

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President S 3 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i>	11/25/67	A
#5 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671013) <i>sanitized 9-13-99 NLJ 98-275</i> TS 1 p <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> <i>Secret per NLJ 94-479</i>	11/25/67	A
#6 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671012) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-23-99 NLJ 98-34</i> <i>more info released 12-3-04 NLJ/RAC 04-82</i> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/25/67	A
#7 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671007) <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p	11/25/67	A
#8 cable	President 176 to Canberra <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #70, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/25/67	A
#9 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671004) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>open NLJ 98-33 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/25/67	A
#10 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671003) <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/25/67	A
#11 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671002) C 1 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i>	11/25/67	A
#12 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67988) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p <i>open NLJ 98-33 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/24/67	A
#14 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67995) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-23-99 NLJ 98-34</i> <i>more info released 12-3-04 NLJ/RAC 04-82</i> [Duplicate of #7, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/24/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17 memo	Rostow to President exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479 S 1 p <i>open NLJ 94-251 (1102)</i>	11/24/67	A
#18 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67987) exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479 S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 98-53 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #5, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library Box 126]	11/24/67	A
#20 cable	President to Prime Minister <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> TS 1 p	11/23/67	A
#21 cable Downgraded to "S" per NLJ 94-481	Rostow to President (CAP67981) TS "S" 3 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> [Duplicate of #4, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library Box 126]	11/23/67	A
#22 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67985) <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/23/67	A
#24 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67971) <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> TS 2 p	11/23/67	A
#27a memo	President to Prime Minister (part. duplicate of #24) TS 2 p <i>open NLJ 94-479 (1102)</i>	11/22/67	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, re: Brazil <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 4 p	11/22/67	A
#33a ltr	President to Costa e Silva <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p [Duplicate of #3, Special Head of State Correspondence, "Brazil, 8/1/67-12/31/67"]	11/21/67	A
#35a memo	Jorden to Rostow <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/21/67	A
#37a ltr	Kosygin to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p	11/21/67	A
#37b memcon FILE LOCATION	Dobrynin and Kohler <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 2 p	11/21/67	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. <i>open 3-14-96 NLJ94-481</i> S 1 p (dup. # 7, NSF, Subject File, "Radio Free Europe")	11/21/67	A
#38a memo	Helms to President S 1 p <i>open 4-13-95 NLJ94-482</i> (dup. # 7a, as above)	11/21/67	A
#38c memo	Intelligence Memorandum " S 4 p (dup. # 7c, as above)	11/14/67	A
#39 memo	"To be inserted before last paragraph..." <i>open 5-5-95</i> PCI 1 p <i>NLJ94-479</i>	11/21/67	A
#39b ltr	President to Chairman <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> PCI 2 p	undated	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #88, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/21/67	A
#40a cable	Deptel 71853 to Canberra <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #88a, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/20/67	A
#45c ltr	President to Bustamante <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> PCI 2 p	8/18/66	A
#48a ltr	President to Kittikachorn <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> PCI 1 p	11/20/66	A
#49a ltr	President to Otero <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> PCI 2 p	11/21/66	A
#53a memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> S 2 p	11/21/67	A
#53b notes	"Proposed Priorities--Short Term" <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> S 2 p	undated	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ94-479</i> C 1 p	11/18/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a cable	Rome 2642 C 1 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480; same same NLJ 019-025-3</i>	11/18/67	A
#67a rpt	"Number of 3rd country troops now in VN..." S 1 p <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i>	undated	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 9-13-99 NLJ 98-274</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i>	11/18/67	A
#70a rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482; same same NLJ 019-025-3</i> <i>open 6-11-98</i>	11/18/67	A
#74a cable	Prime Minister to President <i>exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/18/67	A
#72a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> C 2 p <i>dup #2, NSF, CF, VN, "8A2" Box 104</i>	11/18/67	A
#81a cable	Bucharest 718 <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 7 p	11/15/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 4-17-95 NLJ 94-456</i> <i>(dup #2, NSF, files of Walt Rostow, "Alsop," Box 8)</i>	11/17/67	A
#82a memo	Read to Rostow <i>open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 2 p <i>(dup of #4a, see above)</i>	11/16/67	A
#86 memo	Rostow to Watson S 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLJ 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #118a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/17/67	A
#87 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. TS 1 p <i>open 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i>	11/21/67	A
#93 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> TS "S" 1 p <i>open 4-8-98 RAC</i> <i>Downgraded to "S" per NLJ 94-481</i>	11/16/67	A
#95 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p	11/16/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#96 memo	Rostow to President, 4:50 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A
#96a memo	Davis to Rostow <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A
#96b cable	USUN 2296 C 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-480</i>	[11/67]	A
#98 memo	Rostow to President, 3:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#98a cable	London 3905 <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 3 p <i>sanitized 3-11-94 NLS 93-293</i> [Duplicate of #92a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#102a cable	Saigon 11200 C 3 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-480</i> [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1B(1) 11/66-12/67, Economic Activity and Planning"]	11/16/67	A
#103 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #119, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#104 memo	Rostow to President <i>NLS 93-291; 9/12/94</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #119, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#111 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#4 memo	Rostow to the President - TS 1 p Sanitized 4/26/00 NLJ 98-276	11/25/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 51, November 16-25, 1967
Box 25

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

1
November 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Following is a draft as requested on The Search for Peace in Vietnam.

*sent Rostow
via wire
CAP671015*

I should welcome your suggestions for revision.

The punch line is at the very end.

The problem with the speech is that the theme--- it's Hanoi's move---doesn't fit Thieu's initiative in Hanoi. And it doesn't address the issue about which talk is increasing; namely, a Southern Solution, in which the NLF and Saigon negotiate.

But I'm sure you're clear as to what you want. And this is forwarded only as a beginning for you to shoot at.

1a

Draft -- November 25, 1967

The Search for Peace in Vietnam

I am going to talk about peace in Vietnam.

For the end of all wars is peace -- sometimes honorable peace, sometimes lasting peace, and sometimes the peace of despair and slavery.

And let me make it clear -- the peace I speak of is not the peace of surrender. -- open or disguised. It is not the peace that would come with abandonment of our commitments or the violation of our word.

The peace I speak of is a peace under which a man can go to bed at night and feel confident he will awake in the morning. A peace in which, when he awakens, he will not find his neighbor or his village elders slaughtered. A peace in which men can raise their families in dignity and hope. A peace in which men can, through orderly and fair constitutional procedures, select a government of their free choice -- and change it in the same orderly way. A peace in which the peoples of North as well as South Vietnam would devote their talents and resources to progress, working with the other governments of Southeast Asia.

* * * *

Let me recall some of the specific ways in which we have tried to help find that kind of peace.

I cannot disclose all we have done nor every channel that has been used. I am sure you would not want me to. For we still remain hopeful that one day one of these points of contact will produce a turning point in the struggle for a peaceful solution.

And I must, of course, preserve the confidential nature of the efforts of some other governments -- as we have given our word we would.

But there are things that can be said. There are things that I believe need saying. And I will say them.

* * * *

One major effort to achieve peace in Vietnam has now been all but forgotten by millions of people around the world and here at home. But is worth recalling.

As you know, North Vietnam's decision to take over South Vietnam was made in the late 1950's. By 1959 officers and non-commissioned officers, military specialists, political organizers, saboteurs, and agents were moving in increasing numbers from North Vietnam into the South. Weapons and other supplies were also sent South. The pace increased in 1960 and even more in 1961. Some moved by sea. Others went across the Demilitarized Zone. And others travelled down the jungle trails of neighboring Laos into South Vietnam.

In Laos itself the Communist Pathet Lao -- backed by armed men from North Vietnam and with supplies from Hanoi and other Communist capitals -- were trying to take over the country.

In 1961 President Kennedy directed Governor Harriman to negotiate a new agreement on Laos. It was clear the 1954 arrangement was not working.

A year of tough negotiating in Geneva followed. Yet, even as the talks went forward, the North Vietnamese tried to change drastically the military situation with a large offensive. They gave up the effort only when President Kennedy sent U. S. forces into Thailand and made it clear we were ready to act if necessary.

Only then did the Communist negotiators finally accept the new Geneva Accords of 1962.

It is worth recalling that a principal negotiator of that settlement -- indeed, the co-chairman of the conference -- was the Soviet Union. They assumed, with the British, responsibility for overseeing the agreement, with making it work. That responsibility was incorporated in Article 3 of the Agreement. It was backed by detailed private assurances of the Soviet negotiator to Mr. Harriman. It is a tragic fact that the Soviet Union has been unwilling or unable to fulfill that responsibility which it freely assumed.

For Hanoi did not observe the spirit or the letter of the agreement from the day it went into effect. They did not, as they had promised, pull their military forces out of Laos. And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos to send their men and war material into South Vietnam. Their goal -- the conquest of South Vietnam and eventually of Laos -- never changed.

If Hanoi had lived up to its word, the problem in Vietnam would have found its solution.

If, today, the men in Hanoi wonder why we and others take their words with some skepticism, they need look no further for the reason than to the 1962 Agreement on Laos and their open violation of their solemn pledge.

It was directly because of that violation that the war in Vietnam expanded in 1963 and 1964. In the South, political confusion erupted in the spring of 1963, leading to the coup against the Diem government and to a long period of instability. Seeing what they thought was a bright chance for quick success, the North rapidly expanded its forces in the South. By the end of 1964, regular units of the North Vietnamese Army were moving into attack positions in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong main force units were expanded. The Laos trails were developed into roads on which trucks could run.

Through this period we tried to explore whether Hanoi had any interest in moving toward a peaceful settlement. These explorations, conducted by a responsible third party, produced a clear reading that Hanoi was absolutely confident of victory. It was totally unprepared to consider peace except on its own terms -- terms that would have ensured Communist control in the South.

By early 1965 we recognized that stronger action -- the kind of action contemplated in the Senate Resolution of the previous August -- would be necessary. Pressure from the North was not just maintained, it was stepped up.

It was necessary to take new measures to try to slow and make more difficult the flow of armed men and supplies coming from the North. It was necessary, finally, and after five long years of restraint, to bring home to the men in Hanoi some of the punishment that they had long been inflicting on their fellow Vietnamese in the South. The bombing of North Vietnam began.

Soon after the bombing began, I made clear -- in a speech at Johns Hopkins -- that we were ready to negotiate at any time without conditions.

A short time after the bombing started -- in April and May of 1965 -- we began to hear from other governments that a halt in the attacks would get a favorable response from Hanoi. We decided to try.

And so, on May 12 -- on the occasion of Buddha's birthday -- we halted air strikes against targets in the North.

In a message to the North Vietnamese government we noted:

- that air strikes had stopped;
- the standdown would run into the next week;
- we were acting on "suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives" that there could be no progress toward peace while air attacks were going on;
- we would be watching, during the pause, for signs of "significant reductions" of armed action by the North against the South;
- we hoped Hanoi's response would permit "further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future."

In short, the door to peace was open. We hoped Hanoi would come through and join in a real search for peace.

The note was given to the Soviet Union with the request it be delivered to the North Vietnamese. Moscow refused.

A copy was delivered to the North Vietnamese Embassy in one capital. It was returned the following day.

We arranged for delivery of another copy directly to the Foreign Ministry in Hanoi -- through a third government which had a representative there. This, too, was returned the following day.

And so -- after five days -- after our proposal had been turned back on three occasions -- bombing was resumed.

Not only was our offer turned down, but then -- as later -- the North Vietnamese used this interlude to strengthen its military position.

A second major chance for peace was lost. It was lost because of Hanoi's refusal to do two simple things -- to send a responsible representative to talk with us, and to show a restraint on the military front equal to ours.

For a time, most people here and abroad seemed to understand what had happened -- and to place the blame where it belonged. I remind you that throughout this time -- 1964 and 1965 -- when we were exploring every possible avenue to peace -- and even many that seemed utterly impossible -- we heard not one constructive word from Hanoi. North Vietnamese leaders came forward with no concrete proposals -- no reasonable suggestions.

But soon we began to hear a new theme from domestic critics and from a number of foreign governments.

The earlier pause was good -- but it didn't last long enough -- didn't give Hanoi enough time to think and respond.

We doubted this. We believed then -- as we do now -- that when lives and peace are at stake, men can and should act quickly and without conditions.

But we decided to set aside our skepticism. We decided to walk the extra mile. We decided to try again.

Christmas came, and, as part of the Christmas truce, we halted bombing on December 24. Then, responding to the insistent cries of hope, we decided to extend the bombing pause.

We informed a large number of governments of our decision. Messages went to dozens of capitals and were passed on. The United Nations Secretary General was informed.

In a message to one government close to Hanoi, we said:

"If . . . the other side will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension."

We then were able to deliver this same message directly to an official of the North Vietnamese government in another capital.

Finally, in still another capital, an American official spoke directly and at length with the top official in a North Vietnamese Embassy. The answer we got from Hanoi was that its position "remained unchanged." We were trying to "force" Hanoi to sit down at a table and talk. We had to stop the bombing "unconditionally and forever."

When we suggested another meeting, we were told the North Vietnamese had nothing further to say.

Nevertheless, our efforts continued in other places. But the results were the same. We were told we were trying to give Hanoi an "ultimatum." We could expect a settlement in Vietnam only when we accepted the four point stand of the North Vietnamese government -- and when we proved this acceptance "by actual deeds."

At the outset, many well-meaning people had told us that the bombing pause should last three weeks if it were to succeed in producing talks. It lasted for 37 days. And at the end of that period -- after dozens of efforts to encourage some favorable response -- and after we knew beyond any doubt ~~that~~ that North Vietnam was using the respite to pour more men, more guns, more ammunition and supplies into the South -- we resumed bombing.

Another serious attempt to find peace -- or even a possible door to peace -- and another setback.

I have had moments of deep regret about this decision. Our enemy took clear advantage of us. And some brave South Vietnamese and some Americans are gone today because of Hanoi's actions.

Yet, looking back, I feel I could not have done otherwise. If there had been a chance for peace -- as many speaking with full governmental responsibility suggested to us -- we could not in conscience have neglected it. And, if it had succeeded, many lives would have been saved.

But you will understand if, today, I hear with grave doubts the same proposals -- the same arguments -- the same reasoning that I heard -- and took seriously -- less than two years ago.

For there is nothing to indicate that the men in Hanoi have altered their stand one bit.

Despite our deep disappointment with the failure of the long bombing pause to bring us closer to peace, the search for a solution went on.

In the fall of 1966 our Ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, was approached by the Polish representative on the International Control Commission. In several long sessions they discussed the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

We set forth a number of proposals that we would be willing to accept. Above all, we were interested in direct contact with Hanoi so the details could be worked out in mutually agreeable form. Among the issues to be discussed would be acts of mutual de-escalation, including a cessation of the bombing of the North.

The Polish representative said that he had conveyed our views to Hanoi. If they were as we had outlined them, we should confirm them directly in conversations with a North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw. We agreed to do so.

In Warsaw our representative ran into one delay after another. The bombing of certain targets in the Hanoi area in early December was blamed for "creating a bad atmosphere." In fact, these strikes were not significantly

different from others that had occurred throughout the previous months -- while the talks in Saigon were proceeding without interruption.

Finally, air strikes on December 13 and 14 were used as the reason for breaking off this contact. Yet our representative had been in Warsaw and had been ready for direct contact with the North Vietnamese for a week before those air strikes and on the agenda was the question of bombing itself.

The fact is that from the very outset we had no direct word from Hanoi, no outline of Hanoi's views such as we had provided the Poles of our views.

It is perfectly clear that whatever the good will of the Polish intermediary, Hanoi, in fact, was not ready to negotiate. The air strikes were simply an excuse for Hanoi's failure to sit down and discuss this matter in a serious and reasonable way.

In many such cases, we have found that the optimism of intermediaries far exceeds the performance of the Hanoi regime.

With the failure of the Warsaw contact, we turned to other means of opening a useful dialogue with the North Vietnamese. Despite the argument advanced in the Polish capital about bombing, the fact is that direct contact was established with a representative of Hanoi soon thereafter.

In these talks we made a variety of proposals -- and they covered every possible road to peace we could suggest. In answer, Hanoi's representative simply jumped from one to another of these proposals. But he never accepted any. Nor did he make any useful counter-proposals beyond what we know to be Hanoi's hard public request for surrender.

After these hundreds of contacts in almost every capital in the world -- direct and through official and private intermediaries -- I wondered whether, in fact, any North Vietnamese could speak for his government. Perhaps only Ho Chi Minh would be able to break through the confusion and the hardened positions we had been hearing.

I decided to address a message directly to the North Vietnamese leader. On February 2, this year, I sent that message.

It was as serious as I could make it. It contained no threats, no ultimatum. After citing the problems I saw in an "unconditional" halt to the bombing, I added:

"...I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U. S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

Then the letter was delivered, on February 8, we had stopped bombing the North. The next week President Ho sent a letter to Pope Paul in which Hanoi's hard line was repeated. Only the was bombing resumed. Ho's reply to me arrived a few days later and was couched in the same wording as that given the Pope.

He wrote: "The U. S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U. S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

Let no well-meaning observer deceive you: that remains the position of Hanoi as of this hour -- as Hanoi transmits it to us privately as well as publicly.

* * * *

This is a description of some of the efforts we have made. It could be multiplied many times over with the story of other well-meant contacts -- other proposals -- and other rejections by Hanoi.

It is a gloomy and disheartening recital. But I think no fair-minded person can say that we have not tried -- tried hard -- tried often.

In my recent speech at San Antonio I spoke of the basic position of this Government regarding the way to peace. I said then:

"As we have told Hanoi ^{time} and/again, the heart of the matter really is this: the United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

These words are clear. We stand by them.

I would go further ^{and} ~~say~~ say:

If Hanoi wishes to talk about a settlement, we stand ready to talk -- this week, tomorrow, even today;

If Hanoi is interested in deeds, we are prepared to undertake actions to lower the level of fighting -- so long as Hanoi acts in reciprocity;

And, if it is preferred that deeds and discussions go hand in hand, we are ready to take that course;

We will meet in public at a conference;

We will meet in private;

We will meet ^{at} any time. ~~at any place~~

But let me say this -- most solemnly and with utter candor: Peace is not a one-way street. It is not going to be found by the efforts of only one party. If there is to be peace, it will require that both sides be prepared to act -- and to live up to their promises.

The record of the past years makes it clear that we have tried hard to find a way to end the bloodshed.

Indeed, it is possible that all these efforts -- all the statements -- all the diplomatic approaches -- may have been misunderstood in Hanoi.

The men in Hanoi may have taken all these sincere efforts to end the war as signs of weakness -- as a desire to get out at any price -- as a way to cut our losses and run.

They may have decided that if they just hang on a little longer -- hold out a few more months -- inflict a few more casualties -- that our will is going to soften, our determination break.

If that is their conclusion, they are making a deadly error. And they are inflicting on their own people and on their innocent neighbors a terrible price for that error.

For we shall stand firm. The people of South Vietnam will stand firm. And the aggressors will never succeed.

I think the next move is up to Hanoi. We have tried -- and tried -- and tried. Our efforts have been turned back. If they desire real peace -- they know where to find us. We will be waiting. But, in the meanwhile, we shall not be standing still.

#####

~~SECRET~~

FOR PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

2
11/25/67
sent Rusk
via wire
CAP 671017

Following discussions yesterday and today with his advisers, Secretary Fowler's negotiating instructions to Deming for Sunday meeting in Frankfurt on gold were:

(1) seek multi-lateral agreement and strong public announcement of large gold pool commitment (\$2 to \$3 billion) to support London gold price -- coupled preferably with gold certificate proposal although ^{this} not essential at the outset. Question left open as to whether London market should be permitted to open Monday or should be closed for specified cooling off period.

(2) If (1) not negotiable, seek multi-lateral agreement on

(a) national laws or regulations to restrict dealing in gold or make it more costly (100% margin requirement, higher handling charges, etc.) thus cutting down demand for gold on all markets, or

(b) limiting sales on London market to licensed industrial demand (maximum \$750 million a year) which gold pool members would be prepared to underwrite at \$35 price in agreed proportion and in exchange for gold certificates. Private non-industrial demand, whether prompted by fear or speculation, would be forced to Paris, Beirut and other markets where it would be met at higher price.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By , NARA, Date 4-5-95

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Advantage this system would be quantitative and readily manageable limit on amounts gold pool countries would be committed to provide from reserves to meet private demand.

Disadvantage--two-price system would put some pressure on other central banks to request us to exchange their dollar holdings into gold. This might involve us in screening out any use by central banks of the gold convertibility privilege in situations where, instead of normal reserve use, the gold was being fed into the private market for profit.

Under these alternatives as well, strong likelihood London market would be suspended for specified period while license systems set up.

(3) If ^eneither of above negotiable, multi-lateral agreement to close out gold pool which would result in sharp increase in free-market price of gold. U. S. would publicly reiterate its intention keep \$35 price and would continue its commitments to buy and sell gold at this price to other governments. High free market price for gold would make number of governments ¹ increasingly uncomfortable with continuing keep large proportion of their reserves in dollars and bring them to our gold window for conversion.

Strong possibility, therefore, that even under best circumstances and any of these alternatives, it might

~~SECRET~~

-3-

be necessary suspend operations London gold market on Monday for cooling-off period or longer, with resulting increase uncertainty in all financial markets.

We seeking multi-lateral agreement on whatever course chosen.

November 25, 1967

Mr. President:

You asked us to acquire for you
a copy of Gen. Ridgway's book on
Korea.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 25, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENTT

You should know we have two intercepts

[REDACTED]

that Robert

McNamara has been nominated by the U. S. to succeed George Woods.

I killed all distribution of these documents within the U. S. government.

But I assume it may leak out of other capitals soon -- or from
Washington Embassies.

You may wish to prepare George for press handling if and when it
breaks.

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-276
By LD, NARA Date 4-11-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967 NOV 25 15 46

51

EEA581
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2556

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671013

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-275
By cb, NARA Date 8-25-99

Pratt
67 NOV 25 PM 12:07

SATURDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 25, 1967

HEREWITH BUS WHEELER'S VIEW ON THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM [REDACTED] SEC. MCNAMARA CONCURS. I AM INFORMED SEC. RUSK ALSO CONCURS.

1. ~~(S)~~ THE SUBJECT OF THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM [REDACTED] HAS BEEN A MATTER OF INTENSIVE REVIEW FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

2. ~~(S)~~ GENERAL LEMNITZER STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST MAKING ANY OVERT US MILITARY MOVES IN THESE COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE FLINCHING, THAT WE CONSIDER CONFLICT CERTAIN, OR THAT WE ARE WILLING AT THIS TIME TO PULL OUT OF [REDACTED] THE MAJOR SYMBOLS OF THE INTEGRATED STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE. THE PRESENCE OF NATO COMMITTED US WEAPONS SERVES AS A VERY SOBERING CONSIDERATION WHICH TENDS TO DAMPEN RECKLESS ACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. A US INITIATIVE TO ALTER OR DEGRADE OUR PRESENT US NUCLEAR WEAPON [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COULD HEIGHTEN TENSION TO THE FLASH POINT.

3. ~~(S)~~ I CONCUR WITH THE FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH MR. MCNAMARA, WHO AGREES WITH THIS VIEW.

4. ~~(S)~~

[REDACTED]

DTG: 251512Z NOV 67

PRESERVATION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET
WHQ

6

1967 NOV 25 15 45

EEA580
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2555

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP671012

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

67 NOV 25 PM 12:07

SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE CYPRUS SITUATION
AS OF 8:00 A.M. EST
25 NOVEMBER 1967

1. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, WITH THE KING, THE JUNTA MEMBERS, AND THE CIVILIAN CABINET MEMBERS ALL APPARENTLY IN AGREEMENT, HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS WILLING TO BEGIN THE REDUCTION OF ITS MILITARY FORCE ON THE ISLAND WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN INITIAL CONTINGENT OF 500. THIS MOVE, HOWEVER, IS TO BE IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL BY UNSYG THANT ADDRESSED TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND CYPRUS, CALLING FOR THE REDUCTION OF TENSION BY THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON THE ISLAND, AND IS ALSO TIED TO A COUNTER MOVE BY THE TURKS: THE PHASED RETURN TO THE CONDITION OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO 14 NOVEMBER.

2. THANT, AFTER SOME INITIAL RESISTANCE, HAD ALREADY ISSUED A SIMILAR APPEAL ON 24 NOVEMBER, BUT HE REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING THE REDUCTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES TO THE LEVELS AUTHORIZED BY THE 1960 LONDON/ZURICH AGREEMENT. THIS WILL MAKE HIS MESSAGE LESS PALATABLE IN ANKARA, WHERE A RETURN TO THE LONDON/ZURICH COONDITIONS IS CONSIDERED A BASIC OBJECTIVE. ANKARA MAY ALSO RESENT THE LECTURING TONE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE NOTE, WHICH SEEMS MORE DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY THAN AGAINST GREECE OR CYPRUS (I.E. CONDEMNATION OF THREATS OF FORCE).

3. TURKEY WOULD REPORTEDLY BE WILLING TO BACK OFF SOMEWHAT FROM ITS INSISTANCE ON AN IMMEDIATE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK "ILLEGALS" ON CYPRUS AS LONG AS ATHENS FURNISHED AN "EXACT SCHEDULE" OF THE PHASE-OUT AND PERMITS SUPERVISION OF THE DEPARTURES BY THE LONDON/ZURICH SIGNATORIES (GREECE, TURKEY, AND GREAT BRITAIN). ATHENS HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING WILLING TO GO THIS FAR.

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-82
By *no*, NARA, Date *11-15-04*

APPROX FROM CUTCKY COPY

4. [REDACTED] SAYS THAT THE GOVT CANNOT MUCH LONGER RESIST PUBLIC PRESSURE TO IMPOSE A CYPRUS SOLUTION. IF AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE IS NOT FORTHCOMING FROM ATHENS, 25 NOVEMBER MIGHT BE THE "DAY OF DECISION" AND 26 NOVEMBER THE "DAY OF ACTION".

5. [REDACTED] THE TURKISH CABINET AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNANIMOUSLY AGREE THAT, UNLESS GREECE MAKES SOME MOVE TOWARD EVACUATING ITS "ILLEGALS" FROM CYPRUS VERY SOON -- PERHAPS BY NOON OF 25 NOVEMBER -- A TURKISH MOVE ON CYPRUS IS INEVITABLE. TURKEY HAS ALREADY GOTTEN ASSURANCES FROM THE USSR THAT IT WILL REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES, BUT ANKARA FEELS THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO BRING ENOUGH PRESSURE ON GREECE TO FORESTALL HOSTILITIES.

6. ANKARA'S FEAR THAT THE TURKISH PUBLIC MIGHT FEAR ANOTHER "SELLOUT" IS REFLECTED IN THE RADIO ANKARA DOMESTIC BROADCAST AT 1700 ON 24 NOVEMBER, WHICH SOUGHT TO ASSURE ITS LISTENERS THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS NOT GOING TO BE DIVERTED FROM ITS INTENTION TO SECURE AN ACCEPTABLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT NO MATTER WHAT EMISSARIES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SAID. THE BROADCAST FEATURED UNUSUALLY ABUSIVE TREATMENT OF THE GREEK JUNTA, TERMING IT "BYZANTINE REMNANTS", ETC. AND HARKING BACK TO A LONG HISTORY OF GREEK INTRIGUES.

7. THE MILITARY POSTURE OF BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY REMAINS UNCHANGED AT A STATE OF HIGH COMBAT READINESS. AN INVASION FORCE AND ITS BACKUP TOTALLING ABOUT 35,000 IS ASSEMBLED ALONG THE SOUTH TURKISH COAST. MOST MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAVE LEFT ANKARA. THE PORTS OF ISKENDERUN AND MERSIN ARE CLOSED TO INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC.

8. THIRTEEN PAKISTANI AIR FORCE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY ARRIVED IN TURKEY ON 24 NOVEMBER, 10 ANKARA AND 3 ISTANBUL. SEVERAL REFERENCES TO PAKISTANI SUPPORT OF TURKEY IN THE PRESENT CRISIS WERE MADE ON THE 8 P.M. BROADCAST OF RADIO ANKARA.

9. THE ATMOSPHERE ON CYPRUS HAS GROWN MORE TENSE DURING THE LAST 24 HOURS. STORE WINDOWS IN NICOSIA ARE BOARDED UP, AND CIVILIAN VEHICLES HAVE ABOUT DISAPPEARED FROM THE STREETS. MILITARY VEHICLES, MANY OF THEM CARRYING JERRYCANS AND EMERGENCY PROVISIONS, ARE INCREASINGLY EVIDENT IN THE GREEK SECTOR. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMUNIST LABOR MOVEMENT WAS BOMBED ON 24 NOVEMBER, AND STUDENTS TRIED TO STONE THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON 23 NOVEMBER. POLICE ARE PROTECTING THE SOVIET AND GREEK EMBASSIES. THE CYPRIOT CABINET MET WITH HIGH-RANKING MAINLAND GREEK OFFICERS ON 24 NOVEMBER, BUT CAME UP WITH NO NEW INITIATIVES. THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CYPRUS IS TO BE INVADED DEPENDS ON DIPLOMATIC MANUVERING IN ATHENS AND ANKARA, AND ON THE WEATHER, WHICH HAS NOW CLEARED UP.

DTG: 25/1420Z NOV 67

ACRDX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

2

EEA575
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2550

1967 NOV 25 04 34

87 NOV 24 PM 11:41
FRIDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671007

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

HEREWITH A SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE'S WEEKLY TELEGRAM FROM VIETNAM. THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE TELEGRAM WILL BE AVAILABLE UPON YOUR RETURN

1. WE ARE IN PROCESS OF DISCUSSING CHRISTMAS, NEW YEARS AND TET CEASE FIRES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU. WHATEVER WE AGREE TO WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE SEVEN TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES BEFORE RELEASE.

THIEU'S IDEA (AFTER TALKING WITH GENERALS VIEN AND VY) WAS 36 HOURS CHRISTMAS, 36 NEW YEARS AND 72 TET, WITH PROVISIO THAT EACH CEASE FIRE WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON THE ENEMY'S OBSERVANCE OF PRECEDING CEASE FIRE.

OUR IDEA WAS THE FORMULATION 24-24-48 HOUR STANDDOWNS, WHICH I FEEL SURE PRESIDENT THIEU WILL ACCEPT IF WE WISH.

2. THE NEW CABINET OF PRIME MINISTER LOC, INSTALLED IN OFFICE NOVEMBER 9, IS A SYMBOL OF THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE NEW CABINET HAS BROUGHT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF NEW FACES INTO THE GOVERNMENT, ONLY 7 PREVIOUS MEMBERS OF THE CABINET REMAINING ON.

PRESIDENT THIEU INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THAT THE SELECTION OF THE CABINET WAS BASED ON THE NEED TO FIND THE BEST-QUALIFIED GROUP OF MINISTERS, WHO WOULD WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM IN RESOLVING NATIONAL PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT THIEU IS CONFIDENT THAT THE NEW CABINET WILL BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM.

LIMITED EVIDENCE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS REASONABLY COMPETENT, HONEST AND DEDICATED AND THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIEU AND KY.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By cl, NARA, Date 4-5-95

A FRAME WORK EXISTS FOR A SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY BROADENING OF THE BASE OF THE GOVERNMENT. I WOULD SAY SO FAR, SO GOOD, BUT IT IS A LITTLE EARLY TO MAKE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENTS.

3. PRIME MINISTER LOC HAS MADE A GOOD BEGINNING, PRESENTING A WIDE-RANGING, THOUGH AMBITIOUS SHORT-TERM AND LONG TERM, GOVERNMENT PROGRAM.

THE PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE A REWRITTEN, SHORTER AND MORE MODEST VERSION OF THE MORE AMBITIOUS TOP PRIORITY PROGRAM AND NATIONAL POLICY DESCRIBED IN AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S 28TH WEEKLY TELEGRAM.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM WILL BE A MAJOR TASK, AND ONLY BEGINNINGS CAN BE MADE ON CONSIDERABLE PARTS OF IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. THE REACTION OF THE SAIGON PRESS AND THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE PUBLIC TO THE NEW CABINET HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS AND RESERVED. THERE IS SOME DOUBT EXPRESSED THAT PRIME MINISTER LOC WILL BE ABLE TO GET THINGS MOVING, HOWEVER, VICE PRESIDENT KY TOLD THE NEW CABINET HE EXPECTS IT TO SERVE IN OFFICE FOR FOUR YEARS.

5. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY A CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOB KOMER AND VICE PRESIDENT KY ON NOVEMBER 13 IN WHICH KY EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO DO HIS BEST TO HELP WITH CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM.

BOB EMPHASIZED THAT PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS WOULD BE THE MOST HELPFUL ANTIDOTE TO UNITED STATES CRITICISM AND FRUSTRATION.

6. ON NOVEMBER 20 THE VIET CONG'S LIBERATION RADIO REJECTED RECENT PUBLIC COMMENTS BY PRESIDENT THIEU THAT HE MAY SOON SEND A LETTER TO HO CHI MINH, PROPOSING DIRECT PEACE TALKS.

THE RADIO SCORNE THE STATEMENT SAYING THIEU DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REPRESENT ANYONE. THE BROADCAST CONTINUED THAT "PEACE NEGOTIATION ARGUMENTS DEFINITELY CANNOT DECEIVE ANYONE."

PRESIDENT THIEU IS PROCEEDING WITH HIS PLANS TO SEND A LETTER TO HO SOMETIME BEFORE CHRISTMAS AND HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO ASK THE JAPANESE TO TRANSMIT IT TO HANOI. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RESPONDED TO HIS REQUEST YET.

DTG: 250252Z NOVEMBER 1967

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCC758

8

PAGE 01 STATE 74715

81
ORIGIN SS 20

INFO NSCE 00,SSO 00,RSC 01,EA 15,NSC 10,/046 R

DRAFTED BY MR ROSTOW TEXT REC'D FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY S/S MR CARROLL BROWN

Outgoing
DD

Pres file

Z 250132Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA FLASH 0176

Nov 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 74715

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PRESIDENT

AS SOON AS THE POLLS CLOSE OR AS SOON AFTER AS YOU HAVE
RESULTS I WANT THOSE RESULTS FLASHED TO ME PERSONALLY.

TEL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT MY THOUGHTS ARE WITH HIM ON THIS
ELECTION DAY. RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By cl, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

9

1967 NOV 25 01 22

Profile

1967 NOV 24 PM 9:18

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA572
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2546

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671004

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

IT NOW LOOKS AS IF VANCE MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO TAKE BACK TO ANKARA THAT COULD STAY THE TURKS HANDS. THE BIG QUESTION IS WHETHER THE TURKS AT THIS POINT ARE SO WOUND UP THAT THEY DON'T REALLY WANT A WAY OUT. VANCE SEES THE TURK FOREIGN MINISTER AT 8:30 A.M. TOMORROW (1:00 A.M. EST).

THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER HAS AGREED TO A DOCUMENT WHICH INCORPORATES MOST OF THE TURKS' FIVE POINTS. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR U THANT TO APPEAL TO GREECE, CYPRUS AND TURKEY TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS, MOST IMPORTANTLY IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWING SOME GREEK TROOPS AND FOR DE-ESCALATING TURK WAR PREPARATIONS. THE KEY ELEMENT IS THAT THE GREEKS WOULD BE GIVING IN TO U THANT AND NOT TO ANKARA. THE NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS AND MATCHING RESPONSES TO U THANT ALSO HELPS GET AROUND THE BIG ISSUE OF WHO MOVES FIRST.

WE HAVE NO WORD YET THAT THE GREEK JUNTA HAS BOUGHT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PLAN. IT'S ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE TURKS WON'T CONSIDER IT ENOUGH. BUT AT LEAST CY CAN RETURN TO ANKARA BEFORE THE SATURDAY EVENING DEADLINE WITH A PROPOSAL IN HAND.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS TONIGHT PROBABLY, BUT OUR STRATEGY WILL BE -- AT VANCE'S REQUEST -- TO SAY NOTHING OURSELVES AND TRY TO MINIMIZE WHAT OTHERS SAY AND HAVE THE MEETING ADJOURNED WITHOUT A RESOLUTION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-33
By us, NARA Date 3-15-99

PRESERVATION COPY

THE TASK IS COMPLICATED BY A GREEK GOVERNMENT LEAK TO THE LONDON TIMES AND THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE PROPOSED PACKAGE. WE FEAR IT WILL COMPLICATE CY'S TASK TOMORROW. NICK KATZENBACH TALKED WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES WHICH AGREED TO KILL THE STORY IF THE LONDON TIMES DIDN'T ACTUALLY RUN IT.

FULL TEXT OF PROPOSAL FOLLOWS:

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS; SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:

A) AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INVIOABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS;

B) A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND TO BRING ABOUT A REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CYPRUS.

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF...X... NUMBER OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS; ON ITS SIDE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS TO THE LEVELS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 14, 1967.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THEY ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH A UN MISSION WHICH WOULD STUDY ON THE SPOT AND PROPOSE NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING SAFETY OF MINORITIES) AND THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE OF CYPRUS.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEREUPON SEND A MISSION OF MILITARY AND POLICE EXPERTS TO CYPRUS FOR THE ABOVE PURPOSE.

6. A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS WOULD TAKE PLACE, SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO COINCIDE WITH AND CORRESPOND TO THE PHASED BUILD-UP OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED UNDER 4 ABOVE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO TURKISH MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CYPRUS.

DTG: 250028Z NOV 1967

~~SECRET~~

10

67 NOV 24 PM 8:39

FRIDAY

1967 NOV 25 00 49

VVCZCEEA571
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2545

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP671003

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN ELECTION

AUSTRALIAN VOTERS ARE GOING TO THE POLLS JUST ABOUT NOW (SATURDAY MORNING THERE). AT STAKE ARE THE 60 SEATS IN THE UPPER HOUSE.

OUR EMBASSY EXPECTS LITTLE OR NO CHANGE IN THE PRESENT LINEUP--28 SEATS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, 28 FOR AUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY, 2 FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR. A FEW CLOSE CONTESTS COULD ALTER THIS BY ONE OR TWO SEATS.

AMBASSADOR IN A CABLE TODAY CONSIDERED IT QUOTE UNLIKELY THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE ANY MAJOR EFFECT ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNQUOTE.

WE DO NOT EXPECT TO HAVE ANY RESULTS FOR ABOUT 20 HOURS. WHEN WE DO, YOU WILL HAVE THEM IMMEDIATELY.

DTG: 250027Z NOV 67

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJL 94-479
By CB, NARA, Date 4-5-95

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-479

By cb, NARA, Date 4-5-95

1967 NOV 25 00 26

VZCZCEEA570
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2544

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671002

97 NOV 24 PM 8:37

FRIDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

FOLLOWING IS SECRETARY RUSK'S RECOMMENDATION THAT YOU SEE CHIP BOHLEN, WHO IS JUST BACK FROM PARIS, FOR HALF AN HOUR ON TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK. I THINK IT IS A GOOD IDEA.

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU MEET FOR A HALF HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR BOHLEN ON NOVEMBER 28 OR 29 AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

DATE _____ TIME _____

11:30 Am, Tues Nov 28

DISCUSSION:

AMBASSADOR BOHLEN HAS JUST RETURNED FROM FRANCE AND IS IN WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION. ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF DE GAULLE'S POLICIES REGARDING SUCH PROBLEMS AS VIETNAM, THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM'S REQUEST TO ENTER THE COMMON MARKET AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE THE AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL VIEWS ON THE EVOLVING FRENCH POSITION ON THESE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 27.

THERE IS ALSO THE BASIC QUESTION OF DE GAULLE'S POWER POSITION INSIDE FRANCE IN THE WAKE OF HIS MIDDLE EAST FAILURE, THE QUEBEC VENTURE, AND THE RUMBLINGS IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT OVER HIS DOMESTIC POLICIES. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN'S ASSESSMENT OF THIS QUESTION WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. I HOPE YOU CAN FIND THE TIME TO MEET WITH HIM.

DEAN RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 242357Z NOV 1967

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Secret

1967 NOV 24 03 25

12

EEA551
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2524

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-33
By ico, NARA Date 3-15-99

Pres file

FROM WALT BOSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 57988

~~SECRET~~

PM 10

HEREWITH SEC. RANCE'S REPORT
FOR THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA

67 NOV 23 PM 10:42

THURSDAY

1. I HAVE COMPLETED MY FIRST ROUND OF TALKS IN ANKARA WITH PRESIDENT SUNAY, PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL. THROUGHOUT THE TURKS MAINTAINED A CONSISTENTLY HARD POSITION WHICH APPARENTLY REFLECTS A CONCERTED CABINET DECISION.
2. WHILE THE DANGERS OF A MILITARY CONFRONTATION ARE ACUTE, NONE OF US BELIEVE THE TURKS WILL ATTACK WHILE MY MISSION REMAINS IN THE AREA. THUS, WE PROBABLY HAVE SOME TIME TO TRY TO FIND AN EFFECTIVE HANDLE TO THIS PROBLEM BUT THE GRIP IS SHORT.
3. THE TURKS ARE CLEARLY IN A DANGEROUS, FATALISTIC MOOD. AFTER FOUR YEARS OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN PAINFUL SALAMI TACTICS ON CYPRUS, THEY CLAIM THEY WILL PAY NO MORE. THE SITUATION IS DESCRIBED IN SIMPLISTIC TERMS OF GREEK ILLEGALITY AND VILLIANY AND TURKISH SUFFERING. THEY ASSERT THAT THEIR HONOR IS AT STAKE, AND POPULAR PASSIONS IN THE COUNTRY ARE SO HIGH THAT A CATALYSTIC EXPLOSION IS IN THE OFFING. THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY OUT, IN THEIR OPINION, IS A VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATE GREEK DECISION TO COMMENCE WITHDRAWING ITS "ILLEGAL" MILITARY UNITS ON CYPRUS.
4. THIS IS HEADY STUFF. YET, THROUGHOUT WE WERE RECEIVED WITH COURTESY AND FRIENDSHIP. BENEATH THE HARSH DESCRIPTION OF THE IMPERATIVES OF THE SITUATION WE SENSE A TURKISH HOPE THAT WE CAN PULL A RABBIT OUT OF THE ESSENTIALLY ULTIMATIVE HAT THEY HAVE PRESENTED TO US. THIS GOING TO TAKE SOME DOING BUT WE ARE STILL IN THE BALL GAME.
5. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATIONS FOLLOW. SEPTEL SUBMITTED FROM ANKARA IN VANTC SERIES ON SUNAY CONVERSATION.
TALBOT

DTG: 240241Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

EEA560
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2536

1967 NOV 24 19 01

FM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70544

Profile

UNCLAS

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM W. W. ROSOW

THE FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF CONGRATULATORY
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER ETEMADI OF AFGHANISTAN:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN EXTENDING THE WARM
CONGRATULATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PRIME
MINISTER OF AFGHANISTAN. MAY I ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO CONVEY BEST WISHES TO YOUR NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE
PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN FOR PROSPERITY AND CONTINUED SUCCESS
IN AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORT.

SINCERELY,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

MESSAGE OKAY -----
SEND AS AMENDED -----

DTG 24/1834Z NOV 1967

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

13a

Friday, November 24, 1967
11:00 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM W. W. ROSTOW

The following is proposed text of Congratulatory Message to Prime Minister Etemadi of Afghanistan:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I take great pleasure in extending the warm congratulations of the Government and the people of the United States of America on your appointment as Prime Minister of Afghanistan. May I also take this opportunity to convey best wishes to your new government and the people of Afghanistan for prosperity and continued success in Afghanistan's development effort.

Sincerely,

END MESSAGE.

WWR:EKH/vmr

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

14

EEA559
OO WTE 16
DE WTE 2533

1967 NOV 24 18 58

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-82
By us, NARA, Date 9-27-04

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67995

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

THE CYPRUS SITUATION (AS OF 12:00 NOON EST)

1. THE TURKISH POSITION APPEARS TO BE HARDENING STILL FURTHER. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL IMPLIED TO THE US AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING THAT WAR WAS ALMOST INEVITABLE. WHILE EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR US EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS THROUGH DIPLOMACY, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE ACTION OR FACE FAR GRAVER CONSEQUENCES INTERNALLY. IF HE HAD TIME, CAGLAYANGIL SAID, HE COULD PERHAPS NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK TROOPS, BUT HE HAD NO MORE TIME.

2. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS TONE OF THE US AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATIONS WITH CAGLAYANGIL, SPECIAL ENVOY VANCE HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO NICOSIA AND RETURN TO ANKARA DIRECTLY FROM ATHENS. HE HAS REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TOMORROW MORNING.

3. SOME ELEMENTS IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES ARE REPORTEDLY TALKING OF OVERTHROWING THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT IF NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION BY 27 NOVEMBER.

[REDACTED] OFFICERS [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT THE YILDIZ WAR ACADEMY IN ISTANBUL TO ELICIT THE SUPPORT OF THE CADET CORPS IN THE EVENT A MILITARY COUP IS ATTEMPTED. THEY APPARENTLY RECEIVED NO DEFINITE ANSWER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE OPPOSITION REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY WILL EXPLOIT ANY TURKISH DIPLOMATIC LOSSES AND [REDACTED] ISMET INONU, PRESIDENT OF THE RPP MIGHT CONVINCING HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE ARMED FORCES TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. THE RPP BELIEVES THAT THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT TANGIBLE SIGNS OF VICTORY ON CYPRUS.

4. USCINCEUR REPORTS INCREASED ACTIVITY AT ERHAC AIRFIELD NORTHEAST OF ISKENDERUN. UNCONFIRMED RUMORS INDICATE A "PROBABLE LAUNCH OF A STRIKE FORCE IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS."

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

5. A TURKISH EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN NICOSIA CALLED AT THE US EMBASSY THIS MORNING, WHERE HE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED THE COORDINATES OF THE US INSTALLATIONS ON CYPRUS. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD PLENTY OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS BUT WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN, AND ADDED THAT THE US FIRM CYPRUS MINES NEED HAVE NO WORRIES BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO A TURKISH ENCLAVE IN LEFKA. TURKISH MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS OF CYPRUS ARE CONTINUING.

6. THE BRITISH AIR ADVISOR IN CYPRUS REPORTS THAT HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN LANDING NEAR TURKISH VILLAGES IN THE EASTERN PART OF CYPRUS FOR THE PAST THREE NIGHTS. THE BRITISH BELIEVE THAT THE HELICOPTERS COME FROM A SHIP WHICH APPEARS OFF THE ISLAND DURING THE NIGHT AND DISAPPEARS BEFORE DAWN. THE UN HAS ALSO REPORTED TWO UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTERS LANDING AT KOPHINOU. THE UK ADVISOR AND THE US ATTACHE BELIEVE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE LANDING IS TO POSITION GUIDES AND PATHFINDER TEAMS. THE ATTACHE ALSO THINKS THAT THE TURKS MAY BE INTRODUCING MILITARY LEADERS INTO TURKISH CYPRIOT AREAS.

7. CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER KYPRIANOU TOLD THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER LAST NIGHT THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO REJECT THE TURKISH FIVE-POINTS AS A BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. THE CYPRIOTS INSIST ON COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND, INCLUDING BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES. A FURTHER OBJECTION APPARENTLY WAS THAT AT NO PLACE IN THE PROPOSAL WAS THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS THE PARTY WITH THE MAJOR INTEREST. THIS REJECTION COMES DESPITE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' PREVIOUS INDICATION THAT HE HAD NO REAL OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSALS.

8. MORE THAN 697 AMERICANS AND CANADIANS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM CYPRUS TO BEIRUT.

9. NATO SECRETARY GENERAL BROGIO WAS APPARENTLY STILL IN BRUSSELS THIS MORNING DESPITE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY OF HIS OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES. THE US MISSION TO NATO FEELS THAT BROGIO IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION, IN THAT THE GREEKS COULD BE RESPONSIVE TO HIM WITHOUT APPEARING TO YIELD TO TURKISH "PROVOCATION" AND BECAUSE HIS INTERVENTION IN A NATO ROLE WOULD BE LESS OFFENSIVE TO THE TURKS THAN EXTERNAL NATIONAL PRESSURES. THE US MISSION HOPES THAT BROGIO MIGHT BE ABLE TO BREAK THE PRESENT IMPASSE BY LEANING ON THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT THAT GREECE AND TURKEY NOW HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN OR DESTROY THE CRITICAL SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE WHOLE NATO INSTITUTION.

DTG: 24/1732Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

REBOX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15

1967 NOV 24 18 10

Pres file
67 NOV 24 PM 1:46
FRIDAY

EEA558
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2534

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67996

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1967
11:45 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

LOMBORHOPOSED CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT MOZUTU OF THE CONGO ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES ON YOUR SECOND
ANNIVERSARY IN OFFICE. ALL FREE MEN ADMIRE YOUR COURAGEOUS
EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY AND PROGRESS TO THE CONGO. YOUR
PEOPLE HAVE ENDURED MUCH THIS PAST YEAR, BUT YOUR LEADERSHIP
HAS BROUGHT THEM T ROUGH TO A HAPIER AND MORE HOPEFUL DAY.
MAY THAT DAY LAST MANY YEARS.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END MESSAGE

DTG: 241736Z NOV 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb.
By *hy*, NARA, Date *11-22-91*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

15a

Friday, November 24, 1967
11:45 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The following is proposed text of Congratulatory Message to President Mobutu of the Congo on the second anniversary of his administration:

Dear Mr. President:

My warm congratulations and best wishes on your second anniversary in office. All free men admire your courageous efforts to bring stability and progress to the Congo. Your people have endured much this past year, but your leadership has brought them through to a happier and more hopeful day. May that day last many ~~more~~ years.

Sincerely.

Lyndon B. Johnson

END MESSAGE

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

16

Pres file

Friday, November 24, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Rusk's recommendation that you see Chip Bohlen, who is just back from Paris, for half an hour Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. I think it is a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

RHU:em

Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1967
11:30 AM

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested call on you by
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

Recommendation:

That you meet for a half hour with Ambassador Bohlen on
November 28 or 29 at a time convenient to you.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Date _____ Time _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Bohlen has just returned from France and is in Washington on consultation. Although we are aware of de Gaulle's policies regarding such problems as Vietnam, the Atlantic Alliance, the United Kingdom's request to enter the Common Market and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I believe it would be useful for you to have the Ambassador's personal views on the evolving French position on these issues, particularly in the light of de Gaulle's press conference on November 27.

There is also the basic question of de Gaulle's power position inside France in the wake of his Middle East failure, the Quebec venture, and the rumblings in the French Parliament over his domestic policies. Ambassador Bohlen's assessment of this question will be of interest to you. I hope you can find the time to meet with him.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

17

~~SECRET~~

November 24, 1967

*Sent to Lane
CAP 67993*

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Wilson's reply.

"I am greatly moved by your message. It is indeed heartening to feel the depth of your understanding for the action we felt it right to take.

"Pat Dean will be in touch with your people shortly about the best time for us to meet. I greatly look forward to it."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 94-2 52
By 9/c6, NARA, Date 1/13/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 NOV 24 01 05

18

Pres file

EEA550
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2522

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67987

1967 NOV 23 PM 0:16

THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

HERewith SEC VANCE'S FIRST REPORT

1. AFTER MEETING WITH PRIMIN DEMIREL SECT VANCE AND AMBASSADOR CALLED ON PRESIDENT SUNAY AT 2015 LOCAL. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROTOCOL CALL FOR VANCE TO PASS WARM GREETINGS FROM PRES. JOHNSON (CORDIALLY RECIPROCATED), DISCUSSION QUICKLY TURNED TO SUBSTANCE. AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT SUNAY WAS WELL BRIEFED ON CYPRUS CRISIS.

2. SAYING VANCE CAME AT TIME WHEN TURKS FACED CRITICAL DAYS ON CYPRUS, PRESIDENT REVIEWED PAST FOUR YEARS DESCRIBING INDIGNITIES AND KILLINGS TO WHICH TURK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN SUBJECTED CULMINATING IN LATEST EVENTS (NOV 15 AND 16). PROBLEM WAS THAT THROUGHOUT THIS TIME TURKS COULD DO LITTLE BECAUSE DISCUSSIONS HAD ALWAYS AMOUNTED TO NOTHING. GOT FELT POWERLESS TO AID FELLOW TURKS WHO LIVED ON ISLAND, 40 MILES OFF TURKISH COAST. HE INVITED VANCE'S THOUGHTS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-33
By iso, NARA Date 3-15-99

PRESERVATION COPY

3. VANCE SAID HE HAD COME AS EMISSARY OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SEE HOW U.S. MIGHT BE OF HELP. PROBLEM CENTERED ON REMOVAL OF EXCESS GREEK TROOPS IN CONTEXT MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION, AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED TO PRIME MINISTER. HE PLANNED PROCEED TO ATHENS TONIGHT TO SEE WHETHER HE COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING PARTIES TOGETHER. EACH SIDE FACED PROBLEM OF WHO WAS TO MAKE BEGINNING IN DIMINISHING TENSION. TURKS WANTED IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK TROOPS, EXCESS TO TREATY CONTINGENT, AND GREEKS WANTED TO SEE DIMINSION AT ONCE OF TURK MOBILIZATION.

4. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ONE ITEM WHICH INCLUDED MARKARIOU AND EVEN ATHENS GOVERNMENT: THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY WEAPONS ON CYPRUS. SUNAY NODDED AGREEMENT. WHEN TWO PARTIES WERE EMOTIONALLY AROUSED OVER AN ISSUE, AS IN PRESENT CASE, THIRD PARTY SOMETIMES CAN FIND COMMON GROUND. IN THIS CASE IT WAS DEMILITARIZATION. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED NOV. 19 DISCUSSIONS RESULTING FROM INVITATION OF FOMMIN CAGLAYANGIL AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS RE FIVE-POINTS, EMPHASIZING THAT BY PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH CAGLAYANGIL THEY HAD BEEN DEVELOPED UNDER PRINCIPLE THAT APPEARANCE OF ULTIMATUM OR OF DIPLOMATIC VICTORY OR DEFEAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. NO DEFINITIVE GREEK POSITION YET TAKEN.

5. SUNAY EXPRESSED TO VANCE AND AMBASSADOR HIS UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM BUT EMPHASIZED NONETHELESS THAT KEY REQUIREMENT WAS REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL GREEK TROOPS FROM CYPRUS. ALTHOUGH NOTHING SUNAY SAID DIFFERED FROM THIS MAIN PRINCIPLE ON WHICH TURKS HAVE STUCK TO DATE, ATMOSPHERE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, AS COMPARED WITH THAT IN PRIMIN'S OFFICE, WAS REFLECTIVE AND WITHOUT POLEMIC. SUNAY WAS THOUGHTFUL AND TROUBLED, VERY COURTEOUS AND WISHED VANCE ALL SUCCESS ON HIS MISSION.

DTG: 240622Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

EEA548
OO WFIELD
DE WIE 2515

13 24

19

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67983

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 1

By ..., NARS, Date 5-7-84

~~SECRET~~

22 NOVEMBER 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW HEREWITH DICK HELMS
RESPONDS TO YOUR REQUEST FOR AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION
OF VC LOSS DATA

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

A WEEK AGO YOU ASKED ME FOR A PAPER DESCRIBING THE
METHODS USED TO COMPILE CASUALTY FIGURES IN THE WAR
IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A RATHER FULL DISCUSSION
OF THIS PROBLEM AT BREAKFAST YESTERDAY, I THOUGHT YOU WOULD STILL
LIKE TO HAVE THIS PAPER SINCE IT IS MORE DETAILED AND
SINCE AT THE END IT DOES IDENTIFY CERTAIN OF THE PROBLEMS
IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS FIELD.

67 NOV 23 PM 1:35

THURSDAY

RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR

ATTACHMENT -1

THE VALIDITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VIET CONG LOSS DATA

SUBJECT: THE VALIDITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VIET CONG LOSS DATA

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION (KIA)

1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE VIET CONG
KIA FIGURES ENTAILS TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS: THE ACCURACY
OF THE KIA FIGURES THEMSELVES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THESE
FIGURES TO THE VIET CONG'S MANPOWER POTENTIAL. SIMPLY
STATED, THE QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED ARE: (A)
ARE WE KILLING THE NUMBER OF ENEMY PERSONNEL EXPRESSED
IN THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES; AND (B) DO THE KIA FIGURES
REPRESENT LOSSES TO COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL
FORCE UNITS ONLY, OR ARE THEY A CONGLOMERATE OF MILITARY,
IRREGULAR, AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

2. PROCEDURALLY, COMUSMACV HAS SOUGHT TO INSURE THAT
THE KIA FIGURES REFLECT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE NUMBER
OF ENEMY ACTUALLY KILLED IN EACH GROUND OPERATION.
INITIAL REPORTS ARE MADE BY THE TACTICAL UNITS-- PLATOONS
AND COMPANIES -- DIRECTLY ENGAGED. USUALLY THESE REPORTS
REFLECT AN ACTUAL COUNT OF BODIES FOUND ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
THE COMPLETENESS -- AND HENCE THE VALIDITY -- OF SUCH
COUNTS DEPEND LARGELY ON THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN AND

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACTION. ENGAGEMENTS IN FLAT, OPEN TERRAIN IN WHICH FRIENDLY UNITS CONTROL THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER THE ACTION PRODUCE MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE COUNTS THAN THOSE IN JUNGLE AREAS OR UNDER CONDITIONS WHERE THE ENEMY HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE HIS DEAD FROM THE BATTLEFIELD OR WHERE BODIES MAY SIMPLY NOT BE SEEN BY FRIENDLY TROOPS. GENERALLY, BODIES OF YOUNG CHILDREN, UNARMED WOMEN, AND OLD MEN ARE NOT INCLUDED AS KIA'S BUT ALL BODIES OF MEN OF MILITARY AGE ARE COUNTED EVEN IF WEAPONS ARE NOT FOUND WITH THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT VIET CONG IRREGULAR TROOPS -- AND OFTEN REGULARS AS WELL -- DO NOT CARRY PAPERS WHICH WOULD PERMIT AUTHENTICATION OF THEIR STATUS. FURTHERMORE, IN ANY SINGLE ACTION THE VC MAY USE A MIX OF MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE TROOPS (REGULARS), PORTERS OR OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE ELEMENTS, LOCAL GUERRILLAS AND, SOMETIMES, ELEMENTS OF LOCAL IRREGULAR FORCES (E.G., SELF-DEFENSE PERSONNEL). THUS EVEN AN ACCURATE COUNT OF BODIES DOES NOT PROVIDE FIRM LOSS FIGURES FOR EACH UNIT PARTICIPATING IN A GIVEN ACTION.

3. INITIAL KIA (BODY COUNT) REPORTS ARE REVIEWED AND CONSOLIDATED AT HIGHER LEVELS -- BATTALION, BRIGADE, TASK FORCE OR DIVISION -- AND CROSS - CHECKED TO PRECLUDE DUPLICATE REPORTING OF KIA'S BY ADJOINING UNITS. IN SOME CASES THE INITIAL REPORTS MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH COUNTS DERIVED FROM LOW-LEVEL AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. OCCASIONALLY, AN ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL KIA'S MAY BE ADDED TO THE OBSERVED COUNT BY GROUND COMMANDERS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE PHYSICAL SEARCH OF THE BATTLEFIELD IS NOT FEASIBLE; HOWEVER, THIS IS AGAINST COMMAND POLICY AND IS THOUGHT TO OCCUR LESS FREQUENTLY THAN IN THE PAST.

4. IN GENERAL, THE COMMAND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OUTLINED ABOVE TEND TO PRODUCE A CONSERVATIVE COUNT OF ENEMY KIA'S . ALTHOUGH SOME NON-COMBATANTS MAY BE ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN ENGAGEMENTS OCCURRING IN DENSELY POPULATED AREAS, THIS MAY BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY EXCLUSION OF FIGURES ON BODIES REMOVED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD UNDER COVER OF NIGHT OR JUNGLE. MOREOVER, THE POSSIBLY INHERENT INFLATIONARY EFFECTS OF DEVELOPING A VALID COUNT UNDER THE PRESSURE OF BATTLE ARE COUNTERBALANCED BY THE UNCOUNTED -- AND UNESTIMATED -- NUMBERS OF ENEMY TROOPS KILLED BY THE HUNDREDS OF DAILY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES WHOSE RESULTS ARE NOT OBSERVED BUT WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY INFLECT SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE ENEMY.

5. GIVEN THESE INFLATIONARY AND DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES, ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES REFLECT THE GENERAL ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF VIET CONG COMBAT LOSSES WITH A MODEST CONSERVATIVE BIAS. ATTEMPTS TO VALIDATE THE ACCURACY OF KIA FIGURES FOR SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS BY EXAMINING CAPTURED DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. IN SOME INSTANCES, THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE SHOWN THE OFFICIAL COUNT TO HAVE BEEN LOW, AND IN OTHERS THE KIA FIGURES WERE EXAGGERATED. THE EVIDENCE IS TOO FRAGMENTARY TO WHOLLY CONFIRM OR WHOLLY DISCREDIT THE SYSTEM. THUS, ASSUMING RELATIVE CONSISTENCY IN THE REPORTING PROCEDURES, WE BELIEVE THE KIA FIGURES ARE BOTH A USEFUL INDICATOR OF TRENDS IN THE RELATIVE INTENSITY OF COMBAT, AND A GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE, ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE REFLECTION OF VIET CONG COMBAT

LOSSES. THESE, HOWEVER, ARE GROSS OR AGGREGATE LOSSES, NOT LOSSES POSITIVELY ASSIGNABLE TO SPECIFIC ENEMY FORCE COMPONENTS. FROM BODY COUNT ALONE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE LOSSES INCURRED BY MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE COMPONENTS (INCLUDING PORTERS), GUERRILLAS OR OTHER IRREGULAR ELEMENTS OR, IN SOME CASES, MORE OR LESS INNOCENT BYSTANDERS.

ENEMY WOUNDED

6. NUMBERS OF ENEMY WOUNDED ARE RARELY KNOWN OR REPORTED. NO ATTEMPT IS MADE BY COMUSMACV TO CALCULATE FIGURES FOR ENEMY WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS COMPARABLE TO THE PROCEDURES USED FOR DETERMINING KIA'S. RATIOS OF THE NUMBER OF WOUNDED TO KIA'S HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, FOR USE IN ANALYZING THE VIET CONG MANPOWER SITUATION. THESE RATIOS WERE DERIVED FROM AN ANALYSIS BY COMUSMACV OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WHICH REVEALED THAT, DURING 1966, FOR EVERY 100 ENEMY TROOPS KILLED, 150 ARE WOUNDED; OF THESE, 35 SUBSEQUENTLY DIE OR ARE PERMANENTLY DISABLED, WHILE THE OTHERS PRESUMABLY RETURN TO DUTY. THE VALIDITY OF THIS METHODOLOGY, WHICH WAS BASED ON FRAGMENTARY EVIDENCE, IS QUESTIONABLE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PATTERN OF CASUALTIES IN 1967 MAY DIFFER MARKEDLY FROM THAT IN 1966 BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF COMBAT. WHILE THESE RATIOS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, WE RECOMMEND CAUTION IN USING THEM TO COMPUTE ABSOLUTE VIET CONG MANPOWER LOSSES.

ENEMY PRISONERS

7. CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING VIET CONG LOSSES THROUGH CAPTURE DIFFER MARKEDLY FROM THOSE USED FOR EITHER KIA'S OR WOUNDED. PRISONER DATA IS NOW BASED SOLELY ON THE ACTUAL INVENTORY OF PROCESSED MILITARY PRISONERS HELD IN CAMPS. PREVIOUSLY, PRISONER DATA WAS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS REPORTEDLY "CAPTURED" IN BATTLE, BUT EVENTS PROVED THIS TO BE QUITE UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE SUCH REPORTS OFTEN INCLUDED A LARGE PROPORTION OF "SUSPECTS" WHO SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED TO BE INNOCENT BYSTANDERS. OUR ONLY MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS THE TIME LAG -- SOMETIMES UP TO A YEAR-- BETWEEN THE CAPTURE OF THE PRISONER AND HIS ULTIMATE ARRIVAL, AFTER PROCESSING, IN A PRISON CAMP. THIS TIME LAG MEANS THE DATA ARE NEVER CURRENTLY COMPLETE, AND PAST FIGURES ARE CONSTANTLY BEING ADJUSTED AND UPDATED TO REFLECT DELAYED CHANGES IN THE INVENTORY. PRISONER DATA ARE THUS INHERENTLY CONSERVATIVE, AND ALTHOUGH THEY CAN BE USED WITH CONFIDENCE IN BROAD MANPOWER CALCULATIONS, THEY SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS REFLECTING CURRENT TRENDS IN ENEMY MORALE, FRIENDLY FORCE EFFECTIVENESS, OR EVEN COMBAT INTENSITY.

ENEMY DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS

8. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY CHIEU HOI DEFECTION DATA PROVIDE A REASONABLY ACCURATE REFLECTION OF DESERTION FROM THE ENEMY, THEY MUST BE USED WITH CAUTION IN VIET CONG MANPOWER CALCULATIONS. CURRENT REPORTING METHODS DO NOT DIFFERENTIATE ADEQUATELY BETWEEN MEMBERS OF IRREGULAR AND REGULAR FORCES, MERELY CLASSIFYING THEM TOGETHER AS MILITARY. SINCE WE HAVE NO BASIS FOR ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION WHICH MAY BE REGULAR, VIET CONG LOSSES THROUGH THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE TOTAL OF REGULAR AND IRREGULAR FORCES -- INCLUDING THE VAGUE "SELF-DEFENSE" CATEGORY --

AND NOT TO THE REGULAR FORCES ALONE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ARE NO RELIABLE DATA AVAILABLE ON SIMPLE VIET CONG DESERTIONS. A RATIO OF ONE UNDETECTED DESERTION FOR EVERY MILITARY CHIEU HOI IS USED IN SOME US OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS, BUT THIS IS A VERY ROUGH FIGURE WHICH LOGIC WOULD SUGGEST IS LOW. ALTHOUGH CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS REFLECT INCREASING CONCERN OVER A SEEMINGLY MOUNTING DESERTION PROBLEM, THEY RARELY CITE STATISTICS, AND THE FEW FIGURES AVAILABLE ARE OFTEN LISTED IN AN AMBIGUOUS FASHION.

ALLIED LOSSES

9. ALTHOUGH DATA FOR ALLIED LOSSES ARE ACCURATE, DIFFERING CRITERIA FOR LISTING WOUNDED AMONG THE ALLIED FORCES TEND TO DISTORT THE IMPACT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND SERIOUSLY DISTORT COMPARATIVE "CASUALTY" STATISTICS. THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES GENERALLY LIST AS WOUNDED ONLY THOSE WHOSE INJURIES REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION US FORCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, INCLUDE AS WOUNDED-- AND HENCE AS "CASUALTIES" -- PERSONNEL WHO HAVE RECEIVED ONLY LIGHT INJURIES WHICH CAN BE TREATED WITHOUT HOSPITALIZATION. (MANY OF OUR "WOUNDED" REQUIRE LITTLE MORE THAN FIRST AID, AND SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF 80 PERCENT OF ALL "WOUNDED" US PERSONNEL ULTIMATELY RETURN TO DUTY STATUS.) THIS ANOMALY IN CASUALTY ACCOUNTING HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE US LOSSES APPEAR TO BE DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGHER THAN THOSE OF THE VIETNAMESE. RECENTLY, THE US COMMAND HAS BEGUN TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN HOSPITALIZED AND UNHOSPITALIZED WOUNDED IN CASUALTY REPORTING. THIS PROCEDURE WILL PERMIT US AND VIETNAMESE "CASUALTIES" TO BE COMPARED ON A MORE MEANINGFUL BASIS.

10. THIS NEW PROCEDURE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF COMPARING ALLIED LOSSES TO THOSE OF THE ENEMY, SINCE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. WE BELIEVE THE ONLY MEANINGFUL COMPARISON THAT CAN BE DRAWN IS THAT OF ALLIED KILLED TO ENEMY KILLED. ALTHOUGH THE RELIABILITY OF THE DATA IS NOT ABSOLUTE ON THE ENEMY'S SIDE FOR SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS, WE BELIEVE THE AGGREGATE WEEKLY FIGURES DO PROVIDE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR COMPARISON AS A MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS A MEASURE OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT.

PUBLIC USE OF LOSS DATA

11. IT IS NOT NORMALLY WITHIN OUR PURVIEW TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE PRESS. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOTE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN SUCH A JUDGMENT:

A. WHILE THE VALIDITY OF THE "BODY COUNT" MAY VARY WIDELY IN DIFFERENT ENGAGEMENTS, THE AGGREGATE FIGURES PROVIDE A USEFUL INDICATOR OF THE LEVEL OF COMBAT AND A CONSERVATIVE, GENERAL MEASURE OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY.

B. CURRENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD EFFECTIVELY LIMIT ADMINISTRATIVE AND HUMAN ERRORS TO A REASONABLE MINIMUM.

C. WHILE SOME SEGMENTS OF THE PRESS ARE SKEPTICAL OF THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES, THEY DO TEND TO REPORT THEM-- NORMALLY WITHOUT CRITICISM -- ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

D. WITHHOLDING OF THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES FROM THE PRESS WOULD REMOVE THE ONE MEANINGFUL YARDSTICK OF THE INTENSITY AND GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS NOW AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

E. ALTHOUGH WE SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE TO BE DERIVED FROM WITHHOLDING THE KIA FIGURES -- EITHER FOR INDIVIDUAL ENGAGEMENTS OR IN PERIODIC TOTALS -- WE DO SEE ADVANTAGES TO WITHHOLDING FROM RELEASE THOSE FIGURES IN WHICH WE HAVE CONSIDERABLY LESS CONFIDENCE, I. E., THE RATIOS FOR WOUNDED AND THE COMPUTATIONS -- BASED ON INCOMPLETE AND WEAK EVIDENCE -- OF OVER-ALL VIET CONG MANPOWER DIFFICULTIES.

F. THE MOST MEANINGFUL COMPARISON THAT CAN BE MADE BETWEEN ALLIED AND ENEMY LOSSES IS THAT IN THE KILLED IN ACTION CATEGORY ON AN AGGREGATE, PERIODIC BASIS. WE BELIEVE IT MAY NEVER BE FEASIBLE TO DEVELOP RELIABLE, UNCHALLENGEABLE ESTIMATE OF VIET CONG WOUNDED WHICH WOULD PERMIT MEANINGFUL COMPARISONS OF TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR THE OPPOSING FORCES.

G. PRESENTATION OF US CASUALTY DATA IN A FORM WHICH DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN HOSPITALIZED AND UNHOSPITALIZED WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS WOULD HELP TO DISPEL DISTORTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS INEVITABLY PRODUCED BY THE PRESENT REPORTING SYSTEM.

DTG: 23/1517Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

20

1967 NOV 23 17 01

PRUS001
1506 ZULU 23 NOVEMBER 67
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By NARA Date 4-5-95

Pre file
67 NOV 23 PM 12:07
THURSDAY

CAF67984

NOVEMBER 23, 1967

I HAVE READ SEVERAL TIMES YOUR COURAGEOUS MESSAGE OF 17 NOVEMBER. I THINK I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR DECISION WAS, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR THINGS WENT SO WELL. IF IT IS A COMFORT TO YOU, I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY FAITH IS DEEP THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE THE WILL AND THE MEANS BOTH TO PAY THEIR WAY AND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THE PART THEY MUST IN THE WORLD.

THIS FAITH IS IN MY BLOOD AND IN MY LIFE'S EXPERIENCE WITH BRITAIN.

AS FOR YOURSELF, I UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS TO ABSORB THE SHOCK OF ALL THIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TRY TO SET YOUR PEOPLE ON A SOUND IF PAINFUL COURSE.

OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU AND WITH THE MEN AND WOMEN OF YOUR LAND; FOR IT IS SOMEHOW JUST WRONG FOR BRITAIN TO BE OFF BALANCE THIS WAY.

AS FOR OURSELVES, WE SHALL BE HELPING IN THE IMF AND ELSEWHERE TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF THE NEW STERLING RATE. AND WE SHALL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE DOLLAR.

IMMEDIATELY ON HEARING THE NEWS FROM YOU, I TURNED TO THE TASK OF TRYING TO GET A TAX INCREASE AND AN EXPENDITURE CUT FROM THE CONGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNLESS OUR DEFICIT IS CUT QUITE SHARPLY, OUR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS ARE LIKELY TO PUSH INTEREST RATES THROUGH THE CEILING WITH GRAVE EFFECTS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. AND WE SHALL ALSO, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SPECULATORS ALREADY WORKING AGAINST THE DOLLAR.

I WAS MUCH HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE AROUND THE WORLD IN THE WAKE OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE POUND. THERE ARE STRONG CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD WILL. AND THERE OUGHT TO BE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE LIKE YOU AND ME WHO LIVED THROUGH THE UNNECESSARY TRAGEDY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION AFTER 1929 AND WHO ALSO LIVED THROUGH THE OTHER TRAGEDY WHEN BRITAIN SAVED US ALL.

IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD EACH OF THE MAJOR NATIONS ON A STEADY COURSE BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. THAT IS CLEARLY OUR DUTY. I SHALL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO FULFILL IT. AND I KNOW WE SHALL BE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER.

AS PAT DEAN TOLD YOU, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR TAKING STOCK TOGETHER HERE AT ANY PERIOD WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR YOU.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

21

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Send 11:22 AM

Pres file

EEA546
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2512

1967 NOV 23 16 22

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE [REDACTED]

13La)(4)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

1967 NOV 23 AM 11:35

THURSDAY

HEREWITH THE CIA'S REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CYPRUS.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION

TURKEY APPEARS TO BE MARKING TIME WITH PLANS TO FORCE THE CYPRUS ISSUE WITH MILITARY MEANS WHILE THEY LISTEN TO THE PRESENTATIONS OF THE US AND UN EMISSARIES, VANCE AND ROLZ-BENNETT. AN INDICATION THAT THEY DO NOT WISH THIS PARADE OF PEACEMAKERS TO HAMPER THEIR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS GIVEN BY THEIR NEGATIVE REACTION TO A PROPOSED VISIT BY NATO SYG BROSIO TO ANKARA.

THE TURKISH CABINET MET UNTIL 0330 (LOCAL TIME) ON THE MORNING OF 23 NOVEMBER TO CONSIDER THE GREEK REPLY TO THEIR NOTE OF 17 NOVEMBER. MINISTER OF THE STATE OZTURK STATED THAT THE REPLY HAD NOT BEEN "FOUND SATISFACTORY" AND THAT THE SITUATION WAS SO URGENT THAT NO DISCUSSIONS COULD BE "TOLERATED." THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WAS DETERMINED TO INSURE THE "FREEDOM OF OUR KINSMEN ON CYPRUS".

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-481

By sig, NARA, Date 1-24-96

PRESERVATION COPY

[REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)

IN ATHENS UNIDENTIFIED
"GREEK GOVERNMENT SOURCES" SPECULATED THAT IF TURKISH
FORCES LANDED ON CYPRUS, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD
TAKE "DISASTROUS RETALIATORY MEASURES" AGAINST THE
TURKISH COMMUNITIES ON THE ISLAND.

RECRIMINATIONS ARE FLYING THICK AND FAST ON
THE GREEK/GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. JUNTA LEADER PAPADOPOULOS
BLAMES GRIVAS FOR THE MESS, SAYING THAT GRIVAS WILL
NOT RETURN TO CYPRUS, AND WILL BE KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE
TO SEE THAT HE DOES NOT. PAPADOPOULOS
ALSO FEARS THAT KING CONSTANTINE MIGHT JUST WELCOME
MORE TROUBLE WITH TURKEY, SINCE IT MIGHT PROVIDE A
WAY OF GETTING RID OF HIM (PAPADOPOULOS). PAPADOPOULOS
CLAIMS THAT, AFTER AN INITIAL FEELING THAT THE DANGER
WAS PAST, THE GREEK MILITARY IS NOW "95 PERCENT CERTAIN"
THAT THE TURKISH ARE GOING TO MOVE ON CYPRUS.

ANOTHER LEADING GREEK JUNTA FIGURE, BRIGADIER
PATTAKOS, STILL THINKS THE DANGER IS PAST.
HE BLAMES EVERYTHING ON MAKARIOS
AND GRIVAS. HE SEES NO GREAT OBJECTION TO WITHDRAWING
THE GREEK FORCES FROM CYPRUS, WHERE THEY ARE EATING
THEIR HEADS OFF, AND TURNING MATTERS OVER TO THE LOCAL
POLICE AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

[REDACTED] ALSO PLACES THE BLAME
ON MAKARIOS AND GRIVAS.

1.3
(a)(4)

MEANWHILE, GRIVAS SAYS HE IS BLAMELESS, AND
HE HAS DOCUMENTS TO PROVE IT. THE GREEK MILITARY
AND MAKARIOS KNEW ALL ABOUT HIS PLANS IN ADVANCE
AND HAD APPROVED THEM IN WRITING. HE HAS PHOTOSTATS AND
HAS TRIED TO GET TWO ATHENS' PAPERS TO PUBLISH THEM.
NO LUCK. HE HAS OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION, BUT IT HASN'T
BEEN ACCEPTED YET.


MAKARIOS HAS SENT A NOTE TO UNSYB
THAT CALLING FOR A TRIPARTITE (GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS)
AGREEMENT TO THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL GREEK AND
TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND PHASED DEMILITARIZATION OF THE
ISLAND UNDER AEGIS OF THE UN. KING CONSTANTINE HAS
INFORMED AMBASSADOR TALBOT THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
WILL ACCEPT MAKARIOS' APPEAL. IT NOW REMAINS TO BE
SEEN WHETHER THE TURKS WILL GO ALONG OR INSIST ON A
MORE RAPID EQUALIZATION OF THE FORCES ON THE ISLAND.

KING CONSTANTINE ASKED AMBASSADOR TALBOT AT
0245 23 NOVEMBER WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE TURKS WOULD LAND
ON CYPRUS LATER THE SAME NIGHT. TALBOT SAID, PROBABLY
NOT, SO LONG AS THEY ARE RECEIVING CYRUS VANCE.

THE SIXTH FLEET HAS BEEN OFFERED, ON CINCUSNAVEUR'S
INITIATIVE AS A POSSIBLE MEETING PLACE FOR GREEK AND
TURKISH NEGOTIATORS, WHO COULD BE FLOWN FROM THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPITALS TO THE US ROOSEVELT ON SIX HOURS
NOTICE.

SOMEBODY IN LONDON NAMED O.S. OPHONTOS HAS SENT A
TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO THE "SOVIET PREMIER" IN WHICH HE
"BESEECHES IMMEDIATE SOVIET INTERVENTION TO STOP TURKEY
FROM INVADING CYPRUS." BUT A SOVIET DIPLOMAT REMARKED IN
ISTANBUL THAT, WHILE TURKEY WAS MAKING A BIG MISTAKE BY
ADOPTING SO AGGRESSIVE A STANCE, THE USSR COULDN'T POSSIBLY
INTERVENE.

1.3
(a)(4)



DTG: 23/1543Z NOV 67

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4

94-479

20/108, DATA, Date 4-5-95

22

VEEA547
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2518

1967 NOV 23 16 45

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67985

~~SECRET~~

67 NOV 23 AM 11 51
THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

INFORMATION: THE GOLD MARKET

PRESSURE CONTINUED TODAY ON THE GOLD MARKET. THE GOLD POOL LOST \$128 MILLION (THE FINAL FIGURE MAY BE A BIT HIGHER). TOMORROW WILL BE MORE OF THE SAME.

OUR PARTNERS IN THE GOLD POOL TOLD BILL MARTIN THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SHARE LOSSES THROUGH THE WEEK BUT THEN WANTED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK. THEY WERE UNWILLING, PARTICULARLY THE GERMANS AND THE ITALIANS WHO ARE THE KEY COUNTRIES, TO COME OU WITH A STATEMENT NOW SAYING UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE GOLD POOL WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE MARKET.

THEY ARE ARRANGING A MEETING IN FRANKFURT FOR SATURDAY OR SUNDAY TO GO OVER THE SITUATION WITH US AND DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. DEMING WILL BE THERE. HE WILL PUT BEFORE THEM OUR GOLD CERTIFICATE PROPOSAL UNDER WHICH THE GOLD POOL COUNTRIES WOULD ANNOUNCE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE \$35 PRICE, PUT A LARGE INITIAL SUBSCRIPTION OF GOLD ON THE TABLE (1-2 BILLION DOLLARS OF WHICH WE WOULD PROVIDE 60 PERCENT) AS EVIDENCE OF THIS SUPPORT, AND EXCHANGE THESE SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR GOLD CERTIFICATES, WHICH WE WOULD ALL AGREE TO TREAT AS RESERVES.

DEMING'S GROUP WILL MEET TOMORROW, WHERE ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE EUROPEAN GOLD MARKET WILL BE IN. AT THAT TIME WE WILL PROPOSE FOR YOU OUR BEST VIEW OF THE OPTIONS AHEAD.

DTG 23/1616Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

GPS 250 IMI 250

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

23

1967 NOV 23 16 09

Sent 11:09

Pres file

EEA545
PP WTE18 WTE15
DE WTE 2514

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP67982

67 NOV 23 AM 11:18

THURSDAY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NOVEMBER 22, 1967

STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS YOU SEND A SHORT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO MOROCCAN KING HASSAN ON THE BIRTH OF HIS DAUGHTER AS FOLLOWS:

"MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES."

WE WOULD NOT RELEASE THE MESSAGE HERE BUT WOULD TELL THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT NO OBJECTION IF THEY WISH TO DO SO.

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION TO KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO ON THE BIRTH OF HIS DAUGHTER

ENCLOSED FOR APPROVAL IS A PROPOSED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF A DAUGHTER.

IF APPROVED, WE WOULD ADVISE THE EMBASSY THAT THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE GOVERNMENT OF MOROCCO WISHES TO DO SO.

S/ BENJAMIN H. READ
T/ BENJAMIN H. READ
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ENCLOSURE

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

PROPOSED MESSAGE

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY YOURS,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON

HIS MAJESTY

HASSAN II,
KING OF MOROCCO,
RABAT.

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

STATE-----

1. REQUEST EMBASSY TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING FROM PRESIDENT: QUOTE HIS MAJESTY HASSAN II, KING OF MOROCCO, RABAT -

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY YOURS,
LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOM WISHES DO SO.

GP-3

DIG: 23/1503Z NOV 67

GPS: 320 IMI 320

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

24

~~TOP SECRET~~

Pres file

1967 NOV 23 01 05

VZCZCEEA537
OO WTIIS
DE WTA 2502

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67971

*From the President
For the Prime Minister*

67 NOV 22 PM 8:18

WEDNESDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOVEMBER ²³ 1967

~~HEREWITH A DRAFT RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON FOR
YOUR CONSIDERATION.~~

I HAVE READ SEVERAL TIMES YOUR COURAGEOUS MESSAGE OF 17
NOVEMBER. I THINK I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR DECISION WAS, ESPECIALLY
BECAUSE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR THINGS WENT SO WELL. IF
IT IS A COMFORT TO YOU, I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY FAITH IS DEEP THAT
THE BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE THE WILL AND THE MEANS BOTH TO
PAY THEIR WAY AND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THE PART THEY MUST IN
THE WORLD.

THIS FAITH IS IN MY BLOOD AND IN MY LIFE'S EXPERIENCE WITH
BRITAIN.

AS FOR YOURSELF, I UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS TO ABSORB THE SHOCK
OF ALL THIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TRY TO SET YOUR PEOPLE ON A
SOUND IF PAINFUL COURSE.

OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU AND WITH THE MEN AND WOMEN OF YOUR LAND; FOR IT IS SOMEHOW JUST WRONG FOR BRITAIN TO BE OFF BALANCE THIS WAY.

AS FOR OURSELVES, WE SHALL BE HELPING IN THE IMF AND ELSEWHERE TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF THE NEW STERLING RATE. AND WE SHALL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE DOLLAR.

IMMEDIATELY ON HEARING THE NEWS FROM YOU, I TURNED TO THE TASK OF TRYING TO GET A TAX INCREASE AND AN EXPENDITURE CUT FROM THE CONGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNLESS OUR DEFICIT IS CUT QUITE SHARPLY, OUR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS ARE LIKELY TO PUSH INTEREST RATES THROUGH THE CEILING WITH GRAVE EFFECTS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. AND WE SHALL ALSO, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SPECULATORS ALREADY WORKING AGAINST THE DOLLAR.

I WAS MUCH HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE AROUND THE WORLD IN THE WAKE OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE POUND. THERE ARE STRONG CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD WILL. AND THERE OUGHT TO BE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE LIKE YOU AND ME WHO LIVED THROUGH THE UNNECESSARY TRAGEDY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION AFTER 1929 AND WHO ALSO LIVED THROUGH THE OTHER TRAGEDY WHEN BRITAIN SAVED US ALL.

IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD EACH OF THE MAJOR NATIONS ON A STEADY COURSE BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. THAT IS CLEARLY OUR DUTY. I SHALL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO FULFILL IT. AND I KNOW WE SHALL BE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER.

AS PAT DEAN TOLD YOU, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR TAKING STICK TOGETHER HERE ~~WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR YOU.~~

at any period when the time is right for you.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 230025Z NOV 1967

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

1967 NOV 22 21 47

EEA53A
CO WTE10
DE WTE 2495

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67966

87 NOV 22 PM 5:09

WEDNESDAY

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU WILL WANT TO READ THIS INTERESTING AND LUCID ACCOUNT OF THE FIGHTING AROUND DAK TO WHICH WAS SENT IN BY GENERAL ABRAMS.

BEGIN TEXT

IT IS 1800 NOVEMBER 22, IN SAIGON AND I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM KONTUM PROVINCE. I SPENT SOME TIME WITH PEERS AND LT COL LUAT, THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMANDER FOR FLEIKU AND KONTUM AND HIS ADVISOR COL KAUFFMAN. I VISITED BRIEFLY WITH COL JOHNSON 1ST BRIGADE 4TH DIVISION AND COL RATTAN 1ST BRIGADE 1ST CAV, AND A GOOD TALK WITH SCHWEITER OF THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE. I THEN FLEW OVER MUCH OF THE BATTLE AREA.

IN LATE OCTOBER INTELLIGENCE INDICATED THAT THE 1ST NVA DIVISION WAS PREPARING TO ATTACK DAK TO. DEPLOYMENTS TO KONTUM TO DATE ARE 9 US BATTALIONS AND 6 ARVN BATTALIONS.

DAK TO LIES ON A VALLEY FLOOR ADJACENT TO A RIVER. TO THE NORTH, SOUTH, EAST AND WEST DAK TO IS SURROUNDED BY MOUNTAINS, RIDGES AND PEAKS EXTENDING FOR MANY KILOMETERS IN ALL DIRECTIONS. THESE PEAKS AND RIDGES VARY BETWEEN 800-1300 METERS IN HEIGHT. THE SLOPES ARE STEEP, THEY ARE COVERED BY TREES 100 TO 200 FT. HIGH AND UP TO FOUR FEET IN DIAMETER AND TOPPED WITH DOUBLE AND TRIPLE CANOPY. IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN ATTACK ON DAK TO YOU MUST SECURE THE HIGH GROUND AROUND IT. THIS THE 4TH DIVISION BEGAN ON 4 NOV AND MADE ITS FIRST CONTACT ON THE FIRST RIDGE SOUTH OF DAK TO. ON SUCCESSIVE DAYS THE 1ST BRIGADE 4TH DIVISION PUSHED SOUTH AND WEST FROM DAK TO, THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE PUSHED WEST AND THEN SOUTHWEST AND THE ARVN PUSHED OUT TO THE NORTH, NORTHEAST AND EAST. THEY HAVE ALL FOUND THE ENEMY IN DEFENSIVE POSTIONS ON THE TOPS OF THE PEAKS AND RIDGES. I VIEWED ONE POSITION TODAY CONSISTING OF

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JAG 830024
By 125/100, NARA, Date 12 16 91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3 CONCENTRIC TRENCHES MAKING 3 COMPLETE CIRCLES AROUND THE TOP OF ONE MOUNTAIN. I AM INFORMED THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCHES ARE SOME HORIZONTAL HOLES DUG BACK INTO THE MOUNTAIN WHERE THE ENEMY STAYS DURING BOMBING AND ARTILLERY.

THE PATTERN OF ENEMY DEPLOYMENT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE 24TH REGIMENT WITH ITS 4TH AND 5TH BATTALIONS AND THE 304TH VC BATTALION NORTHEAST AND EAST OF DAK TO. THE 1ST NVA DIVISION WITH THE 66TH, 32D AND 174TH REGIMENTS AND THE 6TH BATTALION OF THE 24TH REGIMENT SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST AND WEST OF DAK TO. IN THE LAST 2 DAYS THE 4TH BATTALION OF THE 95 BRIGADE HAS MOVED IN WEST OF KONIUM CITY.

SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN 4 NOVEMBER IT HAS BEEN HARD AND TENACIOUS ON BOTH SIDES. A DEFECTOR FROM THE 32D NVA REGIMENT SAID HIS UNIT HAD NOT HAD FOOD FOR SIX DAYS. THIS IS NOT A GENERAL CONDITION EVEN IF TRUE IN HIS UNIT. THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE 4TH BATTALION 24TH REGIMENT WAS CAPTURED AND LATER DIED OF WOUNDS. HE HAD ON HIS PERSON A HAND WRITTEN DIRECTIVE THAT HE WOULD DEFEND HIS POSITION TO THE LAST MAN. THIS IS THE POSITION ASSAULTED AND TAKEN BY THE ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE. ON THE 14, 15, AND 16 THERE WAS A LULL EXCEPT FOR THE MORTAR ATTACKS ON THE DAK TO BASE. ON THE 17TH HEAVY FIGHTING BEGAN AGAIN AND CONTINUES TO NOW. THIS IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY FRIENDLY FORCES PRESSING FURTHER OUT. TODAY THE FIGHTING CONTINUES FOR HILL 875 ABOUT 8 KM FROM THE BORDER AND 882 ABOUT 5 KM FROM THE BORDER. MANY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS COME FROM ALMOST ALL STRIKES IN THE VALLEYS WEST OF THE RIDGES.

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	MIA
US	249	843	16
ARVN	54	220	3
TOTAL	303	1063	19

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3 CONCENTRIC TRENCHES MAKING 3 COMPLETE CIRCLES AROUND THE TOP OF ONE MOUNTAIN. I AM INFORMED THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCHES ARE SOME HORIZONTAL HOLES DUG BACK INTO THE MOUNTAIN WHERE THE ENEMY STAYS DURING BOMBING AND ARTILLERY.

THE PATTERN OF ENEMY DEPLOYMENT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE 24TH REGIMENT WITH ITS 4TH AND 5TH BATTALIONS AND THE 304TH VC BATTALION NORTHEAST AND EAST OF DAK TO. THE 1ST NVA DIVISION WITH THE 66TH, 32D AND 174TH REGIMENTS AND THE 6TH BATTALION OF THE 24TH REGIMENT SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST AND WEST OF DAK TO. IN THE LAST 2 DAYS THE 4TH BATTALION OF THE 95 BRIGADE HAS MOVED IN WEST OF KONIUM CITY.

SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN 4 NOVEMBER IT HAS BEEN HARD AND TENACIOUS ON BOTH SIDES. A DEFECTOR FROM THE 32D NVA REGIMENT SAID HIS UNIT HAD NOT HAD FOOD FOR SIX DAYS. THIS IS NOT A GENERAL CONDITION EVEN IF TRUE IN HIS UNIT. THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE 4TH BATTALION 24TH REGIMENT WAS CAPTURED AND LATER DIED OF WOUNDS. HE HAD ON HIS PERSON A HAND WRITTEN DIRECTIVE THAT HE WOULD DEFEND HIS POSITION TO THE LAST MAN. THIS IS THE POSITION ASSAULTED AND TAKEN BY THE ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE. ON THE 14, 15, AND 16 THERE WAS A LULL EXCEPT FOR THE MORTAR ATTACKS ON THE DAK TO BASE. ON THE 17TH HEAVY FIGHTING BEGAN AGAIN AND CONTINUES TO NOW. THIS IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY FRIENDLY FORCES PRESSING FURTHER OUT. TODAY THE FIGHTING CONTINUES FOR HILL 875 ABOUT 8 KM FROM THE BORDER AND 882 ABOUT 5 KM FROM THE BORDER. MANY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS COME FROM ALMOST ALL STRIKES IN THE VALLEYS WEST OF THE RIDGES.

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	MIA
US	249	843	16
ARVN	54	220	3
TOTAL	303	1063	19

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY