

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m. TS 1 p open 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481	11/15/67	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, re: Congo S 2 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 [Duplicate of #64, NSF, Country File, Congo, Vol. 14]	11/15/67	A
#12 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan 5/17/200 NLJ 92-131, 9/17/94 C 1 p open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-320	11/15/67	A
#12a rpt	"Japanese Tentative Proposal" PCI 1 p open 1-10-95 NLJ 94-320	11/14/67	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477	11/15/67	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. S 1 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477	11/14/67	A
#18a cable	Deptel to Beirut (work copy) S 2 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478	11/14/67	A
#18b cable	Beirut 3998 S 3 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478	11/14/67	A
#18c cable	Beirut 3999 open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478 S 1 p	11/14/67	A
#25 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 C 1 p open 5-25-95 NLJ 94-357	11/14/67	A
#26 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 [Duplicate of #53, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	11/14/67	A
#26a ltr	Eban to Goldberg open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478 S 1 p [Duplicate of #63a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1978]	11/14/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 50, 11/15-15/67

Box 25

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#27a memo	Jones to President <i>open 1-26-96 NLS 94-282</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #109a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/13/67	A
#35 memo	Rostow to President <i>Dup. #5, Diary backup, 11/14-15/67, box 82</i> S 1 p Sanitized 12-22-93 NLS 92-131 [Duplicate of #229, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] [Sanitized NLS 83-17] <i>open NLS 97-182 9.24.98</i>	11/13/67	A
#35a rpt	"Language for the 2nd paragraph..." S 1 p <i>Dup. #86 Diary Backup 11/14-15/67 Box 82; dup #5a same file</i> [Duplicate of #229a, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] <i>open NLS 92-131 (2/02)</i>	undated	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 5:25 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	11/13/67	A
#37a cable	Deptel to Saigon (work copy) S 2 p <i>open 10/18/96 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#37b cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>open 10/18/96 NLS 94-478</i>	11/10/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i> S 1 p <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-357</i>	11/13/67	A
#38a memo	Rusk to President, re: Ryukyus S 2 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#38c rpt	Duplicate of #35a		
#39a memo	Rusk to President S 3 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#39b rpt	"VII The President and the PM..." S 4 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	undated	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. <i>Sanitized NLS 92-131, 9/1/94</i> C 1 p <i>OPEN 5/31/96 NLS 95-349</i>	11/13/67	A

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43, 43a #43 memo	43, 43a DUPLICATES IN FILE OF WWR, BOX 4, "VIETNAM", Docs #10, 10a Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 S — 2 p open 4-17-95 NLJ 94-456 [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 11/13/67] [Sanitized NLJ 85-68]	11/13/67	A
#43a memo	Katzenbach to President TS — 3 p open 10/18/96 NLJ 94-478 [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 11/13/67] [Sanitized NLJ 85-69]	11/13/67	A
NOT OPEN #44 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 S — 1 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478	11/13/67	A
#44a cable	Deptel 246 to Beirut S — 1 p open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478	11/12/67	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. C — 1 p OPEN 5/31/96 NLJ 95-349 [Duplicate of #268, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7]	11/13/67	A
#45a memo	Rostow for Record open 5-26-95 NLJ 94-357 C — 2 p [Duplicate of #268a, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] " 265b " " " " " " " " " " " "	11/13/67	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President S — 1 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, NSC History, Gold Crisis, Book 1; Sanitized NLJ 87-45]	11/13/67	A
#48a memo	Fowler to President open 3-25-96 S — 2 p NLJ 95-347 [Sanitized NLJ 83-16]	11/11/67	A
#48b rpt	Briefing Paper, re: Japan S — 2 p [Sanitized NLJ 83-16]	11/11/67	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan S — 1 p OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 [Sanitized NLJ 83-17]	11/13/67	A

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#50a memo	Duplicate of #48a <i>open 3-25-96 NLS 95-347</i>		
#50b memo	Duplicate of #48b <i>"</i>		
#51 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru <i>sanitized 1-22-93 NLS</i> S <i>3 p</i> <i>Open 5/5/00 NLS 00-114</i> <i>91-467</i> [Duplicate of #110b, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/13/67	A
#51a memo	Katzenbach to President C <i>2 p</i> [Duplicate of #110d, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/13/67	A
#51b rpt	"Talking Points--Peru" C <i>3 p</i> [Duplicate of #110d, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	undated	A
#51d cable	Lima 2213 <i>open 12/16/09</i> S <i>1 p</i> <i>sanitized 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #110g, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/11/67	A
#51e cable	Lima 2215 <i>open 12/16/09</i> S <i>2 p</i> <i>exempt 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #110h, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/12/67	A
#52 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67949) S <i>2 p</i> <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	11/12/67	A
#53 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67945) S <i>2 p</i> <i>" " "</i>	11/11/67	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 3:25 p.m. S <i>1 p</i> <i>" " "</i>	11/11/67	A
#54a cable	Beirut 3901 <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> S <i>3 p</i>	11/11/67	A
#54b cable	Beirut 3905 S <i>3 p</i> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/11/67	A

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#54c cable	Beirut 3908 S 1 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i>	11/10/67	A
#58a memo	Katzenbach to President S 1 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478 more released</i> [Duplicate of #88a, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 12] [Sanitized NLJ 86-16] <i>open 1-20-11 NLJ/RACIB-188 (#88a)</i>	11/10/67	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i>	11/11/67	A
#61a memo	Schultze to President C 2 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i>	11/3/67	A
#61b memo	Gaud and Freeman to President C 2 p <i>open 7-9-99 NLJ 94-275</i>	10/30/67	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 9:50 a.m. TS 1 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i>	11/10/67	A
#63a memo	McNamara to President S 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-273 5-26-98</i>	11/9/67	A
#63b memo	Wheeler to SecDef S 2 p [Duplicate of #76a]	11/7/67	A
#63c map	Attachment to #63b S 1 p [Duplicate of #76b]	undated	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-8-93 NLJ 91-528</i> [Duplicate of #187, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/9/67	A
#66a cable	Bangkok 5749 S 3 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #187a, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/8/67	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i> C 1 p <i>Dup #3, NSF, CE, VN "KA2" Box 4</i>	11/9/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69a rpt-	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i> C 1 p <i>Dup. #3a, NSF, CF, VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	11/9/67	A
#71a cable	Saigon 10641 S 9 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10] <i>[dup. #27a, NSF, CF, VN, "8B(1)(B)" Box 104]</i> <i>[enc. dup #71c, NSF, CF, VN, "8B(1)" Box 105]</i>	11/8/67	A
#75a memo	Wheeler to President S 1 p <i>open 5-26-98 NLJ 96-273</i>	11/8/67	A
#75b rpt	"Comments by Gen. Westmoreland" <i>open 5-1-00 RAC</i> S 3 p <i>[dup. #21a, 23b - NSF CF Vietnam, bx66, "2A1 - 1 Corps + DMZ"]</i>	undated	A
#75c ltr	Greene to Bus <i>open RAC 3/98</i> S 2 p <i>[dup. #21b, 23c - NSF CF Vietnam, bx66, "2A1 - 1 Corps + DMZ"]</i>	11/67	A
#76a memo	Duplicate of #63b <i>open 5/26/98</i>		
#76b memo	Duplicate of #63c <i>"</i>		
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 12:10 p.m. C 2 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i>	11/8/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. C 1 p <i>SAME SANITIZATION 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i> [Sanitized NLJ 85-72] <i>[dup. #10c, NSF, Files of Rostow, "Mtg w/Pres, July-Dec 1967" Box 1]</i>	11/8/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. <i>sanitized NLJ 98-52</i> S 1 p <i>exempt 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481 5-21-99; same NLJ 019-025-2</i>	11/8/67	A
#82a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>exempt 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i>	11/7/67	A
#84 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i>	11/8/67	A
#84a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>open 10/18/96 NLJ 94-478</i>	11/8/67	A
#87a memo	Rostow to President, re: Germany <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i> S 2 p <i>OPEN 6/22/95 NLJ 94-344</i> <i>(Dup. of #152a, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 14)</i>	11/7/67	A

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#87b cable	Bonn 4773 <i>open 12-16-94 NLJ 94-342</i> S <i>3 p</i> <i>[Dup. of #152c, NSF, C.F. Germany, Vol 14]</i>	11/2/67	A
#88 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p SAME SANITIZATION 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 [Sanitized NLJ 85-72]	11/8/67	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President, re: Laos C <i>2 p</i> OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477	11/8/67	A
#93 memo	Duplicate of #89 <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</i>		
#94 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-93</i> C <i>1 p</i> <i>NLJ 91-467</i> [Duplicate of #112, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/8/67	A
#94a cable	Lima 2139 C <i>2 p</i> <i>open 12/16/09</i> [Duplicate of #112a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/8/67	A

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#24 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1 p Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-57	11/14/67	A
#24a cable	Intelligence report - TS 6pp Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-58	11/14/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 50, November 8-15, 1967
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1
~~1~~
2. Pres. file

Wednesday - November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Costa Rican Fifth Presidential Prayer
Breakfast

On November 29, 1967, the Costa Rican chapter of the International Council for Christian Leadership will hold its annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast in honor of the President of the Republic, Professor Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez. As in the past, local government, congressional, business and religious leaders will attend.

In previous years, you have sent a message to the President of Costa Rica on this occasion. State recommends that you do so again this year. A suggested message is attached. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested message to Costa Rican President Trejos

Approve ✓

Disapprove

See me .

1a

Suggested Presidential Message
to Costa Rican President Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
(on the occasion of the fifth annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast
by the Costa Rican Chapter of the International Council for
Christian Leadership, on November 29, 1967)

His Excellency
Lic. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez
President of the Republic of Costa Rica
San Jose, Costa Rica

I am pleased to join you through this message in the Fifth Presidential Prayer Breakfast. I send my best wishes to you and the Costa Rican people.

The theme of the meeting, Isaiah 2:4, is particularly appropriate. People of goodwill everywhere long for the day when nations can "beat their swords into plowshares". This is my personal desire and that of the American people. But we also know that the defense of freedom requires that we be in a position to help people whose rights and liberties are threatened.

I join with you and your colleagues in a fervent prayer that those who pursue aggression would cease and make common cause with us in building peace and prosperity for all peoples.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
11/15/67

2

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Profile

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
7:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the study by Dick Helms
on the international connections of U.S.
peace groups, which you requested.

I have the only other copy outside the
CIA and will analyze it carefully tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-481
By ing, NARA, Date 1-24-96

WWRostow:rlh

ACTION

Pres file

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
7:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Via George Christian

Herewith a draft letter to the
Editor of The New York Times, of
the kind you suggested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

November 15, 1967 *3a*

To the Editor:

Your editorial on The Patriotism of Dissent (TIMES, November 15) calls for some sharp dissent.

I find it totally misleading as a description of a problem and as a picture of the Administration's position.

First, it speaks of two things -- "rational debate" and "dissent" -- and fails entirely to distinguish between the two. It lumps together the rational and the irrational, the responsible and the irresponsible, the constructive and the destructive. Then it seeks to portray the President and officials in his Administration as being firmly opposed to both.

That, I submit, is the wildest kind of distortion. Surely there is a vast difference between a thoughtful column and a draft-card burning. Surely there is a wide gulf between serious discussion before a Senatorial committee and the rock-throwing of irresponsible demonstrators.

I think this distinction has repeatedly been made clear -- by the President and by others. Earlier this month, the President told a news conference:

"I would hope that every person who has a plan, or a program, or observation in connection with the war that our young men are fighting out there, would engage in some introspection and ask himself whether what he is about to say is going to make a contribution to solving the problem before he speaks. If, in his judgment, it does, then he has that opportunity and that right."

And on another occasion, he said:

"Today's young people enjoy not only unparalleled ease and comfort, but they enjoy enormous freedom -- freedom of inquiry, freedom of expression, yes, freedom of dissent. That free spirit we need, too, for freedom of speech can never harm us if we remember that freedom of speech is a two-way street.

"We must guard every man's right to speak. But we must also defend every man's right to answer."

In defense of your questionable thesis that the President feels dissent is unpatriotic, you quote out of context a statement of his in which you say he "derided those who make Vietnam 'a topic of cocktail parties,' etc."

The President was at Fort Benning on this occasion. He was talking to men who are going to Vietnam and others who have returned. He was talking to the families of men who are in Vietnam and of some who will never return from that battleground. And he said:

"For these Americans, Vietnam is no academic question. It is not a topic for cocktail parties, office arguments, or debate from the comfort of some distant sidelines."

That statement is just about as true as any statement one could make. And I do not think it serves the readers of The Times to take such a statement and twist its meaning and divorce it from the setting in which it was made.

On the front page of the issue in which your unfortunate editorial appeared, there was a long and detailed story about the actions of "roaring bands of antiwar demonstrators." They sought to prevent our Secretary of State from appearing at a meeting and expressing there the Government's views on Vietnam. Unable to prevent his appearance, they sought to create as much noise and disruption as possible. And by capturing a front page column in a distinguished newspaper, they, of course, achieved a significant part of their aim -- to call attention to opposition to the war. Meantime, the statement of a high government official on a serious problem was pretty well lost in the shadow of unthinking violence. Violence, intimidation, and hysterical slogans have no place in the American political tradition -- nor in the liberal tradition throughout the world. What we saw at the Pentagon on October 21 and at the New York Hilton on November 14 belong with the hooligan tradition of fascism we knew in the 1930's.

I would think that an editorial on "dissent" would at least have noted this aspect of the problem. But it didn't.

Sincerely,

The Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York

~~SECRET~~Wednesday, November 15, 1967
3:50 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Sato at 5:15 p. m. this afternoon

As I already informed you (Tab A), the Ryukyus language has been settled and the communique as a whole (Tab B) is wrapped up.

Therefore, you may:

-- wish to congratulate him on his Press Club appearance which, from the accounts of Bill Jorden and Bill Bundy, appears to have gone very well. Under questioning, he said flatly that he supported our position in Viet Nam and that Asia would regard it as a very poor idea for us to get out of Viet Nam.

-- wish to explore with him, against the background of our AID position on the Hill, the possibilities of:

- increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;
- increasing economic aid to Viet Nam;
- enlarging Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

When your private chat has been exhausted, you may wish to join the others in the Cabinet Room. It would be good for Ministers Miki and Kimura to hear directly from you the importance of an enlarged Japanese aid contribution to Asia.

W. W. R.

Attachments - Tab A
Tab B

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NCQ 83-17
By ag/ics, NARA, Date 12-10-9

~~SECRET~~

4a

INFORMATION

SECRET

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
1:45 p.m.

sup

A

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy's report on the Ryukyus language and the acceptability of the formula to Senators Mansfield and Russell. As you will note on the second page, you may wish to discuss with Sato this afternoon:

- The possibility of his increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;
- Increase economic aid to Vietnam; and
- An enlarged Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

The text of the critical Ryukyus language in the communique is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-9-83-17
By rf/ls, NARA, Date 12-10-91

WWRostow:rlh

46

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

For the President's information, the Secretary of State submitted the present language of VII of the Communique to Sato this morning, based on Japanese language of last night. The language avoids any commitment whatsoever by the President as to future timing, stating only that he "fully understands" Japanese desires and undertakes a joint and continuous review "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions." The reference to this aim is not in itself new, since we have consistently stated it in these general terms.

At the Secretary's direction, after Sato had accepted this language, I called Senator Mansfield. I explained the language carefully to him, and he fully approved, saying only that he would like to have seen us go further and make some future timing undertaking.

I then informed Senator Russell through his administrative assistant. I explained that the language actually goes less far than the language that I had read personally to the Senator last night, which had had the President "express the hope" that we could reach a timing agreement within a few years. The administrative assistant undertook to inform the Senator promptly, and to let me know if there was any problem. He has since called me that the Senator is fully informed and has no objection.

As to Senator Fulbright, I have tried to reach him since noon yesterday, but his office has been unable to locate him between here and Arkansas. I talked personally

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

Authority MLG 83-15
By AS/12, NARA. Date 12-10-91

4c

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

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As to Senator Fulbright, I have tried to reach him since noon yesterday, but his office has been unable to locate him between here and Arkansas. I talked personally

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 83-15

By sp/ies, NARA, Date 12-10-91

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967 -- 3:00 PM

Presley

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congo Situation Report (3:00 PM)

1. The mercenaries (around 120) and the Katangans (about 2,000 with families) are still sitting in what amounts to internment camps across the border in Rwanda. Our three C-130's (2 still on Ascension, 1 in the Congo) are waiting to help in an international evacuation provided (a) the plan is workable and (b) there are reasonable security guarantees for our aircraft.
2. The Red Cross has other promises for aircraft on the same conditions. The Canadians have a C-130 also on Ascension. The British have pledged an Argosy transport (about C-130 size) which is still in the U.K. There's a Belgian DC-6 waiting at the scene. And the French have a DC-3 ready to move in.
3. Consequently, the Red Cross could conceivably begin in 48 hours or so to fly out the Katangans. Mobutu has told us he approves this part of the evacuation, and claims the Zambians are ready to take them. But the Zambians say they can't move without "express request" from the Congo to take the Katangans. Zambia thinks that request will come out of an OAU Commission meeting tomorrow in Kinshasa. Flying the 2,000 Katangans to Zambia would involve our C-130s and probably all the other aircraft except France's DC-3, which the French have earmarked for white (French) mercenaries. The operation ferrying the Katangans would take several days.
4. The tougher problem is evacuating the white mercenaries who would then be left in Rwanda. It's anybody's guess how soon they'll get out to Malta.
5. A week ago Mobutu was in the flush of victory (a first for the Congolese army) and calling for "extradition" of the whites. He has since falled back to a face-saving formula which was adopted over the weekend by the OAU Commission on Mercenaries. But the conditions of this formula are still exacting and could mean delay in completing the evacuation. To let the whites go, Mobutu is requiring:
 - some "compensation" for damages from the parent countries (read Belgium and France)

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- written assurances from the mercenaries themselves and their parent countries that they'll never enter the Congo again
 - an ad hoc OAU tribunal to screen and question the mercenaries before they leave Rwanda, trying to find out who planned their operation, who financed them, etc.
6. McBride thinks these conditions make it "obvious" that the mercenary problem will drag on "for weeks at best" -- even if we get the Katangans out to Zambia this week. He reports that Mobutu sees these conditions as minimum punishment for the mercenaries, and will be in no mood for any short cut.
7. State is a little more hopeful that a quick and sensible response from the Belgians and French might satisfy Mobutu and thus put the whites on the planes. They point out:
- The Belgians have already offered to help in Red Cross relief for Bukavu and we think the French can be persuaded to do likewise. Mobutu just might accept this token compensation as sufficient.
 - The Belgians have a suitable anti-mercenary law already in Parliament, and State thinks the French could meet Mobutu's demands for assurances with some new passport regulations restricting French nationals who were involved.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/RPM/vmr

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6

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
1:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy's report on the Ryukyus language and the acceptability of the formula to Senators Mansfield and Russell. As you will note on the second page, you may wish to discuss with Sato this afternoon:

-- The possibility of his increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;

-- Increase economic aid to Vietnam; and

-- An enlarged Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

The text of the critical Ryukyus language in the communique is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 76983-17
By rg/ks, NARA, Date 12-10-91

6a

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

For the President's information, the Secretary of State submitted the present language of VII of the Communique to Sato this morning, based on Japanese language of last night. The language avoids any commitment whatsoever by the President as to future timing, stating only that he "fully understands" Japanese desires and undertakes a joint and continuous review "guided by the aim of returning administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions." The reference to this aim is not in itself new, since we have consistently stated it in these general terms.

At the Secretary's direction, after Sato had accepted this language, I called Senator Mansfield. I explained the language carefully to him, and he fully approved, saying only that he would like to have seen us go further and make some future timing undertaking.

I then informed Senator Russell through his administrative assistant. I explained that the language actually goes less far than the language that I had read personally to the Senator last night, which had had the President "express the hope" that we could reach a timing agreement within a few years. The administrative assistant undertook to inform the Senator promptly, and to let me know if there was any problem. He has since called me that the Senator is fully informed and has no objection.

As to Senator Fulbright, I have tried to reach him since noon yesterday, but his office has been unable to locate him between here and Arkansas. I talked personally

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Authority MLG 83-15
By sg/ics, NARA, Date 12 10 91

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-2-

to him last week, and there was every indication that his feelings would be along the lines of Senator Mansfield's. I have explained to his administrative assistant what I wanted to reach him about, so that he would have no valid grounds for complaint that we did not try.

The President will also wish to know that Secretary Rusk raised two key matters of Japanese financial action with Sato. Sato agreed firmly that Japan would pick up one-third of the Indonesian need for 1968 (now estimated at \$325 million total). In response to the Secretary's urging that Japan put up another \$100 million (for a total of \$200 million) to the Asian Development Bank Special Funds, Sato said he would give this serious study but did not commit himself.

The indications are that Sato will raise with the President tonight just what his government is prepared to do on Indonesia, the ADB, and possibly Viet-Nam. The President may well wish to press him to do something more in Viet-Nam as soon as possible; Sato's visit has prepared the way for this, and we know that the local Japanese Ambassador believes more can now be undertaken and rapidly.

W. P. Bundy

William P. Bundy

SECRET

For Mr. Truman

F.

(ignore underlining)

VII

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the return of administrative rights over [Reversion of] the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and expressed his belief that an adequate solution should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights

OVER these Islands to Japan and in the light of these Discussions.

The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents. To this end, they agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan proper. The existing United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo will be kept informed by the High Commissioner of the progress of the work of the Advisory Committee. It was also agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and

The United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of Administration of the Bonin Islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the con-

11
viction of the Japanese people that the return of the
administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also
be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the
two countries.

~~SECRET~~

7

Lunch Meeting With the President
Wednesday, November 15, 1967, 1:30 pm

Pres file

AGENDA

1. Vietnam
 - a. Rusk-McNamara CBS TV appearance in December?
 - b. Situation Reports: Gen. Westmoreland; Amb. Komer.
 - c. General discussion of priorities in next six months.
 - d. Guidance to Amb. Bunker, Gen. Westmoreland, and Amb. Komer on Congressional and public contacts.
2. Middle East. (Sec. Rusk)
Situation Report
3. Vice President's trip to England?
4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 49, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

8

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
1:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Moose examines
the confusions and state of mind of
your devious friend Rev. Lewis of
Bruton Parish Church.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1967

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

Here are my observations on the recent remarkable sermon of the Reverend Cotesworth P. Lewis of Bruton Parish Church, Williamsburg:

Rev. Lewis' sermon strikes me as a statement of apprehension and concern --

"The future looks terrible"

"We seem to be surrounded by insoluble problems"

"The peril is that we may panic and do foolish things"

"Many people are badly scared -- and it's almost impossible to think straight when we are frightened"

He coupled this with an appeal for reassurance and guidance directed (somewhat clumsily) to the President in the first instance, and more generally, to God. Despite the sermon's initial impact, I believe it is incorrect to interpret it simply as criticism of the President.

The Reverend's expressed attitude on the war is ambivalent. He twice reiterates his support of the Presidency: "We know the necessity of supporting our leader..." and "while pledging our loyalty...". At the same time, he finds the situation "baffling," and he is "appalled" by (erroneous) accounts of civilian casualties, but "mystified" by reports of restraints and equipment shortages which hamper the military effort. The manner in which he enumerates these concerns certainly gives the impression that he accepts them at face value. This was particularly unfortunate.

In his direct expressions on the war he meets himself coming and going. As a Christian he feels he must question the (morality) rightness of our actions; yet as one who does not contemplate "even the mildest form of disloyal action," he wonders why we do not do all we can "to terminate the conflict successfully."

He does not understand why we are doing what we are -- and if he did, his conscience would probably still bother him. This question of conscience is aggravated by his sensitivity, and apparent receptivity, to domestic and foreign criticism of the war.

When he asks for a "logical, straightforward explanation," I think he means a simple one which he can easily grasp and believe in. I do not think his use of the word "straightforward" need necessarily be interpreted as implying that previous explanations have been misleading or devious.

This man feels like Isaiah's people who sat in the darkness, dwelling in the shadow of death. He hopes that, as in Isaiah, a light will shine on him.

There is a little religious mysticism in this. He apparently is a strong believer in the efficacy of good will and the enlightening effect of dialogue. Hence his analogies involving Martin Luther and Charles the Fifth (they never met did they?), and the Catholics and the Protestants. (Interestingly enough, he describes this latter situation as a "stalemate").

I think this incident at Bruton Parish Church illustrates a point which should be remembered: For all his political naivety and lack of taste, the Reverend's confusion about the war is representative of a large segment of American opinion. They want to support the war, but they have grave reservations about it. Therefore, they ^{are} overly susceptible to every doubt and criticism that comes along. In this troubled condition, they will respond -- and they want to respond -- to a strong, clearly-reasoned lead by the President. But this lead must not be oversimplified because this too disturbs them. If there is one thing they know, it is that the situation is not simple.


Dick Moose

86
November 12, 1967

The people who sat in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined.
Isaiah 9:2

Moses' exploits in leading the children of Israel out of Egypt, once dull as dust - leap with front page applicability. The Red Sea, Sinai Peninsula, the Negev, Jordan and Jericho - are things we talk about at breakfast.

Moses thought he had escaped the cries of his oppressed countrymen when he fled to Midian. But as he watched his father-in-law's flocks he heard the voice of God remind him - "The slaves of Egypt are your brethren - go, lead them to freedom." He was annoyed - He remembered them as a shiftless lot, crude, unreliable, ~~shiftless~~ - people with whom he'd prefer not to associate. So he began making excuses - "I don't speak well - I don't have the facts - send someone else". God's promise that He would be with him came with such authority, when Moses appeared before Pharaoh he declared with unmistakable power - "Let my people go!"

Alone, we shirk responsibilities, tallying our small capacities. With the assurance which comes from prayer and worship and study - we take on a boldness which reflects ~~xxx~~ the voice of God.

The rhythm of history brings alternating moments of darkness and light. When Constantinople fell in 1453, men feared that civilization would end; but the fleeing scholars carried with them the sparks that ignited the Renaissance. What could have been more futile than for ^{the penniless monk} Martin Luther to speak his mind to Charles the Fifth, ruler of most of Europe and a considerable portion of the New World? Out of that dialog came our religious freedoms.

Today, we seem ~~to be~~ surrounded by insoluble problems. Irresistible forces appear to be approaching ~~a point of~~ collision with immovable objects.

The most immediate and demanding conflict arises from the ^{insistence} demand of racial minorities ^{be given} ~~to enjoy~~ all the rights and privileges it has been the good fortune of the majority to achieve. The race problem can no longer be evaded either in the North or South - in this country or abroad. Seemingly impossible questions must be answered, - and this will require even more good will than brains.

Getting Catholics and Protestants together appeared ten years ago as about the wildest idealism imaginable. We/^{who} have been separated by language, education, social and economic barriers - today are allowing the Holy Spirit to lead us into an increasing number of intimate contacts,-- and a united force for Good is becoming a possibility. Some deeply loved prejudices ^{must have to be} must be put aside - and a great deal of serious thinking done in all sectors of the camp - but God is working His purpose out, invalidating what seemed a stalemate.

ent The overshadowing problem before us is in the international realm. Communism seems to be an irresistible force - and we assume that we are an immovable object. Geographically, Communism is getting closer and closer to us. Cuba is a toe-hold in this hemisphere, and there is little reason to hope the tide will recede. The peril is that we may panic and do foolish things. Many people are badly scared - and it's almost impossible to think straight when we are frightened. Enzxtkexsitzmakianxixzfarzzfzankopslexx.

West Berlin and Hong Kong are quite literally within the jaws of Communism. If their psychology were our psychology they would be gloomy, depressed spots. On the contrary both cities are enjoying a building boom, while the visitor is astonished at the vigor of life. The Communists are 40 miles from Helsinki, Vienna, Trieste - and yet these communities are less concerned about the threat they offer than are Dallas, Phoenix, and Seattle. The closer we get to the real Reds, the less we are intimidated by them - and the more

stimulate our minds and hearts.

The economic problem is simpler than is commonly assumed. Even the cursory presentation of LIFE magazine this week^{out}, bears ^{out} this ~~out~~. Both pure Communism and pure Capitalism are the creation of fevered imaginations. There is an increasing amount of private enterprise in Communist countries, while even the rankest capitalist ^{many send their children to public schools,} rides over state-owned roads, /puts up with many socialistic practises (such as old-age payments). The problem of the future is to discover what can best be done by the state and what can best be left to private enterprise.

The more serious threat of Communism of course is political. To those who have little, it promises much - it fires hopes, - even though the world has seen relatively few instances of their willingness or ability to make good on such promises. As a nation we are called upon to live up to our profession of "liberty and justice for all". If we set right the inequalities and erase the dark blots on our life, we have nothing to fear for ourselves. As for the rest of the world - it is most difficult to devise ways of exporting democracy.

When we read the paper or listen to the radio or TV - and learn of problems popping up all over the world - even the bravest of us grow faint-hearted.

The years ahead will be painful. Customs which seem an essential part of life may have to be given up. Opinions we have held tenaciously may be proven false. Physical and emotional landmarks may be swept aside. We may be compelled to think new thoughts and walk in new paths. Emerging young men and women who will gradually take over with more understanding than we have had. Necessity will compel them to rise to greater heights than we have known. The future looks terrible; but with guidance from God (as in every strategic juncture of history) He will infuse a new factor into the equation - something we could never suspect as a possibility - to make the future glorious.

INSERT

The political complexities of our involvement in an undeclared war in Vietnam are so baffling that I feel presumptuous even in asking questions. But since there is ^{Consensus} a rather general conviction that what we are doing in Vietnam is wrong (a conviction voiced by leaders of nations traditionally our friends - leading military experts - and the rank and file of American citizens) - we wonder if some logical, straightforward explanation might be given without endangering whatever military or political advantage we hold.

Relatively few of us plan even the mildest form of disloyal action against constituted authority. We know the necessity of supporting our leader. But we cannot close our Christian consciences to consideration of the rightness of actions as they are reported to us, - perhaps erroneously, perhaps for good cause (of which we have not been apprised). We are appalled that apparently this is the only war in our history which has had three times as many civilian ~~casualties~~ as military casualties. It is particularly regrettable that to most nations of the world the struggle's purpose appears as neo-colonialism. We are mystified by news accounts suggesting that our brave fighting units are inhibited by directives and inadequate equipment from using their capacities to terminate the conflict successfully.

While pledging our loyalty - we ask respectfully, WHY?

We know we must avoid the oversimplification which views the war as struggle against a monolithic Communism.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Wednesday, Nov. 15, 1967
12:15 p.m.Authority NLJ-285-19MR. PRESIDENT By Date 6-23-84*Pres file*

Herewith Dick Helms' memo to you on a new National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam." I have marked its main conclusions, summarized on the last two pages.

It comes to this:

- manpower is the major problem confronting the Communists;
- there has been a substantial reduction in guerrillas since an estimated peak in early 1966;
- there has been a slight reduction in main force units in the past year, but this has been possible only by using more North Vietnamese replacements in Viet Cong units;
- there is a "fairly good chance" that the Communist military strength and political infrastructure will continue to decline;
- Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition and to persuade the United States that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's terms. Their judgment is that the "Communists still retain adequate capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year."

The memo to you and the introductory note reflect a considerable debate in the intelligence community. The debate centers on the fact that they now know more from captured documents than they did about guerrillas, village defense forces, etc. What they know indicates that guerrilla strength was probably underestimated last year, but has declined substantially since.

I had urged that they do a retroactive estimate showing that decline; but they say they cannot do it, and confine themselves to the simple statement that the guerrillas "have suffered a substantial reduction."

The estimate does not deal with an important fact as estimated by Westmoreland and the JCS: namely, that there has been a very substantial decline in the past year in enemy main force battalions rated as "combat effective." (Buzz Wheeler told the group the other day, and confirmed to me on the telephone this morning, that in October 1965 the enemy had 123 maneuver battalions, all rated combat effective. In October 1967 the enemy had 162 maneuver battalions, of which only 87 were rated combat effective.)

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11/15/67

In general, this is a conservative estimate; but it is not a bad thing to build our plans on conservative estimates.

The one danger, of which Dick Helms is aware, is that the underestimate of guerrillas in 1966 be taken out of context and distorted, if leaked. They have tried hard to avoid that possibility.

I told Dick that the one sentence I would challenge is the marked sentence on page 1. I agree that the guerrilla figure was underestimated in 1966; but we have suffered in other areas from overestimation as well as underestimation in dealing with Communist capabilities. But that is not important.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

14 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. Since mid-May, the intelligence community, both here and in Saigon, has been painstakingly working on the data for a National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam". In essence, this is a revision of an estimate on the same topic issued by the United States Intelligence Board in 1966 and now very much out of date.

2. The new estimate has been produced through an exhaustive process of analysis including detailed consultations in Saigon between the Embassy and MACV and a team from the Washington Community headed by my personal representative. We now have a text concurred in without dissent by all the United States Intelligence Board members and employing figures agreed to by the United States Mission in Saigon.

3. The new estimate is sensitive and potentially controversial primarily because the new strength figures are at variance with our former holdings. ~~Much of the past data on overall Communist capabilities in Vietnam has turned out to be unreliable and many of the figures have been too low.~~ We have taken pains to construct the paper in such a fashion that we explain at each stage how we arrive at the numbers

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Authority NLS/CBS 1
By ics NARS, Date 5-7-84

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- 2 -

used. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a reliable basis for reconstructing Communist strength figures retrospectively to provide a true standard of comparison between present and Communist strength as it actually was a year ago. Like any document, however, the Estimate can still make for difficulties if particular portions are taken out of context.

4. I have considered not issuing this Estimate and after considerable consultation, believe this would be a mistake. In the inevitable daily process of work to ascertain Communist strength levels in Vietnam, too many people are aware that the exercise to get agreed figures has been going on. In short, the charge of bad faith or unwillingness to face the facts would be more generally damaging than the issuance of this document which can stand on its own feet.

5. My purpose in writing you is to outline the problems this Estimate involves and to advise you in advance of the way in which I propose to handle them. The Estimate is now scheduled for release the end of this week to you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the individual members of the United States Intelligence Board who coordinated it. This procedure will restrict the distribution of the Estimate while at the same time making it available to those members of the Government who need it to do their jobs.

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- 3 -

6. Attached hereto are an Introductory Note and the Conclusions of the Estimate.

Rich

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - 2

- 1) Introductory Note
- 2) Conclusions

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Our earlier understanding of overall Communist capabilities in Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely heavily on data provided by the GVN. Much of this turned out to be unreliable, and in many instances our numerical estimates of Communist forces, other than for the Regular forces, were too low. Our information has improved substantially in the past year, but the unconventional nature of the war poses difficult intelligence problems, the more so in a social environment where basic data is incomplete and often untrustworthy.

Manpower, for example, is a key element for the Communists but we lack precise basic data on population size, rates of growth, and age distribution for both North and South Vietnam. Assessing Communist capabilities also involves an understanding of the organization and effectiveness of the various components in the Communist military and political apparatus in South Vietnam. Much of the evidence on these components is obtained from a variety of sources, including captured documents, of varying reliability and timeliness. The analysis of this data, as well as that concerning North Vietnamese support to the South and all manpower questions requires complex methodological approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs.

Our data and conclusions are, therefore, subject to continuing review and revision, especially since capabilities do not remain static. In this

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Authority NLS/CBS 1
By ics, NARS, Date 5-7-84

estimate we have concentrated on reaching the best judgments of the current strength of the Communist forces and, because of incomplete and unreliable basic data, we have not attempted to reconstruct Communist strength retrospectively.

Reservations with respect to evidence are explained where appropriate in the individual sections of the estimate. The main conclusions which follow, however, allow for such uncertainties in the supporting intelligence, represent our best appreciation of the overall situation as it now stands, and are based on the assumption that there is no radical change in the scale and nature of the war.

9c

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CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past year, Hanoi's direct control and share of the burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This trend will continue.

B. ~~Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists.~~ Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more difficult. ~~Despite heavy infiltration from North Vietnam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year.~~

C. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at the lower levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing these levels to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of the Regular military forces. ~~In particular the guerrillas, now estimated to total some 70,000 - 90,000, have suffered a substantial reduction since the estimated peak about early 1966. Regular force strength, now estimated at 118,000, has declined only slightly, but Viet Cong units are increasingly dependent upon North Vietnamese replacements.~~

D. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations, a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas are to be maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967 and intensive Viet Cong (VC) recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant

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factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the overall strength and effectiveness of the military forces and the political infrastructure will continue to decline.

E. The Communist leadership is already having problems in maintaining morale and quality. These problems have not yet impaired overall military effectiveness, but they are likely to become more difficult.

F. Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local shortages and interfere with Communist operations from time to time. But we believe that the Communists will be able to continue to meet at least their essential supply requirement for the level forces and activities in South Vietnam described in this Estimate.

G. Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition and to persuade the United States that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's terms. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year. Whether or not Hanoi does in fact persist with this strategy depends not only on its capabilities to do so, but on a number of political and international considerations not treated in this Estimate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
10:50 a. m.

TOP-SECRET

Mr. President:

I have marked up the attached copy of a special report on Dak To fighting in the period 3-14 November.

In sum:

-- Enemy forces of some 7000 have been engaged: we have built up U. S. and ARVN forces of 9000.

-- Thus far enemy killed are estimated at 636; friendly, 102.

-- The purpose is, at the maximum, to achieve a limited dramatic tactical victory over a major U. S. military unit; at the minimum, to draw forces to the frontier, away from pacification -- as at the DMZ.

W. W. R.

TOP-SECRET attachment (Dak To Special Report 15 Nov 67)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 11-21-91

~~TOP SECRET~~
NOFORN

10a



CINCPAC
(Continued)

DAK TO SPECIAL REPORT

Dak To is located in the northern portion of the 2d Corps near the tri-border area (Cambodia - Laos - Vietnam) in extremely rugged terrain. Intelligence indicates that enemy objectives in the western highlands include the annihilation of a major US element in order to draw to and tie down in the area additional friendly forces. As a result, action consisted of numerous contacts in an area approximately 16 nautical miles around Dak To. Contact with enemy forces was initiated on 3 November when US Army units in Operation MAC ARTHUR reported three separate contacts in an area 3 nautical miles south of Dak To (OPSUMS 259-67 and 260-67). (C)

On 6 November a US Army battalion engaged enemy forces in the same general area killing 104. Sixteen US were killed and 27 were wounded in the action. (OPSUMS 261-67 and 262-67). (C)

On 8 November in an area centered 4 nautical miles west of Dak To, a US Army company on a search and destroy mission engaged an unknown-size enemy force in fortified positions. The enemy broke contact leaving 12 dead. In another contact on 8 November a few miles farther southwest, three US Army companies on a sweep found 232 enemy bodies and 21 individual and 14 crew-served weapons in an area that had been under friendly tactical air and artillery fire. On 10 November, a US Army battalion made heavy contact with an unknown-size enemy force dug-in 4 nautical miles south-southwest of Dak To. Six US were killed and 24 wounded. The enemy withdrew after 2 hours leaving 14 dead. (OPSUMS 264-67 and 265-67). (C)

There were three significant enemy contacts on 10 and 11 November. In the first contact 11 nautical miles west-southwest of Dak To, two US Army companies engaged an unknown-size enemy force. Two additional US Army companies maneuvered to exploit the contact and became heavily engaged with a well dug-in enemy. In the ensuing action US and enemy units launched numerous attacks and counter-attacks. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day with

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NOFORN



CINCPAC
(Continued)

friendly units finally overrunning the enemy positions after approximately 7 hours of fighting. The enemy left 103 dead; 20 US were killed and 132 wounded. The second contact occurred 7 nautical miles southwest of Dak To when three US Army companies sweeping an area of a previous contact engaged an unknown-size enemy force for approximately 4 hours. The enemy then broke contact leaving 92 dead and 1 person detained; 18 US were killed and 119 wounded. In the third contact, a US engineer truck convoy was attacked by an unknown-size enemy force 16 nautical miles southwest of Dak To. The enemy broke contact leaving nine dead and one detained; US losses were five killed and seven wounded. (OPSUM 265-67) (C)

On 13 November a US Army battalion had a heavy 2-hour engagement with an unknown-size enemy force 12 nautical miles southwest of Dak To. US casualties were 9 killed, 21 wounded, and 6 missing. Enemy losses were unknown. (OPSUM 266-67) (C)

Cumulative results of contacts in the Dak To area during the period 3-14 November are -- friendly: 102 KIA, 529 WIA, 6 MIA; enemy: 636 KIA, 137 individual weapons and 29 crew-served weapons seized. The status of friendly and enemy units in the vicinity of Dak To is shown on the following page. (C)

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
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**DAK TO
FRIENDLY UNIT LOCATIONS**

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10c



CINCPAC
(Continued)

UNITS IN VICINITY OF DAK TO

	<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Hq, 42d ARVN Regiment	Unknown	
1st Bn, 42d Regiment	Unknown	448
3d Bn, 42d Regiment	Unknown	576
1 ARVN Airborne Bn	Unknown	494
4 CIDG Companies	Unknown	490
2 ARVN Mike Strike Companies	Unknown	392
Hq, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Div	29 Oct	
3d Bn, 8th Infantry	30 Oct	821
2d Bn, 12th Infantry	29 Oct	874
1st Bn, 8th Infantry	10 Nov	893
Hq, 173d Infantry Brigade (Airborne)	6 Nov	
1st Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	6 Nov	743
2d Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	6 Nov	739
4th Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	1 Nov	693
Hq, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Kontum City)	14 Nov	
2d Bn, 8th Cavalry (Kontum City)	14 Nov	695
1st Bn, 12th Cavalry	11 Nov	698
9th ARVN Airborne Battalion	6 Nov	490
	TOTAL	9,046

ENEMY FORCES AND ESTIMATED STRENGTHS

	<u>3 NOV</u>	<u>14 NOV</u>
Hq, 1st NVA Div	122	Unknown
1st NVA Div Forward CP	179	Unknown
32d NVA Regiment	1,700	1,460
66th NVA Regiment	1,700	1,450
24th NVA Regiment	1,620	1,620
174th NVA Regiment	1,815	1,815
304th VC Local Force Bn	400	400
	<u>7,536</u>	<u>6,745 (TS)</u>

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NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

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NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958
DA Memo 11-3-1992
By Ag NARA Date 11-21-91

INFORMATION

Wednesday, November 15, 1967
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh did this rather
careful analysis of Gen. Gavin's
Meet the Press interview on Vietnam.
Its theme is: Will the real Gavin
stand up?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

11

Pres. file

11a

14 November 1967

GENERAL GAVIN ON VIETNAM

It is extremely difficult to analyze General Gavin's Meet the Press appearance because (1) so many of his positions are contradictory and (2) the general has a nervous mannerism of automatically prefacing his answers with "yes." The major issues he addressed are discussed below.

China. On the one hand, General Gavin takes Secretary Rusk and "policy makers" in the Administration to task for describing China as the real threat. ~~On the other hand, the general also considers China the real threat.~~ His prescription is to avoid isolating China and to start talking with them with a view toward recognition.

It is difficult to see wherein he disagrees with the government's policy toward China of "containment without isolation." He ignores the existence of the Warsaw talks with the ChiComs and the fact that it is ChiCom intransigence which prevents their acceptance into the family of nations.

Buffer State. General Gavin's solution to the ChiCom threat is the establishment of a buffer country between ourselves and Red China, such as we have in Yugoslavia. He argues that continuing to fight now will push the NLF into the hands of Hanoi and that Ho Chi Minh into the arms of Peking.

This argumentation ignores ~~(1) Gavin's thesis that we are already at war with China, (2) that the NLF is now a puppet of Hanoi, (3) his own principle that the South Vietnamese should be free to determine their own future, (4) that Ho Chi Minh can save himself from the clutch of Peking if he calls off the aggression, and (5) a buffer state of a communist North Vietnam is a more apt analogy to Yugoslavia than all of Vietnam.~~

Administration Credibility. Apparently, General Gavin has retreated from his pre-trip statement "that the White House is saying one thing while preparing in Vietnam to do another." He also acknowledges that ~~all the people he talked to were "meticulous on this point of avoiding any semblance of intent to move into North Vietnam."~~

Nevertheless, he insists "that there are those in the Administration who intend to stay in Southeast Asia for a long period of time. . . contrary to the avowed purpose of the Administration." He bases this on "the changing statements" of Secretary Rusk, Gavin's discussions before the House Armed Services Committee, and conversations with people in the armed forces.

Following General Gavin's reasoning, one could conclude from talking to certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee that it was really U.S. policy to get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible regardless of the consequences. He lacks a basic education as to the facts of the situation and the way the U.S. government works, specifically (1) there has been no change in U.S. policy toward North Vietnam or China, (2) Congressional committees do not speak for the United States, (3) no responsible military leaders have recommended we stay in Southeast Asia permanently, (4) cocktail party talk or latrine talk is no substitute for responsible military advice, and (5) in any event, the U.S. is governed by legally constituted civil authorities -- not the military.

Stay in South Vietnam? General Gavin does not think we should stay in South Vietnam indefinitely. It is not clear whether this represents a change of his mind. In any event, he now thinks we should get out as soon as South Vietnam "can be given its independence and be a country in its own right in every respect."

This is precisely the stated position of the U.S. government. South Vietnam's independence from external aggression is what this war is all about.

Negotiations. General Gavin supports Senator Symington's proposal for suspending military activities as a prelude to negotiations. He suggests other possibilities, such as (1) turning the problem over to the UN Security Council, and (2) stopping the bombing unconditionally as the first step toward negotiations. He has no evidence that this would lead to negotiations, but this is his best estimate, based on his judgment of the Oriental mind. On the other hand, he says it is very likely that Ho Chi Minh will not enter into any discussion before the election. Then he proceeds to say: "If this point is absolutely set that there will be no negotiations under any circumstances before the election, well then, except for reasons of morality, there is no reason to stop the bombing." Nevertheless, he states that "there is some

hope that we can get some negotiations underway." His statements are self-contradictory, and his "hope" is simply wishful thinking without any shred of evidence. The underlying basis for his position is really based on his view that (1) bombing is militarily unproductive, (2) bombing is very immoral, and (3) we should not demand reciprocity for a cessation of bombing because they are not bombing us. General Gavin displays the myopia of the old stick-in-the-mud foot soldier who cannot see beyond the range of his artillery. Fortunately, modern military men appreciate the relationship between bombing and the ground battle. General Gavin chooses to ignore the immorality of North Vietnamese aggression which is the reason for our bombing in the first place. If we were to follow the general's logic on reciprocity, we should not be using helicopters, tanks, or heavy artillery because the enemy doesn't have them.

Enclaves. General Gavin has actually discarded his earlier enclave theory -- but he refuses to admit it. Instead, he argues that General Westmoreland is applying it.

General Westmoreland has been applying a consistent military strategy for the last three years. If this is what General Gavin really meant to urge, he had no basis for raising an issue in the first place.

Progress of the War. Although General Gavin argues that we should get out as soon as possible, he says we may not be able to extricate ourselves for five to ten years. He bases this estimate on his talks with Vietnamese. Success will depend on how well we deal with the hamlets and on the stability of the GVN. On the other hand, he says that the military are confident of being able to achieve victory in the not too distant future. He says that they will admit, however, that they made a mistake at the outset in attacking at once the Viet Cong forces. (He says that he confirmed this in Thailand -- whatever that means!) He says that Ambassador Lodge addressed himself to this a couple of years ago. On the other hand, he notes that there is a tendency for the Viet Cong to organize their logistical bases farther and farther back toward Cambodia, which would suggest the imminence of earlier victory than we had thought on our part. Although he describes the border battles as peripheral, he acknowledges that we have to win them too.

Will the real General Gavin please stand up?

Domestic Political.

General Gavin insisted that he had no political purpose in going to South Vietnam.

He said that his views were not greatly different from Governor Rockefeller's, but he should speak for himself on Vietnam.

He wants to see a moderate candidate for 1968 who will offer as an alternative to Administration policy a determination to bring about a resolution of the war as quickly as possible and bring peace to Southeast Asia.

~~He is not a candidate; he is opposed to a third political party.~~

~~He agrees with Senator McCarthy's position on Vietnam.~~

Miscellaneous.

General Gavin would not say that General Westmoreland is not using his troops well, although he implied as much in saying that he thinks we can get more combat troops out of the total involvement. He took refuge in the statement that General Westmoreland is "using them as well as he can" and that he is "trying to use them better."

General Gavin would not send any more troops. On the other hand, he does not see us bringing any troops out for some time -- despite the fact that he had previously argued that 250,000 troops were enough.

General Gavin said he had not been brainwashed and that ~~civilians and military in South Vietnam were doing a tremendous job.~~

~~He states that the South Vietnamese armed forces are doing better than they have been given credit for.~~

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 15, 1967 -- 7:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

I received at 7:00 a.m. this morning a call from Mr. Kei Wakazumi. He first asked what I thought of Prime Minister Sato's speech.

I said that I thought it was an excellent expression of Japanese interest.

He asked if I had any changes to suggest on a personal basis, since there was still an opportunity for changes.

I said that I would not suggest changes in a speech by the chief of another government.

He then asked if it was possible to extend the time that Prime Minister Sato could see you alone this afternoon. I said that I did not know your schedule but I would communicate this suggestion.

I do not know what it is that Prime Minister Sato wishes to discuss; but, given the importance of the visit, you may wish to see if you could run somewhat over the scheduled time in a further private talk this afternoon.

At 10:30 p.m. last night the Japanese gave us the attached fall-back language on the Ryukyus. Sec. Rusk will be meeting with Prime Minister Sato at, I believe, 10:00 a.m. this morning. In the light of the Japanese proposal and the language acceptable to Sen. Russell, I see no reason why they cannot come up with an agreed passage for the communique.

W. W. Rostow

Have Marvin extend scheduled time
by, say 30 minutes _____

No _____

See me _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-320
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlh

JAPANESE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL

12a

10.30 P.M. - 11/14

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the reversion of these islands, and expressed his belief that an adequate solution ^{to this problem} should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-350
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Shah

*1. [unclear]
2. Per file*

Governor Harriman will stop off to see the Shah in connection with his visit to Pakistan to help dedicate the Mangla Dam. Since there has been a minor misunderstanding with the Shah over the proposal for talks on Vietnam he mentioned during his visit here, we felt it would be useful to make a special point of the fact that Governor Harriman is coming on your behalf. While we don't think his idea is a starter, we don't want to be the ones to kill it; he might as well find out for himself how tough this game is.

The following message should serve that purpose:

Your Imperial Majesty:

I am very pleased that you are able to receive Governor Harriman in Tehran on November 22. His visit will come just three months after our pleasant and useful talks here, and I look forward to hearing his report when he returns. I have asked the Governor to inform you fully of our views and the present possibilities for bringing about a peaceful solution in Vietnam. Once again, I want you to know how much we value your constructive position on this as on so many other international problems.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-477
By ing, NARA, Date 6-28-95

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday - November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

SUBJECT: Letter from President Costa e Silva

The Brazilian Embassy has delivered a letter to you from President Costa e Silva (Tab A) asking your personal intervention in the soluble coffee problem.

The problem is more than a year old. It stems from an unfair competitive position which Brazilian coffee policy gives to its soluble producers. This permits them to undersell US soluble producers in our market by a substantial margin. The US coffee trade has indicated it will withdraw its support of the International Coffee Agreement now under negotiation unless Brazil changes its unfair practices. Without the trade's support, we will not be able to get Congressional support for the Agreement.

Efforts to get the Brazilians to take corrective action has so far been unsuccessful. At our suggestion, the Brazilian Minister of Industry and Commerce is now in Washington for another round of talks. He will be seeing Secretary Rusk, as well as Covey Oliver and Tony Solomon.

It is too early to say whether a compromise formula will result from these talks. We will be preparing a suggested reply in the light of the results.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - President Costa e Silva's letter of November 10.

cc - Ed Fried

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Brasilia, November 10th, 1967.

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson,
President of the United States
of America.

Dear Mr. President,

In the spirit of friendship and frankness which has prevailed between us since our meeting at Punta del Este, where we entered into important commitments for the progress of the Americas, I wish to set forth to you my concern over two problems of particular urgency and gravity which may come to jeopardize our common objectives of close collaboration between the United States of America and Brazil and of ample international cooperation, especially for the benefit of the less developed countries.

2. I refer to maritime shipping and to the Brazilian exports of soluble coffee. As to the former, my Government's objectives is to ensure a substantial participation of the Brazilian merchant navy in the transport of our exportable products, as well as to equip it adequately for this purpose.

3. The latter problem presents a special interest for the relations between our two countries, upon whose concurrence the future of the International Coffee Agreement substantially depends. My Government has sought, in the spirit of Punta del Este, to provide incentives to the production and export of

manufactured goods, for the understandable reason that infant industries in my country require a certain amount of protection. Brazilian soluble coffee exports - which represent a negligible value in the world coffee trade - have raised objections on the part of sectors of the coffee industry in the United States of America, thus creating a certain atmosphere of crisis in the re-negotiation of the Agreement which regulates the world market. For the sum total of the economy of your country those exports mean relatively little whereas for the Brazilian economy, as a whole, they are highly important. Although convinced of the legitimacy of the Brazilian marketing policy, I nevertheless recognize the existence of a political problem and its significance in regard to the relations between our two countries and the decisions to be taken concerning the Agreement.

4. I share Your Excellency's wishes to do our best to maintain and strengthen the Coffee Agreement and to make the relations between our two Governments more fruitful. Therefore, my delegates have sought to reach an understanding with representatives of your Government and have presented reasonable proposals towards the solution of the problem, so far without success. I have the impression that the position one might consider inflexible of the United States Government is due to a certain misunderstanding of our efforts and of our wish to support international cooperation in this area without, at the same time, sacrificing the incipient export industry of my country.

5. Therefore, I address myself to Your Excellency in order to request your personal intervention for the solution of this problem, which will persist unless the two principal parties are willing to adjust their positions, as for my part

I have endeavoured to do. The Brazilian sensitivity to this question is too sharp for both of us to allow it to eventually hurt our relations in other areas. Furthermore, the fact that the economy of so many countries of this Hemisphere depends substantially on their coffee exports, to a greater degree than that of Brazil, is a circumstance which will certainly be present in your mind, as well as in my own, as regards the survival of the Agreement.

With great confidence in your understanding and in your practical spirit of conciliation, I remain,

very sincerely

(signed) Arthur da Costa e Silva

15

Pres file

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Westmoreland is coming in with Mrs. Westmoreland and their daughter.

Gen. and Mrs. Westmoreland had planned to stay with Gen. and Mrs. Wheeler and their daughter with friends.

Do you wish to invite the whole family to stay at the Mansion? _____

Gen. and Mrs. Westmoreland? _____

Stay with present Washington plans? _____

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

16

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Tuesday, November 14, 1967
7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Gen. Westmoreland's assessment for the month of October before you see him.

As usual, we have summarized it in general and by Corps areas, with the key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 11-21-91

16a

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Assessment for the Month of October.

S U M M A R Y

A general shift in the pattern of enemy activity during October reflects the onset of the northeast monsoon period, heavy rains and flooding conditions in the northern coastal areas, and the beginning of the fall/winter rice harvest. The pace of activity in the western highlands has increased, with the probability of more intense enemy actions in Kontum, Pleiku and Dar Lac provinces. Our forces are being adjusted to meet this threat.

The most significant developments of the month occurred in Third Corps with the enemy committing a number of VC/NVA Main Force regiments in large scale actions. He may be expected to continue an aggressive posture in northwest Third Corps during the winter campaign despite his heavy casualties in SHENANDOAH II at Loc Ninh and Song Be and massive weapons losses in Phuoc Tuy provinces.

Activity elsewhere in the country has been marked by enemy avoidance of contact and a step-up in the frequency of attacks by fire on the populace, particularly in Fourth Corps. South Vietnamese Armed Forces aggressiveness and effectiveness continues to improve with several very favorable actions during October.

Reports continue to indicate serious food shortages and morale problems in the enemy ranks. There is a credible link between his military actions and his attempts to obtain rice during the harvest season. Allied activities in all Corps are coordinated to deny rice to the enemy.

The successful Vietnamese Lower House elections and Presidential inauguration illustrated a further decline in the ability of the VC to influence the people or the constitutional government processes. The enemy's capability to intimidate or impress has been seriously eroded.

Although the pacification effort remains behind schedule, there are indications that the programs, slowed in previous months by Vietnamese preoccupation with the national elections, are beginning to gain momentum. The basic infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation structure is now established in all Corps and in most provinces. Although the Government of Vietnam has not as yet

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Authority NLS/CBS 7
By is, NARS, Date 7-25-83

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-2-

accepted ICEX at the national level, an increase in US/GVN province pacification planning for 1968 has been accepted by the Government of Vietnam. This should give the U.S. a firmer control of pacification resources and, properly utilized, will provide the Province Senior Advisor with another source of control.

~~SECRET~~

FIRST CORPS AREA

The primary objectives in the First Corps during October were to destroy enemy forces, minimize disruption of the elections, deny access to areas from which vital installations could be subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, deny enemy access to rice crops, and construct the Strong Point/Obstacle System and a C-131 capable airfield at Quang Tri City.

Enemy activity was at a low level in the First Corps during October. In early October, intelligence indicated enemy forces in the DMZ area had suffered substantial losses from our concentrated air, naval gunfire, and artillery attacks. At the same time, there was a corresponding reduction in the amount of heavy weapons attacks in this sector. During the last week of October, however, increased enemy ground activity was noted at Con Thien.

In the remainder of the Corps Area, principal actions were generated by friendly operations. Our forces retained the initiative throughout the month in military, psychological, and pacification efforts. Eleven battalion size or larger operations were conducted which resulted in 1,364 enemy killed and 292 weapons captured. U. S. losses were 248 killed in action.

The priority construction projects continued to move ahead with some revision of schedules required due to heavy rains.

Pacification activity in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces regained momentum lost in August and September. However, all provinces remained behind schedule in 1967 pacification programs except Thua Thien, which is on schedule. Danang City also has virtually completed its program.

In summary, the enemy suffered from several significant military setbacks in the First Corps during October, from a second major psychological defeat in the successful Lower House election, and from the continued denial of food during local harvest.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988
By 18 NARA. Date 11-21-91

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16c

SECOND CORPS AREA

The objectives in the Second Corps for October were to destroy enemy forces in the zone, deny him access to the rice harvest, and prevent disruption of the Lower House elections.

Friendly operations consisted primarily of small unit actions in which overwhelming force was swiftly applied to the enemy wherever he could be found. Long-range patrols and stay-behind forces continued to scour the hinterland, inflicting casualties intermittently and uncovering food and weapon caches.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations were devoted largely to security missions in connection with the Lower House elections and protection of the rice harvest. A dearth of overt enemy activity within Army of the Republic of Vietnam areas contributed to a reduced tempo of operational activity. A two-day running battle on October 6 and 7 between an estimated Viet Cong company and elements of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiment was characterized by friendly aggressiveness, good use of air mobility, and a willingness to fight at night. Regular and Popular Force contacts with enemy forces continue to increase, particularly on night operations, demonstrating an improving active defense capability.

There were no significant changes in the status of lines of communication in the Second Corps during October. Major emphasis was placed upon 1968 pacification planning which for the first time will integrate both military and civilian aspects of the program. Government of Vietnam refugee officials are becoming increasingly responsive as evidenced by their rapid reaction in providing rice, cement, and roofing to refugees generated by the battle of Ninh Hoa.

Enemy preparation for attack was noted throughout the Corps Area during the latter part of the month, especially in the highlands and Kontum Province.

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3
DA Memo: Jan 9, 1998
By RG NAFA Date 11-21-91

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14d

THIRD CORPS AREA

Two recent trends have resulted in significant progress toward the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency effort in the Third Corps. First, the National Priority Area has been secured to the extent that additional U. S. units can be employed against enemy main force elements operating outside the area. Second, the enemy has once again committed the main force units in strength against U. S. /Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. This combination can only hasten the destruction of the main force units and facilitate the expansion of our pacification effort.

The increased tempo of jungle clearing operations contributed to the destruction of several base camp areas and tunnel complexes, as well as uncovering the largest weapons cache ever found in the Third Corps. This cache, discovered by the 9th Infantry Division, was concealed in a tunnel complex and contained in excess of 1,100 weapons, 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,200 rounds of ammunition for crew-served weapons, and 3,600 grenades.

During the month, the number of enemy-initiated incidents against pacification was up 80 percent over August and 25 percent over September. From 29-31 October, a series of determined mortar and ground attacks were directed against Loc Ninh. Outnumbered Army of the Republic of Vietnam and local Civilian Irregular Defense Group troops made a heroic stand, literally throwing the enemy out of the defense perimeter and subsector headquarters. Regular U. S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam units reacted with additional forces. Heavy contact resulted on several occasions and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment completed its in-country training and began independent operations in the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3
DATE: Jan. 3, 1988
BY: 18 NARA, OAS: 11-21-91

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16e

FOURTH CORPS AREA

The overall tactical situation in the Fourth Corps remained favorable. Tactical operations were conducted with about the same frequency as during September. The overall morale, fighting spirit and combat effectiveness of Government of Vietnam units has been steadily increasing. They have maintained, and in some cases increased, their rate of attrition of Viet Cong forces despite the enemy's continuing practice of avoiding contact.

South Vietnamese units conducted a total of 158 major unit operations of battalion size or larger, of which contact with the Viet Cong was realized on 81. The percentage of contacts versus total operations has increased significantly during 1967, in spite of Viet Cong attempts to avoid contact. This is indicative of an improvement in intelligence and better Vietnamese responsiveness to this intelligence. The most significant tactical accomplishment of the month was the sustained field operation conducted by the 7th Infantry Division and Dinh Tuong Sector Regional Force Units. This operation began on October 27 and continued day and night through the end of the month. Results through October 31 were 113 Viet Cong killed, 31 Viet Cong captured, and 186 weapons captured. There were 21 operations which penetrated five other enemy base areas resulting in 163 Viet Cong killed, 18 captured, and 40 weapons of various caliber captured.

The effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces continues to improve slowly. Efforts to accelerate the program have been undertaken and all Popular Force training centers have been placed under direct control of the Fourth Corps Headquarters. The Regional and Popular Force desertion rate which continues to remain lower than in the past indicates that confidence in the Government of Vietnam is higher than last year.

The morale of the Viet Cong has continued to decline, as has the morale of the people living in Viet Cong-controlled and contested areas.

Losses sustained by the Viet Cong totaled 1,258 killed in action, 524 captured, and 582 weapons captured, compared to September losses of 944 killed in action, 300 captured, and 377 weapons lost.

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988
By 176 NARA Date 11-21-91

Sunday, November 12, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (37083)

SUBJECT: Monthly Military Assessment

This is my assessment for the month of October and the fourth of a series of the situation here in Vietnam.

Last month was marked by a decrease in enemy activity, the continuing destruction of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Forces and their base areas, and the consequent enemy loss of large quantities of weapons and equipment.

Again, the enemy has failed to achieve a single significant psychological or military victory. He lost politically with the successful completion of the Lower House elections and militarily in a series of clashes resulting from our search and destroy operations.

Although another major step has been taken to afford the people of South Vietnam political stability, pacification and the development of civil and military leaders continue to be major problem areas.

First Corps

In the First Corps during October, our primary objectives were to destroy enemy forces, minimize disruption of the elections, deny access to areas from which vital installations could be subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, deny enemy access to rice crops, install a dy marker, and construct a C-131 capable air field at Quang Tri City.

In accomplishing these objectives, the Third Marine Forces conducted eleven battalion size or larger operations which resulted in 1,364 enemy killed and 292 weapons captured. U. S. losses were 248 killed in action.

Significant operations in the First Corps last month include:

1. Kingfisher, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in northern Quang Tri Province.
2. Wheeler, a multi-battalion Americal Division search and destroy operation in Quang Tin Province, continued throughout October inflicting heavy casualties on the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division and denying the enemy access to rice from the Que Son Valley harvest.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guido, SEA Records, 4/1/98
By kg NARA, Date 12-16-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1938
By kg NARA, Date 12-16-91

3. Wallowa, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in northeastern Quang Tin and southeastern Quang Ngai Provinces by the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, which deployed to the First Corps during October. Wallowa, like Wheeler, was against elements of the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division. This operation accounted for 675 enemy killed against friendly losses of 48 killed in action. Deployment of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to the First Corps in early October permitted redeployment of additional Marine maneuver forces to northern First Corps.

Sixty-six arc light strikes were conducted in the vicinity of the DMZ.

Allied Forces retained the initiative throughout the First Corps during October in military, psychological and pacification efforts. The psychological operations rewards program has shown increased success by designating special geographical locations to receive weapons and make rewards. Women and children have surrendered significant quantities of munitions. This procedure will be further exploited. Hoi Chanh support of psychological operations is excellent. Armed propaganda teams are being brought up to strength, trained and armed during October. Kit Carson scouts strength rose from 67 to 98. These scouts are used extensively with combat units.

Morale of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam combat forces in the First Corps remains good. Desertions dropped substantially in October to 428 from 514 in September. Operational successes and improved unit facilities are major contributing factors to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam morale. Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations in conjunction with Allied operations in support of the October elections were successful as evidenced by a 78 percent turnout of eligible personnel. Forty-five large operations were conducted in October but enemy casualties from these operations were approximately one-half the September count. Significant operations included Lam Son, northeast of Hai Lang, where elements of the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment captured 47 weapons and inflicted 197 killed on the North Vietnamese battalion. The Viet Cong infrastructure in Hoi An was dealt a serious blow during a raid in which Revolutionary Development elements and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam identified or eliminated 38 Viet Cong. Another sweep northwest of Hai Lang netted 12 killed in action and 15 prisoners, all on the village infrastructure black list. The 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division continued to operate in a highly effective manner and the 2nd Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division has shown a general trend of improved combat effectiveness. Specific areas noted include coordination of combat elements, employment of supporting fires, aggressiveness on the part of battalion and lower unit commanders, and increased night operations.

Regional and Popular Force support for pacification in the First Corps is progressing and has proven effective. Twenty-nine Regional Force companies and 192 platoons are now providing direct support. The Regional and Popular Force basic unit training and refresher training is progressing according to schedule.

Dragon Fire, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation by the Republic of Korea Brigade on Batangan Peninsula in Quang Tin Province, continued throughout the month with 63 enemy killed.

Although extensive engineering effort was required to restore lines of communication, the priority construction projects (dye marker and Quang Tri airfield) continued to move ahead with some revision of construction schedules required due to heavy rains.

Enemy damage to 13 bridges and 18 culverts during October was overshadowed by effects of tropical storm 34 which from October 6-9 washed out 23 bridges, 13 culverts, and numerous small sections of roads. The most significant bridges lost were 600 feet of new Liberty Bridge on Route 5 and 50 percent of the Class 60 floating naval bridge on Route 1 north of Danang. The last two and a half weeks of October permitted accelerated repair and construction efforts to restore most losses and make appreciable progress in the highway upgrading program.

Dye marker construction continued during October subject to limitations imposed by weather and enemy actions. Site C-2 was completed and significant construction was accomplished at four other sites. Sites A-1, A-2, A-4, C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4 are currently occupied.

Pacification activity in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces regained momentum lost in August and September. Reasons for improvement were a marked decline in Viet Cong incidents and attacks and increased security following deployment of new American Division units in Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam Provinces. Steady progress continued in Thua Thien Province and in Danang City. Quang Tri reported an interruption in pacification momentum caused by difficulties in the transition to a new logistics system and movement of Revolutionary Development teams to second semester hamlets.

All provinces remained behind schedule in completion of 1967 pacification programs except Thua Thien, which is on schedule, and Danang City, which has essentially completed its program.

The flood in early October temporarily displaced 12,000 persons and halted most corps road transportation. Despite a five-fold increase in logistics airlift, normal tonnage of goods for civilian operations transported to provinces decreased by two-thirds from last month due to flood conditions on Highway 1 and monsoon prohibition of intra-corps junk transportation.

The Lower House election campaign was noteworthy for its active participation by all political groups in the First Corps except Communists, and because of minimal Viet Cong harassment. Voter turnout, though lower than the September election, still reached approximately 78 percent. Radical Buddhist opposition movement continued its efforts against the Thieu-Ky Government, including one self-immolation in Quang Ngai City. However, Buddhists have thus far failed to elicit a meaningful response from the First Corps populace due to lack of issues and apparent overall weariness and disillusionment with Buddhist leadership and tactics.

Civic action included distribution of food (606,767 pounds), cement, lumber, clothing and school supplies. There were 121,284 treatments by medical and dental teams. Assistance was rendered for construction and repair of bridges, family dwellings, schools, wells, libraries, etc.

The number of Hoi Chanh rose from a yearly low of 75 in September to 160 for October following increased friendly military pressure throughout the First Corps.

Enemy activity was at a low level in the First Corps during October. In early October, Intelligence indicated enemy forces in the DMZ area had suffered substantial losses from our concentrated air, naval gunfire, and artillery attacks, and to some extent had withdrawn northward across the DMZ. At the same time, there was a corresponding reduction in the amount of heavy weapons attacks in this sector, decreasing from over 7,800 rounds in September to less than 4,000 in October. During the last week of October, increased ground activity was noted at Con Thien. It appeared the enemy had repositioned his forces in a more offensive posture. His employment of heavy weapons, particularly mortars, increased substantially during the same period.

In the remainder of the First Corps, principal actions were generated by friendly operations.

Interrogation reports of ralliers and prisoners continued to reflect the bleak picture presented in my September assessment. The enemy situation in the First Corps is considered to have further deteriorated.

In summary, the enemy suffered from several significant military setbacks in the First Corps during October, from a second major psychological defeat in the successful Lower House election, and from the continued denial of food during local harvest.

Second Corps

Our objectives in the Second Corps for the month of October were to destroy enemy forces in the zone, deny him access to the rice harvest, and prevent disruption of the Lower House elections.

Despite the shadow of major enemy forces stirring in the Western Highlands, a spirit of guarded optimism pervaded the Second Corps at the end of October. The success of the three recent, broadly based national elections can only be interpreted by a realistic enemy as a disaster to his fortunes. More than ever, he needs a dramatic tactical victory to buoy the morale of his troops and to convince the man in the village of Communist invincibility. The destruction of a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp or major Allied force would meet his needs admirably.

Among the fighting forces, a decrease of activity in October was evidenced by fewer friendly casualties across the board. The protection of the rice harvest and the Lower House elections were the principle preoccupations. Aggressive patrolling of the hinterlands continued with attention being devoted to political and tactical boundaries.

Operations in October were characterized for the most part by small unit actions in which overwhelming force was swiftly applied to the enemy wherever he could be found. Were the enemy looking for a war of attrition this month, he picked the wrong time and the wrong place. Some typical kill ratios in the Second Corps for October were: Bolling (12:1); Pershing (16:1); and Francis Marion (65:1). The latter operation was combined with Operation Greeley and renamed Operation MacArthur on the 12th of October with no further contact of significance reported. Long-range patrols and stay-behind forces continued to scour the hinterland, inflicting casualties intermittently and uncovering food and weapon caches. New during the month was mobile guerrilla operation Boudinot on the Pleiku/Darlac Provincial Boundary to exploit the enemy's propensity for infiltration along political and military boundaries. Mobile strike force 27 already has reported surprising and scattering one North Vietnamese company and has captured a sizeable amount of weapons and munitions.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations were devoted largely to security missions in connection with the Lower House elections and protection of the rice harvest. Dearth of covert enemy activity within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam area operations contributed to a reduced tempo of operational activity. Most active was the 22nd Division in Binh Dinh where a significant battle was fought on October 3 by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Popular Force troops in which 40 enemy were killed (favorable kill ratio of 6.7 to 1). Near Ban Me Thout, a two-day running battle on October 6 and 7 between an estimated Viet Cong company and elements of the 45th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment was characterized by friendly aggressiveness, good use of air mobility and a willingness to fight at night. Overall results, however, were disappointing, with an unfavorable kill ratio of 2.4 to 1.

Regional and Popular Force contacts with enemy forces continue to increase, particularly on night operations, demonstrating an improved active defense capability. There were two significant contacts during the months. Five Regional Force companies engaged an unknown size Viet Cong unit on October 20, southeast of Phu Cat and were supported by U.S. artillery, gunships and tactical air strikes. A supply dump believed to be North Vietnamese Army was captured and ten enemy were killed. The other action was at Ninh Hoa in which Regional and Popular Forces were the first units into action, supported later by Republic of Korea forces. The overall favorable kill ratio for October was 2.3 to 1 (versus an average of 2.5 to 1).

Korean forces provided protection for the rice harvest and the Lower House elections in the coastal provinces. In addition to the several skirmishes near Tuy Hoa, a major fight erupted mid-month around Ninh Hoa in which elements of the 188th North Vietnamese Army regiment attempted to reassert their influence over the population and to gain badly-needed food supplies. The area was cleared by October 28 with remarkably few civilian casualties in view of the North Vietnamese Army use of innocent civilians as human shields throughout the action. The restraint offered by the Korean Army, however, was paid for by a greater than normal casualty rate and a lower kill ratio than in September 4.5 to 1 versus 5.4 to 1).

There were no significant changes in the status of our lines of communication in the II Corps during October.

Major emphasis was placed upon 1968 pacification planning which, for the first time, will integrate both military and civilian aspects of the program.

The Government of Vietnam refugee officials are becoming increasingly responsive as evidenced by their rapid reaction in providing rice, cement, and roofing to refugees generated by the battle of Ninh Hoa.

At the direction of the Commanding General of 1st Forces, intensified emphasis has been placed upon rice control with plans consisting of both protection of the harvesters and immediate removal of harvested rice to secure areas. In addition, plans have been prepared to collect or destroy rice in Viet Cong-controlled areas.

As a result of increased emphasis upon attacks on the Viet Cong infrastructure, 67 Viet Cong cadre were killed and 392 captured during October.

The voter turnout for the Lower House elections was 81.2 percent. It was anticipated that there would be a dramatic drop from the 88.4 percent experienced

in the Presidential elections. The Government of Vietnam and allied forces again provided an effective shield for the voters, with only scattered incidents reported.

Enemy preparation is evident throughout the II Corps. In the western highlands and Kontum Province, ominous signs persist of an offensive build-up by elements of the B-3 front. Targeted for attack may be the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps and other installations from Dak Seang South to Duc Co, especially those considered to be lightly defended. On October 26 some 46 rounds of 122mm rocket fell on the II Corps headquarters and the MACV and adjacent unit compounds.

The first indication of the presence in Pleiku of the attacking unit, believed to be the 200th artillery battalion, is evidence of this build-up. The recent reinforcement of the 95th regiment, considered to be a "low priority" unit, in Eastern Pleiku Province is also significant. Further south the enemy continued to infiltrate and to develop supply corridors through Dar Lac Province enroute to the Coast.

In Binh Dinh Province, the 3rd North Vietnamese Army division was dispersed to threaten the central Regional Development areas and to forage for rice. Enemy objectives may require development of strategic hamlets to protect Viet Cong-controlled areas and to "liberate" the people from New Life hamlets. In Khanh Hoa Province enemy sapper units, aided by troops from the 18B regiment, were active in the Nha Trang area where they mined two trains and mortared the 5th Special Forces Logistical Support Center and the 281st aviation airfield.

In late October, troops from the Regiment, joined by local force companies and guerrillas, entered the outlying hamlets surrounding Ninh Hoa without being detected. At the same time these forces mortared the 9th Korean Army Division Headquarters. While no new tactics were noted in the Ninh Hoa incident, this was the first major enemy-initiated ground attack in Khanh Hoa Province since the arrival of the 18B Regiment in late 1966. This action served not only to demonstrate the combat effectiveness of the 18B Regiment following a long period of inactivity, but to trigger a review of friendly surveillance and intelligence operations.

In the southern provinces, enemy activity increased in an effort to disrupt the Lower House elections and to replenish depleted food stocks from the coastal rice harvests. Local force and district units gave propaganda lectures in villages to discourage voter participation, destroyed ballot boxes, and confiscated voting cards.

The enemy's short-term economic objective was the harvesting of outlying rice fields.

Third Corps

Objectives in the III Corps during the month of October were to destroy enemy main force units, his base areas and equipment, to disrupt his lines of communication, and to provide a secure environment for the Lower House elections.

Two recent trends have resulted in significant progress toward the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency effort in the III Corps. First, the national priority area has been secured to the extent that additional U. S. units can be employed against enemy main force elements operating outside the area. Second, the enemy has once again committed his main force units in strength against allied forces. This combination can only hasten the destruction of the main force units and facilitate the expansion of our pacification effort.

The increased tempo of jungle clearing operations contributed to the destruction of several base camp areas and tunnel complexes, as well as uncovering the largest weapons cache ever found in the III Corps. This cache, discovered by the 9th Infantry Division, was concealed in a tunnel complex and contained in excess of 1100 weapons, 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,200 rounds of ammunition for crew-served weapons, and 3,600 grenades. From October 29-31, a series of determined mortar and ground attacks were directed against Loc Ninh. Outnumbered South Vietnam and Civilian Irregular Defense Group made a heroic stand, literally throwing the enemy out of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group perimeter and subsector headquarters. The 1st Infantry Division (U. S.) and 5th Vietnamese (South) Division reacted with additional forces. Heavy contact resulted on several occasions and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy. 369 enemy had been killed as of October 31. The engagement continued into November.

On October 27 the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attacked the 3rd Battalion, 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, south of Song Be and was repulsed with heavy personnel and equipment losses (the kill ratio exceeded 20:1).

Two other Civilian Irregular Defense Group Forces had extremely successful operations in October. On October 20, Civilian Irregular Defense Group units from Tra Cu engaged 40 Viet Cong and killed 15 with no friendly losses. On October 21, two Civilian Irregular Defense Group Companies engaged an enemy force of unknown strength in a strike and killed 94 Viet Cong with light friendly losses.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Third Corps units have continued to enthusiastically utilize helicopters furnished by the Second Forces. A total of 126 air mobile assaults were made by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during October, a significant increase over the 36 operations in the previous month.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment completed its in-country training and began independent operations this month in the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province.

The construction and maintenance of roads and bridges so vitally important to both military operations and civilian commerce continues. During October, 254 kilometers of road was improved and/or maintained and 314 feet of tactical bridging was installed.

Our pacification effort continued with six new District Operations Intelligence Coordinating Centers established and staffed by Intelligence Advisory Officers during October. There are now 32 operational District Operations Intelligence Coordinating Centers in the Third Corps contributing to the identification and destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Forty of 46 Army of the Republic of Vietnam Battalions have undergone the Revolutionary Development Direct Support training cycle. Seven battalions have completed the combined battalion refresher training program conducted by U. S. brigades and ten are presently in training.

The construction of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam housing under the approved \$2.8 million program will be an important contribution to the morale, retention and overall effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam soldier. The model units of this dependent housing are now nearing completion in each of the Third Corps Army of the Republic of Vietnam Divisional areas.

In October, 216 refugee families were resettled in Duc Thanh of Phuoc Tuy Province. The resettlement of 3,000 additional persons is planned over the next 90 days.

Operation Doi Moi, a carefully controlled and intensive psychological operations campaign, resulted in 91 "quick reaction" leaflet drops exploiting information provided by Hoi Chanh. An example of "quick reaction" psychological operations was the use of airborne loudspeakers to broadcast Allied successes at Loc Ninh while action was still in progress. Ralliers increased from 369 in September to 424 in October.

The total number of incidents initiated by the Viet Cong against pacification is up 80 percent over August and 25 percent over September.

During the month, the enemy conducted attacks with Main Force and North Vietnamese Army units. He appeared to be striving for a victory in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. Both are important to the security of his routes of infiltration and logistical support. These efforts resulted in heavy enemy losses.

On October 27, the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment was identified for the first time in the Third Corps area in an attack against Song Be. Three diversionary attacks were conducted in conjunction with the main attack in a probable attempt to prevent timely reinforcements. The assault was repulsed with heavy enemy losses (130 killed in action).

The Loc Ninh attack, October 29-31, was the first known attempt in the Third Corps to employ multi-regimental forces from two divisions against a single objective. In this engagement, the enemy employed 122MM rockets for the first time since July.

The enemy suffered severe losses in the seven main force regiments contacted during the month. Each regiment lost at least 100 killed. Over 2,000 small arms and crew-served weapons were captured, the largest number ever captured in a single month in the Third Corps.

Agent and POW reports continue to indicate shortages of food and medicine. Over 200 tons of rice and significant quantities of medical supplies and hospital facilities were either captured or destroyed in October.

Fourth Corps

Our objectives in the Fourth Corps during this past month were to prevent Viet Cong interference in the Congressional elections, further the pacification effort, upgrade security, prevent interdiction of the major lines of communication, and destroy enemy main forces, provincial units, and their bases.

The overall tactical situation in the Fourth Corps remained favorable. Tactical operations were conducted with about the same frequency as during September. The overall morale, fighting spirit and combat effectiveness of Government of Vietnam units has been steadily increasing. They have maintained, and in some cases increased, their Viet Cong killed and captured count despite the enemy's continuing practice of avoiding contact.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units conducted a total of 158 major unit operations of battalion size or larger, of which contact with the Viet Cong was realized on 81. Major unit operations are continuing with less frequency when compared to like periods during 1966. This can be largely attributed to 15 infantry battalions being designated to support pacification in early 1967. The percentage of contacts versus total operations has increased significantly during 1967, in spite of Viet Cong attempts to avoid contact. This is indicative of an improvement in intelligence and better Government of Vietnam responsiveness to this intelligence. The most significant tactical accomplishment of the month was the sustained field operation conducted by the 7th Infantry Division and Dinh Tuong Sector Regional Force units. This operation commenced on October 27 and continued day and night through the end of the month. Results thus far are 113 Viet Cong killed in action, 31 Viet Cong captured, and 186 weapons captured. There were 21 operations which penetrated five other base areas resulting in 163 Viet Cong killed in action, 18 captured and 40 weapons of various caliber captured. Small unit operations number 54,357. Major unit airmobile operations numbered 29 with a total of 50,357 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Troops airlifted.

The effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces continues to improve slowly. Efforts to accelerate the program have been undertaken and all Popular Force training centers have been placed under direct control of the Fourth Corps Headquarters. The Regional and Popular Force desertion rate which continues to remain lower than in the past indicates that confidence in the Government of Vietnam is higher than last year. Beneficial results are reflected in the fact that Regional Force assigned strength is approximately 95 percent and Popular Force strength is approximately 98 percent of authorized strength.

The overall security status of major lines of communication displayed little change during the month. Surprisingly light Viet Cong interdiction was evidenced on these routes. Except for the last six days of the month, on the nights of October 25 and 26, the Viet Cong cratered Route 4 between the My Thuan Ferry and Long Dinh in 39 places, although at only one site the road was closed for longer than four hours. On the night of October 27, the Viet Cong cratered the road in eight places and constructed two roadblocks in the same general area of the preceding night. Repairs were again accomplished on the same day and the road was reopened to at least one lane of traffic. Constant damage and repairs

makes the condition of Route 4 poor, at best. The security status of all land and waterway lines of communication in the Fourth Corps remained unchanged except for the regression of Route 24 from My Tho to Cho Gao which reverted from green to amber, and Route 26 from Ben Tre to Ba Tri which reverted from amber to red. Overall maintenance of most major roads in the Fourth Corps is poor. All airfields in the corps are operational.

The pacification programs regained momentum after a slowdown due to preparation for and conduct of elections. All Revolutionary Development cadre teams which were scheduled to work in second semester hamlets are now working in them; however, some teams are returning to their former areas during the hours of darkness. The recent allocation of 36 Regional Force companies and 166 Popular Force platoons to the Fourth Corps, when recruited and trained, will enhance the security posture of the Revolutionary Development areas and permits greater flexibility in the employment of the Revolutionary Development teams. The Viet Cong initiated a total of nine incidents against the Revolutionary Development cadre resulting in 22 cadre killed, 52 Revolutionary Development cadre wounded, and 13 Revolutionary Development cadre missing. Greater command emphasis is being placed on the pacification effort.

During the first three and one-half weeks of October, Viet Cong activity of the Fourth Corps was relatively light despite the Lower House elections which took place on October 22. In the week prior to the House of Representatives elections, there were only 85 Viet Cong initiated incidents. Although the Viet Cong warned people not to vote, intelligence reports did not indicate any large scale anti-election campaigns, such as occurred before the Presidential elections. On the night of October 24, there was a sudden upsurge in Viet Cong activity in Viet Cong Military Region II. The towns of Phan Phu, Mo Cay, and Ba Tri of Kien Hoa Province were shelled with 60MM mortars and Ben Tre, the capital of Kien Hoa Province, was shelled with 75MM recoilless rifle and 82MM mortar fire. During the daylight hours of October 25, Ben Tre Airfield was mortared and two personnel carriers were destroyed by recoilless rifle fire near Ben Tre.

There were 597 Viet Cong initiated incidents reported for October as compared to 728 for the month of September. No major ground attacks occurred during October, although Phu Hung Op, located eight kilometers northeast of Ba Cang Subsector, Binh Long Province, was overrun and its defenders suffered heavy casualties. Except for this one incident, the pattern of enemy initiated activity continued to consist of harassments to outposts and watchtowers and occasional shelling of district towns.

Most of the Viet Cong increased activity occurred in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces where the 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division has recently conducted more successful operations than at any time during the past two years.

In Dinh Tuong Province, combined 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division and 2nd Brigade, 9th U. S. Division Operations have caused the Viet Cong severe losses and have forced them to concentrate units in the area in order to retain their hold and to interdict Highway 4. The overall situation in these areas is more favorable than it has been in the last two years. This is caused by an increase in sustained Government of Vietnam operations.

The morale of the Viet Cong has continued to decline, as has the morale of the people living in Viet Cong-controlled and contested areas. Although the morale and devotion of the Viet Cong cadre remains high, intelligence reports indicate that increased effort is required from these cadre to politically indoctrinate and motivate both the armed forces and populace in order to offset their lowering morale. Losses sustained by the Viet Cong totaled 1,258 killed in action, 524 captured, and 582 weapons captured, compared to September losses of 944 killed in action, 300 captured, and 377 weapons lost. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi Program totaled 531. In addition to the Chieu Hoi, there were 72 Hoa Hao soldiers who returned to Government of Vietnam control.

The primary objectives of our naval forces in Vietnam last month were to destroy the enemy by offensive action, interdict his waterborne logistic efforts, and promote the Government of Vietnam by conducting psychological operations.

The onset of the northeast monsoon has required redeployment of Market Time Forces. The larger, more seaworthy ships have been concentrated on the northern-east coast in anticipation of trawler infiltration attempts during the seasonally inclement weather.

Game Warden Forces continued to provide effective patrols in the riverine areas. Many small raids were conducted against Viet Cong Communications-Liaison Way Stations, ambush positions, and the enemy infrastructure. In one unusual operation, ten Viet Cong (including a hamlet chief and the head of the Viet Cong assassination security platoon) were abducted while attending the funeral of a Viet Cong village chief killed the night before by a seal team. Information concerning the funeral was obtained from a Hoi Chanh. The actual abduction was conducted by 40 Vietnamese inserted by helicopter obtained through the Fourth Corps, supported and extracted by Vietnamese Regional Advisory Groups and Game Warden Forces, and coordinated by the Regional Advisory Group Advisor.

Coronado operations of the Mobile Riverine Force continued in Dinh Tuong and Long An Provinces. Significant contact was made in Coronado V in the Bac Long and Cam Son Secret Zones in Dinh Tuong Province, resulting in 173 killed in action and 12 U. S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnamese killed.

Two Vietnamese ships, converted into medical/psychological warfare ships, treated 10,800 medical and dental patients and dispensed food and clothing to approximately 20,000 needy people, while psychological warfare teams, cultural teams, and social workers provided entertainment and propaganda in the form of movies, plays and speeches. During October, these ships operated a total of 32 days in the Bassac and Mekong Rivers.

7th Air Force

The objectives of the 7th Air Force during October were to provide Allied direct support, tactical air and logistical support for ground operations, locate the enemy and his resources, and limit enemy movement.

In support of these objectives, there were a total of 11,029 tactical air sorties flown in-country during the month of October; 7,999 of these were flown as close air support missions for ground operations. Ordnance was expended primarily against enemy troop concentrations, base areas, fortifications and installations. There were 232 secondary explosions, 4,382 military structures destroyed, another 2,591 damaged, and 280 sampans destroyed.

Included in the overall effort were 758 combat skyspot sorties flown to deny the enemy the use of night time as a sanctuary. An additional 336 combat skyspot sorties were flown during daylight hours in inclement weather. Two hundred sixty-four immediate support requests were honored by Allied flareships illuminating battlefields, depriving the enemy the concealment of darkness, and flaring for tactical air strikes in all corps. Airlift figures were equally impressive with approximately 292,000 passengers and 60,000 tons of cargo being airlifted throughout South Vietnam.

More than 2,500 Vietnamese Air Force strike sorties were flown against enemy targets, resulting in 1,098 military structures destroyed, 714 damaged, 85 sampans destroyed and 18 secondary explosions.

Herbicide operations increased more than 10 percent this month as compared to September. Five hundred of the 684 sorties scheduled during the month were flown. The majority of these were defoliation missions scheduled into War Zone D. A limited number of sorties were scheduled against Viet Cong crops in southern Second Corps and the eastern and northern portions of the Third Corps. Missions were also flown over the U Minh forest in the Fourth Corps.

Constant pressure was placed on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army movement by the more than 7,200 visual reconnaissance sorties flown in O1/O2 type aircraft. This extensive surveillance program produced 1,631 significant sightings and resulted in 341 immediate airstrike sorties being flown to destroy fleeting enemy targets.

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 7:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith, officially delivered by Wakaizumi from the Prime Minister, is the advanced text of Sato's speech at the Press Club tomorrow.

The Prime Minister took special pains to assure its delivery to you tonight.

You may wish to mention it at dinner.

Wakaizumi said the Prime Minister is very anxious to find more time to talk with you alone -- not about the Ryukyus or bilateral matters but about other issues.

He says that Miki can find all the time in the world to talk with Rusk but he has only this one chance to talk with President Johnson whose policy in Asia he believes to be correct.

You may wish to find an occasion tonight or tomorrow to give him a chance to chat further on a bilateral, personal basis.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

ACTION~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 14, 1967
7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's negative draft response to Anderson's latest two cables which:

1. Report Nasser's specific complaints with our UN draft, his anxiety to see Anderson again; and Anderson's feeling Nasser will assume Anderson is going back on a personal commitment if he doesn't go to Cairo.

2. Anderson's message to Sec. Rusk on how he would handle a trip.

W. W. Rostow

Katzenbach draft OK _____

No _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-477
By *sig*, NARA, Date 6-28-95

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WWRostow:rlh

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Anembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

STATE

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REF.: Beirut's 3998, 3999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-478
By CL, NARA, Date 2-22-95

Under
Please pass following message Anderson from ~~XXXXXX~~ Secretary
Katzenbach:

1. We have carefully considered what can be accomplished by another visit Cairo. Our conclusion is that very little can be achieved and that some damage might be done. Egyptians in New York are not acting in a helpful manner and have succeeded in undercutting Hussein's efforts either because of their desire prevent Hussein from getting too far in the lead or because Russians did not like idea of Security Council addressing itself to a U.S. resolution that had chance of success. For these reasons UAR asked for Security Council meeting at moment when there appeared to be some opportunity move Arabs and Israelis to moderate course. Situation in Security Council at present confused and unclear. We fear that there may be desire on Nasser's part utilize your presence Cairo add further confusion situation.

NEA:LDBattle:lab 11/14/67 4263

The Under Secretary

IO - Mr. Popper (substance)

3/S -

~~SECRET~~

2

Ambassy BEIRUT

~~SECRET~~

Moreover, message you have received from him clearly sounds like Foreign Ministry drafting rather than Nasser since it goes into detail on resolution. It seems to suggest to us that Nasser hopes for negotiations with you on wording resolution which at this stage in context U.N. would be unfortunate. Our conclusion, therefore, is that chance progress is not increased by further efforts with Nasser in light behavior UAR with Hussein, tendency make propaganda out of your presence, and in view his hope use you as negotiating instrument which we sure you would not want.

2. We recognize this puts you in difficult position, and we do not wish embarrass you in area nor in your relations with Nasser which have been asset to U.S. in past and will be again. Suggest your answer declining return Cairo might be based on one or all following elements:

(a) illness in your family;

(b) obvious desire from Nasser's message get into wording of resolution which you not able discuss as private citizen;

(c) outstanding commitments U.S. necessitating your return as soon as possible;

(d) public disclosure (NYTimes article) of proposed visit to Cairo.

Best regards.

END

GP-1

~~SECRET~~