

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2a ltr	President to Nyerere PCI 2 p	1/15/68	A
#2b ltr	Nyerere to President PCI 2 p	1/2/68	A
#5 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. open 6-11-98 S 2 p	1/15/68	A
#6 memo	Rostow to President open 6-11-98 E 1 p	1/15/68	A
#10 cable	President to Prime Minister open 6-11-98 S 2 p	1/14/68	A
#12a memo	Partial duplicate of #10 open 6-11-98		
#14 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80329) S 2 p open 6-11-98 RAC	1/13/68	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President open 6-11-98 PCI 1 p	1/13/68	A
#15a ltr	President to PM Holyoake open 6-11-98 PCI 1 p	1/13/68	A
#16 cable	Saigon 15899 S 20 p [Sanitized NLJ/CBS 10]	1/13/68	A
#18a cable	Saigon 15901 C 3 p [Duplicate of #11c, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "1S Land Reform"]	undated	A
#23 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80319) S 2 p open 7-29-03	1/13/68	A
#26 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80337) TS 3 p [Dupl #14, NSF Country File, Vietnam, b x 6c "ZAI-1corpstDMZ"]	1/13/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NLS CBS 22 opened 5/7/96

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 56, Jan. 1-15, 1968

Box 27

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#27 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80338) <i>open 2-24-04 NW/PACOS-256</i> C 1 p	1/13/68	A
#30 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80335) <i>open 1-5-01</i> C 2 p [Duplicate of #87a, NSF, Country File, India, Vol. 10]	1/13/68	A
#32 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80315) C 2 p <i>open 2-23-93 NLS 92-22</i>	1/12/68	A
#35 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80317) C 2 p <i>open 11/25/96 NLS 94-290</i>	1/12/68	A
#36 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80307) C 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/12/68	A
#37 cable	Saigon 996 <i>pani nls 019-027-2 (1/02)</i> S 1 p	1/12/68	A
#38 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80311) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/12/68	A
#41 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80303) C 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/12/68	A
#42 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80305) S 3 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/12/68	A
#44 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80279) C 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/11/68	A
#45 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80274) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/11/68	A
#46a ltr	President to Prime Minister <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 2 p	1/11/68	A
#47 notes	"Jim Jones telephoned..." <i>open 6-11-98</i> -PCI 1 p	1/11/67	A

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#47a memo	Rostow to President <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 2p	1/11/68	A
#47b memo	"British Withdrawal from the Far East" <i>open 6-11-98</i> PCI 1p	undated	A
#47c ltr	President to PM Wilson <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 2p	undated	A
#51 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80262) <i>open 6-11-98</i> C 1p	1/11/68	A
#58 memo	Rostow to President S 1p <i>open 3-11-05 NW 09-74</i>	1/10/68	A
#58b ltr	Papadopoulos to President PCI 3 p	1/6/68	A
#59 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80252) <i>open 4-17-95 NLS 94-456</i> C 3p <i>Dup of #3, Files of W Rostow, "Alsop," Box 4</i>	1/10/68	A
#60 memo	Rostow to President C 1p <i>open 3-11-05 NW/PAL 03-257</i>	1/10/68	A
#61 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80244) S 2p <i>open NLS 019-0272 (1/02)</i>	1/10/68	A
#62 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80247) S 1p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/10/68	A
#63 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80237) S 2p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/10/68	A
#65 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80218) S 3 p [Duplicate of #136, NSF, Country File, UAR, Vol. 6]	12/28/67	A
#67 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80213) S 2p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/9/68	A

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#68 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-28-03</i>	1/9/68	A
#69 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80214) C 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/9/68	A
#71a memo	McNamara to President S 5 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	undated	A
#72 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80170) <i>open 6-11-98</i> S 2 p [Duplicate of #110, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. 13]	1/7/68	A
#73 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80159) S 3 p [Duplicate of #125, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	1/7/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p	1/6/68	A
#74a memo	Welsh to President C 2 p	12/26/67	A
#74b memo	Hornig to President C 1 p	1/5/68	A
#74c memo	Seamans to Hornig C 2 p	12/15/67	A
#76 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80153) <i>open 11-3-99 NLS 97-241</i> S 1 p <i>Dup. #8 NSF Name File, Eisenhower, Box 2</i>	1/6/68	A
#77 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80151) S 1 p	1/6/68	A
#78 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/6/68	A
#79 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80145) S 2 p <i>Open 2-24-04 NLS 03-2463</i>	1/6/68	A

see RA 8/09

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#79a cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80157) S 3 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/6/68	A
#80 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80147) S 3 p [Duplicate of #126, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8] [Exempt NLJ 85-202]	1/6/68	A
#81 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80148) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/6/68	A
#82 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80149) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/6/68	A
#83 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80143) S 2 p	1/6/68	A
#84 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80146) S 2 p <i>open 2-24-04 NW 03-2603</i>	1/6/68	A
#85 cable	Rosen to President (CAP 80138) S 2 p <i>Exempt NLJ 019-0272</i> [Exempt NLJ 83-222]	1/6/68	A
#86 cable	WH Situation Room to President (CAP 80137) S 2 p	1/6/68	A
#87 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80132) <i>dup. # 20, NSF, CF</i> S 3 p <i>Open 10/23/01</i> <i>Middle East, Vol. 2, Box 104</i> <i>RAC 001-104-1-7</i>	1/6/68	A
#89 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80121) S 1 p <i>open 5/98 NLJ 97-03</i> [Duplicate of #96, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "3D(1), Prisoners of War"]	1/5/68	A
#92 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80116) S 3 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/5/68	A
#93 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80113) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/5/68	A

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#94 cable 95	Rostow to President (CAP 80122) S 2 p open 7-29-03	1/5/68	A
#96 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80124) C 1 p open 7-29-03	1/5/68	A
#97a ltr	President to Hernandez PCI 1 p	1/6/68	A
#98 memo	Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. PCI 1 p open 2-24-04 NW/RAC 03-258	1/5/68	A
#99 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p open 7-29-03	1/5/68	A
#102 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 7-29-03	1/5/68	A
#103 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 3/3/98 NLJ 97-80	1/5/68	A
#103b memcon	Goldberg and Dobrynin S 5 p open NLJ 77-79 7.8.98	1/3/68	A
#103c draft	Statement on Vietnam C 3 p " " "	undated	A
#105 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80102) C 1 p open 3-11-05 NW/RAC 03-25	1/4/68	A
#107 memo	Duplicate of #105		
#108 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80079) S 7 p open 7-29-03	1/4/68	A
#109 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80092) S 4 p open 7-29-03	1/4/68	A
#110 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80080) S 2 p open 7-29-03	1/4/68	A

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#111 cable	Rostow to Christian (CAP 80079) C 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/4/68	A
#113 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80084) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/4/68	A
#116a memo	Rusk to President C 4 p	1/2/67	A
#118 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/2/68	A
#118a ltr	President to Ordaz PCI 1 p	1/3/68	A
#118b ltr	Ordaz to President PCI 1 p	12/22/67	A
#118c ltr	Ordaz to President PCI 1 p	12/26/67	A
#118e ltr	Ordaz to President PCI 3 p	12/22/67	A
#118g ltr	Ordaz to President PCI 2 p	12/26/67	A
#119 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80041) S 2 p <i>open 7-29-03</i>	1/2/68	A
#120 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80083) S 1 p <i>open 8-23-94 NY 94-57</i>	1/4/68	A
#121 cable	Rostow to Jones (CAP 80077) C 1 p [Duplicate of #36, NSF, Country File, Israel, "Eshkol Visit-Memos and Misc."]	1/3/68	A
#122 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80078) C 1 p <i>open 2-24-04 NW 03-263</i>	1/4/68	A

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#125 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80074) C 1 p [Duplicate of #38, NSF, Country File, Israel, "Eshkol Visit-Memos and Misc."]	1/3/68	A
#130 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80064) C 5 p [Duplicate of #35, NSF, Country File, Israel, "Eshkol Visit-Memos and Misc."]	1/3/68	A
#131 memo	Rostow to President sanitized 1-19-80 sanitized 4-3-97 NLJ 95-365 S 1 p [Duplicate of #40, NSF, Country File, Cuba, "[WG Bowdler File, Vol. 3]"] [Sanitized NLJ 89-51]	1/3/68	A
#132 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80060) S 2 p open 7-29-03	1/3/68	A
#133 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80061) C 3 p open 7-29-03	1/3/68	A
#134 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p open 7-29-03	1/3/68	A
#135 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80031) C 2 p open 7-29-03	1/2/68	A
#136 cable	Rostow to President S 1 p open 7-29-03	1/2/68	A
#137 memo	Rostow to President, 5:30 p.m. PCI 1 p	1/2/68	A
#137a ltr	President to Nyerere PCI 1 p	1/6/68	A
#139 cable	Duplicate of #136		
#141a memo	Valenti to President C 2 p	12/29/67	A

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#141b map	Region of the Jordan River Valley PCI 1 p	undated	A
#142 memo	Rostow to President C 2 p <i>open 7.29.03</i>	1/2/68	A
#144 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80015) <i>open 7.29.03</i> S 2 p	1/2/68	A
#146 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80013) <i>open 7.29.03</i> S 2 p	1/2/68	A
#147 rpt	Text of message S 2 p	1/1/68	A
#148 cable	Rostow to President (CAP 80014) S 2 p <i>Open 8.31.98 RAC</i>	1/2/68	A
#149 cable	WH Situation Room to President (CAP 671270) S 3 p <i>Exempt NIG 019-027-2</i>	1/1/68	A

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#43 cable	Rostow to the President - S 1 p Sanitized, NLJ 83-24, 1984	1/11/68	A
91 memo	Rostow to the President - S 1 p	1/5/68	A
#91a memo	Rostow to the President Chairman, AEC - S 1 p	1/9/68	A
#91b memo	Chairman, AEC to the President - S 2pp	12/22/67	A
#91c rpt.	Enclosure 1 to #91 b - S 6 pp	[12/67]	A
#91d draft	Enclosure 2 to #91b (draft endorsement) - S 1 p	[12/67]	A
#127 memo	Walt Rostow to the President - TS 1 p <i>Exempt S-304 NW/PAC 05-259</i>	1/3/68	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 56, January 1-15, 1968
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1968 JAN 13 19 57

Pres file
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN
CITE CAP80342

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 13, 1968

1968 JAN 13 PM 3:08

SATURDAY

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WALT ROSTOW
INFO: GEORGE CHRISTIAN

NEW YORK TIMES STORY THIS MORNING REPORTS THAT YOU PROMISED ESHKOL A FEW MORE SKYHAWKS BUT THAT NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE ON PHANTOMS. IT IS A MODERATELY WRITTEN AND FAIRLY ACCURATE STORY. IN MY VIEW, THIS IS PROBABLY AS GOOD A WAY TO HAVE THESE FACTS COME OUT AS WE COULD EXPECT. IN FACT, WE HAD ALREADY PLANNED TO COME TO YOU FOR APPROVAL TO DO SOME BACKGROUNDING TO ACHIEVE THIS RESULT.

IF YOU APPROVE, STATE WOULD LIKE TO USE THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS THIS AFTERNOON:

THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE END OF PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL'S VISIT MAKES CLEAR OUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY. IN THIS SPIRIT, WE ARE CONTINUING THE DELIVERY OF PLANES UNDER A 1966 AGREEMENT AND IN LIGHT OF DELIVERIES TO OTHER STATES IN THE AREA SINCE THE JUNE WAR HAVE AGREED TO AN EXTENSION OF THE 1966 AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A LIMITED NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL PLANES OF THE SAME TYPE TO ISRAEL. FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ISRAEL'S MILITARY SITUATION GIVES US TIME TO CONSIDER FURTHER A DECISION ON F-4 PHANTOMS, WHICH ISRAEL ALSO WANTS. WE WANT TO USE THAT TIME TO EXPLORE FURTHER THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ARMS LIMITATION IN THE AREA AND TO WORK FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE JARRING MISSION. PEACE WAS THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IN OUR TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE HAS TOP PRIORITY IN OUR PRESENT EFFORTS. WHAT WE DO ABOUT ISRAEL'S REQUEST FOR MORE AIRCRAFT WILL DEPEND ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA IN THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE ARMS SUPPLY POLICY OF OTHERS AND THE PROGRESS MADE TOWARD A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

IF ASKED WHETHER LEAD TIMES REQUIRE A DECISION SOON, STATE WOULD SAY THAT WE HAVE EXAMINED THIS QUESTION AND CONCLUDED THAT LEAD TIME IS NOT A PROBLEM THAT CANNOT BE HANDLED. BEYOND THAT, WE WOULD REFUSE TO DISCUSS DETAILS.

THE TIMES STORY ALSO SAYS WE HAVE INFORMED JORDAN WE WOULD RELAX OUR BAN ON ARMS SALES. THIS HAS ATTRACTED LESS ATTENTION, SO OUR SPOKESMEN WILL NOT HAVE TO DEAL WITH IT TODAY. WE WOULD PLAN EARLY NEXT WEEK, AFTER INFORMING KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, TO SAY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS THAT WE DECIDED AT THE BEGINNING OF JANUARY TO INCLUDE JORDAN AMONG THOSE COUNTRIES FOR WHOM WE WOULD MAKE LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO OUR ARMS FREEZE AND THAT WE ARE STUDYING REQUESTS FROM JORDAN.

APPROVE GUIDANCE ON ISRAELI STORY -----

CALL ME -----

APPROVE YOUR PROPOSED COURSE ON JORDAN -----

CALL ME -----

DTG: 13/1851Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Monday, January 15, 1968
5:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft reply (Tab A)
to Julius Nyerere's letter to you of
January 2, 1968 (Tab B).

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

3
Monday, January 15, 1968
5:45 p. m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Misgivings about Vietnam felt by VIP group

In early December a meeting of a distinguished group of 22 American citizens was called by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The purpose was to discuss our Vietnam policy. The meeting was chaired by the President of the Carnegie Endowment, Joe Johnson, and included Harding Bancroft of the New York Times, and John Cowles, Hedley Donovan, Richard Neustadt, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, Roger Hillsman, etc. (A list of those attending is attached.)

As a follow-through to the meeting, three members of the group, Joe Johnson, Charles Yost, and Ernest Gross, called on Secretary Rusk and had a lengthy meeting with two members of my staff. The purpose of these meetings was to pave the way for presentation of the group's conclusions to you.

Joe Johnson has written to you transmitting a memorandum setting forth the "substantial consensus" of the group's views on Vietnam. He asks to see you to make a personal report and answer any questions you may have.

In brief, the group felt that Hanoi is not likely to agree to negotiations in the near future, and that a "precipitant or dishonorable" US withdrawal "would be disastrous." The group felt that the United States should avoid any ground probes into Laos or Cambodia but should work to strengthen ICC activities along the Cambodian frontier. The group also felt that any widening of the war would alienate friendly world opinion and endanger domestic support for the US effort in Vietnam.

Specifically, the group made four recommendations:

1. In the South we should make every effort to reduce the level of military conflict. Our emphasis should be on "clear-and-hold" operations, rather than "search-and-destroy" efforts.
2. We should stop the bombing of North Vietnam. This should not be contingent upon any comparable action by the enemy, nor should we expect that it would lead to early negotiations.
3. We should press the South Vietnamese Government to assume greater responsibility for both the defense and pacification of the country and should make continued aid to South Vietnam contingent upon progress.

4. We should accept the National Liberation Front as an organized factor in the political life of South Vietnam and should recognize that the risk of trying to deal with the National Liberation Front politically is less than the attempt to destroy it or exclude it by force.

In sum, the group believes that we should moderate the level of hostilities without regard to the prospects for negotiations. They believe that such a posture on our part reduces the risk of a broader war and makes it easier to maintain domestic support for an indefinite US involvement in Vietnam. You are familiar with this pattern of thought.

You should also know:

-- I had a long telephone conversation with Joe Johnson. It turned out that a good deal of the mood of the group was generated by fear that we were about to go pouring into Cambodia and Laos. When I explained the dangers involved in a bombing halt, he said that it would be good if I talked to the group about this matter. (In fact, I am sure their views on bombing have been generated by Adam Yarmolinsky, George Kistiakowsky, and Roger Hillsman.)

-- Joe Johnson called me today to say that Joe Kraft has hold of a copy of their memo.

Their great objective, of course, is to see you. Although there are some quite important people in the Group (Bancroft, Cowles, Donovan, Ridgway), I recommend against your meeting with them. Secretary Rusk takes the same view. He is willing to see them again; and I have already indicated that, subject to finding an appropriate time, I would see them.

W. W. Rostow

President will see them _____

Sec. Rusk will see them _____

W. W. Rostow will see them _____

No one _____

See me _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, January 15, 1968
5:45 p. m.

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3. We should press the South Vietnamese Government to assume greater responsibility for both the defense and pacification of the country and should make continued aid to South Vietnam contingent upon progress.

4. We should accept the National Liberation Front as an organized factor in the political life of South Vietnam and should recognize that the risk of trying to deal with the National Liberation Front politically is less than the attempt to destroy it or exclude it by force.

In sum, the group believes that we should moderate the level of hostilities without regard to the prospects for negotiations. They believe that such a posture on our part reduces the risk of a broader war and makes it easier to maintain domestic support for an indefinite US involvement in Vietnam. You are familiar with this pattern of thought.

You should also know:

-- I had a long telephone conversation with Joe Johnson. It turned out that a good deal of the mood of the group was generated by fear that we were about to go pouring into Cambodia and Laos. When I explained the dangers involved in a bombing halt, he said that it would be good if I talked to the group about this matter. (In fact, I am sure their views on bombing have been generated by Adam Yarmolinsky, George Kistiakowsky, and Roger Hilsman.)

-- Joe Johnson called me today to say that Joe Kraft has hold of a copy of their memo.

Their great objective, of course, is to see you. Although there are some quite important people in the group (Bancroft, Cowles, Donovan, Ridgway), I recommend against your meeting with them. Secretary Rusk takes the same view. He is willing to see them again; and I have already indicated that, subject to finding an appropriate time, I would see them.

 Rostow

President will see them _____

Sec. Rusk will see them _____

W. W. Rostow will see them _____

No one _____

See me _____

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Panel Discussion on Vietnam
1-3 December 1967

List of Participants

Harding F. Bancroft
The New York Times

Lincoln Bloomfield
Center for International Studies, M.I.T.

Charles G. Bolté
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

John Cowles
The Minneapolis Star and Tribune

Hedley Donovan
Time, Inc.

Daniel Ellsberg
The RAND Corporation

Miss Frances FitzGerald
author of recent articles on Vietnam in Atlantic

Ernest A. Gross
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt and Mosle

Roger Hilsman
School of International Affairs, Columbia University

Joseph E. Johnson
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Milton Katz
Harvard Law School

George Kistiakowsky
Department of Chemistry, Harvard University

Franklin A. Lindsay
Itek Corporation

Richard Neustadt
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

Ithiel de Sola Pool
Center for International Studies, M.I.T.

Matthew B. Ridgway
General, U.S. Army, retired

Marshall D. Shulman
Russian Institute, Columbia University

Donald B. Straus
American Arbitration Association

Kenneth W. Thompson
The Rockefeller Foundation

James C. Thomson
Department of History, Harvard University

Stephen J. Wright
United Negro College Fund

Adam Yarmolinsky
Harvard Law School

Charles Yost
Council on Foreign Relations

Kenneth Young
Asia Society

Staff:

Mrs. Martha Sue Tharp
Robert C. Richter
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

21 December 1967

Mr. President:

The attached brief memorandum on Vietnam reflects the substantial consensus of a group of private United States citizens who met recently at my invitation to look at the implications of the present situation in Vietnam and to consider possible future courses of action. This two-day meeting was convened by me as president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the approval of the Endowment's Trustees. The Endowment's basic mandate is, in the words of Andrew Carnegie, "to hasten the abolition of international war."

I submit this memorandum as a private citizen who has been continuously concerned on a professional basis since before World War II with the role of the United States in world affairs, and particularly with its role as a leader in the search for a just and lasting peace. As a citizen and as an historian, I am also deeply concerned that the quality of American life reflect our highest national values.

On Monday, 18 December, I met by appointment with Secretary Rusk; I was accompanied by two other members of the group, Messrs. Ernest A. Gross and Charles W. Yost. After we had explained to him the origin of the meeting and handed him a copy of the attached list of the participants, we had a frank and illuminating discussion with him about the memorandum. The Secretary thought it would be helpful if I clarified in writing certain of the premises on which the document is based, premises that had been omitted from the memorandum in the interest of brevity.

First, there was a clear recognition by those present at the meeting that Hanoi continues to be unyielding in its objectives and shows no willingness to change its policies. The group recognized that this meant that there is little or no likelihood that a United States strategy along the lines urged

President Lyndon B. Johnson
The White House
Washington, D.C.

in the memorandum would lead to effective negotiations in the near future. The feeling was strong that the strategy proposed would be conducive to the advancement of United States interests, whatever Hanoi's stand might be; this is the significance of the sentence: "United States policy should not be dependent on Hanoi's decisions."

Second, there was virtually unanimous support among those present for the view that the United States must accept a long-term involvement in South Vietnam, and that precipitate or dishonorable withdrawal would be disastrous. This, in fact, underlies and is embodied in the proposals made in the attached memorandum.

Third, with respect to the recommendation that the United States should not engage in ground probes into Laos and Cambodia, Messrs. Gross, Yost and I--and I believe most of the other participants--would support pressures upon all parties to the Laos Declaration and Protocol of 1962 to fulfill their contractual obligations under that agreement, and also endorse efforts to strengthen the International Control Commission along the Cambodian frontier.


Although the group did not have an opportunity to consider thoroughly and reach a conclusion about the possible role of the United Nations, I and other participants in the meeting, including notably Mr. Gross, believe that, should the United States cease strategic bombing of North Vietnam, the United States can engage the responsibilities of the Members of the United Nations and enlist their support in bringing about a satisfactory end to the strife in Vietnam. A suggestion as to how this might be accomplished was spelled out orally to Mr. Rusk.

Following our meeting with Secretary Rusk, Messrs. Gross, Yost and I had an appointment with Mr. Walt W. Rostow. Finding at the last minute, however, that he would be unable to see us, he asked Messrs. Leonhart and Wright of his staff to receive us, and we gave them a full account of the meeting and of our talk with Mr. Rusk.

This letter and the enclosed memorandum are offered in a spirit of appreciation for your untiring efforts toward peace, and of the consciousness of my responsibility to try, as you expressed it in your recent speech in Miami, "to be constructive in word and constructive in deed." I should welcome an opportunity, both for myself and on

behalf of the deeply concerned group of citizens who attended our meeting, to report personally to you on the meeting and answer questions you may have.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. E. Johnson". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal flourish at the end.

Joseph E. Johnson

cc: The Honorable Dean Rusk

Private
Not for Publication or Quotation

12 December 1967

Memorandum on Vietnam

The following memorandum represents substantial consensus among those present at a private meeting organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in December 1967, although it should not be assumed that every participant agrees with all of it. It does not represent an official Endowment position.

This statement is not addressed to the past; it concerns the present and the future.

There now appears to be serious danger that the momentum of the Vietnam conflict may carry hostilities to disproportionate and even perilous levels. Under the circumstances there is a need to explore policy alternatives for the future. To do so is not to criticize earlier decisions or to suggest abandoning our resistance. But if we were to pursue present objectives by widening the war as by ground probes into Laos and Cambodia, our commitments would escalate along with our risks, and the next step could be an invasion of North Vietnam. Such developments would entail unacceptable risks and threaten world peace.

It seems most unlikely that widening the war, and particularly invading North Vietnam, would lead to military victory or shorten the war. Rather, this would heighten the possibility of direct Chinese and Soviet intervention, further alienate friendly and neutral nations, and jeopardize other world-wide American interests. It would also deepen

divisions inside the United States and curtail programs essential to our domestic tranquillity; it could revive isolationism.

The United States should modify its strategy so that it can defend South Vietnam without surrender and without increasing the risks of a wider war. United States policy should not be dependent on Hanoi's decisions.

First, in the war in the South every effort should be made to reduce violence to levels at which a sustained effort can be maintained with the support of both the American and Vietnamese people. The emphasis should not be on the military destruction of communist forces in the South but on the protection of the people of South Vietnam and the stabilization of the situation at a politically tolerable level. Tactically, this would involve a shift in emphasis from "search-and-destroy" to "clear-and-hold" operations.

Second, we should stop the bombing of North Vietnam. From now on the costs of strategic bombing will increasingly exceed the benefits. This step would tend to shift international pressures from Washington to Hanoi. It should not be made contingent upon an immediate military quid pro quo nor taken in the expectation that it would lead to early negotiations. If North Vietnam chose to exploit the cessation flagrantly by expanding its forces in the South, bombing of infiltration routes could be

resumed, with the prospect of increased domestic political support.

Third, the South Vietnamese government at all levels should be steadily pressed to assume greater and greater responsibility, both political and military, for the defense and pacification of the country. To achieve this purpose, the United States should seek every opportunity to make aid to the South Vietnamese conditional upon fulfillment of their commitments.

Fourth, a major problem arises concerning the role of the National Liberation Front as an organized factor in the political life of South Vietnam. In seeking an end to open hostilities, we should recognize that the risks of attempting to cope with the National Liberation Front primarily by political means on a long-term basis, although real, are less than the risks for the United States of persisting in an indefinitely prolonged attempt to destroy the National Liberation Front or to exclude it by American military force.

In sum, United States policy should aim at moderating the level of hostilities regardless of whether formal negotiations for an ultimate settlement are now possible. In the large, United States posture should be one that can be sustained for an indefinite period with reduced risks and increased political benefits until such time as the conflict can be resolved in an honorable and peaceful fashion.

ACTION

Monday, January 15, 1968
11:05 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This language, in my judgment, would both give the State of the Union message a punch and put a certain amount of heat on Hanoi.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

1/15/68

4a

In recent weeks there have been public statements and diplomatic reports that the other side might be willing seriously to seek peace by negotiation. We are exploring these reports ~~that~~ we have explored similar possibilities in the past.

You all know the formula I stated in San Antonio as the foundation for opening peace negotiations. That formula, of course, still stands.

I want Congress and my fellow citizens to know that no effort is being spared -- in any part of the world -- in the attempt to find the grounds for peace. I would hope, therefore, that those who wish to be helpful would await the result of these developments rather than to engage either in prophecy or in new proposals. during the days ahead.

Monday, January 15, 1968
10:00 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Pres. file

Minister Evron came in this morning.

He first reported on various activities of Prime Minister Eshkol which, he hoped, were helpful to you, notably his statements on Vietnam.

Evron then said that Prime Minister Eshkol felt it extremely important that, before he returns to Israel, there be a lucid understanding about what had been decided and not decided concerning the Phantoms.

Specifically, two issues had arisen in discussions between the Pentagon and General Hod:

-- If you should decide to sell Phantoms, to be available January 1, 1970, was a figure for the initial number to be available on that date mentioned or not mentioned?

-- Was the agreement:

-- that you would make a decision on the Phantoms no earlier than December 1968; or

-- was it agreed that Sec. McNamara would give you the latest date possible for making a production decision in time for January 1, 1970 delivery; and Generals Wheeler and Hod would give you the latest date possible for training air and ground crews in time for the January 1970 date.

Evron says that these debates at the working level had been reported to Prime Minister Eshkol. He thinks it is in the interest of both governments that there be clarity as to what was and was not agreed. Evron requested, therefore, that Luke Battle and he be permitted to work out a draft, based on notes, as to what had been decided.

I said that:

-- I would report the matter to you;

-- He should take stock with Luke Battle to see if there are any differences in the notes;

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

-- Only you could make the decision on whether the notes expressed your understanding, as well as a decision on whether there should be a paper expressing that understanding.

Unless I hear to the contrary from you, I shall be sending up, perhaps at the end of the day, a brief working paper, based on our notes. You could then decide:

-- Is our understanding of your decision correct?

-- Should there be a piece of paper available to the Israelis expressing that understanding?

My initial recommendation is that, when misunderstandings are cleared up, we permit Luke Battle and Evron to O. K. each other's notes.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

5a



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4

12 January 1968

By lg, NARA, Date 1-17-92

I-20233/68

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

U.S. Side

Israeli Side

Paul C. Warnke, ASD(ISA)
Harry H. Schwartz, DASD(ISA)

BG Mordecai Hod, Commander Israeli
Air Force
BG Joseph Geva, Defense and Armed
Forces Attache

TIME: January 12, 1968, 1115 hours

PLACE: Mr. Warnke's Office

General Hod and General Geva explained their understanding of the President's decision concerning F-4s as follows: that the President made no decision or commitment at the Ranch to deliver F-4 aircraft to Israel; that he did, however, assure the Israelis that were he so to decide in December 1968 the U.S. would deliver to Israel by January 1970, 20 to 30 F-4s in Israeli-desired configuration, that it was therefore necessary to begin technical discussions concerning the configuration prior to a December 1968 Presidential decision, in order to make it possible for the commitment to be carried out were the decision made.

Mr. Warnke explained his understanding and that of the Secretary of Defense as follows: the President made no commitment at the Ranch to deliver F-4s; the President did assure the Israelis, however, that were he to make a decision in December 1968 to deliver F-4s to Israel, they would be delivered, beginning in January 1970, by diversion from U.S. production, at the same schedule that they would have been delivered had he made the decision in January 1968 at the Ranch. (Mr. Warnke said that this meant 4-5 per month.) Mr. Warnke further explained that under this understanding no Israeli training in the U.S. and no detailed Israeli-United States technical discussions, design work, etc., was required prior to a Presidential decision to deliver and would not take place.

General Hod, General Geva and Mr. Warnke agreed that the difference in understanding between them was clear.

Distribution:
Sec/Def Sec/Nav
Dep/Sec/Def State (Mr. Battle)
CJCS DASD/NESA/ISA
Sec/AF

PAUL C. WARNKE

~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday - January 15, 1968

~~to [unclear]~~
2. Pres file

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Law of the Sea Conference

Last summer Ambassador Dobrynin told us that the Soviet Government is interested in a new Law of the Sea Conference, to achieve universal acceptance of a 12-mile territorial sea. Kohler told Dobrynin in October that our interest in such a conference might depend on Soviet willingness also to discuss passage through international straits and possible accommodation of fishery interests beyond 12 miles.

About two weeks ago Tcherniakov, the Soviet Minister-Counselor, told us the Soviets would be happy to have a preliminary and informal meeting at the expert level at a date and place agreeable to us. Tcherniakov parried a question whether this meant Soviet willingness to discuss straits and fisheries, saying that he assumed the experts would work out an agenda.

The State Department has checked with Defense and Interior, and now plans to suggest the last week in February for informal and confidential talks with the Russians at the expert level (with Leonard Meeker representing the Department). The meeting will be exploratory.

In order to find out how friendly countries -- particularly the Latin Americans -- feel about this, we have asked our Embassies to take soundings. Reactions so far are general support if we can be reasonably sure in advance that there will be agreement for a new limit to the territorial sea.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:ND:gg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Pres file

Monday, January 15, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval is a message to President Saragat of Italy expressing your sympathy on the occasion of the loss of life caused by earthquakes in Sicily.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

See me _____

MWG
MWG:em

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply distressed to learn of the tragic loss of life caused by the earthquakes in Sicily. All Americans join me in offering our heartfelt sympathy to you and the people of Sicily. I am asking Ambassador Reinhardt to keep in close touch with the Italian authorities to determine in what way we can be of assistance in this sad moment.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 15, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached, for your approval, is a proposed message congratulating Sekou Toure on his recent reelection as President of Guinea.

Toure was the only formal candidate, but he runs a fairly honest and orderly election by African standards. He was a sure bet to win big even with opposition on the ballot. Our people in Guinea think a message won't hurt anything -- and it might make some money personally with Toure.

This won't set a precedent. You have congratulated other Africans reelected under similar circumstances.

I recommend you approve.

W. W. R.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Speak to me _____

Att: File #43

8a

Suggested Message to Sekou Toure

I congratulate you on your reelection. You have my best wishes for success in your work for the prosperity and well-being of the people of Guinea.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:State:EKH:WWR:rla

Mr. Rostow

Profile 9

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *Ag*, NARA, Date 1-17-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, January 15, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on Israeli Aircraft and Jordanian Arms

We would like to deal in two ways this morning with press reports that you promised Eshkol a few more Skyhawks but that no commitment was made on Phantoms. The stories I've seen so far haven't been bad, but they haven't given us enough credit for restraint or for making an honest effort to achieve some sort of arms limitation. Therefore, we would like to give the following guidance to Bob McCloskey for use at noon and to our Ambassadors in Arab capitals to put your decision in the right perspective:

The joint statement issued at the conclusion of Prime Minister Eshkol's visit makes clear our continuing interest in Israel's security. In this spirit we are continuing the delivery of planes under our 1966 agreement and, in light of deliveries to other states in the area since the June war, have agreed to an extension of the 1966 agreement in order to provide a limited number of additional planes of the same type to Israel. For the immediate future, however, we are convinced that Israel's military situation gives us time to consider further a decision on F-4 Phantoms, which Israel also wants. We want to use that time to explore further the opportunities for arms limitation in the area and to work for the success of the Jarring Mission. Peace was the first order of business in our talks with Prime Minister Eshkol, and the search for peace has top priority in our present efforts. What we do about Israel's request for more aircraft will depend on developments in the area in the coming months, including the arms supply policies of others and the progress made toward a peaceful settlement.

If asked whether lead times require a decision soon, we would say that we have examined this question and concluded that lead time is a problem that can be handled. Beyond that, we would refuse to discuss details.

Some stories have also said we have informed Jordan we would relax our ban on arms sales. This has attracted less attention, so our spokesmen will not have to deal with it today. We would plan soon, however, after informing key Congressional leaders, to say in response to questions that we decided at the beginning of January to include Jordan among those countries for whom we would make limited exceptions to our arms freeze and that we are studying requests.

Approve guidance on Israeli story _____

W. W. Rostow

Call me _____

Approve your proposed course on Jordan _____

Call me _____

Sent to Sec. of F. at
15/9:40 AM

10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

Pres file

PRUS001
2051 ZULU 14 JAN 68
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER
~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

1968 JAN 14 21 55

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CAP80345

THE QUESTION OF BRITAIN'S FUTURE IN THE WORLD, ABOUT WHICH I WROTE YOU THE OTHER DAY, CONTINUES TO BE VERY MUCH ON MY MIND. I KNOW THAT YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES WILL BE MAKING CRUCIAL DECISIONS ON THIS QUESTION IN THE COMING HOURS.

THE LONDON PRESS THIS MORNING CARRIES REPORTS THAT THE CABINET HAS IN FACT DECIDED TO CANCEL THE F-111. THOUGH I KNOW HOW UNRELIABLE THE PRESS CAN BE, I HAVE DECIDED TO COMMUNICATE TO YOU MY EXTREME CONCERN ABOUT THIS MATTER IN PARTICULAR.

AS DEAN RUSK AND BOB MCNAMARA EXPLAINED TO GEORGE BROWN DURING HIS RECENT VISIT, AND AS I STATED IN MY RECENT LETTER TO YOU, THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF ACCELERATED BRITISH WITHDRAWAL BOTH FROM ITS FAR EASTERN BASES AND FROM THE PERSIAN GULF WOULD CREATE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD. AMERICANS WILL FIND GREAT DIFFICULTY IN SUPPORTING THE IDEA THAT WE MUST MOVE IN TO SECURE AREAS WHICH THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS ABANDONED.

IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT A DEMONSTRATED ABILITY OF UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY FORCES SPEEDILY TO DEPLOY TO THESE AREAS FROM ITS OWN BASES MIGHT ALLEVIATE SOMEWHAT THE STRONG REACTION WHICH WILL INEVITABLY TAKE PLACE. THE F-111, BECAUSE OF ITS RANGE AND OVERALL CAPABILITY, WOULD DEMONSTRATE THIS RAPID DEPLOYMENT ABILITY.

BUT IF YOU DECIDE TO FOREGO THE ACQUISITION OF THE F-111, EVERYONE HERE WILL REGARD THIS AS A TOTAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM ANY COMMITMENTS WHATSOEVER TO THE SECURITY OF AREAS OUTSIDE EUROPE AND, INDEED, TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT IN EUROPE AS WELL. MOREOVER, IT WILL BE VIEWED HERE AS A STRONG INDICATION OF BRITISH ISOLATION WHICH WOULD BE FATAL TO THE CHANCES OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN THE FIELD OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT.

BOTH DEAN AND BOB MADE IT CLEAR TO GEORGE BROWN THAT FINANCIAL PENALTIES WILL HAVE TO BE APPLIED IF THERE IS A DECISION TO CANCEL THE F-111 CONTRACT. POLITICALLY, WE HAVE NO CHOICE. APPRECIABLE AS THESE PENALTIES WOULD BE IN MONETARY TERMS, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD BE FAR LESS SERIOUS THAN THE RECIPROCAL ACTIONS WHICH IN ALL LIKELIHOOD WOULD FOLLOW. RETENTION OF THE PRESENT OFFSET ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BECOME OUT OF THE QUESTION. PRESSURES FOR DOMESTIC PROCUREMENT COULD NO LONGER BE RESISTED. THESE WOULD ALMOST INESCAPABLY LEAD TO COMPLETE CANCELLATION OF RECENT AWARDS OF MILITARY CONTRACTS TO BRITISH FIRMS.

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BUT EVEN THESE SEVERE ECONOMIC EFFECTS WOULD BE OVERSHADOWED BY THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF AN F-111 CANCELLATION. MANY IN THIS COUNTRY, INCLUDING INFLUENTIAL MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, WOULD BRING THE STRONGEST PRESSURES TO BEAR ON US TO SACRIFICE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS TO EASE OUR PRESENT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN EUROPE, WHILE FIGHTING A DIFFICULT AND COSTLY WAR IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, WOULD BE GREATLY ENDANGERED.

AS I INDICATED IN MY LAST LETTER TO YOU, I RECOGNIZE FULLY THAT A DECISION ON THIS QUESTION IS ONE THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ALONE CAN MAKE. I HOPE THAT IT WILL DO SO WITH FULL CONSIDERATION OF ALL THE FACTORS INVOLVED. AND I WANTED YOU TO KNOW HOW IMPORTANT I CONSIDER IT TO BE THAT THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES MAINTAIN THEIR UNDERSTANDING ON THE F-111 IN ALL ESSENTIAL RESPECTS AND CONTINUE TO AT LEAST TRY TO DEFEND FREEDOM IN THIS HECTIC AND UNSETTLED WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

MESSAGE ENDS

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

11

Sunday, January 14, 1968 -- 12:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

As you come down to the wire on the State of the Union message, it may be helpful if I record the substantial points that I think need some thought in the foreign affairs portion. I am, of course, giving a copy of this to Harry McPherson.

1. We must check carefully the increase in South Vietnamese living under GVN administration and security. I will take this in hand. The phrase "government control" should not be used.

2. I believe this is a bad time to introduce any new elements into the negotiating picture -- or even to elaborate on the San Antonio formula. I would simply add, after the paragraph which ends "attack upon the South," the following: The formula I stated at San Antonio reflects this hope and our determination not to accept another Panmunjom. We stand behind that formula today and hope the other side will accept it as a basis for beginning the movement towards peace.

3. I don't know what my friend Harry has against partnership and the commitment to move from "narrow nationalism to partnership." In any case, I think it ought to be in as a strand of continuity in the President's position. But it is wholly a matter of your own taste and wish.

4. I personally feel there should be no reference to the French. It would cheer up General de Gaulle to make the State of the Union message. There is no action that flows from it, only pious hope. You may wish to discuss this with Sec. Rusk.

5. With respect to the passage on the Soviet Union, it is going too far to say that "the spirit of the Cold War no longer dominates our relationship with the Soviet Union." It is a particularly awkward time to say this when there may be a leadership crisis going on in Moscow and they are having pretty serious attacks on the intellectuals, which may reflect resurgence of the secret police. I prefer the more cautious language used in my earlier draft. I also prefer the reference back to the language of the State of the Union last year to the quotation from President Kennedy.

6. My friend Harry keeps dropping the Asian Development Bank Special Fund from the list, even though we are already committed to it in the Congress; and I can't seem to get him interested in education. Incidentally, on that Doug Cater is examining a specific further idea that might be thrown into the draft at the last minute.

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

12
—

Sunday, January 14, 1968
11:45 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

It has been reported to us that the British Cabinet has decided to cancel the F-111 contract.

Sec. McNamara recommends that you dispatch immediately the attached letter to Prime Minister Wilson warning him, as you can see, of the financial and military consequences of the cancellation.

John Leddy has cleared for State.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dear Harold:

The question of Britain's future in the world, about which I wrote you the other day, continues to be very much on my mind. I know that you and your colleagues will be making crucial decisions on this question in the coming hours.

The London press this morning carries reports that the Cabinet has in fact decided to cancel the F-111. Though I know how unreliable the press can be, I have decided to communicate to you my extreme concern about this matter in particular.

As Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara explained to George Brown during his recent visit, and as I stated in my recent letter to you, the announcement of accelerated British withdrawal both from its Far Eastern bases and from the Persian Gulf would create most serious problems for the United States Government and for the security of the entire free world. [Americans will not support the idea that we must move in to secure areas which the United Kingdom has abandoned.]

It has been our hope that a demonstrated ability of United Kingdom military forces speedily to deploy to these areas from its own bases might alleviate somewhat the strong reaction which will inevitably take place. The F-111, because of its range and overall capability, would demonstrate this rapid deployment ~~ability~~ ability.

But if you decide to forego the acquisition of the F-111, everyone here will regard this as a total disengagement from any commitments

SECRET - EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 5-19-98

whatsoever to the security of areas outside Europe and, indeed, to a considerable extent in Europe as well. Moreover, it will be viewed here as a declaration of British isolation which would be fatal to the chances of cooperation between our countries in the field of defense procurement.

Both Dean and Bob made it clear to George Brown that financial penalties will have to be applied if there is a decision to cancel the F-111 contract. Politically, we have no choice. Appreciable as these penalties would be in monetary terms, however, they would be far less serious than the reciprocal actions which in all likelihood would follow. Retention of the present offset arrangements would become out of the question. Pressures for domestic procurement could no longer be resisted. These would almost inescapably lead to cancellation of recent awards of military contracts to British firms.

But even these severe economic effects would be overshadowed by the foreign policy consequences of an F-111 cancellation. Many in this country, including influential Members of Congress, would bring the strongest pressures to bear on us to sacrifice international security interests to ease our present financial problems. Our ability to maintain substantial forces in Europe, while fighting a difficult and costly war in South East Asia, would be greatly endangered.

As I indicated in my last letter to you, I recognize fully that a decision on this question is one that the British Government alone

can make. I hope that it will do so with full consideration of all the factors involved. And I wanted you to know how important I consider it to be that the United Kingdom and the United States maintain their understanding on the F-111 in all essential respects.

Sincerely,

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80324

1968 JAN 13 01 02

Pres file

UNCLAS

1/11/68

1968 JAN 12 PM 8:38

FRIDAY

CAPTAINS REGENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO SENT YOU FOLLOWING CHRISTMAS AND NEW YEAR GREETING:

ON THE OCCASION OF CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR, WE TAKE PLEASURE IN SENDING YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, SINCERE GOOD WISHES IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO. TO OUR GOOD WISHES FOR YOU PERSONALLY, WE ADD THOSE FOR THE PROSPERITY AND WELL-BEING OF THE GREAT AMERICAN NATION, TO WHICH THE LITTLE REPUBLIC OF SAN MARINO FEELS UNITED BY BONDS OF CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP. UNQTE

SUGGESTED REPLY FOLLOWS:

I WELCOME YOUR KIND MESSAGE ON THE OCCASION OF CHRISTMAS AND THE NEW YEAR. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE JOIN ME IN SENDING YOU AND THE PEOPLE OF SAN MARINO WARM GREETINGS AND OUR HOPE FOR YOUR HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY IN 1968.

APPROVED -----

Sit Rm log 2150 - Marie Felmer telephoned Sit Rm who notified State Dept

DISAPPROVED -----

SEE ME -----

DTG: 122346Z JAN 68

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Jan 9:54 PM

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EEA 090
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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80J29

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Authority RAC 15182
By us NARA, Date 1-13-98

68 JAN 12 PM 9:58

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JANUARY 12, 1968

1 DAY

AS YOU CAN SEE FROM THE FOLLOWING CABLE TO AMB. BUNKER, WE ARE ASKING HIM TO COMMENT ON A DRAFT STATEMENT SEC. RUSK MIGHT MAKE ON MONDAY, TO HELP DAMP DOWN GROWING UNEASINESS IN VIETNAM WHICH COULD BECOME DANGEROUS.

QUOTE

1. YOUR CABLES CONFIRM OUR FEELING HERE THAT ATMOSPHERE IN SOUTH VIETNAM IS EDGY, AND GIVE US VALUABLE GUIDELINES ON REQUIRED ACTIONS TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION.

2. WE AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE EARLY STATEMENT FROM HERE AND BELIEVE THAT THIS COULD MOST-APPROPRIATELY COME FROM SECRETARY. WE WOULD WISH TO HAVE STATEMENT RUN HERE IN AS LOW KEY AS POSSIBLE TO AVOID STORIES ON "ANOTHER SPLIT", AND PREFERABLY IN RESPONSE TO NUMBER OF QUESTIONS THAT CAN EASILY BE DEPICTED TO EXIST IN THIS FIELD. SINCE SECRETARY DOES NOT PLAN TO BE BACK IN WASHINGTON UNTIL MONDAY, BEST OCCASION WOULD BE THEN UNLESS YOU FEEL THAT THERE IS GREATER TIME URGENCY. SUBSTANCE OF WHAT SECRETARY MIGHT SAY--STATED TO BE IN RESPONSE TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS RAISED--WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

A. I HAVE NOTHING TO ADD AT THIS TIME TO MY COMMENTS ON JAN. 4 CONCERNING RECENT STATEMENTS FROM NORTH VIETNAM AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS. AS I POINTED OUT AT THAT TIME, THERE ARE ASPECTS IN THESE STATEMENTS THAT APPEAR TO REQUIRE CAREFUL EXPLORATION, AND THIS PROCESS MAY TAKE TIME.

B. WE HAVE OF COURSE DISCUSSED THESE STATEMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AND OUR OTHER ALLIES, SINCE IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE COULD BE NO DECISIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION WITH THEM. IN PARTICULAR, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THE FUTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM COULD NOT BE DECIDED WITHOUT THE (FULL) PARTICIPATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

C. I REITERATE--ONLY BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION ON THE MATTER--THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE WHATEVER IN OUR VIEWS AS TO THE FUTURE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. OUR BASIC PRINCIPLE IS THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE MUST DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE WITHOUT EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE. AS THE DEPARTMENT MADE CLEAR IN ITS STATEMENT OF DEC. 8, THE IMPOSITION OF ANY COALITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE AT VARIANCE WITH THIS PRINCIPLE. AS WE STATED AT THAT TIME: QUOTE IN ESSENCE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE MUST WORK OUT THEIR OWN FUTURE, ACTING THROUGH ELECTORAL PROCESSES OF THE KIND CARRIED FORWARD IN THE PAST TWO YEARS UN-QUOTE

(D. IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD ALSO TAKE THE OCCASION TO REAFFIRM THAT THE JOINT SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND U.S. STATEMENT ISSUED AT CANBERRA LIKEWISE REMAINS UNCHANGED.)

3. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE PROPOSED FORMAT, TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF SUCH A STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY TEXT IN PARENTHESES. IF WE ARE ABLE TO AGREE OVERNIGHT, AND IF STATEMENT CAN BE HELD UNTIL MONDAY, THIS WOULD GIVE US TIME TO ALERT THIEU THAT STATEMENT WILL BE MADE. IN ANY EVENT, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TELL THIEU AT ANY TIME IN YOUR DISCRETION THAT USG CONTINUES TO TAKE RESERVED POSITION ON TRINH STATEMENT. AS SECRETARY HAS STATED PUBLICLY, WE NATURALLY FEEL IMPELLED TO CONDUCT QUIET EXPLORATIONS. WE CONTINUE TO STAND ON SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AND INTEND TO KEEP THIEU INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS AS WE HAVE IN THE PAST.

END QUOTE

STATEMENT ACCEPTABLE -----

ALTER AS FOLLOWS -----

DTG: 130048Z JAN 68

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

Saturday
January 13, 1968

~~1 copy~~
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Holyoake and the frigate

Attached is a letter from Prime Minister Holyoake to you and a proposed reply for your signature.

Holyoake is pulling way back from the frigate offer. As I suggested to you earlier, part of his problem has to do with Cabinet politics. However, he also raises his problems in connection with the accelerated British withdrawal from Asia, and says quite candidly that until those problems are solved it would be difficult to ask his Cabinet to consider an additional commitment to Vietnam.

The draft reply is intended to keep the matter open but not to push very hard. I think it will be wiser to save our push until after Holyoake has recovered from the shock of the British decision.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

MWright:wpt

15a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 5-19-98

January 13, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of January 3 about New Zealand's military contribution to Vietnam.

You know how highly we value New Zealand's military and political support for the allied effort in Vietnam and how important it is to make clear to Hanoi that its aggressive course is futile.

I understand the difficulties you face in making a further increase at present. The contribution of a frigate would, however, be very helpful and would be warmly welcomed whenever it should prove feasible for you. For our part, we will do our best to help you overcome the problems of compatibility mentioned in your letter. I do not believe they should prove insoluble, and Admiral Sharp is prepared to work closely with your naval authorities on the matter.


With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

LBJ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Right Honorable
Keith J. Holyoake
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

LBJ:State:MW:wpt



SANITIZED

Authority NLI/CBS 10

By is NARS, Date 11-28-83

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

HEREWITH MY THIRTY-FOURTH WEEKLY MESSAGE.

A. GENERAL

1. IN THE PRESENT MESSAGE, I AM ATTEMPTING TO GIVE AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATION OF THE EFFORTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS WHICH, IN COMMON WITH OUR VIETNAMESE AND OTHER FREE WORLD ALLIES, WE HAVE RECORDED DURING 1967. THIS REPRESENTS NOT ONLY MY OWN VIEWS BUT ALSO THOSE OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION SO THAT IN EFFECT IT REPRESENTS A MISSION CONSENSUS. IN THE NEXT MESSAGE, I HOPE TO OUTLINE THE MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS WE FORESEE AND TO SUMMARIZE THE ACTIONS WE PLAN TO TAKE TO DEAL WITH THEM IN THE YEAR AHEAD.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 15899/1 ~~SECRET~~

2. THE PAST YEAR HAS BEEN ONE OF SUSTAINED AND UNREMITTING EFFORT AND I BELIEVE HAS SEEN ENOUGH ACHIEVEMENTS TO GIVE US EVERY ENCOURAGEMENT TO CONTINUE ALONG THE PRESENT LINES. WE CAN HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION IS ASSURED. OUR EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MAGNIFICENTLY SUPPORTED BY YOU AND BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED IN MEN AND MONEY TO A DEGREE UNPARALLELED IN OUR OWN HISTORY, TO THE DEFENSE OF A PEOPLE FAR FROM OUR SHORES. BUT AS YOU HAVE OFTEN SAID, THE COST IN MEN AND MONEY, HEAVY AS IT HAS BEEN, CANNOT BE COMPARED TO WHAT THE COST WOULD ULTIMATELY BE IF WE ALLOWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND SUBVERSION TO SUCCEED IN VIET-NAM. ALL OF US WORKING IN THE MISSION HERE ARE CONVINCED THAT WHAT WE DO WILL AFFECT NOT

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56. MISSION PRESS CENTER ACTIVITIES DURING 1967 FOCUSED ON IMPROVING PUBLIC MEDIA COVERAGE OF US AND FREE WORLD EFFORTS IN VIET NAM. THE CENTER EMPHASIZED THE ENCOURAGING POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF 1967 BY PROVIDING BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND FACILITATING COVERAGE OF THE ELECTIONS AND THE PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION.

57. BACKGROUNDING OF NEWSMEN WAS INCREASED DURING THE YEAR AS ACCREDITATION REACHED A NEW HIGH, RISING FROM A LOW OF 487 IN JANUARY TO A HIGH OF 575 IN EARLY SEPT, JUST BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. DURING THE YEAR 679 AMERICAN NEWSMEN AND 518 FROM 37 OTHER COUNTRIES ARRIVED TO SPEND SHORT PERIODS IN VIET NAM. BACKGROUNDING RANGED FROM MY MEETINGS WITH CORRESPONDENTS TO INDIVIDUAL SESSIONS HELD BY OFFICERS OF ALL MISSION ELEMENTS.

H. CONCLUSION

58. I AM AFRAID THIS BEEN AN OVERLY LONG MESSAGE, BUT I WANTED TO PULL TOGETHER ALL OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE GONE INTO OUR EFFORTS HERE. WE SHALL BE SENDING IN MORE DETAILED EVALUATIONS OF THE VARIOUS ACTIVITIES WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED.

59. OVER I THINK THAT WE HAVE BEEN ON THE RIGHT TRACK AND THAT IF WE CONTINUE BROADLY ALONG PRESENT LINES, REINFORCING SUCCESS AND DRAWING APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS FROM FAILURE WE WILL ATTAIN OUR OBJECTIVES HERE.
BUNKER

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APPROXIMATELY VN 591 BILLION IN 1967 AS COMPARED TO VN 257 BILLION IN 1966.

48. FORTUNATELY, IMPORTS WERE VERY EFFECTIVE IN FILLING THE GAP IN 1967. DURING THE YEAR AS A WHOLE, IMPORTS (INCLUDING INVESTIBLES) ARE ESTIMATED TO HAVE ABSORBED ABOUT VN 285 BILLION OF DOMESTIC PURCHASING POWER, WHICH IS SLIGHTLY MORE THAN DOUBLE THE 1966 FIGURE. THIS LARGE INCREASE IN IMPORTS WAS MAINLY DUE TO A (A) THE ABOLITION DURING THE

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 15899/6 ~~SECRET~~
SUMMER OF 1966 OF MOST IMPORT QUOTAS AND RESTRICTIONS, (B) THE LICENSING OF OVER 200 NEW IMPORTERS, AND, MOST IMPORTANT, (C) THE DEVALUATION OF THE PIASTER IN JUNE 1966 FROM 60 TO 118 PIASTERS TO THE DOLLAR WHICH GREATLY INCREASED THE PIASTER ABSORPTION OF EACH DOLLAR'S WORTH OF IMPORTS.

49. FINALLY, THE OTHER SIDE OF INFLATION WAS THE INCREASE IN RURAL PROSPERITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MEKONG DELTA, DURING 1967. HIGHER PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, PARTICULARLY RICE, THE DECLINE IN RURAL UNEMPLOYMENT, AND AN INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT.

6. PUBLIC AFFAIRS

50. IN COOPERATION WITH THE GVN, JUSPAO RECORDED SOLID ACHIEVEMENTS IN 1967: PROMOTING THE EVOLUTION OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT THROUGH POSTERS AND SUPPORT FOR RADIO, TV, AND DIRECT CONTACT PROGRAMS; SUPPORTING THE PACIFICATION EFFORTS WITH SIMILAR TECHNIQUES; AND ENCOURAGING DEFLECTIONS FROM THE ENEMY THROUGH PUBLICIZING THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM.

51. JUSPAO ADVISORY SUPPORT TO THE GVN DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INFORMATION AND PRESS WAS IMPORTED TO STRENGTHEN GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION TO ADVISORS WORKING WITH GVN AGENCIES IN THE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 15899/6 ~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION FIELD. THE AIM OF THIS EFFORT WAS TO IMPROVE THE GVN'S INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY AND TO MAKE ITS CONTACTS WITH THE ELECTORATE MORE PERSUASIVE AND ATTRACTIVE.

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SUBSTANTIAL BENEFIT WAS OBTAINED FROM VIGOROUS BUT ECONOMICAL USE OF AN IMPREST FUND TO FINANCE LOCAL EXPENDITURES IN QUICK RESPONSE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY.

52. A NATIONWIDE HAMLET SURVEY SYSTEM WAS ESTABLISHED TO PROVIDE FOR THE FIRST TIME A GLIMPSE OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE RURAL POPULATION ON ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE MISSION. A SURVEY OF RALLIERS WAS MADE DURING THE 1967 TET SEASON WHICH PROVIDED USEFUL FINDINGS ON VC PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES WHICH PROVED TO BE OF VALUE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR.

53. TV SETS INSTALLED ROSE FROM A LEVEL OF ABOUT 50,000 AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR TO ABOUT 150,000 AS THE YEAR ENDED. THIS NOW INVOLVED A PEAK NIGHTLY AUDIENCE OF MORE THAN ONE MILLION, WHEREAS THE NATION'S LARGEST DAILY NEWSPAPER PROBABLY DOES NOT HAVE A CIRCULATION OF MORE THAN 50,000. BY EXPANDING TELECAST FACILITIES TO COVER RURAL VIETNAM AND BY OUR SUPPORT OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF ABOUT 2,000 COMMUNITY RECEIVERS, WE PROVIDED MAJOR STIMULUS TO THE DEVELOPMENT.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 15899/6 ~~SECRET~~
OF A NATION-WIDE TV AUDIENCE. SIXTY NINE PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY IS NOW WITHIN RANGE OF A TV TRANSMITTER AND PLANS WERE SET IN MOTION TO INCREASE COVERAGE TO 74 PERCENT IN 1968. TV HAS GREAT IMPACT IN A COUNTRY LIKE SOUTH VIETNAM, WHERE LITERACY LEVELS, THOUGH IMPROVING, IS STILL COMPARATIVELY LOW.

54. THE CULTURAL DRAMA TEAMS, SUPPORTED BY JUSPAO, PROVIDED ENTERTAINMENT WITH A POLITICAL MESSAGE TO MORE THAN THREE MILLION VILLAGE AND HAMLET DWELLERS IN 1967. THE VC REACTED VIOLENTLY BY ATTACKING THE 12 TEAMS IN THE FIELD, WHICH SUFFERED TWO PERCENT KILLED AND 12 PERCENT WOUNDED DURING THE YEAR.

55. THE RELEASE OF TRANSLATIONS OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS TO SPOTLIGHT DEMORALIZING ADMISSIONS OF DIFFICULTIES AND FAILURES, AND THE RESURRECTION OF NGUYEN VAN BE, "DEAD" VC HERO-PATRIOT, WHO TURNED UP ALIVE AND SCARED IN GVN CUSTODY, PROVIDED EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.
BUNKER

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-2- SAIGON 15899, JAN 13, SECTION ONE OF SEVEN

ONLY THE FUTURE OF VIET-NAM BUT ALL OF THE COUNTRIES IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WHO WISH TO BE FREE AND SO HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON OUR OWN VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

3. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE PAST YEAR, I BELIEVE, FALL INTO THREE MAIN CATEGORIES. IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY OPERATIONS THE BRINGING INTO PROPER BALANCE OF THE RATIO

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 15899/1 ~~SECRET~~

OF COMBAT TO SUPPORT TROOPS IN THE U.S. FORCES AND THE STEADY IMPROVEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, TOGETHER WITH THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR FREE WORLD ALLIES, RESULTED IN INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE ACTIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY. HE HAS BEEN THWARTED IN HIS ATTEMPTS AT PENETRATION SOUTH OF THE DMZ, HIS BASES INCREASINGLY NEUTRALIZED, AND HE HAS BEEN STEADILY PUSHED BACK TOWARD THE LAOTIAN AND CAMBODIAN BORDERS. VIET CONG RECRUITMENT AND MORALE HAVE DECLINED. LINES OF COMMUNICATION HAVE BEEN STEADILY OPENED UP, COMMERCE AND TRADE THUS PERMITTED TO DEVELOP.

4. SLOW BUT STEADY PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION COMBINED WITH MILITARY SUCCESSES HAVE BROUGHT A STUADILY INCREASING PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL, NOW ABOUT 67 PERCENT, WITH A CORRESPONDING DECREASE UNDER VIET CONG CONTROL, APPROXIMATELY 17 PERCENT, THE BALANCE BEING IN CONTESTED AREAS.

5. PROGRESS IN THESE TWO CATEGORIES WERE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN THE THIRD, THAT OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. PERHAPS THE MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT OF THE YEAR HAS BEEN THE STABILIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE OPENING AND

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 15899/1 ~~SECRET~~

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. PEOPLE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO VOTE FOR LOCAL, VILLAGE, AND HAMLET OFFICIALS THUS MARKING THE BEGINNING OF THE REINSTITUTION OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT. THE PROMULGATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OPENED THE WAY FOR THE ELECTION OF A PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE INAUGURATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT MARKED A BEGINNING OF FULLY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES AND THE CHANGE-OVER TO CIVILIAN RULE. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM NOW FACING US

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-3- SAIGON 15899, JAN 13, SECTION ONE OF SEVEN

IS TO ENCOURAGE, PROD, PERSUADE, AND DRAW OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES TO USE THEIR NEW POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE TO FACE UP TO AND RESOLVE MORE EFFECTIVELY THE PROBLEMS OF DEFENSE AND GROWTH THAT HAVE BESET THEM FOR MANY YEARS.

6. I THINK THESE ACHIEVEMENTS REFLECT FAVORABLY ON THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. FOR THEM THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS, AND THEIR LOSSES HAVE BEEN HEAVY. BUT WE CAN NOW SEE GROWTH OF A CONVICTION AMONG THEM THAT THEY CAN AND WILL SEE THE STRUGGLE THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THEIR CONCERNS NOW TURN MORE DIRECTLY ON THE NATURE AND FORM OF

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 15899/1 ~~SECRET~~

A FINAL SETTLEMENT AND THE POSITION IT WOULD LEAVE THEM IN, LOCATED IMMEDIATELY NEXT TO AN UNREMITTINGLY HOSTILE NEIGHBOR. THEIR CONCERN IS WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESS RATHER THAN WITH THE RESULTS OF FAILURE.

7. OUR DEFECTS IN THE FIELD OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BOTH HERE AS WELL AS IN WASHINGTON, HAVE REQUIRED IMAGINATION AND ENERGY. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO PRESENT THE TRUE DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT IN VIET-NAM TO AMERICAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS OBJECTIVELY AND FAIRLY AS WE CAN, BUT WE HAVE HAD TO DO THIS THROUGH A PRESS WHICH, IT SEEMS TO ME, HAS BEEN UNUSUALLY SKEPTICAL AND CYNICAL. ONE EXPERIENCED JOURNALIST GAVE AN EXPLANATION FOR THIS WHICH MAY HAVE SOME VALIDITY, I.E., THAT THERE IS A GENERATION GAP HERE IN THAT MANY OF THE YOUNG REPORTERS HAVE NEVER SEEN NOR EXPERIENCED WAR BEFORE AND CONSEQUENTLY SUFFER FROM AN EMOTIONAL TRAUMA WHICH RESULTS IN SUBJECTIVE REPORTING. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE THE RESULT OF ALL THIS IS THAT THERE TEND TO BE TWO SEPARATE AND ONLY PARTIALLY CONNECTED REALITIES: THE VIEW OF VIET-NAM AS WE SEE IT HERE IN VIET-NAM AND THE VIEW THAT IS BEING

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 1,299/1 ~~SECRET~~

PRESENTED TO AMERICAN AND WORLD PUBLIC OPINION. THIS PROBLEM HAS ENGAGED MAJOR ATTENTION DURING THE PAST YEAR AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE OUR ATTENTION IN THE FUTURE. I THINK WE HAVE MADE SOME, THOUGH LIMITED, PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH IT.

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-4- SAIGON 15899, JAN 13, SECTION ONE OF SEVEN


B. POLITICAL

6. THE PRINCIPAL POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENT OF 1967 IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM NOW OPERATES WITHIN A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, AND AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT IS IN POWER. INDEED, THE DRAFTING OF A CONSTITUTION BY AN ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE CONDUCT OF REASONABLY FAIR AND FREE ELECTIONS FOR A PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCED THE PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE POLITICAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS. THE ADVENT TO POWER OF A LEGITIMATE POLITICAL REGIME IN THE SOUTH DIRECTLY CUTS AT THE BASE OF THE COMMUNIST CLAIM THAT THE NLF IS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

BUNKER

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9. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND THE ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION HAVE RECEIVED SIGNIFICANT ATTENTION DURING THE YEAR. (A NUMBER OF OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROSECUTED FOR CORRUPTION OR ARE CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION.) PLANS TO IMPROVE THE TRAINING AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT CHIEFS HAVE BEEN PREPARED, AND THE PROGRAMS WILL BEGIN TO BE IMPLEMENTED SHORTLY AFTER TET. THE GOVERNMENT HAS INSTITUTED A SIX-DAY WORK WEEK IN ORDER TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE OF SERVICE TO THE POPULATION.

10. THE ELECTION AND INAUGURATION OF PRES THIEU UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION BRINGS THE PROMISE OF A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, ALTHOUGH THIS CHANGE HAS NOT YET BEEN DULY REALIZED. GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE AND DECREE HAS FORMALLY ENDED.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 15899/2 ~~SECRET~~

AND GOVERNMENT BY A PRESIDENT IN WHOM ALL EXECUTIVE POWERS ARE VESTED HAS BEGUN. THIEU IS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES; HE IS EMPOWERED TO APPOINT AND DISMISS CORPS COMMANDERS, MINISTERS, AND HIS PRIME MINISTER AT WILL; HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING NATIONAL POLICY.

11. FEELING PROBABLY THAT HE COULD NOT MOVE TOO FAST WITHOUT EVOKING A STRONG AND PERHAPS UNMANAGEABLE REACTION FROM THE MILITARY, THIEU HAS EASED INTO HIS JOB GRADUALLY. THIS APPROACH IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF HIS CAUTIOUS AND SOMEWHAT SECRETIVE NATURE. FOR EXAMPLE, PRIME MINISTER LOC, WHO WAS NOT HIS PERSONAL CHOICE FOR THE POSITION BUT RATHER THAT OF VICE PRES KY, WAS APPOINTED BY THIEU, IN MY OPINION WISELY, IN ORDER TO CEMENT HIS RELATIONS WITH KY. THIEU HAS NOT YET REPLACED ANY OF HIS CORPS

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-2- SAIGON 15899, JAN 13, SECTION TWO OF SEVEN

COMMANDERS, NOR HAS HE YET TRIMMED THEIR CIVILIAN POWERS, THOUGH HE PLANS TO HAVE PROVINCE CHIEFS REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, RATHER THAN TO CORPS COMMANDERS. LIKEWISE, THIEU HAS RETAINED IN OFFICE A NUMBER OF FIGURES FROM THE OLD REGIME WHOM HE PROBABLY WOULD PREFER

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 15899/2 ~~SECRET~~

TO REPLACE, SUCH AS GEN LOAN, THE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR. I JUDGE THAT THIEU WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO DO SOME OR ALL OF THESE THINGS IF HE IS TO CARRY OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES EFFECTIVELY AS A CONSTITUTIONALLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND EMERGE AS A RESPECTED NATIONAL LEADER. THE ARMY AND THE ADMINISTRATION CANNOT BE REFORMED IF THE OLD SYSTEM OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS AMONG GENERALS IS NOT BROKEN DOWN AND ADJUSTED TO THE CHANGED BALANCE OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. THIS WILL REQUIRE SOME UNPLEASANT AND DIFFICULT DECISION AND POSSIBLE SHOWDOWNS WITH SOME OF THE LEADING GENERALS BEFORE IT IS EFFECTED.

12. RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LEADERS ARE ALSO A KEY PROBLEM. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAS ALREADY ACHIEVED FAR MORE CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION AND MILITARY-CIVILIAN COOPERATION THAN ITS PREDECESSOR. CIVILIAN POLITICIANS AND THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP SEEM TO BE LEARNING THAT THEY MUST WORK TOGETHER, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT QUITE SURE HOW TO DO IT. THE RELATIONSHIP IS IN MANY CASES STILL AN UNEASY MODUS VIVENDI RATHER THAN THE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WE HOPE TO SEE EMERGE.

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13. THE RECENT NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS, HELD WHILE THE COUNTRY WAS ENGAGED IN A BITTER WAR, INVOLVED LARGE NUMBERS OF VIETNAMESE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED, I BELIEVE, QUITE A REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT. THE SIGNS OF DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES THAT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO PROPER OPERATIONS OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, OBSCURE THE REALIZATION THAT LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN SO FAR ACHIEVED. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLID AND ACTIVE POLITICAL

PARTIES WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF VIETNAMESE DEMOCRACY. SHOULD THE WAR END SUDDENLY THE LONG ESTABLISHED AND HARDENED COMMUNIST POLITICAL APPARATUS WOULD BE WITHOUT EFFECTIVE COMPETITORS ON THE NATIONAL SCENE.

14. AS WE ARE ONLY TOO PAINFULLY AWARE, WE HAVE NOT MOVED EXPLICITLY ANY CLOSER TO PEACE EXCEPT AS OUR OVERALL PROGRESS BRINGS PEACE NEARER. THE FIGHTING HAS BEEN HEAVY


AND THE CASUALTIES ON ALL SIDES -- COMMUNIST, GVN, AND US -- HAVE BEEN HIGHER THAN BEFORE, WITH THE PROSPECT THAT 1968 MAY SEE CASUALTIES MOUNTING EVEN FURTHER.

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15. NEVERTHELESS, 1967 SAW A VERY CONSIDERABLE CLARIFICATION OF THE ISSUES IN VIETNAM AND A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATTITUDE OF MAJOR FAR EASTERN COUNTRIES TOWARDS OUR STAND HERE. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE VERY SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY EFFORT MADE BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, WHO CONSTITUTE MORE THAN HALF OF THE TOTAL COMMUNIST MAIN FORCE UNITS, HAS LED TO NO SIGNIFICANT RESULTS, OTHER THAN TO INCREASE THEIR CASUALTIES. THE COMMUNISTS ALMOST CERTAINLY KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT WIN A MILITARY VICTORY; EVEN THOUGH THEIR PROPAGANDA TO THEIR TROOPS AND TO THE PEOPLE UNDER THEIR CONTROL CONTINUES TO EMPHASIZE MILITARY VICTORY AS THEIR GOAL.

16. THE FORMULATION INTRODUCED BY DRV FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN DUY TRINH IN DEC TO THE EFFECT THAT TALKS "WILL", RATHER THAN "COULD" OR "WOULD", FOLLOW AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING CESSATION TAKEN INTO CONJUNCTION WITH THE EMERGENCE OF THE THEME OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMUNIST DOCUMENTS OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS OR SO MAY HAVE SIGNIFICANCE IN INDICATING WANING CONFIDENCE OF THE DRV IN MILITARY SUCCESS AND A TURNING TOWARD POLITICAL MANEUVER.

17. IN VIETNAM THE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH THE WAR IS BEING FOUGHT HAS SLOWLY CHANGED FOR THE BETTER, AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STABLE GOVERNMENT, THE STEADY IF SLOW PROGRESS IN PACIFICATION, AND THE COMMUNIST FAILURE ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THERE IS A GROWING CONVICTION AMONG KNOWLEDGABLE VIETNAMESE HERE THAT 1968 WILL BE THE DECISIVE YEAR, BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY.
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18. THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE FAR EAST IN WHICH THE WAR IS BEING FOUGHT HAS ALSO CHANGED FOR THE BETTER. THERE HAS BEEN A FURTHER AND SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE FREE WORLD FORCES COMMITTED TO THE STRUGGLE. THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT HAS REFLECTED A POSITIVE AND COMPREHENDING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WAR AND TOWARDS THE NEW VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, BOTH IN PRIVATE AND IN PUBLIC, IN SPITE OF HEAVY DOMESTIC OPPOSITION.



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INTERNAL UPHEAVALS IN COMMUNIST CHINA HAVE ALMOST CERTAINLY REINFORCED THE CAUTIOUS ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY MAO TSE-TUNG TOWARDS THE STRUGGLE, EVEN THOUGH THE PROPAGANDA DEFAMATIONS OF THE U.S. REMAIN AS BITTER AND VICIOUS AS EVER.

19. OUR POLICIES HAVE BEEN PRUDENT AND SOUND, OUR ACTIONS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL AND CONSIDERED. WE HAVE BUILT A FOUNDATION ON WHICH, I BELIEVE, WE CAN BUILD THE STRUCTURE OF SUCCESS.

C. MILITARY

20. MILITARY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED DURING 1967 WERE DESIGNED TO DEFEAT THE VC/NVA MAIN FORCE UNITS, DESTROY THE ENEMY'S BASE

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-2- SAIGON 15899, JAN 13, SECTION THREE OF SEVEN

AREAS AND TO DENY HIM ACCESS TO AREAS OF HIGH POPULATION DENSITY AND CONCENTRATED RESOURCES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, US/FWMAF FORCES ASSISTED THE GVN IN IMPROVING ITS FORCES AND IN PROVIDING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH TO BUILD A NATION.

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A. 1967 CAMPAIGN GOALS: SINCE JAN 1967 LOSSES HAVE BEEN INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY AT A RATE WHICH EXCEEDS HIS INPUT OF PERSONNEL. KNOWN AND ESTIMATED INPUT THROUGH INFILTRATION AND IN-COUNTRY RECRUITING HAS AVERAGED ABOUT 9500 PER MONTH WHILE THE KNOWN LOSSES HAVE AVERAGED ABOUT 12,000 MEN PER MONTH; 16 OF THE 41 PRIORITY VC/NVA IN-COUNTRY BASE AREAS ARE NEUTRALIZED AND 11 PARTIALLY NEUTRALIZED. ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY CRITERIA, 99.7 PERCENT OF THE ROADS ESSENTIAL TO FREINDLY MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE OPEN AND 68.9 PERCENT ARE SECURE; 37.5 PERCENT OF

RAILROADS ARE OPEN WITH 31 PERCENT SECURE; ALL RAILROADS IN THE NATIONAL PRIORITY PACIFICATION AREAS OF II AND II CORPS ARE SECURE; 92 PERCENT OF THE WATERWAYS IN THE NATIONAL PACIFICATION PRIORITY AREAS OF III AND IV CORPS ARE OPEN AND 47 PERCENT ARE SECURE.

B. NATIONAL ELECTION: THE COORDINATED SECURITY SCREEN PROVIDED BY VN POLICE/RVNAF/US/FWMAF FORESTALLED ALL MAJOR ASSAULTS AND RESTRICTED THE ACTIVITIES OF THE VC/NVA DURING THIS CRUCIAL PERIOD, THEREBY PERMITTING A RECORD 83 PERCENT OF THE ELIGIBLE VOTERS TO CAST THEIR BALLOTS ON SEPT 3.

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C. IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF: DURING 1967 MAJOR GAINS WERE ACHIEVED IN MANY AREAS INCLUDING: 1) IMPROVED LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING BY NEW TRAINING COURSES AND TECHNIQUES, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL DEFENSE COLLEGE; 2) ENHANCED MOTIVATION AND MORALE BY IMPROVEMENT OF THE GARRISON RATION, FREE OPERATIONAL RATION IN THE FIELD, INCREASED HOUSING, ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARVN COMMISSARY, PAYMENT OF A RICE ALLOWANCE TO EACH SERVICEMAN AND HIS DEPENDENTS, AND PF PAY INCREASE; 3) EQUIPMENT MODERNIZATION BY ISSUANCE OF NEW EQUIPMENT TO SELECTED UNITS (INCLUDING 19,317 M16 RIFLES) AND IMPROVEMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS IN ARVN MANEUVER BATTALIONS AND RF/PF. TWO MAJOR PROGRAMS, THE MILITARY TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, VIETNAM, AND THE SIGNAL MODERNIZATION PLAN, ACCOUNTED FOR AN OVERALL 90 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE RVNAF COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY DURING 1967.

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OTHER SIGNIFICANT PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE REORGANIZATION OF RVNAF AND THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMMAND, CONTROL AND SUPPORT IN THE RF/PF WERE INITIATED DURING THE YEAR.

D. RVNAF ACHIEVEMENTS: A REVIEW OF RVNAF OPERATIONS AND RESULTS ACHIEVED REFLECT A NOTABLE INCREASE IN MORALE, CONFIDENCE AND AGGRESSIVENESS. DESERTIONS DURING THE FIRST ELEVEN MONTHS OF

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1967 WERE APPROXIMATELY 32 PERCENT LOWER THAN DURING THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR, WHILE THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IS DOWN ABOUT 41 PERCENT FROM LAST YEAR. ARVN AND RF/PF UNITS ARE SHOWING AN INCREASING WILLINGNESS TO STAND AND FIGHT IT OUT WITH THE ENEMY, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH US/FWMAF FORCES. LIKEWISE, THE VNN AND THE VNAF CONTINUE TO SHOW STEADY IMPROVEMENT. THE VNN HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED ITS MARKET TIME OPERATIONS AND THE VNAF, WITH 16.5 PERCENT OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN-COUNTRY, ACCOUNTED FOR APPROXIMATELY 18 PERCENT OF ALL TACTICAL SORTIES FLOWN.

E. LOGISTICAL BASE: AN ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL BASE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. EMPHASIS IS NOW SHIFTING TOWARD MAKING THE U.S. SYSTEM MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT AND TOWARD IMPROVING THE RVNAF LOGISTICS SYSTEM. ADJUSTMENT IN CONSTRUCTION OF BASE AND SERVICE SUPPORT STRUCTURE WERE MADE TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.

21. ASSESSMENT - A YEAR OF PROGRESS: AT THE END OF 1967, THE MILITARY INITIATIVE CLEARLY RESTS WITH GVN/US/FWMAF FORCES. THE ENEMY WAS THWARTED IN EVERY SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENT AND HE HAS NOT WON A MAJOR BATTLE IN MORE THAN A YEAR. IN GENERAL, HE

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IS FIGHTING HIS LARGE FORCES ONLY AT THE EDGES OF HIS SANCTUARIES. EVEN HERE, FRIENDLY FORCES, THROUGH SUPERIOR MOBILITY AND FIREPOWER, MAINTAIN CONSTANT PRESSURE ON THE ENEMY. THE IMPROVED MILITARY SITUATION IS BEGINNING TO PAY DIVIDENDS IN THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. AS THE ENEMY'S COERCIVE CONTROL OVER THE PEOPLE IS FURTHER LOOSENED, THESE DIVIDENDS ARE EXPECTED TO INCREASE. THE IMPROVEMENT OF RVNAF WAS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED IN 1967. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE

TO REINFORCE SUCCESSSES AND TO INTENSIFY THESE IMPROVEMENTS DURING 1968.

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D. PACIFICATION

22. MORE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION WAS GIVEN, MORE WAS SAID ABOUT, AND MORE WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN PACIFICATION DURING 1967 THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. IT WAS A YEAR OF FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE PACIFICATION FRONT, THOUGH LESS PRODUCTIVE THAN WE HAD HOPED. THE REORGANIZED CIVIL/MILITARY TEAM UNDER GEN WESTMORELAND, WITH BOB KOMER AS HIS DEPUTY, HAS WORKED OUT EVEN BETTER THAN EXPECTED. BUT PACIFICATION BY ITS NATURE HAS TO BE LARGELY A VIETNAMESE ENTERPRISE, AND VIETNAMESE PERFORMANCE--THOUGH BETTER--STILL LEAVES MUCH TO BE DESIRED. THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, STARTING WITH LOCAL ELECTIONS IN THE SPRING AND ENDING WITH THE LOWER HOUSE ELECTION IN OCT, DIVERTED GVN ENERGIES TO SOME EXTENT. EVEN SO, ALL KEY TRENDS ARE UP OVER A YEAR AGO, AND WE HAVE LAID A SOLID FOUNDATION

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FOR YET A BETTER PERFORMANCE IN 1968.

23. PACIFICATION IS TOUGH TO MEASURE--ITS SOMETHING THAT ONE JUDGES BY FEEL, LIKE POLITICS, PERHAPS THE BEST WAY IS TO LOOK AT IN TERMS OF HOW KEY PROGRAMS ARE FARING. BOB KOMER PUT SPECIAL EMPHASES ON THESE VIA HIS PROJECT TAKOFF.

24. OUR BEST MEASURE OF PACIFICATION PROGRESS, THE NEW HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM INSTALLED IN JAN 67, SHOWS A MODEST INCREASE IN SECURE HAMLETS DURING 1967, BUT A MUCH MORE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE POPULATION IN RELATIVELY SECURE AREAS. YEAR-END REPORTS ON 12,722 HAMLETS SHOW

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11,510,000 PEOPLE (67 PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION INCLUDING URBAN AREAS) LIVING UNDER RELATIVELY GOOD GVN PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENTAL CONDITIONS. THIS IS AN INCREASE OF 1,323,000 PEOPLE IN THE "SECURE" CATEGORY SINCE END-JAN 1967, WHEN ONLY 62PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WAS CONSIDERED SECURE. DURING THE SAME PERIOD VC-DOMINATED POPULATION DECREASED 315,200 TO 17PERCENT OF THE TOTAL POPULATION. HOWEVER, HAMLET SECURITY SCORES SHOW THAT A NET OF ONLY 268 MORE HAMLETS (CONTAINING ABOUT 300,000 PEOPLE) ARE IN THE SECURE CATEGORY TODAY THAN 11 MONTHS AGO, THOUGH A LARGER NUMBER WERE UPGRADED FROM VC TO "CONTESTED". THIS SUGGESTS

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THAT EXPANSION OF LOCAL SECURITY HAS LAGGED BEHIND SUCH FACTORS AS BETTER LOCAL GOVERNMENT, MORE HAMLET SCHOOLS, IMPROVED MEDICAL CARE, A GREATER NUMBER OF LOCAL SELF-HELP PROJECTS. MOST OF THE INCREASE IN POPULATION LIVING UNDER GVN PROTECTION REPRESENTS MOVEMENT INTO ALREADY SECURE AREAS. MOREOVER, SINCE MANY MORE THAN 268 RD HAMLETS WERE UPGRADED INTO THE "SECURE " CATEGORY, THIS WAS OFFSET BY REGRESSION IN OTHER ALREADY SECURE HAMLETS. HENCE WE ARE GOING TO MOUNT A SPECIAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST SUCH REGRESSION IN 68.

25. ATTACK ON THE INFRASTRUCTURE. SINCE LITTLE HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN ERODING THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF COORDINATED GVN EFFORT, WE CHOSE THIS AS ANOTHER TOP-PRIORITY TASK. TO INFLUENCE BY EXAMPLE, WE FIRST SET UP A UNIFIED MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ON THE US SIDE. OPERATING AT DISTRICT AND PROVINCE LEVEL, WE CONVINCED THE VIETNAMESE TO FOLLOW SUIT. AS A RESULT, 103 DISTRICT CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED TO TIE TOGETHER INTELLIGENCE AND EXPLOITATION FORCES DOWN AT THE CUTTING EDGE. THE IN DEC WE FINALLY GOT THE GVN TO INITIATE A LONG SOUGHT AFTER NATIONAL PROGRAM, WHICH IT CALLS PHOENIX. THE NATIONAL POLICE WILL HAVE THE CHIEF LABORING OAR, BUT ALL GVA AGENCIES WILL COOPERATE IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE VC

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INFRASTRUCTURE. WE HAVE DESIGNED A NEW REPORTING SYSTEM. FOUR NEW FIELD COURTS ARE OPERATING TO TRY SUSPECTS. PLANS HAVE BEEN DRAWN UP FOR MORE THAN 12,000 ADDITIONAL DETENTION CENTER SPACES TO HANDLE CONVICTED INFRASTRUCTURE MEMBERS. THERE SHOULD BE AN INCREASING PAYOFF IN 68.

26. NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES DURING 1967, PARTICULARLY AFTER WE SINGLED OUT POLICE AS A TOP PRIORITY. BY 31 DEC NP STRENGTH STOOD AT 70,571, MUCH OF THE INCREASE BEING IN RURAL AREAS. THE POLICE FIELD FORCE (NOW SOME 12,000 MEN) HAS BEEN RETARGETED AGAINST THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE TO FILL A CRITICAL VOID. RESOURCE DENIAL, WHICH FORMERLY HURT THE ECONOMY MORE THAN IT RESTRICTED THE ENEMY, IS BEING REDIRECTED TO CONTESTED AREAS. IN SAIGON, WHERE TERRORIST CELLS HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY SEARCHED POLICE PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN EXCELLENT.

27. THE WORK OF RD TEAMS. THOUGH OFTEN INCORRECTLY REGARDED AS THE WHOLE OF PACIFICATION, EXPANDED AND IMPROVED DURING 1967. THANG'S ENERGY AND LEADERSHIP, TOGETHER WITH VUNG TAU MOTIVATIONAL TRAINING, CONTRIBUTED TO STRENGTHENING THIS RELATIVELY NEW PROGRAM WHICH YOU HELPED LAUNCH AT HONOLULU. IN 1967, FOR THE FIRST TIME, MOST OF THE RD TEAMS IN THE FIELD WERE VUNG TAU-TRAINED. THE NUMBER OF TEAMS INCREASED

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FROM 420 TO 555, AVERAGE STRENGTH PER TEAM WENT UP, AND THE HIGH RATE OF ATTRITION (PARTLY BECAUSE OF INTENSIFIED VC PRESSURE AGAINST RD AREAS) DECLINED. THOUGH IT IS STILL TOO HIGH. MONTAGNARD CADRE TEAMS, FOR USE IN THE HIGHLANDS, INCREASED FROM 84 TO 120. ABOUT FORTY SPECIAL CIVIL-MILITARY TEAMS, MADE UP OF AN RF/PF PLATOON AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, ROUNDED OUT THE EFFORT. THANG SHOULD COME TO CLOSE TO HIS 1967 GOAL OF PACIFYING AT LEAST 1000 HAMLETS BY THE END OF JAN AT TET, BECAUSE WE ALREADY CARRY 910 OF THESE HAMLETS IN THE "SECURE" CATEGORY. THIS IS A VAST IMPROVEMENT OVER THE 1966 RD PERFORMANCE.
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28. SUSTAINED LOCAL SECURITY, THE KEY TO PACIFICATION, BECAME A TOP-PRIORITY EFFORT IN 1967. CARRYING OUT ITS MANILA PLEDGE, GVN MARKEDLY INCREASED ITS MILITARY ASSETS DEVOTED TO TERRITORIAL SECURITY. IN 1967, 54 ARVN BATTALIONS WERE ASSIGNED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO DIRECT SUPPORT OF RD-TO MAKE UP FOR INADEQUATE NUMB OF RF/PF. BY THE END OF THE YEAR THEY HAD BEEN JOINED BY 213 RF COMPANIES AND 753 PF PLATOONS. ALL THESE WERE ORGANIZED FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO "RD CAMPAIGNS" TO INTEGRATE PACIFICATION RESOURCES IN PRIORITY "GIL SPOT" AREAS UNDER A SINGLE COMMANDER. MEANWHILE MACV HAS BEEN PRESSING A MAJOR RF/PF IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, WHICH INCLUDES BEEFING UP ADVISORS SERVING IN THE FIELD

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WITH SMALL RF/PF UNITS. IMPROVED RF/PF KILL AND WEAPONS CAPTURED RATIOS ATTEST TO IMPROVEMENTS MADE. BUT THERE ARE STILL CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND MOTIVATION. WE HAVE BEEN COUNTING ON THE PROMISING RVNAF RE-ORGANIZATION, WHICH MADE THANG RF/PF COMMANDER, TO HELP ON THIS SCORE, BUT IT IS NOT YET OFF THE GROUND.

29. REFUGEE CARE ALSO RECEIVED TOP PRIORITY FROM THE NEW INTEGRATED CIVIL/MILITARY PACIFICATION TEAM UNDER MACV. THE NEW GVN MINISTRY HANDLING REFUGEES ALSO GREW IN STRENGTH AND PERFORMANCE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, PARTLY THE RESULT OF DOUBLING THE NUMBER OF US ADVISORS. BOTH AS A RESULT OF MANY FEWER REFUGEES (ABOUT HALF AS MANY AS 1966) AND GREATLY INCREASED CAPABILITIES TO CARE FOR THEM, REFUGEE HANDLING MARKEDLY IMPROVED.

E. AID PROGRAMS

30. THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC PROGRESS, TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICE TO THE VIET-

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NAMESE PEOPLE, AND TO INVOLVE THE PEOPLE OF VIET-NAM IN THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONHOOD WERE REWARDED WITH MEASURABLE SUCCESS IN 1967.

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31. THE SITUATION AT THE CLOSE OF 1967 CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THAT OF A YEAR AGO. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF THE LARGE-SCALE IMPORT PROGRAM DESIGNED TO COMBAT INFLATION WERE THREATENED BY CONGESTION IN THE PORT OF SAIGON. THE CAPACITIES OF CVN CIVILIAN AGENCIES WERE SEVERELY STRAINED BY ATTEMPTS TO CARRY OUT TRADITIONAL TASKS AND, IN ADDITION TO THEM, MANY NEW PROGRAMS NECESSITATED BY THE WAR. THE RESTORATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS WAS ONLY A PLAN.

32. BY THE END OF 1967, THE PORT HAD BEEN CLEARED AND WAS FUNCTIONING SMOOTHLY. THE APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENT HAD BEGUN TO CARRY BETTER THE HEAVY WORKLOAD IMPOSED BY THE REQUIREMENTS OF WAR AND THE NEED FOR IMPROVED PUBLIC SERVICE. ELECTIONS HAD BEEN HELD IN OVER HALF OF THE VILLAGES, AND VILLAGE COUNCILS WERE FUNCTIONING.

33. THE ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY AID HAS TAKEN THREE MAIN FORMS: (1) THE PROVISION OF RESOURCES ON A LARGE SCALE AND EMERGENCY BASIS TO KEEP THE ECONOMY STABLE AND TO AFFORD RELIEF FROM OTHER BURDENS OF THE WAR; (2) SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE GOVERN-

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MENT ADMINISTRATION DESPITE THE WAR; AND (3) ADVISORY ASSISTANCE PLANNING FOR THE PEACE AHEAD. IN ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES, THE ROLE OF USAID HAS BEEN ONE OF ASSISTING AND ENHANCING THE EFFORTS OF THE VIETNAMESE.

34. SUMMARIZED BELOW ARE SOME OF THE SPECIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE VIETNAMESE IN WHICH USAID HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE IN 1967. THEY INCLUDE:

35. INCREASED PRICES FOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, AIDING THE STIMULATION OF AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY AND CREATING GREATER PROSPERITY IN RURAL AREAS.

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36. EXPANSION OF INDUSTRY, INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCING TEXTILES, ELECTRIC WIRE, ASBESTOS, CEMENT, CHEMICALS, PHARMACEUTICALS, PAPER, GLAYS, PLASTICS, AND ANIMAL FOOD PRODUCTS.

37. AN IMPROVED POWER SYSTEM FOR THE CITY OF SAIGON. THE ANNUAL SYSTEM PEAK OF 188,000 KW OCCURRED IN DECEMBER IN COMPARISON TO A 1966 PEAK DEMAND OF 94,000 KW.

38. INCREASED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, THROUGH GREATER USE OF FERTILIZER, PESTICIDES, IRRIGATION FOR CROPS, VACCINES FOR

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LIVESTOCK, AND THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW RICE VARIETIES. ESTIMATES ARE THAT THESE EFFORTS WILL ALLOW VIET-NAM TO INCREASE RICE PRODUCTION BY 50 PERCENT IN THREE YEARS.

39. INCREASE IN THE CREDIT EXTENDED TO FARMERS AND AGRICULTURAL BUSINESSMEN. IN 1967 THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK LENT 1.5 BILLION PIASTERS TO MORE THAN 100,000 FARMERS WHICH WAS OVER THREE TIMES THE NUMBER OF LOANS MADE BY THE COMPARABLE ORGANIZATION IN 1966 AND OVER FOUR TIMES THE AMOUNT LOANED.

40. EXPANSION OF EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES AND TEACHER TRAINING TO THE POINT WHERE ALMOST 75 PERCENT OF ALL PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN AND 15 PERCENT OF ALL SECONDARY SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN NOW ATTEND SCHOOL.

41. HOLDING OF ELECTIONS IN OVER 1,300 VILLAGES AND ABOUT 5,000 HAMLETS AND THE SUBSEQUENT TRAINING OF OVER 8,000 OF THE MORE THAN 15,000 ELECTED VILLAGE AND HAMLET OFFICIALS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION.

42. IMPROVEMENT OF FISCAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM, INCLUDING MORE EFFECTIVE PROCEDURES FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION AND CUSTOMS COLLECTION.

43. ESTABLISHMENT IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF A DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF CIVIL SERVICE, AND THE DRAFTING OF A NEW CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT.

44. IMPROVEMENT AND EXPANSION OF WATER, POWER, TELEPHONE, HIGHWAY, RAILROAD, CANAL, PORT, AND AIRPORT SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIET-NAM.

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7. ECONOMIC SITUATION

45. 1967 HAS BEEN A YEAR OF PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS TO MODERATE THE VIETNAMESE INFLATION AND TO BEGUN BRINGING INCREASES PROSPERITY TO THE COUNTRY SIDE. THE STABILIZATION PICTURE WAS STRIKENLY DIFFERENT IN 1967 FROM THAT OF THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. OVERALL PRICES INCREASED 34 PERCENT IN 1967. BY CONTRAST, CONSUMER PRICES ROSE 63 PERCENT IN 1966 AND 47 PERCENT IN 1965.

46. 1967 PRICE INCREASES WERE ALSO HIGHLY SELECTIVE. THROUGH NOV NON-FOOD PRICES HAD RISEN BY ONLY 13 PERCENT AND THE INCREASE IN FOOD PRICES WAS HEAVILY CONCENTRATED IN PROTEIN FOODS (MAINLY PORK AND FISH) AND RICE. RICE PRICES HAD RISEN BY 48 PERCENT BY NOV, LARGELY BECAUSE OF SPECIAL FACTORS, I.E. A POOR CROP YEAR IN 1966, AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, A SHARP INCREASE IN THE PRICE AT WHICH THE GOVERNMENT SELLS

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 15899/6 ~~SECRET~~

IMPORTED RICE AS PART OF A DELIBERATE POLICY OF MAINTAINING HIGHER DOMESTIC RICE PRICES IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE RETURN TO THE FARMER. PROTEIN FOOD (MAINLY PORK AND FISH) PRICES HAD RISEN BY 45 PERCENT BY NOV MAINLY DUE TO A RISING DEMAND AND CONTINUED SUPPLY BOTTLENECKS. OTHER FOOD PRICES AND CONSUMER DURABLE PRICES REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE.

47. THE REDUCTION IN GENERAL INFLATIONARY PRESSURE BETWEEN 1966 AND 67 WAS NOT DUE TO ANY EFFECTIVE GVN EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DEFICIT IN GOVERNMENT SPENDING. ON THE CONTRARY, BOTH US AND GVN PIASTER SPENDING CONTINUED TO RISE SHARPLY (BY APPROXIMATELY 66 AND 40 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY), GVN REVENUES ROSE AT A LESSER RATE (BY APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT) AND US SPENDING, PLUS THE GVN DEFICIT WILL TOTAL

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

17

Saturday, January 13, 1968
5:05 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the Japanese display
their anxiety at a possible unilateral
immediate U. S. move on the border tax.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



#639

IN REPLY REFER TO:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON202
ly to Fried 17c

January 13, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEMEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Border Tax

Mr. Barnett of EA received an urgent call at 11:40 this morning from the Minister of the Japanese Embassy. Foreign Minister Miki has requested Amb. Shimoda to inform the Department that the Japanese Government is strongly opposed to the U.S. Government's imposition of border tax adjustments. Miki recalled that Under Secretary Rostow had suggested that this matter be discussed by the two governments at Honolulu and also in the GATT and OECD framework. The Japanese government hopes that the U.S. Government will make no hasty decision. Miki fears that the border tax may be mentioned in the President's State of the Union message and asks that if this is done, the Japanese Government be informed in advance. Miki hopes that the border tax will not be referred to at all in the President's message.

During Mr. Eugene Rostow's discussions in Tokyo, January 3-4, Prime Minister Sato personally indicated deep anxiety over consequences for Japan of U.S. border tax. This anxiety was echoed by other ministers and officials. Request for advance notice of mention of border tax possibilities in the State of the Union message suggests that the Japanese may be readying themselves for precipitant moves if they feel that the U.S. Government is moving unilaterally.

BHR

Benjamin H. Read
Executive SecretaryLIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INFORMATION

18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, January 13, 1968
5:00 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here at last a rather full report
on what the Vietnamese are in fact
doing about land reform.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 12-26-91

Saigon 15901

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

Saturday, January 13, 1968
4:50 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will be interested, if you have not otherwise received it, in this balance sheet on bombing by the Douglas Committee.

They come out a bit tougher than the San Antonio formula.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlm

ACTION

Saturday, January 13, 1968
4:30 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Bill Gaud sums up the truly great job you did for India last year.

May I leak this to one or more of the following:

Saville Davis ✓

Carl Rowan ✓

Drew Pearson ✓

Other _____

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

20a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JAN 12 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Success of Famine Relief in India

I am happy to be able to report to you the successful completion of our famine relief efforts in eastern India. Last year at this time many knowledgeable observers on the scene were predicting possible deaths in the millions. Yet, today as we reflect upon the emergency, we see that almost all of the potential victims have been saved. The reason: the largest, the most multi-faceted and probably the most successful drought relief program in history.

Considerable assistance was received from the United States and a dozen other nations and international agencies, and major credit for this accomplishment is shared with the Indian Government. By any measure it was an unprecedented achievement of enormous proportions.

Food: Indian officials have both publicly and privately stated that American food was a decisive factor in averting disaster. The successful Indian rationing system was assisted considerably by over 6 million metric tons of U.S. PL 480 Title I grain. In addition, through a special approval by you of a \$25 million Title II emergency food program in March, U.S. voluntary agencies distributed daily meals to more than eight million Indian children. Food-for-work programs under the U.S. regular Title II program which is administered by American Voluntary Agencies (CARE, Catholic Relief Services and Church World Service/Lutheran World Relief) fed another 400,000 people.

Water: The U.S. contribution, however, went considerably beyond food. At one point it appeared as if the critical shortage of drinking water might be as damaging as the lack of food. With the help of the U.S.A.I.D. drought task force, including an AID Hydrologist and three AID well drillers, a large drilling and water program was undertaken in the drought areas. Over half a million temporary wells were dug in Bihar alone. In addition, equipment from international and voluntary agencies made possible the construction of a thousand permanent wells. Thirty-nine Peace Corps volunteers were responsible for digging some 200 of these.

Vaccines: Small pox was another serious threat. With the outbreak of several hundred cases of small pox and the threat of an epidemic, the Government of India requested our help. This was on a Saturday afternoon. By Sunday, necessary Washington approvals had been obtained and by Thursday morning 10 million doses of small pox vaccine, 26 pedo-jet injectors and four inoculation trainer/specialists were in India.

Nutrition: It was apparent at the outset that those who might suffer most from the famine were the youngsters. Accordingly, much of the U.S. effort was directed towards this vulnerable group. One special project was the development of a new low-cost high protein food known as Bal Ahar ("Child's food"), made possible by using some of the commodities shipped under the Title II program. Initial quantities of Bal Ahar were produced in time for distribution to needy Bihari children by CARE.

Reporting System: Another need which became apparent as the drought unfolded last winter was for a famine information control system. A team of four AID management specialists worked with Indian Government officials to devise a simple early warning system which helped identify priority problems. The resulting system should serve as a model for disaster relief efforts elsewhere.

Development Implications: Besides the short term effects of mitigating the consequences of the drought, our relief programs have also had long range development implications. Consideration is being given, for example, for the use of the famine reporting system as the basis for an agricultural reporting program in Bihar and other states. The production and distribution of Bal Ahar is now being planned on an all-India basis (Government of India officials speak in terms of providing Bal Ahar mid-day meals to 25 million children). The completed works projects -- the wells, the roads, the irrigation canals, the water tanks -- have increased the strength of the economic infrastructure in the drought area.

Role of Voluntary Agencies: Worth special mention is the effect the successful famine work of the U.S. voluntary agencies has had on Indian attitudes. In addition to the solely humanitarian role displayed in the past by voluntary agencies there is increased recognition of the broader developmental contributions which can be made. In a recent pamphlet "Beyond the Famine" the Prime Minister's Press Secretary, Mr. G.B. Verghese, reflected this: "The special role that voluntary bodies can play in development is as pathfinders and pace-setters. So many of the problems facing the country are novel and complex and cannot be tackled satisfactorily by conventional methods. There is need for experimentation and unorthodox approaches. Once established, it would be easier for Government to take over or adapt these procedures. They (the voluntary agencies) can... destroy the ancient myths of what can and cannot be done in India".

The work of the AID team in India and the work of the U.S. voluntary agencies represent a success story of which all Americans can be proud. Their efforts reflected the best that America stands for -- compassion and hard work under extremely trying circumstances.

Consideration might be given to special and appropriate White House mention of these achievements, especially of the U.S. voluntary agencies -- CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World Service/ Lutheran World Relief. Their work represents many small individual contributions by millions of Americans. It was money well spent -- and a success story worth telling.

/s/ WSG

William S. Gaud

INFORMATION

21

SECRET

**Saturday, January 13, 1968
4:15 p.m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith Bob McNamara
reports why we can't meet the
90 day target on the Thai division.**

Free file

W. W. Rostow

~~**SECRET**~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 1/8, NARA, Date 12/26/91

~~SECRET~~

198

21a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

12 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Equipping, Training, and Deploying Royal Thai Army Expeditionary Division to South Vietnam

During your Canberra discussions with Prime Minister Thanom, you stressed the importance of the earliest possible deployment to Vietnam of the additional Thai forces. Thanom agreed and we understood him to guarantee the deployment would be completed in a maximum of 90 days from the receipt in Thailand of the necessary equipment. Subsequently, Embassy Bangkok reported that the Prime Minister's thinking was that 90 days was a minimum period.

Meanwhile, we requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to undertake on an urgent basis an analysis of our current timetable for providing the human and material resources needed to train the Thai force to determine the feasibility of accelerating its deployment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the presently planned training cycle is estimated to be the minimum time required to produce a Thai force capable of accomplishing the specified mission in the Vietnam area of employment without accepting unnecessary risk. Urgency, consistent insofar as possible with sound military practices, was a controlling consideration in the development of the present training plan. ~~I agree with the JCS view that the current timetable provides for the most practicable deployment of the Thai Division.~~

~~As it now stands, the first of the two increments comprising the Division will begin training on 8 January and will deploy to Vietnam starting 15 July. This schedule would give the Thai force, composed mainly of green troops, a maximum of about 180 days training, in contrast to a U.S. Division which normally receives nine to twelve months preparation. Moreover, the latter is formed around a solid cadre of experienced professional personnel, whereas the opposite is true in the Thai case. As a matter of interest, current legislation precludes assignment of any U.S. Servicemen to duty on land outside of the United States until he has completed a minimum of 120 days training.~~

~~With respect to the delivery of equipment, maximum use is being made of material already prepositioned in country. Items not on hand will be airlifted. The Department of the Army has assigned a priority for the Thai Division equal to U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam. In short, equipment is and will be provided just as soon as the training schedule permits the Thai to absorb it.~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Group 4
By 18, NARA, Date 12-26-91

GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals;
Declassified after 12 years.
DCD Dir. 6200.10

~~SECRET~~


0208

Sec Def Cent Nr. X-_____

~~SECRET~~

We have also investigated the possibility of completing the training cycle of elements of the first increment in South Vietnam, which would mean the arrival of the elements in June instead of July. ~~It is the judgment of General Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this course of action is militarily undesirable.~~ If elements of the Division arrive before they are capable of combat, they would require a protective force which would be a drain on COMUSMACV's resources. There would also be the danger of their sustaining an early defeat which could negate the political significance of their presence.

The Department of Defense will continue to take all those actions needed to secure the earliest practicable deployment of this force. I will give this matter my personal attention.



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

By lg, NARA, Date 1-17-92
Pres file

January 13, 1967

*sent to Ranch
CAP 80342*

FROM: WALT ROSTOW

WFO: George Christian

New York Times story this morning reports that you promised Eshkol a few more Skyhawks, but that no commitment was made on Phantoms. It is a moderately written and fairly accurate story. In my view, this is probably as good a way to have these facts come out as we could expect. In fact, we had already planned to come to you for approval to do some backgrounding to achieve this result.

cleared with Evron

If you approve, State would like to use the following language in answer to questions this afternoon:

Prime Minister Eshkol's

The joint statement issued at the end of ~~the~~ visit makes clear our continued interest in Israel's security. In this spirit, we are continuing the delivery of planes under a 1966 agreement and in light of deliveries to other states in the area since the June war have agreed to an extension of the 1966 agreement in order to provide a limited number of additional planes of the same type to Israel. For the immediate future, we are convinced that Israel's military situation gives us time to consider further a decision on F-4 Phantoms, which Israel also wants. We want ^{to use} that time to explore further the opportunity for arms limitation in the area and to work for the success of the Jarring mission. Peace was the first order of business in our talks with Prime Minister Eshkol and the search for peace has top priority in our present efforts. What we do about Israel's request for more aircraft will depend on developments in the area in the coming months, including the arms supply policy of others and the progress made toward a peaceful settlement.

If asked whether lead times require a decision soon, State would say that we have examined this question and concluded that lead time is not a

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

problem that cannot be handled. Beyond that, we would refuse to discuss details.

The Times story also says we have informed Jordan we would relax our ban on arms sales. This has attracted less attention, so our spokesmen will not have to deal with it today. We would plan early next week, after informing key Congressional leaders, to say in response to questions that we decided at the beginning of January to include Jordan among those countries for whom we would make limited exceptions to our arms freeze and that we are studying requests from Jordan.

Approve guidance on Israeli story_____

Call me _____

Approve your proposed course on Jordan_____

Call me_____

See 8.08

ZEV

1968 JAN 13 01 05

Pres file

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OO WIE 12
DE WIE 368

SECRET

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP88319

68 JAN 12 PM 8:22

FRIDAY

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

HEREWITH SEC. RUSK FILES SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA FOR THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE.

THE DRAFT I SENT THIS MORNING HAS THE SIMPLE STATEMENT: "WHAT I SAID AT SAN ANTONIO STILL HOLDS."

WE DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THINGS WILL LOOK LIKE AT THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK; BUT I DOUBT THAT WE WANT TO GO INTO ELABORATE RESTATEMENTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I LIKE SOME OF SEC. RUSK'S GOOD, ROUSING RHETORIC ABOUT WHAT PEACE MEANS; AND, CLEARLY, OUR NUMBER ONE JOB AT THE MOMENT IS TO STABILIZE THE UNEASY SITUATION INSIDE SOUTH VIETNAM.

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY RUSK

I BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT THE STATE OF THE UNION BE CONSISTENT WITH THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA. IT WENT AS FAR AS ANYONE CAN REASONABLY AND FAIRLY GO IN THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. IN THE OTHER DIRECTION, WERE WE TO DRAW BACK FROM IT WE WOULD BE CHARGED WITH RETREATING TO A MORE BELLIGERENT POSITION IN THE FACE OF AN ALLEGED "PEACE MOVE" BY HANOI. I KNOW THIS IS YOUR OWN VIEW. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE OF SOME USE BUT WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REVIEW WHAT IS SAID IN THE STATE OF THE UNION ABOUT VIET-NAM IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE WEEK END, INCLUDING BUNKER'S PROBLEM IN SAIGON.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

"IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OUR ARMED FORCES ARE ACTING WITH GREAT GALLANTRY AND PROFESSIONAL SKILL TO MEET OUR COMMITMENTS AND TO ACHIEVE A MORE RELIABLE PEACE IN THE AREA. THEY DESERVE AND WILL GET OUR FULL SUPPORT. THE JOB THEY ARE DOING EARNS THE GRATITUDE OF EVERY AMERICAN AND OF THOSE ASIANS WHO ARE LIVING AT THE POINT OF DANGER.

"OUR WAR AIM IS PEACE. WE KNOW THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IF THE SMALLER NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ARE OVERRUN BY FORCE. WE KNOW THERE CAN BE NO PEACE IF THOSE TO WHOM WE ARE COMMITTED BY TREATY ARE TO BE ABANDONED AT THE MOMENT OF PERIL. WE KNOW THAT THE SAFETY OF MANY NATIONS DEPENDS UPON THE FIDELITY OF THE UNITED STATES. WE KNOW THAT WE ENTER INTO OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS AS A MATTER OF OUR OWN MOST VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

"IN SEPTEMBER I SAID IN SAN ANTONIO: 'THE UNITED STATES IS WILLING TO STOP ALL AERIAL AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OF NORTH VIET-NAM WHEN THIS WILL LEAD PROMPTLY TO PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS. WE, OF COURSE, ASSUME THAT WHILE DISCUSSIONS PROCEED, NORTH VIET-NAM WOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE BOMBING CESSATION OR LIMITATION.' CAN THERE BY ANY OFFER MORE REASONABLE AND FAIR? IF THERE IS ANY INTEREST IN PEACE ON THE OTHER SIDE, DOES THIS OFFER NOT OPEN AN HONORABLE DOOR?

"LET US ASK OURSELVES WHAT PEACE MEANS TO THE NATIONS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. SURELY IT MEANS THAT EACH SHALL BE FREE TO DETERMINE ITS OWN FUTURE IN ITS OWN WAY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WISHES OF ITS OWN PEOPLE. SURELY IT MEANS THAT EVERYONE LEAVE LAOS TO THE LAOTIANS AS REQUIRED BY THE ACCORDS OF 1962. SURELY IT MEANS RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORY AND NEUTRALITY OF CAMBODIA. SURELY IT MEANS THAT ARMS AND AGENTS NOT BE SENT INTO THAILAND OR BURMA TO IMPOSE AN ALIEN SYSTEM UPON THEIR PEOPLES. SURELY IT MEANS THAT ALL THE BOMBING STAND DOWN -- THE BOMBS THAT ARE CARRIED BY AIRPLANE OR BY HAND OR BICYCLE AND THE MINES WHICH DESTROY CIVILIAN BUSES.

"THERE IS NO MYSTERY ABOUT PEACE AND NO NEED FOR THE CYNICAL OR FAINTHEARTED TO COMPLICATE IT BY WEAVING COBWEBS OF SOPHISTRY AROUND IT. CONGRESS HAS DECLARED THAT 'THE UNITED STATES REGARDS AS VITAL TO ITS NATIONAL INTEREST AND TO WORLD PEACE THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.' WE SHALL MAKE PEACE JUST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. BUT WE SHALL NOT SURRENDER ANOTHER PEOPLE AND CALL IT PEACE. THE VIOLENCE CAN STOP WHEN ALL THE VIOLENCE STOPS. MAY THAT DAY COME SOON. BUT UNTIL THAT DAY COMES, WE SHALL DO OUR DUTY.

AT ARLINGTON AND RUNNYMEDE, THERE ARE ENGRAVED IN STONE THE FOLLOWING WORDS OF OUR BELOVED PRESIDENT KENNEDY: 'LET EVERY NATION KNOW, WHETHER IT WISHES US WELL OR ILL, THAT WE SHALL PAY ANY PRICE, BEAR ANY BURDEN, MEET ANY HARDSHIP, SUPPORT ANY FRIEND, OPPOSE ANY FOE, TO ASSURE THE SURVIVAL AND THE SUCCESS OF LIBERTY.'

DTG: 12239Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

Jan 2 18 PM

Free file

1968 JAN 13 19 16

68 JAN 13 PM 2:33

SATURDAY

EEA 186
PP WTE 18
DE WTE 384

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: WH89341

UNCLAS

JANUARY 13, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

SINCE SENDING YOU BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR YOUR MONDAY
JANUARY 15 MEETING WITH HAROLD MACMILLIAN WE HAVE RECEIVED
REPORT THAT SPEAKING IN CHICAGO ON JANUARY 12, HE EXPRESSED
HIS "REGRET THAT THE PRESENT BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS SYMPATHY
BUT NO ACTIVE HELP" FOR THE U. S. IN VIETNAM.

DTG: 13/1848Z JAN 68

*Pres file
sent Ranch
WH 80 340*

January 13, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I see that on AP 59 Lyman Kirkpatrick's book on the CIA has surfaced. Kirkpatrick will be appearing on the TODAY show on January 17.

Dick Helms tells me that he hopes, at least, the book will not be damaging.

Kirkpatrick was with the CIA for a long time and was its Inspector General after being immobilized by infantile paralysis.

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENT 1:32 P.M.

1968 JAN 13 12 22

EEA103
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 380

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80337

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 13, 1968

1968 JAN 13 PM 1:41

SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOV
FOR THE PRESIDENT

BUS WHEELER ASKED WESTY TO COMMENT ON TWO DIFFERING VIEWS OF THE SITUATION IN THE KHE SANH AREA: (1) REACTING TO AN ENEMY ASSAULT IN THE KHE SANH AREA BY A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE INTO LAOS; (2) A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH.

HEREWITH WESTY'S COMMENTS (WITH WHICH BUS CONCURS):

QUOTE 1. I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A VISIT WITH GENERAL CUSHMAN DURING WHICH WE DISCUSSED CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR REINFORCING KHE SANH AND THE I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE. GENERAL CUSHMAN HAS TWO US MARINE BATTALIONS IN KHE SANH NOW AND CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR AUGMENTING THIS FORCE WITH AN ADDITIONAL MARINE BATTALION ON EIGHT HOUR NOTICE, FOLLOWED BY A SECOND BATTALION ON TWELVE HOUR NOTICE, AND BY MARINE SPECIAL LANDING FORCES. ADDITIONALLY, AND AS A RESULT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, I HAVE DIRECTED HIM AS A MATTER OF FIRST PRIORITY TO ALERT A BRIGADE OF THE AMERICAL DIVISION TO MOVE INTO THE HUE/PHU BAI AREA. THIS CAN BE DONE QUICKLY WITH FIXED WING OR ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

2. AS A SECOND PRIORITY WE ARE PREPARED TO REINFORCE I CORPS IN THE HUE/PHU BAI, DANANG, OR CHU LAI AREAS IN THAT PRIORITY WITH ANOTHER BRIGADE, EITHER FROM THE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION OR FROM THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4
REF. CBS-22
By 50W, NARA, Date 5-7-95

3. ADDITIONAL ACTIONS UNDER WAY INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. AS THE KOREAN MARINE BRIGADE MOVES INTO THE DANANG TACTICAL AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY, ELEMENTS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ARE BEING RELEASED FOR DEPLOYMENT NORTH OF AI-VAN PASS. THIS IN TURN IS RELEASING ELEMENTS OF THE 3RD MARINE DIVISION FOR MOVEMENT INTO QUANG TRI PROVINCE. TWO BATTALIONS OF THE KOREAN MARINE BRIGADE HAVE COMPLETED THEIR MOVEMENT AND FOUR BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION ARE NOW NORTH OF AI-VAN PASS. THIS MOVE WILL BE COMPLETED BY 31 JANUARY WITH FOUR KOREAN BATTALIONS IN THE DANANG AREA AND FIVE 1ST MARINE DIVISION BATTALIONS NORTH OF THE PASS.

B. THE VIETNAMESE JOINT GENERAL STAFF HAS AGREED TO DEPLOY A TASK FORCE OF TWO AIRBORNE BATTALIONS TO I CORPS ON OR ABOUT 15 JANUARY 1968, BRINGING TO FOUR THE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE AIRBORNE BATTALIONS IN I CORPS.

C. WE ARE DEVELOPING PRIORITY TARGETS IN OPERATION NIAGARA FOR A SUSTAINED B-52 CAMPAIGN, AUGMENTED BY TACTICAL AIR, BEGINNING NOT LATER THAN 18 JANUARY. WE PLAN TO CONCENTRATE ON TARGETS IN VIETNAM PRIOR TO TET WITH APPROXIMATELY 75 PERCENT OR MORE OF OUR TOTAL EFFORT. DURING AND FOLLOWING THE TET CEASE-FIRE, WE WILL STRIKE TARGETS IN LAOS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH OUR SUSTAINED B-52 CAMPAIGN. I AM REQUESTING (BY SEPARATE COMMUNICATION) A FURTHER STEP UP IN THE B-52 ACCELERATED PROGRAM NOW SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 20 JANUARY.

D. WE ARE ALSO REQUESTING THAT A CARRIER BE ALERTED TO BE BROUGHT IN TO AUGMENT TACTICAL AIR, AND THE PROMPT RETURN OF THE MARINE SPECIAL LANDING FORCE FOR COMMITMENT TO EITHER THE 3D OR 1ST MARINE DIVISION AREAS.

E. MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT SHIPS WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN I CORPS.

4. REGARDING VIEW (1), ABOVE, MY CONCEPT FOR OPERATIONS IN LAOS IS OUTLINE IN OPERATION EL PASO, PROPOSED FOR OCTOBER 1968. A COUNTER-OFFENSIVE INTO LAOS IS NEITHER LOGISTICALLY NOR TACTICALLY FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME. SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. TO BE EFFECTIVE, A LAOTIAN ASSAULT SHOULD BE LAUNCHED IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

B. WITH THE NORTHEAST MONSOON UPON US, LAUNCHING AND SUPPORTING THE MAGNITUDE OF FORCE ENVISIONED IS NOT WITHIN OUR CURRENT CAPABILITY. AN AIR LINE OF COMMUNICATION IS ESSENTIAL AND FLYING WEATHER IS MARGINAL. ADDITIONALLY, OUR AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT BOTH THIS CONCEPT AND AN ACCEPTABLE TACTICAL POSTURE IN OTHER THREAT AREAS AT THIS TIME.

C. WE ESTIMATE SIZABLE ENEMY FORCES TO BE IN THE TCHEPONE AREA AND TO THE NORTH THEREOF; THUS A BRIEF SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN THERE MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE.

5. REGARDING A WITHDRAWAL FROM KHE SANH, I CONSIDER THIS AREA CRITICAL TO US FROM A TACTICAL STANDPOINT AS A LAUNCH BASE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP TEAMS AND AS FLANK SECURITY FOR THE STRONG POINT OBSTACLE SYSTEM; IT IS EVEN MORE CRITICAL FROM A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEWPOINT. TO RELINQUISH THIS AREA WOULD BE A MAJOR PROPAGANDA VICTORY FOR THE ENEMY. ITS LOSS WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT VIETNAMESE AND US MORALE. IN SHORT, WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS STEP BACKWARDS.

6. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE SOME IN NON-MILITARY CIRCLES WHO FAVOR THE CONCEPT OF RETREATING INTO ENCLAVES, I MUST REITERATE THAT SUCH A STRATEGY MERELY RETURNS THE CENTER OF VIOLENCE TO THE MIDST OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE IN THE POPULATED CENTERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, A MASSIVE ASSAULT INTO LAOS IS NOT FEASIBLE IN THE NEAR TIME FRAME.

7. IN VIEW OF THE ENEMY CAPABILITY TO INITIATE A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE BEFORE TET, I WOULD PREFER TO DEFEND WITH FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND COMBAT SUPPORT AS INDICATED ABOVE. I WILL SUBMIT ADDITIONAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS SEPARATELY FOR B-52, CARRIER AND NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT. END QUOTE

W. W. ROSTOW COMMENT: I CONCLUDE THAT WESTY HAS KHE SANH ON HIS MIND AS MUCH AS WE DO.

DTG: 13/1707Z JAN 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file
CAP 80338*

With respect to offsets for Australia:

1. DOD and CINCPAC are working out a larger R & R program (which will probably come out of Japan and Hong Kong programs).
2. Secretary of Defense has approved (or is expected to approve momentarily) the purchase of \$8 million of sugar from Australia as an offset to Australian purchases in Vietnam.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-256
By no, NARA, Date 1-14-04

WWRostow:rln

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Saturday, January 13, 1968 -- 12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Henry F. Graff on Monday, January 15, 1968, 6:00 p.m., Off the Record.

Herewith talking points for the session with Dr. Henry F. Graff, of Columbia University, whom you are to see on Monday, according to Jim Jones. Dr. Graff is doing an article for the New York Times Magazine on U. S. foreign policy.

I suggest that you:

-- Emphasize that you have found the time and energy to conduct a global foreign policy despite the burdens of Vietnam;

-- Emphasize progress since 1964 with regionalism in Latin America (the Summit); Africa (your OAU speech); Asia (new Asian regional institutes and the mobilization of Japanese support for them);

-- Holding the line in support of Europe despite de Gaulle;

-- Limited progress with the Soviet Union despite Vietnam: consular treaty; space treaty; air agreement; NPT; Glassboro; hot line; etc.

-- Global progress on trade, money, water, satellite communications, food policy, population policy, education;

-- Emphasize underlying confidence that the world is turning away from radical extremism towards more practical, moderate men concerned with human welfare: the future does not lie with Castro, Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Nasser, Sukarno, Ho and Mao;

-- Finally, underline that while everyone's eyes are fastened on Vietnam, you have been building the structure of world arrangements of partnership which will gradually permit the U. S. to reduce its burdens in the world while not withdrawing into dangerous isolationism. You would like to see a world in which we play our part as an essential junior partner to strong regional groupings in Latin America, Africa, Asia, Europe and -- hopefully -- the Middle East.

WWRostow:rlm

W. W. Rostow

Sent 8:44

VZCZCEEA088
OO WTE10
DE WTE 367

1968 JAN 13 01 44

FROM VALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80326

Free file
FRIDAY
68 JAN 12 PM 9:02

UNCLAS

JANUARY 12, 1968

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER
MACMILLAN; 1:00 P.M., MONDAY, JANUARY 15

YOU LAST MET MR. MACMILLAN AT THE FUNERAL OF KONRAD
ADENAUER IN APRIL 1967.

MR. MACMILLAN WILL BE IN THE UNITED STATES FROM JANUARY 11
TO JANUARY 17 TO VISIT OLD FRIENDS AND TO PROMOTE THE SALE
OF VOLUME II OF HIS MEMOIRES "THE BLAST OF WAR 1939-45". HE
WILL VISIT NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON AND HIS MOTHER'S BIRTH-
PLACE, SPENCER, INDIANA. HE WILL BE ADDRESSING VARIOUS
UNIVERSITY AND LITERARY GROUPS.

MR. MACMILLAN HAS GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM PUBLIC STATE-
MENTS SINCE HE RETIRED IN 1963, SPENDING MOST OF HIS TIME
WRITING AND HELPING MANAGE THE FAMILY PUBLISHING BUSINESS.

SPEAKING AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY ON JANUARY 11, WHERE HE
RECEIVED AN HONORARY DOCTOR OF LAW'S DEGREE, MACMILLAN URGED
THE U.S. TO ENTER INTO "GENUINE DISCUSSIONS" WITH THE USSR
LEADING TO "COOPERATION" IN WORLD AFFAIRS.

YOU MAY WISH TO HEAR MACMILLAN'S VIEWS ON:

1. THE PRESENT STATE OF BRITISH POLITICS;
2. THE BRITISH PULL-OUT OF SUEZ;
3. BRITISH ECONOMIC PROSPECTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD;
4. ANY CONCRETE THOUGHTS HE MAY HAVE ON U.S.-SOVIET
"COOPERATION."

I REALLY DON'T KNOW HOW CLOSELY HE IS ACTUALLY FOLLOWING
POLITICAL EVENTS; AND YOU MAY, THEREFORE, WISH TO FEEL YOUR
WAY BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND POLITE BUT UNSUBSTANTIVE TALK.

DTG: 122357Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 1-5-01

30
Pres. file
CAP 80335

I had yesterday one of the most cheering meetings in the last year. It was with Mr. Chandrasekhar, Minister of Family Planning in India. He is a vigorous man in his 40's who is really driving ahead on family planning in India. He reports that in certain provinces the birth rate has already begun to decline. More than that, he is beginning to get a response from the people like the response which took hold on chemical fertilizers a few years ago. He is also going to take in hand in his Ministry the question of producing and distributing cheap protein for the children.

We got on so well that I raised with him rather bluntly the problem that George Woods and we have in interesting Congress and Europeans on aid to India because of India's sluggishness on moving forward with Pakistan towards normal relations and in reducing its military budget. He said Mrs. Gandhi and the government are conscious that this is an excellent time to move with Ayub. I underlined that the Paks had lowered their military budget by 3% and India ought also to move in this direction. Above all, I told him that the world needed to know about India's family planning progress so that they could begin to see light at the end of the tunnel. He said he would make available statistics to me.

He had lunch with Fulbright and Greening.

I shall make sure that AID, with whom he has been talking, gets behind his program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

He said that due to excellent winter rains, the harvest will be about 100 million tons and there is a good chance they will be able to have enough to bring down the barriers between the states.

Incidentally, he reported that your message from Air Force One "greatly moved" the whole Indian cabinet. He quoted from it verbatim.

The interview reinforces the case for a strong passage on family planning in your State of the Union message.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31

Friday, January 12, 1968 -- 12:30 PM

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

sent back via wire

Following, for your approval, are proposed condolence messages on the death of South African President-elect Dongs.

WH 803/6

Dongs had been ill for several months and never took office.

These are routine condolences. I recommend you approve.

BEGIN TEXT: 1

Dear Mrs. Dongs:

I was very saddened to learn of the death of your distinguished husband. You and the members of your family have my sincere sympathy.

Sincerely,

BEGIN TEXT : (2 To Acting State President Naude

Dear Mr. Naude:

I wish to express to you and to the people of the Republic of South Africa my condolences on the death of President-elect T. E. Dongs. My thoughts and those of my countrymen are with you in this time of sorrow.

Sincerely,

END MESSAGE.

Pres file

EKH/RPM/vmr

CONFIDENTIAL

1968 JAN 12 21 14

VZCZCEEA078
OO WIE10
DE WIE 355

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80315

Pres file

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

SUBJECT: A NATO MULTINATIONAL NAVAL FORCE: GOOD NEWS.

1. ON SATURDAY, 13 JANUARY, THE NATO STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC WILL BE ACTIVATED IN PORTLAND, ENGLAND. THIS FORCE, INITIALLY COMPOSED OF DESTROYER TYPE SHIPS FROM THE UK, NORWAY, THE NETHERLANDS, AND THE U.S., WILL LATER HAVE SHIPS JOIN IT FROM GERMANY AND CANADA. THIS WILL BE A HISTORICAL MOMENT IN THE HISTORY OF NATO. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE NATO ALLIANCE WILL HAVE AN OPERATIONAL FORCE IN PEACETIME, ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS, THAT CAN BE USED IN CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC. DURING THE EIGHTEEN YEARS SINCE THE CREATION OF NATO, OBTAINING AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH SUCH A FORCE HAD BEEN CONSIDERED IMPOSSIBLE. WE NOW HAVE IT. THE IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH OTHERWISE MIGHT WELL HAVE TO ACT UNILATERALLY IN MANY SUCH CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS, IS CLEAR. ALTHOUGH THE EXISTENCE OF THE FORCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE COMMON POLITICAL WILL AND DECISION AT A MOMENT OF CRISIS, IT SHOULD MAKE COMMON DECISION EASIER. FOR EXAMPLE, IT MIGHT WELL HAVE HELPED IN THE PRE-JUNE 5 CRISIS OVER THE GULF OF AQABA.

2. FOURTEEN COUNTRIES OF NATO (FRANCE EXCEPTED) UNANIMOUSLY AGREED IN BRUSSELS ON 12 DECEMBER 1967 TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS FORCE. SEC. RUSK AND PAUL NITZE REPRESENTED THE U.S. AT THIS MEETING.

3. WHILE THE FORCE IS SMALL IN TOTAL NUMBERS OF SHIPS AND IN ITS MILITARY CAPABILITY, THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DECISION BY NATO IS CLEAR. WHEREVER IT IS MOVED IN THE ATLANTIC AREA, IT REPRESENTS NATO, AND IS A DYNAMIC SYMBOL OF THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

4. THE CONCEPT OF THE FORCE, INITIATED BY ADMIRAL MOORER WHEN HE WAS THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC AND CARRIED THROUGH TO FRUITION BY ADMIRAL HOLMES, HIS SUCCESSOR IN THAT ASSIGNMENT, IS BASED ON THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE AMONG COUNTRIES. (ITS SPARKPLUG WAS ADMIRAL RICHARD COLBERT, WHO WAS WITH ME IN THE POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL, AND IS NOW WITH ADMIRAL HOLMES IN NORFOLK.) THE CONTRIBUTION OF SHIPS AND PERSONNEL IS ON AN EQUAL BASIS. THE SMALL AND LARGE COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTE EQUALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. ALLOCATES ONE DESTROYER ONLY AS DO THE OTHER NATIONS. COMMAND OF THE FORCE ROTATES AMONG THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES. WHILE THE SHIPS ARE NATIONAL AND NATIONALLY MANNED, THE STAFF IS INTERNATIONAL WITH ALL PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES REPRESENTED.

5. THE BRITISH, WHILE INITIALLY RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT, ARE NOW WHOLEHEARTEDLY BEHIND IT. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY SEE IN IT A WAY TO PARTICIPATE AT MODEST NATIONAL COST IN A FORCE THAT CAN BE VERY MEANINGFUL TO NATO, FROM A POLITICO-MILITARY VIEWPOINT. IN THE LIGHT OF THE UK DECISION TO WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY FROM THE EAST OF SUEZ AREA AND IN VIEW OF OUR POTENTIAL GLOBAL PROBLEMS IN THE FACE OF A CLEARLY EVIDENT SOVIET WORLD WIDE MARITIME THREAT, WE SHALL BE CONSIDERING OTHER APPLICATIONS OF THIS MULTINATIONAL NAVAL CONCEPT. IT MIGHT WELL BE APPLICABLE TO THE BROADER CHALLENGES POSED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, AS WELL AS BEYOND NATO, IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, THE WESTERN PACIFIC, AND IN LATIN AMERICA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 122026Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 12 15 58

Pres file

10:58 AM

12 JAN

VZCZCEEA065
OO WTE10
DE WTE 340

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAPS0301

*DELT DELAY DUE
TO
POWER FAILURE
AT RANCH*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

HEREWITH A FOREIGN AFFAIRS DRAFT, REVISED AND PARED DOWN ACCORDING TO YOUR INSTRUCTION OF YESTERDAY MORNING -- FROM AN EARLIER MCPHERSON DRAFT.

DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONS ON POPULATION AND EDUCATION, IT IS ONLY ABOUT 2,300 WORDS, INCLUDING THE INTRODUCTORY FIRST PAGE.

I SHALL MAKE A COPY AVAILABLE TO HARRY.

W. W. ROSTOW
DRAFT-JAN. 12, 1968

STATE OF THE UNION

MR. SPEAKER, MR. PRESIDENT, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE, MY FELLOW AMERICANS:

I HAVE COME TO THIS HALLOWED BUILDING TONIGHT TO GIVE YOU-- AS THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES-- "INFORMATION OF THE STATE OF THE UNION."

I REPORT TO YOU:

-- THAT WE ARE BEING TESTED, AT HOME AND ABROAD;

-- THAT THE TEST IS OF OUR WILL, NOT OF OUR STRENGTH; OF OUR DETERMINATION, NOT OF OUR ABILITY TO ACHIEVE A BETTER AMERICA AND TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE AND PROGRESS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

WE CAN -- IF WE WILL.

TONIGHT I WILL SPEAK

OF VIETNAM

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 16, 1983.

BY *128* ON 1-12-92

-- OF OTHER CHALLENGES TO PEACE AND HUMAN PROGRESS;

-- OF WAYS TO MAKE OUR OWN LAND SAFER, MORE JUST, AND MORE HOPEFUL;

-- OF WHAT WE MUST DO TO CONTINUE THE UNINTERRUPTED ECONOMIC PROGRESS WE HAVE ENJOYED FOR NEARLY SEVEN YEARS.

VIETNAM

BEHIND OUR ACTION IN VIETNAM IS THE CONVICTION THAT A SECURE ASIA IS VITAL TO OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY NOW:

-- AS IT WAS WHEN WE FOUGHT IN THE PACIFIC TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO;

-- AS IT WAS WHEN WE JOINED IN THE RESCUE OF SOUTH KOREA;

-- AS IT WAS WHEN THE SENATE RATIFIED THE MANILA TREATY.

TO ACHIEVE SECURITY TAKES MORE THAN MILITARY POWER AND DIPLOMATIC SKILL.

IT TAKES AN AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO ARE STEADFAST, PATIENT, AND DETERMINED.

THE WORLD KNOWS WE HAVE VAST MILITARY POWER. WE MUST SHOW WE HAVE STAYING POWER AS WELL.

IT IS IN VIETNAM THAT THE TEST HAS COME -- FOR US AND FOR ASIA.

OUR FAILURE THERE WOULD STRENGTHEN THOSE IN THE WORLD WHO ARE COMMITTED TO VIOLENCE AS THE ROAD TO CHANGE.

IF WE REACH OUR LIMITED GOALS -- AND WE SHALL -- THAT SUCCESS WILL NOT END EVERY THREAT TO ASIA'S FUTURE. BUT IT WILL MAKE SUCH THREATS LESS LIKELY. IT WILL BRING A GREATER DEGREE OF STABILITY AND SECURITY TO ASIA -- AND HENCE TO AMERICA. IT WILL DEMONSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM CAN BE SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED. IT WILL PROVE THAT THE PATH OF VIOLENCE IS NOT MERELY DANGEROUS, BUT FUTILE.

SINCE I REPORTED TO YOU LAST JANUARY,

-- THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR WILL IN THREE FREE ELECTIONS;

-- THEY HAVE CHOSEN A PRESIDENT AND A VICE PRESIDENT, AN UPPER AND LOWER HOUSE, AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS;

-- THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS ADOPTED AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF PROGRESS;

-- THE NUMBER OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE LIVING UNDER EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION INCREASED BY ABOUT 1,600,000 -- 15 PERCENT MORE THAN IN JANUARY LAST YEAR -- EFFECTIVE ENEMY MILITARY STRENGTH DECLINED DURING 1967 DESPITE EXPANDED NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR.

THESE ARE SIGNS OF PROGRESS.

BUT:

-- 9,358 AMERICAN SOLDIERS GAVE THEIR LIVES;

-- OUR VIETNAMESE ALLIES LOST ALMOST 11,000 KILLED IN BATTLE AND ABOUT 8,000 CIVILIANS ASSASSINATED OR KIDNAPPED BY THE ENEMY.

-- THE ENEMY CONTINUED TO POUR MEN AND MILITARY SUPPLIES ACROSS INTERNATIONAL FRONTIERS AND INTO THE BATTLE ZONE, DESPITE HIS HEAVY LOSSES;

-- HANOI STILL BELIEVED THAT OUR WILL TO PERSEVERE -- NOT THE WILL OF OUR SOLDIERS, BUT OUR WILL HERE AT HOME -- COULD BE BROKEN.

THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, WE HEARD VOICES OF IMPATIENCE:

-- THOSE WHO WANTED TO WALK AWAY FROM THE PROBLEM AND LEAVE IT FOR ANOTHER TIME AND PLACE;

-- THOSE WHO WANTED TO RAISE SHARPLY THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, REGARDLESS OF THE RISKS;

-- THOSE WHO WOULD PULL BACK AND DIG IN;

-- AND THOSE WHO SAID "NEGOTIATE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES" -- REGARDLESS OF THE COST -- EVEN IF TALKS WERE USED TO MASK INCREASED MILITARY PRESSURE.

TO ALL OF THESE I SAY THAT THIS WAR WILL END -- THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS OR OTHERWISE -- WHEN THE ENEMY DECIDES THAT OUR PATIENCE IS AS GREAT AS OUR POWER.

WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY THAT HANOI WILL TALK IF BOMBING STOPS. WE ARE EXAMINING THESE REPORTS CAREFULLY, HOPING THERE MAY AT LAST BE A GENUINE DESIRE TO END THE CONFLICT.

BUT, BEFORE WE RISK THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN, VIETNAMESE, AND ALLIED LIVES BY STOPPING ATTACKS ON HANOI'S CAPACITY TO SUPPLY ITS FORCES IN THE SOUTH, WE MUST HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE HE WILL NOT USE OUR RESTRAINT TO POUR IN NEW TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. WE SHALL NOT PERMIT THE WAR TO BE PROLONGED IN THE NAME OF PEACE TALKS.

MORE THAN HALF A MILLION NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED TO COUNTER OUR BOMBING. I WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR RELEASING THEM TO JOIN THE ATTACK ON THE SOUTH.

WHAT I SAID AT SAN ANTONIO STILL HOLDS.

THE LARGER MEANING OF VIETNAM

THE MEANING OF VIETNAM GOES BEYOND THE BORDERS OF THAT GALLANT COUNTRY AND EVEN THE VAST EXPANSE OF ASIA.

VIETNAM IS A VITAL ISSUE FOR ALL THE ONE AND ONE-HALF BILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN NATIONS WHICH ARE THE PROCLAIMED TARGET FOR WHAT COMMUNISTS CALL WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. EACH HAS A STAKE IN PROOF THAT SUCH AGGRESSION DOESN'T WORK. EACH RECEIVES FROM OUR STAND IN VIETNAM THE PRICELESS GIFT OF TIME -- TIME TO BUILD; TO EDUCATE; TO GAIN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MOMENTUM WHICH ARE THE BEST HOPE FOR LASTING PEACE.

SUPPORTING THE PEACEFUL REVOLUTION

THE UNITED STATES IS AS FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORT THIS PEACEFUL REVOLUTION AS WE ARE TO RESIST BLOODY AGGRESSION.

TO CARRY FORWARD THIS COMMITMENT:

-- I SHALL PROPOSE THIS YEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTE ITS FAIR SHARE TO A MAJOR EXPANSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.

-- I SHALL URGE FAVORABLE ACTION ON LEGISLATION FOR A U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO THE SPECIAL FUND FOR THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK.

-- I SHALL PROPOSE A FRUGAL FOREIGN AID PROGRAM ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF OUR TIMES.

-- I SHALL PROPOSE A FIVE-YEAR RENEWAL OF THE FOOD FOR FREEDOM PROGRAM.

-- I SHALL PROPOSE A SPECIAL PROGRAM TO PRODUCE MORE LIFE-GIVING PROTEIN FOR ALL THE WORLD.

-- I SHALL PROPOSE FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION ACT.

GROWING THE FOOD WE NEED

WE ARE BUILDING A PROUD RECORD OF HELP TO NATIONS READY AND WILLING TO HELP THEMSELVES.

WHEN I SPOKE TO YOU LAST JANUARY, FOR EXAMPLE, INDIA AND PAKISTAN WERE SUFFERING THE MOST SERIOUS DROUGHT OF THE CENTURY. THEY SURVIVED THAT DROUGHT WITHOUT MASS STARVATION AND WITHOUT POLITICAL CHAOS.

TODAY -- THANKS NOT ONLY TO MORE RAIN, BUT TO MORE FERTILIZER, NEW SEED, AND A STRONG TUG ON THEIR OWN BOOTSTRAPS -- THEY ARE HARVESTING THE LARGEST GRAIN CROP IN THEIR HISTORY.

THIS IS WHAT I CALL VICTORY.

THERE HAVE BEEN MANY SUCH VICTORIES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, AS MEN AND NATIONS TURNED ON THE PROBLEM FOOD SUPPLY AND BEGAN TO TAKE ITS MEASURE.

THE POPULATION CRISIS

BUT WE ARE ONLY BUYING TIME. UNLESS POPULATION GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS CHECKED, THE GAP BETWEEN THE RICH AND POOR WILL WIDEN STEADILY.

FAMILY PLANNING IS A FAMILY MATTER. EACH FAMILY IN EACH COUNTRY MUST TAKE ITS OWN DECISION WHETHER AND HOW MUCH TO LIMIT ITS GROWTH.

BUT MORE AND MORE FAMILIES HAVE REACHED A DECISION. MORE AND MORE COUNTRIES ARE RECOGNIZING THAT ONE DOLLAR INVESTED IN FAMILY PLANNING IS WORTH AT LEAST TWENTY DOLLARS INVESTED IN A STEEL PLANT OR A ROAD.

THIS IS A FACT WHICH EVERY GOVERNMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD MUST FACE AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN ITS DECISION; WE SHALL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE.

THE CONGRESS HAS DIRECTED THAT \$35 MILLION OF THE 1968 FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATION BE USED TO SUPPORT FAMILY PLANNING. IT WILL BE.

AND I PROPOSE THAT WE SPEND \$50 MILLION IN FISCAL 1969 -- ABOUT 25 TIMES AS MUCH AS WE SPENT TWO YEARS AGO.

EDUCATING THE YOUNG

WHILE WE HELP DEVELOPING NATIONS TO LIMIT POPULATION GROWTH, WE MUST PRESS FORWARD WITH PROGRAMS TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF CHILDREN ALREADY BORN. THIS MEANS, ABOVE ALL, EDUCATION.

NEVER IN MAN'S HISTORY HAVE WE HAD SUCH TOOLS TO SPREAD THE BLESSINGS OF KNOWLEDGE. SATELLITE TELEVISION CAN BRING A GREAT TEACHER TO AN ENTIRE NATION -- TO EVERY VILLAGE -- ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EARTH. MICROFILM CAN PROVIDE A GREAT LIBRARY TO EAGER MINDS THOUSANDS OF MILES AWAY.

THE OLD WAYS WILL NOT DO.

IN THE 1969 NEGOTIATION OF A GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM, THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS FOR A SYSTEM THAT SERVES THE NEEDS OF ALL NATIONS, SMALL AND LARGE. DURING 1968 -- IN PREPARING FOR THAT CONFERENCE -- WE SHALL PULL TOGETHER EVERY LESSON OF EXPERIENCE -- EVERY TECHNICAL POSSIBILITY -- EVERY DREAM THAT MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROPOSE.

THE GROWTH OF PARTNERSHIP

SINCE I SPOKE TO YOU LAST JANUARY A NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVENTS STRENGTHENED THE FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AND ORDER:

-- THE KENNEDY ROUND OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED.

-- THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM WEATHERED THE DEVALUATION OF THE POUND.

-- THE NATIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AGREED TO MOVE TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.

-- IN ASIA, NATIONS FROM KOREA AND JAPAN TO INDONESIA AND SINGAPORE WORKED, STRENGTHENED THEIR ECONOMIES AND BROADENED THEIR POLITICAL COOPERATION BEHIND THE ALLIED SHIELD IN VIETNAM.

-- NATO AGREED TO STABILIZE ITS FORCES ON THE CRITICAL CENTRAL FRONT.

-- IN AFRICA THE SPIRIT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION BEGAN TO TAKE HOLD IN PRACTICAL WAYS.

WE WELCOME THESE EVENTS. ALL REFLECT THE "TRANSITION FROM NARROW NATIONALISM TO INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP" OF WHICH I SPOKE A YEAR AGO.

FACING CRISES

THE WORLD ALSO FACED A NUMBER OF CRISES.

-- DURING THE SWIFT ARAB-ISRAEL WAR LAST JUNE, THE HOT LINE BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW WAS USED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY. A CEASE-FIRE WAS ACHIEVED WITHOUT A MAJOR POWER CONFRONTATION -- AND, IN THE UNITED NATIONS, A MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION WAS AGREED AFTER LONG DEBATE.

NOW THE NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY -- AND THE RESPONSIBILITY -- TO FIND WAYS OF LIVING TOGETHER IN STABLE PEACE AND DIGNITY.

WE ARE HELPING THEM ACHIEVE THAT RESULT. BUT THE MIDDLE EAST REMAINS TONIGHT IN A CONDITION OF GRAVE DANGER.

NO ONE MUST TRY TO EXPLOIT A DISTURBED AND FRAGILE SITUATION IN THE HOPE OF WINNING SHORT-RANGE ADVANTAGE.

-- A TENSE CRISIS FLARED ON CYPRUS -- INVOLVING TWO OF OUR FRIENDS: GREECE AND TURKEY. OUR REPRESENTATIVE, ALONG WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO AND A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, HELPED EASE THIS CRISIS AFTER SEVERAL ANXIOUS DAYS.

-- TURMOIL CONTINUES ON THE MAINLAND OF CHINA AFTER A YEAR OF VIOLENT DISRUPTION. THIS GREAT PEOPLE -- COMPRISING NEARLY ONE IN EVERY FOUR HUMAN BEINGS -- LONG TO ENTER THE MODERN WORLD. YET THE RADICAL EXTREMISM OF THEIR GOVERNMENT HAS ISOLATED THEM STILL MORE COMPLETELY BEHIND THEIR BORDERS. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS WILLING TO START ALONG THE ROAD OF COMMON SENSE: TO PERMIT THE TRAVEL OF JOURNALISTS IN BOTH OUR COUNTRIES; TO UNDERTAKE CULTURAL EXCHANGES; AND TO TALK ABOUT TRADE IN CERTAIN NON-STRATEGIC COMMODITIES.

-- WE FACED IN 1967 A CONTINUING PROBLEM WITH OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. ON JANUARY FIRST I OUTLINED A SIX-POINT PROGRAM TO REDUCE THAT DEFICIT SHARPLY THIS YEAR. WE ARE WORKING OUT ITS DETAILS IN WAYS WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN RATHER THAN WEAKEN

OUR PARTNERSHIPS ABROAD. I SHALL SOON SUBMIT TO CONGRESS A LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM TO COMPLEMENT THE EXECUTIVE ACTION ALREADY TAKEN. THIS IS OUR COUNTRY'S PROBLEM. IT COULD HURT EVERY CITIZEN IF IT IS NOT SQUARELY MET AND RESOLVED. IT REQUIRES THE CO-OPERATION OF ALL.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

WE HAVE CONTINUED--AS I SAID WE WOULD A YEAR AGO--TO MOVE WITH THE SOVIET UNION "FROM THE HARSH SPIRIT OF THE COLD WAR TO THE HOPEFUL SPIRIT OF COMMON HUMANITY ON A TROUBLED AND THREATENED PLANET." WE HAVE INSISTED ON THE NEED FOR RECIPROCAL ACTION, BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS UNILATERAL DETENTE.

IN THAT SPIRIT WE HAVE:

- WORKED TOWARDS A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY;
- COMPLETED A CONSULAR TREATY;
- SIGNED THE FIRST COMMERCIAL AIR AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES;
- SIGNED AN OUTER SPACE TREATY.

I MET AT LENGTH WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN -- ACHIEVING, IF NOT ACCORD, AT LEAST A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF HIS POSITION, AND CONVEYING A CLEARER PICTURE OF OURS. MANY ISSUES REMAIN BETWEEN US; BUT WE SHALL PRESS ON AS FAST AND AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO GO TO BUILD A STABLE PEACE.

DEFENSE

DESPITE THESE STEPS TOWARD MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE STILL FACE THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING A MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF DETERRING ANY NATION FROM THREATENING THE WORLD'S PEACE.

LET ME REVIEW A LITTLE OF WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED DURING THE PAST SEVEN YEARS IN EXPANDING, AND DIVERSIFYING, OUR MILITARY POWER:

-- IN 1961 WE HAD 800 NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ALERT, ALMOST ALL OF THEM CARRIED BY BOMBERS. WE HAVE 2,200 TODAY -- MANY OF THEM CARRIED BY A FORCE OF 1,000 MINUTEMAN ICBM'S AND 41 POLARIS SUBMARINES. AND WE ARE DEVELOPING NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT WILL PROVIDE AN EVEN GREATER RETALIATION FORCE.

-- WE HAVE GREATLY INCREASED THE COMBAT POWER AND MOBILITY OF OUR ARMY AND MARINE CORPS. THE NUMBER OF TROOPS THAT CAN BE CARRIED INTO COMBAT BY HELICOPTER IS EIGHT TIMES WHAT IT WAS IN 1961. STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CAPACITY IS FIVE TIMES WHAT IT WAS IN 1961. WITH THE DELIVERY OF THE CSA IN 1971, IT WILL BE TEN TIMES GREATER.

-- BY NEW YEAR OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES WILL BE THREE TIMES WHAT THEY WERE IN 1961

-- WE HAVE, NOW, THE ABILITY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE LIMITED RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION. OUR CHOICES ARE NO LONGER CONFINED TO TOTAL WAR OR TOTAL ACQUIESCENCE.

I DO NOT RECITE THESE FIGURES BOASTFULLY OR WITH BELLIGERENT PURPOSE. I RECITE THEM BECAUSE IT IS ESSENTIAL NOW-- AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD -- THAT OUR POWER MATCH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.

OUR STRENGTH IS NEEDED TO BUILD A RELIABLE PEACE; AND ONLY A RELIABLE PEACE CAN PERMIT THE HUMAN FAMILY TO TURN ALL ITS THOUGHTS AND TALENTS TO ITS FAMILY AFFAIRS.

(DOMESTIC AFFAIRS FOLLOW)

CONFIDENTIAL

DTG: 12/1351Z JAN 1968

Sent 6:10

Pres file

1968 JAN 12 23 10

68 JAN 12 PM 6:13

FRIDAY

EEA881
PP WTE10
DE WTE 361

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80320

UNCLASSIFIED

JANUARY 12, 1968

FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR APPROVAL, IS PROPOSED ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF NEW YEAR'S GREETING FROM AFGHAN PRIME MINISTER ETEMADI.

YOU SENT NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE TO KING OF AFGHANISTAN AS USUAL. STATE RECOMMENDS THIS FURTHER MESSAGE TO ETEMADI. HE IS WORKING TO CONTINUE MODERATE POLICIES OF MAIWANDVAL AND CAN USE THE BOOST. I RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WANT YOU TO KNOW HOW MUCH I APPRECIATED YOUR NEW YEAR'S GREETING. ALL AMERICANS ARE PROUD THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES BEGIN 1968 IN THE SAME WARM FRIENDSHIP WE HAVE ENJOYED FOR SO LONG. I EARNESTLY HOPE THE YEAR AHEAD WILL BRING A FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THAT FRIENDSHIP, AND CONTINUED PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY FOR THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS.

SINCERELY,

DTG: 122249Z JAN 1968

SENT
RECEIVED
WHCA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEE080
OO WTE10
DE WTE 358

1968 JAN 12 22 36

5 36 P.M.

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
INFO COL. CROSS
CITE CAP80317

free file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM

PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN NEW YORK NEXT WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17 (PAA 220, 12:50 P.M., KENNEDY AIRPORT). HE WILL ENTER BETHESDA THAT EVENING.

WE HAVE INFORMED MARIE FEHMER, AND SHE IS ARRANGING FOR FLOWERS.

FOLLOWING IS A SUGGESTED MESSAGE, WHICH, IF YOU APPROVE, WE WILL GET TO THE HOSPITAL PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL.

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ASKED WHETHER A SPECIAL AIRCRAFT COULD FLY HIM FROM NEW YORK TO WASHINGTON. AMBASSADOR CARLSON AND COVEY OLIVER RECOMMEND THAT THE REQUEST BE MET, ALTHOUGH STATE SAYS IT DOES NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO PICK UP THE TAB (\$310-ONE WAY.)

WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WILL WANT TO CALL ON YOU BEFORE GOING BACK TO GUYANA. I RECOMMEND THAT YOU SEE HIM FOR AN ON-THE-RECORD, COURTESY VISIT. HE FACES A TOUGH ELECTION AGAINST JAGAN NEXT YEAR AND ALL WE CAN DO TO BUILD HIM UP IS IN OUR INTEREST.

BEGIN MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-290
By cb, NARA Date 10-16-96

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM PLEASED TO HAVE YOU IN WASHINGTON AGAIN, BUT I SINCERELY REGRET THE CIRCUMSTANCES. TWO YEARS AGO I HAD A SIMILAR NEED TO ENTER BETHESDA NAVAL HOSPITAL. I HOPE YOUR STAY THERE WILL BE AS BRIEF AND SUCCESSFUL AS MINE.

WHILE YOU ARE IN WASHINGTON, I WOULD LIKE TO SEE YOU. PLEASE LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU LEAVE THE HOSPITAL. IN THE MEANTIME, I AM SURE THE NAVY WILL TAKE GOOD CARE OF YOU.

WARMEST REGARDS,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

END MESSAGE

1. APPROVE MESSAGE ---

DISAPPROVE ---

SPEAK TO ME ---

2. AUTHORIZE SPECIAL AIRCRAFT AT WH EXPENSE ----

AUTHORIZE SPECIAL AIRCRAFT BUT MAKE STATE
PICK UP THE TAB ----

SPEAK TO ME ----

3. APPOINTMENT APPROVED ----

PREFER NO APPOINTMENT ----

SPEAK TO ME ----

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 122149Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEA068
OO WTE10
DE WTE 346

1968 JAN 12 17 48

12:48 PM

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80307

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

Free file

FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: WHEAT FOR PAKISTAN

YOU WILL RECALL THAT YOU AUTHORIZED US TO ACCEPT PRESIDENT AYUB'S OFFER OF A 500,000 TON WHEAT DEAL, 100,000 TONS IN CCC SALES AND 400,000 TONS ON PL 480 TERMS. THAT DECISION WAS CONVEYED TO BEN OEHLERT.

LAST NIGHT OEHLERT ADVISED US THAT (1) HE UNDERSTOOD YOU TO INSTRUCT HIM TO PUT TOGETHER A PROGRAM TOTALLING ONE MILLION TONS OF WHEAT (NOT 500,000); (2) HE HAS PUT TOGETHER A PACKAGE PROPOSING A ONE MILLION TON PROGRAM -- ALL PL 480 -- TO COVER THE REST OF CALENDAR '68; AND (3) HE WANTS TO GIVE THIS PROPOSAL TO AYUB AT 9:30 TONIGHT RANCH TIME.

EVERYBODY WANTS TO MOVE AS MUCH WHEAT TO PAKISTAN AS POSSIBLE. BUT WE NEED ORGANIZED RECOMMENDATIONS ON TWO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE OEHLERT PROPOSAL. FIRST, DO WE WANT TO BLESS THE CALCULATIONS OF WHEAT REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN OEHLERT'S MEMORANDUM? (ONCE WE SIGN ON TO THESE, WE WILL HAVE PRETTY WELL SETTLED THE LIMITS ON OUR 1968 PL 480 PROGRAM.) SECOND, DO WE WANT TO OFFER AYUB THE FULL MILLION TONS ON PL 480 TERMS? (THIS PROPOSAL INVOLVES A ONE-TO-TEN RATIO BETWEEN CCC SALES AND PL 480, RATHER THAN THE ONE-TO-FOUR RATIO REPRESENTED BY THE PROPOSAL YOU APPROVED LAST MONTH.)

WE KNOW OF NO REASON WHY A DELAY OF A DAY OR TWO TO PULL THE GOVERNMENT TOGETHER ON THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD CAUSE ANY PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN. THEREFORE, WE HAVE INSTRUCTED OEHLERT NOT TO DELIVER HIS PROPOSAL UNTIL HE GETS FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

WE EXPECT TO COME TO YOU FOR A DECISION ON THIS MATTER IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. BUT I THOUGHT YOU WOULD WANT TO KNOW HOW WE ARE HANDLING OEHLERT'S REQUEST. IF YOU WISH, OF COURSE, WE CAN SIMPLY TELL HIM TO GO AHEAD NOW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 121638Z JAN 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Frus 64-68, vol. 25, #480
By jc . NARA, Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

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FM ANEMB SAIGON
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY 121102Z JAN 68

FM AMB LOCKE SAIGON 996

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY THE PRESIDENT

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, I INTEND TO RETURN TO TEXAS AND ANNOUNCE FOR GOVERNOR THERE JANUARY 29. ACCORDINGLY, I HEREBY RESIGN AS DEPUTY AMBASSADOR SOUTH VIETNAM EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO MY ANNOUNCEMENT. YOU WILL HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM AMBASSADOR BUNKER SENT YESTERDAY APPRISING YOU OF THIS AND INDICATING HIS CONCURRENCE.

2. IT HAS BEEN A GREAT HONOR FOR ME TO REPRESENT YOU AND THE UNITED STATES HERE AND PREVIOUSLY IN PAKISTAN. I DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE CONFIDENCE YOU HAVE SHOWN IN ME AND THE SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME. I AM PROUD TO CONSIDER YOU AS MY FRIEND AS WELL AS MY PRESIDENT. IT HAS BEEN A DISTINCT PRIVILEGE TO WORK HERE WITH AMBASSADOR BUNKER, AND I CAN TRUTHFULLY SAY THAT YOUR INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES HERE COULD NOT BE IN BETTER HANDS. THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY YOU HAVE GIVEN ME.

GP-1
220

SANITIZED
Authority NLS 019.0270-2
By *SP* NARA Date 12/13/01

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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~~SECRET~~

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1968 JAN 12 19 22

VZCZCEEAB73
OO WTE10
DE WTE 350

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80311

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 12 , 1968

HEREWITH CHET BOWLES SUGGESTS WE ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. AS YOU KNOW, THE ISSUE IS OUR ACCEPTING HIS DEFINITION OF HIS BORDERS, WHICH THAILAND AND SOUTH VIETNAM CHALLENGE.

1. BY THE TIME YOU RECEIVE THIS CABLE YOU SHOULD HAVE ON YOUR DESKS ALL OUR REPORTS FROM PHNOM PENH INCLUDING MY PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS SPECIAL MESSAGE IS TO EXPRESS MY CONVICTION THAT WE SHOULD DO WHATEVER WE REASONABLY CAN TO RE-ESTABLISH NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES:

A. A SMALL BUT EXPERIENCED US MISSION IN PHNOM PENH WOULD HELP TO HOWD THE LINE IN REGARD TO THE AGREEMENT WE HAVE JUST REACHED AND PERHAPS GRADUALLY OPEN DOOR FOR BROADER UNDERSTANDING AND ULTIMATELY EVEN COOPERATION.

B. CAMBODIA'S APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO ESTABLISH NORMAL RELATIONS WITH USG WOULD BE CLEAR SIGNAL THAT SIHANOUK, AN ASTUTE ASIAN POLITICAL LEADER, NO LONGER ASSUMES THAT THE COMMUNISTS MAY FORCE THE US OUT OF EAST ASIA.

C. THE RESTORATION OF NORMAL RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA WOULD ALSO HAVE REASSURING EFFECT NOT ONLY ON OUR FRIENDS AND NEUTRALS OVERSEAS BUT ON THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FHS 64-68, vol 27, #230

By JC NARA. Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

D. SIHANOUK'S CHANGE OF DIRECTION WOULD AROUSE BITTER ATTACKS BY CHINESE, NLF AND NVN AND POSSIBLY SOVIETS WHICH WOULD FURTHER PROMOTE FAVORABLE US IMAGE AS A NATION EAGER FOR PEACE.

2. AT PRESENT THE ADMINISTRATION IS OFTEN CHARGED, HOWEVER UNREASONABLY, WITH A RIGID AND UNCOMPROMISING VIEW IN REGARD TO NEGOTIATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. THIS CRITICISM COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY EASED IF WE COULD ANNOUNCE IN REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE THAT WE HAVE NOT ONLY REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH SIHANOUK IN REGARD TO THE ICC ROLE IN CURBING VIET CONG-NVN INFILTRATION BUT ALSO HAVE RESTORED NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA.

3. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THE PRINCE, SON SANN, AND THE C-IN-C GENERAL NHIK TIOLONG, AS WELL AS OTHERS, URGED ME TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH CAMBODIAN AMBASSADOR NONG KINNY IN NEW DELHI. WITH YOUR APPROVAL IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR ME OVER NEXT FEW WEEKS QUIETLY TO DETERMINE BASIS ON WHICH NORMAL RELATIONS COULD BE ESTABLISHED. IF UNDERSTANDING IS REACHED THROUGH NONG KINNY, I COULD RETURN TO PHNOM PENH AND COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PRINCE.

4. I REALIZE THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE FROWNED ON BOTH IN BANGKOK AND SAIGON. HOWEVER, I CANNOT SEE WHY WE SHOULD ALLOW TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON USG FOR THEIR SURVIVAL TO VETO A POLICY DECISION WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY PROMOTE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF USG AS WELL AS THEIR OWN SECURITY.

DTG: 121837Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 12 19 13

VZCZCEEAO72
OO WTE 10
DE WTE 349

Pres. file

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
INFO: JIM JONES
CITE: CAP80310

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

FOLLOWING OUR PLANNING MEETING IN PREPARATION FOR HAROLD WILSON'S VISIT, FEB 8-9, WE NEED GUIDANCE FROM YOU ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE VISIT. WE BELIEVE THE FORMAT OF THE VISIT SHOULD BE FAIRLY INFORMAL AND LOW KEY, WHILE BEARING IN MIND WILSON'S DESIRE FOR VISIBILITY TO HIS ELECTORATE. (THIS IS ENTIRELY APPROPRIATE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT ONLY LAST JUNE YOU RECEIVED WILSON WITH FULL HONORS, REMARKS, BLACK TIE DINNER, ETC.). IN THE LIGHT OF FORTHCOMING UNPLEASANT U.K. DECISIONS, THIS IS NOT A GOOD TIME FOR A DRAMATIC VISIT.

AS NOW PROJECTED, THE PRIME MINISTER'S ARRIVAL WOULD BE INFORMAL-- NO MILITARY HONORS OR REMARKS. THIS WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THURSDAY, FEB 8 AT ABOUT 11:30 A.M., FOLLOWED BY AN HOUR AND A HALF PRIVATE MEETING. IS THIS AGREEABLE TO YOU?

YES..... NO.....

SHOULD THIS MEETING BE FOLLOWED BS A LUNCHEON, OR WOULD YOU RATHER GIVE A DINNER FOR WILSON THAT EVENING? IF YOU OPT FOR A LUNCHEON-- WHICH I RECOMMEND--YOU WOULD HAVE A CHOICE OF FORMATS. I SURGEST A SMALL LUNCHEON WITH A GUEST LIST OF ABOUT 40. (MRS. WILSON PROBABLY WILL ACCOMPANY THE PRIME MINISTER.) WOULD YOU INDICATE YOUR PREFERENCE:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12355, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *kg*, NARA, Date *12-26-91*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

LUNCHEON AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.....

SMALLER WORKING LUNCHEON.....

LARGE LUNCHEON (GUEST LIST OF 140).....

DINNER.....

THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE SECOND MEETING TURNS TO SOME DEGREE ON YOUR PREFERENCE FOR LUNCH VS. DINNER. IF YOU OPT FOR A LUNCHEON, I WOULD SUGGEST SCHEDULING A BRIEF SECOND MEETING ON FRIDAY, FEB 9 AT 11:30 AM. WITHOUT THIS, YOUR PARTICIPATION IN WILSON'S "VISIT" WOULD BE RATHER BRIEF -- BACK-TO-BACK MEETING AND LUNCH -- COMPLETED WITHIN THREE HOURS THE FIRST DAY. WHILE THIS WOULD BE THE EASIER COURSE FOR YOU, IT PROBABLY WOULD FALL SOMEWHAT SHORT OF WHAT WILSON NEEDS BY WAY OF EXPOSURE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF YOU HAVE A DINNER FOR WILSON, THERE WOULD BE LESS NEED TO SCHEDULE A SECOND MEETING. IN ANY EVENT, WE COULD ALWAYS RESERVE TIME FOR A BRIEF SECOND MEETING AND WAIT UNTIL NEARER THE TIME OF THE VISIT BEFORE MAKING A FINAL DECISION.

SCHEDULE A BRIEF SECOND MEETING.....

RESERVE TIME FOR SECOND MEETING (BUT MAKE NO COMMITMENT).....

DTG: 121802Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCEEA069
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 348

1968 JAN 12 18 16

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80309

Pres file

UNCLAS

JANUARY 12, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH NICK PUTS A QUESTION.

QUOTE SOME WEEKS AGO I ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO SPEAK BEFORE THE ADLAI E. STEVENSON INSTITUTE IN CHICAGO TOMORROW (JANUARY 13). IF I KEEP THE ENGAGEMENT, IT WILL MEAN THAT I MUST BE OUT OF TOWN FROM ABOUT 11 A.M. TO 7:30 P.M. DEAN IS IN CALIFORNIA.

THE CHICAGO AUDIENCE WILL INCLUDE A NUMBER OF SENIOR WESTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AS WELL AS PROMINENT AMERICAN BUSINESSMEN AND FINANCIERS. I HAD INTENDED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT US-WESTERN EUROPEAN RELATIONS IN GENERAL AND TO GIVE YOUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM ANOTHER STRONG PUSH.

I CAN GET A SUBSTITUTE IF YOU WOULD RATHER I REMAIN HERE. ENDQUOTE

OK TO GO -----
RATHER YOU WOULD STAY
IN WASHINGTON -----

DTG 121751Z JAN 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

41

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NAC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By JC NARA Date 7-21-03

68 JAN 12 16 58

Free file

VZCZCEEA067
OO WTE10
DE WTE 342

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP 80303

11:52 AM

12 JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

I SUSPECT THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATION ON OUR BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS PROGRAM IS TYPICAL IN EUROPE.

BONN 7101 FROM FESSENDEN

1. DURING A CONVERSATION JANUARY 10 BETWEEN THE EMBASSY ECONOMIC MINISTER AND HARKORT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE, THE LATTER COMMENTED THAT HE DETECTED IN THE GERMAN PRESS AND REPORTS FROM ELSEWHERE IN WESTERN EUROPE GROWING DOUBTS ABOUT THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM WHICH CONTRASTED WITH THE INITIAL AFFIRMATIVE REACTIONS TO IT. WHEN ASKED FOR HIS ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION HARKORT SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT RESULTED FROM THE PRECISION OF MEASURES DIRECTED AGAINST SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND THE LESSER PRECISION REGARDING MEASURES AIMED AT DEFLATING THE US ECONOMY.

2. HE POINTED TO THE FACT THAT NEW INVESTMENT FROM THE US IS ALREADY PROHIBITED. IT IS CLEAR WHAT WE WILL BE SEEKING IN THE WAY OF NEUTRALIZING THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COST OF TROOP PRESENCE. TOURISTS HAVE BEEN EXHORTED NOT TO TRAVEL TO WESTERN EUROPE. YET, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, IT WILL BE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MEASURES TO DEFLATE THE HUGE US ECONOMY WHICH WILL BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE SUCCESS OF THE TOTAL PROGRAM. HE SAID HE DETECTS A GROWING SKEPTICISM IN WESTERN EUROPE THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN OBTAINING A SUFFICIENT TAX SURCHARGE AND IN ESTABLISHING WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY AS THE ADMINISTRATION CLEARLY WISHES. IN SHORT, THE CONSERVATIVE MANAGERS OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS IN WESTERN EUROPE NEED TO BE SHOWN THAT WE CAN BRING THE DOMESTIC US ECONOMY UNDER CONTROL BEFORE THEY WILL BE CONVINCED THAT OUR PROGRAM CAN BE SUCCESSFUL.

3. COMMENT: THE POINT MERELY UNDERLINES AGAIN WHAT HAS BEEN STRESSED BY REPORTS FROM OTHER POSTS AND IN THE PRESS, NAMELY, THAT PROMPT ACTION ON A TAX SURCHARGE IS REGARDED AS OF PRIME SIGNIFICANCE BOTH FOR ITS ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS.

DTG: 121507Z JAN 68

CONFIDENTIAL

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 12 16

11:42 AM

Free file

VZCZCEEA066
OO WTE18
DE WTE 344

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAPS0395

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 12, 1968

HEREWITH AMB. BUNKER REQUESTS A PROMPT STATEMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY OF STATE TO QUIET GROWING ALARM IN VIETNAM THAT WE ARE GOING TO SHOVE A COALITION GOVERNMENT DOWN THEIR THROAT.

SAIGON 15741

1. THERE ARE SIGNS OF RISING CONCERN AMONG SIGNIFICANT FIGURES WITHIN SVN THAT US MAY BE SHIFTING POSITION ON COALITION WITH NLF. THE FEAR APPEARS TO BE WIDESPREAD, AND SOMETIMES IS STATED EXPLICITLY, THAT US WILL ULTIMATELY SEEK TO FORCE GVN TO ENTER INTO COALITION WITH NLF, WHICH WILL MEAN END OF NON-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

2. STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO JOURNALISTS JANUARY 5 STATED HE WILL CRUSH ALL PEACE MOVES WHICH FAVOR THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT. DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED BY INTERIM CHAIRMAN OF LOWER HOUSE, NGUYEN BA LUONG, THAT US MAY SHIFT POSITION TOWARDS NLF.; SVN BUDDHIST "STRUGGLE" ELEMENTS IN II CORPS FEAR US MAY ENGINEER "SETTLEMENT" OF WAR WITHOUT GVN PARTICIPATION WHICH WOULD LEAD EITHER TO COALITION GOVERNMENT OR PARTITION OF SOUTH VIET-NAM. SAIGON PRESS COMMENT CURRENTLY IS PREOCCUPIED WITH FEAR US MAY PUSH GVN INTO COALITION GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE HEARD FROM SENATORS AND DEPUTIES AND OTHER PROMINENT LEADERS THAT THE SITUATION IS "SERIOUS", I.E., MISUNDERSTANDING HAS REACHED SERIOUS PROPORTIONS, AND THAT CLARIFICATION IS NEEDED TO CALM VIETNAMESE OPINION.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 15177, RAC 15178
By scj/d NARA, Date 7-22-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

3. MISSION HAS MADE AND IS CONTINUING TO MAKE MAXIMUM USE OF DEPARTMENT'S DECEMBER 8 STATEMENT ON VIET-NAM, WHICH INCLUDES FIRM STATEMENT THAT WE WOULD NOT IMPOSE COALITION GOVERNMENT ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE OR TURN GVN OVER TO NLF. HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 20 TV ADDRESS, HAVE BEEN INTERPRETED HERE AS REFLECTING A SOFTENING OF US POSITION ON COALITION GOVERNMENT, AND THE JOINT CANBERRA COMMUNIQUE HAS NOT DISPELLED THIS IMPRESSION. THIS HAS LED TO FEARS EXPRESSED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, AS WELL AS SPATE OF PRESS COMMENTING SOME OF WHICH MAY BE INSPIRED BY GVN, BUT MUCH OF WHICH CLEARLY REFLECTS HONEST FEAR OF NON-COMMUNIST NATIONALISTS WHO, HAVING BEEN SOLD OUT BY FRENCH IN 1954, HALF EXPECT US TO DO SAME THING. VIETNAMESE WITHIN AND OUTSIDE GVN ARE, OF COURSE, AWARE OF VOLUME AND EXTENT OF CRITICISM WITHIN US OF OUR VIET-NAM POLICY AND HAVE LITTLE DIFFICULTY CONCLUDING THAT US, IN ORDER TO APPEASE DOMESTIC OPINION, MAY WELL OPT FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WHICH IN THEIR VIEW WOULD FATALLY AFFECT PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL ON INDEPENDENT SOUTH VIET-NAM, THROUGH SOME COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMULA.

4. SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH DEVELOPMENT OF THIS FEAR THERE HAS BEEN INCREASED ATTENTION IN VC CIRCLES TO THE COALITION GOVERNMENT THEME. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER VC ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING COALITION GOVERNMENT AS ACCEPTABLE OBJECTIVE, CONFIDENT THAT THROUGH SUPERIOR ORGANIZATION AND QUALITY OF CADRES THEY COULD WIN FROM NON-COMMUNISTS IN OPEN POLITICAL ARENA WHAT THEY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO WIN ON BATTLEFIELD. IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY TO US THAT VC HANDLING OF THIS IDEA IS, FOR THE TIME BEING, SIMPLY DESIGNED TO RAISE FEAR OF A US "SELLOUT" OF GVN, TO EXPLOIT A POTENTIAL POINT OF DIVISION BETWEEN US AND GVN, TO HAVE A SERIOUSLY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON PERFORMANCE OF GVN CIVIL AND MILITARY APPARATUS, AND SO TO RESULT IN A DISINTEGRATION OF EFFORT WHICH WOULD ENABLE VC TO ACHIEVE ITS VICTORY BY OTHER MEANS.

5. EMBASSY PROVINCIAL REPORTING OFFICERS HAVE BEEN ALERTED TO REPORT EVIDENCE OF DECLINING MORALE AS RESULT OF COALITION GOVERNMENT RUMORS AND CORDS IS QUERYING ITS PROVINCIAL TEAMS TO REPORT ON SAME SUBJECT. MACV HAS LEARNED THAT NUMBER OF SENIOR VIETNAMESE OFFICERS IN III CORPS HAVE APPROACHED GEN. KHANG TO LEARN WHETHER US IS IN FACT CONSIDERING PRESSING COALITION GOVERNMENT SOLUTION ON GVN.

6. ANOTHER INDICATION OF CONCERN IS CONVERSATION UPPER HOUSE PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN HUYEN HAD WITH KOREN IN DA NANG JANUARY 10 IN WHICH HUYEN SAID THERE IS REAL FEAR IN VIETNAMESE CIRCLES AS TO SOLIDITY OF US COMMITMENT AND WORRY THAT US MIGHT SELL OUT VIETNAMESE. HUYEN SAID PRIMARY CAUSE WAS CONFUSING STATEMENTS CONCERNING POSITION OF NLF IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS.

NLF, HE SAID, IS JUST PUPPET OF HANOI WHICH HAS THUS BEEN ABLE TO PUT ITS FOOT INTO SVN. HUYEN ADDED US AND VIETNAMESE ARE ASSOCIATES WITH SAME INTERESTS AND GOALS AND MUST WORK TOGETHER AS EQUALS. AS PARTNERS, VIETNAMESE WANT TO BE KEPT CLOSELY INFORMED ON OUR THINKING AND DON'T WANT TO FIND THAT WE HAVE MADE SECRET OVERTURES TO COMMUNISTS IN SOME FAR-OFF CAPITAL.; HUYEN SAID WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS AN AUTHORITATIVE, DECISIVE STATEMENT FROM HIGHEST US SOURCE CLEARING THE AIR AND SUPPORTING GVN POSITION. HUYEN IS MILD-MANNERED, PRESTIGIOUS LAWYER NOT GIVEN TO OVERSTATING ISSUES. HIS CONVERSATION WITH KOREN IS PROBABLY MOST POINTED WE CAN RECALL.

7. OUR MAJOR CONCERN IN ALL OF THIS IS THAT, WHETHER RUMORS OF COALITION GOVERNMENT SOLUTION ARE BASED ON REAL US INTENTION OR NOT, WHETHER THEY ORIGINATE WITH VC OR NOT, THERE IS A DANGER THAT GVN CIVIL AND MILITARY APPARATUS AND INFORMED VIETNAMESE OPINION MAY BECOME DEMORALIZED TO POINT THAT THEY WILL NOT PUT OUT THE KIND OF EFFORT REQUIRED UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES.

8. FOR OUR PART WE ARE TAKING EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO KNOCK IN THE HEAD THE RUMOR THAT THE US PLANS TO PRESS THE GVN INTO A COALITION GOVERNMENT. WE ARE PREPARING A GUIDANCE STATEMENT TO US OFFICIALS IN THE FIELD TO MAKE SURE THE MESSAGE GETS ACROSS AT ALL LEVELS. WE ARE PREPARING A COMPILATION OF RECENT STATEMENTS INCLUDING THE DECEMBER 8 STATEMENT AND THE CANBERRA DECLARATION, TO WHICH WE WILL GIVE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY. WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING OTHER MEANS HERE IN VIETNAM TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION.

9. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE DEEP AND WIDESPREAD CONCERN, I BELIEVE WE NEED TO CAP THIS NECESSARY EFFORT WITH A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OR SECRETARY WHICH WILL MAKE PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT US IS FULLY AWARE OF DANGER OF COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH UNRECONSTRUCTED COMMUNISTS, WHICH AMPLY PROVED BY EXPERIENCE EVERYWHERE IN WORLD THAT HAVING MADE SUBSTANTIAL SACRIFICES IN LIVES AND IN RESOURCES, THE US HAS NO INTENTION OF THROWING THESE AWAY BY PRESSING GVN INTO COALITION GOVERNMENT VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT DO NOT WANT; THAT US LOOKS TO VIETNAMESE PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN INSTITUTIONS RATHER THAN HAVE THEM IMPOSED BY OTHERS. POINT COULD ALSO BE MADE THAT MUCH OF THIS MALAISE HAS BEEN FED BY COMMUNISTS SEEKING TO EXPLOIT THIS ISSUE AS PART OF THEIR OVERALL PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THEY ARE GAINING ON THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FRONT AT A TIME WHEN IN FACT THEY ARE FACING SERIOUS TROUBLES ON ALL FRONTS. IT CAN PERHAPS BE INTERPRETED AS A SIGN THAT THEY ARE MAKING A FINAL EFFORT TO DISRUPT MORALE HERE AND UNDERMINE SUPPORT IN THE US TO STAVE OFF THEIR INEVITABLE DEFEAT. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD MEET THIS EFFORT HEAD-ON AND PUT ALL THESE ISSUES TO REST.

~~SECRET~~

DTG 121521Z JAN 68



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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 83-211
Document # 43
SANITIZ

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80284



SANITIZED

1968 JAN 11 22 41

Authority NLJ 83-211

By ics, NARS, Date 10-30-84

JANUARY 11, 1968


Profile

HEREWITH A CIA SUMMARY OF A LONGER TEXT ON THE ENEMY
THREAT TO KHE SANH.

IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER
OF INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS BUILDING UP ITS FORCES
IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE WEST OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

THE TARGET PRIMARILY THREATENED BY THESE FORCES APPEARS
TO BE THE ALLIED BASE AT KHE SANH IN WESTERN QUANG TRI
PROVINCE OF SOUTH VIETNAM. ENEMY RECONNAISSANCE AND PROBING
ACTIVITY NEAR KHE SANH HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY IN THE LAST FEW
WEEKS.

THE
COMMUNISTS COULD BE USING THE TIME BETWEEN NOW AND THE TET
HOLIDAYS TO COMPLETE THEIR CONCENTRATION AROUND KHE SANH IN
PREPARATION FOR AN OFFENSIVE AFTER TET.



THE COMMUNISTS COULD MUSTER A TOTAL FORCE OF OVER 20,000
SHOULD THEY DECIDE AT SOME POINT TO COMMIT ALL PERSONNEL
FROM THE ELEMENTS OF THE FOUR DIVISIONS NOW IN THE GENERAL
AREA. THIS IS CONSIDERABLY MORE THAN THEY WOULD NEED MERELY
TO TAKE KHE SANH. THEIR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN ATTACKING KHE
SANH WOULD BE TO DRAW US REINFORCEMENTS INTO THE AREA, TIE
THEM TO STATIC DEFENSIVE POSITIONS, AND INFLICT MAXIMUM
CASUALTIES ON US FORCES OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.

THE BUILDUP OF FORCES IN LAOS AND WESTERN QUANG TRI
PROVINCE ALSO STRENGTHENS NORTH VIETNAMESE DEFENSE
OF THE LAOS CORRIDOR.



DTG 112147Z JAN 68



Approved for Release
Date 9 OCT 1984

68 JAN 11 PM 5:55

THURSDAY

1.3(a)(4)
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1.3(a)(4)
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DECLASSIFIED

Authority EAC 16373

By pc/w NARA, Date 7-22-03

CONFIDENTIAL

1968 JAN 11 17 M

EEA044
OO VTE18
DE VTE 316

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80279

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 11, 1968

THE LAST SENTENCE OF THIS U. K. REPORT FROM HANOI MAY INTEREST YOU.

1. DIPLOMATIC RECEPTIONS DURING THE WEEK HAVE GIVEN ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS TRINH'S LATEST STATEMENT WITH SOVIET, CZECH AND POLISH AMBASSADORS HERE. THEY ARE OBVIOUSLY UNBRIEFED ON ANY PARTY LINE AND HAVE OFFERED NO FRESH INTERPRETATION.
2. MY INDIAN COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO ACHIEVE ANY CLARIFICATION FROM HIS OFFICIAL D.R.V. CONTACTS. HE INTERPRETS THIS SPEECH AS A CLIMB DOWN BY DRV ALBEIT RECOGNISING THAT THE CHANGE OF TENSE DOES NOT ALTER THE FUNDAMENTAL POSITION SO LONG AS THE U.S. AND DRV CHOOSE TWO ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SETS OF PREMISES UPON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES.
3. A RUMANIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES QUOTED PREMIER DONG AS SAYING RECENTLY THAT THE DOOR TO PEACE WAS VERY WIDE BUT IT WAS ONLY OPENED A SMALL FRACTION. THIS SEEMS A FAIR SUMMING UP BUT THE CRACK HAS BEEN WIDENED.
4. I REGRET I HAVE HAD NO OPPORTUNITY AND AM UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS.
5. I AM NOT CLEAR PRECISELY WHAT IS MEANT BY TESTING BONA FIDES. AS SEEN FROM HERE THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THERE WOULD BE TALKS BUT THE ULTIMATE BONA FIDES OF DRV AND THE FRONT CAN ONLY BE TESTED BY HOLDING TALKS. IN ANY EVENT, THE CHANGE OF TENSE CANNOT BE ACCIDENTAL. IT SEEMS TO REPRESENT A CLEAR CONCESSION AND THUS TO IMPLY THAT THE WAR IS HURTING THE DRV MORE.

DTG: 111714Z JAN 68

1968 JAN 11

~~SECRET~~
17-00

EYES ONLY

EEA841
OO WTE 18
DE WTE 311

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80274

Pres file

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOV

HEREWITH AMB. BUNKER ASKS FOR WIN BROWN IF POSSIBLE -
OR MARSHALL GREEN - AS GENE LOCKE'S SUCCESSOR.

BUNKER 962

1. BEFORE GENE LOCKE LEFT FOR HOME EARLY IN DECEMBER, HE TALKED TO ME ABOUT HIS INTEREST IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF ENTERING THE GOVERNORSHIP RACE IN TEXAS. HE WANTED FIRST, OF COURSE, TO TALK WITH YOU AND THEN TO CONSULT WITH HIS FRIENDS IN TEXAS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF POTENTIAL SUPPORT FOR HIS CANDIDACY. HE HAS TALKED WITH ME AGAIN ON HIS RETURN AND HAS REPORTED ON HIS TALKS WITH YOU AND THE CONCLUSIONS HE HAS REACHED AS A RESULT OF HIS SURVEY. HE HAS CONCLUDED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF THE PARTY AND IN THE IDEALS AND OBJECTIVES WHICH WE ALL HOPE TO SEE ACHIEVED UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP HE OUGHT TO MAKE THE RACE. MUCH AS I WILL REGRET SEEING HIM LEAVE SAIGON, I FEEL THAT I CAN ONLY RESPECT HIS VIEWS AND JUDGMENT AND ENCOURAGE HIM TO DO WHAT HE BELIEVES TO BE RIGHT.

2. GENE HAS DONE AN OUTSTANDING JOB HERE. HE HAS BROUGHT HIGH INTELLIGENCE AND COMPLETE LOYALTY AND INTEGRITY IN SEEKING TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO THE TASKS WHICH HAVE CONFRONTED US. HE HAS HAD A MAJOR PART IN FORMULATING OUR POLICY AND ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES FOR THE OBJECTIVES WE HOPE TO ACHIEVE. MOREOVER OUR PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF GREATEST SATISFACTION TO ME. GENE HAS BEEN AN ABLE, DEVOTED, AND LOYAL COLLEAGUE AND HAS GIVEN UNSTINTINGLY OF HIS ENERGIES AND TALENTS TO OUR MISSION HERE. I AM CONSTRAINED TO ACQUIESCE AT HIS DEPARTURE ONLY BECAUSE I FEEL THAT OUR MAJOR TASK, THAT IS THE FORMULATION OF POLICY OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES, HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM IS ONE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF WHAT WE AND THE GVN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*

HAVE AGREED TO. IT IS BECAUSE I FEEL THAT THE MAJOR PART OF OUR TASK, IN WHICH GENE'S JUDGMENT AND WISDOM HAVE BEEN INDISPENSABLE, HAS BEEN COMPLETED THAT I FEEL THAT HE SHOULD BE PERMITTED IN THIS NEW WAY TO MAKE WHAT I BELIEVE COULD TURN OUT TO BE ANOTHER MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF U.S. INTERESTS.

3. SINCE HE WILL NEED TO INITIATE HIS CAMPAIGN PROMPTLY, HIS PRESENT PLANS ARE TO DEPART SAIGON JANUARY 16, STOP OVER IN TAIPEI, ARRIVING HOME ON THE EVENING OF JANUARY 18. HE WOULD PLAN TO ANNOUNCE HIS CANDIDACY JANUARY 20.

4. GENE MENTIONED TO DEAN RUSK IN DECEMBER THE FACT THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING ENTERING THE CAMPAIGN, IT OCCURS TO ME THAT YOU MAY WISH TO APPRISE DEAN OF HIS DECISION, SHOULD YOU PREFER IT GENE WOULD, OF COURSE, DO SO HIMSELF.

5. I WOULD HOPE TO HAVE THE BEST POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR TO GENE HERE. IN THIS CONNECTION, IF IT SHOULD MEET WITH YOUR APPROVAL, I SHOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO HAVE WINTHROP BROWN IF HE CAN POSSIBLY BE PERSUADED TO TAKE ON THE JOB. WIN SERVED AS MY DEPUTY IN INDIA FOR THREE YEARS THEN SUBSEQUENTLY, AS YOU KNOW, SERVED WITH DISTINCTION AS AMBASSADOR TO LAOS AND TO KOREA. HE, THEREFORE, KNOWS THE AREA WELL. HE SPENT A WEEK HERE WITH ME IN DECEMBER IN ORDER TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH THE SITUATION IN CONNECTION WITH HIS LIAISON WITH THE GOVERNORS AND ABSORBED THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE PROBLEMS HERE EXTRAORDINARILY WELL IN A BRIEF PERIOD. HE IS A MAN OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE AND COMPLETE INTEGRITY. BECAUSE OF HIS REPUTATION AND STANDING, I BELIEVE HE COULD COME INTO THE SITUATION HERE WITH THE LEAST POSSIBLE DISTURBANCE TO THE ORGANIZATION.

6. IF WIN BROWN IS NOT AVAILABLE, I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST AS A NEXT ALTERNATIVE MARSHALL GREEN FOR WHOSE ABILITIES I ALSO HAVE HIGH REGARD.

DTG: 111506Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

January 11, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

Herewith the message to Wilson, as dispatched.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 12-26-91

~~SECRET~~

January 11, 1968

46a

From the President

To the Prime Minister

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By ju, NARA, Date 5-19-98

Dear Harold:

I have just learned from Dean Rusk of your plans for total British withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by 1971.

I know you are close to a final decision and that there is not much time for reconsideration. I also can guess at what soul-searching you and your colleagues have been going through in trying to find the means for restoring the health of the British economy and still carry as much as possible of the financial burdens which you have so courageously borne thus far.

This having been said, I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone.

Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if you and all of your associates have taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alternatives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

LBJ:State:WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

47

Jan 11, 1967

Jim Jones telephoned Mr. Rostow with following change: "Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if you and all of your associates have taken fully into account the direct and indirect consequences."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By fw, NARA, Date 5-19-98

47a

Jan. 11, 1968

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By JW, NARA, Date 5-19-98

CAP 80282
Pres file

Following are:

- the
- a memorandum of/conversation this morning between George Brown and Secretary Rusk;
- a draft letter from you to Harold Wilson.

As you can see, George Brown said that the British intend to announce next Tuesday their total withdrawal from the Far East and Persian Gulf by 1971.

It is Secretary Rusk's view -- as well as George Brown's and Pat Dean's -- that you should come back with the strongest letter possible to Wilson today, since the Cabinet may be meeting on this tomorrow and over the weekend.

You should also know the following:

- George Brown sought out and talked to Bob McNamara and myself at lunch. He said these were the saddest days of his life. He doubted that the situation could be turned but only the strongest possible letter from the President could turn it. Wilson's position was based on three considerations: (1) his political base in the left wing of the Labor Party, which insisted on this action as part of the austerity package; (2) the "little England view" of certain members of the Cabinet; and (3) Roy Jenkins' hope that with this kind of cut in the budget Britain could be earning^a surplus by mid-1969. Bob and I asked if Wilson had taken into account what others would do if Britain walked away from its responsibilities, including Lee's threat to

withdraw Singapore's sterling balances from London. Had they really looked at the secondary cost to Britain of going it alone? George replied that he had made the point, but it had been rejected.

Brown also said that they were planning to cancel the F111 contract, although Denis Healey was fighting to the last ditch and had not yet been completely defeated.

You may wish to add, after the third full paragraph, an additional paragraph as follows:

"Although the decision must, of course, be your own, I can only wonder if all the direct and indirect consequences of these actions, in a world which is so interdependent in its security and economic affairs, have been fully measured."

I suggest this polite warning to lay the basis for certain ~~counter-~~ actions we might be forced to take ^{with respect to arrangements} which have rested on the assumption that Britain was carrying a part of our common global responsibilities.

(memorandum of conversation between Sect. Rusk and George Brown follows)

47b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

~~Subject: British Withdrawal from the
Far East and Persian Gulf~~

In his meeting this morning with the Secretary George Brown informed him that the British intend to announce next Tuesday, January 16, that they will withdraw all British forces from the Far East (except Hong Kong) by March 31, 1971 and will retain no specific military capability at all in that area after withdrawal as they had envisaged last July; and will also withdraw by the same date all of their forces from the Persian Gulf which they had earlier intended to maintain indefinitely, and indeed to increase. They will "re-negotiate" rather than terminate the Anglo-Malaysian Agreement. While they will remain a member of SEATO and CENTO their force level declaration in SEATO will cease to have any meaning after withdrawal is complete. The sole UK forces available for deployment to these areas or elsewhere outside Europe will be limited to those stationed in the UK or Europe. George Brown explained that these steps are considered essential to help achieve £ 1 billion in overall budget savings which will also involve heavy cuts in social welfare expenditures and steep tax increases. He said that the UK felt strongly that the achievement of the £ 1 billion saving is absolutely essential to make devaluation work and to restore the strength of sterling. He left no doubt that decisions had for all practical purposes been made and would be confirmed by the British Cabinet at its meeting tomorrow, January 12.

The Secretary expressed to George Brown our deep dismay over these pending actions which he characterized as being tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs and having profound repercussions on the future of the free world, on US public opinion and on our political will to maintain our own presence. He said that the US would not and could not fill the vacuum left by the British and urged that the British Government and people consider most carefully the alternatives to the disastrous path of action on which they seem to be setting their feet.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 5-19-98

(draft letter to Harold Wilson follows)

Dear Harold:

I have just learned from Dean Rusk of your plans for total British withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by 1971.

I know you are close to a final decision and that there is not much time for reconsideration. I also can guess at what soul-searching you and your colleagues have been going through in trying to find the means for restoring the health of the British economy and still carry as much as possible of the financial burdens which you have so courageously borne thus far.

This having been said, I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By hw, NARA, Date 5-19-98

While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alternatives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Final WWR comment: This is the tragic fate of nations which increase their wages faster than their productivity. I hope our industrial and labor leadership learn the lesson before we go this way.

###

~~SECRET~~

January 11, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

*(via Jim Jones)**Pres file
WA 80278*

At your request I held off James Roosevelt and said that he would be hearing later about the possibilities of his going to ^{Vietnam} Asia. I received the following telegram this morning.

QUOTE Appreciate your letter. For your information I am departing Geneva January 19 for New York Regency Hotel. Arriving Washington evening of 22nd, Madison Hotel, remaining until 24th. Plan continue Los Angeles and general Los Angeles area January 26 through February 3, then proceeding Manila. Good wishes. END QUOTE

WWRostow:rln

49

Pres file

1/11/68 to Roberts

Limited Official Use

Thursday - January 11, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - - ACTION

SUBJECT: Visit by Benito Juarez Scholars

Herewith a recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you receive 40 young Latin American men and women who will be coming to the US as Benito Juarez scholars. They will be in town February 7-9.

If you agree to meet them, I will make arrangements with Jim Jones on the scheduling and arrange for the briefing papers.

W. W. Rostow

I will see them _____
Prefer not to _____
Speak to me _____.

Attachment

Secretary Rusk's recommendation



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

49a
January 10, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Appointment for Benito Juarez Scholars

Recommendation:

I suggest that you receive informally approximately forty Latin American young men and women who will be coming to the United States as Benito Juarez Scholars. They arrive in Washington February 7, and could meet with you at your convenience February 8 or 9.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Background:

You and Mexican President Diaz Ordaz agreed in April 1966 to create Lincoln and Juarez Scholarship Programs for the youth of the hemisphere. There are now 41 Juarez Scholars from 13 Latin American countries studying in the United States. The group arriving in February represents the second year's selection.

Your meeting with the 1968 Juarez Scholars will provide an opportunity to emphasize your continued interest in furthering education in Latin America as well as symbolizing the warm relations you enjoy with Mexico and its President.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Exempted from automatic decontrol.

January 11, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

Sec. Rusk's birthday is February 9.

VZCZCEEA027
OO WTE10
DE WTE 298

1968 JAN 11 01 27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80262

Pres file

68 JAN 10 PM 8:44

WEDNESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 10, 1968

NICK KATZENBACH GOT IN TOUCH WITH MILLS IN ARKANSAS AND TOLD HIM ABOUT HIS TRIP AND THAT HE WANTED TO SEND HIM A REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS WITH DEBRE, AND GO OVER OTHER PARTS OF THE TRIP WITH HIM. MILLS WAS VERY APPRECIATIVE AND ASKED NICK TO SEND TO HIS OFFICE THE REPORT ON HIS PARIS VISIT AND ANY OTHER USEFUL MATERIAL ON VISITS TO OTHER EUROPEAN CAPITALS. HE PLANS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON FRIDAY EVENING AND WILL GO OVER THE MATERIAL ON SATURDAY. HE SAID, AFTER HE HAD READ THE REPORTS, HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH NICK TO GET HIS OVERALL IMPRESSIONS ON THE MISSION.

DTG 110112Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *pw*, NARA, Date 5-19-98

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Wednesday
January 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Joseph H. Allen, President of McGraw-Hill
Publications

Allen wrote you recently (letter attached). He feels that American businessmen do not understand the U.S. economic stake in Asia -- and the importance of that war in Vietnam to that stake. He feels the McGraw-Hill Publications can rectify this situation and he is considering an on-the-spot survey early in 1968 of Vietnam, Japan, and India.

His basic idea is to describe for American businessmen the kind of Asia they will be doing business with if South Vietnam falls to the Communists, and to contrast that with the role of American business in a free Asia.

Before undertaking such a survey Allen wants an indication that we would consider it useful.

I think his idea is a good one. Attached is a letter for your signature which gives him the encouragement he wants.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

MWright:wpt

52a

January 11, 1968

Dear Mr. Allen:

I was glad to receive your letter of December 26.

I share your view that the future shape of Asia depends on the outcome of the war in Vietnam; and that this nation has vital interests in the future of that region.

We need to have as wide a public understanding as possible of what is now happening in Asia and of the nation's stake in the outcome. I am, therefore, pleased that you are thinking of going there yourself. We would like to know your reflections and suggestions when you return.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Joseph H. Allen
President
McGraw-Hill Publications
330 West 42nd Street
New York, New York 10036

*mailed from
Johnson City, Texas
1/13/68*

LBJ:WWRostow:rlh

RGR
EEA008
OO WTE10
DE WTE 278

Received: Washington ComrCen
7:36 AM Wednesday 10 ~~DECEMBER~~ 1968
January

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80243

Received: LBJ Ranch ComrCen
7:52 AM Wednesday 10 January 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

HEREWITH AN INTERESTING ITEM FROM THIS MORNING'S INTELLIGENCE:

A RECENTLY CAPTURED DOCUMENT MAY REFLECT INCREASED VIET CONG SENSITIVITY TO THE CAMBODIAN BORDER IN VIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE DOCUMENT, DATED JANUARY 2, STATES, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT VIET CONG UNITS WERE TO BE READY TO EVACUATE IF ALLIED FORCES CAME TO THEIR POSITIONS IN THE COSVN BASE AREA (TAY NINH PROVINCE), BUT THAT BECAUSE THE BORDER SITUATION HAD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT, THEY WERE, DURING EVACUATION, TO "COMPLY STRICTLY WITH BORDER REGULATIONS," IN ORDER TO WIN "LONG TERM SUPPORT FROM OUR FRIEND."

DTG: 10/1336Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo, Jan. 5, 1968
By *per* NARA, Date 12-26-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 10 19 06

EEA013
OO WIE10
DE WIE283

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80248

Profile

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 10, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH, AS TELEPHONED BY EVRON, THE KEY PASSAGE OF A STATEMENT WHICH PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL MADE IN NEW YORK JANUARY 9 TO THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS IN AMERICA.

"I AM SURE YOU ALL WANT TO HEAR ABOUT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF MY VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS TO MEET AGAIN WITH THE PRESIDENT. I THINK THAT OUR JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF YESTERDAY SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. THEY WERE VERY GOOD AND FRIENDLY AND SERIOUS CONVERSATIONS, AND THEY WERE HELD IN A VERY GOOD ATMOSPHERE. I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE QUESTION OF ATMOSPHERE. THIS IS THE SECOND TIME THAT I HAVE MET PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE FIRST WAS IN 1964, AND NOW AGAIN. IN 1964 WHEN I CAME AWAY FROM HIM I TOLD MYSELF THAT HE IS A FRIEND. NOW I AM EVEN MORE CONVINCED OF THIS. HE SHOWED THIS TO ME IN MANY PRACTICAL WAYS. THERE IS IN HIM A DEPTH OF UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PROBLEM AND POSITION AND OF OUR NEEDS. I COULD TALK TO HIM MAN-TO-MAN AND FEEL THAT THERE IS A RAPPORT, AND IT IS NOT JUST A QUESTION OF FORMAL WORDS. I BELIEVE HE HAS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK IN WHICH OUR PROBLEMS HAVE TO BE VIEWED AND OF WHAT IS AT STAKE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, NARA, Date 1-17-92

I THINK THAT HE IS ABLE TO REACH THIS UNDERSTANDING BECAUSE OF HIS GENERAL APPROACH TO WHAT IS NEEDED IN THE WORLD, BECAUSE OF HIS FEELING THAT IT IS VITAL IN OUR WORLD THAT SMALL COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT BE EATEN UP BY BIG COUNTRIES, AND THAT PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE THE WAY THEY WANT TO LIVE EVEN IF THEY ARE LITTLE PEOPLE.

"I SPEAK HERE OF MY IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE BASED ON HOURS OF CONVERSATION BOTH AT FORMAL AND INFORMAL MEETINGS IN 1964 AND IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, AND BETWEEN THESE TWO MEETINGS WE WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH ON THESE MATTERS. I SENSE IN HIM A CONCEPT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AMERICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS WHICH, I BELIEVE, IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD AND FOR ITS PEACE. I AM IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH HIM ON THIS. AND IT HAS VITAL AND DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR US IN ISRAEL. IT IS NOT MY JOB HERE TO SURVEY ALL THE PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD. THERE ARE MANY AREAS OF CONFLICT IN THE WORLD TODAY AND HAVE BEEN FOR THE LAST 20 YEARS SINCE THE END OF THE WAR. NOR CAN I SAY THAT THESE CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE LESS PUBLICIZED CONFLICTS IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA ARE ENTIRELY IDENTICAL. HOWEVER, I DO THINK THERE ARE BASIC UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES AT STAKE IN ALL OF THEM. ONE PRINCIPLE IS THE NEED TO RESIST AGGRESSION. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE IS THAT WHEREVER THERE IS A SITUATION OF CONFLICT IT CAN ONLY BE SOLVED BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION. I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT THE U.S. IS GENUINELY SEEKING A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING ALL THOSE I HAVE MENTIONED ABOVE."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 101807Z JAN 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

55

Wednesday
January 10, 1968

Chen

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Joseph H. Allen, President of McGraw-Hill
Publications

Allen wrote you recently (letter attached). He feels that American businessmen do not understand the U. S. economic stake in Asia -- and the importance of that war in Vietnam to that stake. He feels the McGraw-Hill Publications can rectify this situation and he is considering an on-the-spot survey early in 1968 of Vietnam, Japan, and India.

His basic idea is to describe for American businessmen the kind of Asia they will be doing business with if South Vietnam falls to the Communists, and to contrast that with the role of American business in a free Asia.

Before undertaking such a survey Allen wants an indication that we would consider it useful.

I think his idea is a good one. Attached is a letter for your signature which gives him the encouragement he wants.

I recommend you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Atts.

MWright:wpt

55a

January 11, 1968

Dear Mr. Allen:

I was glad to receive your letter of December 26.

I share your view that the future shape of Asia depends on the outcome of the war in Vietnam; and that this nation has vital interests in the future of that region.

We need to have as wide a public understanding as possible of what is now happening in Asia and of the nation's stake in the outcome. I am, therefore, pleased that you are thinking of going there yourself. We would like to know your reflections and suggestions when you return.

Sincerely,

Mr. Joseph H. Allen
President
McGraw-Hill Publications
330 West 42nd Street
New York, New York 10036

LBJ:WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ZEV

1968 JAN 10 23 40

1968 JAN 10 PM 6:42
WEDNESDAY

Free file

EEA021
OO VTE10
DE VTE 292

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP88256

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 10, 1968

AMB. LODGE HAS REQUESTED THAT YOU SEE HIM UPON YOUR RETURN TO WASHINGTON. HIS ONLY ENGAGEMENT IS TO GO TO THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN NEW YORK ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 12; BUT HE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PREPARED TO CANCEL THAT APPOINTMENT IF THAT IS THE TIME YOU WISH TO SEE HIM.

I TOLD HIM I WOULD FORWARD HIS REQUEST TO YOU.

DTG: 102327Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *lg*, NARA, Date *12-26-91*

VZCZCEEA017
PP WTE10
DE WTE 289

1968 JAN 10 22 26

88 JAN 10 PM 5:29

WEDNESDAY

FROM W. W. ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE WH80253

Pres file

UNCLAS

JANUARY 10, 1968

SUBJECT: NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT TREJOS

COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT TREJOS HAS SENT YOU THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR NEW YEAR'S GREETING:

"I APPRECIATE YOUR KIND MESSAGE TRANSMITTED
BY YOUR DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR, HIS EX-
CELLENCY CLARENCE A. BOONSTRA. IT IS A
PLEASURE TO RECIPROCATATE WITH MY VERY FERVENT
WISHES THAT IN THE YEAR THAT BEGINS, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MAY QUICKLY AND
SATISFACTORILY RESOLVE THE GRAVE PROBLEMS
WHICH PREOCCUPY YOUR GOVERNMENT, WHICH ARE
ALSO CAUSE OF DEEP CONCERN FOR THE FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES. I ALSO WISH THE HAPPINESS AND
EVER-GROWING PROSPERITY OF THE NOBLE NORTH
AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND THE PERSONAL HAPPINESS
OF ITS ILLUSTRIOUS PRESIDENT. A WARM AND CORDIAL
GREETING FROM JOSE JOAQUIN TREJOS FERNANDEZ."

DTG: 10/2151Z JAN 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 10, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Private Letter from Greek Prime Minister

The attached from Papadopoulos comes to you via Tom Pappas and Hal Pachios. Although it doesn't say so specifically, it looks like a plea for recognition. It makes two points:

1. His coup last April was necessary. He exaggerates both the Communist threat and the deterioration in Greece at that time, but there are elements of truth to both and he sounds sincere.

2. He's doing his best to restore democracy. He must build safeguards for democracy first, so he doesn't know when he can hold elections. He will present the new constitution "no later than 1968" and assures you he will not perpetuate an undemocratic regime.

He concludes by asking for a "due response" to Greece's "sincere devotion to its allies and to the principles of the Free World." Presumably, this means recognition.

There's nothing in this letter that Papadopoulos hasn't said to Phil Talbot. The interesting point in his making this direct approach to you is that it shows some discomfort over our keeping our distance and the value he apparently still places in a relationship with us.

Our embassy is doing business with the regime, but Phil Talbot is avoiding formal contact. State feels we must show our domestic critics that we haven't written off the King. They also want to keep pressing the government back to constitutionalism and to help re-establish the King. Soon we will regularize relations, but only after we get everything we can out of the present situation.

State proposes you not answer now, but they will find a useful time to acknowledge the letter and maybe pass a word back. But they don't want to waste that opening.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 04-74
By *is*, NARA, Date 10-5-04

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20590

58.6

January 8, 1968

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is a letter to you from the Prime Minister of Greece,
Mr. Papadopoulos.

The letter was brought by hand from Greece and delivered to
Mr. Thomas Pappas, a prominent American industrialist of
Greek extraction. Pappas has been a trusted friend of the
Greek people for many years, and the Prime Minister entrusted
him with the responsibility of getting his personal message to
you. Unexpectedly, Pappas left New York yesterday to fly to
Greece. Since Pappas is an old family friend of mine, he
asked me if I would undertake the responsibility of getting the
letter to you. It was brought to me today by a messenger.

I know nothing of the importance or urgency of the letter.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "H.C. Pachios".

Harold C. Pachios
Office of Operations
and Legal Counsel

Attachment

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EEAB19
OO WTE10
DE WTE 288

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80252

1968 JAN 10 22 45

Free file
1968 JAN 10 PM 5:47
WEDNESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

JANUARY 10, 1968

AT HIS URGENT REQUEST, I HAD LUNCH TODAY WITH JOE ALSOP AT HIS HOUSE. I THOUGHT I WOULD USE THE OCCASION TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO WRITE THOUGHTFULLY ABOUT THE INADEQUACIES OF THE TRINH NEGOTIATING FORMULA; UNDERLINE THE ELEMENTS IN SAN ANTONIO; AND DISCOURAGE FALSE OPTIMISM. I FOUND MYSELF CONFRONTED WITH AN HOUR'S MONOLOGUE IN WHICH I COULD BARELY GET A WORD IN EDGEWISE.

THE MONOLOGUE WAS, HOWEVER, OF SUFFICIENT INTEREST FOR ME TO REPORT IT PRECISELY.

THERE WERE THREE SUBJECTS: NEGOTIATIONS; SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY; AND KHE SANH.

NEGOTIATIONS. IN HIS BEST GLOOM-AND-DOOM MANNER, JOE SAID WE ARE ABOUT TO LOSE A WAR WE ARE WELL ON THE WAY TO WINNING. HE HAS BEEN TALKING TO MCNAMARA AND BILL BUNDY. HE SAYS MCNAMARA'S IDEA THAT WE CAN FIGHT A MORE EFFECTIVE WAR WITHOUT BOMBING THE NORTH IS "TRAGIC NONSENSE," EVEN IF THE DMZ IS QUIET. THERE ARE, IN JOE'S JUDGMENT, 800,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TIED UP IN DEALING WITH OUR BOMBING. THEY WILL POUR SOUTH VIA THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL INTO LAOS. WE SHALL HAVE A NEW MASSIVE WAR AS THE RESULT OF LIVING WITH THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AS HE UNDERSTANDS IT IS NOW BEING INTERPRETED. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT WE DID NOT INTEND TO ENGAGE IN PANMUNJOM-TYPE ENDLESS NEGOTIATIONS, HE THEN SAID THAT THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE AN INCREASE IN INFILTRATION WOULD BE SO OBSCURE THAT WE COULD NEVER PERSUADE THE BRITISH, ETC., THAT INFILTRATION HAD INCREASED. THE PRESSURE TO CONTINUE THE TALKS ON HANOI'S TERMS WOULD BE VERY GREAT. ONCE THE PRESIDENT HAD ACCEPTED THE TALKS AND THEN WAS FORCED BACK TO BOMBING, HE WOULD LOSE GROUND. HE WOULD APPEAR WEAK AND VULNERABLE.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 94-456
By cl, NARA, Date 4-5-95

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

HE THEN WENT ON, WITH SOME RELISH, TO SAY: "I TOLD THE PRESIDENT HE SHOULD MAKE A STATEMENT THAT WOULD FEND OFF ANY NEGOTIATIONS. HE REFUSED TO TAKE MY ADVICE. NOW HE IS IN A GREAT DILEMMA WHICH COULD BE MORTAL. WHAT HE SHOULD DO IS TO GET ON THE AIR AND TELL THE PEOPLE: 'I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR 525,000 OF OUR MEN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. I WILL NOT ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL RELEASE THE MANPOWER IN THE NORTH FOR A MUCH EXPANDED WAR IN THE SOUTH. I WILL NOT HAVE THAT BLOODSHED ON MY HANDS. LET THOSE WHO ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS COST STEP FORWARD.'"

PUTTING THE EMOTION ASIDE, WHAT JOE IS SAYING IS THAT:

- IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO MONITOR AN INCREASE IN INFILTRATION;
- IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO DEMONSTRATE AN INCREASE IN INFILTRATION PERSUASIVELY;
- IT WILL BE HARD, THEREFORE, TO MAKE A PUBLIC CASE FOR RESUMING BOMBING IF TALKS ARE PROTRACTED AND THEY BEGIN TO RELEASE MANPOWER FROM THE NORTH TO THE SOUTH;
- AND, THEREFORE, WE MUST INTERPRET THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AS REQUIRING A TOTAL CESSATION OF INFILTRATION.

IN SHORT, JOE PUTS A VERY HIGH PREMIUM ON THE PINNING DOWN IN THE NORTH OF WHAT HE NOW ESTIMATES TO BE 800,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE BY OUR BOMBING; AND BELIEVES THAT IF WE PUT HANOI IN A POSITION TO RELEASE THESE PEOPLE FOR MOVEMENT TO THE SOUTH, WE COULD GRAVELY PROLONG THE WAR.

SENATOR ROBERT F. KENNEDY. JOE SAYS HE SAW BOBBY KENNEDY YESTERDAY. BOBBY IS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM ALL HIS ADVISERS EXCEPT TED SORENSEN TO CHALLENGE YOU FOR THE NOMINATION. "ALL THAT IS STOPPING HIM IS HIS OWN SENSE OF POLITICAL REALITY." HE SAYS THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD ADVISERS STRETCHING FROM TED SORENSEN ON THE LEFT TO HIS FATHER ON THE RIGHT. SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY HAS TED SORENSEN ON THE RIGHT AND GOD KNOWS WHOM ON THE LEFT. IN HIS OWN JUDGMENT, THE ONLY WAY FOR THE PRESIDENT TO DEAL WITH SENATOR KENNEDY IS TO ASSERT TOUGH LEADERSHIP. UNCERTAINTY MIGHT LEAD HIM TO JUMP, EVEN THOUGH HE TOLD BOBBY, HE SAYS, THAT THE ONLY RESULT WOULD BE TO DESTROY HIMSELF AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND PUT THE REPUBLICAN RIGHT WING INTO POWER FOR TWENTY YEARS. JOE LINKED HOW THE NEGOTIATION ISSUE IS HANDLED TO HOW SENATOR KENNEDY WILL MOVE. IF WE GET INTO A NEGOTIATING SITUATION AND THEN HAVE TO RESUME BOMBING ON INADEQUATE EVIDENCE, WE SHALL LOOK WEAK AND UNCERTAIN. THAT WILL BE THE SIGNAL FOR ROBERT KENNEDY TO GET INTO THE RING.

KHE SANH. JOE SAID THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE MILITARY CAMPAIGN IS GOING EXACTLY AS THE DOCUMENTS SAID IT WOULD. THEY ARE USING UP THEIR ASSETS IN THE SOUTH. HE IS, HOWEVER, WORRIED ABOUT THE CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN LAOS AGAINST THE MARINE OUTPOST OF KHE SANH. HE SAID THAT IF HE WERE THE PRESIDENT HE WOULD ASK WESTMORELAND FOR A STATEMENT OF THE PROS AND CONS OF OUR GETTING OUT OF KHE SANH. HE UNDERSTANDS THE ROAD TO KHE SANH IS ALREADY CUT. HE BELIEVES THE AIRFIELD AT KHE SANH CAN BE COMMANDED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FROM NEARBY HILLS. HE FEELS THAT WESTMORELAND IS INHIBITED IN THAT AREA BY THE TRADITIONAL, SOMEWHAT DISTANT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MARINE COMMANDER IN I CORPS AND HIMSELF. HE FEELS THE PRESIDENT MUST BE ASSURED THAT WESTMORELAND IS ABSOLUTELY CONFIDENT HE CAN DEAL WITH THE KHE SANH PROBLEM. IT IS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR A DIENBIENPHU. AND THE ENEMY IS LOOKING FOR A DIENBIENPHU.

FYI. I HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN ASKING QUESTIONS ABOUT KHE SANH. IT IS CLEAR THAT WESTMORELAND HAS IT VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND. I SHALL LOOK FURTHER INTO OUR CONTINGENCY PLANNING.

DTG 102127Z JANUARY 1968

EYES ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN 10 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visit to U. S. Ports by British Nuclear Powered Polaris Submarines

Charles F. Baird, the Acting Secretary of the Navy, advises that arrangements have been made for the new British Polaris submarine HMS RESOLUTION to visit Charleston, South Carolina and Port Canaveral, Florida during the period January 24 through March 6, 1968. This is to conduct a missile shakedown and firing operational test as provided by our Polaris Sales Agreement with the UK. Following the RESOLUTION visit, the three other Polaris submarines will also conduct similar tests as their construction is completed. The arrangements and safety regulations have been worked out by the Navy and AEC and the British Government has provided diplomatic clearances. The AEC will keep the Joint Committee advised.

At our request, the Navy has also provided a public affairs plan to cover the visit. This plan was prepared with the assistance of UK representatives.

The British desire to hold publicity to a reasonable minimum because of political considerations in the U. K. The U. S. Chief of Naval Operations will send a suitable message to the ship upon her arrival in the U. S. and there will be a low-key press release issued simultaneously by both governments shortly before the submarine arrives in the U. S.

(signed) W. W Rostow

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-257
By iss, NARA, Date 12-1-04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 10 16 51

EEA889
OO WIE10
DE WIE 279

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO: THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80244

~~SECRET~~

TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Pres file

HEREWITH AN INTERESTING CIA REPORT:

THE DILEMMA POSED BY THE SOVIET INTELLECTUALS

SOVIET LEADERS ARE GETTING THEMSELVES IN TO HOTTER AND HOTTER WATER AS THEY PURSUE THEIR DRIVE AGAINST DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS. THE FOUR YOUNG INTELLECTUALS WHO WENT ON TRIAL THIS WEEK FOR "SLANDERING THE STATE" ARE NO MERE ODDBALLS. BEHIND THEM IS THE MORAL BACKING OF THE OVERWHELMING BULK OF THE COUNTRY'S TOP CREATORS AND THINKERS IN MANY FIELDS. THEY INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION'S MOST ABLE WRITERS, HISTORIANS, ARTISTS, COMPOSERS, CHEMISTS, BIOLOGISTS, AND PHYSICISTS. SEVERAL ARE NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS; ONE IS KNOWN IN THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AS THE FATHER OF THE SOVIET H BOMB.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLT 019-027-2-4
By [Signature], NARA, Date 2/13/01

WELL OVER A HUNDRED OF THESE MEN HAVE SIGNED PUBLIC PETITIONS OF PROTEST AGAINST THE EFFORTS SOVIET LEADERS HAVE MADE IN THE PAST TWO YEARS TO LIMIT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE COUNTRY. THESE EFFORTS GOT UNDER WAY NEARLY TWO YEARS AGO WITH THE CELEBRATED TRIAL OF THE TWO SOVIET NOVELISTS SINYAVSKY AND DANIEL. THE CURRENT TRIAL, AND THREE OTHERS DURING THE PAST YEAR, STEMMED DIRECTLY FROM THAT TRIAL. EXPRESSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR SINYAVSKY AND DANIEL AND PROTESTS AGAINST THE SYSTEM THAT PERSECUTED THEM HAVE PROMPTED NEW EFFORTS BY THE REGIME TO ENFORCE ITS WILL. THESE, IN TURN, HAVE SPARKED NEW PROTESTS. THE PROBLEM CONTINUES SPIRALING UPWARD AND BOTH SIDES CLEARLY MEAN BUSINESS.

ONE SIGN OF THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH THE INTELLECTUALS VIEW THE ISSUE IS THE OPEN ADMISSION SOME OF THEM HAVE MADE THAT THEY TOO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR STALIN'S TERRORISM--BECAUSE THEY DARED NOT PROTEST IT. THESE MEN HAVE VOWED NEVER TO BE SO COVED IN THE FUTURE. ONE OF OUR SOURCES WITH CONTACTS AMONG THE INTELLECTUALS REPORTS THAT THESE PEOPLE FEAR THE REGIME'S LATEST ACTIONS HERALD A RETURN TO THE WAYS OF STALIN.

THE INTELLECTUALS DID TASTE ONE BRIEF PERIOD OF RELATIVE FREEDOM DURING THE KHRUSHCHEV DAYS. KHRUSHCHEV WAS AN INNOVATOR AND HE OFTEN USED INTELLECTUAL DISSENT AS A WAY OF BRINGING PRESSURE AGAINST CONSERVATIVES IN THE PARTY WHO WERE DRAGGING THEIR FEET, RESISTING THE CHANGES HE THOUGHT WERE NECESSARY TO REVITALIZE THE SOVIET SYSTEM. KHRUSHCHEV'S SUCCESSORS ARE QUITE ANOTHER KETTLE OF FISH IN THIS RESPECT. THE BIGGEST CONCERN OF TODAY'S COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IS TO KEEP A UNITED FRONT ON IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. THEY HAVE NOT TRIED ANY LONG - TERM SOLUTIONS AND RESENT ANYONE TRYING TO ROCK THE BOAT. TO THEM, THE DISSIDENCE IN THE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY IS A TROUBLESOME DISTRACTION.

SOME SOVIET INTELLECTUALS HAVE OCCASIONALLY HINTED THAT SOMEWHERE IN THE UPPER REACHES OF THE PARTY ARE MEN WHO SYMPATHIZE WITH, OR AT LEAST UNDERSTAND, THEIR AIMS. NO ONE IN THE PRESENT PARTY LEADERSHIP HOWEVER, HAS YET STEPPED UP TO SUPPORT THEM OPENLY.

DTG: 101551Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EEA012 1968 JAN 10 17 58

PP WTE10
DE WTE 282

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80247

Free file
JAN 10 PM 1:28
WEDNESDAY

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 10, 1968

SUBJECT: PL 480 AGREEMENT FOR JORDAN

SECRETARY FREEMAN, BILL GAUD AND CHARLIE SCHULTZ RECOMMEND YOU APPROVE A \$2.1 MILLION WHEAT AGREEMENT FOR JORDAN. TREASURY CONCURS. THIS WOULD COVER 30,000 TONS FOR DOLLARS OVER TWENTY YEARS.

THIS AGREEMENT WILL PARTLY SUBSTITUTE FOR AID DOLLARS. SINCE JORDAN FOR THE MOMENT IS RECEIVING ALL THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AID IT NEEDS, WE SUSPENDED OUR BUDGET SUPPORT AS THE FINAL QUARTER OF 1967. OUR STRATEGY IS TO COMBINE THIS PL 480 DEAL AND \$3 MILLION IN AID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FUNDS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT LAST QUARTER OF BUDGET SUPPORT TO CUSHION THE TRANSITION TO NO SUPPORT IN 1968. WE PLAN TO USE THE AID MONEY FOR FEASIBILITY STUDIES THAT WILL HELP THE JORDANIANS USE THE ARAB MONEY THEY HAVE TO GOOD PERMANENT ADVANTAGE.

THIS WOULD BE USEFUL POLITICALLY, TOO. IT IS ONE OF THE FEW POSITIVE THINGS WE'VE BEEN ABLE TO DO. THE JORDANIANS ARE UPSET THAT WE ARE ENDING BUDGET SUPPORT, AND WE ARE JUST BARELY SCRAPING THROUGH ON THE MILITARY SIDE. WE GOT OUR RESPONSE ON ARMS OUT THE DAY AFTER HUSSEIN HAD AGREED TO RECEIVE SOVIET MISSION. HARRY SYMMES HAD TO PERSUADE HUSSEIN TO WITHDRAW A LETTER STATING THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE AND TO PUT OFF THE SOVIET VISIT. HE SUCCEEDED, BUT WE MAY STILL HAVE A HARD ENOUGH TIME RESPONDING ADEQUATELY TO HIS ARMS REQUESTS. A MOVE ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE WOULD HELP A LITTLE. NOW THAT WE HAVE ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE TO OUR BLOCKING THE SOVIETS IN JORDAN, I THINK WE NEED TO GET BACK INTO BUSINESS IN EVERY WAY WE REASONABLY CAN. FORTUNATELY, PL 480 IS ONE OF THE FEW RESOURCES WE CAN USE RELATIVELY FREELY.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS IS THE FIRST SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT TO BE PROCESSED UNDED THE NEW "SYMINGTON AMENDMENT" TO THE AID BILL WHICH REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO "TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION" WHETHER SUCH AID WILL BE DIVERTED TO MILITARY ENDS OR ENABLE THE RECIPIENT TO SUPPORT UNNECESSARY MILITARY EXPENDITURES. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE KEPT THE JORDANIAN MILITARY BUDGET WITHIN AGREED LIMITS. THE PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL EXPENDITURES HAS BEEN QUITE HIGH BUT DECLINING. THE JORDANIANS ARE THE ONLY ARAB COMBATANTS IN THE JUNE WAR THAT HAVE NOT PURCHASED SUBSTANTIAL REPLACEMENTS FOR THEIR LOSES.

WE WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS OUT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE SINCE A SOVIET ECONOMIC MISSION IS ALREADY IN JORDAN.

APPROVE-----

CALL ME-----

DTG: 101720Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64 68, vol 20, #43
By jc NARA, Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

VZCZCZEA003
00 WTE18
DE WTE 272

~~SECRET~~

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80237

1968 JAN 10 09 11

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

Profile

RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM DESCRIBED IN THE MESSAGE FROM
BROMLEY SMITH, HERewith THE CABLE DISPATCHED BY SECRETARY
RUSK AFTER DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY MCNAMARA.

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
STATE

1. SECRETARY INFORMED DOBRYNIN AT 1730 EST JAN 9 OF
ACCIDENTAL DROP OF DELAYED ACTION BOMBS IN CUA CAM RIVER,
HAIPHONG, AT TIME OF THE JANUARY 4 PERESLAVL-ZALESSKIY
INCIDENT.
2. SINCE DOBRYNIN DEPARTING WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY, HE RECOMMENDED EMB MOSCOW INFORM
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF INCIDENT WITHOUT DELAY IN
VIEW OF DANGER OF FURTHER EXPLOSIONS.
3. REQUEST YOU HAVE DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION SEEK APPOINTMENT
URGENTLY WITH APPROPRIATE LEVEL OFFICIAL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS BELOW GROMYKO TO CONVEY FOLLOWING INFORMATION.
4. INITIAL INVESTIGATION INDICATES AS RESULT INACCURATE
AREA CHART, DELAYED ACTION BOMBS WERE RELEASED WELL SHORT OF
PLANNED RELEASE POINT. RESULT IS THAT NUMBER (NOW BELIEVED
TO BE 17) SUCH BOMBS DEPOSITED IN TWO STRINGS ACROSS CUA CAM
RIVER JUST NORTH OF THE COUPURE DE HA LY, (UP RIVER FROM
PRINCIPAL COMMERCIAL PIERS AND WEST OF MAIN FERRY CROSSING)
PRESENTING DANGERS TO SHIPPING IN THIS SECTION OF RIVER.
DOBRYNIN GIVEN 1962 CITY MAP SHOWING APPROXIMATE LOCATION
OF BOMB STRINGS AND INTENDED BOMB TARGET LINE WHICH HE CARRYING
WITH HIM TO MOSCOW.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 13252

By spies, NARA, Date 7-22-03

5. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT BOMBING OF PERESLAVL-ZALESSKIY AS WELL AS DROPPING OF THE UNDETONATED BOMBS WAS NOT RPT NOT DELIBERATE, BUT RESULT OF ERROR. AS STATED IN OUR NOTE OF JAN 5, THIS INCIDENT "IS REGRETTEED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT" AND "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT MAY BE ASSURED THAT UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID RECURRENCE OF SUCH INCIDENTS."

6. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THIS INFORMATION IS BEING PASSED TO SOVIETS SIMPLY TO AVOID POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER SHIPPING INCIDENT. IT IS NOT REPEAT NOT CONVEYED WITH ANY POLITICAL OR POLICY OBJECTIVE IN MIND. IT IS SIMPLY BECAUSE WE PREFER NOT TO HAVE ANY SHIPS IN TROUBLE AS A RESULT OF THIS INADVERTENT DROPPING OF DELAYED ACTION BOMBS.

7. WE HAVE PASSED SIMILAR INFORMATION TO UK AND MAY DO SO TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHOSE FLAG VESSELS IN OR EN ROUTE TO HAIPHONG ACCORDING TO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US. MEANWHILE, WE ARE GIVING URGENT CONSIDERATION TO OTHER MEASURES WE MIGHT APPROPRIATELY TAKE TO MINIMIZE DANGER TO SHIPPING, E.G. PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

DTG 10/2714Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

64
Pres file

8:25 p. m. , Tuesday, January 9, 1968

Following telephoned by Yolanda Boozer from the Ranch for dispatch. She stated Amb. Clark had dictated it over phone and President had approved it. Sen. Gorton is to be sworn in at 11:00 p. m. Texas time today.

Senator John G. Gorton
Parliament House
Canberra ACT, Australia

sent by DX to State
for immediate
dispatch

Warmest congratulations to you on assuming the great and challenging office of Prime Minister. It gives me strength and comfort to know under your leadership the same close and mutually satisfactory friendship and relations as between our friends Menzies and Holt will continue between our two countries. Australia has a great role and voice in the free world and I look forward to close communication and frequent discussions on matters of mutual interest. Mrs. Johnson and I send our warmest personal regards and best wishes to you and Mrs. Gorton.

Lyndon B. Johnson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EZA985
PP WJ10
DE WTE 251

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80219

1968 JAN 9 22 44

free file

68 JAN 9 PM 6:18

TUESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 9, 1968

HEREWITH CHARLES MAGUIRE'S DRAFT MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER-DESIGNATE GORTON. IT MAY BE WISE TO HOLD DISPATCH UNTIL IT IS OFFICIAL.

BEGIN TEXT I CONGRATULATE YOU AS THE NEW PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA AND WELCOME YOU AS A PARTNER.

THE OFFICE YOU ASSUME IS A POST OF FRIENDSHIP WHERE THE DESTINIES OF OUR TWO NATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN JOINED. AMERICANS ARE PROUD AND REASSURED TO CONTINUE FORWARD IN COMMON PURPOSE WITH YOU. WE FIND NEW HAPPINESS AND CONFIDENCE IN KNOWING THAT YOU APPROACH THE GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF YOUR OFFICE IN THE SPIRIT OF YOUR MAGNIFICENT PREDECESSORS, SIR ROBERT MENZIES AND HAROLD HOLT.

THEIR DREAM OF A NEW AUSTRALIA AND A NEW ASIA ENDURES. THEIR COURAGE AND FAITH AS CHAMPIONS OF FREEDOM INSPIRE ALL MEN OF PEACE TODAY. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR AUSTRALIA'S EXAMPLE. WE ARE EAGER TO HELP FULFILL ITS DREAM.

I PLEDGE YOU ALL COOPERATION IN ADVANCING THE GROWTH OF THAT NEW COMMUNITY WE SEE EMERGING NOW IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. TOGETHER, LET US DEDICATE OUR LEADERSHIP ANEW TO THE RAISING OF A COMMUNITY OF NATIONS WHERE ALL MEN UNITE THEIR STRENGTHS IN THE GOOD WORKS OF COMMON SECURITY, PROGRESS AND FULFILLMENT.

I WISH YOU EVERY PERSONAL HAPPINESS AND SUCCESS. MAY GOD GUIDE YOU AND YOUR GOOD PEOPLE ALWAYS.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

APPROVE -----

DISAPPROVE -----

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House G. L. S. Feb. 24, 1983
By *lg* / IFAA Date *1-27-9*

DTG: 092141Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

1968 JAN 9 20 52

EEA968
OO WTE18
DE WTE 245

FROM WALT ROSTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP89213

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 9, 1968

1968 JAN 9 PM 4:35
TUESDAY

IT WAS A CLOSE THING WITH HUSSEIN, AS THE FOLLOWING CABLE SHOWS. WE SHALL HAVE TO TALK TO THE JORDANIANS ABOUT MORE THAN 800 SMS.

AMMAN 2912

1. WE HAVE HAD A SERIES OF VERY GRIM DISCUSSIONS WITH JORDANIANS TODAY. WITH CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY WE HAVE JUST OBTAINED KING HUSSEIN'S AGREEMENT TO POSTPONING THE VISIT OF A HIGH-LEVEL SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (TWO LIEUTENANT-GENERALS AND FOUR OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON THE ELEVENTH) PENDING DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL KHAMMASH WITH OUR MILITARY PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON. (KHAMMASH'S TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE SUBJECT SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. THE KING HAS ALSO AGREED TO WITHDRAWAL OF A LETTER WRITTEN BY ZAID RIFA'I TO ME INCORPORATING THE KING'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ORAL MESSAGE I DELIVERED TO THE KING YESTERDAY. I OBTAINED THE KING'S AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THIS LETTER, WHICH STATED BASICALLY THAT OUR RESPONSE HAD COME TOO LATE, AGAINST MY PERSONAL ASSURANCES TO HIM THAT THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IMPLIED THAT THE "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" OF JORDAN WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN A POSITIVE WAY WITH KHAMMASH IN WASHINGTON. THE NATURE OF THESE "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS" AS THE EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THEM FROM THE KING AND KHAMMASH WILL BE SPELLED OUT IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

Pres. file

DECLASSIFIED

Authority ERUS 64-68, vol. 20, #42

By JC NARA, Date 7-21-03

3. TODAY'S SITUATION CAME ABOUT PRIMARILY BECAUSE WE WERE LATE IN RESPONDING TO THE KING'S ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER TO THE PRESIDENT. BEYOND THAT, HOWEVER, THE KING APPARENTLY HAD DECIDED WE WERE ONLY STRINGING HIM ALONG, THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION OF DISCUSSING OR SUPPLYING MORE THAN TOKEN ARMS TO JORDAN, AND THAT IN EFFECT WE HAD CALLED HIS HAND. RELIABLE JORDANIAN SOURCES AND AN EMBASSY OFFICER WHO KNOWS HIM WELL SAID THE KING HAS BEEN UNDER CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL TENSION ON THIS MATTER. MY OWN LIMITED EXPERIENCE WITH HUSSEIN CONFIRMS THAT HE HAS BECOME QUITE DESPERATE AND SOMEWHAT OVERWROUGHT. PRIME MINISTER ESKOL'S VISIT AND THE RECENT SERIES OF DIFFICULTIES ON THE BORDER HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS SENSE OF BEING CORNERED. WE ARE ALSO INFORMED HE HAS DEVELOPED A DEEP SENSE OF GUILT ABOUT THE EVENTS OF JUNE.

4. I WOULD EMPHASIZE THAT IN AGREEING (1) TO POSTPONE THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION (2) TO WITHDRAW THE LETTER AND (3) TO SEND GENERAL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON THE KING UNDERSTANDS WE SERIOUSLY INTEND TO COME TO A MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH GENERAL KHAMMASH ON WHAT ARMS WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPLY TO JORDAN. KHAMMASH WILL HAVE FULL POWERS TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER. I THINK HE AND THE KING RECOGNIZE THEY MAY NOT GET ALL THEY WANT, BUT THEY DO EXPECT MORE THAN TOKEN SATISFACTION AND PLAYING FOR TIME. IF WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE ON "LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS", THEN THE KING WILL CONSIDER HE HAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO RESCHEDULING THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND, PRESUMABLY, ACCEPTING SOVIET OFFERS.

5. KING HUSSEIN REQUESTED MY PERSONAL UNDERTAKING THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD WE REVEAL THAT AT OUR REQUEST (1) HE HAD POSTPONED THE SOVIET VISIT OR (2) WITHDRAWN ZAID RIFA'I'S LETTER. I ASSURED HIM HE WOULD BE PROTECTED IN BOTH CASES.

SYMMES

NOTE: ABOVE TEL BEING SERVICED FOR OMISSION OF NUMBERED PARA TWO (2)

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 09/1911Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

January 9, 1968

Pres file

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT -- LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Just so you can stare at an alternative, herewith a crisper way to respond, which would force Hanoi's hand. It has the advantage of leaving a cleaner historical record if they refuse. It has the disadvantage of somewhat unconventional diplomatic boldness.

BEGIN TEXT We have received from Mr. Macovescu your views and noted Foreign Minister Trinh's statement of December 30, 1967.

We propose: cessation of military operations against North Vietnam on (about 14 days from the receipt of this message).

Our negotiating team will be in Rangoon, subject to the agreement of Ne Win, on (about 16 days from receipt of this message), assuming this arrangement is satisfactory.

Our policy remains governed in this matter by the San Antonio formula.

Given the issues you wish to raise, according to Mr. Macovescu's account, we shall ask the Government of Vietnam to join us in these talks.

We await word through this or another appropriate channel that this proposal is acceptable to your side.

We shall be preparing on the assumption that this arrangement is acceptable.

We shall seek to maintain secrecy. END TEXT

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date 72203

69

CONFIDENTIAL

EEA978
OO WTE10
DE WTE 246

SNT:
2:43 PM
9 JAN 68

FROM: WALT ROSTOV
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP30214

1968 JAN 9 19 43

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 9, 1968

Profile

FROM WALT ROSTOV
FOR THE PRESIDENT

WITHOUT PUTTING YOU THROUGH THE DETAILS, YOU SHOULD KNOW THE VARSAN MEETING WITH THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS YESTERDAY WAS CLEARLY BETTER IN TONE AND ATMOSPHERE THAN THE PREVIOUS SESSION LAST JUNE; ALTHOUGH THERE WAS, OF COURSE, NO MOVEMENT IN SUBSTANCE.

IT APPEARS THAT THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATS HAVE RECAPTURED THE FOREIGN OFFICE FROM THE RED GUARDS.

DTG: 091912Z JAN 68

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By , NARA, Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ *SENT*

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 9 16 13

1968 JAN 9 AM 11:22
TUESDAY

EEA976.
OO WTE10
DE WTE 241

FROM: WALT ROSTOW
TO : THE PRESIDENT
CITE: CAP80210

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN. 9, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM WALT ROSTOW

GEORGE BROWN WILL BE IN WASHINGTON WEDNESDAY EVENING (JAN. 10), AND THURSDAY (JAN. 11) WITH SECRETARY RUSK. HE WILL LEAVE THURSDAY EVENING SINCE HE MUST BE BACK IN LONDON ON FRIDAY.

PAT DEAN WANTED YOU TO KNOW THIS IN CASE YOU WOULD BE BACK IN WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY AND WANTED TO SEE BROWN.

DTG: 091541Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *rg*, NARA, Date 12-27-91

For the President
From Walt Rortow

71

Herewith Sent. M. Navarra's
views on Israeli aircraft.

I shall have with me
today a copy with statistical
tables attached.

Jan 7, 1968 15:27

sent back via wire
CAP80169

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

71a

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aircraft for Israel

In response to your request of yesterday, here is my assessment of the threat Israel faces, Israel's aircraft requirements, and my recommendations with respect to the Israeli request for A-4 and F-4 aircraft.

The Threat to Israel and Israel's Response.

Air superiority is crucial to military success in the Arab-Israeli environment. Israel knows this, and assumes the Arabs have learned this lesson. General Weizman, Israeli Air Force, argued here last September that the Arabs are acquiring more and better aircraft from the Soviet Union, and will continue to do so into the 1970s; that they will now be providing better protection for aircraft at existing airfields and will be building new airfields and improving techniques and training; and that the Arab states will now cooperate more efficiently in their military and political efforts against Israel. Israeli representatives continue to press these points. Weizman concluded that Israel needs additional versatile aircraft in order to confront successfully a growing Arab capability, and also to make up Israeli war losses (43 combat aircraft) and to replace certain of Israel's older aircraft. Weizman projected an air force of 250 combat aircraft by the end of 1968 and 350 aircraft in the early 1970s. (Comparisons of Arab-Israeli aircraft capabilities and inventories are attached.)

We agree, by and large, with the Israeli data on current Arab air inventories and on post-war Soviet resupply. And although uncertain, the Israeli numerical projections of Arab (including Algeria and Saudi Arabia) inventories for 1970, totaling 924 aircraft, appear reasonable. The number of aircraft in Arab inventories has never been, however, the principal factor in the Arab-Israeli military equation. Israel always has been numerically inferior. But despite their large numbers of aircraft, the Arabs have never been able to maintain or use these effectively; thus the numbers of aircraft which can be brought to bear effectively against Israel is much smaller than the totals of their inventories.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 20, #38
jc NARA, Date 7-22-03~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

2

The offensive (attack) capabilities of the Arab aircraft are limited, and considerably inferior to those of Israel. Also, not every Arab state is militarily relevant to the conflict. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Algeria, for example, cannot bring effective power to bear against Israel. The decisive factor is the superior overall quality in the maintenance, command and control, training, equipment and, especially, personnel of Israel. Their training, organization, technical competence, and will to fight is far superior to the Arabs. This will remain so for the foreseeable future. Although Arab aircraft losses will undoubtedly be fully replaced by the Soviets in coming months, the Arab military forces were decimated and their morale shattered; it will take them a number of years to exceed their pre-war capabilities. Arab territorial losses will make it more difficult in the future to conduct air or ground operations against Israel--the Sinai will surely be demilitarized, even if returned to Egypt.

In sum, the Israeli military position has improved markedly since 4 June. I am sure that the Arabs will learn some lessons from the recent conflict, and that there will be improvements in Arab air forces. They have shown some modest evidence of this already. They are unlikely, however, to make dramatic gains. And Israel's air force is itself improving: the supply of 48 A-4H aircraft is underway, and we have recommended to you the sale of an additional 27 A-4s. Israel would thus be adding over the next 18-24 months at least 75 new attack aircraft to its inventory, more than overcoming, quantitatively and qualitatively, Israel's June losses. Israel will have, by the end of 1969, an inventory of over 225 combat aircraft. I believe this is presently adequate for Israel to maintain its security. The Joint Chiefs have stated: "The Israeli capability to prevail in any renewal of hostilities, even without the Mirages, is considered assured for at least the next 18 months. Release of the 27 additional A-4s would further raise this level of assurance."

Further, although the delivery of the 50 new French Mirage V remains uncertain, there is a reasonable possibility that France will deliver these as earlier promised. Israel would then be able to phase out some older aircraft, and have an air force clearly superior to the Arabs. This would preserve Israel's margin of superiority into the 1970s without further aircraft from us. Israel further hopes to buy or fabricate 100 F-1 French aircraft when this airplane is produced (1972-4).

A-4H SKYHAWKS.

We agreed in March, 1966 to accede to the Israeli request of the previous October for attack aircraft, to supplement its inventory of high-performance French fighters and fighter-bombers. On 2 June 1966 a specific agreement provided for the sale of these 48 new production A-4 attack aircraft, plus support, for \$70.6 million to be credit-financed over ten years at 3 1/2% interest.

~~SECRET~~**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

3

Delivery was to be in Israel in flyable condition, commencing with four in December 1967 (which have been delivered), and completed by December 1968. These terms and delivery schedules are being adhered to. The agreement was to be secret. The Israelis agreed to look primarily to Europe for arms and noted our expectation that they would request no additional US military aircraft for at least five years.

Israel now wishes 27 additional A-4H Skyhawks and I recommend we accede to this request. To minimize the possible impact, we propose to amend the 1966 agreement to increase the number sold by 27 (for a total of 75 A-4H's). We prefer to sell these for cash. Military sales credit funds have been sharply curtailed and Israel's financial position permits a straight cash sale. If some credit seems desirable, however, we suggest offering to finance up to \$20 million of the A-4H program (which will probably total between \$30 and \$35 million for the 27 aircraft plus support) at 5 1/2% interest. If necessary, we could finance the whole sale, but at the cost of reducing the credit available for other sales, including any for Israel.

Delivery of the additional 27 A-4H's cannot start before June 1969. This is because certain components peculiar to the Israeli version of the A-4 have a long production leadtime. Delivery would be completed in April 1970 under normal conditions. We could shorten this to December, 1969 without much difficulty, by diverting from U. S. military requirements.

The Israelis have repeatedly pressed for speedier delivery of the 48 Skyhawks ordered in 1966 and will surely urge quick delivery of the additional 27. The present schedule for delivery of the 48 A-4H's by the end of CY 1968 cannot be expedited without curtailing production for Navy requirements; even by diversion, delivery could not be completed until September 1968, only three months ahead of schedule.

More importantly, the least costly and most efficient way to meet Israel's request for the 27 additional A-4's, is to delay the delivery of the last of the aircraft in the existing order of 48 until the production of the additional 27 can begin, thereby preventing a break in the production line.

F-4 Phantom Aircraft.

We could deliver F-4 aircraft to Israel beginning 24 months from date of contract, provided Israel did not want extensive modifications made to the aircraft or on maintenance and support procedures. This would be the normal delivery. If necessary we could, by diversion from U. S. force requirements, deliver F-4's to Israel in 12 months.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

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4

~~SECRET~~

Israel is arguing that the production leadtime of 24 months or longer from decision to first deliveries of F-4's, coupled with the uncertainties about Soviet/Arab and French intentions, requires some positive decision now. The Israeli Defense Attache' has proposed that we at least agree to undertake joint engineering studies on possible configuration changes and permit Israel to finance advance procurement of long leadtime components.

There are persuasive arguments against the sale, or even the promise of a future sale, of the F-4. The history of the Arab-Israeli arms race is a long one. The Arabs (particularly Egypt) and the Israelis have competed with one another, at very high cost, in maintaining modern armaments. The acquisition of a superior aircraft by one has stimulated the other to acquire a yet more superior airplane. The F-4 would clearly be the most sophisticated aircraft in the Middle East and its delivery there would risk the beginning of still another cycle in the arms race, contrary to your June 19 call for an end to the arms race.

The Soviet Union hastily replaced most Arab aircraft losses from the June war but these aircraft losses have not been fully overcome, and Soviet supply activities have returned to their pre-war level. The supply of F-4's to Israel would cause a sharp reaction from the Arabs and may bring irresistible pressures on the USSR to supply more, or more sophisticated, aircraft to them.

F-4 aircraft are not militarily required by Israel to assure its security. Although Soviet and French intentions, and the speed with which the Arabs can overcome their considerable military disabilities, remain uncertain and require close and constant scrutiny, there are no indications that Israel's advantageous security position will be upset for the foreseeable future. Should conditions change, we are able to deliver F-4's to Israel from new production within 24 months, even 12 months if we divert from US force requirements. There is no need at this time, as has been suggested by Israel, to insure our ability to deliver these aircraft quickly by advance procurement of long lead time items. (We could, if necessary, use our own funds to buy these items, without informing Israel, and reduce the leadtime to about 18 months.)

Finally, it is my view that implicit or explicit agreements now for the sale of these aircraft may jeopardize the Jarring UN mission seeking a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, upon which Israel's long-term security more clearly depends.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DDI DIR 5200.10

~~SECRET~~

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5

SECRET

Recommendations

I recommend you approve the sale of 27 additional A-4H aircraft, preferably for cash but, if desirable, for credit at 5 1/2% with amounts and terms to be subsequently determined, and with the important condition that the transaction be kept secret until the United States determines otherwise.

I recommend against expedited delivery of any of the A-4H aircraft and recommend that you refer any questions about this subject to me. I will, with your approval, discuss this subject with Eshkol when I see him in New York on 10 January; or we could discuss the problem in Washington with Israeli military representatives.

I recommend against any commitment to sell, or to buy long lead time items in anticipation of a future sale, of F-4 Phantom aircraft. I suggest you assure the Prime Minister that we will follow closely the activities of the Soviets and the French supply policies. We will continue to scrutinize the situation in the coming months. You may assure the Prime Minister that, if significant changes require it, we could deliver the F-4 promptly--if necessary, as soon as Israel would receive them if we made an agreement today.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 7 15 16

EEA937
PP WTE10
DE WTE 191

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80170

~~SECRET~~

free file

68 JAN 7 AM 10:53

SUNDAY

~~SECRET~~

HEREWITH NICK GETS WILSON'S FINAL REFLECTIONS ON OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PACKAGE.

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 5279

SECUN 31

FOR SECRETARY AND SECRETARY FOWLER FROM KATZENBACH

1. TONIGHT WE MET AT CHEQUERES WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON, FRED HULLEY, PETER SHORE, PAUL GORE-BOOTH AND WILLIAM ARMSTRONG. I FIRST GAVE THE PRIME MINISTER A RUN-DOWN ON OUR VISITS AROUND THE CONTINENT. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN FRENCH REACTION AND WHETHER ANY OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES HAD BEGUN TO MAKE ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF OUR MEASURES. PRIME MINISTER REITERATED THE POSITION TAKEN BY ROY JENKINS AT OUR MEETING LAST TUESDAY OF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM. I EMPHASIZED THAT THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN IN A POLITICAL CONTEXT AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS VERY ANXIOUS TO BE ABLE TO SUBTRACT THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ARGUMENT FROM THOSE WHO WOULD, FOR OTHER REASONS, WISH TO ADVOCATE EITHER TROOP WITHDRAWALS OR PROTECTIONIST MEASURES.

2. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THESE POLITICAL FORCES WERE AT WORK, THE PRIME MINISTER DID EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT ANY MEASURES IN THE TRADE FIELD AND COMMENTED THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BORDER TAX BY THE UNITED STATES COULD LEAD TO CONSEQUENCES ON WORLD TRADING PATTERNS. HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO OVER-DRAMATIZE THIS SITUATION BUT CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH TO GO FORWARD WITH THEIR ELIMINATION OF EXPORT REBATES AT A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES WAS INTRODUCING SUCH A MEASURE. HE INQUIRED WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE, AS IT WAS IN THE BRITISH SYSTEM, TO LEAVE DISCRETIONARY MEASURES IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT WHILE DISCUSSIONS WERE PROCEEDING IN THE GATT ABOUT THE IVA. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO POINTED OUT

THAT ALTHOUGH WE MIGHT BE SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF THE MAJOR WORLD TRADING POWERS TO STAND STILL FOR OUR BORDER TAX MEASURES AT THIS TIME, WE MIGHT VERY WELL FIND THAT THE NEXT COUNTRY TO GET INTO TROUBLE WOULD USE THIS METHOD AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE PROTECTIONIST DEVICES IN ITS "PACKAGE".

3. IN DISCUSSING OUR TALKS IN BONN AND THE REACTIONS TO OUR PLEAS FOR NEUTRALIZATION OF BALANCE OF PAYMENTS EFFECTS OF TROOP STATIONING, PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL FOR BRITAIN TO OBTAIN ONE HUNDRED MILLION POUNDS OFFSET AGREEMENT BY APRIL 1ST WHEN THE CURRENT AGREEMENT RUNS OUT. HE SAID THAT THE GERMANS HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO TALK TO THEM BECAUSE THEY HAD NOT REACHED AGREEMENT ON THEIR PURCHASE PLANS BECAUSE OF INTERNAL BUDGET DIFFICULTIES. IT LOOKED NOW AS THOUGH THESE TALKS COULD NOT BEGIN YET FOR SOME TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE THE FLAT STATEMENT THAT WITHOUT SUCH AN OFFSET, GIVEN ALL THE OTHER DRASTIC MEASURES HE HAS HAD TO TAKE AND THE SITUATION IN THE PARLIAMENTARY LABOR PARTY, HE COULD NOT DEFEND THE MAINTAINANCE OF TROOPS IN GERMANY. HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR TO THE GERMANS. HE RECOGNIZED THAT ANY BREAKDOWN IN BRITISH ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE GERMANS NECESSITATING SUCH A WITHDRAWAL COULD VERY WELL FUEL THE VERY FORCES THE PRESIDENT WAS OPPOSING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THEREFORE HE WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE GERMANS. HE WAS NOT INSISTING THAT PAYMENTS UNDER AN OFFSET AGREEMENT BE RECEIVED IMMEDIATELY, BUT WOULD BE CONTENT WITH ASSURANCE THAT PAYMENTS WOULD IN TIME BE RECEIVED SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETELY OFFSET UK MILITARY EXPENDITURES AFTER APRIL 1.

4. IN DISCUSSING THIS PROBLEM PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT RECENT CABINET DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN LEADING IN THE DIRECTION OF DECISIONS TO PUT THE GREATEST STRESS ON BRITISH MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. HE KNEW THAT THIS GAVE US PROBLEMS AND MENTIONED THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY HAD SENT A LETTER TO GEORGE BROWN TODAY ON THE PERSIAN GULF. I SAID THAT THIS DID GIVE US CONCERN BUT FELT IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS DISCUSSION I SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER. (IN ANY CASE GERORGE BROWN WILL BE DISCUSSING THIS WITH YOU NEXT WEEK.)

5. AS WE WERE LEAVING PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING THE PRESIDENT NEXT MONTH IN WASHINGTON AND ASSUMED HE COULD CONTINUE THIS CONVERSATION THERE. WE WOULD THEN HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO.

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 071446Z JAN 68



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE COUNCIL
WASHINGTON 20502

A
n4a

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

December 26, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Space Launch of Nuclear Power Unit

NASA has submitted a request to me that the established procedure be followed leading to the hoped for approval by the President for a launch of a SNAP 19 nuclear power unit.

National Security Action Memorandum No. 50 states that the President's approval is required for all launches of nuclear powered devices into space and asserts that the Executive Secretary of the Space Council is responsible for coordinating requests for approval action and announcements of such launches. This procedure has been followed on previous occasions.

The SNAP 19 unit is to furnish auxiliary power of 50 watts on board a Nimbus weather satellite and will increase substantially the effective life and usefulness of that important spacecraft.

After due notice and appropriate advance dissemination of information to the interested agencies, I held a meeting of representatives of those agencies to ascertain if, in their judgment, sufficient care had been taken as to the safety provisions of the proposed launch to permit recommending to the President that approval for the launch be granted. High-level officials attended and participated in this examination. Among them were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the AEC, the Deputy Administrator of NASA, the Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs of the State Department, as well as representatives of Rostow (White House), Hornig (OST), and Marks (USIA).

A thorough exposure of the care and attention given the safety features involving SNAP 19 took place. The work of the Interagency Safety Evaluation Panel was found impressive. No objections to the launch were made. Questions raised were answered and an additional written statement regarding biological effects if an accident did occur attested to the minimal risks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RAC 019-27-2-67
By: JOL WARA Date: 12-7-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Based upon this carefully coordinated evaluation, I recommend most respectfully that your approval of this launch be granted. Upon receipt of your reply, I will then consult with your Press Secretary as to the most appropriate manner of handling any announcement on this matter.



E. C. Welsh

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74b 3

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


January 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Review of NIMBUS B / SNAP-19 under NSAM 235

At the request of NASA (attached), I have reviewed the potential biological risks involved in the proposed launch of the NIMBUS B meteorological satellite with a plutonium 238 power source. This was submitted to me by NASA in accordance with the review procedure in NSAM 235 on "Large-Scale Scientific or Technological Experiments with Possible Adverse Environmental Effects."

While there is a possibility of accidental release of plutonium 238, I believe the probability of an accident is so low and the biological risk resulting from such an accident is sufficiently small that this experiment does not constitute an unreasonable hazard or risk to health or safety. I conclude, therefore, that this experiment poses no problem under NSAM 235 and recommend that you approve the test.


Donald F. Hornig

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED
Authority RAC 019-27-2-67
B: Jon vARA Date 12-7-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20546

DEC 15 1967

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR

Dr. Donald F. Hornig
Director, Office of Science
and Technology
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear ^{Don} ~~Dr.~~ Hornig:

NASA plans to launch the Nimbus B meteorological satellite with the SNAP-19, 50 watt, isotope thermoelectric power system on board as an experiment during the spring of 1968. Nimbus B will mark the first use of a nuclear power system on a NASA spacecraft. As such, it is deemed to be an important technological experiment and is the culmination of four years of effort on the part of AEC and NASA.

Although the SNAP-19 is not the primary power system on Nimbus B, this test flight is considered a logical and necessary step and a major milestone in the development and acceptance of long lived, highly reliable isotope power systems for space use. The characteristics of nuclear subsystems in an operational satellite will be assessed, the feasibility and utility of nuclear subsystems on future satellites will be determined and 50 watts of power will be available to offset solar cell power system degradation due to space radiation or other factors. This latter point is of importance since it is expected that the output of the solar power system will decrease in three months to levels below that required for spacecraft housekeeping and simultaneous operation of the meteorological experiments on board. The SNAP-19 will extend this period of full spacecraft operation by more than a year. In addition, the power from the SNAP-19 may be of special importance in the event of a solar array drive system malfunction, as in the case of the Nimbus I, by permitting operation of the solar cell at various levels of performance depending on the solar array attitude at the time of malfunction.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 019-27-2-6-7
By JOW vARA Date 12-7-17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S&T Cont. No. 1675

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

An Interagency Safety Evaluation Panel co-chaired by AEC, DOD and NASA members reviewed the nuclear safety aspects of the proposed launch and assessed the attendant hazards as being consistent with normal space operations. As noted in Section IV, "Conclusions", of the attached summary of the Nuclear Safety Evaluation of the Nimbus B/SNAP-19 launch, AEC concludes that there is no undue risk from a nuclear safety standpoint and recommends approval of the launch.

It is the purpose of this letter to inform you of the Nimbus B/SNAP-19 launch in accordance with the Policy Directive NSAM 235 (dated April 17, 1963) requiring such notification. The attached summary of the Nuclear Safety Evaluation Report prepared by AEC, the attached Interagency Safety Evaluation Report and its references and associated documentation, together with the briefing to the Space Council scheduled for December 19, 1967, comprise the documentation in support of this launch.

Sincerely yours,



Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Deputy Administrator

Attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SENT: 06/12:45 P.M.

1968 JAN 6 17 45

68 JAN 6 PM 12:56

SATURDAY

free file

VZCZCEEA922
OO WTE10
DE WTE 172

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80153

~~SECRET~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY

JANUARY 6, 1968

ANDY GOODPASTER CALLED TODAY. HE BRIEFED GENERAL EISENHOWER ON GENERAL JOHNSON'S QUITE OPTIMISTIC REPORT AFTER HIS VISIT TO VIET NAM. HE TELLS ME THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER IS VERY MUCH INTERESTED IN OUR JUDGMENT ON THE HANOI PEACE FEELER AND WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO ABOUT IT. HE SAYS THAT HE WILL BE AWAY FOR THE WEEKEND, BUT IT WOULD BE GOOD IF WE COULD INFORM HIM OF SOMETHING "EARLY NEXT WEEK," IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. I TOLD HIM NOTHING, OF COURSE, ABOUT HARRIMAN'S CONTACT. BUT YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHEN AND HOW GENERAL EISENHOWER MIGHT BE BROUGHT UP TO DATE.

DTG 051726Z JAN 1968

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 97-241

By CG, NARA Date 7-21-99

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

79

EEA928
OO WTE10
DE WTE 170

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80151

68 JAN 6 17 09

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 6, 1967

68 JAN 6 PM 12 23

SATURDAY

WE SENT TO YOU IN THE POUCH EARLY THIS MORNING TWO LATE MEMOS ON ESHKOL FROM DICK HELMS WITHOUT COMMENT. AFTER REFLECTING ON THEM THIS MORNING, I FIND THAT THEY BRING THE FOLLOWING POINTS INTO SHARPER FOCUS:

1. MORE THAN JUST SEEKING A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT, ESHKOL MAY BE LOOKING FOR A FIRMER COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY. HE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT SECURITY GUARANTEES AND TREATIES ARE OUT, BUT HE MAY SEEK A GUARANTEED SOURCE OF ARMS. ACCORDING TO DICK'S PLAUSIBLE REPORT, THE JUNE WAR DESTROYED ESHKOL'S POLICY OF PUTTING OUT AS MANY SUPPORT LINES AS POSSIBLE. HIS FRENCH AND RUSSIAN POLICIES ARE BANKRUPT, AND HE NOW SEEKS THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE TIE WITH US.

2. TO SEAL THIS RELATIONSHIP, HE MAY COME OFFERING TO ASSOCIATE ISRAEL WITH OUR POSITION IN VIETNAM.

3. HE IS APPARENTLY WILLING TO ACQUIESCE IN OUR RESUMING MILITARY AID TO JORDAN. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS INCREASED FEAR OF THE USSR.

IF THIS REPORT IS TRUE--AND WE HAVE TO MAKE THE NORMAL ALLOWANCE FOR THE FACT THAT IT REFLECTS ONLY ONE MILITARY MAN'S OPINION--IT RAISES THE PROBLEM OF ESHKOL TRYING TO GET TOO CLOSE TO US. HIS POSSIBLE OFFER TO ASSOCIATE WITH US ON VIETNAM RUNS THE RISK OF SHARPENING THE IMAGE OF ISRAEL AS OUR STOOGES AND DRIVING THE WEDGE FURTHER BETWEEN US AND THE ARABS. WE WANT TO CONSIDER WHETHER ESHKOL'S QUIET SUPPORT WOULDN'T HELP YOU AS MUCH WHILE AVOIDING DAMAGE ABROAD.

IT'S HARD TO KNOW HOW MUCH THE ISRAELIS ARE PUSHING THE SOVIET THREAT MERELY TO JUSTIFY THEIR CASE FOR MORE ARMS.

DTG 86/1639Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: NLS/RAC 02-79 (#23a)

By jc/ics NARA, Date 7-22-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~

1/6/68

78

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

NOV 23 6 11 63

Andy Goodpaster called today. He briefed General Eisenhower on General Johnson's quite optimistic report after his visit to Viet Nam. He tells me that General Eisenhower is very much interested in our judgment on the Hanoi peace feeler and what we propose to do about it. He says that he will be away for the weekend, but it would be good if we could inform him of something "early next week," if that is possible. I told him nothing, of course, about Harriman's contact. But you may wish to consider when and how General Eisenhower might be brought up to date.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

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1968 JAN 6 AM 8:15

Area file

SATURDAY

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OO WTE 10
DE WTE 164

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80145

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

THIS FRENCH CONVERSATION IN HANOI DEMONSTRATES WHAT A DRY CREEK
A VIET-NAM EXERCISE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD BE.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 8722

NODIS - MARIA THREE

SUBJ: HANOI CONVERSATION BETWEEN FRENCH OFFICER AND NVN
EUROPEAN DIRECTOR.

SOURCE GAVE COUNSELOR JANUARY 5 FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM
HANOI DATED DECEMBER 21, RECEIVED DECEMBER 22.

"THE DIRECTOR OF EUROPE CALLED ME IN THE EVENING OF DECEMBER
20 TO EXPRESS THE POINT OF VIEW OF HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE
NEW INITIATIVES RELATING TO VIETNAM CONFLICT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 03-263
By *nd* NARA, Date *12-16-03*

"THE UNITED STATES, HE TOLD ME, HAS DISTRIBUTED A DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WHICH, PROMISING STOPPING OF THE BOMBARDMENTS, REQUEST THE CONVOCAION OF A CONFERENCE REUNITING THE THREE MEMBER STATES OF THE ICC, THE RDVN, THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT, THE SAIGON REGIME AND THE U.S.

"THIS CONFERENCE WOULD DISCUSS AMONG OTHER THINGS A CEASE FIRE, WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS, DEMOBILIZATION OF ARMED FORCES NOW CONTROLLED BY THE SAIGON REGIME.

"FURTHERMORE, THE DELEGATE OF INDIA ON THE ICC HAS CONSULTED THE RDVN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION WITH A VIEW TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERVENTION.

"REGARDING THIS PROJECT AND THIS SUGGESTION THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RDVN REAFFIRMS ITS POSITION IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

1. "THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE NO RIGHT OF INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF VIETNAM".

2. THE FOUR POINT DECLARATION OF HANOI IS 'THE ONLY BASIS FOR A CORRECT SOLUTION OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM'. REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS, THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SAID CLEARLY THE 28TH OF JANUARY LAST THAT THEY ONLY COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF BOMBARDMENT AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE RDVN.

3. "THE NLF IS THE ONLY AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE" AND THE SAIGON AUTHORITIES ARE ONLY 'PUPPETS' IN THE HANDS OF THE AMERICANS.

4. "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RDVN ASKS THE ASSISTANCE OF FRANCE WHICH COULD: (1) EXERCISE ITS INFLUENCE WITH OTHER STATES IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM INVOLVING ITSELF IN THE VIETNAM AFFAIR. (2) IN THE EVENT HOWEVER THAT SECURITY COUNSEL INVOLVES ITSELF, TO OPPOSE ANY DISCUSSION ON THE DRAFT RESOLUTION. (3) IN CASE OF NECESSITY TO UTILIZE ITS RIGHT OF VETO.

"I PROMISED M. NGUYEN THANH HA TO TRANSMIT WITHOUT DELAY TO THE DEPARTMENT THE TENOR OF HIS COMMUNICATION. SIDRE."

WALINER

~~SECRET~~

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DTG: 061140Z JAN 68

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1968 JAN 6 22 28

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DE VTE 176

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80157

Free file

SECRET

JANUARY 6, 1968

HEREWITH NICK HAS A CIVILIZED TALK WITH THE FRENCH.

1. FRED DEMING, BILL ROTH, AND I MET WITH DEBRE AND SOME OF HIS SENIOR OFFICIALS AND THEN LATER I MADE COURTESY CALL ON COUVE. I WOULD DESCRIBE ATMOSPHERE AS ONE OF FRIENDLY, IF STUDIED, UNDERSTANDING. I THINK THIS BEST TYPIFIED BY COUVE'S REMARK THAT HAVING ARGUED FOR US TO TAKE ACTION, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR FRENCH NOW TO COMPLAIN. EXCEPT FOR RATHER BRIEF REFERENCES TO DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES, ALL THE REMARKS AND COMMENTS MADE BY THE FRENCH SEEMED POSITIVE AND UNCONTENTIOUS.
2. DEBRE STRESSED ONE POINT SEVERAL TIMES--ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO MORALIZE. HE SAID THAT MEASURES WILL BE ACCEPTED OR REJECTED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES IN DIRECT RELATION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH GOVTS AND PUBLIC OPINION THAT THE U.S. IS ALSO DEALING EFFECTIVELY WITH ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY. BOTH COUVE AND DEBRE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF PRESIDENT GETTING HIS TAX MEASURES EXACTLY AS INTRODUCED, AS WELL AS THE U.S. TAKING STEPS TO CONTROL INTERNAL CREDIT AND STABILIZE PRICES AND WAGES. THEY SEEMED TO ACCEPT MY POINT THAT OUTSIDERS SHOULD NOT WISH U.S. DEFLATION AND COUVE REPLIED THAT, ON CONTRARY, FRENCH WISH SEE STABILITY IN U.S. ECONOMY. THE EMBASSY WILL REPORT OUR CONVERSATIONS IN DETAIL BUT I THINK THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE WORTH NOTING HERE.
3. DEBRE STATED POSITION OF FRENCH GOVT THAT THEY ACCEPTED MEASURES IN PRINCIPLE AND RECOGNIZED THE STRONG AND DETERMINED EFFORTS OF THE PRESIDENT IN BOTH THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AREAS. THEY PUT USUAL STRESS ON RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFICIT COUNTRIES TO TAKE ACTION, BUT RATHER SURPRISINGLY INDICATED THAT SURPLUS COUNTRIES TOO HAD AT LEAST A SECONDARY RESPONSIBILITY. THEY EMPHASIZED THAT OVERWHELMING POSITION OF U.S. ECONOMY IN WORLD ECONOMY PRESENTS SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND CALLS FOR U.S. TO EXERCISE SPECIAL CARE.

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XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 8, #173
By JC NARA, Date 7-21-03

4. DEBRE SAID ON INVESTMENT MEASURES HE WAS PERPLEXED BY DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT. PARTICULARLY, HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY OIL COUNTRIES HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN GROUP B. HE WAS CAREFUL TO SAY THAT THIS DISCRIMINATION COULD NOT BE WHOLEHEARTEDLY, OR FOR LONG ACCEPTED BY THE FRENCH GOVT, BUT DID NOT APPEAR TO REJECT MEASURE FOR THE TIME BEING. HE QUESTIONED HOW U.S. COULD REGULATE FOREIGN AFFILIATES OF AMERICAN COMPANIES IF THE U.S. CONTINUED TO WISH THEM TREATED EQUALLY IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS FRANCE. I RESPONDED TO THESE REMARKS BY POINTING OUT THAT ANY REGULATION IS INHERENTLY DISCRIMINATORY SINCE SITUATION DIFFERS FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER AND ONE COMPANY TO ANOTHER. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD ACTED RESPONSIBLY IN NOT WISHING TO PUT BURDEN OF OUR ADJUSTMENT ON LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OR THOSE IN WEAKER B/P POSITION.

5. DEBRE EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN THAT WE MIGHT BE ABOUT TO START A CREDIT WAR. HE WARNED THAT THIS WOULD LEAD TO ORGANIZED DISORDER. BOTH FRED AND I ATTEMPTED TO REASSURE HIM ON THIS AND SAID WE HAD NO INTENTION OF BEGINNING COMPETITION ON EXPORT CREDIT.

6. DEBRE'S GENERAL CONCLUSION WAS THAT HE ADMIRER U.S. ACTION. "FRANCE HAD HOPED TOO LONG FOR THIS ACTION TO CRITICIZE IT NOW." HE RECALLED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD LED THE WORLD IN ELIMINATING EXCHANGE CONTROLS, LIBERALIZING TRADE AND FREEING BOTH CAPITAL AND MOVEMENTS OF PEOPLE. HE SAID THE FRENCH RECOVERY HAD TAKEN ITS CUE FROM THIS LEADERSHIP AS THEY REDUCED PROTECTION, SUPPORTED THE KENNEDY ROUND, ELIMINATED EXCHANGE CONTROL, AND OPENED THEIR DOORS TO INVESTMENT. THE PRESENT FRENCH GOVT HAD DONE MORE IN THE LAST FEW YEARS THAN IN THE PAST 50 TO ELIMINATE FRENCH PROTECTIONISM. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT THEY COULD ACCEPT TEMPORARILY THESE MEASURES BUT, ASIDE FROM THEIR DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S., THEY WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE THEIR PUBLIC OPINION UNLESS THE U.S. INTERNAL MEASURES WERE PERHAPS STRONGER THAN THOSE PROPOSED. (I AM NOT SURE THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD U.S. INTERNAL MEASURES.) HE ALSO THOUGHT WE SHOULD EXAMINE OUR INVESTMENT MEASURES TO SEE WHETHER THEY COULD BE LESS DISCRIMINATORY AND POSSIBLY RE-EXAMINE ALL OUR MEASURES TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THEIR DESIRED EFFECT AND NOT BE QUITE SO INEQUITABLE. COUVE ALSO EXPRESSED APPROVAL FOR CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, PARTICULARLY ON EFFECTS OF MEASURES, IN OECD ECONOMIC POLICY DISCUSSIONS.

7. I THINK IT WAS RIGHT FOR US TO GO TO PARIS AND I THINK WE NOW HAVE A RECORD FROM THE FRENCH ON WHICH WE CAN BUILD. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY WILL USE DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS WITH THEIR EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES AND OTHERS. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THE CORRECT POSITION FOR US TO TAKE WITH FRANCE IS ONE WHICH EMPHASIZES OUR DETERMINATION TO ACT RESPONSIBLY AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR OWN STRENGTH AND NOT JEOPARDIZE OTHERS WHO ARE IN A WEAKER POSITION.

3. DEBRE MADE A VERY STRONG STATEMENT AT THE BEGINNING THAT HE AND THE FRENCH GOVT WERE "SCANDALIZED" BY SOME OF THE THINGS APPEARING IN THE FOREIGN PRESS. HE SAID THAT THESE HAD COMPLETELY MISREPRESENTED THE ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS OF THE FRENCH GOVT. FRED OBSERVED THAT WE TOO HAD BEEN SHOCKED BY SOME OF THE THINGS SAID IN THE PRESS AND THAT WE COULD ONLY ASSUME THAT THE FRENCH GOVT HAD NOT INSPIRED THESE THINGS AS WE HAD NOT INSPIRED THE STORIES IN OUR OWN PRESS. FRED POINTED TO LAST NIGHT'S "LE MONDE" STORY WHICH TALKED OF A TAX ON GOLD. HE SAID THAT HE HAD DENIED THAT THERE WAS ANY CONSIDERATION OF A MOVE OF THIS NATURE BUT POINTED TO THIS STORY TO INDICATE THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CONTROL WHAT THE PRESS SAYS.

BRUCE

~~SECRET~~

DTG: 062056Z JAN 68

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DE WTE 167

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FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80148

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT

1968 JAN 6 13 14

1968 JAN 6 AM 9:14

SATURDAY

FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH NICK REPORTS A GOOD SESSION WITH THE ITALIANS.

PARIS 8727

TODAY WE HAD PRODUCTIVE SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER MORO, FOREIGN MINISTER FANFANI, BUDGET MINISTER PIERACCINI AND MINISTER OF TREASURY COLOMBO. LATER FRED DEMING MET WITH PRESIDENT OF BANK OF ITALY CARLI. ALL THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM ALONG THE LINES OF COLOMBO'S PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENT. I THANKED COLOMBO FOR HIS IMMEDIATE RESPONSE WHICH I DESCRIBED AS VERY HELPFUL IN SETTING THE TONE OF COMMENT ON OUR MEASURES. MORO PUT PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF US MAINTAINING ITS FORCES IN EUROPE AND ON ITALIAN WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. HE ALSO RECOGNIZED POSSIBLE DANGERS FROM PROTECTIONIST FORCES, AND UNDERSTOOD MY POINT THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM WAS NECESSARY TO COUNTER-ACT THESE FORCES IN THE US. MORO STATED THAT HE HOPED WE COULD FOLLOW EXPANSIONIST POLICIES AND THAT OUR CONSULTATIONS SHOULD BE AIMED AT PROMOTING BETTER COOPERATION ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

Pres file

2. FANFANI ALSO RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS OF RISING PROTECTIONISM AND THE ESSENTIALITY OF SUPPORTING THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM. HE MENTIONED THAT THERE IS A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM CONNECTED WITH ANY RESTRICTIONS ON TOURISM AND SAID THAT HE DID NOT LIKE THE DISCRIMINATION SHOWN BETWEEN THE POUND AND THE CONTINENTAL CURRENCIES. WHILE WELCOMING THE MEASURES, FANFANI REMARKED THAT IF IT WERE NOT FOR VIETNAM WE WOULD NOT HAVE A B/P PROBLEM. I POINTED OUT THAT VIET-NAM HAD VERY LITTLE TO DO WITH OUR CURRENT DEFICIT. THE DETERIORATION OF OUR BALANCE IN 1967 OWED LESS THAN \$400 MILLION TO VIET-NAM ITSELF. I POINTED TO THE \$1.5 BILLION DEFICIT ON MILITARY ACCOUNT ASIDE FROM VIETNAM, WITH ABOUT \$1 BILLION IN NATO ALONE.

3. LATER, IN A STATEMENT TO THE PRESS, FANFANI REPEATED HIS REMARK WITHOUT GIVING MY ANSWER. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE AIRPORT BEFORE LEAVING I SET THE MATTER STRAIGHT. (EMBASSY ROME IS REPEATING BOTH FANFANI AND MY STATEMENTS BY CABLE.)

4. COLOMBO'S TALK WITH US WAS PARTICULARLY POSITIVE. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT SURPLUS COUNTRIES HAD TO REALIZE RESERVES ARE THERE TO BE USED AND NOT JUST ACCUMULATED. HE SAID THIS IN

CONNECTION WITH OUR DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF OUR MEASURES ON EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS. HE SAID THAT THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THESE EFFECTS, BUT THAT IT WAS UP TO THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO DO SOMETHING TO OFF-SET THEM.

5. AT VARIOUS POINTS IN THE DISCUSSION, THE ITALIANS EXPRESSED FEAR THAT AN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE GATT RULES, OR THE IMPOSITION RESTRICTIVE TRADE MEASURES WOULD LEAD TO RETALIATION AND COUNTER-RETALIATION. I EXPLAINED THAT IF WE COULD NOT GET POSTPONEMENT OF EUROPEAN ACTION WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE SOME STEPS OURSELVES TO HEAD-OFF PROTECTIONIST REACTION. SUCH STEPS WOULD WE BELIEVE, BE WITHIN GATT RULES. ITALIANS ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT RESTRICTIONS ON TOURISM BECAUSE OF THEIR DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH LARGE ITALO-AMERICAN POPULATION. THEY FEEL THAT ANY HEAD TAX OR SIMILAR MEASURE WOULD BE REGRESSIVE AND HIT PARTICULARLY HARD THE LOWER INCOME TOURIST.

6. THERE IS GENUINE CONCERN THAT AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENT IN SOUTHERN ITALY NOT BE JEOPARDIZED. THIS IS A PART OF THE COUNTRY WHERE SEVERAL LARGE AMERICAN ENTERPRISES HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY HELPFUL AND THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HOPE THAT MEANS COULD BE FOUND FOR THEM TO CONTINUE WORKS IN PROGRESS AS WELL AS PROJECTS ALREADY IN OPERATION.

7. AT SEVERAL POINTS THEY MENTIONED THEIR VIEW THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROCEED WITH AN IMF DRAWING AND REMOVE THE GOLD COVER. FRED DENING DISCUSSED THESE MATTERS WITH CARLI. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPROVAL OF PROGRAM AS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE, RAISED NO QUESTIONS ABOUT ANY PHASE OF IT, STATED THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BAD FOR US AND FOR WORLD TO SHARPLY DEFLATE US ECONOMY FOR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RESERVES, SAID HE WOULD DEFEND ITALY'S POSITION RE RESERVES IN PARLIAMENT BECAUSE OF DECEMBER GOLD PURCHASE, AND HOPED WE WOULD DRAW ON IMF AS NEEDED.

8. ITALIANS SEEMED QUITE ANXIOUS TO HAVE OUR MEASURES DISCUSSED MULTILATERALLY-- PARTICULARLY IN THE OECD--SO THAT ALL THE EFFECTS CAN BE JUDGED AND OUR PARTNERS CAN DISCUSS TOGETHER POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR THEIR ALLEVIATION.

9. I EXPLAINED THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TAKING ACTIONS TO RETALIATE IF WE INTRODUCE A BORDER TAX. I SENSED FROM MY DISCUSSION THAT, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE TECHNICIANS WILL ARGUE THE DEBATABLE GATT POINTS, MEN LIKE COLOMBO, MORO AND CARLI UNDERSTAND THE POLITICAL NECESSITIES AND WILL FIND A WAY TO AVOID ACTION. THEY DID NOT SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE COMMUNITY COULD PUT OFF IMPLEMENTATION OF TAX HARMONIZATION, SINCE THIS IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO EQUALIZE COMPETITION AS TRADE BARRIERS AMONG THE SIX DISAPPEAR.

10. PRESIDENT MORO ASKED THAT I CONVEY GOI THANKS FOR FREDDIE REINHARDT'S LONG AND OUTSTANDING SERVICE AND DEEP REGRET AT HIS DEPARTURE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT PRESIDENT HAD APPOINTED TRUSTED ADVISOR TO REPLACE HIM. WALLNER

DTG 06/1140Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 6 11 18

EEA916
CO WTE10
DE WTE 168

FROM WALT ROSTOW
TO THE PRESIDENT
CITE CAP80149

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

68 JAN 6 AM 9:18

SATURDAY

HEREWITH AMB. LOCKE FILES A SUMMARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF VIETNAM SHOWING MORE PROGRESS, DESPITE THE WAR, THAN IS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD.

1. DOUGLAS DACY OF MY STAFF HAS PREPARED A PAPER ON ECONOMIC CHANGES IN VIET-NAM, 1964-67, WHICH WILL BE OF INTEREST TO YOU. THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPER WAS TO FURNISH INFORMATION TO DOCUMENT ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT.

from file

2. DACY'S PAPER DOCUMENTS ECONOMIC PROGRESS THAT HAS OCCURRED IN MUCH OF VIET-NAM EVEN IN MIDST OF WAR. MATERIAL IN THIS PAPER PROVIDES BASIS FOR DEMONSTRATING THAT VIET-NAM IS FAR FROM WAR-RAVAGED WASTELAND. ALTHOUGH PAPER ITSELF IS WRITTEN IN TYPICAL ECONOMIST'S JARGON, I BELIEVE PEOPLE IN WASHINGTON CAN DRAW ON IT TO PREPARE SOMETHING THAT WOULD BE OF USE WITH PRESS AND CONGRESS.

3. DACY'S PAPER WAS SENT TO WASHINGTON AS ATTACHMENT TO SAIGON AIRGRAM A-345, DEC. 16, AND IS AVAILABLE AT AID/W. DACY HIMSELF IS NOW WORKING AT INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS IN WASHINGTON, IN CASE YOU WANT TO CONTACT HIM. HE IS CONTINUING TO WORK IN THIS SUBJECT.

4. DACY'S PAPER COVERS PERIOD 1964-67 AND SHOWS FOLLOWING ABOUT PRODUCTION AND TRANSPORTATION (OBVIOUSLY, THE AGGREGATE INDUSTRIAL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FIGURES ARE THE MOST RELIABLE).

(A) ALTHOUGH OVERALL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IS DOWN TEN PERCENT, IT IS UP IN SOME PRODUCTS, SUCH AS VEGETABLES (45 PERCENT INCREASE FROM 1964), FISH AND PORK (ABOUT THE SAME AS IN 1964, BUT UP ABOUT FIVE PERCENT FROM 1966 TO 1967). THE PRODUCTS WHERE PRODUCTION IS DOWN ARE THOSE MOST AFFECTED BY THE WAR--RICE, RUBBER, TIMBER.

(B) INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION IS UP 45 PERCENT. THIS IS CONSERVATIVE BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INCLUDE OUTPUT FROM SOME NEW INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY OR ANY SERVICE INDUSTRIES.

(C) NEW INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY HAS BEEN ADDED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE WAR, SUCH AS IN CEMENT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*

(D) PRODUCTION OF ELECTRICITY IS UP 47 PERCENT.

(E) COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC IS UP ON HIGHWAY, AIR, AND RAILROAD (BOTH PASSENGER AND FREIGHT). ALSO, THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN NATIONAL HIGHWAYS OPEN TO COMMERCE AND, IN THE LAST YEAR, IN OPEN RAILROAD MILEAGE (ALTHOUGH RAILROAD MILEAGE DOWN FROM 1964).

5. DACY TRIES TO QUANTITATIVELY MEASURE IMPROVEMENT IN THE ECONOMIC WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE. HE CONCLUDES THAT THE STANDARD OF LIVING OF THE AVERAGE VIETNAMESE HAS RISEN, BUT THAT THE DISTRIBUTION HAS BEEN VERY UNEVEN (THE LIVING STANDARD OF MOST REFUGEES, FOR EXAMPLE, IS DOWN). FOR LACK OF THE USUAL INFORMATION ON NATIONAL INCOME HE USES A CONCEPT OF "GROSS AVAILABILITY OF GOODS FOR CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT" AND CONCLUDES THAT THESE HAVE INCREASED. THE ECONOMISTS HERE TELL ME THERE ARE TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH DACY'S WORK, OF WHICH HE IS WELL AWARE, WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICATION OF THIS CONCEPT. AGAIN THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE PRIMARILY LACK OF COMPLETE INFORMATION. THE STUDY DOES ESTABLISH, HOWEVER, THAT THE FARMER WHO CAN STILL FARM HIS LAND SHOULD BE BETTER OFF BECAUSE:

(A) FOR THE FIRST NINE MONTHS IN 1967 THE AVERAGE PRICE OF RICE IN THE DELTA HAS RISEN 112 PERCENT OVER THE SAME PERIOD IN 1966; YET THE WHOLESALE PRICE OF FERTILIZER HAS INCREASED ONLY 40 PERCENT AND CONSUMER PRICES IN SAIGON ARE UP ONLY 50 PERCENT.

(B) THE PRICE OF HOGS IN THE DELTA HAS RISEN MORE THAN CONSUMER PRICES AND MORE THAN THE PRICE OF HOG FEED. THE HOG/RICE BRAN PRICE RATIO IS 9.2 TO 1, AN INCREASE OVER THE 6.4 TO 1 PRICE RATIO EXISTING IN MAY, AND OVER THE 8 TO 1 RATION EXISTING IN JANUARY.

FURTHER, THE STUDY AT LEAST ESTABLISHES THAT VIET-NAM IS NOT A WASTELAND WHERE THE ENTIRE RURAL POPULATION IS SUFFERING ECONOMICALLY.

6. THE STUDY DOES NOT MENTION THE GREAT ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF (A) SOLVING THE CONGESTION PROBLEM AT THE PORT OF SAIGON, AND (B) GETTING REASONABLE CONTROL OVER INFLATION, SO THAT THE PROBLEM IS NO LONGER OF CRISIS PROPORTIONS.

7. I BELIEVE DACY'S MATERIAL CAN BE OF BENEFIT TO YOU, AND THAT WASHINGTON'S RESOURCES CAN PUT IT INTO MORE USEABLE FORM.

LOCKE

DTG 061140Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~