

1. *[Signature]*
2. *Per file*

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Israeli Approaches on the Suez Canal

3.4(b)(1)(6)

Attached is a memo from Dick Helms saying that the [redacted] sees a new crisis brewing over the Suez Canal.

3.4(b)(1)(6)

The Israelis agreed via Jarring to allow the Egyptians to clear the southern half of the Canal enough to let 15 trapped ships out. The UN is now pressing Israel to let the Egyptians begin surveying the northern half. This could lead to re-opening the whole Canal. Eban has warned U Thant that Israel will oppose that, and this morning's firing along the northern portion of the Canal gives credence to the [redacted] statement that they will oppose by force if necessary. They see any Egyptian moves without their approval as a violation of the August cease-fire agreement.

3.4(b)(1)(6)

The [redacted] says the UAR is working secretly to clear the whole Canal without Israel's approval. He suggests that the Egyptians may provide information on the remaining obstacles in the Canal to permit Soviet vessels in Port Said to transit the Canal and present Israel with a "fait accompli."

He then said he believes Israel and the US have a common interest in keeping the northern part of the Canal blocked to keep the Soviet navy away from Yemen, Aden and the Persian Gulf.

Eppie Evron came in late last evening to state the same case and ask us informally to help relieve the pressure on them from New York to let Egyptian surveying go ahead in the northern part of the Canal. I asked him whether he was proposing keeping the Canal closed "forever" to keep the Soviets out of the Red Sea or whether Israel's desire to keep the Canal closed would end if Egypt offered to let the Israeli flag through. He said he couldn't answer.

This is serious business, and I am passing Eppie's request to Secretary Rusk. We have to be careful with the way the Israelis mix intelligence and the strategy of containing the USSR with their own bargaining interest in keeping the Canal closed. For the moment, I just want you to have this background against which to read today's stories of firing on the Canal.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President
Tuesday, January 30, 1968, 8:30 a.m.
Presentation to Congressional Leadership: the PUEBLO case

Agenda

1. The facts. (General Wheeler)

Essentially, what we know about the location of the PUEBLO before, during, and after seizure, from all sources. Also: its orders; navigational gear; probabilities of error between January 10 and its seizure.

2. Questions raised and answers (Sect. McNamara and General Wheeler)

-- Why was the PUEBLO on this mission?

(To get necessary intelligence concerning the activities of armed forces which have been increasingly aggressive over the past year.)

-- Why was the PUEBLO not escorted?

(It was on the high seas. If we apply the principle of escorting vessels in international waters, the scale of our naval and air forces would have to be greatly expanded; intelligence missions would become much more provocative; the chances of incidents would increase; and the minimum principles of international law and order would be undermined.)

-- Why did Capt. Bucher delay in asking for assistance?

(He thought he was being harassed, not seized. The PUEBLO sister ship, the SS BANNER, was harassed seven times over the last year. In the past four years, there were more than a hundred such harassing incidents.)

-- Why did the naval base at Yokohama not respond to the first message from the PUEBLO?

(It believed that the message transmitted at 10:52 p. m. (EST) and received at Yokohama, seemed a harassing message, as did the PUEBLO's second message.

-- Why did the 5th Air Force not respond in the period between its notification that the PUEBLO was in danger and the arrival of the PUEBLO in Wonsan port?

(The commander of the 5th Air Force made the judgment that air operations would be ineffective or imprudent. He could not re-rig the strike aircraft in Korea in time [nor could the USS ENTERPRISE get its aircraft over Wonsan bay in time]. Beyond that, the poor weather, poor late afternoon visibility, and the presence of substantial numbers of hostile aircraft made it, in the air commander's judgment, unlikely that his aircraft could do anything useful for the PUEBLO and its crew: in fact, the outcome might have been an ineffective operation against the PT boats in which U. S. aircraft and crews would have been lost, the PUEBLO and its crew additionally endangered.)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NY 94-473
By ig, NARA, Date 5-24-95

-- Why were only four U. S. aircraft in Korea?

(We have greater flexibility for the whole Pacific area if we do not tie down our aircraft in Korea itself, but keep them in Japan and Okinawa for swift deployment. As the movements of aircraft after the PUEBLO attack indicate, they can be moved into Korea in a matter of hours.)

-- Why were the aircraft in Korea and elsewhere not on the alert for this kind of event?

(It was a unique event. No one had attempted to capture one of these ships before. It was not judged a contingency worthy of the allocation of significant resources.)

3. Diplomatic action since seizure (Secretary Rusk)

- approaches to the Russians;
- demarche in all the capitals;
- UN Security Council meeting;
- Panmunjom machinery;
- future possibilities of offer of impartial arbitration.

4. Actions that might be undertaken (Secretary McNamara)

Our objective is to get back the crew and the ship; keep the South Koreans confident and willing to put an extra division into South Vietnam; and avoid the opening up of a second front.

We have examined a number of possible courses of military action, if diplomacy fails, to achieve the return of the men and the ship (tab A). We have not decided on any such courses of action yet.

But we may have to take certain actions that will permit us to maintain a situation of confidence in South Korea, and in particular keep them to their tentative commitment to place an extra division in South Vietnam.

In particular, we might be considering with the Congress:

- the grant to the President of the right to extend enlistments;
- the maintenance of some -- but by no means all -- the reinforcements we have put into the area; and
- a substantial increase in military aid to South Korea so that it can face the possibility of increased infiltration from North Korea with confidence, while going forward with its plans to reinforce in South Vietnam.

W. W. Rostow

ACTION

January 30, 1968

*sent thru
Harry McPherson*

Mr. President,

Attached is a memorandum from Adrian Fisher forwarding the ACDA Annual Report with a proposed transmittal letter to Congress for your signature. The report has been cleared by State and does not present any problems. As Fisher explains in his memorandum, the transmittal letter has been designed in part to assist the Geneva negotiations by emphasizing the seriousness that the United States attaches to the obligation in Article VI of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures regarding cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament..." since some of the non-nuclear weapons countries consider the Article to be too general.

If possible, Fisher would like to have the transmittal coincide with his appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 1. Although this would be helpful in supporting the NPT, the date is not critical since the report was not submitted until the middle of February last year. The fact that the report had to be substantially rewritten after the NPT was presented in Geneva accounts for its late submission.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments

Memorandum for the President
from Adrian Fisher w/2 atts

SECRET

Tuesday - January 30, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- ACTION*Free file***SUBJECT: Dominican Situation**

As you requested, I have passed word to the FBI to keep close watch on Weesin.

Regarding your question about having Averell Harriman go to the DR to talk to Balaguer, I do not think it would be a good idea. His presence would raise a lot of speculation about what the American "pre-consul" was doing in Santo Domingo. The extreme left would play this theme to discredit Balaguer.

It would be better to have someone go who has known Balaguer and whose presence would not stir up speculation. Two names come to mind -- Adolf Berle and Congressman Neil Gallagher. Gallagher visits the DR periodically. He has Balaguer's confidence and would draw the least attention.

In Covey Oliver's absence, we have discussed this matter with Bob Sayre. He believes that Gallagher would be the better of the two.

W. W. Rostow

Prefer Berle _____
 Prefer Gallagher _____
 Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
 NLJ 93-240
 By 9/14, NARA, Date 4/24/96

44

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, January 29, 1968
7:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Lodge responds
to Sen. Edward Kennedy's speech.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 18, NARA, Date 1-29-92

44a

~~NO DIS~~ SECRET
IMMEDIATE

January 29, 1968

TO: The President

FROM: H. C. Lodge *H. C. Lodge*

As per your instructions at lunch today I enclose my quick reaction to Senator Edward M. Kennedy's speech. I understand you have seen Ambassador Bunker's views and those of the Embassy Staff and I have tried not to duplicate.

typo-graphy?
Please excuse errors which are due to desire to get this to you fast.

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *RL* ON *1-29-68*

Comments on Senator Kennedy's Speech

1. He stress corruption

In every country where there is abject poverty, there is corruption. In a prosperous country ^athe job to sweep the roads, for example, is not eagerly sought after. In a poor country even the most menial job is prized and people will pay money to the man who makes the appointment in order to get the job for themselves. This means that the man who makes the appointment has a job which is prized -- because he is receiving the pitiful bribes of the very poor. Therefore he too is willing to pay to get his job. The man who appoints him in turn has to pay to get his job and so on until it gets up to the top where the graft and the bribery becomes great.

Corruption exists in all very poor countries and most Asian countries are very poor. There is corruption in Viet-Nam, as much as in any Asian country, although probably not more.

The corruption in Viet-Nam bothers the Vietnamese. In this respect Vietnamese are different from most countries

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-117

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

By lig, NARA, Date 9-14-95

in the general area where nobody is much bothered by the idea of corruption. A study made by the Embassy reveals that one of the reasons why people flocked to the first elections in September 1966 and then to the later elections in such large numbers -- over 80 percent --, braving hand grenades and rifle fire, was because they thought that by building a constitutional government they would eventually get rid of corruption. They thought that under a constitutional government there would be civil service and jobs would be given out on the basis of examinations and that there would also be elections and that politicians would compete with each other so that if one of them was corrupt, it would be revealed and exposed at election time.

This corruption is also a great worry to the people up at the top in the Government of Viet-Nam. In 1965, 1966, and 1967 Prime Minister Ky took risky steps to get rid of the most highly-placed of the corrupt officials. He obviously had no way of reaching the little ones. He went at it so hard that once it almost overthrew the Government of Viet-Nam. In all he got rid of four generals, very highly placed, who had

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

3

been engaging in corrupt practices. Also 1/10th of the total of province officials have been removed from their offices because of corruption.

Corruption is brought on by the poverty and poverty is brought on by the war. Once the war stops, the poverty will go down and so will the corruption. To talk about giving up the war and undergoing defeat in order to get rid of corruption is a terrible and dangerous confusion of thought.

The legislative leaders under the new Constitution (who have been ⁱⁿ office 3 months) have ~~further~~ ^{given} high priority to elimination of corruption.

2. He implies it's an "American war"

Included in the speech is the assumption that we are in Viet-Nam only to help the Vietnamese. He says: "We are in Viet-Nam because they are in peril; it is their country, their war, their future."

This is a preposterous statement. If it were not also an American war we would have no business being there -- and neither would the Australians, Koreans or Thais if it were not

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET NODIS~~

also an Australian war, a Korean war, and a Thai war. We sent our young men there because a change in the balance of power was threatening which endangered our vital interests. No President would ever send a soldier anywhere where this was not true

After the first big French defeat in the early 1950's Field Marshal Juin came out from Paris to look at the situation. His report was that the only way that the French could be successful would be if a national Viet-nameese army existed. There is such an army today -- 770,000 men under arms. They are not perfect; there is some slackerism; there have been some desertions. But if that army were not there, our position in Viet-Nam would be totally untenable. The existence of that army is indispensable to our presence. Without that army Viet-Nam would be conquered -- with all that that implies not only for the Vietnamese but for us too.

Also, of 142,562 men inducted into the Vietnamese armed forces last year, 101,317, or more than 2/3, were voluntary enlistments.

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

He
Last year, [^]United States lost 9,357 men killed in action ; the Vietnamese lost 12,716, which does not count their heavy civilian casualties. For us to suffer a loss comparable to theirs we would have to have more than 162,000 killed in action.

~~TOP SECRET-NODIS~~

3. Miscellaneous Points.

When he says that 40 percent of the death toll is accounted for by children under two years of age, children killed primarily by dissentry and penumonia, he is reciting something that existed long before the war and is not due to the war.

When he complains of the "wide corridors of defoliated
" forests, he is complaining because the Viet Cong was prevented
~~there~~ from lurking behind trees and bushes so as to kill our own troops.
As between the existence of a bush and the life of an American
soldier the choice should not be hard.

When he says that to the Vietnamese "the promises of the United States and the promises of the Viet Cong make little difference," he is stating pure assumption. He has no way of knowing this or of proving it.

When he says that 25 percent of the nation's population consists of refugees he is making a statement for which there is

no basis at all. The figure is nearer 12 percent, and 1.2 million have been resettled, returned to their villages or otherwise absorbed into the economy -- to ^{which} ~~which~~ he makes no reference at all. When he complains that people have been moved away from their farms because a battle was going to take place, what would he have us do, leave them to be killed by the field artillery?

When he says that they have no "national mobilization" he ignores their draft of all youths from 18 to 35, which is a higher age than ours, and that their 770,000 men in uniform would for us be the equivalent of over 10 million men.

8

It is hard to say this, but the unavoidable conclusion is that Senator Kennedy knows nothing about the antecedents of Viet-Nam and the Vietnamese people. He speaks of poor little beat-up, struggling Viet-Nam as though it were a country like ours with 200 years of democracy, or England with more than three centuries.

He is apparently shocked because the Vietnamese hospitals are not as good as the Massachusetts General. He is appalled because there are less doctors. He speaks of how horrible it would be if "there would be almost no doctors at all to help these people" -- which is exactly how it was in 1963 before your programs were in existence and as it had been for centuries and centuries before that.

He is furthermore unaware that Vietnamese society was based on the notion of respect for authority, that there had never been any democracy as we know it, that the ruler was supposed to be brave,

intelligent and unselfish and thus entitled to everyone's respect and after he stayed in too long and had become old and fat and cruel he was assassinated and replaced by another.

He ignores the first principals of Confucianism which is that a man's great and first loyalty goes to the family. He then expresses great surprise at a report that scholarships to take Vietnamese veterans to the United States are all given to relatives of the officials -- a report, by the way, which is denied by our mission in Saigon. The Viet-Nam family loyalty is put up at the top and the old people are kept at home. Is not aggression against a decentralized nation of families as bad as aggression against a modern western centralized nation-state?

~~Senator Kennedy is all against corruption and against slackerism and against disease. He is against sin. I am against sin. But this can't possibly explain anything about Viet-Nam.~~

He quotes "one member of the Vietnamese assembly" as opposing a draft as though this one member was speaking for the entire membership of the Assembly. If we were to quote Senator Morse alone would he give a fair picture of the U. S. Senate?

Viet-Nam has no civil service. The French never trained young men for civil government. Is it any wonder, therefore, that there is inefficiency and waste? And what is the solution? For us to take over the country and govern it ourselves and be a colonial power -- or to advise and help them so that they can learn how to run a government themselves?

He urges negotiations as though we had but to give the word and they would start, ignoring that Hanoi refuses to negotiate. Indeed he never blames Hanoi for starting and prolonging this cruel war.

He opposes "searching out the enemy" when it is absolutely essential to search out the enemy if we are going to *Keep*

the enemy split up and off balance so that he won't surround our cities, pouring in mortar and shell fire preparatory to fighting in the cities themselves.

He insists that we must "demand more from the South Vietnamese Government in the basic political effort of gaining the allegiance of the people." This Government has been in power for three months. They are learning how to make a brand new constitution work. The ~~G~~overnors of Viet-Nam, who are trying to master the art of self-government, come from a background which is rooted in the middle ages and authoritarianism. They are governing ^a ~~the~~ country which is very hot and damp with the result that nature is very rich and people can live within a very small radius without ever going outside of it. How in such a country can public opinion and political life be expected to exist as it does in a temperate ~~to~~ zone where a man has to span a much larger area in

12

order to satisfy his needs. How can any politician -- in Washington or Saigon -- "gain the allegiance of the people" if they didn't have it to begin with? The American people believe in their system of government. The Vietnamese are just beginning this process.

Senator Kennedy accuses the present government of "indifference to the people." This is unfair. I know President Thieu and Vice President Ky very well and I never met two people less indifferent to the people.

When Senator Kennedy asks them "to attract the people of Viet-Nam to the government," he is asking something that nobody could reasonably ask of the United States. Why does he apply a more stringent criteria to this poor, little beat-up country than he does to our own country?

Senator Kennedy says that the Vietnamese officials believe that "we Americans are tied to the Vietnamese irrevocably"

17
They do not think so today. This is what President Diem and his government thought in 1963. They thought they had us hooked -- and they were disillusioned. Every Vietnamese official today well remembers 1963 and they well know that nobody can hook the United States and that nobody can hook the American people.

Senator Kennedy wishes us to make clear to "the elected government of South Viet-Nam that we cannot continue year after year picking up the pieces of their failure." This statement ignores the fact that they are in a state of evolution and that they have moved since 1965 from a state of flagrant instability in which governments were changing every 3 months to a ~~constitutional~~ ^{government which was} ~~government~~ fairly drafted and adopted and which they are now trying to make work and that their evolution has, in the opinion of experts and in government, been impressive.

It helps, when making criticisms, to know something of what you are talking about.

INFORMATION

45

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, January 29, 1968
6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a wise observation from Cabot Lodge on how to deal with the Vietnamese on negotiations -- based on experience.

In brief: be specific, not hypothetical.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

Pres file

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 1-29-92



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

45a

~~TOP SECRET~~

January 26, 1968

Dear Walt:

Herewith a memorandum which I sent to the Secretary and Under Secretary and which deals with a topic which, I know, interests you.

With warm regards,

As ever yours,

Carrie L.

Henry Cabot Lodge

The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The White House

Enclosure

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY *AS* ON *1-29-92*

456

January 25, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

To: The Secretary
U - Mr. Katzenbach

From: H. C. Lodge

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-207
By is, NARA Date 6-12-97

1. Ambassador Bunker's thirty-sixth weekly telegram (Saigon 5003) contains the following statement in paragraph 11(e):
2. "The GVN will be very difficult to deal with in the matter of preparing for negotiations. Every move we make towards an accommodation of views with the Communists will raise lively and genuine fears of abandonment. I believe our best course is to focus on specific aspects of negotiations, discuss them in advance and in depth with the top leadership of the GVN and try to bring them and their followers along as best we can without sapping their ability and their will to continue the struggle."
3. My experience with the Vietnamese and with small under-developed countries at the United Nations is that it is virtually impossible to get an agreement in advance on generalities and abstractions covering hypothetical situations. Incidentally, this is what the press constantly tries to get Vietnamese and American officials to comment on -- with the result that the press can always report the existence of disagreement.
4. It is, however, quite possible to get the GVN to agree with us on specific, concrete propositions.
5. I therefore concur with Ambassador Bunker on the need to focus on specifics and to discuss these specifics in depth and as far in advance as possible. I assume that Ambassador Bunker does not mean hypothetical specifics, but specifics which are actively under consideration.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

6. But I will also go one step further and say that we should not under any circumstances -- either in large or small meetings with the Vietnamese -- seek agreements on hypothetical generalities or abstractions in advance. To seek such agreements is the sure way to create trouble, arouse all kinds of needless misunderstandings, and create serious disagreement to no good purpose.
7. This, of course, should not foreclose keeping the GVN informed of whatever pertains to negotiations which they will learn about anyway from other sources. It is vitally important not to neglect this.
8. When the time comes to discuss specifics, it should be done very quietly with as few people involved as possible, preferably one senior American talking to one senior Vietnamese with a junior on each side to take notes. Large meetings with Viets and Americans at a big table are to be avoided, as are statements by us in which we speak as breezily to the Vietnamese as we do among ourselves. I can cite specific instances when such tactics had unfortunate results.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Monday, January 29, 1968
6:30 p. m.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

Secretary Rusk asked Joe Sisco to come and talk to me about the following:

1. The Secretary General, through Ralph Bunche, has suggested that the Security Council, by means of SC "consensus," call on Thant to provide good offices. This same proposal has been transmitted by the Secretary General to the USSR simultaneously through Nesterenko. Goldberg is unaware how much prior discussion, if any, the Secretary General has had with the Soviets.
2. Thant proposes that the attached "consensus" be adopted by the Security Council. As you note, the Secretary General would "be invited to take the initiative and offer his good offices in whatever manner he may consider appropriate and helpful." This would be said in the context of reducing the prevailing tension and finding an acceptable solution. If the consensus is adopted, the Secretary General would send Deputy Foreign Minister of Rumania, Mircea Malitza, to Pyongyang. Thant has already discussed this proposal with the Rumanians who are agreeable to sending Malitza on this mission.
3. Secretary Rusk has already told Arthur Goldberg that:
 - he agrees that we could not oppose this kind of a proposal if it develops in the context of the Security Council discussions;
 - however, we need time to see how the direct contacts at Panmunjom go to assure that such an initiative at the UN not cross with our efforts at Panmunjom;
 - he react positively to the Secretary General, but tell him candidly that we do need time and that we do want to see how the bilateral contact progresses before making any final determination on the desirability of a UN intermediary going forward;
 - if the UN intermediary is sent to Pyongyang, he should discuss with the Secretary General the possibility of sending someone else to the Republic of Korea and to the United States to also discuss this matter.

You may wish to discuss this matter with Secretary Rusk on the telephone and consider it further at tomorrow's lunch.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-148
By Sp/ir, NARA, Date 2/20/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President:

After intensive consultations among all delegations, I believe a consensus has developed that, even while this question is still under the consideration of the Security Council, no time should be lost in regard to efforts to reduce the prevailing tension and to find an acceptable solution. In this context, all members of the Security Council believe that the Secretary-General should be invited to take the initiative and offer his good offices in whatever manner he may consider appropriate and helpful. I am sure that all members of the Council join me in expressing the hope that the Secretary-General may be able to take promptly the necessary steps in this direction.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-148
By gd/p, NARA, Date 2/20/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, Jan 29, 1968
5:30 p.m.

41

Mr. President:

Herewith Prime Minister Wilson reflects
on the split mind of Moscow, as he saw
it on his trip.

Pres file

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~-attachment (1/29/68 msge)

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 29 21 56

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I PROMISED YOU SOME FURTHER THOUGHTS ABOUT MY MOSCOW TRIP. I SHALL IN FACT WANT TO THINK ABOUT IT PRETTY CAREFULLY OVER THE NEXT 12 DAYS, SO AS TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU PERSONALLY WHEN WE MEET, AS PART OF THE BACKGROUND TO OUR WIDER DISCUSSIONS. BUT MEANWHILE THE FOLLOWING ARE JUST A FEW FURTHER REFLECTIONS TO THOSE I SENT YOU ON THE EVENING OF MY RETURN.

MY MAIN EXCHANGES OF COURSE WERE WITH KOSYGIN. YOU WILL ALREADY HAVE HAD AN ACCOUNT OF MY FIRST LONG TALK WITH HIM ON THE AFTERNOON OF MY ARRIVAL AND YOU ALSO KNOW ABOUT OUR FULL-BLOWN EXCHANGE IN COMPETITION WITH THE TOREADORS. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN, MY MAIN JOB WAS TO TRY TO CONVINCE HIM OF THE SINCERITY OF YOUR POSITION AS SET OUT AT SAN ANTONIO AND IN THE STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE. I AM AFRAID THAT DOBRYNIN HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVEYING THE POINT THAT AVERELL HARRIMAN HAD MADE SO CLEARLY TO HIM - NAMELY THAT YOU WERE NOT INSISTING ON KNOWING THE OUTCOME OF ANY EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS, BEFORE AGREEING TO HALT THE BOMBING (WHICH WOULD OF COURSE HAVE BEEN A NONSENSICAL POSITION); BUT THAT WHAT YOU NEEDED WAS TO BE ASSURED THAT, IF THE BOMBING STOPPED, NOT ONLY PROMPT BUT MEANINGFUL TALKS WOULD FOLLOW AND THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT TAKE ANY UNFAIR MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF THE PAUSE. I MADE THIS POINT CLEAR BEYOND POSSIBILITY OF DOUBT SEPARATELY TO KOSYGIN, TO BREZHNEV AND TO PODGORNYY. AND I THINK I GOT IT ACROSS.

I WAS INTERESTED TO FIND THAT KOSYGIN WAS THROUGHOUT MUCH MORE RIGID DURING THE FORMAL MEETINGS WHEN HE HAD POLYANSKY AT HIS ELBOW THAN WHEN WE WERE ON OUR OWN, IN THE CAR, AT MEALS OR AT THE OPERA. OF COURSE, THIS IS PARTLY BECAUSE, WHEN HE IS SPEAKING FOR THE RECORD, HE STICKS MORE CLOSELY TO THE OFFICIAL LINE. BUT THERE IS A BALEFUL QUALITY TO POLYANSKY'S GLANCE, AND A CERTAIN BRASH IMPERTINENCE TO HIS OCCASIONAL INTERVENTIONS WHICH MADE ME FEEL (RIGHTLY OR WRONG) THAT KOSYGIN WAS UNEASILY AWARE THAT LITTLE BROTHER WAS KEEPING A CLOSE EYE. GROMYKO WAS HIS USUAL SARDONIC SELF AND, THOUGH HE SAID LITTLE, WHAT HE SAID, PARTICULARLY AT THE DRAFTING SESSION, WAS HARD LINE STUFF.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 1/30/95, State Dept. Guidelines

By , NARA, Date 4-23-01

XEROX FROM QUICK COPY

BUT, ON THINKING IT OVER, I FEEL THAT MY TALK WITH BREZHNEV WAS - PERHAPS NOT SURPRISINGLY - THE MOST REVEALING ABOUT BASIC SOVIET THINKING ON VIETNAM. I NEED NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS - PAT DEAN WILL BE GIVING YOUR PEOPLE AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT WAS SAID. ON THE PERSONAL PLANE, HE WAS MUCH MORE RELAXED, FRIENDLY AND QUIET IN TONE THAN WHEN I LAST SAW HIM TWO YEARS AGO, WHEN HE DID HIS BEST TO PUT ME THROUGH THE WRINGER. THIS TIME WE HAD A PERFECTLY NORMAL EXCHANGE AND I THINK I MADE SOME IMPACT ON HIM IN TERMS OF SAN ANTONIO. BUT IT ALSO CONFIRMED MY MORE GENERAL IMPRESSION OF A KIND OF SCHIZOPHRENIA IN MOSCOW ABOUT VIETNAM.

I CANNOT HELP FEELING THAT THEIR REAL DILEMMA IS HOW TO STRIKE A SATISFACTORY BALANCE IN THEIR OWN MINDS BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR GLOBAL RELATIONSHIP WITH YOURSELVES AND THEIR DETERMINATION NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT WITH YOU; AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, A BLEND OF GUT-REACTION AGAINST (AS THEY WOULD SEE IT) ANY ATTEMPT BY THE CAPITALIST WORLD TO ELIMINATE A SOCIALIST STATE AND OF PLAIN FEAR THAT ANY OPEN LET UP ON THEIR PART WILL WEAKEN THEIR EFFORT TO RETAIN LEADERSHIP OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. BREZHNEV COULD NEVER ADMIT THAT THERE WAS ANY CONTRADICTION BETWEEN HIS SAYING AT TWO POINTS IN THE SAME CONVERSATION THAT ALL THAT WAS NEEDED TO STOP THE WAR WAS FOR YOUR SHAMEFUL AGGRESSION TO END; AND, AT THE SAME TIME AND KNOWING PERFECTLY WELL WHAT OUR POSITION WAS, HIS CONTENTION THAT BRITAIN AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD SINGLY AND JOINTLY DO EVERYTHING THEY COULD TO HELP END THE WAR. WE SAW THE SAME PROCESS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION IN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT THE APPALLINGLY LONG ARGUMENT OVER THE VIETNAM SECTION IN THE COMMUNIQUE. BUT, AS YOU KNOW, THEY FINALLY CONCEDED NOT ONLY A REFERENCE TO THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP, BUT ALSO, THOUGH WITH INFINITELY GREATER DIFFICULTY, THE PHRASE ABOUT THE TWO SIDES HAVING THE FIRM INTENTION TO TAKE SINGLY OR JOINTLY ALL ACTIONS WITHIN THEIR POWER TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

ON BALANCE I WAS NOT DISCOURAGED BY MY EXCHANGES. LET US LEAVE IT AT THAT UNTIL WE MEET. IN ANY CASE, YOU HAVE OTHER THINGS ON YOUR MIND AT PRESENT. I KNOW HOW DEEPLY CONCERNED AND TROUBLED YOU MUST BE: AND SEND YOU MY WARM AND SYMPATHETIC WISHES.

JANUARY 29, 1968.

~~SECRET~~

END OF MESSAGE

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, January 29, 1968
5:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Here are my draft minutes.

I will circulate them to see if my colleagues agree.

W. W. Rostow

TOP SECRET

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-29-92

48a

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-473
By is, NARA Date 6-30-97 January 29, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

Report on Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29, 1968

Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell Taylor.

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction to Sec. Rusk's message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other "suitable international tribunal" after the men ^{and} on the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn't work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.
2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, BLACK SHIELD, rather than DRONE, photography was recommended.
3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U.S. would wish to assert its rights to international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel -- perhaps a destroyer -- rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS BANNER.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

4. Action to recover crypte material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypte material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be light; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over a protracted period. In general, this might be an action of limited reprisal if the men and ship were not returned.

6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship -- or even the ship alone -- not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to pursue this possibility with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U. S. ; ~~we~~ would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations. Not recommended.

10. Free World Economic Pressures on North Korea. The Free World's trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.

11. U. S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U. S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.

At lunch today with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:

-- Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;

-- The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.

-- It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:

-- Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;

-- Keep the ^{confidence} ~~question~~ of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam

-- Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Jan. , 1968
5:00 p. m.

49

Mr. President:

Herewith Mac Bundy and Cy Vance
leave behind -- on a contingency basis --
a paragraph you might wish to use later
in the week if all does not go well at
Panmunjom.

W. W. R.

Attachment

DRAFT STATEMENT

49a

My Fellow Americans:

It is now appropriate for me to make a further statement on the course of action we have been taking with respect to the seizure of the American ship PUEBLO and her crew.

I announced on January 26 that we were taking the question to the Security Council of the United Nations and were making other diplomatic efforts as well. We have been following those courses, and it is with great regret that I must report that intensive discussions in the United Nations and private but most serious diplomatic exchanges, both direct and indirect, with the Government of North Korea, have so far produced no progress. An American ship and an American crew continue to be illegally held.

Today we are making it clear, both in the United Nations and to the Government of North Korea and its friends, that we have a further course to propose for early and peaceful settlement: If the American crew and ship are promptly returned, we stand ready to submit to any appropriate international tribunal all the issues raised by this case. We would be glad to see the matter taken to the World Court or to any other agreed set of judges, such as one representative of the United States, one of North Korea, and a third party to be named by the President of the World Court.

###

Monday, January 29, 1968 -- 1:30 p.m. lunch with the President

OFF THE RECORD

**Clark Clifford
George Ball
Cyrus Vance
Gen. Maxwell Taylor
Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
McGeorge Bundy
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Director Richard Helms
General Earle Wheeler
Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EA
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Walt Rostow**

INFORMATION**SECRET -- PACKERS**

Monday, January 29, 1968
10:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

This report of what the government in Hanoi told some non-Communist diplomats may foreshadow what we get from the Rumanian -- from whom we should be hearing in the next 24 hours in one way or another.

W. W. Rostow

London 5969

SECRET -- PACKERS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 93-291
By ju, NARA, Date 7-14-94

WWRostow:rla

Pres file

JRET

HCE805

~~SECRET~~

London
57a

PAGE 01 LONDON 05969 291246Z

RECEIVED
WHCA

EXDIS

42
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

1968 JAN 29 13 13

O R 291235Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1494
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 490
AMEMBASSY SAIGON 515

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 5969

EXDIS

Rostow

1. MURRY THIS MORNING SHOWED US TELEGRAM FROM UK CONSULATE HANOI DATED JAN. 27 REPORTING THAT DRVN HAD CALLED MEETING OF "NON-SOCIALIST" REPRESENTATIVES TO INFORM THEM:

A) DRVN WAS ANXIOUS TO GET TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE.

B) TALKS WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS BOMBING HALT IS VERIFIED.

PAGE 2 ~~RUDTOR 5969 SECRET~~

C) FIRST SUBJECTS WOULD BE PLACE, LEVEL OF DISCUSSION, AND AGENDA.

D) STATE OF UNION MESSAGE WAS NOT CONSIDERED ANSWER TO TRINH STATEMENT, BUT THE DOOR WAS STILL OPEN.

2. IN ANSWER TO QUERY, MURRAY THOUGHT SOURCE ABOVE INFORMATION MIGHT BE INDONESIANS OR UAR. MURRAY HAS INSTRUCTED THAT HANOI TELEGRAM BE PASSED TO WASHINGTON.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-295
By *fw*, NARA, Date *3-11-94*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXDIS

PAGE 02 LONDON 05969 291246Z

ECE

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, January 29, 1968
10:10 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

In preparation for the lunch at 1:30 p.m. today, you may wish to go through the kinds of actions described in this working level paper. Your senior group, plus the advisers, will be looking at them at noon today.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 1-29-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

~~SECRET~~

NLJ 94-473
By us, NARA Date 6-30-97

Action No. 1

ADVISING SOVIETS OF ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE MILITARY MOVES

1. Information on military movements now underway (e.g. air build-up in South Korea, movements of Enterprise, Yorktown and Ranger) would be passed through official channels to the Soviets. The Soviets would be told that the purpose of these movements is to discourage any further provocations by the North Koreans and to reassure the South Koreans that their independence and territorial integrity will be defended against action from the North; the movements should not be read as forecasting action against North Korea if it returns the Pueblo and its crew and ceases provocative action against South Korea.
2. At some juncture we may wish to warn Soviets of actions -- not just precautionary measures -- we may be compelled to take. Such warnings should not be passed through official channels since Soviet prestige would be immediately engaged and they would feel compelled to respond. For this purpose, a clandestine channel would be appropriate; our spokesman could be a reliable non-official American, possibly a newspaperman, and the Soviet interlocutor would be the top KGB official in the U.S. We are asking Ambassador Thompson for his views, and if he concurs, we could move immediately to establish the channel. Initially, the channel would be used simply to stress the gravity of the situation and the need for some action by the North Koreans to avoid further deterioration. No threats would be made until it is clear that efforts currently underway will not succeed.

TOP SECRET

Action No. 2

CONDUCT AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE

Objective of Operation - Create concern that US and ROK are preparing for military action, thus inducing the release of Pueblo out of fear of escalation; also to provide intelligence for possible future military actions against North Korea.

Concept of Operations - Use very high performance, tactical or drone photographic aircraft, primarily against ground, air and naval targets in DMZ and coastal areas (up to 50 miles inland) and ECM aircraft against air defense and surveillance radars.

Estimate of Communist Reactions - Within their capabilities, the North Koreans would attempt to shoot down these missions. Should they succeed (likely in the case of drones), the resulting propaganda would strengthen their contention that the US was engaged in a heavy espionage program in violation of North Korean sovereignty and was preparing for an open attack on North Korea. The Soviets, Chinese, and North Koreans would recognize that the US was trying to intimidate North Korea and simultaneously obtain intelligence for air strikes. They would thus be somewhat more concerned that retaliatory action in this form would actually be undertaken.

Discussion - Reconnaissance flights can be mounted quickly, and -- depending on the vehicle and targets -- loss probabilities

DECLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

Authority MLJ 94-473 (430)

Re 10/10/12 NARA. Date 12-18-09

can be kept very low. The flights would amplify communist concern arising from more visible preparations for US and ROK military action. Communist military reaction would probably be limited to the aircraft themselves; the risk of escalation, therefore would be low. If the flights become known to the public, the US would be subjected to criticism for a hostile action. If they are seen as a clear prelude to something more violent, there will be world-wide pressures, particularly on the US, to avoid escalation.

Conclusion - Reconnaissance has little to recommend it as a pressure tactic but would be essential to support possible follow-up military actions. Aerial reconnaissance required as a precaution against North Korean moves should be maintained. Political-military plans should be prepared.

TOP SECRET

52c

Action No. 3

SAIL USS BANNER INTO THE AREA WHERE THE USS PUEBLO WAS SEIZED

Purpose - To demonstrate the determination of the United States to exercise the freedom of the seas in its intelligence collection activities.

Concept - The USS Banner would cruise along the North Korean coast escorted by two destroyers and one cruiser. Combat air patrol would be flown during daylight hours for protection against North Korean fighters and patrol boats. Early warning radar picket aircraft would be airborne both day and night. Carrier aircraft from the Enterprise would be utilized, and Air Force aircraft in South Korea would be kept on strip alert. The Banner would remain a minimum of 13 miles from North Korean territory during the day time and at least 30 miles from the coast during the night to gain time to respond to radar indications. The patrol would be continued for about 8 days. US forces would observe the 12-mile limit claimed by North Korea, but in response to attack there might be inadvertent violations.

Likely Communist and Other Reactions - No direct military reaction to this move is likely. All of the Communists would recognize it as a demonstration, and as long as North Korean territorial waters were not violated, there would be no response.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA 94-473 (#3g)
By jc/ics NARA Date 12-18-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

There would be further military alerts in North Korea and a Soviet vessel would probably shadow the US force. There would be the danger of incidents, particularly between the Banner's air cover and patrolling North Korean fighters. And such incidents would draw considerable international criticism of the US for deliberately seeking such encounters. This course of action probably and any incidents certainly would undercut US diplomatic efforts aimed at a peaceful solution of the Pueblo episode.

Discussion - This action would demonstrate to North Korea and the world the right of the United States to move her ships anywhere within international waters on the high seas. The risks involved and possibility of escalation would be relatively low, although an attempt by the North Koreans to attack the task force cannot be precluded.

This action would make the release of the Pueblo and its crew less likely. Possible gains to US prestige from re-establishing the right to use the high seas might be more than offset by popular interpretation of the action as an ineffective irritant. If an armed conflict should result, much of world opinion is likely to assume that a substantial share of the blame rests with the United States for issuing a challenge during a period of tension.

Conclusion - The United States has little to gain at this time from sending another ship along the North Korean coast. However, political-

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3-

military planning should be undertaken on the possibility we will want to carry out a relatively unprovocative action.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Action No. 4

ACTION TO RECOVER CRYPTO MATERIAL JETTISONED FROM THE PUEBLO

Objective of Operation

This operation would have the objectives of possibly recovering gear jettisoned by the crew of the Pueblo and of demonstrating in a low key the US exercise of the freedom of the seas.

Concept of Operations

The operation would require a Navy tug and mine sweepers from Sasebo, Japan, special detection gear from CONUS, and probably a midget submarine, which could be flown from Nassau.

Air and naval support could be supplied by the Enterprise Task Force and TAC aircraft from South Korea. A credible search, with adequate support, could be underway in 4-5 days. The operation would be confined to daylight hours. It could be terminated in a week or 10 days, even if salvage of the jettisoned materials had not been achieved.

Estimate of Communist Reactions

The possibility of armed interference by the North Koreans is small. The Soviet Union and Communist China would not be in a good position to criticize the U.S. activity.

Discussion

The possibility of recovery is low but worthy of consideration.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSA 44-473 (E3i)

By fc/ics NARA, Date 12-18-09

The operation would underscore our contention that the Pueblo was seized more than 12 miles from North Korean territory. If any of the jettisoned material were recovered, it would help to establish this fact.

This action would probably have little effect either way on the return of the Pueblo and crew.

If the Security Council were still in session or seized of the issue in any way, this action might be deplored as provocative, although to a lesser degree than the deployment of the Banner. If UN action had already been frustrated, this move could probably be undertaken without severe reaction from UN members.

Conclusion

This action is not worth pursuing, as a means of recovering the Pueblo and its crew. However, it would constitute a legitimate display of US activity and concern for US rights and property with relatively little risk of provoking North Korean interference. Political-military planning should, therefore, be undertaken.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 94-473

By is, NARA Date 6-30-97

Action No. 5

MINE WONSAN HARBOR

Objective of Operation - To demonstrate to North Korea that its aggressive acts will not be tolerated without response. To bring pressure on North Korea to release the Pueblo and crew.

Concept of Operations - Deny Wonsan Harbor to shipping for an indefinite period by mining Wonsan Harbor, using Naval A-6 aircraft from Enterprise in one night (17 sorties dropping 83 mines). Mining to be repeated as necessary to insure denial of harbor use.

Estimate of Communist Reactions - North Korea would, of course, defend against this action; it might also attempt some retaliation of its own, for example against US ships or forces. The USSR would assist in any efforts to remove the mines, if requested, and they would also begin to build up North Korean air defense capabilities around Wonsan and other major ports. Mining of Wonsan would be of special concern to the USSR, not only because Soviet ships use the harbor, but also because the action might be seen as a precedent to similar action against Haiphong.

Discussion - This action could be accomplished by small forces, rapidly, and with small loss in aircraft (estimated at less

~~TOP SECRET~~

than two percent). While it would effectively deny to North Korea the use of the port, it would amount to little more than a minor inconvenience, considering the limited use of its naval forces and the availability of other ports. The action would be directly associated with the scene of the Pueblo incident and, therefore, would make clear that aggressive actions will not be tolerated without response. However, it probably would impede rather than promote return of the Pueblo or crew.

There would be little that North Korea could do to prevent the mining, but they would consider it a major provocative act to which they would feel compelled to react. Air combat over the area would be likely, and risks of escalation would increase, if mining were maintained over a protracted period.

Opinion in the UN would be strongly opposed to the action, particularly if the seeding were maintained and resulted in loss of third country shipping. Damage or loss to third country shipping would be very difficult to defend.

Conclusion - Mining of the harbor would be an act of retaliation and a warning. The impact on North Korean economy and military capabilities would be minor, and prospects for recovery of Pueblo and crew might be impeded.

~~TOP SECRET~~

52 f

Action No. 6

SEIZE NORTH KOREAN VESSELS

Objective of Operation - Seize a North Korean ship or ships in order to retaliate in kind and to use the men and ships as an exchange for the Pueblo and her crew.

Concept of Operations - A surprise seizure of one or more North Korean ships could be accomplished either on the high seas or in the territorial waters of North Korea. Seizure could involve North Korean merchant, fishing or naval ships.

Estimate of Communist Reactions - If time and circumstances permitted, the North Koreans would defend against such a seizure, regardless of whether in international or territorial waters. Presumably, they are perspicacious enough not to expose a major ship to such action beyond the reaches of their air cover. In any case, the North Koreans would not be likely to bargain for an exchange. And the resulting propaganda would becloud the original US case against Pyongyang. No military retaliation would be likely, however.

Discussion - North Korea has only five merchant vessels of 1000 tons or more. Only the largest, a fish factory ship of 7000 tons, represents a major investment. It is questionable whether one of these or any but a small naval vessel could be found out of port. Seizure of fishing boats or naval coastal

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority NLS 94-473(*3m)

Re: relies NARA. Date 12-18-09

patrol craft would have to occur close to North Korean shores, involving a risk of air action.

The military or economic loss would be minor. North Korean prestige would be at stake, but this action, by itself, would probably not gain release of the Pueblo and its crew. On the other hand, having a North Korean vessel and its crew available for exchange might be advantageous.

Should an attempt fail, through North Korean air action or other reasons, the Communist side would gain a propaganda advantage.

World reaction would probably be strong but manageable. Some would argue that this represented a reprisal, largely prohibited by the UN Charter.

Conclusion - Taken alone, this action would not be particularly risky, nor would it have any appreciable chance of accomplishing the release of the Pueblo and its crew. As a step in a sequence of events, it could prove advantageous.

Action No. 7

SELECTED AIR STRIKES ON NORTH KOREA

Objective of the Operation - To impose a penalty on North Korea for acts of aggression against the US and the ROK. To disrupt and reduce the North Korean military posture.

Concept of the Operations - Conduct air strikes on Wonsan Air Base and Munpyong Ni Naval Base, employing USN, USAF and ROKAF aircraft. Ninety-two strike aircraft would be used (74 against Wonsan Air Base and 18 against Munpyong Ni). (If an action of this type were undertaken, the JCS would prefer to attack all North Korean military airfields and neutralize the NK air force).

Estimate of Communist Reactions - North Korea might be prompted to request military assistance from both Red China and the USSR. Although it seems unlikely that either Moscow or Peking would encourage North Korea to precipitate a major conflict, they probably would feel compelled to provide substantial military support. Direct military intervention by the USSR or Red China is unlikely unless the conflict escalated far beyond the two strikes.

Discussion - Although sufficient forces soon will be available to make this action feasible, there is some risk, since most of North Korea's entire MIG force (500) conceivably could be concentrated against the attacks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 94-473
By ics, NARA Date 6-30-97

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

The action would demonstrate that the US will not tolerate provocative acts; however, it would not substantially reduce or disrupt North Korean military capabilities. North Korea certainly would resist the attacks and could be expected to undertake retaliatory action, with attendant potential for further escalation. Prospects for early release of the Pueblo or crew would be lessened.

Retaliatory nature of the action makes it difficult to defend legally. This might endanger the status of the UN command and might imperil the use of bases in Japan for defense of Korea.

This action would be considered by the majority of UN members as a dangerously excessive measure, disproportionate to the provocation and too risky in terms of resumed hostilities in Korea. The US would be placed sharply on the defensive.

Conclusion - These strikes would be essentially an act of retaliation. The effect on North Korean military capability would be small. The large forces required to insure success would give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the US.

The neutralization of the North Korean Air Force, as preferred by the JCS, might be required in a later phase of the crisis, if hostilities should become imminent.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

524

Action No. 8

RAID ACROSS THE DMZ

Objective of Operation - Conduct a punitive raid of reasonable size against a significant North Korean installation across the DMZ to demonstrate that aggressive North Korean actions will not be tolerated.

Concept of Operations - A US, ROK or combined force, preferably heavy in armor, employing surprise and massive fire support, would seize, exploit for intelligence purposes, and destroy, for example, the Command Post of the 6th North Korean Division (approximately 10 kilometers north of the DMZ). This installation consists of a multi-storied headquarters, numerous administrative and barracks buildings and a steel and concrete bunker for the Command Post proper. It is estimated that the operation would require one day, including the withdrawal to the DMZ.

Estimate of Communist Reactions - The Soviets and Chinese Communists would probably vie with each other in denouncing the move and promising aid to North Korea; however, they would be unlikely to intervene in response to this isolated action. North Korea could be expected to mount rapid counter activities and, as a minimum, use this as an excuse for continued harassment along the DMZ.

Discussion - A raid such as this could be successful and could probably be completed before it triggered a major response, if everything worked well. However, it envisages moving through a

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority NUJ 94-473 (135)

By jc/ic, NARA, Date 12-18-09

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

a position held by the North Koreans since 1953 and would be highly dependent on the element of surprise.

It could inflict severe casualties and destruction of material on the North Koreans and gain valuable intelligence information. It could also demonstrate to the North Koreans that they are vulnerable to counteraction if they persist in their policy of harassment.

This is a high-risk action which, should it go badly, could result in starting major ground action which would be difficult to stop. Should the action result in significant US or ROK casualties, particularly prisoners, the Communists would have gained a valuable propaganda tool.

While some nations would applaud such an action, the overall result would be to weaken our position in the UN. It would be cited as a clear violation of the Armistice Agreement. Use of US troops would evoke the greatest criticism. Use of ROK or combined action forces would be less provocative and would tend to highlight the over-all nature of North Korean harassment rather than concentrate on the Pueblo.

Conclusion - This is an extremely risky course of action which even if successful militarily would be purely punitive. After being punished and alerted to possible future action of this type, the North Koreans would have little incentive to negotiate.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

52

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 94-473

By js, NARA Date 6-30-97

Action No., 9

NAVAL BLOCKADE OF WONSAN

Objective of Operation - Exert pressure on North Korea to release Pueblo by denying access to North Korea's principal naval base.

Concept of Operations - Use US, and possibly ROK, naval vessels with appropriate air cover, to establish a blockade, inside the 12-mile limit of Wonsan. The blockade would be limited to preventing movement of naval vessels.

Estimate of Communist Reactions - There would be a high risk that the North Koreans would challenge the blockade with their forces. The Soviets might ostentatiously move ships through the blockade line, possibly including some military vessels. Some move would probably be made by the Soviets at the UN; they would have good prospects for getting wide support. At this point the North Koreans and Soviets would conclude that further US military action might follow; they would move ahead rapidly with defensive preparations. The Chinese too would probably begin some show of military activity in North China and Manchuria.

Discussion - The blockade could be mounted fairly quickly and presumably could be a joint US-ROK effort. Air cover would have to be provided, and quite possibly the air threat could be made manageable only by air strikes against North Korean airfields -- thus greatly raising the level of escalation. To be meaningful

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

the blockade would have to operate inside the 12-mile limit. There is little economic leverage in a blockade but North Korean Komar patrol craft could be immobilized. A major disadvantage would be the fact that a blockade would be only an inconvenience, not a great threat to North Korea. There is little reason to think, therefore, that a blockade would force the release of the Pueblo. Moreover, the inconvenience to the US would also be great, tying up valuable naval and air assets for an indefinite period. World reaction would be adverse.

Conclusion - By itself, a blockade does not appear to meet the required objective and includes the possibility of substantial escalation. If no North Korean action were forthcoming, we would be committed to an indefinite, inconclusive and politically awkward course of action that would be difficult to retreat from. Since, however, a blockade might be a useful action at some point, political-military planning should be undertaken. (The JCS would want also to plan for the blockade of Hungnam, a port 50 miles north of Wonsan).

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

522

Action No. 10

FREE WORLD ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON NORTH KOREA

Objective - To cause economic inconvenience to North Korea, symbolize Free World disapproval of the illegal seizure of the Pueblo, and increase pressures on the regime to release the crew and vessel.

Concept of Objectives - (1) Total multilateral embargo on trade with North Korea. COCOM countries (NATO plus Japan) prohibit the export to North Korea of a selected list of strategic items. (2) Japanese prohibition of trade and withdrawal of ships. (Japan is the largest Free World importer of North Korean goods; the majority of Free World ships calling at North Korean ports are of Japanese registry.) (3) Cessation of Free World wheat exports. (Wheat accounts for half of Free World exports to North Korea. Australia and France are currently shipping wheat.)

Estimate of Communist Reactions - The impact of increased Free World controls on trade and shipping would be small. If Free World vessels were removed from the trade, an additional burden would be thrown either on communist flag or communist chartered vessels or on land transport routes. The preliminary CIA view is that the added burden on shipping or on land routes would not be significant.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-473
By *g/p*, NARA, Date 4/26/96

Discussion - Our COCOM partners would regard a total embargo as going far beyond the COCOM criteria for selective strategic controls. France, the United Kingdom, Japan and West Germany have all indicated their opposition to any significant increase in controls on exports to East Asia.

Japan would probably respond to a separate approach by pointing out the political impossibility for them to deny exports to a communist country in Asia in the absence of parallel action by other major Western trading countries.

Australia might be sympathetic to a request to stop wheat shipments. But there would probably be problems of breaking contracts. In any event, it would be difficult to impose effective controls on wheat because of the number of potential suppliers and of circuitous routes.

Conclusion - The unlikelihood of obtaining agreement to trade denial in COCOM or in bilateral efforts with major trading countries plus the estimate that the communist countries could promptly provide substitutes for Free World supplies seriously limit the prospects for these possible economic measures.

Monday, January 29, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

I recommend following be invited for lunch today:

Clark Clifford
George Ball
Cyrus Vance
Gen. Maxwell Taylor
Amb. Henry Cabot Lodge
McGeorge Bundy (if possible)

In addition:

Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Nick Katzenbach
Richard Helms
General Wheeler
George Christian
Tom Johnson
W. W. Rostow

W. W. Rostow

rlh

54

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~-CACTUS

Monday, January 29, 1968 - 8:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The attached cables indicate

1. President Park is now fully aboard on the basis of the proposals and the procedure we cabled out to Porter yesterday afternoon.
2. The heavy emphasis in your statement on North Korean infiltration into the South was extremely helpful.
3. Porter is now in touch with the North Korean member of the Military Armistice Commission; but no time has been set for the meeting between Adm. Smith and his opposite number.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3727
Seoul 3731
State 106096
Seoul 3712

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-191
By sig, NARA Date 11-25-96

~~SECRET~~-CACTUS

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

54a
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

***** ZZ RUEHC RUEHCR CONTROL : 7145Q
DE RUALOS 3727E 0290640 RECD : Jan. 29, 1968
ZNY SSSSS ZZH 02:14 A.M.

Z 290630Z JAN 68 ZF71
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8630
RUEHCR/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 260
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3727

NODIS/CATUS

REF: A. STATE 106070

B. STATE 106056

C. STATE 106085

1. I CARRIED OUT INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN REFTELS
IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT PARK. TO SAVE TIME ONLY
RESULTS BEING REPORTED BELOW.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3727E ~~SECRET~~

2. IN CONNECTION WITH REFTEL (A), ROK UN DELEGATION
BEING INSTRUCTED IMMEDIATELY TO WITHHOLD REQUEST
TO PARTICIPATE IN SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE.

3. PRESIDENT PARK HAS APPROVED OUR DESIRE FOR
PRIVATE, OR IF NEED BE PUBLIC, MEETING BETWEEN
PRINCIPAL KPA/CPV AND UN MAC REPRESENTATIVES
FOR PURPOSES MENTIONED. HE REQUESTED THAT WE
AVOID, IN DISCUSSING PUEBLO AND CREW, GIVING
IMPRESSION TO NORTH KOREANS THAT THIS IS ALL THERE
IS TO MATTER. I SAID WE WOULD CERTAINLY NOT GIVE
THEM SUCH IMPRESSION AND THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY
LEARN FROM OTHER MEASURES DISCUSSED WITH PARK
THAT WHATEVER HAPPENS WE WILL REMAIN DEEPLY
CONCERNED ABOUT NK VIOLATIONS IN THE DMZ AND
INFILTRATION.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-192
By cr, NARA Date 3-2-97

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 SEOUL 3727 - NODIS

4. PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TO AMERICAN PEOPLE ON
JANUARY 26 AND AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S STATEMENT
TO KIM OF ROK DEL WERE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE ON THIS

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3727E ~~SECRET~~
OCCASION AS WAS PARA SIX OF REFTTEL (B). THESE ITEMS
WERE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE IN THE MATTER.

GP-2. PORTER
BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED USMISSION USUN NEW YORK BY OC/T 1/29/68.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

7-546

*****ZZ RUEHCR
DE RUALOS 3712E 0290030
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
Z 290020Z JAN 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH
STATE GRNC
BT

7 1 2 9Q

1968 JAN 28 PM 8 00

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3712

NODIS/CACTUS

(CORRECTED COPY)

REF: (A) STATE 106001

1/28/68 1158 p.m.

(B) STATE 106085

(C) STATE 103144

1. NOT CLEAR WHETHER SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE STATEMENT CONTAINED SECOND SENTENCE PARA 5 REF B AT MAC MEETING OR WHETHER THIS INTENDED FYI. PLEASE CLARIFY
2. UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY, WE WILL PROCEED ON ASSUMPTION THAT AT MAC MEETING ADMIRAL SMITH WOULD NOT RPT NOT AGAIN RAISE REQUEST FOR APOLOGY WHICH HE MADE AT PREVIOUS MEETING (PARA 3 REF B REF C), NOR NEED HE AGAIN RAISE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION (PARA 3 D REF C).
3. RE PARA 4 REF B, ALSO ASSUME ADMIRAL SMITH IS AUTHORIZED TO SIGN SIMPLE RECEIPT FOR PRISONERS PROVIDED IT DOES NOT RPT NOT CONTAIN ANYTHING RESEMBLING APOLOGY OR ADMISSION OR CONFESSION OF GUILT. GP-3 PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-192
By US NARA Date 6-23-96

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

2

54c

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL : 7166Q

RECD : Jan 29, 1968

5:22 A.M.

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUALOS 3731E 0290958
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
7 290947Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8633
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3731

MODIS/CACTUS

REF: (A) STATE 105085
(B) SEOUL 3727

1. INITIAL MESSAGE FROM SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAC TO KPA/CPV SENIOR MEMBER MAC WAS PRESENTED IN WRITTEN FORM TO COMMUNIST SIDE THROUGH JOINT DUTY OFFICERS AT PANMUNJOM AT 1515 HRS THIS AFTERNOON. AFTER CONSIDERABLE WRANGLING OVER PROCEDURAL MATTERS WHICH INDICATED LOW LEVEL COMMUNIST OFFICIALS AT PANMUNJOM WERE NERVOUS AND UNCERTAIN OF THEIR ROLE, THEY FINALLY AGREED TO ACCEPT MESSAGE OVER TELEPHONE. MESSAGE AS MODIFIED BY PARA 11, REF (A), WAS ACCEPTED AT

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3731E ~~SECRET~~
1315 HRS.

2. A SECOND MESSAGE IN WHICH SENIOR MEMBER UNCMAN PROPOSES CLOSED MEETING BUT EXPRESSES WILLINGNESS TO MEET IN EITHER OPEN OR CLOSED SESSION IS NOW BEING TRANSMITTED BY TELEPHONE. GP-3. PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

By us, NARA Date 6-23-98

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

~~SECRET~~

100000

54d

Origin ACTION: AmEmbassy SEOUL FLASH

25 JUN 68 02 10Z

Info: STATE 106096

NODIS/CACUS

Ref A. Seoul 3712
Ref B. State 106081
Ref C. State 106085
Ref D. State 103144

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-192
By us, NARA Date 6-23-98

1. Re your para 1, Senior Member UNCMAC is authorized to make statement contained second sentence para 5, Ref C at meeting with North Korean Senior Member.

2. Re your para 2, Admiral Smith ^{should} ~~would~~ not repeat not ~~again~~ raise request for apology nor question ~~an~~ of compensation.

~~Information on North Korean Senior Member to private. If meeting is open Admiral Smith's good discretion need not question unless he believes necessary for records.~~

3. Re your Para 3, Admiral Smith is authorized to sign simple receipt for ~~prize~~ prisoners provided it does not contain either apology or admission of guilt.

Dis'ed by: S/S:DO'Donohue:sb:1/28/68

Tel. Ext. 5381

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Korean Task Force -Berger

Clearances:

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Read (substance)

S/S - Mr. O'Donohue

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~SECRET~~

Page 2 of telegram to SEOUL~~SECRET~~

If North Koreans propose contentious or ambiguous wording; for incorporation into receipt UNCMAC Senior Member should immediately refer text to Washington for guidance.

END

RUSK

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

55.

Pres file

SECRET

Monday, January 29, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: \$60-million Package for Indonesia

In the attached, Messrs. Freeman, Poats and Schultze recommend a \$60-million AID/PL 480 package for Indonesia. It would provide \$35 million in food (rice, cotton bulgur wheat, tobacco, and wheat flour) and \$25 million in AID loans. Joe Fowler joins in the recommendation.

Schultze's memorandum (Tab A) is a concise summary of this proposal. There has been one wrinkle added by common agreement -- we will substitute 50,000 tons of rice for the equivalent dollar value of cotton. We will get this rice from supplies now consigned to Vietnam on the understanding that next summer we will send to Vietnam 50,000 tons of the new-crop rice now scheduled for Indonesia. This will get rice to Indonesia now when it is needed to head off serious inflation. It will not short Vietnam nor will it change the total amounts of rice and cotton you have authorized for Indonesia in 1968. Bill Leonhart agrees.

I vote you approve the recommendation. However, you should be aware of its effect on our position in the aid-Indonesia club and our posture with respect to the Conte Amendment to the foreign aid legislation.

BURDEN SHARING

This package would begin deliveries on our aid pledge to Indonesia before most other donors have even pledged. We have pledged 1/3 (\$110 million) of Indonesia's aid requirements as defined by the World Bank on the condition that other donors provide the other 2/3. The other major supplier is Japan, which last year matched our contribution. Neither Japan nor other donors has yet announced a pledge, but we have good reason to believe that they will come up with at least enough to justify this \$60 million package. In view of the pressing need in Indonesia, your advisors are unanimous in recommending that we push ahead with this package before we know precisely how much the others will put up. (Schultze also warns that the odds are against the other donors matching our full \$110 million pledge on a 1/3-2/3 basis, so that you will have to decide later whether (1) to scale down our pledge, (2) to proceed with the full amount despite

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 71C 983-03

By ics/ry, NARA, Date 2-4-92

SECRET

- 2 -

shortfalls elsewhere, or (3) to increase our aid to make sure the Indonesians get what they need. But you need not decide this now.)

CONTE AMENDMENT

This would be the first major AID loan since passage of the Conte Amendment, which requires you to withhold an equal amount of aid from any poor country that spends money on "sophisticated weapons." The SIG has been hard at work putting together a policy for interpreting and carrying out this amendment. By law, we must notify the Congress of what we are going to do by March 2. A circular cable requesting each Ambassador to seek the necessary information about arms purchases went out last Saturday. This week Katzenbach and Gaud will be telling people on the Hill in general terms what we plan to do. But we will have no hard and fast policy on such difficult questions as the definition of sophisticated weapons until we have reviewed the bidding from the field.

There are, however, a few loans which should not wait until we have all our ducks in a row on the Conte Amendment. This is the first; there will probably be one for Pakistan next week, and perhaps a further one for Brazil. We have made a special point of requesting and receiving explicit assurances from the Indonesian Foreign Minister that (1) they have purchased no sophisticated weapons of any kind since January 2 (when the Amendment went into effect), and (2) they plan no such purchases. Thus we have a very strong case that we are complying with the Amendment despite the fact that our world-wide fact-finding exercise is not completed.

I think our position is sound. If you have any worries on this score, you may wish to instruct Katzenbach and Gaud to speak to Conte and other interested people on the Hill before they signal Marshall Green to approach the Indonesians with the package.

W. W. Rostow

Go ahead with package 1 2/1/69

Disapprove _____

Go ahead with package, but have Katzenbach and Gaud notify interested parties on the Hill of our handling of the Conte Amendment _____

Call me _____

Consult on the Hill on the Conte Amendment problem and come back to me _____

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

55a

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JAN 25 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Aid to Indonesia in CY 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-191
By isp, NARA Date 11-25-96

Rud Poats and Orville Freeman request your approval to negotiate a combined development loan/P. L. 480 package of \$60 million to Indonesia for CY 1968. The package consists of \$25 million in AID funds to provide foreign exchange for essential non-agricultural imports and \$35 million of P. L. 480 commodities - raw cotton, bulgur, tobacco, and wheat flour.

Last November, you approved a negotiating posture which provided for a U. S. contribution of up to one-third (\$110 million) of Indonesia's estimated \$325 million foreign assistance requirement for CY 1968, on the condition that others pledge at least two-thirds of the total. This package would be our initial commitment of aid under that negotiating posture.

The Indonesians need our assistance now because they face difficult economic problems during the first quarter of CY 1968. The foreign aid pipeline is critically low, and help from other donors is not likely to be forthcoming until after the CY 1968 pledging session, now scheduled for March. In recent weeks, prices have risen sharply and the floating exchange rate has depreciated 40 percent. The Suharto government needs tangible evidence - quickly - that additional assistance will be forthcoming soon enough to prevent disruption of normal economic activity. Poats and Freeman are therefore requesting that you approve this package now, even though pledges from other donors thus far total only \$2 million.

I agree that Indonesia needs resources now, but you should be aware of the following factors which could cause us to break some of the ground rules contained in the negotiating posture you approved last November:

- Other nations may not provide two-thirds of the total CY 1968 requirement. It is likely that other donors will put up at least as much as last year (\$144 million), but it is not clear they will increase their contributions to cover two-thirds of the higher requirement for CY 1968. This is particularly true of Japan, on whom we are relying for one-third of the CY 1968 total.
- We may be pressed to exceed the \$110 million ceiling. AID and Agriculture have under consideration a number of possibilities for further assistance to Indonesia later in CY 1968 - \$40 million in P. L. 480 rice, \$25 million in development loans, and up to \$40 million in cotton textiles. Both the rice and the additional development loan money are higher priority to the

~~SECRET~~

W 716 - 1

~~SECRET~~

2

Indonesians than the commodities in the present P. L. 480 package, but we can't move rice now and additional development loans will probably have to come from FY 1969 funds. If we move the present P. L. 480 package now, we might have to cut down on these high priority items if we wish to stay within the \$110 million ceiling.

If others do not increase their contribution above CY 1967 levels, you will almost certainly have to make a decision later in the year to break the two-thirds matching formula - and possibly the \$110 million ceiling - or allow Indonesia to fall short of the aid the IMF/IBRD now says is needed.

If you wish to retain greater flexibility while still providing the resources needed to meet the pipeline problem, we could reduce the P. L. 480 portion of the present package to \$20 million by eliminating tobacco and wheat flour and cutting the cotton in half - to a six months supply. However, because we wish to move these commodities, and because the Indonesians need solid evidence of our support now, I recommend going ahead with the \$60 million package. It is within the 1968 budget, even after the recently announced P. L. 480 cutbacks.

Balance of payments

✓ 4.
H#7.
All funds made available under the AID loan would be used to purchase goods and services in the United States. For some time, AID and Treasury have been working with the Indonesians on measures to assure that imports financed by AID loans are additional to Indonesia's usual commercial purchases in the U. S. The Suharto government has now agreed to exclude from AID financing a number of commodity groups which in the past have formed a significant portion of our commercial exports to Indonesia. Secretary Fowler concurs in this loan in view of the foregoing progress on the additionality question.

Military expenditures

The application of the Symington and Conte-Long amendments to this proposal is discussed in an attachment. In summary, I believe we should consider that the conditions in the amendments have been satisfied, especially in light of Indonesia's situation. Indonesia's military expenditures in 1968 will be 28% of the budget, down sharply from 50% in 1965; in addition, Indonesia has not purchased sophisticated equipment recently.

Charles L. Schultz

Attachments

Approve \$60 million package _____

Approve \$45 million package _____

Disapprove _____

Charles L. Schultz
Director

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

556

ATTACHMENT

Military Expenditures

Symington and Conte-Long Amendments

The Symington Amendment provides that in furnishing economic assistance or P. L. 480, the President shall take into account (1) the percentage of the recipient country's budget that is devoted to military purposes, and (2) the degree to which the recipient country is using its foreign exchange to acquire military equipment. When the President finds that economic assistance or P. L. 480 resources are being diverted to military expenditures, or the recipient country is diverting its own resources to "unnecessary" military expenditures, to a degree which "materially interferes" with its development, the President shall terminate assistance until he is assured such diversion shall no longer take place.

The Conte-Long Amendment requires the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by a recipient country for the purchase of "sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes" unless he determines that such action by the recipient country is "vital to the security of the United States." Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Korea are specifically excluded.

Indonesia's military expenditures have declined from a high point of about 50 percent of the budget in 1965, during Sukarno's confrontation with Malaysia, to 33 percent in 1967, and are expected to decline further to 28 percent in 1968. Since cessation of the Malaysian confrontation, the military budget has been used increasingly for civic action purposes, such as the construction of roads and bridges and the maintenance of railroads and irrigation works. Indonesia has not used its foreign exchange for military equipment purchases since September 1967, when it contracted with the U.S.S.R. to buy \$10 million of spare parts needed to maintain Soviet equipment acquired during the Sukarno regime. As far as we can determine, Indonesia has not entered into any such agreements since, nor are any planned for the future.

The Suharto government is a military regime that is attempting to work its way out of years of economic and political chaos. AID believes that under the circumstances we should proceed with this \$60 million package on the grounds that:

- The Symington Amendment has been complied with in that the Suharto government has achieved satisfactory progress in its stabilization program, as measured by the IMF, and that its military spending is not "unnecessary" and has not "materially interfered" with its development.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-191

By 48, NARA Date 11-25-96

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

- The Conte-Long Amendment prohibitions against purchases of sophisticated weapons (a) do not preclude the purchase solely of spare parts for such weapons, and (b) do not apply to obligations incurred prior to January 2, 1968, the effective date of the amendment.

AID has instructed our mission in Djakarta to inform the Suharto government of our need for official assurance of their continued abstinence from expenditures which would require the withholding or reduction of economic aid prior to signing the AID loan and P. L. 480 credit sales agreements.

~~SECRET~~

55c

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523

OFFICE OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR

JAN 18 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aid to Indonesia

In November 1967, you authorized a U.S. pledge of one-third of Indonesia's CY 1968 aid needs as estimated by the IMF/IBRD, provided other countries made satisfactory commitments. The IMF/IBRD endorsed Indonesia's \$325 million request, and we are ready with the first major installment on our pledge. It would consist of:

A.I.D. Development Loan	\$25.0 million
P.L. 480	
150,000 bales Raw Cotton	20.0
100,000 M/T Bulgur Wheat	9.0
27,000 M/T Wheat Flour	2.0
1,000 M/T Tobacco	2.0
Ocean Transportation	2.0
TOTAL	\$60.0 million

A Memorandum from Secretary Freeman and myself on the P.L. 480 part of this package accompanies this memorandum.

While no other aid donor has yet announced its pledge for 1968, we believe we should go ahead now because:

(a) Indonesia needs this aid in the first quarter (prices have risen sharply and the exchange rate has depreciated 40% in the last three weeks; the Government needs this tangible evidence of support for its stabilization program), and other commitments are unlikely to contribute substantially to first quarter pipeline requirements; and

(b) This \$60 million package, combined with \$3 million in P.L. 480 bulgur wheat authorized earlier, is less than the \$65 million, one-third share of \$200 million, that we obligated last year. We regard it as virtually certain other donors will provide more than they did last year, and so this \$63 million offers ample cushion to maintain our one-third

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE


-2-

share. We won't make any more obligations until others have pledged the remaining two-thirds (the pledging session is in March) or we have further authorization from you in the light of any prospective shortfall.

All funds under the A.I.D. loan will be spent in the United States. A.I.D. and the Treasury Department agreed last fall to attempt to work out measures with the GOI to insure that our A.I.D. loans are additional to commercial exports. The Government of Indonesia has now agreed to exclude from its list of imports eligible for A.I.D. financing a number of major commodity groups which have in the past been U.S. commercial exports to Indonesia. We will continue to work with the GOI on other possibilities for maximizing additionality as well as overall U.S. exports to Indonesia.

Indonesia's self-help is outlined briefly at Tab A. The IMF is currently negotiating a standby arrangement with the GOI, which will provide fiscal and monetary performance standards.

Recommendation: That you approve the A.I.D. loan to Indonesia as part of the above package.


Rutherford M. Poats
Acting Administrator

Enclosure:

1. Tab A, "Indonesia--General Self-Help Measures"

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IndonesiaGeneral Self-Help Measures

The GOI has taken strong fiscal and monetary steps in implementing an IMF-endorsed stabilization program. Under this plan, the GOI has abolished import licensing and multiple exchange rates based on an overvalued rupiah, in favor of a free foreign exchange market (Bonus Export system). At the same time, it has courageously eliminated stifling but often politically expedient subsidies, and has moved away from bureaucratic intervention towards reliance upon the free market in allocating national resources. For the first time in a decade, Indonesia has made a serious effort to balance its national budget. Moreover, the GOI has opened its doors to foreign investment by returning nationalized assets to their original owners and providing substantial encouragement to new investment under a new liberal foreign investment law. The GOI is determined to continue its policy of economic self-discipline and face constructively the immediate problems of rice shortages, the urgent need for operational and management assistance in many Indonesian enterprises, further increases in tax collections and considerable improvements required in their statistical system.

The GOI is currently discussing a Five Year (1969-73) Plan with emphasis on financial stability and economic development. Agriculture will receive first priority. Second priority will be accorded to light and medium industries using agricultural and other domestic raw materials or contributing to agricultural output (e.g., fertilizer). In the infrastructure area, the rehabilitation of roads, highways, transport and communication media, will also be stressed to remove bottlenecks impeding export and inter-island trade. Capital input in heavy industrial projects is expected to come from foreign resources. The Asian Development Bank is financing a broad survey of Indonesia's agricultural resources and has recently sent a team to Djakarta to evaluate technical assistance requirements. In addition, experts from IBRD/IMF, the Harvard Advisory Group and a group of Dutch economists under Professor Tinbergen are helping GOI in its planning effort.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53e

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

JAN 18 1968

Subject: Public Law 480 Program with Indonesia

We recommend that you authorize us to negotiate a convertible local currency P.L. 480 sales agreement with Indonesia to provide approximately 150,000 bales of cotton for processing in Indonesia, 100,000 tons of bulgur, 27,000 tons of wheat flour, and 1,000 tons of tobacco for which the current export market value is \$35.0 million (including certain ocean transportation costs). The proposed terms are the minimum for development loans. The Department of State and Treasury concur in this recommendation.

Need for Program

P.L. 480 assistance is needed (1) to help ease the Indonesian balance of payments deficit, (2) to supply additional foodgrains to supplement Indonesia's deficit domestic production, and (3) to generate funds to finance increased investments in the agriculture sector. Although Indonesia is taking steps to increase domestic production of rice and other food items, Indonesia continues to need substantial imports of rice, flour, and foodgrains. The cotton will meet about a one-year's requirement of Indonesia's expanding textile mills and reduce needs for foreign exchange expenditures for textiles and yarn imports. The tobacco will be used for blending with Indonesia's domestic tobacco and help combat contraband in cigarettes as well as provide increased revenue to the Government. The P.L. 480 financing would be a part of the U. S. contribution in association with the Intergovernmental Group to assist Indonesia's stabilization efforts undertaken in cooperation with IMF.

After other donor Government pledges are known and a determination can be made of the size and conditions of the U. S. commitment, consideration will need to be given to additional P.L. 480 programing for about \$40.0 million for the 200,000 metric tons of rice from the U. S. 1968 crop as well as financing up to \$40.0 million of U.S.-processed cotton textiles and yarns under P.L. 480.

Usual Marketing Requirements

None for cotton, tobacco and bulgur. With respect to the wheat flour, we have proposed to the Australians that there be no UMR on the grounds that the flour we are supplying under this P.L. 480 agreement leaves ample room for commercial sales as well as Australia's concessional sales to Indonesia.

Self-help

Indonesia's prime food problem--a chronic rice shortage--is aggravated by a tradition of pricing policies which subsidize consumption but fail to provide incentives for farmers. The self-help provisions we would seek to

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-201

By MEG, NARA Date 1-21-97


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

negotiate, therefore, would place top priority on improved price and procurement practices. Specifically, they would call on the Government of Indonesia to: (1) assure that prices received by farmers for rice during the coming April-June harvest will be sufficient to encourage and reward the use of fertilizer, pesticides, improved seeds, and other production inputs; (2) provide adequate financing to the Central Food Board to enable maximum procurement of rice during the major harvest season, thereby strengthening producer prices and helping meet year-round food distribution requirements; (3) further expand the BIMAS project through increased budget and administrative support in 1968; (4) establish production and import targets aimed at rapid expansion of fertilizer and pesticide use; and (5) expand field testing and adaptive research on high-yielding seed varieties.

Recommendation: That you authorize us to begin negotiation with Indonesia for a convertible local currency P.L. 480 sales agreement for 150,000 bales of cotton for processing in Indonesia, 100,000 tons of bulgur, 27,000 tons of wheat flour, and 1,000 tons of tobacco.

January 18 1968



Acting Administrator
Agency for International Development



Secretary
Department of Agriculture

APPROVE: _____

DISAPPROVE: _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

Pres file

Monday, January 29, 1968

Mr. President:

At Tab A is a memo from Secretary Rusk recommending you send a brief message to the Second United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD II). It would be delivered by Gene Rostow, who is our delegate to the Conference. A draft message prepared in State and revised here is attached for your approval.

The developing countries are strongly interested in this Conference. Major items on its agenda include the tariff preference issue, commodity agreements, and compensatory financing arrangements.

UNCTAD I was held in the spring of 1964. Under Secretary of State Ball read your message to that Conference.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓ 2/1/68No Call me

ERF:MWG:mat

3.5
56a
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message to the Second Session of the
United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD-II).

Recommendation:

That you approve the enclosed message to UNCTAD-II
to be delivered on your behalf by the U.S. delegation to
the Conference.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

UNCTAD-II will be held in New Delhi February 1 -
March 25, 1968. (The first session - UNCTAD-I - was
held in Geneva in 1964.) Some 130 members of the U.N.
and its specialized agencies are expected to be represented.
We hope for a constructive dialogue with the developing
countries on practical steps that can be taken to accelerate
their economic growth. The question of temporary trade
preferences for all developing countries - an idea which
you said at Punta del Este last April we would pursue -
will probably be one of the principal topics for discussion.

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow
will be our chief delegate to the Conference.

Dean Rusk
Dean Rusk

Enclosure:
Suggested message.

522

January 29, 1968

**Proposed Message to the Second United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development**

For two decades the United States has been committed to the struggle against want and ignorance. We shall sustain that commitment.

This Conference was called to help advance the welfare of all nations and to accelerate the growth of the developing countries. In this vital task we are united.

We share a common interest in a secure and prosperous world. My hope is that this conference will create wider understanding of this common interest and further progress toward this common goal.

I wish you every success in your work.

Lyndon B. Johnson

ERF:MWG:mst

5?

INFORMATION

SECRET

Sunday, January 28, 1968
12:00 noon

Pres file

Mr. President:

Before clearance, I wanted you to read this contingency instruction to our man in Cairo, should they wish to move towards resumption of relations with the U.S. I have marked the key passages.

W. W. Rostow

Cable approved _____

Amend _____

Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 2-4-92

DRAFT

57a

TO: CAIRO

FROM: STATE

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLJ 91-450

By WJH, NARA, Date 2-4-92

Subject: US-UAR Relations

1. Following for use in your next discussion of subject with Muhammad Riad.
2. Although frequent repetition UAR line that we are being negative about resumption relations is beginning raise question whether Egyptians trying use issue as stick with which to beat us, we are prepared accept at face value Riad's assertion that UAR desire for resumption is genuine. For our part, as we have made clear to UARG on number of occasions, we believe diplomatic relations most useful in difficult times and would be glad to see them resumed. We are ready to agree in principle to formal resumption now and to work towards restoration of friendly and cooperative relations thereafter. We have conveyed our interest in resumption to highest levels UARG and have as yet received no specific proposals. If Egyptians want to resume, they should get down to cases.
3. Question of who is taking initiative no longer seems relevant, given statements of interest made by both sides already. We willing settle for joint statement along lines proposed para 10. C of Cairo's 1413 and if UARG wishes proceed on that basis it should authorize appropriate official to inform us, privately if it wishes, that it is prepared resume relations and is ready to negotiate details. (We need some official confirmation, as

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

opposed unofficial expression of opinion, that UARG in fact ready to resume. We have already indicated our willingness to resume relations. UARG should reciprocate.)

4. With respect to UARG allegation that British and American planes were involved in June war, we set no conditions and have asked for no conditions and have asked for no apologies. We do, however, stand on our position that public misapprehensions regarding events of last June should be clarified and that it is inconsistent with good relations to leave an impression that the United States engaged in military actions against Egyptian people when in fact we had no part in them. In the perspective of Egypt's good relations with the American people, which both governments desire rebuild, it would be wise now officially to make it clear that the charges of American and British involvement were based on mistakes and misinformation. UARG should realize that American people saw and heard spokesmen for Egypt repeat these accusations daily on TV and radio and that these accusations have done a great deal of harm to our mutual interests. Hussein's dignified statement on subject won him much respect in the United States and cleared the air. We have no particular formula to suggest, and we reject none in advance. We would welcome suggestions from UARG.

5. FYI. Your suggestion of unilateral statement by us that UARG acknowledged last June's allegations based on misinformation has merit

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-3-

and in final analysis we would be prepared settle for such a formula. Before doing so, however, we believe we should endeavor get UARG take action of its own to clarify misapprehensions. If it appears there no hope of getting UARG over a multilateral hurdle, you may discuss idea of unilateral statement, but you should not propose specific language or reveal our willingness to accept such formula. END FYI.

6. Compensation - Total amount involved is not large. Although impossible make accurate estimate without survey of building in Alexandria and Port Said, we believe total damage for which we should expect restitution from UARG is under \$1 million, most of which probably payable in local currency. We do not propose make agreement on amount condition precedent for resumption, but before resumption we should have agreement in principle to payment of compensation. We assume UARG will be prepared give us such an undertaking in response to our taking a leaf from British book as suggested para 10. E your 1413, but undertaking should be explicit, such as personal assurance from Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad that compensation will be forthcoming.

7. If question is raised about representation once agreement on resumption is reached, you may say that while we plan to resume at Ambassadorial level, we do not now envisage immediate exchange of Ambassadors but would plan to keep our representation at Charge level initially. Our reasons for this are administrative rather than political.

END

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

576

~~SECRET~~

ARS HW/2
RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 1413/1 0201010
ZNY SSSSS
R 200931Z JAN 68
FM CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4290
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 1413

4 9 0 2 Q

Jan 20 8:30AM 1968

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MLG 91-450By cap/18, NARA, Date 2/4/92

MODIS

SUBJECT: US-UAR RELATIONS

1. HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF FUTURE OF US-UAR RELATIONS WITH MOHAMED RIAD OF FONOFF JANUARY 18. IT WAS AGREED AT OUTSET THAT BOTH OF US WERE UNINSTRUCTED AND THAT ANY REMARKS OR SUGGESTIONS WERE PURELY PERSONAL. MOHAMED LET IT BE KNOWN HE HAD HAD ACCESS TO MEMCON OF MY JANUARY 6 TALK WITH NASSER (DOUBTLESS RECONSTRUCTED FROM TAPE RECORDING).
2. I SUGGESTED WE REVIEW FOUR POINTS OF U.S. REQUIREMENTS: UAR INITIATIVE; CORRECTION OF "BIG LIE"; COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGED OR DESTROYED PROPERTY; AND CLEAR DESIRE ESTABLISH A REAL (AS COMPARED WITH FORMAL) RELATIONSHIP. (N.B. LAST POINT CAME FROM BATTLE-HARMAN MEMCON OF DECEMBER 22).
3. UAR INITIATIVE. I WONDERED IF SENSITIVITIES RE REACTIONS IN OTHER ARAB STATES MADE UAR SHY AWAY FROM CLEAR-CUT INITIATIVE FOR RESUMPTION RELATIONS. RIAD SAID THIS WAS NOT IMPORTANT OBSTACLE. UAR GENUINELY DESIRED RESUME RELATIONS WITH U.S. FEAR WAS THAT UAR MIGHT TAKE INITIATIVE ONLY TO RECEIVE REBUFF FEW DAYS LATER FROM DEPT PRESS SPOKESMAN. I SAID TIME HAD COME FOR UAR GET OVER ITS "ASWAN DAM COMPLEX" TOWARDS U.S. AS MOHAMED AWARE, PRESIDENT OF U.S. HAD TAKEN CONSIDERABLE PAINS REPLY COURTEOUSLY AND POINT-BY-POINT TO MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM NASSER THROUGH HIGHLY UNORTHODOX CHANNEL. WAS THIS BEHAVIOR CONSISTENT WITH UAR HYPOTHESIS THAT U.S. WAS TRYING TO SET A TRAP FOR UAR? MOHAMED SEEMED IMPRESSED WITH THIS ARGUMENT. WHILE UAR INITIATIVE WAS REQUIRED, I CONTINUED, I SAW NO REASON WHY IT HAD TO BE MADE PUBLICLY. IT TOOK ONLY ONE COUNTRY TO BREAK RELATIONS BUT IT TOOK TWO TO RESUME THEM. I WAS WILLING PROPOSE TO DEPT THAT ANY JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED AT TIME OF RESUMPTION BE BASED ON PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALITY.
4. "BIG LIE". I SAID I WAS DISAPPOINTED AT NASSER'S STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT SINCE HE HAD NEVER DIRECTLY AND IN HIS OWN NAME ACCUSED U.S. OF PARTICIPATION IN JUNE WAR, PROBLEM OF "BIG LIE"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- CAIRO 1413, J. JARY 20, 1968,

DID NOT EXIST. NASSER'S STATEMENT MIGHT BE TECHNICALLY AND NARROWLY TRUE. BUT FACT REMAINED THAT RESPONSIBLE MEMBERS OF GUAR, INCLUDING MOHAMED'S OWN BOSS, HAD MADE FALSE ACCUSATION. AT THIS POINT I MADE USE OF EXCELLENT MEMORANDUM SENT TO BATTLE FROM PARKER JANUARY 9. I SAID WE CANNOT HANDLED GENUINE PROBLEM BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES BY PRETENDING PROBLEM DOESN'T EXIST.

5. MOHAMED WAS RATHER SHAKEN BY ARRAY OF DOCUMENTATION. ME THEN ASKED IF FACT THAT SINCE JUNE UAR FONMIN AND OTHER HIGH UAR OFFICIALS HAD MET FREELY AND OPENLY WITH SECRETARY, AMBS GOLDBERG AND BATTLE, AND OTHER AMERICAN OFFICIALS COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED AS EVIDENCE THAT GUAR NO LONGER BELIEVED THAT USG HAD WAGED WAR ON EGYPT IN JUNE.

6. I SAID I DID NOT THINK THIS WAS GOOD ENOUGH. I PERSONALLY PREFERRED LINE TAKEN BY HEYKAL WHEN I MET HIM JUST AFTER MY RETURN TO UAR LAST AUGUST. HEYKAL HAD FREELY ADMITTED THAT UAR HAD FALSELY ACCUSED U.S. BUT ASKED US REALIZE THAT EGYPTIANS THOUGHT ACCUSATION WAS TRUE AT TIME THEY PUBLISHED IT. I SAID HEYKAL APPROACH GAVE ME MUCH MORE TO WORK WITH THAN IDEA THAT WE PRETEND "BIG LIE" NEVER GOT TOLD. I, FOR ONE, WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH HYPOTHESIS THAT GUAR HAD BEEN UNDER TREMENDOUS STRAIN TO POINT WHERE JUDGMENTS WERE CLOUDED DURING TIME OF JUNE WAR. FONMIN RIAD HAD COME CLOSE TO SAYING JUST THIS IN HIS TALK WITH BATTLE IN NEW YORK. SEEMED TO ME THAT IF GUAR COULD SAY IT WAS AGREEABLE TO SOME VERSION OF HEYKAL HYPOTHESIS, WE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO WORK WITH. MOHAMED SEEMED TO SEE MERIT IN THIS SUGGESTION.

7. COMPENSATION. I SAID I HAD IMPRESSION THAT COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGED USG PROPERTY POSED NO PROBLEM TO GUAR. MOHAMED AGREED.

8. REAL AS COMPARED WITH FORMAL RELATIONSHIP. I SAID THIS REQUIREMENT FLOWED NATURALLY FROM OTHERS. USG DID NOT WISH UNDERTAKE CONSIDERABLE TASK OF RESUMPTION RELATIONS IF IT SUBSEQUENTLY WERE TO BE HELD AT ARM'S LENGTH OR GIVEN FROSTY TREATMENT BY UAR. I DID NOT THINK THIS POSED MANY PROBLEMS. I HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT DESPITE MY OWN RATHER PECULIAR SITUATION HERE I HAD BEEN TAKEN MOE INTO GUAR'S CONFIDENCE. THAN, SAY AMBASSADOR OF URUGUAY. I FELT THAT THERE REMAINED SUFFICIENT MUTUAL INTERESTS BETWEEN US TO FOSTER A USEFUL RELATIONSHIP. OUR COMMON INTEREST IN JUST AND LASTING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- CAIRO 1413, JANUARY 20, 1968,

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST WOULD GIVE US SOMETHING TO TALK ABOUT FOR QUITE A WHILE. MOHAMED SAID IT ENTIRELY IN UAR'S INTEREST HAVE AS MEANINGFUL A RELATIONSHIP WITH U.S. AS POSSIBLE. HE COMPLAINED THAT U.S. HAD NOT RESPONDED TO UAR GESTURE IN SENDING OFFICIAL WITH RANK MINISTER TO HEAD EGYPTIAN TEAM IN WASHINGTON. I SAID ALL I COULD TELL HIM ON THIS POINT WAS THAT IT RECEIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN WASHINGTON.

9. WE PARTED ON UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WOULD RESUME DISCUSSION AFTER MOHAMED'S RETURN TO CAIRO IN EARLY FEBRUARY.

10. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. I BELIEVE IT TO OUR INTEREST TO WORK ACTIVELY FOR RESUMPTION DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH UAR. I BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE RESUME RELATIONS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FULLY CONSISTENT WITH HONOR AND DIGNITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

B. INITIATIVE. FIRST STEP IS CLEAR PRIVATE STATEMENT BY MOHAMED OR ANY OTHER AUTHORIZED UAR OFFICIAL, SPEAKING IN NAME OF GUAR, THAT UAR WISHES RESUME RELATIONS WITH U.S.

C. JOINT COMMUNIQUE. WE WOULD THEN NEGOTIATE TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT WHICH COULD RUN SOMETHING LIKE THIS: QUOTE. SINCE THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UAR ON JUNE 6, 1967 THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS. BOTH SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED REGRET AT THE FACT OF THE RUPTURE AND AT THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED UP TO IT. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT A RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS, WITHOUT CONDITIONS AND ON A BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT, WOULD BE TO THEIR COMMON INTEREST AND TO THE INTEREST OF WORLDPEACE. ACCORDINGLY, BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO RE-ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS OF (BLANK) 1968 AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADOR. UNQUOTE.

D. BIG LIE" WE WOULD INFORM GUAR THAT AT TIME OF ISSUANCE JOINT COMMUNIQUE, DEPTNSPOKESMAN WOULD MAKE STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: QUOTE. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS LEADING UP TO RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND UAR, BOTH SIDES ALLUDED TO THE FALSE CHARGES MADE AT THE TIME OF THE JUNE HOSTILITIES THAT UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THOSE HOSTILITIES. THESE CHARGES WERE MADE UNDER THE FULL IMPACT OF EVENTS SURROUNDING THOSE HOSTILITIES. UAR REPRESENTATIVES HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THOSE CHARGES WERE BASED ON WHAT SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS HAS INDICATED TO HAVE BEEN INACCURATE INFORMATION. UNQUOTE. WHILE WE WOULD NOT ASK GUAR SPOKESMAN TO MAKE SIMILAR STATEMENT, WE WOULD EXACT COMMITMENT THAT GUAR WOULD NOT OFFICIAL DENY STATEMENT OF DEPT SPOKESMAN.

BT

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~



Department of State

(6) *Wt*
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ARS HW/2
RR RUEHC
DE RUEIVCR 1413/2 0201030
ZNY SSSSS
R 200931Z JAN 68
FM CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4291
STATE GRNC
BT

4 9 1 5Q

1968 JAN 20 9:07 AM

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 1413

NODIS

SUBJECT: US-UAR RELATIONS.

E. COMPENSATION. LET US TAKE LEAF FROM BRITISH BOOK AND STATE IN COURSE NEGOTS THAT WE ASSUME THAT UPON RESUMPTION RELATIONS TIMELY AND ADQUATE COMPENSATION WILL BE PAID FOR DAMAGE TO U.S. PROPERTY. I AM CERTAIN THIS WILL POSE NO PROBLEM TO EGYPTIANS.

F. REAL AS COMPARED WITH FORMAL RELATIONS. I THINK WE HAVE MADE OUR POINT ON THIS ONE AND DOUBT WE SHOULD PUSH IT FURTHER. IT COULD BOOERANG IN THAT EGYPTIANS COULD START PRESSING US FOR ECONOMIC AID TO ADD A LITTLE REALITY TO THE RELATIONSHIP. THEY NOW AWARE THIS NOT IN OFFING. THEY ALSO AWARE WE WORLD'S GREATEST POWER AND ARE RATHER INTERESTING TO TALK TO FROM TIME TO TIME.

BERGUS
BT

~~SECRET~~

7

8

ACTION

SECRET

Pres file

Sunday, January 28, 1968 -- 11:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

I am informed that this draft cable has been cleared by Sec. Rusk and Under Sec. Katzenbach. It has been modified in the light of certain of Bob McNamara's views; but it does not have his full clearance.

The two Secretaries and Nick Katzenbach are tied up briefing our advisers.

I have sidelined certain key passages.

You may wish to discuss this with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara on the telephone before clearance.

W. W. Rostow

Approved cable _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By hgz, NARA, Date 1-29-92

WWRostow:rlm

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

31

58a

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

INFO: USUN

NODIS/CACTUS

REF: Seoul's 3706

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

By ms, NARA Date 6-23-98

1. We fully understand nature of problems and believe we can meet all of them with following approach.

2. It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their actions and that Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. Easiest way for them to immediately ease acute tension and ^danger is to return Pueblo crew, and possibly vessel. It is imperative in ROK and our interest that nothing be done to interfere with this and that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off hook. To raise assassination and raider problem as you suggest at ~~some~~ meeting will only complicate and delay solution to all our problems.

2. The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate us and ROK. If they do we should let them rant and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. We should not call their attention to it or make any threats, or at this juncture even call ~~their~~ ^{excessive} attention to the gravity of the situation. They know how grave it is. We should be business like and non-contentious.

3. We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew. ^{Admiral} / Smith should try obtain vessel as well. The North Koreans may ask UNCMAC to sign a receipt for the men, as they did in the helicopter case, on which is written

~~SECRET~~

-2-

confession of guilt that they were engaged in espionage and violated territorial waters. UNCMAC should not rpt not be drawn into polemics, and only state quietly that North Koreans have their view of matter and we have ours. But he is not rpt not signing any statement of this kind.

4. If they insist on apology we should reply all our data indicate no repeat no violation. If after crew is released and we talk with Bucher and other crew members we find that the vessel was within the territorial waters claimed by North Korea we will make this fact public.

As to our further strategy to deal with the vessel, if they do not release it, and the ROK problem, we intend to continue with the build-up of air and naval forces in the area even if the crew is released. Under cover of this we will ask for further senior level meetings with UNCMAC to continue the dialogue.

6. As soon as the men are released, or if the release is long delayed, announcement will be made of our intention to keep augmented forces in the area in view of North Korean campaign against the ROK. Also you may tell Park we are considering substantial additional Map for the ROK to strengthen her anti-infiltration and military forces.

This info is for Park alone and must not be published in any way. This will give ample assurance to Park and his military leaders and people of our concern and interest. We will also announce that two destroyers will be provided Korea, with date for delivery of first.

7. President Park is a military man, wise and a realist, and the approach to him should be made in these terms. The enemy is about to retreat from one of its exposed positions. When we take that we will move on the next ones. You can tell Park that we will airlift available CIGCOREP items as practicable, and will give this program same priority as we give Vietnam.

~~SECRET~~

(counter-infiltration)

~~SECRET~~

-3-

8. You should see Park soonest and outline our strategy. Admiral Smith's message should be held for time being. If Park objects our approach we shall send presidential message to Park in effort further prevail on him.

9. On letter to be sent to NK MAC, revise para 5 as follows: QTE 5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officers. Further I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss the modalities for resolving this matter promptly. UNQTE

10. We suspect that North Koreans will want private meeting initially, and perhaps throughout, and under cover of that say ~~we~~ insisted on private meeting where we confessed our sins. You should make clear in initial contact that we prepared to agree to either open or closed sessions whichever they wish.

would U.S.

~~SECRET~~

59

ORIG to President
Per Mr Rostow

59a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS

*Pres file
1/28/68*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Secretaries McNamara and Rusk met with Messrs. Ball, Vance, Lodge, and General Taylor for several hours this morning. They were fully briefed on all of the events to date in connection with the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo and related matters. A long discussion ensued. The general consensus of the meeting was that there was a fair possibility of success with respect to the track now being followed by you. All members of the group were extremely skeptical about the wisdom of taking highly visible and provocative action and about the wisdom of actual military operations in North Viet-Nam in the future, but were aware that this would have to be looked at in the light of events over the next few days.

Sincerely,

N.K.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
PS/S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-153
Plj NARA, Date 4/26/96

SECRET/NODIS

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Sunday, January 28, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the instruction cable as
it went out.

Pres. file

W. W. Rostow

State 106085

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 1-29-92

WWRostow:rlh

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TOSECRET

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL ~~URGENT~~ FLASH
INFO: Am USUN New York

20 JUN 68 20 55Z

Info

STATE 106085

NODIS/CACTUS

REF: Seoul's 3706

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

By isa, NARA Date 6-23-98

1. We fully understand nature of problems and believe we can meet all of them with following approach.

2. It is apparent that North Koreans now realize full possible consequences of their actions and that Soviets have almost certainly told them to defuse situation. Easiest way for them to immediately ease acute tension and anger is to return Pueblo crew, and possibly vessel. It is imperative in ROK and our interest that nothing be done to interfere with this and that we make it as easy as possible for them to get off hook. To raise assassination and raider problem as you ~~same~~ suggest at ~~same~~ meeting will only complicate and delay solution to all our problems.

3. The North Koreans will probably talk tough and try to humiliate us and ROK. If they do we should let them ~~xx~~ ~~xx~~

Drafted by: EA:Amb. Berger:sb:1/28/68	Tel. Ext. 7741	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S - Mr. Walsh
Clearances: White House - Mr. Rostow DOD - Secretary McNamara	S - The Secretary U - Mr. Katzenbach	

SECRET

Page 2 of telegram to SEOUL~~SECRET~~

and ignore it. The velvet glove approach is the best, for there is a steel fist in it, and the North Koreans know it. We should not call their attention to it or make any threats, or at this juncture, even call excessive attention to the gravity of the situation. They know how grave it is. We should be business like and non-contentious.

43. We expect the first round of talks will produce the release of the crew. Admiral Smith should try obtain vessel as well. The North Koreans may ask UNCMAC to sign a receipt for the men, as they did in the helicopter case, on which is written confession of guilt that they were engaged in espionage and violated territorial waters. UNCMAC should not repeat not be drawn into polemics, and only state quietly and repeatedly that North Koreans have their view of matter and we have ours. He is not repeat not authorized to sign a statement of the kind they are asking for.

5.4. If they insist on apology we should reply all our data /~~data~~ ~~xxxx~~ indicate no repeat no violation. If after ~~xxx~~ crew is released and we talk with Bucher and other crew members we find that the vessel was within the territorial waters claimed by North Korea we will make this fact public.

6. You can say to Park that as soon as the men are released, or if the release is long-delayed, announcement will be

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

made of our intention to keep augmented forces in the area in view of North Korean campaign against the ROK. Also you may tell Park we additional R MAP for the ROK to strengthen their and are considering substantial//anti infiltration//military forces. We, that will also announce/~~that~~ two destroyers will be provided Korea, with date for delivery of first. You can tell Park that we will airlift available CIGCOREP items as practicable, and will give this program same priority as we give Viet-Nam.

6

76. Para/5 is for Park alone and must not be published in any way.

87. We would think that when these announcements are made they will give ample assurances to Park and his military leaders and people who are concerned and interested. These announcements will be accompanied by request by UNCMAC for further senior level meetings with North Koreans to press insistently for an end to the North Korean violations in the DMZ and infiltration.

98. President Park is a military man, wise and a realist, and the approach to him should be made in these terms. The enemy is about to retreat from one of its exposed positions. When we take that we will move on the next ~~one~~ ones.

103. You should see Park soonest and outline relevant parts of above strategy emphasizing this represents President's own views

REPRODUCTION COPY

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~X SECRET~~

on how ~~next~~ next moves should be made. Admiral Smith's message should be held for time being. If meeting with Park results in his concurrence or acquiescence, Admiral Smith should proceed to deliver message to NK MAC. However, if Park strongly objects our approach you should come back with FLASH message.

11. On message to be sent to NK MAC, revise para 5 as follows:

QTE 5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officers. Further I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides to discuss the modalities for resolving this matter promptly. ~~xx~~ UNQTE

12. We suspect that North Koreans will want private meeting initially, and perhaps throughout, and under cover of that say ~~x~~ we insisted on private meeting where we confessed our sins. It should be made clear in initial contact that we prepared to agree to either open or closed sessions ~~xxxx~~ whichever they wish.

13. There are great domestic problems and interest in this situation as well as those of world-wide implication. We are sensitive to the Korean problems and have gone very far to

~~SECRET~~

meet them but we cannot permit ourselves become satellite of ~~ROK~~ ROK.

END

11

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Sunday, January 28, 1968

Mr. President:

I think Amb. Bunker and Gen. Westmoreland's reply to Senator Ted Kennedy might be the basis for a speech denouncing that young man for demagoging with a vital set of issues -- If you can find the right man to use this material.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 17179 (6 sections)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-118
By pljw, NARA, Date 4/24/96

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm



Department of State

Mr. Smith
President
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 17179/1 0281415
ZNY SSSSS
O 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5297
STATE GRNC
BT

7096Q

1968 JAN 28 AM 9 42

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 94-119

By *isp*, NARA, Date 9-14-95

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

SUBJ: SENATOR KENNEDY'S SPEECH

REF: STATE 10597

A. GENERAL

1. I DISCUSSED THE KENNEDY SPEECH THIS MORNING WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE U.S. MISSION HERE. WE ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT IT IS A MOST UNFORTUNATE STATEMENT, APPARENTLY BASED IN LARGE PART ON INCOMPLETE, BIASED OR FALSE INFORMATION. IT

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/1 ~~SECRET~~
APPEALS HEAVILY TO THE EMOTIONS, AND IS IN NO SENSE A SOBER EVALUATION OF OUR POLICY, OUR TACTICS, AND OUR PROGRESS IN VIET-NAM. IT IGNORES COMPLETELY SOME VERY IMPORTANT POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND SOME MAJOR FACTS ABOUT THE SITUATION AND THE ENEMY. IT CONTAINS,

REGRETTABLY, INDISCRIMINATE AND IN MY VIEW UNWARRANTED ATTACKS ON THE ELECTED LEADERS OF THIS NATION. THERE ARE ALSO A NUMBER OF FACTUAL ERRORS IN THE SPEECH, THOUGH MANY OF THE IMPORTANT POINTS ARE FLAT ASSERTIONS OF OPINION OR EVEN RUMOR ADVANCED WITH LITTLE OR NO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE AND SELECTED, IT WOULD APPEAR, MAINLY TO FIT AN ALREADY CONCEIVED THEME AND WITHOUT REGARD TO A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE SITUATION.

2. IN THIS MESSAGE I WILL MAKE SOME GENERAL COMMENTS ABOUT THE KENNEDY SPEECH AND ITS PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IN FRAMING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO IT. A SECOND MESSAGE, TO FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY, WILL DEAL IN DETAIL WITH SOME OF THE FACTS AND WITH ERRORS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE SPEECH.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 1 OF 6
PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17179/1 ~~SECRET~~

3. WITH THE THOUGHT THAT IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO HAVE A STATEMENT ON THE RECORD FROM THE MISSION, WHICH COULD BE USED INITIALLY IN WASHINGTON AND THEN PUT OUT HERE, WE HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING GENERAL COMMENT: QUOTE THE U.S. MISSION GENUINELY REGRETS SENATOR KENNEDY'S MISCONCEPTIONS AS TO THE REAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE EFFORTS OF ITS PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT TO DEFEND THEIR FREEDOM WHILE REBUILDING THEIR NATION. THE SENATOR QUITE NATURALLY SPENT MOST OF HIS LIMITED TIME IN VIETNAM LOOKING INTO THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH HE WAS MOST CONCERNED, CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES AND REFUGEES. THE U.S. MISSION THEREFORE UNFORTUNATELY WAS UNABLE TO CONVEY TO HIM -- IN THE REMAINING TIME HE HAD AVAILABLE -- A ROUNDED PICTURE OF WHAT IS ACTUALLY BEING DONE BY THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, AND ARMED FORCES. HAD THE MISSION BEEN ABLE TO DO SO, IT BELIEVES THE SENATOR WOULD NOT HAVE LEFT OUT OF CONSIDERATION THE MANY CONSTRUCTIVE AND HEARTENING THINGS BEING DONE. END QUOTE

4. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT AT THE OUTSET THAT SENATOR KENNEDY HAS CITED A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT PICTURE OF VIETNAM (AFTER

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/1 ~~SECRET~~
ONLY 10 DAYS IN COUNTRY) THAN THAT AVAILABLE TO THE EXPERIENCED PEOPLE IN THE U.S. MISSION HERE. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR HIS STATEMENT THAT QUOTE LITERALLY 25 PERCENT END QUOTE OF THE PEOPLE ARE REFUGEES, OR THAT ESTIMATE FIRST STATED BY SENATOR KENNEDY HIMSELF BEFORE COMING TO VIETNAM. NOR ARE HIS SWEEPING ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN ANY WAY DEMONSTRABLE. HE CLEARLY ACCEPTED A LOT OF HEARSAY ALLEGATIONS FROM THOSE QUARTERS ALWAYS EAGER TO DENIGRATE THE GVN OR THE U.S. EFFORT IN VIETNAM. IN SUM, SENATOR KENNEDY SAW AND HEARD MOSTLY WHAT HE WANTED TO SEE AND HEAR.

5. AS I READ IT, THE SPEECH MAKES TWO MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS: (A) WE SHOULD WITHDRAW TO THE CENTERS OF POPULATION AND GIVE UP OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY IN ORDER TO REDUCE CASUALTIES; (B) WE SHOULD TRY TO FORCE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TO TAKE ENERGETIC ACTION AGAINST CORRUPTION AND WASTE BY THREATENING TO WITHDRAW ALTOGETHER IF THEY FAIL TO DO SO. OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS IN THE SPEECH ARE THE REPEATED IDEA

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17179/1 ~~SECRET~~
THAT THE LEADERS OF THIS NATION ARE HEARTLESS MEN WITH NO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28, SECTION 1 OF 6

CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE, CORRUPTION IS UNIVERSAL, AND THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DO NOT CARE ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR AND DON'T WANT TO FIGHT THE COMMUNISTS.

6. I THINK IT IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE SPEECH IS BASED ON THE UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTION THAT WE ARE IN VIET-NAM ONLY TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE. THE FACT THAT WE ARE ALSO HERE BECAUSE OUR OWN SECURITY IS DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE IS NOT MENTIONED, MUCH LESS SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED AS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE VIET-NAM PROBLEM. THE ATTITUDE OF OTHER ASIAN NATIONS IS EQUALLY IGNORED. THE FACT THAT THEIR LEADERS CONSIDER OUR ROLE HERE HIGHLY IMPORTANT TO THEIR OWN SECURITY HAS EVIDENTLY NOT ENTERED INTO THE THINKING BEHIND THE SPEECH. THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPLAINED THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR VIET-NAM POLICY AND OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE SECURITY OF FREE ASIA, BUT THE KENNEDY SPEECH MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THESE STATEMENTS. IT IS AS IF VIETNAM EXISTED ALONE, QUITE OUTSIDE THE WORLD WE LIVE IN, AND I BELIEVE OUR RESPONSE SHOULD DEAL WITH THIS

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17179/1 ~~SECRET~~
VITAL ASPECT OF OUR ROLE AND PURPOSE HERE.

7. THERE SEEMS ALSO TO BE THE UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM TODAY IS THE SAME GOVERNMENT WHICH WAS IN POWER IN 1965 WHEN THE SENATOR LAST VISITED THIS COUNTRY. NOWHERE IN THE SPEECH DOES IT APPEAR THAT ANY CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN TO THE FACT THAT THIS NEWLY ELECTED, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN IN POWER LESS THAN THREE MONTHS, THAT IT IS JUST BEGINNING TO CREATE AND TEST OUT THE NEW INSTITUTIONS PROVIDED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, AND THAT BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE LEADERS HAVE GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY TO DEALING WITH THE VERY PROBLEMS THE SENATOR STRESSES: CORRUPTION, MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES, AN IMPROVED AND EXPANDED MILITARY EFFORT, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, AND MEANS TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR.

BUNKER
BT.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

2

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 17179/2 0281449
ZNY SSSSS
O 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5298
STATE GRNC
BT

7098Q
1968 JAN 28 AM 10 10

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

8. ALSO STRIKINGLY ABSENT IS ANY REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT THIS NEW GOVERNMENT IS AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT. THE SPEECH DOES NOT MENTION THAT THE MEN ACCUSED OF BEING QUOTE COLONIALISTS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY END QUOTE AND CHARGED WITH SYSTEMATICALLY LOOTING THEIR OWN PEOPLE WERE A FEW SHORT MONTHS AGO FREELY CHOSEN AS THE LEADERS OF VIETNAM BY THEIR FELLOW CITIZENS IN WHAT IS GENERALLY CONCEDED TO HAVE BEEN A VERY FAIR AND DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. I SHOULD ADD IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THIS BLANKET ATTACK ON THE ENTIRE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATION, WHICH CHARGES THEM WITH BEING UNFEELING AND HEARTLESS MEN CONCERNED ONLY WITH THEIR OWN WELFARE, IS SURE TO RAISE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/2 ~~SECRET~~

A STORM OF INDIGNATION IN THE VIETNAMESE ASSEMBLY, THE PRESS, AND NATIONALIST CIRCLES GENERALLY. NOT ONLY SUPPORTERS OF THE REGIME, BUT MOST SENSITIVE VIETNAMESE - AND THEY ARE A PROUD PEOPLE - ARE GOING TO BE DEEPLY OFFENDED. THERE WILL LIKELY BE UNFORTUNATE EFFECTS ON OUR WORKING RELATIONS WITH MANY PEOPLE AT MANY LEVELS AS A RESULT. THIS IS AN ASPECT OF THE SPEECH WHICH WILL PLEASE NO ONE HERE BUT THE COMMUNISTS.

B. MILITARY

9. AS REGARDS THE FIRST OF THE TWO RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE SPEECH, I.E. THAT WE SHOULD ADOPT A MORE DEFENSIVE MILITARY POSTURE DESIGNED TO PROTECT AND HOLD AREAS OF HEAVY POPULATION RATHER THAN TO SEEK OUT THE ENEMY. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT KENNEDY MEANS BY THIS. IF HE MEANS A STRATEGY THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS, AMONG OTHERS, TO ASSURE THE ULTIMATE PROTECTION OF THE MAJORITY OF VIETNAMESE FROM THE COMMUNISTS, WE ARE ALREADY DOING THIS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, HE MEANS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 2 OF 6
WITHDRAWING OUR FORCES FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE CENTERS

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17179/2 ~~SECRET~~

OF POPULATION AND THE CESSATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. THEN I MUST SAY THAT I CAN SCARCELY THINK OF A POLICY BETTER CALCULATED TO JETTISON MOST OF THE GAINS WE HAVE MADE AND TO BRING INCREASED MISERY AND CASUALTIES TO BOTH AMERICANS AND VIETNAMESE. THE COMMUNISTS WOULD AT ONCE CONCLUDE THAT MILITARY VICTORY WAS IN SIGHT AND OUR WHOLE EFFORT TO BRING THEM TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WOULD HAVE BEEN VIRTUALLY NULLIFIED - IN FACT WE WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY CREATED A SITUATION WHICH COULD HARDLY FAIL TO ASSURE AN ULTIMATE OUTCOME FAVORABLE TO THE COMMUNISTS. FOR THEIR PART, VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS WOULD IN MANY CASES CONCLUDE THAT WE WERE ABOUT TO REALIZE THEIR WORST FEARS AND TURN THEM OVER TO A COMMUNIST REGIME. THEIR MORALE AND THAT OF THE GVN WOULD BE DANGEROUSLY UNDERMINED, AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC GVN WOULD BE PLACED IN A POSITION WHERE ITS RIGHT TO CLAIM TO REPRESENT ALL SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOULD BE SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED. IF IT COULD SURVIVE AT ALL UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD BE REMARKABLE. CASUALTIES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE INCREASED. WITH THE VIET CONG IN A POSITION TO OPERATE MUCH MORE FREELY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE WOULD MOST CERTAINLY

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/2 ~~SECRET~~

BE AN UPSWING IN REVENGE KILLINGS OF VILLAGERS FOR PAST ASSOCIATIONS WITH US AND THE GVN. WITHDRAWING TO POPULATED ENCLAVES WOULD GIVE THE COMMUNISTS THEIR FAVORITE SITUATION: A CHOICE OF MANY THINLY DEFENDED TARGETS SUITABLE FOR ALL KINDS OF STRIKES, FROM TERROR MORTARING TO COMPLETE SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION BY LARGE REGULAR FORCES. MOREOVER, THE FIGHTING WOULD TEND TO MOVE FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE TO THE SUBURBS AND EVEN INTO THE CITY STREETS. CAN ANYONE BELIEVE THAT FIGHTING IN CITIES WILL PRODUCE FEWER INNOCENT CASUALTIES THAN FIGHTING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE?

IN GENERAL WESTMORELAND ALSO HAS SOME VERY FIRM VIEWS ON THIS SUGGESTION AS PUT FORWARD BY KENNEDY AND THEY FOLLOW: SENATOR KENNEDY'S ATTACK ON U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY IN VIETNAM, IS ESSENTIALLY A SUGGESTION THAT THE U.S. ADOPT SOME VERSION OF THE SO-CALLED QUOTE ENCLAVE STRATEGY END QUOTE. IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING HIS RECOMMENDATION THE SENATOR CLAIMS SOME SUPPORT FROM MILITARY LEADERS IN VIETNAM AND IMPLIES THAT SEARCH AND DESTROY MISSIONS ARE CONDUCTED TO PRODUCE A FLOW OF STATISTICS AND THAT THESE STATISTICS ARE IN FACT OUR GOAL IN VIETNAM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 2 OF 6

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17179/2 ~~SECRET~~

11. THE SENATOR'S BASIC COMMENT CONCERNING MILITARY STRATEGY IS CONTAINED IN THIS SENTENCE: QUOTE THE ADOPTION OF A MORE DEFENSIVE MILITARY POSTURE, ONE DESIGNED TO PROTECT AND HOLD AREAS OF HEAVY POPULATION RATHER THAN TO SEEK OUT THE ENEMY, HAS, I FOUND, SOME SUPPORT AMONG OUR MILITARY LEADERS IN VIETNAM END QUOTE.

12. THIS PROPOSAL IS SO UNSOUND MILITARILY THAT IT IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT IT WOULD RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM ANY COMPETENT MILITARY MAN WHO IS IN POSSESSION OF THE FACTS. SUCH A STRATEGY WOULD SURRENDER THE MILITARY INITIATIVE TO THE ENEMY--AN ACTION WHICH HAS PROVED FATAL, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, IN ANY WAR IN RECORDED HISTORY. MOREOVER, SUCH STRATEGY WOULD PRODUCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM THE SAME SITUATION AS NOW EXISTS IN LAOS--A DE FACTO PARTITION WITH VC CONTROL OF A LARGE PORTION OF THE COUNTRY FULLY ACCEPTED. IT WOULD, IN FACT, PRODUCE AN IMMEDIATE STALEMATE, WITH THE ENEMY HAVING THE BEST CHANCE TO BREAK THE STALEMATE.

13. AS TO THE MATTER OF MILITARY SUPPORT OF THE SENATOR'S

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17179/2 ~~SECRET~~

A SAMPLING HAS BEEN TAKEN OF THOSE GENERAL OFFICERS WHO TALKED WITH KENNEDY AND NO DIRECT DISCUSSION OF THIS DEFENSIVE STRATEGY THESIS WAS DISCOVERED. MOST OF THOSE CONTACTED POINTED OUT TO THE SENATOR THAT SECURITY WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR PACIFICATION. SOME ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEED TO SEARCH OUT AND DESTROY THE ENEMY IS A BASIC INGREDIENT OF SECURITY. OTHERS SAID THE MATTER DID NOT COME UP AT ALL. THE SENATOR TAPED ALL OF HIS CONVERSATIONS AND IT IS THEREFORE POSSIBLE THAT HE COULD PRODUCE AN OUT OF CONTEXT STATEMENT WHICH MIGHT SEEM TO SUPPORT THE DEFENSIVE STRATEGY CONCEPT.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

2

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 17179/3 0281515
ZNY SSSSS
O 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF+1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5299
STATE GRNC
BT

7102Q
1968 JAN 28 AM 10 50

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 5 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

14. FINALLY, THE FOLLOWING QUOTE DESERVES COMMENT: "OUR OVER-
RIDING GOAL SHOULD BE TO MAXIMIZE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF
THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND OUR OWN SOLDIERS, RATHER THAN TO
SEARCH OUT THE ENEMY IN HIS TERRITORY AND ON HIS TERMS. TO
PRODUCE A FLOW OF STATISTICS OF ENEMY KILLED, ROADS OPENED,
HAMLETS SECURED IS NOT OUR GOAL IN VIETNAM, AND IT IS NOT
WORTHY OF OUR EFFORT".

15. THE INFERENCE THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO PRODUCE A FLOW OF
STATISTICS IS RIDICULOUS. FURTHER, IT IS NOT THE OBJECTIVE OF
SEARCH AND DESTROY OPERATIONS TO PRODUCE A FLOW OF STATISTICS.
THE PURPOSE OF SUCH OPERATIONS IS TO DESTROY THE ENEMY MAIN

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/3 ~~SECRET~~
FORCES, BOTH NVA AND VC, WHO OPERATE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY
AND WHO POSE THE CHIEF THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE POPULATION
OF SVN AND TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY. IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED,
THESE MAIN FORCES WOULD SOON ACHIEVE COMPLETE SUCCESS IN
CONSOLIDATING ENEMY MILITARY POWER ON SVN TERRITORY.

16. THE CURRENT STRATEGY OF APPLYING MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST
THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF ENEMY FORCES AND BASE AREAS IS THE ONLY
STRATEGY THAT CAN PRODUCE MILITARY VICTORY. TO WITHDRAW TO THE
HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS WOULD NOT ONLY REMOVE ANY HOPE OF MILITARY
VICTORY, BUT WOULD ALSO WEAKEN OUR POSITION IN NEGOTIATIONS AND
WOULD SURELY PROLONG THE WAR INDEFINITELY.

17. ON THE MATTER OF DESTRUCTION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, WHEN
A WAR IS FOUGHT ON A BATTLEFIELD THAT EMBRACES THE ENTIRE
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE OF A COUNTRY, INCLUDING THE POPULATED
AREAS, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT DISLOCATION AND DESTRUCTION OF
FIELDS, HOMES, AND INNOCENT CIVILIANS WILL OCCUR. HOWEVER,
ANY ACTION ON OUR PART TO PREVENT THIS WILL BE REMEDIAL ONLY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28

SECTION 3 OF 6

TO A LIMITED EXTENT, BECAUSE IT IS THE ENEMY WHO IS DETERMINED

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17179/3-~~SECRET~~

TO FIGHT THE WAR IN THESE AREAS. FOR OUR PART, WE INSURE THAT ALL OF OUR OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED WITH THE GREATEST RESTRAINT, AND OUR WEAPONS USED WITH EXTREME PRECISION TO REDUCE DESTRUCTION TO AN ABSOLUTE MINIMUM, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE DELIVERY OF SUPPORTING FIRES, IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREST CLEARING, AND IN OUR CROP DESTRUCTION AND DEFOLIATION PROGRAMS.

18. WITH REGARD TO KENNEDY'S STATEMENTS ON THE DRAFT AND MOBILIZATION, THE FACT IS THAT THERE IS ALREADY ON THE BOOKS A MOBILIZATION DECREE WHICH COVERS MEN FROM AGE 18 TO 33. PRESENT PLANS CALL FOR DRAFTING OF 18 AND 19 YEAR OLDS IN THE COURSE OF THIS YEAR, ALONG WITH THE RECALL OF RESERVISTS AND THE "MOBILIZATION IN PLACE" OF CIVILIANS WITH ESSENTIAL SKILLS. IF WE MAKE A COMPARISON WITH THE U.S. EFFORT, WE MAY NOTE THAT OUR OWN DRAFT LAW COVERS ONLY MEN FROM 18 TO 26. MORE IMPORTANT, THE GVN NOW HAS 770,000 MEN UNDER ARMS; TO EQUAL THIS EFFORT WITH OUR MUCH GREATER POPULATION, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE 10 MILLION MEN IN OUR ARMED FORCES, ABOUT THE NUMBER WE HAD UNDER ARMS IN WORLD WAR II; AND WE WERE A COUNTRY FAR MORE HIGHLY ADVANCED IN EVERY SENSE THAN VIETNAM.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/3-~~SECRET~~

19. KENNEDY SAID THAT WHILE THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS FIGHTING IN VIET-NAM THE POLICE HERE MUST MAKE A HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCH FOR DRAFT ELIGIBLE MEN. IN FACT THERE IS A VIGOROUS EFFORT BY THE POLICE TO APPREHEND DRAFT DODGERS. IT IS ALSO A FACT THAT OF THE 142,562 MEN INDUCTED INTO THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES LAST YEAR 101,317 OR MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS WERE VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENTS. THIS FACT IS ALSO A COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT THAT THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT HAVE THEIR HEARTS IN THE STRUGGLE.

20. IF WE COMPARE CASUALTIES WE GET A SIMILAR PICTURE. THE U.S. LOST 9,557 MEN KILLED IN ACTION LAST YEAR. THE VIETNAMESE LOST 12,716 NOT COUNTING THE VERY HEAVY CIVILIAN CASUALTIES INFLICTED BY THE VIET CONG. FOR THE U.S. TO SUFFER COMPARABLE LOSSES IN TERMS OF OUR MUCH LARGER TOTAL POPULATION, WE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE MORE THAN 162,000 KIA.

C. GVN PERFORMANCE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28

SECTION 3 OF 6

21. AS REGARDS THE SECOND RECOMMENDATION, THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO FORCE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER UNDER THREAT OF OUR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, THERE ARE THREE BASIC COMMENTS TO BE MADE. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE,

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17179/3 ~~SECRET~~

WE HAVE LONG HOPED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD BE ABLE TO FORM A STRONG, POPULARLY SUPPORTED GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD ENJOY BOTH THE CONFIDENCE OF ITS OWN PEOPLE AND THE RESPECT OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS. FOR US TO DICTATE POLICY TO THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO THE DEGREE SUGGESTED BY KENNEDY WOULD DESTROY THE VERY THING WE HAVE TRIED TO NURTURE. NO PATRIOTIC VIETNAMESE WOULD HAVE ANYTHING BUT CONTEMPT FOR HIS OWN GOVERNMENT IF HE BELIEVED THAT A FOREIGN POWER, ALBEIT A FRIENDLY ONE, WAS GIVING HIS GOVERNMENT ORDERS. NO OTHER GOVERNMENT WOULD CONSIDER SERIOUSLY DEALING WITH SUCH A PUPPET. IN SHORT, I CAN SEE NO POLITICAL ADVANTAGE FOR US IN TRYING TO ESTABLISH JUST ANOTHER COLONIAL REGIME HERE, AND IT RUNS AGAINST A TRADITION OF TWO CENTURIES IN WHICH WE HAVE THROWN OFF OUR OWN COLONIALISM AND SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE INDEPENDENCE UNDER VIALBE CIRCUMSTANCES FOR OTHER COLONIAL AREAS.

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17179/3 ~~SECRET~~

22. THE SECOND COMMENT ON THIS POINT IS SIMPLY THAT THIS GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED ON BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE SIDES THAT IT FULLY INTENDS TO TACKLE SUCH PROBLEMS AS CORRUPTION, REFUGEES, AND MEDICAL FACILITIES. SUCH THINGS AS THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF NEW PROVINCE CHIEFS, SCHEDULED TO START FEBRUARY 2, AND THE NEW INSPECTORATE PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION ARE DESIGNED TO ROOT OUT CORRUPTION. OTHER PLANNED MEASURES ARE DIRECTED AT THE BASIC CAUSES OF CORRUPTION, AS FOR EXAMPLE THE IMPROVEMENT OF SALARY SCALES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES ALIKE. THE ASSEMBLY HAS COMMITTEES CHARGED WITH LOOKING INTO CORRUPTION AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE. NUMBERS OF PROVINCIAL OFFICIALS HAVE ALREADY BEEN RELIEVED AND/OR CHARGED BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION OR INCOMPETENCE. THERE IS GOOD REASON TO HOPE THIS YOUNG GOVERNMENT WILL ACT EFFECTIVELY AGAINST CORRUPTION. WE MUST GIVE THEM A LITTLE TIME AND ENCOURAGEMENT IF THIS EFFORT IS TO SUCCEED, HOWEVER.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

2

00 RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 17179/4 0281610
ZNY SSSSS
O 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF-1 7107 Q
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5300 1968 JAN AM 11 58
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 4 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

23. KENNEDY CHARACTERIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET-NAM NOT ONLY AS CORRUPT BUT AS LISTLESS AND INERT. HE SUGGESTS TODAY'S LEADERS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS -- IN CONTRAST TO THE VIET CONG -- POSSESS NO DESIRE OR ABILITY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICE FOR THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. THIS IS A GROSS MISCHARACTERIZATION.

24. THERE IS, OF COURSE, CORRUPTION, INEPTITUDE, INCAPABILITY AND INERTIA WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. BUT THERE ARE ALSO EXAMPLES WHICH ABUND OF SLOW, STEADY AND CUMULATIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE GVN'S ABILITY TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICE TO THE VIETNAMESE. A GOOD EXAMPLE IS THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE AND IS CONTINUING IN PRIMARY EDUCATION. IN THE EARLY

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/4 ~~SECRET~~.

1950'S, LESS THAN 10 PERCENT OF VIETNAMESE CHILDREN OF PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE WERE ENROLLED IN PRIMARY SCHOOL. IN TWO YEARS, 85 PERCENT WILL BE ENROLLED. INERTIA AND INCOMPETENCE ARE NOT THE QUALITIES THAT HAVE ENABLED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TO APPROACH UNIVERSAL ELEMENTARY EDUCATION IN THE MIST OF WAR. THE GOVERNMENT HAS HAD MUCH ASSISTANCE FROM US, OF COURSE, IN ACHIEVING THESE LEVELS AND COULD NOT HAVE DONE AS WELL WITHOUT OUR ASSISTANCE. BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THERE ARE MORE AND MORE VIETNAMESE CHILDREN IN VIETNAMESE SCHOOLS, TAUGHT BY VIETNAMESE TEACHERS, USING VIETNAMESE TEXTS.

25. IN ADDITION TO SUCH EFFORTS TO PROVIDE MORE SERVICE FOR ITS PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO NOW GIVING MORE THAN A LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND REFORM.

26 AN INTERAGENCY CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, CHAIRED BY AN ABLE, RESPECTED ACADEMICIAN-ADMINISTRATOR, HAS UNDER SERIOUS AND SYSTEMATIC STUDY FOUR MAJOR AREAS REQUIRING IMPROVEMENT AND REFORM. THESE ARE: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT; CIVIL SERVICE ADMINISTRATION; PUBLIC FINANCE; AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 (SECTION 4 OF 6)

27. THE MODERNIZATION AND REFORM OF ARCHAIC GOVERNMENT MACHINERY IS A SLOW AND DIFFICULT PROCESS. PROGRESS CANNOT BE RAPID. THE ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATION HERE IS THAT SERIOUS AND GENUINE EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE.

28. AS A THIRD COMMENT ON THE RECOMMENDATION THAT WE THREATEN TO PULL OUT IF THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT REFORM THEIR GOVERNMENT, I WOULD SAY THIS IS SIMPLY NOT A CREDIBLE THREAT. AN AMERICAN WITHDRAWAL, LEAVING THE VIETNAMESE TO THE COMMUNISTS, WOULD HAVE SUCH AN EFFECT ON OUR POSITION IN THE PACIFIC AND WOULD SO DEVALUE OUR COMMITMENTS EVERYWHERE IN THE WORLD THAT WE CANNOT SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATE PAYING THAT PRICE IN AN EFFORT TO DISCIPLINE THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT. SOME CRITICS WILL DISAGREE WITH THIS EVALUATION, BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT. THEY BELIEVE, RIGHTLY I THINK, THAT THIS STRUGGLE INVOLVES THE SECURITY AND THE FUTURE OF ALL OF THE FREE WORLD. THEY DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMERICANS WILL DELIBERATELY ENDANGER THAT SECURITY AND THAT COMMON FUTURE.

29. I SHOULD ADD IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/4 ~~SECRET~~

A VERY PROUD PEOPLE AND THEY ARE AN ASIAN PEOPLE WITH A SENSE OF FATALISM THAT HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH OCCIDENTAL RATIONALITY. IF TO TRY TO FACE US DOWN ON THE ISSUE REGARDLESS OF ITS ULTIMATE EFFECT. DIEM WAS NOT THE ONLY VIETNAMESE LEADER WHO COULD BE ADAMANT WHEN HE THOUGHT VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY WAS AT STAKE. THERE ARE MANY HERE WHO MIGHT TRUTHFULLY SAY THEY WOULD RATHER BE RIGHT THAN PRESIDENT, OR RATHER BE RED THAN DEAD IN A MORAL AND NATIONAL SENSE.

30. WITH RESPECT TO KENNEDY'S COMMENTS ABOUT SAIGON, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE RICH PEOPLE IN SAIGON WHO HAVE PROFITED FROM THE WARTIME BOOM. THIS IS AN INEVITABLE BY-PRODUCT OF A THRIVING WARTIME ECONOMY - ONE I VERY EVIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II AND THE KOREAN CONFLICT. WHAT IS NOT TRUE IS THAT ONLY THE RICH ARE BENEFITTING FROM THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN VIET-NAM. IN GENERAL, PEOPLE OF EVERY SOCIAL CLASS IN VIET-NAM TODAY, OUTSIDE OF THOSE IN REFUGEE CAMPS OR IN THE MOST ISOLATED AND INSECURE RURAL AREAS, ARE BETTER OFF ECONOMICALLY THAN THEY WERE FEW YEARS AGO. UNEMPLOYMENT, PREVIOUSLY VERY MARKED, HAS BEEN TRANSFORMED INTO LABOR SHORTAGE AND WAGES ARE

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17179/4 ~~SECRET~~

HIGH. THE RURAL ECONOMY, PARTICULARLY IN THE DELTA, IS IN THE MIDST OF AN ECONOMIC BOOM AND SHOWS CLEAR SIGNS OF THE BEGINNING OF AN AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION AS PEASANTS BUY AND USE MORE FERTILIZER, PESTICIDES, MACHINERY AND OTHER AGRICULTURAL INPUTS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-, SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 (SECTION 4 OF 6)

IN ADDITION TO REFUGEES AND OTHERS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE WAR, GVN CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE SEEN THEIR REAL INCOMES HURT BY INFLATION AND THEIR RELATIVE ECONOMIC STANDING IN THE COMMUNITY FALL AS OTHERS DO BETTER. CERTAINLY, THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF SAIGON - HOUSING, REFUSE, ETC. -- HAVE BEEN GREATLY AGGRAVATED BY THE INFLUX OF POPULATION. BUT MUCH OF THAT INFLUX HAS COME IN RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES SAIGON OFFERS.

31. GVN EFFORTS TO INCREASE TAXATION NEED TO BE STEPPED UP - FOR BOTH SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS. THE GOVERNMENT IS ATTEMPTING TO DO SO. BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE ARE A FEW WHO ARE VISIBLY MORE PROSPEROUS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE MANY ARE GETTING POORER. QUITE THE CONTRARY: THE SAME FACTORS BENEFITTING THE RICH ARE ALSO BENEFITTING THOSE ON THE LOWER END OF THE ECONOMIC SCALE - AND TODAY'S PROSPERITY IN VIET-NAM IS WIDELY SHARED - NOT JUST FOR CHOLON MERCHANTS, BUT THE SAIGON

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17179/4 ~~SECRET~~

CYCLO DRIVER AND THE PEASANT IN THE BA XUYEN ARE EARNING AND PRODUCING MORE THAN EVER BEFORE.

D. CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

32. KENNEDY SPEAKS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AS VICTIMS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF CONCERN FOR THEIR PLIGHT. THIS HAS THINGS TURNED AROUND. THEY ARE VICTIMS OF A WAR DELIBERATELY UNDERTAKEN BY A CRUEL AND MURDEROUS COMMUNIST ENEMY WHOSE VICIOUSNESS THE SENATOR ELSEWHERE DESCRIBES WITH AWE. THE SUFFERINGS OF CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY CASUALTIES ARE DIRECTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG, NOT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF AN UNDERDEVELOPED SOCIETY THAT SEEKS ONLY TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. IT IS NECESSARY TO REMEMBER THAT THE WAR-TIME

BUNKER

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

Z

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DI RUMJIR 17179/5 0281645
ZNY SSSSS
O 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5301
STATE GRNC
BT

7108Q
1968 JAN 28 PM 12 46

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 5 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

INFLUX OF CIVILIAN INJURED HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE BEYOND VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN MEDICAL CAPABILITY AND THAT THAT CAPABILITY CANNOT BE RAPIDLY INCREASED. SOME OF KENNEDY'S CRITICISM IS DEFENSIBLE, HOWEVER. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT MADE OPTIMUM USE OF THEIR TOTAL MEDICAL STAFF AND RESOURCES: TOO MANY DOCTORS, NURSES, AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN CONSCRIPTED; ARVN FACILITIES ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY USED TO ACCOMMODATE CIVILIAN INJURED; THE VIETNAMESE MAY NOT HAVE THE SAME SENSE OF COMPASSION FOR PATIENTS THAT THEIR AMERICAN HELPERS HAVE. THEY ARE THE HEIRS TO A DIFFERENT TRADITION, THAT OF ASIA. THIS IS CHANGING, TOO, BUT THE CHANGE IS NOT COMPLETE.

33. KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT THE GVN INTENDS TO DIVERT MANY OF THE MEAGER NUMBERS OF PHYSICIANS NOW SERVING IN THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MINISTER OF HEALTH HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN OBTAINING THE RE-ASSIGNMENT OF RVNAF DOCTORS TO THE PROVINCIAL

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/5 ~~SECRET~~

HEALTH SERVICES, AND HE HAS RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE THAT AN ADDITIONAL 12 TO 15 PHYSICIANS AND A NUMBER OF PHARMACISTS WILL BE DETAILED TO THE MOH. TODAY, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 250 PHYSICIANS IN THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH SYSTEM, RATHER THAN THE 150 SENATOR KENNEDY REFERS TO.

34. WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SENATOR'S FIGURES ON CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, WHICH HE PRESENTS AS FACTS, RATHER THAN THE ROUGH AND EXAGGERATED ESTIMATES THEY ARE. THERE IS NO RELIABLE STATISTICAL BASIS FROM WHICH OVERALL CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTY DATA MAY BE PROJECTED. IN 1967 THERE WERE 48,724 CIVILIANS ADMITTED TO MINISTRY OF HEALTH HOSPITALS FOR WAR-RELATED INJURIES. THE MISSION'S BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT THERE HAVE BEEN APPROXIMATELY AS MANY CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 5 OF 6
IN 1967 WHO HAVE NOT BEEN ADMITTED TO A HOSPITAL AS THERE
ARE WHO HAVE BEEN, MAKING AN ESTIMATED TOTAL
FOR 1968 OF AROUND 100,000. WE CANNOT FURTHER
SUPPORT THIS ESTIMATE, BUT IT IS FAR MORE REASONABLE THAN
KENNEDY'S FIGURE OF 150,000, WHICH HE DID NOT SUBSTANTIATE
IN ANY WAY. SIMILARLY, HIS ESTIMATE OF 25,000 ANNUAL DEATHS

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17179/5 ~~SECRET~~

IS NOTICEABLY HIGHER THAN OUR ROUGH ESTIMATE OF 20,000 BASED ON
A SAMPLING PROCESS.

35. SINCE THE VIETNAMESE ARE NOT CAPABLE, IN ANY CASE, BY
THEMSELVES OF MINISTERING TO THE NEEDS OF THOSE PEOPLE, LARGE
EXTERNAL RESOURCES HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE. THE USAID-RV
SUPPORTED PUBLIC HEALTH ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS MAINTAINED
APPROXIMATELY 200 AMERICAN AND FREE WORLD PHYSICIANS, 600
KEY TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEALTH PERSONNEL, AS WELL
AS UP TO 400 LOGISTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT PERSONNEL. IN
ADDITION, 400 BEDS IN U.S. MILITARY HOSPITALS ARE IN USE
NOW FOR VIETNAMESE WITH WAR-RELATED INJURIES.

36. IN THE MIDST OF WAR, THE GVN IS CARRYING OUT A
COMPREHENSIVE COMBINATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL
TRAINING PROGRAMS WHICH, IN TIME, WILL GREATLY EXPAND THE
NUMBERS OF WELL-TRAINED DOCTORS, DENTISTS, NURSES, AND
OTHER MEDICAL AND PARAMEDICAL PERSONNEL REQUIRED
BY THIS SOCIETY BUT DENIED IT DURING ITS COLONIAL PAST.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/5 ~~SECRET~~

E. REFUGEES

37. AS REGARDS REFUGEES, PRESIDENT THIEU DEVOTED PART
OF HIS STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE TO THIS PROBLEM. HE
STATED THAT QUOTE IN THE SOCIAL FIELD, THE MOST IMPORTANT
PROBLEM IS THAT OF ANTI-COMMUNIST REFUGEES END QUOTE.
HE WENT ON TO OUTLINE BOTH EMERGENCY AND LONG-
RANGE EFFORTS TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE REFUGEES.

38. I MUST SAY THAT I FIND IT MOST DISTRESSING THAT KENNEDY
SHOULD SAY WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THE FLOW OF
REFUGEES WITH ITS ATTENDANT HUMAN SUFFERING. BOB KOMER
TELLS ME THAT AMERICAN OFFICIALS WORKING ON THE REFUGEE
PROBLEM AND FAMILIAR WITH IT FROM A COUNTRYSIDE POINT OF
VIEW AGREE IT IS A GROSS EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT QUOTE OVER
80 PERCENT END QUOTE OF THE REFUGEES WERE DEPOSITED IN
THE CAMPS BY AMERICAN FORCES OR FLED TO THE CAMPS IN FEAR
OF U.S. PLANES AND ARTILLERY. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, THE SENATOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 5 OF 6

SEEMS TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THAT IT IS THE VIET CONG AND THE FORCES OF NORTH VIETNAM WHICH STARTED THIS CONFLICT, AND IT IS THEY

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17179/5 ~~SECRET~~

WHO NOW PROLONG IT. THE SUFFERINGS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING THE REFUGEES, FLOW FROM THE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF HANOI.

29. I AM ALSO AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND SOME OF THE QUOTE FACTS END QUOTE AND FIGURES ON REFUGEES USED BY SENATOR KENNEDY. THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES IS NOT REMOTELY CLOSE TO 25 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION. THERE ARE 17 MILLION PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AT THE END OF 1967 THERE WERE 230,000 REGISTERED AS REFUGEES, AND ONLY ABOUT HALF OF THESE WERE LIVING IN REFUGEE CAMPS. IF WE TAKE AN OVERALL FIGURE, WE MAY SAY THAT THE GVN ESTIMATES TOTAL REFUGEES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1964 AT TWO MILLION - LESS THAN 12 PERCENT, NOT 25 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION - AND 1.2 MILLION OF THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN RESETTLED, RETURNED TO THEIR VILLAGES, OR OTHERWISE ABSORBED INTO THE ECONOMY.

40 AS FOR THE STATEMENT THAT ONLY HALF OF THE U.S. SUPPLIES REACH THE REFUGEES, THIS IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. NOR IS IT TRUE THAT 75 PERCENT OF THE RESETTLEMENT FUNDS ARE SIPHONED OFF BEFORE

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17179/5 ~~SECRET~~

THEY REACH THE REFUGEES. IN SOME INSTANCES, THERE MAY HAVE BEEN PROBLEMS IN THE MISUSE OR DIVERSION OF FUNDS, BUT TO SUGGEST THAT THEY REACHED ANY SUCH DIMENSIONS COUNTRYWIDE IS PREPOSTEROUS.

BUNKER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

00 RUEHC

DE RUMJRR 17179/6 0281715

ZNY SSSSS

C 281315Z JAN 68 ZFF-1

7109Q

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

1968 JAN 28 PM 12 45

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5302

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 6 OF 6 SAIGON 17179

NODIS

F. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

41. I HAVE SAID THAT THE KENNEDY SPEECH APPEALS HEAVILY TO THE EMOTIONS. IN RESPONDING TO IT WE MUST OF COURSE, IN AN OBJECTIVE WAY, BRING FORWARD THE FACTS AND CONSIDERATIONS WHICH THE SPEECH TENDS TO OBSCURE OR IGNORE. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE AT THE SAME TIME TO APPEAL ALSO TO THE EMOTIONS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS CHOSEN TO PAY TRIBUTE TO OUR FIGHTING MEN. HE HAS IN EFFECT ALSO IMPLIED THAT THOSE WHO HAVE DIED HERE WERE SACRIFICED NEEDLESSLY AND THAT WE SHOULD HALT SUCH SACRIFICES. I BELIEVE THEIR

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17179/6 ~~SECRET~~

SACRIFICE WAS NOT AT ALL NEEDLESS, THAT THEY DIED DEFENDING OUR PEOPLE AND OUR BELIEFS. I THINK WE SHOULD SAY SQUARELY THAT WE OWE THEM A SOLEMN DEBT, AND THAT IS TO BE SURE THAT THEIR SACRIFICE IS NOT WASTED, THAT WHAT THEY DIED FOR WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED. WE SIMPLY CANNOT IN CONSCIENCE HOLD THEIR LIVES CHEAP AND LET HISTORY RECORD THAT THEY DIED IN VAIN AND THAT THE U.S. SUFFERED A HUMILIATING AND DEEPLY DANGEROUS DEFEAT IN VIETNAM WHICH COULD UNDERMINE THE ENTIRE FREE WORLD POSITION.

42. SENATOR KENNEDY HAS ENDED HIS SPEECH WITH WHAT SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN IRONIC STATEMENT OF THE VALUE OF OUR PLEDGED WORD. WE HAVE INDEED MADE SOME COMMITMENTS HERE WHICH WE MUST HONOR, AND WE CANNOT HONOR THEM IF WE FOLLOW THE SENATOR'S PRESCRIPTION.

43 THERE REMAINS ONE MORE IMPORTANT COMMENT WHICH I WANT TO MAKE. THAT IS THE REPLY TO THE ASSERTION THAT THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM ARE NOT INTERESTED IN THEIR OWN SURVIVAL AS A FREE PEOPLE. IT IS CURIOUS THAT A NATION THAT HAS RESISTED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SAIGON 17179, JANUARY 28 SECTION 6 OF 6

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17179/6 ~~SECRET~~

COMMUNISM FOR SO MANY YEARS, AT SUCH A HIGH PRICE IN BLOOD AND MONEY, SHOULD SO OFTEN BE ACCUSED OF NOT CARING ENOUGH AND NOT FIGHTING HARD ENOUGH. THE VIETNAMESE NATIONALISTS HAVE BEEN FIGHTING COMMUNISM HERE EVER SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II. WE HAVE NO ACCURATE FIGURE ON THE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WOUNDED OR KILLED IN THIS EFFORT OVER THE YEARS, BUT I KNOW IT IS IMMENSE. A GREAT MANY OF THESE PEOPLE KNEW EXACTLY WHAT THEY WERE FIGHTING AND WHY THEY SHOULD RISK THEIR OWN LIVES AGAINST IT. THE VIETNAMESE HAVE IN FACT HAD EXCELLENT INSTRUCTION IN THE MEANING OF A COMMUNIST REGIME. TODAY IT IS NOT ONLY THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS WHO ARE FIGHTING - AND THEY ARE CERTAINLY FIGHTING, OFTEN WITH GREAT VALOR - BUT MANY CIVILIANS AS WELL. IN THE CASUALTY FIGURES THERE IS A STEADY STREAM OF HAMLET AND VILLAGE OFFICIALS, RD WORKERS, SCHOOL TEACHERS, HEALTH WORKERS, AND LOCAL POLICEMEN. THEY ARE NOT DRAFTED INTO SERVICE. THEY DO NOT HAVE TO FIGHT UNLESS THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO, AND THEY ARE USUALLY NOT KILLED BECAUSE THEY WERE CAUGHT BETWEEN OPPOSING ARMIES. THEY ARE ASSASSINATED BY THE VIET CONG BECAUSE THEY STAND IN THE WAY OF A

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17179/6 ~~SECRET~~

COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THEIR HAMLET OR VILLAGE. THEY ARE THE SMALL HERODS WHO TAKE THE GREAT RISK AND KNOW IT AND EXPECT NO HONOR FOR IT. THEIR NAMES ON THE CASUALTY LISTS ANSWER SUFFICIENTLY THOSE WHO SAY THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT HAVE THEIR HEARTS IN THIS STRUGGLE.

44. I MUST SAY THAT REREADING THE KENNEDY SPEECH I AM REMINDED BY HIS QUOTE FROM THOMAS PAINE OF PERHAPS THE BEST KNOWN QUOTATION BY THAT GREAT MAKER OF PHRASES: QUOTE THESE ARE THE TIMES THAT TRY MEN'S SOULS. THE SUMMER SOLDIER AND THE SUNSHINE PATRIOT WILL, IN THIS CRISIS, SHRINK FROM THE SERVICE OF HIS COUNTRY; BUT HE THAT STANDS IT NOW, DESERVES THE LOVE AND THANKS OF MAN AND WOMAN. TYRANNY, LIKE HELL, IS NOT NEASILY CONQUERED; YET WE HAVE THIS CONSOLATION WITH US, THAT THE HARDER THE CONFLICT, THE MORE GLORIOUS THE TRIUMPH. WHAT WE OBTAIN TOO CHEAP, WE ESTEEM TOO LIGHTLY; 'TIS DEARNESS ONLY THAT GIVES EVERYTHING ITS VALUE. HEAVEN KNOWS HOW TO PUT A PROPER PRICE UPON ITS GOODS; AND IT WOULD BE STRANGE INDEED, IF SO CELESTIAL AN ARTICLE AS FREEDOM SHOULD NOT BE HIGHLY RATED. END QUOTE.

BUNKER

BT

~~SECRET~~

62

By Adam Clymer
New Delhi Bureau of the Baltimore Sun
New Delhi, January 28

*orig sent
President
1/28/68*

The U. S. S. R. has told North Korea Soviet support cannot be taken for granted as the Pueblo crisis develops, an authoritative communist source maintained today.

He contended the Soviet Union was seeking a peaceful solution to the crisis and was not guaranteeing major backing of anything the North Koreans might do, nor was it promising in advance to come to North Korea's rescue if a clash with the United States resulted, he said. Meanwhile Soviet Premier Kosygin told Western reporters "when there is a violation by one country of the air space or territorial waters of another, the two countries must somehow solve that problem."

Kosygin also said "I am sure there was" a violation of North Korean territorial waters by the American intelligence ship before it was captured a week ago.

"There is no question about it", he added.

Kosygin was intercepted as he emerged from a luncheon in his honor at Hardway, about 120 miles north of here. Soviet security men sought to prevent the reporters from questioning him.

Though Kosygin appeared to answer the questions readily, if briefly, a responsible Soviet source suggested tonight Kosygin had not wanted to speak on the subject. The source also indicated there were no new developments of which Kosygin's party was aware since they were out of New Delhi until 9:30 p.m. tonight. (New Delhi time)

Despite a hint yesterday that the Soviet side might consider a meeting with United States representatives here more helpful, it is understood that there was no response today when the American Embassy here indicated its availability for a meeting in the event Soviet officials had anything to communicate or to ask.

The authoritative Communist source said the U. S. S. R. had also enlisted other Communist Nations in an effort to mediate between the United States and North Korea. There are apparently talks now going on in Warsaw.

Kosygin's public remarks today followed what an authoritative source last night reported him as saying privately to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi: that there might have been a "genuine mistake" involved in the Pueblo capture. But that mistake might have involved American navigation, for Kosygin did not make it clear what error he believed had occurred.

His comments today were not inconsistent with the line that Soviet officials here had taken privately. They had said that the USSR must reject direct American requests for intercession in order to have any private influence with Pyongyang.

In announcing in this obscure fashion that their ostensible public role is not their true purpose, observers feel, they have been seeking to diffuse angry American reaction to the incident. But in the absence of direct Soviet-American diplomatic contacts here, the observers say it is impossible to judge whether the Soviets are accurately portraying their motives, or simply seeking to put the United States off the track.

Meanwhile a spokesman for the North Korean Consulate General here -- while saying he knew nothing of a possible exchange of the Pueblo and its crew for North Korean terrorists held in South Korea, including those accused of planning the assassination of South Korean President Park -- said he did not regard such a swap as out of the question.

But the authoritativeness of any comments by the North Korean Consulate here was downgraded by reports from reliable Indian sources that when Li Jang Hwa, North Korean Consul General, answered a request to call on the Ministry of External Affairs here yesterday he was unable or unwilling to provide the Indians with any useful details on the incident.

#

Sunday, January 28, 1968

Mr. President:

**Herewith Sec. Rusk's letter
to Gromyko.**

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

~~NO DIS~~

632

RR RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 0290145
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 290140Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
DE RUEHC 106090/1 0282328
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
D R 282325Z JAN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1073
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 29 02 50

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-192

By us, NARA Date 6-23-98

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 106090

MODIS

GIVE TO AMBASSADOR THOMPSON JANUARY 29 AT 0700

PLEASE DELIVER SOONEST TO GROMYKO FOLLOWING LETTER DATED
JANUARY 28, 1968 FROM SECRETARY RUSK:

BEGIN TEXT: QTE "DEAR MR. GROMYKO: I HAVE STUDIED CAREFULLY
AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S REPORT OF HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU ON
FRIDAY AND I AM, OF COURSE, AWARE OF CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO
PRESIDENT JOHNSON. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT BOTH YOU AND I COULD DO
WITHOUT THE KIND OF INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED BY THE SEIZURE OF THE
USS PUEBLO.

A CENTRAL POINT IN YOUR CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR THOMPSON HAD
TO DO WITH WHETHER THE USS PUEBLO WAS IN FACT SEIZED IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE CAPTAIN HAD THE MOST STRINGENT ORDERS TO STAY AT ALL
TIMES MORE THAN THIRTEEN NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE NEAREST LAND
(THE NORTH KOREANS CLAIM 12 NM TERRITORIAL WATERS)
IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY INCIDENT. THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT
IN OUR MINDS THAT HE WAS WELL OUTSIDE THAT TWELVE NAUTICAL MILE
LIMIT AT THE TIME THE PUEBLO WAS SEIZED. I AM ATTACHING HERewith A MORE
DETAILED EXPOSITION OF WHY WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE INCIDENT
OCCURRED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. WE WILL BE GLAD TO FURNISH
YOU TAPES OR OTHER TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IF YOU WISH TO RECEIVE IT.

I SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT, IN ANY EVENT, THAT THE TREATMENT OF
WARSHIPS WITH RESPECT TO TERRITORIAL WATERS IS DIFFERENT FROM
TREATMENT WHICH MIGHT BE APPLICABLE TO OTHER TYPES OF VESSELS.
ARTICLE 23 OF THE 1958 CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND
THE CONTIGUOUS-ZONE STATES: INNER QTE "IF ANY WARSHIP DOES NOT
COMPLY WITH THE REGULATIONS OF THE COASTAL STATE CONCERNING
PASSAGE THROUGH THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND DISREGARDS ANY REQUEST
FOR COMPLIANCE WHICH IS MADE TO IT, THE COASTAL STATE MAY
REQUIRE THE WARSHIP TO LEAVE THE TERRITORIAL SEA. END INNER QTE

IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE 23, THE USS PUEBLO ATTEMPTED TO
LEAVE THE AREA AND WAS FORCIBLY PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY NORTH
KOREAN VESSELS.

PRESERVATION COPY

BEGIN TEXT OF ATTACHMENT

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING THE SEIZURE OF THE USS PUEBLO

KOREAN STANDARD
TIME

EVENT

10 JANUARY 1968

USS PUEBLO ARRIVED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OFF
THE NORTH KOREAN COAST.

23/1000

PUEBLO REPORTED ITS POSITION AS 39-24N
127-59E

PAGE 3 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NORTH KOREAN NAVY
COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE NORTH KOREAN
SUBMARINE CHASER NR. 35 WHILE SHE WAS
CAPTURING THE PUEBLO ARE AS FOLLOWS:

23/1055

39-01N 128-11E

23/1127

39-11N 127-54E

23/1140

39-15N 128-00E

23/1200

39-25N 127-56E

23/1350

39-26N 128-02E

23/1252

PUEBLO RADIOED TO THE US THAT HER POSITION AT
1200 WAS 39-25.2N 127-55E. (NOTE: THIS IS
17.6 NAUTICAL MILES TO THE NEAREST MAINLAND
AND MORE THAN 15 NAUTICAL MILES FROM THE
NEAREST NORTH KOREAN TERRITORY, UNG DO ISLAND-
A POSITION APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE FURTHER WEST
AND LANDWARD FROM THAT REPORTED BY NR. 35
AT 1200). PUEBLO REPORTED THAT SUBMARINE
CHASER NR. 35 HAD CIRCLED HER AND HAD SENT
FLAG SIGNALS, "HEAVE TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE
ON YOU." AFTER HOISTING THE UNITED STATES
ENSIGN, PUEBLO SENT THE SIGNAL, "I AM IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS."

PAGE 4 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~
23/1300

PUEBLO REPORTED THAT NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE CHASER NO. 35, JOINED BY THREE OTHER CRAFT, HOISTED SIGNAL TO "FOLLOW IN MY WAKE". TWO MIGS WERE OVERHEAD. PATROL CRAFT NO. 604 BACKED TOWARD PUEBLO'S BOW WITH FENDERS RIGGED. AN ARMED LANDING PARTY REPORTED ON BOW OF PUEBLO, WHICH DEPARTED AREA UNDER ESCORT.

23/1329

PUEBLO REPORTED IT WAS SURROUNDED BY NORTH KOREAN CRAFT.

23/1345

PUEBLO REPORTED BEING BOARDED BY NORTH KOREAN PERSONNEL. POSITION GIVEN AS 39-25N 127-54E. SOS SENT.

23/1350

PUEBLO REPORTED IT WAS PROBABLY BEING ESCORTED INTO WONSAN. NORTH KOREAN SUBCHASER NO. 35 REPORTED ITS POSITION AS 39-29N 128-08E (NOTE: THIS IS APPROXIMATELY 26.3 MILES OFF THE COAST AND ABOUT 25.6 MILES FROM THE NEAREST ISLAND). SUBCHASER INSTRUCTED OTHER PATROL CRAFT TO INFORM US VESSEL VIA HAND SIGNALS TO INCREASE SPEED.

PAGE 5 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~
23/1410-1415

ONE NORTH KOREAN PATROL CRAFT INSTRUCTED ANOTHER TO WATCH FOR ATTEMPTS BY US PERSONNEL TO THROW THINGS INTO THE WATER. PUEBLO REPORTED THREE WOUNDED AND ONE MAN WITH LEG BLOWN OFF. THE REPORT STATED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS HAD ORDERED THE PUEBLO TO FOLLOW THEM INTO WONSAN; THAT THE PUEBLO HAD NOT USED ITS WEAPONS OR EVEN UNCOVERED THEM; AND THAT IT DID NOT INTEND TO OFFER ANY RESISTANCE.

23/1432

PUEBLO REPORTED, "HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO COME TO FULL STOP." PUEBLO WENT OFF AIR.

END TEXT OF ATTACHMENT

RUSK

BT

REPRODUCTION COPY

PAGE 3 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE, THERE WAS NOT THE RIGHT TO SEIZE THE SHIP AS DISTINCT FROM REQUIRING IT TO LEAVE.

I AM AWARE THAT NORTH KOREA IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS CONVENTION, BUT THIS PROVISION OF THE CONVENTION SIMPLY RESTATES THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA IN THIS REGARD-- A LAW WHICH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPT AND RESPECT.

THERE IS SOUND REASON BEHIND THE PRACTICE CODIFIED IN ARTICLE 23. IT REFLECTS A CONSENSUS THAT HOSTILE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST A NAVAL VESSEL IS A PARTICULARLY SERIOUS AND SENSITIVE MATTER. TO SEIZE SUCH A VESSEL IS LIKELY TO AROUSE THE STRONGEST FEELINGS AND CREATE REAL DANGERS TO THE PEACE. THEREFORE, AS THE CONVENTION INDICATES, WARSHIPS ENTERING TERRITORIAL WATERS SHOULD BE DEALT WITH CAREFULLY AND PEACEFULLY--NOT VIOLENTLY AND FORCIBLY.

THIS REQUIREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IS NO STRANGER TO US. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH PROBLEMS OF WARSHIPS ENTERING TERRITORIAL WATERS.

ON APRIL 7, 1965, THE SOVIET TRAWLER BAROMETER CAME WITHIN 2.3 MILES OF PUERTO RICO WHILE MANEUVERING TO REMAIN NEAR US NAVAL FORCES. WE PROTESTED THIS VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL WATERS ON MAY 3; ON JULY 7 YOU DENIED THAT ANY VIOLATION HAD OCCURRED.

PAGE 4 RUEHC 106090/1 ~~SECRET~~

THE SOVIET SHIP ARBAN WAS INSIDE US TERRITORIAL WATERS OFF SAN PEDRO, CALIFORNIA, ON OCTOBER 23, 1965, FOR A PERIOD OF THIRTY-FOUR MINUTES. DURING THIS PERIOD THE ARBAN REFUSED TO RESPOND TO A CHALLENGE FROM ONE OF OUR SHIPS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR NOVEMBER 23 PROTEST, YOU REPLIED ON JANUARY 7, 1966, THAT THE ARBAN ENTERED US TERRITORIAL WATERS BRIEFLY WHILE FOLLOWING SAILING DIRECTIONS PUBLISHED BY THE US COAST GUARD.

~~SECRET~~

~~NODIS~~

RECEIVED
WHCA

1968 JAN 29 03 09

RR RUEHEX
DE RUEHCR 0290155
ZNR SSSSS ZZH
R 290150Z JAN 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO WHITE HOUSE
DE RUEHC 106090/2 0282328
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 282325Z JAN 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1074
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 STATE 106090

NODIS

INNER QTE WARSHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS HAVE COMPLETE IMMUNITY FROM THE JURISDICTION OF ANY STATE OTHER THAN THE FLAG STATE. END INNER QTE IT IS OF COURSE APPARENT THAT IF THIS PRINCIPLE WERE NOT GENERALLY A SCRUPULOUSLY ADHERED TO, THE GRAVEST CONSEQUENCE COULD ARISE FROM INCIDENTS ALL OVER THE WORLD.

CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN CALLED TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTENTION THE QUESTION OF ALLEGED HARRASSMENT OF SOVIET AND OTHER VESSELS ON THE HIGH SEAS US MILITARY AIRCRAFT. AS YOU KNOW THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD MANY OCCASIONS TO COMPLAIN OF INCIDENTS CREATED BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT AND NAVAL VESSELS INVOLVING UNITED STATES SHIPS. IT MAY BE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE SOME PRIVATE DISCUSSION OF THESE MATTERS IN THE INTEREST OF AVOIDING UNNECESSARY INCIDENTS BUT IT COULD ONLY BE DISCUSSED CONSTRUCTIVELY AS A RECIPROCAL PROBLEM.

PAGE 2 RUEHC 106090/2 ~~SECRET~~
IN RESPECT TO THE CARRIER ENTERPRISE AND OTHER US VESSELS, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IS FULLY AWARE OF THEIR NON-PROVOCATIVE LOCATION BECAUSE IT HAS ITS OWN SHIPS IN THE IMMEDIATE VICINITY.

WE AGREE WITH CHAIRMAN KOSYGIN THAT "THE PROMPTEST POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL SIDES."

WE DO HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL EXERCISE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO BRING THIS ABOUT. PERMIT ME TO OBSERVE THAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS BEEN ACTING WITH VERY CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF A SITUATION WHICH HAS CREATED A WAVE OF INTENSE INDIGNATION THROUGHOUT OUR COUNTRY.

PRESERVATION COPY

SINCERELY YOURS, DEAN RUSK

END TEXT OF LETTER

~~SECRET -- EXDIS~~

DRAFT -- January 27, 1968

Pres. file

TO SEOUL
 RPTD USUN
 REF:

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
 NLJ 96-192
 By ica, NARA Date 6-23-98

*Mr. Rostow
 cleared with the
 President.*

1. I have received the message which you (Major General Pak Chung-kuk, Senior North Korean member of Military Armistice Commission) sent me through the channels of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

2. My reply is as follows: The policy of the United States Government with respect to the S. S. Pueblo and its crew was publicly stated when the President of the United States on January 26 said, "We shall continue to use every means available to find a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem."

3. The crew of the S. S. Pueblo are United States Naval personnel, acting under orders of the United States Navy. Two of them are civilian scientists, specialists in hydrographic work.

You have captured these men by force of arms. *At the very least* They are entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to which you subscribe.

4. I am relieved to receive information through unofficial channels that they are in good condition, the wounded are receiving normal medical care, and that the body of the one who died is preserved.

5. It has been suggested that further details could be obtained through direct contact between both sides. I therefore request that the names of the injured and dead be provided us through the Joint Duty Officer, and I request an immediate meeting of the Senior Members of both sides.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

to discuss and resolve this matter promptly. ~~I believe the problems~~
~~can be resolved sooner in a private meeting.~~

6

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, January 27, 1968
8:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick discusses all the statements, public and private, we have made about the "not take advantage" portion of the San Antonio formula.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET--SENSITIVE~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 128, NARA, Date 1-29-92

65a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~
PENNSYLVANIA/ASPEN/PACKERS

January 27, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: The "Not Take Advantage" Portion of
the San Antonio Formula

I have assembled our statements--both public and private--on the meaning of the "not take advantage" assumption in the San Antonio formula. They indicate that Clark Clifford's statement before the Armed Services Committee was consistent with previous explanations of San Antonio, although recent confidential messages have also taken into account the special situation in the DMZ area.

Clark's statement is one of two recent public statements attributable to senior US officials that explain the "no advantage" assumption. The other, which was overlooked by the entire press corps, was made by Bill Bundy on "Speaking Freely," an interview with Edwin Newman shown on WNBC in New York on January 7:

MR. NEWMAN: Now "Would I be correct in deducing from what you said, if we had an assurance there would be no increase in the movement from North to South, that that would be sufficient for us?"

MR. BUNDY: Well that's an illustration. What we've said...is what the President said at San Antonio. We're not imposing any condition but if you're going to have any serious good faith negotiations, you pretty much have to assume that the situation that has been

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-207

By iso, NARA Date 6-12-97

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

created is one that neither side is taking advantage
That's what we referred to and the question of
based for is certainly a good illustration
that."

Clark, of course, was more explicit than in saying that during the summer of 1968 the U.S. will continue to transport troops to South Vietnam.

Clark's statement, made in 1964, as derived directly from Senator Thurmon, to explain that we have come to the point where we have to explain

-- Even Antonio, W
of the
the other
Kissingc
channel

M
W

ONE

c May 1967, dor D ded to
 emoj in-
wing statement

resident, in	his	that
Vietnamese wo	take	of
ng cessation	ation	discussions
	Vie	ld cut
rely its support	for	South
he	t	

advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation to increase its support of its forces in the South, to attack our forces from north of DMZ or to mount large-scale visible resupply efforts now impossible it would not be acting in good faith."

~~TOP SECRET/NOBIS~~

-3-

-- On November 23, 1967, the Secretary sent Foreign Minister Nilsson in Stockholm a personal message which included the following paragraph:

"The third point relates to the understanding of a 'no advantage' situation, as described in the President's San Antonio speech and in my October 6 message to you, in connection with a bombing cessation and the start of talks. One way to clarify this is in terms of questions that I emphasize are illustrative of examples only. What would happen with respect to the flow of supplies and men into South Viet-Nam and to positions directly threatening South Viet-Nam? For example, if following a cessation or limitation of bombing, there was a marked increase in the flow of trucks southward; if a new North Vietnamese regiment were to appear; or if we saw a massive increase in the flow of supplies just to the north of the DMZ, we would be negatively impressed. Similarly, to take another example, we would want to know what would happen with respect to the three North Vietnamese Divisions now in the area of the Demilitarized Zone which have been employed as part of offensive operations against our forces south of the DMZ. Would artillery located north of the demarcation line be employed against our forces? And, if so, would we be expected not to bomb these artillery positions?"

-- On December 27, 1967, Governor Harriman reported on the following exchange he had with Ambassador Dobrynin:

"He told me that his Government had gained the impression that the President's statement 'we would, of course, assume that while discussions proceed North Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation' meant that Hanoi would have to agree in advance to a de-escalation of the conflict. I stated that this was not true. 'Taking advantage' meant what it said, namely, that Hanoi

~~TOP SECRET/NOBIS~~

would not use the advantage of no bombing to send more supplies and reinforcements to the South than were now getting through. I also referred to the DMZ as a special problem. They were using artillery, and our bombing of the gun positions and other bases just north of the DMZ was a tactical operation which would have to continue unless there was mutual restraint in that area, which we thought would be the best solution.

"Dobrynin said that he would inform his Government, but underlined that both his Government and Hanoi believed that Hanoi had interpreted the San Antonio formula, taken in connection with other statements, to mean that Hanoi would have to agree in advance to some sort of de-escalation of its operations if we were to stop the bombing."

-- And on January 11, 1968, we gave Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Macovescu an exact repetition of the formulation previously given the Romanians and Macovescu informed us that it had been transmitted to Hanoi.

-- On January 20, Bunker told Thieu that:

"Some of the actions which we would interpret as meaning a lack of good faith on the North Vietnamese side would be (1) any increase in support by North Viet-Nam for other forces in the South, (2) any attacks across the DMZ, and (3) any major visible resupply efforts (without reference to location)."

What all this adds up to is that while the Clifford statement may have caught the eye of The New York Times, (and will catch the eye of others) it does not represent anything new to Hanoi. We should not refute the Clifford statement in any way, but could explain that Clifford was simply illustrating the San Antonio formula without defining it precisely. We can point to Bundy's remarks as evidence that substantially this has been stated before.

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

-5-

The position taken by you as commented on by Clifford is sufficiently forthcoming so that I think no reasonable American can ask the Administration to go further. Clifford's formulation even impressed The New York Times. On January 24 (before Clifford's testimony) it editorialized:

"There have been indications that in private contacts with Hanoi, Washington's position may not have been so inflexible as it has appeared in public. It has been reported in The Times of London that the President privately is no longer insisting on some form of de-escalation by North Viet-Nam. The British newspaper's Washington correspondent says that the phrase 'not take advantage' of a bombing halt does not require the North Vietnamese to reduce their military infiltration but only that they not increase the level of men and supplies flowing into the South...If this report truly reflects the American position as it has been conveyed by secret emissaries to North Viet-Nam, Hanoi's response supports the theory that the North Vietnamese are not really interested in peace talks at this time but are deliberately stalling until after the Presidential election in this country--which would be a very foolish thing for them to do..."

The GVN

As The New York Times charged in their editorial on January 27, President Thieu has placed himself in public disagreement with the "no increase" explanation of the "no advantage" formulation given by Clifford. From conversations which Bunker and Phil Habib, who has just returned from a visit to Saigon, had with Thieu, we believe that Thieu:

1. Understands what we mean by "not take advantage;"
2. Believes that for his own political reasons, he must stick to the position he has been taking up to now--that the bombing will stop only if the North halted "all its aggressive actions;" and,

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

-6-

3. Will accept the American formulation when the time comes to do so.

Ky also told Habib that while the GVN will take a hard line on this question for domestic political reasons it understands the need for flexibility and will follow our position in private.

Nonetheless, I remain concerned about what the GVN does and does not understand. For this reason, I think we should send Ellsworth a message asking him specifically if he feels that Thieu and Ky understand and accept our formulation. We should be ready to press them further on the matter if they do not show clear understanding and agreement. We do not wish any misunderstandings to obstruct us. Provided there is no basic conflict with us, there is even some advantage in Thieu making public statements that do not accord completely with ours. It shows the world that the GVN is not our satellite.

San Antonio and The State of the Union

Questions were raised by the difference in phraseology between the San Antonio "assumption" and the use of the words "must not take advantage" in the State of the Union speech. While the Secretary's backgrounder on January 18 sought to lay the difference to rest by emphasizing that there was no difference between San Antonio and the State of the Union, the question may remain: if there is no difference between the two statements, why the difference in words, and--more important--which of the two is the exact US position?

Despite the Secretary's backgrounder, we may still encounter some minor-league flak on this issue with the American press (although I suspect that it has peaked already, and will fade from view). As for Hanoi, I believe that they should understand clearly from the Romanians that, in the

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

-7-

words of the Secretary in his conversation with Macovescu on January 11: "Do not pay too much attention to what I say /publicly/. The document that I have given you is the important thing." When Governor Harriman later explained to the Romanian Ambassador that the two statements meant the same thing, the Ambassador "said that he recalled that Secretary Rusk has said that what he told the Romanians is what counts and not what was said publicly. Ambassador Bogdan said the Romanians understand that no advantage is not a condition but a warning."

The Romanians have undoubtedly communicated this to Hanoi.

I believe that we should stick to your original use of the words "we assume..." The value of this phraseology is, as Harriman told the Romanians, that we "avoid stating a condition, but the President wanted North Viet-Nam to know what he was assuming if he stopped the bombing...The President used 'assumption' to explain what is on his mind. We do not ask Hanoi to agree in advance, but they should know what is on his mind and what he means."


The Secretary's remarks, as referred to in The New York Times ("Do they really expect us to stop half the war while the other half goes on?"), may appear at first glance to be in disagreement with the testimony of Clark Clifford. But I think we can, and should, get around this valueless impasse by pointing out--if questioned or pressed--that what the Secretary meant was that in any final or even partial solutions to the war, both sides will have to take certain self-restraining steps. The Secretary's remarks do not mean that we will stop the bombing of the North only in return for a complete cessation of infiltration (as The Times tries to suggest) but rather mean that concessions and understandings must always be two-sided. In essence this is exactly what we mean by "not take advantage." If we desist from bombing they must in fact desist from doing the things they could do absent bombing--else they have "taken advantage of" the cessation. While we avoid references to "reciprocity" and "conditions" our assumption in fact assumes both.

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

--8--

Without an explanation of the consistency of the two statements along the above lines to the press, there may be continued comments from the press about differences. But these "differences" should not bother Hanoi or affect their understanding of San Antonio.


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Saturday, January 27, 1968
6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin, August, 1964

Pres. file

Attached are papers which address themselves to allegations that the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin in August, 1964, did not take place but if they did, occurred in territorial waters.

1. Ambassador Stevenson, in presenting our complaint to the United Nations Security Council on August 5, said that the first Tonkin incident involving the SS Maddox occurred 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam. The second incident involving the SS Maddox and the SS C. Turner Joy occurred 65 miles offshore. (Tab A)

The Vietnamese have, at various times, advanced the claim that the entire Gulf of Tonkin was a closed area, i. e., territorial waters. No major maritime state has acknowledged this claim. The map showing the precise track of the first incident is attached. (Tab B)

2. As regards allegations that neither of these attacks took place, there is attached a statement by the Defense Department giving conclusive proof that the U. S. destroyers were attacked twice while they were on patrol in international waters. (Tab C)

Brom
Bromley Smith

Document IX-130

United States Complaint to the United Nations Security Council
Concerning "Deliberate Aggression by the Hanoi Regime": STATE-
MENT MADE BY THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE (STEVENSON) IN THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL, AUGUST 5, 1964 (EXCERPTS)**

I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam. The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* were fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were

** Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 24, 1964, pp. 272-274. The United States had requested a meeting of the Security Council on Aug. 4 to discuss its complaint. The subject was debated at the 1140th and 1141st meetings of the Security Council, Aug. 5 and 7. The texts of documents transmitted to the Security Council by the North Vietnamese government denying the U.S. charges and accusing the United States of violation of its territorial waters, acts of war, and aggression in South Viet-Nam are contained in U.N. docs. S/5888 and S/5907. The South Vietnamese Government forwarded documents in support of the U.S. position (U.N. docs. S/5892 and S/5906).

again s
motor
Americ
seas as
torped
Ther
planned
ent in
work c
objectiv
My
and rel
sion.
Vietna
limited
which
that th
to be t
tolerat

Mr.
in inter
Let
accept
Let
kind u
And
is the
Charte
The
Tonkin
al expl
As isol
South
of a s
murde
crowd
All
pattern
decade
Viet-N
tion o
ment
acts o
the in

See
See

again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack. This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves.⁸⁵ Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no belligerent actions of any kind until they were subject to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.


The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnaping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos⁸⁶—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the

⁸⁵ See *post*, doc. IX-135.

⁸⁶ See *ante*, docs. IX-89-99.

666 F
S



DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 2/15/77

By rg/ky, NARA, Date 2-7-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

64c



CINCPAC

US DESTROYER ATTACKED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE PT BOATS

At 020350 EDT, while on routine patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, the US destroyer MADDOX (DD-731) was approached by three North Vietnamese motor torpedo boats (see map) with the apparent intention of launching a torpedo attack. The MADDOX retired to the eastward at 27 knots, while the torpedo boats continued to close. As the boats approached to 9,000 yards at 020408 EDT, MADDOX fired three warning shots from her 5-inch battery. The PT boats did not alter course and were taken under continuous fire. The boats closed to 5,000 yards where they launched two torpedoes at 020421 EDT. The MADDOX turned away, and the torpedoes passed well clear. One of the three boats received a direct hit and dropped a torpedo in the water which did not appear to function. Machine gun fire from the torpedo boats resulted in one hit on the MADDOX. There were no US casualties. (S)

At 020430 EDT, four F-8E aircraft, armed with ZUNI rockets and 20-mm ammunition, arrived from USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-14). The aircraft attacked the boats and reported one PT boat dead in the water and burning. The other two boats fled toward shore with minor damage. MADDOX continued southward to rendezvous with the destroyer TURNER JOY (DD-951) and the tanker ASHTABULA (AO-51). (S)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the MADDOX and the TURNER JOY to continue the patrol as indicated on the map, remaining 11 or more miles offshore, with combat air patrol (CAP) during daylight hours. In the event these patrolling ships are attacked, they have been directed to seek to destroy the attacking forces. However, pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized. (S)

SOURCE: CTG 72.1 020949Z (S); CTG 77.5 021506Z (S);
JCS 7680 021725Z (S); JCS 7681 022349Z (S)

3 Aug 64

HMCC OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

Page 3

DECLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

Authority JCS Ltr 2/11/77

By ry/hg, NARA, Date 2-7-92

STATEMENT BY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN

Gulf of Tonkin

Any suggestion that the August 1964 attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf did not occur is contrary to the known facts.

The two attacks were made on August 2 and 4 when U.S. destroyers were on patrol in international waters. The attacks were seen, heard, and detected electronically by the crews of the ships.

During the first, daylight, attack, photos were taken of the attacking torpedo boats, and damage was done to the destroyer by machine gun bullets.

The evidence that the destroyers were attacked is conclusive. It includes:

AUGUST 2 ATTACK

- 1) Visual sighting of three torpedoe boats making daylight runs on the Destroyer MADDOX and firing at least four torpedoes.
- 2) Photographs of the attackers taken from ships and aircraft.
- 3) Damage to the MADDOX from North Vietnamese fire.

AUGUST 4 ATTACK

- 1) Radar tracks of fast, small craft parrelling and then closing in on the Destroyers MADDOX and TURNER JOY.
- 2) Numerous sonar detections of torpedoes fired at the destroyers, reported by the sonar man who manned the MADDOX'S equipment throughout the attack.
- 3) Visual sighting by an officer and several crewmen of the WAKE of a torpedo passing near the TURNER JOY.
- 4) Visual sighting of the attacking craft lit by aircraft flares and by shells fired during the engagement.

- 5) Visual sighting of a search light beam from one of the attacking craft.
- 6) Visual sighting of anti aircraft fire directed at American planes overhead.
- 7) Visual sighting from aircraft of the WAKE of a small, fast craft near the destroyers.

Persons who have examined all of the evidence can have no doubt that the MADDOX twice and the TURNER JOY once were attacked by North Vietnamese small naval craft well in international waters and without provocation.

Dictated by phone by Miss Valenti (11-70713) 12/22/67
taken by C. L. Horn

62

January 27, 1968 -- 5:15 p. m.

Following telephoned from Baltimore Sun in Baltimore: From Baltimore Sun correspondent in New Delhi.

North Korea may want to swap the PUEBLO and its crew for North Koreans charged with terrorism in South Korea, including an assassination attempt on President Chung Hee Park, a responsible Soviet source said today.

Meanwhile Soviet Premier Alexi N. Kosygin told Indian Prime Minister (garble) said it was possible there had been a "genuine mistake" in the incident, an authoritative source reported. He also said there might have been a 'deliberate straying."

On another issue, when Mrs. Gandhi said the U. S. asked what was the guarantee that fighting would stop in Vietnam if bombing of the North was halted, Kosygin replied "They can stop for 10 days and see the result," the source reported.

The Soviet source who raised the possibility of a prisoner swap reiterated that his country was trying privately to obtain a solution to the crisis, despite its refusal to agree publicly to such a mediatory role.

He hinted that Soviet efforts to get North Korea to agree to release the naval intelligence ship in exchange for admission of its guilt and perhaps a fine has been unsuccessful. He raised the subject of a possible exchange himself.

While an American Embassy spokesman said there had been no contact between the Embassy and Kosygin's delegation or resident Soviet diplomats, there were indications that such a meeting might be regarded as useful by the Soviet side.

The Soviet source said the USSR was gathering information on the PUEBLO crisis and was interested in finding out from the U. S. and from the North Koreans just what each side wanted and what it would give up to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Kosygin also told Mrs. Gandhi the PUEBLO was intercepting messages being sent from North Korea to other countries, including the USSR, the authoritative source said.

In raising the suggestion that a "genuine mistake" might have been involved in the incident, Kosygin did not make it clear whether he thought it was possible the PUEBLO might have strayed mistakenly or the North Koreans might have mistakenly thought it strayed.

Otherwise, his discussion of the issue reflected official Soviet rejections of a mediatory role. He termed the dispute a "routine matter."

The Soviet source took a different tack. He indicated the USSR thought it could not openly say it would mediate at U.S. request and retain influence in Pyongyang.

more coming

68

Pres file

INFORMATION

SECRET

Saturday, January 27, 1968 -- 2:40 p.m.

Mr. President:

I am preparing an analysis of Kossygin's message; but one point is reasonably clear, especially in the light of yesterday's report from New Delhi: Kossygin is urging us to settle the matter bilaterally, as an affair between military men.

We discussed this idea this morning; for example, a meeting of the naval commander from our Japanese base and a North Korean naval man at Pannunjom.

As I was drafting, the attached came in. The North Koreans appear to be suggesting that they will return the men as "prisoners of war."

Something like this is probably the quickest track.

We would then have to satisfy Park and the South Koreans by:

- keeping some of the aircraft in South Korea;
- increasing military aid to deal with North Korean infiltration.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3702

Sir: This is the break. The problem is how to do it with maximum dignity.

W.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 92-148
By *plip*, NARA, Date 2/20/96

WWRostow:rlm

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Seoul 3702, January 27, 1968

682
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
92-153
NLJ
By , NARA, Date 2/20/96

Country Team Message

1. Shortly after midnight January 28, Swiss Member, Neutral Nations Survey Commission (NNSC), (Barbey), telephoned following information which he had received from Communist Member, NNSC, to Senior Member United Nations Commission Military Armistice Commission (UNSMAC):

Between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. January 27 the Communist Members of NNSC met with Major General Pak Chung-Kuk, Senior Member Korean Peoples Army/Communist Party/side of Military Armistice Commission. Pak requested them to transmit following official and unofficial messages from him to Senior Member UNCMAC. The messages, in Korean, were translated into English by Korean Peoples Army, then taken by Polish and Czech NNSC members to Swiss and Swedish members. Official message follows:

"Government of North Korea thinks that solving question of ship and crew is impossible when made by threatening of using force. If the United States will try to use force to free the ship, Korean Peoples Army will answer with the same means and it is risk that instead of freeing the crew they would get only bodies. It is quite possible to solve this problem if USA will acknowledge that the people of the ship are prisoners of war and if U. S. will show willingness to negotiate or discuss in a normal way when one side would like to have prisoners back."

2. The following unofficial message was given to Poland Czech obviously for transmission also:

"Now the Captain recognizes his criminal acts... The crew are in very good condition. Although they acted as enemies in our coastal waters and committed a crime, those who are wounded are under normal medical care. The body of one killed is preserved. Further details about the situation of the crew members could be obtained through direct contact between both sides."

3. Comment by Swiss Member: This is interesting in that only two days ago Pak told his NNSC members "even if not in territorial waters the ship was acting against us."
4. Comment: Most unusual feature of foregoing is that Pak chose to use NNSC as channel. We can only surmise that Communist members NNSC had

SECRET

- 2 -

earlier passed request for information on crew members to him, despite statement to contrary to Swiss and Swede. Experience with Pak at Military Armistice Commission indicates he would not have taken this action without instructions from Pyongyang.

Porter.

~~SECRET~~

69

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, January 27, 1968
1:50 p. m.

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Herewith Gromyko's conversation with
Tommy and Tommy's own reflections on Kosygin's
statements.

Sec. Rusk is drafting a reply which,
tentatively, he believes should be Rusk-Gromyko
rather than the President to Kosygin.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 2605
Moscow 2606

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 48, NARA, Date 1-29-92

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

TELEGRAM

TOPSECRET

..... ZZ RUEHC
DE RUEHCR 2605FD 0271500
ZNY TTTT
Z 271458Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7605
STATE GRNC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 2605

069990
1968 JAN 27 AM 11 09

NODIS

1. GROMYKO CALLED ME TO FOREIGN OFFICE TODAY AND HANDED ME KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, TRANSMISSION OF WHICH FOLLOWS IN SEPTEL.

2. GROMYKO THEN SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY THE SOVIETS KNOW OUR MILITARY WHO HAD A DEFINITE REPUTATION WITH THEM AND WITH OTHERS. THE SOVIETS COULD NOT TRUST THEIR STATEMENTS. HE COULD CITE ME INCIDENTS IN THE PAST WHEN STATEMENTS OF OUR MILITARY HAD BEEN REFUTED AND HE REFERRED TO AN INCIDENT THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE OVER THE URAL MOUNTAINS. THE REPUTATION OF OUR MILITARY WAS ALREADY ESTABLISHED ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS DEPLORED THIS FACT.

~~PAGE 2 RUEHCR 2605FD TOP SECRET~~

3. OUR MILITARY HAD NO BUSINESS NEAR THE COAST OF THEIR STATES. WERE THESE ATTEMPTS TO LOOK FOR INCIDENTS? THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HAD OFTEN STATED THAT OUR TWO GREAT POWERS HAD A RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD PEACE. THIS WAS TRUE, BUT IT WAS NECESSARY TO ACT ACCORDINGLY. HE SUGGESTED THAT I LOOK AT A MAP AND ASK FOR WHAT PURPOSE OUR SHIP WAS OPERATING IN THE TRIANGLE OF WONSAN BAY. HE ASKED HOW WE WOULD ACT IF A NORTH KOREAN SHIP INTRUDED INTO OUR TERRITORIAL WATERS. IF ONE SOUGHT TO CREATE AN INCIDENT AND HEIGHTEN THE ATMOSPHERE, THAT WAS ONE THING, BUT IF THE US SOUGHT TO AVOID HIGHER TENSIONS, WHY COMMIT SUCH ACTIONS? THIS WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. THIS GAVE RISE TO THE THOUGHT THAT THESE ACTS RAN COUNTER TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT AND MR. RUSK THAT THE US SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE A DETENTE. THIS WAS NOT THE FIRST INCIDENT OF THIS KIND. THE SOVIETS KNEW THAT THE KOREANS DID NOT SEEK INCIDENTS. WE SHOULD GET DEEPER IN THIS MATTER. WHEN WE DID, WE WOULD KNOW WHERE THE SHIP WAS AND WOULD SEE THAT WE WERE NOT RIGHT.

4. I SAID I COULD NOT ACCEPT HIS STRICTURES ON OUR MILITARY AND POINTED OUT THAT DEPLORABLE AS THE U-2 INCIDENT WAS, IT HAD NOTHING

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-153

By *[signature]* NARA, Date 4/20/96

TOPSECRET

~~TOPSECRET~~

-2-, MOSCOW 2605, JANUARY 27

TO DO WITH OUR MILITARY. I SAID THE QUESTION OF FACT SEEMED TO BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE. I SAID THAT WE HAD THE COORDINATES WHICH WERE REPORTED BY THE CAPTAIN OF OUR VESSEL AT THE TIME OF SEIZURE, WHICH CLEARLY SHOWED IT WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. I SAID THIS WAS TRUE, EVEN ACCEPTING THE FACT THAT THE WATERS OF THE BAY OF WONSAN WERE INTERNAL WATERS. I ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE ISLANDS IN THE AREA AND THAT OUR SHIP WAS OVER 15 MILES FROM THE NEAREST KOREAN ISLAND. MOREOVER, I SAID THAT THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST NORTH KOREAN VESSEL ON THE SCENE HAD RADIOED THE COORDINATES OF HIS POSITION WHICH PLACED IT ONE MILE FARTHER OUT THAN THE POSITION REPORTED BY OUR OWN SHIP. I POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS OPERATED SIMILAR SHIPS. MOREOVER, I REFERRED TO THE GENERAL SITUATION IN THE AREA AND SAID THAT FROM THE FIRST OF JANUARY TO OCTOBER 18 OF LAST YEAR THE US AND ROK ARMED FORCES HAD LOST 122 KILLED IN ACTION, 279 WOUNDED, AS WELL AS A NUMBER OF ROK NATIONAL POLICE AND OTHER CIVILIANS KILLED OR WOUNDED.

5. GROMYKO RESPONDED THAT I KEPT REPEATING THAT THE INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, CITING OUR MILITARY. ~~HE SAID THESE REPORTS WERE NOT TRUE~~ THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE MATTER WAS CONTRARY

~~PAGE 4 RUENOR 2605FD TOP SECRET~~

TO THESE REPORTS. SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE TRUE FACTS. THE SOVIETS DEPLORED THE FACT THAT THE US MILITARY ACTED IN THIS WAY. IF THIS WAS US POLICY, THAT WAS ONE THING, BUT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD USE GREATER CONTROL OVER OUR MILITARY. HE SAID HE COULD RECITE TENS OF CASES IN WHICH THE REPORTS OF OUR MILITARY ON INCIDENTS HAD NOT BEEN BORNE OUT.

6. GROMYKO THEN WITH A VERY SERIOUS MIEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT LATELY IN THE UNITED STATES STATEMENTS WERE ~~HEARD~~ CONTAINING THREATS TO NORTH KOREA. THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION WE SHOULD NOT APPROACH THIS QUESTION LIGHTLY. WE SHOULD WEIGH MOST SERIOUSLY ALL CIRCUMSTANCES. HE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACT IN A SOBER WAY AND THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN IDEAS IN THE REPLY OF THE CHAIRMAN.

7. I INQUIRED IF THE SOVIETS HAD DIRECT INFORMATION OF THEIR OWN OR IF THEY WERE RELYING UPON THE KOREAN STATEMENTS. GROMYKO SAID HE WOULD NOT SAY IF THEIR INFORMATION WAS DIRECT OR NOT, BUT THAT IT WAS RELIABLE AND THAT THEY TRUSTED IT. IT WAS CONTRARY TO THE INFORMATION WHICH OUR MILITARY HAD GIVEN AND LATER WE WOULD PROBABLY

~~PAGE 5 RUENOR 2605FD TOP SECRET~~

BE ABLE TO FIND OUT THAT THIS WAS THE CASE.

~~TOPSECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-3- MOSCOW 2605, JANUARY 27

8. I SAID THAT IF THE SOVIETS COULD GIVE US ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION WHICH WOULD BEAR ON THIS MATTER, WE WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL. I ASKED IF HIS INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF THE INCIDENT COINCIDED WITH THE LOCATION GIVEN IN THE KOREAN STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT IT DID.

9. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION I POINTED OUT THAT THE ~~INFORMATION~~ ^{INFORMATION} FURNISHED BY THE CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP WAS SENT AT THE VERY TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THIS WAS BEING REPORTED TO HIS SUPERIOR OFFICERS AND HE KNEW THAT IT WOULD BE USED AS THE BASIS FOR THEIR JUDGMENT AS TO WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. IT WAS THEREFORE INCONCEIVABLE TO ME THAT THE CAPTAIN OF THE VESSEL WOULD NOT HAVE REPORTED ACCURATELY. I SAID I WOULD OF COURSE PROMPTLY TRANSMIT THE CHARIMAN'S MESSAGE.

GP-1. THOMPSON

~~TOP SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

4964

OO RUEHC
DE RUEHCR 2606FD:0271522
ZNY TTTT
O 271500Z JAN 68
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7306
STATE.GRNC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~ MOSCOW 2606

~~TOP SECRET~~

NODIS

REF: MOSCOW 2604, 2605

1. I THINK WE CAN TAKE SOME ENCOURAGEMENT FROM FACT THAT DESPITE KUZNETSOV'S FIRST STATEMENT TO ME THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACT AS INTERMEDIARY, SOVIETS IN FACT HAVE TRANSMITTED TWO MESSAGE TO PYONGYANG. I AM ALSO STRUCK BY KOSYGIN'S STATEMENT THAT SOVIETS BELIEVE QUICK SETTLEMENT OF INCIDENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL SIDES
2. GROMYKO GAVE EVERY APPEARANCE OF BEING CONVINCED THAT INCIDENT TOOK PLACE IN TERRITORIAL WATERS. IF WE COULD TELL SOVIETS THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THEM COPY OF TAPE RECORDING OF

~~PAGE 2 RUEHCR 2606FD TOP SECRET~~

REPORT OF KOREAN SUBCHASER REPORTING ITS POSITION THIS COULD DISPOSE OF THAT PART OF THE ARGUMENT, ALTHOUGH I DOUBT SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT SUCH OFFER AND WOULD SAY SUCH TAPES COULD EASILY BE FAKED.

3. WHILE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT SOVIETS WERE PARTY TO THIS AFFAIR, MY JUDGMENT, BASED ON THEIR HANDLING OF THE PROBLEM UP TO NOW AND THE GENERAL SITUATION, IS THAT THEY WERE NOT. THEY ARE CLEARLY CONCERNED OVER THE WAY THE MATTER IS BLOWING UP WHICH TENDS TO LIMIT THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION. THEIR DISTRUST OF OUR MILITARY IS CERTAINLY GENUINE.

4. ANYTHING WE CAN DO TO CONVINCE THEM THAT OUR PURPOSE IS SIMPLY TO SETTLE THE INCIDENT AND GET OUR MEN AND SHIP BACK WOULD BE HELPFUL. FOR EXAMPLE, IF WE COULD FIND A WAY TO LET THEM KNOW, PERHAPS IN ANY REPLY PRESIDENT MAY MAKE TO KOSYGIN, THAT WE HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO CALM DOWN SOUTH KOREANS, THIS WOULD BE USEFUL. IT WOULD ALSO INCREASE SOVIETS' POSSIBILITY TO PRESSURE NORTH KOREANS IF WE COULD PULL ENTERPRISE OUT OF THE AREA OR AT LEAST FROM THE VICINITY OF WONSAN. I THINK WE MUST TAKE GROMYKO'S WARNING TO ME SERIOUSLY.

GP-1. THOMPSON
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-153
B. J. W. NARA, Date 2/20/96

n. President:
Enterprise
is not
off Wonsan
I think
B 388
J. Allen