

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/7/67	A
#5a cable	Saigon 10563 S 2 p open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476	11/7/67	A
#9 memo	Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m. S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/7/67	A
#9a cable sanitized 8-9-04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Intelligence Cable S 3 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476	11/7/67	A
#9b cable more info released 8-9-04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Intelligence Cable S 2 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476	11/7/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President same sanitizing 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481 S 1 p same sanitizing 10-24-92 NLJ/RAC 00-271; same San. per [Sanitized NLJ 85-72]	11/7/67	A
#12a rpt	Talking Points S 6 p sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476	11/5/67	A
#15a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow S 2 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	9/12/67	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President, 7:45 a.m. S 1 p	11/6/67	A
#18a cable more info released 8-9-04 NLJ 94-476 appen 1	Saigon 499 S 3 p sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476	undated	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru S 2 p SANITIZED 7/28/95 NLJ 94-170	11/6/67	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475	11/4/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru S 1 p	11/4/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28 memo	Rostow to President, 12:00 noon S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i>	11/67	A
#28a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i>	11/3/67	A
<del>#30 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i></del>	<del>11/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#30a memo	Denney to Read S 3 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
<del>#31a cable</del>	<del>Harriman to President and SecState</del> <del>S 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i></del> <del>[Sanitized NLJ 86-165]</del>	<del>11/3/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#32 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i></del>	<del>11/4/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#36 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m.</del> " <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>11/3/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#36a cable	Intelligence Cable <i>EDUP. #3A, NSF, CF, Mideast Crisis, "Sandstorm/Whv/Wild." by 113</i> S 8 p <i>sanitized 11-21-96 NLJ 94-476</i> <i>8-9-09 NLJ 94-476</i> <i>appeal</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>same sanitization 3-26-09 NLJ 08-226 and NLJ 94-476</i>	11/67	A
#39a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 4 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i> <i>same as NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>[Duplicate of #108, NSF Country File, Vietnam, 6x66, "291-1 Corps DMZ"]</i>	10/31/67	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>exempt 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>exempt 5-16-01 NLJ 00-199</i> [Duplicate of #108, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	11/3/67	A
#41a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>exempt 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i> S 8 p <i>exempt 5-6-03 NLJ 00-200</i> [Duplicate of #108a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1979]	10/27/67	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67**

**Box 25**

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#42 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	<del>11/3/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#42a cable	Deptel 64092 to Moscow <i>open 11/9/00 NS CO-201</i> <del>S</del> 2 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/3/67	A
#43a cable	Rawalpindi 1598 <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/3/67	A
<i>436</i> #47 memo	<i>filed in open 9/12/99</i> Rostow to President <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/3/67	A
#50a cable	Saigon 10206 <i>Cable dup #13, NSF, CF, VN, 8BB(1) "BOKIPS"]</i> <del>S</del> 11 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/2/67	A
#53 memo	Rostow to President <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i>	11/2/67	A
#53a memo	Read to Rostow <del>C</del> 1 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/2/67	A
#54a cable	Karachi 807 S 4 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-476</i>	11/1/67	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President, 4:40 p.m. <del>TS</del> 3 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLJ 94-475</i> [Sanitized NLJ 83-55]	11/2/67	A
#62 memo	Rostow to President, 10:20 a.m. <i>same sanitization 10-24-02 NLJ 94-481</i> <del>TS "S"</del> 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>Downgraded per NLJ 94-481</i>	11/2/67	A <i>RAC 3/04</i>
#64 memo	Rostow to President, 10:07 a.m. <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <del>TS "S"</del> 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> <i>Sanit. NLJ 019-025-1</i>	11/2/67	A
#64a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <del>TS</del> 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482; same sanit. NLJ 019-025-1</i> <i>Downgraded to "Conf" NLJ 94-482</i>	11/1/67	A

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67**

**Box 25**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#66a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized 4-11-95 NLS 94-475</i> <i>same as NS 019-023-1</i>	11/2/67	A
<del>#65a memo</del>	<del>Goldberg to President</del> <del>C 8 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i></del>	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#72a cable</del>	<del>Tokyo 2972</del> // <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>10/31/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#75a cable</del>	<del>Kuala Lumpur 1709</del> <del>S 2 p <i>open 10-14-94 NLS 93-501</i></del>	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#76 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 11:45 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p <i>open 3-14-96 NLS 94-481</i></del>	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#76a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLS 94-482</i>	10/31/67	A
#76b rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLS 94-482</i> <i>more info released 3-14-96 NW 04-149</i>	<i>same as NS 019-023-1</i> undated	A
<del>#82 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 1 p <i>open 4-11-95 NLS 94-475</i></del> [Duplicate of #168, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82a ltr</del>	<del>Lin to Rusk</del> <i>Open RAC 2/12</i> <del>C 1 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i></del> [Duplicate of #168a, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	<del>10/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82b ltr</del>	<del>Lin to Rusk</del> <i>open 11/8/00 NS 00-201</i> <del>C 1 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i></del> [Duplicate of #168b, NSF, Country File, Malaysia, Vol. 4]	<del>10/17/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82c rpt</del>	<del>"Malaysia was the first..."</del> <i>open 11/8/00 NS 00-201</i> <del>PCI 3 p <i>exempt 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i></del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82d rpt</del>	<del>"In an article entitled..."</del> <del>PCI 1 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-476</i></del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#82e rpt</del>	<del>"Malaysia's diplomatic support..."</del> // <del>PCI 4 p</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67

Box 25

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#82f ltr</del>	<del>Rusk to Lin</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p <i>open 1-23-94 NLJ 94-476</i>	<del>10/27/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#84a rpt</del>	<del>Vietnam Political Situation Report</del> " <del>S</del> 1 p <i>Dup #89, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#86 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C</del> 2 p <i>open 7/26/95 NLJ 94-18</i>	<del>11/1/67</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 49, 11/1-7/67**

**Box 25**

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#16 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 1:30 p.m. - S 1 p [Dupl # 24 NLS of Vietnam, 6/66 "241-1001st" (Santized, NLJ - CBS 19, 6/22/84) open 5-1-00 DMZ RAC	11/6/67	A
#16a report	Intelligence Report - open 4/3/03 NLS/RAC 00-272 S 2 pp	10/26/67	A
<del>#16a report</del>	<del>Intelligence Report - S 1 pp open 4/3/03 NLS/RAC 00-272</del>	<del>10/26/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#51 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. - TS 1p open 4/3/03 NLS/RAC 00-273	11/2/67	A
#51a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1p Exempt 4/3/03 NLS/RAC 00-272	11/2/67	A
#55 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 6:50 p.m. - TS 1 p Santized 4/3/03 NLS/RAC 00-273	11/2/67	A
#55a cable	Intelligence report - TS 1 p Exempt 6-27-04 NLS/RAC 04-56	11/2/67	A
#62 <del>xxxxxx</del> memo	Richard Helms to the President - TS 3 pp <i>Santized 9-13-07 NLS 04-63 and NLS 93-51</i>	11/1/67	A
55b cable	intelligence cable TS- 1p exempt 5/03	10/31/67	A

## FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, <sup>Walt Rostow</sup> Volume 49, November 1-8, 1967 Box 25

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



1  
Pres file  
W. W. Rostow

November 7, 1967  
Tuesday, 5:30 P. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attendance at NSC Meeting, 10:00 A. M., Wednesday  
November 8

There is attached a list of those usually attending the National Security Council Meeting plus Cabinet Secretaries. The Congressional Leaders who have been invited and are expected to attend will be sent later.

Secretary Freeman is out of town and his Under Secretary has not been invited.

Dick Helms must be on the Hill at 10:00 A. M. Do you wish us to invite his deputy, Admiral Taylor?

W. W. Rostow

Invite Admiral Taylor: \_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_no

BKS:amc



1a

List of Invitees, NSC Meeting

November 7, 1967, Wednesday, 10:00 AM

Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCS Chairman General Wheeler

OEP Director Daniel

USIA Director Marks

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

Attorney General Clark

Postmaster General O'Brien

Secretary of Interior Udall

Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge

Secretary of HEW Gardner

Secretary of Labor Wirtz

Secretary of HUD Weaver

Secretary of Transportation Boyd

Walt Rostow

George Christian

Bromley Smith



2

November 7, 1967  
Tuesday, 5:30 P.M.

*Free file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attendance at NSC Meeting, 10:00 A.M., Wednesday  
November 8

There is attached a list of those usually attending the National Security Council Meeting plus Cabinet Secretaries. The Congressional Leaders who have been invited and are expected to attend will be sent later.

Secretary Freeman is out of town and his Under Secretary has not been invited.

Dick Helms must be on the Hill at 10:00 A.M. Do you wish us to invite his deputy, Admiral Taylor?

W. W. Rostow

Invite Admiral Taylor: \_\_\_\_yes \_\_\_\_no

BKS:amc



2a

List of Invitees, NSC Meeting

November 7, 1967, Wednesday, 10:00 AM

Secretary of State Rusk

Secretary of Defense McNamara

JCS Chairman General Wheeler

OEP Director Daniel

USIA Director Marks

Secretary of Treasury Fowler

Attorney General Clark

Postmaster General O'Brien

Secretary of Interior Udall

Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge

Secretary of HEW Gardner

Secretary of Labor Wirtz

Secretary of HUD Weaver

Secretary of Transportation Boyd

Walt Rostow

George Christian

Bromley Smith



INFORMATION

3

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
5:15 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Westy on Gavin and Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 10596

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date *11-18-91*

~~SECRET~~

*Reston*  
*3a*

RECEIVED  
WHCA

EYES ONLY

1967 NOV 7 18 38

ZCZCQAA735 .....  
OO YEKADS  
DE YSEKQA 28 3111813  
O 071805Z ZYH ZFF-4  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
INFO WHITE HOUSE  
O 070610Z ZFF-1  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON  
TO GEN WHEELER CHAIRMAN JCS WASH  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ MAC 10596 EYES ONLY

1. JIMMY GAVIN AND STY WAINWRIGHT DEPARTED VIETNAM THIS MORNING FOR BANGKOK. THEY WILL CONFER WITH AMBASSADOR UNGER IN BANGKOK AND TRAVEL TO MANILA TODAY. THEY PLAN TO DEPART MANILA FOR RETURN TO CONUS TOMORROW AFTERNOON, 8 NOVEMBER.

2. GAVIN VISITED ALL FOUR CORPS AREAS, CONFERRED WITH ALL VIETNAMESE CORPS COMMANDERS AND SENIOR US OFFICIALS, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, IN EACH CORPS AREA. HE MET WITH ADVISORS AND GVN OFFICIALS DOWN TO THE HAMLET LEVEL. ONLY MAJOR US UNIT VISITED WAS 1ST AIR CAV. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS 4-DAY FIELD TRIP, HE SPENT A DAY IN SAIGON WHERE HE CALLED ON PRES. THIEU, VICE PRES. KY; (JGS) Joint General staff VICE CHIEF OF STAFF THANG, THE FRENCH CONSULATE GENERAL AND OTHER

OFFICIALS. I HAD A SMALL DINNER FOR HIM LAST NIGHT AND INVITED ABRAMS, KOMER, ZORTHIAN, MOMYER, BRUCE PALMER, CHUCK COOPER, AND KEY MEMBERS OF MY STAFF. ALTHOUGH THE SAIGON PRESS HAS BEEN INTERESTED IN TALKING TO HIM ALL ALONG THE WAY, GAVIN CONSISTENTLY HELD THE POSITION THAT HE HAD NO STATEMENTS TO MAKE UNTIL HE HAD TIME TO THINK ABOUT WHAT HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD. FRANKLY, HE WAS VERY GOOD IN AVOIDING PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE DID, HOWEVER, DINE WITH DEAN BRELLIS, PETER ARNETT, AND ONE OR TWO OTHER MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHEN HE WAS IN SAIGON.

3. GAVIN WAS DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A FIRST HAND LOOK AT THE SITUATION OUT HERE. HE WAS MOST COMPLIMENTARY OF THE ITINERARY WHICH HAD BEEN PLANNED FOR HIM AND THE FREEDOM ALLOWED HIM IN MAKING CHANGES AND ADJUSTMENTS WHICH WERE FEW. HE TOLD ME HE WAS IMMENSELY IMPRESSED BY THE AMERICANS OUT HERE AND SURPRISED AT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE (RVNAF). HE IMPLIED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE TROOP DISPOSITIONS THAT HAD BEEN MADE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND SHARES TO SOME DEGREE OUR ESTIMATE THAT WE ARE HURTING THE ENEMY IN THE SOUTH. HE WAS QUICK TO REAFFIRM HIS CONVICTION THAT THE BROAD NATIONAL STRATEGY, WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM, IS DEFECTIVE. HE CONTENDS THAT HE IS NOT, REPEAT, NOT A PROPONENT OF

DECLASSIFIED

REPUBLIC of VIETNAM ARMED FORCES (South Vietnam)

Authority MLG 85-56

By sg/aw, NARA, Date 12-5-91



WITHDRAWAL OR OF FURTHER ESCALATION, BUT HE FEELS THAT OUR POLICY OF CONTINUED AND UNRELENTING PRESSURE, BOTH IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH, DOES NOT SHOW MUCH PROMISE FOR ANYTHING BUT MORE OF THE SAME. (HE MEANS BY THIS "A LONG AND EXPENSIVE COMMITMENT OF U.S. RESOURCES FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME.") HE CONSISTENTLY REFERRED TO THE DOMESTIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS AT HOME, THE MASSIVE DEFICIT IN OUR BUDGET, THE 10 PER CENT SURCHARGE, THE IMPAIRING IMPACT OF THIS WAR ON OUR ABILITY TO COPE WITH PROBLEMS IN NATO AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE SIGNIFICANT LACK OF SUPPORT FOR OUR VIETNAM POLICY BY OUR ALLIES. HE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT WE MUST DO SOMETHING VERY SOON TO BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN QUERIED AS TO SPECIFICS, HE INVARIABLY RESPONDED THAT AS THE FIRST STEP, WE SHOULD CEASE BOMBING IN THE NORTH AND CONSIDER "STOPPING THE SHOOTING" IN THE SOUTH. HE IMPLIED THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THESE INITIATIVES WITHOUT DEMANDING A QUID PRO QUO FROM THE OTHER SIDE. HE BELIEVES THESE STEPS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO PROVIDE THE FACE SAVING AVENUE THAT WILL LEAD HANOI TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

4. WAINWRIGHT OBVIOUSLY HAS AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE ON GAVIN'S THINKING AND APPARENTLY SHARES GAVIN'S VIEWS, BUT MAY HAVE MODERATED HIS POSITION BY THE EXPERIENCE.

5. IN SUM, I THINK THE VISIT WAS WORTHWHILE FOR GAVIN, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF HIS ABSENCE FROM THIS COUNTRY FOR WELL OVER TEN YEARS. HE APPARENTLY WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE AMERICAN TEAM HERE AND HAS HAD HIS MIND CHANGED SOMEWHAT REGARDING RVNAF EFFECTIVENESS. HE MAY CONCEDE THAT WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE FIELD AND IN PACIFICATION. HIS PRINCIPAL QUARREL REMAINS CENTERED ON THE US STRATEGIC POLICY CONNECTED WITH OUR INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND HIS BELIEF THAT THIS IS HAVING AN ALMOST DISASTROUS EFFECT IN INTERNATIONAL, DOMESTIC AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

~~SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY~~

735

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

NNNN

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Green reports in glowing terms on the Vice President's trip to Indonesia.

W. W. Rostow

Djakarta 2651

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 2.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 11-19-91



Tuesday, November 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR GREEN (Djakarta 2651)

SUBJECT: Vice President's Visit to Indonesia

I consider the Vice President's visit to Indonesia to be an outstanding success.

The public reception was uniformly warm and at times amazingly exuberant. There was no hint of a negative demonstration, no anti-American placards, and no hostile gestures or words. Even Djakarta's outspoken press, which usually finds some point to criticize in every event, was exceptionally friendly. While the crowds were not large in Djakarta, which is often exposed to high-level visits, tens of thousands of people lined the rural roads of Bali and Central Java cheering and sometimes waving paper American flags. These areas, it should be remembered, spent the last decade under the influence of the Communist Party as well as the PNI's xenophobic nationalism.

The Vice President's warm and vigorous personality came through exceptionally well both in his hand-shaking forays into crowds of laborers and peasants as well as in his speeches and discussions. I would say that it was in his impromptu remarks that the Vice President's eloquence struck home most movingly. At Demak, site of Java's first Mosque, he departed from prepared remarks with a perfectly timed plea for religious tolerance which paralleled the campaign Suharto has recently undertaken in this area. By pointing out similarities between Pantja Sila and the U. S. pledge of allegiance, he aptly identified the common principles of our two countries and, according to Indonesian friends present, gave a better interpretation of Indonesia's over-interpreted creed than I believe Indonesian leaders have ever managed to do. All his remarks conveyed sympathy for and understanding of Indonesia's problems. My only regret is that the Vice President's speech to the American community, which provided a brilliant positive exposition of our larger policies and purposes, was not heard by Indonesians but we plan to give this printed text wide circulation.

The Vice President was equally successful, I believe, in establishing a personal rapport with Suharto both in his own and President Johnson's names -- this despite Suharto's retiring Javanese nature and need to work through a translator. Such rapport will serve Suharto well in this critical period both to bolster his self-confidence and his position vis-a-vis internal political critics. As the Department is aware, Suharto is deeply concerned over the increase in the price of rice (which constitutes 40 percent of local cost of living) and somewhat unsure of how he should handle political repercussions.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ALJ 88-120By 19/10, NARA, Date 12-6-91

Suharto's able team of economists, who have been under pressures from within as well as from outside the administration, will benefit from the healthy assist from the Vice President. He made a strong pitch for a free economy approach, minimum controls and encouragement of individual initiative. These are points he also intends to make in the letter which, as President of Senate, he will write to Parliament Speaker Sjaichu (the idea was checked with Suharto who welcomes it). The Vice President, both in the November 5 working session and in November 6 final conversation, strengthened the hands of those in this government who have stressed the use of proper institutional channels in conducting economic and commercial relations with foreign countries. He pointed out the error in believing those who claim to have special influence with the Vice President and President. He emphasized that the way to do business is through the Ambassador. (Comment: This will strengthen the Embassy's hand as well as that of our friends, but I am not so naive as to believe the problem has been finally disposed of. The backdoor dealers and influence peddlers are a persistent crowd.)

In the foreign policy field, the Vice President stressed that the greatest contribution Indonesia can make to stability and progress in Asia is to put its own house in order. Without implying any criticism of Foreign Minister Adam Malik. (for whom he expressed high regard), he suggested that the Government of Indonesia should make an effort to understand our problems in Vietnam and elsewhere and, phrasing his argument in positive terms, indicated that criticism would not help.

Specific points raised in Vice President's discussions with Suharto, as well as with individual ministers, advisers, non-governmental personalities, etc., covered separately.

My dominant impression of the Vice President's visit is that it deepened the understanding of the spiritual values and long-term goals which our two nations share. He brought Indonesia and the United States closer together.



5

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
5:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Bunker reports Ky is in an  
operational mood and making sense.

The Thieu relation looks better  
on the surface.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-475  
By ig, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rlh

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

## FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER (Saigon 10563)

I spent about one hour with Vice President Ky the morning of November 7. I told Ky that I would be leaving Thursday for a trip to Washington, which was in the nature of a normal consultation after six months here. I said that I thought the three measures the Government of Vietnam had already taken with respect to: 1) partial mobilization; 2) transfer of land tax administration to local authorities; and 3) attack on corruption, had all been very useful and constructive steps. In connection with the land tax transfer to local authorities, I mentioned to Ky the draft ordinance on land reform which I had given to Thieu on November 4.

I gave him a copy of my memorandum and draft ordinance, noting that this would be a logical next step to follow the tax reform. Ky agreed and added that it was important to get the control at the local level. With respect to the anti-corruption program, he confirmed that in the Third Corps alone, some 75 officials had been removed this year.

Ky then went on to describe his own thoughts about what his major interests and concerns would be in the new government. The anti-corruption program would be one. He also planned to devote a good deal of his time to pacification and coordination in this field among Generals Thang, Vien and Tri. Ky said that he expected to spend a good deal of his time in the provinces. He planned, for example, to spend some time in the First Corps next week examining the situation in Hue and Danang, and with the Marines, evaluating how the Revolutionary Development team effort was proceeding in that area. Ky agreed with the report by a mission official who had recently visited there that generally speaking, the people in the hamlets were pleased with the Revolutionary Development teams, wanted them to stay on in their hamlets, or wanted them to come in if they were not already there.

Coming back to my Washington trip, Ky said he was worried about the generally poor conditions under which the Vietnamese Armed Forces operate. He cited as examples their inadequate pay, difficulties in getting food, etc., observing that something needed to be done for them but the Government of Vietnam simply didn't have the money. He cited the 95 million piaster ceiling on the budget. Ky noted that General Westmoreland had agreed to provide 42 million dollars for subsistence but added that they were sorely in need of help with respect to

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-476

By hij, NARA, Date 1-10-95



distribution and specifically needed more advisors for this purpose. In connection with the budget, he commented that the Government of Vietnam would have to do much more to increase the government revenue.

I told Ky that although we had no official instructions yet regarding a possible stand-down over the forthcoming holiday periods, it would be useful to know what his personal views were since he had been so intimately involved last year. Ky said that he thought we should agree to have a stand-down, preferably 24 hours for Christmas, 24 hours for New Year's, and 48 hours for Tet, since these are traditional holidays. He thought it important that we take the initiative rather than let Hanoi or the Viet Cong get the benefit of it.

I then asked Ky how he envisaged the development of adequate support for the government in the two Houses of the Assembly. I said that in my view it would be essential to have such support initially for major government programs and ultimately to develop the basis for new political parties. Ky said he thought this trend was moving satisfactorily. He remarked that there were already about 50 Deputies in the Lower House who supported the government and added that he thought there would be as many as 80. In the Senate, he foresaw support for the government from the slates of Senators Don, Hien, and Cao. He also thought it was possible that Huyen's slate and some of Nguyen Kngoc Ky's slate (Revolutionary Dai Viets) might cooperate. He was therefore optimistic that they would have a clear majority in both Houses. With respect to political party development, Ky said that the old parties were already disappearing and that a new generation was coming in, which was a healthy sign. He thought that the development of new party organizations must come slowly and at its own pace. If it were forced, they would be artificial and not afford a solid foundation for the stable political development which was needed. Ky also said that it was important for the government party to develop from the grass roots and from the Assembly and not be imposed by the government itself. He cited Diem's policy of creating a personal party and forcing people into it as a wrong approach. Ky said that for these reasons he had recently refused a suggestion from Senator Don that he, Ky, agree to head up a national political party.

Prime Minister Loc came in during my visit with Ky and I had an opportunity to congratulate him and to have a brief conversation with both of them.

Comment: I found Ky in a very good mood and was encouraged to see that he has now focused on moving ahead with vital government programs which will hopefully bring some early and constructive results. His general approach to developing support for the government in the Assembly and for creating the basis for a political party structure also seems sound to me. From his comments, and from reports from sources near Thieu, I get the impression that Thieu and Ky are now keeping more closely in touch on development of political support for the government rather than stimulating separate and rival organizations.

*Pres. file*  
*6*

Tuesday, Nov. 7, 1967  
1:10 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor volunteers an interesting paper on the alternatives facing Washington and Hanoi in the months ahead.

I recommend that you turn the paper over to Nick Katzenbach's Viet Nam group and ask them:

- Do you agree?
- If not, how would you state the choices and make your recommendations?
- What new actions flow from your recommendations?

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-166  
By sig, NARA, Date 1-26-88



6a

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 1967

Mr. President:

As an outgrowth of our group discussion of Vietnam in the Cabinet Room on November 2, I am attaching my personal analysis of the alternatives which appear available to our side (Blue) and to their's (Red) in pursuing our conflicting policy objectives. For the Blue policy objective, I have paraphrased your statement at Johns Hopkins in April, 1965; the Red objective is derived from apparently authentic statements emanating from Hanoi.

In listing available alternatives, I have assumed that neither side will ever completely abandon its objective but either may be obliged to settle for half a loaf or for an indefinite postponement of full attainment. Thus, I have not included an immediate pull-out among Blue alternatives or an unconditional surrender under Red's.

In listing alternatives, one may argue that negotiation is not a true alternative since it takes two to negotiate and, for the moment, only our side is willing. We might say that, under these conditions, negotiation is an alternative for Red but not for Blue. However, for convenience of discussion, I have included it as an alternative, recognizing that it is a development which may grow out of any of the other alternatives.

*M.D.T.*

M. D. T.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-166

By 1-8, NARA, Date 1-26-88

~~SECRET~~

66

~~SECRET~~

An Estimate of the Vietnam Situation  
November 1967

1. Objectives

A. Blue Objective. The independence of South Vietnam and its freedom from attack. A self-determined government in South Vietnam with a reasonable chance of surviving.

B. Red Objective. The imposition of a Communist-oriented regime on South Vietnam and the elimination of foreign troops, bases, and influence. Eventually, the unification of all Vietnam under the Communist rule of Hanoi.

2. Blue alternatives.

A. Stick it out. This alternative is generally identical with our present course of action which seeks to bring security to all or most of the South Vietnamese population; to inflict such losses on the VC and North Vietnamese forces as to convince their leadership that they cannot afford to continue the war on the present basis; to continue air pressure on North Vietnam to limit infiltration and to confirm the impression caused by the ground war that it is to the interest of the Hanoi leaders to cease the aggression in the south; and, simultaneously, to strengthen the government, economy, and society of South Vietnam. Under this Blue alternative, these actions would be continued for the same purposes as in the past while making every effort to increase their effectiveness but staying generally within the past ground rules of operations.

B. All out. This is the escalation alternative and escalation means different things to different proponents. In the air war, it calls for the attack of all targets of any political, economic or military importance in North Vietnam with maximum intensity and in the shortest possible time in a revulsion against the gradualism which has been the hallmark of our bombing policy in the past.

In the ground war, it implies an expansion varying from raids into cross-border sanctuaries to various forms of invasion of North Vietnam.

On the home front, some partisans of this alternative favor a declaration of war and the imposition of war-time controls of various kinds.

C. Pull-back. This is the de-escalation alternative which usually includes in the statements of its advocates a cessation of the bombing, a diminution of offensive ground actions, some degree of selectivity in holding and defending terrain, and, in its extreme form, may extend to the so-called enclave concept of defense.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 86-166  
By inf, NARA, Date 1-26-88



D. Negotiations under the most favorable conditions possible. The purpose of the negotiations may be a cease-fire, a political settlement, or both.

3. Red Alternatives.

A. Hang On. This alternative amounts to continuing about as at present the guerrilla war in the south, the criminal war of terrorism and the cross-border forays out of sanctuaries beyond reach of our forces. It includes a maximum effort in the propaganda field and a maximum exploitation of divisions of opinion in the United States.

B. Escalate. The possible forms of escalation open to Hanoi appear to be an increased infiltration of North Vietnamese forces and equipment into the south, to include - the introduction of such new weapons as may be obtainable from Soviet or Red Chinese sources; the use of "volunteers" in North Vietnam to free Vietnamese for combat in the South; and perhaps the opening of a new front outside Vietnam to divert hostile forces. Such a new front might conceivably be in Thailand, in Burma, in Korea, in South America or in Berlin.

C. Pull-Back. This is "the back to the woodwork" alternative, a fade-away to avoid further contact and losses and to give the impression that the war is subsiding, or indeed has ended. It might be a short-term ruse or a true withdrawal with the long-term intention to live to fight another day.

D. Negotiations under the most favorable conditions possible. As under the similar Blue alternative, the objective may be a cease-fire, a political settlement or both.

4. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative A (Stick-it-out) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

The principal argument in favor of "sticking it out" is that this course of action has since 1965 recorded many successes in the political, military, and economic fields. Its continuation carries little danger of an expansion of the war beyond Vietnam and the United States and its allies have adequate material resources to sustain it indefinitely at the present level of effort.

On the negative side, it is not clear that the U.S. public has the moral resources to support indefinitely this slow, seemingly indecisive strategy of gradualism which runs counter to the impatient, impetuous American temperament. This evident disinclination for a long, drawn-out test of will in concert with the noisy demonstrations of the radical minorities encourages Ho Chi Minh and his advisers to hang on (Red Alternative A) or to escalate (Red Alternative B).

The growing disunity on the home front may eventually make itself felt on the battle field. It may cause our efforts to slacken and the current progress to stagnate at some point short of success. While the morale of our troops in action has thus far been magnificent, it should not be taken for granted if the home front continues to deteriorate.

The foregoing evaluation of the pros and cons of Blue Alternative A applies generally to a situation in which Ho has opted for hanging on (Red A). If he chose to escalate (Red B), this attempt to raise the tempo would accomplish little more than to require a continuing reinforcement of our U.S. Forces. We should have no particular difficulty in providing the necessary forces (although probably with some reserve call-up) as long as the war remains within the confines of Vietnam.

A new front opened outside of Vietnam would help Hanoi significantly but Hanoi alone does not have the resources to open such a front. It would be necessary to persuade the Chinese to involve themselves in Thailand, Burma, or Korea, or perhaps, to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in stirring up trouble in Berlin. At this moment, such possibilities look very unlikely to us here. If, by any chance, it did occur, the opening of a new front could change the complexion of the entire situation and require a world-wide re-evaluation of strategic requirements.

If, while we are sticking it out on our present course of action, the other side should decide to pull back into the woodwork (Red C), that decision would seem a favorable development from our point of view. We would be able to liberate much of the population which, thus far, has remained under Viet Cong control and would gain ample time to dig out the Communist infrastructure in the villages and hamlets within our extended control. We would obtain a welcome breathing spell in which to concentrate our efforts on rehabilitating and rebuilding the war-damaged provinces. There would be the additional advantage of the depression in the Viet Cong morale resulting from this retreat and the abandonment of hard-won territory and population.

On the other hand, such a pull-back would leave us in doubt as to the true intentions of the enemy and we would be unsure whether we had reached a truce, a peace, or only a breathing spell in which the enemy was preparing for a new offensive. It would be difficult to decide under these circumstances when, if ever, we could start withdrawing our U.S. forces. In this uncertainty, the South Vietnamese would be very much concerned about their own future in the absence of any firm assurance of peace.

In the United States, once that it seemed the conflict had ebbed and that some kind of de facto cease-fire was in effect, one might expect a cry "to bring the boys home." How difficult it would be to control this emotional surge is hard to evaluate here and now.

It is also difficult to analyze the consequences of a decision on our side to stick it out (Blue A) and on their side to negotiate from a favorable position (Red D). There are certain contradictions in such a confrontation of options since the stick-it-out course, if followed without swerving on our side would make it difficult for the enemy to find favorable factors in the situation to lead them to negotiate. There might be a negatively favorable factor created

for them in that the pressures by our side might become so unpleasant that the outcome of negotiations, uncertain though they might be, would appear a better choice to the Communist leaders than a continuation of the struggle.

5. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative B (All out) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

The primary justification on our side for adopting this alternative would be the desire to bring greater pressure faster on the Viet Cong and North Vietnam, hoping thereby that they would reach a breaking point in a comparatively short period of time. If this were the outcome, it would result in a reduction in the loss of lives and resources and the increased effort would tend to satisfy the "hawks" at home who are demanding "all out or get out." However, if the enemy adhered to their Alternative A and hung on at about the present level of their effort, our increased military efforts would face the same problems as in the past, particularly the difficulty of finding decisive targets to strike either on the ground or from the air. If the ground war were expanded to cross-border operations into Cambodia, Laos, or North Vietnam, there would be a considerable time lag required to raise, train and transport the additional troops necessary for these ground campaigns, a delay which would contravene the hope for quick results which is a prime justification for the option.

To meet additional force requirements, particularly the ground forces, it would probably be necessary to pass to a condition approaching general mobilization in the United States and the imposition of economic controls and other measures equally unpopular on the home front.

Our neighbors in the international world would be concerned over these acts of escalation and, although the danger of Red Chinese or Soviet direct intervention would probably remain low, in comparison to Blue A (Stick-it-out) the escalation route would be relatively risky in possibilities of unwanted expansion of the conflict.

If the other side responded to our escalation with those escalatory acts available to them (Red B), the results would be essentially the same as in our discussion of Blue A. Unless it were possible for the other side to open another front or to bring in effective new weapons (such as light anti-helicopter weapons or missile-firing ships), it is unlikely that Red escalation would have much effect on our course of action. Indeed, if in the course of their escalation, the enemy side responded with major attacks, this development could work in our favor in giving us important targets to destroy with our overwhelming mobile fire capability.

If Red elected to pull back and go into the woodwork (Red C) in response to our escalation, our increased military strength would be of little avail since there would be few targets to attack. There would be less justification to invade the sanctuaries or to destroy the urban centers of Hanoi and Haiphong



~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

by air attack. However, if we allowed ourselves to be lured into a guerrilla chase into Cambodia or Laos, we could readily dissipate any increase in ground force and dilute this strength without adding substantially to our offensive effectiveness.

If in response to our acts of escalation, the Red side sought the negotiation route (Red D), the fact that we had greater strength in being at the time would be a factor tending to strengthen the hands of our negotiators in the tough horse-trading which will inevitably take place around the conference table.

6. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative C (Pull-back) in confrontation with the Red Alternatives.

If we elect the pull-back option, there is little that our side can hope to gain beyond appeasing some of our domestic and international critics and perhaps facilitating the opening of negotiations. However, in the course of achieving these dubious gains, we would have encouraged Ho and his colleagues who will take any retreat as an evidence of weakness on our part and of a readiness to capitulate. We would discourage our allies, particularly the South Vietnamese, many of whom would begin to seek political storm cellars in anticipation of the eventual Communist take-over.

Only in the case that our pull-back was part of an overt or tacit agreement involving a similar pull-back on the other side could there be any possible gain for us in this option. Even in such a case, we would have to react very cautiously to this kind of proposal to be sure that it was not a ruse and would not allow the Viet Cong to stake out permanent territorial enclaves in South Vietnam as they have done in Laos.

It is true that our adoption of this alternative might create in the minds of Ho and his colleagues the feeling that a favorable situation had finally arrived for initiating negotiations. However, an offer from them to negotiate at such a time would catch us in a weakened military position with our relations probably strained with the South Vietnamese government which would be made deeply suspicious by our pull-back behavior. At a conference table, we would be faced by a team of negotiators convinced that we were weak, vacillating, and a push-over for intransigent bargainers.

7. The advantages and disadvantages of Blue Alternative D (Negotiation) in confrontation with Red Alternative D (Negotiation)

Since it takes two willing parties to hold a conference, we need to consider only the pros and cons of Blue D in confrontation with Red D.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

If both parties favored the negotiation option, the outcome would depend very much upon the relative strength and posture of the contending parties at that particular moment. The side which needed the negotiations most to correct an unfavorable imbalance in the situation would negotiate under a great disadvantage - if the other side used its wits and "blue chips."

Both sides would need to consider the best way to conduct the negotiations and the play of the "blue chips", the relative advantages of negotiating first a cease-fire then a political settlement, of reversing that order or of negotiating both issues at the same time. Because of the great complexity of negotiating a cease-fire and the virtual impossibility of checking on the faithful observance of its terms, the Blue side would be well advised either to reach a private agreement on the major elements of the political settlement and then negotiate a cease-fire or, if the package did not seem too large, to negotiate both simultaneously. The important thing from our side is that we keep on the pressure during negotiations to avoid the foot-dragging which took place at Panmunjom.

Negotiations might grow out of any one of the first three Blue alternatives. Blue A (Stick-it-out) and Blue B (all out) offer the possibility of creating a situation which will convince Hanoi that negotiations are preferable to continuing on a course which is becoming increasingly painful and costly. Blue C (Pull-back) might produce an offer of negotiations by the enemy but he could come to the table in a mood to ask everything and give nothing, convinced that we were prepared to accept the abandonment of our policy objective in Vietnam in order to be relieved of our burdens in continuing the struggle.

There is a strong likelihood that Hanoi will never negotiate unless we opt for Blue C (Pull-back). Rather than come to a public conference table at a disadvantage and accept terms tantamount to the loss of their policy objective (or at least the indefinite deferment of the hope of its attainment) which will probably require public admission of the role played by Hanoi in the frustrated aggression, Ho and his friends would probably prefer to adopt Red C (Pull-back). On the other hand, remembering the advantages of the Panmunjom talks to the Communist side in Korea, they might decide to go to a conference at any time, hoping by twisting and turning to stall the discussions, gain propaganda advantages, split the opposing negotiators, exasperate the Americans and conceivably gain by debating maneuvers at least some important part of their policy objective.

#### Conclusions

After analyzing the consequences of the confrontation of the various alternatives open to Blue and Red, it would appear to me that Blue A is the cheapest, safest and most promising of courses for our side provided the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

home front holds and we overcome our burning impatience for quick results.

Blue B (All out) is more costly and more risky and probably will not produce results in a much shorter time than Blue A. However, it is more appealing to the American temperament and may be necessary to rally the home front and to convince the public that we are in a de facto state of war and that we should adjust our behavior accordingly.

The pull-back alternative, Blue C, offers nothing to Blue except in the improbable case of a reciprocal pull-back in lieu of a formally negotiated settlement. The advantages and disadvantages of such a development would depend upon the conditions existing at the time and the possibilities of verifying enemy performance.

As to the negotiation alternative, Blue D, its outcome will depend upon the balance of strength existing at the initiation of negotiations and upon the attitude shown by the representatives at the conference table. This is going to be a tough contest viewed merely as an extension of the battle field by the Communists who will use every negotiating and propaganda device to gain advantages and to put the United States in the position of the warmonger who really does not want peace. Our side must keep two major points in mind. We must not give away anything in advance for the privilege of negotiating and, once at the table, we must insist that progress be rapid and that the quest for peace be sincere. Our slogan should be, "Never another Panmunjom."

#### Recommended Courses of Action

##### For Blue

In light of the foregoing analysis, it would seem to be to our interest to stay with Blue A (Stick-it-out) while making every effort to stiffen the home front. Our government should be prepared to pass to Blue B (All out) only if the enemy escalates in pursuance of Red B (Escalate) or as a means of pulling together the U.S. home front if it seems in danger of collapse. Blue C (Pull-back) should be rejected except in the unlikely case where it is our response to a reliable offer of mutual de-escalation. As for negotiations, we should always be ready to enter into them but only under favorable conditions and with the resolve not to tolerate another Panmunjom. If the Red pull-back (Red C) takes place, we should exploit the advantage offered to widen Saigon's hold on the territory and population and to increase joint efforts to strengthen the government and the society of South Vietnam.

##### For Red

We might also undertake to make a recommendation to Ho Chi Minh based upon this analysis. It would be to keep on the essentially present level of

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

- 8 -

military, terrorist and political action until Hanoi can understand better the situation on the United States home front. In the meantime, Ho should try to get the USSR or China or both to open a new front to divert the Americans. If there are better weapons available in the Communist world to attack U.S. bases or to shoot down helicopters and aircraft, Ho should make every effort to get them from his Communist backers. In a final pinch, rather than fading away in implementation of Red C, it would seem better to accept negotiations and then utilize all possible devices to drag them out, confuse and divide the opposition, and wage a propaganda war which will compromise the U.S. objective of a truly independent Vietnam able to choose its own government. Otherwise, he will have to accept the Red C Alternative, send the VC underground or into feigned submission to the Saigon government, and await a better day to impose Northern rule on the South.

*M.D.T.*  
M. D. T.

~~SECRET~~

1

~~EYES ONLY -- TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
11:40 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Clark Clifford responds  
to the draft memorandum of November 1.

W. W. Rostow

~~EYES ONLY -- TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 83-55  
By isa, NARS, Date 10-4-83

7a

MEMORANDUM

I disagree with the recommendations presented in the memorandum of November 1, 1967. I believe that the course of action suggested therein will retard the possibility of concluding the conflict rather than accelerating it.

The question is often asked: Why does North Vietnam continue to prosecute the war when it appears that they have no chance of winning it?

The answer is clear. Hanoi is depending upon a weakening of the will of the United States to carry on the war. Their previous experience with the French has convinced them that the same result will occur again insofar as the United States is concerned.

It is my opinion that Hanoi will never seek a cessation of the conflict if they think our determination is lessening. On the other hand, if our pressure is unremitting and their losses continue to grow, and hope fades for any sign of weakening on our part, then some day they will conclude that the game is not worth the candle.

If one accepts this premise, then the course of action recommended in the memorandum must be subjected to the test of Hanoi's reaction.

It is suggested in the memo that there be "complete cessation of

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ 83-55  
By isa, NARS, Date 10-4-83



bombing in the North." The argument is made that "it is probable that Hanoi would move to 'talks' perhaps within a few weeks after the bombing stopped."

I am at a loss to understand this logic. Would the unconditional suspension of the bombing, without any effort to extract a quid pro quo persuade Hanoi that we were firm and unyielding in our conviction to force them to desist from their aggressive designs?

The answer is a loud and resounding "no."

It would be interpreted by Hanoi as (a) evidence of our discouragement and frustration, and (b) an admission of the wrongness and immorality of our bombing of the North, and (c) the first step in our ultimate total disengagement from the conflict.

It would give an enormous lift to the spirits and morale of the North, and an equally grave setback to the will and determination of the South Vietnamese and our other allies fighting with us.

It would dramatically confirm the conviction of the North that Premier Pham Van Dong was correct when he said, "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars; thus we are sure to win in the end."

The cessation of the bombing would be used to great advantage to repair roads and bridges, improve anti-aircraft defenses, and build up the war-making potential of the North. The Chinese and Russians would

react enthusiastically to such cessation and would redouble their efforts to drive us out of Asia.

I think it is reckless to talk about resuming the bombing after such a suspension. It would create a storm of protest, which would be compounded by our greater losses of men and planes due to their improved air defenses.

I feel strongly that it is grossly fallacious to contend that we are fighting two wars: the war in the South and a separate war in the North. They are part and parcel of our single effort to convince Hanoi that it must abandon its effort to conquer South Vietnam.

The second recommendation in the memo is that we "stabilize" our military effort in the South.

This would be achieved by stating "publicly" that we would not increase our forces; we would not call up reserves; we would not expand ground action in North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia; we would not attack North Vietnam seaports; we would not hit the dikes or locks; and we would engage in continued efforts to restrict the war.

Can there be any doubt as to the North Vietnamese reaction to such an announcement? The chortles of unholy glee issuing from Hanoi would be audible in every capital of the world.

Is this evidence of our zeal and courage to stay the course? Of

course not! It would be interpreted to be exactly what it is. A resigned and discouraged effort to find a way out of a conflict for which we had lost our will and dedication.

And what of our bargaining position? It would have been utterly destroyed. Hanoi would be secure in the comforting thought that we had informed the world that we would refrain from practically all activities that would be damaging to North Vietnam.

It would be tantamount to turning over our hole card and showing Hanoi that it was a deuce.

Can one recall that we ever successfully terminated a war by such a program? In World War I, World War II and the Korean War, the pressure was constantly increased until the enemy found it intolerable and capitulated.

The President and every man around him wants to end the war. But the future of our children and grandchildren require that it be ended by accomplishing our purpose, i.e., the thwarting of the aggression by North Vietnam, aided by China and Russia.

Free peoples everywhere, and Communists everywhere, in fact the entire world, is watching to see if the United States meant what it said when it announced its intention to help defend South Vietnam.

It will affect the plans and intentions and aspirations of many people.

Because of the unique position we occupy in the world of today,



we cannot expect other countries and other peoples to love us, but with courage and determination, and the help of God, we can make them respect us.

It is clear to me that the course of action offered in the memorandum does not accomplish this purpose.

8

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
11:25 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Beginning on Thursday of this week (Nov. 9), the Rectors of all five of the South Vietnamese universities will be in Washington. They have come to the U. S. under AID auspices for a seminar in university administration conducted by the University of Wisconsin.

The Rectors have completed their seminar and are presently meeting with officers of the Education and World Affairs (EWA) group (with whom you met last January) to discuss possible cooperation on programs being developed by EWA to relate the U. S. academic community more effectively to the development and reconstruction needs of South Vietnam.

I recommend that you invite the Rectors to the White House along with representatives of Education and World Affairs. This would (1) demonstrate your interest in a constructive Vietnamese civilian endeavor -- higher education, and (2) further a valuable dialogue with the EWA.

You will recall meeting with some of the Trustees of EWA last January. As a result of that meeting, EWA has developed a program for directing U. S. academic activity toward the reconstruction and development of South Vietnam. Their ideas have been discussed extensively within the academic community as well as with Ellsworth Bunker and David Lilienthal, both of whom are EWA trustees. (In fact, if the meeting took place on Friday, you might have Bunker present as well.)

The main focus of such a meeting, of course, would be the Vietnamese Rectors. They are as distinguished a group of Vietnamese educators as one could find. As noted above, they represent all five Vietnamese universities, and include a Catholic and a Buddhist. Inviting the EWA people along with the Rectors gives an added value to the meeting in that it identifies the academic community with your interest in Vietnam's education.

I have discussed this idea with George Christian and Bill Leonhart, both of whom fully share my enthusiasm. The inclusion of the EWA group is entirely our own idea, and was not prompted by them.

W. W. R.

Arrange time with Marv Watson \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

9

Tuesday, November 7, 1967  
11:10 a. m.

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP

EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, on prisoners, Loan (cable 1) suggests the following cautious scenario.

1. Release Sau Ha, as requested, at the time the courier returns to NLF headquarters; although Loan is skeptical that Sau Ha will be anxious to return, since he revealed name of fellow-VC.

2. Ask at that time ~~of~~ release of two U. S. prisoners by name: one U. S. Air Force, the other U. S. Army.

3. Ask the NLF to specify by name those it next wished to be released, indicating the U. S. and GVN are ready to comply.

4. This, in his view, could lead to a gradual expansion in prisoner exchanges.

5. He is preparing dossiers on all those mentioned in Buttercup message plus those arrested due to Sau Ha's interrogation. These will go to Thieu who will, in fact, discuss next steps with us.

6. On substantive message (as Bunker indicates in Cable 2), we shall get a draft political statement to accompany return of courier which Bunker hopes to clear with Thieu.

In short, with GVN understandably playing it cool, we shall proceed slowly.

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP attachments

W. W. R.

(Saigon 509, 526)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-475  
By WJ, NARA, Date 4-6-95



9a

~~SECRET~~ NODIS

A GAIN

DLA656 .....  
OO YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 422 3110500  
O 070458Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1967 NOV 7 05 25

~~SECRET~~ 070353Z VIA [REDACTED]

IMMEDIATE

3.3(b)(1)

NODIS [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 509  
TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROSTOW  
SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK  
SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA  
DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

[REDACTED] DISCUSSION WITH GENERAL LOAN ON 6 NOVEMBER 1967

3.3(b)(1)

1. ON 6 NOVEMBER, [REDACTED] BRIEFED GENERAL LOAN ON  
[REDACTED] 5 NOVEMBER DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT THIEU ON  
THIEU'S CONCLUSION THAT OUR SIDE SHOULD MAKE  
AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE [REDACTED] AND THIEU'S  
REQUEST THAT LOAN BRIEF THIEU ON [REDACTED]  
THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION CONCERNING THOSE VC WHO WERE ARRESTED  
[REDACTED] AND WHOM [REDACTED] HAS  
ASKED TO BE RELEASED. LOAN WAS ALSO GIVEN A COPY OF THE [REDACTED]  
MESSAGE (VIETNAMESE TEXT) WHICH HE THEN PROCEEDED TO READ. HE  
COMMENTED THAT THE NLF IS CONFUSING THE ISSUE WHEN IT DISCUSSES GVN  
MISTREATMENT OF VC PRISONERS SINCE THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE SPIES AND  
SABOTEURS, NOT MILITARY PRISONERS OF WAR, THAT THE GVN DOES NOT  
MISTREAT POW'S, AND FURTHER, THAT THE NLF WOULD NOT ONLY MISTREAT  
ANY GVN SPIES WHICH THEY APPREHENDED BUT WOULD SUMMARILY EXECUTE  
THEM AFTER EXTRACTING WHATEVER INFORMATION THEY COULD FROM THEM.  
LOAN ALSO REMARKED WHILE READING THE MESSAGE [REDACTED]  
THAT THE NLF IS INCONSISTENT IN STATING THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO  
TALK ABOUT BROADER ISSUES THAN THE POW EXCHANGE, WHILE IN THE SAME  
MESSAGE INDICATING THAT IT IS NOT NOW THE RIGHT TIME TO TALK PEACE.

3.3(b)(1)

2. LOAN'S CONCLUSION AND PRESENT POSITION IS THAT BY

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 94-476 Appeal  
By SJ, NARA, Date 4-23-04

RELEASING [ ] FROM PRISON TO ACT AS AN COURIER [ ]  
THE GVN HAS ALREADY DEMONSTRATED ITS GOOD FAITH AND IT IS NOW UP  
TO THE NLF TO MAKE A POSITIVE GESTURE OF ITS OWN GOOD FAITH BY  
RELEASING ONE U.S. AIR FORCE PILOT AND ONE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY  
OFFICER UPON RECEIPT OF OUR NEXT MESSAGE WHICH [ ]

3.3(b)(1)

[ ] WOULD OUTLINE OUR PRESENT POSITION  
PER THE FOREGOING. LOAN FEELS THAT FOR US TO GO BEYOND THIS AT THIS  
STAGE WOULD DETRACT FROM OUR FUTURE LEVERAGE AND BARGAINING POSITION  
WHEN AND IF WE SHOULD EVER ENGAGE IN ANY SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL  
DISCUSSIONS AFTER A PRISONER EXCHANGE HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. LOAN  
ALSO FEELS THAT A MATTER OF "HONOR" IS INVOLVED BETWEEN THE GVN AND  
THE NLF, AND THAT THE NLF IS EXCESSIVE IN THE CONDITIONS WHICH IT  
DEMANDS AND WHICH MUST BE MET BEFORE THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS  
SPECIFICS OF A PRISONER EXCHANGE AND PERHAPS LATER THE BROADER  
POLITICAL ISSUES.

3. LOAN COMMENTED THAT HE "DOES NOT GIVE A DAMN" ABOUT [ ]  
[ ] BEING RELEASED SINCE HE ALREADY PLANS TO SEND HIM AND OTHER VIET  
CONG ABROAD ON A PROPAGANDA MISSION, BUT THAT HE OBJECTS TO HIS  
RELEASE BECAUSE THE NLF IS ASKING FOR TOO MUCH AT THIS POINT. LOAN  
FURTHER FEELS THAT THE NLF IS ASKING FOR A GREAT DEAL WHEN THEY  
REQUEST THAT ALL PRISONERS ARRESTED BECAUSE OF [ ] INTERROGATION  
BE RELEASED BECAUSE, IN FACT, THE NLF PROBABLY DOES NOT KNOW WHO ALL  
HAVE BEEN APPREHENDED, AND ARE HOPING THIS PLOY WILL NOT ONLY INFORM  
THEM WHICH OF THEIR AGENTS HAVE BEEN PICKED UP BY THE GVN, BUT WILL ALSO  
SUCCEED IN OBTAINING THEIR RELEASE. IF THE NLF WERE CERTAIN WHICH  
OF THEIR AGENTS ARE NOW IN THE HANDS OF THE POLICE, THEY WOULD HAVE  
LISTED THEM BY NAME. LOAN DISMISSED THE ISSUE OF BETTER TREATMENT  
FOR THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN [ ] MESSAGE AS "NO PROBLEM,"  
AND REMARKED THAT THIS WOULD BE "EASY ENOUGH TO ARRANGE." LOAN WAS  
QUITE SPECIFIC, HOWEVER, IN HIS FEELING THAT [ ] WOULD NOT LIKELY  
BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE NLF'S SECRET ZONE BECAUSE HE IS "AFRAID" 3.3(b)(1)  
TO DO SO NOW, AFTER HAVING UNDERGONE EXTENSIVE INTERROGATION BY THE  
GVN AND HAVING REVEALED CONSIDERABLE INFORMATION ABOUT HIS  
COLLEAGUES, ETC., WHICH IS AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE NLF.

4. LOAN AGREED TO PREPARE DOSSIERS ON ALL PRISONERS MENTIONED  
IN [ ] MESSAGE, AS WELL AS PRISONERS ARRESTED BECAUSE OF  
THE INTERROGATION [ ] HE WILL PRESENT THIS INFORMATION TO  
PRESIDENT THIEU AND WILL ALSO GIVE ONE COPY OF EACH DOSSIER TO  
[ ] LOAN STATED HE WOULD RELEASE WHOMEVER PRESIDENT  
THIEU "ORDERS" HIM TO RELEASE, BUT FEELS FIRMLY THAT OUR SIDE HAS  
DONE AS MUCH AS IT SHOULD AT THIS STAGE AND SHOULD NOW WAIT FOR A  
SHOW OF FAITH BY THE NLF.

5. LOAN FEELS THAT THE NLF MIGHT WELL RESPOND FAVORABLY TO OUR NEXT MESSAGE CALLING FOR THE RELEASE OF ONE U.S. AIR FORCE PILOT AND ONE U.S. ARMY INFANTRY OFFICER AS A SHOW OF GOOD FAITH ON THE PART OF THE NLF AS A MEASURE TO CONTINUE RECIPROCAL MOVES ON PRISONER EXCHANGE. LOAN RECOMMENDS THAT WE ASK THE NLF TO SPECIFY WHICH VC PRISONERS THEY WOULD LIKE OUR SIDE TO RELEASE AND OUR NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO COMPLY ACCORDINGLY. THIS MOVE ON OUR PART WOULD IN TURN HOPEFULLY LEAD TO A CONTINUATION AND ESCALATION IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF PRISONERS TO BE EXCHANGED ON BOTH SIDES FROM THAT POINT FORWARD.

3.3(b)(1) 6. REGARDING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS BY THE GVN UNDER THE 1 NOVEMBER AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS, LOAN STATED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS THE NLF IS ASKING BE RELEASED, [REDACTED]

ARE NOT EVEN FORMALLY CHARGED WITH ANY SPECIFIC OFFENSES AND, THEREFORE, ARE NOT TECHNICALLY ELIGIBLE FOR AMNESTY RELEASE AS SUCH. LOAN REMARKED THAT, OF COURSE, THEY COULD BE TOLD THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS WITHIN THE SAME GENERAL FRAMEWORK AS THE 1 NOVEMBER AMNESTY DECLARATION AND IS THE RESULT OF THE GVN'S LIBERAL ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THIS WOULD SUFFICE AS COVER FOR THE RELEASE OF THESE PRISONERS.

7. LOAN CLEARLY DOES NOT PUT MUCH STOCK IN RESULTS TO BE DERIVED FROM DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NLF COMMAND ECHELON, EVEN THOUGH HE FEELS THE PRISONER EXCHANGE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED TO SOME DEGREE, AND EVEN THOUGH IT IS HIS OPINION THAT HANOI IS AT LEAST GENERALLY AWARE OF THE NLF EFFORTS, BOTH ON THE PRISONER EXCHANGE AND THEIR OPENING GAMBIT TO DISCUSS THE BROADER POLITICAL ISSUES.

8. OUR NEXT STEP WILL BE TO OBTAIN THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THE PRISONERS WHICH THE NLF HAS ASKED TO BE RELEASED, WHILE LOAN IS BRIEFING PRESIDENT THIEU ON THE SAME BACKGROUND INFORMATION. AFTER WE HAVE REVIEWED THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THESE PRISONERS, WE WILL BE ABLE TO FORMULATE OUR NEXT APPROACH TO PRESIDENT THIEU AND RECOMMEND A SPECIFIC COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE IMPLEMENTED.

GP-1  
900

~~SECRET~~

MODIS

NNNN



92  
~~SECRET~~

NODIS

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1967 NOV 7 13 16

OO YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 3471 3111300  
O 071124Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ 0 71124Z [REDACTED]

IMMEDIATE

NODIS [REDACTED]

FM AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 526

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROSTOW

SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK

SECDEF, EXCL USIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

~~SECRET~~ 071125Z [REDACTED]

REFS: A. [REDACTED] WASHINGTON 49639

B. [REDACTED] SAIGON 499 (MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU)

C. [REDACTED] SAIGON 509 (MEETING WITH GENERAL LOAN)

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER

1. IN LIGHT OF YOUR COMMENTS IN REF A AND NOW THAT THE RETURNS ARE IN FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT THIEU AND LOAN (REFS B AND C), WE CONCUR WITH YOUR SUGGESTED REPLY IN PARA FIVE WITH CERTAIN ADDITIONS, FOR REASONS I WILL DESCRIBE BELOW.

2. FROM OUR CONVERSATIONS WITH THIEU AND LOAN IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY BOTH FEEL WE SHOULD GIVE NO MORE [REDACTED] THAN HE REQUESTED, THAT THEY DISTRUST [REDACTED] BUT, AS THIEU PUTS IT, WE MUST "TEST" THE NLFSVN SINCERITY ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTS THEY ARE SERIOUS. LOAN GOES EVEN FURTHER IN SUGGESTING WE SHOULD FORCE THE NLFSVN TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH BY RELEASING TWO PRISONERS WE NAME BECAUSE THE GVN HAS ALREADY RELEASED [REDACTED] AND WOULD BE RELEASING [REDACTED] TO COMPLY WITH MINIMUS REQUIREMENTS. (I KNOW YOU AGREE THAT WE MUST RESPECT THE OPINIONS AND SUGGESTIONS OF THE GVN NOW AND

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 94-476 Appeal

By SL NARA, Date 4-23-04

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



PAGE 2 SAIGON 526 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]  
IN THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS MATTER. THEY ARE, IN EVERY  
RESPECT, CO-EQUALS IN THIS NEGOTIATION). I, THEREFORE, SUGGEST  
THAT WE BE PREPARED IN PARA FIVE REF A INGOING MESSAGE TO REQUEST  
[REDACTED] TO RELEASE TWO AMERICAN POWS (TO BE NAMED AT YOUR  
DISCRETION) TO SHOW HIS (THEIR) GOOD FAITH. IF [REDACTED]  
RESPONDS FAVORABLY, WE WILL HAVE TELESOPED THE TIME ELEMENT  
I FORSEE BETWEEN NOW AND THE INITIAL RELEASE OF POWS.

3. BOTH IN THE INGOING MESSAGE AND IN THE ORAL BRIEFING  
WE PLAN TO GIVE TO [REDACTED] WE WILL STRESS THE NEED FOR  
SAFE AND RAPID MEANS OF FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS AND URGE  
[REDACTED] TO OPEN THE RADIO LINK. I AM NOT SANGUINE, HOWEVER,  
[REDACTED] WILL USE THE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL  
AT ALL, AND IF THEY DO, THEN ONLY AT A MUCH LATER DATE. WE ARE,  
THEREFORE, FACED WITH THE PROBABILITY THAT EVEN IF WE CAN  
ARRANGE TO HAVE [REDACTED] LIFTED TO A POINT CLOSER THAT  
TAY NINH CITY, SUBSEQUENT DIALOGUE AND ARRANGEMENTS WILL AT  
BEST BE CUMBERSOME, TEDIOUS AND TIME CONSUMING. IN SHORT, QUICK  
REACTION BY OUR SIDE AND THE OTHER WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IN  
THIS CONTEXT.

4. RE SUBJECT OF RESPONDING TO BROADER POLITICAL QUESTIONS

PAGE 3 SAIGON 526 ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED]  
RAISED [REDACTED] AS YOU KNOW PRESIDENT THIEU RESERVES TO  
HIMSELF A KEY ROLE IN DECIDING ON WHAT WILL BE SAID IN OUR JOINT  
RESPONSE. HIS POSITION IN THIS MATTER PROMISES TO BE ONE OF GREAT  
RESTRAINING, DISTRUST, AND CYNICISM; THEREFORE, I PLAN ON GETTING  
HIS CONCURRENCE IN A RESPONSE [REDACTED] THAT WILL BE BRIEF,  
AVOID GIVING THE OTHER SIDE TOO MUCH OPPORTUNITY FOR THEIR  
FAMOUS AFFINITY TOWARDS POLEMICS WHILE RETTERATING OUR OBJECTIVES  
AND AIMS IN VIETNAM AND ENCOURAGING THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER  
EXCHANGES OF VIEWPOINTS EITHER IN THE ESTABLISHED COVERT CHANNEL  
OR IN PERSONAL MEETINGS AT A LOCALE AGGEEABLE TO ALL CONCERNED.  
I WILL SEPARATELY FORWARD A SUGGESTED RESPONSE, ON THESE  
POLITICAL ASPECTS, THAT MAY BE ACCEPTABLE TO PRESIDENT THIEU  
AND SUBJECT TO YOUR PRIOR CONCURRENCE.

BT

NNNN

MODIS

~~SECRET~~

THERE A FEW SLIGHTLY GARBLED WORDS WHICH I'M SURE U CAN EASILY CORRECT  
TNX

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

10

Tuesday,  
November 7, 1967

*Propile*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Suggested Message to President Marcos

Manila and other areas of the Philippines were heavily damaged over the weekend by Typhoon Welming. Full reports are not in, but it is estimated that several hundred lives were lost. A message of sympathy to President Marcos along the attached lines would be appropriate.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Message approved \_\_\_\_\_

Message disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

WJJ/State 711/7/67



102

SUGGESTED MESSAGE

His Excellency  
Ferdinand E. Marcos  
President of the Republic  
of the Philippines  
Manila

I have been distressed to learn of the heavy damages and tragic loss of lives caused by Typhoon Welming in the Philippines. On behalf of the American people, I send heartfelt sympathy and condolences to you and all those who have suffered from this disaster.

Sincerely,

WORK !!  
Pres file

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Report to the Congress on the Kennedy Round Agreement

At Tab A, for your approval and signature, is a draft Presidential report to the Congress on the Kennedy Round. A copy of the agreement (a bulky volume of tariff schedules) will go along with it. The Trade Expansion Act requires the President to transmit to the Congress "promptly" a copy of each trade agreement entered into under the authority of the Act, together with a statement of his reasons for entering into the agreement.

The report is based on a draft prepared by Bill Roth's people and cleared by his interagency committee. We have gone over the attached version with Bill, who approves. Harry McPherson has also reviewed and contributed to the revision.

The report highlights the results we achieved -- in overall and specific terms -- and the care we exercised in making and seeking trade concessions.

It also states that:

- You expect to issue a proclamation later this year making the reductions in U.S. tariffs effective January 1. (This was agreed in Geneva on the condition that all major countries adopt equivalent procedures. We hope to be able to request your approval to make this announcement by December 1 -- thus giving the usual 30-day notice. By that time we should know what others intend. Some will join us in making the first of the five annual tariff cuts on January 1. Others -- notably the EEC and the UK -- probably will make double cuts covering the first two years on July 1. This would be equivalent to our procedure.)
- You will seek the advice and consent of the Senate on the Grains Arrangement. You authorized us to sign this agreement and we expect to do so on Wednesday, November 8. Bill Roth and John Schnittker do not see much trouble in the Senate, but they plan to check further on timing. The report does not indicate when you would submit the Grains Arrangement to the Senate.)
- You will submit a trade bill to the Congress to make effective the ASP agreement in the Kennedy Round, to revise the Adjustment

Assistance Program, and to provide authority for making further progress in promoting world trade. (No timing indicated.)

The report on the trade negotiations provides concrete evidence of what we could gain from trade expansion and what we could lose from moves toward protectionism. Issuance of the report now would be timely in view of the import quota bills before the Senate Finance Committee.

  
W. W. Rostow

(If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A.)

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

  
ERF:mst




Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with King Hussein--Wednesday, November 8, 5:30 p. m.



3.4(b)(1)

3.4(b)(6)

If you have time, you may want to scan the attached to help set the stage. Because of the fast-changing situation, Secretary Rusk will give you his final memo in the morning and can discuss your tack at lunch.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAL 00-27/  
By its NARA, Date 10-10-02

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

12a

TALKING POINTS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-476

By ip, NARA, Date 1-10-95

What Hussein Wants

Hussein comes here worried, and with a sense of grievance.

He is willing to negotiate with the Israeli, but not without the cover of a UN resolution. He believes he has helped prepare the way for such a resolution -- first by obtaining a moderate Arab position at the Khartoum summit, then by promoting a text drawn from the US five points and the US-Soviet agreement. Now, he feels, we are upping the ante in New York and backing off, as the Israeli position has become harder. This -- combined with our failure to reinstate the military aid program -- leads him to question whether the US is still interested in Jordan and in a political settlement. He has been to Moscow to get Soviet backing for a settlement, and received there offers of economic and military aid. Hussein is coming to Washington not only seeking reassurance, but to make a new calculation of how far he can depend on the United States. In specific, Hussein will want to know:

-- What kind of a resolution do we want in New York and what are we willing to do to get it?

-- What is our position on Jerusalem and the West Bank, and what are we willing to do to back it up?

-- How do we see the future of US/Jordan relations?

Do we still have an interest in a moderate Jordan, and if so, what are our intentions on military and economic aid?

What We Want

We have made a new calculation of what the Jordanian connection is worth. In essence Hussein is valuable to us because of the -- possibly indispensable -- role he can play in

~~SECRET - EXDIS~~

1.3  
(u)(5) starting and sustaining negotiations for a general political settlement between Israel and its neighbors. [redacted]

[redacted] If he fails to survive, or turns away from us towards Moscow, our prestige in the area -- and the confidence of other moderate regimes in us -- will suffer. The balance of power in the Arab world would shift sharply away from moderation. Given the existing limits to our access in the area, the loss would be serious.

Our objective in these talks is to keep Hussein on course towards a UN resolution and direct or indirect negotiations with Israel. Because of attitudes in Congress on arms and the AID budget problem, we have nothing tangible to offer him now as evidence of support. (Indeed, we will have to tell him we are altering the nature of our economic support.) But we must convince him that we want a settlement equitable to both sides, and are willing to use our influence to get it. In order to do so, we must first make certain that he has no misconceptions of what we are up to in New York. We must also explain more definitely than so far what our position is regarding his territorial problems. And we must reaffirm that despite our difficulties we wish to continue our close and friendly relationship with Jordan.

Hussein will be skeptical. Since we have only assertions and not action to offer him, our success will depend on how convinced he is that we will act on those assertions to obtain a balanced settlement. If he is not convinced, the immediate danger is that Hussein will conclude that there is no future in negotiation. If Jordan gives up, no Arab country is likely to pursue negotiations. The delay -- given the Israelization of Jerusalem -- would be very damaging.

#### Consequences of Failure to Reach a Settlement

1.3  
(u)(5) You should know that the Israeli evaluation of Hussein does not jibe with ours. [redacted]



1.3  
(a)(5)

[REDACTED] Their motive may be to make sure Hussein comes to the bargaining table alone; or their view may reflect a much diminished interest in negotiations. Manifestly they do not want continued close US/Jordan relations. We shall have to have this out with the Israelis.

Whatever the chances of settlement -- and as of now it is hard to be sanguine -- failure would be costly to us. Arab/Israeli tension would heighten, terrorism increase, the arms race accelerate, as both sides prepared for a new round. The United States could not stand aside, and probably could not avoid closer identification with Israel. The long-term risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union would grow.

### Talking Points

1. We both want to create conditions in which negotiations can start. Your efforts at Khartoum and afterwards have made an important contribution. For our part we have taken the lead in New York in working for a UN resolution. We have also tried to protect an environment favorable to negotiation by intervention on both sides in such questions as the movement of refugees, the terrorist problem, the opening of banks. We interceded strongly with Foreign Minister Eban of Israel on these problems two weeks ago.

2. Hope your talks with Arthur Goldberg have cleared up any misunderstanding on what our intentions are in New York.

3. We hope for quick action on a resolution. We agree with you that time is not on the side of a peaceful settlement. We understand your need for a Security Council resolution before undertaking negotiations.

When you are ready to negotiate either directly or indirectly, we are prepared to put our weight behind an equitable solution. We have no precise blueprint for a settlement.

But we do believe that it should involve the return of the West Bank to Jordan. In order to obtain this the West Bank would probably have to be demilitarized. Territorial adjustments would have to be made around boundary lines as they stood before the war. The boundaries must be permanent.

Jerusalem is tougher for a variety of reasons including our historical position with which you are familiar. As we have stated publicly, we do not accept Israel's unilateral action. We are prepared to use our influence to see what arrangements can be worked out. We believe Jerusalem should be a city with free access to all and that the interests of the three great religions and the interest of the inhabitants must be protected. It may be that these objectives could best be achieved through some form of international or other status involving participation of Jordan. But we do not exclude the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Jordan that would meet Jordan's political, economic and religious interests. In the context of peace, we can envision Jerusalem becoming the focus of a new and profitable relationship between the economies of Jordan and Israel. These might include bilateral trade, increased tourism across newly opened borders, duty-free access by Jordan to the Mediterranean, improved use of the Jordan waters.

4. You will appreciate that we cannot speak for the Israelis nor do we have unlimited influence over them. What we have said reflects our thinking alone.

5. We are seriously disturbed by the arms race in the Middle East. Congress is concerned about our general arms policy as well as that for the Middle East area. We have tried to find a formula for curbing the arms race and accordingly refrained from June until October from supplying arms to the area. Unfortunately our hands were forced by a heavy Soviet arms influx. As we are concerned with an arms balance in the area, we accordingly had to sell arms to Israel. We recognize Jordan's legitimate requirements for some arms and sincerely regret that strong feelings in Congress make it difficult for

us to carry out a military assistance program for Jordan in the absence of negotiations for a settlement. With a settlement we should be able to provide reasonable quantities of arms. However, given Congressional sentiment on this question and the serious trouble we are having in getting a foreign aid bill out of the Congress, we cannot resume any arms supply to Jordan at this particular time. We would hope that favorable developments looking towards a settlement might permit us to resume some shipments of military equipment other than major combat items in the fairly near future. In the interim we are prepared to support certain of Jordan's arms requests from Western European suppliers.

6. We do appreciate your situation and ask your patience a while longer. I think you know the temper of this country. There is much unhappiness about the events of June 5. I believe we can overcome these difficulties. I am sure I am telling you nothing you do not already know when I say that a decision of Jordan to obtain arms in the Soviet Union would make close US/Jordan cooperation of the sort we have enjoyed much more difficult.

7. Although we understand you do not wish to discuss economic matters, we do want to assure you of our continued active interest in Jordan's economic development and viability. We want to continue to participate in your development effort. I want you also to know that we are discussing ways of helping you get the Potash project under way as soon as possible. The nature of our assistance must, however, reflect your mounting reserves of foreign exchange, the sizeable contributions from other Arab states and our own stringent budgetary situation. We would like to discuss these matters with your Government.

8. I know you share our continuing concern at the possibility of an outbreak of fighting as a result of terroristic activity. We commend your wisdom in trying to convince other Arab states of the folly in using this tactic. We know you



will continue to do everything you can to control infiltration from Jordan. We on our side have been pressing restraint on the Israelis and emphasized the dangers of retaliation. We are nonetheless worried by the consequences, should the Syrians persist in using this weapon.

9. We agree that a solution to the refugee problem is essential to a permanent settlement. We have been actively studying the problem and are prepared to devote substantial resources to a settlement of the problem. A final solution would probably involve some repatriation, resettlement and compensation. We would be interested in hearing any ideas which the King might suggest for best dealing with the refugee problem, including interim measures which might be taken to provide dignity and a sense of self-sufficiency to the refugees even in advance of a settlement of the overall problem.

M:TOEnders/NEA:ARN:RHoughton  
11/5/67

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached is a draft Presidential statement announcing the U. S. has signed the International Grains Arrangement and that we will be sending it, as an International Treaty, to the Senate for its advice and consent. (No timing indicated for submission to the Senate.) John Schnittker, as acting Secretary of Agriculture, is tentatively scheduled to sign the Arrangement tomorrow at 4:00 p. m.

The statement points up the benefits the agreement will bring to our farmers as well as to the developing nations. I recommend you authorize us to issue it as a Presidential announcement. Roth and Schnittker concur.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

No (issue as Agriculture statement) \_\_\_\_\_

*ERF*  
ERF:em

13a

PRESIDENTIAL DRAFT STATEMENT  
ON THE SIGNING OF THE INTERNATIONAL GRAINS ARRANGEMENT

I am pleased to announce that Acting Secretary of Agriculture John Schnittker has today signed the new International Grains Arrangement on behalf of the United States Government. We will be submitting it to the United States Senate for its advice and consent.

When ratified by participating governments, the new Arrangement will go into effect July 1, 1968, replacing the International Wheat Agreement. Its duration will be three years.

This new Arrangement, an outgrowth of the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, contains two major provisions:

First, it establishes new minimum prices in world trade for 14 major wheats. For U.S. wheats, the new minimums are generally about 23 cents a bushel higher than under the old International Wheat Agreement.

Second, it establishes a new program under which developed wheat exporting and importing nations will provide 4.5 million tons of food grain or cash equivalent annually to less developed countries -- the first time this has ever been done on a regular and continuing basis.

The new Arrangement thus will provide new price insurance to U.S. wheat farmers and at the same time will bring other wheat exporting and importing nations into partnership with us in helping the developing nations of the world meet the urgent food needs of their growing populations while they expand their own food production.

(Highlights of the new Arrangement are attached.)



## HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERNATIONAL GRAINS ARRANGEMENT

There are two parts to the new Arrangement -- the Wheat Trade Convention and the Food Aid Convention. The former provides new and improved procedures for stabilizing world wheat prices, building on the administrative and institutional structure of the International Wheat Agreement. The Food Aid Convention provides for a \$5.5 million ton program of food grains aid to less developed countries.

Major wheat trading countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Economic Community negotiated the basic pricing and food aid provisions of the new Arrangement during the Kennedy Round in May of this year. Representatives from 52 countries then met at the International Wheat Conference in Rome, July 12 to August 18, 1967, and developed the text of the International Grains Arrangement, opening the results of the Kennedy Round grain negotiations to the widest possible participation.

### Wheat Trade Convention

The Wheat Trade Convention sets minimum and maximum prices for 14 major wheats moving in world trade. Minimum prices for other wheats may be established as the need arises by the Prices Review Committee, a new body which has the responsibility to make sure the objectives of the Convention relating to price are carried out. For U.S. wheats, the minimum prices are generally about 23 cents a bushel higher than in the old Agreement.

Procedures to be followed when prices reach minimum or maximum levels are also detailed in the Convention. It is recognized that an exporting country may offer its wheat at competitive prices even though such prices might be below the minimum levels specified in the Arrangement, if consultative procedures have failed to find a basis for maintaining prices above established minimum levels.

A section on guidelines for concessional transactions included in the Wheat Trade Convention reaffirms and strengthens the previously recognized principle that grains transactions made on concessional terms should avoid harmful interference with normal patterns of production and commercial trade.

#### Food Aid Convention

The Food Aid Convention commits developed countries, importers and exporters alike, to a 4.5 million ton annual program of food aid to developing countries. 4.2 million tons have been subscribed.

The United States will supply 42 percent -- about 1.9 million tons; the European Common Market, 23 percent -- about 1.0 million tons; Canada, 11 percent; Australia, the U. K., and Japan, each 5 percent; with other countries contributing smaller amounts. Contributions can be in the form of wheat, coarse grains suitable for human consumption, or the cash equivalent. Contributing countries may specify the recipients of their donations, or they may channel them through an international organization such as the World Food Program of the United Nations.

A Food Aid Committee, consisting of representatives of the contributing countries, will be established. Its primary function will be to review the overall functioning of the Convention, and especially its effects on food production in the recipient countries.

The International Wheat Council and its Secretariat will continue to perform essentially the same functions under the new International Grains Arrangement as they performed previously under the International Wheat Agreement.



~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 6, 1967  
6:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that you may wish to take the occasion of November 10-11 to visit Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps installations.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

14  
*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24  
By *rg*, NARA, Date *11-19-91*

~~SECRET~~

14a



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

6 November 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Saturday, 11 November, is Veterans Day which is traditionally dedicated to the commemoration of those men and women who have served in the defense of this country. The preceding day, 10 November, is the 192d Anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Corps.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest that it would be especially fitting on this occasion for the Commander-in-Chief to participate with the Armed Forces in the commemoration of these events by visiting with representative units of men and women of the Armed Forces who are serving in the defense of freedom. They believe that such visits would highlight your deep dedication to the cause of freedom, and it would provide renewed inspiration to members of the Armed Forces by demonstrating the interest of this Nation in them.

In the hope that you may find time in your crowded schedule to accommodate the above proposal, attached hereto is a suggested itinerary for visits to units and installations of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

With all good wishes and deep respect.

Sincerely,

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

Regraded Unclassified  
when separated from  
Classified information

~~SECRET~~

146

# SPECIFIC ITINERARY

(All Times Local)

10 November 1967

<u>Departure</u>		<u>Arrival</u>	
<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
Andrews AFB, Md.	0830	Ft. Benning, Ga.	1010
Ft. Benning, Ga.	1110	<i>Marine Corps Air Station</i> (MCAS), El Toro, Calif.	1220
MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1245	Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1310
Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1500	<i>Naval Air Station</i> (NAS) North Island, San Diego, Calif. (to board USS ENTERPRISE)	1530
San Diego, Calif. (aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	1615	(Remain overnight aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	
11 November 1967			
NAS North Island, Calif. (Depart USS ENTERPRISE 0830)	0900	McConnell AFB, Kan.	1255
McConnell AFB, Kan.	1355		

- Tab A - Ft. Benning Schedule of Events
- Tab B - MCAS, El Toro/Camp Pendleton Schedule of Events
- Tab C - NAS North Island/USS ENTERPRISE Schedule of Events
- Tab D - McConnell AFB Schedule of Events

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By rg, NARA, Date 11-19-91



~~SECRET~~

14c

TAB A

VISIT TO FT. BENNING, GEORGIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. The President will be at Ft. Benning for one hour, during which he will attend an honor guard ceremony and present a short address at Doughboy Stadium. The audience will consist mainly of soldiers and dependents associated with the following activities:

The Infantry School, to include Officer Career Courses, Officer Candidate School, Noncommissioned Officer School.

Infantry Training Center.

Tactical Units.

*Continental United States*

2. Ft. Benning is closely associated with the Army effort in Vietnam. Officers, Officer Candidates, and enlisted men receive training here in preparation for their combat assignments. It has also served as the CONUS station for tactical units preparing for deployment. Many Army dependents reside in the local area while their soldier husbands are in Vietnam. There will probably be some civilian attendance from Columbus, Georgia.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1010	Arrive by Air Force One at Lawson Army Airfield.
1015	Depart Lawson Army Airfield by motor for Doughboy Stadium (capacity about 10,000 people).
1025	Arrive Doughboy Stadium. Honor Guard Ceremony. Address by President Johnson.
1055	Depart by motor for Lawson Army Airfield.
1105	Arrive Lawson Army Airfield.
1110	Depart Lawson Army Airfield on Air Force One for MCAS, El Toro, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

*Group 4*

By

*pg*

NARA, Date

*11-19-91*

GROUP 4
Declassified at 3 year
Tab A
after 12 years



~~SECRET~~

TAB B

14d

VISIT TO MCAS, EL TORO, CALIFORNIA, AND  
CAMP JOSEPH H. PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. At MCAS, El Toro, visit with Marines and their families present at the airstrip as desired by the President.

2. At Camp Pendleton meet Commanding General and participate in US Marine Corps Birthday ceremony, preliminaries of which commence at 1300. Ceremony includes pageant of USMC history, massed colors of Marine Corps Base and 5th Marine Division, and traditional cake cutting. President will participate in cake cutting and speak at that time. There will be at least 15,000 people present; the majority will be Marines and their families. There will also be local citizenry in attendance. The Marines present will be primarily RVN returnees or Marines preparing to go to RVN as replacements. The concept of this ceremony is not only to commemorate the birth of the Corps, but that the officers and NCOs present this ceremony on the occasion of the Marine Corps Birthday for the enlisted Marines. After President speaks at ceremony, he will go to USNH, Camp Pendleton, to visit with patients.


Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1220	Arrive MCAS, El Toro, California.
1225 - 1240	Visit with Marines and their families at airstrip.
1245 - 1310	Enroute El Toro/Camp Pendleton via helo.
1310	Arrive Camp Pendleton via helo from El Toro.
1315 - 1420	Participate in and speak at ceremony.
1420 - 1430	Enroute USNH, Camp Pendleton.
1430 - 1500	Visit Hospital.
1500	Depart via helo for San Diego, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By sg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~  
TAB C

14e

VISIT TO NAS NORTH ISLAND (SAN DIEGO)/  
USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

10-11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

The President will be aboard NAS North Island (air station and pierside) for forty minutes during which time honors will be accorded and where he will be afforded the opportunity to speak to assembled Service personnel and their families. Disembarking from helo at NAS North Island he will travel via auto to pierside of USS ENTERPRISE. After speaking to personnel, board USS ENTERPRISE getting underway immediately for the Southern California operations area to conduct carrier flight operations (day and night). The President remains overnight with USS ENTERPRISE returning to dockside, NAS North Island Saturday morning.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

1530	Arrive NAS North Island.
1535	Depart via auto for dockside USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65).
1540	Speak to assembled Service personnel and families.
1610	Board USS ENTERPRISE.
1615	USS ENTERPRISE underway for Southern California operations area;
1715	USS ENTERPRISE conduct flight operations (day and night). President remains overnight.
11 November 1967	
0830	USS ENTERPRISE docks NAS North Island pier.
0850	President disembarks USS ENTERPRISE for Air Force One.
0900	Air Force One departs NAS North Island.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By kg, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab C

~~SECRET~~

14 F

TAB D

VISIT TO MCCONNELL AFB, KANSAS

11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

During the Presidential visit to McConnell AFB on 11 November 1967, it is anticipated that he will give a speech, present awards, and view a fly over.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1255	Touch down McConnell AFB, Kansas.
1255 - 1300	Taxi and offload.
1300 - 1305	Host and Guests.
1305 - 1317	Speech.
1317 - 1332	Award Presentation.
1332 - 1335	Fly over.
1335 - 1345	Shake hands with crowd.
1345 - 1353	Board aircraft and taxi.
1355	Take off.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By ry, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab D



~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 6, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

At the time you gave your instruction to Gen. Johnson to produce a plan for South Vietnam, I asked Bob Ginsburgh to do one on his own. He came up with the attached 10-point program.

As he notes, they are all listed somewhere in the "Blueprint" for Vietnam. The problem, as always, is to get top level concentrated attention in the field on programs which are now moving slowly and which ought to move faster.

That, in turn, requires a short list -- shorter than ten.

I have marked with yellow pen the 4 items (2, 4, 7 and 9) which, from a distance, seem most important to me. (For example, nothing could accelerate the breakdown of the Viet Cong more than success in "coordinated attack on VC infrastructure." But I know for certain that this program is going slowly. I am having a Situation Room meeting this week on it to see what can be done.)

Once we work out such a short list, we then must hold our top-level people accountable for moving it and regularly reporting progress.

That is the kind of result I should like to see from Bunker and Westmoreland's visit in Washington.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 86-166  
By ref, NARA, Date 1-26-88

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

Herewith is my ten-point program of military measures to accelerate progress of the war:

1. Stress neutralization of priority enemy base areas.
2. Coordinated attack on VC infrastructure.
3. Expand area and scale of covert operations in Laos.
4. Increased use of ARVN in integrated operations with U.S.
5. Commit additional ARVN units to support pacification.
6. Furnish additional U.S. advisors to RF and PF.
7. Concept of active area security for RD rather than static defense --  
emphatic ARVN search and destroy against VC provincial battalions.
8. Give operational control of all pacification forces in the province to province chief.
9. Supplement RD team effort with locally formed and trained civil/military teams.
10. Stress opening and securing of LOCs, especially railroad and waterways.

All of the above, plus others, are included in the Blueprint for Vietnam. These ten may deserve special emphasis. In general, they can be pursued within existing or approved resources. Emphasis on these measures should result in an accelerated but unspectacular rate of progress.

If a more spectacular rate of progress were to be achieved, some combination of the following would be necessary.

- Authorize bombing of all targets on JCS recommended list, expand armed reconnaissance, mine inland waterways north of 20 degrees -- this is only a difference in degree rather than in kind from what we are already doing.
- Mount a shallow amphibious envelopment to trap NVN troops just north of the DMZ -- probably not feasible until next summer, if then.
- Mine the ports -- probably effective, possibly risky.

- Conduct operations to destroy enemy bases in Cambodia -- worth considering if political pressure is ineffective -- and after amphibious entrapment above DMZ.

- Mobilize to demonstrate will and to provide additional troops -- untimely in view of very recent decision not to mobilize.

- Bomb dikes in order to flood Red River delta -- could be very effective -- but I can't see how the U.S. would go about rationalizing such a major policy change.

- Create wasteland with low yield nuclear weapons in southern part of NVN -- virtually unthinkable.

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

~~SECRET/CODEWORD~~

Monday, November 6, 1967  
1:30 p.m.

*Free file*

Mr. President:

The attached report indicates we  
may expect increased North Vietnamese  
pressure:

- in the Western highlands;
- at the DMZ.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 09330  
By is NARA, Date 4-30-00

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

16a

Thursday, October 26, 1967

## TEXT OF NSA REPORT

Future aggressive operations by large Vietnamese Communist main force units throughout South Vietnam are probably being planned -- possibly for the forthcoming dry season. This is evidenced in SIGINT by the augmentation of main force units -- indicated by the introduction of numerous possible groups of infiltrated replacement personnel since early 1967 -- and by instances of reorganization of the existing military structure -- including possible resubordination of the PAVN 88th Regiment from a minor PAVN Headquarters in the Second Corps to a Viet Cong division operating in the Third Corps.

The Vietnamese Communist Rear Service apparatus in Military Region 5 has also been significantly expanded since late 1966, a development which may be attributed to increased support requirements for the growing main force structure operating in the area.

## DETAILS

SIGINT indicates that Vietnamese Communist military forces in South Vietnam are continuing to be augmented by main force units infiltrated from North Vietnam. The most recent indications of the continued infiltration of main force units is the appearance of the PAVN 31st Regiment on PAVN High Command communications serving elements in South Vietnam since early October -- indicating that this regiment too may be in the process of infiltrating to South Vietnam. In other recent activity the Viet Cong 5th LID operating in the Military Region 1/10 area has been augmented by a regiment of the PAVN B3 Front -- the possible PAVN 88th Regiment -- while a realignment of PAVN B3 Front entities appears to be in progress in the western highlands. Vietnamese Communist activity in east-central Quang Ngai Province indicates that this area may be the target of imminent offensive operations.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-272  
By ctm, NARA, Date 3-17-03



Thursday, October 26, 1967

## TEXT OF NSA REPORT

Renewed North Vietnamese Army interest in the Con Thien area has been reflected in SIGINT. The phase of increased tactical activity by North Vietnamese units which was initiated on September 1 and ended sometime in early October has apparently been resumed. Since approximately October 18, increased reconnaissance by artillery as well as North Vietnamese Army ground force units has been noted, indicating an impending resumption of tactical activity in the Con Thien area.

Indications are that the 31st Regiment, PAVN 341st Division is preparing to deploy, possibly out-of-country, from its southern Ha Tinh Province locations.

## BACKGROUND

Since mid-October, North Vietnamese Army artillery units operating in the DMZ area have been noted in increased reconnaissance activity and have also been involved in apparent repositioning activity. The North Vietnamese Army 90th Regiment, which had withdrawn from the Con Thien area in late September after sustaining heavy casualties, has again indicated interest in the Con Thien area and areas further west, along Route 9 in the vicinity of Camp Carroll. Since October 8 the North Vietnamese Army 31st Regiment has been exchanging messages with Headquarters, Military Region 4, Vinh, utilizing a communications system which, in the past, has been indicative of out-of-country deployment. In addition, the regiment has been communicating with PAVN High Command on a communications group which serves Vietnamese Communist units operating in South Vietnam and adjacent border areas.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 00-272  
By CDM, NARA, Date 3-17-03

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 6, 1967  
11:30 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler proposes  
an itinerary for November 10-11.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 11-19-91



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

17a

CM-2736-67  
6 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed Itinerary, 10 and 11 November 1967

Reference is made to our conversation of 4 November in which you expressed your desire to highlight the part which is being played by the Armed Forces in the defense of freedom in Southeast Asia by visiting military units and installations in CONUS over the Veterans Day weekend.

Generally, it is proposed that you visit Fort Benning, Georgia; Camp Pendleton, California; and USS ENTERPRISE, San Diego, California, on 10 November. Following an overnight stay on USS ENTERPRISE, you would proceed to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; and the Coast Guard installation, Yorktown, Virginia, on 11 November.

Attached is a recommended specific itinerary for you with supporting schedules of events for each stop. The itinerary follows the guidance outlined during our conversation and has been discussed for suitability with Colonel Cross. The general parameters of the visit to the Coast Guard installation have been discussed with Admiral Smith, Commandant US Coast Guard. Details of the schedule of events at the Coast Guard installation are being arranged separately between the US Coast Guard and Colonel Cross.

A copy of this memorandum has been provided to Secretary McNamara.

*Earle G. Wheeler*

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment  
a/s

~~SECRET~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E.O. 12958  
SEC. 1.1(c)

BY RG ON 11-19-7

SPECIFIC ITINERARY

(All Times Local)

10 November 1967

<u>Departure</u>		<u>Arrival</u>	
<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
Andrews AFB, Md.	0830	Ft. Benning, Ga.	1010
Ft. Benning, Ga.	1110	MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1220
MCAS, El Toro, Calif.	1245	Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1310
Camp Pendleton, Calif.	1500	NAS North Island, San Diego, Calif. (to board USS ENTERPRISE)	1530
San Diego, Calif. (aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	1615	(Remain overnight aboard USS ENTERPRISE)	

11 November 1967

NAS North Island, Calif. (Depart USS ENTERPRISE 0830)	0900	McConnell AFB, Kan.	1255
McConnell AFB, Kan.	1355	Patrick Henry Airport, Va.	1715
Patrick Henry Airport, Va.	1730	Coast Guard Base, Yorktown, Va.	1800
Coast Guard Base, Yorktown, Va.	1830	Williamsburg, Va.	1900

- Tab A - Ft. Benning Schedule of Events
- Tab B - MCAS, El Toro/Camp Pendleton Schedule of Events
- Tab C - NAS North Island/USS ENTERPRISE Schedule of Events
- Tab D - McConnell AFB Schedule of Events

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

By 18, NARA, Date 11-19-91



~~SECRET~~

17c

TAB A

VISIT TO FT. BENNING, GEORGIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. The President will be at Ft. Benning for one hour, during which he will attend an honor guard ceremony and present a short address at Doughboy Stadium. The audience will consist mainly of soldiers and dependents associated with the following activities:

The Infantry School, to include Officer Career Courses, Officer Candidate School, Noncommissioned Officer School.

Infantry Training Center.

Tactical Units.

2. Ft. Benning is closely associated with the Army effort in Vietnam. Officers, Officer Candidates, and enlisted men receive training here in preparation for their combat assignments. It has also served as the CONUS station for tactical units preparing for deployment. Many Army dependents reside in the local area while their soldier husbands are in Vietnam. There will probably be some civilian attendance from Columbus, Georgia.


Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1010	Arrive by Air Force One at Lawson Army Airfield.
1015	Depart Lawson Army Airfield by motor for Doughboy Stadium (capacity about 10,000 people).
1025	Arrive Doughboy Stadium. Honor Guard Ceremony. Address by President Johnson.
1055	Depart by motor for Lawson Army Airfield.
1105	Arrive Lawson Army Airfield.
1110	Depart Lawson Army Airfield on Air Force One for MCAS, El Toro, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Thompson

By ry, NARA, Date 11/19/91



17d

~~SECRET~~  
TAB B

VISIT TO MCAS, EL TORO, CALIFORNIA, AND  
CAMP JOSEPH H. PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA

10 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

1. At MCAS, El Toro, visit with Marines and their families present at the airstrip as desired by the President.


2. At Camp Pendleton meet Commanding General and participate in US Marine Corps Birthday ceremony, preliminaries of which commence at 1300. Ceremony includes pageant of USMC history, massed colors of Marine Corps Base and 5th Marine Division, and traditional cake cutting. President will participate in cake cutting and speak at that time. There will be at least 15,000 people present; the majority will be Marines and their families. There will also be local citizenry in attendance. The Marines present will be primarily RVN returnees or Marines preparing to go to RVN as replacements. The concept of this ceremony is not only to commemorate the birth of the Corps, but that the officers and NCOs present this ceremony on the occasion of the Marine Corps Birthday for the enlisted Marines. After President speaks at ceremony, he will go to USNH, Camp Pendleton, to visit with patients.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1220	Arrive MCAS, El Toro, California.
1225 - 1240	Visit with Marines and their families at airstrip.
1245 - 1310	Enroute El Toro/Camp Pendleton via helo.
1310	Arrive Camp Pendleton via helo from El Toro.
1315 - 1420	Participate in and speak at ceremony.
1420 - 1430	Enroute USNH, Camp Pendleton.
1430 - 1500	Visit Hospital.
1500	Depart via helo for San Diego, California.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4  
By 13, NARA, Date 11-19-91





VISIT TO NAS NORTH ISLAND (SAN DIEGO)/  
USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65)

10-11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

The President will be aboard NAS North Island (air station and pierside) for forty minutes during which time honors will be accorded and where he will be afforded the opportunity to speak to assembled Service personnel and their families. Disembarking from helo at NAS North Island he will travel via auto to pierside of USS ENTERPRISE. After speaking to personnel, board USS ENTERPRISE getting underway immediately for the Southern California operations area to conduct carrier flight operations (day and night). The President remains overnight with USS ENTERPRISE returning to dockside NAS North Island Saturday morning.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

1530	Arrive NAS North Island.
1535	Depart via auto for dockside USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65).
1540	Speak to assembled Service personnel and families.
1610	Board USS ENTERPRISE.
1615	USS ENTERPRISE underway for Southern California operations area.
1715	USS ENTERPRISE conduct flight operations (day and night). President remains overnight.
11 November 1967	
0830	USS ENTERPRISE docks NAS North Island pier.
0850	President disembarks USS ENTERPRISE for Air Force One.
0900	Air Force One departs NAS North Island.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

*Group 4*

By

*15*

NARA, Date

1179-41

Tab C

~~SECRET~~

17f

TAB D

VISIT TO MCCONNELL AFB, KANSAS

11 November 1967

Scope of Activity.

During the Presidential visit to McConnell AFB on 11 November 1967, it is anticipated that he will give a speech, present awards, and view a fly over.

Detailed Schedule. (All Times Local)

<u>Time</u>	<u>Activity</u>
1255	Touch down McConnell AFB, Kansas.
1255 - 1300	Taxi and offload.
1300 - 1305	Host and Guests.
1305 - 1317	Speech.
1317 - 1332	Award Presentation.
1332 - 1335	Fly over.
1335 - 1345	Shake hands with crowd.
1345 - 1353	Board aircraft and taxi.
1355	Take off for Patrick Henry Airport, Virginia.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 1

By ss, NARA, Date 11-19-91

Tab D



~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP/SENSITIVE

Monday, November 6, 1967 -- 7:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is a summary of the attached.

Thieu, on being fully briefed, reacted positively but with caution and sensitivity to the political dangers.

He feels the National Liberation Front is "not serious" in their stated willingness to move on to "establishing the basis for resolving greater matters" after working out the prisoner exchange, but also feels that it is too important a possibility to ignore and, therefore, there is an overriding consideration for us to "test" their sincerity by our making the next move and observing their response to it." Thieu designated General Loan as his action officer on the prisoner of war aspects of the case, but reserved specifically to himself the substantive political aspects of the case. Thieu believes that we should not initially release too many of the prisoners held by our side, in order to retain some bargaining power for later stages of discussion with the NLF, and should also consider specifying exactly which U.S. or Vietnamese prisoners we would like the NLF to release. Thieu stressed that it could be an extremely serious political problem to the Government of Vietnam if the NLF, after releasing some American prisoners, were to propagandize that the release was a result of United States Government liaison with the National Liberation Front as a political entity, and that precautions should be taken to insure secrecy of this undertaking on prisoner exchange.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 499

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NUJ 94-475  
By Wip, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



182  
~~SECRET~~

NODIS

RECEIVED  
WHCA

DLA642 .....  
OO YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 240 3101135  
O 061132Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ 061016Z [REDACTED] SECTION 1 OF 2

NODIS [REDACTED]

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 499

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR ROSTOW  
SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK  
SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA  
DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

1. SUMMARY: [REDACTED] MET WITH PRESIDENT THIEU LATE  
AFTERNOON 5 NOVEMBER FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION OF [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] FOLLOWING AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S TALK WITH THIEU ON SAME  
GENERAL SUBJECT ON 4 NOVEMBER. [REDACTED] REVIEWED THE  
HISTORY OF THE CASE FOR THIEU, AND SUMMARIZED WHAT THE NLF HAS  
REQUESTED AS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER STEPS  
BY THE NLF. THIEU STATED THAT HE FEELS WE MUST RESPOND TO THI S  
OVERTURE FROM THE NLF, BUT SHOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY AND NOT  
OVER-REACT TO THE NLF MESSAGE. THIEU COMMENTED THAT HE FEELS  
NLF IS "NOT SERIOUS" IN THEIR STATED WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON TO  
"ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR RESOLVING GR EATER MATTERS" AFTER  
WORKING OUT THE PRISONER EXCHANGE, BUT ALSO FEELS THAT IT IS TOO

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 94-476 Appeal  
By Sj NARA, Date 4-23-04



IMPORTANT A POSSIBL ITY TO IGNORE AND THEREFORE THERE IS AN  
OVERR, IDING CONSIDERATION FOR US TO "TEST" THEIR SINCERITY BY OUR  
MAKING THE NEXT MOVE AND OBSERVING THEIR RESPONSE TO IT. THIEU  
DESIGNATED GENERAL LOAN AS HIS ACTION OFFICER ON THE POW ASPECTS  
OF THE CASE, APPROVED [REDACTED] BRIEFING LOAN ON THE 19  
OCTOBER MESSAGE [REDACTED] AND WORKING JOINTLY WITH LOAN  
TO ASCERTAIN THE BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND IMPORTANCE OF EACH  
PRISONER THE NLF HAS ASKED BE RELEASED, BUT RESERVED SPECIFICALLY  
TO HIMSELF THE SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE. THIEU  
BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD NOT INITIALLY RELEASE TOO MANY OF THE  
PRISONERS HELD BY OUR SIDE IN ORDER TO RETAIN SOME BARGAINING  
POWER FOR LATER STAGES OF DISCUSSION WITH THE NLF, AND SHOULD ALSO  
CONSIDER SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHICH U.S. OR VIETNAMESE  
PRISONERS WE WOULD LIKE THE NLF TO RELEASE. THIEU STRESSED  
THAT IT COULD BE AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEM TO THE GVN  
IF THE NLF, AFTER RELEASING SOME AMERICAN PRISONERS, WERE TO  
PROPAGANDIZE THAT THE RELEASE WAS A RESULT OF UNITED  
STATES GOVERNMENT LIAISON WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT  
AS A POLITICAL ENTITY, AND THAT PRECAUTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN  
TO INSURE SECRECY OF THIS UNDERTAKING ON PRISONER EXCHANGE.

2. [REDACTED] BEGAN THE SESSION WITH THIEU BY REVIEWING  
THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF [REDACTED] BEGINNING WITH THE  
ARREST [REDACTED] AND THE MESSAGE [REDACTED] CARRIED [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] OUR REPLY MESSAGE  
[REDACTED] AND FINALLY THE LATTER'S 19 OCTOBER RETURN  
MESSAGE TO US. THIEU ASKED FOR AND WAS GIVEN A RUNDOWN ON WHAT  
EXA CTLY THE NL F HAS ASKED OUR SIDE TO DO AND WAS TOLD THEY WANT:  
(A) RELEASE OF [REDACTED] AND GUARANTEE OF [REDACTED] SAFE RETURN TO THE  
VC ZONE, (CB) RELEASE OF THE OTHERS ARRESTED [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (CC) GOOD TREATMENT FOR PRISONERS  
HELD BY GVN MENTIONED [REDACTED] LATEST MESSAGE.

3. THIEU WAS THEN SHOWN AND READ OUR OUTGOING MESSAGE TO  
[REDACTED] (IN VIETNAMESE TEXT) AND [REDACTED] 19 OCTOBER  
REPLY (ALSO IN VIETNAMESE TEXT). [REDACTED] POINTED OUT TO  
THIEU THE REFERENCES IN THE 19 OCTOBER MESSAGE OF NLF  
WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON TO "ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR RESOLVING  
GREATER MATTERS," AT WHICH POINT THIEU EXPRESSED HIS DOUBT  
THEY WOULD IN FACT BE WILLING TO DO SO AND LATER COMMENTED ON NLF  
STATEMENTS OF THE CERTAINTY OF U.S. DEFEAT IN VIETNAM AS  
EVIDENCE THEY WOULD NOT BE INTERESTED IN "CONTINUING ON TO  
OTHER, LARGER MATTERS" AFTER A PRISONER EXCHANGE. DURING  
AND AFTER READING THE 19 OCTOBER [REDACTED] MESSAGE THIEU  
REMARKED THAT NLF "CANNOT BE TRUSTED," THAT WE MUST BE WARY



OF THEIR "TRAPS", THAT WE MUST CHECK CAREFULLY TO ASCERTAIN THE DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE TO THE NLF OF THE PRISONERS THEY ARE ASKING TO BE RELEASED, AND SPECULATED ON WHAT GUARANTEE WE WOULD HAVE THAT THE NLF WOULD RELEASE ANY U.S. OR VIETNAMESE PRISONERS IN RESPONSE TO OUR NEXT MOVE. THIEU CONCLUDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE DOUBTS THE NLF ARE "SERIOUS" ABOUT ANYTHING BROADER THAN A PRISONER EXCHANGE FROM WHICH THEY WOULD HOPE TO GAIN THE NET BENEFIT, IT IS NONETHELESS TOO IMPORTANT A MATTER NOT TO "TEST" THE NLF BY OUR TAKING AN APPROPRIATE STEP FORWARD ON THE PRISONER EXCHANGE ASPECT. THIEU COMMENTED THAT WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO RELEASE ALL OF THEIR IMPORTANT (TO THEM) PRISONERS AT THE OUTSET AND LEAVE US NO MATERIAL TO BARGAIN WITH LATER, PARTICULARLY UNTIL WE OBSERVE THE RECIPROCAL ACTION THE NLF TAKES IN ACTUALLY RELEASING OR NOT RELEASING U.S. AND VIETNAMESE PRISONERS. AT THIS POINT THIEU SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD SPECIFY WHICH PRISONERS WE WANT THEM TO RELEASE IN RETURN FOR OUR TAKING THE ACTION THEY HAVE REQUESTED ON VIET CONG PRISONERS.

4. THIEU STRESSED THE GRAVITY OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE GVN IF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE TO BECOME AWARE OF A LIAISON BETWEEN THE USG AND THE NLF, AND COMMENTED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NLF RELEASING A NUMBER OF AMERICAN PRISONERS AND THEN PROPAGANDIZING THAT THEIR RELEASE WAS A RESULT OF U.S.G. LIAISON WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT AS A POLITICAL ENTITY. IN ANSWER TO THIEU'S QUERY ON HOW TO INSURE MAXIMUM SECRECY OF THIS UNDERTAKING, [REDACTED] INDICATED THAT WE WERE PLANNING TO SUGGEST THAT PRISONERS NOW HELD BY GVN BE RELEASED UNDER THE GVN 1 NOVEMBER GENERAL AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS WITH NO AMERICAN HAND SHOWING, AND THAT IN THE CASE OF [REDACTED] HIMSELF AND ANY OTHERS WE MIGHT DECIDE TO RELEASE WHO WOULD GO BACK TO THE VC ZONE, THEY WOULD BE PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED WITH GETTING BACK TO THE ZONE AND SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN THIS REGARD. THE POINT WAS ALSO MADE THAT THE NLF COULD, IN ANY CASE AND WITHOUT REGARD TO OUR PRESENT LINK WITH THEM, SIMPLY RELEASE SOME AMERICAN PRISONERS AND THEN FALSELY CLAIM THEIR RELEASE WAS A RESULT

GP-1

900

3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

NODIS

NNNN

19

*Pres file*

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Birthday Message for the King of Laos

Attached is a draft from the State Department of a proposed message from you to the King of Laos on his 60th birthday. You have sent such messages in the past and this one seems particularly desirable because:

- (1) The 60th birthday is a particularly important astrological event for the Lao,
- (2) The Lao Crown Prince will be in the U.S. on the King's birthday.

I recommend you approve the telegram.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:hg

*approve message —*  
*disapproved —*  
*see me —*

Limited Official Use

## SUGGESTED BIRTHDAY MESSAGE TO THE KING OF LAOS

(November 13, 1967)

Your Majesty:

On this particularly auspicious occasion, I extend to you my heartiest congratulations and best wishes. The American people join me in hoping that you will have many happy returns of this day and that the great progress which Laos has experienced under your leadership will be continued. We share and respect the desires of the Lao people for a life of peace and prosperity, and I assure you of our unflagging support for the independence and dignity of your country.

It was our great honor and pleasure last week to welcome to our country Their Royal Highnesses the Crown Prince and Princess, and I deeply appreciate the warm greetings from Your Majesty which the Crown Prince conveyed to me.

Sincerely,

(Lyndon B. Johnson)



CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Consultation with Congressional Leaders on our Handling  
of the Ryukyus and Bonins During the Sato Visit

Ambassador Johnson has now given the Japanese our full position on reversion of the Ryukyus and Bonins, in draft communique language as approved by you.

You will recall that our next contemplated step was consultation with Congressional leaders. Secretary Rusk has requested your approval (attached) for him and Secretary McNamara to arrange consultation with

-- the leadership of both Houses;

and with the chairman and ranking minority members of

-- the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

-- the Senate Armed Services Committee;

-- the House Foreign Affairs Committee;

-- the House Armed Services Committee;

as well as

-- Senator Hayden and Congressman Mahon.

Recommendation:

That you approve prompt Congressional consultations along the proposed lines.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Changes and Additions as Noted \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Mr. Jorden

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVED PER E.O. 12958  
MAR 13 1993

BY *18* ON *12-4-91*

CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

20a

November 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Consultation with Congressional  
Leaders on our Handling of the  
Ryukyus and Bonins during the  
Sato Visit

RECOMMENDATION

Secretary McNamara and I yesterday instructed Ambassador Johnson to put Sato and Miki on notice that we reserved the right to discuss potential nuclear weapons storage in the Bonins during the consultations with the Japanese on reversion of these islands to Japanese Administration. With this notice, Ambassador Johnson has now presented our total position in draft communique language as approved by you. It is of course understood that any communique will be subject to your final approval.

I now recommend that you approve immediate consultations with Congressional leaders on this matter, on the lines set forth below.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Changes and additions as noted \_\_\_\_\_

DISCUSSION

1) Secretary McNamara and I would arrange consultation with the following:

- a) The leadership of both Houses.
- b) The chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
- c) The same for the Senate Armed Services Committee.
- d) The same for the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
- e) The same for the House Armed Services Committee.
- f) Senator Hayden and Congressman Mahon

2) I would expect to report any serious problem at once to you and to give you a full report about the consultations.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk



November 6, 1967

~~Handwritten signature~~  
2. Pres file

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a draft reply to Reuther's letter. I understand that Ambassador Goldberg may speak as early as next Wednesday but the highest probability is that the debate will not begin until early next week.

The statement being drafted for Goldberg is a conservative one calculated to go as far as possible in satisfying the Reuthers and Eichelbergers without needlessly arousing opposition on the Hill. The three principal points of the statement that Goldberg will make as it now exists, I am informed, will be:

1. A recommendation for the establishment of a UN committee on the oceans.
2. A call for greatly expanded international cooperation in the study of the oceans.
3. A reaffirmation of your July 13 statement which will quote your warning about avoiding a neocolonial race to grab the riches of the seas but will not amplify this theme.

I recommend that you sign the attached letter.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_

21<sup>a</sup>

November 6, 1967

Dear Walter:

Thank you for your helpful letter regarding the General Assembly debate on a regime for the bed of the sea.

I share your view of the historic opportunity we have to assure that the resources of the sea will in a practical way become the heritage of all mankind. I think that the statements to be made shortly by Arthur Goldberg, when debate on the Malta resolution is resumed, will prove this Government supports the principles first declared last July at the dedication of the Oceanographer and to which you so kindly refer.

We may not yet know enough about the sea and its mysteries to plan in detail a complete system of international law and administration; but by rallying the United Nations to certain essential basic principles, we can lay the basis on which international law and administration can be developed in the future.

Sincerely,

*LBJ Lyndon B Johnson*

Mr. Walter Reuther  
President  
United Auto Workers  
3000 East Jefferson Avenue  
Detroit, Michigan 48214

LBJ:CEJ:WWRostow:rlh

22

*Pres file*

CONFIDENTIAL

Monday, November 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is an exchange between Westmoreland and Wheeler regarding your conversation with Wheeler of Saturday on the Loc Ninh operation.

Westy feels that the news accounts on the fighting have been reasonably well-balanced, but has been reluctant to comment himself because of the possibility the enemy campaign in this area has not yet concluded. He is quite proud of the showing made by both Vietnamese and U. S. units involved in the fighting at Loc Ninh. His account of the action vividly demonstrates how successful these forces were in defending this outpost.

W. W. Rostow

*P.S. Note Westy's phrase (p.2) marked in red. Sounds almost like Joe Alsop!*

AMcC:jjjs

*W*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1993  
By *leg*, NARA, Date *11-20-91*

CONFIDENTIAL





ABBREVIATED JOINT MESSAGEFORM and/or CONTINUATION SHEET				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	
PRECEDENCE		RELEASED BY		DRAFTED BY	
ACTION <b>IMMEDIATE</b>					
INFO					
<p>thinks that you might wish to make a suitable statement concerning it.</p> <p>3. You should send your reply ASAP, by this channel, to the White House with info copies to Secretary McNamara and to me. In your reply be sure to state whether or not you think the Loc Ninh operation is a suitable vehicle for your comment as to the progress of the war. Warm regards. GP-4.</p> <p>SSO NOTE: Deliver during waking hours. Precedence for transmission only.</p>					
CONTROL NO.		TOR/TOD		INITIALS	
PAGE NO.		NO. OF PAGES		MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION	
2		2			
REGRADING INSTRUCTIONS				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
GP-4				<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	

**DD FORM 173-1**  
1 NOV 63

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 55 WHICH WILL BE USED.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

22b

NOV 1957

O 060256Z ZYH ZFF-1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASHINGTON

ZEM

BOOK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 10547 EYES ONLY

REFERENCES: A. MACV 10518 DTG 050322Z

B. CJCS 9463 DTG 051944Z

1. REFERENCES A & B APPARENTLY CROSSED ON THE WIRES. I ASSUME REF A FULFILLS AT LEAST PART OF THE REQUIREMENT OF REF B. I AM THEREFORE ADDRESSING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS WILL SUFFICE OR OTHERWISE YOU WILL GIVE ME FURTHER GUIDANCE AS TO DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT.
2. IN ANTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE INTEREST IN THE LOC NINH OPERATION, I DISPATCHED REF A, HOWEVER THE CAMPAIGN IN BINH LONG-PHUOC LONG PROVINCES IS NOT YET CONCLUDED. YESTERDAY THE 3D BATTALION OF THE 9TH ARVN INFANTRY AND AN ARVN RANGER BATTALION MADE CONTACT WITH A SIZEABLE ENEMY FORCE NEAR SONG BE AND WE ARE NOW REACTING. I HAVE BEEN LOATHE TO MAKE A PERSONAL COMMENT ON THIS OPERATION FOR TWO REASONS: FIRST, I DID NOT WANT TO RUSH OUT AND MAKE A PERSONAL STATEMENT UNTIL THE CAMPAIGN IN THE AREA HAD CONCLUDED AND, SECONDLY, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT THE NEWS ACCOUNTS HAD BEEN REASONABLY WELL BALANCED FOR A CHANGE AND THAT THESE SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES. IN OTHER WORDS A HARD SELL APPROACH DID NOT SEEM TIMELY.
3. IN SUMMARY, THE LOC NINH ACTIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL; VIETNAMESE UNITS AND ELEMENTS OF THE US 1ST INF DIVISION REACTED RAPIDLY,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By 10 NARA Date 11-20-91



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

2

FOUGHT BRAVELY, AND SHOWED EXCEPTIONAL PROFESSIONALISM. THE CAMPAIGN IN BINH LONG AND PHUOC LONG AREA IS NOT YET OVER SINCE OUR INTELLIGENCE REVEALS THAT TWO ENEMY REGIMENTS, NAMELY THE 88TH AND THE 275TH ARE IN THE VICINITY OF SONG BE AND CONTACT HAS RECENTLY BEEN MADE WITH THEM. THE PRESS HAS COVERED THE SITUATION ADEQUATELY TO DATE.

4. TO SHED FURTHER LIGHT ON THE SITUATION THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL ANALYSIS MAY BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMMANDER OF COSVN (NGUYEN CHI THANH) WAS KILLED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO BY A B52 STRIKE. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT HEV HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A GENERAL THAI WHO SEEMS TO BE UNSURE OF HIMSELF, VACILLATING, AND INCOMPETENT. APPARENTLY THAI RECEIVED ORDERS FROM HANOI ALONG WITH OTHER COMMANDERS TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE, ACHIEVE VICTORY, AND THUS CAPTURE THE HEADLINES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INAUGURATION AND NATIONAL DAY AT WHICH TIME MANY FOREIGN DIGNITARIES WERE IN SAIGON. A PRISONER OF WAR STATES THAT ORDERS WERE RECEIVED TO SEIZE LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN AT ALL COSTS AND THIS EXPLAINS WHY ATTACKS OCCURRED ON THREE CONSECUTIVE DAYS. IT APPEARS THAT AN ATTACK ON SONG BE WAS A PART OF THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE BUT WAS DELAYED PROBABLY BECAUSE OF THE DEFEAT OF THE 88TH NORTH VIETNAMESE REGIMENT BY THE 3D BATTALION OF THE ARVN 9TH INFANTRY ON 27 OCTOBER.

5. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HANOI AS TO A GREAT VICTORY AT LOC NINH. I BELIEVE THIS TO BE DELIBERATE FABRICATION WHICH SUGGESTS TO ME THAT THE ENEMY MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF CONCLUDING THAT HIS MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH IS AN EXERCISE OF FUTILITY.

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

6. (U) I AM ISSUING TO THE PRESS THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS  
I AM SENDING TO LTG KHANG, VIETNAMESE III CORPS COMMANDER, ON  
THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS TROOPS AT LOC NINH. WARM REGARDS."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

6 NOV 1967

22c

O 050322Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND SAIGON

BOOK COPY

TO ADMIRAL SHARP HAWAII

GEN WHEELER JCS

ZEM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MAC 10518 EYES ONLY

SUBJ: ARVN ACTIONS AT SONG BE AND LOC NINH

THE FOLLOWING ACCOUNTS OF THE RECENT ARVN SUCCESSES AT SONG BE AND LOC NINH ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION. I HAVE PROVIDED AMBASSADOR BUNKER WITH THE SAME INFORMATION.

SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON THE MORNING OF FRIDAY, OCTOBER 27TH, FOUR KM SOUTH OF SONG BE, PHOU LONG PROVINCE, THE 88TH NVA REGIMENT ATTACKED THE COMMAND POST OF THE 3D BATTALION, 9TH ARVN INF REGT. THE ATTACK BEGAN WHEN MORE THAN 200 ROUNDS OF MORTAR AND RECOILLESS RIFLE FIRE BEGAN RAINING ON THE TINY VIETNAMESE ARMY INSTALLATION. ABOUT ONE HALF-HOUR AFTER THIS BARRAGE, THREE WAVES OF ATTACKING SOLDIERS FROM THE 88TH REGT LEFT THE COVER OF SURROUNDING JUNGLE AND SWAMP TO RUSH THE OUTPOST. THREE TIMES BEFORE THEY FINALLY GAVE UP, JUST BEFORE DAWN, THE NVA ATTACKERS MADE IT TO THE PERIMETER OF THE OUTPOST. EACH TIME THEY WERE DRIVEN BACK BY THE STOUT DEFENSE OF THE ARVN TROOPS TOGETHER WITH THEIR SUPPORTING FIRES. THE OUTPOST WHICH HOUSED THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 3D BATTALION, 9TH ARVN REGT OF THE 5TH ARVN DIV AND OTHER ELEMENTS CONTAINED LESS THAN 200 MEN; THE STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE WAS ABOUT 800 - 1000 MEN. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE ARVN DE-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3(h)  
DA Memo, JMW, 5, 1988  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 113, NARA, Date 11-20-91



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

FENDERS WERE OUTNUMBERED AT LEAST 4 TO 1. WHEN THE ENEMY ATTACK WAS FINALLY BROKEN AT 0400H HOURS AND THE ENEMY BEGAN TO FALL BACK, A 50 MAN GROUP OF THE VIETNAMESE CHARGED OUT OF THEIR OUTPOST AND PURSUED THE ENEMY UNTIL THEY DISAPPEARED INTO THE JUNGLE. RESULTS OF THIS ACTION CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE FIGHTING SPIRIT OF THE ARVN TROOPS WHEN PROPERLY ARMED AND LED. SIGNIFICANT IN THIS ACTION WAS THE AWARD OF THE U.S. SILVER STAR TO SERGEANT VAY CHIU CHAN. SERGEANT CHAN BECAME THE FOURTH VIETNAMESE ENLISTED MAN TO RECEIVE THIS AMERICAN AWARD. THE AWARD WAS MADE PRIMARILY FOR HIS ACTION AT ONE CORNER OF THE OUTPOST WHERE HE THREW APPROXIMATELY 100 GRENADES AT THE ATTACKING FORCE THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE AND IS CREDITED WITH HAVING STOPPED THE ENEMY PENETRATION OF THAT POSITION. THE ENEMY SUFFERED 134 KIA AND THE LOSS OF 37 INDIVIDUAL AND 20 CREWSERVED WEAPONS. FRIENDLY LOSSES WERE 13 KILLED, SIX ARVN AND SEVEN CIVILIAN LABORERS. OF THE 44 WOUNDED, 24 WERE ARVN, 18 WERE CIVILIAN LABORERS AND TWO WERE U.S. ADVISORS.

AT 0115H ON THE MORNING OF 29 OCT, ELEMENTS OF THE 273D VIET CONG REGIMENT INITIATED A MORTAR ATTACK ON LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN IN NORTHERN BINH LONG PROVINCE. LOC NINH IS SITUATED 13KM SOUTH OF THE NORTHERN BORDER BETWEEN II CTZ AND THE BORDER OF CAMBODIA AND WAS DEFENDED BY THREE CIDG COMPANIES, A REGIONAL FORCE COMPANY AND A POPULAR FORCE PLATOON. THE ENEMY FIRED A BARRAGE OF 97 ROUNDS OF MIXED CALIBER, 120 MM AND 82 MM MORTAR, ON THE SUBSECTOR AND CIDG COMPOUNDS. THE MORTAR BARRAGE WAS FOLLOWED BY A HEAVY GROUND ATTACK WITH THE ENEMY TROOPS FIRING SMALL ARMS AND B-40 ROCKETS. THE GROUND ATTACK FORCE SUCCEEDED IN PENETRATING THE OUTER DEFENSES OF THE SUBSECTOR HEADQUARTERS AND AT 0220H OCCUPIED THE OUTER PERIMETER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

OF THE COMPOUND. AT 2645H, THE RAPID REACTION FORCE COMPRISED OF TWO OF THE LOCAL CIDG COMPANIES WAS COMMITTED TO REPEL THE ENEMY. AT 2900H, TWO COMPANIES OF THE 5TH ARVN DIVISION REINFORCED THE CIDG COMPANIES AND EXPELLED THE ENEMY FROM THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND. SPORADIC ENEMY CONTACT CONTINUED IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRFIELD ALL MORNING. AT 1515H HOURS THE ENEMY BROKE CONTACT LEAVING BEHIND 148 DEAD. MOST OF THE DEAD WERE KILLED BY GROUND FIRE FROM THE DEFENDERS AND THE ARVN REACTION FORCE. DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, THE CIDG CAMP ABOUT 2 KM SW OF LOC NINH WAS ATTACKED BY A HEAVY CONCENTRATION OF MORTAR FIRE. THIS ATTACK CEASED AT ABOUT 0250 HOURS. DURING THIS ATTACK, THE CIDG CASUALTIES WERE LIGHT. THE TWO CIDG COMPANIES DISCUSSED PREVIOUSLY, WITH THEIR ADVISORS, THEN INITIATED THE COUNTER-ATTACK TO RELIEVE THE ELEMENTS THAT WERE UNDER ATTACK IN THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND. OTHER SCATTERED CONTACTS ON 29 OCTOBER LEFT AN ADDITIONAL 12 ENEMY KIA. THROUGHOUT OCTOBER 30TH, SPORADIC AND HARASSING ATTACKS WERE MADE BY THE ENEMY. THE MOST RECENT SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE LOC NINH DISTRICT TOWN BEGAN WITH A MORTAR ATTACK SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 31 OCTOBER. THE NEARBY CIDG CAMP WAS ATTACKED AT THE SAME TIME WITH SMALL ARMS AND MORTAR FIRE. THE MAIN GROUND ATTACK BY ABOUT 1500 ENEMY WAS LAUNCHED AT 0427 AGAINST THE SUBSECTOR COMPOUND AND THE CIDG CAMP. THE ENEMY WAS SUCCESSFUL IN PENETRATING THE SUBSECTOR PERIMETER AT ABOUT 0500 IN THE MORNING. ONCE AGAIN THE ARVN DEFENDERS EXPELLED THE ENEMY FROM THEIR POSITIONS. THE DUL-HARD EFFORTS OF THE ENEMY IN HIS THREE DAY INITIAL EFFORT TO CAPTURE THE LOC NINH DISTRICT COST HIM 371 MEN KILLED AND A LARGE AMOUNT OF WEAPONS AND MATERIEL LOST. THE ENEMY 371 KILLED ARE IN ADDITION TO THE 369 ENEMY KILLED IN THIS ACTION TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY

4 NOVEMBER BY U.S. FORCES.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ACTION AT LOC NINH, A HANOI NEWS BULLETIN INDICATES THE TYPE OF REPORTS EMANATING FROM THE NORTH. THE TRUE FACTS OF THE ENGAGEMENT MUST HAVE REACHED HANOI, AND THEIR DISTORTIONS SEEK TO COVER WHAT WAS CLEARLY A STINGING DEFEAT. THE HANOI NEWS ITEM FOLLOWS: "HANOI, 31 OCTOBER -- TO AVENGE THE VICTIMS OF THE U.S. BOMBING OF HANOI OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS, THE PEOPLES LIBERATION ARMED FORCES IN LOC NINH, NORTH OF SAIGON, ON THE NIGHT OF 30 OCTOBER PUT OUT OF ACTION A MULTI-BATTALION U.S. PUPPET COMBAT GROUP COMING TO RESCUE BATTERED POSITIONS IN THE LOC NINH MILITARY SUBSECTOR, GIAI PHONG PRESS AGENCY REPORTED.

ACCORDING TO INITIAL REPORTS, THE AGENCY SAID THE PLAN PUT OUT OF ACTION ONE INFANTRY BATTALION, ONE ARTILLERY BATTALION, ONE U.S. ARMORED CAR BATTALION, PART OF THE 2D BATTALION, NINTH REGIMENT, OF THE PUPPET 5TH DIVISION, AND A NUMBER OF AMERICAN COMMANDO UNITS."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
EYES ONLY



~~SECRET~~

-2-

~~SECRET~~

Monday - November 6, 1967

23

*File*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 11:30 Meeting Today on Peru

The purpose of the meeting is to review the modalities of the proposal (Tab A) for persuading Peru to drop the Mirage deal.

Those attending will be:

State: Secretary Rusk, Covey Oliver.

DOJ: Paul Nitze, Paul Warnke

CIA: Dick Helms

WH: Rostow, Bowdler

I suggest you follow this agenda:

1. Workability of the Proposal

Comment: Covey Oliver has been checking with Northrop on the availability of F-5s, commercial credit for their financing and the training of Peruvian pilots. You might ask him to report on his findings.

2. Your Emissary to Peru.

Comment: Dr. Eisenhower told Covey Oliver last Friday that he could not undertake the assignment until after Friday. Covey was getting in touch with him again to establish how soon after Friday he would be available.

Others who might do the job are listed at Tab B.

An essential element of the approach to Peru is to make is as free from publicity as possible.

3. Advisability of Using Brazil to Help with Peru.

q Comment: I sent you a SECRET report on Saturday from a reliable source that President Costa e Silva had decided not to purchase Mirages. We have not been officially informed of this decision. You might ask Secretary Rusk and Dick Helms how we might get the Brazilians to so notify us so that we in turn could ask

SANITIZED  
Authority NLT 019-0251-5  
By *sp*, NARA, Date 1/7/02

~~SECRET~~

-2-

President Costa e Silva if he would help in persuading President Belaunde not to go through with the Mirage deal.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tabs A and B.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 90-10 agree  
By ag/kip, NADA, Date 12-94A. Problem

1. The Peruvian economy is in a descending spiral which threatens stability and poses the imminent threat of a military takeover.
2. To reverse this trend, Peru desperately needs to put into effect a stabilization program which will require strong backing from us.
3. We are prepared to make a \$40 million program loan available conditioned on fiscal and budgetary self-help measures and no French Mirages.
4. The principal obstacle is the aircraft purchase. We need to devise a formula for Peru to void the contract or otherwise get rid of the Mirages.
5. The Peruvian Mirage deal, if carried out, will have an interacting impact on purchase of Mirages by other Latin American countries and US Congressional reaction which could seriously compromise our Alliance for Progress effort and the OAS Summit Program.

B. What We Know About the Mirage Deal

We do not have a copy of the contract and only a vague idea of its contents from second and third hand sources:

- The contract is reportedly between the Peruvian Air Force and the French Government.
  - It provides for the sale of 12 Mirage 5's at a price of \$27-28 million, including aircraft, training and spare parts.
-



- An initial payment is supposed to have been made, amount unknown.
- Delivery of aircraft is reported to start at the end of 1967.

We have no specific data on contract cancellation penalty or the resale provisions.


C. Alternative Courses for Peru

1. Cancel the contract, forfeit the down payment and pay whatever else the penalty clause provides. This is neatest solution and our preferred position.
2. Resell the aircraft to a third country before delivery, if there is a resale provision. Belaunde has suggested resale after delivery.

D. Our Strategy

1. We should offer President Belaunde and his military leaders an attractive alternative to the Mirage deal consistent with our stand that American F-5's will not be programmed into Latin America until 1969-70 time frame.
2. Depending upon the options open to the Peruvians, our offers would be:

First Choice

- Peru would cancel the Mirage contract.
  - We would help devise a way to cover the losses from forfeiture and the penalty clause.
  - We would arrange with Northrop Canada to sell six CF-5's with delivery in the period October 1968-July 1969, with Northrop US selling another six F-5's for delivery during the July 1969-June 1970 period on favorable commercial terms.
  - We would train Peruvian pilots on F-5's in the US starting in January 1968.
- 

Second Choice

- Peru would agree to resell the Mirages to a third country before delivery.
- We would help find a third country purchaser and Peru would get French Government (or Dassault Co.) agreement to the transaction.
- Same as in First Choice on sale and delivery dates for Canadian and US F-5's.
- Same as in First Choice on training of pilots.

E. Scenario

1. Obtain the President's approval of this approach.
2. Check with Northrop US on its and Northrop Canada's ability to meet the sale and delivery schedule with attractive commercial terms.
3. Send a high level representative to Peru (e.g., Vance, Harriman, Anderson, M. Eisenhower) to find out whether Belaunde and the Peruvian military are willing to work with us on either the First or Second Choices and find out the precise terms of the Mirage contract so that we know what we are up against.
4. Have Tuthill explain to Costa e Silva what we are proposing to Peru and what we are prepared to do in Brazil.
5. If the Peruvians accept our alternative, the high level representative would work out a tentative scenario for handling the contract cancellation or resale and the respective US-Peruvian roles.

WGBowdler:mm  
11/2/67



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, November 4, 1967 - 1:00 pm

23b  
cy sent w/ Boudier  
11/6/67

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru

Jim Jones tells me that your schedule will permit a meeting on Peru at 11:30 am on Monday, November 6. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara (or Paul Nitze), Dick Helms and Covey Oliver are lined up for that hour. If this meets with your approval, I will confirm the hour to the participants.

Monday at 11:30 am OK ✓

Prefer another time         

Covey Oliver told Dr. Milton Eisenhower that you wanted him to undertake the mission to Peru. Dr. Eisenhower said that his commitments made it impossible for him to do before next Friday, if then. He is now travelling and cannot make it to the Monday meeting.

Covey Oliver believes we should not delay the mission beyond Wednesday. We discussed other names and submit these alternatives:

Cy Vance	<u>        </u>
George Ball	<u>        </u>
Henry Cabot Lodge	<u>        </u>
ex-Governor Scranton	<u>        </u>
Clark Clifford	<u>        </u>
Linc Gordon	<u>        </u>

If you will indicate your next preference we will try him.

W. Rostow

cc: Jim Jones

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 / Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Collection, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 12-9-91

Saturday, November 4, 1967 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Lucius Clay, an old friend, called me about Radio Free Europe. He said he was one of the founders of the organization. He very much believed it should be kept going. He is prepared to do anything you think would be helpful once you made up your mind what you wanted to do. He said he was sure he could persuade Gen. Eisenhower to pitch in to back any proposal you might have to keep RFE going.

I told him that Dick Helms was completing Congressional consultations on the matter, without giving the formula.

I said I was sure you would be grateful for his offer, when I informed you of it.

WWR comment: If we kill RFE I am sure it will be something of a Republican political issue.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President

Saturday, November 4, 1967, 2 PM

Possible Agenda

1. The Ryukyus and the Bonins (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler)

Papers attached at Tab A.

2. Buttercup response (Secretary Rusk)

Issues:

- Should we try to get first response to Buttercup message before Bunker returns?
- Should first response be limited to prisoners, or should political statement be included?
- Should we go beyond Dang's conditions? If so, how far?

Secretary Rusk will have a draft at 2 PM.

3. Other

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-475  
By ig, NARA, Date 4-6-95

~~SECRET~~



26

*Rusk file*

Saturday, November 4, 1967 - 1:00 pm

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru

Jim Jones tells me that your schedule will permit a meeting on Peru at 11:30 am on Monday, November 6. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara (or Paul Nitze), Dick Helms and Covey Oliver are lined up for that hour. If this meets with your approval, I will confirm the hour to the participants.

Monday at 11:30 am OK \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer another time \_\_\_\_\_

Covey Oliver told Dr. Milton Eisenhower that you wanted him to undertake the mission to Peru. Dr. Eisenhower said that his commitments made it impossible for him to do before next Friday, if then. He is now travelling and cannot make it to the Monday meeting.

Covey Oliver believes we should not delay the mission beyond Wednesday. We discussed other names and submit these alternatives:

Cy Vance	_____
George Ball	_____
Henry Cabot Lodge	_____
ex-Governor Scranton	_____
Clark Clifford	_____
Linc Gordon	_____

If you will indicate your next preference we will try him.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jim Jones

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-475  
By *ing*, NARA, Date 4-6-95

10

27

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

pa

Saturday, Nov. 4, 1967  
12:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT :

Herewith some extra cold water  
McCloskey tried to pour on the Anderson  
fire yesterday.

W. H. R.

Attachment



18967

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1967

4308  
27a  
1 - Rostow 11/4  
2 - Rostow


Rostow

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

At the noon briefing today the Department spokesman had the following exchange with a correspondent:

Q. Please, would you comment on Mr. Anderson's visit to Cairo? Did he contribute to the outlook of a settlement in the Middle East?

A. Well, I'd have to re-emphasize again that Mr. Anderson was on a private visit. He has interests both in Egypt and one of the other Arab countries in the area. He was not undertaking an official mission for the United States Government. He has had a conversation with President Nasser. I don't know of anything that we have received from him at this point. But I would emphasize again that he is not in any way negotiating on relations or the re-establishment of relations between the United States and the UAR.

  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary



Pres file

H?

~~SECRET~~Saturday, November 12, 1967  
12:00 noon

Mr. President:

According to [REDACTED] President  
Costa e Silva has decided that Brazil  
Will not buy expensive French Mirages.  
He has also warned the Brazilian Air Force  
not to mount a public campaign for Mirages  
in an effort to force his hand.

1.3(a)(4)  
C

W. W. Rostow

Att.: [REDACTED]  
3 Nov 19671.3(a)(4)  
C~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authority NLT 019-025-1-6  
By q NARA, Date 1/7/02

SANITIZED

Authority NLS 019-025-1-7  
By OP, NARA, Date 1/7/02

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

28c

IN 86203

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	OCR	DDO	AID
DDI		EXO							USIA	ONE	ORR	DCS	CGS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

031732Z

1.3(a)(4)

DIST 3 NOVEMBER 1967

COUNTRY: BRAZIL/FRANCE

DOI: 27 OCTOBER 1967

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DECIDES NOT TO BUY FRENCH MIRAGE JETS

LEWIS  
BUDGET  
DAVIS  
FRIED  
GINSBURGH  
HAMILTON  
JESSUP  
JOHNSON  
JORDEN  
KEENE  
LEONHART  
ROCHE  
WINDSTADT

ACQ:

SOURCE:

1.3(a)(4)

1. ON 27 OCTOBER 1967

1.3(a)(4)

PRESIDENT ARTHUR DA COSTA E SILVA HAD DECIDED THAT BRAZIL WOULD NOT BUY FRENCH MIRAGE JET FIGHTERS. COSTA E SILVA RECENTLY ADVISED AIR MINISTER MARCIO DE SOUZA E MELLO OF THIS AND EXPLAINED THAT, EVEN IF PAYMENTS WERE SPREAD OUT OVER

1.3(a)(4)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE MAR 1995

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(4)

SEVERAL YEARS, THE FEDERAL BUDGET WOULD BE SERIOUSLY UN-  
BALANCED BY THE PURCHASE OF SUPERSONIC MIRAGE JETS AT ABOUT  
FOUR MILLION DOLLARS EACH.

2. [REDACTED] COSTA E SILVA ALSO WARNED  
SOUZA E MELLO THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO EXERCISE BETTER CONTROL  
OVER A GROUP OF AIR FORCE OFFICERS WHO ARE TRYING TO PRESSURE  
THE GOVERNMENT INTO BUYING THE MIRAGES. COSTA E SILVA SAID  
HE WAS AWARE THAT THESE OFFICERS WERE TRYING TO TURN THE  
PURCHASE OF MIRAGES INTO THE THEME OF A NATIONALIST PUBLICITY  
CAMPAIGN THAT WOULD FORCE THE PRESIDENT TO BUY THE MIRAGES  
RATHER THAN APPEAR AS AN ANTI-NATIONALIST SUBSERVIENT TO  
THE AMERICANS THE PRESIDENT SAID HE DID NOT INTEND TO BE  
CAUGHT IN ANY SUCH TRAP.

1.3(a)(4)

3. [REDACTED] COMMENT: FOR PREVIOUS REPORTING ON THE PUR-  
CHASE OF MIRAGE JETS SEE [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, CINCSO, CINCLANT [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)



~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Saturday, November 4, 1967 29  
10:15 a. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 86-167

By isp, NARA, Date 1-27-88

Mr. President:

Here are the McNamara and Mac Bundy positions you asked me to compare.

McNAMARA

MAC BUNDY

General:

An announced new policy of stabilization.

No major change in public posture established in San Antonio speech.

Bombing:

Unilateral stand-down to await Hanoi reaction.

Against:

- any unconditional pause;
- any extended pause for sake of appearances;
- any major headline-making intensification of the bombing.

U. S. Troops:

No increase beyond current approved level.

No large-scale reinforcements beyond totals already agreed.

Mac Bundy did not address himself explicitly to the following list of points made by Secretary McNamara. Presumably he would agree with the following list, within the general framework of existing policy rather than a new announced policy of "stabilization. "

- There will be no call up of reserves.
- No expansion of ground action will be undertaken in North Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
- No attempt will be made to deny sea imports into North Vietnam.
- No effort will be made to break the will of the North by an air campaign on the dikes, locks or populated targets -- efforts will be made to hold down civilian casualties in the North.

Nov. 4, 1967

- We will engage in continued efforts to restrict the war.
- We will endeavor to maintain our current rates of progress but with lesser US casualties and lesser destruction in South Vietnam.
- We will be willing to accept slow but steady progress for whatever period is required to move the North Vietnamese to abandon their attempt to gain political control in South Vietnam by military means.
- In light of the political progress of the GVN, we will gradually transfer the major burden of the fighting to the South Vietnamese forces.

W. W. R.

30

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, November 4, 1967  
9:30 a.m.

*For file*

Mr. President:

I asked State to list all the occasions when Communists have drawn out attention to the new NLF program as a possible basis for a settlement in the South along the lines now suggested in the BUTTERCUP channel.

They appear to run back to early September.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

INR memo to Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Nov 3, 1967, from George C. Denney, Jr.,  
Subject: Efforts to Draw the Attention of the United States to the Front Program.

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-475  
By inf, NARA, Date 4-6-95



~~SECRET/EMBIS~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To : S/S - Mr. Benjamin H. Read  
From : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *h.c.d.*

*NOV 3 1972*

*30a U  
SAH  
EA Bundy  
JWH. Rostow*

Subject: Efforts to Draw the Attention of the United States to the Front Program

We have examined the statements made publicly and privately by Communist sources in an effort to determine whether any sort of concerted or unilateral effort has been made specifically to call our attention to the new front program as something we should study. We find that, to the extent to which this effort has been made, it appears to be largely a Soviet exercise with perhaps one rather indirect statement by Romanian Premier Maurer. Hanoi's one statement that might be interpreted as an effort in this direction was made in describing the Bratislava meeting. Otherwise, the generally voluminous comment that the Front program has evoked seems to be devoted largely to extolling it, to discussing its various aspects, and to insisting to the United States as to others that it forms a correct basis for the settlement of the war and the determination of South Vietnam's future course.

The following are statements made that seem to relate most closely to an effort to call the program to the particular attention of the United States.

USSR

September 30. In a speech at Kishinev, Soviet Premier Kosygin stated that "The question is often asked in the USA, why don't the Vietnamese agree to negotiations? The Americans must unconditionally stop bombing the DRV, recognize the program announced recently by the NFLSV, and only then will the path to negotiations be cleared. The Soviet Union fully supports the statement of the Government of the DRV and the program of the NFLSV."

Middle of October. Premier Kosygin told the [redacted] to the USSR that "escalation" and the "NLF program" are the major new developments in the Vietnamese situation. According to the [redacted] in Moscow, Kosygin described the new Front program as "important", "serious", a "new factor of great political importance", and an element that no government can overlook. He said the program had to be "accepted". The [redacted] was impressed by the amount of time Kosygin devoted to Vietnam and the emphasis he placed on the Front program. 1,3  
(a)(3)

October 12, 13. [redacted] reported that the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi told the [redacted] that the USSR approved of the goals of the new Front program but could not accept the program as definitive and authoritative until it had formal status, such as approval by assembly. The Soviet Ambassador also remarked on the differences between the old and new 1,3  
(a)(3)

~~SECRET/EMBIS~~

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-476

By *18*, NARA, Date *1-10-95*

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

Front programs. He said the USSR regrets that the US has apparently not recognized the forward steps taken by the new program in comparison with the old one although he gave no examples. After discussion of the program, the Soviet Ambassador said he did not see any possibility of early negotiations but was personally convinced that if the US bombing stopped, this would soon lead to negotiations.

October 21. Representatives of Soviet "public organizations" gave a statement to US Ambassador Thompson during Vietnam protest day stating that the "Soviet people [were] convinced" that the position of the DRV and the new program of the Front offer "broad opportunities" for a fair settlement in accordance with the Geneva accords; and that the first step must be complete and unconditional halt to bombing.

#### Romania

The Romanians have given notably little publicity to the NLF program (an abbreviated account of which was published in Scinteia September 3) and have avoided discussing the program per se in talks with Americans or other non-communist diplomats. Certain aspects of Premier Maurer's recent talk with Ambassador Davis on the Vietnam situation, however, seem to touch on ideas involved in the NLF program. Maurer appeared to advocate a broad coalition in postwar South Vietnam, for example, when he spoke of a solution to the political problems necessarily "taking into account the interests of all sides". The emphasis in the NLF program on a fully independent South Vietnam also found support in Maurer's stress throughout his remarks that both in Washington and Hanoi he found endorsement of this principle. The sine qua non to a political settlement in his view is the "full liberty" of the South Vietnamese people to decide their own fate.

#### North Vietnam

In describing the Bratislava meeting (September 6-12) between representatives of the DRV, NLF and US anti-war groups, Hanoi VNA in English said on 18 September: "The two Vietnamese delegations clearly and fully explained the four-point stand of the DRV government...and emphasized the important significance of the political program of the NLFV."

On two other occasions in conversations with Americans, Hanoi may have been calling for particular US attention to the contents of the Front program.

American journalist David Schoenbrun told the US mission in Vientiane that Pham Van Dong had stated in the agreed version of his early September interview that in addition to accepting the Four Points, the US would have to accept the new updated Front program which provided for free universal suffrage to elect an independent government for the Republic of South Vietnam which would in turn negotiate the terms of reunification with the North.\*

\* In fact, while calling for National Assembly elections the Front program does not specifically provide for elections for a South Vietnamese government.

When asked about the Front by Leslie Metcalf of the Friends International Center in Geneva during a late October interview with Phung Manh Cung, First Secretary of the DRV Embassy in Budapest, Cung said: "I expect you will have read their program. They want a coalition and do not want socialism, but we in the North have reached a degree of political maturity and will not fall out with them. Unification may take one, two or perhaps five years."

Similar emphasis on explaining the program to Americans, albeit anti-war Americans, was reflected in the statement given by the Front representative at Bratislava Mrs. Nguyen Thi Dinh to the Austrian Communist Party newspaper Volksstimme. "We had opportunity in Bratislava bring this program to attention of representatives of US fighters against Vietnam war, explain it to them and to convince them that it is really a program of whole people, for freedom, democracy, progress and neutrality, creating the preconditions for the reunification, at a later date, of the Vietnamese homeland."



~~SECRET~~

Saturday, November 4, 1967  
9:25 a.m.

*Profile*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gov. Harriman argues there is a possible negotiating job to do between now and November 1968, despite observations made at the advisers' meeting.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Nov 3, 1967 Memo for the President and the Sec of State, Subject: Negotiations, from W. A. Harriman

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12555, Sec. 3.4(h)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *sg*, NARA, Date 12-12-91

31a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

November 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject: Negotiations

There were several statements made by members of the Senior Group during the discussions on Wednesday evening and Thursday, regarding which I should like to comment:

(1) A number of participants expressed the opinion that proposals for negotiation for peace by the United States Government only encourage Hanoi to hold out. There is no evidence whatever supporting this contention. On the other hand, it seems clear that the President's position has been materially strengthened both at home and abroad by the statements and efforts he has made or authorized to bring about talks. I strongly recommend that this policy be continued.

(2) Some participants indicated their belief that there was no chance of the other side's agreeing to talks until after our election and that, therefore, it was useless for us to attempt to bring about talks before then. I agree that serious talks are unlikely until after our election (or at least until after the Republican Convention) but I believe there is a significant chance that should not be overlooked that talks may be possible before then. The clearest evidence of this is "Buttercup" in which the NLF approach appears to be a bona fide attempt to begin talks. Furthermore we have indications of differences of opinion within the Hanoi leadership on the issue of negotiations. Prime Minister Maurer of Rumania, who recently visited Hanoi, has told us of this. I think it important that we not exclude the possibility that talks with either Hanoi or the NLF may be held before our elections and that our actions could increase the likelihood of talks.

(3) Certain

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-476  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-95 ~~SECRET - NODIS~~

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

2

(3) Certain participants expressed the belief that there will never be talks but that at some point the enemy forces will merely fade away. I agree with what Walt Rostow stated, namely, that when Hanoi decides to consider abandoning its attack on the South, it will in all likelihood wish negotiations to attempt to reach agreement on certain important issues, either directly or through the NLF, though probably not on the Geneva model. It is also possible that some matters can be settled between the GVN and the NLF.

Therefore, unless otherwise instructed, I plan to continue my activities without regard to these particular comments made at the recent meetings.

I also recommend that Ambassador Bunker continue to urge the new GVN not only to pursue vigorously their National Reconciliation Program, but also to develop any leads for talks with the NLF or with its members.

W. Averell Harriman

*Otherwise, I felt the meetings  
were extremely interesting & constructive.*

~~SECRET - NODIS~~

November 4, 1967

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

This year's sterling crisis is coming to a boil again. The pound came under heavy pressure Thursday and Friday and talk of devaluation ran through the markets. Prospects for next week are not good.

Secretary Fowler's small interagency group has been watching the situation closely. We have our contingency plans in good shape. Fowler has scheduled a meeting for Monday at 9:00 am to examine the alternatives we may have to face. We will report to you fully when we have the issues in order.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-475  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-6-95

*EdR*



November 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Get Well Message to the Pope

The State Department recommends that we send the following message to the Embassy in Rome for delivery to Pope Paul:

"All Americans join Mrs. Johnson and me in prayers and sincere wishes for your quick recovery."

I recommend that we send this message from you, not releasing it here but telling the Vatican that we have no objections if they wish to release it.

W. W. Rostow

\_\_\_\_\_ Approved

\_\_\_\_\_ Prefer no message

*the draft of  
message  
not sent*

34

Friday, November 3, 1967  
5:00 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mrs. Kennedy's visit to Cambodia

*Pres file*

Last winter the Cambodian Chief of State, Prince Sihanouk, invited Mrs. Kennedy to Phnom Penh to participate in a ceremony naming a street in the Cambodian Capital after her late husband. Mrs. Kennedy accepted, but when she learned that the only convenient time for her was a period when Sihanouk would be out of the country, she decided not to go. In July of this year, Sihanouk renewed his invitation and the period November 2 - 8 was agreed upon.

Arrangements for the trip were handled through the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh because we have no relations with Cambodia.

Mrs. Kennedy flew by commercial plane to Bangkok, Thailand. There were three ways of arranging her flight onward to Phnom Penh: (1) by a local commercial line, (2) by Pan American, (3) by using the Air Attache's plane stationed in Bangkok or the Air Force plane assigned to our base at Udorn, Thailand.

Secretary McNamara authorized the use of a U. S. plane after he learned that the local commercial line was judged unsafe and that acceptance of Pan American's offer to fly Mrs. Kennedy without cost would be linked in the eyes of some to Pan American's attempt to obtain permission to build a hotel at Angkor.

The U. S. plane flew Mrs. Kennedy from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and returned to Bangkok. It is scheduled to go to Phnom Penh again on November 8 and fly Mrs. Kennedy out to Bangkok where she will continue her trip via commercial planes.

Mrs. Kennedy's trip is purely personal and she has no government instructions. One of the members of her party, Michael Forrestal, has been briefed by the State Department<sup>so</sup> that in the event Sihanouk brings up the question of our POW's in North Viet Nam, he will be aware of our existing policy. Forrestal has no authority to initiate any discussions with Sihanouk.

*I assume Averell*

W. W. R.

Friday, November 3, 1967  
4:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to Livie  
Merchant, for your signature, as  
requested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

35

1. ~~copy~~  
2. *for file*

35a

November 3, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I was glad to receive your views on the future of Radio Free Europe.

We are now actively considering the alternatives open to us, conscious of the problem posed in your letter.

As you say, the choices are not easy.

When we decide what is wise and practical, we may well call on you and your colleagues for help.

Sincerely,

*/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson*

Honorable Livingston T. Merchant  
4853 Loughboro Road  
Washington, D. C.

LBJ:WWRostow:rlm



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Nov. 1, 1967  
11:00 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Livie Merchant expresses his anxiety about Radio Free Europe, as a member of their Board of Directors.

W.A.R.

Attachment

Prepare counter reply —  
I can't clean up all the  
mess the NY Times leaves  
behind while these old  
pros & intellectuals sit  
silent — L

35c

4853 LOUGHBORO ROAD  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 31, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Were I not deeply troubled over the uncertainty clouding the future and continued operation of Radio Free Europe, I would not presume to write you at this time.

I have had some knowledge of this enterprise both when I was in the Government and in recent years as a member of the Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. I am satisfied that Radio Free Europe has played a significant role in encouraging and even accelerating constructive changes within the Soviet Union and particularly Eastern Europe. It is, I believe, importantly contributing today to an improved understanding of the United States within those countries.

Radio Free Europe, I am satisfied, has an important role to play as a private institution, not operated as an arm of the United States Government, in improving understanding between peoples. I am personally convinced that a transfer of Radio Free Europe to the USIA would create problems inherent in the direct competition which would thereby arise with the Voice of America, but even more importantly, in the risk that the present acceptance which it has earned with the people in the countries to which it broadcasts, would be seriously impaired.

I think the record shows that over the years Radio Free Europe has had widespread and strong support in the American public, though the magnitude of the operation precludes its ability to operate exclusively on funds raised from the public in annual drives.

An ideal long-term solution I do not think has yet been devised, let alone agreed, and frankly I am more concerned with the immediate problem of continued support enabling continued operation of Radio Free Europe. I know my concern is shared by my fellow Directors of Free Europe, Inc. We are anxious to contribute in any way possible to an arrangement which would ensure continued governmental support as has been given in the past and the authority to acknowledge quietly to private givers that it has had governmental

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

4853 LOUGHBORO ROAD  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The President,  
The White House


- 2 -

Oct. 31, 1967

financial support in past years. To withdraw it or even to give the appearance of doing so--as for example by a transfer to USIA--would risk, in my judgment, serious repercussions abroad and in this country as well.

Please forgive my intrusion on your time, but I think this problem--for which at least an interim solution must be found very soon--is important.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Livie Merchant". The signature is written in dark ink and has a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Livingston T. Merchant

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 3, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres. file*

This Nasser-Anderson conversation is important and interesting.

I suspect it is essentially honest for one reason: Nasser is going to run out of money before too long.

It is more relaxed than his first conversation. The Arab position may not be as hard as it seemed in the past few days; but there is still a substantial gap to be closed with the minimum Israeli position. The effort to close the gap begins tonight when Arthur Goldberg sees Hussein in New York at 5:30 p.m.

I must say Bob Anderson was wholly correct in his conversation and in dealing with the press (para. 25).

W. W. Rostow

P. S. I talked firmly to the Chief of the Washington UPI Bureau, Julius Frandsen, who promised to try to kill the story.

W. W. R.

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-475  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-6-95



00 YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 134A 3071544  
O 031516Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
DEPT OF STATE  
ZEM

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 08-226 and NLJ 94-476 appeal  
By ist, NARA, Date 3-11-09

36a  
3.3(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ SECTION ONE OF FOUR [REDACTED]  
EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND WHITE HOUSE FOR THE  
PRESIDENT:

FOLLOWING IS TEXT MESSAGE DICTATED (BUT NOT READ) BY  
ANDERSON IN PRESENCE [REDACTED] AND EDITED AND IN PARTS REORGANIZED  
BY LATTER AT SPECIFIC ANDERSON REQUESTS, EARLY EVENING 2  
NOVEMBER. FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE ATTENTION OF THE PRES-  
IDENT FROM ANDERSON.

1. THIS WILL BE A SOMEWHAT DIFFICULT MESSAGE BECAUSE OF  
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT IS BEING DICTATED AT THE BEIRUT  
AIRPORT EN ROUTE BETWEEN CAIRO AND BAGHDAD.

I MET TODAY WITH PRESIDENT NASIR AT 1230. HE ADVISED ME  
THAT HE WAS LEAVING LATER TODAY FOR A VACATION IN THE DESERT NEAR  
AL ALMAYN, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST REAL VACATION HE HAD  
TAKEN IN FIFTEEN YEARS. HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SWIMMING,  
SITTING IN THE SUN AND HAVING TIME TO THINK AND RELAX. HE OPENED  
THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING, "ABOVE ALL ELSE, TRY TO MAKE CLEAR TO  
YOUR GOVERNMENT AND YOUR PEOPLE THAT WE ARE EAGER FOR A POLITICAL  
SETTLEMENT, FOR A POLITICAL PEACE." HE STATED THAT THIS HAD NOT  
BEEN TRUE IN THE VERY BEGINNING, AFTER THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES  
ON 9 JUNE, BECAUSE "WE WERE IN A STATE OF CONFUSION, UNCERTAINTY,  
AND DOUBT. WE DID NOT KNOW, BUT WE FEARED WHAT THE ISRAELIS WERE  
GOING TO DO." NOW, HE SAID, "WE KNOW THAT OUR INTEREST LIES NOT  
IN WAR, BUT IN PEACE."

3. HE THEN SAID, "PLEASE TRY TO CONVINCE YOUR PEOPLE AND  
YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT ANY QUESTION OF DIRECT NEGOTIATION, OR EVEN  
OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A THIRD PARTY MEDIATOR PRESENT, WOULD BE AN  
ACT OF SUICIDE. IT WOULD BE SO FOR ME, AND IT WOULD BE SO FOR  
ANY OTHER ARAB LEADERS." HE FURTHER SAID THAT EVEN IF HE ATTEMPTED  
THIS OF AGREED TO IT, IT WOULD BE SUICIDE ON THE PART OF ANY OTHER  
ARAB LEADER NOT IMMEDIATELY TO DENOUNCE IT AND TO DEMAND TO RESUME  
HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE ISRAELIS. NASIR SAID, "UNDER THESE  
CIRCUMSTANCES, LET US TRY TO BE PRACTICAL AND, IF WE ALL WANT  
PEACE, AND WE DO, THEN LET US FIND A WAY TO SETTLE OUR DIFFERENCES  
AND LIVE IN PEACE." HE SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE DETAILS  
OF AN AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IN PUBLIC, OR THAT ANYTHING  
COULD BE EFFECTIVELY BEGUN BY NEGOTIATIONS BE A COMMITTEE OR ANY  
MEDIATOR APPOINTED BY THE U.N. UNTIL SOME FORMAL ACTION HAD BEEN

TAKEN BY THE U.N. "AS A FIRST STEP." HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT A  
RESOLUTION BE OFFERED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH WOULD INVOLVE  
S ITS BASIS THE FIVE PRINCIPLES THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD MADE, AND

WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

- A. THE RIGHT OF ISRAEL AND OF ALL OTHER NATIONS IN THE  
AREA TO LIVE;
- B. FREE MOVEMENT OF "INNOCENT" SHIPPING IN THE WATERWAYS  
OF THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE SUEZ;
- C. FULL WITHDRAWAL BY THE ISRAELIS FROM THE TERRITORIES  
WHICH THEY HAD OCCUPIED AT THE TIME OF THE HOSTILITIES;
- D. A DECLARATION OF NON-BELLIGERENCE BETWEEN ARAB STATES  
AND ISRAEL; AND
- E. FINALLY, AND SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES.

NASIR STATED THAT AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS TYPE OF  
RESOLUTION, WHICH HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD ACCEPT BECAUSE IT WAS  
BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY OUR PRESIDENT, THE RESOLUTION  
WOULD DIRECT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ADVISE AND ASSIST THE

WHICH THEY HAD OCCUPIED AT THE TIME OF THE HOSTILITIES.

D. A DECLARATION OF NON-BELLIGERENCE BETWEEN ARAB STATES AND ISRAEL; AND

E. FINALLY, AND SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REFUGEES.

NASIR STATED THAT AFTER THE ADOPTION OF THIS TYPE OF RESOLUTION, WHICH HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD ACCEPT BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED BY OUR PRESIDENT, THE RESOLUTION SHOULD DIRECT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO APPOINT ONE OR MORE PERSONS TO CONSULT WITH THE ARAB NATIONS INVOLVED AND WITH ISRAELIS AND, FROM THESE NEGOTIATIONS, TO DRAW UP "A DECLARATION FOR DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION, WHICH WOULD THEN BE SUBMITTED AGAIN FOR ADOPTION OR RATIFICATION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL."

5. AT THIS POINT, I TOLD HIM THAT AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, THE ISRAELIS PROFESSED THEY WOULD NOT BE SATISFIED WITH ANY DECLARATION MADE BY THIRD PERSONS, EVEN INCLUDING THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND THAT THEY WANTED SOME CONTRACTUAL UNDERTAKING BETWEEN THEM AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD ENSURE NON-BELLIGERENCE AND THE OTHER IDEAS HE HAD REFERRED TO. NASIR SAID THAT HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR ALL THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES, BUT AS FOR HIMSELF, HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SIGN SUCH A (SECURITY COUNCIL) DECLARATION "AFTER IT HAD BEEN AGREED TO," OR, AS AN ALTERNATIVE, WRITE A LETTER OR OTHER DOCUMENT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OR TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDERTAKING TO CARRY OUT THE DETAILS AND IMPLICATIONS CONTAINED IN THE DECLARATION. HE FELT THAT THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES WOULD BE WILLING TO DO THE SAME THING, BUT REITERATED THAT "HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THEM." IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT HE IS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, JUST SO LONG AS THEY ARE NOT INCORPORATED INTO A SIMPLE TREATY JOINTLY MADE AND SIGNED BETWEEN THE UAR AND ISRAEL. THIS POINT HE MADE FROM TIME TO TIME, REFERRING ALWAYS TO THE FACT THAT EVEN SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUICIDE.

6. NASIR THEN SAID THAT THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS WERE GOING TO BE THE SUEZ CANAL AND JERUSALEM. I SAID THAT OBVIOUSLY I COULD NOT SPEAK ON ANY OF THESE TOPICS, BUT COULD ONLY EXPLORE HIS OWN THINKING. IN THIS CONNECTION, I ASKED IF HE COULD AGREE TO LET ANY SHIP, INCLUDING THE ISRAELIS, TRANSIT THE SUEZ CANAL IF SUCH SHIPS CARRIED NOT THE FLAG OF THE COUNTRY INVOLVED, BUT THE U.N. FLAG. NASIR SAID, "I DO NOT RULE THIS OUT BUT THERE IS STILL THE QUESTION OF LOGS, MANIFESTS AND TROUBLE WITH THE PEOPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU WILL SETTLE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM THEN I CAN ALLOW ISRAELI SHIPS TO TRANSIT," HE SAID. I TOLD HIM I WAS SKEPTICAL THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD EVER NEGOTIATE FOR A RESETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE. AT THIS POINT, NASIR SAID, "ALL RIGHT; THEN, LET US SETTLE WITH THEM BY AGREEING TO PAY THEM COMPENSATION." IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THIS POINT, I STATED AGAIN THAT I WANTED TO BE QUITE SURE THAT HE WOULD AGREE TO A MUTUAL SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM WITHOUT GIVING THE REFUGEES THE ALTERNATIVE CHOICE OF RESETTLEMENT (COMMENT: IN PALESTINE) OR OF TAKING MONEY INSTEAD, AND HE AGAIN SAID THAT IF RESETTLEMENT IS NOT POSSIBLE, WE CAN AGREE ON A MUTUAL COMPENSATION. HE CONTINUALLY LINKS THE FREE PASSAGE OF ISRAELI SHIPS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM.

GP-1

900

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EVER ONLY



00 YEKAD5  
DE YEKADL 134B 3071544  
O 031516Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
DEPT OF STATE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION TWO OF FOUR [REDACTED]

33(b)(1)

EYES ONLY SECRETARY OF STATE AND WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT

7. HE THEN BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF TERRITORY. HERE, NASIR SAID THAT THE KEY POINT IS THAT ISRAEL CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO EXPAND, THAT FOR EVERY MUSLIM NATION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT IT BORDERS ON ISRAEL, THE CONSUMING FEAR IS THAT ISRAEL PLANS TERRITORYAL EXPANSION. HE SAID THIS IS ONE OF THE BASIC PROBLEMS IN TRYING TO UNIT THE NEW AND THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. IT IS REGARDED BY EVERYONE OF THE MUSLIM FAITH AS A VIOLATION OF THEIR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND AS ISRAELI EXPANSION.

8. HE THEN STATED THIS, THAT AGAIN HE WOULD SPECULATE THAT CERTAIN TERRITORY SURROUNDING THE STATE OF ISRAEL MIGHT BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL TO THEIR OWN SECURITY. NASIR SAID THAT IF THIS IS SO, LET US DEMILITARIZE IT. AGAIN HE SAID, "I CANNOT SPEAK FOR ALL OTHERS, BUT AS FOR ME, I WILL WITHDRAW PERMANENTLY ALL FORCES 10 MILES, 15 MILES, OR ANY AGREED NUMBER OF MILES FROM THE BORDERS." I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THE COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE SINAI PENINSULA. HE SAID, "THIS I CANNOT DO, BECAUSE IT IS TOO BIG AND EXTENSIVE A LAND FOR ME TO SAY THAT NO MILITARY PERSONNEL CAN EVER BE PLACED THERE. I CAN AGREE THAT NO MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL EVER BE PLACED IN SHARM AL SHAYKH, OR WITHIN 10 OR 15 MILES OF THE ISRAELI BORDERS, IF THEY OR THEIR STATE WILL AGREE NOT TO PLACE TROOPS WITHIN THE SAME DISTANCE." HE SAID AGAIN, "I CANNOT SPEAK FOR JORDAN OR SYRIA, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE SAME PRINCIPLES WOULD BE AGREED TO BY THEM."

9. NASIR SAID THAT EXCEPT FOR TERRITORY, MOST OF THE ARAB NATIONS ARE LEAVING OTHER DETAILS OF THE ARAB SETTLEMENT TO HIM. HE SAID, "IT IS A TASK I DO NOT WANT, BUT ONE WHICH OTHERS HAVE ASKED THAT I UNDERTAKE. IT, HOWEVER, MUST BE EXPECTED THAT EACH WILL DECIDE WITH REFERENCE TO HIS OWN TERRITORY, AND EACH OF THE NEIGHBORING STATES MUST AGREE ON THE FINAL SETTLEMENT." I TOLD NASIR THAT OBVIOUSLY I WAS GOING FULLY TO COMMUNICATE HIS VIEWS TO MY GOVERNMENT, AND HE SAID, "THIS IS EXACTLY WHY I AM TELLING YOU, AND I HOPE WE WILL BE GETTING A RESPONSE THAT IS FAVORABLE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT. YOU ARE GOING TO IRAQ. IF YOU GET ANY KIND OF RESPONSE, PLEASE ADVISE MY AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ, AND I WILL BE GLAD TO RECEIVE YOU AT ANY TIME YOU WANT TO RETURN." NASIR STATED, "PLEASE TRY TO EXPLAIN TO YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT HOWEVER DESPERATELY WE WANT PEACE, WE CANNOT HAVE IT AT THE PRICE OF DESTROYING OURSELVES OR ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER, WHEN YOU CAN BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT ANYBODY WHO SUCCEEDS ME OR ANY OF THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS WILL BE MUCH MORE RADICAL AGAINST THE ISRAELIS THAN WE ARE."

10. NASIR SAID THAT SOME OF THE ARAB STATES, NOTABLY SYRIA AND ALGERIA, HAD BEEN VERY VEHEMENT WITH HIM IN STATING, "YOU CANNOT AGREE TO A RESOLUTION OR A DECLARATION WHICH INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO LIVE FOR ISRAEL". NASIR SAID, "I MERELY POINTED OUT TO THEM THAT WE ARE NO LONGER TALKING ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OUR OWN RIGHT TO LIVE." HE REPEATED THIS TWO OR THREE TIMES. HE ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND HIS ECONOMIC DESTRUCTION, BECAUSE AT PRESENT HE HAD NO REVENUE FROM THE SUEZ CANAL OR FROM TOURISM, AND NOW THEY HAD DESTROYED HIS REFINERIES. HE SAID, "THEREFORE, MY TASK IS NOW TO BUILD A STRONG ECONOMY WITHIN MY OWN COUNTRY. THIS IS THE BEST WAY I CAN RETALIATE."

11. I ASKED NASIR IF HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS OWN VERSION OF THE SINKING OF THE ISRAELI SHIP "EILATH." HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO. HE SAID THIS SHIP HAD BEEN PATROLLING IN AND OUT OF UAR

WILL DECIDE WITH REFERENCE TO HIS OWN TERRITORY, AND EACH OF THE NEIGHBORING STATES MUST REE ON THE FINAL SETTLEMENT." I TOLD NASIR THAT OBVIOUSLY I WAS GOING FULLY TO COMMUNICATE HIS VIEWS TO MY GOVERNMENT, AND HE SAID, "THIS IS EXACTLY WHY I AM TELLING YOU, AND I HOPE WE WILL BE GETTING A RESPONSE THAT IS FAVORABLE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT. YOU ARE GOING TO IRAQ. IF YOU GET ANY KIND OF RESPONSE, PLEASE ADVISE MY AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ, AND I WILL BE GLAD TO RECEIVE YOU AT ANY TIME YOU WANT TO RETURN." NASIR STATED, "PLEASE TRY TO EXPLAIN TO YOUR GOVERNMENT THAT HOWEVER DESPERATELY WE WANT PEACE, WE CANNOT HAVE IT AT THE PRICE OF DESTROYING OURSELVES OR ANY OTHER ARAB LEADER, WHEN YOU CAN BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT ANYBODY WHO SUCCEEDS MEOR ANY OF THE OTHER ARAB LEADERS WILL BE MUCH MORE RADICAL AGAINST THE ISRAELIS THAN WE ARE."

10. NASIR SAID THAT SOME OF THE ARAB STATES, NOTABLY SYRIA AND ALGERIA, HAD BEEN VERY VEHEMENT WITH HIM IN STATING, "YOU CANNOT AGREE TO A RESOLUTION OR A DECLARATION WHICH INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO LIVE FOR ISRAEL". NASIR SAID, "I MERELY POINTED OUT TO THEM THAT WE ARE NO LONGER TALKING ABOUT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO LIVE. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT OUR OWN RIGHT TO LIVE." HE REPEATED THIS TWO OR THREE TIMES. HE ALSO SAID HE BELIEVED THE ISRAELIS HAD IN MIND HIS ECONOMIC DESTRUCTION, BECAUSE AT PRESENT HE HAD NO REVENUE FROM THE SUEZ CANAL OR FROM TOURISM, AND NOW THEY HAD DESTROYED HIS REFINERIES. HE SAID, "THEREFORE, MY TASK IS NOW TO BUILD A STRONG ECONOMY WITHIN MY OWN COUNTRY. THIS IS THE BEST WAY I CAN RETALIATE."

11. I ASKED NASIR IF HE WOULD GIVE ME HIS OWN VERSION OF THE SINKING OF THE ISRAELI SHIP "EILATH." HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO. HE SAID THIS SHIP HAD BEEN PATROLLING IN AND OUT OF UAR WATERS FOR A NUMBER OF WEEKS, "JUST ON THE BORDER." ON OR ABOUT 11 JULY, THIS SAME SHIP HAD ATTACKED AND SUNK TWO EGYPTIAN TORPEDO BOATS AND KILLED THEIR CREWS. THIS, HE SAID, ATTRACTED NO WORLD ATTENTION. "ALSO, THEY SANK THEM IN OUR OWN WATERS". HE SAID THEN GENERAL RABIN ISSUED A STATEMENT SAYING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE LOOKING FOR THE EGYPTIAN NAVY, BUT THE NAVY WAS HIDING. HE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO THIS, AN ISRAELI PLANE SANK ANOTHER EGYPTIAN TORPEDO BOAT IN THE SUEZ. AS FAR AS THE ACTUAL SINKING OF THE "EILATH" WAS CONCERNED, NASIR SAID, "IT WAS ALL FINISHED AND DONE WITH BEFORE I EVEN HEARD ABOUT IT. I WAS FIRST INFORMED ABOUT 6:30 IN THE EVENING. AT THAT TIME, I WAS NOT DEALING WITH WHAT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BE DONE. I WAS DEALING WITH A FACT THAT HAD ALREADY HAPPENED. I AM SURE THAT MILITARY COMMANDERS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD DO NOT RING UP THEIR PRESIDENTS AND ASK THEM WHAT TO DO EVERY TIME THERE IS AN INVASION OF THEIR TERRITORY". NASIR ENDED THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING, "I WANT NOTHING BUT PEACE. I WANT TO GO AS FAR AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE IT. BUT I MUST NOT BE ASKED TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE. I MUST NOT BE ASKED TO DO SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE CONDEMNED BY EVERY OTHER LEADER AND BY MY OWN PEOPLE. I AM WILLING TO GO AS FAR AS THE FACTS OF LIFE WILL ALLOW ME, AND I HOPE YOU WILL MAKE THIS CLEAR TO AND GET A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT. SURELY, THEY CAN SUPPORT THE PRINCIPLES OF YOUR PRESIDENT, AND SURELY WE CAN FIND WAYS TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF IMPLEMENTATION. SURELY, PEACE MUST NOT DEPEND BOTH ON CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROCEDURES, UPON THE DEMANDS OF THE ISRAELIS, SOME OF WHICH THEY THEMSELVES KNOW ARE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US." NASIR AGAIN ASKED ME TO STAY IN TOUCH WITH HIS AMBASSADOR IN IRAQ AND BE PREPARED TO RETURN IF A RESPONSE FOR HIS GOVERNMENT WAS FORTHCOMING.

12. I ASKED NASIR WHETHER ALL OF THE DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING YEMEN HAD BEEN FINALLY SETTLED AND IF HIS AGREEMENT WITH THE

GP-1  
900

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY



00 YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 134C 3071544  
O 031516Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
DEPT OF STATE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION THREE OF FOUR [REDACTED]

3,3(b)(1)

EYES ONLY SECRETARY OF STATE AND WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT SAUDIS WAS GOING TO BE CARRIED OUT. NASIR REPLIED, "OUR RELATIONSHIPS IN YEMEN HAVE BEEN SETTLED FOR GOOD. WE ARE GOING TO CARRY OUT OUR AGREEMENTS. THE SAME GOES FOR ALL OF THE OTHER STATES IN THE SOUTHERN ARABIAN PENINSULA. MY CONCENTRATION IS GOING TO BE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UAR."

13. NOTE THAT IN MY TALK ON THE FIRST DAY I ARRIVED, I TOLD NASIR WE WERE STILL PUZZLED AS TO WHY HE HAD MASSED TROOPS IN THE SINAI AND WE BELIEVED THIS WAS WHY THE WHOLE ISSUE HAD COME ABOUT. NASIR DID NOT REFER TO THE GULF OF AQABA, BUT SAID, "WHETHER YOU BELIEVE IT OR NOT, WE WERE IN FEAR OF AN ATTACK FROM ISRAEL. WE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE MASSING TROOPS ON THE SYRIAN BORDER WITH THE IDEA OF FIRST ATTACKING SYRIA, THEN THEY DID NOT EXPECT TO MEET GREAT RESISTANCE, AND THEN COMMENCE THEIR ATTACK ON THE UAR." SAND SAID TO HIM THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THE UAR HAD BELIEVED SUCH REPORTS, WHICH WERE SIMPLE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS. NASIR SAID THAT THE INFORMATION HAD NOT COME TO HIM FROM SOURCES HE WOULD SUSPECT. HE ADDED THAT AMONG OTHER SIGN "YOUR OWN STATE DEPARTMENT CALLED IN MY AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. IN APRIL OR MAY AND LEARNED HIM THIM THAT THERE WERE RUMORS THAT THERE MIGHT BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UAR." I TOLD HIM THAT SO FAR AS I KNEW, I HAD NEVER HEARD THIS REPORT BEFORE.

14. NASIR OBSERVED THAT THE U.S MUST REMEMBER THAT JERUSALEM PRESENTS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR ALL THREE FAITHS. HE COMMENTED THAT "IN THIS COUNTRY, WE ARE MUSLEMS, BUT WE ARE NOT ISLAMIC." I ASKED NASIR IF HE WOULD CONSIDER PERMITTING BOTH THE OLD AND NEW CITY OF JERUSALEM TO COME UNDER A SINGLE ISRALI ADMINISTRATION WITH RESPECT TO SUCH THINGS AS PUBLIC UTILITIES, ETC., BUT WITH EACH FAITH TO HAVE CUSTODY AND SUPERVISION OF ITS HOLY PLACES. NASIR REPLIED THAT EVEN

IF HE AGREED TO THIS ANY SUCH SOLUTION WOULD LEAVE ISRAEL ULTIMATELY CONFRONTED WITH WAR OR RESISTANCE SO FAR AS ANYBODY COULD SEE INTO THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT NOTHING HE OR ANY OTHER RULER IN THE WORLD COULD DO WOULD PREVENT THAT PEOPLE WILL DO THINGS IN THE NAME OF RELIGION THAT THEY WOULD NOT CONSIDER DOING IN THE NAME OF POLITICS. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE THINKS JERUSALEM COULD BE ZONED SO THAT EACH FAITH WOULD HAVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF ITS OWN SECTOR, "MY COUNTRY ISIDUSLIM, CHRISTIAN AND JEWISH, AND I EXPECT IT ALWAYS TO BE SO. EACH HAS HIS OWN PARTICULAR INTEREST IN HOW WE SETTLE THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM." WE HAD NO FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT, BECAUSE NASIR SAID THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A MATTER OF SUCH IMPORTNACE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND ONE OR MORE PERSONS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION DISCUSSED EARLIER ABOVE TO MANAGE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

15. CONCERNING THE SHELLING OF THE SUEZ REFINERIES, NASIR COMMENTED THAT HE RECOGNIZED IT AS RETALIATION FOR THE SINKING OF THE "EILATH," AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE THIS, BECAUSE IT WOULD HURT THE UAR ECONOMICALLY. HE SAID, "WE COULD HAVE ATTACKED THEIR REFINERIES, BUT WE DECIDED THAT THIS HAD GONE FAR ENOUGH, AND WE SHOULD HAVE PEACE AND NOT ESCALATION."

16. NASIR'S WILLINGNESS TO SIGN AN AGREED UN DECLARATION OR WRITING A LETTER TO THE UN AGREEING TO THE TERMS OF SUCH A DECLARATION IS, OF COURSE, CONDITIONED ON ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO DO THE SAME.

17. ON CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING, NASIR THANKED ME FOR COMING

DISCUSSED EARLIER ABOVE TO MANAGE SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

15. CONCERNING THE SELLING OF THE SUEZ REFINERY, NASIR COMMENTED THAT HE RECOGNIZED IT AS RETALIATION FOR THE SINKING OF THE "EILATH," AND THAT HE THOUGHT THE ISRAELIS HAD DONE THIS, BECAUSE IT WOULD HURT THE UAR ECONOMICALLY. HE SAID, "WE COULD HAVE ATTACKED THEIR REFINERIES, BUT WE DECIDED THAT THIS HAD GONE FAR ENOUGH, AND WE SHOULD HAVE PEACE AND NOT ESCALATION."

16. NASIR'S WILLINGNESS TO SIGN AN AGREED UN DECLARATION OR WRITING A LETTER TO THE UN AGREEING TO THE TERMS OF SUCH A DECLARATION IS, OF COURSE, CONDITIONED ON ISRAEL'S WILLINGNESS TO DO THE SAME.

17. ON CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING, NASIR THANKED ME FOR COMING AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE A FAVORABLE RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTIONS INCORPORATED IN THE FOREGOING.

18. AFTER LEAVING NASIR, I PROCEEDED TO SEE ZAKARIYAH MUHYI AL DIN AT HIS HOME. ZAKARIYAH BEGAN BY ASKING ME TO BRIEF HIM ON WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN NASIR AND ME, AND I DID SO. ZAKARIYAH ASKED WHETHER WE HAD GOTTEN INTO DISCUSSION OF DETAILS CONCERNING THE TERRITORIES INVOLVED, ESPECIALLY THE GAZA STRIP. I TOLD HIM NASIR HAD SAID OTHER NATIONS MUST BE CONSULTED INsofar AS THEIR TERRITORIES WERE CONCERNED, BUT THAT THE GAZA STRIP HAD NOT BEEN MENTIONED TODAY. ZAKARIYAH SAID THAT RELINQUISHING THE GAZA STRIP COULD NOT BE DECIDED ON BY THE UAR OR THE ISRAELI. THE UAR HAD NEVER ANNEXED GAZA FORMALLY BECAUSE IT IS TERRITORY BELONGING TO THE PALESTINIS, AS IS SOME OF THE TERRITORY ON THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN. I ASKED THAT IF THIS IS TRUE, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE PALESTINIANS. ZAKARIYAH SMILED AND SAID HE DID NOT KNOW. I ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE AHMAD SHUKAYRI, AND ZAKARIYAH AGAIN SMILED AND COMMENTED THAT SHUKAYRI WAS AN APPOINTED, NOT AN ELECTED OFFICIAL, AND THAT THERE MIGHT WELL BE SOME OTHER POLITICAL VOICE WHO COULD SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE SEEMED DISAPPOINTED THAT THE ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED BY NASIR. I TAKE IT AS ZAKARIYAH'S IMPLICATION, AND ONLY THAT, THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THE FATE OF THE GAZA STRIP SHOULD BE A DETERMINING FACTOR. HE IS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED ABOUT THE PEOPLE IN THE GAZA STRIP, AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY COULD BE INCORPORATED INTO THE STATE OR ISRAEL, AND PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS TO WHETHER THE ISRAELI WOULD ALLOW THEM TO STAY. HE SAID, "THE REAL PROBLEM IS NOT THE LAND BUT THE PEOPLE, AND WHETHER AFTER WE MAKE PEACE THE NATIVES WOULD BE EJECTED AS UNSIRABLE." I TOLD HIM THAT THESE WERE THE SORT OF THINGS I HAD GATHERED FROM NASIR, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSIONS BY ONE OR MORE PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE APPOINTED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL PURSUANT TO THE RESOLUTION CITED ABOVE.

19. ZAKARIYAH SAID THAT THE THOUGHT SO FAR AS HE KNEW I HAD CLEARLY OUTLINED NASIR'S VIEWS. HE SAID, "WE WANT TO GO AS FAR AS WE CAN, BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT WAR CAN ONLY DESTROY US BOTH, AND THAT PEACE CAN FOLLOW US TO FULFILL OUR OBLIGATIONS AS A NATION. BUT PLEASE DO NOT ASK US TO DO THE IMPOSSIBLE, AND PLEASE TRY TO TELL YOUR PEOPLE THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT OTHERS MIGHT SAY, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH A MEDIATOR COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE, AND EVEN THE ISRAELIS KNOW THIS AS WELL AS WE. I ASKED ZAKARIYAH IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE PUBLIC OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT, AND HE SAID, "NO. NEITHER IN THIS COUNTRY NOR IN OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. WE MIGHT CHANGE THEIR OPINION ON OTHER TOPICS, BUT NOT ON THIS".

20. I ASKED ZAKARIYAH IF THERE WERE ANYTHING HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD TO THE REVIEW OF NASSER'S VIEWS. HE SAID, "YES. FIRST OF ALL, WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A NEW START IN RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. WE HAVE BEEN THROUGH A PERIOD OF CONFUSION. WE KNOW BEYOND ALL DOUBT THAT IT IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST TO HAVE ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE U.S. WE HOPE THAT YOUR COUNTRY FEELS

1967 NOV 3 17 5

DL  
DLA580 .....  
OO YEKADS  
DE YEKADL 134D 3071544  
O 031516Z ZYH  
FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
DEPT OF STATE  
ZEM

~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF FOUR [REDACTED]  
EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY OF STATE AND WHITE HOUSE FOR THE  
PRESIDENT:

3.3(b)(1)

THE SAME WAY. WE ARE FEARFUL THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT JUST DOES NOT UNDERSTAND US AND THAT YOUR PEOPLE DO NOT UNDERSTAND US. WE ARE FEARFUL THAT THEY DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS POSSIBLE AND WHAT IS IMPOSSIBLE. PLEASE EXPLAIN THAT ABOVE EVERYTHING ELSE, WE ARE NATIONALISTS. WE ARE EGYPTIANS AND WE ARE NOT TRYING TO RULE THE ARAB WORLD. YOU MAY NOT BELIEVE THAT NASIR FROM TIME TO TIME HAS FELT THAT HE HAS BEEN PUT INTO A CORNER. HE FEELS HE HAS BEEN PERSONALLY DISLIKED AT HIGH LEVELS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. ZAKARIYAH WENT ON, "HE HAS GREAT RESPECT FOR YOUR PRESIDENT AND FOR YOUR PEOPLE. HE KNOWS HE HAS MADE MISTAKES, BUT HE THOROUGHLY WANTS, AS WE ALL DO, THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR HELP IN MAKING PEACE -- BUT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT IS HUMANLY POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT THINK WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THIS. WE DO NOT THINK OUR PUBLIC RELATIONS ARE GOOD, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DEPEND ON SOMEONE TO GET OUR POINT OF VIEW ACROSS. I HOPE THAT YOU GET A FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM YOUR GOVERNMENT ALONG THE LINES OF YOUR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT NASIR AND THAT WE CAN MOVE TO PEACE. WE WILL BE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING THE RESPONSE THAT IS MADE AS THE RESULT OF OUR CONVERSATIONS."

21. ZAKARIYAH MADE THE POINT THAT PRIOR TO THE KHARTOUM MEETING, THE FEELING FOR CONTINUATION OF SOME FORM OF HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL WAS VERY STRONG. HE SAID IN FACT THAT ONLY ON THIS ASPECT HAS THERE EVER BEEN ARAB UNITY. BUT AT KHARTOUM, NASIR TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN SEEING THAT THE UAR MUST HAVE POLITICAL PEACE, CORRECTS ITS OWN ERRORS AND SETTLE ITS OWN PROBLEMS WITH YEMEN AND THE OTHER STATES IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA.

22. REGARDING JERUSALEM, ZAKARIYAH MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS AS HAD NASIR. HE NOTED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS OF CONCERN NOT ONLY TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO TO A GREAT MANY OF THE AFRICAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE THERE WERE HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF THE MUSLIM FAITH.

23. I WAS ADVISED THAT IF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WERE TO APPOINT AN INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES NOTED ABOVE, ZAKARIYAH MIGHT WELL BE SENT TO JOIN FOREIGN MINISTER RIYAD IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. LIKE NASIR, ZAKARIYAH THANKED ME FOR COMING TO CAIRO AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPES FOR A FAVORABLE RESPONSE.

24. I SUSPECT THE ONLY WAY FOR ME TO BE ADVISED OF THE RESPONSE TO THE FOREGOING IS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT. WHEN I RETURN WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR WE GET IN CONTRACTUAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. I CAN AND WILL, HOWEVER, INTERRUPT THOSE DISCUSSIONS AND COME TO BEIRUT TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)(6)

[REDACTED] WE HAVE DEVISED A METHOD SO THAT HE CAN DISCREETLY REQUEST ME TO RETURN HERE. I ASSUME THERE IS NO GREAT HURRY ABOUT GETTING BACK TO NASIR, SINCE HE TOLD ME HE WAS GOING ON VACATION. I GATHER THIS IS TO BE A SHORT VACATION, BUT NASIR DID NOT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF DAYS. I ALSO SUPPOSE HE WOULD WANT TO BE IN TOUCH IF YOU CONSIDER THE RESPONSE A MATTER OF URGENCY. I WILL DO NOTHING UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU. IF IT IS DECIDED FOR ANY REASON THAT I SHOULD NOT COMMUNICATE A RESPONSE TO NASIR, I WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE CONVERSATIONS IN IRAQ AND FROM BEIRUT PROCEED HOME.



...CONCERN, ZAKARIYAH MADE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME POINTS AS HAD NASIR. HE NOTED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS OF CONCERN NOT ONLY TO THE ARAB COUNTRIES, BUT ALSO TO A GREAT MANY OF THE AFRICAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE THERE WERE HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF THE MUSLIM FAITH.

23. I WAS ADVISED THAT IF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL WERE TO APPOINT AN INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION ALONG THE LINES NOTED ABOVE, ZAKARIYAH MIGHT WELL BE SENT TO JOIN FOREIGN MINISTER RIYAD IN THE DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK. LIKE NASIR, ZAKARIYAH THANKED ME FOR COMING TO CAIRO AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPES FOR A FAVORABLE RESPONSE.

24. I SUSPECT THE ONLY WAY FOR ME TO BE ADVISED OF THE RESPONSE TO THE FOREGOING IS TO RETURN TO BEIRUT. WHEN I RETURN WILL DEPEND ON HOW FAR WE GET IN CONTRACTUAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ. I CAN AND WILL, HOWEVER, INTERRUPT THOSE DISCUSSIONS AND COME TO BEIRUT TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOU [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

[REDACTED] WE HAVE DEVISED A METHOD SO THAT HE CAN DISCREETLY REQUEST ME TO RETURN HERE. I ASSUME THERE IS NO GREAT HURRY ABOUT GETTING BACK TO NASIR, SINCE HE TOLD ME HE WAS GOING ON VACATION. I GATHER THIS IS TO BE A SHORT VACATION, BUT NASIR DID NOT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF DAYS. I ALSO SUPPOSE HE WOULD WANT TO BE IN TOUCH IF YOU CONSIDER THE RESPONSE A MATTER OF URGENCY. I WILL DO NOTHING UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU. IF IT IS DECIDED FOR ANY REASON THAT I SHOULD NOT COMMUNICATE A RESPONSE TO NASIR, I WILL RETURN TO BEIRUT AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE CONVERSATIONS IN IRAQ AND FROM BEIRUT PROCEED HOME.

25. I WAS ASKED BY PACE OF THE NEW YORK TIMES AND CARRUTHERS OF THE LOS ANGELES HERALD WHETHER I WOULD VISIT WITH THEM. I ONLY SPOKE TO PACE ON THE TELEPHONE AND TOLD HIM THAT I WAS DISCUSSING COMMERCIAL FERTILIZER AND LAND RECLAMATION AS I HAVE BEEN DOING FOR SOME YEARS. I WOULD NOT GIVE HIM THE NAMES OF ANYBODY WITH WHOM I HAD HAD CONVERSATIONS. I DID SAY THAT I WAS ACTING ENTIRELY ON MY OWN, DISCUSSING COMMERCIAL MATTERS OF LONG STANDING AND WAS NOT IN THE UAR WITH ANY OFFICIAL STATUS.

26. I HAVE DICTATED THIS [REDACTED] IN BEIRUT AND WILL NOT HAVE TIME TO HAVE IT TRANSCRIBED FOR READING BEFORE I DEPART FOR BAGHDAD. I SHALL READ IT AND MAKE SUCH CORRECTIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY ON MY RETURN TO BEIRUT.

3.3(b)(1)

27. ONE FINAL POINT FROM DISCUSSION WITH ZAKARIYAH: WHILE HE SPOKE OF MAKING A NEW START IN OUR RELATIONSHIPS, HE SAID THAT OF COURSE AT SOME POINT, WE MUST RENEW FORMAL, DIPLOMATIC TIES. I SAID ONLY IF THIS WERE THE WISH OF PRESIDENT NASIR AND THAT THEY SHOULD THEN INSTRUCT THEIR FOREIGN MINISTER TO BE IN TOUCH WITH OUR SECRETARY OF STATE. I NOTED IT WAS THEY WHO BROKE RELATIONS, AND THEY WHO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO DISCUSS THEIR RESUMPTION.

BP-1

1-30

~~SECRET~~

NNN

EYES ONLY



*Pres file*

Friday, November 3, 1967 -- 1:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. McNamara is hooked to give a speech at Denver on Tuesday, November 7. When I underlined what I have done many times before -- namely, Tuesday must be held for lunch -- he said that if we are going to speak around the country, we can't always decide the day of the week.

Since Sec. Rusk must host a lunch for Hussein on Monday, November 6, Wednesday is free for both of the Secretaries.

W. W. Rostow

Tell Sec. McNamara to cancel Denver speech\_\_\_\_\_

Wednesday lunch acceptable\_\_\_\_\_

Set meeting for some other time on Monday\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

Remarks by Secretary McNamara to the  
National Association of Educational Broadcasters  
7 November 1967

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I want to talk to you this morning about the unused potential of the Department of Defense -- a potential for contributing to the solution of the social problems wracking our nation.

The Defense Department is the largest single institution in the world: an institution employing directly four and a half million men and women, indirectly employing several million more, and directing the use of nearly 10 percent of the nation's wealth.

The question I want to put to you is this: can these vast resources be used to contribute to our nation's benefit beyond the narrow -- though vitally necessary -- role of military power?

As a basis for exploring this question, I want to describe to you three projects that are currently under way:

- . An Open Housing Program, to break through the barriers of racial discrimination in off-base housing for military personnel.
- . PROJECT 100,000, a program to salvage the poverty-scarred youth of our society at the rate of 100,000 men each year -- first for two years of military service, and then for a lifetime of productive activity in civilian society.
- . And finally, PROJECT TRANSITION, a program to assist the three-quarters of a million men leaving military service each year to select and train for the role in civilian life that will contribute most to their personal fulfillment and to the nation's benefit.

But before discussing these programs, let me make it unmistakably clear that our primary responsibility and our clear mandate from the President and from the Congress is to procure and maintain in a high state of combat readiness whatever military forces are necessary to protect this nation from external attack, keep our commitments to our allies, and support the objectives of our foreign policy.

We are meeting that responsibility.

Since 1961, excluding those forces added because of operations in Vietnam, we have increased our military capability in every essential category:

- . A 45% increase in the number of combat assigned Army divisions -- from 11 to 16.
- . A 73% increase in the funds for general ship construction and conversion to modernize the fleet.

- . A 200% increase in the number of guided missile surface ships -- from 23 to 72.
- . A 300% increase in our inventory of nuclear-powered ships -- from 19 to 77.
- . A 40% increase in the number of Air Force tactical fighter squadrons -- from 67 to 94 -- and a 100% increase in the total payload capability of all our fighter and attack aircraft, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.
- . A 300% increase in helicopter troop lift capability.
- . A 340% increase in our fixed-wing airlift capability -- an increase which will reach 1000% in the 1970s with the introduction of the mammoth new C-5A transport.
- . A 100% increase in the number of nuclear weapons deployed in NATO Europe.
- . A 160% increase in the number and total megatonnage of nuclear weapons in the strategic alert forces.

Nor do these increases tell the full story. We have developed in the past several years a broad new array of weapons which include:

- . The SR-71: a highly sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft that can fly three times the speed of sound.
- . The POSEIDON intercontinental missile which has five to ten times the destructive power of the POLARIS missile it replaces.
- . The MBT-70, a new main battle tank, providing increased firepower, protection and mobility.
- . The CH-54 flying crane: our first heavy-lift helicopter, which has paid for itself many times over in recovering battle-damaged helicopters, as well as performing an expanded range of supply and logistic functions in support of our troops.
- . The family of F-111 aircraft: the most sophisticated and effective attack aircraft in the world today -- and recognized as such by foreign governments who are buying it in preference to aircraft produced in their own countries.

- . The multi-warhead ballistic missile re-entry system which multiplies the effectiveness of our missile force.
- . The WALLEYE guided bomb, which uses a television guidance system, enabling aircraft and conventional explosives to hit targets in Southeast Asia today with extreme accuracy and effectiveness.
- . The LANCE tactical surface-to-surface missile, equipped with both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, which has greater range, accuracy and reliability than the missiles it will replace.
- . The SPARTAN and SPRINT anti-ballistic missiles which will provide defense against a possible Chinese attack in the 1970s.
- . The PHOENIX air-to-air missile system, providing us with the capability of destroying formations of enemy aircraft in the air at substantially greater distances.
- . The SRAM air-to-surface missile, increasing the effectiveness of our strategic bombers, and enabling us to penetrate advanced enemy defenses.
- . The COBRA attack helicopter, providing faster, more flexible support of our ground troops.
- . The A-7 attack aircraft, giving our Navy and the Air Force an improved capability to support our ground forces, with its greater bomb capacity and longer range.
- . And scores of other weapon systems and sub-systems -- many of them, of course, still highly classified.

Now, obviously, the real test of combat readiness is not simply to have an adequate arsenal of advanced weaponry -- which we have greatly added to over the past six years -- but to be able to respond rapidly and effectively to an emergency.

Such an emergency faced us in the summer of 1965, when it became apparent that Hanoi was on the verge of cutting South Vietnam in half by overwhelming force.

If we in the United States were to prevent that defeat, we had to respond rapidly and effectively.

That is what we did -- and our accomplishments in the face of that emergency are the most realistic measure of our combat readiness.



In the first crucial months of the crisis we moved over 100,000 men to Southeast Asia in 120 days. We supplied them with hundreds of thousands of different items, at the end of a 10,000 mile pipeline -- which at the time had only one deepwater port, and neither roads nor rail line to move the supplies inland.

In those first critical months we saved South Vietnam from complete and final defeat.

Today we are supporting some 600,000 men in Southeast Asia -- at a standard of proficiency never before equalled in the history of warfare -- and we are doing so without wage controls, without price controls, without profit controls -- and indeed without the serious dislocation of the economy that has been the inevitable accompaniment of every other war we have fought in this century.

What is more, we are accomplishing this without calling up our reserve forces; without any significant movement of our men and equipment out of Western Europe; without any important change in our forces in South Korea; and without jeopardizing our ability to meet additional emergencies that might occur elsewhere in the world.

Now, how has all this been possible?

It has been possible because we have met our first and overriding responsibility in the Defense Department: we were, we are, and we will continue to remain in a high state of combat readiness.

Combat readiness is our primary responsibility.

But I want to stress that responsibility is not inconsistent with other goals.

We have been concerned, for example, with obtaining and operating the required level of military power at the lowest possible cost. That goal is clearly sensible in a Department that is spending over \$70 billion per year.

Efficient, economical management does not detract from combat readiness. On the contrary, it strengthens it.

Our defense expenditures today -- even including the full cost of our commitments in Southeast Asia -- constitute a smaller percentage of the Gross National Product than they did in any fiscal year from 1952 through 1959.

That is due in part to the five-year Cost Reduction Program, which we initiated in 1962. Over the five years we saved the taxpayers in excess of 14 billions of dollars. Now that the initial phase has been completed,

we have established the Cost Reduction Program as a permanent annual procedure -- with stated goals and carefully audited results.

As part of reducing costs, we have to date initiated actions to consolidate, reduce, or close over 950 Defense installations or activities -- all over the world -- involving property that has become surplus to foreseeable peacetime or wartime needs.

The base closure program understandably created, in the beginning, a great deal of local apprehension and political pressure. And yet we have not reversed a single base closure decision due to pressure; nor has it been necessary to reopen a single installation to take care of the 25% expansion of our forces which has occurred in the past two years. The recurring annual savings of the base closure program alone, when completed -- including the elimination of 200,000 jobs -- will total \$1.5 billion.

Furthermore, the usual pattern of these base closures is that the local communities -- ultimately -- benefit from the action. Our Office of Economic Adjustment works closely with the community leaders from the day a base closure is announced, and helps explore fully the growth potential of the area.

Now, just as efficient management and cost reduction are not the Defense Department's primary goals -- but are nevertheless entirely consistent with our central responsibility of combat readiness -- so it is becoming clear there are other measures that we can take that benefit the economy, and the social profile of the nation, which are equally consistent with our primary objective.

As I said at the outset, we are currently conducting three programs which are directed toward alleviating certain social inequities in the nation.

First, the Open Housing Program:

Racial discrimination -- granting the great legislative advances that have been achieved in the past six years -- remains a festering infection in our national life.

The Defense Department, beginning with the courageous executive order of President Truman in 1948 integrating the armed services, has been a powerful fulcrum in removing the roadblocks to racial justice -- not merely in the military, but in the country at large.

But clearly the nation's road to equality is still strewn with boulders of bias.

Shortly after I became Secretary of Defense, I asked Mr. Gerhard A. Gesell, a leading member of the bar, to organize a committee to review the progress of equal opportunity in the Armed Forces.

That committee took a hard, realistic look at the problem. It reported that substantial improvement had been made on military bases. But it found that there remained severe off-base discrimination affecting thousands of Negro servicemen and their families. This discrimination was most destructive in the field of housing.

Open housing is a serious issue throughout our society. It is not confined to the Armed Forces. Too many of our citizens cannot live in the homes of their choice, on the streets of their choice, in the neighborhoods of their choice.

But this intolerable racial discrimination affects military personnel even more severely than it does the population at large. The serviceman and his family, on limited compensation and under military orders, must move every few years. While defending their nation, they are singularly defenseless against this bigotry.

My response to the Gesell Committee findings was to issue a directive incorporating its recommendations. Commanders everywhere were asked to organize voluntary programs to eliminate housing discrimination in the communities surrounding their bases.

In the Pentagon we turned our minds to other problems.

Early this year we reviewed the results of that four-year-old directive. We sent teams to a dozen bases to look into every aspect of equal opportunity. A special task force was set up for the greater Washington area. Seventeen thousand service families were surveyed. Their answers were analyzed.

One fact became painfully clear. Our voluntary program had failed, and failed miserably.

This failure we found intolerable. I put the matter to you bluntly: our nation should not, and will not, ask a Negro sergeant, for example, to risk his life, day after dangerous day, in the heat and hardship of a jungle war, and then bring him home and compel him to remain separated from his wife and his children because of the hate and prejudice that parades under the pomposity of racial superiority.

And yet, that is precisely what has been happening in this country.

The color of the blood that our men shed in the defense of Asia is all the same shade.

But when these men return home, it is not the color of their blood that matters: it is the color of their skin.

There are thousands of our Negro troops, returning from Vietnam, who are being discriminated against in off-base housing. When there is adequate housing on the base, Negro men in uniform are treated as all Americans should be treated. When there is not, and the Negro must depend on the civilian community for housing, he all too often is denied this equality of treatment.

Because of his color he suffers a penalty; his family suffers a penalty; and our national security suffers a penalty because of the impaired morale of our fighting forces.

We are talking here about a group of men who have distinguished themselves in the service of their nation. It is a fact that Negroes often volunteer for the most difficult and hazardous assignments. It is a fact that 20 percent of Army deaths in Vietnam last year were Negroes.

Earlier this year, in a visit to his home State of South Carolina, General Westmoreland paid tribute to the superb performance of these men.

"I say to the people of my native State and my country," the General noted, "that the performance of the Negro serviceman has been particularly inspirational to me. He has served with distinction equal to that of his white comrade in arms. The Negro serviceman, like all servicemen, has been a credit to our country. He has been courageous on the battlefield, proficient in a cross section of technical skills. Like his white colleague, he understands what the war is all about, he is loyal to his country and supports its policies, and is carrying out his responsibilities with a sense of responsibility."

The Negro serviceman has been loyal and responsible to his country. But the people of his country have failed in their loyalty and responsibility to him. The country which sent him to hazardous duty abroad refuses to permit him to live in the midst of the white civilian community when he returns.

Our original voluntary program to correct off-base housing discrimination floundered and fell apart. It lacked sufficient leadership from the top -- starting with me, and going right on down through the senior echelon of the Defense establishment. And it lacked appropriately stiff sanctions for the violation of our anti-discrimination policy.

We have forged, therefore, a whole new set of tools to deal with this failure.

We have mapped out a two-pronged campaign. The first phase was to compile a nation-wide census of open off-base rental housing for military personnel. That we have completed.



The second phase is to mobilize -- throughout the entire country -- effective community support for non-discriminatory military Off-base housing. That is now well under way.

We selected the greater Washington metropolitan area, including Maryland and Virginia, as our first objective. We wanted to make the area surrounding the nation's capital a model program -- as it should be -- and we wanted to learn quickly all the lessons we could that would assist us in the country at large.

Officials from the highest levels of the Defense Department -- the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, and senior commanders -- met with realtors and landlords of the area and put the matter to them squarely.

The extent of off-base housing discrimination was appalling. The morale of our Negro servicemen and their families was being severely eroded. We told the landlords the Defense Department could no longer tolerate the situation.

We appealed to the landlords for voluntary compliance with our non-discriminatory housing policy.

But we pointed out that the situation as it stood was so unjust that, whether we secured their voluntary compliance or not, we simply could not permit the conditions to continue. If, then, the landlords felt they would not or could not comply, we were going to have to prohibit any of our men -- regardless of their race -- from signing rental agreements in housing units where such discrimination was practiced.

Many proprietors complied voluntarily. Too many did not.

Let me say that in many instances their position -- while shortsighted -- was understandable. Some faced genuine economic pressures.

In any event, they did not comply. And so we were compelled to take the only action open to us. We prohibited all military personnel, both white and Negro, from signing new leases or rental agreements in their facilities.

This had the effect of applying a countervailing economic pressure, and our open housing program took on an altogether new and positive direction.

In Northern Virginia and Maryland, within 120 days, we more than trebled the number of non-discriminatory units -- from about 15,000 to 53,000 units.

Now we are at work elsewhere throughout the nation. We have, for example, an intensified program going on in California at the moment. We are giving particular emphasis to this State, not merely because of the large number of

Defense installations and military personnel there; but because of the 14 states with open housing regulations and laws, California has the lowest percentage of apartment facilities open to all races.

Indeed, we have plans to extend the program in a dozen additional states in the near future.

Everywhere our approach will be the same. We will survey the local situation of each military base. We will meet with the realtors and landlords and explain the problem fully. We will request their cooperation and seek their voluntary compliance. We will do everything possible to see that our military families act as good tenants: that they pay their obligations promptly, and that they respect the property of private owners. We will enlist the help of local and State officials. And only when, and if, all other actions fail, will we apply the appropriate sanctions.

I want to emphasize that I am fully aware that the Defense Department is not a philanthropic foundation or a social-welfare institution. But I want to emphasize just as strongly that I do not propose to let our Negro servicemen and their families continue to suffer the injustices and indignities they have in the past.

It is said that there are no atheists in foxholes. I can assure you that in South Vietnam there is no segregation in foxholes.

There is no segregation of our servicemen in on-base housing.

And the Defense Department cannot tolerate segregation of our servicemen in off-base housing.

Where we must use stiff sanctions, we will.

What we prefer, hope for, and expect is an overwhelming measure of voluntary compliance.

Now let me discuss with you for a moment our second program in the social field. It is called PROJECT 100,000, and I first announced it in a speech in New York in August of last year.

I pointed out, at the time, that though there were roughly 1.8 million young men reaching military service age each year in the United States, some 600,000 -- a full third -- were failing to qualify under our draft standards. Some had medical problems, but I was particularly concerned about those thousands who failed because of educational deficiencies.

In some areas, the failure rate for draftees ran as high as 60 percent; and for Negroes in some states it exceeded 80 percent.

What this clearly meant was that the burden of military service was not being shouldered equally. Inequities were serious: inequities by region; inequities by race; and inequities by educational level.

What was even worse was the obvious implication. If so massive a number of our young men were educationally unqualified for even the least complicated tasks of military service, how could they reasonably be expected to lead productive and rewarding lives in an increasingly technological and highly-skilled society?

Our studies confirmed that a great number of these draft rejectees were the hapless and hopeless victims of poverty: a poverty that is not the mere absence of American middle-class affluence, but something infinitely more complex: a corrosive and decaying mix of social, educational, and environmental deprivation.

What these men badly need is a sense of personal achievement -- a sense of succeeding at some task -- a sense of their own intrinsic potential.

They have potential, but the slow and silent poison of the poverty virus has paralyzed it in many of them. They have grown up in an atmosphere of drift and discouragement. It is not simply the sometimes squalid ghettos of their external environment that has debilitated them -- but an internal and more destructive ghetto of personal disillusionment and despair: a ghetto of the human spirit.

Poverty in America pockmarks its victims inwardly.

If unchecked and unreversed, that inner ghetto of the poverty-scarred personality of these men can fester into explosive frustrations of bitterness and violence.

Chronic failures in school throughout their childhood, they are destined to a downward spiral of defeat and decay in a skill-oriented nation that requires from its manpower pool an increasing index of competence, discipline, and self-confidence.

Poverty destines thousands of young men today to a dismal future. Destines them, yes. But dooms them, no.

These young men -- and they are typified by those who in the past have failed to qualify for military service due to educational deficiencies -- can be saved from that futile future. They can be rehabilitated, both inwardly and out. They are men, we concluded, who given the benefits of the Defense Department's experience in educational innovation and on-the-job training, and placed in an atmosphere of high motivation and morale, could be transformed

into competent military personnel. Beyond that, after their tour of duty they could return to civilian life -- equipped with new skills and attitudes -- and thus break out of the self-perpetrating poverty cycle.

The Defense Department is the world's largest producer of skilled men. We provide enlisted men with highly professional training in 1,500 different skills, in more than 2,000 separate courses. And each year we return about three-quarters of a million men to the nation's manpower pool.

The goal of PROJECT 100,000 was, therefore, to take in 40,000 rejectees the first year, and 100,000 each year thereafter. The program completed its first year on September 30.

I want to report to you on its progress.

Our goal was to take 40,000 men; we took 49,000.

They entered all of the services: Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

Now, what sort of backgrounds do these men come from? About 60 percent are whites; about 40 percent Negroes. Their average age is 21. Thirty percent of them are unemployed at the time they come to us, and an additional 26 percent are earning less than \$60 a week.

What this means is that more than half of these men are gripped in poverty. Nor is that surprising. Their average reading score is a bare sixth-grade level; and 14 percent of them read at a third-grade level or less. Many are poorly motivated when they reach us. They lack initiative. They lack pride. They lack ambition.

If nothing were done to give them a strong sense of their own worth and potential, they, their wives and their children would almost inevitably be the unproductive recipients of some form of the dole 10 years from now.

I want to repeat: we have taken these men into the service because we are convinced that, given the proper environment and training, they can contribute just as much to the defense of their country as men from the more advantaged segments of our society.

Has that belief been borne out by the facts?

We now have had a full year's experience with this program, and let me tell you the results.

Ninety-eight percent of our traditional categories of recruits successfully graduated from basic training during the year. And the successful graduation rate of these 49,000 new category men was 96 percent -- only two percentage points less than our traditional recruits.



I have insisted that these men should never be singled-out or stigmatized as a special group. Technically -- and for our own internal record-keeping -- men who would have formerly been draft rejectees are termed New Standards men. But the men themselves are never informed that they are in this category.

It is absolutely imperative that they believe in themselves and their own potential. They obviously cannot do that if we treat them with anything remotely suggesting condescendence.

The plain fact is that our PROJECT 100,000 is succeeding beyond even our most hopeful expectations. Many of our commanders report that these men are turning out to be even more highly motivated than some servicemen with a much more privileged background.

Now these are the initial results, and we are immensely encouraged. But obviously the real test is going to come later, when these men move back into civilian society. How will they fare then?

Will the vital sense of achievement and self-confidence they have experienced in their military service, as well as the skills they have learned, move them forward in society -- or will they return to the depressing downward-spiraling, poverty-in-the-midst-of-plenty phenomenon that plagues our urban ghettos and our rural pockets of economic stagnation?

We cannot say for certain. But we intend to find out.

We are launching a careful follow-up study to test conclusively the ultimate outcome of PROJECT 100,000. At least a decade of careful measurement of the performance of the men both in and out of the service will be required. We won't know until the end of that period what the definitive study will prove. But I am willing to make a prediction. I am convinced that the PROJECT 100,000 men will continue to do a fully creditable job in the service; and that on return to civilian life, their earning capacity -- and their over-all achievement in society -- will be two or three times what it would have been had there been no such program, and had they remained rejectees.

Hundreds of thousands of men can be salvaged from the blight of poverty, and the Defense Department -- with no detriment whatever to its primary role -- is particularly well equipped to salvage them.

We not only can do it. We are doing it. And the benefit to our society -- and to the ultimate roots of our security -- will be immense.

Now, let me describe to you briefly our third program in this field. We call it PROJECT TRANSITION.

As I mentioned, we return some 750,000 men from the services annually to civilian life. Some of these men can move readily into civilian jobs without difficulty, but a significant number of them are faced with genuine problems.

We surveyed the situation, and found that some 50 percent of the men about to leave the services need and want some degree of help to make the transition to a productive civilian life.

To provide that help, we have created a voluntary program -- PROJECT TRANSITION -- for men with 30 to 180 days of service time remaining. The project gives priority to certain groups: to those disabled in battle; to those with no previous civilian occupation; to combat arms servicemen with no civilian-related skill; to those who have such a skill, but who require additional training or upgrading; and finally to those who desire a completely new civilian skill, regardless of their current training status.

The program meets four basic needs of the man leaving the service: counseling, skill enhancement, education, and job placement.

We now have pilot programs -- for each of the services -- at five bases. I can report to you today that within sixty days PROJECT TRANSITION will be in operation at all eighty of the major installations in this country.

We have enlisted the cooperation of other federal agencies -- the Labor Department, HEW, the Postal Service -- as well as a number of State and local agencies that can assist with training, and offer employment to these men. A number of police departments around the nation, for example, are participating, not only with professional advice and technical assistance but with solid job offers as well.

Though the program is still in its pilot stage, it clearly has tremendous potential, and industrial leaders throughout the nation have already expressed enthusiasm for the idea. Further, the Ford Foundation has offered to work closely with us in solving the problems connected with placing the right veteran in the right job.

We are going to be able to give the returning Negro veteran -- particularly the Negro veteran who without help might be compelled to drift back into the stagnation of the urban ghetto -- an opportunity for valuable training and satisfying employment.

Every veteran -- regardless of color, creed, or class -- who has served his country in the Armed Forces deserves the opportunity to move back usefully and productively into civilian life. PROJECT TRANSITION will help give him the opportunity.

I think the point we must realize is this. There is no question but that the economic, social, and educational legislation of the current period eventually will transform American society immensely for the better.

But the very magnitude of the task will require a decade or two for the full effects to be felt.

This means that the present generation of the under-privileged youth of all races, caught in the self-perpetuating trap of poverty, are in danger of being left out of these eventual benefits.

The President has made clear that the United States cannot be satisfied with that situation. We must find ways to assist people now -- even before our present legislation can reach its full potential for economic and social improvement.

This is manifestly a national responsibility -- not primarily a Department of Defense responsibility.

Our primary responsibility -- to repeat -- is the security of this nation. But in the ultimate analysis, the foundation of that security is a stable social structure. I suggest to you that the Defense Department can find ways to contribute to the development of such a structure without compromising the combat readiness of its forces.

The three social programs I have described to you today are the kinds of programs that will bolster the security of this nation. They are the kinds of programs that will reduce the criticism, some of it justified, that we are often bludgeoned with internationally: criticism that grows out of the discrepancy between our traditional preaching of the principles of liberty and equality -- and our obvious lapses in the practice of those two bedrock constitutional guarantees. They are partial answers to the basic question: can our present American society afford to meet simultaneously its responsibilities both at home and abroad?

Can we continue to meet our commitments to contain aggression internationally, and at the same time take the measures necessary to cure our urban and racial ills here at home?

I say definitively that we can.

This nation is immensely powerful -- both in material and human resources.

Our current Defense expenditures -- as heavy as they are -- are only 9 percent of the GNP. That is a lesser percentage of the GNP than defense spending in most of the years of the 1950s. The taxes we pay today are billions of dollars less than the taxes we would be paying under the tax rates of the 1950s. The modest surcharge that the President is recommending -- and which makes eminent sense in our highly charged economy -- will represent a recision of less than half of the tax cuts this Administration has achieved.

And yet, we appear to believe that we cannot afford to achieve all that genuinely needs achieving.

We appear to believe that we are stretching our resources too thinly.

We appear to believe that we cannot simultaneously wage war against aggression abroad, and a war against poverty, urban decay, and social injustice here at home.

That we cannot afford it is a myth.

That we may choose not to attempt it, is another matter entirely.

But if we make that choice, let us make it deliberately and rationally.

Let us not make that choice because of a mere mythology -- the mythology that America is not strong enough to do all that needs doing.

We are strong enough materially and technologically. We do have the resources in both money and manpower.

What we may lack is the will power.

If we do lack it, so be it. But let that be our conscious choice. Let us face the issues honestly, and admit to ourselves that we simply do not want to make the effort.

Let us not blame the lack of effort on the myth that we cannot do all that needs doing.

For the fact is, we can.

We can curb aggression abroad. And we can meet our pressing social problems here at home. And we can do both at the same time if we will use wisely existing institutions and available resources.

The simple question is this: do we have the requisite faith in ourselves?

Do we have the requisite confidence in our constitutional objectives?

Do we have the requisite resolve to complete the achievements that the United States was founded less than 200 years ago to secure?

I, for one, say we do.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what say you?

Thank you, and good morning.

E N D



Friday, November 3, 1967  
9:20 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the full take of statements  
on Vietnam by Messrs. Romney, Reagan,  
Rockefeller, Nixon and Percy -- up to  
October 27.

W. W. Rostow

*4 large, loose-leaf volumes*

WWRostow:rlh

39

Friday, November 3, 1967  
9:10 a. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

The marked passages in the attached report on one province (Long An) for one month (Sept. 1967) indicate clearly the process of erosion which, for old professional guerrilla warriors, indicates the clock is ticking slowly against them. Thus:

- pressure on the DMZ <sup>*and Cambodian border*</sup> to draw U. S. strength out of the provinces;
- ducking of engagements by the VC main force units;
- attacks on RD cadres;
- and any other actions that can slow down the process and buy time for erosion in the U. S. base for conduct of the war.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment (TDCS-314/16031-67 31 Oct 67)

*(initials)*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 19

By isa, NARS, Date 6-22-84

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

39a  
J  
ROUTINE  
IN TELEPOUCH

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

STAT/DIA NMCC/MC I SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR CIA/NMCC NIC NSA OCR SDO AID  
USIA ONE ORR DCS CGS  
F-40 DD/T

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

1.3(a)(4)

OCT 31 22 23 Z

DIST 31 OCTOBER 1967

Roston

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM  
DOI SEPTEMBER 1967  
SUBJECT SUMMARY OF VIET CONG ACTIVITIES IN LONG AN PROVINCE  
DURING SEPTEMBER 1967

ACQ VIETNAM, BIEN HOA /17 OCTOBER 1967/ [REDACTED]  
SOURCE THIS IS A VIETNAM SITUATION REPORT PREPARED AS OF  
30 SEPTEMBER 1967 BY CAS OFFICERS IN THE AREA CONCERNED

1.3(a)(4)

1.3(a)(3)(4)  
& (5)

SUMMARY. VIET CONG /VC/ MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LONG AN  
PROVINCE WAS LOW DURING SEPTEMBER 1967, AND PREPARATIONS ARE  
UNDERWAY FOR THE NEW "WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN." ALLIED  
MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE CAUSING PEOPLE TO LEAVE VC-CONTROLLED  
AREAS, WHICH IN TURN RESTRICTS VC ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES.  
VC POPULATION CONTROL AND MOTIVATION CAPABILITIES ARE DECLINING  
IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING LOSSES OF EXPERIENCED CADRES. END SUMMARY.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-025-1-9  
By [signature], NARA, Date 1-7-02

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE MAR 1995

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)

## POLICY

1. VIET CONG /VC/ MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LONG AN PROVINCE DURING SEPTEMBER 1967 WAS AT A LOW POINT, WHICH IS CUSTOMARY FOR THIS TIME OF YEAR WHEN TROOPS ARE ENGAGED IN HELPING WITH THE RICE HARVEST. THE VC WERE ALSO REDUCING MILITARY ACTIVITY TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR FORCES AND TO BEGIN THE STUDY PERIOD FOR THE "WINTER-SPRING" OFFENSIVE. DIRECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM /COSVN/ TO VC MILITARY REGION 2 AND LONG AN PROVINCE CALLED FOR A MASSIVE BUILDUP OF FORCES. THE VC ALSO TALKED OF RE-EQUIPING UNITS WITH NEW COMMUNIST CHINESE WEAPONS. /COMMENT-- REPORTS GAVE NO INDICATION OF THE TYPE OF COMMUNIST CHINESE WEAPONS./

2. PRIMARY TARGETS FOR THE VC WINTER-SPRING CAMPAIGN WILL BE, FIRST, THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ CHIEU HOI /OPEN ARMS/ PROGRAM AND, SECONDLY, THE GVN REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT RD/ PROGRAM. THE VC ARE PLANNING THE INTERDICTION OF NATIONAL ROUTE NO.4, THE MAIN LINE OF COMMUNICATION FROM MY THO, DINH TUONG PROVINCE, TO SAIGON, WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BEN LUC BRIDGE. U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HAS INFORMATION ON THE VC STORING OF EXPLOSIVES IN THE AREA OF THE BRIDGE.

(classification) (dissem controls)

1.3(a)(4)



(classification) (dissem controls)

~~A CAPTURED COSVN DOCUMENT WHICH INDICATES INTEREST IN THE MECHANICS OF THE RD PROGRAM AT THE PROVINCE LEVEL LENDS CREDENCE TO REPORTS OF VC PLANS AGAINST THE RD PROGRAM.~~

## PROBLEMS

3. ~~THE VC ECONOMIC BASE CONTINUED TO DECREASE IN SEPTEMBER DUE TO ALLIED TAKEOVER OF NEW AREAS AND MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE OUT OF VC-CONTROLLED INTO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS. U.S. ARMY OPERATIONS HAVE OPENED UP AND NOW CONTROL LARGE PORTIONS OF LONG AN PROVINCE'S RICE-RICH INTERIOR, HURTING VC TAX, FOOD AND MANPOWER BASES. INCREASED GVN/U.S. PRESSURES ON VC-CONTROLLED AREAS IN THE FORM OF AIR STRIKES AND HARASSING ARTILLERY FIRE HAVE DRIVEN THE PEOPLE FROM VC-CONTROLLED AREAS. MOST OF THE POPULATION IS INDIFFERENT TO VC OR GVN CAUSES BUT IS PRESENTLY MOVING TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS BECAUSE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC PRESSURES ARE LESS THAN IN VC AREAS. VC ABILITY TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC SUPPORT ON THE LOCAL LEVEL, THOUGH DECREASING, REMAINS PROPORTIONATELY THE SAME. AS PEOPLE MOVE TO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS VC CAPABILITIES DECREASE BUT SO DO VC RESPONSIBILITIES, AT ABOUT THE SAME RATE. THE RESULTING ECONOMIC SHORTAGE IS FELT~~

(classification) (dissem controls)

(classification) (dissem controls)

~~AT THE DISTRICT AND PROVINCE LEVEL BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON THE LOWER LEVELS FOR SUPPORT. AS THE VC-CONTROLLED POPULATION DECLINES, THE VC ARE BEING FORCED TO TAX THE REMAINING POPULATION MORE HEAVILY. INCREASED VC ECONOMIC PRESSURES, ADDED TO THE ALLIED MILITARY PRESSURES, PUSH MORE PEOPLE OUT OF VC-CONTROLLED INTO GVN-CONTROLLED AREAS. THE TREND APPEARS LIKELY TO CONTINUE, AND THE VC WILL FACE INCREASING ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.~~

4. ~~THE QUALITY OF VC CADRE LEADERSHIP HAS DECLINED IN LONG AN PROVINCE. AS EXPERIENCED CADRES ARE LOST, THE VC ARE FINDING IT DIFFICULT TO FIND CAPABLE REPLACEMENTS. TWO JOBS MUST BE GIVEN TO ONE PERSON, OR SUB-STANDARD CADRES ARE ASSIGNED TO JOBS. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS PATTERN IS THE LOSS OF VC TAX COLLECTORS. WHEN A TAX COLLECTOR IS LOST FROM AN AREA, ANOTHER MEMBER OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE IS ASSIGNED THE ADDITIONAL TASK OF TAX COLLECTION. AT THIS POINT HE BECOMES VISIBLE AND CAN EASILY BE IDENTIFIED. A PORTION OF THE STRENGTH OF THE VC LIES IN THE ABILITY OF ITS CADRES TO CONTROL AND MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE, AND ELIMINATION OF SKILLED CADRES IS ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO VC LOSS OF CONTROL IN LONG AN PROVINCE.~~

5. FIELD DISSEM-- STATE USMACV CORDS DIR/JUSPAO /MR.  
ZORTHIAN ONLY/ CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

(classification) (dissem controls)

40

Friday, November 3, 1967  
9:05 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

President Diori's reactions to his U. S.  
tour may interest you.

W. W. R.

Attachment (Airgram A-39 10/28/67)

*[Handwritten signature]*

# AIRGRAM

POL 7 NIGER

40a

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
FOR	FBO	AIO
1		20
FS	SP	SY
10	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

20

A-39

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NO.

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

OCT 31 3 46 AM 1967

HANDLING INDICATOR

Rostow

FROM : Amembassy NIAMEY

DATE: October 28, 1967

SUBJECT: Diori Enthusiastic Over U. S. Visit

REF :

Our preliminary readings on President Diori's reactions to his U. S. visit are uniformly gratifying. Following are his principal reactions brought to our attention to date:

1) Diori was astounded by what he refers to as the "puissance" of the U.S. "The U.S. can do whatever it wants to do in the world," he reportedly told a close associate. At the same time he was struck by the role of region-wide economic arrangements in organizing and channeling this "power".

2) Arizona was a revelation, and certainly that part of the U.S. which Diori will most remember. Here was a natural setting that reminded him vividly of Niger, but with the difference produced by the application of science and capital. Fortunately Diori is realistic enough not to expect that Niger can do the same thing except over decades.

3) People were amazingly friendly and hospitable. "They even showed me their bathrooms." One woman in Arizona particularly impressed the President when she gave him a gift of candlesticks on behalf of all the religious faiths of the town - "not just Christians," said the President.

4) Although taught in Niamey largely by Americans, Diori found American English a much more formidable challenge than he had anticipated. He could not understand President Johnson, in spite of the fact he had coached himself with tapes of Johnson speeches. He found Mrs. Johnson "somewhat easier to comprehend"; but was "completely lost" in Arizona. In Chicago it went "somewhat better".

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

DBEasum/eb 10/27/67

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Donald B. Easum, Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Clearances:



COMMENT: This has not discouraged Diori in the slightest. On the contrary, it appears to have made him all the more determined. He has already revived his two-hour open house with PCV's and Embassy personnel each Sunday, and he is back on his routine of a private English lesson every night.

5) The great number of Cadillacs owned by Negroes flabbergasted Diori in Chicago. He has even wondered out-loud since his return whether the Department of State set them up in advance.

6) No discordant notes have yet come to our attention other than the perennial problem of fatigue resulting from too much to do in too little time. In fact, the Embassy attempted to guard against this during the period of preparing for the visit, but it was Diori himself who said he wanted to go all out.

COMMENT: It is interesting to note that not a single French friend or contact has mentioned Diori's U.S. visit to any member of the Embassy.

EASUM  
JS

~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 3, 1967  
8:15 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This U. K. Embassy report on a conversation between their Ambassador in Moscow (Harrison) and Kosygin tends to confirm (para. 4) Soviet interest in the BUTTERCUP track.

W. W. Rostow

To Moscow 64092

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-475  
By wp, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rlh

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT  
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~  
Classification

3 Nov 67 00 57z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

Info

STATE 64092  
REF : MOSCOW 1638  
NODIS

November 1

1. British Embassy/HMM furnished us materials (copies pouched) concerning Kosygin-Wilson exchange of letters on Middle East.
2. Kosygin letter to Wilson, delivered October 23, was essentially same as his letter to President Johnson. Wilson in his reply emphasized precarious nature of cease fire and risk of further escalation and ultimate great power confrontation. Use of Soviet supplied missiles against Israeli ship EILAT may give arms spiral new twist and HMM play into hands of those in Israel who oppose any concessions and advocate Israeli development of nuclear weapons. Dangers of nuclearization of Arab-Israeli/Soviet agreement to some limitation on arms supply to Mideast; e.g., agreement not to supply arms of greater sophistication than already exist. HMG remain convinced of need for very early action by UN, believing this can best take form of balanced resolution in Security Council providing for appointment of UN representative. As to form of resolution, Wilson said UK not tied to any particular wording but hope formulation will contain two balancing principles found in earlier resolutions; namely, withdrawal on the one hand and recognition of right to live in peace and security on the other.

Drafted by:  
EUR/SOV:NToon:llp 11/2/67

Int. Ext.  
6906

Telegraphic transmission and  
classification approved by: *John P. Walsh*

S/S - Mr. Walsh

Clearance:

EUR - Mr. Leddy

~~SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED Classification

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NIJ 00-201

By CG, NARA Date 10-25-00

FORM 8-65 DS-322

*Row*

~~SECRET~~ NODIS  
Classification

3. When Ambassador Harrison delivered Wilson's reply on October 30, Kosygin informed him Soviet Government now had under consideration new steps with regard ME settlement. When asked if he could reveal nature of these steps, Kosygin replied he was not at liberty to do so since they were 'still being considered by Soviet leadership but he could say that in his view they would be constructive.

4. When Kosygin raised subject of Vietnam, Harrison asked if there were any particular significance to formula Kosygin used in Kishinev speech when he said that negotiations would depend on cessation of bombing and recognition of NLF program for liberation SVN. Kosygin replied that President Johnson had said repeatedly that he wanted to see a government formed in SVN on a broad democratic basis. NLF program made clear that the Front also wanted a government on a broad democratic basis. It spoke of the creation of an independent state of SVN. \* It certainly seemed to Soviets therefore that it furnished a way out.

5. UK Ambassador here has been given substance, but not rpt not text, of President's reply to Kosygin.

NNNN

6. Department has received no information from French on Kosygin-de Gaulle exchange Wormser's NNN or NNNNNNNNNNN call beyond bare report that Kosygin letter received in Paris.

GP-1:

END

RUSK

\* "independent state" is exact  
Buttress language.

W

~~SECRET~~ NODIS  
Classification



~~SECRET~~

Friday, November 3, 1967  
8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

1. Another signal that BUTTERCUP is the presently chosen approach: this time the Pak Ambassador in Peking from the North Vietnamese Ambassador there.

2. The National Liberation Front makes the first move on prisoners.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 1598  
FBIS 19

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-475  
By ing, NARA, Date 4-6-95

WWRostow:rlh

O 030417Z NOV 67 ZFF-1  
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2565

43a

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 1598

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-476  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-95

1. AT 0800 THIS MORNING GOP FOREIGN SECRETARY YUSUF TOLD ME THAT YESTERDAY THEY HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM GOP AMBASSADOR IN PEKING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR TO PEKING HAD CALLED UPON HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY AND HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

QUOTE A. NORTH VIETNAM HAD NO REPEAT NO DESIRE TO IMPOSE A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAM AND IN THEIR VIEW THE BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE A COALITION REPRESENTING ALL INTERESTS. //

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 1598 ~~SECRET~~

B. WHILE REUNION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE, THIS COULD ONLY COME ABOUT AT A TIME AND IN A MANNER ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. //

C. IT MIGHT EVEN BE DESIRABLE TO HAVE A NEUTRAL BLOC COMPRISING SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA. //

PAGE 32 RAWALP 01598 030438Z

D. IF THERE WERE AN UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM BY THE AMERICANS, NEGOTIATIONS COULD FOLLOW WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS. UNQUOTE.

2. I ASKED YUSUF IF THE WORD QUOTE COULD UNQUOTE IN (D) ABOVE WAS ACCURATE OR WHETHER OR NOT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN QUOTE WOULD UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD CHECKED THAT POINT AND THAT QUOTE COULD UNQUOTE WAS THE WORD USED.

PAGE 3 RUQVGM 1598 ~~SECRET~~

3. I ASKED YUSUF IF ANY TIME FRAME HAD BEEN INDICATED IN CONNECTION WITH (D) ABOVE AND HE RESPONDED NEGATIVELY.

4. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN SEVERAL BOMBING PAUSES AND ONE FOR AS LONG AS 37 DAYS, HE POINTED OUT THAT THE LONG ONE HAD BEEN NEARLY TWO YEARS AGO AND OBSERVED THAT PROBABLY AT THAT TIME NORTH VIETNAM HAD HOPES FOR A MILITARY SETTLEMENT FAVORABLE TO THEM WHEREAS NOW THEY PROBABLY REALIZED THAT HIS WOULD NOT REPEAT NOT BE POSSIBLE. GP-3. OEHLERT

~~SECRET~~

~~EXDIS~~

2

FBIS 19

RELEASE OF U.S. PRISONERS

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIETNAMESE TO SOUTH VIETNAM  
1400 GMT 2 NOV 67 S

(TEXT) TO IMPLEMENT AN ORDER OF THE NFLSV CENTRAL COMMITTEE, TO CONFORM WITH THE FRONT'S HUMANE AND LENIENT POLICY, TO ANSWER THE GOOD WILL FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE OF PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO ARE OPPOSING THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' WAR OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM, AND TO DISPLAY SOLIDARITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE JUST STRUGGLE OF THE U.S. NEGROES IN THE UNITED STATES IN CLAIMING THEIR BASIC NATIONAL RIGHTS, A STRUGGLE WHICH IS COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH THE JUST STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, DEMOCRACY, PEACE, NEUTRALITY, AND PROSPERITY, THE SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES COMMAND HAS DECIDED:

ART 1--TO RELEASE THREE U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR:

1--EDWARD ROBERT JOHNSON, NEGRO, M SGT, ADVISER TO THE REBEL FIRST BATTALION, 31ST REGIMENT, 21ST DIVISION, SERIAL NUMBER RA 33510856, CAPTURED DURING THE BATTLE AT LUC CHI, GO QUAO, RACH GIA PROVINCE ON 21 JULY 1964.

2--DANIEL LEE PITZER, WHITE, ARMED MEDICAL MASTER SERGEANT, ADVISER, BORN IN (NAME INDISTINCT), WEST VIRGINIA, ARRIVED IN VIETNAM ON 11 JULY 1963, CAPTURED DURING THE BATTLE AT TAN PHU, CA MAU PROVINCE ON 29 OCTOBER 1963.

3--JAMES ELEX JACKSON, ARMED MEDICAL SERGEANT, BORN IN (? STACCO), WEST VIRGINIA; SERVED IN VIETNAM TWICE IN 1963 AND 1965, CAPTURED DURING THE BATTLE AT BINH HUNG, CA MAU PROVINCE.

THESE THREE PRISONERS OF WAR SINCERELY REPENTED THE CRIMES THEY COMMITTED AGAINST THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE (WORDS INDISTINCT) DURING THE PERIOD OF DETENTION.

ART 2 --THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES UNITS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING THESE THREE PRISONERS OF WAR WITH NECESSARY CONDITIONS SO THAT THEY MAY RETURN SOON TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES.

(SIGNED) THE SOUTH VIETNAM PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES COMMAND, 31 OCTOBER 1967.

3 NOV 0929Z GKE/IJ



44

*Pres file*

Friday, November 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Authorization to Sign the International Grains Arrangement

At Tab A is Nick Katzenbach's memo recommending that you authorize the Secretary or Acting Secretary of Agriculture to sign the International Grains Arrangement. John Schnittker and Bill Roth concur in this recommendation. If you approve, a full power authorizing this is at Tab B for your signature.

The International Grains Arrangement carries out the bargain on cereals we negotiated in the Kennedy Round. It will replace the International Wheat Agreement of 1962, which we signed. It is more advantageous to us than the old Wheat Agreement because:

- It sets higher minimum and maximum prices for wheat moving in world trade -- which could benefit us as wheat exporters.
- It obligates other countries, for the first time, to share responsibility with us for food aid. The Arrangement provides for an annual 4 1/2 million ton food aid program. Our share is 42% or 1.9 million tons, in grain. Others will supply 2.6 million tons a year -- either in grain or cash.

The Arrangement is open for signature until November 30. Since we pushed it, we should sign as early as possible. Other countries are waiting for our lead.

The Arrangement would be sent to the Senate as a treaty. Katzenbach will probably recommend that this be done early this month, but this is for your later decision. (We will have a separate memo for you setting forth the issues.)

Schnittker and Roth do not expect serious difficulty in getting Senate approval.

- They discussed the Grains Arrangement at various times with Senators Carlson, Church, McGovern, Mondale, Young and Burdick. (Carlson said Fulbright has no problem with it.)



- They met Tuesday with Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper and Carlson. (the only members of the Foreign Relations Committee who showed up for the session). Carlson again indicated his support; Hickenlooper didn't say no, and McCarthy told Schnittker afterward there would be no problem in the Senate.
- Only Senators Mundt, Curtis, Hruska and Miller are expected to actively oppose.

All the major farm organizations, except the Farm Bureau, support the Arrangement. The Farm Bureau opposes it -- as they do all commodity agreements as well as domestic farm programs.

I recommend you authorize signing the Arrangement on behalf of the United States.

W. W. Rostow

(If you approve we need your signature on the Full Power at Tab B.)

No \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

  
ERF:mst

44a





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1967

4177  
446  
1-7 sub  
2-121

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request for Full Power for Signature of the  
International Grains Arrangement

The International Grains Arrangement is open for signature until November 30, 1967. This Arrangement embodies the principles agreed to in the Kennedy Round.

As one of the Arrangement's principal architects it is important that we sign early: other nations, particularly importers, are expected to await our signature before signing themselves. Should we fail to sign promptly there would not be sufficient time for them to act.

Following signature, the Arrangement will be submitted to the Senate as a treaty. No serious difficulty is expected in obtaining approval.

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed full power authorizing Secretary Freeman, or, in his absence, Acting Secretary Schnittker to sign the Arrangement on behalf of the United States.

Discussion:

You approved the basic principles of this Arrangement when you authorized signature by the United States of the Memorandum of Agreement on Cereals in the Kennedy Round. On the basis of these understandings, major wheat importers and exporters (excepting the Soviet Union) have negotiated this Arrangement, which is to take the place of the International Wheat Agreement of 1962.

### Farm Organization Attitudes

The Arrangement has the support of the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, the National Farmers Organization, and the National Association of Wheat Growers.

The American Farm Bureau Federation, which has traditionally opposed all commodity agreements, has voiced disapproval and will openly oppose Senate approval of the Arrangement. We have beaten the Farm Bureau in the past and we will do it this time. A few big grain companies also may openly oppose the Arrangement.

### Congressional Attitudes

We do not believe there will be any serious difficulty in obtaining Senate approval.

This conclusion is based upon conversations Under Secretary Schnittker has had with Senators Carlson and Church of the Foreign Relations Committee, McGovern, Mondale, and Young (N. D.), of the Agriculture Committee, and with Senator Burdick. It is also based on conversations which Ambassador Roth has had with Senator Carlson, who reports that Senator Fulbright has no problem with the Arrangement.

In a meeting which Under Secretary Schnittker and Ambassador Roth had yesterday with Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson, Senator Carlson indicated support and Hickenlooper voiced no opposition. Senator McCarthy indicated afterward that we should not have serious difficulty in the Senate.

We expect that only Senators Mundt, Curtis, Hruska, and Miller will actively oppose it.

### Major Provisions

The Arrangement is in two parts--a Wheat Trade Convention and a Food Aid Convention. The substantive provisions of both parts are scheduled to enter into force on July 1, 1968, for a three-year period.



The Wheat Trade Convention

(a) sets minimum and maximum prices for major wheats moving in world trade and

(b) assures that the United States and other exporting member countries will be able to supply specified percentages of the other members' import requirements. The EEC, the UK, and Japan agree to import at least 90 per cent from member countries if the USSR joins the Arrangement and not less than 80 per cent if the USSR does not become a member.

The Food Aid Convention provides for a 4.5 million ton annual program of food aid to developing countries. Of this, signers of the Kennedy Round Memorandum of Agreement will contribute about 4.26 million tons. The great bulk of these contributions will be in the form of wheat, although some grain deficit countries may contribute cash. The United States will supply 42 per cent annually--about 1.9 million tons; the EEC, 23 per cent--about 1.0 million tons; Canada, 11 per cent--about 0.5 million tons; Australia, UK, and Japan, each 5 per cent.

Food Aid will be supplied on concessional terms (grants or local currency not available, as a rule, for use by the contributing country). Contributing countries will have the right to determine the recipient of their contributions.

Advantages Include:

1. The higher level of world prices resulting from the Arrangement will benefit our farmers, and will minimize use of export subsidies.

2. The new Arrangement spells out minimum prices in greater detail than before, so that we will know more clearly when the price agreement is in danger.

3. It permits sales below the minimum price if needed to maintain our competitive position.

4. Other countries will begin to take on formal responsibility for sharing the food aid burden. This will strengthen commercial markets, as supplies that otherwise would have gone into commercial markets shift to food aid. This will make room for increased commercial exports from the United States and other exporting countries.

Congressional Action

The Arrangement is a treaty rather than an executive agreement because --

(a) the predecessor wheat agreement and other commodity agreements have been treaties,

(b) we have promised that we would submit the Arrangement to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

We expect to recommend that the treaty be sent to the Senate early this month.

Present legislative authorities--the Food for Peace Act and the wheat export certificate program under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965--are adequate to implement the obligations of the treaty. However, both statutes will have to be renewed during the life of the Arrangement.

Under Secretary Schnittker and Ambassador Roth participated in the writing of this memorandum and concur in its recommendation.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure:

Full Power for Signature of the  
International Grains Arrangement.