

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 3 p	11/25/67	A
#5 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671013) <i>sanitized 9-13-99</i> TS 1 p <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLS 94-479 NLS 98-275</i> <i>Secret per NLS 94-479</i>	11/25/67	A
#6 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671012) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-23-99 NLS 98-34</i> <i>man info released 12-3-04 NLS/RAC 04-82</i> [Duplicate of #2, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/25/67	A
#7 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671007) <i>open 5-5-95</i> S 2 p <i>NLS 94-479</i>	11/25/67	A
#8 cable	President 176 to Canberra <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #70, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/25/67	A
#9 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671004) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>open NLS 98-33 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/25/67	A
#10 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671003) <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/25/67	A
#11 cable	Rostow to President (CAP671002) <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> C 1 p	11/25/67	A
#12 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67988) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p <i>open NLS 98-33 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/24/67	A
#14 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67995) <i>Exempt 3-1-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-23-99 NLS 98-34</i> <i>man info released 12-3-04 NLS/RAC 04-82</i> [Duplicate of #7, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library]	11/24/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 51, 11/16-25/67

Box 25

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#17 memo	Rostow to President exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479 S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 94-251 (1/02)</i>	11/24/67	A
#18 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67987) exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479 S 2 p <i>Open NLJ 98-53 3-15-99</i> [Duplicate of #5, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library Box 126"]	11/24/67	A
#20 cable	President to Prime Minister <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> TS 1 p	11/23/67	A
#21 cable <i>Downgraded to "S" per NLJ 94-481</i>	Rostow to President (CAP67981) TS "S" 3 p <i>Sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> [Duplicate of #4, NSF, Country File, Cyprus, "Cyprus Crisis, Vance, Filed by LBJ Library Box 126"]	11/23/67	A
#22 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67985) <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/23/67	A
#24 cable	Rostow to President (CAP67971) <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> TS 2 p	11/23/67	A
#27a memo	President to Prime Minister (part. duplicate of #24) TS 2 p <i>Open NLJ 94-479 (1/02)</i>	11/22/67	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President, re: Brazil <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 4 p	11/22/67	A
#33a ltr	President to Costa e Silva <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p [Duplicate of #3, Special Head of State Correspondence, "Brazil, 8/1/67-12/31/67"]	11/21/67	A
#35a memo	Jorden to Rostow <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, Country File, Thailand, Vol. 7]	11/21/67	A
#37a ltr	Kosygin to President <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p	11/21/67	A
#37b memcon FILE LOCATION	Dobrynin and Kohler <i>Open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 2 p	11/21/67	A

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#38 memo	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. <i>open 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> S 1 p (dup. # 7, NSF, Subject File, "Radio Free Europe")	11/21/67	A
#38a memo	Helms to President S 1 p <i>open 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482</i> (dup. # 7a, as above)	11/21/67	A
#38c memo	Intelligence Memorandum " S 4 p (dup. # 7c, as above)	11/14/67	A
#39 memo	"To be inserted before last paragraph..." <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 1 p	11/21/67	A
#39b ltr	President to Chairman <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p	undated	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 11:50 a.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #88, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/21/67	A
#40a cable	Deptel 71853 to Canberra <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #88a, NSF, Country File, Australia, Vol. 3]	11/20/67	A
#45e ltr	President to Bustamante <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p	8/18/66	A
#48a ltr	President to Kittikachorn <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 1 p	11/20/66	A
#49a ltr	President to Otero <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> PCI 2 p	11/21/66	A
#53a memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p	11/21/67	A
#53b notes	"Proposed Priorities--Short Term" <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 2 p	undated	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p	11/18/67	A

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#65a cable	Rome 2642 C 1 p <i>sanitized 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480; Sanzani NJ 019-025-3</i>	11/18/67	A
#67a rpt	"Number of 3rd country troops now in VN..." S 1 p <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i>	undated	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open 9-13-99 NLJ 98-274</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i>	11/18/67	A
#70a rpt	Intelligence Report S 2 p <i>sanitized 4-13-95 NLJ 94-482; Sanzani NJ 019-025-3</i> <i>Open 6-11-98</i>	11/18/67	A
#74a cable	Prime Minister to President <i>exempt 3-1-95 NLJ 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/18/67	A
#72a rpt	Vietnam Political Situation Report <i>Open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> C 2 p <i>Op. #2, NSF, File of Walt Rostow, "Also, Box 8"</i>	11/18/67	A
#81a cable	Bucharest 718 <i>Open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 7 p	11/15/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open 4-17-95 NLJ 94-456</i> <i>(dup #2, NSF, File of Walt Rostow, "Also, Box 8")</i>	11/17/67	A
#82a memo	Read to Rostow <i>Open 1-23-95 NLJ 94-480</i> S 2 p <i>(dup of #4a, see above)</i>	11/16/67	A
#86 memo	Rostow to Watson S 1 p <i>Open 7-14-94 NLJ 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #118a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/17/67	A
#87 memo	Rostow to President, 12:15 p.m. TS 1 p <i>Open 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i>	11/21/67	A
#93 memo	Rostow to President, 8:00 p.m. <i>sanitized 3-14-96 NLJ 94-481</i> TS 1 p <i>Open 6-8-98 RAC</i> <i>Downgraded to "S" per NLJ 94-481</i>	11/16/67	A
#95 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. <i>Open 5-5-95 NLJ 94-479</i> C 1 p	11/16/67	A

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#96 memo	Rostow to President, 4:50 p.m. <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A
#96a memo	Davis to Rostow <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A
#96b cable	USUN 2296 C 2 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-480</i>	{11/67}	A
#98 memo	Rostow to President, 3:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #92, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#98a cable	London 3905 <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 3 p <i>sanitized 3-11-94 NLS 93-293</i> [Duplicate of #92a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#102a cable	Saigon 11200 C 3 p <i>open 1-23-95 NLS 94-480</i> [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1B(1) 11/66-12/67, Economic Activity and Planning"]	11/16/67	A
#103 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #119, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#104 memo	Rostow to President <i>NLS 93-291; 9/12/94</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #119, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Vol. 12]	11/16/67	A
#111 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 5-5-95 NLS 94-479</i> S 1 p	11/16/67	A

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#4 memo	Rostow to the President - TS 1 p Serialized 4/26/06 NLJ 98-276	11/25/67	A

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NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 51, November 16-25, 1967
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November 25, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Following is a draft as requested on The Search for Peace in Vietnam.

*sent Rostow
via wire
CAP671015*

I should welcome your suggestions for revision.

The punch line is at the very end.

The problem with the speech is that the theme--- it's Hanoi's move---doesn't fit Thieu's initiative in Hanoi. And it doesn't address the issue about which talk is increasing; namely, a Southern Solution, in which the NLF and Saigon negotiate.

But I'm sure you're clear as to what you want. And this is forwarded only as a beginning for you to shoot at.

1a

Draft -- November 25, 1967

The Search for Peace in Vietnam

I am going to talk about peace in Vietnam.

For the end of all wars is peace -- sometimes honorable peace, sometimes lasting peace, and sometimes the peace of despair and slavery.

And let me make it clear -- the peace I speak of is not the peace of surrender. -- open or disguised. It is not the peace that would come with abandonment of our commitments or the violation of our word.

The peace I speak of is a peace under which a man can go to bed at night and feel confident he will awake in the morning. A peace in which, when he awakens, he will not find his neighbor or his village elders slaughtered. A peace in which men can raise their families in dignity and hope. A peace in which men can, through orderly and fair constitutional procedures, select a government of their free choice -- and change it in the same orderly way. A peace in which the peoples of North as well as South Vietnam would devote their talents and resources to progress, working with the other governments of Southeast Asia.

* * * *

Let me recall some of the specific ways in which we have tried to help find that kind of peace.

I cannot disclose all we have done nor every channel that has been used. I am sure you would not want me to. For we still remain hopeful that one day one of these points of contact will produce a turning point in the struggle for a peaceful solution.

And I must, of course, preserve the confidential nature of the efforts of some other governments -- as we have given our word we would.

But there are things that can be said. There are things that I believe need saying. And I will say them.

* * * *

One major effort to achieve peace in Vietnam has now been all but forgotten by millions of people around the world and here at home. But is worth recalling.

As you know, North Vietnam's decision to take over South Vietnam was made in the late 1950's. By 1959 officers and non-commissioned officers, military specialists, political organizers, saboteurs, and agents were moving in increasing numbers from North Vietnam into the South. Weapons and other supplies were also sent South. The pace increased in 1960 and even more in 1961. Some moved by sea. Others went across the Demilitarized Zone. And others travelled down the jungle trails of neighboring Laos into South Vietnam.

In Laos itself the Communist Pathet Lao -- backed by armed men from North Vietnam and with supplies from Hanoi and other Communist capitals -- were trying to take over the country.

In 1961 President Kennedy directed Governor Harriman to negotiate a new agreement on Laos. It was clear the 1954 arrangement was not working.

A year of tough negotiating in Geneva followed. Yet, even as the talks went forward, the North Vietnamese tried to change drastically the military situation with a large offensive. They gave up the effort only when President Kennedy sent U. S. forces into Thailand and made it clear we were ready to act if necessary.

Only then did the Communist negotiators finally accept the new Geneva Accords of 1962.

It is worth recalling that a principal negotiator of that settlement -- indeed, the co-chairman of the conference -- was the Soviet Union. They assumed, with the British, responsibility for overseeing the agreement, with making it work. That responsibility was incorporated in Article 8 of the Agreement. It was backed by detailed private assurances of the Soviet negotiator to Mr. Harriman. It is a tragic fact that the Soviet Union has been unwilling or unable to fulfill that responsibility which it freely assumed.

For Hanoi did not observe the spirit or the letter of the agreement from the day it went into effect. They did not, as they had promised, pull their military forces out of Laos. And they continued illegally to use the Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos to send their men and war material into South Vietnam. Their goal -- the conquest of South Vietnam and eventually of Laos -- never changed.

If Hanoi had lived up to its word, the problem in Vietnam would have found its solution.

If, today, the men in Hanoi wonder why we and others take their words with some skepticism, they need look no further for the reason than to the 1962 Agreement on Laos and their open violation of their solemn pledge.

It was directly because of that violation that the war in Vietnam expanded in 1963 and 1964. In the South, political confusion erupted in the spring of 1963, leading to the coup against the Diem government and to a long period of instability. Seeing what they thought was a bright chance for quick success, the North rapidly expanded its forces in the South. By the end of 1964, regular units of the North Vietnamese Army were moving into attack positions in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong main force units were expanded. The Laos trails were developed into roads on which trucks could run.

Through this period we tried to explore whether Hanoi had any interest in moving toward a peaceful settlement. These explorations, conducted by a responsible third party, produced a clear reading that Hanoi was absolutely confident of victory. It was totally unprepared to consider peace except on its own terms -- terms that would have ensured Communist control in the South.

By early 1965 we recognized that stronger action -- the kind of action contemplated in the Senate Resolution of the previous August -- would be necessary. Pressure from the North was not just maintained, it was stepped up.

It was necessary to take new measures to try to slow and make more difficult the flow of armed men and supplies coming from the North. It was necessary, finally, and after five long years of restraint, to bring home to the men in Hanoi some of the punishment that they had long been inflicting on their fellow Vietnamese in the South. The bombing of North Vietnam began.

Soon after the bombing began, I made clear -- in a speech at Johns Hopkins -- that we were ready to negotiate at any time without conditions.

A short time after the bombing started -- in April and May of 1965 -- we began to hear from other governments that a halt in the attacks would get a favorable response from Hanoi. We decided to try.

And so, on May 12 -- on the occasion of Buddha's birthday -- we halted air strikes against targets in the North.

In a message to the North Vietnamese government we noted:

- that air strikes had stopped;
- the standdown would run into the next week;
- we were acting on "suggestions from various quarters, including public statements by Hanoi representatives" that there could be no progress toward peace while air attacks were going on;
- we would be watching, during the pause, for signs of "significant reductions" of armed action by the North against the South;
- we hoped Hanoi's response would permit "further and more extended suspension of this form of military action in the expectation of equally constructive actions by the other side in the future."

In short, the door to peace was open. We hoped Hanoi would come through and join in a real search for peace.

The note was given to the Soviet Union with the request it be delivered to the North Vietnamese. Moscow refused.

A copy was delivered to the North Vietnamese Embassy in one capital. It was returned the following day.

We arranged for delivery of another copy directly to the Foreign Ministry in Hanoi -- through a third government which had a representative there. This, too, was returned the following day.

And so -- after five days -- after our proposal had been turned back on three occasions -- bombing was resumed.

Not only was our offer turned down, but then -- as later -- the North Vietnamese used this interlude to strengthen its military position.

A second major chance for peace was lost. It was lost because of Hanoi's refusal to do two simple things -- to send a responsible representative to talk with us, and to show a restraint on the military front equal to ours.

For a time, most people here and abroad seemed to understand what had happened -- and to place the blame where it belonged. I remind you that throughout this time -- 1964 and 1965 -- when we were exploring every possible avenue to peace -- and even many that seemed utterly impossible -- we heard not one constructive word from Hanoi. North Vietnamese leaders came forward with no concrete proposals -- no reasonable suggestions.

But soon we began to hear a new theme from domestic critics and from a number of foreign governments.

The earlier pause was good -- but it didn't last long enough -- didn't give Hanoi enough time to think and respond.

We doubted this. We believed then -- as we do now -- that when lives and peace are at stake, men can and should act quickly and without conditions.

But we decided to set aside our skepticism. We decided to walk the extra mile. We decided to try again.

Christmas came, and, as part of the Christmas truce, we halted bombing on December 24. Then, responding to the insistent cries of hope, we decided to extend the bombing pause.

We informed a large number of governments of our decision. Messages went to dozens of capitals and were passed on. The United Nations Secretary General was informed.

In a message to one government close to Hanoi, we said:

"If ... the other side will now reciprocate by making a serious contribution toward peace, it would obviously have a favorable effect on the possibility of further extending the suspension."

We then were able to deliver this same message directly to an official of the North Vietnamese government in another capital.

Finally, in still another capital, an American official spoke directly and at length with the top official in a North Vietnamese Embassy. The answer we got from Hanoi was that its position "remained unchanged." We were trying to "force" Hanoi to sit down at a table and talk. We had to stop the bombing "unconditionally and forever."

When we suggested another meeting, we were told the North Vietnamese had nothing further to say.

Nevertheless, our efforts continued in other places. But the results were the same. We were told we were trying to give Hanoi an "ultimatum." We could expect a settlement in Vietnam only when we accepted the four point stand of the North Vietnamese government -- and when we proved this acceptance "by actual deeds."

At the outset, many well-meaning people had told us that the bombing pause should last three weeks if it were to succeed in producing talks. It lasted for 37 days. And at the end of that period -- after dozens of efforts to encourage some favorable response -- and after we knew beyond any doubt ~~that~~ that North Vietnam was using the respite to pour more men, more guns, more ammunition and supplies into the South -- we resumed bombing.

Another serious attempt to find peace -- or even a possible door to peace -- and another setback.

I have had moments of deep regret about this decision. Our enemy took clear advantage of us. And some brave South Vietnamese and some Americans are gone today because of Hanoi's actions.

Yet, looking back, I feel I could not have done otherwise. If there had been a chance for peace -- as many speaking with full governmental responsibility suggested to us -- we could not in conscience have neglected it. And, if it had succeeded, many lives would have been saved.

But you will understand if, today, I hear with grave doubts the same proposals -- the same arguments -- the same reasoning that I heard -- and took seriously -- less than two years ago.

For there is nothing to indicate that the men in Hanoi have altered their stand one bit.

Despite our deep disappointment with the failure of the long bombing pause to bring us closer to peace, the search for a solution went on.

In the fall of 1966 our Ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, was approached by the Polish representative on the International Control Commission. In several long sessions they discussed the possibilities of a peaceful settlement.

We set forth a number of proposals that we would be willing to accept. Above all, we were interested in direct contact with Hanoi so the details could be worked out in mutually agreeable form. Among the issues to be discussed would be acts of mutual de-escalation, including a cessation of the bombing of the North.

The Polish representative said that he had conveyed our views to Hanoi. If they were as we had outlined them, we should confirm them directly in conversations with a North Vietnamese representative in Warsaw. We agreed to do so.

In Warsaw our representative ran into one delay after another. The bombing of certain targets in the Hanoi area in early December was blamed for "creating a bad atmosphere." In fact, these strikes were not significantly

different from others that had occurred throughout the previous months -- while the talks in Saigon were proceeding without interruption.

Finally, air strikes on December 13 and 14 were used as the reason for breaking off this contact. Yet our representative had been in Warsaw and had been ready for direct contact with the North Vietnamese for a week before those air strikes and on the agenda was the question of bombing itself.

The fact is that from the very outset we had no direct word from Hanoi, no outline of Hanoi's views such as we had provided the Poles of our views.

It is perfectly clear that whatever the good will of the Polish intermediary, Hanoi, in fact, was not ready to negotiate. The air strikes were simply an excuse for Hanoi's failure to sit down and discuss this matter in a serious and reasonable way.

In many such cases, we have found that the optimism of intermediaries far exceeds the performance of the Hanoi regime.

With the failure of the Warsaw contact, we turned to other means of opening a useful dialogue with the North Vietnamese. Despite the argument advanced in the Polish capital about bombing, the fact is that direct contact was established with a representative of Hanoi soon thereafter.

In these talks we made a variety of proposals -- and they covered every possible road to peace we could suggest. In answer, Hanoi's representative simply jumped from one to another of these proposals. But he never accepted any. Nor did he make any useful counter-proposals beyond what we know to be Hanoi's hard public request for surrender.

After these hundreds of contacts in almost every capital in the world -- direct and through official and private intermediaries -- I wondered whether, in fact, any North Vietnamese could speak for his government. Perhaps only Ho Chi Minh would be able to break through the confusion and the hardened positions we had been hearing.

I decided to address a message directly to the North Vietnamese leader. On February 2, this year, I sent that message.

It was as serious as I could make it. It contained no threats, no ultimatum. After citing the problems I saw in an "unconditional" halt to the bombing, I added:

"...I am prepared to move even further towards an ending of hostilities than your government has proposed in either public statements or through private diplomatic channels. I am prepared to order a cessation of bombing against your country and the stopping of further augmentation of U. S. forces in South Vietnam as soon as I am assured that infiltration into South Vietnam by land and by sea has stopped. These acts of restraint on both sides would, I believe, make it possible for us to conduct serious and private discussions leading toward an early peace."

Then the letter was delivered, on February 8, we had stopped bombing the North. The next week President Ho sent a letter to Pope Paul in which Hanoi's hard line was repeated. Only the was bombing resumed. Ho's reply to me arrived a few days later and was couched in the same wording as that given the Pope.

He wrote: "The U.S. Government must stop definitively and unconditionally its bombing raids and all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw from South Vietnam all U. S. and satellite troops, recognize the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, and let the Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs."

Let no well-meaning observer deceive you: that remains the position of Hanoi as of this hour -- as Hanoi transmits it to us privately as well as publicly.

* * * *

This is a description of some of the efforts we have made. It could be multiplied many times over with the story of other well-meant contacts -- other proposals -- and other rejections by Hanoi.

It is a gloomy and disheartening recital. But I think no fair-minded person can say that we have not tried -- tried hard -- tried often.

In my recent speech at San Antonio I spoke of the basic position of this Government regarding the way to peace. I said then:

"As we have told Hanoi ^{time} and again, the heart of the matter really is this: the United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation."

These words are clear. We stand by them.

I would go further ^{and} say:

If Hanoi wishes to talk about a settlement, we stand ready to talk -- this week, tomorrow, even today;

If Hanoi is interested in deeds, we are prepared to undertake actions to lower the level of fighting -- so long as Hanoi acts in reciprocity;

And, if it is preferred that deeds and discussions go hand in hand, we are ready to take that course;

We will meet in public at a conference;

We will meet in private;

We will meet ^{at} any time. ~~xxxxxxx~~

But let me say this -- most solemnly and with utter candor: Peace is not a one-way street. It is not going to be found by the efforts of only one party. If there is to be peace, it will require that both sides be prepared to act -- and to live up to their promises.

The record of the past years makes it clear that we have tried hard to find a way to end the bloodshed.

Indeed, it is possible that all these efforts -- all the statements -- all the diplomatic approaches -- may have been misunderstood in Hanoi.

The men in Hanoi may have taken all these sincere efforts to end the war as signs of weakness -- as a desire to get out at any price -- as a way to cut our losses and run.

They may have decided that if they just hang on a little longer -- hold out a few more months -- inflict a few more casualties -- that our will is going to soften, our determination break.

If that is their conclusion, they are making a deadly error. And they are inflicting on their own people and on their innocent neighbors a terrible price for that error.

For we shall stand firm. The people of South Vietnam will stand firm. And the aggressors will never succeed.

I think the next move is up to Hanoi. We have tried -- and tried -- and tried. Our efforts have been turned back. If they desire real peace -- they know where to find us. We will be waiting. But, in the meanwhile, we shall not be standing still.

#####

~~SECRET~~

FOR PRESIDENT From WALT ROSTOW

2
11/23/67
sent Rusk
via wire
CAP 671017

~~Secret~~
Following discussions yesterday and today with his advisers, Secretary Fowler's negotiating instructions to Deming for Sunday meeting in Frankfurt on gold were:

Pres. file

(1) seek multi-lateral agreement and strong public announcement of large gold pool commitment (\$2 to \$3 billion) to support London gold price -- coupled preferably with gold certificate proposal although ^{this} not essential at the outset. Question left open as to whether London market should be permitted to open Monday or should be closed for specified cooling off period.

(2) If (1) not negotiable, seek multi-lateral agreement on

(a) national laws or regulations to restrict dealing in gold or make it more costly (100% margin requirement, higher handling charges, etc.) thus cutting down demand for gold on all markets, or

(b) limiting sales on London market to licensed industrial demand (maximum \$750 million a year) which gold pool members would be prepared to underwrite at \$35 price in agreed proportion and in exchange for gold certificates. Private non-industrial demand, whether prompted by fear or speculation, would be forced to Paris, Beirut and other markets where it would be met at higher price.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-479
By CB, NARA, Date 4-5-85

~~Secret~~

Advantage this system would be quantitative and readily manageable limit on amounts gold pool countries would be committed to provide from reserves to meet private demand.

Disadvantage--two-price system would put some pressure on other central banks to request us to exchange their dollar holdings into gold. This might involve us in screening out any use by central banks of the gold convertibility privilege in situations where, instead of normal reserve use, the gold was being fed into the private market for profit.

Under these alternatives as well, strong likelihood London market would be suspended for specified period while license systems set up.

(3) If ^either of above negotiable, multi-lateral agreement to close out gold pool which would result in sharp increase in free-market price of gold. U. S. would publicly reiterate its intention keep \$35 price and would continue its commitments to buy and sell gold at this price to other governments. High free market price for gold would make number of governments ~~1~~ increasingly uncomfortable with continuing keep large proportion of their reserves in dollars and bring them to our gold window for conversion.

Strong possibility, therefore, that even under best circumstances and any of these alternatives, it might

~~SECRET~~

-3-

be necessary suspend operations London gold market on Monday for cooling-off period or longer, with resulting increase uncertainty in all financial markets.

We seeking multi-lateral agreement on whatever course chosen.

November 25, 1967

Mr. President:

You asked us to acquire for you
a copy of Gen. Ridgway's book on
Korea.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 25, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW

LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENTT

You should know we have two intercepts

[redacted] that Robert

McNamara has been nominated by the U. S. to succeed George Woods.

I killed all distribution of these documents within the U. S. government.

But I assume it may leak out of other capitals soon -- or from
Washington Embassies.

You may wish to prepare George for press handling if and when it
breaks.

SANTIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-276
By LD, NARA Date 4-11-00

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967 NOV 25 15 46

5

SATURDAY

67 NOV 25 PM 12:07

Pratt

EEA581
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2556

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671013

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-275
By cb, NARA Date 8-25-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 25, 1967

HEREWITH BUS WHEELER'S VIEW ON THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM [REDACTED] SEC. MCNAMARA CONCURS. I AM INFORMED SEC. RUSK ALSO CONCURS.

1. (S) THE SUBJECT OF THE REMOVAL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM [REDACTED] HAS BEEN A MATTER OF INTENSIVE REVIEW FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS.

2. (S) GENERAL LEMNITZER STRONGLY RECOMMENDED AGAINST MAKING ANY OVERT US MILITARY MOVES IN THESE COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT WE ARE FLINCHING, THAT WE CONSIDER CONFLICT CERTAIN, OR THAT WE ARE WILLING AT THIS TIME TO PULL OUT OF [REDACTED] THE MAJOR SYMBOLS OF THE INTEGRATED STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE. THE PRESENCE OF NATO COMMITTED US WEAPONS SERVES AS A VERY SOBERING CONSIDERATION WHICH TENDS TO DAMPEN RECKLESS ACTIONS ON BOTH SIDES. A US INITIATIVE TO ALTER OR DEGRADE OUR PRESENT US NUCLEAR WEAPON [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COULD HEIGHTEN TENSION TO THE FLASH POINT.

3. (S) I CONCUR WITH THE FOREGOING RECOMMENDATION AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH MR. MCNAMARA, WHO AGREES WITH THIS VIEW.

4. (S)

[REDACTED]

DTG: 251512Z NOV 67

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY

SECRET
WHQ

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EEA588
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2555

1967 NOV 25 15 45

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP671012

Free file

~~SECRET~~

67 NOV 25 PM 12:07

SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

THE CYPRUS SITUATION
AS OF 8:00 A.M. EST
25 NOVEMBER 1967

1. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, WITH THE KING, THE JUNTA MEMBERS, AND THE CIVILIAN CABINET MEMBERS ALL APPARENTLY IN AGREEMENT, HAS INDICATED THAT IT IS WILLING TO BEGIN THE REDUCTION OF ITS MILITARY FORCE ON THE ISLAND WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF AN INITIAL CONTINGENT OF 500. THIS MOVE, HOWEVER, IS TO BE IN RESPONSE TO AN APPEAL BY UNSYGTANTH ADDRESSSED TO GREECE, TURKEY, AND CYPRUS, CALLING FOR THE REDUCTION OF TENSION BY THE REMOVAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON THE ISLAND, AND IS ALSO TIED TO A COUNTER MOVE BY THE TURKS: THE PHASED RETURN TO THE CONDITION OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS THAT EXISTED PRIOR TO 14 NOVEMBER.

2. THANT, AFTER SOME INITIAL RESISTANCE, HAD ALREADY ISSUED A SIMILAR APPEAL ON 24 NOVEMBER, BUT HE REFRAINED FROM MENTIONING THE REDUCTION OF GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES TO THE LEVELS AUTHORIZED BY THE 1960 LONDON/ZURICH AGREEMENT. THIS WILL MAKE HIS MESSAGE LESS PALATABLE IN ANKARA, WHERE A RETURN TO THE LONDON/ZURICH COONDITIONS IS CONSIDERED A BASIC OBJECTIVE. ANKARA MAY ALSO RESENT THE LECTURING TONE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE NOTE, WHICH SEEMS MORE DIRECTED AGAINST TURKEY THAN AGAINST GREECE OR CYPRUS (I.E. CONDEMNATION OF THREATS OF FORCE).

3. TURKEY WOULD REPORTEDLY BE WILLING TO BACK OFF SOMEWHAT FROM ITS INSISTANCE ON AN IMMEDIATE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE GREEK "ILLEGALS" ON CYPRUS AS LONG AS ATHENS FURNISHED AN "EXACT SCHEDULE" OF THE PHASE-OUT AND PERMITS SUPERVISION OF THE DEPARTURES BY THE LONDON/ZURICH SIGNATORIES (GREECE, TURKEY, AND GREAT BRITAIN). ATHENS HAS SHOWN NO SIGN OF BEING WILLING TO GO THIS FAR.

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 04-82

By *uo*, NARA, Date *11-15-04*

APPROX FROM CUTEKI COPY

4. [REDACTED] SAYS THAT THE GOC CANNOT MUCH LONGER RESIST PUBLIC PRESSURE TO IMPOSE A CYPRUS SOLUTION. IF AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE IS NOT FORTHCOMING FROM ATHENS, 25 NOVEMBER MIGHT BE THE "DAY OF DECISION" AND 26 NOVEMBER THE "DAY OF ACTION".

5. [REDACTED] THE TURKISH CABINET AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNANIMOUSLY AGREE THAT, UNLESS GREECE MAKES SOME MOVE TOWARD EVACUATING ITS "ILLEGALS" FROM CYPRUS VERY SOON -- PERHAPS BY NOON OF 25 NOVEMBER -- A TURKISH MOVE ON CYPRUS IS INEVITABLE. TURKEY HAS ALREADY GOTTEN ASSURANCES FROM THE USSR THAT IT WILL REMAIN ON THE SIDE-LINES, BUT ANKARA FEELS THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT HAS THE POWER TO BRING ENOUGH PRESSURE ON GREECE TO FORESTALL HOSTILITIES.

6. ANKARA'S FEAR THAT THE TURKISH PUBLIC MIGHT FEAR ANOTHER "SELLOUT" IS REFLECTED IN THE RADIO ANKARA DOMESTIC BROADCAST AT 1700 ON 24 NOVEMBER, WHICH SOUGHT TO ASSURE ITS LISTENERS THAT THEIR GOVERNMENT WAS NOT GOING TO BE DIVERTED FROM ITS INTENTION TO SECURE AN ACCEPTABLE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT NO MATTER WHAT EMISSARIES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SAID. THE BROADCAST FEATURED UNUSUALLY ABUSIVE TREATMENT OF THE GREEK JUNTA, TERMING IT "BYZANTINE REMNANTS", ETC. AND HARKING BACK TO A LONG HISTORY OF GREEK INTRIGUES.

7. THE MILITARY POSTURE OF BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY REMAINS UNCHANGED AT A STATE OF HIGH COMBAT READINESS. AN INVASION FORCE AND ITS BACKUP TOTALLING ABOUT 35,000 IS ASSEMBLED ALONG THE SOUTH TURKISH COAST. MOST MEMBERS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF HAVE LEFT ANKARA. THE PORTS OF ISKENDERUN AND MERSIN ARE CLOSED TO INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC.

8. THIRTEEN PAKISTANI AIR FORCE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT REPORTEDLY ARRIVED IN TURKEY ON 24 NOVEMBER, 10 ANKARA AND 3 ISTANBUL. SEVERAL REFERENCES TO PAKISTANI SUPPORT OF TURKEY IN THE PRESENT CRISIS WERE MADE ON THE 8 P.M. BROADCAST OF RADIO ANKARA.

9. THE ATMOSPHERE ON CYPRUS HAS GROWN MORE TENSE DURING THE LAST 24 HOURS. STORE WINDOWS IN NICOSIA ARE BOARDED UP, AND CIVILIAN VEHICLES HAVE ABOUT DISAPPEARED FROM THE STREETS. MILITARY VEHICLES, MANY OF THEM CARRYING JERRYCANS AND EMERGENCY PROVISIONS, ARE INCREASINGLY EVIDENT IN THE GREEK SECTOR. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMUNIST LABOR MOVEMENT WAS BOMBED ON 24 NOVEMBER, AND STUDENTS TRIED TO STONE THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON 23 NOVEMBER. POLICE ARE PROTECTING THE SOVIET AND GREEK EMBASSIES. THE CYPRIOT CABINET MET WITH HIGH-RANKING MAINLAND GREEK OFFICERS ON 24 NOVEMBER, BUT CAME UP WITH NO NEW INITIATIVES. THE GENERAL FEELING IS THAT THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CYPRUS IS TO BE INVADED DEPENDS ON DIPLOMATIC MANUVERING IN ATHENS AND ANKARA, AND ON THE WEATHER, WHICH HAS NOW CLEARED UP.

DTG: 25/1420Z NOV 67

ORDX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

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1967 NOV 25 04 34

67 NOV 24 PM 11:41
FRIDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671007

~~SECRET~~

HERewith A SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS FROM AMBASSADOR LOCKE'S WEEKLY TELEGRAM FROM VIETNAM. THE COMPLETE TEXT OF THE TELEGRAM WILL BE AVAILABLE UPON YOUR RETURN

1. WE ARE IN PROCESS OF DISCUSSING CHRISTMAS, NEW YEARS AND TET CEASE FIRES WITH PRESIDENT THIEU. WHATEVER WE AGREE TO WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE SEVEN TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES BEFORE RELEASE.

THIEU'S IDEA (AFTER TALKING WITH GENERALS VIEN AND VY) WAS 36 HOURS CHRISTMAS, 36 NEW YEARS AND 72 TET, WITH PROVISIO THAT EACH CEASE FIRE WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON THE ENEMY'S OBSERVANCE OF PRECEDING CEASE FIRE.

OUR IDEA WAS THE FORMULATION 24-24-48 HOUR STANDDOWNS, WHICH I FEEL SURE PRESIDENT THIEU WILL ACCEPT IF WE WISH.

2. THE NEW CABINET OF PRIME MINISTER LOC, INSTALLED IN OFFICE NOVEMBER 9, IS A SYMBOL OF THE RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

THE NEW CABINET HAS BROUGHT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF NEW FACES INTO THE GOVERNMENT, ONLY 7 PREVIOUS MEMBERS OF THE CABINET REMAINING ON.

PRESIDENT THIEU INDICATED TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THAT THE SELECTION OF THE CABINET WAS BASED ON THE NEED TO FIND THE BEST-QUALIFIED GROUP OF MINISTERS, WHO WOULD WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM IN RESOLVING NATIONAL PROBLEMS. PRESIDENT THIEU IS CONFIDENT THAT THE NEW CABINET WILL BE ABLE TO WORK TOGETHER AS A TEAM.

LIMITED EVIDENCE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS REASONABLY COMPETENT, HONEST AND DEDICATED AND THERE HAS BEEN NO EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIEU AND KY.

XEROX FROM CHECK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By CL, NARA, Date 4-5-95

A FRAME WORK EXISTS FOR A SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY BROADENING OF THE BASE OF THE GOVERNMENT. I WOULD SAY SO FAR, SO GOOD, BUT IT IS A LITTLE EARLY TO MAKE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENTS.

3. PRIME MINISTER LOC HAS MADE A GOOD BEGINNING, PRESENTING A WIDE-RANGING, THOUGH AMBITIOUS SHORT-TERM AND LONG TERM, GOVERNMENT PROGRAM.

THE PROGRAM APPEARS TO BE A REWRITTEN, SHORTER AND MORE MODEST VERSION OF THE MORE AMBITIOUS TOP PRIORITY PROGRAM AND NATIONAL POLICY DESCRIBED IN AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S 28TH WEEKLY TELEGRAM.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAM WILL BE A MAJOR TASK, AND ONLY BEGINNINGS CAN BE MADE ON CONSIDERABLE PARTS OF IT IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

4. THE REACTION OF THE SAIGON PRESS AND THE POLITICALLY ACTIVE PUBLIC TO THE NEW CABINET HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS AND RESERVED. THERE IS SOME DOUBT EXPRESSED THAT PRIME MINISTER LOC WILL BE ABLE TO GET THINGS MOVING, HOWEVER, VICE PRESIDENT KY TOLD THE NEW CABINET HE EXPECTS IT TO SERVE IN OFFICE FOR FOUR YEARS.

5. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY A CONVERSATION BETWEEN BOB KOMER AND VICE PRESIDENT KY ON NOVEMBER 13 IN WHICH KY EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE TO DO HIS BEST TO HELP WITH CURRENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO VIETNAM.

BOB EMPHASIZED THAT PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SPHERES DURING THE NEXT 6 MONTHS WOULD BE THE MOST HELPFUL ANTIDOTE TO UNITED STATES CRITICISM AND FRUSTRATION.

6. ON NOVEMBER 20 THE VIET CONG'S LIBERATION RADIO REJECTED RECENT PUBLIC COMMENTS BY PRESIDENT THIEU THAT HE MAY SOON SEND A LETTER TO HO CHI MINH, PROPOSING DIRECT PEACE TALKS.

THE RADIO SCORNE THE STATEMENT SAYING THIEU DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REPRESENT ANYONE. THE BROADCAST CONTINUED THAT "PEACE NEGOTIATION ARGUMENTS DEFINITELY CANNOT DECEIVE ANYONE."

PRESIDENT THIEU IS PROCEEDING WITH HIS PLANS TO SEND A LETTER TO HO SOMETIME BEFORE CHRISTMAS AND HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO ASK THE JAPANESE TO TRANSMIT IT TO HANOI. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT RESPONDED TO HIS REQUEST YET.

DTG: 250252Z NOVEMBER 1967

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HCC758

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PAGE 01 STATE 74715

81
ORIGIN SS 20

INFO NSCE 00,SSO 00,RSC 01,EA 15,NSC 10,/046 R

DRAFTED BY MR ROSTOW TEXT REC'D FROM WHITE HOUSE
APPROVED BY S/S MR CARROLL BROWN

Outgoing
DD

Pres file

Z 250132Z NOV 67 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA FLASH 0176

Nov 25, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 74715

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR FROM PRESIDENT

AS SOON AS THE POLLS CLOSE OR AS SOON AFTER AS YOU HAVE
RESULTS I WANT THOSE RESULTS FLASHED TO ME PERSONALLY.

TEL THE PRIME MINISTER THAT MY THOUGHTS ARE WITH HIM ON THIS
ELECTION DAY. RUSK

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By CL, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

9

1967 NOV 25 01 22

Profile

1967 NOV 24 PM 9:18

FRIDAY

VZCZCEEA572
OO WIE10
DE WIE 2546

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671204

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

IT NOW LOOKS AS IF VANCE MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO TAKE BACK TO ANKARA THAT COULD STAY THE TURKS HANDS. THE BIG QUESTION IS WHETHER THE TURKS AT THIS POINT ARE SO WOUND UP THAT THEY DON'T REALLY WANT A WAY OUT. VANCE SEES THE TURK FOREIGN MINISTER AT 8:00 A.M. TOMORROW (1:00 A.M. EST).

THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER HAS AGREED TO A DOCUMENT WHICH INCORPORATES MOST OF THE TURKS' FIVE POINTS. THE AGREEMENT CALLS FOR U THANT TO APPEAL TO GREECE, CYPRUS AND TURKEY TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS, MOST IMPORTANTLY IMMEDIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWING SOME GREEK TROOPS AND FOR DE-ESCALATING TURK WAR PREPARATIONS. THE KEY ELEMENT IS THAT THE GREEKS WOULD BE GIVING IN TO U THANT AND NOT TO ANKARA. THE NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS AND MATCHING RESPONSES TO U THANT ALSO HELPS GET AROUND THE BIG ISSUE OF WHO MOVES FIRST.

WE HAVE NO WORD YET THAT THE GREEK JUNTA HAS BOUGHT THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PLAN. IT'S ALSO POSSIBLE THAT THE TURKS WON'T CONSIDER IT ENOUGH. BUT AT LEAST CY CAN RETURN TO ANKARA BEFORE THE SATURDAY EVENING DEADLINE WITH A PROPOSAL IN HAND.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS TONIGHT PROBABLY, BUT OUR STRATEGY WILL BE -- AT VANCE'S REQUEST -- TO SAY NOTHING OURSELVES AND TRY TO MINIMIZE WHAT OTHERS SAY AND HAVE THE MEETING ADJOURNED WITHOUT A RESOLUTION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-33
By us, NARA Date 3-15-99

PRESERVATION COPY

THE TASK IS COMPLICATED BY A GREEK GOVERNMENT LEAK TO THE LONDON TIMES AND THE NEW YORK TIMES ON THE PROPOSED PACKAGE. WE FEAR IT WILL COMPLICATE CY'S TASK TOMORROW. NICK KATZENBACH TALKED WITH THE NEW YORK TIMES WHICH AGREED TO KILL THE STORY IF THE LONDON TIMES DIDN'T ACTUALLY RUN IT.

FULL TEXT OF PROPOSAL FOLLOWS:

1. THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS WOULD ADDRESS AN APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY, GREECE AND CYPRUS; SUCH AN APPEAL TO INCLUDE, INTER ALIA:

A) AN INVITATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO REAFFIRM THE INVIOABILITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS;

B) A REQUEST THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REMOVE ANY THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF EACH OTHER AND OF CYPRUS AND TO BRING ABOUT A REDUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES IN CYPRUS.

2. THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD DECLARE THEIR READINESS TO COMPLY FORTHWITH WITH THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

3. THEREUPON THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS FOR THE REPATRIATION OF...X... NUMBER OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS; ON ITS SIDE THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT WOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO REDUCE THEIR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS TO THE LEVELS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 14, 1967.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, THE CYPRUS GOVERNMENT SHOULD DECLARE THAT THEY ARE READY TO COOPERATE WITH A UN MISSION WHICH WOULD STUDY ON THE SPOT AND PROPOSE NEW PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SAFEGUARD OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY (INCLUDING SAFETY OF MINORITIES) AND THE TERRITORIAL DEFENSE OF CYPRUS.

5. THE SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD THEREUPON SEND A MISSION OF MILITARY AND POLICE EXPERTS TO CYPRUS FOR THE ABOVE PURPOSE.

6. A PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM CYPRUS WOULD TAKE PLACE, SUCH WITHDRAWAL TO COINCIDE WITH AND CORRESPOND TO THE PHASED BUILD-UP OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED UNDER 4 ABOVE. THE SAME WOULD APPLY TO TURKISH MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CYPRUS.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 250028Z NOV 1967

PREPARATION COPY

10
FRIDAY

67 NOV 24 PM 8:39

1967 NOV 25 00 49

VVCZCEEA571
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 2545

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP671003

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN ELECTION

AUSTRALIAN VOTERS ARE GOING TO THE POLLS JUST ABOUT NOW
(SATURDAY MORNING THERE). AT STAKE ARE THE 60 SEATS IN THE
UPPER HOUSE.

OUR EMBASSY EXPECTS LITTLE OR NO CHANGE IN THE PRESENT
LINEUP--28 SEATS FOR THE GOVERNMENT, 28 FOR AUSTRALIAN LABOR
PARTY, 2 FOR DEMOCRATIC LABOR. A FEW CLOSE CONTESTS COULD
ALTER THIS BY ONE OR TWO SEATS.

AMBASSADOR IN A CABLE TODAY CONSIDERED IT QUOTE UNLIKELY
THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE ANY MAJOR EFFECT ON GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNQUOTE.

WE DO NOT EXPECT TO HAVE ANY RESULTS FOR ABOUT 20 HOURS.
WHEN WE DO, YOU WILL HAVE THEM IMMEDIATELY

DTG: 250027Z NOV 67

from file

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By CB, NARA, Date 4-5-95

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 NOV 25 00 26

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-479

By CLT, NARA, Date 4-5-95

VZCZCEEA570
00 WTE10
DE WTE 2544

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671002

67 NOV 24 PM 8:37

FRIDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

FOLLOWING IS SECRETARY RUSK'S RECOMMENDATION THAT YOU SEE
CHIP BOHLEN, WHO IS JUST BACK FROM PARIS, FOR HALF AN HOUR
ON TUESDAY OR WEDNESDAY OF NEXT WEEK. I THINK IT IS A GOOD
IDEA.

RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU MEET FOR A HALF HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR BOHLEN ON
NOVEMBER 28 OR 29 AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU.

APPROVE ☒ DISAPPROVE ☐

DATE TIME

11:30 AM, Tues Nov 28

DISCUSSION:

AMBASSADOR BOHLEN HAS JUST RETURNED FROM FRANCE AND IS IN
WASHINGTON ON CONSULTATION. ALTHOUGH WE ARE AWARE OF DE GAULLE'S
POLICIES REGARDING SUCH PROBLEMS AS VIETNAM, THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM'S REQUEST TO ENTER THE COMMON
MARKET AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, I BELIEVE IT WOULD
BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE THE AMBASSADOR'S PERSONAL VIEWS ON
THE EVOLVING FRENCH POSITION ON THESE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY
IN THE LIGHT OF DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON NOVEMBER 27.

THERE IS ALSO THE BASIC QUESTION OF DE GAULLE'S POWER POSITION
INSIDE FRANCE IN THE WAKE OF HIS MIDDLE EAST FAILURE, THE QUEBEC
VENTURE, AND THE RUMBLINGS IN THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT OVER HIS
DOMESTIC POLICIES. AMBASSADOR BOHLEN'S ASSESSMENT OF THIS
QUESTION WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. I HOPE YOU CAN FIND
THE TIME TO MEET WITH HIM.

DEAN RUSK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 242357Z NOV 1967

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SENT

1967 NOV 24 03 25

EEA551
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2524

FROM WALT BOSTON
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP 57988

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-33
By ico, NARA Date 3-15-99

Pres file

67 NOV 23 PM 10:42

THURSDAY

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH SEC. RANCE'S REPORT

FOR THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY MCNAMARA

1. I HAVE COMPLETED MY FIRST ROUND OF TALKS IN ANKARA WITH PRESIDENT SUNAY, PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL. THROUGHOUT THE TURKS MAINTAINED A CONSISTENTLY HARD POSITION WHICH APPARENTLY REFLECTS A CONCERTED CABINET DECISION.
2. WHILE THE DANGERS OF A MILITARY CONFRONTATION ARE ACUTE, NONE OF US BELIEVE THE TURKS WILL ATTACK WHILE MY MISSION REMAINS IN THE AREA. THUS, WE PROBABLY HAVE SOME TIME TO TRY TO FIND AN EFFECTIVE HANDLE TO THIS PROBLEM BUT THE GRIP IS SHORT.
3. THE TURKS ARE CLEARLY IN A DANGEROUS, FATALISTIC MOOD. AFTER FOUR YEARS OF WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO HAVE BEEN PAINFUL SALAMI TACTICS ON CYPRUS, THEY CLAIM THEY WILL PAY NO MORE. THE SITUATION IS DESCRIBED IN SIMPLISTIC TERMS OF GREEK ILLEGALITY AND VILLIANY AND TURKISH SUFFERING. THEY ASSERT THAT THEIR HONOR IS AT STAKE, AND POPULAR PASSIONS IN THE COUNTRY ARE SO HIGH THAT A CATALYSTIC EXPLOSION IS IN THE OFFING. THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY OUT, IN THEIR OPINION, IS A VIRTUALLY IMMEDIATE GREEK DECISION TO COMMENCE WITHDRAWING ITS "ILLEGAL" MILITARY UNITS ON CYPRUS.
4. THIS IS HEADY STUFF. YET, THROUGHOUT WE WERE RECEIVED WITH COURTESY AND FRIENDSHIP. BENEATH THE HARSH DESCRIPTION OF THE IMPERATIVES OF THE SITUATION WE SENSE A TURKISH HOPE THAT WE CAN PULL A RABBIT OUT OF THE ESSENTIALLY ULTIMATIVE HAT THEY HAVE PRESENTED TO US. THIS GOING TO TAKE SOME DOING BUT WE ARE STILL IN THE BALL GAME.
5. DETAILED ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATIONS FOLLOW. SEPTEL SUBMITTED FROM ANKARA IN VANTO SERIES ON SUNAY CONVERSATION.

TALBOT

DTG: 240241Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

13
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RECEIVED
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OO WTE10
DE WTE 2536

1967 NOV 24 19 01

FM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH70544

Profile

UNCLAS

NOVEMBER 24, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM W. W. ROSOW

THE FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF CONGRATULATORY
MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER ETEMADI OF AFGHANISTAN:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I TAKE GREAT PLEASURE IN EXTENDING THE WARM
CONGRATULATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS PRIME
MINISTER OF AFGHANISTAN. MAY I ALSO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY
TO CONVEY BEST WISHES TO YOUR NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE
PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN FOR PROSPERITY AND CONTINUED SUCCESS
IN AFGHANISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORT.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

MESSAGE OKAY -----

SEND AS AMENDED -----

DTG 24/1834Z NOV 1967

XEROX FROM QUEUE COPY

13a

Friday, November 24, 1967
11:00 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM W. W. ROSTOW

The following is proposed text of Congratulatory Message to Prime Minister Etemadi of Afghanistan:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I take great pleasure in extending the warm congratulations of the Government and the people of the United States of America on your appointment as Prime Minister of Afghanistan. May I also take this opportunity to convey best wishes to your new government and the people of Afghanistan for prosperity and continued success in Afghanistan's development effort.

Sincerely,

END MESSAGE.

WWR:EKH/vmr

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DE WTE 2533

1967 NOV 24 18 58

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SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 04-82
By iss, NARA, Date 9-27-04

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67995

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

THE CYPRUS SITUATION (AS OF 12:00 NOON EST)

1. THE TURKISH POSITION APPEARS TO BE HARDENING STILL FURTHER. TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL IMPLIED TO THE US AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING THAT WAR WAS ALMOST INEVITABLE. WHILE EXPRESSING HIS APPRECIATION FOR US EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE CRISIS THROUGH DIPLOMACY, THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT MUST TAKE ACTION OR FACE FAR GRAVER CONSEQUENCES INTERNALLY. IF HE HAD TIME, CAGLAYANGIL SAID, HE COULD PERHAPS NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK TROOPS, BUT HE HAD NO MORE TIME.

2. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS TONE OF THE US AMBASSADOR'S CONVERSATIONS WITH CAGLAYANGIL, SPECIAL ENVOY VANCE HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE HIS VISIT TO NICOSIA AND RETURN TO ANKARA DIRECTLY FROM ATHENS. HE HAS REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER TOMORROW MORNING.

3. SOME ELEMENTS IN THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES ARE REPORTEDLY TALKING OF OVERTHROWING THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT IF NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN ON THE CYPRUS SITUATION BY 27 NOVEMBER.

[REDACTED] OFFICERS [REDACTED] ARRIVED AT THE YILDIZ WAR ACADEMY IN ISTANBUL TO ELICIT THE SUPPORT OF THE CADET CORPS IN THE EVENT A MILITARY COUP IS ATTEMPTED. THEY APPARENTLY RECEIVED NO DEFINITE ANSWER. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE OPPOSITION REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY WILL EXPLOIT ANY TURKISH DIPLOMATIC LOSSES AND [REDACTED] ISMET INONU, PRESIDENT OF THE RPP MIGHT CONVINCE HIS FOLLOWERS IN THE ARMED FORCES TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT. THE RPP BELIEVES THAT THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT TANGIBLE SIGNS OF VICTORY ON CYPRUS.

4. USCINCEUR REPORTS INCREASED ACTIVITY AT ERHAC AIRFIELD NORTHEAST OF ISKENDERUN. UNCONFIRMED RUMORS INDICATE A "PROBABLE LAUNCH OF A STRIKE FORCE IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS."

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

5. A TURKISH EMBASSY OFFICIAL IN NICOSIA CALLED AT THE US EMBASSY THIS MORNING, WHERE HE REQUESTED AND RECEIVED THE COORDINATES OF THE US INSTALLATIONS ON CYPRUS. HE SAID THAT THEY HAD PLENTY OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS BUT WANTED TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN, AND ADDED THAT THE US FIRM CYPRUS MINES NEED HAVE NO WORRIES BECAUSE OF ITS PROXIMITY TO A TURKISH ENCLAVE IN LEFKA. TURKISH MILITARY OVERFLIGHTS OF CYPRUS ARE CONTINUING.

6. THE BRITISH AIR ADVISOR IN CYPRUS REPORTS THAT HELICOPTERS HAVE BEEN LANDING NEAR TURKISH VILLAGES IN THE EASTERN PART OF CYPRUS FOR THE PAST THREE NIGHTS. THE BRITISH BELIEVE THAT THE HELICOPTERS COME FROM A SHIP WHICH APPEARS OFF THE ISLAND DURING THE NIGHT AND DISAPPEARS BEFORE DAWN. THE UN HAS ALSO REPORTED TWO UNIDENTIFIED HELICOPTERS LANDING AT KOPHINOU. THE UK ADVISOR AND THE US ATTACHE BELIEVE THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE LANDING IS TO POSITION GUIDES AND PATHFINDER TEAMS. THE ATTACHE ALSO THINKS THAT THE TURKS MAY BE INTRODUCING MILITARY LEADERS INTO TURKISH CYPRIOT AREAS.

7. CYPRIOT FOREIGN MINISTER KYPRIANOU TOLD THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER LAST NIGHT THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS HAD UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO REJECT THE TURKISH FIVE-POINTS AS A BASIS FOR A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS. THE CYPRIOTS INSIST ON COMPLETE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE ISLAND, INCLUDING BOTH LEGAL AND ILLEGAL GREEK AND TURKISH FORCES. A FURTHER OBJECTION APPARENTLY WAS THAT AT NO PLACE IN THE PROPOSAL WAS THE GOVERNMENT OF CYPRUS MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS THE PARTY WITH THE MAJOR INTEREST. THIS REJECTION COMES DESPITE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS' PREVIOUS INDICATION THAT HE HAD NO REAL OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSALS.

8. MORE THAN 697 AMERICANS AND CANADIANS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED FROM CYPRUS TO BEIRUT.

9. NATO SECRETARY GENERAL BROGIO WAS APPARENTLY STILL IN BRUSSELS THIS MORNING DESPITE ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY OF HIS OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES. THE US MISSION TO NATO FEELS THAT BROGIO IS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION, IN THAT THE GREEKS COULD BE RESPONSIVE TO HIM WITHOUT APPEARING TO YIELD TO TURKISH "PROVOCATION" AND BECAUSE HIS INTERVENTION IN A NATO ROLE WOULD BE LESS OFFENSIVE TO THE TURKS THAN EXTERNAL NATIONAL PRESSURES. THE US MISSION HOPES THAT BROGIO MIGHT BE ABLE TO BREAK THE PRESENT IMPASSE BY LEANING ON THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT THAT GREECE AND TURKEY NOW HAVE THE CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN OR DESTROY THE CRITICAL SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE WHOLE NATO INSTITUTION.

DTG: 24/1732Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

APPROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15

Pres file

1967 NOV 24 18 10

67 NOV 24 PM 1:46

FRIDAY

EEA558
00 WTE 10
DE WTE 2534

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67996

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1967
11:45 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

LONGER PROPOSED CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT MOZUTU OF THE CONGO ON THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MY WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES ON YOUR SECOND
ANNIVERSARY IN OFFICE. ALL FREE MEN ADMIRE YOUR COURAGEOUS
EFFORTS TO BRING STABILITY AND PROGRESS TO THE CONGO. YOUR
PEOPLE HAVE ENDURED MUCH THIS PAST YEAR, BUT YOUR LEADERSHIP
HAS BROUGHT THEM THROUGH TO A HAPPIER AND MORE HOPEFUL DAY.
MAY THAT DAY LAST MANY YEARS.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END MESSAGE

DTG: 241736Z NOV 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb.

By *hy* NARA Date 11-22-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

15a

Friday, November 24, 1967
11:45 AM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ROSTOW

The following is proposed text of Congratulatory Message to President Mobutu of the Congo on the second anniversary of his administration:

Dear Mr. President:

My warm congratulations and best wishes on your second anniversary in office. All free men admire your courageous efforts to bring stability and progress to the Congo. Your people have endured much this past year, but your leadership has brought them through to a happier and more hopeful day. May that day last many ~~more~~ years.

Sincerely.

Lyndon B. Johnson

END MESSAGE

Approve ____

Disapprove ____

Speak to me ____

EKH/vmr

16

Pres file

Friday, November 24, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached is Secretary Rusk's recommendation that you see Chip Bohlen, who is just back from Paris, for half an hour Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. I think it is a good idea.

W. W. Rostow

RHU:em

Tuesday, Nov. 28, 1967
11:30 am

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested call on you by
Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen

Recommendation:

That you meet for a half hour with Ambassador Bohlen on
November 28 or 29 at a time convenient to you.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Date _____ Time _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Bohlen has just returned from France and is in Washington on consultation. Although we are aware of de Gaulle's policies regarding such problems as Vietnam, the Atlantic Alliance, the United Kingdom's request to enter the Common Market and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I believe it would be useful for you to have the Ambassador's personal views on the evolving French position on these issues, particularly in the light of de Gaulle's press conference on November 27.

There is also the basic question of de Gaulle's power position inside France in the wake of his Middle East failure, the Quebec venture, and the rumblings in the French Parliament over his domestic policies. Ambassador Bohlen's assessment of this question will be of interest to you. I hope you can find the time to meet with him.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

~~SECRET~~

November 24, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Herewith Wilson's reply.

"I am greatly moved by your message. It is indeed heartening to feel the depth of your understanding for the action we felt it right to take.

"Pat Dean will be in touch with your people shortly about the best time for us to meet. I greatly look forward to it."

17
*Sent to Land
CAP 67993*

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Authority NLJ 94-2 52
By 9/c6, NARA, Date 1/13/02

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~~SECRET~~

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1967 NOV 24 01 05

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67987

~~SECRET~~

HERewith SEC VANCE'S FIRST REPORT

1. AFTER MEETING WITH PRIMIN DEMIREL SECT VANCE AND AMBASSADOR CALLED ON PRESIDENT SUNAY AT 2015 LOCAL. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROTOCOL CALL FOR VANCE TO PASS WARM GREETINGS FROM PRES. JOHNSON (CORDIALLY RECIPROCATED), DISCUSSION QUICKLY TURNED TO SUBSTANCE. AND IT WAS APPARENT THAT SUNAY WAS WELL BRIEFED ON CYPRUS CRISIS.

2. SAYING VANCE CAME AT TIME WHEN TURKS FACED CRITICAL DAYS ON CYPRUS, PRESIDENT REVIEWED PAST FOUR YEARS DESCRIBING INDIGNITIES AND KILLINGS TO WHICH TURK CYPRIOTS HAD BEEN SUBJECTED CULMINATING IN LATEST EVENTS (NOV 15 AND 16). PROBLEM WAS THAT THROUGHOUT THIS TIME TURKS COULD DO LITTLE BECAUSE DISCUSSIONS HAD ALWAYS AMOUNTED TO NOTHING. GOT FELT POWERLESS TO AID FELLOW TURKS WHO LIVED ON ISLAND, 40 MILES OFF TURKISH COAST. HE INVITED VANCE'S THOUGHTS.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-33

By iso, NARA Date 3-15-99

PRESERVATION COPY

THURSDAY

67 NOV 23 PM 01 16

Free file

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3. VANCE SAID HE HAD COME AS EMISSARY OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO SEE HOW U.S. MIGHT BE OF HELP. PROBLEM CENTERED ON REMOVAL OF EXCESS GREEK TROOPS IN CONTEXT MUTUAL DE-ESCALATION, AS PREVIOUSLY PRESENTED TO PRIME MINISTER. HE PLANNED PROCEED TO ATHENS TONIGHT TO SEE WHETHER HE COULD BE OF ASSISTANCE IN BRINGING PARTIES TOGETHER. EACH SIDE FACED PROBLEM OF WHO WAS TO MAKE BEGINNING IN DIMINISHING TENSION. TURKS WANTED IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF GREEK TROOPS, EXCESS TO TREATY CONTINGENT, AND GREEKS WANTED TO SEE DIMINSHION AT ONCE OF TURK MOBILIZATION.

4. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON ONE ITEM WHICH INCLUDED MARKARIOS' AND EVEN ATHENS GOVERNMENT: THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY WEAPONS ON CYPRUS. SUNAY NODDED AGREEMENT. WHEN TWO PARTIES WERE EMOTIONALLY AROUSED OVER AN ISSUE, AS IN PRESENT CASE, THIRD PARTY SOMETIMES CAN FIND COMMON GROUND. IN THIS CASE IT WAS DEMILITARIZATION. AMBASSADOR REVIEWED NOV. 19 DISCUSSIONS RESULTING FROM INVITATION OF FOMMIN CAGLAYANGIL AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS RE FIVE-POINTS, EMPHASIZING THAT BY PRIOR AGREEMENT WITH CAGLAYANGIL THEY HAD BEEN DEVELOPED UNDER PRINCIPLE THAT APPEARANCE OF ULTIMATUM OR OF DIPLOMATIC VICTORY OR DEFEAT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. NO DEFINITIVE GREEK POSITION YET TAKEN.

5. SUNAY EXPRESSED TO VANCE AND AMBASSADOR HIS UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM BUT EMPHASIZED NONETHELESS THAT KEY REQUIREMENT WAS REMOVAL OF ILLEGAL GREEK TROOPS FROM CYPRUS. ALTHOUGH NOTHING SUNAY SAID DIFFERED FROM THIS MAIN PRINCIPLE ON WHICH TURKS HAVE STUCK TO DATE, ATMOSPHERE AT PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, AS COMPARED WITH THAT IN PRIMIN'S OFFICE, WAS REFLECTIVE AND WITHOUT POLEMIC. SUNAY WAS THOUGHTFUL AND TROUBLED, VERY COURTEOUS AND WISHED VANCE ALL SUCCESS ON HIS MISSION.

DTG: 240022Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

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EEA548
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2515

1967 NOV 25 13 24

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67983

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 1

By isa, NARS, Date 5-7-84

~~SECRET~~

22 NOVEMBER 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW HERewith DICK HELMS
RESPONDS TO YOUR REQUEST FOR AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION
OF VC LOSS DATA

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

A WEEK AGO YOU ASKED ME FOR A PAPER DESCRIBING THE
METHODS USED TO COMPILE CASUALTY FIGURES IN THE WAR
IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS A RATHER FULL DISCUSSION
OF THIS PROBLEM AT BREAKFAST YESTERDAY, I THOUGHT YOU WOULD STILL
LIKE TO HAVE THIS PAPER SINCE IT IS MORE DETAILED AND
SINCE AT THE END IT DOES IDENTIFY CERTAIN OF THE PROBLEMS
IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS FIELD.

RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR

67 NOV 23 PM 1:35

THURSDAY

ATTACHMENT -1

THE VALIDITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VIET CONG LOSS DATA

SUBJECT: THE VALIDITY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF VIET CONG LOSS DATA

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION (KIA)

1. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE VALIDITY OF THE VIET CONG
KIA FIGURES ENTAILS TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS: THE ACCURACY
OF THE KIA FIGURES THEMSELVES AND THE RELEVANCE OF THESE
FIGURES TO THE VIET CONG'S MANPOWER POTENTIAL. SIMPLY
STATED, THE QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED ARE: (A)
ARE WE KILLING THE NUMBER OF ENEMY PERSONNEL EXPRESSED
IN THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES; AND (B) DO THE KIA FIGURES
REPRESENT LOSSES TO COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL
FORCE UNITS ONLY, OR ARE THEY A CONGLOMERATE OF MILITARY,
IRREGULAR, AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

2. PROCEDURALLY, COMUSMACV HAS SOUGHT TO INSURE THAT
THE KIA FIGURES REFLECT AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE THE NUMBER
OF ENEMY ACTUALLY KILLED IN EACH GROUND OPERATION.
INITIAL REPORTS ARE MADE BY THE TACTICAL UNITS-- PLATOONS
AND COMPANIES -- DIRECTLY ENGAGED. USUALLY THESE REPORTS
REFLECT AN ACTUAL COUNT OF BODIES FOUND ON THE BATTLEFIELD.
THE COMPLETENESS -- AND HENCE THE VALIDITY -- OF SUCH
COUNTS DEPEND LARGELY ON THE NATURE OF THE TERRAIN AND

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACTION. ENGAGEMENTS IN FLAT, OPEN TERRAIN IN WHICH FRIENDLY UNITS CONTROL THE BATTLEFIELD AFTER THE ACTION PRODUCE MORE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE COUNTS THAN THOSE IN JUNGLE AREAS OR UNDER CONDITIONS WHERE THE ENEMY HAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO REMOVE HIS DEAD FROM THE BATTLEFIELD OR WHERE BODIES MAY SIMPLY NOT BE SEEN BY FRIENDLY TROOPS. GENERALLY, BODIES OF YOUNG CHILDREN, UNARMED WOMEN, AND OLD MEN ARE NOT INCLUDED AS KIA'S BUT ALL BODIES OF MEN OF MILITARY AGE ARE COUNTED EVEN IF WEAPONS ARE NOT FOUND WITH THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT VIET CONG IRREGULAR TROOPS -- AND OFTEN REGULARS AS WELL -- DO NOT CARRY PAPERS WHICH WOULD PERMIT AUTHENTICATION OF THEIR STATUS. FURTHERMORE, IN ANY SINGLE ACTION THE VC MAY USE A MIX OF MAIN AND LOCAL FORCE TROOPS (REGULARS), PORTERS OR OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE ELEMENTS, LOCAL GUERRILLAS AND, SOMETIMES, ELEMENTS OF LOCAL IRREGULAR FORCES (E.G., SELF-DEFENSE PERSONNEL). THUS EVEN AN ACCURATE COUNT OF BODIES DOES NOT PROVIDE FIRM LOSS FIGURES FOR EACH UNIT PARTICIPATING IN A GIVEN ACTION.

3. INITIAL KIA (BODY COUNT) REPORTS ARE REVIEWED AND CONSOLIDATED AT HIGHER LEVELS -- BATTALION, BRIGADE, TASK FORCE OR DIVISION -- AND CROSS-CHECKED TO PRECLUDE DUPLICATE REPORTING OF KIA'S BY ADJOINING UNITS. IN SOME CASES THE INITIAL REPORTS MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH COUNTS DERIVED FROM LOW-LEVEL AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OF THE BATTLEFIELD. OCCASIONALLY, AN ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL KIA'S MAY BE ADDED TO THE OBSERVED COUNT BY GROUND COMMANDERS IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE PHYSICAL SEARCH OF THE BATTLEFIELD IS NOT FEASIBLE; HOWEVER, THIS IS AGAINST COMMAND POLICY AND IS THOUGHT TO OCCUR LESS FREQUENTLY THAN IN THE PAST.

4. IN GENERAL, THE COMMAND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OUTLINED ABOVE TEND TO PRODUCE A CONSERVATIVE COUNT OF ENEMY KIA'S. ALTHOUGH SOME NON-COMBATANTS MAY BE ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN ENGAGEMENTS OCCURRING IN DENSELY POPULATED AREAS, THIS MAY BE MORE THAN OFFSET BY EXCLUSION OF FIGURES ON BODIES REMOVED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD UNDER COVER OF NIGHT OR JUNGLE. MOREOVER, THE POSSIBLY INHERENT INFLATIONARY EFFECTS OF DEVELOPING A VALID COUNT UNDER THE PRESSURE OF BATTLE ARE COUNTERBALANCED BY THE UNCOUNTED -- AND UNESTIMATED -- NUMBERS OF ENEMY TROOPS KILLED BY THE HUNDREDS OF DAILY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES WHOSE RESULTS ARE NOT OBSERVED BUT WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY INFLICT SIGNIFICANT LOSSES ON THE ENEMY.

5. GIVEN THESE INFLATIONARY AND DEFLATIONARY PRESSURES, ON BALANCE, WE BELIEVE THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES REFLECT THE GENERAL ORDER OF MAGNITUDE OF VIET CONG COMBAT LOSSES WITH A MODEST CONSERVATIVE BIAS. ATTEMPTS TO VALIDATE THE ACCURACY OF KIA FIGURES FOR SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS BY EXAMINING CAPTURED DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN INCONCLUSIVE. IN SOME INSTANCES, THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE SHOWN THE OFFICIAL COUNT TO HAVE BEEN LOW, AND IN OTHERS THE KIA FIGURES WERE EXAGGERATED. THE EVIDENCE IS TOO FRAGMENTARY TO WHOLLY CONFIRM OR WHOLLY DISCREDIT THE SYSTEM. THUS, ASSUMING RELATIVE CONSISTENCY IN THE REPORTING PROCEDURES, WE BELIEVE THE KIA FIGURES ARE BOTH A USEFUL INDICATOR OF TRENDS IN THE RELATIVE INTENSITY OF COMBAT, AND A GENERALLY CONSERVATIVE, ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE REFLECTION OF VIET CONG COMBAT.

LOSSES. THESE, HOWEVER, ARE GROSS OR AGGREGATE LOSSES, NOT LOSSES POSITIVELY ASSIGNABLE TO SPECIFIC ENEMY FORCE COMPONENTS. FROM BODY COUNT ALONE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF THE LOSSES INCURRED BY MAIN AND LOCAL FORCES, ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE COMPONENTS (INCLUDING PORTERS), GUERRILLAS OR OTHER IRREGULAR ELEMENTS OR, IN SOME CASES, MORE OR LESS INNOCENT BYSTANDERS.

ENEMY WOUNDED

6. NUMBERS OF ENEMY WOUNDED ARE RARELY KNOWN OR REPORTED. NO ATTEMPT IS MADE BY COMUSMACV TO CALCULATE FIGURES FOR ENEMY WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS COMPARABLE TO THE PROCEDURES USED FOR DETERMINING KIA'S. RATIOS OF THE NUMBER OF WOUNDED TO KIA'S HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED, HOWEVER, FOR USE IN ANALYZING THE VIET CONG MANPOWER SITUATION. THESE RATIOS WERE DERIVED FROM AN ANALYSIS BY COMUSMACV OF CAPTURED DOCUMENTS WHICH REVEALED THAT, DURING 1966, FOR EVERY 100 ENEMY TROOPS KILLED, 150 ARE WOUNDED; OF THESE, 35 SUBSEQUENTLY DIE OR ARE PERMANENTLY DISABLED, WHILE THE OTHERS PRESUMABLY RETURN TO DUTY. THE VALIDITY OF THIS METHODOLOGY, WHICH WAS BASED ON FRAGMENTARY EVIDENCE, IS QUESTIONABLE ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PATTERN OF CASUALTIES IN 1967 MAY DIFFER MARKEDLY FROM THAT IN 1966 BECAUSE OF CHANGES IN THE NATURE OF COMBAT. WHILE THESE RATIOS ARE NOT UNREASONABLE, WE RECOMMEND CAUTION IN USING THEM TO COMPUTE ABSOLUTE VIET CONG MANPOWER LOSSES.

ENEMY PRISONERS

7. CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING VIET CONG LOSSES THROUGH CAPTURE DIFFER MARKEDLY FROM THOSE USED FOR EITHER KIA'S OR WOUNDED. PRISONER DATA IS NOW BASED SOLELY ON THE ACTUAL INVENTORY OF PROCESSED MILITARY PRISONERS HELD IN CAMPS. PREVIOUSLY, PRISONER DATA WAS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS REPORTEDLY "CAPTURED" IN BATTLE, BUT EVENTS PROVED THIS TO BE QUITE UNSATISFACTORY BECAUSE SUCH REPORTS OFTEN INCLUDED A LARGE PROPORTION OF "SUSPECTS" WHO SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED TO BE INNOCENT BYSTANDERS. OUR ONLY MAJOR DIFFICULTY WITH THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS THE TIME LAG -- SOMETIMES UP TO A YEAR-- BETWEEN THE CAPTURE OF THE PRISONER AND HIS ULTIMATE ARRIVAL, AFTER PROCESSING, IN A PRISON CAMP. THIS TIME LAG MEANS THE DATA ARE NEVER CURRENTLY COMPLETE, AND PAST FIGURES ARE CONSTANTLY BEING ADJUSTED AND UPDATED TO REFLECT DELAYED CHANGES IN THE INVENTORY. PRISONER DATA ARE THUS INHERENTLY CONSERVATIVE, AND ALTHOUGH THEY CAN BE USED WITH CONFIDENCE IN BROAD MANPOWER CALCULATIONS, THEY SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS REFLECTING CURRENT TRENDS IN ENEMY MORALE, FRIENDLY FORCE EFFECTIVENESS, OR EVEN COMBAT INTENSITY.

ENEMY DESERTIONS AND DEFECTIONS

8. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY CHIEU HOI DEFECTION DATA PROVIDE A REASONABLY ACCURATE REFLECTION OF DESERTION FROM THE ENEMY, THEY MUST BE USED WITH CAUTION IN VIET CONG MANPOWER CALCULATIONS. CURRENT REPORTING METHODS DO NOT DIFFERENTIATE ADEQUATELY BETWEEN MEMBERS OF IRREGULAR AND REGULAR FORCES, MERELY CLASSIFYING THEM TOGETHER AS MILITARY. SINCE WE HAVE NO BASIS FOR ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION WHICH MAY BE REGULAR, VIET CONG LOSSES THROUGH THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM SHOULD BE APPLIED TO THE TOTAL OF REGULAR AND IRREGULAR FORCES -- INCLUDING THE VAGUE "SELF-DEFENSE" CATEGORY --

AND NOT TO THE REGULAR FORCES ALONE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE ARE NO RELIABLE DATA AVAILABLE ON SIMPLE VIET CONG DESERTIONS. A RATIO OF ONE UNDETECTED DESERTION FOR EVERY MILITARY CHIEU HOI IS USED IN SOME US OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS, BUT THIS IS A VERY ROUGH FIGURE WHICH LOGIC WOULD SUGGEST IS LOW. ALTHOUGH CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS REFLECT INCREASING CONCERN OVER A SEEMINGLY MOUNTING DESERTION PROBLEM, THEY RARELY CITE STATISTICS, AND THE FEW FIGURES AVAILABLE ARE OFTEN LISTED IN AN AMBIGUOUS FASHION.

ALLIED LOSSES

9. ALTHOUGH DATA FOR ALLIED LOSSES ARE ACCURATE, DIFFERING CRITERIA FOR LISTING WOUNDED AMONG THE ALLIED FORCES TEND TO DISTORT THE IMPACT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS AND SERIOUSLY DISTORT COMPARATIVE "CASUALTY" STATISTICS. THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES GENERALLY LIST AS WOUNDED ONLY THOSE WHOSE INJURIES REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION US FORCES, ON THE OTHER HAND, INCLUDE AS WOUNDED-- AND HENCE AS "CASUALTIES" -- PERSONNEL WHO HAVE RECEIVED ONLY LIGHT INJURIES WHICH CAN BE TREATED WITHOUT HOSPITALIZATION. (MANY OF OUR "WOUNDED" REQUIRE LITTLE MORE THAN FIRST AID, AND SOMETHING ON THE ORDER OF 80 PERCENT OF ALL "WOUNDED" US PERSONNEL ULTIMATELY RETURN TO DUTY STATUS.) THIS ANOMALY IN CASUALTY ACCOUNTING HAS CONSISTENTLY MADE US LOSSES APPEAR TO BE DISPROPORTIONATELY HIGHER THAN THOSE OF THE VIETNAMESE. RECENTLY, THE US COMMAND HAS BEGUN TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN HOSPITALIZED AND UNHOSPITALIZED WOUNDED IN CASUALTY REPORTING. THIS PROCEDURE WILL PERMIT US AND VIETNAMESE "CASUALTIES" TO BE COMPARED ON A MORE MEANINGFUL BASIS.

10. THIS NEW PROCEDURE, HOWEVER, WILL NOT RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF COMPARING ALLIED LOSSES TO THOSE OF THE ENEMY, SINCE IT IS NOT FEASIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF ENEMY WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS. WE BELIEVE THE ONLY MEANINGFUL COMPARISON THAT CAN BE DRAWN IS THAT OF ALLIED KILLED TO ENEMY KILLED. ALTHOUGH THE RELIABILITY OF THE DATA IS NOT ABSOLUTE ON THE ENEMY'S SIDE FOR SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS, WE BELIEVE THE AGGREGATE WEEKLY FIGURES DO PROVIDE A REASONABLE BASIS FOR COMPARISON AS A MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF FRIENDLY OPERATIONS, AS WELL AS A MEASURE OF THE INTENSITY OF COMBAT.

PUBLIC USE OF LOSS DATA

11. IT IS NOT NORMALLY WITHIN OUR PURVIEW TO MAKE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO THE PRESS. IN THIS INSTANCE, HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOTE THE FOLLOWING FACTORS WHICH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN SUCH A JUDGMENT:

A. WHILE THE VALIDITY OF THE "BODY COUNT" MAY VARY WIDELY IN DIFFERENT ENGAGEMENTS, THE AGGREGATE FIGURES PROVIDE A USEFUL INDICATOR OF THE LEVEL OF COMBAT AND A CONSERVATIVE, GENERAL MEASURE OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY.

B. CURRENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IN THE FIELD EFFECTIVELY LIMIT ADMINISTRATIVE AND HUMAN ERRORS TO A REASONABLE MINIMUM.

C. WHILE SOME SEGMENTS OF THE PRESS ARE SKEPTICAL OF THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES, THEY DO TEND TO REPORT THEM-- NORMALLY WITHOUT CRITICISM -- ON A CONTINUING BASIS.

D. WITHHOLDING OF THE OFFICIAL KIA FIGURES FROM THE PRESS WOULD REMOVE THE ONE MEANINGFUL YARDSTICK OF THE INTENSITY AND GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS NOW AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC.

E. ALTHOUGH WE SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE TO BE DERIVED FROM WITHHOLDING THE KIA FIGURES -- EITHER FOR INDIVIDUAL ENGAGEMENTS OR IN PERIODIC TOTALS -- WE DO SEE ADVANTAGES TO WITHHOLDING FROM RELEASE THOSE FIGURES IN WHICH WE HAVE CONSIDERABLY LESS CONFIDENCE, I. E., THE RATIOS FOR WOUNDED AND THE COMPUTATIONS -- BASED ON INCOMPLETE AND WEAK EVIDENCE -- OF OVER-ALL VIET CONG MANPOWER DIFFICULTIES.

F. THE MOST MEANINGFUL COMPARISON THAT CAN BE MADE BETWEEN ALLIED AND ENEMY LOSSES IS THAT IN THE KILLED IN ACTION CATEGORY ON AN AGGREGATE, PERIODIC BASIS. WE BELIEVE IT MAY NEVER BE FEASIBLE TO DEVELOP RELIABLE, UNCHALLENGEABLE ESTIMATE OF VIET CONG WOUNDED WHICH WOULD PERMIT MEANINGFUL COMPARISONS OF TOTAL CASUALTIES FOR THE OPPOSING FORCES.

G. PRESENTATION OF US CASUALTY DATA IN A FORM WHICH DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN HOSPITALIZED AND UNHOSPITALIZED WOUNDED ON A CONTINUING BASIS WOULD HELP TO DISPEL DISTORTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS INEVITABLY PRODUCED BY THE PRESENT REPORTING SYSTEM.

DTG: 23/1517Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

20
~~TOP SECRET~~

1967 NOV 23 17 01

PRUS801
1606 ZULU 23 NOVEMBER 67
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 94-479

By CLY NARA Date 4-5-95

CAP67984

NOVEMBER 23, 1967

Pre file
67 NOV 23 PM 12:01
THURSDAY

I HAVE READ SEVERAL TIMES YOUR COURAGEOUS MESSAGE OF 17 NOVEMBER. I THINK I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR DECISION WAS, ESPECIALLY BECAUSE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR THINGS WENT SO WELL. IF IT IS A COMFORT TO YOU, I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY FAITH IS DEEP THAT THE BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE THE WILL AND THE MEANS BOTH TO PAY THEIR WAY AND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THE PART THEY MUST IN THE WORLD.

THIS FAITH IS IN MY BLOOD AND IN MY LIFE'S EXPERIENCE WITH BRITAIN.

AS FOR YOURSELF, I UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS TO ABSORB THE SHOCK OF ALL THIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TRY TO SET YOUR PEOPLE ON A SOUND IF PAINFUL COURSE.

OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU AND WITH THE MEN AND WOMEN OF YOUR LAND; FOR IT IS SOMEHOW JUST WRONG FOR BRITAIN TO BE OFF BALANCE THIS WAY.

AS FOR OURSELVES, WE SHALL BE HELPING IN THE IMF AND ELSEWHERE TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF THE NEW STERLING RATE. AND WE SHALL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE DOLLAR.

IMMEDIATELY ON HEARING THE NEWS FROM YOU, I TURNED TO THE TASK OF TRYING TO GET A TAX INCREASE AND AN EXPENDITURE CUT FROM THE CONGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNLESS OUR DEFICIT IS CUT QUITE SHARPLY, OUR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS ARE LIKELY TO PUSH INTEREST RATES THROUGH THE CEILING WITH GRAVE EFFECTS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. AND WE SHALL ALSO, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SPECULATORS ALREADY WORKING AGAINST THE DOLLAR.

I WAS MUCH HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE AROUND THE WORLD IN THE WAKE OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE POUND. THERE ARE STRONG CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD WILL. AND THERE OUGHT TO BE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE LIKE YOU AND ME WHO LIVED THROUGH THE UNNECESSARY TRAGEDY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION AFTER 1929 AND WHO ALSO LIVED THROUGH THE OTHER TRAGEDY WHEN BRITAIN SAVED US ALL.

IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD EACH OF THE MAJOR NATIONS ON A STEADY COURSE BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. THAT IS CLEARLY OUR DUTY. I SHALL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO FULFILL IT. AND I KNOW WE SHALL BE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER.

AS PAT DEAN TOLD YOU, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR TAKING STOCK TOGETHER HERE AT ANY PERIOD WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR YOU.

MESSAGE ENDS

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

21

~~TOP SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

EEA546
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2512

1967 NOV 23 16 22

Send 11:22 AM

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE [REDACTED]

1.3 La) (4)

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

HEREWITH THE CIA'S REPORT ON THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CYPRUS.
THE CYPRUS SITUATION

TURKEY APPEARS TO BE MARKING TIME WITH PLANS TO FORCE THE CYPRUS ISSUE WITH MILITARY MEANS WHILE THEY LISTEN TO THE PRESENTATIONS OF THE US AND UN EMISSARIES, VANCE AND ROLZ-BENNETT. AN INDICATION THAT THEY DO NOT WISH THIS PARADE OF PEACEMAKERS TO HAMPER THEIR FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IS GIVEN BY THEIR NEGATIVE REACTION TO A PROPOSED VISIT BY NATO SYGROSIO TO ANKARA.

THE TURKISH CABINET MET UNTIL 0330 (LOCAL TIME) ON THE MORNING OF 23 NOVEMBER TO CONSIDER THE GREEK REPLY TO THEIR NOTE OF 17 NOVEMBER. MINISTER OF THE STATE OZTURK STATED THAT THE REPLY HAD NOT BEEN "FOUND SATISFACTORY" AND THAT THE SITUATION WAS SO URGENT THAT NO DISCUSSIONS COULD BE "TOLERATED." THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY WAS DETERMINED TO INSURE THE "FREEDOM OF OUR KINSMEN ON CYPRUS".

1967 NOV 23 AM 11:35

THURSDAY

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-481

By sig, NARA, Date 1-24-96

PRESERVATION COPY

[REDACTED] 1.3
(a)(5)

IN ATHENS UNIDENTIFIED
GREEK GOVERNMENT SOURCES SPECULATED THAT IF TURKISH
FORCES LANDED ON CYPRUS, THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WOULD
TAKE "DISASTROUS RETALIATORY MEASURES" AGAINST THE
TURKISH COMMUNITIES ON THE ISLAND.

RECRIMINATIONS ARE FLYING THICK AND FAST ON
THE GREEK/GREEK CYPRIOT SIDE. JUNTA LEADER PAPADOPOULOS
BLAMES GRIVAS FOR THE MESS, SAYING THAT GRIVAS WILL
NOT RETURN TO CYPRUS, AND WILL BE KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE
TO SEE THAT HE DOES NOT. PAPADOPOULOS
ALSO FEARS THAT KING CONSTANTINE MIGHT JUST WELCOME
MORE TROUBLE WITH TURKEY, SINCE IT MIGHT PROVIDE A
WAY OF GETTING RID OF HIM (PAPADOPOULOS). PAPADOPOULOS
CLAIMS THAT, AFTER AN INITIAL FEELING THAT THE DANGER
WAS PAST, THE GREEK MILITARY IS NOW "95 PERCENT CERTAIN"
THAT THE TURKISH ARE GOING TO MOVE ON CYPRUS.

ANOTHER LEADING GREEK JUNTA FIGURE, BRIGADIER
PATTAKOS, STILL THINKS THE DANGER IS PAST.
HE BLAMES EVERYTHING ON MAKARIOS
AND GRIVAS. HE SEES NO GREAT OBJECTION TO WITHDRAWING
THE GREEK FORCES FROM CYPRUS, WHERE THEY ARE EATING
THEIR HEADS OFF, AND TURNING MATTERS OVER TO THE LOCAL
POLICE AND AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. 1.3
(a)(4)

[REDACTED] ALSO PLACES THE BLAME
ON MAKARIOS AND GRIVAS.

MEANWHILE, GRIVAS SAYS HE IS BLAMELESS, AND
HE HAS DOCUMENTS TO PROVE IT. THE GREEK MILITARY
AND MAKARIOS KNEW ALL ABOUT HIS PLANS IN ADVANCE
AND HAD APPROVED THEM IN WRITING. HE HAS PHOTOSTATS AND
HAS TRIED TO GET TWO ATHENS' PAPERS TO PUBLISH THEM.
NO LUCK. HE HAS OFFERED HIS RESIGNATION, BUT IT HASN'T
BEEN ACCEPTED YET.

MAKARIOS HAS SENT A NOTE TO UNSYG
THANT CALLING FOR A TRIPARTITE (GREECE, TURKEY, CYPRUS)
AGREEMENT TO THE PHASED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL GREEK AND
TURKISH ARMED FORCES AND PHASED DEMILITARIZATION OF THE
ISLAND UNDER AEGIS OF THE UN. KING CONSTANTINE HAS
INFORMED AMBASSADOR TALBOT THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
WILL ACCEPT MAKARIOS' APPEAL. IT NOW REMAINS TO BE
SEEN WHETHER THE TURKS WILL GO ALONG OR INSIST ON A
MORE RAPID EQUALIZATION OF THE FORCES ON THE ISLAND.

KING CONSTANTINE ASKED AMBASSADOR TALBOT AT
0245 23 NOVEMBER WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE TURKS WOULD LAND
ON CYPRUS LATER THE SAME NIGHT. TALBOT SAID, PROBABLY
NOT, SO LONG AS THEY ARE RECEIVING CYRUS VANCE.

THE SIXTH FLEET HAS BEEN OFFERED, ON CINCUSNAVEUR'S
INITIATIVE AS A POSSIBLE MEETING PLACE FOR GREEK AND
TURKISH NEGOTIATORS, WHO COULD BE FLOWN FROM THEIR
RESPECTIVE CAPITALS TO THE US ROOSEVELT ON SIX HOURS
NOTICE.

SOMEBODY IN LONDON NAMED O.S. OPHONTOS HAS SENT A
TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO THE "SOVIET PREMIER" IN WHICH HE
"BESEECHES IMMEDIATE SOVIET INTERVENTION TO STOP TURKEY
FROM INVADING CYPRUS." BUT A SOVIET DIPLOMAT REMARKED IN
ISTANBUL THAT, WHILE TURKEY WAS MAKING A BIG MISTAKE BY
ADOPTING SO AGGRESSIVE A STANCE, THE USSR COULDN'T POSSIBLY
INTERVENE.

1.3
(a)(4)

DTG: 23/1543Z NOV 67

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SENSITIVE~~

PRESERVATION COPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 17305, Sec. 3.4

94-479

20/48, DATA, Date 4-5-95

22

VEEA547
OO WTE13
DE WTE 2518

1967 NOV 23 16 45

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67985

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

THURSDAY
67 NOV 23 PM 11 51

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW
INFORMATION: THE GOLD MARKET

PRESSURE CONTINUED TODAY ON THE GOLD MARKET. THE GOLD POOL LOST \$128 MILLION (THE FINAL FIGURE MAY BE A BIT HIGHER). TOMORROW WILL BE MORE OF THE SAME.

OUR PARTNERS IN THE GOLD POOL TOLD BILL MARTIN THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SHARE LOSSES THROUGH THE WEEK BUT THEN WANTED TO TAKE ANOTHER LOOK. THEY WERE UNWILLING, PARTICULARLY THE GERMANS AND THE ITALIANS WHO ARE THE KEY COUNTRIES, TO COME OUT WITH A STATEMENT NOW SAYING UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE GOLD POOL WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE MARKET.

THEY ARE ARRANGING A MEETING IN FRANKFURT FOR SATURDAY OR SUNDAY TO GO OVER THE SITUATION WITH US AND DISCUSS NEXT STEPS. DEMING WILL BE THERE. HE WILL PUT BEFORE THEM OUR GOLD CERTIFICATE PROPOSAL UNDER WHICH THE GOLD POOL COUNTRIES WOULD ANNOUNCE THEIR SUPPORT OF THE \$35 PRICE, PUT A LARGE INITIAL SUBSCRIPTION OF GOLD ON THE TABLE (1-2 BILLION DOLLARS OF WHICH WE WOULD PROVIDE 60 PERCENT) AS EVIDENCE OF THIS SUPPORT, AND EXCHANGE THESE SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR GOLD CERTIFICATES, WHICH WE WOULD ALL AGREE TO TREAT AS RESERVES.

DEMING'S GROUP WILL MEET TOMORROW, WHERE ALL THE INFORMATION ON THE EUROPEAN GOLD MARKET WILL BE IN. AT THAT TIME WE WILL PROPOSE FOR YOU OUR BEST VIEW OF THE OPTIONS AHEAD.

DTG: 23/1616Z NOV 67

~~SECRET~~

GPS 250 IMI 250

23
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1967 NOV 23 16 09

Sent 11:09

Pres file

EEA545
PP WTE18 WTE15
DE WTE 2514

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE: CAP67982

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

67 NOV 23 AM 11:16

THURSDAY

NOVEMBER 22, 1967

STATE DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDS YOU SEND A SHORT CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO MOROCCAN KING HASSAN ON THE BIRTH OF HIS DAUGHTER AS FOLLOWS:

"MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES."

WE WOULD NOT RELEASE THE MESSAGE HERE BUT WOULD TELL THE MOROCCAN GOVERNMENT NO OBJECTION IF THEY WISH TO DO SO.

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION
TO KING HASSAN II OF MOROCCO ON THE
BIRTH OF HIS DAUGHTER

ENCLOSED FOR APPROVAL IS A PROPOSED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATION FROM THE PRESIDENT TO KING HASSAN OF MOROCCO ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF A DAUGHTER.

IF APPROVED, WE WOULD ADVISE THE EMBASSY THAT THE WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE THE MESSAGE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF THE GOVERNMENT OF MOROCCO WISHES TO DO SO.

S/ BENJAMIN H. READ
T/ BENJAMIN H. READ
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ENCLOSURE

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

PROPOSED MESSAGE

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY YOURS,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

HIS MAJESTY

HASSAN II,

KING OF MOROCCO,

RABAT.

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY

STATE-----

1. REQUEST EMBASSY TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO KING FROM PRESIDENT: QUOTE HIS MAJESTY HASSAN II, KING OF MOROCCO, RABAT -

YOUR MAJESTY:

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME ON THE OCCASION OF THE BIRTH OF YOUR DAUGHTER IN EXTENDING TO YOU AND THE ROYAL FAMILY OUR WARM CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY YOURS,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON UNQUOTE

2. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE, BUT HAS NO OBJECTION IF GOM WISHES DO SO.

GP-3

DIG: 23/1503Z NOV 67

GPS: 320 IMI 320

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

24

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967 NOV 23 01 05

Pres file

VZCZCEEA537
OO WTI 13
DE WTI 2502

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP67971

*From the President
For the Prime Minister*

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 23, 1967

67 NOV 22 PM 8:18

WEDNESDAY

HEREWITH A DRAFT RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER WILSON FOR
YOUR CONSIDERATION.

I HAVE READ SEVERAL TIMES YOUR COURAGEOUS MESSAGE OF 17
NOVEMBER. I THINK I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR DECISION WAS, ESPECIALLY
BECAUSE IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR THINGS WENT SO WELL. IF
IT IS A COMFORT TO YOU, I CAN TELL YOU THAT MY FAITH IS DEEP THAT
THE BRITISH PEOPLE HAVE THE WILL AND THE MEANS BOTH TO
PAY THEIR WAY AND TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THE PART THEY MUST IN
THE WORLD.

THIS FAITH IS IN MY BLOOD AND IN MY LIFE'S EXPERIENCE WITH
BRITAIN.

AS FOR YOURSELF, I UNDERSTAND WHAT IT IS TO ABSORB THE SHOCK
OF ALL THIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TRY TO SET YOUR PEOPLE ON A
SOUND IF PAINFUL COURSE.

OUR PRAYERS ARE WITH YOU AND WITH THE MEN AND WOMEN OF YOUR LAND; FOR IT IS SOMEHOW JUST WRONG FOR BRITAIN TO BE OFF BALANCE THIS WAY.

AS FOR OURSELVES, WE SHALL BE HELPING IN THE IMF AND ELSEWHERE TO MAKE A SUCCESS OF THE NEW STERLING RATE. AND WE SHALL DO WHATEVER IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE DOLLAR.

IMMEDIATELY ON HEARING THE NEWS FROM YOU, I TURNED TO THE TASK OF TRYING TO GET A TAX INCREASE AND AN EXPENDITURE CUT FROM THE CONGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNLESS OUR DEFICIT IS CUT QUITE SHARPLY, OUR BORROWING REQUIREMENTS IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS ARE LIKELY TO PUSH INTEREST RATES THROUGH THE CEILING WITH GRAVE EFFECTS HERE AND ELSEWHERE. AND WE SHALL ALSO, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SPECULATORS ALREADY WORKING AGAINST THE DOLLAR.

I WAS MUCH HEARTENED BY THE RESPONSE AROUND THE WORLD IN THE WAKE OF THE DEVALUATION OF THE POUND. THERE ARE STRONG CURRENTS OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD WILL. AND THERE OUGHT TO BE, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE LIKE YOU AND ME WHO LIVED THROUGH THE UNNECESSARY TRAGEDY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION AFTER 1929 AND WHO ALSO LIVED THROUGH THE OTHER TRAGEDY WHEN BRITAIN SAVED US ALL.

IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO HOLD EACH OF THE MAJOR NATIONS ON A STEADY COURSE BUT THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. THAT IS CLEARLY OUR DUTY. I SHALL DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO FULFILL IT. AND I KNOW WE SHALL BE SHOULDER TO SHOULDER.

AS PAT DEAN TOLD YOU, I LOOK FORWARD TO OUR TAKING STICK TOGETHER HERE ~~WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR YOU.~~

at any period when the time is right for you.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DTG: 230025Z NOV 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1967 NOV 23 00 59

Pres file

VZCZCEEA536
OO WTE10 WTE15
DE WTE 2503

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP67972

67 NOV 22 PM 8:08

WEDNESDAY

CONFIDENTIAL

NOVEMBER 22, 1967

HEREWITH BOB KOMER'S PRESS ACTIVITIES. HE DESERVES A SILVER STAR FOR HIS WORK ON SCOTTY RESTON.

WARRING WITH THE PRESS. I TOOK ON ALL TWELVE (COUNT 'EM) OF THE NEW YORK TIMES WASHINGTON BUREAU AT LUNCH YESTERDAY. MY WOUNDS ARE STILL BLOODY, BUT ONE DIRECT RESULT WAS RESTON'S 22 NOVEMBER COLUMN ON "WHY WESTMORELAND AND BUNKER ARE OPTIMISTIC." I'M PROUD OF MYSELF.

LARRY SPIVAK CALLED FOR MEET THE PRESS NEXT TIME I'M IN TOWN (I TOLD HIM END-JANUARY IF YOU PERMITTED). HE'D SEEN ME ON TODAY SHOW THIS MORNING AND THOUGHT I WAS BETTER THAN BUNKER/WESTY, THOUGH NOT AS FORCEFUL AS YOU. SPIVAK, WHO CONFESSED TO BEING RATHER A HAWK, WONDERED WHY WE DON'T MAKE MORE OF ALL THE COMMUNIST SCREAMING AGAINST OUR BOMBING THE NORTH. "IF IT ISN'T DOING ANY GOOD WHY ARE THEY YELLING SO?" HE ASKED. HE SAID AN EE AMBASSADOR SPENT TWO HOURS PROPAGANDIZING HIM.

TODAY SHOW WENT WELL, THANKS TO RAY SCHERER'S DECENCY. NO DIRTY QUESTIONS. THEY SWITCHED IT FROM THANKSGIVING TO TODAY.

I GAVE DON OBERDORFER OF KNIGHT PAPERS A 15 MINUTE QUICK FILL-IN ON A SERIES ABOUT THE VC HE PLANS TO DO IN SAIGON.

SPENCER DAVIS OF ASSOCIATED PRESS SAT STILL FOR AN HOUR ON PACIFICATION (MOSTLY ON THE RECORD). MAYBE A STORY, MAYBE NOT.

TOOK 2 HOURS TO BEAT UP ROWLAND EVANS AND STEWART ALSOP ON THE THEME "I TOLD YOU SO." THEY (AND MOST OF THE TWO DOZEN OR SO PRESS TYPES I'VE BACKGROUNDED) HAVE BEEN HIT HARD BY THE NEW DOCUMENTED CASE THAT WE'RE AT LONG LAST ON THE UPGRADE IN VIETNAM.

MEL ELFIN OF NEWSWEEK CALLED FOR A PEP TALK.

JESS COOK (TIME) ASKED ABOUT THE TUESDAY BREAKFAST. I GAVE HIM WHAT YOU TOLD ME TO SAY ("YOU ASKED EVERYBODY REPEATEDLY IF WERE SURE WE WERE GETTING ALL WE NEEDED, ETC.")

DTG: 230024Z NOV 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROX FROM QUECK COPY

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING. CANCELLED F20 E.O. 11652 SEC 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR 16, 1983.

BY *rg* ON *12-9-91*

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

26

1967 NOV 22 21 47

EEA53A
CO WTE10
DE WTE 2495

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP67966

67 NOV 22 PM 5:09

WEDNESDAY

SECRET EYES ONLY

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

YOU WILL WANT TO READ THIS INTERESTING AND LUCID ACCOUNT
OF THE FIGHTING AROUND DAK TO WHICH WAS SENT IN BY GENERAL
ABRAMS.

BEGIN TEXT

IT IS 1800 NOVEMBER 22, IN SAIGON AND I HAVE JUST RETURNED
FROM KONTUM PROVINCE. I SPENT SOME TIME WITH PEERS AND
LT COL LUAT, THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMANDER FOR FLEIKU
AND KONTUM AND HIS ADVISOR COL KAUFFMAN. I VISITED
BRIEFLY WITH COL JOHNSON 1ST BRIGADE 4TH DIVISION AND COL RATTAN
1ST BRIGADE 1ST CAV, AND A GOOD TALK WITH SCHWEITER OF
THE 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE. I THEN FLEW OVER MUCH OF THE BATTLE AREA.

IN LATE OCTOBER INTELLIGENCE INDICATED THAT THE 1ST
NVA DIVISION WAS PREPARING TO ATTACK DAK TO. DEPLOYMENTS
TO KONTUM TO DATE ARE 9 US BATTALIONS AND 6 ARVN
BATTALIONS.

DAK TO LIES ON A VALLEY FLOOR ADJACENT TO A RIVER.
TO THE NORTH, SOUTH, EAST AND WEST DAK TO IS SURROUNDED
BY MOUNTAINS, RIDGES AND PEAKS EXTENDING FOR MANY
KILOMETERS IN ALL DIRECTIONS. THESE PEAKS AND RIDGES
VARY BETWEEN 800-1300 METERS IN HEIGHT. THE
SLOPES ARE STEEP, THEY ARE COVERED BY TREES 100 TO 200
FT. HIGH AND UP TO FOUR FEET IN DIAMETER AND TOPPED WITH
DOUBLE AND TRIPLE CANOPY. IN ORDER TO PREVENT AN ATTACK
ON DAK TO YOU MUST SECURE THE HIGH GROUND AROUND IT.
THIS THE 4TH DIVISION BEGAN ON 4 NOV AND MADE ITS FIRST CONTACT ON
THE FIRST RIDGE SOUTH OF DAK TO. ON SUCCESSIVE DAYS THE
1ST BRIGADE 4TH DIVISION PUSHED SOUTH AND WEST FROM DAK TO, THE
173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE PUSHED WEST AND THEN SOUTHWEST AND THE ARVN PUSHED
OUT TO THE NORTH, NORTHEAST AND EAST. THEY HAVE ALL
FOUND THE ENEMY IN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ON THE TOPS OF THE
PEAKS AND RIDGES. I VIEWED ONE POSITION TODAY CONSISTING OF

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 3A6-830024

By 125/101, NARA, Date 12-16-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3 CONCENTRIC TRENCHES MAKING 3 COMPLETE CIRCLES AROUND THE TOP OF ONE MOUNTAIN. I AM INFORMED THAT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCHES ARE SOME HORIZONTAL HOLES DUG BACK INTO THE MOUNTAIN WHERE THE ENEMY STAYS DURING BOMBING AND ARTILLERY.

THE PATTERN OF ENEMY DEPLOYMENT NOW APPEARS TO BE THE 24TH REGIMENT WITH ITS 4TH AND 5TH BATTALIONS AND THE 304TH VC BATTALION NORTHEAST AND EAST OF DAK TO. THE 1ST NVA DIVISION WITH THE 66TH, 32D AND 174TH REGIMENTS AND THE 6TH BATTALION OF THE 24TH REGIMENT SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST AND WEST OF DAK TO. IN THE LAST 2 DAYS THE 4TH BATTALION OF THE 95 BRIGADE HAS MOVED IN WEST OF KONTUM CITY.

SINCE THE FIGHTING BEGAN 4 NOVEMBER IT HAS BEEN HARD AND TENACIOUS ON BOTH SIDES. A DEFECTOR FROM THE 32D NVA REGIMENT SAID HIS UNIT HAD NOT HAD FOOD FOR SIX DAYS. THIS IS NOT A GENERAL CONDITION EVEN IF TRUE IN HIS UNIT. THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE 4TH BATTALION 24TH REGIMENT WAS CAPTURED AND LATER DIED OF WOUNDS. HE HAD ON HIS PERSON A HAND WRITTEN DIRECTIVE THAT HE WOULD DEFEND HIS POSITION TO THE LAST MAN. THIS IS THE POSITION ASSAULTED AND TAKEN BY THE ARVN AIRBORNE TASK FORCE. ON THE 14, 15, AND 16 THERE WAS A LULL EXCEPT FOR THE MORTAR ATTACKS ON THE DAK TO BASE. ON THE 17TH HEAVY FIGHTING BEGAN AGAIN AND CONTINUES TO NOW. THIS IS BROUGHT ABOUT BY FRIENDLY FORCES PRESSING FURTHER OUT. TODAY THE FIGHTING CONTINUES FOR HILL 875 ABOUT 8 KM FROM THE BORDER AND 882 ABOUT 5 KM FROM THE BORDER. MANY SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS COME FROM ALMOST ALL STRIKES IN THE VALLEYS WEST OF THE RIDGES.

FRIENDLY CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	MIA
US	249	843	16
ARVN	54	220	3
TOTAL	303	1063	19

THE MEDICAL OFFICERS ESTIMATE THAT OF THE WOUNDED EVACUATED 75 PERCENT TO 80 PERCENT WILL BE RETURNED TO DUTY FROM IN COUNTRY FACILITIES. SOME MEN IN THE 2ND BATTALION OF THE 503D BRIGADE WERE WOUNDED UP TO 48 HOURS BEFORE BEING EVACUATED. SOME MEN OF THE 318TH INFANTRY BATTALION WERE WOUNDED UP TO 24 HOURS BEFORE BEING EVACUATED. THIS WAS BECAUSE OF INTENSE FIRE ON THE LANDING ZONE AND IN ONE CASE THE DUST-OFF WAS HIT BY A B40 ROCKET IN THE LANDING ZONE AND EXPLODED AND BURNED. THE LANDING ZONE HAD TO COOL OFF AND BE CLEARED BEFORE EVACUATION COULD BE RESUMED. SERIOUSLY WOUNDED ARE TAKEN FROM DAK TO TO THE 71ST EVACUATION HOSPITAL IN PLEIKU IN A SPECIALLY FITTED AND EQUIPPED CHINOOK - MEDICAL PERSONNEL, PLASMA, WHOLE BLOOD, ETC. OF THE WOUNDED WHOSE EVACUATION WAS DELAYED ONLY 2 LATER DIED IN THE HOSPITAL.

SINCE THE 4TH OF NOVEMBER 1408 TACTICAL AIR SORTIES HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THIS FIGHT. ON ONE SMALL POSITION ALONE 40 SORTIES LOADED WITH 1000 LB BOMBS WERE APPLIED. 194 B-52 SORTIES HAVE BEEN EXECUTED IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF THESE OPERATIONS.

ARTILLERY	TUBES	ROUNDS FIRED
105MM	50	77,748
155MM	17	15,784
175MM	4	2,120
8 IN	6	4,483
	-----	-----
TOTAL	77	100,135

LOGISTICS-295 TONS PER DAY BY AIR TO DAK TO. 532 TONS PER DAY BY TRUCK FROM QUI NHON TO DAK TO (246 KM). 200 TONS PER DAY BY TRUCK FROM QUI NHON TO KONTUM CITY.

THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN ALL UNITS IS GOOD EXCEPT THE 173D BRIGADE. THEIR BATTALIONS SHOULD HAVE A FOXHOLE STRENGTH OF 450. THE 1ST BATTALION HAS TODAY 360, THE 2ND BATTALION HAS 293 AND THE 4TH BATTALION HAS 292. THERE ARE 179 REPLACEMENTS AT AN KHE FOR 173D BRIGADE.

ENEMY CASUALTIES BODY COUNT

BY US	910
BY ARVN	259
TOTAL	1169

AND 19 PRISONERS

I BELIEVE THAT THE ENEMY OBJECTIVE WAS TO ATTACK DAK TO AND PROBABLY BEN HET THE NEW SITE UNDER PREPARATION FOR CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUPS. BY THIS ATTACK HE WOULD DRAW FORCES TO KONTUM WHERE HE WOULD CAUSE MAXIMUM ATTRITION TO OUR FORCES. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS INDICATE THAT EACH ENEMY REGIMENT WAS CHARGED WITH THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE US BATTALION. A PRISONER FROM A TRANSPORTATION UNIT STATED THAT FOR ALL OF OCTOBER ALL TROOPS WERE EMPLOYED CARRYING SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION INTO KONTUM AND PREPARING POSITIONS. TODAY THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT HAND THAT HE IS WITHDRAWING. HE MAY BE FIGHTING HARD TO GET HIS SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT OUT. GEN SCHWIETER FEELS THE 173D BRIGADE HAS MADE INEFFECTIVE 4 ENEMY BATTALIONS FROM THE 66TH AND 174TH REGIMENTS.

WE DEPLOYED TO DAK TO BASED ON INTELLIGENCE. WE WENT OUT FROM DAK TO TO PREPARE HIS ATTACK AND TO FIND HIM AND DESTROY HIM. WE HAVE PRESSED OUTWARD AND BELIEVE WE ARE ASTRIDE HIS MAIN AVENUES OF WITHDRAWAL BETWEEN HIS MAIN FORCES AND THE BORDER. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HIM BRINGING THE FULL WEIGHT OF FIRE POWER TO BEAR.

THE BATTLEFIELD IN KONTUM RESEMBLES A CHESS BOARD AT PLAY. WE HAVE UNITS AND FIRE BASES ON PEAKS AND RIDGES AND THE ENEMY HAS TOO. WE SHIFT OURS BY HELICOPTER TO CHECK HIM OR GET BEHIND HIM OR ASSAULT HIM. EXTENSIVE USE IS MADE OF LONG RANGE RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS, MIKE FORCES, CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUPS, THE PEOPLE SNIFFER, AIR OBSERVERS AND ALL OTHER MEANS TO LOCATE THE ENEMY. WHEN FOUND MAXIMUM FIRE POWER IS PUT ON HIM. I BELIEVE WHEN THE ENEMY COMES FORTH FROM CAMBODIA OR LAOS WITH HIS PRINCIPAL FORMATIONS LOOKING FOR A FIGHT WE MUST GO OUT AND FIGHT HIM. THE LEADERS WE HAVE TO DO IT - PEERS, SCHWIETER, JOHNSON AND RATTAN ARE AMONG THE MOST TALENTED.

WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS UNTIL WE HAVE SWEEPED THE AREA UP TO WITHIN 3 KILOMETERS OF THE BORDER.

DTG: 221827Z NOV 67

SECRET

EYES ONLY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

27
Pres file
November 22, 1967

Herewith a draft response to Prime Minister Wilson for your
consideration.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
Walt Rostow Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 11-26-91

27a
/

~~TOP SECRET~~
PERSONAL

November 22, 1967

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLT 94-479
By sp/cb, NARA, Date 1/15/02

I have read several times your courageous message of 17 November. I think I know how hard your decision was, especially because in the first half of the year things went so well. If it is a comfort to you, I can tell you that my faith is deep that the British people have the will and the means both to pay their way and to continue to play the part they must in the world.

This faith is in my blood and in my life's experience with Britain.

As for yourself, I understand what it is to absorb the shock of all this and, at the same time, try to set your people on a sound if painful course.

Our prayers are with you and with the men and women of your land; for it is somehow just wrong for Britain to be off balance this way.

As for ourselves, we shall be helping in the IMF and elsewhere to make a success of the new sterling rate. And we shall do whatever is necessary to defend the dollar.

Immediately on hearing the news from you, I turned to the task of trying to get a tax increase and an expenditure cut from the Congress as soon as possible. ~~That will not be easy; but,~~ unless our deficit is cut quite sharply, our borrowing requirements in the capital markets are likely to push interest rates through the ceiling with grave effects here

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

and elsewhere. And we shall also, of course, have to deal with the speculators already working against the dollar.

I was much heartened by the response around the world in the wake of the devaluation of the pound. There are strong currents of international understanding and good will. And there ought to be, especially for those like you and me who lived through the unnecessary tragedy of the great depression after 1929 and who also lived through that other tragedy when Britain saved us all.

It will be difficult to hold each of the major nations on a steady course but this is the only way to maintain and strengthen the international monetary system. That is clearly our duty. I shall do everything I can to fulfill it. And I know we shall be shoulder to shoulder.

As Pat Dean told you, I look forward to our taking stock together here when the time is right for you.

WWRostow:rlm

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 22, 1967 28

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

The gold market continues to be nervous as an aftermath of sterling devaluation. Rumors are circulating that the price of gold will not be held on the London market. These rumors have been fed by leaks out of Paris on the operation of the gold pool and French withdrawal from the pool (which actually took place in June).

We expected substantial gold losses after the devaluation. The gold pool lost \$28 million Monday, \$45 million Tuesday, and \$104 million today. (We supply 60%; our European partners the other 40%) Rumors were responsible for the sudden rise.

Bill Martin is going to call the other Governors of the central banks who are partners with us in the gold pool (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, U. K., and Switzerland), to support us in a statement today affirming business as usual. If they won't, Bill Martin would issue a statement that U. S. intends to continue to support the market and referring again to your statement of Saturday that the U. S. will buy and sell gold at \$35 an ounce.

We expect further heavy losses this week. An unequivocal statement of our position should calm things down. We will keep you advised.

By wire -- 2:30 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC 2-24-10
Measures 10-27-78, ERS 7-14-79,

67-43144

12-441

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - November 22, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Brazilian Economic Performance and our Program Loan

*Pres. file
sent back
via pouch*

I looked into the status of our \$100 million program loan to Brazil for FY 1967 and believe it important that you have the whole picture. Following the disbursement of the first \$25 million in June, there has been a hold-up on the remaining \$75 million pending renegotiation of new self-help targets which is now nearing completion.

Poor performance on some of the original self-help commitments threatens the stabilization program which President Castello Branco and his Planning Minister Roberto Campos carried out with such success in 1964-66. Failure of the Costa e Silva Administration to take corrective measures could precipitate an economic crisis by mid-1968 comparable to what Peru is now undergoing. Since Brazil's performance sets the tone for our Alliance for Progress elsewhere in the hemisphere, the situation assumes added importance.

The Castello Branco Stabilization Program

Castello Branco's economic policies brought Brazil from the edge of collapse to a sound footing:

- the cash deficit was reduced from 28% of total expenditures in 1964 to 10.5% in 1966.
- the operating budget deficit which equalled 6% of expenditures in 1964 was turned into a surplus equivalent to 22.5% of expenditures in 1966.
- a realistic exchange rate led to a 32% increase in non-coffee exports.
- foreign exchange reserves went up \$600 million and Brazil's credit standing was restored.

One trouble spot remained: price stability. Castello Branco had reduced the rate of increase of the cost-of-living index from 84% in 1964 to 41% in 1966. This rate of inflation was still too high, but steps were underway to bring it down to manageable proportions.

The 1967 program loan was designed to achieve stabilization which last January was well in sight. Its key features included:

- further import liberalization to make Brazilian industry more competitive internationally.
- continuance of a realistic exchange rate.
- further reduction of the fiscal deficit.
- monetary and credit policies to dampen excess demand pressures.
- internal coffee prices which would discourage over-production and encourage diversification.

The program loan agreement was checked with then President-elect Costa e Silva and his economic team, who indicated their support.

The Costa e Silva Administration Performance

The Castello Branco stabilization program, while successful, had worked certain hardships on lower income groups and brought a mild recession which hit business interests. Sensitive to both of these sectors, and desiring to achieve political popularity, Costa e Silva has made a special effort to help them. The stabilization program he inherited and new price control measures he instituted have worked to:

- hold the cost-of-living increase to the lowest level since 1962.
- stimulate economic activity which is expected to bring a growth rate of 5% despite the first quarter recession.

Judged on these factors alone, there is ample basis for proceeding with disbursements. But Costa e Silva has taken steps which give us

serious concern over the longer-range impact of his economic policy. By lowering interest rates, reducing or postponing taxes, increasing the coffee support price and maintaining levels of government expenditures far in excess of income, the government has brought about expansionary pressures which by mid-1968 could lead again to economic collapse. Danger signals are already clearly evident in the projected budget deficit of NCr\$1.2 billion for CY 1967 and a net loss of US \$220 million in its foreign reserves during the period June 30 - November 4, 1967.

The Program Loan Negotiations

After it became clear in July that the Costa e Silva was not meeting important self-help aspects of the program loan agreement, we told the Brazilians that further disbursement would have to wait until mutually agreed new targets could be worked out. Also concerned over a resurgence of demand inflation, they accepted this decision in a cooperative spirit.

A new understanding covering performance during the second half of 1967 was promptly worked out. It centered on:

- keeping the budget deficit within an established limit.
- holding net domestic credit expansion over existing levels to roughly the same magnitude as originally programmed for the second half year, and
- moving the exchange rate in the event of substantial reserve losses.

But before the new agreement was submitted to you for approval and a new disbursement made, the Brazilians were taking measures contrary to the new undertakings. So we went back to the negotiating table.

We fully recognize that many of the problems we have had with the Brazilians stem in the first place from the inexperience of the new team as well as their desire to get away from the hard political

image of the Castelo Branco Government. At the same time, our over-riding concern is to prevent serious reversal of the move toward stabilization in which we have invested so much money and effort during the past three years. Adjustment of the exchange rate is one of several measures which need to be taken. In the negotiations the Costa e Silva Government has recognized that it is necessary. The only remaining question is one of timing and on this we are flexible.

Because of our over-riding interest in preserving the momentum of stabilization we have kept pressing for a mutually acceptable program of self-help. We now think we are close to success. The Brazilian Minister of Finance is coming to Washington on December 6 for further talks. In preparation for these, Covey Oliver and Bill Gaud are preparing a memorandum defining the issues and presenting the alternatives for your decision.

The Congress has judged the success of our program lending in Brazil on the basis of progress toward decelerating inflation. The consequences to the whole Alliance for Progress budget would be serious if next year we had to tell the Congress that despite all our program lending the stabilization program has unravelled.

W. W. Rostow

Tuesday - November 21, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Farewell Letter from Paraguayan Ambassador
Plate

After nine years in Washington, Paraguayan Ambassador Plate is returning to his country. He departs December 2.

At Tab B is a warm letter of farewell to you and Mrs. Johnson.

I suggest you send him the reply at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Suggested reply to Ambassador Plate's letter

Tab B - Letter of November 6 from Ambassador Plate.

30a

November 21, 1967

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was most thoughtful of you to write me on the eve of your departure from Washington.

You have spent nine fruitful years here. In your ambassadorship you have skillfully combined strong advocacy of the interest of Paraguay and friendship toward the United States. I appreciate all that you have done to increase understanding and cooperation between our two countries.

As you return home, Mrs. Johnson and I send our best wishes to you and Mrs. Plate. We were glad to have you at the Ranch and are pleased that you enjoyed your visit. For us it was also a very special occasion.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Dr. Juan Plate
Ambassador of Paraguay
Washington, D. C.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

EMBAJADA DEL PARAGUAY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

306
19363

November 6, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

On the eve of my departure after nine years as Ambassador of Paraguay to the United States, I should like to express my deep appreciation of the cordial and generous collaboration of yourself and officials of your Government in our joint endeavors to strengthen relations between our countries.

As I look back on the decade of my stay in the United States and recall the many occasions of fruitful cooperation based on mutual understanding and appreciation of the common interest that unites our two countries, I leave with the gratifying feeling of service accomplished that will be with me all my life.

On a personal note, Mr. President, my family and I are grateful for the opportunity we have had to know the American way of life at first hand, and to experience, even though vicariously, developments of local, national and international significance in the life of this great country. My children have been privileged to complete their education in this country.

My contacts with you provided me on memorable occasions with evidence of your warm friendship outside the conventional formalities of diplomatic protocol at ideally suitable places, such as the LBJ Ranch where you and Mrs. Johnson invariable created a unique and delightful atmosphere in which Latin Americans could feel truly at home at all times. I shall always cherish the memory of this relationship.

Paraguay, Mr. President, continues to achieve gradual and constant progress towards economic and social welfare within the framework of political order and stability under the leadership of President Alfredo Stroessner. Your personal interest in Paraguay was evident to President Stroessner in your conversations with him in Punta del Este. Much remains to be done in the years ahead but

The President of the
United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

the course of action chartered with vision by government officials and supported by willing citizens together with the cooperation of friendly nations, in particular that of the United States, makes us all look to the future with confidence.

Mrs. Plate joins me in conveying to you and Mrs. Johnson our best wishes.

With highest regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Juan Plate". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "J" that loops around the first part of the name. The name "Plate" is written in a cursive script. The signature is positioned above the printed name and title.

Juan Plate
Ambassador of Paraguay

Booth 31

Tuesday - November 21, 1967

Mr. President:

The latest edition of LIFE en Espanol (copy attached) has an eleven-page spread on the Diaz Ordaz visit.

Entitled "Two Good Neighbors Consolidate Their Friendship", the article is divided into three parts:

- the significance of the visit and decisions reached, by Dick Saltonstall;
- the fun of the social events, by Arlene Gould;
- a photographic report of the Chamizal ceremony.

Dick Saltonstall's narrative is a good interpretive job, which I am happy to say we helped him write.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Pres file

Tuesday, November 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You are scheduled to see Jim Lucas today at 12:30 PM. He had asked to see General Westmoreland and I would imagine he is interested in 1) your impressions following your meetings with Westy and Bunker and, 2) the relationship between Westmoreland and McNamara -- and the possibility that Westmoreland is to be replaced.

You are in the best position to know how to handle the latter question. As an outline of how to summarize the series of meetings and our current outlook, I offer the following guidance along the same line I suggested last week for your press conference:

1. These were stock-taking sessions after 6 months' experience by the new team in Saigon and after the formation of the newly elected Vietnamese government.

2. No new decisions were before us because our policy in Vietnam is firmly established; and we are making progress in the military, political, and economic fields.

3. We are examining how we can accelerate forward movement within an agreed strategy in the light of the priorities set by the South Vietnamese and in the light of our own military operations.

4. We are heartened by the steps already taken by the new South Vietnamese Government with respect to:

- corruption;
- the new responsibilities passed to elected local governments with respect to the collection and use of land taxes;
- establishment of direct relationship between province chiefs and the central government;
- the enlargement by 65,000 of the armed forces of South Vietnam;
- and the program to assist the regional and popular forces.

W. N. Rostow

Limited Official Use

Tuesday - November 21, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Reply to President Costa e Silva

Last Wednesday I sent you a letter from President Costa e Silva (Tab B) asking for your personal intervention in the soluble coffee problem.

I noted that the problem stems from an unfair competitive position which Brazilian coffee policy gives to its soluble producers. This permits them to undersell US soluble producers in our market by a substantial margin. The US coffee trade has indicated it will withdraw its support from the International Coffee Agreement now under negotiation in London unless Brazil changes its unfair practices. Without the trade's support, we will not be able to get Congressional support for the Agreement.

The Brazilian Minister of Commerce and Industry held talks with Secretary Rusk, Covey Oliver and Tony Solomon last Thursday and Friday. They reached an understanding on steps which Brazil might take to meet our difficulties with present Brazilian soluble coffee policy. These steps include a reduction of the national subsidy to Brazilian soluble producers and the imposition of an export tax on soluble coffee which will substantially reduce the competitive advantage which the Brazilian producers now enjoy. Success of the understanding will depend on how well Minister Soares is able to deliver on these measures when he returns to Rio. Meanwhile, last week's talks served to get the soluble coffee problem out of the Presidential channel and back to the technical level where it belongs.

The suggested reply at Tab A expresses a cautious optimism over the understanding with Macedo Soares and tactfully notes the shift back to the technical level.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tabs A and B.

33a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By CLr, NARA, Date 4-5-95

November 21, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate the spirit of friendship and frankness in your letter of November 10, 1967, in which you expressed your concern over problems related to maritime shipping and to Brazilian exports of soluble coffee.

As regards maritime shipping, I understand fully your government's objective of ensuring a substantial participation of the Brazilian merchant marine in the transport of your exports. We have a similar policy, based on law. I believe that it is important, however, in the implementation of such a policy to ensure that good services are provided and that appropriate competition is not eliminated. In addition, I believe that full consideration must be given to the views and interests of all of the parties concerned in working out any arrangements for participation in ocean trade. I understand that efforts are being made to deal with this problem, and I am hopeful that agreement will be reached soon.

I share your view that the question of Brazilian exports of soluble coffee is a matter of high importance which bears on the future of the International Coffee Agreement. I understand your government's desire to increase the production and export of soluble coffee. I have also been informed of the attention being given this problem in many quarters in Brazil. At the same time I believe you understand the importance to the future of the International Coffee Agreement of insuring that all types of coffee exported under the Agreement are treated comparably.

I received the text of your letter on the eve of Minister Macedo Soares' arrival in the United States to discuss this problem. I sent word to him that I have received your letter and that I would be following the progress of the discussions.

I have since been informed that Minister Macedo Soares and United States representatives felt that the talks held in Washington November 15-17, which were carried out in a spirit of utmost frankness and cordiality, were most useful. I understand that the Minister also expressed the view to Secretary Rusk that a way to resolve the problem appears to have been found.

Secretary Rusk explained to Minister Macedo Soares the role of the United States Congress in the renewal of the International Coffee Agreement. The Congress will be examining the Agreement from several points of view, including the way with which the Agreement deals with the question of soluble coffee. Any solution found to the question will therefore have to stand or fall on its own merits.

I understand that Minister Macedo Soares and United States representatives are now continuing their talks in London in connection with the meetings of the International Coffee Council which has just begun.

I am sure you share the hope that these meetings will be a success, leading to a continuation of the International Coffee Agreement with benefit to both the producers and consumers of coffee.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Arthur da Costa e Silva
President of the Republic of Brazil
Brasilia

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

*I am always anxious to help with your problems
and please always bring matters of importance to
my attention*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 58302
T3/T-86/R-XX
Portuguese

33b

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

November 10, 1967

My dear Mr. President:

In the spirit of friendship and candor established between us at our meeting at Punta del Este, where we subscribed to important commitments for the progress of the Americas, I wish to express to you my concern over two problems of particular urgency and seriousness, which may be prejudicial to our common objectives of close cooperation between the United States of America and Brazil and extensive international cooperation, particularly for the benefit of the less developed countries.

I refer to maritime transport and the exportation of soluble coffee by Brazil. In regard to the first problem, my Government's objective is to ensure that the Brazilian merchant fleet participates to a substantial extent in the transportation of our exportable products and to equip it adequately for that purpose.

The second problem is of special importance to the relations between our two countries, with the future of the International Coffee Agreement depending to a considerable extent on our understanding of this problem. Furthermore, my Government has sought, in the spirit of Punta del Este, to provide incentives for the production and exportation of manufactured products since it is understandable that young industries in my country need some protection. The industrial coffee sectors of the United States of America have raised objections to Brazilian soluble coffee exports, which are of infinitesimal value on the world coffee market, and this is creating a certain atmosphere of crisis in the renegotiation

of the Agreement governing the world market. From the standpoint of your country's economy as a whole, these exports represent relatively little, but, again relatively, they are of great importance to the Brazilian economy as a whole. Although I am convinced of the legitimacy of the Brazilian marketing policy, I recognize the existence of the political problem that has been created and its significance in the relations between our countries and in the decisions to be taken with respect to the Agreement.

Like Your Excellency, I wish to do everything possible to maintain and strengthen the Agreement and to make the relations between our two Governments more fruitful. Consequently, my delegates have sought to reach an understanding with representatives of your Government and have submitted reasonable formulas for the solution of the problem; this has not yet succeeded. I have the impression that the position (which I might say is inflexible) of the United States Government is due to a certain failure to understand our efforts and our desire to maintain international cooperation in this sector without, at the same time, sacrificing my country's budding export industry.

Therefore, I am addressing Your Excellency in order to request your personal intervention for the purpose of solving the problem, which will persist if the two principal parties are not willing to reconcile their positions as, for my part, I have attempted to do. The feeling about Brazil's problem is too keen for both of us to permit it to be prejudicial to our relations in other fields also. Furthermore, the fact that the economy of so many countries of this Hemisphere depends to a substantial extent on their coffee exports, even more than the economy of Brazil itself, is a circumstance that Your Excellency will certainly bear in mind just as I do, with respect to the survival of the Agreement.

I am confident of your understanding and practical spirit of conciliation

Faithfully yours,

[Signed]

A. Costa e Silva

INFORMATION

34

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
4:25 p.m.

for file

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's
account of the discussion at Walter Reed
Hospital yesterday with Gen. Eisenhower.

As indicated, I am already working
with Bill Leonhart on the possibility of
pre-empting rice buying in Cambodia.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 2.4(b)
White House, Dec 21, 1993
By 129, Hudd, Date 12-5-91



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

21 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Undoubtedly you have already had a report on much of the attached, reflecting the visit to General Eisenhower at Walter Reed yesterday of Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, General Wheeler and myself. However, it may be useful to have this record of the principal points raised and discussed.

1 Att
as


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, USA

DECLASSIFIED TO BE AS
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12812,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY hg ON 12-5-91

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

346

21 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 20 November 1967

A meeting was held with General Eisenhower at Walter Reed Hospital beginning at 4 P.M., on 20 November 1967. It lasted just over an hour and a half. Those visiting him were Ambassador Bunker, General Westmoreland, General Wheeler and myself.

Prior to the arrival of the others, I spent a few minutes with General Eisenhower giving him the answers that had been developed to several questions posed by him at the end of a meeting in Gettysburg on November 9. These were: How good are the SVN units; is economic life and commerce improving in SVN; and does General Westmoreland have the troops he needs to keep the initiative and react quickly? I provided the information as a preliminary response, noting that General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker would be able to give their impressions derived from on-the-spot experience. In addition, I left with General Eisenhower a brief chronology of principal steps in the development of our present operation and commitment in South Vietnam, extending back to 1950.

When General Wheeler, Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland arrived, the discussion took the form of responses and comments by Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland on questions and topics raised by General Eisenhower. The principal points follow:

First was how good the SVN units are. On the premise that the units reflect their commanders, General Westmoreland indicated that between 40 and 50% would be rated first-class, another 40 to 50% satisfactory, and the remaining 8 to 10% unsatisfactory. Six ARVN battalions have been awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation. These can be taken to be outstanding units in anyone's Army. On the question how the ARVN units are doing in the revolutionary

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLE MR 77-148 #2

By eg/ldk, NARA, Date 12-5-91

~~SECRET~~

development role, General Westmoreland said that progress is being made through training and orientation, though much remains to be done.

General Eisenhower next asked whether public enthusiasm and support is developing for our cause in South Vietnam. Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland answered, indicating that there has been a rise by very realistic standards--including the turnout for the election, and the amount of intelligence being forwarded to ARVN, U.S. and allied troops by the Vietnamese people.

General Eisenhower next asked General Westmoreland if he feels he has the troops that he needs, and specifically whether he ought not have a "corps of maneuver". General Westmoreland answered at length reviewing the buildup of U.S. forces from two years ago when combat elements had to go into an area lacking in ports, roads and logistic forces, enabled simply to keep the enemy off balance and denying him further gains, to the present time when our forces are taking the offensive, destroying the enemy and denying him effective results on the battlefield. Sometime next year, General Westmoreland foresees that he will be able to use the 1st Cavalry Division as an uncommitted reserve in the northern two corps, and the 101st in the southern two corps.

General Eisenhower expressed his concern over the existence of sanctuaries for the enemy in the Cambodia, Laos and north of the DMZ. He said he would see merit in an operation, possibly an amphibious operation, just north of the DMZ to sweep through the area and destroy the enemy forces there, including the enemy artillery. General Westmoreland said he has given study to such an operation, although no decisions have been made, and no authority sought to date. In further discussion of the fact that the Viet Cong and NVA seem to be obtaining a considerable portion of the food to support themselves through purchases of rice from Chinese merchants in Cambodia, General Eisenhower suggested that the possibility of preemptive buying ought to be examined. All present thought this was a suggestion that should be pursued. (I have phoned Mr. Rostow about this, and he has undertaken to look into it.)

There was a good deal of discussion of the problem of informing U.S. public opinion about the war and of problems relating to the TV and the press. During this discussion Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland referred to their comments on this matter


~~SECRET~~

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during their TV appearance last Sunday.

General Westmoreland showed General Eisenhower a series of data cards and graphs, covering indicators relating to various aspects of the war in Vietnam. General Eisenhower found these highly impressive, taking particular note of the chart on weapons losses, the significance of which was emphasized by General Westmoreland.

Also brought out during the discussion was the progress that has been made in opening up roads, railroads, and waterways, over which greatly increased commerce is now flowing. General Eisenhower found these statistics gratifying and encouraging.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
4:25 p.m.

Mr. President:

The attached situation report on Thai troop training is encouraging, so far as the Thai mood is concerned.

I shall have a check on our equipment arrival schedules.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rln

copy sent to Wm. Jorden: to follow thru.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 128 NARA, Date 12-29

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 21, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Thai Troop Contribution

35a
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-479
By clj, NARA, Date 4-5-95

Ambassador Unger met today with Foreign Minister Thanat in Bangkok.

In the course of the talk, Thanat volunteered that Unger could tell Washington that the departure date of the first new Thai units was contingent only on the date of receipt of the necessary arms to begin training. He said:

"The Royal Thai Army has every intention of proceeding as rapidly as possible in getting the new Thai forces in place and into action in South Vietnam, and the U. S. Government need have no concern about any procrastination on the Thai side."

This indication of the Thai mood is encouraging.

Bill
William J. Jorden

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
3:50 p.m.*Profile*

Mr. President:

Late on Monday, November 20, 1967, I had an hour's session alone with Amb. Bunker. I took him through exactly the same questions I took Westy, derived from Bob McNamara's memorandum. The results were as follows.

1. A bombing standdown in North Viet Nam except in the tactical area across the DMZ if they continue to press at the DMZ. Ellsworth talked speculatively about the problem around these three points:

-- He sees no reason to believe that a bombing stand down now would lead to serious negotiations, and he does not think we should trade bombing simply for talk;

-- He is, however, interested in the barrier and in SOUTHPAW (harassment on the ground in Laos) because he would like to put us in a position where we might put Hanoi to a test in the future with a bombing pause. Therefore, he feels it important that we get as good a grasp as we can on infiltration of Laos so that the costs of a pause designed to test Hanoi would be minimized.

2. Announce that our present U. S. troop ceilings are the limit of our commitment. Bunker is rather drawn to this proposition if we make it clear that an announced troop ceiling would assume that no one else would expand the war. He says that we are fighting a limited war for limited objectives and believes that we will not need more than 525,000 U. S. forces. He was not dogmatic on this point but, I would say, mildly favorable.

3. Forego ground operations in North Vietnam; Laos; and Cambodia. Bunker would make no statement committing us against such ground operations. His advice: keep them guessing. As for Laos, as indicated above, he actively supports SOUTHPAW.

4. No mining of Haiphong. Bunker is against mining the harbors. We are doing almost as well by hitting transport around Haiphong. The international complications are worth avoiding.

5. No attack on dikes. Bunker is against the attack on dikes because of the international political repercussions.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 85-316
By rg/af, NARA, Date 12-4-91

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-2-

6. Maintain progress with lesser U. S. casualties and destruction inside South Vietnam. Under this heading Bunker is worried about future operations in the Delta. He is afraid that an additional massive flow of refugees could turn the people of South Vietnam against us. He is skeptical of Komer's view that the refugees are churned up by enemy operations. He believes they are mainly trying to get away from our bombing. It is true that of 2 million refugees generated by the war, 638,000 have already gone back to their villages and another 600,000 have been resettled elsewhere. But he would like to see the total refugee number decline in 1968 and not increase. (I told Bunker that I had raised this question with the President and with Westy, so you would get a feel for it. I urged him to set down with Westy and make sure that the actual tactical plan Westy proposes to follow in the Delta would not generate excessive refugees, pointing out that Westy himself seemed sensitive on this point as well as on the need not to induce a decline in Delta rice production by his military operations.

7. Transfer functions to the ARVN. Bunker, is, of course, all for this; but he says we must go slow and steady. We should not shove at them more than they can absorb at any one time. Like Westy, he regards the build up of the political and military capacity of the South Vietnamese as a central task.

Coming back to Bob McNamara's two basic propositions -- about a new announced policy of stabilization and a bombing halt -- Bunker said in general we should refuse to put the war in a time frame. He has carefully separated his own language in this matter from Westy's. In any policy announcement it would be good to indicate that we expect the GVN to take over increasing military and nation building responsibility, but we must avoid giving them the feeling that we are pulling out and leaving them alone, or that we are relaxing in our effort to bring the war to a conclusion as rapidly as possible. In general, we must keep flexible and try to conduct the war with maximum imagination within accepted limits. Bunker's position on bombing is set out in paragraph 1, above.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

37

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
3:35 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Kosygin's latest letter,
plus Kohler's memorandum of conversation.

We shall have a suggested reply to
you by the time you arrive at the Ranch.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ng, NARA, Date 12-2-91

WWRostow:rlh

37a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By CL, NARA, Date 4-5-95

Rec'd 11/21/67

TRANSLATION

Dear Mr. President:

We have received your letter of 19 November and have studied it attentively. I wish to remind you that in your preceding letter of 23 October it was stated in the name of the Government of the United States of America that the position of the United States on the Middle East had not undergone change in comparison with that which had been set forth at the end of the extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

If your last reply does not mean a change in your position to the detriment of the victims of aggression - the Arab States - then evidently it is necessary to reach a mutual understanding, above all on two questions:

A. The immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories of the Arab States seized by them, that is, to the lines which they occupied before 5 June of this year should be in fact ensured.

B. Israel should not make territorial claims on the other side and exploit the situation which has developed as

the result of the war unleashed by them in order to take possession of foreign territories and change for its own benefit boundaries which actually existed before the conflict.

Without resolution of these problems there can be no permanent peace in the region of the Middle East in which both our countries should be interested.

It is understood that together with this there should be decided the question of immediate recognition of the rights of all states of this region to independent national existence in conditions of peace and security.

In the presence of such understanding we would not oppose the acceptance of the British Draft if, of course, it is acceptable to the Arabs.

We would like to receive from you an urgent reply.

Respectfully,

A. Kosygin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

376

DATE: November 21, 1967
2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT: Middle East

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR

Deputy Under Secretary Foy D. Kohler

FDK

COPIES TO:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-450
By cb, NARA, Date 1-17-95

Not long after he had returned to his Embassy from our discussion this morning, Ambassador Dobrynin called for an urgent appointment in the early afternoon. He came in at 2:15 p.m. He handed me an undated reply from Chairman Kosygin to the President's letter of November 19, relating to the Middle East crisis (original attached together with unofficial translation). The Ambassador said if it were at all possible for the American side to reply to this message today, this would enable the Soviet Government to get appropriate instructions to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov in New York prior to tomorrow's session of the UNSC.

I said that I would bring the letter immediately to the attention of the President and that we would do our best to have a quick response. I could not, however, make any commitment in this respect.

In a relatively brief discussion of this general subject, I cited the acceptance of the British resolution by the Arab States and wondered why the Soviets were trying to be more Arab than the Arabs themselves. Dobrynin replied that he did not question that the

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NODIS

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Jordanians had accepted the British resolution, but he was not so sure that the Egyptians had. However, he said that he was personally sure that if the Arabs really did accept the British resolution, the Soviets would not vote against it.

SECRET

NODIS

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
2:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms reports the active support of Representatives Mahon, Bow, Lipscomb, as well as Senators Russell and Milton Young, for continuing CIA support for RFE and Radio Liberty.

That still leaves us with the problem of a *public* formula to which we ought to address ourselves soon.

You will note that Dick has fully informed and consulted with Sec. Rusk.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-481
By ig, NARA, Date 1-24-96

WWRostow:rla

4416 38c
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

21 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. Per your request, I forward herewith a memorandum describing talks about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty with congressional leaders on the Appropriations Committees. You will note that I sent this memorandum to Secretary Rusk for his review since this problem of the radios falls within his sphere of responsibility.

2. When Secretary Rusk is ready, I would like to try to reach a resolution among us as to how we should proceed.

Dick
Richard Helms
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 94-482
By 48, NARA, Date 4-7-95

38b

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of THE SECRETARY

November 18, 1967

Mr. Helms -

The Secretary has asked me to tell you that the attached memorandum is completely satisfactory to him.


Andrew L. Steigman

Attachment:

Memorandum for the President
re Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty dated 14 November 1967.

NOV 20 1967
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

14 November 1967

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-482

By ig, NARA, Date 4-7-95

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. You will recall that at lunch on 17 October we discussed the future of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. At that time, you expressed a willingness for me to consult those leaders of Congress having to do with appropriations in an effort to establish whether or not they would be willing to continue appropriating money for these radios on the understanding that this would not constitute a request by you for this money or a charge against your congressional program.

2. As a result, I visited individually with five members of Congress: Representatives Mahon of Texas, Bow of Ohio, Lipscomb of California, and Senators Russell of Georgia and Milton Young of North Dakota. All five of these individuals expressed a willingness to support the radios financially in the round amount of \$30,000,000 per annum for at least the next fiscal year and possibly longer.

3. At my visit with each of these five individuals, I explained in detail the problem we have had in finding alternative means of financing these radios. I made it clear that a public relations problem still exists in terms of how the Administration explains the

continuation of the present financial arrangements. On the other hand, if there is no firm assurance of congressional support for the radios, there is no need to waste time on devising the right tactical approach to the press. I carefully underlined that I was there on my own since you wanted it clearly understood that you did not want to make a personal appeal for the money involved nor did you feel that you should be asked to plead for these radios as against other projects which you felt to be more essential. It was my distinct impression that each individual understood the terms of the discussion quite clearly.

4. ~~Congressman Mahon reacted to my presentation by saying that he had felt it had been a mistake to include the radios in the Katzenbach report and that he had always preferred to have them continue to operate as they had in the past.~~ He recognized the public relations problems but stated that it did not concern him unduly even if there were some criticism. (At this point, he made a disparaging reference to the influence of THE NEW YORK TIMES and told me "I never read Reston.") He then remarked that he thought the radios should be continued and that ~~he was prepared to help provide the necessary funds.~~ He pointed out, however, that Mr. Bow would have to agree and asked me to see both Mr. Bow and Mr. Lipscomb, the two Republican members of ~~his CIA Appropriations Subcommittee.~~

5. Representative Bow told me that he thought the radios were doing a good job and that they should be continued. He promised to help provide the money. In the course of our conversation, he pointed out that he was on the Appropriations Subcommittee which deals with USIA and that in his opinion it would make no sense to try to meld Radio Free Europe and/or Radio Liberty into the Voice of America organization. He indicated that he clearly understood the difference in the program content of the Voice of America on the one hand and the two "private" radios on the other. He concluded by opining that this was no time in history to reduce our efforts to bring about change behind the Iron Curtain.

6. Representative Lipscomb said that he was in favor of the radios and did not want to see them terminated. He volunteered to do what he could to have the money appropriated and asked a few questions about the amounts involved and how they were allocated. He accepted the fact that some admission of government support might have to be made. He stated that this would present "a tricky problem" in dealing with the press but did not anticipate widespread newspaper criticism.

7. Senator Russell expressed his support of the radios and said that he thought they ought to be continued at least for a time. He repeated what he has said before that he never could understand

what all the ruckus had been about. He pointed out that criticism over these subsidies had died out quickly after the initial flurry last winter. He indicated his willingness to help secure the money involved and ~~asked me to go see Senator Young and put the matter to him.~~ He authorized me to tell Senator Young that he favored continuing the radios.

8. When I met with Senator Young, ~~I told him that Senator Russell had asked me to see him, but I did not attempt to influence his decision by telling him in advance what Senator Russell's position was. He did not even inquire. He simply stated that he thought the radios should continue to operate and that he would do what he could to help as far as appropriations are concerned.~~ He expressed the opinion that the state of the world being what it was, ~~no useful efforts to deal with Communism or Communist ideology should be reduced.~~ He voiced concern that possibly not enough was being done in this area.

9. I have reported the above to Secretary Rusk. We will again raise with you shortly how we should proceed on this problem of handling Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

Dick

Richard Helms
Director

November 21, 1967

39
sent to DX to Ben Reed
S/S

To be inserted before last paragraph of reply to Kosygin:

see file

I am sure that we should not try to negotiate the details of a Middle East settlement ~~in the corridors and meeting halls of the United Nations.~~ *thousands of miles from the scene*
What we urgently need is a well-balanced resolution that would permit a United Nations representative to go to the area, listen to those directly concerned, reason with them, and find on the spot fair and equitable agreements with which these nations can live in peace and dignity.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By CLB, NARA, Date 4-5-95

ACTION

39a

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Pres

Sec. Rusk's draft reply does not answer the two Soviet questions; but then Kosygin had no right to put them.

The basic draft is Amb. Goldberg's who is, therefore, fully aboard.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

396

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you very much for your prompt reply to my letter of November 19. I, too, am responding promptly since the Security Council is scheduled to meet tomorrow afternoon to vote on the United Kingdom draft resolution. It is imperative in the interests of early progress toward peace that a constructive result be achieved at that meeting. The United States position on the Middle East has been consistent throughout. I explained our policy directly to you at Glassboro and I subsequently set it forth publicly in my statement of June 19. This statement continues to be the policy of the U.S.

Ambassador Goldberg set forth yesterday in the Security Council the United States position on the United Kingdom resolution. This resolution deals, in a balanced way, with essential ingredients for a just and lasting peace in the area, including withdrawal of Israeli armed forces. We consider the United Kingdom draft to be consistent with my statement of June 19 and will vote for it.

Moreover, we have been informed that the key Arab States principally concerned and Israel are willing to receive a United Nations representative on the basis of the United Kingdom draft. I am sure you will agree, Mr. Chairman, that the special representative is entitled not only to cooperation from the parties but to the full support of all the members of the Security Council, permanent and elected, as he undertakes his arduous and difficult peacemaking tasks. We are prepared to extend our diplomatic and political support to the efforts of the United Nations representative under the United Kingdom resolution

to achieve a fair and equitable settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security, and tranquility. I hope that your government will be prepared to do the same.

It is my considered view that we ~~ourselves~~ not let pass this opportunity to initiate the peacemaking process. I therefore express the hope that you can join the broad consensus of the Security Council by voting for the United Kingdom resolution tomorrow.

Sincerely yours,

INFORMATION

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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
11:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

Here is the log on your message to
Amb. Ed Clark (attached.)

I have not been able to ascertain the
exact time but the Australian announcement
that it would hold fast came after delivery of
your message.

I dictated message at about 8:20 p.m.

State transmitted it at 8:30 p.m.

Received at Canberra approximately
8:40 p.m.

Delivered to Prime Minister at 9:30 pm

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-479
By CL, NARA, Date 4-5-95

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy: CANBERRA FLASH **DECLASSIFIED**

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Info:

STATE 71853

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 94-479

By cb, NARA, Date 4-5-95

NODIS

Rostow

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR AMBASSADOR ED CLARK

The de-evaluation of the pound could spread elsewhere. It is of the highest importance to our common cause that Australia stand fast. I talked personally about this with Sato when he was here and the Japanese are holding steady. Malaysia and Singapore are holding as well. It is, therefore, all the more important that Australia not break the line.

Communicate immediately with Prime Minister Holt and tell him from me please to stand fast. Stop look and listen and count ten before moving. I know in my ~~heart~~ heart and mind that it would be most unwise for Australia to budge from the present ~~position~~ position.

END

RUSK

Drafted by: White XXXXXX House:WWRostow	Tel. Ext.	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. W. Walsh
Clearances:		

SECRET

INFORMATION

41

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
11:40 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith for your diary are
Ed Fried's clear, terse notes on
your November 18 leadership meeting
on the sterling devaluation and tax
increase.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AL 9 84-323
By sgldch, NARA, Date 12-4-91

412

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sunday, November 19, 1967

NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE LEADERSHIP

SUBJECT: Sterling Devaluation and the Need for Tax Increase --
November 18, 4:30 to 7:00 P.M.

PRESENT:

The President	Senator Mansfield	Speaker McCormack
Secretary Fowler	Senator Long	Representative Boggs
Chairman Martin	Senator Anderson	Representative Ullman
Under Secretary Barr		
Under Secretary Deming		
Budget Director Schultze		
Walt Rostow		
Joe Califano		
Ernest Goldstein		
Art Okun		
Ed Fried		

Secretary Fowler -- Discussed actions to be taken in defense of the dollar during present crisis.

- The President's statement -- designed to remove any uncertainty regarding U.S. intention to stand firm.
- Financial diplomacy -- getting all other major countries to hold their rates with us and prevent a chain reaction.
- Building confidence in the dollar through demonstrating fiscal responsibility and other constructive measures to improve the balance-of-payments position. Read concluding portion of statement he made at November 16 press conference announcing programs to strengthen U.S. balance of payments. Stressed that enactment of President's tax increase program at this Session of the Congress was the single most important and indispensable step the nation can take now to protect the dollar, safeguard the international monetary system, and stop the interest rate escalation that threatened our domestic and international position. The devaluation of the pound now brought the requirements for fiscal action and the tax increase into even sharper and more critical focus.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chairman Martin -- Stressed the great uncertainty that currently plagues the securities market and the cost it is exacting in higher interest rates. He cited recent examples: a Nova Scotia bond that required a 7 1/4% yield; postponement of the U.S. steel issue when financing was not obtainable at 6 3/8%; a Treasury 5 3/4% that sold below par.

Essential to stop and reverse the trend of accelerating deficits or inflation would get out of hand. Sterling devaluation complicated the situation and made it all the more important to restore a position of confidence -- which required evidence of fiscal responsibility.

Under Secretary Deming (The President said Deming had been sent to meetings in Paris during the week in an effort to mobilize a multilateral support operation to save the pound.)

Deming noted two points:

1. Situation in London was black; nobody wanted to see the pound go, but in the end they could not see any feasible alternative.
2. U.S. last year, in its financing operations, paid back \$11 billion to the market in the second half of the year. This year, we would only be able to put back 2 1/2 billion -- even with a tax increase. This tremendous swing from last year would greatly tighten credit conditions.

Under Secretary Barr -- In the credit crunch, the big fellows would manage to meet their requirements but the smaller borrowers, the institutions, and housing will get squeezed and suffer.

Director Schultze -- Discussed possible expenditure reductions totalling \$4 billion:

- \$1 3/4 billion Congress had already made or would make in the 14 appropriation bills (of which 12 already completed);
- \$2 1/4 billion Administration could make in withholding expenditures if Congress prepared to stand the pressure.

The President -- Prepared to cut actual expenditures by one dollar for each dollar of tax increase. Secretary Fowler had been ready to offer 4 different proposals to achieve this end to the Ways and Means Committee, but the Committee acted without giving him the opportunity to put these proposals before it.

We will rue the day if we fail to face up to these critical responsibilities. If we don't act now it will not be possible to undo the harm that will result. Every day's delay is costly.

He had had nine discussions with Chairman Mills.

He was trying to convince those members of the leadership he could -- but the President cannot act for the Congress. He was prepared to accommodate his views to theirs and to this end advance proposals for a cut of \$4 billion in expenditures.

Secretary Fowler -- Senator Williams had written him a letter on November 7, which he has not yet answered. The letter is essentially a campaign document designed to hurt the Democrats if it were answered under present circumstances. (Fowler read letter which made two central points.)

1. A tax increase bill has not been introduced in either House.
2. Uncertainty is causing financial disruption with serious consequences for the economy and our international position.

Senator Mansfield -- Williams' argument is spurious. There is no indecision on the part of the Administration -- it had constantly advanced its tax increase proposals.

Rep. Boggs -- Normal to work from proposals. Was willing, ready, able and happy to introduce bill.

Speaker McCormack -- Need for tax increase. In his view President not asking for big enough tax increase.

Secretary Fowler -- Read his proposed answer to Senator Williams with stress on concluding portion outlining Administration's new proposal to break deadlock between spending and tax powers of the Congress.

Package would:

- reduce administrative budget deficit by \$11 billion in Fiscal '68, and relieve credit market to this extent;
- increase income taxes of individuals by \$3.9 billion;
- reduce actual expenditures (counting actions taken by Congress on appropriation bills) by about \$4 billion;
- increase corporate tax receipts by \$3.1 billion (\$2.3 billion surtax -- \$.8 tax collection speedup).

Extending excise taxes could add \$.3 billion.

Stressed again that expert opinion overwhelmingly supported need for tax increase. Same with major organizations -- the Chamber of Commerce has now come around in support.

The President -- He had reviewed the answer to Williams and the new proposal yesterday with Mills in light of the pending sterling devaluation and its serious potential consequences. He told Mills he wanted to review it with other members of the leadership. (He noted other members who had been invited to today's meeting, but were not available.) Mills had been unable to stay in Washington over the weekend.

The President summarized the situation. He said the President cannot impose reductions on the Congress. He is prepared to act and to share responsibility with the Congress if the Congress is prepared to accept its share. He does not want to cut expenditures, but each day of inaction brings increased costs and makes the situation worse. It will lead to some slippage in revenues and to automatic increases in expenditures (higher interest costs, more farm loans, etc.).

The Mills-Ford line is hard to break. Of course the public does not favor tax increases. Nobody likes them. But the leadership must accept its responsibilities or face far more serious difficulties. If reductions in appropriations are not adequate and there is no tax increase, then it will be necessary to impound expenditures -- notably for highways, public works and other areas where the Congress will immediately feel repercussions. (He noted highway expenditures now were a billion dollars over any previous figure and were feeding inflation.)

But do we start or not? The President doesn't want to make the decision alone. Last year the leadership accepted the responsibility of impounding expenditures. If we have to make reductions they will be drastic and they will have to be made soon. This should be done with the full knowledge and approval of the leadership.

If we don't act soon, we will wreck the Republic. The President can't spend what the Congress does not appropriate. The Congress has now acted on appropriations, and now the President must act. He then reiterated the need for the proposed package of expenditure reductions and tax increases.

Rep. Ullman -- Said he favors a tax increase, but a tax increase could not solve the situation alone. When Schultze testified before the Ways and Means there were ambiguities in expenditure reduction proposals.

The President -- Cited instances where he had made clear the Administration was prepared to match tax increases and expenditure reductions dollar for dollar. He referred again to the Committee's unwillingness to hear Fowler's four alternative proposals to achieve this objective. He set the record straight on Schultze's testimony.

Rep. Ullman -- Sterling devaluation made this a new ball game. There is no point in recriminations. Said he believed there would be widespread repercussions on Monday throughout the economy. Repeated that he did not believe expenditure reductions had been adequately spelled out. But we should now try the new formula.

Secretary Fowler -- Reviewed formula again, together with proposal for President to set up special group to go over programs and prospective expenditure cuts.

The President -- Pointed to need for clearance from Government Operations Committee on \$4 billion expenditure reductions.

Rep. Ullman -- Important to try to put package together in next few days -- before Thanksgiving. The sterling crisis should be a vehicle for getting it done.

The President -- Asked for the views of the leadership on the proposal and on any alternatives they had to deal with the situation.

Senator Long -- Asked Rep. Ullman whether the Committee would report favorably on the tax bill without Mills' support. Answer -- probably not. Senator Long then said that Senator Talmadge doubted that the bill could be passed either in the House or the Senate. Said it would be even more difficult in the House, because the members had to run next year.

The President -- Said any action taken would be unpopular but it would have to be done.

Rep. Ullman -- The situation would be worse if we don't pass the tax bill. Unable to know the outcome beforehand.

Secretary Fowler -- Said it is essential to report out the bill and put it in the glare of domestic and international publicity. Then vote it up or down so everyone would know where each stood.

Rep. Ullman -- Said he would give every support he could.

The Speaker -- Made following points:

1. No tax bill is popular.

2. We are faced with desperate situation and the Congress is on trial.
3. He had personally taken public position in favor of tax bill.
4. It should be possible to get bipartisan support and to begin through action by Mills and Mahon.

Senator Long -- Reserved judgment on his own position but suggested following procedure to break impasse:

1. Sit down with as few people as possible.
2. Heart-to-heart talk between the President and Mills.
3. If the House sent the tax bill over, the Senate would take a look but he was not in favor of the expenditure reductions part of the package.

The President -- Said this was not facing facts and pointed again to the consequences of sterling devaluation.

Senator Long -- Repeated that it was important to get together with Mills, but said Mills could not lay down conditions on which he can't deliver.

Director Schultze -- Pointed out that the tax increase bill provided for \$7 billion during the remainder of this fiscal year, and \$12 billion over the next fiscal year. It was essential to keep the latter in mind.

The President -- Pointed out that the Defense budget for Fiscal '69 that had now been received came to \$98 billion. If Congress did not act on a tax increase, then it would be necessary to start thinking not about a \$4 billion expenditure cuts, but about cuts of many billions of dollars.

Rep. Boggs -- He had given thoughtful consideration to the possibilities of the bill. He pointed out that the Poverty Program had come out much better than anyone had guessed three weeks ago. His judgment is that if the Chairman supports the bill, it would be passed in the House.

Rep. Ullman -- If was necessary to talk to Mills not only about the situation this year, but next year as well, and the consequences of a \$98 billion Defense budget. Also said that Ways and Means cannot originate action on the bill where other Committees have jurisdiction. It's different when the President proposes the bill, and next year's situation is clearly critical. In his view, if the bill gets to the Floor, it will have bipartisan support, but Mills' approval is essential. Mills is critical of a tax

increase and his speech on Monday is in that vein but the speech does not close the door on action on a tax bill.

The President -- Asked when can we get the Committee to act.

Rep. Mahon -- The House voted by continuing resolution to cut expenditures by \$7 billion which was equivalent to a cut of \$14 billion in appropriations. In his view, expenditure cuts were worse than a tax increase.

The way to get a tax increase was for the President to stick his neck out and cut expenditures by \$4 billion -- even without a tax bill. The cuts should include programs which he considers among his best programs, e. g., Federal Aid to Education.

Mahon would then try to get his Committee to endorse those specific cuts.

He recognized the risk -- that the President would make cuts on his own and then end up without a tax bill.

Secretary Fowler -- Reviewed the formula proposal for making cuts under which responsibility would in fact be shared. (Use of either of the following, whichever is lower: (a) a cut of 2% in personnel and 10% in program; or (b) the difference between the original appropriation request for each program and what Congress appropriated.)

The President -- Stressed the need to work from the package proposal: the tax bill, the expenditure cuts (with the formula) and a review group. The need was to get the Committee to move now.

The consensus that emerged was to organize a meeting with the President Tuesday morning -- which was the earliest it would be possible to get Chairman Mills back to Washington. Speaker McCormack and Secretary Fowler would try to get in touch with Mills. Others at the meeting might include the Speaker, Representative Mahon, Senator Mansfield and Senator Long.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

42

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
11:35 a.m.

Free file

Mr. President:

Credit WWR's account with
one nickel.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

42a

WILLIAM S. WHITE

5264 Loughboro Road, NW
Washington, D. C.

November 20, 1967

Hon. Walt Rostow
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Walt:

I appreciated your tip about the Sato speech and I thank you for sending me a copy of it. The enclosed column (this one clip from the Philadelphia Inquirer) was one result of it.

Ever your friend,

W

William S. White

Japanese Premier Dissolves Last Alibi of War Dissenters

426

WASHINGTON.

THE main myths of the professional anti-Vietnam war faction are falling one by one, like the leaves of November, and one of the hardest of them all has now been sent fluttering down to earth by the Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato.

The new isolationists have long pushed as the central of all their arguments the claim that even if the visible aggression of Communist North Vietnam upon South Vietnam must be acknowledged to be what it plainly is, the United States is, nevertheless, supported out there only by these Asian nations that are its "client," or stooge, states.

This legend has, of course, always ignored the towering realities that such indisputably independent powers as Australia and New Zealand are among our fighting Allies. Still, there has been some mileage in it because other fighting Allies, like the Republics of Korea and of the Philippines, are indeed, "tied" to the United States in the sense that the American Government has dared to guarantee their safety from Communist encroachment.

The claim that such as these, plus Thailand, were only American "clients" could find some house room among those Americans willing to buy most any bill of goods if thereby it would promote their hopes for peace at any price in Vietnam.

Strips the Trump

But the trump card always played by the antiwar people has been Japan. Look, they have said over and over, at this, the only truly powerful industrial democracy in all Asia—look how Japan wisely rejects the American doctrine that if aggression is to be allowed to win in Vietnam it will win other and even more costly victories in Southeast Asia.

The fiction of a Japan not really concerned with this logic, and not really afraid of this threat, in a word, has been the last, best alibi of those who wish to find some means for American withdrawal from Vietnam under some kind of double-think formula by which surrender could be masked under other words.

But Sato, who presumably knows rather better how Japan

feels, has now given an answer which will compel the peaceniks to find yet other escape hatches, as so often they have done when other myths have been exploded in the cold, factual air of the world as it really is.

Having widely traveled in Asia before coming here, Prime Minister Sato publicly declares he found that "the United States' efforts in Vietnam were well understood and appreciated by the governments and peoples of the other Asian countries."

Calling the Roll

Having so long offered Japan as their arch model of the "independent," unconcerned, unthreatened, non-"client" state, can the peaceniks now consign it to the stooge category in which they are pleased to put the active Allies of this country in Vietnam?

One would hardly think so; and surely not in light of the fact that the distinctly liberal Sato has now joined the unarguably leftist, notably unbossed Socialist Prime Minister Lee of Singapore.

Lee in a recent visit here said much the same thing; but the Vietnicks shrugged him off as anyhow only the representative of a not very important Asian state.

So now let the roll be called honestly. Who in Asia accepts the heart of the American policy that Communist aggression is a real and present danger in Asia and must be checked, however hard and painful the effort? Well, Thailand does. South Vietnam—which really ought to know, considering the scores of thousands of its civilians who have been murdered by Communist infiltrators—does. The Republic of Korea does. The Republic of the Philippines does. Australia does. New Zealand does. Japan does. Indonesia does. Singapore does. Malaysia does.

Who doesn't? Communist North Vietnam doesn't. Red China doesn't. And India, then? Well, India for decades has clung to neutralism as though to holy writ; but even there the ablest of American correspondents report that India knows and feels what India does not dare say officially with a glowering Red China standing at its very gates.

Who imperils peace?

By Roscoe Drummond

Washington

It seems almost inconceivable that the Secretary of State of the United States, an influential Soviet commentator, a sharp American critic of the Vietnam war, the Prime Minister of Singapore, and the President of Tunisia should be saying the same thing on the same subject at almost the same time.

But they are.

Their remarkable consensus should do much to make convincingly clear why we are in Vietnam and to illumine the overriding reason.

These five world figures of otherwise diverse views — Dean Rusk, the late Ilya Ehrenberg, Lt. Gen. James M. Gavin, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, and President Habib Bourguiba — showed in separate public declarations over the past few months that they were in agreement on something profoundly crucial and revealing.

They were in agreement that the greatest threat to the peace of the world today is Red China.

When Secretary Rusk first began talking about the danger of the expansionist Chinese, who had already conquered Tibet and seized thousands of square miles of Indian territory, he noted that in the near future there would be "a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons."

The instant retort of the automatic Rusk critics, wary of his persuasiveness, was to try to immobilize him with the accusation that the Secretary of State was being racist. James Reston, Washington columnist of the New York Times, led the pack with the assertion that Rusk was recklessly invoking "the yellow peril." But this untrue and unfair accusation fell of its own lack of weight, and a few days later Mr. Reston publicly withdrew his comment.

But Ilya Ehrenburg, long one of the most influential and authoritative of the Soviet authors and journalists, did not deem it wise or safe to ignore the expansive nationalism of Red China under any circumstances. When he was interviewed by Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times in Moscow this summer, he used almost exactly the same words to describe exactly the same danger as Secretary Rusk.

"The root of the problem," Ehrenburg said, "is their population. They have so many people and the population continues to grow. The larger China gets, the greater the danger."

Mr. Salisbury found that many other highly placed Soviets took the same view and even "spoke of the danger of actual war between Russia and China."

And these words from retired General Gavin: "The real enemy in Southeast Asia

is Communist China. China is the power that is providing the means for Ho Chi Minh to fight."

President Bourguiba, speaking as the moderate leader of a North African Arab nation, is even more explicit.

"By inciting Hanoi to intransigence," he said, "China seeks nothing less than to confound its opposing Soviet brother, and to prove that guerrilla warfare can get the better of the American Army."

"The world would be in danger the day that . . . America decided to go back to her former isolationism. China would seize control of all the countries in the region and would wrest leadership of the Communist world from Moscow. And that would be the end of world peace."

"The North Vietnamese are mistaken about who their enemies are: those who incite them to fight the Americans are the very ones waiting for the moment to enslave them—the Chinese."

This is why Prime Minister Lee of Singapore joins in warning that unchecked Chinese expansionism imperils the independence of all the nations of Southeast Asia.

And this is why the United States is acting to halt Asian Communist expansion-by-force at the Vietnamese gate—to defeat aggression at its start in order to avert worse war under worse conditions with worse casualties.

~~SECRET~~*Pres file*

Tuesday, November 21, 1967 -- 8:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to go over this list of issues we shall confront in the weeks ahead, although decision is not required today:

- response to NLF proposal for longer cease-fires at Christmas, New Years, and Tet;
- Southpaw: ARVN operations inside Laos against enemy bases.
- What we do about Cambodian bases -- now surfaced.
- How we present order of battle statistics:
 - MACV is completing retrospective estimate, including previous underestimate of guerilla forces;
 - intelligence community in Washington has not done retrospective estimate;
 - danger is press will latch on to previous underestimate and revive credibility gap talk.

(My recommendation is that Gen. Westmoreland present new order of battle statistics in context of year-end review in Saigon of changing course of the war in 1967 as opposed to 1966 -- removing emphasis from statistics themselves.)

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 19By iss, NARS, Date 6-22-84

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

44

ACTION

Monday - November 20, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Appointment for Salvadorean President's Son

Stuart Morrison, Director of the privately operated (Copley Newspapers) exchange program "Operation Amigo", has sent us the attached letter from President Sanchez from El Salvador. President Sanchez informs you that his 15-year old son, Manuel Vicente, is in the United States travelling under the "Operation Amigo" program.

Morrison's ploy is to have you invite Manuel Sanchez to stop by as you did President Frei's son when he toured the US under "Operation Amigo" auspices earlier this year.

Would you be willing to see the boy for a few minutes when he passes through Washington? If you prefer not to, we can make polite excuses without injuring sensibilities.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

Letter of October 25, 1967 from El Salvadorean President

Will see him ____

Prefer not to ____

See me ____

*11/22/67
Jim Jones telephoned
Mr. Rostow & said
Pres. will see
Pres. Sanchez's son.
Wm. Bowden to
arrange time with
Jim Jones*

44a

Translation
of
Letter to President from Salvadorean President Fidel Sanchez Hernandez

(S E A L)

President
of the
Republic of El Salvador

San Salvador, October 25, 1967

His Excellency
Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Through Mr. Stuart Morrison, Director of "Operation Amigo", I have the honor of informing Your Excellency that my son, Manuel Vicente, will form part of a group of 25 students who under the sponsorship of "Operation Amigo" will travel to San Diego, California, on November 7, by invitation of "Copley Newspapers".

I am very pleased that my son is a part of this program which has made possible for 400 Salvadorean youths to visit different places in the United States of America under the sponsorship of this magnificent operation which promotes the ties of friendship between our people.

With personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

/s/ Fidel Sanchez Hernandez
President of El Salvador

Limited Official Use

Monday - November 20, 1967

45
ACTION

Pres. file

11/21/67

Mr. Bowdler
telephoned
S/S

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Issues Raised by Jamaican Prime Minister Shearer

During Prime Minister Shearer's visit last month he raised two matters:

Jim Jones
telephoned
okay to Mr. Boston
Mr. Boston not to
on Bowdler

- more AID concessionary lending to Jamaica.
- continuation of PL 480 assistance.

You asked that we look into what we might do to help.

This is where we come out after careful review:

AID Concessionary Lending

In recent years Jamaica has been a member of the club of countries -- along with West Germany, Japan, Israel and Mexico which have maintained a high level of economic growth: over 7% per annum. It has done so largely through substantial private domestic and foreign investment. Jamaica's problem is, therefore, not to achieve a high growth rate but to maintain the current level.

The two weak spots in the Jamaican economy are unemployment and low agricultural production. To help in these areas, AID has programmed \$3 million for FY 1968 and \$6 million in FY 1969, in development loans, technical assistance and PL 480.

Jamaica's political stability, the rate of domestic and foreign private investment and generally favorable economic position, does not justify AID putting a lot of "soft" money into the island. With the cuts in foreign aid, other countries will have a higher claim on scarce resources.

Nevertheless, AID is prepared to consider, subject to the availability of funds, loans which will enable or induce Jamaica to undertake reforms of real significance, particularly in education and agriculture. These loans would be on terms concessionary enough to make the reforms attractive but also tailored to Jamaica's economic capacity.

While this is not as forthcoming as the Jamaicans might wish, it is the only position appropriate to AID's status as a lender of last resort and to Jamaica's economic position.

PL 480 Assistance

Prime Minister Shearer left the impression that we were drastically cutting back on PL 480 assistance. This is not the case. (See Tab B for amount and value figures). What has taken place over the past 18 months is a shift away from dole-type feeding of adult indigents to maternal and child feeding. This is in line with your letter to Prime Minister Bustamante in August 1966 (Tab C).

The shift was for two reasons:

- a policy decision last year to give a higher priority to productive food programs like child-maternal feeding.
- the determination of the voluntary agencies in Jamaica to get out of indigent feeding because of the serious difficulties in administering the program.

The phase-down on indigent feeding will be completed by June 30, 1968. It was done over a two-year period to cushion the effect. The Jamaican Government knows of the target date.

While AID is not prepared to resume the indigent feeding program, because of the unhappy past experience, it is willing to expand child-maternal welfare feeding if the Jamaican Government requests it.

I recommend that the response to Prime Minister Shearer be handled by State along the lines of the proposed telegram at Tab A.

W. W. Rostow

Telegram OK _____

Hold up, see me _____.

Attachments - Tabs A, B & C.

A 45a
Limited Official Use

Proposed Joint State/AID Message to American Embassy Kingston

SUBJECT: Matters raised by Prime Minister Shearer in Washington
on October 13, 1967

1. As reported earlier, Shearer raised two matters in Washington:
 - a. AID concessionary loans for Jamaica.
 - b. the level of PL 480 assistance.
2. Informing Prime Minister Shearer that you are acting upon Washington instructions, Embassy/USAID should discuss items a and b. with him along the following lines:
 - a. Within availability of AID funds and taking into account the fact that AID is by statute lender of last resort, AID is prepared to discuss with Jamaican Government limited number of developments loans which could have the effect of enabling Jamaica to take high priority actions having significant effect in accelerating Jamaican development. Terms of such loans, while concessionary, would be negotiated in light of particular purposes and in light of Jamaica's favorable economic situation.

- b. Given compelling reasons which lead US to assign highest priority to school, child, and maternal feeding on world-wide basis we are not prepared to abandon plans for orderly phaseout of dole-type feeding of adult indigents. US is, however, prepared consider further enlargement of child-maternal welfare feeding programs if requested by Jamaican Government.
3. Please reiterate to Prime Minister Shearer that President Johnson was pleased to have had an opportunity to talk with Shearer and that President Johnson renews his best wishes to Shearer and to Jamaican people.
4. For your guidance: In discussing paragraph 2-a, above, with Jamaicans, please be careful to convey to them a clear sense that AID cannot necessarily be expected make any loan in any particular year. Furthermore, AID must be highly selective with regard to projects proposed and would be unwilling to consider particular proposals which in AID's opinion have only minimal development significance.

B
456PL 480 ProgramsJAMAICA

FY 1966 (Title III)	Supplied	16,970,000 lbs.
	CCC Value	\$1,559,000

Recipients:

Maternal and child feeding	202,900
Other	<u>70,245</u>
Total	273,145

FY 1967 (Title III)	Approved	16,137,000 lbs.
	CCC Value	\$1,504,000

Recipients:

Maternal and child feeding	201,860
Other	<u>46,880</u>
Total	248,740

FY 1968 (Title III)	Approved	4,932,000 lbs.
	CCC Value	\$331,000

(Title II)	Approved	9,050,000 lbs.
	CCC Value	\$1,545,000

Totals	Approved	13,982,000 lbs.
	CCC Value	\$1,876,000

Recipients:

Maternal and child feeding	231,200
Other	<u>26,950</u>
Total	258,150

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 18, 1966

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-479
By cl, NARA, Date 4-5-95

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciate the frankness with which you have written me concerning our Food for Peace Program in Jamaica.


As was explained to your Acting Prime Minister when he was in Washington last month, increasing world demands for food have sharply reduced our existing food surplus. In order that adequate assistance may be made available to programs benefiting the children of the world, the group most vulnerable to malnutrition and most dependent on the help of others, we have made a decision to give lowest priority to family feeding type programs. This policy is being applied world-wide. As you point out in your letter, the shift from a family feeding program to assistance to children in Jamaica will take place gradually so as not to cause undue hardships.

I understand that representatives of our two countries have already discussed the possibility of expanding the school luncheon and maternal child welfare programs. We would be pleased to consider proposals for additional commodity assistance for programs of this type. If we can agree on such proposals, there is no reason why the existing level of food commodity assistance to Jamaica cannot continue and possibly expand.

Again, Mr. Prime Minister, I thank you for the confidence with which you have written me. It is a measure of the deep and long-standing good-will which exists between our two countries.

I send you best wishes for your continued good health and happiness.

Sincerely,



The Right Honorable
Sir William Alexander Bustamante
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs
of Jamaica
Kingston.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 769 85-316
By ng/wsp, NARA, Date 12-4-91

SECRET

Monday, November 20, 1967

Free file

Mr. President:

I could not get Westmoreland and Bunker together because of Bunker's schedule today, but I had a good lunch in my office with Westy and put to him the key propositions in Bob McNamara's memorandum.

1. A bombing stand down in North Viet Nam except in the tactical area across the DMZ if they continue to press at the DMZ. He was against such a policy. Effective bombing operations against the logistical system requires pressure throughout that system, from the Chinese Communist border all the way south. He wants to keep the northeast railway lines cut or harassed; he wants to continue complicated shipments out of Haiphong to Hanoi and south. He wants to keep destroying the temporary bridges which they put in.

When I pressed him on the question of Hanoi-Haiphong area, he said: bombing south of the 20th parallel is "absolutely essential." He would prefer to see bombing continued all the way to the Chinese Communist border.

2. Announce that our present U.S. troop ceilings are the limit of our commitment. He said that in one sense the issue is academic because they will not all be there for a year; although he is satisfied that the present troop shipment schedule is as tight as it can be. On television he said he would pass judgment on the adequacy of the troop level at the time when the 525,000 are in place. He believes it would be "foolish" to announce now that 525,000 is our limit, although obviously we hope that it will prove to be the maximum requirement.

3. Forego ground operations in North Vietnam; Laos; and Cambodia. With respect to North Vietnam, he would like for us to have the capability to raid North Vietnam in force above the DMZ in May-June of next year -- the earliest time that might be technically possible. He is not now recommending such an operation; but he thinks it important that we have such an option if our DMZ position requires it at that time.

With respect to Laos, he has been discussing with Bob McNamara some very limited operations by South Vietnamese forces, which would get at certain critical base areas now being used in Laos to support operations against us in the highlands. In addition, there is an area in southeast Laos which is used as a rocket storage base which he would like to get at come next March, again with South Vietnamese troops. These would be raid operations designed to make the enemy uncertain of his sanctuary. Therefore, although a formal recommendation

—SECRET—

~~SECRET~~

-2-

has not yet come to us from him, he would not like us flatly to rule out the possibility of some limited raiding operations in Laos.

With respect to Cambodia, he is sensitive, of course, to the political problem. He believes there are "dozens even hundreds" of VC bases of the kind just discovered by the press inside Cambodia. Again, he is not now recommending any Cambodian operations but he does not wish to see them flatly ruled out.

4. No mining of Haiphong. He thinks we ought to make a maximum effort to throttle the flow of supplies from Haiphong into the country, but believes our present efforts to harass and isolate Haiphong are quite effective; and he understands well that they involve less risk than mining or attacking Soviet ships. Therefore, he is not recommending an attack on Haiphong harbor.

5. No attack on dikes. He is not at all sure the Air Force has a realistic capability for destroying the dikes; and the effort to destroy them would raise tremendous political problems. He does not recommend, therefore, an attack on the dikes.

6. Maintain progress with lesser U.S. casualties and destruction inside South Vietnam. Westy's reply to this point was, simply, that is his "constant endeavor." Every operation is undertaken with a view to minimizing our own and South Vietnamese civil casualties. On the other hand, he cannot permit his tactical operations to be controlled by these criteria. In this context, he noted that certain technical devices now coming into use would tend to make our bombing attacks in South Vietnam more accurate and otherwise help to limit casualties.

7. Transfer functions to the ARVN. Over the next two years this is Westy's central purpose. Elements in a program have been studied; but a mature operational program to transfer functions does not yet exist. One reason for his statements in the U.S. about the ARVN and the U.S. phase down within two years is to give him leverage, when he goes back, to both elevate the South Vietnamese -- by recalling the confidence he showed in them in the U.S. -- and to pressure them in the direction of better performance and more responsibility. He is extremely conscious that one of our tasks is not merely to achieve our immediate purpose in Vietnam but to leave behind a military establishment capable of looking after itself increasingly.

With respect to Bob McNamara's two central propositions, then:

-- Westy is against a new announced program of stabilization, although he does not now envisage more U.S. troops and actively wishes to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

see the ARVN take over more functions;

-- He is flatly against a bombing stand down for reasons set out in paragraph 1, above.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

47

Monday, November 20, 1967
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Wheeler thanks
you on behalf of the JCS over the
Veterans Day week end.

W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow:rlh

Monday,
November 20, 1967

48
Profile

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Thai Prime Minister

Following up on your instructions, we have redone the proposed letter to the Thai Prime Minister. The note of urgency which you suggested is contained in the new second paragraph. This, I think, should do it. State has approved this text.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Text approved _____

Text disapproved _____

See me _____

November 20, 1967

48a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have learned with great satisfaction of your Government's decision to send a division of Thai troops to Viet-Nam. In your letter to me of September 21, you noted that Thailand had never felt more conscious of its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia. I congratulate you on your Government's present action, which demonstrates to the world how seriously Thailand regards its responsibilities. It also shows that Thailand recognizes the aggression against South Viet-Nam as a threat to Thailand and to the entire region of Southeast Asia.

As you know, in response to General Westmoreland's request, we have raised the level of United States forces in Viet-Nam to 525,000 men and are making every effort to deploy these troops to the field as rapidly as possible. I hope that for your part, it would be possible to dispatch your most welcome contribution to Viet-Nam at the earliest possible date. Ambassador Unger and General McCown are prepared to render any necessary assistance in this connection.

I am aware of your concern over the threat to your security from Communist activities within your borders. As you know, we are continuing to seek ways to assist you in meeting this problem.

Sincerely,

J. Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn
Prime Minister of Thailand
Government House
Bangkok

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-479
By 06, NARA, Date 4-5-95

LBJ:WJJorden:pas:11/20/67

49
ACTION

Monday - November 20, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Reply to Telegram from President Leoni of Venezuela

On November 1 President Leoni sent you a cable (Tab B) expressing concern over the protectionist bills pending in the Congress and complaining that we had not done enough, pursuant to the Punta del Este talks, to help Venezuela on petroleum exports.

We do not know whether President Leoni's complaint reflects unawareness of what we have done on Venezuelan oil since Punta del Este or simply continued unhappiness that we do not give Venezuela the preferential treatment he wants.

The steps we have taken in recent years to assure Venezuela participation in the growth of our market are:

1. made the Canadians limit their oil exports to the US through 1971, which assures a small increase for off-shore suppliers but more importantly protects them from a reduction which was inevitable from the unchecked Canadian exports.
2. established a high level for petroleum product purchases by our defense establishment from Caribbean sources.
3. required Puerto Rican refineries and petro-chemical facilities to use crude and feedstocks produced in this hemisphere.
4. removed import restrictions on residual, including no. four fuel oil.
5. placed no restrictions on imports of bonded jet fuel.

Of these five steps, the two producing the greatest benefit for Venezuela (nos. 1 and 4) were taken following your talks with President Leoni at Punta del Este.

At Punta del Este you also mentioned our willingness to help on desulfurization and to increase asphalt imports. We are doing the former. On the latter, Secretary Udall has run into difficulties, but the amount of the possible increase is so small that the Venezuelans have lost interest in it.

State has prepared the proposed reply at Tab A, which lists the five steps mentioned above and notes the technical level talks now underway on a limited Western Hemisphere preference which Tony Solomon advanced two years ago and the Venezuelans at that time turned down as inadequate. They are now interested in reviving the proposal.

I recommend you sign the letter. (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Tab A - Proposed letter to President Leoni.

Tab B - Telegram from President Leoni, November 3, 1967.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____.

49a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 74-479
By CB, NARA, Date 4-5-95

NOV 21 1967

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for the telegram of November 1 in which you expressed your concern over the possibility of action by the United States Congress to restrict imports into this country. As you know, I have publicly expressed my opposition to these legislative proposals because of the unfortunate effects they will have on the vital interest of my country in foreign trade, as well as our interest in the welfare of our trading partners.

Concerning the specific problem of the petroleum trade between our countries, I am happy that we have made real progress toward the goals we discussed at Punta del Este. Since my letter to you of August 8, we have advanced to an understanding with the Government of Canada by which it has agreed to limit its oil exports to the United States through 1971. On the question of what follows 1971, the Government of Canada is aware of our intention to re-examine our understanding with them at that time. Thus, despite the difficulties of negotiation, I believe that we have obtained a reasonable understanding with Canada which will assure participation by Venezuela and other off-shore suppliers in the growth of our market, as we undertook to do at Punta del Este.

In addition to the measures we discussed at Punta del Este, my government has found other ways of improving Venezuela's opportunity to share in United States market growth whenever it is politically and economically feasible. Taking the picture as a whole, a considerable number of measures have been taken of benefit to Venezuela. The Department of Defense has established a

high level for petroleum product purchases from Caribbean sources. The petroleum refineries and petrochemical facilities in Puerto Rico have been required to utilize crude oil and feedstocks produced in this hemisphere. You are aware of our action to grant freely licenses for the import of residual fuel oil, including number four fuel oil. Our imports of bonded jet fuel, which represent an expanding market for Venezuela, are not restricted by the import program. We will continue these and other efforts, and although it may not be possible fully to satisfy Venezuela's aspirations, our information is that the outlook for overall Venezuelan oil exports in 1967, and exports to the United States in 1968, is excellent.

The meetings between my Secretaries of State and Interior and your Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons at the end of October, and the technical talks between their staffs which have followed, were welcomed by my government as in the spirit of these efforts. I am confident that through these frank and friendly discussions we will continue to seek ways and means within the context of our oil imports program toward strengthening the Venezuelan position in the United States market and the traditionally close relations between our two countries.

With my personal best wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Raul Leoni Otero
President of the Republic of Venezuela

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm
11/20/67

50

ACTION

Pres file

Monday, November 20, 1967

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a warm congratulatory message to the President of Finland on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Finnish independence on December 6. The message will accompany a map case which State feels will be an appropriate U.S. gift.

W. W. Rostow

RHU
RHU:em

50a

November 21, 1967

Dear Mr. President:

As Finland enters its second half-century of independence, the American nation joins with me in extending to you and to the people of Finland our warm congratulations.

Our two countries share national goals of liberty, peace, and economic and social justice. We share a common dedication to free and democratic government as a means of achieving these goals. These are strong bonds, and they will, I know, serve in the future, as they have in the past, to strengthen the friendship which has so happily characterized our relations.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Urho Kekkonen
President of the
Republic of Finland

LBJ:RHU:em (11/21/67)

RM

Monday, November 20, 1967--4:00pm

51

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a proposed letter to Pakistani President Ayub on the Mangla Dam dedication (November 23).

For file

Each delegation will be carrying a congratulatory message from its head of state. Governor Harriman would like to read your letter during his remarks at the dedication, and then hand the signed original to Ayub. This will give us much more mileage than a routine message sent by telegram.

Harriman and his delegation leave tomorrow morning.

W. W. Rostow

ww R
51a
/

NOV 20 1967

Dear Mr. President:

There are many monuments to the energy, imagination and hard work of the people of Pakistan. But none is greater than the achievement you celebrate today. The dam at Mangla fulfills man's oldest and most noble dream: to harness nature for the lasting benefit of all.

Mangla has been called -- and justly so -- a model of development projects. It is a triumph of human skill and humane purpose. Its one million kilowatts of light and power will brighten the lives of tens of millions. Its vast irrigation waters will enrich countless fields and farms. In the building, Mangla has become a model of organization and management which will be followed wherever man seeks to cast out the darkness of poverty and despair.

Yet, Mr. President, you dedicate today something even greater than a feat of engineering and good planning. For Mangla is also an inspiring example of international cooperation. It is the work of many nations -- impressive proof that our common purpose is best served by common action.

I know this is an immensely proud and joyous day for you and for the people of Pakistan. The United States is proud to have had a part in your achievement. All Americans share your joy.

With hearty congratulations and warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Lady Bird & I often think of you and wish for you the best in life.

His Excellency

Mohammad Ayub Khan, H. Pk., H. J.

President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Rawalpindi

LBJ/EKH/RPM/vmr

11/20/67

57c
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Embassy Lima's 2212, November 12, 1967

Subject: Military Aircraft

1. Washington Star correspondent Jerry O'Leary has informed Embassy officers of his November 10 interview with Peruvian War Minister Doig. According to O'Leary, Doig appears far less emotional and more reasonable in his approach to problems arising from the Mirage purchase by the Government of Peru. O'Leary gained the impression that Doig believed there might still be room for negotiation. Surprisingly, Doig referred to a previous instance in which the Peruvians had backtracked on contracts with the French. Doig recalled that Peru had switched to US helicopters after an earlier commitment to the French once the United States had reversed its policy on helicopter sales. Doig also went out of his way to praise General Harold K. Johnson, United States Army Chief of Staff, who, Doig said, is a firm and understanding friend. In this connection, Doig recalled General Johnson's assistance in helping the Peruvian Army to obtain 105 mm. howitzers. O'Leary, although unsure as to how much effective influence Doig could exercise over Peruvian Air Force Chief General Gagliardi, believes that with Doig, there is still room for maneuver on the Mirage/F-5 question while he gained the opposite impression from his conversation with General Gagliardi.
2. Doig mentioned his concern (or unspecified reasons) over the Ecuadorian threat to Peru.
3. O'Leary also reports that at the conclusion of the interview he queried Doig directly on published accounts that Doig is being singled out as the most probable leader of a military coup should the internal situation in Peru continue to deteriorate. Doig treated the question with humor and made the point that the Peruvian Military is now a professional institution unlike the situation existing previously when "twenty or thirty" military interventions had occurred.

INFORMATION

52

Tuesday, November 21, 1967
2:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will wish to see this dignified
and gracious response to your letter
to Mrs. Gustav Hertz.

W. W. Rostow

53

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 20, 1967
2:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

I have done the agenda this time
as far as possible guide to your handling
tomorrow's breakfast.

W. W. Rostow

P.S. The attached summary of
everyone's priority lists may interest
you.

W. W. R.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rlg, NARA, Date 12-3-91

~~SECRET~~

53a

Breakfast Meeting With the President
Tuesday, November 21, 1967, 8:30 a.m.

AGENDA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-479
By CG, NARA, Date 4-5-95

I. Priorities. (The President)

Are we agreed on priorities:

1. Get U.S. and other additional forces into the field as fast as possible.
2. Improve the ARVN (as well as Regular Forces and Popular Forces) and find ways of getting that improvement reported effectively.
3. Move the GVN forward visibly and as effectively as possible in anti-corruption campaign, including increased tax collections for higher salaries.
4. Get everything needed to make Komer's operation work: advisers, prisons, resources for roads, people, etc.
5. Do all we can to make government work and to develop effective and constructive relations between Executive Branch and the two legislative houses, including emergence of as big a government political party as possible.
6. Press Thieu into the most forthcoming position possible on ^{reconciliation} ~~reconstruction~~ and negotiations, including negotiating contacts with NLF.
7. Make the economic stabilization program work; encourage rural and urban development; encourage work on long-range development planning.

Above all, the Vietnamese, by what they do -- even if it is limited -- must gradually emerge towards the center of the stage.

(You may wish to ask for comments on this view from: Bunker, Westmoreland, Komer; and then Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara.)

II. Information Policy in Saigon. (The President)

- Ask Bunker when he will make a recommendation on Zorthian's successor.
- Ask Bunker and Westmoreland when they plan joint TV briefing.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

-- Urge all three to pick one subject at a time and give Saigon press so factual and persuasive a briefing it can't be ignored; for example, an increasing ARVN ability and willingness to fight at night.

-- Remember the main front is here in the U. S. -- on this Hanoi and Washington agree. And the U. S. front is primarily affected by what the Saigon press corps and TV crews file.

III. Momentum. (The President)

We are all aware that the Vietnamese have limited capacity and must concentrate on a narrow front; therefore, our approach to them must be in terms of clear priorities.

The same holds for us; for example, AID must be concentrated and reduced in activities other than pacification.

But within those priorities we must drive hard to gather momentum -- that is the key to support at home and the confidence the Vietnamese need to take over increasingly.

IV. Loose Ends. (The President)

You may wish to go around the table and ask each one if there are any specific matters that were not settled during the week and require follow-up.

V. BUTTERCUP.

You may wish to ask Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara, plus Amb. Bunker, to withdraw for a brief discussion of the next stage of BUTTERCUP.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PROPOSED PRIORITIES - SHORT TERM (6 MONTHS)

53-b

Mission (Saigon 9096)

G. V. N.

State Department

1. Mobilization measures
 - a. Lowering draft age
 - b. extending service
 - c. recalling certain personnel
2. Reorganization of RVNAF
 - a. leadership training
 - b. improved logistics
 - c. morale services, Veterans programs
3. Reorganization of Civilian Administration
 - a. pay scales
 - b. improved training
 - c. increased flexibility and responsibility for province chiefs (e.g. reduced interference in civil and pacification matters by Corps & Division Commanders)
4. Vital Pacification Measures in Addition to Above
 - a. attack on VC infrastructure
 - b. expanded detention centers and related judicial measures
5. Attack on Corruption at All Levels
6. Economic Stabilization Measures
 - a. Increased taxes, particularly gas
 - b. Increased U.S. Rice Price
7. Peace to include willingness to seek peaceful settlement, seek out members of NLF and move towards reintegration through National Reconciliation

Peace, Democracy, Reform

1. Move toward negotiations
 - a. Approach to Hanoi
 - b. Mediation of other countries
2. Social
 - a. Attack on corruption
 - b. Reform admin. organization
 - c. Improve public services - water, electricity, transportation, public health, urban services
 - d. Protection of morals, juvenile delinquency
3. Economic stabilization
4. Restoration of order and national discipline
5. Youth - Encouragement to take part in civic actions
6. Austerity - Reduce gap between countryside & affluent cities

1. Anti-corruption
2. ARVN improvement
3. Anti-infrastructure
4. Building political institutions
5. Economic stabilization Program
6. National Reconciliation (Peace and negotiations) (Proper Military Stance)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-479

By CG, NARA, Date 4-5-95

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

JCS

1. Attack on VC infrastructure
2. Increased use of ARVN in integrated operations with US forces
3. Active area security and ARVN search and destroy against provincial battalions
4. Supplementing RD effort with locally trained teams
5. Additional US advisors for RF and PF
6. Opening and security of lines of communication
7. Various economic programs including universal elementary education, land reform and agricultural productivity

Komer (Top Pacification Priorities)

1. Attack on VC infrastructure
2. All-out effort to improve RF/PF
3. Reopen and upgrade key roads and waterways
4. RVNAF reorganization
 - a. improve territorial security
 - b. stronger role to Province Chiefs
5. Revivify Chieu Hoi Program
6. Step up refugee care, particularly in I Corps
7. Revamp and expand National Police with emphasis on Special Branch and Police Field in attack on VC infrastructure, refining of resources control and reducing corruption.
8. Improve RD teams and supplement them with other resources to reinforce local authorities

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 20, 1967 -- 2:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Report from your amateur but aspiring salesman.

I think I can claim a share in the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT story on Vietnam, pages 50-51, and urging use of full text of Sato speech, pages 55-56.

I suspect Jack Sutherland also had a hand in the item on page 61.

BUSINESS WEEK. The Vietnam story, pages 35-36.

NEWSWEEK, via Elfin and Christopher, the stories on Vietnam, pages 36-41, and the Sato story, pages 49-50.

Although with Christopher I underlined the consequences of getting out of Vietnam, I confess a failure in persuading him to take the simple view that Southeast Asia has for long been regarded as a major U.S. direct security interest and that we were simply following through on it. He preferred to stay with the view which he arrived in my office; namely, that you can argue about whether our interest in Southeast Asia is vital; but there is no doubt about the cost of our getting out now.

I would also add this: It was an easy week, basically, with Sato, Bunker, Westmoreland, and a glorious press conference by the President.

W. W. Rostow

WW Rostow:rln

RICHARD WILSON

Sato Visit to U.S. Enhances Vision of Pacific Era

It is no exaggeration to say that President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato got along well. This marks a maturity of Japanese-American postwar relations which unquestionably will prove to be great of significance in what some people at the White House call the Pacific era.

Our relations with Japan are probably better than with England. We are becoming closer associated in Asia with a nation which will soon become the world's third greatest industrial power, exceeded only by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Sato blasted the myth that no major nation identifies with the United States in Vietnam. Japan's material aid to Vietnam will be increased. Japan will take greater risks in the operations of the Asian bank. Sato could act with confidence

in these matters because the government's measures of opinion in Japan show 70 percent back America's actions in Vietnam.

Japan has a noisy, headline-grabbing minority just like the United States, and just as prone to violence. But the underlying support for what Sato represents is strong. Japan has a way to go yet in raising its standard of living to the American and Western European level, but it is on its way.

Japan also will have to mature more in the ways of the real world before Okinawa and the Ryukus can be returned to her. This involves recognizing the necessity of U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons on Japanese bases, as is the case in West Germany.

The atomic-powered aircraft carrier, Enterprise, will soon make a journey to Japan to illustrate that nuclear energy has other purposes than to ob-

literate Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But it will be some years before the constitutional changes can be made and the public attitude altered to fit the realities of modern Japan confronted by Chinese nuclear rockets.

Few people in America yet have Johnson's vision of the Pacific era. The country as a whole was not responsive to his Asian trip last year. Korea's spurt forward arouses little interest in this country. Japan's steady climb to industrial eminence is more visible here in the form of the Sony electronic products and the new Japanese automobiles.

Japan is interested not only in America but in cooperation with the Soviet Union in the industrial development of Siberia.

All these matters are more real at the White House than with the American public at large. Australia's political reorientation toward America,

rather than England, as illustrated by Prime Minister Holt's frequent intimate visits with Johnson, is another factor in the White House vision of the Pacific era. Australia for the first time considers herself a part of Asia. Her trade with Japan is now greater than with England.

The alignment with Johnson's aims of the scrappy prime minister of Singapore, the new found compatibility with Indonesia, the modification in the attitude of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia—all these things, too, are part of the vision of the Pacific era.

In that vision the war in Vietnam appears crucial. Without the protection of a freely chosen government in South Vietnam the Pacific vision fades into rhetoric. Johnson's critics would like to have it remain there. They do not believe in the Pacific vision. They consider it quixotic and unreal.

The rest of the country does not even understand it. The fighting in Vietnam is far off and limited in scope, and supported as stopping the advance of communism. The war is not seen in its true frame as guaranteeing eventual Asian regional cooperation with the United States playing a leading, fraternal and profitable part.

Johnson's vision races some years into the future and beyond the final settlement of the Vietnam war to the time when a more tractable China can play its part in regional Asian cooperation along with North Vietnam.

The Sato visit did nothing to destroy the Pacific vision but enhanced it greatly. The Japanese have much to gain from the Pacific vision and so does South Vietnam and North Vietnam as well.

55

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, November 20, 1967
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

The first two summary pages
of this N. I. E. may interest -- but
nbt surprise -- you.

W. W. Rostow

NIE 22-1-67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By AB, NARA, Date 12-3-91

WWRostow:rln

ACTION

56

Monday, November 20, 1967
11:35 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

At. Mrs. Johnson's request
Elspeth paid some particular attention
to Mr. Hugh Bullock at dinner the other
night. One result is the attached
invitation.

Should I accept?

W. W. Rostow

Yes ☒
No
See me

WWRostow:rlh



CALVIN BULLOCK FORUM
ONE WALL STREET
NEW YORK 10005

56a
November 17, 1967

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20050

Dear Mr. Rostow:

The President is dead right on Viet-Nam. He is dead right on the tax question. Won't you come to our Forum and say so?

Once or twice a month a remarkably prominent group of business men gathers at One Wall Street to hear a speaker discuss some matter of major interest to the business world.

Such meetings are usually held in mid-week and begin at four o'clock sharp. The talk lasts half an hour and is followed by a quarter hour question period.

Everything said is off the record. This permits unusually intimate addresses and discussions.

A partial list of speakers is enclosed. Their eminence and the character of the audience have given this institution an international reputation.

Won't you honor us by talking to our members on November 30 or December 13 or December 14? If another date would be better for you perhaps my assistant, Mr. Converse, could arrange it by telephoning yours.

I know what pressure you are under but consider whether you and Mrs. Rostow could slip off afterwards to dinner and a theatre of your choosing with us.

Very sincerely,

Hugh Bullock

HB:m
encl.

57
Pres file

Monday, November 20, 1967 -- 11:00 AM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Talking Points for your meeting with Messrs. Perkins, Black
and Rockefeller -- ~~1:00~~ PM today
12:15

This is a delegation from Jim Perkins' General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs (membership at Tab A). They will give you a memorandum proposing that the Perkins Committee do a complete restudy of foreign aid -- problems, programs and presentations -- with a report to you after next year's election. If you want them to do the study, they will ask you to issue a press statement appointing them to this task, and they will ask then to direct the Bureau of the Budget to find \$500,000 or so to finance the study operation.

You know my views on this proposal. I think this group is first-rate on all counts, professional and political. They would do at least as thorough a review as any blue-ribbon panel you could name and they ~~are~~ probably the only bipartisan group you are going to find which will be willing to look constructively at the aid program in an election year. Thus, I think it would be very useful for them to do the study.

But there is another side of the question. If you select them publicly as a chosen instrument to do your thinking on foreign aid, it could (1) cut down your flexibility on this issue during the campaign, (2) make the 1968 Aid Program a lame duck and a target for cuts even deeper than this year's, and (3) get you into a public rather than a private argument with the Committee in January 1969 if you decide not to buy the recommendations. I am told that, with the Commission on Civil Disorders sopping up most of the money around town, the Budget Bureau would also have a problem dunning agencies for contributions to an independent budget for the study group.

Therefore, Joe Califano and I recommend you take the following line with the Perkins group:

1. You have enormous respect for the group and you want very much to have their views on foreign aid.
2. You hope that the Committee will proceed with the study immediately, and that it will be the most comprehensive job they can manage. The President will be an enthusiastic customer for their product, though of course he cannot guarantee he will accept the recommendations therein.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 13526,
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 18, 1983.

BY 18 ON 12-11-91

3. However, the public announcement aspect of the problem presents real problems. It might well hurt the AID appropriation bill in the Senate, it might be used as an excuse to slash the aid appropriation even more deeply next year, and it would damage morale and operating efficiency in AID during the fourteen months between now and January 1969. (These gentlemen know how ICA and DLF suffered during the reorganization task force operation in 1961.)
4. There is a similar problem with setting up and announcing a separate budget for the study group in terms of both other requirements (Commission on Riots) and the atmosphere on the Hill.
5. Moreover, the Perkins Committee is already established to do jobs precisely of this kind. It has a public mandate from the President. The beauty of it is that, unlike ~~some~~ other advisory committees, it can take on this big and difficult job without forcing the President to a public announcement which inevitably discredits the present program.
6. Therefore, you suggest that the Committee:
 - Go ahead with the study. (You might promise to direct Gaud and Katzenbach to beg, borrow and steal the people and the administrative money necessary to run it. This should be workable for them.)
 - Do so on a quiet, business-as-usual basis.
7. This low-key procedure does not represent any lack of Presidential interest in this enterprise. The Committee has the President's absolute assurance that he will support the study while in progress and give a full and sympathetic hearing to the recommendations which emerge.
8. You know that this is not a decision the delegation can make on the spot -- they will have to check with their cohorts. You hope they will let you know their decision.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EKH/vmr

AUGUST 17, 1967

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President announced today the appointment of three new members to his General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs.

They are:

Dr. Theodore M. Hesburgh, of Notre Dame, Indiana
(President, University of Notre Dame)

Mr. Rudolph A. Peterson of San Francisco, California
(President, The Bank of America)

Dr. Frank Stanton of New York City
(President, Columbia Broadcasting System)

The General Advisory Committee, chaired by Dr. James A. Perkins, President of Cornell University, was established by the President on March 26, 1965, to advise him, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and other Departments and Agencies on a continuing basis concerning policies, problems and implementation of foreign assistance programs.

In addition to Chairman Perkins and the new appointees, the other members of the Committee are:

Mr. Dwayne O. Andreas, Chairman, Executive Committee,
National City Bank of Minneapolis

Mr. Joseph A. Bierne, President, Communications Workers of
America

Mr. David E. Bell, Vice President, The Ford Foundation

Mr. Eugene R. Black, Special Presidential Advisor for South
East Asian Economic and Social Development

Mrs. Everett N. Case, Chairman, Board of Trustees,
Skidmore College

Dr. Luther H. Foster, President, Tuskegee Institute

General Alfred M. Gruenther, former President of the
American Red Cross

Dr. J. George Harrar, President, The Rockefeller Foundation

Mr. William R. Hewlett, President, Hewlett-Packard Company

Prof. Edward S. Mason, Lemont University Professor,
Harvard University

Mr. George Meany, President, AFL-CIO

Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Chancellor, University of California at L. A.

MORE

Mr. David Rockefeller, President, Chase Manhattan Bank

Mr. William J. Zellerbach, President, Zellerbach Paper Company

The Committee conducts its studies and reviews in Washington and in the countries where the assistance programs are carried on. To date, almost all of the members have visited U.S. Missions abroad on behalf of the Committee; 33 aid-receiving countries have been visited by at least one member of the Committee.

The Committee has held nine two-day meetings to date, including sessions with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Director of the Peace Corps, President of the World Bank, President of the Export-Import Bank, the Administrator of A.I.D., as well as staff representatives of all of these departments, agencies and institutions. The ninth meeting was held on June 20 and 21, 1967, and a tenth meeting is scheduled for September 11 and 12, 1967. No regular schedule of meetings have been adopted, though they have been held at approximately quarterly intervals.

#

Monday -
November 20, 1967

58

~~1. P. 1~~
2. P. 1 file

Mr. President:

Herewith a suggested reply to Sir Alexander Bustamante which you requested.

I have included a paragraph on your grandson, thinking that this would give the letter a personal touch and greatly appeal to Sir Alexander. If you decide to use this paragraph, I assume Juanita will know the picture you would like to send.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

58a

November 20, 1967

Dear Sir Alexander:

I was so pleased to receive your personal letter of November 6. When the going gets a little rough, there is nothing that means more than a note of encouragement from a friend, especially one who has shouldered the responsibilities of state.

Since I last wrote to you, my daughter Luci has made us grandparents. I thought you and Mrs. Bustamante might enjoy having the enclosed photograph of young Patrick Lyndon Nugent and his proud grandfather.

I hope that you and your wife continue to enjoy good health. Lady Bird and the girls join me in sending best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Rt. Hon. Sir Alexander Bustamante
P. C., Kt. B., LL.D., G. B. E.
"Bellencita"
P. O. Box 219
Kingston 6, Jamaica, W.I.

LBJ/WGBowdler:mm

59
INFORMATION

Monday, November 20, 1967
8:05 a.m.

Mr. President:

This is how the charts look.

We shall be reproducing the
explanatory memo this morning and
making copies available to Barefoot.


W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh


STATISTICS ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM

PREPARED BY MACV HEADQUARTERS
SAIGON


POPULATION DISTRIBUTION (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




SOUTH VIETNAM ELECTIONS (MILLIONS)




SECURED HAMLETS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



RD CADRE TEAMS




VC/NVA STRENGTH (100,000)




(FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE POLITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF ABOUT 80,000)


VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALIONS (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



KILLED IN ACTION (MONTHLY AVERAGE)




FREE WORLD STRENGTH (100,000) MONTHLY AVERAGES



DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL FORCES ANNOUNCED BY AUSTRALIA, THAILAND, SO, KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, AS WELL AS THE UNITED STATES.

U.S.
OTHER


GVN STRENGTH (100,000) (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



DOES NOT INCLUDE ADDITIONAL 65,000 ANNOUNCED BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM.


GVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS

(MONTHLY AVERAGE)




RVNAF KILLED IN ACTION

(MONTHLY AVERAGE)




GVN DESERTIONS (AVERAGE MONTHLY RATE PER THOUSAND)




INCLUDES REGULAR ARMY, AIR FORCE, NAVY, REGIONAL FORCES, AND POPULAR FORCES.


WEAPONS LOST (MONTHLY AVERAGE)



CHIEU HOI (OPEN ARMS) MONTHLY AVERAGE




AIRFIELDS




OVERLAND HAUL (ROAD)

(THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS)

(MONTHLY AVERAGE)



PORT THROUGHPUT CAPABILITY (THOUSANDS OF SHORT TONS)



DEEP DRAFT BERTHS

