

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 cable	Rostow to Jones (CAP 671038) <i>open 7-29-03</i> S 1 p	12/10/67	A
#2 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 671037) S 2 p <i>open 8-30-95 NLS 98-448</i> [Duplicate of #207b, NSF, Country File, UAR, Vol. 6]	12/10/67	A
#3 memo	Rostow to President, 6:05 p.m. <i>open 6-11-98</i> PCI 1 p	12/9/67	A
#3a memo	Rusk to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	12/9/67	A
#3b ltr	Kiesinger to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> PCI 3 p	undated	A
#3c ltr	President to Kiesinger <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 3 p	undated	A
#3d memo	"Conversation between SecState and UK Ambassador" S 1 p <i>open 6-11-98</i>	12/9/67	A
#3e ltr	Dean to Rusk <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 3 p	12/9/67	A
#4a cable	USUN 2912 <i>open 12-17-96</i> S 1 p <i>[Dept. # 744, UN Agency File, vol 9]</i>	12/9/67	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	12/9/67	A
#5a cable	USUN 2925 S 2 p	12/9/67	A
#6a cable	Tehran 2454 S 1 p	12/8/67	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. <i>open 9-27-99</i> S 1 p <i>NLS 98-288</i>	12/8/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#7a ltr	Rostow to President <i>open 9-27-99 NLS 98-288</i> S — 2 p	12/8/67	A
#14a ltr	President to Banda PCI 1 p	12/11/67	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 7-29-03</i> C — 1 p	12/8/67	A
#15b memo	Schultze to President C — 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	12/11/67	A
#16 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 7-29-03</i> S — 2 p	12/8/67	A
#21a cable	Seoul 2769 S 3 p [Duplicate of #74a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "5D(3) Allies' Troop Commitment"] [Sanitized NLJ 91-7] [Dup. # 28a, NSF, CF, Korea, "Vol. II," Box 255]	12/6/67	A
<i>open 6-24-03</i> <i>NLS 02-155</i> #22a cable	Amman 2519 S — 3 p <i>sanitized 9-15-92 NLS 92-217</i>	12/7/67	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 2:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>San NLS 019-026-2-2 (1/02)</i>	12/7/67	A
#23a rpt	Intelligence Report S 3 p <i>exempt NLS 019-026-2</i>	12/5/67	A
#26a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>exempt NLS 019-026-2</i>	12/6/67	A
#26b rpt	Intelligence Report S 4 p <i>exempt NLS 019-026-2</i>	[12/67]	A
#27 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-99</i> PCI 1 p	12/7/67	A
#27a ltr	President to Jonathan PCI 1 p	12/8/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#28 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 10-17-97 NLS 10-17-97 NLS 97-255</i>	12/7/67	A
#28a ltr	President to King Faisal PCI 2 p <i>open 10-17-97 NLS 10-17-97 NLS 97-255</i>	12/7/67	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p [Duplicate of #3, NSF, Agency File, NATO, Vol. 5] <i>open 9-21-92 NLS 91-213</i>	12/7/67	A
#31 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p [Duplicate of #29, NSF, Country File, Mexico, Vol. 3] [Exempt 1979] <i>open 12-15-95 NLS 95-188</i>	12/7/67	A
#31a memo	Oliver to President C 3 p [Duplicate of #29a, NSF, Country File, Mexico, Vol. 3] [Exempt 1978]	12/6/67	A
#32 memo	Host Rostow to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p <i>open NLS 019-026-2-6 (1/02)</i>	12/6/67	A
#32a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 6 p <i>open 10-5-01</i>	12/5/67	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 5:50 p.m. PCI 1 p <i>open NLS 019-026-2-8 (1/02)</i>	12/6/67	A
#33a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 5 p <i>open NLS 019-026-2-9 (1/02)</i>	12/5/67	A
#34a memo	McCafferty to Rostow C 1 p	12/6/67	A
#34b map	Attachment to #34a S 1 p	undated	A
#35a cable	Harold to President C 1 p <i>dup #42, NSF HOS, "H.O.D. 1967" Box 11</i>	12/6/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#37 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	12/6/67	A
#37a memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 1 p	12/5/67	A
#37b memo	Saunders to Rostow <i>Open NLJ 98-280 4-23-99</i> S 3 p	12/4/67	A
#38 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 2-24-04 NW/RAC 03-260</i>	12/6/67	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, re: Uruguay C 1 p <i>open 7-27-03</i> [Duplicate of #81, NSF, Country File, Uruguay, Vol. 1]	12/6/67	A
#40a rpt	Bio Sketch C 1 p [Duplicate of #81a, NSF, Country File, Uruguay, Vol. 1]	undated	A
#44a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 3 p <i>Open NLJ 019-026-2-12 (1/02)</i>	12/5/67	A
#45a memo	Rostow to President, 9:45 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 7-27-03</i>	12/5/67	A
#47b ltr	Holt to President <i>open 12-17-99 NLJ 98-308</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #40c, Vol. 54]	12/5/67	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 11:10 a.m. S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 019-026-2-13 (1/02)</i>	12/5/67	A
#50a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p <i>Open NLJ 019-026-2-14 (1/02)</i>	12/4/67	A
#50b cable	Saigon 258 <i>sanitized per RAC 12-11-0109</i> S 1 p	12/5/67	A
#51a memo	Davis to Rostow S 2 p	12/4/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54 memo	Rostow to President, re: Brazil G 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i> [Duplicate of #38b, NSF, Country File, Brazil, Vol. 7a]	12/5/67	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 5:45 p.m. C 1 p <i>(dup. of #42, NSF Name File, Rostow Memos)</i>	12/4/67	A
#59a memo	Morris to Rostow S 4 p <i>open 1/16/02</i> <i>(dup. #1912, NSF, CF Pakistan, Vol. 8)</i>	12/1/67	A
#60a memo	Rusk to President C 1 p	11/21/67	A
#64a cable	Canberra 2427 <i>open 6-11-98</i> C 2 p	12/4/67	A
#68d ltr	President to PM Wilson (draft) <i>open 6-11-98</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#68e ltr	President to PM Pearson (draft) <i>open 6-11-98</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#69 memo	Smith to President, 3:05 p.m. C 1 p	12/3/67	A
#70a cable	Saigon 12242 S 5 p	12/1/67	A
#72 memo	Smith to President, 6:00 p.m. S 1 p	12/2/67	A
#74a memo	Read to Rostow S 1 p	12/1/67	A
#74b rpt	Attachment to #74a PCI 1 p	undated	A
#75 memo	Smith to President, 12:15 p.m. S 1 p <i>(dup. #21, NSF, Files of Rostow, 1st trip w/Pres. July-Dec. 1967 "Box 1")</i>	12/2/67	A
#75a memo	Rusk to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 3 p	undated	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#75b rpt	"Resolution on Vietnam" S 1 p <i>[dup #22, NSF Files of Rostow, "1 p w/Pres. July-Dec 1967" Box 13]</i>	undated	A
#76 memo	Smith to President, 10:45 a.m. C 1 p	12/2/67	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. C 1 p OPEN 6/22/95 NLS 94-344	12/1/67	A
#77a memo	Rusk to President open 6-11-98 C 3 p	4/6/67	A
#77b ltr	Ramey to Rostow C 2 p open 10-6-95 NLS 94-347	12/1/67	A
#77e memo	Foster to President C 3 p open 9-21-94 NLS 94-343	undated	A
#79a cable	Deptel to Tokyo (draft) S 4 p open 8-25-94 NLS 93-367	12/1/67	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 4:30 p.m. <i>open 6-10-95 NLS 93-458</i> C 1 p <i>Dup #22, Files of Hamilton, "AID-PL480" Box 7</i>	12/1/67	A
#80a memo	Schultze to President open 6-10-95 NLS 93-458 C 2 p Dup #22, as above	11/30/67	A
#80b memo	Schultze to President open 6-10-95 NLS 93-458 C 1 p Dup #22, as above	11/30/67	A
#82 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. S 2 p <i>sanitized 9-27-99 NLS 98-292</i>	12/1/67	A
#82a cable	Intelligence Cable S 1 p <i>sanitized NLS 98-298 1-10-00</i>	12/1/67	A
#84b ltr	PM Sato to President PCI 1 p	11/19/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, 12/1-10/67, Vol. 53

Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#19 memo	Walt Rostow to the President, 7:00 p.m. TS 1 p open 9-28-99 NLS 97-391 Ct-010, Yemen, vol. 2 Box 161]	12/7/67	A
#19a memo	Hal Saunders to Walt Rostow - TS 2 pp Sanitized 9-28-99 NLS 97-391 more info released 12-23-93 NLS/RAC D2-ATM Edw #104, Yemen vol. 2 Box 161] same sanitization 9-13-07 NLS D6-96	12/7/67	A
#34a rpt.	Intelligence report - TS 4pp Sanitized 9/19/01 NLS 98-299	12/67	A

FILE LOCATION

NATIONAL SECURITY FILE, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 53, December 1-10, 1967
Box 26

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

Lair
~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1967 DEC 10 16 56

Pres. file

EEA602
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2635

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO JIM JONES
CITE CAP671238

~~SECRET~~

JIM JONES FROM WALT ROSTOW

PASSAGE SUGGESTED BY PRESIDENT IS, OF COURSE, WHOLLY APPROPRIATE TO RESPOND TO SPIRIT OF KIESINGER'S HELPFUL LETTER.

IT SHOULD GO IN JUST BEFORE LAST SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH KINDEST REGARDS....

IF PRESIDENT APPROVES, SIT ROOM WILL ARRANGE DESPATCH URGENTLY UPON RECEIPT OF OK FROM RANCH.

"MY VISIT WITH YOU IN BONN AND LATER IN WASHINGTON IMPRESSED ME WITH YOUR DETERMINATION TO HAVE YOUR GREAT PEOPLE DO THEIR PART IN PRESERVING PEACE IN THE WORLD. YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND YOUR SUPPORT OF MANY OF THE DIFFICULTIES FACING MY COUNTRY AND ALL OF US WHO LOVE FREEDOM FOR THAT MATTER IS A GREAT STRENGTH TO ME.

"I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE LOOK FORWARD TO THE TIME WHEN YOU CAN COME BACK TO VISIT WITH US AND SEE MORE OF OUR COUNTRY AND OUR PEOPLE."

"WITH KINDEST REGARDS TO YOU AND TO MRS. KIESINGER, I REMAIN.

SINCERELY YOURS,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DTG: 101613Z DEC 67

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*

GPS 210 IMI 210

~~SECRET~~

DEC 10 AM 11:58
SUNDAY

1967 DEC 10 16 31

VZCZCEEA631
OO WTE10
DE WTE 2534

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP671037

Profile

Dec 10, 1967-1631

~~SECRET~~

DEC 10 AM 11:31

SUNDAY

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOV. BIRDSALL IS AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN WITH STRONG CAIRO TIES. HE HAS A MESSAGE FROM NASSER FOR YOU. THIS IS THE STORY AS WE NOW HAVE IT. WITH THE RUSSIANS TRYING TO TAKE OVER FROM NASSER IN THE YEMEN, IT IS, IN DEED, POSSIBLE THAT HE WANTS TO GET CLOSE TO US TO KEEP INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW.

1. BIRDSALL SAW NASSER FOR OVER TWO HOURS LAST NIGHT AND I DEBRIEFED HIM THIS MORNING.
2. BIRDSALL SAYS HE WAS GIVEN "FORMAL MESSAGE" BY NASSER TO BE DELIVERED TO NO ONE EXCEPT PRESIDENT JOHNSON. (NASSER TOLD BIRDSALL THAT NOT EVEN HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AWARE BIRDSALL'S PRESENCE CAIRO).
3. FROM BIRDSALL'S SUBSEQUENT LONG AND RAMBLING CONVERSATION FEEL FAIRLY SURE ABOUT CONTENTS OF "FORMAL MESSAGE." NASSER BELIEVES THAT RUSSIANS ARE INCREASING THEIR PRESSURE ON HIM AND THAT IN ABSENCE ANY TIES WITH USG HE INCREASINGLY POWERLESS TO RESIST. NASSER HINTED AT STRONG RUSSIAN PRESSURE RE USE OF ALEXANDRIA, POSSIBLY INVOLVING PERMANENT FUELING FACILITIES AND BARRACKS FOR SOVIET NAVAL PERSONNEL. NASSER ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT MAGNITUDE OF SYG CONCENTRATION OF UAR ARMED FORCES.
4. NASSER SAID HE WILLING ACCEPT NON-BELLIGERENCY WITH ISRAEL WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES. IF ISRAEL WILL PAY JUST AND ADEQUATE COMPENSATION TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, NASSER WILL EXCHANGE AMBASSADORS WITH ISRAEL.
5. NASSER WAS QUITE CONTRITE FOR THE GRAVE MISTAKES HE MADE IN MAY AND JUNE, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN SOUNDLY DEFEATED, MOSTLY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT KNOW HOW TO USE SOVIET WEAPONS. NASSER ALSO EXPRESSED REGRET FOR PAST SPEECHES HE MADE ACCUSING U.S. OF "WAR OF STARVATION" AND SO FORTH, INDICATING SOME OF THESE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO PLEASE SOVIETS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 91-448
By cls, NARA, Date 8-21-95

BACK FROM QUICK COPY

6. NASSER WISHES RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WANTS SOME TIME TO CONSULT WITH OTHER ARABS BUT FEELS HE CAN ENCOURAGE OTHER ARAB STATES WHICH BROKE RELATIONS ALSO TO RESUME. SOLE EXCEPTION IS SYRIA, WHERE HE SAYS HE HAS NO INFLUENCE WHATSOEVER.

7. NASSER SAID HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE NO QUESTION RESUMPTION ANY FORM U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO UAR FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

8. RE BIG LIE, NASSER MADE INGENUOUS STATEMENT THAT HE HAD NEVER ACCUSED USG OF MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN JUNE WAR. HE CLAIMS THAT ALL HE DID WAS QUOTE HUSSEIN DIRECTLY ON THIS POINT. (COMMENT: IF THAT IS CASE, WHY DID UAR BREAK RELATIONS WITH U.S.?).

9. BIRDSALL LEAVING CAIRO TODAY FOR LONDON AND PLANS RETURN NEW YORK DECEMBER 14. HE WILL UPON ARRIVAL REQUEST MEETING WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON. HIS THESIS WILL DOUBTLESS BE THAT USG CANNOT AFFORD STAND IDLY BY IN FACE OF SOVIET TAKEOVER OF UAR AND ULTIMATELY OTHER ARAB STATES IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

10. RECOMMENDATION: I WOULD HOPE THAT IF ALL POSSIBLE PRESIDENT JOHNSON COULD RECEIVE BIRDSALL IF ONLY FOR A FEW MOMENTS BEFORE TURNING HIM OVER TO WHITE HOUSE OR DEPARTMENTAL ADVISERS.
SERGUS

DTG: 101552Z DEC 67

~~SECRET~~

GPS : 570 IMI 570

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday December 9, 1967
6:05 PM

3
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith three items, of which only A requires prompt action.

A. Secretary Rusk's prompt draft reply to a good letter from Kiesinger. He resisted strong pressures from his staff on the NPT and kept at the level of his conversation with you. He has also made good on his (almost) personal commitment to you not to cut German forces this year. I have added to Secretary Rusk's draft a personal note on page 3.

The urgency is this: Kiesinger ought to get it before Secretary Rusk sees Willy Brandt on Monday - and in time for him to relay to Brandt your message.

B. PM Wilson says:

- Christmas week is out;
- He'd like to see you before Kosygin (whom he sees in the second half of January) and, therefore, would like to see you early in January;
- If not, February.

C. Some nonsense between George Brown and Sherman Cooper, apparently as follows:

- Brown gave Cooper a message for you;
- He then found out that Cooper had not delivered it immediately by having Tomkins of the British Embassy call Cooper;
- Secretary Rusk learned of this through Pat Dean (who didn't like the business) and asked what the message was, to protect you;
- Pat then got the enclosed from the Foreign Office, which explains what Brown said, as nearly as Pat knows it.

Brown should not have done this; but in any case we are ^{for}warned.

WWR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

4657

3a

(A)

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

December 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter to German Chancellor
Kiesinger on Non-proliferation

Recommendation:

That you send the enclosed letter to Chancellor
Kiesinger in reply to his letter.

Discussion:

Chancellor Kiesinger wrote to you on December 8
to discuss unresolved German concerns over the Non-
proliferation Treaty. He also discusses other
bilateral issues and his recent trips to London and
Asia. Since I shall be seeing German Foreign Minister
Brandt in Brussels on December 12 and shall raise the
Non-proliferation Treaty with him there, I think it
would be helpful for you to send the enclosed letter
in time to reach Chancellor Kiesinger before that
meeting.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Kiesinger letter.
2. Suggested reply.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By *jw*, NARA, Date 5-14-98

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

The English translation of this message reads as follows:

46.5

"(m.p.) Dear Mr. President,

3b

I am deeply impressed by the offer of the United States Government which you, Mr. President, announced last weekend, to place American civilian nuclear activity under IAEA safeguards. This is an important contribution towards the realization of equality of treatment in the civilian sphere. Immediately after your announcement the Federal Government drew the attention of the German public to the significance of your decision.

The placing of America's civilian nuclear industry under non-proliferation safeguards was an essential result of the German-American consultations on a safeguards article held last Spring. Thanks to your decision it has now been consolidated.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect that the Soviet Union will follow your example. But it would be gratifying if your offer were at least to induce the Soviet Union to agree to the verification of EURATOM safeguards by IAEA. I am satisfied to find this second important point which emerged from the Spring consultations in the letter on questions concerning the present position of non-proliferation negotiations which your ambassador wrote to me after my return from Asia. This common aim of verification is opposed, however, by the Soviet intention not to admit any verification of the well-established EURATOM safeguards.

I foresee the danger of the free market for nuclear materials and nuclear energy in Europe suffering harm. This would be a serious setback to the efforts to achieve the economic and political integration of Europe, efforts which have now been going on for decades, just at a time when consolidation and expansion of the European Community is required. However, if your negotiators managed to convince the Soviets that the requirement of verification of the EURATOM safeguards must be adequately expressed in the text of the safeguards article, I would be relieved of a grave anxiety.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By gn, NARA, Date 5-14-98

On my recent visit to India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan I had an opportunity of expounding the principles of our policy to the governments and peoples of those countries. I was particularly keen to make it clear that there is no conflict between our determination to fulfil our obligations to the Alliance and our policy of detente. Nor did I leave them in any doubt that, in the course of this policy of detente, it would be necessary to seek and find a just solution of the German problem. I had the impression that the political leaders I spoke to showed understanding for our attitude in this matter.

We have agreed with India and Pakistan to hold annual consultations at Foreign Minister level.

During my stay in Asia I again became clearly conscious of the responsibility falling to the Western industrialized nations to ensure peaceful developments in this part of the world. I shall endeavour, in spite of our present financial difficulties, to fulfil this responsibility and I know that our views on this point concur.

Yesterday the German Bundestag held the debate on defence policy which had long been in preparation. The Government policy statement made by the Minister of Defence, just as I had told you in Washington, did not propose any reduction of the Federal Armed Forces.

(m.p. I remain, Mr. President, with best wishes to yourself and to your family,

Yours sincerely,
sgd. K.G. Kiesinger."

Respectfully yours,

sgd. von Lilienfeld
(Minister Georg von Lilienfeld)
Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

I would be extremely grateful to you, Mr. President, if you would give your attention to this most important question as well as to the other matters affecting German interests described by Foreign Minister Brandt in his letter of 13th October, 1967, to Secretary Rusk.

As you know, I think it very important that a reasonable time limit should be fixed for the treaty; by a reasonable time limit I mean a period which, in practice, would not have the same effect as that of a treaty of unlimited duration. I am pleased that - as Ambassador McGhee informs me - your Chief Delegate in Geneva has proposed to the Soviet co-chairman of the Geneva disarmament conference that a provision limiting the duration of the non-proliferation treaty be accepted and that the United States will pursue this goal with determination.

May I assure you that I very much appreciate the close co-operation between the competent authorities of our two governments on this treaty, which is of such great significance.

I recall with pleasure the talks we had during my visit to Washington. I have meanwhile been to London and negotiated with the British Government on possibilities of Britain joining the European Economic Community. My Government is resolved to support this request of the British Government. As French resistance is as strong as ever, we are also trying to find solutions which should eventually also win the approval of France.

The policy of detente which my Government has adopted towards our Eastern neighbours has hitherto met with a cool reception from the Soviet Union. It is due to that country's influence that some countries who would gladly have established diplomatic relations with us have not been able to fulfil their wish. We shall nevertheless continue to pursue our policy with all patience because we are convinced that it is in the interest of Europe as a whole. And I am certain that we shall be able to keep on improving our relations with a number of our Eastern neighbours from year to year.

4657
3c

~~SECRET~~

Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Chancellor:

I am grateful for your letter of December 8.

I have noted with pleasure that the close consultations between our two countries during this year have served to move the proposed Non-proliferation Treaty in the direction both you and I desire. The United States shares your hope that the Soviet Union may be persuaded to accept the concept of verification of Euratom safeguards by IAEA. I can assure you we are exerting our utmost efforts to achieve that end. Furthermore, we are mindful that an unimpeded flow of nuclear materials for peaceful uses from country to country is of crucial importance in maintaining the momentum of the European integration movement. The Non-proliferation Treaty must not have the effect of hampering that flow among those nations who enter into and carry out the obligations of the treaty in good faith.

Having ascertained the views of our allies in the North Atlantic Council as to how to proceed further in

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gn, NARA, Date 5-14-98

~~SECRET~~ -2

seeking an effective safeguards article which also protects the principle of verification, we have instructed our delegates in Geneva to tell the Soviet Co-chairman that we believe the road to achieving agreement on Article III is through the draft of November 2. So far the Soviets have rejected this language on the ground that it would constitute self-inspection by Euratom members of Euratom members. We shall do our best to convince them that this is not so. We have told them that the agreement between IAEA and Euratom provided for in this article will take into account that safeguards must be of such nature that all parties to the Treaty can have confidence in their effectiveness and that IAEA must be able to satisfy itself that nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. I gather that both of these key principles are consistent with the German position.

I am asking Secretary Rusk to discuss the entire matter of non-proliferation with your Foreign Minister when he sees him in Brussels on December 12.

~~SECRET~~

I have followed your journeys to London and Asia with great interest. Your resolve to support the British Government in its quest to join the Common Market is much appreciated. The results of your visit to Asia and the impressions you gained there are most gratifying to us also.

As you know, you have my complete support in your future efforts to improve the relations between your country and your Eastern neighbors. Finally, I appreciated very much the policy statement of your Government on defense.

With kindest regards to you and to Mrs. Kiesinger, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

(B)

3d

Seen by Mr. Rostow

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~SECRET~~-NODIS

December 9, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Conversation between Secretary and
British Ambassador re Prime Minister
Wilson's visit to U.S.

The British Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, told the Secretary this morning that Prime Minister Wilson cannot accept the President's invitation to visit the ranch after Christmas.

Meanwhile, Chairman Kosygin has confirmed that a visit to Moscow by Prime Minister Wilson in the second half of January would be agreeable, and Mr. Wilson proposes to accept that invitation.

Prime Minister Wilson still wishes to see President Johnson before he goes to Moscow, but obviously there should be some "blue sky" between the two trips. Therefore, Mr. Wilson hopes the President could see him early in January. If this is out of the question, the Prime Minister would accept Secretary Rusk's suggestion of a visit in February.

~~SECRET~~

EUR:ICheslaw:S:jmr

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 5-14-98



STRICTLY PRIVATE & SECRET

3e

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

(C)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

9 December, 1967

Dear Secretary of State,

I am indeed sorry about what happened between Edward Tomkins and Senator Cooper. So far as I am concerned, the facts are as follows.

Some days ago, I received a telegram from George Brown's Private Secretary, which read as follows :-

"Vietnam: When Senator John Sherman Cooper called yesterday afternoon the Foreign Secretary told him, as he had made clear in September to President Johnson, that he would go all the way with the President, if he decided to continue the present pattern of bombing. Mr. Brown accepted that we had no men at hazard in Vietnam and that this was an issue the President had to decide. If he considered the present bombing policy was right then Mr. Brown would defend his decision. But he must add that he wondered whether the President was right in pursuing this policy to the end.

2. Sherman Cooper said he would convey this to the President on his return to Washington. The Foreign Secretary would be grateful if you would ensure that an accurate statement of his views reaches the White House."

As I was away from Washington for twenty-four hours, I asked Tomkins to find out from Senator Cooper whether he was intending to report to the President about his conversation with George Brown. The object of our enquiry was to make certain that he was going to report before we, in accordance with the telegram from London, asked the State Department, to pass on to the White House what George Brown had said.

Cooper told Tomkins that he had not yet reported his conversation, but intended to do so as soon as he could.

Of course, I have no idea what actually happened between George Brown and Senator Cooper but my reading of the Foreign Office telegram was that Mr. Brown felt that perhaps what he had said had not been fully understood and he was anxious to make certain that the correct version reached the White House. There would have been no difficulty, I think, if Senator Cooper had not himself said that he intended to report to the White House when he got back to Washington.

/I am

The Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

STRICTLY PRIVATE & ~~SECRET~~

~~STRICTLY PRIVATE & SECRET~~

STRICTLY PRIVATE & ~~SECRET~~

I am sorry about this but I would like to repeat that there was absolutely no intention to go behind the back of the State Department or yourself.

I am not keeping any copy of this letter.

Yours Sincerely
Patrick Dean.

4

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, December 9, 1967
1:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith U Thant responds to your
message on Cyprus and has a good word
for Cy.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

USUN 2912

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rf, NARA, Date 12-17-91

Dec. 9, 1967

4a

Copy of USUN 2912 (message from U Thant to the President)

"Mr. President,

I deeply appreciate your message of December 5 concerning the crisis which recently arose over Cyprus, and I would like to thank you most warmly for the sentiments which you have expressed concerning the roles of the United Nations, of my representative Mr. Rols-Bennett and of myself, during this crisis.

It is a matter for great satisfaction for all member states and for the United Nations Secretariat alike, when the organization can contribute to averting the threat of imminent war and to opening the way for constructive efforts to find solutions. May I also express to you my great appreciation of the unfailing cooperation which I have received during the recent crisis for Ambassador Goldberg and the United States Mission to the United Nations, and also for the indefatigable efforts of your own personal representative in the area, Mr. Cyrus Vance.

Yours sincerely,

U Thant"

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1963
By ju/rq, NARA, Date 12-17-96

Pres file
5

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Dec. 9, 1967
10:00 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Goldberg reports:

-- He has eight votes and could probably get Ethiopia for inscribing Viet Nam at the Security Council;

-- He is uncertain of the reaction to our simple resolution or to the question of a bombing cessation; and judges we shall not know until we engage;

-- The NLF question has not come into focus;

-- He recommends we proceed despite these ambiguities.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By gn, NARA, Date 5-14-98

6

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 8, 1967
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

The Shah has a nibble.

W. W. Rostow

Tehran 2419

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 12-17-91

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, December 8, 1967 -- 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

I understand you wish to have my view on CABRIOLET.

On balance we should go forward because:

-- The legislative record shows that we promised Congress not to let the Soviet Union outstrip us in this field by applying different standards;

-- There is no hazard to health;

-- Without CABRIOLET there will be a substantial delay in establishing whether we can have an excavation capability to make good our promises within the framework of the NPT;

-- I do not believe that the test will in fact diminish the possibilities of an NPT and the de minimis interpretation of the limited test ban treaty is both sound and has already been acted upon by the Soviet Union.

There may well be noises from the Left, notably from scientists who do not believe in the PLOWSHARE program in general and who have wished from the first day to use the limited test ban treaty as an excuse for killing it. It is quite clear from the discussions with Khrushchev at the signing of the limited test ban treaty that the treaty was not meant to exclude PLOWSHARE; and we so informed the Senate.

There will also be political problems from the Right if we backed away and delayed for a negotiated change in the limited test ban treaty.

In order to see how the political problems could be minimized, I asked Spurgeon Kenny to draw up a draft memorandum as to how CABRIOLET should be handled if you decide to go ahead with it at this time. His memorandum is attached. I submit it to you by way of illustration.

If you decide to proceed, I recommend that you instruct Sec. Rusk promptly to come up with a scenario for minimizing the political and diplomatic problems. The attached set of ideas could be made available as a starter.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-288
By CA, NARA Date 8-26-99

WWRostow:rlm

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 8, 1967

Mr. President:

I suggest that Cabriolet be handled along the following lines if you decide to go ahead with it at this time. The public handling should be kept as low-key as possible without creating the impression that we are being secretive. The rationale for the test should be established in terms of the prospect for nuclear excavation and the de minimis interpretation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In the light of these principles, a scenario for Cabriolet might be along the following lines:

1. The test should be scheduled for late January so that any announcement or leak concerning final preparations would come after the State of the Union speech and the resumption of the ENDC, which will probably be around January 18.
2. The AEC should make a low-key announcement of the test as close to the event as possible. A few days in advance would appear to be sufficient to maintain the open nature of the test without permitting time for domestic or foreign protests.
3. Well in advance of our announcement, we should stimulate some low-key press discussion of the de minimis interpretation of the LTBT and the fact that several Soviet tests have resulted in radioactive debris crossing Soviet borders.
4. When the ENDC resumes, Bill Foster could make some statement elaborating on our ideas as to how Plowshare explosives might be made available to other countries under the NPT through an international organization. Such a statement would be helpful to the NPT as well as restraining possible foreign criticism of Cabriolet.
5. Press and foreign observers should not be invited to Cabriolet since this would advance the lead time on announcement and stimulate discussion. Such observers might also create additional problems since there could well be long delays on account of weather and the event itself with its large mushroom cloud might appear to present more of a health hazard than is in fact the case.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6.

NLJ 98-288

~~SECRET~~By CB, NARA Date 8-26-99

~~SECRET~~

-2-

6. We should advise Canada and Mexico in advance of the public announcement, emphasizing the very small amount of radioactivity involved, to discourage any possibility of a protest from them if they were taken by surprise.

7. If the test does not create any significant problems, there should be a minimum of government discussion about the treaty implications. However, if the radioactivity is more serious than anticipated or if there is significant domestic or international concern, we should have carefully prepared contingency statements for immediate release along the following lines: (a) AEC description of the test emphasizing the extremely small amount of debris involved and that there is absolutely no health hazard domestically or internationally; (b) State Department explanation of the de minimis interpretation of the treaty and the apparent Soviet interpretation of the treaty as evidenced by their previous actions; and (c) statements by appropriate key Senators to the effect that such tests were consistent with their interpretation of the LTBT when they voted for ratification.

8. If the Soviet Union protests the test as a treaty violation, we should simply refer to their previous actions and suggest they accept our previous offer to discuss the establishment of a mutually agreed interpretation of the LTBT. Unless the Soviets make their protest public, we should maintain this exchange on a private basis.

I believe a scenario along the above lines would set the proper background for the Cabriole test and minimize the probability that it would become a serious domestic or international political problem.

W. W. Rostow

SMKseny:jb:12-8-67/2:30p

bcc: SMK file & chron

WWR (2)

SMK comeback copy

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8
INFORMATION

Friday, December 8, 1967
5:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Attached is a legal account of our position with respect to military credit sales of the kind we have carried out in the past with Israel. Stripped down to simple language, the answers to your questions are these:

- Until the end of FY 68, we can proceed to make commitments on the existing basis within the ceiling of 190 million in credit guarantees;
- After June 30, 1968, the legal foundation for our policy is gone;
- Therefore, DOD proposes to ask in the next session of Congress for new legislation which would: be separated from the economic aid appropriation; would not involve request for a revolving fund; would involve a request for new obligation authority up to 25% of the credit sales envisaged, the balance to come either via ExIm or commercial financing.

Attachment



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

8a

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NITZE

SUBJECT: Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-137)

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 (P.L. 90-137) which was signed into law on November 14, 1967 would affect the credit sales program in the following way:

1. It would terminate as of June 30, 1968 the authority to issue guaranties against risks of non-payment on credit sales of defense articles and defense services.
2. Places a ceiling of \$190M on the total face amount of guaranties which may be issued during FY 68.
3. Terminates the Revolving Fund as of June 30, 1968.
4. Terminates the authority to lease or barter defense articles or services.

The House took the position in Conference that the guaranty program should be continued after June 30, 1968, subject to annual authorization. The Senate, on the other hand, although it agreed to a continuation of such authority through fiscal year 1968, expressed the view in Conference that the guaranty authority should be terminated.

Language has also been included in the bill which, after the termination of the Revolving Fund, makes available funds derived from payments received under credit sales agreements or guaranties issued prior to June 30, 1968, to discharge outstanding liabilities and obligations of the United States. Any such payments not needed to discharge such liabilities are to be transferred from time to time to the general fund of the Treasury.

It was the understanding of the Conference Committee that payments received would be available to pay off obligations to agencies of the United States, including the Export-Import Bank and the military departments, as well as non-governmental suppliers of defense articles and services, including payments and obligations resulting from the sale of evidences of indebtedness prior to June 30, 1968.

Up to the present time the EXIM Bank has purchased DOD guaranteed military sales paper without knowing the foreign country involved. This was EXIM's preference and the Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations and Appropriations Committees were informed of the transactions. The bill to extend the authority of the EXIM Bank has been amended to require a Presidential determination before the bank can be used to finance sales to the LDC's. The legislation, however, has been put over until the next session of Congress. Although no legal provisions are yet in effect which limit EXIM's authority to continue these loans, Mr. Linder, President of the bank, has told Congress he will finance no more LDC sales until Congress has acted.

Continued authority to make credit sales and to furnish guaranties will be requested in FY 69 legislation.



PAUL C. WARNKE

9

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Friday, December 8, 1967 -- 5 PM

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a letter to the Speaker transmitting additional materials (pictures and charts) to be printed with the PL 480 Annual Report you approved a couple of weeks ago. By mistake State/AID didn't send these to the Hill with the Report. We need a Presidential transmittal in order to get them into the printed version.

W. W. Rostow

9a

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress additional material for the 1966 report on the Food Aid Program under Public Law 480. The report was received by the Congress on November 6 and designated House Document 179.

This material should be incorporated in the printed version of the report.

Sincerely,

Honorable John W. McCormack
Speaker of the House
of Representatives

EKH/RPM/vmr 11/29/67

Friday, December 8, 1967, 1:15 P.M.

Rostow

Mr. President:

I have just listened to the State Department's noon press briefing. Bob McCloskey read the statement which you approved dealing with our policy toward the NLF. (attached)

Upon completion of the statement he added the following, on background: "I would remind you that the Communists have been making various propaganda campaigns on bombing, coalitions, and what have you. The policy of this Government is stable and has been stated by the President. If there is a change in this policy you will know it--because the President will state it."

There were then several attempts by the reporters to question aspects of the statement, but McCloskey referred them back to the language which he had read and stoutly refused to "comment, clarify, interpret or tamper with" the statement in any way.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

RMM:amc

Statement by Department Spokesman

I think it would be helpful if I commented on various questions that have arisen concerning US policy toward the NLF.

1. On the question of negotiations and the search for peace in any form, our policy remains what it has been: namely, we are prepared to discuss peace with the government in Hanoi or any other government at any time. As the President made clear on July 28, 1965, the Viet Cong or the so-called National Liberation Front would have no difficulty being represented and having its views represented.

2. Any alteration in this policy would be a matter which we would take up with our fighting allies, including especially the government newly elected under the Constitution in Saigon. At the moment, nothing in the present situation requires or justifies a change in policy.

3. So far as the situation in the UN is concerned, Ambassador Goldberg has made clear -- always strictly in accordance with the above policy -- that we would not oppose representatives of the NLF presenting their views to the United Nations when they are officially invited for official business. The question of the NLF coming to the United Nations under an official invitation is of course totally different from any question of their entering the United States for propaganda purposes. We do oppose their coming merely to mount a propaganda campaign.

4. On the question of the future political structure in the South, we have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle. We would oppose any proposal which would turn the government of South Vietnam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind carried forward in the past two years.

5. In this connection, the South Vietnamese Government has for some time been carrying out a policy of national reconciliation, under which individuals now associated with the Viet Cong may, if they accept Constitutional processes, receive the full rights of citizenship. The South Vietnamese Government has also made clear its willingness to enter into contacts with elements of the NLF. All of these actions are consistent with their belief, and ours -- and the many times stated^d policy of this government -- that the political future of South Vietnam must be worked out in South Vietnam by the people of South Vietnam.

ACTION

Friday, December 8, 1967
10:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

We need your urgent clearance of
modification of this proposed statement
by McCloskey.

As you will see, it follows quite
closely your guidance to me which I
transmitted promptly to State.

W. W. Reston

11

Pres file

11a

Statement by Department Spokesman

I think it would be helpful if I commented on various questions that have arisen concerning US policy toward the NLF.

1. On the question of negotiations and the search for peace in any form, our policy remains what it has been: namely, we are prepared to discuss peace with the government in Hanoi or any other government at any time. As the President made clear on July 28, 1965, the Viet Cong or the so-called National Liberation Front would have no difficulty being represented and having its views represented.

2. Any alternation in this policy would be a matter which we would take up with our fighting allies, including especially the government newly elected under the Constitution in Saigon. At the moment, nothing in the present situation requires ^{OR JUSTIFIES} ~~our justifying~~ a change in policy.

3. So far as the situation in the UN is concerned, Ambassador Goldberg has made clear that we would not oppose representatives of the NLF coming to present their views to the United Nations if they are officially invited for official business. The question of the NLF coming to the United Nations under an official invitation is of course totally different from any question of their entering the United States for other purposes. We ^{do} ~~would~~ oppose their coming ^{for} ~~merely~~ to mount a propaganda ^{purpose} ~~campaign~~.

4. On the question of the future political structure in the South, we have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle. We would oppose any proposal which would turn the government of South Viet-Nam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind carried forward in the past two years.

5. In this connection, the South Vietnamese Government has for some time been carrying out a policy of national reconciliation, under which individuals now associated with the Viet Cong may, if they accept Constitutional processes, receive the full rights of citizenship. The South Vietnamese Government has also made clear its willingness to enter into contacts with elements of the NLF. All of these actions are consistent with their belief, and ours, that the political future of South Viet-Nam must be worked out by its own people.

Friday, December 8, 1967 -- 9:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

Pres file

With respect to your getting with Amb. Eugenie Anderson, her report is positive, although she expresses anxiety on refugees. (Tab A)

I attach (Tab B) the passage on refugees from Ellsworth's cable of yesterday which you may wish to call to her attention. There are several points we ought to make to her and make in public as well.

-- 60% of the 2,100,000 refugees reported in the past 4 years have been resettled or returned to their villages.

-- In 1967 for the first time the number of refugees returned home or resettled exceeded new refugees coming in.

-- Half the refugee problem is in the I Corps. This is not due to U.S. action but to the pressure on I Corps by the North Vietnamese across the DMZ. In short, the view that our military actions generate refugees is not a correct position of the problem at the present time.

-- The plans for 1968 on the Vietnamese side and ours promise further reduction in refugees during the year.

You may wish to have her meet the press after your talk with her.

I recommend that Bill Leonhart be present when you have your session with Mrs. Anderson. I should be glad to come along, also.

W. W. Rostow

Have Leonhart and Rostow in _____

No _____

See me _____

cc: Amb. Leonhart
Mr. Christian

WWRostow:rla

11:45 A.M. - DEC. 8

12a

December 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Ambassador Eugenie Anderson, U. S. Representative on the U. N. Trusteeship Council

SUBJECT: Vietnam

The following general observations are based on my eight day stay in Vietnam. I concentrated on the political aspects of the struggle, in particular the Revolutionary Development program. This "front" of the war is, in my opinion, very little understood in our country, although it is equally as important as the military.

1. I believe that we can eventually win in Vietnam if the American people will sustain the war with the same commitment and depth of understanding shown by the Americans in Vietnam, and with the same persistence shown by the Vietnamese people. To win the political struggle there will probably take even longer than the military. Both aspects are interrelated and interdependent. To win a war, pacify a countryside and build a nation all at the same time is bound to require considerable time, perseverance and great resources.

2. I believe that Americans in this country need to know more about what the Americans in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese are doing along constructive and reconstructive lines. If the epoch-making story were better understood, most Americans at home would feel - as I do - a deep pride and confidence in what we are doing in Vietnam.

This is the first time in history when people were fighting a cruel and many fronted war against outside aggression and internal subversion, and yet, at the same time, they were also engaged in building a new nation, in revolutionary social development, and in constructive humanitarian programs.

While all this is an immense undertaking, I saw many evidences of progress and of new hope among the people. Given security from VC and North Vietnamese attack, the Revolutionary Development program is bound eventually to succeed.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of this and other new political developments. If ever there were a political war, this is it.

3. The most immediately critical and vulnerable problem on the non-military side (although closely affected by and having effect on military undertakings) is the growing number of refugees, currently conservatively estimated at about 750,000.

(I am sure I need not mention that certain Senators are exploiting this issue for their own political purposes.)

However it is inescapable that the refugee program is massive and can be dealt with effectively only on a commensurate scale. While I am aware that Ambassador Komer has recently integrated the refugee work under the CORDS program, nevertheless I believe that this problem requires a much greater sense of urgency and priority.

Extract from Saigon 12892 -- Amb. Bunker's thirtieth weekly report

I know that there has been growing interest in the press and in Congress on refugees and this has also been a matter of great concern to us here. There are indications, however, that the problem may be getting more manageable. The number of known refugees coming in during 1967 (460,553 during the first ten months) is down considerably from the 980,323 who came in during 1966. For the first time in some years the number of refugees enabled to return home or resettled during 1967 to date has exceeded the new refugees coming in. In fact, of the cumulative total of 2,100,000 refugees reported over the four years since January 1, 1964, almost 60 percent have been resettled or returned to their villages. The 1967 refugee problem has principally been concentrated in First Corps (51 percent) and Second Corps (24 percent), in Third Corps and in the Fourth Corps Delta area resettlement or repatriation is proceeding considerably faster than the generation of new refugees. The criticism that refugees have been created by U.S. and Government of Vietnam military operations is no doubt true in part, but it seems to me equally valid to point out that heavy North Vietnam infiltration in First and Second Corps has caused the fighting which creates refugees.

The Government of Vietnam and the U.S. are steadily increasing their refugee efforts. The Government of Vietnam budgeted 1 billion piasters for refugees in 1966, just over 1.5 billion piasters for 1967 and 2 billion piasters for 1968. On the U.S. side, the amount of direct support we provide is only a part of our total assistance. Military civic action plus the growing activities of any voluntary agencies must also be added in.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 7129/CBS10

By 12/1/82, NARA, Date 1-13-92

13
12/8/67
as revised by
the President

Statement by Department Spokesman

I think it would be helpful if I commented on various questions that have arisen concerning US policy toward the NLF.

1. On the question of negotiations and the search for peace in any form, our policy remains what it has been: namely, we are prepared to discuss peace with the government in Hanoi or any other government at any time. As the President made clear on July 28, 1965, the Viet Cong or the so-called National Liberation Front would have no difficulty being represented and having its views represented.

2. Any alteration in this policy would be a matter which we would take up with our fighting allies, including especially the government newly elected under the Constitution in Saigon. At the moment, nothing in the present situation requires or justifies a change in policy.

3. So far as the situation in the UN is concerned, Ambassador Goldberg has made clear -- always strictly in accordance with the above policy -- that we would not oppose representatives of the NLF presenting their views to the United Nations when they are officially invited for official business. The question of the NLF coming to the United Nations under an official invitation is of course totally different from any question of their entering the United States for propaganda purposes. We do oppose their coming merely to mount a propaganda campaign.

4. On the question of the future political structure in the South, we have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle. We would oppose any proposal which would turn the government of South Vietnam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind carried forward in the past two years.

5. In this connection, the South Vietnamese Government has for some time been carrying out a policy of national reconciliation, under which individuals now associated with the Viet Cong may, if they accept Constitutional processes, receive the full rights of citizenship. The South Vietnamese Government has also made clear its willingness to enter into contacts with elements of the NLF. All of these actions are consistent with their belief, and ours -- and the many times stated policy of this government -- that the political future of South Vietnam must be worked out in South Vietnam by the people of South Vietnam.

December 8, 1967

*1. [Signature]
2. Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a proposed reply to President Banda of Malawi.

Banda wrote you to ask our further help on a pulp scheme he discussed with you when he was here in June. (You will recall that you were instrumental in getting Brown and Root to make an investment survey of the project.) We're now trying to interest some private U. S. company to take the next step and do a detailed technical report.

Banda also had some warm words for you on Vietnam.

I recommend you sign.

W. W. Rostow

EH:RM:lw

Att: file #4538

ACTION~~CONFIDENTIAL~~December
Friday, November 8, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Middle East Refugees

Pres file

In late August, you approved a grant of \$125,000 to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to be used for the Jewish refugees who had to leave Arab countries after the war in June.

In dealing with the mechanics of funding, Secretary Rusk finds it is necessary to ask you to sign the attached Determination that this donation is important to the national interest. The money will actually come from AID's contingency fund, but to make legal the use of these funds under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, a determination is required. Charlie Schultze endorses this procedure.

The money involved comes from the \$5 million dollar reserve you set aside from contingency funds on June 27 to meet the urgent relief needs of war victims from the Middle East conflict. Most of that has gone for Arab refugee needs through our normal channels for contributing to UNRWA, but this small contribution has to be handled differently since most of the Jewish refugees are now in European safe havens.

The attached is for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15a

Dec 11, 1967

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (the "Act") Authorizing the Transfer of up to \$125,000 of Funds Made Available for Use Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

1. In accordance with the memorandum of the Secretary of State of November 18, 1967, and in order to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs arising in connection with the Middle East crisis, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 2(c) of the Act, that it is important to the national interest that up to \$125,000 of funds made available for use in fiscal year 1968 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, be transferred to and consolidated with funds made available for this Act.

2. The Secretary of State is authorized to direct the transfer of funds for this purpose from appropriation accounts under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and to consolidate funds so transferred with funds made available for this Act.

3. The Secretary of State is requested to inform the appropriate committees of Congress of this determination and the transfers of funds made under this authority.

15/ Lyndon B Johnson

156

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

DEC 1 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Middle East Refugees

I concur in Dean Rusk's recommendation that you sign the attached Presidential Determination. It would authorize the use of \$125,000 for AID's Contingency Fund to finance a contribution to the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees. This Determination is required by the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, which authorizes the transfer of up to \$10 million from Foreign Assistance funds whenever the President determines that such transfer is "important to the national interest."

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee requested \$497,500 to help care for Jewish refugees from Libya who fled to Italy. The United States Government decided to contribute \$125,000 of this sum, and to try to create a sense of international responsibility by making this contribution through the U. N. High Commissioner for Refugees. On the strength of our commitment, he approached several European countries for similar assistance.

Since June, when you established a \$5 million target for funds to meet the emergency needs of victims of the Arab-Israeli war, AID has committed some \$4.1 million. (Another \$10.4 million in P. L. 480 food donations have contributed to the same objectives.)

Charles R. Schultze

Charles R. Schultze
Director

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15c

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

19433

November 18, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Middle East Reserve from Contingency
Funds for Urgent Relief of War Victims

Recommendation:

That you sign the enclosed determination transferring \$125,000 in foreign assistance funds.

Discussion:

On June 27, 1967 you directed the establishment of a reserve of \$5,000,000 from contingency funds to meet urgent relief needs of war victims of the Middle East conflict.

An accounting of commitments made pursuant to the directive is enclosed for your information.

One of these commitments was for \$125,000 to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to be used by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee for the benefit of Jewish refugees of the Middle East war.

The commitment was originally made to the UN High Commissioner to avoid the possibility of offending Arab sensitivities. I continue to believe this is the correct approach and that it is still in our interest to help defray expenses incurred on behalf of Jewish refugees.

It now has been determined by subsequent legal investigation that payment of this commitment in this fashion should be through the exercise of a Presidential determination to transfer the necessary amount from foreign assistance funds to funds available for contributions to the UN High Commissioner.



Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

Tab A - Determination

Tab B - Commitments to Date

154

Presidential Determination
No. _____

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 2(c) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (the "Act") Authorizing the Transfer of up to \$125,000 of Funds Made Available for Use Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

1. In accordance with the memorandum of the Secretary of State of _____ and in order to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs arising in connection with the Middle East crisis, I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 2(c) of the Act, that it is important to the national interest that up to \$125,000 of funds made available for use in fiscal year 1968 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, be transferred to and consolidated with funds made available for this Act.

2. The Secretary of State is authorized to direct the transfer of funds for this purpose from appropriation accounts under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and to consolidate funds so transferred with funds made available for this Act.

3. The Secretary of State is requested to inform the appropriate committees of Congress of this determination and the transfers of funds made under this authority.

Commitments Made Pursuant to the President's Statement of
June 27 Establishing a \$5 Million Reserve to Meet
Emergency Needs of Middle East War Victims

Commitments of Foreign Assistance Funds

Special Contribution to the UN Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) ----- \$2,000,000

On June 29, Ambassador Goldberg informed the Secretary General of the UN that the United States pledged a special contribution of \$2,000,000 for meeting urgent needs in the period immediately ahead.

Contributions through American Red Cross to
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) -- \$300,000

Announcement of a first contribution of \$100,000 was included in the President's statement of June 27. A second contribution of \$200,000 was approved on October 10. These contributions help finance ICRC's activities in the Middle East in providing material assistance to war victims, promoting exchange of prisoners, rescuing UAR troops stranded in the Sinai Desert, promoting the return of refugees from the East Bank to the West Bank, and other activities.

Contribution to American Red Cross for
Transportation of Medical Supplies ----- \$40,000

These funds financed the air shipment of antibiotics and vitamins valued at \$434,000 which were contributed by the ARC to the ICRC for distribution in the Middle East.

Contribution of tents and other supplies, and
air transportation to Jordan ----- \$1,675,000

On June 15, the United States agreed to furnish 5,000 tents plus the cost of air transportation in response to a request from

the Government of Jordan, for shelter to meet the immediate needs of the homeless. On June 29 in response to a further request from the Jordanian Government the United States agreed to provide 5,000 additional tents and their air transportation. We are also providing small cooking stoves procured in India and have offered to furnish blankets and household utensils for the refugees. The last named items have not yet been requested by the Government of Jordan and have not therefore been furnished.

Special Contribution to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for Jewish Refugees from Arab countries -----	\$125,000
---	-----------

On October 8 the U. S. Mission in Geneva was instructed to inform the UN High Commissioner that the U. S. would provide \$125,000 in response to his offer to act as a channel for contributions to the American Joint Distribution Committee which has been providing care and maintenance for Jewish refugees from Arab countries who fled to Italy during and after the Middle Eastern hostilities.

The total amount committed for urgent relief needs in the Middle East from funds available under the Foreign Assistance Act is -----	\$4,140,000
--	-------------

Commitments Under P.L. 480

It should be noted that in addition to the assistance listed above, the United States has furnished substantial quantities of foodstuffs through various channels for relief of the victims of Middle East hostilities. While these contributions represent continuation of on-going pre-hostilities programs, nevertheless they helped meet the needs of the persons affected by hostilities. The agricultural commodities and the cost of their transportation to Middle Eastern ports are available under Public Law 480, and do not require the use of funds appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act.

In early July the United States allocated to UNRWA 24,000 metric tons of wheat flour and 1,200 tons of vegetable oil to help meet UNRWA's requirements over a three month period. In August a second allocation of the same amount of commodities was made to UNRWA for use during the last quarter of 1967. A total value of these commodities including their transportation to the Middle East is about \$8.6 million.

The United States is also continuing donations of commodities to American voluntary agency programs for distribution to war victims in the area at about the same rates prevailing prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The value of such donations, including ocean transportation, is \$1.8 million annually.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 27, #372

By jc NARA, Date 7-21-03

16
Pres file
Friday
December 8, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Speedup in deployment of additional Thai troops to Vietnam

We have gone thoroughly into the possibility of a speedup in the movement of Thai troops to Vietnam. The schedule of the deployment of the first group (about 6,000 men) has been advanced from August to July. The remainder are scheduled to be in Vietnam by January 1969.

1. We looked into the possibility of compressing this schedule and found the following:

-- Our military consider the schedule about as short as it can be if the units are to meet professional standards.

-- The creation of an expeditionary force of over 10,000 men is a really major undertaking for the Thai military. They will be hard put to it to perform on the present schedule, much less on a shortened one.

-- The schedule compares favorably with our own performance in similar circumstances (the creation of a new unit around a cadre of trained officers and NCOs). It takes us about a year from decision to deployment (e.g. the 9th Division now fighting in the Delta area).

-- If we were to pressure them into sending half-trained units there is a real possibility that the units would get involved in a bloody disaster, with the worst possible effect on US-Thai relations.

2. We also looked into the possibility of sending existing and MAP-equipped Thai battalions to Vietnam after an intensive but short training period. The trouble with this approach is:

-- The Thai Government and the Thai King are publicly and emotionally committed to the volunteer concept. They are in concrete on this, and have our approval for it. The use of existing units is therefore not a political possibility.

-- Moreover, it is the judgment of our military people that there are no Thai battalions which could be deployed to Vietnam without

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2.

a rather extended training period and without some re-equipping. The savings of time would, therefore, be slight.

-- Finally, to take the two best professional battalions out of Thailand would greatly compound the already large problem of finding the cadre around which to build the 10,000 men expeditionary force.

3. Another possibility is to move the unit into Vietnam as quickly as possible and complete the training cycle on the ground. The Thai themselves like this idea, and would like to deploy the forces to Vietnam in June for final training. In the past, MACV has had reservations about completing the formal training cycle in Vietnam. We will raise this again with MACV.

On balance, I am now convinced that we should work for a June or July deployment and concentrate on our efforts on making certain that there is no slippage. If training in Vietnam works out, we should be able to get the second group into Vietnam before the end of 1968. I have taken steps to make certain that we get the needed equipment and personnel where they ought to be, when they ought to be there. The Thai themselves are very anxious for an early deployment and feel with some justification that they are making a maximum effort. ~~At this stage, I think the name of the game for us is to make sure their efforts succeed.~~

W. W. Rostow

MEMORANDUM

17

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, December 7, 1967
7:55 PM

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have just learned that a US nuclear submarine (The Marshall) collided with a Soviet submarine in the Mediterranean Sea at 5:46 PM this evening.

Both submarines were submerged when the collision occurred.

Extent of damage to the submarines is unknown at present, however, the US submarine continued on its mission after the collision.

The incident took place near Sicily. Our submarine was not shadowing the Soviet submarine. On the basis of experience of similar contacts the incident need not become public; although we have no information on the extent of damage to the Soviet submarine.

WWR

INFORMATION

18

Thursday, December 7, 1967
7:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

At Amb. Bohlen's suggestion we have rounded up from State key quotations from de Gaulle in the Tournoux book.

They start with de Gaulle on the U. S.

There is little doubt that they are basically authentic.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

18a

TO : EUR - Mr. John M. Leddy

DATE: December 5, 1967

FROM : EUR/FBX - Robert Anderson

SUBJECT: De Gaulle Quotations from La Tragedie du General

Attached are selected statements by General de Gaulle extracted from La Tragedie du General by Jean-Raymond Tournoux (Librairie Plon, 1967). I have included those statements which have given me a further insight into this historic personality. The quotations have been organized into sections dealing with (1) France and the U.S., (2) Europe, (3) Indochina, and (4) de Gaulle and France.

The sources of the quotations in Tournoux's book are: (1) public pronouncements such as press conferences; (2) interviews with the author; and (3) statements made to an individual who reported directly to the author. With regard to this last category, the author recently told Ambassador Bohlen that even in those cases where he does not cite the source, he received his information directly from the person to whom de Gaulle spoke, and that in no case did he use third hand sources.

Attachment (UNCLASSIFIED)

De Gaulle quotations from
La Tragedie du General.

EUR:FBX:RAnderson:blh

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Statements by General de Gaulle from
La Tragedie du General by Jean-Raymond Tournoux
(1967 - Librairie Plon - Paris-Match)

A. France and the U.S.

1. Speaking of the failure of President Truman, "the suspender salesman", to use atomic power to force the Russians to back down: "If I were President of the United States, that's what I would do right away. The Americans will foul up the job in every way they can, of that you can be sure, they'll even think of new ways to foul it up...The French are weak, cowardly and intelligent. The Yanks are strong, brave and stupid." (Said to several unnamed individuals, 1947, p. 35)

2. "(France) does not make preparations to hold her place in it (the atomic era)"...."thanks to American bombs we are not invaded by the Russians who are only 300 miles away..." (1947, p. 32)

3. "If it should ever happen by some misfortune that a new tyranny would threaten all or part of the world, this much we know in advance: the United States and France would agree to oppose it." (Speech at Strasbourg, 1947, p. 38)

4. "The little bastard (Truman) thinks he is a patriot. He has the instinct of a street fighter and that's what made him react with South Korea was invaded, but Dean Acheson's had him under control." (To General Monclar, commander of French troops in Korea, 1950, p. 104)

5. "...this (NATO) Treaty must be ratified, but it is indispensable to secure from the Americans the firm and final commitment that they will maintain their troops and their bases in France. The Americans have always intervened too late. This time they must be in a position to act without delay. It's the only way to save us." (Statement on signing of NATO Treaty, 1949, p. 106)

6. "From America: the hardware. From France: the men." (c. 1953 on European Defense Community)

7. "We have become the subjects of the Americans just because they supply arms to us. In 1914-18 we also gave arms to other nations...even to the Americans...did we dictate special conditions to them? ...and best of all is our give-away diplomacy... It gives everything away....you Americans want to establish yourselves in North Africa? Fine. You want the supreme command in Europe? Splendid. You are not directly interested in the Indochina war? We understand this so well." (To Rene Plevin, c. 1953, p. 141)

8. (On the Marshall Plan): "...some leaders appeared to think that more important than aiding our country was the maintenance in it of a regime....that would perpetuate its weakness, hence more easily subjected to foreign will, than would be the case with strong and free state headed by de Gaulle." (1953, p. 142)

9. "If the Americans pour so much money into our country it is to keep de Gaulle in check....France is up for grabs." (1953, p. 142)

10. "(General) war could have broken out in Korea at the time of MacArthur, but the Americans are not warriors. They did not wage war. Rather, they wage McCarthyism! ...If America had listened to MacArthur in 1951, she would have won the war in Asia. She was the only one with atomic bombs available. When you are a colossus you make war, or else, you sit in your chair, smoke your pipe and watch television. That's what the Americans are doing." (Interview with Tournoux, March 10, 1954, p. 165)

11. "Let us assume that a severe economic crisis breaks out in the United States. This is a possibility, one day it could happen. Then everything would change. America would become paralyzed. I say this again, America is like Carthage. Americans have money, they have the sea, just as Carthage did. They are able to have others doing the fighting for a very long time: French, Germans, English, Pakistanis, etc.... Americans are not warriors. They do not dominate, they corrupt. We conquered Africa. When I go to Africa, they shout 'Long Live de Gaulle.' If Eisenhower comes to France, no one will shout 'Long Live Eisenhower.'" (Interview with Tournoux, March 10, 1954, p. 167)

12. "Without the United States we cannot balance the budget. We have Dulles at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Americans at the Finance Ministry, Gruenther heads the Army..." (Interview with Tournoux, March 10, 1954, p. 169)

13. "I

13. "I would have screamed: I refuse to have the defense of France depend upon a foreign general. No, we shall not fall to the level of subjects of the United States." (On European defense, 1955, p. 186)

14. "The Americans have the jitters. They're bourgeois. With every means at their disposal to make war they don't want war. The Russians have the jitters too... One day the bomb will explode and no one will know why... Sometimes you make war without wanting to. One day war will come, perhaps in one or two generations. There's always a war in the future." (Interview with Tournoux, November 30, 1956, p. 211)

15. (On Suez): "Yes, we should have told the Americans this is what we want to do and if you do not accept it, the Atlantic Pact is no more. They would have gone along. Today we are threatened with a stoppage of gasoline supplies. Well, I would say: 'As of midnight tonight, American troops can no longer travel on French highways and there are no longer any American bases in France until further notice.'" (Interview with Tournoux, November 30, 1956, p. 215)

16. "History, if there is to be a history still, will say that the world lost out when Truman kept MacArthur from smashing the Chinese, and eventually the Russians, with the atom bomb. Then, the Americans could have smashed their opponents. Not anymore. Truman stopped MacArthur because he was a politician and because he was afraid of the voters. The great debate of our times took place right there." (Interview with Tournoux, January 8, 1958, p. 276)

17. "I don't want to hear a word about Atlantic cooperation as long as I don't have my atomic force. When I have it, well, then we shall combine our strategies. Provided the Americans give us as much control over their strategy as we give them over ours. We shall deal between equals. And if they don't want to allow us control over their strategy, well, we won't allow them control over ours. They know it and they don't like it. That's what they have against our atomic force. It forces them to recognize a breach of their monopoly. We flush out a will to dominate which is hypocritically camouflaged as integration.

"The/

"The memorandum (to Eisenhower) of 1958 was but an instrument of diplomatic pressure. I was looking for a way out of the Atlantic Alliance and a way to regain a freedom which had been alienated by the Fourth Republic when the NATO Treaty was signed.

"So, I asked for the moon. I knew I would not get it. Don't count on it. They would always turn me down. The Anglo-Saxons would always want to use force at their discretion and they don't want us because of that. They only want to dominate us.

"By not replying to my letter they make it possible for me to take steps towards leaving the Atlantic Alliance and I could not have done this if, first, I had not been turned down. In fact that is what we have been doing since 1958: We are no longer there, we are present without being there. Just like at the U.N. We're not leaving but we work things out so the U.N. will in no way hamper us." (To an unnamed colleague, March, 1959, p. 320)

18. "It is from its friends and allies that a nation must first demand the respect of its independence. With your enemies it is a simpler matter." (To the ambassador of an unnamed East European country in Paris, undated, p. 326)

19. "They take me to task: 'You're overdoing it in your dealings with the Americans'. And I answer: If you want to conduct the policies of France, which are sometimes in opposition to the Allies, you won't get the Americans to yield just by being cute with them, and talking about LaFayette, Franklin and Rochambeau. You've got to be blunt.... They'll despise you in your weakness or else you'll amuse them with LaFayette. Believe me, better to face their ill temper than their contempt." (To former Gaullist Minister Louis Jacquinot, 1961, p. 331)

20. "I don't want my deterrent force to be broken up and watch my successor kneel down to the Yanks." (October, 1962, p. 439)

21. "This

21. "This was President Johnson's first official action, to say that I was coming to Washington to see him. Johnson needs me to be re-elected. He was only too happy to have some good news for the American people and to be able to force my hand. This I don't like." (November, 1963, after President Kennedy's funeral, p. 458)

22. "President Johnson.....is a Third, or at most a Fourth Republic type of radical... History, for him, is just lobbying maneuvers. Kennedy was a man of different scope. American politics may fall back to the level of petty politicking... Still, one never knows....remember Truman "Our policies are more necessary than ever. Let us not yield to what may come from Washington, never and in no area, regardless of who the man in the White House may be." (To his Council of Ministers, November, 1963, p. 459)

23. "To yield to Washington is to choose the easiest way out. The path of least effort. It costs less of course than to be oneself and be independent." (To his Council of Ministers, November, 1963, p. 459)

24. "The landing in southern France was a French operation. The landing in Normandy took place without France. It was carried out behind de Gaulle's back and behind the back of Free France. They could have told me. Churchill had sent for me the day before, in a train yet! That, I have never forgiven. We have no reason to commemorate these days with any particular pomp. The Minister of Veterans Affairs will go to Normandy." (Apparently to his Council of Ministers, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of D-Day, May, 1964, p. 475)

25. "Johnson is overburdened with problems. See what became of the English? The Germans got what they had coming to them, since 1945. The Chinese are stuck in their own excesses and are talking it out with the Red Guards. As for us, we got rid of our problems." (Summing up the year 1964, p. 489)

26. "France is accused of being neutralist. The Americans are the neutralists. They care about prosperity, greatness. They don't care a hoot about Europe." (c. 1965, p. 493)

B. Europe

1. "...what the Americans and the English want to rebuild is the Reich. They want to rebuild the German Reich. ...I know that the Anglo-Saxons claim they can use the Reich against the Soviet Union. Maybe so and then again maybe not." (Said privately to an unnamed individual, 1948, p. 69)

2. "...we may miss our last chance to make Europe. Either Europe will be an agreement between the French and the German people or it will be nothing. ...English policy has always conceived of Europe in terms of Franco-German rivalry with British arbitration. This ideology which Churchill censured many times has partly disappeared. Not completely though. And this is one of the reasons preventing Europe from rebuilding itself." (Press Conference, March 29, 1949, p. 71)

3. "We refuse the suicide of France. The European army is the army of Europe, but Europe as a moral and political entity does not exist... We wander around in the realm of speculation... The EDC is the camouflage for national abdication... We have become subordinated to American strategy and we will not prevent the reconstitution of the Wehrmacht, no matter what we do." (To Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 1953, p. 140)

4. (On Churchill): "He feels a sort of frustrated emulation since he did not weigh much between Roosevelt and Stalin... To understand him don't forget that he is the Prime Minister of a nation of shopkeepers and they want to do business, with China in particular and with Iron Curtain countries... America is strong, but not strong enough to break with the West. America will probably impede the work of the Big Four Conference. She can't help doing it, and the Russians will help her. In the final analysis...it will bring Red China into the UN." (Interview with Tournoux, 1953, p. 154)

5. "Nor do the Russians want war. That is crystal clear. They never wanted to make war themselves. War was made against them. ...today, things being what they are, all signs are in favor of world-wide detente. How will it develop?... A detente begins with a state of mind... The Geneva Conference will accentuate the detente, then there will be a third and a fourth and a fifth conference. From now on there will always be conferences." (Interview with Tournoux, March 10, 1954, p. 165)

6. "There is

6. "There is no national defense since the responsibilities have been passed on to others, to General Norstad..." (Interview with Tournoux, January 8, 1958, p. 272)

7. "It was because of the RPF (de Gaulle's party) that the Americans rushed to France with the Marshall Plan dollars. The Marshall aid was huge and it was dissipated just the same. The purpose was to keep the regime from collapsing under its difficulties. Marshall Plan aid was followed by the Atlantic Pact in the name of the defense of the West. De Gaulle was not wanted in all of this; de Gaulle with the Americans, that was incompatible.

At that time, the Americans were wrong to want to unify the West without its heart, without its soul. The misfortune is that the Americans claimed to build the Western world while subordinating Europe. They lacked intellectual means... They were not able to replace France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany. True, this Europe was terribly torn apart. I grant you that it was a difficult task. A very difficult task." (Interview with Tournoux, January 8, 1958, p. 273)

8. (On the Rapacki Plan): "Relations with the East must be improved and we must continue to work toward German reunification. But this reunification cannot be achieved by American military pressure on Russia. With Russian consent, a detente must be initiated between Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The Rapacki Plan is not ripe but it is a step in the right direction." (To Andre Philip, April 1958, p. 284)

9. "Today the radius of defense is 2,500 to 4,000 miles. But tomorrow, the armed forces will face one another across 8,000 miles, with ICBM's. Then the Americans will evacuate the Continent. The Americans are in Europe to protect their own territory. Tomorrow they will no longer need Europe and they will go home. That is why Europe must organize its own defense." (To his Council of Ministers, March, 1959, p. 315)

10. "Americans never understood the positive aspect of nationalism in Europe even though they are themselves among the most nationalistic of all." (To Senator Margaret Chase Smith, 1959, p. 329)

11. "In 25

11. "In 25 or 30 years, the interest of France will perhaps dictate an alliance with Russia which as it grows more 'bourgeois' will probably know a way of living very close to the Western way of living." (Apparently to Tournoux, 1961, p. 332)

12. "For 15 years the interest of the U.S. has coincided with the defense of Europe. Encirclement of the Soviet Bloc was involved. Now, with the rockets, strategy has evolved. So, we go toward American neutralism in the case of a conflict between Eastern and Western Europe, the latter being disarmed when left to her own forces." (Apparently to Tournoux, 1961, p. 332)

13. "You see, Europe could be betrayed the day the Americans believe that their interest no longer goes through Europe." (Apparently to Tournoux, 1961, p. 333)

14. "America needs to place Europe under her dependence otherwise she could not live. American power was long self-sufficient. ...The economic annexation of Europe by the United States would give the latter a shot in the arm. The dollar is threatened. What is at stake for the Americans is the salvation of their national interests at the expense of Europe." (To an unnamed individual, 1961, p.333)

15. "In Europe there is only one city able to attract and that is Paris, the capital of France. In spite of appearances and official declarations do not doubt that in the final analysis it is Paris, because all wish this deep down, that will be the capital of the Europe that will be. In Western Europe only two countries matter: France and Germany. Of course Italy tries to stay in the game. And then there is Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg. All that carries no weight at all." (To his Council of Ministers, 1961, p. 390)

16. "I don't want the English in (the Common Market). They'll come with their procession of clients. And then they will resume their traditional policies on the Continent." (To his Council of Ministers, 1961, p. 391)

17. "I do

17. "I do not believe in the progress of Communism in the world. Communism is making no headway in France, England, Italy, Germany. It makes no progress in the Arab countries. It does not even make progress in Russia. Sure, in Latin America, in Central America, you witness movements used against the United States. But Communism is making no progress. Still, don't give the Soviets a free hand." (Interview with Tournoux, April 2, 1962)

18. "If France is attacked, it is a certainty that the Americans will intervene. But what we don't know is when and how. When? We don't know since their interest may differ from ours.

"Of course they (U.S.) will be at our side, and more than with a moral presence this time, since they are bound by the Alliance. But the Alliance does not compel them to be present with all their weight and all their arms. That's why our deterrent is so useful." (To his Council of Ministers, November, 1963, p. 460)

19. "We are the only ones who can say no to the American protectorate. The Germans, the Italians, the Belgians, the Dutch won't say no. We alone can and must say it." (Following his trip to Germany, 1963, p. 462)

20. "Italy is an American state." (Following his trip to Germany, 1963, p. 462)

21. "The Europe of the Six is like a roast. The meat of the roast is France and Germany. A sprig of watercress on the side: Italy. A bit of gravy: Benelux." (Following his trip to Germany, 1963, p. 463)

22. "Macmillan crossed the Atlantic to throw himself into Kennedy's embrace and traded his European birthright for a dish of ...Polaris." (Following his trip to Germany, 1963, p. 463)

23. "As long as I live Great Britain shall not enter the Common Market. As soon as I'm gone she'll show up." (Following his trip to Germany, 1963, p. 464)

24. "A supra-

24. "A supra-national Europe, as you know, is Europe under American command... France alone is not dominated and in order to dominate her, they would like to see her go into a supra-national structure taking orders from Washington." (1963, p. 467)

25. "One day, the rivalry between Peking and Moscow will yield to a fatal confrontation. Europe, from the Atlantic to the Ural, must prepare herself for this. The division of Europe is only temporary. European solidarity will prevail over all ideological considerations which are becoming less and less important." (To an unnamed individual, 1963, p. 471)

26. (On leaving NATO): "This is a major issue. This will rock the boat. I hope you won't be seasick. Frenchmen born in the last twenty-five years have never known their national territory without the presence of foreign troops. They are unused to seeing only French troops on their soil..." (To his Council of Ministers, apparently in 1964, p. 475)

27. "Yes, the Americans are reaching an understanding with the Russians behind Germany's back. Europe will pay for this just as Europe was made to pay for Yalta. It's the same thing all over again. The two super-powers work it out between themselves. With England in the part of the honest broker." (c. 1965, p. 493)

28. "If they (the Germans) are not good boys, i.e., if they don't follow the Franco-German treaty and if they run to Washington they will become Washington's boys'. From then on I will not look at them again. It will be all over with their reunification. We shall forsake the Germans. We will no longer fight for their reunification and since this reunification, subordinated to a treaty, cannot go through without our agreement and since, furthermore, the Russians don't want it, well we'll reject it and there will be no treaty." (c. 1965 p. 499)

c. Indochina

1. "We may be driven out (of Indochina). One should never leave voluntarily... The situation in Indochina is very

simple

simple. War is being waged against us. The only thing to do is resist and win. ...France believes that Emperor Bao Dai embodies the principle of Vietnamese sovereignty...he must be able to reign and under him there must come into being a government capable of actually governing Viet-Nam." (To Alexandre de Parodi, 1949, p. 101)

2. "...The best attitude to observe in Indochina at the moment is not to hasten anything. We must know how to take our time. We must have the power to stay, gather the means necessary, and, if need be, increase those means." (Press Conference, November 17, 1948, p. 113)

3. "...France must remain in Indochina... More and more we realize that the events of Indochina are only one part of a whole. In reality, the question is will Asia remain free." (Press Conference, November 14, 1949, p. 113)

4. "...Suppose that France and the French army were to leave Indochina. In the light of what has happened in China and in view of the general climate in Asia, Ho Chi Minh would take over... France and the French army must therefore remain in Indochina." (Press Conference, May 16, 1950, p. 114)

5. "...One must know how to take it and not let Asia go. We have got to stay in Korea and we have got to stay in Indochina... One could pull out, or pull back to hold a few beachheads. These are defeatist solutions. As for myself, I reject these solutions." (Press Conference, June 22, 1951, p. 114)

6. "The UN will take over in Indochina; it will even take over all the difficulties of Southeast Asia. ...We will be driven out of Indochina..." (Interview with Tournoux, 1954, p. 154)

7. "...It is all over in Indochina...it is understood that France will not keep Indochina, Indochina will no longer be hers. France may remain there under various forms. We can always visit Angkor. One of these days they'll find a gimmick in which Ho Chi Minh will have his place." (Interview with Tournoux, March 10, 1954, p. 165)

8. "I brought

8. "I brought France back to Indochina but I did not go back to Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh and Bao Dai should have been left face to face while we were firmly camped in Cochinchina. Then, we should have waited." (To General Ely, French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, 1954, p. 174)

9. "Today I would take four divisions out of Germany. I would relocate them in Cochinchina, in Laos, in Cambodia and then I would deal with Ho Chi Minh. I'd let them hold their own elections in their own way. We would see what we would see. And if the Americans complained about the departure of our divisions I would invite them to replace us in Germany." (To General Ely, French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, 1954, p. 175)

D. De Gaulle and France

1. "Those who think that I could once again take a plane for England are ridiculous...if it should unfortunately be history's design once again that I should assume France's disinherited legacy, I would stop in England long enough to refuel. Canada is where I would go." (Apparently to Madame de Gaulle, 1947, p. 54)

2. "Parliamentarians, they make me vomit. They eat their chow. The chow is good. Whiners. Cheats. Escape artists." (To an unnamed individual, 1949, p. 85)

3. "The eunuchs of the Fourth Republic..." (To an unnamed individual, 1949, p. 85)

4. "You can only get Frenchmen together under the impetus of fear...How can you bring together a country with 265 different cheeses?" (To an unnamed individual, 1953, p. 110)

5. "Do you know anyone who has not been, who is not, or who will not be a scoundrel? As for myself, I prefer a man whom I know to have been a scoundrel to a man of whom I do not know whether he'll become one." (To an unnamed official, 1955, p. 193)

6. "My tragedy

6. "My tragedy can be summed up in a few words: I have esteem only for those who stand up to me, but I cannot tolerate them." (To Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 1955, p. 194)

7. "If ever I came back to power, I would never relinquish it." (To Colonel Passy of the Free French Intelligence Service, 1956, p. 225)

8. "Me, I believe in nothing. The Catholic religion is a part of the political structure of France." (To Jacques Soustelle, London, c. 1941, p. 236)

9. (On international organizations): "...either they serve no purpose or they serve some purpose. If they serve no purpose except to create soft jobs, so much the better for the beneficiaries...as long as they serve no purpose. But if they are applied to a purpose then it is the end of France." (To Pierre Berteaux, 1956, p. 253)

10. "I am too much aware of the troubles of having France governed by an old man to want to play a role beyond a certain age." (To Colonel de Bonneval, his Aide-de-Camp, 1955, p. 257)

11. "Today there is no collective ambition anymore. France does not give a damn. Yes, France does not give a damn. The French no longer have any ambition. They care only about their standard of living and that, after all, is not a national ambition." (Interview with Tournoux, reacting to Sputnik, January 8, 1958, p. 267)

12. "There will be war because such is the law of the species." (Interview with Tournoux, January 8, 1958, p. 267)

13. Emmanuel d'Astier asks: "General, are you happy?" De Gaulle replies: "D'Astier, you are stupid. Happiness! There is no such thing." (April 30, 1958, p. 286)

14. "The day a treaty is in contradiction with national interests sees the end of the treaty. It has never been otherwise." (1961, p. 335)

15. "What can

15. "What can I say to them? The French will always be the same. After I'm gone they'll go back to what they used to be: Disunited, divided, victims of their own internecine bickering." (To Pierre Abelin, 1962, p. 393)

16. "I am not only the supreme recourse but in the final analysis, I, alone, can decide of the fate of the Nation. What does this country look like? Without me, this country would amount to nothing. Without me all this would collapse." (To former Gaullist Minister Pierre Sudreau, 1962, p. 432)

17. "(After me) no one will ever have the nerve to do what I am doing." (To former Gaullist Minister Pierre Sudreau, 1962, p. 432)

18. "First and foremost comes the superior interest of the Nation... It outranks every other consideration and I alone judge what it is... In the second place, far behind, come political circumstances, conveniences, tactics. They must be taken into account otherwise you get nowhere. In the third place, far, far behind is the juridical order." (To his Minister of Justices, 1962, p. 437)

19. "And so, you believe that the Constitution binds me?" (To Pierre-Henri Teitgen, 1962, p. 438)

20. "The French are just a bunch of cattle...the country shows itself incapable of discipline. I raised it to its present level. After I'm gone it will sink back into chaos and decadence..." (Following the 1962 constitutional referendum on direct presidential elections whose results--though a success for de Gaulle--disappointed him, p. 439)

21. "What the French need is an elective monarchy and not a hereditary one, coming from divine right. I practice monarchy in the name of France. The people don't care for go-betweens." (To former Minister Paul Coste-Floret, 1962, p. 478)

22. "Too many eunuchs surround me...the country is soft... I am not a marshmallow peddler...they feed me fudge and I only care for spicy dishes." (To an unnamed individual, 1964, p. 485)

23. "There are

23. "There are three realities in this world: The Soviet colossus, the American giant and then there is France, France who is smaller, who knows what she wants, who knows where she is going, France who has a huge part to play because of her universal calling, universal to a degree which is encountered in no other country. France has an eminent role to play. France is the light of the world. Her genius consists in shedding light over the Universe." (To an unnamed individual, c.1965, p. 494)

19
19
Profile
INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET CODEWORD~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

This note to me on the USSR in the Yemen
may interest you.

It's dangerous for them -- and us -- that
they are apparently committing their prestige
in a most risky venture again.

Their equivalent of Luke Battle is not very
good.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-391

By CL, NARA Date 9-21-99

~~TOP SECRET~~

December 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The New Mystery--Soviet Motives in Yemen

This is to bring you up to date on Yemen now that some of the Cyprus clouds have blown over enough to allow some light to fall on this fascinating situation. The Soviets are taking over some of the Egyptian role there, but it looks as if Moscow may find itself fighting the wrong war in the wrong place again.

The moderate Republicans who took over last month are in trouble. Their efforts to win over moderate pro-Royalist tribes had less success than most people expected, and they are now in danger of losing their capital at Sanaa. Continued Royalist victories make any large scale defections from anti-Republican forces unlikely.

The withdrawal of Egyptian forces has seriously weakened the Republican military. What Egyptian troops remain in Yemen have been ordered to avoid any military involvement no matter what happens. The Egyptian Air Force closed down permanently on Monday, and the rest of Nasser's troops are scheduled to be out within a week.

3.3
(b)(1) The Soviets have stepped up the air lift of equipment and are apparently supplying pilots. [REDACTED] indicates that the Soviet Ambassador might be de facto commander of the Yemeni Air Force, and there is even some speculation that the TU-16 bombers in Cairo are slated for missions in Yemen.

So far, however, Moscow has not sent in enough to stop the Royalists. The USSR may hope to emerge as the savior of the Republicans with a significant military presence in Yemen. But there is no guarantee that the Republicans will win, and right now it appears that they won't.

The Republicans are stepping up their efforts to get us to reestablish relations, and Bill Brewer is going to meet their UN man in New York Friday. But he'll just be maintaining contact and urging a negotiated settlement. We're not in any rush to send an Ambassador to Sanaa. The US is not going to be the country which will save the Republicans, so we won't be able to offset Soviet influence in any case. If the Royalists win, or if the war goes on forever, relations with the Republicans aren't going to do us much good.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.3 (b)(1)

SANITIZED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5


NLJ 06-96

By isl, NARA, Date 6-20-06

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

- 2 -

The most interesting dimension in all this is what the Soviets are up to. We guessed after Nasser announced his withdrawal that the Soviets might try to fill the vacuum, but now they seem to have mounted a spavined horse again and bungled the follow-through. The dangers if they suffer another setback are that they'll try for a quick success with the new government in South Yemen (and that, as Nat Davis has pointed out, they'll be increasingly sensitive in other places). While we don't want to make too much of their rush into Yemen, the Mid-Easterners are fully aware of it, so a setback, if any, will be known where it counts.


John W. Foster
Hal Saunders~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.3(b)(1)

INFORMATION

20

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967
6:55 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in
Amb. Bunker's report on how our priority
program is moving.

There is interesting material on:

- the refugee problem (p. 4);
- two good ARVN performances
(pp. 5-6);
- the basic anxiety of the government
on our attitude towards the NLF
(p. 8).

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 12-18-91

WWRostow:rla

Thursday, December 7, 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 12892)

Herewith my thirtieth weekly telegram:

A. General

I have now had talks with all three of the top Government of Vietnam leaders since my return from Washington; with Vice President Ky on November 30th and with Prime Minister Loc, the same day. I reported on my talk with President Thieu in last week's message. Since this was my first official call on the Prime Minister I spent about 1 1/2 hours with him and covered a broad range of subjects. I was impressed with his easy manner and general grasp of the problems faced by his government. Although his ability to administer and direct has not been tested, it is apparent that he has given careful thought to many of the priority issues and objectives and is trying to move ahead on them. It will obviously take time for the new government to get fully organized and shaken down. For example, cabinet meetings so far have been quite protracted and lasting three to four hours, becoming at times quite discursive and getting into non-agenda matters. It needs to adopt more rigorous procedures and the Prime Minister is confident that it will be able to establish an effective working pattern.

Following my talks with all three of the top Government of Vietnam leaders since my return from Washington, I am encouraged by their attitude and by the signs of a coordinated approach to the priority programs and objectives that we both share. Especially all three are aware of the need to get moving urgently on the short term (six months) priorities. Since we and the Government of Vietnam are in general agreement as to what these objectives should be, I thought it would be useful to comment each week under the specific headings we have established on progress or lack of it and then at the end of each month to attempt an overall evaluation to see how far we have progressed. I might recall what these short term (six months) agreed objectives are:

1. Mobilization measures;
2. Reorganization of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces;
3. Reorganization of the civilian administration;
4. Vital pacification measures, including attack on Viet Cong infrastructure and expanded detention centers and related judicial measures;

SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MLG/CBS10
By ag/kap, NARA, Date 1-13-92

5. Attack on corruption at all levels;
6. Economic stabilization measures; increased taxes, higher price for U. S. rice;
7. Peace - willingness to seek peaceful settlement, seek out members of the National Liberation Front and move towards reintegration through national reconciliation.

To these seven points the Government of Vietnam has added urban rehabilitation, especially in Saigon whose population has increased astronomically with attendant deterioration in living conditions.

As to specific progress:

With regard to mobilization, as you know, a partial mobilization decree has already been issued lowering the draft age, extending service and recalling to duty certain personnel. This will be implemented in stages beginning January 1, 1968. In a note released by the Ministry of Defense to the press on November 29, it was made clear that young men will be called to duty in turn and by age group. Twenty-year-olds will be called as from January 1968; 19-year-olds from April 1968; and 18-year-olds from July 1968. Deferments for education will be continued, although more rigid criteria will be applied. Ex-servicemen will also be recalled to duty, those having less seniority in the service called first.

Reorganization of Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces continues though in some areas at a slower pace than we would wish. General Thang has been active in preparing plans and recommendations for the Regional and Popular forces but some of his recommendations have not yet been acted upon. This is especially true in regard to the appointment of deputies for territorial security in the Corps areas in connection with the pacification program. The Government of Vietnam has also been slow in implementing changes in some of the top commands. I mentioned this to Thieu yesterday and General Westmoreland will be taking up the matter with him within the next few days. The Vietnamese Armed Forces continue to show good results of training and have continued to turn in some excellent performances.

Reorganization of the civilian administration has begun in one of its most important aspects, i. e., in the restructuring of provincial administration making the Province Chiefs responsible to the Central Government. This should make for much more efficient administration at the Provincial level, relieve the Corps Commander of administrative responsibilities and at the same time eliminate much of the "War Lord" aspect of his present status. It should also reduce opportunities for corruption. New candidates for the

offices of Province Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs are being selected, training of candidates is planned to begin in January and hopefully they will be installed in February. In addition, a series of seminars is to be started in January at the National Institute of Administration to train present District Chiefs and those to be appointed in the future in the principles of administration and governmental procedures. The collection and administration of all land taxes by local governments which I have previously reported is another important forward step.

In pacification we believe we have scored a minor breakthrough this week on one of our most urgent short term priorities--a successful attack on the Viet Cong political infrastructure. At a meeting of all interested ministries on December 5, the Government of Vietnam presented its program which Bob Komer reports is practically the same as ours, a fair payoff for all the hard missionary work he and his people have put in over the last several months. I shall be reporting on this in greater detail in the pacification section.

Progress is beginning to be made in the attack on corruption. As Prime Minister Loc pointed out, this attack falls into two categories:

- a. Immediate and drastic moves against individuals, and
- b. Solutions directed at combating the root causes of corruption.

In the first category, in addition to moves previously reported, action has been taken against two Province and twelve District Chiefs and the Deputy for Administration in Vung Tau who has been relieved and charged recently. For the first time in history, Province Chiefs have asked to be relieved in order to avoid impending investigation. Their resignations have been refused and they are to stand investigation and prosecution. The Director of military justice has issued a circular letter to military courts directing them to give priority to trials of the most important cases and that where the accused are found guilty, severe punishments should be inflicted not only as a penalty but as a warning to others. The press has reported that a 2nd Lieutenant and the paymaster of a military unit in Binh Tuy Province had been sentenced to death for embezzlement. It was announced also that 59 additional servicemen would be brought to trial on charges of corruption. The Prime Minister has instituted the practice of direct payment of rewards to Hoi Chanh thus avoiding payoffs to intermediaries. He has also taken steps to eliminate fraud in tax enforcement. One of the first measures he has announced is the replacement of the Director of Customs, a job well known for its potential profits. In the second category, getting at the root causes of corruption, the reorganization of the provincial administration to which I referred should be helpful for it

will eliminate the practice of the Province Chief looking to the Corps Commander for protection. Other measures are still to be taken such as the restructuring of pay scales and upgrading the quality of individuals having administrative responsibility and authority.

The Government of Vietnam is aware of the need to take measures toward economic stabilization. Thieu, Ky and Loc have all agreed that better enforcement of tax collection is essential and have estimated that revenue at present rates can be increased by 3 to 4 billion piasters through more effective collection. They have also agreed in principle that increased taxes and a rise in the price of U. S. rice are both necessary. Because of the tendency of prices, particularly food stuffs, to rise between now and the TET holidays at the end of January, they wish to defer an increase in tax rates until after the holidays. This involves a political consideration affecting the stability of the new government. They argue that the government must first establish a basis for popular support and that immediate demands for higher taxes and higher food prices in the face of upward pressure of prices in the immediate period ahead could have a serious, adverse affect on the government. I think this is a reasonable assumption and that we should not press them to take action before the TET holidays.

Regarding a search for peaceful settlement, no steps have been taken other than Thieu's search for a way in which to deliver his proposed letter to Ho. I have reported my several talks with him on this, the last one being Saigon 12115. He is now waiting to see what suggestions the Vatican may have.

The Government of Vietnam has set aside a fund of 350 million piasters for rehabilitation of roads and improvement in water and electrical services for Saigon and has asked our cooperation in initiating work on this project proposing that we set up a joint committee to handle it. Our contribution will be chiefly in lending heavy equipment. This we have agreed to do.

I know that there has been growing interest in the press and in Congress on refugees and this has also been a matter of great concern to us here. There are indications, however, that the problem may be getting more manageable. The number of known refugees coming in during 1967 (460, 553 during the first ten months) is down considerably from the 980, 323 who came in during 1966. For the first time in some years the number of refugees enabled to return home or resettled during 1967 to date has exceeded the new refugees coming in. In fact, of the cumulative total of 2, 100, 000 refugees reported over the four years since January 1, 1964, almost 60 percent have been resettled or returned to their villages. The 1967 refugee problem has principally been concentrated in First Corps (51 percent) and Second Corps (24 percent), in Third Corps and in the Fourth Corps Delta area resettlement or repatriation is proceeding considerably faster than the generation of new refugees. The criticism that refugees have been created by U. S. and Government of Vietnam military operations is no doubt true in part, but it seems to me equally valid to point out that heavy North Vietnam infiltration in First and Second Corps has caused the fighting which creates refugees.

The Government of Vietnam and the U. S. are steadily increasing their refugee efforts. The Government of Vietnam budgeted 1 billion piasters for refugees in 1966, just over 1.5 billion piasters for 1967 and 2 billion piasters for 1968. On the U. S. side, the amount of direct support we provide is only a part of our total assistance. Military civic action plus the growing activities of any voluntary agencies must also be added in.

B. Military

Two examples of recent Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces successes point out the increasing effectiveness of Government of Vietnam forces:

In the period from the 14th to the 29th of November, in the battle of Dak To, the Third Battalion of the 42nd (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Infantry Regiment and the Second and Third Vietnamese Airborne Battalions engaged the enemy on numerous occasions. Heavy fighting occurred on the 14th, 17th, 19th, and again on the 29th when the Second and Third Airborne Battalions engaged an estimated 500-man enemy force. During the battle, the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces were opposed by Regular Forces of the 24th North Vietnamese Regiment. The cumulative results of fighting around Dak To were: Friendly -- 73 killed, 296 wounded and 14 missing. Four hundred seventeen of the enemy were killed.

The Commanding General of the 4th U. S. Infantry Division, Major General Peers, in overall command at Dak To, has stated: "Although in the beginning there were only a few Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops in the area, as the battle increased in scope, reinforcement was carried out by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam quickly and efficiently. All tasks were carried out in a professional manner with extremely good results. All told, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam accomplished every mission assigned in a competent manner."

Early on the morning of December 4, a task force composed of the Third and Fourth Battalions of the 47th Infantry (U.S.), and the 5th Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalion was proceeding north on the Rach Ruong River approximately 11 kilometers northeast of Sa Dec with the 5th Vietnamese Marine Corps Battalion leading. Troops were aboard armored troop carriers of the Navas River assault flotilla when the lead element received heavy small arms and heavy automatic weapons fire along with recoilless rifle and B-40 rocket fire. The Battalion Commander decided to immediately land his force. The battalion beached under fire, and upon landing was heavily engaged with the dug-in, well fortified enemy force. Vietnamese Marines were unable to utilize air support due to the close proximity to enemy emplacements. However, by skillful and aggressive maneuvering, they launched a quick, coordinated four-company attack against the enemy position. The most significant action in this attack occurred when the Marines assaulted this position and killed more than 100 enemy.

Throughout the rest of the day, the Vietnamese Marine units continued to sweep the area. The enemy, who by now were being pressed from the south, north and east by U. S. units as well as the Vietnamese Marines, began withdrawing to the west in an attempt to escape. Contact was broken at approximately 6:00 p.m. that evening. The action resulted in the Vietnamese Marines losing 41 killed and 99 wounded and killing 154 of the enemy.

C. Pacification

In the plan for the attack on the infrastructure which I have mentioned, the national police will play the key role, but the Government of Vietnam will set up a management committee structure at each level from Saigon down to district to bring other contributors like the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and Revolutionary Development teams into the act. The Government of Vietnam also agrees on an urgent detention facilities program.

We greatly appreciate the rapid Washington response to the five urgent pacification requirements which Bob Komer discussed with Secretary McNamara. Funds and people for the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure will give a big boost to this essential activity. Additional advisors to work with Regional and Popular Forces will go a long way toward giving territorial security the needed emphasis. General Thang, now Commander of the Regional/Popular Forces, is fully behind the concept. He has plans for a greatly expanded Popular Forces training program in which our advisors will play an important role. The additional \$27 million from the Department of Defense for upgrading roads and waterways, although still less than we need, will spur the economic side of pacification by opening the farm to markets routes.

General Thang is pushing through the scheme we have wanted for converting the lowly Popular Forces to a motivated force that can fight and build at the same time, just as the Revolutionary Development cadre do today. This will require overhauling Popular Forces training, retraining all Popular Forces instructors at Vung Tau, consolidating 37 training centers into 11 and rebuilding these, and putting 1,000 platoons of 35 men each through the course during 1968. This is a formidable task. We will have to help with building the physical facilities and may have to provide a portion of the increased salaries Thang plans to give the Popular Forces.

Bob Komer has been putting heat on the Government of Vietnam Ministries to spend monies allotted to 1967 projects. New Ministries can make their mark by carrying out on-going programs effectively rather than changing course now. Hence, we keep close tabs on spending. Chieu Hoi and psychological operations have good records, having spent 76 and 68 percent of their respective 1967 funds as of the end of October. The Ministry of Revolutionary Development had spent 58 percent of its funds at the end of October. On the other hand, only 31 percent of

refugee funds had been used. At the low end of the scale, the Ministry of Security had spent 13 percent of its 1966 construction funds and 2.5 percent of its 1967 funds -- a dismal record. Armed with these facts, I can demonstrate to Thieu, Ky and Loc where they need to direct executive action.

D. Political

The organization of political parties and blocks continues to be a matter of considerable interest at various levels of the Government of Vietnam. Prime Minister Loc told me on November 30 that he thought the government could count on the support of about 80 members of the 137-member Lower House and about two-thirds of the Upper House. Vice President Ky told me the same day that the government would have fairly broad support in the Assembly. Ky said he thought the government would have as many as 100 supporters in the Lower House and about two-thirds in the Upper House. I mentioned to Ky the importance of developing local government and administration as a basis for political development in the countryside, but it was apparent that his thinking had not gone very far as yet in this field. In my meeting with President Thieu November 28, he said he was considering how to develop a political party in the countryside. He said he was planning to bring qualified people into the Presidency to work on it and added that he would welcome advice and assistance from us.

In a conversation with an Embassy officer November 29, Tran Van Tuyen, former Deputy Prime Minister (in the Phan Huy Quat Cabinet in 1965) and a respected political figure, he said he is working closely with Senator Tran Van Don to build a mass political organization. Tuyen expressed concern at the lack of political organization on the Vietnamese nationalist side, adding that once the level of hostilities begins to subside, political problems will continue to be very difficult. Adequate political organizations are now in place and functioning. He seemed optimistic about the prospects for progress in this field, however.

The Upper House and Lower House made further progress in adopting their internal rules. The Upper House has virtually completed its operating rules and is presently discussing rules on relationships with the executive and with the Lower House. The Lower House has completed action on 38 of its rules. The pace of both Upper and Lower Houses is certainly slow, a matter which the Saigon press has begun to comment adversely on. One of the Saigon papers particularly criticized the Upper House for drawing up 230 articles to govern its internal operations. However, the members of the Assembly feel they will have to live with these procedures for a long time, and later amendment will be more difficult than careful drafting in the first place.

In a conversation with the political counselor on December 1, Foreign Minister Tran Van Do reviewed various aspects of an early move to initiate action in the Security Council of the U.N. on Vietnam. Do indicated his understanding of our

general position. Do noted that, according to the Saigon press of December 1, the National Liberation Front, in a communication to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, referred to itself as a government. He said that if the Vietnam question is raised before the Security Council he would not be surprised if the National Liberation Front insisted on being heard as a government, rather than as an organization. He noted the problems posed for the Government of Vietnam would be obvious and would require careful consideration and consultation. We subsequently learned that the reported National Liberation Front reference to itself as a government was incorrectly reported. However, the incident reflects the Government of Vietnam's concern about the status of the National Liberation Front.

This concern was further highlighted by a foreign ministry statement issued on December 4 in Saigon (reported previously). The statement reaffirms the Government of Vietnam's desire for peace but states that direct talks should be held between North and South Vietnam "if a lasting and reasonable solution is to be reached." The statement notes that the Government of Vietnam cannot accept "temporary solutions, full of hidden thoughts, as the one taken in 1954-1955. They cannot accept either patched-up solutions that conceal an actual surrender . . history has shown that to yield to threats is but to give further motivation to the Communists, and a false peace today will pave the way for even more dreadful wars tomorrow . . ." The statement was generally sound and a reflection of the Government of Vietnam's true views on the subject.

The Quaker sailing yacht Phoenix, whose adventures in Danang were recounted in my twenty-ninth and previous weekly telegrams, arrived at Vung Tau, near Saigon, on December 5; its intentions remain somewhat unclear, but we have received for delivery to the ship a message from a Quaker representative in Phnom Penh, who has been attempting to make arrangements for the ship to visit Cambodia. The representative appears to have urged that the ship attempt to ascent the Mekong River, rather than go around point Ca Mau to Sihanoukville, on the ground that the situation in Cambodia is very delicate. We can only assume that, in the wake of the revelations of Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army bases on Cambodian soil, the Cambodian Government does not wish to have the Quakers turn in Sihanoukville to turn over medicines to National Liberation Front or Democratic Republic of Vietnam representatives. The Government of Vietnam has made clear to us that it does not want to discuss delivery of medical supplies further with the Phoenix. It seems unlikely that the ship will be allowed to go up the Mekong. We are sending an Embassy officer and a U. S. Navy officer to contact the ship on December 6 to deliver the message from the Quaker representative in Phnom Penh and to make clear we do not plan to intervene further on behalf of the ship with the Government of Vietnam authorities. The continued insistence of the Quakers on assuring delivery of half of the supplies to the anti-government extremist Buddhist group has made impossible unloading the supplies in

South Vietnam. If the Quakers turn over the medical supplies to the National Liberation Front or Democratic Republic of Vietnam representatives in Cambodia in knowing violation of our laws, we can safely assume that they will not specify that the half of the supplies must go to anti-National Liberation Front or anti-Democratic Republic of Vietnam groups. But that is the double standard of conduct that some groups apply to the situation here in Vietnam.

E. Economic

The Saigon Retail Price Index remained steady at 300 (January, 1965, equals 100), as increases in rice prices were counterbalanced by decreases in the prices of fish and shrimp. The Imported Commodity Index fell by one point from 225 last week to 224 this week (January, 1965, also equals 100).

Vietnamese Finance Minister Luu Van Tinh, in reply to press questions, stated that devaluation of sterling would not have a serious influence on the Vietnamese piaster in view of the small volume of commerce between Vietnam and Great Britain. He said that the piaster rate, based on the U. S. dollar, would not be changed. The black market piaster rate in Saigon remained essentially unchanged at 156 to the dollar, though it is more than 160 to the dollar in Hong Kong.

F. Chieu Hoi

During the past week there were 309 returnees, compared to 217 the previous week and 556 during the same period in 1966. Revolutionary Development cadres have been credited with inducing 889 Viet Cong to rally, and static census grievance units have been credited with inducing 1551 other Viet Cong to rally during the first 10 months of 1967. The census grievance units have been employing returnees for identifying Viet Cong in market places of district and provincial capitals.

G. Vietnamese Killed

During the week ending December 2, the enemy killed 121 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 274, and kidnapped 143. Among the dead were 14 Revolutionary Development workers, five Chieu Hoi returnees, four national police, two Hamlet Chiefs, and three Hamlet officials. During the same period, the enemy killed 216 Vietnamese military personnel. Since January 1, 1967, the Viet Cong have killed 3,487 civilians, wounded 6,670 and kidnapped 4,487.

21

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967
4:10 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Locke and Porter get a
commitment from Park for a "light
division" for Vietnam. Timing dependent
on Assembly action in Seoul.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 2769

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-15-92

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*21a
~~SANITIZED~~~~SECRET~~

Action

CONTROL: 1 5 0 6Q
RECEIVED: DECEMBER 6, 1967, 11:08 P.M.

Info

00 RUEHC
DE RUALOS 2769E 3410230
ZNY SSSSS
O 070200Z DEC 67 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7758
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SAIGON 890
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 2769

*Type for [unclear]**Reflow*~~NOTES~~

FOR SECRETARY AND BUNDY

REF: STATE 79164

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-7

By *[signature]* NARA, Date 5-28-91

1. RESULT OF TWO AND ONE HALF HOUR CONVERSATION TODAY BETWEEN PRESIDENT PARK, PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTER ON ONE HAND, AND LOCKE AND PORTER ON OTHER, WAS THAT ROKG HAS AGREED TO MAKE AVAILABLE ONE QTE LIGHT DIVISION UNQTE TO AUGMENT ALLIED FORCES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. TIMING OF AVAILABILITY OF THESE ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO AWAIT ROKG ASSESSMENT OF ASSEMBLY WILLINGNESS TO PASS ENABLING LEGISLATION. IN MEANTIME PORTER AND MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE MAY OPEN CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE QTE ARRANGEMENTS UNQTE WHICH WILL PERMIT ACTIVATION OF SUCH LIGHT DIVISION.

2. PARK, WHO CLEARLY MAINTAINED CONTROL OF ESSENTIALS OF CONVERSATION FOR ROK'S, SAID THAT WHEN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TURNED IN REPORT INDICATING HE UNABLE RECOMMEND DISPATCH OF MORE TROOPS BECAUSE OF ROK SECURITY PROBLEMS, PRESIDENT HAD RETURNS REPORT TO MINISTER, TELLING LATTER TO FIND WAY TO MEET OBVIOUS NEEDS OF VN SITUATION. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR TO MINISTER HE WISHED HELP PRESIDENT JOHNSON. LOCKE WENT THROUGH POINTS CITED IN STATE 79164, PUTTING SPECIAL STRESS ON CURRENT COMING US TROOP CONTRIBUTION, NEED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON ENEMY AT THIS POINT WHEN HIS PROBLEMS ARE SEVERE, EXCELLENT EFFECT ADDITIONAL ROK CONTRIBUTION WOULD HAVE ON SITUATION, AND ON PUBLIC AND CONGRESS IN US.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 2769, DECEMBER 7. N O D I S

3. PRESIDENT PARK REVEALED THAT DEFMIN HAD REPLIED TO HIS REQUEST FOR RE-STUDY OF POSSIBILITIES BY INDICATING THAT IF REAR AND LOGISTICAL ELEMENTS NOW SUPPORTING ROK TROOPS IN VIET-NAM COULD BE REPLACED BY CIVILIANS, ENOUGH COMBAT TROOPS WOULD BE GAINED TO FORM A QTE REINFORCED REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM. UNQTE. ADDITIONALLY, PARK CONTINUED, THIS REGIMENT COULD BE FOUND IN KOREA WHICH WOULD BRING TOTAL NEW CONTRIBUTION TO LEVEL OF QTE LIGHT DIVISION.

4. PRIME MINISTER AND DEFENSE MINISTER THEN SPOKE IN TURN. BOTH OPPOSED SENDING MORE TROOPS. FORMER SAID HIS OPPOSITION RESULTED FROM ASSURANCES GIVEN BY AMERICANS THAT PREVIOUS TROOP DISPATCH WAS LAST WHICH WOULD BE REQUESTED AND BECAUSE SUCH ASSURANCES HAD BEEN PASSED TO ASSEMBLY AND PUBLIC. HE QUALIFIED HIS RESISTANCE TO NEW DISPATCH, HOWEVER, BY STATING THAT SOMETHING MUST BE FOUND WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIS PRESIDENT TO FACE OPPONENTS OF NEW DISPATCH, ADDING THAT HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY AMERICAN REFUSAL THUS FAR TO QTE TAKE INITIATIVE UNQTE IN THAT SENSE. LOCKE REPLIED THAT WE TOO HAD EXCEEDED WHAT CONGRESS EXPECTED IN WAY OF TROOPS FOR VIET-NAM BECAUSE NO ONE COULD PREDICT REQUIREMENTS, BUT THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAD FACED UP TO LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN MATTER.

5. DEFMIN SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO HIS OPPOSITION ON GROUNDS OF SECURITY HE HAD BEEN VERY DISAPPOINTED

1.3
(u)(5)

[REDACTED]

LOCKE ASSURED PRESIDENT THAT US GREATLY CONCERNED WITH MAINTENANCE OF KOREAN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE. HE RELATED OUR INTENTIONS RE MAP IN COMING YEAR, SUPPORT FUND LEVEL, AND \$10 MILLION PROGRAM LOAN.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER THEN MADE STATEMENT WHICH RELATED TO HIS OWN SUCCESS IN TURNING OFF ASSEMBLY INQUIRY INTO MATTER OF IMPLEMENTATION OF MARCH 4, 1966 AGREEMENT. HE ALSO REFERRED AS DID DEFMIN. TO QTE ANTI-INFILTRATION MEASURES

1.3
(u)(5)

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3- SEOUL 2769, DECEMBER 7. N O D I S

1.3
(u)(S)
[REDACTED]

7. BEFORE DISCUSSION ENDED, LOCKE ASKED PARK IF WE COULD SET DATE FOR DISCUSSION OF QTE ARRANGEMENTS UNQTE TO SUPPORT QTE LIGHT DIVISION UNQTE HE HAD MENTIONED. PARK REPLIED THAT PORTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE COULD ARRANGE FOR MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME TO OPEN CONVERSATIONS.

1.3
(u)(S)
[REDACTED]

8. RECOMMEND VERY CAREFUL HANDLING OF THIS MATTER. [REDACTED]

1.3
(u)(S)
[REDACTED]

9. I WILL SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH DEFMIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER AMB LOCKE HAS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS MATTER IN WASHINGTON AND I HAVE YOUR COMMENTS.

1.3
(u)(S)
[REDACTED]

10. [REDACTED]

GP-3. PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

Pres File
22

Thurs., Dec. 7, 1967
3:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Senator Ribicoff and Hussein chat.

If the Senator stays put in support of some
U. S. arms for Jordan, it could be helpful
(see last sentence, page 2).

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS attachment

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR SYMMES (Amman, 2519)

SUBJECT: Tour d'Horizon of Senator Ribicoff with King Hussein

King Hussein received Senator Ribicoff and Mr. Granquist with me this morning. Senator Ribicoff had been received earlier by Prime Minister Talhouni and Deputy Prime Minister Touqan and had had extensive discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem in which he delved into the specifics of a possible settlement.

In the meeting with the King, the Senator referred to those earlier discussions. He said he had just come from Israel where he had had talks with Prime Minister Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban. He had discussed with Prime Minister Talhouni his own personal views re possible steps towards peace in the area.

The Senator threw out specific examples of mutuality of Israeli-Jordanian interest in such areas as Eilat/Aqaba port development, joint potash development in the Dead Sea, Jordan use of Ashdod or Haifa, joint tourist development in Jerusalem, joint development of water and agricultural resources and settlement of the refugee problem. The Senator also outlined the possibility of Jordan supervision of Muslim shrines in Jerusalem.

The Senator then led into the Israeli view that direct negotiations are necessary to move toward an Arab-Israeli settlement of a lasting nature. He said he recognized that the King could not move alone and that it would be necessary for him to consult his Arab allies but he wondered how the King saw the possibility of direct negotiations.

The King responded by providing a general outline of recent Jordanian policy. He stressed that he saw the forthcoming summit meeting (for which a definite date had not been set) as chiefly a means by which he would obtain flexibility to pursue policies in Jordan's interest. Jordan would press for an early summit meeting in Rabat, perhaps by the twelfth. He elaborated on human, economic and political problems posed for Jordan by the latest crop of refugees, by perennial difficulties arising from the 1948 war,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 02-155
By 44, NARA, Date 6-10-03

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

and from continued, strident attacks on Jordan's policies of moderation by various Arab extremists. He said he could not, in these circumstances, move to direct negotiations, but in response to appointed questions from Senator Ribicoff he said he was not against direct negotiations in principle. That stage could only be reached through the Jarring mission and "with the help of friends."

The King also told the Senator that he had no objection to and, in fact, would favor the Senator's passing on his views to Government of Israel leaders on a confidential basis. Because of enemies of moderation in the Arab world, however, he did not wish these views on the possibility of direct negotiations to be publicly attributed to him.

The King strongly reiterated his opposition to terrorist activity. He stressed that even the Israelis would have to admit that those they had arrested were not Jordanian and that their arms and other equipment, as well as their training and briefing, had been supplied by Syria. He also pointed out the possibility that the Syrians are falsely briefing and misleading infiltrators in order deliberately to compromise Jordanian efforts against terrorism in the eyes of the Israelis.

The King outlined in well-known terms Jordan's situation with regard to arms requirements. He stressed that he had almost reached the limits of his ability to deal with this situation. He is beginning to see danger points in his own army which, he said frankly, is his only guarantee of continued stability and moderation.

The army's morale continues to deteriorate as they see other Arab states and Israel supplied with new equipment while they get nothing. The King stressed that he has been forced to accept the presence of other Arab troops in his territory, and this is an added danger. On the other hand, he cannot ask for the removal of these troops so long as he obtains no military equipment. The Soviets have offered to supply him with arms, and he will soon be faced with having to turn to that source if there is no other alternative. The King said this was a most unpleasant alternative for him and that he did not consider it in the interest of the U.S. or other states in the area for him to be forced to make this choice.

The Senator agreed with the King and asked me to brief him and the King on the present status of U.S. arms supply to Jordan, which I then did. The Senator also said he intended to discuss this situation with Ambassador Barbour on his return to Israel with a view to giving his personal endorsement of a resumption of U.S. military shipments to Jordan.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-3-

The conversation throughout was frank and cordial. Senator Ribicoff's sincerity and objectivity seemed to me to make a distinctly favorable impression on the King.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Thursday, December 7, 1967
2:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is pretty good evidence of
what we will be up against in New York:
Security Council pressure for a bombing
pause.

W. W. Rostow

25X1A

5 Dec. 1967

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

SANITIZED
Authority NLT 019-026-2-2
By SP, NARA, Date 1/8/02

INFORMATION*Pres file*

Thursday, December 7, 1967 -- 1:50 p.m.

Mr. President:

I spoke at some length to Bob McNamara about the colleges.

1. CIA has already stopped on-campus recruiting.
2. He had "advised" Dow to stop; believes they did issue an order; doesn't understand the latest incident but will check.
3. As for Defense Department visits to campuses. He believes it would be wrong to stop all visits; equally wrong to go to "sensitive" campuses. Therefore, he has ordered visits be on a careful, selected basis. But, he reiterated, it would be a "disaster" and a "great victory" for the Vietnaks if the Defense Department withdrew from campus contacts.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~1. Prop~~
2. Pres file~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967 - 12:30pm

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Eshkol Visit

The Israelis have told us that the dates we propose (February 7-8) are fine with them. Since Eshkol is coming here to speak to the Israeli Bonds Organization and to other groups, the Israeli Embassy in making arrangements will have to tell these groups almost immediately when he's coming. Therefore, it seems sensible to announce his visit soon.

If you approve the dates and early announcement, I suggest that George make the following announcement next Monday: "Prime Minister Eshkol will be visiting the United States in early February. In the course of this visit, he will come to Washington at President Johnson's invitation."

Approve ✓ Call me _____

The other point on which we need your guidance is the question of entertainment. If it were anyone else, you would not be called on to entertain on a private trip of this kind. However, you might want to consider hosting an occasion to which prominent members of the American Jewish community could be invited. State Department recommends a lunch as most appropriate and I concur. Mrs. Eshkol will be with him, and we would, of course, invite the Eshkols to stay at Blair House.

Include a luncheon in the program ✓

Prefer to decide later about luncheon _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(h)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 12-18-91

Rtd - 12/8/67

W. W. Rostow

cc: George Christian

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967

9:15 a.m.

11:30

Mr. President:

Herewith another Czech view of
U. S. Vietnam policy.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

Memo for the President from Richard Helms, 6 Dec 1967

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 12-18-91

December 7, 1967

~~top~~
2. Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your signature, is a proposed reply to two recent letters from Prime Minister Jonathan of Lesotho. The first asked that we follow up on your suggestion (made during his September visit) that we see whether we can help him with PL 480 feed grains. The second letter invited the Vice President to include Lesotho on his trip to Africa.

We have looked very carefully at what Lesotho can use in additional food aid. They now get about 9,000 tons of corn a year. Our man on the spot thinks they can probably use about 16,000 tons. The draft reply is designed to get them to make a formal request for an increase, which we would promptly grant.

Jonathan also did some star-gazing in his letter about an aircraft deal and a hydro-electric project. We can't help him on these. But we'll lose nothing -- and can let him down easy -- by agreeing at least to discuss his ideas.

I recommend you sign.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ED:RM:lw

Att: File #4283

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

Pres file~~SECRET~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to King Faisal

We've had reports that King Faisal feels we've been ignoring him in the swirl of negotiations that put the UN representative in the field.

He was in New York in 1948 when Israel became independent, and ever since he has deeply felt that we've taken Israel's side. Against that background, he can't understand our present position except as our digging in alongside Israel again.

The best we can hope for is to keep reassuring him that we have his concerns in mind and are trying to start an honest negotiation that will give Arab interests a fair hearing. The attached letter tells him we think the November 22 UN resolution provides a good framework for a fair settlement.

Secretary Rusk has instructed our ambassadors in all the Arab countries to take a similar line with each of the Arab foreign ministers before their meeting this weekend, but Faisal is worth a little extra personal attention. We will shortly be recommending to you a letter to Eshkol urging him also to give the UN representative full cooperation.

The attached is for your signature if you approve.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-255
By ms, NARA Date 10-3-97

~~SECRET~~

December 7, 1967

Your Majesty:

Since the unhappy events of last June, I have tried to keep Your Majesty currently informed on the attitude of the United States toward developments in the difficult Near Eastern situation. In this spirit, I would like to share with you my views on the future now that the United Nations Security Council has unanimously adopted its resolution on this complex problem.

The extended debates in New York, both in July and for the past two months, have been difficult for us all. None of us has achieved everything desired. We have all had to adjust and modify our views to establish a workable consensus. Throughout the long effort, our own objective has been to work for a resolution with which both sides can in good conscience cooperate. The unanimous adoption of a resolution by the Security Council on November 22 makes clear that we have succeeded in this important initial step.

Passage of this resolution embodying an agreed set of principles--including withdrawal, an end to belligerency, and secure and recognized boundaries--and authorizing the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to help the parties concerned work out solutions is most welcome. But it is only a first step.

I recognize that neither our Arab nor Israeli friends are entirely happy with the outcome. We fully understand the concern of both sides on matters which so vitally affect both, and I know how deeply Your Majesty feels on such key issues as Jerusalem, troop withdrawal and a just solution to the refugee problem.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 97-255
By iso, NARA Date 10-3-97

But all members of the Security Council have worked diligently to establish a framework for peace in which the legitimate concerns of all parties can be met. We believe that passage of the November 22 resolution has now set in motion a process which provides an excellent opportunity for us all to do what we can to help establish lasting conditions of peace in this long troubled region.

I recognize and appreciate the contribution to moderation and stability which the Saudi Government has made in recent weeks under your wise leadership. While Your Majesty's country is not one of the four states most intimately concerned, I have no doubt that Saudi Arabia will continue to take a constructive attitude toward the efforts, now in the hands of Ambassador Jarring, to work out a just and lasting settlement in full agreement with both sides.

You may be sure that we will continue to exert our diplomatic and political influence in support of this effort to secure a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility. The unanimity of the Council's action gives us all a particular opportunity, which we should not let pass, to try to resolve outstanding problems on a basis mutually acceptable to both sides.

I value highly our continuing friendly exchanges on matters of key importance to both our governments. With understanding and good will, I believe that the many difficulties that still lie ahead can be surmounted and conditions of permanent tranquility established which will benefit all the peoples of the Near East.

All best personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

His Majesty
Faisal ibn Abd-al-Azis Al-Saud
King of Saudi Arabia

December 7, 1967

Pres file

Mr. President:

Secretary Rusk recommends that you receive B. K. Nehru for a brief farewell call sometime before Thursday, December 14. Nehru leaves that day after six years here.

I second Rusk's recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Set up a short meeting with Nehru _____

No _____

See me _____

WWR:EH:lw

Att: File #4618

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1967

29a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Farewell Call by Indian Ambassador
B. K. Nehru

Recommendation:

That you receive outgoing Indian Ambassador
B. K. Nehru, who wishes to pay a farewell call.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

Ambassador Nehru will be leaving on December 14
after more than six years as head of the Indian
Embassy and a total of some thirteen years in Washington.
He is to become Governor of Assam and Nagaland, two
sensitive states on the eastern borders of India.

We do not anticipate that Nehru will raise any
specific substantive issues during this final call
but he is likely to have some valedictory remarks
on Indo-American relations generally.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 91-213

By ing, NARA, Date 9-15-92

30

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday, December 7, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: NATO Claims Against France

Attached is Secretary Rusk's memo requesting your approval to seek agreement among the other Fourteen Allies of France to begin action on the Alliance's financial claims against France. Secretaries McNamara and Fowler join in this recommendation.

NATO's claims against France are for costs incurred in being forced out of French territory. Although an exact amount has not yet been established, State estimates that the figure may be up to \$400 million.

In addition, the U.S. has substantial bilateral claims against France. For political and practical reasons, State feels -- and I agree -- that the Alliance should proceed with its claims first, and then we can follow with our own.

Although a working group of lawyers from the Fourteen have agreed on the outlines of a strong case against France, there is considerable reluctance among some of the Allies -- including the British and the Germans -- to press the French on this issue now. If you approve this recommendation, Secretary Rusk will carry on quiet exploratory talks at the NATO Ministerial meetings next week.

Even if we get agreement of the others for pressing a claim within the machinery of the Alliance, there is no assurance that the French will admit to any liability. Furthermore, once our case is presented, the French may seek to blow it up into a political issue or simply stonewall.

Nevertheless there are good reasons for going ahead now.

-- We have a good case under international law. The legal experts of the Fourteen agree on this.

-- It will give us a line on how to proceed on our bilateral claims.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- The NATD forum reduces the U.S. - France public confrontation on the claims issue.
- We will be under strong pressure from Congress to show action on this issue.

I concur in Secretary Rusk's recommendation. He should know your views before he leaves Sunday morning, December 10, for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

W. W. Rostow

Approve Secretary Rusk's recommendation _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

ERF:em

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4611
30a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: NATO Claims Against France

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to proceed as soon as possible to seek agreement among the Fourteen Allies of France to present a NATO claim to France. This NATO claim would be negotiated under the aegis of the North Atlantic Council and would, if possible, precede any approach to France on a U. S. bilateral claim.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

The Group of Fourteen Allies of France is considering a Fourteen report on "Claims Against France" which indicates that the Fourteen have a sound legal case for a claim for the value of certain NATO-financed facilities remaining in France. The claim could amount to as much as \$400 million depending on legal, accounting and political decisions still to be made by the Fourteen. With consideration of the Fourteen report, the NATO claims will now attract attention as an international political problem involving our relations with France and our NATO Allies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 91-216
By ag/ap, NARA, Date 1-13-92

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

There are strong indications that several of our NATO Allies (including the U.K. and Germany) are apprehensive about a possible confrontation with France on this issue. Also, the chances are that the French Government will never admit liability or make any substantial payment to the Fourteen. On the other hand, in its Aides Memoires of 11 and 29 March, 1966, the French Government expressed its willingness to discuss with its Allies, bilaterally or multilaterally, the problems created by France's actions. Obviously, the true French position will only emerge when a claim is presented.

Domestic political pressures are such that we must move ahead on this issue immediately. Specifically, we wish to avoid criticism that the Administration has not done enough to recover at least part of the value of U.S.- and NATO-financed facilities denied us by France's 1966 actions. State and Defense expect to be called to account, possibly in the early weeks of the new Congressional Session, on this matter. The Treasury Department has also maintained an unflagging interest in moving the NATO claim (and U.S. bilateral claims against France) promptly forward.

It is politically appropriate that the U.S. -- as the principal NATO victim of France's actions -- play the leading role in moving the claims forward. In consideration of U.S. domestic interest, Secretary McNamara and I should be prepared to state the U.S. position to Ministers of the Fourteen at the NATO Ministerial meeting next week.

As soon thereafter as possible, we would plan to present the NATO claim in the North Atlantic Council, in response to France's expressed willingness to discuss such matters. This procedure would be least public and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

least inflammatory in political terms. NATO Secretary General Brosio believes that the French would find a settlement proposed in this manner more difficult to resist than a public confrontation.

The U.S. is now completing preparation of material for a possible approach to France on a U.S. bilateral claim. There are political and practical reasons for presenting the NATO claim in advance of a U.S. bilateral claim:

-- The direct U.S.-France confrontation aspect of the claims problem would be minimized by an initial multi-lateral approach.

-- Discussion of the NATO claim should reveal preferred tactics for an approach to France on U.S. bilateral claims.

In the event we should not succeed in moving the NATO claim along promptly, we may have to reconsider the appropriate time to proceed with our bilateral claim.

The Secretaries of Treasury and Defense join me in making this recommendation.



Dean Rusk

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, December 7, 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Secretary Wirtz Trip to Mexico

Herewith a memorandum from Covey Oliver concerning Secretary Wirtz's trip to Mexico to discuss labor matters. He points up the problems of making the trip now and suggests a delay of about a month. He does not think we can satisfy the Mexicans on the bracero question and wants time to develop alternatives.

Secretary Wirtz told Bill Bowdler that he is prepared to go next week and is waiting for the signal from here. Asked what proposals he and Covey had worked out, he said that he would go down simply to talk and perhaps from these talks would emerge ideas for easing the Mexican bracero problem. Obviously, there has not been a meeting of the minds between the Secretary and Covey on how to proceed.

Our sense of the play between them is this:

-- Both feel that we cannot meet Mexico's aspirations on braceros (and reduce the wetback problem) without increasing the number to levels which will get us into trouble with the Congress and AFL-CIO. For example, raising the quota from the present 8,000 to 30,000 per year will not do the trick; going to 100,000 would, but also creates deep trouble at home.

-- Wirtz is prepared to go to Mexico to talk over issues without taking any specific proposals.

-- Covey thinks this is bad for U. S. - Mexican relations because his trip will arouse Mexican expectation which we cannot meet. He wants to work out alternative suggestions for helping Mexico ease its unemployment problems. Covey mentions two alternatives:

1. State/AID to develop with Mexico job-creating and vocational training programs for which we would provide substantial AID loans.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2. State/Justice to work out cooperative arrangements with Mexico on control of illegal entrants.

Two other constructive steps might be:

1. Tell Labor to advise Mexico well in advance of the harvest season how many braceros it will certify. (Our intelligence is that Labor waits until the last moment by which time our growers have looked elsewhere for labor and the Mexicans are hard put to round up the quantity needed to meet the immediate demand. This year the quota was set at 8,000 and only 6,000 came over.)

2. Have State explore with Mexico a mutually beneficial economic agreement for border trade and development.

I share Covey's concern about Secretary Wirtz going to Mexico City to talk with no specific proposals in hand. I recommend a crash effort to staff out the four ideas mentioned above, meanwhile holding up the Wirtz trip. Then both Secretary Wirtz and Covey could go down to discuss them.

W. W. Rostow

Staff out four proposals and
meantime hold up Wirtz trip

Prefer that Wirtz make trip
next week for general talks

Speak to me

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

32

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, December 6, 1967
6:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Dick Helms files a strong case for U.S. arms aid to Jordan -- from an intelligence perspective.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Attachment: Memo for the Director (CIA), 5 Dec 1967 from Sherman Kent, "Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US, the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 019-026-2-6
By φ, NARA, Date 1/8/02

WWRostow:rla

4605
32a

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Implications of Jordan Receiving Arms from the US,
the USSR, France, or Other Western Powers

I. INTRODUCTION

1. King Hussain feels a strong need to re-equip his armed forces after their heavy losses in the June war. This need springs more from political and psychological reasons than from military ones. Failure to get arms would give rise to severe domestic dissidence -- particularly from the officer corps on whose support Hussain depends. It would also weaken him politically in the rest of the Arab world -- inviting invidious comparison between the holdup in US resumption of arms sales to Jordan -- but not to Israel -- and the promptness with which Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi losses have been made good by the Soviets. Moscow has offered arms to Jordan on liberal terms. The \$100 million annual subsidy to Jordan from conservative oil-rich states will enable

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 001-148-1-4
By NY NARA, Date 10-5-01

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

Hussain to pay Western prices, and he would still prefer to rely chiefly on the US or, failing this, on French, British, and other Western European sources for his needs. He does so partly because his forces already use Western arms, partly because he fears Soviet influence, and perhaps most of all, because he feels a strong need for evidence that the US and the West, to which he has always looked for support, have not deserted him. If he does not meet with reasonable satisfaction from the US and the West he would take Soviet arms.

2. If the US refuses to supply any equipment at all and thus appears to be abandoning Jordan, other countries in the area would reassess their own relations with the US. Some, pro-US in orientation, would feel obliged to reinsure their positions by seeking closer relations with other states -- for example, Saudi Arabia might improve relations with Egypt, or even open diplomatic relations with the USSR. Any apparent abandonment of Jordan would in time also be observed with concern in Lebanon, Libya, Ethiopia, and other area states. Radical forces in the Arab world would be heartened.

- 2 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

II. ARMS FROM THE USSR

3. For Hussain to accept Soviet arms would mean that the USSR had established a position in another country heretofore largely closed to it. It would mean that all major Arab forces were standardized on Soviet equipment. The Israelis would raise an alarm about this and would urgently request additional US arms to offset those the Soviets supplied to Jordan. Such a development would serve to identify the US more closely with Israel and the Soviets with the Arabs. Prospects for movement toward an accommodation between the Arabs and Israel would probably be further dimmed.

4. In Jordan itself acceptance of Soviet arms would make preservation of Western influence increasingly difficult. In time, Jordan would be likely to come to share the antipathy of the radical Arabs toward the US and the West, and at best would adopt a neutralist stance. The acceptance of Soviet arms would probably improve Hussain's popularity in the short term, but would encourage the revolutionary forces that constitute the underlying threat to continuation of the monarchy.

5. We believe that Soviet aims in offering arms to Jordan are political, not military. By this move the Soviets do not have

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

it in mind to facilitate eventual military operations of their own in the area. Soviet policy almost certainly does not contemplate direct military intervention in intra-regional quarrels there. Moreover, Jordan, like those Arab states already equipped with Soviet weapons, would probably be unwilling to permit Soviet forces to use its territory except in the highly unlikely event that they were offered for use against Israel.

III. ARMS FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES

6. Damage to US-Jordanian relations by US refusal to sell arms might be mitigated somewhat if the US facilitated acquisition of arms from other Western sources. Britain and France appear to be the most likely sources of the arms Jordan wants, but others, such as Belgium and Sweden, manufacture limited types of armaments.

France

7. De Gaulle's recent sharp condemnation of Israel and his suspension of military supplies to Israel on the eve of the war have already enhanced France's image in the Arab world. Sales of French arms, even through a third country intermediary, would

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

~~SECRET~~

further boost French prestige in both Jordan and in other Arab countries; it is not likely to benefit the US position in Jordan. While France could supply virtually all the categories of arms that Jordan wants, Jordan is particularly interested in French supersonic aircraft. Direct sales of French equipment to Jordan, especially of such significant items as Mirage aircraft, would bring a further deterioration of French-Israeli relations.

The UK

8. The UK has long been a major source of military supply for Jordan and has already provided a few aircraft since the war, though the British appear to be encountering difficulties in finding enough Hawker-Hunters to replace the two squadrons Jordan lost in the war. (The specific model Jordan wants is no longer in production.) Britain would be eager to earn hard currency from arms sales to Jordan and would not be much concerned at Israel's reaction. While the Jordanians have not so far pressed for ground equipment, they are familiar with British weapons and would probably prefer them as a first alternative to US equipment.

~~SECRET~~


~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

IV. ARMS FROM THE US

9. US agreement to provide a substantial proportion of the \$15-20 million in arms that Jordan has requested would help to slow the decline in US influence in the Arab world evident since the Arab-Israeli war. It would be interpreted both in Jordan and by other Arab regimes friendly to the US as tangible evidence that the US is not abandoning them. While provision of US arms would by no means fully restore US prestige in Jordan or in the area, particularly as long as Israel continues to occupy important Arab territories, it would encourage the moderate Arabs, for whom Hussain is at present the foremost spokesman, to maintain their relations with the US. It would also help Hussain maintain his moderate course in seeking an arrangement with Israel.

10. No matter what the source of Hussain's arms, there is not likely to be any significant effect on the military balance between the Arab states and Israel. Nonetheless, the latter would protest vigorously if the US resumed arms supply to Jordan. Tel Aviv would be certain to use shipments of arms to Jordan from any source as an argument for additional US aid.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:


SHERMAN KENT
Chairman

- 6 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Dec. 6, 1967
5:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

25X1A

This memo of conversation between the Shah
and [REDACTED] will interest
you -- including the marked passage on page 4.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

SANITIZED
Authority *NLS 019-026-2-8*
By *q* NARA, Date *1/8/02*

5 December 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director for Plans
SUBJECT: Conversation with the Shah on
16 November 1967

1. This memorandum is for your information.

2. A fortnight after his coronation, the Shah was in a relaxed but sober mood reflecting confidence in his domestic program, his role as a leader in the Middle East and his relations with the Great Powers -- a confidence mixed with concern and some anxiety about obvious elements in the Middle East situation which continue to threaten his own ambitions for the area.

3. Although priorities in Iranian foreign policy now rest on his decision to develop regional strengths that will give the Middle East nations a common capability to contain and live with the threat of Soviet pressures, his policy rests on the premise that his special and primary relationship with the United States can be preserved a few years more. Strengthened relations with Pakistan and Turkey remains the basis of his regional policy; as CENTO fades, other military and economic arrangements in which the US and the UK play no direct role are expanding. He has found it necessary to give Ayub "virtually an ultimatum" to get his foreign affairs in order; he

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : NLJ-019-026-2-9-5

Authority NLT 019-026-2-9
By OP, NARA, Date 1/8/02

- 2 -

sees Pakistan gradually turning more to the West, placing more confidence on regional security arrangements, being less dependent on the Great Powers and emphasizing Islamic rather than radical Afro-Asian associations.

4. The Shah's relations with the Arab-Israel world remain complicated. In the Cold War context his sympathies lie entirely with Israel; the defeat of the radical Arabs in June dramatically served Iran's interest. In matters of common security, the Shah conducts his affairs with Israel secretly and partly in consort with Turkey. Top intelligence, security and some military officials from Tel Aviv and Ankara were in Teheran meeting with the Shah's top officials during my visit. Denial of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the lower end of the Red Sea Basin to the Soviet Union and the radical Arabs is the strategic goal that constitutes the basis for this relationship. Arms captured by the Israelis in June are now finding their way via Iran into friendly Arab hands in the Yemen. The expansion of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, the appearance of "Red Beret Russian Marines" and the military implications of the "Elath" sinking were all on the

25X1C

25X1C

5. Overtly, the Shah continues to associate Iran with the Arab, but more particularly the Islamic, cause in

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

the context of the Arab-Israel conflict. He told me that during April 1967 he had advised Hussein to give vigorous armed response to any repetition by Israel of the 13 November 1966 raid on Samu in Jordan's West Bank; this action was essential, in the Shah's view, to Hussein's survival. Since the war, the Israelis have approached the Shah seeking his assistance in mediation efforts with Jordan; the Shah declined because he did not feel that Hussein and moderate forces in Jordan could survive reaction in the Arab world to a unilateral Jordan role. While the Shah has reservations about Hussein's judgement, he argues that Hussein's survival is vital to Iranian and American interests.

6. The Shah is relaxed about the expansion of French influence in Middle East oil and arms. The Shah takes a positive view of the prospect of some standardization of aircraft -- Mirage in the short run -- in Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly other Arab countries. However, he is emphatic in his view that the Turkish and Iranian Air Forces must be based on US equipment and doctrine. This was one of two points raised by the Shah in comparatively strong language. The other dealt with the attacks on the President concerning his Vietnam policy.

7. We had examined the likelihood that Moscow, sooner or later, would have to take a hard look at Khrushchev's policy of providing armed support for "just wars of national


- 4 -

liberation". In four areas of the world -- Southeast Asia, the Arab Near East, Africa and the Western Hemisphere, the Soviets had gained no favorable decision, had suffered several disasters and had seen the price of the game rising steadily. I had said that I thought the time for a Soviet reappraisal of Khrushchev's policy might come after President Johnson was re-elected. A decision by the Soviets to write off the Vietnam War -- following the disaster which struck them in the Middle East in June 1967 -- could, I said, mark the turning point in Soviet policy. In this case, President Johnson would emerge in history as "one of our greatest Presidents". With some vigor the Shah interrupted and corrected my statement -- "he will emerge as the greatest President of the United States; the toughness and courage demonstrated by him in sticking to his position when under attack from all those in the US and abroad who oppose his Vietnam policy is inspiring to all of us who know that he is right".

8. The Shah feels that trade with and aid from the Soviet Union is entirely compatible with his basic policy of seeking to build a strong Middle East bloc of nations which will have normal relations with the industrially developed powers, including Russia and all of Europe. He seems confident that a combination of economic and social progress in Iran and an effective and sharply oriented intelligence and security effort keeping track of the Soviets in Iran will limit the

- 5 -


dangers of expanding trade and relations with the Soviets to a tolerable level. In this task, he desires to retain his special relationship with the United States. I assured



25X1C 8

9. I saw the Shah alone; the foregoing represents only the highlights of a lengthy conversation.

25X1A



INFORMATION

P file
34

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Wednesday, Dec. 6, 1967
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the answer to your question on
Cambodian military strength.

The answer: not much -- about 32,000 men.

If they are to deal with the VC/NVA forces,
I suspect it will have to be via inspection teams
(ICC or Cambodian) and publicity rather than
by Cambodian forces.

W. W. R.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

34a

CAMBODIAN AIR FORCE

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 98-299
By cbm, NARA, Date 9-17-01

A. (S/NFD) Mission: To provide Cambodia with an air defense capability; support the Army with an air transport capability as well as tactical ground support and civic action programs; provide a pool of pilots for civil aviation.

B. (S/NFD) Organization: The Air Forces is organized into five squadrons: one tactical air, one transport, one helicopter, one training, one liaison. All five squadrons are stationed at Phnom Penh.

C. (S/NFD) Air Order of Battle AOB:

1. Aircraft Strength

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>JANUARY 1967</u>	<u>DECEMBER 1967</u>
<u>Jet Fighters</u>	Total (11)	Total (13)
MIG-17	11*	13*
<u>Light Bombers</u>		
AlH	12	12
<u>Transports</u>	Total (22)	Total (26)
AN-2 (COLT)	2**	6**
MARCEL DASSAULT 315	6	6
IL-14 (GRATE)	2	2
C-47A	2	2
C-47B	5	5
C-47D	5	5
<u>Helicopters</u>	Total (9)	Total (9)
MI-4	1	1
ALLOUETTE II	4	4
ALLOUETTE III	2	2
UH-19	2	2

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>JANUARY 1967</u>	<u>DECEMBER 1967</u>
<u>Trainers</u>	<u>Total (53)</u>	<u>Total (61)</u>
MIG-15 (MIDGET)	1	1
LT-6G	7	7
T-28D	14	14
MAGISTER CM-170	4	4
MORANE SAULNIER 733	23	23
T-37B	4	4
MAX YAK-18s	--	8**
<u>Misc Aircraft</u>	<u>Total (17)</u>	<u>Total (17)</u>
O-1A	9	9
U-6A	4	4
CESSNA 170	2	2
UTVA-60	2	2

* Five MIG-17s are carried in operational units. Three additional are reported being assembled by Chinese technicians.

** are not carried in operational units.

*** are not carried in operational units, two are reported being assembled.

2. Radar Order of Battle

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
BIG BAR B	2	Phnom Penh Airfield
FISHNET	3	" " "
TOKEN	4	" " "
TOKEN	1	Tuksrak (VT 455473)
FIRECAN	1	Pong Tuk Airfield (VS 307643)
FIRECAN	1	Phnom Penh Airfield
DECCA-41	1	" " "

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

D. ~~(S/NFD)~~ Current Capabilities: The AVRK has been and still is primarily a support unit for the army as most of the flying activities are directed toward support for ground units, civic action programs, training programs, and border patrol missions. The Tactical Air Squadron's capabilities to perform the dual mission of air defense and ground support are limited to five MIG-17s and 12 A-1H aircraft. The one U-MIG-15 assigned to the squadron is used for transitional training. While the in-commission rate of aircraft is good, the combat ready status is low due to low pilot availability. The AVRK has only 11 pilots that are fighter/bomber qualified, and three of these are flight commanders. At least six of the eleven pilots are jet qualified. The squadron maintains a runway alert at Phnom Penh Airfield and flies border patrol missions. An EW/GCI (BIG BAR B and FISHNET IFF) installation at Phnom Penh is tied into a system of ground reporting and observation posts. The AVRK has no strategic air capabilities. Its transport squadron performs aerial resupply, troop lift, paradrop, and VIP transport missions. In terms of flying hours, in-commission rates and pilot proficiency, this squadron is the most professionally qualified squadron. Some pilot training and personnel and cargo transport missions are conducted by the Helicopter Squadron. The Liaison Squadron's capabilities are limited by the large number of AOCP aircraft.

E. ~~(S)~~ Recent Activities: The initial observance of the AVRK in a tactical role occurred in early April 1967, with the deployment of three fighter aircraft and one observation plane to Cambodia's Battambang Airfield, Military Region (MR) 3. Two SKYRAIDERS were later observed in an air support mission in the course of which they fired rockets and machineguns in an area of Battambang which was the scene of rebel activity. The AVRK has not, however, demonstrated an offensive capability which would permit Cambodia to oppose air operations of any of its neighbors. Training flights on the (C-170) and MIG-17F jet aircraft were observed in February, June, and August 1966, each lasting one month; similar training flights were scheduled in 1967 on 19 and 24 January, 2 February, and 25 March. Otherwise, the activity of the AVRK consists of the transportation of supplies and personnel to outlying areas, air drops of food and other supplies (particularly during the rainy season).

F. ~~(TS)~~ Collection Effort

1. The Australian attache is our primary source of AOB. Trojan Horse photographic coverage is inadequate since it is not extensive enough to render complete analysis of all operational airfields in Cambodia.

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

2. NSA cannot gain adequate coverage of the Cambodian Air Force primarily because of the low priority afforded to this activity and lack of resources. Since they are thin in this area, we do not see scheduling, pre-flights or air operational activities. In Cambodian military and police traffic we do have reports of transport aircraft traffic. NSA has recently shifted SIGINT responsibility for Cambodian air activity from South Vietnam [redacted] 3.4(b)(1) and hopefully coverage may improve in the near future.

3. NSA has no radar resources to detect reflections of the Cambodian air operations, and the US Air Force has no radar reports reflecting Cambodian air traffic. Attached are two graphics which reflect US radar coverage of Cambodia.

LTC Thomas J. Burckell
DIAAP-4A2/LTC
55317
December 1967

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, December 6, 1967
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson
responds to your message to him about
Cyprus.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

T. 315/67, Dec 6, 1967

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 12-18-91

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, December 6, 1967

12:30pm

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U. S. Investment in France

You recently asked for up-to-date information on U. S. investment in France. This information is shown below -- along with comparable data for other Common Market countries and on a world basis.

(in million dollars)

	<u>U. S. Direct Investment 1966</u>	<u>Total U. S. Direct Investment at end of 1966</u>	<u>U. S. Earnings From Direct Investment</u>
France	149	1758	88
Germany	646	3077	208
Italy	166	1148	39
The Netherlands	172	858	48
Belgium-Luxembourg	149	745	52
Total Common Market	<u>1283</u>	<u>7587</u>	<u>435</u>
 Total All Areas	 <u>5234</u>	 <u>54562</u>	 <u>5680</u>

In his press conference de Gaulle claimed that: (1) U. S. investment in France brought U. S. control, and (2) that these investments were financed in a kind of underhanded way through the continuing deficit in the U. S. balance of payments. These are old themes for de Gaulle and he played them in low key.

French policy toward U. S. investment is selective. Licenses are granted quickly for investments that bring new technology and raise productivity. The fact is that the French cannot afford to act alone in

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 76286-15
By rg/lap, NARA, Date 1-9-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

discriminating against U.S. investment. To do so would drive such investments to their partners to the disadvantage of the French competitive position within the Common Market.

W. W. Rostow

92F

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, Dec. 6, 1967
11:30 a. m.

37

Mr. President:

At my request, our Hal Saunders did these two thoughtful memos on:

- the choice ahead in the Middle East;
- the meaning of Nasser's Nov. 23 speech.

My view is: the Arabs are still confused, humiliated, looking for revenge in part of their minds. But they have no long-term plan. Therefore, we must:

- struggle for an Arab-Israeli settlement;
- then follow through with policies to strengthen moderate Arabs so that, with the passage of time, the attractiveness of economic and social development gradually, slowly overtakes the passion for revenge.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachments

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-14-98

37a

~~SECRET~~

December 5, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: The Choice Ahead in the Middle East

The analysis of Nasser's November 23 speech you asked for is attached. It leads to a basic question: How much should we involve ourselves in the process which the UN resolution has set in motion? We don't have to answer until after the Arab summit and Jarring's first rounds. But we may need an answer when Eshkol comes.

Reactions to Nasser's speech reveal two schools of thought:

1. One figures that a settlement is unlikely. It assumes that political forces in Israel one way or another will scuttle chances for a settlement. It also figures that the Arabs won't make the compromises that a real settlement would require. Since settlement looks all but impossible, we'd be foolish to invest heavily in trying to bring one about--especially in a US election year because at some point a fair settlement might require us to press Israel pretty hard. (The Israelis are, in effect, feeding this line of thought with their campaign to blacken Hussein's image and paint the bleakest picture of Nasser's intentions.)

2. The other figures that our only hope of salvaging most of our conflicting interests in the Mid-East is to make a real college try to build something solid on the President's June 19 position. They say it's one thing to be on our guard against the worst in both Arab and Israeli positions and to be realistic about chances for a peace settlement. But it's quite another to be so "realistic" (i. e. pessimistic) that we decide the job is impossible and fold our tents.

Our final position will include a little of both viewpoints. I lean toward making a serious effort for a peace settlement, and we have pledged ourselves to that course. Success would be a great achievement for the President and compensate for any painful moments. Even an honest failure would redound more to our credit than a half-hearted try which the Arabs could blame on election-year sensitivities. But a lot of people here and in the Arab world doubt we have the heart to try when it means leaning on Israel.


Harold H. Saunders

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By pw, NARA, Date 5-14-98

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

December 4, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR WALT ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Nasser's November 23 Speech and the Mood of the Arabs

Ten days after Nasser's November 23 "State of the Union" speech, it's worth reflecting on where it leaves us.

Speech Consistent with Khartoum

The Israelis see the worst in it. Eshkol described it to Barbour as a "dagger in the back of the cause of peace" (and then went on to stress his need for more aircraft). Foreign Ministry officials--some more relaxed than others--see it as bearing out their interpretation of the Khartoum meeting that Nasser's ultimate aim is war.

Politically conscious Arabs from New York to Saudi Arabia interpret it as a "moderate" speech consistent with Nasser's effort since Khartoum to keep the initiative away from extremists. They all say it "didn't slam any doors." A few lump his harsher statements with Israel's as a prelude to bargaining.

Everyone (including Federenko) agrees that Nasser soured the atmosphere, but Arabs and Israelis alike agree that the speech did not depart from Nasser's position at Khartoum as he has interpreted that position to both King Hussein and Robert Anderson.

This is borne out by two subsequent official UAR clarifications which slightly soften the initial hard impact of the speech in our press:

--The official text of the passage on "never" allowing Israel to pass through the Canal indicates that the following qualifying sentences were lost in applause: "Passage through the Canal is an indivisible part of the original Palestine question. It is not part of the problem of eliminating the effects of the aggression." In the official text, the word "never" becomes "will not." Whatever Nasser actually said, official UAR policy still links the Canal to a refugee settlement.

--Nasser's official spokesman on November 26 qualified Nasser's statement that there could be no "peace" with Israel by saying he had not rejected a peaceful settlement but only a "peace treaty." The Israelis put no stock in this distinction, but the Egyptians have carefully maintained it since Khartoum and seem to think it increases their flexibility in arriving at a settlement.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Khartoum Position: A Two-phase Strategy?

The main argument over Nasser's position, then, boils down to interpretation of the position he took at Khartoum, not of the 23 November speech.

The Israelis say their reports on Khartoum show a two-phase strategy: Nasser's long-run objective remains the destruction of Israel. Their short-run aim is to get Israel out of occupied territories. They can't push Israel out by force, so they're ready to make marginal political concessions to get their land back. At the same time, military preparations continue for a future second-stage war against Israel. They quote Hussein at Khartoum: "Once the Israelis withdraw, we will return to our previous ways."

We agree that Nasser at Khartoum took to the political track because he has neither the military nor the economic power to get the conquered lands back by force. But our transcript of the Khartoum conference reveals no consciously conceived two-phase plan. In fact, the radical leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization tried to force the leaders there to focus on solution of the overall Palestine problem, and they literally shouted him down. They insisted that the only subject they were discussing was how to get the Israelis out. They talked about rebuilding military strength, but mainly so they don't have to negotiate flat on their backs and in order to use force eventually if political means fail.

The truth about Khartoum, I think, is that Nasser hasn't really thought beyond Israeli withdrawal one way or another. There was almost no talk at Khartoum about the "lasting peace" we talk about. And the Israelis are probably right in fearing that leopards don't change their spots. But for the moment, we don't think they're talking about a second phase, if any.

The same, incidentally, is true of the Israelis. Yaacov Herzog, Eshkol's Chef de Cabinet, told me two weeks ago that Israeli leaders are deeply divided over whether they should risk a political settlement, if the right terms can be negotiated, or sit tight on their expanded boundaries and rely for survival on the added military security they provide. He says he won't know for sure what Israeli strategy is until the Cabinet votes on a specific proposal (though he thinks "peace" will win).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Operational Significance

There may be small comfort in saying that Nasser for the moment is so preoccupied with Israeli withdrawal that he's not focusing right now on longer range objectives. But there are two important operational points here:

1. No one should trust Nasser. He broke his word to us last May. He's trying to recoup his losses at the lowest cost. His main objective is to be Mr. Big in the Arab world, and anti-Zionism will continue to be his one reliable rallying cry. He honestly believes we're to knock him off and would happily see us cut down to size-- even though he knows he needs our power in the area to push Israel back and to hold the USSR at bay and preserve his freedom.

2. But no one should assume that Nasser is so irrevocably committed to a two-phase strategy that no reasonable deal is possible.

a. Some Israelis would like an excuse for not having to face up to the tough decisions they'd have to make to achieve a real settlement.

b. Some Americans assume that, since the odds seem against a settlement, we shouldn't invest too much more in pressing the parties--especially Israel in an election year--toward a settlement. They believe realism suggests we wash our hands of the whole process as much as possible now that the UN representative has the ball.

The danger in working exclusively from this assumption is that we would give up an honest effort to build something on the President's June 19 foundation. It's one thing to be on our guard against the worst in both the Arabs and the Israelis and to assess our chances realistically. It's another to decide that we should fold our tents with all the consequences for our interests in the Middle East.


Harold H. Saunders

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION*Pres file*

Wednesday, December 6, 1967 -- 11:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

Glenn Seaberg called and asked me to tell you that a CABRIOLET decision, if affirmative, is required within the next week because:

- three weeks are required for technical preparations;
- an additional three weeks must be allowed for the right weather to come round;
- this would just allow enough time to do CABRIOLET and BUGGY (the planned follow-on project for FY 1968) before the cows go to pasture in mid-March.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ/RAC 03.260

By *id*, NARA, Date *1-12-04*

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - December 6, 1967

*transp
2. Profile*

Mr. President:

President Dias Ordaz on December 1 -- the third anniversary of his administration -- gave a press conference in which he said this about you, the U. S. Congress and the American people in response to a question about US-Mexican relations:

"Our relations, I believe, are at their best. I do not say they cannot be improved because everything that is human can be perfected: we can and should, as members of the government and peoples of both countries, make greater and lasting efforts to improve our relations. They are at present, however, exceedingly cordial and based fundamentally on an absolute reciprocity of respect and show of friendship and truth. I believe that deceit has no ethical justification even between enemies, but between friends it is unpardonable. The language of friends is the language of truth.

I have had the opportunity to speak to President Johnson on various problems, and I can tell you that I have always had magnificent results telling him the truth. While I am on this point, let me pay homage to a country which among its virtues knows how to listen to, not just to tolerate, the truth. It listens to it attentively, meditates on the truth which is presented to them and acts accordingly. You and I were witness to the way in which the Congress of the United States listened to our modest words of truth, not simply tolerating what we had to say, but giving cordial attention to what was said by outward signs of their assent. In this respect, Congress simply reflects one of the traditional virtues of the American people: that of knowing how to tell and how to listen to the truth."

I don't recall any Mexican President in recent times making so warm a public statement about the United States.

Thinking that you might wish to bring this to the attention of Senator Mansfield and Speaker McCormack, I enclose suggested letters for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

Enclosures

Bowdler

39a

December 6, 1967

Dear Mike:

President Diaz Ordaz held a press conference on December 1, the third anniversary of his administration. A reporter asked for his views on the present state of US-Mexican relations. This was his response:

"Our relations, I believe, are at their best. I do not say they cannot be improved because everything that is human can be perfected: we can and should, as members of the government and peoples of both countries, make greater and lasting efforts to improve our relations. They are at present, however, exceedingly cordial and based fundamentally on an absolute reciprocity of respect and show of friendship and truth. I believe that deceit has no ethical justification even between enemies, but between friends it is unpardonable. The language of friends is the language of truth.

I have had the opportunity to speak to President Johnson on various problems, and I can tell you that I have always had magnificent results telling him the truth. While I am on this point, let me pay homage to a country which among its virtues knows how to listen to, not just to tolerate, the truth. It listens to it attentively, meditates on the truth which is presented to them and acts accordingly. You and I were witness to the way in which the Congress of the United States listened to our modest words of truth, not simply tolerating what we had to say, but giving cordial attention to what was said by outward signs of their assent. In this respect, Congress simply reflects one of the traditional virtues of the American people: that of knowing how to tell and how to listen to the truth."

I thought that you might wish to bring this tribute to the United States Congress and the American people to the attention of

-2-

your colleagues in the Senate.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature, likely of J. Edgar Hoover, consisting of a stylized 'J' and 'E' followed by a vertical line.

Honorable Mike Mansfield
Majority Leader
United States Senate

LBJ/WGBowdler:mmm

Johnson
396

December 6, 1967

Dear John:

On the third anniversary of his administration -- December 1 -- Mexican President Diaz Ordaz held a press conference in which he was asked to comment on the present state of US-Mexican relations. This is how he replied:

"Our relations, I believe, are at their best. I do not say they cannot be improved because everything that is human can be perfected: we can and should, as members of the government and peoples of both countries, make greater and lasting efforts to improve our relations. They are at present, however, exceedingly cordial and based fundamentally on an absolute reciprocity of respect and show of friendship and truth. I believe that deceit has no ethical justification even between enemies, but between friends it is unpardonable. The language of friends is the language of truth.

I have had the opportunity to speak to President Johnson on various problems, and I can tell you that I have always had magnificent results telling him the truth. While I am on this point, let me pay homage to a country which among its virtues knows how to listen to, not just to tolerate, the truth. It listens to it attentively, meditates on the truth which is presented to them and acts accordingly. You and I were witness to the way in which the Congress of the United States listened to our modest words of truth, not simply tolerating what we had to say, but giving cordial attention to what was said by outward signs of their assent. In this respect, Congress simply reflects one of the traditional virtues of the American people: that of knowing how to tell and how to listen to the truth."

I bring these words of tribute to the United States Congress and the American people to your attention, thinking that you might want to bring them to the attention of your colleagues in the House of Representatives.

Sincerely,

/s/

Honorable John W. McCormack
Speaker of the House
United States House of Representatives

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 6, 1967

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: New Uruguayan President

The death of President Gestido is not expected to result in any basic change in Uruguayan political orientation or in relations with us.

President Jorge Pacheco Areco -- who is 47 years old -- is the first of a new generation of political leaders to rise to the top. This group has more vision and dynamism than the old-line caudillos of the Gestido generation. The change should work for the benefit of Uruguay.

Ambassador Hoyt and his staff have close working relationships with Pacheco. They regard him as more action-oriented and decisive than his predecessor. They say he is a strong supporter of the principles of western democracy and a firm friend of the West.

The new President, Vice President and Foreign Minister have already assured Ambassador Hoyt that they will continue the Gestido policies and want to maintain close working relationships with the U. S.

A biographic sketch of the new President is enclosed.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*