

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 10:35 p.m. <i>open 9-28-99</i> PCI 1 p <i>NLS 98-279</i>	11/30/67	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 7:10 p.m. <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	11/30/67	A
#4a cable	Bucharest 803 <i>open 9-16-10 NLS/RAC 10-67</i> S 9 p	11/29/67	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	11/30/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 4:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized 9-28-99 NLS 98-279</i>	11/30/67	A
#7a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized per RAC 12/16/09</i>	11/24/67	A
#10 memo	Rostow to President, 2:25 p.m. <i>open 9-28-99 NLS 98-279</i> S 1 p	11/30/67	A
#11a cable	Saigon 12129 <i>open 8-16-06 RAC #146 (#302)</i> S 10 p <i>and NLS/CBS 10</i> [Sanitized NLS/CBS 10]	11/29/67	A
#12a memo	"Where do we go from here?" C 2 p <i>open 2-21-96 NLS 95-98</i>	11/29/67	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, 11:00 PCI 1 p <i>Open NLT 98-278 5/19/99</i>	11/30/67	A
#17a memo	Rusk to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #22a, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, "Visit of PM Wilson, 2/7-9/68"]	11/29/67	A
#19 memo	Rostow to President, 5:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>Open 2-24-04 NLS/RAC 03-252</i>	11/29/67	A
#19a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>open 2-24-04 NLS/RAC 03-253</i> S 3 p	11/27/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 11/26-30/67, Vol. 52

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#25 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 18-278 4-24-79</i> S 1 p	11/29/67	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 2-8-93 NLJ 91-433</i> S 1 p	11/29/67	A
#29 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p <i>open 8-30-95 NLJ 91-448</i>	11/28/67	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President, 6:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 6-28-70 NLJ/RAC 10-68</i>	11/28/67	A
#31a cable	Moscow 1389 <i>open 9-16-70 NLJ/RAC 10-67</i> S 1 p	10/9/67	A
#31b cable	Deptel 74809 to Moscow " S 3 p	11/25/67	A
#31c cable	Moscow 1946 " S 2 p	11/27/67	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 2-24-93 NLJ 91-404</i> TS 2 p [Duplicate of #155, NSF, Country File, Laos, Volume 17]	11/28/67	A
#34a cable	Vientiane 2912 <i>open 2-6-92 NLJ 91-382</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #155a, NSF, Country File, Laos, Volume 17]	11/27/67	A
#34b rpt	"Vehicle Sightings 1966" TS 1 p <i>open 6-28-70 NLJ/RAC 10-68</i>	undated	A
#36 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. <i>open 1-5-01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #94, NSF, Country File, India, Volume 10]	11/28/67	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#36b memo	Schultze to President, re: India <i>open 1-5-01</i> C <u>2 p</u> [Duplicate of #94b, NSF, Country File, India, Volume 10]	11/27/67	A
#36d memo	Freeman and Gaud to President, re: India <i>open 1-5-01</i> C <u>3 p</u> [Duplicate of #94d, NSF, Country File, India, Volume 10]	11/22/67	A
#37a memo	Habib to Jordan TS <u>1 p</u> <i>open 9-16-10 NLS/RAC 10-67</i>	11/27/67	A
#37b cable	Deptel to Vientiane (draft) <i>"</i> TS <u>2 p</u> <i>open 1-26-11 NLS/RAC 10-67</i>	11/27/67	A
#39 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> E <u>2 p</u>	11/28/67	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President S <u>1 p</u> <i>open 6-28-10 NLS/RAC 10-68</i>	11/28/67	A
#40a ltr	President to Shah of Iran <i>"</i> PCI <u>1 p</u>	11/28/67	A
#40b ltr	Shah of Iran to President <i>"</i> PCI <u>3 p</u>	11/15/67	A
#43 memo	Rostow to President S <u>2 p</u> <i>open 3-18-92 NLS 9/1-71</i>	11/28/67	A
#46 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> E <u>1 p</u>	11/28/67	A
#47a memo	Kohler to Rostow C <u>2 p</u> <i>open 8-16-10 NLS/RAC 10-67</i>	11/27/67	A
#52 memo	Rostow to President, 4:55 p.m. <i>6-11-98</i> S <u>1 p</u>	11/27/67	A

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#52a cable	President to Ankara (draft) <i>open 6-28-10</i> S 2 p <i>NLJ/RAC 10-68</i>	undated	A
#56a cable	Saigon 11830 <i>open 8-16-06 RAC 11145 (#292)</i> S 14 p <i>and NLJ/CBS 10</i> [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	11/25/67	A
#57a memo	Read to Van Dyk C 1 p <i>open 9-16-10 NLJ/RAC 10-67</i>	11/25/67	A
#57b rpt	"Trip of VP to Africa" C 3 p	undated	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	11/27/67	A
#62 cable <i>Copy duplicate #107, cyprus, vol. 10, Box 123</i>	Rostow to President (CAP671022) <i>some sanitization 12-3-04</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 9-23-99 NLJ 398-34 NLJ/RAC 04-32</i> <i>sanitized 9-28-99 NLJ 398-379</i>	11/26/67	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 98-278 4-24-99</i> S 2 p	11/26/67	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President <i>6-11-98</i> S 1 p	11/26/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 11/26-30/67, Vol. 52

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<p>#2a rpt.</p>	<p>Intelligence report - open 10/29/09 1 p S Page in File of WKUR, Box 7, "Cambodia", #50, 9f</p>	<p>11/30/67</p>	<p>A</p>

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 52, November 26-30, 1967
 Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a rpt.	Intelligence report - open 10/29/09 1 p - 5 Dups in Files of WWR, Box 7, "Cambodia", #5a, 9f	11/30/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 52, November 26-30, 1967
Box 26

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday November 30, 1967
10:35 PM

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know the following:

1. The Cyprus delegate to the UN, Rossides, has refused to interpret Makarios' response to Vance as acceptance of the Greek-Turkish agreement.
2. We know from firm intelligence that the Markarios government has told Rossides that their response should be regarded as an agreement.
3. In these circumstances, however, the Secretary General refuses to make his public request for action, which is the heart of Vance formula.
4. Therefore, Nick Katzenbach is going out to Vance asking if he does not agree that it would be better for him to stay in the area until the matter is cleared up, rather than to arrive home with his agreement shadowed by Cypriot ambiguity.

WWR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-279
By cb, NARA Date 9-21-99

INFORMATION

2

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, November 30, 1967
7:25 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know we have the attached quite solid evidence of further North Vietnamese deployment of forces south.

I shall ask CIA-DIE for an evaluation tomorrow.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 19
By ics, NARS, Date 9-25-84

WWRostow:rla

2a

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

November 30, 1967

TEXT OF NSA REPORT: NVA Division Deployments

SIGINT indicates that a major southward deployment (out of the Red River Delta area) of North Vietnamese ground forces has been underway since at least 11 November. The units involved are the subordinates of the probable 304th and 320th Infantry Divisions possibly totaling some eight regiments.

The communications patterns of the divisions observed since early November indicate that some of the deploying units may be destined for the DMZ area and others probably points further south. Those units aimed at the latter areas are or will probably be moving through the Laotian panhandle via established infiltration routes. On 29 November airborne radio direction finding located one possible regiment of the 304th Division in Laos west of the DMZ. An unconfirmed Royal Laotian Army report of 27 November placed a North Vietnamese regiment inside Laos, south of the Mu Gia Pass near the junction of routes 23 and 121. There is no direct SIGINT evidence to establish a relationship between this reported regiment and one of those believed deploying; however, the coincidence in time points toward such a relationship.

Each of the deploying divisions is possibly leaving one regiment and the divisional anti-aircraft battalion in place inside North Vietnam.

In addition to the deployments of the regiments of the two probable divisions, the 31st Regiment of the NVA 341st Division has been in deployment through the Laotian panhandle. Airborne radio direction finding of 27 November placed the unit some 23 nautical miles west of the A Chau Valley (Thua Thien Province, RVN). The ultimate destination of this regiment is not known from SIGINT.

Other than the possible regiment of the 304th located west of the DMZ, no locations are available on the deploying regiments. Hq, probable 304th Division was located on 29 November in the Vinh area of Nghe An Province, North Vietnam, south of that unit's normal garrison location. No current location is available for Hq, probable 320th Division.

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ-141-021.017/1
By je, NARA, Date 10-29-09

INFORMATION

3

Thursday, November 30, 1967
7:15 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You should know of these
rumors -- if you do not already.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1967

3a

Memo to Walt Rostow

Press Contact

David Breasted, New York News, called to ask me about rumors that Goldberg was resigning the first of the year. I told him I knew nothing to support the rumor. He told me that the State Department was collecting information about the salary and allowances of the UN job. I told him there could be a number of innocent explanations for this.

Later, he called back to say that he had learned Goldberg had instructed his people not to flatly deny such reports. I told him my answer remained the same.



Dick Moose

cc. George Christian

INFORMATION

4

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, November 30, 1967
7:10 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in
Harriman's discussion with Maurer, on Vietnam.
It comes to this:

-- Maurer believes a possibility for
negotiations exists because the U. S. and Hanoi
agree that "the South Vietnamese people should
decide their own destiny"(see pp. 2-3);

-- He agreed to undertake an initiative
based on this principle.

They got no where on the San Antonio
formula.

W. W. Rostow

Bucharest 803, 3 sections
(GOVTO 33)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jw*, NARA, Date 5-14-98

WWRostow:rlh

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

Mr. Roaton 4a
6

~~SECRET~~

Action

PP RUEHC
DE RUFUHT 803 3331330
ZNY SSSSS

CONTROL: 8 0 5 7Q
RECEIVED: NOVEMBER 30, 1967
3:47 A.M.

Info

P 291315Z NOV 67
FM AMEXBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1787
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ BUCHAREST 803 SEONE OF THREE

NODIS

GOVTO 33

SUBJECT: MAURER'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM
FROM HARRIMAN.

1. AFTER BRIEFLY TOUCHING ON MIDDLE EAST AND MANESCU'S ELECTION AND PERFORMANCE AT UN, I BROUGHT UP VIETNAM AND CONVEYED THE PRESIDENT'S GRATITUDE FOR THE COMPLETE ACCOUNT MAURER HAD GIVEN AMBASSADOR DAVIS. I ASKED MAURER IF HE HAD GIVEN FULL ATTENTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S SAN ANTONIO SPEECH. I TOLD HIM THIS WAS AS SWEEPING A STATEMENT AS HAD EVER BEEN MADE DURING WAR AND SHOWED THE PRESIDENT'S DESIRE FOR NEGOTIATED PEACE. I INFORMED HIM THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF THE "NO ADVANTAGE" FORMULATION WHICH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY GIVEN HIM HAD BEEN CONVEYED TO HANOI THROUGH CHANNELS THEN OPEN. I TOLD HIM OF OUR DISAPPOINTMENT AT HANOI'S HAVING TURNED DOWN THE OFFER SO COLDLY AND ASKED FOR HIS JUDGMENT AS TO WHY HANOI HAD DONE SO.
2. MAURER THEN WAUNCHED INTO WHAT WAS VIRTUALLY A TWO-HOUR MONOLOGUE OUT OF A THREE HOUR DISCUSSION. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW DIRECTLY WHY SAN ANTONIO OFFER HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN SINCE SPEECH WAS GIVEN ON LAST DAY OF HIS TALK WITH PHAM VAN DONG AND NEITHER OF THEM HAD TEXT AVAILABLE.
3. HIS TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAD CONVINCED HIM THAT PRIMARY AND OVERRIDING AMERICAN GOAL WAS TO GUARANTEE RIGHT BF SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN DESTINY AND ONLY SECONDARILY TO FULFILL COMMITMENT TO GVN. BASED ON THIS BELIEF, HE ADVISED PHAM VAN DONG THAT WITHOUT CEASING MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH, NVN SHOULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH US. HE TOLD DONG THAT THE STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH SHOULD CONCLUDE ONLY WHEN US AND NVN BOTH AGREE ON HOW SVN PEOPLE CAN DEFINE FREELY THEIR OWN DESTINY. THEN AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOLD HIM CATEGORICALLY AMERICAN TROOPS WILL GO HOME.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NL/RAC 10-67
By *id*, NARA, Date 7-27-10

~~SECRET~~

-2- BUCHAREST 803, NOVEMBER 29. SEONE OF THREE N O D I S

4. MAURER DELIBERATELY FOCUSSED ON ONLY ONE THING: "THE STARTING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND NOTHING MORE". MAURER BELIEVES THAT ONCE DISCUSSIONS BEGUN THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD WILL THROW THEIR INFLUENCE BEHIND REACHING A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION AND WOULD PUT PRESSURE BOTH ON HANOI AND THE US THAT WOULD PUSH THEM TOWARDS SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. ~~US AND NVN BOTH AGREE THAT SVN PEOPLE SHOULD DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY AND DISCUSSIONS COULD WORK OUT DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS EACH SIDE MAY HAVE OF THIS PRINCIPLE.~~

5. AT THE END OF THE FIRST DAY OF CONVERSATIONS WITH PHAM VAN DONG (INTERRUPTED ONCE OR TWICE BY HAVING TO GO DOWN TO AIR RAID SHELTER), MAURER CONCLUDED FROM THE HAZY AND CONTRADICTORY ANSWERS HE RECEIVED THAT HANOI DID NOT WISH TO ENTER DISCUSSIONS. MAURER DECIDED NOT TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER. THE NEXT DAY MAURER SUGGESTED THAT THEY DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT AFTER A SHORT MORNING DEVOTED TO BILATERAL MATTERS DONG BROUGHT THE TALKS BACK TO NEGOTIATIONS. DONG THEN ASKED MAURER TO ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT HANOI'S STANDPOINT ON THE STATEMENT MAURER HAD ASKED HANOI TO MAKE TO THE EFFECT THAT IF BOMBARDMENT WOULD CEASE, THEY WOULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US.

6. I QUESTIONED HIS USE OF "WOULD", SAYING THAT HANOI USUALLY USES "COULD". MAURER REPLIED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO RECALL PRECISE WORD BUT THAT IT DIDN'T MATTER SINCE THEY WERE TALKING IN FRENCH, AND DONG'S FRENCH IS SO POOR THAT NO SUCH NUANCES COULD BE RETAINED.

7. MAURER CONTINUED THAT THIS TIME DONG'S POSITION WAS VERY CLEAR AND LOGICAL. DONG ASSERTED THAT YOU (MAURER) ARE RIGHT. THE DRV MUST MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT. IT SHOULD ENTER DISCUSSIONS WHILE CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE IN THE SOUTH AS LONG AS THERE IS UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE RIGHT OF THE SVN PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR DESTINY.

8. MAURER AND DONG THEN DISCUSSED DETAILS ON HOW SUCH DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN. DONG THOUGHT THAT HANOI'S STATEMENT MUST BE "RATHER MORE CIRCUMSTANTIAL, THAT IS TO MEAN NVN WAS TO DECLARE THAT IT WAS READY TO START DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US IF US DECLARED AND CEASED UNCONDITIONALLY AND PERMANENTLY FOR ALL TIME BOMBARDMENT OVER NVN DMZ IF US DECLARED THAT IT WOULD "NEVER RESUME". HANOI WOULD ALLOW CERTAIN TIME TO PASS TO ENABLE IT TO TEST SINCERITY OF SUCH DECLARATION AND ACTION. MAURER ASKED WHY THESE CONDITIONS, WHEN ONE CONDITION COULD BE ENOUGH-- THAT THE US DECLARE THAT IT CEASES UNCONDITIONALLY AND FOR ALL TIME AND THAT IT WOULD NOT RESUME THE BOMBING. WHY, MAURER ASKED, SHOULD THERE BE AN INTERVAL BETWEEN END OF BOMBING AND START OF NEGOTIATIONS?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- BUCHAREST 803, NOVEMBER 29. SEONE OF THREE N O D I S

9. MAURER APPARENTLY DID NOT RECEIVE AN ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION. HE INDICATED HIS PERSONAL BELIEF THAT THERE EXISTS WITHIN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP SOME WITH POINTS OF VIEW MORE RESERVED TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS THAN ONE WITH WHICH DONG FINALLY AGREED. HE THOUGHT SUCH RESERVE MIGHT BE THE RESULT OF THE CHINESE VIEWPOINT. MAURER TOLD ME THAT THE US SHOULD EXERCISE FLEXIBLE JUDGMENT MEANT TO STRENGTHEN THE VIETNAMESE (AS OPPOSED TO CHINESE) WAY OF THINKING.

10. MAURER EMPHASIZED THAT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS THAT ON THE SECOND DAY PHAM VAN DONG WAS EXPRESSING THE OPINION OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP. WHILE MAURER DID NOT SEE HO, MAURER BELIEVES THAT AT EVERY INTERMISSION HO WAS TOLD OF THE DISCUSSION. MAURER BELIEVES THAT ON THE NIGHT OF THE FIRST DAY, HO WAS CONSULTED AND THAT THERE MIGHT EVEN HAVE BEEN A MEETING OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP. DAVIS
BT

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

~~SECRET~~

6

Action

PP RUEHC
DE RUFUHT 803/2 3331400

CN 8063
Nov 30, 1967

Info

ZNY SSSSS
P 291315Z NOV 67
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1787 PRIORITY
STATE GRNC

3:42 a.m.

BT
~~SECRET~~ BUCHAREST 803 SETWO OF THREE

NODIS

GOVTO 33

SUBJECT: MAURER'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

FROM HAIRIMAN

11. MAURER THEN TURNED HIS MONOLOGUE TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE "SERIOUS ANGLE TO PROBLEM": CHINA. HE SAID THAT IF THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP KNOW OF TODAY'S DISCUSSION, ROMANIAN AND CHINESE RELATIONS "WOULD BE BURIED". HE RECOUNTED PORTIONS OF HIS SEVEN DAYS OF CONVERSATIONS WITH CHOU EN LAI. MAURER TOLD ME AT LENGTH OF HOW HE URGED UPON CHOU HIS OPINION THAT NEITHER SIDE COULD WIN THE AR. HE TOLD CHOU THAT ALL IN ALL AMERICA HAS BEEN RESTRAINED, BUT THAT AMERICA COULD WAGE WAR IN OTHER WAYS; THAT RATHER THAN SUFFERING YEARS OF CONTINUOUS HEMMORHAGING AMERICA MAY SPREAD THE WAR TO NORTH VIETNAM BY INVADING IT. THIS WOULD WIDEN THE GAP BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOCIALIST STATES. AND BRING ABOUT A CONFRONTATION VERY NEAR TO CONFLICT. MAURER TOLD HIM THAT SINCE CHINA BORDERED NVN, IT WOULD ENTER THE CONFLICT.

PAGE2 RUFUHT 803/2 ~~SECRET~~

12. MAURER SAID THAT THE CHINESE REPLY AS "DISCONCERTINGLY SHORT". THEY SAID THAT THEY AGREED PARTIALLY WITH MAURER'S JUDGMENT, THAT THEY THOUGHT THAT THE US HAD ONLY TWO CHOICES; EITHER LEAVING VN, OR EXPANDING THE WAR. IF THE US EXTENDED THE WAR, THEN IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT IT WOULD EXPAND OVER CHINA. THE CHINESE SAID THAT "WE ARE READY FOR THIS AND ARE WAITING FOR IT". THEY OFFERED NO AMPLIFICATION, REASONING OR JUSTIFICATION FOR THEIR POSITION. MAURER CAN ONLY IMAGINE WHAT LIES BEHIND THEIR POSITION, BUT HE IS CONCERNED THAT ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE A CHINESE THEORY THAT "UNLEASHING OF WORLD WAR WOULD SPEED TRANSFORMATION OF MANKIND". MAURER REMARKED THAT ROMANIANS BELIEVE LARGE-SCALE WAR WOULD TRANSFORM MANKING FROM SOMETHING TO NOTHING.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, BUCHAREST 803, SECTION 2 of 3, NODIS

I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE CHINESE DID WANT WAR. MAURER SAID THAT HE WOULDN'T SAY THEY WANTED IT, BUT HE WOULDN'T SAY THEY DON'T WANT WAR. ONE EXPLANATION OF THEIR STATEMENTS COULD BE THE THEORY HE HAD MENTIONED. TO THIS HE COULD ADD THE FACT THAT "CHINA IS GETTING READY FOR WAR." MAURER SAID THIS WAS NO SECRET AND HE WOULD BE VERY CONCERNED IF THE US WERE UNAWARE OF IT.

PAGE 3 RUFUHT 803/2 ~~SECRET~~

HE SAID THAT ALL LIFE IN CHINA IS CONCENTRATED ON PREPARATION FOR WAR, AND ASKED IF WE WERE AWARE OF WHAT THE SPREAD OF THE WAR FROM AN AREA WITH A POPULATION OF 30 MILLION TO ONE WITH 700 MILLION PEOPLE WOULD MEAN. MAURER ADDED THAT BEYOND THIS IS "THE PROSPECT THAT IT MAY SPREAD TO A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS". I ASKED IF HE MEANT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BECOME INVOLVED. HE REPLIED THAT THE "LOGIC OF DEVELOPMENT" IS PUSHING IN THAT DIRECTION. MAURER SAID THAT WHILE THE QUARREL BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA WAS NOW VERY STRONG, ONE SHOULD NOT FORGET THEY HAVE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS IN COMMON. THE ONLY WAY THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET-CHINESE CONFLICT COULD BE ELIMINATED WOULD BE TO POSE A DANGER TO THEIR FUNDAMENTAL COMMON INTERESTS. IF THAT WERE DONE, THEY WOULD FACE ALL SOCIALIST STATES. MAURER SAID HE KNEW THE EVOLUTION OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST STATES ON VN. AT THE BEGINNING THEY FURNISHED LESS SUPPORT TO NVN THAN THEY DO NOW. CONTINUATION OF THE SITUATION WOULD BRING THEM CLOSER TOGETHER.

PAGE 4 RUFUHT 803/2 ~~SECRET~~

13. MAURER CLOSED HIS PRESENTATION BY INDICATING THIS IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS A CHANCE TO END THE WAR AND THAT THE US AND NVN WANT TO DO SO. THOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE DIFFICULTIES, MAURER MADE A PLEA FOR UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF US BOMBING FOR ALL TIME STATING THAT SUCH AN ACT WOULD PUSH FORWARD THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS REASON AND PERMIT OTHER COUNTRIES TO BRING NECESSARY PRESSURE TO BEAR TO GET TALKS STARTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE THEN OFFERED TO ANSWER MY QUESTIONS.

14. I TOLD HIM THAT WHAT IS MISSING IS ANY INDICATION THAT HANOI WANTS SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, THAT HANOI SAYS THAT THE US SHOULD STOP BOMBING, BUT DOES NOT EVEN SAY THAT THEY WILL TALK. THEY ASK NOT ONLY FOR UNCONDITIONAL BUT PERMANENT CESSATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-Page, BUCHAREST 803, SECTION 2 of 3, NODIS

OF BOMBING. I POINTED OUT THAT HANOI IS NOW ATTACKING US FORCES JUST BELOW THE DMZ, AND THAT SINCE THE PRESIDENT WILL NOT PERMIT THE INVASION OF NVN, THE ONLY WAY WE CAN SLOW DOWN THEIR ATTACK IS TO HIT THEIR POSITIONS IN NVN. I MENTIONED THE CANADIAN SUGGESTION OF THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A DEMILITARIZED DMZ AND HANOI'S REJECTION. I SAID THERE SEEMS TO BE A STRANGE IDEA THAT THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH IS NOT PART OF THE MILITARY ACTION OF THE WAR,

PAE 5 RUFUHT 803/2 ~~SECRET~~
BUT IS SOMEHOW DISCONNECTED. HANOI IS ASKING THE US TO COMMIT ITSELF NOT TO RESUME BOMBING WHILE LEAVING ITSELF FREE TO DO ANYTHING IT WANTS. I SAID IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT HANOI HAS NO SERIOUS INTENTION OF ENTERING MEANINGFUL TALKS, FOR IF THEY HAD, THEY WOULD SEND US A MESSAGE EITHER THROUGH MAURER OR OTHER CHANNELS. IF THEY SENT US A MESSAGE PRIVATELY OR TALKED WITH US PRIVATELY ON CONDITIONS NECESSARY PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS, OR IF THEY TOLD US WHAT THEY INTENDED TO DO, THIS WOULD BE ANOTHER MATTER. I POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF DESTROYING THE REGIME IN NVN, BUT JUST WANT TO STOP IT FROM TAKING OVER THE SOUTH BY FORCE. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THE SOCIALIST STATES WOULD BE PUTTING PRESSURE FOR NEGOTIATION ON HANOI, RATHER THAN ENCOURAGING IT BY ESCALATING AID, AND THAT I THOUGHT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE NOT THREATENING THE REGIME IN NVN,

PAGE 6 RUFUHT 803/2 ~~SECRET~~
BUT THAT WE ARE UNDER TREATY OBLIGATION TO DEFEND SVN AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM NVN. I SAID IT WAS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES, BUT NOT PEKING, WANT THE FIGHTING STOPPED, AND THAT IF CONCERN EXISTS ABOUT MAJOR CONFRONTATION, WE SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO AGREE UPON ENDING OF CONFLICT.

15. I SAID WE THOUGHT THAT THE SAN ANTONIO STATEMENT, SUPPLEMENTED BY THE EXPLANATION GIVEN MAURER, MADE CLEAR A POSSIBLE WAY TO END CONFLICT.

DAVIS
BT

~~SECRET~~

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

(6)

Action PP RUEHC
DE RUFUHT 803/3 3331440
ZNY SSSSS
P 291315Z NOV 67
Info FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
STATE GRNC
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1967 NOV 29 12:33 PM

~~SECRET~~ BUCHAREST 803 SETHREE OF THREE

NODIS

GOVTO 33

SUBJECT: MAURER'S VIEWS ON VIETNAM

FROM HARRIMAN.

16. I SAID I WAS SURE THAT MAURER AGREED THAT ABOVE ALL THE PRESIDENT WANTED NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AND ASKED HIM IF HE HAD ANY DOUBT ABOUT THIS. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD NONE, THAT IF HE HAD ANY HE WOULDN'T HAVE TALKED TO NVN AS HE DID. I ASKED HIM IF HE THOUGHT NVN HAD A RIGHT TO ENTER SVN, AND WHETHER HE THOUGHT WEST GERMANY HAD A RIGHT TO ENTER EAST GERMANY. I RECALLED THAT WE FOUGHT IN KOREA BECAUSE THE NORTH ENTERED THE SOUTH. I SAID DIVIDED COUNTRIES WERE UNHAPPY SITUATIONS, BUT THE US HAS AGREED, AND WE CONSIDER THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED, THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNIFICATION BY FORCE. I TOLD HIM THAT PERHAPS HE HOPED REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY WOULD NEVER COME, BUT THAT WHILE WE HOPE THAT IT WILL, WE DO NOT WANT IT TO COME THROUGH FORCE. I REFERRED TO OUR SEATO COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN IN 1954 DURING THE EISENHOWER

ADMINISTRATION, AND SAID THAT THE SOCIALIST STATES SHOULD REALIZE THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE CONSIDER OUR OBLIGATION AND SHOULD TRY TO INDUCE HANOI TO TERMINATE ITS AGGRESSION.

17. I ASKED MAURER HOW HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO A CHANGE IN HANOI'S ATTITUDE. I SAID A PAUSE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED, THOUGH UNLESS HANOI ACTED DIFFERENTLY THAN LAST TIME, IT WOULD BE OF A SHORT DURATION AND CREATE A MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION. I EXPLAINED HOW HANOI HAD TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE TET PAUSE. I SAID I HOPED THE SOVIET UNION, ROMANIA, AND OTHER EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO GET TALKS STARTED UNDER CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD GIVE SOME HOPE OF A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. I SAID THAT ASKING FOR A PERMANENT CESSATION WITHOUT ANY INDICATION OF WHAT MIGHT RESULT--PERHAPS NOTHING--IS LIKE ASKING US TO TIE OUR RIGHT HAND BEHIND OUR BACK WHILE FIGHTING CONTINUES. IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT IF THEY SAID STOP BOMBING FOR TWO WEEKS OR A MONTH WHILE WE TALK, BUT THEY ASK FOR A

~~SECRET~~

-2- BUCHAREST 803, 29 NOV 1967 SECT 3 of 3
PERMANENT STOP. I ASKED HOW THIS COULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY.

18. MAURER SAID HE "ABSOLUTELY AGREED" THAT BOMBING IS A PART OF GENERAL MILITARY ACTION, AND SAID HE WOULD GO FURTHER BY SAYING THAT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW NOT ONLY COULD BOMBING BE RECOMMENDED, BUT THAT THE OCCUPATION OF NVN AS A WAY OF DESTROYING THE "BACKYARD" OF SVN COULD BE RECOMMENDED. AFTER NVN WAS TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AND THE WAR IN THE NORTH BECAME A GUERRILLA ONE, THE SAME MILITARY RECOMMENDATION COULD BE MADE CONCERNING CHINA, WHICH WOULD BECOME THE NEW BACKYARD. BUT, SAID MAURER, IT WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED FROM THE POLITICAL VIEWPOINT. WAR IS NOTHING BUT POLITICS CONDUCTED BY OTHER MEANS. IT IS WAGED TO BRING ONE SIDE IN A POLITICAL CONFLICT A DECISIVE ADVANTAGE. THIS IS WHY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD BE DOMINANT AND IT IS WHY PRESIDENT JOHNSON DOES NOT PERMIT HIS TROOPS TO CROSS THE DMZ. FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW HE SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS WRONG IN NOT ORDERING THE CROSSING OF THE DMZ, BUT FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW HE IS CORRECT, AND THAT IS WHY HE CAN'T THINGS NOT JUSTIFIED ON MILITARY GROUNDS.

19. MAURER ADMITTED THAT THE CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT INVOLVED RISKS THAT TALKS MAY NOT START FOR SOME TIME, THAT NEGOTIATIONS MAY START BUT BE UNDULY PROLONGED, OR THAT THEY MAY NOT RESULT IN A SOLUTION. BUT HE THOUGHT THAT WITH ALL COUNTRIES (EXCEPT POSSIBLY CHINA) EXERTING THEIR INFLUENCE, THERE WOULD BE A SETTLEMENT.

20. I COMMENTED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS USING LIMITED MEANS BECAUSE OF THE LIMITED CHARACTER OF OUR OBJECTIVES. HE DID NOT WANT TO INVAD E NVN BECAUSE HE HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERFERING WITH A SOCIALIST REGIME WHICH HE KNOWS SOCIALIST STATES WILL DEFEND. HE ORDERED ATTACKS ON SUPPLY ROUTES AND MILITARY TARGETS BUT AGAINST THE ADVICE OF THE MILITARY HE HAS NOT ORDERED MINING OF HAIPHONG ~~harbor~~ INTERFERENCE WITH ITS SHIPPING. WE HAVE NOT ATTACKED THE DIKES OR ENGAGED IN AREA BOMBING OF POPULATION CENTERS AS WAS DONE IN WORLD WAR II. THE PRESIDENT'S MILITARY ADVISORS SAY THE SITUATION IN THE SOUTH WOULD BECOME SUBSTANTIALLY MORE DIFFICULT IF NVN WERE PERMITTED TO FREELY MOVE MEN AND SUPPLIES SOUTH. I APPEALED TO MAURER AS A MAN IN A STRATEGIC

~~SECRET~~

-3- BUCHAREST 803, NOV 29, 1967 Set 3 of 3.

POSITION WHO HAS THE EAR OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON, OF THE SOVIET UNION, OF CHINA AND HANOI, TO ADVISE US AS TO HOW WE CAN BRING ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS. I REPEATED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO STOP BOMBING PERMANENTLY, WITHOUT SOME INDICATION FROM HANOI AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN. I SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE HIS PROPOSAL IN SAN ANTONIO, AND THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING TO RECEIVE ANY OTHER REASONABLE PROPOSAL FROM MAURER. MAURER REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT MIGHT PUT MORE HOPE IN ROMANIAN ACTION THAT WAS JUSTIFIED. MAURER SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THERE WAS NOW A CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE US AND NVN THAT PEOPLE OF SVN SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THEIR OWN DESTINY. KNOWING THAT, SAID MAURER, WE WILL SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. "THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE WILL TRY TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT."

21. MAURER DID NOT THINK IT WAS NECESSARY TO INVOLVE SOVIET UNION YET. WHEN THAT TIME CAME, HE THOUGHT US WAS IN A BETTER POSITION TO DO SO THAN ROMANIA.

22. THE DISCUSSION CONTINUED AFTER LUNCH. I THEN ASKED MAURER WHETHER HE HAD ANY STEPS IN MIND NOW. HE REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY, BUT SAID HE COULD NOT NAME THEM YET, THAT THE SUBJECT MUST BE THOUGHT OVER AND STUDIED. I ASKED HIM TO KEEP AMBASSADOR DAVIS INFORMED.

DAVIS
BT

~~SECRET~~

5
DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE
MARKING. CANCELLED (20) E.O. 12812
SEC 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF
MAY 18 1982.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY ky ON 1-14-92

Thursday, November 30, 1967, 5:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Cyrus Vance

Profile

Secretary Rusk recommends that you send at once the following congratulatory message to Cy Vance:

"Dear Cy:

"At a critical time for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean you accepted from me at a moment's notice a difficult and highly important mission. I asked nothing less of you than to help the Governments of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus avoid a major war and a terrible human tragedy. With courage, perceptiveness, skill, and total dedication you pursued this formidable task, and you succeeded. Because of your efforts, and those of the Secretary General of NATO and the Secretary General of the United Nations through his Special Representative, the Governments concerned have been helped to save peace. It is not often possible to say of a man 'he helped prevent a war,' but I say this now to you. You have my profound gratitude and admiration, and that of the American people. I am sure these sentiments are shared by the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean region in particular, and by all men of good will everywhere.

"I look forward to seeing you tomorrow. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

BKS for
W. W. Restow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
 By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

1. sup
 2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Thursday, November 30, 1967

SUBJECT: Vance Agreement

Cy is back in Athens and reports: "My mission is now about finished, and I trust that we have in fact defused the explosive scene in this area." If details can be wrapped up in New York today, he will leave Athens about midnight EST. State believes he ought to come here rather than getting involved in New York. You may want him to report to you, and State is drafting a letter for you to issue thanking him and putting your blessing on his agreements.

The agreements he has worked out call for (1) withdrawing of illegal Greek troops, (2) standdown of the Turkish mobilization and (3) an expanded UN pacification effort on Cyprus. There are naturally some differences in interpretation of how these agreements are to be carried out, but by and large they ought to stick.

The next step is for U Thant to issue an appeal--hopefully today--and for the three governments to respond. Then it remains to set up some sort of monitoring of the Greek withdrawal and the Turkish demobilization and to work out the new status of the UN force.

At that point, we will have ended the November 1967 Cyprus Crisis, but the Cyprus problem will remain. Cy has rightly steered clear of basic issues, but he also urges fighting for "our proper national benefits from actions which the President had the courage and leadership to take."

Although Cy recommends that the coordinating role in the stage just ahead be shifted to New York, he also says that "we must continue to play an active role for some time to come." Without progress toward a final settlement there will surely be another serious incident on the island, and there's little hope of holding back the Turks again.

Luke Battle in the NSC yesterday indicated hope that the UN could take on the longer range problem, but that may not be enough with these NATO partners. This is one thing we'll want to talk with Cy about when he gets back.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

7

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, November 30, 1967
4:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a CIA report from a
Pole on Moscow's lack of interest in a
Vietnam settlement.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

[Redacted]

24 Nov. 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANTIZED

Authority NLJ-019-026-001/1

By pc N/A/A, Date 12-16-09

7a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable IN

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XIM USIA SDO ONE OCR ODIRXOEXXEXXEXX CIA/NMCC
EXO DD1 OSR

25X1

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

~~SECRET~~

CITE

DIST 24 NOVEMBER 1967

COUNTRY POLAND/NORTH VIETNAM/USSR

DOI FALL 1967

25X1

SUBJECT VIEWS OF POLISH [REDACTED] ON SOVIET STRATEGY
VIS A VIS VIETNAM

ACQ

[REDACTED]

25X1

FIELD NO.

SOURCE

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION REFLECTS A LACK OF INTEREST IN A QUICK SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE WAR. THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT MATERIAL AID SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN CONTINUE THE FIGHTING. THIS WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO EXPLOIT AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM AND CONSEQUENTLY TO STRENGTHEN THEIR OWN POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE SOVIETS ARE SOMEWHAT ALARMED OVER AMERICAN ACTIVITY IN THE ARAB WORLD. THEY FEAR A POSSIBLE SECOND INDONESIA.

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2. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCPAC (ADMIRAL SHARP ONLY), STATE
(AMBASSADOR BUNKER ONLY), USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND ONLY).

25X1

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~~SECRET~~
(classification)

[REDACTED]

SANTIZED

Authority NLS-019-026-001/2

By jc -NARA, Date 12-16-09

Thursday, November 30, 1967 -- 3:30 PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a pleasant farewell message to the King of Nepal. He leaves from New York tomorrow night; he has spent the last month hunting in Alaska.

Pres file

The proposed message includes a paragraph in response to his request that we help him in such areas as agriculture, family planning, etc. (This would be largely financed with excess Indian rupees.) The language commits you to nothing, but it may help to get him to make his proposal specific enough for real dialogue.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

Presidential Farewell Message to King of Nepal

Your Majesty:

As you depart for your homeland, I want to tell you how much I enjoyed your visit. You and your gracious Queen honored us by your presence, and Mrs. Johnson and I greatly enjoyed meeting you.

I was interested to learn about the important challenges you and your nation face in such fields as communications, transportation, agriculture and family planning. We await with interest Your Majesty's Government's specific proposals in these and other important fields. I am asking Ambassador Laise to be in touch with you and your Government regarding these proposals. They will receive our sympathetic consideration.

We hope that your visit, public and private, has been a rewarding and pleasant one. Mrs. Johnson joins me in wishing you and your Queen a most happy homeward journey.

Sincerely,

Thursday, November 30, 1967 -- 3:00

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a proposed message to the Presidents of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda congratulating them on activation of the East African Community. The Community gives them a framework for continuing the economic cooperation -- customs, communications, etc. -- which was started by the British. This is exactly the kind of thing we are trying to promote in Africa.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

9a

Presidential message to:

President Kenyatta of Kenya

President Nyerere of Tanzania

President Obote of Uganda

Your Excellencies:

Your American friends join you and your peoples in celebrating the inauguration of the East African Community. The birth of the Community provides dramatic evidence to the world that the governments of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are determined not only to maintain but to strengthen the regional economic cooperation which has linked your countries in the past. By your statesmanship, you, the Presidents of these East African nations, have made a far-reaching contribution to the momentum for unity which is a vital force in the new Africa.

At a time when there is much divisiveness in the world, your decision to join hands to promote the common welfare is a heartening example to nations everywhere. In common with the representatives of your neighbors who are gathered with you on this historic occasion, I offer you the heartfelt congratulations of the American Government and people.

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

10

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, November 30, 1967
2:25 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a marked copy of the latest appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DIA-CIA "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" (thru 16 Nov 1967)
S-2607/AP4A

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLI 98-279
By cb, NARA Date 9-21-99

INFORMATION

11

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, November 30, 1967
2:20 p. m.

Profile

Mr. President:

I have marked key passages in
Bunker's latest weekly.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 12129

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Cl. Affairs, Feb. 24, 1983
By TCG, NARA, Date 12-16-91

Wednesday, November 29, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 12129)

Herewith my twenty-ninth weekly telegram:

A. General

I had a long talk with President Thieu yesterday. My purpose was to provide him with my impressions of the mood in Washington and elsewhere in the United States as it related to the situation here: a summary of the main subjects I had discussed with you during my consultations; and the need for definite signs of progress during the next few months.

I said that one of the principal themes evident in almost all of my meetings, public and private, was the degree of commitment by the government and people of Vietnam to the war effort, whether the Vietnamese were carrying their full share of the load and were making the necessary sacrifices. This overall query then broke down into more specific questions as:

1. Were the Vietnamese Armed Forces doing their share of the fighting and what was the quality of their performance;
2. Was the government committed to a serious attack on corruption and was anything being done about it;
3. Concern over the creation of refugees through our joint military actions and concern regarding their care and rehabilitation;
4. Land reform -- how much had been done and what did the government propose to do;
5. Economic stabilization and the related problem of taxes;
6. Progress in pacification and what was being done to root out the infrastructure;
7. Attitude of the Government of Vietnam toward negotiations and especially toward approaches to the National Liberation Front;

I said that General Westmoreland, Bob Komer and I had endeavored to give a balanced and objective report of the situation here and had tried to counter what we felt had been much subjective and erroneous reporting of developments by the

DECLASSIFIED ^{11/13} NLS/CBS10
Authority RAC 11146 (H302)
By RG/id NARA, Date 8-15-06

press. Recognizing that much remained to be done and that there were many problems still to be solved, we had reported there had been nevertheless steady progress, militarily, politically, and in pacification and nation building. We also reported that we believed that the progress made in all these areas had established a base from which, together, we could now accelerate the forward movement.

I then said that I knew that he shared our view of the importance of some early moves on the priority programs that he and I had discussed and on which there was general agreement among ourselves and the Government of Vietnam. He had made this clear in his inaugural address as had Prime Minister Loc in his statement of government policy. I recognized the fact that there would probably be exaggerated expectations of progress here on various fronts and that the new government had to have time to get itself organized and functioning. On the other hand, I thought it important that some early and constructive moves be made. Two had already been taken; namely, the mobilization decree, lowering and extending the draft age, extending the service of those within the draft brackets, and recalling certain personnel to service; and secondly, the decree transferring the collection and administration of all land taxes to local governments. It seemed to me that a logical sequence to the land tax decree would be the promulgation of an ordinance transferring the administration of land reform to the village councils. I recalled that I had already provided him and Vice President Ky with a memorandum on this subject as well as his public remarks on the need for "massive" land reform. Thieu replied that he had this in mind and that the Minister of Agriculture was presently studying the problem.

I remarked that I understood that plans were also underway to restructure the provincial administration and for the training and appointment of new Province Chiefs. Thieu confirmed the fact that this was already in process and said that at the Cabinet meeting to be held Thursday, this week, the restructuring of the provincial administration would be taken up, the relations between the Province Chiefs and the Ministry representatives in the provinces defined, and the responsibility of the Province Chief to the central government established. This would result in a reduction in the authority of the Corps Commanders over administrative matters and in restricting their authority to the military field. Thieu felt that this would also have a further beneficial effect in limiting opportunities for corruption. As a further move in the Government of Vietnam austerity program the Cabinet will also take up the matter of closing our nightclubs and bars in Saigon.

Thieu said that last week he had taken the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Interior and other officials to the Delta area of the Fourth Corps to check on the prospects for rice production and security, especially of Route 4, in order to move rice out of the Delta. He said that he felt there were definite prospects for improvement in production and greater efforts would be directed toward security of highways and waterways to facilitate transportation of produce to markets. He

said, however, that storage silos for rice were an urgent need and he intended to approach U. S. AID for some assistance in this respect. I brought up the question of an increase in the price of rice which as you know we have strongly advocated in order to give the farmer a better price for paddy. Thieu replied that the government had on hand high-priced rice which it would have to sell at an advance and felt that a further increase would be unwise at the present time because of the adverse political effects it would have on the new government. The means by which a rise in price would accrue to the benefit of the farmer and not the intermediary is presently under study and still to be worked out. I shall want to go into this matter on an increase in the price of rice with him again in the near future.

I returned to the question of increasing taxes especially oil taxes. Thieu replied that this matter was under discussion in the Cabinet. He said that there was a general feeling that oil, especially gasoline, entered so much into the daily life of the population in the movement of people and goods, in propelling the thousands of sampans, irrigation pumps and things of that kind that a radical increase in the price would affect the price level in other respects. He said that the new Finance Minister informed him that through improved collection of taxes and the appointment of a new and competent Chief of Customs, he could secure as much new revenue as would result from an increase in oil taxes. I replied that I thought that an improvement in tax collection was essential but that in view of the large increases in the upcoming budget, increased taxes would also be essential. Thieu replied that he agreed in principle that taxes would have to be increased as would the price of rice but that in both cases it was a question of timing. The government felt that too many actions adversely affecting large elements of the population could not be taken all at one time in view of the need of the government to establish itself firmly.

I think it will probably take one or two weeks more for the new Prime Minister and Cabinet to settle into their offices, organize their staffs, and complete other necessary administrative arrangements. Matters of this nature have been taking up much of the Cabinet's time in recent days. There are some excellent people in the new government, others who lack executive experience, and still others somewhat lacking in decisiveness. Time and experience will indicate how well the individual members can perform. I think Thieu feels that based on experience and results, or lack of them, some changes may be indicated in the future. We are starting out, however, with the advantage that there is general agreement between the Government of Vietnam and ourselves on programs, on what the priorities should be for the shorter six months' phase and for the longer term. I shall try to make a point of reporting specifically on progress on these priority matters as we shall be pressing for action.

I took up the question of the holiday cease fires and referred to Ambassador Locke's talk with him on November 22 in which ideas were exchanged as to the exact span of times the stand-downs would be observed on the Allied side, as well as procedures to be followed in arriving at an agreed U. S. /Government of Vietnam position and in coordination with the other members of the seven nations. I said that we continue to believe that 24, 24-48 hour stand-downs are in the best interest of all the Allied forces in Vietnam and would hope that we could agree on this position; that fulfillment of the stand-downs after Christmas should be based upon examination of North Vietnamese/Viet Cong performance during previous stand-downs, in light of all the circumstances at the time; and that we believe the Government of Vietnam should keep open the possibility of offering to meet with the other side to discuss a longer pause, in much the same terms as was done during the 1967 Tet period.

Thieu replied that he had no objection to this proposed formula; what he had intended to suggest was that for Christmas and New Years the maximum stand-down should be 36 hours and that for Tet 72 hours might be agreed to "in principle" if the performance of the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong during earlier stand-downs had been satisfactory. What he had in mind also was that the Tet stand-down could be extended if it could lead to a "fruitful result" but obviously, representatives of both sides would have to meet and confer on the matter. He added that the opposing forces are too close at three points -- the DMZ, the Dak To-Kontum front, and in Phuoc Long and Binh Long Provinces in the Third Corps -- to run the risk of a long stand-down which might give the enemy an opportunity for a surprise attack. He suggested that General Westmoreland confer with General Vien and agree on the terms of the stand-downs, to be followed promptly by a meeting of the seven nations' ambassadors. I do not believe that we shall have difficulty in having our view prevail.

President Thieu has referred publicly on several recent occasions to his plans to send a letter to Ho Chi Minh, regarding peace negotiations, despite the hostile comment on the idea broadcast over the Viet Cong and Hanoi radios. Thieu told the press on November 25 that he was asking several nations, including Japan, to transmit the letter. The departure November 25 of Japanese Ambassador Nakayama for reassignment was the occasion for further press speculation that Nakayama would carry Thieu's letter to Ho Chi Minh. However, Nakayama told political counselor at the airport that no final decision or commitment to transmit Thieu's letter to Ho had been made. He pointed out the difficulties which face the Japanese Government in dealing with this question and emphasized the likelihood that the letter would be rejected by Hanoi. He made clear that he had informed Thieu of this in his final call on November 24 but also said that this was not a final answer by the Japanese Government.

Thieu confirmed in General Nakayama's statement but added that Nakayama had said that the Japanese "in principle" would be glad to act as intermediary. Nakayama added that Sato did not believe that he could establish contact soon with Hanoi in view of his recent visits to the United States and to Australia; that he would wish

to have some favorable indication in advance that Hanoi would be willing to receive the letter; and that while up to now Japan has had no contact with Hanoi, he would endeavor to make contact.

Thieu then ruminated on the possibility of having the letter delivered through the Pope, noting that the Vatican has various ways of getting in touch with North Vietnam authorities or through the United Nations, perhaps through the Soviet Ambassador there. I suggested to him the possibility of using the Indian Chairman of the ICC since he has direct access to the government in Hanoi. Thieu replied that he has the feeling that the Indian believes that a first step should be a bombing pause which should precede delivery of the letter and is therefore somewhat reluctant to approach him but agreed that the possibility was worth looking into. I expect to see Ambassador Lukose within the next few days and will try to feel him out.

Knowing of Thieu's concern as well as the general concern expressed publicly here over Ambassador Goldberg's testimony with reference to the National Liberation Front, I informed Thieu that I had an opportunity to talk with Ambassador Goldberg and clarified once again the fact that this move was tactical and did not represent a change in the U. S. position. I added that we continued to believe that prospects of accomplishing inscription as a result of the Government of Vietnam's initiative would be very poor, whereas some additional Security Council members might support a U. S. initiative. In these circumstances, I thought the best approach would be for the Government of Vietnam to react positively to any U. S. initiative to convene the Council, perhaps sending a letter to the President of the Security Council, requesting a Government of Vietnam participation and suggesting principles similar to those in the draft resolution. I assured Thieu that Ambassador Goldberg would wish to consult closely with the Vietnamese Government representative in New York and would be in touch with him prior to any Security Council move. I added that I thought it was in the Vietnamese Government interest to be represented at the U. N. by an able and competent individual who could present their views convincingly and forcefully. This is not the case with the present incumbent.

We are very happy to have with us the distinguished group of American women you invited to visit Vietnam: Mrs. Norman Chandler, Miss Anna Lord Strauss, and Ambassador Eugenie Anderson. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Charlotte Hubbard, who is here for two weeks, is joining them for most of their program. They have already met with a representative group of community leaders in Saigon and are visiting other areas of the country as well. They are showing a very lively interest in everything and I think they will have obtained a full and fair picture of the situation here, with successes and problem areas balanced, by the time they leave.

B. Pacification

The new Government of Vietnam is slowly getting organized to step up pacification. General Thang, now in charge of Regional and Popular Forces, and the new Revolutionary Development Minister, General Tri, are now fully immersed in 1968 planning, with Bob Komer and his crew coaching actively behind the scenes. Meanwhile, the Government of Vietnam has revived the central Revolutionary Development Council, which will be chaired by PM Loc and include all relevant ministers. It will meet once a month, and Komer (who pressed for it) considers it a much needed coordinating mechanism.

Our hamlet evaluation system figures for October showed very little overall gain in population security. Stepped up enemy pressure on the Government of Vietnam pacification areas -- particularly in Quang Ngai, Phu Yen, and Khanh Hoa -- led to regression offsetting most gains elsewhere. As a result, the total population (including urban) living in relative security remains roughly 67 percent while 16 percent remain in contested hamlets, and 17 percent under Viet Cong domination. As Bob Komer pointed out in Washington, we do not expect dramatic changes in this pattern, because pacification is, at best, a gradual, undramatic process. But with the increased pacification effort programmed for 1968, we should see a gradual cumulative increase in secure population.

C. Political

Both houses of the National Assembly made further progress in adopting their rules and are beginning to participate more directly in the national political process. The Upper House has adopted 150 of a projected total of 200 rules, while the Lower House on November 21 approved an eleven-part outline for internal rules as presented by the rules drafting committee.

Mixed in with the Upper House debate on rules was discussion of the merits of the decree on partial mobilization, which was signed by President Thieu on October 24. At its session on November 25, the Upper House decided by a vote of 43 out of 45 Senators present to invite Prime Minister Loc or Minister of Defense Nguyen Van Vy to appear before the Upper House in the near future to explain how the partial mobilization decree will be carried out. (Article 40 of the Constitution gives either House, with the agreement of one-third of the members, the right to request the Prime Minister or other government officials to appear before it to answer questions regarding the execution of national policy.) Members of the Upper House with whom we have spoken since November 25 have made clear that they are not opposed to the purpose behind the partial mobilization decree, but rather to the way in which it was done. They have also explained that they were

unclear on what the government's plans were and on what considerations they were based. They felt this was an opportunity for the government to mobilize additional support for the measure which, not surprisingly, has encountered some adverse comment -- particularly the plans to mobilize 18- and 19-year-olds.

On November 27 Prime Minister Loc received a delegation of the special committee appointed by the Lower House to intervene with the government to obtain the release from Army service of 17 students who were mobilized following their participation in rioting in early October. Prime Minister Loc heard them out and stated that he would present the request of the committee to President Thieu. The reaction of the members of the committee to Loc's handling of the matter was mixed, largely as a function of their general attitude. Deputy Nguyen Dai Bang (Hue) indicated his disappointment with Loc's presentation, although this is not unexpected, as Bang is emerging as a determined critic of the government. On the other hand, Deputy Ho Van Minh (Saigon) was encouraged by the responsiveness of the Prime Minister. Minh has so far been generally well-disposed towards the government.

Since the roundup of recent developments among the Buddhists in Ambassador Locke's personal report to you of November 24, the "moderate" Buddhist faction led by Thich Tam Chau appears to be moving in the direction of making the split in the Buddhist ranks more or less permanent. At a dinner given by one of Tam Chau's supporters on November 26, Thich Tam Giac, chief Buddhist chaplain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces, the formation of a Buddhist political bloc which would function as a political party was discussed informally. It was interesting that Tam Giac invited Senator Vo Van Truyen and Deputy Nguyen Ba Luong, interim chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses of the Assembly, respectively, as well as a number of non-Buddhist political figures, including two well-known Catholics, Senators Nguyen Gi Hien and Huynh Van Cao. The two Senators were undoubtedly invited in their political rather than their personal capacities. It is also interesting to note that representatives of the An Quang faction were reportedly in Hue on November 26 to see about establishment of a political party. One or more Buddhist political parties may emerge in the next few months.

Cas has learned that General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, Director General of the National Police, submitted his resignation on November 24. This has since been confirmed by other sources. According to Cas, General Loan is ill, but he has also been disappointed that he was not consulted even routinely, in connection with the formation of the Cabinet. According to General Loan, Prime Minister Loc did not ask to review the security dossiers of any of those under consideration for Cabinet posts, a serious lapse in his view, since Loan reportedly has considerable reservations concerning the new Minister of Economy, Truong Thai Ton, who is alleged to have some links to the Viet Cong. (We do not take these reports

seriously.) Loan has been a generally effective Director General of the National Police, one of the most difficult and demanding posts in the Government of Vietnam. However, he has brought considerable criticism on the government by his handling of the arrest of Au Truong Thanh last September and by heavy-handed appearances in the visitor's gallery of the former National Assembly when critical votes were taken. The new Secretary-General at the Presidency, Nguyen Van Huong, whom Loan also suspects of having pro-Communist links (we have seen no significant evidence of this), is openly critical of Loan's fondness for drink and his habit of playing with a loaded pistol at meetings of government officials. Loan has indicated that he will not withdraw his resignation unless specifically asked to do so by President Thieu. Since these developments, we have heard that Loc did receive Loan to discuss Cabinet appointments and the latter was satisfied that he had had a hearing. We have also learned that Vice President Ky has told Loan that he should take a rest and then go back to work.

The two Republican Congressmen who recently visited Saigon, Fred Schwengel (Iowa) and William O. Cowger (Kentucky), appear to have become even more interested in a visit to Hanoi, despite our efforts to point out to them here in Saigon the problems and pitfalls involved in such a visit. While they were in Bangkok November 24-25, they asked the British Embassy to transmit a request to Democratic Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister Pham Van Don for permission to visit Hanoi. Schwengel and Cowger appear to be convinced that the recent remark by Pham Van Dong regarding a possible visit to Hanoi by U. S. Congressmen to view bomb damage was directed specifically at them and that they would be failing in their duty and would be showing a lack of courage if they did not take up what they regard as a challenge. This puts the matter in considerably more dramatic and personal a light than the facts seem to warrant. We have no basis for believing that Pham Van Dong was aware that Congressmen Schwengel and Cowger were in Southeast Asia at the time he made the remark in response to a question by a French journalist. Efforts made by our own people here and by our Embassy in Bangkok to point out to the two Congressmen that they would not be free agents once they were in North Vietnam do not appear to have had any effect on them. They have left Southeast Asia and are on their way back to the United States. It remains to be seen whether Hanoi shows any further interest in the matter.

A five-member delegation from the National Assembly is currently attending the session of the Asian Parliamentary Union in Bangkok. The Assembly delegation is a good one, and the occasion marks the beginning of the return of Vietnamese legislators to international parliamentary gatherings, where they have played a useful role in the past. In addition, they will have an opportunity to present the Vietnamese Nationalist views of the struggle against Communist aggression and subversion in this country.

The adventures of the sailing yacht Phoenix continue to occupy our attention. (The problems of the Phoenix and its crew of earnest and determined Quakers were discussed at some length in Ambassador Locke's personal report to you of November 24.) The ship returned to Danang November 25, after having been towed out to international waters by the Vietnamese authorities on November 22. It developed that one of the crew, Dr. Richard Butterworth, who had jumped into the water when the ship was being towed out to sea, had become acutely seasick in the rough waters now prevailing near Danang, with the northeast monsoon blowing. The ship was allowed to return to Danang to obtain medical care for Dr. Butterworth, who will be allowed to go ashore and return to the United States by air. The disposition of the medical supplies now on the Phoenix is still unresolved. The Quaker group insists that half of the medical supplies must go to the extremist (and generally anti-government) Buddhist faction of Thich Tri Quang and that the turnover of the supplies take place in front of witnesses. Originally, they had demanded that they be present when half of the supplies are turned over to the Buddhist group, although they have since modified this demand, noting that an Embassy representative or a representative of an American charitable group would suffice. We have pointed out to them that the demand is insulting to the Vietnamese and has little chance of acceptance. Actually, the Buddhist have shown little interest in the matter, although there has been steady reporting on the vicissitudes of the ship in the Saigon press. The Quaker group on the Phoenix has told us they intend to go to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, to contact the National Liberation Front representative there, in order to turn over medical supplies to him as well. Just to complicate matters further, they propose to travel to Phnom Penh via the Mekong River, transiting Vietnamese territory. To enter the river, they are required to join a convoy, maintaining a speed (about 6-8 knots) which the Phoenix is not capable of. I imagine we shall continue to hear of the good ship Phoenix for some time to come. The Prime Minister has maintained a firm position against accepting the medicines under the conditions insisted upon by the Quakers.

C. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index declined slightly to 300 from 301 last week. Increases in the price of U. S. remilled and local rice were offset by declines in the prices of protein foods, vegetables, charcoal, and firewood. The Imported Commodity Index also remained steady. There was a sharp rise in black market currency and gold rates resulting from devaluation of the British pound and the Honk Kong dollar, though this may be transitory in nature.

D. Chieu Hoi

During the week ending November 18, there were 217 returnees, compared to 611 during the same period of 1966. This is the sixth straight week when the

Chieu Hoi rate has been down from the previous week and down from the corresponding week last year. Total returnees so far this year are 25,765. A rallier who came in on November 17 in Quang Tim Province led elements of the U. S. 101st Airborne Division to a Viet Cong main force base hospital where 20 Viet Cong were captured. Information furnished by the same rallier resulted in the capture of two Viet Cong caches which included 1.5 tons of rice, two rocket launchers, and parts and ammunition for many crew-served weapons.

E. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending November 25, the enemy killed 60 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 73, and kidnapped 77. Among the dead were 26 Revolutionary Development workers and two Hamlet Chiefs. During the same period the enemy killed 269 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong killed 3,366 civilians, wounded 6,587, and kidnapped 4,344.

INFORMATION

12

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, November 30, 1967
2:20 p. m.

Pres files

Mr. President:

Herewith Henry Owen proposes
some central themes which would
link the domestic and foreign policies
of the Administration.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. Callfano
Mr. McPherson

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, HMA, Date 12-16-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12a

MEMORANDUM

November 29, 1967

SUBJECT: Where Do We Go From Here?

1. The Administration is taking the offensive. It needs a battle cry - a central theme, to which its speeches and statements on domestic and foreign policy can be related. The theme should:

-- make sense;

-- be sufficiently simple so that it can be readily understood and remembered.

2. That theme should be built around three key points:

(a) Our goal, abroad and at home, is to improve human welfare.

(b) This involves partnership with people who come together in cooperative effort to help themselves; it can't be done by fiat from Washington.

(c) It also involves defending such constructive ventures against violence: against those who would burn our cities at home or use aggressive force across frontiers abroad.

3. The first point - that our central goal is human welfare:

-- explains a good deal of what we're doing - the War on Poverty at home and the War on Hunger abroad - in terms which have their roots deep in the American ethic and in our country's history;

-- fits the President; he's at his best when speaking in this "populist" vein.

4. The second point - that our object is to encourage "partnership," i.e., increased cooperative effort with and by the people involved:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 95-98
By Cb, NARA, Date 12596

-- reflects the plain fact that the only way the problem of poverty can be licked, at home or abroad is by securing wider cooperative effort from a wide range of entities - private, local, international, etc.

-- provides a peg for stressing the new departures that the administration is taking to this end: creative federalism and involving private enterprise in cities at home, and encouraging regional cooperation abroad;

-- appeals to the American middle class' basic aversion to trying to solve problems by US "give-aways."

5. The third point - that we must frustrate those who want to use force to break up our constructive efforts:

-- helps to put the Vietnam war in proper perspective, - as the international equivalent of our domestic efforts to frustrate extremist violence, and as something we're doing to protect a constructive policy, rather than as an end in itself;

-- emphasizes that the administration isn't soft on city rioters, thus balancing our "do good" ventures at home by showing a stern face to would be wreckers - again, a matter of great concern to the American middle class.

6. Packaging these three points into a single presentation, equally relevant to what we are doing abroad and at home, helps to make clear that our domestic and foreign policies:

-- derive from the same concepts;

-- are addressed to the same goal;

-- add up to a coherent long-term strategy for achieving that goal.

7. If the theme in para 2 has merit, it should be featured in speeches, messages to Congress, press conferences, etc. Repetition will be the key to success in getting across the fact that the administration has a clear conception of its longer run aims and a well thought out strategy for attaining them.

INFORMATION

13

Thursday, November 30, 1967
2:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

I believe you will wish to go through this with some care. It is an analysis of two polls taken in I Corps and II Corps on Vietnamese attitudes.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

South Vietnam Nationwide Hamlet Public Reaction Survey

During the period July - September 1967, Vietnamese employees of the Saigon Center for Vietnamese Studies, under JUSPAO supervision, conducted a public reaction survey in 122 hamlets throughout South Vietnam. These hamlets are located in 15 provinces spread through all four Corps regions. A total of 1313 respondents were interviewed in privacy. In viewing the results, it should be borne in mind that the survey had to be restricted to localities which are reasonably secure and accessible.

Thus far, the results of the surveys in First and Second Corps have been tabulated. In the First Corps, these comprised 218 interviewees in 25 hamlets located in two provinces. In the Second Corps, there were 231 interviewees from 24 hamlets located in three provinces.

The results of the surveys in the two Corps are remarkably alike. The significant point of difference between the two is that the villagers in the First Corps said that their life is worse now than it was a year ago, whereas a relatively large proportion of the people in the Second Corps feel that their life has improved during the past year and will continue to improve in the coming year. Obviously, the reason for this difference is the fact that the war has escalated in the First Corps area during the past year, and particularly just prior to the survey period which in First Corps was the first two weeks of July, while at the time of the survey in Second Corps, the war had de-escalated.

One of the most interesting responses was to the question of how do the people feel about the presence of American forces in the country.

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Welcome the presence	71%	71%
Do not welcome	6%	6%
Noncommittal	23%	23%

In the First Corps, half of the respondents welcome the American presence because it aids the fight against Communists and

assures security and peace for them. The others focus on economic and other aid aspects. In Second Corps, which is more secure, the American presence is welcomed mainly because the Americans help them fight the Communists, and partly because they extend economic and other aid.

On the point of who is responsible for the continuation of the war, the following responses were made:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Do not know	40%	45%
Of the others:		
North Vietnam	39%	29%
Viet Cong	23%	29%
Communist China	28%	28%
Soviet Union	17%	16%
United States	6%	8%
South Vietnamese Govt.		3%

The most frequently stated reasons for the continuation of the war are colonialism and ideological and economic expansionism. More than half of the respondents seem undecided or reluctant to offer any suggestion on how to bring the war to an end. Of those who do, a plurality advocate intensification of the war with about half as many calling for efforts toward negotiation. Whatever the suggestions, in both Corps, more than two to three times as many want the Government of Vietnam to "do it" as want the U. S. to "do it."

On the other hand, there is definite pessimism on the question of how long the war will last. The responses on this question were:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Less than one year	4%	7%
One to five years	10%	11%
More than five years	14%	12%
Do not know	72%	70%

Of significance in both Corps is the relatively high feeling of security among the villagers questioned, the satisfaction with the way in which the forces protect their hamlets (90 percent expressed satisfaction in the Second Corps) and the high percentage of satisfaction both with the way in which hamlet elections were held and with the elected individuals (about 70 percent in Second Corps and 87 percent in First Corps). As for the personal behavior of the protective forces, more than 90 percent are satisfied. The small percent who are not satisfied refer to the arrogant bullying or vandalistic behavior, and disregard to personal property on the part of the troops.

On the question of what the forces of the Government and its Allies should do to fight the Viet Cong effectively, 60 percent of the respondents in both Corps had no opinion. Among the others, the following responses were given:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Intensify military pressure	9%	16%
Provide adequate security for the population	11%	7%
Fair and sympathetic treatment of the population	15%	7%

In the Second Corps, others called for better training and discipline of the forces and for helping the people by better farming methods and building hospitals.

The primary objective guiding these suggestions is to defeat the Viet Cong rapidly; the secondary and third are to win the villagers' hearts and to take the initiative away from the Viet Cong.

Among the great number of economic and sociological questions that were posed, perhaps the most interesting comparisons between an escalating and de-escalating war situation can be seen in the responses on the present economic situation and aspirations for the future.

When asked to compare their situation now with a year ago, the following responses were obtained:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Worse	40%	33%
Better	20%	33%
Same	39%	33%
Why is it better?		
Higher income and crops	12%	19%
Better and more secure traveling conditions	5%	21%
Why is it worse?		
Inflation	19%	11%
Poor crops and lower income	16%	17%

Insecurity was another reason (6%) for worse appraisals in the Second Corps while defoliation plus road and air strip construction (8%) was mentioned in the First Corps.

The following results were obtained when the respondents were asked what they felt their situation would be a year from now:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
Better	9%	18%
Worse	13%	8%
Same	29%	26%
No opinion	49%	48%

Higher income and more security are the main reasons for optimism, while poor crops, insecurity and inflation account chiefly for the pessimism.

An interesting response was received when people were asked to describe in a few words what a Viet Cong is and what he does.

The majority of the respondents reflect a highly derogatory image of the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong were described as "brutal," as "terrorists," as "traitors," and as "subservient to Communist China or Russia." A minority of the respondents seem indifferent or non-committal on this question.

The Revolutionary Development program is widely known and the image of the Revolutionary Development cadre is, by and large, favorable. After listening to a brief explanation of the objectives of Revolutionary Development, all respondents were asked what they thought should be done in their respective hamlets to achieve these objectives. Of those who expressed suggestions, the following were noted:

	<u>First Corps</u>	<u>Second Corps</u>
- building or repairing public utilities (water and power systems, canals, roads, bridges, etc.)	35%	41%
- supply and low-cost sales of agricultural and fishery implements, e.g., seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, sampans, buffaloes	28%	28%
- public buildings, e.g., dispensaries, schools, hamlet offices, information offices	13%	22%
- measures to provide security	5%	20%
- helping needy people by providing jobs, food, medicine, etc.	13%	10%
- supply and low-cost sales of construction materials to villagers	8%	5%
- loans (unspecified)	5%	2%

Other items which are covered in the survey and which could be illustrated, if desired, are:

1. Use of media as sources of information. Loud speakers are the dominate source of information on inside-district events; radio on outside-district events. Printed media play a minor role.

2. Effects of Allied aircraft/artillery attacks on hamlets. A substantial proportion of the respondents experienced local Allied air or artillery strikes. A majority attributed the attacks to GVN forces. In the Second Corps, 27 percent of those whose hamlets were struck, acknowledged that the hamlets were attacked in order to return or open fire on the enemy or prevent him from taking over.

3. Chieu Hoi program. The Chieu Hoi program is widely known and there is good potential for people in secure hamlets appealing to relatives in Viet Cong ranks to rally.

4. Local hamlet elections. Nearly all people in whose hamlets local elections were held in the Spring of 1967 expressed satisfaction in the way in which they were conducted and with the outcome.

5. Constitution. There is a little cognizance of the Constitution and even less substantial information on it.

6. Government land title and tenure program. A great majority of all respondents do not own the land they till, yet knowledge about the program is very limited. A brief explanation, however, elicits majority approval.

14

ACTION

Thursday, November 30, 1967 -- 12:30pm

Pres file

Mr. President:

My inclination is to say no to the attached request to speak at the National Press Club. If you think it would be useful, I would, of course, do it. If you approve, what I'd like to do is to talk about President Johnson's foreign policy over four years.

W. W. Rostow

Do not accept _____

Accept _____

See me _____

WWRostow:rla

Thursday, November 30, 1967 -- 11:00

Pres file
15

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a National Day (December 1) message to President Bokassa of the Central African Republic.

Bokassa is a military strongman, but his regime is reasonably progressive and provides stability where the alternative is probably chaos and cannibalism. Normally, National Day messages go out pro forma. But State recommends you send Bokassa a particularly warm message to help compensate for the aid cut-off and as a token of appreciation for Bokassa's help to us on UN issues, African peace-keeping, etc.

My own vote is with State. The attached message will do us no harm, won't set a bad precedent, and might do us some good.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-278
By us, NARA Date 4-24-99

EKH/RPM/vmr

15a

**PROPOSED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT BOKASSA OF THE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

Dear Mr. President:

**All Americans join me in sending our warm congratulations
on your National Day.**

**I know this is a proud moment for you and for the people of
the Central African Republic. This day marks a milestone in the in-
dependence you are striving so vigilantly to secure and the economic
progress you are working so hope fully to achieve.**

**This day also commemorates the entry of your country into the
community of nations, where the Central African Republic has been a
good neighbor and a constructive partner.**

**In your continuing efforts toward a better life at home and peace-
ful cooperation abroad, the United States wishes you well.**

Sincerely,

EKH/vmr

Pres file

Thursday, November 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jean Monnet, Friday, December 1, 12 noon

Background

Monnet was in New York Wednesday to receive the 1967 Family of Man Award in recognition of fifty years of service, particularly his great contributions to the reconstruction of Europe and to the ideal of a strong and united Europe working in close concert with the U. S. toward Atlantic partnership.

At 79, Monnet continues to pursue his goal of a united Europe. He remains Founder-President of the 17-year-old Action Committee for the United States of Europe, an influential coalition-lobby of major European political and labor leaders. One of their current projects is to establish a special group to deal with U. S. -European problems.

Talking Points

- You will want to congratulate Monnet on the Family of Man Award.
- What is de Gaulle up to?
- Where are the European Communities going? Can the other Five overcome de Gaulle's "veto" on UK entry?
- What should the U. S. be doing in Europe? Monnet may suggest a Presidential speech on European policy. If he does, you might ask what he thinks could usefully be said.

W. W. Rostow

RHU:em



S/S #20387

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


16a

November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's Appointment with
Mr. Jean Monnet

The President has agreed to see Jean Monnet on December 1 at 12:00 a.m. As background for their conversation, we have prepared the enclosed briefing materials, talking points and biographic information sheet.


Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

1. Briefing materials.
2. Talking points.
3. Biographic data.

BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR THE
PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MR. JEAN MONNET

Jean Monnet is in Washington for a brief visit following his appearance in New York to receive the 1967 Family of Man Award, [That award was] conferred [on him on November 29] in recognition of a record of accomplishment spanning five decades. The text of the Award citation (enclosed) illustrates Monnet's contribution to the reconstruction of a continent and to the ideal of a strong and united Europe working in close concert with the United States toward Atlantic partnership.

At [age] 79 Monnet continues to pursue his goal of a united Europe. He remains Founder-President of the 17-year old Action Committee for the United States of Europe. It is an influential coalition-lobby of over 40 major European political party and labor leaders (excluding the Communists and Gaullist UNR/UDT) which seeks to persuade leaders of government, industry and labor that the future of Europe lies in the political unification of Europe.

Recently Monnet's Action Committee adopted a set of resolutions on UK accession, technological development, cooperation with the US and consultation with the Eastern European countries, which the major political parties in the Common Market countries have introduced in their parliaments. The resolutions have been well received at the national level.

[A brief description of the Monnet Committee's four resolutions is enclosed.]

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S
MEETING WITH MR. JEAN MONNET

1. You may wish to congratulate Mr. Monnet on receiving the 1967 Family of Man Award for long and deserving service.
2. What are Monnet's views on the condition of the European Communities? How does he evaluate the present chances for UK entry into the Communities?
3. What does Monnet think of U.S. policy toward Europe?
4. Monnet may suggest a Presidential speech on European policy. If he raises this matter, you might ask what he thinks could usefully be said at this time either in a Presidential address or in the State of the Union message beyond your June 7 statement.
5. You have made clear your firm opposition to protectionism in this country and its willingness to take vigorous action to assure that the great benefits of the Kennedy Round are realized. You might seek Monnet's views on this problem from the European viewpoint. There are active protectionists in Europe who concern us.
6. Monnet's Action Committee is planning a Committee of Entente to deal with European-American issues. What specifically does Monnet have in mind?

Resolutions - Action Committee for a United States of Europe
June 15, 1967

1. Entry of U.K. into the European Communities - Endorsement of opening and rapidly bringing negotiations leading to British membership in the Common Market to a successful conclusion. Also in favor of the other EFTA nations assuming obligations of European Communities' membership.

2. Organization of the Technological Development of the European Community - Recommendation to governments to request the European Communities to facilitate establishment of European companies, to organize a European capital market, and to establish a European technological development program.

3. Establishment of a Relationship of Equals with the United States - Approval of the Kennedy Round success which showed that a united Europe can negotiate with the U.S. as an equal, and recommendation that a "Committee of Entente" be established in which major questions of mutual European and American interests would be debated before decisions were made.

4. Cooperation of the European Communities with the USSR and Eastern Europe - Recommending that the governments ask the European Communities to establish consultations with the Soviet bloc to seek to increase trade and the exchange of knowledge and to solve the problems dividing Europe.

(Begin Text)

The sustained and brilliant performance of His Excellency Jean Monnet as businessman, financier, economist, planner, administrator and humanitarian has made him a valued advisor to governments of many countries in periods of war and peace. He stands as a dramatic example of the contribution each of us can make to the family of man, whatever our field.

He has brought his special skills to bear on the economic and social upheaval in Europe and helped lead it from a state of exhaustion and near collapse at the end of World War Two to a vigorous and thriving community of nations through the instrumentality of the European Common Market and the European Coal and Steel Community.

In summing up his accomplishments, President Kennedy said: "Europe has moved closer to unity in less than twenty years than it had done before in a thousand. . . you are transforming Europe by the power of a constructive idea."

Currently his energies are being employed as President of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. This committee was established in 1955 to support the action of the governments of six European countries in building a united Europe. It promises to supply a practical blueprint for the constructive and democratic growth of nations elsewhere through a free cooperative economic system as a first step.

The long line of successes in a wide variety of fields show something of the magnitude of Jean Monnet's contribution. To mention some, he created a "victory program" which was used by President Roosevelt during World War Two and significantly increased American production. He served as Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations. He played a major role in rebuilding the French economy. For some time he was a member of the American investment banking firm of Blair and Company, in addition to developing a successful family business.

In each of these he has demonstrated his skill and propensity for success. He has pursued his immediate objectives always with a view to a broader context, namely that of the whole family of man. He has also demonstrated that real and concrete progress can and will be made toward this ultimate ideal. As he himself put it: "The ultimate goal must be a 'society of man'. Our aim is not rpt not to build coalitions of states but to unite men. To achieve this great transformation is the essential task of our generation." (End Text)

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

NAME: Jean Monnet

BORN: Cognac, France, November 9, 1888, the son of a prominent brandy manufacturer and exporter

EDUCATION: Baccalaureate degree (age 16) No university

PROFESSION: International public servant, international businessman and banker

PRESENT POSITION: President, Action Committee for the United States of Europe

FAMILY: Married, two children, lives outside Paris

CAREER:- In teens, employed by father's brandy concern

- World War I - French Ministry of Commerce
French representative in London - Inter-allied
Committee on Food Distribution and Marine Transport
- 1919-23 - Deputy Secretary General of League of Nations
- 1923 - Took over family business
- 1925-32 - Named head of American investment firm in Paris
In U.S. with same firm
- 1932-36 - Appointments with Swedish, Chinese and Polish Governments as financial consultants
- 1936 - Returned to New York to enter investment partnership
- 1938 - Returned to France to serve with French Government
Sent to U.S. as head of French purchasing mission buying war planes
- 1939 - French chairman of Anglo-French Coordinating Committee on Inter-Allied Agencies, pushed for political union between France and UK

- 1940 - After fall of France, named member of British purchasing mission to Washington, participated in "Victory program of accelerated war production"
- 1943 - Named Commissioner for Armament, Supplies and Reconstruction in French Committee of National Liberties
- 1944 - Appointed Commissioner of State without portfolio in provisional de Gaulle government
- 1945 - Chief of French Economic mission to Washington and French representative at UN Conference on International Organization at San Francisco
- 1945-50 - Named French Commissioner General for Planning
- 1947 - Participated in Paris Conference on Marshall Plan in addition numerous other important missions
- 1950 - Drafted plan to pool coal and steel resources of France and Germany
- 1952-55 - First president of resulting European Coal and Steel Community
- 1955 - Proposed idea of a European Atomic Energy Community and European Common Market

Organized the Action Committee for the United States of Europe

- 1957-Present - Action Committee - took lead role in pressing Parliament to ratify the treaties creating the European Economic Community and Euratom. Subsequently has supported acceleration of integration in Europe and the entry of Britain into the Common Market.

Recipient of numerous awards, declarations and honorary degrees.

Thursday, November 30, 1967

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Wilson's Visit

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memorandum containing Prime Minister Wilson's suggestion of Tuesday and Wednesday, January 16 and 17, as dates for a possible visit with you.

The Prime Minister would plan to stop at Ottawa on his way here. He may go to Moscow at the end of January.

Secretary Rusk suggests we tell the Prime Minister that January 16 and 17 would be agreeable subject to adjustment should Congress decide to convene later than usual.

Jim Jones says your schedule is free on these dates.

You agreed to see Sir Harold Macmillan sometime between January 13-17 for a courtesy call. I believe we can move this around so there will be no problem.

W. W. Rostow

Approve January 16-17, subject to adjustment
should Congress convene late _____

No _____

See me _____

inf
ERF:mst

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *lg*, NARA, Date 1-3-82

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

4522
17a

~~SECRET~~

November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Sir Patrick Dean came in to see me this afternoon with a message from his Prime Minister about the dates for a possible visit.

The Prime Minister suggests Tuesday and Wednesday, January 16th and 17th.

It would be his plan to stop off in Ottawa on the way and reach Washington on the evening of the 15th or the morning of the 16th. It seems to me that a stop in Ottawa on the way presents no problems, especially in view of DeGaulle's recent attack on Canada.

If the 16th and 17th are not convenient, Sir Patrick Dean thought that a week earlier might be agreeable. This idea arose because of the possibility that our Congress might elect to return later than usual in January. I believe the Prime Minister suggested the 16th and 17th because he thought you would have the State of the Union behind you by that date.

There is also the possibility that the Prime Minister would be going to Moscow at the very end of January. He would probably change this date if such a Moscow visit would create any problems for you. My own impression is that if there were a ten day interval no particular problem would arise.

I would suggest:

That we tell the Prime Minister that the dates of January 16 and 17 appear to be agreeable but that some adjustment would have to be made if the Congress decides to meet later than usual in January. This would mean that we should hold off making a public announcement of his visit for another ten days or two weeks.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines, 7/21/97
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

18

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, November 29, 1967
6:05 p. m.

Presfile

Mr. President:

I thought you might wish to take a look at the way Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara plan to handle the Locke operation, since it is very much your idea.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

See me _____

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rlm*, NARA, Date 12-16-91

18a

~~SECRET~~

Amembassy SEOUL IMMEDIATE
 Amembassy SAIGON IMMEDIATE
 Amembassy TOKYO IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NO 91-7
 By NSA/NARA, Date 1-16-92

STATE

NODIS

Seoul Eyes Only for Porter. Saigon Eyes Only for Bunker and
 Locke. Tokyo Eyes Only for Johnson.

1. Highest levels now wish to pursue additional ROK troop contri-
 bution with maximum urgency. Since Ambassador Locke is returning
 to US for consultation on December 7 in any event, our proposal
 is that he go via Seoul for short visit, possibly bearing
 Presidential message to Park.

2. Purpose of visit would not repeat not be to nail down all
 details, but to convey sense of urgency felt at highest levels
 here and to carry forward from Clifford/Taylor mission. At same
 time, we wish his message to be as specific as possible in terms
 of type and scale of additional forces, and we would hope that
 Seoul can provide ^{US} best judgment on what kind of "package" ROK
 might ask in return, so that ^{we can provide} Locke ^{with instructions and} might be in position either to ^{put him}

EA:WPBundy:mk 11/29/67 4235

The Secretary

White House - Mr. Rostow (subs)

DOD - Secretary McNamara

S/S -

~~SECRET~~

② 2

Seoul, Saigon, Tokyo

~~SECRET~~

respond under some headings or at any rate to undertake to get rapid answers on his return here.

3. To minimize visit appearing wholly as solicitation of additional contribution, we would in any event wish to depict it as normal US/ROK consultation on Viet-Nam situation. Depending on Tokyo's judgment, we might also schedule short visit in Japan, recalling that GOJ has expressed interest in reports on Viet-Nam situation. Possible schedule might take Locke to Tokyo on December 4 and 5, with visit to Seoul on December 6 and departure from Seoul during day December 7.

4. Request urgent Seoul and Tokyo comment on this schedule and basic outline. You wx should not repeat not approach host governments until we have final exchanges. Your comment should cover receptivity of hsmx host government, date problems, and whether you see additional elements that could be used effectively to further the general picture of routine consultation on a regularly scheduled consultation return to the US. For example, would it be useful or the reverse to depict Tokyo visit as related to non-military areas in which GOJ already helping and in which such additional projects as educational television are pending? Replies should be NODIS with copies to other posts concerned.

5. Seoul already has our EXDIS ~~xxxxxx~~ request (State 76010, NOTAL)

~~SECRET~~

Corrections made on original green MUST be made on this and other flimsy work copies before delivery to Telecommunications Operations Division

19

ACTION

Pres file

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, November 29, 1967
5:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms:

-- Agrees to surrender Bill Colby to Bob Komer;

-- but notes the public relations danger of a public CIA association with Komer's operation.

You will wish to consider this; but I should think advantages of a first-class man in that post outweigh the public relations cost, which might be kept low with some care in handling quietly the transfer from Latham to Colby.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-252
By is, NARA, Date 1-14-04

WWRostow:rla



4780
19a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

27 November 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

SUBJECT: Assignment of Senior CIA Officer as
Ambassador Komer's Civilian Deputy

1. At breakfast Tuesday, 21 November, Ambassador Komer mentioned the problem he was having in finding a replacement for his civilian deputy, Mr. Lathram (an AID officer scheduled to leave Vietnam next spring). Mr. Komer indicated that he would like to have Mr. William E. Colby, a senior Agency officer, assigned to him as Mr. Lathram's replacement. Ambassador Komer and I met on Wednesday, 22 November, to discuss this request.

2. As you know, Ambassador Komer has, in effect, two deputies: one a Major General (presently General Forsythe), the other a civilian (Mr. Lathram). The civilian deputy is the general manager of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Staff (CORDS) structure and holds the MACV title of Assistant Chief of Staff for CORDS. In effect, this civilian deputy serves as Ambassador Komer's alter ego and directs the day-to-day operations of the whole United States pacification effort. Ambassador Komer wants Mr. Colby for this position, because Ambassador Komer believes that there is no one who has a more sensitive appreciation than Mr. Colby of what pacification involves. I would

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6
NLJ/RAC 03-253
By me, NARA, Date 1-14-04

agree with this judgment.

3. We will, of course, make Mr. Colby available. We have done everything we can to support the Vietnam program and will naturally continue to do so. I was pleased to hear Ambassador Komer say during our Wednesday discussion that this Agency has done more to assist him in his pacification responsibilities than any other single component of the Government.

4. Before Mr. Colby's assignment is cast in concrete, however, I want to be sure that you are personally aware of his background. Mr. Colby served in our Saigon Station from the spring of 1959 until the summer of 1962, he took over as Chief of Station in June 1960 and served in that capacity for the remaining two years of his Saigon assignment. Upon his return to Washington, he became the Deputy Chief of our Clandestine Services' Far East Division and in January 1963 replaced the late Desmond FitzGerald as Chief of the Far East Division, a post he still holds. In sum, Mr. Colby ran CIA's Vietnam activities in the field for more than two years and for almost five years has been in charge of our clandestine and covert activities throughout the Far East. He is widely known to have been our Chief of Station in Saigon and many of the senior press correspondents in Washington (and Vietnam) are aware of his present position.

~~SECRET - (S)~~

5. I note the above points only because I want to be sure you recognize, before the fact, that if Mr. Colby is assigned as Ambassador Komer's principal civilian deputy, the press can contend that the whole pacification effort has been "taken over" by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Rich

Richard Helms
Director

INFORMATION

20

Profile

Wednesday, November 29, 1967 -- 4:45 pm

Mr. President:

You asked for an authoritative interpretation of our responsibilities under the SEATO Treaty. In the marked passages of the attached two papers the following question is dealt with: whether the defense obligations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty are individual as well as collective. As the covering note indicates: "For more than five years, the United States has made plain that it considers each party to the Treaty to have such an individual obligation under the Treaty provision."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

4/66
20a

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

November 24, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Applicability of the SEATO Treaty
to Viet Nam

In accordance with Secretary Rusk's request, I am enclosing with this note copies of two papers that discuss the applicability of the SEATO Treaty to Viet Nam. Each of these takes up the question whether the defensive obligations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty are individual as well as collective. For more than five years, the United States has made plain that it considers each party to the Treaty to have such an individual obligation under the Treaty provision. I have marked the portions of the attached papers that are directed to this point.

LCM

Leonard C. Meeker
The Legal Adviser

Enclosures:

1. Department of State memorandum of March 4, 1966 entitled "The Legality of US Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam."
2. Background Paper for SEATO Council Meeting in April 1967.

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G. International Law Does Not Require a Declaration of War as a Condition Precedent To Taking Measures of Self-Defense Against Armed Attack

The existence or absence of a formal declaration of war is not a factor in determining whether an international use of force is lawful as a matter of international law. The United Nations Charter's restrictions focus on the manner and purpose of its use and not on any formalities of announcement.

It should also be noted that a formal declaration of war would not place any obligations on either side in the conflict by which that side would not be bound in any event. The rules of international law concerning the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict apply regardless of any declaration of war.

H. Summary

The analysis set forth above shows that South Viet-Nam has the right in present circumstances to defend itself against armed attack from the North and to organize a collective self-defense with the participation of others. In response to requests from South Viet-Nam, the United States has been participating in that defense, both through military action within South Viet-Nam and actions taken directly against the aggressor in North Viet-Nam. This participation by the United States is in conformity with international law and is consistent with our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

II. THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN COMMITMENTS TO ASSIST SOUTH VIET-NAM IN DEFENDING ITSELF AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH

The United States has made commitments and given assurances, in various forms and

¹² For a statement made by President Eisenhower on June 21, 1954, see *ibid.*, Aug. 2, 1954, p. 163.

¹³ For text, see *ibid.*, p. 162.

¹⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

at different times, to assist in the defense of South Viet-Nam.

A. The United States Gave Undertakings at the End of the Geneva Conference in 1954

At the time of the signing of the Geneva accords in 1954, President Eisenhower warned "that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern," at the same time giving assurance that the United States would "not use force to disturb the settlement."¹² And the formal declaration made by the United States Government at the conclusion of the Geneva conference stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security."¹³

B. The United States Undertook an International Obligation To Defend South Viet-Nam in the SEATO Treaty

Later in 1954 the United States negotiated with a number of other countries and signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.¹⁴ The treaty contains in the first paragraph of article IV the following provision:

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Annexed to the treaty was a protocol stating that:

The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

Thus, the obligations of article IV, paragraph 1, dealing with the eventuality of

see especially next page

armed attack, have from the outset covered the territory of South Viet-Nam. The facts as to the North Vietnamese armed attack against the South have been summarized earlier, in the discussion of the right of self-defense under international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The term "armed attack" has the same meaning in the SEATO treaty as in the United Nations Charter.

Article IV, paragraph 1, places an obligation on each party to the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of an armed attack. The treaty does not require a collective determination that an armed attack has occurred in order that the obligation of article IV, paragraph 1, become operative. Nor does the provision require collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. As Secretary Dulles pointed out when transmitting the treaty to the President, the commitment in article IV, paragraph 1, "leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event an armed attack occurs."¹⁵

The treaty was intended to deter armed aggression in Southeast Asia. To that end it created not only a multilateral alliance but also a series of bilateral relationships. The obligations are placed squarely on "each Party" in the event of armed attack in the treaty area—not upon "the Parties," a wording that might have implied a necessity for collective decision. The treaty was intended to give the assurance of United States assistance to any party or protocol state that might suffer a Communist armed attack, regardless of the views or actions of other parties. The fact that the obligations are individual, and may even to some extent differ among the parties to the treaty, is demonstrated by the United States understanding, expressed at the time of signature, that its obligations under article IV, paragraph 1, apply only in the event of Commu-

¹⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 29, 1954, p. 820.

nist aggression, whereas the other parties to the treaty were unwilling so to limit their obligations to each other.

Thus, the United States has a commitment under article IV, paragraph 1, in the event of armed attack, independent of the decision or action of other treaty parties. A joint statement issued by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand on March 6, 1962,¹⁶ reflected this understanding:

The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.

Most of the SEATO countries have stated that they agreed with this interpretation. None has registered objection to it.

When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, it noted that the treaty area was further defined so that the "Free Territory of Vietnam" was an area "which, if attacked, would fall under the protection of the instrument." In its conclusion the committee stated:

The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that acceptance of these additional obligations commits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1.

C. The United States Has Given Additional Assurances to the Government of South Viet-Nam

The United States has also given a series of additional assurances to the Government of South Viet-Nam. As early as October 1954 President Eisenhower undertook to provide direct assistance to help make South Viet-

¹⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498.

SEATO COUNCIL MEETING
Washington, April 18-20, 1967

Background Paper

SEATO Relationship to U.S. Actions in Viet Nam

United States Position

United States actions in assisting South Viet Nam to defend itself against armed attack from the North are in fulfillment of an obligation we undertook in 1955 in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. Article IV, paragraph 1 of the Treaty provides:

"Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations."

From the outset South Viet Nam was included within the treaty area by virtue of a protocol to the Treaty. Therefore, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty has provided a substantiating basis for United States support of South Viet Nam. Since North Viet Nam's aggression reached the level of "armed attack", however, our support of South Viet Nam is properly considered as fulfilling our obligation under Article IV, paragraph 1. There may be some question as to the exact date at which North Viet Nam's aggression grew into an "armed attack", but there can be no doubt that it had occurred before February 1965.

~~The obligations of the parties under the Treaty are individual, as well as collective.~~ Article IV, paragraph 1 places an obligation on each party to the SEATO Treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of an armed attack. The Treaty does not require a collective determination that an armed attack has occurred in order that the obligations of Article IV, paragraph 1

Exempted from automatic decontrol.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2

become operative. Nor does the provision require collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. A joint statement issued by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand on ~~March 6, 1962~~, reflected this understanding:

~~"The Secretary of State assured the Foreign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as well as collective."~~

Most of the SEATO countries have stated that they agreed with this interpretation. None has registered objection to it.

Other SEATO Members

Thailand, Australia and New Zealand have all subscribed publicly to a position virtually identical with that of the United States as described above. The Philippines has linked its provision of a military construction unit to assist South Viet-Nam with its SEATO Treaty obligations. The United Kingdom, France and Pakistan would not agree that the Treaty obligates them to assist South Viet-Nam in its present defense against the North, despite the fact that the Communique of the 1966 SEATO Council Meeting specifically characterized North Viet-Nam's aggression against the South as a "continuing armed attack."

SEATO

SEATO as an organization is not closely related to United States actions in Viet-Nam. There has been no request for assistance from South Viet-Nam to SEATO as an entity and no collective action by SEATO. The attitudes of the United Kingdom, France and Pakistan would make SEATO collective action difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. The closest relation of the organization to U.S. actions is the support given by the annual Council meetings, particularly the presence of the observer from South Viet-Nam and the generally helpful references in the Communique.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Wednesday, November 29, 1967 -- 4:30

Mr. President:

Pres file

President Leon Mba of Gabon died yesterday after a long illness. We've had very good relations with Gabon under Mba.

Attached, for your approval, are warm condolence messages to Mba's widow and his successor, Vice President Bongo.

W. W. Rostow

Approve both messages _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/RPM/vmr

21a

Proposed Message to Madam Mba of Gabon

Dear Madam Mba:

Mrs. Johnson and I were most saddened to learn of the death of President Mba. We want you to know how much you have our sympathy at this hour. Your husband will long be remembered as one of the great pioneers of African independence.

Sincerely,

Proposed Message to President-designate Bongo of Gabon

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Government and the people of the United States, I extend our heartfelt condolences to you and the people of Gabon on the death of President Mba. All free men revere the memory of this brave and wise leader who not only led his nation to independence but also set it firmly on the road to prosperity.

As you assume the heavy responsibilities of leadership, I wish you every success. I look forward to a continuation of the close friendship and cooperation which our two countries have always enjoyed.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

INFORMATION

22

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, November 29, 1967
3:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a summary of a reassuring special MACV study of the accuracy of enemy body count.

Answer: biases are not conservative and, surprisingly, for the ARVN also.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS-CBS 19

By isa, NARS, Date 6-22-84

WWRostow:rla

22a~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Body Count Verification

The attached document is the latest MACV study on the accuracy of enemy body count. The report is the result of a recent in-depth study of the captured documents coupled with an extensive field survey.

Results of the captured document study were inconclusive, mainly because most enemy sources report losses without further breakdown. A newly-arrived statistician will be put on the project, however, and, hopefully, be able to develop better statistical procedures.

The field survey consisted of sending a number of teams into the various Corps to examine reporting procedures at the various levels and to make spot checks at the battle sight when possible. During the period of the survey, October 10 through 25, a total of 924 actions, ranging from fire teams to battalion-size, were reported which resulted in confirmed killed. Twenty-nine percent, or 268 actions, were surveyed. At no time during the survey was any intentional inflation or error observed. At all levels, every effort was made by the units to report only accurate and verified enemy killed.

Discrepancies were noted, but they tended to have a deflating influence on the figures rather than an inflating influence.

The following conclusions were reached:

A. There is no intentional inflation of the reported enemy body count.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority NLS-CBS 19
By ica, NARS, Date 6-22-84

B. There are from time to time administrative errors made in the reporting system, but the errors tend to be more delationary than inflationary. However, the reporting system is sound.


C. The policy of counting bodies found in graves as confirmed enemy killed is nonstandard and could be a source of inflating reported enemy confirmed killed.

D. There is hard evidence that air and artillery strikes result in more enemy killed than is reported.

E. The number of civilians killed and reported as VC killed cannot be determined in that often bodies carry no identification.

F. Any inflation as a result of human error is more than offset by the enemy killed not reported.

G. The Joint Generals Staff and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces may be receiving a low body count as a result of administrative errors in the reporting chain.


Art McCafferty

cc: Jorden
Ginsburgh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

226

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96222

MACJ343

24 NOV 1967

SUBJECT: Enemy Losses

TO: Defense Intelligence Agency
Attn: DIAAP-4A
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Reference:

- a. DIA Msg DIAAP-4A 6953, DTG 212049Z Sep 67 (C).
- b. COMUSMACV Msg 31538, DTG 241131Z Sep 67 (C).

2. Reference a, requested best estimate as to accuracy of the reported enemy body count. Reference b, responded to reference a and stated that an in-depth study of captured documents coupled with an extensive field survey using sample techniques had been initiated and that the results would be forwarded.

3. Both studies have been completed. The results of the document study are at Inclosure 1 and the Enemy Body Count Survey Report is at Inclosure 2.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl
as

Walter T. Kerwin, Jr.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

Copies furnished:
US Embassy, Saigon, Vietnam
CINCPAC (J22)
✓ White House Situation Room
OSD System Analysis

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NLS/CBS 7
By ics, NARS, Date 7-25-83

DOWN CLASS
SEPARATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

22c

MACJ2 FACT SHEET

30 October 1967

SUBJECT: Credibility of Body Count Report

I. GENERAL.

(U) CofS memorandum to ACoFS, J2 dated 5 October 1967 directed that, in connection with the J3 body count sampling project, a study be conducted to validate the body count through the use of enemy documents.

II. CURRENT STATUS/FORECAST.

A. (U) A comparison of losses reported by the enemy in captured documents and POW interrogations and enemy KIA reported by friendly units is appended as Supplemental Data Sheet A.

B. (C) An analysis of enemy reported losses which could be identified with a specific unit and a specific engagement totaled 2,222. The enemy body count reported by the friendly units involved in the same engagements totaled to 1,791. Results are inconclusive since most enemy sources report "losses" without further breakout. Additional sources of inaccuracies in the figures shown in the supplemental data sheet are: WIA who subsequently die are removed from the battlefield by the enemy; many dead are removed from the battlefield by the enemy thereby precluding body count by friendly forces; and in some instances more than one enemy unit may have been in an engagement, but we have captured a document reflecting losses of only one of the units in contact.

C. (C) ACoFS, J2 will continue to screen captured documents and POW interrogations for enemy statements of KIA's which can be then compared to friendly unit body count reports.

D. (C) Mr. Thomas, the statistician recently attached to J2, will analyze the previous enemy loss study and its update as a priority project. It is hoped that his study will result in the development of statistical procedures which will more accurately determine total enemy losses, to include KIA, DOW, permanently disabled, deserted, and non-battle casualties.

III. RECOMMENDED ACTION.

(U) That contents of this fact sheet be noted.

LTC Parkins
ARVN 31379

Supplemental Data Sheet
A - Comparison of Body Count
Report with Enemy Losses
Stated in Documents and
POW Interrogations

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MACJ2 Supplemental Data Sheet A
SUBJECT: Comparison of Body Count Report
Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: I CTZ

Analysis of documents screened for indications of enemy losses consistent with FWMAF claims of enemy KIA produced the following relationships:

a. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
1st & 2nd ARVN Abn Bns	YD 5741	21 Jul 67	205	COC, 22 Jul 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
800th VC Bn	YD 5741	21 Jul 67	200	Det, SIA, 1st Inf Div. 28 Jul 67

b. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
Quang Tri City & La Vang AF	YD 343509 YD 339530	6 Apr 67	60	J2 Daily Intel Briefing. 6 Apr 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
416th NVA Bn, 5th NVA Regt	YD 343509 YD 339530	6 Apr 67	35 KIA 45 WIA	Cap Doc, CDEC Log #05-0743-67

c. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
Recon Patrol, USMC	XD 736465	5 Jun 67	10	COC, 6 Jun 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
9th Co, 6th Bn, 95th Regt	XD 736465	5 Jun 67	10	Det, ITT-III MAF #552-67, 7 Jun 67

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Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: I CTZ (Cont)

d. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
11th Co, 3rd Bn, 2nd ROKMC Bde	BS 588833	15 Feb 67	243	COC, 16 Feb 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
1st VC Regt	BS 588833	15 Feb 67	200	Det, IIT-III MAF #342-67, 22 Feb 67

e. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
Opn Lien Ket 81	Northern Quang Ngai Province	17-22 Feb 67	388	III MAF SITREP, 22 Feb 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
21st NVA Regt, Spt Elms of 2nd NVA Div	Northern Quang Ngai Province	17-22 Feb 67	842	Det, MACV INTSUM 7165-67, 13 Jun 67

f. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
Opn Tuscaloosa	Quang Nam Province	25-28 Jan 67	78	III MAF SITREP #28, 28 Jan 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
R-20 LF Bn	Quang Nam, Opn Tuscaloosa	25-28 Jan 67	100	J2 MACV Daily INTSUM #36-67, 3 Feb 67

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Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: II CTZ

Analysis of documents screened for indications of enemy losses consistent with FVMAF claims of enemy KIA produced the following relationships:

a. Friendly

Unit	Location	Dated	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
1/8 Cav	YA 717318	18 May 67	119	MACV COC, 18 May 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
32nd Regt	YA 717318	18 May 67	120	PW, IFFV INTSUM #1441, 21 May 67

b. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
C/1/5 Cav	BR 758745	16 Oct 66	59	IFFV PER #46, 4 Dec 66

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
2nd Bn, 2nd VC Regt	BR 758745	16 Oct 66	59	PW, IFFV INTSUM #365 31 Dec 66

c. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
2/5 Cav	BR 983837	28-29 Jun 67	66	IFFV INTSUM #180, 29 Jun 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
9th Bn, 18th Regt	BR 983837	28-29 Jun 67	150	PW, IFFV INTSUM #224, 12 Aug 67

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Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: III CTZ

Analysis of documents screened for indications of enemy losses consistent with FWMF claims of enemy KIA produced the following relationships:

a. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
43rd ARVN Regt	YT 8236	28 Feb 66	142	II FFV VC Contact List

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
5th VC Div	YT 8236	28 Feb 66	140	CMIC Rpt 1211, 24 Aug 66

b. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
25th US Inf	XT 4154	4-6 Nov 66	166	1st US Div INTSUM #237

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
271st VC Regt	XT 4154	4-6 Nov 66	55	II FFV INTSUM #237, re: PW

c. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
AP/MP TSN AB	XS 6888	4 Dec 66	29 KIA 2 WIA 4 PW	COC, 5 Dec 66

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
6th VC LF Bn A 2/C-10 MF Bn	XS 6888	4 Dec 66	13 WIA 22 KIA	CDEC Log #01-2926 67

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Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: III CTZ (Cont)

d. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
25th US Inf	XT 5626	19 Jul 66	51	II FFV VC Contact List

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
1st VC MF Bn	XT 5626	19 Jul 66	49 KIA/WIA	II FFV INTSUM #47, (PW Le Van Du)

e. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
9th US Inf	XT 7019	25-26 Feb 67	92	COC, 26 Feb 67

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
1st VC MF Bn	XT 7019	25-26 Feb 67	100 KIA/WIA	II FFV INTSUM #57 (PW Huynh Van Huynh)

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Body Count/Enemy Unit Deterioration Studies: IV CTZ

Analysis of documents screened for indications of enemy losses consistent with PW/MAF claims of enemy KIA produced the following relationships:

a. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
7th (ARVN) Div	XS 1854	15 Mar 66	50	IV DASC DISUM, 15 Mar 66

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
261st VC Inf Bn	XS 1854	15 Mar 66	30	7th ARVN Adv OB Study

b. Friendly

Unit	Location	Date	Enemy Body Count Reported	Source
7th (ARVN) Div	XS 1446	7 Feb 66	33	IV DASC DISUM, 8 Feb 66

Enemy

Unit	Location	Date	Losses Reported	Source
263rd VC Inf Bn	XS 1446	7 Feb 66	52	CDEC Bul. 5042, 30 May 67

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DISPOSITION FORM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL

SUBJECT

MACJ343

Enemy Body Count Survey Report (U)

TO Chief of Staff

FROM ACofS, J3

DATE 8 Nov 1967

CMT 1

CDR Langford/cms/2814

1. (U) PROBLEM: To conduct a sample survey to validate the reported enemy body count.

2. (U) FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

- a. Terrain features limiting visual counting and search.
- b. The moving nature of battle actions and the lack of area control.
- c. The enemy's practice of removing dead from the battlefield particularly during hours of darkness.
- d. The enemy's addition of non-combatants such as civilian porters and laborers makes it difficult to distinguish VC soldiers from civilians.

3. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. On 22 September COMUSMACV set forth a requirement to conduct a survey to sample the enemy body count to determine the validity of the enemy body count reports. ACofS, J3 was tasked to produce a plan and conduct a survey. COMUSMACV message 030257Z Oct 67, set the survey in motion and on 5 October representatives from Headquarters MACV deployed to Headquarters III MAF, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, and SA, IV Corps to act as survey team leaders in those areas. Teams were organized in each CTZ as shown in Annex A. The survey included only U.S. and ARVN/RF/PF forces. The survey was to cover company size actions or larger and significant RF/PF actions. However, as the survey progressed it was felt that insufficient data would be collected owing to the limited number of company size actions compared to total enemy KIA and the survey was expanded to cover smaller actions, when these actions resulted in enemy KIA. The mechanics of the survey are discussed in Annex B.

b. Enemy contact reports are reported from the field units through battalion, regiment/brigade, to division. Division reports major actions to the Headquarters III MAF/I FFORCEV/II FFORCEV, in the form of a spot report. Smaller actions are reported in a six hour SITREP. The divisions also submit each 24 hours an INTSUM which consolidates the days actions. The Force Headquarters consolidate the significant actions for their area and report them to MACV on a 24 hour INTSUM.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

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MACJ343

SUBJECT: Enemy Body Count Survey Report (U)

9 OCT 1967

c. During the period of the survey, 10-25 October, a total of 924 actions ranging from fire teams to battalions were reported which resulted in a confirmed KIA. Twenty-nine percent or 268 actions were surveyed. A total of 2,720 enemy KIA were reported and 47.2 percent or 1,286 enemy KIA were counted by the survey team. Details are shown in Annex C. At no time during the survey was any intentional inflation or error observed. At all levels, from the field through the Force Headquarters every effort was made by the units to report only accurate and verified enemy KIA. However, seven discrepancies were detected by the survey team which indicated that a total of 70 (2.6 percent) enemy KIA were not reported to MACJ2/JGS/RVNAF as of the termination of the survey. These are discussed in detail in Annex D.

d. The most prominent error detected during the survey was unintentional human error. In the present combat situations where no front lines exist, most actions are continually moving and the possibility of dual counting on the battlefield exists. It is doubtful, however, that this will exceed five to ten percent in any major action and probably would not exist at all in small actions. Aerial observer reports are always questionable (suspected low) unless the action takes place in a completely open area, or a ground assessment team is inserted. In one instance during the survey a ground assessment team located 26 more bodies than was reported by the aerial observer. Dual counting may exist with the reporting of bodies found in graves and different procedures are used in reporting graves in the CTZs. (Six point three percent (6.3%) of all enemy KIA reported by US/FWMAF during the period, were the result of finding graves.) Errors in reporting grid coordinates are always a problem and the possibility of dual counting as a result of location errors is present. Undoubtedly civilians are killed as a result of some ground unit actions or air and artillery strikes whose bodies are classed VC. Their true identification is impossible. The details of these examples are listed in Annex E.

4. (C) CONCLUSIONS:

- a. There is no intentional inflation of the reported enemy body count.
- b. There are from time to time administrative errors made in the reporting system, but the errors tend to be more deflationary than inflationary. However, the reporting system is sound.
- c. The policy of counting bodies found in graves as confirmed enemy KIA is nonstandard and could be a source of inflating reported enemy confirmed KIA.

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MACJ343

SUBJECT: Enemy Body Count Survey Report (U)

8 NOV 1967

d. There is hard evidence that air and artillery strikes result in more enemy KIA than is reported.

e. The number of civilians KIA and reported as VC KIA cannot be determined in that often the bodies carry no identification.

f. Any inflation as result of human error is more than offset by enemy KIA not reported.

g. JGS/RVNAF may be receiving low body count as a result of administrative errors in the reporting chain.

5. (C) ACTIONS RECOMMENDED:

a. That the current reporting system remain in effect.

b. That commanders at all echelons continue to emphasize accurate body count procedures.


c. That MACJ2 publish standard guidelines for counting enemy bodies found in graves. J-2 ✓
c/s

d. That U.S. J2 advisors to JGS/RVNAF bring attention to the possible low body counts resulting from possible administrative errors. J-2 ✓
c/s

e. That COMUSMACV be briefed on the mechanics of the survey and the findings.

f. That, in light of the survey team's findings, the press be invited, at their convenience, to witness and examine body count procedures.

g. That a copy of this report be provided to the Force Commanders and Senior Advisor, IV Corps.


WILLARD PEARSON

MG, USA

ACofS, J3

5 Annexes

- A. Survey Team Organization
- B. Mechanics of the Body Count Survey
- C. Survey Tabulations
- D. Survey Report Discrepancies
- E. Areas Where Errors are Possible

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MECHANICS OF THE BODY COUNT SURVEY

1. The MACV Survey Team membership consisted of the following:

Team Captain - Col W. F. Gausman, J34

Team Leader III MAF - CDR J. M. Langford, J34
LTC D. F. Coelho, J34

Team Leader I FFORCEV - Capt T. K. Newell, JR., J25

Team Leader II FFORCEV - Maj P. A. Vinett, J22

Team Leader SA, IV Corps - LTC H. W. McQuown, J32

2. Team leaders deployed to their assigned stations on 5 October to organize and brief their respective teams. Individual team membership consisted of a representative from the force headquarters who assisted the MACV team leader and a representative from each division, regiment/brigade, and battalion in the area. Representatives from company level were required in the Third Marine Division and the Americal Division because of the nature of the operations. Each level of command was to verify reports received from the next lower unit either by personal observation of the enemy bodies or interview with the reporting unit.

3. In the case of ARVN and RF/PF units, the U.S. Advisors to ARVN units were designated team members to survey ARVN actions and U.S. Advisors to Sector and Subsector were designated as team members to survey RF/PF actions.

4. The MACV team leader's work primarily was administrative in nature although trips to division, brigade and battalion were necessary to spot check the accuracy of the reporting procedure. Where possible the team leaders made actual trips to the scene of action to conduct a personal post action survey of enemy KIA.

5. Spot reports were checked against SITREPS and INTSUMS for accuracy and the survey reports cross checked with the INTSUMS to insure that any errors were detected. COC journals were also checked to determine if errors were being generated in the reporting system. These checks were made at Force Headquarters and at Division Headquarters.

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ARVN Corps INTSUMS were checked against surveyed or other known actions for accuracy.

6. Each team member was required to submit an individual report on each action surveyed in the following format:

Alfa - Frd unit engaged in action

Bravo - Est size of enemy force

Charlie - Total body count

Delta - VC body count

Echo - NVA body count

Foxtrot - No. KIA between age 15-45

Golf - No. KIA under age 15

Hotel - No. KIA over age 45

India - No. female KIA

Juliet - Weapons & mil equip captured

Kilo - Comments as appropriate (not intended as action narrative)

Lima - Method obtained (personal observation, interview/debriefing of AO:)

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SURVEY TABULATIONS

<u>CORPS AREA</u>	<u>ACTIONS REPORTED</u>	<u>ACTIONS SURVEYED</u>	<u>EN. KLA REPORTED</u>	<u>EN. KLA SURVEYED</u>
I	496	82	1,379	543
II	180	26	466	131
III	161	128	496	423
IV	87	32	379	189
TOTALS	924	268	2,720	1,286

PERCENT ACTIONS SURVEYED: 29%

PERCENT ENEMY BODIES SURVEYED: 47.2%

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SURVEY REPORT DISCREPANCIES

1. On 13 October C/5/7 (Americal) reported by spot report seven NVA KIA. The actual survey count was 11 NVA KIA. The survey team did not see a correction for this action reported. Results were four more NVA killed than were reported.

2. On 13 October the ARVN 41st Rangers contacted one VC Platoon and reported 29 VC KIA and captured 1 c/s and five individual weapons. The U.S. Advisor could confirm only eight VC KIA however, he was unable to cover the entire area. Therefore, only eight could be confirmed by U.S. Advisor count for a discrepancy of 21.

3. On 19 October GLAO DUC RF/PF reported contact with two VC squads at WS 980402 and reported 17 KIA. The survey showed 17 KIA, eight individual weapons and a 15 kilo mine captured. This report was not picked up by IV Corps, and reported to JGS.

4. On 20 October B/1/9 (Americal) reported eleven actions with 49 VC/KIA. The actual survey report indicated that 51 (30 VC and 21 NVA) were killed, two more than reported.

5. On 23 October B/D-5/7 (Americal) engaged a large enemy force and reported 50 (6 VC and 44 NVA) KIA. A new man in the TOC posted the information but credited the wrong unit with the action. The watch officer recognized an error and attempted to determine the actual units engaged. In the ensuing unraveling of the discrepancy the action did not get into the INTSUM, although it was reported by SITREP. As a result of the survey report a correction will be made.

6. On 23 October 3/4 ARVN engaged a VC company and killed 16 VC. The U.S. Advisor surveyed the action and reported it through advisor channels. The action did not get in the ARVN I Corps G2 INTSUM.

7. On 23 October in operation LE LOI 14/38, 1/14 ARVN and 139th RF Company contacted an unknown size enemy force at XS 455025 and reported four VC KIA. The actual survey showed six KIA and the correction was not picked up by IV Corps.

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TOTAL SURVEY REPORT DISCREPANCIES

	<u>Surveyed More than Reported</u>	<u>Surveyed Less than Reported</u>
1.	4 (U.S.)	
2.		21 (ARVN)
3.	17 (RF/PF)	
4.	2 (U.S.)	
5.	50 (U.S.)	
6.	16 (ARVN)	
7.	2 (RF)	
TOTAL	<u>91</u>	<u>21</u>

Surveyed but not reported during period 10 - 25 Oct

= 70 Enemy KIA (2.6%)

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AREAS WHERE ERRORS ARE POSSIBLE

A. AERIAL ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY KIA:

1. On 10 October an aerial observer reported 11 KIA at BR 810753 as a result of air and artillery strikes. The following day a ground assessment team was inserted into the area and counted 37 bodies and in addition killed 11 more NVA who were in the area. In addition, 45 individual and crew served weapons were captured. This example demonstrates these important points.

a. The fact that there were still NVA in the area 16 hours after the strike could mean that more NVA had been killed and the party still in the area were collecting their dead. However, the fact that there were still so many weapons left might indicate that the NVA unit had been seriously hit and the remaining had fled leaving their dead and weapons behind. In this case the additional 11 KIA on 11 October were stragglers.

b. In any event had there only been an aerial assessment of the action the body count would have remained at 11 KIA. This would tend to corroborate the feeling that many enemy are killed by air and artillery, but are never counted.

2. On 10 October at BQ 948587 an aerial observer observed and reported three NVA bodies. Thirty minutes later at BQ 949588 a ground search found and reported five bodies. There is a possibility that these sightings were the same and that three bodies were reported twice. The distance between sightings was less than 200 meters. There is also the possibility that there were in fact two different sightings and both reports were valid. In either case it would be extremely difficult to determine if double counting was involved and further, very little can be done to eliminate the problem owing to the terrain and the enemy's practice of removing his dead from the battlefield.

B. DOUBLE COUNTING OF ENEMY KIA:

1. Graves:

a. The policy of counting enemy KIA as a result of finding bodies in graves is not standard in Vietnam. In the III MAF area bodies found in graves are credited as a confirmed KIA and an equal figure is deleted from their Probable KIA list. In I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV it becomes a matter of judgement as to whether or not to count bodies found in graves. If fresh graves are located near the sight of a recent

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battle, the bodies are listed as confirmed KIA. If the graves are old, then it is assumed that the bodies have been reported previously and they are not added to the confirmed KIA list.

b. Counting bodies found in graves could in fact have an inflationary effect on enemy loss figures. For example, if the bodies are double counted, this would inflate the actual body count and also affect the computed Died of Wounds (DOW)/Permanently Disabled (PD) figures. The same is true if the bodies found, DOW after the action and later were placed on the confirmed KIA figures.

c. Also it is impossible to distinguish between civilians killed in the engagement and buried and VC killed and buried.

2. Combined Actions:

a. When operating with ARVN units, U.S. units generally are very careful not to take credit for ARVN VC/NVA KIA, however, there are times when confusion does exist. Apparently there is no agreement before hand through which channels the report should be made. For instance on 13 October elements of the U.S. 25th Division and elements of the ARVN 25th Division uncovered two grave sites. The day before the ARVN unit had contact with a VC force and reported VC losses unknown. The U.S. unit assumed the ARVN unit would report the bodies because it was their action and the ARVN unit assumed the U.S. unit would make the report because they found the graves. As a result no report was made until an inquiry by the survey team brought the matter to light.

3. ARVN Dual Reporting: On 20 October the II Corps INTSUM reported ten KIA on 201700H at CR 037407 in an action by the 181st, 183rd, 713th, 733rd, and 938th RF CO's. On 21 October, II Corps reported five RF companies killed ten VC in Binh Dinh Province at 211710H. There was only one action involving five RF CO's, but due to an oversight it was reported both days, once through Province channels, and once through ARVN channels.

4. Double Reporting by a Second Sweep Unit: On 17 October at XT 686576 2/28th 1st Inf Division had an engagement with the 271st Main Force Regiment and claimed 101 VC KIA. Three days later 1/16 1st Inf Division swept through the area and found five VC KIA at XT 685586. This report was sent in and added to the 101 figure reported earlier. It is possible that these bodies were reported in the 101 figure or later died of wounds. In either case, if they did occur, this would tend to inflate enemy losses.

C. IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY KIA VS NONCOMBATANTS KIA.

1. This probably is the most difficult area in the body count procedure. It is known that the enemy impresses (kidnaps) villagers for forced labor and porters. Whether these people should be classed as VC, VC sympathizers, or civilians is a problem over which the battlefield commander has no control. Those persons killed in the battle area are currently classed, and quite naturally so, as VC or NVA.

2. There are areas in Vietnam where the people are illiterate and are not aware of restricted areas or free fire zones. These areas are unquestionably VC controlled but the people inevitably will enter restricted and free fire zones and are subject to being killed. For instance a small village in a free strike zone southwest of Phan Thiet was recently hit by an airstrike. Refugees from the village still had old French currency and thought they were fighting the French.

3. The problem of identifying innocents from VC and VC sympathizers but counting all as VC will have to a certain degree an inflationary effect on enemy body count.

Wednesday, November 29, 1967 -- 1:00 PM

Pres file

Mr. President:

There is in Washington now a delegation of six high-ranking officials who are lobbying on behalf of the poor countries in preparation for UNCTAD II. They would like to see you. We don't think it's worth your time, but it would make sense in terms of our relations abroad if the Vice President could spend a half hour with them. He is willing to do so if you approve.

This is an entirely ceremonial proposition. No negotiations or commitments are involved. I recommend you approve a session for this delegation with the Vice President.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

EKH/vmr

cc: Mr. Ed Fried

Wednesday, November 29, 1967
10:25 a. m.

Presfile

Mr. President:

Sec. Rusk tells me he has to leave
the NSC meeting at about 12:50 p. m.
He is hosting a lunch to mark the occasion
of Iran's "graduation" from A. I. D. rolls.

He asks that you please excuse him.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-278
By isa, NARA Date 4-24-99

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~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, November 29, 1967 -- 9:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

As you know, I take BUTTERCUP seriously because it seems increasingly clear that Hanoi's and Moscow's policy is to move towards an NLF negotiation with Saigon as the way to end the war.

To illustrate the evidence -- which comes in every day in various forms -- here are three quotations from cables that came across my desk yesterday:

-- Thompson from Moscow, Nov. 27. "In my talk with Kosygin he indicated disagreement with our position that presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam was foreign intervention. On the other hand he has recently been describing to visitors new NLF program as offering us a great opportunity. I think he can only have in mind fact that new program does not envisage immediate reunification."

-- Report just received of talk between North Vietnamese Ambassador in Peking and Swiss Ambassador, on October 16. "In any negotiations the North Vietnamese assume that the NLF would be recognized as the representative of the South Vietnamese people. Nevertheless Hanoi and NLF 'would not be disinclined' to sit at the table with the United States along with 'the puppet regime of Saigon.' The basis for negotiations, the North Vietnamese Ambassador stated, would be the recently announced program of the NLF."

"North Vietnamese Ambassador commented that reunification of Viet-Nam is a rather subordinate question. He said that the first requirement is a democratic government of South Viet-Nam and that it would be up to people of South Viet-Nam to decide whether they want to be communist or not. Such a government could pursue a neutral policy, in accordance with Geneva agreements."

-- Tito to Harriman, November 28. "He was certain that the key to peace was in the hands of the United States which until now has pursued only military course and has not tried for political solution that would result in an acceptable government being created from 'democratic elements' in South Vietnam and the NLF."

We can expect very heavy pressure -- once negotiations start and are surfaced -- for us to go soft on the NLF, via Fulbright, Bobby, etc. But if we stand firmly with the constitutional process -- for which the people voted at risk -- we can hold it off.

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

W. W. Rostow

Wednesday - November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Luncheon for Latin American Ambassadors
Participating in Hemisfair

Ernie Goldstein is hosting a luncheon at 1:00 p.m., Thursday, November 30, in the Fish Room for the Latin American Ambassadors whose governments are committed or prospective participants in Hemisfair. Governor Connally will also be present. You are to drop in toward the end of the luncheon.

The purpose of the gathering is to give Governor Connally and you the chance to stress the importance of Hemisfair and persuade the uncommitted to sign up.

Those attending the luncheon will be:

- Ambassador Hugo Margain - Mexico
- Ambassador Francisco Linares - Guatemala
- Ambassador Ramon Clairmont-Duenas - El Salvador
- Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa - Nicaragua
- Ambassador Fernando Ortuno - Costa Rica
- Ambassador Ricardo Arias - Panama
- Ambassador Hernan Echavarria - Colombia
- Ambassador Enrique Tejera-Paris - Venezuela
- Ambassador Vasco Leitao da Cunha - Brazil
- Ambassador Celso Pastor - Peru
- Ambassador Julio Sanjines - Bolivia.

You know all of them. All speak good English.

The Hemisfair people tell us that the degree of commitment of these eleven countries is as follows:

- Firm Participants - Mexico
- Central American countries
- Panama
- Venezuela.

Almost Certain - Bolivia
Colombia.

Still Dubious - Brazil
Peru.

Hemisfair is also checking the OAS to see if they would exhibit. We have also suggested the Pan American Health Organization which is doing so much to improve health conditions and combat disease in the hemisphere. Publicity of what the two most important regional bodies are doing would be of interest to the American public and helpful to us.

The situation of the four countries which are not yet firm is:

Bolivia has \$60,000 in hand toward a \$90,000 minimum operating budget. Hemisfair is asking American companies with interests in Bolivia to make up the difference.

Colombia, through President Lleras, has assured Hemisfair that it will participate but has yet to complete the formalities.

Brazil has been a reluctant dragon despite repeated approaches here and in Rio. President Costa e Silva recently told Jack Valenti that Brazil did not have the resources or sufficient time prior to the opening to mount the type of exhibit which would properly reflect the position of Brazil.

Peru has so far declined to participate because of lack of funds.

The economic and time arguments are not convincing. Hemisfair is giving free 3,000 sq. ft. of exhibit space to each country. They estimate the minimum operating budget for each pavilion for 6 months to be from \$90 - 100,000. To this must be added the cost of packing, freight and insurance for the exhibit, but this is not much. Countries like Peru and Brazil -- whose participation would add so much to the fair -- could mount excellent exhibits for \$150 - 200,000.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-433
By gw, NARA, Date 2-3-93

Mr. Rostow 27

t. camp
2. Pres file

SECRET

Wednesday, November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: South Arabia Independent Today

Just a word on what we're doing about the independence of South Arabia--the new People's Republic of South Yemen. British negotiations with the National Liberation Front concluded in Geneva yesterday, and for the first time we have a fairly clear picture of the post-independence government.

We are not recognizing immediately. Today and tomorrow we'll respond to press queries by welcoming South Yemen to the family of nations. Then if the NLF continues in firm control for a week or two and acknowledges its international obligations, Secretary Rusk will recommend to you that we recognize. We want to be more sure first of Saudi views and of the ability of the NLF to act like a government.

The new government will take the usual anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, suspicious-of-the-West line. We expect it will proclaim a Nasser-style or Algerian-style "socialism", but so far don't have any evidence of extensive Communist ties. The NLF itself probably doesn't know yet what its policies will be. Its only policy so far has been to get the British out and win power.

The government will face two main problems--staying in power and keeping afloat economically. South Arabia is still a collection of tribes--not a nation--and is vulnerable to a number of disruptive influences. The Saudis may exploit tribal opposition. The pro-Egyptian nationalists, who lost to the NLF in the final drive to power may fight on. The South Arabian Army has backed the NLF so far, but it could turn to opposition. We still don't know what kind of continuing aid the British have agreed to, but that will be crucial in determining whether the new government has to look to Cairo or Moscow.

The situation is still uncertain--and a good target for Moscow--but Nasser's pullout in Yemen has made the transition to independence easier than we thought it could be earlier this year. We don't look to the new government for much, but this is probably as good an outcome as we could have hoped for.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

Pres file

Wednesday - November 29, 1967

Mr. President:

The Political Counsellor of our Embassy in Caracas sent Bill Bowdler the attached statement by Marine Corps Major Americo Sardo of our Military Advisory Group in Venezuela.

The Major made the statement at the annual Marine Corps Ball. Because of the eloquent way in which this soldier expresses the essence of the elusive balance between protest and service, I thought you would like to read it.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

US Marine Corps Major Sardo's
address at annual Marine Corps Ball

cc - Col. Cross

It is incumbent on me on this occasion, as the personal representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to address myself to the deeper meaning of "marine" for those of us privileged to wear this uniform.

The Marine Corps is a force wed to our nation's history. We are an organic part of its greatness and its fallibility For no nation, as an organism devised and directed by human beings, has failed to run the gamut of both foibles and greatness in its history.

But through all, marines have rendered unquestioning service.

It is said that in a democratic system a vital balance must be maintained between a process of criticism and a concept of public service. Both are obviously vital to the well-being of a democratic system.

To render service in a democracy, however, one need not abjure the rights of personal conscience, the prerogative of questioning, or the responsibility of criticism. Indeed, constructive criticism is recognized as an essential element within any instrument of public service. In the exercise of these rights beyond the confines of our own organization, however, we who serve must by necessity sublimate and temper our right of criticism to the longer pull, the larger design. We cannot afford the luxury of day to day doubts which gnaw at energies essential for other purposes. We who serve are committed to protecting the fundamental values and purposes of a democratic society ----- to the preservation of the fundamental rights of the individual, and the democratic decision-making process. Our fundamental queries therefore, should be directed less to today's policies and to short-run historical vacillations, than to the hows and whys of protecting and furthering these fundamental values.

This then is both the dilemma and the burden of the democratic citizen who chooses to serve. He must cast the long glance and work day to day to

preserve what he sees in that vision He must deny those momentary doubts which impair his effectiveness and weaken his fundamental commitment. He must with grace bear the burdens of restraint and the pursuit of professional excellence.

Today, Marines must serve, as in the past, in recognition that their performance of duty may demand the highest of sacrifices and unquestioning devotion This we must give and thus we must serve if democracy is to progress and remain the most perfect form of government yet devised by man, for man, upon God's earth

28-1

Pres. file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday -
November 29, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Repatriation of Americans from Cuba

Foreign Secretary Carrillo Flores confirms that the first flight to repatriate US citizens and their dependents will take place on December 5. A Mexican aircraft with 72 passenger capacity will be used. The flight will be from Cuba to Matamoros from where the Americans will be brought directly to Brownsville.

Last year Castro permitted 2 repatriation flights and then stopped them. We hope he will not discontinue them, but nobody is taking any bets.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 712 89-53
By rs/isp, NARA, Date 1-13-92

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, November 28, 1967 ²⁹
7:40 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Bob Anderson dropped in to see me this afternoon to chat about the Middle East and told me the following:

1. While seeing his Arab friends in New York, he found the Egyptian Foreign Minister Riad and Dr. Kahouli disappointed that we have not moved to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo, as have the British.

2. When he pointed out that Arthur Goldberg had told Riad Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him in Washington, Riad had said that he wanted a more explicit invitation and some assurance that the U. S. was in fact willing to move forward toward normal diplomatic relations.

3. When Kahouli raised the question of whether President Nasser should write to President Johnson and asked how such a letter could be delivered, Bob Anderson said: Why not deliver it in Cairo via Don Bergus? The response was: He is only a clerk. How can a Presidential message be delivered through a clerk?

4. Kahouli then asked if Anderson on his next trip to the Middle East (which is soon -- to Iraq on sulphur) could stop in Cairo. Anderson said flatly: No.

5. Kahouli then said: If I delivered a letter for President Johnson to you in Beirut, would you receive it? Anderson told him: I would receive it, but only as a messenger boy. That is how it was left.

6. I asked Bob what he thought the Egyptians would do about acknowledging that we were not involved in the war and reparations. He said they took the view that their official newspapers have already published in Cairo the fact that we were not involved and it would be very difficult for them to go further. As for reparations, they would be made when diplomatic relations were established, but not immediately, because they were terribly short of money. Bob Anderson's view was that this could be the first issue we raised after diplomatic relations were established.

7. Bob showed great sensitivity to the fact that we must do absolutely nothing to interfere with UN Representative Jarriag and his contacts and negotiations in the Middle East.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-448
By Cl, NARA, Date 8-21-95

cc: Hal Saunders

8. Bob underlined his view that we are likely to have to deal with Nasser for some time; that he believes from his long personal discussions that Nasser has learned a painful lesson; and that it is in our national interest to establish relations with him soon.

9. His mission to Iraq is to get American firms involved in exploiting the biggest sulphur deposits in the world. A personal letter to the Iraqi President from de Gaulle had been sent urging that French firms take the contract. Bob is reasonably confident that his more experienced firms will win out.

I talked with Luke Battle, who is very doubtful that Nasser will in fact send a letter to you via Anderson; although a resumption of diplomatic relations is obviously much on their minds, and should be on ours also.

W. W. R.