#### MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Taylor's arguments in response to those I gave him from the unidentified paper.

He will be filing a paper of his own in a few days.

W. W. R.

SECRET attachment

Prosple

Authority NARS, Date 10-4-13

## THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

November 3, 1967

Mr. President:

Walt Rostow has asked my comments on the following possible course of action:

#### Proposal

The U.S. will stabilize its military strength in Vietnam at presently approved levels and, with its allies, will continue to conduct the war in South Vietnam essentially as at present, making every effort to hold down U.S. casualties and battle damage and to pass the burden of the fighting to the South Vietnamese.

There will be no extension of the air target system in North Vietnam beyond the present one and no blockade or mining of the ports. At some point, we will stop the bombing of North Vietnam except for the use of air strikes in the Demilitarized Zone to suppress shelling or to interdict enemy troop movements.

The purpose of the foregoing course of action would be to allay apprehensions at home and abroad of a further expansion of the conflict and to increase the pressure on Hanoi to reduce its military activities or to enter upon negotiations. It is my understanding that all or most of our intentions under this alternative would be announced publicly.

#### Comment

Of the alternatives\* open to the U.S., this is one form of the Pull-back Alternative. While this course of action might tend to allay the fears of those who are concerned over an expansion of the conflict, it would provide fresh ammunition for the numerically larger number of critics who say that we are embarked on an endless and hopeless struggle or that we are really not trying to win. The decrease in our efforts implicit in this proposal would tend to nullify by a form of self-stagnation the progress which we properly contend that we are now making and would give renewed stimulus to our impatient fellow citizens who are even now crying for a quick solution or get out. Like other variations of the Pull-back Alternative, it would probably degenerate into an eventual pull-out.

\* There are four in all: Pull-out, Pull-back, All-out, Stick-it-out

Authority NL1 83-55

By NARS, Date 10-4-83



The curtailment of the bombing under this proposal has all the liabilities which we have noted in previous discussions of this issue. The South Vietnamese would be deeply discouraged by this lifting of the penalty which the bombing imposes on the North. I would suspect that our other allies contributing troops would object strongly to this course of action - they are convinced of the essentiality of the bombing. Our own forces would regard this action as a deliberate decrease in the protection which, they feel, is afforded them by the bombing. The large majority of our citizens who believe in the bombing but who thus far have been silent could be expected to raise violent objections on the home front, probably surpassing in volume the present criticisms of the anti-bombers.

Probably the most serious objection of all to this Pull-back Alternative would be the effect upon the enemy. Any such retreat will be interpreted as weakness and will add to the difficulty of getting any kind of eventual solution compatible with our overall objective of an independent South Vietnam free from the threat of subversive aggression.

I would recommend strongly against adopting any such course of action.

M.D. Z.

SECRET

Friday, November 3, 1967

#### MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

I did not take full notes in yesterday's advisory meeting; but I did try to list suggestions for action.

Here is my list.

#### Dean Acheson:

- -- organize citizen's committees in all cities over 100,000;
- -- get fresh faces to defend our Viet Nam policy.

#### McGeorge Bundy:

- -- cool attention to bombing: make it routine;
- -- reward in White House ceremonies those who have done great work in the provinces, military and civilians;
- -- assure that military men on advisory duty in pacification are promoted on same basis as those in combat:
- -- develop publicity that Vietnamese are doing more, and make sure they do;
- -- shift our stance on negotiations to one of not expecting negotiations until after November 1968:
- -- dramatize that we have already won a great strategic victory in Asia: lift people's eyes from Viet Nam to the whole scene;
- -- brief the key editors and communicators just as the group was briefed (Dick Helms has no objection to using Carver when it's off-the-record and no public attribution);
- -- let good news speak for itself: don't strain publicly to convince people progress is being made.

#### Douglas Dillon:

- -- spend time not on how we got into Viet Nam, but on position we're in and real choices we face;
- -- clarify what we are doing on the ground and in bombing;

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Authority ML g 84-39

By Ag/K5, NARA, Date 12-4-91

#### Douglas Dillon (cont'd)

- -- develop sense of progress: sense of stalemate is what invites extreme doves and hawks; let events speak for themselves, but there are ways of getting good news out;
- -- have Bunker -- a fresh and trusted voice -- report to the nation;
- -- the President should brief top college presidents and deans as Advisory Group was briefed.

#### Arthur Dean:

- -- clarify our "get out of Viet Nam" position: if we're really going to get out, why spend all this blood and treasure?
- -- explain critical importance of Viet Nam to our Asia and Pacific positions: people don't understand implications for U.S. national interest of loss of Viet Nam;
- -- avoid another Panmunjom.

#### Cabot Lodge:

- -- an independent audit of the pace and success of the revamping and reorientation of the ARVN;
- -- limit U.S. casualties by diminishing "search and destroy" operations, substituting a doctrine of "split up and keep off balance";
- -- encourage a "true revolution" in South Viet Nam by throwing our weight behind private cooperative institutions such as farmers' unions, marketing organizations, which would stimulate, agitate, and engage the people themselves and begin to push the French and Chinese middlemen to the wall. (WWR comment: the French and Chinese businessmen ought to be moving into light industry at this stage of Vietnamese development.)
- -- agreed with Acheson on a no-bombing versus DMZ deal;
- -- urged that Bunker and his views be given maximum exposure.

#### Robert Murphy:

-- sharpen focus and action against small group of Hanoi villains: we have no target for hate in this, as opposed to other wars.

#### General Omar Bradley:

- -- talk less about negotiations: Hanoi takes it as a sign of weakness;
- -- use "Patience" as a slogan;

#### General Maxwell Taylor:

- -- questions close-in defense of DMZ;
- -- decide what we are prepared to offer the VC; that is a major gap in our policy and ought to be filled;
- -- bombing should not be traded against DMZ pressure but against level of VC incidents in the South: bombing is our equivalent of guerrilla warfare;
- -- organize nationwide, continuous campaign of speeches in support of policy;
- -- organize an hour TV program regularly: government replies to its citizens on Viet Nam, answering questions.

#### George Ball:

-- stop bombing, except across the DMZ, to create climate for negotiation.

#### Abe Fortas:

-- get George Carver to briefing on television. (Dean Acheson, Dick Helms, and others objected to using Carver in public.)

### Clark Clifford:

-- bring Thieu to the United States (Nick Katzenback implied we should make sure his political base in Saigon would be safe during such a tour).

W. W. R.

-CONFIDENTIAL

Friday - November 3, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Latin American Nuclear Free Zone

Prestile

I understand that in your conversations with President Diaz Ordaz you informed him we intend to sign Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty with an interpretive statement. You also told him that we are not ready to announce our intention until we have first consulted Congress.

If the foregoing is an accurate reflection of what you said to the Mexican President, I propose to tell State and ACDA to proceed with Congressional consultations. The results of these consultations are to be reported back to you, together with recommendations for the handling of the announcement.

W. W. Rostow

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Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:10 p.m.

#### Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud's report on the conference on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.

W. W. Rostow

Profile

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR November 2, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Results of Conference on Foreign Assistance Act of 1967

After seven weeks, the conferees have reached agreement on the foreign aid authorization bill. Doc Morgan is not certain when he will bring the conference report to the floor, but he expects Passman to hold the appropriation bill until the House acts on the authorization bill.

The principal results of the conference are:

1. <u>Funds</u>. The bill authorizes \$2.860 billion for economic and military assistance (including \$185 million; eviously authorized for Development Loans).

	(\$ in millions)						
	FY 1968 Appropriation Request	Amount Authorized for FY 1968	Amount Reduced by Authorization Bill	Percent Reduction			
Development Loans	\$774	\$ 635	\$139	18%			
Technical Assistance	243	210	33	14%			
Alliance for Progress	643	578	65	10%			
Supporting Assistance	720	660	60	8%			
Administrative Expenses	59.3	55.8	3.5	6%			
Other Economic	191	207	<u></u>		-		
Total Economic	\$2,630	\$2,350	\$281	11%			
Military Assistance	620	510	110	18%			
Total - Economic and Military	\$3,250	\$2,860	\$ 391	12%			

The military assistance figures exclude \$60 million for NATO infrastructure, which has been transferred to the DOD budget.

The above figures are no guide to what we will ultimately get to work with. The Passman Subcommittee figures are some \$660 million below the \$2.860 billion total authorization shown above.

- Military Sales Program. The Church amendment was revised so that it creates no serious problems for this fiscal year. The bill now provides that
  - -- DOD will have authority to make credit sales, but after June 30, 1968 funds for credit sales will have to be obtained from new appropriations rather than from the revolving fund;
  - -- The revolving fund will terminate on June 30, 1968, but provision is made for orderly liquidation so that new appropriations will not be needed to pay outstanding obligations incurred as a result of past credit sales;
  - -- DOD will have the authority until June 30, 1968 to guarantee credit extended by private banks, exporters or the Export-Import Bank (the House conferees have made it clear that next year they will try to extend this authority for another year);
  - -- DOD may guarantee no more than \$190 million of credit sales in fiscal year 1968.
- 3. Number of Country Restrictions. The restrictions on the number of countries that may receive Development Loans, Technical Assistance or Supporting Assistance were modified so that
  - -- The numerical limitations make it possible for us to carry out our planned programs this year;
  - -- The unconstitutional procedure for increasing the number of countries is deleted, leaving the restrictions as flat limitations without Presidential discretion to increase the numbers.
- 4. Transfers to the World Bank. The Senate receded completely from its position that 10 percent of our Development Loan funds may be used only for transfer to the World Bank family.

- 5. Gross Amendment. The conferees modified this amendment so that military sales to, or purchases from, countries such as the U.K. will not be prohibited because of North Vietnam trade or shipping. We should be able to live with the amendment as modified.
- Findley Amendment. The conferees dropped this amendment which required the President to withdraw most-favored-nation treatment for Poland.
- 7. Restrictions on Military Assistance to Latin America, Central America, and Africa. These were modified. Only the African restriction will now cause us trouble. It limits all military grants and sales to Africa for fiscal year 1968 to \$40 million; our proposed program is \$58 million.

William S. Gaud

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:05 p.m.

Mr. President:

If you haven't see it, you will wish to read Gen. Bradley's article.

frer file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

## GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

The GI's general of World War II reports on his 14 days with the troops

# MY WISIT O WIETNAM





"There is no substitute," says General Bradley, "for talking to the men in the field." Above, he reviews his GI's in Germany and, right, 22 years later, arrives aboard the U.S.S. Constellation in the Tonkin Gulf.

BY GENERAL OF THE ARMY OMAR N. BRADLEY WITH MRS. BRADLEY In 1915, when Cadet Bradley was graduated, the West Point yearbook predicted: "If he keeps up the clip... some of us some day will be bragging... 'Sure, General Bradley was a classmate of mine!" "He kept up the clip in Africa, Sicily, Normandy and the sweep to Berlin in World War II, as Veterans Affairs Administrator, Army Chief of Staff, Joint Chiefs Chairman thereafter. He is the last, along with classmate Dwight D. Eisenhower, of nine men to be honored with five-star rank. For General Bradley's personal report on where we stand in Vietnam, turn the page.



tht," complained one other dropped with his battalion o VC territory, attack. None came.

I don't call that stalemate."

"After amping throughout the length and width of South Vietnam... I am convinced this is a war at the right place, at the right time and with the right enemy."

ISTORY WILL CIVE high marks to the United States for its responsible behavior since World War II. Never has a nation of such power been so sorely and so systematically tried. The Communists, disciples of a doctrine that no people ever willingly embraced, have sought domination by attacking a supposed weak spot through trickery, propaganda, bluster and violence. Each time, the United States has reacted and, with the help of allies, blocked them from achieving an easy victory. And always we have done it without resorting to that horror of horrors, all-out total war.

The Communists tried blockade in Berlin, terrorism in Greece, conventional warfare in Korea. In each instance, we stopped them. In Cuba, they tested us to see if we were prepared to go to nuclear war and found we were. Now we are heing tested again. As with Berlin, Greece, Korea and Cuba, Vietnam is a proving ground. This is no simple civil war fought solely by patriots, although there certainly are patriots on both sides. It is, in essence, a laboratory experiment, executed with callous disregard for human life by those in Hanoi and Peking who want to see if the "protracted war" theories of Mao Tse-tung will work. If these theories hold in Vietnam, they unquestionably will be applied elsewhere, and we shall have to confront them again and again. The Communists have spelled it all out for us. In statements as blunt as Hitler's Mein Kampf, they have assured us time and again it is their intention to impose their form of government upon the world.

In May of 1951, testifying before two Senate committees as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I opposed enlarging the Korean War to include the China mainland. I was referring solely to the crossing of the Yalu River, although in ensuing years, I frequently have been misquoted as opposing the action in Korea, which I actually supported. I said that a "limited war" with Red China then "would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."

The Soviet Union had a mutual defense treaty with Red China providing that each would treat any attack on the other as an attack on itself. Furthermore, the Russians were furnishing most of the war supplies used by North Korea. If we had wanted to stop the flow of those supplies by strategic bombing or other means, our attack should have been directed against Russia. In my view now, as then, Red China was the wrong enemy.

Maybe, as some critics claim, Vietnam is

the wrong war too, in the sense that we should have avoided getting involved so deeply in it. I don't know. Playing armchair general is much easier than bearing the responsibility and rendering the decisions at the moment of crisis, and history does not reveal the results of untried alternatives. It is fruitless to dwell upon what-might-have-been when faced with the screaming realities of the here and now. After tramping throughout the length and width of South Vietnam, going wherever I wanted to go and talking to whomever I wanted to talk, I am convinced that this is a war at the right enemy—the Communists.

My wife Kitty brought the trip about. She sensed my growing conviction that I had to go and see Vietnam for myself. She knew I had always believed there is no substitute for talking to the men in the field. The deterrent to taking a trip like this was a bothersome cartilage in my right knee, torn while playing football at West Point. I did not want to go into a war zone and then wind up a nonbattle casualty. Recent surgery removed the entire kneecap and made it possible for me to walk once again without limp or pain. Kitty was with me during a postsurgical checkup in late July, when the doctor pronounced the knee "as close as it ever will be to God's work." In the car en route home, she turned to me and softly said, "You've been aching to go, and now you can." I nodded and had to admit, "An old soldier never really fades away."

Kitty had no objection to my going to Vietnam. She just didn't want me to go without her. We both knew that as a general officer on active duty, I could officially request permission to visit Vietnam, but she would have to stay behind.

My wife is a quiet, determined woman. Less than a week after the knee checkup, she had arranged with LOOK to accompany me to Vietnam as a correspondent, with the stipulation that all payment for this article be turned over to the United Service Organizations for distribution to the USO facilities serving our men in Vietnam.

Kitty was invaluable on the trip. A professional writer for more than 20 years, she is a trained observer and, in the evenings, when we mulled over where we had been and what we had seen, I found she had often picked up details that I had missed. She was great for morale, particularly in hospitals, where she paused for unhurried chats with the wounded, and at isolated outposts in the boondocks. Kitty felt she wanted to do something special to jus-

continued

and talk to the five-star general, above, with his wife Kitty and Korean Lt. Gen. Chae Myung Shin, and, left, inspecting the Green Beret camp at My Da in the Mekong Delta.

tify her presence. She decided that upon our return, she would communicate with the family of every serviceman to whom she talked in Vietnam. Whenever she volunteered to give a personal message to the folks back home, she was surrounded by the homesick, and at last count, she had telephoned or written a personal letter to 917 families.

Those fine young men out there did something for our morale too. One night at Pleiku, after an exhausting day in the central highlands and after a sobering but otherwise uneventful oil-line failure while helicoptering over Vietcong territory, we talked quietly about the brave men and how selflessly they worked, the gruesome scars of war all around, the now-familiar grumbling of nearby artillery, the Vietcong mortar bursts on a motor pool at Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport as we were landing. And Kitty, who had never before been this close to battle, said: "If something should happen, and we should die, at least we are in good company—each other's and these wonderful men fighting here." I agreed.

Gen. William C. Westmoreland, our commanding general in Vietnam, met us at the airport when we arrived August 17. I had known him as Cadet Westmoreland 32 years ago, when I was on the West Point faculty, and our paths have crossed several times since. He looked fit. We later were told that he gets out into the field with his men several times a week. I know that wherever we went, there was nothing but praise and affection for him. "Westy's been carrying this responsibility for three and a half years," one man said, "but he always has the drive and enthusiasm of a second lieutenant who arrived only yesterday."

From that day until August 30, when we left Vietnam, we stayed constantly on the go, traversing the country from one end to the other, keeping a schedule of 14 to 16 hours daily. We saw thousands of Americans—soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, Seabees. We went to them where they live and fight—aboard a carrier, a fleet oiler, a hospital ship, a "Riverine" ship; in trenches, foxholes, dugouts, jeeps, tanks; at artillery positions, radar posts on hilltops, montagnard villages in the highlands, Special Forces camps on the South China Sea coast and in the waterlogged paddies of the Me-

kong Delta. We visited allied units—the South Vietnamese, Koreans, Filipinos and others. Everywhere, they seemed glad to see us and somehow managed to have a five-star flag or plate to greet us.

We mingled with villagers who have known nothing but war for a generation. At Plei Bong Hiot, a montagnard hamlet in the central highlands, all 376 inhabitants turned out to greet us. A montagnard band playing gongs scaled in size from saucers to manhole covers beat out an eerie tune, over and over, as we sipped rice wine from a communal jar through communal straws to become honorary members of the Bahnar tribe. The straws were plastic fuel tubes borrowed from our helicopters. Because the plastic tubes were transparent, the hamlet leaders could see whether we really drank or simulated drinking. My wife tried to fudge, but she got caught and there was no make-believe the second time. She said the rice wine tasted like a mixture of sake, tequila and helicopter fuel. At Edap Enang, a montagnard village in the same general area, we saw some 7,800 people who had been relocated because of military operations near the Cambodian border, where they formerly lived. These families are comfortably housed, and each has its own vegetable patch. Some had run away at first, but when their crops sprouted, the runaways returned and began to take root in their new homes.

The noncombatant Philippine Civic Action Group was working closely with another village, made up of 491 refugee families. The Filipinos, doing what amounts to Peace Corps work under occasional fire, proudly showed us a new school where 1,000 children were being educated. Brig. Gen. Gaudencio V. Tobias, the Philippine commander, demonstrated to us the self-government, sanitation and hygiene techniques his command is teaching the people.

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and General Westmoreland abided by my request to spend most of the time in the field. They arranged for two days of orientation briefings in Saigon, after which we flew north to Da Nang. Throughout our travels in Vietnam, we were cloaked by the code name "Burma Road" for security reasons. Wherever we went, we were cordially received by the various



commanders, who saw to it that we spent much of our time in no-holds-barred talking with their junior officers and enlisted men. We asked hard questions and got direct answers. They showed us the bad with the good and left it to us to decide how things stood on balance.

From Da Nang, we flew out to sea to the U.S.S. Constellation. She was circling with two other carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin, far north of the 17th Parallel dividing the two Vietnams. In the two days aboard, we questioned crew members, visited fliers in their ready rooms and saw several strikes launched against targets in the Hanoi area and

tipe with

elsewhere in North Vietnam. On one strike, one of our aircraft was shot down, but quick work by rescue helicopters plucked the two-man crew from jungle highlands. When we learned they were being returned to the carrier, Kitty begged to wait to see for herself that they were safe. We delayed our departure and were able to congratulate Cdr. Robin McGlohn of Balboa Beach, Calif., and Lt. (jg) James M. McIlrath of San Diego.

I never heard a pilot aboard the Constellation question the usefulness of what he is doing. One senior officer estimated that 100 times as much ammunition was being expended against our planes in the North as against our ground troops in the South. "That's a plus in itself," he said.

Back in Da Nang—after a stop at a field hospital to fix a tooth my wife broke in the jolt of the catapulted takeoff from the carrier—we were shown to our billets by Marine Maj. Charles Edwards of Raleigh, N.C. He casually mentioned that according to our Intelligence, the enemy might fire rockets at the base at any time, as they had done in July. He showed us the bunker in which we were to take cover if that happened. Kitty assured the major she has no sense of direction and wondered if in the event of a rocket attack, he could

come and lead the way. "Yes, ma'am, if I'm alive," he replied earnestly. "I just wanted to show you, in case a rocket gets to me first."

At my request, the marines helicoptered us to a forward base for an open discussion with junior officers and enlisted men. About 25 assembled in a rattan hut that served as their mess hall. One of them, Cpl. Lester W. Shell, Jr., of Chesapeake, Va., a gangling 23-year-old, said the hardest job was identifying the Vietcong. They mingled with the rice farmers until dusk, and after dark, slipped into black pajamas, took up hidden weapons "and turned into VC's." Corporal Shell assured us that continued

LOOK 11-14-67 33

#### GENERAL BRADLEY CONTINUED

things were getting better because more farmers were reporting VC operatives as they developed trust in the marines. "When I arrived 11 months ago, we had to send out patrols in company size, about 160 men, and now we go on squad patrols, 12 to 15 men. That right there is progress.

Another member of this group, a sniper, showed us his weapon, a civilian rifle with a tele-scopic sight. He said: "Sometimes, we find a seat in a tree or a hole in the ground and just sit down and wait. Quite often, someone shows up. We're doing better. We're learning patience."

N DA NANG harbor, we went aboard the U.S.S. Repose, one of two hospital ships in the area. We had visited two general hospitals near Saigon, and we would go to field hospitals elsewhere, but the Repose offered prime insight into how quickly the wounded are treated. The speed is amazing. The secret is helicopters. The Repose has a heli-pad on its deck, just as the hospitals ashore have them on their grounds. The wounded go directly from the battlefield to the hospital. Rarely is ground transportation necessary. This means that except in very few cases, no man in the country is more than 30 minutes away from complete, expert medical care. Only 2.5 percent of the wounded admitted to a medical facility die. More than 40 percent of the wounded return to duty without being admitted to a medical facility. And over 80 percent of all wounded admitted to a medical facility are returned to their units. The effect on morale is evident. Kitty and I found most of the patients we visited in a cheerful bantering mood, and anxious to get back to their units and their work.

Wherever we ate, whether with officers or enlisted men, the chow was good. In my 56 years in the Army, I have never seen better fed men, in peace or war. Ninety percent of the meals served to American personnel in Vietnam are hot. It is commonplace, according to some men I talked with, to have a helicopter hover over an embattled unit and lower what my wife termed "a businessman's breakfast"-fruit juice, two soft-boiled eggs, buttered toast, marmalade and hot coffee.

At China Beach, near Da Nang, we visited with men enjoying a three-day respite from all duty. Kitty took on a couple of the GI's in Ping-Pong to put them at ease and encourage them to talk freely. We learned that like all servicemen, however dedicated, they count the days until they go home. In this war, except for key officers, they know exactly how long that will be. Our men go over for a one-year tour of duty unless they voluntarily extend. I asked one fellow how long he had to go, and he quickly replied, "Seventy-six days and a wake-up." Not 77 days, but 76 and a wake-up a little autopsychology, like setting a clock ahead, because it sounds shorter that way. But many found themselves irresistibly drawn back, like John Paul Vann of Littleton, Colo. He had served a military tour in Vietnam, gone home, left the service and signed on with Revolutionary Development. Marine M/Sgt. George A. Mitchell had been there for 21/2 years, and when we asked him why, he said simply, "I want to see the job finished."

As time goes on, the steady flow of returning Vietnam veterans, currently at the rate of 50,000 a month, may give Americans a better picture of Vietnam. The quality of these young men, tempered by their travail and the ringside knowledge of the plight of those they fought to help, cannot but improve the quality of American society.

As we worked our way south from Da Nang, we spent most of a day with the South Korean forces headed by Lt. Gen. Chae Myung Shin. He commands more than 49,000 men and, from all reports, they are doing a superb job. One of his staff officers gave us an excellent briefing, winding up with the assurance that ROK forces are pleased to fight by our side to repay in some small measure all that the Americans did for their country when it faced a similar threat. The Koreans seem to have a special zest for their mission and a particular talent for keeping the highway open and driving the VC out of the coastal area in the central part of the country.

Here, as elsewhere, a strengthened effort is being made in Revolutionary Development, the program to provide a new life for villagers former-ly under VC control. We visited one such village, where all the people turned out to meet us. They showed us what they were building-an infirmary, a bridge, a concrete road. This is the new concept, involving the villagers more deeply in the things they need. Foremost is security, provided by the villages' own Popular Forces.

At Nha Trang, we watched South Vietnamese soldiers training at the Noncommissioned Officers Academy. I was interested because the high caliber of our own military forces today is the result of such schools. I witnessed two combat problems conducted with live ammunition. They were impressive. Not only are the Vietnamese learning to defend themselves by fighting alongside our troops,

but gradually they are adopting our methods.

In the heavily populated Mekong Delta, traffic is by water, and so is the war. Our Army and Navy have combined operations there, in the Riverine Force. Soldiers live aboard ship when not slogging the paddies and swamps, and sailors called "Seals" fight like the green-bereted Special Forces. These men are effectively hampering the movement of VC units and supplies. Navy person-nel, accompanied by South Vietnamese civil officers, stop and search between 1,500 and 2,000 boats a day. Sometimes, they are fired on from the banks, but quite often our boats pull away without returning the fire to avoid hitting innocent civilians in the area.

I had heard complaints that we were killing innocent people in Vietnam. I am not sure how those who make such complaints define "innocent." If they mean civilians as distinguished from men in uniform, it should be pointed out that since 1958, the Vietcong have assassinated an estimated 11,-798 South Vietnamese civilians and have kidnapped 41,177. This toll includes 1,000 civilian officials killed and 1,500 kidnapped. Anyone in a combat area is apt to become a casualty, as we found when we landed in Normandy during World War II. Wherever possible, people are moved out of a battle zone, which is what we are doing in Vietnam today. As careful as we are, modern weapons make it difficult to confine casualties to the fighting men. But there is no such excuse for the deliberate, premeditated, selective killings by the VC.

In the Delta, far from the source of men and materials in the North, the enemy seems to be having considerable trouble. One unit I visited re-ported capturing 10 VC. Two were 12 years old and one was 13. These children said they were told that unless they joined the VC, their families

would be killed. One Riverine Force reported the enemy they were chasing simply melted away after burying their guns. I saw 43 of these arms, including three automatic weapons, displayed on the

deck of one of our ships.

On our last afternoon in Vietnam (we had that day and a wake-up to go), we met with Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and a team of American officials who are setting up an agency modeled along the lines of our own Veterans Ad-ministration, of which I was administrator for more than two years following World War II. Already they are planning the postwar future of South Vietnam's veterans.

As we climbed aboard the jetliner taking us back to the States, my head was bursting with information, and my heart with pride. What a paradox this war is. The morale of the men in the foxholes is higher than that of many people safely at home. The fighting men know why they are in Vietnam. It is a pity their understanding, patience, fortitude and enthusiasm cannot be transmitted to

As Kitty turned to look back at Saigon fading from our view, she murmured half to herself, "I don't believe anybody can fly into Vietnam a

dove, and fly out a dove.

We are in Vietnam because we cannot long remain the leader of the free world if we do not stand by our promises to help the smaller nations threatened by Communist engulfment. Vietnam is an historical necessity, not because we said so but because the Communists want it that way. On September 2, 1965, the Red Chinese Defense Minister Lin Piao declared in Peking that Vietnam was the "testing ground" for the worldwide application of Mao Tse-tung's military-revolutionary strategy. This strategy, used by Mao in China and by Ho Chi Minh in Southeast Asia, starts with a peasant base and gradually encircles, throttles and captures the cities. Marshal Lin likened underdeveloped countries such as South Vietnam to the peasants and described the capitalist countries as the "cities of the world." We are on notice then that this is the challenge.

If we fight on in Vietnam and win, it is possible we may have to repeat our effort elsewhere If we pull out, it is certain we will face more and tougher Vietnams. History repeatedly has taught us that appeasement is at best a temporary measure

and inevitably leads to war.

Wherever we went, I asked the question: Are we making progress? And, as a Missouri native, l added: Show me. From Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland and their top subordinates, from the Koreans and other Free World Force units, from the South Vietnamese, from our men at all levels and from what I could see with my own eyes, the answer was clear: Yes. And I could not help but wonder why this was not clear to the American people. Perhaps it is because, as a peo ple, we have appetites that lean toward the extraordinary in the news. Too often, we are disinterested in the 99 percent that is right and focus our attention on the one percent that is wrong.

How do you measure progress? To me, it is progress when things are better than they were previously. From what I saw and heard, things are better than they were three or six months or a year ago. We are making progress in Vietnam. We are gaining, often dramatically, in the military struggles and in the even more difficult task of healing the social ills on which the Communists feed

"Why not invite Ho Chi Minh down south? Let him see the dug-in magnitude of our effort."

As we traveled, I became increasingly aware that we are slowly but inexorably rolling the enemy back from the cities and the seacoast. His movement in areas he used to own is now severely restricted. Main force units inside the country, except up north near the Demilitarized Zone, generally stay under cover and keep shifting their bases to avoid detection and contact. The enemy's supply and communication routes, especially around Saigon and in the Mekong Delta, are being interdicted with improved efficiency. Because of his logistics problems in the midlands and down south, he has had to concentrate activity up north near the DMZ. There, the supply route is shorter. Except for that area and a few others, his regiments and battalions are splitting into small groups. "I can't find a fight," complained one American commander whose unit six months ago was battling for its life. One reason we invite attack is because we can react so quickly; in one Delta area, the VC assaults, usually limited to mortar fire, last no more than five minutes because by then our planes and artillery start pounding them. This is a far cry from early 1965, when North Vietnamese regulars and hard-core Vietcong sought to cut the country in two and, in the opinion of many observers, were dangerously close to succeeding.

Intelligence is the key. It seems to be improving as more captives and defectors appear. I have a hunch the other side is hurting a good deal more than it lets on. It may be, as I was told, that the enemy has reached the "crossover point" at which he is losing men through death, wounds, capture and defection at a faster rate than he can replace them by recruitment and infiltration. It seems unlikely that Hanoi can meet such manpower requirements for any protracted length of time. Ho Chi Minh's one hope is to hang on in the expectation that the American public, inadequately informed about the true situation and sickened by the loss in lives and money, will force the United States to give up and pull out.

A North Vietnamese captured this year told interrogators that anti-war demonstrations help sustain the morale of his people and the troops. This man, Nguyen Huu Nghia, who speaks Russian and holds a Ph.D. degree in psychology, described demonstrations as "very effective" encouragement for the North Vietnamese. He compared the situation to that of France during the Indochina War. He said an anti-war movement in France started slowly, gained momentum and influenced the final

outcome-French capitulation.

If the French pattern should be repeated, it would be a stigma the American people would have to bear forever. Pulling out now would break faith with those who have died there, with the families of those who have died there and with those who after much suffering are on the threshold of success. The Communists assuredly would take revenge against the South Vietnamese who cast their lot with us.

Neighboring nations like Thailand, which recently sent a regiment to fight and from whose territory most of the air strikes against the North are launched, would immediately face Communist infiltration and aggression. American influence would wane, not only in the Far East, but around the globe. Our integrity as a nation would be

gravely questioned.

In Hanoi, there is no free press, radio or television to give uncensored sustained reports of what goes on behind the smoke screen of propaganda. But word leaks out. The port of Haiphong has become more a bottleneck than a distribution point. Haiphong's docks and streets are piled high with supplies requiring transshipment because the railroad to Hanoi is unserviceable. Trucks on the Hanoi-Haiphong route now average less than ten miles an hour because the highway is so torn up. U.S. bombing is paralyzing North Vietnam.

The Navy pilots my wife and I watched fly off the U.S.S. Constellation, as well as the Air Force crews that fly out of Thailand, have developed electronic gear and aerial tactics to escape antiaircraft fire, including Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles (SAM's). When we visited the carrier, the last full week's tally reported 128 SAM's fired;

only one of them hit a plane.

"Stalemate" was a much-used word when we went to Vietnam. I don't call it stalemate when, almost everywhere, the enemy is avoiding contact and our troops are progressively digging him out and pushing him back. I don't call it stalemate when, by every measurement, the other side is getting weaker and we are getting stronger. This war is like no other in my experience. There are no great wall maps on which to draw lines and say, "Here is the front." The front is everywhere.

APTURED PRISONERS tell a story of constant attrition. One man, taken in his first battle, said he had started out from Hanoi in a 300-man unit, but only 30 survived the six-week trek. Other prisoners said North Vietnamese soldiers sent south are told they are "mop-up troops" because the war is virtually won. Instead, infiltrators find they must live in the jungle, harassed by bombs, artillery and patrols, and soon they realize their mission is near-suicidal. Enemy defections under South Vietnam's Chieu Hoi, or "Open Arms," policy are stepping up. All these things tell a story, not of stalemate, but of an enemy that is hard pressed.

There was criticism, too, that we had little progress to show for the 13 years we have been in Vietnam. Actually, we only started building strength there two and a half years ago, and did not reach current force level until this year.

General Westmoreland first had to concentrate on building a logistics base. Once this base was laid down, he was able to take the initiative. He could begin rooting out and pushing back the Communists, while the South Vietnamese, learning to fight by our side, simultaneously developed a nation with a government more responsive to the needs and the will of the people.

In the process of creating logistical support for our troops, we have invested in South Vietnam's future. A short while ago, Saigon was the only major seaport, and there were only three airfields capable of handling jet aircraft. There are now six ports and eight jet fields, several with two runways. These tremendous resources back up more than the U.S. forces. They support allied troops, the South Vietnamese military effort, American civilians and the South Vietnamese economy. When the war is over, this nation will have a floor on which to build.

Flying over Camranh Bay, once little more than sand and water and now a teeming complex of American power, I was struck by a thought: What if the other side could see what it is up against? Why not invite Ho Chi Minh down south and grant him immunity and every possible protection? Let him see the dug-in magnitude of our effort. If Ho would take the trip I took, he would realize the futility of continuing the war.

Before we went to Vietnam, we heard critics say that Hanoi would agree to truce talks if we would stop the bombing. Maybe. I do know that previous bombing halts did not have this result. The mud-spattered GI's in the central highlands near Dragon Mountain and the marines up at the DMZ know that the tons of ammunition being expended against our planes would be coming down the trail to be fired at them. They know the vast manpower kept occupied by the raids would be free for use against them. It is not academic, up

where the fighting is.

Two weeks in Vietnam do not make me an expert. But I have seen battlefields before. What this war needs more than anything else, I believe, is home-front understanding. I would like to see the people at home more deeply involved in Vietnam. Even those opposed to the war cannot be opposed to the men fighting it. My wife Kitty has suggested that women's clubs take a few minutes off from their bridge sessions to write letters to our men in the field. Marines in Vietnam receive 150 pounds of cookies every month from 231 citizens of little Dayton, Wyo.; they demolish the cookies but their gratitude to Dayton is indestructible. Other Americans are shipping soap for the war refugees. These are relatively small in themselves, but as symbols of an America that cares, they are important. What we do does not matter as much as that we do it.

On our last evening in Saigon, Ambassador Bunker showed Kitty a definition of Freedom I wrote many years ago: "Freedom-No word was ever spoken that has held out greater hope, demanded greater sacrifice, needed more to be nurtured, blessed more the giver, damned more its destroyer, or came closer to being God's will on earth. May Americans ever be its protector."

We are a free people, a learning people. As pilgrims, we learned to farm. As colonists, we learned to govern. As immigrants, we learned new ways. As pioneers, we learned the wilderness. As victors, we learned that the end of a great war does

not mean peace.

History, I believe, will judge that, alongside Berlin, Greece, Cuba and Korea, Vietnam was one of our finest hours. We did not flinch. Or it will say that the Communists are right, and History will belong to them. SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have marked the critical passages in Amb. Bunker's latest weekly.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 10206

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

White House Guidelines, Feb, 24, 1982

By- 25 NARA, Bate 11-2041

for file

Thursday, November 2, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 10206)

Herewith my twenty-seventh weekly telegram:

#### A. General

I believe that no one could have been an observer of the events of the last few days without feeling that he had been witnessing the rebirth of a nation. One sensed everywhere a new feeling of confidence, of pride in the fact that the Vietnamese people had had the maturity to carry out five elections in the last fourteen months in the midst of war and had been able to establish institutions of representative democracy, a new determination to play a greater part in their own destiny. This came out in a good many ways -- in the dignity, in the simplicity, in the good taste of the inaugural ceremonies, appropriate to wartime conditions, and in the effectiveness and precision with which they were carried out; in the restrained pageantry of the National Day celebration, the parade being shorter this year because of the war but splendidly executed, to the obvious pleasure and approval of the crowds who were watching. It is interesting that Chieu Hoi's contingent received a good deal of applause from the crowds and suffered no critical or derogatory comments. And President Thieu's fine inaugural address was a call to greatness, for further sacrifices, for greater determination, for a continual search for peace. In it he referred to the difficulties of the past four years as having been useful in helping to determine the path to follow and opening up a great new era full of promise; in his own words, "The greatness and the promise of the glories and the difficulties awaiting us." He stated that his administration would have three guiding principles in carrying out his national program: to build democracy, to restore peace, and to reform society.

In the pursuit of peace, he would propose directly to the North Vietnamese Government that it meet with the Government of South Vietnam to seek a way to end the war, that he would open the door to peace and leave the door always open. The Liberation Front would not be an obstacle to peace talks. As in 1954, the Front elements today have the right of choice: "Whoever believes in Marxism is free to go north. Whoever believes, as we do, in freedom and democracy may remain and work with us."

At the same time, he made clear the "iron determination" of South Vietnam to defend the ideal of freedom and democracy. While paying tribute to the Government and people of the United States and other friendly countries who had rendered assistance, he reminded his people "that the present war is still our war and the entire force of the population must be marshalled in support of the overall war effort in order to defend the freedom and sovereignty of the country, that all,

civilians and soldiers alike, must understand the necessity for sacrifice for the common struggle. A united effort must be made to grasp the initiative and shorten the road to peace." He pointed out that this increased effort and determination was not aimed at destroying their compatriots above the parallel. On the contrary, it was designed to check the expansion of Communist aggression, to preserve stability of Southeast Asia, and to build a lasting peace for Asia and the whole world.

He asked the people for a stronger war effort because all weapons must be employed to achieve victory; not military weapons alone, but political, economic, cultural and social as well. A genuine appropriate democratic regime must be built in order to restore participation in national affairs to the people, and to reform society in order to liberate and advance the people. To this end all the people would have to endure many more sacrifices and make many more efforts. To achieve unity and solidarity many things would have to be done:

- A. The army must be constantly improved and strengthened but it must also have the backing of moral support and strong popular organization on the home front;
- B. A strong home guard must be organized to defend the towns in order to reduce the burdens on the fighting troops;
- C. Those living in the capital and other cities will have to strive and sacrifice more to reduce the appalling contrast between cities and the countryside which had long borne the greater part of the war burden;
- D. And the Government must win the confidence of the people so that they will voluntarily accept the efforts and the sacrifices necessary to the war effort. It must carry forward its task of building democracy and reforming society, of raising people's living standards and education, of accelerating the national rural development policy and industrial development.

Among the short-term measures the President included a number of urgent preliminary things which he felt should be undertaken immediately:

- A. To publicize more widely Vietnam's position and to win world support for its cause;
- B. In the social field, defense of morals must be promoted, public order and measures vital to the daily life of the city people guarded and increased;
  - C. Economic stability must be promoted and the price spiral halted;

SECRET/NODIS

- D. National order and discipline and respect for law must be strengthened;
- E. Opportunities for students and civil servants to serve the nation and to employ their ability and enthusiasm must be opened up;
- F. An austerity movement to eliminate the excessive disparity between the sufferings and hardships of the rural front lines and high living in the urban areas must be launched;
- G. Finally, and most importantly, corruption must be stamped out and administrative organization, procedure and personnel must be improved in order to serve the people better.

In concluding, the President appealed for the help of all the people in the common task of this beginning of a new era.

As if in confirmation of this feeling of confidence and the pride which I have mentioned, within the last ten days the Vietnamese Armed Forces have turned in some really superior performances, five of them outstanding, to which I shall refer in the military section of this message. During the period of the Vice President's visit, on 29-31 October, the Vietnamese forces conducted 29 battalion-size or larger size operations. They had 4 major, 65 small contacts which resulted in 373 enemy killed, 92 suspects detained and 281 weapons captured. Thirty-five Vietnamese were killed and one hundred forty-six wounded. The Vietnam Air Force flew 275 combat missions and the Navy conducted 1,024 sea, river, and coastal operations. These actions centered largely in the Third and Fourth Corps and were carried out by some elements which had been subject previously to criticism. These are evidences of the steady improvement which has been taking place in the Vietnamese Armed Forces on which I have previously reported and give the lie to much of the cynical and skeptical reporting emanating from Saigon.

At the same time, there was welcome news on the anti-corruption front. Shortly before midnight, October 28, a special court sentenced the former Chief of Binh Dinh Province, Lt. Colonel Tran Dinh Vong, to death on corruption charges and ordered his property confiscated. Three other persons charged with Col. Vong have been sentenced to life imprisonment with confiscation of property. While it is heartening to see the Government move against corruption and to see the court act speedily (the trial lasted only one day), the sentences appear rather Draconian and recall the trial and execution of the Chinese businessman, Ta Vinh, in 1966. Vinh's execution was deeply resented in Cholon and may have been responsible for Thieu and Ky's rather poor showing among the Chinese in the Presidential election. Hopefully, the new government will handle its anti-corruption drive in such a way as to avoid terrorizing the bureaucracy to the point of paralysis.

The press this morning reports action by the special court of Kien Giang Province in voiding the election to the Lower House of Ta Ngoc Mai. Sentencing him to three months of imprisonment and a fine of \$20,000 (Vietnamese). The court also sentenced four of his accomplices to three months of imprisonment and fined one of them \$10,000 (Vietnamese). Mai was charged with various cheating schemes including armed pressure upon the voters.

Other evidence of this new feeling of nationalism and pride came out during the Vice President's visit. To a luncheon which I gave for him on Tuesday, I invited members of the Senate and the Lower House and representatives of Education, Labor, Civil Administration and Youth. In a postluncheon discussion, Senator Nguyen Gia Hien expressed appreciation for the Vice President's remarks and for the wise advice of a man who understood both the legislative and executive functions of government. He noted that although political life was a new experience in Vietnam, he was confident that the new government would be able to meet the requirements of this young country. Its members were approaching their task with goodwill and a strong sense of their responsibilities to the nation. They must serve, he said, as a link between the government and the people -- a link which in most developing countries is weak.

Dr. Phan Quang Dan, former Vice Presidential candidate, said that the Vietnamese people must play a larger part in conducting affairs in their own country. The war must be won by the Vietnamese with American assistance, not by the U. S. with Vietnamese assistance. Now Vietnam has a constitutional government of its own and must play a greater role in its own country. There is much to be done in Vietnam, he said, and therefore, the American is sometimes impatient with Vietnamese leadership and moves in to deal with local problems in his own way. We are, he continued, fighting both against Communism and well-intentioned Americanization of our struggle. He asked for patience and restraint and opportunity wherever possible for the Vietnamese now to deal with their own problems in their own way.

Immediately following the inaugural ceremonies, President Thieu announced the appointment of Nguyen Van Loc as the new Prime Minister. Prime Minister Ky tendered his resignation and that of his cabinet but agreed to remain in office to handle current affairs until Prime Minister Loc is ready to announce his cabinet and take over the government. The directorate also resigned after Thieu's inauguration. I asked Thieu this morning how Loc was progressing with the formation of his government and he replied that he had asked Loc to complete his list within four days but that Loc had asked for a week. Thieu confirmed the fact which we had heard from his brother, Kieu, that Loc was having some problems with the southerners who are asking for three cabinet posts: the Ministries of Agriculture, Economy and Education. He said that Loc is presently conferring with Tran Van Huong and leaders of the Old School Boys Association on the question of southern representation and Thieu expects that he will be able

to resolve his problems. I think, however, we should anticipate that it will be the middle of next week before we shall know the composition of the new government.

It remains to be seen how effective a cabinet Loc can put together and how well they will work as a team. I think, nevertheless, that he is approaching his task realistically. Thieu told me this morning that Loc was hoping to include a high ranking Hoi Chanh in the Government, perhaps Col. Chu Yen who led the Chieu Hoi contingent in the National Day parade or Lt. Col. Cu. He also confirmed again that Dr. Tran Van Do would continue as Foreign Minister but with a strong supporting cast in the Ministry. Thieu remarked that one of the reasons for the relative ineffectiveness of the Vietnamese missions abroad was the lack of adequate supporting organization at home. Loc also understands the need for continued cooperation between President Thieu and Vice President Ky. Some time ago, he told an Embassy officer that everything depends on this. In this respect, it is encouraging that in the talk which Vice President Humphrey had with Ky the latter emphasized his determination to work with Thieu, asserted that he wanted no special responsibilities, but wanted a strong government, a strong policy, and to make it work. He was ready to serve Thieu and to do whatever was asked of him.

It is obvious I think, that the effort to establish a functioning representative democracy in Vietnam will encounter many problems. Some of them will be difficult for us to live with. Political parties will have to evolve and learn how to function. The process of governing may be slowed by having to go through the legislative process rather than enacting laws by decree. Workable relationships will have to be established between the executive and legislative branches of Government. There will be many other problems with which the Vietnamese and we will have to contend. Yet, I think we can take considerable pride in the fact that a functioning constitutional government is being established, especially in what seems to me to be a new feeling of confidence and pride on the part of the Vietnamese, and in their determination to increase their efforts and to do more than they have been doing in carrying their share of the burden.

I want to close this section of my message with a brief report on the visit of Vice President Humphrey. In my opinion, viewed from any angle, it was an outstanding success. The Vice President left Saigon at 7:45 November 1 on his trip to the First Corps after having spent an extremely active 62 hours with us here. His busy schedule included a morning visiting the mobile Riverine Forces in the Delta and the National Training Center at Vung Tau in which he evinced great interest both in the excellent briefing by the Director, Major Be, and in his visit to the training cadres; a lengthy ceremony at which credentials were presented; private calls on President Thieu and Vice President Ky; a reception at the Foreign Ministry; an informal dinner with the Mission Council;

a tour of our new chancery, after which the Vice President gave a moving and inspiring talk to our mission; a luncheon at my house with a broad selection of Vietnamese political, cultural, and social leaders; calls by the Australian Minister of External Affairs and the Prime Minister of Korea; and a reception and State Dinner given by President Thieu Tuesday evening at Independence Palace. Four mortar rounds landed behind the Palace while the reception was in progress but hardly caused a ripple of excitement and both the reception and dinner continued uninterrupted. The Vice President's conversations with Thieu and Ky which have been separately reported, were carried out in a most friendly and informal atmosphere and if nothing more had been accomplished, the visit would have been extremely worthwhile.

In speaking to President Thieu, the Vice President covered a wide range of subjects telling him frankly the chief criticisms of the Government of Vietnam current in the United States and stressing the need for the newly elected Chief Executive to tackle problems with vigor during his first "hundred days." In his talk with Ky, the Vice President covered much of the same ground, emphasizing the need for cooperation between the Vice President and President, to which Ky responded positively. General Westmoreland reported to me last night on his return from the First Corps that the Vice President's trip there had also been a great success, that he had spoken to our troops in the most inspiring way, and talked very frankly to members of the press about their skepticism and criticism of the situation here.

The Vietnamese Government and people were tremendously pleased by the Vice President's visit, especially as he was the highest ranking dignitary to attend the inauguration. His frankness, his friendliness, the appropriateness of his remarks, and his reaffirmation of our commitment here made an extremely favorable impression and gave a feeling of renewed confidence and encouragement to our allies.

#### B. Military

In connection with the Vice President's visit, General Westmoreland prepared some comments on the combat effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces which are worth recalling, particularly as the American press continues critical of the Vietnamese military effort.

As General Westmoreland observes, the notion that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces is not carrying its share of the load is a myth that has tended to become fixed in the minds of our public.

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During the first nine months of this year, South Vietnamese Forces accounted for more than one-half of the effort spent on large operations by all friendly forces in the country. These operations and many smaller ones in the first eight months of this year resulted in the South Vietnamese losing about three men (9,703 total killed) to every two that the U. S. has lost (6,215 total killed) in the same period.

Other encouraging indications of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces performance are that the desertion rate is less than half that of early 1966; the number missing in action is 60 percent of that of the first half of 1966; and the rate at which weapons are captured from the enemy, compared to the rate at which the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces loses weapons, has more than doubled (now two to one).

I mentioned that within the past ten days, there had been several instances in which the enemy engaged Vietnamese Government forces and were soundly beaten and driven off with heavy losses. I think it worthwhile to describe briefly the five most significant engagements, which indicate the fighting spirit and will to win of Vietnamese Government forces when properly led and supported.

- 1. At 3:00 a.m. on October 20, 15 kilometers east of Quang Trì City (in Quang Trì Province), the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment were attacked by a large enemy force. The units remained in contact with the enemy until nightfall of October 20 when the enemy withdrew. The fighting resulted in 197 enemy killed, 20 individual and 13 crew served weapons captured, 49 enemy structures and 2 enemy bunkers destroyed; at the cost of 18 Army of the Republic of Vietnam killed and 107 Army of the Republic of Vietnam wounded.
- 2. At 8:15 a.m. on October 21, 20 kilometers east of Lai Khe in Binh Duong Province, Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) elements from Vung Tau engaged an estimated enemy company. Contact was maintained until the enemy withdrew at 5:40 p.m. The Civilian Irregular Defense Group elements swept the area the next morning and found 94 enemy bodies, two boxes of documents, three crew served and one individual weapon. Friendly losses were five killed, 26 wounded, and three missing.
- 3. On October 27 at 1:00 a.m., four kilometers southeast of Song Be in Phuoc Long Province, the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attacked the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment. Armed helicopters, AC-47 aircraft and artillery fire supported the defenders. The stout defense by Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, together with the supporting fires, drove the enemy off at 3:45 a.m. The enemy suffered 134 killed and the loss of 37 individual and 20 crew served weapons. Friendly losses were 13 killed and 44 wounded.

- 4. Binh Long Province, the subsector headquarters and Regional Forces compounds at Loc Ninh were attacked by at least two battalions of the 273rd Viet Cong Regiment at 1:15 a.m. on October 29. At the same time, a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp at the Loc Ninh airstrip was attacked with mortars and B-40 rockets. Armed helicopters, AC-47 aircraft, artillery fire and tactical air strikes supported the friendly forces at Loc Ninh and a rapid reaction force comprised of two Civilian Irregular Defense Group companies, the 2nd battalion of the 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment, and two companies from the 5th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Regiment was committed. A U. S. infantry unit was inserted four kilometers west of Loc Ninh as a blocking force and engaged an estimated enemy company from 12:08 p.m. until the enemy broke contact at 1:02 p.m. The reaction forced the withdrawal of the enemy from the subsector headquarters compound at 3:15 p.m. The latest results of the above actions are 160 enemy killed and 19 weapons captured versus friendly losses of 9 killed and 37 wounded.
- In Cuu Long 178, a search and destroy operation in the Fourth Corps, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 32nd Ranger Battalion killed 75 enemy on October 30.

It will be noted that three of the five engagements took place at night which rather gives the lie to the oft quoted criticism that "the Army of the Republic of Vietnam doesn't fight at night".

#### C. Political

The Transitional National Assembly (formerly the Constituent Assembly) sat together for the last time at the inauguration of President Thieu October 31 and was automatically dissolved that afternoon, after the Lower House of the new National Assembly formally was convened.

The political organization of the Lower House is proceeding steadily, with several groups coming prominently into the picture. Among these are the Nong Cong Binh group (farmers-workers-soldiers) associated with Senator Tran Van Don's Upper House list (about 20 members); the Catholic Dai Doan Ket (Greater Solidarity Force) Group, with an initial membership of 11 but probably to grow larger with the addition of other Catholics; the small but dynamic group of the movement for the Renaissance of the South (initially four, but likely to grow); and the Toan Viet Group (All Vietnam Bloc), with four to start, possibly as high as 11 and likely to grow. In addition, we have heard that Prime Minister Ky, assisted by the Director General of National Police General Loan, has lined up, both before and since the elections a total of about 40 members of the Lower House who will, presumably, be responsive to Ky's influence in the future. The veteran Trotskyist and neutralist, Ho Huu Tuong, asserted to an Embassy officer on October 26 that he thought he could weld together a bloc of about 50 Lower

House members. The reported strength of Ky's group (tentatively called the Dan Chu or Democratic Bloc) is open to some question, as the other blocs being formed in the Lower House are similarly trying to increase their voting strength and are probably contacting many of the same members. It is also hard to believe that Ho Huu Tuong has been able to collect any considerable strength so far in the Lower House. However, in some versions, the above is an indication of the groups which will be most active in the Lower House. We as yet have no indication that President Thieu is working towards the formation of a bloc in the Lower House, although eventually he will have to come to grips with the problem of assuring support for his programs in the new legislature.

As the pattern of the Lower House elections has emerged more definitively, it is evident that the traditional political parties (particularly the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang and the Dai Viets) have largely been eclipsed, except on a limited, local basis, and several new groupings, described in the preceding paragraph, are emerging which might be the nucleus of the political parties of the future. At the same time, the average age of the Lower House is 39, considerably less than that of the Upper House. There will be a number of vigorous and forceful personalities in the Lower House, including some who will be critical of various aspects of our presence in Vietnam. They remain firmly commited to the struggle against the Communists, however, and we will want to listen to what they have to say. The Lower House is capable of performing a useful job in developing the substance of democratic government in South Vietnam. General Thieu has expressed satisfaction to me over the general quality of the Lower House, a judgment which I share.

Viet Cong and Hanoi comment on the Lower House elections has been very light. "Liberation Radio" of the Viet Cong expressed satisfaction over terrorist incidents that disrupted voting and alleged that the 45 (sic) percent turnout in Saigon "reflected perfectly the failure of the U. S.-Thieu-Ky clique". The turnout in Saigon was actually 57 percent, but a simple matter like the facts has never troubled Hanoi or the Viet Cong before and obviously does not trouble them now.

The Buddhist internal troubles remain unresolved. Following a series of meetings between General Thieu and the leaders of both the An Quang and the Tam Chau factions, no agreement on the disposition of the Buddhist Charter controversy was reached. On October 29, the extremist An Quang Group attempted to stage a march from their Pagoda to the National Pagoda (the seat of the Tam Chau faction), but were prevented from doing so by the police. There were rumors that extremists associated with An Quang groups in Saigon and Danang would stage a number of suicides by fire in an effort to embarrass the Government of Vietnam around inauguration time. One such suicide took place in Quang Ngai Province on inauguration day itself but the event went virtually unnoticed. On the whole, the extremist Buddhists have achieved no significant

success in their efforts to create an impression of widespread dissatisfaction with the newly elected regime. As I have reported, President Thieu has indicated that there is an inclincation on the part of moderate elements in both factions to come together, even if it involves the setting aside of Quang Tri and Tam Chau.

A disturbing development, but one which hopefully is being resolved without serious difficulty, is the effort by the Government of Vietnam to halt convoys of shipping on the Mekong River proceeding to Cambodia. The Government of Vietnam military authorities were understandably upset by an act of piracy in which the crew of a monitor was slaughtered and the ship was delivered by one of the crew to the Cambodian side in return for a cash payment. Alleging that there were Viet Cong mines in the river, convoys were halted in mid-October. We were informed confidentially by Tran Van Do that there was considerable sentiment within the Government of Vietnam, particularly among the military, for a complete stoppage of ship traffic on the Mekeng to Cambodia. The military have long chafed at Prince Sihanouk's attitude towards the struggle against the Communists in South Vietnam and in particular at Cambodia's at least passive support for the Viet Cong in the border area. The consequence of stoppage in the shipment of petroleum products, in particular, has been to reduce Cambodian stocks to a dangerously low point. Sihanouk has now made a protest to the Government of Vietnam through the Australian Embassy. Sihanouk is a mercurial and often disagreeable personality and Cambodia has been of material help to the Viet Cong in the Cambodian-Vietnamese border area. However, he could be even more disagreeable to us, were he forced, or should he see himself forced, to go over more explicitly to the enemy. I have taken this up twice with Ky, and General Westmoreland has twice followed up with the Government of Vietnam military. The Government of Vietnam has ordered that the convoys be permitted to proceed as of November 2. We hope this will break the convoys loose within the next few days.

#### D. Economic

The Retail Price Index in Saigon was 290 this week, little changed from last week's figure of 291. The Imported Commodity Index was unchanged from last week's level of 219. The subsidized P. L. 480 Title II Corn Program ended last week. In the future, corn for animal feed will be non-subsidized Title I corn shipped into Vietnam as a commercial import and sold on the free market without restriction as to distributor or end user. Corn will be sold at a price to be determined by the Government of Vietnam and U. S. AID which is intended to minimize economic hardship for pork and poultry producers while encouraging domestic feed grain production.

Farm labor scarcity is a factor limiting rice production in the Mekong Delta, according to a study by American technicians. Because of the war and the military draft, as well as the lack of security and heavy migration to urban areas, old men, women, children are often the only available farm labor. Some provinces report that thinner stands of rice and lower yields are the result of a lack of experience on the part of the rice transplanters. In floating rice areas, production will be greater than last year, when the crop was ravaged by floods.

#### E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 452, slightly lower than the 1966 figure of 477 for the same period last year, but again higher than last week's figure of 338. The total number of returnees so far this year is 24,666.

#### F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending October 28, the enemy killed 35 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 100, and kidnapped 92. Among the dead were two Hamlet Chiefs, two Revolutionary Development workers, and one Forestry Chief. During the week, the enemy killed 210 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed a total of 2,786 civilians, wounded 5,610, and kidnapped 3,904.

#### TOP SECRET-GODEWORD-

Thursday, November 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

Prestile

Mr. President:


They're at it again.

Helms has your instruction.

W. W. Rostow

\_TOP-SECRET

WWRostow:rln



Prestile

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 7:00 p.m.

SECRET

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT:

Peru

The paper at Tab A describes how we might approach President Belaunde and his military chiefs to persuade them to drop the French Mirage deal.

Admittedly, the offer represents a long shot, but it is better than passively awaiting for the almost inevitable military coup.

I have checked the proposal with Foy Kohler, Paul Nitze, Dick Helms and Covey Oliver, who recommend that we try this approach.

The choice of an emissary to take the offer to Belaunde can be made at one of two levels. We can try for a high-level representative like Bob Anderson, Milton Eisenhower, Cy Vance or Averell Harriman, who would carry more punch. They also have greater visibility, and their presence in Peru will draw wider attention there and here. We can try a lower level approach with someone like Bob Sayre or Bill Bowdler, who could make the same soundings with less risk of publicity. (At Tab B is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk suggesting that Bill go.) Bill, in my judgment, would be excellent: professional, imaginative, determined.

If you prefer to have a meeting with DOD, State and CIA on the proposal before reaching a decision, I will set one up.

W. W. Rostow

OK to go ah	ead with approach,	but check l	back with me	on the	emissary	

Prefer to have meeting first

Attachments: Tab A - Paper on approach to Belaunde

Tab B - Secretary Rusk's memorandum on subject

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By 128/19, NARA, Date 12991

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#### Problem

Authority ne 9 90-10 appear By As Aip, NARA, Date.

- 1. The Peruvian economy is in a descending spiral which threatens stability and poses the imminent threat of a military takeover.
- To reverse this trend, Peru desperately needs to put into effect a stabilization program which will require strong backing from us.
- 3. We are prepared to make a \$40 million program loan available conditioned on fiscal and budgetary self-help measures and no French Mirages.
- 4. The principal obstacle is the aircraft purchase. We need to devise a formula for Peru to void the contract or otherwise get rid of the Mirages.
- 5. The Peruvian Mirage deal, if carried out, will have an interacting impact on purchase of Mirages by other Latin American countries and US Congressional reaction which could seriously compromise our Alliance for Progress effort and the OAS Summit Program.

#### B. What We Know About the Mirage Deal

We do not have a copy of the contract and only a vague idea of its contents from second and third hand sources:

- The contract is reportedly between the Peruvian Air Force and the French Government.
- It provides for the sale of 12 Mirage 5's at a price of \$27-28 million, including aircraft, training and spare parts.

- An initial payment is supposed to have been made, amount unknown.
- -- Delivery of aircraft is reported to start at the end of 1967.

We have no specific data on contract cancellation penalty or the resale provisions.

### C. Alternative Courses for Peru

- Cancel the contract, forfeit the down payment and pay whatever else the penalty clause provides. This is neatest solution and our preferred position.
- Resell the aircraft to a third country before delivery, if there is a resale provision. Belaunde has suggested resale after delivery.

### D. Our Strategy

- We should offer President Belaunde and his military leaders an attractive alternative to the Mirage deal consistent with our stand that American F-5's will not be programmed into Latin America until 1969-70 time frame.
- Depending upon the options open to the Peruvians, our offers would be:

### First Choice

- -- Peru would cancel the Mirage contract.
- -- We would help devise a way to cover the losses from forfeiture and the penalty clause.
- -- We would arrange with Northrop Canada to sell six CF-5's with delivery in the period October 1968-July 1969, with Northrop US selling another six F-5's for delivery during the July 1969-June 1970 period on favorable commercial terms.
- -- We would train Peruvian pilots on F-5's in the US starting in January 1968.

### Second Choice

- Peru would agree to resell the Mirages to a third country before delivery.
- -- We would help find a third country purchaser and Peru would get French Government (or Dassault Co.) agreement to the transaction.
- Same as in First Choice on sale and delivery dates for Canadian and US F-5's.
- -- Same as in First Choice on training of pilots.

### E. Scenario

- 1. Obtain the President's approval of this approach.
- Check with Northrop US on its and Northrop Canada's ability to meet the sale and delivery schedule with attractive commercial terms.
- 3. Send a high level representative to Peru (e.g., Vance, Harriman, Anderson, M. Eisenhower) to find out whether Belaunde and the Peruvian military are willing to work with us on either the First or Second Choices and find out the precise terms of the Mirage contract so that we know what we are up against.
- Have Tuthill explain to Costa e Silva what we are proposing to Peru and what we are prepared to do in Brazil.
- 5. If the Peruvians accept our alternative, the high level representative would work out a tentative scenario for handling the contract cancellation or resale and the respective US-Peruvian roles.

# THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

November 11, 1967

### SECRET

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Request that Mr. William G. Bowdler go to Lima Regarding Mirage Aircraft Problem

### Recommendation:

That you authorize William G. Bowdler to go to Lima to explore possibilities for solution of the Mirage aircraft problem.

Approve	Disapprove
---------	------------

### Discussion:

The dangers to our policy should Peru go ahead with the Mirage contract are very great. We think that someone who is closely involved with our efforts to explore every possibility to keep the level of arms down and who knows some of the key Peruvian figures should go to Lima to advise and assist the Embassy. At the same time, he should not be well known to the Lima press.

I believe that Mr. Bowdler is the best man to do this. He knows intimately and well all the possibilities that should be explored. While Mr. Bowdler has been involved in this problem at a high level, his departure and presence in Lima will not attract press interest.

Dean Rusk

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Group 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

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Authority Dr. g 90-9

By Agley, NARA, Date 129

Mr. Restow 53

CONFIDENTIAL Thursday, November 2, 1967 2 Purple

Mr. President:

Mr. President:

You asked yesterday for a report on how Bob Anderson was briefed. The attached confirms that Luke Battle gave him our message loud and clear -- that he was to talk only as a private citizen and not as your emissary.

We do not yet have a report on his scheduled talk with Nasser today. We will try to make sure that he calls it quits with today's session.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED By NARA, Date 4-6-95

CONFIDENTIAL

Att: Read-Rostow memo, 11/2/67, Subj: Briefing of Robert B. Anderson, (WH-4187)



S/S 18888

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

November 2, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Briefing of Robert B. Anderson

On October 27, Robert B. Anderson was given a general briefing by Assistant Secretary Battle on the current situation in the Middle East with particular reference to Jordan, Israel and the UAR. Prior to Mr. Anderson's departure on the morning of October 28 from New York, Mr. Battle conveyed to him our views on his visit to Cairo. He was informed that he should make clear to President Nasser that he came purely as a private citizen and in no way represented either the President or the State Department. He was not to raise in Cairo the question of the possible resumption of US-UAR relations. If this subject were raised by the Egyptians, he was to urge them to convey their views to Washington through diplomatic channels. In addition, he was advised that he could state, as a private citizen who reads the newspapers, that he believed the United States Government would be sympathetic if it were approached by the Egyptian authorities through appropriate diplomatic channels with a proposal to resume relations. Certain basic conditions would be required, however, if relations were to be resumed. These would include: (1) an appropriate public statement from the UAR Government exonerating the United States from the charge that it was militarily involved in the June war; (2) compensation would have to be paid for damage to U.S. properties; and (3) appropriate assurances would have to be provided that the UAR Government would conduct its relations with the United States in the future in accordance with normal diplomatic practices.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-476

By A.C., NARA, Date 1-10-55

Benjamin H. Read Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL.

### SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:55 p.m.

### Mr. President:

This conversation between President Ayub and Amb. Oehlert covers a number of items which may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

Karachi 807

SECRET-

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 By 124, NARA, Date 11-20-91

Sy file

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

### FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR OFHLERT (Karachi 807)

At 11:00 p.m. Monday, October 30, I received a phone call at my residence from Mansur Ahmad of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that in a telegram from Ankara President Ayub had instructed them to request me to meet with him in Karachi on November 1. I proceeded to Karachi last evening and this morning met with him, Foreign Minister Pirzada and Ahmad for one hour.

Ayub apologized for calling me to Karachi but stated he had gathered information in Romania which he considered could be urgently important to the U. S. Government. He then stated that Chairman Maurer had advised him that approximately one month ago he (Maurer) had visited with Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi and that Minh had stated that:

- A. North Vietnam does not insist on a unified Vietnam;
- B. North Vietnam does not insist on any settlement which would result in loss of face to the U. S. Government;
- C. A bombing pause would lead to negotiations but apparently no time element indicated;
- D. It was recognized that the withdrawal of the U. S. Government and allied forces would have to be accompanied by both Vietnamese withdrawal and also by the creation of an international presence in South Vietnam to supervise a referendum and to keep the peace;
- E. Upon Maurer's request of Minh as to why he did not signal this to the
   U. S. Government, Minh replied that to do so would be to surrender;
- F. Ayub indicated to me that he believed that Maurer would be more than willing to try to maintain a dialog with Minh if the U. S. Government so desired;
- G. Ayub questioned Maurer about the North Vietnamese ability to continue the conflict and elicited the reply that while industry was leveled on the ground, food supplies were adequate, military supplies generous from the Chinese Communists and the U.S.S.R., and that underground facilities provided for minimal non-military industrial requirements;

GEGRET/EXDIS

SANITIZED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ 94-476 By 10-9, NARA, Date 1-10-95

### H. In all this context, Ayub added that:

On his recent trip to the U.S.S.R., Kosygin had indicated to him that if Vietnam were settled then the U.S.S.R. could and would come to a harmonious agreement with the U.S. Government on all other outstanding issues but for its position in the Communist world vis a vis the Chinese Communists could not proceed cooperatively with the U.S. Government before Vietnam was resolved;

De Gaulle had just stated to Ayub that in his opinion, the U. S. and U.S.S.R. could and would find total accommodations albeit not friendship, if Vietnam could be gotten out of the way.

Ayub added that throughout their talks, De Gaulle had never spoken of or referred to the U. S. with rancor and while he had pressed Ayub for a joint condemnation of U. S. policy in Vietnam, he had yielded to Ayub's insistence that their joint communique in this area be tailored to Ayub's formula of peaceful self-determination.


Ayub then turned to the subject of CENTO, making the following points:

- A. The original military purposes of CENTO have disappeared both because the U.S.S.R. no longer constitutes a military threat and also because the U.S. was no longer affording full military support to CENTO. To my question about the Chinese Communist threat, he responded that they were incapable of seriously threatening anyone.
- B. He added that his own military supply picture was so desperate that he could not use up anything by participation in joint maneuvers or exercises.
- C. The U.S.S.R. was pressing him about CENTO but he had stated to them that apparently U.S. policy considered the continued existence of CENTO to be important and that he would not do anything to hurt his American friends.
- D. He then stated that in his opinion, the future of CENTO lay in the direction of joint economic developments, citing micro-wave as an excellent example of such a project which also had military undertones in that it represented a facility which had both great peaceful uses and also afforded fall-back military usefulness should the need ever arise.

Finally in his context he suggested that serious thought be given to the establishment of a joint study team to develop a general program for further orienting CENTO toward the economic field and later identifying specific projects. He indicated that both Iran and Turkey concurred in this view.

SECRET/EXDIS

Having spoken of the military aspects of CENTO and his reasons for non-involvement in them, he reverted to the tank issue renewing his "need" for 500 tanks to restore his accepted force levels and his preference for U. S. equipment.



Next I reverted to my previous conversation with the Pakistani Minister and Secretary of Defense in the context that in order to determine whether any tanks were justified in the context of our military supply policy we would need to know how many Chinese Communist tanks Pakistan had received, what others might be committed from that or other sources, whether an obsolete tank would be scrapped for each U. S.-controlled tank acquired, and whether Pakistan would commit itself not to acquire tanks from other sources.

He then said that he was confused as to just what our military supply policy is and I again explained that the U. S. was striving for a military balance on the subcontinent and attempting to lower the level of military expenditure so that more resources could be devoted to economic development. He commented that he understood and concurred in this policy but that the trouble was that India was not complying with it.

SECRET/EXDIS

After some sparing in which he indicated that the U. S. should tell him what it is prepared to do to help him obtain equipment needed to achieve agreed upon force levels before he told us precisely what he had, he did indicate that he would instruct the Defense Minister to review precise figures with me and that if his minimal requirements could be met in U. S. equipment he would undertake first to scrap one obsolete tank for each new one acquired and second, not to seek or accept additional equipment elsewhere. Since he several times referred both to need for 50 tanks and request for 200 tanks, it is uncertain which figure he regards as minimal requirements. He raised no question of equipment other than tanks, but of course this by no means precludes subsequent reversion to aircraft and artillery.

After thanking him for the improved balance in press treatment, I told him that Governor Harriman would head our Mangla Dam delegation at which he expressed great pleasure. Without my requesting an audience, he said that he would look forward to a private meeting with the Governor and me and that he would also be glad to receive the other delegation members. Both he and Pirzada assured me voluntarily that our delegation need not be limited to five or any other number and that they would be happy for it to be any number we found convenient. Both he and Pirzada agreed there should be no publicity yet about composition of the delegation and that at our appropriate time, there should be a joint Pindi-Washington release.

I reported my wheat conversation with Finance Minister Uquaili and thanked Ayub again for the renewed assurances that any commercially purchased wheat would be purchased from us. I again reviewed with him the significance of a purchase and referred to the possibility of credit, pointing out that such arrangements would not require any actual cash payments until one year after final delivery when the first one-third would be due. He said "It seems such a small thing in your context but so important to us. Is it really all that important?" He made no response to my observation that though the amounts were small the importance lay in the area of Congressional relations. I have the impression that if pressed, there is at least a fifty-fifty chance that he would agree to purchase half of the remaining 234,000 tons over Uquaili's objection. I shall await your instructions.

To my suggestion that I have an early appointment with him to introduce and have a working visit with Bill Kontos, he responded affirmatively and willingly.

-SECRET/EXDIS

furfile

### -TOP SECRET CODEWORD

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

1.5(c) 3.4(bX1),(3) 6.1(c)

W. W. Rostow

SANITIZED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ /64c 00-273 Bychu, NARA, Date 3-77-03 Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 6:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Of Pres file Clark Clifford is out of town until Monday. He told me he had urgent business starting at mid-day.

Although I indicated the urgency you attached to a response from him, I rather doubt that, given his responsibilities for the Advisory Group, he had time to focus his mind on the paper. Therefore, we may have to wait until early next week.

As instructed, I posed, without indicating the source, the key positions in the paper to General Taylor. He said he would need until Monday to develop a response.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Thursday, November 2, 1967 6:40 p.m.

### Mr. President:

It turns out on investigation, as you can see from the attached, that the Dial Press book is a Hoax.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow;rln

fres file

# THE WHITE HOUSE

57a

November 2, 1967

### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Your Request for Information Regarding

<u>Dial Press</u> book, "Report from Iron Mountain"

You will recall that Price Daniel called Marvin Watson's attention to the forthcoming publication by <u>Dial Press</u> of a work purporting to be the suppressed report of a government-sponsored study group, akin to the Gaither Committee, concluding that for economic and social reasons, the U.S. cannot afford "peace." The attached advertisement, from the <u>New York Times</u> of November 1, shows how <u>Dial</u> is promoting the book -- implying by innuendo, but not direct statement, that the report is official.

The "report" is, in fact, a rather cleverly done parody, with all the apparatus, such as elaborate citation of bona fide governmental and academic studies, which might lend it credibility. There are relatively few tip-offs that the document is bogus. The most apparent indicator is the quite mediocre quality of the argument itself.

If we get questions, the book should be quickly dismissed as a transparent hoax.

Edward R. Fried

RHU:em

w

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING WASHINGTON \$5 D.C. 20504

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

The 1963 study did not deal the Vietnam, of course, but with the us arms race. It concluded that the US arms race. It concluded that the US economy could tolerate drastic cute in

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE W. MARVIN WATSON SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

One of my staff passed on some information which he had received that Dial Press is planning to publish a book dealing with the transition from war to peace that might be an attack on Administration policy. The book apparently includes a thesis that the Administration purposely fosters the maintenance of the economy through war. It was reported that the book includes material from a Government disarmament study conducted in 1963 dealing with the effects of peaceful settlement on the economy. It was also reported that excerpts from the book will be published in Ramparts and in Esquire prior to publication.

You may already have information on this book. Our information is second hand but I thought it might be helpful in anticipation of publication. We do not have any information about the date but could probably get further information if you thought it desirable.

To Walt



from REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE:

Which Chin

POSSIBILITY DESIGNATION OF

"It is uncertain, at this time, whether peace will ever be possible. It is far more questionable...that it would be desirable."

"'John Doe', as I will call him for reasons that will be made clear, is a professor at a large university in the Middle West... Early in August of 1963, he [responded to a call from Washington] to serve on a commission of the highest importance.' Its objective was to determine, accurately and realistically, the nature of the problems that would confront the United States if and when a condition of 'permanent peace' should arrive, and to draft a program for dealing with this contingency...

"It met [initially at Iron Mountain, New York] and worked regularly for over two and a half years, after which it produced a Report. It was this document, and what to do about it, that Doe wanted to talk to me about...

duced a Report. It was this document, and what to do about it, that Doe wanted to talk to me about . . . "The report, he said, had been suppressed — both by the Special Study Group itself and by the government interagency committee to which it had been submitted. After months of agonizing, Doe had decided that he would no longer be party to its being kept secret . . . ". . the unwillingness of Doe's associates to publicize their findings [is] readily understandable . . . they concluded [that] lasting peace, while not theoretically impossible, is probably unattainable; even if it could be achieved it would almost certainly not be in the best interests of a stable so-

almost certainly not be in the best interests of a stable so-ciety to achieve it..."—from the Foreword by Leonard C.

## REPORT FROM IRON MOUNTAIN ON THE POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY OF PEACE

With introductory material by LEONARD C. LEWIN

> \$5.00, now at your bookstore THE DIAL PRESS

58

TOP SECRET
LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Thursday, November 2, 1967 4:40 p.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Prospile

Herewith my comments on Secretary McNamara's draft paper of November 1, 1967.

1. I would summarize Secretary McNamara's argument as follows: In the next 15 months we shall make progress in South Vietnam but not enough progress either to: lead to peace or convince our people that major progress has been made and there is light at the end of the tunnel.

Under these circumstances, he believes two conflicting tendencies will grow in U. S. public opinion: on the one hand, to escalate the war in the North and expand it on the ground in the South; on the other hand, to pull out.

To avoid this believed polarization of U.S. public opinion around the extremes, he believes we should take a series of measures that would stabilize the war and push the North Vietnamese into a negotiation, even on a "fight and talk" basis. At the maximum, he believes this process could lead to a successful negotiation; at the minimum, it would avoid the pressures to expand the war in the air and on the ground, which he greatly fears.

- My observations on the political, military and diplomatic aspects of this argument follow.
- a. Political. If his proposed strategy did not lead to a successful negotiation, you would be pushed off the middle ground you now hold at home. To test Bob's strategy would require a long bombing cessation, plus a Panmunjom phase, until we found out whether they were serious about negotiations. If we then had to resume full-scale bombing, the Republicans could accuse us of vacillation and adopt a hard line which might then appeal to our people. If we got caught in a Panmunjom phase, the case for their advocating a stronger policy would be even more clear. In a recent Gallup poll, some 67% of the American people want us to continue bombing the North (as I remember it). Acknowledging my limitations as a judge of domestic politics, I am extremely skeptical of any change in strategy that would take you away from your present middle position; that is, using rationally all the power available, but avoiding actions likely to engage the Soviet Union and Communist China. If we shift unilaterally towards de-escalation, the Republicans will move in and crystallize a majority around a stronger policy.

If I felt Bob's strategy would measurably increase the chances of a true settlement, I believe the risk might be worth taking. But both a unilateral

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 94-475

By 19, NARA, Date 4-6-95

bombing cessation and an announced policy of "stabilization" would, in my view, be judged in Hanoi a mark of weakness rather than evidence of increased U. S. capacity to sweat out the war.

- b. Military. Although I certainly will not predict for you an early end to the war, I believe that, with a little luck and reasonable performance by the South Vietnamese under the new government, the evidence of solid progress will become increasingly clear to one and all. It is no accident that Republican politicians are beginning to smell this. If progress in fact continues, we will get more and more of the kind of testimony that Alsop, Walter Judd, General Bradley, etc., are now generating. Moreover, as an old intelligence officer, I know that one should take very seriously events that one did not predict. I have been looking for a long time, as you know, for a negotiation within South Vietnam. But I did not expect so soon after the failure in Paris as substantive a message as we got by the Buttercup channel. That channel may develop only slowly. It may not yield anything. But the simple fact is this: it emerged while we were bombing the North full scale. Before changing our strategy in the direction suggested by Bob McNamara, I would certainly play this string out to the full. Incidentally, if it works well, I am sure we will come back to the bombing question -- if and when the National Liberation Front suggests that we talk to Hanoi about the issues directly at stake between the U.S. and the DRV. (That is foreshadowed in their description of the three negotiations required for peace.) Until proved otherwise, then, I would stay with Buttercup and see where it leads us, while holding steady on our present program.
- c. <u>Diplomacy</u>. As indicated above, I would play out the <u>Buttercup</u> string before probing or initiating in any other direction. I detect the the full flow of intelligence a shift of the following kind:
- -- an increase in Soviet influence in Hanoi, partially caused by our bombing and a consequent requirement for very large increases in Soviet aid;
- -- a shift in Hanoi to the view that they cannot directly take over the South now and, therefore, they have to accept the 17th parallel for a considerable time period;
- -- within this framework, a probing for what the status of the Communists would be within South Vietnam in a time of peace.

TOP SECRET - LITERALLY EYES ONLY

If this is right, we are already in a kind of Panmunjom stage; that is, their military operations are designed not to produce victory but to improve their position in a negotiation which is, in a sense, already under way. It is quite clear from Buttercup that they are trying to bargain the highest possible status for the National Liberation Front in the South against our clear desire to get the war off our necks. If and when we come into contact and begin to exchange views, it may well turn out that their minimum price for National Liberation Front status is higher than we and the government of South Vietnam are prepared to pay. In that case, we shall have to prove that their bargaining power diminishes with the passage of time -- not increases. That, in turn. means high costs in the North; maximum pressure in the South on their manpower base. I believe Bob's strategy would ease their problem and permit them rationally to protract the negotiation -- unless Bob is correct on domestic politics and I am wrong. That is, if the country settled down for the long pull comfortably with Bob's program, he could be right. If his policy opened up a debate between united Republicans claiming we had gone soft and a Democratic Administration, with the JCS in disagreement if not open revolt, then my view is correct.

3. Some Specifics. Having taken this negative stance in general, I would agree at the moment with his points 1 - 5, and 9 (page 6); but I would not announce them as a new policy -- in part, because I don't think we need a new announced policy; in part, because changing circumstances might make it wise to reopen some of the issues in those paragraphs.

W. W. R.

SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 4:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Presfile

At the end of a long technical report by Gen. Greene of the situation in I Corps, he concludes as indicated in the following:

"The general state of affairs. While both U.S. and Vietnamese officials have always been resolute with respect to the outcome of the war, they have analyzed the problem somewhat differently, in terms of where we are and how to get where we want to go. This time, I noted a singular uniformity among U.S. and Vietnamese officials, both in concept and in the estimate of where we stand.

"Basically, this is a consensus of how they feel .--

- "- All of the in-country ingredients of victory are now present. The Republic of Vietnam has a constitution. It has a popularly elected president, congress, and rural officialdom. The representation is broad, reflecting a high order of honesty in the election. Now, when problems arise in the provinces, the plaintiffs can be told to take the matter to their congressman, just as in the U.S.A. The democratic mechanism is established, and they need only to put it to work.
- "- The Vietnamese military continues to improve. It may have little similarity with the great military formations of history, but its leadership grows steadily better, as does its basic competence.
- "- The Revolutionary Development program, suffering from half matured ideas and stumbling over the graves of defunct former programs, is nevertheless causing the enemy anguish. Its momentum is not great and its faults are many, but the fact is, the program is showing results. The recent congressional elections certainly attest to this. The Viet Cong did not even claim that they could stop the elections this time, as they claimed in September.
- "- Refugees, serving as they do as an index of the number of people who want to escape the Communist yoke, tell a mixed story. Whether the number of refugees in I Corps is 500,000 (the accepted cumulative figure) or about half that (the number actually in refugee camps), the figure is impressive. The refugees are not generously cared for, but all they seek is insulation from the war or sanctuary from the Communists, and they are willing to sacrifice to get it. Walter Lippmann recently said, in an attack on our policy, that we have been unable to "bend the will" of the Communists in Vietnam. He would do well to remember that millions of South Vietnamese have been fighting the Communists for 20 years, and that their will also remains unbent. The army

of refugees is further living evidence of this fact. Because of the growing number of refugees the Viet Cong recruitment base is diminishing in size, and this is probably the reason that we now see the Viet Cong main force units heavily larded with North Vietnamese replacements, while the Viet Cong guerilla strength goes slowly downward.

"- The above story is a bare synthesis of what I heard from both U.S. and South Vietnam sources. But equally uniform was their grim statement that the focus of the war is now not in South Vietnam, not in North Vietnam, but in Washington. And there is an almost plaintive hope expressed by many that Ho Chi Minh will not over-magnify the volume of the signal from the anti-war protesters in the United States. General Lam, the I Corps Commander, told me that, in his judgment, Ho Chi Minh fights on mainly because he believes the war protest movement in the United States may be decisive, this despite the fact that he knows his chances of military victory have disappeared.

"I asked the views of many rank and file Marines concerning the marchers who paraded from the Lincoln Memorial to the Pentagon. The reactions were divided into two parts. One group -- the younger Marines -- were wrathful; describing the protests as disloyal and the violence as treasonous; professing that the marchers ought to be punished because they were costing U.S. lives in Vietnam. The other group expressed pity for the protesters, feeling that they are ignorant, do not know what is going on and, if aware of the truth, might change their minds. Frequently this group made the point that many of the young marchers are immature and ignorant, and perhaps should be forgiven; but that when grown-up people, some of whom are even in public office, are so wide of the mark in terms of their knowledge of the situation, it is truly a source of concern.

"The point which struck me most forcibly in all of my conversations with the young Marines was their unanimous dedication to what they are doing and their unanimous conviction that anybody, young or old, who could see what they are doing would soon find himself aligned with them in their cause. I cannot help but believe, as these young men go home at the rate of 30,000 a month, that they must in the end outweigh the impact of the marchers."

W. W. Rostow

Thursday - 76:30 am November 2, 1967 Pres ple

Mr. President:

The Mexican Embassy has delivered this thank you note from President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

60a

Message to the President from President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, dated October 30, 1967

(delivered by Mexican Embassy, Washington)

Mr. President and Esteemed Friend:

My wife, my children, and I wish to express once again to you and Mrs. Johnson our thanks for the very warm and friendly courtesies that you extended to us during our visit to your country.

I wish also to tell you how gratified I was to have the opportunity of talking with you and to state my conviction that, thanks to the agreements we reached, which are expressed in the Joint Communique and in the Action Program, the happy relations of friendship and mutual cooperation that exist between Mexico and the United States will become even closer.

Most cordially yours,

Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.

Purfile

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 10:25 a.m.

### Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter to an understanding Indonesian student in Paris. You may also wish to inscribe the attached copy of the publication on your trip to Asia.

A possible inscription might read:

To Daoed Joesoef.

who understands.

Lyndon B. Johnson

W. W. Rostow

Dear Mr. Joesoef:

I am very grateful for your letter of September 15 and for your prayers for me, my family, our fighting men in Viet-Nam, and my country. You will understand that in this job I am called upon to face many hard decisions. Letters such as yours may not make the job easier, but they certainly make it seem worthwhile.

I am enclosing a booklet of some remarks I made during my visit to Asia in 1966. It makes clear, I think, what the sacrifices and struggle are all about.

Sincerely.

Encl.

"The Promise of the New Asia"

Mr. Daoed Joesoef
21, rue de Boulainvilliers
Paris 16
France

LBJMWright:hg

TOP SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:20 a.m. Prospile

Mr. President:

This intelligence estimate (summarised briefly by Dick Helms) reports some "narrowing" of our lead in strategic nuclear capabilities vis-a-vis the USSR.

This is bound to be raised in the campaign next year.

I suggest Sec. McNamara prepare for you our lines of reply.

W. W. Rostow

Memo for the President from Richard Helms, 1 November 1967, "NIE 11-8-67: Soviet Capabilities Ca

3.4(6)(1)

NIE 11-8-67

26 October 1967

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
SANITIZED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ/RAC 00-27/

By ico NARA, Date 10-10-02

WWRostow:rln



1 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT:


NIE 11-8-67: Soviet Capabilities for Strategic

Attack

l. The attached National Intelligence Estimate is our annual assessment of present and projected Soviet strategic attack forces. It puts in perspective the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an extremely sensitive, all-source document with very limited distribution. I commend it to your attention, particularly the Conclusions (pages 1-4).

### 2. I would summarize its essential message as follows:


a. The Soviets are narrowing the lead that the United States has long held in strategic offensive forces. In ICBM's, they will by the end of next year reach approximate numerical parity with the United States. We do not yet know whether they will settle for such parity in numbers, but in any case, we expect qualitative improvements in their ICBM forces over the next few years. They are also emphasizing ballistic missile submarines, and by the mid-70's, will probably have a submarine force about the size of our present Polaris force. In addition, they are likely to have ready within the next few years a limited number of fractional orbit weapons; these differ from ICBM's in that they can be fired



- 2 -

on a south pole trajectory, complicating the United States' warning problem by attacking from the south.

- b. Since the United States-Soviet strategic relationship is a dynamic, inter-acting matter, the Soviets look not only to present United States forces but also to planned improvements for United States forces during the next decade. Within the limits of realistic economic and technological constraints, the Soviets will, of course, seek any advantage they can acquire. We continue to believe, however, that the essential Soviet goal is to achieve and maintain, for both military and political reasons, a credible deterrent against the United States, rather than to gain the kind of overwhelming advantage which would permit them to launch nuclear war without receiving unacceptable damage in return. They recognize that the latter goal is beyond their means.
- 3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with certain findings of this Estimate -- particularly with respect to the projected size of the ICBM force and the role of Long-Range Aviation. His dissents appear in footnotes to appropriate paragraphs of the Conclusions and Discussion.
- 4. This Estimate will be followed within the next few weeks by other National Intelligence Estimates on Soviet strategic defense forces and general purpose forces.



Attachment:

NIE 11-8-67 Copy No. <u>1</u> of

## Copies Sent to:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover

Copy No. 1

787 37 MET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:15 a.m.

Prartile

Mr. President:

These materials from captured documents may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

# THE WHITE HOUSE

November 1, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW:

The following extracts from captured documents, although probably not individually indicative of any wide-spread problems in the enemy camp, do give a vivid illustration of the hardships faced by the troops in South Vietnam.

### Captured in Phuoc Long Province

In a personal letter dated September 27, 1967 a North Vietnamese soldier wrote his mother that the entire unit was suffering from malaria.

Another personal letter dated September 15, 1967 from a soldier to his brothers and sisters in North Vietnam reveals that he and his friends are in poor health due to the shortage of food in the mountainous area.

### Captured in Quang Tri Province

A medical plan dated September 10, 1967 and found by the Chief of a local area medical unit reveals that the number of malaria cases in the area increased during the latter part of the third quarter 1967 and that the troops over-all health status is substandard.

### Captured in Quang Tin Province

A diary kept by a North Vietnamese soldier during his infiltration through Laos and subsequent entry into battle contains a final entry as follows:

"Generally speaking I've not been given any pleasures, nothing but hardships to go with my life. Shortage of sleep, continuous movements, carrying of heavy loads, hunger, internal dissension. The poor living conditions in both North and South Vietnam cannot be thoroughly depicted."

A series of five reports dated between February 24 and June 14, 1967 reveals that the fear of hardships, low fighting spirit, pessimism, and dissession among unit cadre resulted in the unit (a specialized company of the 21st regiment, second North Vietnamese division) failing to carry out its mission during the first quarter of 1967. The document further reveals that after a vital defeat, a number of cadre and combatants of the unit were pessimistic and lost confidence in future victories. Further, the loss had a bad effect on morale and created fear and panic.

Arthur Mc Cafferty

#### TGP SECRET

Thursday, November 2, 1967 10:07 a.m.

Preside

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms' summarizes the attached CIA report on the Soviet military and economic budget.

I suggest we have a briefing on this at the next NSC meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Brief nex	t CIA meeting
No	
See me_	

#### TOP SECRET

Helms memo to the Presid	lent,	copy 1,	1.3(a)(4)
"Military and Economic Im	aplications of the l	New Soviet Plan"	C
plus CIA Intelligence Memo	orandum "Econom	ic and Military Implications	
of the New Soviet Plan" C	y 5, RR IM 67-67,	30 Oct 1967,	1.3(a)(4

WWRostow:rln

Authority NLT 019-025-1-11
By 9, NARA, Date 1/5/02



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 1 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT

: Military and Economic Implications

of the New Soviet Plan

- 1. I have attached our analysis of the recent Soviet plan and budget announcements calling for a rise of 2, 2 billion rubles in defense expenditures in 1968. We feel that the Soviet leaders have made an important change in economic priorities in favor of the military establishment. Moreover, we feel that they want us to know it. We do not look for a crash expansion of any single military program, such as the ABM system, but we anticipate the augmentation of a number of programs.
- 2. We believe that Soviet military and space outlays will grow by a substantial amount in real terms. Other factors, such as accounting changes, higher prices for military goods, and perhaps military pay increases, also account for some part of the announced increase.

APPROVED FOR RELEASEMAR 1995

SANITIZED Authority NLT 019-025-1-12

3. This diversion of additional funds to military purposes will force a slowdown in Soviet industrial and agricultural investment. The USSR will thereby be jeopardizing the long-term technological quality of its industrial plant. It will also make future agricultural gains more uncertain.

> Richard Helms Director

Attachment:

1.3(a)(4)

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 10:00 a.m.

## MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith an interesting and persuasive comment by Ambassador Goldberg on the Economist article you asked him to check.

W. W. R.

CONFIDENTIAL attachment (log 4176)

65a



## CONFIDENTIAL

November 1, 1967

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE \_
UNITED NATIONS

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Article in the Economist regarding the UN and Vietnam

Pursuant to your request relayed to me by Walt Rostow, I am sending you my views regarding the assessment in the Foreign Report published by the <a href="Economist">Economist</a> (issue of October 26) regarding the UN and Vietnam. I agree with the statement made that no one in the Assembly -- or at least a very few -- wish to have a debate about Vietnam in the Assembly. Regarding the remainder of the assessment, my views are as follows:

Should the occasion arise and should the Assembly be faced only with a resolution calling for the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam -- and calling for nothing else -- there is no doubt a two-thirds majority could be obtained for such a resolution. The vote, in my opinion, would be in the neighborhood of 61 to 25 with 36 abstentions and would be made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 1.

It is, however, improbable that Assembly consideration of the Vietnam problem would develop in that way. If there is an alternative resolution before the Assembly calling for an immediate and prior cessation of the bombing as a first step to be followed either by meaningful negotiations toward a settlement and/or abatement of

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-476
By , NARA, Date 1-10-95

- 2 -

hostilities on both sides, both to be within a reasonable but unspecified period, the tactical situation would change. With an alternative resolution along these lines on the table to be voted on, it seems unlikely a simple cessation of bombing resolution could attain a two-thirds majority; rather the vote in that circumstance I believe would be in the neighborhood of 41 to 37 with 44 abstentions, made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 2.

When the alternative resolution would then be put to a vote it too would fail to secure a two-thirds majority vote. The vote on the alternative resolution I think would be in the neighborhood of 50 to 39 with 33 abstentions, made up along the lines of the attached voting list Number 3.

In summary, if both resolutions were before the Assembly, my assessment is that neither would command the requisite two-thirds vote.

Arthur J. Joldberg

Attachments:

Three Voting Lists

**CONFIDENTIAL** 

		GENE	RAL ASSEN	BLY VOTING LIST		÷	
PLENARY MEETING				DATE _			
COMMITTEE I	Vote	on S	imple Ces	sation of Bombin	g		
QUESTION AT ISSUE _	Resolu	tion	(with no	alternative res	. av	ail	able)
COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Afghanistan	$\sim$		1	Dahomey			
Albania				Denmark .	- Jul.		-
Algeria				Dominican Rep.		$\propto$	
Argentina	1	$\times$	1	Ecuador	$\times$		ĺ
Australia	1	X		El Salvador		K	
Austria	7		-	Ethiopia	$ \sim$	7	
Barbados				Finland	×		
Belgium		> <		France	$\leq$		
Bolivia		X		Gabon			
Botswana		X		Gambia		$\simeq$	
Brazil				Ghana	$\times$		
Bulgaria	> <			Greece		$\times$	
Burma				Guatemala	$>\!\!<$		
Burundi				Guinea	$\times$		
Byelorussian SSR	-		1.	Guyana	$\geq$		
Cambodia	and the same			Haiti			
Cameroon			1 1	Honduras		X	3.5
Canada	$\geq <$			Hungary	$\sim$		
Cen. African Rep.			The state of the s	Iceland	$\times$		
Ceylon	> Comment			India	$\geq \leq$		
Chad				Indonesia	$\leq$		
Chile	>~<			Iran .			$\times$
China		$\geq \leq$		Iraq	$\simeq$		
Colombia		đ	><	Ireland			$\times$
Congo (B)	><		•	Israel		X	
Congo (Demo. Rep of)				Italy			
Costa Rica		$\overline{\mathbf{x}}$		Ivory Coast			
Cuba		-		Jamaica	$\sim$	1	
Cyprus				Japan	T		$\overline{}$
Czechoslovakia				Jordan			$\sim$

Sub-Total .

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstai
Kenya	X			Portugal Portugal		1	$\times$
Kuwait	X		7	Romania	×		
Laos				Rwanda	· `	7	$\sim$
Lebanon				Saudi Arabia	7.	,	
Lesotho		$\times$		Senegal	$\sim$	-	
Liberia				Sierra Leone	><		
Libya				Singapore		:	$\sim$
Luxembourg				Somalia	$\times$		
Madagascar		$\sim$	1	South Africa	1	abla	
Malawi		$\sim$		Spain	-		$\sim$
Malaysia			$\sim$	Sudan	×		
Maldive Islands				Sweden	1	1	
Mali	X			Syria	$\sim$		
Malta		1	$\sim$	Thailand		×	
Mauritania				Togo	-	1	$\sim$
Mexico	X	1		Trinidad & Tobago	$\sim$	1	
Mongolia	$\bowtie$			Tunisia	100		
Morocco	$\overline{\sim}$		i	Turkey	1		$\sim$
Nepal	X	1	1	Uganda	>		
Netherlands		$\times$		Ukrainian SSR	$\sim$		
New Zealand	1	1	1	U.S.S. R.	×	1	
Nicaragua /				U.A. R.		1	
Niger .		1	$\sim$	United Kingdom	1		×
Nigeria	X			United Rep. Tanzania	/		
Norway	X	1		United States	1	200	
Pakistan	>			Upper Volta	>		-
Panama	7	$\sim$		Uruguay			$\times$
Paraguay	1	$\overline{\times}$		Venezuela	1	1	
Peru	1	1		Yemen	×	1	-
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XXXXXXXX Vol. II	Vote	on S	imple Ces	sation of Bombin	g (w	ith	altern lution
QUESTION AT ISSUE	to be	vot	ed on las	t)	- (		
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COUNTRY	les	NO	Abstain		Yes	NO	ADSLAL
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	$\Leftrightarrow$			Denmark .	<del> </del>		
Algeria			<u> </u>	Dominican Rep.			
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Barbados	<del></del>			Ethiopia	5		_
Belgium				Finland ,	$\Rightarrow$	-	
Bolivia		$\Rightarrow$		France			
Botswana	<u> </u>	$\Leftrightarrow$		Gabon	-		
	-			Gambia	-		20
Brazil	-	_	<u></u>	Ghana		-	
Bulgaria				Greece		25	
Burma			ļ	Guatemala		Comme.	×
Burundi		-		Guinea	$\simeq$	├	
Byelorussian SSR	$\geq$			Guyana		-	
Cambodia				Haiti		$\geq$	
Cameroon				Honduras		$\simeq$	
Canada				Hungary	25		
Cen. African Rep.			$\sim$	Iceland			$\times$
Ceylon	$\sim$			. India	2000	-	
Chad			$\simeq$	Indonesia			
Chile			$\sim$	Iran			$\times$
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Congo (B)	><			Israel		X	
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Cuba	1			Jamaica			×
Cyprus	ash.		× 1	Japan		×	,
Czechoslovakia				Jordan	1		1

COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstai
Kenya .	X			Portugal			
Kuwait	34	-	X	Romania	$\prec$		
Laos				Rwanda		7	
Lebanon			><	Saudi Arabia		7	
Lesotho	1	$\overline{}$		Senegal		1	X
Liberia	1			Sierra Leone			X
Libya			$\times$	Singapore		7	$\sim$
Luxembourg		><		Somalia	$\overline{\mathbf{x}}$	7	
Madagascar		De Com		South Africa		X	
Malawi		><	1	Spain		X	·
Malaysia			$\sim$	Sudan	1		
Maldive Islands			$\sim$	Sweden	~	1	
Mali	×		-	Syria	1		
Malta	1		×	Thailand		$\sim$	
Mauritania	$\overline{\sim}$	1	1	Togo			$\overline{\mathbf{x}}$
Mexico	1	1	$\overline{\sim}$	Trinidad & Tobago	-		X
Mongolia	×			Tunisia		1	~
Morocco	1	1	<b>X</b>	Turkey		×	
Nepal	×			Uganda	X		
Netherlands		><		Ukrainian SSR	5	1	
New Zealand	1	1		U.S.S. R.			
Nicaragua /	1	$\sim$		U.A. R.	-	1	
Niger .				United Kingdom	1	X	-
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Norway	1		X	United States		V	7
Pakistan	×			Upper Volta	×	-	
Panama	1	1		Uruguay		X	1
Paraguay	1	1		Venezuela	, ,	X	
Peru	1		X	Yemen	X	[	
Philippines		>	4	Yugoslavia	X	Γ.	1
Poland	X			Zambia.		1:	

		GENE	RAL ASSE	BLY VOTING LIST			
PLENARY MEETING				DATE			
COMMITTEE III Vote	on t	he a	lternative	resolution (		:4	
,			200			-	
QUESTION AT ISSUE (	if vo	ted	on last)		7		
COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain
Afghanistan		×	1	Dahomey			$\times$
Albania	]		1	Denmark .	$\propto$		
Algeria		$\sim$		Dominican Rep.	$\leq$		
Argentina		}		Ecuador	$\times$		
Australia	$\bowtie$			El Salvador	$\times$	7,0	
Austria		1	$\times$	Ethiopia			
Barbados	L		$\sim$	Finland			-
Belgium				France		$\simeq$	
Bolivia	$\sim$			Gabon			$\geq$
Botswana	$\sim$		. ,	Gambia	$\geq$		
Brazil	$\geq \leq$			Ghana		L	$\times$
Bulgaria		><		Greece	$\geq$		
Burma		$\geq$	L	Guatemala			<u> </u>
Burundi		5		Guinea		$\geq$	
Byelorussian SSR		×		Guyana	1		$\geq \leq$
Cambodia		$\geq$	<u>                                     </u>	Haiti	$\geq$	_	
Cameroon			<b>&gt;</b>	Honduras	$\geq$	_	
Canada	$\geq$			Hungary		$\geq$	
Cen. African Rep.		L	$\times$	Iceland	$\geq$	_	
Ceylon		$\simeq$		. India	-	$\bowtie$	
Chad	ļ		>	Indonesia		$\geq$	
Chile				Iran	×	<u></u>	
China			$\times$	Iraq	<u></u>	$\geq$	
Colombia	> <			Ireland	$\geq \leq$	_	
Congo (B)		$>\!\!<$		Israel	1		
Congo (Demo. Rep of)			$\times$	Italy	$\times$	1	
Costa Rica	$\sim$			Ivory Coast	×		
Cuba		$\times$		Jamaica			
Cyprus			$\times$	Japan	X	1	
Czechoslovakia		1		Jordan		7 7	$\times$

Sub-Total Sub-Total .	٠.				
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COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstain	COUNTRY	Yes	No	Abstair
Kenya	I	<		Portugal	~		
Kuwait	1	1	$\overline{}$	Romania		$\overline{\mathbf{x}}$	,
Laos	1			Rwanda		-	
Lebanon			X	Saudi Arabia		,	>
Lesotho	5			Senegal .		×	
Liberia	X			Sierra Leone	-		×
Libya	1		× -	Singapore	><	-	
Luxembourg	><			Somalia		×	
Madagascar	X			South Africa	X	1	
Malawi	X			Spain	2000		-
Malaysia	1			Sudan	1	X	
Maldive Islands	1		$\times$	Sweden			$\sim$
Mali		2		Syria		×	
Malta	1			Thailand	$\times$		
Mauritania		$\overline{>}$		Togo		1	$\times$
Mexico			$\overline{\mathbf{x}}$	Trinidad & Tobago	1		
Mongolia		X		Tunisia ,	,		$\sim$
Morocco			$\times$	Turkey	$\sim$		
Nepal				Uganda		5.	X
Netherlands	X			Ukrainian SSR	1	X	
New Zealand				U.S.S. R.		X	,
Nicaragua	1			U.A. R.	1	1	
Niger	1		$\times$	United Kingdom	><		
Nigeria		X		United Rep. Tanzania		X	
Norway	$\sim$			United States	~	-	
Pakistan		1		Upper Volta		X	1
Panama	1			Uruguay	$\sim$		
Paraguay	1			Venezuela	X	1	-
Peru	1			Yemen		X	
Philippines	Jakon Com	·		Yugoslavia	100	×	[
Poland	T	1		Zambia	1	X	1

Sub-Total .

TOTAL

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 9:15 a.m.

## MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith John Roche suggests a speech by the Vice President upon his return.

W. W. R.

Yes	
No	
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FM JOHN ROCHE TO THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND WALT ROSTOW

NO NIGHT ACTION

JOHN ROCHE TO PRESIDENT AND WALT ROSTOW, WHITE HOUSE: VICE PRESIDENT'S RETURN SEEMS TO ME IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR SHORT REPEAT SHORT NATIONAL TV. SP EECH (PERHAPS FIFTEEN MINUTES) DRAMATIZING THE NEW ASIA THEME, RAMMING HOME : INTERRELATIONSHIP OF MILITARY POWER AND PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT, AND EMPHASIZING TO AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT WE ARE NOT OUT HERE ALONE. I WOULD WRITE SPEECH AND KEEP IT OUT OF HANDS OF WILL AWAIT YOUR JUDGEMENT BEFORE DISCUSS COTTON CANDY DREW. WITH VICE PRESIDENT. REGARDS.". J100

Approved For Release 2000/08/16: NLJ-019-025-1-13-2

Thursday, Nov. 2, 1967 9:10 a.m.

## MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Ambassador Bunker reflects on enemy casualty statistics in a thoughtful way.

W. W. R.

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EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR ROSTOW

1. WHILE IN WASHINGTON I DISCUSSED THE CORROBORATION BY CAPTURED DOCUMENTS OF FWMAF BODY COUNT, AND OFFICIALS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN THE DATAILS AND DOCUMENTS.

2. I FIND THAT THE CORROBORATION CONSISTS OF A STATISTICAL STUDY OF 70 SEPARATE DOCUMENTS FOR PERIOD 1 JAN 1966-30 NOV 1966 AND NUMEROUS ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE PERIOD DEC 1966 THROUGH MAR 1967. EACH OF THESE DOCUMENTS GIVES ASSIGNED STRENGTH OF AN ENEMY UNIT AND SOME INFORMATION ON LOSSES IN THAT UNIT, SUCH AS KIA, WIA, MIA, AND DESERTERS. FROM THE DOCUMENTS IT WAS DETERMINED

WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE ENEMY, ON THE AVERAGE IN THE UNITS COVERED, WERE KIA, DESERTED, ETC. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THESE PERCENTAGES WOULD BE ROUGHLY APPLICABLE TO THE ENEMY FORCES AS A WHOLE, THE SAME PERCENTAGES WERE APPLIED TO TATAL ENEMY FORCES, AS WE THEN CARRIED THEM ON THE ORDER OF BATTLE. THE RESULTING FIGURES WERE COMPARED WITH OUR BODY COUNT FIGURES, AND THE KIA SO DERIVED COMPARED REMARKABLY CLOSELY WITH OUR BODY COUNT (ALSO POW AND CHIEU HOI FIGURES COMPARED WITH ADJUSTED DESERTER FIGURES).

3. IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT THE ANALYSIS CAN BE USED WITH THE PRESS AT THIS TIME AS STATISTICAL BODY COUNT CORROBORATION. THERE ARE TOO MANY INDEFINITE AREAS, SUCH AS (A) THE REPRESENTATIVE NATURE OF THE SAMPLE, (B) THE ACCURACY OF OUR ORDER OF BATTLE, (C) THE FACT THAT "BODY COUNT" INCLUDES PORTERS AND OTHERS TEMPORARILY MOBILIZED AND NOT ON THE ORDER OF BATTLE, AND (D) THE FACT THAT KIA IN ENEMY DOCUMENTS INCLUDES KIA FROM AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES NOT ALWAYS INCLUDED IN "BODY COUNT." FURTHERMORE, WE ARE PRESENTLY UPDATING OUR ORDER OF BATTLE FIGURES FOR THE PAST AND THIS WILL OBVIOUSLY AFFECT

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 10221 0 0 N F I D E N I I A-L

OUR RESULTS. THE ACTUAL ANALYSIS WAS DONE BY A MATHEMATICIAN NO LONGER WITH MACV, AND SOME OF HIS WORK (PARTICULARLY ON DESERTERS--ADJUSTMENT FOR MEN RETURNED TO THEIR UNITS, KIA, POW, ETC.) ARE NOT COMPLETELY ACCEPTED BY PRESENT MACV STAFF.

4. ALSO, MACV CONTINUALLY CHECKS CAPTURED DOCUMENTS GIVING LOSSES IN PARTICULAR ENGAGEMENTS WITH OUT BODY COUNT TO
DETERMINE CORRELATION. THEY HAVE CORRELATED ABOUT 20 ENGAGEMENTS IN THIS WAY, AND THE TOTAL OF ENEMY COUNT EXCEEDS
OURS BY 10 TO 15 PERCENT. THE PROBLEM IS THAT WHEREAS SOME
ARE REMARKABLY CLOSE OR EVEN IDENTICAL, OTHERS ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY OFF THE MARK. IN SOME CASES ENEMY ADMISSIONS FAR EXCEED OUR BODY COUNT, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE MOST
OF THE BODIES WERE DRAGGED OFF THE FIELD BY THE ENEMY. IN
OTHER CASES OUR BODY COUNT SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEEDS ENEMY
ADMISSIONS, PRESUMABLY RESULTING FROM EITHER (A) KILLING OF
PORTERS AND LOGISTICAL PERSONNEL NOT APPEARING IN ENEMY
FIGURES, OR (B) KILLING OF SOLDIERS IN OTHER UNITS IN MULTI-UNIT
ACTIONS WHERE CAPTURED DOCUMENT ONLY REVEALS LOSSES OF A
SINGLE UNIT.

## PAGE 4 RUNGIR 19221 C ON FIDENTIAL

5. WE ARE FORWARDING TO YOU THE JANUARY MACV STUDY OF VC LOSSES. THE CAPTURED DOCUMENTS UPON WHICH THIS STUDY WAS BASED HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO DIA. HOWEVER, AS MENTIONED IN PARA 3 ABOVE, MACV HAS SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE METHODS OF ANALYSIS EMPLOYED IN THAT STUDY. WE WILL ALSO SEND TO YOU COMPARATIVE INFORMATION WE HAVE ON PARTICULAR ENGAGEMENTS. IN VIEW OF THE NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THESE DOCUMENTS MAY RAISE WITH UNFRIENDLY SOURCES, WE BELIEVE ALL FACTORS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED BEFORE ANY RELEASE IS MADE.

BUNKER BT

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Checked by 68

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phone with

Clark Clifford

W.

Thursday, November 2, 1967 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

fran

This memorandum incorporates a brief summary of the discussion last night plus some suggestions for how the meeting this morning might be handled.

## I. Report on the meeting.

- 1. The meeting began with two briefings: one by Gen. Wheeler and the other by George Carver. I would urge you to check with Clark Clifford and others, but I found the briefings impressive, especially Carver who hit just the right balance between the progress we have made and the problems we still confront. He handled the population control data in a lucid but credible way. There was hardly a word spoken that could not be given directly to the press. You may wish to consider a full leadership meeting of this kind, introduced by yourself, after which you could put the whole thing on television, perhaps when Bunker is here.
- 2. They both concluded that there was very great progress since 1965. We can't count on sufficient progress in the next 15 months to collapse the enemy; but Carver made two good points with respect to the future:
- -- In part, the future is in our hands and the South Vietnamese's. In particular, the appointment of good officials and effective attack on corruption and a sharp improvement of the ARVN in pacification operations could produce dramatic change.
- -- From the point of view of Hanoi, they would make a strategic decision to end the war when they had decided the U.S. would not behave like the French did in 1954 and when a viable state structure seemed on the way to emerging in Saigon.
- Sec. Rusk then, over drinks, reviewed the attitude of Hanoi towards negoations, emphasizing that their eyes were increasingly fastened on American politics.
  - 4. The general discussion then came to focus around two issues:
    - -- The problem of sustained support for our policy within the U.S.; and the bombing question.

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Arthur Dean and General Bradley spent a good deal of their time on the domestic situation and how to present the story of the war in ways which would encourage our people to unify and stay the course. Dean cited the kinds of questions he got in talking to college audiences. Dean Acheson put forward the view that the bulk of the university student opposition stemmed from an understandable desire not to have to go to fight in Vietnam. He was chalkenged by Mac Bundy and others that this was part but not all the story.

- 5. On bombing the line up was about as follows:
- -- All agreed with McNamara, who read from a CIA document, that bombing did not prevent the present level of infiltration of men and arms.
- a negotiating chip against pressure across the DMZ. Acheson said that we should stop bombing when they did not press across the DMZ and resume bombing when they did until they got the point. Sec. Rusk pointed out we had tried to establish that connection but had failed; but they rather ignored what he was saying. Bob Murphy and General Bradley, in particular, said that out of their experience over the years they were sure that the bombing was having some effect on operations in the South, although it could not be precisely measured. In this discussion it emerged that while Helms, agreed with Sec. McNamara that the present level of bombing would not have a demonstrable effect on flows to the South, he disagreed with the judgment that a stoppage of bombing would not result in increased flows to the South. It might.
- 6. Arthur Dean made strongly the point, out of his experience, that an excessive eagerness as to negotiate or a broad humanitarian gesture to the Communists is interpreted as a sign of weakness by Communists.
- 7. At the close Sec. Rusk urged them all to put their minds to this question: In the face of the situation, as it was outlined to them, what would they do if they were President?
- 8. Douglas Dillon's questions mainly centered on possibilities for escalation against the North; that is, mining the harbors, hitting the dikes, etc.
- 9. Incidentally, I detected in this group no sentiment for our pulling out of Vietnam.

- II. This is one possible way to handle the meeting this morning at 10:30 a.m.
- 1. Thank them for giving their time; and suggest the importance of maintaining the existence and substance of the meeting in confidence. You would like to call on them again. But they constitute so weighty a group that public knowledge of their meetings might be misinterpreted and lead to speculation of crises.
- 2. A President faced with the present situation constantly must ask himself two questions:
- -- Is our course in Vietnam right? If it is right, how can we increase public understanding and support for that policy? As they are aware, Hanoi's view of public understanding and support is a major front in the war -- perhaps now the most important front.
- 3. The first question is: Is there anything that we are not doing in the South that we ought to do?

(You might go around the table on this issue.)

The second question: With respect to the North, should we: continue what we are doing? Mine the ports and plan to take down the dikes when the water is high? Unilaterally reduce or eliminate bombing of North Vietnam?

(Again around the table.)

The third question: Negotiations. Should we adopt a passive policy of willingness to negotiate but wait for their initiatives?

If we should try additional initiatives, what should they be?

Despite their refusal of the San Antonio formula, should we unilaterally cease bombing and just see what happens?

The fourth question: Taking into account all that they know, do they believe that we should in one way or another get out of Vietnam?

The fifth question: What measures would they suggest to rally and unite our own people behind the effort in Vietnam?

I suggest that Tom Johnson be present and keep a tally sheet on each man with respect to each question.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

Mr. President:

Pres file

Recently, a relatively obscure Member of the Canadian Parliament, Mr. F. J. Bigg, stood up and delivered a remarkable and eloquent speech on your behalf, contrasting your career with that of Ho Chi Minh:

"...as I read the reports of (Ho Chi Minh's) achievements
I find they are all negative and all designed to destroy freedom.
However, as I read the record of Lyndon B. Johnson's career
I find that for the last 35 years at least he has only had one end
in mind, to uphold the dignity of the human being..."

Mr. Bigg chided his fellow countrymen for their criticism, ("I am sick and tired of hearing criticisms of the noble efforts made by President Johnson..."), offered unqualified support for U. S. policy in Vietnam, and concluded: "I, for one, thank God we have a man of Johnson's calibre for a neighbor."

Because the warmth of his words is in such contrast to what we often hear from up North, I thought you might derive some comfort from reading his speech. I have marked several passages.

The State Department has thanked Mr. Bigg for his remarks, and they have been inserted in the Congressional Record by Congressman Gallagher of New Jersey.

W. W. Rostow

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cc: Fried

citizen, not to use the almost obsolete term of Bill of Rights.

It must be understood, Mr. Speaker, that the feelings of a whole people have been roused, and the go ahead signal in our daily life, in every field, has made us realize for some years now that we want to be fullfledged Canadians and therefore we must be recognized as such by our English-speaking fellow citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I am fully aware of witnessing, along with the entire population, these decisive hours for our country. In my opinion, it is the logical consequence for a nation that wishes to develop, to free itself and to take in all those various constitutional formulas.

The leader of the Quebec wing, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration stated recently:

Those who scheme to bring about a divorce between the people of Quebec and their federal representatives are knowingly seeking the destruction of Canada.

Men such as the one I have just quoted deserve our confidence.

Mr. Speaker, we too from Quebec are making a useful contribution to the federal parliament; we have our de Gaulles, our thinkers, our leaders able to face the facts as they really are.

I am quoting here the hon, senator whose statement was the highlight of the recent Montmorency conference.

Let us not act in such a way as to alter the true facts into a chasm.

In all the upheaval that befogs the current political atmosphere, our first concern should be to seek the living standard within the Canadian framework. The concerns of ordinary mortals, of the man in the street, is with the standard of living; the daily bread is the uppermost question in his mind. That is why, in my humble judgment, I favour appreciable reforms of the constitution but I unconditionally reject any clause that might tend to isolate Quebec and force it to segregation. And as our youngest minister already said, let us favour the policy of presence.

This brings me to the financial situation of our country, and I would not want the occurrence of a tragedy that would place my province under the yoke of isolationism. Quite recently, when one of the most famous tourists in Hawaii stated:

No China wall around Quebec.

We all heaved a sigh of relief, and the strain was markedly eased.

[Mr. Tremblay.]

The Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Pearson) told us yesterday that, to date, eight provinces were seriously considering his invitation to attend a federal-provincial conference slated for next January. Well, the detente was further increased when the provincial Liberals came out openly against separatism.

So, it should be realized that sides are now being taken, and that this centennial year will end in a blaze of optimism and constitutional occumenism, as the hon member for Lotbinière (Mr. Choquette) called it.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, once again I appeal to all my English-speaking compatriots whom I like a lot, not to watch passively what is happening in Quebec. We have here men of great value who are ready to do anything to promote unity in Canada and our Minister of Finance and Receiver General (Mr. Sharp) is one who, by his gift as an administrator and his great qualifications in human relations, is trying to develop a prosperous Canada, financially balanced, and first of all united and harmonious.

[English]

Mr. F. J. Bigg (Athabasca): Mr. Speaker, We have a great many problems at home in Canada today which I should like to discuss if I had the time. However, there is a problem abroad which far transcends all our domestic problems. I refer to the deplorable fact that most of the people of Canada are being systematically brainwashed. I am not accusing the present administration of having a hand in this, apart from the contribution they make because of ineptitude. I give this administration full credit for meaning well. Nevertheless this ineptitude on the part of those in positions of responsibility to this house and the nation makes it evident that they are guilty of serious neglect.

Although I am not an expert on foreign affairs I intend to take a few minutes of the time of the house to attempt to outline what is so obvious to me as a layman and novice in foreign affairs. A true picture of the international situation is not being presented to us. We have an enemy in this world, international communism and I am in no way hesitant about saying that. These people have friends in this country, although as I have said before I do not think any of them sit in this house

The Canadian war crimes tribunal organization which seeks to put President Johnson of the United States on trial for his so-called war crimes is allowed to operate. Free discussion in Canada has always been

our prerogative and I would be the last to suggest that a person does not have the right to say what he wants as long as he is willing to accept the responsibility involved. Having regard to the anti-United States propaganda to which this country has been subjected, I have waited in vain for a clear voice from the fourth estate, from the television and radio media, yes, even from responsible members of the government and of this house, to give what I consider a fair and balanced picture of the situation.

It is passing strange that Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the North Vietnamese and the soul of the Vict Cong, should always be given the benefit of the doubt and favourable publicity. I have in my hand a paper which clearly indicates in straight, factual terms, Mr. Ho Chi Minh's record. I think it would be fair, and perhaps interesting, to know in chronological order what have been the actions of Ho Chi Minh during the last 47 years and what have been the actions of one Lyndon B. Johnson, who bears the responsibility both militarily and politically for maintaining the freedom of at least the western world, and in Vict Nam certainly some semblance of freedom amongst the small nations of Asia.

On December 25, 1920, Ho Chi Minh, a Viet Nam born Chinese, became a member of the Marxist wing of the French socialist party while attending the party conference in Paris. Lyndon B. Johnson was at this time attending high school in Johnson City, Texas. He had the same kind of background as most of us in the house have enjoyed. He was raised on a farm and received a western-style free educa-

Lyndon B. Johnson found it necessary to work with his hands and learned that he needed energy and individual effort in order to finish his schooling. Ho Chi Minh was educated at the expense of the international socialist party. In 1923 Ho Chi Minh became the editor of Le Paria, a French communist publication, and received one year's training in Moscow. In December, 1924, he was sent to Canton, China, as interpreter for the communist Michael Borodin. At that time Lyndon B. Johnson was graduating from high school as president of his class and had already achieved a reputation as a debater.

At that time President Johnson did not know of his rendezvous with fate. He did not know that he would one day be President of the United States. In fact, he scorned higher He is a man who has always thought for

education. He was a young, energetic man who went out looking for work, which was not easy for an untrained man to find even in those days. It was difficult for him to find suitable work to which he could devote his great talents. Therefore Lyndon B. Johnson wandered about the United States working with his hands. He graduated from the school of hard knocks. Lyndon B. Johnson recognized that education was necessary for all young people and he went back to school.

In January, 1930 we find that under Ho Chi Minh's leadership a conference was held in Hong Kong with Chinese communists to integrate three Vietnamese communist parties, the Oriental Communist Party, the Annamese Communist Party and the Oriental Communist League. These became the communist party of Indo-China, a branch of the Third International of Moscow, and it so remained until 1940.

Let us go back to our friend Lyndon B. Johnson. He enrolled at Southwest Texas Teachers State College and became a school teacher. He was a school teacher for a year. He then continued his studies at college, obtained a degree and took up public speaking. He was just a nice, friendly school teacher. In 1931 Lyndon B. Johnson, having a greatinterest in politics even from his early years, became secretary to a congressman. Mr. Hoover was the Republican president. From his early days Lyndon B. Johnson was a liberal with a small "l".

In 1932 Lyndon B. Johnson attached himself to Mr. Roosevelt's administration and worked unceasingly for the New Deal. I think the most rabid of critics of that program cannot say that the New Deal was anything but a tremendous attempt to maintain the dignity of the individual and the right of little people to share in the great wealth and progress of North America.

On May 19, 1941, Moscow disbanded the Third Communist International. The Vietnamese communist party established the Doc Lap Dong-Minh, or the Viet Minh, to wage guerrilla warfare. They went underground. Who was the spiritual leader of this group? It was Ho Chi Minh. In 1940 Viet Nam, together with most other southeast Asian countries, was occupied by Japan. At the end of the eastern theatre of world war II the power of the United States was ascending. Ho Chi Minh at this time continued his program of the march of communism.

Where was Lyndon B. Johnson at this time?

himself. He heeded United States' public opinion and came out flatly for entering world war II on the side of the free nations. In 1941 England stood alone, Lyndon B. Johnson, who has always been a very strong nationalist, came out flatly in favour of his country fighting with Britain. He said that the United States needed the draft and he worked toward that end. Mr. Johnson was the kind of man who did not only talk but acted. He stood for principles. He promised the young men of the United States, on the day he voted for conscription to send America's young blood to fight for freedom, that he would be with them. Less than three hours after he put his name to the draft bill Lyndon B. Johnson joined the United States navy. He worked in the theatre of war in which Ho Chi Minh was working underground with the communists.

President Johnson, as he now is, served as a volunteer licutenant in the United States navy. His short term of service in the Pacific was exciting. His courage was rewarded by being decorated by his country. The president of that day, believing that Lyndon B. Johnson and his ability to organize the war effort were of more use in Washington, ordered him back for duty.

### • (5:40 p.m.)

On August 15, 1945 Japan surrendered to the allies. On August 17 and 18, 1945 an uprising was provoked in Hanoi. On August 19, 1945 Ho Chi Mihn launched his take-over. On September 2, 1945 Ho Chi Minh established his regime in Hanoi, ousting Bao Dai, the former emperor of Annan. Where was Lyndon B. Johnson at that time?

Mr. Mather: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether I could ask the hon. member a question. I was very interested in his remarks but would he say whether he is in favour of or opposed to the general budget which I thought we were considering?

Mr. Bigg: I am speaking about something which affects every dollar we wish to earn in Canada and every dollar we wish to spend. It is only in the budget debate that an amateur like myself can say what is in his heart; and I am quite sure that while I stand here and speak every hon. member within hearing of my voice knows that I speak with the firm conviction that we are only hearing one side of the story. I would take my seat if I did not think this was so. I cannot imagine anything more important for Canada than national survival and I cannot imagine national survival for Canada unless there is the fullest

co-operation between our country and the United States of America. We rely on them at this time for any defence of our continent. We rely on them entirely to protect our skies and if in the-future intercontinental missiles are to be stopped on their way it will be farsighted men like Lyndon B. Johnson who will be able to provide the kind of leadership which we require in this country.

Mr. Mather: May I ask the hon. member one more question? I appreciate the hon. member's reply to my previous question but what I asked in fact was whether he is in favour of or opposed to the budget?

Mr. Bigg: I listened with considerable patience while the hon, member spoke and I wish he would give me the same forbearance.

Mr. Mather: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker, I have not spoken.

Mr. Bigg: I might say that I do not expect my speech to be widely read and no political advantage whatsoever will be gained by injecting that type of question into it. I have spoken about my concern, and it is only in the budget debate that we can speak about such matters. If the hon, member wishes me to speak about the budget in detail. I will get to that subject where we discuss the subject of defence. At that time I will speak about how the money can be used to further some of the things I have in mind. However, I am merely trying to do one specific job, and I hope I am doing it, namely, to draw a parallel between the leader of the state of North Viet Nam and the leader of the state in the only country on earth able to stem what I consider to be a threat to my country. If this is a small matter, one unworthy of capturing the attention of the house for 15 or 20 minutes, then I am prepared to sit down. But I am not convinced of that.

Mr. Mather: If the hon, gentleman does not wish to answer my question that is his privilege.

Mr. Bigg: In 1945 Mr. Johnson ran for the United States senate. In the senate, until the time he became president, he fought for all those things which leftists talk about and do nothing about and which he himself backed whenever it meant that the strength of the strong should be used to help the poor. There was no segment of society, however small and neglected, that President Johnson did not support, and this has been affirmed by minority groups such as the one composed of Germans in his own state during world war II and the

negro minority. During his term in the senate he instituted and pushed with all his might for reforms which it had taken 82 years to put on the statute books of the United States.

I had hoped in the 20 minutes allotted to me to present the full record of this man but it would take hours to review in detail the accomplishments of this great president. I am sick and tired of hearing criticisms of the noble efforts made by President Johnson himself to bring peace to Viet Nam and the noble efforts made by the American people and their sons to continue the fighting. I think we should level criticism whenever we can if we think an injustice is being done, and the point I am trying to make this afternoon is that an injustice is done when those who feel the way I do not give lip service at least to our American friends and allies.

A partisan politician would say it is better to support his party no matter how bad it is than to support the other party no matter how good it is. This has never been the style of Lyndon B. Johnson. He has always had the courage to stand up against those things in which he did not believe and he is exceptionally good at getting things done. I believe that Ho Chi Mihn is also exceptionally good at getting things done that he wants done, but as I read the reports of his achievements I find they are all negative and all designed to destroy freedom. However, as I read the record of Lyndon B. Johnson's career I find that for the last 35 years at least he has only had one end in mind, to uphold the dignity of the human being. Because he lives in an imperfect world and can only work through political organizations, imperfect as they are, and because it is difficult even for the Americans who use restraint to achieve peace and security in our world, it is beneath our dignity to sit here in smug security north of the line and have nothing but had to say about those who are at least doing their best.

Attempts are being made to force us to talk about dollars and cents and not to talk about things on a high plane. I can do that. I think the Canadian people should pay 10 per cent of the cost of freedom along with the Americans. I go further and say, as I said in 1939, that more than our money should be at stake. President Johnson thought his life was at stake. He thought that strongly about the matter and I do not think he has changed. But I do think we should change.

### • (5:50 p.m.)

Some may sit here quietly, accept things as they are and say, "We know all that, Bigg, 56—1967—3 why don't you sit down?" If these facts are known, I do not hear about them. I read the newspapers daily and I listen to the news broadcasts. One would really think President Johnson was the leader of some kind of international gang. It is for this reason I ask hon. members to consider these facts. They are in every "Who's Who". When I am doing my homework, my desk is piled high with papers containing these facts. These articles were not written by President Johnson's friends. As I said before, President Johnson is a liberal with a small "l", while I am a conservative with a small "c". However, like President Johnson, when the welfare of my country is at stake I have no politics. I have seen these very issues kicked around, even on the floor of this house, for cheap political reasons, and I do not point my finger at the Liberals when I say that. We on this side of the house are condemned by our own silence as well as by interpreting the remarks made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin), who is seized with the responsibility of giving us the whole truth, nothing but the truth.

I am not afraid of the truth. It has been said many times that the truth will make one free. If we are only going to be given half truths, then I say half truths will lead to slavery. It will be the same kind of slavery that President Johnson has spent his whole life fighting. He has risked his political career fighting it. Slavery is not dead in the United States. President Johnson knows that, as do many other people in the United States. However, it is not politically wise to stand up and say so because down there feelings run high. Thank God, we do not have it in this country.

Some parliamentarians from England were visiting us last week. They said that our prospects are greater than our problems. If we take the attitude that the war in Viet Nam is none of our business, then we should at least keep quiet about those who think they have a stake in it and think they are doing their best. If we have a better alternative, then what is it? Ho Chi Minh is represented as a man who is working for the self-determination of people. Well, there are a lot of people in South Viet Nam as well as in North Viet Nam. If this man Johnson wanted to use all the power he has to stop the war, we know only too well how quickly that war could be stopped. We also know at what cost. Here is a man who is not going to use all the power he has for cheap political purposes.

I wanted to go through his record to indicate that while Ho Chi Minh was busy undermining the small nations of Southeast Asia President Johnson was quietly doing his duty. Since President Kennedy is dead, it is safe to make him a hero. However, since President Johnson is still alive he can still be used for cheap political purposes. I say it is time we in Canada cut it out. This man was chosen by President Kennedy. Kennedy said of him, this man is even more fit to serve the American people than I am. When Kennedy got the opportunity to sit in high places he knew that he needed the wisdom and dedication of this man Johnson to help him guide the United States through very difficult times.

I, for one, thank God we have a man of Johnson's calibre as our neighbour. I fear no invasion from the south. President Johnson has always supported the United Nations. He has done all he could to make the United Nations effective. President Johnson has offered to give up his right to decide these issues if the United Nations is willing and able to deal with them. When he has made these suggestions he has been turned down. The facts are here and we all know them. Less than 18 months ago the United States did stop the bombing for six weeks. What has happened to the memories of those men who write this propaganda we are getting? What did North Viet Nam do? They methodically and coldbloodedly built up their military strength. More United States soldiers died because this man Johnson was reasonable enough to give North Viet Nam every oppor-

There are many nations in the world today in which both sides of this story will not be told. The iron curtain encircles them. There is only one press and only one party in those countries. I thank God again that here we have two parties. If a man is delinquent or is interpreted as not telling us the truth, then it is my plain duty to ask for the truth. I am not afraid the people of Canada will condemn me for that. I put freedom above all other things, and it is the truth that will make us free.

# PROCEEDINGS ON ADJOURNMENT

SUBJECT MATTER OF OCESTIONS TO BE

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Tardif): It is my duty, pursuant to provisional standing order 39A, to inform the house that the questions to be raised at the time of adjournment tonight [Mr. Bigg.]

are as follows: the hon, member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge), Canadian Pacific Railway—request for more effective methods of dealing with accidents; the hon, member for Parkdale (Mr. Haidasz), Public Works—Toronto—inquiry as to availability of funds; the hon, member for Queens (Mr. Macquarrie), External Affairs—Rhodesia—an expression of disapproval of racial practices.

At six o'clock the house took recess.

### AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 8 p.m.

### THE BUDGET

ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE

The house resumed consideration of the motion of Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Minister of Finance) that Mr. Speaker do now leave the chair for the house to go into committee of ways and means.

Mr. L. R. Sherman (Winnipeg South): Mr. Speaker, I wish to discuss many matters at this time, but as many subjects have already been spoken about since the beginning of the debate I shall, for the most part, limit myself to one item that I feel most urgently constrained to discuss, to one position that I feel obligated to place on the record.

Before launching into that paramount and focal area of my remarks I wish to say, also for the record, that all who come from my part of the country and all in this chamber who represent areas outside the major metropolitan areas of central and eastern Canada, that part known as the golden triangle region of the country, are vividly and anxiously concerned about the negotiations going on at the present time between the premier of Manitoba and the Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) with respect to the future of the Air Canada overhaul base in Winnipeg.

I have nothing to add to what has been said about this matter that affects my constituency, Winnipeg South, my city, metropolitan Winnipeg and, for that matter, the whole of Manitoba. The speeches in the past about the future of the Air Canada base in Winnipeg and about the potential development and use of Winnipeg facilities ring hollow to the citizens of Winnipeg and Manitoba. Considering the latest apparently arbitrary announcement by the president of Air Canada about the phase-out of the Winnipeg base, those speeches ring hollow indeed. I, other members of this chamber and the

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 4:00

Preafile

Mr. President:

Attached is the joint communique to be issued after your meeting with the King of Nepal. George Christian has a copy. If you approve, he will issue it right after your five o'clock meeting today. It contains acthing controversial.

I recommend you approve.

signed by Ed Hamilton in Mr Roston's absence

Approve \_\_\_\_

EKH/vmr

cc: George Christian

### JOINT COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of President and Mrs. Johnson,
King Mahendra and Queen Ratna of Nepal are paying a
State visit to the United States of America beginning
November 1, 1967. The Crown Prince, who is studying
in the United States, joined Their Majesties during this
State visit. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
Kirti Nidhi Bista is accompanying Their Majesties. On
the completion of the Washington portion of the visit,
during which they have met various members of the United
States Government, Their Majesties are traveling to various
points of interest in the United States before departing for
Nepal on December 3.

The visit afforded King Mahendra and President Johnson an opportunity to become acquainted with each other and to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern. The personal rapport and mutual esteem stemming from their conversations enabled them to discuss these matters with the frankness and friendship which characterize the relations between the United States and Nepal.

The King explained to the President the efforts made in Nepal to secure a better standard of living for the people under the Panchayat system and the measure of success achieved in this direction. President Johnson was impressed with the progress made in Nepal under His Majesty's leadership and praised Nepal's emphasis on increasing agricultural production and the increased self-help measures taken by Nepal. King Mahendra explained that Nepal hoped to have achieved an increase of fifteen per cent in its agricultural production by the end of the current five year plan in 1970. President Johnson assured His Majesty of the continuing deep interest of the United States Government and people in supporting Nepal's efforts to reach its goals. King Mahendra thanked the President for the important role being played by the United States for achieving these high purposes.

King Mahendra and President Johnson discussed the efforts which both the Governments have been making to ease world tensions. It was agreed that the strong

support of both countries for the United Nations would not slacken. The King explained that the policy of peaceful co-existence and non-alignment had a continuing validity for Nepal at a time when there were increased tensions in the region itself. The President expressed his understanding of Nepal's efforts to reduce tensions. In affirming their desire for a world in which the arms race could be slowed and in which general and complete disarmament could be achieved under safeguards, President Johnson and King Mahendra expressed their earnest hope that a non-proliferation treaty would soon be concluded. They reasserted their unwavering support for a world of law and order and one in which international obligations and non-interference in the internal affairs of a country are solemnly respected.

King Mahendra and President Johnson discussed other problems facing the world today. They reviewed the situation in Viet Nam, stating their respective views, and agreed that the problem of Viet Nam could be solved in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1954. They expressed the hope that a lasting and honorable peace

would soon be restored to Viet Nam. With respect to
the Middle East, it was agreed that both Governments
should continue to support the efforts of the United
Nations to evolve a just and durable peace for the
Middle East which would be acceptable to all the peoples
affected by the recent hostilities there.

President Johnson and King Mahendra agreed that their friendly exchange of views, reflecting the mutual respect and equality of the two nations, had reinforced the already strong bonds of friendship which have characterized Nepalese-American relations since their inception in 1947 and made more meaningful their common quest for peace, justice, and progress.

In taking leave of President Johnson, King Mahendra expressed his thanks for the warm and friendly reception accorded him. King Mahendra extended a cordial invitation to President Johnson and Mrs. Johnson to visit Nepal. The President expressed his gratitude for the invitation and his hope that he and Mrs. Johnson could visit Nepal.

## Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 3:00 PM

Mr. President:

Pres file

Attached, <u>for your approval</u>, is a proposed message to Emperor Haile Selassie on the anniversary of his coronation (November 3).

W. W. Rostow

Approve	
Disapprove	_
Speak to me	

EKH/RPM/vmr

## Presidential Anniversary Message to HIM Haile Selassie

Your Imperial Majesty:

I am deeply pleased to send you my warmest congratulations on the anniversary of your coronation. Your courage, your statesmanship and your great wisdom have long inspired men everywhere. Yet it is fitting that the finest tributes to Your Majesty's reign are the healthy children, the new homes, the new schools and roads and hospitals that give Ethiopia so much hope for the future.

On this day America joins the many friends of Ethiopia in marking your brilliant past. We know you will serve mankind in an equally brilliant future.

Mrs. Johnson and I send you, as always, our warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

## SECRET

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 1:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to know of this conversation between Amb. Johnson and Senators Sparkman and Tower, in Tokyo.

W. W. Rostow

**Tokyo 2972** 

-SEGRET-

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) Whate House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 DY 19 NARAD 11-2091

Pres file

## SECRET

Action

Info

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7138

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BT

SECRET TOKYO 2972

RECEIVED:

OCTOBER 31.

NODIS

1. DURING COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON JAPAN WITH SENATORS SPARK-MAN AND TOWER, WITH GENERAL RIDGEWAY ALSO PRESENT, I TOOK AD-VANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO LAY OUT THE OKINAWA AND BONINS ISSUE, INCLUDING QUESTION OF IWO JIMA. I, OF COURSE, POINTED OUT THAT NO DECISIONS, HAD BEEN MADE, I HAD NO IDEA OF WHAT WASH

NGTON DECISIONS MIGHT BE, BUT WAS SIMPLY LAYING OUT QUESTION AS SEEN BY GOJ WITH THE PROS AND CONS AS THEY APPEAR

- 2. BOTH SPARKMAN AND TOWER (AS WELL AS GENERAL RIDGEWAY) IN-DICATED THAT THEY FELT SOME "FORWARD MOVEMENT" ON OKINAWA LOOK TOWARD REVERSION PRIOR TO 1970 AND RETURN OF THE BONINS AT THIS TIME WAS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE AND NEITHER COULD FORE-SEE ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE US IF MATTER PRESENTED IN TERMS OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH FRIENDLY JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. DURING OUR DISCUSSION, I INCLUDED AS OBJECTIVE EXPLANATION AS I COULD OF MILITARY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RE-TENTION OF THE BONINS. AS FORMER NAVY OFFICER IN PACIFIC AND MEMBER OF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, I PARTICULARLY SOLICITED SENATOR TOWERJS VIEW ON IWO JIMA. SENATOR TOWER SAID THAT HE DID NOT FEEL THERE WOULD BE ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL OPPOSI-TION TO INCLUSION OF IWO JIMA IN RETURN OF BONINS.
- 3. I, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZED TO BOTH SENATORS THAT I WAS DISCUSSING THIS MATTER ONLY FROM LOCAL POINT OF VIEW IN CONTEXT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WAS SOLICITING THEIR VIEWS ONLY ON MOST INFORMAL AND PERSONAL BASIS. DEPENDING ON ANY DECISIONS THAT WASHINGTON MIGHT MAKE URWOULD ASSUME THAT THERE WOULD BE THE NORMAL CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL LADERSHIP AND I WAS NOT SEEKING TO TIE THEM TO THEIR OFF-THE-CUFF ANSWERS TO ME. HOWEVER, HOPE FOREGOING MAY BE HELPFUL YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THESE QUESTIONS.

GP-3. JOHNSON

SEGRET

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEI 94-476

, NARA, Date 1-10-95

Prestile

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 -- 1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk says he has conveyed your line of approach to Arthur Goldberg re Mansfield Resolution.

Arthur says he <u>cannot</u> get an Executive session, but will try to talk to principal committee members informally before public session.

Sec. Rusk will try to confirm this this afternoon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

## SECRET

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 12:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara have signed off on the attached cable covering Bunker and Westmoreland trips to the U.S.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b) White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983 By 19, NARA, Date 11-20-91

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Amembassy SAIGON

IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

STATE

NII 86-165

By A. NARA, Date 2-3-87

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

- 1. Highest levels desire that you plan to return here for consultation of approximately one week, arriving not later than November tenth. We are of course propered to send aircraft for departure at time you suggest, with possible allowance for rest en route. We are arranging that our Ambassador to Nepal will Nepalese remain here following completion of official/visit. Please advise your desires.
- 2. As to press handling and announcement, we would propose visit be placed in terms of normal consultation about six months after your arrival. Please adrise if you see any problems.
- 3. Topics for consultation will be broad, with principal focus on political prospects and GVN priority actions. However, we exe naturally wish to review progress and prospects on all fronts. Please give us your recommendations as to what winge

4235

EA:WPBundy:bam 10/30 422 DoD-Secretary McNamara

White House - Mr. Rostow

U - The Under Secretary

WXX The Secretary

SECRET

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

DS-322 8-65

2

Saigon

SECRET

you would wish to have accompany you.

4. You should inform Westmoreland of this plan and advise him that highest levels wish him to return for consultation, arriving so as to overlap for last 2 - 3 days of your visit, i.e., not later than November 15. DoD and JCS will be in touch directly with him on this.

GP-3

END

#### SECRET

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

This report on Vietnam from the Vice President is heartening.

W. W. Rostow

Kuala Lumpur 1709 (VIPTO 57)

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By Ag., NARA, Date 11-20-91

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

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SECRET KUALA LUMPUR 1709

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 93-50/

By NARA, Date 10-12-54

VIPTO 57

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO PASS SECRETARY

NODIS

I HAVE JUST LEFT VIET-NAM ON MY WAY TO KUALA LUMPUR
AFTER A FULL DAY WITH OUR TROOPS IN THE FIELD. THE
LEADERSHIP, QUALITY, AND THE MORALE OF OUR MEN IN UNIFORM IS
MAGNIFICENT. AS I REMARKED ON DEPARTURE FROM
CHU LAI A SHORT WHILE AGO, I SAW THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS
DURING MY VISIT TO VIET-NAM, AND HEARD NOT ONE COMPLAINT.
I SAW CONFIDENCE, SPIRIT AND DETERMINATION.

I WILL GIVE YOU A DETAILED REPORT ON RETURN. I
WISH TO EMPHASIZE NOW, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS SOLID REASON
FOR SATISFACTIONS AND OPTIMISM IF THE TRUE PICTURE CAN BE
SHOWN AND THE PUBLIC MADE TO UNDERSTAND IT. I AM
CERTAIN THATOUR COUNTRY CAN STEADILY BE MOBILIZED IN
SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS HERE. WE ARE WINNING-STEADY PROGRESS
IS EVERYWHERE EVIDENT.

PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY BOTH SEM
DETERMINED NOT ONLY TO UNDERTAKE POPULAR PROGRAMS TO
GAIN BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT, BUT SEEM TO BE
RESOLVED TO WORK TOGETHER IN UNITY. I MET AT LENGTH
WITH BOTH OF THEM, AS WELL AS WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPRR
AND LOWER HOUSES AND LABOR LEADERS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS
AND STUDENT LEADERS. MY MESSAGE TO THEM WAS ONE OF UNITY,
RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION.

I MADE IT CLEAR TO THIEU, KY AND OTHER LEADERS THAT AMBASSADOR BUNKER HAD YOUR FULLEST CONFIDENCE AND WAS THE

FACE -RUNJKL-1709-S-E-S-R-E-T SOLE SPOKESMAN FOR OUR COUNTRY IN VIET-NAM. HE ENJOYS UNIVERSAL RESPECT.

THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MEMBERS OF OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS HERE ARE CONFIDENT

PRESERVATION

SHOWN AND THE PUBLIC MADE TO UNDERSTAND IT. I AM -CERTAIN THATOUR COUNTRY CAN STEADILY BE MOBILIZED IN SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS "ERE. WE ARE WINNING-STEADY ROGRESS IS EVERYWHERE EVIDENT.

PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT KY BOTH SEEM DETERMINED NOT ONLY TO UNDERTAKE POPULAR PROGRAMS TO GAIN BROAD PUBLIC SUPPORT, OUT SEEM TO BE RESOLVED TO WORK TOGETHER IN UNITY. I MET AT LENGTH WITH BOTH OF THEM, AS WELL AS WITH MEMBERS OF THE UPPRR AND LOWER HOUSES AND LABOR LEADERS, UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND STUDENT LEADERS. MY MESSAGE TO THEM WAS ONE OF UNITY, RECONCILIATION AND COOPERATION.

I MADE IT CLEAR TO THIEU, KY AND OTHER LEADERS THAT AMBASSADOR BUNKER HAD YOUR FULLEST CONFIDENCE AND WAS THE

PAGE-3-RUMJKL-1709-6-E-6-R-E-T SOLE SPOKESMAN FOR OUR COUNTRY IN VIET-NAM. HE ENJOYS UNIVERSAL RESPECT.

THE AMBASSADOR, GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND MEMBERS OF OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS HERE ARE CONFIDENT OF OUR SUCCESS. WITH THEIR WORK, WITH THE COOPERATION OF ALLIES, AND AT THE PRESENT RATE OF PROGRESS, I AM REASONABLY SURE THAT THE NEWS WILL CONTINUE TO BE BETTER.

THE CRITICAL FACTOR, OF COURSE, IS WHETHER OR NOT THE THIEU/KY GOVERNMENT CAN BUILD A STRONG BROAD BASE AMONG THE PEOPLE. IF THEY MAINTAIN THEIR PRESENT DETERMINATION, AND IF THEY MOVE QUICKLY TO IMPLEMENT THEIR PLANS, I BELIEVE THEY WILL. AMBASSAOR BUNKER CAN BE RELIED ON TO ACHIEVE THIS.

MORE THAN EVER, I AM CONVINCED THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE IS RIGHT AND THAT WE HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO PERSEVERE AND SEE IT TROUGH TO SUCCESS.

A FULL, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT MY DEPARTURE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWS BY SEPARATE CABLE.

BELL BT



#### -SECRET

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 11:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

This CIA report on the training of negroes in Cuba for disruptive activities in the United States has been referred to the Director, FBI. You may wish Marv to solicit his comment.

W. W. Rostow

-SECRET-

DECLASSIFIED

R.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-481

By in NARA, Date 1-24-96

WWRostow:rln

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

31 CL A/

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow

Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT

: Training of Negroes in Cuba

Attached is a report which I believe will be of interest to you. The sources of this information are being identified to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Thomas H. Karamessines Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment: a/s

cc: The Secretary of State

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

1.3(a)(4)

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-025-1-14

By 90, NARA, Date 1/7/02



#### TRAINING OF NEGROES IN CUBA

 The following reports have been received from Cuban refugee sources concerning alleged Negro training schools which are located in the Santiago de Cuba area.

2. A Cuban refugee who arrived in Miami on 1967
reported that she had been in contact with one
in Cuba who told her that he was a member of an anti-Castro resis-
tance group which maintained contact with the United States. She
claimed that she was invited by to join this resistance
group but that she declined to do so. She described as
a white man about 29 years old. According to source, before she
departed for the United States in early October, was requested
that she inform the United States Government that a Negro training
camp has been in operation for some time at Playa Siboney (located
near Santiago de Cuba). Source, claiming to quote said
that these Negroes were being trained for subversive operations
against the United States and their courses included English which
was taught by Soviet instructors. The students were to be infiltrated
into the United States through the normal airlift channel and would be
claimed by relatives on their arrival. Their subversive activities
가는 아마지는 아니 말을 다시 됐다. 그녀를 하나 있는 것이 되었는데 말을 하나 하는데
against the United States would include sabotage in connection with
race riots directed at bringing about a Negro revolution in the United
States. According to the report, approximately 150 Negroes are in-
volved in the training program and some have already arrived in the
United States and have been replaced by new students in the training
camp.

A former Santiago de Cuba who arrived in the United States on 1967, reported there is a training school about four blocks from Morro Castle in Ciudad Mar near Santiago de Cuba. All of the trainees are Negroes, some of whom are said to be from Africa. Source stated "it is common knowledge among the area residents" that these Negroes are being trained to infiltrate the United States to stimulate unrest among American Negroes. Source later identified the exact site as La Estrella Beach Club, an exclusively Negro beach club prior to 1959.

SANITIZED E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5 NLJ 04-149 By u.s., NARA, Date 11-8-04

- 4. A former Santiago de Cuba who arrived in the United States on 1967, reported that many beach and summer houses in Ciudad Mar have been appropriated by the Cuban Government and are presently occupied by 100 to 150 young men from North Vietnam, North Korea, Africa, and Latin American countries. The entire area is restricted with only limited civilian traffic permitted in daylight hours. Source stated that at Playa Daiquiri, a former white beach resort approximately one hour southeast of Santiago de Cuba (and only 5 - 10 minutes drive from Playa Siboney), there is a two-story white concrete building, a former private beach clubhouse, which is now used for classrooms for trainees. This area is secured by a barbed wire fence and has several guard posts. Orientals and Africans, wearing field packs, carrying weapons and being transported by Cuban Army trucks, have been observed in this area.
- 5. A former Havana who arrived in the United States on 1966, reported that an alleged guerrilla training school is located 1/2 kilometer from Guantanamo City on the road to Santiago de Cuba. Many Negroes, reported to have come from Africa, were observed in the school area.

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 10:55 a.m.

# Pres file

#### Mr. President:

You might be interested in this personal letter to me from Cy Sulzberger covering general impressions of South Americanand Afrea, plus Sec. Rusk's new son-in-law.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

### The New Hork Times 37 Rue Caumartin Paris.FRANCE

Accra, Oct. 24, 1967

C. L. SULZBERGER

Dear Walt:

I promised I'd write you after finishing my South American trip and, being a man of my word, I do so although I really have nothing to say. That is, I don't have anything keft over from what I squeezed into my columns. The Alianza approach is obviously a right approach but the Augean stable is so enormous that I wonder if Uncle Hercules can flush it out fast enough. If one looks backward at what has been done the accomplethments are truly impressive. But if one looks forward at what remains, the prospect is flabbergasting. My essential feeling is that the Alianza needs more executive coordination at the top and a renewed stress on its wish to reform and improve societies, to help the underdog. The old feudal families will resent this but they can scarcely opt for Castro in exchange.

As I wrote I think our arms policy was being nonsensical but thank Heavens we got out of that bind. I was most impressed with the quality of our embassies (except in Venezuela) and also by the wisdom of some ambassadors like Tuthill in Rio and Hoyt in Montevideo who want to trim the size of uselessly swollen staffs and get the USA out of many useless endeavors we drifted into. That's about it, Walt. Africa presents even more ghastly headaches, alas. I guess I'll be on this dreary continent at least a month more but if by any chance you wish to write me I suggest the above address. All the warmest regards,

P.S.Dean Rusk's new son-in-law has been an unexpected pelbtycal bonanza in both S.A. and A., quite apart from looking like ted pelbtycal bonanza

Wednesday, November 1, 1967 9:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a better and more substantive speech proposed for Thursday morning.

You may wish to read it before making a final decision.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

Prestile

# THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA

(Draft Speech by the President on the Occasion of Foreign Service Day)

I am delighted to have this opportunity to meet with this distinguished company of members and friends of the Foreign Service of the United States. It is entirely fitting that we pause once each year to honor the men and women of the Foreign Service for their important contributions to our nation.

On this occasion, many subjects might appropriately be discussed, for the work of the Foreign Service is as broad and varied as the world itself. I have chosen to speak to you about one part of the world, Asia, whose importance to the United States has grown within our own lifetimes and whose future influence on our own peace and prosperity may be expected to increase.

When I was a boy, the term "the Orient" was a synonym for what was strange and mysterious. My friends and I never stopped to think that we in the West were perhaps as strange and mysterious in Eastern eyes as Orientals were in ours.

In this attitude we were no different from most people in most countries, and in all periods of history.

We defined "strangeness" as being different from ourselves. We didn't reflect that perhaps all nations
and civilizations are strange.

For man everywhere is strange and infinitely various.

Each civilization has its own experience of the world.

Each has its own notions of what is "strange" and what

is "natural." And if we in the West have now learned

that lesson, as I think we have, we owe this to the work

that you and your predecessors have performed.

Many of you here today extended our understanding of Asia's richness and variety. In teaching us more about Asia, you have helped us to understand ourselves better. And you have done the great work of eliminating the twin superstitions that are fed by ignorance -- one is the superstition that the patterns of any civilization can be easily transported to another. The other, its opposite, is the superstition that there is an unbridgeable gulf between East and West. Your own work demonstrates the falsehood of this time-worn platitude.

Thanks in part to the work of the Foreign Service, indeed, we can now set about, in the East and West alike, to place our relations on a more realistic basis.

. For more than a thousand years, Asia and the Western world have intermittently traded and traveled back and

forth. But, for the most part, they went their separate ways. Only in the past hundred years has the impact of the industrialized West on traditional Asia become the major theme of Asian history.

Over much of Asia the West imposed colonial systems.

The West also powerfully influenced independent Asian states through trade, cultural exchange and occasional armed clashes.

The Western impact on Asia has had two main effects. First, it set in motion a process of change, of political and economic modernization. Second, it left a heritage of resentment against the West.

The growing relationship between Asia and the West brought progress and mutual benefit, but was also marred by strife. The blind fury of the Boxers, the

aggressive actions of the Japanese militarists, and the bitter hostility of Maoist China today, all have manifested in different manner and degree the failure of Asia and the West to progress side-by-side in harmony.

The dismantling of the outmoded colonial system following World War II created a new basis for relations between Asia and the West. A community of fiercely independent Asian states has arisen. They reject domination, either by the West or by their Asian neighbors.

They will resist attempts to take them over, whether by armed force or subversion. New and productive relationships have been worked out between these states and the West, facilitating the advance toward shared goals of modernization and progress.

The past few years have taught one simple lesson.

This is that fastest progress toward the aspirations of Asian peoples occurs where close and fruitful collaboration between free Asian states and Western countries exists. Anti-Western, totalitarian, closed societies, imposed "out of the barrel of a gun" are not the answer.

The United States has a long history of contact with Asia -- dating from the time when the United States itself was a colony and including our own brief flirtation with Colonialism in the Philippines. But only since World War II have the people of the United States come to realize that their destiny is linked with that of the peoples of Asia.

We have come to recognize that in Asia, no less than in Europe, we have a stake in the principle that peoples should be allowed to live out their lives free

from forcible interference by powerful neighbors. And we have also come to accept that it is in our own interest that Asian peoples should progress toward their goal of modernization. Together with like-minded states, both Asian and non-Asian, we have worked hard to achieve these ends.

There is thus a harmony of interests between America and the emerging Asia. We seek for Asia the two essentials flowing from her history: modernization and independence. This is what Asia seeks. So we can work together in a common cause with Asia in the central role.

I do not mean that all problems are solved -- far from it. A deep gulf between Western and Asian cultures continues to exist. Misunderstandings will occur and recur. But the prospects for overcoming our differences

and working together with goodwill on common problems are better than ever before.

of course, it is necessary for the United States and its allies to persevere in Vietnam. This we will do. Eventually Hanoi will realize that its aggression against South Vietnam cannot succeed. Then resources which have had to be expended in war will be released for more constructive uses. And when that time comes, Hanoi will find us ready and willing to join with them and others in rapidly healing the wounds of war.

I have said before that a peaceful Mainland China is central to a peaceful Asia. We understand and sympathize with the desire of the Chinese people to assume an international role in Asia appropriate to their distinguished contributions to mankind.

We do not believe that the hostility expressed today by Peking toward much of the rest of the world will persist indefinitely. We look forward to the day when belligerence toward the United States will moderate. We intend to continue seeking ways through which the blocked lines of communication between the people of the United States and Mainland China can be reopened.

But healing these misunderstandings is only one of the tasks. Another is modernization and there are formidable obstacles to modernization. The greatest is the need for food enough to feed the exploding populations of Asia. They are not eating enough food nor enough of the right kinds. And not enough progress is being made toward closing the nourishment gap.

The nations of Asia, with the support of the

developed countries, should take as their goal closing the nourishment gap within one generation. Hunger has stalked Man through thousands of years of history. So this is a goal worthy of our best efforts. We should not waver. The means are at hand to destroy this ancient enemy. It can be done in one generation. It would be wrong for the world to take longer.

Let us consider what must be done to close the nourishment gap in one generation.

First, it means that incomes have to be raised so that the food that is produced can be sold. Unless the farmer of Asia has a good market he will not produce.

Second, it means the rural sector of Asia must be modernized so that it can produce more. And this means education; education of an entire generation of people.

For only education can break the bonds of traditionalism that enshackle entire rural areas. And only a generation freed from these shackles can achieve real breakthroughs in food production. Only a modern minded rural sector will participate in the economy of the nation.

Let us not wait for the children of the rural people to migrate to the cities to bring them the benefits of enlightenment. It is as urgently needed on the farm.

Efforts in agriculture to date have frequently been limited to the small fraction of the farmers who are now part of the modern economy. In the short run this pays off. But if we lift our sights to the task for the generation ahead of us the perspective changes: then we see that it is not enough to work with isolated

enclaves in the rural areas. There is time enough to do the job right. And to do it right all the people must be included.

Third, it means the urban sector must fabricate the tools needed on the farm and the goods to sell the farmer in exchange for his food. For unless the farmer has the tools and the prospect of a reward he will not produce.

Fourth, in order to achieve any of these steps,

the growth of population must be stabilized. For the

unbridled expansion in Man's numbers is the most basic

barrier to success.

In short, the war on hunger is as broad as the war on underdevelopment.

We must not be easily satisfied with half-way measures.

This means that all of us -- developed and developing nations alike--must stay the course for a full generation--or more if need be.

There is no need to despair. For much progress has been made. Japan, Korea and Taiwan have virtually closed the nourishment gap. New strains of rice in the Philippines give promise of dramatic results. There is much the Asians have learned; much they can teach one another.

And providentially, there is a new movement arising in Asia: the movement toward regionalism. There is a growing awareness in Asian countries of their increasing dependence on one another; a growing desire to cooperate in quest of modernization. Thus, through the development of regionalism, lessons learned in one part of Asia can spread throughout the area.

In this new trend the developed nations of the Pacific Basin have an important and cooperative role to play in meeting khm emerging needs.

Speaking of the oncoming generation of Asians, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Singapore observed: "For Youth, anti-colonialism ispart of history and communism has split and lost its appeal in the process. Perhaps regionalism with its promise of stability and economic progress will be youth's big concept for the future."

But, despite the best efforts of all of us, there will be times when acute shortages of food develop; times when crops fail for reasons beyond the control of the nations and the farmers affected.

Secretary Rusk spoke of the need to take concerted measures against such disasters a year ago when the Development

Assistance Committee met in Washington. I have asked

Secretary Rusk, working with others in the U.S. Government

to develop a plan for international action which, if agreed

by other nations, would help to meet this need.

I have spoken to you of the new synthesis emerging in our relations with Asia. There are understandable resentments against the West of the past, but a new generation of Asians is with us which will not waste its heritage in beating the dead horse of colonialism nor be beguiled by the waning ideology of communism but has set for itself the reasonable goals of modernization and independence. These/visions we share. These are goals we can support with all our hearts.

Let conflicts and misunderstanding be done and in their place this resolve: that this will be the last generation in

which men go hungry and children grow stunted by undernourishment. Let this resolve be the beginning of a new
relationship between Men of the East and the West, a relationship that will endure and will lift the World to nobler purposes
and deeper understanding.

Wednesday, November 1, 1967
9:15 a.m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith the information you requested on South Vietnamese casualties, broken down by:

-- regular forces (ARVN);

-- regional forces;

-- popular forces.

Broadly speaking, in the past, regular forces operated throughout one of the four corps areas; regional forces operated throughout a province; popular forces were tied to the defense of a hamlet or village, dealing with attacks by local guerrillas.

As you know, a considerable proportion of the regular forces have been assigned to regular security duty in connection with pacification. Regular forces also include air force and navy units, plus forces assigned to certain static defense tasks with respect to security of major urban areas.

As the summary sheet reveals, the casualties taken by regular forces, in relation to their numbers, are not much out of proportion: 46% to 54%. The popular forces do take casualties disproportionate to their numbers: 35% to 23%. This is because VC tactics consist often in concentrating in secret a sizable force and then jumping a village or hamlet under circumstances where the VC have initial tactical superiority. The popular forces then call in aircraft and other support, but bear the brunt of the initial engagement.

W. W. R.

Attachments

# South Vietnamese Military Order of Battle as of September 1967

	(in thousands)		Percent of				
	<i>h</i> .		Total				
Regular	, ,	332.5	54				
Regiona	ıl	144.3	23				
Popular		141.4	23				

# Killed in first half of 1967 in:

	Rate per 1,000 OB	Percent of Total
Regular	7.8	46
Regional	7.4	. 19
Popular	13.6	35

Table 4E 3 of 3

RVMAF CASUALTIES (Regular, Popular and Regional Force -By RVN Corps Area)

C. (2) 1 - 4																			_				_
원물이 많아보는 것	1965		1966						10				1967	7				- 40					
	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	lst	2nd Qtr	Jul	Aug	Sep	3rd Qtr	Oct	Nov	Dec	4th Qtr	Jan	Feb	Mar	lst . Qtr	Apr	Har	Jun	2nd Qtr	lst Half	Jul	Aug
REGULAR FORCES			1		-		- 0.7				200	11	1		1.7		5 ,	. 325					
KIA WIA MIA/CAPT	1247 2747 242	1541 3764 555	1107 3151 225	884 2693 103	346 811 39	257 736 20	270 768 56	873 2315 115	331 1118 38	322 994 26	326 905 227	979 3017 291	338 933	347 1172 34	482 1526 144	1167 3631 197	577 1670 21	530 1862 39	269 976	1376 4508 64	2543 8139 261	340 1208 52	383 1322 15
TOTAL	14236	5860	4483	3680	1196	1013	1094	3303	1487	1342	1458	4287	1290	1553	2152	4995	2268	2431	1249	5948	10943	1600	1720
REGIONAL FORCES KIA WIA MIA/CAPT TOTAL	585 1196 205 1986	755 1255 313 2323	786 1103 329 2218	452 879 170	212 393 52 657	181 274 126	96 248 4	489 915 182	188 335 58	164 363 44	202 422 45	554 1120 147	222 436 49	191 488 37	213 570 126	626 1494 212	122 347 50	133 398 39	166 421 29 616	121 1166 138	1047 2660 350 4057	146 369 38	205 465 42
POPULAR PORCES	2,00	-3-3	2210	1501	057	581	340	1586	581	571	669	1821	707	716	909	2332	519	, 590	010	1127	40)	553	712
KIA WIA MIA/CAPT	789 1517 754	938 1714 803	809 1262 635	759 1206 237	303 435 151	291 482 62	195 483 117	789 1400 330	392 626 126	320 576 131	286 524 66	998 1726 323	326 667 97	239 464 85	427 690 197	992 1821 379	236 474 64	365 568 50	336 725 106	937 1767 220	1929 3588 599	179 355 34	265 493 75
TOTAL	3060	3455	2706	2202	889	835	795	2519	1144	1027	, 876	3047	1090	788	1314	3192	774	983	1167	2924	6116	568	833
TOTALS  XIA  WIA  MIA/CAPT	2621 5460 1201	3234 6733 1671	2702 5516 1189	2095 14778 510	861 1639 242	729 1492 208	561 1499 177	2151 4630 627	911 2072 222	806 1933 201	814 1851 338	2531 5856 761	886 2036 165	777 2124 156	1122 2786 467	2785 6946 788	935 2491 135	1028- 2828 148	771 2122 139	2734 7441 422	5519 14387 1210	665 1932 124	853 2280 132
GRAND TOTAL	9282	11638	9407	′ 7383	2742	2429	2237	7408	3215	2940	3003	9148	3087	3057	4375	10519	3561	40 <b>04</b>	3032	10597	21116	2721.	3265

Data are from DIA worksheets based on USMACV Military Report for period July 1 - September 25 and on USMACV Weekly Summary and OFREP-5 for period September 25 to present.

Mr. Rostow 81 2. Prespile

#### Wednesday, November 1, 1967

Mr. President:

You have so many problems presented to you that I feel we sometimes neglect telling you when things go right.

Armin Meyer's letter (attached)
thanking you for making the Shah's visit
a great success is only the latest in a
series of reports on the Shah's deep satisfaction.

The Shah himself has also just sent the attached thank-you letter for your gifts and congratulations on his coronation. No reply is needed since this is his response to you.

#### W. W. Rostow

Att: 1. Ltr from Armin H. Meyer, American Ambassador to Iran, to The President, 10/21/67

2. Ltr from the Shah to the President, 10/24/67

Tehran, October 21, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Nothing since my return to Tehran (which was delayed because of temporary duty at UN) has diminished my conviction that the Shah's visit to our country enjoyed success without precedent.

In a letter to Secretary Rusk I have suggested that the two greatest gains were: a) the focussing of both Iranian and American attention on the broad positive picture rather than on bones of contention; and b) understanding each other's problems, with each side taking the other's problems into account in the shaping of policies. Both these gains, in my view, are the essence of diplomacy.

The warmth which you and Mrs. Johnson and your White House family so graciously accorded His Majesty obviously moved him deeply. The hospitality at the dinner and the master stroke of presenting the Shah unscheduled to the legislators in the East Room reinforced the bonds of understanding and friendship which featured your two tete a tete discussions with His Majesty.

All in all, the visit exceeded our fondest hopes. As a result, American-Iranian relations are healthier than ever. We shall still have problems (some of them unfortunately due to a lingering lack of Congressional understanding) but thanks to our President, his lady and their Washington team (including Walt Rostow, Hal Saunders and Bess Abell), we who serve you in Iran are confident that this country will remain a bright spot for progress and a true friend of our country and the principles for which it stands.

Sincerely,

Armin H. Meyer American Ambassador

The President The White House



24th October, 1967.

Dear Mr. President,

It gave me infinite pleasure to receive your very kind letter of felicitations on behalf of yourself and Mrs. Johnson on the occasion of the Coronation of the Empress and myself which coincides with my birthday celebrations.

I am deeply touched by the very kind words which you have expressed with regard to my country, the Empress and myself.

It is a source of great satisfaction that the traditional relations existing between the United States of America and Iran have at all times, and in every circumstance, been founded on co-operation, understanding and mutual trust.

I am particularly glad that the present occasion offers me the opportunity to renew my expression of deep admiration for you, Mr. President, and to wish you every success in leading the noble American Nation towards greater prosperity.

The Empress and I have received, through the Ambassador, the beautiful silver-gilt dish, engraved with your coat of arms and the Imperial emblem of Iran, and the interesting maps which you were so kind as to send us. We both wish to offer you our warmest and heartfelt thanks for your kind thought.

The Empress joins me in conveying to you, as well as to Mrs. Johnson, our best wishes for your continued good health and happiness.

Sincerely,

M.R. Vahlan

The Honourable
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

82

Pres file

#### CONFIDENTIAL

November 1, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your comments to the Malaysian Finance Minister about the need for more assistance in Viet-Nam generated some action.

Through Secretary Rusk, the Malaysian Prime Minister has sent his assurances to you that Malaysia will not only continue to train South Vietnamese officers, but will increase the size of that program.

The Malaysians have also sent a note to the Department of State itemizing the assistance they have provided to South Viet-Nam. Their contribution is considerably greater than was described to you in the meeting with the Finance Minister.

- -- Over 5,000 Vietnamese officers trained in Malaysia.
- -- Training of 150 U.S. soldiers in handling Tracker Dogs.
- -- A rather impressive list of military equipment and weapons given Viet-Nam after the end of the Malaysian insurgency (for example, 641 armored personnel carriers, 56,000 shotguns).
- -- A creditable amount of civil assistance (transportation equipment, cholera vaccine, and flood relief.

Our Ambassador to Malaysia, Jim Bell, is all revved up to work with the Malaysians on an increased program of training assistance for the Vietnamese. I expect there will be some developments on this within the next month or so.

Secretary Rusk undertook to convey the Prime Minister's assurances to you, and this memorandum is intended to discharge that undertaking.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

MWright:hg

NEJ 94-475 By 48, NARA, Date 4-6-95

CONFIDENTIAL

THE AMBASSADOR



KEDUTAAN BESAR MALAYSIA

EMBASSY OF MALAYSIA 2401 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

October 13, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Dean Rusk The Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would refer to the conversation between the

Honorable Tun Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance of Malaysia,
and His Excellency Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United

States of America, on the afternoon of October 10, 1967, at
the White House. During that conversation the President
touched on the question of training by Malaysia of more South

Vietnamese officers in Malaysia.

I have today been asked by Prime Minister Tunku

Abdul Rahman to renew his assurances to the President that

Malaysia will not only continue to provide such training but

also to give it to larger numbers of South Vietnamese officers.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Ong Yoke Lin

Authority NIJOOIR -276-1-52 (+1884)

By A NARA, Date 2/1/12

lic d 10/18/67 (38)

THE AMBASSADOR



KEDUTAAN BESAR MALAYSIA

EMBASSY OF MALAYSIA 2401 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008

October 17, 1967

ACTION is assigned to

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Dean Rusk The Secretary of State Department of State Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Further to my letter of October 13, 1967, I attach herewith detailed information on the assistance Malaysia has given to South Vietnam.

Please accept, Mr. Secretary, the renewed assurances of my highest esteem and consideration.

> Yours sincerely, Customber

Ong Yoke Lin

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 NLJ 00-201 By Cb , NARA Date 10-25-00

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ CO-20/

M Lysia was the first Asian count. to provide training assistance and military material to the anti-communist effort in South Vietnam.

# (A) Training Assistance:

Over 5,000 Vietnamese armed forces and police officers have been trained in Malaysia since 1956, the date of inception of training programme.

#### Recent Figures:

	1.0			
	1963	-	*	1141
35.5	1964	-	52	699
	1965	-		764
	1966			59,2
Up to September	1967	-		840
		Tot	al	4036

# (B) Types of Training for Officers:

- (a) Senior advanced administration and police duties.
- (b) Techniques of instructions, criminal investigation and general duties.
- (c) Police field force training.
- (d) Jungle warfare, riot control training and emergency methods.
- (e) Special branch.
- (f) Special branch intelligence.
- (g) Set up of operations rooms and working of SWEC and the maintenance of criminal records.

# (C) Training for U.S. Soldiers in the handling of Tracker Dogs:

In 1965 American soldiers were given training at Kota Tinggi in the handling of Tracker Dogs. The training programme involved the training of 15 teams of 150 U.S. Army men and 30 British Labrador Dogs. They were trained by British Army Experts in Kota Tinggi, Johore.

# (D) Military Material:

#### (i) Vehicles:

641 Armoured personnel carriers.
2957 Items of various spare parts

# (ii) Weapons:

		Item	Quantity
(	(a)	Stevens Savage S/Gun 12-bore	23,342
	(ъ)	Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore	22,365
.(	(c)	Winchester S/Gun P/A 12 PV Bore	4,918
. (	(d)	Remington S/Gun P/A 12-bore	4,950
	(e)	Carbine .30	836
	(f)	Carbine Magazine .30	3,344
. (	(g)	Carbine Bayonet	836
(	(h)	Browning Pistol 9 MM	436
	(i)	Browning Magazine 9 MM	450
_	(j)	Ammunition 12-bore	1,900,000
	(k)	Ammunition .30 carbine	3,000,000
	(1)	Ammunition 9 MM	1,000,000

# (iii) Weapons Spare Parts Items:

- (a) Stevens S/Gun 12-bore
- (b) Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore (New)
- (c) Iver Johnson S/Gun 12-bore (Part-worn)
- (d) Remington P/A S/Gun 12-bore
- (e) Winchester P/A S/Gun 12-bore
- (f) Carbine .30 mark I
- · (g) Pistol Browning Auto 9 MM
  - (h) Pistol Signal No. 1 Mark V One Inch

# (E) Civil Assistance:

- (i) Spare parts by S/Malaysian Railways
- (ii) Gifts of 12 Mark I and 18 Mark II Wickham Trolleys
- (iii) 500 c.c. Anti-Cholera Vaccine in 1964
- (iv) Gift of M\$30,000.00 to South Vietnamese Government in December 1964 for Flood Relief.

### (F) Pacification and Rural Development:

On June 14, 1967, Malaysia sent a ranking three man mission headed by the Chairman of the Federal Land Development Authority to South Vietnam to study pacification and rural development programmes with a view to recommending to the Malaysian Government the most effective ways by which Malaysia would assist Vietnam's development programme. This is manifestation of Malaysia's deep concern and interest re South Vietnam.

In an article entitled "Malaysia: Key area in South Fest
Asia" in the July 1965 edition of Foreign Affairs, an American quarterly
review, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said:

"We look northward in Asia with equal anxiety. We see the unscrupulous advantage the Communists have taken of small and weak states, most of whom have shaken off the burden of colonialism only to fall under the spell of Communism. Vietnam, in particular, has caused us great concern, as we have watched the familiar Communist pattern being re-enacted by the Hanoi Government, using the usual methods of infiltration, subversion and open aggression against South Vietnam, making a mockery of the Geneva I recall that the very first foreign country I visited Agreement of 1954. after becoming Prime Minister of newly independent Malaya was South Vietnam in January 1958. I declared then that the Communist aggression taking place both in Malaya and in South Vietnem was rightly the concern of the whole free world, and that our two countries were fighting in the front line of the battle for freedom. In 1960, I did what I could to help South Vietnam in its struggle against Communism. All the guns and ammunition and vehicles which had become surplus to us as the result of the ending of our own emergency I had shipped to Saigon. We started our own aid program, quietly and without publicity, to train some thousands of Vietnamese in either jungle warfare or police administration; and we are continuing to do so today.

"The long history of aggressive action by North Vietnam and its intensifications of hostilities in recent months more than justify the firm stand taken by the United States. We in Malaysia fully support Washington's actions. Past experience has clearly shown that the Communists will back down whenever they are faced with determined and definite opposition. Cuba, the Berlin Blockade and the incidents in the Tongkin Culf, each of which Malaysia completely supported at the time, are testimony to this. We cannot, however, ignore the fear felt by many nations that

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-476

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NEJ 94-476

By .... NARA, Date 1-10-95

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the war in Vietnam may escalate into such proportions that an ultimate peaceful solution becomes impossible. We, therefore, welcome President Johnson's statement that the United States is ready to negotiate without any precondition. His proposal for a massive aid program to Southeast Asia clearly shows that the United States is seeking neither political nor military conquest, but desires only an honorable settlement of the Vietnamese problem.

"From our own experience it is our belief, however, that the final answer in Vietnam does not lie in either arms or economic aid but in the hearts and minds of the people. The present state of affairs in South Vietnam is due to a lack of ideological response to an ideological challenge. Political instability in Saigon has drawn attention away from the basic principles of freedome for which South Vietnam has been fighting. The Republic of Vietnam must be given time to reconsolidate itself on these principles and its people must have an opportunity to understand that democracy is worth fighting and dying for. In the long run, the present military involvement by the United States can only be temporary; but it will provide that essential time. In our view it is imperative that the United States does not retire from the scene; such action would create an ideological vacuum which only the Communists would exploit. "

# On 22 August 1966 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The South Vietnamese have every right to defend their territorial integrity by whatever means available to them. So the request by friendly nations to help them including America shows the extent of their plight as otherwise they would be wiped out by superior forces aided by outside powers."

#### On 20 January 1967 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The intention of the Communists is not just to take over South

that democracy is worth fighting and dying for. In the long run, the present mileary involvement by the United test can only be temporary; but it will provide that essential time. In our view it is imperative that the United States does not retire from the scene; such action would create an ideological vacuum which only the Communists would exploit.

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#### On 20 January 1967 Prime Minister stated in Parliament:

"The intention of the Communists is not just to take over South Vietnam. They will not stop there. They will carry on and on until they succeed in taking over every country in the world. Americans felt that one of the ways of shortening the war is to bomb military targets in North Vietnam."

On September 16, 1967. Prime Minister stated in London at

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers! Conference that without the help
and encouragement given by Communist China North Vietnam would not have been
able to carry the war into the territory of South Vietnam. Had the
Americans not gone to the assistance of South Vietnam, North Vietnam
which had got its forces into the south could occupy the country through
military means. If this kind of Communist aggression was allowed to
succeed the Prime Minister continued, it would be a matter of time before
they marched through and militarily occupy the whole of Asia. Prime
Minister went on that those who criticise the Americans for their
assistance to South Vietnam should not be blind to the intervention of
Communist powers in the war in Vietnam.

On 21 September 1966 Maleysia together with Theiland and
Philippines spearheaded "An Asian Initiative" at the United Nations to
get North and South Vietnam to settle their dispute by negotiation.

Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak stated in New York:

"Our main concern is to bring the conflict from the battle ground to the Conference Table. I will raise the Vietnam issue at the United Nations as it has now become our main concern. This situation constitutes a very real threat to the peace and security of South East Asia. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines will make an appeal to the North and South Vietnam to settle the dispute by negotiations."

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have conveyed to the President the assurances of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman as set forth in your letter of October 13, 1967. The detailed information contained in your letter of October 17 was also very useful.

We are most appreciative of Malaysia's past contributions to the cause in Viet-Nam, vital as it is to both our national interests. That the Prime Minister is now prepared to accept a larger number of Vietnamese officers for special police training is indeed heartening. I understand this program has been very helpful.

We also admire the way in which Malaysia is sharing a rich experience through Tun Razak's development seminars. As you have demonstrated, the skills of rural development are essential to peace, which is the ultimate goal we all seek in Viet-Nam. A training program for appropriate Vietnamese officials, conducted at one of your development sites, could significantly advance the struggle to bring peace and achieve a better life for the courageous people of Viet-Nam.

Sincerely yours,

15/

Dean Rusk

His Excellency
Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin, Clearances:
Ambassador of Malaysia.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-476

By NARA, Date 1-10-95

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN WATSON

Pres file

SUBJECT: U. S. Delegation to Ceremony Dedicating the Mangla Dam in Pakistan (November 23)

I think you know that the President has asked Averell Harriman to head the U. S. delegation to this ceremony. The project is the largest of the \$1 billion in works financed under the Indus Basin Treaty. We are the largest single contributor in a club of 8 donors.

Harriman is having a rough time getting people from Congress to join the delegation. With Senator Mansfield talking about adjournment that weekend, nobody wants to be away during the last minute rush.

Averell wonders whether there are any governors or others that the President would like to honor by naming them to this delegation. Candidates who have occurred to him are Governors Connally,, Guy and Rampton, as well as people like Pat Brown.

Harriman has room for perhaps four such people if the President wants to send them. Their wives would also be invited. Would you check this with the President?

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday, November 1, 1967

Pres. file.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

Attached is today's political situation report on Viet-Nam.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

SECRET/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

### SEGRET/EXDIS

Viet-Nam Political Situation Report November 1, 1967

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

Installation of New Government

Thieu and Ky were inaugurated in a brief but impressive ceremony on October 31. Thieu's inaugural speech stressed the same three themes which he highlighted in his speech to the Senate two weeks ago: building democracy, restoring peace and reforming society.

Thieu has announced the appointment of Nguyen Van Loc as Prime Minister. Thieu has asked the members of the present Cabinet to remain on until Loc forms his government, hopefully within a week. Thieu has also inaugurated the Lower House in a brief opening session.

### Vice President's Conversations

Thieu expressed to the Vice President full awareness of the public opinion problem in the United States. The Vice President specifically cited corruption, the performance of the Vietnamese armed forces, and the refugee problem as particular problem areas in American public opinion. The Vice President also suggested to Thieu that the new government's first few months were extremely important.

The Vice President also explained U.S. public opinion problems to Ky, and suggested that the Vietnamese Government might wish to strengthen its information services.

The Vice President met at lunch with a group of Vietnamese political, labor and academic leaders. He stressed that the success of the new government was vital to both Viet-Nam and the United States and that progress during the next six months was crucial. He also emphasized the importance of cooperation between legislative and executive branches in the months ahead. Phan Quang Dan, prominent Constituent Assembly Deputy and unsuccessful Vice Presidential candidate, stressed that the Vietnamese Government and people must play a larger part in conducting the affairs of their country, now that there is a constitutional system.

SECRET/EXDIS

fru file

#### CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - November 1, 1967

Mr. President:

I wonder whether during your conversation with President Diaz Ordaz you raised the problem which the Ford Motor Company is having in Mexico?

If so, did President Diaz Ordaz react favorably to the appointment of representatives to look into it?

W. W. Rostow

Ι	did	not	ra	ise	it	
I	rai	sed	it.	sec	me	

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-18

By \_\_\_\_\_\_, NARA, Date 5-23-95

86

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - November 1, 1967

Prestile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: President Frei's Arms Limitation Proposal

Yesterday President Frei made a public call for the Latin American countries to limit their acquisition of new military equipment. He asked that his statement be brought to your attention.

The Frei proposal is an exhortation rather than a specific proposal. It is a plea against an arms race which would drain resources from development and be contrary to the spirit of economic integration and the Alliance for Progress. Frei specifically disclaimed passing judgment on purchases which governments might have made in exercise of their sovereign rights. He said that what is needed is specific agreements to carry out the arms limitation pledge made by the Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este. But he added that he was not proposing an arms limitation conference, although Chile would attend if some other country took the initiative.

The statement puts Frei on the side of the angels, but it does not get us very far down the road of specific agreement on arms limitation. On the contrary, this kind of grandstand play without careful advance preparation with other governments is likely to do more harm than good.

The origin of the Frei statement goes back to a conversation which Secretary Rusk and Govey Oliver had with Ambassador Tomic following the swearing in of Ed Korry. Tomic was told that we would welcome a Latin American initiative aimed at restraining an arms buildup. He passed this on to President Frei, who quickly embraced the idea and asked if we would back him. State said yes, pointing out the need to do careful homework with other countries before making a public statement. State also said that once public statements of support for Frei's initiative are forthcoming, we would make a supporting statement.

In the besence of a favorable response from several of the larger Latin American countries, it would be a mistake for us to endorse Frei. It would make him look like a stalking horse for us. Given the attitude of the military in Peru toward Chile and toward us on the Mirage deal, it would undo whatever chance is left to get the Peruvian military to reverse their decision on the Mirages.

We will follow Latin American reaction to the Frei statement and let you know how it fares. In the meantime, if George Christian is asked about your views on the Frei proposal, I recommend he say:

"We fully supported the Declaration of the Latin American Presidents at Punta del Este on arms limitation, and we will support any Latin American initiative to implement this Declaration. We believe that any agreement is best achieved by the Latin Americans working out an understanding among themselves as they did in the case of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone. We are prepared to lend every appropriate assistance toward that end if it is desired by the Latin American governments."

I have checked this language with Covey Oliver.

W. W. Rostow

cc - George Christian

## Wednesday - November 1, 1967

fre file

Mr. President:

Attached is a letter of commendation to Tom Mann for his contribution to the Chamizal Settlement.

I have asked John Macy what governmental civilian awards are available in case you wish to give him an award as the Mexicans are going to do.

Bill Bowdler checked Tom on the letter to Sayre before we sent it to you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

#### October 31, 1967

Dear Tom:

During the ceremony at the Chamizal Monument last Saturday, I thought of the great service you had rendered to your country and to me by working out the Chamizal settlement. We were there because your imagination, persistence and skill had found a formula which local, state and federal officials on both sides of the border could accept.

President Diaz Ordaz said in his address that Mexico would bestow its highest honor on you. This is a measure of the esteem in which you are held by our neighbors.

Your own government and countrymen are deeply grateful for your contribution, as I am personally.

Sincerely,

Sh

Mr. Thomas C. Mann President Automobile Manufacturers Association 1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036

LEJ/WGBowdler:mm