


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

hostilities on both sides, both to be within a reasonable but unspecified period, the tactical situation would change. With an alternative resolution along these lines on the table to be voted on, it seems unlikely a simple cessation of bombing resolution could attain a two-thirds majority; rather the vote in that circumstance I believe would be in the neighborhood of 41 to 37 with 44 abstentions, made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 2.

When the alternative resolution would then be put to a vote it too would fail to secure a two-thirds majority vote. The vote on the alternative resolution I think would be in the neighborhood of 50 to 39 with 33 abstentions, made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 3.

In summary, if both resolutions were before the Assembly, my assessment is that neither would command the requisite two-thirds vote.

  
Arthur J. Goldberg

Attachments:

Three Voting Lists

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING LIST

PLENARY MEETING \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMITTEE \_\_\_\_\_ I - Vote on Simple Cessation of Bombing \_\_\_\_\_

QUESTION AT ISSUE Resolution (with no alternative res. available)

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Afghanistan	X			Dahomey			X
Albania	X			Denmark	X		
Algeria	X			Dominican Rep.		X	
Argentina		X		Ecuador	X		
Australia		X		El Salvador		X	
Austria			X	Ethiopia	X		
Barbados	X			Finland	X		
Belgium		X		France	X		
Bolivia		X		Gabon			X
Botswana		X		Gambia		X	
Brazil			X	Ghana	X		
Bulgaria	X			Greece		X	
Burma	X			Guatemala	X		
Burundi	X			Guinea	X		
Byelorussian SSR	X			Guyana	X		
Cambodia	X			Haiti			X
Cameroon	X			Honduras		X	
Canada	X			Hungary	X		
Cen. African Rep.			X	Iceland	X		
Ceylon	X			India	X		
Chad			X	Indonesia	X		
Chile	X			Iran			X
China		X		Iraq	X		
Colombia			X	Ireland			X
Congo (B)	X			Israel		X	
Congo (Demo. Rep of)			X	Italy			X
Costa Rica		X		Ivory Coast			X
Cuba	X			Jamaica	X		
Cyprus	X			Japan			X
Czechoslovakia	X			Jordan			X

Sub-Total . \_\_\_\_\_ Sub-Total . . . \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Kenya	X			Portugal			X
Kuwait	X			Romania	X		
Laos			X	Rwanda			X
Lebanon			X	Saudi Arabia			X
Lesotho		X		Senegal	X		
Liberia			X	Sierra Leone	X		
Libya			X	Singapore			X
Luxembourg			X	Somalia	X		
Madagascar		X		South Africa		X	
Malawi		X		Spain			X
Malaysia			X	Sudan	X		
Maldives Islands			X	Sweden	X		
Mali	X			Syria	X		
Malta			X	Thailand		X	
Mauritania	X			Togo			X
Mexico	X			Trinidad & Tobago	X		
Mongolia	X			Tunisia			X
Morocco	X			Turkey			X
Nepal	X			Uganda	X		
Netherlands		X		Ukrainian SSR	X		
New Zealand		X		U.S.S. R.	X		
Nicaragua		X		U.A. R.	X		
Niger			X	United Kingdom			X
Nigeria	X			United Rep. Tanzania	X		
Norway	X			United States		X	
Pakistan	X			Upper Volta	X		
Panama		X		Uruguay			X
Paraguay		X		Venezuela			X
Peru			X	Yemen	X		
Philippines		X		Yugoslavia	X		
Poland	X			Zambia	X		

Sub-Total . . . . .

TOTAL .. . . .

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING LIST

PLENARY MEETING

DATE

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Vol. II<sup>7</sup> Vote on Simple Cessation of Bombing (with alternative resolution)  
QUESTION AT ISSUE to be voted on last)

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Afghanistan	X			Dahomey			X
Albania	X			Denmark			X
Algeria	X			Dominican Rep.		X	
Argentina		X		Ecuador			X
Australia		X		El Salvador		X	
Austria			X	Ethiopia			X
Barbados			X	Finland	X		
Belgium		X		France	X		
Bolivia		X		Gabon			X
Botswana		X		Gambia		X	
Brazil		X		Ghana			X
Bulgaria	X			Greece		X	
Burma	X			Guatemala			X
Burundi	X			Guinea	X		
Byelorussian SSR	X			Guyana			X
Cambodia	X			Haiti		X	
Cameroon			X	Honduras		X	
Canada			X	Hungary	X		
Gen. African Rep.			X	Iceland			X
Ceylon	X			India	X		
Chad			X	Indonesia	X		
Chile			X	Iran			X
China		X		Iraq	X		
Colombia			X	Ireland			X
Congo (B)	X			Israel		X	
Congo (Demo. Rep of)			X	Italy		X	
Costa Rica		X		Ivory Coast			X
Cuba	X			Jamaica			X
Cyprus			X	Japan		X	
Czechoslovakia	X			Jordan			X

Sub-Total

Sub-Total



COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Kenya	X			Portugal			X
Kuwait			XX	Romania	X		
Laos			XX	Rwanda			XX
Lebanon			XX	Saudi Arabia			XX
Lesotho		XX		Senegal			XX
Liberia		XX		Sierra Leone			XX
Libya			X	Singapore			XX
Luxembourg		XX		Somalia	X		
Madagascar		XX		South Africa		X	
Malawi		XX		Spain		X	
Malaysia			XX	Sudan	XX		
Maldives Islands			XX	Sweden	XX		
Mali	X			Syria	XX		
Malta			X	Thailand		X	
Mauritania	X			Togo			XX
Mexico			X	Trinidad & Tobago			XX
Mongolia	X			Tunisia			XX
Morocco			X	Turkey		X	
Nepal	X			Uganda	XX		
Netherlands		XX		Ukrainian SSR	XX		
New Zealand		XX		U.S.S. R.	XX		
Nicaragua		XX		U.A. R.	XX		
Niger			X	United Kingdom		X	
Nigeria	X			United Rep. Tanzania	X		
Norway			X	United States		X	
Pakistan	X			Upper Volta	X	X	
Panama		XX		Uruguay		XX	
Paraguay		XX		Venezuela			
Peru			X	Yemen	XX		
Philippines		XX		Yugoslavia	XX		
Poland	X			Zambia	XX		

Sub-Total . . . . .

TOTAL .. . . .

# GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOTING LIST

PLENARY MEETING \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

COMMITTEE III Vote on the alternative resolution 21

QUESTION AT ISSUE (if voted on last) 7

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Afghanistan		X		Dahomey			X
Albania		X		Denmark	X		
Algeria		X		Dominican Rep.	X		
Argentina	X			Ecuador	X		
Australia	X			El Salvador	X		
Austria			X	Ethiopia			X
Barbados			X	Finland			X
Belgium	X			France		X	
Bolivia	X			Gabon			X
Botswana	X			Gambia	X		
Brazil	X			Ghana			X
Bulgaria		X		Greece	X		
Burma		X		Guatemala			X
Burundi		X		Guinea		X	X
Byelorussian SSR		X		Guyana			X
Cambodia		X		Haiti	X		
Cameroon			X	Honduras	X		
Canada	X			Hungary		X	
Gen. African Rep.			X	Iceland	X		
Ceylon		X		India		X	
Chad			X	Indonesia		X	
Chile			X	Iran	X		
China			X	Iraq		X	
Colombia	X			Ireland	X		
Congo (B)		X		Israel	X		
Congo (Demo. Rep of)			X	Italy	X		
Costa Rica	X			Ivory Coast	X		
Cuba		X		Jamaica			X
Cyprus			X	Japan	X		
Czechoslovakia		X		Jordan			X

Sub-Total . \_\_\_\_\_ Sub-Total . . . \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Kenya		X		Portugal	X		
Kuwait			X	Romania		X	
Laos	X			Rwanda			X
Lebanon			X	Saudi Arabia			X
Lesotho	X			Senegal		X	
Liberia	X			Sierra Leone			X
Libya			X	Singapore	X		
Luxembourg	X			Somalia		X	
Madagascar	X			South Africa	X		
Malawi	X			Spain	X		
Malaysia	X			Sudan		X	
Maldives Islands			X	Sweden			X
Mali		X		Syria		X	
Malta	X			Thailand	X		
Mauritania		X		Togo			X
Mexico			X	Trinidad & Tobago			X
Mongolia		X		Tunisia			X
Morocco			X	Turkey	X		
Nepal			X	Uganda			X
Netherlands	X			Ukrainian SSR		X	
New Zealand	X			U.S.S. R.		X	
Nicaragua	X			U.A. R.			
Niger			X	United Kingdom	X		
Nigeria		X		United Rep. Tanzania		X	
Norway	X			United States	X		
Pakistan		X		Upper Volta		X	
Panama	X			Uruguay	X		
Paraguay	X			Venezuela	X		
Peru	X			Yemen		X	
Philippines	X			Yugoslavia		X	
Poland		X		Zambia		X	

Sub-Total .

TOTAL ..

66

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967  
9:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith John Roche suggests a speech by  
the Vice President upon his return.

W. W. R.

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Tell them to submit draft \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET attachment



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P 1.3 (a) (5)

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TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

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FM JOHN ROCHE KUALA LUMPUR 519

TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND WALT ROSTOW  
NO NIGHT ACTION

"JOHN ROCHE TO PRESIDENT AND WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE:  
VICE PRESIDENT'S RETURN SEEMS TO ME IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR  
SHORT REPEAT SHORT NATIONAL TV. SP EECH (PERHAPS FIFTEEN  
MINUTES) DRAMATIZING THE NEW ASIA THEME, RAMMING HOME  
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY POWER AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT,  
AND EMPHASIZING TO AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE NOT OUT HERE  
ALONE. I WOULD WRITE SPEECH AND KEEP IT OUT OF HANDS OF  
COTTON CANDY DREW. WILL AWAIT YOUR JUDGEMENT BEFORE DISCUSSING  
WITH VICE PRESIDENT. REGARDS."  
J100

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 019-025-1-13  
By Q NARA Date 1-7-02



Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967  
9:10 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Bunker reflects on  
enemy casualty statistics in a thoughtful way.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (Saigon 10221)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~EXDIS~~

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RR RUEHEX  
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 91  
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC  
STATE GRNC  
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Authority NLS/CBS 10

By iss, NAES, Date 11-28-83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 10221

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR ROSTOW

1. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I DISCUSSED THE CORROBORATION BY CAPTURED DOCUMENTS OF FWMAF BODY COUNT, AND OFFICIALS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THE DETAILS AND DOCUMENTS.
2. I FIND THAT THE CORROBORATION CONSISTS OF A STATISTICAL STUDY OF 70 SEPARATE DOCUMENTS FOR PERIOD 1 JAN 1966-30 NOV 1966 AND NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE PERIOD DEC 1966 THROUGH MAR 1967. EACH OF THESE DOCUMENTS GIVES ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF AN ENEMY UNIT AND SOME INFORMATION ON LOSSES IN THAT UNIT, SUCH AS KIA, WIA, MIA, AND DESERTERS. FROM THE DOCUMENTS IT WAS DETERMINED

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 10221 CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE ENEMY, ON THE AVERAGE IN THE UNITS COVERED, WERE KIA, DESERTED, ETC. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE PERCENTAGES WOULD BE ROUGHLY APPLICABLE TO THE ENEMY FORCES AS A WHOLE, THE SAME PERCENTAGES WERE APPLIED TO TOTAL ENEMY FORCES, AS WE THEN CARRIED THEM ON THE ORDER OF BATTLE. THE RESULTING FIGURES WERE COMPARED WITH OUR BODY COUNT FIGURES, AND THE KIA SO DERIVED COMPARED REMARKABLY CLOSELY WITH OUR BODY COUNT (ALSO POW AND CHIEU HOI FIGURES COMPARED WITH ADJUSTED DESERTER FIGURES).

3. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE ANALYSIS CAN BE USED WITH THE PRESS AT THIS TIME AS STATISTICAL BODY COUNT CORROBORATION. THERE ARE TOO MANY INDEFINITE AREAS, SUCH AS (A) THE REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE SAMPLE, (B) THE ACCURACY OF OUR ORDER OF BATTLE, (C) THE FACT THAT "BODY COUNT" INCLUDES PORTERS AND OTHERS TEMPORARILY MOBILIZED AND NOT ON THE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND (D) THE FACT THAT KIA IN ENEMY DOCUMENTS INCLUDES KIA FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES NOT ALWAYS INCLUDED IN "BODY COUNT." FURTHERMORE, WE ARE PRESENTLY UPDATING OUR ORDER OF BATTLE FIGURES FOR THE PAST AND THIS WILL OBVIOUSLY AFFECT

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 10221-8 CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUR RESULTS. THE ACTUAL ANALYSIS WAS DONE BY A MATHEMATICIAN NO LONGER WITH MACV, AND SOME OF HIS WORK (PARTICULARLY ON DESERTERS--ADJUSTMENT FOR MEN RETURNED TO THEIR UNITS, KIA, POW, ETC.) ARE NOT COMPLETELY ACCEPTED BY PRESENT MACV STAFF.

4. ALSO, MACV CONTINUALLY CHECKS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS GIVING LOSSES IN PARTICULAR ENGAGEMENTS WITH OUT BODY COUNT TO DETERMINE CORRELATION. THEY HAVE CORRELATED ABOUT 20 ENGAGEMENTS IN THIS WAY, AND THE TOTAL OF ENEMY COUNT EXCEEDS OURS BY 10 TO 15 PERCENT. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WHEREAS SOME ARE REMARKABLY CLOSE OR EVEN IDENTICAL, OTHERS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY OFF THE MARK. IN SOME CASES ENEMY ADMISSIONS FAR EXCEED OUR BODY COUNT, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE MOST OF THE BODIES WERE DRAGGED OFF THE FIELD BY THE ENEMY. IN OTHER CASES OUR BODY COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEEDS ENEMY ADMISSIONS, PRESUMABLY RESULTING FROM EITHER (A) KILLING OF PORTERS AND LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL NOT APPEARING IN ENEMY FIGURES, OR (B) KILLING OF SOLDIERS IN OTHER UNITS IN MULTI-UNIT ACTIONS WHERE CAPTURED DOCUMENT ONLY REVEALS LOSSES OF A SINGLE UNIT. |||

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 10221-8 CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. WE ARE FORWARDING TO YOU THE JANUARY MACV STUDY OF VC LOSSES. THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH THIS STUDY WAS BASED HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO DIA. HOWEVER, AS MENTIONED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, MACV HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE METHODS OF ANALYSIS EMPLOYED IN THAT STUDY. WE WILL ALSO SEND TO YOU COMPARATIVE INFORMATION WE HAVE ON PARTICULAR ENGAGEMENTS. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THESE DOCUMENTS MAY RAISE WITH UNFRIENDLY SOURCES, WE BELIEVE ALL FACTORS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BEFORE ANY RELEASE IS MADE.

BUNKER  
BT

NN

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~~EXDIS~~



~~SECRET~~

Agenda - p. 3 -  
checked by 68  
phone with  
Clark Clifford  
W.

Pres file

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres

This memorandum incorporates a brief summary of the discussion last night plus some suggestions for how the meeting this morning might be handled.

I. Report on the meeting.

1. The meeting began with two briefings: one by Gen. Wheeler and the other by George Carver. I would urge you to check with Clark Clifford and others, but I found the briefings impressive, especially Carver who hit just the right balance between the progress we have made and the problems we still confront. He handled the population control data in a lucid but credible way. There was hardly a word spoken that could not be given directly to the press. You may wish to consider a full leadership meeting of this kind, introduced by yourself, after which you could put the whole thing on television, perhaps when Bunker is here.

2. They both concluded that there was very great progress since 1965. We can't count on sufficient progress in the next 15 months to collapse the enemy; but Carver made two good points with respect to the future:

-- In part, the future is in our hands and the South Vietnamese's. In particular, the appointment of good officials and effective attack on corruption and a sharp improvement of the ARVN in pacification operations could produce dramatic change.

-- From the point of view of Hanoi, they would make a strategic decision to end the war when they had decided the U. S. would not behave like the French did in 1954 and when a viable state structure seemed on the way to emerging in Saigon.

3. Sec. Rusk then, over drinks, reviewed the attitude of Hanoi towards negotiations, emphasizing that their eyes were increasingly fastened on American politics.

4. The general discussion then came to focus around two issues:

-- The problem of sustained support for our policy within the U. S. ; and the bombing question.

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By 04/1/85	NARS, Date 11-2-83



~~SECRET~~

-2-

Arthur Dean and General Bradley spent a good deal of their time on the domestic situation and how to present the story of the war in ways which would encourage our people to unify and stay the course. Dean cited the kinds of questions he got in talking to college audiences. Dean Acheson put forward the view that the bulk of the university student opposition stemmed from an understandable desire not to have to go to fight in Vietnam. He was challenged by Mac Bundy and others that this was part but not all the story.

5. On bombing the line up was about as follows:

-- All agreed with McNamara, who read from a CIA document, that bombing did not prevent the present level of infiltration of men and arms.

-- George Ball and Dean Acheson urged that we use bombing as a negotiating chip against pressure across the DMZ. Acheson said that we should stop bombing when they did not press across the DMZ and resume bombing when they did until they got the point. Sec. Rusk pointed out we had tried to establish that connection but had failed; but they rather ignored what he was saying. Bob Murphy and General Bradley, in particular, said that out of their experience over the years they were sure that the bombing was having some effect on operations in the South, although it could not be precisely measured. In this discussion it emerged that while Helms, agreed with Sec. McNamara that the present level of bombing would not have a demonstrable effect on flows to the South, he disagreed with the judgment that a stoppage of bombing would not result in increased flows to the South. It might.

6. Arthur Dean made strongly the point, out of his experience, that an excessive eagerness as to negotiate or a broad humanitarian gesture to the Communists is interpreted as a sign of weakness by Communists.

7. At the close Sec. Rusk urged them all to put their minds to this question: In the face of the situation, as it was outlined to them, what would they do if they were President?

8. Douglas Dillon's questions mainly centered on possibilities for escalation against the North; that is, mining the harbors, hitting the dikes, etc.

9. Incidentally, I detected in this group no sentiment for our pulling out of Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-3-

II. This is one possible way to handle the meeting this morning at 10:30 a. m.

1. Thank them for giving their time; and suggest the importance of maintaining the existence and substance of the meeting in confidence. You would like to call on them again. But they constitute so weighty a group that public knowledge of their meetings might be misinterpreted and lead to speculation of crises.

2. A President faced with the present situation constantly must ask himself two questions:

-- Is our course in Vietnam right? If it is right, how can we increase public understanding and support for that policy? As they are aware, Hanoi's view of <sup>U.S.</sup> public understanding and support is a major front in the war -- perhaps now the most important front.

3. The first question is: Is there anything that we are not doing in the South that we ought to do?

(You might go around the table on this issue.)

The second question: With respect to the North, should we: continue what we are doing? Mine the ports and plan to take down the dikes when the water is high? Unilaterally reduce or eliminate bombing of North Vietnam?

(Again around the table.)

The third question: Negotiations. Should we adopt a passive policy of willingness to negotiate but wait for their initiatives?

If we should try additional initiatives, what should they be?

Despite their refusal of the San Antonio formula, should we unilaterally cease bombing and just see what happens?

The fourth question: Taking into account all that they know, do they believe that we should in one way or another get out of Vietnam?

The fifth question: What measures would they suggest to rally and unite our own people behind the effort in Vietnam?

I suggest that Tom Johnson be present and keep a tally sheet on each man with respect to each question.

WWRostow:rlh.

W. W. Rostow

Thursday, November 2, 1967

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Recently, a relatively obscure Member of the Canadian Parliament, Mr. F. J. Bigg, stood up and delivered a remarkable and eloquent speech on your behalf, contrasting your career with that of Ho Chi Minh:

"...as I read the reports of (Ho Chi Minh's) achievements I find they are all negative and all designed to destroy freedom. However, as I read the record of Lyndon B. Johnson's career I find that for the last 35 years at least he has only had one end in mind, to uphold the dignity of the human being..."

Mr. Bigg chided his fellow countrymen for their criticism, ("I am sick and tired of hearing criticisms of the noble efforts made by President Johnson..."), offered unqualified support for U. S. policy in Vietnam, and concluded: "I, for one, thank God we have a man of Johnson's calibre for a neighbor."

Because the warmth of his words is in such contrast to what we often hear from up North, I thought you might derive some comfort from reading his speech. I have marked several passages.

The State Department has thanked Mr. Bigg for his remarks, and they have been inserted in the Congressional Record by Congressman Gallagher of New Jersey.

W. W. Rostow

Moose 11/2/67

cc: Fried

citizen, not to use the almost obsolete term of Bill of Rights.

It must be understood, Mr. Speaker, that the feelings of a whole people have been roused, and the go ahead signal in our daily life, in every field, has made us realize for some years now that we want to be full-fledged Canadians and therefore we must be recognized as such by our English-speaking fellow citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I am fully aware of witnessing, along with the entire population, these decisive hours for our country. In my opinion, it is the logical consequence for a nation that wishes to develop, to free itself and to take in all those various constitutional formulas.

The leader of the Quebec wing, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration stated recently:

Those who scheme to bring about a divorce between the people of Quebec and their federal representatives are knowingly seeking the destruction of Canada.

Men such as the one I have just quoted deserve our confidence.

Mr. Speaker, we too from Quebec are making a useful contribution to the federal parliament; we have our de Gaulles, our thinkers, our leaders able to face the facts as they really are.

I am quoting here the hon. senator whose statement was the highlight of the recent Montmorency conference.

Let us not act in such a way as to alter the true facts into a chasm.

In all the upheaval that befalls the current political atmosphere, our first concern should be to seek the living standard within the Canadian framework. The concerns of ordinary mortals, of the man in the street, is with the standard of living; the daily bread is the uppermost question in his mind. That is why, in my humble judgment, I favour appreciable reforms of the constitution but I unconditionally reject any clause that might tend to isolate Quebec and force it to segregation. And as our youngest minister already said, let us favour the policy of presence.

This brings me to the financial situation of our country, and I would not want the occurrence of a tragedy that would place my province under the yoke of isolationism. Quite recently, when one of the most famous tourists in Hawaii stated:

No China wall around Quebec.

We all heaved a sigh of relief, and the strain was markedly eased.

[Mr. Tremblay.]

The Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Pearson) told us yesterday that, to date, eight provinces were seriously considering his invitation to attend a federal-provincial conference slated for next January. Well, the detente was further increased when the provincial Liberals came out openly against separatism.

So, it should be realized that sides are now being taken, and that this centennial year will end in a blaze of optimism and constitutional ecumenism, as the hon. member for Lotbinière (Mr. Choquette) called it.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, once again I appeal to all my English-speaking compatriots whom I like a lot, not to watch passively what is happening in Quebec. We have here men of great value who are ready to do anything to promote unity in Canada and our Minister of Finance and Receiver General (Mr. Sharp) is one who, by his gift as an administrator and his great qualifications in human relations, is trying to develop a prosperous Canada, financially balanced, and first of all united and harmonious.

[English]

Mr. F. J. Bigg (Athabasca): Mr. Speaker, we have a great many problems at home in Canada today which I should like to discuss if I had the time. However, there is a problem abroad which far transcends all our domestic problems. I refer to the deplorable fact that most of the people of Canada are being systematically brainwashed. I am not accusing the present administration of having a hand in this, apart from the contribution they make because of ineptitude. I give this administration full credit for meaning well. Nevertheless this ineptitude on the part of those in positions of responsibility to this house and the nation makes it evident that they are guilty of serious neglect.

Although I am not an expert on foreign affairs I intend to take a few minutes of the time of the house to attempt to outline what is so obvious to me as a layman and novice in foreign affairs. A true picture of the international situation is not being presented to us. We have an enemy in this world, international communism and I am in no way hesitant about saying that. These people have friends in this country, although as I have said before I do not think any of them sit in this house.

The Canadian war crimes tribunal organization which seeks to put President Johnson of the United States on trial for his so-called war crimes is allowed to operate. Free discussion in Canada has always been



our prerogative and I would be the last to suggest that a person does not have the right to say what he wants as long as he is willing to accept the responsibility involved. Having regard to the anti-United States propaganda to which this country has been subjected, I have waited in vain for a clear voice from the fourth estate, from the television and radio media, yes, even from responsible members of the government and of this house, to give what I consider a fair and balanced picture of the situation.

• (5:30 p.m.)

It is passing strange that Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the North Vietnamese and the soul of the Viet Cong, should always be given the benefit of the doubt and favourable publicity. I have in my hand a paper which clearly indicates in straight, factual terms, Mr. Ho Chi Minh's record. I think it would be fair, and perhaps interesting, to know in chronological order what have been the actions of Ho Chi Minh during the last 47 years and what have been the actions of one Lyndon B. Johnson, who bears the responsibility both militarily and politically for maintaining the freedom of at least the western world, and in Viet Nam certainly some semblance of freedom amongst the small nations of Asia.

On December 25, 1920, Ho Chi Minh, a Viet Nam born Chinese, became a member of the Marxist wing of the French socialist party while attending the party conference in Paris. Lyndon B. Johnson was at this time attending high school in Johnson City, Texas. He had the same kind of background as most of us in the house have enjoyed. He was raised on a farm and received a western-style free education.

Lyndon B. Johnson found it necessary to work with his hands and learned that he needed energy and individual effort in order to finish his schooling. Ho Chi Minh was educated at the expense of the international socialist party. In 1923 Ho Chi Minh became the editor of *Le Paria*, a French communist publication, and received one year's training in Moscow. In December, 1924, he was sent to Canton, China, as interpreter for the communist Michael Borodin. At that time Lyndon B. Johnson was graduating from high school as president of his class and had already achieved a reputation as a debater.

At that time President Johnson did not know of his rendezvous with fate. He did not know that he would one day be President of the United States. In fact, he scorned higher

education. He was a young, energetic man who went out looking for work, which was not easy for an untrained man to find even in those days. It was difficult for him to find suitable work to which he could devote his great talents. Therefore Lyndon B. Johnson wandered about the United States working with his hands. He graduated from the school of hard knocks. Lyndon B. Johnson recognized that education was necessary for all young people and he went back to school.

In January, 1930 we find that under Ho Chi Minh's leadership a conference was held in Hong Kong with Chinese communists to integrate three Vietnamese communist parties, the Oriental Communist Party, the Annamese Communist Party and the Oriental Communist League. These became the communist party of Indo-China, a branch of the Third International of Moscow, and it so remained until 1940.

Let us go back to our friend Lyndon B. Johnson. He enrolled at Southwest Texas Teachers State College and became a school teacher. He was a school teacher for a year. He then continued his studies at college, obtained a degree and took up public speaking. He was just a nice, friendly school teacher. In 1931 Lyndon B. Johnson, having a great interest in politics even from his early years, became secretary to a congressman. Mr. Hoover was the Republican president. From his early days Lyndon B. Johnson was a liberal with a small "l".

In 1932 Lyndon B. Johnson attached himself to Mr. Roosevelt's administration and worked unceasingly for the New Deal. I think the most rabid of critics of that program cannot say that the New Deal was anything but a tremendous attempt to maintain the dignity of the individual and the right of little people to share in the great wealth and progress of North America.

On May 19, 1941, Moscow disbanded the Third Communist International. The Vietnamese communist party established the Doc Lap Dong-Minh, or the Viet Minh, to wage guerrilla warfare. They went underground. Who was the spiritual leader of this group? It was Ho Chi Minh. In 1940 Viet Nam, together with most other southeast Asian countries, was occupied by Japan. At the end of the eastern theatre of world war II the power of the United States was ascending. Ho Chi Minh at this time continued his program of the march of communism.

Where was Lyndon B. Johnson at this time? He is a man who has always thought for

himself. He heeded United States' public opinion and came out flatly for entering world war II on the side of the free nations. In 1941 England stood alone. Lyndon B. Johnson, who has always been a very strong nationalist, came out flatly in favour of his country fighting with Britain. He said that the United States needed the draft and he worked toward that end. Mr. Johnson was the kind of man who did not only talk but acted. He stood for principles. He promised the young men of the United States, on the day he voted for conscription to send America's young blood to fight for freedom, that he would be with them. Less than three hours after he put his name to the draft bill Lyndon B. Johnson joined the United States navy. He worked in the theatre of war in which Ho Chi Minh was working underground with the communists.

President Johnson, as he now is, served as a volunteer lieutenant in the United States navy. His short term of service in the Pacific was exciting. His courage was rewarded by being decorated by his country. The president of that day, believing that Lyndon B. Johnson and his ability to organize the war effort were of more use in Washington, ordered him back for duty.

• (5:40 p.m.)

On August 15, 1945 Japan surrendered to the allies. On August 17 and 18, 1945 an uprising was provoked in Hanoi. On August 19, 1945 Ho Chi Minh launched his take-over. On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh established his regime in Hanoi, ousting Bao Dai, the former emperor of Annam. Where was Lyndon B. Johnson at that time?

Mr. Mather: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether I could ask the hon. member a question. I was very interested in his remarks but would he say whether he is in favour of or opposed to the general budget which I thought we were considering?

Mr. Bigg: I am speaking about something which affects every dollar we wish to earn in Canada and every dollar we wish to spend. It is only in the budget debate that an amateur like myself can say what is in his heart; and I am quite sure that while I stand here and speak every hon. member within hearing of my voice knows that I speak with the firm conviction that we are only hearing one side of the story. I would take my seat if I did not think this was so. I cannot imagine anything more important for Canada than national survival and I cannot imagine national survival for Canada unless there is the fullest

[Mr. Bigg.]

co-operation between our country and the United States of America. We rely on them at this time for any defence of our continent. We rely on them entirely to protect our skies and if in the future intercontinental missiles are to be stopped on their way it will be farsighted men like Lyndon B. Johnson who will be able to provide the kind of leadership which we require in this country.

Mr. Mather: May I ask the hon. member one more question? I appreciate the hon. member's reply to my previous question but what I asked in fact was whether he is in favour of or opposed to the budget?

Mr. Bigg: I listened with considerable patience while the hon. member spoke and I wish he would give me the same forbearance.

Mr. Mather: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker, I have not spoken.

Mr. Bigg: I might say that I do not expect my speech to be widely read and no political advantage whatsoever will be gained by injecting that type of question into it. I have spoken about my concern, and it is only in the budget debate that we can speak about such matters. If the hon. member wishes me to speak about the budget in detail, I will get to that subject where we discuss the subject of defence. At that time I will speak about how the money can be used to further some of the things I have in mind. However, I am merely trying to do one specific job, and I hope I am doing it, namely, to draw a parallel between the leader of the state of North Viet Nam and the leader of the state in the only country on earth able to stem what I consider to be a threat to my country. If this is a small matter, one unworthy of capturing the attention of the house for 15 or 20 minutes, then I am prepared to sit down. But I am not convinced of that.

Mr. Mather: If the hon. gentleman does not wish to answer my question that is his privilege.

Mr. Bigg: In 1945 Mr. Johnson ran for the United States senate. In the senate, until the time he became president, he fought for all those things which leftists talk about and do nothing about and which he himself backed whenever it meant that the strength of the strong should be used to help the poor. There was no segment of society, however small and neglected, that President Johnson did not support, and this has been affirmed by minority groups such as the one composed of Germans in his own state during world war II and the



negro minority. During his term in the senate he instituted and pushed with all his might for reforms which it had taken 82 years to put on the statute books of the United States.

I had hoped in the 20 minutes allotted to me to present the full record of this man but it would take hours to review in detail the accomplishments of this great president. I am sick and tired of hearing criticisms of the noble efforts made by President Johnson himself to bring peace to Viet Nam and the noble efforts made by the American people and their sons to continue the fighting. I think we should level criticism whenever we can if we think an injustice is being done, and the point I am trying to make this afternoon is that an injustice is done when those who feel the way I do not give lip service at least to our American friends and allies.

A partisan politician would say it is better to support his party no matter how bad it is than to support the other party no matter how good it is. This has never been the style of Lyndon B. Johnson. He has always had the courage to stand up against those things in which he did not believe and he is exceptionally good at getting things done. I believe that Ho Chi Minh is also exceptionally good at getting things done that he wants done, but as I read the reports of his achievements I find they are all negative and all designed to destroy freedom. However, as I read the record of Lyndon B. Johnson's career I find that for the last 35 years at least he has only had one end in mind, to uphold the dignity of the human being. Because he lives in an imperfect world and can only work through political organizations, imperfect as they are, and because it is difficult even for the Americans who use restraint to achieve peace and security in our world, it is beneath our dignity to sit here in smug security north of the line and have nothing but bad to say about those who are at least doing their best.

Attempts are being made to force us to talk about dollars and cents and not to talk about things on a high plane. I can do that. I think the Canadian people should pay 10 per cent of the cost of freedom along with the Americans. I go further and say, as I said in 1939, that more than our money should be at stake. President Johnson thought his life was at stake. He thought that strongly about the matter and I do not think he has changed. But I do think we should change.

• (5:50 p.m.)

Some may sit here quietly, accept things as they are and say, "We know all that, Bigg,

56-1967-3

why don't you sit down?" If these facts are known, I do not hear about them. I read the newspapers daily and I listen to the news broadcasts. One would really think President Johnson was the leader of some kind of international gang. It is for this reason I ask hon. members to consider these facts. They are in every "Who's Who". When I am doing my homework, my desk is piled high with papers containing these facts. These articles were not written by President Johnson's friends. As I said before, President Johnson is a liberal with a small "l", while I am a conservative with a small "c". However, like President Johnson, when the welfare of my country is at stake I have no politics. I have seen these very issues kicked around, even on the floor of this house, for cheap political reasons, and I do not point my finger at the Liberals when I say that. We on this side of the house are condemned by our own silence as well as by interpreting the remarks made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin), who is seized with the responsibility of giving us the whole truth, nothing but the truth.

I am not afraid of the truth. It has been said many times that the truth will make one free. If we are only going to be given half truths, then I say half truths will lead to slavery. It will be the same kind of slavery that President Johnson has spent his whole life fighting. He has risked his political career fighting it. Slavery is not dead in the United States. President Johnson knows that, as do many other people in the United States. However, it is not politically wise to stand up and say so because down there feelings run high. Thank God, we do not have it in this country.

Some parliamentarians from England were visiting us last week. They said that our prospects are greater than our problems. If we take the attitude that the war in Viet Nam is none of our business, then we should at least keep quiet about those who think they have a stake in it and think they are doing their best. If we have a better alternative, then what is it? Ho Chi Minh is represented as a man who is working for the self-determination of people. Well, there are a lot of people in South Viet Nam as well as in North Viet Nam. If this man Johnson wanted to use all the power he has to stop the war, we know only too well how quickly that war could be stopped. We also know at what cost. Here is a man who is not going to use all the power he has for cheap political purposes.

I wanted to go through his record to indicate that while Ho Chi Minh was busy undermining the small nations of Southeast Asia President Johnson was quietly doing his duty. Since President Kennedy is dead, it is safe to make him a hero. However, since President Johnson is still alive he can still be used for cheap political purposes. I say it is time we in Canada cut it out. This man was chosen by President Kennedy. Kennedy said of him, this man is even more fit to serve the American people than I am. When Kennedy got the opportunity to sit in high places he knew that he needed the wisdom and dedication of this man Johnson to help him guide the United States through very difficult times.

I, for one, thank God we have a man of Johnson's calibre as our neighbour. I fear no invasion from the south. President Johnson has always supported the United Nations. He has done all he could to make the United Nations effective. President Johnson has offered to give up his right to decide these issues if the United Nations is willing and able to deal with them. When he has made these suggestions he has been turned down. The facts are here and we all know them. Less than 18 months ago the United States did stop the bombing for six weeks. What has happened to the memories of those men who wrote this propaganda we are getting? What did North Viet Nam do? They methodically and coldbloodedly built up their military strength. More United States soldiers died because this man Johnson was reasonable enough to give North Viet Nam every opportunity.

There are many nations in the world today in which both sides of this story will not be told. The iron curtain encircles them. There is only one press and only one party in those countries. I thank God again that here we have two parties. If a man is delinquent or is interpreted as not telling us the truth, then it is my plain duty to ask for the truth. I am not afraid the people of Canada will condemn me for that. I put freedom above all other things, and it is the truth that will make us free.

#### PROCEEDINGS ON ADJOURNMENT MOTION

#### SUBJECT MATTER OF QUESTIONS TO BE DEBATED

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Tardif): It is my duty, pursuant to provisional standing order 39A, to inform the house that the questions to be raised at the time of adjournment tonight  
[Mr. Bigg.]

are as follows: the hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge), Canadian Pacific Railway—request for more effective methods of dealing with accidents; the hon. member for Parkdale (Mr. Haidasz), Public Works—Toronto—inquiry as to availability of funds; the hon. member for Queens (Mr. Macquarrie), External Affairs—Rhodesia—an expression of disapproval of racial practices.

At six o'clock the house took recess.

#### AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 8 p.m.

#### THE BUDGET

#### ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE

The house resumed consideration of the motion of Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Minister of Finance) that Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair for the house to go into committee of ways and means.

Mr. L. R. Sherman (Winnipeg South): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss many matters at this time, but as many subjects have already been spoken about since the beginning of the debate I shall, for the most part, limit myself to one item that I feel most urgently constrained to discuss, to one position that I feel obligated to place on the record.

Before launching into that paramount and focal area of my remarks I wish to say, also for the record, that all who come from my part of the country and all in this chamber who represent areas outside the major metropolitan areas of central and eastern Canada, that part known as the golden triangle region of the country, are vividly and anxiously concerned about the negotiations going on at the present time between the premier of Manitoba and the Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) with respect to the future of the Air Canada overhaul base in Winnipeg.

I have nothing to add to what has been said about this matter that affects my constituency, Winnipeg South, my city, metropolitan Winnipeg and, for that matter, the whole of Manitoba. The speeches in the past about the future of the Air Canada base in Winnipeg and about the potential development and use of Winnipeg facilities ring hollow to the citizens of Winnipeg and Manitoba. Considering the latest apparently arbitrary announcement by the president of Air Canada about the phase-out of the Winnipeg base, those speeches ring hollow indeed. I, other members of this chamber and the

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 4:00

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached is the joint communique to be issued after your meeting with the King of Nepal. George Christian has a copy. If you approve, he will issue it right after your five o'clock meeting today. It contains nothing controversial.

I recommend you approve.

*signed by Ed Hamilton in Mr Rostow's absence*  
W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr

cc: George Christian

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President and Mrs. Johnson, King Mahendra and Queen Ratna of Nepal are paying a State visit to the United States of America beginning November 1, 1967. The Crown Prince, who is studying in the United States, joined Their Majesties during this State visit. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kirti Nidhi Bista is accompanying Their Majesties. On the completion of the Washington portion of the visit, during which they have met various members of the United States Government, Their Majesties are traveling to various points of interest in the United States before departing for Nepal on December 3.

The visit afforded King Mahendra and President Johnson an opportunity to become acquainted with each other and to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern. The personal rapport and mutual esteem stemming from their conversations enabled them to discuss these matters with the frankness and friendship which characterize the relations between the United States and Nepal.

The King explained to the President the efforts made in Nepal to secure a better standard of living for the people under the Panchayat system and the measure of success achieved in this direction.

President Johnson was impressed with the progress made in Nepal under His Majesty's leadership and praised Nepal's emphasis on increasing agricultural production and the increased self-help measures taken by Nepal.

King Mahendra explained that Nepal hoped to have achieved an increase of fifteen per cent in its agricultural production by the end of the current five year plan in 1970. President Johnson assured His Majesty of the continuing deep interest of the United States Government and people in supporting Nepal's efforts to reach its goals. King Mahendra thanked the President for the important role being played by the United States for achieving these high purposes.

King Mahendra and President Johnson discussed the efforts which both the Governments have been making to ease world tensions. It was agreed that the strong



support of both countries for the United Nations would not slacken. The King explained that the policy of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment had a continuing validity for Nepal at a time when there were increased tensions in the region itself. The President expressed his understanding of Nepal's efforts to reduce tensions. In affirming their desire for a world in which the arms race could be slowed and in which general and complete disarmament could be achieved under safeguards, President Johnson and King Mahendra expressed their earnest hope that a non-proliferation treaty would soon be concluded. They reasserted their unwavering support for a world of law and order and one in which international obligations and non-interference in the internal affairs of a country are solemnly respected.

King Mahendra and President Johnson discussed other problems facing the world today. They reviewed the situation in Viet Nam, stating their respective views, and agreed that the problem of Viet Nam could be solved in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1954. They expressed the hope that a lasting and honorable peace

would soon be restored to Viet Nam. With respect to the Middle East, it was agreed that both Governments should continue to support the efforts of the United Nations to evolve a just and durable peace for the Middle East which would be acceptable to all the peoples affected by the recent hostilities there.

President Johnson and King Mahendra agreed that their friendly exchange of views, reflecting the mutual respect and equality of the two nations, had reinforced the already strong bonds of friendship which have characterized Nepalese-American relations since their inception in 1947 and made more meaningful their common quest for peace, justice, and progress.

In taking leave of President Johnson, King Mahendra expressed his thanks for the warm and friendly reception accorded him. King Mahendra extended a cordial invitation to President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson to visit Nepal. The President expressed his gratitude for the invitation and his hope that he and Mrs. Johnson could visit Nepal.

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 3:00 PM

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message to Emperor Haile Selassie on the anniversary of his coronation (November 3).

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_

EKH/RPM/vmr



71a

Presidential Anniversary Message to HIM Haile Selassie

Your Imperial Majesty:

I am deeply pleased to send you my warmest congratulations on the anniversary of your coronation. Your courage, your statesmanship and your great wisdom have long inspired men everywhere. Yet it is fitting that the finest tributes to Your Majesty's reign are the healthy children, the new homes, the new schools and roads and hospitals that give Ethiopia so much hope for the future.

On this day America joins the many friends of Ethiopia in marking your brilliant past. We know you will serve mankind in an equally brilliant future.

Mrs. Johnson and I send you, as always, our warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
1:25 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will wish to know of this conversation between Amb. Johnson and Senators Sparkman and Tower, in Tokyo.

W. W. Rostow

Tokyo 2972

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

BY *10* NARA D-11-20-91

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

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*Rostow*

~~SECRET~~ TOKYO 2972

NODIS

1. DURING COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON JAPAN WITH SENATORS SPARKMAN AND TOWER, WITH GENERAL RIDGEWAY ALSO PRESENT, I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO LAY OUT THE OKINAWA AND BONINS ISSUE, INCLUDING QUESTION OF IWO JIMA. I, OF COURSE, POINTED OUT THAT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE, I HAD NO IDEA OF WHAT WASH

NGTON DECISIONS MIGHT BE, BUT WAS SIMPLY LAYING OUT QUESTION AS SEEN BY GOJ WITH THE PROS AND CONS AS THEY APPEAR TO ME.

2. BOTH SPARKMAN AND TOWER (AS WELL AS GENERAL RIDGEWAY) INDICATED THAT THEY FELT SOME "FORWARD MOVEMENT" ON OKINAWA LOOK TOWARD REVERSION PRIOR TO 1970 AND RETURN OF THE BONINS AT THIS TIME WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE AND NEITHER COULD FORESEE ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE US IF MATTER PRESENTED IN TERMS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FRIENDLY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. DURING OUR DISCUSSION, I INCLUDED AS OBJECTIVE EXPLANATION AS I COULD OF MILITARY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RETENTION OF THE BONINS. AS FORMER NAVY OFFICER IN PACIFIC AND MEMBER OF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, I PARTICULARLY SOLICITED SENATOR TOWER'S VIEW ON IWO JIMA. SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THERE WOULD BE ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO INCLUSION OF IWO JIMA IN RETURN OF BONINS.

3. I, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZED TO BOTH SENATORS THAT I WAS DISCUSSING THIS MATTER ONLY FROM LOCAL POINT OF VIEW IN CONTEXT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WAS SOLICITING THEIR VIEWS ONLY ON MOST INFORMAL AND PERSONAL BASIS. DEPENDING ON ANY DECISIONS THAT WASHINGTON MIGHT MAKE I WOULD ASSUME THAT THERE WOULD BE THE NORMAL CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP AND I WAS NOT SEEKING TO TIE THEM TO THEIR OFF-THE-CUFF ANSWERS TO ME. HOWEVER, HOPE FOREGOING MAY BE HELPFUL YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THESE QUESTIONS.

GP-3. JOHNSON  
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-476  
By *48*, NARA, Date *1-10-95*

*Pres file*

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk says he has conveyed your line of approach to Arthur Goldberg re Mansfield Resolution.

Arthur says he cannot get an Executive session, but will try to talk to principal committee members informally before public session.

Sec. Rusk will try to confirm this this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



74

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
12:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara  
have signed off on the attached cable  
covering Bunker and Westmoreland  
trips to the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 11-20-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 86-165

By ig, NARA, Date 2-3-87

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

1. Highest levels desire that you plan to return here for consultation of approximately one week, arriving not later than November tenth. We are of course prepared to send aircraft for departure at time you suggest, with possible allowance for rest en route. We are arranging that our Ambassador to Nepal will remain here following completion of official visit. <sup>Nepalese</sup> ~~Please~~ ~~advise your desires.~~

2. As to press handling and announcement, we would propose visit be placed in terms of normal consultation about six months after your arrival. Please advise if you see any problems.

3. Topics for consultation will be broad, with principal focus on political prospects and GVN priority actions. However, will we ~~are~~ naturally wish to review progress and prospects on all staff fronts. Please give us your recommendations as to what ~~stage~~

4235

EA:WPBundy:bnm 10/30 488

DoD-Secretary McNamara

White House - Mr. Rostow

XXX The Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U - The Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

2

Saigon

~~SECRET~~

you would wish to have accompany you.

4. You should inform Westmoreland of this plan and advise him that highest levels wish him to return for consultation, arriving so as to overlap for last 2 - 3 days of your visit, i.e., not later than November 15. DoD and JCS will be in touch directly with him on this.

GP-3

END

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

This report on Vietnam from  
the Vice President is heartening.

W. W. Rostow

Kuala Lumpur 1709 (VIPTO 57)

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 11-20-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 93-501  
By 1-7, NARA, Date 10-12-94

~~SECRET~~ KUALA LUMPUR 1709

VIPTO 57

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO PASS SECRETARY

NODIS

I HAVE JUST LEFT VIET-NAM ON MY WAY TO KUALA LUMPUR  
AFTER A FULL DAY WITH OUR TROOPS IN THE FIELD. THE  
LEADERSHIP, QUALITY, AND THE MORALE OF OUR MEN IN UNIFORM IS  
MAGNIFICENT. AS I REMARKED ON DEPARTURE FROM  
CHU LAI A SHORT WHILE AGO, I SAW THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS  
DURING MY VISIT TO VIET-NAM, AND HEARD NOT ONE COMPLAINT.  
I SAW CONFIDENCE, SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION.

~~PAGE 2 RUMJXL-1709 SECRET~~

I WILL GIVE YOU A DETAILED REPORT ON RETURN. I  
WISH TO EMPHASIZE NOW, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS SOLID REASON  
FOR SATISFACTIONS AND OPTIMISM IF THE TRUE PICTURE CAN BE  
SHOWN AND THE PUBLIC MADE TO UNDERSTAND IT. I AM  
CERTAIN THAT OUR COUNTRY CAN STEADILY BE MOBILIZED IN  
SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS HERE. WE ARE WINNING-STEADY PROGRESS  
IS EVERYWHERE EVIDENT.

PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY BOTH SEEM  
DETERMINED NOT ONLY TO UNDERTAKE POPULAR PROGRAMS TO  
GAIN BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT, BUT SEEM TO BE  
RESOLVED TO WORK TOGETHER IN UNITY. I MET AT LENGTH  
WITH BOTH OF THEM, AS WELL AS WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPRR  
AND LOWER HOUSES AND LABOR LEADERS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS  
AND STUDENT LEADERS. MY MESSAGE TO THEM WAS ONE OF UNITY,  
RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION.

I MADE IT CLEAR TO THIEU, KY AND OTHER LEADERS THAT  
AMBASSADOR BUNKER HAD YOUR FULLEST CONFIDENCE AND WAS THE

~~PAGE 1 RUMJXL-1709 SECRET~~

SOLE SPOKESMAN FOR OUR COUNTRY IN VIET-NAM. HE ENJOYS  
UNIVERSAL RESPECT.

THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MEMBERS OF  
OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS HERE ARE CONFIDENT

SHOWN AND THE PUBLIC MADE TO UNDERSTAND IT. I AM -  
CERTAIN THAT OUR COUNTRY CAN STEADILY BE MOBILIZED IN  
SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS HERE. WE ARE WINNING-STEADY PROGRESS  
IS EVERYWHERE EVIDENT.

PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY BOTH SEEM  
DETERMINED NOT ONLY TO UNDERTAKE POPULAR PROGRAMS TO  
GAIN BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT, BUT SEEM TO BE  
RESOLVED TO WORK TOGETHER IN UNITY. I MET AT LENGTH  
WITH BOTH OF THEM, AS WELL AS WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPRR  
AND LOWER HOUSES AND LABOR LEADERS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS  
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~~PAGE 3 RUMJL 1709 SECRET~~

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UNIVERSAL RESPECT.

THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MEMBERS OF  
OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS HERE ARE CONFIDENT  
OF OUR SUCCESS. WITH THEIR WORK, WITH THE COOPERATION OF  
ALLIES, AND AT THE PRESENT RATE OF PROGRESS, I AM  
REASONABLY SURE THAT THE NEWS WILL CONTINUE TO BE BETTER.

THE CRITICAL FACTOR, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER OR NOT  
THE THIEU/KY GOVERNMENT CAN BUILD A STRONG BROAD BASE AMONG THE  
PEOPLE. IF THEY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT DETERMINATION, AND  
IF THEY MOVE QUICKLY TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PLANS, I BELIEVE  
THEY WILL. AMBASSADOR BUNKER CAN BE RELIED ON TO ACHIEVE  
THIS.

MORE THAN EVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING  
HERE IS RIGHT AND THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO  
PERSEVERE AND SEE IT THROUGH TO SUCCESS.

~~PAGE 4 RUMJL 1709 SECRET~~

A FULL, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT MY DEPARTURE PRESS  
CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE CABLE.

BELL  
BT

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This CIA report on the training of negroes in Cuba for disruptive activities in the United States has been referred to the Director, FBI. You may wish Marv to solicit his comment.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-481  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-24-96

WWRostow:rla

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3100

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : Training of Negroes in Cuba

Attached is a report which I believe will be of interest to you. The sources of this information are being identified to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

/s/ Thomas H. Karamessines

Thomas H. Karamessines  
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment: a/s

cc: The Secretary of State

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

**APPROVED FOR RELEASE**  
MAR 1995

1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED  
Authority NLS 019-025-1-14  
By GP, NARA, Date 1/7/02



~~SECRET~~

76-b

### TRAINING OF NEGROES IN CUBA

1. The following reports have been received from Cuban refugee sources concerning alleged Negro training schools which are located in the Santiago de Cuba area.

2. A Cuban refugee who arrived in Miami on [REDACTED] 1967 reported that she had been in contact with one [REDACTED] in Cuba who told her that he was a member of an anti-Castro resistance group which maintained contact with the United States. She claimed that she was invited by [REDACTED] to join this resistance group but that she declined to do so. She described [REDACTED] as a white man about 29 years old. According to source, before she departed for the United States in early October, [REDACTED] requested that she inform the United States Government that a Negro training camp has been in operation for some time at Playa Siboney (located near Santiago de Cuba). Source, claiming to quote [REDACTED] said that these Negroes were being trained for subversive operations against the United States and their courses included English which was taught by Soviet instructors. The students were to be infiltrated into the United States through the normal airlift channel and would be claimed by relatives on their arrival. Their subversive activities against the United States would include sabotage in connection with race riots directed at bringing about a Negro revolution in the United States. According to the report, approximately 150 Negroes are involved in the training program and some have already arrived in the United States and have been replaced by new students in the training camp.

A former Santiago de Cuba [REDACTED] who arrived in the United States on [REDACTED] 1967, reported there is a training school about four blocks from Morro Castle in Ciudad Mar near Santiago de Cuba. All of the trainees are Negroes, some of whom are said to be from Africa. Source stated "it is common knowledge among the area residents" that these Negroes are being trained to infiltrate the United States to stimulate unrest among American Negroes. Source later identified the exact site as La Estrella Beach Club, an exclusively Negro beach club prior to 1959.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 04-149  
By us NARA, Date 11-8-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

4. A former Santiago de Cuba [REDACTED] who arrived in the United States on [REDACTED] 1967, reported that many beach and summer houses in Ciudad Mar have been appropriated by the Cuban Government and are presently occupied by 100 to 150 young men from North Vietnam, North Korea, Africa, and Latin American countries. The entire area is restricted with only limited civilian traffic permitted in daylight hours. Source stated that at Playa Daiquiri, a former white beach resort approximately one hour southeast of Santiago de Cuba (and only 5 - 10 minutes drive from Playa Siboney), there is a two-story white concrete building, a former private beach clubhouse, which is now used for classrooms for trainees. This area is secured by a barbed wire fence and has several guard posts. Orientals and Africans, wearing field packs, carrying weapons and being transported by Cuban Army trucks, have been observed in this area.

5. A former Havana [REDACTED] who arrived in the United States on [REDACTED] 1966, reported that an alleged guerrilla training school is located 1/2 kilometer from Guantanamo City on the road to Santiago de Cuba. Many Negroes, reported to have come from Africa, were observed in the school area.

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
10:55 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You might be interested in this personal letter to me from Cy Sulzberger covering general impressions of South America and Africa, plus Sec. Rusk's new son-in-law.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

78


The New York Times  
37 Rue Caumartin  
Paris, FRANCE

Accra, Oct. 24, 1967

C. L. SULZBERGER

Dear Walt:

I promised I'd write you after finishing my South American trip and, being a man of my word, I do so although I really have nothing to say. That is, I don't have anything kept over from what I squeezed into my columns. The Alianza approach is obviously a right approach but the Augean stable is so enormous that I wonder if Uncle Hercules can flush it out fast enough. If one looks backward at what has been done the accomplishments are truly impressive. But if one looks forward at what remains, the prospect is flabbergasting. My essential feeling is that the Alianza needs more executive coordination at the top and a renewed stress on its wish to reform and improve societies, to help the underdog. The old feudal families will resent this but they can scarcely opt for Castro in exchange.

As I wrote I think our arms policy was being nonsensical but thank Heavens we got out of that bind. I was most impressed with the quality of our embassies (except in Venezuela) and also by the wisdom of some ambassadors like Tuthill in Rio and Hoyt in Montevideo who want to trim the size of uselessly swollen staffs and get the USA out of many useless endeavors we drifted into. That's about it, Walt. Africa presents even more ghastly headaches, alas. I guess I'll be on this dreary continent at least a month more but if by any chance you wish to write me I suggest the above address. All the warmest regards, 

P.S. Dean Rusk's new son-in-law has been an unexpected ~~liberal~~ bonanza in both S.A. and A., quite apart from looking like a ~~liberal~~



Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a better and more  
substantive speech proposed for  
Thursday morning.

You may wish to read it before  
making a final decision.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

*Pres. file*

PaTHE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

(Draft Speech by the President on the  
Occasion of Foreign Service Day)

I am delighted to have this opportunity to meet with this distinguished company of members and friends of the Foreign Service of the United States. It is entirely fitting that we pause once each year to honor the men and women of the Foreign Service for their important contributions to our nation.

On this occasion, many subjects might appropriately be discussed, for the work of the Foreign Service is as broad and varied as the world itself. I have chosen to speak to you about one part of the world, Asia, whose importance to the United States has grown within our own lifetimes and whose future influence on our own peace and prosperity may be expected to increase.

When I was a boy, the term "the Orient" was a synonym for what was strange and mysterious. My friends and I never stopped to think that we in the West were perhaps as strange and mysterious in Eastern eyes as Orientals were in ours.

In this attitude we were no different from most people in most countries, and in all periods of history. We defined "strangeness" as being different from ourselves. We didn't reflect that perhaps all nations and civilizations are strange.

For man everywhere is strange and infinitely various. Each civilization has its own experience of the world. Each has its own notions of what is "strange" and what is "natural." And if we in the West have now learned that lesson, as I think we have, we owe this to the work that you and your predecessors have performed.

Many of you here today extended our understanding of Asia's richness and variety. In teaching us more about Asia, you have helped us to understand ourselves better. And you have done the great work of eliminating the twin superstitions that are fed by ignorance -- one is the superstition that the patterns of any civilization can be easily transported to another. The other, its opposite, is the superstition that there is an unbridgeable gulf between East and West. Your own work demonstrates the falsehood of this time-worn platitude.

Thanks in part to the work of the Foreign Service, indeed, we can now set about, in the East and West alike, to place our relations on a more realistic basis.

. For more than a thousand years, Asia and the Western world have intermittently traded and traveled back and



forth. But, for the most part, they went their separate ways. Only in the past hundred years has the impact of the industrialized West on traditional Asia become the major theme of Asian history.

Over much of Asia the West imposed colonial systems. The West also powerfully influenced independent Asian states through trade, cultural exchange and occasional armed clashes.

The Western impact on Asia has had two main effects. First, it set in motion a process of change, of political and economic modernization. Second, it left a heritage of resentment against the West.

The growing relationship between Asia and the West brought progress and mutual benefit, but was also marred by strife. The blind fury of the Boxers, the

aggressive actions of the Japanese militarists, and the bitter hostility of Maoist China today, all have manifested in different manner and degree the failure of Asia and the West to progress side-by-side in harmony.

The dismantling of the outmoded colonial system following World War II created a new basis for relations between Asia and the West. A community of fiercely independent Asian states has arisen. They reject domination, either by the West or by their Asian neighbors. They will resist attempts to take them over, whether by armed force or subversion. New and productive relationships have been worked out between these states and the West, facilitating the advance toward shared goals of modernization and progress.

The past few years have taught one simple lesson.

This is that fastest progress toward the aspirations of Asian peoples occurs where close and fruitful collaboration between free Asian states and Western countries exists. Anti-Western, totalitarian, closed societies, imposed "out of the barrel of a gun" are not the answer.

The United States has a long history of contact with Asia -- dating from the time when the United States itself was a colony and including our own brief flirtation with Colonialism in the Philippines. But only since World War II have the people of the United States come to realize that their destiny is linked with that of the peoples of Asia.

We have come to recognize that in Asia, no less than in Europe, we have a stake in the principle that peoples should be allowed to live out their lives free

from forcible interference by powerful neighbors. And we have also come to accept that it is in our own interest that Asian peoples should progress toward their goal of modernization. Together with like-minded states, both Asian and non-Asian, we have worked hard to achieve these ends.

There is thus a harmony of interests between America and the emerging Asia. We seek for Asia the two essentials flowing from her history: modernization and independence. This is what Asia seeks. So we can work together in a common cause with Asia in the central role.

I do not mean that all problems are solved -- far from it. A deep gulf between Western and Asian cultures continues to exist. Misunderstandings will occur and recur. But the prospects for overcoming our differences



and working together with goodwill on common problems are better than ever before.

Of course, it is necessary for the United States and its allies to persevere in Vietnam. This we will do. Eventually Hanoi will realize that its aggression against South Vietnam cannot succeed. Then resources which have had to be expended in war will be released for more constructive uses. And when that time comes, Hanoi will find us ready and willing to join with them and others in rapidly healing the wounds of war.

I have said before that a peaceful Mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia. We understand and sympathize with the desire of the Chinese people to assume an international role in Asia appropriate to their distinguished contributions to mankind.

We do not believe that the hostility expressed today by Peking toward much of the rest of the world will persist indefinitely. We look forward to the day when belligerence toward the United States will moderate. We intend to continue seeking ways through which the blocked lines of communication between the people of the United States and Mainland China can be reopened.

But healing these misunderstandings is only one of the tasks. Another is modernization and there are formidable obstacles to modernization. The greatest is the need for food enough to feed the exploding populations of Asia. They are not eating enough food nor enough of the right kinds. And not enough progress is being made toward closing the nourishment gap.

The nations of Asia, with the support of the

developed countries, should take as their goal closing the nourishment gap within one generation. Hunger has stalked Man through thousands of years of history. So this is a goal worthy of our best efforts. We should not waver. The means are at hand to destroy this ancient enemy. It can be done in one generation. It would be wrong for the world to take longer.

Let us consider what must be done to close the nourishment gap in one generation.

First, it means that incomes have to be raised so that the food that is produced can be sold. Unless the farmer of Asia has a good market he will not produce.

Second, it means the rural sector of Asia must be modernized so that it can produce more. And this means education; education of an entire generation of people.

For only education can break the bonds of traditionalism that enshackle entire rural areas. And only a generation freed from these shackles can achieve real breakthroughs in food production. Only a modern-minded rural sector will participate in the economy of the nation.

Let us not wait for the children of the rural people to migrate to the cities to bring them the benefits of enlightenment. It is as urgently needed on the farm. Efforts in agriculture to date have frequently been limited to the small fraction of the farmers who are now part of the modern economy. In the short run this pays off. But if we lift our sights to the task for the generation ahead of us the perspective changes: then we see that it is not enough to work with isolated



enclaves in the rural areas. There is time enough to do the job right. And to do it right all the people must be included.

Third, it means the urban sector must fabricate the tools needed on the farm and the goods to sell the farmer in exchange for his food. For unless the farmer has the tools and the prospect of a reward he will not produce.

Fourth, in order to achieve any of these steps, the growth of population must be stabilized. For the unbridled expansion in Man's numbers is the most basic barrier to success.

In short, the war on hunger is as broad as the war on underdevelopment.

We must not be easily satisfied with half-way measures.

This means that all of us -- developed and developing nations alike--must stay the course for a full generation--or more if need be.

There is no need to despair. For much progress has been made. Japan, Korea and Taiwan have virtually closed the nourishment gap. New strains of rice in the Philippines give promise of dramatic results. There is much the Asians have learned; much they can teach one another.

And providentially, there is a new movement arising in Asia: the movement toward regionalism. There is a growing awareness in Asian countries of their increasing dependence on one another; a growing desire to cooperate in quest of modernization. Thus, through the development of regionalism, lessons learned in one part of Asia can spread throughout the area.

In this new trend the developed nations of the Pacific Basin have an important and cooperative role to play in meeting ~~the~~ emerging needs.

Speaking of the oncoming generation of Asians, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Singapore observed: "For Youth, anti-colonialism is part of history and communism has split and lost its appeal in the process. Perhaps regionalism with its promise of stability and economic progress will be youth's big concept for the future."

But, despite the best efforts of all of us, there will be times when acute shortages of food develop; times when crops fail for reasons beyond the control of the nations and the farmers affected.

Secretary Rusk spoke of the need to take concerted measures against such disasters a year ago when the Development

Assistance Committee met in Washington. I have asked Secretary Rusk, working with others in the U.S. Government to develop a plan for international action which, if agreed by other nations, would help to meet this need.

I have spoken to you of the new synthesis emerging in our relations with Asia. There are understandable resentments against the West of the past, but a new generation of Asians is with us which will not waste its heritage in beating the dead horse of colonialism nor be beguiled by the waning ideology of communism but has set for itself the reasonable goals of modernization and independence. These <sup>are</sup> visions we share. These are goals we can support with all our hearts.

Let conflicts and misunderstanding be done and in their place this resolve: that this will be the last generation in



which men go hungry and children grow stunted by under-nourishment. Let this resolve be the beginning of a new relationship between Men of the East and the West, a relationship that will endure and will lift the World to nobler purposes and deeper understanding.

80

Wednesday, November 1, 1967  
9:15 a. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres file*

Herewith the information you requested on South Vietnamese casualties, broken down by:

- regular forces (ARVN);
- regional forces;
- popular forces.

Broadly speaking, in the past, regular forces operated throughout one of the four corps areas; regional forces operated throughout a province; popular forces were tied to the defense of a hamlet or village, dealing with attacks by local guerrillas.

As you know, a considerable proportion of the regular forces have been assigned to regular security duty in connection with pacification. Regular forces also include air force and navy units, plus forces assigned to certain static defense tasks with respect to security of major urban areas.

As the summary sheet reveals, the casualties taken by regular forces, in relation to their numbers, are not much out of proportion: 46% to 54%. The popular forces do take casualties disproportionate to their numbers: 35% to 23%. This is because VC tactics consist often in concentrating in secret a sizable force and then jumping a village or hamlet under circumstances where the VC have initial tactical superiority. The popular forces then call in aircraft and other support, but bear the brunt of the initial engagement.

W. W. R.

Attachments

80a

South Vietnamese Military Order of Battle as of September 1967

	(in thousands)	Percent of Total
Regular	332.5	54
Regional	144.3	23
Popular	141.4	23

Killed in first half of 1967 in:

	<u>Rate per 1,000 OB</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Regular	7.8	46
Regional	7.4	19
Popular	13.6	35

Table 4E  
3 of 3

RVNAF CASUALTIES <sup>a/</sup>  
(Regular, Popular and Regional Force -  
By RVN Corps Area)

	1965							1966														1967									
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Qtr	2nd Qtr	Jul	Aug	Sep	3rd Qtr	Oct	Nov	Dec	4th Qtr	Jan	Feb	Mar	1st Qtr	Apr	May	Jun	2nd Qtr	1st Half	Jul	Aug								
<b>COUNTRYWIDE</b>																															
<b>REGULAR FORCES</b>																															
KIA	1247	1541	1107	884	346	257	270	873	331	322	326	979	338	347	482	1167	577	530	269	1376	2543	340	383								
WIA	2747	3764	3151	2693	811	736	768	2315	1118	994	905	3017	933	1172	1526	3631	1670	1862	976	4508	8139	1208	1322								
MIA/CAPT	242	555	225	103	39	20	56	115	38	26	227	291	19	34	144	197	21	39	4	64	261	52	15								
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4236</b>	<b>5860</b>	<b>4483</b>	<b>3680</b>	<b>1196</b>	<b>1013</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>3303</b>	<b>1487</b>	<b>1342</b>	<b>1458</b>	<b>4287</b>	<b>1290</b>	<b>1553</b>	<b>2152</b>	<b>4995</b>	<b>2268</b>	<b>2431</b>	<b>1249</b>	<b>5948</b>	<b>10943</b>	<b>1600</b>	<b>1720</b>								
<b>REGIONAL FORCES</b>																															
KIA	585	755	786	452	212	181	96	489	188	164	202	554	222	191	213	626	122	133	166	421	1047	146	205								
WIA	1196	1255	1103	879	393	274	248	915	335	363	422	1120	436	488	570	1494	347	398	421	1166	2660	369	465								
MIA/CAPT	205	313	329	170	52	126	4	182	58	44	45	147	49	37	126	212	50	39	29	138	350	38	42								
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1986</b>	<b>2323</b>	<b>2218</b>	<b>1501</b>	<b>657</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>1586</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>669</b>	<b>1821</b>	<b>707</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>909</b>	<b>2332</b>	<b>519</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>616</b>	<b>1725</b>	<b>4057</b>	<b>553</b>	<b>712</b>								
<b>POPULAR FORCES</b>																															
KIA	789	938	809	759	303	291	195	789	392	320	286	998	326	239	427	992	236	365	336	937	1929	179	265								
WIA	1517	1714	1262	1206	435	482	483	1400	626	576	524	1726	667	464	690	1821	474	568	725	1767	3588	355	493								
MIA/CAPT	754	803	635	237	151	62	117	330	126	131	66	323	97	85	197	379	64	50	106	220	599	34	75								
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3060</b>	<b>3455</b>	<b>2706</b>	<b>2202</b>	<b>889</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>795</b>	<b>2519</b>	<b>1144</b>	<b>1027</b>	<b>876</b>	<b>3047</b>	<b>1090</b>	<b>788</b>	<b>1314</b>	<b>3192</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>983</b>	<b>1167</b>	<b>2924</b>	<b>6116</b>	<b>568</b>	<b>833</b>								
<b>TOTALS</b>																															
KIA	2621	3234	2702	2095	861	729	561	2151	911	806	814	2531	886	777	1122	2785	935	1028	771	2734	5519	665	853								
WIA	5460	6733	5516	4778	1639	1492	1499	4630	2072	1933	1851	5856	2036	2124	2786	6946	2491	2828	2122	7441	14387	1932	2280								
MIA/CAPT	1201	1671	1189	510	242	208	177	627	222	201	338	761	165	156	467	788	135	148	139	422	1210	124	132								
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>9282</b>	<b>11638</b>	<b>9407</b>	<b>7383</b>	<b>2742</b>	<b>2429</b>	<b>2237</b>	<b>7408</b>	<b>3215</b>	<b>2940</b>	<b>3003</b>	<b>9148</b>	<b>3087</b>	<b>3057</b>	<b>4375</b>	<b>10519</b>	<b>3561</b>	<b>4004</b>	<b>3032</b>	<b>10597</b>	<b>21116</b>	<b>2721</b>	<b>3265</b>								

<sup>a/</sup> Data are from DIA worksheets based on USMACV Military Report for period July 1 - September 25 and on USMACV Weekly Summary and OPREP-5 for period September 25 to present.



Mr. Rostow 81

*Pres file*

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

Mr. President:

You have so many problems presented to you that I feel we sometimes neglect telling you when things go right.

Armin Meyer's letter (attached) thanking you for making the Shah's visit a great success is only the latest in a series of reports on the Shah's deep satisfaction.

The Shah himself has also just sent the attached thank-you letter for your gifts and congratulations on his coronation. No reply is needed since this is his response to you.

W. W. Rostow

- Att: 1. Ltr from Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Iran, to The President, 10/21/67  
2. Ltr from the Shah to the President, 10/24/67

81a

Tehran, October 21, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Nothing since my return to Tehran (which was delayed because of temporary duty at UN) has diminished my conviction that the Shah's visit to our country enjoyed success without precedent.

In a letter to Secretary Rusk I have suggested that the two greatest gains were: a) the focussing of both Iranian and American attention on the broad positive picture rather than on bones of contention; and b) understanding each other's problems, with each side taking the other's problems into account in the shaping of policies. Both these gains, in my view, are the essence of diplomacy.

The warmth which you and Mrs. Johnson and your White House family so graciously accorded His Majesty obviously moved him deeply. The hospitality at the dinner and the master stroke of presenting the Shah unscheduled to the legislators in the East Room reinforced the bonds of understanding and friendship which featured your two tete a tete discussions with His Majesty.

All in all, the visit exceeded our fondest hopes. As a result, American-Iranian relations are healthier than ever. We shall still have problems (some of them unfortunately due to a lingering lack of Congressional understanding) but thanks to our President, his lady and their Washington team (including Walt Rostow, Hal Saunders and Bess Abell), we who serve you in Iran are confident that this country will remain a bright spot for progress and a true friend of our country and the principles for which it stands.

Sincerely,

Armin H. Meyer  
American Ambassador

The President  
The White House



816

24th October, 1967.

Dear Mr. President,

*It gave me infinite pleasure to receive your very kind letter of felicitations on behalf of yourself and Mrs. Johnson on the occasion of the Coronation of the Empress and myself which coincides with my birthday celebrations.*

*I am deeply touched by the very kind words which you have expressed with regard to my country, the Empress and myself.*

*It is a source of great satisfaction that the traditional relations existing between the United States of America and Iran have at all times, and in every circumstance, been founded on co-operation, understanding and mutual trust.*

*I am particularly glad that the present occasion offers me the opportunity to renew my expression of deep admiration for you, Mr. President, and to wish you every success in leading the noble American Nation towards greater prosperity.*

*The Empress and I have received, through the Ambassador, the beautiful silver-gilt dish, engraved with your coat of arms and the Imperial emblem of Iran, and the interesting maps which you were so kind as to send us. We both wish to offer you our warmest and heartfelt thanks for your kind thought.*

*The Empress joins me in conveying to you, as well as to Mrs. Johnson, our best wishes for your continued good health and happiness.*

Sincerely,

*M. R. Vahidi*

The Honourable  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States of America,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 1, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your comments to the Malaysian Finance Minister about the need for more assistance in Viet-Nam generated some action.

Through Secretary Rusk, the Malaysian Prime Minister has sent his assurances to you that Malaysia will not only continue to train South Vietnamese officers, but will increase the size of that program.

The Malaysians have also sent a note to the Department of State itemizing the assistance they have provided to South Viet-Nam. Their contribution is considerably greater than was described to you in the meeting with the Finance Minister.

- Over 5,000 Vietnamese officers trained in Malaysia.
- Training of 150 U.S. soldiers in handling Tracker Dogs.
- A rather impressive list of military equipment and weapons given Viet-Nam after the end of the Malaysian insurgency (for example, 641 armored personnel carriers, 56,000 shotguns).
- A creditable amount of civil assistance (transportation equipment, cholera vaccine, and flood relief).

Our Ambassador to Malaysia, Jim Bell, is all revved up to work with the Malaysians on an increased program of training assistance for the Vietnamese. I expect there will be some developments on this within the next month or so.

Secretary Rusk undertook to convey the Prime Minister's assurances to you, and this memorandum is intended to discharge that undertaking.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

MWright:hg

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-425  
By lig, NARA, Date 4-6-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE AMBASSADOR



KEDUTAAN BESAR MALAYSIA

EMBASSY OF MALAYSIA  
2401 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

October 13, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would refer to the conversation between the Honorable Tun Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance of Malaysia, and His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America, on the afternoon of October 10, 1967, at the White House. During that conversation the President touched on the question of training by Malaysia of more South Vietnamese officers in Malaysia.

I have today been asked by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to renew his assurances to the President that Malaysia will not only continue to provide such training but also to give it to larger numbers of South Vietnamese officers.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Ong Yoke Lin

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Authority NGJ001R-276-1-52 (+1682)  
By J NARA, Date 2/11/12



THE AMBASSADOR



KEDUTAAN BESAR MALAYSIA

EMBASSY OF MALAYSIA  
2401 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

October 17, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION  
is assigned to



The Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Further to my letter of October 13, 1967, I attach  
herewith detailed information on the assistance Malaysia has  
given to South Vietnam.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances  
of my highest esteem and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Ong Yoke Lin

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-201  
By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00

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EX

Malaysia was the first Asian country to provide training assistance and military material to the anti-communist effort in South Vietnam.

(A) Training Assistance:

Over 5,000 Vietnamese armed forces and police officers have been trained in Malaysia since 1956, the date of inception of training programme.

Recent Figures:

1963	-	1141
1964	-	699
1965	-	764
1966	-	592
Up to September 1967	-	<u>840</u>
	Total	<u>4036</u>

(B) Types of Training for Officers:

- (a) Senior advanced administration and police duties.
- (b) Techniques of instructions, criminal investigation and general duties.
- (c) Police field force training.
- (d) Jungle warfare, riot control training and emergency methods.
- (e) Special branch.
- (f) Special branch intelligence.
- (g) Set up of operations rooms and working of SWEC and the maintenance of criminal records.

(C) Training for U.S. Soldiers in the handling of Tracker Dogs:

In 1965 American soldiers were given training at Kota Tinggi in the handling of Tracker Dogs. The training programme involved the training of 15 teams of 150 U.S. Army men and 30 British Labrador Dogs. They were trained by British Army Experts in Kota Tinggi, Johore.

(D) Military Material:

(i) Vehicles:

641 Armoured personnel carriers.

2957 Items of various spare parts.

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By cb, NARA Date 10-25-00

(ii) Weapons:

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
(a) Stevens Savage S/Gun 12-bore	23,342
(b) Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore	22,365
(c) Winchester S/Gun P/A 12 PV Bore	4,918
(d) Remington S/Gun P/A 12-bore	4,950
(e) Carbine .30	836
(f) Carbine Magazine .30	3,344
(g) Carbine Bayonet	836
(h) Browning Pistol 9 MM	436
(i) Browning Magazine 9 MM	450
(j) Ammunition 12-bore	1,900,000
(k) Ammunition .30 carbine	3,000,000
(l) Ammunition 9 MM	1,000,000

(iii) Weapons Spare Parts Items:

- (a) Stevens S/Gun 12-bore
- (b) Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore (New)
- (c) Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore (Part-worn)
- (d) Remington P/A S/Gun 12-bore
- (e) Winchester P/A S/Gun 12-bore
- (f) Carbine .30 mark I
- (g) Pistol Browning Auto 9 MM
- (h) Pistol Signal No. 1 Mark V One Inch

(E) Civil Assistance:

- (i) Spare parts by S/Malaysian Railways
- (ii) Gifts of 12 Mark I and 18 Mark II Wickham Trolleys
- (iii) 500 c.c. Anti-Cholera Vaccine in 1964
- (iv) Gift of M\$30,000.00 to South Vietnamese Government in December 1964 for Flood Relief.

(F) Pacification and Rural Development:

On June 14, 1967, Malaysia sent a ranking three man mission headed by the Chairman of the Federal Land Development Authority to South Vietnam to study pacification and rural development programmes with a view to recommending to the Malaysian Government the most effective ways by which Malaysia would assist Vietnam's development programme. This is manifestation of Malaysia's deep concern and interest re South Vietnam.



82 d

In an article entitled "Malaysia: Key area in South East Asia" in the July 1965 edition of Foreign Affairs, an American quarterly review, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said:

"We look northward in Asia with equal anxiety. We see the unscrupulous advantage the Communists have taken of small and weak states, most of whom have shaken off the burden of colonialism only to fall under the spell of Communism. Vietnam, in particular, has caused us great concern, as we have watched the familiar Communist pattern being re-enacted by the Hanoi Government, using the usual methods of infiltration, subversion and open aggression against South Vietnam, making a mockery of the Geneva Agreement of 1954. I recall that the very first foreign country I visited after becoming Prime Minister of newly independent Malaya was South Vietnam in January 1958. I declared then that the Communist aggression taking place both in Malaya and in South Vietnam was rightly the concern of the whole free world, and that our two countries were fighting in the front line of the battle for freedom. In 1960, I did what I could to help South Vietnam in its struggle against Communism. All the guns and ammunition and vehicles which had become surplus to us as the result of the ending of our own emergency I had shipped to Saigon. We started our own aid program, quietly and without publicity, to train some thousands of Vietnamese in either jungle warfare or police administration; and we are continuing to do so today.

"The long history of aggressive action by North Vietnam and its intensifications of hostilities in recent months more than justify the firm stand taken by the United States. We in Malaysia fully support Washington's actions. Past experience has clearly shown that the Communists will back down whenever they are faced with determined and definite opposition. Cuba, the Berlin Blockade and the incidents in the Tongkin Gulf, each of which Malaysia completely supported at the time, are testimony to this. We cannot, however, ignore the fear felt by many nations that

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NEJ 94-476

By sp, NARA, Date 1-10-95



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Malaysia's diplomatic support for South Vietnam/American  
effort in Vietnam

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-476

By 10, NARA, Date 1-18-95

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the war in Vietnam may escalate into such proportions that an ultimate peaceful solution becomes impossible. We, therefore, welcome President Johnson's statement that the United States is ready to negotiate without any precondition. His proposal for a massive aid program to Southeast Asia clearly shows that the United States is seeking neither political nor military conquest, but desires only an honorable settlement of the Vietnamese problem.

"From our own experience it is our belief, however, that the final answer in Vietnam does not lie in either arms or economic aid but in the hearts and minds of the people. The present state of affairs in South Vietnam is due to a lack of ideological response to an ideological challenge. Political instability in Saigon has drawn attention away from the basic principles of freedom for which South Vietnam has been fighting. The Republic of Vietnam must be given time to reconsolidate itself on these principles and its people must have an opportunity to understand that democracy is worth fighting and dying for. In the long run, the present military involvement by the United States can only be temporary; but it will provide that essential time. In our view it is imperative that the United States does not retire from the scene; such action would create an ideological vacuum which only the Communists would exploit."

On 22 August 1966 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The South Vietnamese have every right to defend their territorial integrity by whatever means available to them. So the request by friendly nations to help them including America shows the extent of their plight as otherwise they would be wiped out by superior forces aided by outside powers."

On 20 January 1967 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The intention of the Communists is not just to take over South

that democracy is worth fighting and dying for. In the long run, the present military involvement by the United States can only be temporary; but it will provide that essential time. In our view it is imperative that the United States does not retire from the scene; such action would create an ideological vacuum which only the Communists would exploit. "

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On 20 January 1967 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The intention of the Communists is not just to take over South Vietnam. They will not stop there. They will carry on and on until they succeed in taking over every country in the world. Americans felt that one of the ways of shortening the war is to bomb military targets in North Vietnam."

On September 16, 1967, Prime Minister stated in London at The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference that without the help and encouragement given by Communist China North Vietnam would not have been able to carry the war into the territory of South Vietnam. Had the Americans not gone to the assistance of South Vietnam, North Vietnam which had got its forces into the south could occupy the country through military means. If this kind of Communist aggression was allowed to succeed the Prime Minister continued, it would be a matter of time before they marched through and militarily occupy the whole of Asia. Prime Minister went on that those who criticise the Americans for their assistance to South Vietnam should not be blind to the intervention of Communist powers in the war in Vietnam.

On 21 September 1966 Malaysia together with Thailand and Philippines spearheaded "An Asian Initiative" at the United Nations to get North and South Vietnam to settle their dispute by negotiation. Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak stated in New York:

"Our main concern is to bring the conflict from the battle ground to the Conference Table. I will raise the Vietnam issue at the United Nations as it has now become our main concern. This situation constitutes a very real threat to the peace and security of South East Asia. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines will make an appeal to the North and South Vietnam to settle the dispute by negotiations."



OCTOBER 27, 1967

22f

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have conveyed to the President the assurances of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman as set forth in your letter of October 13, 1967. The detailed information contained in your letter of October 17 was also very useful.

We are most appreciative of Malaysia's past contributions to the cause in Viet-Nam, vital as it is to both our national interests. That the Prime Minister is now prepared to accept a larger number of Vietnamese officers for special police training is indeed heartening. I understand this program has been very helpful.

We also admire the way in which Malaysia is sharing a rich experience through Tun Razak's development seminars. As you have demonstrated, the skills of rural development are essential to peace, which is the ultimate goal we all seek in Viet-Nam. A training program for appropriate Vietnamese officials, conducted at one of your development sites, could significantly advance the struggle to bring peace and achieve a better life for the courageous people of Viet-Nam.

Sincerely yours,

/s/

Dean Rusk

His Excellency

Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin,  
Ambassador of Malaysia.

Clearances:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-476  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-10-95



Wednesday, November 1, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

SUBJECT: U. S. Delegation to Ceremony Dedicating the Mangla Dam  
in Pakistan (November 23)

I think you know that the President has asked Averell Harriman to head the U. S. delegation to this ceremony. The project is the largest of the \$1 billion in works financed under the Indus Basin Treaty. We are the largest single contributor in a club of 8 donors.

Harriman is having a rough time getting people from Congress to join the delegation. With Senator Mansfield talking about adjournment that weekend, nobody wants to be away during the last minute rush.

Averell wonders whether there are any governors or others that the President would like to honor by naming them to this delegation. Candidates who have occurred to him are Governors Connally, Guy and Rampton, as well as people like Pat Brown.

Harriman has room for perhaps four such people if the President wants to send them. Their wives would also be invited. Would you check this with the President?

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

24

*Pres. file*

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's political  
situation report on Viet-Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

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~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report  
November 1, 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-476  
By ig, NARA, Date 1-10-95

Installation of New Government

Thieu and Ky were inaugurated in a brief but impressive ceremony on October 31. Thieu's inaugural speech stressed the same three themes which he highlighted in his speech to the Senate two weeks ago: building democracy, restoring peace and reforming society.

Thieu has announced the appointment of Nguyen Van Loc as Prime Minister. Thieu has asked the members of the present Cabinet to remain on until Loc forms his government, hopefully within a week. Thieu has also inaugurated the Lower House in a brief opening session.

Vice President's Conversations

Thieu expressed to the Vice President full awareness of the public opinion problem in the United States. The Vice President specifically cited corruption, the performance of the Vietnamese armed forces, and the refugee problem as particular problem areas in American public opinion. The Vice President also suggested to Thieu that the new government's first few months were extremely important.

The Vice President also explained U.S. public opinion problems to Ky, and suggested that the Vietnamese Government might wish to strengthen its information services.

The Vice President met at lunch with a group of Vietnamese political, labor and academic leaders. He stressed that the success of the new government was vital to both Viet-Nam and the United States and that progress during the next six months was crucial. He also emphasized the importance of cooperation between legislative and executive branches in the months ahead. Phan Quang Dan, prominent Constituent Assembly Deputy and unsuccessful Vice Presidential candidate, stressed that the Vietnamese Government and people must play a larger part in conducting the affairs of their country, now that there is a constitutional system.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

*Pres file*

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - November 1, 1967

Mr. President:

I wonder whether during your conversation with President Diaz Ordaz you raised the problem which the Ford Motor Company is having in Mexico?

If so, did President Diaz Ordaz react favorably to the appointment of representatives to look into it?

W. W. Rostow

I did not raise it \_\_\_\_

I raised it, see me \_\_\_\_.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - November 1, 1967

*Free file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Frei's Arms Limitation Proposal

Yesterday President Frei made a public call for the Latin American countries to limit their acquisition of new military equipment. He asked that his statement be brought to your attention.

The Frei proposal is an exhortation rather than a specific proposal. It is a plea against an arms race which would drain resources from development and be contrary to the spirit of economic integration and the Alliance for Progress. Frei specifically disclaimed passing judgment on purchases which governments might have made in exercise of their sovereign rights. He said that what is needed is specific agreements to carry out the arms limitation pledge made by the Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este. But he added that he was not proposing an arms limitation conference, although Chile would attend if some other country took the initiative.

The statement puts Frei on the side of the angels, but it does not get us very far down the road of specific agreement on arms limitation. On the contrary, this kind of grandstand play without careful advance preparation with other governments is likely to do more harm than good.

The origin of the Frei statement goes back to a conversation which Secretary Rusk and Covey Oliver had with Ambassador Tomic following the swearing in of Ed Korry. Tomic was told that we would welcome a Latin American initiative aimed at restraining an arms buildup. He passed this on to President Frei, who quickly embraced the idea and asked if we would back him. State said yes, pointing out the need to do careful homework with other countries before making a public statement. State also said that once public statements of support for Frei's initiative are forthcoming, we would make a supporting statement.

In the absence of a favorable response from several of the larger Latin American countries, it would be a mistake for us to endorse Frei. It would make him look like a stalking horse for us. Given the attitude of the military in Peru toward Chile and toward us on the Mirage deal, it would undo whatever chance is left to get the Peruvian military to reverse their decision on the Mirages.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

We will follow Latin American reaction to the Frei statement and let you know how it fares. In the meantime, if George Christian is asked about your views on the Frei proposal, I recommend he say:

"We fully supported the Declaration of the Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este on arms limitation, and we will support any Latin American initiative to implement this Declaration. We believe that any agreement is best achieved by the Latin Americans working out an understanding among themselves as they did in the case of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. We are prepared to lend every appropriate assistance toward that end if it is desired by the Latin American governments."

I have checked this language with Covey Oliver.

W. W. Rostow

cc - George Christian

Wednesday - November 1, 1967

*Pro file*

Mr. President:

Attached is a letter of commendation to Tom Mann for his contribution to the Chamizal Settlement.

I have asked John Macy what governmental civilian awards are available in case you wish to give him an award as the Mexicans are going to do.

Bill Bowdler checked Tom on the letter to Sayre before we sent it to you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

October 31, 1967

Dear Tom:

During the ceremony at the Chamizal Monument last Saturday, I thought of the great service you had rendered to your country and to me by working out the Chamizal settlement. We were there because your imagination, persistence and skill had found a formula which local, state and federal officials on both sides of the border could accept.

President Diaz Ordaz said in his address that Mexico would bestow its highest honor on you. This is a measure of the esteem in which you are held by our neighbors.

Your own government and countrymen are deeply grateful for your contribution, as I am personally.

Sincerely,



Mr. Thomas C. Mann  
President  
Automobile Manufacturers Association  
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

LEJ/WGBowdler:mm