

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

Wednesday, December 13, 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Brazilian Program Loan

I did not follow through with your "See me" on my December 5 Brazilian program loan memorandum because it was overtaken by events. The differences which existed within the Executive Branch and with the Brazilians were ironed out in the talks State/AID had with Brazilian Finance Minister Delfim Neto on December 6-7. The understanding reached on handling the remaining \$75 million of the 1967 program is as follows:

1. Subject to your authorization, \$25 million will be disbursed early in January when Brazil takes the agreed exchange and credit actions. In the meantime, we would start now processing amendments to the loan agreement and the banking requirements so that there would be no delay in the disbursement once Brazil acts.
2. The remaining \$50 million will be made part of the 1968 program loan to be released in accordance with the schedule contained in the loan agreement to be negotiated (probably February or March).

We need your approval now for the \$25 million second tranche in order to proceed with the January disbursement. We will seek your authorization to proceed with the remaining \$50 million when we ask your approval for the total amount of the 1968 program loan (between \$75-100 million) and the negotiating instructions.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \$25 million  
tranche \_\_\_\_\_

Hold up, see me \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC Ltr 1/5/81By rg/lv, NARA, Date 1-10-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

Wednesday,  
December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Trade Problems Along Texas-Mexico Border

Marvin Watson last week showed you a report on the difficulties faced by our merchants in the Texas border cities resulting from a sudden strict application of Mexican customs regulations for overland travelers.

Since the enforcement is only along the Texas border from Matamoros to del Rio, it is quite clear that the Mexican action responds to pressure from the Monterrey merchants.

Our quiet representations have produced partial results. The tight inspection is no longer being made against residents of the Mexican border cities and American tourists are not being held up at interior check-points. But the enforcement is in full operation outside the border cities for Mexicans residing beyond the immediate border area.

Congressman Kasen called Bill Bowdler this afternoon expressing deep concern over the increasingly explosive mood in Laredo. He said that if total relaxation were not promptly achieved, those affected in Laredo planned to retaliate by blockading the bridge to Nuevo Laredo. He also feared public criticism of the President among loyal supporters.

Bill explained to him what Covey Oliver and Tony Freeman have done and assured him they would continue discreet pressure on the Mexicans.

Bill has reported to Covey and asked him to get a reading from our Consuls along the border on what is going on and to make another pitch to Margain and Carrillo Flores.

W. W. Rostow

Copy - Marvin Watson

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority State Ltr 11/30/78  
By 13/1p, NARA, Date 1-9-92

December 13, 1967

Mr. President:

*1. Summary*  
*2. Pres file*

Attached, for your approval, are congratulatory messages to Ceausescu, who has become Romanian Chief of State, and Maurer, who has been named again as Premier.

Ambassador Davis urges that you send these messages and the State Department agrees.

W. W. Rostow

Approved ✓

*12/14/67*

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_\_

WWR:ND:gg  
*[Signature]*

**PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU**

**Excellency:**

**I extend to you cordial congratulations on becoming  
President of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of  
Romania.**

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**



**PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO CHAIRMAN MAURER**

**Excellency:**

I extend to you cordial congratulations on being  
chosen again as Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

~~SECRET~~

December 13, 1967

Mr. President:

*Pres. file*

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador B. K. Nehru of India  
1 p.m., Thursday, December 14, 1967

Attached is a short briefing memo from Nick Katzenbach.

This is Nehru's farewell. You may want to invite him to give you his general reflections on the state of our relations with India.

You may also wish to make the following general points:

1. We are deeply interested in India. We have never flagged in our concern for the welfare of the Indian people nor in our understanding that the freedom and security of India is critically important to our own.
2. Nehru's work here has been very valuable in keeping our two countries on the right track.
3. He can go on serving our joint objectives if he will communicate to his countrymen the great understanding of Indo-U. S. politics he has acquired. Specifically, that our ability to help India in the future is threatened by two problems:

-- Their continuing quarrel with Pakistan. It would make things a lot easier for both our countries if we could begin to see some signs of an eventual reconciliation. We know this is a tough problem for India, and reconciliation is a two-way street. We don't expect miracles, in Kashmir or elsewhere. But we both badly need some indication that real effort is being made to compose old differences and move toward cooperation.

-- The problem of arms policy. He knows how difficult it is to get aid appropriations when the recipients spend their limited money on weapons. We know India has legitimate security needs. But we would hope that arms purchases will be kept at a bare minimum. Every new arms deal that hits the papers makes it harder for us to help India build the best guarantee to its security -- a strong and vibrant economy.

W. W. Rostow

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WWR:EH:RM:lw

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Farewell Call by Indian Ambassador  
B. K. Nehru

Ambassador Nehru, who will be calling on you at 1:00 p.m., December 14, is leaving the United States after more than six years as head of the Indian Embassy and a total of some thirteen years in Washington. He is to become Governor of Assam and Nagaland, two sensitive states on the north-eastern borders of India adjoining China, Burma and Pakistan. The assignment should be a challenging one for Nehru.

Ambassador Nehru's successor, Ali Yavar Jung, has had diplomatic and civil service experience and is now head of Aligarh Muslim University. He is expected to arrive in Washington toward the end of January.

We do not anticipate that Nehru will raise any specific substantive issues during this final call but he is likely to have some valedictory remarks on Indo-American relations generally.

  
Acting Secretary

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ACTION

Wednesday  
December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres. file*

SUBJECT: Press release on US assistance to the troop-contributing countries

Citing the Freedom of Information Act, the press has formally requested the State Department to release the texts of agreements on assistance to countries with troops in Vietnam. They have also asked for details and dollar amounts of assistance.

The mischievous can obviously use this information to push the line that we are using "mercenaries" in Vietnam.

On the other hand, it is not feasible simply to ignore the request for information.

Attached is a statement we have worked out for release by State as soon as possible.

Frankly, I believe we will get some flak on this. But I also believe the attached statement is well calculated to keep the flak to a minimum.

I recommend that you approve its release by the Department of State. George Christian concurs.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

MWright:wpt

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## STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The Department has received requests from the press to release the texts of agreements entered into by the USG for assistance to the countries which have contributed forces in South Vietnam and to provide the items and dollar amounts of this assistance.

The Department has concluded that release at this time of certain of the information of the kind requested would be prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States and that the non-disclosure of this information is sanctioned by Section 552 (b), Title 5 of the United States Code (Freedom of Information law).

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam has 660,000 men under arms, and is in the process of increasing its forces by 65,000 men. It has asked for and received from five of its neighbor states military forces to help in the fight against aggression.

At the present time, the governments of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand have responded to requests from the Republic of Vietnam by sending or undertaking to send military forces in the following numbers:

- A. Australia: Approximately 6,300 combat troops including a brigade and support, and a squadron of 8 Canberra bombers, are in Vietnam. Included is naval assistance and a guided missile destroyer, 100 combat advisers, and a 73-man transport aircraft unit. Australia is now in the process of deploying an additional 1700-man reinforced infantry battalion which will bring the total to 8000 men.
- B. Korea: Approximately 48,000 troops including 2 combat divisions and one combat brigade, a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, and a 2,200-man engineer and support unit are in Vietnam.
- C. New Zealand: Approximately 400 troops in an artillery battery and an infantry company are in Vietnam. They are in the process of deploying an additional infantry company of approximately 170 men.
- D. The Philippines: A 2000-man civic action group, consisting of an engineer battalion with its own security support force, in Vietnam.
- E. Thailand: 2500 ground, air, and naval forces now in Vietnam. In addition, the Royal Thai Government announced on November 14 that its ground forces in Vietnam will be augmented to a light division of about 12,000 men.



Two of these five countries, Australia and New Zealand, are bearing the entire cost of their contributions.

The remaining three countries, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, have an average per capita GNP of \$133 per year. These countries have needed both economic and military assistance for many years. Although they wish to join in the Vietnam struggle, they clearly are not able to finance an overseas force without some support.

Accordingly, in the case of these countries, the US provides equipment, supplies and other direct within-Vietnam support for their troops in Vietnam. Base pay continues to be paid by the home country.

In addition, we have made adjustments in our assistance programs in each case. The guideline for such actions has been that the despatch of troops to Vietnam should not weaken the home defense forces of the country, nor interfere unduly with pressing and urgently needed economic development efforts.

In sum, we have provided the assistance needed to enable these developing countries to join a cause they support by reason of their own views of their own national interests and security.

The details of our continuing military and economic assistance programs to these countries have been disclosed to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

Mr. Rostow

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*[Signature]*  
2. Pres file

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Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli and Jordanian Arms Requests

Attached is Nick Katzenbach's recommendation for handling our pending decision on Jordan and Israeli arms requests. You will probably want more time to consider the substance of his proposals and may want to discuss them before deciding.

However, you should know that Luke Battle has been summoned to appear before Senator Symington's Mid-East subcommittee tomorrow and probably will be unable to avoid saying something about this problem. Luke would propose to take the following line, which Nick Katzenbach wants to be sure you approve:

*stop here*  
(No decisions have been made.) However, we may have to move on both Jordanian and Israeli requests while the Senate is in recess.

We are fully aware of Israel's needs and will help provide for its basic security. We have not yet, however, determined precisely what are Israel's essential equipment needs. We believe there is no immediate threat to Israel--a belief which the Israelis also share. The problem is one of lead time, particularly in light of the uncertainty that other sources, e. g. France, will deliver aircraft already contracted for. We are now actively and sympathetically examining these questions with the Israelis.

On Jordan, the question of whether we move on supplying a small amount of equipment depends on whether we want to keep the Jordanians from accepting Soviet offers for a major arms supply program. A Soviet arms presence in Jordan would not make a Middle East settlement easier. If we do decide to give some arms to Jordan, we will do only enough to keep the Jordanians from turning to the East--not enough to give them an offensive capability, and certainly much less than they would get from the Soviets.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-308  
By cb, NARA Date 8-26-99

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- 2 -

Luke is fully aware of the importance of not creating substantial Jewish reaction on the Hill and will do his best to keep his answers within the above positive framework unless you would rather see him take some other line.

Related subject. I might report that I delivered your message to Congressman Farbstain and other Jewish Congressmen this afternoon and assured them that we're on top of the Mid-East arms situation. They got the point and asked me, in return, to let you know of their concern over the Arab-Israeli military balance and their thanks for all you've done for Israel this summer. \*

W. W. Rostow

Luke's line is OK

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*Just say no decision on acct  
Cong. aid provisions, etc  
L*

*\* Farbstain's last word: he wants a positive decision  
on Israeli aircraft by Friday !!*

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By pw, NARA, Date 5-19-98

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Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Arms for Jordan and Israel

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-308  
By cb, NARA Date 12-9-99

The attached memos from Nick Katzenbach lay out the trickiest Mid-East arms decisions we face--Jordan and Israel.

We don't believe we can string King Hussein along much longer. A Soviet economic delegation with a few military members is in Jordan now. The King feels he has to give his army some assurance that US equipment will be available or consider Soviet offers.

Nick thinks we should do something before Christmas. He recommends a small package from pre-war programs (roughly \$6.5 in spares, automotive and commo gear, some anti-tank guns and ammo). He knows the Israelis won't like this, but says it won't affect the arms balance. He proposes letting the key members of Congress know what we plan to do and then informing King Hussein.

That would leave us with the problem of how to handle Israeli aircraft requests. As you know, they've asked for (a) 27 additional A-4 Skyhawks to be delivered in 1969 on top of the 48 that will be delivered in 1968 and (b) 50 F-4 Phantoms for delivery in 1969-70.

The questions with Israel are not so much "whether" but "when" and "how many."

In principle, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believe we should go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks to replace Israel's war losses and provide a margin of safety. They do not believe we have to decide on the 50 Phantoms until later in 1968 since the Arab-Israeli military balance today is at least as favorable to Israel as it was on June 5.

Nick would prefer not to give the Israelis a definite answer now because he does not want to do anything to jeopardize Ambassador Jarring's peacemaking mission or trigger a new round of Arab demands on Moscow. He would like to hold off at least until Eshkol's visit in early February. To meet predictable Israeli pressures, he'd assure them that we can't decide for another month or two but we will take steps to be sure that this delay will not delay eventual delivery of the aircraft if we go ahead. He would also say that, if the military balance tips sharply against Israel, we would be prepared to divert aircraft from other contracts to meet Israel's needs quickly.

~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

The alternative is to go ahead with 27 Skyhawks now to balance our move with Jordan. With the substantial Soviet resupply to the Arabs over the summer, no one could argue seriously that 27 aircraft to Israel would upset chances for peace. The Israeli pressure is beginning to build up here.

Therefore, the following decisions are before you:

1. Can we go ahead with a limited program for Jordan in the next week or two, after appropriate Congressional consultation?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ Hold for discussion ✓

2. If so, which is the better way to handle the Israelis?

--Delay decision but assure Israelis our delay won't delay delivery? ✓

--Or tell the Israelis now we'll go ahead with the 27 additional Skyhawks and talk about the rest later? \_\_\_\_\_

This situation is complex enough that you may want to talk it over with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and Nick Katsenbach before you decide. However, this will give you a chance to consider the problem beforehand.

Hold for discussion ✓

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
State Dept. Guidelines and N.J. 58  
By gwn NARA, Date 4-28-99 DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1967

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The attached memorandum (concurrent in by Rusk and McNamara) sets out alternative courses of action for dealing with the priority arms problem in the Middle East. We have deliberately given you these various options, although I am sure you will recognize that the choices on Jordan are narrow indeed.

It may be useful to you, in making this difficult decision, to have my views on how you might play it-- particularly in light of the potential domestic problems.

\* \* \*

Israel has asked for 27 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, to be delivered in 1969. (These are in addition to the 48 Skyhawks now scheduled for delivery in 1968). It has also asked for 50 F-4 Phantom jets, to be delivered in 1969-70.

The military balance is in Israel's favor and should remain so for at least a year. But I believe there is a legitimate Israeli concern about their continued air superiority beyond 1968.

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-2-

King Hussein is pressing hard for some arms deliveries--both as evidence of our continued support and to meet minimum equipment needs for his defeated army.

Hussein's position is threatened by his efforts in favor of a settlement, his association--in Arab eyes--with the West, and his resistance to attractive Soviet arms offers.

If it can be done without endangering Israel's security, it is in our national interest--as well as Israel's--to avoid further substantial US arms commitments until we know more about the chances for a negotiated settlement.

I therefore conclude that:

1. The US should tell Hussein before Christmas that we are willing to supply certain of Jordan's minimum requirements. But doing something for Jordan, no matter how little, will almost certainly be strenuously opposed by Israel. This will mean some political trouble for you on the domestic front.

2. We must give some indication now to the Israelis on how we propose to deal with their requests. We could:

- assure Israel that a delay in committing ourselves to sell them A-4s does not mean that the 1969-70 delivery date would slip (assuming we decide to go ahead with the sale);
- indicate that the US would be prepared to divert F-4s from other contracts in order to meet a clearly demonstrated Israeli need (i.e., French cancellation of Mirage deliveries; delivery of substantial


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numbers of Mirages to the Arabs, escalation of Soviet aircraft supplies to Arabs.)

3. In terms of dealing with the domestic situation here, and the likely Israeli reaction to our moving on Jordan, I do not believe we should tell the Israelis more than the foregoing. By withholding firm word on our intentions until Eshkol's visit in February, we may be able to dampen Israeli opposition to Jordan sales.

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Acting

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 11, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Arms for Jordan and Israel

The IRG for the Near East and South Asia, chaired by Luke Battle, and the SIG under my chairmanship have just completed a review of our arms supply policy for the Near East, with particular attention to pending arms requests from Jordan and Israel.

We have concluded that we should resume limited arms shipments to Jordan in the very near future, and that some increment of aircraft should be provided to Israel. We are recommending for Israel a good deal less at this time than it has asked for, but enough to assure its continued air superiority and to provide an extra margin of safety.

Discussion

The following have been key factors in our review:

- Israel's military superiority over the Arabs is assured at least through the end of next year. How long it will retain its superiority will be affected by the rate and nature of Soviet resupply and training of the Arabs and by Israel's ability to maintain adequately modern weapons in its own inventory.
- We continue to have a major interest not only in Israel's continued ability to defend itself, but also in maintaining influence in the Arab world. We need to retain friendly ties with the moderate Arab states, which have looked to us or other Western sources for their minimum requirements of weapons.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 98-302

By is, NARA Date 4-28-99

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GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.

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- 2 -

--The Soviets have made important inroads among the Arabs in recent years, and we are faced with the threat of further Soviet penetration via arms aid in the Near East.

For the short term at least, our hopes for progress towards some political accommodation between the Arabs and Israel--and, flowing from that, for some effective arms limitation in the area--ride on the success of Swedish Ambassador Jarring as U Thant's Special Representative under the Security Council's resolution of November 22. The Soviets voted for the Security Council resolution and even tabled their own draft resolution with a clause on arms control reminiscent of your proposal of June 19. They are continuing to ship arms to the Arab radicals, but they are probably not making decisions on shipments over the long term pending further developments.

#### Jordan

We led King Hussein to believe last August that we were sympathetic to his need to get some arms from the U. S., but we excluded Jordan from the partial lifting of our arms freeze in October. We put King Hussein off when he raised the issue in his visit here in November. Hussein stuck his neck out, played a helpful role in the Arab acceptance of the Security Council resolution, and has been working actively towards a settlement. He has staked his fate on working with the West and, particularly, the U. S.

Our principal conclusions are:

- Unless we indicate in the very near future that we will make some supplies available, we run a serious risk--acceptance by Jordan of Soviet arms or erosion of the King's support by the Jordanian military, with a consequent threat to his very survival. We should tell the King of our decision before the end of the year.
- U. S. supply commitments should, for the present, be kept to the minimum necessary to preserve stability in Jordan. We should work on the basis of the minimum list of roughly \$6.5 million (including \$1.5 million in the MAP pipeline) recommended by Embassy Amman--spare parts, automotive and communication gear, some anti-tank guns and ammunition. The Israelis won't like it, but the supply of these items will not have a noticeable effect on the arms balance in the area.

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- 3 -

- Except for drawing on acceptable items in the existing MAP pipeline (funded prior to this fiscal year), supplies should be provided on a cash sales basis.
- We should continue to encourage Jordan to find the major part of its needs in Western Europe.

Israel

The Israelis have given us a request for 27 A-4H Skyhawk aircraft (additional to the 48 to be delivered between now and the end of 1968) and 50 F-4 Phantom jets. The Israelis were able to prevail despite a 3 to 1 ratio against them in aircraft in June--they would have done so even without their preemptive strike--and they consider continued control of the air to be crucial for their future security. Israel lost about 40 out of an inventory of slightly under 200 tactical aircraft during the June war. It wants not only to make up its losses, but to modernize and expand its air force during the next few years.

Soviet supply to the Arab radicals is a major element in the equation. Arab aircraft inventories are edging back toward prewar levels. Soviet deliveries of jet fighters have brought the figure up to 60-80% of the prewar level in the UAR and about 90% in Syria. Arab bomber inventories are still only about half of prewar. Deliveries since June have been largely under contracts negotiated prior to the war and have consisted, by and large, of less advanced types of aircraft similar to those previously supplied. (The attached table shows the trend of Soviet deliveries since the war.) Our intelligence indicates that recent Arab pleas for large amounts of additional military equipment are still the subject of haggling and negotiation with the Soviets. We have no firm basis for predicting the volume and nature of Soviet deliveries over the months and years ahead.

French actions will also be of key importance. It now looks very uncertain whether France, which is the source of Israel's total current tactical air inventory, will actually deliver 50 Mirage V jets ordered in 1966 and scheduled for delivery in 1968.

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Our principal conclusions are:

- We should continue very carefully to study Israel's needs and assure its access to a supply of aircraft essential to preserve its security.
- We should take action in the near future to assure at least an option to supply 27 additional A-4s in 1969. These planes would provide an extra margin of safety in the light of present uncertainties in the equation. They could play a role in deterring future military action by the Arabs.
- We should not accede at this time to Israel's request for 50 F-4s. These planes are not justified by the threat Israel faces, and would tend to add unnecessarily to the arms race, not only in numbers but in sophistication of arms in the area.
- We should handle any action on the additional A-4s in such a way as to minimize possible damage to Jarring's peacemaking mission and the possibility of provoking an arms escalation by the Soviets.

We are now examining various alternatives for handling the request for additional A-4s. These include:

- (a) Deferring a commitment to the Israelis, perhaps for several months while the Jarring mission is under way, but taking measures on our own side for the procurement of components with a long lead time so as to protect the option to supply the aircraft in 1969. This would entail some obligation against our own funds.
- (b) Roughly the same as (a) above but getting the Israelis to stand the financial obligation of procurement of the long-lead items.

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- 5 -

- (c) Finding a formula to enter into an agreement to supply the planes under terms explicitly reserving our option to deliver them in the event we find they are not needed after all.
- (d) Agreeing to supply the additional planes and entering into an early agreement to that effect. The political visibility of our action would be reduced if we could simply amend the existing 1966 contract calling for 48 A-4s.
- (e) On any of the above, although we might find the funds to provide credit despite the current stringency, a straight cash sale is justified by Israel's current financial situation.

If the French actually renege on supplying the 50 Mirage Vs to Israel in 1968, we shall have to reconsider the impact on Israel's security and the implications for our arms supply policy. In that event we may have to come back to you with additional recommendations.

In any event, France's apparent decision to supply a substantial military package to Iraq--possibly including Mirage planes--and to lift its arms embargo for certain other Arab states will increase Israel's concern. It heightens the urgency of some action by us on Israel's pending request.

Scenario: We all agree that we should not take any action until we have consulted with the key people on the Hill. In view of the urgency on Jordan we should like to do so just as soon as Congressional action is completed on the foreign aid appropriation. We believe it will be desirable to inform the key people that we are considering sympathetically some additional commitment to Israel, at the same time as we inform them of our conclusion that it is essential to resume limited shipments to Jordan.

What we need now is authority from you to go ahead with consultations on the above basis. Subject to the satisfactory conclusion of those consultations, we would envisage informing King Hussein of our decision to supply him some arms. We would come back to you for a go-ahead on talking to the Israelis about additional A-4s, as soon as we have worked out more specific terms of a feasible approach to them.

~~SECRET~~

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- 6 -

Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara agree with this memorandum.

Go ahead with consultations \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me before you do anything \_\_\_\_\_

*Walter D. [unclear]*  
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

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ESTIMATES OF SOVIET RESUPPLY OF FIGHTER AND BOMBER AIRCRAFT

(Inventories before, immediately following, and six months  
after the Arab-Israeli war)

	<u>UAR</u>			<u>Syria</u>			<u>Iraq</u>			<u>Algeria</u>		
	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>Dec</u>
	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>
Fighter aircraft	365	119	304	85	30	81	95	76	106	122	120	129
Bombers	69	13	43	4	2	2	22	21	29	33	33	21*

\*Some bombers transferred to UAR during the war.

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GROUP 3  
Downgraded at 12-year intervals,  
not automatically declassified.



Wednesday, December 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Fourth Asian Printing Congress

The Public Printer, Mr. James L. Harrison, and his wife have been invited to be honorary guest observers at the Fourth Asian Printing Congress to be held in Taipei March 1-5, 1968.

The Harrisons attended the Second Congress in Japan in 1962 and the Third in the Philippines in 1965, bearing personal Presidential messages each time. Mr. Harrison has been asked to seek again a message from you to the Congress. A suggested message is attached.

Embassy Taipei believes that Mr. Harrison's attendance at the Taipei Congress would be in the U.S. interest and State concurs.

I recommend that you approve the attendance of Mr. and Mrs. Harrison at the Congress and that you approve a message along the lines of the attached.

W. W. Rostow

Harrisons' attendance:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

Presidential message:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*Reid back from Pres 12/16/67  
sent to Shipping desk*

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**TO THE MEMBERS OF  
THE FOURTH ASIAN PRINTING CONGRESS:**

I have asked the Public Printer of the United States, Mr. James L. Harrison, to bring to you my cordial greeting and to express my personal good wishes for the success of your Congress.

Since your Fourth Congress is being held under Chinese auspices, it is fitting to pay special homage to the remarkable Chinese culture, which first gave us printing -- block printing in the 9th Century and movable-type printing in the 11th. We all have a stake in the preservation of the best in this great culture, so impressive has been its contributions to the world.

In this century the growth in the total fund of man's knowledge has been of awesome proportions. It is chiefly the printed word which has made this vast fund of knowledge inheritable, thus securing to posterity the achievements of the past.

Scarcely there are few jobs in the entire world today as important as that which the Asian press may perform in helping to build a peaceful and prosperous Asian and Pacific community. The American people long for that dream to become real, and wish you great success in your contributions to make it so.

Sincerely,



LBJ:HB:BKS:amc



Wednesday, December 13, 1967

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Fourth Asian Printing Congress

The Public Printer, Mr. James L. Harrison, and his wife have been invited to be honorary guest observers at the Fourth Asian Printing Congress to be held in Taipei March 1-5, 1968.

The Harrisons attended the Second Congress in Japan in 1962 and the Third in the Philippines in 1965, bearing personal Presidential messages each time. Mr. Harrison has been asked to seek again a message from you to the Congress. A suggested message is attached.

Embassy Taipei believes that Mr. Harrison's attendance at the Taipei Congress would be in the U.S. interest and State concurs.

I recommend that you approve the attendance of Mr. and Mrs. Harrison at the Congress and that you approve a message along the lines of the attached.

W. W. Rostow

Harrisons' attendance:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

*ret'd, signed, 12/15/67*

Presidential message:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



87a

**TO THE MEMBERS OF  
THE FOURTH ASIAN PRINTING CONGRESS:**

I have asked the Public Printer of the United States, Mr. James L. Harrison, to bring to you my cordial greeting and to express my personal good wishes for the success of your Congress.

Since your Fourth Congress is being held under Chinese auspices, it is fitting to pay special homage to the remarkable Chinese culture, which first gave us printing -- block printing in the 9th Century and movable-type printing in the 11th. We all have a stake in the preservation of the best in this great culture, so impressive has been its contributions to the world.

In this century the growth in the total fund of man's knowledge has been of awesome proportions. It is chiefly the printed word which has made this vast fund of knowledge inheritable, thus securing to posterity the achievements of the past.

Surely there are few jobs in the entire world today as important as that which the Asian press may perform in helping to build a peaceful and prosperous Asian and Pacific community. The American people long for that dream to become real, and wish you great success in your contributions to make it so.

Sincerely,

18/LBJ

LBJ:HB:BKS:amc



ACTION

Tuesday, December 12, 1967 -- 6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

VIA George Christian

Michel Solomon, of L'Express, came in today. He approached both John Roche and myself with good credentials indicating he is anti-Gaullist and pro-American. He feels that if he could have a picture taken with the President -- no more -- his chance of getting the job as American editor of L'Express would be improved. L'Express is roughly the French equivalent of TIME magazine. He is now a roving editor who writes lead stories. He says the transfer to the American desk would not raise his pay. It would simply beat out a pro-Gaullist.

Copies of the magazine indicate that he has had helpful interviews with Prime Minister Luns and other major public figures.

If it is literally a matter of a picture, we might not lose much and could gain something.

W. W. Rostow

Picture agreed \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

ACTION

89

Tuesday, December 12, 1967  
6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

Herewith a proposed reply to  
Don Fraser and the other members of  
the House who wrote to you on Nov. 29th  
after they had seen Sec. Rusk.

It would be wholly proper -- if you  
so wish -- to cut the letter off after the  
second paragraph.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

December 12, 1967

Dear Don:

I read with interest the letter of November 29 to me from you and several of your colleagues on our policy towards a political settlement in South Viet-Nam.

I attach a copy of a statement issued at the Department of State on December 8 touching on this subject. It expresses clearly, I believe, our position on this matter.

In assessing the "realities" which must be faced in South Viet-Nam, I would underline these:

-- The government in South Viet Nam resulted from an election in which 57% of the entire population of the country over 18 years of age went to the polls -- a proportion similar to that for a Presidential election in our country.

-- There is not the slightest indication at the present time that Hanoi or the NLF are prepared to end the war on the basis of a policy of national reconciliation and constitutional democratic government in the South.

-- As the statement of December 8 says, we believe: "...the political future of South Viet-Nam must be worked out in South Viet-Nam by the people of South Viet-Nam."

Sincerely,

*LBS*

Honorable Donald M. Fraser  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

(Enclosure: Extracted statement from 12/8/67 12:37 pm State press and radio news briefing by Mr. McCloskey)

LBJ:WWR:mz

896

Extracted from Department of State press and radio news briefing, Friday, December 8, 1967, 12:37 p.m.

Mr. McCloskey: I think it would be helpful if I commented on various questions that have arisen concerning United States policy toward the National Liberation Front.

One, on the question of negotiations and search for peace in any form. Our policy remains what it has been, namely, we are prepared to discuss peace with the government in Hanoi or any other government at any time.

As the President made clear July 28, 1965, the Viet Cong, or the so-called National Liberation Front, would have no difficulty being represented and having its views represented.

Secondly, any alteration in this policy would be a matter which we would take up with our fighting allies, including especially the government newly elected under the constitution in Saigon.

At the moment, nothing in the present situation requires or justifies a change in policy.

So far as the situation in the United Nations is concerned, Ambassador Goldberg has made clear, always strictly in accordance with the above policy, that we would not oppose representatives of the National Liberation Front presenting their views to the United Nations when they are officially invited for official business.

The question of the National Liberation Front's coming to the United Nations under an official invitation is, of course, totally different from any question of their entering the United States for propaganda purposes.

We do oppose their coming merely to mount a propaganda campaign.

On the question of the future political structure in the South, we have repeatedly made clear that our objective is that the South Vietnamese people determine their own future without external interference. The imposition of any coalition government would be at variance with this principle.

We would oppose any proposal which would turn the government of South Viet-Nam over to the NLF. In essence, we believe that the South Vietnamese must work out their own future, acting through electoral processes of the kind carried forward in the past two years.

In this connection, the South Vietnamese government has for some time been carrying out a policy of national reconciliation under which individuals

now associated with the Viet Cong may, if they accept constitutional processes, receive the full rights of citizenship.

The South Vietnamese government has also made clear its willingness to enter into contacts with elements of the National Liberation Front. All of these actions are consistent with their belief and ours and the many-times stated policy of this government, that the political future of South Viet-Nam must be worked out in South Viet-Nam by the people of South Viet-Nam.

I would add two points on BACKGROUND, to remind you that the Communists have been making various propaganda campaigns on questions of bombing, coalition, what have you. The policy of this government is stable and has been stated by the President. If there is a change in policy, you will know it, because the President will state it.



MEMORANDUM

17

896

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Barefoot Sanders

*BS*

Attached is a letter to you from several House members regarding Vietnam. I have acknowledged the letter and have sent a copy to Walt Rostow.

*Rostow Consult  
Ask  
Humphrey  
Roche  
Rostow  
to prepare reply*

89d

November 30, 1967

Dear Congressman:

Thank you for your letter of November 29 to the President in which you were joined by several of your colleagues in commenting on United States policies in Vietnam.

Your letter will have the careful attention of the President and his advisers.

Sincerely,

Barefoot Sanders  
Legislative Counsel  
to the President

Honorable Donald M. Fraser  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

cc:

Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier  
Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal  
Honorable William F. Ryan  
Honorable Don Edwards  
Honorable John Conyers, Jr.  
Honorable John G. Dow

jl/jf

14

89e

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C.

November 29, 1967

5

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
President  
The United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

On October 31, 1967 a group of House members who had written you on October 12 urging a bombing halt met with Secretary Rusk at his request. This letter is to advise you of how, based on that meeting, we view the Administration's present position on settlement of the conflict in Vietnam.

We understand that the United States is unwilling to consider settlement of the war on the basis of current realities in South Vietnam. These realities include the substantial role of the National Liberation Front in the war, its effective control over a wide area in South Vietnam, its command of the allegiance of many South Vietnamese, and the absence of any early prospect of dislodging the Front from its control of that area and those people.

The Administration, according to the Secretary of State, is unwilling to take the position that, as a result of negotiation, the National Liberation Front might be given a role in a future peacetime government or in the political processes of South Vietnam.

Thus, the American government, in our view, is only willing to negotiate a settlement designed to achieve results substantially greater than those achieved thus far through American military and civil efforts. Meaningful negotiations are obviously precluded by such a position.

We applaud Ambassador Goldberg's statement that the NLF could take part in Security Council discussions or in a conference convened by

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson  
November 9, 1967 - page two

third parties. We continue to urge a bombing cessation in North Vietnam. However, we reluctantly conclude that such initiatives will contribute little to ending the conflict in the absence of a fundamental decision to negotiate on the basis of current realities in the South.

We are not here urging any particular formula for settlement. Indeed, discussion of specific proposals is of little value as long as the basic decision to negotiate a realistic settlement is lacking. The absence of that willingness is what most concerns us, particularly in light of the Administration's oft-professed desire to seek negotiations to end the war.

We consider this to be a private communication.

Sincerely,

Robert K. Rusk

Don Rusk

Ben Rusk

William F. Ryan

Don Edwards

John Longjohn

John J. Deas

SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 98-301  
By CB, NARA Date 9-16-99

90

Tuesday, Dec. 12, 1967  
3:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

This [REDACTED] view of Soviet attitudes on Viet Nam is interesting and quite possibly correct. [REDACTED]

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

"On Vietnam, [REDACTED] at apparent Soviet intransigence toward a settlement of the war. It was apparently his first realization that Moscow's reluctance to participate in peace efforts, as well as its support of North Vietnam, might be instrumental in prolonging the fighting.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] He was told the Soviet Union sees advantage to itself in the involvement of large American forces in a costly war in Vietnam, in terms both of the drain on U. S. resources and the negative effects on U. S. relations with its allies. Therefore, [REDACTED] one should not expect the Soviet Union to move 'one jot' to assist in a settlement.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

[REDACTED] the Russians are very conscious of the Washington-Moscow-Peking triangle. Their interest in a continued war in Vietnam is sustained, he said, by the fact that they 'count on' an ultimate Chinese-U. S. confrontation -- perhaps over Vietnam, perhaps over larger issues. In such an event, [REDACTED] the Soviet Union would do nothing to assist either side. "

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs  
(C)

W. W. R.



91

Tuesday, Dec. 12, 1967  
10:00 a. m.

**CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE**

**LITERALLY EYES ONLY**

Mr. President:

I have been chatting informally with Mac Bundy about candidates for Ambassadorships. He came back this morning with the following report:

1. At Secretary Rusk's request, he has sounded out John McCloy. McCloy is not ready to take the UN job, or any other ambassadorship.

2. In Mac's view, Arthur Dean would be excellent in New York or as an Ambassador.

3. Mac added the following. He senses that Averell Harriman would like the job, and he said that Harriman's presence in New York might be helpful in damping down Senator R. F. Kennedy's "yen to run in 1968." He further reported that, rather to his surprise, there was a meeting in New York of the Kennedy supporters in which the Senator showed rather more inclination to push for the nomination in '68 than he, Mac, had thought was the case. He believes that Harriman can be a considerable force in discouraging him. He thinks that Averell, back-stopped by Joe Sisco, could do the job.

4. Two other possible nominees for the post are:

-- Herman Wells, former President of Indiana; and

-- Ambassador Charles Yest, if you wish to move to a career ambassador in that job.

W. W. R.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING, CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR 16, 1983

BY rg ON 1-30-92

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday - December 12, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Haitian Situation

*Pres file*

After six months on the job, Ambassador Ross has done an assessment of Duvalier's position and what our policy should be. These are the highlights:

Duvalier's position

1. He seems more firmly in control after weathering plots in his family circle and security forces.
2. No erosion in his power base is detectable, although dissatisfaction among the influential classes has probably increased.
3. The economy continues to deteriorate, but with so many people living outside the money economy, it is not likely that current economic difficulties will trigger any important political reaction.
4. The prospects are that Duvalier will continue in control as long as he finds money to pay his security forces and key government services.
5. If he cannot get substantial help from abroad, Duvalier will squeeze domestic and foreign companies, which will further depress the economy, wreck what institutional base remains, and lead to gradual worsening of US-Haitian relations.

Our Policy

1. We should not encourage or support the overthrow of Duvalier.
2. Present levels of outside assistance will not halt progressive deterioration of political and economic and social institutions which will make the transition that more explosive when Duvalier goes.

3. Our best interests are served by very modest increases in US-funded programs (e.g., malaria eradication, food for work, community development) and slightly more substantial expansion of international agency programs (e.g., technical advisers, water facilities, education, port improvement) which will preserve the institutional framework from destruction without bolstering Duvalier.

The Ambassador's specific recommendations will be reviewed by the Latin American IRG. Meanwhile, we are moving ahead slowly in establishing a Caribbean Security Arrangement. The Arrangement has the double purpose of preventive medicine against Castro subversion and a club predisposed to act jointly in Haiti.

Following the Central American example which has worked so well, State has approached Venezuela on calling a meeting of security chiefs of the Caribbean basin countries. The reaction in Caracas has been favorable. We are now pushing them toward a date and place.

W. W. Rostow

93

SECRET

DEC 1 2 1967

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: W. W. Rostow

The gold market has come to a boil again. The markets are full of rumors that gold sales will be restricted through licensing or other techniques. Press stories out of Paris and elsewhere passing on garbled versions about what the Frankfurt Group has been talking about contributed to the uncertainty. The Basle Group of central bankers, which usually gets together in privacy, met this weekend surrounded by reporters.

After the quiet of last week, the gold pool lost \$56 million Monday and something over \$100 million today. (Some of this was central bank demand from small countries.) Sterling has also been under some pressure.

Deming is coming back this evening from his meeting with the Frankfurt Group, where he seems to have met some rough going. We will know from him where the other countries stand. In the meantime we are avoiding any statements.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority Treasury 10-27-78 NSC 2/28/80  
By ag/lap, NARA, Date 1/3/92

SECRET



~~SECRET~~*Sent 6:04 PM*

EFA005  
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 DE WTE 2683

1967 DEC 12 23 04

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
 TO THE PRESIDENT  
 CITE CAP671058

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 12, 1967

THE GOLD MARKET HAS COME TO A BOIL AGAIN. THE MARKETS ARE FULL OF RUMORS THAT GOLD SALES WILL BE RESTRICTED THROUGH LICENSING OR OTHER TECHNIQUES. PRESS STORIES OUT OF PARIS AND ELSEWHERE PASSING ON GARBLED VERSIONS ABOUT WHAT THE FRANKFURT GROUP HAS BEEN TALKING ABOUT CONTRIBUTED TO THE UNCERTAINTY. THE BASLE GROUP OF CENTRAL BANKERS, WHICH USUALLY GETS TOGETHER IN PRIVACY, MET THIS WEEKEND SURROUNDED BY REPORTERS.

AFTER THE QUIET OF LAST WEEK, THE GOLD POOL LOST \$56 MILLION MONDAY AND SOMETHING OVER \$100 MILLION TODAY. (SOME OF THIS WAS CENTRAL BANK DEMAND FROM SMALL COUNTRIES.) STERLING HAS ALSO BEEN UNDER SOME PRESSURE.

DEMING IS COMING BACK THIS EVENING FROM HIS MEETING WITH THE FRANKFURT GROUP, WHERE HE SEEMS TO HAVE MET SOME ROUGH GOING. WE WILL KNOW FROM HIM WHERE THE OTHER COUNTRIES STAND. IN THE MEANTIME WE ARE AVOIDING ANY STATEMENTS.

DTG: 122238Z DEC 67

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

*Treasury/06/78*  
 Authority ERS 7/19/79, NSC 2/28/80  
 By ng/ep, NARA, Date 1/3/92



95

ACTION

Tuesday -  
December 12, 1967

1. ~~sup~~  
2. Pres file

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: PL 480 Agreement with Uruguay**

Herewith a unanimous recommendation that you authorize negotiating a \$19.3 million PL 480 agreement with Uruguay.

Uruguay needs this assistance. The loan has been carefully coordinated with the Agricultural Sector Loan you authorized last June. The new Uruguayan President has pledged to support the economic recovery program launched by President Gestido which the PL 480 and Sector loans are designed to support.

I recommend approval.

W. W. Rostow

Approve

✓  
\_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove

\_\_\_\_\_

See me

\_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

12/7/67 Memo for President from Charles Schultze

12/1/67 Joint memo for President from William Gaud  
and Acting Secretary of Agriculture John  
Schnittker.

95a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DEC 7 1967

Memorandum for the President

Subject: P. L. 480 Agreement with Uruguay

Bill Gaud and John Schnittker request your authorization to negotiate a \$19.3 million P. L. 480 agreement with Uruguay for 200,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of feed grains. The sale would be for dollar credit, repayable over 20 years at 2-1/2 percent.

Uruguay is usually a wheat exporter, but drought, freeze and floods have kept half of the country's wheat lands out of production this year. Usual marketing requirements are waived since there is no history of commercial imports.

This would be the first P. L. 480 agreement which is explicitly linked to the self-help conditions we are seeking with our dollar aid. Last June, you authorized negotiation of a \$15 million Agricultural Sector Loan with Uruguay. That loan was designed to induce the Uruguayan Government to take some of the self-help actions necessary to reverse a decade of economic deterioration. Following several months of political and economic crises, the government is now prepared to negotiate. By relating the two loans, we maximize our leverage for tough - but essential - self-help actions in the agriculture sector.

Signature and announcement of the P. L. 480 agreement would be for the full amount to heighten the impact on the domestic market, but the grain would be released in three equal portions:

- The first release would be made immediately based only on a commitment to press for general self-help measures;
- The second release would be related to actual performance on the preconditions for the Agricultural Sector Loan, including an IMF standby agreement, elimination of export taxes on wool and meat, and an adequate price support policy;
- The third P. L. 480 release (and a second release under the sector loan) would be tied to passage of further important agricultural legislation.

Negotiation of the sector loan will begin this month. The first P. L. 480 release would meet Uruguay's supply requirements during the period of negotiation. The wording of the P. L. 480 agreement would be flexible enough so that we could make further wheat shipments if it proved desirable, even without full progress on the sector loan.

Consistent with your directive to substitute food for dollar aid wherever possible, AID is exploring the possibility of reducing the amount of the sector loan. Both the agreement and the loan would be within your 1968 budget totals even after the cutback.

The death of President Gestido Wednesday morning has added some uncertainty to the situation in Uruguay, but State/AID officials are optimistic. Gestido's successor, former Vice President Pacheco Areco, was instrumental in convincing Gestido to adopt sounder economic policies. Moreover, shortly after Gestido's death, the Cabinet voted unanimously to continue his policies.

I recommend approval of the request to negotiate a P. L. 480 agreement with Uruguay.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze  
Charles L. Schultze  
\_ Director

Attachment

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

95b

DEC 1 1967

To: The President

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Uruguay

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Uruguay to provide approximately 200,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of feed grains, of which the current total export market value is \$19.3 million, including ocean transportation. Proposed terms are payment in dollars of 5 percent on delivery and the balance in approximately equal installments over 19 years. Interest will be 2 percent per annum during the two-year grace period and 2½ percent thereafter. The Departments of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

#### Need for Program

Although Uruguay is not traditionally a wheat or feed grain importer, it has been hurt badly by a serious drought last fall followed by a severe freeze, torrential rains and damaging floods. Wheat could not be planted in time for harvest which would ordinarily be made within the next two months, with the result that the area seeded is approximately only half that of the preceding year. The resulting emergency requires importation of wheat for human consumption and supplemental feed for livestock in order to alleviate the crisis in the agricultural sector.

#### Usual Marketing Requirements

There are no usual marketing requirements because Uruguay is not generally a wheat or feed grain importer, and because its current financial situation makes commercial imports very difficult. There will be limitation provisions of 49,000 tons on Uruguay's rice exports, except that exports to Viet Nam or Indonesia will not be counted against this limitation.

#### Self-Help Measures

Within the framework of the Uruguayan "National Economic and Social Development Plan" the government of the importing country undertakes to:

- (1) Increase actual budgetary support to its agricultural agencies and programs;
- (2) Press for the passage of the following legislative measures now pending before Congress: the Seed Law, Forestation Law, Water and Soil Conservation Law, Fertilizer Law, Cooperative Law, and Tenancy Law;



- (3) Press for legislation that will: (a) replace the current system of export retentions with a land value and/or income tax system and (b) tax exports on a fixed valorem basis of real export price instead of on the basis of "afore" value;
- (4) Review present price policy and develop a stable price and incentive program to increase livestock and agricultural production;
- (5) Conduct studies on export taxation, proposed agrarian reform law, restructuring of the rural credit system, and marketing, distribution, and storage systems in the public and private sectors, including agricultural cooperatives.

The local currency proceeds from the sales of the commodities in the importing country will be used primarily in the field of agriculture, including feeder roads, storage facilities, agricultural credit, port improvement and rural education.

#### Relationship to AID Sector Loan

Last June you authorized the negotiation of a \$15 million AID Agricultural Sector Loan with Uruguay. Negotiations have been delayed because between June and October Uruguay was not following the sound economic policies which were considered conditions precedent to negotiations. The situation has now changed and AID expects to begin negotiations for the sector loan in early December.

During the course of negotiation of the sector loan, AID intends to explore the degree to which some of the resources to be made available through the PL 480 program may make it possible to reduce the total amount of the sector loan. The self-help conditions outlined in this memorandum will reinforce those to be sought in connection with the sector loan.

Authorizations to purchase grain under the agreement would be issued in increments of approximately one-third of the value of the agreement. The first would be issued immediately after signature of the agreement, and issuance of the next two would be related to progress in signing the Agricultural Sector Loan, a standby agreement with the IMF, and passage into law of the six bills referred to in the self-help section.

#### Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement.

William L. Sand  
Administrator  
Agency for International Development

John A. Schmitt  
Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jn*, NARA, Date *5-19-98*

96

~~SECRET~~

EFAB01  
OO WTE1  
DE WTE 2677

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671056

1967 DEC 12 16 58

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

DECEMBER 12, 1967

I TALKED WITH ED RITCHIE, FOLLOWING JIM JONES' ACCOUNT OF YOUR INSTRUCTION THAT YOU WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE VISIT TURNED OFF, BUT WOULD ACCEPT THE 27TH OR 28TH SO LONG AS THERE WOULD BE NO VIETNAM AFFAIR AS A RESULT.

I CONVEYED YOUR WILLINGNESS TO SEE PRIME MINISTER PEARSON ON THE 27TH OR 28TH WITH THE VIETNAM PROVISIO. I THEN ADDED ON MY OWN THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT PERIOD FOR YOU WITH KEY DECISIONS TO BE MADE CONCERNING THE BUDGET, STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE, ETC.

RITCHIE RESPONDED BY ASKING IF YOU WOULD BE OFFENDED IF THE PRIME MINISTER WERE TO COME THROUGH WASHINGTON, ASSUMING THAT YOU WOULD BE AT THE RANCH ON THE 27TH - 28TH, AND SEE A FEW FRIENDS TO "CATCH UP ON THINGS," INCLUDING PERHAPS SECRETARY RUSK.

I SAID THAT I DID NOT KNOW SECRETARY RUSK'S SCHEDULE-BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND IF HE STOPPED IN WASHINGTON FOR AN INFORMAL CHAT OF THIS KIND ON HIS WAY TO HOBE SOUND.

I TALKED WITH NICK WHO SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM WITH SEC. RUSK WHO WOULD BE IN WASHINGTON AT THAT TIME.

RITCHIE, THEN, WILL BE PRESENTING PEARSON THREE OPTIONS: (1) GO STRAIGHT THROUGH TO HOBE SOUND; (2) SEE YOU AT THE RANCH 27TH OR 28TH WITH VIETNAM PROVISIO; (3) STOP FOR INFORMAL DINNER IN WASHINGTON, PROBABLY WITH SEC. RUSK.

DTG: 121512Z DEC 67

~~SECRET~~

87 DEC 12 AM 11 57

TUESDAY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING. CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAR. 16, 1983.

EYES ONLY

97

BY ry ON 1-16-92

EEA640  
OO WTE 10  
DE WTE 2675

DEC 12 15 46

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671055

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SENSITIVE  
LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT:

DEC 12, 1967

I HAVE BEEN CHATTING INFORMALLY WITH MAC BUNDY ABOUT CANDIDATES  
FOR AMBASSADORSHIPS. HE CAME BACK THIS MORNING WITH THE FOLLOWING  
REPORT.

1. AT SECRETARY RUSK'S REQUEST, HE HAS SOUNDED OUT JOHN MCCLOY. MCCLOY IS NOT READY TO TAKE THE U.N. JOB, OR ANY OTHER AMBASSADORSHIP.
2. IN MAC'S VIEW, ARTHUR DEAN WOULD BE EXCELLENT IN NEW YORK OR AS AN AMBASSADOR.
3. MAC ADDED THE FOLLOWING. HE SENSES THAT AVERELL HARRIMAN WOULD LIKE THE JOB, AND HE SAID THAT HARRIMAN'S PRESENCE IN NEW YORK MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN DAMPING DOWN SENATOR R.F. KENNEDY'S "YEN TO RUN IN 1968." HE FURTHER REPORTED THAT, RATHER TO HIS SURPRISE, THERE WAS A MEETING IN NEW YORK OF THE KENNEDY SUPPORTERS IN WHICH THE SENATOR SHOWED RATHER MORE INCLINATION TO PUSH FOR THE NOMINATION IN '68 THAN HE, MAC, HAD THOUGHT WAS THE CASE. HE BELIEVES THAT HARRIMAN CAN BE A CONSIDERABLE FORCE IN DISCOURAGING HIM. HE THINKS THAT AVERELL, BACK-STOPPED BY JOE SISCO, COULD DO THE JOB.
4. TWO OTHER POSSIBLE NOMINEES FOR THE POST ARE:
  - HERMAN WELLS, FORMER PRESIDENT OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY;  
AND
  - AMBASSADOR CHARLES YOST, IF YOU WISH TO MOVE TO  
A CAREER AMBASSADOR IN THAT JOB.

DTG 121511Z DEC 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EYES ONLY

EXX FROM QUICK COPY

INFORMATION

98

~~SECRET~~

Monday, December 11, 1967  
7:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a sober CIA evaluation of Chinese and Soviet reactions to the likelihood of Communist failure in South Vietnam.

It is somewhat less alarmist on this point -- and more precise -- than Brzezinski's interesting paper.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *Ng*, NARA, Date 1-15-92

WWRostow:rla

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

The other day at a meeting on Vietnam you read out loud to us a memorandum you had received from Zbigniew Brzezinski, although you did not identify him by name. It occurred to me that it would be useful to have our Estimates' officers focus on the same matter. Here are the results.

*Rich*

Richard Helms

Att. - 1

9 December 1967

Chinese and Soviet Reactions (DATE)  
to the Likelihood of Communist Failure in  
South Vietnam.

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-227  
By *ig*, NARA Date 9-3-96



~~SECRET~~

98b

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

8 December 1967

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Chinese and Soviet Reactions to the Likelihood  
of Communist Failure in South Vietnam

1. In this memorandum we assume that Hanoi anticipates failure of the Communist effort in South Vietnam because of the continued attrition of military and political capabilities. In this circumstance Hanoi might choose to terminate the war, with or without negotiations, or seek additional outside help. We examine below the probable Chinese and Soviet attitudes in such a situation.

China

2. Peking has a considerable stake in an outcome of the war which would demonstrate the validity of "national liberation struggles" in Southeast Asia. The Chinese are prepared to exert considerable pressure on Hanoi and to increase military and economic assistance in order to sustain Hanoi's will and ability

**DECLASSIFIED****E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6****NLJ 96-227****By ing, NARA Date 7-3-96**

GROUP 1

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~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

to prolong the war in the south. If requested, the Chinese would also be willing to station combat troops in North Vietnam to make additional Vietnamese available for infiltration to the South and to assist, if necessary, in preserving internal security.

3. Even so, Peking is not committed to a Communist success in South Vietnam at any price. The Chinese have allowed themselves room in their public position to accept failure of the military effort in the South. If, in the end, the situation there could only be saved by use of Chinese ground combat troops against US forces, we feel that Peking's fear of major hostilities with the US would be the deciding factor. Rather than accept this risk, and even in the unlikely event that Hanoi urged direct Chinese intervention, we believe that Peking would accept a termination of the fighting. The setback would be attributed to deviations from Maoist doctrines and to Soviet perfidy.

4. As an alternative to direct intervention in South Vietnam the Chinese might consider a diversionary effort in Laos to relieve pressures in South Vietnam and confront the US with the prospects of a wider war. A small number of Chinese forces could be introduced into Laos clandestinely. From Peking's

- 2 -

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standpoint, however, an intervention in Laos on a scale likely to make much impact on the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam would incur the same risks of US counteraction as would direct intervention in South Vietnam. Thus, we think the Laotian move would be an unlikely one for the Chinese to try.

5. While Peking in our view could accept Communist failure in South Vietnam, it almost certainly could not accept a collapse of Communist government in Hanoi. In the unlikely event that an unfavorable course of the war in the South combined with internal divisions in the North to present such a prospect, the Chinese would probably move into North Vietnam with combat troops to restore political order. Chinese troops might meet some resistance but they probably could reconstitute a central Vietnamese authority in Hanoi and restore order in much of the country. However, the puppet nature of the new regime would detract from its nationalist appeal, and it probably could not rally much positive support either in the North or the South.

6. Should the US extend its ground combat operations to North Vietnam, we think the Chinese reaction would depend on Peking's view of the extent and nature of the threat this action presented to the Hanoi regime itself. If Peking judged that the threat to

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Hanoi was not critical, e.g., if it involved only a US operation just north of the DMZ to outflank the NVA troops there, the initial Chinese military reaction would probably be limited to a rapid and conspicuous buildup of combat forces in South China and perhaps in the northern parts of North Vietnam as well. This action would be accompanied by strong verbal warnings.

7. On the other hand, if the Chinese perceived US actions as directly threatening the existence of the Communist regime in North Vietnam, and estimated that their intervention was necessary to preserve that regime, We believe that they would use their own ground forces to engage US forces in North Vietnam.

8. Like most estimates concerning Chinese actions the foregoing must be qualified because of the uncertain situation in Peking. We cannot be sure what the impact of the internal struggle has had or will have on Chinese policies. It is conceivable that in some circumstances a foreign war might appear to certain leaders or factions as a way out of a political impasse. It seems more likely, however, that the Chinese leadership would seek to avoid a major external crisis so long as internal affairs remain in disarray.

- 4 -

~~SECRET~~

The USSR

9. The USSR's stake in the war in South Vietnam rests on considerations different from those influencing Peking. The Soviets do not have a security interest of their own in the area as do the Chinese, but have been concerned primarily to preserve their claims to leadership of the Communist movement. At present the Soviet leaders probably think that a military victory by either side is not possible. They probably prefer a political settlement to the uncertainties and risks of a protracted struggle. If Hanoi itself chose to seek such a settlement or to quietly liquidate the conflict we believe that Moscow would accept such action.

10. If Hanoi remained determined to fight on despite failing prospects and requested still more assistance, Moscow would probably feel compelled to respond. But the response would still be conditioned by Soviet concern to limit the risks of enlarging the war. Thus, Moscow might provide more sophisticated weapons for the defense of North Vietnam, and non-nuclear weapons with additional range and fire power which would be employed against US forces and bases from positions north of the DMZ.



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Moscow might accompany these moves with a far tougher stand in all its relations with the US, and generally create an atmosphere of tension designed to pressure the US into a more flexible posture in Vietnam. But we do not believe that the USSR, merely to prevent a Communist defeat in South Vietnam, would be willing to become involved directly in the fighting or to encourage high risk diversions in Korea, Berlin, or elsewhere.

11. Finally, if the Hanoi regime appeared on the verge of collapse, we think it probable that the Soviets would make vigorous efforts to settle matters by diplomatic means before the collapse occurred, and if possible before the Chinese intervened militarily to prevent or offset it.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT  
Chairman

~~SECRET~~

*Profile*

Monday, December 11, 1967  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Over the week end I did this first draft of the foreign policy section of the State of the Union message. It is based on the binding theme of partnership which Joe Califano and I agree should run through your exposition of domestic and foreign policy.

Obviously, as a draft, it has a long way to go. But I would wish you to have an early look at it so that you could begin to guide us as to what you really want.

I have found that the earlier we begin to get your own feelings about a draft, the better we can perform for you; and the best way is for you to react to a piece of paper.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

I.

The tests for judging the state of the union were set down a long time ago  
in the Preamble to our Constitution:

- to form a more perfect Union;
- establish Justice;
- insure domestic Tranquility;
- provide for the common defence;
- promote the general Welfare; and
- secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.

These are the abiding tasks of our government; of all of its branches in  
Washington; in the states and cities, counties and towns.

In terms of these purposes the challenges of government change from  
year to year, from generation to generation. But in our time one fact is clear.  
Our purposes can only be achieved at home and abroad by building on the  
basis of partnership -- by building a web of voluntary agreements among  
legally independent units to pursue goals that are shared.

At home the conditions and problems of modern life have created a  
new interdependence among us. A riot in Detroit; a disproportionate wage  
agreement in one industry; an excessive rise in one price; a failure to educate  
and train one part of our young -- these things affect the life of all our people --  
everywhere. And all the means of action -- public and private -- must work

as partners to deal with the problems which underlie them or which they create.

In the same way modern weapons and means of communication, and the network of international trade, monetary and capital movements -- have created among the nations of the world an interdependence almost equally intense. Diplomacy is now international politics -- reaching deep into the domestic life of each nation. A threat to the peace anywhere is a threat to every nation and every citizen on our planet. A drought or monetary crisis across the seas might, in another day, have been a question of local concern. It is now a problem requiring action by the community of nations.

Your government has acted in the past year in domestic and foreign affairs on this principle of partnership; and we have made progress. And it is in that spirit that we shall go forward in the year ahead.

## II.

[ Domestic section would then follow, covering progress and plans on the domestic scene, emphasizing, in particular:

-- partnership between the Executive Branch and the Congress is required to reduce the deficit and provide minimum framework for stable domestic progress;



-- partnership between government, labor, and industry is required to reconcile wage and price stability with productivity increases;

-- partnership reaching down to individuals in every community is required to make good our moral commitment and our laws guaranteeing equality for every citizen;

-- partnership is required to carry forward and make effective the legislative revolution in education, health, and urban development.

The section should end with this kind of statement: Partnership in a democracy requires that every citizen accept this fact: the freedoms of our Constitution impose an equal responsibility; and that responsibility requires that dissent from the judgment and policy of the majority be carried forward within the law. The law guarantees that the rights and views of the minority will be protected. It does not guarantee that the actions of the minority shall frustrate the will of the majority.

It is inevitable at a time of rapid change at home and of conflict abroad that views shall differ. We are determined that those differences shall be expressed within a framework of law and order. ]/

### III.

Speaking to you a year ago, I said: "We are in the midst of a great transition -- a transition from narrow nationalism to international partnership;

from the harsh spirit of the cold war to the hopeful spirit of common humanity on a troubled and a threatened planet. "

I can report to you a year of quiet but substantial progress in this transition.

The cold war is not yet behind us; and narrow nationalism is not yet gone from the world scene. But, while public attention has been focused on the bitter struggle in Vietnam, the forces of partnership and moderation have been at work in almost every region of the world.

Within a single year these things have happened;

- the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations was successfully completed;

- the Monetary Conference at Rio agreed to create a new international

reserve unit to supplement supplies of gold too little to match

the rapid increase in the world's commerce;

- by intensive cooperation among the world's monetary authorities,

the international financial system weathered the devaluation of the pound;

- with our NATO allies we found through the trilateral talks between

Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the basis for

stabilizing the level of our forces on NATO's critical central front

and equitable financial arrangements to support those forces;

- in the face of the second successive drought in India, affecting the

lives of half a billion human beings, for the first time food aid

was handled on a global basis -- one might say on a community chest

basis -- with \_\_\_\_\_ nations contributing.

-- a Water For Peace Conference was held, turning the minds of men

to possibilities that lie ahead in making arable land more productive

and the deserts bloom.

In three major regions of the world a new spirit of cooperation has taken firmer grip with enormous promise for the future:

-- the Summit Conference at Punta del Este yielded a commitment by

the nations of Latin America to move towards economic integration

and through multinational projects to open up the inner frontiers of

South America.

-- in Africa, east and west, young nations are beginning to help each

other and to build on the wide foundations that regionalism provides.

-- in Asia we see the domino theory in reverse. With confidence that

we and our fighting allies shall see it through to an honorable peace

in Vietnam, the whole region from Tokyo and Seoul to Djakarta and

Singapore is finding new ways to shape its own destiny and to make

sure that the time being bought with bloody sacrifice in Vietnam

is used to build a new, stable and productive Asia.

IV.

The ambitions which have marked the cold war and intense national conflicts have not yet given way to stable peace. Therefore, we must also count our achievements negatively as well as positively, in dangers avoided as well as constructive steps forward:

-- We achieved a cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli war without a major power confrontation; and, for the first time in history, the hot line between Moscow and Washington was used.

-- A Middle East resolution was unanimously achieved after long and difficult debate in the United Nations. A representative of the United Nations has gone to the area. The nations and people of the Middle East now have the opportunity and the responsibility of finding the terms to live together in stable peace and dignity. We shall do all in our power to help them achieve this result.

-- A dangerous crisis flared up on Cyprus. It brought two good friends -- Greece and Turkey -- to the brink of war. Our representative, along with the Secretary General of NATO and a representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, helped defuse this crisis and provide an opportunity for the nations concerned to permit those who live on that island a life of secure and equal citizenship.

-- In the Congo, too, there could have been massive bloodshed; but, with our help and the help of others, civil strife was ended; and that nation has the opportunity to go forward in peaceful development.



-- Castro continued his illegal and reckless policy of fostering guerrilla warfare across international frontiers. But the nations attacked have been dealing successfully with the threat, backed by the united support of the other nations of the Hemisphere.

V.

This period of transition has a particular meaning for our relations with the Soviet Union. In the past twenty years the U. S. and the Soviet Union have been on the opposite side of many issues, on many occasions. The U. S. has maintained its commitments to the independence of nations and the cause of human freedom. We are reminded every day that Moscow's drive to expand has not ended; and it requires endless vigilance by potential victims and their friends. But our objective goes beyond deterrence and defense.

I should like to see the Soviet Union recognize increasingly the responsibility it shares with us -- as a great industrial and nuclear power -- a responsibility to create by joint or parallel action a framework of peace and order in the world. That was the burden of my message at Hollybush.

The United States and the Soviet Union can destroy the world as we know it; But or help bring peace to it. Neither nation has the power -- and neither should have the power -- to control other nations. Nevertheless, the military, economic and political strength of the two nations gives us great potential

constructive influence. That influence can be exercised by the example we set in our relations with one another and by the policies we pursue on a global and regional basis. It has been my purpose to move from the spirit of Cold War to the spirit of joint responsibility as fast as Moscow is prepared to move. And I can report some limited progress.

In bilateral relations we have achieved this year a consular treaty with the Soviet Union; and soon Soviet commercial aircraft will be flying to the United States and American commercial aircraft to the Soviet Union.

On a global basis we have worked with other countries to achieve an outer space treaty and to move towards a global non-proliferation treaty which could do much in the generations ahead to diminish the danger of nuclear war.

Above all, we wish to engage with the Soviet Union in a searching and determined effort to avoid another costly and sterile round in the arms race in nuclear weapons, means of delivery, and means of defense against them. The clock is ticking. Every day lost in coming to grips with this problem is costly to the citizens of the two nations and to the cause of peace and stability.

We have thus far avoided in Southeast Asia and the Middle East a direct confrontation. But the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its responsibilities as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference to bring about effective execution of the Accords of 1954 and 1962.

And we would wish to see the Soviet Union cooperate to damp down the arms race in the Middle East, which has contributed so much to instability and conflict in that troubled region and to encourage in that region a spirit of moderation and reconciliation.

VI.

With respect to Western Europe, I would say this: events of the last year have demonstrated a proposition in which we have believed for twenty years; namely, that only a Europe which acts together can achieve the full prosperity of which it is capable and play on the world scene the role which its qualities and resources justify and make possible. It is a simple fact that the world community misses an active and fully effective European voice. The movement towards unity in Europe is obviously not complete. Nevertheless, we could begin to see in the Kennedy Round negotiations the advantages to Europe, the United States, and to the world, as a whole, of our dealing directly with European institutions.

Therefore, I should like to repeat a proposition that I have made before. I would like to see us work with the institutions of the European communities and with other industrialized nations of the world:

-- to make our policies of assistance to developing nations more effective;

- to strengthen further the world monetary system;
- to consider together the problems and possibilities of flows of capital and technology back and forth among us;
- and, finally, to examine together and exchange experiences on the problems we all share, the problems of modern urban life.

## VII.

The policy of partnership, which we are now pursuing for the first time in every corner of the globe, is based on a vision of America's proper place in the world. As we look ahead to the future, it is clear to every one of us, I am sure, that we cannot safely withdraw into isolation. On the other hand, it has never been the policy of the United States to seek empire or satellites. Our purpose for more than twenty years has been to help build a stable world order which would permit us to develop in security our own way of life. To build that kind of world order, we wish to see the nations of the world take as much responsibility as they can for their own destiny. But they can only do this in a modern world if they work together in regional associations. Only in this way can we find effective partners in dealing with our great common problems. That is why we have been the friend and supporter of those who wish to organize themselves for progress and stability: first in Europe, and now in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

We are prepared to be the partner of all. We seek to dominate none.



As other nations grow strong and organize to shape their future together, we wish to draw back -- not to isolation, but to partnership.

VII.

It is in that spirit that I shall propose the following further steps in the year ahead to strengthen our partnership with those who are working to advance human welfare.

-- I shall propose that we join in replenishing the International Development Association -- to which our contributions are more than matched by others.

-- I shall propose that the U. S. provide additional support for regional banks -- the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Bank -- which draw resources from many countries.

-- I shall propose that the United States continue to place growing emphasis on self-help, in its bilateral aid to developing countries.

-- I shall seek increasingly to use multilateral organizations to provide United States technical aid; such aid helps other nations to acquire the skills and knowledge needed for effective self-help.

-- I shall seek new ways to carry forward our support for international education. To this end, I shall ask the Congress to fund the International Education Act. I have directed intensive study, within the United States Government,

of how best to use satellite television, computers, and other recent technical advances, to bring wider learning to people throughout the world.

I look forward, perhaps in 1970, to an International Education Year which will help to marshal world opinion behind the attack on illiteracy and wider communication between peoples.

-- I shall propose that the United States provide increased support for private investment in developing countries, as part of next year's aid program.

-- I shall propose that we carry forward the war on hunger, via our Food for Freedom programs. The food aid that other nations agreed to join us in providing as part of the Kennedy Round, will be a valuable supplement. I shall direct that special emphasis be placed on efforts to combat pre-school malnutrition.

-- I shall ask that we follow up on successes so far achieved in respect to multilateral assistance to South Asia. This is the crucial front in the war on hunger. That war can only be won, as the recent report of my Science Advisory Committee pointed out, by across-the-board economic development. Our aid for such development in India and Pakistan has elicited internal reform by the receiving countries and large contributions from others. Whether these efforts continue will depend critically on the level of our further aid.

-- I shall direct our delegation at UNCTAD to consider with other countries steps to share more widely the burden of meeting emergency food aid needs, possibly via some means of ensuring crops in developing countries against natural disasters. (This language should be reviewed in light of results of current inter-agency study of proposed global crop insurance scheme.)

-- I shall propose that we move ahead, as now agreed with our OECD partners, to offer preferential and temporary tariff treatment to the developing countries' manufactured and semi-manufactured exports to industrial countries.

-- I shall ask the Congress for prompt action on the legislation, which I submitted in 1966, to maintain the momentum of international trade expansion generated by the Kennedy Round, while we are developing new approaches to our traditional goal of freer world commerce. And I shall use the full powers of my office to resist demands for quotas and similar restrictions, which would hurt our domestic economy, depress our exports, and disrupt our foreign policy.

-- I have directed study, within the Executive Branch, of ways of ensuring that the resources of the ocean floor, beyond the continental shelf, are explored and exploited for the benefit of all mankind.

#### VIII.

In Vietnam, too, the ultimate theme of our policy is partnership. We

are partners with the Vietnamese and five other nations in the task of defeating aggression. We are the partners with the Vietnamese and \_\_\_\_\_ other nations in helping ease the human burdens of war and carry forward the tasks of economic and social progress.

We are now partners with a constitutional government, the product of a free election in which almost 60% of the total eligible voters of the country actually voted -- a proportion we rarely match in a Presidential election in the United States.

Our policy in Vietnam will support the priority tasks set by that government:

- to expand their own armed forces;
- to make their armed forces more effective, notably the regional and popular forces engaged in the hamlets and provinces;
- to back their measures to improve civilian administration;
- to help them accelerate the process of revolutionary development in the countryside;
- to help them reduce corruption;
- to back their measures of economic stabilization and their plans and programs for development;
- to help them in the rehabilitation of the rapidly expanding cities; and
- above all, to work with them to achieve an honorable and stable peace at the earliest possible date.



We strive and pray for the earliest possible end to the fighting; but

I cannot tell you when the war will end. But I do know three things.

First, I know that if this nation is to maintain its place as an effective world power, we must see it through to an honorable peace; because our word -- pledged in a solemn treaty -- is at stake in Vietnam.

Second, I know that our national security depends on seeing the war through to an honorable peace, because stability and progress in Asia, where two-thirds of humanity live, requires that aggression not succeed in Vietnam.

Third, I know there is progress in South Vietnam -- military progress; political progress; economic progress. Slowly but surely the people of South Vietnam are coming to realize that they have a future to forge; and that future is in their hands.

There will be difficulties ahead. War is never certain; and I expect we and they and our other fighting allies will face many tough engagements. And it is not easy -- as we and many other nations know from their own experience -- to learn how to make democratic constitutional government work effectively. Nor is it easy to carry forward the tasks of economic and social development in the midst of a war.

But in the past two years -- coming from the brink of defeat and despair -- the South Vietnamese have found their feet. They are moving forward. And

we shall be at their side until the day aggression from the North has ended, the violence subsides, and peace returns to Southeast Asia --a peace in which all the people of the Area, including the North Vietnamese, can turn their minds and hearts and energies to providing for the welfare of those who live there.

## IX.

In the life of our nation there are periods of quiet and periods of great strain. There are times when the purposes of our Constitution can be fulfilled without great public effort; and there are other times when Americans are challenged to the limit of their capacity.

This is a time of great challenge:

- to reconcile continued prosperity with the stability of our prices and our money;

- to carry forward in our cities a great social revolution in an environment of public order;

- to reconcile the claims on our resources at home with our interests and duties on the world scene;

- to fight a bloody war while striving, at the same time, to help build the institutions of peace and progress abroad.

It is in such times that nations and men are tested. The strength of America, as we come closer to our two hundredth year of national existence, derives from

-17-

the fact that we have met such tests in the past.

We shall meet them now.

###

Monday, Dec. 11, 1967  
3:00 p. m.

100

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a sealed letter containing a message  
to you from Senator John Sherman Cooper,  
which I promised to transmit unopened.

W. W. R.

Attachment



100a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

December 11, 1967

Personal for

The Honorable  
Walt W. Rostow  
The White House

Enclosed, per your instructions, is a sealed envelope containing a message from Senator John Sherman Cooper, which you have agreed to transmit unopened directly to the President.

As you and Secretary Rusk are aware, Senator Cooper is insistent that the President see this message before it is read by anyone else.

I am also enclosing, at Secretary Rusk's instruction, a copy of Senator Cooper's letter to the Secretary. This was handed to me at the same time that the Senator gave me the sealed message to the President, and the Secretary asked that this be sent to the President along with the sealed message.

*Wm B Macomber Jr*

William B. Macomber, Jr.

—

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# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF  
ARTHUR M. KUHLMAN, CHIEF CLERK

December 10, 1967

Honorable Dean Rusk  
Secretary of State  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was in Rome for a few days and met with Mr. Fanfani and later with Mr. Tremmolini, the Defense Minister. I am not certain about the spelling of his name. I believe the Embassy told me that a report of my talks had been sent to the Department. As they were written by members of the Ambassador's staff who accompanied me, I am sure that they are accurate, and you might want to see them before you go to the Brussels meeting.

Mr. Fanfani got on the subject of the Mideast immediately, and as he seemed very interested, I hardly interrupted him. He expressed concern about the growing presence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean, and thought that only the concern of the Arab countries, that they would become dependent and subordinate to the Soviet Union, stood in the way of a continued expansion of Soviet influence in the area. He thought that there was a possibility that the Soviets would use the naval base in Algeria which the French are giving up, but saw some signs of a moderate opinion developing in Algeria which might prevent this action.

He discussed every-Arab country around the Mediterranean and gave the impression that Italy, and particularly he, had better means of communication with these countries than does the United States, saying "We can be of help to the United States".

He expressed concern about possible conflict between Yemen and the new Republic of South Arabia, saying that it could become another Vietnam now that the Soviet Union is supplying arms to Yemen. He spoke of the efforts of Italy to secure oil rights in Iraq and of the French entry, expressing concern over the French activity in the area.

Tremmolini also was concerned over the Soviet movement into the Mediterranean. When I asked what he thought should be done, he simply said that the most important matter was to resolve the Israel-Arab question, and that it was essential that the members of NATO remained unified and cooperated fully.

Both Fanfani and Tremmolini voiced doubts about the nuclear proliferation treaty, stating that it would cut Italy off from technological and scientific activity, and that as no one knew what would develop in this field in the future, their countries might be prevented from better defending themselves. Tremmolini brought up the subject of the application of Italy for nuclear material for a

Navy  
Seam  
nuclear-powered ship. He explained that the project would be paid from defense funds because they were the only funds available, and that naval sailors would be used as there was danger of other seamen striking and they could be employed without additional cost. He thought that this may have given concern to the United States, but emphasized that it was a peaceful development. I believe that this matter has some relationship to the attitude against the NPT, ~~of~~ casting doubt upon the availability of nuclear material after the signing of the NPT.

As I have noted above, I was told that a detailed report had been sent to the Department, but I wanted to give my own impressions.

At the NATO Assembly I acted as Rapporteur to the Military Committee under the Chairman, Sir Fitzroy McLean, a Conservative member of the House of Commons, and one who supports the United States strongly, including its position in Vietnam. Vietnam was not discussed in the Military Committee.

While the members of the Committee are supporters of NATO, I found questions raised during the discussions of the Committee which indicate concern over recent developments.


The proposed deployment of U.S. forces led some to state that it would lead to a decrease in the forces of other NATO members, and nearly all stated that while trusting the United States to return the forces as planned, when necessary, this would not be as effective as forces on the ground in Europe. Some thought also that it would involve a political decision which might not be made by the government of the United States.

I found some concern as to whether the United States is maintaining its nuclear deterrent, and over advancing Soviet nuclear weaponry. Others thought that the limited anti-ballistic missile system would grow into an anti-Soviet ballistic missile system, and that the security of Europe would be diminished as the Soviet Union and the United States became more concerned with offensive and defensive weapons against the other. I was surprised to find such apprehension about the FOBS. None understood the weapon with the exception of two former military officers on the Committee. But the news added to their concern that the United States may not be maintaining its nuclear deterrent.

On the whole, I found very little dissent in the Committee about the policies of the United States and their support of the United States, but these matters I have mentioned stood out.

With best wishes for your trip, I am

Sincerely,

  
John Sherman Cooper

101

December 11, 1967

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Here for your approval is a routine acknowledgment of a message to you from the Prime Minister of Thailand. It concerns the appointment of a Special Envoy who will participate in a goodwill visit to the United States. Among others, I met with this group. You have already approved similar acknowledgments to Ayub Khan and President Frei of Chile. I recommend you approve this message.

"Thank you for informing me that His Excellency Ambassador Upadit Pachariyangkin will be Thailand's Special Envoy on the Goodwill Mission of the Group of 77 to the United States. The United States Government has been most pleased to receive from the Goodwill Mission a firsthand account of the results of the recent Ministerial meeting of the Group of 77."

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

LBJ:State:MW;WWRostow:rlh



Monday, December 11, 1967

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Visit of Klaus Schuetz, Mayor of Berlin**

At Tab A is Secretary Rusk's memorandum recommending that you see the new Mayor of Berlin, Klaus Schuetz, during his prospective visit to the U. S. January 29-February 3.

This will be Schuetz' first official visit to the U. S. He saw de Gaulle in November and will see Prime Minister Wilson in January shortly before his visit here.

Morale in Berlin is slipping. Young people are leaving and industrial growth has slowed down. During his visit Schuetz will be seeking to interest U. S. firms in Berlin. His primary purpose however is to demonstrate the continuing U. S. commitment to the security of his city.

Schuetz is an important German political leader in his own right and is close to Brandt. He was an exchange student at Harvard after the war and has a strong interest in U. S. politics.

I recommend you see Schuetz. It would help us a great deal in Berlin. When Brandt was mayor, he always saw the President on visits to the U. S.

W. W. Rostow

Arrange appointment with Marvin \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_

ERF:em

4510  
102a

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Berlin's Governing  
Mayor Klaus Schuetz

Recommendation:

That you receive Mayor Klaus Schuetz of Berlin. He will be in the U.S. January 29 - February 3 but would prefer his appointment on January 29 or January 30 if convenient to you.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

Berlin's Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz plans to visit the United States from January 28 to February 3 on his first official visit. Schuetz became Governing Mayor on October 19. He has embarked upon a vigorous campaign to stimulate Berlin's economy and to come to grips with the city's political malaise.

Schuetz visited France on November 16 and saw President de Gaulle, the French Foreign Minister and numerous French businessmen. Schuetz was impressed by French interest in Berlin's problems. Schuetz also plans to call on Prime Minister Wilson.

Mayor Schuetz will be coming to the United States primarily to see you. He will also seek to establish contact with United States businessmen who might wish to invest in Berlin. I and other suitable Department officials intend to see him during this visit.

As you know, it has been customary for the Mayor of Berlin to be received at least briefly by the President when in Washington on official business. Since this will be Schuetz' first visit since taking office and since he has expressed a strong wish to see you, I urge you to see him. Berlin morale has slipped from the levels it reached when the city was at the center of the stage and I believe that it is particularly useful to keep our ties firm with the Mayor of Berlin at a time of mounting internal difficulties.

Schuetz is quite prepared to see you either in Washington or at the ranch at any time convenient to you.

*Dean Rusk*

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Biography of Mayor Schuetz.

## KLAUS SCHUETZ

### Governing Mayor of Berlin

Schuetz has just turned forty-one (41) but he looks somewhat older. He was seriously wounded in Italy during World War II (born Heidelberg, September 17, 1926). He wears a black glove over his right hand, probably to warn those who do not know him well that he is unable to shake hands in the normal manner.

Schuetz--as well as his wife--speaks excellent English. They are considered a handsome couple. They have three children. Schuetz was an exchange student at Harvard in 1949-50. He has visited the United States several times since; he is interested in U. S. techniques of electioneering, and he last visited the U. S. during the Presidential campaign of 1960. Subsequently, he tried to adapt these techniques to the German elections of 1965 (in which his mentor Brandt was defeated).

Schuetz has played an active role in Berlin politics for more than a decade now. From 1954 to 1957 he was a member of the Berlin House of Representatives. From 1957 to 1961 he was a Berlin deputy in the Bundestag (lower house in Bonn). In 1961 he was selected by Governing Mayor Brandt to be the Berlin official for Federal Relations. In December 1966 Brandt took Schuetz with him to Bonn to serve as Number 2 in the Foreign Office. He was chosen for this position of Mayor of Berlin by leaders of his party who hoped that he would be able to solve political difficulties which had led to the failure of his predecessor, Mayor Albertz.

Schuetz has impressed Americans as essentially moderate. His strong points include a bent for organization, discretion, patience and skill in negotiation.

Schuetz is younger than most prominent German political leaders and probably has a long and important political future before him.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1967 DEC 11 22 39

103  
Sent 5:39

EEA618  
CO WTE 12  
DE WTE 2653

FROM: WALT ROSTON  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP671847

Pres file  
MONDAY  
DEC 11 PM 5:54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 11, 1967

WE GATHER FROM JIM JONES THAT YOU WOULD WISH TO SLIDE THE VISIT OF JEAN REY TO FEBRUARY.

THERE IS SOME IMPORTANCE IN BEING ABLE TO ASSURE REY THAT A FEBRUARY DATE IS, IN FACT, AVAILABLE TO TALK WITH YOU, BECAUSE HE MUST MAKE HIS TRAVEL PLANS. HIS SITUATION IN REELATION TO HIS FELLOW COMMISSIONERS AND THE SIX MEMBERS OF THE COMMON MARKET IS ALMOST AS COMPLICATED IN MAKING TRAVEL PLANS AS A CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT.

THERE IS ANOTHER ADVANTAGE IN SETTING THE DATE IN ADVANCE; NAMELY, THAT WE CAN MAKE SOMETHING USEFUL POLITICALLY OUT OF THE VISIT. YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN YOUR TALK AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN YOU MENTIONED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS ON AN EXPANDED RANGE OF ISSUES, AS WE DID IN THE KENNEDY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS.

WE ARE PUTTING THIS THEME AGAIN INTO THE FIRST DRAFTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY SECTION OF THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE WHERE IT FITS WELL. MAY WE, THEREFORE, INFORM REY THAT WE WILL BE EXPECTING HIM IN FEBRUARY AND INFORM HIM LATER OF A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOU? WE HAVE THUS FAR BEEN CONSIDERING ONLY AN OFFICE INTERVIEW WITH YOU. A LUNCH WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS PRESENT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN DAMPING DOWN PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN THE CONGRESS.

FEBRUARY OFFICE DATE ACCEPTABLE .....

NO .....

LUNCH ACCEPTABLE.....

NO.....

SEE ME.....

DTG: P12202Z DEC 67

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By: *ju*, NARA, Date 5-19-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOX FROM QUICK COPY



~~SECRET~~

104

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *ju* NARA, Date 5-15-98

VZCZCEEA619  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 2645

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671044

1967 DEC 11 16 13

67 DEC 11 AM 11:21

MONDAY

*Free file*

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

DECEMBER 11, 1967

ED RITCHIE CALLED THIS MORNING. HE SAYS PRIME MINISTER PEARSON WILL BE GOING ON HIS ANNUAL VACATION TO FLORIDA, COMING THROUGH THE U.S. ABOUT DECEMBER 27-28 AND RETURNING TO CANADA THROUGH THE U. S. ON ABOUT JANUARY 10.

HE HAS BEEN ASKED BY THE PRIME MINISTER INFORMALLY TO SEE WHETHER IT WOULD BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU TO MEET WITH HIM EITHER GOING OR COMING. IT WOULD BE SIMPLY A FRIENDLY CALL WITH NOTHING CEREMONIAL.

THERE ARE NO GREAT BILATERAL ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED AND RITCHIE VOLUNTEERED THAT, WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS VIETNAM, THERE WOULD BE NOTHING PUBLIC OR "TO MAKE HEADLINES."

RITCHIE, ON HIS OWN, SUGGESTED THAT IF YOU COULD SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IN TEXAS, IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT TO USE THE OCCASION OF PEARSON'S VISIT TO GO OVER TO SAN ANTONIO AND DRAMATIZE HEMIS FAIR. CANADA IS ONE OF THE MAJOR EXHIBITORS AT HEMIS FAIR AND PEARSON IS MR. EXPO 67.

ED RITCHIE ADDED THAT IT MIGHT BE A GOOD OCCASION FOR YOU TO DISCUSS WITH PEARSON HIS PERSONAL POLITICAL PLANS, OF WHICH YOU ARE AWARE. A MEETING LATER IN 1968 MIGHT BE AWKWARD FOR POLITICAL REASONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES.

TURN OFF SUGGESTED PEARSON VISIT-----

ARRANGE DECEMBER 27 OR 28 IN TEXAS-----

ARRANGE ABOUT JANUARY 10 IN WASHINGTON----

SEE ME-----

DTG: 111528Z DEC 67

GPS: 270 IMI 270

~~SECRET~~

REX FROM QUICK COPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Send 6:27 PM  
105

VZCZCEEA620  
OO WTE 10  
DE WTE 2656

1967 DEC 11 23 27

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO: THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP671049

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 11, 1967

HEREWITH NICK KATZENBACH ASKS YOUR PERMISSION, WITH THE SUPPORT OF SEC. RUSK, TO BRIEF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IN EXECUTIVE SESSION ON NLF CONTACTS. HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE PRISONER EXCHANGE ASPECT OF THE CONTACT IN SAIGON.

"IN THE ABSENCE OF DEAN, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAS ASKED THAT I APPEAR BEFORE THEM IN EXECUTIVE SESSION SOMETIME THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS CONTACTS WITH THE NLF. ON BALANCE I BELIEVE THAT I SHOULD AGREE TO DO SO AS (A) WE HAVE A SOUND LOGICAL STORY TO TELL ABOUT THE NEW YORK-UN SITUATION, AND (B) I WOULD PLACE THE SAIGON FOCUS ON THE PRISONER EXCHANGE PROBLEM WHERE I AM QUITE CONFIDENT THAT WE WOULD GAIN THE COMMITTEE'S UNDERSTANDING.

THE REQUEST COMES AS A RESULT OF THE ATTENTION THE SUBJECT HAS BEEN GETTING RECENTLY IN THE NEWSPAPERS. APPARENTLY A NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ARE CONNECTING THE NEW YORK AND SAIGON DEVELOPMENTS AND LEAPING TO EXAGGERATED SUSPICIONS AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT IS GOING ON. MY TESTIMONY WOULD BE DESIGNED TO HEAD THIS OFF BEFORE THEY ARE VOICED PUBLICLY AND DO MORE DAMAGE. DEAN AGREES THAT I SHOULD ACCEPT THE COMMITTEE'S INVITATION, SUBJECT TO YOUR CONCURRENCE."

APPROVED .....

DISAPPROVED .....

SEE ME .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 112252Z DEC 67

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By fw, NARA, Date 5-19-98

BOX FROM QUICK COPY



Send 5:53

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEA619

1967 DEC 11 22 53

OO WTE 10  
DE WTE 2654

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP671048

File  
MONDAY  
11 PM 6:04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 11, 1967

HEREWITH PRESIDENT SUNAY RESPONDS TO YOUR LETTER WITH THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE PRAISE FOR CY.

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT PREPARED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY OF PRESIDENT SUNAY'S LETTER OF DEC. 10 TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON HANDED EMBASSY OFFICER DEC. 11 BY FOREIGN OFFICE GREECE-CYPRUS DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WHO ASKED IT BE TREATED AS CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL.

2. "MR. PRESIDENT,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU ON MY BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF OUR GOVERNMENT OUR SINCERE THANKS AND DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE SUSTAINED EFFORTS YOU HAVE DEPLOYED WITH A VIEW TO REDUCE THE GRAVE CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN CYPRUS.

"YOUR DISTINGUISHED PERSONAL EMISSARY, MR. CYRUS VANCE, HAS DONE A MAGNIFICENT JOB IN CONTRIBUTING TO ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TURKISH AND GREEK GOVERNMENTS. HIS TIRELESS, SKILLFUL AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS HAVE LEFT UPON US A PROFOUND IMPRESSION.

"I WISH ALSO TO STRESS HOW MUCH WE HAVE ALL ALONG APPRECIATED THE EFFORTS OF YOUR AMBASSADOR MR. PARKER HART WHO ONCE AGAIN HAS RENDERED A PRECIOUS SERVICE TO TURKISH-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP AND ALSO TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE.

"IF THE AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE, AS WE TRUST, IS IMPLEMENTED IN GOOD FAITH, SOME OF THE CAUSES OF THE TENSION WILL HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. BUT PEACE IN CYPRUS AND IN OUR AREA CAN ONLY BE SECURED IF AN EFFECTIVE PACIFICATION IS CARRIED OUT IN THE ISLAND, AS AN IMPORTANT STEP WHICH COULD CONTRIBUTE TO PAVE THE WAY TO THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE.



THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN HIS APPEAL TO THE INTERESTED PARTIES, HAS UNDERLINED THE NECESSITY FOR ENLARGING THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS SO AS TO GIVE IT A BROADER FUNCTION IN REGARD TO THE REALIZATION OF PEACE AND QUIET IN CYPRUS, INCLUDING SUPERVISION OF DISARMAMENT AND THE DEVISING OF PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS TO SAFEGUARD INTERNAL SECURITY, EMBRACING THE SAFETY OF ALL PEOPLE OF CYPRUS. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH AN ACTION, WITH DUE REGARD TO THE SITUATION PREVAILING IN THE ISLAND AND THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES, IS URGENT AND VITAL, IN ORDER TO PREVENT NEW AND PERHAPS EVEN GREATER THREATS TO PEACE. THIS ISSUE IS GOING TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OUR GOVERNMENT FEELS CERTAIN THAT IT CAN CONTINUE TO RELY ON STRONG UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR AN EFFECTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DECISION BY THE COUNCIL. I AM SURE THAT BY COMBINING OUR EFFORTS AGAIN WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE SAFEGUARDING OF PEACE AND TO AN EARLY AND JUST SOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT WHICH SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED THE PEACE AS SEEN ONCE AGAIN BY THE LAST CRISIS.

YOURS SINCERELY,

CEVDET SUNAY, PRESIDENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

3. SIGNED TURKISH TEXT BEING FORWARDED VIA TURKISH EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON. HART

DTG: 112215Z DEC 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPRODUCTION FROM QUICK COPY



DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERVS, 64-68, vol. XI, item 223

By *gn* NARA, Date 5-19-98

107

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Lois*

1967 DEC 11 01 03

*Pres file*

EEA603  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 2636

FROM CHARLES MAGUIRE  
TO JIM JONES  
CITE CAP671039

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REVISED TEXT OF KIESINGER LETTER. ROSTOW HAS CLEARED, BUT ASKS FOR FINAL CHECK BY KATZENBACH. TEXT GOING FROM SITUATION ROOM TO HIM. HE WILL CALL YOU WITH COMMENTS, IF ANY.

TEXT NOW FOLLOWS:

DEAR MR. CHANCELLOR:

I WAS HEARTENED BY THE WARMTH AND HOPEFULNESS OF YOUR RECENT LETTER.

THIS HAS BEEN AN EVENTFUL YEAR FOR EACH OF US, BOTH OUR NATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OUR PARTNERSHIP SERVES.

OUR CLOSENESS OF MIND AND HEART HAS GIVEN VITAL MOMENTUM TO THE PROPOSED NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. IT IS MOVING NOW IN THE DIRECTION WE DESIRE. I SHARE YOUR HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION MAY ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF VERIFICATION OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS BY IAEA. YOU CAN BE CERTAIN THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THAT WITH ALL VIGOR AND PERSUASIVENESS.

THE MOMENTUM OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION MOVEMENT MUST BE MAINTAINED. A FREE FLOW, FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY, OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR PEACEFUL USES IS CRUCIAL TO EUROPE'S PROGRESS. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY MUST NOT HAMPER SUCH TRAFFIC BETWEEN NATIONS WHO ENTER INTO THE TREATY AND CARRY OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS IN GOOD FAITH.

WE HAVE CONSULTED WITH OUR ALLIES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON FURTHER ACTION TO OBTAIN AN EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS ARTICLE THAT ALSO PROTECTS THE PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION. OUR GENEVA DELEGATES ARE INSTRUCTED TO TELL THE SOVIET CO-CHAIRMAN OF OUR FIRM BELIEF THAT THE ROAD TO AGREEMENT ON ARTICLE III IS THROUGH THE DRAFT OF NOVEMBER 2.

REX FROM QUICK COPY



THE SOVIETS, AS YOU KNOW, HAVE SO FAR REJECTED THIS LANGUAGE. THEY CLAIM IT CONSTITUTES SELF-INSPECTION BY EURATOM MEMBERS OF EURATOM MEMBERS. THIS IS NOT SO. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO REASSURE THE SOVIETS OF THAT.

WE HAVE EMPHASIZED TO THEM THE CLEAR AND BASIC INTENT OF THIS ARTICLE. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN IAEA AND EURATOM SEEKS ONLY TO ASSURE ALL TREATY PARTIES THAT SAFEGUARDS WILL BE EFFECTIVE IN PRACTICE. IT INTENDS ONLY THAT IAEA CAN BE CERTAIN THAT NUCLEAR MATERIAL IS NOT DIVERTED TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR OTHER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

I AM ASSURED THAT THESE KEY PRINCIPLES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GERMAN POSITION. SECRETARY RUSK IS NOW EN ROUTE TO BRUSSELS, AND I HAVE ASKED HIM TO REVIEW THE ENTIRE MATTER OF NON-PROLIFERATION WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER.

YOUR OWN JOURNEYS TO LONDON AND ASIA HAVE GIVEN ME REAL AND TIMELY ENCOURAGEMENT. THE BRITISH QUEST TO JOIN THE COMMON MARKET IS STRENGTHENED BY YOUR SUPPORT. MY OWN HOPES FOR PEACE IN ASIA ARE LIFTED BY THE PROMISE YOU FOUND, AND THE EXAMPLE YOU LEFT. I AM NO LESS GRATEFUL FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S RECENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DEFENSE.

THESE ARE INITIATIVES ALL THE WORLD CAN VALUE. THEY SPEAK ELOQUENTLY AND OPTIMISTICALLY OF YOUR PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO A WORLD AT PEACE, AND YOUR PEOPLE'S DETERMINATION TO ADVANCE THAT JOYOUS DAY. ITS COMING IS HASTENED BY GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO DRAW HER EASTERN NEIGHBORS CLOSER IN ONE COMMUNITY PLEDGED TO THE BETTERMENT OF ALL. AMERICANS ARE PROUD TO SHARE THAT VISION WITH YOU.

FOR MYSELF, IT IS A COMFORT TO KNOW THE WARMTH OF YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND THE STRENGTH OF YOUR PARTNERSHIP IN THESE TRYING DAYS. WITH FREEDOM AT TEST AND THE FUTURE IN HAZARD, IT IS GOOD TO RECALL THE RESOLVE WE SHARED IN OUR BONN AND WASHINGTON MEETINGS. IT WILL SUSTAIN ME, AND INSPIRE ALL WHO WORK WITH US, IN THE NEW YEAR THAT APPROACHES.

MAY IT BRING US THE BLESSINGS OF PEACE AND FREEDOM THAT WE SEEK. SHOULD IT ALSO BRING YOU BACK TO MY COUNTRY, THAT TOO WOULD BE A BLESSING. MRS. JOHNSON AND I LOOK FORWARD TO THE HAPPINESS OF SHOWING YOU MORE OF AMERICA AND HER PEOPLE.

WE SPEAK FOR ALL OF THEM IN SENDING YOU AND MRS. KIESINGER OUR KINDEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DTG: 110008Z DEC 67

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM QUICK COPY