

In my meeting with President Thieu on November 4 I made a strong statement of our desire that the U. S. Government receive the full 118 piasters in exchange for dollars. I said we had been advised that the Board of Directors of the National Bank had determined that a commission payment of one-half of one percent must be collected on transactions involving purchase of piasters for U. S. military personnel as well as for official U. S. uses. I noted that when the 80 to one rate was in effect for official uses and the 118 to one rate for personnel purchases, the National Bank had waived the commission on both. I pointed out that the establishment of a lower rate for U. S. personnel and for U. S. official uses could have serious consequences on American opinion and on the American Congress. President Thieu said he was not familiar with the problem and would look into it.

In my meeting with President Thieu November 4 I also went into several outstanding civil aviation matters, including the status of the Caribou aircraft in Bangkok awaiting clearance from the Government of Vietnam for use by a U. S. contract agency in South Vietnam, French rights to overfly South Vietnam en route to communist China, and continental air services operating problems with the ministry of transport in fulfilling its contracts with U. S. contract agencies in South Vietnam. President Thieu smiled and said simply that the new Minister of Transport should be able to take care of the three pending problems.

E. Chieu Hoi

Returnees during the reporting period were 362, compared to 392 for the same period last year, and also below last week's figure of 452. The total number of returnees so far this year is 25,028.

F. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending November 4 the enemy killed 111 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 236, and kidnapped 45. Among the dead were 23 Revolutionary Development workers, 20 national police, two Hamlet Chiefs, and one member of a Village Council. During the week the enemy killed 160 Vietnamese military personnel.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

5:05 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Attitudes in the Senate Toward the
International Grains Arrangements

Schnittker and Roth's consultations in the Senate indicate there should be no serious difficulty with ratification of the International Grains Arrangement.

Only Senators Mundt, Curtis, Hruska and Miller are expected to actively oppose. You asked why. John Schnittker says their position is a combination of partisan politics and support of the Farm Bureau line. The Bureau -- alone among the major farm organizations -- opposes the International Grains Arrangement (as they do all commodity agreements and domestic farm programs) as being inconsistent with a free market.

W. Rostow Rostow

73

CONFIDENTIAL—

Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
4:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres file

I had a good talk with Bill Scranton this afternoon. Although he won the election in Pennsylvania yesterday, he was willing to hear my pitch on the importance of the Philippines.

He then asked why you had asked him.

I said I believed it was for the following reason: while a good career Ambassador could understand the political process in the Philippines, it would take someone with political experience and confidence to play our margin of influence well; and how we played our cards could mean the difference between a success story and disaster, since there are both positive and negative forces at work in the Philippines. He said that he would like to have until next Monday to think it over.

I said we would give him until then.

Comment: I think my pitch was strong enough to keep him from saying "no." And I would guess he is attracted by the idea of going back into diplomacy and public service. On the other hand, the pull of his Pennsylvania commitments, etc., may prove too strong over the week-end.

W. W. R.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED FOR E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAR. 12, 1992.

BY kg CN 12-11-91

~~SECRET~~

74
ACTION

Pres file

Mr. President:

Wednesday, November 8, 1967 -- 3:00 p.m.

Herewith Joe Alsop's revised draft -- now cleared on a factual basis by the CIA.

His proposed scenario is in the covering letter to you.

I believe there is merit in his argument that we should use what we know about Communist thinking to sober those who believe that the object of the exercise is "negotiations" rather than peace. In terms of substance, I believe:

-- The bracketed passage on the first page is not necessary.

-- A passage like the attached (Tab B) should be included. It is from a captured notebook reflecting a high-level lecture on the Communist concept of a coalition government.

-- Most important, there should be a closing passage which says this: I am making available these facts not because we do not seek a negotiated end to the war. We wish to see the war ended by negotiation at the earliest possible date. But it is important for all of us to understand maturely what Communists have in mind when they talk of negotiations. In the end, if there is to be an honorable peace, they will have to be persuaded that the object of a negotiation is a stable peace, not a route to victory over the South Vietnamese and their allies.

-- A final question is whether you should introduce this material into the national dialogue, or should Secretary Rusk.

You may wish to seek the views of Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara on this whole matter.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MANUAL. CANCELLED FOR E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 18, 1992.

BY *lg* ON *12/1/96*

~~SECRET~~

74a

JOSEPH ALSOP

2720 Dumbarton Avenue
Washington 7, D. C.

Telephone
965-1770

November 8, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

The misunderstanding concerning my first draft for you has now been cleared up, and I am sending today to Walt the text which has been gone over word by word with the appropriate experts, who have approved it in full, as easy to support from the numerous documents in their possession.

Let me briefly suggest a scenario for use of this paper.

First, you should have a late afternoon press conference in order to present the paper itself. This should command the leading position in every newspaper the next morning. If the thing is rightly done, your statement should also be on television.

Second, this initiative by you will then touch off a document-hunt, to find what it is that your statement refers to. The documents themselves should then be made available the next day, marked appropriately, so that my generally rather lazy colleagues can find the relevant passages in the general wilderness of the texts. The documents will then command the lead of the following morning's papers.

Third, inevitably an argument about the meaning of the documents themselves will then ensue. If the people that everyone like Scotty will go to, Bill Bundy, Dick Helms et al, are appropriately briefed, most of the people who will most deeply dislike the new facts put before the public, will in the end be forced to admit that facts are facts, and must be taken cognizance of. If you successfully arrive at this point, you will have achieved the great change in tone in the national debate that is now so urgent.

on luck - so ? say:

your luck is always

Good luck! Yours -

Joe Alsop

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

From many quarters -- some of them new -- your government is again being assailed with advice to order a pause in the Northern bombing in Vietnam, in the hope that this may lead to meaningful negotiations. The time may come -- I hope it does -- when a change of signals from the other side will again make a bombing pause a worthwhile experiment. But at the present time, it is more appropriate to set the record straight on this matter of pauses and negotiations.

[I hope I shall not shock you by saying that I have known for a long time how to get negotiations immediately -- at any rate in theory. And I hope, too, that when I reach that aspect of the problem, you will heartily agree with me that negotiations on the terms set by Hanoi are not to be desired by a single decent American.

But] this is a complex story, which has been mainly reconstructed with great care, and beyond persuasive challenge, from the numerous enemy documents our brave men have captured on the field of battle; and it is better to begin at the beginning. Briefly, there were two stages in Hanoi's first response to the American decision to keep our solemn pledges to South Vietnam. In the first stage, after the intervention of American troops on the ground in the summer of 1965, the central committee of the North Vietnamese Communist party considered what to do next -- the Viet Cong in the South never seem to have had any say at all in the matter. On this occasion, the Chinese Communist government pressed the Hanoi leaders to adopt a sharply revised war strategy, and the Hanoi Politburo perhaps also included some advocates of this course of action. The proposed revision of strategy (also called for in such circumstances by the North Vietnamese doctrine covering this kind of war) would have

meant fragmenting many of the big units that were already in the field in the South -- the divisions and regiments in fact -- and giving the main emphasis to small unit guerrilla warfare until a more favorable opportunity. In the upshot, the Chinese advice was rejected for reasons which are debatable. Probably the decision was strongly influenced by the morale effects of following the Chinese program, which was to fight on "for seven years," after which the Chinese said they would be ready to come to the aid of North Vietnam. That autumn, we then began to receive informal intimations from Soviet sources that the Hanoi leaders could be induced to come to the negotiating table, if only I would order a long pause in the Northern bombing. There was no formal promise or commitment, but, the intimations were very strong and very numerous. Accordingly, I ordered a pause of more than a month, beginning in the Christmas season of 1965. We now have clear evidence that the Soviets tried hard to make their intimations become realities, by urging the Hanoi leaders to go to the negotiating table without further delay. But this Soviet advice was also quite flatly rejected.

Such is the needed background for an understanding of the decisions of the meeting of the central committee of the North Vietnamese Communist party that occurred at some time in the winter of 1965, and passed what was called "Resolution Twelve". We have no precise text of Resolution Twelve, but we now know many very important elements of its contents, from voluminous captured documents on at least the level, say, of messages from Secretary McNamara to General Westmoreland. To begin with, Resolution Twelve

confirmed the summer decision to go forward with the big unit war -- the war of regiments and divisions, already at that time mainly sustained by North Vietnamese regular troops covertly invading South Vietnam. It further confirmed the decision not to negotiate, at least until "victory" had been won. But this "victory" that was stated to be the absolutely essential prelude to talks, was defined in a peculiar way. It was to be -- and I quote from the documents -- "the annihilation of a brigade, or at least a battalion of American troops". In other words, what was sought was a sort of Dienbienphu, which the Hanoi leaders evidently expected to create a favorable negotiating climate. Thank God, no such "victory" has yet been won. But I would have you note, very carefully indeed, that the Hanoi leaders long ago concluded that they would not negotiate before such a "victory" -- before this hoped-for annihilation of a whole American unit, which they believed, following analogies from their own past, would paralyze the United States with fear and dismay. I think the Hanoi leaders misread the American character; for if we ever have a serious reverse on the field of battle -- and pray God we do not -- I believe the response will be altogether different. But it must also be noted that to put it in mildest terms, the Hanoi leaders' prior requirement for going to the negotiating table, as decided by them, was pretty cold-blooded. And finally, I would have you note that if you had a government mad, cruel and authoritarian enough to have plotted to meet Hanoi's requirement by sacrificing a U. S. unit, we might by now have been at the negotiating table for many months.

Nor does the story end there; for in that winter of 1965, the Hanoi leaders looked even further ahead, to the new phase that they hoped would open when they had won their "victory," and had

therefore begun to negotiate. This phase was characterized -- and again I quote from the documents -- as "fighting while negotiating." The documents make it abundantly clear that a great deal more importance was attached to the fighting than to the negotiating. Indeed, "negotiating" was described, ^{the documents} in this, as a "tactic" to exploit the prior "victory". And the documents also make it clear that the phase of "fighting while negotiating" was therefore expected to lead to "complete victory," meaning the subjugation of South Vietnam.

Such then was the enemy's actual policy formally adopted by the North Vietnamese Communist Party, concerning the right timing of negotiations, and the right way to proceed if and when negotiations should be opened. As soon as the policy had been communicated to the Southern headquarters, known as Central Office South Vietnam, it was obediently accepted there. We know that this whole policy, as above outlined, was again reviewed, and we infer that it was confirmed, at another meeting of the central committee of the North Vietnamese Communist party which took place at some time last winter. This meeting passed "Resolution Thirteen." Concerning Resolution Thirteen our evidence is more skimpy. But it is enough to indicate that doubts were already rising about North Vietnam's ability to sustain the kind of war that they were still trying to fight at that time. For example, according to one document, it was decided that the whole matter was to be reconsidered at once in the event of the U. S. troop commitment reaching 600,000 men. But there is not a hint, in any of the evidence, that there was any change of negotiating policy.

We are beginning to suspect, finally, that those rising doubts in Hanoi may have led to a decision this summer to change the long-standing pattern of the war. There is evidence--(fragmentary as yet, that there has been still another Central Committee meeting, which passed a Resolution 14. We must wait and see what the new pattern may be---although we may be confident that any change made will reflect North Vietnam's increasing difficulty in carrying the burden in the South on the old basis. We still have not a particle of evidence, meanwhile, of any change whatever in the distinctly grim but formally adopted negotiating policy I have already outlined.

To this I would add two further points. In the hope of promoting negotiations, and on the basis of all sorts of intimations from UN and other sources, I have at different times since Christmas, 1965, ordered five additional bombing pauses of varying durations. None has had any result. Until the signals from the other side change a bit, I see no reason to repeat an experiment which has proved useless six times in a row. Nor can I ignore the central fact that "fighting while negotiating" is the enemy's own description of the phase that is to begin when and if we ever go to the table together. If negotiations are to be a mere "tactic", solely intended to give the other side a fighting advantage, I cannot in good conscience and with due regard for our men in the field go forward on that basis. Precisely because the enemy purpose is "fighting while negotiating", your government has always insisted that any really prolonged suspension of bombing would have to be paralleled or reciprocated by a comparable step taken by Hanoi, such as the stoppage of the flow of Northern regular troops into South Vietnam. I am sorry that this statement has been so long. The facts are complex, and although almost all of them have been declassified long ago, they still need to be set forth in detail because no one seems to be aware of them.

I shall now be glad to answer questions

74c

~~SECRET~~

In the process of this general uprising there may be a coalition government. The U.S. troops must withdraw. The coalition government may include a non-revolutionary element as president. But he must follow the essential line of action as stipulated by the Front... If a coalition government is formed and the chairman is not a comrade of ours what will be the consequences?... The Front will be the core element but we are not strong enough now to deal them a lethal blow. A coalition government opens the way to attaining our revolutionary goals... To all appearances, it is a coalition government but its real powers lie in our hands. And the government must be on the side of the Front's stand and follow the lines of the revolution's policy. We must take risks and form a coalition government without having to wait until the Americans have completely pulled out.

Extract from Saigon 544, November 8, 1967

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-217

By ms, NARS, Date 1-18-84

~~SECRET~~

75

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
3:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Sec. McNamara may well have forwarded to you this memorandum to him from Gen. Wheeler on the increased use of ARVN forces in the DMZ area.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rln

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By lg, NARA, Date 11-22-91



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

75a
CM-2741-67
8 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Foreign Report Article: "Vietnam: Is the DMZ Worth Fighting For?"

1. I am enclosing for your information comments by General Westmoreland and General Greene on the subject article.

2. General Westmoreland points out the importance of Con Thien as a key piece of terrain and a critical position in the strongpoint obstacle system. He also outlines improvements in the situation at Con Thien since late September, and reaffirms his ability to defeat the enemy should the attack be reopened. (at paragraph) w.


3. General Greene states that there are two basic reasons for the presence of Marines in strength along the DMZ: construction of the strongpoint obstacle system and defense against a strong enemy invasion threat. He also points out the importance of protecting Route #9, which is the only East-West line of communication available in North and South Vietnam.

4. In general, I believe that the attached comments have covered the major issues raised in this article. I would add only one thought: our withdrawal from Con Thien at this point would no doubt have a sharply adverse psychological impact -- here at home, in Vietnam and world-wide. In this regard, you may recall the serious morale problems which were encountered earlier this year among the civilian population in the northern provinces at the height of the VC/NVA campaign in that area. Despite this, however, it is completely inaccurate to say -- as the article does -- that the fate of the whole American effort in Vietnam is at stake, or even that the loss of Con Thien would lead to the fall of the northern provinces to the enemy.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-273
By jis, NARA Date 5-11-98

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

75-8

COMMENTS BY GENERAL WESTMORELAND ON

Foreign Report Article, "Vietnam: Is the DMZ Worth Fighting For?"

1. I have reviewed the article quoted in the reference and believe there is little to be gained in attempting to refute the speculative comments of the author, and have, therefore, limited my comments to those statements which are somewhat substantive.

2. First as to the importance of Con Thien. There is no difference of opinion between myself and my senior subordinates, Army or Marine, or between myself and General Vien on the importance of Con Thien. Our mission in Quang Tri is to defeat the enemy in his attempts to invade northern I CTZ through the DMZ. Since July 1966, he has made several efforts with multi-battalion forces to thrust his way into South Vietnam. These incursions had to be defeated. The importance of Con Thien to our posture in Quang Tri Province is manifested in several ways. First, it is the key piece of terrain between Gio Linh and the rugged foothills to the west and lies astride a natural infiltration route into South Vietnam. From Con Thien, direct observation to the south and southeast covers the entire US/ARVN positions from Gio Linh/Dong Ha to Cam Lo. If available to the enemy, this vantage point would cause incalculable damage to friendly positions and the populated areas in Quang Tri. Because of its criticality, our plans for a defensive system in Quang Tri are hinged on Con Thien. This is the key strongpoint in the obstacle system. Finally, if we didn't hold at Con Thien, I am confident the process would be repeated at C-2, Cam Lo, or wherever we decide that our foremost position should be. Although, the rearward positions would not have as much enemy artillery bearing on them as at Con Thien, he could reach them with his longer range guns from behind the Ben Hai, and they would be equally susceptible to mortar, rocket and ground probes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 09324
By is NARA, Date 8-16-99

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3. The statement that the Marine Corps position at Con Thien is becoming increasingly more vulnerable is not supported by the facts. During the peak of the attacks in September, accompanied as they were by a 100 per cent increase in rainfall over the average of 15 inches for that month, the road to Con Thien was blocked. However, since late September, regular convoys have been moving overland into the position. On a daily basis the position is being hardened and, although fighting may be a preferred occupation for Marines to digging, they have shown a professional grasp of the relationship between the two, and are preparing their defenses properly. Last Sunday, 29 October, in a sudden surge of artillery firing, the enemy delivered over 100 rounds on Con Thien and there were no casualties incurred.

4. In September, we did not fear a second Dien Bien Phu at Con Thien. In fact, when the final reports are in from both sides, I am convinced that the record will show that the enemy suffered enormously from his decision to concentrate large numbers of men and weapons in the DMZ area. If he reopens the attack, after its current lull, he will again pay dearly and will be defeated. I will repeat a statement that I made earlier: If an analogy must be made, Con Thien is a Dien Bien Phu in reverse.

5. The statement that "counter attacks (whether by shelling or bombing) have killed more Marines than enemy troops" is groundless. We have not claimed a specific enemy KIA by air and artillery because much of it has been delivered across the demarcation line where count is impossible. However, we do know, that a large portion of the 3,000 enemy killed (body count) since July in Quang Tri Province has been caused by air and artillery. To this figure my J2 has estimated from collateral sources that at least 3,000 additional casualties have been suffered by the enemy from air and artillery attacks in the DMZ. On our side there have been some short round casualties. Specifically, over the past six months there have been 17 Marines KIA by friendly fires out of a total of 614 Marines lost in Quang Tri Province.

~~SECRET~~

6. In conclusion, our tactical dispositions in northern Quang Tri are sound. They have brought about a major enemy defeat. Although I do not believe we should be inflexibly welded to any one position or posture, I am fixed in my belief that we must continue to hold the strongpoints north of Route 9 in Quang Tri Province, or give the enemy a major tactical as well as psychological victory. The one accurate inference that can be drawn from the article is that I find the latter alternative unacceptable.

~~SECRET~~



HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

75c

~~SECRET~~

Dear Bus,

This responds to your memorandum of 1 November requesting my views on the British article "Is the DMZ Worth Fighting For", published 26 October 1967 by the Economist Newspaper Limited, of London.

The article, of course, is filled with vague statements, and contains numerous inaccuracies. I have seen and concur wholeheartedly with General Westmoreland's response to your back channel. The following additional thoughts may be helpful.

In general terms, two basic reasons account for our presence along the DMZ in strength. In the first place US Forces remain in the DMZ area because CG III MAF has been directed by COMUSMACV, and he in turn by higher authority, to construct a strong point-obstacle system to help impede infiltration of forces from NVN across the DMZ into South Vietnam. In the second place, forces are there to meet the immediate threat posed by some thirty thousand enemy troops who possess the capability to invade South Vietnam in force and have repeatedly demonstrated they are not loth to use that capability. So long as either of the above reasons remains valid, the requirement to keep significant force in the DMZ area will continue.

In addition to those reasons, Route #9 is the only East-West line of communications available in northern South Vietnam, and it, in turn, intersects several major infiltration trail networks from Khe Sanh all the way to Quang Tri City. The next significant East-West line of communications is near Danang. While I do not infer that any movement to the southward would automatically constitute a realignment of our forces all the way to Danang, it is relevant to note that by giving up Route #9, we would be sacrificing the continuing access to enemy infiltration routes which Route #9 now provides.

As a final comment, I abhor the invidious and continuing veiled allusions to Marine and Army differences in strategy and viewpoint. COMUSMACV is the operational commander on the

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Authority RAC 09329
By lis NARA, Date 3-13-98

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SECRET

ground. CG III MAF performs the tasks which are assigned him. From the start of our joint involvement, the views of the Marine Corps Commander have been received and respected, and in the same vein, the directives of General Westmoreland have been received and carried out. There is no lack of communications between the two Commanders, physically, vocally or electrically. The inferences that either misunderstandings or differences exist are simply not so and I continue to reject them.

Sincerely,

Wally

WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.
General, U. S. Marine Corps

SECRET

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INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
2:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Generals Wheeler,
Westmoreland and Greene comment on
The Economist article on the DMZ.

The marked passages at the
paper clip may particularly interest
you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By ry, NARA, Date 11-22-91



~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

76a

CM-2737-67
7 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Disposition of Forces in the DMZ Area (S)

1. (S) In response to your request concerning plans for ARVN Forces to assume a greater share of the garrison responsibility in the DMZ area, as discussed in our 30 October meeting, General Westmoreland has been queried and the details of his plan are outlined below.

2. (S) The plan provides for ARVN units to occupy specific strong points and combat operating bases in the Strong Point Obstacle System (SPOS). At the enclosure hereto, strong points are indicated as A-1 thru A-6 and combat operating bases as C-1 thru C-4.

3. (S) Plans call for the 2d ARVN Regiment to occupy positions A-1, A-2 and A-3 with one battalion at each strong point position; also with one battalion, the regimental headquarters, reconnaissance company and artillery at the combat operating base C-1. The US Marines will man A-4 at Con Thien and combat operating bases C-2, C-3 and C-4, thereby providing depth and reinforcement to the forward elements. At the present time four ARVN Airborne Battalions are in position at A-1, A-2 (Gio Linh) and C-1 while the 2d ARVN Regiment is being trained for their new role. Two battalions have completed training and will relieve two airborne battalions in the SPOS next week. The remaining two battalions will complete training on/or about 15 November 1967 and will relieve the remaining airborne battalions. The 2d Regiment has been equipped with the M-16 rifle and has received special training on the employment of sensors.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-273

~~SECRET~~

By iss, NARA Date 5-11-98

~~SECRET~~

4. (S) The US Marines will continue to occupy A-4 (Con Thien) until after the monsoon and the tactical situation permit the transfer of responsibility to the ARVN. 2

5. (S) It is significant to note that US elements are in position to reinforce and influence the action in the entire DMZ area.

6. (S) It is recommended that a copy of this memorandum be provided to the President.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

By iso, NARA Date 5-11-98

~~SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Wednesday, November 8, 1967, 1:00 pm

AGENDA

1. Middle East. (Sec. Rusk)
 - Situation in New York
 - Line to be taken with Hussein when he meets the President at 5:30 pm
2. BUTTERCUP. (Sec. Rusk)
 - Next moves.
3. Bombing Policy. (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
4. Amb. Bunker's visit. (Sec. Rusk)
 - Schedule, including public exposure.
 - Substantive issues and objectives.
5. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing. (Sec. Rusk)
 - A report.
6. Other.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 12-13-81

78

~~PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wed., Nov. 8, 1967
12:25 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

It would be good if -- at lunch today -- you were to underline your wish that Sect. Rusk actually take off the full week-end at Camp David.

He needs a rest.

W. W. R.

~~PERSONAL/CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,
SEC. 1.3 AND ADMINISTRATOR'S MEMO OF
MAY 13, 1992.

BY rg ON 12-11-91

~~Confidential~~

79

Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
12:10 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

At their request, Congressman Brad Morse and Paul Findley called on me today. Morse did most of the talking, but Findley indicated that he spoke well for both.

1. They hear rumors and believe that major new military initiatives will be taken by the United States. In particular, they think that an invasion of North Viet Nam is being planned. They believe that if any such new move is taken, there should be Congressional consultation that goes beyond regular consultation; that is, there ought to be some kind of vote.

2. I asked on what basis they had come to this conclusion. Morse listed the six following "assertions and pieces of gossip" which he has put together:

- assault troops are being assembled at Okinawa, Hawaii and the Philippines;
- naval and marine enlistments have been extended by four months;
- landing barges are being assembled on the West coast;
- the Department of Defense is quietly buying up contracts for container ships, which are now hard to get on a commercial basis;
- the production of jet engines has been diverted to flying crane helicopters to the point that deliveries to the F111 are being slowed down;
- an unnamed prominent businessman reports that "several Government economists" told him that we shall have mobilization of an extra million men, which will lead to price and wage controls.

I said that I could verify none of this information.

3. The second point they made was this: They believe it would be a good idea to get from the Congress a vote in support of your Viet Nam policy. They are sure that the vote in the House of Representatives would be "overwhelmingly" in favor of your policy. The support would not be as great as in the Tonkin Gulf resolution, but it would be overwhelming. It is because he shares the judgment that Jack Bingham and other "dove" Congressmen would not join Morse and Findley in proposing such a vote.

I confined my response to assuring them that this information would be passed to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-477
By lip, NARA, Date 6-28-95

4. The final word was this: Tell the President that these observations are not meant to be an attack on his policy. We believe that the Congress should take more responsibility than it is taking; and this is one way to diminish controversy over the war. Morse said: I am only a "very mild" dove; for example, I would not urge that we cease our bombing of North Viet Nam. Findley said: I am a hawk. My people in Illinois want us to use our full power, and then get out. I don't like this kind of isolationism, but that is how they are feeling.

(S)

W. W. R.

cc: Barefoot Sanders

~~SECRET~~
ACTION

Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
11:20 a. m.

80

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Joe Sisco called. He said Arthur Goldberg and he believe that the most important thing for you to convey to Hussein at 5:30 this afternoon is the following:

-- If he wants our help in getting a settlement, it is important that he and his representatives get behind the U. S. resolution in New York.



1,3
(a)(5)

You may wish to discuss this at lunch today under item 1. of the agenda.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-477
By isp, NARA, Date 4-28-95

W. W. R.

ACTION

81

Wednesday, Nov. 8, 1967
11:10 a.m.

Pres file

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Fulbright's question of this morning

Senator Fulbright asked: Who is the enemy: Hanoi or Peking?

The answer is: both, in different ways.

If we fail in Viet Nam, two things will happen: Hanoi will take over South Viet Nam; U. S. military power will be moved off the Asian mainland. The combination of U. S. failure to deal with wars of national liberation and the removal of U. S. forces from the mainland will, in the judgment of all Asian observers, leave Southeast Asia at the mercy of Communist China. Without the U. S., there is no force in Southeast Asia capable of deterring Communist China.

Since 1954 that has been the assessment of the U. S. Government. It remains our assessment today.

W. W. R.

You may wish to raise this at lunch today and see if we can get agreement in the Government that this is the way to handle Fulbright's "confusion."

WWRostow:mz:rln

INFORMATION

82

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
10:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This exchange in Phnom Penh
between the U. K. Ambassador and
Burchett may interest you.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Intelligence Information Cable
7 Nov, [] 3 pages
for CIA internal use only

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 98-52; NLT 019-025-2-2
By 0115, NARA, Date 1/14/02

LIST OF INVITEES, NSC MEETING
November 8, 1967, Wednesday, 10:00 A.M.

Pro file

Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of Defense McNamara
JCS Chairman General Wheeler
OEP Director Daniel
USIA Director Marks
Secretary of Treasury Fowler

Attorney General Clark
Postmaster General O'Brien
Secretary of Interior Udall
Secretary of Commerce Trowbridge
Secretary of HEW Gardner
Secretary of Labor Wirtz
Secretary of HUD Weaver
Secretary of Transportation Boyd

Walt Rostow
George Christian
Bromley Smith

Senator Mansfield
Senator Richard Russell
Senator Margaret Chase Smith
Senator Fulbright
Senator Robert C. Byrd

Representative McCormack
Representative Albert
Representative Boggs
Representative Bates
Representative Bolton
Representative Mahon

INFORMATION

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/BUTTERCUP

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, for information,
Sec. Rusk's suggestion to Amb. Bunker
that we not name U.S. prisoners, but
let them send out some in poor health.
The reason: U.S. picking some rather
than others by name would involve either
inequity or suggestion of importance of
individuals concerned, which could be
misleading.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-477
By ing, NARA, Date 6-28-95

WWRostow:rln

DLA573 *****
OO YEKADS
DE YEKADL 294 3120133
O 080119Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE
ZEN/DEPT OF STATE
ZEN/OSD
ZEN/CAS SAIGON
ZEN

~~SECRET~~ ~~NOTIS~~

84a

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 NOV 8 02 29

~~SECRET~~ 080119Z VIA CAS CHANNELS CITE CAS WASHINGTON 50294
NODIS BUTTERCUP
FROM SECSTATE
TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON
THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. ROSTOW
SECDEF, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY MCNAMARA
SECSTATE, EXCLUSIVE FOR SECRETARY RUSK
DIRECTOR CIA, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. HELMS
REF: A. SAI GON 526
B. SAIGON 509
C. CAS/WASHINGTON 49639

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-478
By , NARA, Date 4-3-96

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED IN OUR BUTTERCUP MESSAGES TO YOU,
THEY ARE SUBJECT TO OUR DESIRE TO LEAVE FINAL DECISIONS ON DETAILS
IN YOUR HANDS.

THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR PRESENT SUGGESTIONS:

1. WHILE WE AGREE ON DESIRABILITY OF TRYING TO OBTAIN RELEASE OF US PWS AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT, WE DO NOT THINK IT ADVISABLE TO GO BEYOND SUGGESTING THAT US WOULD REGARD IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF SOME AMERICAN PWS (PARTICULARLY ANY WHO MAY BE IN POOR HEALTH) AS SIGN OF NLF GOOD FAITH MATCHING OUR GOOD FAITH IN RELEASING SAU HA AND THOSE CAPTURED THROUGH HIM AND OTHERWISE MEETING NLF CONDITIONS. WE PREFER TO AVOID NAMING EITHER SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS OR EXACT NUMBER OF PERSONS WE EXPECT TO BE RELEASED.
2. WE SUGGEST THAT A SENTENCE BE ADDED AT END OF PARAGRAPH 5D OF REF C ON INDICATING THAT US WOULD REGARD IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF SOME US PRISONERS (PARTICULARLY ANY WHO MAY BE IN POOR HEALTH) AS APPROPRIATE SIGN OF VC GOOD FAITH. IN ORDER NOT TO DELAY POSSIBLE RELEASE OF US PWS, THIS GESTURE OF GOOD FAITH SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD AS SUGGESTION AND NOT AS PRIOR CONDITION. WE SHOULD STAND ON OFFER CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 5D OF REF C.
3. IF WE ARE GOING TO SUGGEST IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF US PRISONERS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD ALSO ADVANCE SOME POSSIBLE MECHANISM WHICH WOULD AVOID GIVING CLEAR PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF AGREED EXCHANGE. ONE METHOD MIGHT BE TO HAVE NLF NOTIFY US THAT PWS IN POOR HEALTH WILL BE IN DESIGNATED AREA AT DESIGNATED TIME FOR EVACUATION BY US HELICOPTER. THE RELEASE COULD BE PORTRAYED AS HUMANITARIAN GESTURE.
4. WE ARE CONCERNED OVER POSSIBILITY RAISED IN REF B THAT SAU HA MAY NOT WANT TO RETURN TO NLF. WHAT IS CAS EVALUATION?
5. WHILE WE DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD INITIATE FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH LOAN ABOUT POLITICAL CONTENT OF MESSAGE FROM NLF YOU MAY WISH TO OBSERVE, IF THIEU RAISES POINT, THAT WE DISAGREE WITH LOAN'S INTERPRETATION (REF B PARA 1) THAT THERE IS SERIOUS INCONSISTENCY IN NLF MESSAGE WHICH STATES BOTH THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT BROADER ISSUES THAN PW EXCHANGE AND THAT NOW IS NOT RIGHT TIME TO TALK PEACE. WE REGARD THE LATTER STATEMENT IN CONTEXT OF BALANCE OF MESSAGE PRIMARILY AS AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW NLF IN POSITION OF STRENGTH.
6. WE ARE AWAITING YOUR DRAFT RESPONSE TO NLF MESSAGE.

GP-1

515

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

85

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
8:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

State (Bundy-Habib) have been working on a draft scenario for Bunker's visit, at George Christian's suggestion and mine.

It is on the agenda for lunch today, when you may wish to give definitive guidance to Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1992

By kg, NARA, Date 11-22-91

WWRostow:rlh



19182

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Proposed Program of Consultation
for Ambassador Bunker

Ambassador Bunker arrives the morning of November 10, a holiday, and will be here for a week or 10 days on consultation. I enclose a proposed program of consultation and other activities for the Ambassador, beginning November 13. On receiving White House approval, the Department will proceed to arrange specific engagements.

Regarding the substance of Ambassador Bunker's discussions here, we suggest the following major topics:

1. Progress in the war and prospects for 1968;
2. Development of effective Vietnamese political institutions and of effective government;
3. Ways to accommodate Vietnamese sensitivities regarding the United States presence and Vietnamese sovereignty;
4. Peace initiatives;
5. United States public's assessment of the war.

John P. Walsh
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Proposed program

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-165

By *ing*, NARA, Date 2-3-87

~~SECRET~~

Proposed Program of Consultation
for Ambassador Bunker
November 13-18

Monday, November 13

Morning

The President
Public appearance with the President at White House

Afternoon

The Secretary of State
The Vice President

Tuesday, November 14

Morning

Today's Show (Washington)
The Secretary of Defense

Afternoon

The Under Secretary, Mr. Katzenbach

Wednesday, November 15

Morning

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Afternoon

Governor Harriman
Ambassador Lodge

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 86-165

By lip, NARA, Date 2-3-87

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Thursday, November 16

Morning

House Foreign Affairs Committee

Afternoon

Ambassador Goldberg

Friday, November 17

Morning

Mr. Gaud

Mr. Helms

Mr. Marks

Afternoon

JCS

Saturday, November 18

Morning

The Secretary of State
The President

Evening

Major speech in New York or elsewhere away from
Washington

Sunday, November 19

Joint TV appearance with General Westmoreland on
discussion type program

Evening

Departure

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

86

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
8:50 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Nick's attached suggestion of Ed Martin as DAC chairman (Development Assistance Committee) is, in my judgment, excellent.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

86a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Edwin Martin as DAC Chairman


Some weeks ago Bill Gaud and I suggested that Ed Martin, now our Ambassador at Buenos Aires, be considered as the American nominee for the Chairmanship of the Development Assistance Committee. You indicated at that time that you wanted to consider other possibilities. I am attaching a list of people from inside and outside Government who we considered for this appointment. Those names I have checked have indicated that they would not be interested in the job. The others have not been approached, but I doubt that any of them have the qualifications of Martin.

The DAC Chairman is elected by the Members of DAC. These members are the principal aid contributing countries in Europe plus Japan and Australia. The Chairman is an independent person, not a governmental representative, but it is important to US interests that he be thoroughly familiar with and loyal to our objectives. He is the fellow who initiates consortium proposals, pulls them together, works closely with the IBRD and the regional banks, and does his best to see that multilateral funds are put together in ways which are most productive. It is essential that he be a senior person recognized by other countries as a man who knows and understands economic development. It is also important that he have a complete understanding of US programs and objectives and by doing so, effectively minimizes the need for government-to-government representations. It is important also to have an American, in view of our decreasing aid capabilities and emphasis upon multilateral programs, since a European or Japanese would be likely to make continuous unrealistic requests of the United States.

Other governments have candidates for the job, and the Germans have recently put up a quite strong candidate. It is important that we counter with a person whom they will accept as extremely well-qualified. This is difficult because the job does not have great prestige, yet the right person in it can significantly advance US development interests.

Martin has excellent qualifications, having had long experience in major posts dealing with economic matters, including serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from 1960 through 1962. He has also had major economic jobs with respect to Far East and European matters and is well-known to the Members of DAC. He has served in Argentina since January, 1964, and is therefore due for reassignment or retirement. He is 59 years old.

The Foreign Affairs Act of 1961 gives the President authority to appoint a US citizen to the DAC Chairmanship. ~~The appointment does not require Senate confirmation but~~ does require the approval of DAC countries.



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Attachment:
List

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

LIST OF INDIVIDUALS CONSIDERED FOR DAC CHAIRMAN

INSIDE GOVERNMENT

✓ John O. Bell
Former Ambassador
Former Deputy ICA
Presently Political Adviser, POLAD/CINCSTRIKE

Joel Bernstein
Former Director, USAID/Korea

✓ Winthrop Brown
Former Ambassador to Korea

John Bullitt
Former Assistant Secretary of Treasury
Presently Assistant Administrator, A. I. D.

Bob Fluker
Economic Minister in Thailand

✓ William O. Hall
Former Assistant Administrator for Administration, A. I. D.
Presently Ambassador to Ethiopia

✓ Michael Harris
Former Deputy Secretary General, OECD

Julius Holmes
Retired Ambassador

✓ Graham Martin
Ambassador to Thailand

James Riddleberger
Ambassador (in process of retirement)

✓ Anthony Solomon
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Lane Timmons
Ambassador to Haiti

Philip Trezise
Ambassador to OECD

86c

OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT

Robert Asher
Brookings Institute

✓ Vincent Barnett
President, Colgate University
Former Economic Counselor, Rome
ECA Official

Leland Barrows
Staff, University of Pittsburgh
Former Ambassador and ICA Official

Walker L. Cisler
Chairman Board, Detroit Edison Co.
Consultant, AID

✓ Emile Despres
Professor of Economics
Stanford University

✓ Milton Eisenhower

Robert Everts
Netherlands Representative to DAC

✓ Irving Friedman
IBRD

✓ Michael Hoffman
IBRD

Neil Jacoby
UCLA

✓ Milton Katz
Harvard Law School
Formerly Marshall Plan Representative in Paris

John Kenney
Sullivan, Shea & Kenney
Former Director, ECA, England and Deputy Director, MSA

✓ Walter Levy
Oil Consultant

OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT

-2-

- ✓ Edward S. Mason
Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Chairman, AID Advisory Committee on Economic Development
- ✓ Escott Reid
Principal of Glendon College, York University, Toronto, Canada
(Former Canadian Ambassador to Germany)
- Sir Denis Rickett
Second Secretary, British Treasury Department
- Seymour Rubin
Surrey, Karasik, Gould & Greene
Former General Counsel of A.I.D.
- Charles E. Saltzman
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
- ✓ Raymond Vernon
Harvard University

87

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Wednesday, November 8, 1967
8:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

I prepared this note on the assumption that Sec. Rusk would wish to report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty at lunch today.

He feels that, despite some alarmist cables from ~~Amb.~~ McGhee, there is no reason to do so at the moment.

Nevertheless, you may wish to read this note as background.

W. W. Rostow

*Example attached at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 28, NARA, Date 12-11-91

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-344

By ab, NARA, Date 6-7-85 Tuesday, November 7, 1967

87a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Germany and the N. P. T.

This is a good time to get Secretary Rusk's appraisal of where we are going on the N. P. T. Last week we made good progress on Article III (the safeguards clause):

- The Euratom countries could not get together on their own Article III (only the Germans presented an "illustrative" draft) and contented themselves with giving us five "principles," which we probably can live with.
- We were able to hand to the Russians at Geneva on Thursday a revision of their own draft Article III incorporating much of the five Euratom principles, plus some key language from the German "illustration." Preliminary Russian reaction was reasonably forthcoming.

We still must be particularly careful with the Germans. There is a strong possibility that they will not ratify the N. P. T. even if (as seems likely) they grudgingly sign it. German adherence, however, is vital to the success of the Treaty. Yet we cannot afford to put so much pressure on them that we give nationalists an easy means of attacking Germany's U. S. ties. The political situation comes down to this:

- Attitudes among top German politicians and officials range from total hostility, represented by people like Strauss and the right-wing press, to grudging acceptance, represented by Kiesinger and Brandt.
- The basic German dissatisfaction with the Treaty makes it easier for people like Strauss to propagate the view that the N. P. T. represents a U. S. - Soviet "deal" made behind Germany's back at her expense.
- The N. P. T. is not yet a big public issue; so far the issues it presents have been too complex to capture popular attention. We

~~SECRET~~

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can be grateful, in fact, that opposition has focussed on Article III, perhaps the most complicated aspect of the Treaty, rather than on basic principles. Nevertheless, the danger we face is that someone like Strauss will try to blow the Treaty up into a nationalist issue.

We do not yet know how the Russians will finally react to our revised Article III. If they insist on their original formulation we will face a dilemma:

- We must push the Russians hard to meet German concerns regarding Article III. Not to do so would give the Germans an excuse for rejecting the Treaty, and would seriously damage our relations with them. (We can ease things somewhat by close and high-level consultations.)
- On the other hand, an impasse with the Russians now would probably make it impossible to put a draft Treaty before this year's UN General Assembly and thus could delay the Treaty for as much as a year, if not kill it altogether.

You will want to get Secretary Rusk's assessment of these risks.

W. W. Rostow



RHU:em

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-342

By ing, NARA, Date 12-8-94

87-b
Thursday, November 2, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR MCGHEE (Bonn 4773)

SUBJECT: Possible Repercussions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

I have just learned that on October 31, the day of the NATO Advisory Committee Meeting, Chancellor Kiesinger summoned Ambassador Schnippenkoetter for a lengthy discussion because of his deep concern over the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Chancellor was evidently disturbed that the West German agreement to go along with EURATOM's five principles without insisting on specific language may have constituted a dangerous concession. It would appear that Science Minister Stoltenberg and other Christian Democratic elements so advised him. It will be recalled that just after the EURATOM ministerial decision, Stoltenberg held a press conference in which he laid down very strict requirements for an acceptable Article III and, in effect, rejected a reservations procedure. We are told that Schnippenkoetter persuaded the Chancellor only with the greatest difficulty to go along with the Foreign Office's agreement to permit the U. S. to proceed to negotiations with the Soviets on the basis of the five principles.

I believe the Chancellor's concern is symptomatic of the situation we now face locally. I am therefore setting out below some of the German domestic considerations which lead me to conclude that unless we now proceed with great caution in our negotiations with the Soviets and insure that basic German interests and concerns are met, the Non-Proliferation Treaty can constitute a serious threat to U. S. - West German relations and the future political orientation of West Germany much more serious, for example, than the effects of the offset issue.

Among German attitudes toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there exist various levels of sophistication. Regardless of their degree of understanding, however, all vocal elements oppose the Treaty in its present form. A general impression has taken root that:

A. The Treaty symbolizes an unwritten understanding between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., wherein we seek a political quid pro quo from the Soviets at Germany's expense;

B. A Non-Proliferation Treaty will result in serious handicaps for German nuclear research and commercial opportunities; and,

C. It will result in a setback for the European movement. Even those who agree that proliferation is dangerous and should be avoided, doubt that the proposed treaty will be effective in preventing it. No leading politician has publicly advocated that the West Germans should sign the treaty in its present form.

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The argument that signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is necessary in order to advance the government's new policy toward the East, although probably persuasive to some members in the Socialist Democratic Party, including Brandt, does not operate effectively on the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union, which has misgivings about certain aspects of the Eastern policy in any event. The two powerful often opposing wings of the party, headed by Strauss and Schroeder representing, respectively, the former Gaullists and the Atlanticists -- agree in rejecting the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and both have misgivings concerning the new Eastern policy, at least its all-German aspect. Strauss and his followers fear that the Treaty would preclude the creation of a European Nuclear Force which they consider a necessary step toward European unity. Schroeder's group probably concludes that a Non-Proliferation Treaty would result in a weakening of Atlantic ties through sharper delineation between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

As the Embassy's reporting indicates, the German press ranges from skepticism to outright hostility to the Treaty -- with the latter attitude predominating. The Springer press, which alone among the major public German media has supported our policy in Vietnam, is among the most outspoken in its opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are, throughout the press, dire warnings of a major breach in confidence between the U. S. and Germany over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Springer's influential Die Welt on October 31, 1967, stated: ... "Whether or not the Non-Proliferation Treaty comes into being, it has already fulfilled its main purpose for the Russians, namely to accelerate the erosion of European confidence in the U. S. That confidence could not be fully restored even by a failure of the Treaty, after Americans had been ready, in conjunction with the Kremlin, to subject the defense systems of its allies to a kind of discrimination which has no precedent in the relations among allies. It seems that ranking men in Washington are still unclear about the deeper consequences of this course. Meanwhile, they ought to have recognized that they can have only one thing: either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or an Atlantic Policy ..."

Regardless of the Chancellor's own feelings on the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- and they have never really been very positive -- he will have to pay heed to the sentiment within his party, which will be strongly against a Treaty which fails to take into account major German concerns. The concerns expressed by Birrenbach, who is the leader of his party on this issue, are restrained in comparison with the views of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union rank-and-file. The fear of Germany's being isolated on this issue is shared by both members of the coalition, and may in the end prove to be the

~~SECRET~~

controlling reason why West Germany will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I would consider it most dangerous, however, if we tried to take advantage of West Germany's apparent isolation in EURATOM. The effect on West Germany's relations with us and on its future orientation, if it were forced by a world opinion we have generated to sign a treaty which they feel does not protect basic German interests would, I believe, be very dangerous. If it is to sign, the German Government requires a treaty which it can defend publicly. This can best be accomplished by relying, to the maximum extent possible, on the draft language proposed by West Germany. It is of utmost importance that we do everything we can to counter the present deep concerns in Germany over the Non-Proliferation Treaty, through careful handling of the next stage of the negotiations -- in close consultation with the German Government.

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

Mr. Rostow 88

Pres file

SAINTED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-477

Dj. inf, NARA, Date 4-28-95

~~SECRET~~

November 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Luncheon Discussion--Points to be Made to King Hussein
(5:30 p. m. Today)

The main question to discuss with Secretary Rusk at lunch is exactly what tack to take with Hussein.

The Secretary and Arthur Goldberg have reassured him that we would try to get him the best deal possible in a negotiation. The net effect of this reassurance is that we, as a matter of policy, do not envision a Jordan consisting only of the East Bank. We're prepared to support the return of a substantial part of the West Bank with boundary adjustments, and we would use our influence to get compensation for any territory Jordan has to give up. Although we don't agree with either Jordan's or Israel's position on Jerusalem, we're prepared to use our influence to obtain a role for Jordan in Jerusalem. All this was covered with the clear qualification that we can't guarantee anything and don't speak for Israel.

You will probably want to confirm that position, but the tough question is how much to qualify it. Our ability to make good on our reassurance will depend partly on what comes out of the UN. We told Hussein Monday evening he ought to try to block the Indian resolution in the UN if he wanted us to be much good to him. The move to introduce the Indian resolution yesterday seems to have surprised him. Therefore, we don't know whether the Arabs and Soviets in New York have undercut Hussein or whether he was already committed to the Indian resolution and did not tell us, hoping that we might do the blocking job without his getting involved.

We don't want your talk with Hussein to be overly tactical, but there's a basic issue in how much we agree to help him if he can't help himself and us.



W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Pres file~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Crown Prince of Laos

Crown Prince Vong Savang will arrive tomorrow (Nov. 9) at 12:30 p. m. at the diplomatic entrance and will accompany you to your office for a 30-minute talk before lunch.

The Crown Prince is 35, shy but friendly, and has no real responsibilities in the government. He is being groomed to succeed his father. We do not expect the Prince to raise any matters of substance.

You may wish to:

-- recall your useful talks with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma last month and his helpful analysis of the situation in Laos and Southeast Asia;

-- praise the headway Laos has made toward political stability despite the strains of prolonged war;

-- tell him you have heard of his interest in agriculture and note we have made arrangements for him to see some of our agricultural experimental facilities at Beltsville and something of rural America;

-- say we are following progress of the Nam Ngum (Nahm-Goom) Dam with great attention. (We are one of nine countries involved in financing the dam which will produce 30,000 KW of power and will irrigate more than 12,000 acres of rice land;

-- express our regret and concern at the loss of life (200-300 a month) and the economic drain of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos;

-- ask for his views on recent heavy fighting in Laos, some of it 50 miles north of the royal capital (Luang Prabang).

The Prince may ask for U. S. help in building a new hospital outside Luang Prabang. The King is deeply interested in this.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-477

By WJ, NARA, Date 6-28-95~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You may wish to reply:

-- we are cooperating with UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) and the British in building a new maternal and health center in Luang Prabang;

-- while we have no funds available now for a new hospital, we would be willing to help renovate the existing provincial hospital in Luang Prabang.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

90

Wednesday,
November 8, 1967

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You may wish to send the attached letter of sympathy to Mrs. Hertz, widow of the AID man who died in Viet Cong captivity.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

copy
Pres file

90a

November 8, 1967

Dear Mrs. Hertz:

I am deeply grieved at the report of your husband's death while a captive of the Viet Cong. He died a hero, as surely as any soldier in the front lines. And he was in the front lines -- of our long-continuing struggle to make this world a better place.

He was a man of courage, a brave man, a man who served others. He was in Viet-Nam to help the people, and for this he was kidnapped by the Viet Cong, and held illegally through the long years, only to die, tragically, still unjustly held by his captors.

You and your children can always be proud of a man who made the ultimate sacrifice as he sought to help improve the lives of others.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our heartfelt sympathy -- a sympathy that is shared by a grateful nation.

Sincerely

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mrs. Gustav C. Hertz
Route 2
Leesburg, Virginia

LBJ:WJJorden:pas:11/8/67

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting with Rectors of South Vietnamese Universities and
Trustees of Education and World Affairs, November 9

The Rectors you are seeing represent each of the five South Vietnamese universities. They recently completed a seminar on "Policy Formulation in American Higher Education" conducted by Wisconsin State University, and financed by AID. (A Summary of this program is at Tab A). We do not yet know the participants' reaction to their visit, though in general, they are reported enthusiastic and pleased with what they have seen and done so far.

The Rectors (biographies at Tab B) and their universities are:

Dr. Tran Quang De, University of Saigon
Father Nguyen Van Lap, University of Dalat
Professor Nguyen The Anh, University of Hue
Venerable Thich Minh Chau, Van Hanh (Buddhist) University
Professor Pham Hoang Ho, University of Can Tho
(Dr. Bui Xuan Bao, University of Saigon (Secretary to the group)
Mr. Hoang Si Binh, AID/Vietnam interpreter

Vietnamese Amb Bui Dien
With the Rectors will be three trustees of Education and World Affairs (EWA). On Tuesday of this week, the Rectors met with the trustees to learn about EWA's activities and to discuss EWA's proposed Vietnam program. The EWA trustees present will be:

Mr. William W. Marvel, President of Education and World Affairs
Mr. Herman B. Wells, Chancellor of Indiana University
Mr. Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., President of Colgate University
Dr. Lee Dreyfus, President, Wisconsin State College
(You met with Marvel and Wells and other EWA trustees last January).

I suggest the following scenario for the meeting:

1. Introduction of Vietnamese Rectors and EWA trustees.
2. Remarks by you along the following lines:

To the Rectors -- The Vietnamese universities have a vital task in preparing a new generation for responsibilities of independence and growth.

-- Higher education abroad for Vietnamese can affect only a few students. The Vietnamese universities have a far more important educational role to play in finding and teaching solutions to Vietnamese problems.

-- You are pleased that the Rectors have had an opportunity during their visit to learn something about American education and to meet with distinguished educators, such as those in Education and World Affairs.

To the EWA Trustees

-- You are impressed by the progress EWA has made since January in formulating a role for the US academic community in the reconstruction and further development of Vietnam. (A copy of this program, with brief summary is at Tab C).

-- Encourage EWA to move forward with their plan and offer the continuing cooperation of the Government in so doing.

Suggest to both groups

-- That they discuss means by which the US academic community could assist the vital work of Vietnamese institutions of higher learning.

-- That they examine the possibility of using educational television in Vietnamese universities to present selected lectures by outstanding American academicians -- and, more importantly, to permit the best Vietnamese teachers to be available to all university students.

3. After your remarks, you might:

-- Ask the Rectors for their impressions of the United States. (They understand English, but are reluctant to express themselves in it -- we will suggest to them in advance that a spokesman be designated).

-- Give one of the trustees an opportunity to say a few words about EWA.

This should cover all the necessary aspects of your meeting, but I would recommend that you have the photographers in to take pictures of the group. ~~Depending on how the meeting goes, you might want to suggest that they see the reporters on their way out.~~

In addition to those named above, Doug Cater, Bill Leonhart and I would be present if you wish.

A fact sheet on Vietnamese universities is at Tab D.

W. A. Rostow

TABA
9/a

AID Seminar for Vietnamese Rectors

The Rectors of the five universities in South Vietnam are visiting the U. S. under an AID-sponsored project. The project grew out of an AID higher education survey in South Vietnam completed last April. The object is to allow the Rectors to review the administration and development of U.S. higher education, both public and private, with emphasis not only on purely technical aspects but also on the role and relationship of the schools to the community (educator-layman relationships, Board of Regents operation, etc.).

The trip is being run by the Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point, Wisconsin, under AID contract. Most of the participants' time has been spent in Wisconsin, visiting schools and participating in various educational activities there. They have also visited the University of Chicago and Harvard briefly. Their trip totals six weeks; they will remain in Washington until November 13 and will return to Saigon from a final conference in Hawaii on November 18.

Upon their return to Vietnam, they are expected to lead a conference of higher educators in determining improvements in the Vietnamese system.

TAB B
91b

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dr. Tran Quang De

Rector, University of Saigon
Born 1908, Sadec (South Viet-Nam)
Received Doctorate in Medicine at Faculty of
Medicine, Paris, 1935
Practicing surgeon and professor of medicine
at University of Saigon
Married, three children
Speaks French, some English

Father Nguyen Van Lap

Rector, University of Dalat
Born 1914, Quang Tri (Central Viet-Nam)
Graduate of the Faculty of Science and Letters
(History and Geography), University of
Aix-en-Provence, France
Formerly National Director of Catholic Action,
a Catholic welfare and community organization
Speaks French

Professor Nguyen The Anh

Rector, University of Hue
Born 1936 (Laos)
Received Doctorate in History from University of
Toulouse 1964, after "Agregat" degree from
University of Paris 1963
Married, four children
Speaks French and English

Venerable Thich Minh Chau

Rector, Van Hanh (Buddhist) University
Born 1920
Received M.A., Ph.D. in Buddhist studies from
Nalanda University, India
Author of several works on Buddhism, in Vietnamese
and Poli
Speaks English, French, Chinese, Poli
Comment: Minh Chau is highly respected as the
leading Buddhist intellectual. He has not
been involved in Buddhist political activity
and has managed to keep Van Hanh University
relatively clear of politics.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 -

Professor Pham Hoang Ho

Rector, University of Can Tho
Born 1931, Can Tho (South Viet-Nam)
Received Doctorate of Science (Biology and
Psychology) from University of Paris
Author of several books and articles on biology
and psychology
Was Director of Oceanographic Institute, Nha Trang
Married, three children
Speaks English and French

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

T A B C
91c

Summary of Education and World Affairs Vietnam Program --
"Reconstruction and Further Development in South
Vietnam: A Role for the U. S. Academic Community"

EWA takes note of the alienation of segments of the US academic community from our Vietnam policy. Their program grows out of the belief that if the academic community addressed itself to the economic and reconstruction needs of Vietnam something can be accomplished to ameliorate this alienation, that this will be an outcome strongly in the national interest and congenial to EWA's purposes.

Their objectives are summarized as follows:

1. To help create and support a climate of intelligent and informed concern in the United States, especially in academic circles, with respect to the development problems of South Vietnam.
2. To study the various means that should be adopted in order to give effective voice to that concern.
3. To provide as broad a base as practicable for participation by the U. S. academic community in cooperative development efforts with that country.

Their program has two main elements: study and operations. Study programs would be conducted directly within the present pattern of their organization and would include:

1. Academic study groups on up to 20 campuses sponsored and supported by EWA. These groups would concern themselves with subjects such as the Vietnamese educational system, nutrition and agriculture.
2. Study of the transfer of developmental expertise with Vietnam as a case study.
3. Study of Vietnam's "brain drain" problem. EWA has recently launched a world-wide study of this phenomenon. (The Vietnamese Rectors were particularly interested in this idea).
4. Study of possible additional sources of third-country assistance to Vietnam.

Operational programs would be identified by EWA, but undertaken by qualified existing organizations. These programs would include:

1. Assessment of Vietnamese educational development and the relationship of educational planning and expansion to manpower utilization and employment.

2. Manpower identification and recruitment.

3. Identification, collection and dissemination of information and research results bearing on development problems in Vietnam.

Thus far, EWA has taken the following specific steps to implement their program:

1. Preparation for the formation of study groups.

2. Formation of an EWA advisory committee.

3. Consultation with other groups involved in Vietnamese development efforts. They are already working with David Lilienthal's Development and Resources Corporation. (Lilienthal, like Ambassador Bunker, is an EWA trustee.)

4. Establishment of an informal advisory relationship with AID.

Comment

EWA's greatest need at this point is:

1. Encouragement from the Government.

2. Foundation funds -- they have hopes of some Ford money.

August 1, 1967

TABC
gld

EDUCATION AND WORLD AFFAIRS
522 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

RECONSTRUCTION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN
SOUTH VIET-NAM: A ROLE FOR THE U.S.
ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

This document is intended as a summary of several EWA memoranda and internal reports on this subject during recent months. In reflecting the June Board of Trustees decisions, it supersedes all the preceding EWA documents on this problem and sets the stage for what this organization will seek to accomplish on the Viet-Nam problem in the next year or two.

- I. Background of EWA Concern
- II. Elements of an EWA Program
 - A. Study Activities
 - B. Operational Activities
 - C. Categories of Personnel
in EWA Program
 - D. Steps Planned for Next
Six Months
- III. The Long-Term Nature of the Problem

Attachments

- A. Excerpt from EWA Board Meeting Minutes,
June 27, 1967
- B. I. Principal Features of Viet-Nam
Faculty Study Groups
- II. Report on Planning Undertaken for
Study Group at Cornell

For the past seven or eight months, Education and World Affairs has had under discussion the question of how the U.S. private sector (especially the academic community) might be more closely and more meaningfully related to the reconstruction and developmental needs of South Viet-Nam. Following the visit of the EWA trustees to the White House on January 20th, and especially since the regular March board of trustees meeting, the staff has been engaged in a wide range of conversations, and the establishment of new contacts, with individuals who are well informed on the nonmilitary side of the situation in South Viet-Nam. Our purpose over these weeks has been to accomplish the large amount of "homework" necessary for effective action on the ideas which EWA had formulated in a preliminary way prior to the January 20th discussions in Washington.

At their June 27th meeting, following a discussion of the problems of Viet-Nam with various invited guests who are knowledgeable about the country, the EWA board of trustees concluded that they had reached the definition of a role for this organization which is meaningful in terms of the problems of reconstruction and development in South Viet-Nam and at the same time is consonant with the nature of EWA itself. The trustees at that time voted approval for moving ahead with certain activities which had been proposed to them during the discussion and which had been fully explored during the meeting. (See Attachment A, excerpt from June 27 board meeting minutes.)

I. Background of EWA Concern

The compelling nature of the problem which South Viet-Nam constitutes for the United States forms the context of EWA's interest and concern. That country presents us with foreign policy dilemmas unequalled in recent American history. Many Americans, both in and out of government, question not only our tactics and strategy in South Viet-Nam, but even the validity of the entire American posture in Southeast Asia.

Given a national mood of such unrest and alienation, it is not surprising that the developmental needs of South Viet-Nam have appeared to be in the background of U.S. concern. The constructive aspects of American efforts in that country

are not well known and have not caught the public imagination. X
Many people seem to reject the possibility of doing anything significant on the development front in the midst of active hostilities. They apparently believe that internal insecurity is so great, because of the Viet Cong, that institution-building and development remain irrelevant until the war is ended.

* * * * *

We believe that the problem now faced by the United States in supporting the development of South Viet-Nam has parallels to the background situation which brought EWA into being. In the late 1950's, it had been agreed by a number of responsible officials and observers in both public and private life that the major resources of knowledge and skill within the academic community were not being brought to bear as effectively as they should be on the nation's problems in international affairs. To improve this situation was the principal reason for the creation of EWA.

AS/Adviser
Now again, but in a highly specific context and under much more complex circumstances, the need is to mobilize the resources of the universities, colleges and other reservoirs of talent and skill in the private sector, to plan and carry out a cooperative program of reconstruction, institution-building, and long-term development in South Viet-Nam. If we can be skillful and inventive enough to move forward on this front even before hostilities have ended, this alone will be an historic achievement. But in any event, it is not too early to start the planning of what can be done -- indeed, what must be done -- when the war is over.

The sharp emotional dissension we find in American public and private life today over the Viet-Nam question is itself a source of concern to EWA. One of the objectives of this organization is to promote constructive and fruitful relationships between the academic community and the federal government. But we doubt that circumstances are propitious for direct reestablishment of a meaningful dialogue, or for genuinely closing the gap that now separates a number of academicians and intellectuals from their government.

Yet the fact is, that to a significant degree, the resources needed to assist in the rebuilding and development of that unfortunate Southeast Asian country are to be found in the U.S. academic community. If, therefore, in approaching the Viet-Nam problem from other angles, something can be accomplished to ameliorate the present picture of alienation, it will be an outcome strongly in the national interest and especially congenial to EWA's purposes. This is the basic assumption underlying our projected efforts.

There are also several other premises. One is that the United States has a deep moral obligation to assist further with the constructive development of South Viet-Nam, not only because that country's stability and independence have been declared essential to American national interests, but also because of the destruction and disruption which the prosecution of the war has visited on it. EWA believes that the more direct participation of the U.S. private sector will become increasingly important over time. Working relationships between American and South Vietnamese individuals and institutions should contribute significantly to reknitting and strengthening the social fabric of that country. Although in the immediate future warfare in South Viet-Nam will presumably limit the involvement of the U.S. private sector, ways should be sought, even while hostilities are going on, to extend and strengthen our nongovernmental ties with the South Vietnamese.

EWA believes that the South Korean case may be instructive, that what that country has achieved in recent years underlines the importance of beginning to build as early as possible for the future reconstruction and concerted development of South Viet-Nam. To some students of the problem, it now appears that we waited ten or fifteen years longer in the case of South Korea than was really necessary. They feel that the heartening progress which South Korea has shown in the 1960's might well have come earlier if Americans and Koreans had been able to think in those terms during or immediately after that war. (It is therefore especially encouraging that the Development and Resources Corporation, under AID contract, has begun to work cooperatively with the South Vietnamese on a broad long-range economic development program. It will be of the greatest importance for EWA to keep fully informed on D and R's project, a process that can be facilitated by direct contacts with Mr. David E. Lilienthal who is a trustee of EWA and has already been extremely helpful to this organization on the Viet-Nam problem.)

Finally, we assume that our fundamental ignorance of South Viet-Nam must be taken into account and corrected as we prepare to work effectively with the people of that country. It is therefore important that appropriate linkages be established between U.S.-supported research and writing on and in that country, and our efforts to contribute to the solution of developmental problems through technical assistance and educational exchange. With respect to the theory and practice of developmental assistance generally, the United States might succeed in making a dramatic advance if it systematically based its efforts on the potentially supporting relationships between research on the problems of another country and the whole process of cooperation for development.

* * * * *

Against this background, Education and World Affairs has three objectives in view in proposing the program of activities described in the remaining pages of this document:

First, to help create and support a climate of intelligent and informed concern in the United States, especially in academic circles, with respect to the development problems of South Viet-Nam;

Second, to study the various means that should be adopted in order to give effective voice to that concern;

Third, to provide as broad a base as practicable for participation by the U.S. academic community in cooperative development efforts with that country.

II. Elements of an EWA Program

We foresee a need for two different kinds of activity directed towards the reconstruction and further development of South Viet-Nam: study and operations. The nature of EWA suggests that the study function could more easily be accommodated directly within the present pattern of the organization. When operational functions are identified and EWA believes itself not to be in a position to undertake them

directly, it should assume responsibility for helping to place them with qualified existing organizations, including EWA's affiliate, Overseas Educational Service.

A. Study Activities

1. Academic Study Groups. The program idea most fully developed at this stage is that of EWA sponsorship and support of up to twenty college and university faculty study groups on aspects of Vietnamese reconstruction and development. The idea of encouraging such study groups was first explored through EWA staff visits to several college and university campuses; was then the subject of a letter from EWA board chairman Herman B. Wells to eleven college and university presidents asking for nominations of faculty to attend a consultative conference; and was then discussed in depth at a conference held in New York in early June 1967.

The study groups would focus on problems of real and pressing concern in the reconstruction and further development of South Viet-Nam, such topics as: the present character and future reform of the educational system; problems of nutrition; improved patterns of agriculture; technical aspects of political development, with particular attention to the role of the hamlet in the Vietnamese political structure; transportation and water resource development; and architectural questions such as the adaptation of military structures to peace-time needs. Individual study groups might also expand the geographic focus beyond South Viet-Nam to include all countries in the lower Mekong region.

The study groups would be interdisciplinary, including not merely social scientists, but representatives from the humanities, natural sciences, and professional fields as well. Each group would be independent in the sense of adopting its own frame of reference on such matters as political and military expectations for South Viet-Nam. However, several groups would probably wish to develop some form of affiliation among themselves in order to share information, personnel, and financial resources. EWA would serve as the catalytic agent for the formation of the study groups, as a communication link between the various groups, as a channel both of information, and of financial and human resources to .

the groups and of recommendations from the groups to individuals involved in Vietnamese reconstruction and development.

The purposes of the study group program would be several: to develop new knowledge and information about South Viet-Nam and related problems; to disseminate this new knowledge to those individuals responsible for assisting in reconstruction and development programs; to provide those American faculty involved in the study groups an opportunity to explore and refine their theories of development; to provide U.S. government officials and others knowledgeable about South Viet-Nam an opportunity to meet with these faculty groups; and to facilitate the preparation of academic people for future service in programs of reconstruction and development.

(Attachment B gives further information on the faculty study group idea, being composed of "I. Principal Features of Viet-Nam Faculty Study Groups" and "II. Report on Planning Undertaken for Faculty Study Group at Cornell.")

2. Study of the Transfer of Developmental Expertise.

Programs for the reconstruction and development of South Viet-Nam should be based on an understanding of the ways in which a developing society can draw upon the accumulated expertise of a more advanced society. Despite twenty years of concentrated attention by the United States and other developed nations to the needs of the developing countries the concepts and techniques of this transfer of expertise are not nearly so well understood as one would expect.

Although this problem is obviously much broader than U.S. relationships with South Viet-Nam, nevertheless EWA hopes to carry out a study of it as part of the cluster of activities herein described. To work with the staff and other EWA consultants in thinking our way into this complex of questions will be one of the main assignments for the advisory committee, mentioned below. The objective would be, by making South Viet-Nam the main case study but drawing on other relevant experiences as well, to formulate basic concepts and operating principles applicable to the relationships in development cooperation between the United States and the less-advanced countries. It is anticipated that there will be opportunities for mutual support between this planning activity of the Advisory Committee and the deliberations of the faculty study groups.

(If a plan for a full-scale study of this range of problems is worked out three to six months in the future, it will probably require the designation of a study director and committee and the obtaining of special financing. What is projected here is only the exploration of the need for and possibility of such a study by the Advisory Committee working with the EWA staff.)

3. Study of Overseas Vietnamese. The willing or unwilling expatriation of many highly trained South Vietnamese seriously hinders the reconstruction and further development of their country. EWA has recently launched a major study of this "brain drain" phenomenon on a world-wide basis, under the title of "The International Migration of Talent." A special sub-study is now being explored to deal with these same "brain drain" problems with respect to South Viet-Nam.

This study would describe the present geographical distribution of overseas Vietnamese, analyze the reasons for their expatriation, and suggest policy recommendations that would encourage the return of some expatriates to useful positions in their own country.

4. Study of Third-Country Assistance to South Viet-Nam. Many Americans, in both the public and private sectors, have come to recognize the importance and relevance of multi-national approaches to development assistance. The peculiarly difficult problems of South Viet-Nam have prompted the effort to encourage participation of friendly European and Asian governments in present efforts to support that country, especially on the military front.

EWA believes there may be value in a careful study of the potential contributions from the private sectors of these other friendly countries to Vietnamese reconstruction and development. Of particular interest would be the possibility of increased attention by those Asian countries whose own national interests are most affected by the problems of South Viet-Nam, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and South Korea. Such a review might be done within the framework of the study proposed above, in Point A, 2; or, it might be a separate undertaking.

B. Operational Activities

1. Education and Human Resource Development in South Viet-Nam. Given the nature and orientation of EWA, it is natural that education would be its principal area of potential contribution. Although the details of any such involvement remain to be worked out, there are several patterns that might be followed. An appropriate kind of relationship might be one that paralleled the role which EWA's committee on Education and Human Resource Development has had in Nigeria under a contract of more than two years' standing with the African Bureau of AID. In collaboration with both AID and the relevant Nigerian officials, this committee has carried on a series of assessments of Nigerian educational development and the relationship of educational planning and expansion to manpower utilization and employment.

Other roles suitable for EWA might be developed out of the report, "Public Universities of the Republic of Viet-Nam", a survey begun by the eight U.S. educators who lost their lives in the plane accident in that country in early 1967 and completed by a second team of American university people. There are several recommendations in this report, having to do with the working out of exchange and other support arrangements with American universities, that might be appropriate for EWA participation. Parallel plans might well be developed also by the two private universities of South Viet-Nam, which were not covered in this report.

Several observers who have reviewed the educational scene in South Viet-Nam have commented on the need for a general plan for integrated educational development in that country, a plan that would suitably relate the changes and reforms necessary at the various levels of education--primary, secondary, university and technical-vocational--with other aspects of economic planning and the expansion of employment. When the opportunity is at hand for the carrying out of such an effort, EWA, through the Advisory Committee on this project and Overseas Educational Service, might make appropriate contributions. Such planning will be meaningful, of course, only when South Vietnamese political leaders and educators recognize its value and genuinely want it to happen. It must, therefore, be set up as a joint, cooperative endeavor with the South Vietnamese; it would be a serious mistake to undertake it as a purely American exercise.

2. Manpower Identification and Recruitment. There are a number of Americans, Vietnamese, and nationals of allied countries who, though concerned and knowledgeable about the problems of South Viet-Nam, are not now involved in programs related to the developmental needs of that country. Of particular interest are those individuals who find themselves unable or unwilling to serve in governmental positions; many of them may, because of career patterns or personal preferences, be more amenable to accepting positions with private organizations concerned with Vietnamese development.

Given EWA's orientation toward encouraging the commitment of academic and other private expertise to problems of public concern, this organization, with its affiliate OES, would be an appropriate body to assist in locating this manpower and channeling it to organizations and programs connected with reconstruction and development in Viet-Nam.

3. Information Activities. There is a considerable amount of scattered and fugitive material on the development problems of South Viet-Nam which is not readily accessible to either the general public or to those with a special and serious interest in that country. No agency seems to be performing the general clearinghouse function for published material on South Viet-Nam.

It is possible that one of the universities involved in the academic study group program might undertake, through a contract, to identify, collect and disseminate information and research results bearing on development problems in Viet-Nam. Meanwhile, EWA will begin this task on a modest basis, particularly in support of the academic study group program.

C. Categories of Personnel in EWA Program

Education and World Affairs plans to draw on the expertise and service of five categories of individuals to develop and implement the Viet-Nam proposals:

1. Board of Trustees. EWA activities concerned with Viet-Nam have been approved by the board of trustees, with an ad hoc committee appointed at the March 1967 board meeting exercising special oversight. Its members are Messrs. Vincent Barnett, Grayson Kirk, David Lilienthal and Edward Mason.

2. Officers and Staff. Within EWA there is a Viet-Nam Task Force consisting of: William W. Marvel, president (chairman); Irwin T. Sanders, vice president; John Scott Everton, vice president and executive director of Overseas Educational Service; Peter N. Gillingham, executive associate; Andre E. Rheault, executive associate and director, EWA Washington office; and David B. Arnold, executive associate.

3. OES Staff. Overseas Educational Service, which functions under the authority of the EWA board, is expanding both its operational scope and its geographic focus. The number of U.S. registrants for overseas service (almost entirely academic people) on the OES roster now approaches 14,000. OES' earlier, almost exclusive concern with the identification of American faculty for African universities has now expanded to include recruitment of university faculty for Turkey and Thailand as well. With the arrival of Preston Schoyer (who has directed EWA's Universities Service Center in Hong Kong) to assume the post of deputy director of OES, three of the four senior staff people have had major experience in Southeast Asia. These OES developments clearly enhance the relevance of the organization for the Viet-Nam program now envisaged.

4. The Viet-Nam Advisory Committee. As indicated earlier in this document, EWA plans to assemble a committee of prominent experts on Viet-Nam, on development problems, and on related matters, to function in a role of continuing study, assessment, consultation and recommendation on all aspects of EWA involvement on this front. EWA believes there is great future potentiality in the concept of the Advisory Committee--if the right people can be persuaded to serve--and will seek to establish the group on the basis of a broad mandate and considerable flexibility of approach.

5. Consultants. EWA expects to make considerable use of outside consultants in the course of this program. The staff has already met with a number of individuals with relevant experience in Viet-Nam and is currently planning the further expansion of this crucial network of contacts.

D. Steps Planned for Next Six Months

As indicated throughout this document, EWA has a full but manageable Viet-Nam agenda for the next six months or one year. If the necessary additional financing required to begin various aspects of the program can be obtained, the following would be the projected timetable:

1. Launching of the Academic Study Group Program.

Building from the June 1967 exploratory conference, EWA is prepared to start the first of the faculty study groups during the late fall of 1967. Their initiation would depend, of course, on the state of readiness on any particular campus (in this connection, see the report from Cornell which is part of Appendix B) and, of course, the full number of study groups would probably not be organized until the close of the 1967-68 academic year. A part of the plan is to organize a three or four week summer seminar on goals and procedures for these study groups, based on the experience accumulated during 1967-68, and to hold this in the summer of 1968 for representatives of all the groups, organized or projected. Then, by the academic year 1968-69, it is assumed that this part of the program would be fully underway with perhaps as many as twenty such study groups going forward.

2. Formation of Viet-Nam Advisory Committee. During the fall of 1967, the individuals who would be sought as members would be approached, and it is hoped that the committee could be fully organized and launched by the end of the calendar year 1967. One of its early activities might be the convening of a meeting of individuals knowledgeable about the institutional patterns of rural South Viet-Nam, thus launching a practical exploration of just what the socio-economic environment for development in that country actually is. This would be expected to lead into the kind of ongoing effort suggested earlier in this document under A, 2, Study of the Transfer of Developmental Expertise. Thereafter, the committee might turn its attention to the formulation and refinement of plans for other studies that would contribute toward the better understanding of how an advanced country like the United States can cooperate in development programs with a country such as South Viet-Nam.

3. Regular Consultation with Other Groups Involved in Developmental Efforts in South Viet-Nam. There are various organizations carrying on programs related to these same matters and it is important that EWA establish and maintain close liaison with them. Perhaps the two most important ones are the Development and Resources Corporation, which is carrying forward a long-range economic planning effort for South Viet-Nam under AID contract, and the Council on Vietnamese Studies of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG), which is giving its major attention to the furthering of research on Viet-Nam in the U.S. scholarly community. EWA believes that there is a distinctiveness of approach and emphasis as between these efforts and what this organization itself seeks to accomplish. But in order to assure that this is the case on a continuing basis and to enable EWA to plan its activities so that, to the extent possible, they are supportive of the efforts of these other groups, regular contact and liaison with the Development and Resources Corporation and the SEADAG Council are of great importance.

4. Beginning of Information and Personnel-Identification Activities. These aspects of the general program, as described above in this paper, will be undertaken on a limited basis starting immediately. EWA has already begun to bring together in a special collection within its Information Center, basic materials on problems of reconstruction and development in Viet-Nam. And it is currently developing a modest roster of individuals who have various kinds of specialized knowledge and experience in relationship to these problems. The groundwork will be laid during the last months of 1967 for what in the future may be an activity of considerably larger proportions. In the meantime, these beginnings will be important in support of both the Advisory Committee and the faculty study groups on the various campuses.

5. Informal Advisory Relationship. EWA will be prepared to work with the Agency for International Development and its new Bureau on Viet-Nam in an advisory relationship as appropriate matters, having to do with the United States academic community, arise. The ways in which EWA can be useful cannot be precisely charted at the present time, but informal liaison has already been established and several program activities have been discussed in connection with which the resources EWA could bring to bear appear to be of value.

6. Exploratory Field Visit to South Viet-Nam. Under an arrangement worked out with the Bureau on Viet-Nam of AID, and with several AID representatives in Viet-Nam, Peter N. Gillingham, executive associate of EWA, will visit that country in September 1967. His purpose will be to familiarize himself with those aspects of conditions in South Viet-Nam relevant to EWA's projected activities. He will be considering particularly the contributions which the U.S. academic community and other parts of the private sector of this country might, in the future, make for education and manpower programs as a part of the long-term reconstruction and development of that country.

III. The Long-Term Nature of the Problem

EWA fully recognizes that all efforts to assist with the reconstruction and national development of South Viet-Nam will be long-range. Given the nature of the development process, moves undertaken and activities begun now will frequently not have visible practical results for several years at best. One important part of our thinking has been the possibility that new institutional arrangements and administrative structures may eventually have to be created in order to support and facilitate a full program of U.S. cooperation in development with the South Vietnamese.

It is also EWA's conviction that the efforts described in this paper will succeed only to the extent that patterns of genuine cooperation between elements of the American private sector and appropriate South Vietnamese institutions and individuals can be given reality. It therefore seems likely that any new institutional arrangements or administrative structures that may be devised should have a substantial private and non-governmental character, especially at the United States end, and possibly in South Viet-Nam as well.

An important part of the thinking at EWA, over the past eight or nine months when these problems have been under active consideration, has been the concept of working toward a developmental foundation or commission appropriately grounded in the American private sector and effectively anchored in Vietnamese society. Although we have concluded that it would be premature at this time to draw a detailed blueprint of such an American foundation, or to encourage the South Vietnamese

to formulate their own plans for a counterpart institution, nevertheless we believe these developments, at a suitable time in the future, will prove to be highly desirable to undergird an extended U.S. commitment to developmental activities in South Viet-Nam. So far as EWA is concerned, the status of this part of the problem is revealed in the corresponding passage from the minutes included in the excerpt of the board meeting of June 27, (Attachment A):

"...the board approved the vigorous further exploration of the new institutional arrangements necessary to sustain a long-term effort of U.S. private sector cooperation with South Viet-Nam in reconstruction and development. At the same time, the board stipulated that EWA would not at this time be considered committed to any particular type or form of institutional arrangement."

With this board of trustees authorization and encouragement, EWA intends to make such "vigorous further exploration" a concerted part of the other more immediate program activities described in this document. EWA recognizes that in order to devise the appropriate institutional arrangements at the U.S. and South Viet-Nam ends of the relationship, and to assure their effective implementation, there will have to be extremely wide discussions and the development of a broad consensus. EWA does not underestimate the difficulty of this task. But for the long run, this may be the most important challenge we face and EWA therefore intends to pursue it as far as conditions and opportunities permit.

Attachment A - August 1, 1967 Paper

(Excerpt from Minutes of Meeting of the Board of Trustees of Education and World Affairs held at the Princeton Inn, on Tuesday, June 27th.)

After discussion, the board concluded that EWA should proceed with the further refinement and implementation of the program presented in the paper entitled, "The U.S. Private Sector and Developmental Efforts in South Viet-Nam: A Plan of Action" (Document I for this meeting).

The board agreed that the general objective of this effort, during Phase I, should be to create a climate of intelligent and informed concern in the United States, especially in academic circles, with respect to the development problems of South Viet-Nam; to study the various means that should be adopted in order to give effective voice to that concern; and to provide as broad a base as practicable for U.S. participation in cooperative development efforts with that country. A long-range objective would be to help create a situation in South Viet-Nam which would encourage the people of that country to define their own problems and to take the initiative in seeking help from the outside as necessary in order to solve them.

The trustees specifically approved the undertaking of the activities included in Phase I of the aforementioned document, with particular attention to the academic study groups that would be established on a number of U.S. university campuses. It was recommended that the target number of university-based study groups be twenty, the trustees, however, recognizing that considerable time and energy would have to be invested in order to reach this scale of activity.

With respect to Phase II, as outlined in the cited document, the board approved the vigorous further exploration of the new institutional arrangements necessary to sustain a long-term effort of U.S. private sector cooperation with South Viet-Nam in reconstruction and development. At the same time, the board stipulated that EWA would not at this time be considered committed to any particular type or form of institutional arrangement.

It was understood that the actual launching of any new activities included within this board authorization would be contingent upon EWA requesting and receiving sufficient funds, additional to those now available to the organization, to finance the new programs.

The board also approved the president's recommendation that a strong advisory committee for this project be formed. There was discussion of individuals who might be invited to serve.

The trustee committee appointed at the March board meeting, composed of Messrs. Barnett, Kirk, Lilienthal, and Mason, was requested by the chairman to continue as the chief point of regular contact between the board of trustees and the staff in overseeing this effort. Mr. Wells will join the committee as its chairman.

After discussion and upon motion duly made and seconded it was unanimously:

RESOLVED, to authorize the officers to proceed with Phase I of the special project on U.S. - Viet-Nam cooperation in development, along the lines proposed in the basic staff paper and discussed at the meeting, on condition that adequate special financing is secured; and to explore thoroughly the plan proposed for the second phase of the project, without, however, commitment to any specific form or means of implementing Phase II.

I. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF VIET-NAM FACULTY STUDY GROUPS

A. In selecting universities as sites for a study group on the problems of reconstruction and development of Viet-Nam the EWA staff will take the following criteria into account:

1. There must be an identifiable core group of from 7-12 people interested in constituting such a study group and ready to devote reasonable time to it.

2. They must have agreed upon one or more topics dealing with some aspect of development and have the competence to treat, both theoretically and practically, this theme. This means, that representatives of 4 or 5 fields may each have a contribution to make to the theme or themes under study.

3. The study group must have an express interest in relating their theme or themes to Viet-Nam or to a broader Southeast Asian context. What expertise on Viet-Nam that does exist on the campus should be brought into the study group.

4. Where additional expertise on Viet-Nam is required, (this will prove true in most cases) the group should express a readiness to make use of relevant materials on Viet-Nam made available to it, as well as to utilize guest speakers familiar with Viet-Nam whose visits can coincide with study group discussions of topics related to the competence of the guest.

5. The study group will agree to prepare either a series of papers, each written by a member of the group, or a combined group report on the application of the themes investigated to the reconstruction or development of Viet-Nam or a wider area.

B. For its part, the EWA staff assumes that each study group will be related to some continuing interest within the university to developmental topics and/or an area interest in Southeast Asia. It also assumes that some of the senior, highly competent people in the university will be attracted to the study group if it sets out to deal with hard intellectual and theoretical problems but in terms of applying them to a specific set of local conditions that prevail in Viet-Nam.

EWA also assumes that each study group will set for itself the assumptions regarding the military, political and economic conditions in terms of which its analysis is being made.

C. Although EWA has not tried to negotiate the details of any study groups before funding is assured, it has thoroughly tested the idea behind these groups. On the basis of conversations with university administrators and faculty members and of remarks made at the June 11-12th conference in New York, the following illustrations are believed to be realistic:

One seminar, probably located at Vanderbilt, might focus on problems of nutrition in Viet-Nam.

Three or more seminars might deal with some aspect of agriculture, Iowa State, Cornell and Wisconsin being prime possibilities.

Three or more might deal with some of the technical aspects of political development, particularly as related to the role of the hamlet in the national political structure. (University of Michigan.)

Two or three might be devoted to problems connected with education such as human resource development, strengthening of the school and university systems, and adult education.

Engineering matters such as transportation and water resource development might interest a cluster of engineers as well as nonengineers. (MIT-Harvard group.)

Architects might concern themselves with the problem of adapting structures built for military purposes to peace-time uses. (Yale)

D. It should be pointed out that EWA is aware of the fact that some of the above topics have probably been studied in detail by various governmental and even private agencies. But a university study group might sift through what has been done

vis-a-vis Viet-Nam and relate it to development experience gained in South Korea, Taiwan, and other similar countries. As it begins to clarify its propositions, it might speed up the process of direct rigorous test before issuing any report or pronouncements.

In other words, the purpose of the study groups is to make it possible for university people and the guest experts associated with them to think about the problems of Viet-Nam and share the results of their deliberations. Such a luxury is seldom found off the university campus where people are involved day-by-day in all-absorbing action programs. At some point thought and action must be related, and both deserve support.

E. In closing, certain obvious benefits of these study groups might be mentioned:

1. On selected campuses across the U.S. there will be groups looking seriously at the development aspects of Viet-Nam, on a sustained basis, and from a professional, non-political point of view. This will be the focal point for widening information and contacts concerning Viet-Nam. The academic community will to some degree become better informed about the issues so much in debate.

2. It is most likely that some professional school people who participate in these study groups will be willing to engage in technical cooperation projects in Viet-Nam, having been attracted to this activity largely by the study group experience.

3. The analysis of some aspect of the development problem in Viet-Nam carried out by each group can provide helpful leads for those responsible for programs in that country. The degree to which this will happen will depend upon the competence of the people involved and the extent to which reliable Viet-Nam data are provided. In several fields, however, it seems reasonable to expect that "the state of the art" will be advanced.

4. Government officials and others with first-hand knowledge of Viet-Nam will be given the opportunity to meet with these study groups. Such "action" personnel may clarify their own ideas by having a chance to talk with these groups.

5. By maintaining communication links among all of the seminars the work being done by one group can stimulate the others. Thus, we are not proposing a set of discrete, separate, unrelated seminars that rise and fall on the enthusiasm of just a few people. Participants will be made to feel that they are part of a much larger undertaking and will visit back and forth between various study groups. The three- or four-week seminar or workshop for representatives of the different groups during the summer of 1963 should give further meaning and coherence to the whole effort.

II. REPORT ON PLANNING UNDERTAKEN FOR FACULTY STUDY GROUP AT CORNELL.

A meeting of Cornell faculty members concerned with the EWA project on Viet-Nam study groups met on July 15 to consider what steps might be taken to create such a group on the Cornell campus. It was felt that both the library resources at the university and the strong interest in Southeast Asia and development problems warranted an attempt to set up a group, which would include qualified graduate students as well as faculty members and would stress the coordination of information and methodology of the applied and social sciences. The establishment of such a group, it was stressed, would not indicate endorsement or rejection of the current U.S. role in Viet-Nam.

Although faculty members likely to participate in such a study group had heavy work commitments, it was felt probable they would devote time to active participation in it providing there was enough leadership and resource material to make the sessions useful. Here the major problem is that in spite of its interest in Southeast Asia, Cornell does not possess a faculty member whose area specialty is Viet-Nam and who could therefore be looked to for the necessary expertise and

willingness to devote considerable time to the project. It is unlikely that this gap will be filled in the immediate future, as the qualifications asked of a permanent Viet-Nam specialist are rather stringent. However, it would seem possible that as an interim measure we might undertake the temporary appointment of a more junior person with experience and interest in Viet-Nam who might act as a human resource and development administrator while pursuing his own funds for such a person, and it would have to be seen if money for this purpose could be diverted from ongoing projects at Cornell or, if this was impossible or insufficient, whether EWA's aid could be enlisted in securing the necessary support.

Even if no difficulty develops in funding such an appointment, it seems unlikely that we will be able to obtain a qualified person to fill this position by September, and perhaps not before the end of the coming academic year. It was felt, nonetheless, that it would be worthwhile holding intermittent sessions of the study group during the coming year in order to develop interest and commitment, to survey the available human and library resources, and to define problems and methods of approach. Perhaps half a dozen such sessions would be held. While the first session or so might rely on persons at Cornell to lead the discussions, it would be necessary, to preserve momentum and provide qualified background, for outside experts to be brought in to lead subsequent meetings. Recommendations for such leaders are now being requested of faculty members, and information from EWA regarding possible outside resource persons would be appreciated. We should also like to know whether EWA would be able to provide, or help secure the provision of, funds to bring session leaders to Cornell or to provide for the commuting of a Viet-Nam specialist at another university who would be willing to lead a series of sessions at Cornell. As the lack of a Viet-Nam area specialist is not peculiar to Cornell among the universities interested in sponsoring study groups, it might be appropriate for EWA to consider the possibility of recruiting someone who would be able to lead study groups at several participating universities on a "circuit-riding" basis.

We felt that the orientation of the study group at Cornell should be towards a problem which could provide a focus for discussion and a means for utilizing the expertise of faculty members in other Southeast Asian areas and in developmental problems in general. It was generally agreed, pending a more thorough polling of faculty interest and abilities in the fall, that the question of land usage, tenure, and reform would be a good topic. It is a subject whose importance for Viet-Nam and other areas of Southeast Asia is widely recognized, but on which policy decisions are often made (or avoided) on the basis of a superficial understanding. There is a good deal of available material, especially in French, which has never been properly brought together and considered in the light of current conditions. As a thorough investigation would involve such questions as kinship patterns, social structure, historical development, and the impact of past and potential technological change on land usage, production and social relationships, it would involve a broad spectrum of expertise and hopefully would result in a useful synthesis of knowledge and methodology. As other study groups will be developing their own interdisciplinary approaches to the subject, it is to be hoped that there may be an exchange of plans and experiences while the formation of the study groups is in process and that EWA will facilitate this. Meanwhile, so that we may be able to determine better the possibilities to be suggested to the larger group of potential participants meeting in the fall, we should appreciate having EWA's reaction to the queries concerning outside support contained here.

TAB D
912

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN VIET-NAM

Historically, the first university in Indo-China was established at Hanoi in 1917. After the second World War, some branch units were created in Saigon. They were (1) a Higher School of Sciences (1946), (2) a Center for Medical Studies and a High School of Law (1947), (3) Faculty of Letters (1948).

In 1953, a new set of regulations was developed and became the law for governing the University of Hanoi. These later became the basis of a constitutional document for the universities established at Saigon, Hue and Can Tho.

Following the partitioning of Viet Nam at the 17th parallel, the first new university was officially established at Saigon in 1955.

Characterized by a very rapid growth in student population, the University of Saigon overshadows the entire educational system with an enrollment of 26,916. Enrollment by faculties in 1966-67 was

Letters	7,882
Law	7,877
Science	4,854
Pharmacy	2,880
Medicine	1,352
Architecture	1,084
Pedagogy	814
Dentistry	<u>173</u>
	26,916

With the selection of Hue (1957), the old imperial city of Viet Nam, for the site of a second state university, this new institution was given a special responsibility for developing Vietnamese culture. Despite serious turmoil in recent years, there are 3,247 students now enrolled in the various faculties. Science and Letters are most frequently selected by the students

with Law, Pedagogy, Medicine and Chinese studies having much smaller enrollments.

The University of Dalat is located in a beautiful highland resort area. It is a private institution which operates under Catholic auspices. Since its inception in 1957, however, it has maintained a close relationship with the Vietnamese Government and has received considerable financial assistance. It has grown slowly but now enrolls more than 1,500 students in Letters, Science and Political, Economic and Administrative Sciences.

A fourth institution, the University of Van Hanh, was established in 1964 by the Buddhists. This private institution emphasizes ancient and modern languages, oriental studies, Buddhist philosophy and a concept of social service. Its current enrollment is 1,200 students.

The fifth and newest university is a public institution which was established at Can Tho in 1966. Serving the needs of the Mekong Delta, this new university opened its door to 974 students who attend four faculties: Science, Letters, Pedagogy and a new combination listed as Law and Social Sciences.

Wednesday,
November 8, 1967

Pres file

MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. President:

You may wish to send the attached letter of sympathy to Mrs. Hertz, widow of the AID man who died in Viet Cong captivity.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

92a

November 8, 1967

Dear Mrs. Hertz:

I am deeply grieved at the report of your husband's death while a captive of the Viet Cong. He died a hero, as surely as any soldier in the front lines. And he was in the front lines -- of our long-continuing struggle to make this world a better place.

He was a man of courage, a brave man, a man who served others. He was in Viet-Nam to help the people, and for this he was kidnapped by the Viet Cong, and held illegally through the long years, only to die, tragically, still unjustly held by his captors.

You and your children can always be proud of a man who made the ultimate sacrifice as he sought to help improve the lives of others.

Mrs. Johnson and I extend our heartfelt sympathy -- a sympathy that is shared by a grateful nation.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Gustav C. Hertz
Route 2
Leesburg, Virginia

LBJ:WJJorden:pas:11/8/67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

93
Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit of Crown Prince of Laos

Crown Prince Vong Savang will arrive tomorrow (Nov. 9) at 12:30 p. m. at the diplomatic entrance and will accompany you to your office for a 30-minute talk before lunch.

The Crown Prince is 35, shy but friendly, and has no real responsibilities in the government. He is being groomed to succeed his father. We do not expect the Prince to raise any matters of substance.

You may wish to:

-- recall your useful talks with Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma last month and his helpful analysis of the situation in Laos and Southeast Asia;

-- praise the headway Laos has made toward political stability despite the strains of prolonged war;

-- tell him you have heard of his interest in agriculture and note we have made arrangements for him to see some of our agricultural experimental facilities at Beltsville and something of rural America;

-- say we are following progress of the Nam Ngum (Nahm-Goom) Dam with great attention. (We are one of nine countries involved in financing the dam which will produce 30,000 KW of power and will irrigate more than 12,000 acres of rice land;

-- express our regret and concern at the loss of life (200-300 a month) and the economic drain of North Vietnamese aggression against Laos;

-- ask for his views on recent heavy fighting in Laos, some of it 50 miles north of the royal capital (Luang Prabang).

The Prince may ask for U. S. help in building a new hospital outside Luang Prabang. The King is deeply interested in this.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-477

By rip, NARA, Date 6-28-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

You may wish to reply:

-- we are cooperating with UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) and the British in building a new maternal and health center in Luang Prabang;

-- while we have no funds available now for a new hospital, we would be willing to help renovate the existing provincial hospital in Luang Prabang.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - November 8, 1967

Mr. President:

for file

I understand Covey Oliver mentioned to you this afternoon the remark which President Belaunde made to Jack Valenti about hoping he would not live to wish that he had gone to the University of California instead of Texas.

Attached is a report on the Belaunde-Valenti conversation where you will see the crack in context. I think he is trying to say that you should not let Reagan or Nixon get the best of you next year.*

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Lima's ExDis 2139, 11/7/67.

** That's Bill Bowdless's interpretation.
mine is less charitable.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec 3.4
NLJ 91-467
By sig NARA, Date 11-18-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

94a

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR JONES IN LIMA, PERU (2139)

Jack Valenti has been in Lima the past few days on motion picture business. He was thoroughly briefed in Washington as you know on U. S. - Peruvian problems and saw President Belaunde yesterday with me.

Valenti opened the conversation by saying he knew from personal experience how busy Presidents were and thus doubly appreciated Belaunde receiving him.

Belaunde replied he was not as busy as he was worried.

Valenti said he could assure him of President Johnson's deep interest in Peru, in the Belaunde Administration and in its current problems. The kind of democratic, constitutional regime which Belaunde's Government represented must succeed. There was great appreciation in Washington for what Belaunde was trying to do in Peru and it would be tragic if anything intervened to interrupt his constitutional period of office, Valenti added.

Because Belaunde had expressed irritation in a speech the night before over a Time Magazine article on Peru, Valenti referred to it and said President Johnson, too, was very often offended by what this magazine had to say about him and his administration. In fact, Valenti went on, there was great similarity between the two Presidents, Johnson and Belaunde, in their serious problems with reluctant Congresses, in their efforts to raise more taxes to decrease budget deficits, and in having to tolerate a critical press.

Belaunde replied that some of the local Peruvian press had connection with the international press and thus were able to carry internal politics into the international arena.

In his effort to assure Belaunde that Peruvian problems were receiving high-level attention in Washington in an effort to overcome obstacles to full U. S. collaboration, Valenti once mentioned the Mirage issue.

President Belaunde did not pick this one up and the subject was not raised again.

Since Valenti had said he would see President Johnson on return from his South American tour to report on his impressions, Belaunde said at the end of the 35-minute interview:

"Tell President Johnson I am ready for action".

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12812, Sec. 3.4
By *jc/g* NARA, DATE *12-16-09*

Then, with reference to his Texas University education, Belaunde added that he hoped he would not live to wish he had gone to the University of California instead.

On leaving, I told the President I had been recalled to Washington for consultation for a few days and asked if there were any messages I could carry for him.

He replied that the telephone problem had finally been solved despite continuing grumblings from Senator Carrillo-Smith and that he had that day approved a bid of Hughes Aircraft International to construct a ground station for Peru's participation in COMSAT. He did not touch on more fundamental issues, so I added I would be in Lima all day today in case he had any additional suggestion before my departure.

95
ACTION

Pres file

CONFIDENTIAL

Wednesday - November 8, 1967

Mr. President:

Ambassador to Peru J. Wesley Jones arrived in Washington this morning.

He is being briefed on the F-5 proposal which we are prepared to make in an effort to get the Peruvians to cancel the Mirage contract.

We are not recommending that he go back with a letter from you -- as we did in the case of Ambassador Tuthill last July -- but it would strengthen his hand considerably if he could say to President Belaunde that he had discussed Peruvian developments with you.

I recommend that you make 5-10 minutes available in your schedule today or tomorrow for Ambassador Jones.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129 90-10
By 128/128, NARA, Date 129-91

96

Pres file

Wednesday, November 8, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is an instrument of ratification for a routine supplementary tax convention between the U.S. and Canada signed on October 25, 1966. The Senate gave its advice and consent on November 7, 1967.

W. W. Rostow

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NOV 7 1967

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2 - R.L.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Ratification of supplementary income-tax
convention with Canada

I enclose for the President's signature an instrument of ratification, in duplicate, of the supplementary convention between the United States and Canada, signed at Washington on October 25, 1966, modifying and supplementing the convention of March 4, 1942, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion in the case of income taxes, as modified by supplementary conventions of June 12, 1950, and August 8, 1956.

On November 2, 1967, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the 1966 supplementary convention. According to its terms, the convention will enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the two countries.

The 1966 supplementary convention contains a single substantive article, the sole purpose of which is to add to Article XI of the 1942 convention, as modified, a new paragraph whereby it is provided that paragraph 1 of Article XI shall not apply in respect of income derived from sources in one of the countries and paid to a corporation organized under the laws of the other country if such corporation, by reason of the fact that it is not a resident of the last-mentioned country for purposes of its income tax, is not subject to tax by the last-mentioned country on that income. Under paragraph 1 of Article XI as now in force, the rate of tax with respect to income other than earned income "shall not exceed 15 percent for each taxable year."

B. H. Read

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Ratification,
in duplicate.