

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COPY October 7, 1967

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

The current session of the General Assembly has brought an outpouring of foreign office statements which urge the United States to call a halt to the bombing of North Viet Nam. Led by the Soviet Union, twenty or more nations have publicly pressed this advice in recent weeks. There are probably additional nations which feel the same way even if they have not yet expressed themselves.

In my judgment, this nation should not make light of this international advice. In some cases, it comes from nations with which we have had a long and intimate association and whose well-being is linked closely with our own. In any event, it is not necessarily either gratuitous or misdirected but arises, I am sure, from a deep and worldwide concern with the prolongation and expansion of the war in Viet Nam. This government has a responsibility, as do all governments, to pay a decent respect to the concerns as well as the opinions of other nations.

Well-intentioned or not, however, international advice is not likely to prove very helpful in this instance unless there is a willingness to couple it with a measure of international responsibility in seeking the termination of the Vietnamese conflict. That willingness, I regret to say, is still conspicuously lacking. A willingness to attempt a concrete contribution to a solution of the Vietnamese problem is not present among the Geneva Conference and it is not present in the Security Council.

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The Soviet Union, which is a member of both, has been in the forefront of the nations which insist that a discontinuance of the bombing is an essential in the restoration of peace in Viet Nam. Indeed, we are advised--almost assured--that the cessation will lead to negotiations with North Viet Nam. If the Soviet Union is convinced that this is the course to peace, it would seem to me to be appropriate for that nation to put its conviction into a formal resolution and present it for consideration to the Security Council. Until that is done, eloquent pleas and statements calling for an end of the bombing, particularly as they come from members of the Security Council can hardly be regarded a contribution to peace or even as a fulfillment of elementary responsibilities under the Charter.

I would hope, therefore, that the Soviet Union or any other member of the Security Council for that matter, which is persuaded that an end to the bombing is the way to peace, ^{would} frame its conviction as a draft resolution and present it to the Council. In that way, the regular procedures of the Charter will be engaged. In that way, perhaps, a path to peace may yet be uncovered either inside the U. N. Security Council or through its initiatives, in some other forum.

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, October 26, 3:00 P. M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Transportation for General Taylor

General Taylor cannot obtain commercial air transportation from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Washington in time to attend the 10:00 A. M., Thursday, November 2, meeting of foreign policy advisers. He has a scheduled address Wednesday evening which he is unable to cancel. He is very desirous of attending the Thursday session.

May we ask Colonel Cross to arrange military transportation for General Taylor?

W. W. Rostow

_____ Ask Colonel Cross to arrange military air transport

_____ Prefer General Taylor arrive when he can by commercial means

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 11-7-91

~~SECRET~~

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Thursday - October 26, 1967
11:30 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the advanced text of President Diaz Ordaz's address to the Joint Session of Congress.

We were so disturbed by the complaining nature of parts of the speech and the absence of any reference to the Alliance for Progress and the strong support which you and Congress has given it, that we asked Tony Solomon to speak with Ambassador Margain. We chose Tony because of his close personal relationship with Ambassador Margain, and his knowledge of trade matters which form the basis of the complaints.

Tony went over the speech with Margain in great detail, making numerous suggestions for changes:

- express appreciation to Congress for the Alliance for Progress and note your contribution.
- delete a reference to military expenditures that is a touchy subject.
- delete some slighting remarks about private foreign investment.
- rephrase the section complaining about our policies regarding prices for raw materials and delete the second reference to it.
- cast the issue of increasing the duty-free allowance for returning Americans in favor of a respectful request instead of a complaint.
- delete the complaint about import restrictions because it is inaccurate.

Margain reacted favorably to these changes. He passed them on to the Director General of the Mexican Foreign Office whose response was also positive.

We have heard nothing since from the Mexicans. We don't know to what extent the speech has been altered.

I am concerned that if the speech is not modified, President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz will not be doing justice to you and the reaction on the Hill and in the press will be unfavorable.

In your meeting with President Diaz Ordaz this afternoon, you might draw him out on the address.

W. W. Rostow

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We know that the progress of the country is based mainly on our effort, but in order to accelerate development, we call upon outside financing. We enjoy good international credit based upon the strict fulfillment of our obligations and on an absolute respect to a limit we have set ourselves; never to go beyond our payment capacity.

In other countries, direct foreign investment even enjoys privileges over national investment. We are convinced that, when the interests of the foreign capitalist go against those of the nation where he invests, all guarantees granted will be worthless. The actual incompatibility of interests will fatally determine the cancellation of apparent advantages.

The conditions we have established, perhaps are not spectacularly attractive for the businessman, but they are quite solid, because they operate both ways: in favor of Mexico and of the investor. The concordance of interests make them lasting and worthy of trust.

Mexico and the United States find themselves bound by close economic ties. Traditionally, we have been one of your major consumers of goods and services. The value of our imports in 1966 was one thousand 462.7 million dollars.

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In your trade with Latin America we always occupy first place as buyers and third as sellers. In world trade we have rated between second and fifth. Only Canada has been above us every year and, at present, also Japan. The Federal German Republic and the United Kingdom -- third and fourth places -- annually handle a volume slightly higher than ours.

Our purchases in the American market are equivalent to half of the sum of the rest of Latin America and twice that of the South Pacific.

Those of the thirteen Middle East countries, added to those of the British and French possessions of the region, represent 69 percent of what Mexico buys from the United States. Those of the whole African Continent, 91 percent.

Trade of United States cities on the border with Mexico depends, in a vital proportion, on Mexican buyers.

Tourism constitutes a trade item between the two countries, both because of expenditures by North Americans in Mexico, as well as for what is spent by Mexicans in this country.

No restriction, no limitation to expenditures abroad, do we impose on Mexican travelers.

We are, therefore, in many ways, one of the most important clients of the United States and it is a rule

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of international trade that to keep a client one must be, in turn, a good client. It is a matter of elementary logic that the less you buy from us or the less you spend in Mexico, the less we can buy from you.

And so, we are concerned not only by the disparity of prices between the raw materials we export and the capital goods, which are our main import, but also by the limitations to buy in Mexico fixed on American visitors, that are not justified in the case of a bordering country, and by the barriers or restrictions of another kind that hinder the concurrence of numerous manufactured goods, highly competitive in price and quality, into the market of the United States.

I have mentioned only the trade aspects of greater entity. I deem it necessary that we should study them together, conscientiously, in order to reach decisions favorable to both countries. When one part benefits and the other is harmed, trade relations cannot last. When business favors both parts, then it is permanent. From lack of equity stemmed the prejudice that business is an inevitable factor of international friction. The truth is that strict reciprocity unites men and peoples.

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In conclusion, geography made us neighbors, economy has turned us into the best of clients, and the decided will of our peoples, overcoming at times the relentless course of history, has made us cordial and respectful friends, our deals must always have these characteristics; of neighbors, good neighbors; of clients, magnificent clients; of friends, loyal friends.

I have not been authorized by the nations of Latin America to speak in their name, but it would be petty on my part and I would fail continental solidarity and the deeply felt Indo-American fraternity, if I spoke only in the name of my country.

It is imperative for public opinion in the United States, and particularly that of the groups of greater economic and political influence, to clearly understand, that to insist on the difficulties of economic and political development of Latin America, is not a desire to annoy or an eagerness to formulate complaints, but the expression of urgent necessities afflicting millions of human beings.

Underdevelopment is not just one more name for the "folklore" of remote countries. It involves a human drama

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of incalculable consequences, for what it implies in natural resources that are not used, sterile loss of lives, waste of creative energy, talents that never get to flourish.

For Latin America the decisive economic problem is the same I already pointed out in the case of Mexico, that of prices of raw materials in the world market. As long as they are frozen, or what is even worse, lowered, we can hardly aspire to a process of sustained development and any other exterior effort, such as technical assistance or financial cooperation, might temporarily alleviate the situation, but never solve it.

" Suppose that the exports of the less developed countries, instead of declining as a proportion of world trade, last year had been able to maintain the same modest position that they had occupied five years earlier. On that supposition, the less developed countries would have had a one percent larger share of world exports -- and that one percent would have earned them well over a billion dollars more of foreign exchange than their exports actually did earn in 1966.

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If a one percent adjustment in shares of world export trade would bring about a billion-dollar improvement in the fortunes of the poor, then surely the matter is worth consideration and action. Price stabilization for selected primary products is a closely related subject similarly entitled to consideration, even though it admittedly presents difficult problems. If the less developed countries are encouraged -- and permitted -- to improve their export earnings, many problems will become more manageable. External debt crises will be fewer, the need for aid will diminish, the attraction for private capital will grow."

These thoughts are not mine, nor do they belong to a passionate Latin American, they were expressed by George D. Woods, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, on September 25, 1967, in Rio de Janeiro.

We reiterate this problem, before the people of the United States, and I do it now in this Congress that represents it, not only because North America has a decisive weight on the fluctuations of international markets, but also because what is said here has a world-wide resonance.

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The idea that a global efficiency of socially-minded investments is preferable, should replace the one that considers the achievement of the highest profits in the shortest time as the goal of excellence.

The most powerful business concerns of the United States, following the advice of distinguished North American economists and of their executives with greater experience, are already deliberately limiting their profits, to avoid a serious economic crisis through the suction of excessive amounts of money.

The thesis is valid for one or for a group of business firms, as well as for a nation or a group of nations. We must decide whether it is fairer and more convenient to live in opulence surrounded by poor, or among prosperous nations, even if we never reach excessive wealth.

The most dangerous agitators are fear, lack of health, bread, shelter, dress and schooling.

The lack of enough capital and the deterioration of foreign trade is not, for our peoples, a problem of good or bad business, but a matter of life and death for hundreds of thousands of Latin American men, women, old-aged and

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children. It is not morally acceptable to put business on one side of the scale and the lives of millions of disinherited on the other.

An ideologist of our revolution said one must go through the terrible pains of death in order to give birth to a new life. We have gone through those pains so that Mexico might be born to independence, political freedom and social justice.

Mexicans know from long experience -- all their history -- that what they do not do for themselves, no one else will do for them and that that which is worthwhile is not easily obtained. All we have achieved has been difficult, having our own soil and ruling over it, and selecting in sovereignty the ways of life that are peculiar to us.

Thus, I do not expect that others do what we must do ourselves. Neither do I come to point my finger at someone in particular as guilty. Nothing would be gained by accusing each other. But above all, to be honest, we must admit that no one, man or nation, is solely responsible. Responsibility belongs to all, to absolutely everybody, each one of us, to the extent of his possibilities. By acknowledging this we take a transcendental step forward.

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What I want to say is that if we wish to survive and obtain peace there must be a true revolution of the mind, that may allow all of us to construct a world where justice prevails. And in such world, let each nation gain its prosperity through its own merits and the efforts of its children.

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Vietnam | Our poor world cannot continue to live between one and another war, that engender evils for many, and desperation for millions. Today, the worse suffering is fear. There is no country on the face of the earth that does not long to enter the path of hope and security.

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Vietnam | The eventual risks of peace are infinitely less than the positive evils of war. The problems, difficulties, the mutual tolerance that peace demands are amply justified if we only think on the consequences of war, knowing that, in this matter, fantasy stops short at the horrors of fact.

Even more so now that we find ourselves in the most dangerous of crossroads. History shows how empires, civilizations and cultures have vanished. But not until today do we know that, through man's own action, mankind can disappear.

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- 12 -

I should like to quote words said, under unfortunate circumstances for the North American nation, by the great revolutionary Abraham Lincoln: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew."

Indeed, we must think and act with a new spirit, if we wish to solve the multiple and complex problems that afflict us.

As a matter of principle, we must make compatible through common aims, that which by nature and essence is varied and different. We must embrace multiple diversity, respecting and conciliating peculiar characteristics of autonomous groups, to build a world in accordance with the plurality which forms it.

To understand it so is to begin to solve the problems. To attempt to standardize, and believe that all groups are equal in institutions and habits, would be a serious mistake.

Each country has the right to select the path she considers adequate, following her idiosyncrasy, to seek

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- 13 -

freedom and happiness for her people, but each one has the obligation to see that diversity does not turn into conflict.

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, Members of the Senate, Members of the House of Representatives:

I tried to present to you briefly an image of modern Mexico. I mentioned some aspects of our bilateral relations. I spoke of matters that have a great interest for Latin America, and I dared expose my thoughts on the great problems of the world.

I go back now to the essential reasons of my visit in Washington and of my presence in this Congress, to confirm, once again, bonds of loyal friendship, and try to find, jointly, the road to peace.

Neighbors by geography, the way to reach this friendship that now unites us has not been easy.

Not always do our points of view coincide, nor have they coincided in the past, but we have learned to respect them.

From the sacred respect we have for ourselves, is born the respect we profess to other nations, which, in turn, serves as a strong support to demand respect from others.

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- 14 -

This is the basis of friendship that allows the common enjoyment of affinities and the tolerance of differences, for understanding generates affection.

I finish quoting thoughts by two eminent men of the past. One, a strong jurist and untiring fighter, the other, a profound thinker and inspired poet. Their expressions are dissimilar, one, a political formula, the other a beautiful vision. But if we dare unite them - reality and dream - they let us confirm the road that with great clear-sightedness, our ancestors had found. Since both, notwithstanding - their diversity, have in common a flavor of eternity.

The great Mexican Benito Juarez said: "Democracy is the fate of future mankind, freedom, its indestructible weapon: Possible - perfection its goal."

The great North American Henry Davis Thoreau said: "Goodness is the only investment that never fails."

Let us do whatever is necessary to go through life heeding the deep voice of our peoples, to obey and serve them, which is the essence of democracy, jealously

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- 15 -

watching over and increasing freedom for all, fighting to accomplish social justice, untiringly pursuing the ideal of becoming better every day. And let us fulfill that great mission sowing goodness, as the best of all seeds.

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~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967
10:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's back channel response to my message to him, also attached.

I am making it available, on an eyes only basis, to Sec. Rusk and to Sec. McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

62
Pres file

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993

By *kg*, NARA, Date *11-2-91*

DLA376
PP YEXADS
DE YEKADL 924 2991213
P 251338Z

~~TOP SECRET~~

NO EYES

63a

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER 264

TO WALT ROSTOW PRIORITY

1. ALTHOUGH I WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF A PERSONAL MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE A LOOK AT WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE SHOULD BE GOING, I HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE SUGGESTION FOR A WEEK-END MEETING AT HONOLULU BEGINNING NOVEMBER 3.
2. THE ENTIRE TOP ECHELON OF THE MISSION IS LARGELY TIED UP IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE VISIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE INAUGURATION AND WILL BE COMPLETELY OCCUPIED FROM THE TIME OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 29, THROUGH THE AFTERNOON OF WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, WHEN THE VICE PRESIDENT DEPARTS FROM DANANG. THIS LEAVES INADEQUATE TIME FOR PREPARATION FOR MEETING SUCH AS PROPOSED. IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE TRY TO KEEP WASHINGTON FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS HERE AND OF OUR RECOMMENDED PLANS, PROGRAMS, AND PROCEDURES, TO ACHIEVE ADEQUATE AND COMPENSATORY RETURNS FROM SUCH A MEETING WE WOULD WANT TO PULL TOGETHER MUCH DATA AND MATERIAL.
3. I HAVE REPORTED IN MY LAST SEVERAL WEEKLY MESSAGES AND IN OTHER MESSAGES THE INCREASING SENSITIVITY HERE AT ALL LEVELS TO APPEARANCES

PAGE 2 SAIGON 264 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY [REDACTED]
OF U.S. PRESSURE ON THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. I DO NOT QUESTION THE NEED TO APPLY PRESSURE OR LEVERAGE AS THE CASE MAY BE. THE QUESTION IS HOW IT IS DONE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO FORM A JUDGMENT IN EACH CASE AS TO WHAT METHOD WILL BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN ACHIEVING RESULTS, E.G., PERSUASION, URGING, PRODDING, LEVERAGE, OR PRESSURE, AND THE FORM IN WHICH THE METHOD SHOULD BE APPLIED. IN VIEW OF THE CHARACTERISTIC PRIDE (NOT EXCLUSIVE TO THE VIETNAMESE BUT EXISTING GENERALLY IN MOST UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES) AND INCREASING SUSCEPTIBILITY TO PUBLIC EVIDENCE OF U.S. PRESSURE, IT IS MY FEELING THAT WE OBTAIN RESULTS MOST EFFECTIVELY AND RAPIDLY BY EXERTING THE ABOVE METHODS AS QUIETLY AND PRIVATELY AS POSSIBLE. THEY ARE MOST EFFECTIVE WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN APPLIED IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE IDEAS, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS APPEAR TO BE COMING AS IDEAS PROPOSED BY THE VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES. I BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY ABLE TO DO THIS AND I AM CONVINCED THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK IN THIS WAY WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT WHEN THE SPOTLIGHT, WITH THE ASSEMBLY IN EXISTENCE AND FUNCTIONING, WILL BE MORE CONCENTRATED ON WHAT WE DO AND HOW WE DO IT.

4. AS YOU KNOWN, WE HAVE HAD TO PRESS THE GVN LEADERSHIP RATHER HARD RECENTLY ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT AND URGENT QUESTIONS. THIS

FROM YOUR QUICK COPY

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019-0a4-4-12
By 80 NARA Date 11/7/02

3
(a)(5) PAGE 3 SAIGON 264 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY [REDACTED]
FACT WILL BECOME EVIDENT AS CERTAIN OF THESE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN. IN VIEW OF THE SENSITIVITY I HAVE MENTIONED, WHICH HAS BEEN EVIDENT DURING THE RECENT ELECTION CAMPAIGNS AND FROM THE FULL AND FRANK CRITICISM IN THE UNCENSORED VIETNAMESE PRESS, A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING AT HONOLULU IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO BE INTERPRETED HERE AND OUTSIDE AS NEW EFFORTS TO APPLY STRONG PRESSURE ON THE NEW VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. THIS COULD STRENGTHEN CRITICISM AND GIVE CREDENCE TO THOSE WHO HAVE ALREADY LABELED THE GVN AS A U.S. PUPPET. IT MIGHT WELL CAUSE EMBARRASSMENT TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT AND THEIR FRIENDS JUST AS IT IS GETTING UNDER WAY. ITS REACTION MIGHT WELL BE THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN FREELY GIVEN THE CHANCE TO GET ORGANIZED AND MOVING.

5. IN SUCH A SESSION WE WOULD OF COURSE BE DISCUSSING PRECISELY THAT, NAMELY, HOW TO GET THE NEW GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED AND MOVING, AND THIS IS WHY I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE FAR PREFERABLE TO DO THIS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT APPEAR PUBLICLY TO BE WHAT IT IS. I RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR NEEDS AT HOME ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR SITUATION IN SAIGON, BUT I HOPE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE ATMOSPHERE HERE AS UNDISTURBED AS POSSIBLE DURING THIS CRITICAL NEW PERIOD.

1.3
(a)(5) PAGE 4 SAIGON 264 ~~TOP SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY [REDACTED]

6. AN ALTERNATIVE, AND IT SEEMS TO ME PREFERABLE, WOULD BE TO HOLD A MEETING SUCH AS PROPOSED IN WASHINGTON RATHER THAN IN HONOLULU A WEEK OR TWO WEEKS LATER, SAY NOVEMBER 10TH OR 17TH. THIS WOULD GIVE TIME FOR ADEQUATE PREPARATION, AND THE FACT OF OUR PRESENCE IN WASHINGTON COULD BE HANDLED AS MORE OR LESS A NORMAL, ROUTINE CONSULTATION AFTER THE NEW TEAM HAS BEEN HERE SIX MONTHS. IN FACT, I WROTE YESTERDAY, BEFORE RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE, TO DEAN RUSK SUGGESTING THAT I RETURN IN NOVEMBER ABOUT THAT TIME FOR CONSULTATION TO TAKE UP WITH PRESIDENT, YOU, DEAN, AND BOB MCNAMARA A NUMBER OF THINGS RELATING TO POLICY AND PROGRAMS HERE BOTH REGARDING OUR OWN EFFORTS AND THE PROGRAMS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

7. I PASS THESE THOUGHTS ON TO YOU AS MY BEST JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT WOULD BE THE MOST PRODUCTIVE AND USEFUL PROCEDURE AS SEEN FROM THIS END. BUNKER.

GP-1
850

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

NNNN

EXTRA FROM QUICK COPY

64

Thursday - October 26, 1967
8:30 am

Pres file

Mr. President:

We have just received from the Mexican Embassy the attached personalized volume of statements made by the Presidents at Punta del Este. Yours appear on page 107 translated into Spanish.

I suspect that President Diaz Ordaz would be pleased to see this on your coffee table when he calls at 5:00 p.m. You might ask him to autograph it and let him know that you plan to include the book in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

65

Thursday,
October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Farewell Cable to Singapore
Prime Minister Lee

Prime Minister Lee is leaving the continental United States tomorrow morning. Attached is a suggested draft for a farewell cable from you.

I recommend that you approve this cable for transmission by the State Department.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

65a

DRAFT CABLE FOR
SINGAPORE PRIME MINISTER LEE

As you leave the continental United States after what must have been a very strenuous schedule, I want you to know how delighted I have been that you were able to make this visit. I profitted greatly from our conversation, and I know that you have been a strong and articulate voice throughout the country for your own nation and for Southeast Asia as a whole.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in warm regards and all best wishes to you and to Mrs. Lee.

Pres file

Thursday, October 26, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is the response State
made to the Canadian announcement
re-defining its territorial waters
around Labrador and New Foundland.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:em

66a

RELEASED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
October 26, 1967, 5:30 p.m.

The Department of State has been informed that the Government of Canada today announced that it intends to draw straight baselines for the delineation of Canada's territorial sea and contiguous fishing zone, initially along the Coast of Labrador and the eastern and southern Coast of New Foundland.

The United States Government has not concurred in the proposed action of the Government of Canada. It is our view that some of the announced lines are inconsistent with established principles of the international Law of the Sea. The United States is not prepared to recognize the validity of these lines and plans formally to object to their establishment to the Government of Canada and to reserve its rights and those of its nationals in the affected waters.

~~SECRET~~

67

OCT 26 1967

Mr. President:

Pres file

This ^{is} one way to look at the war.

From Hanoi's point of view there are two central facts:

- the decline of the Viet Cong manpower base;
- the possibility of a political break in the United States.

Hanoi's purpose, therefore, is to buy time to see what U.S. politics may yield. Hanoi has attempted to achieve this purpose by:

- reducing activity in II, III, and IV Corps;
- increasing pressure in the DMZ area to (1) prevent a more rapid erosion of the communist structure and (2) inflict higher U.S. casualties in hopes of eroding the U.S. will.

Hanoi's strategy has been only partially successful -- but extremely costly, in that:

- Revolutionary development progress has been slowed as a result of the diversion of U.S. forces to I Corps -- but it has not been stopped.
- U.S. losses have increased substantially (7,000 killed in action in nine months against 5,000 all last year) -- but for every American killed they have had more than nine deaths.
- Total friendly casualties have also increased (15,600 killed in nine months compared with 11,100 for the same period in 1966) -- but they have suffered disproportionately (the kill rate is now 4.26 against them compared with 3.2 in the same period in 1966).

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-454

By sig, NARA, Date 10-4-95

~~SECRET~~

- Despite their increased losses in I Corps (and higher kill ratios against them in I Corps), they have been unable to cut their losses in the other corps areas (April through August losses equalled 25,800 compared with 18,400 for the same period last year. Monthly average was 5,200 compared with 4,900 for the preceding 15 months).

- North Vietnamese losses have probably increased more than VC losses.

In the meantime, the intensity of the fighting in I Corps has tended to obscure the fact that the over-all pace of the war has slowed down:

- Communist-initiated incidents in I Corps have increased from 20% of the total to 26% -- but the total incident rate is down about 30% from the peak.

- Battalion-size contacts in I Corps have increased from 34% of the total to 66% -- but the total rate is down 55%.

- Small unit actions and contacts per quarter in I Corps have increased from 600 to 3,000. In the other corps areas they have decreased from the peak of 1,900 to 1,500.

- September death rates are substantially down from their peaks this spring: U.S. rate is down from 1,233 to 775; South Vietnamese, from 1,026 to 740; enemy, from 9,351 to 6,354.

It is too early to tell whether the current "lull" will be followed by a renewal of intense fighting in I Corps or whether Hanoi will now change its strategy.

Hanoi may feel that its DMZ strategy has been too costly in terms of its limited gains. If so, their alternatives are:

- negotiate with or without a continuation of the fighting;
- retreat from stage III to stage II insurgency (fragmentary evidence indicates that this process may be underway in some areas);

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- switch their main effort from the DMZ to some other area;
- a combination of the above.

On the other hand, Hanoi may well decide to pursue its DMZ strategy despite its high cost, because:

- they simply are not yet ready to quit;
- even though it is a "losing" strategy, it may buy more time at less cost than other alternatives (Hanoi may calculate that they would have suffered even more if they had not adopted the DMZ strategy).
- for a time, at least, the communists may be prepared to exchange 7,200 killed a month for 800 American deaths (or 1,700 friendly deaths) if they believe that their will to persist is that much stronger than ours.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter from Indonesian Student

Pres file

The attached letter from an Indonesian student in Paris is a touching expression of Asian support for our policy in Vietnam. The letter has been answered on your behalf by General De Puy, but it occurs to me that it would be a nice gesture if this student received a copy, autographed by you, of the brochure published by State after your Asian tour. It would also make a useful human interest story for the press. If you approve I will ask George Christian to follow up.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-453
By cl, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for King Hussein

*1. [unclear]
2. Pres file*

King Hussein arrives in New York on November 2nd and will stay at least until the 10th. Since his trip to Moscow, he has been to see Nasser again and is stopping in Algiers, Madrid, Paris, Bonn, and London on the way here. He is coming largely in hopes of seeing you. Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation that you invite him for a small working lunch on November 7 or 8 as you did in June.

I hate to involve you so deeply. However, I believe your role is crucial for these reasons:

- Your relationship with him will be our main, if not our only important tie with him in the weeks ahead. We have just announced releasing military shipments to all the friendly Arabs except Jordan, and we'll have trouble completing our budget support commitment for this year because the sizable Arab donations have put Jordan in pretty good financial shape.
- Despite the Israelis' bitter feelings about him, he's still the best bet to work out a settlement with Israel. He may not settle alone, but for the moment he seems to be carrying Nasser's proxy.
- He feels we've let him down, and the Soviets have made him attractive aid offers. He has worked hard to get the Arabs behind a position he thinks meets our objectives. Secretary Rusk and Arthur Goldberg may be able to persuade him we haven't changed our tune, but there's really no substitute to his hearing it from you.

Therefore I recommend you have him for a working meal, but offer these options:

Working lunch if we can find a date. (You are booked for lunch on November 7 and 8.) _____
Working dinner on 7 or 8 November _____
Office meeting only ✓ _____
Prefer not to see him ✓ _____

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

70

~~Thursday~~
Wednesday, October 26, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

The attached telegram on the anti-American tone of recent Canadian Government actions is worth your reading. The language is flamboyant but on the whole accurate. National self-assertion in Canada seems to require an anti-American cast.

The developments Butterworth describes are not new. Nor do they require immediate U.S. action. In part they reflect the present unsteady condition of Canadian politics. The Liberal Party is divided and dispirited. The Quebec issue is cutting deep. Martin is trying to establish a reputation for himself, in part at Pearson's expense. (Pearson may step down next year.) Although the present Parliament has three years to run, many people expect an earlier election. In such a climate, the nationalist drum is a good one to beat.

Ambassador Butterworth arrives in Washington this evening for a week's visit.

W. W. Rostow

RHU:mst
7:00 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

702

Copy of Ottawa 504, 23 Oct. 1967

1. There has been a steady accumulation of evidence in the past few months that the Pearson government has been working out more policies, at variance with U. S. views and harmful to U. S. interests, which spell a general outlook which, if not anti-American in inspiration, is certainly anti-American in result. Some of these policies have some realistic relationship to Canadian interests; others reflect little more than a yen to yank Uncle Sam's beard, to strike a theatrical and supposedly popular pose in U. S. expense in the leadership race, and to embarrass the U. S. by highlighting embarrassing problems, partly with the view to papering over controversy with Quebec.

2. On the political side, there is supporting evidence in Canada's recent actions regarding Vietnam, abandonment of private diplomacy, China, and ABM's. The Pearson government's failure to make NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) as cooperative a military arrangement as it could have been, and its notification that it would nationalize certain international waters even over our objections, are long-time irritants and will not be further noted.

A. Vietnam. For the first time, Foreign Minister Martin called for unilateral cessation of bombing of North Vietnam by U. S. in his speech at UN General Assembly on September 27. He even twisted the stiletto, once inserted, by saying in Parliament in response to a question, that he had advised us beforehand. In fact, he had only given a preview of his speech to U. S. officials in the UN in "general terms." To add insult to injury, he said in a speech on October 13, when questioned about Secretary's remarks, expressing concern over what might happen if bombing stopped and Hanoi did nothing, that he could not discuss a hypothetical situation. Of course he had no hesitancy in calling on the U. S. to create a hypothetical situation, consequences of which would not be forecast and which Martin has already advised the Secretary he would do nothing to meet. In a CBC TV interview October 11, he even fixed blame on the U. S. in Vietnam by saying, "If the bombing stops, I think then the onus will be on the North. Now the onus is on the U. S. to explain its position to the people of the world."

B. Public Diplomacy. In the same TV interview, Foreign Minister Martin also stated that he was, in effect, abandoning his advertised policy of private diplomacy about Vietnam vis-a-vis the U. S. He said Canada had been mistaken in thinking it should not "speak up" to the U. S. on the subject. Canada had the responsibility for action in its capacity as a member of the International Control Commission.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 92-398

By CB, NARA Date 7-8-99

C. China. In connection with abortive centennial visit to Ottawa of China's Vice President Yen, Foreign Minister Martin, even while the Government of Canada was trying to put a visit by some substitute (eventually Deputy Premier Huang) back on the rails, made embarrassing comments to the press in Halifax October 1 and 2 on Formosa's not having been Chinese for a hundred years, and reiterating his one China - one Taiwan policy. This was symptomatic of his present penchant to raise an embarrassing subject to capitalize upon neutralist public opinion he exploits and encourages.

D. ABM's. After Secretary McNamara announced the U. S. decision to establish a thin ABM defense line, a question was put to Prime Minister Pearson in Parliament whether the Government of Canada was advised in advance. Despite agreement between Canadian officialdom and the Embassy that the official line would be that the US had "consulted" with the Government of Canada (as it had, indeed, throughout the previous year), Prime Minister Pearson said only that the Government of Canada had been "notified." This eased him out of any necessity to explain Canadian rationale for participation or non-participation in the system, but gave the U. S. cold comfort in permitting the belief it had acted somewhat cavalierly in so vital a matter.

3. There are a number of indications in the economic area which may represent a reinforcing trend toward more divergence between U. S. and Canadian policies.

A. The insistence of the Government of Canada that it would, despite the compelling nature of evidence gathered to prove that the passage of the Bank Act would retroactively discriminate against small American bank in Canada, proceed to limit the bank's growth notwithstanding, is one example of this trend.

B. Similarly, the leftist-oriented economic nationalists of Canada have also placed significant restrictions on advertising of U. S. sources in publications circulated in Canada in an effort to weaken the bonds of cultural affinity.

C. The Government of Canada now seems bent on introducing discriminatory postal rates against TIME and Reader's Digest to the same end.

D. Proposed changes in regulation of radio and television in Canada follow a similar course, further strengthening Canadian content requirements and regulating cable vision facilities.

E. The Carter Commission report (on which the Government of Canada has yet to take a stand), which would revolutionize Canadian tax policy and practice, may also be seen as an attempt to stem the rising tide of

integration of U. S. -Canadian capital markets by establishing disincentives to both U. S. capital investment in Canada and Canadian capital investment in the U. S. The report also urges elimination of special incentives to mining and petroleum industries controlled largely by U. S. corporations, and points out that this move will shift the burden of taxation from Canadian to foreign taxpayers.

F. Canada's foreign trade policy has for a considerable period of time been at substantial variance with that of the U. S. as regards trading with Communist countries, and particularly with Castro's Cuba.

G. Another evidence of the thrust of Canadian economic nationalists appeared in the October 14 column of well-informed journalist Peter Newman under the title, "A Test for English Canadians Nationalist Urges." According to Newman, the special task force under Walter Gordon's chairmanship set up to look into the problems of foreign investment (particularly American) "may become the basis both for a tough new era in Canadian-American relations and a major plank in the liberal government's next election platform". The "senior liberal politicians" cited by Newman as his sources, "see economic nationalism as the kind of issue which might give this country a post-centennial set of objectives on which both French and English politicians could agree". While the Embassy has reported that the Newman article contains inaccuracies and is discounted by some officials, the article is at least representative of the views of economic nationalists in the government.

4. Comment: There is then this recent record of the Government of Canada's giving the U. S. and U. S. interests the sandpaper treatment to the point where it begins to hurt and be obvious to many,-- not to Americans only -- that the Pearson government is fanning, whether purposely or not, anti-Americanism in the country. The best known and most visible evidence of this development is in government Crown Corporation CBC's TV public affairs broadcasts. Principal prime-time public affairs program Sunday night (formerly this hour had seven days, now the way it is) continues to carry slanted and venomous attacks on U. S. policy and U. S. society. A recent shocker was a half-hour U. S. -made documentary film of race riots in U. S. cities this past summer, which was a psychedelic presentation attempting to show American society as a welter of fear, hate, depravity, rot, and disintegration. Individual Canadians are still expressing their concern to the Embassy over this particular program, but CBC (and the Government of Canada) can be expected to carry on mote-less.

BUTTERWORTH

71

Thursday, October 26, 1967 *Pres file*

Mr. President:

The Canadians will announce this morning that they will henceforth consider as internal waters certain bays along the coast of Newfoundland and Labrador. We do not yet know the full details of what they plan to announce. Their action could give us additional difficulties in holding to our position on the status of international waters. It could also be troublesome to our fishing industry.

The attached memorandum from State gives some background on this action and outlines what we propose to do.

State will issue a public statement at its afternoon briefing, making clear that we are reserving our rights.

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst

Secret

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.4(h)
White House, Washington, Feb. 11, 1981
By *lg*, NARA, Date *5-5-92*



S/S 18413

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

4091
71a
October 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Law of the Sea Action by Canada

The Canadian Government informed us late yesterday that Secretary of State for External Affairs Martin will announce to a Parliamentary Committee at 11:00 a.m. today the drawing of certain baselines off the east coast of Canada.

The Canadian move is surprising only in its timing. Our efforts over several years to dissuade the Canadian Government from action of this kind had led to a general understanding with Canada that: (1) because we think the action is contrary to international law and a harmful precedent, we would register our objections; (2) we would strenuously resist any effort to claim as Canadian waters certain larger bodies such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Hudson Bay (which apparently will not be included in today's announcement); and (3) Canada would join us in seeking an international solution to the fisheries problems which Canada claims as its motivation. Today's announcement is apparently going to be generally consistent with these understandings, although we have not yet had a firm commitment from Canada to join in the international effort.

The Canadian action is, however, disappointing in several important ways: the short notice, permitting inadequate consultation with us; the fact that the

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-398
By sig, NARA, Date 3-5-93

Canadians have already informed other governments as well; the indication that the announcement will imply further similar action in the near future; and the apparent intent to include language in the announcement which will recognize our traditional fishing rights but will imply that further negotiations with us will lead to their curtailment.

Under these circumstances and depending upon the text of the Canadian announcement, we propose to take the following action:


(1) Immediately to inform the Canadian Ambassador of our concern at the inadequacy of the consultation and our expectation that the Canadian action will confirm to our recent understandings, confirmed on June 7, 1967.

(2) Immediately to confirm his Government's agreement to join with us in co-sponsoring a multi-lateral approach to the broader fisheries problem.

(3) Late this afternoon, pursuant to our understandings, to issue a public statement saying we have been informed of the Canadian action, that we consider it contrary to international law, and that we reserve all our rights.

(4) Subsequently, formally to register our objections and reservations with the Canadian Government.

We are enclosing recent memoranda of conversations with the Canadians.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures: Memoranda

Approved in M,
6/22/67

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Part 1 of 2 parts

DATE: June 7, 1967
TIME: 6:15 p.m.
PLACE: Mr. Rostow's office

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-398

By ing, NARA, Date 3-5-93

PARTICIPANTS: Canadian Side
A. E. Ritchie, Canadian Ambassador
Miss Dorothy Burwash, Counselor, Canadian Embassy

US Side
Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
REPRESENTATIVE: Charles A. Kiselyak, EUR/CAN
Stuart Blow, S/FW
Robert T. Grey, Jr., Staff Assistant to the Under Secretary

S/S	INR/OD	ARA	L	Dept. of Interior
S/P	CIA	EUR-2	S/FW	
G	WH	DOD	Embassy OTTAWA	

The Ambassador, calling at his request, referred to the position of the US set forth by Under Secretary Rostow on May 22 that the US Government could not accept a Canadian claim to the bays of Newfoundland as historic Canadian waters and said that his Government was now prepared to proceed to co-sponsor an international conference even if the US Government felt compelled to object to some of the base lines Canada intended to draw around Newfoundland. The Ambassador said his Government still hoped the US Government would ultimately accept Canada's legal argument in support of all its claims and, if not, that the US would object in only a mild way.

The Under Secretary responded that the US still hoped Canada would see the rectitude of the US legal position and added that the US would do what it could to comply with the request for as mild an objection as possible. He said the US would probably inform the GOC by diplomatic note of its objection to claims to the Newfoundland bays in question and that Canada could respond by simply taking note of the US position.

The Ambassador noted that the present international atmosphere would probably preclude any action by Canada in the next few days and that the two countries should closely co-ordinate their plans - e.g. the invitations to the other nations to attend the conference. The Under Secretary agreed.

Thirdly, Mr. Rostow continued, we had noted that the Canadian Aide-Memoire speaks of an understanding that the US Government would not find it necessary "to object to or protest" the actions outlined in the Aide-Memoire. He said he was now seeking from the Ambassador a "gentleman's agreement" that if we were to object but not protest, it would not mean that the Canadian Government would decline to proceed with the plans for the international conferences. We intended to reply to the Canadian Aide-Memoire and to set forth our reasoning on the substance of the Canadian case. He hoped that the Canadian Government would find our argumentation persuasive, but he also hoped that we could have an understanding that if it should prove unacceptable the Canadian Government would nevertheless be prepared to continue as we had agreed with regard to the conferences. He said he understood Foreign Minister Martin's position and knew that the Minister felt under considerable pressure to begin the drawing of baselines by June 1. He did not wish to impede forward movement on this whole problem and therefore was seeking this understanding from the Ambassador.

Ambassador Ritchie commented that he was not entirely sure he understood the subtlety of the distinction between "object" and "protest."

Making clear that he was speaking only of the areas referred to in the May 4 Aide-Memoire and not the "special areas" such as the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Hudson Bay, on which our clear position was already recorded, Mr. Rostow said that he meant that we would reserve our rights and maintain our position of principle in order to prevent an unraveling of our entire position.

The Ambassador responded that he would consult his government promptly and would be in touch with us.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Approved in M (Mr. Novak)
5-23-67.

Time: 5:00 p.m.
DATE: May 22, 1967
Mr. Rostow's Office

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea: Canadian Plans for
Drawing Straight Baselines

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-398

By ing, NARA, Date 3-5-93

PARTICIPANTS:

CANADA

A. E. Ritchie, Canadian
Ambassador
Miss Dorothy Burwash,
Counselor

US

Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs
Rufus Z. Smith, Director, EUR/CAN
Alan R. Novak, Special Asst., M

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INR - 10

EUR

EUR/CAN

Interior Dept.

DOD

Embassy Ottawa

Under Secretary Rostow began the conversation by saying that he had asked the Ambassador to call in order to discuss, among other things, the current status of our Law of the Sea discussions. Referring to the Canadian Aide-Memoire of May 4, 1967, Mr. Rostow said that our experts had studied it carefully but simply were not persuaded that the Canadian Government had made a convincing case. We were willing to study the matter further and to examine any other evidence that might be adduced, but as of now at any rate we simply could not accept certain of the lines which Canada proposed to draw with regard to certain bays of Newfoundland.

Secondly, Mr. Rostow stressed that there were matters of principle involved to which the US attached very great importance. We were engaged in discussions with the States of Alaska and Louisiana and were taking a firm position against certain moves they proposed to take with regard to territorial waters. A very important principle was involved about which we could not be inconsistent, and we would therefore have to take a clear and firm position in the Canadian case as well.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

72

Wednesday - October 25, 1967
7:30 pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk's office has raised the question whether the Secretary should plan to be on hand for your 5:00 p.m. meeting with President Diaz Ordaz *tomorrow*.

You have asked the Secretary to see Congressman Ryan and the 29 co-signers of the letter on Vietnam as soon as possible. He can do this tomorrow at 6:00 p.m., but it would require that he leave here around 5:45.

I assume that in this particular case with Carrillo Flores present, you would want him to be here even if it is for only part of the time.

W. W. Rostow

Would like for him to
come for as long as he
can. _____.

OK if he does not
come _____.

73

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
6:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Locke's talk with Marcos
on issues other than the equipment for
the engineer construction battalions.

W. W. Rostow

Manila 3760

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 11-7-91

~~SECRET~~

73

Tuesday, October 24, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE (Manila 3760)

I had an over 2-hour private talk with Philippine President Marcos on Sunday, October 22. No one else was present.

President Marcos intends to secure an appropriation for existing Philippine Civic Action Group replacement after the impending elections.

With respect to Vietnam, help from the Philippines, in addition to existing Philippine Civic Action Group:

A. President Marcos said combat troops are not politically possible.

B. President Marcos suggested an "Operation Brotherhood" similar to the Laos Operation as an addition to the existing Philippine Civic Action Group. He did not mention the De Vencia Proposals.

C. I indicated this is not feasible because: (1) It does not fulfill the U. S. need for further troop participation from Asian countries; (2) It is a civilian-aid type project, which would require the cooperation, approval and greater involvement of the Government of Vietnam and, (3) It is an AID-financed project, and AID is having trouble financing our own projects in Vietnam without taking on anything new.

D. The most likely projects appeared to be: (1) Another Philippine Civic Action Group or (2) Army engineering battalions divorced from a civic action concept which could build roads, bridges, etc. Military Assistance Command in Vietnam would prefer a combat battalion to another Philippine Civic Action Group. Therefore, I pushed the idea of an engineering battalion to guard, build, maintain roads, etc., but did not use word "combat" to describe battalion. This strategy is a product of a long briefing session with Embassy Manila the previous night, it being thought the word "combat" might kill the idea before it started. I made it clear we wanted an "army" battalion.

E. Marcos would not have money to finance, and would not want us to finance directly because of possible charges of our hiring "mercenaries." He thought it might be possible if we financed indirectly by financing work in the Philippines which otherwise he would have to finance.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-451
By CG, NARA, Date 3-30-95

F. Marcos said he would study the matter. I made it plain I could not commit the U. S. and that our discussion was only an attempt to find possible solutions for our mutual problems that were at least worthy of his study and of my submission to Washington.

The following morning I had a discussion with Secretary Ramos and De Vencia. Ramos and Secretary of Defense Mata had a talk with President Marcos at length after I left. Secretary Ramos said:

A. The President is agreeable, in principle, to the army engineering battalion concept and also to sending engineering battalion concept and also to sending engineering specialists as "observers".

B. The President is prepared to seek an appropriation for this purpose if we will build certain roads near Clark Field.

Ramos said these would have the military value of (1) speeding up traffic between Clark Field and Manila; (2) extending roads into Huk territory, thus helping the government deal with the Huks. Ramos mentioned a diversionary road north of Clark to relieve traffic. Marcos had mentioned the Clark to Subic Bay route.

Secretary Ramos will be in Saigon for the Thieu inauguration. He will come armed with maps and details of roads. I will have General Westmoreland come up with the nuts and bolts of the desired battalions. The plan is for General Westmoreland, or perhaps his appropriate staff man, Ramos, and me to discuss the details and costs October 29 in Saigon. I discussed this with Embassy Manila which was agreeable. If the matter proceeds to the proper point, discussions will then naturally shift to Embassy Manila and to various appropriate Philippine officials after the elections. Ramos is informed I cannot make a commitment and the present stage is one of discussion only.

Other matters discussed by Marcos were:

A. A Japanese agreement to finance part of the projected new road system. The Japanese Prime Minister will send Japanese private contractors to Manila to negotiate construction contracts. Marcos did not mention an amount, but De Vencia had previously mentioned \$60,000,000 and this was confirmed by the newspapers.

B. The Marcos desire that United States contractors come to Manila to negotiate construction contracts for roads. He said he would guarantee them there would be no under-the-table payoffs, the fear of which he believes has prevented U. S. contractors from being interested in the past. (This statement he also made in front of a group of his Ministers and U. S. Charge D'Affaires

Wilson with whom he discussed some matters in my presence after our private talk.) I told him I would inform Washington of his desires. I was thinking the Department of Commerce might be interested. I also suggested that through the Philippine Bank or the Philippine Embassy in the U. S., he could probably get information on road contractors in the Federal Highway System and Dunn and Bradstreet reports on those interested. I surmise one of his interests in U. S. contractors is that they might make it easier to finance his road program. I understand U. S. contractors would have to take Philippine contractors as joint venturers and that the Philippine Bank guarantees might be available for highly qualified and reputable companies.

C. The Marcos desire that U. S. Armed Forces at Clark conduct a civil action program to help hamlets in the area. This is to be part of anti-Huk work and part of a program to improve the U. S. image, as "good work done" stories could be leaked to the press. He is thinking of help with farm roads, irrigation ditches, schools -- small and scattered work -- a completely U. S. program. (I understand from Embassy Manila such a program is now contemplated.)

D. Marcos said the Huks in the provinces are known and could be picked up but are connected with intellectuals in Manila whom he wished to identify first. The Huks are now supporting political candidates, and he is supporting the best candidates to oppose them without reference to party lines. Candidates deny a connection with the Huks or that they seek Huk support, and he has told them that if they get elected and help the Huks, he will clamp down. The Huks infiltrated guards at Clark, necessitating his using the constabulary to guard the base. Also some accommodation with lower army echelons, necessitating his change of army units in the area. Also some Huks have had M-16 weapons.

E. Discussion was held of the situation in Vietnam (I said progress is being made in all respects), of peace negotiations (I said no sign of change in attitude by Hanoi) of the importance of Vietnam to all Asia (he agreed, and said all Asian leaders agreed. He said even Sukarno had told him he was glad of the U. S. presence in Asia and that Sukarno claimed he was "using" the Communists). It is possible, if Washington thinks it useful, that he might be willing to start a movement toward negotiation for a limited purpose of prisoner exchange.

Before leaving Vietnam, I had discussed various proposals with the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam, Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development, and the Agency for International Development for Philippine help in technical and civilian fields. I did not discuss these with President Marcos because I did not want to confuse the engineering battalion issue. De Venecia

thinks it important to have the civilian "mix" with the military aid. Probably this will come up when Secretary Ramos comes to Vietnam. I will send a separate message about this.

So far, there have been no press leaks. The President's lunch at the Palace was very small, and included U. S. Charge Wilson and his wife. The only sizeable party (about 50) was given by Secretary and Mrs. Ramos and Mrs. Perez (widow of former House Speaker and mother-in-law of De Vencia) at Mrs. Perez' home. Presumably, only friends of the government were invited and they were not necessarily told of the Presidential invitation.

74

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
6:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This report of Vietnamese
attitudes is interesting.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

74a

Saigon, October 17, 1967

The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to
The President
The White House

Dear Walt:

Enclosed herewith is Barry Zorthian's first "Nationwide Hamlet Survey," which was taken on various subjects in 14 hamlets in Thua Thien Province and 12 hamlets in Quang Tin Province in I Corps. He is in the process of taking similar surveys in the other three Corps.

The following are conclusions in which you would be particularly interested:

1. Seven in ten people welcome the American presence in Viet-Nam, mainly for military reasons, and partly for economic and other aid. Less than one in ten (six percent) do not welcome the Americans here, the remainder rendering no opinion (pages 2 and 7).
2. Nearly ten times as many people blame the war on North Viet-Nam, Communist China, the VC and Soviet Russia as on the United States. Fifty-four percent blame the war on one of the mentioned Communist forces, only six percent on the U.S., and 40 percent don't know (page 6).
3. Villagers who say their life is worse now than it was a year ago outweigh those who say it is better--by a ratio of two to one. Negative appraisals are based

mainly on inflation and poor harvests (pages 2 and 12). (It is to be noted that I Corps is the one area where the war has greatly intensified over the last year. Therefore, it will be interesting to see how other Corps villagers answer this question.)


4. The VC image is bad. One-third describe the VC as "brutal," "inhuman," "murderous," "subversive," "tyrannical," "terroristic," etc.; another one-third describe the VC as dominated by Communist China or Soviet Russia; one-fourth express no opinion; and one-fifth simply state the VC are Vietnamese (page 8).

5. The Revolutionary Development program is widely known (two-thirds of the villagers) and the image of Revolutionary Development Cadre is by and large favorable, both in terms of their personal behavior and usefulness (only one percent derogatory and most of the remainder complimentary).

6. The report deals with a number of other subjects, as indicated in the Table of Contents. The above mentioned information may be useful in connection with our program to get the facts known.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



Eugene M. Locke
Deputy Ambassador

Enclosure:
JUSPAO Research Report dated
10 October 1967

746

JUSPAO RESEARCH REPORT
10 October 1967

NATIONWIDE HAMLET SURVEY

(First Interim Summary Report - I Corps)

DISTRIBUTION: Limited

PUBLISHED BY:
JUSPAO PLANNING OFFICE
SAIGON, VIETNAM

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- (b) The Agricultural Credit Program
- (c) Other Programs

4. Situation and Aspirations

I. INTRODUCTION

During the period July - September 1967, the Saigon Center for Vietnamese Studies, under JUSPAO supervision, conducted a survey in some 120 hamlets throughout the Republic of Vietnam. They are located in 15 provinces spread through all four Corps regions. The number of respondents totaled more than 1200.

The localities and respondents were sampled in accordance with random methods and in consideration of the population spread. The questionnaire was structured by JUSPAO in coordination with other offices engaged in Psyops and RD policy and program work. It should be borne in mind, however, that the survey had to be restricted to localities which are reasonably secure and accessible.

This is the first of four interim summary reports. It covers I Corps and is based upon the tabulated responses of 218 interviewees sampled in the two provinces of Thua-Thien and Quang Tin. Interviewing was carried out during the first two weeks of July 1967 in the following 25 hamlets:

Thua Thien Province

Ming Thanh, The Lai Thuong, Lai Khe, Bao Vinh, Trieu Son Tay, Duc Bau, Doc So, La Y, Trung Dong, Mau Tai, Lai Triem, Tan My, Van Tan My, An Ninh.

Quang Tin Province

Van Long, Dan Ha, Dan Trung, Doan Trai, My Thach, An Tay, Thanh Long, An Tan, Long Phu, Long Binh, Dong Yen

Similar interim summary reports will be issued for each of the other three regions plus a final interpretative report. Detailed tabulations will be available at the Survey Research Branch of the JUSPAO Planning Office.

II. HIGHLIGHTS

..... Loudspeaker systems are the dominant source of information on inside-district events, radio on outside-district events. BBC and VOA are the only foreign stations with at least a limited audience

..... Newspapers play a very small role, but the survey underscores the effectiveness of Huong Que magazine

..... A large majority are undecided or reluctant as to suggestions on how to end the war and only very few foresee an early end

..... Seven-in-ten people welcome the American presence in Vietnam, mainly for military reasons, and partly in consideration of economic and other aid

..... The way GVN and Allied forces treat villagers and their property is seen as a prime factor in fighting the Viet Cong effectively

..... Villagers who say their life is worse now than it was a year ago outweigh those who say it is better - by a ratio of 2:1. Negative appraisals are based mainly on inflation and poor harvests. The future outlook is also lackluster

..... Public utilities and security rank highest in hopes and wishes for the future of the hamlets, while greater income and prosperity rank highest in personal aspirations

..... The Revolutionary Development (Rural Reconstruction) Program is widely known, although only a limited number of hamlets have so far experienced its implementation. The image of RD cadre is by and large favorable, both in terms of their personal behavior and usefulness

..... Knowledge about the Government's Land Title and Tenure Program is rather limited in range and substance, even though three-fourths of all respondents do not own the land they till

..... Only half of all respondents have some notions of the land ownership and title concept, but many more react in a positive vein after a brief explanation of the Program's basic objective

..... Most respondents are familiar with the Agricultural Credit Program, and only a minority finds faults with it

..... Loan programs on the whole top the list of Government programs deemed most useful

..... There is little cognizance of the Constitution and even less substantive information on it

..... The great majority is satisfied with the local hamlet elections of early 1967, in terms of their process as well as prior information which was received mainly through VIS cadre and loudspeaker systems

..... The ordinary people in hamlets are seen as the major factor in helping refugees resettle satisfactorily

..... The Chieu Hoi Program is widely known and there is still some good potential for people in hamlets appealing to relatives in VC ranks

..... The Viet Cong image is largely a derogatory one, yet, a substantial minority among the respondents are non-committal

III. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

1. Media

(a) Information on events inside the District.

Loudspeaker systems top all other media, as 51% of all respondents list them as their usual source. Person-to-person communications rank next with 45%, radio third with 26%. Bulletin boards (18%) and mass meetings organized by GVN cadre (13%) are next in line. Newspapers and magazines rank very low, with 3% and 2% respectively.

Credibility ratings run along a similar pattern, with loudspeakers outweighing person-to-person communications and radio each at a 2:1 ratio and bulletin boards and mass meetings each by more than 3:1.

(b) Information on events outside the District.

Here, radio is the dominant source, as listed by 66% of all respondents. Next, but far behind, are person-to-person communications (24%), newspapers (22%), loudspeakers (18%), bulletin boards (12%), magazines (7%), newsreels (6%) and GVN cadre (5%). (Television was included in the list shown to the respondents, but was not checked by any of them).

Credibility ratings run similarly, with radio clearly outweighing all other sources. Almost as many who list radio as their usual source also say they receive most of their information from it.

(c) Radio listening

Forty-four percent of all respondents own a radio and an additional 18% have access to a radio where they live. Nearly all of these two groups (56%) say they listen to radio every day; the others listen at lesser intervals, except for 17% who say they never listen to radio.

The most listened-to stations are Hue (65%) and VTVN (62%). Thirty-six percent listen to VOF, 29% to Radio ARVN. The only foreign stations usually listened to are BBC, listed by 14%, and VOA, listed by 8%.

VTVN is the best liked station, as stated by 24%. Next are the Hue Station (18%), VOF (8%) and BBC (7%). Less than 1% list VOA as the station they like best. The chief criteria for liking a station best are its attractive programs, fast and wide news coverage and strong and clear signals - in the order as stated here.

IV. THE WAR

1. Outlook

Only 4% of the respondents think the war will be over in less than a year. Ten percent expect it to last from one to five years, 14% more than five years. The vast majority of 72%, however, say they do not know.

A plurality of 40% say they do not know who is responsible for the continuation of the war. The others place the blame mainly upon the Government of North Vietnam (39%) and Communist China (28%) whereas 23% blame the Viet Cong in the South and 17% blame Soviet Russia. The U.S. is held responsible by a small minority of 6%.

The chief reasons for the continuation of the war are seen in colonialism and ideological and economic expansionism. As many as two-thirds of all respondents seem undecided or reluctant to offer any suggestion on how to bring the war to an end. Of those who do, a plurality of 16% advocate intensification of the war, whereas 10% advocate negotiations, and the small remainder come up with various irrelevant points. It is interesting to note in this context that, whatever the suggestions offered, twice as many people want the GVN to "do it" as want the U.S. to "do it."

2. Allied Aircraft/Artillery Attacks on Hamlets.

Twenty-two percent of all respondents say their hamlets were at some time or other struck by artillery or aircraft fire. About half of that group attribute the attacks to GVN forces, the other half to the Americans. Most say they do not know the reason for such attacks or blame them on stray shells. A few see the attacks as aimed at the enemy or at preventing VC penetration; only 1% say their hamlet was attacked by mistake.

Eight percent say civilians were killed, 5% say civilians were injured in such attacks. Three percent say the victims received compensation. Only 2% feel the casualties were unavoidable. The others are uncertain or think the armed forces could have fired more carefully. As to whether these strikes altogether could have been avoided, most of the respondents concerned are uncertain (14%), the others (8%) are halfway divided in yes and no.

3. Security

Only six percent of all respondents say their hamlets are not protected by any friendly forces. Eighty-two percent say their localities are protected by Popular Forces or self-defense militia, 26% by Regional Forces, 22% by Armed Youth, 13% by American forces, 5% by others. (Many of these respondents mentioned more than one category).

(d) Newspaper and magazine reading

Sixty-six percent of all respondents never read a newspaper. Only 2% read one every day, the others at lesser intervals.

Huong Que magazine, on the other hand, is read by 25% and an additional 4% have it read to them or just look at the pictures. Only 3%, however, say they receive the magazine regularly. Less than half of all readers are able to keep copies, while most have to share them with other people.

The majority of Huong Que readers (15%) obtain their copies from military units or government services; nine percent borrow them from other people; only 2% read them in an information office, hamlet office or reading room.

In reference to the format of Huong Que, eleven percent of the respondents like its "nice and clear" pictures best. The quality of paper and print and the "attractive" cover pages, are specifically praised. As to contents, the majority of readers (18%) like articles on agriculture best, and 12% refer specifically to animal husbandry in this connection. There are virtually no suggestions as to changes in contents.

2. VIS Cadre

Four-in-ten respondents say cadre of the VIS have been or are working in their hamlets. When asked to describe their functions, most (27%) say the cadre give information, 14% say they show films, 11% say they make propaganda and 7% say they organize mass meetings. The impact of mass meetings is underscored by the fact that 18% ask for more of them.

3. Cultural/Drama Teams

Two-in-ten respondents say their hamlets have at some time or other been visited by cultural/drama teams. Half of them (11%) attended performances of such teams. The other half give lack of spare time as the main reason for not attending. Nearly all of those who attended were favorably impressed, with 7% describing the performances as interesting and useful and 2% stating specifically that they gained a better understanding of government policies from them.

Seventy-five percent are satisfied with the way the forces protect their hamlets; only 4% are not, the others are not certain. Eighty-eight percent, in fact, say they and their families feel safe going out of the hamlet to tend their fields. The others do not feel safe going out or have no outside fields to take care of.

As for the personal behavior of local troops, only 6% of the respondents say they are dissatisfied, partly because of arrogant behavior and partly because of the troops' disregard for personal property. Seventy-eight percent, however, say they are satisfied.

4. American and Allied Presence in Vietnam

Seventy-one percent say they welcome the presence of the American forces in their country; only 6% say they do not, yet, 23% are either undecided or reluctant to commit themselves on this point, saying they do not know. Half of all respondents welcome the American presence because it aids the fight against the communists and assures security and peace for them. The others focus on economic and other aid aspects.

When asked what the forces of the GVN and its Allies should do to fight the Viet Cong more effectively, the majority of 60% express no opinion. Among the others, a plurality of 15% stress the need for a fair and sympathetic attitude toward the people to "win their hearts", 11% call for adequate security through encampment in villages, etc., and 9% suggest intensified military pressure.

About half of all respondents express no views on what the forces of the GVN and its Allies should refrain from doing in order to fight the Viet Cong effectively. Among the others, the vast majority focus on the disrespect for people's lives and properties and on impolite acts and attitudes; seven percent urge no more random shooting or shelling and an equivalent proportion criticize the lack of discipline, such as drunkenness or misbehavior toward women. Only 2% specify defoliation as a practice that should be discontinued.

5. Refugees

About half of the respondents say there are refugees living in their hamlets. Only 6% of all respondents are refugees themselves.

A plurality of 28% feel refugees in their hamlets are satisfactorily settled, 17% feel they are not, mainly because they have not received any assistance and have to live on their own and on assistance by other people in the hamlet.

When asked who helped the refugees most in settling in their hamlets, only 9% of all respondents mention the government or local authorities and another 9% mention relatives, whereas 21% say the people in the hamlets helped them most.

6. The Viet Cong Image

When asked to describe in a few words what a Viet Cong is and what he does, one third of the respondents use such derogatory terms as "brutal", "inhuman", "murderous", "subversive", "tyrannical", "terroristic"; another third describe the Viet Cong as subservient to Communist China, to Soviet Russia, as totalitarian and as dominated by communist ideology. One fourth express no opinion at all and one-fifth simply state the Viet Cong are Vietnamese.

7. The Chieu Hoi Program

Two thirds of the respondents have heard of the Government's Chieu Hoi Program, and nearly all of them can describe what they heard. A plurality of 34% say they heard the Program provided assistance and fair treatment by the government; twenty-nine percent say it meant return to the national government, to the national cause; eighteen percent recall the government's appeal to come back to one's family; thirteen percent stress the element of amnesty and government generosity; four percent recall the promise of rewards by the government and 3% the government's call to come back to avoid death.

Only 1% of all respondents have some suggestions on how the Chieu Hoi Program could be improved and made more effective. They call for better livelihood provision for returnees and for better and wider dissemination of the Chieu Hoi appeal, including use of better broadcasting equipment.

When asked what people like themselves could do in connection with the Chieu Hoi Program, only 15% respond affirmatively; nearly all of them think that they could effectively appeal to relatives still in Viet Cong ranks.

V. CIVIC AFFAIRS

1. Hamlet Elections

Virtually all are cognizant of the hamlet elections conducted in the spring of 1967 and 87% say they voted in these elections. Most of the non-voters explain that they had no voting card, being either too young or too new in the hamlet; the few others say they were away on election day or too old or sick or too preoccupied at home to go to the polls.

Eighty-seven percent state that they are personally satisfied with the way the hamlet elections were conducted, 9% are not sure and only 3% express dissatisfaction. They are divided in a few who say there were not enough candidates to choose from and a few who merely describe the election as unfair and undemocratic.

Eighty-seven percent also voice satisfaction over the individuals elected. Ten percent are not sure and the few who say they are dissatisfied base this mainly on candidates' mediocre qualities.

Eighty-eight percent think they had all the necessary information about the election before it took place. The balance are halfway divided among some who do not know whether they had all the information and a few who feel they did not have it, but do not seem to know why. The majority of 57% received their information in mass meetings organized by VIS cadre, 38% through loudspeaker broadcasts, 8% through radio, 7% through leaflets, posters, bulletin boards, and 4% through other people.

2. The Constitution

Two-thirds of the respondents never heard about the Constitution of the Republic of Viet Nam which was promulgated earlier in 1967. One-third heard about it, mainly through radio (22%), but also through GVN cadre (12%), newspapers (4%), and other people (4%).

Nevertheless, only about 13% are able to say what they heard about the Constitution and their knowledge is very superficial. They merely recall that the Constitution is "the country's law", "the government system", or "freedom, democracy".

However, when asked what the Constitution meant to them personally, most of those who say they had heard about it seem to have some meaningful concepts. Twelve percent say the Constitution protects the citizens' rights and properties; ten percent see freedom and democracy in it; and 2% associate it with social justice.

VI. ASPECTS OF REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. General Reactions

Two-thirds of the respondents say they have heard about the RD/Rural Reconstruction Program currently being conducted by the GVN.

Seventeen percent of all respondents say RD cadre have been or are working in their hamlets and another 33% say they heard of such cadre working in other hamlets.

Only 1% comment derogatorily about the personal behavior of these cadre, saying they take things away without paying. All others comment favorably, emphasizing particularly the cadre's nice, polite, and cheerful behavior.

Only 4% say the cadre are not useful at all to the people in a hamlet, whereas 22% stress their help to the community (building roads, markets, schools, wells, etc.), 11% point out their help to individuals (assisting them in building or repairing homes), 8% stress their help in agriculture and animal husbandry, 6% stress their educational and hygiene work, 5% their help in paper work and in dealing with local authorities, and 5% their role in providing security.

2. General Suggestions

After listening to a brief explanation of the basic RD objectives, all respondents were asked what they thought should be done in their respective hamlet to achieve these objectives. A plurality of 35% suggest building or repairing public facilities and utilities, such as roads, bridges, canals, electrical systems, etc.; 28% suggest the supply and low-cost sale of agricultural and fishery implements, including buffaloes, fertilizers, sampans, etc.; 13% suggest more public buildings to house dispensaries, schools, information offices, hamlet offices, etc.; 13% suggest helping needy people with jobs, food, medicines, etc.; 8% suggest the supply and low-cost sale of construction materials to individual villagers; 5% just suggest loans in general and another 5% suggest providing security to hamlets.

Among the 17% who said that RD cadre were or had been working in their hamlets, only 2% felt that the Program (a) lacked realism and consistency and (b) should not exert contributions in money or labor from the villagers.

3. Agricultural Reform and Related Programs

(a) The Land Title and Tenure Program

One fourth of all respondents own the land they till, three-fourths do not. When asked what it does - or would - mean to them personally to own land and hold permanent title to it, half of all respondents say they do not know. The views expressed by the others are all of practical nature without idealistic overtones. Twenty-two percent say they would not have to rent land and be exploited by the rich; eighteen percent say they would have enough to eat; twelve percent say they could use the ricefields any way they liked; six percent say they would work carefully and get good harvests.

Only 13% know about the Government's Land Title and Tenure program, but their knowledge is spotty. Eight percent say it means purchasing land by installments and the others say it provides farming loans and sales of fertilizers and vehicles.

After listening to a brief explanation of the Program, three-fourths of all respondents say they approve of it, one fourth express no opinion. The main reasons for approval are "villagers would have rice fields of their own and rights on them" (23%), "villagers would have enough to eat, higher living standards" (18%), "villagers would not have to rent rice fields and be exploited by the rich" (16%), "poorer farmers would not have to work for others" (5%) and "the gap between the rich and poor classes would be reduced" (5%).

(b) The Agricultural Credit Program

Sixty-two percent say they know about this government program, with 40% viewing it as an opportunity for low interest funding. Fourteen percent criticize it because the loans are inadequate, too selective, or badly timed in issuance and repayment; six percent criticize its practices as unfair and bureaucratic.

(c) Other Programs

Only 15% know of any other current Government programs to help farmers, e.g. animal husbandry and breeding assistance and distribution or sales of seeds, fertilizers, insecticide, agricultural or fishery implements. Most of them react favorably to these programs, while 3% merely say the results are not good.

As far as their respective hamlets are concerned 26% of all respondents deem loan programs "most useful". Ten percent give this label to programs supplying implements at low prices, 10% to public utility programs, 8% to title-ownership programs and 4% to animal husbandry programs. Very few mention programs as "least useful".

When asked what other measures should be taken by the authorities to help hamlet people improve their lives, one third of all respondents say they do not know. Most of the others speak in such generalities as help to needy villagers (24%), public utilities (22%) and help in agriculture (17%).

4. Economic Situation and Aspirations

Forty percent of all respondents think their life is worse now than it was a year ago, while only 20% think it is better. Thirty-nine percent think it is about the same. Higher income, good crops and higher wages (12%) and better and more secure roads (5%) are the main reasons for the favorable appraisal. Inflation (19%), poor harvests, low wages (16%) and defoliation plus road and air strip construction (8%) account chiefly for the negative appraisal.

The future outlook is also dim. Only 9% think their life will be better in a year from now than it is today; thirteen percent think it will be worse; twenty-nine percent think it will be about the same and 49% have no opinion at all. Higher income (5%) and more security (3%) are the main reasons for optimism. Poor harvest, drought (4%), defoliation (3%), insecurity (3%) and inflation (3%) account chiefly for the pessimism.

Among the respondents' hopes and wishes for the future of their hamlets, public utilities and security rank highest, with 36% and 28%, respectively. Next in line are low-cost sales and loans (19%), public buildings, i.e. schools, dispensaries, etc. (16%), and no more damage from defoliation and construction of roads and air strips (8%).

Most of the hopes and wishes for their own and their families' future center on income and prosperity (49%), but they also concern health (11%), educational advancement (10%), real estate and properties (10%), the family's happiness in general (9%), better agriculture (7%), employment (6%) and a normal secure life at the regular place of residence (5%).

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You may be interested in
President Diaz Ordaz' response to this
CIA briefing.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ. 94-454
By ig, NARA, Date 10-23-95

WWRostow:rlh

76

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
6:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker's latest
weekly.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 9529

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By eg, NARA, Date 11-7-91

Wednesday, October 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 9529)

Herewith my twenty-sixth weekly telegram:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-451
By Cb, NARA, Date 3-30-95

A. General

The elections for the Lower House which were successfully completed on October 22 marks the fifth time the Vietnamese people have gone to the polls within the last fourteen months. With the country at war, this fact in itself seems to me a truly remarkable performance. What is equally significant is the high percentage of the registered voters which went to the polls in spite of the massive efforts of the Viet Cong, especially in the Presidential elections on September 3, to disrupt the polling through terror and threat. This fact, together with the large number of candidates for seats in both houses of the Assembly, seemed evidence of a great interest in the democratic process on the part of the Vietnamese people. With the completion of the elections for the Lower House, we are on the threshold now of seeing the establishment of a functioning, constitutional government with a demonstrable democratic base and the development of all the other organs of democratic representative government. The village and hamlet elections, which took place last spring and summer, in which some 14,000 local officials were elected and are now being trained in the processes of government, is an equally significant development. It marks the reinstitution of local government, of getting the people involved in their own development, and in their own well being.

In addition to the inauguration and organization of the new government (Thieu told me yesterday that he expects to announce his Cabinet at the time of the inauguration or immediately thereafter), the Senate and the House will have to complete their respective organizations. In the case of the Senate, it is anticipated that this will not be completed until about November 20. In the case of the House, it will probably take longer and I imagine that we cannot expect its organization to be completed until the end of November.

Now we must concentrate on the urgent question of priority programs which should be undertaken by the new government. We recognize that there are both first stage and second stage priorities which need to be considered. Sometimes these are overlapping or closely related in terms of getting the new government moving on the most urgent and important tasks. We are agreed that the primary emphasis now should be on certain first stage priorities, including programs which will have impact during the immediate period ahead. In this connection, it is encouraging that both Thieu and Ky are conscious of the fact that the new

government must begin to show visible results in the near future. As Thieu has said to me, "the next six months will be critical in our ability to demonstrate progress to the people and to gain their support". And again he said to me only last week, "it is imperative that we Vietnamese do more, militarily, in the reorganization of our armed forces and of our civil administration, in the attack on corruption, in pacification, and in moving ahead with the social revolution in order to shorten the war."

Using the next six months as an arbitrary period, within which we need to see concrete results, we are agreed on the following objectives which we have spelled out in some detail in a previous telegram. Priority headings are:

- A. Mobilization measures, such as lowering the draft age, extending service and recalling certain demobilized personnel;
- B. Reorganization and improvement of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, including leadership, training, improved logistics, morale services, veterans' programs;
- C. Reorganization of the civil administration, including improved pay scales, improving government control, training and quality (through replacement of Province Chiefs);
- D. Via pacification measures additional to the above, including attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure, related detention center expansion and legal and judicial matters;
- E. Attack on corruption at all levels;
- F. Economic stabilization measures, including increased taxes, particularly on gasoline, and higher resale prices for U. S. rice;
- G. Peace issue, to include willingness to seek a peaceful settlement as continuing Government of Vietnam policy, and positive steps to seek out members of the National Liberation Front and to initiate discussions and move toward reintegration through the national reconciliation program.

With the exception of the economic stabilization objective, all of the other "first phase" objectives have been mentioned to me by Thieu and Ky in recent talks with them although not spelled out in as much detail as in a previous telegram. As I mentioned in my weekly telegram of September 27, I submitted to Thieu on September 24 a document entitled "Democracy, Peace, and Social Justice" as a dynamic thirteen-point program designed to achieve democracy, peace, and social justice and the development of the nation. In addition to the first phase of priority objectives mentioned above, other objectives included:

- A. The evolution of the constitutional and party processes;
- B. Full utilization of manpower resources;
- C. Agriculture, including steps to increase production, land reform, and other measures to improve the lot of the rural dweller;
- D. Industry;
- E. Improvement of the cities, including self-help urban renewal;
- F. Education, increasing training of teachers and providing adequate school facilities;
- G. Youth. The government pledges to serve youth and to be open to youth, assuring an important place in the government for young men and women, and establishment of a new and expanded ministry of youth.

In my talk yesterday with Thieu, in addition to expressing general satisfaction with the preliminary results of the Lower House elections, he confirmed to me that he has empowered Nguyen Van Loc to seek to form a government. Thieu said he had given Loc several suggested names for each Cabinet portfolio, but that Loc may run into some problems in assembling a broadly representative Cabinet, since some of the southern Vietnamese are not particularly anxious to serve under him. Thieu was fairly confident this is not because of any fundamental aversion to him, but rather as a result of the widely-held belief that he will be essentially subservient to General Ky, who has never been popular with the southerners.

As to some indicators of the new cabinet, General Thieu's brother told us last week that Tran Van Do will probably remain as Foreign Minister, with the present Government of Vietnam Ambassador to Australia and New Zealand, Tran Kim Phuong, and the Ambassador to the Philippines, Pham Dang Lam, being appointed as his immediate subordinates to strengthen the foreign ministry. Both Phuong and Lam are able and experienced, particularly Lam, who was Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry from 1957-1963 and was Foreign Minister on two occasions in the Cabinets which followed the fall of the Diem Government. Lam is considered one of the most capable of the Government of Vietnam's diplomatic officers. General Thieu's brother also told us that Tran Van An, a respected civilian member of the Directory, may be appointed Minister for Information and Chieu Hoi. In addition, Tran Van Huong, the defeated but highly respected Presidential candidate, has apparently agreed to become a member of the Inspectorate, the body charged with investigating and making recommendations on cases involving corruption. In view of his reputation, he would probably become Chairman. An approach is also expected to be

made to Ha Thuc Ky, the defeated Dai Viet Presidential candidate, to discuss a possible government position for him, perhaps that of Government Delegate in the First Corps.

In separate conversations with Generals Thieu and Ky over the last ten days, I have discussed with them suggestions for the issuance of certain decrees before the inauguration of the new government, in order to maintain forward momentum. The decrees would deal with: (1) increased taxes on petroleum products; (2) increase in pay for police; (3) an executive and military pay rise; (4) extension of military service and broadening the draft ages to 18-33 years. Ky agreed in principle with the first three proposals and said he would try to seed action by decree. Thieu said he would sign the decree on extension of military service and broadening of the draft ages on October 24 and Ky later told me this had been done.

In last week's telegram I mentioned to you that I had discussed with General Thieu on October 17, during a call in which I was accompanied by Phil Habib and Bill Jorden, the approach to Hanoi which Thieu committed himself to publicly during the election campaign. Although the approach has not, of course, yet been made, the Viet Cong's "Liberation Radio" on October 10 unceremoniously rejected General Thieu's reported offer in advance. The Viet Cong radio reiterated the National Liberation Front position in standard language and did not remark on the fact that the letter would be addressed to Ho Chi Minh, rather than to the Front. How definitive this "rejection" is cannot be estimated, but it is hardly surprising.

In a generally related development, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do stated in an interview published by Vietnam Press October 19 that: (1) The threat of Communism concerns not only Vietnam but all of Southeast Asia; (2) all troop contributing nations in the South Vietnam "will attend" any peace negotiations; (3) the Government of Vietnam will play the "main role in any peace talks"; (4) agreed with the Thai Deputy Prime Minister's insistence that allied nations participate in the negotiations and that the Thai troops are in South Vietnam because of the common Communist threat; and (5) stated that recent allied troop increases are not escalation but are only to meet the requirements of the war. These statements appear to be addressed mainly to Vietnamese public opinion which is currently rather sensitive on Vietnamese sovereignty and prestige. They seem designed to underline the primacy of a Government of Vietnam role in any settlement of the war.

We are looking forward to the visit of the Vice President and his party for the inauguration of the newly-elected Government of Vietnam on October 31. His visit is a welcome symbol to the people and Government of South Vietnam of our steadfastness here, particularly in view of the continuing reports of opposition to our policies within the United States. The Vietnamese people, and even the

Vietnamese Government, cannot be expected to remain unmoved by the reports of demonstrations against the war in the United States, details of which are quickly available to them in the Saigon Press. I can readily appreciate that this is not the most convenient time for the Vice President to be absent from Washington, in the closing month of this session of Congress. However, his presence will be a significant contribution to our efforts here and will go far to reassure the Vietnamese.

B. Pacification

While statistics must always be treated with some reserve, especially where we get down to the basic hamlet level, our new hamlet evaluation system is providing an increasingly valuable picture of pacification at the cutting edge. For example, by September, over 80 percent of the population in 11 provinces was regarded as relatively secure. In 3 provinces between 50 percent and 79 percent of the population was relatively secure. Eight provinces have less than 50 percent secure population, the worst being An Xuyen (only 26 percent) in the far Delta and next worst being Quang Tin in the First Corps. During September, there were substantial gains in population pacified in six provinces, and significant losses in four -- especially Quang Ngai.

C. Political

Although full and official returns from the Lower House elections are not expected to be available until October 26, the general outline of the results is already available. Almost 4.3 million voters, or 72.9 percent of the total registered, cast their ballots for the 137 Deputies in the Lower House, in 53 constituencies. The voter turnout was quite good in most regions of the country, varying from 65 percent in Third Corps up to 80.9 percent in Second Corps. In Saigon itself, the turnout was only 57.8 percent, which brought the Third Corps figure down. In U. S. terms, at least, this is substantially better than we achieve in most Presidential election years.

In statistical terms, the initial return indicates that 35 Catholics (about 25 percent) and 52 Buddhists (about 38 percent) were elected, with the remaining 47 divided among Hoa Hao (13), Cao Dai (5), and Confucianists and others (presumably the rest). The Catholic showing is a strong one, well beyond their proportion of the population (about 10 percent) but much less conspicuous than the almost 50 percent they elected in the Upper House. The Buddhist showing is better than it was in the Upper House election, but not enough to cause alarm to the Catholics. In regional terms, there are 32 Deputies from North Vietnam (23 percent), 44 from Central Vietnam (31 percent), and 59 from South Vietnam (41 percent), with two others unknown as to regional origin. The Deputies average age is 39.

In terms of personalities, a number of fairly strong figures have emerged as winners in the Lower House. In Saigon, for example, there will be two vigorous representatives of the Southern Renaissance Movement, Ly Qui Chung and Nguyen Huu Chung, both in their late 20's. Ho Huu Tuong, a 57-year-old former Trotskyite and long-time neutralist, was also elected. Tuong is a well-known and somewhat symbolic figure, whose candidacy for the Upper House was initially rejected on grounds of neutralism and whose candidacy for the Lower House was rejected on the same grounds. It was then restored on appeal. His election helps to confer credibility on the election as a whole, and one well-known neutralist will certainly be no danger to the Republic under the circumstances. As a whole, I think there will be promising quality in the new House, and this was the view Thieu expressed to me.

As in the Upper House election, there was evidently a good deal of more or less random or irrational voting. The press reports that one university-educated Saigon woman was faced with the necessity of voting for six candidates out of 60 running in her district and said she knew only two. She voted for one she liked, ignored the other, and then "looked for five kind faces." (Candidates' photos appear on the ballot.)

The voter turnout took place despite some opposition from both non-Communist and Communist sources. Although there were few direct calls for a boycott from non-Communist sources, some of the smaller opposition parties in Saigon, such as the Socialist and Democratic Socialist (Hoa Hao), Parties withdrew their candidates in the Lower House elections as a protest against what they regarded as "manipulated" results in the Upper House campaign. This was essentially a sterile gesture, as ultimately 1,172 candidates remained in the race for the 137 seats, assuring the voters a broad choice. In Da Nang, a student opposition group called "Committee of Youth and Students Struggling for Democracy", which is closely associated with militant Buddhist groups there, denounced the elections of October 22 as a "rude slander by the Americans against the Vietnamese" and called for a boycott. This student group, which we have reason to believe has been infiltrated by the Viet Cong, had little effect on the outcome, for the voter turnout in Da Nang was 72.1 percent.

The Viet Cong and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, as expected, repeatedly denounced the whole election process in South Vietnam as a vain American effort to legalize the government in Saigon. A Nhan Dan (official Communist Party newspaper in Hanoi) commentary of October 22 noted that Vice President Humphrey is coming to the inauguration but added that "in spite of all these tricks, the Saigon puppets still remain puppets and stooges of the U. S. aggressors". The Viet Cong Liberation Radio stated that "any type of Lower House created by Thieu and Ky under U. S. instigation will be but a machine camouflaged with the

name of the people's representatives." Although the tone is as uncompromising as ever, Viet Cong/Democratic Republic of Vietnam action against the October 22 elections was much more limited than that against the September 3 elections. Voting at a refugee center in the First Corps was interrupted for about 30 minutes due to incoming mortar fire. However, voting resumed promptly there. There were three other incidents of mortarings near voting places in Quang Tri Province. A threat to assassinate General Thieu was placed in a voting envelope in one ward in Da Nang. The threat, which states that "the righteous cause is on the other side of the (seventeenth) parallel", makes it virtually certain that it was of Viet Cong origin.

The Buddhist issue continues to simmer on without resolution so far, which Tam Chau's announced decision on October 10 to suspend application of the July Charter to allow time for further discussions with other Buddhist groups and the Government of Vietnam has drawn no corresponding gesture from the extremist An Quang Pagoda group. According to Do Dang Cong, Secretary of the Directory, on October 19 General Thieu met with An Quang representatives Thich Thien Hoa and Thich Duc Nhuan. However, the An Quang representatives showed no sign of being prepared to make any concessions, holding out for a straight-out cancellation of the July Charter and reinstatement of the 1964 Buddhist Charter (under which Thich Tri Quang dominated all major Buddhist institutions). A meeting between General Thieu and Thich Tam Chau October 20 evidently led to an offer signed by Thich Tam Giac (one of Tam Chau's associates) on October 22 and directed to the An Quang Pagoda leaders, offering to meet with them at any time to discuss outstanding issues. As far as we are aware, there has been no response from the An Quang group, which has publicly referred to Thich Tam Chau as a "traitor". In a conversation with an Embassy officer October 21, An Quang leader, Thich Thien Minh, had some kind words to say regarding General Thieu but indicated the An Quang group believed they had a promise from Thieu to "solve" the charter problem no later than October 24. There was certainly no such promise made. The Directory made clear, in a public announcement issued October 24, that the two Buddhist factions had been unable to resolve their differences and that the problem of the charter remains unchanged. The Directory added that it hoped the two factions would sit down together and resolve the problem of the charter and pledged itself to do everything in its power to help the Buddhists achieve peace and harmony among themselves.

Meanwhile, a low level of irritations goes on. There was a small demonstration October 23, staged by about 100 Buddhist monks, egged on by An Quang activists, before the Province Chief's house in Gia Dinh Province, just outside the Saigon city limits. The monks were demanding the body of a Buddhist nun who burned herself to death October 22. The Province Chief explained that she had already been buried as no one claimed the body in the time prescribed by regulations. This apparently satisfied the chief monk of the principal Pagoda in Gia Dinh but not the An Quang extremists, who continued to insist that the body be exhumed

and given a more formal burial (with attendant hoopla, no doubt). Their demands were refused, although General Loan, Director-General of National Police, offered to cooperate in holding commemoration services. The monks eventually dispersed. Saigon police peacefully entered An Quang Pagoda October 20, seized copies of a newspaper entitled Tran Dau (struggle) which reportedly contained violently anti-Government of Vietnam articles, and sealed the press on which it was printed. The newspaper was reportedly edited by Thich Thien Hoa, one of the extremist faction, but it had not received permission to publish.

As I have mentioned, the Senate is engaged in the process of organizing. In its sessions of October 19, 20, 21, and 23, it approved the sending of messages to the national assemblies of allied nations, to the national assemblies of other friendly nations, to the Chairman of the U. N. General Assembly, to the people of the nation, and to the International Parliamentary Union. Senator Tranh Chanh Thanh, the Chairman of the Committee on Rules and Procedures, told an Embassy officer October 22 that it would be the latter part of November before the rules were completed. He expressed appreciation for the copy of the Senate rules which we provided him from the Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group library.

Editorial comment on the issue of Vietnamese sovereignty has continued to appear in the Saigon Press, much along the lines I mentioned in my last weekly telegram. The bulk of the commentary is addressed to alleged U. S. domination of Vietnamese internal affairs. We doubt this is having much impact on the population as a whole, in view of the limited number of Vietnamese outside Saigon who read the press, although there was some echo of the charges in the Lower House elections campaign and we can expect to hear more.

There were some echoes of the case of Truong Dinh Dzu this past week. You will recall that Dzu ran a strong second to General Thieu in the September 3 Presidential elections. Sentenced on September 15 to nine months in prison and payment of a substantial fine for bad checks and illegal currency transactions, he appealed to the court for reconsideration but again failed to appear personally. The sentence was confirmed October 20 by the same judge (a woman) who had originally sentenced him. He has 10 days in which to appeal the sentence. The initial appeal, which Dzu is almost certain to make, will be to the Court of Appeals, followed by a second appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The procedure being followed is fully in accordance with Vietnamese procedures, and public interest so far is minimal. Ha Thuc Ky, another of the defeated Presidential candidates, told us October 19 that one Vietnamese bar association will almost certainly disbar Dzu. Dzu's "democratic front" of opposition to the Government of Vietnam has shown no recent signs of life.

In addition to its reaction to the Lower House elections (noted above), Hanoi has also expressed itself on a number of other issues this week. Hanoi radio reported October 22 that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Foreign Ministry had issued a statement condemning the increases in troop contributions to Vietnam recently announced by Australia and New Zealand. The statement said that "should the Australian and New Zealand ruling circles obdurately continue to lend a hand to the U. S. aggressors in Vietnam, they would certainly step into the same path of inevitable failure as the U. S. aggressors". It predicted that "the people and progressive political circles in Australia and New Zealand would certainly step up their struggle and would not allow innocent youths in their countries to be turned into cannon fodder for the U. S. aggressors in Vietnam".

In much the same vein, Hanoi has been reporting with obvious relish and in great detail the current anti-war demonstrations in the U. S. Hanoi radio announced October 20 that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong had received an "American peace delegation" headed by one Tom Hayden, of whom we had not previously heard. Along the same line, Hanoi radio announced October 16 that a "South Vietnam people's committee for solidarity with the American people" had been founded in South Vietnam, apparently as an outgrowth of the September 6-12 Bratislava Conference which brought American leftists into contact with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and National Liberation Front personalities to "further develop the anti-war movement." We will probably hear more of this solidarity group.

Japanese Prime Minister Sato paid a short, four-hour visit to Saigon October 21, with the schedule abridged considerably from the 24-hour visit originally envisaged, due to the death of former Prime Minister Yoshida. Even so, the short visit achieved the purpose that Japanese Ambassador Nakayama told us was intended: to offer to be of help to the new Government of Vietnam and to its free world allies. Nakayama said he thought Sato's statements at earlier stops on his trip (in Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines) were clear evidence of this intention. He added that a primary reason for the Sato visit was to bring domestic Japanese opinion to recognize the reality of Japan's position and role in Asia and to understand the importance of their being involved both economically and politically in Asia's future. Although the visit was short, it seems to have achieved its purpose. Certainly, General Thieu had every reason to be satisfied at the language of the Joint Communique, which noted that "the Prime Minister of Japan expressed sympathy and understanding toward the efforts being made by the Vietnamese Government and people to ensure the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Vietnam".

D. Economic

Beginning this week, the economic indicators include a seasonally adjusted retail price index. On this basis, the seasonally adjusted index (January, 1965 equals 100) was 287, compared to the unadjusted index of 291. The index figure of 291

was virtually unchanged from last week's figure of 290. Most protein food and vegetable prices fell, as did rice, with increasing arrivals of local new crop rice and plentiful stocks of U. S. remilled rice on hand. The imported commodity index level was unchanged from last week's level of 219.

E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period was 338, again lower than the 1966 figure of 377 for the same period last year, but higher than last week's figure of 288. The total number of Chieu Hoi returnees so far this year is 24,214. Since the program began in 1963, a total of 72,245 returnees have rallied to the Government of Vietnam.

F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 21, the enemy killed 41 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 101, and kidnapped 75. Among the dead were three Revolutionary Development cadre, one Village Chief, two Hamlet Chiefs, the wife of a Hamlet Chief, and one candidate for the Lower House. During the week the enemy killed 81 Vietnamese military personnel. The Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,751 civilians, wounded 5,510 and kidnapped 3,812.

22
Pres file
22
Wednesday, August 25, 1967 -- 5:30 PM

Mr. President:

We have a request for a Presidential Statement to be used in the 1967 Colombo Plan Commemorative Volume. You sent a message for last year's book.

AID recommends that you send a message again this year. The Colombo Plan is very much in line with our own efforts to encourage self-help in the war on hunger.

A proposed message is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/Morris/vmr

PROPOSED MESSAGE FOR 1967 COLOMBO PLAN
COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME

The war on hunger and malnutrition is the urgent business of every nation in the world. It demands wise leadership, generous policy, and effective cooperation between nations. The Colombo Plan association combines all of these elements. It is a great event for mankind that the association has undertaken this vital task.

The United States will continue its best efforts to help others help themselves in the struggle to overcome poverty and despair. We welcome the opportunity to work together with the nations of the Colombo Plan family in this historic campaign to free men from the grim threat of starvation. It is our common challenge. It will be our common victory.

Pres file

Wednesday - 5:30 p.m.
October 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Congressman Mahon's office has come up with two additional Texas Tech people they would like to have invited to the honorary degree ceremony. They are Dean Lorrin Kennamer and Alfredo J. de la Cerda.

May we add them to the invitation list?

Yes ____

No ____.

W. W. Rostow

79

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By CS, NARA, Date 4-11-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, October 25, 1967, 4:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Decision on CABRIOLET Nuclear Test

AEC says that a decision on conducting the CABRIOLET nuclear test does not have to be made before December 2.

The AEC schedule for further nuclear tests would not be upset if the CABRIOLET test were held on December 19, approval having been given on December 2.

The General Assembly is scheduled to adjourn about the middle of December and would thus have adjourned if CABRIOLET were held on December 19.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-453

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
1:30 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT: By CB, NARA, Date 4-11-95

Before telephoning the 10 men for a meeting, I wish to report to you and get your guidance on the scenario which Clark Clifford and I worked out this morning.

1. Time

We believe it extremely unlikely that we could get all of these 10 men for Friday. Moreover, we still think that it would be wise to have them briefed at a dinner session by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, as well as General Wheeler, before they see you, so that they have a clear and uniform picture of where we now stand in Viet Nam in terms of the military situation, the political situation, and the negotiating situation. Our first recommendation is, therefore, that we ask them to come on Sunday evening for a dinner briefing and see you on Monday. A Monday evening briefing for a Tuesday meeting with you would do as well.

Stick with Friday _____

Try for Sunday evening briefing, and meeting
with the President on Monday _____

Try Monday evening briefing, and meeting
with the President on Tuesday _____

See me _____

Incidentally, the dinner with Diaz Ordaz on Thursday night would rule out a briefing before a Friday meeting.

2. Approach

We shall, of course, take every possible step to maintain security on this gathering; but a leak is always possible. Therefore, we would propose to invite them to join the President and the senior officers of the government for "a periodic review of our whole posture in Southeast Asia." The primary briefing would be in the State Department. You might even think of joining them there for discussion so that the story would be, if it came out, that Secretary Rusk had had these men in for general consultation and you joined them for informal talks. We make this suggestion because we do not wish to develop either a sense of crisis -- if the gathering should leak -- or an implication that you were dissatisfied with the advice of your senior advisers.

General Southeast Asia review formula OK _____

Will meet them in White House _____

Will meet them in State _____

3. Group Leader

I would suggest that you designate Clark Clifford as the chairman of the advisory group; and that he work out the arrangements with State, Defense, and CIA for the briefing. It might even be wise if he made the telephone calls to these men. Again, the reason for this is to put the group at one remove from the President. Besides, he is an exceedingly good and wise chairman with a clear idea of how this group might best serve you. I will, of course, help him; and, if you thought it wiser, take over the organization of the enterprise.

Clark Clifford as chairman and organizer _____

WWR should make the telephone calls _____

WWR should organize _____

4. Substance

Since there is no single issue like a pause to deal with, we believe it important to decide in advance the critical questions that you might wish to have them focus on when you see them after their briefing. We present these as illustrative:

- (1) What is your attitude towards the U. S. presence in Viet Nam?
- (2) What is your attitude and recommendation with respect to the bombing of North Viet Nam?
- (3) In the light of what you now know about the negotiating situation, what is your attitude towards an unconditional bombing pause?
- (4) Under present circumstances, what, if any, U. S. peace initiatives or gestures would you suggest:
 - an approach via the UN?
 - another overt effort to press for a Geneva conference?

- (5) What is your attitude towards the conduct of the war in the South?
- more U. S. troops?
 - increasing South Vietnamese responsibility at the cost of slowing down the war?
- (6) What is your judgment on the possibilities of greater USSR or Chinese Communist intervention?
- (7) What themes could be projected, or actions taken, that would produce greater unity among our people in support of the Viet Nam effort?
- (8) What would you do about Viet Nam now if you were President?

We both think that you should end the session by going around the table and making each of these men face up to the final question.

We do not envisage that we would tell these men what these questions are before you met them; but we do think it important that you decide what you would like them to focus on during your meeting.

5. It is our judgment that you ought to budget about 2-1/2 or 3 hours with this group to get all you can out of them at this time, and so that they feel that their time has been well spent. If there is a prior evening briefing, we think that something like 10 a. m. to 1 p. m. would be best so that they could go about their business by lunchtime and feel that their time had been used efficiently and well.

6. You may wish to indicate on the attached list of names eliminated the order in which we might ask for substitutes, should any of the first 10 not be available.

W. W. R.

Attachment

Names Eliminated from the List

Eugene R. Black
James A. Perkins
James Wadsworth
George B. Kistiakowsky
Roswell L. Gilpatric
Morris Liebman
Robert Anderson
James Rowe
John McCone
Abe Fortas
Dean Acheson

81

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to have these
available when you talk with Bob Anderson
at 5:00 p.m. today.

Pres file

*Cabriolet
package*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ag, NARA, Date 11-7-91

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
12:00 noon

MR. PRESIDENT:

Profile

With respect to the Baltimore Sun story, Nick tells me that he made arrangements yesterday to brief Reuss and others on Thursday on our case for selling the planes in Latin America. Nick says that he gave the instruction on the Middle East for the following reason. Yesterday's early edition of the Washington Star, in the story by George Sherman, said that we were going to sell arms to Israel and the moderate Arabs, including Jordan. The wire services picked it up. He said we "could not live" with the Jordan item. It would bring all of Israel's friends down on our head.

Therefore, he took the responsibility for going ahead.

W. W. R.

84

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

This passage from a recent
briefing by Gen. Davidson, J-2 in
Saigon, will interest you.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Day by day, the war in the south is becoming more and more a North Vietnamese war. To this date, Hanoi has not publicly admitted the introduction of military forces into South Vietnam. We have evidence that there are at least 55,000 North Vietnamese in the country with substantial numbers being infiltrated each month.

We also have mounting evidence that the southern-born enemy is rapidly losing heart for the war. Once the enemy was able to recruit about 7,000 men per month from the population. Now we believe fewer than 3,500 are recruited; and many of these are boys 14 and 15 years of age. Women are also being recruited where possible in order to release more men to combat. No doubt the enemy is trying to offset his recruiting deficiency in the South by increasing his rate of infiltration from the North. While we do not know just how successful he is we believe he has not sent south enough men to offset his losses during the past several months. We believe the tide has turned and the enemy strength is on the decline.

I have stated that there is evidence of faltering morale and discipline among the southern enemy--the true Viet Cong. There are fewer but significant signs that the Northern invader is likewise weakening. Here are just a few extracts taken from captured diaries and letters:

"As we go to the South, we are told that we are going to liberate the South, that we will be welcomed, that we will fight the Americans. But when we arrive we are not greeted as liberators. When we enter villages, the people ask us to leave. I begin to feel like a leper."

Another wrote about his trip to the South:

"Walked 30 km today--began to eat canned food--walked 17 km today--bridges washed out. Walked 22 km today--troop morale is down."

This same diary covered a period of more than three months while his unit moved through the jungles of Laos into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam. Near the end of the diary are entries which indicate that many of his comrades have been left behind due to sickness brought on by the hostile elements and severe shortage of food.

One soldier wrote his parents saying:

"Today I am in the innermost recesses of a forest in the Western Highlands. Here I live a life without joy, and sometimes I feel like a dead man. We are

waiting for the time to fight, but I have received some bad news. A number of my comrades were killed in battle. I think the same fate is awaiting me."

These are mild statements, typical of the average conditions experienced by the enemy. There are others which describe conditions so horrible that we consider them to be untrue.

To understand the true significance of the enemy's situation you must realize that the war has taken a subtle but dramatic change over the last few months. The enemy is now steadily losing control of the populated areas. And as in any insurgency when you begin to lose control of the people you are beginning to lose the war. The enemy's problem then is how to reverse this population loss?

He can go on doing what he has been, but this will surely lead to defeat since each day he grows weaker while we grow stronger.

He can negotiate, but we see no evidence that he has any serious intent to negotiate on terms acceptable to us. There has been some talk of using negotiations as a means of gaining time in which to rebuild his forces.

He can make a last ditch try using all or a part of his remaining forces in North Vietnam. Should he do so, the battle would be difficult but the outcome would certainly be his total defeat.

He would ask for volunteers from China, Russia, and other bloc countries, but there is no evidence that either China or Russia are willing to engage us in a ground war.

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
11:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Congressman Pucinski called me yesterday when I was out, and I called him back late in the day. He said:

1. Your Monday speech to the international labor group was "great." You put Viet Nam in just the proper perspective.
2. He believes the country is ready to rally to your leadership on Viet Nam. You should get out of Washington into the country. Only you can do it. He recommends that you set up a train, with all the communication equipment you need to run the government, and whistle-stop, in small towns as well as big ones. He believes you should do this soon, so that it will not be regarded as part of next year's campaign but merely a President rallying his country at a time when its capacity to carry on a difficult effort is being challenged.

W. W. R.

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
11:07 a.m.

Mr. President:

We need your approval of the
guest list at Tab B of the attached
memorandum.

W. W. Rostow

Pres file

rlh

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
10:30 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

Last evening on the telephone and again at greater length this morning, the Vice President explained the origins of the wise service story. He had a stock passage in his speech which said: We have tried for peace last year and this year; last month and this month; and President Johnson will be trying for peace next month. The Vice President uses this regularly. The Senatorial briefing was not in his mind. He wishes you to understand that this is how it happened. He and his party in Philadelphia were not questioned on "this month." As you see, the papers are not carrying anything on it today. He understands, of course, the extremely confidential nature of the Leadership briefing.

W. W. R.

Pres file

Wednesday, October 25, 1967
10:27 a.m.

Mr. President:

I don't know whether you've
seen Lee's talk to the reporters and
his answers to questions at the
Overseas Writers lunch.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Address and Responses to Questions by His Excellency
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore,
to the Overseas Writers at Luncheon on October 18, 1967,
Sheraton Carlton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

(NOTE: This transcript has been prepared for the
convenience and use of the Prime Minister and his
party. The Prime Minister's remarks were addressed
to an invited audience, which was authorized to use
them solely on the basis of "it is known that the
Prime Minister believes. . ." Any other use of this
transcript is solely as may be authorized by the
Prime Minister or his party.)

THE PRIME MINISTER

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:

In the last few minutes, in a somewhat desultory but
valuable conversation with the gentlemen on my left and on my
right, I had to decide, first, what you wanted to hear, second,
what I should let you hear, and, third, how shall I frame it.
But first let me explain why I am here.

I'm not seeking American aid, nor am I in receipt of any.
I do not have an American guarantee of my security, nor am I
seeking any. I am worried about the changes that are going to
take place in South and Southeast Asia. I am concerned with the
kind of problems which we will face, both in economic and in
security terms, in the seventies and beyond. But most of all,
I am very worried about what happens between now and November
1968--when the American people will go through this highly pub-
licized, highly controversial, highly charged leader-making
process.

First, I am not going to talk directly about the subjects
which I seem to feel have preoccupied the whole of your American
mass media--you know, Viet-Nam, black power, and who is the best
man to solve this, and what should we do. And living as I do
with danger all the time, for a very long while, my problem is
how--in spite of the fact of developing a certain degree of
aequanimitas--to retain that sensitivity to know that this part-
icular rumble of the volcano is not a normal one. You know, if
you all slept with a rumble, you would say this is another one.
And if you misjudge it, then you're dead. And we've got a very

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12333
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY kg ON 11-29

great instinct for survival in our part of the world. We want to live, we want to prosper, we want to keep what we've built, and I am interested in the United States and what it is going to do because it's going to affect me.

What I can say to your Administration or to you can only have very marginal influence, and everybody will pick out that part of me which fits into his argument. I mean this is the world all over. And I accept this.

What have I come here for? To try and make an assessment for myself of the kind of climate that I can expect next year in 1968, and, if that goes all right, the kind of situation we will face in the middle 70's when the British will leave their Mainland bases and it will be a very different world because, according to your estimates, there will be 50 more or less Chinese ICBM's and so on. Therefore, if I may, I'll start off the other way--a broad perspective.

First of all, which is the center of gravity of the world? Is it Europe and America? Or is it going to shift? Is it America, China and Russia? I think not just for you but for me this is crucial, because this debate will go on, just like the East of Suez debate went on, for years. And then the British did their calculations backwards and forwards and decided no there was no future for them--that there was no use playing an auxiliary or being Sancho Panza to an American Don Quixote, and they decided to scrap it. And this was what we feared.

And, similarly, after a lot of debate in whatever it is--you know, teach-ins, seminars--the American people will have to decide whether in the 80's and 90's and beyond it is a European, an American or a Western dominated world, or whether there are new contestants to supremacy.

I happen to believe that the center of gravity will shift to the Pacific. You know when we talk about Asia we are talking really of a very vast continent, and when we talk of Asians we are talking of diverse peoples. And when I say it will shift, the center of gravity, I mean because there are some people, particularly the East Asians, the Koreans, North and South, the Chinese, Mainland and Formosa, the Japanese, the Vietnamese, North and South, who have got that kind of cultural milieu, the kind of values, motivations, physical stamina, the ductless glands, whatever it is. You know, floods, famine, pestilence eliminated all the weak ones, and we have got some very durable digits.

And they intend to take their place in the modern world, very

much as I intend. They don't feel themselves unequal to this. They make no apologies. I mean the Japanese may bow very deeply to you, but the deeper he bows the more intense is the determination that you will recognize that he is more than your match. And I think this goes for the whole of East Asia.

Southeast Asia is slightly different--climate, culture, religion. That begins with Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Ceylon, parts of the Archipelago. It's not what an American sociologist would call an achievement-orientated society. There's nothing wrong with them. You've got bright men, able men, great scholars, but achievement and the acquisition of wealth are not admired. What is admired is leisurely living. And these are facts. I started off with politics, we went into Malaysia, it failed, I end up by reading history and anthropology. And it's all been study, not by Chinese or Malaysians. It's been done

-- by British anthropologists,

-- by some Americans who have gone and lived with Chinese villagers, found out why some people become guerrillas, why some people surrender--like Lucien Pye writing his book "Guerrilla Communism"--and so on,

-- by anthropologists in the University of London, a husband and wife team, one living in a Chinese squatter area and the other living with the wife learning Malayan living with a Malaysian.

And these are the facts of life. They are different. They are changed. And this is another thing we must accept, that they will change, their values will change under the pressure of competition, but slowly. You can't change it too fast.

Now, if I am right, then once you have got this vast number on the move, the consequences will be vast. When the Japanese moved, you know, from the Meiji restoration, they made the grade; in 50 years they defeated the Russians; 25 years after that they were a real challenge to you; you smacked them flat down; 22 years after that they are the third biggest industrial power in Asia. And I don't see anything different between the Japanese and the Chinaman, and I know them both. I lived with the Japanese, under them, for 3-1/2 years. And I think you've got to accept this.

They the Chinese are going to have their ICBM's. They're going to make all kinds of errors because they believe that there are shortcuts. You know this nonsense of Walt Rostow saying that the take-off of an airplane requires a certain runway and you must

go through all these various stages. Well, that's old-fashioned. You start off with uranium 235, and then you go on to heavy water and so on. They just do a shortcut and they believe it will work-- maybe as a result of overconfidence--and they will make mistakes, but I've not the slightest doubt that they will make the grade.

I don't want to sound like a, you know, a counterpart of what you've called, your Secretary of State, the "yellow peril." I don't consider them a peril, not really in the long run, if you play this right. Basically they are human beings. They considered themselves to be the center of civilization for a very long time. They feel a deep sense of grievance, bitterness, they want to restore their dignity, their stature, their sense of importance as the central kingdom. I don't believe they are going to come down to Southeast Asia with their armies. It's not the cleverest thing to do, and they are clever people. But I do believe that if you misplay Viet-Nam, not because of Viet-Nam but because of the commitments you have made in Viet-Nam, and the things you have said, some of them I profoundly disagree with, then I say you are going to give away this whole region.

First, because you will destroy the will to resist, to be ourselves. You know, every time they the Communists suffer a setback and they are held up, whether it is in Viet-Nam or whether it is the Red Guards rampaging through Canton, Hanchow or Shanghai, my own Communists get confused, disorientated. They also develop schisms, and my life is much easier. And only naturally I relay all these different strands of Maoist thoughts which will help confuse them more. And they stop recruiting and I recruit because what I preach makes sense.

Now if all of a sudden, as a result of completely domestic American politics . . . I am not here to intervene in your domestic situation. That's very foolish. Whoever is the American President, whoever is the American Administration Secretary of State, whoever is the Assistant Secretary of State, I hope to do business with him. I've got my own likes and dislikes, but I do business with anybody. Similarly, with the British Government. I am a friend of the Labour Party. I was sort of nurtured by them, but I do business with the Conservatives, and very well and intimately. And so what I want to say before I go on to talk about what are sensitive and controversial areas, I want to make it quite clear I do not want to intervene in your domestic living. All I want to say is I live in Southeast Asia, whether I like it or not, what you are going to do there in the next 13 months, and something's got to be done because otherwise all kinds of things will happen like, you know, what happens in preliminary conventions

before the vote and so on. I can't tell you what I discussed with your leaders, but, even assuming that you've got no incumbent President contesting, any Democratic candidate wants to win and he's got to live with this policy. And any Republican candidate who wants to win too will have to put out a credible alternative.

I've thought it backwards and forwards. I want peace. I want security. I want a minimum of commitment and danger. How do I get it? Well, I am nonaligned. What does that mean? That means I don't want to get involved in power blocs. I don't want to get involved in other people's quarrels. But, in the end, never mind what could have been yesterday, day before, and I think there might have been other possibilities. You know the bus stops so many times along the road. In 1956, 2 years after the Geneva Accords, well, if Mr. Galbraith is right, nobody would have heard of Viet-Nam if you had made the other decision. Well, I am not quite sure about it. The Japanese when they came down south did not come from Bangkok, they came from Saigon. Saigon is nearer Malaya and Singapore than Bangkok is if you have a close look at the map, and I travel it by air frequently. But there were other opportunities--'61, '63 were as dubious /Reischauer/ argues, but I have read Mr. Bundy's East Asia speech /"The Path to Viet-Nam"/ as part of my job you know. I don't agree with all of it, but I'll tell you this. If you decided to exercise the option in '63 after Diem was killed (by accident or otherwise) you would have had to come to an accommodation with the Viet Cong because by then you had 25,000 advisers on the ground.

(You know the British have only about 30,000 men in Malaya and Singapore and their families and they are disengaging and they are depending on me, my competence to insure that they do not run into an Aden type situation. Otherwise, chaps die, riots take place--you know, people will say "we have been made use of by the colonialists; now they are deserting us"--riots, breaking car windows, beating up women and children because they are white and therefore deemed to be British.)

That /late 1963/ was your last get-off point. Now if you really pack up, I say you have given it away. Because the Thais will not fight. They are the world's best anticipators of history. Look. Field Marshal Kittakachorn has told his men bluntly, and I read it in a Thai newspaper, far better to fight in Viet-Nam than in Thailand, and, if it is lost there, pack up. You know it is just not one field marshal. People develop the kind of establishment and also an ethos, a philosophy of life, and for a few hundred years, 250 years, they warded off the British on the left

coming in eastwards from Burma and northwards from Malaya and the French eastwards from the right moving westwards from Cambodia. And they played one against the other and they kept more or less a sovereign Thailand. The West was supreme--they were with the West. The Japanese, and you know they were wise men. They calculated in their very strange Thai fashion and decided who was going to win and they were on the winning side. Net result--large chunks of Burma were given back to them, four states in Malaya given back, large chunks of Cambodia given back. All that had to be returned to status quo ante, but they did it very skillfully, the Thai way, namely, as the battle lines swung and the tide flowed the other way they had an alternative resistance government emerging.

And if they [the Thai] pack up, then you can assume that the Malaysians will be put through this mincing machine in two to three years. I don't think the Burmese, I mean however neutral, you can't be more neutral, you know. They can't even dare to sneeze.

What will happen? All right, that it doesn't matter to you. Well, Singapore matters to me, but perhaps it does not matter to you. Well, I am not sure. You know I have been brought up in the place and met a whole series of British marshals, air marshals, generals, and so on, and when you lost that sea route through the Straits of Malacca during 3-1/2 years of Japanese occupation, there is a good deal of trouble going around the south of Australia, down the Cape of Good Hope, up northward.

But let's assume you decide to write off the whole of the undeveloped world. You know, let plague on them, pestilence. You think that is the end result? I don't think so. You know South Asia left to themselves, disorganized, can't threaten you. It will be like quite a number of countries--I mean Indonesia is a case in point of scratching a living off the ground; Burma from a rice exporter also having some difficulties with rice, and so on. But you know when the Dutch were in charge of Indonesia and they imported Chinese to make the Indonesians work--tax gatherers, shopkeepers, the little bankers, the chaps who know which farmer is worth the credit, who is the man who is going to collect the next harvest and pay me, and who is not a good security risk. The place boomed, and great treasure flowed to Holland.

And if you can just imagine in a whole group of fraternal Communist Parties . . . The Chinese are not going to move down;

why should they? These are very unhealthy places. You can't breed healthy, vigorous people in this sort of climate. But you have fraternal Communist Parties feeding in, gearing in, to this big machine, and I say the 21st century will not be one in which you will be able to recognize the scheme of things as you have recognized it for the last few hundred years.

The problem really is this. You know Europe so well in a way compared to Asia because you are, by and large, Europeans by extraction. You know that when you talk of Europe you don't mean one enormous land mass, I mean all white people. There are differences. There are Italians, there are Frenchmen. Even the Englishmen or the British are different, or Welsh different from the Englishmen, the southerners different from the Yorkshiremen and as different from the Scotsmen. And the Irish very different from everybody else, and he is also very different really from the chap in Belfast to the one from Dublin. So you understand all these nuances. But when you talk of Asia you imagine this is one homogeneous group. It isn't. Even 700 million Chinese are very different. The chap in Peking really thinks the chap in Nanking is one down. And so it goes on, and the chap in Canton thinks the Hong Kong Chinese more or less really beyond the pale, unless you go down to Djakarta, well, having long years of stupor plus inter-marriage with the local gentry, right down the line.

I'd just like to end up by saying this, that I'm not asking you to stay in Viet-Nam just as I haven't got the right to ask the British to stay in Singapore. Nobody's got the right to say "Look, you expend your blood and your treasure on my behalf." All I want to do is have a good assessment and say "Look, what is this chap going to do in his interests?" And arising after that we make contingency plans. And one of my contingency plans includes, amongst other things, putting up a last-ditch fight and doing it heroically or getting the hell out of it. I don't know which I'll do, probably the former rather than the latter because in any case I have already expended the best part of my life doing some of the things which I believe worthwhile doing. And I would like to believe there are enough thinking Americans in charge of the mass media who, in spite of a great deal of partisanship, will look at the facts. And there must be partisanship; it's part of political life in an open society. I went to Scarborough. Whatever I said was going to be disliked by one side or the other, even within one party, let alone in a situation like this.

But I say this as the final note of what I hope to get out of my visit. First of all, I'm for Singapore. Next, I'm for the people whose lives are so closely interwoven and interrelated with

Singapore's as not really to be indivisible, namely, peninsular Malaysia. And this whole region really depends upon whether, having already paid the price, you can establish conditions which make it possible for us to go on and rise.

And we can, you know. We can. I'm not saying it's going to be done overnight. But nobody 15 years ago, or even 10 years ago just before we took office, would have believed that here /in Singapore/ in Southeast Asia, where ethnic Chinese constitute 80 percent of the population and the Communist Party is the strongest single party both above ground and underground with a history that goes back to 1923; the year I was born, with the first cell established in Singapore, nobody would have believed that here Communism was defeated by the ballot and not by the bullet. And it's an absolute fact, and all these things would not have been possible but for very intelligent policies by the British in allowing a group of men who finally found themselves handed the gun faster than they wanted to, and I think it can be done for other parts of Southeast Asia. There are more homes and better homes, there are more schools and better schools, more roads, a better promise of a future in Singapore today than anybody would have dreamt of 20 years ago or 15 years ago. And all this can be repeated provided you back the modernizing forces. It's no use backing the chaps who want to stop the shooting. You've got this enormous Pacific rim and there are three major powers, two super-powers and one potential, all with coastlines on it, all wanting to grow.

There's a logic in greatness. You want to be greater. Or, having become greatest, you want to stay the greatest. That depends on whether you back the right forces to win. And if you back the wrong ones, the people who are going to lose anyway--the obscurantists, the reactionaries, the ones who want to go backwards and not forwards--you must lose. For the ones who want to go forwards are the second generation, the people who are not interested in the past, what it was under the colonialists, but tomorrow for them and their children, and how do we get there. When you back them to move forward, then you have a lot of friends. You turn your backs on them, and you do so, in my opinion, at your peril. Thank you.

Mr. Bailey: Mr. Prime Minister, I wonder if you can give us your thoughts on what might be viable and practical political arrangements for a satisfactory settlement in the terms you have spoken of in Vietnam?

PM Lee: No, I don't want to get caught in the intricacies of the Vietnam debate. I'd like rather to state the conditions under which I think you can get a settlement. First of all, you must convince the North Vietnamese that you, in spite of your very open society, in spite of the vigorous and sometimes vicious dissension, you have got the capacity to match their will with you will, their fanaticism with your determination, and that you are prepared to go with them to the end of the road. The moment they are convinced of that, I think you begin to see settlement.

You know nobody would have said in the early '40's in the whole of all of Southeast Asia there were only two real resistance groups against Japanese-occupied Asia. The Japanese Kenpeitai, the Gestapo has got nothing on them. I mean, really, when they torture you, they do it and you need to be a very brave man with almost fanatical convictions to do it. And there was the Viet Minh and there was the Malayan Communist Party, largely Chinese, you know, both East Asian ethnic types.

Nobody would have said 10 years ago that today I'd have men in their late 30's having spent 20 years of their best years for the Communist cause going before my television cameras and sincerely, not as a result of brain-washing like Cardinal Mindszenty, that's valueless, I mean you know it's an open society, highly sophisticated and cynical audience, denouncing the stupidities and follies of the Communists. And I tell you why it happened--because they finally decided they can't win.

You've got to convince them of that. Far be it from me to tell you how to conduct an open democratic debate, but every time somebody says that we should be doing this; and we should get the hell out of here, and we should be doing the other, if I were a North Vietnamese and read it, I would say, well, let's see who can sweat this one out. You can bomb me, London was bombed, very few people were killed, they can go back to the mountains; they are prepared to see this one out. And you've got to show them that you can match them in sheer determination and the capacity to go through with it. The moment you do that, that's light at the end of the tunnel.

When you do that, I don't know, but I would be very surprised if you'll get it before your Presidential elections are over because in the nature of things once this debate has started, if I were a Vietnamese, I would just sit down and wait. As Mr. Khrushchev said, you know he said: "I helped President Kennedy to be elected. I could have seen Mr. Nixon and helped him." I don't think Hanoi's got a great love for, I don't know whether you love, LBJ. I can't go all the way with LBJ because if I do that I am dead. My base won't go all the way with me with LBJ. Mr. Holt can, but I'll tell you this. I'm quite sure Hanoi wants to fix LBJ and therefore I don't see how it is conceivable that they will meet and talk and there will be a happy, peaceful, sort of Asian Glassboro, and then LBJ gets re-elected. I don't see this yet. I mean, Ho Chi Minh looks so benign. He's got a wispy beard, but, by God, he's all there and he wants to fix the guy that's fixing him.

Mr. McGaffin: Mr. Prime Minister, could you talk for a moment on the China problem? You mentioned in your remarks that you did not regard the Chinese as a yellow peril. . . do you think as an impartial outsider you would suggest any changes in our policy toward China which you think would be realistic and practical to be attempted at this time such as a change in our policy at the UN?

PM Lee: Well, this is a very large subject. I don't know how we are for time. . . . This is one of my main areas for disagreement with the United States. I think there were eight disastrous years really, even before Chiang went over from the Mainland. And I don't think the Truman Administration is altogether free from blame. I mean, it was because America was Eurocentric that China was lost while you rescued Europe. NATO, Marshall Plan, you know, 1947-48. I was a young student then in Britain. I watched it. I read it all in the newspapers. And I don't know whether this is all water under the bridge, but I do not believe seeing Taiwan, and you've seen Taiwan, I mean if this is possible, surely if an effort had been made, it would not have been lost like this, but it was.

I think having been lost, you've got to live with it. Well, pros and cons, people say if we had begun a dialogue, then this schism would not have taken place between the Chinese and the Russians, and then Communist China or Mainland, as you call it, wouldn't have been presented as this ugly truculent unreasonable group of lunatics. I don't think so. I think you've got to have a dialogue on all the time. And the more

you open them up to influences, the more all the nuances within the Chinese hierarchy become pronounced. They are human beings, and one of the reasons why what is happening is happening is because Mao knows he is a human being; and a very great human being, mind you, strategist, poet, organizer, but he can only live one life. Let's assume he's got a hundred years--God forbid. Of that, the first 20 years are not worth very much, so he's only got about 70 years, and he's got to fight against 400 years of history, and written history; for every Mao precept, whether it is four-legged, eight-legged, you can quote 25 others on the other side. You've got to burn all the books, you know, as Chin Shih Huang Ti burnt all the books once upon a time.

And this in my view is just a matter of time. Finally, a group of men must emerge who want to see a great China. That's only fair. Why shouldn't they be great? They are going to work for it, and in any case, you can't stop them. So you'd better live with them. Maybe I'm biased. I am ethnic Chinese. Let me just add this, that if there is just one chap in South-east Asia they would like broiled slowly more than any other, a chap who understands their language, a chap who has fought them their way, and beat them in a way which hurts, [I am that chap.] You know the Tunku beating them doesn't really matter. After all, it doesn't make any difference. He shut them up, and that's that.

But this highly urbanized Chinese community, 40 to 45 percent of which was first-generation born in China, partly bred in China, came to Singapore, pulled away from them to my side.

And therefore I say there's something intrinsic in that culture and civilization. It puts a very high emphasis on individual performance and rewards. I think whoever wants that country to industrialize and rapidly has got to take into account the cultural motivations, the value motivations of that people. You know I'm a Socialist. I believe in Socialism. I believe in equal opportunities. But I don't believe in equal places or equal homes or equal salary, because then we go down to the lowest. We've tried this. We pay them all the same salary, and the brighter they are, the more they can do, the less they do; and then they get on another job, saying--"You're paying \$4 for doing this; I'm doing exactly the same." And so he conserves his energy and does something else. And the best performance industry that we've got is our construction industry.

Cost effective-wise, we beat even the Japanese and with more primitive implements than the Japanese. But you know there's tremendous incentive, and they are all, by and large, Chinese workers, Chinese masons, concrete steel workers, master woodworkers, and so on. And they work in teams from the government out to the tender, out to the contractor. The contractor knows every sub-contractor for every specialized job and each sub-contractor knows what every man in his team is worth. And the thing just goes up, just like a wedding cake, every day, all the time, and I believe--and it's the same culture, you know, basically, slightly different, mind you, it's gone overseas. You know, as Toynbee says, a trans-marine migration takes place when you pack things up and put them in a junk and sail them 2000 miles south. But the basic values are the same, and I say we just wait, and we'll have a much safer and a pleasanter world if we wait and have the courage in the meantime to endure it.

Mr. Marder: Could you say whether you believe, in the current situation, in the campaign coming up here, whether you see danger of exaggerating the Chinese nuclear potential, or do you believe that to be as you stated, a present danger which must be concentrated on?

PM Lee: Well, I don't want to get involved in a domestic dispute because I think it is very unwise for me. Whoever wins in America I do business with. I mean, that is as it should be. I do that with all my neighbors. When President Sukarno was there, I mean he is a great President; when an acting president is there, he is a great acting president, and so on.

But if I could just answer your question in a completely different way. I don't know what the cause for argument will be in this great debate, but coming across on the aircraft I turned over U.S. News & World Report and it had a diagram showing Chinese ICBM's going across the Pacific taking 35 minutes and I see your light ABM thing for \$5 billion is going to catch them somewhere around midway. Now, I've got no generals; I've got no air marshals; all I've done is to attend some of these Institute of Strategic Studies seminars and so on because I live in a dangerous part of the world and I want to know how I can get hit, and from where, and how do I duck, if it's possible. I remember one group saying that when they've got this thing developed the shortest way between China and the USA is by the ice cap. Well, this long argument where you can meet them midway on a 35-minute warning system, well, I just don't know.

-5-

When I next meet my friend who belongs to the Institute of Strategic Studies, I'm going to ask him this. I'll say: "Well, look, is this true? Will they have 35 minutes?" Because we have done the other argument.

Suppose he [the Chinese] did go south to Singapore, and it is quite conceivable one day. Which is the southernmost point? Is it Hainan Island, or is it somewhere in southern Yunnan? You take your calipers and say, all right, which one is it? And of course there are a few technicalities and so on--weather conditions, sighting, and God knows what else. For what it is worth, I'm told by some people who are experts on this that you're seriously underestimating the speed at which these things can happen--development, and sophistication, and so on. And this light defense, well, I expect if I were an American I would feel just that much more tranquil when I go to sleep, and, if it does that, it's good for America.

Mr. Spencer Davis: Mr. Prime Minister, carrying this on, some strategic thinkers have suggested that it would take India, Japan, and all of the neutral countries of Southeast Asia together to contain China. What do you think of this idea, and what do you think of the possibilities for defenses after mid-1970?

PM Lee: I think when we say "contain China" we get back to the idiom of the Dulles era. What is it? Is it a herd of cows? Can you fence them in and the cows are just eating grass inside and they can't eat your grass? I don't think this is the kind of sophistication one expects in the '70's and beyond.

First, I do not believe as of now that if you lump up the whole of the rest of South and Southeast Asia where South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, the whole of Southeast Asia, assuming you have solved India's and Pakistan's problem over Kashmir, and you throw in 100 million Indonesians solid, you know, it's like if you put them on the scales and what you talk about is a balance of power, then on the one side you've got huge amounts of these heavy-barrelled machine guns which I see some of your Marines wear, and on the other side you put large beautiful peacock feathers. That's the balance as of now.

For this was the position in Europe after the war, wasn't it? I mean 1946-47. You know you dismantled all your military apparatus, withdrew your army, and if there had to be a European balance, an indigenous balance, there was no balance. But look at the difference today. The French, I am not saying I approve or disapprove, but they believe they can do it all on their own. Well anyway, their neighbors using part of your strength.

But I believe, given a little time and no little effort, some kind of balance will be struck. And what we want really in the end is the minimum of outside underpinning, but there must be underpinning. And, best of all, multilateral underpinning. There are lots of people with an interest to see that these large potential discoveries of both known and future valuable minerals and other resources do not go to one side or the other to upset the protocol list amongst the super-powers. And I can think of quite a number of countries very keen to see that peace is maintained in that region. I think that the real answer in the end is, once you live through this Vietnam problem, and Vietnam after all is one little part of Southeast Asia, the final situation where first of all you get more of a NATO type. You know, if you compare NATO and SEATO you will find one very great divergence. In NATO it was stated that an attack on one is a threat to peace and security. In other words, we all sit down and say, "What shall we do?" "Shall we let this chap go under or not?" Eventually what you want to do is to say "Look"--take Cambodia as a case in point. It has withdrawn from the Asian Bank. Why? They are not going to go Communist. It wants to go Cambodian. It wants to be there a thousand years from now. It looks at Angkor Wat and has got a deep fear that that will not belong to it in a few years if it doesn't watch out. If you can create a situation where there is confidence that the territorial boundaries of South and Southeast Asia will not be changed by the use of force, and you get them to jell together and cooperate economically on sub-regional and then wider regional bases and then there is the Japanese-promoted proposal--you know, the great Pacific basin interlocking developed nations like Canada, USA, Australia, with the underdeveloped parts of Asia, I think you could get a very prosperous and peaceful world community in the 1990's and beyond, and that is what I hope will happen. But perhaps I will know that after your 1968 elections. Thank you.

Mr. Kilpatrick: Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for a very illuminating talk.

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MEMORANDUM

October 20, 1967

SUBJECT: A Proposal

1. Proposal: The President should announce that he is appointing Mr. X (someone widely respected and with a reputation for unorthodox and independent thought) to head a small Government staff which would receive and act on:

(a) complaints of citizens who believe that the bureaucracy has dealt wrongly with them;

(b) proposals from citizens (or bureaucrats) who believe that they have new ideas regarding domestic policy worthy of adoption by the government.

Each of these functions is discussed below.

2. Complaints: Three Scandinavian countries and New Zealand have appointed "ombudsmen" - officials whose job is to receive complaints of citizens concerning bureaucratic action or inaction affecting them, investigate same, and recommend redress. These officials have succeeded in:

-- giving the average citizen a feeling that he is not wholly dependent on the whims of a faceless bureaucracy;

-- keeping the bureaucracy on its toes in dealings with the public;

-- correcting those few instances in which the bureaucracy has departed from law or approved norms in such dealings.

Why not try the same thing in the US?

In giving the average citizen greater confidence that his rights will get respectful treatment from the bureaucracy, it might reduce public resistance to expansion of governmental functions (and hence of the bureaucracy) to meet Great Society needs.

3. New Ideas: The proposal that handling of new ideas be added to the Ombudsman's functions also has precedent:

Recently Secretary Rusk activated an "Open Forum" program in the State Department. All officers in the Department and the field are invited to send in new ideas; these are reviewed by a Panel which sends ideas that pass its scrutiny to the Secretary. This program gives State Department employees, particularly in junior ranks, assurance that their new ideas will not be smothered by the bureaucracy.

The possible usefulness of such an operation on the domestic front is suggested by this experience:

Some time back I sent the White House staff a suggestion that the Federal Government build summer camps for under-privileged children. It was referred to OEO, which sent back a list of reasons why the idea should be dropped. I sent back counter-arguments, and that was the last I heard of it until the idea showed up in the President's Message on Youth.

This set me to wondering: What happens to new ideas conceived by people (in and out of government) who don't happen to know someone on the White House staff, and so don't have a chance to argue back with the Government Bureaus to which their ideas are referred?

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal makes a judgment about industry which may well be applicable to government as well: "Because of the way most companies are organized, new products created within them do not have the survival potential of those created outside, since they get shot down moving up through channels."

Why not give the Ombudsman the task of ensuring that proposals "created outside" get a fair shake, despite the natural resistance of operating bureaus to outside suggestions?

Doing so might help to convince the public that the administration is open to new ideas, and might also produce some useful innovations.

so
Henry Owen

90
Pres file
Wednesday - October 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Herewith Charlie Schultze's views on State's proposal for special exemption from duty for certain alcoholic beverages which come primarily from Mexico.

You will see that he is against it, as is the weight of opinion in town. Charlie's principal reason is that at a time when trade issues are under such active consideration at home and abroad, we should not be taking actions which can be associated with preferences.

I agree, and recommend that State's proposal be held in abeyance.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____.

Attachment

Schultze memo to President, 10/25/67.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

OCT 25 1967

90a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Special exemption from duty for certain alcoholic beverages which come primarily from Mexico

I understand that you would like my views on a proposed relaxation of the limit of one quart on alcoholic beverages that returning United States residents can bring in from Mexico.

I do not believe that a relaxation is justified on the merits. However, if some relaxation is necessary in the interest of our relations with Mexico, I would favor the State's proposal.

Pending bills

Three bills, sponsored by Rep. Udall, White, and de la Garza, are now pending before the Ways and Means Committee. They would increase from one quart to one gallon the duty-free exemption on alcoholic beverages brought back by returning U. S. residents, provided the additional three quarts were acquired in countries contiguous to the U. S.

State Department's proposal

State opposes the three bills because their geographic limitations would be inconsistent with our international commercial policy of nondiscrimination. Instead, it proposes a one-gallon exemption for six specialty alcoholic beverages regardless of where they were acquired--tequila, mescal, aguardiente, coffee liqueurs, cachaca, and pisco. Much of the production of these beverages is in Mexico.

It argues that:

- The reduction in the duty-free alcoholic beverage exemption in 1965 from one gallon to one quart per person has created hardships for certain less-developed countries heavily dependent on American tourist expenditures.

- This approach would help Mexico while avoiding explicit geographic discrimination.
- Beverages produced by other Latin American countries have been included in the list to avoid the charge of discrimination.
- The U. S. produces little or none of these beverages.

On the other hand, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Bill Roth are opposed to relaxation of the existing one bottle limit because it would have an adverse effect on our balance of payments, present administrative complications, still involve in fact geographic discrimination, and move us in the direction of regional preferences.

Recommendation:

Although we doubt that the actual balance of payments costs of State's proposal would be very great and question that administrative complications would be severe, I agree generally with the reasons for opposing State's proposal. In particular, I believe we should avoid, if possible, actions which can be associated with preferences until current studies and negotiations on the general subject have had a chance to produce results.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze
Charles L. Schultze
Director

_____ Approve State's proposal

_____ Disapprove State's proposal

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THE WHITE HOUSE

1967 OCT 25 PM 4 33

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Wednesday, October 25, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

My prejudice is to go along with the attached proposed message to McBride in Kinshasa. But I want to be sure that I am reflecting your wishes.

The message has been cleared by Messrs. Katzenbach and Nitze and General Wheeler. It authorizes McBride and our Ambassador in Geneva to tell the International Red Cross that we would respond favorably to a Red Cross request to use the three U.S. military aircraft now in the Congo to help evacuate the mercenaries and their Congolese henchmen. The three planes involved are the one C-130 still in the Congo, the C-123 assigned to our Military Advisory Team, and our Air Attache's C-54. (We would not bring back the two C-130's we pulled out in late summer.)

We would insist that the Red Cross request be strongly worded and that we have the right to make it public. We would also tell them that our favorable response is primarily designed to make it easier for them to get other countries to make similar contributions.

This decision arises because, after endless haggling, the Red Cross has finally negotiated an evacuation plan acceptable to all parties. It involves three steps:

1. A battalion is flown in from the neighboring Central African Republic to supervise the evacuation and guarantee safe passage for the mercenaries.
2. The mercenaries are flown to Malta.
3. The 1,000 plus Congolese (Katangans) now with the mercs are flown to Zambia.

All this must be done quickly. The operation will be mounted from an airport in Rwanda, the only nearby field large enough to take big transports. Rwandan President Kayibanda insists that the job be done in a period of no more than four days so as to minimize the risk of trouble while the evacuees are in his country. This is a big job -- about 20 C-130 round trips at about 8 hours per round trip. It would probably take five C-130's to do the job in four days.

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The only non-U. S. aircraft now in sight are two Zambian C-130's which we are now reasonably certain will be available. We are scouring the landscape for other planes from African countries and from Europe, as well as looking into other kinds of transport. But prospects are bleak. McBride has concluded that the evacuation probably won't happen without our logistic support and has requested "earnest consideration" of bringing the two U. S. C-130's back to the Congo for this purpose.

The request to bring back the two C-130's has been denied. This message tells McBride that he is free to use the planes now in the Congo. Nobody can guarantee that we will not have to make the C-130 decision again if the evacuation effort breaks down, but McBride understands that the chances of reversal are very slim.

We have a considerable stake in a successful evacuation. If the mercenaries can be peacefully spirited out of the Congo, there is reasonable chance of relative stability for sometime to come. If they remain, every day increases the chances that there will be an attempt to reinforce them (we have intelligence that strongly suggests a Portuguese-backed reinforcement effort in neighboring Angola), and/or that they will decide to march south to Katanga. The latter would almost certainly lead to civil war and a real threat that the country would come apart. In short, we would be back in the same situation we have spent more than half a billion dollars over the last six years to escape.

I think we should go ahead with this limited step. I doubt that it will hurt us much in the Congress to respond to a Red Cross appeal to use planes already on the ground in an evacuation effort which is clearly an attempt to avoid more fighting. I recommend you approve the message.

W. W. Rostow

Approve message _____

Have Katzenbach and Nitze talk to Russell, Fulbright, Morgan, et al
and come back to me _____

Approve message, but make sure Congressional conversations happen
before any action is taken _____

Disapprove message _____

Speak to me _____

~~SECRET~~

EKHamilton/vmr

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

DATE: ☐ COTTER
THRU TO

~~SECRET~~

Classification

FOR CLEARANCE

1-Hamilton
2-Pet.

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy KINSHASA PRIORITY
Info US Mission GENEVA "

—INFO: Amembassy BRUSSELS
Amembassy KIGALI
Amembassy BUJUMBURA
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-451
By CL, NARA, Date 3-30-95

1. It becoming increasingly evident to Dept as ICRC negotiations unfold that success or failure of mercenary evacuation may hinge upon ICRC success in securing capability to airlift Kats from Kamenbe to Bujumbura or Zambia.
2. We continue to hope that ICRC will succeed in obtaining sufficient airlift capacity from variety of possibilities including Wigmo, Congofrigo, Zambian Govt charters from Europe or even Africa (for example East African Airlines) or any combination of these, but we recognize that ICRC efforts along these lines may either be fruitless or turn up an airlift capability insufficient permit rapid execution of evacuation.
3. We do not wish see evacuation plan founder on this point. Accordingly we are prepared to make available to ICRC services of two USG aircraft currently in Congo (one C-130 and one Comish C-123) for purposes of

Drafted by: AFCM:ATTienken	10/24/67	Tel. Ext. 5557	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF-JPalmer
Clearances: AF/AFCM-LDBrown; White House-Mr. Hamilton (sub); DOD/ISA-Mr. Lang;			

The Under Secretary;
(draft)

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Classification

evacuating Kats to Zambia. (Air Attache C-54 would not be able to use Kamemba but we would consider its utilization if partial evacuation through Bujumbura possible.) We strongly prefer not to introduce additional aircraft into Congo for this purpose. Our purpose in making US aircraft available is to make it easier for ICRC obtain additional aircraft from non-US sources. (ICRC should understand that US aircraft alone would not be adequate for task.)

4. You are therefore authorized whenever you believe it would have most positive impact on ability of ICRC to get additional aircraft to inform Gafner on confidential basis in response to his request, that you have reason believe favorable response may be forthcoming but that official request must come from ICRC Geneva and that we are so notifying our Mission in Geneva.

5. FOR GENEVA: Immediately upon receipt of info from Kinshasa that above message has been passed to Gafner, you are authorized to make similar statement to ICRC headquarters. Formal request from ICRC should be couched in language that can be made public in US if this seems desirable and include strongest possible justification for request. (FYI While we prepared make aircraft available, use of US aircraft for this operation will be more palatable here if we have good strong and well-documented ICRC request. End FYI)

GP-1

End

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Classification

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-453
By CB, NARA, Date 4-11-95

October 25, 1967

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72
Long
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Discussions with the USSR on Security Assurances

In the attached memorandum (Tab A) Secretary Rusk asks your approval for starting discussions with the Soviets on security assurances for non-nuclear countries.

Secretary Rusk believes this formula is the best compromise between:

- assurances strong enough to meet the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear powers -- particularly India -- and facilitate their acceptance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and,
- avoidance of a blank check commitment to a wide variety of countries for an uncertain future.

Essentially, the attached package would only commit us to go to the Security Council -- where we have the veto. It does not extend our commitments. In this sense, Secretary Rusk's formulation is more cautious than some drafts considered last spring and reflects his real concern over the mood of the Congress. Bill Foster's consultations on the Hill show general support for this formula (Tab B).

There is a real question whether the present formula will be strong enough to satisfy the non-nuclear countries -- particularly India. On the other hand, the Indians have given mixed signals on what they would really settle for. Parallel Soviet and American declarations -- obviously tailored to the Red Chinese threat to India, and buttressed by a Security Council resolution -- should have some real value in their eyes.

Agreement with the Russians, if we can obtain it, would also be significant to the worldwide political climate.

This is only a preliminary step, and the Secretary plans to move carefully and consult with our principal allies and others as appropriate. Further delay would probably open the door to other -- unwelcome -- proposals.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

10/26/67
Pres said he doesn't know enough about the matter to make a decision; do what you thing right.
LN

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

92a

October 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Congressional Consultations on Draft U.N.
Resolution and U.S. Declaration on Security
Assurances for Non-Nuclear Countries

Bill Foster has concluded his Congressional consultations on the draft U.N. Resolution and U.S. Declaration on security assurances which we discussed last week. These consultations are summarized in an attachment. I believe they have been adequate for the purpose of initiating discussions with the Soviets. If our negotiations go well, we will of course wish to consult further and in further depth with the Congress.

I recommend that you approve the initiation of negotiations with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the attached texts.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Attachment:

1. Draft U.N. Resolution.
2. Draft U.S. Declaration.
3. Report on Foster Consultations.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-451
By cl, NARA, Date 3-30-95

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92b

DRAFT UN ASSURANCES RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

1. Noting with appreciation the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby to undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,

2. Taking into consideration the concern of certain of those states that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security,

3. Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices will endanger the peace and security of all states,

A. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state will create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon state Permanent Members, will have to act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the United Nations Charter;

B. Welcomes the intention expressed by states that they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that is a victim of an act of aggression in which they are used;

C. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

By CL, NARA, Date 3-30-95

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Draft US Declaration to be Made in UN Security Council
in Explanation of US Vote on Security Council Resolution

The Government of the United States notes with appreciation the desire expressed by a large number of states to subscribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We welcome the willingness of these states to undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States also notes the concern of certain of those states that, in conjunction with their adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken to safeguard their security. Any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would endanger the peace and security of all states. The United States recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or the threat of such aggression, against a non-nuclear-weapon state will create a situation in which nuclear-weapon states Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council will have to act immediately, through the Security Council in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to take the measures necessary to counter such use or threatened use.

The United States affirms its intention, as a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon state that has undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that is a victim of an act or threat of aggression in which they are used.

The United States reaffirms in particular the inherent right under Article 51 of the Charter of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-451

By CB, NARA, Date 3-30-95

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The United States vote for this resolution and this statement of the way in which the United States intends to act in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are based upon the fact that the Resolution is supported by other Permanent Members of the Security Council who are nuclear-weapon states and are also proposing to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that these states have made similar statements as to the way in which they intend to act in accordance with the Charter.

~~SECRET~~

92d

October 20, 1967

REPORT ON FOSTER CONSULTATIONS
ON DRAFT RESOLUTION AND US DECLARATION
ON SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES

The following points were made in support of the draft U.N. Resolution and U.S. Declaration:

(1) Non-nuclear countries have repeatedly asked for some assurance of protection from nuclear attack if they are to renounce nuclear weapons under a non-proliferation treaty.

(2) We intend to answer their request through the draft Resolution and Declaration, not with any new commitment. The Indians, who have a real security problem because of the Chinese, will probably not be satisfied and may ultimately need something more. But we hope something like this will suffice for others.

(3) The Resolution and Declaration make clear that the U.S. would take action through the Security Council where we have a veto. In the event of an act or threat of aggression with nuclear weapons on a non-nuclear country, we would request Security Council action to provide assistance and support -- military or otherwise.

The Foreign Relations Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy heard testimony in 1965 on an earlier draft U.N. resolution which was slightly stronger than the present drafts in that it did not emphasize that action would be through the Security Council where we have a veto. No serious objection was raised to the earlier draft although there were some questions.

The consultations on the present drafts produced the following responses:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-451

By cls, NARA, Date 3-30-95

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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-2-

A. Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Senator Fulbright, in a discussion with John McCloy and other members of ACDA's General Advisory Committee before the texts became available, said he saw no particular difficulty in meeting the request of non-nuclear countries for security assurances if there were participation by Congress. He thought it important that the assurances be provided through a joint U.S.-Soviet approach, which is, of course, the present plan. His schedule did not permit another meeting to review the texts after they became available, but he saw the 1965 text and he has been sent the operative parts of the current text by letter. In addition, Carl Marcy was shown the current texts and raised no problem.

Senator Gore (Chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee) felt the proposed action was a good idea and said he would support it.

Senator Hickenlooper retained his usual skepticism of any agreement with the Soviets. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had disagreed on the form of Fulbright's sense-of-the-Senate resolution on U.S. commitments, there was strong support, he said, for something along those lines. The texts shown him, he added, would be judged in this light. He did say they moved in the right direction.

B. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Senator Pastore said the texts seemed to go in the right direction. He was well aware of the concerns of the non-nuclear countries and thought a joint undertaking with the U.S.S.R. in the general form proposed would be useful in meeting these concerns. He wondered whether the Soviet Union would back out even after voting in the Security Council first for the resolution and subsequently for some action. It was explained to him (1) that our vote for the resolution was conditioned on the Soviet vote, (2) that we thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would support a future Security

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-3-

Council decision to take action against a specific act of aggression but then not comply with that decision; and (3) that if the Soviet Union did so, a clear violation of the U.N. Charter would result.

Chairman Holifield supported the idea of providing security assurances in the manner indicated in the texts.

The views of Senators Gore and Hickenlooper are indicated above. John Conway of the JCAE staff also saw the texts and expressed no objection.

C. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

Senator Stennis could not find time for an appointment because of the press of other commitments. In a telephone conversation, he was reluctant to express any opinion although he said we were doing the right thing by consulting Senators on the problem. He added that he had confidence in Col. Glenn Smith of the Preparedness Subcommittee staff who has seen the drafts and who seemed not at all concerned. Smith did, however, express skepticism that the drafts would be sufficient to meet the non-nuclear countries' concerns.

Senator Smith said she would not give a firm conclusion but thought our effort was probably in the right direction.

D. Senate Leadership

Senator Mansfield's busy schedule did not permit any discussion but a letter describing the problem and setting forth the substance of the texts has been dispatched to him.

Senator Dirksen asked whether the texts would actually satisfy the non-nuclear countries, thought that our approach was a good one, and concluded that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee would at some point wish to give the matter more detailed consideration than he could.

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~-EXDIS

Wednesday, October 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Philippine President Marcos' Remarks to Gene Locke About
Being Shortchanged on Engineering Construction Battalions

We have checked into this. There is no question whatever about the facts:

-- Prior to the Marcos visit, we agreed to equip three engineering construction battalions (ECB's).

-- The Filipinos asked that this be raised to ten ECB's.

-- You agreed to provide the equipment for five ECB's before the end of fiscal year 1967 and to consider later providing the equipment for the other five. Subsequently, you agreed to provide the equipment for the other five.

-- Thus, we have met in full the Filipino request.

-- At no time did the Filipinos indicate that the initial three ECB's should not be counted.

-- In carrying out your pledge, we negotiated with the Filipinos a precise equipment list. At no time during these negotiations did the Filipinos suggest that the equipment being provided did not meet the commitment.

In other words, everybody concerned with this matter, American or Filipino, understood perfectly that we were talking about a total of ten ECB's including the three for which we had previously promised equipment. If Marcos did not understand it this way, he failed totally to communicate that to his own people or to us until his conversation with Locke last week.

The only basis which Marcos puts forward for his claim is his private conversation with you. Unless in that conversation you undertook quite clearly to provide five ECB's during FY 1967 in addition to the three

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~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

-2-

for which we had already promised equipment, there is no basis for President Marcos feeling that he has been "shortchanged."

Bill Jorden discussed this matter with Marcos this week. Bill will be back next Monday, and we will report to you further at that time.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

94
Wednesday,
October 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's situation
report on Vietnamese politics.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

942

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report

October 25, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-451
By CL, NARA, Date 3-30-95

Lower House Elections

The 137-seat Lower House will represent a substantial cross-section of non-communist political opinion in South Viet-Nam.

Major groups excluded or under-represented in the Upper House are assured of some representation in the Lower House. Several successful candidates were either backed by the militant Buddhists or are considered acceptable to them. There were about 50 Buddhists of various persuasions elected overall. The Hoa Hao elected 13 candidates and the Cao Dai 5. The electoral law guaranteed representation for 16 members of the ethnic minorities (the Upper House law did not). There were several winners representing Southern regionalist sentiment.

The Catholics (about 35 elected) will still be over-represented, but not nearly so much as in the Upper House, where they are dominant.

The number of GVN-backed winners is still unknown. Present and former military men and civil servants did well, but by no means are all of them GVN supporters. 18 members of the Constituent Assembly were elected.

Several young, dynamic politicians including former student leaders were elected. In fact, the Lower House membership should be quite young -- an average of about 40 or 41, the same as the Constituent Assembly and well below that of the candidates as a whole (49) or of the Upper House (48).

The showing of the new and traditional political parties cannot yet be determined. The new "Farmer-Worker-Soldier" party of ex-General Tran Van Don apparently did not do as well as in the Upper House race. Organized labor reportedly did not do as well as expected either.

Overall, the Lower House election seems to have fulfilled one important immediate need -- wider participation and a "stake" in the new constitutional system for most significant political tendencies, including a potential opposition to the elected GVN. At the same time, the very diversity of the Lower House points to difficulty in organizing a pro-GVN majority and to some strain between the executive and the legislative branches.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~WFO~~
95
Pres file

~~Monday,~~
October 23, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Kampong LBJ

Attached is the letter you asked
Ernie Goldstein to draft for your signature
to the Manager of Kampong LBJ in Malaysia.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

95a
—

October 25, 1967

Dear Inche Omar:

Word has reached me of your plans to celebrate on October 30 the anniversary of the visit Mrs. Johnson and I made to your Kampong.

Through you and by this letter, Mrs. Johnson and I send our greetings and best wishes to all of the families at Kampong LBJ. We hope that your Pesta Ria will be a great success.

Please convey our particular good wishes to our host, Inche Jamrus bin Jani and his fine family. We were so happy to learn of the success of his daughter, Azizah, who will soon be coming to our country on a scholarship.

We remember your Kampong as a fine example of how people of many races can live and work together to better their own future and the future of their country. Mrs. Johnson and I wish all of you continued peace and prosperity and a happy life.

Sincerely,

Inche Omar Cheppa
Kampong LBJ
Seremban, N. S.
Malaysia

LBJ:EGoldstein:WMWright:pas:
10/23/67

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your First Day with President Diaz Ordaz, Thursday,
October 26, 1967

Rather than burden you with a mass of papers covering the entire visit, I will send you a daily briefing memorandum on each day's activities. This describes the schedule for tomorrow, October 26.

Your Involvement

- 12:15 pm - Arrival Ceremony on the South Lawn.
- 12:45 pm - You and Mrs. Johnson will accompany President Diaz Ordaz to Blair House and stay for the Key to the City presentation.
- 5:00 pm - Meeting with President Diaz Ordaz.
- 5:50 pm - Texas Tech honorary degree ceremony in the Rose Garden.
- 8:00 pm - State Dinner.

Your Statements

Your welcoming statement, remarks on receipt of the honorary degree, and the toast for the dinner have been prepared and are in Harry McPherson's hands. I have gone over them and they look fine to me. Harry will get them to you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

The Working Session with President Diaz Ordaz

Attached at Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's briefing memorandum for your meeting with the President. I have three comments to make:

1. Regarding the Mexicans taking leadership in the Latin American Common Market (page 1 of Talking Points), I recommend that you press this. The Common Market needs an Henri Spaak to give it direction and impetus. Tony Carrillo Flores, with President Diaz Ordaz's backing, could be it. There is no other Latin American of comparable stature.
2. On the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, (page 2 of Talking Points), I hope to have an agreed government position by the time you meet. This is a subject dear to the Mexicans' heart. They would love nothing better than to have you say that the US will sign Protocol II of the Treaty. We are working on a formula which would allow us to do this. Our basic problem with the Treaty is the important question of transit rights. An interpretive statement may do the trick.
3. The problem of Ford in Mexico is not mentioned because we have handled this on a highly restricted basis. This meeting is the best place to raise the subject. The memorandum I sent you is at Tab B.

I am sending to Marvin a complete set of the briefing papers prepared by State in case you wish to refer to it.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Nick Katzenbach's briefing memo - 10/21/67.

Tab B - My memo to you on Ford in Mexico - 10/24/67.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - October 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Pres file

Our Embassy in Mexico relayed the following message:

"The Embassy has been requested by the Mexican authorities to inform the Department and the White House that President Diaz Ordaz has personally added to the list of persons invited to the Chamizal Ceremony two old-time 'Communists': Vicente Lombardo *Toledano* and Francisco Martinez de la Vega. The Embassy was requested to add that Diaz Ordaz personally guarantees the proper behavior of these guests."

W. W. Rostow

cc: Secret Service

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Authority State ltr 4/3/78

By sg/led, NARA, Date 11-13-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

98
Wednesday - October 25, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Chamizal Ceremony

Secretaries Gardner and Weaver, OEO Director Shriver and Civil Service Chairman Macy will be in El Paso on Saturday attending Vicente Ximenez's Mexican-American Conference.

Do you want to ask them to attend the Chamizal ceremony if their schedule permits?

Yes ☐

No ☐

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday - October 25, 1967

[Handwritten signature]
D. Presfile
99

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Diaz Ordaz Visit Communique

Yesterday I sent you Ray Telles' memorandum in which he suggested a separate joint Presidential statement on the work of the Border Development Commission (Tab B).

At Tab A is the draft Communique prepared by State in consultation with the Mexicans. To avoid excessive length and to provide greater public impact, the Communique has been divided into two parts. The Communique proper will cover past achievements. The Presidents' Action Program offers guidelines for future action.

I have reviewed Ray Telles' proposed statement in the light of the draft Communique. I come to the conclusion that the substance of Ray's draft is adequately covered in the Communique and it would be a mistake for you and President Diaz Ordaz to subscribe a third document. If you were to do so, the Communique would have to be revised to avoid duplication, with a resulting weakening of the principal documents.

Therefore, I strongly recommend that we stick with the Communique - Presidents' Action Program package. It gives adequate recognition to the work of the Border Development Commission. We plan further recognition of the Commission and Ray's role in your Chamizal speech. Ray's personal interests are also satisfied by your making him part of your official Chamizal delegation.

May I tell Ray Telles that you prefer to stick to the Communique - Presidents' Action Program package?

Yes ☒
No ☐
See me ☐

May I inform State that the Communique - Presidents' Action

Program meets with your approval subject to such changes as arise from your talks with President Diaz Ordaz?

Yes	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>
See me	<input type="checkbox"/>

W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Draft communique.

Tab B - Separate joint Presidential statement on Border Development Commission.

99a

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ OF MEXICO
October 26-28, 1967

SUGGESTED JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President and Mrs. Johnson, President and Mrs. Diaz Ordaz of the United Mexican States are paying a state visit to the United States. .

The two Chiefs of State expressed greatest pleasure in having another opportunity to renew their cordial personal relationship and to resume informal talks held during their previous visits and at the Punta del Este Meeting of American Presidents in April 1967.

President Diaz Ordaz expressed his sincere thanks for the warm and friendly reception accorded him, which he said reflects the traditional friendship between the peoples of the United States and Mexico.

During the visit to Washington, October 26 - 27, the two Presidents, joined by Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores and Secretary Rusk, engaged in wide-ranging talks during which they reviewed the relations between the two countries and the important international problems affecting world peace and security.

The two Presidents took note of the highly successful mutual assistance arrangements worked out in late September by state and local authorities along the border

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and the cooperation within Mexico to undertake flood relief operations. The Presidents praised the flood control system of the joint International Boundary and Water Commission for saving lives and minimizing damage from the unprecedented quantity of flood waters. They were pleased, moreover, that in addition to developing a broad program to raise living standards along the border, the recently created U.S.-Mexico Border Developing Commission facilitated relief operations by communicating with federal and local agencies.

The Presidents reviewed the resolutions and results of the recent meeting of Hemisphere Presidents at Punta del Este and reaffirmed the importance of the establishment of a Latin American Common Market to foster economic and social development. They agreed that this was primarily a problem to be worked out through the efforts of the Latin American countries themselves.

The Presidents agreed that the Alliance for Progress, the broad objectives of which closely follow those of the

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Mexican Revolution, had been highly instrumental in furthering the development of the Hemisphere. President Diaz Ordaz personally testified to the role being played within Mexico of such important self-help projects as supervised agricultural credit for low income farmers, low cost housing and urban redevelopment, and the advances in higher education. He proudly stated that Mexico, as an Alliance Partner, was itself training thousands of students and technicians from other Latin American countries. The Presidents expressed satisfaction that in furthering the educational development of the Hemisphere, the Abraham Lincoln and Benito Juarez Funds were now in operation and that more than 80 Hemisphere youth would benefit in 1967.

The Presidents were gratified at the ^{steadily increasing} ~~continued high~~ level of trade which makes the U.S. Mexico's best customer and Mexico the major market for U.S. products in Latin America. They noted that the U.S.-Mexico Joint Trade Committee continues to provide a forum for discussion of

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trade problems. They agreed on the importance to the developing countries of access to the world market for their exports.

The two Chief Executives also noted with satisfaction the completion of an agreement, in accordance with recent U.S. and Mexican legislation, which will allow continued traditional fishing through 1972 for the fishermen of each country in the exclusive fishing zones of each nation.

The Presidents commended the statesmen and negotiators whose vision and high sense of responsibility had brought the two Governments to the Chamizal settlement. They remarked that a settlement of this nature, freely arrived at and fair to both countries, was all too exceptional in relations between neighboring countries. In their presence, Secretary Rusk of the Department of State and Secretary Carrillo Flores of the Secretariat of Foreign Relations exchanged letters expressing approval, as of 12:01 A.M., October 28, of a minute of the International

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Boundary and Water Commission demarcating the new boundary line between El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, under the Chamizal settlement. In accordance with the Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963, that new boundary line will become effective as of that moment.

Tomorrow, October 28, the two Presidents will fly to El Paso and Ciudad Juarez and, at the invitation of President Diaz Ordaz, they will visit Ciudad Juarez for a ceremony at the Mexican memorial to the Chamizal settlement.

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99b

VISIT OF PRESIDENT DIAZ ORDAZ
OF MEXICO
October 26-28, 1967

PRESIDENTS' ACTION PROGRAM

As a result of their discussion the two Presidents agreed that further inquiry and action should be taken with respect to the following important matters affecting both countries:

1. The Work of the International Boundary and Water Commission

They noted that since their visit in December 1966 to the Amistad Dam site on the Rio Grande, joint construction had advanced rapidly, and that the Commission can begin to store water before the flood season of 1968. They noted that recently the two Governments had approved a project for the relocation and channelization of the Tijuana River in the States of California and Baja California, and an expansion of the international sanitation plant for the two Nogales on the Arizona-Sonora border. They recalled President Johnson's meeting with President Lopez Mateos in

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February 1964 at which time the Commission had been instructed to submit studies relating to any portions of land that might have become separated from the country to which they belonged, so that the Rio Grande could be made once again the boundary between the two countries from El Paso and Ciudad Juarez to the Gulf of Mexico. The Presidents were informed that the Commission is well advanced in the surveys needed, and that the studies are under way with a view to their early completion. They further instructed the International Boundary and Water Commission to complete as soon as practicable its studies of the recent record flood on the lower Rio Grande, and to recommend to the two Governments such modification of the international flood control project as may be necessary to control and contain floodwaters of this unexpected magnitude.

2. U.S.-Mexico Border Development and Friendship Commission

The Presidents discussed the work of the Commission which they had agreed to create in April, 1966, to study

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cooperatively the improvement in the standard of living of communities along the border. The Presidents reviewed the minutes of the first joint meeting of the Commission in Mexico City on October 19-20 of this year in which the two Sections reviewed plans for beautification projects and increased tourism, joint city planning between adjoining cities, increased job opportunities on both sides of the border, binational cultural centers, health and vocational educational facilities, and other programs which will permit the neighboring communities to work together to improve their living conditions. The Presidents instructed the two Sections of the Commission to give priority attention to a program of social and economic rehabilitation of the lower Rio Grande Valley.

3. Cooperation in the Development of Water Resources

The Presidents spoke of the remarkable exchange of information on water resources management that took place at the Conference on Water for Peace held in Washington

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last May. They reiterated their intention to continue to keep pace with modern science and techniques in the collaboration between the two countries for the development of their respective water resources. President Diaz Ordaz remarked on the fact that this cooperation is exemplified in the Mexican project now under construction utilizing United States technology for the desalting of ocean water for the city of Tijuana, Baja California. The two Presidents reviewed the most recent report of the United States-Mexican Study Group which is investigating the feasibility of a joint nuclear project to desalt water of the Gulf of California for use in the States of Arizona and California in the United States and Sonora and Baja California in Mexico. The Presidents requested the Study Group to submit its recommendations to the two Governments early in 1968. The Presidents spoke of the continued efforts of the two Governments to control salinity in the

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two great international rivers that their countries share. They agreed that there should be continued consultation at the technical level in regard to projects of either Government that might adversely affect the other.

4. Elimination of the Screwworm Fly

The Presidents agreed in principle that the present barrier in Northern Mexico to control and eventually eliminate the screwworm fly should be rolled back to the narrow Isthmus of Tehuantepec. They proposed that an agreement be negotiated as soon as possible to implement this program which would materially benefit large areas in Mexico which are not now covered.

5. The Establishment of Friendship Parks

The two Presidents announced that they had agreed in principle to consider the establishment of a number of parallel national parks on the international border, to be known as Friendship Parks. The first to be created are

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the Chamizal Memorial Parks already opposite one another on the new international boundary between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez. Among other possible locations under consideration are the Big Bend area of the Rio Grande, where the United States has developed a national park, and the huge reservoir to be formed by the international Amistad Dam being constructed jointly by the two Governments on the Rio Grande. The Governments would consult in adopting appropriate regulations for the public use of the parallel Friendship Parks as the parks are established and when the wishes of the respective Congresses are known.

6. Expansion of Cultural Exchange

To further extend the exchange of persons from all walks of life between the two countries, the Presidents agreed that a new cultural agreement should be negotiated. This would provide guidelines for the types of cultural

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interchange and foster continued understanding of and training in the two countries. They discussed the preparations being made in Mexico for the Olympics in October 1968 and the cooperation of many countries to provide cultural groups to perform in Mexico during the entire Olympic year. They felt that many visitors would combine visits to Mexico with visits to HemisFair in San Antonio. They viewed these events as important incentives to continued high levels of tourism, which permit the peoples of the two countries to maintain personal relations and friendly understanding.

7. Stability for Coffee Prices

To provide conditions of stability in the coffee trade at price levels both remunerative to producers and fair to consumers and to obtain dependable income for coffee-producing countries, they agreed that the International Coffee Agreement should be extended with such

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amendments as may be required to improve enforcement procedures, to bring production into line with consumer requirements, and to ensure equitable trading conditions.

8. Movement of Articles of Historical Value

The Presidents agreed to explore possible methods of controlling the unauthorized movement of articles of historical value between their two countries.

9. Control of Narcotics

The Presidents noted with satisfaction the continued cooperative efforts between the enforcement agencies of both countries in the field of controlling the international trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and resolved to continue this cooperation.

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99c

JOINT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

RECOMMENDED BY

U.S.-MEXICO COMMISSION FOR BORDER
DEVELOPMENT AND FRIENDSHIP

Agreed to in Mexico City, October 20, 1967

The two Presidents reviewed the work of the United States-Mexico Commission for Border Development and Friendship which was created as a result of their meeting in Mexico City in April 1966 to study means of improving relations between border communities and of raising the standard of living in the border region. They noted with satisfaction the Commission's coordinating role in the relief and rehabilitation of the border areas affected by Hurricane Beulah. Based on this experience they authorized the Commission to continue its role in rehabilitation and in addition to develop cooperative plans and procedures for handling future disasters. Other specific areas of the Commission's activities were reviewed as follows:

Health. They authorized the acceleration of joint programs in such areas as the control and eventual eradication of communicable diseases such as tuberculosis, rabies and others; they endorsed the work already being done jointly in environmental health and urged the acceleration of this work. They noted with special approval the close cooperation of the Commission with the Pan American Health Organization in public health programs and cited this binational cooperation with a multinational institution as a model for other areas of endeavor.

Education. The two Presidents agreed that education is a most important area for cooperative work by the Commission and that initially priority should be given to a study of technical and vocational training, linking it to the pressing needs currently being felt on both sides of the border.

Social and Cultural. They warmly endorse the idea of cooperative cultural centers on both sides of the border where each country could learn to appreciate the contributions and greatness of the other's language and

understand its values, and where communities can work together to solve mutual social problems.

Sports. Having in mind the XIX Olympic Games to be held in Mexico City in 1968, the Presidents agreed that sports have always been an effective way of promoting friendship and understanding between peoples and urged the development of cooperative sports programs on both sides of the border.

Friendship Parks. The two Presidents authorized the study of the feasibility of creating parallel friendship parks on both sides of the border to help meet the recreational needs of both populations and to provide additional opportunities to deepen the friendship existing between them in areas of natural beauty or historical significance. Some areas are under consideration, among others, the areas around the Amistad Dam as well as the Big Bend National Park and neighboring areas on the Mexican side.

Economic and Social Development. The Presidents agreed that one of the greatest hopes of the people who live in the border region lies in economic and social development which will begin to alleviate the problems of unemployment and underemployment and to establish stable sources of income. They agreed that the creation of new opportunities for significant employment and the expansion of training programs would go far to raise the general levels of living of the people. They noted with satisfaction the studies being made in areas of industrialization, tourism, transportation, and public facilities along the border, especially those that would provide long-term employment opportunities.

Expression of the Spirit of Punta del Este, 1967. The Presidents declared that the activities of such an organization as the Commission are a concrete and inspiring demonstration of the spirit of the Meeting of the Presidents in Punta del Este in which multinational, cooperative social and technical projects were stressed.

1602

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-453
By CL, NARA, Date 4-11-95

October 25, 1967

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I deeply appreciated your message of October 16 stating that your Government has decided to increase New Zealand's assistance to Viet-Nam by deploying a second infantry company. In view of your limited resources and the need to consider your future defense relations with Malaysia and Singapore, I know the decision could not have been an easy one. I believe, however, that you have chosen wisely, and that this renewed demonstration of New Zealand's determination will reinforce our efforts to convince Hanoi that its present course is futile and that it has no real alternative to negotiation.

I have also read your article of October 1, entitled "Aspects of the Viet-Nam Problem," and I want to express my warm admiration for this fine statement. It is one of the most lucid and compelling presentations I have ever seen of the reasons why we together are now contributing to the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

LBJ:WMWright:pas:10/25/67



100-8

NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY
19 OBSERVATORY CIRCLE, NW,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

16 October 1967

17792

Dear Mr President,

I have been asked by my Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Keith Holyoake, to pass to you the following message:

"In my message of 29 August I indicated that the Government would be considering the possibility of a further increase in our forces in Vietnam. At the beginning of October I paid a short visit to Canberra to explore with Harold Holt some of the implications of the British decision to leave Malaysia and Singapore and to consider the demands of the situation in Vietnam, which we both recognised as the most direct and immediate challenge. We agreed that the time had come for us to see what more we could do, if possible together, as an earnest of determination to see the war in Vietnam through to an acceptable conclusion.

/"In our case

The President

of the United States of America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5
By isl NLJ 10-112 (#892)
NARA, Date 1-31-11

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"In our case the most readily available means of meeting the need is by drawing further on the forces we have in Malaysia. In present circumstances there are limits to the extent to which we can run down those forces without running the risk of jeopardising our future defence relations with Malaysia and Singapore, the nature of which will remain uncertain until we have had further discussions with the Governments of those countries and our allies.

"Nevertheless I discussed the matter with Cabinet immediately upon my return and we have now decided to increase New Zealand's military assistance to Vietnam by deploying a second infantry company of about 170 men, most of whom will be drawn from our battalion in Malaysia and, like the company we sent earlier this year, will also be fitted into the Australian task force. I shall be announcing this at 1630 hours on Tuesday 17 October (0430 hours Tuesday GMT). This represents about all that we can do now by way of ground forces but we shall be considering whether there is anything further we could contribute in other directions.

/I have spoken

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3.

"I have spoken before of how keenly aware we are of the difference between the needs of the Vietnam conflict and our capacity to help meet those needs. My colleagues and I are very conscious too of the burden which the United States is carrying in Asia. But, if, as I believe is the case, the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam depends as much as anything on convincing Hanoi that the allies have the will and the patience to continue their efforts to the end, then even the limited contributions that countries such as New Zealand are able to make should serve a useful purpose in convincing the aggressors that their tactics will not succeed and that there is no alternative to coming to the conference table."

Yours sincerely,

Ambassador of New Zealand

~~SECRET~~

1002

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Of the additional infantry company of some 170 men to be sent by New Zealand to South Vietnam, approximately 150 will come from the New Zealand Battalion in Malaysia and about 20 from New Zealand. The Company will be detached from the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, but New Zealand reserves the right in the case of this Company, as in the case of the infantry company earlier sent to South Vietnam, to restore it to the Battalion if a compelling need should arise in the Malaysian area. It is, however, considered unlikely, given the present relative tranquility in the Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia area, that such a need will arise in the foreseeable future.

J.H.C.

16 October 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority PLS 00-192 (896)
By J/CB NARA, Date 12-15-09

October 25, 1967

101

~~1. copy~~
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a suggested letter to Australia's Prime Minister Holt thanking him for his recent decision to send more troops to Viet-Nam.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

101a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-453
By CL, NARA, Date 4-11-95

October 25, 1967

Dear Harold:

I deeply appreciated your letter of October 6, and your splendid speech in Parliament October 17, about the substantial additional forces your Government has decided to contribute to Viet-Nam. Australia is once again giving the world eloquent proof of its determination to see our common task in Viet-Nam through to the finish. Even before your new troops enter the field, your announcement has served to reinforce our efforts to persuade Hanoi that its present course is futile, and that it has no real alternative to sitting down at the conference table.

I am aware that the decision could not have been an easy one, and that it was carefully considered in the light of the implications of the British withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia which you discussed with Keith Holyoake. The outline of your thinking on this subject in your letter of October 6 was useful to me and enhanced the value of the excellent talks we had with Paul Hasluck.

Warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Harold E. Holt
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

LBJ:WMWright:pas:10/25/67

orig sent to Jemite 10/19

~~TOP SECRET~~

101 b



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By cb NARA, Date 4-11-95

6th October, 1967

Dear Mr President,

I have been instructed by the
Prime Minister to deliver the following message to you
urgently.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'J.K. Waller'.

(J.K. Waller)

A large, stylized handwritten mark or flourish, possibly a signature or a checkmark, consisting of a long horizontal stroke with a loop at the end.

The President,
The White House,
WASHINGTON D.C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday - October 25, 1967

Mr. President:

Congressman Mahon's office asks if the following persons connected with Texas Tech can attend the honorary degree ceremony:

Alvin R. Allison
Levelland, Texas

Carl E. Reistle, Jr.
Houston, Texas

Judge Marshall Formby
Plainview, Texas

Herbert Allen
Houston, Texas

Harold Hinn
Dalls, Texas

Retha R. Martin
Lubbock, Texas

Dr. Fladger F. Tannery
Dallas, Texas

Frank Gonzalez
Lubbock, Texas

Ronald Ham
Lubbock, Texas

Dr. S. M. Kennedy
Lubbock, Texas.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ____ Disapprove ____ See me ____.

Wednesday - October 25, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Diaz Ordaz Visit Communique

Profile

Yesterday I sent you Ray Telles' memorandum in which he suggested a separate joint Presidential statement on the work of the Border Development Commission (Tab B).

At Tab A is the draft Communique prepared by State in consultation with the Mexicans. To avoid excessive length and to provide greater public impact, the Communique has been divided into two parts. The Communique proper will cover past achievements. The President's Action Program offers guidelines for future action.

I have reviewed Ray Telles' proposed statement in the light of the draft Communique. I come to the conclusion that the substance of Ray's draft is adequately covered in the Communique and it would be a mistake for you and President Diaz Ordaz to subscribe a third document. If you were to do so, the Communique would have to be revised to avoid duplication, with a resulting weakening of the principal documents.

Therefore, I strongly recommend that we stick with the Communique -- President's Action Program package. It gives adequate recognition to the work of the Border Development Commission. We plan further recognition of the Commission and Ray's role in your Chamizal speech. Ray's personal interests are also satisfied by your making him part of your official Chamizal delegation.

May I tell Ray Telles that you prefer to stick to the Communique - Presidents' Action Program package?

Yes ☐
No ☐
See me ☐

May I inform State that the Communique - Presidents' Action

Program meets with your approval subject to such changes as arise from your talks with President Diaz Ordaz?

Yes
No
See me .

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Draft communique.

Tab B - Separate joint Presidential statement on Border
Development Commission.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-453
By CB, NARA, Date 4-11-95

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Tuesday, October 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Invitation to Indonesian President Suharto to Visit the U.S.

President Suharto is now planning a visit to several Asian countries and a trip to Western Europe sometime in the spring of 1968. Foreign Minister Malik has informed Marshall Green of these plans and of Malik's belief that Suharto would appreciate an invitation to visit the United States, perhaps in connection with his European visit. It is certain that during the Vice President's visit to Djakarta, the possibility of Suharto's travel to the U.S. will come up.

Suharto does not speak English and has never travelled outside Indonesia. All things considered, his visit here would probably be more productive if it came after his horizons were broadened by travel to other countries. The Indonesians, however, probably think we will feel neglected if not included early in Suharto's foreign travels.

I suggest that the Vice President be authorized to say on your behalf that you appreciate the demanding nature of the problems with which Suharto is dealing, but that you are very much looking forward to receiving him as your guest whenever he feels the time is ripe for a visit to the United States.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~