# MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor's arguments in response to those I gave him from the unidentified paper.

He will be filing a paper of his own in a few days.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

Pres file

Authority NLJ 83-55

By ..., NARS, Date 10-4-83

# THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 3, 1967

Mr. President:

Walt Rostow has asked my comments on the following possible course of action:

# Proposal

The U.S. will stabilize its military strength in Vietnam at presently approved levels and, with its allies, will continue to conduct the war in South Vietnam essentially as at present, making every effort to hold down U.S. casualties and battle damage and to pass the burden of the fighting to the South Vietnamese.

There will be no extension of the air target system in North Vietnam beyond the present one and no blockade or mining of the ports. At some point, we will stop the bombing of North Vietnam except for the use of air strikes in the Demilitarized Zone to suppress shelling or to interdict enemy troop movements.

The purpose of the foregoing course of action would be to allay apprehensions at home and abroad of a further expansion of the conflict and to increase the pressure on Hanoi to reduce its military activities or to enter upon negotiations. It is my understanding that all or most of our intentions under this alternative would be announced publicly.

# Comment

Of the alternatives\* open to the U.S., this is one form of the Pull-back Alternative. While this course of action might tend to allay the fears of those who are concerned over an expansion of the conflict, it would provide fresh ammunition for the numerically larger number of critics who say that we are embarked on an endless and hopeless struggle or that we are really not trying to win. The decrease in our efforts implicit in this proposal would tend to nullify by a form of self-stagnation the progress which we properly contend that we are now making and would give renewed stimulus to our impatient fellow citizens who are even now crying for a quick solution or get out. Like other variations of the Pull-back Alternative, it would probably degenerate into an eventual pull-out.

\* There are four in all: Pull-out, Pull-back, All-out, Stick-it-out

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

NARS Date 10-4-83

By is NAR



The curtailment of the bombing under this proposal has all the liabilities which we have noted in previous discussions of this issue. The South Vietnamese would be deeply discouraged by this lifting of the penalty which the bombing imposes on the North. I would suspect that our other allies contributing troops would object strongly to this course of action - they are convinced of the essentiality of the bombing. Our own forces would regard this action as a deliberate decrease in the protection which, they feel, is afforded them by the bombing. The large majority of our citizens who believe in the bombing but who thus far have been silent could be expected to raise violent objections on the home front, probably surpassing in volume the present criticisms of the anti-bombers.

Probably the most serious objection of all to this Pull-back Alternative would be the effect upon the enemy. Any such retreat will be interpreted as weakness and will add to the difficulty of getting any kind of eventual solution compatible with our overall objective of an independent South Vietnam free from the threat of subversive aggression.

I would recommend strongly against adopting any such course of action.

M.D. T.

Secret

# MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

I did not take full notes in yesterday's advisory meeting; but I did try to list suggestions for action.

Here is my list.

# Dean Acheson:

- -- organize citizen's committees in all cities over 100,000;
- -- get fresh faces to defend our Viet Nam policy.

# McGeorge Bundy:

- -- cool attention to bombing: make it routine;
- -- reward in White House ceremonies those who have done great work in the provinces, military and civilians;
- -- assure that military men on advisory duty in pacification are promoted on same basis as those in combat:
- -- develop publicity that Vietnamese are doing more, and make sure they do;
- -- shift our stance on negotiations to one of not expecting negotiations until after November 1968;
- -- dramatize that we have already won a great strategic victory in Asia: lift people's eyes from Viet Nam to the whole scene;
- -- brief the key editors and communicators just as the group was briefed (Dick Helms has no objection to using Carver when it's off-the-record and no public attribution);
- -- let good news speak for itself: don't strain publicly to convince people progress is being made.

# Douglas Dillon:

- -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on position we're in and real choices we face;
- -- clarify what we are doing on the ground and in bombing;

Authority ML g 84-39

By Ag/KS, NARA, Date 12-9-91

# Douglas Dillon (cont'd)

- -- develop sense of progress: sense of stalemate is what invites extreme doves and hawks; let events speak for themselves, but there are ways of getting good news out;
- -- have Bunker -- a fresh and trusted voice -- report to the nation;
- -- the President should brief top college presidents and deans as Advisory Group was briefed.

# Arthur Dean:

- -- clarify our "get out of Viet Nam" position: if we're really going to get out, why spend all this blood and treasure?
- -- explain critical importance of Viet Nam to our Asia and Pacific positions: people don't understand implications for U.S. national interest of loss of Viet Nam;
- -- avoid another Panmunjom.

# Cabot Lodge:

- -- an independent audit of the pace and success of the revamping and reorientation of the ARVN;
- -- limit U.S. casualties by diminishing "search and destroy" operations, substituting a doctrine of "split up and keep off balance";
- -- encourage a "true resolution" in South Viet Nam by throwing our weight behind private cooperative institutions such as farmers' unions, marketing organizations, which would stimulate, agitate, and engage the people themselves and begin to push the French and Chinese middlemen to the wall. (WWR comment: the French and Chinese businessmen ought to be moving into light industry at this stage of Vietnamese development.)
- -- agreed with Acheson on a no-bombing versus DMZ deal;
- -- urged that Bunker and his views be given maximum exposure.

# Robert Murphy:

-- sharpen focus and action against small group of Hanoi villains: we have no target for hate in this, as opposed to other wars.

# General Omar Bradley:

- -- talk less about negotiations: Hanoi takes it as a sign of weakness;
- -- use "Patience" as a slogan;

# General Maxwell Taylor:

- -- questions close-in defense of DMZ;
- -- decide what we are prepared to offer the VC; that is a major gap in our policy and ought to be filled;
- -- bombing should <u>not</u> be traded against DMZ pressure but against level of VC incidents in the South: bombing is our equivalent of guerrilla warfare;
- -- organize nationwide, continuous campaign of speeches in support of policy;
- -- organize an hour TV program regularly: government replies to its citizens on Viet Nam, answering questions.

# George Ball:

-- stop bombing, except across the DMZ, to create climate for negotiation.

# Abe Fortas:

-- get George Carver to briefing on television. (Dean Acheson, Dick Helms, and others objected to using Carver in public.)

# Clark Clifford:

-- bring Thieu to the United States (Nick Katzenback implied we should make sure his political base in Saigon would be safe during such a tour).

W. W. R.

-CONFIDENTIAL Friday - November 3, 1967

Prestile

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

I understand that in your conversations with President Diaz Ordaz you informed him we intend to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement. You also told him that we are not ready to announce our intention until we have first consulted Congress.

If the foregoing is an accurate reflection of what you said to the Mexican President, I propose to tell State and ACDA to proceed with Congressional consultations. The results of these consultations are to be reported back to you, together with recommendations for the handling of the announcement.

W. W. Rostow

Proceed with Congressional consultations		
Hold up, see me	DECLASSIFIED  E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  NEL 94-475	
	By Lip, NARA, Date 4-6.	95

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's report on the conference on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.

W. W. Rostow

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# LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR November 2, 1967

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Results of Conference on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967

After seven weeks, the conferees have reached agreement on the foreign aid authorization bill. Doc Morgan is not certain when he will bring the conference report to the floor, but he expects Passman to hold the appropriation bill until the House acts on the authorization bill.

The principal results of the conference are:

1. <u>Funds</u>. The bill authorizes \$2.860 billion for economic and military assistance (including \$185 million; eviously authorized for Development Loans).

	(\$ in millions)								
	FY 1968	Amount	Amount						
	Appropriation	Authorized	Reduced by	Percent					
	Request	for FY 1968	Authorization Bill	Reduction					
Development Loans	\$774	\$ 635	\$139	18%					
Technical Assistance	243	210	<b>3</b> 3	14%					
Alliance for Progress	643	578	65	10%					
Supporting Assistance	720	660	60	8%					
Administrative Expenses	59.3	55.8	3.5	6%					
Other Economic	191	207	<u></u>						
Total Economic	\$2,630	\$ 2,350	\$ 281	11%					
Military Assistance	620	510	110	18%					
Total - Economic and Military	\$3,250	\$2,860	\$ 391	12%					

The military assistance figures exclude \$60 million for NATO infrastructure, which has been transferred to the DOD budget.

The above figures are no guide to what we will ultimately get to work with. The Passman Subcommittee figures are some \$660 million below the \$2.860 billion total authorization shown above.

- 2. Military Sales Program. The Church amendment was revised so that it creates no serious problems for this fiscal year. The bill now provides that
  - -- DOD will have authority to make credit sales, but after June 30, 1968 funds for credit sales will have to be obtained from new appropriations rather than from the revolving fund;
  - -- The revolving fund will terminate on June 30, 1968, but provision is made for orderly liquidation so that new appropriations will not be needed to pay outstanding obligations incurred as a result of past credit sales;
  - -- DOD will have the authority until June 30, 1968 to guarantee credit extended by private banks, exporters or the Export-Import Bank (the House conferees have made it clear that next year they will try to extend this authority for another year);
  - -- DOD may guarantee no more than \$190 million of credit sales in fiscal year 1968.
- 3. Number of Country Restrictions. The restrictions on the number of countries that may receive Development Loans, Technical Assistance or Supporting Assistance were modified so that
  - -- The numerical limitations make it possible for us to carry out our planned programs this year;
  - -- The unconstitutional procedure for increasing the number of countries is deleted, leaving the restrictions as flat limitations without Presidential discretion to increase the numbers.
- 4. Transfers to the World Bank. The Senate receded completely from its position that 10 percent of our Development Loan funds may be used only for transfer to the World Bank family.

- 5. Gross Amendment. The conferees modified this amendment so that military sales to, or purchases from, countries such as the U.K. will not be prohibited because of North Vietnam trade or shipping. We should be able to live with the amendment as modified.
- 6. <u>Findley Amendment</u>. The conferees dropped this amendment which required the President to withdraw most-favored-nation treatment for Poland.
- 7. Restrictions on Military Assistance to Latin America, Central America, and Africa. These were modified. Only the African restriction will now cause us trouble. It limits all military grants and sales to Africa for fiscal year 1968 to \$40 million; our proposed program is \$58 million.

William S. Gaud

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you haven't see it, you will wish to read Gen. Bradley's article.

frer file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

# GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

The GI's general of World War II reports on his 14 days with the troops

# MY WIST O WETTAM





"There is no substitute," says General Bradley, "for talking to the men in the field." Above, he reviews his GI's in Germany and, right, 22 years later, arrives aboard the U.S.S. Constellation in the Tonkin Gulf.

BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY WITH MRS. BRADLEY In 1915, when Cadet Bradley was graduated, the West Point yearbook predicted: "If he keeps up the clip... some of us some day will be bragging... 'Sure, General Bradley was a classmate of mine!" "He kept up the clip in Africa, Sicily, Normandy and the sweep to Berlin in World War II, as Veterans Affairs Administrator, Army Chief of Staff, Joint Chiefs Chairman thereafter. He is the last, along with classmate Dwight D. Eisenhower, of nine men to be honored with five-star rank. For General Bradley's personal report on where we stand in Vietnam, turn the page.



ght," complained one other dropped with his battalion o VC territory, attack. None came.

I don't call that stalemate."

"After amping throughout the length and width of South Vietnam... I am convinced this is a war at the right place, at the right time and with the right enemy."

ISTORY WILL CIVE high marks to the United States for its responsible behavior since World War II. Never has a nation of such power been so sorely and so systematically tried. The Communists, disciples of a doctrine that no people ever willingly embraced, have sought domination by attacking a supposed weak spot through trickery, propaganda, bluster and violence. Each time, the United States has reacted and, with the help of allies, blocked them from achieving an easy victory. And always we have done it without resorting to that horror of horrors, all-out total war.

The Communists tried blockade in Berlin, terrorism in Greece, conventional warfare in Korea. In each instance, we stopped them. In Cuba, they tested us to see if we were prepared to go to nuclear war and found we were. Now we are being tested again. As with Berlin, Greece, Korea and Cuba, Vietnam is a proving ground. This is no simple civil war fought solely by patriots, although there certainly are patriots on both sides. It is, in essence, a laboratory experiment, executed with callous disregard for human life by those in Hanoi and Peking who want to see if the "protracted war" theories of Mao Tse-tung will work. If these theories hold in Vietnam, they unquestionably will be applied elsewhere, and we shall have to confront them again and again. The Communists have spelled it all out for us. In statements as blunt as Hitler's Mein Kampf, they have assured us time and again it is their intention to impose their form of government upon the world.

In May of 1951, testifying before two Senate committees as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I opposed enlarging the Korean War to include the China mainland. I was referring solely to the crossing of the Yalu River, although in ensuing years, I frequently have been misquoted as opposing the action in Korea, which I actually supported. I said that a "limited war" with Red China then "would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

The Soviet Union had a mutual defense treaty with Red China providing that each would treat any attack on the other as an attack on itself. Furthermore, the Russians were furnishing most of the war supplies used by North Korea. If we had wanted to stop the flow of those supplies by strategic bombing or other means, our attack should have been directed against Russia. In my view now, as then, Red China was the wrong enemy.

Maybe, as some critics claim, Vietnam is

the wrong war too, in the sense that we should have avoided getting involved so deeply in it. I don't know. Playing armchair general is much easier than bearing the responsibility and rendering the decisions at the moment of crisis, and history does not reveal the results of untried alternatives. It is fruitless to dwell upon what-might-have-been when faced with the screaming realities of the here and now. After tramping throughout the length and width of South Vietnam, going wherever I wanted to go and talking to whomever I wanted to talk, I am convinced that this is a war at the right place, at the right time and with the right enemy—the Communists.

with the right enemy-the Communists.

My wife Kitty brought the trip about. She sensed my growing conviction that I had to go and see Vietnam for myself. She knew I had always believed there is no substitute for talking to the men in the field. The deterrent to taking a trip like this was a bothersome cartilage in my right knee, torn while playing football at West Point. I did not want to go into a war zone and then wind up a nonbattle casualty. Recent surgery removed the entire kneecap and made it possible for me to walk once again without limp or pain. Kitty was with me during a postsurgical checkup in late July, when the doctor pronounced the knee as close as it ever will be to God's work." In the car en route home, she turned to me and softly said, "You've been aching to go, and now you can." I nodded and had to admit, "An old soldier never really fades away."

Kitty had no objection to my going to Vietnam. She just didn't want me to go without her. We both knew that as a general officer on active duty, I could officially request permission to visit Vietnam, but she would have to stay behind.

My wife is a quiet, determined woman. Less than a week after the knee checkup, she had arranged with LOOK to accompany me to Vietnam as a correspondent, with the stipulation that all payment for this article be turned over to the United Service Organizations for distribution to the Uso facilities serving our men in Vietnam.

Kitty was invaluable on the trip. A professional writer for more than 20 years, she is a trained observer and, in the evenings, when we mulled over where we had been and what we had seen, I found she had often picked up details that I had missed. She was great for morale, particularly in hospitals, where she paused for unhurried chats with the wounded, and at isolated outposts in the boondocks. Kitty felt she wanted to do something special to jus-

continued

and talk to the five-star general, above,
with his wife Kitty and Korean Lt. Gen. Chae
Myung Shin, and, left, inspecting the
Green Beret camp at My Da in the Mekong Delta.

tify her presence. She decided that upon our return, she would communicate with the family of every serviceman to whom she talked in Vietnam. Whenever she volunteered to give a personal message to the folks back home, she was surrounded by the homesick, and at last count, she had telephoned or written a personal letter to 917 families.

Those fine young men out there did something for our morale too. One night at Pleiku, after an exhausting day in the central highlands and after a sobering but otherwise uneventful oil-line failure while helicoptering over Vietcong territory, we talked quietly about the brave men and how selflessly they worked, the gruesome scars of war all around, the now-familiar grumbling of nearby artillery, the Vietcong mortar bursts on a motor pool at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport as we were landing. And Kitty, who had never before been this close to battle, said: "If something should happen, and we should die, at least we are in good company—each other's and these wonderful men fighting here." I agreed.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, our commanding general in Vietnam, met us at the airport when we arrived August 17. I had known him as Cadet Westmoreland 32 years ago, when I was on the West Point faculty, and our paths have crossed several times since. He looked fit. We later were told that he gets out into the field with his men several times a week. I know that wherever we went, there was nothing but praise and affection for him. "Westy's been carrying this responsibility for three and a half years," one man said, "but he always has the drive and enthusiasm of a second lieutenant who arrived only yesterday."

From that day until August 30, when we left Vietnam, we stayed constantly on the go, traversing the country from one end to the other, keeping a schedule of 14 to 16 hours daily. We saw thousands of Americans—soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, Seabees. We went to them where they live and fight—aboard a carrier, a fleet oiler, a hospital ship, a "Riverine" ship; in trenches, foxholes, dugouts, jeeps, tanks; at artillery positions, radar posts on hilltops, montagnard villages in the highlands, Special Forces camps on the South China Sea coast and in the waterlogged paddies of the Me-

kong Delta. We visited allied units—the South Vietnamese, Koreans, Filipinos and others. Everywhere, they seemed glad to see us and somehow managed to have a five-star flag or plate to greet us.

We mingled with villagers who have known nothing but war for a generation. At Plei Bong Hiot, a montagnard hamlet in the central highlands, all 376 inhabitants turned out to greet us. A montagnard band playing gongs scaled in size from saucers to manhole covers beat out an eerie tune, over and over, as we sipped rice wine from a communal jar through communal straws to become honorary members of the Bahnar tribe. The straws were plastic fuel tubes borrowed from our helicopters. Because the plastic tubes were transparent, the hamlet leaders could see whether we really drank or simulated drinking. My wife tried to fudge, but she got caught and there was no make-believe the second time. She said the rice wine tasted like a mixture of sake, tequila and helicopter fuel. At Edap Enang, a montagnard village in the same general area, we saw some 7,800 people who had been relocated because of military operations near the Cambodian border, where they formerly lived. These families are comfortably housed, and each has its own vegetable patch. Some had run away at first, but when their crops sprouted, the runaways returned and began to take root in their new homes.

The noncombatant Philippine Civic Action Group was working closely with another village, made up of 491 refugee families. The Filipinos, doing what amounts to Peace Corps work under occasional fire, proudly showed us a new school where 1,000 children were being educated. Brig. Gen. Gaudencio V. Tobias, the Philippine commander, demonstrated to us the self-government, sanitation and hygiene techniques his command is teaching the people.

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Westmoreland abided by my request to spend most of the time in the field. They arranged for two days of orientation briefings in Saigon, after which we flew north to Da Nang. Throughout our travels in Vietnam, we were cloaked by the code name "Burma Road" for security reasons. Wherever we went, we were cordially received by the various



commanders, who saw to it that we spent much of our time in no-holds-barred talking with their junior officers and enlisted men. We asked hard questions and got direct answers. They showed us the bad with the good and left it to us to decide how things stood on balance.

From Da Nang, we flew out to sea to the U.S.S. Constellation. She was circling with two other carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, far north of the 17th Parallel dividing the two Vietnams. In the two days aboard, we questioned crew members, visited fliers in their ready rooms and saw several strikes launched against targets in the Hanoi area and

I trips

elsewhere in North Vietnam. On one strike, one of our aircraft was shot down, but quick work by rescue helicopters plucked the two-man crew from jungle highlands. When we learned they were being returned to the carrier, Kitty begged to wait to see for herself that they were safe. We delayed our departure and were able to congratulate Cdr. Robin McGlohn of Balboa Beach, Calif., and Lt. (jg) James M. McIlrath of San Diego.

I never heard a pilot aboard the Constellation question the usefulness of what he is doing. One senior officer estimated that 100 times as much ammunition was being expended against our planes in the North as against our ground troops in the South. "That's a plus in itself," he said.

Back in Da Nang—after a stop at a field hospital to fix a tooth my wife broke in the jolt of the catapulted takeoff from the carrier—we were shown to our billets by Marine Maj. Charles Edwards of Raleigh, N.C. He casually mentioned that according to our Intelligence, the enemy might fire rockets at the base at any time, as they had done in July. He showed us the bunker in which we were to take cover if that happened. Kitty assured the major she has no sense of direction and wondered if in the event of a rocket attack, he could

come and lead the way. "Yes, ma'am, if I'm alive," he replied earnestly. "I just wanted to show you, in case a rocket gets to me first."

At my request, the marines helicoptered us to a forward base for an open discussion with junior officers and enlisted men. About 25 assembled in a rattan hut that served as their mess hall. One of them, Cpl. Lester W. Shell, Jr., of Chesapeake, Va., a gangling 23-year-old, said the hardest job was identifying the Vietcong. They mingled with the rice farmers until dusk, and after dark, slipped into black pajamas, took up hidden weapons "and turned into VC's." Corporal Shell assured us that continued

LOOK 11-14-67 33

# GENERAL BRADLEY CONTINUED

things were getting better because more farmers were reporting VC operatives as they developed trust in the marines. "When I arrived 11 months ago, we had to send out patrols in company size, about 160 men, and now we go on squad patrols, 12 to 15 men. That right there is progress."

Another member of this group, a sniper, showed us his weapon, a civilian rifle with a telescopic sight. He said: "Sometimes, we find a seat in a tree or a hole in the ground and just sit down and wait. Quite often, someone shows up. We're doing better. We're learning patience."

N DA NANG harbor, we went aboard the U.S.S. Repose, one of two hospital ships in the area. We had visited two general hospitals near Saigon, and we would go to field hospitals elsewhere, but the Repose offered prime insight into how quickly the wounded are treated. The speed is amazing. The secret is helicopters. The Repose has a heli-pad on its deck, just as the hospitals ashore have them on their grounds. The wounded go directly from the battlefield to the hospital. Rarely is ground transportation necessary. This means that except in very few cases, no man in the country is more than 30 minutes away from complete, expert medical care. Only 2.5 percent of the wounded admitted to a medical facility die. More than 40 percent of the wounded return to duty without being admitted to a medical facility. And over 80 percent of all wounded admitted to a medical facility are returned to their units. The effect on morale is evident. Kitty and I found most of the patients we visited in a cheerful bantering mood, and anxious to get back to their units and their work.

Wherever we ate, whether with officers or enlisted men, the chow was good. In my 56 years in the Army, I have never seen better fed men, in peace or war. Ninety percent of the meals served to American personnel in Vietnam are hot. It is commonplace, according to some men I talked with, to have a helicopter hover over an embattled unit and lower what my wife termed "a businessman's breakfast"—fruit juice, two soft-boiled eggs, buttered toast, marmalade and hot coffee.

At China Beach, near Da Nang, we visited with men enjoying a three-day respite from all duty. Kitty took on a couple of the GI's in Ping-Pong to put them at ease and encourage them to talk freely. We learned that like all servicemen, however dedicated, they count the days until they go home. In this war, except for key officers, they know exactly how long that will be. Our men go over for a one-year tour of duty unless they voluntarily extend. I asked one fellow how long he had to go, and he quickly replied, "Seventy-six days and a wake-up." Not 77 days, but 76 and a wake-up -a little autopsychology, like setting a clock ahead, because it sounds shorter that way. But many found themselves irresistibly drawn back, like John Paul Vann of Littleton, Colo. He had served a military tour in Vietnam, gone home, left the service and signed on with Revolutionary Development. Marine M/Sgt. George A. Mitchell had been there for  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years, and when we asked him why, he said simply, "I want to see the job finished."

As time goes on, the steady flow of returning Vietnam veterans, currently at the rate of 50,000 a month, may give Americans a better picture of Vietnam. The quality of these young men, tem-

pered by their travail and the ringside knowledge of the plight of those they fought to help, cannot but improve the quality of American society.

As we worked our way south from Da Nang, we spent most of a day with the South Korean forces headed by Lt. Gen. Chae Myung Shin. He commands more than 49,000 men and, from all reports, they are doing a superb job. One of his staff officers gave us an excellent briefing, winding up with the assurance that ROK forces are pleased to fight by our side to repay in some small measure all that the Americans did for their country when it faced a similar threat. The Koreans seem to have a special zest for their mission and a particular talent for keeping the highway open and driving the VC out of the coastal area in the central part of the country.

Here, as elsewhere, a strengthened effort is being made in Revolutionary Development, the program to provide a new life for villagers formerly under VC control. We visited one such village, where all the people turned out to meet us. They showed us what they were building—an infirmary, a bridge, a concrete road. This is the new concept, involving the villagers more deeply in the things they need. Foremost is security, provided by the villages' own Popular Forces.

At Nha Trang, we watched South Vietnamese soldiers training at the Noncommissioned Officers Academy. I was interested because the high caliber of our own military forces today is the result of such schools. I witnessed two combat problems conducted with live ammunition. They were impressive. Not only are the Vietnamese learning to defend themselves by fighting alongside our troops, but gradually they are adopting our methods.

but gradually they are adopting our methods.

In the heavily populated Mekong Delta, traffic is by water, and so is the war. Our Army and Navy have combined operations there, in the Riverine Force. Soldiers live aboard ship when not slogging the paddies and swamps, and sailors called "Seals" fight like the green-bereted Special Forces. These men are effectively hampering the movement of VC units and supplies. Navy personnel, accompanied by South Vietnamese civil officers, stop and search between 1,500 and 2,000 boats a day. Sometimes, they are fired on from the banks, but quite often our boats pull away without returning the fire to avoid hitting innocent civilians in the area.

I had heard complaints that we were killing innocent people in Vietnam. I am not sure how those who make such complaints define "innocent." If they mean civilians as distinguished from men in uniform, it should be pointed out that since 1958, the Vietcong have assassinated an estimated 11,-798 South Vietnamese civilians and have kidnapped 41,177. This toll includes 1,000 civilian officials killed and 1,500 kidnapped. Anyone in a combat area is apt to become a casualty, as we found when we landed in Normandy during World War II. Wherever possible, people are moved out of a battle zone, which is what we are doing in Vietnam today. As careful as we are, modern weapons make it difficult to confine casualties to the fighting men. But there is no such excuse for the deliberate, premeditated, selective killings by the VC.

In the Delta, far from the source of men and materials in the North, the enemy seems to be having considerable trouble. One unit I visited reported capturing 10 VC. Two were 12 years old and one was 13. These children said they were told that unless they joined the VC, their families

would be killed. One Riverine Force reported the enemy they were chasing simply melted away after burying their guns. I saw 43 of these arms, including three automatic weapons, displayed on the

deck of one of our ships.

On our last afternoon in Vietnam (we had that day and a wake-up to go), we met with Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and a team of American officials who are setting up an agency modeled along the lines of our own Veterans Administration, of which I was administrator for more than two years following World War II. Already they are planning the postwar future of South Vietnam's veterans.

As we climbed aboard the jetliner taking us back to the States, my head was bursting with information, and my heart with pride. What a paradox this war is. The morale of the men in the foxholes is higher than that of many people safely at home. The fighting men know why they are in Vietnam. It is a pity their understanding, patience, fortitude and enthusiasm cannot be transmitted to

As Kitty turned to look back at Saigon fading from our view, she murmured half to herself, "I don't believe anybody can fly into Vietnam a

dove, and fly out a dove.'

We are in Vietnam because we cannot long remain the leader of the free world if we do not stand by our promises to help the smaller nations threatened by Communist engulfment. Vietnam is an historical necessity, not because we said so but because the Communists want it that way. On September 2, 1965, the Red Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao declared in Peking that Vietnam was the "testing ground" for the worldwide application of Mao Tse-tung's military-revolutionary strategy. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and captures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdeveloped countries such as South Vietnam to the peasants and described the capitalist countries as the "cities of the world." We are on notice then that this is the challenge.

If we fight on in Vietnam and win, it is possible we may have to repeat our effort elsewhere. If we pull out, it is certain we will face more and tougher Vietnams. History repeatedly has taught us that appeasement is at best a temporary measure

and inevitably leads to war.

Wherever we went, I asked the question: Are we making progress? And, as a Missouri native, l added: Show me. From Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and their top subordinates, from the Koreans and other Free World Force units, from the South Vietnamese, from our men at all levels and from what I could see with my own eyes, the answer was clear: Yes. And I could not help but wonder why this was not clear to the American people. Perhaps it is because, as a people, we have appetites that lean toward the extraordinary in the news. Too often, we are disinterested in the 99 percent that is right and focus our attention on the one percent that is wrong.

How do you measure progress? To me, it is progress when things are better than they were previously. From what I saw and heard, things are better than they were three or six months or a year ago. We are making progress in Vietnam. We are gaining, often dramatically, in the military struggles and in the even more difficult task of healing the social ills on which the Communists feed.

"Why not invite Ho Chi Minh down south? Let him see the dug-in magnitude of our effort."

As we traveled, I became increasingly aware that we are slowly but inexorably rolling the enemy back from the cities and the seacoast. His movement in areas he used to own is now severely restricted. Main force units inside the country, except up north near the Demilitarized Zone, generally stay under cover and keep shifting their bases to avoid detection and contact. The enemy's supply and communication routes, especially around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta, are being interdicted with improved efficiency. Because of his logistics problems in the midlands and down south, he has had to concentrate activity up north near the DMZ. There, the supply route is shorter. Except for that area and a few others, his regiments and battalions are splitting into small groups. "I can't find a fight," complained one American commander whose unit six months ago was battling for its life. One reason we invite attack is because we can react so quickly; in one Delta area, the VC assaults, usually limited to mortar fire, last no more than five minutes because by then our planes and artillery start pounding them. This is a far cry from early 1965, when North Vietnamese regulars and hard-core Vietcong sought to cut the country in two and, in the opinion of many observers, were dangerously close to succeeding.

Intelligence is the key. It seems to be improving as more captives and defectors appear. I have a hunch the other side is hurting a good deal more than it lets on. It may be, as I was told, that the enemy has reached the "crossover point" at which he is losing men through death, wounds, capture and defection at a faster rate than he can replace them by recruitment and infiltration. It seems unlikely that Hanoi can meet such manpower requirements for any protracted length of time. Ho Chi Minh's one hope is to hang on in the expectation that the American public, inadequately informed about the true situation and sickened by the loss in lives and money, will force the United States to give up and pull out.

A North Vietnamese captured this year told interrogators that anti-war demonstrations help sustain the morale of his people and the troops. This man, Nguyen Huu Nghia, who speaks Russian and holds a Ph.D. degree in psychology, described demonstrations as "very effective" encouragement for the North Vietnamese. He compared the situation to that of France during the Indochina War. He said an anti-war movement in France started slowly, gained momentum and influenced the final

outcome-French capitulation.

If the French pattern should be repeated, it would be a stigma the American people would have to bear forever. Pulling out now would break faith with those who have died there, with the families of those who have died there and with those who after much suffering are on the threshold of success. The Communists assuredly would take revenge against the South Vietnamese who cast their lot with us.

Neighboring nations like Thailand, which recently sent a regiment to fight and from whose territory most of the air strikes against the North are launched, would immediately face Communist infiltration and aggression. American influence would wane, not only in the Far East, but around the globe. Our integrity as a nation would be

gravely questioned.

In Hanoi, there is no free press, radio or television to give uncensored sustained reports of what goes on behind the smoke screen of propaganda. But word leaks out. The port of Haiphong has become more a bottleneck than a distribution point. Haiphong's docks and streets are piled high with supplies requiring transshipment because the railroad to Hanoi is unserviceable. Trucks on the Hanoi-Haiphong route now average less than ten miles an hour because the highway is so torn up. U.S. bombing is paralyzing North Vietnam.

The Navy pilots my wife and I watched fly off the U.S.S. Constellation, as well as the Air Force crews that fly out of Thailand, have developed electronic gear and aerial tactics to escape antiaircraft fire, including Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles (SAM's). When we visited the carrier, the last full week's tally reported 128 SAM's fired;

only one of them hit a plane.

"Stalemate" was a much-used word when we went to Vietnam. I don't call it stalemate when, almost everywhere, the enemy is avoiding contact and our troops are progressively digging him out and pushing him back. I don't call it stalemate when, by every measurement, the other side is getting weaker and we are getting stronger. This war is like no other in my experience. There are no great wall maps on which to draw lines and say, "Here is the front." The front is everywhere.

APTURED PRISONERS tell a story of constant attrition. One man, taken in his first battle, said he had started out from Hanoi in a 300-man unit, but only 30 survived the six-week trek. Other prisoners said North Vietnamese soldiers sent south are told they are "mop-up troops" because the war is virtually won. Instead, infiltrators find they must live in the jungle, harassed by bombs, artillery and patrols, and soon they realize their mission is near-suicidal. Enemy defections under South Vietnam's Chieu Hoi, or "Open Arms," policy are stepping up. All these things tell a story, not of stalemate, but of an enemy that is hard pressed.

There was criticism, too, that we had little progress to show for the 13 years we have been in Vietnam. Actually, we only started building strength there two and a half years ago, and did not reach current force level until this year.

General Westmoreland first had to concentrate on building a logistics base. Once this base was laid down, he was able to take the initiative. He could begin rooting out and pushing back the

Communists, while the South Vietnamese, learning to fight by our side, simultaneously developed a nation with a government more responsive to the needs and the will of the people.

In the process of creating logistical support for our troops, we have invested in South Vietnam's future. A short while ago, Saigon was the only major seaport, and there were only three airfields capable of handling jet aircraft. There are now six ports and eight jet fields, several with two runways. These tremendous resources back up more than the U.S. forces. They support allied troops, the South Vietnamese military effort, American civilians and the South Vietnamese economy. When the war is over, this nation will have a floor on which to build.

Flying over Camranh Bay, once little more than sand and water and now a teeming complex of American power, I was struck by a thought: What if the other side could see what it is up against? Why not invite Ho Chi Minh down south and grant him immunity and every possible protection? Let him see the dug-in magnitude of our effort. If Ho would take the trip I took, he would realize the futility of continuing the war.

Before we went to Vietnam, we heard critics say that Hanoi would agree to truce talks if we would stop the bombing. Maybe. I do know that previous bombing halts did not have this result. The mud-spattered GI's in the central highlands near Dragon Mountain and the marines up at the DMZ know that the tons of ammunition being expended against our planes would be coming down the trail to be fired at them. They know the vast manpower kept occupied by the raids would be free for use against them. It is not academic, up

where the fighting is.

Two weeks in Vietnam do not make me an expert. But I have seen battlefields before. What this war needs more than anything else, I believe, is home-front understanding. I would like to see the people at home more deeply involved in Vietnam. Even those opposed to the war cannot be opposed to the men fighting it. My wife Kitty has suggested that women's clubs take a few minutes off from their bridge sessions to write letters to our men in the field. Marines in Vietnam receive 150 pounds of cookies every month from 231 citizens of little Dayton, Wyo.; they demolish the cookies but their gratitude to Dayton is indestructible. Other Americans are shipping soap for the war refugees. These are relatively small in themselves, but as symbols of an America that cares, they are important. What we do does not matter as much as that we do it.

On our last evening in Saigon, Ambassador Bunker showed Kitty a definition of Freedom I wrote many years ago: "Freedom—No word was ever spoken that has held out greater hope, demanded greater sacrifice, needed more to be nurtured, blessed more the giver, damned more its destroyer, or came closer to being God's will on earth. May Americans ever be its protector."

We are a free people, a learning people. As pilgrims, we learned to farm. As colonists, we learned to govern. As immigrants, we learned new ways. As pioneers, we learned the wilderness. As victors, we learned that the end of a great war does

not mean peace.

History, I believe, will judge that, alongside Berlin, Greece, Cuba and Korea, Vietnam was one of our finest hours. We did not flinch. Or it will say that the Communists are right, and History will belong to them. SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked the critical passages in Amb. Bunker's latest weekly.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 10206

SEGRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

White House Guidelines, Feb, 24,1988

By JS NARA, Date 11-20-91

Pres file



Thursday, November 2, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 10206)

Herewith my twenty-seventh weekly telegram:

DECLASSIFIED

B.O. 12356, Sec. 3,4

NLJ 94-4 76

By \_\_\_\_\_, NARA, Date 1-10-5 5

# A. General

I believe that no one could have been an observer of the events of the last few days without feeling that he had been witnessing the rebirth of a nation. One sensed everywhere a new feeling of confidence, of pride in the fact that the Vietnamese people had had the maturity to carry out five elections in the last fourteen months in the midst of war and had been able to establish institutions of representative democracy, a new determination to play a greater part in their own destiny. This came out in a good many ways -- in the dignity, in the simplicity, in the good taste of the inaugural ceremonies, appropriate to wartime conditions, and in the effectiveness and precision with which they were carried out; in the restrained pageantry of the National Day celebration, the parade being shorter this year because of the war but splendidly executed, to the obvious pleasure and approval of the crowds who were watching. It is interesting that Chieu Hoi's contingent received a good deal of applause from the crowds and suffered no critical or derogatory comments. And President Thieu's fine inaugural address was a call to greatness, for further sacrifices, for greater determination, for a continual search for peace. In it he referred to the difficulties of the past four years as having been useful in helping to determine the path to follow and opening up a great new era full of promise; in his own words, "The greatness and the promise of the glories and the difficulties awaiting us." He stated that his administration would have three guiding principles in carrying out his national program: to build democracy, to restore peace, and to reform society.

In the pursuit of peace, he would propose directly to the North Vietnamese Government that it meet with the Government of South Vietnam to seek a way to end the war, that he would open the door to peace and leave the door always open. The Liberation Front would not be an obstacle to peace talks. As in 1954, the Front elements today have the right of choice: "Whoever believes in Marxism is free to go north. Whoever believes, as we do, in freedom and democracy may remain and work with us."

At the same time, he made clear the "iron determination" of South Vietnam to defend the ideal of freedom and democracy. While paying tribute to the Government and people of the United States and other friendly countries who had rendered assistance, he reminded his people "that the present war is still our war and the entire force of the population must be marshalled in support of the overall war effort in order to defend the freedom and sovereignty of the country, that all,

civilians and soldiers alike, must understand the necessity for sacrifice for the common struggle. A united effort must be made to grasp the initiative and shorten the road to peace." He pointed out that this increased effort and determination was not aimed at destroying their compatriots above the parallel. On the contrary, it was designed to check the expansion of Communist aggression, to preserve stability of Southeast Asia, and to build a lasting peace for Asia and the whole world.

He asked the people for a stronger war effort because all weapons must be employed to achieve victory; not military weapons alone, but political, economic, cultural and social as well. A genuine appropriate democratic regime must be built in order to restore participation in national affairs to the people, and to reform society in order to liberate and advance the people. To this end all the people would have to endure many more sacrifices and make many more efforts. To achieve unity and solidarity many things would have to be done:

- A. The army must be constantly improved and strengthened but it must also have the backing of moral support and strong popular organization on the home front;
- B. A strong home guard must be organized to defend the towns in order to reduce the burdens on the fighting troops;
- C. Those living in the capital and other cities will have to strive and sacrifice more to reduce the appalling contrast between cities and the countryside which had long borne the greater part of the war burden;
- D. And the Government must win the confidence of the people so that they will voluntarily accept the efforts and the sacrifices necessary to the war effort. It must carry forward its task of building democracy and reforming society, of raising people's living standards and education, of accelerating the national rural development policy and industrial development.

Among the short-term measures the President included a number of urgent preliminary things which he felt should be undertaken immediately:

- A. To publicize more widely Vietnam's position and to win world support for its cause;
- B. In the social field, defense of morals must be promoted, public order and measures vital to the daily life of the city people guarded and increased;
  - C. Economic stability must be promoted and the price spiral halted;

- D. National order and discipline and respect for law must be strengthened;
- E. Opportunities for students and civil servants to serve the nation and to employ their ability and enthusiasm must be opened up;
- F. An austerity movement to eliminate the excessive disparity between the sufferings and hardships of the rural front lines and high living in the urban areas must be launched;
- G. Finally, and most importantly, corruption must be stamped out and administrative organization, procedure and personnel must be improved in order to serve the people better.

In concluding, the President appealed for the help of all the people in the common task of this beginning of a new era.

As if in confirmation of this feeling of confidence and the pride which I have mentioned, within the last ten days the Vietnamese Armed Forces have turned in some really superior performances, five of them outstanding, to which I shall refer in the military section of this message. During the period of the Vice President's visit, on 29-31 October, the Vietnamese forces conducted 29 battalion-size or larger size operations. They had 4 major, 65 small contacts which resulted in 373 enemy killed, 92 suspects detained and 281 weapons captured. Thirty-five Vietnamese were killed and one hundred forty-six wounded. The Vietnam Air Force flew 275 combat missions and the Navy conducted 1,024 sea, river, and coastal operations. These actions centered largely in the Third and Fourth Corps and were carried out by some elements which had been subject previously to criticism. These are evidences of the steady improvement which has been taking place in the Vietnamese Armed Forces on which I have previously reported and give the lie to much of the cynical and skeptical reporting emanating from Saigon.

At the same time, there was welcome news on the anti-corruption front. Shortly before midnight, October 28, a special court sentenced the former Chief of Binh Dinh Province, Lt. Colonel Tran Dinh Vong, to death on corruption charges and ordered his property confiscated. Three other persons charged with Col. Vong have been sentenced to life imprisonment with confiscation of property. While it is heartening to see the Government move against corruption and to see the court act speedily (the trial lasted only one day), the sentences appear rather Draconian and recall the trial and execution of the Chinese businessman, Ta Vinh, in 1966. Vinh's execution was deeply resented in Cholon and may have been responsible for Thieu and Ky's rather poor showing among the Chinese in the Presidential election. Hopefully, the new government will handle its anti-corruption drive in such a way as to avoid terrorizing the bureaucracy to the point of paralysis.

The press this morning reports action by the special court of Kien Giang Province in voiding the election to the Lower House of Ta Ngoc Mai. Sentencing him to three months of imprisonment and a fine of \$20,000 (Vietnamese). The court also sentenced four of his accomplices to three months of imprisonment and fined one of them \$10,000 (Vietnamese). Mai was charged with various cheating schemes including armed pressure upon the voters.

Other evidence of this new feeling of nationalism and pride came out during the Vice President's visit. To a luncheon which I gave for him on Tuesday, I invited members of the Senate and the Lower House and representatives of Education, Labor, Civil Administration and Youth. In a postluncheon discussion, Senator Nguyen Gia Hien expressed appreciation for the Vice President's remarks and for the wise advice of a man who understood both the legislative and executive functions of government. He noted that although political life was a new experience in Vietnam, he was confident that the new government would be able to meet the requirements of this young country. Its members were approaching their task with goodwill and a strong sense of their responsibilities to the nation. They must serve, he said, as a link between the government and the people -- a link which in most developing countries is weak.

Dr. Phan Quang Dan, former Vice Presidential candidate, said that the Vietnamese people must play a larger part in conducting affairs in their own country. The war must be won by the Vietnamese with American assistance, not by the U. S. with Vietnamese assistance. Now Vietnam has a constitutional government of its own and must play a greater role in its own country. There is much to be done in Vietnam, he said, and therefore, the American is sometimes impatient with Vietnamese leadership and moves in to deal with local problems in his own way. We are, he continued, fighting both against Communism and well-intentioned Americanization of our struggle. He asked for patience and restraint and opportunity wherever possible for the Vietnamese now to deal with their own problems in their own way.

Immediately following the inaugural ceremonies, President Thieu announced the appointment of Nguyen Van Loc as the new Prime Minister. Prime Minister Ky tendered his resignation and that of his cabinet but agreed to remain in office to handle current affairs until Prime Minister Loc is ready to announce his cabinet and take over the government. The directorate also resigned after Thieu's inauguration. I asked Thieu this morning how Loc was progressing with the formation of his government and he replied that he had asked Loc to complete his list within four days but that Loc had asked for a week. Thieu confirmed the fact which we had heard from his brother, Kieu, that Loc was having some problems with the southerners who are asking for three cabinet posts: the Ministries of Agriculture, Economy and Education. He said that Loc is presently conferring with Tran Van Huong and leaders of the Old School Boys Association on the question of southern representation and Thieu expects that he will be able

to resolve his problems. I think, however, we should anticipate that it will be the middle of next week before we shall know the composition of the new government.

It remains to be seen how effective a cabinet Loc can put together and how well they will work as a team. I think, nevertheless, that he is approaching his task realistically. Thieu told me this morning that Loc was hoping to include a high ranking Hoi Chanh in the Government, perhaps Col. Chu Yen who led the Chieu Hoi contingent in the National Day parade or Lt. Col. Cu. He also confirmed again that Dr. Tran Van Do would continue as Foreign Minister but with a strong supporting cast in the Ministry. Thieu remarked that one of the reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese missions abroad was the lack of adequate supporting organization at home. Loc also understands the need for continued cooperation between President Thieu and Vice President Ky. Some time ago, he told an Embassy officer that everything depends on this. In this respect, it is encouraging that in the talk which Vice President Humphrey had with Ky the latter emphasized his determination to work with Thieu, asserted that he wanted no special responsibilities, but wanted a strong government, a strong policy, and to make it work. He was ready to serve Thieu and to do whatever was asked of him.

It is obvious I think, that the effort to establish a functioning representative democracy in Vietnam will encounter many problems. Some of them will be difficult for us to live with. Political parties will have to evolve and learn how to function. The process of governing may be slowed by having to go through the legislative process rather than enacting laws by decree. Workable relationships will have to be established between the executive and legislative branches of Government. There will be many other problems with which the Vietnamese and we will have to contend. Yet, I think we can take considerable pride in the fact that a functioning constitutional government is being established, especially in what seems to me to be a new feeling of confidence and pride on the part of the Vietnamese, and in their determination to increase their efforts and to do more than they have been doing in carrying their share of the burden.

I want to close this section of my message with a brief report on the visit of Vice President Humphrey. In my opinion, viewed from any angle, it was an outstanding success. The Vice President left Saigon at 7:45 November 1 on his trip to the First Corps after having spent an extremely active 62 hours with us here. His busy schedule included a morning visiting the mobile Riverine Forces in the Delta and the National Training Center at Vung Tau in which he evinced great interest both in the excellent briefing by the Director, Major Be, and in his visit to the training cadres; a lengthy ceremony at which credentials were presented; private calls on President Thieu and Vice President Ky; a reception at the Foreign Ministry; an informal dinner with the Mission Council;

a tour of our new chancery, after which the Vice President gave a moving and inspiring talk to our mission; a luncheon at my house with a broad selection of Vietnamese political, cultural, and social leaders; calls by the Australian Minister of External Affairs and the Prime Minister of Korea; and a reception and State Dinner given by President Thieu Tuesday evening at Independence Palace. Four mortar rounds landed behind the Palace while the reception was in progress but hardly caused a ripple of excitement and both the reception and dinner continued uninterrupted. The Vice President's conversations with Thieu and Ky which have been separately reported, were carried out in a most friendly and informal atmosphere and if nothing more had been accomplished, the visit would have been extremely worthwhile.

In speaking to President Thieu, the Vice President covered a wide range of subjects telling him frankly the chief criticisms of the Government of Vietnam current in the United States and stressing the need for the newly elected Chief Executive to tackle problems with vigor during his first "hundred days." In his talk with Ky, the Vice President covered much of the same ground, emphasizing the need for cooperation between the Vice President and President, to which Ky responded positively. General Westmoreland reported to me last night on his return from the First Corps that the Vice President's trip there had also been a great success, that he had spoken to our troops in the most inspiring way, and talked very frankly to members of the press about their skepticism and criticism of the situation here.

The Vietnamese Government and people were tremendously pleased by the Vice President's visit, especially as he was the highest ranking dignitary to attend the inauguration. His frankness, his friendliness, the appropriateness of his remarks, and his reaffirmation of our commitment here made an extremely favorable impression and gave a feeling of renewed confidence and encouragement to our allies.

### B. Military

In connection with the Vice President's visit, General Westmoreland prepared some comments on the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces which are worth recalling, particularly as the American press continues critical of the Vietnamese military effort.

As General Westmoreland observes, the notion that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is not carrying its share of the load is a myth that has tended to become fixed in the minds of our public.

During the first nine months of this year, South Vietnamese Forces accounted for more than one-half of the effort spent on large operations by all friendly forces in the country. These operations and many smaller ones in the first eight months of this year resulted in the South Vietnamese losing about three men (9,703 total killed) to every two that the U. S. has lost (6,215 total killed) in the same period.

Other encouraging indications of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces performance are that the desertion rate is less than half that of early 1966; the number missing in action is 60 percent of that of the first half of 1966; and the rate at which weapons are captured from the enemy, compared to the rate at which the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces loses weapons, has more than doubled (now two to one).

I mentioned that within the past ten days, there had been several instances in which the enemy engaged Vietnamese Government forces and were soundly beaten and driven off with heavy losses. I think it worthwhile to describe briefly the five most significant engagements, which indicate the fighting spirit and will to win of Vietnamese Government forces when properly led and supported.

- 1. At 3:00 a.m. on October 20, 15 kilometers east of Quang Trì City (in Quang Trì Province), the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment were attacked by a large enemy force. The units remained in contact with the enemy until nightfall of October 20 when the enemy withdrew. The fighting resulted in 197 enemy killed, 20 individual and 13 crew served weapons captured, 49 enemy structures and 2 enemy bunkers destroyed; at the cost of 18 Army of the Republic of Vietnam killed and 107 Army of the Republic of Vietnam wounded.
- 2. At 8:15 a.m. on October 21, 20 kilometers east of Lai Khe in Binh Duong Province, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) elements from Vung Tau engaged an estimated enemy company. Contact was maintained until the enemy withdrew at 5:40 p.m. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group elements swept the area the next morning and found 94 enemy bodies, two boxes of documents, three crew served and one individual weapon. Friendly losses were five killed, 26 wounded, and three missing.
- 3. On October 27 at 1:00 a.m., four kilometers southeast of Song Be in Phuoc Long Province, the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attacked the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment. Armed helicopters, AC-47 aircraft and artillery fire supported the defenders. The stout defense by Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, together with the supporting fires, drove the enemy off at 3:45 a.m. The enemy suffered 134 killed and the loss of 37 individual and 20 crew served weapons. Friendly losses were 13 killed and 44 wounded.

- 4. Binh Long Province, the subsector headquarters and Regional Forces compounds at Loc Ninh were attacked by at least two battalions of the 273rd Viet Cong Regiment at 1:15 a.m. on October 29. At the same time, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp at the Loc Ninh airstrip was attacked with mortars and B-40 rockets. Armed helicopters, AC-47 aircraft, artillery fire and tactical air strikes supported the friendly forces at Loc Ninh and a rapid reaction force comprised of two Civilian Irregular Defense Group companies, the 2nd battalion of the 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment, and two companies from the 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment A U. S. infantry unit was inserted four kilometers west of was committed. Loc Ninh as a blocking force and engaged an estimated enemy company from 12:08 p.m. until the enemy broke contact at 1:02 p.m. The reaction forced the withdrawal of the enemy from the subsector headquarters compound at 3:15 p.m. The latest results of the above actions are 160 enemy killed and 19 weapons captured versus friendly losses of 9 killed and 37 wounded.
- 5. In Cuu Long 178, a search and destroy operation in the Fourth Corps, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 32nd Ranger Battalion killed 75 enemy on October 30.

It will be noted that three of the five engagements took place at night which rather gives the lie to the oft quoted criticism that "the Army of the Republic of Vietnam doesn't fight at night".

# C. Political

The Transitional National Assembly (formerly the Constituent Assembly) sat together for the last time at the inauguration of President Thieu October 31 and was automatically dissolved that afternoon, after the Lower House of the new National Assembly formally was convened.

The political organization of the Lower House is proceeding steadily, with several groups coming prominently into the picture. Among these are the Nong Cong Binh group (farmers-workers-soldiers) associated with Senator Tran Van Don's Upper House list (about 20 members); the Catholic Dai Doan Ket (Greater Solidarity Force) Group, with an initial membership of 11 but probably to grow larger with the addition of other Catholics; the small but dynamic group of the movement for the Renaissance of the South (initially four, but likely to grow); and the Toan Viet Group (All Vietnam Bloc), with four to start, possibly as high as 11 and likely to grow. In addition, we have heard that Prime Minister Ky, assisted by the Director General of National Police General Loan, has lined up, both before and since the elections a total of about 40 members of the Lower House who will, presumably, be responsive to Ky's influence in the future. The veteran Trotskyist and neutralist, Ho Huu Tuong, asserted to an Embassy officer on October 26 that he thought he could weld together a bloc of about 50 Lower

House members. The reported strength of Ky's group (tentatively called the Dan Chu or Democratic Bloc) is open to some question, as the other blocs being formed in the Lower House are similarly trying to increase their voting strength and are probably contacting many of the same members. It is also hard to believe that Ho Huu Tuong has been able to collect any considerable strength so far in the Lower House. However, in some versions, the above is an indication of the groups which will be most active in the Lower House. We as yet have no indication that President Thieu is working towards the formation of a bloc in the Lower House, although eventually he will have to come to grips with the problem of assuring support for his programs in the new legislature.

As the pattern of the Lower House elections has emerged more definitively, it is evident that the traditional political parties (particularly the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang and the Dai Viets) have largely been eclipsed, except on a limited, local basis, and several new groupings, described in the preceding paragraph, are emerging which might be the nucleus of the political parties of the future. At the same time, the average age of the Lower House is 39, considerably less than that of the Upper House. There will be a number of vigorous and forceful personalities in the Lower House, including some who will be critical of various aspects of our presence in Vietnam. They remain firmly commited to the struggle against the Communists, however, and we will want to listen to what they have to say. The Lower House is capable of performing a useful job in developing the substance of democratic government in South Vietnam. General Thieu has expressed satisfaction to me over the general quality of the Lower House, a judgment which I share.

Viet Cong and Hanoi comment on the Lower House elections has been very light. "Liberation Radio" of the Viet Cong expressed satisfaction over terrorist incidents that disrupted voting and alleged that the 45 (sic) percent turnout in Saigon "reflected perfectly the failure of the U. S.-Thieu-Ky clique". The turnout in Saigon was actually 57 percent, but a simple matter like the facts has never troubled Hanoi or the Viet Cong before and obviously does not trouble them now.

The Buddhist internal troubles remain unresolved. Following a series of meetings between General Thieu and the leaders of both the An Quang and the Tam Chau factions, no agreement on the disposition of the Buddhist Charter controversy was reached. On October 29, the extremist An Quang Group attempted to stage a march from their Pagoda to the National Pagoda (the seat of the Tam Chau faction), but were prevented from doing so by the police. There were rumors that extremists associated with An Quang groups in Saigon and Danang would stage a number of suicides by fire in an effort to embarrass the Government of Vietnam around inauguration time. One such suicide took place in Quang Ngai Province on inauguration day itself but the event went virtually unnoticed. On the whole, the extremist Buddhists have achieved no significant

success in their efforts to create an impression of widespread dissatisfaction with the newly elected regime. As I have reported, President Thieu has indicated that there is an inclincation on the part of moderate elements in both factions to come together, even if it involves the setting aside of Quang Tri and Tam Chau.

A disturbing development, but one which hopefully is being resolved without serious difficulty, is the effort by the Government of Vietnam to halt convoys of shipping on the Mekong River proceeding to Cambodia. The Government of Vietnam military authorities were understandably upset by an act of piracy in which the crew of a monitor was slaughtered and the ship was delivered by one of the crew to the Cambodian side in return for a cash payment. Alleging that there were Viet Cong mines in the river, convoys were halted in mid-October. We were informed confidentially by Tran Van Do that there was considerable sentiment within the Government of Vietnam, particularly among the military, for a complete stoppage of ship traffic on the Mekong to Cambodia. The military have long chafed at Prince Sihanouk's attitude towards the struggle against the Communists in South Vietnam and in particular at Cambodia's at least passive support for the Viet Cong in the border area. The consequence of stoppage in the shipment of petroleum products, in particular, has been to reduce Cambodian stocks to a dangerously low point. Sihanouk has now made a protest to the Government of Vietnam through the Australian Embassy. Sihanouk is a mercurial and often disagreeable personality and Cambodia has been of material help to the Viet Cong in the Cambodian-Vietnamese border area. However, he could be even more disagreeable to us, were he forced, or should he see himself forced, to go over more explicitly to the enemy. I have taken this up twice with Ky, and General Westmoreland has twice followed up with the Government of Vietnam military. The Government of Vietnam has ordered that the convoys be permitted to proceed as of November 2. We hope this will break the convoys loose within the next few days.

# D. Economic

The Retail Price Index in Saigon was 290 this week, little changed from last week's figure of 291. The Imported Commodity Index was unchanged from last week's level of 219. The subsidized P. L. 480 Title II Corn Program ended last week. In the future, corn for animal feed will be non-subsidized Title I corn shipped into Vietnam as a commercial import and sold on the free market without restriction as to distributor or end user. Corn will be sold at a price to be determined by the Government of Vietnam and U. S. AID which is intended to minimize economic hardship for pork and poultry producers while encouraging domestic feed grain production.

Farm labor scarcity is a factor limiting rice production in the Mekong Delta, according to a study by American technicians. Because of the war and the military draft, as well as the lack of security and heavy migration to urban areas, old men, women, children are often the only available farm labor. Some provinces report that thinner stands of rice and lower yields are the result of a lack of experience on the part of the rice transplanters. In floating rice areas, production will be greater than last year, when the crop was ravaged by floods.

# E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 452, slightly lower than the 1966 figure of 477 for the same period last year, but again higher than last week's figure of 338. The total number of returnees so far this year is 24,666.

# F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 28, the enemy killed 35 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 100, and kidnapped 92. Among the dead were two Hamlet Chiefs, two Revolutionary Development workers, and one Forestry Chief. During the week, the enemy killed 210 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,786 civilians, wounded 5,610, and kidnapped 3,904.

# TOP SECRET-CODEWORD-

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

frestile

Mr. President:

They're at it again.

Helms has your instruction.

W. W. Rostow

TOP-SECRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ / RAC 00-273 By cbm. NARA, Date 3-17-03

Prestile

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

SECRET

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

Peru

The paper at Tab A describes how we might approach President Belaunde and his military chiefs to persuade them to drop the French Mirage deal.

Admittedly, the offer represents a long shot, but it is better than passively awaiting for the almost inevitable military coup.

I have checked the proposal with Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Dick Helms and Covey Oliver, who recommend that we try this approach.

The choice of an emissary to take the offer to Belaunde can be made at one of two levels. We can try for a high-level representative like Bob Anderson, Milton Eisenhower, Cy Vance or Averell Harriman, who would carry more punch. They also have greater visibility, and their presence in Peru will draw wider attention there and here. We can try a lower level approach with someone like Bob Sayre or Bill Bowdler, who could make the same soundings with less risk of publicity. (At Tab B is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk suggesting that Bill go.) Bill, in my judgment, would be excellent: professional, imaginative, determined.

If you prefer to have a meeting with DOD, State and CIA on the proposal before reaching a decision, I will set one up.

W. W. Rostow

OK to	go	ahead	with	approach,	but	check	back	with	me	on t	he	emissary	

Attachments: Tab A - Paper on approach to Belaunde

Prefer to have meeting first

Tab B - Secretary Rusk's memorandum on subject

DECLASSIFIED

By 18/9, NARA, Date 12991

DECLASSIFIED

A. Problem

By As lip, NARA, Date 1241

- The Peruvian economy is in a descending spiral which threatens stability and poses the imminent threat of a military takeover.
- To reverse this trend, Peru desperately needs to put into effect a stabilization program which will require strong backing from us.
- 3. We are prepared to make a \$40 million program loan available conditioned on fiscal and budgetary self-help measures and no French Mirages.
- 4. The principal obstacle is the aircraft purchase. We need to devise a formula for Peru to void the contract or otherwise get rid of the Mirages.
- 5. The Peruvian Mirage deal, if carried out, will have an interacting impact on purchase of Mirages by other Latin American countries and US Congressional reaction which could seriously compromise our Alliance for Progress effort and the OAS Summit Program.

# B. What We Know About the Mirage Deal

We do not have a copy of the contract and only a vague idea of its contents from second and third hand sources:

- -- The contract is reportedly between the Peruvian Air Force and the French Government.
- -- It provides for the sale of 12 Mirage 5's at a price of \$27-28 million, including aircraft, training and spare parts.

- -- An initial payment is supposed to have been made, amount unknown.
- -- Delivery of aircraft is reported to start at the end of 1967.

We have no specific data on contract cancellation penalty or the resale provisions.

#### C. Alternative Courses for Peru

- 1. Cancel the contract, forfeit the down payment and pay whatever else the penalty clause provides. This is neatest solution and our preferred position.
- 2. Resell the aircraft to a third country before delivery, if there is a resale provision. Belaunde has suggested resale after delivery.

#### D. Our Strategy

- 1. We should offer President Belaunde and his military leaders an attractive alternative to the Mirage deal consistent with our stand that American F-5's will not be programmed into Latin America until 1969-70 time frame.
- Depending upon the options open to the Peruvians, our offers would be:

#### First Choice

- -- Peru would cancel the Mirage contract.
- -- We would help devise a way to cover the losses from forfeiture and the penalty clause.
- -- We would arrange with Northrop Canada to sell six CF-5's with delivery in the period October 1968-July 1969, with Northrop US selling another six F-5's for delivery during the July 1969-June 1970 period on favorable commercial terms.
- -- We would train Peruvian pilots on F-5's in the US starting in January 1968.

#### Second Choice

- -- Peru would agree to resell the Mirages to a third country before delivery.
- -- We would help find a third country purchaser and Peru would get French Government (or Dassault Co.) agreement to the transaction.
- -- Same as in First Choice on sale and delivery dates for Canadian and US F-5's.
- -- Same as in First Choice on training of pilots.

# E. Scenario

- 1. Obtain the President's approval of this approach.
- 2. Check with Northrop US on its and Northrop Canada's ability to meet the sale and delivery schedule with attractive commercial terms.
- 3. Send a high level representative to Peru (e.g., Vance, Harriman, Anderson, M. Eisenhower) to find out whether Belaunde and the Peruvian military are willing to work with us on either the First or Second Choices and find out the precise terms of the Mirage contract so that we know what we are up against.
- 4. Have Tuthill explain to Costa e Silva what we are proposing to Peru and what we are prepared to do in Brazil.
- 5. If the Peruvians accept our alternative, the high level representative would work out a tentative scenario for handling the contract cancellation or resale and the respective US-Peruvian roles.

# THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

November 11, 1967

# SECRET

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request that Mr. William G. Bowdler go to Lima Regarding Mirage Aircraft Problem

# Recommendation:

That you authorize William G. Bowdler to go to Lima to explore possibilities for solution of the Mirage aircraft problem.

Approve	Disapprove	

# Discussion:

The dangers to our policy should Peru go ahead with the Mirage contract are very great. We think that someone who is closely involved with our efforts to explore every possibility to keep the level of arms down and who knows some of the key Peruvian figures should go to Lima to advise and assist the Embassy. At the same time, he should not be well known to the Lima press.

I believe that Mr. Bowdler is the best man to do this. He knows intimately and well all the possibilities that should be explored. While Mr. Bowdler has been involved in this problem at a high level, his departure and presence in Lima will not attract press interest.

Dean Rusk

Dean Ruck

SECRET Group 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

DECLASSIFIED

By Agent, NARA, Date 12991

Mr. Rostow 53

And Frank
Thursday, November 2, 1967 2 Profile CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. President:

You asked yesterday for a report on how Bob Anderson was briefed. The attached confirms that Luke Battle gave him our message loud and clear -- that he was to talk only as a private citizen and not as your emissary.

We do not yet have a report on his scheduled talk with Nasser today. We will try to make sure that he calls it quits with today's session.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 By Lip, NARA, Date 4-6-95

CONFIDENTIAL

Att: Read-Rostow memo, 11/2/67, Subj: Briefing of Robert B. Anderson, (WH-4187)



# DEPARTMENT OF STATE



IN REPLY REFER TO: S/S 18888 November 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing of Robert B. Anderson

On October 27, Robert B. Anderson was given a general briefing by Assistant Secretary Battle on the current situation in the Middle East with particular reference to Jordan, Israel and the UAR. Prior to Mr. Anderson's departure on the morning of October 28 from New York, Mr. Battle conveyed to him our views on his visit to Cairo. He was informed that he should make clear to President Nasser that he came purely as a private citizen and in no way represented either the President or the State Department. He was not to raise in Cairo the question of the possible resumption of US-UAR relations. If this subject were raised by the Egyptians, he was to urge them to convey their views to Washington through diplomatic channels. In addition, he was advised that he could state, as a private citizen who reads the newspapers, that he believed the United States Government would be sympathetic if it were approached by the Egyptian authorities through appropriate diplomatic channels with a proposal to resume relations. Certain basic conditions would be required, however, if relations were to be resumed. These would include: (1) an appropriate public statement from the UAR Government exonerating the United States from the charge that it was militarily involved in the June war; (2) compensation would have to be paid for damage to U.S. properties; and (3) appropriate assurances would have to be provided that the UAR Government would conduct its relations with the United States in the future in accordance with normal diplomatic practices.

Benjamin H. Read Executive Secretary

- CONFIDENTIAL

### SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This conversation between President Ayub and Amb. Oehlert covers a number of items which may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Karachi 807

SECRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 By 10, NARA, Date 11-20-91

54 Prestile

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

### FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR OFHLERT (Karachi 807)

At 11:00 p.m. Monday, October 30, I received a phone call at my residence from Mansur Ahmad of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that in a telegram from Ankara President Ayub had instructed them to request me to meet with him in Karachi on November 1. I proceeded to Karachi last evening and this morning met with him, Foreign Minister Pirzada and Ahmad for one hour.

Ayub apologized for calling me to Karachi but stated he had gathered information in Romania which he considered could be urgently important to the U. S. Government. He then stated that Chairman Maurer had advised him that approximately one month ago he (Maurer) had visited with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and that Minh had stated that:

- A. North Vietnam does not insist on a unified Vietnam;
- B. North Vietnam does not insist on any settlement which would result in loss of face to the U. S. Government;
- C. A bombing pause would lead to negotiations but apparently no time element indicated;
- D. It was recognized that the withdrawal of the U. S. Government and allied forces would have to be accompanied by both Vietnamese withdrawal and also by the creation of an international presence in South Vietnam to supervise a referendum and to keep the peace;
- E. Upon Maurer's request of Minh as to why he did not signal this to the
   U. S. Government, Minh replied that to do so would be to surrender;
- F. Ayub indicated to me that he believed that Maurer would be more than willing to try to maintain a dialog with Minh if the U. S. Government so desired;
- G. Ayub questioned Maurer about the North Vietnamese ability to continue the conflict and elicited the reply that while industry was leveled on the ground, food supplies were adequate, military supplies generous from the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., and that underground facilities provided for minimal non-military industrial requirements;

SECRET/EXDIS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-476

By is 8, NARA, Date 1-10-95

#### H. In all this context, Ayub added that:

On his recent trip to the U.S.S.R., Kosygin had indicated to him that if Vietnam were settled then the U.S.S.R. could and would come to a harmonious agreement with the U.S. Government on all other outstanding issues but for its position in the Communist world vis a vis the Chinese Communists could not proceed cooperatively with the U.S. Government before Vietnam was resolved;

De Gaulle had just stated to Ayub that in his opinion, the U. S. and U.S.S.R. could and would find total accommodations albeit not friendship, if Vietnam could be gotten out of the way.


Ayub added that throughout their talks, De Gaulle had never spoken of or referred to the U. S. with rancor and while he had pressed Ayub for a joint condemnation of U. S. policy in Vietnam, he had yielded to Ayub's insistence that their joint communique in this area be tailored to Ayub's formula of peaceful self-determination.

Ayub then turned to the subject of CENTO, making the following points:

- A. The original military purposes of CENTO have disappeared both because the U.S.S.R. no longer constitutes a military threat and also because the U.S. was no longer affording full military support to CENTO. To my question about the Chinese Communist threat, he responded that they were incapable of seriously threatening anyone.
- B. He added that his own military supply picture was so desperate that he could not use up anything by participation in joint maneuvers or exercises.
- C. The U.S.S.R. was pressing him about CENTO but he had stated to them that apparently U.S. policy considered the continued existence of CENTO to be important and that he would not do anything to hurt his American friends.
- D. He then stated that in his opinion, the future of CENTO lay in the direction of joint economic developments, citing micro-wave as an excellent example of such a project which also had military undertones in that it represented a facility which had both great peaceful uses and also afforded fall-back military usefulness should the need ever arise.

Finally in his context he suggested that serious thought be given to the establishment of a joint study team to develop a general program for further orienting CENTO toward the economic field and later identifying specific projects. He indicated that both Iran and Turkey concurred in this view.

Having spoken of the military aspects of CENTO and his reasons for non-involvement in them, he reverted to the tank issue renewing his "need" for 500 tanks to restore his accepted force levels and his preference for U. S. equipment.



Next I reverted to my previous conversation with the Pakistani Minister and Secretary of Defense in the context that in order to determine whether any tanks were justified in the context of our military supply policy we would need to know how many Chinese Communist tanks Pakistan had received, what others might be committed from that or other sources, whether an obsolete tank would be scrapped for each U. S.-controlled tank acquired, and whether Pakistan would commit itself not to acquire tanks from other sources.

He then said that he was confused as to just what our military supply policy is and I again explained that the U. S. was striving for a military balance on the subcontinent and attempting to lower the level of military expenditure so that more resources could be devoted to economic development. He commented that he understood and concurred in this policy but that the trouble was that India was not complying with it.

SECRET/EXDIS

After some sparing in which he indicated that the U. S. should tell him what it is prepared to do to help him obtain equipment needed to achieve agreed upon force levels before he told us precisely what he had, he did indicate that he would instruct the Defense Minister to review precise figures with me and that if his minimal requirements could be met in U. S. equipment he would undertake first to scrap one obsolete tank for each new one acquired and second, not to seek or accept additional equipment elsewhere. Since he several times referred both to need for 50 tanks and request for 200 tanks, it is uncertain which figure he regards as minimal requirements. He raised no question of equipment other than tanks, but of course this by no means precludes subsequent reversion to aircraft and artillery.

After thanking him for the improved balance in press treatment, I told him that Governor Harriman would head our Mangla Dam delegation at which he expressed great pleasure. Without my requesting an audience, he said that he would look forward to a private meeting with the Governor and me and that he would also be glad to receive the other delegation members. Both he and Pirzada assured me voluntarily that our delegation need not be limited to five or any other number and that they would be happy for it to be any number we found convenient. Both he and Pirzada agreed there should be no publicity yet about composition of the delegation and that at our appropriate time, there should be a joint Pindi-Washington release.

I reported my wheat conversation with Finance Minister Uquaili and thanked Ayub again for the renewed assurances that any commercially purchased wheat would be purchased from us. I again reviewed with him the significance of a purchase and referred to the possibility of credit, pointing out that such arrangements would not require any actual cash payments until one year after final delivery when the first one-third would be due. He said "It seems such a small thing in your context but so important to us. Is it really all that important?" He made no response to my observation that though the amounts were small the importance lay in the area of Congressional relations. I have the impression that if pressed, there is at least a fifty-fifty chance that he would agree to purchase half of the remaining 234,000 tons over Uquaili's objection. I shall await your instructions.

To my suggestion that I have an early appointment with him to introduce and have a working visit with Bill Kontos, he responded affirmatively and willingly.

-SECRET/EXDIS

for file

# -TOP SECRET CODEWORD

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

1.5(c) 3.4(b)(1),(3) 6.1(c)

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ /R4c 00-273 Bychn., NARA, Date 3-17-03 Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Of Pres file Clark Clifford is out of town until Monday. He told me he had urgent business starting at mid-day.

Although I indicated the urgency you attached to a response from him, I rather doubt that, given his responsibilities for the Advisory Group, he had time to focus his mind on the paper. Therefore, we may have to wait until early next week.

As instructed, I posed, without indicating the source, the key positions in the paper to General Taylor. He said he would need until Monday to develop a response.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:40 p.m.

#### Mr. President:

It turns out on investigation, as you can see from the attached, that the Dial Press book is a Hoax.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Prestile

# THE WHITE HOUSE

57a

November 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Your Request for Information Regarding

<u>Dial Press</u> book, "Report from Iron Mountain"

You will recall that Price Daniel called Marvin Watson's attention to the forthcoming publication by <u>Dial Press</u> of a work purporting to be the suppressed report of a government-sponsored study group, akin to the Gaither Committee, concluding that for economic and social reasons, the U.S. cannot afford "peace." The attached advertisement, from the <u>New York Times</u> of November 1, shows how <u>Dial</u> is promoting the book -- implying by innuendo, but not direct statement, that the report is official.

The "report" is, in fact, a rather cleverly done parody, with all the apparatus, such as elaborate citation of bona fide governmental and academic studies, which might lend it credibility. There are relatively few tip-offs that the document is bogus. The most apparent indicator is the quite mediocre quality of the argument itself.

If we get questions, the book should be quickly dismissed as a transparent hoax.

Edward R. Fried

RHU:em

W

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING WASHINGTON 25/ D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The 1963 study did not deal the Vietnam, of course, but with the with what the US arms race. It concluded that the US economy could tolerate drastic cute in economy could tolerate drastic cute in

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE W. MARVIN WATSON SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

One of my staff passed on some information which he had received that Dial Press is planning to publish a book dealing with the transition from war to peace that might be an attack on Administration policy. The book apparently includes a thesis that the Administration purposely fosters the maintenance of the economy through war. It was reported that the book includes material from a Government disarmament study conducted in 1963 dealing with the effects of peaceful settlement on the economy. It was also reported that excerpts from the book will be published in Ramparts and in Esquire prior to publication.

You may already have information on this book. Our information is second hand but I thought it might be helpful in anticipation of publication. We do not have any information about the date but could probably get further information if you thought it desirable.

To Walt



from REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE:

POSSIBILIT

"It is uncertain, at this time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more questionable...that it would be desirable."

"'John Doe', as I will call him for reasons that will be made clear, is a professor at a large university in the Middle West
... Early in August of 1963, he [responded to a call from
Washington] to serve on a commission of the highest importance. Its objective was to determine, accurately and
realistically, the nature of the problems that would confront
the United States if and when a condition of 'permanent
peace' should arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with
this continuous.

this contingency . . .
"It met [initially at Iron Mountain, New York] and worked regularly for over two and a half years, after which it produced a Report. It was this document, and what to do about

it, that Doe wanted to talk to me about ...
"The report, he said, had been suppressed — both by the

Special Study Group itself and by the government interagency committee to which it had been submitted. After months of agonizing, Doe had decided that he would no longer be party to its being kept secret...

"... the unwillingness of Doe's associates to publicize their findings [is] readily understandable... they concluded [that] lasting peace, while not theoretically impossible, is probably unattainable; even if it could be achieved it would almost certainly not be in the best interests of a stable soalmost certainly not be in the best interests of a stable so-ciety to achieve it..."—from the Foreword by Leonard C.

# REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE

With introductory material by LEONARD C. LEWIN

> \$5.00, now at your bookstore THE DIAL PRESS

58

TOP SECRET
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Thursday, November 2, 1967 4:40 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Jovember I

Herewith my comments on Secretary McNamara's draft paper of November 1, 1967.

I would summarize Secretary McNamara's argument as follows:
 In the next 15 months we shall make progress in South Vietnam but not enough progress either to: lead to peace or convince our people that major progress has been made and there is light at the end of the tunnel.

Under these circumstances, he believes two conflicting tendencies will grow in U. S. public opinion: on the one hand, to escalate the war in the North and expand it on the ground in the South; on the other hand, to pull out.

To avoid this believed polarization of U.S. public opinion around the extremes, he believes we should take a series of measures that would stabilize the war and push the North Vietnamese into a negotiation, even on a "fight and talk" basis. At the maximum, he believes this process could lead to a successful negotiation; at the minimum, it would avoid the pressures to expand the war in the air and on the ground, which he greatly fears.

- 2. My observations on the political, military and diplomatic aspects of this argument follow.
- a. Political. If his proposed strategy did not lead to a successful negotiation, you would be pushed off the middle ground you now hold at home. To test Bob's strategy would require a long bombing cessation, plus a Panmunjom phase, until we found out whether they were serious about negotiations. If we then had to resume full-scale bombing, the Republicans could accuse us of vacillation and adopt a hard line which might then appeal to our people. If we got caught in a Panmunjom phase, the case for their advocating a stronger policy would be even more clear. In a recent Gallup poll, some 67% of the American people want us to continue bombing the North (as I remember it). Acknowledging my limitations as a judge of domestic politics, I am extremely skeptical of any change in strategy that would take you away from your present middle position; that is, using rationally all the power available, but avoiding actions likely to engage the Soviet Union and Communist China. If we shift unilaterally towards de-escalation, the Republicans will move in and crystallize a majority around a stronger policy.

If I felt Bob's strategy would measurably increase the chances of a true settlement, I believe the risk might be worth taking. But both a unilateral

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-475

By 19, NARA, Date 4-6-95

bombing cessation and an announced policy of "stabilization" would, in my view, be judged in Hanoi a mark of weakness rather than evidence of increased U. S. capacity to sweat out the war.

- b. Military. Although I certainly will not predict for you an early end to the war, I believe that, with a little luck and reasonable performance by the South Vietnamese under the new government, the evidence of solid progress will become increasingly clear to one and all. It is no accident that Republican politicians are beginning to smell this. If progress in fact continues, we will get more and more of the kind of testimony that Alsop, Walter Judd, General Bradley, etc., are now generating. Moreover, as an old intelligence officer, I know that one should take very seriously events that one did not predict. I have been looking for a long time, as you know, for a negotiation within South Vietnam. But I did not expect so soon after the failure in Paris as substantive a message as we got by the Buttercup channel. That channel may develop only slowly. It may not yield anything. But the simple fact is this: it emerged while we were bombing the North full scale. Before changing our strategy in the direction suggested by Bob McNamara, I would certainly play this string out to the full. Incidentally, if it works well, I am sure we will come back to the bombing question -- if and when the National Liberation Front suggests that we talk to Hanoi about the issues directly at stake between the U.S. and the DRV. (That is foreshadowed in their description of the three negotiations required for peace.) Until proved otherwise, then, Ewould stay with Buttercup and see where it leads us, while holding steady on our present program.
- c. <u>Diplomacy</u>. As indicated above, I would play out the <u>Buttercup</u> string before probing or initiating in any other direction. I detect the the full flow of intelligence a shift of the following kind:
- -- an increase in Soviet influence in Hanoi, partially caused by our bombing and a consequent requirement for very large increases in Soviet aid;
- -- a shift in Hanoi to the view that they cannot directly take over the South now and, therefore, they have to accept the 17th parallel for a considerable time period;
- -- within this framework, a probing for what the status of the Communists would be within South Vietnam in a time of peace.

TOP SECRET - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

If this is right, we are already in a kind of Panmunjom stage; that is, their military operations are designed not to produce victory but to improve their position in a negotiation which is, in a sense, already under way. It is quite clear from Buttercup that they are trying to bargain the highest possible status for the National Liberation Front in the South against our clear desire to get the war off our necks. If and when we come into contact and begin to exchange views, it may well turn out that their minimum price for National Liberation Front status is higher than we and the government of South Vietnam are In that case, we shall have to prove that their bargaining prepared to pay. power diminishes with the passage of time -- not increases. That, in turn. means high costs in the North; maximum pressure in the South on their manpower base. I believe Bob's strategy would ease their problem and permit them rationally to protract the negotiation -- unless Bob is correct on domestic politics and I am wrong. That is, if the country settled down for the long pull comfortably with Bob's program, he could be right. If his policy opened up a debate between united Republicans claiming we had gone soft and a Democratic Administration, with the JCS in disagreement if not open revolt, then my view is correct.

3. Some Specifics. Having taken this negative stance in general, I would agree at the moment with his points 1 - 5, and 9 (page 6); but I would not announce them as a new policy -- in part, because I don't think we need a new announced policy; in part, because changing circumstances might make it wise to reopen some of the issues in those paragraphs.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ 86-/66 By 2-7, NARA, Date /-26-88

SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Presfile

At the end of a long technical report by Gen. Greene of the situation in I Corps, he concludes as indicated in the following:

"The general state of affairs. While both U.S. and Vietnamese officials have always been resolute with respect to the outcome of the war, they have analyzed the problem somewhat differently, in terms of where we are and how to get where we want to go. This time, I noted a singular uniformity among U.S. and Vietnamese officials, both in concept and in the estimate of where we stand.

"Basically, this is a consensus of how they feel .--

- "- All of the in-country ingredients of victory are now present. The Republic of Vietnam has a constitution. It has a popularly elected president, congress, and rural officialdom. The representation is broad, reflecting a high order of honesty in the election. Now, when problems arise in the provinces, the plaintiffs can be told to take the matter to their congressman, just as in the U.S.A. The democratic mechanism is established, and they need only to put it to work.
- "- The Vietnamese military continues to improve. It may have little similarity with the great military formations of history, but its leadership grows steadily better, as does its basic competence.
- "- The Revolutionary Development program, suffering from half matured ideas and stumbling over the graves of defunct former programs, is nevertheless causing the enemy anguish. Its momentum is not great and its faults are many, but the fact is, the program is showing results. The recent congressional elections certainly attest to this. The Viet Cong did not even claim that they could stop the elections this time, as they claimed in September.
- "- Refugees, serving as they do as an index of the number of people who want to escape the Communist yoke, tell a mixed story. Whether the number of refugees in I Corps is 500,000 (the accepted cumulative figure) or about half that (the number actually in refugee camps), the figure is impressive. The refugees are not generously cared for, but all they seek is insulation from the war or sanctuary from the Communists, and they are willing to sacrifice to get it. Walter Lippmann recently said, in an attack on our policy, that we have been unable to "bend the will" of the Communists in Vietnam. He would do well to remember that millions of South Vietnamese have been fighting the Communists for 20 years, and that their will also remains unbent. The army

of refugees is further living evidence of this fact. Because of the growing number of refugees the Viet Cong recruitment base is diminishing in size, and this is probably the reason that we now see the Viet Cong main force units heavily larded with North Vietnamese replacements, while the Viet Cong guerilla strength goes slowly downward.

"- The above story is a bare synthesis of what I heard from both U.S. and South Vietnam sources. But equally uniform was their grim statement that the focus of the war is now not in South Vietnam, not in North Vietnam, but in Washington. And there is an almost plaintive hope expressed by many that Ho Chi Minh will not over-magnify the volume of the signal from the anti-war protesters in the United States. General Lam, the I Corps Commander, told me that, in his judgment, Ho Chi Minh fights on mainly because he believes the war protest movement in the United States may be decisive, this despite the fact that he knows his chances of military victory have disappeared.

"I asked the views of many rank and file Marines concerning the marchers who paraded from the Lincoln Memorial to the Pentagon. The reactions were divided into two parts. One group -- the younger Marines -- were wrathful; describing the protests as disloyal and the violence as treasonous; professing that the marchers ought to be punished because they were costing U.S. lives in Vietnam. The other group expressed pity for the protesters, feeling that they are ignorant, do not know what is going on and, if aware of the truth, might change their minds. Frequently this group made the point that many of the young marchers are immature and ignorant, and perhaps should be forgiven; but that when grown-up people, some of whom are even in public office, are so wide of the mark in terms of their knowledge of the situation, it is truly a source of concern.

"The point which struck me most forcibly in all of my conversations with the young Marines was their unanimous dedication to what they are doing and their unanimous conviction that anybody, young or old, who could see what they are doing would soon find himself aligned with them in their cause. I cannot help but believe, as these young men go home at the rate of 30,000 a month, that they must in the end outweigh the impact of the marchers."

W. W. Rostow

Thursday - 10:30 am November 2, 1967 Prople

Mr. President:

The Mexican Embassy has delivered this thank you note from President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

60a

Message to the President from President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, dated October 30, 1967

(delivered by Mexican Embassy, Washington)

Mr. President and Esteemed Friend:

My wife, my children, and I wish to express once again to you and Mrs. Johnson our thanks for the very warm and friendly courtesies that you extended to us during our visit to your country.

I wish also to tell you how gratified I was to have the opportunity of talking with you and to state my conviction that, thanks to the agreements we reached, which are expressed in the Joint Communique and in the Action Program, the happy relations of friendship and mutual cooperation that exist between Mexico and the United States will become even closer.

Most cordially yours,

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

Pres file

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 10:25 a, m.

#### Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to an understanding Indonesian student in Paris. You may also wish to inscribe the attached copy of the publication on your trip to Asia.

A possible inscription might read:

To Daoed Joesoef,

who understands.

Lyndon B. Johnson

W. W. Rostow

Dear Mr. Joesoef:

I am very grateful for your letter of September 15 and for your prayers for me, my family, our fighting men in Viet-Nam, and my country. You will understand that in this job I am called upon to face many hard decisions. Letters such as yours may not make the job easier, but they certainly make it seem worthwhile.

I am enclosing a booklet of some remarks I made during my visit to Asia in 1966. It makes clear, I think, what the sacrifices and struggle are all about.

Sincerely.

Encl.

"The Promise of the New Asia"

Mr. Daoed Joesoef
21, rue de Boulainvilliers
Paris 16
France

LBJMWright:hg

TOP SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:20 a.m.

Prestile

Mr. President:

This intelligence estimate (summarized briefly by Dick Helms) reports some "narrowing" of our lead in strategic nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis the USSR.

This is bound to be raised in the campaign next year.

I suggest Sec. McNamara prepare for you our lines of reply.

W. W. Restow

Memo for the President from Richard Helms, 1 November 1967, "NIE 11-8-67: Soviet Capabilities Ca

3.4(6)(1)

NIE 11-8-67

26 October 1967

SANITIZED


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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/ RAC 00-27/

By NARA, Date 10-10-02

WWRostow:rln



1 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT:


NIE 11-8-67: Soviet Capabilities for Strategic


Attack

1. The attached National Intelligence Estimate is our annual assessment of present and projected Soviet strategic attack forces. It puts in perspective the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an extremely sensitive, all-source document with very limited distribution. I commend it to your attention, particularly the Conclusions (pages 1-4).

### 2. I would summarize its essential message as follows:


a. The Soviets are narrowing the lead that the United States has long held in strategic offensive forces. In ICBM's, they will by the end of next year reach approximate numerical parity with the United States. We do not yet know whether they will settle for such parity in numbers, but in any case, we expect qualitative improvements in their ICBM forces over the next few years. They are also emphasizing ballistic missile submarines, and by the mid-70's, will probably have a submarine force about the size of our present Polaris force. In addition, they are likely to have ready within the next few years a limited number of fractional orbit weapons; these differ from ICBM's in that they can be fired





on a south pole trajectory, complicating the United States' warning problem by attacking from the south.

- b. Since the United States-Soviet strategic relationship is a dynamic, inter-acting matter, the Soviets look not only to present United States forces but also to planned improvements for United States forces during the next decade. Within the limits of realistic economic and technological constraints, the Soviets will, of course, seek any advantage they can acquire. We continue to believe, however, that the essential Soviet goal is to achieve and maintain, for both military and political reasons, a credible deterrent against the United States, rather than to gain the kind of overwhelming advantage which would permit them to launch nuclear war without receiving unacceptable damage in return. They recognize that the latter goal is beyond their means.
- 3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with certain findings of this Estimate -- particularly with respect to the projected size of the ICBM force and the role of Long-Range Aviation. His dissents appear in footnotes to appropriate paragraphs of the Conclusions and Discussion.
- 4. This Estimate will be followed within the next few weeks by other National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic defense forces and general purpose forces.



- 3 -

#### Attachment:

NIE 11-8-67 Copy No. <u>1</u> of

# Copies Sent to:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover

Copy No. 1

TOT STATE

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:15 a.m. Prestile

Mr. President:

These materials from captured documents may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

# THE WHITE HOUSE

November 1, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW:

The following extracts from captured documents, although probably not individually indicative of any wide-spread problems in the enemy camp, do give a vivid illustration of the hardships faced by the troops in South Vietnam.

# Captured in Phuoc Long Province

In a personal letter dated September 27, 1967 a North Vietnamese soldier wrote his mother that the entire unit was suffering from malaria.

Another personal letter dated September 15, 1967 from a soldier to his brothers and sisters in North Vietnam reveals that he and his friends are in poor health due to the shortage of food in the mountainous area.

# Captured in Quang Tri Province

A medical plan dated September 10, 1967 and found by the Chief of a local area medical unit reveals that the number of malaria cases in the area increased during the latter part of the third quarter 1967 and that the troops over-all health status is substandard.

#### Captured in Quang Tin Province

A diary kept by a North Vietnamese soldier during his infiltration through Laos and subsequent entry into battle contains a final entry as follows:

"Generally speaking I've not been given any pleasures, nothing but hardships to go with my life. Shortage of sleep, continuous movements, carrying of heavy loads, hunger, internal dissension. The poor living conditions in both North and South Vietnam cannot be thoroughly depicted."

A series of five reports dated between February 24 and June 14, 1967 reveals that the fear of hardships, low fighting spirit, pessimism, and dissession among unit cadre resulted in the unit (a specialized company of the 21st regiment, second North Vietnamese division) failing to carry out its mission during the first quarter of 1967. The document further reveals that after a vital defeat, a number of cadre and combatants of the unit were pessimistic and lost confidence in future victories. Further, the loss had a bad effect on morale and created fear and panic.

Arthur Mc Cafferty

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:07 a.m.

Preside

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms' summarizes the attached CIA report on the Soviet military and economic budget.

I suggest we have a briefing on this at the next NSC meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Brief next CIA meeting	
No	
See me	

# TOP SECRET

Helms memo to the President, copy l,	1.3(a)(4)
"Military and Economic Implications of the New Soviet Plan"	C
plus CIA Intelligence Memorandum "Economic and Military Implications	
of the New Soviet Plan" Cy 5, RR IM 67-67, 30 Oct 1967,	1.3(a)(4)

WWRostow:rln

Authority NLT 019-025-1-11
By D NARN Date 1/5/02

4111



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

# Office Of THE DIRECTOR 1 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT : Military and Economic Implications


of the New Soviet Plan

1. I have attached our analysis of the recent Soviet plan and budget announcements calling for a rise of 2.2 billion rubles in defense expenditures in 1968. We feel that the Soviet leaders have made an important change in economic priorities in favor of the military establishment. Moreover, we feel that they want us to know it.

We do not look for a crash expansion of any single military program, such as the ABM system, but we anticipate the augmentation of a number of programs.

2. We believe that Soviet military and space outlays will grow by a substantial amount in real terms. Other factors, such as accounting changes, higher prices for military goods, and perhaps military pay increases, also account for some part of the announced increase.

APPROVED FOR RELEASEMAR 1895



1.3(a)(4)

3. This diversion of additional funds to military purposes will force a slowdown in Soviet industrial and agricultural investment. The USSR will thereby be jeopardizing the long-term technological quality of its industrial plant. It will also make future agricultural gains more uncertain.

Richard Helms Director

Attachment:

1.3(a)(4)

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 10:00 a.m.

# MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an interesting and persuasive comment by Ambassador Goldberg on the Economist article you asked him to check.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment (log 4176)



#### CONFIDENTIAL

November 1, 1967

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE \_
UNITED NATIONS

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Article in the Economist regarding the UN and Vietnam

Pursuant to your request relayed to me by Walt Rostow, I am sending you my views regarding the assessment in the Foreign Report published by the <a href="Economist">Economist</a> (issue of October 26) regarding the UN and Vietnam. I agree with the statement made that no one in the Assembly -- or at least a very few -- wish to have a debate about Vietnam in the Assembly. Regarding the remainder of the assessment, my views are as follows:

Should the occasion arise and should the Assembly be faced only with a resolution calling for the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam -- and calling for nothing else -- there is no doubt a two-thirds majority could be obtained for such a resolution. The vote, in my opinion, would be in the neighborhood of 61 to 25 with 36 abstentions and would be made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 1.

It is, however, improbable that Assembly consideration of the Vietnam problem would develop in that way. If there is an alternative resolution before the Assembly calling for an immediate and prior cessation of the bombing as a first step to be followed either by meaningful negotiations toward a settlement and/or abatement of

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-476

By \_\_\_\_\_\_, NARA, Date /-/0-55