

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA914  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 165

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80146

1968 JAN 6 13 00

1968 JAN 6 AM 8:21

SATURDAY

~~SECRET~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW  
THIS FRENCH-CHICOM CONVERSATION SHOWS HOW THE CHINESE LOOK  
AT THE WORLD-ESPECIALLY U.S.-USSR RELATIONS.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 8720

MODIS MARIA THREE

SUBJ: FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH CHEN YI

SOURCE GAVE CONSELOR JANUARY 5 FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PEKING  
WITH DATES AND SIGNATURE BLOCKED OFF:

"MARSHAL CHEN YI SHOWED A DESIRE TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR. HE  
RECALLED THAT GENERAL DEGAULLE HAD DENOUNCED THE HEGEMONY WHICH THE  
TWO 'GIANTS', THE USSR, THE U.S., WERE TRYING TO IMPOSE ON  
THE WORLD. HE BELIEVES THAT VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED; THE KREMLIN  
WISHES TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. IN A POLICY OF AGGRESSION  
AGAINST CHINA. WHEREAS WASHINGTON'S HOSTILITY WITH REGARD  
TO CHINA WOULD NOT SURPRISE THE CHINESE, THAT OF MOSCOW IS  
IN FACT A BETRAYAL OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP WHICH BINDS  
THE TWO PEOPLES."

"I RESPONDED THAT WE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE  
OF THE COLD WAR, WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE WITH THE SIGNING OF THE  
VARSAW PACT AND THE CREATION OF NATO, HAD BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY  
MODIFIED, AND THAT FRANCE, IN THE INTEREST OF ALL EUROPEAN  
COUNTRIES, CONSIDERED IT USEFUL TO UNDERTAKE AND TO STRENGTHEN  
CONTACTS BETWEEN WEST EUROPE AND EAST EUROPE OR BETTER, AS  
GENERAL DEGAULLE HAD DECLARED DURING HIS VISIT TO POLAND,  
BETWEEN WESTERN EUROPE, CENTRAL EUROPE AND EASTERN EUROPE.  
THE VISITS OF CHIEFS OF STATE, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND OF  
MINISTERS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND A COOPERATION  
HAD BEEN INSTITUTED IN DIFFERENT AREAS NOTABLY IN SCIENTIFIC  
AND CULTURAL MATTERS."

*Pres. file*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5

NLJ 03-263

By *iso* NARA, Date *12-16-03*

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



"AS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO 'GIANTS' I ADDED IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO INTERPRET IT AS MARSHALL CHEN YI HAD JUST DONE. IT IS NORMAL THAT TWO GREAT COUNTRIES, BELONGING TO THE UN AND MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS, DETERMINE CONJUNCTIONS OF INTEREST AND ASSESS THEIR DIFFERENCES. ARE NOT THESE DIFFERENCES REAL, NOTABLY IN VIETNAM WHERE THE USSR FURNISHES IMPORTANT ARMAMENT TO THOSE WHO RESIST AMERICAN TROOPS, AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHERE THE SOVIET UNION HAS PRACTICALLY REBUILT THE MILITARY POWER OF THE UAR?"

"THE MINISTER ANSWERED ME, SMILING, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT TRUSTING INFORMATION OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET HELP TO VIETNAM. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS PERFECTLY INFORMED ON THIS SUBJECT AND WAS ACQUAINTED WITH THE LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET AID WHICH WAS IN REALITY 'MINIMAL' AND WHICH WAS LIMITED TO THAT WHICH APPEARED NECESSARY TO MOSCOW IN ORDER TO HAVE A VOICE IN THE AFFAIR (A VOIR VOIX AU CHAPITRE). IT WAS THEREFORE IN REALITY A POLICY FAVORABLE TO THE U.S."

"ACCORDING TO THE MARSHAL, THE TWO 'GIANTS' DID NOT HARBOR EXACTLY THE SAME DESIGNS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WISH TO 'GOVERN THE WORLD' ON A PAR WITH THE U.S., BUT THE LATTER REFUSE SUCH A DIVISION AND INTEND TO BE THE SOLE MASTERS. THIS IS THE SOURCE OF THEIR DIFFERENCES. HOWEVER, AT DIFFERENT TIMES, NOTABLY CUBA AND MORE RECENTLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MOSCOW HAS CAPITULATED TO WASHINGTON. IF THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN FLEETS CRUISE AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, IT IS BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE FEIGNING TO AID THE ARAB COUNTRIES, FOLLOWS IN ACTUALITY THE AMERICAN POLICY. THE SOVIETS SEEK TO ESTABLISH THEIR CONTROL OVER THE ARAB COUNTRIES, AND THE U.S. NOT BEING ABLE TO IMPOSE DIRECTLY THEIR DOMINATION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, TRIES TO ACCOMPLISH IT THROUGH THE INTERMEDIARY OF THE USSR."

"BUT, THE MINISTER ADDED, THE GREAT SOVIET PEOPLE WILL NOT ACCEPT FOR A LONG TIME THE ROLE OF ACCOMPLICE AND VALET OF THE AMERICANS WHICH THE 'CLIQUE' WHICH RULES THE KREMLIN TODAY MAKES IT PLAY."

WALLNER

DTG: 061140Z JAN 68

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~~SECRET~~

87

1968 JAN 6 13 18

68 JAN 6 AM 0:29

SATURDAY

EEA915  
CO WTE10  
DE WTE 162

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP39143

*Per file*

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT DESERVE EXCESSIVE WEIGHT, THIS CIA REPORT  
DESERVES READING.

1. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON AMERICAN  
POLICY IN THE MID-EAST:

A. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE  
ITS PASSIVE APPROACH TO THE CURRENT MID-EAST SITUATION  
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS WORKS TO THE SOVIET ADVANTAGE  
IN THAT BY THE TIME THE AMERICANS DO DECIDE TO MODIFY  
THIS ESSENTIALLY "MONITORING" POSTURE TO THE EXTENT OF  
POSITIVE MANEUVERS TO REGAIN INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD  
IT WILL BE "TOO LATE." THE SOVIET CLARIFIED THIS BY  
STATING THAT THE SOVIETS ARE RAPIDLY SOLIDIFYING THEIR  
INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE LEVELS OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT,  
THAT THE SYRIANS ARE "ALMOST EMBARRASSINGLY FRIENDLY"  
AND THAT ONLY ALGERIA IS CAUSING PROBLEMS BY CRITICIZING  
THE SOVIETS FOR NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH ON THE SUBJECT OF  
ISRAEL. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE SUBJECT OF THE SOVIET  
SLOC DECLARATION ON ISRAEL IN WARSAW ON 22 DECEMBER WAS  
NOT BROUGHT UP DURING THE CONVERSATION.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC-NLJ 001-104-1-7

By isa NARA, Date 10-5-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

B. THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF DEALING WITH PRESIDENT NASIR, AND HIS SEIZURE OF SHARM AL SHAYKH WITHOUT PRIOR INTIMATION TO THE SOVIETS STILL RANKLES. THEY REGARD HIM AS QUITE CAPABLE OF SHIFTING HIS GROUND IF HE THINKS HE CAN GAIN BY SO DOING. THEY DO NOT REGARD HIM AS "PRO COMMUNIST" IN ANY SENSE AND REALIZE THAT THE COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN EGYPT HAS DECREASED EVEN AS SOVIET INFLUENCE HAS RISEN. THE SOVIETS MAKE A CONSCIOUS POLICY OF BEING NON POLITICAL IN THIS CONTEXT AND HAVE ABANDONED FOR THE SHORT RUN AT LEAST ANY IDEAS THEY MIGHT ONCE HAVE HAD OF BUILDING AN EGYPTIAN COMMUNIST PARTY WITH ANY WEIGHT. THERE IS NO SOVIET SUPPORT IN EGYPT, COVERT OR OVERT, FOR EGYPTIAN COMMUNISTS.

2. THE SOVIET SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE ATTEMPTING TO ASSIST THE EAST GERMANS TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN THE ARAB WORLD BY REFERRING THE EGYPTIANS TO THE EAST GERMAN REPRESENTATION IN CAIRO ON ANY TIMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WHERE THE SOVIETS FEEL THERE IS A REMOTE CHANCE OF THE EGYPTIANS AND EAST GERMANS COMING TO ANY AGREEMENT. THE LONG RANGE OBJECTIVE HERE IS TO PREEMPT THE WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC POSITION PLUS ADDING WHATEVER PRESTIGE THE SOVIETS CAN TO THE EAST GERMAN REGIME'S IMAGE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE ARAB WORLD.

3. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION IS MISTAKEN, IN THE SOVIET DIPLOMAT'S VIEW, IF IT HOPES FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN DETENTE IN 1968 WHICH MIGHT INCREASE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S CHANCES FOR REELECTION. THE SOVIETS ARE HOPING FOR THE ELECTION OF EITHER GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER OR SENATOR ROBERT KENNEDY, WITH EITHER OF WHOM THEY FEEL THEY CAN WORK.

DTS:861853Z JAN 63

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~



Friday - January 5, 1968

TO: The President - ACTION

*Pres file*

FROM: W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Message to Bolivian President Barrientos

President Barrientos arrives in New York tomorrow (Saturday, January 6) for a 24-hour stop-over before proceeding to La Paz. He has been to Switzerland for a brief vacation and medical check-up.

It would be a nice gesture if you were to send the following message to him at The Waldorf-Astoria where he will be staying:

"His Excellency  
Rene Barrientos Ortuno  
Constitutional President of the  
Republic of Bolivia

Dear Mr. President:

I was happy to learn that you will be in New York today. You are warmly welcome to the United States. As you return to La Paz, I wish you continuing success in your efforts to bring greater progress to the Bolivian people in 1968.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

89

~~SECRET~~

EEA888

OO WTE19  
DE WTE 138

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAPS0121

1968 JAN 5 17 59

1968 JAN 5 PM 1:17

FRIDAY

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 5, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH THE VATICAN IS NOT HOPEFUL ABOUT GETTING A MISSION TO HANOI.

IN CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR JANUARY 3, VATICAN UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE CASAROLI SAID VATICAN SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SUGGESTION VATICAN SEND MISSIONS TO NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM TO EXAMINE CONDITIONS OF PRISONERS OF WAR. CASAROLI SAID POPE APPRECIATED PRESIDENT'S OFFER HELP ARRANGE VISIT VATICAN MISSION TO SOUTH VIET-NAM. HE NOTED WITH REGRET HOWEVER THAT VATICAN HAD BEEN UNABLE SECURE VISAS FOR OTHER PROPOSED DELEGATIONS TO NORTH VIET-NAM AND WAS NOT OVERLY HOPEFUL MISSION PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE ANY GREATER SUCCESS.

DTG 051731Z JAN 1968

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-03  
By is, NARA Date 4-23-98

PRESERVATION COPY



EEA889  
00 VTE10  
DE WTE 136

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS/CBS 10

By us, NARS, Date 11-28-83

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80119

90  
Pres file  
68 JAN 6 PM 1:26

FRIDAY

~~TOP SECRET~~

JANUARY 5, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH AN INTERESTING CABLE FROM LOCKE, WESTMORELAND, KOMER  
ON HANOI'S MILITARY POSTURE IN RELATION TO ITS DIPLOMATIC POSTURE.

1. WE HAVE NOTED VARIOUS BITS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, SUCH AS TRINH STATEMENT, WHICH SUGGEST HANOI SETTING STAGE FOR TALKS. WHAT STRIKES US FORCIBLY HERE IS SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN THESE APPARENT SIGNS AND INCREASINGLY SOLID EVIDENCE OF MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BUILDUP AGAINST I CORPS AREA.
2. AS YOU KNOW, TRUCK TRAFFIC FROM NORTH VIETNAM DOWN HO CHI MINH TRAIL FOR LAST FEW MONTHS HAS REACHED MASSIVE PROPORTIONS. NOW THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS OF MAJOR NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOP REINFORCEMENTS IN BORDER AREAS OF QUANG TRI-THUA THIEN-QUANG NAM. GEN WESTMORELAND'S BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY MASSING FOR ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THIS AREA, PERHAPS TARGETED THIS TIME ON KHE SANH.
3. SINCE FACT OF NEW NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY BUILDUP IS BECOMING INCONTROVERTIBLE, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO RELATE THIS TO SIGNS OF HANOI WILLINGNESS TO TALK. MOST PRUDENT EXPLANATION IS THAT APPARENT INCREASED WILLINGNESS TO TALK IS SMOKE SCREEN TO COVER BUILDUP. TO GO FURTHER, IF HANOI COULD SECURE CESSATION OF US BOMBING IN NORTH AS PRICE FOR TALKS, THIS WOULD IMMENSELY FACILITATE SUSTAINED NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY OFFENSIVE. THESE EXPLANATIONS WOULD SUGGEST THAT CURRENT POLITICAL FEELERS ARE ESSENTIALLY DESIGNED TO BOLSTER HANOI'S MILITARY POSITION.
4. ANOTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT HANOI PLANNING ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE EFFORT TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST ONE PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY IN HOPES THIS WOULD ESTABLISH POSITION OF STRENGTH PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS. ALTERNATIVELY, HANOI MAY NOT HAVE YET DECIDED ON ITS EVENTUAL COURSE, AND BE AWAITING RESULTS OF NEXT OFFENSIVE.
5. WE HERE INCLINE TO FIRST VIEW, BUT PICTURE FROM THIS END IS STILL MURKY. HENCE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS MERELY TO COUNTER-POINT HANOI'S MILITARY PREPARATIONS AGAINST ITS APPARENT DESIRE TO CREATE IMPRESSION OF GREATER DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE. GEN WESTMORELAND WILL SEND THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS A MORE DETAILED APPRECIATION OF ENEMY BUILDUP AND LIKELY OFFENSIVE MOVES.

05/1717Z JAN 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 5 18 30

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JAN 5 PM 2:06

FRIDAY

EEA887  
OO WIE12  
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FROM VALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80116

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 5, 1968

HEREWITH NICK AND THE GERMANS. ON THE WHOLE, POSITIVE.

1. WE MET TUESDAY AFTERNOON WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND VICE CHANCELLOR WILLY BRANDT IN A LARGE MEETING ATTENDED BY SIX OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. AN OBVIOUS EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO BRING TOGETHER THIS LEADING GROUP OF OFFICIALS, SOME OF WHOM HAD BEEN ON THEIR HOLIDAYS. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY AND BEGAN WITH MY PRESENTATION ALONG THE LINES OF THE ONE I REPORTED FROM LONDON. THE TWO-HOUR MEETING COVERED A SERIES OF DETAILED QUESTIONS ON SPECIFICS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM. MOST OF THE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED BY LAHR IN HIGHLY METHODICAL FASHION MOVING THROUGH THE PROGRAM POINT BY POINT. THE QUESTIONING CENTERED ON POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INVESTMENT ACTIONS WHICH THE GERMAN SIDE CLEARLY FELT WOULD TIGHTEN THEIR CAPITAL MARKET (ALTHOUGH AT ONE POINT LAHR SEEMED TO BE SAYING THAT VERY LITTLE AMERICAN CAPITAL HAD COME TO GERMANY DIRECTLY FROM US -- A POINT REFUTED BY FACTS.) I WELCOMED THEIR ASSURANCES THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN PROMOTING A HIGH GROWTH RATE, WHICH THEY CONSIDERED TO BE A RESPONSIBLE POSITION FOR A SURPLUS COUNTRY TO TAKE.

2. ON BORDER TAXES, THE GERMAN SIDE MADE AN EFFORT TO DISCLAIM THAT GERMAN ACTIONS HAVE A SERIOUS TRADE EFFECT, BUT LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO MY STRONG POLITICAL ARGUMENTS THAT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AND HOW MUCH WE CAN SHOW TRADE EFFECT TO BE, THE FACT OF THEIR REBATES WAS A POTENTIAL POLITICAL ISSUE IN THE U.S. WHICH WOULD ENHANCE PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES. BILL ROTH EXPLAINED IN DETAIL THAT WE WISH TO DISCUSS IN GATT AND RELATED THIS TO THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS.

*Prople*

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 8, #171

By jc NARA, Date 7-21-03

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



3. I WOULD SUMMARIZE THE LARGE INITIAL MEETING AS REVEALING THE GERMANS TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR GOALS OF AVOIDING A RESURGENCE OF PROTECTIONISM AND OF WISHING TO DO ALL THAT IS REQUIRED TO ASSURE THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF U.S. FORCES FOR THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. ON OFFSET, THE GERMANS WERE INTERESTED IN MY MENTION OF POSSIBLE MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE LONGER TERM, BUT AGREED THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.

4. FOLLOWING THE LARGE MEETING, I ASKED BRANDT FOR A MORE RESTRICTED SESSION ATTENDED ONLY BY FRED DEMING, BILL ROTH, RUSS FESSENDEN AND ME AND ON THE GERMAN SIDE BY BRANDT, LAHR, HARKORT AND DUCKWITZ.

5. I EXPLAINED TO BRANDT THAT, IN POLITICAL TERMS, TWO STEPS FROM THE GERMANS ARE REALLY ESSENTIAL TO US.

(A) FIRST, I STRESSED THE PRIME IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ATTACH TO MAINTAINING OUR COMMITMENTS FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE. IN THIS CONTEXT I SAID, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE HAVE FULL NEUTRALIZATION OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS OF OUR TROOPS IN GERMANY. I DID NOT MENTION A SPECIFIC FIGURE, BUT SPOKE IN TERMS OF A TWO-YEAR AGREEMENT THAT WOULD COVER US FULLY.

IT WAS CLEAR FROM WHAT I SAID THAT WE WERE NOT SPEAKING ONLY OF CONTINUANCE OF THIS YEAR'S ARRANGEMENTS. I ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT WE NEEDED AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

(B) SECOND, I DESCRIBED THE HEAVY PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES IN THE U.S. AND OUR POLITICAL NEED TO HAVE SOMETHING WHICH COULD FORESTALL THESE PRESSURES. I THEN REFERRED TO OUR CONSIDERATION OF NEW LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD GIVE A 2 PERCENT - 2 1/2 PERCENT TAX REBATE TO AMERICAN EXPORTERS AS SOMETHING POSITIVE WHICH COULD ENABLE THE ADMINISTRATION TO CONTAIN PROTECTIONIST PRESSURE. WHAT WE NEEDED, I STRESSED, WAS A GERMAN COMMITMENT TO STAND STILL IF WE PUT INTO EFFECT SUCH LEGISLATION. IF GERMAN AND OTHER COUNTRIES WERE TO RETALIATE, OBVIOUSLY THE WHOLE EFFECT WOULD BE LOST. I ADDED THAT IN ADDITION WE NEED TO HAVE A FULL EXPLORATION IN GATT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF INEQUALITIES IN THE TAX FIELD AS FAR AS INTERNATIONAL TRADE IS CONCERNED. THE 2 PERCENT - 2 1/2 PERCENT BORDER ADJUSTMENT PLUS RE-EXAMINATION OF THE GATT RULES COULD PROVIDE A MEANS FOR KEEPING PROTECTIONISM UNDER CONTROL.

6. I STRESSED THAT, IN MAKING THESE TWO REQUESTS OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT, I HOPED CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE POLITICALLY COURAGEOUS STEPS THE PRESIDENT WAS TAKING IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR. I POINTED OUT THAT THE 10 PERCENT TAX INCREASE, THE STOPPAGE OF ALL DIRECT INVESTMENT TO WESTERN EUROPE AND THE TOURIST MEASURES ARE ALL OF THEM POLITICALLY VERY DIFFICULT.

7. IN HIS REPLY, BRANDT SAID THAT SERIOUS AND URGENT CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO THESE REQUESTS BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT. WE COMMENTED SYMPATHETICALLY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FIRST IN PARTICULAR, AND FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SECOND. WE ADDED THAT THESE MATTERS WOULD BE CONSIDERED AT THE NEXT CABINET MEETING, JANUARY 13, AFTER WHICH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IN CONTACT WITH THE EMBASSY.

8. IN A LATER CONVERSATION AT THE DINNER WHICH HE GAVE FOR US, BRANDT TOLD ME THAT THE TWO REQUESTS WHICH I HAD OUTLINED TO HIM IN THE PRIVATE MEETING PRESENTED QUOTE NO REAL PROBLEM UNQUOTE. LAHR, IN SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS TERMS, MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO FRED AND RUSS FESSENDEN.

9. BRANDT'S TOAST AT THE DINNER WAS UNUSUALLY WARM. HE DWELT AT SOME LENGTH ON GERMAN APPRECIATION AND SYMPATHY FOR PRESIDENT AS HE CARRIES IMMENSE BURDENS OF FREE WORLD LEADERSHIP. BRANDT ALSO SPOKE OF HIGH REGARD FOR YOU AND ASKED THAT I SEND BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR.

10. FULL REPORT BEING SENT SEPTEL ON LARGE MEETING.

DTG: 051639Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



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00 WTE10  
DE WTE 137

1968 JAN 5 22

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH80120

UNCLASSIFIED

68 JAN 5 PM 2:02

FRIDAY

*Pres file*

JANUARY 5, 1968

HEREWITH CHIEU HOI RETURNS FOR 1967 VERSUS 1966. MUCH LESS IMPROVEMENT THAN WE HAD EARLIER HOPED; BUT REASONS ARE INTERESTING.

SUBJECT: CHIEU HOI WEEKLY REPORT NO. 94

PERIOD OF REPORT: DECEMBER 23-31, 1967

1. RECAPITULATION OF RETURNEES:	1967	1966
THIS PERIOD (DECEMBER 23-31)	153	1019
EAST PERIOD	157	585
YEAR'S TOTAL	27,178	20,242

2. BREAKDOWN:

REGION	RETURNEES	CATEGORIES	RETURNEES
I	59	MILITARY	103
II	29	POLITICAL	38
III	31	OTHER ELEMENTS	12
IV	34		
TOTALS	153		153

3. COMMENT:

A. REPORTS NOT RECEIVED FROM VINH BINH, VINH LONG, CHAU DOC AND ANGIANG PROVINCES FOR INCLUSION IN ABOVE.

B. 1967 SHOWED INCREASE OF 34 PERCENT OVER 1966. OF 1967 TOTAL OF 27,178, MILITARY RETURNEES TOTALLED 17,671 OR EQUIVALENT OF TWO ENEMY DIVISIONS. THIS NUMBER ALSO EQUALS APPROXIMATELY ONE FIFTH OF NUMBER OF VC/NVA KILLED OR CAPTURED BY ALL ARMED FORCES IN VIET NAM (91,595).

C. POLITICAL CATEGORY OF RETURNEES TOTALLED 7,886, OF WHOM 4,731 CLASSIFIED AS INFRA-STRUCTURE CADRE OR PARTY ORGANIZERS. OTHER CIVILIAN ELEMENTS TOTALLED 1,621. SHARP DECLINE IN CHIEU HOI RATE IN NOVEMBER-DECEMBER BELIEVED CAUSED BY FOLLOWING FACTORS LISTED IN ESTIMATED ORDER OF PRIORITY:

(1) VC COUNTERMEASURES INCLUDING WINTER-SPRING OFFENSIVE, TIGHTER CONTROL OF PERSONNEL.

(2) VC PROPAGANDA CONCERNING IMMINENT NEGOTIATIONS AND COALITION GOVERNMENT, REINFORCED BY WIDESPREAD LOCAL VIETNAMESE SPECULATION ON SAME SUBJECTS AND BY REPORTS FROM OVERSEAS, PARTICULARLY US PRESS.

(3) CHANGE IN TYPE AND LOCATION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

(4) CERTAIN LARGE POOLS OF DEFECTIBLE VIET CONG ALREADY FISHED OUT: E.G., BINH DINH, PHU YEN.

(5) NEW GVN HAS NOT YET PROJECTED IMAGE OF AGGRESSIVE FORWARD MOTION, WHICH COMPLICATED BY NEGOTIATIONS RUMORS.

(6) HIGHER PROPORTION OF NVA IN ENEMY STRUCTURE.

DTG 051718Z JAN 68



~~SECRET~~RECEIVED  
WHCAVZCZCEEA883  
00 WTE10  
DE WTE 130FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80113

JAN 5 14 33

file  
JAN 5 AM 10 07

FRIDAY

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 5, 1968

HEREWITH BELGIUM ASKS FOR A \$50 MILLION EXCEPTION ON OUR CAPITAL EXPORT PROGRAM. WE SHALL HAVE ACCUMULATED A GOOD MANY GORED OXEN IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

1. AFTER MEETING WITH EUROPEAN COMMISSION THIS MORNING, I (KATZENBACH) HEARD OUR FIRST CRY OF ALARM FROM THE GORED OX. BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER VANDEN BOEYANTS IN HIS APPARENTLY USUAL FRANK AND STRAIGHT FORWARD MANNER MADE IMPASSIONED PLEA FOR RELIEF FROM WHAT HE TERMED DIRE EFFECTS OUR INVESTMENT ACTIONS. WE MET IN CABINET ROOM AND PRIME MINISTER WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN MINISTER HARMEL, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS VAN OFFELEN, PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL BANK ANSIAUX AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FINANCE MINISTER DE CLERQ.

2. AFTER MY INITIAL PRESENTATION, PM LAUNCHED INTO STATEMENT OF SERIOUS EFFECTS ON BELGIUM OF OUR MORATORIUM ON NEW INVESTMENT. HE SAID THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR ACTION -- AND HE WAS WEIGHING HIS WORDS CAREFULLY -- COULD CALL INTO DOUBT COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF BELGIUM GOVERNMENT. HIS PRINCIPAL PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE ROUGHLY \$50 MILLION OF "FRESH" INVESTMENT WHICH AMERICAN FIRMS HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO MAKE PARTICULARLY IN THE DISADVANTAGED REGIONS OF BELGIUM WHERE COAL MINES AND STEEL MILLS HAVE BEEN IN SERIOUS ECONOMIC TROUBLE. HE LINKED THIS PROBLEM TO WHAT HE REFERRED TO AS THEIR CANADIAN PROBLEM OF TWO NATIONALITIES. HE RECALLED THAT BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD TAKEN MOST DIFFICULT DECISION IN WELCOMING NATO HEADQUARTERS AND SHAPE EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS CERTAIN TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES FOR THEM. HE STATED THAT THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO TAKEN THE POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR DECISION TO WELCOME AMERICAN INVESTMENT WHEN BELGIAN INDUSTRY AND OTHER FORCES IN EUROPE HAD SEVERELY CRITICIZED THIS POLICY. PM UNDERScoreD THAT WHOLE REPEAT WHOLE BELGIAN POLICY COULD BE CALLED INTO QUESTION AND PARTICULARLY REFERRED TO GOVERNMENT'S UNPOPULAR SUPPORT OF US ON VIET-NAM. HE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE AND THE NECESSITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM BUT STATED THAT SOME METHOD MUST BE FOUND TO DEAL WITH THE PARTICULAR EFFECTS IN BELGIUM WHICH IS SO HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON US INVESTMENT. HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS OF ALMOST TRAGIC PROPORTIONS. HE POINTED OUT THAT UK IS NOT AS DEPENDENT ON US INVESTMENT BUT APPARENTLY WILL BE TREATED MORE FAVORABLY. \$50 MILLION MAY SEEM SMALL AMOUNT BUT IT PRESENTS TERRIBLE PROBLEM TO BELGIAN GOVERNMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By jc/mr NARA, Date 7-22-03

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3. PM SUGGESTED THAT US SHOULD EXAMINE POSSIBILITY OF SETTING QUOTA OF \$50 MILLION OF ALLOWABLE NEW INVESTMENT IN BELGIUM IN RETURN FOR AGREEMENT BY BELGIAN GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE THAT THIS OUT-FLOW DOES NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON US GOLD RESERVES. HE SUGGESTED THAT HIGH-LEVEL MISSION SHOULD BE SENT TO WASHINGTON IN SECOND HALF OF JANUARY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM AND FIND A SOLUTION.

4. WHILE NOT PROMISING PM ANY SPECIFIC ACTION, I ASSURED HIM THAT US ALWAYS WELCOMED DISCUSSIONS AND THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO EXAMINE ANY SPECIAL PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY OUR MEASURES. AT THE SAME TIME, I STATED QUITE FORCEFULLY THAT WE HAD TO SOLVE OUR PROBLEM AND THAT EUROPEANS HAD URGED US TO DO SO. WE COULD NOT ALLOW EXCEPTIONS TO PREVENT US FROM REACHING DESIRED TARGETS. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THESE DECISIONS WERE NOT EASY FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESENTED HIM WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES AS WELL.

5. ON OTHER PROVISIONS OF PROGRAM, BELGIANS TOOK POSITION THAT NEUTRALIZATION OF B/P EFFECTS OUR MILITARY PRESENCE SHOULD BE MULTILATERAL PROBLEM CONSIDERED IN NATO. IT MIGHT BE THAT WATER BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE NECESSARY BUT THIS SHOULD BE TREATED IN FIRST INSTANCE AS ALLIANCE PROBLEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT BELGIUM WISHED TO PURCHASE US AIRCRAFT BUT FRENCH HAVE MADE EXTREMELY GOOD OFFER. IF US COULD IMPROVE ITS OFFER, BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO BUY F-5S. TOWARD THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING PM SAID, HOWEVER, THAT BELGIUM WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK OUT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT EVEN THOUGH HE BELIEVED IN PRINCIPLE OF MULTILATERAL DISCUSSION FIRST.

6. ON TOURISM, BELGIANS WERE HAPPY TO HEAR WE WERE NOT CONSIDERING EXCHANGE CONTROLS BUT RECOGNIZED THAT PROBLEM WAS MAINLY FOR US TO WORK OUT. ON BORDER TAX, THEY TOOK POSITION THAT BELGIUM WAS NOT THE OFFENDER AND WE SHOULD THEREFORE LOOK TO THE GERMANS, FRENCH, AND DUTCH TO MEET US CONCERNS. THEY ALSO INDICATED THAT, IF US IMPOSED ITS OWN BORDER TAX, THIS MUST CLEARLY FALL WITHIN GATT RULES. THEY EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS HOWEVER TO DISCUSS GENERAL PROBLEM BOTH BILATERALLY AND IN THE GATT.

7. MY OWN FEELING, AND I WOULD APPRECIATE AMBASSADOR KNIGHT'S COMMENTS, IS THAT VANDEN BOEYANTS IS USING THIS ISSUE FOR HIS OWN POLITICAL PURPOSES. I FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT \$50 MILLION OF US INVESTMENT, WHICH MIGHT, IN FACT, PROVE TO BE MUCH LESS IF US COMPANIES FIND ALTERNATIVE SOURCES, IS QUESTION WHICH SHOULD RAISE SUCH A SERIOUS PROBLEM. FRED DEMING AND I CANNOT RECALL THAT BELGIANS WERE AS VIGOROUS AS THEY APPEARED TO BE TODAY IN OPPOSING THE GENERAL EUROPEAN VIEW ON THE INIQUITIES OF US INVESTMENT POLICY. NEVERTHELESS, BOTH FRED AND I FEEL THAT WE SHOULD BE WILLING AT LEAST TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM AND SEE WHETHER OR NOT IN EXAMINING SPECIFIC CASES THE PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE AS SERIOUS AS PORTRAYED BY THE BELGIANS.

DTG 051300Z JAN 1968

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1968 JAN 5 19 18

*Pres file*

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
 TO THE PRESIDENT  
 CITE CAP88122

~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 5 PM 2:37

FRIDAY

JANUARY 5, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
 FOR THE PRESIDENT

HEREWITH NICK AMONG THE DUTCH. SOME PROBLEMS, BUT  
 BASICALLY HELPFUL.

1. THURSDAY AFTERNOON WAS RATHER REFRESHING CONTRAST TO THURSDAY MORNING'S MEETING WITH THE BELGIANS. THE DUTCH, ALTHOUGH OCCASIONALLY CRITICAL, WERE PARTICULARLY FRIENDLY AND WARM IN THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM. WE WERE RECEIVED BY ACTING PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF FINANCE WITTEVEEN, TREASURER GENERAL VAN LENNEP, FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DE BLOCK, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE LARDINOIS, AND PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL BANK ZIJLSTRA.

2. I PUT SPECIAL EMPHASIS IN MY PRESENTATION ON THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT ATTACHES TO FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AT HOME THROUGH HIS TAX MEASURES AND ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE MILITARY B/P PROBLEM WAS NOT RPT NOT DUE IN LARGE PART TO VIET-NAM SINCE I KNEW THAT THESE WERE POINTS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN WITH THE DUTCH.

3. WHILE WELCOMING OUR MEASURES AS BEING INDISPENSABLE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE EXISITING MONETARY SYSTEM, THE DUTCH WERE CRITICAL IN TWO MAIN AREAS. FIRST, THEY DO NOT RPT NOT LIKE THE DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS OF BOTH OUR INVESTMENT CONTROLS AND OUR PROPOSAL ON TOURISM. SECOND, THEY HAVE SERIOUS QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO

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CONTROL TOURISM AT ALL. ON INVESTMENT, DUTCH POINTED OUT THAT THEY ARE ONLY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD TO HAVE MORE INVESTMENT IN THE US THAN US HAS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THEY BELIEVE IT IS UNFAIR TO LUMP ALL EEC COUNTRIES TOGETHER. LUNS STATED THAT THIS WOULD FORCE SIX CLOSER TOGETHER AT TIME WHEN DUTCH WERE RETHINKING THEIR POLICIES BECAUSE OF FRENCH INTRANSIGENCE, PARTICULARLY ON UK PROBLEM. WITTEVEN COMMENTED THAT US SHOULD NOT DISCRIMINATE IN APPLYING INVESTMENT CONTROLS ON BASIS OF B/P POSITION OF INVESTMENT RECIPIENTS. THIS IS NOT RIGHT CRITERION HE SAID. DUTCH ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT THEY WILL BE DISADVANTAGED IN COMPARISON WITH THE UK ON NORTH SEA OIL DEVELOPMENT. THEY ALSO QUESTIONED WHY WE APPEARED TO BE FAVORING JAPAN WHICH IS A STRONG COMPETITOR PARTICULARLY IN SHIP BUILDING AND REPAIR. WHILE THIS POINT MADE FORCEFULLY I DO NOT TAKE IT TOO SERIOUSLY AS THEY UNDERSTAND RATIONALE FOR OUR POSITION.

4. DUTCH URGED GREAT CARE IN DEALING WITH TOURISM. THEY SEE DANGER IN DISCRIMINATORY ASPECTS AND QUESTION WHETHER THIS IS PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND RULES. THEY ALSO RAISED FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION TREATY OBLIGATIONS. THEY POINTED OUT THAT KLM IS LARGEST PURCHASER OF US AIRCRAFT.

5. ON BORDER TAX PROBLEM, DUTCH AGREED TO DISCUSSIONS IN GATT BUT ARGUED STRONGLY THAT RECENT EUROPEAN MEASURES WERE NEUTRAL IN TRADE EFFECT.

6. ZIJLSTRA, AFTER COMMENTING ON NECESSITY OF US FISCAL MEASURES AND ACCEPTING NECESSITY OF SOME INVESTMENT CONTROLS, STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO FIND A WAY TO MANAGE THE LARGE OUTSTANDING US DOLLAR BALANCES. HE THOUGHT THAT THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED IN IMF AND THAT US SHOULD PROCEED WITH A FUND DRAWING. HE ALSO SAID THAT EURO-DOLLAR PROBLEM WOULD HAVE TO BE SKILLFULLY HANDLED SINCE INTEREST RATE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN US AND EUROPE MIGHT RESULT IN OUT-FLOW TO EURO-DOLLAR MARKET.

7. IN ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS, I RE-EMPHASIZED THE LARGE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE PROCEEDING. I PLACED PARTICULAR STRESS ON OUR FEELING THAT IF DEFICIT COUNTRIES HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES, SO DO SURPLUS COUNTRIES. I ASKED THE DUTCH TO LOOK INTO THEIR PARTICULAR INVESTMENT PROBLEMS AND SEE WHETHER THEY WERE AS SERIOUS AS THEY MIGHT BELIEVE. IN THE CASE OF THE OIL COMPANIES, I QUESTIONED WHETHER OR NOT THEY WOULD BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED IN VIEW OF THEIR LARGE WORLD-WIDE HOLDINGS AND THEIR ABILITY TO USE DEPLETION ALLOWANCES.

8. ON THE BORDER TAX ISSUE, I THINK THAT THE DUTCH WILL EXAMINE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO MINIMIZE EFFECT AND IF WE MOVE TO ADOPT A BORDER TAX THEY WILL ACCEPT IT IF WE CAN MAKE GATT JUSTIFICATION.

9. IN SUMMARY, I THINK THAT DUTCH ATTITUDE WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND THAT WE SHOULD AGREE TO THEIR URGINGS TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF OUR PROGRAM IN THE IMF, THE OECD AND GATT.

DTG: 051731Z JAN 68

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo. 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-22-03

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68 JAN 5 PM 3:07

FRIDAY

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80124

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 5, 1968

THE FOLLOWING IS MIKE PEARSON'S WARM RESPONSE TO YOUR NOTE TO HIM ON HIS RETIREMENT:

"MY DEAR PRESIDENT:

"YOUR AMBASSADOR CONVEYED TO ME YOUR VERY FRIENDLY MESSAGE ON MY FORTHCOMING RETIREMENT. I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR KIND AND ENCOURAGING WORDS.

"IT WAS A VERY DIFFICULT DECISION FOR ME TO MAKE BUT I FELT THAT, AFTER FORTY YEARS IN PUBLIC SERVICE AND HAVING REACHED MY THREE SCORE YEARS AND TEN, IT WAS TIME FOR ME TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ARENA OF ACTIVE POLITICS, THOUGH NOT, I ASSURE YOU, FROM ACTIVE LIFE.

"I HAVE MANY WONDERFUL THINGS TO LOOK BACK ON AND, HIGH AMONG THEM, THE FRIENDLY AND FRANK RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED. I THANK YOU FOR THIS, ALL THE MORE SO BECAUSE IT HAS MET THE MOST IMPORTANT TEST OF FRIENDSHIP, THE FEELING THAT WE COULD DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT AND EVEN DISAGREE WITHOUT OUR GOOD RELATIONSHIP BEING DISTURBED.

"AS YOU FACE PROBLEMS OF AGONIZING COMPLEXITY, GREATER THAN THOSE EVER FACED BY A POLITICAL LEADER, I CAN ONLY OFFER YOU MY BEST WISHES FOR CONTINUED STRENGTH AND RESOLUTION, AND THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING WHICH YOU HAVE SHOWN IN SO MANY WAYS OVER SO MANY YEARS.

"SINCERELY,  
MIKE PEARSON"

DTG 051914Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE      Friday - January 5, 1968      - ACTION

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Letter from Salvadorean President Sanchez**

*Handwritten:*  
1. ~~Letter from President Sanchez~~  
2. Punta del Este

In a recent visit to Washington Salvadorean Education Minister Beneke brought a letter from President Sanchez to you (Tab A) referring to your conversation at Punta del Este and asking for your help in the early implementation of an ETV project for El Salvador.

At Punta del Este you proposed a pilot ETV project in Central America (Salvador was not specified, although we had it in mind as the most likely place) and a regional training center in South America. In line with these proposals, AID has been studying the design of a pilot project in El Salvador. President Sanchez is aware of this. His letter is intended to speed up a decision to go ahead in El Salvador.

During Minister Beneke's visit here, our AID people found a close correlation between the Minister's plans and the views of our experts on the nature, size and pre-conditions for an ETV program. The Minister has in mind a 5-year program for introducing ETV gradually into the educational system, beginning at the junior secondary level in 1969 and extending it into the primary schools starting in 1971. AID agreed to send a team this month to work with the Minister in drawing up the project. The cost will be in the \$4 - \$5 million range. We would finance with loans and grants a substantial portion of the initial phase. The Salvadoreans would pick up the tab for the on-going costs.

At Tab B is a suggested reply to President Sanchez for your signature.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachments**

Tab A - 12/14/67 letter from President Sanchez

Tab B - Suggested reply.



INFORMATION

98

~~SENSITIVE~~

Friday  
January 5, 1968 -- 2:40 p.m.

*fre*

Mr. President:

Herewith an interesting and  
rather sophisticated analysis of  
student dissent in the U. S. , by the  
CIA.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-258  
By iso, NARA, Date 1-14-04

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. You will recall that on 22 December we sent you a follow-up to the study of the United States peace movement.

2. Herewith is a paper entitled "Student Dissent and its Techniques in the United States", which is part of our continuing examination of this general matter. It is an effort to identify the locus of student dissent and how widespread it is.

3. No other copies of this paper will be released except on your instruction.

*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

Attachment - 1

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SENSITIVE



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SENSITIVE

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5 January 1968

STUDENT DISSENT AND ITS TECHNIQUES IN THE US

Summary

The emergence of widespread protest against certain US Government policies by radical American university students began in the early 1960s. An estimated 30,000 students now actively participate in a peace or protest movement chiefly aimed at the draft and at Vietnam policies by staging campus sit-ins, picketing government and industrial recruiters, or marching in antigovernment demonstrations such as the one in Washington in October 1967.

Of the six million students enrolled in the more than 2,100 US colleges and universities, the overwhelming majority are politically apathetic or staunchly conservative. Except on the issue of selective service, the student community appears generally to support the Administration more strongly than the population as a whole.

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SENSITIVE

The activists are bright young people. Their movement is a shifting alliance of a number of diverse groups welded together by only a few leaders. Their strategy is flexible and their techniques and tactics are constantly changing. Early in 1967 they relied heavily on rather large but passive demonstrations to register their points, but by fall they had shifted toward smaller, more violent protests.

Communist front groups have been permitted to participate in some of the student organizations but have not succeeded in controlling them. American student radicals have not forged effective alliances with foreign student groups nor have they borrowed uniquely European or Asian protest techniques for use in the US. In fact, just the contrary appears to be the case. They do, however, count on the moral support and encouragement of expatriate Americans.

The chief issues which the majority of student activists attack are the ghettos and Vietnam. Most are emotionally concerned over US involvement in Southeast Asia; relatively few are committed

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**SENSITIVE**

to working with the poor and underprivileged. It is dubious whether their movement would long survive an end to the Vietnam conflict.

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**SENSITIVE**

STUDENT DISSENT AND ITS TECHNIQUES IN THE USIntroduction

The emergence of widespread, radical protest by American youth which began in the early 1960s has been congruent with a wider protest against the course of American foreign policy. There are, to be sure, distinctions to be made between people who disagree with policy decisions made by this or any other US administration and the few who would repudiate our entire governmental system either in honest search for a better way or out of ideological loyalty to a foreign power. All three are involved in the so-called American Peace Movement. All three figure in demonstrations such as the 21 October 1967 Protest at the Pentagon, the anti-Rusk tumult in New York on 14 November and the 4-8 December "Stop the Draft Week."

This paper is not directly concerned with groups such as the Women Strike for Peace or SANE. Nor is it concerned in the main with party-line groups such as the Progressive Labor Party, the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs or the short-lived May 2nd Movement, which play



no central role in present-day dissent. They are stigmatized by a record of subservience to Soviet, Chinese or local Communist example and direction and far too dogmatic to be able to succeed in the kind of free wheeling debate which seems a hallmark of youthful protest. The front groups have been permitted to participate in the student organizations but have not succeeded in controlling them nor in doing more than seize momentary advantage. In a broader sense, of course, dissent and civil disobedience comport with Communist objectives; but the party's fronts probably would prefer a more effectively organized protest movement in which they could grasp a lever of control.

We are concerned with that mobile and vocal band of university youth who provide dissidence its manpower and are most prone to challenge established authority.

#### What is Protest?

The Student Movement of 1967 is a disparate amalgam: it has a flavor of Bakunin-like anarchism, Quaker pacifism and utopian socialism--all wedded to an overriding dedication to social involvement.

Its adherents often mirror the community in which they live. In New York they reflect a pragmatic, liberal concern for the problems of the underprivileged. In the south they have a strong quasi-religious cast. In Berkeley, they have a decidedly literary-existentialist tinge. (Student activists are not societal drop-outs, i.e., Hippies. They bitterly resent being mislabelled. Activist Sherman Chickering admits that both activists and hippies are true believers in what he calls "Youth Culture" but avers that the two differ in origin. "The activist is most likely to be the child of liberal Democratic parents; the hippie is most likely to be the child of a conservative Republican. The one considers his father a New Deal sellout, but adopts his father's Constitutional ideas; the other considers his father irrelevant and rejects the prevailing culture entirely.")

The urbanologist Daniel P. Moynihan regards the dissenters as the counterparts of the religious heretics of the Middle Ages and argues that their appearance in the affluent United States and Europe in the early 1960s is symptomatic of the first Great Liberal Heresy. Moynihan contends that today's young



radicals are embittered by the realization that poverty and injustice and racial hatreds endure despite humanitarian laws and the type of economic system long sought by yesteryear's Liberals.

Protest is not unprecedented in American education and politics. Student radicalism dates back more than 60 years. The oldest organization, the Inter-Collegiate Socialist Society was founded in 1905 by Walter Lippman, Upton Sinclair and others. In 1917 the same men founded the League for Industrial Democracy (LID) which since has served to fund and counsel left-wing student groups.

Briefly put, the ranks of student radicals swelled when the Socialist party was strong (1919-20), lost members from 1920 to 1935, posed as champions of the Oxford Pledge, split over the Hitler-Stalin Pact in 1939 and revived briefly for the period of Henry Wallace's candidacy in 1948. These earlier dissidents carried picket signs, manned soup kitchens and fought in Spain. On the whole, however, their Marxism had a distinct bookish cast; they were closely allied with political organizations led by older radicals. Unlike today's dissidents, they were well read in economics and history and prone to engage opponents in debate.

Civil Rights and Protest

The Civil Rights Movement and Protest do overlap--but not in current goals, direction or membership.

The Supreme Court's 1954 decision on school desegregation raised aspirations which the Negro had found himself unable to fulfill. Those who began to press for legal rights after 1954 came principally from segregated colleges. Their tactic was civil disobedience and they welcomed the aid of white activists who went south for a summer, or longer, and witnessed the abuse of police and judicial power. The Civil Rights militants learned how to employ passive resistance to challenge the authorities and overturn custom, they engineered mob scenes and used crisis or the threat of crisis. It proved a dramatic experience which served to radicalize many of those who took part. If such tactics worked in the south, why not in the north? And in behalf of other causes than Civil Rights?

Coincidentally, there had been a rebirth of interest in Marxist studies in Europe. *The Universities and Left Review*, first published in England in 1956, found an American readership.



Graduate students at the University of Wisconsin edited the first issue of *Studies on the Left* in 1959 and a year later the University of Chicago put out *New University Thought*. With their seemingly perceptive social and political commentary, such neo-Marxist publications provided an intellectual stimulus of sorts to a generation raised on television.

Finally, there were the "heroic" examples of Fidel Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Patrice Lumumba. Latter day Marxists, ex-student revolutionaries, these three had a charisma--an appeal which owed nothing to logic or political realities. Fidel's flamboyant character, "Che's" self-effacing zeal and Lumumba's death at the hands of foreign mercenaries assured them an emotional following among a group which admits no other heroes, alive or dead.

#### Depth of Feeling - Student Alienation

Slightly more than six million Americans currently are enrolled in colleges and universities, according to the United States Office of Education. An overwhelming majority either are apathetic or staunchly conservative.

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Polls taken since 1962 show that country-wide most agree with the Administration's over-all course in foreign affairs.

This support is not unqualified, however, and varies from region to region. *The Washington Post* reported from Boston on 13 December 1967, for example, that a week-old survey of 21,000 students at nineteen colleges in the northeast showed that 84 percent voted against the Administration and favored de-escalation of the Vietnamese conflict. Only three percent support continuation of the fighting at its present level; 13 percent favored a step-up in US involvement. Significantly, less than 3.2 percent opted for disruptive or violent tactics to voice their dissent.

A poll on selective service probably would bring similar results. Objections to the draft and to the way in which it is administered serve to galvanize youthful opposition to the American commitment in Southeast Asia--undoubtedly because of the centrality of the issue to the lives of the participants.

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There are 127 separate groups involved in the so-called Peace Movement. Diverse, eclectic, they are united only in their opposition to the course of US policy in Southeast Asia and have no formal organizational ties. Many are little more than skeletal, letterhead groups. Others, like SANE, count an elite and influential adult following. The Communist-run Du Bois Clubs total no more than 2,000 members. Coordination is achieved by a relatively small number of full-time leaders who largely by dint of personality are able to bring their constituencies together in steering committees like the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam. For manpower, they look to the students.

### How Many?

Most commentators place the strength of the Protest Movement at 200,000 to 250,000. At no time have the dissidents been able to marshal such numbers. Such estimates appear grossly inflated--even if they include all who can be mobilized briefly in support of local issues. The hard core militants probably are no more than 30,000.

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In short, the Protest Movement depends upon the communications media for much of its image. This may be unavoidable. A bi-partisan foreign policy encourages the media to search out extra-parliamentary opposition in order to render the "issues" intelligible. A random sampling suggests that less attention is paid to protest demonstrations when other forums provide an alternative source of "news."

### Who?

What prompts a young man or woman to participate in campus sit-ins and street demonstrations? The psychologists and sociologists can provide a good deal of penetrating data.

In October 1964, *The Journal of Social Issues* published the findings of an on-the-spot survey of 4,000 students who had come to Washington, D.C. in 1962 before the Cuban crisis or subsequent Test Ban Treaty to picket the White House and the USSR Embassy under a "Turn Toward Peace" banner. The students (1) were quite young--18 1/2 was the mean age; (2) had no well-formed, comprehensive political

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ideology; (3) expressed themselves moralistically about the Cold War and nuclear weapons--but admitted little or no personal religious commitment; and (4) came from politically liberal families.

They represented 57 colleges; two-thirds (66 percent) were majoring in the humanities or social sciences, few in the physical or biological sciences and almost none in pre-professional courses. Twenty percent stated that they were Jewish. Fourteen percent claimed some degree of membership in "liberal" Protestant denominations (Unitarian and Quaker) and 13.5 percent identified with other more conservative Protestant sects. Less than one percent were Roman Catholic. Only a very small number were members of dedicated pacifist groups, such as the Committee for Nonviolent Action and the War Resisters' League. Half had participated in Civil Rights activities of some kind.

Subsequent studies have validated these findings. All commentators have been impressed by the depth of personal feeling which the protesters focus on their actions and by the fact that relatively few of them attend small denominational colleges or Catholic schools of any size.

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Most come from relatively affluent and well-educated middle-class Democratic families of recent immigrant stock. Many writers sense that the protesters are confident of tacit parental support, even if their immediate actions provoke verbal censure.

Dr. Daniel Katz of the University of Michigan, working under contract with the United States Office of Education, soon (March 1968) will publish a monograph summarizing eight studies of the protesters done at Berkeley, Chicago, and the University of Pennsylvania. Katz holds that activists are more intelligent, less prejudiced and psychologically more stable than non-activists.

Doctor Kenneth Kenniston of Yale told *US News & World Report* on 30 May 1966 that "on the whole, the students who are the most vociferous tend to be the most talented" and are rebelling because "they are worried about what they call hypocrisy, the gap between the American creed and the American society as it exists. For students in general, the war in Vietnam is not seen as a very glorious or noble or inspiring kind of war. Today's student activists...dislike doctrine and dogma of all

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kinds. A Communist...is usually laughed at rather than respected. What you do find...is a focus on very basic moral and ethical convictions--brotherhood and human decency and peace. Anybody who thinks he has the ultimate answers is very much out of step with most student activists."

Kenniston's statements are typical. His observation that the students are anti-intellectual and anti-ideological is particularly apt. Many who sympathize openly with the protesters, such as Jack Newfield or Michael Harrington, decry their lack of familiarity with history or the social polemics of the 1920s. So marked is their anti-ideological bent that one wag has compared them with "An 80-year old who says Sex no longer exists because he can't feel it any longer."

#### Which Schools?

There are roughly 2100 colleges and universities in the United States. Student activism is unknown in 1800 or more. A survey based on replies to questionnaires from Deans of Students in 849 schools in 1964-65, reported a lack of any kind of activism in 74 percent of the cases.

In general, activism is most common in selective liberal arts colleges which place great emphasis on independent inquiry and academic freedom.

Three "multiversities" figure in all accounts of student activism--the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and the University of Wisconsin at Madison. All are located away from national centers of political power and influence. All have outstanding faculties, student enrollments of 30,000 and sizeable graduate departments. A relatively small number of students can stage a large demonstration in absolute terms. For example, slightly fewer than 700, or less than three percent of Berkeley's enrollment, participated in the sit-in in the Sproul Hall which climaxed the so-called Berkeley Revolt.

Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Madison also are known for poor faculty-administration relations; aggrieved faculty openly agitate and at both Berkeley and Michigan have attacked the university as a means of winning political concessions. All have exceptionally high drop-out rates: 60 percent of the freshmen at Berkeley do not graduate.



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The median family income among students at Michigan has been estimated at \$17,000, as it is at Berkeley.

Seymour Martin Lipset contended in *Government and Opposition* in May 1966 that the high socio-economic background of most of the protesters did not mean that the student dissenters were in conflict with well-to-do conservative parents. Rather, he found evidence in samples from Berkeley and what he termed "impressionistic data" to warrant the belief that most were the children of former "radicals" of the 1930s and 1940s. He also argued that "when some New Left students speak of the hypocrisy of their parents' generation, they are often referring to those who at the breakfast and dinner table constantly discussed the failings of American society while seeming to conform to the system in business and remaining inactive politically. Many students are practicing what their parents have preached."

In brief, the militants do not come from the disadvantaged, status-anxious, underprivileged or uneducated groups.

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That is one of the reasons why few Negroes have moved from Civil Rights to Protest. Except for a few extremists who profess a belief in Separatism, the Negro Civil Rights activist seeks accommodation. The White can seek to overturn the system or The Establishment.

Students for a Democratic Society

In numbers, determination and vocal power, visibility and range of activities no group in the Protest Movement rivals Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). This being so, it is useful to examine the background, organization, program and strategy of the SDS in some detail.

Students for a Democratic Society was founded in 1961 as an adjunct of the antiquated but still existent Socialist-oriented League for Industrial Democracy. The relationship between the two groups has been strained from the outset. Alarmed by the activist rhetoric of SDS' initial statements, the League censured and then cut adrift the students for fear of losing its tax-exempt status. The influence of men like Norman Thomas has prevented open hostility between the two groups, but SDS views the League with disdain.



Inspired by the examples of the Congress for Radical Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), SDS set out to harness the political potential of the urban slum dweller.

The SDS charter, the so-called Port Huron Statement of 1962, rehearsed the complaints of alienated students in an industrial society. It drew heavily on the ideas of the late, distinguished American sociologist C. Wright Mills whose last books, *The Power Elite* and *The Sociological Imagination*, raised the spectre of an oligarchy of economic, political and military interests in the United States.

The Port Huron Statement--like SDS pronouncements to follow--also was indebted to the Hegelian philosopher and social critic Herbert Marcuse. Like Marcuse, it despaired of the feasibility of genuine reform in a system in which both major parties allegedly had become spokesmen for a gigantic technocracy (The Establishment). Like Marcuse, the Statement saw little cause to have faith in masses bound to their material possessions. It saw the contemporary democratic state as latently dictatorial, even

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terroristic, and determined to quash dissent. The Statement rejected the support of Communists, along with the notion that their nostrums offered any greater promise for man's future. It also renounced professional anti-Communism which, it hinted, had become a hallmark of government policy and served only to inhibit dissent.

No one ever will look to Students for a Democratic Society as an organizational model. Records keeping, like finances, are precarious. Headquartered in Chicago to which it moved from New York when some of its national leaders feared too close an involvement with older radical groups, SDS has 5,000 to 6,000 national members in 227 or more chapters. There are as many as 30,000 local chapter members. National members pay 50¢ monthly dues. Chapter dues are set locally. Not all chapters--which do not require any charter from the national unit--remit anything to Chicago. National Secretary Paul Booth estimates that the organization can rely upon the support of at least five sympathizers for every enrolled member.

There is a national staff of approximately fifteen full-time, underpaid employees and an annual budget of upwards of \$80,000--much of it

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apparently raised through special appeals. There are annual conventions. A National Council of 35 members meets from time to time to set policy. In practice, however, the Chicago staff is at least as influential. SDS abhors individual leadership. Its meetings are chaotic. There have been attempts to abolish even the post of national secretary and to adopt the Quaker method of consensus. No member is denied the right to speak, regardless of how germane his remarks. SDS professes a belief in "participatory democracy," the theory that all must be heard, all must be involved. (Opponents are not accorded the same respect once an SDS faction takes control of another forum.)

### The Ghettos

SDS set out in 1962 to work with the poor and underprivileged in the urban ghettos. Slum projects had not proved a rewarding or continuing field for campus based groups in the past, but SDS did not limit itself to soup kitchens or solely charitable undertakings. It sought to apply in the ghetto the voter registration methods and other tactics which had proved so successful in the south in order to redress the balance of effective power in the cities. It sought better



schools, health facilities, dependable police protection--all more valuable, if less tangible, to the slum dweller than \$5 on Election Day. To this end, SDS employs an estimated 75 full-time organizers in the ghettos, the so-called Economic Research and Action Program (ERAP). Tom Hayden--who recently figured in the release of the three Americans captured by the Viet Cong--runs the Newark Community Union Project. Hayden launched his project with a \$5,000 grant from United Auto Worker's President Walter Reuther. There are nine others. All are underfinanced; the SDS workers live in conditions of poverty, receiving less than subsistence wages. Many have been assaulted, most have been hungry and dismayed by the apathy and innate distrust which surrounds them.

#### Beyond the Slums

SDS might have stayed in the slums had it not been for two developments. The first, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1964, has been variously interpreted. The student activists saw it as a new application of the sit-in techniques which had spelled success for the adherents of

Civil Rights. Over 600 of the students involved at Berkeley earlier had, in fact, actively participated in one or more Civil Rights demonstrations. (Berkeley also had an extremely active pro-Communist element, perhaps numbering as many as 300 students. One of these, Bethina Aptheker, quickly gained prominence in the Free Speech Movement. The adeptness with which she exploited the issues to win student approbation and support were to prove typical of the way party-line groups would seek to capitalize on non-Communist student activism.)

With the deepening American involvement in Vietnam, the scene shifted to Ann Arbor, where a faction evidently impressed by the success of the Free Speech Movement in California courted faculty participation in the first of the sit-ins and demanded a strike to protest the first bombing of North Vietnam in February 1965. Though much publicized, the teach-in did not prove too successful a vehicle for those who opposed US policy and petered out; its vestiges can be seen from time to time on Sundays in the petition-like advertisements which appear in *The New York Times*. Many of those who participated turned away from direct opposition.

A New Phase

Without tutelage from the professors, student activists began to disassociate from anything connected with the Vietnam conflict.

Initially, the SDS was indebted to professedly Marxist or Communist influence for tactical planning to obstruct the build-up of American forces in Vietnam. A national Viet Nam Day Committee, (VDC) including pro-Viet Cong speakers, was formed at Berkeley following a two-day protest rally in May of 1965. VDC members undertook to publish tracts aimed at subverting members of the armed forces and sought to block the progress of troop transports by sitting astride the train tracks.

The national leadership of SDS has been equivocal on the problem of Communism, willingly has accepted the support of and participated beside Communist-front groups in anti-Vietnam causes and in 1965 did agree to delete from an update of the Port Huron Statement what passed for an anti-Communist stricture.

However, SDS does not seem to be either pro-Communist or naive so much as it is a-Communist: it welcomes support from any quarter and is



willing to forge tactical alliances with Communist front groups. The October 1967 Protest in Washington, for example, evolved from Communist Bethina Aptheker's call in the early Fall of 1966 for a nation-wide student strike. At a meeting held at the University of Chicago during Christmas week 1966 several SDS representatives opted to support such a walk-out and SDS members subsequently were prominent in the Washington demonstrations.

Not all rank-and-file SDS members or chapter leaderships are sanguine about Communist infiltration, however, and a good many more who are willing to accept Communist support of SDS objectives are increasingly reluctant about committing their membership recklessly to Communist-sponsored ventures.

Pragmatic and issue-oriented, SDS members have opted gradually for what they call the Politics of Confrontation, i.e., efforts to disrupt civil order whenever they disagree with government policy.

#### On Their Own: Tactics

SDS has shown a flair for improvisation. It has moved from the tactics of protest and obstruction--marches, sit-ins, and picket lines--to

those of overt resistance in the belief that passive confrontation, though it won headlines, failed to deter government policy. It is obvious that many SDS members look on passive anti-war demonstrations as ineffective and are increasingly frustrated. They are out to challenge "The Rotten Society" with what they call "Institutional Resistance."

This element, whose spokesmen appear most influential in the New York and Chicago areas, regard strikes, picket lines and sit-ins as devices for building a political movement and disparage what they call "that old mass mobilization thing." They are reluctant to share decision making with steering committees which include representatives of other, smaller radical organizations which do not have the manpower and rely on SDS to marshal the crowds. In the space of six months, between the spring and fall of 1967, this group has nudged the bulk of SDS away from demonstrations, such as the October 1967 Washington protest, toward smaller, more violent protests.

Writing in *New Left Notes* on 13 November 67, SDS Organizational Secretary Carl Davidson saw anti-recruiting sit-ins conducted throughout the

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Spring of the year as "acts of moral witness," whereas demonstrations set off during the Fall "displayed the quality of Tactical Political Resistance. The tactics we have developed thus far cover a wide range, beginning with mild dissident protest and reaching to forceful resistance...the selection of tactics naturally depends on one's strength relative to a particular opponent within the limits of the current political situation. In general, we have been underestimating our own strength and overestimating the enemy.

Davidson then led his readers through the full range of tactics employed by the SDS--"leaf-letting" ROTC classes, picketing military recruiters, "war crimes trials," guerrilla sieges of buildings where CIA or industrial recruiters interview potential employees, blocking the automobiles of recruiters and government lecturers, student strikes, etc. Most SDS spokesmen--like Doctor Spock of SANE--have been chary of exposing themselves to indictment by counseling outright violation of federal law. Except for the October Protest and a few relatively minor demonstrations in Washington, in fact, most protesters have sought

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to avoid flouting federal statutes and where confronted with a choice have preferred to violate state or local ordinances.

An Eye to the Uncommitted

There are recurrent but unsubstantiated reports that SDS militants advocate the use of sharpened pebbles or lubricating oil under the hooves of police horses or are prepared to overturn and burn police automobiles and stone public buildings. No such tactics have been employed--probably for fear of alienating whatever potential support the students think they enjoy or can enlist. (The chimera of a broad based following tempts those SDS stalwarts who seek to transform the Protest Movement into a political alliance.)

Davidson, for example, warned on 13 November that SDS members should avoid at all costs becoming isolated by tactics which were likely to divide them from their "present and POTENTIAL constituency." Secondly, he urged that the tactics decided upon accomplish two things: (1) that they weaken the target of the moment and (2) enhance the demonstrators' own sense of growing power.

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Significantly, he criticized the leaders of the October Protest at the Pentagon for prolonging their demonstration into the second day when it had exhausted the attention span of television viewers and then fell apart after the majority of the participants had departed.

SDS leaders are not discouraged by polls which indicate that their activities do not yet have the sympathetic understanding of the American people. In reading the Harris poll published in *The Washington Post* on 18 December, for example, they would not be deterred by the finding that 76 percent of the people judge that recent anti-Vietnam demonstrations have "encouraged" the Communists. Rather, they would look to Harris' conclusion that 59 percent of the American people believe that anti-war sentiment is rising and that 58 percent are prepared to accept peaceful demonstrations, even if over-all sentiment against demonstrations has risen 10 points (from 30 percent) since July 1967.

Image is vital to the SDS--both from the standpoint of its own self-esteem and in furtherance of its goals. No responsible SDS leader advocates

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martyrdom. But there are factions anxious to exploit the kind of newspaper coverage which follows from a head-on clash between demonstrators and the police.

According to eyewitnesses, the group of 2500 or more who picketed Secretary of State Rusk in New York on 14 November were shepherded by marshals who sought to move the demonstrators to changing vantage points. Once the police seized the initiative, however, blocking sidewalks and streets and pressing the crowds farther and farther away from Mr. Rusk, the marshals provoked violence. The photographers recorded only the swinging police clubs. Later an SDS spokesman chortled that well dressed middle-class women bystanders who had been manhandled left the scene angered by police tactics and for the first time sympathetic to the demonstrators.

The 14 November melee may have triggered controversy in SDS ranks. At a meeting held at Princeton the week before the 4-8 December "Stop the Draft" demonstrations, several collegiate SDS representatives berated their organizers for failing to familiarize themselves with the area and



narrow streets of downtown New York and of plotting the kind of demonstrations in which the participants would be vulnerable to riot-control countermeasures. On 5 December this proved to be the case, as New York police cordoned off the demonstrators, separating them into smaller and smaller groups, and moved them away from the Whitehall Induction Center.

The SDS have not met head-on any other constabulary equipped and trained in riot control techniques. But they probably are apprehensive about a future when marginally disciplined National Guard units with such techniques could be arrayed directly against them or against urban rioters with whom they are allied.

#### What's Happening?

We know relatively little about day-to-day developments within the SDS. Part of the difficulty can be traced to the SDS' organizational weakness: many activities are undertaken on the initiative of local chapters without the sanction of the national leadership.

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There appears to be no good reason for concluding that the SDS is hindered to an intolerable degree by a lack of effective internal communications or funds.

Local chapters--singly or in liaison with other campus group--mount demonstrations against military recruiters and Central Intelligence Agency personnel officers. Moreover college newspapers, such as Syracuse University's *Daily Orange* for the period of 6-14 November 1967, provide sufficiently detailed coverage of confrontations between the dissidents and government or corporate representatives to enable students on other campuses to carry off similar ventures. This, as much as any other reason, probably explains the appearance coast to coast during the week of 4-8 December of "Dow Shalt Not Kill" signs.

Police reports and information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation tend to focus on the activities of local chapter meetings and do not shed much light on the attitude of the organization as a whole. For such insight, the analyst must depend on such journals as *Dissent*, *The New York Review of Books* and SDS' own offset paper

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There are about three dozen others, all members of what is called the "underground press syndicate," like *The Berkely Barb*, *The East Village Other*, *The Fifth Estate*, *The LA Free Press*, and *The Washington Free Press*. *The New Republic* on 2 December called them "the seedier media." They are sold on street corners and mailed to subscribers.

The underground press is like a photographic negative of the more sober newspapers and magazines: it registers many of the same images--in reverse. Cops assault innocent girls and charge them with battery. Police brutality is a shibboleth.

Several psychologists have remarked on the need of the dissidents to personalize issues by identifying them with individual government leaders. New Left literature is given to personal vendetta and ridicule; it is unmatched for vitriol since the days of Nast's anti-Tammany Tweed cartoons. Unflattering pictures of the President and prominent government officials are captioned with epithets.

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Policy Evolution

Denied access to position papers or whatever intramural debate precedes SDS council meetings or annual conventions, the analyst must infer a good deal when attempting to trace the evolution of policy decisions or identify which factions within SDS advance particular viewpoints. The resolutions published after the conventions and *New Left Notes'* columns provide some insight, however.

With expanding membership rolls and several years experience, 400 SDS delegates decided at a meeting at the University of Illinois in 1965 to formulate a more cohesive political program than that enunciated at Port Huron in 1962. There was a split between men like Tom Hayden--who favored an all-out effort in the city slums--and others who would have concentrated on organizing non-radical college students into a political force, as well as a third faction of "elitists" who wanted the organization to become a more selective and intellectually disciplined core of social critics. In one sense, no one emerged on top: factional disagreements evidently were papered over out of common resentment at deepening US involvement in Vietnam and the failure of the academic teach-ins. The Port Huron Statement was amended to drop the bar to Communist



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participation as the delegates voted to strike tactical alliances with any group opposed to the Vietnam conflict.

### REP

But the attraction of a more cohesive, ordered political program did not wane. In 1966 the SDS National Council established the Radical Education Project (REP). "An independent education, research and publication organization," REP was to be "devoted to the cause of democratic radicalism" and aspire "to the creation of a new left in America." In an initial brochure, REP solicited the assistance of "all people who identify with the forces of radical democracy in America and abroad."

It set forth the following "convictions" as a basis for research:

- the promise of American abundance has been perverted and thwarted by contemporary capitalism
- class division, privilege and exploitation are unnecessary for abundance
- the possibility of greater wealth for Americans does not justify exploitation of other countries
- democracy must be judged in practice and by the accountability of officeholders to the voters who are affected by their decisions

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--present-day US Government does not allow for democratically arrived at decisions which affect social development or the quality of individual life

--America is held in moral and political stalemate by economic and political forces and by a "deadening" belief in national chauvinism, i.e., "the American way of life."

--anti-Communism is central to the ideological manipulation of the people and provides a cover for "the most brutal applications of military and economic power."

--that violent revolution, though deplorable, may be necessary where the oppressed lack political leverage as a precondition to economic and political freedom

--that issues such as "Vietnam and the oppression of the American underclass cry out for action. The work for long-term research, education, organization, theory, does not relieve the obligation for immediate, passionate protest.

REP called for concrete proposals necessary for effective political action which would broaden the interests of students drawn to SDS by "single issues" or

"gut reaction" and further the expansion of SDS to a constituency beyond students and improverished. They pledged cooperation with the University Christian Movement, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and SNCC in founding a Latin American Institute to "coordinate research, monitor information and maintain contacts between radical student, church and academic groups in this hemisphere."

REP has become the focal point of much of the controversy surrounding SDS. Several of its members have been active in Communist-front groups, such as the Du Bois Clubs, the Socialist Workers' Party, the American Institute for Marxist, the Tri-Continental Information Center and the CP/USA.

REP set out to publish "scenarios" which students could use to introduce "relevant" material into classroom discussion and promised that it would establish a "network" of people around the world to provide "quick" and "incisive" intelligence on issues as they developed.

Incorporated as a non-profit, educational organization, REP applied for tax-exempt status and set up a staff of 15 in Ann Arbor. It is dependent on donations for operating funds.

Subversion

SDS seems to have benefited from the written experiences of French radicals, who learned during the Algerian strife that the armed forces did not offer much of a target for subversion.

Generally speaking, American student radicals do not hold out much hope for adherents among members of the armed forces. There is little evidence of any carefully planned effort to propagandize among the military, despite the defection of four Navy enlisted men in Japan in November and a few other publicized desertions. Individual US servicemen have been found in possession of anti-war literature--much of it of a decidedly pacifist stripe--or agitating against US involvement in Vietnam. Most of these men apparently had pre-service ties to radical groups. Rather than attempt to reach men already in uniform, SDS has opted to impede selective service. SDS regards the draft system as a primary means for channeling men into areas of the economy where they are deemed essential by "the military-industrial-defense complex." The National Council in December of 1966, set about to organize a "draft resistance program."



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*New Left Notes* devoted its 27 March 1967 issue to the problem. It endorsed a program which would (1) provide counselling and information to draft-age men who seek alternatives to induction, (2) seek broader support through an Anti-Draft Union and (3) mobilize anti-draft sentiment "for the general purpose of mobilizing protest against the war." *New Left Notes* published the names of nine "regional coordinators" and included a list of campus and local anti-draft organizations. Correspondent Mike Price reviewed step by step the tactics he had employed to obstruct his induction at Fort Wayne in the Spring of 1966. He advised would-be draft resisters to report for induction with anti-war pamphlets to distribute to other men awaiting induction, to engage military personnel in rhetorical debate and to refuse to sign affidavits or submit to medical examinations, etc.

The 4-8 December Stop the Draft Week has been the highwater mark of this continuing effort. In alliance with several other groups, including Communist fronts, SDS militants sought to blockade and disrupt induction centers.

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Foreign Ties

There is little, if any, evidence that the American student radicals have forged effective alliances with foreign student groups or have borrowed uniquely European or Asian techniques for use here. In fact just the contrary appears to be the case. They do, however, count on the moral support and encouragement of expatriate Americans. There are such colonies in Paris and London, along with American Committees To End the War in Vietnam.

The British student community has been far less militant than its American counterpart; what demonstrations there have been have taken their inspiration and most of their tactics from student groups in this country--with Americans in the foreground. Off campus demonstrations do include students but there is a numerically larger mixed element of anarchists, pacifists, trade unionists, Communists and Trotskyites. During a demonstration in front of the US Embassy on 22 October, two American students drove a minicar disguised as a tank in an abortive attempt to breach police lines. Anti-Vietnam students in England distribute propaganda tracts to American servicemen. One such pamphlet, *The Fort Hood Three*, which seeks to enlist

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support for three Army enlisted men who balked at serving in Vietnam, is published in New York City.

A few expatriate Americans have been active in the much publicized German Socialist Student Federation (SDS) at West Berlin's Free University, where 300 to 400 activists--not all of whom are SDS members--control the student government. The "New Left" in Berlin is comprised of the sons and daughters of well-to-do West German professional and business men. Radical leaders have been successful in attracting broad student support for vigorous protests against the Vietnam war and in behalf of a long overdue reform of the German university system. A student bystander was killed by police during a protest over a visit by the Shah of Iran last June. His death resulted in an unprecedented alliance between students and faculty against the city administration, led to the resignation of several high ranking police officers and ultimately resulted in the resignation of Heinrich Albertz as Governing Mayor. With one "martyr," the student demonstrators have set out to solidify their hold on popular sympathy and to prove "police brutality" by bringing infants and young children to gatherings where police retaliation is possible.

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There is no direct evidence that radical American students have sought advice or training from the Japanese peace group, Beheiren. The Tokyo organization is led by a handful of ex-Communist Party members and leftist intellectuals held together by a fierce anti-Americanism. Well financed, Beheiren employs the familiar anti-US newspaper advertisements, sponsors anti-American radio and television "discussion groups" featuring prominent foreign leftists, participates in international anti-war conferences, demonstrates in front of the US embassy and has begun to solicit and aid US military deserters. Japanese radicals do maintain contact with their American counterparts, particularly with such stalwarts of the American SDS as Professor Howard Zinn who is alleged by New York press sources to have provided counsel for the four sailors who deserted the Intrepid.

#### The Future

It would be hazardous and probably futile, as well, to predict the development of any student political organization. SDS and its hangers-on undergo a never ending change of membership and new leaders appear

who with few exceptions prove vulnerable to the bias with which the young regard the old--even those who are only five to ten years older. SDS has not demonstrated any skill at winning adherents among the young professional classes. It can hardly survive without such support.

The Issues are the Ghetto and Vietnam. But today's issues often prove tomorrow's old slogans. The majority of SDS adherents are emotionally wrapped up in the cause of US involvement in Southeast Asia; relatively few are committed to working with the poor and underprivileged. It is dubious whether the Movement would long survive an end to the Vietnam conflict or that whatever momentum remained would approximate what we know it to be at present. However one measures their respective success at doing so, the genius of both the Republican and Democratic Parties for absorbing splinter groups and adopting once radical political planks has proved the great strength of our political system for over one hundred years.



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INFORMATION

Friday - January 5, 1968

*Pres file*

TO: The President

FROM: W. W. Rostow

This is a message from Prime Minister Williams in Trinidad in answer to your New Year's message:

"Dear Mr. President:

I thank you most warmly for your fine greeting and I trust that you too will have a very good year. We are doing all we can to make a success of the proposals for Caribbean integration and to adhere to the deadline of May 1, 1968, for the achievement of the Caribbean Free Trade Area. I hope to discuss this shortly with Prime Minister Burnham. In the meantime, we are continuing our efforts towards the realization of the objectives outlined at Punta del Este. I myself will be trying in early March to make a brief visit to three of the Andean countries, Venezuela, Colombia and Chile; you will understand our interest in the Andean sub-grouping.

As I proceed to my budget on Friday next, I have great hopes that your new measures designed to improve your balance of payments position will not too seriously affect our development plans for 1968.

Yours sincerely,

Eric Williams".

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*



100a

December 16, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Press release on US assistance to TCCs -- How to respond to the President's query

Some of the Public Affairs guys at State feel exactly as does the President. As I see it, this is one of those damned-if-you-do and damned-if-you-don't situations. The question is: what handling hurts us least? Here's the way I see the dangers:

A. If we simply cite Section 552 (b):

1. The press will suspect that we are hiding something awful and write the "mercenary" stories accordingly.
2. The usual cries will be raised of government secrecy and of the American people not knowing how appropriated funds are being used.
3. Every time we try to get some mileage out of third country contributions in Vietnam the story will be soured by references to the mercenary issue.
4. The initial stories will be written up without any of the balance that the press statement gives.
5. We lose the fact that the Aussies and N. Z. 's pay their own way.

B. If we issue the statement

1. We will still get "mercenary" stories and government secrecy stories. They will, however, have some balance in them for the press will use our statement (if for no other reason than to set up a target to shoot at.).
2. At least some of the comment will be favorable and our statement will give our friends something to support.
3. We focus some attention on the fact that some 70,000 allied soldiers are there or pledged. There are lots of Americans who don't give a damn how much it costs to support a foreign soldier so long as it enables an American boy to stay home.

4, I think most Americans (and even some newsmen) will acknowledge the inability of countries with \$133 annual income per person to finance overseas military expeditions without some help.

As I see it, there are losses both ways. But, if we merely cite the section and stand pat-- it is all loss and no gain.

With shaky hand and quivering voice, I vote for the statement.

Marshall Wright

MW:wpt

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

1006

The Department has received requests from the press to release the texts of agreements entered into by the USG for assistance to the countries which have contributed forces in South Viet-Nam and to provide the items and dollar amounts of this assistance.

of certain  
the The Department has concluded that release at this time / of/information of the kind requested would be prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States and that the non-disclosure of this information is sanctioned by Section 552 (b), Title 5 of the United States Code (Freedom of Information law).

The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has 660,000 men under arms, and is in the process of increasing its forces by 65,000 men. It has asked for and received from five of its neighbor states military forces to help in the fight against aggression.

At the present time, the governments of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand have responded to requests from the Republic of Viet-Nam by sending or undertaking to send military forces in the following numbers:

- A. Australia: Approximately 6,300 combat troops including a brigade and support, and a squadron of 8 Canberra bombers, are in Viet-Nam. Included is naval assistance and a guided missile destroyer, 100 combat advisers, and a 73-man transport aircraft unit. Australia is now in the process of deploying an additional 1700-man reinforced infantry battalion which will bring the total to 8000 men.
- B. Korea: Approximately 48,000 troops including 2 combat divisions and one combat brigade; a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, and a 2,200-man engineer and support unit are in Viet-Nam.
- C. New Zealand: Approximately 400 troops in an artillery battery and an infantry company are in Viet-Nam. They are in the process of deploying an additional infantry company of approximately 170 men.



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- D. The Philippines: A 2000-man civic action group, consisting of an engineer battalion with its own security support force, in Viet-Nam.
- E. Thailand: 2500 ground, air, and naval forces now in Viet-Nam. In addition, the Royal Thai Government announced on November 14 that its ground forces in Viet-Nam will be augmented to a light division of about 12,000 men.

Two of these five countries, Australia and New Zealand, are bearing the entire cost of their contributions.

The remaining three countries, Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, have an average per capita GNP of \$133 per year. These countries have needed both economic and military assistance for many years. Although they wish to join in the Viet-Nam struggle, they clearly are not able to finance an overseas force without some support.

Accordingly, in the case of these countries, the US provides equipment, supplies and other direct within-Viet-Nam support for their troops in Viet-Nam. Base pay continues to be paid by the home country.

In addition, we have made adjustments in our assistance programs in each case. The guideline for such actions has been that the despatch of troops to Viet-Nam should not weaken the home defense forces of the country, nor interfere unduly with pressing and urgently needed economic development efforts.

In sum, we have provided the assistance needed to enable these developing countries to join a cause they support by reason of their own views of their own national interests and security.

The details of our continuing military and economic assistance programs to these countries have been disclosed to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

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ANTICIPATED QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED REPLIES

Q: What is the Executive Order covering these matters?

A: The relevant Executive Order is No. 10501 of November 10, 1953.

Q: Are these agreements involving our assistance to these countries "matters that are specifically required by executive order to be kept secret"?

A: Yes. Among types of things Executive Order 10501 specifically indicates should not be divulged are defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could jeopardize the international relations of the United States or endanger the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense or compromise important military or defense plans.

Q: Do you mean to say that all of the agreements we have with these three countries and all the details of our assistance are classified?

A: No. Much of this information is or will be in the public domain.

Q: May we have this information?

A: Yes. We will get it for you. It should be understood, however, that some of this assistance was already under consideration as part of our on-going assistance programs in these countries. The hawk for Thailand, for instance, are

being provided in response to long-standing Thai requests. Thus, the information you will find covers our entire programs with these countries.

Q: What are normal disclosure practices for information on American assistance programs like these?

A: Disclosure practices on economic and military assistance differ.

It is the policy of the Agency for International Development that information about its objectives and operations be freely available to the public. Information on AID programs is generally available to the public in a wide range of documents, such as the annual "Summary Presentation to the Congress" for the worldwide program and in considerable detail in the annual Program Memoranda for all countries in which AID has programs.

All identifiable AID records are made available to the public upon request to the AID Information Staff except for those records determined to be exempt from disclosure. Exceptions to this general policy are made when the information is specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret.

Dollar amounts of military assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act are released once a year in the spring at about the time of the Congressional presentation in

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"Military Assistance Facts". These figures include, by country and by year, the total dollar amounts of military equipment delivered up to and including the most recent past fiscal year plus the quantities of important items of military equipment delivered worldwide. General material on the current year Military Assistance Program may be given in the President's budget message. Details of Military Assistance Programs are not released for national defense reasons.

Q: But this information does not cover all our arrangements, right? Why will you give us some information and not the rest of the story?

A: Because some of the information is classified and some is not. The classified information remains classified for the reasons I outlined already.

Q: What are you trying to hide? Are you holding back this information because the sums involved are so great?

A: No. As you can see from my statement, we are not trying to deny that we are doing a great deal but we continue to think that it would be detrimental to our interests to release all the details of this assistance.

Q: Why have you given this information to the Congress and not to the public?

A: We have made this information available to interested

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Congressional committees on a classified and need-to-know basis because these committees work on these matters and have to know the facts.

Q: Why were the off-set figures on European troop contributions made public and not this information we are asking for?

A: The European troop-off-set question is not comparable or analogous to the matter at hand.

Q: Are you afraid to release this information because you think it will make it look as though we "bought" the troop contributions from these countries?

A: Definitely not. When these countries told us and the Government of Viet-Nam that they would be willing to send troops to Viet-Nam in response to the request of the GVN but that they could not afford all the modern equipment needed, etc., we naturally agreed to help them out where necessary. I think you would agree we were wise in making it possible for these countries to send troops for otherwise we would have had to send an equivalent number of GI's. No one seems to question the fundamental principle of our on-going military assistance programs -- say in Korea. I cannot understand why all of a sudden such a hullabaloo is raised over our assistance to Korea which makes it



possible for them to send troops to fight in Viet-Nam. These countries have made the commitment of the lives and energies of their men for reasons of their own national interests and security, nothing more, nothing less. All we have done has been to try to help these countries make the military contributions in Viet-Nam that they wished to make.

Q: Are you afraid to release the figures because of the comparisons the recipient countries might make?

A: Our negotiations with each of these three countries have naturally been carried on on a bilateral basis. Each case is different since the ability of the three countries to shoulder the additional cost of their manpower contributions has varied according to the size of the contribution, the country's over-all military capabilities and requirements, and the state of the country's economy.

Q: What do you mean by "other direct within-Viet-Nam support"?

A: Logistical support, for instance.

INFORMATION

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January 3, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a farewell memorandum  
from Ed Clark on closer U.S. -  
Australian cooperation in scientific  
fields.

*Pres file*

I am making a copy available  
to Dr. Hernalg as well as to State.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

1012

Canberra, Australia  
December 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

During the almost two and one-half years I have served as Ambassador to Australia I have been particularly impressed by Australian developments in science. As you know, we already enjoy close and mutually beneficial relations in a number of areas of scientific endeavor, most notably in space and defense programs. However, I believe that there are a number of other instances in which it would be profitable for the United States to investigate more thoroughly the advantages of closer cooperation with Australia in scientific fields.

I have had prepared a brief description of a number of such programs which I believe merit special attention. These are attached to this memorandum, with specific recommendations for action by specified United States Government agencies.

You will note that my proposals, which have been selected from a large number of possible areas of joint cooperation, call for only a modest expenditure of funds by the United States Government. In all cases, the cooperating Australian agency would also make a substantial and in most cases the major contribution to each project listed. I have discussed these projects with the Australian officials concerned and know that they would welcome U.S. participation in the proposed programs. I have, of course, avoided making any kind of commitment with respect to our participation. The counterpart Australian agency in each case is of international renown.

If you agree that my recommendations warrant further consideration, it would be appreciated if you would ask Dr. Donald Hornig to study them and to arrange for specific indications of United States willingness to cooperate to be conveyed to the appropriate Australian institution through State Department channels. Perhaps Dr. Hornig also could be asked to discuss them in more detail with the Australian officials concerned during his prospective trip to Australia in 1968.

You may wish to give particular attention to my proposal that the National Institutes of Health consider extending additional financial assistance to the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research in Melbourne for the study of cancer and immunology. I have recommended that US\$250,000 be made available for the construction of a new laboratory for this world-famous institution. If funds can be provided, it undoubtedly would be possible to have the laboratory dedicated to the memory of the late Prime Minister Holt, as a token of the esteem of the American people.

I have submitted these proposals with full knowledge of the difficulty currently involved in financing off-shore research and other programs by U.S. agencies and institutions. However, I sincerely believe that the small monetary contribution involved will pay large dividends to American taxpayers and be most welcome to our good and true Australian friends.

Faithfully yours,

Edward Clark  
American Ambassador

Attachment:

List of Proposed Projects for Closer US/Australian  
Cooperation in Scientific Fields

LIST OF PROPOSED PROJECTS FOR CLOSER  
US/AUSTRALIAN COOPERATION IN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS

I. ARID ZONE RESEARCH

It is proposed that a joint comparative study of Australian and U.S. arid zones be made and that a small number of qualified U.S. experts be assigned to Australian arid zone research stations to coordinate joint activities and to further develop techniques of arid zone resource management which would be of use in the two participating countries and in various other countries.

II. SCIENTIFIC FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

It is proposed that existing programs of exchanges of scientific personnel between Australia and the United States be expanded.

III. OCEANOGRAPHY

It is proposed that a joint committee be established to examine the scope for collaborative work in the field of oceanography and to make recommendations for consideration by the Governments of the United States and Australia.

IV. EARTH RESOURCES EVALUATION

It is proposed that a joint program be established to permit Australian participation in the current earth resources evaluation program being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.



V. WEATHER SCIENCE

It is proposed that a joint program be established between the United States and Australia to improve knowledge of weather conditions in the Southern Hemisphere by an increased program for the exchange of scientific personnel in this field.

VI. CANCER AND IMMUNOLOGY

It is proposed that the United States increase its support of research in cancer and immunology at the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research in Melbourne.

VII. MINERALS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY

It is proposed that certain contracts be let to the Battelle Memorial Institute of Columbus, Ohio, and the Australian Minerals Development Laboratories of Adelaide, South Australia, for research in specified areas of minerals and industrial technology.

ARID ZONE RESEARCH

A PROPOSAL THAT A JOINT COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. ARID ZONES BE MADE AND THAT A SMALL NUMBER OF U.S. EXPERTS BE ASSIGNED TO AUSTRALIAN ARID ZONE RESEARCH STATIONS

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SITUATION:

Both the United States and Australia have large areas of arid and semi-arid country. These areas are economically important to Australia since one-third of the whole country is arid and another one-third semi-arid, the two areas comprising more than two million square miles. Because of low and erratic rainfall, arid areas are susceptible to climatic crises and to the effects of use by man. In both the United States and Australia the pressure on arid areas will increase as development proceeds. There have been substantial investments by U.S. companies in arid and semi-arid areas of Australia, particularly in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland, and expanded arid zone studies would have direct significance to these investors.

The United States has many arid zone research groups. Australia is attempting to develop this field of research and there have been many contacts at the research worker level between the two countries. Australia is a leading country in the development

of techniques for land resource surveys and land evaluation and already has mapped a large proportion of its arid areas in this way. The experience in Australia has created considerable interest in other countries and in international agencies. Joint use of these techniques and available information by U.S. and Australian research workers could not only further develop these techniques but encourage their utilization in foreign aid programs.

Organized cooperation between the United States and Australia, perhaps through one of the major U.S. arid zone research centers, could coordinate activities and provide machinery for closer cooperation in arid zone research. Joint comparative studies of Australian and U.S. arid areas would be beneficial to both countries. It would provide both with a wider base for studying the issues involved in protecting and managing arid zone resources with the objective of achieving optimum productivity with conservation.

The participation of U.S. research workers in Australia would assist by increasing the numbers of technical people involved locally in arid zone research. An exchange of personnel also would assist Australia in the training of additional research

workers. Australia already has some research accommodations and facilities established in arid areas, although an expanded program would require substantial increases in these facilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the U.S. Departments of Agriculture and Interior and the U.S. Agency for International Development be asked to develop a program leading to closer cooperation with Australian institutions in the field of arid zone research, including the assignment, on a non-reimbursable basis, of appropriate personnel to Australian arid zone research centers. It also is recommended that, at an appropriate time, consideration be given by the above U.S. agencies to providing funds for the expansion of important arid zone research facilities in Australia.

SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

A PROPOSAL THAT EXISTING PROGRAMS OF EXCHANGES OF  
SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND THE  
UNITED STATES BE EXPANDED

Scientific research in the United States and Australia has much in common. The industries it serves are similar and increasing investment by Americans in Australia tend to strengthen this trend. Well staffed and adequately equipped laboratories working on problems to meet the needs of industry are located in both countries. However, assistance to industry by scientists and technicians could benefit greatly if those concerned with research in both countries enjoyed closer contact.

Visits by scientists between the two countries often tend to be too brief to permit acquisition of more than a superficial understanding of techniques and approaches in planning scientific work. Exchanges between scientific staffs are not adequate. An insufficient number of American scientists have an opportunity to spend a year or so in Australian laboratories. While Australian research organizations can often supply laboratory space and equipment, they lack money to provide travel and sustenance to visiting American research workers.

A number of programs already are established to provide for exchanges of scientific personnel, such as those operated by the U.S. National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health. However, an expansion of current fellowship and grant programs or the inauguration of a new science fellowship program would be of great benefit to industry in both countries.

I have reason to believe that Australia would be willing to increase its financial contribution to some current programs if the United States were willing to make a similar increase in its share of costs.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the National Science Foundation and similar U.S. government agencies give consideration to increasing funds offered by the United States with respect to scientific exchange programs.



OCEANOGRAPHY

A PROPOSAL THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE BE ESTABLISHED TO  
EXAMINE THE SCOPE FOR COLLABORATIVE WORK IN THE FIELD  
OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION  
BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA

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SITUATION:

In the past it has not been possible for Australia to give high priority to oceanography in the allocation of research funds since urgent calls for research in agriculture and secondary industry have pre-empted available monies. The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) has one laboratory working on fisheries and oceanographic matters, but oceanographic work has been limited through a lack of staff and equipment. Some small amount of research has been accomplished by several local universities.

The situation is now changing as Australia becomes aware of possible mineral resources off its shores; oceanographic influences on supplies of fish, crayfish, prawns and other marine foods; and, the likelihood of sea temperatures and other oceanographic factors having an influence on weather patterns. It is apparent that Australia now is at a stage when it can and should devote more of its research efforts to oceanography. It further is evident that considerable advantage could accrue to the United States by determining what collaborative work might be undertaken with Australia in this field.

Australia has much to offer the oceanographer since:

- a. As it lies between the western Pacific and the eastern Indian oceans, many different kinds of ocean current patterns are available for study.
- b. The great distance from Cape York to Tasmania enables a wide range of off-shore climatic conditions to be investigated.
- c. The under-ocean terrain varies from broad shallow areas in the north to steeply dissected valleys in the edge of the continental shelf in the south.
- d. Australia provides relatively close access to the volcanic line between New Zealand and New Guinea.
- e. The varied marine life of Australian waters makes it a suitable country on which to base studies for human food production.

These are but some of the reasons why Australia is well suited for oceanographic work. Another of perhaps equal importance is its research institutions, such as CSIRO, on which oceanographic groups could draw sustenance.

This brief statement does no more than highlight some of the features of the Australian environment and the interest being generated locally in oceanography. It points to the need for a joint US/Australian committee to examine the scope for collaborative

work and to make recommendations for consideration by our two governments in the area of oceanography.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the U.S. Environmental Science Services Administration take the lead in the formation of a U.S. committee, to include representatives of various U.S. Government agencies as well as representatives of private institutions, to meet with a counterpart group from Australia for the purpose of examining the scope for collaborative work in oceanography and to make recommendations in this area to the governments of the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia. The American Embassy in Canberra would be happy to coordinate arrangements. It is believed that the first meeting of the group should be held in Australia.

EARTH RESOURCES EVALUATIONA PROPOSAL THAT A JOINT PROGRAM BE ESTABLISHED TO PERMIT  
AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CURRENT EARTH RESOURCES  
EVALUATION PROGRAM BEING DEVELOPED BY NASASITUATION:

It is my understanding that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has developed techniques for mapping from aircraft and satellites various features on the ground such as patterns of topography, moisture, minerals, saline areas, etc. In Australia, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO) and other scientific groups have made considerable progress in similar work using land based equipment.

During a recent exchange between scientists of NASA and CSIRO, it became evident that mutual benefit could accrue from a collaborative effort whereby NASA's remote sensing equipment could be tested on various types of terrain which already has been studied on the ground by Australian scientists. As more active collaboration seemed mutually advantageous, a suggestion was made through the Australian Embassy in Washington that a joint program be developed. Apparently no decision has yet been taken by NASA with respect to this suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration indicate through the Australian Embassy in Washington its willingness to enter into a joint program of earth resources evaluation with Australia.

WEATHER SCIENCE

A PROPOSAL THAT A JOINT PROGRAM BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA TO IMPROVE KNOWLEDGE OF WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE BY AN INCREASED EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL IN THIS FIELD

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SITUATION:

Both Australia and the United States would profit from improved knowledge of weather in the Southern Hemisphere. Australia would do so since weather has a great economic influence on agriculture, aviation, floods, bush fires and particularly droughts. All of these things are of tremendous consequence to Australia, both from the standpoint of industry and agriculture. The United States has an interest because of increasing U.S. financial investment in agriculture, mining and industry in Australia, its interest in aid programs in Southeast Asia and in connection with the operation of its various military services.

Research in meteorology in Australia needs very active encouragement. In the United States there are large official and university groups working in areas of interest to Australia. Great opportunities now present themselves for active advances in Southern Hemisphere meteorology due to new techniques provided by satellites, balloons and other devices.

What Australia needs most is the stimulus of active research workers. To a very large extent, facilities already exist which would permit the undertaking of research of interest both locally



and to the United States. Australian meteorology at the research level could be stimulated in a considerable and valuable way by: (a) the opportunity for U.S. post doctoral research graduates to work in Australian institutions for periods of two to three years; and (b) through a regular exchange of visits of U.S. and Australian senior scientists.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Environmental Science Services Administration, in consultation with appropriate U.S. universities, undertake to supply on a non-reimbursable basis at least several post doctoral research graduates to work in Australian institutions (CSIRO, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology and, possibly, Australian universities) for periods of two to three years.

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CANCER AND IMMUNOLOGY

A PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED STATES INCREASE ITS SUPPORT OF  
RESEARCH IN CANCER AND IMMUNOLOGY AT THE WALTER AND ELIZA HALL  
INSTITUTE OF MEDICAL RESEARCH IN MELBOURNE

SITUATION:

The Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research in Melbourne has gained a unique reputation in world medical research, particularly as it relates to cancer and to organ transplantation. Another area of important interest is autoimmune diseases. It attracts large numbers of brilliant young foreigners for post-graduate study or for doing advanced collaborative research. During 1967 five American workers were on the scientific staff and five more are expected during 1968.

The relationship between senior members of the Institute and the United States is very close and staff members frequently are invited to the United States to lecture on their work to various learned societies. In addition, staff members are involved in the writing of important medical textbooks for American publishers. As evidence of its excellence, the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the U.S. Atomic Energy Agency have and are providing a small measure of financial support to the Institute. I know that this support is appreciated by the Institute and truly believe that the aid rendered is of real importance and will eventually confer lasting benefits on the world, and thus on the American taxpayer.

The Institute has, among other things, two developmental projects which its Director would like to see carried forward if extra financial support can be found. The first is the creation of a new set of laboratories for the study of immunogenetics. Immunogenetics is a new science which welds together the skills of immunology and of genetics and it is vitally important in the study of both organ transplantation and leukemia, the Institute's special fields of study. The Institute already has the staff which, given space and facilities, could make effective and important contributions to this new science, in particular as it relates to cancer and organ transplantation.

A second field of study which the Institute desires to expand is the application of computer techniques to medical diagnosis and prognosis. This is a vast area, but the Institute already has made a promising beginning. However, it already is clear that a lack of facilities will be a big problem. I refer not to the computer itself, because the Institute has access to the University of Melbourne's machine, but rather to peripheral devices and general facilities.

Both projects are handicapped because of a serious lack of funds for building and operating expenses. Both represent, in my belief, a very sound opportunity for U.S. investment of grant funds through our normal granting agencies. While I do not wish to see any

reduction of funds currently provided by U.S. agencies to the Institute, I believe that an additional investment of about US\$250,00 to permit acquisition of the required new laboratories would have lasting benefit not only to Australia but to the United States as well.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the National Institutes of Health, or some other appropriate U.S. agency, be asked to consider providing US\$250,000 to the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research for the purpose of establishing new laboratories for the study of immunogenetics and the application of computer techniques to medical diagnosis and prognosis.

## MINERALS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY

A PROPOSAL THAT CONTRACTS BE LET TO THE BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, AND THE AUSTRALIAN MINERALS DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES OF ADELAIDE, SOUTH AUSTRALIA, FOR RESEARCH IN CERTAIN AREAS OF MINERALS AND INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY

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### SITUATION:

The Battelle Memorial Institute of Columbus, Ohio, and the Australian Minerals Development Laboratories (through its parent organization, the Australian Mineral Industries Research Organization) of Adelaide, South Australia, recently have entered into a joint-venture to form International Technical Services Limited, a non-profit technical and technico-economic organization incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory. The new company, the first of its kind in Australia, has been organized to provide locally the wide range of scientific and industrial services which Battelle and, to a lesser extent, AMDEL currently are able to offer throughout the world.

At the present time, International Technical Services primarily is in a position to undertake studies in the area of economics, drawing on the staffs and wide range of practical experience in science and technology available to Battelle and AMDEL for related scientific research. I view this association as a most welcome one which should be encouraged not only because of the contributions it can make to the development of Australia but because the unique talents offered by the partners could contribute substantially to the resolution of a number of problems in scientific and technological fields.

The partners have indicated that they are qualified to undertake studies related to the development of remote areas in Australia including the feasibility of carrying out major development tasks using nuclear explosives, the establishment of large and small-scale power and desalinization complexes and the utilization of water resources in general. In addition, the partnership is interested in studying problems related to off-shore mining and exploration, the dry processing of minerals, utilization of sea water in metallurgical processing, the recovery of metals from low-grade deposits, the direct reduction of iron ore and wear on materials used in mining and related activities.

I believe that the Battelle/AMDEL partnership can perform effective and useful work in the scientific and technological areas indicated above and that it would be in the best interest of the United States to provide, on appropriate occasion, opportunities for such research by the partners.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that appropriate U.S. government agencies be asked to give consideration to the award of contracts, at a suitable time, to the Battelle Memorial Institute and the Australian Minerals Development Laboratories for research and technico-economic studies in the above described fields of minerals and industrial technology.



January 5, 1968

*Pres file*~~SECRET~~*sent Ranch  
via wire  
CAP 80117*

TO THE PRESIDENT  
FROM WALT ROSTOW

Latter intelligence indicates that the stern of the Soviet merchant ship was not "broken," but was "damaged." In this case the NMCC states that the damage to the vessel could have been caused by either friendly or enemy ordnance.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority RAC 13273By plis, NARA, Date 7-22-03

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 5, 1968

*Pres file  
103  
w/ia  
poulet*

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. Arthur Goldberg called me yesterday afternoon to say he was sending down the attached memo of conversation with Dobrynin, plus a draft statement on the Viet Nam issue in the UN.

2. With respect to the latter, he said that his advice to you would be that, if your judgment on the Viet Nam issue in the UN was adverse, you should make an announcement like this before Congress convenes. He said further that although he had made his private views known to you, you should lean heavily on his reporting that there was "no desire, sympathy, or support" for bringing the Viet Nam issue to the UN "at the present time." He said that he would stand firmly by this position whatever his recommendations may have been.

3. He also said that he would be seeing Eshkol, and could I indicate the line that he should take. I said that it would be wise for him not to get into the military hardware issues, but underline the importance that we attach in trying to make a success out of the Jarring mission on behalf of the UN. He said he understood and agreed with this posture toward Eshkol.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-80  
By ics, NARA Date 2-25-98

~~SECRET~~



42  
103a

THE REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS


January 4, 1968

Dear Walt:

Pursuant to our telephone conversation late this afternoon I am enclosing: 1) a memorandum of my conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin of yesterday and 2) a suggested draft statement for the President on Vietnam and the Security Council.

With all good wishes for the New Year,  
I am

Yours most cordially,

  
Arthur J. Goldberg

Mr. Walt W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

103b

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

January 3, 1968

Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Dobrynin

Secretary Rusk  
Ambassador Harriman  
Ambassador Fisher  
Mr. Bundy  
Ambassador Battle  
Mr. Sisco

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 97-79**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-21-98**

In mid-December Ambassador Dobrynin approached me at a large social function and indicated a strong desire for a private meeting with me at an early date. After checking with the Secretary and with his concurrence, I arranged a luncheon in the Secretary's private dining room for the Ambassador and myself on January 3, 1968. Both the Secretary and Adrian Fisher before the luncheon asked me to raise specific points with Dobrynin which I did and are the subject of this report. My talk with Ambassador Dobrynin therefore covered a wide variety of topics and our discussion of two and one-half hours is briefly summarized as follows:

1) I asked Ambassador Dobrynin whether the rumors concerning Malik's appointment to replace him were well founded. Speaking unofficially, he told me that they were and that Malik would replace him shortly as Ambassador to Washington.\* I then inquired whether this meant a promotion for Dobrynin in the Soviet office and particularly whether he would be named a Deputy Foreign Minister. He replied again informally that while this had been mentioned to him in the past it had not been confirmed to him

\* Sisco reports this is a mistake. Malik will replace Federenko at the U. N.

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

officially but that he would be returning to Moscow very shortly and he assumed that then he would be advised as to his future assignment.

2) Pursuant to Ambassador Fisher's request, I then said that it was our impression that the ball was in the Soviet court for the Soviets to come forward with some further ideas about revisions in Article III of the proposed non-proliferation treaty. Dobrynin then said that based upon his reading of their traffic, he was under the impression that the ball was in our court and that Roschin was waiting to hear from Foster. He referred to the last conversation between Foster and Roschin which he said, according to his reports, indicated that Foster had some further ideas on the subject. I replied by repeating what Fisher had told me and then stressed that it would be highly advisable to clear up whatever could be negotiated bi-laterally between the Soviets and ourselves before the resumption of the ENDC meeting on January 19. I emphasized that under the terms of the General Assembly resolution the ENDC would be required to report by March 15 and that time was of the essence. Dobrynin said he recognized the desirability of progress and that he would communicate with his government about the viewpoint expressed by Fisher.

Dobrynin then asked whether in my view the Euratom objections were to be taken seriously. I said definitely so and reminded him that the important thing was to get the non-nuclear powers on board. I then expressed the personal view that it seemed to me that the Soviets were making too much of their objections to the Euratom conditions and that more attention ought to be paid by the Soviets to getting a text acceptable to the Euratom countries.

3) I then inquired as to the meaning of Gromyko's current inquiry as reported in Moscow \_\_\_\_\_ as to the desirability of Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Gromyko participating personally in the resumed ENDC sessions. Dobrynin professed to be unaware of the fact that Gromyko had raised this issue again but said that based upon prior conversations with Gromyko he assumed that Gromyko

~~SECRET EXDTS~~

meant that it would be desirable for both foreign ministers to join in the discussions if the differences were so narrowed to permit a final conclusion with their participation without undue delay.

4) I then raised with Dobrynin the question of the misunderstanding which had developed between the Soviets and ourselves as to the text of the proposed Middle Eastern resolutions at the Special Emergency session last July. We had a pleasant but inconclusive discussion on this subject agreeing at the outset that it was now academic in light of the unanimous vote for the resolution adopted by the Security Council. I said that this resolution represented about 95% of our common agreement last July and Dobrynin said, "Well not 95 but perhaps 90%." From our review of the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the July resolution, I can only conclude that Gromyko and Dobrynin inadvertently sent to Moscow the two versions including in both the June 4 date. It may very well be that it was simply a case of bad reporting. I reminded him that I had told Kutznetsov that the Soviets had in their possession the draft in Ambassador Pedersen's handwriting which did not have the date in the first version. Dobrynin admitted that they did have a draft in Pedersen's handwriting but did not respond to my statement to him recalling that I had told Kutznetsov that we would stand by the Pedersen handwritten draft if they produced it as the authentic version of our July understanding. We concluded by agreeing that there had been a good faith misunderstanding.

5) Dobrynin then inquired as to my personal appraisal of the situation in the Middle East. I said that while the task would not be easy, I felt there were possibilities in the Jarring mission if supported both by the Soviet Union and the United States. I stressed that time would be required and patience would have to be exercised for the mission to be fruitful. Dobrynin then said that the Arabs, including countries friendly to the U.S., were convinced that because of domestic policies the United States would not be in a position to exercise its influence in support of a settlement acceptable to the Arabs until after November elections. I told Dobrynin that this was a mistaken analysis and that U.S. policy would be constant both before and after the election.

~~SECRET EXDTS~~



I then asked him point blank whether Soviet policy in the Middle East would be responsive to the needs of a fair peace and stated that on a personal level the newspaper reports that a Soviet pilot had been shot down over Yemen, if true, did not seem to me to be consistent with a policy of using their influence to stabilize the situation. Dobrynin asked if I had official confirmation of this incident. I said I did not and that I was expressing merely a personal reaction based on newspaper reports. He then, choosing his words very carefully, said that the past policy of the Soviet Union had been not to involve any of its own personnel directly in military operations. This he added did not exclude advisors and training personnel. He then stated that if there had been a change in this policy he had not been advised. He also commented that he had received an inquiry from the Department about this.

6) I then, as suggested by the Secretary, asked whether his government would use its influence with India and Poland to agree to an appropriate role in Cambodia for the ICC. He then expressed doubts whether legally the ICC could operate in Cambodia as it did in Laos. I replied that I was not aware of legal problems in this connection but that appropriate officers of the Department would no doubt want to discuss this matter with him.

7) We then talked briefly about Viet Nam and the Security Council. I told him that our final decision had not been made but then asked whether in light of the recent statements out of Hanoi the Soviet position about UN involvement had changed in any way. Dobrynin replied that insofar as he was aware their position remained the same against UN involvement and then frankly in response to a question from me stated that their position would, as in the past, be determined by Hanoi's attitude. He added that it had been their view for some time that the NLF position was not necessarily the same as Hanoi's and expressed the private opinion that it would be highly useful to explore possibilities through the NLF. I then asked for his reaction to the recent statement of Foreign Minister Trinh of North Vietnam. He disclaimed any official information about the statement but added that it was not surprising since Hanoi had stated the same position to Kosygin last February.

He added that Kossygin had communicated this to us at the time. I inquired whether in light of Trinh's statement, the Soviets as a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference would feel at great liberty to join with the British in reconvening the conference. He replied that the bombing still stood in the way. He then asked as to the meaning of the President's San Antonio statement and I replied that I thought the statement spoke for itself and that I had tried at the UN to express the same concept when I said that negotiations or discussions could only take place under circumstances which would disadvantage neither side. He then asked whether the words meaningful or fruitful negotiations were not conditions and I said rather than being conditions they were a simple statement that negotiations would have to be good-faith negotiations.

8) I then, at the Secretary's suggestion, raised with him the desirability of an early signing of the new Treaty on Rescue and Return of Astronauts. He agreed with me that it would be very desirable to have an early signing in light of the fact that both the Soviets and ourselves had impressed on the General Assembly the urgency of concluding this Treaty at an early date for humanitarian reasons. He suggested that we provide him with two or three early suggested dates and that he would attempt to obtain a prompt reply from Moscow fixing an agreed date. I said that appropriate officers of the Department would promptly be in touch with him about this subject.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

I wish to make a brief statement in connection with Senate Resolution 180 - the Mansfield Resolution - passed unanimously by the Senate on November 30.

As Ambassador Goldberg made clear in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2, the Administration agrees fully with the two concepts underlying that Resolution: that the United Nations Security Council has the responsibility and duty to act for peace in Vietnam, and that the involvement of non-members of the United Nations in the Vietnam conflict is not an obstacle to United Nations action.

It was because we agree with these concepts that we welcomed the adoption of the Mansfield Resolution. It was also because we agree with these concepts that we have sought, particularly since 1964, to induce the members of the Security Council to accept the challenge offered by the situation in Southeast Asia and Vietnam.

Supported and encouraged by the Senate's unanimous adoption of the Resolution, I gave prompt instructions to Ambassador Goldberg further to explore the attitudes of the members of the

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 97-79  
By is, NARA Date 9-21-98

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Security Council, to ascertain whether they share our belief that the United Nations should take appropriate action with regard to the Vietnamese situation.

Ambassador Goldberg has now concluded consultations with all members of the Security Council, including the new members who took office on January 1. The results have been far from gratifying. It has been reported to me that there is a broad consensus among Security Council members, regardless of their views on the substance of the Vietnam issue, that resumed Security Council consideration of Vietnam at this stage would be unproductive. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and France, both permanent members of the Council, have maintained their earlier opposition to both the competence and the desirability of the Security Council taking appropriate action to encourage or facilitate a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. And Hanoi has again, very recently, publicly reiterated its view that the United Nations cannot and should not deal in any way with the Vietnam problem.

Under these circumstances, I have reluctantly reached the conclusion that it would not improve the prospects for peace in Vietnam to ask that the Security Council, at this time, resume its consideration of the matter.

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-3-

This conclusion is relevant to the timing of an initiative on our part, a matter appropriately left to my determination by the Mansfield Resolution. It does not reflect any lessening of our conviction that the Security Council should exercise its clear responsibility under the Charter with respect to Vietnam. Nor does it reflect any slackening of our resolve to persevere in our efforts to have the Security Council discharge this responsibility.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

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Thursday, January 4, 1968

Mr. President:

This memo of Ham Armstrong's (although somewhat overtaken by the Bowles mission) may interest you, as well as Mac Bundy's covering note.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



104a

THE FORD FOUNDATION  
320 EAST 43<sup>RD</sup> STREET  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

McGEORGE BUNDY  
PRESIDENT

January 3, 1968

Dear Walt:

Here is Ham Armstrong's essay of Christmas Day on Cambodia. As we agreed on the phone yesterday, some of it is certainly out of date, in the sense that it does not take account of your current exchanges with the Prince. On the other hand, Armstrong is a very perceptive man, and I think he does indeed have a real feel for Cambodia.

I am greatly encouraged by the prospect that we may have a real dialogue with the Prince, but I must say I do hope that we can use it more for beefing up the ICC than for getting Westy a green light. I can well understand that there may be exceptional tactical situations in which a compelling case can be made for hot pursuit, but that seems to me a totally different thing from attempting to "clean out bases", and I should think the very last thing we need this year is an enlargement of the war in another country. And while I do not have Armstrong's special competence, I would also be inclined to the view that the Prince is engaged in a balancing act in which, whatever he says, anything more than a temporary hot-pursuit incursion will carry grave danger of pushing him toward the grip of the enemy. I am sure that our troops are less unpalatable than the ARVN, but on the evidence thus far I would say that the President has everything to gain by sustaining his current posture of great restraint in the Cambodian case.

With warmest greetings to Elspeth,

As ever,

*Ma*  
McGeorge Bundy

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

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# FOREIGN AFFAIRS



AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG  
EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK

Christmas Day, 1967

Dear Mac:

Here, as promised, are my reasons for feeling so worried over press reports that we may authorize our troops or South Vietnamese troops to cross into Cambodia either "in hot pursuit" of fleeing Viet Cong guerrillas or to destroy Viet Cong nests believed to exist in the Cambodian scrub or jungle. I recognize that our operations are handicapped by the enemy's ability to find a safe haven across the border. But I feel that the proposed remedy may involve consequences far more dangerous than the condition it would seek to cure.

I venture to make these comments because our government does not have diplomatic relations with Cambodia and therefore lacks direct information on conditions there, and because it happens that I am fairly familiar with South East Asia and had talks with Prince Sihanouk in Phnom-Penh as recently as last April.

I want to emphasize the special risks attending the entry of South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia. Our troops would be disciplined, and although serious incidents might unexpectedly grow out of their temporary violations of the border, their operations could, in principle, be strictly controlled and limited. Whether or not we felt able to count on the same behavior by South Vietnamese troops, Cambodians would certainly not do so. The Vietnamese and the Thais are the hereditary enemies of the Cambodians. There is no doubt in my mind that if South Vietnamese troops crossed the long-disputed Cambodia-Viet Nam border, all Cambodians would look on it as an "invasion;" and I feel reasonably sure that Prince Sihanouk would at once appeal to Moscow and Peking for help in repulsing it.

Whether Moscow would feel able to refuse some sort of support in the circumstances is open to question. But Peking seems most unlikely to remain inactive. It would be, in fact, the opportunity which she has been waiting for to take Cambodia into the Communist camp.

Peking has been regularly supplying the strong underground Communist elements in Cambodia with money and arms and with

McGeorge Bundy, Esq.

advisers as to how best to use them. Prince Sihanouk, although in an awkward and dangerous position between nearby Communist China and Cambodia's two traditional enemies, Viet Nam and Thailand, both allies of the United States, has managed to maintain a considerable degree of neutrality. He has repeatedly used force when necessary to put down the Communists. A spectacular instance occurred at Batambang last April (during the time I happened to be in Cambodia), when embryo "Red Guards," instructed and armed from Peking, tried to take over an area of the country bordering on Laos. Sihanouk put down the rising ruthlessly. However, I think that in a crisis caused by South Vietnamese inroads he would feel himself limited to choosing between forming a national resistance comprising all elements, supported by Peking, or resigning and either killing himself or fleeing the country.

Prince Sihanouk is perfectly aware that a Communist-dominated regime would soon eliminate him and his family. But I believe that his fanatical patriotism would lead him to set up such a regime in the guise of a national front government rather than abdicate in face of an attack by one of Cambodia's age-old enemies. And to conduct an effective defense he would accept help from Moscow, Peking or anywhere else.

Prince Sihanouk also would undoubtedly appeal at once to the United Nations to take steps to halt the American-sponsored "aggression." Legal arguments about the rights of hot pursuit would not be of much avail against the ensuing storm of protest from all over the world, especially if there were reports of Cambodian villages being overrun and Cambodian civilians killed.

If the Cambodian people united in defense of the country, with or without Prince Sihanouk's leadership, either the South Vietnamese troops would withdraw or would be forced to extend their operations.

If they quickly withdrew, nothing of importance would have been gained and, I believe, much of importance would have been lost. Prince Sihanouk, if he survived, would no longer call himself a neutral and would no longer act as a neutral to the limited extent possible for him heretofore. We would have acquired another open enemy, supported openly by Communist China.

If, on the other hand, the South Vietnamese forces persisted

McGeorge Bundy, Esq.

Christmas Day, 1967

in their attack they would be led deeper into the country, doubtless (for reasons that would appear legitimate in a military sense) destroying it as they went. Unless their operation was remarkably successful, United States air and maybe other forces would be required to support them, especially if Peking sent in arms, supplies and perhaps volunteers. A new war would have begun, peripheral to the main struggle, and of unpredictable dimensions.

Alternatively, I suggest that the United States make a new and vigorous effort to find ways of strengthening the International Control Commission to do a better job. The Commission is unlikely ever to possess sufficient strength to "seal" the Cambodia-Viet Nam frontier. But if its numbers were somewhat augmented and if it were properly equipped it would control the border at strategic points and report factually about border incidents.

Prince Sihanouk told me categorically last spring that he would have no objection to the Commission being provided with helicopters and jeeps by the United States or any other nation willing to give them without strings. He suggested that a way might be found through the United Nations to reimburse the three member nations for the added expense of increasing their missions in the field in order to make full use of the new equipment. Perhaps Canada would initiate such a proposal or perhaps the U.N. Secretariat could be instigated to do so. A sustained effort to get action of this sort would have the advantage of centering attention on the real problem involved and might perhaps uncover a means of dealing with it at least partially.

In conclusion, let me urge that Cambodia not be regarded as a negligible quantity or Prince Sihanouk as a farcical character. Cambodia prides itself on a long history during which it has maintained its identity against two strong and often rapacious neighbors. Prince Sihanouk undoubtedly knows that Cambodian territory is being used by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. He cannot possibly cope with these activities; nor can he make any real effort to do so without sacrificing his declared neutrality and opening his country to the sort of destructive warfare which he sees going on in Viet Nam. Our best course, I believe, is to treat him not as an adversary but as a ruler of a small country caught between terrifying alternatives and trying by subterfuges, evasions and denials to escape or at least

McGeorge Bundy, Esq.

Christmas Day, 1967

postpone having to choose either. I believe it is more profitable for the United States to nurse him along in this course than to risk making him a declared adversary. In any case, Prince Sihanouk is not an adversary to be discounted. He is an astute politician both in the domestic and the foreign field, as shown by the fact that he has remained in complete control of his country and has held it on the delicate knife-edge of non-involvement while wars have been in progress on all frontiers.

All the best,

As ever,

Bar

McGeorge Bundy, Esq.  
President, The Ford Foundation  
New York



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1968 JAN 4 22 14

*Pres file*

EEAS72V  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 116

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80102

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN. 4, 1968

JOE CALIFANO HAS RETURNED THE FILE, INCLUDING THE  
DRAFT LETTER TO SENATOR PASTORE, CONCERNING THE SALE TO THE  
U. K. OF URANIUM FUEL FOR ITS NUCLEAR SUBMARINES.

HE WAS NOT CLEAR ON YOUR INSTRUCTION AS TO HOW THIS  
MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED.

I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY GUIDANCE YOU CAN GIVE ME.

DTG: 04/2156Z JAN 1968

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ/RAC D3-257  
By 110, NARA, Date 12-1-04

Thursday - January 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Medical Attention for Prime Minister Burnham

Guyana Prime Minister Forbes Burnham has been plagued with recurring throat trouble. He has recently suffered a bout which has left him without voice.

At his requests, arrangements have been made for him to enter Bethesda Naval Hospital. He will be coming to Washington sometime next week.

You will recall that he visited you in July 1966.

W. W. Rostow

*Pres file*

*sent to ~~Pres~~  
Jimmie Roberts  
for next pouch  
to Ranch*



~~Confidential~~

n. 4, 1968

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FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT

Joe Califano has returned the file, including the draft letter to Senator Pastore, concerning the sale to the U. K. of uranium fuel for its nuclear submarines.

He was not clear on your instruction as to how this matter should be handled.

I would be grateful for any guidance you can give me.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ/RAC 03-257  
By iss, NARA, Date 12-1-04



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority FEU 64-68, vol 27, #226

By JC NARA, Date 7-21-03

EEA861  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 89

1968 JAN 4 03

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAPS0079

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

JANUARY 3, 1968

SUBJECT: BOWLES' MISSION TO CAMBODIA

SIHANOUK HAS PUT A 24-HOUR HOLD ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MISSION FOR "TECHNICAL REASONS."

FOLLOWING ARE THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BOWLES' MISSION. THE CABLE HAS BEEN PERSONALLY CLEARED BY BOTH RUSK AND MCNAMARA.

THERE IS AMPLE TIME FOR ANY CHANGES YOU MAY DIRECT.

THE INSTRUCTIONS LOOK GOOD TO ME.

SUBJECT: SUBSTANTIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR BOWLES MISSION.

1. FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIVE INSTRUCTIONS ARE FOR PERSONAL USE OF AMBASSADOR AND HIS GROUP, AND AT SAIGON, BANGKOK AND CANBERRA SHOULD GO INITIALLY TO LOCKE, WESTMORELAND AND CALHOUN, AND TO UNGER AND CRONK ONLY. WE EXPECT TO SEND INSTRUCTIONS TOMORROW TO SAIGON AND BANGKOK AS TO THOSE PARTS THAT SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF COORDINATION IN RESPECTIVE CAPITALS, AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR SUGGESTIONS IN THIS REGARD TO REACH US BY TOMORROW MORNING. HOWEVER, INSTRUCTIONS THEMSELVES SHOULD BE HELD IN CLOSEST CONFIDENCE AT ALL TIMES.

2. SUBJECT ANY FURTHER AMENDMENTS THAT MAY BE DECIDED HERE, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INSTRUCTIONS. IN VIEW OF OUR CLOSE TIES TO THE AUSTRALIANS AND OUR PROBABLE CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON THEIR CHANNEL, WE WOULD EXPECT TO SHARE WHOLE OF INSTRUCTIONS WITH THEM, SUBJECT TO ANY COMMENT YOU MAY HAVE.

BEGIN TEXT

A. REVIEW OF U.S. POLICY

3. THE BASIC U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CAMBODIA REMAINS RECOGNITION OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, NEUTRALITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE DO NOT SEEK TO ENGAGE CAMBODIA IN THE WAR IN VIET-NAM, NOR DO WE SEEK TO EXPAND THE WAR TO CAMBODIAN TERRITORY. IT IS EVIDENT TO ALL, AND HAS BEEN PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED BY PRINCE SIHANOUK, THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN ACTING WITH GREAT RESTRAINT. IT WISHES TO CONTINUE TO DO SO.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



4. WHEREAS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SPEAK FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIET-NAM, WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT U.S. RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF CAMBODIA, AS EXPRESSED ABOVE, IS ADHERED TO BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE.

5. IT HAS BEEN INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN A POLICY OF RESPECT FOR CAMBODIA'S POSITION IN THE FACE OF CONTINUOUS AND INTENSIFIED VIOLATION OF CAMBODIA'S SOVEREIGNTY BY THE VC AND NVA FORCES. IT IS OUR CONCERN FOR THE CONSEQUENCES IF OUR POSITION IN VIET-NAM WERE TO CONTINUE TO BE JEOPARDIZED BY VIET-CONG UTILIZATION OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY, THAT HAS LED US TO PROPOSE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE SITUATION.

#### B. GENERAL APPROACH

6. WE SHOULD CONVEY TO PRINCE SIHANOUK FROM THE OUTSET THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM VC AND NVA USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY. SIHANOUK SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNDER ANY ILLUSION THAT WE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH LIP SERVICE PAID TO THE PROBLEM NOR WOULD WE ACCEPT PROMISES THAT CANNOT BE TRANSLATED INTO REALITY. OUR GENERAL STANCE SHOULD BE ONE OF FIRMNESS AND REALISM.

7. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT SIHANOUK HAVE A CLEAR VIEW OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BELIEVES IS GOING ON INSIDE CAMBODIA, AND THE DEPTH AND EXTENT OF OUR GROWING CONCERN. WE CANNOT AFFORD TO LEAVE SIHANOUK WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT HAVING GONE THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF TALKING ABOUT THE PROBLEM AND MAKING A FEW GESTURES TOWARD TRANSLATION INTO PRACTICAL MEASURES, WE WOULD THEN BE SATISFIED TO ABANDON OUR OFTEN EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE MISUSE OF HIS TERRITORY.

8. WE BELIEVE THAT SIHANOUK HAS AGREED TO TALKS BECAUSE HE IS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMMINENT POSSIBILITY OF LARGE-SCALE U.S. MILITARY ACTION AGAINST VC/NVA FORCES IN THE BORDER AREAS OF CAMBODIA. WITHOUT THREATENING CAMBODIA, WE DO NOT WISH TO DIMINISH HIS CONCERN. ADDITIONALLY WE DO NOT WISH TO FORECLOSE ANY FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH WE MAY FEEL ARE NECESSARY. WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO DENY OURSELVES THE RIGHT TO TAKE ACTION IN CAMBODIA SIMPLY BECAUSE HE HAS AGREED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. THE TALKS THEMSELVES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT. THERE HAS TO BE SOME DEFINITE INDICATION OF PRACTICAL AND USEFUL RESULTS IN RESPECT TO MEASURES TO INHIBIT THE ENEMY'S UNAUTHORIZED USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY.

9. OUR GENERAL APPROACH ENVISAGES THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE RESULTS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBJECTIVES: A) EXPANSION OF THE COMPETENCE OF THE ICC TO DEAL WITH BORDER VIOLATIONS; B) INCREASED CAMBODIAN EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM; AND C) SOME REASONABLY CLEAR INDICATION OF WHAT UNILATERAL U.S. ACTIVITY SIHANOUK IS PREPARED TO ALLOW ON CAMBODIAN TERRITORY TO MEET A DIRECT THREAT FROM ENEMY FORCES.

#### C. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

10. THE UNITED STATES HAS SUBMITTED UNDER COVER OF ITS NOTE OF DECEMBER 4 EVIDENCE OF THE INCREASING USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY BY VC/NVA FORCES. THAT MATERIAL IS ONLY A SMALL PART OF A LARGER BODY OF EVIDENCE. WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ALONG THESE LINES, ESTABLISHING WITHOUT QUESTION THE GROWING RELIANCE OF THE ENEMY ON CAMBODIAN SANCTUARY AND BASE AREAS.

11. WE DO NOT ACCUSE CAMBODIA OF COMPLICITY WITH VIET CONG AND NVA FORCES. WE ARE WILLING TO REGARD ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIA AS A MUTUAL PROBLEM SUBJECT TO REASONABLE SOLUTION. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT CAMBODIA CAN TAKE MEASURES BOTH THROUGH ITS OWN EFFORTS AND THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION TO RESTRICT SUCH MISUSE OF ITS TERRITORY. WE ARE AWARE THAT AT TIMES THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ABLE TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED USE OF ITS TERRITORY. WE WELCOME THIS AND URGE THAT SUCH EFFORTS BE INCREASED. WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT CAMBODIA HAS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION FULFILL ITS FUNCTIONS WITH GREATER EFFICIENCY. IT IS TO THIS PROPOSITION THAT WE NOW WISH TO ADDRESS OURSELVES IN SOME DETAIL.

D. FOCUS ON THE ICC

12. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS AN IMPARTIAL AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ESTABLISHING THE FACTS ALONG THE BORDER. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY SUPPORTED THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT IN ITS EXPRESSED DESIRE TO MAKE THE ICC A MORE EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR PROTECTING THE NEUTRAL STATUS OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY.

13. FRONTIER AND TERRITORIAL VIOLATION BY THE VC/NVA FORCES CAN BE DETECTED AND OBSERVED BY THE ICC IF IT IS GIVEN THE EQUIPMENT, INFORMATION AND THE DIRECTION REQUIRED. THE NEED FOR MORE FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, MORE PERSONNEL, AND MORE EFFICIENT IMPARTIAL OPERATING METHODS, HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY INTERESTED PARTIES. WE HAVE ALREADY OFFERED ASSISTANCE IN THE FORM OF HELICOPTERS AND STAND READY TO CONSIDER SYMPATHETICALLY ANY FURTHER REQUEST FOR MATERIAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICC OPERATION. WE DO NOT RESTRICT OUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE TO HELICOPTERS BUT WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR OTHER TYPES OF COMMUNICATION AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT USEFUL IN THE TASK.

14. THERE MAY BE SOME QUESTION AS TO THE WILLINGNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO RECEIVE MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES DIRECTLY. WE DO NOT SEE ANYTHING IN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PREVENT SUCH TRANSFER. HOWEVER, IF IT BECOMES AN ISSUE WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE EQUIPMENT ON LOAN TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER TO THE COMMISSION.

15. THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA HAS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS EXPRESSED THE DESIRE FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE ICC IN MONITORING ACTIVITY ALONG ITS BORDERS AND MAIN PORTS OF ENTRY. PAST INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICC IS NOT SIMPLY A CONSEQUENCE OF INSUFFICIENT



EQUIPMENT BUT ALSO STEMS FROM INADEQUATE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES. WE SEE THE NEED FOR A NUMBER OF CHANGES. FOR EXAMPLE, WE HOPE THE COMMISSION WILL ESTABLISH FIXED POSTS IN KEY AREAS, INSTITUTE PROCEDURES FOR RANDOM INVESTIGATIONS OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS, AND AGGRESSIVELY FOLLOW UP ON INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO THE COMMISSION. THE ICC SHOULD BE URGED TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS AT ITS OWN INITIATIVE, AS WELL AS IN RESPONSE TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

16. THE IMPORTANT THING IS FOR THE COMMISSION TO ACCEPT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PROPER ADMINISTRATION OF THOSE ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT WITH WHICH IT HAS BEEN CHARGED IN THE PAST AND WITH WHICH IT MAY BE CHARGED IN THE FUTURE. THE IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ICC DEPENDS IMPORTANTLY ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND FACILITATIVE DECISIONS SUBJECT ONLY TO THE MAJORITY RULE OF THE COMMISSION ITSELF. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSION, FOR EXAMPLE RANDOM INVESTIGATIONS, ARE IN OUR OPINION ALSO WITHIN THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION TO DETERMINE BY MAJORITY RULE -- A PROCEDURE WHICH HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE. THERE MAY BE SOME LEGAL QUESTIONS RAISED AS TO THE COMPETENCE OF THE COMMISSION TO FUNCTION WITHIN THESE GUIDELINES. IT IS OUR VIEW THERE IS NOTHING IN THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT TO INTERFERE WITH THESE FUNCTIONS AND THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO BLOCK MORE EFFECTIVE ICC ACTION THROUGH RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, WILL BE A LEGALISTIC RUSE.

17. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR FOR SOME TIME, AS THE PRINCE HAS RECOGNIZED, THAT THE POLISH MEMBER OF THE ICC HAS RESTRICTED THE COMMISSION'S FULFILLING ITS PROPER FUNCTION. WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA WILL IMPRESS UPON ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, ITS DESIRE FOR AN EXPANSION OF THE COMMISSION'S CAPABILITY AND ITS EXPECTATION THAT THE COMMISSION WILL FUNCTION MORE EFFECTIVELY WITHIN BROADER GUIDELINES THAN HERETOFORE.

18. IT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT DISCUSS THIS INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION WITH THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION. MUCH DEPENDS UPON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE INDIAN COMMISSIONER IS PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF A DETERIORATING SITUATION. THE SUCCESS OF THESE EFFORTS TO REVIVE THE ICC DEPENDS IN GREAT MEASURE UPON THE MANNER IN WHICH THE INDIAN CHAIRMAN EXERCISES HIS RESPONSIBILITIES.

#### **E. CAMBODIAN EFFORTS**

19. EVEN WITH THE BEST OF FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT AND AN IMPROVED WILLINGNESS TO EXERCISE ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IMPARTIALLY, THE ICC CANNOT BY ITSELF DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. IT WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE, INDEED IT IS LIKELY, FOR THE VC AND NVA TO VIOLATE CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY WITHOUT IMMEDIATE DISCOVERY, AND WITHOUT REGARD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE.

20. IT IS APPARENT, THEREFORE, THAT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT MUST ITSELF TAKE WHAT MEASURES IT CAN TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT PRINCE SIHANOUK HAS MENTIONED THE LIMITED CAPACITY OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO PROTECT ITS TERRITORY. WE DO NOT WISH TO PROPOSE ANY JOINT CAMBODIAN-UNITED STATES MILITARY EFFORTS IN

THIS REGARD. WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF PRINCE SIHANOUK'S REFERENCE TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF MIXED PATROLS. THE U.S. HAS AT NO TIME PROPOSED SUCH PATROLS NOR DO WE DO SO NOW. ON THE CONTRARY, WE WOULD AGREE THAT PROTECTING ITS FRONTIERS IS UP TO THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD AS IT DESIRES INCREASE PATROLS AND THE NUMBER OF POSTS IN BORDER AREAS. WE WOULD ALSO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN IT DISCOVERS VIOLATORS OF ITS NEUTRALITY, THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT FOLLOW NORMAL INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE IN THIS REGARD AND PROMPTLY INTERNE OR REPEL THE VIOLATORS.

21. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THAT ENEMY FORCES HAVE UTILIZED CAMBODIAN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION TO MEET THEIR NEEDS IN THE BORDER AREAS AND WITHIN VIET-NAM. WE HAVE NOTED THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONTENTION THAT SUPPLY OF NON-CONTRABAND MATERIAL IS WITHIN THE RIGHTS OF A NONBELLIGERENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE. HOWEVER, WE ARE ALSO AWARE OF HOW IMPORTANT THIS SOURCE OF SUPPLY IS TO CONTINUED VC AND NVA OPERATIONS IN THE CAMBODIA BORDER AREAS. ONE WAY OF REDUCING VC/NVA USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY WOULD BE TO CUT OFF THEIR SOURCES OF SUPPLY IN CAMBODIA. JUST AS PRINCE SIHANOUK HAS WELCOMED THE RESTRAINT WITH WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS RESPONDED TO DEMANDS FOR U.S. ACTION ALONG THE BORDER, SO WOULD WE HOPE THE PRINCE OR THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD SEEK TO RESTRAIN THESE ACTIVITIES WHICH SUSTAIN THE VC/NVA WAR EFFORT.

#### F. U.S. OPERATIONS

22. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOTED RECENT STATEMENTS BY PRINCE SIHANOUK BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY TO THE EFFECT THAT HE IS AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT UNITED STATES FORCES MIGHT FIND IT NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH VC AND NVA ELEMENTS IN REMOTE AREAS ALONG THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. IN EFFECT, PRINCE SIHANOUK HAS INDICATED HIS TACIT APPROVAL OF U.S. OPERATIONS IN THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE CAMBODIAN NATIONALS ARE NOT PRESENT OR IN ANY WAY INVOLVED. WE ARE INTERESTED IN DETERMINING JUST WHAT PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD IN MIND IN REGARD TO TOLERABLE U.S. COUNTERACTION.

23. VC AND NVA USE OF CAMBODIA MAY, FOR EXAMPLE, LEAD TO CERTAIN CONSEQUENCES: A) IT MAY IMPOSE A NEED ON THE U.S. COMMANDER TO CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE ACROSS THE BORDER WITH VERY LIMITED FORCES AS REQUIRED TO PROTECT HIS FORCES FROM THE ENEMY MASSING ITS FORCES OR PREPARING A SURPRISE ATTACK; B) THERE MAY ARISE A SITUATION IN WHICH ALLIED FORCES OPERATING CLOSE TO THE BORDER WILL BE FIRED UPON FROM WITHIN CAMBODIA AND BE FORCED TO RETURN THAT FIRE; C) U.S. FORCES MAY BE MANEUVERED AGAINST FROM ACROSS THE BORDER AND BE FORCED TO REACT TACTICALLY TO PROTECT THEMSELVES BY CROSSING INTO CAMBODIA.

24. WE HAVE NOTED PRINCE SIHANOUK'S REMARKS CONCERNING THE FREEDOM WITH WHICH U.S. FORCES CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES IN THESE BORDER AREAS WITHOUT PROVOKING CAMBODIAN REACTION. HE SHOULD BE FULLY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF MAINTAINING SECRECY IN SUCH OPERATIONS. IF, AS IS LIKELY, THEY WERE TO BECOME KNOWN



PUBLICLY THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT DENY THE MEASURES IT HAD TAKEN IN DEFENSE OF ITS FORCES. MOREOVER, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN INHABITED AND UNINHABITED AREAS. FOR US TO HONOR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THESE AREAS, MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO KEEP THE VC/NVA OUT OF THE INHABITED AREAS. HOWEVER, WE WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT SEEK TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION IN THE BORDER AREAS, INHABITED OR UNINHABITED. WHAT WE DO SEEK IS THE PREVENTION OF ENEMY USE OF CAMBODIA'S TERRITORY. IF THIS IS DONE THROUGH ICC AND CAMBODIAN EFFORTS, THE QUESTION OF U.S. ACTION DOES NOT ARISE.

## **G. CONTINGENCIES**

### **DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION AND THE BORDER PROBLEM**

25. WE MUST ANTICIPATE PRINCE SIHANOUK'S RAISING THE QUESTION OF RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. (FYI WE DO NOT WISH TO RAISE THIS OURSELVES END FYI). IF, AS EXPECTED, HE DOES SO AND COUPLES IT WITH THE USUAL CONDITION -- A DECLARATION OF RESPECT AND RECOGNITION OF CAMBODIA'S "PRESENT BORDERS" -- WE SHOULD STATE CLEARLY OUR DIFFICULTY WITH MAKING SUCH A DECLARATION WITH RESPECT TO ONE STATE WHICH WOULD NOT BE MADE WITH OTHER STATES. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR ESTABLISHED POSITION OF BEING UNWILLING TO MAKE A DECLARATION GOVERNING BORDER DISPUTES BETWEEN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD AS WE HAVE SAID ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, ASSURE PRINCE SIHANOUK THAT WE OURSELVES ARE NOT IN ANY SENSE CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF CAMBODIA'S FRONTIERS.

26. DEPENDING UPON THE MOOD OF THE CONVERSATION AND THE WAY IN WHICH THIS SUBJECT COMES UP, WE SHOULD EXPLORE WITH SIHANOUK WHETHER HE REALLY WISHES A U.S. PRESENCE IN PHNOM PENH AT THE PRESENT TIME. WE SHOULD REFER TO THE CONVERSATION OF LAST SPRING WHICH HE HAD WITH HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG AND SAY WE ARE INCLINED TO SHARE WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE THE PRINCE'S FEELING AT THAT TIME THAT A U.S. PRESENCE MIGHT BE DISTURBING TO THE ATMOSPHERE IN PHNOM PENH. WE OURSELVES BELIEVE, AS WE GATHER SIHANOUK DOES, THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE AUSTRALIANS. FYI WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERMEDIATE STEPS THAT FALL SHORT OF REESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS BUT PROVIDE REGULAR CONTACT BETWEEN THE US AND CAMBODIA: ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE THE SETTING UP OF AN "AMERICAN INTERESTS SECTION" IN THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, WITH A STAFF OF THREE OR FOUR OFFICERS. ANOTHER WAY WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH CHANNELS FOR CONTINUING CONTACT BETWEEN OUR OFFICIALS AT NEW DELHI OR NEW YORK. END FYI

27. IN SHORT, WE WISH TO INDICATE CONSIDERABLE RESERVE, BUT DO NOT RPT NOT WISH TO APPEAR NEGATIVE. BASIS OF OUR POSITION ON BORDER DECLARATION SHOULD BE SPELLED OUT WITH SOME CARE NOTING THAT THIS IS PART OF OUR WORLD-WIDE POLICY NOT RPT NOT TO TAKE OR APPEAR TO TAKE A POSITION ON ANY BORDER QUESTION INVOLVING NATIONS WITH WHICH WE HAVE FRIENDLY VIEWS. WE WILL BE SUPPLYING OTHER INSTRUCTIONS WHERE WE HAVE APPLIED THIS

POLICY, FOR CONTINGENT USE AS REQUIRED. IN ADDITION, AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE WISH TO PROBE SIHANOUK -- IF HE RAISES THIS SUBJECT -- AS TO WHETHER IN FACT HE REALLY WISHES A US PRESENCE IN CAMBODIA.

28. SIHANOUK MAY RAISE THE QUESTION OF CLAIMS ARISING FROM PREVIOUS INCIDENTS. (FYI WE ARE NOT CLEAR AS TO JUST HOW MANY INCIDENTS AND WHAT CLAIMS ARE INVOLVED. IN THE PAST SIHANOUK HAS MADE EXCESSIVE DEMANDS WITHOUT ANY REAL JUSTIFICATION. END FYI.)

29. WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS AT A LATER DATE ANY OUTSTANDING CLAIMS, THAT PAYMENT FOR SUCH INCIDENTS WOULD NORMALLY BE TAKEN CARE OF BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. WE BELIEVE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE HAVE MADE SEVERAL OFFERS AND THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER APPROPRIATE INDEMNIFICATION FOR ESTABLISHED DAMAGES.

#### MEKONG RIVER

30. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SIHANOUK WILL RAISE THE QUESTION OF INTERFERENCE BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WITH TRAFFIC ON THE MEKONG RIVER. OUR POSITION IN THIS REGARD SHOULD BE TO AVOID ACTING AS AN ARBITRATOR BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIET-NAM. WE BELIEVE THIS IS WHOLLY A MATTER FOR SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE MEKONG CONVENTION AND IS A SUBJECT FOR THE GOVERNMENTS DIRECTLY CONCERNED.

#### FURTHER MEETING

31. THERE MAY ARISE A NEED FOR SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS AT EITHER THIS OR THE TECHNICAL LEVEL. WE WISH TO KEEP THESE OPTIONS OPEN. AT THE END OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO RECONVENE AT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL IF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ARE NECESSARY.

#### PRESS GUIDANCE

32. WE WOULD HOPE TO AVOID DAILY REPORT TO THE PRESS DURING THE DISCUSSIONS. WE WOULD PROPOSE TO THE CAMBODIANS AT THE OUTSET THAT PRESS COMMENT BE AVOIDED AND THAT A JOINT COMMUNIQUE BE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS MAY ONLY BE A FAINT HOPE GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY OF REGULAR LEAKS AND WE WILL THEREFORE BE PREPARED TO DO SOME JUDICIOUS BACKGROUNDING OF THE PRESS OURSELVES AS NECESSARY.

END OF TEXT  
GP-1

DTG 032322Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



DECLASSIFIED

Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 6, #4

NARA, Date 7-21-03

SETH  
04/2:08 A.M.

VZCZCEA864

00 WTE18

DE WTE 185

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80092

1968 JAN 4 07 00

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

SECRET SENSITIVE LITERALLY EYES ONLY

1. JIM JONES HAS ASKED ME FOR COMMENT ON THE WESTINGHOUSE INTERVIEW WITH BO IN PARIS. IT MUST, OF COURSE, BE COMBINED WITH THE TRINH FORMULA PRESENTED AT THE OUTER MONGOLIAN BANQUET AND COMBINED WITH OTHER EVIDENCE AS WELL.

2. I SHALL, THEREFORE, DIVIDE THIS REPORT INTO THREE PARTS:

--ANALYSIS OF BO AND TRINH STATEMENTS;

--OTHER EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS OF IT;

--CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

I. TRINH AND BO

3. ON THE FACE OF IT THE TRINH AND BO STATEMENTS MEET ALL BUT ONE OF THE CRITERIA--MORE OR LESS--BUILT INTO THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA:

--"PROMPT". THE WESTINGHOUSE BROADCAST, FOR THE FIRST TIME, SAYS "HANOI IS WILLING TO OPEN PEACE TALKS AT ONCE IF THE BOMBING ETC., ARE HALTED."

--"PRODUCTIVE". IN BOTH THE WESTINGHOUSE AND THE TRINH STATEMENTS HANOI PARAPHRASES PRODUCTIVE AS "CONVERSATIONS ON PROBLEMS INTERESTING THE TWO PARTIES." IN LINE WITH THE BUTTERCUP FORMULA, THE WESTINGHOUSE INTERVIEW SHARPLY DISTINGUISHES THOSE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE NORTH (U.S. OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM PLUS ANYTHING RECIPROCAL THEY WOULD DO WITH THE SOUTH) FROM THOSE MATTERS APPROPRIATE TO THE NLF AND SAIGON IN THE SOUTH.

--"ASSUMING". THERE IS NO WORD IN PUBLIC AT ALL, IN EITHER THE TRINH OR THE WESTINGHOUSE STATEMENTS, RESPONDING TO YOUR "ASSUMPTION" THAT HANOI WOULD NOT "TAKE ADVANTAGE" OF A BOMBING PAUSE.

4. THIS IS CLEARLY THE GREATEST GAP BETWEEN HANOI'S APPARENT PRESENT POSITION AND SAN ANTONIO FORMULA; THAT IS THEY DO NOT ADDRESS THEMSELVES AT ALL TO THE DMZ PROBLEM.

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

*Sample*



5. NOW LOOK AT THESE FORMULI FROM HANOI'S PREVIOUS POINT OF VIEW:

--THEY HAVE DROPPED "COULD" FOR "WILL"; THEY HAVE DROPPED "PERMANENTLY," LEAVING ONLY "UNCONDITIONALLY" WHICH COULD BE AS MUCH TO OUR ADVANTAGE AS THEIRS, BECAUSE IT LEAVES US FREEDOM OF ACTION TO RESUME BOMBING IF IN OUR JUDGEMENT THEY DO NOT MEET OUR "ASSUMPTION."

6. IN SHORT, HANOI, SO FAR AS THE PUBLIC RECORD IS CONCERNED, HAS LEFT US IN THE POSITION OF HAVING SOME KIND OF RESPONSE TO ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA EXCEPT RECIPROCAL RESTRAINT AT THE DMZ; SINCE WE CAN CONTINUE TO BOMB IN LAOS ALONG THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL EVEN DURING A PAUSE.

## II. OTHER EVIDENCE

7. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THESE MOVES BY HANOI ARE, AT LEAST PART--AND PERHAPS WHOLLY--AN EFFORT TO EXERT INCREASED POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON YOU TO STOP BOMBING THE NORTH. I SAY THIS FOR TWO REASONS:

--WE KNOW FOR CERTAIN THAT VARIOUS EASTERN EUROPEAN FRIENDS OF HANOI HAVE BEEN URGING THEM FOR SOMETIME TO PRESENT A BETTER FACE TO THE WORLD BY BEING "MORE FLEXIBLE."

--IF THEY WERE ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING THE WAR THEY WOULD HAVE USED A SECRET CHANNEL TO US, NOT THE PUBLIC PRINTS, TO SHIFT THEIR POSITION AND FIND ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA.

8. HAVING SAID THIS, I MUST ALSO SAY THAT I THINK WE MUST KEEP OUR MINDS OPEN TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEY HAVE DECIDED IT IS MORE IN THEIR INTEREST TO END THE WAR BEFORE THE NOVEMBER 1968 ELECTION THAN AFTER THE ELECTION.

9. FOR AT LEAST A YEAR WE HAVE KNOWN THE OBJECT OF THEIR MILITARY OPERATIONS WAS NOT VICTORY IN THE FIELD IN VIETNAM BUT POLITICAL VICTORY IN THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE GENERALLY BELIEVED THEIR HOLDING OUT UNTIL NOVEMBER 1968 IN THE HOPE THAT AMERICAN POLITICAL LIFE WOULD PRODUCE A MENDES-FRANCE WHO WOULD ACCEPT DEFEAT AS THE FRENCH DID IN 1954. BUT THEY MAY HAVE DECIDED NOW THAT A PRE-ELECTION JOHNSON WILL GIVE THEM A BETTER DEAL THAN A POST-ELECTION JOHNSON OR A NIXON - ROCKEFELLER - REAGAN WITH FOUR YEARS TO GO.

10. WHETHER THIS TRANSITION IN THEIR THOUGHTS HAS--OR HAS NOT--TAKEN PLACE, THE FOLLOWING ARE FACTS WITH WHICH WE MUST RECKON:

--THEY HAVE TOLD THE VIET CONG CADRES ALL OVER SOUTH VIETNAM THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE WINTER - SPRING OFFENSIVE IS TO YIELD SOON A COALITION GOVERNMENT WHICH THE NLF WILL DOMINATE; THEY ARE NOW PROMISING THEIR LONG SUFFERING CADRES PEACE; AND THIS IS AN IMPORTANT HOSTAGE TO FORTUNE.

--THE NEW NLF PROGRAM SHIFTS THE NLF FROM BEING "THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE" TO BEING A PARTICIPANT IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

--THERE IS BUTTERCUP, THE MOST PERSUASIVE OF ALL THE APPROACHES WE HAVE THUS FAR HAD.

--IN AT LEAST ONE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PROVINCE (LONG AN) THE VIET CONG PROVINCE LEADER IS PROMISING PEACE BY TET TO HIS PEOPLE.

--THE RUSSIANS HAVE BEEN DENOUNCING MAO AS HAVING TURNED ASIA OVER TO THE UNITED STATES TO ORGANIZE BY FRIGHTENING THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH "HITLERITE" DOMINATION (SOVIET SPEECHES ON THIS THEME SOUND VERY MUCH LIKE OUR OWN SPEECHES ABOUT THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW ASIA).

--HANOI HAS BEGUN TO SPREAD THE CONCEPT OF A NEUTRALIZED SOUTHEAST ASIA--NOT DOMINATED BY ANY OTHER MAJOR POWER; AND HANOI IS ALSO BEGINNING TO ESTABLISH TIES TO FRANCE, SINGAPORE, AND ELSEWHERE LOOKING, APPARENTLY, TO ITS POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT.

--A RUMANIAN ENVOY IS COMING HERE ON JANUARY 5TH WITH A MESSAGE FROM HANOI; AND WE ARE RETURNING BUTTERCUP/2 TO MEET BUTTERCUP/1 THE SAME DAY.

### III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

11. KEEP OUR POWDER DRY: UNLESS PROVED TO THE CONTRARY WE MUST PLOW AHEAD WITH OUR PRESENT PLANS IN BOTH SOUTH VIETNAM AND WITH RESPECT TO THE BOMBING OF THE NORTH. WE ARE ENGAGED IN A TEST OF NERVE AND WILL IN WHICH WE ARE BEING MEASURED EVERY DAY. WE SHOULD NOT DRAW BACK FROM OUR PRESENT DISPOSITIONS AND OPERATIONS UNLESS WE HAVE REASONS OF SUBSTANCE TO DO SO.

12. WE MUST ACCEPT THAT WE ARE BEING SUBJECTED, AT THE MINIMUM, TO A MAJOR HANOI PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OFFENSIVE TO GET US TO STOP BOMBING IN ORDER TO PERMIT THEM MORE CHEAPLY TO PROLONG THE WAR IN THE SOUTH.

13. WE SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE ON THE TRINH - WESTINGHOUSE FORMULA UNTIL WE HEAR OUT THE RUMANIAN ENVOY ON JANUARY 5TH-6TH. THEN WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO THE ENVOY AND TO HANOI THAT THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IS ROCK-BOTTOM. YOU MEANT EVERY WORD THAT YOU SAID ABOUT THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IN YOUR TV INTERVIEW.

14. BUT IF THE RUMANIAN MESSAGE IS REASONABLY FORTHCOMING, WE WILL FACE A VERY TOUGH PROBLEM:

--SHOULD YOU HAVE A BOMBING PAUSE AND TALKS "AT ONCE" EVEN IF YOU DO NOT HAVE PRIOR ASSURANCE ON THE "ASSUMPTION" OF "NO TAKING ADVANTAGE"?

--OR, SHOULD YOU FIRST NEGOTIATE AND INSIST ON THE ASSUMPTION OF RECIPROCAL ACTION FROM THEIR SIDE.



15. THIS IS A MATTER OF WHICH, OF COURSE, YOU MUST JUDGE IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE EVIDENCE AT THE TIME. WE HAVE NOT HEARD THE RUMANIAN YET. I WOULD, HOWEVER, MAKE THIS OBSERVATION: IF THERE IS ANY CHANCE FOR PEACE, IT IS BECAUSE THEY WANT IT BEFORE 1968. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD, IF WE GET A REASONABLY FORTHCOMING RESPONSE FROM THE RUMANIANS, TAKE IT SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY DESPITE THE PRESSURES THAT ARE ALREADY BUILDING AT HOME AND ABROAD. TO MAKE IT PRECISE, I THINK WE SHOULD SEND THE RUMANIANS BACK TO CHECK OUT THE "ASSUMPTION" BEFORE WE ACTUALLY STOP BOMBING--ASSUMING THAT THEY CONFIRM AT A FORMAL DIPLOMATIC LEVEL THE TRINH AND WESTINGHOUSE STATEMENTS.
16. FINALLY, WE MUST WATCH SENSITIVELY THE BUTTERCUP CHANNEL AND OTHER INDICATORS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOUTHERN NEGOTIATION. BOTH THE WESTINGHOUSE BROADCAST AND BUTTERCUP HAVE, AND I NOTED INITIALLY, MADE THE SAME SHARP DISTINCTION:
- BETWEEN A SOUTHERN NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE THE POLITICAL SHAPE OF SOUTH VIETNAM;
  - AND A U.S. - HANOI NEGOTIATION TO STOP THE BOMBING (WITH NVN RECIPROCAL ACTION) AND THUS SET THE STAGE FOR THE REINSTALLATION OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954 AND 1962--TO WHICH THE WESTINGHOUSE INTERVIEW REFER EXPLICITLY.
17. IN SHORT, MR. PRESIDENT, I AM BEGINNING TO BELIEVE MY JUDGEMENT AT THE TIME OF HO'S LETTER TO YOU A YEAR AGO COULD BE WRONG. I THEN SAID THAT PEACE WAS BEYOND OUR GRASP UNTIL AFTER THE NOVEMBER 1968 ELECTION. I AM NOW BEGINNING TO OPEN MY MIND TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT HANOI MAY HAVE DECIDED THAT TIME IS NO LONGER ITS FRIEND--EITHER ON THE BATTLE FIELDS OF VIETNAM OR THE BATTLE FIELDS OF U.S. POLITICS. BUT, I REPEAT, A PART OF WHAT WE SEE IS CERTAINLY NOT DIPLOMACY BUT POLITICAL PRESSURE AGAINST US.
18. ON BOTH COUNTS, THEREFORE, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND ACTIVELY TO WHAT WE HEAR FROM THE RUMANIANS ON JANUARY 5-6 AND TO WHAT EMERGES FROM BUTTERCUP. AT A CERTAIN POINT YOU MAY WISH TO CEASE THE INITIATIVE. INSTEAD OF COUNTERPUNCHING YOU MAY WISH TO HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE ON BOTH THE SAN ANTONIO FORMULA AND YOUR FIVE POINTS ON TV. IF YOU WISH THIS SCENARIO PURSUED I CAN CONTINUE; BUT THAT'S ENOUGH FOR TONIGHT.

EYES ONLY

DTG: 040510Z JAN 68

SECRET

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

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VZCZCEEA:34  
PP WTE13  
DE WTE 90

DEC 31 4 01 PM '68

FROM: WALT ROSTOV  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP80080

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

*Pres file*

JANUARY 3, 1968

KING HUSSEIN HAS RESPONDED TO YOUR REQUEST FOR ASSURANCE AGAINST GETTING SOVIET ARMS WITH THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

"I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND OF THE WEST AND I HAVE NO DESIRE TO BUY ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION, FOR THIS REASON I HAVE WAITED SOME MONTHS FOR THE US TO DECIDE WHETHER IT WILL RESUME THE SUPPLY OF THE LEGITIMATE ARMS REQUIREMENTS OF MY COUNTRY. I HOPE YOU WILL AGREE THAT WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IF THE USG WILL SUPPLY OUR NEEDS, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF BUYING ANY OF OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN MAKING THIS ASSURANCE I HAVE TO ASSUME THAT IN DUE COURSE OUR LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR ME THAT WE REACH A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ON THESE LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO THE SUMMIT MEETING ON JANUARY 17 SINCE AT THAT TIME I SHALL HAVE TO ASSURE THE OTHER ARAB STATES THAT OUR ARMS NEEDS WILL BE MET. GIVEN THE TIME FACTOR, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO REACH THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDINGS THAN TO SEND MY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL AMER KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO DISCUSS OUR REQUIREMENTS WITH THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES. IN THIS WAY I SHALL BE ABLE TO PUT OFF DISCUSSING MY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IF YOU PREFER, WE SEE NO NEED FOR ANY PUBLICITY CONCERNING GENERAL KHAMMASH'S VISIT. I HOPE ARRANGEMENTS FOR HIM TO PROCEED TO WASHINGTON CAN BE MADE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."

SECRETARY RUSK RECOMMENDS YOU SEND THE FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE IN REPLY:

"I APPRECIATE THE ASSURANCES YOU HAVE GIVEN ME IN YOUR ORAL MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 30 WITH REGARD TO JORDANIAN PROCUREMENT OF ARMS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC. ON OUR PART, WE ARE PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO RESUME ARMS SHIPMENTS TO JORDAN AND WOULD BEGIN WITH THE FOLLOWING ITEMS FROM THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENT LIST WHICH GENERAL KHAMMASH GAVE TO COLONEL JORDAN IN LONDON AUGUST 1967:

106 MM RIFLES

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *jc*, NARA, Date *7/22/03*



2-1/2-TON TRUCKS

COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

AERIAL TARGET DRONE SYSTEMS

AMMUNITION

AND SPARE PARTS FOR PREVIOUSLY DELIVERED US EQUIPMENT.

WE WELCOME GENERAL KHAMMASH'S CONTEMPLATED VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD EXPECT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM DETAILS (INCLUDING QUANTITIES) OF THE ABOVE SHIPMENTS AND VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE ARMS QUESTION IN GENERAL. WE WOULD HOPE HE MIGHT ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON AROUND JANUARY 8."

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE SECRETARY'S DRAFT DELIBERATELY AVOIDS DIRECT RESPONSE TO THE KING'S ASSUMPTION THAT HIS REQUIREMENTS WILL BE MET. HOWEVER, THE SECRETARY POINTS OUT THAT THE KING WILL INTERPRET THIS REPLY AS ASSURANCE THAT EITHER WE OR OTHER WESTERN SOURCES WILL MEET HIS LEGITIMATE NEEDS. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS INITIAL PACKAGE WILL BE JUST THE FIRST INSTALLMENT IN A RENEWED MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP, ALBEIT TO A PROBABLY SMALLER JORDAN ARMY.

THE ISRAELIS SEEM FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THIS FOR THE MOMENT, ALTHOUGH THEIR ACQUIESCENCE MAY ASSUME THEY'LL GET PHANTOMS AS WELL AS SKYHAWKS. THEY SEEM FINALLY TO HAVE REALIZED THE DANGERS OF A SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN YEMEN.

IN ANY CASE, HUSSEIN NOW WANTS FRENCH MIRAGE AIRCRAFT OR BRITISH LIGHTNINGS RATHER THAN OUR F-104 AND HE MAY BE PERSUADED TO STANDARDIZE HIS TANK CORPS ON THE BRITISH CENTURION. BUT WE PROBABLY WON'T ALWAYS BE ABLE TO GET AWAY WITH THE SORT OF HARMLESS EQUIPMENT ON THIS LIST.

SECRETARY RUSK RECOMMENDS WE MOVE QUICKLY IF YOU ARE READY TO TAKE THIS STEP. THERE IS SOME ADVANTAGE TO BOTH JORDANIANS AND ISRAELIS IN NOT HAVING IT APPEAR THAT YOUR DECISION FOLLOWED YOUR TALK WITH ESHKOL. BESIDES, A SOVIET "ECONOMIC MISSION" INCLUDING THREE MILITARY EXPERTS IN HUFTI IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN JORDAN ON JANUARY 5, AND YOUR MESSAGE WOULD BRING GENERAL KHAMMASH TO WASHINGTON NEXT MONDAY IN ORDER TO REACH SOME UNDERSTANDING BEFORE THE ARAB SUMMIT UNCERTAINLY SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 17.

THIS IS A PAINFUL DECISION BUT I DON'T SEE ANY OTHER WAY TO KEEP THE SOVIETS OUT AT THIS POINT. FORTUNATELY, THE ISRAELIS SEEM MORE MANAGEABLE NOW THAN THEY DID EVEN SIX WEEKS AGO.

APPROVE MESSAGE TO HUSSEIN-----

CALL ME-----

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

DTG: 032826Z JAN 68

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 4 01 54

VZCZCEE855  
PP WTE10 WTE15  
DE WTE 91

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
INFO JIM JONES  
CITE CAP80079

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Pres file*  
JANUARY 3, 1968

FOR: GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
INFO: JIM JONES

I'D SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR YOUR BACKGROUNDING ON THE ESHKOL VISIT.

1. BACKGROUND OF THE VISIT:

-- THE PRIME MINISTER HAS ACCEPTED PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S INVITATION TO VISIT HIM IN TEXAS DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S CURRENT TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES.

-- THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT IS ONE OF THE PERIODIC CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON SUBJECTS OF COMMON INTEREST. THE TWO LAST MET IN 1964.

-- ALTHOUGH ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 1968, THE VISIT WAS ADVANCED BY ONE MONTH WHEN A POSTPONEMENT OF THE RECONVENING OF CONGRESS MADE THAT TIME MORE CONVENIENT FOR PRESIDENT JOHNSON. THE NEW DATE WAS EQUALLY CONVENIENT FOR PRIME MINISTER ESHKOL.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-22-03



2. SCHEDULE (WORTH DOUBLE-CHECKING WITH JIM JONES). PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. ESHKOL WILL ARRIVE AT THE RANCH FROM NEW YORK (VIA SAN ANTONIO OR AUSTIN) AT 4:00 P.M. SUNDAY, JANUARY 7; WILL LEAVE ABOUT 2:00 P.M. MONDAY. WILL STAY AT THE RANCH. THERE WILL BE NO SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OTHER THAN DINNER AND LUNCH FOR THE OFFICIAL PARTIES.

3. ISRAELI OFFICIAL PARTY. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY A SMALL GROUP OF ADVISERS, NO CABINET OFFICERS. FYI, IN PROTOCOL ORDER: PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. ESHKOL; AMBASSADOR AND MRS. HARMAN; YA'ACOV HERZOG, DIRECTOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE; MINISTER AND MRS. EVRON; MOSHE BITAN, THE UNDERSECRETARY-LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DEALING WITH US AFFAIRS; AVIAD YAFEH, POLITICAL SECRETARY; GENERAL JOSEPH GEVA, DEFENSE ATTACHE; COL. LIOR, MILITARY AIDE; DAN PATTIR, PRESS COUNSELOR.

4. SUBSTANCE. I SUGGEST CONFINING YOURSELF AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO SOME GENERALITY LIKE THIS: "THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER WILL DISCUSS SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN US-ISRAELI BILATERAL RELATIONS AND THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST."

EVERYONE KNOWS, WHAT THE SITUATION IS THE MID-EAST, THAT OUR POLICY IS THE PRESIDENT'S 19 JUNE STATEMENT AND THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE 22 NOVEMBER UN RESOLUTION. HOWEVER, I KNOW YOU WILL NEED A LITTLE LATITUDE TO HANDLE QUESTIONS ON WHETHER ARMS OR MAYBE DESALTING WILL BE DISCUSSED. TO THESE, I THINK THE BEST LINE MIGHT BE: "THAT SUBJECT IS PART OF THE OVERALL PICTURE, AND IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME IT WILL BE DISCUSSED ALONG WITH ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION."

WE WILL SUGGEST THE SAME GUIDANCE TO THE ISRAELIS AND TRY TO KEEP THEM WITHIN THESE LIMITS TOO. THE ARMS QUESTION WILL BE THE HARDEST TO HANDLE AFTER THE VISIT. WE WILL HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES THEN, BUT OUR CURRENT RECOMMENDATION IS THAT ANY DECISION BE KEPT SECRET FOR THE TIME BEING.

DTG 032337Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

INFORMATION

Thursday - January 4, 1968

TO: The President

*Pr. file*

FROM: W. W. Rostow

President Costa e Silva has sent you the following telegram in answer to your New Year's message:

"Deeply touched, I express to your Excellency my thanks for your friendly New Year's message to the Brazilian people and to its President. I also, as does your Excellency, have the most pleasant memories of our meetings during the past year. Inspired by the traditional friendship which identifies our two countries, I take this opportunity to express my wish that your Excellency and the American people attain fully, during this year, your high objectives.

Cordially,

Arthur da Costa e Silva,  
President of Republic of Brazil."

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCEEA;893  
00 WTE18  
DE WTE-097

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP80084

1968 JAN 4 01 39

*Free file*

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 3, 1968

SUBJECT: SECOND DAY FOREIGN REACTIONS TO BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM.

MARKET

GOLD QUIET AGAIN. PRICE FELL SLIGHTLY IN LONDON. GOLD POOL TOOK IN \$2 MILLION

THE DOLLAR AGAIN STRONG. STERLING FIRMED.

OFFICIAL REACTIONS

1. KATZENBACH MISSION.

A. UK--WELCOMED MISSION, SUPPORTED DESIGN OF PROGRAM WITH MAJOR IMPACT ON SURPLUS COUNTRIES BUT WORRIED ABOUT DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON UK. KATZENBACH AGREED TOUCH BASE WITH THEM AGAIN ON HIS WAY HOME.

B. GERMANY-GOOD RESPONSE. BRANDT SAID GERMANS WOULD COME THROUGH ON CONTINUING OFFSETS ON TROOPS AND PROBABLY WOULD STAND STILL FOR U.S. BORDER TAX. OTHER GERMAN OFFICIALS A LITTLE MORE CAUTIOUS.

C. SWITZERLAND--WORRIED ABOUT TOURISM AND TRADE MISSIONS.

2. ROSTOW MISSION

TOKYO--SATO EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT'S ACTION, SAID JAPAN WOULD COOPERATE, BUT MADE NO SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *je/mp*, NARA, Date *7-22-03*

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3. OT

A. FRANCE--PRICELESS COMMENT FROM PRIME MINISTER POMPIDOU REMINDING OUR CHARGE THAT FRENCH GOVERNMENT NOT OPPOSED TO U.S. INVESTMENTS AS SUCH BUT ONLY TO INVESTMENTS FINANCED "OUT OF OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT".

B. ITALY--CONTINUING MAKE GOOD NOISES.

#### EUROPEAN PRESS

MIXTURE OF GENERAL THEMES, SOME CONTRADICTIONARY

-- PROGRAM SHOWS U.S. DETERMINATION TO DEFEND DOLLAR AND PRICE OF GOLD;

-- APPREHENSION OF CONSEQUENCES FOR EUROPE;

-- VICTORY FOR DEGAULLE BUT AT SAME TIME SERIOUS THREAT TO FRANCE;

-- WORRIED ABOUT U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE

AUSTRALIAN PRESS --TIMING BAD FOR AUSTRALIA BUT EFFECTS SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE.

JAPANESE PRESS --MORE PESSIMISTIC; WORRIED THAT FURTHER STEPS MAY BE NECESSARY.

#### IMPACT ON AUSTRALIA

WE MAKING SEPARATE STUDY THIS PROBLEM. PRESENT PROGRAM COULD CALL FOR REDUCTION ABOUT \$100 MILLION IN U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN AUSTRALIA. COULD BE OFFSET TO SOME DEGREE BY SPECIAL LICENSES FOR WORK IN PROCESS AND EX-IM LOANS. TOURISM NOT REAL PROBLEM. TOTAL U.S. TOURIST EXPENDITURES AUSTRALIA ABOUT \$18 MILLION IN 1967. REDUCTION IN CIVILIAN TOURIST EXPENDITURES WOULD BE MORE THAN MADE UP BY INCREASE IN R&R EXPENDITURES WHICH PROJECTED TO RISE FROM LESS THAN \$2 MILLION IN 1967 TO \$14 MILLION THIS YEAR. LOOKING INTO POSSIBILITIES ADDITIONAL R&R AUSTRALIA.

DTG: 240026Z JAN 1968

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

RECEIVED  
WHCA

EEA858  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 102

1968 JAN 4 02 23

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO JIM JONES FOR THE PRESIDENT  
CITE WH80089

*Franklin*

UNCLAS

JANUARY 3, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT VIA JIM JONES

RESPONDING TO JIM JONES' REQUEST, HERE ARE THE RECENT TOURIST  
DEFICIT FIGURES:

( IN MILLIONS \$)

	PAYMENTS	RECEIPTS	DEFICIT
1960	-2263	1025	-1238
1961	-2292	1057	-1235
1962	-2514	1070	-1444
1963	-2729	1133	-1596
1964	-2856	1357	-1499
1965	-3158	1545	-1613
1966	-3412	1768	-1644
1967	-4064	1827	-2237

"JANUARY-SEPTEMBER, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED ANNUAL RATE.

IF WE BUDGET FOR A \$500 MILLION REDUCTION IN THE 1967 DEFICIT  
AND ASSUME A "NORMAL" INCREASE IN RECEIPTS, 1968 WOULD LOOK ABOUT  
LIKE THIS:

	PAYMENTS	RECEIPTS	DEFICIT
1968(SAY)	-3650	1950	-1700

U.S. TOURIST EXPENDITURES FOR 1968 WOULD THEN BE \$200 ABOVE THE  
1966 LEVEL-- A PREVIOUS PEAK.

IF WE BUDGET FOR A \$500 MILLION REDUCTION FROM THE 1966 DEFICIT--  
WHEN WE DIDN'T HAVE THE EXPO 67 BULGE--1968 WOULD LOOK ABOUT LIKE  
THIS:

	PAYMENTS	RECEIPTS	DEFICIT
1968	-3100	1950	-1150

THE DEFICIT WOULD BE ABOUT \$500 MILLION LESS THAN THE 1966 DEFICIT  
OF \$1644.

THE DEFICIT WOULD BE ABOUT \$1100 LESS THAN THE EXPECTED 1967 DEFICIT  
OF \$2237.

U.S. TOURIST EXPENDITURES WOULD BE AT ABOUT THE 1965 LEVEL (\$3158).

DTG: 040125Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Tuesday~~, January 3, 1968

115

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file  
sent Bush  
CAP 0063*

Following is a suggested message from you to General Ne Win on the occasion of Burma's Independence Day, January 4.

QUOTE Dear General Ne Win: ~~It gives me great pleasure to~~ extend to Your Excellency and to the Burmese people my warmest wishes and those of the American people on the anniversary of Burma's 20th year of independence.

Our two peoples in past years have come to know and understand each other well. I sincerely hope that the friendships we have formed will grow even stronger. I am confident that Burma's resolute determination to maintain its independence and neutrality will not waiver. I hope, too, that in the coming years Burma will prosper in the more secure and orderly world for which we all strive.

Our visit together in Washington remains fresh in mind. The understanding we achieved is a continuing source of strength and comfort to me. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson UNQUOTE

We would tell our Embassy we do not plan to release message but have no objection if Burmese wish to.

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By RG, NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ACTION**CONFIDENTIAL**

Wednesday, January 3, 1968  
3:15 p.m.

*Pres file***Mr. President:**

Herewith a suggestion for bringing Edward Thompson to the State Department, which I support. In addition to the reasons mentioned, Thompson could help Sec. Rusk in speech writing -- which he needs.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 12-27-91

WWRostow:rlh

January 3, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW

FOR THE PRESIDENT VIA JIM JONES

*Pres file*

Responding to Jim Jones' request, here are the recent tourist deficit figures:

	(in millions \$)		
	<u>Payments</u>	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Deficit</u>
1960	-2263	1025	-1238
1961	-2292	1057	-1235
1962	-2514	1070	-1444
1963	-2729	1133	-1596
1964	-2856	1357	-1499
1965	-3158	1545	-1613
1966	-3412	1768	-1644
1967*	-4064	1827	-2237

\*January-September, seasonally adjusted annual rate.

If we budget for a \$500 million reduction in the 1967 deficit and assume a "normal" increase in receipts, 1968 would look about <sup>like</sup> this:

	<u>Payments</u>	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Deficit</u>
1968 (say)	-3650	1950	-1700

U.S. tourist expenditures <sup>for 1968</sup> would then be \$200 above the 1966 level -- a previous peak.

If we budget for a \$500 million reduction from the 1966 deficit -- when we didn't have the EXPO 67 bulge -- 1968 would look about like this:



	<u>Payments</u>	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Deficits</u>
1968	\$3100	1950	-1150

The deficit would be about \$500 million less than the 1966 deficit of \$1644.

The deficit would be about \$1100 less than the expected 1967 deficit of \$2237.

U.S. tourist expenditures would be at about the 1965 level (\$3158).

WWRostow:rlm

11  
Tuesday, January 2, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Letters from President Diaz Ordaz**

President Diaz Ordaz has sent you the two letters at Tab A. One acknowledges your Thanksgiving letter to him. The other congratulates you on your recent round-the-world trip. It is interesting that he should have sent the letters through the regular mail. I think this is his way of insuring their privacy.

You might wish to reply to his letter on your trip. I enclose a suggested draft at Tab B.

**W. W. Rostow**

**Attachments**

**Tab A - Two letters from President Diaz Ordaz, December 22 and 26, 1967.**

**Tab B - Suggested reply for signature.**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

11802

December 30, 1967

Mr. Bowdler,

Juanita sent these down for you to run over  
hastily.

LN

VZCZCOEA813  
00 WTE10  
DE WTE 46

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80041

~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 5 01 10

JANUARY 2, 1968

SUBJECT: FOREIGN REACTION TO THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM  
MARKET

GOLD -- LONDON MARKET VERY QUIET (SWISS MARKET CLOSED FOR  
HOLIDAY). NO GOLD POOL SALES.

THE DOLLAR WENT UP STRONGLY IN ALL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS.

STERLING WAS WEAK -- PARTLY BECAUSE THE BRITISH ANNOUNCED A  
DECLINE IN THEIR RESERVES DURING DECEMBER.

#### OFFICIAL REACTION

ITALY, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS SAID PROGRAM WAS GOOD THING AND  
THEY PREPARED TO TAKE THEIR MEDICINE. ITALIANS MADE EXCELLENT  
PUBLIC STATEMENTS. NO REACTION YET FROM GERMANY AND UK.

FRENCH SAID GOOD TRY BUT COMMENTS GENERALLY CHURLISH. DEBRE  
INTIMATED TROUBLE ON BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

CANADIANS SAID THEY REASSURED FROM PRIOR CONSULATIONS  
(TONY SOLOMON SAW PEARSON IN FLORIDA AND SHARP IN OTTAWA).  
SHARP MADE PUBLIC STATEMENT SAYING PROGRAM NECESSARY FOR WORLD  
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, AND SHOWED SPECIAL EFFORT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT  
CANADA'S POSITION.

JAPAN WORRIED BUT SATO PLEASED OVER SPECIAL CONSIDERATION  
SHOWN FOR JAPAN.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By cmf, NARA, Date 7-22-03



AUSTRALIA AND SPAIN SAID WORRIED OVER TOURISM.

PRESS

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL AND OTHER PRESS ACCOUNTS GENERALLY FAVORABLE, BUT PATTERN NOT YET CLEARLY FORMED. A NUMBER OF COMMENTS THAT MEDICINE NECESSARY BUT WORRIED IT LIKELY TO BE BITTER MEDICINE FOR EUROPE.

ORGANIZATION IN WASHINGTON

GOOD OPERATION GOING IN COMMERCE ON DIRECT INVESTMENT PROGRAM. GROUP OF SENIOR LAWYERS ORGANIZED FROM AROUND THE GOVERNMENT ANSWERING QUESTIONS. FIRST CALLS WERE FROM WALL STREET LAWYERS. LATER BEGAN COMING IN FROM COMPANIES ACROSS THE COUNTRY.

DTG: 030014Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~



120

~~SECRET~~

HVZCZCEEA850  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 96

1968 JAN 4 00 31

*Pres file*

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80083

~~SECRET~~

JANUARY 3, 1968

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

HERewith SULLIVAN NOTES WITH SATISFACTION THE TRUCK KILL RATE IN DECEMBER ON THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL. THE BARRIER DEVICES ARE BEGINNING TO CONTRIBUTE marginally, BUT ARE NOT YET A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR.

1. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GREAT SATISFACTION WITH CONTINUING HIGH OF TRUCK KILLS IN HO CHI MINH TRAIL STRUCTURE. OUR RECORDS SHOW THAT 902 TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED AND 77 DAMAGED IN THE PERIOD 1-31 DECEMBER WHICH EXCEEDS ALL-TIME HIGH SET IN NOVEMBER (693 DESTROYED - 78 DAMAGED).

2. KILLS ON THE TRAIL THIS DECEMBER WERE MORE THAN FIVE TIMES GREATER THAN LAST YEAR WHEN 170 TRUCKS WERE DESTROYED. LOSSES OF THIS MAGNITUDE SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIR EFFECTIVENESS OF PANHANDLE SUPPLY SYSTEM.

DTG 032346Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



VZCZCEE848  
PP WTE10  
DE WTE 88

122

V 1968 JAN 4 00 11

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80078

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 3, 1968

*Profile*

SUBJECT: VISA FOR VLADIMIR DEDIJER

FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS VLADIMIR DEDIJER OF YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN COMING TO THE UNITED STATES AS A PROFESSIONAL SCHOLAR. MIT INVITED HIM TO COME AGAIN THIS JANUARY TO LECTURE ON: "THE PEASANT AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY REVOLUTION." DEDIJER HAS PROMISED OUR CONSUL IN ZAGREB THAT HE WILL REFRAIN FROM ACTIVITIES UNCONNECTED WITH HIS SCHOLARLY WORK.

NOW MIT HAS SECOND THOUGHTS, AND JERRY WEISNER CALLED ME THIS MORNING TO FIND OUT WHETHER WE WOULD OR WOULD NOT GRANT HIM A VISA. THE PROBLEM IS DEDIJER'S RECENT ACTIONS AS CO-CHAIRMAN OF BETRAND RUSSELL'S "TRIBUNAL." DEDIJER WENT SO FAR AS TO SEND A TELEGRAM TO THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT CALLING THE U. S. ADMINISTRATION "THE WORST CROOKS IN HISTORY, MORE CRUEL THAN HITLER."

ALTHOUGH DEDIJER WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1954 -- ALONG WITH DJILAS -- HE WILL STILL NEED A WAIVER OF INELIGIBILITY AS A COMMUNIST, WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE MUST REQUEST FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. (PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, ALL EASTERN EUROPEANS MUST COME IN ON WAIVERS.)

AMBASSADOR ELBRICK THINKS, ON BALANCE, THAT WE SHOULD LET DEDIJER IN. HE IS A RECOGNIZED HISTORIAN. HIS VIEWS ON VIETNAM ARE DISCREDITED, AND HARDLY BIG NEWS. THE ADMINISTRATION MIGHT GET SOME CREDIT IN THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY FOR BEING BROAD-MINDED -- ALTHOUGH A FEW RIGHT-WINGERS MIGHT, OF COURSE, BE OUTRAGED. IF WE GRANT THE VISA, WE COULD JUSTIFY IT ON THE BASIS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY.

MIT COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY WITHDRAWING THE INVITATION IN LIGHT OF DEDIJER'S SHAMELESS POLITICAL AGITATION. MIT IS NOT INCLINED TO DO THIS, AND WOULD UNDERSTANDABLY PREFER ANY REFUSAL TO COME FROM THE U. S. GOVERNMENT.

I HAVE TALKED WITH SECRETARY RUSK, AND HE IS SEIZED WITH THE PROBLEM. IF YOU HAVE ANY GUIDANCE IN THE MEANTIME, I CAN PASS IT ON.

DTG: 032323Z JAN 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 03-263  
By *ris* NARA, Date *12-16-03*



123

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Send 8:19*

VZCZCEEAS14  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 50

1968 JAN 3 02:10

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80045

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 2, 1968

I HAVE A FIRST-RATE CANDIDATE FOR THE ISRAELI DE-SALTING  
JOB AND FOR MID-EAST WATER IN GENERAL: PROFESSOR MAX F. MILLIKAN  
OF MIT.

IT WOULD HAVE TO BE PART TIME; BUT HE COULD BE ENLISTED.

HE IS A UNIVERSALLY RESPECTED ECONOMIST; A TRAINED PHYSICIST;  
WIDE KNOWLEDGE OF DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS; A REMARKABLY WELL-  
BALANCED AND JUDICIOUS MIND; CONSIDERABLE GOVERNMENTAL EXPERIENCE.

YOU MIGHT CHECK HIM OUT INDEPENDENTLY, IF YOU DON'T HAVE  
A MAN FOR THE JOB.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 030020Z JAN 68

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *ry*, NARA, Date 12-27-91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Leah 5:50 PM*

VZCZCEEA815  
OO WTE19  
DE WTE 49

603 JAN 7 01 50

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO MRS JOHNSON  
INFO JIM JONES  
CITE CAP80044

*Free file*

9 JAN 9:14

TUESDAY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JANUARY 2, 1968

FOR: MRS. JOHNSON  
FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
INFO: JIM JONES

HERE ARE THE FACTS ON THE ESHKOL VISIT AS WE HAVE THEM SO FAR, SUBJECT TO YOUR FURTHER VIEWS AND THE PRESIDENT'S:

1. SCHEDULE. SUNDAY, JANUARY 7, 4:00 P.M. ARRIVE AT RANCH;  
4:30 - 6:00 P.M. MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER;  
7:00 P.M. DINNER. MONDAY, JANUARY 8, BREAKFAST IN ROOMS;  
10:00 - 11:30 A.M. TOUR OF RANCH FOR THE ENTIRE OFFICIAL PARTY;  
11:30 - 12:00 NOON SECOND MEETING; 12:00 - 1:00 P.M. BUFFET  
LUNCH FOR ENTIRE OFFICIAL PARTY; 2:00 P.M. DEPARTURE.

2. THE ISRAELI OFFICIAL PARTY WILL TOTAL 12, INCLUDING  
3 LADIES. IN PROTOCOL ORDER: PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. ESHKOL;  
AMBASSADOR AND MRS. HARMAN; YA'ACOV HERZOG, DIRECTOR OF THE  
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE; MINISTER AND MRS. EVRON; MOSHE BITAN,  
THE UNDERSECRETARY-LEVEL FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL DEALING  
WITH US AFFAIRS; AVIAD YAFEH, POLITICAL SECRETARY; GENERAL  
JOSEPH GEVA, DEFENSE ATTACHE; COL. LIOR, MILITARY AIDE;  
DAN PATTIR, PRESS COUNSELOR. ALL SPEAK ENGLISH.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *alg*, NARA, Date 12-27-91



DOUBLE BEDS ARE SATISFACTORY FOR THE COUPLES, AND ALL OF THE MEN IN THE PARTY ARE ABLE TO SHARE ROOMS.

3. SPLITTING THE ISRAELI PARTY. WORKING FROM JIM JONES' ORIGINAL GUIDANCE, WE HAD ASSUMED THAT ONLY THE ESHKOLS AND THE HARMANS WOULD STAY AT THE RANCH; THE REST, IN SAN ANTONIO. THIS, OF COURSE, IS ENTIRELY UP TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. WE UNDERSTAND NOW THAT THE ESHKOLS WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TUCK IN A COMBINATION SECURITY MAN AND VALET SOMEWHERE ON THE PREMISES.

4. AFTER CHECKING WITH JIM JONES, WE HAVE TENTATIVELY PARED THE U.S. PARTY TO 3, INCLUDING: LUKE BATTLE, JIM SYMINGTON, AND ME.

5. THE DINNER GUEST LIST CAN BE SUITED TO THE NUMBERS YOU CAN ACCOMMODATE BY JUST PARING THE ISRAELI LIST FROM THE BOTTOM. WE THINK IT WOULD BE NICE IF THE ENTIRE OFFICIAL PARTY COULD BE ACCOMMODATED FOR A BUFFET LUNCH BEFORE THEY LEAVE MONDAY.

6. IT IS REALLY UP TO YOU WHETHER WE EVEN BRING TO THE RANCH SUNDAY AFTERNOON ANY OF THE ISRAELI PARTY WHOM THE PRIME MINISTER DOES NOT NEED NEAR HIM DURING HIS TALK WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WHOM YOU DO NOT INVITE FOR DINNER. SYMINGTON CAN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH A SPLINTER GROUP IN SAN ANTONIO.

DTG 030019Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



VZCZCEE844

OO WTE15

DE WTE 86

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE WH80076

1968 JAN 3 23 16

UNCLAS

JAN. 3, 1968

*Per file*

TONY LAMBTON, A KNOWLEDGEABLE AND INFLUENTIAL BRITISH MP, WHOSE WRITINGS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS HAVE A WIDE EUROPEAN NEWSPAPER AUDIENCE IS MAKING A U.S. TOUR AND WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO HAVE A BRIEF INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING THE LAST WEEK OF JANUARY OR THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY. IF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IS MANAGEABLE, I BELIEVE AN APPOINTMENT WITH LAMBTON WOULD BE WORTHWHILE.

DAVID BRUCE'S LETTER TO JOHN LEDDY, GIVING BACKGROUND ON LAMBTON AND RECOMMENDING AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT, FOLLOWS:

"DEAR JOHN:

"I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY TONY LAMBTON (VISCOUNT LAMBTON, SON AND HEIR OF THE EARL OF DURHAM) TO PUT IN A WORD FOR HIM IN CONNECTION WITH HIS APPLICATION WHICH WILL BE PASSED THROUGH THE BRITISH EMBASSY TO SEE THE PRESIDENT DURING THE LAST WEEK OF JANUARY OR THE FIRST WEEK OF FEBRUARY. HE EXPECTS TO GO TO THE UNITED STATES IN ANY CASE, BUT HIS SCHEDULE WILL DEPEND, AS RESPECTS WASHINGTON, ON WHETHER OR NOT HE MAY BE ABLE TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. HARASSED AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON IS BY PEOPLE SEEKING APPOINTMENTS, I HAVE USUALLY NOT RECOMMENDED PARTICULAR VISITORS FROM GREAT BRITAIN.

"IN THE CASE OF LAMBTON, IF A 15-MINUTE INTERVIEW COULD POSSIBLY BE FITTED IN, I WOULD RECOMMEND IT ON TWO GROUNDS: (1) LAMBTON IS ONE OF THE STOUTEST BACKERS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS FOR OUR POLICY IN VIETNAM; (2) FORTY-FIVE YEARS OLD, HE HAS BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SINCE 1951. ALTHOUGH A CONSERVATIVE, HE IS ABSOLUTELY INDEPENDENT IN HIS POLITICAL VIEWS, COMMANDS A LARGE AUDIENCE AS A FREQUENT WRITER ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FOR THE MASS CIRCULATION EVENING STANDARD AND OTHER PAPERS. HE AND HIS FATHER ARE STILL GREAT LAND OWNERS AND AGRICULTURISTS. HE IS FORTUNATE IN ANOTHER PARTICULAR, IN BEING CONSIDERED THE FINEST BIRD SHOT IN THIS COUNTRY. HE IS OFTEN REGARDED AS SOMETHING OF AN ECCENTRIC, SINCE HE DOES AND WRITES AS HE PLEASES. HE IS A FIRST COUSIN OF ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME. I ENCLOSE A LIST OF HIS NEWSPAPER OUTLETS.

"HE WILL, IN ANY EVENT, CONTRIBUTE ARTICLES TO THE EVENING STANDARD ABOUT HIS TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES, SO IT MIGHT BE WELL, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO TURN HIS CHARM ON HIM.

"IN A LETTER TO ME, HE SAID HE WOULD, AS A JOURNALIST, BE WRITING AN ARTICLE IN SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES, AND WOULD ALSO BE VISITING AMERICA IN HIS CAPACITY AS A POLITICIAN, BEING AN MP AND A VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSERVATIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

"I AM TAKING THE LIBERTY OF SENDING A COPY OF THIS LETTER TO WALT ROSTOW.

"WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS TO BOTH OF YOU, I AM

"EVER YOURS,

DAVID BRUCE"

NO ENCLOSURE.

PRESIDENT WILL SEE LAMBTON-----

NO-----

DTG 032215Z JAN 68

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

128

1968 JAN 3 18 39

VZCZCEE839  
00 WTE15  
DE WTE 75

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP80069

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

JAN. 3, 1968

STATE PROPOSES FOLLOWING TEXT FOR ANNOUNCEMENT REY VISIT TO BE RELEASED TO PRESS SIMULTANEOUSLY BY WHITE HOUSE AT NOON AND BY COMMISSION AT BRUSSELS AT 6:00 PM ON JANUARY 5, 1968, LOCAL TIME:

BEGIN TEXT

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS INVITED THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, MR. JEAN REY, TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON. MR. REY WILL ARRIVE IN NEW YORK ON THE EVENING OF FEBRUARY 5 AND PROCEED TO WASHINGTON DURING THE AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 6. HE WILL MEET WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON ON FEBRUARY 8. DURING HIS VISIT HE WILL ALSO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND WITH OTHER OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS MATTERS OF CURRENT INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. HE IS SCHEDULED TO DEPART THE UNITED STATES ON FEBRUARY 9. THIS WILL BE MR. REY'S FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON SINCE HE BECAME PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN JULY 1967.

END TEXT

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION WILL FOLLOW.

REQUEST APPROVAL TEXT AND DATE OF ANNOUNCEMENT.

WILL THEN COORDINATE TIME AND ANNOUNCEMENT WITH REY IN BRUSSELS.

DTG: 031757Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~ LIMDIS

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 1-24-92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 3 17 56

WEDNESDAY  
JAN 3 PM 1 56  
*Pres file*

VZCZCEE836  
OO WTE10 WTE15  
DE WIE 74

FROM WALT ROSTOV  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
INFO GEORGE CHRISTIAN  
CITE CAP80068

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAN. 3, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOV

REPEAT TO GEORGE CHRISTIAN

1. SECRETARY RUSK HAD A LONG TOUGH TALK WITH KAY GRAHAM. KAY TOOK THE REMARKABLE VIEW: "IF THE STORY IS WRONG, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE GOVERNMENT TO CORRECT IT!"

2. I CALLED CHUCK ROBERTS, WHOM I HAD BRIEFED ON THE ROME VISIT AS INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT. BEFORE I COULD SPEAK, HE SAID:

-- IN SEVENTEEN YEARS WITH "NEWSWEEK" HE HAS NEVER COME SO CLOSE TO RESIGNING;

-- THE STORY WAS "MALICIOUS" AND "UNFORGIVABLE";

-- HE WAS "SHOCKED" AND "FRIGHTENED" BY THEIR IGNORING HIS SUBSTANTIVE ACCOUNT, BASED ON TALKS WITH JACK VALENTI AND ME, ON THE GROUNDS THAT WE WERE MERELY "PUTTING THE BEST FACE ON THE MATTER."

I TOLD HIM I HAD FULL FAITH IN HIS PERSONAL INTEGRITY, BUT IT WAS THE MOST IRRESPONSIBLE PIECE OF JOURNALISM I HAD SEEN IN MY YEARS IN WASHINGTON.

DTG: 031723Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12333, SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF MAR. 14, 1983

BY *RG* ON *1-24-92*



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SANITIZED

INFORMATION

131 file

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday - January 3, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Cuba

Fidel Castro's problems seem to be mounting as a result of failure in his foreign adventures and economic difficulties at home. Here-with are two intelligence reports showing the trend.

The State Department study (Tab A) describes the first significant indication of disenchantment with Castro inside the regime. It seems to be most widespread in the ranks of the old Communist party. But the university and intellectuals are also in ferment. The dissension has not reached proportions where Castro's hold is threatened, but he may increasingly have to resort to strong-arm measures to maintain his personal control.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

The CIA document (Tab B) reports the views of a high [redacted] Communist leader who in the past has had close links with Castro. He thinks that Castro's policy of exporting revolution is a fantasy. By pushing the guerrilla campaign, Castro has become a negative factor in the Latin American revolution and is highly dangerous to all revolutionary movements. The Bolivian venture is the proof.

Walt Rostow

## Attachments

Tab A - State Department study, 12/28/67 (INR Note 1024)

Tab B - A CIA report of 12/26/67 from [redacted]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)SANITIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-365  
By sig, NARA Date 2-11-97

EA881  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 66

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80060

~~SECRET~~

1968 JAN 3 16 23

132  
WEDNESDAY  
11.29  
Pres. file

JANUARY 3, 1968

HERewith NICK'S FIRST CONTACT WITH LONDON. THEY ARE SYMPATHETIC BUT WORRIED ABOUT THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON THE U.K. -- DIRECT VIA REDUCED U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENTS; INDIRECT, VIA HIGHER EUROPEAN INTEREST RATES.

1. FRED DEMING, BILL ROTH, DAVID BRUCE AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS THIS MORNING WITH ROY JENKINS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS OF BRITISH TREASURY, BOARD OF TRADE, FOREIGN OFFICE AND BANK OF ENGLAND. I BEGAN MY PRESENTATION BY PUTTING PRESIDENT'S STRONG ACTION ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN ITS BROAD POLITICAL CONTEXT. I STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT IS FACED WITH MANY PRESSURES TO REVERSE US POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THAT THESE PRESSURES WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE BEEN EXACERBATED BY NEWS OF OUR WORSENING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS. FAILURE TO ACT WOULD HAVE INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR RECENT SUCCESSES IN THE KENNEDY ROUND WOULD BE LOST AND WOULD PROBABLY ALSO HAVE LED TO INCREASED DEMANDS TO REDUCE TROOPS ABROAD WITH A SUBSEQUENT EFFECT ON OUR SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO TAKE THESE DIFFICULT ACTIONS WAS MOTIVATED BY HIS KEEN DESIRE TO AVOID THIS REVERSAL OF ALL THAT WE HAVE STOOD FOR IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD. IT IS OUR HOPES THAT THE SUCCESS OF THIS PROGRAM WILL ENABLE US TO AVOID THESE CONSEQUENCES.

2. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT FEELS VERY STRONGLY THAT THE LONGER TERM SOLUTION TO THE KIND OF PROBLEM WE FACE IN OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MUST BE GREATER COOPERATION AND A SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, NOT JUST ON THE PART OF DEFICIT COUNTRIES, BUT MORE PARTICULARLY BY THE SURPLUS COUNTRIES.

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Authority FRUS 64-68, vol. 8, #70

By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

Xerox from Quick Copy

3. THROUGHOUT SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION, JENKINS AND BRITISH OFFICIALS STRESSED THEIR SYMPATHETIC ATTITUDE AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE PROBLEM WE FACED. THEY WELCOMED THESE MEASURES AS STRENGTHENING THE DOLLAR AND THEREFORE ULTIMATELY BENEFITTING ALL TRADING NATIONS. JENKINS RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH MEASURES WERE BOUND TO HAVE UNPLEASANT EFFECTS, EVEN FOR THOSE COUNTRIES IN A WEAKER BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SITUATION, BUT THAT THIS WAS CERTAINLY PREFERABLE TO A RETURN TO PROTECTIONISM. HE WELCOMED THE DIFFERENTIATION WE WERE ABLE TO INTRODUCE INTO PROGRAM IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE EFFECTS ON COUNTRIES LIKE THE UK, WHO HAVE THEIR OWN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES, BUT HE DID NOT WISH TO HIDE FROM US THE CONCERN WHICH HER MAJESTIES GOVERNMENT FEELS. THE MORE THEY STUDIED MEASURES, THE MORE PESSIMISTIC THEIR ASSESSMENTS BECAME OF THE EFFECT ON THE UK. HE STRESSED THAT THEY HAD NOT YET REACHED ANY DEFINITIVE CONCLUSION, BUT WISHED TO MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST CONSULTATION WITH US AS THEY WENT THROUGH THEIR CALCULATIONS.

4. MAIN SUBSTANTIVE CONCERN APPEARS TO BE WITH EFFECT OF INVESTMENT CONTROLS, WHERE BRITISH CALCULATION SHOWS HIGHER EFFECT THAN OUR ESTIMATE OF \$150-\$160 MILLION IN 1968. BRITISH THINKING IN TERMS OF POSSIBLY AS HIGH AS 100 MILLION POUNDS, BUT DEMING FELT THAT THIS CALCULATION ON DIRECT EFFECT WAS TOO HIGH. HOWEVER, BRITISH ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO THINK OF INDIRECT REPEAT INDIRECT EFFECTS DUE TO DRYING-UP OF AVAILABLE CAPITAL IN EUROPE AND CONSEQUENT OUT-FLOWS FROM LONDON EURODOLLAR MARKET. EFFECT ON EUROPEAN INTEREST RATES ALSO STRESSED.

5. JENKINS AGREED UK WOULD NOT REACH FIRM CONCLUSIONS UNTIL THEY HAVE OPPORTUNITY DISCUSS AGAIN WITH US RESULTS OF OUR TALKS ON CONTINENT. TENTATIVELY WE PLAN RETURN NEXT SATURDAY FOR TALKS WITH HAROLD WILSON.

6. FULL REPORT BEING SENT BY EMBASSY LONDON.  
FESSENDEN

DTG 031426Z JAN 1968

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1968 JAN 3 17 21

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
 TO THE PRESIDENT  
 CITE CAP30061

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/3/68

HEREWITH JULIUS NYERERE SUGGESTS YOU TAKE THE RISKS OF RESPONDING TO THE LATEST TRINH NO-BOMBING-FOR-TALKS FORMULA. HE SAYS HE RECEIVED THIS FORMULA EARLIER FROM A NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE. HE HAS WRITTEN A PERSONAL LETTER IN THE SAME SENSE TO BILL LEONHART, WHO WAS OUR AMBASSADOR IN TANZANIA.

QUOTE JANUARY 2 1968

DEAR PRESIDENT JOHNSON,  
 IT IS WITH SOME HESITATION THAT I BEGIN THE NEW YEAR BY WRITING A LETTER TO YOU ON THE SUBJECT OF VIETNAM, BUT I HOPE YOU WILL ACCEPT MY ASSURANCE THAT I DO SO SOLELY BECAUSE OF MY STRONG DESIRE TO SEE AN END TO THE DEATH OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN, ON BOTH SIDES, AND THE FEARFUL SUFFERING OF INNOCENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

I FULLY ACCEPT THAT YOU AND YOUR GOVERNMENT HAVE FELT IMPELLED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE VIETNAM CONFLICT BECAUSE OF YOUR INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AS BEING A THREAT TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES YOU HOLD SO DEAR, AND EVEN TO THE UNITED STATES ITSELF. THAT I DO NOT RPT NOT AGREE WITH YOUR INTREPRETATION OF THESE EVENTS IS, I BELIEVE, KNOWN TO YOU, AND I WOULD NOT PRETEND OTHERWISE BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF YOUR CONVICTION. IT IS MY COMPLETE ACCEPTANCE OF YOUR SINCERITY WHICH HAS PROMPTED ME TO WRITE THIS LETTER TODAY, AND I HOPE THAT YOU IN TURN WILL ACCEPT THAT THERE IS GOOD FAITH ON MY SIDE.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *jc/r*, NARA, Date 7-22-03

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FOR ALTHOUGH WE DISAGREE ON MANY THINGS CONCERNING VIETNAM, I BELIEVE THAT WE ARE AT ONE IN DESIRING AN END TO THE CONFLICT THERE, AN END TO THE KILLING OF VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS, AND A BEGINNING OF REBUILDING. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT I AM URGING YOU TO CONSIDER VERY SERIOUSLY THE PUBLIC STATEMENT MADE BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN HANOI A FEW DAYS AGO, IN WHICH HE SAID DEFINITELY THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM IS STOPPED. THIS STATEMENT CONFORMS WITH THE MESSAGE WHICH REACHED ME PRIVATELY DURING NOVEMBER, BUT WHICH I DID NOT RPT NOT FORWARD TO YOU AS I WAS CONVINCED THAT YOU WOULD RECEIVE IT THROUGH OTHER MEDIA.

LET ME MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I DO REALISE THAT THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF RISK INVOLVED IN A DECISION BY YOU TO CEASE THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM. I REALISE YOUR FEAR THAT A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING BEFORE TALKS HAVE EVEN BEGUN MAY LEAD TO A REINFORCEMENT OF THE VIETCONG FROM THE NORTH WITHOUT ANY ASSURANCE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL END QUICKLY, AND TO THE SATISFACTION OF BOTH SIDES.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO DENY THIS RISK; BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THERE ARE RISKS ON THE OTHER SIDE TOO - RISKS THAT THE WAR WILL DRAG ON FOR YET MORE YEARS, AND THAT IT WILL SPREAD AND ENGULF THE WHOLE OF SOUTH EAST ASIA, IF NOT RPT NOT BEYOND. THE REAL QUESTION IS NOT RPT NOT WHETHER RISKS CAN BE AVOIDED, BUT WHICH RISK GIVES THE GREATER HOPE FOR BRINGING THIS TERRIBLE CONFLICT TO AN END. FOR I AM CONVINCED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DO WANT PEACE. INDEED I WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THOSE WHOSE COUNTRY IS BEING RAVAGED BY WAR HAVE LESS DESIRE FOR PEACE THAN THOSE WHOSE COUNTRY IS SAFE FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THAT WAR. I COULD NOT BELIEVE THAT YOUR COUNTRY DESIRED PEACE AND FAIL TO BELIEVE THAT THE VIETNAMESE DESIRE PEACE WITH AT LEAST EQUAL FERVOUR. DISCUSSIONS ARE AN ESSENTIAL PRELIMINARY TO THE BEGINNING OF PEACE; IF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARE WILLING TO ENTER INTO THEM, SHOULD NOT RPT NOT THE UNITED STATES BE EQUALLY WILLING?

MR. PRESIDENT, THE POWER OF YOUR COUNTRY IS WITHOUT PARALLEL IN HISTORY. NO RPT NO ONE REALLY DOUBTS THAT AMERICA COULD BOMB NORTH VIETNAM OUT OF EXISTENCE AND EXTERMINATE ALL ITS PEOPLE - IF THE UNITED STATES WISHED TO DO SO. BUT THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION AT ISSUE. THE REAL QUESTION NOW IS WHETHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS POWERFUL ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO TALK WITH THE SMALL NATION WHICH HAS DEFIED IT, AND BRING THOSE TALKS TO A CONCLUSION WHICH MEANS PEACE FOR THE UNHAPPY VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND RELIEF TO THE REST OF THE WORLD.



IT MAY BE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THIS LETTER IS NOT RPT NOT COUCHED IN THE TRADITIONAL LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY, AND THAT AS PRESIDENT OF A SMALL COUNTRY WRITING TO THAT OF A POWERFUL COUNTRY I HAVE BEEN UNDULY FRANK. IF THAT IS THE CASE I BEG YOU TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS MY EARNEST DESIRE THAT TANZANIA AND THE UNITED STATES - DESPITE THE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR SIZE, ECONOMIC STRENGTH, AND THEIR POWER - SHOULD BE FRIENDS. I HAVE WRITTEN FROM THIS DESIRE FOR A FRIENDSHIP CLOSER THAN THE HERE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT OR CLASH OF INTEREST. I HAVE ALSO WRITTEN FROM A CONVICTION THAT YOU AND I ARE AT ONE IN OUR DESIRE FOR PEACE IN THE WORLD, AND A PEACE WHICH IS BASED ON HUMAN EQUALITY AND A UNIVERSAL ACCEPTANCE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.

ALLOW ME THEREFORE TO CLOSE WITH MY ASSURANCES OF THE GOOD WISHES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WE HAVE, DURING OUR SHORT HISTORY, DRAWN GREAT INSPIRATION FROM THE PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH YOUR NATION WAS FOUNDED, FROM YOUR DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, AND FROM THE EARLY STRUGGLES OF YOUR FOUNDING FATHERS. THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR ECONOMIES, AND IN THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, INEVITABLY RESULT IN VERY DIFFERENT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICIES BEING FOLLOWED BY EACH OF US AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE CAN, AND DO, DIFFER SOMETIMES IN OUR ASSESSMENTS OF A SITUATION, AND IN OUR INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS. BUT I DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THESE THINGS AFFECT OUR COMMON ADHERENCE TO THE BASIC BELIEFS IN DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN FREEDOM, OR OUR COMMON ASPIRATION TO SERVE THOSE BELIEFS. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT OF BROTHERHOOD THAT I HAVE WRITTEN, AND IN WHICH I HOPE YOU WILL READ MY LETTER  
YOURS SINCERELY,  
JULIUS K. NYERERE

UNQUOTE

THE SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER WILL BE FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON BY COURIER ON JANUARY 6.

2. A MAJOR PORTION OF THE TEXT OF NYERERE'S NEW YEAR'S DAY SPEECH TO CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AN ANNUAL CUSTOM IN DAR ES SALAAM, IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY FOLLOWING CABLE. IT WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY DRAFTED CONCURRENTLY WITH THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER AND THROWS ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON THE BASES OF NYERERE'S THOUGHT

BURNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DTG: 031543Z JAN 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/3/68

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

Herewith Julius Nyerere suggests you take the risks of responding to the latest Trinh no-bombing-for-talks formula. He says he received this formula earlier from a North Vietnamese representative. He has written a personal letter in the same sense to Bill Leonhart, who was our Ambassador in Tanzania.

*(quote Dar Es Salaam 1785/10)*

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03



135

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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OO WTE10  
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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80031

1968 JAN 2 22 15

*Leads*

*Pro file*

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

JAN. 2, 1968

JAN 2 PM 5:50

TUESDAY

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS PHONED TO ME TODAY BY MY FRIEND, WALTHER CASPER, WHO TOOK THE INITIATIVE IN MAKING CONTACT WITH RAINER BARZEL AND CHANCELLOR KIESINGER ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MATTER. BOTH BARZEL AND KIESINGER ARE ON WINTER HOLIDAY.

1. BARZEL SAID HE "FULLY UNDERSTOOD" THE U.S. MEASURES AND WOULD DEFEND AND SUPPORT THEM.

2. CHANCELLOR KIESINGER SAID HE WILL BE WRITING PERSONALLY TO THE PRESIDENT IN RESPONSE TO HIS LETTER INFORMING THE CHANCELLOR OF OUR ACTION. HE FULLY SYMPATHIZED WITH THE U.S. ACTION. HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR OFFSETS IF WE WERE TO KEEP OUR TROOPS IN GERMANY. STAFF WORK IN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WAS GOING FORWARD AS TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. ACTION FOR GERMANY AND ON WHAT THE APPROPRIATE GERMAN RESPONSE SHOULD BE.

I TOLD CASPER:

-- NOW WAS THE TIME FOR GERMANY TO ACT IN ITS FULL RESPONSIBILITIES AS A SURPLUS NATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, I RECALLED BOTH OUR PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT AND THE RECENT OECD RESOLUTION;

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

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-- FOR EXAMPLE, GERMANY AND ALL OF EUROPE SHOULD THINK OF A PROPOSAL THAT HE, CASPER, HAD MADE TO ME; NAMELY, THAT MEASURES BE TAKEN FROM THE EUROPEAN END TO ENCOURAGE TOURISM IN THE UNITED STATES;

-- FOR EXAMPLE, EUROPE MUST THINK OF REDUCING ITS SURPLUS BY PUTTING LONG-TERM CAPITAL IN THE U.S. AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD;

-- AND, IN GENERAL, IT WAS AS MUCH EUROPE'S DUTY TO BRING DOWN ITS SURPLUS AS IT WAS THE U.S. DUTY TO BRING DOWN ITS DEFICIT.

I POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS TRYING TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM IN THE SPIRIT OF COOPERATION ACROSS THE ATLANTIC. IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS SPIRIT BE RECIPROCATED, OR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POLICY WOULD FALL INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO WITHDRAW TROOPS FROM EUROPE OR INDULGE IN A WAVE OF AMERICAN PROTECTIONISM. IT WAS, THEREFORE, A TIME FOR A MAXIMUM EFFORT BY GERMANY TO REDUCE ITS SURPLUS AS FAST AS WE TRIED TO REDUCE OUR DEFICIT.

HE SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I WERE TO PUT IN A PERSONAL LETTER TO HIM EXACTLY WHAT I HAD SAID.

MAY I DRAFT A LETTER TO CASPER IN THIS SENSE?

LETTER TO CASPER APPROVED-----

DISAPPROVED -----

SEE ME-----

DTG 022115Z JAN 68

**CONFIDENTIAL**

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

RECEIVED  
January 2, 1968

*sent Ranch  
via wire*

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Roumanian envoy will be here January 4 or 5, with two aides.  
They say he will bear "new information."  
A scenario has been worked out to assure secrecy.  
He will see Harriman and Sec. Rusk.

WWRostow:rln

~~SECRET~~--SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By *jc*, NARA, Date *7-21-03*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 2, 1968

FOR: MRS. JOHNSON  
FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
INFO: JIM JONES

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12836, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By leg, MARRA, Date 12-27-91

Here are the facts on the Eshkol visit as we have them so far,  
subject to your further views and the President's:

1. Schedule. Sunday, January 7, 4:00 p.m. Arrive at Ranch;  
4:30 - 6:00 p.m. Meeting between the President and Prime Minister;  
7:00 p.m. Dinner. Monday, January 8, Breakfast in rooms; 10:00 - 11:30 a.m.  
Tour of Ranch for the entire official party; 11:30 - 12:00 noon Second meeting;  
12:00 - 1:00 p.m. Buffet lunch for entire official party; 2:00 p.m. Departure.

2. The Israeli official party will total 12, including 3 ladies. In  
protocol order: Prime Minister and Mrs. Eshkol; Ambassador and Mrs.  
Harman; Ya'acov Hersog, Director of the Prime Minister's office; Minister  
and Mrs. Evron; Moshe Bitan, the undersecretary-level Foreign Ministry  
official dealing with US affairs; Aviad Yafeh, political secretary; General  
Joseph Geva, defense attache; Col. Lior, military aide; Dan Pattir, press  
counselor. All speak English.

Double beds are satisfactory for the couples, and all of the men  
in the party are able to share rooms.

3. Splitting the Israeli party. Working from Jim Jones' original  
guidance, we had assumed that only the Eshkols and the Harmans would  
stay at the Ranch; the rest, in San Antonio. This, of course, is entirely  
up to you and the President. We understand now that the Eshkols would

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

also like to tuck in a combination security man and valet somewhere on the premises.

4. After checking with Jim Jones, we have tentatively pared the U. S. party to 3, including: Luke Battle, Jim Symington, and me.

5. The dinner guest list can be suited to the numbers you can accommodate by just paring the Israeli list from the bottom. We think it would be nice if the entire official party could be accommodated for a buffet lunch before they leave Monday.

6. It is really up to you whether we even bring to the Ranch Sunday afternoon any of the Israeli party whom the Prime Minister does not need near him during his talk with the President or whom you do not invite for dinner. Symington can make arrangements for such a splinter group in San Antonio.

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~~SECRET~~*Left 5:41 PM*

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1968 JAN 2 22 41

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FROM WALT ROSTOW  
 TO THE PRESIDENT  
 CITE CAP80034

*Pres file PM 5:59*

TUESDAY

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

JANUARY 2, 1968

THE ROUMANIAN ENVOY WILL BE HERE JANUARY 4 OR 5, WITH TWO  
 AIDES. THEY SAY HE WILL BEAR "NEW INFORMATION." A SCENARIO  
 HAS BEEN WORKED OUT TO ASSURE SECRECY. HE WILL SEE HARRIMAN  
 AND SECRETARY RUSK

D11: 022221Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

EX-101 COPY

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 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
 NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
 By *jc*, NARA, Date 7-21-03

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*Pres. file*

**Tuesday, January 2, 1968  
2:45 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**As Jack suggests, I will have this  
analyzed carefully.**

**W. W. Rostow**

**12/29/67 note from Valenti to the President w/copy of AMERICA,  
Dec 16, 1967 issue.**

**WWRostow:rla**

140a

December 29, 1967

Mr. President:

I suggest someone in Rostow's office go over this interview with a fine tooth comb. It shows McCarthy unable to answer basic questions. His prose is fuzzy and he averts clear answers. It is, in my judgment, the most devastating indictment of him as a serious critic -- the questioners put a knife right in his belly and he shimmies all over the place. It ought to be required reading for all those who need to know the McCarthy position.

jv

# Interview With McCarthy

Several days before Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy formally announced he would enter a number of State primaries as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States, AMERICA editors Vincent S. Kearney, S. J., and Harry J. Sievers, S. J., had a 45-minute interview with him in his office in the Old Senate Office Building

*Q. Senator, you are throwing your hat into the Presidential primary ring as a "peace candidate." Does this imply that the present Administration is bent on war? How do you propose to achieve peace in Vietnam where the Administration has apparently failed?*

I don't know that one could imply that. The President says he is for peace more than anyone in the country. I do not want to dispute that claim with him. I think it is not a question of how you get to peace, but how you establish some kind of order in Southeast Asia and of the projection you want to make of the influence of the United States in Asia and in other parts of the world in the last quarter of this century and beyond that into the 21st century. It also involves a practical judgment on what the Administration has achieved.

I usually get the question: "Are you for peace at any price?" I say I'm not, but I'm willing to pay a pretty high price for it. I see as yet no indication that the Administration has set any limitation on the price it is willing to pay for what it calls victory. Their definition of victory and their description of what victory is going to mean over there has had to be changed about every six months since we first went in.

Their first projection was that there was a viable country in South Vietnam, that it was loyal, that it had some structure, a dedicated people who, with a little bit of help, would be able to defend their country and also to build

it. That conception has long been discarded and we are now proceeding into something called nation-building in Vietnam. This is a direct contradiction of the image they gave us of what was required in South Vietnam in the early stages of the war.

More recently, the Administration has expanded it to say that Vietnam is really a part of the defense of all Southeastern Asia from Asian communism as reflected in China. About the same time, the President was talking about bringing back all the troops within six months after some kind of peace settlement with Hanoi or with the Vietcong. It seems to me that if this is the case, if you are worried about Chinese expansion into Southeastern Asia, peace with Hanoi with reference to Vietnam would not leave you free to withdraw from South Vietnam.

I think the burden is on the Administration to explain the contradictions in their own explanations. If one just stood inside, as in historical criticism, as if you were looking at an ancient text, and just read what the Administration has said, how they have explained what has happened over the last three or four years, the internal contradictions above would be enough to make you reject their whole thesis.

We reached the point, I think, about the middle of 1966, when we began to put in over 200,000 troops, intensified the bombing, moved major military units in, when the Vietnamese participation became less and less effective

and when indications that the South Vietnamese government had popular support were weaker, that the proportion between what it was going to cost to win a victory and what would come of victory became at that point out of balance. Progressively since that time, I think, the war has become indefensible by almost any standard you apply—military or political, diplomatic or moral.

*Q. Has the Administration itself really changed, or has the situation itself so changed that the Administration was forced into deeper involvement if it was going to see its commitment through?*

I think the Administration has changed. I do not think there is any more indication now of a great Asian Communist drive into Southeast Asia than there was in 1964 or 1965. The Administration has escalated its physical effort. As it has done that it has also of necessity escalated the explanation for its presence in South Vietnam.

*Q. You are stating, Senator, that this has been a one-sided, unilateral escalation?*

I think in most cases the escalation was on our side. We can just get so much power in there all the time that, no matter what they do, it is an attempt to kind of match our power. This was the situation early in 1966. There was talk about the possibility of negotiations



then. I don't know whether we had any real offers or not, but I know the Administration's position was that we were not really ready to negotiate then because the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese had a military advantage over us and we did not want to negotiate from weakness. We then attempted to get into a position of military strength so that we could negotiate from a position of strength, at which point the other side would not negotiate—and so you have kind of a leap-frog situation.

*Q. What then, Senator, is the answer to this problem?*

Well, what's the Administration's answer? Scorched earth? Destroy everybody? You know everything the Church seems to have given up at Vatican II has now been picked up by the Pentagon and the Administration. The Church has more or less said holy wars are out. It has kind of backed off from the idea of persecuting heresy.

*Q. Isn't this a rather extreme interpretation of Vatican II? The Church has not yet said that all wars are immoral. The cost of this war has been indeed high but aren't there certain spiritual values at stake here? How precisely do you weigh a material value against a spiritual value?*

What spiritual value?

*Q. The value that is placed on human dignity. Isn't the ultimate issue here whether or not 15 million Vietnamese are to be turned over to a Communist regime?*

What do you mean by turning them over to communism? What do you turn over to them? What do they get? What do they become when you turn them over? There is no indication that these people want to be saved by us. We were going to turn them over to Diem.

*Q. Senator, in view of what you have just said, we would like your reaction to an excerpt from a letter that I have here. The significant feature of the letter is that it comes from a non-American Jesuit who went to Vietnam with a Yankee-go-home mentality and has*



*since emphatically changed his mind regarding the U. S. presence in South Vietnam.*

Missionaries are the worst sources. Nearly every historical document in the past by missionaries in the Far East has turned out under critical examination to be unreliable—nearly every one. They view situations in terms of what they are trying to do—their own conversions, the record they are making over there, the people they know. You had all this with reference to Chiang Kai-shek. You know that. Their views then did not turn out to be very accurate about what was happening in China. But go ahead.

*Q. The letter reads: There's one thing no U. S. papers talk about. The VC's are trying to rule the Vietnamese people by sheer terror. They kill several hundred civilians every month to show their strength and defiance of the government. I used to think, myself, in terms of "Yankee, go home," but, believe me, fifty days in Vietnam have made all the difference. I have seen the real thing. The day the United States pulls out, just write my name in the obituary section of your diary and start saying all the prayers in the book for the people who will be left around. . . . One newsman told me: "I know*

*damn well what the truth is, but I'll lose my job the day I ask my boss to change his policy."*

I don't know. Most of the newsmen report that things are chaotic over there.

*Q. Things are chaotic. But what is causing the chaos? Do the Vietcong have anything to do with it?*

I do not say they have no responsibility. I just say that I see no proportion between what we are doing and any good that can come of it, unless you say: let's just go in and destroy these people. This assumption that there is going to be a great execution throughout South Vietnam—there is no reason to believe that is going to happen. Ninety per cent of that Vietnamese army, I would venture to say, would disappear into the jungle and into society within 30 days, if somebody said: "Go ahead."

*Q. Do you consider Vietnam an isolated problem? Would developments in South Vietnam have any effect on the rest of Southeast Asia?*

I don't know. I think it is sheer fantasy, arrogance and rash judgment on the part of people who make predictions of the consequences to the rest of Asia.

*Q. Yet there are some pretty knowledgeable people who see a direct relationship between South Vietnam and the rest of Asia. In his latest book, Edwin O. Reischauer, who knows his way around Asia, speaks of the "psychological and political impact of our defeat on Southeast Asia and the whole world." He believes, moreover, that there is something to the "domino theory," though in a "less mechanical sense."*

He says don't pull out altogether, but he also says the thing is a mistake.

*Q. Yes, he says our involvement was a mistake in its origins, but relative to our present position he is in support of U. S. policy as he understands it. The less costly course in the long run, he says, "will prove to be to continue somewhat along the present lines." He is against extremes—either withdrawal or "major" escalation. But, Senator, to*

*move to another question, do you believe we have a commitment of any kind in South Vietnam?*

Yes, we have a commitment, but I do not think we have a commitment that goes beyond reasonable limits. I think that if the Church is going to take this stand, you may as well tear the pages on the conditions for a just war out of that old ethics book. If ever there was a case you cannot justify by the standards you have been teaching, you have it in this war.

*Q. Are you urging, then, that we withdraw from Vietnam?*

I think we ought to begin to withdraw. I think it would be better if we were out of it, if that was the only choice we had other than to be in there doing what we are doing. But I do not see that as the only choice. You work out some kind of a settlement as you pull back.

*Q. With whom do you work out the settlement, Senator?*

You talk to the Defense Department, the Pentagon, as to what your defensible pull-back position might be. I think there is someone on the other side with whom you could work out some negotiable half-way position over there. You go back to Geneva, perhaps, or work out some new accords, setting up some kind of supervision.

*Q. In your book, The Limits of Power, you devote a chapter to Israel and the force of the U. S. commitment to that country. Do you see any difference between our commitments in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia?*

I think the legal case is much clearer in regard to Israel. We participated in setting up Israel under the UN. There is a clear moral obligation. Everyone knows why we set up the country. We did not want to face up to the problem of Jewish immigration here.

*Q. What about the million refugees from North Vietnam who, under the terms of the Geneva agreement, were to be given a choice between Hanoi and Saigon? Was that meant to be some sort of temporary palliative that would allow them to exercise their right of free choice for ten or twenty years?*

I think that was a mistake.

*Q. To give them freedom of choice?*

Well, until you knew what the choice was going to be, yes, especially since there were supposed to be elections at that time and the prospect was for a united Vietnam. That was the formal position. I think the worst mistake you can make is to move millions of people around anywhere. You have it in the Arab world. You had it after World War II. You have it in Vietnam today. In a way we have it on Formosa. I think a phased withdrawal with some stops along the way would lead to a reasonable settlement. Besides, if this is our great obligation, why are we not prepared to move to liberate Hungary? Why not move on Yugoslavia, if this is our great mission? Unless we say we are required only to make a reasonable effort. We say Hungary would have been an unreasonable effort. I don't know whether it would have been. At the time, the Soviet Union was weaker than we were.

*Q. Do you feel we are confronting the Soviet Union in Vietnam?*

I don't think so.

*Q. It takes two to make peace. Hanoi radio announced as late as Nov. 18 that it was still insisting on its four points, which include complete withdrawal of the United States and recognition of the National Liberation Front as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people. Do you see a basis for negotiation there?*

I think a negotiation that would involve withdrawal is possible. It could be talked about. They don't say it would have to happen right away. President Johnson has said he would withdraw in six months. Does he mean it or not? As a matter of fact, I think that would

be precipitous. I think I would advise him against moving that fast. I would put the time limit at five years. But concerning this matter of negotiations, the offer of President Johnson that we will stop bombing if you will stop supplying troops is not, in my opinion, a negotiable offer. If we said, we'll stop sending in troops and you stop supplying yours, that would be closer to a negotiable position.

*Q. You would insist on a continued American presence in Asia?*

I think you would have to insist on a significant presence of some kind there even if we did withdraw from Vietnam, but I do not think we need an American presence in that particular part of Asia. We are now in Thailand. I think we could remain there for some time even though we did withdraw from South Vietnam. We are in Japan. We are in Korea. Our Navy is free in the China Sea.

*Q. In the supposition that we one day face the same problem in Thailand that we now face in South Vietnam, do we apply the same solution, i.e., a graduated withdrawal?*

Yes, we could have a limited presence in Thailand and wait and see what happens. That is, if there was no vitality among the Thais to resist what would be in essence an internal insurrection. The deeper we get involved in such situations, the more we neglect our responsibilities here at home in terms of the cities and the housing problems. We have cut the foreign aid bill to \$2 billion or something like that.

We let the British pound go down. The pound in my judgment is more important east of Suez than the British Navy. What happens now in India, where they have pound holdings that have been reduced by 14 per cent, or in Singapore and other countries in that area that are largely dependent on the pound? Do we institute an economic aid program to make it up, or do we allow India to go worse than it already has gone?

Put it all together and it just doesn't work out. And we attempt to do it all in the name of fighting some kind of communism.

*Q. In an interview in Newsweek, Senator, you are quoted as saying: "Listening to Dean Rusk," Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy told me, "is like listening to an accordion concert. You start out with the melody and gradually you get all the chords and variations. The Administration has consistently escalated its objectives in Vietnam to match the escalation of the war."*

*The comment on this statement is this: "In a sense, however, it would be unhealthy if the Administration's explanation of our presence in Vietnam had not changed in emphasis. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that when a war vastly increases in magnitude, the stakes involved also change. When critics complain that the Administration cannot have it both ways, that it cannot first escalate the war and then proclaim that its significance far transcends the fate of Vietnam, their sense of grievance is understandable, but their logic is not necessarily sound."*

It is not a question of logic. You know that. These people just do not speak English. It is not a question of logic.

*Q. Senator, I think there is logic involved here.*

It is not logic. It is a question of whether or not there is a question of a new threat. It is not a question of a logical projection. If there is a question of a new threat, then you can justify an intensification and expansion of the war. If there is not a new threat, then you ought not to try to explain an intensified military and physical effort in terms of injecting a new motivation or a new objective by way of explaining it.

*Q. You do not feel, then, Senator, that the intelligence reports which as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee you must see, indicate that this situation in South Vietnam has become a rather significant phase of the cold war—except that it happens to be very hot. When 100 per cent of the oil supplies and 80 per cent of the sophisticated weaponry going to North Vietnam come from Soviet Russia, we are in a really tough situation.*

But if this is part of the cold war, then

we are using real money against monopoly money. If we really want to play this in terms of the cold war, it is even more ridiculous than trying to pass judgment in terms of morality. If I were Russia and I wanted to play this in the cold war hard, I couldn't think of anything that would be better than to have us tied down in Vietnam.

*Q. Precisely, Senator, Let's you and him fight. Do we have any choice except to play this in terms of the cold war?*

They have moved into Cairo and established a naval base.

*Q. Which therefore is the reason why you feel that we might have to go to the aid of Israel?*

Well, I really think we haven't anything left to go to the aid of Israel with—nothing significant, at least. We could not meet a major obligation any place because of Vietnam. Perhaps a limited war in Europe. Everything we've got is tied up out there in Southeast Asia. I think it is a serious mistake for a nation that is supposed to be the most powerful in the world to make this much of a commitment in such an area.

*Q. Then it would seem that they have hit upon the ideal solution to their problem, as they see it, stirring up national wars of liberation anywhere and everywhere.*

Well, it depends on where it is. Where can they succeed? Who is there to resist? How much help can we give? We cannot respond to every war that is stirred up. It doesn't require us to move in. I think it requires a prudent response. It is not for us to say this is a Communist thing and therefore "away we go," leaving other areas entirely unprotected. What do you say? There is no indication that these South Vietnamese know what they want or are willing to fight for it.

I don't know why they moved out of North Vietnam. It must have been a panicky move of some kind. Maybe it was engineered. This is one way you can establish refugees. You move refugees in, and there you have a force. You have got to protect them.

*Q. Who would be responsible for the engineering?*

Well, it could have been John Foster Dulles.

*Q. Senator, do you see any similarity in this situation and the situation that existed in Korea?*

No. I made a speech defending the Truman action in Korea. For one thing, the Korean action was a continuation, really, of World War II. For another, we had the support of the United Nations. For a third reason, we had a populace that was prepared to fight.

*Q. It did take time, however, to train a Korean army.*

I did not start to criticize the Vietnam action until the middle of 1966. you know. I said I did not think they should resume bombing in early 1966, until it was found whether the rumors that there was a possibility of negotiations had some substance to them. But other than that, I went along with it pretty much. I felt it was a limited commitment and that maybe it would work out. But I spoke in defense of Truman when he was under fire on the Korean question. I was opposed to the Mansfield resolution about withdrawing troops from Germany.

I think this situation in Vietnam has reached the point where you can't make sense out of it. You cannot make a case for it, because you do not know what you are going to have when you get done with it. If you can negotiate something, you might work it out. President Johnson started the talk about negotiation. What is he going to negotiate? Is he going to negotiate a settlement to take care of the million Catholics?

*Q. What is anybody going to negotiate?*

Well, that's right, but he says he is going to negotiate. But you say if I negotiate they're all going to get killed.

*Q. No, Senator. No one has said that. It depends on what kind of a settlement the negotiator gets.*

But if Johnson negotiates, they are all

going to live happily ever after, and we'll all be out in six months. Nonsense. Whoever negotiates is going to have to take some big risks. Do you put another 250,000 men in there, or do you want to take a chance and try to reduce the effort and see what kind of reasonable compromise can be worked out?

*Q. What then, basically, is the difference between your position and the President's?*

I think he should have held to the position when he had 200,000 men in there and tried to work out something.

*Q. If it could be proved that the escalation of the war came from the other side—proved from intelligence sources—would you then say the President was justified in upping the manpower?*

Not necessarily. I think you then say, well, what happens when they do escalate? Do we hold our position, our limited position, and just say we are going to be a presence here and try to involve some of the other countries of the world in trying to work out a settlement? I don't think you need respond immediately with more force.

*Q. But, Senator, can you do that from a position of weakness? You stated before that the Administration felt in 1965 that it could not negotiate at that time because we would have been negotiating from a position of weakness.*

Well, I don't know what his position of weakness was, if you are thinking in terms of controlling the entire country or if you are thinking in terms of holding some strong positions, maintaining a presence there and saying we are going to stay here.

*Q. You do not think, Senator, that the President has fought a limited war so far?*

It is a question of what you mean by limited. It has not been as total as it might have been, but in every case the effort was to overwhelm the opposition. The President told me just about a year ago that he could not understand why they had not surrendered. He thought at that time that they might do it in two weeks, because he could not figure out how they could take the bombing. Now he is talking about the Vietnamese taking over. That is where I came in.

*Q. This is a hypothetical question, Senator. If you had been chosen as President Johnson's running mate in the last election, and the situation developed the way it has, would you have felt that it was incumbent on you to resign the Vice Presidency?*

I don't know that you would resign. I think you'd be quiet, if you did not agree. I think you have to look upon the Vice Presidency as a special kind of office. It does not really require you to endorse everything the President does. That is a new conception of the job, you know. Really, all you are obligated to do is to preside over the Senate on one or two occasions and try to understand what the issues are.

*Q. But you would not have done that as Vice President, Senator, would you? You are not built that way, are you? You are a teacher.*

You mean, to be quiet?

*Q. Yes.*

Well, I think you accept certain limitations—like the vow of obedience—when you take the office of Vice President. You could sit quietly and say that I accepted this when I took office, depending on what you thought speaking out might mean. For example, if Robert McNamara now feels that this war is bad, I think he has an obligation to speak out instead of going to the World Bank.

*Q. Do you think there is a clash within the Administration between Mr. McNamara and the President?*

There are rumors that he has been against the bombing, that he has been

against the escalation for some time. I don't know, though. I have never heard him say so.

*Q. You would probably propose a halt in the bombing.*

I do not say that necessarily. I think that would be a part of broader military moves. Maybe you would continue the bombing, especially on the supply routes. At the same time you would vacate—withdraw—from some areas in South Vietnam. If the bombing halt were really preliminary to some kind of negotiation, I would say all right. If that is not the case, I would say that you relate it to something else you did that might bring about some kind of negotiated settlement. But I do not see them getting to anything called victory by any further escalation or extension of the war and destruction of the people, especially since South Vietnam has begun to come apart. We are, in a way, back to burning the Huguenots. That did not work very well.

*Q. There are two sides to that question, too, Senator, as you well know. But to get off the question of Vietnam for a moment. As a political candidate (I take it for granted you will announce on Thursday you are to enter several primaries), what, apart from the Vietnam issue, would be some of the things you would want to bring to the attention of the voters?*

Much of it will be concerning complications, some growing partly out of the Vietnam war and some of them in the nature of psychological and moral consequences. There is, of course, the effect of the war on the economy and the failure of the Administration to respond to the consequences of the war. When you get inflation at the rate of four or five per cent a year, and the Administration is either unable to respond or does not know how to respond, you have a problem. I think the fall of the British pound is in part a reflection of bad fiscal policy on our part. Together with the inflation, there is the whole fiasco over this tax increase. This is the first time in the 18 years I have been in Washington that I have seen Congress turn down an Administration request for a major tax increase.



*Q. Is this rejection of the tax increase, in your opinion, a direct rebuff to the Administration?*

I think so. I think it is a device to show that people did not want to sign up to pay for the war.

*Q. This represents, in your opinion, the attitude of Congress, which did allocate the funds to pay for the war, previously? They have, so to speak, seen their mistake?*

Well, I don't know. I think it reflects a popular position of not wanting to be made to sign up for the war. Congress signed up for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Now we make everybody sign up. When they presented it at the time, they extended the draft. They announced an increase in troops. This was going to put everybody on record as signing up for the war.

I think that's what is happening to the domestic program. As far as housing goes, for example, we are worse off than we were in 1948. This is the crisis of the city. In part, it is because of the war. In part, it is because there is a shortage of money. In part, it is because we won't adopt priorities. We could have some tax increases. We could take some money away from other purposes and use it on the problems of the city. I don't mean that it is one to one, but when you put it through these phases, what you've got is a combination of failures, in part from the war, in part from lack of leadership.

*Q. You really feel, Senator, that the plans for the Great Society have eroded?*

There is no question about it. It has eroded some, and the promise of it is not in any way being realized.

*Q. What could you promise in its place?*

Well, if you cut back on the war, you've got some money. If you are going to continue the war, you've got to levy taxes, you've got to raise more money. But you cannot say you are going to have life as usual. There was a \$5 billion increase in social security payments this year. Some of that was nec-

essary. The question is: What are your priorities? What do you want to use the money for? Are you really concerned about the problems in the city? We ought to be spending from \$4 billion to \$5 billion on housing, because I do not think you are going to solve the problem of the riots and the unrest until you do something about housing on a massive scale. It is not being done now.

I think the whole uneasiness in the country, the anxiety—the fact that the President can scarcely go on a campus in this country to speak indicates that they have not made the case for this war or that the case can't be made for it. Or that they have not been able to present the effort to solve domestic problems with sufficient force and to do something about them, so that we can say: "Well, look, we've got the war, but look what we are doing over here." Whereas there was a sense of a kind of warp and woof in American society, it's all kind of felt now, kind of pressed out. Much of this is the fault of the Administration.

*Q. Senator, how much actual backing among the Senators do you have for your entrance into the primaries?*

I really don't think that is very important. In this kind of test, the endorsement of somebody running for President does not mean much. If you are endorsing a county judge or something, people may say, I don't know the judge but I do know the Senator and I think I'll take his recommendation. They make their own decisions about the Presidency.

*Q. Senator, Kenneth Crawford, in the recent issue of Newsweek, remarks: "Sen. McCarthy has said that his object is to help the party by giving its dissidents a personalized outlet for protest. The cynics naturally do not believe him. They suspect he is getting even with the President for dangling the Vice Presidential nomination before him in 1964 and then tossing it to the other Minnesota Senator."*

You know, we do have these fellows, these "psychiatrists," who can discern spirits. This is the world of the columnists. Every society has somebody

who must make that ultimate rash judgment. You don't let the clergy do it any more. You've got to let the columnists do it.

*Q. It's the age of the layman, as you know, Senator.*

Even then you have to institutionalize. You can't let any ordinary layman do it.

*Q. Do you have any feeling pro or con in regard to ex-Senator Paul Douglas's Citizens Committee for Peace With Freedom in Vietnam?*

Really, I was surprised at the people who joined it. This so-called silent center. These people were never silent anywhere. They have all been talking. I don't know where they get "silent center." Now, if they had said the "talking center," it would have been a little more honest. Paul was one of the sharpest hawks in the Senate. All of a sudden he appears and says: "I am a modest fellow from the center." He was a drum beater, as hawkish as anybody. Suddenly he puts on a new hood.

*Q. Do you have any final comment, Senator?*

I really think this whole issue of Vietnam is kind of beyond debate now. Most of the facts and the kind of intellectual judgments people are going to make about Vietnam really have been made. It comes down to a question of just how you want to swing the balance. It becomes almost a matter of will at that point. Do you want to take a chance on some kind of de-escalation, on an easing up with some form of less violent effort? Or do you think the way to do it is to intensify the military action? Do you exercise that order of means, or do you exercise another order of means that is closer to balance.

I think that is the point at which we now are. I think this choice is something you have to kind of personalize in a campaign. You can't simply do it with resolutions. You can't say: "Here is a position represented by Johnson and here is a position more or less represented by McCarthy, and the lines are not always clear." It is kind of an incarnational politics. ■

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, January 2, 1968  
2:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I forward herewith some thoughts of Jack Valenti's on desalting for the Middle East. We will be forwarding our observations shortly.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By rg, NARA, Date 12-27-91

cc: H. Saunders

WWRostow:rla

**FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW**

The following information was phoned to me today by my friend, Walther Casper, who took the initiative in making contact with Rainer Barsel and Chancellor Kiesinger on the balance of payments matter. Both Barsel and Kiesinger are on winter holiday.

1. Barsel said he "fully understood" the U.S. measures and would defend and support them.

2. Chancellor Kiesinger said he will be writing personally to the President in response to his letter informing the Chancellor of our action. He fully sympathized with the U.S. action. He understood the need for offsets if we were to keep our troops in Germany. Staff work in the German Government was going forward as to the implications of the U. S. action for Germany and on what the appropriate German response should be.

I told Casper:

-- Now was the time for Germany to act in its full responsibilities as a surplus nation. In this connection, I recalled both our previous conversations on this subject and the recent OECD resolution;

-- For example, Germany and all of Europe should think of a proposal that he, Casper, had made to me; namely, that measures be taken from the European end to encourage tourism in the United States;

-- For example, Europe must think of reducing its surplus by putting long-term capital in the U. S. and in other parts of the world;

-- And, in general, it was as much Europe's duty to bring down its surplus

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5  
NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines  
By jc, NARA, Date 7-21-03

**Jan 2 1968**

as it was the U. S. duty to bring down its deficit.

I pointed out that the President was trying to solve this problem in the spirit of cooperation across the Atlantic. It was essential that this spirit be reciprocated or the balance of payments policy would fall into the hands of those who wish to withdraw troops from Europe or indulge in a wave of American protectionism. It was, therefore, a time for a maximum effort by Germany to reduce its surplus as fast as we tried to reduce our deficit.

He said it would be helpful if I were to put in a personal letter to him exactly what I had said.

May I draft a letter to Casper in this sense?

**W. W. Rostow**

Letter to Casper approved \_\_\_\_\_

disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

See me \_\_\_\_\_



Tuesday, January 2, 1968

*Pres file*  
*sent Ranch*  
*via wire*

TO: The President  
FROM: W. W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: Congratulatory Message to Grandfather Sevilla-Sacasa

On December 28 the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps became a grandfather. You may want to send him the following congratulatory message:

"His Excellency  
The Ambassador of Nicaragua and Mrs.  
Sevilla-Sacasa  
1627 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in sending our heartiest congratulations on the birth of your grandson. As relatively new grandparents ourselves, we know how happy an event this is for you.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson".

Approve \_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Speak to me \_\_\_\_.

SEP 7:52

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

1968 JAN 2 00 52

EEA737  
OO WTE 12  
DE WTE 18

FROM: WALT ROSTOW  
TO : THE PRESIDENT  
CITE: CAP80015

*For file*

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

MONDAY  
1 PM 8:07

HERewith DEBRE'S REACTION TO FOWLER'S LETTER ON THE NEW PROGRAM. BLESSEDLY THE FRENCH ARE NOT IN A SURPLUS POSITION AND CAN MAKE ONLY LIMITED TROUBLE -- WHICH THEY WILL MAKE.

~~SECRET~~ PARIS 8488

SUBJECT: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM

1. AS DEPT. ALREADY INFORMED BY TELEPHONE, I HAD SET UP APPOINTMENT AT 1:30 PM TODAY WITH DEBRE, WHO DELAYED HIS DEPARTURE FOR AUBOISE TO RECEIVE US. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY BRAND AND MCGREW, AND DEBRE HAD WITH HIM DUPONT-FAUVILLE, HIS DIRECTEUR DE CABINET, AND LARRE, DIRECTOR OF THE TREASURY IN FINANCE MINISTRY. AFTER HE HAD READ FOWLER'S LETTER, I GAVE HIM INFORMAL MEMORANDUM OUTLINING BALANCE OF PAYMENTS MEASURES, BASED ON PARA 4 STATE 91710. I ALSO INFORMED HIM PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC AT 5 PM TODAY PARIS TIME AND DISCUSSED UNDERSECRETARY'S PROPOSED TRIP TO EUROPE AS REPORTED SEPTEL.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By *JP/MP*, NARA, Date *7-22-03*

Xerox from Quick Copy

2. DEBRE SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE WRITE SECRETARY FOWLER TO THANK HIM FOR PROVIDING PREVIEW OF NEW US PROGRAM. HIS OVER-ALL REACTION WAS THAT MEASURES DECIDED UPON WERE "COURAGEOUS, ESPECIALLY IN AN ELECTION YEAR." HOWEVER, HE ADDED, WITHOUT BEING SPECIFIC, THAT HE FELT PROGRAM STILL DID NOT "GET TO THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM."

3. IN HIS VIEW, PROMPT ENACTMENT OF 10 PERCENT SURTAX ON INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE INCOMES WAS "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL," A JUDGMENT HE KNEW FROM THEIR TALKS LAST SUMMER AND FALL THAT SECRETARY FOWLER SHARED. REFERRING TO PASSAGE IN FOWLER'S LETTER RE CONCLUSIONS OF OECD MINISTERIAL MEETING, DEBRE SAID HE HAD MADE IT CLEAR AT THE TIME TO UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW THAT HE DID NOT SUBSCRIBE FULLY TO US THESIS ABOUT RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SURPLUS AND DEFICIT COUNTRIES FOR ASSURING OPERATION OF ADJUSTMENT PROCESS. (MOREOVER, FRANCE AT PRESENT WAS MORE OR LESS IN PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM, CERTAINLY NOT RUNNING ANY APPRECIABLE SURPLUS.) HE RETURNED TO THE POINT LATER ON IN CONVERSATION WHEN COMMENTING ON US VIEW OF BORDER TAX PROBLEM. PREDICTING THAT DISCUSSIONS IN THIS AREA BETWEEN US AND EUROPEANS WOULD BE LONG AND ARDUOUS, HE SAID THAT COUNTRY LIKE FRANCE, WITH ITS TRADE ACCOUNT ONLY BARELY IN EQUILIBRIUM, HAD AS MUCH NEED AS ANYONE ELSE, IF NOT MORE, TO EXPAND EXPORTS. WHEN HE READ THAT FOR PURPOSES OF DIRECT INVESTMENT CONTROLS UK WAS BEING GROUPED WITH CANADA, JAPAN, ETC. RATHER THAN WITH CONTINENTALS, DEBRE REMARKED THAT THIS GAVE US SORT OF "HALF-WAY" STATUS BETWEEN A DEVELOPED AND A LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRY. THIS MEASURE, HE SAID, WOULD CERTAINLY NOT FACILITATE UK ENTRY INTO THE "CONTINENTAL" COMMON MARKET.

4. THE MINISTER LOOKED RESTED AND WAS IN GOOD SPIRITS THROUGHOUT INTERVIEW. AFTER WE HAD TRANSACTED OUR BUSINESS, HE OFFERED US A NEW YEAR'S DRINK OF SCOTCH AND SODA (STICKING TO STRAIGHT SODA HIMSELF, HOWEVER). HIS TOAST WAS TO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND MONETARY HEALTH OF THE WORLD IN THE NEW YEAR.  
WALLNER

DTG: 01/2332Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE



145

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

1968 JAN 2 19 19

*Pres file*

VZCZCEEA798  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 30

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80025

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO GRANDFATHER SEVILLA-SACASA

ON DECEMBER 28 THE DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS BECAME A  
GRANDFATHER. YOU MAY WANT TO SEND HIM THE FOLLOWING CON-  
GRATULATORY MESSAGE:

"HIS EXCELLENCY  
THE AMBASSADOR OF NICARAGUA AND MRS.  
SEVILLA-SACASA  
1627 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N.V.  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MRS. JOHNSON JOINS ME IN SENDING OUR  
HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS ON THE BIRTH  
OF YOUR GRANDSON. AS RELATIVELY NEW  
GRANDPARENTS OURSELVES, WE KNOW HOW  
HAPPY AN EVENT THIS IS FOR YOU.

SINCERELY,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON"

APPROVE-----  
DISAPPROVE-----  
SPEAK TO ME-----

DTG 021833Z JAN 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 12/27/91

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY



~~SECRET~~

7:30 PM

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1968 JAN 2 00 30

VZCZCEEA789  
OO WTE10  
DE WTE 16

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP80013

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM WALT ROSTOW

HEREWITH THE DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGN BASED ON THE LATEST TRINH  
STATEMENT BEGINS - IN VIENTIANE. AND SOUVANNA ASKS A GOOD  
QUESTION; ALTHOUGH THERE WILL BE OTHERS WE SHALL HAVE TO  
ASK.

1. SOUVANNA TOLD ME AT NOON TODAY THAT THE NVN CHARGE DID  
CALL ON HIM AT TEN O'CLOCK THIS MORNING AS AGREED AND THAT  
THE FOLLOWING OCCURED: THE CHARGE INVITED SOUVANNA'S ATTENTION  
TO A STATEMENT MADE BY NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER  
NGUYEN DUY TRINH ON DECEMBER TWENTY-NINTH ON THE OCCASION  
OF THE VISIT TO HANOI OF A MONGOL DELEGATION. THE SUBSTANCE  
OF THIS DECLARATION WAS THAT IF THE U. S. WISHED TO ENTER  
CONVERSATIONS, THE BOMBING OF NVN MUST FIRST CEASE.  
SOUVANNA REPLIED THAT THE STATEMENT WAS NOT CLEAR  
AS TO HOW SOON AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING CONVERSA-  
TIONS WOULD START. HE ASKED THE CHARGE TO CABLE HANOI AND  
ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT MEANT  
TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OR FORTY-EIGHT HOURS AFTER, OR WHEN. HE  
MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS ASKING PERSONALLY AND THAT HIS  
QUESTION DID NOT RPT NOT REFLECT A U. S. CONDITION. THE  
CHARGE AGREED TO CABLE HANOI TODAY AND PROMISED SOUVANNA  
A REPLY. SOUVANNA INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO SERVE UNOFFICIALLY  
(OFFICIEUSEMENT) AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN NVN AND THE  
U. S. SOUVANNA WILL KEEP ME INFORMED.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-457 (#113a)

By [signature] NARA, Date 7-22-03

Xerox from Quick Copy

2. COMMENT: SOUVANNA HAS ALSO TOLD THE FOREGOING TO AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR DEXTER, THE ACTING DEAN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND A FRIEND OF LONG STANDING. PRIMIN UNFORTUNATELY TOLD ESTELLE HOLT, AP STRINGER, ABOUT TWO AM THIS MORNING THAT CHARGE WAS COMING IN TO SEE HIM AT TEN TO TALK ABOUT PEACE. MRS. HOLT CAN BE DISCREET AND WE SHALL TALK TO HER ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING QUIET UNTIL MATTERS MATURE. I AM NOT SANGUINE HOWEVER THAT WE CAN KEEP ALL OF IT UNDER WRAPS IN VIEW OF ALL THE CHAMPAGNE THAT FLOWED INTO LOOSE-LIPPED LAO UNTIL FOUR AM THIS MORNING AT SOUVANNA'S BALL.

3. PRIOR TO THE TEN PM BEGINNING OF HIS BALL LAST NIGHT SOUVANNA MADE HIS ANNUAL RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION AT 8:45 PM IN WHICH HE ACCUSED THE NVN OF "UNSPEAKABLE AGRESSION" (SEPTEL). SOUVANNA ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THE FACT THAT DESPITE THIS CRITICISM, THE NVN CHARGE CAME TO THE BALL, STAYED WELL PAST MIDNIGHT AND KEPT THE TEN AM APPOINTMENT. I MUST CONFESS THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF THE BROADCAST NOR WAS ANY ONE OF THE MANY DIPLOMATS I SPOKE TO DURING THE BALL. SOVIET AMBASSADOR KIRNASSOVSKY WAS UNUSUALLY GENIAL. POLISH COMMISSIONER WITEK AND CZECH CHARGE FRANO WERE PLEASANT AND RELAXED. THE CHICOMS WERE PRESENT AND THEIR USUAL IMPASSIVE SELVES. ALL INDIVIDUALLY WISHED SOUVANNA A HAPPY NEW YEAR. IT IS JUST POSSIBLE, THAT THEY ALSO HAD NOT HEARD THE BROADCAST, ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT BOTH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND CHICOMS HAVE A CAPABILITY FOR UNDE

STANDING LAO RADIO BROADCASTS. IF THEY HAD NOT HEARD IT, THE NVN CHARGE'S ACTIONS ARE NOT AS SIGNIFICANT AS SOUVANNA BELIEVES.

4. AS DEPT AWARE, NVN CHARGE WAS SCHEDULED TO GO TO HANOI ON DEC 29, BUT FLIGHT WAS CANCELLED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT HE HAS BEEN PLANNING TO LEAVE ON THE NEXT FLIGHT (TOMORROW JAN 2). HE MAY RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAIN IN VIENTIANE (OR PROCEED TO HANOI FOR FUTHER DISCUSSIO). WE SHALL REPORT HIS MOVEMENT.

~~SECRET~~

DTL: 012319Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~



~~BRITISH EMBASSY,~~  
WASHINGTON,

1 January, 1968.

*sent Rusk via  
wire 2/2/68  
CAP 80017*

Dear Mr President.

In the Ambassador's temporary  
absence from Washington, I have been  
asked to pass to you the enclosed  
message from the Prime Minister.

Yours Sincerely,

*E. E. Tomkins*

(E. E. Tomkins)

~~The President~~  
~~of the United States of America.~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN  
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING  
NOT NAT'L SECURITY  
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,  
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY leg ON 1-27-92

148

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED  
WHCA

*Good*

1968 JAN 2 00 44

VZCZCEEA786  
OO WTE 13  
DE WTE 17

FROM WALT ROSTOW  
TO THE PRESIDENT  
CITE CAP82014

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM WALT ROSTOW

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority RAC 09660  
By ica NARA, Date 8-31-98

1968 JAN 1 PM 8:08

MONDAY

HERewith ELLSWORTH ASSURES NICK THAT WESTY'S DELTA  
PLAN IS CAREFULLY CO-ORDINATED WITH AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION  
AND DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE DISRUPTIONS.

1. YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT IN SAYING THAT MISSION COUNCIL IS  
UNANIMOUSLY BEHIND PROGRAM TO INCREASE RICE PRODUCTION IN  
1968. ON AGRICULTURAL SIDE WE ARE PLANNING MAXIMUM USE OF  
ALL AVAILABLE FACTORS INCLUDING IR-8 SEED, INCREASED USE  
OF FERTILIZER, AGRICULTURAL CREDIT, MARKETING TECHNIQUES,  
MORE AGRICULTURAL ADVISERS, ETC. ASIDE FROM THE PURELY AGRICULTURAL  
ASPECT OF THE MATTER, HOWEVER, ARE THE PROBLEMS OF SECURITY,  
THE OPENING AND MAINTENANCE OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND  
DENYING FOOD TO THE ENEMY. THESE LATTER FACTORS ARE ALSO  
EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THEIR IMPACT ON PACIFICATION.



2. WHEN I WAS IN WASHINGTON LAST MONTH BOB MACNAMARA SPOKE TO ME ABOUT HIS CONCERN THAT MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNED FOR THE DELTA SHOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OR RESULT IN THE CREATION OF A LARGE NUMBER OF REFUGEES. ON MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON THEREFORE I TOOK UP THE MATTER WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND WENT OVER WITH HIM VERY CAREFULLY HIS CAMPAIGN PLANS FOR THE DELTA. I AM SATISFIED THAT THESE HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT WITH GREAT CARE AND THAT THEY ARE WELL DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT THE RICE PRODUCTION PROGRAM. KOMER WHO WAS ALSO FULLY PRIVY TO MACV PLANNING FEELS THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND'S PLANS FOR 1968 DOVETAIL FULLY WITH PACIFICATION AND NATION BUILDING. IN FACT, GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS MADE CLEARING THE VC AWAY FROM KEY LOC'S SUCH AS ROUTE 4, 7 AND 5 PLUS KEY WATERWAYS A TOP DELTA MILITARY PRIORITY FOR 1968 PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WILL SO GREATLY FACILITATE RICE AND OTHER DELIVERIES FROM THE DELTA. THIS IN TURN WILL INCREASE PROSPERITY OF THE AREA AND SO HAVE A DIRECTLY BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON PACIFICATION AS WELL.

3. NO RAPID OR MAJOR BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES IN THE AREA IS CONTEMPLATED. THIS WOULD BE LOGISTICALLY DIFFICULT IN ANY CASE. ONLY ONE BRIGADE OF THE 9TH U.S. DIVISION IS NOW OPERATING IN THE DELTA AND IT IS CONTEMPLATED THAT A SECOND BRIGADE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED UNTIL MID-1968. LIKEWISE PLANS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT WITH GREAT CARE TO AVOID CREATION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES.

4. WE SEE A CLEAR CORRELATION BETWEEN THE INCREASED SECURITY U.S. AND ARVN FORCES PROVIDE AND INCREASED RICE PRODUCTION AND DELIVERY. NO MAJOR ARVN INCREASES ARE PLANNED FOR THE DELTA. THE ONLY MAJOR INCREASE PLANNED IS IN RF/PF FORCES ON THE TESTED PREMISE THAT GREATER SECURITY MEANS MORE RICE FOR OUR SIDE.

5. IN SUM, OUR MILITARY PLANS FOR 1968 IN THE DELTA SEEM WELL COORDINATED WITH OUR PACIFICATION AND AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS. PLEASE REASSURE BILL GAUD THAT THESE PROBLEMS HAVE OUR CLOSE AND CONTINUING ATTENTION HERE.

BUNKER

DTG 012331Z JAN 68

~~SECRET~~

PRESERVATION COPY