

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#2 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 7:40 p.m.</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>open 3-14-96 NLS 94-481</i>	<del>11/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#5 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Congo</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i> [Duplicate of #64, NSF, Country File, Congo, Vol. 14]	<del>11/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#12 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, re: Japan</del> <i>synthesized with 9-13-1, 9/17/94</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 1-10-95 NLS 94-320</i>	<del>11/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#12a rpt</del>	<del>"Japanese Tentative Proposal"</del> <del>PCI 1 p</del> <i>open 1-10-95 NLS 94-320</i>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#13 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	<del>11/15/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#18 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#18a cable</del>	<del>Deptel to Beirut (work copy)</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#18b cable</del>	<del>Beirut 3998</del> <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#18c cable</del>	<del>Beirut 3999</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> <del>S 1 p</del>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#25 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m.</del> <i>open 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-357</i>	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#26 memo</del>	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i> [Duplicate of #53, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1981]	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#26a ltr</del>	<del>Eban to Goldberg</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #63a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 7] [Exempt 1978]	<del>11/14/67</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 50, 11/15-15/67**

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#27a memo	Jones to President <i>open 1-26-96 NLS 94-282</i> <del>S 1 p</del> [Duplicate of #109a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	<del>11/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#35 memo	Rostow to President <i>Dup. #5, Diary backup, 11/14-15/67, box 82</i> <del>S 1 p Sanitized 12-22-93 NLS 92-131</del> [Duplicate of #229, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] <del>[Sanitized NLS 83-17]</del> <i>open NLS 97-182 9.24.98</i>	<del>11/13/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#35a rpt	"Language for the 2nd paragraph..." <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Dup. #86 Diary Backup 11/14-15/67 Box 82; dup #5a same file</i> [Duplicate of #229a, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] <i>open NLS 92-131 (2/02)</i>	undated	A
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 5:25 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	11/13/67	A
#37a cable	Deptel to Saigon (work copy) <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 10/18/96 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#37b cable	Intelligence Cable <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 10/18/96 NLS 94-478</i>	11/10/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 5-25-95 NLS 94-357</i>	11/13/67	A
#38a memo	Rusk to President, re: Ryukyus <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#38c rpt	Duplicate of #35a		
#39a memo	Rusk to President <del>S 3 p</del> <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/13/67	A
#39b rpt	"VH The President and the PM..." <del>S 4 p</del> <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	undated	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 2:30 p.m. <i>Sanitized NLS 92-131, 9/1/94</i> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>OPEN 5/31/96 NLS 95-349</i>	11/13/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
43, 43a #43 memo	<del>DUPLICATES IN FILE</del> <del>WNR, Box 4, "VIETNAM", Docs #10, 10a</del> Rostow to President, 10:15 a.m. <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del> S — 2 p <del>open 4-17-95 NLJ 94-456</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 11/13/67] [Sanitized NLJ 85-68]	11/13/67	A
#43a memo	Katzenbach to President TS — 3 p <del>open 10/18/96 NLJ 94-478</del> [Duplicate in Diary Backup, 11/13/67] [Sanitized NLJ 85-69]	11/13/67	A
<del>Not OPEN</del> #44 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del> S — 1 p <del>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</del>	11/13/67	A
#44a cable	Deptel 246 to Beirut S — 1 p <del>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</del>	11/12/67	A
#45 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. C — 1 p <del>OPEN 5/31/96 NLJ 95-349</del> [Duplicate of #268, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7]	11/13/67	A
#45a memo	Rostow for Record <del>open 5-26-95 NLJ 94-357</del> C — 2 p [Duplicate of #268a, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] " 245b " " " " "	11/13/67	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President S — 1 p <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del> [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, NSC History, Gold Crisis, Book 1; Sanitized NLJ 87-45]	11/13/67	A
#48a memo	Fowler to President <del>open 3-25-96</del> S — 2 p <del>NLJ 95-347</del> [Sanitized NLJ 83-16]	11/11/67	A
#48b rpt	Briefing Paper, re: Japan S — 2 p [Sanitized NLJ 83-16]	11/11/67	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan S — 1 p <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del> [Sanitized NLJ 83-17]	11/13/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#50a memo	Duplicate of #48a <i>open 3-25-96 NLS 95-347</i>		
#50b memo	Duplicate of #48b "		
#51 memo	Rostow to President, re: Peru <i>sanitized 1-22-93 NLS 91-467</i> S 3 p <i>Open 5/5/00 N-3 op 114</i> [Duplicate of #110b, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/13/67	A
#51a memo	Katzenbach to President C 2 p [Duplicate of #110d, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/13/67	A
#51b rpt	"Talking Points-Peru" C 3 p  [Duplicate of #110d, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	undated	A
#51d cable	Lima 2213 <i>open 12/16/09</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #110g, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/11/67	A
#51e cable	Lima 2215 <i>open 12/16/09</i> S 2 p <i>Exempt 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #110h, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	11/12/67	A
#52 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67949) S 2 p <i>OPEN 7/28/95 NLS 94-477</i>	11/12/67	A
#53 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67945) S 2 p " " "	11/11/67	A
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 3:25 p.m. S 1 p " " "	11/11/67	A
#54a cable	Beirut 3901 <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i> S 3 p	11/11/67	A
#54b cable	Beirut 3905 S 3 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLS 94-478</i>	11/11/67	A

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#54c cable	Beirut 3908 S 1 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i>	11/10/67	A
#58a memo	Katzenbach to President S 1 p <i>Sanitized 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478 more released</i> [Duplicate of #88a, NSF, Country File, France, Vol. 12] [Sanitized NLJ 86-16] <i>open 1-20-11 NLJ/RAC 10-188 (#88a)</i>	11/10/67	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>open 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i>	11/11/67	A
#61a memo	Schultze to President C 2 p <i>open 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i>	11/3/67	A
#61b memo	Gaud and Freeman to President C 2 p <i>open 7-9-99 NLJ 94-275</i>	10/30/67	A
#63 memo	Rostow to President, 9:50 a.m. TS 1 p <i>open 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i>	11/10/67	A
#63a memo	McNamara to President S 1 p <i>open NLJ 96-273 5-26-98</i>	11/9/67	A
#63b memo	Wheeler to SecDef S 2 p [Duplicate of #76a]	11/7/67	A
#63c map	Attachment to #63b S 1 p [Duplicate of #76b]	undated	A
#66 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 2-8-93 NLJ 91-528</i> [Duplicate of #187, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/9/67	A
#66a cable	Bangkok 5749 S 3 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLJ 94-478</i> [Duplicate of #187a, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/8/67	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 7/28/95 NY 94-477</i> C 1 p <i>Dup #3 NSF CF VN XA2 Box 4</i>	11/9/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report C 1 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLT 94-478</i> <i>Dup #32, NSF, CF, VN "8A2" Box 104</i>	11/9/67	A
#71a cable	Saigon 10641 S 9 p <i>open 3-2-95 NLT 94-478</i> <i>[Sanitized NLT/CBS 10] [Dup. #27a, NSF, CF, VN, "8B(1)(B) Box 104]</i> <i>Encer Aug #71a, NSF, CF, VN, "8B(1)" Box 105</i>	11/8/67	A
#75a memo	Wheeler to President S 1 p <i>open 5-26-98 NLT 96-273</i>	11/8/67	A
#75b rpt	"Comments by Gen. Westmoreland" S 3 p <i>open 5-1-00 RAC</i> <i>[Dup. #21a, 23b - NSF CF Vietnam, b6b6,</i> <i>"2A1 - 1 Corps DMZ"]</i>	undated	A
#75c ltr	Greene to Bus S 2 p <i>open RAC 3/98</i> <i>[Dup. #21b, 23c - NSF CF Vietnam, b6b6,</i> <i>"2A1 - 1 Corps DMZ"]</i>	11/67	A
#76a memo	Duplicate of #63b <i>open 5/26/98</i>		
#76b memo	Duplicate of #63c "		
#79 memo	Rostow to President, 12:10 p.m. C 2 p <i>open 7/28/95 NLT 94-477</i>	11/8/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 11:20 a.m. C 1 p <i>SAME SANITIZATION 7/28/95 NLT 94-477</i> <i>[Sanitized NLT 85-72]</i> <i>[Dup. #10c, NSF, Files of Rostow, "Map w/Pres, July-Dec 1967" Box 1]</i>	11/8/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 10:45 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLT 98-52</i> <i>exempt 3-14-96 NLT 99-481 5-21-99, same NLT 019-025-2</i>	11/8/67	A
#82a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 3 p <i>exempt 4-13-95 NLT 94-482</i>	11/7/67	A
#84 memo	Rostow to President, 9:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 7/28/95 NLT 94-477</i>	11/8/67	A
#84a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>open 10/18/96 NLT 94-478</i>	11/8/67	A
#87a memo	Rostow to President, re: Germany S 2 p <i>open 7/28/95 NLT 94-477</i> <i>open 6/22/95 NLT 94-3461</i> <i>[Dup. of #152a, NSF, CF, Germany, Vol 14]</i>	11/7/67	A

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<del>#87b cable</del>	<del>Bonn 4773</del> <i>open 12-16-94 NLJ 94-342</i> <del>S</del> <i>3 p</i> <i>[Dup. of #152c, NSF, C.F. Germany, Vol 14]</i>	<del>11/2/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#88 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p SAME SANITIZATION 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477 <del>[Sanitized NLJ 85-72]</del>	11/8/67	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President, re: Laos <del>C</del> <i>2 p</i> <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del>	<del>11/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#93 memo	Duplicate of #89 <del>OPEN 7/28/95 NLJ 94-477</del>		
#94 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 1-22-93</i> <del>C</del> <i>1 p</i> <i>NLJ 91-467</i> [Duplicate of #112, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	<del>11/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>
#94a cable	Lima 2139 <del>C</del> <i>2 p</i> <i>open 12/16/09</i> [Duplicate of #112a, NSF, Country File, Peru, Vol. 3]	<del>11/8/67</del>	<del>A</del>

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#24 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1 p Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-57	11/14/67	A
#24a cable	Intelligence report - TS 6pp Exempt 6-22-04 NLJ/RAC 04-58	11/14/67	A

## FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 50, November 8-15, 1967  
Box 25

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1  
*hang*  
*2. Pres. file*

Wednesday - November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to Costa Rican Fifth Presidential Prayer  
Breakfast

On November 29, 1967, the Costa Rican chapter of the International Council for Christian Leadership will hold its annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast in honor of the President of the Republic, Professor Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez. As in the past, local government, congressional, business and religious leaders will attend.

In previous years, you have sent a message to the President of Costa Rica on this occasion. State recommends that you do so again this year. A suggested message is attached. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - Suggested message to Costa Rican President Trejos

Approve ✓

Disapprove    

See me    .



1a

Suggested Presidential Message  
to Costa Rican President Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez  
(on the occasion of the fifth annual Presidential Prayer Breakfast  
by the Costa Rican Chapter of the International Council for  
Christian Leadership, on November 29, 1967)

His Excellency  
Lic. Jose Joaquin Trejos Fernandez  
President of the Republic of Costa Rica  
San Jose, Costa Rica

I am pleased to join you through this message in the Fifth Presidential Prayer Breakfast. I send my best wishes to you and the Costa Rican people.

The theme of the meeting, Isaiah 2:4, is particularly appropriate. People of goodwill everywhere long for the day when nations can "beat their swords into plowshares". This is my personal desire and that of the American people. But we also know that the defense of freedom requires that we be in a position to help people whose rights and liberties are threatened.

I join with you and your colleagues in a fervent prayer that those who pursue aggression would cease and make common cause with us in building peace and prosperity for all peoples.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm  
11/15/67



2

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Profile*

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
7:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the study by Dick Helms  
on the international connections of U. S.  
peace groups, which you requested.

I have the only other copy outside the  
CIA and will analyze it carefully tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-481  
By ing, NARA, Date 1-24-96

WWRostow:rla



3  
ACTION

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
7:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Via George Christian

Herewith a draft letter to the  
Editor of The New York Times, of  
the kind you suggested.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



November 15, 1967 *3a*

To the Editor:

Your editorial on The Patriotism of Dissent (TIMES, November 15) calls for some sharp dissent.

I find it totally misleading as a description of a problem and as a picture of the Administration's position.

First, it speaks of two things -- "rational debate" and "dissent" -- and fails entirely to distinguish between the two. It lumps together the rational and the irrational, the responsible and the irresponsible, the constructive and the destructive. Then it seeks to portray the President and officials in his Administration as being firmly opposed to both.

That, I submit, is the wildest kind of distortion. Surely there is a vast difference between a thoughtful column and a draft-card burning. Surely there is a wide gulf between serious discussion before a Senatorial committee and the rock-throwing of irresponsible demonstrators.

I think this distinction has repeatedly been made clear -- by the President and by others. Earlier this month, the President told a news conference:

"I would hope that every person who has a plan, or a program, or observation in connection with the war that our young men are fighting out there, would engage in some introspection and ask himself whether what he is about to say is going to make a contribution to solving the problem before he speaks. If, in his judgment, it does, then he has that opportunity and that right."

And on another occasion, he said:

"Today's young people enjoy not only unparalleled ease and comfort, but they enjoy enormous freedom -- freedom of inquiry, freedom of expression, yes, freedom of dissent. That free spirit we need, too, for freedom of speech can never harm us if we remember that freedom of speech is a two-way street.

"We must guard every man's right to speak. But we must also defend every man's right to answer."

In defense of your questionable thesis that the President feels dissent is unpatriotic, you quote out of context a statement of his in which you say he "derided those who make Vietnam 'a topic of cocktail parties,' etc."

The President was at Fort Benning on this occasion. He was talking to men who are going to Vietnam and others who have returned. He was talking to the families of men who are in Vietnam and of some who will never return from that battleground. And he said:

"For these Americans, Vietnam is no academic question. It is not a topic for cocktail parties, office arguments, or debate from the comfort of some distant sidelines."

That statement is just about as true as any statement one could make. And I do not think it serves the readers of The Times to take such a statement and twist its meaning and divorce it from the setting in which it was made.

On the front page of the issue in which your unfortunate editorial appeared, there was a long and detailed story about the actions of "roaring bands of antiwar demonstrators." They sought to prevent our Secretary of State from appearing at a meeting and expressing there the Government's views on Vietnam. Unable to prevent his appearance, they sought to create as much noise and disruption as possible. And by capturing a front page column in a distinguished newspaper, they, of course, achieved a significant part of their aim -- to call attention to opposition to the war. Meantime, the statement of a high government official on a serious problem was pretty well lost in the shadow of unthinking violence. Violence, intimidation, and hysterical slogans have no place in the American political tradition -- nor in the liberal tradition throughout the world. What we saw at the Pentagon on October 21 and at the New York Hilton on November 14 belong with the hooligan tradition of fascism we knew in the 1930's.

I would think that an editorial on "dissent" would at least have noted this aspect of the problem. But it didn't.

Sincerely,

The Editor  
The New York Times  
229 West 43rd Street  
New York, New York



~~SECRET~~Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
3:50 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Sato at 5:15 p. m. this afternoon

As I already informed you (Tab A), the Ryukyus language has been settled and the communique as a whole (Tab B) is wrapped up.

Therefore, you may:

-- wish to congratulate him on his Press Club appearance which, from the accounts of Bill Jorden and Bill Bundy, appears to have gone very well. Under questioning, he said flatly that he supported our position in Viet Nam and that Asia would regard it as a very poor idea for us to get out of Viet Nam.

-- wish to explore with him, against the background of our AID position on the Hill, the possibilities of:

- increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;
- increasing economic aid to Viet Nam;
- enlarging Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

When your private chat has been exhausted, you may wish to join the others in the Cabinet Room. It would be good for Ministers Miki and Kimura to hear directly from you the importance of an enlarged Japanese aid contribution to Asia.

W. W. R.

Attachments - Tab A  
Tab B

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 700 83-77  
By ag/ee, NARA, Date 12-10-9

~~SECRET~~

4a

INFORMATION

SECRET

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
1:45 p.m.

*snop*

A

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy's report on the Ryukyus language and the acceptability of the formula to Senators Mansfield and Russell. As you will note on the second page, you may wish to discuss with Sato this afternoon:

- The possibility of his increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;
- Increase economic aid to Vietnam; and
- An enlarged Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

The text of the critical Ryukyus language in the communique is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 712983-17  
By rf/ls, NARA, Date 12-10-91

WWRostow:rlm



46

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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As to Senator Fulbright, I have tried to reach him since noon yesterday, but his office has been unable to locate him between here and Arkansas. I talked personally

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Authority MLG 83-15  
By AS/12, NARA. Date 12-10-91

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

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Authority Mcg 83-15  
By hgs/ies, NARA, Date 12-10-91



~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967 -- 3:00 PM

*Presley*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congo Situation Report (3:00 PM)

1. The mercenaries (around 120) and the Katangans (about 2,000 with families) are still sitting in what amounts to internment camps across the border in Rwanda. Our three C-130's (2 still on Ascension, 1 in the Congo) are waiting to help in an international evacuation provided (a) the plan is workable and (b) there are reasonable security guarantees for our aircraft.
2. The Red Cross has other promises for aircraft on the same conditions. The Canadians have a C-130 also on Ascension. The British have pledged an Argosy transport (about C-130 size) which is still in the U.K. There's a Belgian DC-6 waiting at the scene. And the French have a DC-3 ready to move in.
3. Consequently, the Red Cross could conceivably begin in 48 hours or so to fly out the Katangans. Mobutu has told us he approves this part of the evacuation, and claims the Zambians are ready to take them. But the Zambians say they can't move without "express request" from the Congo to take the Katangans. Zambia thinks that request will come out of an OAU Commission meeting tomorrow in Kinshasa. Flying the 2,000 Katangans to Zambia would involve our C-130s and probably all the other aircraft except France's DC-3, which the French have earmarked for white (French) mercenaries. The operation ferrying the Katangans would take several days.
4. The tougher problem is evacuating the white mercenaries who would then be left in Rwanda. It's anybody's guess how soon they'll get out to Malta.
5. A week ago Mobutu was in the flush of victory (a first for the Congolese army) and calling for "extradition" of the whites. He has since falled back to a face-saving formula which was adopted over the weekend by the OAU Commission on Mercenaries. But the conditions of this formula are still exacting and could mean delay in completing the evacuation. To let the whites go, Mobutu is requiring:
  - some "compensation" for damages from the parent countries (read Belgium and France)

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- written assurances from the mercenaries themselves and their parent countries that they'll never enter the Congo again
  - an ad hoc OAU tribunal to screen and question the mercenaries before they leave Rwanda, trying to find out who planned their operation, who financed them, etc.
6. McBride thinks these conditions make it "obvious" that the mercenary problem will drag on "for weeks at best" -- even if we get the Katangans out to Zambia this week. He reports that Mobutu sees these conditions as minimum punishment for the mercenaries, and will be in no mood for any short cut.
7. State is a little more hopeful that a quick and sensible response from the Belgians and French might satisfy Mobutu and thus put the whites on the planes. They point out:
- The Belgians have already offered to help in Red Cross relief for Bukavu and we think the French can be persuaded to do likewise. Mobutu just might accept this token compensation as sufficient.
  - The Belgians have a suitable anti-mercenary law already in Parliament, and State thinks the French could meet Mobutu's demands for assurances with some new passport regulations restricting French nationals who were involved.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/RPM/vmr

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6

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
1:45 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Bundy's report on the Ryukyus language and the acceptability of the formula to Senators Mansfield and Russell. As you will note on the second page, you may wish to discuss with Sato this afternoon:

- The possibility of his increasing the Japanese contribution to the Asian Development Bank Special Fund by an extra \$100,000,000;
- Increase economic aid to Vietnam; and
- An enlarged Japanese contribution in 1968 to Indonesian economic development.

The text of the critical Ryukyus language in the communique is also attached.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlm

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Authority 712983-17  
By 28/003, NARA, Date 12-10-91

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

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Authority MLG 83-15  
By ag/ols, NARA, Date 12 10 91



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to him last week, and there was every indication that his feelings would be along the lines of Senator Mansfield's. I have explained to his administrative assistant what I wanted to reach him about, so that he would have no valid grounds for complaint that we did not try.

The President will also wish to know that Secretary Rusk raised two key matters of Japanese financial action with Sato. Sato agreed firmly that Japan would pick up one-third of the Indonesian need for 1968 (now estimated at \$325 million total). In response to the Secretary's urging that Japan put up another \$100 million (for a total of \$200 million) to the Asian Development Bank Special Funds, Sato said he would give this serious study but did not commit himself.

The indications are that Sato will raise with the President tonight just what his government is prepared to do on Indonesia, the ADB, and possibly Viet-Nam. The President may well wish to press him to do something more in Viet-Nam as soon as possible; Sato's visit has prepared the way for this, and we know that the local Japanese Ambassador believes more can now be undertaken and rapidly.

*W. P. Bundy*

William P. Bundy

SECRET

For Mr. Truman

F.

(ignore underlining)

VII

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the return of administrative rights over [reversion of] the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and expressed his belief that an adequate solution should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning administrative rights



OVER these Islands to Japan and in the light of these Discussions.

The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents. To this end, they agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan proper. The existing United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo will be kept informed by the High Commissioner of the progress of the work of the Advisory Committee. It was also agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and

The United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of the Bonin Islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the con-



viction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

7  
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Lunch Meeting With the President  
Wednesday, November 15, 1967, 1:30 pm

*Pres file*

AGENDA

1. Vietnam
  - a. Rusk-McNamara CBS TV appearance in December?
  - b. Situation Reports: Gen. Westmoreland; Amb. Komer.
  - c. General discussion of priorities in next six months.
  - d. Guidance to Amb. Bunker, Gen. Westmoreland, and Amb. Komer on Congressional and public contacts.
2. Middle East. (Sec. Rusk)  
Situation Report
3. Vice President's trip to England?
4. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 11-21-91

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INFORMATION

8

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
1:00 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Moose examines  
the confusions and state of mind of  
your devious friend Rev. Lewis of  
Bruton Parish Church.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

8a

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1967

MEMO FOR MR. ROSTOW

Here are my observations on the recent remarkable sermon of the Reverend Cotesworth P. Lewis of Bruton Parish Church, Williamsburg:

Rev. Lewis' sermon strikes me as a statement of apprehension and concern --

"The future looks terrible"

"We seem to be surrounded by insoluble problems"

"The peril is that we may panic and do foolish things"

"Many people are badly scared -- and it's almost impossible to think straight when we are frightened"

He coupled this with an appeal for reassurance and guidance directed (somewhat clumsily) to the President in the first instance, and more generally, to God. Despite the sermon's initial impact, I believe it is incorrect to interpret it simply as criticism of the President.

The Reverend's expressed attitude on the war is ambivalent. He twice reiterates his support of the Presidency: "We know the necessity of supporting our leader..." and "while pledging our loyalty...". At the same time, he finds the situation "baffling," and he is "appalled" by (erroneous) accounts of civilian casualties, but "mystified" by reports of restraints and equipment shortages which hamper the military effort. The manner in which he enumerates these concerns certainly gives the impression that he accepts them at face value. This was particularly unfortunate.

In his direct expressions on the war he meets himself coming and going. As a Christian he feels he must question the (morality) rightness of our actions; yet as one who does not contemplate "even the mildest form of disloyal action," he wonders why we do not do all we can "to terminate the conflict successfully."

He does not understand why we are doing what we are -- and if he did, his conscience would probably still bother him. This question of conscience is aggravated by his sensitivity, and apparent receptivity, to domestic and foreign criticism of the war.



When he asks for a "logical, straightforward explanation," I think he means a simple one which he can easily grasp and believe in. I do not think his use of the word "straightforward" need necessarily be interpreted as implying that previous explanations have been misleading or devious.

This man feels like Isaiah's people who sat in the darkness, dwelling in the shadow of death. He hopes that, as in Isaiah, a light will shine on him.

There is a little religious mysticism in this. He apparently is a strong believer in the efficacy of good will and the enlightening effect of dialogue. Hence his analogies involving Martin Luther and Charles the Fifth (they never met did they?), and the Catholics and the Protestants. (Interestingly enough, he describes this latter situation as a "stalemate").

I think this incident at Bruton Parish Church illustrates a point which should be remembered: For all his political naivety and lack of taste, the Reverend's confusion about the war is representative of a large segment of American opinion. They want to support the war, but they have grave reservations about it. Therefore, they <sup>are</sup> overly susceptible to every doubt and criticism that comes along. In this troubled condition, they will respond -- and they want to respond -- to a strong, clearly-reasoned lead by the President. But this lead must not be oversimplified because this too disturbs them. If there is one thing they know, it is that the situation is not simple.

  
Dick Moose

86  
November 12, 1967

- The people who sat in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined.  
Isaiah 9:2

Moses' exploits in leading the children of Israel out of Egypt, once dull as dust - leap with front page applicability. The Red Sea, Sinai Peninsula, the Negev, Jordan and Jericho - are things we talk about at breakfast.

Moses thought he had escaped the cries of his oppressed countrymen when he fled to Midian. But as he watched his father-in-law's flocks he heard the voice of God remind him - "The slaves of Egypt are your brethren - go, lead them to freedom." He was annoyed - He remembered them as a shiftless lot, crude, unreliable, ~~shiftless~~ - people with whom he'd prefer not to associate. So he began making excuses - "I don't speak well - I don't have the facts - send someone else". God's promise that He would be with him came with such authority, when Moses appeared before Pharaoh he declared with unmistakable power - "Let my people go!"

Alone, we shirk responsibilities, tallying our small capacities. With the assurance which comes from prayer and worship and study - we take on a boldness which reflects the voice of God.

The rhythm of history brings alternating moments of darkness and light. When Constantinople fell in 1453, men feared that civilization would end; but the fleeing scholars carried with them the sparks that ignited the Renaissance. What could have been more futile than for <sup>the penniless monk</sup> Martin Luther to speak his mind to Charles the Fifth, ruler of most of Europe and a considerable portion of the New World? Out of that dialog came our religious freedoms.

Today, we seem ~~to be~~ surrounded by insoluble problems. Irresistible forces appear to be approaching ~~a point of~~ collision with immovable objects.

The most immediate and demanding conflict arises from the <sup>insistence</sup> demand of racial minorities <sup>be given</sup> ~~to enjoy~~ all the rights and privileges it has been the good fortune of the majority to achieve. The race problem can no longer be evaded either in the North or South - in this country or abroad. Seemingly impossible questions must be answered, - and this will require even more good will than brains.



Getting Catholics and Protestants together appeared ten years ago as about the wildest idealism imaginable. We/<sup>who</sup> have been separated by language, education, social and economic barriers - today are allowing the Holy Spirit to lead us into an increasing number of intimate contacts,-- and a united force for Good is becoming a possibility. Some deeply loved prejudices <sup>must</sup> be put aside - and a great deal of serious thinking done in all sectors of the camp - but God is working His purpose out, invalidating what seemed a stalemate.

Insert <sup>Tr</sup>  $\rightarrow$

West Berlin and Hong Kong are quite literally within the jaws of Communism. If their psychology were our psychology they would be gloomy, depressed spots. On the contrary both cities are enjoying a building boom, while the visitor is astonished at the vigor of life. The Communists are 40 miles from Helsinki, Vienna, Trieste - and yet these communities are less concerned about the threat they offer than are Dallas, Phoenix, and Seattle. The closer we get to the real Reds, the less we are intimidated by them - and the more

stimulate our minds and hearts.

The economic problem is simpler than is commonly assumed. Even the cursory presentation of LIFE magazine this week<sup>s</sup>, bears <sup>out</sup> this ~~out~~. Both pure Communism and pure Capitalism are the creation of fevered imaginations. There is an increasing amount of private enterprise in Communist countries, while even the rankest capitalist <sup>many send their children to public schools,</sup> rides over state-owned roads, /puts up with many socialistic practises (such as old-age payments). The problem of the future is to discover what can best be done by the state and what can best be left to private enterprise.

The more serious threat of Communism of course is political. To those who have little, it promises much - it fires hopes, - even though the world has seen relatively few instances of their willingness or ability to make good on such promises. As a nation we are called upon to live up to our profession of "liberty and justice for all". If we set right the inequalities and erase the dark blots on our life, we have nothing to fear for ourselves. As for the rest of the world - it is most difficult to devise ways of exporting democracy.

When we read the paper or listen to the radio or TV - and learn of problems popping up all over the world - even the bravest of us grow faint-hearted.

The years ahead will be painful. Customs which seem an essential part of life may have to be given up. Opinions we have held tenaciously may be proven false. Physical and emotional landmarks may be swept aside. We may be compelled to think new thoughts and walk in new paths. Emerging young men and women who will gradually take over with more understanding than we have had. Necessity will compel them to rise to greater heights than we have known. The future looks terrible; but with guidance from God (as in every strategic juncture of history) He will infuse a new factor into the equation - something we could never suspect as a possibility - to make the future glorious.

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The political complexities of our involvement in an undeclared war in Vietnam are so baffling that I feel presumptuous even in asking questions. But since there is <sup>Consensus</sup> a rather general conviction that what we are doing in Vietnam is wrong (a conviction voiced by leaders of nations traditionally our friends - leading military experts - and the rank and file of American citizens) - we wonder if some logical, straightforward explanation might be given without endangering whatever military or political advantage we hold.

Relatively few of us plan even the mildest form of disloyal action against constituted authority. We know the necessity of supporting our leader. But we cannot close our Christian consciences to consideration of the rightness of actions as they are reported to us, - perhaps erroneously, perhaps for good cause (of which we have not been apprised). We are appalled that apparently this is the only war in our history which has had three times as many civilian ~~casualties~~ as military casualties. It is particularly regrettable that to most nations (of the world) the struggle's purpose appears as neo-colonialism. We are mystified by news accounts suggesting that our brave fighting units are inhibited by directives and inadequate equipment from using their capacities to terminate the conflict successfully.

While pledging our loyalty - we ask respectfully, WHY?

We know we must avoid the oversimplification which views the war as struggle against a monolithic Communism.



## MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

Wednesday, Nov. 15, 1967  
12:15 p.m.Authority NLJ-285-19MR. PRESIDENT By        Date 6-23-84*Pres file*

Herewith Dick Helms' memo to you on a new National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam." I have marked its main conclusions, summarized on the last two pages.

It comes to this:

- manpower is the major problem confronting the Communists;
- there has been a substantial reduction in guerrillas since an estimated peak in early 1966;
- there has been a slight reduction in main force units in the past year, but this has been possible only by using more North Vietnamese replacements in Viet Cong units;
- there is a "fairly good chance" that the Communist military strength and political infrastructure will continue to decline;
- Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition and to persuade the United States that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's terms. Their judgment is that the "Communists still retain adequate capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year."

The memo to you and the introductory note reflect a considerable debate in the intelligence community. The debate centers on the fact that they now know more from captured documents than they did about guerrillas, village defense forces, etc. What they know indicates that guerrilla strength was probably underestimated last year, but has declined substantially since.

I had urged that they do a retroactive estimate showing that decline; but they say they cannot do it, and confine themselves to the simple statement that the guerrillas "have suffered a substantial reduction."

The estimate does not deal with an important fact as estimated by Westmoreland and the JCS: namely, that there has been a very substantial decline in the past year in enemy main force battalions rated as "combat effective." (Buzz Wheeler told the group the other day, and confirmed to me on the telephone this morning, that in October 1965 the enemy had 123 maneuver battalions, all rated combat effective. In October 1967 the enemy had 162 maneuver battalions, of which only 87 were rated combat effective.)

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In general, this is a conservative estimate; but it is not a bad thing to build our plans on conservative estimates.

The one danger, of which Dick Helms is aware, is that the underestimate of guerrillas in 1966 be taken out of context and distorted, if leaked. They have tried hard to avoid that possibility.

I told Dick that the one sentence I would challenge is the marked sentence on page 1. I agree that the guerrilla figure was underestimated in 1966; but we have suffered in other areas from overestimation as well as underestimation in dealing with Communist capabilities. But that is not important.

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET attachment~~



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. Since mid-May, the intelligence community, both here and in Saigon, has been painstakingly working on the data for a National Intelligence Estimate entitled "Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam". In essence, this is a revision of an estimate on the same topic issued by the United States Intelligence Board in 1966 and now very much out of date.

2. The new estimate has been produced through an exhaustive process of analysis including detailed consultations in Saigon between the Embassy and MACV and a team from the Washington Community headed by my personal representative. We now have a text concurred in without dissent by all the United States Intelligence Board members and employing figures agreed to by the United States Mission in Saigon.

3. The new estimate is sensitive and potentially controversial primarily because the new strength figures are at variance with our former holdings. ~~Much of the past data on overall Communist capabilities in Vietnam has turned out to be unreliable and many of the figures have been too low.~~ We have taken pains to construct the paper in such a fashion that we explain at each stage how we arrive at the numbers

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Authority NLS/CBS 1  
By ics NARS, Date 5-7-84



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- 2 -

used. Unfortunately, we have not been able to find a reliable basis for reconstructing Communist strength figures retrospectively to provide a true standard of comparison between present and Communist strength as it actually was a year ago. Like any document, however, the Estimate can still make for difficulties if particular portions are taken out of context.

4. I have considered not issuing this Estimate and after considerable consultation, believe this would be a mistake. In the inevitable daily process of work to ascertain Communist strength levels in Vietnam, too many people are aware that the exercise to get agreed figures has been going on. In short, the charge of bad faith or unwillingness to face the facts would be more generally damaging than the issuance of this document which can stand on its own feet.

5. My purpose in writing you is to outline the problems this Estimate involves and to advise you in advance of the way in which I propose to handle them. The Estimate is now scheduled for release the end of this week to you, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the individual members of the United States Intelligence Board who coordinated it. This procedure will restrict the distribution of the Estimate while at the same time making it available to those members of the Government who need it to do their jobs.

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- 3 -

6. Attached hereto are an Introductory Note and the Conclusions of the Estimate.

*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachments - 2

- 1) Introductory Note
- 2) Conclusions

~~TOP SECRET~~

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Our earlier understanding of overall Communist capabilities in Vietnam had, of necessity, to rely heavily on data provided by the GVN. Much of this turned out to be unreliable, and in many instances our numerical estimates of Communist forces, other than for the Regular forces, were too low. Our information has improved substantially in the past year, but the unconventional nature of the war poses difficult intelligence problems, the more so in a social environment where basic data is incomplete and often untrustworthy.

Manpower, for example, is a key element for the Communists but we lack precise basic data on population size, rates of growth, and age distribution for both North and South Vietnam. Assessing Communist capabilities also involves an understanding of the organization and effectiveness of the various components in the Communist military and political apparatus in South Vietnam. Much of the evidence on these components is obtained from a variety of sources, including captured documents, of varying reliability and timeliness. The analysis of this data, as well as that concerning North Vietnamese support to the South and all manpower questions requires complex methodological approaches which cannot rise above the uncertain data inputs.

Our data and conclusions are, therefore, subject to continuing review and revision, especially since capabilities do not remain static. In this

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By ics, NARS, Date 5-7-84



estimate we have concentrated on reaching the best judgments of the current strength of the Communist forces and, because of incomplete and unreliable basic data, we have not attempted to reconstruct Communist strength retrospectively.

Reservations with respect to evidence are explained where appropriate in the individual sections of the estimate. The main conclusions which follow, however, allow for such uncertainties in the supporting intelligence, represent our best appreciation of the overall situation as it now stands, and are based on the assumption that there is no radical change in the scale and nature of the war.

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CONCLUSIONS

A. During the past year, Hanoi's direct control and share of the burden of the war in South Vietnam has grown substantially. This trend will continue.

B. ~~Manpower is a major problem confronting the Communists.~~ Losses have been increasing and recruitment in South Vietnam is becoming more difficult. ~~Despite heavy infiltration from North Vietnam, the strength of the Communist military forces and political organizations in South Vietnam declined in the last year.~~

C. The major portion of this decline has probably been felt at the lower levels, reflecting a deliberate policy of sacrificing these levels to maintain the structure of political cadres and the strength of the Regular military forces. ~~In particular the guerrillas, now estimated to total some 70,000 - 90,000, have suffered a substantial reduction since the estimated peak about early 1966. Regular force strength, now estimated at 118,000, has declined only slightly, but Viet Cong units are increasingly dependent upon North Vietnamese replacements.~~

D. Given current Communist strategy, and levels of operations, a major effort will be necessary if the Regular forces and the guerrillas are to be maintained at or near present levels. To do so will require both a level of infiltration much higher than that observed in 1967 and intensive Viet Cong (VC) recruitment as well. Considering all the relevant

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factors, however, we believe there is a fairly good chance that the overall strength and effectiveness of the military forces and the political infrastructure will continue to decline.

E. The Communist leadership is already having problems in maintaining morale and quality. These problems have not yet impaired overall military effectiveness, but they are likely to become more difficult.

F. Difficulties in internal distribution will continue to cause local shortages and interfere with Communist operations from time to time. But we believe that the Communists will be able to continue to meet at least their essential supply requirement for the level forces and activities in South Vietnam described in this Estimate.

G. Communist strategy is to sustain a protracted war of attrition and to persuade the United States that it must pull out or settle on Hanoi's terms. Our judgment is that the Communists still retain adequate capabilities to support this strategy for at least another year. Whether or not Hanoi does in fact persist with this strategy depends not only on its capabilities to do so, but on a number of political and international considerations not treated in this Estimate.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
10:50 a. m.

TOP-SECRET

Mr. President:

I have marked up the attached copy of a special report on Dak To fighting in the period 3-14 November.

In sum:

-- Enemy forces of some 7000 have been engaged: we have built up U. S. and ARVN forces of 9000.

-- Thus far enemy killed are estimated at 636; friendly, 102.

-- The purpose is, at the maximum, to achieve a limited dramatic tactical victory over a major U. S. military unit; at the minimum, to draw forces to the frontier, away from pacification -- as at the DMZ.

W. W. R.

TOP-SECRET attachment (Dak To Special Report 15 Nov 67)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 11-21-91

**TOP SECRET**  
**NOFORN**

10a



CINCPAC  
(Continued)

DAK TO SPECIAL REPORT

Dak To is located in the northern portion of the 2d Corps near the tri-border area (Cambodia - Laos - Vietnam) in extremely rugged terrain. Intelligence indicates that enemy objectives in the western highlands include the annihilation of a major US element in order to draw to and tie down in the area additional friendly forces. As a result, action consisted of numerous contacts in an area approximately 16 nautical miles around Dak To. Contact with enemy forces was initiated on 3 November when US Army units in Operation MAC ARTHUR reported three separate contacts in an area 3 nautical miles south of Dak To (OPSUMS 259-67 and 260-67). (C)

On 6 November a US Army battalion engaged enemy forces in the same general area killing 104. Sixteen US were killed and 27 were wounded in the action. (OPSUMS 261-67 and 262-67). (C)

On 8 November in an area centered 4 nautical miles west of Dak To, a US Army company on a search and destroy mission engaged an unknown-size enemy force in fortified positions. The enemy broke contact leaving 12 dead. In another contact on 8 November a few miles farther southwest, three US Army companies on a sweep found 232 enemy bodies and 21 individual and 14 crew-served weapons in an area that had been under friendly tactical air and artillery fire. On 10 November, a US Army battalion made heavy contact with an unknown-size enemy force dug-in 4 nautical miles south-southwest of Dak To. Six US were killed and 24 wounded. The enemy withdrew after 2 hours leaving 14 dead. (OPSUMS 264-67 and 265-67). (C)

There were three significant enemy contacts on 10 and 11 November. In the first contact 11 nautical miles west-southwest of Dak To, two US Army companies engaged an unknown-size enemy force. Two additional US Army companies maneuvered to exploit the contact and became heavily engaged with a well dug-in enemy. In the ensuing action US and enemy units launched numerous attacks and counter-attacks. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day with

15 Nov 67

**NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY**

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**NOFORN**

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 19, NARA, Date 11-21-91

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NOFORN



CINCPAC  
(Continued)

friendly units finally overrunning the enemy positions after approximately 7 hours of fighting. The enemy left 103 dead; 20 US were killed and 132 wounded. The second contact occurred 7 nautical miles southwest of Dak To when three US Army companies sweeping an area of a previous contact engaged an unknown-size enemy force for approximately 4 hours. The enemy then broke contact leaving 92 dead and 1 person detained; 18 US were killed and 119 wounded. In the third contact, a US engineer truck convoy was attacked by an unknown-size enemy force 16 nautical miles southwest of Dak To. The enemy broke contact leaving nine dead and one detained; US losses were five killed and seven wounded. (OPSUM 265-67) (C)

On 13 November a US Army battalion had a heavy 2-hour engagement with an unknown-size enemy force 12 nautical miles southwest of Dak To. US casualties were 9 killed, 21 wounded, and 6 missing. Enemy losses were unknown. (OPSUM 266-67) (C)

Cumulative results of contacts in the Dak To area during the period 3-14 November are -- friendly: 102 KIA, 529 WIA, 6 MIA; enemy: 636 KIA, 137 individual weapons and 29 crew-served weapons seized. The status of friendly and enemy units in the vicinity of Dak To is shown on the following page. (C)

15 Nov 67

NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY


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DAK TO  
FRIENDLY UNIT LOCATIONS

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EO 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988

By ky NARA, D&IO 11-21-91

~~SECRET~~



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NOFORN

10c

CINCPAC  
(Continued)

UNITS IN VICINITY OF DAK TO

	<u>ARRIVAL</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
Hq, 42d ARVN Regiment	Unknown	
1st Bn, 42d Regiment	Unknown	448
3d Bn, 42d Regiment	Unknown	576
1 ARVN Airborne Bn	Unknown	494
4 CIDG Companies	Unknown	490
2 ARVN Mike Strike Companies	Unknown	392
Hq, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Div	29 Oct	
3d Bn, 8th Infantry	30 Oct	821
2d Bn, 12th Infantry	29 Oct	874
1st Bn, 8th Infantry	10 Nov	893
Hq, 173d Infantry Brigade (Airborne)	6 Nov	
1st Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	6 Nov	743
2d Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	6 Nov	739
4th Bn, 503d Infantry (Airborne)	1 Nov	693
Hq, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) (Kontum City)	14 Nov	
2d Bn, 8th Cavalry (Kontum City)	14 Nov	695
1st Bn, 12th Cavalry	11 Nov	698
9th ARVN Airborne Battalion	6 Nov	490
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>9,046</u>

ENEMY FORCES AND ESTIMATED STRENGTHS

	<u>3 NOV</u>	<u>14 NOV</u>
Hq, 1st NVA Div	122	Unknown
1st NVA Div Forward CP	179	Unknown
32d NVA Regiment	1,700	1,460
66th NVA Regiment	1,700	1,450
24th NVA Regiment	1,620	1,620
174th NVA Regiment	1,815	1,815
304th VC Local Force Bn	400	400
	<u>7,536</u>	<u>6,745 (TS)</u>

15 Nov 67

NMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

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~~TOP SECRET~~  
NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED  
EO 12958  
DA Memo 11-21-91  
By 19 NARA Date 11-21-91

INFORMATION

Wednesday, November 15, 1967  
8:45 a.m.

Mr. President:

Bob Ginsburgh did this rather  
careful analysis of Gen. Gavin's  
Meet the Press interview on Vietnam.  
Its theme is: Will the real Gavin  
stand up?

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

11

Pres. file



14 November 1967

### GENERAL GAVIN ON VIETNAM

It is extremely difficult to analyze General Gavin's Meet the Press appearance because (1) so many of his positions are contradictory and (2) the general has a nervous mannerism of automatically prefacing his answers with "yes." The major issues he addressed are discussed below.

China. On the one hand, General Gavin takes Secretary Rusk and "policy makers" in the Administration to task for describing China as the real threat. ~~On the other hand, the general also considers~~ China the real threat. His prescription is to avoid isolating China and to start talking with them with a view toward recognition.

It is difficult to see wherein he disagrees with the government's policy toward China of "containment without isolation." He ignores the existence of the Warsaw talks with the ChiComs and the fact that it is ChiCom intransigence which prevents their acceptance into the family of nations.

Buffer State. General Gavin's solution to the ChiCom threat is the establishment of a buffer country between ourselves and Red China, such as we have in Yugoslavia. He argues that continuing to fight now will push the NLF into the hands of Hanoi and that Ho Chi Minh into the arms of Peking.

This argumentation ignores ~~(1) Gavin's thesis that we are already at war with China, (2) that the NLF is now a puppet of Hanoi, (3) his own principle that the South Vietnamese should be free to determine their own future, (4) that Ho Chi Minh can save himself from the clutch of Peking if he calls off the aggression, and (5) a buffer state of a communist North Vietnam is a more apt analogy to Yugoslavia than all of Vietnam.~~

Administration Credibility. Apparently, General Gavin has retreated from his pre-trip statement "that the White House is saying one thing while preparing in Vietnam to do another." He also acknowledges that all the people he talked to were "meticulous on this point of avoiding any semblance of intent to move into North Vietnam."

Nevertheless, he insists "that there are those in the Administration who intend to stay in Southeast Asia for a long period of time. . . . contrary to the avowed purpose of the Administration." He bases this on "the changing statements" of Secretary Rusk, Gavin's discussions before the House Armed Services Committee, and conversations with people in the armed forces.

Following General Gavin's reasoning, one could conclude from talking to certain members of the Foreign Relations Committee that it was really U.S. policy to get out of Vietnam as quickly as possible regardless of the consequences. He lacks a basic education as to the facts of the situation and the way the U.S. government works, specifically (1) there has been no change in U.S. policy toward North Vietnam or China, (2) Congressional committees do not speak for the United States, (3) no responsible military leaders have recommended we stay in Southeast Asia permanently, (4) cocktail party talk or latrine talk is no substitute for responsible military advice, and (5) in any event, the U.S. is governed by legally constituted civil authorities -- not the military.

Stay in South Vietnam? General Gavin does not think we should stay in South Vietnam indefinitely. It is not clear whether this represents a change of his mind. In any event, he now thinks we should get out as soon as South Vietnam "can be given its independence and be a country in its own right in every respect."

This is precisely the stated position of the U.S. government, South Vietnam's independence from external aggression is what this war is all about.

Negotiations. General Gavin supports Senator Symington's proposal for suspending military activities as a prelude to negotiations. He suggests other possibilities, such as (1) turning the problem over to the UN Security Council, and (2) stopping the bombing unconditionally as the first step toward negotiations. He has no evidence that this would lead to negotiations, but this is his best estimate, based on his judgment of the Oriental mind. On the other hand, he says it is very likely that Ho Chi Minh will not enter into any discussion before the election. Then he proceeds to say: "If this point is absolutely set that there will be no negotiations under any circumstances before the election, well then, except for reasons of morality, there is no reason to stop the bombing." Nevertheless, he states that "there is some

hope that we can get some negotiations underway." His statements are self-contradictory, and his "hope" is simply wishful thinking without any shred of evidence. The underlying basis for his position is really based on his view that (1) bombing is militarily unproductive, (2) bombing is very immoral, and (3) we should not demand reciprocity for a cessation of bombing because they are not bombing us. General Gavin displays the myopia of the old stick-in-the-mud foot soldier who cannot see beyond the range of his artillery. Fortunately, modern military men appreciate the relationship between bombing and the ground battle. General Gavin chooses to ignore the immorality of North Vietnamese aggression which is the reason for our bombing in the first place. If we were to follow the general's logic on reciprocity, we should not be using helicopters, tanks, or heavy artillery because the enemy doesn't have them.

Enclaves. General Gavin has actually discarded his earlier enclave theory -- but he refuses to admit it. Instead, he argues that General Westmoreland is applying it.

General Westmoreland has been applying a consistent military strategy for the last three years. If this is what General Gavin really meant to urge, he had no basis for raising an issue in the first place.

Progress of the War. Although General Gavin argues that we should get out as soon as possible, he says we may not be able to extricate ourselves for five to ten years. He bases this estimate on his talks with Vietnamese. Success will depend on how well we deal with the hamlets and on the stability of the GVN. On the other hand, he says that the military are confident of being able to achieve victory in the not too distant future. He says that they will admit, however, that they made a mistake at the outset in attacking at once the Viet Cong forces. (He says that he confirmed this in Thailand -- whatever that means!) He says that Ambassador Lodge addressed himself to this a couple of years ago. On the other hand, he notes that there is a tendency for the Viet Cong to organize their logistical bases farther and farther back toward Cambodia, which would suggest the imminence of earlier victory than we had thought on our part. Although he describes the border battles as peripheral, he acknowledges that we have to win them too.

Will the real General Gavin please stand up?



Domestic Political.

General Gavin insisted that he had no political purpose in going to South Vietnam.

He said that his views were not greatly different from Governor Rockefeller's, but he should speak for himself on Vietnam.

He wants to see a moderate candidate for 1968 who will offer as an alternative to Administration policy a determination to bring about a resolution of the war as quickly as possible and bring peace to Southeast Asia.

~~He is not a candidate; he is opposed to a third political party.~~

~~He agrees with Senator McCarthy's position on Vietnam.~~

Miscellaneous.

General Gavin would not say that General Westmoreland is not using his troops well, although he implied as much in saying that he thinks we can get more combat troops out of the total involvement. He took refuge in the statement that General Westmoreland is "using them as well as he can" and that he is "trying to use them better."

General Gavin would not send any more troops. On the other hand, he does not see us bringing any troops out for some time -- despite the fact that he had previously argued that 250,000 troops were enough.

General Gavin said he had not been brainwashed and that ~~civilians and military in South Vietnam were doing a tremendous job.~~

~~He states that the South Vietnamese armed forces are doing better than they have been given credit for.~~

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*

Wednesday, November 15, 1967 -- 7:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

I received at 7:00 a.m. this morning a call from Mr. Kei Wakazumi. He first asked what I thought of Prime Minister Sato's speech.

I said that I thought it was an excellent expression of Japanese interest.

He asked if I had any changes to suggest on a personal basis, since there was still an opportunity for changes.

I said that I would not suggest changes in a speech by the chief of another government.

He then asked if it was possible to extend the time that Prime Minister Sato could see you alone this afternoon. I said that I did not know your schedule but I would communicate this suggestion.

I do not know what it is that Prime Minister Sato wishes to discuss; but, given the importance of the visit, you may wish to see if you could run somewhat over the scheduled time in a further private talk this afternoon.

At 10:30 p.m. last night the Japanese gave us the attached fall-back language on the Ryukyus. Sec. Rusk will be meeting with Prime Minister Sato at, I believe, 10:00 a.m. this morning. In the light of the Japanese proposal and the language acceptable to Sen. Russell, I see no reason why they cannot come up with an agreed passage for the communique.

W. W. Rostow

Have Marvin extend scheduled time  
by, say 30 minutes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 74-320  
By CG, NARA, Date 1-5-95

WWRostow:rlm

JAPANESE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL

12a

10.30 P.M. - 11/14

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the reversion of these islands, and expressed his belief that an adequate solution <sup>to this problem</sup> should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. He further emphasized that an agreement should be reached between the two Governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these Islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.

As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two Governments should keep under joint and continuous review the status of the Ryukyu Islands, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over these Islands to Japan and in the light of these discussions.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-350  
By CL, NARA, Date 1-5-95



~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Wednesday, November 15, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to the Shah

*1. [unclear]  
2. Per file*

Governor Harriman will stop off to see the Shah in connection with his visit to Pakistan to help dedicate the Mangla Dam. Since there has been a minor misunderstanding with the Shah over the proposal for talks on Vietnam he mentioned during his visit here, we felt it would be useful to make a special point of the fact that Governor Harriman is coming on your behalf. While we don't think his idea is a starter, we don't want to be the ones to kill it; he might as well find out for himself how tough this game is.

The following message should serve that purpose:

Your Imperial Majesty:

I am very pleased that you are able to receive Governor Harriman in Tehran on November 22. His visit will come just three months after our pleasant and useful talks here, and I look forward to hearing his report when he returns. I have asked the Governor to inform you fully of our views and the present possibilities for bringing about a peaceful solution in Vietnam. Once again, I want you to know how much we value your constructive position on this as on so many other international problems.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-477  
By ing, NARA, Date 6-28-95

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday - November 15, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres. file*

SUBJECT: Letter from President Costa e Silva

The Brazilian Embassy has delivered a letter to you from President Costa e Silva (Tab A) asking your personal intervention in the soluble coffee problem.

The problem is more than a year old. It stems from an unfair competitive position which Brazilian coffee policy gives to its soluble producers. This permits them to undersell US soluble producers in our market by a substantial margin. The US coffee trade has indicated it will withdraw its support of the International Coffee Agreement now under negotiation unless Brazil changes its unfair practices. Without the trade's support, we will not be able to get Congressional support for the Agreement.

Efforts to get the Brazilians to take corrective action has so far been unsuccessful. At our suggestion, the Brazilian Minister of Industry and Commerce is now in Washington for another round of talks. He will be seeing Secretary Rusk, as well as Covey Oliver and Tony Solomon.

It is too early to say whether a compromise formula will result from these talks. We will be preparing a suggested reply in the light of the results.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Tab A - President Costa e Silva's letter of November 10.

cc - Ed Fried

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Brasilia, November 10th, 1967.

His Excellency  
Lyndon B. Johnson,  
President of the United States  
of America.

Dear Mr. President,

In the spirit of friendship and frankness which has prevailed between us since our meeting at Punta del Este, where we entered into important commitments for the progress of the Americas, I wish to set forth to you my concern over two problems of particular urgency and gravity which may come to jeopardize our common objectives of close collaboration between the United States of America and Brazil and of ample international cooperation, especially for the benefit of the less developed countries.

2. I refer to maritime shipping and to the Brazilian exports of soluble coffee. As to the former, my Government's objectives is to ensure a substantial participation of the Brazilian merchant navy in the transport of our exportable products, as well as to equip it adequately for this purpose.

3. The latter problem presents a special interest for the relations between our two countries, upon whose concurrence the future of the International Coffee Agreement substantially depends. My Government has sought, in the spirit of Punta del Este, to provide incentives to the production and export of



manufactured goods, for the understandable reason that infant industries in my country require a certain amount of protection. Brazilian soluble coffee exports - which represent a negligible value in the world coffee trade - have raised objections on the part of sectors of the coffee industry in the United States of America, thus creating a certain atmosphere of crisis in the renegotiation of the Agreement which regulates the world market. For the sum total of the economy of your country those exports mean relatively little whereas for the Brazilian economy, as a whole, they are highly important. Although convinced of the legitimacy of the Brazilian marketing policy, I nevertheless recognize the existence of a political problem and its significance in regard to the relations between our two countries and the decisions to be taken concerning the Agreement.

4. I share Your Excellency's wishes to do our best to maintain and strengthen the Coffee Agreement and to make the relations between our two Governments more fruitful. Therefore, my delegates have sought to reach an understanding with representatives of your Government and have presented reasonable proposals towards the solution of the problem, so far without success. I have the impression that the position one might consider inflexible of the United States Government is due to a certain misunderstanding of our efforts and of our wish to support international cooperation in this area without, at the same time, sacrificing the incipient export industry of my country.

5. Therefore, I address myself to Your Excellency in order to request your personal intervention for the solution of this problem, which will persist unless the two principal parties are willing to adjust their positions, as for my part

I have endeavoured to do. The Brazilian sensitivity to this question is too sharp for both of us to allow it to eventually hurt our relations in other areas. Furthermore, the fact that the economy of so many countries of this Hemisphere depends substantially on their coffee exports, to a greater degree than that of Brazil, is a circumstance which will certainly be present in your mind, as well as in my own, as regards the survival of the Agreement.

With great confidence in your understanding and in your practical spirit of conciliation, I remain,

very sincerely

(signed) Arthur da Costa e Silva

15

Pres file

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 7:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Gen. Westmoreland is coming in with Mrs. Westmoreland and their daughter.

Gen. and Mrs. Westmoreland had planned to stay with Gen. and Mrs. Wheeler and their daughter with friends.

Do you wish to invite the whole family to stay at the Mansion? \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. and Mrs. Westmoreland? \_\_\_\_\_

Stay with present Washington plans? \_\_\_\_\_

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow



INFORMATION

16

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 14, 1967  
7:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to read Gen. Westmoreland's assessment for the month of October before you see him.

As usual, we have summarized it in general and by Corps areas, with the key passages marked.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RG, NARA, Date 11-21-91

16a

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: General Westmoreland's Assessment for the Month of October.

S U M M A R Y

A general shift in the pattern of enemy activity during October reflects the onset of the northeast monsoon period, heavy rains and flooding conditions in the northern coastal areas, and the beginning of the fall/winter rice harvest. The pace of activity in the western highlands has increased, with the probability of more intense enemy actions in Kontum, Pleiku and Dar Lac provinces. Our forces are being adjusted to meet this threat.

The most significant developments of the month occurred in Third Corps with the enemy committing a number of VC/NVA Main Force regiments in large scale actions. He may be expected to continue an aggressive posture in northwest Third Corps during the winter campaign despite his heavy casualties in SHENANDOAH II at Loc Ninh and Song Be and massive weapons losses in Phuoc Tuy provinces.

Activity elsewhere in the country has been marked by enemy avoidance of contact and a step-up in the frequency of attacks by fire on the populace, particularly in Fourth Corps. South Vietnamese Armed Forces aggressiveness and effectiveness continues to improve with several very favorable actions during October.

Reports continue to indicate serious food shortages and morale problems in the enemy ranks. There is a credible link between his military actions and his attempts to obtain rice during the harvest season. Allied activities in all Corps are coordinated to deny rice to the enemy.

The successful Vietnamese Lower House elections and Presidential inauguration illustrated a further decline in the ability of the VC to influence the people or the constitutional government processes. The enemy's capability to intimidate or impress has been seriously eroded.

Although the pacification effort remains behind schedule, there are indications that the programs, slowed in previous months by Vietnamese preoccupation with the national elections, are beginning to gain momentum. The basic infrastructure Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation structure is now established in all Corps and in most provinces. Although the Government of Vietnam has not as yet

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Authority NLS/CBS 7  
By es, NARS, Date 7-25-83

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-2-

accepted ICEX at the national level, an increase in US/GVN province pacification planning for 1968 has been accepted by the Government of Vietnam. This should give the U.S. a firmer control of pacification resources and, properly utilized, will provide the Province Senior Advisor with another source of control.

~~SECRET~~



FIRST CORPS AREA

The primary objectives in the First Corps during October were to destroy enemy forces, minimize disruption of the elections, deny access to areas from which vital installations could be subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, deny enemy access to rice crops, and construct the Strong Point/Obstacle System and a C-131 capable airfield at Quang Tri City.

Enemy activity was at a low level in the First Corps during October. In early October, intelligence indicated enemy forces in the DMZ area had suffered substantial losses from our concentrated air, naval gunfire, and artillery attacks. At the same time, there was a corresponding reduction in the amount of heavy weapons attacks in this sector. During the last week of October, however, increased enemy ground activity was noted at Con Thien.

In the remainder of the Corps Area, principal actions were generated by friendly operations. Our forces retained the initiative throughout the month in military, psychological, and pacification efforts. Eleven battalion size or larger operations were conducted which resulted in 1,364 enemy killed and 292 weapons captured. U. S. losses were 248 killed in action.

The priority construction projects continued to move ahead with some revision of schedules required due to heavy rains.

Pacification activity in Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces regained momentum lost in August and September. However, all provinces remained behind schedule in 1967 pacification programs except Thua Thien, which is on schedule. Danang City also has virtually completed its program.

In summary, the enemy suffered from several significant military setbacks in the First Corps during October, from a second major psychological defeat in the successful Lower House election, and from the continued denial of food during local harvest.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3  
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988  
By 18, NARA, Date 11-21-91

SECRET

16c

## SECOND CORPS AREA

The objectives in the Second Corps for October were to destroy enemy forces in the zone, deny him access to the rice harvest, and prevent disruption of the Lower House elections.

Friendly operations consisted primarily of small unit actions in which overwhelming force was swiftly applied to the enemy wherever he could be found. Long-range patrols and stay-behind forces continued to scour the hinterland, inflicting casualties intermittently and uncovering food and weapon caches.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations were devoted largely to security missions in connection with the Lower House elections and protection of the rice harvest. A dearth of overt enemy activity within Army of the Republic of Vietnam areas contributed to a reduced tempo of operational activity. A two-day running battle on October 6 and 7 between an estimated Viet Cong company and elements of an Army of the Republic of Vietnam regiment was characterized by friendly aggressiveness, good use of air mobility, and a willingness to fight at night. Regular and Popular Force contacts with enemy forces continue to increase, particularly on night operations, demonstrating an improving active defense capability.

There were no significant changes in the status of lines of communication in the Second Corps during October. Major emphasis was placed upon 1968 pacification planning which for the first time will integrate both military and civilian aspects of the program. Government of Vietnam refugee officials are becoming increasingly responsive as evidenced by their rapid reaction in providing rice, cement, and roofing to refugees generated by the battle of Ninh Hoa.

Enemy preparation for attack was noted throughout the Corps Area during the latter part of the month, especially in the highlands and Kontum Province.

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo: Jan 9, 1998  
By RG NAIPA Date 11-21-91



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14d

### THIRD CORPS AREA

Two recent trends have resulted in significant progress toward the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency effort in the Third Corps. First, the National Priority Area has been secured to the extent that additional U. S. units can be employed against enemy main force elements operating outside the area. Second, the enemy has once again committed the main force units in strength against U. S. /Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. This combination can only hasten the destruction of the main force units and facilitate the expansion of our pacification effort.

The increased tempo of jungle clearing operations contributed to the destruction of several base camp areas and tunnel complexes, as well as uncovering the largest weapons cache ever found in the Third Corps. This cache, discovered by the 9th Infantry Division, was concealed in a tunnel complex and contained in excess of 1,100 weapons, 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,200 rounds of ammunition for crew-served weapons, and 3,600 grenades.

During the month, the number of enemy-initiated incidents against pacification was up 80 percent over August and 25 percent over September. From 29-31 October, a series of determined mortar and ground attacks were directed against Loc Ninh. Outnumbered Army of the Republic of Vietnam and local Civilian Irregular Defense Group troops made a heroic stand, literally throwing the enemy out of the defense perimeter and subsector headquarters. Regular U. S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam units reacted with additional forces. Heavy contact resulted on several occasions and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment completed its in-country training and began independent operations in the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.3  
DATE: Jan. 3, 1988  
BY: 18 NARA, OAS: 11-21-91



FOURTH CORPS AREA

The overall tactical situation in the Fourth Corps remained favorable. Tactical operations were conducted with about the same frequency as during September. The overall morale, fighting spirit and combat effectiveness of Government of Vietnam units has been steadily increasing. They have maintained, and in some cases increased, their rate of attrition of Viet Cong forces despite the enemy's continuing practice of avoiding contact.

South Vietnamese units conducted a total of 158 major unit operations of battalion size or larger, of which contact with the Viet Cong was realized on 81. The percentage of contacts versus total operations has increased significantly during 1967, in spite of Viet Cong attempts to avoid contact. This is indicative of an improvement in intelligence and better Vietnamese responsiveness to this intelligence. The most significant tactical accomplishment of the month was the sustained field operation conducted by the 7th Infantry Division and Dinh Tuong Sector Regional Force Units. This operation began on October 27 and continued day and night through the end of the month. Results through October 31 were 113 Viet Cong killed, 31 Viet Cong captured, and 186 weapons captured. There were 21 operations which penetrated five other enemy base areas resulting in 163 Viet Cong killed, 18 captured, and 40 weapons of various caliber captured.

The effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces continues to improve slowly. Efforts to accelerate the program have been undertaken and all Popular Force training centers have been placed under direct control of the Fourth Corps Headquarters. The Regional and Popular Force desertion rate which continues to remain lower than in the past indicates that confidence in the Government of Vietnam is higher than last year.

The morale of the Viet Cong has continued to decline, as has the morale of the people living in Viet Cong-controlled and contested areas.

Losses sustained by the Viet Cong totaled 1,258 killed in action, 524 captured, and 582 weapons captured, compared to September losses of 944 killed in action, 300 captured, and 377 weapons lost.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1988  
By 176 NARA Date 11-21-91

Sunday, November 12, 1967

## TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND (37083)

SUBJECT: Monthly Military Assessment

This is my assessment for the month of October and the fourth of a series of the situation here in Vietnam.

Last month was marked by a decrease in enemy activity, the continuing destruction of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Forces and their base areas, and the consequent enemy loss of large quantities of weapons and equipment.

Again, the enemy has failed to achieve a single significant psychological or military victory. He lost politically with the successful completion of the Lower House elections and militarily in a series of clashes resulting from our search and destroy operations.

Although another major step has been taken to afford the people of South Vietnam political stability, pacification and the development of civil and military leaders continue to be major problem areas.

First Corps

In the First Corps during October, our primary objectives were to destroy enemy forces, minimize disruption of the elections, deny access to areas from which vital installations could be subjected to rocket, artillery, and mortar fire, deny enemy access to rice crops, install a dy marker, and construct a C-131 capable air field at Quang Tri City.

In accomplishing these objectives, the Third Marine Forces conducted eleven battalion size or larger operations which resulted in 1,364 enemy killed and 292 weapons captured. U. S. losses were 248 killed in action.

Significant operations in the First Corps last month include:

1. Kingfisher, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in northern Quang Tri Province.
2. Wheeler, a multi-battalion Americal Division search and destroy operation in Quang Tin Province, continued throughout October inflicting heavy casualties on the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division and denying the enemy access to rice from the Que Son Valley harvest.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
AF Guido, SEA Records, 4/1/98  
By 13 NARA, Date 12-16-91

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3  
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1938  
By 169 NARA, Date 12-16-91



3. Wallowa, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation in northeastern Quang Tin and southeastern Quang Ngai Provinces by the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, which deployed to the First Corps during October. Wallowa, like Wheeler, was against elements of the 2nd North Vietnamese Army Division. This operation accounted for 675 enemy killed against friendly losses of 48 killed in action. Deployment of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division to the First Corps in early October permitted redeployment of additional Marine maneuver forces to northern First Corps.

Sixty-six arc light strikes were conducted in the vicinity of the DMZ.

Allied Forces retained the initiative throughout the First Corps during October in military, psychological and pacification efforts. The psychological operations rewards program has shown increased success by designating special geographical locations to receive weapons and make rewards. Women and children have surrendered significant quantities of munitions. This procedure will be further exploited. Hoi Chanh support of psychological operations is excellent. Armed propaganda teams are being brought up to strength, trained and armed during October. Kit Carson scouts strength rose from 67 to 98. These scouts are used extensively with combat units.

Morale of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam combat forces in the First Corps remains good. Desertions dropped substantially in October to 428 from 514 in September. Operational successes and improved unit facilities are major contributing factors to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam morale. Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations in conjunction with Allied operations in support of the October elections were successful as evidenced by a 78 percent turnout of eligible personnel. Forty-five large operations were conducted in October but enemy casualties from these operations were approximately one-half the September count. Significant operations included Lam Son, northeast of Hai Lang, where elements of the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment captured 47 weapons and inflicted 197 killed on the North Vietnamese battalion. The Viet Cong infrastructure in Hoi An was dealt a serious blow during a raid in which Revolutionary Development elements and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam identified or eliminated 38 Viet Cong. Another sweep northwest of Hai Lang netted 12 killed in action and 15 prisoners, all on the village infrastructure black list. The 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division continued to operate in a highly effective manner and the 2nd Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division has shown a general trend of improved combat effectiveness. Specific areas noted include coordination of combat elements, employment of supporting fires, aggressiveness on the part of battalion and lower unit commanders, and increased night operations.



Regional and Popular Force support for pacification in the First Corps is progressing and has proven effective. Twenty-nine Regional Force companies and 192 platoons are now providing direct support. The Regional and Popular Force basic unit training and refresher training is progressing according to schedule.

Dragon Fire, a multi-battalion search and destroy operation by the Republic of Korea Brigade on Batangan Peninsula in Quang Tin Province, continued throughout the month with 63 enemy killed.

Although extensive engineering effort was required to restore lines of communication, the priority construction projects (dye marker and Quang Tri airfield) continued to move ahead with some revision of construction schedules required due to heavy rains.

Enemy damage to 13 bridges and 18 culverts during October was overshadowed by effects of tropical storm 34 which from October 6-9 washed out 23 bridges, 13 culverts, and numerous small sections of roads. The most significant bridges lost were 600 feet of new Liberty Bridge on Route 5 and 50 percent of the Class 60 floating naval bridge on Route 1 north of Danang. The last two and a half weeks of October permitted accelerated repair and construction efforts to restore most losses and make appreciable progress in the highway upgrading program.

Dye marker construction continued during October subject to limitations imposed by weather and enemy actions. Site C-2 was completed and significant construction was accomplished at four other sites. Sites A-1, A-2, A-4, C-1, C-2, C-3, and C-4 are currently occupied.

Pacification activity in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces regained momentum lost in August and September. Reasons for improvement were a marked decline in Viet Cong incidents and attacks and increased security following deployment of new American Division units in Quang Tin and southern Quang Nam Provinces. Steady progress continued in Thua Thien Province and in Danang City. Quang Tri reported an interruption in pacification momentum caused by difficulties in the transition to a new logistics system and movement of Revolutionary Development teams to second semester hamlets.

All provinces remained behind schedule in completion of 1967 pacification programs except Thua Thien, which is on schedule, and Danang City, which has essentially completed its program.

The flood in early October temporarily displaced 12,000 persons and halted most corps road transportation. Despite a five-fold increase in logistics airlift, normal tonnage of goods for civilian operations transported to provinces decreased by two-thirds from last month due to flood conditions on Highway 1 and monsoon prohibition of intra-corps junk transportation.

The Lower House election campaign was noteworthy for its active participation by all political groups in the First Corps except Communists, and because of minimal Viet Cong harassment. Voter turnout, though lower than the September election, still reached approximately 78 percent. Radical Buddhist opposition movement continued its efforts against the Thieu-Ky Government, including one self-immolation in Quang Ngai City. However, Buddhists have thus far failed to elicit a meaningful response from the First Corps populace due to lack of issues and apparent overall weariness and disillusionment with Buddhist leadership and tactics.

Civic action included distribution of food (606,767 pounds), cement, lumber, clothing and school supplies. There were 121,284 treatments by medical and dental teams. Assistance was rendered for construction and repair of bridges, family dwellings, schools, wells, libraries, etc.

The number of Hoi Chanh rose from a yearly low of 75 in September to 160 for October following increased friendly military pressure throughout the First Corps.

Enemy activity was at a low level in the First Corps during October. In early October, Intelligence indicated enemy forces in the DMZ area had suffered substantial losses from our concentrated air, naval gunfire, and artillery attacks, and to some extent had withdrawn northward across the DMZ. At the same time, there was a corresponding reduction in the amount of heavy weapons attacks in this sector, decreasing from over 7,800 rounds in September to less than 4,000 in October. During the last week of October, increased ground activity was noted at Con Thien. It appeared the enemy had repositioned his forces in a more offensive posture. His employment of heavy weapons, particularly mortars, increased substantially during the same period.

In the remainder of the First Corps, principal actions were generated by friendly operations.

Interrogation reports of ralliers and prisoners continued to reflect the bleak picture presented in my September assessment. The enemy situation in the First Corps is considered to have further deteriorated.

In summary, the enemy suffered from several significant military setbacks in the First Corps during October, from a second major psychological defeat in the successful Lower House election, and from the continued denial of food during local harvest.

Second Corps

Our objectives in the Second Corps for the month of October were to destroy enemy forces in the zone, deny him access to the rice harvest, and prevent disruption of the Lower House elections.

Despite the shadow of major enemy forces stirring in the Western Highlands, a spirit of guarded optimism pervaded the Second Corps at the end of October. The success of the three recent, broadly based national elections can only be interpreted by a realistic enemy as a disaster to his fortunes. More than ever, he needs a dramatic tactical victory to buoy the morale of his troops and to convince the man in the village of Communist invincibility. The destruction of a Civilian Irregular Defense Group camp or major Allied force would meet his needs admirably.

Among the fighting forces, a decrease of activity in October was evidenced by fewer friendly casualties across the board. The protection of the rice harvest and the Lower House elections were the principle preoccupations. Aggressive patrolling of the hinterlands continued with attention being devoted to political and tactical boundaries.

Operations in October were characterized for the most part by small unit actions in which overwhelming force was swiftly applied to the enemy wherever he could be found. Were the enemy looking for a war of attrition this month, he picked the wrong time and the wrong place. Some typical kill ratios in the Second Corps for October were: Bolling (12:1); Pershing (16:1); and Francis Marion (65:1). The latter operation was combined with Operation Greeley and renamed Operation MacArthur on the 12th of October with no further contact of significance reported. Long-range patrols and stay-behind forces continued to scour the hinterland, inflicting casualties intermittently and uncovering food and weapon caches. New during the month was mobile guerrilla operation Boudinot on the Pleiku/Darlac Provincial Boundary to exploit the enemy's propensity for infiltration along political and military boundaries. Mobile strike force 27 already has reported surprising and scattering one North Vietnamese company and has captured a sizeable amount of weapons and munitions.

Army of the Republic of Vietnam operations were devoted largely to security missions in connection with the Lower House elections and protection of the rice harvest. Dearth of covert enemy activity within the Army of the Republic of Vietnam area operations contributed to a reduced tempo of operational activity. Most active was the 22nd Division in Binh Dinh where a significant battle was fought on October 3 by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Popular Force troops in which 40 enemy were killed (favorable kill ratio of 6.7 to 1). Near Ban Me Thout, a two-day running battle on October 6 and 7 between an estimated Viet Cong company and elements of the 45th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment was characterized by friendly aggressiveness, good use of air mobility and a willingness to fight at night. Overall results, however, were disappointing, with an unfavorable kill ratio of 2.4 to 1.



Regional and Popular Force contacts with enemy forces continue to increase, particularly on night operations, demonstrating an improved active defense capability. There were two significant contacts during the months. Five Regional Force companies engaged an unknown size Viet Cong unit on October 20, southeast of Phu Cat and were supported by U. S. artillery, gunships and tactical air strikes. A supply dump believed to be North Vietnamese Army was captured and ten enemy were killed. The other action was at Ninh Hoa in which Regional and Popular Forces were the first units into action, supported later by Republic of Korea forces. The overall favorable kill ratio for October was 2.3 to 1 (versus an average of 2.5 to 1).

Korean forces provided protection for the rice harvest and the Lower House elections in the coastal provinces. In addition to the several skirmishes near Tuy Hoa, a major fight erupted mid-month around Ninh Hoa in which elements of the 188th North Vietnamese Army regiment attempted to reassert their influence over the population and to gain badly-needed food supplies. The area was cleared by October 28 with remarkably few civilian casualties in view of the North Vietnamese Army use of innocent civilians as human shields throughout the action. The restraint offered by the Korean Army, however, was paid for by a greater than normal casualty rate and a lower kill ratio than in September 4.5 to 1 versus 5.4 to 1).

There were no significant changes in the status of our lines of communication in the II Corps during October.

Major emphasis was placed upon 1968 pacification planning which, for the first time, will integrate both military and civilian aspects of the program.

The Government of Vietnam refugee officials are becoming increasingly responsive as evidenced by their rapid reaction in providing rice, cement, and roofing to refugees generated by the battle of Ninh Hoa.

At the direction of the Commanding General of 1st Forces, intensified emphasis has been placed upon rice control with plans consisting of both protection of the harvesters and immediate removal of harvested rice to secure areas. In addition, plans have been prepared to collect or destroy rice in Viet Cong-controlled areas.

As a result of increased emphasis upon attacks on the Viet Cong infrastructure, 67 Viet Cong cadre were killed and 392 captured during October.

The voter turnout for the Lower House elections was 81.2 percent. It was anticipated that there would be a dramatic drop from the 88.4 percent experienced

in the Presidential elections. The Government of Vietnam and allied forces again provided an effective shield for the voters, with only scattered incidents reported.

Enemy preparation is evident throughout the II Corps. In the western highlands and Kontum Province, ominous signs persist of an offensive build-up by elements of the B-3 front. Targeted for attack may be the Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps and other installations from Dak Seang South to Duc Co, especially those considered to be lightly defended. On October 26 some 46 rounds of 122mm rocket fell on the II Corps headquarters and the MACV and adjacent unit compounds.

The first indication of the presence in Pleiku of the attacking unit, believed to be the 200th artillery battalion, is evidence of this build-up. The recent reinforcement of the 95th regiment, considered to be a "low priority" unit, in Eastern Pleiku Province is also significant. Further south the enemy continued to infiltrate and to develop supply corridors through Dar Lac Province enroute to the Coast.

In Binh Dinh Province, the 3rd North Vietnamese Army division was dispersed to threaten the central Regional Development areas and to forage for rice. Enemy objectives may require development of strategic hamlets to protect Viet Cong-controlled areas and to "liberate" the people from New Life hamlets. In Khanh Hoa Province enemy sapper units, aided by troops from the 18B regiment, were active in the Nha Trang area where they mined two trains and mortared the 5th Special Forces Logistical Support Center and the 281st aviation airfield.

In late October, troops from the Regiment, joined by local force companies and guerrillas, entered the outlying hamlets surrounding Ninh Hoa without being detected. At the same time these forces mortared the 9th Korean Army Division Headquarters. While no new tactics were noted in the Ninh Hoa incident, this was the first major enemy-initiated ground attack in Khanh Hoa Province since the arrival of the 18B Regiment in late 1966. This action served not only to demonstrate the combat effectiveness of the 18B Regiment following a long period of inactivity, but to trigger a review of friendly surveillance and intelligence operations.

In the southern provinces, enemy activity increased in an effort to disrupt the Lower House elections and to replenish depleted food stocks from the coastal rice harvests. Local force and district units gave propaganda lectures in villages to discourage voter participation, destroyed ballot boxes, and confiscated voting cards.

The enemy's short-term economic objective was the harvesting of outlying rice fields.

### Third Corps

Objectives in the III Corps during the month of October were to destroy enemy main force units, his base areas and equipment, to disrupt his lines of communication, and to provide a secure environment for the Lower House elections.

Two recent trends have resulted in significant progress toward the successful conclusion of the counterinsurgency effort in the III Corps. First, the national priority area has been secured to the extent that additional U. S. units can be employed against enemy main force elements operating outside the area. Second, the enemy has once again committed his main force units in strength against allied forces. This combination can only hasten the destruction of the main force units and facilitate the expansion of our pacification effort.

The increased tempo of jungle clearing operations contributed to the destruction of several base camp areas and tunnel complexes, as well as uncovering the largest weapons cache ever found in the III Corps. This cache, discovered by the 9th Infantry Division, was concealed in a tunnel complex and contained in excess of 1100 weapons, 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition, 3,200 rounds of ammunition for crew-served weapons, and 3,600 grenades. From October 29-31, a series of determined mortar and ground attacks were directed against Loc Ninh. Outnumbered South Vietnam and Civilian Irregular Defense Group made a heroic stand, literally throwing the enemy out of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group perimeter and subsector headquarters. The 1st Infantry Division (U. S. ) and 5th Vietnamese (South) Division reacted with additional forces. Heavy contact resulted on several occasions and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy. 369 enemy had been killed as of October 31. The engagement continued into November.



On October 27 the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment attacked the 3rd Battalion, 9th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Regiment, south of Song Be and was repulsed with heavy personnel and equipment losses (the kill ratio exceeded 20:1).

Two other Civilian Irregular Defense Group Forces had extremely successful operations in October. On October 20, Civilian Irregular Defense Group units from Tra Cu engaged 40 Viet Cong and killed 15 with no friendly losses. On October 21, two Civilian Irregular Defense Group Companies engaged an enemy force of unknown strength in a strike and killed 94 Viet Cong with light friendly losses.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Third Corps units have continued to enthusiastically utilize helicopters furnished by the Second Forces. A total of 126 air mobile assaults were made by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam during October, a significant increase over the 36 operations in the previous month.

The Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment completed its in-country training and began independent operations this month in the Nhon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province.

The construction and maintenance of roads and bridges so vitally important to both military operations and civilian commerce continues. During October, 254 kilometers of road was improved and/or maintained and 314 feet of tactical bridging was installed.

Our pacification effort continued with six new District Operations Intelligence Coordinating Centers established and staffed by Intelligence Advisory Officers during October. There are now 32 operational District Operations Intelligence Coordinating Centers in the Third Corps contributing to the identification and destruction of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Forty of 46 Army of the Republic of Vietnam Battalions have undergone the Revolutionary Development Direct Support training cycle. Seven battalions have completed the combined battalion refresher training program conducted by U. S. brigades and ten are presently in training.

The construction of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam housing under the approved \$2.8 million program will be an important contribution to the morale, retention and overall effectiveness of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam soldier. The model units of this dependent housing are now nearing completion in each of the Third Corps Army of the Republic of Vietnam Divisional areas.

In October, 216 refugee families were resettled in Duc Thanh of Phuoc Tuy Province. The resettlement of 3,000 additional persons is planned over the next 90 days.

Operation Doi Moi, a carefully controlled and intensive psychological operations campaign, resulted in 91 "quick reaction" leaflet drops exploiting information provided by Hoi Chanh. An example of "quick reaction" psychological operations was the use of airborne loudspeakers to broadcast Allied successes at Loc Ninh while action was still in progress. Rallies increased from 369 in September to 424 in October.

The total number of incidents initiated by the Viet Cong against pacification is up 80 percent over August and 25 percent over September.

During the month, the enemy conducted attacks with Main Force and North Vietnamese Army units. He appeared to be striving for a victory in Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. Both are important to the security of his routes of infiltration and logistical support. These efforts resulted in heavy enemy losses.

On October 27, the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment was identified for the first time in the Third Corps area in an attack against Song Be. Three diversionary attacks were conducted in conjunction with the main attack in a probable attempt to prevent timely reinforcements. The assault was repulsed with heavy enemy losses (130 killed in action).

The Loc Ninh attack, October 29-31, was the first known attempt in the Third Corps to employ multi-regimental forces from two divisions against a single objective. In this engagement, the enemy employed 122MM rockets for the first time since July.

The enemy suffered severe losses in the seven main force regiments contacted during the month. Each regiment lost at least 100 killed. Over 2,000 small arms and crew-served weapons were captured, the largest number ever captured in a single month in the Third Corps.

Agent and POW reports continue to indicate shortages of food and medicine. Over 200 tons of rice and significant quantities of medical supplies and hospital facilities were either captured or destroyed in October.

#### Fourth Corps

Our objectives in the Fourth Corps during this past month were to prevent Viet Cong interference in the Congressional elections, further the pacification effort, upgrade security, prevent interdiction of the major lines of communication, and destroy enemy main forces, provincial units, and their bases.

The overall tactical situation in the Fourth Corps remained favorable. Tactical operations were conducted with about the same frequency as during September. The overall morale, fighting spirit and combat effectiveness of Government of Vietnam units has been steadily increasing. They have maintained, and in some cases increased, their Viet Cong killed and captured count despite the enemy's continuing practice of avoiding contact.

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces units conducted a total of 158 major unit operations of battalion size or larger, of which contact with the Viet Cong was realized on 81. Major unit operations are continuing with less frequency when compared to like periods during 1966. This can be largely attributed to 15 infantry battalions being designated to support pacification in early 1967. The percentage of contacts versus total operations has increased significantly during 1967, in spite of Viet Cong attempts to avoid contact. This is indicative of an improvement in intelligence and better Government of Vietnam responsiveness to this intelligence. The most significant tactical accomplishment of the month was the sustained field operation conducted by the 7th Infantry Division and Dinh Tuong Sector Regional Force units. This operation commenced on October 27 and continued day and night through the end of the month. Results thus far are 113 Viet Cong killed in action, 31 Viet Cong captured, and 186 weapons captured. There were 21 operations which penetrated five other base areas resulting in 163 Viet Cong killed in action, 18 captured and 40 weapons of various caliber captured. Small unit operations number 54,357. Major unit airmobile operations numbered 29 with a total of 50,357 Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Troops airlifted.

The effectiveness of Regional and Popular Forces continues to improve slowly. Efforts to accelerate the program have been undertaken and all Popular Force training centers have been placed under direct control of the Fourth Corps Headquarters. The Regional and Popular Force desertion rate which continues to remain lower than in the past indicates that confidence in the Government of Vietnam is higher than last year. Beneficial results are reflected in the fact that Regional Force assigned strength is approximately 95 percent and Popular Force strength is approximately 98 percent of authorized strength.

The overall security status of major lines of communication displayed little change during the month. Surprisingly light Viet Cong interdiction was evidenced on these routes. Except for the last six days of the month, on the nights of October 25 and 26, the Viet Cong cratered Route 4 between the My Thuan Ferry and Long Dinh in 39 places, although at only one site the road was closed for longer than four hours. On the night of October 27, the Viet Cong cratered the road in eight places and constructed two roadblocks in the same general area of the preceding night. Repairs were again accomplished on the same day and the road was reopened to at least one lane of traffic. Constant damage and repairs



makes the condition of Route 4 poor, at best. The security status of all land and waterway lines of communication in the Fourth Corps remained unchanged except for the regression of Route 24 from My Tho to Cho Gao which reverted from green to amber, and Route 26 from Ben Tre to Ba Tri which reverted from amber to red. Overall maintenance of most major roads in the Fourth Corps is poor. All airfields in the corps are operational.

The pacification programs regained momentum after a slowdown due to preparation for and conduct of elections. All Revolutionary Development cadre teams which were scheduled to work in second semester hamlets are now working in them; however, some teams are returning to their former areas during the hours of darkness. The recent allocation of 36 Regional Force companies and 166 Popular Force platoons to the Fourth Corps, when recruited and trained, will enhance the security posture of the Revolutionary Development areas and permits greater flexibility in the employment of the Revolutionary Development teams. The Viet Cong initiated a total of nine incidents against the Revolutionary Development cadre resulting in 22 cadre killed, 52 Revolutionary Development cadre wounded, and 13 Revolutionary Development cadre missing. Greater command emphasis is being placed on the pacification effort.

During the first three and one-half weeks of October, Viet Cong activity of the Fourth Corps was relatively light despite the Lower House elections which took place on October 22. In the week prior to the House of Representatives elections, there were only 85 Viet Cong initiated incidents. Although the Viet Cong warned people not to vote, intelligence reports did not indicate any large scale anti-election campaigns, such as occurred before the Presidential elections. On the night of October 24, there was a sudden upsurge in Viet Cong activity in Viet Cong Military Region II. The towns of Phan Phu, Mo Cay, and Ba Tri of Kien Hoa Province were shelled with 60MM mortars and Ben Tre, the capital of Kien Hoa Province, was shelled with 75MM recoilless rifle and 82MM mortar fire. During the daylight hours of October 25, Ben Tre Airfield was mortared and two personnel carriers were destroyed by recoilless rifle fire near Ben Tre.

There were 597 Viet Cong initiated incidents reported for October as compared to 728 for the month of September. No major ground attacks occurred during October, although Phu Hung Op, located eight kilometers northeast of Ba Cang Subsector, Binh Long Province, was overrun and its defenders suffered heavy casualties. Except for this one incident, the pattern of enemy initiated activity continued to consist of harassments to outposts and watchtowers and occasional shelling of district towns.

Most of the Viet Cong increased activity occurred in Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces where the 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division has recently conducted more successful operations than at any time during the past two years.

In Dinh Tuong Province, combined 7th Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division and 2nd Brigade, 9th U. S. Division Operations have caused the Viet Cong severe losses and have forced them to concentrate units in the area in order to retain their hold and to interdict Highway 4. The overall situation in these areas is more favorable than it has been in the last two years. This is caused by an increase in sustained Government of Vietnam operations.

The morale of the Viet Cong has continued to decline, as has the morale of the people living in Viet Cong-controlled and contested areas. Although the morale and devotion of the Viet Cong cadre remains high, intelligence reports indicate that increased effort is required from these cadre to politically indoctrinate and motivate both the armed forces and populace in order to offset their lowering morale. Losses sustained by the Viet Cong totaled 1,258 killed in action, 524 captured, and 582 weapons captured, compared to September losses of 944 killed in action, 300 captured, and 377 weapons lost. Returnees under the Chieu Hoi Program totaled 531. In addition to the Chieu Hoi, there were 72 Hoa Hao soldiers who returned to Government of Vietnam control.

The primary objectives of our naval forces in Vietnam last month were to destroy the enemy by offensive action, interdict his waterborne logistic efforts, and promote the Government of Vietnam by conducting psychological operations.

The onset of the northeast monsoon has required redeployment of Market Time Forces. The larger, more seaworthy ships have been concentrated on the northern-east coast in anticipation of trawler infiltration attempts during the seasonally inclement weather.

Game Warden Forces continued to provide effective patrols in the riverine areas. Many small raids were conducted against Viet Cong Communications-Liaison Way Stations, ambush positions, and the enemy infrastructure. In one unusual operation, ten Viet Cong (including a hamlet chief and the head of the Viet Cong assassination security platoon) were abducted while attending the funeral of a Viet Cong village chief killed the night before by a seal team. Information concerning the funeral was obtained from a Hoi Chanh. The actual abduction was conducted by 40 Vietnamese inserted by helicopter obtained through the Fourth Corps, supported and extracted by Vietnamese Regional Advisory Groups and Game Warden Forces, and coordinated by the Regional Advisory Group Advisor.

Coronado operations of the Mobile Riverine Force continued in Dinh Tuong and Long An Provinces. Significant contact was made in Coronado V in the Bac Long and Cam Son Secret Zones in Dinh Tuong Province, resulting in 173 killed in action and 12 U. S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnamese killed.

Two Vietnamese ships, converted into medical/psychological warfare ships, treated 10,800 medical and dental patients and dispensed food and clothing to approximately 20,000 needy people, while psychological warfare teams, cultural teams, and social workers provided entertainment and propaganda in the form of movies, plays and speeches. During October, these ships operated a total of 32 days in the Bassac and Mekong Rivers.

#### 7th Air Force

The objectives of the 7th Air Force during October were to provide Allied direct support, tactical air and logistical support for ground operations, locate the enemy and his resources, and limit enemy movement.

In support of these objectives, there were a total of 11,029 tactical air sorties flown in-country during the month of October; 7,999 of these were flown as close air support missions for ground operations. Ordnance was expended primarily against enemy troop concentrations, base areas, fortifications and installations. There were 232 secondary explosions, 4,382 military structures destroyed, another 2,591 damaged, and 280 sampans destroyed.

Included in the overall effort were 758 combat skyspot sorties flown to deny the enemy the use of night time as a sanctuary. An additional 336 combat skyspot sorties were flown during daylight hours in inclement weather. Two hundred sixty-four immediate support requests were honored by Allied flareships illuminating battlefields, depriving the enemy the concealment of darkness, and flaring for tactical air strikes in all corps. Airlift figures were equally impressive with approximately 292,000 passengers and 60,000 tons of cargo being airlifted throughout South Vietnam.

More than 2,500 Vietnamese Air Force strike sorties were flown against enemy targets, resulting in 1,098 military structures destroyed, 714 damaged, 85 sampans destroyed and 18 secondary explosions.

Herbicide operations increased more than 10 percent this month as compared to September. Five hundred of the 684 sorties scheduled during the month were flown. The majority of these were defoliation missions scheduled into War Zone D. A limited number of sorties were scheduled against Viet Cong crops in southern Second Corps and the eastern and northern portions of the Third Corps. Missions were also flown over the U Minh forest in the Fourth Corps.

Constant pressure was placed on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army movement by the more than 7,200 visual reconnaissance sorties flown in O1/O2 type aircraft. This extensive surveillance program produced 1,631 significant sightings and resulted in 341 immediate airstrike sorties being flown to destroy fleeting enemy targets.



Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 7:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

*Per file*

Herewith, officially delivered by Wakaizumi from the Prime Minister, is the advanced text of Sato's speech at the Press Club tomorrow.

The Prime Minister took special pains to assure its delivery to you tonight.

You may wish to mention it at dinner.

Wakaizumi said the Prime Minister is very anxious to find more time to talk with you alone -- not about the Ryukyus or bilateral matters but about other issues.

He says that Miki can find all the time in the world to talk with Rusk but he has only this one chance to talk with President Johnson whose policy in Asia he believes to be correct.

You may wish to find an occasion tonight or tomorrow to give him a chance to chat further on a bilateral, personal basis.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

ACTION~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 14, 1967  
7:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach's negative draft response to Anderson's latest two cables which:

1. Report Nasser's specific complaints with our UN draft, his anxiety to see Anderson again; and Anderson's feeling Nasser will assume Anderson is going back on a personal commitment if he doesn't go to Cairo.

2. Anderson's message to Sec. Rusk on how he would handle a trip.

W. W. Rostow

Katzenbach draft OK \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-477  
By *sig*, NARA, Date 6-28-95

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

18a

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Amembassy BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

STATE

NODIS

REF.: Beirut's 3998, 3999

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-478  
By CL, NARA, Date 2-22-95

Under  
Please pass following message Anderson from ~~/XXXXXX~~ Secretary  
Katzenbach:

1. We have carefully considered what can be accomplished by another visit Cairo. Our conclusion is that very little can be achieved and that some damage might be done. Egyptians in New York are not acting in a helpful manner and have succeeded in undercutting Hussein's efforts either because of their desire prevent Hussein from getting too far in the lead or because Russians did not like idea of Security Council addressing itself to a U.S. resolution that had chance of success. For these reasons UAR asked for Security Council meeting at moment when there appeared to be some opportunity move Arabs and Israelis to moderate course. Situation in Security Council at present confused and unclear. We fear that there may be desire on Nasser's part utilize your presence Cairo add further confusion situation.

NEA:LDBattle:lab 11/14/67 4263

The Under Secretary

IO - Mr. Popper (substance)

S/S -

~~SECRET~~



Amembassy BEIRUT

~~SECRET~~

Moreover, message you have received from him clearly sounds like Foreign Ministry drafting rather than Nasser since it goes into detail on resolution. It seems to suggest to us that Nasser hopes for negotiations with you on wording resolution which at this stage in context U.N. would be unfortunate. Our conclusion, therefore, is that chance progress is not increased by further efforts with Nasser in light behavior UAR with Hussein, tendency make propaganda out of your presence, and in view his hope use you as negotiating instrument which we sure you would not want.

2. We recognize this puts you in difficult position, and we do not wish embarrass you in area nor in your relations with Nasser which have been asset to U.S. in past and will be again. Suggest your answer declining return Cairo might be based on one or all following elements:

(a) illness in your family;

(b) obvious desire from Nasser's message get into wording of resolution which you not able discuss as private citizen;

(c) outstanding commitments U.S. necessitating your return as soon as possible;

(d) public disclosure (NYTimes article) of proposed visit to Cairo.

Best regards.

END

GP-1

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH  
#6

186

~~SECRET~~

Action

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Info

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3766  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3093

REF: BEIRUT 3933

MODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM ANDERSON

1) FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY ANDERSON NOW IN IRAQ DELIVERED TO ME MORNING NOVEMBER 14 BY HIS BUSINESS ASSOCIATION JOHN MCCRANE. I QUOTE VERBATIM TEXT FROM ANDERSON'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES. THIS MESSAGE COVERS CONVERSATION ANDERSON HAD NOVEMBER 12 WITH UAR AMB METWALLY.

2) QUOTE - MESSAGE OF PRESIDENT NASSER TO PBA RPT BBA

PAGE 2 RUHBE 3093 ~~SECRET~~

THROUGH AMBASSADOR METWALLY. PARA (A) - THE AMERICANS DID NOT MENTION CLEARLY AND FRANKLY THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE ARABS CANNOT ACCEPT A DRAFT OF WITHDRAWAL THAT IS NOT DETAILED (NOTE: I THINK HE MEANT EXPLICIT RATHER THAN DETAILED) AND EXPRESSED WITH FRANKNESS. THIS WOULD BE AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES AND CHARTER OF THE UN WHICH SAYS THAT NO PROFIT OR TERRITORIAL GAINS ARE ALLOWED TO BE SECURED BY FORCE.

PARA (B) - THE FIRST PART OF THE DRAFT CONTAINS MANY SUBJECTS SUCH AS PEACE WITH JUSTICE AND THIS MEANS THAT ALL THE SUBJECTS ARE CONNECTED AND THE TIMING FOR THE EXECUTION OF ANY SUBJECT IS NOT KNOWN. THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE TO ASSUME IS THAT THE WITHDRAWAL WILL NOT BE COMPLETED UNLESS ALL OTHER REQUIREMENTS ARE EXECUTED SUCH AS PEACE WITH JUSTICE. PARA (C) - THE STATEMENT IN THE DRAFT CONCERNING (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MUTUAL (END UNDERLINE) RECOGNITION CAN BE CONSIDERED A NEW TEXT NOT FOUND IN ANY PREVIOUS DRAFT. THIS IS CONSIDERED A NEW REQUEST BY THE US. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM US CONFIRMATION THAT (BEGIN UNDERLINE) MUTUAL (END UNDERLINE) RECOGNITION WOULD NOT BE MENTIONED. PARA (D) - WHAT IS SAID ABOUT

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



~~SECRET~~

-2- BEIRUT 3998, NOVEMBER 14

PAGE 3 RUQMBE 3.98 ~~SECRET~~

BORDERS, FOR EXAMPLE 'THE SECURED AND RECOGNIZED BORDERS' IS A NEW TEXT. TO EXECUTE THIS SUBJECT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE (BEGIN UNDERLINE MUTUAL (END UNDERLINE) AGREEMENT ON BOTH SIDES AND THIS WOULD REQUIRE A RECOGNITION PROHIBITED BY THE KHARTOUM CONFERENCE.

PARA (E) - THE DRAFT CONCERNING REFUGEES IS VERY MILD AND CONTAINS NOTHING OBLIGATORY (NOTE: I AM SURE HE MEANS OBLIGATIONS BY ISRAEL) AND TAKES NO NOTE OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. PARA (F) - THE REFERENCE TO DEMILITARIZED AREAS IN THE DRAFT IS CONSIDERED AN ECHO OF THE ISRAELI SPOKESMEN WHO HAVE SPOKEN OF 'GREATER ISRAEL' AND THE DISARMAMENT OF THE SINAI. THE LATEST STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT IS THAT MADE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THE KNESSET ON NOVEMBER 10 WHEN HE STATED THAT ISRAEL WANTED TO DISARM SINAI. THIS WOULD MAKE THE UAR VERY ANXIOUS AND IS ONE REASON NOT TO APPROVE THE US DRAFT. PARA (G) - THE DRAFT IN SETTING OUT THE MISSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN GIVES THE IDEA THAT DIRECT CONTACT IS NECESSARY BETWEEN THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS AND THIS HAS NOT BEEN IN ANY DRAFT RESOLUTION

PAGE 4 RUQMBE 3998 ~~SECRET~~

BEFORE. PARA (H) - GENERALLY, THE US RESOLUTION IS MANY STEPS BACKWARD WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER DRAFTS OFFERED IN THE UN OR THROUGH CONTACTS OUTSIDE THE SC RPT SC OR THE GA RPT GA UP TO NOW. IT IS A STEP BACKWARD FROM THE DRAFT THE US AND SOVIETS AGREED TO AND WHICH THE UAR, AFTER STUDY, REFUSED. PARA (I) - THE OFFERING OF THIS DRAFT CANNOT BE FINAL AS IT IS. THE CHANCE IS STILL OPEN IN FRONT OF THE US TO PROVE ITS DESIRE TO REACH A JUST POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE ISRAEL-ARAB DISPUTE.

PARA (J) - RIAD HAS SAID HE IS VERY KEEN TO COOPERATE WITH THE US REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK AND HAS CONFIRMED TO AMB. GOLDBERG THAT EVEN IF THE SC RPT SC COULD NOT REACH ANY RESULT THIS WILL NOT MEAN THAT THE CONTACTS BETWEEN THE US AND THE UAR WILL BE STOPPED. PARA (K) - HE (NASSER) IS ANXIOUS TO SEE ME AGAIN AND CONTINUE OUR TALKS.

PARA (L) - END OF MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NASSER - UNQUOTE

3) ANDERSON'S PRESENT PLANS, UNLESS THINGS GO WRONG IN IRAQ, ARE RETURN BEIRUT TOMORROW NOVEMBER 15, OVERNIGHT BEIRUT, DEPART FOR US VIA LONDON MORNING NOVEMBER 16,

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

-3- BEIRUT 3998, NOVEMBER 14

PAGE 5 RUQMBE ~~SECRET~~

ARRIVING NY EITHER NOVEMBER 17 OR 18.

4) MCCRANE REPORTS ANDERSON FEELS HE IS GOING BACK ON WHAT NASSER WILL ASSUME IS PERSONAL COMMITMENT, IF HE DOES NOT VISIT CAIRO. ANDERSON WORRIED ABOUT IMPLICATIONS AND HAS NO APPROPRIATE RATIONALE FOR EXPLAINING TO EGYPTIANS WHY HE NOT GOING. HE HAD ORIGINALLY TRIED AVOID RETURN VISIT AS HIS PREVIOUS MESSAGES INDICATED, BUT NOW HE UNDERSTANDABLY FEELS NASSER EXPECTS HIM.

5) HE STARTING TO SPREAD THIN EXCUSE IN IRAQ THAT MCCRANE BROUGHT HIM NEWS FAMILY ILLNESS IN US WHERE HE MAY HAVE TO RETURN QUICKLY.

6) ANDERSON'S CONCERN WILL NOT BE LESSENED BY CAIRO-NY TIMES NOVEMBER 12 ARTICLE, CARRIED HERALD TRIBUNE NOVEMBER 13, WHICH SEEMS TO BE OFFICIAL UARG LEAK THAT ANDERSON PLANNING REVISIT NASSER SOON.

7) I DO NOT KNOW WHAT IF ANYTHING ANDERSON WILL TELL AMB

PAGE 6 RUQMBE 3998 ~~SECRET~~

METWALLY IN BAGHDAD. ANDERSON INFORMS ME HE ALREADY HAS HAD TALK WITH METWALLY IN WHICH HE (ANDERSON) BORE DOWN HARD ON DAMAGE DONE BY HEIKAL ARTICLE AND ASKED METWALLY PASS ON TO NASSER HIS STRONG FEELING THAT IT HURT ARAB CAUSE AND CAUSE OF PEACE. METWALLY REPORTING THIS TO NASSER. ANDERSON DESCRIBES METWALLY AS FAIRLY STRONG INDIVIDUAL WHO SEEMS HAVE GOOD CONNECTIONS.

8) ACCORDING MCCRANE, ANDERSON STILL PREPARED GO TO CAIRO IF DEPT WISHES, AND IF HE CAN HELP. HE COULD LEAVE BEIRUT FOR CAIRO MORNING NOVEMBER 16. OUR RECENT EXPERIENCE MAKES IT CLEAR IT IMPOSSIBLE GET MESSAGES TO ANDERSON IN BAGHDAD EXCEPT THROUGH COURIER. ANDERSON TRIED SEND HIS SON BEIRUT WITH MESSAGE NIGHT NOVEMBER 12 BUT FLIGHTS WEATHERED IN. HE APOLOGIZES TO SECRETARY FOR DELAY.

9) MCCRANE PREPARED RETURN BAGHDAD TONIGHT IF WE WISH PASS MESSAGE. OTHERWISE I WILL SEE ANDERSON IN BEIRUT ABOUT 1030 LOCAL NOVEMBER 15. PLEASE ADVISE.  
PORTER

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

WH  
18-6

~~SECRET~~

Action

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1967 NOV 14 AM 7 28

Info

O 141115Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3767  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3999

REF: BEIRUT 3998

FOR SECRETARY FROM ANDERSON

MODIS

1) FOLLOWING IS VERBATIM TEXT ANDERSON'S HANDWRITTEN MESSAGE HE ASKED ME TRANSMIT TO SECRETARY. THIS MESSAGE OF COURSE WRITTEN PRIOR HIS RECEIPT DECISION THAT ANDERSON NOT RPT NOT GO CAIRO.

2) QUOTE - THE SECRETARY OF STATE: I AM SENDING THE TEXT OF A MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM NASSER THROUGH AMS METWALLY ABOUT 5 PM NOVEMBER 12 BAGHDAD TIME. THE TEXT

PAGE 2 RUOMBE 3999 ~~SECRET~~

IS AS NEAR VERBATIM AS POSSIBLE AND ACCOUNTS FOR THE WORDING. OF COURSE IT IS WRITTEN FROM NOTES AS METWALLY TRANSLATED FROM THE ARABIC BUT I BELIEVE IT ACCURATE AS I ASKED HIM TO REPEAT WHEN I THOUGHT HIS MEANING WAS UNCLEAR. I PLAN TO BE CAIRO BY WEDNESDAY AND WILL CONTACT BERGUS ON ARRIVAL OR ASK HIM TO CONTACT ME SO AS TO GIVE YOUR VIEWS ON NASSER'S MESSAGE BEFORE I SEE NASSER. I PLAN TO BE AT NILE HILTON. UNLESS YOU ADVISE OTHERWISE I WILL NOT INFORM NASSER THAT I HAVE SENT THE TEXT OF HIS MESSAGE TO YOU AND THAT I HAVE YOUR GUIDANCE. PLEASE ADVISE HOW YOU WANT THIS PHASE OF THE CONTACT HANDLED. IN THE ABSENCE OF TELLING NASSER OF MY SENDING THE TEXT TO YOU I WILL SPEAK AS A PERSONAL EXPRESSION OF OPINION TO BE SENT TO YOU LATER. PLEASE ADVISE. ANDERSON - UNQUOTE.  
POSTER

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-478  
By cl, NARA, Date 2-22-95

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 2:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Bill Scranton called with the following message.

1. He has spoken to no one in making up his mind.
2. He has decided he cannot accept the post because:

- He had proposed a constitutional convention;
- He was prevailed upon to be a delegate;
- He campaigned hard; and
- Now he just can't run out.

3. He had the following supplementary remarks. He knows how critical the Manila post now is. He is not being modest, but he honestly believes we can get a better man. He does not command Spanish; and his knowledge of Europe and Latin America is greater than it is of Asia.

4. He asked me to convey his best wishes to you and to Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

*for Sec. Rusk*

*20*

November 14, 1967

11:20a

Mr. President:

*Pro file*

Bill Bundy has spoken with Senator Russell explaining the formula and the reasons for the support of everyone including the JCS.

Senator Russell said he "did not think well" of any formula which had a time element in it.

Our options are:

- stall Sato today and give him a definitive answer tonight or tomorrow
- go back to formula without time
- go ahead.

*W.* W. Rostow

*Mr Rostow indicated to Mome Tchner*



ACTION

21

Tuesday, November 14, 1967, 10:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting of Foreign Policy Advisers and Legislative Leaders  
with Saigon Team

Although Friday is a bit more difficult for Bunker than Saturday, either day would serve for Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, and Ambassador Komer to meet with you and the group of foreign policy advisers you saw November 2, plus legislative leaders, at lunch.

The whole group could meet first with the Saigon team for a briefing. You could join the group for lunch. Or, the session could start at lunch and then adjourn (with or without you) for further briefing and discussion.

The suggested composition of the group would be:

1. Advisers who attended November 2 meeting (suggested list attached for your approval);
2. Additional non-Government advisers who did not attend the November 2 meeting but who would be invited to this meeting: John McCloy     yes     no  
Robert Lovett     yes     no
3. Legislative leaders and representatives from the two foreign affairs committees and the Armed Services Committee (suggested list is attached).

Later in the week we will be better able to prepare an outline for the meeting. Certain questions will arise out of the discussions with the Saigon team between now and then.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule meeting:            Friday            Saturday

Begin session:            before lunch with Saigon team briefing without me  
           with luncheon to be followed by briefing and discussion with me

SUGGESTED LIST OF INVITEES - 21

___	Dean Acheson	
___	George Ball	
___	Gen. Omar Bradley	
___	McGeorge Bundy	
___	Clark Clifford	
___	Arthur Dean	
___	Douglas Dillon	
___	Abe Fortas	
___	Robert Murphy	
___	Henry Cabot Lodge	
___	Gen. Maxwell Taylor	11

___	Secretary Rusk	
___	Secretary McNamara	
___	Richard Helms	
___	Under Secretary Katzenbach	
___	General Wheeler	
___	Governor Averell Harriman	
___	William Bundy	
___	W. W. Rostow	
___	George Christian	
___	Jim Jones	10

## SUGGESTED LIST OF LEGISLATORS TO BE INVITED - 23

1. Bipartisan Leadership - 13Senate

\_\_\_ Hayden  
\_\_\_ Mansfield  
\_\_\_ Dirksen  
\_\_\_ Long  
\_\_\_ Kuchel  
\_\_\_ Robert Byrd  
\_\_\_ Milton Young  
\_\_\_ Margaret Chase Smith

House

\_\_\_ Speaker McCormack  
\_\_\_ Albert  
\_\_\_ Ford  
\_\_\_ Boggs  
\_\_\_ Arends

2. Foreign Relations - 4

\_\_\_ Fulbright  
\_\_\_ Hickenlooper  
\_\_\_ Sparkman  
\_\_\_ Aiken

3. Foreign Affairs - 2

\_\_\_ Morgan  
\_\_\_ Bolton

4. Armed Services - 4

\_\_\_ Russell  
\_\_\_ Stennis  
\_\_\_ Rivers  
\_\_\_ Bates



S

Names eliminated from list

Eugene R. Black  
James A. Perkins  
James Wadsworth  
George B. Kistiakowsky  
Roswell L. Gilpatric  
Morris Liebman  
Robert Anderson  
James Rowe  
John McCone

Add: John McCloy

22

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 123, NARA, Date 11-21-91

ACTION

*Pres file*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 10:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Would you wish to have Bunker at the Wednesday lunch meeting?

Westmoreland and Komer will be coming in at about 10:45 a.m. Do you want them?

Richard Helms?

General Wheeler?

Sec. Rusk and I think it would be a good idea to have Bunker at least.

As I understand it, Westy knows a little about BUTTERCUP; but Bob Komer has not been briefed on it.

Therefore, you may wish to have Bunker come to lunch and let Westy and Bob rest after their flight. In that case, you will wish to budget for an early session with Westy and Bob.

W. W. Rostow

Amb. Bunker at lunch: Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_; See me \_\_\_\_\_

Westmoreland at lunch: Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_; See me \_\_\_\_\_

Bob Komer at lunch: Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_; See me \_\_\_\_\_

Richard Helms at lunch: Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_; See me \_\_\_\_\_

Gen. Wheeler at lunch: Yes \_\_\_\_\_; No \_\_\_\_\_; See me \_\_\_\_\_

Arrange with Marv Watson a time for Westy and Komer \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Tuesday, November 14, 1967  
10:15 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this formal denial by Bob McNamara of Drew Pearson's statements about his view of Westy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Our most knowledgeable people in the State Department on Japan believe that Sato and his Foreign Minister Miki, representing different factions in the ruling party, are slightly competitive about the Ryukyus formula. Prime Minister Sato obviously sought a special and personal channel to communicate his views and he wants to discuss the formula with you alone, as he discussed it alone with Alex Johnson on the plane yesterday. He apparently hopes that you and he will come back with an agreed formula to inform your colleagues and perhaps let them work out some details. In any case, you may wish to know of this possible angle and let Sato express his views as to how the matter should be handled when you return to the Cabinet Room after your discussion this morning.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-357  
By 40, NARA, Date 5-22-95

WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~4. ~~copy~~  
2. Profile

Mr. President:

November 14, 1967

You ought to be aware of the attached Israeli Cabinet decision, which Eban asked Arthur Goldberg to bring to your attention.

The disturbing part about it is the degree to which it formally digs the Israeli government into insistence on direct negotiations. This has been the Israeli position right along, but we have always thought there would be flexibility on mechanics when there was real prospect for negotiations. They seem to be shifting their focus from security to mechanics, although the fact that they're not publishing this may mean it's largely designed to pressure us.

We will include comment on this in the response to Eshkol, which we will send up as soon as we have a clearer picture on the possible timing of his visit.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-477

By ing, NARA, Date 6-28-95

26a

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

November 14, 1967

The following communication from the Foreign Minister of Israel was delivered to Ambassador Goldberg in New York, Sunday, November 12:

Dear Ambassador Goldberg:

In the light of current United Nations discussions, the Israel Cabinet reviewed the national policy in a special meeting on November 8 and adopted a resolution on peace aims which my colleagues and I wish to bring to the attention of the United States.

- (1) Israel aims to achieve a permanent peace with her Arab neighbors.
- (2) Peace will be achieved by direct negotiations and the signature of peace treaties between Israel and her neighbors.
- (3) Free passage of Israel's ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran is a condition of peace.
- (4) Israel considers that the determination of agreed and secure boundaries between herself and her neighbors can only be achieved in the framework of peace treaties.
- (5) The establishment of peace in the Middle East and the regional cooperation which will flow from it will open possibilities for a regional and international solution of the refugee problem.
- (6) Israel sees an appropriate role for a United Nations representative for the Middle East whose task would be to bring about a direct negotiation between the parties.

I should be grateful if this resolution, which has not been published, could be brought to the notice of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State.

Yours very sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-478  
By cb, NARA, Date 2-22-95

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

INFORMATION*For file*

SECRET November 14, 1967

Mr. President:

This is Ambassador Jones' contribution to the riddle of Belaunde's quip about the University of Texas.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

11/13/67 Jones Memo  
to President.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 14176, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, 1-16, 1983

NARA 18 Date 12-4-91





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

21a

~~SECRET~~


November 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At the end of our conversation Thursday afternoon, November 8, I came away with the feeling that there was some misunderstanding of President Belaunde's motives in making his little joke to Jack Valenti about the University of Texas versus California. Let me try to explain.

Belaunde has been disappointed that Peru's share in the aid program (Alliance for Progress) has been small in relation to that of Colombia, Chile and Brazil. He has felt that his Texas education should have given him a special relationship with you and thus favorable consideration in the U.S. Government's many assistance programs under the Alliance. When Jack Valenti in his meeting with President Belaunde last Monday recalled that the latter had attended the University of Texas when Mrs. Johnson did, he said something about this probably having helped Belaunde in his relations with President Johnson and in Peru's development programs within the Alliance for Progress. I am sure that it was within this context, although somewhat later, that Belaunde made his remark about hoping that the day would not come when he would wish that he had gone to the University of California instead of Texas.

I had heard an earlier version of this kind of remark made at a luncheon at the Presidential Palace and reported to me by an American present. On that occasion Belaunde said in an answer to a question about his share in AID programs in Latin America that he might as well have gone to the University of Oklahoma for all the good his relationship with Texas had done him.

  
J. Wesley Jones  
Ambassador to Peru

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-282

By 419, NARA, Date 1-25-96

ACTION <sup>28</sup>

Tuesday - November 14, 1967

~~Long~~  
2 Purple

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message from Honduran President on the Chamizal Settlement

President Lopez of Honduras has sent the message at Tab B congratulating you on the Chamizal Settlement.

State suspects from the language of the message that it was inspired by President Lopez' desire that we abandon title to the Swan Islands which Honduras claims. I am inclined to agree.

State recommends that you approve the cordial, but non-committal, reply at Tab A. I concur.

Approved ☒  
Disapproved ☐  
See me ☐

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Presidential reply to President Lopez's message.

Tab B - Honduran President Lopez' message on Chamizal.

28a

Suggested Presidential Reply to Honduran President Lopez' November 2  
Congratulatory Message on Chamizal Settlement

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your friendly message on the occasion of the final  
step in the settlement of the Chamizal problem.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Oswaldo Lopez Arellano  
President of the Republic of Honduras  
Tegucigalpa.

286

Congratulatory Message from Honduran President Lopez  
on the Chamizal Settlement  
(November 2, 1967)

Tegucigalpa, Honduras, November 2, 1967

The President

The White House

The definitive settlement of the Chamizal problem with the Republic of Mexico in a spirit of friendship and brotherly understanding brings great satisfaction to the Honduran Government and people, and I am happy to send you heartfelt congratulations.

Most cordially yours,

/s/ Oswaldo Lopez Arellano  
President of the Republic  
of Honduras



29

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday - November 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Sol Linowitz - 1:00 pm

I understand that Sol Linowitz will see you today to report on his first year of stewardship as US Ambassador to the OAS.

One subject he may raise is White House announcement of his formation of a US Mission to the OAS. Sol has been working on this for some time and now has put his team together.

In any White House announcement of the US Mission, we must be careful to check Covey Oliver. Jurisdictional problems have arisen between Covey and Sol and these should not be aggravated by the announcement.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 11-21-91

20  
INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 14, 1967

MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached, for your information, is a brief background memo from Joe Fowler on the gold situation and the gold certificate proposal, which he outlined briefly for you during yesterday's meeting on sterling. Fred Deming, Ed Fried and others of their small group, who have been working with Joe on this proposal, see an approach on gold both as a crisis measure and as another step towards strengthening the international monetary system. Deming will get a line on the negotiating possibilities by carefully sounding out the Germans, Italians and possibly the Dutch during his discussions this week.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NSC 2-24-80  
Authority Pres 10-27-78; FR 7-19-79,  
By NSA/NIA, Date 12-4-91

*WRF*  
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTSUBJECT: The Gold Situation

The gold market has been under strong demand pressure during most of 1966 and 1967, and little relief appears in sight. We had hoped -- a hope shared by most of my Group of Ten colleagues -- that agreement on a plan for a new reserve asset would quiet the gold market, but this has not occurred.

Much of the current pressure on the market seems to be connected with the sterling situation. The reasoning runs about as follows:

- If sterling falls, there will be great monetary unrest.
- The dollar will be affected strongly.
- Perhaps the only solution to the crisis will be a rise in the price of gold.

But other factors have affected the market also.

- The Mid-East crisis brought increased gold demand.
- There is growing realization that industrial use is increasing strongly and, perhaps within ten years, will absorb almost all new production.
- Russia has sold no gold in either 1966 or 1967, thus reducing supply.

The net result of all this is that the gold pool has had to meet the difference between supply and demand. It used about \$270 million in 1966 and about \$300 million so far in 1967.

When the gold pool was started in 1961, the eight countries in it pledged \$270 million as follows:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Reasing ltr 11-27-78By ML/CD, NARA, Date 12-4-94

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

United States	\$135 million
Germany	30 "
Italy	25 "
France	25 "
United Kingdom	25 "
Switzerland	10 "
Netherlands	10 "
Belgium	10 "
	<hr/>
	\$270 "

The pool neither gained nor lost in 1961 and 1962. In 1963 and 1964, it gained roughly \$1.3 billion and distributed this to pool members in proportion to their pledges. Demand was fairly quiet, and Russia was selling gold. In 1965, there was rough balance -- no big gains or losses. Then came the 1966 and 1967 losses.

In essence, the original pledge was used up in 1966. In 1967, the members have been feeding the pool in \$50 million payments as needed. They have put up seven such payments so far. France dropped out after the first, and the United States picked up that share, so that now the U. S. puts up roughly \$30 million out of each \$50 million extension.

At Basle this weekend, the pool members agreed to continue supplying the pool, as at present, until at least January, 1968. There is, however, unrest and hope that some better way can be found to deal with this problem.

Given time, we believe the new reserve plan will be regarded -- as it should be -- as reducing the need for monetary gold. This should moderate speculation and allow industrial use more room from new production.

If the sterling situation can be brought under control, this should quiet the market. The two -- gold and sterling -- are linked in this sense.

Meanwhile, we have been working on possible new approaches to the problem. One approach, which appears to have some promise, is to establish a big gold pool -- perhaps \$1 to \$2 billion -- and issue gold certificates against it. The gold pool countries would count these gold certificates in their reserves, much as the Federal Reserve does here.

We are beginning to explore this approach very cautiously. The subject is very sensitive, and we don't want to trigger any market reactions.

We will keep you posted on our progress and on the gold situation in general as it develops.

*Henry H. Fowler*  
Henry H. Fowler

~~SECRET~~



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Tuesday - November 14, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Eight European Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein's  
Lunch Wednesday, November 15, at 1:00 P.M.

The Group

USSR	- Ambassador Dobrynin (Duh-BREEN-in)
Bulgaria	- Ambassador Guerassimov (Ger-AS-imof)
Italy	- Ambassador Ortona (Or-TON-ah)
Iceland	- Ambassador Thorsteinsson (THOR-sten-sen)
Malta	- Ambassador Pardo (PAR-do)
Netherlands	- Ambassador Schurmann (SKOOR-man)
Belgium	- Ambassador Scheyven (Shay-VEN)
Switzerland	- Ambassador Schnyder (SHNEE-dare)

This is a mixed group -- Ambassador Dobrynin, the Bulgarian, neutral Switzerland and Malta, and Italy and three smaller NATO allies.

The main theme of the day should be bridge-building. You may wish to make the following points:

- Some say we are losing interest in Europe. This is not so. Europe's progress and success make her blessedly free of headline-catching disorder and turmoil. But our primary ties are there.
- Despite ideological differences between some of us, we must consider how to work together for the common good. This was a theme of my address of October 7, 1966. I wish to reaffirm this hope now.

We should explore all opportunities for European reconciliation and the building of a lasting peace. A just and secure peace -- in Europe and elsewhere -- is America's most important goal.

- We are among the "rich nations", in a world-wide sea of poverty and frustrated hopes. Building on a foundation of peace, we must go on together to conquer our real enemies -- hunger, want, ignorance, misery.

- We are deeply committed to the liberalization of peaceful trade -- both East-West trade and trade between ourselves and Western Europe.

We are concerned about the rise in protectionist sentiment, both in America and in Europe. We are determined to halt this trend.

- All of us in this room want to move from the unstable environment of deterrence to a more cooperative international order.

We have achieved the Test Ban Treaty and the Space Treaty. Early and successful conclusion of an NPT will be service to mankind. My representatives in Geneva report that we are narrowing our differences -- on a treaty which will take into account the interest of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike.

- I am reassured to have this distinguished group here today. I know all Americans can depend on you to represent our views to your own governments with accuracy, fairness and wisdom.

W. W. Rostow

(Attached are State's fact sheets for each country, giving a biographical sketch of each Ambassador and summarizing bilateral issues.)

Monday, November 13, 1967  
7:45 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

*Pres. file*

Secretaries Rusk and Fowler wish you to find a moment in your private conversation with Sato tomorrow to raise the question of the British pound.

You might say the following:

"As you know, the Group of Ten -- including your representative and ours -- are now discussing in Paris the question of the British pound. It is our hope that a way can be found to sustain the pound without devaluation.

"If devaluation becomes necessary, it is of the highest importance to the whole international monetary system that all the other major countries hold steady at their present rates of exchange. If other major countries follow the British in devaluation, we could face a most serious world financial crisis.

"I would be grateful if you could find an occasion for Secretary Fowler to have a few words with you privately about this matter. "

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~  
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-29-80; FRS 7-19-79

By ag/yp, NARA, Date 12-4-91

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

Monday, November 13, 1967, 7:15 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Vice President's Proposed Trip to London

*Pres file*

We have learned that Ambassador Bruce has been working out arrangements for the visit of the Vice President to London. The present schedule calls for the Vice President's departure on November 28, a meeting with Prime Minister Wilson at Chequers on November 29, and a formal banquet and major address in London on November 30.

We are told that this trip was cleared by the Vice President with you in September and planning has proceeded.

In a recent telephone conversation you gave me reason to believe that the Vice President should not get into the complicated political situation in which the British Labor Party and the Prime Minister now find themselves.

Do you wish me to take any action in this matter?

W. W. Rostow

- ☐ I will talk to the Vice President
- ☐ Bring up at next Luncheon Meeting
- ☐ See me

LE  
BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By 19, NARA, Date 11-21-91



Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 6:30 PM

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with the Ceylonese Ambassador (Weerasinghe)  
Tuesday, November 14, 1967 -- 12:30 PM

This is strictly a brief ceremonial meeting. The Ambassador will present to you a silver casket of tea commemorating the 100th year of the tea industry in Ceylon. (The Ceylonese gave a similar casket to Queen Elizabeth a few weeks ago.)

Tea is Ceylon's principal export. But tea prices are now at a 20-year low, and the Ceylonese are feeling the squeeze. They are currently running a publicity campaign in the United States and elsewhere. This presentation to you will not be used directly in the campaign, though it will surely help them.

Here are a few talking points you might use with the Ambassador (he won't raise any substantive matters):

1. We know how important tea exports are in Ceylon's good efforts to build its economy.
2. We also know they are having difficulty with tea prices at a 20-year low, and we wish them well in their endeavors to expand their markets.
3. Ceylonese tea is justly famous for its high quality. Their current promotion campaign ought to be successful.
4. Personal regards and best wishes to Ceylonese Prime Minister Senanayake (Sen-a-NIGH-ka).

W. W. Rostow

RPMorris/vmr

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

35

Monday, November 13, 1967  
6:30 p. m.~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Alex Johnson has just reported in from the plane with Sato. He spent two hours alone with him.

1. The formula communicated to us by Wakaizumi (Tab A) is, indeed, the formula Sato wants to raise with you.
2. After a private conversation, he would like the matter settled in the presence of his two senior colleagues.
3. I read the proposed change in the formula -- instigated by the JCS -- to Alex Johnson. Alex pointed out that "satisfactory to the two governments" and "consistent with the national interests of both countries" were somewhat redundant.
4. Sato would probably prefer the more general "satisfactory to the two governments"; but he might buy the following: "an agreement on a date consistent with the national interests of both countries for the reversion of these Islands."

~~SECRET~~ attachment

W. R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-182  
By is, NARA Date 9-24-98

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

TAB A

Language for the Second Paragraph of VII  
of the Communique

"As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two governments, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, should hold consultations through diplomatic channels to examine matters pertaining to the reversion with a view to reaching, within a few years, an agreement on a date satisfactory to the two governments for the reversion of these Islands consistent with the national interests of both countries."

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLJ 92-131  
By grip, NARA, Date 1/14/02

SECRET-EXDIS

TAB A

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of the Communique

"As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two governments, guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, should hold consultations through diplomatic channels to examine matters pertaining to the reversion with a view to reaching, within a few years, an agreement on a date satisfactory to the two governments for the reversion of these Islands consistent with the national interests of both countries."

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLT 92-131  
By Q/p, NARA, Date 1/14/02



~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 13, 1967  
6:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Mac Bundy summarizes the meeting of November 2 and proposes, in the end, that we search for a pattern of "some feasible de-escalation based on success and not failure."

I have tried to mark the critical passages in this interesting piece of paper.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 12-10-91

THE FORD FOUNDATION  
477 MADISON AVENUE  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022

36a

McGEORGE BUNDY  
PRESIDENT

November 10, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Here at last is the commentary on the November 2 meeting you asked for from me. It is much longer than I wish it were, and I apologize. It also moves out to some uncharted ground, but that is less my fault than the fault of Taylor and Lodge for having raised a couple of thought-provoking questions during the meeting.

With affectionate respect,

*McG*

McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

SECRET

November 10, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: A commentary on the Vietnam discussion of November 2

I think your instruction to me was to give a brief summary of that discussion, and I also think you were incautious enough to ask for my comments, so the following memo treats each of the five questions you put to the meeting, first by reporting what consensus there was in the answers, and second by offering my own resulting comments. One of the reasons for my delay in reporting in is that I found the discussion enormously interesting and have found my own mind stretched to some new thoughts as a result.

I have somewhat rearranged the order of your initial questions because I think there is a certain logic in taking the most clear-cut answers first.

1. Should we pull out?

The answer to this was a strong and unanimous negative.<sup>7</sup> No one present would quit without a satisfactory settlement. There may well be important latent differences about the kind of settlement that would be acceptable. I suspect that George Ball would be inclined to settle for a deal which might eventually turn sour in the South. I think the rest of us would wish to stay there until there is a viable non-Communist South Vietnam. This difference is not currently critical.

2. What should we do about negotiations?

The general view is that there is no immediate prospect of serious negotiations. Mr. Acheson opened the meeting with a characteristically firm and categorical assertion that there would be no negotiations -- that there never had been negotiations in any real sense with Communists, and that certainly there would be nothing of this sort before our next Presidential election. Most of those present agreed. The principal reservations came from Harriman and Rostow. Harriman continues to believe that the best road to peace lies through Communist capitals (and that he is the right man to travel that road). Harriman does not think that European Communists are watching our election date. Rostow believes that the Communist interest in reducing our presence, and the Communist need at some point for protection of their losers in the South, may lead to real negotiations.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 762 84-39  
By sp/ics, NARA, Date 12-10-91

My own comment is that while Acheson has much the better of the argument, we can probably have our cake and eat it on this one. I see no harm in careful exploration by Harriman, and we can certainly be ready for the kind of real talks which Rostow envisages when and if the time comes. What I think we should not do is to act as if we ourselves believed there was much chance of real negotiations in the early future. We have been ready for them; we are ready for them; we keep checking to see if they are possible; but the Communists do not want them.

I think there could well be a careful statement about the poor prospect for early negotiations, but I wonder whether it should come from the Government. I think the Secretary of State would not be persuasive with doves and moderates on this matter, because they have chosen to believe that he never wanted the negotiations in the first place. The one person in the Government, oddly enough, who might carry conviction with the academic community on this point is Brzezinski in the Policy and Planning Staff. There would also be some appeal in a careful analysis by Katzenbach. Still another alternative would be to get the point made by wise men outside the Government and then refer to their comments. My brother Bill would know which academic men have the most standing on this point. Whoever does it, the point to be made is not that we don't want negotiations, but that we don't expect them from the Communists now, and that even if talks do become possible, we must expect Communist negotiators to act like Communist negotiators.

### 3. What should we do about the bombing in North Vietnam?

There was broad agreement that the bombing of the North should be continued unless we get a real quid pro quo on the ground. All of those who spoke except George Ball believe that the bombing is an important part of our whole campaign. All who touched the subject felt that bombing should be restricted to military targets. Several spoke clearly against mining of Haiphong or bombing the irrigation dikes; a few also indicated a desire to reduce the level of the bombing somewhat. Nobody explicitly advocated mining or attack on the dikes -- although Mr. Murphy said he would follow the Joint Chiefs of Staff on such matters. Several speakers associated themselves with Secretary McNamara's argument before the Stennis Committee, but several others said that the bombing has important values above and beyond its admittedly limited effect upon what can be moved from North to South.

My estimate of the consensus is that there would be general support for a possibility you outlined at the end of the meeting -- namely that when the currently approved targets have been struck, you should clearly rule out any proposal for major widening of the bombing in the North, and should ask the Chiefs to plan a redeployment of air power against targets which would not constitute "escalation" -- with due allowance for necessary restrikes.



If you should decide to move in this direction, I believe it would be highly desirable for you and the two Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs to come to a solid internal understanding on this whole question which would apply to the next fifteen months. There is no doubt that the public airing of differences between McNamara and the top brass has created some confusion, especially when followed by air operations which seemed inconsistent with one or another of the McNamara arguments. And on their side, the top brass have given the impression that they could have done things much better if they had been allowed to do them their own way. This pulling and hauling has been natural, and to some degree inevitable, but the discussion of November 2 suggests that we may be reaching a point where you can find a solid position from which to put a stop to it. You have great assets in such an effort, and you have not yet drawn much on your account of straight loyalty from your top military men. My impression is that they still feel cut off from you and somehow think that they really do not get your ear as much as they should. (Naturally it never occurs to them that their real trouble may be simply that they have not got a very good case, and that you may find them as tiresome as any other powerful but narrow-minded pressure group.)

I believe that if you reach a basic command judgment which clearly defines the future of the bombing in the North, you can put a stop to the sort of thing that has happened in the last few months. I share what I think is a majority view of the outsiders that such a clear delimitation would be of real political value with moderates at home and with worried friends abroad. It would help to stop the foolish and false talk about a collision course with China, and it would help to meet the need for a real focusing of the attention of all toward the South, which remains the real battlefield. Such an internal decision would also require -- and permit -- a gradual reframing of the position of the Secretary of Defense himself. Bob McNamara has tended to focus his attention very sharply upon the single issue of the relation between the bombing in the North and supply and reinforcement in the South. While I tend to agree with him on this emphasis, I do not think it was the emphasis of the majority of those who spoke on November 2, nor do I think it the strongest position for you, all things considered, in the next fifteen months. I therefore believe that Bob should be asked to join in a rationale for the bombing which is a little wider than what he has been using in his wholly understandable argumentation before the Stennis Committee. This is not a matter of a drastic change in his position, but simply a question of reframing it so as to give more emphasis to the element of increased military cost which is a legitimate purpose of bombing.

If I may add one individual comment which does not come out of the discussion of November 2, I would also be inclined to press the Chiefs hard on the question of civilian casualties (both North and South). No matter how often they are pressed on the point, airmen just do not give the kind of attention to this issue that any civilian would wish if he were watching the matter himself. (I first learned this lesson from Colonel Stimson when he was telling me how he was hornswooggled by Hap Arnold on just this point.)

One question which was only briefly argued is whether there should or should not be a pause. Nobody proposed an unconditional pause, but there were several who did urge one form or another of bombing suspension aimed at a possible response by action, and not words alone, from the North. Mr. Acheson thought it would be good if we could trade the bombing for the end of attacks across the DMZ, and one or two others agreed. General Taylor thought this a bad swap and would prefer to trade the bombing of the North against incidents in the South. Still others appeared not to believe that any pause would be productive.

This subject is an obvious candidate for further study. My own belief is that problems of weather and timing make it very difficult to give clear-cut signals that would relate any pauses in the bombing to specific military actions by the enemy. I just don't think we are likely to be that smooth and sophisticated, in the light of the legitimate pressures for continuous use of air power on the lines of communication from the North. I think the case to beat is the case for not having any pause at all (except for short holidays). I think that if such a position is reached within the Government, it should be very carefully expounded, either by the President himself or by Under Secretary Katzenbach. Such a speech should be cleared at the top, whoever gives it, and it might well be an occasion also for such public redefinition of our bombing policy as may become possible after the currently listed targets have been struck.

#### 4. What more can we do in the South?

Few of the speakers were really knowledgeable about events in the South and it is not surprising that most of them refrained from specific suggestions. If there was a general refrain, it was aimed at the need to increase both the reality and the appearance of Vietnamese activity all along the line.

The one area on which I would offer special comment is the one touched on by both Lodge and Taylor. They were the two men with most direct experience in Vietnam, and I found it interesting and troubling that both of them raised important questions about the military tactics now being followed. General Taylor was worried about the fixed positions on the DMZ and in the highlands. Ambassador Lodge questioned the wisdom of large-scale search and destroy operations such as those planned for the Delta. Lodge and I raised the question whether casualties must be expected to continue at their present level and even increase. This specific question was related to the general comment of several others that the prospect of endless inconclusive fighting is the most serious single cause of domestic disquiet about the war.

The discussion permits no conclusion on these questions but it does suggest the importance of a careful review at the highest military and civilian levels. It is obviously a highly sensitive matter to question the tactical judgment of the commander in the field. But it is equally obvious that you have every reason to satisfy yourself about questions of the importance of those raised by Lodge and Taylor.

If the battles near the borders are not wise, or if search and destroy operations in heavily populated areas are likely to be politically destructive, then the plans of the field commander must be seriously questioned. I see no alternative here but to have a very carefully prepared discussion with General Westmoreland, preferably after a good hard look on the spot by junior officers who might be chosen specifically for their acceptability in Saigon.

I should emphasize that what I am suggesting here is something that really has not been done in this war so far, to the best of my knowledge. For extremely good reasons the top men in Washington have kept their hands off the tactical conduct of the war, and most discussions have been directed rather to questions of force levels in the South and bombing limits in the North. (Even in Saigon the successive Ambassadors have been careful to keep out of military matters.) But now that the principal battleground is in domestic opinion, I believe the Commander-in-Chief has both the right and the duty to go further. I don't think anyone can predict the result of such an inquiry, but neither do I see how you can be asked to deal with the home front until you are satisfied that the plan of action in Vietnam -- North and South -- is the one you want.

One obvious difficulty which stands in the way of this kind of policy-making is the risk that there will be leaks of one sort or another which would lead to charges that the whole thing is politically inspired, and governed by election-year thinking. Certainly there would be such leaks and such criticism, but strong answers are available. In the first place, it is entirely legitimate to seek to define and then to explain the policy in terms that will be persuasive at home. But even more persuasive is the fact that clarity of definition is at least as much needed for success in Vietnam as for strengthening public opinion at home. If our present tactics are right from this point of view, all they need is persuasive exposition (which they have not had: how many of us could explain what Westy's strategy really is?). If they need adjustment, to avoid the costs of escalation in the North, and to minimize the danger of political disaffection in the South, then the adjustments are needed on their own merits, and not simply from the point of view of U.S. public opinion.

What I think I am recommending is simply that the Commander-in-Chief should visibly take command of a contest that is more political in its character than any in our history except the Civil War (where Lincoln interfered much more than you have). I think the visible exercise of his authority is not only best for the war but also best for public opinion -- and also best for the internal confidence of the Government. Briefings which cite the latest statistics have lost their power to persuade. So have spectacular summits. These things are not worth one-quarter of what would be gained by the gradual emergence of the fact that the President

himself -- in his capacity as political leader and Commander-in-Chief -- is shaping a campaign which is gradually increasing in its success and gradually decreasing in its cost in American lives and money.

Obviously it would be wrong to prejudge the policy which would emerge from the kind of review I am recommending. But my own hunch is that there may be a really good chance of reaching an agreed program, among civilians and military men alike, which would have these general characteristics:

(1) It could be less expensive in lives by involving fewer exposures to ambush and also by adopting the best tactics of the most successful local commanders.

(2) It could be much less expensive in money. (There just has to be an end of the cost of build-up at some point, and we ought not to let anyone believe that the dollar in Vietnam doesn't matter. It matters like Hell to our ability to stay the course.)

(3) It could be more effective politically in South Vietnam: all evidence of care and control and patient endurance will help on this front.

(4) It could enlarge the real and visible role of the South Vietnamese. There is a good deal of reason for driving home our insistence on their help even by just not doing things they won't join in.

(5) It could still keep plenty of pressure on the Communists.

(6) It could make it plain that we are over the hump. (In a funny, reverse-English way, it occurs to me that such a change of gears could have the same effect in Vietnam as the shift from Walker to Ridgway had in Korea.)

(7) It could establish a pattern of gradually decreasing cost that would be endurable for the five or ten years that I think are predicted by most of the wisest officials in Vietnam. If one thing is more clear than another, it is that we simply are not going to go on at the present rate for that length of time, and since I think the Communists have proved more stubborn than we expected at every stage, I think that sooner or later we are going to have to find a way of doing this job that is endurable in cost for a long pull.

I do have to admit that I can't prove that the time has come to make this shift. But the sooner that time comes -- the less we engage in overkill -- the better for all concerned. And the sooner it is possible to develop this kind of program, the better it will be, in straight foreign policy terms. It would also, quite obviously, be helpful on the hardest question of all:



5. What can be done to pull the home front together?

On this point the advice of last week's group was very mixed. Some seemed to feel that the best course was to march straight ahead without fretting over criticism. While others shared the view that the Administration should not seem to be worried about its critics, they did not seem to feel that nothing ought to be done. A variety of proposals were put forward -- to develop friendly television programs, to organize committees of speech-makers, to bring in the responsible top educators, to reach past the Congress to the people, to promote visits by Bunker or Thieu, and to publicize such favorable assessments as George Carver's (my own reading of Carver's report was somewhat less optimistic, given the necessary discount for a staff officer reporting to superiors who want to hear good news).

My own view of all this is that the advice to keep calm is excellent and that most of the rest is of marginal value -- although I do believe in the value of visible support by those of us not in the Administration. I think we have tried too hard to convert public opinion by statistics and by spectacular visits of all sorts. I do have to say also that I think public discontent with the war is now wide and deep. One of the few things that helps us right now is public distaste for the violent doves -- but I think people really are getting fed up with the endlessness of the fighting.

What really hurts, then, is not the arguments of the doves but the cost of the war in lives and money, coupled with the lack of light at the end of the tunnel. So I think changes in what actually happens in Vietnam are the only effective way of changing public attitudes at home, and I would come back to the notions put forward in the previous section of this memorandum as being the best I can offer on the home front as well. I can add only that if such a redirection of strategy and emphasis should occur, then I also think it would be highly important for us to explain -- really for the first time -- that this war has had a number of phases which are sharply different from each other (our tendency in the past has been to downplay the significance of moves from one phase to the next, but if we can get to a turn-down of overall costs, I think we should candidly review the whole set of major decisions which have moved us up the hill and over the crest).

I apologize deeply for the length of this memo and for the degree to which it really goes beyond the actual discussion of last week. I still hold with all the things I said then and in earlier memoranda about not pausing, not negotiating, and not escalating. I now go on to say that I think some visible de-escalation, based on success and not failure, is the most promising path I can see. I can't prove this path exists, but I think we should search for it.

Ind:10

McG. B.

ACTION~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/BUTTERCUP~~*Free file*

Monday, November 13, 1967  
5:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Your clearance is requested on the attached cable now proposed by Sec. Rusk and Amb. Bunker to set the next stage of BUTTERCUP in motion.

In essence:

- it accepts the limited proposal on prisoners now to be released;
- it indicates in a single sentence (marked) our interest in subsequent political discussions.

The main reference cable is attached.

W. W. Rostow

OK \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-477  
By mg, NARA, Date 6-28-95

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rla

37a~~SECRET~~

Amembassy SAIGON

STATE

NODIS-BUTTERCUP

Ref: a: Saigon 576  
b: CAS Saigon 4407

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-478  
By lip, NARA, Date 4-3-96

1. We approve proposed response in para 1 of ref a but suggest that in para 1 sub para b, 1st sentence, the portion reading "cadres who were detained as a result of the August 1967 arrest" be changed to read: "cadres known to us to have been detained in connection with the August 1967 arrest".
2. We believe that this message should contain only brief reference to broader political subjects and should be cleared with the GVN and dispatched as rapidly as feasible. Therefore we suggest that following sentence be added as new sub-para<sup>1</sup> e to proposed response set forth in para ~~1A~~<sup>1</sup> of ref a: "We are hopeful that successful prisoner exchanges would provide the appropriate background for discussion of the broader political subjects raised in your message of October 19."

S/AH;Davidson:jmj 11/13/ 7541

Amb Bunker

EA - Mr. Bundy

The Secretary  
The Under Secretary  
S/S - Mr. Read

White House -

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy SAIGON

~~SECRET~~

3. We note in ref b para 1f that Sau Ha is undergoing continued interrogation. We assume that he is receiving proper treatment and not being subjected to physical coercion or undue interrogation. Has CAS received sufficient information to evaluate prospects that Sau Ha will be willing to return to NLF?
4. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

END

~~SECRET~~



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FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
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~~SECRET~~ 101106Z VIA CAS CHANNELS

NODIS BUTTERCUP

FM CHARGE D' LOCKE SAIGON 576

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR ROSTOW  
SECSTATE, EXCL USIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER

SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA

DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS

REFS: A. CAS WA SHINGTON 50294  
B. SAIGON 551  
C. CAS WASHINGTON 4 9639

1. OUR PROPOSED RESPONSE TO BUTTERCUP/1 (FIRST PORTION  
PERTAINING TO POWS) FOLLOWS:

"A. WE HAVE TAKEN YOUR MESSAGE, WHICH WAS DELIVERED  
TO US ON OCTOBER 26TH, UNDER MOST CAREFUL AND SERIOUS  
CONSIDERATION. THIS STUDY, ENSUING DISCUSSIONS AND SUB-  
SEQUENT DECISIONS WERE MADE JOINTLY BY SENIOR LEVELS OF  
BOTH INTERESTED PARTIES ON OUR SIDE.

B. WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO COMPLY WITH YOUR REQUEST:  
YOUR ORIGINAL EMISSARY HAS BEEN SET FREE AND RETURNED TO YOU  
ALONG WITH THE BEARER OF THIS MESSAGE WHO WAS EARLIER SET  
FREE; CADRES WHO WERE DETAINED AS A RESULT OF THE AUGUST 1967  
ARREST OF YOUR EMISSARY HAVE ALL BEEN RELEASED AND INFORMED  
THAT THEY MAY REMAIN FREE IF THEY DO NOT ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES  
JUDGED DETRIMENTAL TO THE GOVERNMENT; THE CADRES LISTED BY  
YOU IN YOUR OCTOBER MESSAGE ARE BEING GIVEN GOOD TREATMENT,  
INCLUDING MEDICAL CARE. HAVING INDEPENDENTLY RELEASED SOME  
OF YOUR PEOPLE WE SUGGEST A RECIPROCAL GESTURE BY YOU WOULD  
BE IN ORDER.

C. WE BELIEVE THAT FOLLOWING THESE ACTIONS ON OUR  
PART THE TIME IS PROPITIOUS FOR EXPEDITIOUSLY MOVING FORWARD  
ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR AND OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN, THE RELEASE  
OF PRISONERS. IN THIS REGARD WE BELIEVE THAT THE RADIO  
CHANNEL ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO YOU, IN OUR FIRST LETTER,  
PROMISES BOTH SPEED, SECURITY AND SAFETY; WE SENT YOU OUR  
FIRST MESSAGE ON THIS CHANNEL ON NOVEMBER 5TH AND NOVEMBER  
8TH BUT FAILED TO RECEIVE ANY RESPONSE FROM YOU.

D. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED  
BY YOU IN BOTH YOUR FIRST AND SECOND MESSAGES REPRESENT  
PERSONS THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO SEE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST  
RECIPROCAL RELEASE OF PRISONERS. ON OUR SIDE WE WOULD WANT  
YOU TO RELEASE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY  
THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN WOUNDED OR WHO ARE IN POOR HEALTH. UPON  
RECEIPT OF A MESSAGE FROM YOU THAT YOU ARE UNDERTAKING THE  
RELEASE OF PRISONERS WE WILL PROMPTLY RECIPROCATE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-478

By ij, NARA, Date 4-3-96

*Identified*

THAT THEY MAY REMAIN FREE IF THEY DO NOT ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES JUDGED DETRIMENTAL TO THE GOVERNMENT; THE CADRES LISTED BY YOU IN YOUR OCTOBER MESSAGE ARE BEING GIVEN GOOD TREATMENT, INCLUDING MEDICAL CARE. HAVING INDEPENDENTLY RELEASED SOME OF YOUR PEOPLE WE SUGGEST A RECIPROCAL GESTURE BY YOU WOULD BE IN ORDER.

C. WE BELIEVE THAT FOLLOWING THESE ACTIONS ON OUR PART THE TIME IS PROPITIOUS FOR EXPEDITIOUSLY MOVING FORWARD ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR AND OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN, THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS. IN THIS REGARD WE BELIEVE THAT THE RADIO CHANNEL ORIGINALLY PROPOSED TO YOU, IN OUR FIRST LETTER, PROMISES BOTH SPEED, SECURITY AND SAFETY; WE SENT YOU OUR FIRST MESSAGE ON THIS CHANNEL ON NOVEMBER 5TH AND NOVEMBER 8TH BUT FAILED TO RECEIVE ANY RESPONSE FROM YOU.

D. WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED BY YOU IN BOTH YOUR FIRST AND SECOND MESSAGES REPRESENT PERSONS THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO SEE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST RECIPROCAL RELEASE OF PRISONERS. ON OUR SIDE WE WOULD WANT YOU TO RELEASE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN WOUNDED OR WHO ARE IN POOR HEALTH. UPON RECEIPT OF A MESSAGE FROM YOU THAT YOU ARE UNDERTAKING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS WE WILL PROMPTLY RECIPROCATATE. IN THIS RESPECT WE WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING FROM YOU IN ADVANCE WHERE THOSE PRISONERS TO BE RELEASED BY YOU WILL BE DELIVERED SO THAT WE MAY MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEM, ESPECIALLY THE SICK AND WOUNDED, TO BE PICKED UP BY HELICOPTER AND MEDICAL STAFF."

2. PLEASE NOTE THAT IN PARA A ABOVE, WE REFER TO "BOTH INTERESTED PARTIES" RATHER THAN NAME U.S. AND GVN. THIS INTENTIONAL IN VIEW OUR FEELING WE WOULD WANT PLAUSIBLE DISCLAIMER IF LETTER SURFACED OR FELL INTO WRONG HANDS.

3. PARA B COVERS COMPLIANCE WITH BUTTERCUP/1'S REQUIREMENTS WITH LAST SENTENCE ADDED RE RELEASE TO "SHOW GOOD FAITH" BUT RESTATED TO CALL IT "RECIPROCAL GESTURE." WILL INSERT NAMES OF "CADRES" RELEASED IN ABOVE INGOING MESSAGE ONCE HAVE ESTABLISHED PRECISELY HOW MANY INVOLVED AND EXACT NAMES. GENERAL LOAN'S OFFICE HAS THUS FAR NAMED A TOTAL OF ONLY THREE PRISONERS ARRESTED DIRECTLY AS RESULT OF INTERROGATION OF SAU HA. ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THERE WERE SEVEN OR EIGHT IN THIS CATEGORY, WE WERE TOLD SUBSEQUENTLY AFTER VIETNAMESE HAD ACTUALLY STUDIED THE DOSSIERS INVOLVED MORE PRECISELY, THAT THERE WERE ONLY THREE. WE ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO CLARIFY THIS DISCREPANCY.

4. HOPEFULLY, BUTTERCUP/1 WILL COME UP ON OUR RADIO LINK PER OUR REQUEST OR HE WILL SEND MESSAGE TO US THROUGH BUTTERCUP/2 RE PLACE WE CAN MEET TO PICK UP POWS RELEASED TO US.

5. AS SOON AS FIRST PORTION PERTAINING TO POWS IS APPROVED, WILL OBTAIN APPROVAL OF THIEU AND LOAN. DISPATCH OF THIS PORTION COULD THEN BE UNDERTAKEN IN ACCORDANCE PARA 8 OF REF C, LEAVING DISCUSSION OF BROADER POLITICAL ASPECTS WITH THIEU UNTIL YOUR VIEWS ARE FORMULATED. IF MESSAGES ARE SO SPLIT, REFERENCE TO A LATER MESSAGE ON THESE ASPECTS SHOULD BE ADDED AT THE END OF THE ABOVE RESPONSE. SINCE THIEU HAS RESERVED TO HIMSELF THE HANDLING OF THE "POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THIS MATTER", COMMENTS ON "BROADER ASPECTS" WILL NOT BE SHOWN TO LOAN UNLESS WE REQUESTED DO SO BY THIEU.

CP-1

756

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 13, 1967  
5:00 p.m.

*Profile*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk confirms the present state of agreement on communique language on the Ryukyus.

I shall be checking with State on precisely what it is that we shall be wanting to get from Sato and what the scenario is for nailing it down firmly.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-357  
By ing, NARA, Date 5-22-95

WWRostow:rln



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

4323  
38a

November 13, 1967

SECRET - EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Communique Language on the Ryukyus with Sato

As Walt Rostow can inform you in detail, we received over the weekend a new formula, delivered to Mr. Rostow on Sato's behalf by a Japanese named Kei Wakaizumi. This formula has not come to us through Japanese Foreign Office channels, but we believe that it may well represent Sato's ultimate view.

Wakaizumi had a letter from Sato, and conveyed an oral message that Sato would wish to discuss the matter directly and personally with you.

I set forth in the attached Tab A the Wakaizumi language, which Secretary McNamara and I believe would be acceptable with the underscored addition, which General Wheeler has suggested and on the basis of which General Wheeler too would be agreeable.

The point of this new formula is to satisfy the Japanese desire to show some sense of time, but to do so through a two-stage process that would involve a decision in principle "within the next few years" with the actual date to come some time after. Sato apparently envisages that the decision in principle might come before June 1970, but the actual date of reversion might be 1975 or later. As Secretary McNamara and I see it, this is politically realistic in Japanese terms, and at the same time avoids any present commitment.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-478  
By CL, NARA, Date 2-22-95



~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

-2-

We recommend that you hold this language in reserve for use during your private conversation with Sato. Ambassador Johnson is mentioning to Sato today that we are aware of this formula, but is of course taking no position at this time. If he should bring any additional news from the Japanese side, we will let you know promptly.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Encl:

Tab A - Proposed communique  
language

~~SECRET-EXDIS~~

38b

A

~~SECRET~~

*Pres. file*

Monday, November 13, 1967  
3:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk reports on  
Congressional consultations concerning  
the Bonins and Ryukyus.

As you know, the language on the  
Ryukyus is still under negotiation.

W. W. Rostow

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WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By pg, NARA, Date 11/21/91

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

39a  
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~~SECRET~~

November 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Congressional Consultations and Negotiating  
Status Concerning the Ryukyus and the  
Bonins

This memorandum summarizes the reactions we have had  
in the Congress, and the resulting status as Sato arrives  
Monday night.

Congressional Consultations

I have personally checked with Senator Mansfield and  
Congressman Ford. Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Warnke of  
DOD have seen Senator Dirksen, Senators Russell and Smith,  
Congressmen Rivers, Bates, and Price, and Congressmen Mahon  
and Lipscomb. Mr. Bundy has talked fully with the Speaker,  
Mr. Albert, Senator Fulbright and Senator Hickenlooper,  
and Congressmen Morgan (through staff), Zablocki, Mrs.  
Bolton, and Adair.

These consultations have gone very smoothly indeed.  
Reactions for the most part have been clear approval of  
the proposed course, involving no change for the present  
in the Ryukyus but a decision to proceed with consultations  
for the reversion of the Bonins, subject to our reserving  
appropriate military and naval facilities including some  
special arrangements to deal with our national feeling about  
Iwo Jima. No dissent has been expressed by any of those  
consulted, and the only note of reservation was that of

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;  
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-478  
By CL, NARA, Date 2-22-95



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- 2 -

Senator Hickenlooper, who told us last Wednesday that he had not given the matter extensive thought and would let us know if he developed any significant problem; he has not done so.

For good measure, and on the advice of those consulted, we expect to complete consultation today with Senator Lausche, Congressman Teague, and Senators Hayden and Young. DOD will be also notifying key leaders of the major veterans' organizations on Wednesday.

In short, unless some hitch should develop today -- in which case I will notify you at once -- it seems clear that the proposed course has entirely satisfactory Congressional understanding and support.

#### Further Negotiations with the Japanese

As you know, we appear to have ironed out with the Japanese virtually all the necessary wording on the communique, and I enclose a copy of the current draft of the relevant paragraph 7 dealing with the Ryukyus and Bonins.

One significant issue -- noted in the enclosed draft -- does remain. The Japanese wish to refer to reversion of the Ryukyus taking place "at the earliest possible date." I have told Ambassador Johnson to tell Sato, as he comes here from Seattle Monday, that this phrase poses major difficulties for us, since it suggests more immediate action than we are now prepared to undertake. I have instructed Ambassador Johnson to urge Sato to develop some alternative phrasing. He will be reporting where the matter stands on his arrival Monday night, and it may go over to your talks with Sato, as what we hope will be the only remaining difficult problem on the communique.

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- 3 -

All other elements in the enclosed draft are satisfactory to me and to Secretary McNamara, and the specific language on the Bonins has been checked by Ambassador Johnson personally with General Wheeler.

Apart from the Ryukyus and Bonins, the draft of the communique is in my judgment as strong as we could possibly expect on additional Japanese efforts for economic assistance and in support of regional cooperation. It also appears to me to be as forthcoming as we could wish on Vietnam and the Chinese Communist threat. The Japanese have agreed to form a special subcommittee to consider both short and longer-range balance of payments assistance to both countries. Treasury is also negotiating for immediate benefits to our balance of payments through Japanese actions in 1968, primarily on capital account, amounting to about \$300 million. There are reasonable prospects that Sato will agree in principle to such actions and the consideration of additional benefits up to \$500 million in 1968, leaving the technicalities for Treasury negotiation, despite Japan's prospective overall balance of payments deficit of around \$400 million for 1967.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Draft Paragraph 7 of the Communique

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396

## VII

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized to the President the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the reversion of these islands, and expressed his belief that an adequate solution should promptly be sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the Governments and people of the two countries. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands. At the same time, the President and the Prime Minister recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in East Asia.

Accordingly, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two governments should keep under joint review the status of the Ryukyu Islands,

### U.S. Version

in the light of the desire of the Japanese people for reversion and of the mutual interest of both countries in maintaining and strengthening the security of the Far East region.

### Japanese Version

guided by the aim of returning the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan at the earliest possible date.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-477

By ing, NARA, Date 6-28-95

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The President and the Prime Minister further agreed that, with a view toward minimizing the stresses which will arise at such time as administrative rights are restored to Japan, measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyuan residents. To this end, they agreed to establish in Naha an Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands. The Governments of Japan and the United States of America and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands will each provide a representative and appropriate staff to the Committee. The Committee will be expected to develop recommendations which should lead to substantial movement toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyu Islands and Japan. The United States-Japan Consultative Committee in Tokyo will be kept informed by the High Commissioner of the progress of the work of the Advisory Committee. It was also agreed that the functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and the United States Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

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The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the status of the Bonin Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within the arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between

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the two countries but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

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INFORMATION*Pres file*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am now informed by Paul Nitze that the JCS and Sec. McNamara would accept the following formula on the Ryukyus. From a conversation earlier in the day, I am sure Sec. Rusk would also accept. The underlined words are the addition to the Wakaizumi formula, urged by the Pentagon:

"As a result of their discussion, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the two governments, guided by the aim of returning the administrative right over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan should hold consultations through diplomatic channels on the status of these islands with a view to reaching, within a few years, an agreement, consistent with the national interests of both countries, on a date satisfactory to the two governments for the reversion of these islands."

Sec. Rusk believes the formula is good because:

- It would satisfy Sato's political requirements;
- It would give us great leverage in other matters, notably balance of payments assistance and aid; and
- We shall have to make, in any case, a radical shift in the position of the Ryukyus during the 1970's.

Before making a final decision, we should hear the result of Alex Johnson's discussions with Sato this afternoon on the plane from Seattle.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-349  
By *lip*, NARA Date 3-14-96

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

41

ACTION

*Per file*

Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 1:35 p.m.

Mr. President:

Charles Maguire asked if you wanted Gen. Westmoreland to come to the Cabinet meeting at noon on Wednesday, November 15.

Gen. Westmoreland gets in at 10:45 a.m. on Wednesday. I am sure he would rally round if we told him in advance to come from the plane for a noon Cabinet meeting; but he may be a bit tired after the trip.

W. W. Rostow

Schedule Westmoreland for Cabinet meeting\_\_\_\_\_

No\_\_\_\_\_

See me\_\_\_\_\_

cc: Mr. Maguire

WWRostow:rlh



INFORMATION

42

Monday, Nov. 13, 1967  
1:05 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith Department of Defense answers  
to Drew Pearson's allegations.

W. W. R.

Attachment

43

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-456  
By cb, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Meeting with Amb. Bunker at 11:00 a.m. today.

You need no help from us on this meeting. But you may wish to cover these points.

1. Thank him for the election, which you gave him as his first primary task. Remind him of the other two points: take care of his health and get the people he wants.

2. Acceleration in the South. At your instruction I told Amb. Bunker to be prepared to answer the question: What four or five programs would most accelerate progress in the south in the months ahead? The consensus reached in Nick Katzenbach's Vietnam Committee (attached Tab A) is:

- Anti-corruption effort.
- ARVN performance.
- Anti-infrastructure efforts.
- Building political institutions.
- Economic stability.
- Efforts to get GVN into contact with VC.

You may wish to hear him out and raise these issues with him?

3. BUTTERCUP. You may wish to ask his assessment of this contact. (We should get out a message of guidance on BUTTERCUP today. We have been holding up awaiting Ellsworth's return.

4. Bunker's schedule: Congressional, press, and TV contacts.

You may wish to go over the schedule (Tab B) emphasizing the points it would be most helpful for him to underline; for example --

- the growing desire and will of the South Vietnamese to take a larger hand in their own destiny;
- the improvement of the ARVN;
- evidence of progress in population control, pacification, etc.
- plans and prospects for the new government.

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5. In particular, you may wish to decide what line to take with the press, if you have a joint session with the White House press corps at the end of the meeting -- which George Christian says is now planned.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

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43a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1967

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-478

By lig, NARA, Date 4-3-96

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Highest Priority Areas in Viet-Nam

Our group (Paul Nitze, Bus Wheeler, Walt Rostow, Dick Helms, Averell Harriman, Paul Warnke, Phil Habib, Bill Bundy and myself) addressed the question of what areas should receive the maximum attention and effort by the US in the next year in Viet-Nam.

The list we came up with, without dissent, concentrated on six main themes. They are chosen as themes with a potential short-term payoff, either here or in Viet-Nam. While we make an extra push on them, we should continue our normal efforts, although I have a growing suspicion that we could make some cutbacks in some of our programs without damaging our over-all effort; this can only be done, however, with Ellsworth's full backing and participation.

Our list is quite similar to the present Mission priorities, so I think you will find Ellsworth in basic agreement with us.

These are the items:

1. Anti-corruption effort--There was unanimous agreement that a visible and credible anti-corruption effort would help a great deal in improving the Administration's position, and in building a more effective GVN. (Bus Wheeler was particularly strong on this point.) Current efforts are still highly ambiguous; the quick trial and death sentence of one unfortunate ~~NAME~~ VIETNAM is not the kind of sustained, serious

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-2-

campaign that is essential.

2. ARVN performance--Everything that can be done must be done to make the Vietnamese Army assume a greater portion of the war burden--visibly. While I do not think that we will be able to reduce the US troop role in the next year, we should be able to get more out of the ARVN, and we should have a better press policy to show that this is happening.

3. Anti-infrastructure efforts--This is probably the quickest payoff item around; while the CIA is going all out now on this effort, I think we can and should demand more from the GVN.

4. Building Political Institutions--We all agree that that is important, but unlike Walt Rostow, I tend to doubt that we can anticipate a really dramatic breakthrough on this one in the next year. The Vietnamese are feeling their way slowly in a world that is quite new to them, and while they learn--and write--the new rule book, they are not going to build great national parties. Any effort that Thieu made in that direction, as Ellsworth quoted Thieu as saying, would turn out to be a new version of the old secret parties which were so hated in Viet-Nam.

5. Economic Stability--I wish we didn't have to put this item on our list, but after analyzing the economic situation we are anticipating a probable inflation of about 40%. At the very best we could reduce it to about 25%, but if things get out of hand there could be as much as a 75% increase.

The projected inflation of 40%--which is about what we are experiencing in 1967--would not only wipe out the effects of any GVN wage increase that is granted, but it would also get the new government off on the wrong foot,

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
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and would make any serious anti-corruption campaign that much tougher. Incidentally, if there is a 50% inflation next year, plus a GVN wage increase, the real income of GVN officials and soldiers will be about half of the 1964 level--which itself was inadequate.

6. Efforts to get the GVN into contact with the VC-- On this point, only Ellsworth can really make a dent. We can't push the GVN too hard, or they will think we are asking them to commit suicide. But we can definitely push them harder than they have been pushed in the past. There is no reason why representatives of the GVN, or of the legislature, could not meet with representatives of the Front. I do not think that such meetings would leave the GVN divided and on the verge of collapse, as some people do. Furthermore, if the GVN made its willingness to entertain such contacts clear its position and image would be far stronger than at present. Finally, it would be a major GVN response to the growing desire of the South Vietnamese people for some end to the war.

The Mission's list is quite similar to our six items. It covered:

1. Mobilization measures.
2. Reorganization of RVNAF.
3. Reorganization of Civilian Administration.
4. Vital Pacification Measures in addition to above.
  - a. Attack on VC infrastructure.
  - b. Expanded detention centers and related judicial measures.
5. Attack on Corruption at all levels.
6. Economic stabilization measures.
7. Peace to include willingness to seek peaceful settlement, seek out members of NLF and move towards reintegration through national reconciliation.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Program of Consultation  
for Ambassador Bunker

Ambassador Bunker arrives the morning of November 10, a holiday, and will be here for a week or 10 days on consultation. I enclose a proposed program of consultation and other activities for the Ambassador, beginning November 13. On receiving White House approval, the Department will proceed to arrange specific engagements.

Regarding the substance of Ambassador Bunker's discussions here, we suggest the following major topics:

1. Progress in the war and prospects for 1968;
2. Development of effective Vietnamese political institutions and of effective government;
3. Ways to accommodate Vietnamese sensitivities regarding the United States presence and Vietnamese sovereignty;
4. Peace initiatives;
5. United States public's assessment of the war.

*John P. Walsh*  
Benjamin H. Read  
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed program

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DECLASSIFIED  
Authority REG 85-69  
By 25/10/91 NARA, Date 12-10-91



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Proposed Program of Consultation  
for Ambassador Bunker  
November 13-18

Monday, November 13

Morning

The President  
Public appearance with the President at White House

Afternoon

The Secretary of State  
The Vice President

Tuesday, November 14

Morning

Today's Show (Washington)  
The Secretary of Defense

Afternoon

The Under Secretary, Mr. Katzenbach

Wednesday, November 15

Morning

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Afternoon

Governor Harriman  
Ambassador Lodge

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority 729 85-69  
By 12/17/91, No. 5A, Date 12/30/91



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Thursday, November 16

Morning

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Afternoon

Ambassador Goldberg

Friday, November 17

Morning

Mr. Gaud

Mr. Helms

Mr. Marks

Afternoon

JCS

Saturday, November 18

Morning

The Secretary of State

The President

Evening

Major speech in New York or elsewhere away from  
Washington

Sunday, November 19

Joint TV appearance with General Westmoreland on  
discussion type program

Evening

Departure

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 8:45 a.m.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Re: Bob Anderson

1. After you spoke to me last evening I called Nick Katzenbach. He told me the attached cable had been promptly despatched after you spoke to Sec. Rusk -- definitely closing out the trip to Cairo.

2. Re contingency instructions: He said he took full responsibility for their despatch:

-- the situation in New York justified raising with you again the possibility of Anderson's seeing Nasser;

-- the lack of communications to Bagdad, where Anderson was going from Beirut, made it important that the instructions be available in Beirut, should you have agreed the trip would go forward.

Nick still believes the move was correct.

3. In general, he feels the national interest in doing all that is humanly possible to get a resolution -- and a UN negotiator in the field -- outweigh the common reluctance to use a private contact with Nasser.

W. W. Rostow

State 68086 to Beirut

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-477  
By rip, NARA, Date 6-28-95

WWRostow:rlh

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APPROVED BY: U: MR. KATZENBACH  
S/S: C. BROWN

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-478  
By CL, NARA, Date 2-22-95

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FOR ANDERSON FROM SECRETARY

AFTER THOROUGH REVIEW ALL ASPECTS SITUATION IT HAS BEEN  
DECIDED YOU SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PROCEED TO CAIRO. WISH TO  
SEE YOU WHEN YOU RETURN TO WASHINGTON.  
RUSK

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

SECRET

PRESERVATION COPY

45

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, November 13, 1967 -- 8:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Sato's private emissary puts on paper the proposed Ryukyus formula and the argument for it.

Bill Bundy says the Japanese Embassy people are pressing for a formula less explicit about timing; and Sato may merely be giving Wakaizumi a chance to try this out.

On the other hand, this may represent what Sato feels he really needs and is prepared to pay for.

We may learn something when Alex Johnson flies with Sato during the day from the West coast; or we may only get his view clearly when he talks with you alone tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-349  
By ig, NARA Date 3-14-96

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-357

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By Wig, NARA, Date 5-25-95

Sunday, November 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Prof. Kei Wakaizumi came to my house for dinner last night. He asked for ten minutes privately. He said that, having just gotten off a plane when he last talked to me, he wished to assure that his message was absolutely clear. Therefore, he had written it down, and he read it. That was the only business conducted.

The exact text follows.

"President and Prime Minister agreed that two governments, guided by the aim of the reversion of the Ryukyus to Japan at the earliest possible date, should hold consultations through diplomatic channels on the status of these islands with the view to reach, within a few years, agreement on a date satisfactory to two governments for the reversion of these islands.

"1. Mr. Sato is very grateful to the Johnson administration for the favourable consideration to the early reversion of the Bonins. He is well aware of the difficult problems involved on your side. So, I don't think he has any objections to your reservations with regards to the Bonins' reversion to Japan.

"2. Unfortunately, however, the mounting popular enthusiasm, tremendous political pressures in Japan and needless to say in Okinawa for the early reversion of the administrative rights over the Ryukyus have grown up to such extent that even few Japanese evaluate the return of the Bonins as a great achievement. On the contrary, the great many people now fear that the return of the Bonins might be used as relief in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa, (where almost one million Japanese live).

"3. Under these circumstances, Mr. Sato now strongly feels that he is compelled to get, from President Johnson, some kind of indication of the timing or rather long-range prospects of the Ryukyus' reversion, however vague it may be.

"4. I am certain that at the same time, Mr. Sato understands and fully appreciates how difficult it must be for the President to accommodate Mr. Sato's needs of this nature at this moment. /You gave me the 3 reasons yesterday and they are all reasonable good reasons./

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

"5. Nevertheless, Mr. Sato feels that, after all, as he is coming here to meet President Johnson for the summit conference, he cannot possibly go home without something more specific on the prospects of Okinawa. That's why he carefully devised that formula, to raise to President.

and

"6. Of course, Mr. Sato/ his government as well as his Liberal Democratic Party, and /the majority of Japanese people/ do feel that the maintenance of the effective U. S. military basis (sic) there as long as they are needed and the reversion of the administrative rights to Japan, the both can be made fully compatible. And Mr. Sato is determined to see to that. /USS Enterprise Nov. 2nd./

"7. Based on his firm conviction of this basic principle, Mr. Sato is hoping, under the formula he wishes to propose to President Johnson directly, that an agreement might be reached on the mutually satisfactory date of the reversion before June 1970 (when US-Japan Mutual Security Pact comes to the ten years term: of course we are going to firmly maintain that Pact for many more years to come) (in communique).

"8. From internal political point of view, as the Socialists and left-wingers are trying to make Okinawa the biggest political issue at that time to instigate anti-Pact and anti-American feeling, it is the best policy for us to set the date of the reversion of the Ryukyus by then.

"9. The actual date of the reversion depends upon the three factors you mentioned to me yesterday. So, it may be 1975 or 78 or even 1980, we don't mind as long as we have some prospects of the reversion so that we could say to Ryukyu people as well as Japanese "Wait until 1975, 78, 80, and in the meanwhile we have a lot to do to smooth the way for the actual reversion." Then, I am sure they will patient to wait, and cooperate with Americans to maintain the effective bases there.

"10. By the time of June 1970, (Mr. Sato will be in office until November 1970) I should think we could have much clear idea and prospects of three factors

- a. Vietnam
- b. Communist China
- c. Japan's progress towards its responsibility in the field of security.

"11. Finally, Mr. Sato feels that now President Johnson can alone make such a decision Mr. Sato so badly needs at home. In return, as I told you, he is determined to do everything possible to help the President in spite of certain political price he has to pay at home."

WWRostow:rlh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 13, 1967

46

free file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sterling Crisis

I note you are seeing Joe Fowler at noon today. He may have to give you some background on the sterling crisis on which we may need a decision from you later in the day. We do not yet have all the information to put the issues properly before you.

The British came in Saturday to tell Fowler they were near the end of the line. Without assurance of long-term credit they may have to devalue -- perhaps within a week. Their line of short-term credit is down to \$600 to \$800 million. The announcement of poor trade figures on Tuesday could keep the pound under pressure.

I won't go into the pros and cons of letting the pound go. The main point is the risks for us are just too great to be worth the gamble -- if it can be avoided through a good multilateral support operation. The European Central Bankers seem to be of the same mind.

It may be possible therefore to work out a support package through a large IMF stand-by credit, through a package of bilateral credits and swaps, or through a combination of both. There would be no budgetary or direct balance-of-payments costs for us in any action we might consider, and it would have to be multilateral or not at all.

It is our feeling, and it seems to be that of the Europeans, that this would be the last try at supporting sterling. But it would be well worth it, if it can be pulled off.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-477

By wp, NARA, Date 6-28-95

W. W. Ros tow

~~SECRET~~

ERF:mst



EYES ONLY

November 13, 1967

*Pres file*

Mr. Secretary:

The President asked that I get the following message to you and to Sec. McNamara:

Please inform all your planning people, including your personal secretary, to block out time for the Tuesday luncheon. If you prefer another date, let's get together and agree on that date. Otherwise, keep Tuesday lunch time available.

W. W. Rostow

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State

identical note sent to Sec. McNamara

rlh



*noted*

Monday, November 13, 1967

*for file*SECRET

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Fowler's Memorandum on our Balance of Payments  
Discussion with the Japanese

The attached memorandum and attachment set forth Secretary Fowler's views on how to deal with the Balance of Payments problem in your talks with Prime Minister Sato.

The general approach is covered in the general briefing memo which I have sent. The memorandum from State was re-done to take these views into consideration. The third paragraph reference to more recent information from the Japanese does not now apply.

I thought you would want to see the Secretary's memo for the flavor of his views and for his suggested treatment of specific points covered in the Attachment.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-08377By 25/10, NARA, Date 12-10-91~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20220

~~SECRET~~

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NOV 11 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 95-347

By 410, NARA, Date 2-22-96

Subject: Discussions with Prime Minister Sato

The U.S. has taken an initiative for balance of payments cooperation with Japan which is of major importance to U.S. financial ability to maintain the U.S. military security posture in the Far East. The U.S. has proposed to Japan that certain points be submitted to you and Prime Minister Sato for approval when he visits Washington November 14-15. I believe that it is of major importance to the over-all U.S. balance of payments program that you obtain the Prime Minister's approval of these points. (See Attachment A; Sato will probably state the views shown in parentheses under each point in the attachment.)

You will also have Secretary Rusk's memorandum for the Sato visit which includes balance of payments talking points. We participated in the preparation of this memorandum and are in full agreement with it.

However, after this memorandum was completed on November 9 Japanese Finance Ministry officials provided Treasury officials, in discussions on November 10, with information which overtakes some of the points in the Rusk memorandum to you.

Specifically, Sato will not be able to undertake a commitment now to reach the \$500 million goal of balance of payments assistance insofar as that includes the purchase of special medium-term U.S. paper in the amount of \$200 million. Our supplementary memorandum suggests that, while recognizing that he cannot give you this commitment now, you urge him to keep the matter open for further technical discussion between the two Finance Ministries.

Also, that you emphasize the concept of maintaining the long term financial viability of our security posture in the Far East.

Also, that you do not accept any linkage of Japanese action on our balance of payments in exchange for U.S. action respecting the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands.

These observations are developed briefly below.

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- 2 -

The topic of Japanese reversionary rights to the Bonin and the Ryukyu Islands will also be a major subject during the Sato visit. I anticipate that Sato may say to you that the amount of their balance of payments cooperation depends on how much we satisfy their objectives for control over the Islands.

I recommend that you make clear to Sato that the U.S. does not link the substance of these two matters. Japan is not being asked to cooperate on the over-all U.S. balance of payments program in exchange for some U.S. action respecting the Bonin and the Ryukyu Islands. To the extent possible, I believe each matter should be examined and decided on its own merits.

I recommend that you emphasize to Sato that balance of payments cooperation is particularly important to our financial ability to provide the defense shield under which the Pacific basin can develop. Our military deployments and heavy foreign exchange expenditures in the Pacific area are necessary for our security and Japan's, although we do not view U.S. military forces in Japan as being there primarily for the defense of Japan. These expenditures have brought large direct and indirect benefits to the Japanese economy and balance of payments.

You may wish to emphasize to Sato that no one country should suffer undue costs or gain undue benefits from expenditures for the common security, and that these expenditures should be recognized as an extraordinary item in U.S. accounts. I believe Sato should be led to recognize that neutralizing these extraordinary security expenditures is a prime motivation for the U.S. seeking balance of payments cooperation from Japan -- even though there is agreement that the matter cannot be discussed publicly at this time.

Treasury representatives will be meeting with Japanese officials on Thursday, November 16 (the day after you conclude your sessions with Sato) in order to expedite follow-up action. I hope that arrangements can be made for me to have the benefit of any conclusions you may reach with Sato so that the November 16 meeting can proceed effectively.

*Henry H. Fowler*  
Henry H. Fowler

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

November 11, 1967

Briefing Paper

Balance of Payments Cooperation Between Japan  
and the United States

The U.S. has proposed to Japan the following points for approval by the Prime Minister and the President at their November 14-15 meetings. Discussions on November 10 with an advance party from the Japanese Finance Ministry have revealed that the Japanese have come a long way in trying to achieve the objectives which the U.S. has proposed. The Japanese expressed the views shown in parentheses under the U.S. objectives which follow.

1. Establishment of a subcommittee of the Joint U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, including the Finance and Foreign Ministries, the Treasury and State Departments, the U.S. Defense Department and other agencies as appropriate to reach agreement on specific cooperative actions to deal with the balance of payments needs and goals of each country.

(Japan agrees to establish the subcommittee)

2. Japanese commitment to undertake in CY 1968 new actions to achieve a target of \$500 million in benefit to the U.S. balance of payments relative to 1967 starting with the suggestions in the paper presented by Secretary Fowler to Japanese Finance Minister Mizuta in Washington on September 14, 1967.

(See comment under the related point 3 below.)

3. Japanese commitment to achieve about one-half of the over-all CY 1968 target through investment of a portion of Japan's reserves in medium-term U.S. securities.

(Japan agrees to establish a target but says that its analysis indicates a possible \$300 million target in contrast to the U.S. target of \$500 million. The \$300 million does not include securities purchases which Japan so far says she cannot do. It is recommended that you and Sato agree that within a

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 95-347  
By sig, NARA, Date 2-22-96



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- 2 -

\$300 - \$500 million range specific actions be developed through the subcommittee to achieve the highest possible level on a phased basis. Since Japan has difficulty with purchasing U.S. securities and specifying any amount, it is recommended that you ask Sato to agree to further technical discussions between the Finance Ministry and Treasury which should reveal some possibilities for cooperation in this area also.)

4. Development by the two Governments of specific actions for achieving the remainder of the CY 1968 target.

(Japan is willing to develop specific actions through the subcommittee.)

5. Review by the two Governments of longer term balance of payments matters and possible cooperative actions to meet the longer term needs of each country, including attention to planning toward bilateral and multilateral financial cooperation in the Pacific area.

(Japan agrees to review longer term cooperative actions beyond CY 1968.)

6. Announcement in the communiqué after the Prime Minister-Presidential meetings that the subcommittee has been established.

(Japan agrees to the proposed language for announcing the subcommittee in the communiqué.)

~~SECRET~~

49

*W. W. Rostow*

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Visit of Prime Minister Sato

Japanese Prime Minister Sato (SAH-TOW) will call on you tomorrow (formal arrival at 11:00 a.m.; office call at 11:30 a.m.). A second meeting is scheduled for Wednesday.

Attached memorandum from Secretary Rusk covers the broad issues. The talking-points paper, which we worked out with State, notes the main items the Prime Minister wishes to discuss and suggests the points you may wish to raise with him. Given the range and importance of the items to be considered, the paper is as terse as possible while still covering the ground.

A principal item of business -- the formula for handling the Ryukyus in the communique -- is still being negotiated out. Ambassador Johnson is travelling with the Prime Minister from the West Coast and will be in this evening. I have already given you a memo on my talk with Mr. Wakaizumi.

I will submit a separate memo covering this matter after I have talked with the Ambassador and Secretary Rusk. It will cover the two possible formulas which Sato may raise, and will include the views of our State and Defense people.

It appears that the Prime Minister may wish to discuss this -- and perhaps one or two other items -- in a private way with you. I believe you will wish to arrange the meeting so that you have some private time with him. But Ambassador Johnson believes -- and I agree -- that it would be well for the other leading Japanese (Foreign Minister Miki and Minister Kimura) to hear your discussion with the Prime Minister on the urgent need for additional Japanese economic assistance to Southeast Asia.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NIJ 94-477  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 6-28-95

~~SECRET~~

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*Pres file*

Monday, November 13, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Fowler's Memorandum on our Balance of Payments  
Discussion with the Japanese

The attached memorandum and attachment set forth Secretary Fowler's views on how to deal with the Balance of Payments problem in your talks with Prime Minister Sato.

The general approach is covered in the general briefing memo which I have sent. The memorandum from State was re-done to take these views into consideration. The third paragraph reference to more recent information from the Japanese does not now apply.

I thought you would want to see the Secretary's memo for the flavor of his views and for his suggested treatment of specific points covered in the Attachment.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 77C983-17

By sp/ics, NARA, Date 12-20-91

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20220

~~SECRET~~

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NOV 11 1967

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Discussions with Prime Minister Sato

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 95-347

By 40, NARA, Date 2-22-96

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- 2 -

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*Henry H. Fowler*  
Henry H. Fowler

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November 11, 1967

Briefing PaperBalance of Payments Cooperation Between Japan  
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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 95-347  
By lip, NARA, Date 2-22-96

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(Japan agrees to the proposed language for announcing the subcommittee in the communiqué.)

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 00-114  
By is NARA Date 5-4-00

51  
ACTION

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Monday - November 13, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Peru

At Tab A is a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach recommending approval of talking points for Ambassador Jones on the Mirage F-5 question. The talking points have been approved by DOD (Nitze) and AID (Poats).

Over the weekend three developments in Peru both improve and complicate the prospects for Peruvian acceptance of our F-5 offer:

1. Flexibility in War Minister Doig's attitude on Mirages.

Jerry O'Leary and our Charge talked to General Doig (Reports are at Tab B). Both detected certain flexibility in his attitude toward the Mirages. Doig noted the difficulty of making a change now, but he also volunteered the precedent of the Peruvian switch from French to US helicopters in 1965. The Charge thinks we have a fighting chance if we give the Peruvians a firm offer on F-5s.

General Doig spoke warmly of General Harold Johnson to O'Leary and our Charge. Our Charge recommends a confidential message from General Johnson to Doig to stimulate him to reverse the Mirage decision. I am leery of any written messages, but I think Ambassador Jones could talk to General Johnson and carry an oral message. We have so suggested to Covey Oliver.

2. Trouble on the International Petroleum Case.

For the past two years, President Belaunde has skillfully wended his way through the difficult IPC case to keep his pledge to me not to impair the Company. Last summer when the opposition-controlled Congress forced his hand with a law nationalizing IPC's oil properties, Belaunde came up with



what seemed like a wise solution. He signed the law nationalizing the oil fields which IPC was willing to give up in exchange for an operating contract, but he also worked out a formula allowing IPC to continue operating and referred to the Fiscal Tribunal the controversial question of IPC past taxes.

This past Friday -- on the eve of senatorial bye-elections -- Belaunde published the Fiscal Tribunal's finding that IPC had "unjustly enriched itself" and issued two resolutions instituting judicial proceedings against IPC to recover IPC profits over the past 15 years and back taxes over the past 8 years. It is hard to see how Belaunde will be able to continue delivering on his "no impairment" pledge. But before making a final judgment, we should await Ambassador Jones' talk with him. Belaunde understands that there is no program loan if his bargain with me is not kept.

Politics seems to have dictated Belaunde's action.

### 3. Belaunde Suffers Reverse in Bye-elections

An important senatorial bye-election was held yesterday. Despite the grandstand play on IPC, Belaunde's candidate is running far behind the opposition candidate. To compound Belaunde's difficulties, the Christian Democrats announced on the eve of the elections that they were withdrawing from their alliance with Belaunde's party. These reverses are not likely to improve Belaunde's capacity for decision and leadership.

Despite the gloomy outlook, I think it is still in our interest to proceed with the F-5 offer -- if Belaunde is willing to cancel the Mirage contract -- and with the \$40 million program loan offer -- if he takes the self-help measures and finds the formula for undoing what he appears to have done to IPC. Belaunde is a weak reed to lean on but better than a de facto military junta. We should try

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-3-

to prop him up if he is willing to do those things which are indispensable for our support. The record should show we did everything possible, within reason, to preserve constitutional government in Peru.

I recommend that you approve the talking points. If you want to discuss the matter further, the Tuesday luncheon provides a good opportunity.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Katzenbach memo with talking points for Ambassador Jones.

Tab B - Embassy Lima reports on talks with Peruvian General Doig.

Approve talking points \_\_\_\_\_

Prefer to discuss further  
at Tuesday's luncheon \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

51a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.4

NTJ 91-406

November 13, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

By [Signature] NARA, Date 1/18/95

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Peru - Economic and Military Cooperation

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached talking paper on economic and military assistance to Peru. Ambassador Jones would use it for discussions with President Belaunde and other Peruvian officials. This authority would be contingent upon a determination by me that it would not adversely affect pending legislation.

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

As Ambassador Jones discussed with you last Wednesday, we would like to make one more attempt to get Peru to cancel its contract with the French for Mirages and buy F-5's. I think our chances of getting the Peruvian military to reverse themselves are slim, but the stakes involved are worth another try.

Since the Ambassador talked to you last week, an additional complication has arisen by virtue of action taken by the Peruvian Government regarding the IPC case. On November 10, President Belaunde signed a Supreme Resolution ordering judicial proceedings against IPC to recover the company's profits for the past fifteen years pursuant to a finding by Peru's Fiscal Tribunal that IPC has "unjustly enriched itself." Ambassador Jones intends to return to Peru tomorrow, November 14, to attempt to ascertain whether this latest action is to be

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
taken at face value or whether it is part of a smoke screen being put up by Belaunde to satisfy the anti-IPC forces while still working out an operating contract acceptable to IPC. The Ambassador would proceed with the latest offer of F-5's and economic assistance which he discussed with you only if he finds that this latest development on IPC does not rule out a satisfactory solution of that problem.

If it does not, the Ambassador would use the attached talking paper in his discussions with President Belaunde on the F-5 problem if you approve. He would also talk to the Peruvian military. The new element in our offer would be the delivery of the first two F-5's in late 1968. I believe it essential to be able to deliver some of these airplanes within calendar 1968 if we are to have a chance to undo the French contract, which we understand calls for deliveries to begin in December 1967 or early next year.

The Ambassador would also repeat our earlier offer to negotiate a \$40 million program loan based on improved economic performance if the Mirage contract is cancelled.

I would not be prepared to authorize Ambassador Jones to proceed with these discussions until I was satisfied that this would not have an adverse effect on pending legislation--especially EX-IM and AID appropriations.

Deputy Secretary Nitze and Deputy AID Administrator Poats concur.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosure:

Talking paper.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIALPERU: TALKING POINTS FOR AMBASSADOR JONES

1. The President asked that I return to Washington to give him a first-hand account of developments in Peru.
2. The President maintains a keen interest in your development program, Peru's favorable climate for private investment, and the strengthening of constitutional, representative government under your leadership.
3. The President is aware of the problems you face and wants to be as helpful as he can. At the same time he wants you to understand the problems he confronts with the Congress on economic and military assistance.
4. For several reasons, including the Peruvian decision to purchase Mirages, the Congress had made deep cuts in foreign aid and is expected to place important restrictions on economic assistance for countries making heavy expenditures on military equipment. (Here describe Symington and Conte amendments and show how these stem from Peru's decision to acquire Mirages. Also refer to Reuss's letter, Secretary Rusk's reply, and Secretary's letter to Chairman Morgan as example of difficulty we get into when we try to be helpful to Latin America in a situation of this kind.)
5. Washington is deeply concerned over economic trends in Peru. We recognize that a stabilization and development program is essential and are willing to help but find that the purchase of Mirages is a major stumbling block, primarily because a squadron would cost Peru substantially more than the F-5 and also has substantially higher operating and maintenance costs. Northrup has made an offer to Peru on F-5's. If the Northrup offer is acceptable, and the Mirage contract cancelled (or the Mirages are sold to third countries before delivery), we could then begin negotiations for a \$40 million program loan. Negotiations for such

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;  
not automatically declassified

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 91-406

By PLP NARA. Date 11/18/95

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

a loan would center around fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange performance targets along the lines we have been discussing with the Peruvian Government for several months. Release of the first tranche of \$20 million would be effected immediately upon signature of the loan, in response to the fiscal and foreign exchange actions already taken by the Peruvian Government in the past few months. Release of the second tranche of \$20 million would be conditioned on mid-year review of performance on agreed policy targets to be included in the loan agreement. The major requirement in this regard would be further tax action to reduce the 1968 budget deficit to manageable proportions in the context of a financial program worked out with the IMF, the IBRD (as leader of the Consultative Group for Peru), and AID.

6. Washington has authorized this package proposal because of deep concern over our ability to continue furnishing bilateral assistance to Peru if it goes through with the Mirage contract, as well as our ability to support loans to Peru in the international agencies. Washington fully recognizes that Peru has the sovereign right to purchase what it wants. The caution regarding our continued ability to help Peru is not meant to be a threat in any sense, but simply a frank and honest exposition of realities faced by the U.S. in the handling of foreign aid.
7. It is to our mutual advantage to remove obstacles to our full cooperation under the Alliance for Progress. In this spirit Washington wants to know whether you and your military advisers would be willing to consider terminating the Mirage contract (or reselling Mirages to third country prior to delivery) if Northrup were to furnish F-5 aircraft on this basis:
  - Training of Peruvian ground crews and pilots to commence in early 1968 in the United States so they will be available when aircraft is delivered.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

-- Delivery of F-5 aircraft to begin in December 1968 at the rate of one or two per month.

- ✓ 8. We are not aware of the terms of the Mirage contract and, therefore, do not know what cancellation of the contract (or the resale) involves. If GOP is willing to consider our proposal, we would welcome the opportunity to review the contract with respect to this point.
- ✓ 9. We believe it is in Peru's national interest to purchase F-5's instead of Mirages for these reasons:

-- The cost of the F-5 is 40% less than for the Mirages, representing a substantial saving to Peru.

-- The F-5 meets Peru's needs and is more suited to Peru's defense requirements.

~~-- It will put Peru in a position to continue receiving full Alliance for Progress support, which will play a key role in maintaining a climate propitious to private sector loans and private investment.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



512

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

Embassy Lima's 2213, November 11, 1967

(from Charge d'Affaires Siracusa to Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Jones)

SUBJECT: Peru and Mirage Purchase

1. In our discussions here of an interview between War Minister Doig and Washington Star correspondent Jerry O'Leary, we were struck by Doig's allusion to a previous Peruvian cancellation of contracts with the French (for Allouettes) and his references to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Johnson as a man who has a sympathetic understanding of the requirements of Peruvian security.
2. This leads us to recommend, in view of the importance we attach to exploring every means to reverse the Mirage purchase, that a confidential communication from General Harold Johnson to General Doig (possibly to be handcarried by a Johnson aide) might be helpful in stimulating Doig to an active role. We had considered recommending a meeting between the two, but in view of the crisis atmosphere in Peru and Doig's key position in any possible military move, we fear such a meeting would be subject to misinterpretation possibly damaging to the United States.
3. The Charge expects to see Doig at lunch today (November 11) and will report further if there are any developments bearing on this recommendation.
4. Also we suggest that the Department take steps to have appropriate high Military figures impress upon General Heighes (the ex-Air Minister who is now at the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington, who had a major role in the Mirage deal) the consequences of Mirage purchases, the alternatives and the benefits to the Peruvian Air Force and to Peru stemming therefrom. We believe Heighes has influence with Gagliardi, his successor. Hopefully Heighes can be brought around to see things differently from his Washington perspective.

DECLASSIFIED  
EX-100-111  
Jefrg 12-16-09



51e

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

From Embassy, Lima's 2215, November 12, 1967, Charge Siracusa  
to Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver and Ambassador Jones

1. In a discussion with War Minister General Doig yesterday, the subject of aircraft easily arose. Herschel Peake/was also present. *(see Helium Chief)*
2. Doig, as Jerry O'Leary said, showed some flexibility on a possible cancellation of the Mirage deal. He never said it could not be done, but he said repeatedly that it would be difficult. He volunteered a precedent on helicopters, and spoke warmly of his friendship for General Harold Johnson, and of the latter's interventions to help Peru and Doig specifically in the past regarding military vehicles and 105 mm Howitzers.
3. I explained the problem for United States assistance to Peru if Mirages were purchased. I said that the inability to provide extraordinary aid in that case was not a punitive condition but simply the reality of what the United States Government could and could not do. I emphasized that any given F-5 figure would cost approximately half its Mirage equivalent and that on a purely financial basis it was hard to see how Peru could choose to go ahead with the French deal now that the F-5s are available, especially since the F-5 had been preferred by the Peruvian Air Force and since other financial relationships are involved at a time of great need by Peru.

General Doig listened attentively and repeated that any change would be "very difficult".

4. When I asked whether it would help if Northrop agents were to return with a firm offer including price, number of aircraft, delivery dates and financing, he answered as follows: "The only bad proposal is one never made."
5. Ending this part of the conversation, I asked Doig to let me know if I could help in any way. I said we wanted to continue close collaboration, but it should be clear to any observer of the Washington scene that military aircraft sales are a most difficult problem for the United States Government.

Doig said he would let me know if he had anything to suggest.

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

from Lima's Embtel 2215, 11/12/67 - continued

-2-

6. On the basis of the above, we confirm the recommendation that appropriate means be found to bring General Johnson's influence to bear on Doig. We also think that the proposal to work on General Heighes in Washington should be tried. The sooner the Northrop representative returns with a specific written offer the better, as until then, the FAP will have nothing concrete to work on. We are certain, however, that some degree of 1968 delivery must be included.

SUNDAY

VZCZCWNZ003  
CO WTE20  
DE WTE 2437

'67 ~~NOV 12~~ PM 2:36

Sent  
RECEIVED  
WHCA

*Pres file*  
NODIS

1967 NOV 12 19 32

FROM VALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67949

52  
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-477

By *isg*, NARA, Date 7-10-95

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

AS YOU CAN SEE, DESPITE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS TO AWAIT WASHINGTON DECISION, BOB ANDERSON HAS VIRTUALLY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO GO TO CAIRO.

WE CAN:

- FIRMLY TURN HIM OFF IF WE MOVE FAST;
- LET HIM GO AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN SEEING AN OLD FRIEND WHO WANTS TO SEE HIM;
- RELEASE THE CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIS USE.

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3914

NODIS

ANDERSON MEETING THIS EVENING BAGHDAD WITH AREF. IF HE HAD KNOWN EARLIER, COULD HAVE ALTERED PLANS; SUBNOT FEELS HE MUST GO IRAQ, PARTICULARLY SINCE SUDDEN CHANGE PLANS VISIT NASSER WOULD CREATE WAVE OF PUBLICITY AND EXPECTATION IN MIDDLE EAST AND PERHAPS FORCE NASSER INTO TAKING HARD PUBLIC STANCE. THERE EQUAL PROSPECT OF U. S. BEING ACCUSED OF ARM-TWISTING IF VISIT NOT SUCCESSFUL.

ANDERSON NOW SEEING AMB GHALEB ON WAY TO AIRPORT, ASKING HIM INFORM NASSER HE WILL VISIT CAIRO SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER IRAQ VISIT, AND URGING NASSER NOT TAKE PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS UNTIL THEY TALK. PARTICULARLY ASKING HIM TO HAVE RIAD DELAY SO DEBATE. WILL REPORT RESULTS.

PORTER

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3915

NODIS

1. ANDERSON JUST DEPARTED FOR BAGHDAD. PRESENT PLANS ARE PROCEED DIRECT BAGHDAD-CAIRO, DEPARTING BAGHDAD NOVEMBER 14, 0730, OR NOVEMBER 15, 0800. UAR AMB METAWALLY WILL INFORM HIM OF NASSER'S DESIRES. ANDERSON PLANS URGE AREF FINISH SULPHUR BUSINESS QUICKLY SO HE CAN LEAVE BY TUESDAY MORNING.

PRESERVATION COPY



2. WHILE ANDERSON TALKING TO AMB GHALEB THIS MORNING, CAIRO TELEPHONED URGING HIM VISIT NASSER SOONEST, AND SAYING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM NASSER ON WAY. THIS ALSO WILL BE DELIVERED BY METAWALLY SO I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE CONTENTS. ANDERSON SAID HE WOULD RESPOND TO INVITATION, BUT MADE POINT STRONGLY TO GHALEB ON DESIRABILITY NO PUBLICITY WITH REGARD VISIT, OR FURTHER PROPAGANDA LIKE HEIKEL EDITORIAL. ADDED THAT HIS OWN PERSONAL PRESTIGE WAS INVOLVED AND THERE WAS NO POINT CONTINUING DIALOGUE IF HEIKEL WILL SEIZE OPPORTUNITY DISCREDIT ANDERSON'S EFFORTS. ANDERSON SAID HAD CHANGED PLANS RETURN TO CAIRO DESPITE STRONG PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS. HE WANTED NASSER UNDERSTAND HE COMING FOR SERIOUS EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IF SURROUNDED BY PROPAGANDA.

3. ANDERSON ALSO REQUESTED GHALEB REPORT TO NASSER THAT HE EXPECTED UAR WOULD DO NOTHING AGGRAVATE SITUATION BEFORE HE ARRIVED. THERE NO POINT MEETING IF ANDERSON CONFRONTED WITH A DETERIORATING SITUATION. URGED ALSO THAT RIAD BE INSTRUCTED DO NOTHING UNHELPFUL IN INTERIN, AND DELAY SC IF POSSIBLE. ANDERSON STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ABOVE ALL IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND THAT NASSER SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT MISSION COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL IF NOT ALLOWED TAKE PLACE IN CALM ATMOSPHERE.

4. ANDERSON REPORTS HE BORE DOWN HARD WITH GHALEB ON QUESTION SPEAKING ORDER PRECEDENCE IN LAST SC MEETING. EMPHASIZED THAT US ONLY SEEKING EQUITY AND UPHOLDING LONG-STANDING RULES. UNFORTUNATELY, ALL THAT HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WAS TO PUT ISRAEL IN POSITION OF AGGRIEVED PARTY WHICH NOT HELPFUL TO ARABS. GHALEB HASTILY ADDED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN SPEAKING FOR HIS GOVERNMENT IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH ANDERSON THIS SUBJECT. ANDERSON IS SURE DETAILS THIS CONVERSATION WILL GET BACK TO NASSER. ANDERSON ALSO ASKED GHALEB STRESS TO NASSER THAT THIS WAS NOT TIME TO WRANGLE ABOUT VERBIAGE. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET RESULTS AND ADDITIONAL MEANINGLESS DEBATE ONLY WILL HAVE EFFECT OF LETTING CHANCE GO BY. HE TOLD GHALEB NOTHING MORE ABOUT HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

5. WE HAVE CAREFULLY BRIEFED ANDERSON AND HE HAS SANITIZED COPY OF CONTINGENCY INSTRUCTIONS WITH HIM, TOGETHER WITH ALL OTHER PERTINENT MATERIAL. HE HAD READ AND HAS TALKING POINTS ON USUN 2035 AND STATE 67978, PLUS ALL RECENT HEIKEL STATEMENTS.

6. HE WILL INFORM ME AS SOON AS BAGHDAD-CAIRO TRAVEL PLANS MADE. I CAN STILL TRANSMIT DEPT'S YES OR NO REACTION ON CAIRO TRIP BY SIMPLE CODE, BUT ANDERSON NOW, AS RESULT TALKS WITH GHALEB, FEELS COMMITTED MAKE TRIP UNLESS SITUATION CHANGES DRAMATICALLY. HE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH BERGUS OR BROMWEL IN CAIRO. STAYING AT NILE HILTON. PLANS RETURN US VIA BEIRUT. PORTER

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 121921Z NOV 67

NODIS

PRESERVATION COPY



WNZ004R  
00 WTE20  
DE WTE 2432

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP67945

*Sent to Williamsburg  
at 5:37  
(AFI Garbled LAST  
portion of msg due  
to cutting power)*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-477  
By *isp*, NARA, Date 7-10-95

~~SECRET~~

1967 NOV 11 22 37

*Free file*

1967 NOV 11 PM 5:48

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

HERewith NICK, WITH ARTHUR GOLDBERG'S STRONG ENDORSEMENT, SUGGESTS WE LET ANDERSON ACCEPT NASSER'S URGENT INVITATION TO RETURN TO THE U.S. VIA CAIRO. ALL HANDS ARE AWARE OF YOUR STRONG RESERVATIONS. THERE IS NO DOUBT OF THE AUTHENTICITY OR URGENCY OF NASSER'S REQUEST.

# MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ROBERT ANDERSON TRIP TO CAIRO

DISCUSSION: ROBERT ANDERSON INFORMS US THAT NASSER IS VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE HIM GO BACK TO CAIRO FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. ANDERSON HAS INDICATED SOME RELUCTANCE BUT HAS BEEN CAREFUL TO LEAVE HIS OPTIONS OPEN. WE HERE HAD AT FIRST FELT THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE FOR ANDERSON TO VISIT CAIRO ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIP MIGHT GIVE RISE TO PUBLIC SPECULATIONS ON THE PART OF THE EGYPTIANS WHICH WOULD GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF DIVISION WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

HOWEVER, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG, I AGREE WITH HIM THAT ANDERSON SHOULD GO TO CAIRO, AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WE DO NOT WANT IT SAID THAT WE DID NOT DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT, AND THAT WE TURNED DOWN A DIRECT REQUEST FROM NASSER TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER TALKS. MOREOVER, SINCE KING HUSSEIN HAS ASKED US TO TRY TO BRING THE UAR ON BOARD, A FURTHER TALK WITH NASSER IN A SENSE WOULD REPRESENT A STEP TO KEEP FAITH WITH HUSSEIN. SINCE HUSSEIN WILL BE TALKING WITH THE ARABS IN NEW YORK UNTIL TOMORROW NIGHT, PROMPT ACTION IS IMPORTANT.

WE WOULD ASK ANDERSON WHILE IN CAIRO TO DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. HE WOULD MAKE IT PLAIN TO NASSER THAT THERE IS NO DIVISION WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WE CANNOT SUPPORT AN UNWORKABLE UN RESOLUTION.

2. WE ARE CONTINUING TO TRY TO WORK OUT A UN RESOLUTION WITH WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN LIVE. SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD NOT IN ITSELF PRODUCE A MIDDLE EASTERN SETTLEMENT, BUT IT WOULD OPEN THE WAY TOWARD ONE WHICH WOULD BE AS FAIR AND AS HELPFUL TO BOTH SIDES AS POSSIBLE.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG IS PREPARING TALKING POINTS ON THE NEGOTIATING PROBLEM IN NEW YORK FOR ANDERSON'S USE. IN AGREEING TO RETURN TO CAIRO, ANDERSON WOULD TELL THE UAR AMBASSADOR WITH WHOM HE IS IN CONTACT THAT WE EXPECT HIS RETURN WILL NOT BE FOLLOWED BY UAR PUBLICITY ATTACKING THE U.S. OR THE PRESIDENT/ FOR OUR ATTITUDE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU AUTHORIZE US TO TELL ANDERSON TO PROCEED TO CAIRO.

ACTING SECRETARY

~~SECRET~~

DTG:112138Z NOV 67

PRESERVATION COPY

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Saturday, November 11, 1967  
3:25 p.m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith (in three attached cables)  
Bob Anderson reports Nasser wants to  
see him again.

We shall have a recommendation for  
you shortly -- conscious of your grave  
reservations in this matter.

W. W. Rostow

Beirut 3901  
Beirut 3905  
Beirut 3908

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-477  
By ijg, NARA, Date 6-28-95

WWRostow:rlm



INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*W H 2* *54a*

~~SECRET~~

Action

RNL/6  
CONTROL: 3028Q  
Info RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 11, 1967, 3:57 A.M.

PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMBE 3901 3141025  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 101025Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3721  
STATE GRNC  
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3901

NODIS

REFERENCE: STATE 65484

FROM: ROBERT ANDERSON

1. I ARRIVED LAST NIGHT FROM BAGHDAD AND AM RETURNING BAGHDAD EITHER SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY HOPEFULLY TO CONCLUDE AN ARRANGEMENT FOR SULPHUR DEVELOPMENT WITH THAT COUNTRY EARLY PART OF THE WEEK. I WANTED TO REPORT THAT ON LAST MONDAY I HAD A CALL FROM UAR AMBASSADOR METWALLY IN IRAQ. HE ASKED TO SEE ME AND SAID ONLY THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM CAIRO ASKING THAT I RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES VIA CAIRO WHEN I LEFT BAGHDAD. HE HAD NO OTHER DETAILS. I SAW HIM AGAIN YESTERDAY, THE NINTH, WHEN HE ASKED WHEN I THOUGHT THE IRAQI DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE CONCLUDED. I INFORMED HIM THAT I DID NOT KNOW BUT THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF VISIT TO IRAQ OF PRESIDENT HELOU AND THAT I WAS GOING TO BEIRUT UNTIL EITHER SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY 12TH. I SAID TO HIM THAT I WAS COMPLETELY LACKING IN ANY INFORMATION EXCEPT WHAT IS PRINTED IN THE BAGHDAD NEWS BUT WAS AWARE OF FACT THAT UNITED STATES HAD TABLED A RESOLUTION BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANY IDEA AS TO THE REACTION OF PRESIDENT NASSER TO THIS RESOLUTION. HE SAID HE HAD NONE BUT WAS GOING TO CABLE CAIRO AND PERHAPS THE UAR AMBASSADOR TO BEIRUT WOULD ADVISE ME. I HAVE JUST TALKED TO AMBASSADOR GHALEB WHO STATED THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TALK ON THE TELEPHONE AND ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS RESIDENCE AT 11:00 O'CLOCK. HE STATED "DO YOU HAVE ANY MESSAGES FOR ME?" AND I SAID "NO."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-478  
By *ab* NARA, Date *2-22-95*

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- BEIRUT 3901, NOVEMBER 10, 1967 (NODIS)

I SAID I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT HIS COUNTRY'S REACTION WAS TO THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND HE ANSWERED BY SAYING "I DO NOT WANT TO TALK ON THE TELEPHONE."

2. ANTICIPATING THAT YOU MIGHT PREFER I NOT RETURN TO CAIRO, I DID SAY TO AMBASSADOR METAWALLY IN BAGHDAD THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT I MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY TO RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE UNITED STATES RATHER THAN TO GO BY WAY OF CAIRO AS NASSER REQUESTED.

3. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, ALL OF MANY IRAQI OFFICIALS I SAW RAISED TOPIC OF ARAB-ISRAEL SETTLEMENT AND INDICATED QUITE CLEARLY THAT THEY ARE GOING TO FOLLOW THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UAR. I ALSO WAS ASKED TO SEE FORMER PRIME MINISTERS INCLUDING NAJI TALIB AND DR. BAZZAZ. BAZZAZ IN PARTICULAR HAS ALWAYS SEEMED TO ME TO BE A MODERATE. HE STATED THAT ANY FINAL CONCLUSION WOULD BE ONE BASED UPON ACCEPTANCE BY THE UAR AS NASSER WAS THE ONLY MAN WHO COULD TALK TO THE MAN IN THE STREET. HE ALSO STATED "THE FACT THAT YOUR COUNTRY IS ALLOWING THIS MATTER TO REMAIN UNRESOLVED IS MAKING MORE COMMUNISTS PER MINUTE THAN YOU ARE POSSIBLY GETTING RID OF IN ANY OTHER PART OF THE WORLD". HE SAID "THE ARABS DON'T KNOW WHAT COMMUNISM MEANS BUT THEY ARE LISTENING BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS SPEAK THE LANGUAGE OF THE MAN IN THE STREET AND BECAUSE THE MATTER OF AN ACCEPTABLE SETTLEMENT REMAINS UNRESOLVED."

4. FOREIGN MINISTER KHAIRALLA VOLUNTEERED TO ME THAT IRAQ WOULD SEEK A RESTORATION OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES JUST AS SOON AS RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED WITH THE UAR. I MADE NO COMMENT EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THIS WAS IN OFFICIAL HANDS AND I DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT. ADDING THAT OBVIOUSLY HIS COUNTRY HAD BROKEN RELATIONS AND THEREFORE WOULD ASSUME THE INITIATIVE IN RESTORING THEM.

5. TWO THINGS I DID NOT MENTION IN MY PREVIOUS REPORT FROM CAIRO DICTATED HASTILY IN BEIRUT: FIRST, I AM SURE IT IS OBVIOUS TO YOU THAT I WAS TRYING TO REFLECT IN THAT REPORT ONLY THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE ARABS AND THE EGYPTIANS AS EXPRESSED TO ME AND, SECOND, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, I SAID TO ZAKARIYAH MOHIEDDIN DURING THE LAST HOURS OF MY VISIT THAT I HAD SIMPLY FORGOTTEN TO ASK NASSER WHAT THE REACTIONS OF THE SOVIETS WOULD BE TO THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN MY PREVIOUS

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-3- BEIRUT 3901, NOVEMBER 10, 1967, (NODIS)

REPORT. ZAKARIYAH MOHIEDDIN REPLIED BY SAYING "DON'T WORRY ABOUT IT. THE SOVIETS WILL DO WHAT WE WANT THEM TO DO."

6. I AM GOING TO SEE AMBASSADOR GHALEB AT HIS REQUEST, AT HIS HOUSE AT 11:00 O'CLOCK. I HAVE FEELING THERE WILL NOT BE VERY MUCH TO IT BUT IF THERE IS. I WILL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU BY A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE.

7. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER OR NOT IN VIEW OF THE REQUEST SUBMITTED TO ME BY AMBASSADOR METAWALLY, YOU ARE STILL OF THE OPINION THAT I SHOULD NOT REVISIT CAIRO. MY PRESENT PLANS ARE TO RETURN TO BAGHDAD NOT LATER THAN SUNDAY (12TH) AND THEN BE BACK TO BEIRUT BY TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY AND PROCEED HOME UNLESS YOU ADVISE ME OTHERWISE.

8. AMBASSADOR PORTER ADVISES ME THAT WITHOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE LOCAL LEBANESE SECURITY OFFICERS MET ME AT THE AIRPORT. THIS MORNING'S PAPER CONTAINS A PICTURE SAYING THAT I WAS HERE IN TRANSIT AND THAT THE PRESS DID NOT VISIT WITH ME. I AM PROPOSING TO CONTINUE SAYING THAT I AM DISCUSSING FERTILIZER PROJECTS IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT I AM DOING. PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Action

RNL/G

CONTROL: 3029Q

Info

RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 11, 1967, 4:17 A.M.

PP RUEHC

DE RUQMBE 3905 3141256

ZNY SSSSS

P 101256Z NOV 67

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3722

STATE GRNC

BT

~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 3905

NODIS

REFERENCE: BEIRUT 3901

FROM ROBERT ANDERSON

1. I JUST VISITED WITH AMBASSADOR GHALEB. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM NASSER. "SOME TIME AGO" SAYING THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD EXPECT A CALL FROM ME WHEN I HAD RECEIVED SOME "WORD FROM MY COUNTRY. I TOLD HIM THAT SO FAR AS MY COUNTRY WAS CONCERNED THAY STILL THOUGHT I WAS IN IRAQ WHERE COMMUNICATION WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND THAT I HAD ONLY ADVISED THEM THIS MORNING THAT I WAS BACK IN BEIRUT AND WOULD BE HERE UNTIL SUNDAY WHEN I WOULD RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

2. I TOLD HIM THAT AMBASSADOR METWALLY IN IRAQ TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD ADVISE ME THROUGH GHALEB WHAT THE EGYPTIAN ATTITUDE WAS TOWARD THE AMERICAN RESOLUTION. I ALSO STATED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE AMERICAN RESOLUTION CONTAINED ALL THE POINTS COVERED IN MY DISCUSSIONS IN CAIRO WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN INSTEAD OF BEING REQUIRED TO GO THE THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD CONSULT WITH BOTH SIDES IN A LESS CONSPICUOUS MANNER, WHICH MIGHT BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN GETTING RESULTS. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD EITHER RECEIVE A WIRE FROM NASSER TODAY OR WOULD INQUIRE AS TO NASSER'S ATTITUDE. I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, FOR ME TO RETURN TO CAIRO NOT ONLY BECAUSE I HAD BEEN AWAY SO LONG, BUT BECAUSE I WANTED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF VISITING

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

-2- BEIRUT 3905, NOVEMBER 10, 1967, (NODIS)

WITH MY OLD FRIEND DATING FROM FINANCE MINISTRY DAYS, JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER SATO, WHILE HE WAS IN THE STATES. I SAID I HAD BEEN INVITED TO DINNER WITH SATO. I THOUGHT THAT I SHOULD CAST CONSIDERABLE DOUBT ON ANY POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO CAIRO UNTIL I KNEW MORE ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTITUDE. WHEN I TOLD GHALEB THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT I COULD RETURN TO CAIRO HE ASKED ME IF THIS WOULD BE TRUE EVEN THOUGH PRESIDENT NASSER CONSIDERED IT VERY IMPORTANT. I REPLIED BY SAYING THAT I WOULD NOT FORECLOSE ANY MATTER IF NASSER THOUGHT IT OF SUFFICIENT IMPORTANCE ALTHOUGH PERHAPS THE SAME THING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED EITHER BY NASSER SENDING SOMEONE TO MEET ME HERE OR BY COMMUNICATION THROUGH GHALEB. HE STATED HE WOULD EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY IF NASSER THOUGHT IT SUFFICIENTLY IMPORTANT.

3. GHALEB THEN ASKED ME IF I KNEW ABOUT THE CURRENT HAPPENINGS AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND I TOLD HIM I DID NOT. HE SPENT A LONG TIME TELLING ME ABOUT THE US REQUEST FOR ABBA EBAN TO SPEAK FOLLOWING MAHMOUD RIAD, AND STATED THAT WE INSISTED ON "OUR COLLEAGUE" SPEAKING SECOND FOLLOWING RIAD. HE SAID "ISN'T IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DO ANYTHING WHICH DOESN'T APPEAR ONE-SIDED, DO THE AMERICANS HAVE TO TAKE THE PRO-ISRAELI POINT OF VIEW IN EVERYTHING, INCLUDING PROCEDURE?" HIS TELEPHONE RANG ALMOST CONSTANTLY AND HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS RECEIVING CONTINUOUS CALLS FROM LEBANESE PROTESTING THAT THE AMERICANS WERE INSISTING EVEN ON PROCEDURAL MATTERS TO ACCOMMODATE THE ISRAELIS. HE SAID THAT IF THE AMERICANS DID WANT ABBA EBAN TO SPEAK SECOND, WHY DID WE HAVE TO PROPOSE IT? WHY NOT SOMEBODY ELSE? IMPRESSION FROM ARAB SIDE IS THAT US DELIBERATELY ANTAGONIZING THE ARABS AND HE SAID HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE STRONG REACTION, EVEN IN LEBANON.

4. I SAID THAT SINCE HE HAD RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, I WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND WHY UAR HAD SUDDENLY DEMANDED A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I THOUGHT HIS PRESIDENT HAD FELT, DURING MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM, THAT MORE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUIETLY AND BEHIND SCENES, AND THAT PERHAPS AN AGREED RESOLUTION (WHETHER WITH US LABEL OR NOT) COULD BE TAKEN TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WHERE THE PROCEDURE WOULD BE MORE OR LESS PRO FORMA. HE STATED "I CANNOT SPEAK

~~SECRET~~



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-3- BEIRUT 3905, NOVEMBER 10, 1967, (NODIS)

OFFICIALLY, BUT IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT WE FEARED THE OUTBREAK OF ANOTHER ISRAELI ATTACK EITHER AGAINST US, SYRIA OR JORDAN AND THAT THIS ATTACK WOULD BE LESS LIKELY IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WERE IN SESSION". I HAVE NO IDEA AS TO WHETHER HE IS EXPRESSING A PERSONAL JUDGEMENT, JUST OFFERING AN EXCUSE, OR WHETHER HE KNOWS MORE THAN HE IS TELLING ME. THE REST OF THE CONVERSATION WAS RATHER ACADEMIC IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT ISRAEL HAD INITIALLY BEEN ESTABLISHED AS A CAT'S PAW SO THAT EITHER WE, THE SOVIETS, OR OTHER MAJOR POWER COULD USE THIS SMALL COUNTRY TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN THE ARAB WORLD BUT THAT THE CAT'S PAW WAS RAPIDLY BECOMING THE CAT AND THEY DID NOT KNOW WHERE IT WOULD BITE NEXT.

5. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD CALL ME IN BEIRUT IF HE HEARD ANYTHING ELSE FROM CAIRO. PORTER

BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State

~~SECRET~~

Action

Info

CONTROL: 3021Q  
RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 10, 1967, 9:58 A.M.

PP RUEHC  
DE RUQMBE 3908 3141410  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 101410Z NOV 67  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3723  
STATE GRNC

BT  
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 3908

NODIS

REF: BEIRUT 3905

1. SECRETARY ANDERSON JUST NOTIFIED BY AMBASSADOR GHALEB THAT AS RESULT TALKS ANDERSON HAD WITH MATWALLY IN IRAQ, NASSER HAS INDICATED HE VERY ANXIOUS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH ANDERSON IN CAIRO.

2. ANDERSON ASSUMES MORE SPECIFIC RESPONSE MAY BE RECEIVED FROM NASSER AS RESULT QUERIES SENT TODAY BY AMBASSADOR GHALEB.

3. ANDERSON, OF COURSE, MAKING NO COMMITMENTS, BUT WILL REPORT FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. PORTER

BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-478

By CB, NARA, Date 2-22-95

~~SECRET~~

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INFORMATION

Saturday, November 11, 1967  
3:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

In this matter Ken Galbraith  
behaved well, although his advice  
was faulty, if well meant.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm



55a

Saturday, November 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Prof. J. K. Galbraith called from Chicago early Friday evening (6:15 pm), November 10, 1967, and, since I had left for the day, he asked that I call back.

He reported the following:

He was in Chicago to tape a show that afternoon for showing Saturday, November 11. It was at Station WBBM, the CBS TV outlet in Chicago. The show is called At Random. It is emceed by one John Madigan. The other participants were a political scientists Robert Merriam and a certain Dr. Douglas of Sarasota, Florida, a pillar of the Birch Society. In the course of the exchange Dr. Douglas said the Communists were taking over in Washington. When pressed for specifics, he said Walt W. Rostow was a Communist. When pressed for verification, he said Otepka had stated Rostow was twice denied security clearance during the Eisenhower Administration. He was challenged on this, apparently by Galbraith and Merriam.

Dr. Douglas apparently said some rather dubious things about President Eisenhower as well.

Galbraith suggested that I might wish to call the manager of the station, one Dan O'Connell, and ask him to scrub this passage from the show.

I called Clark Clifford and explained the situation to him. He said that if we succeeded in persuading O'Connell to alter the tape, Dr. Douglas would have a case that we were trying to conceal something. If we failed, it would be on the record that we tried to suppress a TV conversation. He recommended against our calling O'Connell.

I said I wholly agreed with him. That I felt that at one time or another the matter would surface in a way that required our response; we had to be prepared; and we had to be prepared in ways which would not damage the relations between the President and General Eisenhower.

I instructed the Situation Room to ask the station for the text of the broadcast. WBBM has agreed to furnish us the relevant portion for our records.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

MR. PRESIDENT

Sat., Nov. 11, 1967

Pres file

SUBJECT: Press Contacts, period Nov. 6 - 11

Herewith my press contacts for this past week.

Next week I am gearing up to do the Wednesday afternoon - Thursday stint you outlined.

Monday, November 6

Theo Loch, foreign editor of Rheinischer Merkur. This was a general discussion of European affairs with an exceedingly intelligent and basically friendly German editor.

I indicated the depth of your continuing interest in European policy, and the problem we face in Europe's incapacity to help share the major burdens not only in Southeast Asia but also in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. He indicated that he understood this; but felt that progress could be only limited so long as de Gaulle remained in power. He was tolerably optimistic about what would happen in Europe when de Gaulle passed from the scene.

Jess Cook of TIME magazine telephoned to ask (humorously) if I was the author of the "Iron Mountain Report." I said I was not, and that it was a fake.

Les Carpenter telephoned and asked about the authorship of the "Iron Mountain Report." I told him it was a fake. He also asked if Mrs. Kennedy had any substantive assignments in Cambodia. I said it was a wholly private visit.

Tuesday, November 7

I had a long session with Robert Christopher and Mel Elfin of NEWSWEEK. They are planning an article on the character of the reasons for our fighting in Viet Nam. They asked: was it to maintain the credibility of our commitments, or was it to develop democracy in Viet Nam? I replied:

-- The primary reason was that the SEATO Treaty recognized an underlying judgment by our nation; namely, that the preservation of the independence of Southeast Asia was in this nation's security interest, including explicitly the independence of South Viet Nam. This commitment related to the whole shape of Asia where two-thirds of humanity lived, and therefore it was a question of the substance of national security, not merely the credibility of our commitments elsewhere;

-- Second, the credibility of our commitments in Europe and Latin America would, indeed, be involved if we were to fail in Southeast Asia. We would probably have a most painful passage of contentious isolationism if we pulled out.

-- Within South Viet Nam, our commitment was to help them not only maintain their independence but also move as rapidly as they could towards constitutional democratic government. This policy followed from the kind of nation we are and also the same policy we had applied wherever we bore direct responsibility; for example, in Germany, Japan, South Korea, etc.

I don't know what NEWSWEEK will do, but Elfin is with us on Viet Nam, and Christopher seemed in good faith in his questions.

Thursday, November 9

I asked Richard Saltonstall of TIME to drop down, and I explained to him the character of the new Cabinet in South Viet Nam. I pointed out that they had a Presidential system like ours in which only the President and Vice President were elected officials. The Cabinet is not meant to be a collection of independent politicians, but the servants of the policy of the President of the Republic. In those terms it seemed to be a competent Cabinet well distributed with respect to region, with certain of the members having ties to Huong and politicians other than Thieu and Ky.

I said the heart of the democratic process would be the relations between the Executive Branch and the new Senate and Lower House.

Friday, November 10

Joe Alsop came in. I gave him the material on the DMZ. He is very much interested in pushing forward his enterprise on the North Vietnamese view of negotiations. I told him I had forwarded his paper to you, and you were considering the appropriateness of the statement. We also discussed the operations near the Cambodian border, which he believes indicate Hanoi is very near the end of the line.

Ward Just called me early Friday afternoon. He asked if I would see him to discuss our measures of progress in South Viet Nam. I asked him bluntly if he came to study the matter or whether he had already made up his mind. He said that while he had formed certain views in Saigon, he really wanted to know how we thought about and measured progress in South Viet Nam. I invited him in and spent 2-3/4 hours with him. I pointed out that:

-- We used certain statistical measurements but no single measurement was regarded as decisive. It was only when all the measurements tended to tell the same story that we drew any conclusions.

-- But even then we would not believe the statistics unless we had other evidence of a non-statistical kind that reinforced the statistics.

-- Finally, we would not believe our evidence unless the enemy's operational behavior was consistent with our judgment.

I then took him through all the statistical series we have. I made him read a collection of captured documents and field reports on enemy manpower shortages, morale problems, etc. Finally, I explained to him the change in the enemy's operations since about the third quarter of 1966, emphasizing that their military operations were no longer designed to win in the field but to keep the war going while they assessed the capacity of American political life to sustain the war.

I cannot guarantee what he will write; but my impression is that he was open-minded to some degree. At the end, he discussed what the war had looked like to him in Saigon. He said that he had been skeptical about certain of the statistics -- for example, the body count. But his greatest concern was the attitude of the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese whom he had met were skeptical that the war could ever end. I read to him some of Bunker's comments on the Inauguration and the new government and discussed the new younger generation in the military, in economic life, the Revolutionary Development cadres, etc. I had him read some of Westy's reports on recent ARVN operations that had gone well. His mind did not appear to be closed to such evidence; but we shall have to see what he in fact writes. The first suggestion of the effect of all this in this morning's Washington Post (article attached) is not too bad.

W. W. Rostow

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## Progress Reported By Bunker

By Ward Just

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Johnson Administration, in a major effort to take the offensive in the domestic debate over the war in Vietnam, is bringing its two top officials in Saigon to Washington for a high-level policy review, and to argue the case for success.

Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker flew into Washington from Saigon yesterday, reported "steady . . . continual progress" in the war, and revealed that Gen. William C. Westmoreland would join him here for talks with the President next week.

### Offensive Indicated

Bunker's arrival, the expected arrival of Westmoreland, and related developments here lent support to the view that the Administration is beginning to concentrate a major offensive against its domestic critics.

The accent has been, and apparently will be, on progress in the war, with the underlying assumption that victory is now a realistic prospect.

Vice President Humphrey struck that note in an appearance yesterday on the NBC television program "Today." "We are beginning to win this struggle," he declared. "We are on the offensive; territory is being gained. We are making steady progress . . ."

The "Today" appearance was essentially a rerun of earlier Humphrey statements when he was in Saigon as a personal representative of the President at the Nov. 1 inaugural of President Nguyen Van Thieu and, last week, when he returned to the United States and reported his findings to Mr. Johnson.

It is known that the Administration has been vexed by the difficulty of assessing

progress, or change, in the war and finding a means to credibly convey it to the public. The President and his closest advisers are convinced there is progress, but uncertain about the measurements it should use to confirm it.

Lately, the measurements have taken the form of statistics—of body counts, weapons counts, kill ratios, and a new criteria of evaluation of hamlet security. The statistical method of measuring advance in a war without fixed fronts was popular in the early phases of the war, then fell briefly into disrepute.

Now, confident that the statistics—buttressed by what is called independent, qualitative evaluation—are accurate, some officials here are beginning to rely on them again as indicators of the trends of the war. The instinct of these officials is that the war is being won.

Despite the evidence of progress assembled by the Administration, however, the fire from the doubters and dissidents is certain to increase, now that Sen. Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) is maneuvering to enter presidential primaries as an alternative to President Johnson. McCarthy's candidacy is expected to be a lightning rod for much of the dissent over the war.

In this atmosphere, it is considered unlikely that the President and his top-level officials will keep silent. There are no plans for Gen. Westmoreland to address another joint session of Congress, but it is certain he will be given close attention by the press and television while he is here.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk will address a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association in New York next week. That speech is expected to be an overall defense of the foreign policies of the Johnson Administration, particularly its Asian policies.

Bunker, in a brief meeting with newsmen yesterday, was crisp but definite. He was encouraged, he said, by political developments in South Vietnam, and including the appointment of "experienced, competent, good" men to the cabinet of the Thieu government this week.

Bunker said he expected to meet with President Johnson sometime next week and said Westmoreland would take part in the talks. The meeting, he said, is to be part of the "normal consultations" with the State Department and the White House.

But it is considered certain that Westmoreland will have something to say publicly on what he considers to be the improving allied position in bodian border in recent weeks have been exceedingly favorable to the Americans and the war. Battles near the Cam-South Vietnamese, according to reports from Saigon.

Bunker's most recent cables to the President have been enthusiastic about the new government, and optimistic about its chances to achieve stability in the country. The overall estimate of the 73-year-old veteran diplomat is also understood to be optimistic.

Bunker has not been back to Washington since his assignment to Saigon in April. But Westmoreland has been back twice this year, most recently in mid-July when he presented the President with a request for additional troops.



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INFORMATION

*Profile*

Saturday, November 11, 1967  
12 Noon

Mr. President:

The German Embassy has just telephoned to say that they have received the following telegram from Chancellor Kiesinger extending congratulations on the Saturn 5 flight. (The translation is unofficial.)

"To The President of the United States of America

"I congratulate you most cordially on the great success which the American space program has achieved with the launching of the Saturn 5 rocket.

" (signed)  
Kiesinger  
Federal Chancellor"

W. W. Rostow

*RHU*  
RHU:mst

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

*Pres file*

Saturday, November 11, 1967  
10:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick informs us of a  
decision to sell six C-141 aircraft to  
the French for \$60 million.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority 729 86-15

By ref/co, NARA, Date 12-6-91

58a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 10, 1967


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Sale of Up to Six C-141 Aircraft  
to France

I have approved the sale to France of up to six C-141 aircraft, four with in-flight refueling capability. While Bob McNamara leaned toward disapproval, he deferred to our judgment, since this is basically a foreign policy question.

Neither the Limited Test Ban Treaty nor the draft Non-Proliferation Treaty prohibits this sale. Nor would the sale be of importance to the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. NSAM 294, forbidding sales significantly affecting the nuclear and strategic delivery capability of France, or identifying the U.S. as a major supplier or collaborator, does not bar the sale, since the KC-135 refueling force we already sold to France would only be augmented by about 20-25 percent, and France is moving towards missiles in any event. The sale might minimize risks of French harassment to our military overflights, and could be useful for long range airlift of French troops and supplies.

Lockheed tells us that the sale will be worth at least \$60 million in our balance of payments. We will not offer credit or special offset arrangements.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC 10-188 (#88a)  
By 21, NARA, Date 11-2-10

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

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Frankfile

Saturday, November 11, 1967  
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

This summary answer to seven  
key difficult questions about Vietnam  
may be helpful to you.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Progress or Stalemate

WWRostow:rlh



## PROGRESS OR STALEMATE

**Q:** How can the administration argue that we are making progress in Vietnam when after many years we are unable to show territorial gains or definite signs of winning?

**Ans:** The U.S. has not been in Vietnam for years. Our first combat troops arrived only a little over two years ago; the first year was spent primarily in a logistical build-up, and we have only been able to exert the full pressure of our forces on the enemy for a year. Similarly, the current pacification program only really began with the Honolulu Conference and has taken a year to build up momentum.

This is a war for people--not for territory. 80% of the South Vietnamese live on less than 40% of the land. Since the beginning of the U.S. military build-up in early 1965, there has been a substantial increase in the number of people living in areas of relative security under the protection of the government of South Vietnam. In mid-1965, there were at most some 7.7 million people--no more than 47% of the population living in areas under the government's protection. Some 3.7 million people--about 22%--were living in Viet-Cong dominated areas. At the end of September, however, Government of Vietnam statistics show 11.9 million--or 72% living under Government of Vietnam protection, as opposed to only 2.2 million--or 14 percent--under Viet-Cong domination. Our own U.S. statistics, based on detailed evaluations on a hamlet-by-hamlet basis and using different criteria, are somewhat more conservative. Our data places about 69 % of the population under protection of the Government of Vietnam, and about 14% under the Viet-Cong. Thus, by the most conservative estimate, the percentage of people afforded protection from Viet-Cong terrorism has risen by about one-half, and the percentage under Communist domination was reduced by more than one-fourth.

But by one of the most objective criteria of control or security--the population of areas sufficiently secure to hold elections--the percentage of the population under the protection of the Government of Vietnam is greater than shown by either Government of Vietnam or U.S. statistics. For, in the recent Presidential elections, voting took place in areas containing 75 percent of the people of Vietnam.

The trend in numbers of registered voters and of people voting shows the trend in increased security and Government protection. In May 1965, 3.8 million people voted of 4.2 million registered voters in the municipal and provincial elections.

In September 1966, 4.3 million voted of 5.2 registered voters in the Constituent Assembly elections. In September 1967, 4.8 million voted

of 5.8 million registered voters in the Presidential and Upper House elections. Thus, registered voters are up nearly 40% from the first election to the last.

By any reckoning, we have made appreciable and significant progress in the most crucial area of the war--protection of the people.

Q: But are there not just as many of the enemy in South Vietnam now as there were one or two years ago--in spite of these population statistics and in spite of kill ratios?

Ans: No. We believe that enemy strength in South Vietnam has declined over the past year or so. On the basis of captured documents and prisoners we now estimate that Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army organized unit strength has declined from a peak of 126,000 in August 1966, to about 118,000 now. Although our estimates on guerrilla strength are much less precise, we believe that Viet Cong guerrilla strength has also declined significantly. (In the process, we have learned that earlier estimates were too low because of incomplete intelligence.)

The reason for this is simply that the number of troops infiltrated and recruited by the enemy has not been as great as his deaths, desertions and other losses.

Q: Isn't the real test of stalemate the fact that the enemy is able to match our escalation of the war in spite of everything we do--as evidenced by his recent DMZ shellings and by his ability to mount rocket attacks at will on U.S. bases such as Danang?

Ans: We don't think so. Because of the nature of this war, the enemy cannot be prevented from mounting attacks in the border areas such as the DMZ and Cambodian border. Nor can he be prevented from continuing mortar and rocket attacks on U.S. bases. But these costly incidents do not have much significant military impact.

These engagements mark a major change in his tactics since the beginning of 1965 when he roamed the country at will and only his own lack of decision prevented him from mounting an assault on Saigon itself.

In the summer of 1965, he tried to cut South Vietnam in two. In 1966 he tried to capture the northern provinces. This year, his objectives have been the more modest ones of seeking limited victories in the DMZ

and Cambodian border areas. He has been foiled in every attempt and at great loss to himself.

Q: Isn't it possible, however, that the change in enemy tactics is of his own choice rather than something forced on him by our military pressure?

Ans: This is conceivable but not very likely. It is difficult to imagine the enemy deliberately choosing his present course of action and confining his major operations almost entirely to the border areas if it were not for friendly military pressure.

We have blocked his attempts to infiltrate by sea. We have inflicted heavy losses in his infiltration by the Ho Chi Minh trail. We have seized the military initiative in most areas of the country. The enemy now controls fewer miles of roads, fewer thousands of the population, less geographical area, and he is unable to prosecute the war in the manner and to the extent he enjoyed in 1965.

Thus his current tactics simply represent the best choice of the poor alternatives available to him to try to prolong the war while he hopes for a change in the political will on the U. S. home front.

Q: What evidence is there that we are making any military progress?

Ans: The enemy has been unable to mount a major offensive although intelligence indicated he planned to do so last May and June.

The enemy has gained no major victories comparable to his 1965 successes in an engagement of battalion size or larger in over a year.

A program to neutralize 41 enemy base areas in South Vietnam (that is to say to drive the enemy there from and destroy enemy installations therein) was initiated in June 1966. To date, we have penetrated or attacked almost all these bases, and, as of August 1967, had neutralized 14 of them. We believe the enemy may need fewer big in-country base areas now versus two years ago, but he does have a need for some since he has less freedom of movement outside these areas.

From 1966 to 1967 thus far, enemy killed in action per month has increased 63%, enemy weapons captured have increased 65% (1,600 to 2,600 per month), enemy mortar rounds destroyed have increased 500% (7,500 in 1966, and 19,000 in six months of 1967). Small arms

ammunition captured or destroyed has increased 125% (1.1 million rounds in 1966, and 1.5 million in six months of 1967), and enemy rice captured or destroyed has increased nearly 50% (13,000 tons in 1966, and 10,000 in six months of 1967).

The enemy to friendly killed in action ratio has increased from 3.2 to 1 in 1966 to 4.0 to 1 during the first six months of 1967, and has continued to increase since then. The weapon gained to lost ratio has increased from 2.1 to 1 in 1966 to 3.8 to 1 in the first six months of 1967, and has continued to increase since then.

Q: How can we expect to win when the Communists have been fighting for 20 years and are prepared to keep on fighting for 20 more?

Ans: There is solid evidence of the weakening, at least at the lower level, of the enemy's will, especially the Southern Viet Cong.

Under the Chieu Hoi program there has been an increase of ralliers from about 11,000 in 1965, to about 20,000 in 1966, to nearly 24,000 to date in 1967.

Numerous captured documents, ralliers, and prisoners of war testify to the difficulties of Viet Cong administrators maintaining contact with their cadre under U.S. military pressure, the difficulties in Viet Cong recruitment and taxation, resulting in forced conscription and higher Viet Cong taxation, the greater difficulties of the Viet Cong in dealing with the population, and the difficulties in some areas of obtaining food and medicine, and the increased failure of Viet Cong administrative cadre in many areas.

Numerous captured documents, ralliers, and prisoners of war testify to North Vietnamese Army losses of 20-25 % and more from bombing, sickness, disease and desertion before reaching their destinations in South Vietnam, and to lack of food and medicine and poor morale among North Vietnamese troops after they arrive. However, about ten percent of North Vietnamese Army recover from their sickness and eventually complete the trek. Hence the overall attrition is about 15%.

Q: How can the U.S. expect to achieve its objectives in view of the ineffectiveness of the government and the armed forces of South Vietnam?

Ans: During the past two years the South Vietnamese have had a reasonably stable government and a political evolution which is



impressive in a very young country in the midst of war. We now have a Revolutionary Development program which has been well led and which for all its imperfections is better than anything we have had in the past. Although there are many imperfections in the Vietnamese Army, it must be remembered that this Army has been increased by more than 50% in the last three years, and leadership was not automatically available for the expanding forces. It has been only during the last year that the main focus has been on qualitative as opposed to quantitative improvement. During this period the Vietnamese Armed Forces have improved. All the usual indicators of combat effectiveness--killed, missing, weapons captured ratios, desertion rates, operational contact rates--show a favorable trend.

A. The number of desertions this year is less than half the number for the same period last year and the number of missing in action has dropped from 1,500 in the first quarter of 1966 to 750 in the first quarter of 1967, and to 312 in the second quarter of 1967.

B. The trend of weapons lost has reversed. In the first quarter of 1966, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces lost 2,850 weapons and captured 1,400, or an unfavorable ratio of two to one. In the first quarter of 1967, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces lost 2,050 weapons and captured 4,425, or a favorable ratio of two and one-fourth to one.

C. The percentage of contacts to total operations is up. In the first quarter of 1966, there were 360 contacts in 820 large unit operations, and in the first quarter of 1967, there were 380 contacts in 760 operations, or an increase of 15 percent. In small unit operations, the rate of enemy contacts has risen from 2.8 contacts per 1,000 in the first quarter of 1966 to 3.7 contacts per 1,000 for the first quarter of 1967 (a rise of 30%) to 4.3 contacts per 1,000 in the second quarter of 1967 (or a rise of over 50%). The total number of operations is down because of the present heavy commitment to pacification.

D. ARVN has taken a number of actions to improve its general effectiveness. This includes: (1) increased fighting in close association with American units and the corresponding increased availability of U.S. artillery and air support, (2) new and improved training courses, such as the long range reconnaissance patrol course, graduates of which are integrated with U.S. long range reconnaissance patrols and the recycling of maneuver battalions through a six-week national training center course, and (3) increased promotions from the ranks (during 1966, 500 direct commissions, 20 battlefield commissions, and 4,500 battlefield promotions were awarded NCO's; also a special OCS course was offered, from which 1,700 were graduated).

E. Programs have been installed to improve the morale of ARVN, such as a pay increase in July 1966, the establishment of an ARVN commissary, and a free issue of an operations ration in the field beginning July 1967, designed to give greater mobility in the field and to prevent living off the people in the countryside.

F. Far fewer Regional and Popular Force positions have been overrun in 1967 than in the corresponding period of 1966: a revitalized training program has been instituted for Regional and Popular Forces; and U.S. advisors are working more extensively with Regional and Popular Force units.

G. Perhaps most important of all, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces leadership now displays increasing confidence in their own units' capabilities versus those of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army.