

**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i> [Duplicate of #114b, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2a memo	Schultze to President <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i> [Duplicate of #113c, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	<del>1/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2b memo	Poats and Freeman to President <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 1-20-97 NLJ 96-201</i> [Duplicate of #114d, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	<del>1/24/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#2c rpt	"Review of Proposed PL 480..." <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i> [Duplicate of #114e, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#4 memo	Rostow to President, re: Greece <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#4a ltr	President to Prime Minister (draft) <del>PCI 2 p</del> " "	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#5 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel <i>exempt RAC 8/05</i> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>exempt NLJ 96-199 9.1.98</i>	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#5a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>exempt 1.5 (c)(6) 3.4 (b)(1,6) exempt RAC 8/05</i> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>NLJ 96-200 7.15.98</i>	<del>1/26/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#6b rpt	"Gabon" <i>open 5-30-97 NLJ 96-192</i> <del>C 3 p</del> [Duplicate of #24b, Office Files of Ernest Goldstein, "Memoranda re Ambassadorial Luncheons"] [Sanitized NLJ 90-21] <del>(Dup of #52d, NSF, AF, State, V13)</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#6c rpt	"Guinea" <i>open 5-30-97 NLJ 96-192</i> <del>C 2 p</del> [Duplicate of #24c, Office Files of Ernest Goldstein, "Memoranda re Ambassadorial Luncheons"] [Sanitized NLJ 90-21] <del>(Dup of #52c, NSF, AF, State, V13)</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#6h rpt	<del>"Ceylon"</del> <i>Open 5-30-97 NLJ 96-192</i> <del>C 2 p</del> <del>[Duplicate of #24h, Office Files of Ernest Goldstein, "Memoranda re Ambassadorial Luncheons"]</del> <del>[Sanitized NLJ 90-21]</del> <del>(Dup of #516 NSF, CF State, Vol 3)</del>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#7a memo	Rostow and Smith to President, 6:00 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>(dup of #9) Open 3-14-05 NLJ 96-199</i> [Duplicate of #95a, NSF, Country File, China, Vol. 12]	1/31/68	A
#8a memo	<del>Zwick to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>Open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#9 memo	Duplicate of #7a		
#10a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <del>S 2 p</del> <i>Open 7.15.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #2a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(3), General Military Activity," Sanitized NLJ 82-230]	1/31/68	A
#11a map	<del>Korean Situation</del> <del>TS 1 p</del> <i>(Dup of #73c, NSF, CF, Korea-Pueblo, Vol I(B), Box 25)</i> <i>Open 3-14-05 NLJ 96-198</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#12 memo	Rostow to President, 4:45 p.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open NLJ 96-199 9.1.98</i> [Duplicate of #85, NSF, NSC History, 3/31 Speech, "Vol. 5, Tabs JJ-TT and CIA Memos;" Sanitized 1979] <i>Box 48</i>	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#12a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Open 12-23-09</i> <del>S 4 p</del> <i>Sanitized 7.15.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #85a, NSF, NSC History, 3/31 Speech, "Vol. 5, Tabs JJ-TT and CIA Memos;" Sanitized 1989] <i>JJ-TT, Box 48</i>	<del>1/31/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#16 memo	Rostow to President, 11:15 a.m. <del>S 1 p</del> <i>Open 4/96</i>	1/31/68	A
#16a memcon	Prime Minister and Brezhnev <i>Open 12-11-09 NLJ 09-156 (#6a)</i> <del>S 3 p</del> <i>(Dup of #6a, Files of work-material re: VN+Pueblo, Box 10)</i> <i>(Exempted 12/94)</i>	<del>1/23/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17a memo	<del>Taylor to President</del> <del>C</del> 1 p <i>OPEN 6/28/95 NLJ 94-457</i> [Duplicate of #10, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7F(2)A, Congress. Att. and Statements"]	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#19 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Cuba</del> <del>C</del> 2 p <i>OPEN 1/10/97 NY 95-361</i> [Duplicate of #32, NSF, Country File, Cuba, Vol. 3 [Bowdler File]; Exempt NLJ 89-53]	1/31/68	A
#23a ltr	<del>Arosemena to President</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i> <del>PCI</del> 1 p ( <i>Dup. of #315, NTP, Vol 58</i> )	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#23b ltr	<del>Arosemena to President</del> <del>PCI</del> 1 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	1/26/68	A
#27a memo	<del>Lodge to President</del> <i>open 3-28-95 NLJ 94-470</i> <del>C</del> 2 p [Duplicate of #18a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#28a memo	<del>Lodge to President</del> <i>open 9-15-95 NLJ 94-117</i> <del>TS</del> 2 p [Duplicate of #11, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7F(2)A, Congress. Att. and Statements"]	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#29 memo	Rostow to President, 5:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>semi 8/03</i> [Duplicate of #21, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B, 1/68 and #87, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 4, Pt. 6]	1/30/68	A
#29a note	<del>Intelligence Note 75</del> <del>S</del> 4 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #21a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B, 1/68 and #87a, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 4, Pt. 6]	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>

**FILE LOCATION**

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968**

**Box 28**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#29b cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 5 p <i>sanu 8/03</i> [Duplicate of #21b, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B, 1/68]	1/29/68	A
<del>#33a rpt</del>	<del>"Meeting of Advisory Group" <i>open 9-23-97 NLJ 94-473</i></del> <del>TS 3 p <i>(Dup of #116, Files of work, Non-Vol. 1 2/68)</i></del> <del>[Duplicate of #48a]</del>	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#40 memo	Rostow to President <i>exempt NLJ 96-199 9.1.98</i> S 1 p <i>Sanitized photo of us at 22 same name NLJ 11-113 3-16 12</i> [Duplicate of #116, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	1/30/68	A
#40a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 1 p [Duplicate of #116a, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8] [Exempt NLJ 85-195 and appeal] <i>Exempt 1.5(c)(d) 3.4(b)(1,4) 7.15.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	1/29/68	A
#40b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 3 p <i>[Dup of #116b, NSF, CF Israel, V8; Exempted 7.15.98 exempt 1.5(c)(d) 3.4(b)(1,4) NLJ 96-200 NLJ 85-195]</i>	1/29/68	A
<del>#41 rpt</del>	<del>"Meeting with the President..."</del> <del>PCI 2 p <i>open 5-24-95 NLJ 94-473</i></del>	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#43 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	1/30/68	A
#44b rpt	"Comments on Sen. Kennedy's Speech" <i>open 9-15-95 NLJ 94-117</i> TS 13 p [Duplicate of #13b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7F(2)A, Congress. Att. and Statements"]	undated	A
<del>#45b memo</del>	<del>Lodge to Katzenbach</del> <del>TS 2 p <i>open 9-18-97 NLJ 96-207</i></del>	<del>1/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#46 memo	Rostow to President, 6:30 p.m. C 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #23a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	1/29/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#46a ltr	Attachment to #46 C — 1 p <i>Open 4/96</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#47a cable	<i>Open 4/24/01</i> Prime Minister to President <del>Exempt 3-28-95 NLS 94-252</del> S — 2 p <i>(dup. of #50, NSF, Spec Head of G. Corresp. UK, Box 56)</i>	1/29/68	A
#48a rpt	Duplicate of #33a <i>open 9-23-97 NLS 94-473</i>		
#51 memo	Rostow to President, 10:50 a.m. S — 1 p <i>open 7-14-94 NLS 93-291</i> [Duplicate of #201, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. 13]	1/29/68	A
#51a cable	London 5969 S — 1 p <i>open 4-6-94 NLS 93-295</i> [Duplicate of #201a, NSF, Country File, UK, Vol. 13]	1/29/68	A
#52a rpt	"Advising Soviets of Actual and..." <i>open 9-23-97 NLS 94-473</i> S — 1 p [#52a through #52j are duplicates of #61b through #61k, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 4, Pt. 5] <i>(Dup. of WUR, Pueblo Crisis, Bx 10, #3c)</i>	undated	A
#52b rpt	"Action #2" <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS — 2 p <i>(Dup. of #3c, see above)</i>	undated	A
#52c rpt	"Action #3" <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS — 3 p <i>(Dup. of #3g, see above)</i>	undated	A
#52d rpt	"Action #4" <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS — 2 p <i>(Dup. of #3i, see above)</i>	undated	A
#52e rpt	"Action #5" <i>(Dup. of #3k, see above)</i> <i>open 9-23-97 NLS 94-473</i> TS — 2 p	undated	A
#52f rpt	"Action #6" <i>open 12-23-09</i> TS — 2 p <i>(Dup. of #3m, see above)</i>	undated	A
#52g rpt	"Action #7" <i>(Dup. of #3o, see above)</i> <i>open 9-23-97 NLS 94-473</i> TS — 2 p	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#52h rpt	"Action #8" (Dup. of #3g, WWR, Pueblo+VN, 8x10) <del>TS</del> 2 p <i>open 12-23-97</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#52i rpt	"Action #9" (Dup. of #3s, see above) <i>open 7-23-97 NLT 96-173</i> <del>TS</del> 2 p	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#52j rpt	"Action #10" <del>C</del> 2 p <i>open 4/96</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#54 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLT 96-191</i>	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54a cable	Seoul 3727 <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 5-30-97 NLT 96-192</i>	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54b cable <i>not yet open</i>	Seoul 3712 <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 6.23.98 NLT 96-192</i>	<del>1/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54c cable <i>not yet open</i>	Seoul 3731 <del>S</del> 1 p " " "	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#54d cable <i>not yet open</i>	Deptel 106096 to Seoul <del>S</del> 2 p " " " [Duplicate of #50, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 14, Tabs 1-12]	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55a memo	Schultze to President <del>S</del> 2 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLT 96-191</i>	<del>1/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#55b rpt	"Military Expenditures" <del>S</del> 2 p " "	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#55c memo	Peats and Freeman to President <del>C</del> 2 p <i>open 1-28-97 NLT 96-201</i>	<del>1/18/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#58a cable <i>not yet open</i>	From Seoul <del>S</del> 3 p <i>open 5-30-97 NLT 96-192</i> <i>6.23.98 NLT 96-192</i> <i>F9700284 8.27.97</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>
#59a memo	Katzenbach to President <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	<del>undated</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>#60a cable</del> <del>not yet open</del>	<del>Deptel 106085 to Seoul</del> <del>S 5 p</del> <i>Open declass F9700284 8.27.97</i> <del>[Duplicate of #46, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 14, Telegrams to Seoul, Tabs 1-12]</del>	<del>1/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#61 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #17, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7F(2)A, Congress. Att. and Statements"]	1/28/68	A
<del>#61a cable</del>	<del>Saigon 17179</del> <i>open 9-15-95 NLJ 94-117</i> <del>S 17 p</del> [Duplicate of #17a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "7F(2)A, Congress. Att. and Statements"]	<del>1/28/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#63a cable</del> <del>not yet open</del>	<del>Moscow 1073</del> <del>S 6 p</del> <i>Open 6.23.98 NLJ 96-192</i>	<del>1/29/68</del>	<del>A</del>
<del>#64 draft</del> <del>not yet open</del>	<del>To Seoul</del> <del>S 2 p</del> " " " <del>5-30-97</del> <i>open 4/96</i>	<del>1/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#65a memo	Katzenbach to President TS 8 p <i>open 9-18-97 NLJ 96-207</i>	1/27/68	A
#68 memo	Rostow to President, 2:40 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #201, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1(A), Part A]	1/27/68	A
#68a cable	Seoul 3702 S 2 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #202, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1(A), Part A]	1/27/68	A
#69a cable	Moscow 2605 TS 3 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #196, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1(A), Part A]	1/27/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#69b cable	Moscow 2606 TS <del>1 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #197, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1(A), Part A]	1/27/68	<del>A</del>
#70a cable	Moscow 2604 TS <del>2 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #198, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1(A), Part A]	<del>1/27/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#71 memo	Rostow to President, 9:30 a.m. TS <del>1 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #42, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	1/27/68	A
#71a rpt	"Movement of Combat Aircraft..." TS <del>1 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #42a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	undated	<del>A</del>
#72 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. <del>C</del> <del>1 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLS 96-191</i>	1/27/68	<del>A</del>
#73 memo	Rostow to President, re: Dominican Republic C 2 p <i>(Dup of #90 + 98a, NSF CF, DR, Vol 18)</i>	1/27/68	A
#75a memo <i>open CAC 9/03</i>	Katzenbach to President <i>more info released 7-9-98 NLS 96-192</i> S <del>4 p</del> [Duplicate of #54a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B] <i>(sanitized 1992)</i>	1/26/68	<del>A</del>
#76 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 p.m. S <del>1 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLS 96-191</i>	1/26/68	<del>A</del>
#76a cable	Deptel 104819 to all POLADS S <del>3 p</del> <i>open 8-11-97 NLS 96-192</i> [Duplicate of #27, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 14, Telegrams to Seoul, Tabs 1-12]	undated	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76b cable	Deptel 104818 to all POLADS <i>open 8-11-97 NLT 96-19a</i> <del>S 2 p</del> <del>[Duplicate of #25, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 14, Telegrams to Seoul, Tabs 1-12]</del>	undated	A
#76c rpt	"Bolivia" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76d rpt	"Burma" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76e rpt	"Chile" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76f rpt	"Costa Rica" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76g rpt	"Guyana" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76h rpt	"Haiti" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76i rpt	"Honduras" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76j rpt	"Nepal" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76k rpt	"Nicaragua" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76l rpt	"Panama" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76m rpt	"Philippines" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A
#76n rpt	"Singapore" <del>PCI 1 p</del>	undated	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#76o rpt	"Thailand" <i>open 8-11-97 NLS 96-192</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#76p rpt	"Uruguay" <i>open 8-11-97 NLS 96-192</i> PCI 1 p	undated	A
#77a memo	"Secretary's Appearance before the Senate..." S 5 p <i>open 4/96</i>	1/26/68	A
#78 memo	"Pueblo Meeting" <i>Open 8.19.98 NLT 96-199</i> S 1 p <i>(dup. of #88)</i>	1/26/68	A
#78a rpt	Situation Report <i>open 8-11-97 NLS 96-192</i> S 2 p	1/26/68	A
#84a cable	Moscow 2588 " " S 1 p [Duplicate of #51a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B] <i>(sanitized 1992)</i>	1/26/68	A
#86 memo	Rostow to President, 1:30 p.m. S 2 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #52, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	1/26/68	A
#86a rpt	"Draft Statement and Actions on Korea..." S 4 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #52a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	undated	A
#87 memo	Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. <i>sanitized NLS 92-131</i> S 1 p <i>sanitized 5-25-95 NLS 94-357</i> [Duplicate of #253, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7] <i>Doni NLS 00-275(4/01)</i>	1/26/68	A
#87a memo	Katzenbach to President S 2 p <i>open 6-27-94 NLS 92-127 appeal</i> [Duplicate of #253a, NSF, Country File, Japan, Vol. 7]	1/24/68	A
#88 memo	Duplicate of #78 <i>open NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



**WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)**

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#90a cable	Rawalpindi 2969 <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #81, NSF, NSC History, Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 3, "Day-by-Day Documents, Part 3"]	1/26/68	<del>A</del>
#94 memo	Rostow to President, 4:10 p.m. <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#94a cable	Saigon 16850- <i>agen 9-18-97 NLJ 96-207</i> <del>TS</del> 20 p [Sanitized 1983] <i>[Aug 13, VN, Bu-KI, WKI, Rpts, Box 105]</i>	1/24/68	<del>A</del>
#95 memo	Rostow to President, 3:50 p.m. <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #21, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part A]	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#95a cable	Seoul 3623 <del>TS</del> 1 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #21a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part A]	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#97 memo	Rostow to President <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#97a ltr	King Constantine to President <del>PCI</del> 1 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	12/23/67	<del>A</del>
#98 memo	<del>STET</del> Rostow to President <i>NOT OPEN EXEMPT NLJ 96-199</i> <del>S</del> 1 p <i>9.1.98</i> <i>sanitized 019-028-1 (1/02) SOME SANI 8-29-05</i>	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#98a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <del>S</del> 2 p <i>EXEMPT 7.15.98 NLJ 96-200 1.5(c)(d) 3.4(b)</i> <i>SANITIZED 6.25.03 NLW 02.15D</i> <i>SOME SANI 8.29.05 NLW 05.92</i>	1/25/68	<del>A</del>
#99 memo	Rostow to President, 11:30 a.m. <del>S</del> 1 p <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>	1/25/68	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION

**NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968**

**Box 28**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#101 memo	<del>Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m.</del> <del>S 1 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #66, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	1/25/68	A
#101a cable	<del>Moscow 2566</del> <del>S 2 p</del> <i>open 4/96</i> [Duplicate of #66a, NSF, Country File, Korea-Pueblo Incident, Vol. 1, Part B]	1/25/68	A
#102 memo	<del>Rostow to President</del> <del>C 2 p</del> <i>open 11/25/96 NLS 94-290</i> [Duplicate of #27, NSF, Country File, Guyana, Vol. I]	1/25/68	A
#103 memo	<del>Rostow to President, re: Ecuador</del> <del>C 1 p</del> <i>open 1-16-97 NLS 96-191</i> [Duplicate of #168, NSF, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I]	1/25/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 58, Jan. 25-31, 1968

Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



## WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#34 memo	Rostow to the President, 7:50 a.m. - <i>open 10/30/09</i> S 1 p [Sanitized, NLJ-CBS 19] [dupl # 4, NSF Country File Vietnam, bx 66, "ZAI - I Corps + DMZ"]	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#34a cable	Intelligence report - <i>open 10/30/09</i> S 2 pp [Sanitized, NLJ-CBS 8]	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#96 memo	Rostow to the President, 3:15 p.m. - <i>open 10/30/09</i> S 1 pp [Sanitized, NLJ 83-219] [dupl # 7 NSF Country File, Vietnam bx 66, ZAI - I Corps + DMZ]	<del>1/25/68</del>	<del>A</del>
#96a cable	MAC 01218 - <i>open 10/30/09</i> S 1 p [dupl # 1a, NSF Country File, Vietnam, bx 66 "ZAI - I Corps + DMZ"]	<del>[1/25/68]</del>	<del>A</del>
#33 agenda	Agenda meeting 1/30/68 8:30 a.m. PCI 2p. <i>open 4/96</i>	<del>1/30/68</del>	<del>A</del>

FILE LOCATION  
National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 58, January 25-31, 1968  
Box 28

## RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.  
 (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.  
 (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.



1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Director, Bureau of the Budget

I have been giving every moment, aside from time spent in meetings, to quiet thought about the crises which have blown up in the last week, particularly in Viet Nam and Korea, but also some here at home.

In general, it appears to be the judgment of our enemies that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to end the war in Viet Nam so that we are likely to accept, if not defeat, at least a degree of humiliation. It is some such appreciation that must account for: his seizure of the PUEBLO; the attacks across the DMZ at the 38th parallel; the mobilization of 40,000 men at the 17th parallel; the attacks on the cities and towns and airfields in South Viet Nam.

In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on even-handed application of rules of international law -- like the freedom of the seas -- and the terms of international agreements -- like the armistice agreements in Korea and the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

Before proposing a course of action, we may wish to see what the Rumanian brings us tomorrow; but it is my present judgment that we should:

- respond to Kosygin's letter on the PUEBLO;
- and strengthen our posture in Viet Nam*  
-- strengthen our military positions in Viet Nam and Korea;
- go to the Congress and the country seeking additional support for our programs and greater unity in facing the present crises.

I would wish you, therefore, to put the ablest men who report to you at work to recommend action along these lines. Among the measures to be considered are these:

- ① -- Presidential authority to extend tours of duty, ~~and to~~
- ② call up individuals with special technical qualifications for military service;

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD 10-25-78; NSC 8-1480

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By JK/ag, NARA, Date Jan 31, 1992



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- an extra \$100 million in military aid for South Korea; *hidden?*
- prompt lifting of the gold cover;
- prompt passage of the tax bill;
- allocation of funds for the Price Stabilization Board;
- freeing of exchange stabilization fund to defend the dollar;
- trade and tourist legislation.

I wish a preliminary report at 5:00 p.m. this afternoon, January 31,  
and your final recommendations tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191

~~SECRET~~

By ing, NARA Date 11-25-96

Wednesday, January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: PL-480 Program for Israel

Attached is a Freeman-Poats-Fowler-Schultze recommendation on Israel's PL-480 request. There are two separate issues to decide:

1. Quantity. Israel requested a \$33 million program. The Departments recommend \$27 million (same as last year) because Israeli and US experts differ over Israeli requirements, even after we sent a specialist to Tel Aviv. Our problem is not selling so much that we hurt our markets. This is a technical disagreement with some Israeli bargaining thrown in. If you go ahead, three courses are open:

- a. Approve the Departments' \$27.1 million program \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Approve the Departments' program but tell Israel we'd consider adding later if they need more ✓
- c. Give the Israelis what they ask for and write into the agreement safeguards to protect our program \_\_\_\_\_

2. Terms. Last year you approved a 50-50 split between dollar credit and local currency. Israel requests the same terms this year. But everyone agrees that 100% dollar credit for 20 years are the softest terms justifiable on economic grounds, since Israel is doing well. These are the terms we give Jordan, which is in much worse shape. If you wish to make a concession, your advisors recommend at least 75% dollar credit. to continue progress toward 100% dollar sale as the Congress has asked. Your choices are:

- a. 100% total credit (20 years at 2-1/2%) ✓
- b. Compromise at 75% dollar credit \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Approve Israeli request for 50% dollar credit \_\_\_\_\_

I agree that Israel can afford hard terms and is just trying to get aid wherever it can. But I also recognize your needs and personally would suggest the middle course--75% dollar credit this year (2b) for the \$27 million program with the promise of a little more later if the Israelis need it (1b). If you wish to tighten up just a bit more, we could more easily justify a move to 100% dollar sale than being tight on quantities.

W. W. Rostow

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

2a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JAN 27 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: P. L. 480 Proposal for Israel

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By ig, NARA Date 11-25-96

In the attached memorandum, Orville Freeman and Rud Poats request your authority to negotiate a \$27.1 million P. L. 480 agreement with Israel for CY 1968. This proposal compares with last year's program and with the Israeli request as follows:

	<u>CY 1967</u> <u>Agreement</u>	<u>CY 1968</u> <u>Request</u>	<u>CY 1968</u> <u>Proposal</u>
Feedgrains	400,000 tons	350,000 tons	250,000 tons
Wheat	--	150,000 tons	150,000 tons
Vegetable oil	15,000 tons	15,000 tons	15,000 tons
Tobacco	120 tons	200 tons	200 tons
Total value (including transportation)	\$27.1 million	\$32.6 million	\$27.1 million

The proposed reduction from the requested amount of feedgrains is based on the Agriculture Department's most recent estimate of requirements. Freeman and Poats suggest that, if you don't want to provide less than Israel requested, we can either include the full amount (with safeguards to avoid some of the problems of overprogramming) or tell the Israelis that we will give them more later if they need it. I would prefer to provide no more than the proposed level now, and to provide more later if it were really needed.

Terms. Israel's economic situation continues to improve: In 1967, exports rose from 65 to 70 percent of imports, and reserves increased by \$100 million to a level equal to more than ten months' imports. All your advisors agree that a program 100 percent on twenty-year dollar credit terms is the softest that can be justified on economic grounds. Freeman and Poats recommend these terms; Joe Fowler and I agree. The recently-announced agreement with Jordan was 100 percent on dollar credit, and Israel's economy is dramatically sounder than Jordan's. Although there have been differences in the terms offered these two countries in the past, the comparison is more sensitive now that we have discontinued budget support to Jordan.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

2

Previous P. L. 480 agreements with Israel have been on increasingly hard terms. From a full local currency program in 1965, we moved to 25 percent dollar credit in 1966 and 50 percent dollar credit in 1967. The Government of Israel has requested that this year's program be on the same terms as last year's. If you want to be more generous than the 100 percent dollar credit proposed, I agree with Freeman and Poats that the trend should be maintained and that the dollar credit proportion should be at least 75 percent.

Military Expenditures. The review required by the "Symington amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act, which is also applicable to P. L. 480, is now a standard part of "new commitment" memos on food aid. The analysis attached to the Freeman/Poats memo indicates that although Israel spends a substantial amount on defense (30% of the budget, 15% of GNP), such expenditures are not "unnecessary." Further, Israel's outstanding development record amply demonstrates that they do not "materially interfere" with economic development. Therefore, there is no need for you to take any negative action with respect to Israel.

Self-help. Since Israel's agricultural policies are excellent, the self-help measures proposed for this agreement would only serve to highlight and encourage those steps which we believe to be most promising.

Recommendation. I recommend that you authorize negotiation of a \$27 million P. L. 480 agreement with Israel, all on dollar credit terms.

(signed) Charles L. Schultze  
Charles L. Schultze  
Director

Attachment

_____ Approve \$27 million agreement (250,000 tons of feedgrains)	_____ Approve 100% dollar credit
_____ Approve \$33 million agreement (350,000 tons of feedgrains)	_____ Approve 75% dollar credit
_____ Disapprove	

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2b

MEMORANDUM

TO: The President

JAN 24 1968

SUBJECT: Public Law 480 Program with Israel

We recommend you authorize us to negotiate a PL 480 sales agreement with Israel to provide agricultural commodities in CY 1968 having a total value of about \$27.1 million. The commodity composition of the proposed program is: Feedgrains 250,000 metric tons; wheat 150,000 metric tons; vegetable oil 15,000 metric tons; and tobacco 200 metric tons.

The program requested by the Government of Israel totaled about \$32.6 million and consisted of: Feedgrains 350,000 metric tons; wheat 150,000 metric tons; vegetable oil 15,000 metric tons; and tobacco 200 metric tons. The recommendation of 250,000 tons of feedgrains rather than the 350,000 tons requested is based on our best interpretation of statistical data on Israel's consumption requirements for feedgrains. We have tried to reconcile the data in discussions with the Israelis, but we have been unable to do so. If the 350,000 tons requested were provided this could entail the dangers of: (a) Israel's not taking the full quantity provided within CY 1968; (b) building up stocks of feedgrains in Israel beyond desirable levels; (c) exporting to areas now occupied by Israel as the result of the recent war; or (d) increasing exports of livestock products particularly eggs and poultry. If you believe it desirable to undertake the larger program, we will develop safeguards in the agreement to reduce the major dangers. Alternatively, we could proceed now to negotiate the program as recommended and if necessary provide additional quantities of feedgrains later in the year if harder information indicates such a need.

The Government of Israel has asked that the terms of the program be the same as last year. We recommend a dollar credit sale payable over 20 years at 2½ percent interest including 2 years grace period at 2 percent and an initial payment of 5 percent. The State and Treasury Departments concur in this recommendation.

While these recommended terms represent a hardening from last year's 50 percent dollar credit, 50 percent local currency sales, the harder terms are justified by better economic conditions in Israel. Israel's trade balance has improved substantially over the past 3 years, while Israel's gold and foreign exchange position went up by \$100 million in 1967. The proposed terms are identical to those for the Jordan program which you approved last week. However, if you feel for other reasons that easier terms than we recommend are necessary, we note that the 1966 program provided for 25 percent dollar credit, and the 1967 program 50 percent. To maintain the same momentum in the direction in which Congress has enjoined, the 1968 program should be not less than 75 percent dollar credit.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-201

By ing, NARA Date 1-21-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Need for Program

Despite remarkable increases in agricultural production by Israel in recent years, limited resources of water and land make substantial imports of agricultural commodities necessary each year to meet local consumption requirements. The proposed program would assist Israel by easing the financial burden of meeting these import requirements for calendar 1968. The value of PL 480 assistance proposed for 1968 is slightly below the CY 1967 program.

Usual Marketing Requirements

The sales program as proposed would protect normal commercial trade by requiring Israel to import appropriate quantities commercially of commodities included in the agreement.

Self-Help

As part of a continuing policy of strong efforts to encourage agricultural self-help, the Government of Israel is undertaking to: (1) Further increase food production through intensive use of existing croplands; (2) improve the facilities for the storage and distribution of food commodities; and (3) continue emphasis on adaptive research to develop new high yielding crop varieties.

Military Expenditures Review

Attached is a review of Israel's expenditures for military purposes in keeping with Section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended.

Recommendation

That you authorize us to proceed with the PL 480 sales agreement as described above.

January 22 1968

RUTHERFORD POATS

Acting Administrator  
Agency for International Development

Orville L. Freeman

Secretary  
Department of Agriculture

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

26  
DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 76-191

By ing, NARA Date 11-25-96

ATTACHMENT

REVIEW OF PROPOSED P. L. 480 AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL PER  
SECTION 620(a) OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT, AS AMENDED

The United States has made a basic judgment that it is in its interest for Israel to be able to defend itself against attacks by its neighbors. We believe that a strong Israel, able to defend itself with its own arms, minimizes the risk that the United States will be drawn into a conflict in the Near East, with all the risks of escalation into a great power confrontation and of further damage to U.S. interests in the Arab states. In accordance with this policy the United States Government -- after profound deliberation -- has itself sold weapons to Israel, notably HAWK SAMs in 1962, Patton tanks in 1963, and Skyhawk aircraft in 1966. Israel has also purchased weapons from some European countries notably aircraft from France and tanks from the United Kingdom. Three wars with its Arab neighbors in twenty years (and the possibility that still another war may come) emphasize the reality of the danger and difficulty which Israel faces.

Israel spends a substantial share of its Gross National Product (GNP) and government budget on defense. In 1963 and 1966 military expenditures constituted about 10 percent of GNP and 26 percent of the budget. In 1967 these percentages rose as a consequence of the June 1967 war to 15 percent of GNP and 30 percent of the budget. A substantial share of Israel's defense expenditure is in foreign exchange for weapons bought abroad. No really satisfactory data is readily available to us. Very partial figures indicate defense expenditures abroad of at least \$37 million in 1965, \$37 million in 1966, and \$33 million in 1967. Such expenditures have not prevented Israel from accumulating large gold and foreign exchange reserves primarily because of heavy capital inflows from abroad. At the end of 1958, Israel held official reserves of \$102 million, in 1963, \$515 million, and in November 1967, \$721 million.

Despite the burden of defense expenditures, the economic development of Israel, assisted by U.S. aid, has been one of the dramatic success stories of the past twenty years. For the period 1950-1965 real growth in GNP exceeded 10 percent per year. There was little additional growth in 1966 and 1967, as Israel took measures to halt inflation and stimulate exports. Progress has been made on both counts. In 1968 the Government of Israel is trying to strike something of a middle road. While holding down inflation and improving their export position, Israel hopes to resume growing rapidly. The early prediction for 1968 is for real growth in GNP of 8 percent.

~~SECRET~~



Events have shown that a high level of military preparedness was essential to Israel's security and that despite military expenditures, Israel's major focus has been on development. In this connection, it may be noted that Congress specifically excluded Israel from the Conte Amendment which restricts economic assistance to countries that purchase sophisticated weapons systems.

It has not been found under Section 620(a) that development assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act or sales under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, are being diverted to military expenditures or that Israel is diverting its own resources to unnecessary military expenditures, to a degree which materially interferes with its development. Currently available information would not support such a finding.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Rostow

3

January 31, 1968

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Attached for your signature  
are letters transmitting photo  
albums from the Eshkol visit.

W. W. Rostow

Att: Ltr to Prime Minister Eshkol from LBJ 1/31/68  
Ltr to Ambassador Avraham Harman from LBJ, 1/31/68  
Ltr to Minister Ephraim Evron from LBJ, 1/31/68



Mr. Rostow

3a

January 31, 1968

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I hope the attached album of pictures taken during your visit in our home will recapture for you as vividly as they do for me warm recollections of our time together. It is a pleasure to share them with you and all they represent of the close tie between us.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Levi Eshkol  
Prime Minister of Israel  
Jerusalem, Israel

LBJ:HHS:tmt 1/31/68

Mr. Rostow

3b

January 31, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This letter serves the double purpose of sending to you this keepsake of our meetings at the Ranch with Prime Minister Eshkol and of giving me an opportunity to say how much we have valued your own friendship during your long tenure here.

I hope you will take this album home with you not only as a record of one of the milestones of your time here but also as an expression of my personal pleasure in our happy and fruitful association.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Avraham Harman  
Ambassador of Israel  
1621 Twenty-second Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008

LBJ:HHS:tmt 1/3/68



**January 31, 1968**

**Dear Mr. Minister:**

**I hope you will consider this record of our meetings with Prime Minister Eshkol a token of my recognition of the broad role you play in maintaining our relationship. We are delighted that you will be with us a while longer.**

**Sincerely,**

**Honorable Ephraim Evron  
Minister of Israel  
1621 Twenty-second Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20008**

**LBJ:HHS:tmt 1/31/68**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By mg, NARA Date 11-25-96

Mr. Rostow 4

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letter to Greek Prime Minister

You will recall Papadopoulos' letter to you and your request for further argument from State on why you should reply. Phil Talbot will call on Papadopoulos Friday, and he could give him your reply then. Therefore, now seems a good time to come back to you on this subject.

The argument for a letter is that Papadopoulos is the focus of power in Greece and represents the moderate element in the junta. Maintaining our lines to him is designed to strengthen--insofar as we have influence--his resolve to stand up to some of his associates who are inclined towards a permanent military dictatorship and even talk about going deGaulle's route in NATO.

The proposed reply (attached) is a good one. If it should surface, it should help rather than hurt you with domestic critics because it makes clear your insistence on return to constitutional government. Phil will be talking about some specific steps we'd like to see taken, and this would work along the same line.

If you want to avoid a formal message, Phil could say you had appreciated his letter and run through the substance of the attached orally, noting it as your sentiments in response. The risk, of course, is the flak you might take for being in direct touch at all, but this might be offset by the laudable purpose of your contact. The only reason for waiting longer if you wish to reply is that Luke Battle may go to Athens in late February and could deliver your answer then, but that would be almost two months after Papadopoulos wrote to you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve attached text as written message ✓  
Approve text as oral reply \_\_\_\_\_  
Not now \_\_\_\_\_  
Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By ing, NARA Date 11-25-96  
SUGGESTED REPLY

4a

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of January 6th. I have read it with much interest and am gratified that you understand the dilemma which the sudden change of government in your country on April 21, 1967, has posed for democratic countries.

I particularly welcome your assurances that you have no thought of imposing a personal regime, or a permanent one, or one which will be at variance with the fundamental principles proclaimed by Free World countries, and further, that you have pledged yourself to retain the basic structure of government which prevailed in Greece prior to April 21, 1967.

While not wishing to enter into a discussion of internal Greek problems prior to April 21, or of the justifications for actions which took place on that date and following it, my Government has found constructive a number of measures which yours has recently taken to restore a more normal condition to Greek political and social life. I hope that you may see your way clear to continuing along this path until all traditional democratic freedoms are restored to Greece, and that the free, general, secret elections to which you allude may be held as soon as possible.

As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, your country and mine share many important values. We have had a long and fruitful relationship which has encompassed not only common goals, but also the close ties

binding our two peoples. This is a relationship which we Americans set great store by. I am sure you agree it can best be nurtured in a climate of mutual respect and trust. It is in that spirit that I wish for the success of your endeavors to realize in Greece those values to which our peoples aspire.

Sincerely,



6

Wednesday, January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Your Talk with Six African and Two South Asian  
Ambassadors at Ernie Goldstein's lunch Thursday,  
February 1, 1:00 p. m.

The Group:

Ambassador Owono -- Cameroon  
Ambassador Badinga -- Gabon  
Ambassador Bangoura (Ban-GUR-ah) -- Guinea  
Ambassador Kabanda -- Rwanda  
Ambassador Lukumbuya (Loo-koom-BOOZ-ya) -- Tanzania  
Ambassador Rakotomalala (Ra-KOOT-malol) -- Malagasy Republic  
Ambassador Khatri (Cut-ree) -- Nepal  
Ambassador Weerasinghe (We-re-singer) -- Ceylon

(Attached are State's fact sheets for each country. The first paragraph of each is a biographic sketch of the Ambassador. All speak at least fair English.)

Background:

This is a very mixed group. The six Africans:

-- get along with each other, though they're not particularly close;

-- range from moderate to radical nationalists. Tanzania is the most articulate and constructive of the African radicals. Guinea is odd man out with a spendthrift socialism and Sekou Toure, who still talks more than he builds;

-- are pro-Western or "non-aligned", except for Guinea which is close to the Soviets and Chinese. We have given assistance, in some form, to all of them. But Guinea and (last month) Gabon have kicked out the Peace Corps. Our relations with these two are now polite but cool. We have good relations with the other four;

-- are mostly quiet on Vietnam. Cameroon is sympathetic to us in private. Guinea makes strident noises in favor of Hanoi and the Viet Cong.

(None of these six countries was included in the Vice President's recent trip to Africa.)

The South Asians: (Nepal and Ceylon)

- have good relations with each other and with us;
- are moderates making some serious efforts to spur development;
- have been quietly sympathetic to us on Vietnam.

Common Interest in Development:

The group does have one principal interest in common: economic development. Most of them are small, and all of them are poor. They all need outside help to make a go of their development efforts. Each, for his own reasons, would like to get more assistance from us.

The six Africans are worried that we give Africa short shrift and are about to "withdraw" from the Continent altogether. (None of the six has been a major aid recipient.) Ceylon and Nepal haven't been major clients either, but they're similarly worried that we will cut back seriously the aid we have been giving.

The most important thing you can do is to impress upon these Ambassadors that we have not flagged in our determination to help those who help themselves. They must understand your problems. They should recognize our resources are limited, and they've got to help us rally other donors. Most of all, they must show they mean business in tackling their problems with their own measures.

Talking Points:

Along these lines, you might wish to say:

1. Despite Congressional cuts in the aid appropriation, we're going to fight for the same amount we requested last year. We may have had a set-back, but we're not about to give up.
2. But we will need all the support we can get. Congress pays off on results, and especially self-help measures. We need not just talk, but hard evidence that their governments are doing all they can with their own resources.

W. W. Rostow

*ba*

CONFIDENTIAL

CAMEROON

1. Ambassador Owono (Oh-WOH-noh)

Ambassador Joseph N. Owono, 45, presented his credentials on December 16, 1965. He is also Cameroon's Ambassador to Canada and for about a year served as his country's Permanent Representative to the UN as well. A career diplomat, Owono opened the embassy in Washington in 1960 and has served in Liberia and the UAR. Since he has been here, he has shown considerable initiative in seeking US private investment for Cameroon. Reserved but friendly, he speaks excellent French and quite good English.

2. Foreign Policy

A pragmatic African moderate, Cameroon's President Ahidjo (ah-HEED-joh) believes Africans should concentrate on real problems rather than waste scarce resources on demagogy. He has been careful to maintain an independent but basically pro-Western orientation. Heavily dependent on France for economic assistance, Cameroon nevertheless maintains a considerable degree of political independence. During 1967 visits to USSR and Yugoslavia, Ahidjo skillfully avoided being used for anti-US propaganda on Viet-Nam or the Middle East. Since his US visit last October, Cameroon has moved from abstention to vote with us on the Chirep issue in the UN and has declared that Israel cannot be expected to withdraw its troops from occupied territory without adequate guarantees.

3. Viet-Nam

Ahidjo has privately expressed sympathy for our Viet-Nam policy and restrains public criticism of it in Cameroon.

4. US Assistance

Overridingly concerned with economic development, Cameroon seeks assurance that our new aid policy does not

CONFIDENTIAL  
GP-3

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLJ 90-21

By isp/hg, NARA, Date 2-5-92



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

mean abandonment of Cameroon. Although bilateral aid ends in FY 69, AID has agreed to contribute to dollar costs of the second phase of the multi-donor Trans-cameroonian Railroad and a Cameroon mission is due this month to conclude arrangements for assisting in improvement of the Kumba-Mamfe Road in West Cameroon. There are presently 54 Peace Corps volunteers in Cameroon, and 13 more are in training.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GABON

1. Ambassador Badinga (Bah-DING-ah)

Ambassador Leonard Badinga, forty-five, arrived in the United States the day before Thanksgiving 1967 and presented his credentials on January 19, 1968. From 1960 until March 1967, Mr. Badinga held various ministerial portfolios in his country's government, the last being that of Finance. Immediately prior to his nomination as Ambassador, Mr. Badinga was Director General of the Gabonese Social Security Fund. He had a good reputation as an administrator and is said to be conservative in his political views. This is the first time Ambassador Badinga has served abroad, and he appears to be quite shy though friendly in social situations.

Six of Ambassador Badinga's eight children accompanied him to the United States. Mrs. Badinga and the remaining two children plan to join the Ambassador in the near future.

2. Gabon's Internal Situation

Gabon has the reputation of having remained more subject to French influence than any other of France's former African colonial territories. France hopes to maintain this situation in order to insure herself control of the mineral wealth, which gives Gabon the highest per capita GNP in Black Africa. Moreover, Gabon furnishes most of the uranium for France's Force de Frappe. It is doubtful that the Gabonese Government makes any meaningful decisions without prior consultation with, and probably the concurrence of, the French. Gabon's President, Albert Bongo, was elected in March 1967 to a seven-year term as Vice-President and succeeded to the Presidency on December 2 upon the death of President Leon Mba. Intelligent and aggressive, Bongo has so far appeared nervous and ill at ease in the presidency, probably because he lacks a real local political base and owes his position largely to French intervention with former President Mba. In an apparent attempt to demonstrate that he is his own man and not subject to foreign influence, Bongo has adopted a truculent attitude in regard to foreigners

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and has carried out a number of anti-foreign actions including the expulsion of a considerable number of African expatriates from the country and the abrupt termination of Gabon's Peace Corps agreement with the United States. On the other hand, Bongo has been most conciliatory vis-a-vis members of former internal opposition groups.

### 3. Gabon's Foreign Policy

Since independence, Gabon has been a member of the so-called moderate group of former French African states. Gabon is aligned with the West, maintaining diplomatic relations with Nationalist China, South Viet-Nam and South Korea. Gabon does not have diplomatic relations with any Communist state. On other issues, however, Gabon has tended to follow the lead of France. The recent deterioration in US-Gabonese relations can probably be traced to a recrudescence of GOG suspicions, first aroused during the 1964 coup, that the US supports the GOG's illegal opposition. We surmise that this suspicion is encouraged by the French, who want to keep American influence at a minimum in this French preserve.

Gabon has actively sought private foreign investment to develop her immense natural resources. American investment in Gabon to date amounts to some \$75 million, principally in the extractive industries. While Gabon's relations with the United States are cool at the moment, we do not believe that this will adversely affect American business interests in the country. In the first place, in every case, American investments in Gabon are combined with French interests, and, secondly, the country is too dependent upon the foreign exchange earned from the extractive industries to permit any political disruption of production. Bongo's xenophobic attitude may abate somewhat once he becomes more assured in office.

### 4. US Aid Programs

The principal US aid effort in Gabon has been the construction of rural schools and teachers' housing,



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

through a combination of AID financing, PCV assistance, and Gabonese self-help participation. With the termination of the Peace Corps agreement and the expulsion of the volunteers, this program has ended. At present our aid activities are restricted to the assistance in vocational education and the regional measles-small pox campaign.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GUINEA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

1. Ambassador Bangoura (Ban-GUHR-UH) By CL, NARA Date 3-2-97

Ambassador Karim Bangoura, 45, has been here five years and is generally considered to be one of the most effective African Ambassadors in Washington. He has great respect for Secretary Rusk, whom he has met often and is sympathetic to President Johnson's civil rights program. Bangoura, who is pro-US and anti-French, prefers a free-wheeling, personal style of diplomacy. He also is accredited to Mexico and Canada, married, has six children, speaks French and fair English.

2. Guinea's Domestic Policy

Guinea was the only colony to choose full independence in 1958 rather than an affiliation with France, and DeGaulle has not forgotten. President Sekou Toure (Too-RAY), who led his country to independence, was reelected to another 7-year term on January 1, 1968 by 99.98% of the recorded votes. Described by his admirers as charismatic and by his enemies as erratic, he is firmly in power and no potential successor is in sight. He rules the country both as President and as head of Guinea's sole political party, the Parti Democratique de Guinee (PDG). Guinea's 75-man unicameral legislature rubber-stamps decisions made by Guinea's true executive body, the 7-man National Political Bureau of the PDG. On January 19, 1968, Toure reorganized the government so that each member of the National Political Bureau was given responsibility for a segment of the government, thus reflecting the reality of one-party rule. Although Guinea is a socialist state, it welcomes foreign investments to exploit its abundant mineral wealth (bauxite, iron ore, gold, diamonds).

3. Guinea's Foreign Policy

Guinea's foreign policy parallels communist positions, which reflects the Marxist background of its leaders. Guinea carefully cultivates both the USSR and Communist China, and is a radical member of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN. Guinea's relations with the U.S. have fluctuated. The lowest point

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Group 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals;  
declassified after 12 years.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

occurred in October/November 1966, when the Guinean Foreign Minister was removed from a Pan American plane at Accra by Ghanaian authorities. Convinced of an American-Ghanaian plot because Nkrumah received asylum in Guinea, Guinea reacted violently, placed our Ambassador under house arrest and expelled the Peace Corps and Pan American Airways. Our relations have improved since then, but are not particularly close.

Guinea has recently taken steps to resume relations with France and the UK, broken respectively in November and December 1965. The French are in no hurry to resume relations but the UK has agreed in principle to do so. Guinea has improved its relations with neighboring Senegal, but is still distrusted by the Ivory Coast and Ghana.

#### 4. U.S. Programs

Our bilateral assistance program (\$75 million since 1962) is being phased out and we have informed the Guineans that, except for Title I PL 480, they should not anticipate further assistance unless it meets regional and multilateral criteria. Private U.S. investment in Guinea totals \$80 million.

The IBRD is considering a loan of \$65 million to the Guinean Government for a bauxite project in which a consortium of private companies, including US, may invest another \$70 million. The Guineans asked us to pressure the IBRD to approve the loan quickly, but we replied that the IBRD is an independent organization. The Guineans also would like the Peace Corps to return, but the Peace Corps first requires a public request. Guinea also would like Pan American Airways to return, but Pan Am considers the Guinea run uneconomic.

#### 5. Vietnam

Guinea strongly opposes our policy in Vietnam and supports Hanoi and the NLF.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



60d

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RWANDA

Ambassador Celestin Kabanda (Ka-BAN-da)

1. Background Data

Age 31. Ambassador Kabanda presented his credentials in May of 1964, as Rwanda's second Ambassador to the United States. He also is accredited as Ambassador to Canada and serves as Rwanda's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Ambassador Kabanda has studied philosophy and theology, including one year at Lovanium University in Kinshasa. He has held private secretary positions within the Rwandan Government and is a close friend of President Kayibanda. Ambassador Kabanda is married and has two children. He speaks French, Kinyarwanda, Swahili, and good English. The President most recently met with Ambassador Kabanda in August of 1967, at the occasion of an non-official visit by President Kayibanda to President Johnson.

2. Political Orientation

Rwanda is outspokenly pro-West. The existence of a communist party is outlawed. Rwanda consistently votes with the United States at the United Nations. Rwanda recently provoked the wrath of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa) over the mercenary issue, leading the Congo to break diplomatic relations with Rwanda. The Rwandan Government refuses to extradite the mercenaries involved in last year's revolt in the Congo, and prefers that another solution be found.

2. U.S. - Rwanda Relations

The US has provided balance of payments and budgetary assistance in support of the IMF-sponsored Rwandan economic stabilization program and monetary reform undertaken in April 1966. This took the form of a \$1 million grant to finance the importation of trucks, tires, textiles, and grey cloth. No additional US credits to Rwanda are forthcoming. Within the stabilization program the US also furnished wheat flour (5,000 metric tons), edible oil (1,000 metric tons), and non-fat dry milk (100 metric tons) under the PL 480 program, at a cost of \$1.5 million. The local currency generated under these two programs has been allocated to the 1967 Rwandan ordinary and capital budgets.

**DECLASSIFIED**

Authority Reg 90-21

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By wp/ry, NARA, Date 2-5-91

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

AID has undertaken a limited project program in Rwanda. We have assisted in establishing a new water supply system for the capital of Kigali, provided commodities and technical assistance to the Rwandan police forces, and have financed training for Rwandan students in the US. The US is financing the paving of 2.5 miles of Kigali's main streets and laboratory equipment and one professor for the University of Rwanda.

In FY 1968 the AID program in Rwanda will be limited to the continuation of four projects. The US also will continue the PL 480 program. The bilateral AID program will be terminated after FY 1968. Under the new AID policy for Africa, however, we are prepared to consider feasible regional programs proposed by Rwanda and would encourage Ambassador Kabanda's efforts in this regard.

#### 4. President Kayibanda's Visit

The President received Rwandan President Kayibanda on August 14, 1967. At that time, the President and President Kayibanda had a general discussion, without any specific problems being explored in depth. President Kayibanda's visit was two days in length, and non-official, following a visit to Expo-67.

#### 5. Present Status of Mercenaries (FYI only)

The Congolese mercenaries who crossed over into Rwanda on November 5 are still there. President Mobutu and the Congolese Government assert that the OAU has given the Congolese authority to seek the extradition of the mercenaries back to the Congo for trial. President Kayibanda and the Rwandan Government have refused to grant the Congolese request. As a result, the Congolese broke relations with Rwanda on January 11.

The next move is not clear. Apparently the subject was not discussed in detail during the recent OCAM meeting in Niamey. The OAU assumed responsibility for the mercenaries in November and it is possible that future initiatives may come from this quarter. The US has sought in conversations with the Congolese and certain selected African

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

3

countries to encourage a peaceful solution of the problem consistent with interests of all concerned, which would rid Africa of this troublesome problem.

Because of the multiplicity of interests involved, and various confidences which concerned nations have reposed in us, we have avoided taking any public stance on this issue. We would hope that it would not be raised by the Ambassadors, some of whom may have sharply conflicting views.

CONFIDENTIAL



TANZANIA1. Ambassador Michael Lukumbuzya (Loo-koom-booz-yah)

Ambassador Lukumbuzya, 37, is the hereditary chief of the Ukerewe people who live on an island in Lake Victoria. After completing his studies at Makerere University College in Kampala in 1954, he joined the Tanzanian Foreign Service in 1961. He has served at the United Nations, in New Delhi, as Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in Washington since December 15, 1965. An able spokesman for Tanzania's domestic and foreign policies, he combines the dignity of a chief with innate intelligence and ability to deal with people.

2. Tanzania's Foreign and Domestic Policies

Tanzania's foreign policy is based on non-alignment, a concept which President Nyerere applies to the Free and Communist Worlds in their activities inside and outside of Africa. His application in recent years has been slanted in an easterly direction. Tanzania's African policy strongly supports freedom and self-determination in southern Africa. Thus Tanzania gives tangible support to insurgency activities against neighboring Portuguese Mozambique. With its traditional partners Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania has contributed solidly to the functioning of the new East African Community. President Nyerere's domestic version of socialism thus far has included nationalization of banks, trading firms, some food processing industries, and acquiring up to 60 percent control of other basic industries. A code of ethical behavior for all government and political leaders and greater emphasis on providing the fruits of development to rural masses are also part of his program. Continuing to be faced with shortages of skilled manpower, Tanzania still retains many Western technicians and managers, many of them in the nationalized industries.

3. Great North Road and Tan-Zam Railroad

Following Southern Rhodesia's illegal independence move, Zambia has developed alternate routes to the sea, including

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 4 - Downgraded at 3-year intervals;  
declassified after 12 years.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(A) x (D)

By del/19, NARA, Date 2-5-92

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

the Great North Road from the Copper Belt in Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam. This 1000-mile mostly gravel road has been badly overused since November 1965 and will have to be rebuilt and paved before it can serve as a dependable lifeline for Zambia's general imports and copper exports. The United States and the World Bank are involved in upgrading sections of the Great North Road in a relatively short time so that Zambia's dependence on Rhodesian transport will be reduced. In the belief that a rail line is needed, Tanzania and Zambia, in September 1967, signed an agreement with Communist China which calls for a survey, engineering study and construction of a railroad which will roughly duplicate the road link.

4. Tanzania and the United States

General. In January 1965, Tanzania expelled two United States diplomats for allegedly plotting to overthrow its Government. We retaliated by expelling the Tanzanian Counselor in Washington. Since then both countries have made positive efforts with considerable success to improve relations.

Sisal. Tanzania, as the world's leading producer of sisal, has complained that the GSA's disposal of surplus sisal adversely affects the volatile sisal market, thereby hurting her sales. The GSA claims its disposals are not responsible for the current record low world price.

Expropriation. Another problem has been the Tanzanian expropriation of an American-owned farm. After negotiations, the Tanzanian Government made what we considered a reasonable offer of compensation, which the farm's owner has not yet accepted.

Extradition. A third problem is our outstanding request for the extradition of a disbarred Negro lawyer convicted of embezzlement of funds from a local church in Suffolk County, New York. During his hearing in Tanzania, the fugitive claimed that his trial on the felony charge had been instigated because of his alleged civil rights activities. The Tanzanian Minister for Justice has freed the embezzler. We are awaiting an official explanation from the Government of Tanzania.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

5. Letter Exchange. In January 1968, President Nyerere sent two letters to President Johnson concerning negotiations on Vietnam. In both letters, Nyerere expressed his desire to see an end to the fighting and offered to help in any way he could. In his replies, President Johnson explained the American willingness to negotiate and our continuing quiet diplomatic effort to get talks started.

CONFIDENTIAL



6f

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MALAGASY REPUBLIC

Ambassador Louis Rakotomalala (Ra-KOOT-ma-lal)

1. Background Data

Age 67. Ambassador Rakotomalala presented his credentials in 1960, the first envoy to the United States of the newly independent Malagasy Republic. The Ambassador also is accredited to the United Nations as Permanent Representative, and is Malagasy Ambassador to Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Mr. Rakotomalala worked in the vanilla trade and in banking as a young man. He has served as a member of the National Assembly and as an official in the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. He was Foreign Minister for a brief period during 1960. He is married and has three married daughters. Ambassador Rakotomalala speaks Malagasy, French and good English. The President most recently met Ambassador Rakotomalala in December 1967, at the reception given by Governor Harriman for the former Miss Lynda Bird Johnson and Captain Charles Robb.

2. Political Orientation

The Malagasy Republic is outspokenly pro-West. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has a space tracking station on Madagascar, for which a renewal was signed last month, extending our lease through December 31, 1970. The Malagasy Republic repeatedly has voted against Chinese communist membership in the United Nations and President Tsiranana, of whom Ambassador Rakotomalala is a close friend, has defended publicly our position in Viet Nam. President Tsiranana paid an official visit to the US in 1964. The Malagasy Republic has been a leader within OCAM and the OAU.

3. U.S. - Malagasy\* Relations

The US Government is interested in assisting Madagascar's economic development. Accordingly, since 1960 we have loaned or granted a total of approximately \$12.4 million. While the Congress' recent restriction on bilateral aid may limit our assistance to countries such as Madagascar, we nevertheless are prepared to consider regional or multilateral projects which are presented to us without, obviously, being able to guarantee in advance that any or all will be approved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71-90-21

By ep/ly, NARA, Date 2-5-92

CONFIDENTIAL

2

\*The word "Malagasy" is an adjective. The country may be called "Madagascar" or the "Malagasy Republic", never "Malagasy." It may be used alone only when referring to a noun which is understood, i.e., "The Malagasy people speak Malagasy."

CONFIDENTIAL

leg

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NEPAL

Neutral

I. Background on Nepal

Nepal is located along the Himalayan mountain range. It borders India to the south and Communist China (Tibet) to the north. The country is slightly larger than North Carolina and has a population of 10,600,000. King Mahendra rules Nepal with near-absolute power. The King has developed a "Panchayat" or village council system of government which he effectively controls. It consists of four tiers of government with popularly elected village councils forming the lowest tier. Members of the higher councils are elected indirectly. The highest tier, the National Panchayat, acts as the national legislature. The Council of Ministers, headed by a Chairman, is the executive council of the Government.

The economy is almost entirely agricultural. The annual per capita gross domestic product is \$70. Although the country is poor, its foreign exchange position is satisfactory, primarily because of sterling currency remittances to Nepal by Nepalese Gurkhas serving in the British army, largely in Malaysia.

Nepal's sympathies tend towards the West, but it follows a policy of nonalignment and tries to avoid actions which would antagonize Communist China. The major aid donors to Nepal are the United States, India, Communist China, the USSR and Britain. The U.S. has given \$110 million in economic aid, about half of which has been in U.S.-owned Indian rupees. Much of our aid has been concentrated in the fields of transportation, public administration, education and rural development. The U.S. and Britain have small military assistance programs. India is providing the major amount of military aid.

The Ambassador is Carol C. Laise (Mrs. Ellsworth Bunker).

II. Biographic Data on the Nepalese Ambassador - Padma Bahadur Khatri

Ambassador Khatri (Cut-ree) was born in Kathmandu in 1915 and belongs to the influential Chhetri caste. He has a B. S. degree from Patna University in India and in 1946 attended the military staff college at Quetta (now in Pakistan). He was an active army officer for most of his career and served with British forces in Burma in World War II. He attained the rank of Major General in the Nepalese army. In his later civilian career he served as Defense Secretary and Foreign Secretary before becoming Ambassador to the United States in December 1964. Ambassador Khatri is also Nepal's Permanent Representative to the UN. He is married and has three sons and a daughter. Mrs. Khatri does not speak English.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Exempted from automatic decontrol.

1/31/68



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6-h

CEYLON

AMBASSADOR OLIVER WEERASINGHE  
(We're a singer)

NEUTRAL

Oliver Weerasinghe presented his credentials as Ambassador to the U.S. on 1 October 1965, and as Ambassador to Mexico (currently) on 21 July 1967. He served on the UN staff from June 1956 and prior to that was Ceylon's chief town planner. Weerasinghe is a calm man and a competent administrator but lacks imagination and decisiveness. He works hard at his assignment and can claim significant progress in making Ceylon known here. For instance, he has managed to garner a superb group of men to act as honorary Ceylonese consuls in most large cities in the U.S. His relations with Congress are better than those of most Ambassadors from similar countries. However, in discussions with USG officials, Weerasinghe often gives the impression of having failed to do his homework. He often is corrected by (or defers to) one of the assistants who accompany him. In addition, his manner is usually stiff and reserved. While he is thus often ineffective in his representations, he can pursue some subjects with enthusiasm and diligence when he has a personal interest or knowledge of the subject. Politically, the Ambassador is oriented toward the ruling United National Party in Ceylon. He owes his position to the family connections of his wife and would probably be removed from his position should the leftist Opposition return to power in Ceylon. While at the UN he was most cooperative with members of the U.S. Mission. As Ambassador, he has been more active in both intra-governmental relations and diplomatic society than his predecessor. He is a Buddhist, is married and has two children. His daughter is married to an American. The President last saw the Ambassador on November 14, 1967, when the Ambassador presented him with a silver casket of tea from Prime Minister Senanayake in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Ceylon's tea industry.

Our Ambassador in Ceylon is Andrew V. Corry of Montana.

Ceylon is a small island located 18 miles off the southeast coast of India with a population of over 11 million people. In 1965 the moderate, generally pro-Western government of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake came to power replacing a nine-year series of left-leaning governments. It has the normal problems of a primary-producing, less-developed nation: its agricultural exports, while increasing in

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**

**NLJ 96-192**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97**

quantity, bring less money and its essential industrial and food imports are increasingly costly. This government inherited a bankrupt treasury thanks to the irresponsible economic policies of its predecessors. For political reasons it has continued to proclaim a policy of non-alignment abroad. However, this policy has lost much of the leftist taint imposed by Mrs. Bandaranaike. In pursuing this policy, Prime Minister Senanayake has brought an element of moderation to the councils of the non-aligned. He has not been able to endorse our policy in Vietnam, but he has not made public pronouncements in opposition to our involvement in that area. In general he has tried to be helpful whenever possible. While other non-aligned nations have been giving us gratuitous advice Senanayake has remained virtually silent. He has called for a cessation of our bombing in the North, but has linked it with the end of hostilities throughout Vietnam.

A new Peace Corps program has just begun in the island after a two-year hiatus. Ceylon is the first country to have asked the Peace Corps to return after an earlier program had been ended. Ambassador Weerasinghe feels that he was personally responsible for the invitation for this program.

The SS HOPE, the floating hospital of the People-To-People Foundation of Washington, is due to arrive in Ceylon in early March for a one-year stay. Ambassador Weerasinghe also feels personally responsible for having initiated this program. While it is not a United States Government-sponsored effort, we believe it nonetheless is evidence of an interest on the part of the American people in the welfare of the people of Ceylon.

At home the government has continued to espouse an official policy of democratic socialism which has become politically popular over the past decade. However, in this area also the government has evidenced less doctrinaire socialism than its predecessors. Upon coming to power it acted swiftly to reduce the staffs of Communist diplomatic and consular missions in Colombo and has placed increasing emphasis on private sector activity. In a show of political courage rare in Ceylon, Senanayake in December 1966 cut in half the amount of rice issued to the public. This move was coupled with an intensive campaign to reduce Ceylon's import bill by drastically increasing domestic agricultural production. That this effort has been successful is evidenced by a 14% increase in agricultural production, mostly rice, in 1967.

7

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
9:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This arrived when I was in the dining room for the Congressional briefing.

My reaction was "thank God January is ending."

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *rg*, NARA, Date *1-29-92*

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968, 6:00 P.M.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Violation of Communist Chinese Air Space by U.S. Airplanes

An attack bomber modified for electronic intelligence collection from the USS Ticonderoga flew a course within seven to ten miles from the coast of Hainan. Radio orders to depart the area were not acknowledged and a second US plane flew alongside it using hand signals to instruct it to turn out to sea.

Apparently Chinese Communist aircraft were scrambled but did not reach the US planes prior to their leaving Communist airspace. Communist China has protested to intrusions into its territorial waters off Hainan. It is likely that this protest refers to incursions described above.

The crews of the two US planes are on board the USS Ticonderoga and may provide further details of this incident.

W. W. Rostow -

*Bronley Smith*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-179

By *us*, NARA Date ~~5-18-94~~ 5-18-04*map attached.*~~SECRET~~





8

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
9:05 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Charlie Zwick responds  
to your memorandum of this afternoon  
on the main headings of a possible  
message to Congress.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

*18*, NARA, Date 1-29-82

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-191

By ing, NARA Date 11-25-96

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Interim response to your January 31 memorandum on the situation in Asia

I concur with the proposal that you send a special message to Congress on the current situation in Asia. A message would accomplish several objectives. It would

- . help clarify recent events in Vietnam and Korea;
- . help develop support for your policies.

The message should focus on three key areas of preparedness:

- . our military posture;
- . domestic economic policy;
- . our balance of payments program.

To strengthen our military posture, we could take the following new measures:

- . provide an extra \$100 million in military assistance for South Korea;
- . provide for Presidential authority to extend tours of duty;
- . provide for Presidential authority to call up individuals with special technical qualifications for military service.

To strengthen our domestic economic posture, the following are needed:

- . prompt passage of the tax bill;
- . support for your budget, including its program reductions and reforms;
- . funds to provide staff for the new Cabinet Committee on Price Stability.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The third element of the message should be a further development of your balance of payments program, including

- . prompt lifting of the gold cover;
- . tourist legislation;
- . plans contained in this year's budget to expand the Government's promotion activities.

I will submit to you my final recommendations tomorrow by 5:00 p.m.

(Signed) Charles J. Zwick

Charles J. Zwick  
Director

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968, 6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Violation of Communist Chinese Air Space by U.S. Airplanes

An attack bomber modified for electronic intelligence collection from the USS Ticonderoga flew a course within seven to ten miles from the coast of Hainan. Radio orders to depart the area were not acknowledged and a second US plane flew alongside it using hand signals to instruct it to turn out to sea.

Apparently Chinese Communist aircraft were scrambled but did not reach the US planes prior to their leaving Communist airspace. Communist China has protested to intrusions into its territorial waters off Hainan. It is likely that this protest refers to incursions described above.

The crews of the two US planes are on board the USS Ticonderoga and may provide further details of this incident.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-179  
By is, NARA Date 8-19-98 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

10

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
5:28 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is a bad report about Hue.  
We will check it with Westy when he  
gets on the phone.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

OCI 1173/68

CIA 31, January 1968

"Spot Report on the Situation in Hue N (Info as of 3:30 PM EST)"

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSaD ltr 11-15-78  
By 18/ijp, NARA, Date 1-29-92

WWRostow:rlm

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~

104  
OC 1 1173/68  
66-07427/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
31 January 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Spot Report on the Situation in Hue N  
(Information as of 8:30 PM EST)

1. The friendly position in this city has apparently deteriorated seriously during 31 January.
2. According to a local US official who made a flight over the area late on the afternoon of 31 January, and received information relayed from US military officials in Hue, the city appears to be largely under the control of the Communists.
3. During his flight, the official reported that a major market place on the north side of the Song Huong river in flames, with other smaller fires burning on the south side of the river. A fire fight was in progress along the river road on the south side. Ground fire was also coming up from the vicinity of the air strip inside the citadel area.
4. The official was able to raise several local elements by radio and was told that a provincial reconnaissance headquarters outside the city had been overrun, and that many VC were present throughout the area. The official was unable to make contact with the MACV headquarters, or the CORDS headquarters. He observed an ARVN battalion approaching Hue from the northwest, firing artillery to clear the way.
5. A message from the G-2 adviser's office in the MACV compound at Hue, received at I Corps Headquarters at Da Nang, stated that the MACV compound and the 1st Division Headquarters in the citadel at

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-200

By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

~~SECRET~~

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~NO FORN DISSEM~~

Hue were the only "known" places still holding out against the VC. Reportedly, a marine company had tried to cross the highway bridge from the south into the northern sector of the city, but had been driven back with heavy casualties.

6. There is no other information currently available here to confirm the above report.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~



INFORMATION

11

Wednesday, January 31, 1968, 4:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


*Pres file*

The USS Ranger reports a collision between one of its escorting destroyers, the USS Rowan and a Soviet freighter, the Wislabokow, at 1:52 EST about 90 miles east of Pohang, in the Sea of Japan, well below the 37th parallel.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

11a



DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 96-198  
By ns, NARA, Date 8-12-04

INFORMATION

12

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
4:45 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

I have marked the key passages in this interesting report from the CIA Station in Saigon. It indicates clearly (pages 3-4) the task ahead for Thieu and Bunker in regaining confidence after the shock of these attacks.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By ics, NARA Date 8-19-98

WWRostow:rla



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

31 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow  
Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT : 31 January Telephone Conversation with Saigon Station

1. At 31/0433Z I was in telephonic communication with our Saigon Station. The circuit was bad: I could hear Saigon but they could not understand me. The Station reported that the situation was generally stabilizing and the press greatly exaggerating the seriousness of the penetration of the Embassy. The Chancery was not actually penetrated, though Viet Cong did get into the compound. There were no U.S. civilian casualties in Saigon known as of that time.

2. After the phone conversation I transmitted the following specific questions to Mr. Lapham through the open teletype link, explaining that these were the points I had hoped to raise over the phone.

- a. What does the countrywide situation look like?
- b. What do regional officers report?
- c. Was attempt made against Thieu, Ky or other senior GVN officials?
- d. Did Saigon attack seem primarily aimed at American targets?
- e. Was there any local intelligence or other warning of these attacks (in Saigon or elsewhere)?
- f. What do you expect in Saigon and countrywide within next 24-48 hours?
- g. Any indication of effect attacks had on mood or attitudes of Vietnamese population?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: RUS. 64-68. w/ 6, 440

By: jc NARA. Date: 12-17-09

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



h. Your general preliminary comments on meaning and import current countrywide spate of VC activity.

i. How is VC surge likely to affect GVN standing and stability?

3. At 31/0710Z, Mr. Lapham replied. The text of his reply is given below. I am passing it to the recipients of this memorandum in the belief that you may find it useful. You will understand, of course, that these are Mr. Lapham's initial reactions in a very fluid situation, the full dimensions and details of which were not known to him at that time.

\*\*\*\*\*

FOR MR. CARVER FROM MR. LAPHAM:

1. Appreciate your need for rapid coverage of events and assure you we are doing everything possible to comply. It has been extremely difficult during the morning hours to obtain any hard information on the events of the night since ~~police are fully occupied in mopping up operations in various sectors of the city. For example, the VC continued to be holed up in a house across from the Palace and apparently in houses in the area of Tan Son Nhut. Contrary to earlier reports, Embassy employees have been instructed not to report events this afternoon.~~

2. You will shortly receive dissem concerning police report we have received re enemy plans for this evening.

3. Mr. Carver's telecon just received. As you can see from above, announcement premature that situation was calm enough to permit return of personnel to work. At this moment, ~~it is impossible to estimate how long it will take to mop up VC who are holed up around town.~~ If intelligence referred to above is accurate, ~~we may have a busy night again this evening.~~

4. Will be filing report shortly on countrywide situation (TDCS 314/01647-68). Regional officers are preparing sitreps for direct transmission. An FVS has been filed re Loan's comments. ~~President Thieu was in My Tho yesterday and requested MACV assistance in returning to Saigon this morning.~~ Although American facilities received their share of attention, other targets were ~~Korean and Philippine Embassies, Palace and Saigon radio station.~~ During the last few days, Station has diligently pursued all available sources for intelligence that might have given us warning of these attacks. The police had a few spotty

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

reports but nothing which appeared to be very hard. ~~They were unquestionably not prepared for this attack on the opening day of Tet, when large numbers of them were celebrating with their families.~~ At this point, we anticipate that country-wide attacks will continue tonight. However, we lacking intelligence from the regions which would give us an accurate read-out. Your telecon questions, para 2g, h, and i will be dealt with separately.

5. COS and EXO will spend night in Station, with a backup commo command post in another area of the city. We are establishing additional commo links with various police posts. Every possible precaution being taken to assure security of personnel and classified facilities.

6. Re your telecon questions g, h and i:

a. You will appreciate the difficulty we have in even beginning an answer to these questions which will be of great importance when the security situation settles down.

b. We are not today in contact with many elements in the Vietnamese population to discern their attitudes and moods. A circling airplane with loudspeakers ~~told the people to stay off the streets and in their homes.~~ VC have reportedly made specific threats to persons living in certain areas to vacate homes at risk of death. Most Saigonese have indeed stayed at home and we assume that they will follow VC orders as well. ~~The mood is very tense.~~

c. The meaning and import of current activity can be extracted from VC stated intentions regarding the winter-spring campaign, their calls for general uprising, and their obvious drive toward a major victory for propaganda and morale purposes. ~~While we may be undergoing a major multiple harassment without lasting military significance, the ultimate import will depend on their degree of success on the ground and the impact on American and South Vietnamese willingness to rebound.~~ ~~The boost to VC/NVA morale is in any case certain to be substantial.~~

d. Regardless of what happens tonight or during the next few days, ~~the degree of success already achieved in Saigon and around the country will adversely affect the image of the GVN (and its powerful American allies as well) in the eyes of the people.~~ ~~All Vietnamese, both those who are sympathetic and those who are~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

critical, hope and expect for protection from their government and the relative lack of VC activity in Saigon during recent months created a presumption of GVN and police strength in this area at any rate. Those who believe that security situation (not the political) is paramount will deduce that only a tough, efficient, no-nonsense government run by the military can meet the sheer physical thrust of the Viet Cong. Those who cannot stomach such a government will be moved further toward the temptation of negotiations and coalition government.

e. We would hope to be permitted to delay additional analysis and prediction until we have provided for the necessary security of our installations and personnel and can begin to move about the city to communicate with sources able to provide authoritative reactions and ideas. In meantime, hope above will be helpful.

*G. A. C. Jr.*  
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

cc: Secretary Rusk  
Secretary McNamara  
General Wheeler

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

13

Wed., Jan. 31, 1968  
4:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

A conference call is being arranged at 5:00 p. m. our time this afternoon between you and Amb. Bunker and Gen. Westmoreland.

The call will be on an open line because while Gen. Westmoreland is in his headquarters at MACV, Amb. Bunker is in his house. It is dark in Saigon. Gen. Wheeler believes it would be unwise and unsafe to ask either of them to leave his quarters at the present time to join the other.

Unless you rule to the contrary, we shall go forward on this basis.

W. W. R.



ACTION

14

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
4:15 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Sec. Rusk asks your confirmation of his talking points for tomorrow with Congressman Mills in Little Rock.

W. W. Rostow

Approved \_\_\_\_\_

Disapproved \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

WWRostow:rla

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

14a 439

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conversation with Congressman Mills

Joe Fowler, Bill Roth and I are going to Little Rock tomorrow to discuss trade issues with Wilbur Mills. If you approve, I would propose to make the following points to him:

1. The President has indicated his determination to improve our trade account. On the other hand, he does not wish to take any action that might undermine our basic trade policy or unravel the results of the Kennedy Round. He is deeply concerned that any action taken precipitately and unilaterally could begin a downward spiral which could restrict rather than expand world trade.

2. The Administration is still considering several alternatives:

- A. A 2% border tax adjustment on imports and exports based on State indirect taxes;
- B. Asking the GATT for a waiver to permit a 2% border tax adjustment because of balance of payments reasons;
- B Prime. A similar adjustment on the import side only of 2-1/2%. This might be done without legislation.

Alternatively there is a possibility--although not a strong one--that the Europeans will offer expansionary action themselves in order to avoid restrictive measures by the U.S. This action could be: acceleration of the Kennedy Round, untying aid, reducing border tax adjustments, stepping up domestic economic growth, etc.

3. We propose to go to the Europeans late this week, explain our problem, and describe the trade measures we are now considering (Alternatives A, B, and B Prime above). It is essential that we get a better reading than we presently have as to what extent they will stand still without retaliation if the US--and if other countries emulating the US--should go down any of these particular roads.

Germany's attitude will be crucial. We propose to initiate our consultations there with a letter from the President to Kiesinger.

4. Given the unpredictability of possible trade actions by others and the importance and delicacy of what we are trying to achieve, it is clearly in the US interest for the President and the responsible Congressional officials to have these readings before making a final decision on our next move. This move could be either a direct US action, or quite possibly negotiations to carry through on European expansionary action--if we thought that serious and substantial--or to lay a more manageable basis in the GATT for US legislative or executive action.

5. In light of the need for further urgent discussions, both bilaterally in Europe and in the GATT, we will not be prepared to discuss the specific alternative proposals with the Ways and Means Committee next Monday. We would, however, keep in close contact with the Chairman as our negotiations and planning progress.



Dean Rusk

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve

\_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

15

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

You might wish to read what I had just finished dictating before you put me to work on the Friday message.

I shall drop the Kesygin draft letter; although you might wish to send a letter to him simultaneously with your message to Congress.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 1-29-92



152

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
11:45 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

1. I gave some quiet thought last night to our position in the face of the crises in Viet Nam and Korea; and, also, to the enemy's view of our position.

2. In general, it appears to be his judgment that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to get the war in Viet Nam off our necks, so that we are likely to accept not defeat, but what I might call unbalanced or "double standard" behavior. For example:

-- a degree of humiliation in order to get the men of the PUEBLO and the ship back;

-- a defensive stance in the face of increasing incursions across the 38th parallel and the attack on President Park;

-- gross and open violations of the DMZ at the 17th parallel without our moving ground forces into North Viet Nam;

-- increasingly overt violation of Laos and Cambodia, despite international obligations to the contrary;

-- a formula for negotiations which premises, in effect, nothing but talk for a major military act -- the end of the bombing of North Viet Nam.

3. In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on a single standard in the application of rules of international law and the terms of international agreements.

4. Before proposing a course of action, I believe we must wait a few days to see what we get out of the Rumanian (who arrives in Bucharest tomorrow, February 1st) and out of the North Koreans at Panmunjom. Right now, therefore, I am not proposing a course of action.

5. But let us assume that the Rumanian gives us an unsatisfactory answer, while urging us to keep the channel open; and that the North Koreans demand some kind of phony apology based on the Captain's "confession" in order to get our men and ship back. In the circumstances, I believe, we should consider three courses of action which would represent not a radical change in our present policy, but a stiffening of that policy. The three actions would be:

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSI 10-25-80; NSC 8-4-80

By JK/ry, NARA, Date 1-31-92

-- a letter to Kossygin (I attach at Tab A a rough draft to give you the flavor of what I have in mind);

-- a somewhat toughened set of military moves in both Viet Nam and Korea, the exact character of which we would have to work out with the JCS and Defense;

-- going to the Congress and the country on the theme of "a single standard" asking for support for a limited group of additional measures, but in so doing signaling to the world this stiffening of the national spine.

6. If you decided to move down this path in the days ahead you would, I am sure, wish to get as much of the Congressional Leadership aboard from the beginning as possible -- and possibly even groups like the Douglas Committee, labor and business leaders, etc.

15/  
never

INFORMATION

**SECRET**

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
11:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an account of Prime  
Minister Wilson's talk with Brezhnev.

It is mainly interesting because  
Brezhnev has been less accessible than  
Westerners than Kosygin.

Brezhnev -- as opposed to Wilson --  
is to be found in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 94-473  
By Slip NARA, Date 4/24/96

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

16a

1. Following is a summary of the Prime Minister's discussion with Brezhnev about Vietnam on 23 January, 1968.

2. Taking the Trinh statement of 30 December as his starting point, the Prime Minister stressed that President Johnson had made it clear at San Antonio that the bombing would stop providing that the Americans could be sure that serious talks would follow promptly. Possibly the San Antonio position had not been fully understood in Hanoi where there might be an impression that the bombing would only stop if the President were satisfied that there would be a satisfactory outcome to the talks. This appeared to have been Mr. Kosygin's view and the Prime Minister had sought to put him right. Obviously there could be no guarantee of a satisfactory outcome and the two sides opening positions were far apart. In any talks, each side would have to listen to the other and take the other's position into account as well as their own. But the U. S. insistence was on two points:

- (a) As soon as it was evident that the bombing had stopped, serious talks must begin promptly and in good faith;
- (b) While the talks were in progress there would be no bombing of the North but equally the North Vietnamese should not take any military advantage in consequence.

The British and Soviet governments should concentrate on this situation: both knew that the two sides were making serious efforts to probe the issue. The Prime Minister was confident that neither U. K. nor the Soviet Union would wish to do anything to make these exchanges more difficult. However, given their close contacts with, and influence on, Hanoi, possibly the Soviet Government could establish -- and tell us -- what problems presented the greatest difficulties there.

3. Once there was a decision to set talks going, the next stage might be to see whether the two co-chairmen could help in any way by providing facilities to the two sides, or whether the latter preferred to handle matters differently. Whether or not the Russians still believed that they should not establish what the co-chairman might do if the North Vietnamese and Americans reached agreement on a cessation of bombing followed by talks, the co-chairmen ought now to consider whether they could make a serious offer to help, once the two sides had decided to hold talks. It was accepted that neither the Russians nor the British were negotiating on behalf of Hanoi or Washington. But clarifications could be useful. The differences between the positions of the two sides were now very narrow: agreement might be close provided only that confidence could be achieved by each side in what the other was saying. The Anglo/Soviet purpose should be to build up that confidence.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 09-156 (#62.)  
By *isl* NARA, Date 12-11-09



4. Mr. Brezhnev replied that the situation was unpredictable unless the Americans ended the war. Two points stood repetition from what he had said to the Prime Minister two years ago: first that attacks had not been launched by North Vietnam; but the Americans were bombing them. Secondly, while neither the British nor the Russians were empowered to negotiate they were major states who should try to end the bloodshed. For this purpose, each of them should, singly or jointly, do all they could. The Russians wanted the "aggression" brought to an end, but equally they say no need to conceal their assistance to North Vietnam, though this was designed solely to help the latter defend itself and not to widen the conflict. There was a contrast between the British Government's professions that they sought a peaceful solution and the British posture of full support for the United States; he regretted that there was no open condemnation by the British Government of United States policy and that we were giving full support, e. g., by helping to transport American military cargoes and allowing Hong Kong to be used as a leave and supply base. President Johnson had made a number of apparently peaceful speeches, but had taken no practical steps to end the war or start negotiations. By contrast the North Vietnamese had taken several constructive steps, e. g., the Trinh statement. Furthermore, the Liberation Front program should be taken into account: it contained many constructive suggestions; but the U. S. and Britain had ignored it. San Antonio had in effect laid down political pre-conditions for negotiation; terms such as "fruitful" or "productive" were vague and meaningless. Could not the Prime Minister suggest something new? The fact that Hanoi had agreed to negotiate showed their desire for positive results and the Russians favored talks, but the decision rested with Hanoi. He urged the Prime Minister to join in pressing President Johnson to end the bombing and negotiate. The Soviet people fully agreed with the British Government that their two countries should try to extinguish the flames of war everywhere, but this required policies consistent with that objective.

5. Mr. Brezhnev continued that the United States Government were seeking at present to force a negotiation on their terms. When the conference took place, a wide range of matters would come up, including the Geneva agreement, the co-chairmen's attitude, and the Liberation Front program. These were not relevant at present. He urged for a more positive and independent British role, i. e., dissociation from aggressive American policies. He hoped the Prime Minister would bring pressure to bear during his visit to Washington.

6. The Prime Minister countered Mr. Brezhnev's misrepresentation of the British position. We had supplied no military equipment for the war; Hong Kong was not being used as a base. And as regards the use of British ships, there was in fact criticism in the U. S. Congress about ships trading with Hanoi. The British Government was as anxious as the Russians to see the bombing stopped and this could happen within days or weeks. All that was

required was assurance in the minds of the Americans that purposeful talks would then follow and would not be frustrated through military advantage being taken of the cessation of bombing. San Antonio represented a big step forward. If Mr. Brezhnev still had doubts, he could ask the United States Ambassador in Moscow specifically whether the Americans would undertake to stop the bombing if North Vietnam agreed to enter into prompt talks, i. e., talks held in good faith with the purpose of achieving this and with no military advantage taken by either side.

7. After asking why President Johnson could not make direct contact with Hanoi, Mr. Brezhnev supported Mr. Kosygin's proposal for a working group to consider a possible formula on Vietnam. The Prime Minister agreed without commitment and repeated his interpretation (which was authoritative) of the San Antonio speech: that it did not lay down any pre-conditions except that eventual talks should be held promptly after the cessation of bombing and in good faith. Of course President Johnson could not lay down in advance what the outcome of the talks would be.

###

INFORMATION

17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday, January 31, 1968  
11:10 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Gen. Taylor comments  
redoubtably on the strategic views of  
Senator Edward Kennedy.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rg, NARA, Date 1-29-92

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 30, 1968

17a  
**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4**  
**NJ 94-457**  
**By CB, NARA, Date 6-27-95**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In conformance with your instructions of yesterday, I have read the speech of Senator Edward Kennedy, delivered in Boston on January 25. I was about to start a detailed analysis of the arguments when I received a copy of Ambassador Bunker's splendid cable (Saigon's 17179) in which he dissects the Senator's speech with greater effectiveness and authority than I am capable of. I agree with him completely and will only add the following thoughts bearing upon the Senator's proposal to make fundamental changes in our military strategy and tactics.

In essence, Kennedy belongs to the "de-escalation school" who wish to reduce tensions and minimize losses by the avoidance of offensive action and by passage to a defensive posture in protection of centers of civilian population. This resembles the Gavin-Galbraith thinking although it has some special twists of its own.

Like all proposals to pull back and avoid seeking contact with the enemy, this course of action would take the pressure off his units in South Viet-Nam and would allow them to reorganize, refit, and regain strength. It would encourage them at a time when their strength is fading and would foster the illusion in Hanoi that the Americans are about to change course. It would break the momentum which General Westmoreland has built up with such effort over the recent months and would tend to bring about that alleged stalemate which the critics complained about last year. At that time, they used the allegation to support the thesis that this is a war which can not be won and hence should be abandoned. A de-escalation on the Kennedy plan could create a genuine stalemate which would then be used as a reason for withdrawal. I can only view such pull-back tactics as the initial step to a pull-out.

I know of no professional military men who have been on the ground in Viet-Nam who support such proposals. They are familiar with the lesson of military history that an energetic offensive, properly conducted, shortens combat and thereby reduces loss of life and property. A defensive, on the other hand, invites slow but costly attrition, progressive discouragement, mounting loss of morale and eventual defeat.

*MDT*  
M. D. T.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Wednesday, January 31, 1968

*Presfile*

MR. PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Klaus Schuetz (Thursday,  
Feb. 1, 11:30 a.m.): Additional Information

The Federal Republic of Germany has just informed us that the Soviets sent them a new note on January 29. The key Soviet demands were that the FRG conclude a renunciation of force agreement with East Germany, recognize existing European frontiers and renounce "illegal encroachments" on West Berlin. The Soviets imply that acceptance of these conditions will lead to progress on other matters such as trade.

Schuetz will probably be aware of this note. If he raises the subject, you may wish to respond along the lines of your comments regarding our view of the January 6 Soviet note.

W. W. Rostow

MWG:mst

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 95-361

By LEG, NARA Date 11-8-96

19  
INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Wednesday - January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Cuba - Castro Purges "Old"-Communist "Microfaction"

Last week Castro convened an unprecedented three-day meeting of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party. It concerned alleged treason by a group of "old" communists (pre-Castro vintage) working within the regime to discredit Cuban policy at home and abroad. The group is also charged with seeking Soviet pressure on Castro to force him to adhere to Moscow's line.

The indictment in the Central Committee was made by Castro's brother, Raul. It specifies contacts made by the "microfaction" with named officials of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, thereby implicating these governments.

With the exception of two persons who figured prominently in the top echelons of the pre-Castro Communist Party, those detained are small-fry "old" communists. Most of them had been separated from their official positions or been publicly criticized during the past twelve months. The leader of the group -- Anibal Escalante -- had fallen from grace in 1962. At the time he was the chief organizer of Castro's new national party ORI. He was accused then of stacking the ORI leadership with "old" communists. He was banished to Czechoslovakia for two years, returning to Cuba in 1964 where he has held only minor positions in the agricultural sector.

The question arises why Castro has again picked on discredited Escalante at this particular time when things have gone so badly for his revolutionary program in Latin America and his economic dependence on the Soviets is increasing. There are two tentative explanations:

- The number of doubters in the regime may be increasing and Castro wanted to warn them that they cannot succeed against his effective security apparatus (Raul Castro's indictment makes a big point of how the group was under careful surveillance since mid-1966.)

-- Taking a whack at the "old", Moscow-line communists, is a convenient way to tell the Soviets not to try to undermine him or exert too much economic pressure to conform to what Moscow wants him to do. (This is given added credence by the Central Committee coupling announcement of Cuba's non-participation in the Budapest meeting of Communist Parties with the purge.)

The purge marks a new low in Cuban-Soviet relations, but we have no reason to think that it is reaching the breaking point. The Soviets have put up with Castro's defiance before and are likely to do so again -- at least until the new Soviet Ambassador, a very senior Foreign Office fellow who is due to arrive in Havana next month, has had a try at patching up differences.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1968

20

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rostow

Herewith Gen. Westmoreland's telephonic answers to the President's questions.

1. Casualties to date

From the beginning of the planned truce at 6 P. M., 29 January, the following casualties have been suffered by us or inflicted on the enemy:

- Friendly: 421 killed in action, including 189 U. S.
- Enemy: 4,320 killed in action  
1,811 detainees, many of whom are prisoners of war

2. Enemy capacity to sustain present campaign

We see this as a 3-phase campaign.

The first phase involved build-up, sporadic attack, and a well-orchestrated psychological warfare program against the population.

We are now in the second phase, which is an all-out military effort throughout South Viet Nam, except for the two northern provinces. The enemy has achieved some local successes, but the initiative is turning against them. However, we feel that he has the capability of continuing this phase for perhaps several more days at great risk to himself.

The third phase will involve a massive attack in Quang Tri and Quang Nam provinces. The enemy is now poised for this phase which he considers his decisive campaign. Our air strikes have blunted his attack, but we still give him the capability to strike at any time with large forces supported by an abundance of artillery and rockets.

3. Relationship between North Vietnamese and North Korean actions

It would seem to us there is a relationship.

4. Is there a military impasse in South Viet Nam?

We do not think the situation in South Viet Nam is at an impasse, since the initiative is turning in favor of the government and the allies, and the enemy is suffering unprecedented casualties, indeed.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 5.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1983

By lg, NARA, Date 1-29-92

**5. Is the enemy holding any towns in South Viet Nam now?**

**The enemy does not control any single town in South Viet Nam.**

**However, he has some degree of control in several towns. Specifically, he now has forces in Quang Tri, Hue, Day Xuan, Kontum City, Chau Phu and Ben Tre, and scattered elements in Saigon.**

**I repeat, he does not control any single town. In those areas where the enemy has troops, they are confronted by Vietnamese troops and fighting continues.**

**6. What political and psychological problems do Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland foresee?**

**It seems to Ambassador Bunker and me that initially there will be some adverse psychological impact on the people and the government. However, if the government handles the matter carefully, they can use the opportunity to improve their position with the people.**

**President Thieu has the opportunity to exercise rare leadership.**

**The National Assembly has the opportunity to be more constructive.**

**President Thieu has declared martial law, but this will have to be approved by the Assembly after 12 days in accordance with the Constitution. The situation should not slow down major programs for a prolonged period. It will harden the government's position on negotiations with the Front. It may set back civilianization of the government.**

**Military success should give the Army of South Viet Nam and its leadership self-confidence and should encourage the acceleration of their improvement.**

**ROBERT M. GINSBURGH**



*Pres file*

Wednesday, January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Klaus Schuetz (Thursday, Feb. 1, 11:30 a. m.)

You met Schuetz (pronounced SHOOTZ) in Berlin in August 1961 and again at the Adenauer funeral in April 1967.

Schuetz was elected Governing Mayor of Berlin in October 1967. He has begun a vigorous campaign to correct Berlin's slipping morale and faltering economy.

He is in the U.S. to promote investment in Berlin. His worry is that our new balance of payments program will discourage such investment.

Talking Points

Berlin and Our Balance of Payments Program -- Berlin's economy and morale have been hurt by the recession in West Germany and growing uncertainty over the city's future. Unemployment is low, but the young are leaving and business investment is down. Schuetz wants new investment to reinvigorate the economy and boost morale. He will, therefore, probably ask you to exempt Berlin from our new restrictions on direct investment.

You can tell Schuetz the amount of direct investment he seeks can be met within the new program, depending on the decisions of individual companies. The program also provides for consideration of any specific problems. You may also wish to note that a strong dollar and a viable international monetary system are important to Berlin's security.

You might ask how American businessmen reacted to his presentation.

You may wish to ask Schuetz what other steps he believes could be taken to improve morale in Berlin.

Soviet Intentions in Berlin -- The Soviets sent a memorandum to Bonn on January 6 protesting growing ties between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Berlin and suggesting improved Bonn-Moscow relations would follow a reduction in the FRG's presence in Berlin. You may wish to ask Schuetz for his view of Soviet intentions.

You may wish to tell him we do not believe the Soviet memorandum offers much hope for a favorable evolution of Soviet policy toward Berlin. However, we sympathize with the FRG's desire to explore whatever slim chances exist and

expect to remain in consultation regarding an appropriate response. We and the FRG favor forward movement toward a solution of the German and Berlin problems, but not at the cost of our security.

U.S. Commitment to Berlin -- Schuets may seek a renewal of U.S. assurances to defend Berlin. You may reassure him of our determination to resist aggression and honor our commitments.

The Berlin Hospital Center -- Schuets may mention the October opening of the \$75 million Berlin Hospital Center (Klinikum). The Benjamin Franklin Foundation, a Joint German-American organization, sponsored the project and the U.S. Government contributed \$14.6 million. You may wish to assure him the U.S. will be appropriately represented at the opening ceremony.

A biographic sketch is attached.

\* \* \* \* \*

Schuets will come with Ambassador Knappstein. I will be standing by with Ed Fried. Al Puhon (Director, Office of German Affairs) will be here from State.

W. W. Rostow

Klaus Schuetz  
Governing Mayor of Berlin

\* \* \* \* \*

Klaus Schuetz was born on September 17, 1926 in Heidelberg. He came to Berlin at an early age and graduated there from High School.

In 1944 he was drafted into the German Army. His right arm is paralysed as a result of a wound suffered in World War II. From 1946 - 1948 Mr. Schuetz studied German Philology and History at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. He became a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and was one of those who rebelled against the suppression of free thought by the communists in East Berlin. In 1949 Mr. Schuetz received a scholarship from Harvard University, where he studied Political Science. From 1951 - 1959 he served on the faculty of the Institute for Political Science at the Free University in Berlin.

After being elected to the Berlin House of Representatives in 1954 and being appointed as a Delegate from West Berlin to the Bundestag in 1957, Klaus Schuetz, on December 21, 1961, became Senator for Federal Affairs in the Berlin City Government and a member of the Bundesrat, which is the Upper House of the Federal Parliament.

In his capacity as Berlin Cabinet member for Federal Affairs, Senator Schuetz represented the city's special interests in dealings with the Federal Government and with the other states of the Federal Republic.

In all these years Klaus Schuetz was closely associated with Willy Brandt. In 1961 he organized Brandt's election campaign for the Bundestag.

When in November 1966 the Social Democratic Party (SPD) entered the Grand Coalition with the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) Klaus Schuetz went to Bonn with Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Willy Brandt to serve as State Secretary in the German Foreign Office.

On October 19, 1967 the Berlin House of Representatives elected Klaus Schuetz as Governing Mayor of Berlin. On October 27 he was elected for a 12-month term as President of the Bundesrat.

Mr. Schuetz is married and has three children.

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM TO:

Secretary of State  
 Secretary of Defense  
 Director, Bureau of the Budget

*Pres file*

I have been giving every moment, aside from time spent in meetings, to quiet thought about the crises which have blown up in the last week, particularly in Viet Nam and Korea, but also some here at home.

In general, it appears to be the judgment of our enemies that we are sufficiently weak and uncertain at home, sufficiently stretched in our military dispositions abroad, and sufficiently anxious to end the war in Viet Nam so that we are likely to accept, if not defeat, at least a degree of humiliation. It is some such appreciation that must account for: his seizure of the PUEBLO; the attacks across the DMZ at the 38th parallel; the mobilization of 40,000 men at the 17th parallel; the attacks on the cities and towns and airfields in South Viet Nam.

In one way or another in the days ahead, we have to rally our country so that the enemy comes to believe that we will insist on even-handed application of rules of international law -- like the freedom of the seas -- and the terms of international agreements -- like the armistice agreements in Korea and the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962.

Before proposing a course of action, we may wish to see what the Rumanian brings us tomorrow; but it is my present judgment that we should:

- respond to Kosygin's letter on the PUEBLO;
- and strengthen our position in Viet Nam* -- strengthen our military positions in Viet Nam and Korea;
- go to the Congress and the country seeking additional support for our programs and greater unity in facing the present crises.

I would wish you, therefore, to put the ablest men who report to you at work to recommend action along these lines. Among the measures to be considered are these:

- ① -- Presidential authority to extend tours of duty, ~~and to~~
- ② call up individuals with special technical qualifications for military service;

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Authority OSD 10-25-78, NSC 8-14-80By JR/ly, NARA, Date 1-31-92

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- an extra \$100 million in military aid for South Korea; *thailand?*
- prompt lifting of the gold cover;
- prompt passage of the tax bill;
- allocation of funds for the Price Stabilization Board;
- freeing of exchange stabilization fund to defend the dollar;
- trade and tourist legislation.

I wish a preliminary report at 5:00 p. m. this afternoon, January 31, and your final recommendations tomorrow.

CONFIDENTIAL



*Open file*Limited Official Use

Wednesday - January 31, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Messages from Ecuadorean President

It seems that President Arosemena is again trying to get back into your good graces.

Attached are two personal messages to you. One expresses profound gratitude for US backing of Gale-Plaza for Secretary-General of the OAS. The other is an effusive thank you for your New Year's message.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

23a

**Ecuadorean President Arosemena's Message  
of Appreciation for US Support of Galo-Plaza as OAS Secretary-General**

"Quito - January 29, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to address myself to Your Excellency in order to express to the illustrious government of the United States and personally to you my profound gratitude for the backing which at all times you have been kind enough to give to the candidacy of Ecuador, represented in the person of ex-President Galo Plaza, for Secretary General of the OAS. The support which your government is giving is particularly valuable.

In presenting the candidacy of Sr. Plaza, my government has been concerned only with offering for the consideration of friendly countries the name of a person who fulfills the necessary conditions to carry out effectively and successfully the functions of the Secretary General of the OAS, since Ecuador is determined that the inter-American system should achieve the necessary strength for the maintenance of continental peace and security, and should promote more fraternal and expedient cooperation on an economic and social plane for the benefit of the great Latin American masses.

Accept, Your Excellency, my thanks and those of my government as well as the good wishes which I offer in a most sincere and auspicious manner for the success of your difficult and complex task in the Presidency of the illustrious people of the United States, with which we are bound by tight bonds of friendship and understanding.

I take this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the testimony of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

/s/ Otto Arosemena Gomez  
Constitutional President of the Republic  
of Ecuador."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By up, NARA Date 11/25-96

**Acknowledgement of President Arosemena of Ecuador  
to the President's New Year's Greeting**

" Quito - January 26, 1968

Mr. President:

I am sincerely grateful for your kind message on the occasion of the New Year, and, in turn, I express my best wishes for your personal health and that of your illustrious family and for the greatness and prosperity of the people of the United States.

Accept, Your Excellency, the sentiments of my personal regard and friendship.

Otto Arosemena Gomez,  
President of Ecuador".

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By 128, NARA Date 11-25-96

Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 10:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

**SUBJECT: Westmoreland Reports U.S. Embassy Saigon Cleared  
of Viet Cong**

At 9:00 P.M. (EST) General Westmoreland telephoned from the U.S. Embassy compound to report that the Embassy Chancery as well as the entire compound are completely cleared of Viet Cong attackers.

In the rest of Saigon, he reports that things are now quiet. There is still some fighting at the nearby U.S. base at Ton Son Hut. This fighting at the base may be Viet Cong attempting to get out of the area. He reports he has all the strength needed to take care of this fighting.

Ambassador Bunker is safe but has not yet returned to his Embassy office. All Embassy civilians are safe, one marine was killed and two were wounded in the action. Four Military Police were killed and three were wounded. Nineteen Viet Cong were killed in the fighting.

Damage to the Embassy building is minimal. There was no structural damage but part of the lobby was destroyed and the outside of the building damaged.

General Westmoreland reconstructs the operation as follows: At about 3:00 A.M. Saigon time a Viet Cong platoon of about twenty men dressed in civilian clothes and armed with automatic weapons, rockets, satchel charges and explosives, attacked the Embassy compound. They made a hole in the outer wall through which they crawled. Their purpose was apparently to destroy the building.

The MPs moved in, encountering sniper fire coming from buildings nearby. At about 5:00 A.M. U.S. troops moved into the compound, engaging the Viet Cong. At 8:00 A.M. a platoon of the 101 Airborne Division landed on the roof. The fighting ended about 9:00 A.M., all Viet Cong in the area believed killed.

*51*  
Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

**LATE REPORT:**

**A report just received from the Bien Hoa Airbase states that an attack by an enemy battalion has ended. Preliminary casualties are three U.S. killed and 44 wounded. Two aircraft destroyed and ten others damaged. Several buildings in the compound were damaged. Number of enemy attackers killed is unknown. All were dressed in South Vietnamese police uniforms.**



Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 10:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Profile*

SUBJECT: Westmoreland Reports U.S. Embassy Saigon Cleared  
of Viet Cong

At 9:00 P.M. (EST) General Westmoreland telephoned from the U.S. Embassy compound to report that the Embassy Chancery as well as the entire compound are completely cleared of Viet Cong attackers.

In the rest of Saigon, he reports that things are now quiet. There is still some fighting at the nearby U.S. base at Ton Son Hut. This fighting at the base may be Viet Cong attempting to get out of the area. He reports he has all the strength needed to take care of this fighting.

Ambassador Bunker is safe but has not yet returned to his Embassy office. All Embassy civilians are safe, one marine was killed and two were wounded in the action. Four Military Police were killed and three were wounded. Nineteen Viet Cong were killed in the fighting.

Damage to the Embassy building is minimal. There was no structural damage but part of the lobby was destroyed and the outside of the building damaged.

General Westmoreland reconstructs the operation as follows: At about 3:00 A.M. Saigon time a Viet Cong platoon of about twenty men dressed in civilian clothes and armed with automatic weapons, rockets, satchel charges and explosives, attacked the Embassy compound. They made a hole in the outer wall through which they crawled. Their purpose was apparently to destroy the building.

The MPs moved in, encountering sniper fire coming from buildings nearby. At about 5:00 A.M. U.S. troops moved into the compound, engaging the Viet Cong. At 8:00 A.M. a platoon of the 101 Airborne Division landed on the roof. The fighting ended about 9:00 A.M., all Viet Cong in the area believed killed.

Bromley Smith

ACTION

Tuesday, January 30, 1968  
8:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft reply to Gov. Guy  
on the Pueblo.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

24-10  
January 30, 1968

Dear Bill:

I thank you for your views on the Pueblo incident contained in your telegram, and I recognize the charitable spirit which prompted it.

You can be sure that this matter will be kept, as you recommended, in "proper perspective." I believe that the extensive efforts we have made, and are continuing to make, to find a reasonable and peaceful solution speak for themselves.

But it must be evident that it is not we who are "rattling our sabres." It is not we who seized the ship of another nation while it sailed through international waters. It is not we who have taken into custody the seamen of another nation. Nor is it we, or our South Korean allies, who have sent assassination squads into the territory of a neighboring state to murder the leader of that state.

It may be true, as you say, that "in time the crew of the Pueblo will come home." I pray that it will be true. I intend to do everything within my power to see that it is true. But what is "in time?"

It cannot be too soon for the brave officers and men who have been seized and held illegally by North Korea. I am certain it cannot be too soon for their wives and children and parents. It cannot be too soon for any American.

As their Commander-in-Chief, I have an obligation to these men. I have an obligation, too, to many others engaged in hazardous duties elsewhere. They have a right to know that if they fall victims to the illegal actions of others, every reasonable step will be taken to protect their interests and to secure their prompt release. I intend to carry out that obligation.

Sincerely,


The Honorable  
William L. Gay  
Governor of North Dakota  
Bismarck, North Dakota

- 2 -

LBJ:WJJ:cjf

As their Commander-in-Chief, I have an obligation to these men. I have an obligation, too, to many others engaged in hazardous duties elsewhere. They have a right to know that if they fall victims to the illegal actions of others, every reasonable step will be taken to protect their interests and to secure their prompt release. I intend to carry out that obligation.

Sincerely,



Enjoyed seeing you this morning and look forward to your return to the Governor's meeting later.

L -

The Honorable  
William L. Guy  
Governor of North Dakota  
Bismarck, North Dakota



26c

↑

1968 JAN 29 PM 3 43

WA142 PD

BISMARCK NDAK 29 937A CST

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEAR MR PRESIDENT HISTORY IS CLUTTERED WITH TRADEGY WHERE MEN  
AND NATIONS PLACED PRIDE ABOVE REASON. IN TIME THE CREW OF  
THE PUEBLO WILL COME HOME, AND PERHAPS IN TIME THE NORTH KOREANS  
WILL HAVE THE JOB OF SCRAPING THE BARNACLES OFF THE PUEBLOS  
HULL, AND WE CAN LOOK BACK AND WONDER WHAT WAS THE EXCITEMENT  
ABOUT I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE PUEBLO INCIDENT BE REDUCED

TO PROPER PROSPECTIVE AND THAT THE UNITED STATES TAKE THIS  
GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND WITH A MASSIVE PEACE IN THIS  
WORLD OFFENSIVE RATHER THAN THE RATTLING OF OUR SABRES  
RESPECTFULLY

WM L GUY GOVERNOR OF NDAK.

INFORMATION

27

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968  
5:50 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge provides a  
comforting note from history and  
encouragement to moderation on the  
Pueblo.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By rs, NARA, Date 1-29-92

27a

~~Confidential~~

January 30, 1968

TO: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H. C. Lodge*

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-470  
By *rip*, NARA, Date 3-27-95

In connection with the "Pueblo" the following may be of interest:

On May 13, 1861, the United States naval vessel "San Jacinto" fired a shot across the bow of the British Royal Mail packet "Trent," one day out of Havana and steaming through the Bahama channel. When the "Trent" did not slow down, the American sloop sent a shell that burst right in front of the bow.

The "Trent" then hove to and Captain Wilkes, U.S. Navy, sent a party to board her and remove the two Confederate Commissioners to Great Britain and France, respectively, Mason and Slidell, who were then imprisoned on an island in Boston harbor.

The event created an uproar on both sides of the Atlantic. In the northern states Captain Wilkes was a hero and anyone who even suggested releasing Mason and Slidell were fiercely denounced.

In England, public opinion was in an uproar because the United States had humiliated the British flag on the

high seas and had violated international law The air was filled with reports of England and the United States going to war.

President Lincoln was caught between the understandable pressure of the British due to our illegal act on the one hand and of the patriotic fervor of the Americans on the other. Finally, after an enormous amount of excitement and travail Lincoln told Seward, the Secretary of State: "One war at a time." "It was very humiliating", Lincoln said later, "but we had one big war on our hand and we didn't want two at the same time."

The humor of Lincoln's statement plus its brevity, simplicity and wisdom meant that Mason and Slidell were released, reaching their destination some eighty days later than they had intended. Carl Sandburg says that Lincoln "refused to yield an inch to the public clamor and the press outcry for war" and "held with tenacious humility to his policy declared in five words: "One war at a time".

While the circumstances concerning the "Pueblo" are different in many ways, it is similar in one respect: we don't want another war.

Tues., Jan. 30, 1967  
5:45 p. m.

28

Mr. President:

Herewith Ambassador Ledge provides  
some further thoughts on Senator  
Ted Kennedy's position.

*Pres file*

W. W. R.

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~ attachment (log 414)

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By eg, NARA, Date 1-29-92



28a

214

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NEJ 94-117  
By isg, NARA, Date 9-14-95

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 30, 1968

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

To: The President

From: H. C. Lodge

*H.C. Lodge*

Herewith some further thoughts about Senator Edward Kennedy's speech:

1. There is truth in what he says about corruption and three-hour siestas. Ambassador Bunker, therefore, might be able to make good use of Senator Kennedy's speech as he continually seeks to persuade the Government of Viet-Nam to press on with its efforts against corruption and in favor of a hard-hitting conduct of the war. He could show the speech to Thieu as an example of what one prominent American thinks and the concern of the American people in the need for progress in the non-military sides of the war.
2. It should be noted that Senator Kennedy's speech praises the considerable increases for the refugee and health programs.
3. Senator Kennedy's speech is weak in three ways:
  - a) It ignores the very real progress in the non-military field, and
  - b) When he was asked on "Face the Nation" what he would do if the Government of Viet-Nam failed to respond to his demands, his answer trailed off because he will not follow the logic of his position to the point of an American.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

- 2 -

withdrawal. It therefore boils down to this: he wants us to ask the Vietnamese Government to do things which we have been after them to do ever since 1963 and, when you consider where we were at that time, with considerable success. It is just as erroneous to overlook the progress of the past as it is to overlook the problems of the future.

- c) He is obviously not clear in his mind on whether the Viet-Nam war is a vital American interest. In one place he says we are there so as to help the Vietnamese -- as though it were not really an American problem. Yet he will not cross the Rubicon of urging an American withdrawal if the Vietnamese fail to do what he wants.

~~TOP SECRET - NODIS~~

INFORMATION

29

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968  
5:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

These two intelligence reports are worth  
a glance.

1. State's INR evaluates Soviet policy  
towards the Pueblo.
2. Silhanek debates the Soviet Ambassador  
in a lively way.

W. W. Rostow

INR Note 75, January 29, 1968

25X1A

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 001-258-2-23  
By 8 NARA, Date 8/11/03

WWRostow:rlh



## U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Intelligence  
Note - 75

29

January 29, 1968

To : The Secretary  
Through: S/S  
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

①

Rostow

Subject: The Emerging Soviet Line on the Pueblo Incident

Soviet public and private remarks in recent days have thrown some light on how Moscow will be dealing with the Pueblo incident. The USSR appears anxious to preserve a public posture of non-involvement, while at the same time trying to dissipate any sense of urgency in the case and thereby to dissuade the US from taking any action against North Korea. In giving full public support to Pyongyang, the USSR has not committed itself to any specific course of action as the situation develops.

At the United Nations. The Security Council speech of Soviet representative Morozov on January 26 fully supported North Korean contentions that the Pueblo violated DPRK territorial waters. In private, Morozov has told Western representatives that although the USSR is not prepared to act as an intermediary or to come up with new ideas, it does favor a peaceful solution to the crisis and does not exclude the possibility of action in the UN. He told Ambassador Goldberg on January 28 that he desires to continue conversations with the US at the Security Council. He stated, however, that he was not authorized to conduct bilateral negotiations with the US on the problem.

This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-153

By gpljw, NARA, Date 2/21/96

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

US "Aggravation of Tensions." Morozov and other Soviet representatives have claimed that US military moves in the area of Korea make a peaceful solution to the problem more difficult. The Soviet Ambassador in Brussels carried this further by stating that if US actions were less "threatening," it would be easier for the USSR to do something. Considerable Soviet propaganda has been devoted to the theme that the US is "aggravating tensions" in the Far East, and commentary on the reserve call-up announced on January 26 has charged that the US is "fanning war hysteria."

Playing Down the Incident. The general tenor of Soviet remarks thus far has been that the Pueblo incident is primarily a bilateral US-North Korean matter which should not be allowed to get out of hand. Kosygin is reported by Reuters to have told Indian Prime Minister Gandhi that the incident should be regarded as routine or unimportant. A Soviet official in New Delhi and the Soviet military attache in the US have asserted that the best solution might be for the US to acknowledge its guilt and pay a fine to North Korea. These spokesmen have sought to give the impression that North Korea might be amenable to such an arrangement, without, however, committing either Moscow or Pyongyang to any particular position on the return of the Pueblo or its crew.

The Emerging Line. At this point the USSR appears to continue to hope that it can avoid direct involvement in the Pueblo affair



- 3 -

and that it can draw out diplomatic discussions so that more distasteful steps can be avoided. By minimizing the importance of the incident and directing propaganda against the US military buildup in the Korean area, the Soviets are attempting to deter the US from taking military action. This position would also serve to enhance Soviet propaganda possibilities if the US did take military action by making the latter seem disproportionate to the seriousness of the incident. Despite their evident concern over the situation, the Soviets probably have not sought to influence the North Korean position, largely because they recognize the tenuousness of their position in Pyongyang and realize that advice tendered there would not be favorably received. Moscow is probably delaying as long as possible the proffering of unsolicited advice to its North Korean ally and for the present may be relying on North Korea's knowledge of the US military buildup in the area to be at least as influential in Pyongyang as any Soviet advice could be.

Long-Term Outlook. The Soviets are now maneuvering for time for the North Koreans. Ideally, the USSR probably hopes this time can be used to find a solution to the problem which will enable the North Koreans to avoid even the appearance of backing down. Moscow, moreover, probably hopes that it can point to its diplomatic efforts as contributing to this solution. At the same time, however, the USSR probably recognizes that in the end Pyongyang will have to show

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

- 4 -

some flexibility; Moscow would probably regard this as a salutary development, since it might help to temper North Korea's intransigence and would prevent Pyongyang from drawing the conclusion that an aggressive policy is always a successful one.

~~SECRET~~/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-018-028-6-4-5

296

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -39313

PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

STATE/INR	DIA	NMCC/MC	(SECDEF	JCS	ARMY	NAVY	AIR)	CIA/NMCC	NIC	NSA	SDO	ONE	CR
								OER	FBIS	DCS	IRS	AID	USI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

25X1

GROUP  
Excluded from  
downgrading  
and  
declassification

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED

~~SECRET~~

CITE TDCS

DIST 29 JANUARY 1968

COUNTRY: 25X1A IA/USSR/NORTH VIETNAM

DOI: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: SIHANOUK'S REMARKS TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR  
TO CAMBODIA REGARDING A DESIRED REINFORCE-  
MENT OF ICC, SPECULATION THAT CHINA WOULD  
NOT OPPOSE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HIS  
ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THE USSR TO WORK TOWARD  
NEGOTIATIONS  
25X1A

ACQ: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

25X1X

SUMMARY: ON 11 JANUARY 1968 PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK  
CHIDED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA FOR FAILURE

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Approved For Release 2001/08/24 : NLJ-018-028-6-4-5

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 018-028-6-4  
By CP, NARA, Date 3/19/02

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem. controls)

OF THE USSR TO HELP SIHANOUK TO REINFORCE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. SIHANOUK ALSO TOLD THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR THAT HE WAS CERTAIN COMMUNIST CHINA WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD STIPULATE INDEPENDENCE FOR BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND DEPARTURE OF THE AMERICANS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. SIHANOUK URGED THAT THE USSR MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, CLAIMING THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM ITS WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE AS SOON AS BOMBING AND OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM CEASED. DURING THE DISCUSSION THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TOLD SIHANOUK THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS FREE TO NEGOTIATE BUT THAT TIME IS WORKING FOR NORTH VIETNAM, NOT THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NEVER LOSE EVEN IF THE WAR SHOULD LAST ANOTHER 10 YEARS. SIHANOUK'S REPLY WAS THAT THIS WOULD MEAN RUIN FOR ALL EXCEPT CHINA AND THE USSR. END SUMMARY.

1. ON 11 JANUARY 1968, IN AN AUDIENCE GRANTED THE  
SERGEY M. KUDRYAVTSEV,  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CAMBODIA, /PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK  
TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT IF THE USSR DID NOT HELP HIM  
REINFORCE THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (ICC),

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem controls)

SIHANOUK WOULD BEGIN TO THINK THAT THE USSR IS IN CONNIVANCE WITH NORTH VIETNAM AND WANTS TO DRAG CAMBODIA INTO THE WAR. IN REPLY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR DENIED THAT THIS WAS THE USSR'S INTENTION AND CITED THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON THE ICC. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURE SIHANOUK UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS NOT IN THE USSR'S INTEREST TO ASSIST THE UNITED STATES; AND THAT WHILE THE USSR WANTS THE WAR IN VIETNAM TO END, THE WAR SHOULD NOT END TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF NORTH VIETNAM NOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NLF). THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT NEGOTIATIONS MUST TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND THIS WAS THE MINIMUM THAT NORTH VIETNAM OR THE NLF COULD ACCEPT, ADDING THAT NORTH VIETNAM AND THE NLF "ARE DEFENDING THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND THEIR FREEDOM."

2. ON THE SUBJECT OF WHAT COMMUNIST CHINA'S REACTION WOULD BE TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, SIHANOUK SAID THAT HE WAS CERTAIN CHINA WOULD NOT BE OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDED THE NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT RECOVERING INDEPENDENCE FOR BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM



~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem. controls)

INCLUDED DEPARTURE OF THE AMERICANS FROM SOUTH VIETNAM. SIHANOUK MAINTAINED THAT AS LONG AS THE AMERICANS REFUSE TO UNDERSTAND THIS POSITION, THE CHINESE WILL ENCOURAGE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE, IN PARTICULAR, TO CONTINUE THE WAR. SIHANOUK COMMENTED HERE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE NLF, WHICH IN AUGUST 1967 HAD MADE POLITICAL DECISIONS CONTRARY TO COMMUNIST CHINESE PRINCIPLES. HE ADDED THAT CHINA WOULD BE CONTENT WITH ITS PROTECTION OVER NORTH VIETNAM, SINCE "IT MUST BE ADMITTED THAT CHINA'S INTERNAL SITUATION IS NOT VERY BRILLIANT."

3. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TOLD SIHANOUK THAT THE USSR WOULD OFFER NO OPPOSITION IF NORTH VIETNAM DECIDED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR NEGOTIATION. HOWEVER, THE USSR WOULD NOT ENCOURAGE, BUT RATHER WOULD OPPOSE, A "SUICIDE" BY NORTH VIETNAM.

4. SIHANOUK ENCOURAGED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO BEGIN MOVING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAD CONFIRMED TO HIM PERSONALLY THAT ITS LEADERS WERE IN AGREEMENT TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AS SOON AS BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM AND ALL OTHER

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification)

(dissem. controls)

ACTS OF WAR AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM CEASED. SIHANOUK URGED THAT "WE MUST TAKE THIS STEP, OTHERWISE IT WILL MEAN DEATH FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR'S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT NORTH VIETNAM IS FREE TO ACT ACCORDING TO WHAT IT THINKS IS APPROPRIATE.

5. AT ONE POINT IN THE DISCUSSION THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STATED THAT TIME IS WORKING FOR NORTH VIETNAM, NOT FOR THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THE SITUATION HAS REACHED A STAGE WHERE NORTH VIETNAM WILL NEVER LOSE EVEN IF THE WAR SHOULD LAST ANOTHER 10 YEARS. SIHANOUK REPLIED, "THIS MEANS RUIN FOR ALL OF US (IN SOUTHEAST ASIA) EXCEPT FOR THE CHINESE AND YOU."

25X1A

6. ~~SECRET~~ DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV HAI

25X1

CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF ~~SECRET~~

SAIGON).

REPORT CLASS SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1

~~SECRET~~

30

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 4:10 P.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Attack on U.S. Embassy, Saigon

*Pres file*

At 3:15 P.M. our Embassy in Saigon reports that there are no Viet Cong presently within the Embassy.

There has been damage to the main lobby of the Embassy and at least one Embassy marine guard has been wounded.

Rocket-mortar fire in the area is abating.

Small arms fire continues in the Embassy area.

The Pentagon reports that as of 4:00 P.M. (EST) firing in the Embassy area has ceased.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 72987-122

By up/rg, NARA, Date 2592

31

January 30, 1968  
Tuesday, 3:15 P. M.

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Viet Cong Attack on U.S. Embassy in Saigon**

By direct telephone, NMCC has learned that in an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, several Viet Cong got into the compound.

There is one U.S. casualty, an officer in the Embassy's Political Section. The compound is under full U.S. control.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

~~SECRET~~

32

Luncheon with the President  
Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 1:00 p. m.

Agenda

1. Korea: Panmunjom Problem (Secretary Rusk)

Sitrep.

2. Korea: The U Thant Ploy (Secretary Rusk)

Sitrep.

3. Buttercup (Secretary Rusk)

Next steps: do we press the South Vietnamese to release the four?

4. Packers (Secretary Rusk)

Sitrep.

5. Other.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 3-13-79, NSC 3-2.7-80  
By ip/128, NARA, Date 2-3-92



## THE WHITE HOUSE

ACTION

WASHINGTON

Meeting with the President  
 Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 8:30 a.m.  
 Presentation to Congressional Leadership: the PUEBLO case

*Pres file*Agenda1. The facts. (General Wheeler)

Essentially, what we know about the location of the PUEBLO before, during, and after seizure, from all sources. Also: its orders; navigational gear; probabilities of error between January 10 and its seizure.

2. Questions raised and answers (Sect. McNamara and General Wheeler)-- Why was the PUEBLO on this mission?

(To get necessary intelligence concerning the activities of armed forces which have been increasingly aggressive over the past year.)

-- Why was the PUEBLO not escorted?

(It was on the high seas. If we apply the principle of escorting vessels in international waters, the scale of our naval and air forces would have to be greatly expanded; intelligence missions would become much more provocative; the chances of incidents would increase; and the minimum principles of international law and order would be undermined.)

-- Why did Capt. Bucher delay in asking for assistance?

(He thought he was being harassed, not seized. The PUEBLO sister ship, the SS BANNER, was harassed seven times over the last year. In the past four years, there were more than a hundred such harassing incidents.)

-- Why did the naval base at Yokohama not respond to the first message from the PUEBLO?

(It believed that the message transmitted at 10:52 p.m. (EST) and received at Yokohama, seemed a harassing message, as did the PUEBLO's second message.)

-- Why did the 5th Air Force not respond in the period between its notification that the PUEBLO was in danger and the arrival of the PUEBLO in Wonsan port?

(The commander of the 5th Air Force made the judgment that air operations would be ineffective or imprudent. He could not re-rig the strike aircraft in Korea in time (nor could the USS ENTERPRISE get its aircraft over Wonsan bay in time). Beyond that, the poor weather, poor late afternoon visibility, and the presence of substantial numbers of hostile aircraft made it, in the air commander's judgment, unlikely that his aircraft could do anything useful for the PUEBLO and its crew: in fact, the outcome might have been an ineffective operation against the PT boats in which U. S. aircraft and crews would have been lost, the PUEBLO and its crew additionally endangered.)

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-473

By *g/p*, NARA, Date 4/24/96

-- Why were only four U.S. aircraft in Korea?

(We have greater flexibility for the whole Pacific area if we do not tie down our aircraft in Korea itself, but keep them in Japan and Okinawa for swift deployment. As the movements of aircraft after the PUEBLO attack indicate, they can be moved into Korea in a matter of hours.)

-- Why were the aircraft in Korea and elsewhere not on the alert for this kind of event?

(It was a unique event. No one had attempted to capture one of these ships before. It was not judged a contingency worthy of the allocation of significant resources.)

3. Diplomatic action since seizure (Secretary Rusk)

- approaches to the Russians;
- demarche in all the capitals;
- UN Security Council meeting;
- Panmunjom machinery;
- future possibilities of offer of impartial arbitration.

4. Actions that might be undertaken (Secretary McNamara)

Our objective is to get back the crew and the ship; keep the South Koreans confident and willing to put an extra division into South Vietnam; and avoid the opening up of a second front.

~~We have examined a number of possible courses of military action, if diplomacy fails, to achieve the return of the men and the ship (tab A). We have not decided on any such courses of action yet.~~

~~But we may have to take certain actions that will permit us to maintain a situation of confidence in South Korea, and in particular keep them to their tentative commitment to place an extra division in South Vietnam.~~

In particular, we might be considering with the Congress:

- ~~the grant to the President of the right to extend enlistments;~~
- ~~the maintenance of some -- but by no means all -- the reinforcements we have put into the area; and~~
- ~~a substantial increase in military aid to South Korea so that it can face the possibility of increased infiltration from North Korea with confidence, while going forward with its plans to reinforce in South Vietnam.~~

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

33a

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-473  
By js, NARA Date 6-30-97

January 29, 1968

Report on Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29, 1968

Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell Taylor.

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction to Sec. Rusk's message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other "suitable international tribunal" after the men ~~on~~<sup>in</sup> the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn't work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.
2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, BLACK SHIELD, rather than DRONE, photography was recommended.
3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights to international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel -- perhaps a destroyer -- rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS BANNER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be ~~high~~ and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over a protracted period. In general, this might be an action of limited reprisal if the men and ship were not returned.

6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship -- or even the ship alone -- not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to pursue this possibility with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U.S.; ~~we~~ would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations. Not recommended.

10. Free World Economic Pressures on North Korea. The Free World's trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.

11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.

At lunch today with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:

- Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;
- The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.
- It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:
  - Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;
  - Keep the <sup>confidence</sup> ~~question~~ of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam
  - Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~



INFORMATION~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968  
7:50 a.m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy reports an extremely successful use of intelligence to identify and attack with B-52's the new, recently established senior headquarters west of the DMZ.

(Some of our best analysts suspect Gen. Giap may have taken personal command of this installation.)

Westy believes the attack may "at least delay" the major offensive in Northern I Corps.

W. W. Rostow

MAC 01430

\*We must hold this attack with highest possible security.

~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NLS 141.024.022/1  
By pc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EYES ONLY

TO: MR McCafferty  
FROM: KERNNEY

Z 302055Z ZYH ZFF-3

FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV

TO ADMIRAL SHARP CINCPAC

GENERAL WHEELER CJCS

ZEM

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MLJ-141-021-022/2  
By jc, NARA, Date 10-30-09

~~SECRET SAVIN~~ MAC 01430 EYES ONLY

IN REFERENCE TO MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE, I BELIEVE  
THAT WE HAVE STRUCK THE MAJOR NVA HQ WHICH CON-  
TROLLED ALL ENEMY UNITS IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN  
PROVINCE.

COMINT EVIDENCE IN LATE NOV REVEALED THAT A  
NEW MAJOR HQ, SENIOR TO BOTH THE DMZ FRONT AND  
TRI THIEN-HUE MR HEADQUARTERS, HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED  
AND WAS OPERATING NEAR THE DMZ. CONCOMITANTLY,  
THE DMZ AREA WAS BEING REINFORCED WITH TWO FRONT  
LINE NVA DIVISIONS, THE 304TH AND 320TH, PRESAGING  
A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

ONCE ARDF LOCATED THE NEW HQ IN EARLY JANUARY  
WEST OF THE DMZ, I DIRECTED THAT MAXIMUM INTELLI-  
GENCE COLLECTION BE TARGETED IN THE AREA. FINALLY,  
ON 28 JAN, AFTER ADDITIONAL AFDF FIXS, DETAILED  
PHOTO READOUTS, AND CAREFUL PATTERN ANALYSES, THE  
TARGET WAS SELECTED. AND, AS YOU KNOW, THE TARGET

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EYES ONLY

WAS STRUCK AT 2600Z, 30 JANUARY. SUBSEQUENT  
TACTICAL EXPLOITATION AND PHOTO READOUTS UNCOVERED  
A LARGE CAVE MEASURING AT LEAST 12 FEET BY 12 FEET.  
THIS MAY REPRESENT A PORTION OF THE MAIN HEAD-  
QUARTERS COMPLEX. PRESENT BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT  
INDICATES AT LEAST 54 SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS AS A  
RESULT OF THE B-52 STRIKE, AND FIRES ARE  
NUMEROUS.

IN ADDITION, COMINT INDICATES THAT AT LEAST  
THE HQS COMMUNICATIONS COMPLEX WAS DAMAGED. THE  
LAST RADIO CHECK MADE BY THE HQ TO HANOI HIGH COM-  
MAND (HHC) WAS AT 2430H PRIOR TO THE STRIKE. BEGIN-  
NING AT 2612, HHC HAS UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED REPEATEDLY,  
USING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES, TO CONTACT THE  
HQ. THE DMZ FRONT, THE 325C DIV, AND ELEMENTS OF MR-IV  
HAVE ALSO FAILED IN ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE HQS.

IN SUMMARY, THIS COORDINATED AIR ATTACK  
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL AND MAY HAVE  
DISRUPTED OR AT LEAST DELAYED THE ENEMY'S  
PLANS TO MOUNT A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN NORTHERN I CTZ.

EYES ONLY

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Appointment for Frank Williams

I think you will remember Frank Williams, our present Ambassador to Ghana. He was formerly Ambassador to ECOSOC in New York and before that one of Shriver's bright young men in the Peace Corps. A negro, he has a long and distinguished history as a NAACP lawyer and a civil rights activist in general.

Williams is in town on consultations this week and would like to see you. He has 90% decided to resign his post to accept an offer from Columbia University to be founder and Director of a new center for study of urban affairs. He has told nobody about this offer; he wants to be sure that you are the first to know. If you have time, he wants to explain (1) why this offer is so attractive in his particular circumstances (he wants eventually to run for office); (2) that he remains totally committed to you, and (3) that he thinks he can be of considerable use to you in New York, this year and later.

Whether you see Williams is largely a matter of domestic politics on which you need no advice from me. I should report, however, that he has been a first-class Ambassador. You may want to keep him in mind for bigger things both abroad and on the domestic front.

W. W. Rostow

Set up an appointment late this week \_\_\_\_\_

Make my apologies \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Rostow 36

Pres file

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Message to David Ben-Gurion

Former Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's wife died over the weekend and State recommends a personal message of condolence:

"Mrs. Johnson and I were saddened to learn of the death of Mrs. Ben-Gurion. Both personally and on behalf of the American people, we would like to extend to you and your family our heartfelt condolences."

I think this personal gesture toward an important Israeli figure, regardless of his present political role, is right.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

1/30/68

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



Tuesday - January 30, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION**

**SUBJECT: Message to the Sixth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference**

In the memorandum at Tab B, Bill Gaud recommends that you send a message to the Sixth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference which will meet in Rio de Janeiro March 3 - 9, 1968.

This association continues to be one of the success stories in our efforts to develop institutions in Latin America. Accumulated savings now exceed \$169,000,000 and more than 65,400 homes have been financed.

This year the Conference is expected to attract over 900 Latin American delegates and about 100 savings and loan executives from the United States. The current President of the group is Mr. Rex Baker of Houston, Texas.

You have sent messages to the Conference for their two previous meetings. Your personal interest in what they are doing is well received and appreciated.

I recommend that you approve the message which Bill Gaud proposes (Tab A).

W. W. Rostow

Approve message ☐

Disapprove message ☐

Call me ☐

**Attachments:**

Tab A - Proposed message.

Tab B - Bill Gaud's recommendation

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON

JAN 2 1968

OFFICE OF  
THE ADMINISTRATOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to the Sixth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 3-9, 1968

Last year, in your message to the Fifth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference, you noted that substantial savings had been accumulated in savings and loan associations in Latin America and that 58,500 homes had been financed. Accumulated savings now exceed \$169 million and more than 65,400 homes have been financed. This growth exceeds anything we could have hoped for seven years ago when two small associations commenced their operations.

To help maintain this momentum, the Sixth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference will be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from March 3-9, 1968. As in the past, the Conference will be jointly sponsored by A.I.D., the Inter-American Development Bank, the Inter-American Savings and Loan Union and the National League of Insured Savings Associations. The President of the Inter-American Savings and Loan Union is Mr. Rex Baker, who is known to you as the President of Southwestern Savings and Loan Association, Houston, Texas. There is a good deal of interest in the Conference. Last year about 800 persons attended from the U. S. and Latin America. This year, we expect that over 900 Latin American delegates will attend as well as 100 savings and loan executives from the United States.

Your message last year was warmly received, and your interest in the progress of the savings and loan system has been an inspiration to all those who are involved in its development. We would very much appreciate a message from you to the Sixth Conference.

A proposed message is enclosed.

/s/ William S. Gaud  
William S. Gaud

Enclosure

It gives me great pleasure to extend a greeting to the participants of the Sixth Inter-American Savings and Loan Conference. May you have every success in your deliberations designed to promote the principles of thrift and home ownership in the hemisphere.

The Alliance for Progress considers the accumulation of private savings to finance long-term home mortgages one of its major objectives. The exciting growth of the savings and loan movement in Latin America is contributing significantly to the realization of that goal.

In only seven short years the savings and loan movement has grown from two associations to 91 associations in nine Latin American countries. With a total membership of 487,000, these associations have accumulated over \$169 million in savings and have financed more than 65,400 homes.

You are to be commended for this magnificent effort to provide suitable shelter for the increasing numbers of inadequately housed families. However, much remains to be done, and we must continue to work together -- governments and private enterprise -- to provide a better place for all of our people to live.

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

*Pres file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Viscount Lambton, Wednesday,  
January 31, 5:30 p. m.

You have agreed to a brief off-the-record meeting with Viscount Lambton (addressed as Lord Lambton), at 5:30 p. m., Wednesday, January 31. This will be your first meeting with him.

Lord Lambton is visiting the United States both in his capacity as a Member of Parliament (he is Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party Foreign Affairs Committee), and as a journalist.

Talking Points

Vietnam and Korea -- Lambton is a staunch backer of U. S. policy in Vietnam -- and plans to write an article in support of this policy. His columns are carried in the mass circulation London Evening Standard and numerous foreign papers. (He will probably ask about Korea.)

The UK's Future World Role -- Since Lambton is an opposition party spokesman on international affairs, you may wish to ask him for his views on Britain's future role in the world.

You may wish to tell him:

- We regretted the decision to speed up the British pull out East of Suez and hope they will do everything they can to promote regional security arrangements in Asia and in the Persian Gulf.
- We continue to favor UK entry into the Common Market.
- We believe it is particularly important now that the UK maintain its commitments to NATO.

Cuba -- He has just returned from a visit to Cuba. You may wish to ask him for his impressions.

A brief biographic sketch is attached.

  
ERF:MWG:mst

W. W. Rostow

VISCOUNT LAMBTON

Viscount Lambton (addressed as Lord Lambton), forty-five, has been a Conservative Member of the House of Commons since 1951. The son and heir of the Earl of Durham, he and his father are members of Britain's land holding aristocracy. He is a first cousin of Alec Douglas-Home.

Lambton combines politics with journalism. His articles on international affairs command a wide readership in British and overseas press.

He is noted for his independent political views and is regarded as something of a maverick.



Tuesday  
January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Response to Senator Edward Kennedy

Bunker has come in with an excellent analysis of the weaknesses of the Kennedy speech. There is no question that an effective rebuttal is possible but there are questions as to the best way and time to do it.

One thing to bear in mind is that Kennedy plans to make a "report to the Senate" within the next couple of weeks. To the extent that we use all our ammunition now, he will doubtless shape his report to get around and to rebut our arguments. There is, therefore, an argument for holding our fire and concentrating our efforts on an effective rebuttal on his "report to the Senate."

I do not find this argument compelling, however, and I do not believe we should let his assertions lie unanswered for the two weeks or so before his Senate speech.

Kennedy's charges break into three categories:

1. The GVN performance has been inadequate.
2. We ought to make them do better or withdraw our support.
3. Our military strategy is wrong and we ought to go to a "modified enclave" strategy.

I believe all three of these assertions can better be answered from Saigon than from Washington, among other reasons because of Kennedy's pose of I-was-there-and-I-know.

I suggest that we ask Bunker to take on the rebuttal of Kennedy's charges against our civilian programs, and Westmoreland to address himself directly to Kennedy's suggestions for a military strategy. The cable from Saigon gives the position that both Ellsworth and Westy would take, and both would be very effective.

In addition, I think we should ask Bunker to arrange discreetly for a Vietnamese dignitary to answer Kennedy's really outrageous indictment of the Vietnamese

character and effort. My own suggestion is that Senator Don would be a good man for this, but we should leave the actual selection up to the Saigon mission.

In addition, we can do the following:

1. Brief Nick Katzenbach thoroughly, for he is appearing next Sunday on the same program that scheduled Kennedy last Sunday. "Face the Nation."
2. Background the "Time" and "U.S. News and World Report" correspondents on the holes in the Kennedy argument.
3. Keep Bob Kemer out of the Saigon rebuttal and hold him to use after Kennedy's speech. (Kemer is due to be in Washington from February 4 through February 20.)
4. Get someone like General Wheeler on a TV panel to dissect Kennedy's military strategy.

Finally, I think we should use the Kennedy speech to impress upon Thieu the necessity for concrete action now. I suggest we instruct Bunker to discuss this whole problem with Thieu and point out that it is politically imperative that before Kennedy makes his Senate Report we be able to point to some positive action by the GVN (activation of the Inspectorate, for example).

If you approve this general approach, we will get the necessary instructions out.

W. W. Rostow

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

MWright:wpt