

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/7/67	A
#5a cable	Saigon 10563 S 2 p open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476	11/7/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m. S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/7/67	A
#9a cable sanitized 8.9.04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Intelligence Cable S 3 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476 same sanit NLJ 019-0251	11/7/67	A
#9b cable more info released 8.9.04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Intelligence Cable S 2 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476	11/7/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President same sanitizing 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481 S 1 p same sanitization 10-24-92 NLJ/RAC 00-271; same sanit per RAC 3/04 [Sanitized NLJ 85-72]	11/7/67	A
#12a rpt	Talking Points S 6 p sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476	11/5/67	A
#15a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow S 2 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	9/12/67	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. " S 1 p	11/6/67	A
#18a cable more info released 8.9.04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Saigon 499 S 3 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476 same sanit NLJ 019-0251	undated	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru S 2 p SANITIZED 7/28/95 NLJ 94-170	11/6/67	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/4/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru " S 1 p	11/4/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i>	11/67	A
#28a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i>	11/3/67	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/4/67	A
#30a memo	Denney to Read S 3 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
#31a cable	Harriman to President and SecState S 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i> [Sanitized NLJ 86-165]	11/3/67	A
#32 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/4/67	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. " S 1 p	11/3/67	A
#36a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>EDUP. #3A, NSF, CF, Mideast Crisis, "sandstorm/wind" b8, b3</i> S 8 p <i>sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>same sanitization 3-26-89 NLJ 08-226 and NLJ 94-476</i>	11/67	A
#39a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 4 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>[Dupl #1252, NSF Country File, Vietnam, b66, "241 - Corps & DMZ"]</i>	10/31/67	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>exempt 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>exempt 5-16-01 NLJ 00-199</i> [Duplicate of #108, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	11/3/67	A
#41a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>exempt 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i> S 8 p <i>exempt 5-6-03 NLJ 00-200</i> [Duplicate of #108a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1979]	10/27/67	A

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#42 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/3/67	A
#42a cable	Deptel 64092 to Moscow <i>open 11/8/00 NS 00-201</i> S 2 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/3/67	A
#43a cable	Rawalpindi 1598 S 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
<i>43b</i> #47 memo	<i>Filed in open 9/12/94</i> Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/3/67	A
#50a cable	Saigon 10206 <i>Cable dup #13, NSF, CF, VN, "8BB(1)" Box 105</i> S 11 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/2/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/2/67	A
#53a memo	Read to Rostow C 1 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/2/67	A
#54a cable	Karachi 807 S 4 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/1/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. TS 3 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i> [Sanitized NLJ 83-55]	11/2/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 10:20 a.m. <i>same sanitization 10-24-02 NLJ 94-481</i> TS "S" 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 94-481</i>	11/2/67	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 10:07 a.m. <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> TS "S" 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>Sanit. NLJ 019-025-1</i>	11/2/67	A
#64a memo	Intelligence Memorandum TS 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482; same sanit. NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>Downgraded to "Conf" NLJ 94-482</i>	11/1/67	A

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#66a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-11-95 NLS 94-475</i> <i>same as NS 019-023-1</i>	11/2/67	A
#65a memo	Goldberg to President C 8 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i>	11/1/67	A
#72a cable	Tokyo 2972 " S 1 p	10/31/67	A
#75a cable	Kuala Lumpur 1709 S 2 p <i>open 10-14-94 NLS 93-501</i>	11/1/67	A
#76 memo	Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 3-14-96 NLS 94-481</i>	11/1/67	A
#76a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>Sanitized 4-13-95 NLS 94-482</i>	10/31/67	A
#76b rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p <i>Sanitized 4-13-95 NLS 94-482</i> <i>more info released 3-14-96 NW 04-149</i>	<i>same as NS 019-023-1</i> undated	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLS 94-475</i> [Duplicate of #168, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	11/1/67	A
#82a ltr	Lin to Rusk <i>Open RAC 2/12</i> C 1 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i> [Duplicate of #168a, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	10/13/67	A
#82b ltr	Lin to Rusk <i>open 11/8/00 NS 00-201</i> C 1 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i> [Duplicate of #168b, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	10/17/67	A
#82c rpt	"Malaysia was the first..." <i>open 11/8/00 NS 00-201</i> PCI 3 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i>	undated	A
#82d rpt	"In an article entitled..." PCI 1 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i>	undated	A
#82e rpt	"Malaysia's diplomatic support..." " PCI 4 p	undated	A

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#82f ltr	Rusk to Lin PCI 1 p <i>open 1-23-94 NLS 94-476</i>	10/27/67	A
#84a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report " S 1 p <i>Dup. #8a, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	11/1/67	A
#86 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>OPEN 7/26/95 NLS 94-18</i>	11/1/67	A

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#16 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 1:30 p.m. - S 1 p [Dupl # 24 NSF CF Vietnam, 6x66 "ZAI-1 Corpst (Santized, NLJ - CBS 19, 6/22/84) open 5-1-00 DMZ"] RAC	11/6/67	A
#16a report	Intelligence Report - OPEN 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 00-272 S 2 pp	10/26/67	A
#16b report	Intelligence Report - 1 pp OPEN 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 00-272	10/26/67	A
#51 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. - TS 1p OPEN 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 00-273	11/2/67	A
#51a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1p EXEMPT 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 00-272	11/2/67	A
#55 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 6:50 p.m. - TS 1 p Santized 4/3/03 NLJ/RAC 00-273	11/2/67	A
#55a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1 p EXEMPT 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-56	11/2/67	A
#62 report memo	Richard Helms to the President - TS 3 pp Santized 9-13-07 NLJ 04-63 and NLJ 93-511	11/1/67	A
55b cable	intelligence cable TS- 1p. exempt 5/03	10/31/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, /Walt Rostow, Volume 49, November 1-8, 1967 Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

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1
Pres file
W. W. Rostow

November 7, 1967
Tuesday, 5:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attendance at NSC Meeting, 10:00 A. M., Wednesday
November 8

There is attached a list of those usually attending the National Security Council Meeting plus Cabinet Secretaries. The Congressional Leaders who have been invited and are expected to attend will be sent later.

Secretary Freeman is out of town and his Under Secretary has not been invited.

Dick Helms must be on the Hill at 10:00 A. M. Do you wish us to invite his deputy, Admiral Taylor?

W. W. Rostow

Invite Admiral Taylor: ☐ yes ☐ no

BKS:amc

1a

List of Invitees, NSC Meeting

November 7, 1967, Wednesday, 10:00 AM

Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCS Chairman General Wheeler

OEP Director Daniel

USIA Director Marks

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

Attorney General Clark

Postmaster General O'Brien

Secretary of Interior Udall

Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge

Secretary of HEW Gardner

Secretary of Labor Wirtz

Secretary of HUD Weaver

Secretary of Transportation Boyd

Walt Rostow

George Christian

Bromley Smith

2

November 7, 1967
Tuesday, 5:30 P. M.

Free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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November 8

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W. W. Rostow

Invite Admiral Taylor: ☐ yes ☐ no

BKS:amc

2a

List of Invitees, NSC Meeting

November 7, 1967, Wednesday, 10:00 AM

Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCS Chairman General Wheeler

OEP Director Daniel

USIA Director Marks

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

Attorney General Clark

Postmaster General O'Brien

Secretary of Interior Udall

Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge

Secretary of HEW Gardner

Secretary of Labor Wirtz

Secretary of HUD Weaver

Secretary of Transportation Boyd

Walt Rostow

George Christian

Bromley Smith

INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
5:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Westy on Gavin and Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 10596

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 11-18-91

~~SECRET~~

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GEN WHEELER CHAIRMAN JCS WASH
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 10596 EYES ONLY

1. JIMMY GAVIN AND STY WAINWRIGHT DEPARTED VIETNAM THIS MORNING FOR BANGKOK. THEY WILL CONFER WITH AMBASSADOR UNGER IN BANGKOK AND TRAVEL TO MANILA TODAY. THEY PLAN TO DEPART MANILA FOR RETURN TO CONUS TOMORROW AFTERNOON, 8 NOVEMBER.

2. GAVIN VISITED ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS, CONFERRED WITH ALL VIETNAMESE CORPS COMMANDERS AND SENIOR US OFFICIALS, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, IN EACH CORPS AREA. HE MET WITH ADVISORS AND GVN OFFICIALS DOWN TO THE HAMLET LEVEL. ONLY MAJOR US UNIT VISITED WAS 1ST AIR CAV. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS 4-DAY FIELD TRIP, HE SPENT A DAY IN SAIGON WHERE HE CALLED ON PRES. THIEU, VICE PRES. KY, (JGS) Joint General staff, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF THANG, THE FRENCH CONSULATE GENERAL AND OTHER

OFFICIALS. I HAD A SMALL DINNER FOR HIM LAST NIGHT AND INVITED ABRAMS, KOMER, ZORTHIAN, MOMYER, BRUCE PALMER, CHUCK COOPER, AND KEY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. ALTHOUGH THE SAIGON PRESS HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN TALKING TO HIM ALL ALONG THE WAY, GAVIN CONSISTENTLY HELD THE POSITION THAT HE HAD NO STATEMENTS TO MAKE UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO THINK ABOUT WHAT HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD. FRANKLY, HE WAS VERY GOOD IN AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE DID, HOWEVER, DINE WITH DEAN BRELLIS, PETER ARNETT, AND ONE OR TWO OTHER MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHEN HE WAS IN SAIGON.

3. GAVIN WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A FIRST HAND LOOK AT THE SITUATION OUT HERE. HE WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY OF THE ITINERARY WHICH HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR HIM AND THE FREEDOM ALLOWED HIM IN MAKING CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENTS WHICH WERE FEW. HE TOLD ME HE WAS IMMENSELY IMPRESSED BY THE AMERICANS OUT HERE AND SURPRISED AT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE (RVNAF). HE IMPLIED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE TROOP DISPOSITIONS THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SHARES TO SOME DEGREE OUR ESTIMATE THAT WE ARE HURTING THE ENEMY IN THE SOUTH. HE WAS QUICK TO REAFFIRM HIS CONVICTION THAT THE BROAD NATIONAL STRATEGY, WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM, IS DEFECTIVE. HE CONTENDS THAT HE IS NOT, REPEAT, NOT A PROPONENT OF

DECLASSIFIED

REPUBLIC of VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (South Vietnam)

Authority MLG 85-56

By sgl/aa, NARA, Date 12 5 91

WITHDRAWAL OR OF FURTHER ESCALATION, BUT HE FEELS THAT OUR POLICY OF CONTINUED AND UNRELENTING PRESSURE, BOTH IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH, DOES NOT SHOW MUCH PROMISE FOR ANYTHING BUT MORE OF THE SAME. (HE MEANS BY THIS "A LONG AND EXPENSIVE COMMITMENT OF U.S. RESOURCES FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.") HE CONSISTENTLY REFERRED TO THE DOMESTIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS AT HOME, THE MASSIVE DEFICIT IN OUR BUDGET, THE 10 PER CENT SURCHARGE, THE IMPAIRING IMPACT OF THIS WAR ON OUR ABILITY TO COPE WITH PROBLEMS IN NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SIGNIFICANT LACK OF SUPPORT FOR OUR VIETNAM POLICY BY OUR ALLIES. HE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT WE MUST DO SOMETHING VERY SOON TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN QUERIED AS TO SPECIFICS, HE INVARIABLY RESPONDED THAT AS THE FIRST STEP, WE SHOULD CEASE BOMBING IN THE NORTH AND CONSIDER "STOPPING THE SHOOTING" IN THE SOUTH. HE IMPLIED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THESE INITIATIVES WITHOUT DEMANDING A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE OTHER SIDE. HE BELIEVES THESE STEPS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO PROVIDE THE FACE SAVING AVENUE THAT WILL LEAD HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

4. WAINWRIGHT OBVIOUSLY HAS AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON GAVIN'S THINKING AND APPARENTLY SHARES GAVIN'S VIEWS, BUT MAY HAVE MODERATED HIS POSITION BY THE EXPERIENCE.

5. IN SUM, I THINK THE VISIT WAS WORTHWHILE FOR GAVIN, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HIS ABSENCE FROM THIS COUNTRY FOR WELL OVER TEN YEARS. HE APPARENTLY WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE AMERICAN TEAM HERE AND HAS HAD HIS MIND CHANGED SOMEWHAT REGARDING RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS. HE MAY CONCEDE THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE FIELD AND IN PACIFICATION. HIS PRINCIPAL QUARREL REMAINS CENTERED ON THE US STRATEGIC POLICY CONNECTED WITH OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND HIS BELIEF THAT THIS IS HAVING AN ALMOST DISASTROUS EFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL, DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

~~SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY~~

735

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
5:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Green reports in
glowing terms on the Vice President's
trip to Indonesia.

W. W. Rostow

Djakarta 2651

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

SECRET

4a

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR GREEN (Djakarta 2651)

SUBJECT: Vice President's Visit to Indonesia

I consider the Vice President's visit to Indonesia to be an outstanding success.

The public reception was uniformly warm and at times amazingly exuberant. There was no hint of a negative demonstration, no anti-American placards, and no hostile gestures or words. Even Djakarta's outspoken press, which usually finds some point to criticize in every event, was exceptionally friendly. While the crowds were not large in Djakarta, which is often exposed to high-level visits, tens of thousands of people lined the rural roads of Bali and Central Java cheering and sometimes waving paper American flags. These areas, it should be remembered, spent the last decade under the influence of the Communist Party as well as the PNI's xenophobic nationalism.

The Vice President's warm and vigorous personality came through exceptionally well both in his hand-shaking forays into crowds of laborers and peasants as well as in his speeches and discussions. I would say that it was in his impromptu remarks that the Vice President's eloquence struck home most movingly. At Demak, site of Java's first Mosque, he departed from prepared remarks with a perfectly timed plea for religious tolerance which paralleled the campaign Suharto has recently undertaken in this area. By pointing out similarities between Pantja Sila and the U. S. pledge of allegiance, he aptly identified the common principles of our two countries and, according to Indonesian friends present, gave a better interpretation of Indonesia's over-interpreted creed than I believe Indonesian leaders have ever managed to do. All his remarks conveyed sympathy for and understanding of Indonesia's problems. My only regret is that the Vice President's speech to the American community, which provided a brilliant positive exposition of our larger policies and purposes, was not heard by Indonesians but we plan to give this printed text wide circulation.

The Vice President was equally successful, I believe, in establishing a personal rapport with Suharto both in his own and President Johnson's names -- this despite Suharto's retiring Javanese nature and need to work through a translator. Such rapport will serve Suharto well in this critical period both to bolster his self-confidence and his position vis-a-vis internal political critics. As the Department is aware, Suharto is deeply concerned over the increase in the price of rice (which constitutes 40 percent of local cost of living) and somewhat unsure of how he should handle political repercussions.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ 88-120
By 13/1/91, NARA, Date 12-6-91

Suharto's able team of economists, who have been under pressures from within as well as from outside the administration, will benefit from the healthy assist from the Vice President. He made a strong pitch for a free economy approach, minimum controls and encouragement of individual initiative. These are points he also intends to make in the letter which, as President of Senate, he will write to Parliament Speaker Sjaichu (the idea was checked with Suharto who welcomes it). The Vice President, both in the November 5 working session and in November 6 final conversation, strengthened the hands of those in this government who have stressed the use of proper institutional channels in conducting economic and commercial relations with foreign countries. He pointed out the error in believing those who claim to have special influence with the Vice President and President. He emphasized that the way to do business is through the Ambassador. (Comment: This will strengthen the Embassy's hand as well as that of our friends, but I am not so naive as to believe the problem has been finally disposed of. The backdoor dealers and influence peddlers are a persistent crowd.)

In the foreign policy field, the Vice President stressed that the greatest contribution Indonesia can make to stability and progress in Asia is to put its own house in order. Without implying any criticism of Foreign Minister Adam Malik (for whom he expressed high regard), he suggested that the Government of Indonesia should make an effort to understand our problems in Vietnam and elsewhere and, phrasing his argument in positive terms, indicated that criticism would not help.

Specific points raised in Vice President's discussions with Suharto, as well as with individual ministers, advisers, non-governmental personalities, etc., covered separately.

My dominant impression of the Vice President's visit is that it deepened the understanding of the spiritual values and long-term goals which our two nations share. He brought Indonesia and the United States closer together.

5

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
5:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Bunker reports Ky is in an
operational mood and making sense.

The Thieu relation looks better
on the surface.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-475
By sig, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rla

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 10563)

I spent about one hour with Vice President Ky the morning of November 7. I told Ky that I would be leaving Thursday for a trip to Washington, which was in the nature of a normal consultation after six months here. I said that I thought the three measures the Government of Vietnam had already taken with respect to: 1) partial mobilization; 2) transfer of land tax administration to local authorities; and 3) attack on corruption, had all been very useful and constructive steps. In connection with the land tax transfer to local authorities, I mentioned to Ky the draft ordinance on land reform which I had given to Thieu on November 4.

I gave him a copy of my memorandum and draft ordinance, noting that this would be a logical next step to follow the tax reform. Ky agreed and added that it was important to get the control at the local level. With respect to the anti-corruption program, he confirmed that in the Third Corps alone, some 75 officials had been removed this year.

Ky then went on to describe his own thoughts about what his major interests and concerns would be in the new government. The anti-corruption program would be one. He also planned to devote a good deal of his time to pacification and coordination in this field among Generals Thang, Vien and Tri. Ky said that he expected to spend a good deal of his time in the provinces. He planned, for example, to spend some time in the First Corps next week examining the situation in Hue and Danang, and with the Marines, evaluating how the Revolutionary Development team effort was proceeding in that area. Ky agreed with the report by a mission official who had recently visited there that generally speaking, the people in the hamlets were pleased with the Revolutionary Development teams, wanted them to stay on in their hamlets, or wanted them to come in if they were not already there.

Coming back to my Washington trip, Ky said he was worried about the generally poor conditions under which the Vietnamese Armed Forces operate. He cited as examples their inadequate pay, difficulties in getting food, etc., observing that something needed to be done for them but the Government of Vietnam simply didn't have the money. He cited the 95 million piaster ceiling on the budget. Ky noted that General Westmoreland had agreed to provide 42 million dollars for subsistence but added that they were sorely in need of help with respect to

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-476

By 100, NARA, Date 1-10-95

distribution and specifically needed more advisors for this purpose. In connection with the budget, he commented that the Government of Vietnam would have to do much more to increase the government revenue.

I told Ky that although we had no official instructions yet regarding a possible stand-down over the forthcoming holiday periods, it would be useful to know what his personal views were since he had been so intimately involved last year. Ky said that he thought we should agree to have a stand-down, preferably 24 hours for Christmas, 24 hours for New Year's, and 48 hours for Tet, since these are traditional holidays. He thought it important that we take the initiative rather than let Hanoi or the Viet Cong get the benefit of it.

I then asked Ky how he envisaged the development of adequate support for the government in the two Houses of the Assembly. I said that in my view it would be essential to have such support initially for major government programs and ultimately to develop the basis for new political parties. Ky said he thought this trend was moving satisfactorily. He remarked that there were already about 50 Deputies in the Lower House who supported the government and added that he thought there would be as many as 80. In the Senate, he foresaw support for the government from the slates of Senators Don, Hien, and Cao. He also thought it was possible that Huyen's slate and some of Nguyen Kngoc Ky's slate (Revolutionary Dai Viets) might cooperate. He was therefore optimistic that they would have a clear majority in both Houses. With respect to political party development, Ky said that the old parties were already disappearing and that a new generation was coming in, which was a healthy sign. He thought that the development of new party organizations must come slowly and at its own pace. If it were forced, they would be artificial and not afford a solid foundation for the stable political development which was needed. Ky also said that it was important for the government party to develop from the grass roots and from the Assembly and not be imposed by the government itself. He cited Diem's policy of creating a personal party and forcing people into it as a wrong approach. Ky said that for these reasons he had recently refused a suggestion from Senator Don that he, Ky, agree to head up a national political party.

Prime Minister Loc came in during my visit with Ky and I had an opportunity to congratulate him and to have a brief conversation with both of them.

Comment: I found Ky in a very good mood and was encouraged to see that he has now focused on moving ahead with vital government programs which will hopefully bring some early and constructive results. His general approach to developing support for the government in the Assembly and for creating the basis for a political party structure also seems sound to me. From his comments, and from reports from sources near Thieu, I get the impression that Thieu and Ky are now keeping more closely in touch on development of political support for the government rather than stimulating separate and rival organizations.

Per file
6

Tuesday, Nov. 7, 1967
1:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor volunteers an interesting paper on the alternatives facing Washington and Hanoi in the months ahead.

I recommend that you turn the paper over to Nick Katzenbach's Viet Nam group and ask them:

- Do you agree?
- If not, how would you state the choices and make your recommendations?
- What new actions flow from your recommendations?

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 86-166
By sig, NARA, Date 1-26-88

6a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1967

Mr. President:

As an outgrowth of our group discussion of Vietnam in the Cabinet Room on November 2, I am attaching my personal analysis of the alternatives which appear available to our side (Blue) and to their's (Red) in pursuing our conflicting policy objectives. For the Blue policy objective, I have paraphrased your statement at Johns Hopkins in April, 1965; the Red objective is derived from apparently authentic statements emanating from Hanoi.

In listing available alternatives, I have assumed that neither side will ever completely abandon its objective but either may be obliged to settle for half a loaf or for an indefinite postponement of full attainment. Thus, I have not included an immediate pull-out among Blue alternatives or an unconditional surrender under Red's.

In listing alternatives, one may argue that negotiation is not a true alternative since it takes two to negotiate and, for the moment, only our side is willing. We might say that, under these conditions, negotiation is an alternative for Red but not for Blue. However, for convenience of discussion, I have included it as an alternative, recognizing that it is a development which may grow out of any of the other alternatives.

M.D.T.

M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-166

By LS, NARA, Date 1-26-88

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66

~~SECRET~~

An Estimate of the Vietnam Situation
November 1967

1. Objectives

A. Blue Objective. The independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. A self-determined government in South Vietnam with a reasonable chance of surviving.

B. Red Objective. The imposition of a Communist-oriented regime on South Vietnam and the elimination of foreign troops, bases, and influence. Eventually, the unification of all Vietnam under the Communist rule of Hanoi.

2. Blue alternatives.

A. Stick it out. This alternative is generally identical with our present course of action which seeks to bring security to all or most of the South Vietnamese population; to inflict such losses on the VC and North Vietnamese forces as to convince their leadership that they cannot afford to continue the war on the present basis; to continue air pressure on North Vietnam to limit infiltration and to confirm the impression caused by the ground war that it is to the interest of the Hanoi leaders to cease the aggression in the south; and, simultaneously, to strengthen the government, economy, and society of South Vietnam. Under this Blue alternative, these actions would be continued for the same purposes as in the past while making every effort to increase their effectiveness but staying generally within the past ground rules of operations.

B. All out. This is the escalation alternative and escalation means different things to different proponents. In the air war, it calls for the attack of all targets of any political, economic or military importance in North Vietnam with maximum intensity and in the shortest possible time in a revulsion against the gradualism which has been the hallmark of our bombing policy in the past.

In the ground war, it implies an expansion varying from raids into cross-border sanctuaries to various forms of invasion of North Vietnam.

On the home front, some partisans of this alternative favor a declaration of war and the imposition of war-time controls of various kinds.

C. Pull-back. This is the de-escalation alternative which usually includes in the statements of its advocates a cessation of the bombing, a diminution of offensive ground actions, some degree of selectivity in holding and defending terrain, and, in its extreme form, may extend to the so-called enclave concept of defense.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-166
By inf, NARA, Date 1-26-88

D. Negotiations under the most favorable conditions possible. The purpose of the negotiations may be a cease-fire, a political settlement, or both.

3. Red Alternatives.

A. Hang On. This alternative amounts to continuing about as at present the guerrilla war in the south, the criminal war of terrorism and the cross-border forays out of sanctuaries beyond reach of our forces. It includes a maximum effort in the propaganda field and a maximum exploitation of divisions of opinion in the United States.

B. Escalate. The possible forms of escalation open to Hanoi appear to be an increased infiltration of North Vietnamese forces and equipment into the south, to include - the introduction of such new weapons as may be obtainable from Soviet or Red Chinese sources; the use of "volunteers" in North Vietnam to free Vietnamese for combat in the South; and perhaps the opening of a new front outside Vietnam to divert hostile forces. Such a new front might conceivably be in Thailand, in Burma, in Korea, in South America or in Berlin.

C. Pull-Back. This is "the back to the woodwork" alternative, a fade-away to avoid further contact and losses and to give the impression that the war is subsiding, or indeed has ended. It might be a short-term ruse or a true withdrawal with the long-term intention to live to fight another day.

D. Negotiations under the most favorable conditions possible. As under the similar Blue alternative, the objective may be a cease-fire, a political settlement or both.

4. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative A (Stick-it-out) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

The principal argument in favor of "sticking it out" is that this course of action has since 1965 recorded many successes in the political, military, and economic fields. Its continuation carries little danger of an expansion of the war beyond Vietnam and the United States and its allies have adequate material resources to sustain it indefinitely at the present level of effort.

On the negative side, it is not clear that the U.S. public has the moral resources to support indefinitely this slow, seemingly indecisive strategy of gradualism which runs counter to the impatient, impetuous American temperament. This evident disinclination for a long, drawn-out test of will in concert with the noisy demonstrations of the radical minorities encourages Ho Chi Minh and his advisers to hang on (Red Alternative A) or to escalate (Red Alternative B).

The growing disunity on the home front may eventually make itself felt on the battle field. It may cause our efforts to slacken and the current progress to stagnate at some point short of success. While the morale of our troops in action has thus far been magnificent, it should not be taken for granted if the home front continues to deteriorate.

The foregoing evaluation of the pros and cons of Blue Alternative A applies generally to a situation in which Ho has opted for hanging on (Red A). If he chose to escalate (Red B), this attempt to raise the tempo would accomplish little more than to require a continuing reinforcement of our U.S. Forces. We should have no particular difficulty in providing the necessary forces (although probably with some reserve call-up) as long as the war remains within the confines of Vietnam.

A new front opened outside of Vietnam would help Hanoi significantly but Hanoi alone does not have the resources to open such a front. It would be necessary to persuade the Chinese to involve themselves in Thailand, Burma, or Korea, or perhaps, to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in stirring up trouble in Berlin. At this moment, such possibilities look very unlikely to us here. If, by any chance, it did occur, the opening of a new front could change the complexion of the entire situation and require a world-wide re-evaluation of strategic requirements.

If, while we are sticking it out on our present course of action, the other side should decide to pull back into the woodwork (Red C), that decision would seem a favorable development from our point of view. We would be able to liberate much of the population which, thus far, has remained under Viet Cong control and would gain ample time to dig out the Communist infrastructure in the villages and hamlets within our extended control. We would obtain a welcome breathing spell in which to concentrate our efforts on rehabilitating and rebuilding the war-damaged provinces. There would be the additional advantage of the depression in the Viet Cong morale resulting from this retreat and the abandonment of hard-won territory and population.

On the other hand, such a pull-back would leave us in doubt as to the true intentions of the enemy and we would be unsure whether we had reached a truce, a peace, or only a breathing spell in which the enemy was preparing for a new offensive. It would be difficult to decide under these circumstances when, if ever, we could start withdrawing our U.S. forces. In this uncertainty, the South Vietnamese would be very much concerned about their own future in the absence of any firm assurance of peace.

In the United States, once that it seemed the conflict had ebbed and that some kind of de facto cease-fire was in effect, one might expect a cry "to bring the boys home." How difficult it would be to control this emotional surge is hard to evaluate here and now.

It is also difficult to analyze the consequences of a decision on our side to stick it out (Blue A) and on their side to negotiate from a favorable position (Red D). There are certain contradictions in such a confrontation of options since the stick-it-out course, if followed without swerving on our side would make it difficult for the enemy to find favorable factors in the situation to lead them to negotiate. There might be a negatively favorable factor created

for them in that the pressures by our side might become so unpleasant that the outcome of negotiations, uncertain though they might be, would appear a better choice to the Communist leaders than a continuation of the struggle.

5. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative B (All out) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

The primary justification on our side for adopting this alternative would be the desire to bring greater pressure faster on the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, hoping thereby that they would reach a breaking point in a comparatively short period of time. If this were the outcome, it would result in a reduction in the loss of lives and resources and the increased effort would tend to satisfy the "hawks" at home who are demanding "all out or get out." However, if the enemy adhered to their Alternative A and hung on at about the present level of their effort, our increased military efforts would face the same problems as in the past, particularly the difficulty of finding decisive targets to strike either on the ground or from the air. If the ground war were expanded to cross-border operations into Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam, there would be a considerable time lag required to raise, train and transport the additional troops necessary for these ground campaigns, a delay which would contravene the hope for quick results which is a prime justification for the option.

To meet additional force requirements, particularly the ground forces, it would probably be necessary to pass to a condition approaching general mobilization in the United States and the imposition of economic controls and other measures equally unpopular on the home front.

Our neighbors in the international world would be concerned over these acts of escalation and, although the danger of Red Chinese or Soviet direct intervention would probably remain low, in comparison to Blue A (Stick-it-out) the escalation route would be relatively risky in possibilities of unwanted expansion of the conflict.

If the other side responded to our escalation with those escalatory acts available to them (Red B), the results would be essentially the same as in our discussion of Blue A. Unless it were possible for the other side to open another front or to bring in effective new weapons (such as light anti-helicopter weapons or missile-firing ships), it is unlikely that Red escalation would have much effect on our course of action. Indeed, if in the course of their escalation, the enemy side responded with major ground attacks, this development could work in our favor in giving us important targets to destroy with our overwhelming mobile fire capability.

If Red elected to pull back and go into the woodwork (Red C) in response to our escalation, our increased military strength would be of little avail since there would be few targets to attack. There would be less justification to invade the sanctuaries or to destroy the urban centers of Hanoi and Haiphong

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- 5 -

by air attack. However, if we allowed ourselves to be lured into a guerrilla chase into Cambodia or Laos, we could readily dissipate any increase in ground force and dilute this strength without adding substantially to our offensive effectiveness.

If in response to our acts of escalation, the Red side sought the negotiation route (Red D), the fact that we had greater strength in being at the time would be a factor tending to strengthen the hands of our negotiators in the tough horse-trading which will inevitably take place around the conference table.

6. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative C (Pull-back) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

If we elect the pull-back option, there is little that our side can hope to gain beyond appeasing some of our domestic and international critics and perhaps facilitating the opening of negotiations. However, in the course of achieving these dubious gains, we would have encouraged Ho and his colleagues who will take any retreat as an evidence of weakness on our part and of a readiness to capitulate. We would discourage our allies, particularly the South Vietnamese, many of whom would begin to seek political storm cellars in anticipation of the eventual Communist take-over.

Only in the case that our pull-back was part of an overt or tacit agreement involving a similar pull-back on the other side could there be any possible gain for us in this option. Even in such a case, we would have to react very cautiously to this kind of proposal to be sure that it was not a ruse and would not allow the Viet Cong to stake out permanent territorial enclaves in South Vietnam as they have done in Laos.

It is true that our adoption of this alternative might create in the minds of Ho and his colleagues the feeling that a favorable situation had finally arrived for initiating negotiations. However, an offer from them to negotiate at such a time would catch us in a weakened military position with our relations probably strained with the South Vietnamese government which would be made deeply suspicious by our pull-back behavior. At a conference table, we would be faced by a team of negotiators convinced that we were weak, vacillating, and a push-over for intransigent bargainers.

7. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative D (Negotiation) in confrontation with Red Alternative D (Negotiation)

Since it takes two willing parties to hold a conference, we need to consider only the pros and cons of Blue D in confrontation with Red D.

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- 6 -

If both parties favored the negotiation option, the outcome would depend very much upon the relative strength and posture of the contending parties at that particular moment. The side which needed the negotiations most to correct an unfavorable imbalance in the situation would negotiate under a great disadvantage - if the other side used its wits and "blue chips."

Both sides would need to consider the best way to conduct the negotiations and the play of the "blue chips", the relative advantages of negotiating first a cease-fire then a political settlement, of reversing that order or of negotiating both issues at the same time. Because of the great complexity of negotiating a cease-fire and the virtual impossibility of checking on the faithful observance of its terms, the Blue side would be well advised either to reach a private agreement on the major elements of the political settlement and then negotiate a cease-fire or, if the package did not seem too large, to negotiate both simultaneously. The important thing from our side is that we keep on the pressure during negotiations to avoid the foot-dragging which took place at Panmunjom.

Negotiations might grow out of any one of the first three Blue alternatives. Blue A (Stick-it-out) and Blue B (all out) offer the possibility of creating a situation which will convince Hanoi that negotiations are preferable to continuing on a course which is becoming increasingly painful and costly. Blue C (Pull-back) might produce an offer of negotiations by the enemy but he could come to the table in a mood to ask everything and give nothing, convinced that we were prepared to accept the abandonment of our policy objective in Vietnam in order to be relieved of our burdens in continuing the struggle.

There is a strong likelihood that Hanoi will never negotiate unless we opt for Blue C (Pull-back). Rather than come to a public conference table at a disadvantage and accept terms tantamount to the loss of their policy objective (or at least the indefinite deferment of the hope of its attainment) which will probably require public admission of the role played by Hanoi in the frustrated aggression, Ho and his friends would probably prefer to adopt Red C (Pull-back). On the other hand, remembering the advantages of the Panmunjom talks to the Communist side in Korea, they might decide to go to a conference at any time, hoping by twisting and turning to stall the discussions, gain propaganda advantages, split the opposing negotiators, exasperate the Americans and conceivably gain by debating maneuvers at least some important part of their policy objective.

Conclusions

After analyzing the consequences of the confrontation of the various alternatives open to Blue and Red, it would appear to me that Blue A is the cheapest, safest and most promising of courses for our side provided the

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- 7 -

home front holds and we overcome our burning impatience for quick results.

Blue B (All out) is more costly and more risky and probably will not produce results in a much shorter time than Blue A. However, it is more appealing to the American temperament and may be necessary to rally the home front and to convince the public that we are in a de facto state of war and that we should adjust our behavior accordingly.

The pull-back alternative, Blue C, offers nothing to Blue except in the improbable case of a reciprocal pull-back in lieu of a formally negotiated settlement. The advantages and disadvantages of such a development would depend upon the conditions existing at the time and the possibilities of verifying enemy performance.

As to the negotiation alternative, Blue D, its outcome will depend upon the balance of strength existing at the initiation of negotiations and upon the attitude shown by the representatives at the conference table. This is going to be a tough contest viewed merely as an extension of the battle field by the Communists who will use every negotiating and propaganda device to gain advantages and to put the United States in the position of the warmonger who really does not want peace. Our side must keep two major points in mind. We must not give away anything in advance for the privilege of negotiating and, once at the table, we must insist that progress be rapid and that the quest for peace be sincere. Our slogan should be, "Never another Panmunjom."

Recommended Courses of Action

For Blue

In light of the foregoing analysis, it would seem to be to our interest to stay with Blue A (Stick-it-out) while making every effort to stiffen the home front. Our government should be prepared to pass to Blue B (All out) only if the enemy escalates in pursuance of Red B (Escalate) or as a means of pulling together the U.S. home front if it seems in danger of collapse. Blue C (Pull-back) should be rejected except in the unlikely case where it is our response to a reliable offer of mutual de-escalation. As for negotiations, we should always be ready to enter into them but only under favorable conditions and with the resolve not to tolerate another Panmunjom. If the Red pull-back (Red C) takes place, we should exploit the advantage offered to widen Saigon's hold on the territory and population and to increase joint efforts to strengthen the government and the society of South Vietnam.

For Red

We might also undertake to make a recommendation to Ho Chi Minh based upon this analysis. It would be to keep on the essentially present level of

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- 8 -

military, terrorist and political action until Hanoi can understand better the situation on the United States home front. In the meantime, Ho should try to get the USSR or China or both to open a new front to divert the Americans. If there are better weapons available in the Communist world to attack U.S. bases or to shoot down helicopters and aircraft, Ho should make every effort to get them from his Communist backers. In a final pinch, rather than fading away in implementation of Red C, it would seem better to accept negotiations and then utilize all possible devices to drag them out, confuse and divide the opposition, and wage a propaganda war which will compromise the U.S. objective of a truly independent Vietnam able to choose its own government. Otherwise, he will have to accept the Red C Alternative, send the VC underground or into feigned submission to the Saigon government, and await a better day to impose Northern rule on the South.

M.D.T.
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

1

~~EYES ONLY -- TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
11:40 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford responds
to the draft memorandum of November 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~EYES ONLY -- TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLJ 83-55
By iss, NARS, Date 10-4-83

7a

MEMORANDUM

I disagree with the recommendations presented in the memorandum of November 1, 1967. I believe that the course of action suggested therein will retard the possibility of concluding the conflict rather than accelerating it.

The question is often asked: Why does North Vietnam continue to prosecute the war when it appears that they have no chance of winning it?

The answer is clear. Hanoi is depending upon a weakening of the will of the United States to carry on the war. Their previous experience with the French has convinced them that the same result will occur again insofar as the United States is concerned.

It is my opinion that Hanoi will never seek a cessation of the conflict if they think our determination is lessening. On the other hand, if our pressure is unrelenting and their losses continue to grow and hope fades for any sign of weakening on our part, then some day they will conclude that the game is not worth the candle.

If one accepts this premise, then the course of action recommended in the memorandum must be subjected to the test of Hanoi's reaction.

It is suggested in the memo that there be "complete cessation of

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS 83-55
By isa, NARS, Date 10-4-83

bombing in the North." The argument is made that "it is probable that Hanoi would move to 'talks' perhaps within a few weeks after the bombing stopped."

I am at a loss to understand this logic. Would the unconditional suspension of the bombing, without any effort to extract a quid pro quo persuade Hanoi that we were firm and unyielding in our conviction to force them to desist from their aggressive designs?

The answer is a loud and resounding "no."

It would be interpreted by Hanoi as (a) evidence of our discouragement and frustration, and (b) an admission of the wrongness and immorality of our bombing of the North, and (c) the first step in our ultimate total disengagement from the conflict.

It would give an enormous lift to the spirits and morale of the North, and an equally grave setback to the will and determination of the South Vietnamese and our other allies fighting with us.

It would dramatically confirm the conviction of the North that Premier Pham Van Dong was correct when he said, "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars; thus we are sure to win in the end."

The cessation of the bombing would be used to great advantage to repair roads and bridges, improve anti-aircraft defenses, and build up the war-making potential of the North. The Chinese and Russians would

react enthusiastically to such cessation and would redouble their efforts to drive us out of Asia.

I think it is reckless to talk about resuming the bombing after such a suspension. It would create a storm of protest, which would be compounded by our greater losses of men and planes due to their improved air defenses.

I feel strongly that it is grossly fallacious to contend that we are fighting two wars: the war in the South and a separate war in the North. They are part and parcel of our single effort to convince Hanoi that it must abandon its effort to conquer South Vietnam.

The second recommendation in the memo is that we "stabilize" our military effort in the South.

This would be achieved by stating "publicly" that we would not increase our forces; we would not call up reserves; we would not expand ground action in North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia; we would not attack North Vietnam seaports; we would not hit the dikes or locks; and we would engage in continued efforts to restrict the war.

Can there be any doubt as to the North Vietnamese reaction to such an announcement? The chortles of unholy glee issuing from Hanoi would be audible in every capital of the world.

Is this evidence of our zeal and courage to stay the course? Of

course not! It would be interpreted to be exactly what it is. A resigned and discouraged effort to find a way out of a conflict for which we had lost our will and dedication.

And what of our bargaining position? It would have been utterly destroyed. Hanoi would be secure in the comforting thought that we had informed the world that we would refrain from practically all activities that would be damaging to North Vietnam.

It would be tantamount to turning over our hole card and showing Hanoi that it was a deuce.

Can one recall that we ever successfully terminated a war by such a program? In World War I, World War II and the Korean War, the pressure was constantly increased until the enemy found it intolerable and capitulated.

The President and every man around him wants to end the war. But the future of our children and grandchildren require that it be ended by accomplishing our purpose, i.e., the thwarting of the aggression by North Vietnam, aided by China and Russia.

Free peoples everywhere, and Communists everywhere, in fact the entire world, is watching to see if the United States meant what it said when it announced its intention to help defend South Vietnam.

It will affect the plans and intentions and aspirations of many people.

Because of the unique position we occupy in the world of today,

we cannot expect other countries and other peoples to love us, but with courage and determination, and the help of God, we can make them respect us.

It is clear to me that the course of action offered in the memorandum does not accomplish this purpose.

8

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
11:25 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Beginning on Thursday of this week (Nov. 9), the Rectors of all five of the South Vietnamese universities will be in Washington. They have come to the U. S. under AID auspices for a seminar in university administration conducted by the University of Wisconsin.

The Rectors have completed their seminar and are presently meeting with officers of the Education and World Affairs (EWA) group (with whom you met last January) to discuss possible cooperation on programs being developed by EWA to relate the U. S. academic community more effectively to the development and reconstruction needs of South Vietnam.

I recommend that you invite the Rectors to the White House along with representatives of Education and World Affairs. This would (1) demonstrate your interest in a constructive Vietnamese civilian endeavor -- higher education, and (2) further a valuable dialogue with the EWA.

You will recall meeting with some of the Trustees of EWA last January. As a result of that meeting, EWA has developed a program for directing U. S. academic activity toward the reconstruction and development of South Vietnam. Their ideas have been discussed extensively within the academic community as well as with Ellsworth Bunker and David Lilienthal, both of whom are EWA trustees. (In fact, if the meeting took place on Friday, you might have Bunker present as well.)

The main focus of such a meeting, of course, would be the Vietnamese Rectors. They are as distinguished a group of Vietnamese educators as one could find. As noted above, they represent all five Vietnamese universities, and include a Catholic and a Buddhist. Inviting the EWA people along with the Rectors gives an added value to the meeting in that it identifies the academic community with your interest in Vietnam's education.

I have discussed this idea with George Christian and Bill Leonhart, both of whom fully share my enthusiasm. The inclusion of the EWA group is entirely our own idea, and was not prompted by them.

W. W. R.

Arrange time with Marv Watson _____

No _____

See me _____

9

Tuesday, November 7, 1967
11:10 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP

EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, on prisoners, Loan (cable 1) suggests the following cautious scenario.

1. Release Sau Ha, as requested, at the time the courier returns to NLF headquarters; although Loan is skeptical that Sau Ha will be anxious to return, since he revealed names of fellow-VC.
2. Ask at that time ~~2~~ release of two U. S. prisoners by name: one U. S. Air Force, the other U. S. Army.
3. Ask the NLF to specify by name those it next wished to be released, indicating the U. S. and GVN are ready to comply.
4. This, in his view, could lead to a gradual expansion in prisoner exchanges.
5. He is preparing dossiers on all those mentioned in Buttercup message plus those arrested due to Sau Ha's interrogation. These will go to Thieu who will, in fact, discuss next steps with us.
6. On substantive message (as Bunker indicates in Cable 2), we shall get a draft political statement to accompany return of courier which Bunker hopes to clear with Thieu.

In short, with GVN understandably playing it cool, we shall proceed slowly.

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP attachments

W. W. R.

(Saigon 509, 526)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-475
By ijg, NARA, Date 4-6-95

9a

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

A. GAIN

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TO WHITE HOUSE
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IMMEDIATE

3.3(b)(1)

NODIS [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 509

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROSTOW

SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

[REDACTED] DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL LOAN ON 6 NOVEMBER 1967

3.3(b)(1)

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER, [REDACTED] BRIEFED GENERAL LOAN ON
[REDACTED] 5 NOVEMBER DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT THIEU ON
THIEU'S CONCLUSION THAT OUR SIDE SHOULD MAKE
AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE [REDACTED] AND THIEU'S
REQUEST THAT LOAN BRIEF THIEU ON [REDACTED]

THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION CONCERNING THOSE VC WHO WERE ARRESTED
[REDACTED] AND WHOM [REDACTED] HAS

ASKED TO BE RELEASED. LOAN WAS ALSO GIVEN A COPY OF THE [REDACTED]
MESSAGE (VIETNAMESE TEXT) WHICH HE THEN PROCEEDED TO READ. HE
COMMENTED THAT THE NLF IS CONFUSING THE ISSUE WHEN IT DISCUSSES GVN
MISTREATMENT OF VC PRISONERS SINCE THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE SPIES AND
SABOTEURS, NOT MILITARY PRISONERS OF WAR, THAT THE GVN DOES NOT
MISTREAT POW'S, AND FURTHER, THAT THE NLF WOULD NOT ONLY MISTREAT
ANY GVN SPIES WHICH THEY APPREHENDED BUT WOULD SUMMARILY EXECUTE
THEM AFTER EXTRACTING WHATEVER INFORMATION THEY COULD FROM THEM.
LOAN ALSO REMARKED WHILE READING THE MESSAGE [REDACTED]
THAT THE NLF IS INCONSISTENT IN STATING THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO
TALK ABOUT BROADER ISSUES THAN THE POW EXCHANGE, WHILE IN THE SAME
MESSAGE INDICATING THAT IT IS NOT NOW THE RIGHT TIME TO TALK PEACE.

3.3(b)(1)

2. LOAN'S CONCLUSION AND PRESENT POSITION IS THAT BY

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 94-476 Appeal
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-23-04

RELEASING [] FROM PRISON TO ACT AS AN COURIER []
THE GVN HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS GOOD FAITH AND IT IS NOW UP
TO THE NLF TO MAKE A POSITIVE GESTURE OF ITS OWN GOOD FAITH BY
RELEASING ONE U.S. AIR FORCE PILOT AND ONE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY
OFFICER UPON RECEIPT OF OUR NEXT MESSAGE WHICH []

3.3(b)(1)

[] WOULD OUTLINE OUR PRESENT POSITION
PER THE FOREGOING. LOAN FEELS THAT FOR US TO GO BEYOND THIS AT THIS
STAGE WOULD DETRACT FROM OUR FUTURE LEVERAGE AND BARGAINING POSITION
WHEN AND IF WE SHOULD EVER ENGAGE IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL
DISCUSSIONS AFTER A PRISONER EXCHANGE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. LOAN
ALSO FEELS THAT A MATTER OF "HONOR" IS INVOLVED BETWEEN THE GVN AND
THE NLF, AND THAT THE NLF IS EXCESSIVE IN THE CONDITIONS WHICH IT
DEMANDS AND WHICH MUST BE MET BEFORE THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS
SPECIFICS OF A PRISONER EXCHANGE AND PERHAPS LATER THE BROADER
POLITICAL ISSUES.

3. LOAN COMMENTED THAT HE "DOES NOT GIVE A DAMN" ABOUT []
[] BEING RELEASED SINCE HE ALREADY PLANS TO SEND HIM AND OTHER VIET
CONG ABROAD ON A PROPAGANDA MISSION, BUT THAT HE OBJECTS TO HIS
RELEASE BECAUSE THE NLF IS ASKING FOR TOO MUCH AT THIS POINT. LOAN
FURTHER FEELS THAT THE NLF IS ASKING FOR A GREAT DEAL WHEN THEY
REQUEST THAT ALL PRISONERS ARRESTED BECAUSE OF [] INTERROGATION
BE RELEASED BECAUSE, IN FACT, THE NLF PROBABLY DOES NOT KNOW WHO ALL
HAVE BEEN APPREHENDED, AND ARE HOPING THIS PLOY WILL NOT ONLY INFORM
THEM WHICH OF THEIR AGENTS HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY THE GVN, BUT WILL ALSO
SUCCEED IN OBTAINING THEIR RELEASE. IF THE NLF WERE CERTAIN WHICH
OF THEIR AGENTS ARE NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE POLICE, THEY WOULD HAVE
LISTED THEM BY NAME. LOAN DISMISSED THE ISSUE OF BETTER TREATMENT
FOR THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN [] MESSAGE AS "NO PROBLEM,"
AND REMARKED THAT THIS WOULD BE "EASY ENOUGH TO ARRANGE." LOAN WAS
QUITE SPECIFIC, HOWEVER, IN HIS FEELING THAT [] WOULD NOT LIKELY
BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE NLF'S SECRET ZONE BECAUSE HE IS "AFRAID" 3.3(b)(1)
TO DO SO NOW, AFTER HAVING UNDERGONE EXTENSIVE INTERROGATION BY THE
GVN AND HAVING REVEALED CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS
COLLEAGUES, ETC., WHICH IS AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE NLF.

4. LOAN AGREED TO PREPARE DOSSIERS ON ALL PRISONERS MENTIONED
IN [] MESSAGE, AS WELL AS PRISONERS ARRESTED BECAUSE OF
THE INTERROGATION [] HE WILL PRESENT THIS INFORMATION TO
PRESIDENT THIEU AND WILL ALSO GIVE ONE COPY OF EACH DOSSIER TO
[] LOAN STATED HE WOULD RELEASE WHOMEVER PRESIDENT
THIEU "ORDERS" HIM TO RELEASE, BUT FEELS FIRMLY THAT OUR SIDE HAS
DONE AS MUCH AS IT SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AND SHOULD NOW WAIT FOR A
SHOW OF FAITH BY THE NLF.

5. LOAN FEELS THAT THE NLF MIGHT WELL RESPOND FAVORABLY TO OUR NEXT MESSAGE CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF ONE U.S. AIR FORCE PILOT AND ONE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY OFFICER AS A SHOW OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE NLF AS A MEASURE TO CONTINUE RECIPROCAL MOVES ON PRISONER EXCHANGE. LOAN RECOMMENDS THAT WE ASK THE NLF TO SPECIFY WHICH VC PRISONERS THEY WOULD LIKE OUR SIDE TO RELEASE AND OUR NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO COMPLY ACCORDINGLY. THIS MOVE ON OUR PART WOULD IN TURN HOPEFULLY LEAD TO A CONTINUATION AND ESCALATION IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF PRISONERS TO BE EXCHANGED ON BOTH SIDES FROM THAT POINT FORWARD.

3.3(b)(1) 6. REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS BY THE GVN UNDER THE 1 NOVEMBER AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, LOAN STATED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS THE NLF IS ASKING BE RELEASED, [REDACTED]

ARE NOT EVEN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH ANY SPECIFIC OFFENSES AND, THEREFORE, ARE NOT TECHNICALLY ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY RELEASE AS SUCH. LOAN REMARKED THAT, OF COURSE, THEY COULD BE TOLD THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL FRAMEWORK AS THE 1 NOVEMBER AMNESTY DECLARATION AND IS THE RESULT OF THE GVN'S LIBERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THIS WOULD SUFFICE AS COVER FOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS.

7. LOAN CLEARLY DOES NOT PUT MUCH STOCK IN RESULTS TO BE DERIVED FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NLF COMMAND ECHELON, EVEN THOUGH HE FEELS THE PRISONER EXCHANGE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TO SOME DEGREE, AND EVEN THOUGH IT IS HIS OPINION THAT HANOI IS AT LEAST GENERALLY AWARE OF THE NLF EFFORTS, BOTH ON THE PRISONER EXCHANGE AND THEIR OPENING GAMBIT TO DISCUSS THE BROADER POLITICAL ISSUES.

8. OUR NEXT STEP WILL BE TO OBTAIN THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THE PRISONERS WHICH THE NLF HAS ASKED TO BE RELEASED, WHILE LOAN IS BRIEFING PRESIDENT THIEU ON THE SAME BACKGROUND INFORMATION. AFTER WE HAVE REVIEWED THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THESE PRISONERS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO FORMULATE OUR NEXT APPROACH TO PRESIDENT THIEU AND RECOMMEND A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IMPLEMENTED.

GP-1
900

~~SECRET~~

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FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE
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~~SECRET~~ 0 71124Z [REDACTED]

IMMEDIATE

NODIS [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 526

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROSTOW

SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SECDEF, EXCL USIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

~~SECRET~~ 071125Z [REDACTED]
REFS: A. [REDACTED] WASHINGTON 49639

- B. [REDACTED] SAIGON 499 (MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU)
C. [REDACTED] SAIGON 509 (MEETING WITH GENERAL LOAN)

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER

1. IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS IN REF A AND NOW THAT THE RETURNS ARE IN FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND LOAN (REFS B AND C), WE CONCUR WITH YOUR SUGGESTED REPLY IN PARA FIVE WITH CERTAIN ADDITIONS, FOR REASONS I WILL DESCRIBE BELOW.

2. FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THIEU AND LOAN IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY BOTH FEEL WE SHOULD GIVE NO MORE [REDACTED] THAN HE REQUESTED, THAT THEY DISTRUST [REDACTED] BUT, AS THIEU PUTS IT, WE MUST "TEST" THE NLF SVN SINCERITY ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTS THEY ARE SERIOUS. LOAN GOES EVEN FURTHER IN SUGGESTING WE SHOULD FORCE THE NLF SVN TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH BY RELEASING TWO PRISONERS WE NAME BECAUSE THE GVN HAS ALREADY RELEASED [REDACTED] AND WOULD BE RELEASING [REDACTED] TO COMPLY WITH [REDACTED] MINIMUS REQUIREMENTS. (I KNOW YOU AGREE THAT WE MUST RESPECT THE OPINIONS AND SUGGESTIONS OF THE GVN NOW AND

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 94-476 Appeal

By SJ NARA, Date 4-23-04

AEROX FROM QUICK COPY

PAGE 2 SAIGON 526 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
IN THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. THEY ARE, IN EVERY
RESPECT, CO-EQUALS IN THIS NEGOTIATION). I, THEREFORE, SUGGEST
THAT WE BE PREPARED IN PARA FIVE REF A INGOING MESSAGE TO REQUEST
[REDACTED] TO RELEASE TWO AMERICAN POWS (TO BE NAMED AT YOUR
DISCRETION) TO SHOW HIS (THEIR) GOOD FAITH. IF [REDACTED]
RESPONDS FAVORABLY, WE WILL HAVE TELESOPED THE TIME ELEMENT
I FORSEE BETWEEN NOW AND THE INITIAL RELEASE OF POWS.

3. BOTH IN THE INGOING MESSAGE AND IN THE ORAL BRIEFING
WE PLAN TO GIVE TO [REDACTED] WE WILL STRESS THE NEED FOR
SAFE AND RAPID MEANS OF FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS AND URGE
[REDACTED] TO OPEN THE RADIO LINK. I AM NOT SANGUINE, HOWEVER,
[REDACTED] WILL USE THE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL
AT ALL, AND IF THEY DO, THEN ONLY AT A MUCH LATER DATE. WE ARE,
THEREFORE, FACED WITH THE PROBABILITY THAT EVEN IF WE CAN
ARRANGE TO HAVE [REDACTED] LIFTED TO A POINT CLOSER THAT
TAY NINH CITY, SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL AT
BEST BE CUMBERSOME, TEDIOUS AND TIME CONSUMING. IN SHORT, QUICK
REACTION BY OUR SIDE AND THE OTHER WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IN
THIS CONTEXT.

4. RE SUBJECT OF RESPONDING TO BROADER POLITICAL QUESTIONS

PAGE 3 SAIGON 526 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]
RAISED [REDACTED] AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT THIEU RESERVES TO
HIMSELF A KEY ROLE IN DECIDING ON WHAT WILL BE SAID IN OUR JOINT
RESPONSE. HIS POSITION IN THIS MATTER PROMISES TO BE ONE OF GREAT
RESTRAINING, DISTRUST, AND CYNICISM; THEREFORE, I PLAN ON GETTING
HIS CONCURRENCE IN A RESPONSE [REDACTED] THAT WILL BE BRIEF,
AVOID GIVING THE OTHER SIDE TOO MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR
FAMOUS AFFINITY TOWARDS POLEMICS WHILE RETTERATING OUR OBJECTIVES
AND AIMS IN VIETNAM AND ENCOURAGING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER
EXCHANGES OF VIEWPOINTS EITHER IN THE ESTABLISHED COVERT CHANNEL
OR IN PERSONAL MEETINGS AT A LOCALE AGGEEABLE TO ALL CONCERNED.
I WILL SEPARATELY FORWARD A SUGGESTED RESPONSE, ON THESE
POLITICAL ASPECTS, THAT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESIDENT THIEU
AND SUBJECT TO YOUR PRIOR CONCURRENCE.

BT

NNNN

MODIS

~~SECRET~~

THERE A FEW SLIGHTLY GARBLED WORDS WHICH I'M SURE U CAN EASILY CORRECT
TNX

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

10

Tuesday,
November 7, 1967

Profile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Message to President Marcos

Manila and other areas of the Philippines were heavily damaged over the weekend by Typhoon Welming. Full reports are not in, but it is estimated that several hundred lives were lost. A message of sympathy to President Marcos along the attached lines would be appropriate.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Message approved _____

Message disapproved _____

WJJ/State 711/7/67

102

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
President of the Republic
of the Philippines
Manila

I have been distressed to learn of the heavy damages and tragic loss of lives caused by Typhoon Welming in the Philippines. On behalf of the American people, I send heartfelt sympathy and condolences to you and all those who have suffered from this disaster.

Sincerely,

WORK !!
Pres file

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on the Kennedy Round Agreement

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft Presidential report to the Congress on the Kennedy Round. A copy of the agreement (a bulky volume of tariff schedules) will go along with it. The Trade Expansion Act requires the President to transmit to the Congress "promptly" a copy of each trade agreement entered into under the authority of the Act, together with a statement of his reasons for entering into the agreement.

The report is based on a draft prepared by Bill Roth's people and cleared by his interagency committee. We have gone over the attached version with Bill, who approves. Harry McPherson has also reviewed and contributed to the revision.

The report highlights the results we achieved -- in overall and specific terms -- and the care we exercised in making and seeking trade concessions.

It also states that:

- You expect to issue a proclamation later this year making the reductions in U.S. tariffs effective January 1. (This was agreed in Geneva on the condition that all major countries adopt equivalent procedures. We hope to be able to request your approval to make this announcement by December 1 -- thus giving the usual 30-day notice. By that time we should know what others intend. Some will join us in making the first of the five annual tariff cuts on January 1. Others -- notably the EEC and the UK -- probably will make double cuts covering the first two years on July 1. This would be equivalent to our procedure.)
- You will seek the advice and consent of the Senate on the Grains Arrangement. You authorized us to sign this agreement and we expect to do so on Wednesday, November 8. Bill Roth and John Schnittker do not see much trouble in the Senate, but they plan to check further on timing. The report does not indicate when you would submit the Grains Arrangement to the Senate.)
- You will submit a trade bill to the Congress to make effective the ASP agreement in the Kennedy Round, to revise the Adjustment

Assistance Program, and to provide authority for making further progress in promoting world trade. (No timing indicated.)

The report on the trade negotiations provides concrete evidence of what we could gain from trade expansion and what we could lose from moves toward protectionism. Issuance of the report now would be timely in view of the import quota bills before the Senate Finance Committee.


W. W. Rostow

(If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A.)

No _____

Speak to me _____


ERF:mst


Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with King Hussein--Wednesday, November 8, 5:30 p. m.



3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(6)

If you have time, you may want to scan the attached to help set the stage. Because of the fast-changing situation, Secretary Rusk will give you his final memo in the morning and can discuss your tack at lunch.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-27/
By 12 NARA, Date 10-10-02

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

12a

TALKING POINTS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-476

By wp, NARA, Date 1-10-95

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

1.3
(u)(5) starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

1.3
(u)(5) You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. [REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)

[REDACTED] Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordan cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you

will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

M:TOEnders/NEA:ARN:RHoughton
11/5/67

13

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft Presidential statement announcing the U.S. has signed the International Grains Arrangement and that we will be sending it, as an International Treaty, to the Senate for its advice and consent. (No timing indicated for submission to the Senate.) John Schnittker, as acting Secretary of Agriculture, is tentatively scheduled to sign the Arrangement tomorrow at 4:00 p.m.

The statement points up the benefits the agreement will bring to our farmers as well as to the developing nations. I recommend you authorize us to issue it as a Presidential announcement. Roth and Schnittker concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

No (issue as Agriculture statement) _____

ERF
ERF:em

13a

PRESIDENTIAL DRAFT STATEMENT
ON THE SIGNING OF THE INTERNATIONAL GRAINS ARRANGEMENT

I am pleased to announce that Acting Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker has today signed the new International Grains Arrangement on behalf of the United States Government. We will be submitting it to the United States Senate for its advice and consent.

When ratified by participating governments, the new Arrangement will go into effect July 1, 1968, replacing the International Wheat Agreement. Its duration will be three years.

This new Arrangement, an outgrowth of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, contains two major provisions:

First, it establishes new minimum prices in world trade for 14 major wheats. For U.S. wheats, the new minimums are generally about 23 cents a bushel higher than under the old International Wheat Agreement.

Second, it establishes a new program under which developed wheat exporting and importing nations will provide 4.5 million tons of food grain or cash equivalent annually to less developed countries -- the first time this has ever been done on a regular and continuing basis.

The new Arrangement thus will provide new price insurance to U.S. wheat farmers and at the same time will bring other wheat exporting and importing nations into partnership with us in helping the developing nations of the world meet the urgent food needs of their growing populations while they expand their own food production.

(Highlights of the new Arrangement are attached.)

HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERNATIONAL GRAINS ARRANGEMENT

There are two parts to the new Arrangement -- the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention. The former provides new and improved procedures for stabilizing world wheat prices, building on the administrative and institutional structure of the International Wheat Agreement. The Food Aid Convention provides for a \$5.5 million ton program of food grains aid to less developed countries.

Major wheat trading countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community negotiated the basic pricing and food aid provisions of the new Arrangement during the Kennedy Round in May of this year. Representatives from 52 countries then met at the International Wheat Conference in Rome, July 12 to August 18, 1967, and developed the text of the International Grains Arrangement, opening the results of the Kennedy Round grain negotiations to the widest possible participation.

Wheat Trade Convention

The Wheat Trade Convention sets minimum and maximum prices for 14 major wheats moving in world trade. Minimum prices for other wheats may be established as the need arises by the Prices Review Committee, a new body which has the responsibility to make sure the objectives of the Convention relating to price are carried out. For U.S. wheats, the minimum prices are generally about 23 cents a bushel higher than in the old Agreement.

Procedures to be followed when prices reach minimum or maximum levels are also detailed in the Convention. It is recognized that an exporting country may offer its wheat at competitive prices even though such prices might be below the minimum levels specified in the Arrangement, if consultative procedures have failed to find a basis for maintaining prices above established minimum levels.

A section on guidelines for concessional transactions included in the Wheat Trade Convention reaffirms and strengthens the previously recognized principle that grains transactions made on concessional terms should avoid harmful interference with normal patterns of production and commercial trade.

Food Aid Convention

The Food Aid Convention commits developed countries, importers and exporters alike, to a 4.5 million ton annual program of food aid to developing countries. 4.2 million tons have been subscribed.

The United States will supply 42 percent -- about 1.9 million tons; the European Common Market, 23 percent -- about 1.0 million tons; Canada, 11 percent; Australia, the U. K., and Japan, each 5 percent; with other countries contributing smaller amounts. Contributions can be in the form of wheat, coarse grains suitable for human consumption, or the cash equivalent. Contributing countries may specify the recipients of their donations, or they may channel them through an international organization such as the World Food Program of the United Nations.

A Food Aid Committee, consisting of representatives of the contributing countries, will be established. Its primary function will be to review the overall functioning of the Convention, and especially its effects on food production in the recipient countries.

The International Wheat Council and its Secretariat will continue to perform essentially the same functions under the new International Grains Arrangement as they performed previously under the International Wheat Agreement.

14

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Monday, November 6, 1967
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that you may wish to take the occasion of November 10-11 to visit Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps installations.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24,
By rg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

~~SECRET~~

14a



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

6 November 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Saturday, 11 November, is Veterans Day which is traditionally dedicated to the commemoration of those men and women who have served in the defense of this country. The preceding day, 10 November, is the 192d Anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Corps.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that it would be especially fitting on this occasion for the Commander-in-Chief to participate with the Armed Forces in the commemoration of these events by visiting with representative units of men and women of the Armed Forces who are serving in the defense of freedom. They believe that such visits would highlight your deep dedication to the cause of freedom, and it would provide renewed inspiration to members of the Armed Forces by demonstrating the interest of this Nation in them.

In the hope that you may find time in your crowded schedule to accommodate the above proposal, attached hereto is a suggested itinerary for visits to units and installations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

With all good wishes and deep respect.

Sincerely,

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

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when separated from
Classified enclosure

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146

SPECIFIC ITINERARY

(All Times Local)

10 November 1967

<u>Departure</u>		<u>Arrival</u>	
<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
Andrews AFB, Md.	0830	Ft. Benning, Ga.	1010
Ft. Benning, Ga.	1110	<i>Marine Corps Air Station</i> (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.	1220
MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1245	Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1310
Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1500	<i>Naval Air Station</i> (NAS) North Island, San Diego, Calif. (to board USS ENTERPRISE)	1530
San Diego, Calif. (aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	1615	(Remain overnight aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	
11 November 1967			
NAS North Island, Calif. (Depart USS ENTERPRISE 0830)	0900	McConnell AFB, Kan.	1255
McConnell AFB, Kan.	1355		

- Tab A - Ft. Benning Schedule of Events
- Tab B - MCAS, El Toro/Camp Pendleton Schedule of Events
- Tab C - NAS North Island/USS ENTERPRISE Schedule of Events
- Tab D - McConnell AFB Schedule of Events


DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Group 4

By

rg, NARA, Date *11-19-91*



~~SECRET~~

14c

TAB A

VISIT TO FT. BENNING, GEORGIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. The President will be at Ft. Benning for one hour, during which he will attend an honor guard ceremony and present a short address at Doughboy Stadium. The audience will consist mainly of soldiers and dependents associated with the following activities:

The Infantry School, to include Officer Career Courses, Officer Candidate School, Noncommissioned Officer School.

Infantry Training Center.

Tactical Units.

Continental United States

2. Ft. Benning is closely associated with the Army effort in Vietnam. Officers, Officer Candidates, and enlisted men receive training here in preparation for their combat assignments. It has also served as the CONUS station for tactical units preparing for deployment. Many Army dependents reside in the local area while their soldier husbands are in Vietnam. There will probably be some civilian attendance from Columbus, Georgia.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1010	Arrive by Air Force One at Lawson Army Airfield.
1015	Depart Lawson Army Airfield by motor for Doughboy Stadium (capacity about 10,000 people).
1025	Arrive Doughboy Stadium. Honor Guard Ceremony. Address by President Johnson.
1055	Depart by motor for Lawson Army Airfield.
1105	Arrive Lawson Army Airfield.
1110	Depart Lawson Army Airfield on Air Force One for MCAS, El Toro, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By pg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

GROUP 4
Declassified at 3 year
in Tab A
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~

TAB B

14d

VISIT TO MCAS, EL TORO, CALIFORNIA, AND
CAMP JOSEPH H. PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. At MCAS, El Toro, visit with Marines and their families present at the airstrip as desired by the President.

2. At Camp Pendleton meet Commanding General and participate in US Marine Corps Birthday ceremony, preliminaries of which commence at 1300. Ceremony includes pageant of USMC history, massed colors of Marine Corps Base and 5th Marine Division, and traditional cake cutting. President will participate in cake cutting and speak at that time. There will be at least 15,000 people present; the majority will be Marines and their families. There will also be local citizenry in attendance. The Marines present will be primarily RVN returnees or Marines preparing to go to RVN as replacements. The concept of this ceremony is not only to commemorate the birth of the Corps, but that the officers and NCOs present this ceremony on the occasion of the Marine Corps Birthday for the enlisted Marines. After President speaks at ceremony, he will go to USNH, Camp Pendleton, to visit with patients.


Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1220	Arrive MCAS, El Toro, California.
1225 - 1240	Visit with Marines and their families at airstrip.
1245 - 1310	Enroute El Toro/Camp Pendleton via helo.
1310	Arrive Camp Pendleton via helo from El Toro.
1315 - 1420	Participate in and speak at ceremony.
1420 - 1430	Enroute USNH, Camp Pendleton.
1430 - 1500	Visit Hospital.
1500	Depart via helo for San Diego, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By sf, NARA, Date 11-19-91

~~SECRET~~



14e

~~SECRET~~
TAB C

VISIT TO NAS NORTH ISLAND (SAN DIEGO)/
USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

10-11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

The President will be aboard NAS North Island (air station and pierside) for forty minutes during which time honors will be accorded and where he will be afforded the opportunity to speak to assembled Service personnel and their families. Disembarking from helo at NAS North Island he will travel via auto to pierside of USS ENTERPRISE. After speaking to personnel, board USS ENTERPRISE getting underway immediately for the Southern California operations area to conduct carrier flight operations (day and night). The President remains overnight with USS ENTERPRISE returning to dockside NAS North Island Saturday morning.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

1530	Arrive NAS North Island.
1535	Depart via auto for dockside USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65).
1540	Speak to assembled Service personnel and families.
1610	Board USS ENTERPRISE.
1615	USS ENTERPRISE underway for Southern California operations area.
1715	USS ENTERPRISE conduct flight operations (day and night). President remains overnight.
11 November 1967	
0830	USS ENTERPRISE docks NAS North Island pier.
0850	President disembarks USS ENTERPRISE for Air Force One.
0900	Air Force One departs NAS North Island.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By kg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab C

~~SECRET~~

14 F

TAB D

VISIT TO MCCONNELL AFB, KANSAS

11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

During the Presidential visit to McConnell AFB on 11 November 1967, it is anticipated that he will give a speech, present awards, and view a fly over.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1255	Touch down McConnell AFB, Kansas.
1255 - 1300	Taxi and offload.
1300 - 1305	Host and Guests.
1305 - 1317	Speech.
1317 - 1332	Award Presentation.
1332 - 1335	Fly over.
1335 - 1345	Shake hands with crowd.
1345 - 1353	Board aircraft and taxi.
1355	Take off.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By RG, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab D

~~SECRET~~Monday, November 6, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m. *Pres file*

Mr. President:

At the time you gave your instruction to Gen. Johnson to produce a plan for South Vietnam, I asked Bob Ginsburgh to do one on his own. He came up with the attached 10-point program.

As he notes, they are all listed somewhere in the "Blueprint" for Vietnam. The problem, as always, is to get top level concentrated attention in the field on programs which are now moving slowly and which ought to move faster.

That, in turn, requires a short list -- shorter than ten.

I have marked with yellow pen the 4 items (2, 4, 7 and 9) which, from a distance, seem most important to me. (For example, nothing could accelerate the breakdown of the Viet Cong more than success in "coordinated attack on VC infrastructure." But I know for certain that this program is going slowly. I am having a Situation Room meeting this week on it to see what can be done.)

Once we work out such a short list, we then must hold our top-level people accountable for moving it and regularly reporting progress.

That is the kind of result I should like to see from Bunker and Westmoreland's visit in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-166
By ref., NARA, Date 1-26-88

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Herewith is my ten-point program of military measures to accelerate progress of the war:

1. Stress neutralization of priority enemy base areas.
2. Coordinated attack on VC infrastructure.
3. Expand area and scale of covert operations in Laos.
4. Increased use of ARVN in integrated operations with U.S.
5. Commit additional ARVN units to support pacification.
6. Furnish additional U.S. advisors to RF and PF.
7. Concept of active area security for RD rather than static defense --
emphatic ARVN search and destroy against VC provincial battalions.
8. Give operational control of all pacification forces in the province to province chief.
9. Supplement RD team effort with locally formed and trained civil/military teams.
10. Stress opening and securing of LOCs, especially railroad and waterways.

All of the above, plus others, are included in the Blueprint for Vietnam. These ten may deserve special emphasis. In general, they can be pursued within existing or approved resources. Emphasis on these measures should result in an accelerated but unspectacular rate of progress.

If a more spectacular rate of progress were to be achieved, some combination of the following would be necessary.

- Authorize bombing of all targets on JCS recommended list, expand armed reconnaissance, mine inland waterways north of 20 degrees -- this is only a difference in degree rather than in kind from what we are already doing.
- Mount a shallow amphibious envelopment to trap NVN troops just north of the DMZ -- probably not feasible until next summer, if then.
- Mine the ports -- probably effective, possibly risky.

- Conduct operations to destroy enemy bases in Cambodia -- worth considering if political pressure is ineffective -- and after amphibious entrapment above DMZ.

- Mobilize to demonstrate will and to provide additional troops -- untimely in view of very recent decision not to mobilize.

- Bomb dikes in order to flood Red River delta -- could be very effective -- but I can't see how the U.S. would go about rationalizing such a major policy change.

- Create wasteland with low yield nuclear weapons in southern part of NVN -- virtually unthinkable.

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET/CODEWORD~~

Monday, November 6, 1967
1:30 p.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

The attached report indicates we
may expect increased North Vietnamese
pressure:

- in the Western highlands;
- at the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 09330
By is NARA, Date 4-30-00

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

14a

Thursday, October 26, 1967

TEXT OF NSA REPORT

Future aggressive operations by large Vietnamese Communist main force units throughout South Vietnam are probably being planned -- possibly for the forthcoming dry season. This is evidenced in SIGINT by the augmentation of main force units -- indicated by the introduction of numerous possible groups of infiltrated replacement personnel since early 1967 -- and by instances of reorganization of the existing military structure -- including possible resubordination of the PAVN 88th Regiment from a minor PAVN Headquarters in the Second Corps to a Viet Cong division operating in the Third Corps.

The Vietnamese Communist Rear Service apparatus in Military Region 5 has also been significantly expanded since late 1966, a development which may be attributed to increased support requirements for the growing main force structure operating in the area.

DETAILS

SIGINT indicates that Vietnamese Communist military forces in South Vietnam are continuing to be augmented by main force units infiltrated from North Vietnam. The most recent indications of the continued infiltration of main force units is the appearance of the PAVN 31st Regiment on PAVN High Command communications serving elements in South Vietnam since early October -- indicating that this regiment too may be in the process of infiltrating to South Vietnam. In other recent activity the Viet Cong 5th LID operating in the Military Region 1/10 area has been augmented by a regiment of the PAVN B3 Front -- the possible PAVN 88th Regiment -- while a realignment of PAVN B3 Front entities appears to be in progress in the western highlands. Vietnamese Communist activity in east-central Quang Ngai Province indicates that this area may be the target of imminent offensive operations.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-272
By ctm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

Thursday, October 26, 1967

TEXT OF NSA REPORT

Renewed North Vietnamese Army interest in the Con Thien area has been reflected in SIGINT. The phase of increased tactical activity by North Vietnamese units which was initiated on September 1 and ended sometime in early October has apparently been resumed. Since approximately October 18, increased reconnaissance by artillery as well as North Vietnamese Army ground force units has been noted, indicating an impending resumption of tactical activity in the Con Thien area.

Indications are that the 31st Regiment, PAVN 341st Division is preparing to deploy, possibly out-of-country, from its southern Ha Tinh Province locations.

BACKGROUND

Since mid-October, North Vietnamese Army artillery units operating in the DMZ area have been noted in increased reconnaissance activity and have also been involved in apparent repositioning activity. The North Vietnamese Army 90th Regiment, which had withdrawn from the Con Thien area in late September after sustaining heavy casualties, has again indicated interest in the Con Thien area and areas further west, along Route 9 in the vicinity of Camp Carroll. Since October 8 the North Vietnamese Army 31st Regiment has been exchanging messages with Headquarters, Military Region 4, Vinh, utilizing a communications system which, in the past, has been indicative of out-of-country deployment. In addition, the regiment has been communicating with PAVN High Command on a communications group which serves Vietnamese Communist units operating in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 00-272
By ctm, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 6, 1967
11:30 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler proposes
an itinerary for November 10-11.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-19-91



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17a

CM-2736-67
6 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Itinerary, 10 and 11 November 1967

Reference is made to our conversation of 4 November in which you expressed your desire to highlight the part which is being played by the Armed Forces in the defense of freedom in Southeast Asia by visiting military units and installations in CONUS over the Veterans Day weekend.

Generally, it is proposed that you visit Fort Benning, Georgia; Camp Pendleton, California; and USS ENTERPRISE, San Diego, California, on 10 November. Following an overnight stay on USS ENTERPRISE, you would proceed to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and the Coast Guard installation, Yorktown, Virginia, on 11 November.

Attached is a recommended specific itinerary for you with supporting schedules of events for each stop. The itinerary follows the guidance outlined during our conversation and has been discussed for suitability with Colonel Cross. The general parameters of the visit to the Coast Guard installation have been discussed with Admiral Smith, Commandant US Coast Guard. Details of the schedule of events at the Coast Guard installation are being arranged separately between the US Coast Guard and Colonel Cross.

A copy of this memorandum has been provided to Secretary McNamara.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment
a/s

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E.O. 12958
SEC. 1.1(d)

BY RG ON 11-19-9

SPECIFIC ITINERARY


(All Times Local)

10 November 1967

<u>Departure</u>		<u>Arrival</u>	
<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
Andrews AFB, Md.	0830	Ft. Benning, Ga.	1010
Ft. Benning, Ga.	1110	MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1220
MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1245	Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1310
Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1500	NAS North Island, San Diego, Calif. (to board USS ENTERPRISE)	1530
San Diego, Calif. (aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	1615	(Remain overnight aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	
11 November 1967			
NAS North Island, Calif. (Depart USS ENTERPRISE 0830)	0900	McConnell AFB, Kan.	1255
McConnell AFB, Kan.	1355	Patrick Henry Airport, Va.	1715
Patrick Henry Airport, Va.	1730	Coast Guard Base, Yorktown, Va.	1800
Coast Guard Base, Yorktown, Va.	1830	Williamsburg, Va.	1900

- Tab A - Ft. Benning Schedule of Events
- Tab B - MCAS, El Toro/Camp Pendleton Schedule of Events
- Tab C - NAS North Island/USS ENTERPRISE Schedule of Events
- Tab D - McConnell AFB Schedule of Events

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Group 4
By 14, NARA, Date 11-19-91



~~SECRET~~
TAB A

VISIT TO FT. BENNING, GEORGIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. The President will be at Ft. Benning for one hour, during which he will attend an honor guard ceremony and present a short address at Doughboy Stadium. The audience will consist mainly of soldiers and dependents associated with the following activities:

The Infantry School, to include Officer Career Courses, Officer Candidate School, Noncommissioned Officer School.

Infantry Training Center.

Tactical Units.

2. Ft. Benning is closely associated with the Army effort in Vietnam. Officers, Officer Candidates, and enlisted men receive training here in preparation for their combat assignments. It has also served as the CONUS station for tactical units preparing for deployment. Many Army dependents reside in the local area while their soldier husbands are in Vietnam. There will probably be some civilian attendance from Columbus, Georgia.


Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1010	Arrive by Air Force One at Lawson Army Airfield.
1015	Depart Lawson Army Airfield by motor for Doughboy Stadium (capacity about 10,000 people).
1025	Arrive Doughboy Stadium. Honor Guard Ceremony. Address by President Johnson.
1055	Depart by motor for Lawson Army Airfield.
1105	Arrive Lawson Army Airfield.
1110	Depart Lawson Army Airfield on Air Force One for MCAS, El Toro, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Dray

By rs, NARA, Date 11/19/91



17d

~~SECRET~~
TAB B

VISIT TO MCAS, EL TORO, CALIFORNIA, AND
CAMP JOSEPH H. PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. At MCAS, El Toro, visit with Marines and their families present at the airstrip as desired by the President.

2. At Camp Pendleton meet Commanding General and participate in US Marine Corps Birthday ceremony, preliminaries of which commence at 1300. Ceremony includes pageant of USMC history, massed colors of Marine Corps Base and 5th Marine Division, and traditional cake cutting. President will participate in cake cutting and speak at that time. There will be at least 15,000 people present; the majority will be Marines and their families. There will also be local citizenry in attendance. The Marines present will be primarily RVN returnees or Marines preparing to go to RVN as replacements. The concept of this ceremony is not only to commemorate the birth of the Corps, but that the officers and NCOs present this ceremony on the occasion of the Marine Corps Birthday for the enlisted Marines. After President speaks at ceremony, he will go to USNH, Camp Pendleton, to visit with patients.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1220	Arrive MCAS, El Toro, California.
1225 - 1240	Visit with Marines and their families at airstrip.
1245 - 1310	Enroute El Toro/Camp Pendleton via helo.
1310	Arrive Camp Pendleton via helo from El Toro.
1315 - 1420	Participate in and speak at ceremony.
1420 - 1430	Enroute USNH, Camp Pendleton.
1430 - 1500	Visit Hospital.
1500	Depart via helo for San Diego, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By 13, NARA, Date 11-19-91

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Tab B
Excluded from automatic declassification
after 10 years

VISIT TO NAS NORTH ISLAND (SAN DIEGO)/
USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

10-11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

The President will be aboard NAS North Island (air station and pierside) for forty minutes during which time honors will be accorded and where he will be afforded the opportunity to speak to assembled Service personnel and their families. Disembarking from helo at NAS North Island he will travel via auto to pierside of USS ENTERPRISE. After speaking to personnel, board USS ENTERPRISE getting underway immediately for the Southern California operations area to conduct carrier flight operations (day and night). The President remains overnight with USS ENTERPRISE returning to dockside NAS North Island Saturday morning.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

1530	Arrive NAS North Island.
1535	Depart via auto for dockside USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65).
1540	Speak to assembled Service personnel and families.
1610	Board USS ENTERPRISE.
1615	USS ENTERPRISE underway for Southern California operations area.
1715	USS ENTERPRISE conduct flight operations (day and night). President remains overnight.
11 November 1967	
0830	USS ENTERPRISE docks NAS North Island pier.
0850	President disembarks USS ENTERPRISE for Air Force One.
0900	Air Force One departs NAS North Island.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Thayer

By

15

NARA, Date

11/19/90

Tab C

~~SECRET~~

17f

TAB D

VISIT TO MCCONNELL AFB, KANSAS

11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

During the Presidential visit to McConnell AFB on 11 November 1967, it is anticipated that he will give a speech, present awards, and view a fly over.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1255	Touch down McConnell AFB, Kansas.
1255 - 1300	Taxi and offload.
1300 - 1305	Host and Guests.
1305 - 1317	Speech.
1317 - 1332	Award Presentation.
1332 - 1335	Fly over.
1335 - 1345	Shake hands with crowd.
1345 - 1353	Board aircraft and taxi.
1355	Take off for Patrick Henry Airport, Virginia.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group

By ss, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab D

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP/SENSITIVE

Monday, November 6, 1967 -- 7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is a summary of the attached.

Thieu, on being fully briefed, reacted positively but with caution and sensitivity to the political dangers.

He feels the National Liberation Front is "not serious" in their stated willingness to move on to "establishing the basis for resolving greater matters" after working out the prisoner exchange, but also feels that it is too important a possibility to ignore and, therefore, there is an overriding consideration for us to "test" their sincerity by our making the next move and observing their response to it." Thieu designated General Loan as his action officer on the prisoner of war aspects of the case, but reserved specifically to himself the substantive political aspects of the case. Thieu believes that we should not initially release too many of the prisoners held by our side, in order to retain some bargaining power for later stages of discussion with the NLF, and should also consider specifying exactly which U. S. or Vietnamese prisoners we would like the NLF to release. Thieu stressed that it could be an extremely serious political problem to the Government of Vietnam if the NLF, after releasing some American prisoners, were to propagandize that the release was a result of United States Government liaison with the National Liberation Front as a political entity, and that precautions should be taken to insure secrecy of this undertaking on prisoner exchange.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 499

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-475
By lip, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rln

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~~SECRET~~ 061016Z [REDACTED] SECTION 1 OF 2

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FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 499

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR ROSTOW

SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

1. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] MET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU LATE AFTERNOON 5 NOVEMBER FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF [REDACTED] FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S TALK WITH THIEU ON SAME GENERAL SUBJECT ON 4 NOVEMBER. [REDACTED] REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE CASE FOR THIEU, AND SUMMARIZED WHAT THE NLF HAS REQUESTED AS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER STEPS BY THE NLF. THIEU STATED THAT HE FEELS WE MUST RESPOND TO THI S OVERTURE FROM THE NLF, BUT SHOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND NOT OVER-REACT TO THE NLF MESSAGE. THIEU COMMENTED THAT HE FEELS NLF IS "NOT SERIOUS" IN THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON TO "ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR RESOLVING GR EATER MATTERS" AFTER WORKING OUT THE PRISONER EXCHANGE, BUT ALSO FEELS THAT IT IS TOO

3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 94-476 Appeal
By Sj NARA, Date 4-23-04

IMPORTANT A POSSIBIL ITY TO IGNORE AND THEREFORE THERE IS AN
OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION FOR US TO "TEST" THEIR SINCERITY BY OUR
MAKING THE NEXT MOVE AND OBSERVING THEIR RESPONSE TO IT. THIEU
DESIGNATED GENERAL LOAN AS HIS ACTION OFFICER ON THE POW ASPECTS
OF THE CASE, APPROVED [REDACTED] BRIEFING LOAN ON THE 19
OCTOBER MESSAGE [REDACTED] AND WORKING JOINTLY WITH LOAN
TO ASCERTAIN THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND IMPORTANCE OF EACH
PRISONER THE NLF HAS ASKED BE RELEASED, BUT RESERVED SPECIFICALLY
TO HIMSELF THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE. THIEU
BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD NOT INITIALLY RELEASE TOO MANY OF THE
PRISONERS HELD BY OUR SIDE IN ORDER TO RETAIN SOME BARGAINING
POWER FOR LATER STAGES OF DISCUSSION WITH THE NLF, AND SHOULD ALSO
CONSIDER SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHICH U.S. OR VIETNAMESE
PRISONERS WE WOULD LIKE THE NLF TO RELEASE. THIEU STRESSED
THAT IT COULD BE AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM TO THE GVN
IF THE NLF, AFTER RELEASING SOME AMERICAN PRISONERS, WERE TO
PROPAGANDIZE THAT THE RELEASE WAS A RESULT OF UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT LIAISON WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
AS A POLITICAL ENTITY, AND THAT PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN
TO INSURE SECRECY OF THIS UNDERTAKING ON PRISONER EXCHANGE.

2. [REDACTED] BEGAN THE SESSION WITH THIEU BY REVIEWING
THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF [REDACTED] BEGINNING WITH THE
ARREST [REDACTED] AND THE MESSAGE [REDACTED] CARRIED
[REDACTED] OUR REPLY MESSAGE
[REDACTED] AND FINALLY THE LATTER'S 19 OCTOBER RETURN
MESSAGE TO US. THIEU ASKED FOR AND WAS GIVEN A RUNDOWN ON WHAT
EXACTLY THE NLF HAS ASKED OUR SIDE TO DO AND WAS TOLD THEY WANT:
(A) RELEASE OF [REDACTED] AND GUARANTEE OF [REDACTED] SAFE RETURN TO THE
VC ZONE, (B) RELEASE OF THE OTHERS ARRESTED [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (C) GOOD TREATMENT FOR PRISONERS
HELD BY GVN MENTIONED [REDACTED] LATEST MESSAGE.

3. THIEU WAS THEN SHOWN AND READ OUR OUTGOING MESSAGE TO
[REDACTED] (IN VIETNAMESE TEXT) AND [REDACTED] 19 OCTOBER
REPLY (ALSO IN VIETNAMESE TEXT). [REDACTED] POINTED OUT TO
THIEU THE REFERENCES IN THE 19 OCTOBER MESSAGE OF NLF
WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON TO "ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR RESOLVING
GREATER MATTERS," AT WHICH POINT THIEU EXPRESSED HIS DOUBT
THEY WOULD IN FACT BE WILLING TO DO SO AND LATER COMMENTED ON NLF
STATEMENTS OF THE CERTAINTY OF U.S. DEFEAT IN VIETNAM AS
EVIDENCE THEY WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN "CONTINUING ON TO
OTHER, LARGER MATTERS" AFTER A PRISONER EXCHANGE. DURING
AND AFTER READING THE 19 OCTOBER [REDACTED] MESSAGE THIEU
REMARKED THAT NLF "CANNOT BE TRUSTED," THAT WE MUST BE WARY

OF THEIR "TRAPS", THAT WE MUST CHECK CAREFULLY TO ASCERTAIN THE DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE TO THE NLF OF THE PRISONERS THEY ARE ASKING TO BE RELEASED, AND SPECULATED ON WHAT GUARANTEE WE WOULD HAVE THAT THE NLF WOULD RELEASE ANY U.S. OR VIETNAMESE PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO OUR NEXT MOVE. THIEU CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTS THE NLF ARE "SERIOUS" ABOUT ANYTHING BROADER THAN A PRISONER EXCHANGE FROM WHICH THEY WOULD HOPE TO GAIN THE NET BENEFIT, IT IS NONETHELESS TOO IMPORTANT A MATTER NOT TO "TEST" THE NLF BY OUR TAKING AN APPROPRIATE STEP FORWARD ON THE PRISONER EXCHANGE ASPECT. THIEU COMMENTED THAT WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO RELEASE ALL OF THEIR IMPORTANT (TO THEM) PRISONERS AT THE OUTSET AND LEAVE US NO MATERIAL TO BARGAIN WITH LATER, PARTICULARLY UNTIL WE OBSERVE THE RECIPROCAL ACTION THE NLF TAKES IN ACTUALLY RELEASING OR NOT RELEASING U.S. AND VIETNAMESE PRISONERS. AT THIS POINT THIEU SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD SPECIFY WHICH PRISONERS WE WANT THEM TO RELEASE IN RETURN FOR OUR TAKING THE ACTION THEY HAVE REQUESTED ON VIET CONG PRISONERS.

4. THIEU STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE GVN IF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE TO BECOME AWARE OF A LIAISON BETWEEN THE USG AND THE NLF, AND COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NLF RELEASING A NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND THEN PROPAGANDIZING THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS A RESULT OF U.S.G. LIAISON WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY. IN ANSWER TO THIEU'S QUERY ON HOW TO INSURE MAXIMUM SECRECY OF THIS UNDERTAKING, [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT WE WERE PLANNING TO SUGGEST THAT PRISONERS NOW HELD BY GVN BE RELEASED UNDER THE GVN 1 NOVEMBER GENERAL AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS WITH NO AMERICAN HAND SHOWING, AND THAT IN THE CASE OF [REDACTED] HIMSELF AND ANY OTHERS WE MIGHT DECIDE TO RELEASE WHO WOULD GO BACK TO THE VC ZONE, THEY WOULD BE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH GETTING BACK TO THE ZONE AND SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. THE POINT WAS ALSO MADE THAT THE NLF COULD, IN ANY CASE AND WITHOUT REGARD TO OUR PRESENT LINK WITH THEM, SIMPLY RELEASE SOME AMERICAN PRISONERS AND THEN FALSELY CLAIM THEIR RELEASE WAS A RESULT

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NNNN

19

Pres file

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Message for the King of Laos

Attached is a draft from the State Department of a proposed message from you to the King of Laos on his 60th birthday. You have sent such messages in the past and this one seems particularly desirable because:

- (1) The 60th birthday is a particularly important astrological event for the Lao,
- (2) The Lao Crown Prince will be in the U.S. on the King's birthday.

I recommend you approve the telegram.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

approve message —
disapproved —
see me —

Limited Official Use

19a

SUGGESTED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO THE KING OF LAOS

(November 13, 1967)

Your Majesty:

On this particularly auspicious occasion, I extend to you my heartiest congratulations and best wishes. The American people join me in hoping that you will have many happy returns of this day and that the great progress which Laos has experienced under your leadership will be continued. We share and respect the desires of the Lao people for a life of peace and prosperity, and I assure you of our unflagging support for the independence and dignity of your country.

It was our great honor and pleasure last week to welcome to our country Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Princess, and I deeply appreciate the warm greetings from Your Majesty which the Crown Prince conveyed to me.

Sincerely,

(Lyndon B. Johnson)

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Consultation with Congressional Leaders on our Handling
of the Ryukyus and Bonins During the Sato Visit

Ambassador Johnson has now given the Japanese our full position on reversion of the Ryukyus and Bonins, in draft communique language as approved by you.

You will recall that our next contemplated step was consultation with Congressional leaders. Secretary Rusk has requested your approval (attached) for him and Secretary McNamara to arrange consultation with

-- the leadership of both Houses;

and with the chairman and ranking minority members of

-- the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

-- the Senate Armed Services Committee;

-- the House Foreign Affairs Committee;

-- the House Armed Services Committee;

as well as

-- Senator Hayden and Congressman Mahon.

Recommendation:

That you approve prompt Congressional consultations along the proposed lines.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Changes and Additions as Noted _____

See me _____

cc: Mr. Jorden

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING, CANCELLED BY JAL, 10/11/80,
SEC. 1.3 AND AMENDED BY JAL ON
MAR. 13, 1983.

12-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

20a

November 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Consultation with Congressional
Leaders on our Handling of the
Ryukyus and Bonins during the
Sato Visit

RECOMMENDATION

Secretary McNamara and I yesterday instructed Ambassador Johnson to put Sato and Miki on notice that we reserved the right to discuss potential nuclear weapons storage in the Bonins during the consultations with the Japanese on reversion of these islands to Japanese Administration. With this notice, Ambassador Johnson has now presented our total position in draft communique language as approved by you. It is of course understood that any communique will be subject to your final approval.

I now recommend that you approve immediate consultations with Congressional leaders on this matter, on the lines set forth below.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Changes and additions as noted _____

DISCUSSION

1) Secretary McNamara and I would arrange consultation with the following:

- a) The leadership of both Houses.
- b) The chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- c) The same for the Senate Armed Services Committee.
- d) The same for the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- e) The same for the House Armed Services Committee.
- f) Senator Hayden and Congressman Mahon

2) I would expect to report any serious problem at once to you and to give you a full report about the consultations.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

November 6, 1967

~~Long~~
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a draft reply to Reuther's letter. I understand that Ambassador Goldberg may speak as early as next Wednesday but the highest probability is that the debate will not begin until early next week.

The statement being drafted for Goldberg is a conservative one calculated to go as far as possible in satisfying the Reuthers and Eichelbergers without needlessly arousing opposition on the Hill. The three principal points of the statement that Goldberg will make as it now exists, I am informed, will be:

1. A recommendation for the establishment of a UN committee on the oceans.
2. A call for greatly expanded international cooperation in the study of the oceans.
3. A reaffirmation of your July 13 statement which will quote your warning about avoiding a neocolonial race to grab the riches of the seas but will not amplify this theme.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

See me ____

21a

November 6, 1967

Dear Walter:

Thank you for your helpful letter regarding the General Assembly debate on a regime for the bed of the sea.

I share your view of the historic opportunity we have to assure that the resources of the sea will in a practical way become the heritage of all mankind. I think that the statements to be made shortly by Arthur Goldberg, when debate on the Malta resolution is resumed, will prove this Government supports the principles first declared last July at the dedication of the Oceanographer and to which you so kindly refer.

We may not yet know enough about the sea and its mysteries to plan in detail a complete system of international law and administration; but by rallying the United Nations to certain essential basic principles, we can lay the basis on which international law and administration can be developed in the future.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Walter Reuther
President
United Auto Workers
3000 East Jefferson Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48214

LBJ:CEJ:WWRostow:rlh

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, November 6, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is an exchange between Westmoreland and Wheeler regarding your conversation with Wheeler of Saturday on the Loc Ninh operation.

Westy feels that the news accounts on the fighting have been reasonably well-balanced, but has been reluctant to comment himself because of the possibility the enemy campaign in this area has not yet concluded. He is quite proud of the showing made by both Vietnamese and U.S. units involved in the fighting at Loc Ninh. His account of the action vividly demonstrates how successful these forces were in defending this outpost.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. Note Westy's phrase (p.2) marked in red. Sounds almost like Joe Alsop!

AMcC:jjjs

W


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1992

By *kg*, NARA, Date *11-20-91*

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM				RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER													
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<p>FROM: GEN WHEELER, CJCS</p> <p>TO: GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL CJCS 3468 NOV 67.</p> <p>PERSONAL FOR GEN WESTMORELAND FROM GEN WHEELER</p> <p>1. The President has been following with great interest the reports in the news media regarding the series of battles in the vicinity of Loc Ninh. For your information, the news media reports describe the combat operations as being a notable success for our forces. The President would like to have your assessment of the operation to include casualties on both sides and your judgment as to the effect of this operation on enemy plans and programs.</p> <p>2. The President thinks that if the Loc Ninh operation is as great a success for our side as the news reports indicate, it might be that we can capitalize on it to counter charges of stalemate, lack of progress in the war, etc. Moreover, if the Loc Ninh operation is a sizeable success, the President</p>					<p>SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>NMCC DDO CJCS</p> <p>ZFF-1</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">DATE</td> <td style="text-align: center;">TIME</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">5</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">MONTH</td> <td style="text-align: center;">YEAR</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">Nov</td> <td style="text-align: center;">67</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">PAGE NO.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">NO. OF PAGES</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">1</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2</td> </tr> </table>	DATE	TIME	5		MONTH	YEAR	Nov	67	PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES	1	2
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REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.

Authority Group 4

By kg, NARA, Date 11-20-91

NOV 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

22b

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON

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WH
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 10547 EYES ONLY

REFERENCES: A. MACV 10518 DTG 050322Z

B. CJCS 9468 DTG 051944Z

1. REFERENCES A & B APPARENTLY CROSSED ON THE WIRES. I ASSUME REF A FULFILLS AT LEAST PART OF THE REQUIREMENT OF REF B. I AM THEREFORE ADDRESSING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS WILL SUFFICE OR OTHERWISE YOU WILL GIVE ME FURTHER GUIDANCE AS TO DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT.
2. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE INTEREST IN THE LOC NINH OPERATION, I DISPATCHED REF A, HOWEVER THE CAMPAIGN IN BINH LONG-PHUOC LONG PROVINCES IS NOT YET CONCLUDED. YESTERDAY THE 3D BATTALION OF THE 9TH ARVN INFANTRY AND AN ARVN RANGER BATTALION MADE CONTACT WITH A SIZEABLE ENEMY FORCE NEAR SONG BE AND WE ARE NOW REACTING. I HAVE BEEN LOATHE TO MAKE A PERSONAL COMMENT ON THIS OPERATION FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, I DID NOT WANT TO RUSH OUT AND MAKE A PERSONAL STATEMENT UNTIL THE CAMPAIGN IN THE AREA HAD CONCLUDED AND, SECONDLY, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE NEWS ACCOUNTS HAD BEEN REASONABLY WELL BALANCED FOR A CHANGE AND THAT THESE SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. IN OTHER WORDS A HARD SELL APPROACH DID NOT SEEM TIMELY.
3. IN SUMMARY, THE LOC NINH ACTIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL; VIETNAMESE UNITS AND ELEMENTS OF THE US 1ST INF DIVISION REACTED RAPIDLY,

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 109 NARA Date 11-20-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

2

FOUGHT BRAVELY, AND SHOWED EXCEPTIONAL PROFESSIONALISM. THE CAMPAIGN IN BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG AREA IS NOT YET OVER SINCE OUR INTELLIGENCE REVEALS THAT TWO ENEMY REGIMENTS, NAMELY THE 88TH AND THE 275TH ARE IN THE VICINITY OF SONG BE AND CONTACT HAS RECENTLY BEEN MADE WITH THEM. THE PRESS HAS COVERED THE SITUATION ADEQUATELY TO DATE.

4. TO SHED FURTHER LIGHT ON THE SITUATION THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL ANALYSIS MAY BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMANDER OF COSVN (NGUYEN CHI THANH) WAS KILLED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO BY A B52 STRIKE. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HEY HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A GENERAL THAI WHO SEEMS TO BE UNSURE OF HIMSELF, VACILLATING, AND INCOMPETENT. APPARENTLY THAI RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HANOI ALONG WITH OTHER COMMANDERS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE, ACHIEVE VICTORY, AND THUS CAPTURE THE HEADLINES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INAUGURATION AND NATIONAL DAY AT WHICH TIME MANY FOREIGN DIGNITARIES WERE IN SAIGON. A PRISONER OF WAR STATES THAT ORDERS WERE RECEIVED TO SEIZE LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN AT ALL COSTS AND THIS EXPLAINS WHY ATTACKS OCCURRED ON THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. IT APPEARS THAT AN ATTACK ON SONG BE WAS A PART OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE BUT WAS DELAYED PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE DEFEAT OF THE 88TH NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIMENT BY THE 3D BATTALION OF THE ARVN 9TH INFANTRY ON 27 OCTOBER.

5. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HANOI AS TO A GREAT VICTORY AT LOC NINH. I BELIEVE THIS TO BE DELIBERATE FABRICATION WHICH SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF CONCLUDING THAT HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH IS AN EXERCISE OF FUTILITY.

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

6. (U) I AM ISSUING TO THE PRESS THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS
I AM SENDING TO LTG KHANG, VIETNAMESE III CORPS COMMANDER, ON
THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS TROOPS AT LOC NINH. WARM REGARDS."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

6 NOV 1967

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND SAIGON

BOOK COPY

TO ADMIRAL SHARP HAWAII

GEN WHEELER JCS

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 10518 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: ARVN ACTIONS AT SONG BE AND LOC NINH

THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNTS OF THE RECENT ARVN SUCCESSES AT SONG BE AND LOC NINH ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. I HAVE PROVIDED AMBASSADOR BUNKER WITH THE SAME INFORMATION.

SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27TH, FOUR KM SOUTH OF SONG BE, PHOU LONG PROVINCE, THE 88TH NVA REGIMENT ATTACKED THE COMMAND POST OF THE 3D BATTALION, 9TH ARVN INF REGT. THE ATTACK BEGAN WHEN MORE THAN 200 ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE BEGAN RAINING ON THE TINY VIETNAMESE ARMY INSTALLATION. ABOUT ONE HALF-HOUR AFTER THIS BARRAGE, THREE WAVES OF ATTACKING SOLDIERS FROM THE 88TH REGT LEFT THE COVER OF SURROUNDING JUNGLE AND SWAMP TO RUSH THE OUTPOST. THREE TIMES BEFORE THEY FINALLY GAVE UP, JUST BEFORE DAWN, THE NVA ATTACKERS MADE IT TO THE PERIMETER OF THE OUTPOST. EACH TIME THEY WERE DRIVEN BACK BY THE STOUT DEFENSE OF THE ARVN TROOPS TOGETHER WITH THEIR SUPPORTING FIRES. THE OUTPOST WHICH HOUSED THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 3D BATTALION, 9TH ARVN REGT OF THE 5TH ARVN DIV AND OTHER ELEMENTS CONTAINED LESS THAN 200 MEN; THE STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE WAS ABOUT 800 - 1000 MEN. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ARVN DE-

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, JAO, 5, 1988
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 113, NARA, Date 11-20-96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
EYES ONLY

FENDERS WERE OUTNUMBERED AT LEAST 4 TO 1. WHEN THE ENEMY ATTACK WAS FINALLY BROKEN AT 0400H HOURS AND THE ENEMY BEGAN TO FALL BACK, A 50 MAN GROUP OF THE VIETNAMESE CHARGED OUT OF THEIR OUTPOST AND PURSUED THE ENEMY UNTIL THEY DISAPPEARED INTO THE JUNGLE. RESULTS OF THIS ACTION CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE ARVN TROOPS WHEN PROPERLY ARMED AND LED. SIGNIFICANT IN THIS ACTION WAS THE AWARD OF THE U.S. SILVER STAR TO SERGEANT VAY CHIU CHAN. SERGEANT CHAN BECAME THE FOURTH VIETNAMESE ENLISTED MAN TO RECEIVE THIS AMERICAN AWARD. THE AWARD WAS MADE PRIMARILY FOR HIS ACTION AT ONE CORNER OF THE OUTPOST WHERE HE THREW APPROXIMATELY 100 GRENADES AT THE ATTACKING FORCE THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE AND IS CREDITED WITH HAVING STOPPED THE ENEMY PENETRATION OF THAT POSITION. THE ENEMY SUFFERED 134 KIA AND THE LOSS OF 37 INDIVIDUAL AND 20 CREWSERVED WEAPONS. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 13 KILLED, SIX ARVN AND SEVEN CIVILIAN LABORERS. OF THE 44 WOUNDED, 24 WERE ARVN, 18 WERE CIVILIAN LABORERS AND TWO WERE U.S. ADVISORS.

AT 0115H ON THE MORNING OF 29 OCT, ELEMENTS OF THE 273D VIET CONG REGIMENT INITIATED A MORTAR ATTACK ON LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE. LOC NINH IS SITUATED 13KM SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN BORDER BETWEEN II CTZ AND THE BORDER OF CAMBODIA AND WAS DEFENDED BY THREE CIDG COMPANIES, A REGIONAL FORCE COMPANY AND A POPULAR FORCE PLATOON. THE ENEMY FIRED A BARRAGE OF 97 ROUNDS OF MIXED CALIBER, 120 MM AND 82 MM MORTAR, ON THE SUBSECTOR AND CIDG COMPOUNDS. THE MORTAR BARRAGE WAS FOLLOWED BY A HEAVY GROUND ATTACK WITH THE ENEMY TROOPS FIRING SMALL ARMS AND B-40 ROCKETS. THE GROUND ATTACK FORCE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE OUTER DEFENSES OF THE SUBSECTOR HEADQUARTERS AND AT 0220H OCCUPIED THE OUTER PERIMETER

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EYES ONLY

OF THE COMPOUND. AT 0645H, THE RAPID REACTION FORCE COMPRISED OF TWO OF THE LOCAL CIDG COMPANIES WAS COMMITTED TO REPEL THE ENEMY. AT 0900H, TWO COMPANIES OF THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION REINFORCED THE CIDG COMPANIES AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY FROM THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND. SPORADIC ENEMY CONTACT CONTINUED IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRFIELD ALL MORNING. AT 1515H HOURS THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT LEAVING BEHIND 148 DEAD. MOST OF THE DEAD WERE KILLED BY GROUND FIRE FROM THE DEFENDERS AND THE ARVN REACTION FORCE. DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE CIDG CAMP ABOUT 2 KM SW OF LOC NINH WAS ATTACKED BY A HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF MORTAR FIRE. THIS ATTACK CEASED AT ABOUT 0250 HOURS. DURING THIS ATTACK, THE CIDG CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT. THE TWO CIDG COMPANIES DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, WITH THEIR ADVISORS, THEN INITIATED THE COUNTER-ATTACK TO RELIEVE THE ELEMENTS THAT WERE UNDER ATTACK IN THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND. OTHER SCATTERED CONTACTS ON 29 OCTOBER LEFT AN ADDITIONAL 12 ENEMY KIA. THROUGHOUT OCTOBER 30TH, SPORADIC AND HARASSING ATTACKS WERE MADE BY THE ENEMY. THE MOST RECENT SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN BEGAN WITH A MORTAR ATTACK SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 31 OCTOBER. THE NEARBY CIDG CAMP WAS ATTACKED AT THE SAME TIME WITH SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE. THE MAIN GROUND ATTACK BY ABOUT 1500 ENEMY WAS LAUNCHED AT 0427 AGAINST THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND AND THE CIDG CAMP. THE ENEMY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PENETRATING THE SUBSECTOR PERIMETER AT ABOUT 0500 IN THE MORNING. ONCE AGAIN THE ARVN DEFENDERS EXPELLED THE ENEMY FROM THEIR POSITIONS. THE DUE-HARD EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY IN HIS THREE DAY INITIAL EFFORT TO CAPTURE THE LOC NINH DISTRICT COST HIM 371 MEN KILLED AND A LARGE AMOUNT OF WEAPONS AND MATERIEL LOST. THE ENEMY 371 KILLED ARE IN ADDITION TO THE 369 ENEMY KILLED IN THIS ACTION TO

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EYES ONLY