

~~Information~~  
INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, January 27, 1968  
12:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Mr. Rostow asked that I send  
you the attached reply from Kosygin.

Mr. Rostow is at State at a  
meeting.

*President's File*

Lois Nivens

Moscow 2604

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By RS, NARA, Date 1-29-92



Department of State

70a  
TELEGRAM

~~TOPSECRET~~

..... ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUEHCR 2604FD 0271500  
ZNY TTTT  
Z 0271458Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7604  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~TOPSECRET~~ MOSCOW 2604

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1968 JAN 27 AM 1050

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.4  
NJ 92-153  
By plw, NARA, Date 2/20/96

NODIS

1. FOLLOWING IS OUR TRANSLATION OF KOSYGIN'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I HAVE RECEIVED THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE WHICH WAS HANDED BY AMBASSADOR L. THOMPSON TO OUR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON JANUARY 26, 1968, CONCERNING THE INCIDENT INVOLVING THE AMERICAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE VESSEL "PUEBLO" NEAR THE SHORES OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

3. ALLOW ME TO SAY WITH THE UTMOST DIRECTNESS THAT WE CANNOT SHARE THE INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS WHICH IS PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE. INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ATTESTS TO THE FACT THAT THE AMERICAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE VESSEL "PUEBLO" WAS DETAINED BY KOREAN AUTHORITIES NOT IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS BUT IN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE KPDR WHILE CARRYING OUT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS. THIS IS THE MAIN THING, IT IS HERE WHERE

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 2604FD ~~TOPSECRET~~  
THE ENTIRE ESSENCE OF THE AFFAIR LIES, AND THEREFORE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INCIDENT FALLS ENTIRELY ON THE AMERICAN MILITARY COMMAND, WHICH ACTED CONTRARY TO THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROTECTING THE INVIOABILITY OF THE TERRITORIES OF STATES AND THEIR TERRITORIAL WATERS.

4. BUT SINCE THIS IS SO, IT IS THE US WHICH MUST TAKE STEPS TO FIND WAYS OF SETTLING THE INCIDENT AND, IN ANY EVENT NOT DO ANYTHING THAT COULD ADD FUEL TO THE FIRE. YOU YOURSELF EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE THE CONVICTION THAT THE INTERESTS OF PRESERVING UNIVERSAL PEACE WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY INCREASED TENSION IN THAT AREA.

5. HOWEVER, HOW CAN THIS BE RECONCILED WITH THE FACT THAT DURING THE PAST FEW DAYS IN THE US THE SITUATION IS BEING HEATED UP IRRESPONSIBLE VOICES CALLING FOR A "RETURN STRIKE" AGAINST THE

~~TOPSECRET~~

~~TOPSECRET~~

-2-. MOSCOW 2604, JANUARY 27

KPDR AND CALLS FOR THE USE OF ARMS AND FORCE ARE BEING HEARD? THOSE WHO MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE APPARENTLY LITTLE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT ALL THIS CAN LEAD TO.

6. HOW THE AMERICAN MILITARY LOOK AT THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRINCIPLE OF THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, IS WELL KNOWN, IF ONLY BY THE FACT THAT U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARE BUZZING SYSTEMATICALLY SOVIET AND OTHER VESSELS ON-THE HIGH SEAS. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO THE FACT THAT THIS IS FRAUGHT WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF MILITARY INCIDENTS, BUT THE BUZZING OPERATIONS HAVE CONTINUED TO THIS DAY. RECENTLY EVEN MORE SERIOUS CASES HAVE TAKEN PLACE WHERE AMERICAN AIRCRAFT SUBJECTED SOVIET MERCHANT VESSELS TO BOMBING AND STRAFING. AND, INCIDENTALLY, A VERY CALM ATTITUDE, TO PUT IT MILDLY WAS THEN DEMONSTRATED IN THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO THESE FACTS, ALTHOUGH THEY INVOLVED HUMAN LOSSES AND MAJOR MATERIAL DAMAGE.

7. BUT NOW, WHEN AN AMERICAN NAVAL VESSEL HAS BEEN DETAINED BECAUSE IT PENETRATED FOREIGN TERRITORIAL WATERS, A NOSIY CAMPAIGN IS BEING DEVELOPED IN THE U.S., WHICH, JUDGING BY EVERYTHING, HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. OTHERWISE, HOW CAN ONE UNDERSTAND THE REPORT THAT A SEVENTH FLEET DETACHMENT CONSISTING OF THE NUCLEAR CARRIER "ENTERPRISE", DESTROYERS AND OTHER VESSELS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THEU KPDR?

8. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INCIDENT WHICH HAS ARISEN NEAR THE KPDR COAST, IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION SOBERLY AND NOT TO SUCCUMB TO EMOTIONS WHICH CAN LEAD ONE TO WHERE PERHAPS HE DOES NOT EVEN INTEND TO GO.

9. YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, HAVE EXPRESSED A DESIRE THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT RESPOND TO YOUR ANXIETY IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INCIDENT.

PAGE FOUR RUEHCR 2604FD ~~TOPSECRET~~

IN OUR VIEW, THE SHORTEST AND THE MOST RELIABLE WAY FOR SETTLING IT IS NOT TO ALLOW PRECIPITOUS ACTIONS, AND THIS WOULD CREATE A MORE FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE.

10. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROMPTEST POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL SIDES. SUCH SETTLEMENT MUST BE BASED, OF COURSE ON COMPLETE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. ANY ATTEMPTS TO APPLY METHODS OF PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE KPDR CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR A SETTLEMENT.

11. WE HAVE INFORMED THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YOUR MESSAGE.

12. RESPECTFULLY, A. KOSYGIN. JANUARY 27, 1968. END TEXT.

GP-1 THOMPSON

~~TOPSECRET~~

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, January 27, 1968  
9:30 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith, as requested, the aircraft movement schedule to Korea you put into effect yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By JD/dch, NARA, Date 2/20/96

WWRostow:rlh

Movement of Combat Aircraft to "Korea" Following Pueblo Incident

Decision Date	Mov From	Arrive Date	"Korea"	Unit	Aircraft Type	No.	"Daily" Increment	Cumulative Total
-	Japan	1/23	1/23	Enterprise	F-4B	24		
					A-4E	23		
					A-6A	12		
					RA-5C	6		
					Other	10	75	75
-	Oki	1/23	1/23	Air Force	F-105	12		
					RF-4C	3	15	90
1/26	Phil	1/28	1/28	64 FIS	F-102	13	13	103
"	Oki	1/29	1/29	12 TFS	F-105	12		
"	Japan	1/29	1/29	80 TFS	F-105	4	16	119
"	Viet	1/26	1/29	Ranger	F-4B	24		
					A-4C	11		
					A-7A	14		
					A-6A	12		
					RA-5C	5		
					Other	12	78	197
"	US	1/28	1/30	4537 FWS	F-105	6		
"	Oki	1/30	1/30	15 TRS	RF-4C	11		
"	Oki	1/30	1/30	82 FIS	F-102	25		
"	US	1/28	1/30	335 TFS	F-4	24	66	263
"	US	1/29	1/31	19 TEWS	EB-66	6		
"	US	1/29	1/31	334 TFS	F-4	24	30	293
"	US	1/30	2/1	336 TFS	F-4	24	24	317
"	US	1/31	2/2(Viet)	355 TFS	F-100	18		
"	Viet	2/4	2/4(SEA)	AirForce	F-4	18	18	335
"	US	2/3	2/5(Guam)	"	B-52	15	15	350
"	US	2/3	2/6(Guam)	"	B-52	11	11	361

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 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
 NJ 92-159  
 By 81/p, NARA, Date 2/20/96

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*Profile*

Saturday, January 27, 1968 -- 9:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

I have been twice on the phone to Bob Komer about the question of Gen. Thang, his resignation, and his assignment as commander of IV Corps in the Delta. Bob says that, as nearly as anything in Vietnam can be certain, Thieu will appoint Thang to IV Corps and Tang will accept.

Bunker yesterday pointed out to Thieu that the gap between his resignation from his present post and his assignment to IV Corps would create public discussion and uneasiness. Thieu replied that he was aware of this and regretted it; but it was simply impossible for him to remove the present commander of IV Corps until after Tet. Therefore, we shall have to wait it out.

As you may have noted, the Baltimore Sun of this morning has gotten hold of the likelihood that Thang will be appointed to IV Corps and makes an excellent case for that appointment.

New subject: The Ted Kennedy text has gone out to Saigon with instructions for urgent response.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By ing, NARA Date 11-25-96

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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January 27, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith a possible statement for tonight.

"We live in a dangerous and complicated world. There are bound to be moments of crisis and conflict. In the past week a crisis has arisen in Korea.

"It is natural at such a time that men should ask questions; they should wonder whether the crisis could have been avoided, whether it could have been more wisely handled.

"For example, here are two:

"Should the Pueblo have been where it was? My answer is: Yes.

North Korea has been conducting increasingly hostile actions against South Korea. It was not only our right but our duty to collect what intelligence we could about its activities from international waters. You should remember that South Korea -- and the United States -- and the free world -- were shocked one June day eighteen years ago by a surprise attack. Let's not forget that.

"Should the Pueblo have been escorted? If we -- and I might add the Soviet Union -- were to escort every vessel and aircraft engaged in electronic intelligence, we should have to increase vastly our military expenditures. But even more important: we cannot afford to let the principle of freedom of the seas be violated. We cannot have a destroyer accompany every ship any more than we can have a policeman accompany every citizen in our cities. I'd rather fight for the principle of law and order than to provide an escort for every ship.

"And just to throw in one more, I saw on the ticker tonight that a distinguished Senator has stated that U. S. destroyers were attacked in 1964 in North Vietnam's territorial waters. The despatch noted that the Senator didn't say whether the ships were inside the three-mile limit recognized by the United States or the 12-mile limit which the Communists consider the boundary of territorial waters."

"Just for the record, let me say that the first Tonkin Gulf incident occurred 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Vietnam; the second incident occurred 65 miles offshore.

"In a democracy we must expect this. We must expect questioning and debate. I, for one, do not complain. I would only ask you to consider the possibility that it is one thing to raise questions when one does not bear responsibility and one does not have all the facts and quite another matter to act with full responsibility in the light of all the facts available to the President."

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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January 26, 1968  
Friday, 9:45 P.M.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Nick Katzenbach  
seeks to convince you that things  
are in somewhat better shape than  
you may think; and--basically, he  
is right.

W. W. R.

BKS:amc

750

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 26, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: What We Are Doing About the Pueblo

The following is a brief description of what we have under way on the Pueblo:

On the Diplomatic Front:

- Reactions to our representations abroad are still coming in. We are sending you our analyses of them as soon as they are prepared. (I have already sent you 15 and will send you more in the morning.)
- The Japanese have suggested that we agree to the formation of a fact-finding commission made up of the USSR, Japan and an undetermined third country. They propose that this commission determine the facts in the Pueblo case and make recommendations for resolution. We see many flaws in the proposal (e.g. it doesn't handle the problem of North Korean infiltration into South Korea).
- We have persuaded the Swiss and the Swedes (who, along with the Czechs and the Poles, make up the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) to make inquiries about the status of the Pueblo crew. We have gone to the Czechs and the Poles to see if they will agree to go along with the Swiss-Swedish approach.

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Authority NLT 001-257-3-10  
By Q NARA, Date 8/20/03

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- At our request, the International Red Cross has agreed to make inquiries about the Pueblo killed and injured. The IRC has also agreed to ask for the return of the bodies of the dead, but feels that it can't yet ask for the return of the crew. That will be the next step.
- We are examining the pros and cons of another MAC meeting. We will have a recommendation for you on this tomorrow.
- We are studying another appeal to Communist countries with diplomatic representation in North Korea. If we feel there is a chance that any of them can influence Pyongyang we will go back at them again.
- We are looking at the merits and demerits of sending a special Presidential emissary to capitals that might exercise some influence on the North Koreans. We will have a recommendation for you in a day or two.
- We are considering whether we can put indirect pressure on the North Koreans (e.g. getting others to cut their trade).
- Bus Wheeler will report tomorrow on about a dozen possible military actions we can take directly against North Korea (none of these now look very promising).
- I have another group trying to come up with assorted proposals of a less provocative nature than air strikes, etc.
- We are looking into the feasibility of some action particularly directed against North Korean units in North Viet-Nam.

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In the UN:

- Goldberg will begin consultations tomorrow on a possible resolution. We can use this as a tactic--if we want to--for prolonging Security Council consideration.
- It was clear from the debate today that the Soviets have no taste for an extended debate. If we want to keep things going in the UN we will have to avoid coming to a vote on any resolution (since this would mean a Soviet veto).

My strong recommendation is that we keep the issue alive in the Security Council for a while. If the debate is closed off without a satisfactory result, it will mean heavy pressure on you to take other steps.

On the Intelligence Front:

- Dick Helms is studying possible ChiCom attitudes and reactions to various U.S. steps against North Korea. He also will report tomorrow on the location of the North Korean merchant and fishing fleets.
- The preliminary results of our intelligence collection effort over Wonsan are in. We have pictures of the Pueblo which seem to indicate that no external damage has been done to the ship. We can't tell, however, what equipment has been removed. There is no evidence of salvage operations at the point where the Pueblo was seized.

Public and Congressional Relations:

- We are preparing additional materials for you on how best to handle our public and Congressional relations.

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
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I also have given several groups the task of coming up with proposals on how best to influence the USSR and Eastern Europeans. There have been several indications today that the Soviets--whatever their public utterances--are beginning to take the matter seriously. We are looking for ways to keep pressure on the Soviets.

(Note: We have just received a report--on which you will get more details in the morning--that an Eastern European source here says that the North Koreans will release the Pueblo crew on Monday and then scuttle the ship. We are now assessing the reliability of this information.)

  
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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Friday, January 26, 1968, 8:30 P.M.

Mr. President:

*Pres file*

The State Department sent out the two attached telegrams to all our Ambassadors giving a description of the Pueblo incident and summarizing the actions we have taken thus far.

Each Ambassador is instructed to talk to the appropriate Government official stressing the threat to peace and requesting support, including direct approach to the North Koreans.

Also attached is a summary of the Ambassadors' responses. Additional replies which are coming in will be made available to you in the morning.

Bromley Smith

Attachments

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By 120, NARA Date 11-25-96

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Department of State

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97**

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FOR AMBASSADORS FROM SECRETARY.

FOR ALL POLADS.

SUBJECT: USS PUEBLO AND NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH KOREA

FOLLOWING IS FACTUAL SUMMARY OF PUEBLO INCIDENT AND NORTH KOREAN RAID ON SEOUL:

A. SEOUL INCIDENT:

1. FIRST CONTACT WITH INFILTRATORS WAS ON JANUARY 19 NEAR DMZ WHEN FOUR WOODCUTTER HELD CAPTIVE FOR FIVE HOURS. ON EVENING JANUARY 21 BAND OF INFILTRATORS WAS STOPPED AT POLICE CHECKPOINT BUT POSED SUCCESSFULLY AS ROK SPECIAL FORCE UNIT AND WAS ALLOWED TO PASS INTO SEOUL.

2. AT ABOUT 10:00 P.M. ON JANUARY 21 ROK SECURITY FORCES MADE

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CONTACT WITH AN ESTIMATED 30 ARMED NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATORS WHO HAD PENETRATED TO WITHIN 800 METERS OF PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN NORTHWEST SEOUL. INFILTRATORS FLED. SINCE THEN WIDELY SCATTERED FIREFIGHTS HAVE OCCURRED AS POLICE AND ARMY UNITS ATTEMPT TO TRACK DOWN INFILTRATORS. AS OF JANUARY 25, NINETEEN INFILTRATORS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND ONE CAPTURED. TOTAL FRIENDLY CASUALTIES NOW NUMBER EIGHTEEN KILLED AND THIRTY-NINE WOUNDED, INCLUDING ONE AMERICAN KILLED AND FIFTEEN WOUNDED.

3. THE CAPTURED INFILTRATOR HAS STATED THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE TEAM WAS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. THE INFILTRATOR TEAM TOTALED 31 AGENTS, ALL OF LIEUTENANT RANK OR HIGHER, DESPATCHED FROM THE 124TH NORTH KOREA ARMY UNIT. THE AGENTS HAD RECEIVED TWO YEARS OF INFILTRATION TRAINING,

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INCLUDING TWO WEEKS OF INTENSIVE TRAINING FOR THEIR PRESENT MISSION.

4. EQUIPMENT CAPTURED FROM THE NORTH KOREAN TERRORISTS INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT OF RUSSIAN MANUFACTURE:

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(A) SEVEN SUBMACHINE GUNS; MODEL PPS-43 (SUDAREV), 7.62 MM.

(B) FOUR SEMI-AUTOMATIC PISTOLS; MODEL TT-33 (TULA-TOKAREV), 7.62 MM.

B. USS PUEBLO INCIDENT:

1. USS PUEBLO, NAVY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AUXILIARY SHIP, WITH COMPLEMENT OF 6 OFFICERS AND 75 ENLISTED PERSONNEL AND TWO CIVILIANS ABOARD, ENCOUNTERED A NORTH KOREAN SUB-CHASER (PN-34) AT 230300Z AT A POSITION 25 NAUTICAL MILES NORTHEAST OF WONSAN, NORTH KOREA. AT THE TIME PUEBLO WAS OPERATING WITH INTERNATIONAL DAY SHAPES FOR HYDROGRAPHIC OPERATIONS DISPLAYED. PN-34 APPROACHED FROM 180 DEGREES AND CIRCLED PUEBLO. ON SECOND CIRCUIT, PN-34 HOISTED THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL REQUESTING NATIONALITY. PUEBLO HOISTED THE US ENSIGN AND THEN THE SIGNAL INDICATING HYDROGRAPHER. ON THE THIRD CIRCUIT, PN-34 HOISTED THE SIGNAL INDICATING "HEAVE TO OR I WILL OPEN FIRE ON YOU". PUEBLO REPLIED WITH "I AM IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS." PN-34 CONTINUED TO CIRCLE AND AT 230400Z WAS JOINED BY THREE NORTH KOREAN

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P-4 PATROL CRAFT (PN-601, 604, 606) AND THE SIGNAL "FOLLOW IN MY WAKE, I HAVE PILOT ABOARD" WAS SENT. PN-604, WITH ARMED LANDING PARTY ON BOW, BACKED TOWARD PUEBLO'S BOW WITH FENDERS RIGGED. TWO MIGS APPEARED AND CIRCLED PUEBLO. PUEBLO PROCEEDED IN ATTEMPT TO DEPART AREA. PUEBLO FIRST REPORTED BOARDING ATTEMPT BY NORTH KOREAN PERSONNEL AT 230445Z AT 127 DEGREES, 54.3 MINUTES EAST LONGITUDE, 39 DEGREES, 25

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MINUTES NORTH LATITUDE. PUEBLO REPORTED AT 230510Z THAT FOUR MEN WERE INJURED, ONE CRITICALLY. NO WEAPONS WERE USED BY PUEBLO OR ITS CREW. SHIP WENT OFF THE AIR AT 230532Z.

2. NORTH KOREANS HAVE CLAIMED THAT PUEBLO WAS IN NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. HOWEVER, THE PUEBLO'S POSITION AS DETERMINED BY THE RADAR TRACK OF THE NORTH KOREANS THEMSELVES WAS 39.25 NORTH AND 127.56 EAST. THIS DEMONSTRATES CONCLUSIVELY THAT PUEBLO WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

3. ON JANUARY 24 THE UNCMAC SENIOR MEMBER MADE A STATEMENT ON THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO IN MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING AT PANMUNJON. THE STATEMENT EMPHASIZED THAT PUEBLO

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WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS WHEN SEIZED, AND THAT SEIZURE WAS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. SENIOR MEMBER REQUESTED AN APOLOGY FOR THIS ILLEGAL ACTION AND DEMANDED THAT VESSEL AND CREW BE RETURNED INTACT AND IMMEDIATELY. THE NORTH KOREAN REPLY WAS COMPLETELY NEGATIVE AND CYNICAL. RUSK

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FOR AMBASSADORS FROM SECRETARY

FOR ALL POLADS

SUBJECT: USS PUEBLO AND NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH KOREA

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

1. RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY NORTH KOREA HAVE CREATED MOST SERIOUS CRISIS IN KOREA SINCE 1953 ARMISTICE. NORTH KOREAN ASSASSINATION MISSION AGAINST ROK PRESIDENT PAK AND SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS ARE LATEST ACTIONS IN CAMPAIGN OF HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE THAT IS THREATENING MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA. DETAILS OF EARLIER NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT WERE SET FORTH IN UN COMMAND REPORT TO UNITED NATIONS IN NOVEMBER, CIRCULATED TO ALL UN MEMBERS AS SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/8217. THAT REPORT SUMMARIZED CASUALTIES RESULTING FROM NORTH KOREAN ACTIVITIES DURING

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PERIOD JANUARY 1 TO OCTOBER 18, 1967 AS FOLLOWS: UN COMMAND (US AND ROK ARMED FORCES): 122 KILLED IN ACTION, 279 WOUNDED; ROK NATIONAL POLICE AND OTHER CIVILIANS KILLED: 22; ROK NATIONAL POLICE AND OTHER CIVILIANS WOUNDED: 53; NORTH KOREANS KILLED: 224; NORTH KOREANS CAPTURED: 50. NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS ARE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF ARMISTICE, AND SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO IS DIRECT CHALLENGE TO U.S. FURTHERMORE, WE HAVE RELIABLE INFORMATION THAT NORTH KOREANS INTEND TO MOUNT THIS YEAR AN INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN OF VIOLENCE ALONG DMZ AND FURTHER RAIDS INTO ROK.

2. WE ARE CONCERNED NOT ONLY OVER FATE OF PUEBLO AND ITS CREW, BUT ALSO OVER CONTINUED PROVOCATIVE BEHAVIOR OF NORTH KOREANS TOWARD ROK. WE DESIRE, THEREFORE, TO EXERT MAXIMUM DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON NORTH KOREA.

3. WE HAVE ASKED THE SOVIET UNION TO INTERCEDE WITH NORTH KOREA FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE PUEBLO AND ITS CREW. AT

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Department of State

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MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING AT PANMUNJON JANUARY 24,  
NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE WAS BOTH CYNICAL AND GROSS DISTORTION

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OF FACTS.

4. YOU ARE THEREFORE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK IMMEDIATE APPOINTMENT WITH APPROPRIATE HOST COUNTRY OFFICIALS AND BRIEF THEM FULLY ON SITUATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED. YOU SHOULD AT YOUR DISCRETION DRAW ON INFORMATION SET FORTH IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CABLE AND STRESS THAT UNMISTAKABLE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PUEBLO DID NOT VIOLATE NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. YOU SHOULD ALSO STRESS SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE IN NORTHEAST ASIA IF NORTH KOREANS PERSIST IN CONTINUING TO VIOLATE ARMISTICE. AT YOUR DISCRETION, YOU SHOULD REQUEST HOST GOVERNMENT TO APPROACH SOVIET UNION AND ALSO TO CONTEMPLATE URGENTLY WHAT OTHER DIRECT OR INDIRECT APPROACHES MIGHT BE MADE BY THEM TO THE NORTH KOREANS IN ORDER TO IMPRESS ON LATTER THE THREAT TO PEACE ARISING FROM THEIR BELLIGERENT ACTIONS.

5. I REQUEST YOU ADVISE US ASAP OF RESULTS OF YOUR CONVERSATIONS.

6. FOR CLEVELAND - YOU AUTHORIZED DRAW UPON THIS MATERIAL IN

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NAC AS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE.

7. GP-3. RUSK

~~SECRET~~

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BOLIVIA

Foreign Minister expressed full agreement on gravity of situation precipitated by North Korean violation of international waters and related acts of violence but had no immediate suggestions on how to augment diplomatic pressures on North Koreans.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97

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Burma

The Foreign Office official to whom our Ambassador made representations was fully aware of the gravity of the situation. He said that it would be quite atypical of the Burmese to take this matter up with the Russians, but that he would refer this question to higher authority. The Ambassador does not believe that the Burmese will accede to our request.

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By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

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CHILE

President Frei summoned Soviet Ambassador in Santiago today to urge that the Soviets exercise maximum pressure on the North Koreans. Frei lambasted Soviets directly and said he could not tolerate the idea of a reopening of hostilities in Korea and a new front in Asia.

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COSTA RICA

Foreign Minister said US can count on his government's support in every feasible measure.

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GUYANA

Government sent instructions to its UN representative to "give any assistance possible to US interests with respect to the USS Pueblo which comes before the SC."

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

76 h

HAITI

Foreign Minister called the Pueblo seizure a "provocation" and said the GOH "within the limits of its modest possibilities" would support efforts to find a peaceful solution.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97**

76 i

HONDURAS

Undersecretary was sympathetic and said it was possible that the Honduran delegate to the UN might be able to play some helpful role if opportunity arises.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By Cl, NARA Date 3-2-97**

768

Nepal

The Nepalese Foreign Secretary has agreed that Nepal will do whatever it could with the Soviets.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97**

76-K

NICARAGUA

Vice Foreign Minister Marin agreed to convey the substance of our position and the urgency of the Pueblo situation to his Foreign Minister and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa at the earliest opportunity.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97

762

PANAMA

The Foreign Minister indicated his belief that the North Korean action in seizing the Pueblo was an act of aggression and he could not see how UN members could do other than deplore this action on the part of North Korea. He indicated his government would cooperate in that sense in the United Nations.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97**

76 m

The Philippines

Foreign Secretary Ramos, who has been under fire for inaction on the part of the Government of the Philippines in the pueblo matter, expressed special gratitude for the "official" account of the incident and said that he would take the matter up immediately with President Marcos. The latter might wish to call a special meeting of the Philippine National Security Council to review the situation. Ramos said that his Government viewed the situation with the utmost seriousness. In reply to a question as to whether we considered the Pueblo and Seoul incidents to be related to events in Vietnam, our charge cited the Secretary's remarks to the effect that there was "no organic relationship". Ramos said that we could count fully on his government to "fulfill its commitments to you."

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97**

767

Singapore

Although the Foreign Minister was sympathetic to our request, he avoided any direct reply. The implication of his remarks, however, was that there was little that Singapore could do to make a useful contribution. Our Ambassador stated that the Singaporeans are well aware of the subversive threat which is posed by the Soviet, North Korean, and other bloc trade missions but is anxious to maintain a scrupulously correct attitude toward them. A political approach to these trade missions would not square with this attitude. Our Ambassador comments that because of its non-alignment policy, and its diminutive size, Singapore would be extremely reluctant to become directly involved as an intermediary on this question.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97**

760

Thailand

Since all ranking officials were out of Bangkok with the Shah of Iran and will not return until Monday, the Ambassador has conveyed the substance of the telegrams in a letter to Prince Wan. Our Ambassador took advantage of an opportunity to make emphatically clear to the Soviet Ambassador our very grave concern about North Korean actions and his hope that the Soviets could use their influence to resolve the crisis. The Soviet Ambassador took this calmly, noting that the American captain had acknowledged that he had entered North Korean territorial waters. If this was not true, then the vessel should be released. The Ambassador notes that this is no more than a minor and not very reliable indication for us of what line the Soviets might take.

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By CB, NARA Date 3-2-97**

URAGUAY

Acting Foreign Minister Gerona is expected to speak to Russian Ambassador in Montevideo--Gerona described situation as "extremely tense".

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-192**  
**By CG, NARA Date 3-2-97**

Pres file 77

Friday, January 26, 1968, 8:30 P. M.

Mr. President:

Attached is a summary of the reaction of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to Secretary Rusk's briefing today on the Pueblo incident.

Only a few members made specific recommendations for action but of those who did, almost all felt we should be very wary about using force.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

77a

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

January 26, 1968

Subject: Secretary's Appearance Before the Senate  
Foreign Relations Committee on the PUEBLO  
Incident

The Secretary appeared from 11:30 to 2:00 p.m., today, before the Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Sparkman. Others present were Senators Mansfield, Lausche, Gore, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, and Cooper.

The Secretary opened with a general review of events, the steps taken and the options open on the incident. He particularly invited the comments and recommendations of the Senators present.

All Senators spoke. There was emphasis in the questions on the precise chronology of events and the communications that were sent between the ship and the military authorities and between the Pacific commands and Washington; when senior officials were notified; what the specific instructions of the ship were; and who had advance knowledge of it. Only a few Members made specific recommendations for future action. Those who did almost all felt that we should be very wary about using force since it might result in another active military engagement.

The principal questions raised by individual Members were as follows:

Senator Sparkman asked whether, even if a navigational error had brought the ship within territorial waters, the North Koreans would have had any right to seize it. He inquired why no air support was available; whether the skipper was under specific orders not to resist; and, later in the meeting, whether the Committee would be consulted in the event diplomatic efforts failed and it was decided to resort to force. The Secretary replied that he assumed the President would undertake such consultation.

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-153  
By *g/jw*, NARA, Date 7/24/96

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- 2 -

Senator Hickenlooper expressed the opinion that we should have accepted the warning of the attack on the LIBERTY (to which he thought we had under-reacted), and provided more potential military protection for this ship in case it were attacked. He inquired why the ship did not resist boarding. At the same time, he stated it was important that we not fail to react adequately to this attack lest the idea get around that we do not "take care of our own."

Senator Mansfield asked a series of questions regarding the exact location of the ship, the timing of the various steps of notification and the authority for taking necessary protective action at various levels of command. He requested for the record a chronology of actions and communications during the night of the attack. The Secretary noted that there might have to be a classified and an unclassified chronology. The Senator asked if the President knew of this specific mission and its location, whether he knew where the LIBERTY was at the time it was attacked, and whether, in fact, President Eisenhower knew about the U-2 mission which was shot down. The Secretary replied to this and subsequent questions on this subject that this type of operation was planned at a very high level, he personally participated on many occasions, and the President received a vast amount of information and made many decisions. However, he could not say specifically whether the President knew either of the specific location of the ship at this time or of the over-all mission. The Senator concluded, with obvious sympathy for the President, that while it was impossible for one man to know everything, the Chief Executive had to bear ultimate responsibility. At a later point, Senator Mansfield stressed a degree of priority for rescuing the crew of the PUEBLO which would be prejudiced by a resort to force.

Senator Williams inquired regarding the timing of the messages; the availability of people to make decisions at all hours; the capability of the PUEBLO for the destruction

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- 3 -

of equipment or scuttling; and our evaluation of the alleged confession of the skipper which was broadcast.

Senator Gore commended the prudence with which the President had approached this situation. He asked a number of details about the ship's mission, and requested for the record a copy of the operational order of the PUEBLO, to show the course it was to pursue and the nature of its assigned mission. He asked about the record of North Korean incursions during the past year. He asked whether we expected any problems in inscribing on the United Nations Security Council Agenda and what we would do if UN procedures were not successful. He assumed we would explore all diplomatic channels before using force.

Senator Mundt asked questions regarding the actual and potential military involvement on both sides, and said that the Navy had volunteered him a special briefing by two officers which provided information in conflict with information provided at the White House and a briefing of the House Armed Services Committee which had been reported to him. He expressed the opinion that we would be better advised to submit two resolutions to the UN--one covering the PUEBLO incident on the grounds that it would be more awkward for the Soviets to veto both resolutions separately. The Secretary said that all things considered, he did not agree with him. The Senator inquired as to how bad the compromise of intelligence equipment was. He then said that he thought we had made a serious error in conducting this provocative mission in an area of great tension at a time when we were so over-committed in other parts of the world. He said he had so far supported the Vietnamese war, but was becoming reluctant to go on doing so when we take these unnecessary risks for information which could be acquired by other means. The Secretary indicated that there were important security requirements for the mission. At the end of the meeting, Senator Mundt speculated that the North Koreans would probably eventually give back the ship and the men under conditions which would be most insulting

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- 4 -

to the US, and wondered what the impact of this would be on our prestige in the area.

Senator Lausche inquired as to the situation in the area and the US military strength in South Korea. He speculated that the purpose of the north Koreans was to create a diversion to help the Vietnamese and, incidentally, capture useful intelligence equipment. He believed that the main object was to get the ship and the crew back, and that it was most important for the matter to be settled by diplomacy rather than resorting to force. The Secretary noted that no decision had been made as to the future action. The Senator presumed that if we resorted to force, there was an excellent chance that the North Koreans would launch a land attack against South Korea. He felt we do not have the people for another land war, and that he strongly favored great caution in this situation. The Secretary noted that the diversion of the ENTERPRISE, at least for the time being, had not yet weakened our effort in Vietnam, since the aircraft carrier to be relieved was still on station. He agreed with Senator Lausche, however, on the gravity of the situation which he illustrated by quoting the Treaty commitments of the Soviet Union and Communist China to North Vietnam.

Senator Cooper--He asked questions about the messages sent by the PUEBLO throughout its trip showing its location. He inquired whether we had force enough in South Korea to resist a new attack. He agreed with Senator Mundt on the doubtful wisdom of the PUEBLO mission at this time, and concluded that we should pursue the incident by diplomatic means and not resort to force.

Senator Pell expressed general approval of the diplomatic approach used so far, and asked a series of questions regarding the Naval factors involved, including whether the ship was flying its Navy commission pennant in addition to the American flag. He stated that he had information that the PUEBLO had been off the Soviet coast at some point during the present mission. He was told that our information did not confirm

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- 5 -

this but we would check. He finally asked to have recorded his opinion that, if worst came to worst and there was a military response to this situation, we should take steps to remove any nuclear weapons which might be in South Korea in order to avoid the danger of escalation.

Senator Symington read hastily a list of 15 questions which he said he would submit to the Department for inclusion in the record after the staff had checked to see what answers were already available. They included a wide selection from a request for copies of all messages sent during this incident to a request for an evaluation of our ability to fight another war in Korea at this time, without resort to nuclear weapons. He concluded by saying we were badly over-committed and should have a major review of our policies.

In concluding the meeting, Senator Mansfield noted in a conciliatory fashion that it appeared necessary to review and reconcile a great many elements of the information which had been furnished by different parties on this situation. He cited a statement made at the White House that there were only three fighter planes in Korea which could have responded, and these were loaded with armament which would require three hours to remove.

After the meeting, Senators Mansfield, Sparkman and Gore individually told Macomber that they thought it had been a good and useful meeting.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Pueblo Meeting  
Friday, January 26, 1968, 11:00 a. m.

Agenda*Pres file*

1. Intelligence Sitrep (Mr. Helms)  
Photo recce mission successfully completed.
2. Diplomatic Sitrep (Sect. Rusk)  
Responses from: Pakistan, S. Korea, Indonesia, Japan, etc.  
Situation at UN in New York. (Information up to 0600 at Tab A)
3. Phased Aircraft and Naval Movements Schedule (Sect. McNamara & Gen. Wheeler)
4. What Do We Need From the Congress? (Sect. McNamara)
5. What Action Should We Envisage If Diplomacy Fails? (Sects. Rusk and McNamara: Gen. Wheeler)

Note: You may or may not wish to review these again at this meeting.  
It may be wiser to urge staff work to continue and await photo recce results, which should be in Washington on Sunday.

To induce release of Pueblo crew:

- Bottle-up N. Korean naval units in harbor (or harbors);
- Mine harbor (or harbors);
- Capture N. Korean naval vessels;
- etc.

In reprisal for Blue House attack and definitive loss of Pueblo:

- Air attack on terrorist training camps (Park recommendation);
- Naval-air attack on Wonsan military installations;
- Air attack on appropriate industrial installations;
- etc. /

6. Optional if you wish discussion: What are the pros and cons of the President speaking to the nation over the week-end?
7. Optional: The Clifford Question: How best to bring about return of Pueblo and Crew? (Mr. Clifford)
8. Other.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MT 96-199  
By GMIS, NARA, Date 11/4/05

*W. Rostow*

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~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Korean Task Force

Situation Report, 0600 Hours EST, January 26, 1968

A North Korean radio broadcast monitored Thursday night said the crew of the Pueblo "must be punished by law". (FBIS)

Pursuit of the remaining North Korean infiltrators continues, with 23 of the reported 31 infiltrators accounted for thus far. A U.S. soldier was killed Friday morning by enemy fire, the second since the Seoul raid. (FBIS; Seoul 3657).

Presidential Secretary Yi Hu-rak told Ambassador Porter that the ROK Government doubted the usefulness of going to the Security Council and wanted any invitation to the North Koreans to participate couched in terms that would force North Korea to accept UN competence in Korea. The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Porter that the ROK Delegation in New York had been instructed to prevent North Korean participation "even if this meant ROK withdrawal". Ambassador Porter urged against this course and suggests we sound out the ROK Delegation as there may be some flexibility in its instructions. (Seoul 3668 EXDIS)

Pakistani officials report that the Security Council President found that 10 of the 15 Council members support inscription of the item concerning North Korea and that a Council meeting would be called for 3:30 p.m. Friday (Rawalpindi 2985 LIMDIS)

Pakistan

President Ayub assured Ambassador Oehlert that Pakistan shares our concern over the present situation and hopes for a consensus in the Security Council on the best means to meet the situation. (Rawalpindi 2969 EXDIS)

Indonesia

Foreign Minister Malik told Ambassador Green he would immediately instruct his Ambassador in Pyongyang to urge the North Koreans to release the Pueblo and its crew immediately. (Djakarta 4270 EXDIS)

Australia

The Government is instructing its Moscow embassy to express Australia's serious view of the Pueblo incident and violations of the Armistice agreement. (Canberra 3430)

~~SECRET~~ - EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-192  
By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

New Zealand

The Government indicated doubt that New Zealand could do anything, but endorsed our decision to handle the situation by diplomatic means. (Wellington 1216)

Singapore

Foreign Minister Rajaratnam indicated there was little Singapore could do. (Singapore 1285 LINDIS)

Tunisia

The Foreign Minister has said he will discuss with President Bourguiba what action Tunisia might take in response to our approach to them. (Tunis 2819 LINDIS)

Somalia

Prime Minister Egal is reportedly considering a recommendation by an advisor that he express concern over the Korean situation to the Soviets and to the North Koreans through his embassy in Cairo. (Mogadiscio 2010 LINDIS)

Malaysia

A Foreign Office official said Malaysia has no contact with the Soviets or the North Koreans but the Government might consult with other Asian governments concerning the Korean situation. (Kuala Lumpur 2751)

China

Foreign Minister Wei indicated willingness to do anything possible, including discussing the situation with the Japanese if we desired it. He was pessimistic about the results to be expected from the Security Council. (Taipei 1993 LINDIS)

Fri., Jan. 26, 1968  
6:25 p. m.

**MR. PRESIDENT:**

I may have some papers from State and Defense by 6:30, but here are the key questions which I have faced and the answers I have used. Bob McNamara tells me that in dealing with TIME and NEWSWEEK and other correspondents, these are also the key questions. The answers given below have been cleared with him:

1. Q. Why did the Captain of the Pueblo wait so long before sending a distress signal?

A. These ships are habitually harassed. One of them (the Banner) was recently, for example, surrounded by 11 patrol craft for 2-1/2 hours before it was let go. In one year, the Banner was harassed seven times.

2. Q. Why did the naval base at Yokohama not react until they opened fire on the Pueblo?

A. Same reason.

3. Q. Why was there no air and naval protection available for the Pueblo?

A. The Soviet Union and the U. S. have many such ships at sea and conduct literally thousands of flights to collect intelligence by aircraft. Neither country provides protection. If they did so, they would require navies and air forces enormously greater than their present forces.

4. Q. Why didn't the 5th Air Force respond when the Pueblo knew it was in serious trouble?

A. The Pueblo did not ask for help until it was almost too late to respond at all. Under the best of conditions, the time available would have been marginal. But the conditions were poor:

-- there was a low ceiling with some snow falling; darkness was close at hand; the operation was evidently pre-planned, with MIG's on station which might have endangered the aircraft we could have barely gotten in. These were the reasons why the commander of the 5th Air Force decided not to go in.

5. Q. Why were there not more fighter aircraft in Korea?

A. We maintain the bulk of our forces in Okinawa and Japan. The reaction

time to this area from Japan is very little more than it is from Korea.

You might recall, in passing, that at the Guam conference we could all look out and see the unarmed intelligence ship offshore.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

80

Friday, January 26, 1968  
5:20 p. m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith the exact text of  
Adam Clymer's hopeful despatch  
from New Delhi, which may, indeed,  
be a quick private signal to the U. S.  
Government.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

January 26, 1968

Following dictated from Baltimore Sun. Following is dispatch from Adam Clymer, Baltimore Sun Bureau Chief in New Delhi.

Responsible Soviet sources said today - Soviet Union is privately seeking release of the intelligence ship PUEBLO despite formally negative responses to U.S. requests for such action.

They spoke in fairly general terms but made an insistent effort to get that message across. They also stressed that Premier Kosygin, here on a week's visit, was in touch with Moscow on developments involving the North Korean seizure of the ship. Today's comments, to diplomats and correspondents, followed the announcement of call up of American military reservists. That news had not reached here yesterday when Kosygin brushed off a question on the PUEBLO, saying, "See the Koreans." The Soviet sources indicated that rejection of direct American request for intercession with North Koreans, along with attacks by Radio Moscow and Pravda, were necessary to preserve the Kremlin influence in Pyongyang. They noted that North Korean Communists were often unsympathetic to Soviet view of world problems. Their comments were generally devoid of harsh criticism of the PUEBLO, unlike today's Pravda which referred to the listening ship's "criminal mission."

Note from Adam Clymer: I am not vouching for truth of Soviet statements but good source sought me out and they obviously seeking to get this version to the U. S.

80 b

January 26, 1968

5:10 p.m. -- Add to Adam Clymer

But they did suggest that if the U. S. were to admit a violation of North Korean territorial waters, it might simplify release of the vessel and crew. They recalled a recent case where Soviet fishing vessels were seized in Alaska and released after paying a fine. Diplomatic observers here were unable to evaluate confidently the substance behind the Soviets' hints. Some felt they had accurately represented Soviet actions. Others believed they were intended simply to create an impression of Soviet understanding without necessarily being supported by any concrete Soviet steps. The PUEBLO incident is not believed to come up yet in any of Kosygin's discussions with Indian officials. But these have only barely begun. Soviet diplomat said Kosygin had two direct telephone-teleprinter circuits to Moscow. One from the Soviet Embassy and one from the Ashoka Hotel where many members of his party are staying. Kosygin himself is staying at the residence of the President of India.

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**Friday, January 26, 1968**  
**4:45 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Phil Potter called. He tells me that their New Delhi correspondent, Adam Clymer, is filing a story about as follows:**

**A Soviet diplomatic source in New Delhi stated in the presence of foreign diplomats and journalists that, despite its public stance, the Soviet Union may be active in bringing about the return of the PUEBLO and its crew to the United States.**

**Potter will be dictating to my office the exact text of the despatch.**

**W. W. Rostow**

8

Friday, Jan. 26, 1968  
4:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

Bucher has now spoken before newsmen in a public interview.

The Pentagon tells me also that his voice was probably authentic. Either the man is:

-- a traitor;

-- under intense threat; or

-- made a deal to get his men (and possibly ship) out if he said what he does say in this damaging interview.

The last paragraph may or may not be a clue.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment (FBIS 71)

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Friday, January 26, 1968  
3:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a more detailed report on CABRIOLET  
from Glenn Seaborg.

The conditions "could not have been better."  
The wind was "perfect" at 20 miles, northeast--  
possibly slower. The weather prediction is  
for a high pressure area to move down from  
Canada. This should keep the radioactive cloud  
moving eastward across the United States and  
then out to the Atlantic.

In short, if there is no change in weather,  
no radioactive fallout should cross our frontiers.

The crater appears "just right."

So far, so good.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

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**SECRET**

Friday, January 26, 1968  
2:45 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this rather temperate line that a Soviet diplomat took in Moscow earlier today with Senator Mondale.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 2588

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines Feb. 24, 1983  
By *kg*, NARA, Date 1-29-92

842

~~SECRET~~

Moscow 2588, January 26, 1968

1. At a luncheon I gave for Senator Mondale today the Senator had a private conversation with Mr. Zinchuk, of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, concerning the North Korean seizure of the USS PUEBLO. He indicated that he was personally familiar with the matter and made the following points:

- a. The USSR did not know about or prompt the event;
- b. They regretted it;
- c. The vessel was apprehended within the Bay which had been declared territorial waters by North Korea;
- d. That the vessel had been approached by North Korean craft and told of the North Korean's version and asked to leave, but refused to do so;
- e. While he was not personally sure of the facts, he thought the wounded on the PUEBLO were wounded not by gunfire but probably as a result of an accident while destroying secret documents or something of that character.

2. He strongly counseled that the U. S. remain calm and strongly indicated that the Soviet Union wanted this matter to be amicably settled, and indicated some optimism that this was possible through diplomatic channels. He indicated that the use of the aircraft carrier as a direct show of force would detract from a diplomatic resolution of the problem.

3. Sinchuk was present during my meeting with Gromyko today.

Thompson

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
 NLJ 96-192  
 By cb, NARA Date 3-2-97

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

85

Friday, January 26, 1968  
2:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Kemer's temperate  
statement of pacification prospects for  
1968.

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 16822

cc: Amb. Leonhart

WWRostow:rla

Thursday, January 25, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (16822)

In a year-end, on-the-record press conference on pacification, Ambassador Komer made the following points on 1967 progress, 1968 goals.

Pacification, by nature, is slow, undramatic process of extending security, helping people toward self-improvement, and showing the Government of Vietnam cares for people. The current program is only two years old, and really dates from the Honolulu Conference. So, the program is just now getting into stride.

Pacification is almost wholly Government of Vietnam-executed. The US side only advises and supports. There are only about 3900 US advisors, compared to over 500,000 Vietnamese, including local security forces.

Although Revolutionary Development teams are leading the edge of pacification, Revolutionary Development cadre make up only 10 percent of the manpower involved. Pacification also includes programs to attack the Viet Cong infrastructure, Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program, restoring law and order, reviving local government, reopening roads and waterways, and expanding rural economy. Pacification is a hamlet-by-hamlet proposition, so reporters should look for overall trends. One can't visit two poor hamlets and then report pacification is failing.

1967 was a year of forward movement on the pacification front. Much better than was 1966. Many more resources devoted to it, especially the assignment of 54 ARVN battalions, plus Regional Force/Popular Force which permitted sustained local security effort, especially in the 39 Revolutionary Development campaign areas.

The best available measurement of the 1967 pacification results is the new Hamlet Evaluation System, which indicates 67 percent of South Vietnam's 17,200,000 population is now under the Government of Vietnam control, 16.5 percent remain in contested areas and 16.6 percent still are subject to Viet Cong control. The hamlet results are more modest but less significant because of a wide variation in hamlet size. Some 638 hamlets were upgraded to an A-B-C status.

Economic revival in the countryside had a big plus for 1967, with positive signs of prosperity now showing in the Mekong Delta. Many more roads and

waterways are open throughout South Vietnam. The expected rice harvest is eight to ten percent higher than in 1966.

1968 plans are based on 1967 experience and with even greater resources allocated. "Can't see how we can fail to do somewhat better than the past year." The Government of Vietnam has pulled together all Ministries dealing with pacification under the Central Revolutionary Development Council. Revolutionary Development teams will rise by 30 percent from 555 to 721. The Government of Vietnam plans to do Revolutionary Development work in 1480 hamlets, maybe more. Regional and Popular Forces will expand by more than 40,000 this year. More economic progress is expected in the countryside, resulting from more roads and canals opening, a 20 percent increase in the rice harvest, and more farm machinery being distributed.

While in a better position to advance in 1968, serious problems like Government of Vietnam bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and Revolutionary Development teams attrition remain to be solved or maeliorated.

The Government of Vietnam still has a long way to go, with some 2.9 million people in 3900 hamlets still under Viet Cong control and some 2.8 million in 3500 hamlets still contested. But the trend is significantly upward, and pacification can no longer be called "faltering" or "stalled." If another 1.3 million people are brought under Government control, this will further cut back the declining Viet Cong population base. One is warned against expecting miracles, but we foresaw greater forward movement in 1968 than in 1967, which in turn was much better than 1966.

86

**ACTION**

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-148  
By SP14P, NARA, Date 2/20/94

*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

**Friday, January 26, 1968 -- 1:30 p. m.**

**Mr. President:**

**Nick Katzenbach left the attached draft statement for the President.**

**With Arthur Goldberg about to go on the air at 3:30 p. m. today, I believe this statement is either too long or insufficient for the President to use today.**

**It is insufficient because the President should not simply repeat the points that Amb. Goldberg should make. It is too much, however, for a brief reference.**

**Therefore, you may wish to interject some time this afternoon into some other ceremony a statement like the following:**

**While our men and our allies are meeting in Vietnam, a large and dangerous attack, a situation of the utmost gravity, has begun to develop in the Korean area.**

**We have followed closely the North Korean harassment of South Korea over the past fifteen months.**

**They have been apparently seeking to divert South Korean and U. S. military resources and also to interrupt the growing spirit of confidence and progress in South Korea.**

**To this series of dangerous actions -- including an effort to assassinate the President of South Korea -- they have taken an American vessel and its crew off the high seas by armed force.**

**Clearly we cannot and we shall not tolerate their action.**

~~SECRET~~

**SECRET**

**-2-**

We are doing two things. First, we are today taking the matter, as you know, into the Security Council of the United Nations. We have been making other diplomatic moves as well. Clearly the best result would be for the whole world community to persuade the North Koreans to return our ship and our men and to cease the dangerous course of aggression against South Korea.

We shall give diplomacy and persuasion a chance to work in the days ahead.

Second, we have also taken certain actions of a precautionary nature so as to have us ready for any contingency that might arise in the area. These will not draw a man, a gun, a ship, or plane from South Vietnam.

It is clear that the North Koreans are creating a situation by their activities which involves the most serious risk, if continued.

I hope that the North Koreans will recognize the gravity of the situation which they have created.

I am confident that the American people will exhibit in this crisis, as they have in other crises, the calm, determination, and unity which are necessary to see it through.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

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869

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT STATEMENT AND ACTIONS ON KOREA TO BE ANNOUNCED  
BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS

A situation of the utmost gravity has begun to develop in the Korea area.

The North Koreans over the last fifteen months have pursued a stepped-up campaign of harassment and violence in the DMZ, in which South Korean and American troops have been killed, and wounded.

Armed raider teams in large numbers have been sent into South Korea to engage in sabotage and assassination. On January 19 a 31-man team of armed raiders invaded Seoul with the object of assassinating the President of the Republic. Up to now 19 of these have been killed and one captured. Once again there have been Korean and American casualties. An American naval ship and its crew of 83 engaged in intelligence collection outside of territorial waters off North Korea was subject to armed seizure in international waters by North Korean naval vessels in violation of international law and the armistice agreement.

The aim of the North Koreans appears to be to intimidate the South Koreans and to create diversionary actions designed to relax our pressures on Viet-Nam. They have in mind a very great increase in harassment and infiltration this year. They appear to think that they can engage in these actions with impunity.

The North Koreans must be made to understand that we do not intend to stand by idly while these aggressive and hostile actions take place.

This crescendo of violence must stop or it threatens the maintenance

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NU 92-153

By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 2/20/96

~~SECRET~~

of peace in Korea.

I have taken certain actions to deal with this problem.

For the time being our main effort has been concentrated on the diplomatic side.

1. The Senior UN Command Member of the Military Armistice Commission has protested these actions, called for an end to these hostile acts, and for the return immediately and intact of the S.S. Pueblo and its crew. I regret to say that the North Koreans treated our demands with cynicism. They falsely claim that their raiders are South Koreans with whom they have no connection. And in defiance of the data -- ours and theirs -- they claim the S.S. Pueblo was inside their territorial waters.

2. I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg to ask for a meeting of the Security Council.

3. We have approached the leaders of the Soviet Union, and ~~we are now approaching other nations, including Japan,~~ to stress the gravity of the situation. I have asked them to examine what steps they could take to help bring these provocations to an end and secure the release of the S.S. Pueblo and its crew.

SECRET

-3-

4. <sup>At my request</sup> ~~I have asked~~ the Department of State <sup>has</sup> ~~to call~~ in the

16 nations who contributed forces to the UN Command during the Korean War, and who have a special interest and responsibility for the preservation of peace in Korea.

These are the actions of the diplomatic side.

I have also <sup>and am taking</sup> taken certain actions of a precautionary nature so

as to have us ready for any contingency.

1. US and South Korean forces have been placed on the alert.
2. A number of Naval and Air Force units have been deployed to South Korea and the waters around South Korea. (1 carrier, 4 destroyers, and 12 aircraft.)
3. I am moving into the area more Naval and Air Force units, none of them from South Viet-Nam or Europe.
4. I have ordered the call-up of selected reserve Air and Naval units.
5. In view of our need for intelligence on the activities and intentions of the North Koreans, I have ordered a step-up in our intelligence effort. In this connection, the S.S. Banner, an intelligence collection vessel of the US Navy, will be moved into the area with supporting air and naval cover.
6. I have given effect to the Congressional decision to provide two additional destroyers to the Republic of Korea.

SECRET

7. We have already given considerable special equipment to the Republic of Korea under the Military Assistance Program to strengthen its capacity to deal with terrorist raiders. We now need to further increase their ability to deal with infiltrators, as well as further strengthen their military defense. I shall be asking Congress for a special appropriation of \$100 million for these purposes.

8. I do not know what additional measures may need to be taken to provide for the security and maintain the peace of this area. If the situation continues to deteriorate, there will be a need for a special defense appropriation in order to enable our expanded activated military forces to carry out whatever needs to be done in this area.

I want to make clear ~~to the Congress and to the people of the~~ United States and the Republic of Korea -- and to the rest of the world -- that the North Koreans are creating a situation by their activities which, if persisted in, involves <sup>most serious</sup> the ~~risks of war~~. <sup>The North Koreans</sup> I hope that they will recognize the gravity of the situation which they have created. <sup>I hope they will</sup> promptly return the Pueblo and its crew. <sup>And I hope</sup> they will cease their violations of the Armistice Agreement.

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1/15 B  
JW

MEMORANDUM

INFORMATION

253 87

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Friday, January 26, 1968 -- 12:50 p.m.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Visits of U.S. Nuclear Ships to Japan

EX-100  
E.O. 12812, Sec. 3.6  
NLI CO-275  
By COM, NARA Doc 4-4-01


You asked why we sent the Enterprise to Sasebo when it seemed certain to cause demonstrations. Under Secretary Katzenbach answers the question in the attached memo. The basic reasons are:

- for logistic and R&R purposes;
- to increase Japanese involvement in our Asian defense arrangements;
- to reach the point where visits of nuclear powered surface ships are as routine as those of regular naval ships and nuclear subs.

The Under Secretary notes that the Enterprise visit was under consideration for two years. The Japanese had plenty of opportunity to ask for postponement or cancellation, but did not.

The State memo does not, however, deal with what I regard as the most serious element in the Enterprise visit. This is that in the flurry of Diet debate, members of the Sato Government went on record as saying there were no nuclear weapons aboard the ship. They did so on the basis of our assurance that the consultation requirement of the Security Treaty was not involved in the visit.

3.4(b)(6)



*Walt* Rostow

Att.

~~SECRET~~

87a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 24, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Question about Visit of Nuclear  
Carrier Enterprise to Sasebo, Japan

You asked why we sent the Enterprise and Truston to Sasebo, Japan when we were virtually certain that it would lead to violent demonstrations.

The immediate reason for the visit of nuclear-powered surface ships (NPSS) to Japan is the Navy's operational requirement for logistic support and to provide R & R. The Navy also wants to work our NPSS's into the same deployment pattern as conventionally powered warships.

The longer range political reason for the visit is that we want to increase Japan's involvement in our Far East defense arrangements. Port calls by ships of the Seventh Fleet are visible demonstrations of close US-Japanese political relations.

Pursuant to our Security Treaty, nuclear-powered submarines (SSNS) have been calling at Japanese ports since 1964. Initial SSN port calls occasioned violent demonstrations, but these have tapered off to the point where visits are now considered routine by both the Navy and the Japanese people.

We recognized from the outset that the initial NPSS visit carried an element of risk. The Left opposition, we knew, would use the port call as a means of fighting an extension of the Security Treaty after 1970.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-127 appeal

By JW, NARA, Date 6-21-94

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

But we did not consider the risk excessive. The Liberal Democratic Party is united behind Prime Minister Sato as seldom before; the opposition is in disarray and squabbling among themselves, and the Diet is not in session. Both the US and the GOJ believed the opposition would be given a smaller target if the ship made its initial call coming from the US rather than from Viet-Nam.

We coordinated all aspects of the visit with the Japanese Government, which was consulted on the date, the port of entry and the mooring location. The consultations with the GOJ lasted over two years, during which the Japanese were given every opportunity to delay or even to request cancellation of the visit. At no time did they suggest that we abandon the port call. As late as January 17, Sato indicated to Alex Johnson that he had no second thoughts about the visit.

We do not yet have an overall assessment from Embassy Tokyo, but our impression is that the visit went off reasonably well. The Enterprise remained at Sasebo for four days without serious restrictions on the movements of our men. Nor were there any tragic or embarrassing incidents. The people of Sasebo in general gave our sailors a warm welcome, while the news media generally denounced the violence and said that the NPSS port call was only natural in light of the US-Japan Security Treaty.

Before we schedule any more NPSS visits to Japan, we and the Japanese will take a hard look at reactions to the recent visit, and at the prevailing political situation in Japan.

  
Under Secretary

~~SECRET~~

Pueblo Meeting  
Friday, January 26, 1968, 11:00 a. m.

Agenda

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By ics, NARA Date 8-19-98

1. Intelligence Sitrep (Mr. Helms)  
Photo recce mission successfully completed.
2. Diplomatic Sitrep (Sect. Rusk)  
Responses from: Pakistan, S. Korea, Indonesia, Japan, etc.  
Situation at UN in New York. (Information up to 0600 at Tab A)
3. Phased Aircraft and Naval Movements Schedule (Sect. McNamara & Gen. Wheeler)
4. What Do We Need From the Congress? (Sect. McNamara)
5. What Action Should We Envisage If Diplomacy Fails? (Sects. Rusk and McNamara:  
Gen. Wheeler)

Note: You may or may not wish to review these again at this meeting.  
It may be wiser to urge staff work to continue and await photo recce results, which should be in Washington on Sunday.

[ To induce release of Pueblo crew:

- Bottle-up N. Korean naval units in harbor (or harbors);
- Mine harbor (or harbors);
- Capture N. Korean naval vessels;
- etc.

In reprisal for Blue House attack and definitive loss of Pueblo:

- Air attack on terrorist training camps (Park recommendation);
- Naval-air attack on Wonsan military installations;
- Air attack on appropriate industrial installations;
- etc. -j

6. Optional if you wish discussion: What are the pros and cons of the President speaking to the nation over the week-end?
7. Optional: The Clifford Question: How best to bring about return of Pueblo and Crew? (Mr. Clifford)
8. Other.

W. W. Rostow

Friday, January 26, 1968  
10:20 a. m.

*Per file*  
8  
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**MR. PRESIDENT:**

Ambassador Lodge had the following to say about the purpose of his 5:30 meeting with you today.

1. In November he had told Sect. Rusk that the President and the Secretary ought to be thinking about Ambassador Lodge's disposition (after the 6 to 8 months, of which the President had spoken at Guam, had run out). It is now 8 months since Guam. As a matter of courtesy, he feels he should submit his resignation to the President.

2. Beyond that, he feels that if the President wishes him to work in the field of Vietnam and public attitudes towards it, he can be more effective outside of the government than inside.

3. If, however, the President has some diplomatic assignment of substance for him, that would be a different matter.

4. If he should resign now, he would, of course, be available to the President if he wished to call him back for peace talks, or any other service in the public interest.

W. W. Rostow

WWR:mz

INFORMATION

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*Pres file*

~~SECRET~~

Friday, January 26, 1968  
8:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith an initially satisfactory  
response from Ayuh to your message.

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 2969

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By kg, NARA, Date 1-29-92

~~SECRET~~

900  
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Rawalpindi 2969, January 26, 1968

1. President Ayub delayed a scheduled Cabinet meeting to receive me at 9:00 a. m. today.
2. President Johnson's letter was read to him.
3. He expressed his concern for the gravity of the situation, his deep desire for the preservation of peace and his conviction that the USSR, while it might "make a lot of noises," would not block such a resolution.
4. He stated that he would like to consult with his Foreign Office people about the mechanics of the matter and requested that I stand by while he did so.
5. I was followed into the President's office by the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Fida Hassan who, with other members of the Cabinet, had been waiting for the convening of the Cabinet meeting.
6. Fifteen minutes later, Foreign Secretary Yusuf emerged and delivered to me the following oral message, which he said had been personally approved by President Ayub:

"We share your concern for the preservation of peace and will do our best to prevent the situation from deteriorating. We shall try our utmost to bring about a peaceful resolution of the problem. As regards the mechanics of it, Ambassador Shahi is in touch with other members of the Security Council and we earnestly hope that consensus will emerge amongst the members of the Council on the best means to meet the situation.

"As we continue to hear from Ambassador Shahi we will remain in close personal touch with you."

7. I emphasized both to Ayub and to Yusuf that there could be no acceptable solution which did not include prompt release of crew and vessel.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 94-81  
R/jw, NARA, Date 4/24/96

Oehlert

~~SECRET~~

91  
-  
Friday, January 26, 1968  
9:45 a. m.

Mr. President:

You should know: Cabriolet goes at 11:00 A. M.  
this morning, if weather holds.

W. W. Rostow

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*Pres file*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

25 Jan 67  
10:00 PM

Mr. President;

Herewith the draft  
letter Arthur Goldberg <sup>68</sup> proposes to  
file forthwith as a basis for the  
Security Council meeting tomorrow  
morning at 11:30.

WWR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
January 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Walt Rostow

I understand the President wished to see the final draft of the letter which Goldberg submitted to the Security Council President at about 8 p.m. this evening.

Consultations regarding the timing of the Security Council meeting are continuing this evening. We will know later on whether it is set for Friday a.m. or afternoon.

I have drafted a statement for Goldberg for the Security Council tomorrow which is being reworked in New York later this evening. A clean draft will be available in the morning for review.

*Jae*  
IO - Joseph J. Sisco

370  
976

LETTER TO SC PRESIDENT RE KOREA

Dear Mr. President:

I request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave threat to peace which has been brought about by a series of increasingly dangerous and aggressive military actions by North Korean authorities in violation of the Armistice Agreement, of international law, and of the Charter of the United Nations.

The armistice regime established by the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953 has been repeatedly violated by North Korean authorities. These violations have become increasingly serious during the past year and a half, during which armed personnel on many occasions have been despatched from North Korea across the demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea on missions of terrorism and political assassination. A particularly grave incident occurred this month, when a band of armed terrorists was dispatched into the Republic of Korea on a mission whose apparent goal was the assassination of President Park.

More recently, North Korea has willfully committed an act of wanton lawlessness against a naval vessel of the United States operating on the high seas. On January 23, the USS Pueblo,

while operating in international waters, was illegally seized by armed North Korean vessels, and the ship and crew are still under forcible detention by North Korean authorities.

This North Korean action against a U.S. naval vessel on the high seas, and the serious North Korean armed raids across the demilitarized zone into the Republic of Korea, have created a situation of such gravity and danger as to require the urgent consideration of the Security Council which we are accordingly requesting.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

INFORMATION

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Thursday, January 25, 1968  
4:15 p. m.

*Pres. file*

Mr. President:

Herewith President Thieu's State of the Nation message. It is sturdy, quite well balanced, and (page 7) supports your position on negotiations.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 16891

WWRostow:rlh

93a

Thursday, January 25, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM SAIGON (16891)

SUBJECT: President Thieu's "State of the Nation Message"

The following is the official Government of Vietnam English language text of excerpts relating to foreign affairs, from the "State of the Nation Message" being delivered by President Thieu to a joint session of the National Assembly this morning (January 25):

The Problem of Restoration of Peace

For the Republic of Vietnam, the purpose of our present struggle is simply the defense of our national independence, and the reservation for our people of the freedom to choose their own way of life, and their system of government.

The Republic of Vietnam has made many sacrifices in this struggle to defend these ideals, and we are longing for the reestablishment of peace, to put an end to the destructions and sufferings, and to be able to devote all our human and natural resources to the reconstruction and development of this country, but peace should be made with honor, and in conditions which can preserve freedom, otherwise so many soldiers of this nation and Allied countries who fought to defend these ideals, would have died in vain, and stability as well as a durable peace in the world would be seriously jeopardized.

Position of the Republic of Vietnam

The position of the Republic of Vietnam with regard to the restoration of peace has been unequivocally stated at the Manila Summit Conference on October 25, 1966. The Republic of Vietnam will maintain that position, which can be summed up in these following six points:

1. Communist aggression should stop.
2. The territorial integrity of the Republic of Vietnam must be guaranteed.
3. The reunification of Vietnam should be decided by the free choice of the entire population of Vietnam.

4. The Republic of Vietnam puts into effect the National Reconciliation Program, to welcome into the national community all the elements of the population, in the framework of the Constitution adopted by the elected representatives of the nation.

5. The Republic of Vietnam will request Allied troops to withdraw from Vietnam, after the military and subversive units of North Vietnam will have stopped their infiltration and aggressive activities, and withdrawn from South Vietnam.

6. The people of Vietnam require effective international guarantees for the implementation of the above-mentioned points.

#### Nature of this War

In this war, the Republic of Vietnam is fighting to defend itself against Communist aggression coming from the North. It is strictly a struggle for self-defense, nothing more, and nothing less.

Before the ink had dried on the 1954 Geneva Agreements, Communist North Vietnam had violated these agreements by leaving behind, in South Vietnam, hundreds of arms caches hidden in various areas, as well as numerous disguised cadres.

Later, Communist North Vietnam infiltrated into South Vietnam in ever-increasing numbers cadres, weapons, and large military units. Captured North Vietnamese soldiers as well as captured documents have amply proven this aggression, aimed at the destruction of South Vietnam and the overthrow by force of the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

The ICC, in its special report of June 2, 1962, has clearly testified to this aggression.

The bombing of North Vietnam, as well as the presence of Allied troops in South Vietnam which followed by many years the start of Communist aggression, are only the measures in response to Communist aggression. Therefore, any solution toward peace should begin by the cessation of Communist infiltration and aggressive activities. To ask us to stop our defensive measures before the aggression stops, is to ask us to surrender the enemy. The Republic of Vietnam and the other freedom-loving countries will never accept this condition.

#### The Cessation of Bombing

The bombing of North Vietnam is the response to the whole apparatus of Communist aggressive activities, including Communist infiltration across the

borders as well as guerrilla attacks, subversion, sabotage, and terrorism...in South Vietnam.

Therefore, the bombing of North Vietnam can be stopped only after North Vietnam has stopped all their aggressive activities mentioned above.

The cessation of infiltration by itself is not sufficient, because infiltration is only a part in the Communist system of aggression. Besides, it is the part whose cessation is the most difficult to control in view of the lengthy borderline across vast areas covered by jungles and mountains, especially on the frontier between Vietnam and the two neighboring countries, Laos and Cambodia, which the Communists have consistently violated.

We should also try to avoid falling into the strategem of North Vietnam which strives to separate artificially the war in the North from the war in the South, while in fact these are only two battlefields of the same war, because Communist North Vietnam directs and organizes the war of aggression against the Republic of Vietnam.

The scheme of North Vietnam is to require our cessation of bombing in the North, and then to bring pressure on us to negotiate with and to recognize the so-called "National Liberation Front," leading to a "coalition government" with the Communists. North Vietnam hopes, by that detour, to conquer the Republic of Vietnam by political means, through a solution by which Communist elements constitute a fifth column inside our administrative machinery and even at the high level of our government itself. This, we can never accept.

If the Communists reduce infiltration altogether with other aggressive and subversive activities in South Vietnam, the bombing of North Vietnam can also be reduced in the same proportion. Since the bombing of North Vietnam is only a defensive measure, it cannot be stopped until the aggression itself, under all its forms, has completely stopped.

The defensive character of the bombing of North Vietnam needs to be better understood by public opinion in our country and abroad.

In the past two years, at each bombing pause, the Communists took advantage of it to increase their infiltration, and prepare greater assaults against our installations.

The bombing of North Vietnam constitutes also a measure of dissuasion for North Vietnam to stop its aggression. If the Communists maintain their aggressive ambitions, we shall have to increase our pressure in order to bring peace nearer, and to shorten the sufferings of the entire Vietnamese population.

The Communists are fully aware of the effectiveness of our response. Therefore, they concentrate all their political and propaganda efforts to bring pressure on us to stop our most efficient method of defense. They have, to a certain extent, succeeded in confusing public opinion on this issue, because while the international press focussed their attention on, and gave full publicity to the isolated cases in which our bombings created casualties among the civilian population, they have not sufficiently brought to public attention the numerous cases of brutal murders, assassinations, and bombings committed almost daily by the Viet Cong against women, children, the innocent civilian population, as well as local officials in the villages, districts, and provinces in South Vietnam. The question therefore has been often placed in an unbalanced perspective, creating emotion<sup>d</sup> reactions in the wrong direction toward a peace solution.

We are fighting for self-defense, and to preserve freedom. We are anxious for an early restoration of peace, but we have also to be vigilant.

As I have stated in my Inauguration Speech of October 31, 1967, I shall not overlook any opportunity which may bring to us peace with honor and in freedom, and I have already actively explored the avenues which may lead to fruitful negotiations with the North Vietnamese authorities. I believe strongly that the war in Vietnam logically should be discussed, in the first place, among the leaders of both North and South Vietnam.

Recently, with regard to the reestablishment of peace in Vietnam, mention has been made of the convening of an international conference on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

On this question, when the convening of an international conference appears indicated, in my view it can only begin after a complete cessation of hostilities, including the cessation of all the aggressive activities of North Vietnam in South Vietnam.

As you remember, during the Korean War, the Communists dragged the negotiations for two years, and killed more Allied soldiers during the negotiations than before.

In Vietnam, the Communists can, in addition, take advantage of the negotiations to increase their infiltration, and strengthen their logistic bases, while making pressure on international public opinion to require our cessation of bombing against them.

In another respect, concerning the composition of a future conference on Vietnam, it seems to me that such a conference naturally should include only the governments of the countries closely involved in this war.

In this regard, not only is the nature of the present war completely different from the war previously waged by the French in Indochina, but the countries participating in the two wars are also very different. I conceive therefore that only the countries having an active role in this war, in particular the countries whose sons are fighting in the present conflict, and the countries participating in the maintenance of peace and and security in this area, are qualified to participate in a conference on Vietnam.

Another point which needs to be clarified is the fact that the 1954 Geneva Agreement was basically only an armistice agreement concluded between the French and the Viet-Minh high commands, to establish the modalities of ceasefire and regrouping of belligerent forces. There were no legal clauses with regard to Vietnamese political problems in the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

The Vietnamese political problems naturally fall within the sovereign jurisdiction of Vietnam, and normally are to be solved by agreements between the leaders of North and South Vietnam..

Furthermore, the question of guarantees for the faithful implementation of an agreement is also very important. As is well known, the Viet-Minh violated the 1954 Geneva Agreements as soon as these agreements were signed, by leaving behind them in South Vietnam arms caches and cadres, and obstructing a large number of our fellow countrymen in the North who chose freedom and wished to go South....

Another example is the violation by the Communists of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. The Communists have never implemented these agreements, which required them to withdraw their troops from Laos. Instead, the Communist North Vietnamese troops, mingled with the Pathet Lao, continue to occupy Laotian territory, to use Laotain territory both as a base for infiltration into South Vietnam and a military position to threaten, on a permanent basis, the independence of Laos.

Therefore, we should not assume that an international conference will necessarily lead to a peace agreement. Furthermore, on the basis of past experiences, we should not assume that, once we have a peace agreement, we shall necessarily have a genuine and durable peace.

In their aggression, the Communist North Vietnamese made no secret of their strategy of attrition, in which they count on our weariness in this struggle. They also rely on the fact that, after a period of time, the Chinese Communists will have a better arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles, to provide a more powerful support to their expansion in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, we should always keep in mind that, to have peace with honor and in freedom, a genuine and long-lasting peace for Vietnam and Southeast Asia, we should make greater efforts and sacrifices.

In the present struggle, the United States is our principal ally, because the two nations share the same ideals on freedom and democracy, as well as common aspirations for a world in which frontiers cannot be unilaterally changed by the force of arms. The American government has also recognized that if Communist expansion is not checked on time, security of other free nations will be sooner or later jeopardized.

The role of the United States in Vietnam today is not different from its role in Europe in the two World Wars. Communist North Vietnam, with the support of Communist China, and their aggressive strategy for conquest based on infiltration, subversion, . . . sabotage, and terrorism, constitute to Southeast Asia a threat no less serious than the one posed to the security of Europe by Nazi Germany during World War II. Likewise, if the Communists succeed in taking over all of Vietnam and expanding over Southeast Asia, the balance of power will be seriously disrupted and this will gravely affect the chances of international security and a durable peace in the world.

Therefore, the Republic of Vietnam is fully justified in requesting the assistance and receiving the help of the United States and other freedom-loving countries, in resisting Communist aggression.

In their devious propaganda, the Communists naturally try to picture us as lacking independence vis a vis the United States. This propaganda is not without regrettable effects on international public opinion.

Conversely, on this side, in some countries a segment of the press have overdramatized the differences, real or imaginary, between the Vietnamese and the American governments, and seem to expect all the viewpoints and approaches of the Vietnamese government to be always identical to those of the American government. These expectations are not realistic, furthermore they are harmful to our common cause, because the Communists exploit these manifestations to push their propaganda line, in which they pretend to be the standard bearers of the independence of the South.

In our search for a peaceful solution, although the Republic of Vietnam has encouraged and requested friendly governments, and even neutral governments, to make parallel efforts with us to explore the possibilities which may lead to peace with honor, the Republic of Vietnam maintains the position that in all official proposals relating to the future of the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese government should have the principal role, otherwise the prestige of our common cause will be harmed, and we will give ammunition to Communist propaganda.

In fact, as I have mentioned above, the Republic of Vietnam shares the same ideals and the same basic purposes with the friendly countries which are fighting side by side with us in Vietnam. However, in the approaches toward the achievement of these purposes, the emphasis to give to each question may not be identical in all circumstances. That is why, in addition to the regular diplomatic relations, which are very close and naturally very friendly between us and the Allied governments, there are summit meetings and meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers, so that Allied governments can exchange views, and iron out differences when they exist.

Concerning the question of peace negotiations, the American government has pledged, and on January 15, 1968, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has renewed the pledge, that there could be no decisions by the American government on negotiations without prior full consultations with us, and that the United States upholds the basic principle that the South Vietnamese people must determine their own future without external interference.

Besides, the position of President Johnson on peace negotiations, as stated in his San Antonio speech last September and his State of the Union message to the United States Congress on January 17, 1968, seems to me very realistic in requesting solid guarantees before the bombing of North Vietnam could stop.

In the common efforts to resist Communist aggression, unity is indispensable to final success, and we should be careful not to fall into the Communist stratagem of fostering division between us and our Allies.

Together with our Allies, we are devoting all our efforts to achieve a durable peace in freedom and justice, and to build an international society based on mutual respect, and friendly cooperation for common security and prosperity.

On this occasion, I would like to express again the heartfelt gratitude of the Republic of Vietnam for the selfless assistance of friendly countries, at this crucial period of history which will determine the future of Vietnam and Southeast Asia.

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, January 25, 1968  
4:10 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a lucid and well-organized review from Amb. Bunker and his team of the problems we shall be facing in 1968 and how Saigon proposes to cope with them.

I had not been aware (page 13) of a helicopter shortage. I shall follow it from here.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 16850

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By *PLG*, NARA, Date *4/26/96*

WWRostow:ln

94a

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

Wednesday, January 24, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon, 16850)

Herewith my thirty-sixth weekly message:

A. General

In this message, I should like to give a general assessment of some of the problems we shall be facing in 1968 and how we propose to cope with them. We will, of course, be dealing with them and reporting on them in a more specific manner as times goes on, but I thought it would be useful to give a rather general view of the situation ahead as we see it now.

I think one general observation is in order. As a result of a number of elections held since September 1966, and with our encouragement, the Vietnamese have adopted a democratic, constitutional form of government with the institutions which normally pertain to it, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. It marks the transition from a recent military form, and historically an authoritarian form of government, to democratic institutions. It is a form of government with which the Vietnamese have had virtually no experience. A senator said to me last week, "We must make our new government work, but it will be difficult because while we have a history of 4,000 years, we have no tradition of democracy." The fact that the basic structures have been built and representative institutions constructed out of near chaos and are beginning to function is in itself quite a remarkable achievement. But the question we have to look to in the coming year is how well and how rapidly they can be made to operate.

I believe we shall have to face the fact that in many instances action will be less rapid than under the previous government which could rule by decree. The views of the Assembly, which is beginning to assert its prerogatives, will have to be considered by the Executive. Even in cases where regulations might be promulgated by the Executive, as, for example, in the raising of certain taxes, it may be reluctant to take the political risks involved without consulting the Assembly. The

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Decree Law on partial mobilization and the Assembly reaction to it is an example of what may occur. Consequently, unless the Assembly is willing to relinquish some of its authority and grant to the Executive fairly broad wartime powers, I believe we shall have to expect some disappointment in the rapidity with which actions are taken.

Another factor which will make for caution is the necessary process of the transformation of the character of the government from an essentially military one to a civilian regime. This will require some deft handling, especially on Thieu's part. Some resistance by the military to give up prerogatives which they have long enjoyed can be expected. At the same time, the civilian elements of the government have to gain experience and get accustomed to their jobs. Thieu recognizes this problem and, being essentially cautious, will move, I believe progressively, step by step rather than abruptly to bring about the change. I believe he is wise in this, for too precipitate actions might cause strains which would be difficult for the present governmental structure to sustain. A corollary to this is the Thieu-Ky relationship, which needs to be nurtured and cultivated on both sides. I think there are encouraging signs that this is developing satisfactorily and that their present relationships are now better than they have been for some time in the past. Both have very recently expressed a desire to work closely together.

Another thing we shall have to live with is sensitivity to US pressures, at least with a more articulate expression of it. A massive American presence is apt to stimulate a latent xenophobia and with a free press and open debate in the Assembly, I believe we can expect a certain amount of criticism of our actions here. If kept within reasonable bounds, I do not think we need to be apprehensive about this, for it represents a healthy spirit of developing nationalism and independence.

Another general problem is that of political organization, the creation of broadly representative national political parties. This is something which will take time. As both Thieu and Ky have said, the process must develop from a sound base. The effort to force the development too rapidly will result in artificiality and instability. On the other hand, it is something which we must steadily and progressively encourage and help to push, for the development of political organization on national lines is, I believe, the ultimate defense against the Viet Cong and perhaps the only permanent defense. The formation of groupings, or blocs as they call them, in the Assembly and the institution of local government at the village and hamlet level, which is proceeding steadily, may form the nuclei for the development which we seek. This is something which we shall want to keep steadily pushing.

The question of peace, a political settlement and negotiations are matters which will be constantly before us here as well as at home. It is my view, shared by members of the Mission Council, that were we to enter into negotiations now, we would be faced with a most difficult situation. I do not believe that the present government has acquired sufficient strength, either militarily or politically, to be assured of survival on its own. Six months from now, it should be in a somewhat stronger position, but Hanoi may be aware of this and consequently press for negotiations. It seems to me that if I were in their place, this is what I would be doing. I realize their estimate of the situation may be quite different, but I believe that we should be prepared for such an eventuality; and that, therefore, we ought to try to spell out in as precise terms as possible what would be acceptable terms of settlement to us. Since what may be acceptable to us may not be fully so to the Government of Vietnam or some of our other Allies, we may need to engage in some educational effort and I believe we ought to be in a position to begin this before too long.

Some of the matters I have discussed in this section will be covered in more detail later in the message.

B. Political

The principal political problems we anticipate in 1968 include:

- A. The need to maintain the stability of the Government of Vietnam as the basis for future action.
- B. The need to develop momentum across the board in implementing priority Government of Vietnam Programs.
- C. The need to develop popularly-based political organizations, increasingly able to compete with the Communists.
- D. Development of effective public administration at all levels, suited to Vietnamese needs and problems, reasonably free of corruption.
- E. Preparation for the negotiation and implementation of peace.
- F. Dealing with issues resulting from the substantial American presence in Vietnam, including pressures for negotiation of a status of forces agreement with Vietnam.

Regarding these problems, we have been doing the following:

A. In the first instance, this is a matter of maintaining a viable relationship between President Thieu and Vice President Ky. I believe both of them realize how much depends on their coming to terms across a broad spectrum of Government programs and actions. Their relationship may not be a particularly easy one, for their personalities stand in strong contrast to each other, but as I have said I am encouraged by recent signs of closer consultation between them. In the second place, political stability involves maintaining an acceptable relationship between Thieu and Ky, on the one hand, and other top military leaders including the Corps Commanders who are the principal power base at this time on the other. We have made clear to all of the senior generals the importance we attach to the maintenance of governmental stability. We think that they understand this point

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and accept it, in their own personal interest, if for no other motive. Coup rumors are very rarely heard these days, in marked contrast to the situation several years ago, and our presence plus their knowledge of our views are no doubt a main reason for this fact. Ky has said several times, "Coup is an outmoded word in Vietnam."

B. President Thieu has presented in his Inaugural Address October 31, and we expect that in his budget message January 25, he will present both general and specific goals for the Government of Vietnam in the next year or so. With these as a focus, we will be in a position to press the Government of Vietnam, as necessary, in terms of specific programs which have definite budgetary support. I am convinced that the Government of Vietnam leadership is aware of the need to demonstrate progress and forward momentum and of our views on it.

C. We have emphasized to all levels of the Government of Vietnam and to political circles outside it our deep and continuing concern that the non-Communist Nationalists are in an extremely weak position to compete with the Communists in the open political arena. Even if the Communists explicitly abandon hostilities, their political apparatus will remain in place, in many areas virtually the only political organization in sight. Fortunately, we can discern the elements of three embryonic political groupings with the potential of developing into political parties on a national scale. These include a Nationalist, at least partly Catholic and GVN-oriented party with its nucleus in the "Nation, Democracy, Society" bloc in the Upper House; a Nationalist, secular party generally favorable to the Government of Vietnam, with its nucleus in the "labor" bloc in the Upper House; and an Opposition Party, drawn from the disparate elements that opposed Thieu and Ky during the Presidential elections. These are only the nuclei of tentative political groupings at present, but their leaders speak with an evident determination of their desire to develop these bodies into viable political entities. President Thieu has indicated to me his understanding of the need for viable political parties and his desire for advice on how to proceed with party organization. He can be expected, therefore, to look sympathetically on their development. We will be following this evolution closely and encouraging it to grow in useful directions adapted to Vietnamese needs.

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D. The Government of Vietnam is moving to upgrade the quality of Province and District Chiefs through the selection of honest, qualified personnel and the provision of improved training programs. Provincial Councils will probably be elected for another term in May, and elections for Mayor of Saigon will be held in August and in other cities in 1968 at times to be determined. Plans for Government of Vietnam salary increases are being made to reduce the temptation for government officials to engage in corrupt activities.

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E. Through a series of speeches and public statements, President Thieu, Prime Minister Loc, and Foreign Minister Do have defined some aspects of Government of Vietnam policy towards the negotiation of peace. Thieu has sought to contact Ho Chi Minh through a personal letter, but the means of transmission has presented a so-far insoluble problem, as has the contemptuous attitude of Hanoi, which has rejected the effort before it is actually made. A number of political figures generally supporting the Government of Vietnam, as well as both houses of the National Assembly, have voiced support for a "tough" stance by the Government of Vietnam in any negotiations. Only a few Nationalists who generally support the Government of Vietnam accept the idea that a political role needs to be found for the National Liberation Front in any viable settlement. Misleading and at times false reports about alleged American contacts or policies towards negotiations and a coalition government with the National Liberation Front have created widespread fear and some despondency among supporters of the Government of Vietnam. These appear to have been largely dispelled by a series of timely statements which you and Secretary Rusk have made and which we have picked up and used here. Nonetheless, there has been little work done within the Government to face up to the problems of peace, problems which may dominate the political scene in the coming year. We will be addressing this problem with them and seeking to give direction to their thoughts.

F. We have pointed out to President Thieu and to influential members of the National Assembly the serious problems negotiation of a status of forces agreement would pose for us in the midst of a war. While some members of the National Assembly have agitated this issue, there is no strong and immediate pressure for a status of forces agreement.

We see the following prospects for movement on the problems described above:

A. There is every prospect that the Government of Vietnam will continue in power throughout 1968, increasingly sure of itself, more fully engaged in the operation of ongoing programs, with a political base being progressively broadened by the clarification of attitudes in the National Assembly and the development of political organizations in the provinces.

B. I think we can expect some increase in momentum on the part of the Government of Vietnam in moving forward its programs, particularly in the

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more orderly implementation of manpower mobilization programs, the turnover of some provinces to mainly civilian administration, some improvement in the performance of the agricultural economy, and a further improvement in the level of security in the countryside.

C. There will be definite progress in the development of popularly-based political organizations, although they will during 1968 probably remain much less effective than the formidable Communist political apparatus they presently face. This is a long-range process requiring a solid base.

D. There is every prospect for a slow but steady improvement in the quality of public administration. Prospects for effective action against corruption are less clear, although Thieu and Ky have repeatedly told me they understand how necessary such action is. Inflation is likely to continue, and with it, an atmosphere in which corrupting will continue to varying degrees.

E. The Government of Vietnam will be very difficult to deal with in the matter of preparing for negotiations. Every move we make towards an accommodative view with the Communists will raise lively and genuine fears of abandonment. I believe our best course is to focus on specific aspects of negotiations, discuss them in advance and in depth with the top leadership of the Government of Vietnam and try to bring them and their followers along as best we can, without sapping their ability and their will to continue the struggle, which has already lasted a generation and has cost the lives of some of the best elements in Vietnam. This will be a painful experience requiring patience and understanding, but it is vital to our objective of finding a political solution in Vietnam acceptable to the broadest range of Vietnamese Nationalist opinion.

F. Barring an unfortunate series of incidents involving American forces, we do not anticipate that pressures to negotiate a status of forces agreement will become unmanageable during 1968, although there may be growing Assembly and press attention to the matter.

### C. Pacification

With more people, more protection, and more resources earmarked for pacification, we can't help but do better than in 1967, just as 1967 showed significant if modest gains over 1966. As Bob Komer put it to the press, we're up from the crawl to a walk; next year perhaps a trot.

We start out 1968 with a more solid pacification organization than 1967, and with greater experience too. This time we made a special effort to get 1968

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planning done by the end of 1967 to permit an early start, and plans are much more comprehensive. Also, President Thieu has revived the Central Revolutionary Development Council as a board of governors for seeing that essential Government of Vietnam ministries are tied in better than before.

One reason why pacification should go better is that more Government of Vietnam/US resources will be allocated. Regional Forces/Popular Forces will be upgraded and expanded by more than 40,000. Whereas pacification manpower -- military forces, police, Revolutionary Development teams, civil servants in provinces, census grievance workers, teams, etc. -- totaled about 500,000 at the end of 1967, it should increase to over 600,000 by the end of 1968. Police strength should go up from about 74,000 now to 86,000 at year end. Revolutionary Development teams will increase from 555 today to an estimated 721, or almost 30 percent. This greater friendly strength will permit us to put greater pressure on declining Viet Cong local forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure.

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The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure being geared by the Ministry of Interior should begin to show a payoff in 1968. Our goal is to eliminate 12,000 infrastructure during the year, including 5,000 Viet Cong political leaders, key cadre and activists.

We can almost certainly count on much more economic revival in the countryside, one of the key trends which emerged in 1967. Many more roads and waterways are scheduled for opening and upgrading with US/ARVN military engineer or contractor escort. A 20 percent increase in the rice crop is forecast, and IR8 plantings begin to spread. The "Three Machine Revolution" is underway as transistor radios, sewing machines, and water pumps begin to show up in rural communities. This kind of economic revival will give a big boost to pacification. It's something for which the Viet Cong have no counter.

Project Take Off has been revised to include five key top priority goals for 1968. These are to (1) improve and expand territorial security; (2) press the attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure; (3) upgrade refugee care and step up resettlement and vocational training; (4) prevent regression in 5,646 already secure hamlets; and (5) press economic revival of the countryside in conjunction with US aid.

The most serious problems we still face in pacification elsewhere are bureaucratic inefficiency and inadequate Government of Vietnam leadership at all levels. Corruption especially among local officials who come in daily contact with the people must be tackled more vigorously. Hamlet regression must be stopped, so we don't lose what we have previously gained. The high attrition of territorial security forces and Revolutionary Development cadre must be reduced. Despite greater experience and more resources, the quality of Government of Vietnam performance remains the critical variable.

Moreover, even if we do pacify significantly more in 1968 than 1967, we will still have a long way to go. There are still some 2.9 million people in 3,900 hamlets under Viet Cong control, plus 2.8 million people in 3,500 hamlets being contested--although there is some Government of Vietnam presence in the latter.

Nonetheless, pacification can no longer be termed "stalled" or "faltering." Our plans call for pacifying at least 1,500 hamlets (versus 1,100 in 1967), and this goal may rise during the year. We hope to bring 72 - 75 percent of the people under Government of Vietnam control during 1968. If we can do so, it

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will take a further substantial cut out of the already declining Viet Cong population base and create even more serious Viet Cong recurring problems, this making this even more an North Vietnamese Army war.

### C. Economic

The principal economic problem we anticipate in 1968 is continuing inflation. Despite the relative degree of price stability of recent months, the money supply has been expanding at an increasing rate, and all indications point to a continuation of this trend, with predictable results on the level of prices.

We are pressing the Government of Vietnam for a substantial increase in petroleum taxes, a review of customs duties, and other measures to increase tax revenues. We are urging a reduction in the subsidy on imported rice which would help reduce the budget deficit and result in high domestic rice price, encouraging domestic production and spreading prosperity to the countryside.

If the Government of Vietnam takes effective action on the tax front, the problem of inflation should not be overly dangerous.

### D. Military

The principal military problems we anticipate in 1968 include:

A. In the field of military operations, the continued Defense of Frontiers against infiltration from North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; searching out and destroying enemy forces within South Vietnam and neutralizing enemy base areas; and providing territorial security, with priority to the 26 provinces selected for concentrated pacification effort.

B. Net increase of over 50,000 men in RVNAF through broader and more effective manpower mobilization measures; improving RVNAF leadership; revitalizing the Government of Vietnam Veterans Affairs Program.

C. Integration of the joint Government of Vietnam-United States intelligence effort at the field force-ARVN corps level.

D. Improving the effectiveness of the MACV logistics posture and strengthening the logistics posture within RVNAF to reduce dependence on the US system.

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E. Developing, rebuilding, and maintaining a national system of highways, waterways, and railroads to serve the military effort, strengthen security, and support the national economy.

F. Completion of major ongoing communications--electronics programs to support allied military and civilian operations in Vietnam.

Regarding these problems we have been doing the following:

A. The means available to execute envisaged military operations are being strengthened. The deployment of US forces within the 525,000 man ceiling is near completion. The moderate programmed increases in Australian and New Zealand forces, the buildup of Thai forces to a Light Division, and the anticipated deployment of a Republic of Korea Light Infantry Division will improve our combat capability. The deployment of additional shipping and the movement of the remainder of the 9th Infantry Division into the Delta. Air Force B-52 strikes will be increased from 800 to 1200 sorties per month, beginning in February. Completion of a new anti-vehicular/personnel system in Laos and the strong point-obstacle system south of the DMZ will restrict enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. Improvement in the strength, command structure, quality of leadership, weapons, and communications available to Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will place the Vietnamese in a better position to carry on the struggle.

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There are two problem areas in the operational field that will hinder attainment of our objectives:

1) A helicopter shortage exists which will become more serious with the planned increased size and tempo of operations in South Vietnam, resulting in increased helicopter battle loss and damage. The proposed conversion of the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobile division and increased helicopter requirements for the Vietnamese Air Force and elsewhere in the Pacific will worsen the problems. Only increased helicopter production will bring any real improvement in the situation.

2) The enemy's use of border sanctuaries is already a problem which may grow more serious. This will become an even greater danger during possible negotiations and subsequent withdrawals, unless positive verification of dispositions in the border areas is provided. Movement of major North Vietnamese Army and main force Viet Cong units into Laos and Cambodia, either to wait out a U. S. withdrawal after negotiations or to transfer the insurgency effort to Thailand or Laos, would constitute a continuing major threat to our objectives in Southeast Asia.

Assuming self-sufficiency being attained by the South Vietnamese Army, and a greatly improved security posture in South Vietnam, contingency plans are being prepared for the eventual withdrawal of our forces, either through negotiations or the attainment of our objectives. An early cessation of our air and naval bombardment of North Vietnam would have a heavy, adverse impact on the military situation in South Vietnam and, in our view, would be totally unacceptable without compensating reciprocation by North Vietnam. However, in the event a cessation in attacks on all or part of the North should be ordered, the Free World and Government of Vietnam forces should continue combat operations under the present policy of steadily increasing military pressure. This would provide negotiating leverage, defend the population and allied forces from attack, and retain the military initiative. Frontier defense operations along the demilitarized zone and the Laotian and Cambodian borders should continue. In-country offensive and pacification operations should also continue, thus permitting the maximum expansion of Government of Vietnam presence and control over South Vietnam. Strike aircraft and B-52's made available from the putative halt in operations in North Vietnam should be diverted to Laos, particularly the panhandle, and throughout South Vietnam as required. Naval forces freed from duty in the North should be diverted to intensify market time operations.

B) The Government of Vietnam has the authority, under the partial mobilization decree of October 24, to recruit the manpower necessary to make up for anticipated losses in 1968 and meet the requirements for additional troops to expand the overall force structure. Debate on the form and the substance of the mobilization decree in the National Assembly has been sharp and sometimes quite critical of the Government of Vietnam, but there is a general awareness of the need for increased manpower mobilization. A continuing shortage of qualified and experienced NCO's and officers is one of the major problems confronting the South Vietnamese Army. This is progressively being relieved by expanding the facilities

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for leadership training and by improvement of personnel management procedures. The recently enacted partial mobilization decree, with its provision to keep experienced NCO's and officers in the service, will help to alleviate the leadership problem. MACV has assumed advisory responsibilities for the Ministry of Veterans Affairs, which has lacked financial and managerial support from the Government of Vietnam. A revitalized veterans' program will remove large numbers of physically impaired soldiers from South Vietnamese Army rolls and will see to their hospitalization, classification, training, and job placement to assist them in leading useful lives after completion of service.

C) Plans are now underway for the formation of a combined intelligence committee at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff/Embassy/MACV level. This senior committee will in turn issue directives concerning the coordination and integration of U. S. , Free World, and South Vietnamese Army effort at major command and lower levels.

D) Plans are being made to improve the utilization, effectiveness, and efficiency of the MACV logistics base. Excess stocks generated by the rapid build-up and the absence of an "in-country" logistics base will be put to use. South Vietnamese Army logistics self-sufficiency is being enhanced through improved management techniques and procedures, refinements in organization, and balancing of service and support forces with combat forces. South Vietnamese Army mobility is being increased through expediting MAP deliveries of vehicles from the U. S. and by loans of vehicles from U. S. forces in Vietnam.

E) Plans have been made to improve the condition and security of the highways and railroads during the coming year. The 1968 US/Vietnamese Joint General Staff combined campaign plan designates over 2800 miles of national, inter-provincial and provincial highways as essential, for which security and construction restoration are of prime importance. 400 miles of national and inter-provincial highway will be rehabilitated to modern two-way traffic standards in 1968. 296 miles of railroad were operational as of Dec. 31, 1967, with a 1968 goal of an additional 233 miles to be made operational during the year. Emphasis also is being directed to opening and securing additional inland waterways in III and IV Corps. Providing more effective advisory support to the Vietnamese Director General of Highways is anticipated through the projected transfer of this responsibility from AID to MACV, in view of the need to coordinate road maintenance and construction with planned operations to re-establish security.

F) The major current communications/electronics programs to support allied military and civilian operations in Vietnam will be substantially completed in 1968. The tropospheric scatter and microwave radio relay links, integrated with existing coastal submarine cable systems, will probably be completed this year. Communications/electronics support of anti-infiltration and barrier projects will be expanded and improved in 1968, and the first increment of a long-range improvement in South Vietnamese Army communications will be completed during the year.

We see the following prospects for action on the problems described above:

- A. We anticipate significant progress in defeating the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Main Force units in South Vietnam and in neutralizing the enemy's base areas and resources in South Vietnam, driving him into sparsely populated areas where food is scarce. We plan to keep the enemy constantly on the move and deny him the opportunity to refit, resupply, rest, or retrain in South Vietnam. His losses in Main Force units, the destruction and neutralization of his in-country base areas and the continued air and naval attacks on his lines of communications will force him to place greater reliance on sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos. Should a political decision be made to do so, we will be prepared to neutralize the enemy's base areas across the Laotian and Cambodian borders by limited objective ground attacks. The enemy's infiltration will be further restricted by a strong point obstacle system along the DMZ, the muscle shoals project in Laos and in the northwestern part of the First Corps, and by redeployment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group units to provide improved surveillance and interdiction along the frontier. Within South Vietnam, the enemy's recruiting potential will be reduced through the increased momentum of our military offensive and pacification efforts. The attack on the Viet Cong infrastructure is expected to gain headway in 1968.
- B. We anticipate that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will be able to recruit enough troops to meet planned expansion of the force structure, although debate and possible legislation approved by the National Assembly may affect the age groups involved and the timing of their mobilization. We expect a further improvement in the quality of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces leadership, as success breeds further success. The Veterans Affairs Program will improve in effectiveness, among other things because the need for civilian manpower to make up for those drawn into the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces will leave gaps which will need to be filled.
- C. Our knowledge of the enemy structure, personalities, and policies has steadily improved, and with this as a base plus the organizational improvements discussed above, we expect to improve the quality of the intelligence effort in 1968.
- D. Improvement of the logistics posture of both Military Assistance Command in Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces are well within reach, although continuing command effort will be required to reach our goals.
- E. With the resources we now have on hand, we expect to meet our goals for rebuilding and maintaining the national system of highways, waterways, and railroads, along projected lines.
- F. 1968 will see a further improvement in the capacity and effectiveness of the communications/electronics system, both on the U. S., as well as on the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces side.

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E. Aid

The principal problems we anticipate in the aid field in 1968 are as follows:

A. The need to increase agricultural production to come nearer to self-sufficiency in food.

B. Expansion of the educational system through training of teachers, construction of classrooms, and provision of textbooks.

C. Improvement of health care in general and better treatment of civilian casualties in particular.

D. Urban development in Saigon.

E. Land reform.

Regarding these problems, we have been doing the following:

A. Assistance to agriculture is focussing on short-range impact programs to increase production of rice and protein foods -- pork, fish, and poultry. The major new agricultural goal is Vietnamese self-sufficiency in rice by 1971. The Government of Vietnam Minister of Agriculture has established as an initial target planting over 100,000 acres to improved rice seed varieties, primarily IR8, in 33 selected provinces by this summer. This should result in a two to three-fold increase in present rice production yields in the areas involved (about 150,000 tons additional) this year. In support of the agricultural production and pacification programs, assistance is planned in 1968 to Vietnamese financial institutions to accelerate the development of small-scale agroindustries.

B. We plan in 1968 to assist the Government of Vietnam in the training of an additional 4,900 elementary teachers, construction of 4,100 elementary classrooms, and distribution of 2.5 million elementary textbooks. This will permit an increase in elementary school enrollment to 75 percent of the age 6 to 11 group. On the secondary level, we will help to build an additional 500 classrooms, train 1200 teachers, and provide 600,000 textbooks, making possible an enrollment of 20 percent of the secondary school age group.

C. Care of civilian casualties -- expected to average about 4,000 admissions per month to Government of Vietnam Ministry of Health hospitals -- will be improved with the renovation and improvements underway in provincial hospitals and the establishment of a US military system for assisting in the care of civilians with war-related injuries. This will add some 1000 additional hospital

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beds and additional US military medical personnel to the Government of Vietnam's present resources. The hospital at Chu Lai should be operational in March, 1968, and the hospitals at Danang and Can Tho should open in June. A University of California team will review the Government of Vietnam's public health program and develop plans for improving preventive medicine programs as security and manpower resources permit. Three Saigon hospitals will be renovated to permit their use as bedside teaching facilities for the medical education program.

D. A Saigon impact program has been developed for implementation in 1968 to improve public services such as street repair, alley and walkway paving, traffic control, mass transportation, and improvement of other urban services. The Fiscal Year 1969 aid program includes funds for the establishment of a revolving loan fund to finance construction of urban utilities.

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We see the following prospects for action on the problems described above:

- A) We believe there is every prospect for increased agricultural production during 1968. Present forecasts for the 1967-68 rice crop are 4.4 million tons, or 138,000 tons above the 1966-67 harvest, with every expectation that the improvement will continue. The use of IR-8 on a large scale should further improve the rice harvest.
- B) The specific expansion in the elementary and secondary school system is within reach of the available training and construction facilities.
- C) Care of civilian casualties will improve steadily throughout 1968, due to increased facilities available, from both Government of Vietnam and US programs, as well as increased awareness of the dimensions and importance of such treatment.
- D) There already has been a noticeable improvement in a number of Saigon streets and roads which carry heavy civilian and military traffic. Traffic control is considerably improved and will improve further with the installation of new traffic lights. Mass transportation is likely to improve, both through Government of Vietnam purchase of additional buses, and through possible foreign assistance programs currently under consideration by Germany.
- E) With the Government of Vietnam appearing to have overcome its inertia as to land reform, we look forward this year to a new role of assisting the Government of Vietnam with its initiatives. Recent actions by the Government of Vietnam and repeated public pronouncements attest to the seriousness of the government's intentions to carry out a vigorous program. Distribution of permanent titles has been ordered speeded up. French lands, long held by the Government of Vietnam, have been ordered distributed. The Prime Minister has taken a personal hand in monitoring the distribution of these lands, as he has in a new program to renew 500,000 rental contracts. The National Conference on Land Reform, a public working conference, held January 18-20, became a special occasion for reaffirmation by the Government of Vietnam of its intentions and program, and for public response. For the year ahead, we expect to emphasize two major areas of assistance, coinciding with the Government of Vietnam's own assessment of land reform priorities. They are: (1) making administration more effective, particularly the existing land distribution; and (2) meeting the problem of conflicting occupancy rights at the time of pacification. This problem resists ready solution. Among the means by which it can be approached are voluntary transfers, emphasis on rapid distribution of available lands in selected areas, tax revision to encourage voluntary sales, government land purchases, new land development programs, and possibly by expropriation of some lands of absentee landlords.

F) Public Affairs.

The principal problems we anticipate in the public affairs field in 1968 are as follows:

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- A) Beginnings of criticism of the Government of Vietnam among the general public on grounds that the new, elected Government of Vietnam has not accomplished much of note. (This is closely related to the problem discussed in the political section, the need to develop momentum across the board in implementing priority GVN programs.)
- B) Growing sensitivity within the Government of Vietnam and in the public as a whole to imagined U. S. affronts to Vietnamese sovereignty and national prestige and fear of a U. S. "deal" with Hanoi and the Viet Cong at the expense of the Government of Vietnam.
- C) Organizational problems in the Government of Vietnam Directorate General of Information and Press.
- D) Continuing problems with Saigon-based U. S. and foreign journalists in their coverage of the Vietnam problems as a whole.

Regarding these problems, we have been doing the following:

- A) Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), in support of the Directorate General of Information and Press, is in a position to present the achievements of the Government of Vietnam to the public, both in Saigon and the provinces. However, while this is a potentially serious problem, in view of the grumbling that has begun among the general public, only steady and concrete progress by the Government of Vietnam across the board will give the Directorate General of Information and JUSPAO something to work with. This is a public affairs problem, but its ramifications and ultimate resolution depend on action in other areas.
- B) You and Dean Rusk have been most helpful in providing us with public statements which underline our continuing policy of support for the Government of Vietnam and our commitment to close and detailed consultation on issues of common interest. Through release of these statements on a wide scale, as well as briefings and press backgrounders by senior members of the mission in Saigon and JUSPAO personnel in the field, we feel we have been able to keep Government of Vietnam and Vietnamese public sensitivities in this area from being excessively hurt. This is a continuing problem, requiring constant attention, across a broad range of matters.
- C) The Directorate General of Information and Press -- JUSPAO's counterpart -- was reorganized in November 1967 for the eighth time in five years. It remains to be seen whether the new organization will be better and more stable than its predecessors, but, in any case, such frequent changes are not conducive to effective planning and consistent performance. JUSPAO has full-time media advisors with the Directorate General in Saigon and with the Vietnamese Information Service in the provinces, ready to assist.

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

D) Through statements, briefings and backgrounders by senior members of the mission staff, as well as the continuing media services provided by JUSPAO, we have sought and are continuing to seek to assist U. S. and foreign journalists based in or visiting Saigon to present an accurate, balanced picture of the situation here. We have our ups and downs, but there is a chronic problem involved in presenting this situation through a press corps which is jaundiced, hypercritical, and I am sorry to say among some few even emotionally committed to advocacy of our failure in Vietnam. Visible signs of forward progress on both the military and political fronts will greatly ease our problems here. I know you have a similar problem in the U. S. with the press and with elements of Congress and the general public, some of whom have visited us here. We are doing our best on this problem. I think we may have made a little progress, but this is a case where nothing succeeds like success.

We see the following prospects for action on the problems described above.

A) As I have noted in the political section, while there is prospect for development of momentum in the implementation of Government of Vietnam programs, it will not be spectacular. Nevertheless, the achievements of the Government of Vietnam, even though modest, if carefully presented to the public by the GVN and JUSPAO, should blunt, if not fully dispose of, some dissatisfaction now being expressed.

B) I believe that the response we have made to sensitivities regarding Vietnamese sovereignty has considerably soothed potential points of irritation, and I believe the Vietnamese generally accept our statements that we will consult closely with them on all questions of mutual interest. With continued care, I think this problem of Vietnamese sensitivities across a range of questions can be held to manageable proportions.

C) The Government of Vietnam Directorate General of Information is under a reasonably capable and American-educated director who has the potential to turn in a good performance in the job. I believe he will be given every opportunity to do so by President Thieu and Prime Minister Loc, and I look for somewhat greater stability in the Government of Vietnam information field during 1968 than in previous years.

D) I anticipate continuing problems with U. S. and foreign journalists stationed in Saigon and only expect improvement in their attitude as our overlap effort begins to pay dividends. This is a problem which will require constant attention and effort for what will probably be modest returns. But as in the Dominican situation, I am confident that the facts will speak for themselves.

I apologize for the length of this message, but I wanted to try in a preliminary way to pull together the more important factors we are dealing with here in order to give you some overall view of the picture as we see it.

Bunker

###

95

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, January 25, 1968  
3:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

The attached response of Park to the possibility of additional aircraft coming to South Korea indicates that it could have a calming effect there.—

*at least.*

*Pres file*

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3623

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-148  
By Chip, NARA, Date 2/20/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

95a  
TELEGRAM

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

6 0 6 80  
JANUARY 25, 1968  
3:33 A.M.

OO RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 3623E 0250805  
ZNY TTTT  
O 250800Z JAN 68 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8537  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~TOP SECRET~~ SEOUL 3623

*Restow*

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR PORTER

REF: STATE 104293 *attached*

PRESIDENT PARK GREATLY APPRECIATED MESSAGE AND EXPRESSION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FEELING OF COMPLETE SOLIDARITY WITH THE ROK IN THIS SITUATION. HE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED IF PRESIDENT DECIDES TO SEND LARGE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO KOREA AND NEARBY AREAS, AND HE ADDED THAT SUCH A GESTURE WOULD BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE. HE FULLY UNDERSTANDS NEED FOR SECRECY. I ASSURED HIM WE WOULD REMAIN IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM ON SUBJECT.

PORTER  
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-152  
NARA, Date 2/20/96

*P's file 94*

~~SECRET~~

Thursday, Jan. 25, 1968  
3:15 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy announces that the attack on Khe Sanh -- and throughout the northern two Corps areas -- has begun in earnest.

Without a scrap of evidence, I am convinced that the timing of the PUEBLO affair has been carefully geared to this phase of the so-called winter-spring offensive.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET/SAVIN~~ attachment (MAC 01218) EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NWJ. 141.021022/3  
By je, NARA, Date 10-30/09

U 251411Z  
FM GEN WESTMORELAND  
TO ADM SHARP  
INFO GEN WHEELER  
AMB BUNKER  
ZEM

96a

~~SECRET~~ SAVIN MAC 01218 EYES ONLY  
COMUSMACV SENDS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS MY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS IT HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS.
  2. AS EXPECTED, 25 JAN IS SHAPING UP AS D-DAY FOR WIDE-SPREAD PRE-TET OFFENSIVE ACTION ON THE PART OF THE VC/NVA FORCES.
  3. THE ENEMY INITIATED NEW OFFENSIVE ACTIONS IN I CTZ. HE CONDUCTED ATTACKS BY FIRE IN THE QUANG TRI AREA AGAINST THE QUANG TRI AIRFIELD AND THE HQ 1ST ARVN REGT AT LA VANG. HE ALSO LAUNCHED ATTACKS IN THE PHU BAI AND QUE SON AREAS. MORE ACTIONS WILL BE INITIATED TONIGHT POSSIBLY WITH ROCKETS IN THE DA NANG AND KHE SANH AREAS. KHE SANH ALSO RECEIVED HEAVY 120MM MORTAR ATTACKS. THESE MORTARS PROBABLY CAME VIA LAOS WITH THE 304TH NVA DIVISION, AND SOME TUBE ARTILLERY PROBABLY ACCOMPANIED THE DIVISION AND WILL BE EMPLOYED FROM POSITIONS WEST OF KHE SANH AND IN LAOS. ADDITIONALLY, A 24 JAN MESSAGE INTERCEPT REFLECTS THE MOVEMENT OF OVER 800 122MM ROCKET ROUNDS SOUTH TOWARD KHE SANH.
  4. I EXPECT A HEAVY ASSAULT AGAINST THE MARINE POSITIONS AROUND KHE SANH TONIGHT, OR SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE 304TH AND 325C DIVISIONS ARE NOW IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA OF KHE SANH. ONE REGT OF THE 304TH MOVED EAST OF THE BASE YESTERDAY, AND COMPLETED THE ENCIRCLEMENT. HOWEVER, THERE ARE GROWING INDICATIONS THAT THE ENEMY IS NOT CONFIDENT OF SUCCESS IN HIS FIRST ASSAULT. A POW FROM THE 325C DIVISIONS STATES THAT ENEMY FORCES WILL RETIRE TO LAOS IF THE FIRST ATTACK ON KHE SANH FAILS AND RETURN WITH "TWICE AS MANY TROOPS" PLUS TANKS FOR AN ATTACK ON 3 FEB. THIS IS THE SECOND INDICATION THAT A TWO-PHASE ATTACK IS PLANNED. THIS POW ALSO STATES THAT HE HAS BEEN TOLD THAT KHE SANH WILL BE "THE AMERICAN DIEN BIEN PHU."
  5. IN II CTZ, THE B-3 FRONT IS TO BEGIN ITS OFFENSIVE ACTION ON 25 JAN. INTERCEPTED MESSAGES REVEAL AN ENEMY PLAN TO ATTACK DUC CO SPECIAL FORCES CAMP IN REGIMENTAL STRENGTH ON THE NIGHT OF 25 JAN. THOUGH I ALSO EXPECT ACTIONS AROUND PLEIKU CITY, DAK TO, AND KONTUM CITY AS WELL, I DO NOT EXPECT MUCH OF AN EFFORT FROM THE 3D NVA DIVISION. TWO SUCCESSFUL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS HAVE COST THAT DIVISION 307 KIA.
  6. IN III CTZ THE ENEMY LAUNCHED HEAVY ATTACKS BY FIRE IN THE TAY NINH CITY AREA. APPROX 400 MORTAR ROUNDS WERE FIRED AT VARIOUS INSTALLATIONS NEAR THE CITY.
  7. IN SUMMARY, IT APPEARS THAT THE ENEMY WILL ATTEMPT COORDINATED ATTACKS THROUGHOUT AT LEAST THE NORTHERN TWO CORPS SOMETIME TONIGHT. IN ADDITION TO THE INDICATIONS CITED ABOVE, AN ABRUPT INCREASE IN MESSAGE TRAFFIC NOTED BETWEEN HANOI AND MAJOR COMMANDS AND AN INTERCEPT INDICATING THAT ALL UNITS IN COASTAL M 5 WILL "OPEN FIRE" IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS REINFORCE THIS BELIEF.
- SSO NOTE: DELIVERY DURING DUTY HOURS  
500

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: OLJ-141-021-022/4  
By: pc, NARA, Date: 10-30-09

~~SECRET SAVIN~~

EYES ONLY

Mr. Rostow 97  
1. sup  
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

January 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Acknowledgment of Letter from King Constantine

Right before Christmas King Constantine sent you an informal hand-written letter thanking you for our Government's attitude during his abortive mid-December counter-coup and urging your continued help in his "endeavor to reestablish legality, and a democratic way of life" for his people. The text of this letter is attached to refresh your memory.

We have not recommended a response so far because we did not wish to put you in the position of having to deal with the substance of his rather general request before we sorted out the question of his return and our relationship to the military regime. Now, however, we feel it would be useful to instruct Ambassador Reinhardt to acknowledge it orally the next time he sees the King. In addition to noting that you had received the letter, State proposes that Reinhardt convey your thanks and extend your warm personal regards to the King and to his family.

The King has been fairly realistic about our need to resume normal working relations with the Government in Athens. He would like to go back but recognizes this is probably impossible until the Government is farther down the track toward putting the new Constitution into practice. Therefore, he probably does not expect much more from us and there is no great need for us to respond more fully to the obviously hasty and informal proposal he made in his handwritten note to you.

W. W. Rostow

Approve oral acknowledgment and message ✓  
Would prefer written response \_\_\_\_\_  
No reply now \_\_\_\_\_

1/26/68

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By sig, NARA Date 11-25-96

~~SECRET~~

97a

INFORMAL HANDWRITTEN LETTER RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT  
FROM KING CONSTANTINE DATED  
DECEMBER 23, 1967

Mr. President,

These are a few words to tell you how deeply I appreciate  
your Government's attitude during this crisis concerning my country.

It is indeed a great comfort to me to know that at the moment  
of my supreme effort for my people's freedom, I have the support  
of the world's greatest democracy.

I know that my firm stand that has brought great sorrow to  
millions at home as well as to me and my family, will not have been  
in vain, if you, Mr. President, as leader of our western civilization  
will continue to help me in my endeavour to reestablish legality,  
freedom and a democratic way of life to my people.

Wishing you and your family a happy X-mas and a very  
successful New Year.

Your good friend,

Constantine R.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By ijp, NARA Date 11-25-96

~~SECRET~~

January 25, 1968

*Jump*  
*2. Pres file*

Mr. President:



3.3(b)(1)


Khammash has come in with a list of ground equipment totaling \$117 million and including 200 M-48A-3 tanks. He also wants 36 multipurpose aircraft. He is looking to us for either the F-104's we contracted for in 1966 or the F-5. He appears to have rejected British and French planes because they are too expensive.

Defense is putting together a negotiating response far short of Khammash's request and will be back to us when it has a concrete proposal. They're trying to see whether we can avoid selling either tanks or planes... *but I doubt they can.*

In order to avoid the appearance of trying to slip one over on the Israelis, Luke Battle today told Harman that Khammash is here.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~



SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-93  
By *isl*, NARA, Date *8-29-05*



~~SECRET~~  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

25 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I was impressed by his detailed discourse on the mood in Jordan, the vulnerability of King Hussein, the conversations with the Soviet leaders in Moscow and Amman and Hussein's desire to achieve peace with Israel -- even at great risk to himself and the future of his dynasty.

2. This conversation re-enforces my impression that the situation in Jordan is fragile, that Jordan remains an essential element of any favorable solution in the Middle East and that time is running out for Hussein's moderate regime.

3. Hussein is caught in the middle between the radical Arab forces centered in Syria which support an escalation of terrorism and resistance and an insistent Israeli position that Jordan can and must assume the responsibility for these hostile acts. Each incident -- particularly those which lead to an Israeli punitive retaliatory move involving Israeli aircraft against a Jordan that has no air defense -- further undermines Hussein's position. Hussein becomes more vulnerable to the charges that he has been unable to demonstrate any capacity for recovery from the June war.

SANITIZED  
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5  
NLJ 05-92  
By *ial*, NARA Date *8-27-05*

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

356

98a

3.3  
(b)(1)(6)

4. [REDACTED] he regards a public commitment to provide Jordan arms as primarily a political action that is essential in the short-term to Jordan's survival. If peace with Israel can be achieved, the delivery of the arms will not be necessary. If some sort of settlement with Israel is not achieved, the question of Jordan's survival will probably become acute before any significant arms deliveries are possible.

3.3  
(b)(1)(6)

5. [REDACTED]

3.3  
(b)  
(1)(6)

*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

Information

99

Thursday, January 25, 1968  
11:30 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You should know the following:

1. We have one unverified report that Kosygin may proceed from New Delhi to Hanoi around the time of Tet. (We also have indications he may stay in Delhi as long as 6 days.)

2. Should he go to Hanoi during the planned period of our bombing stand-down, Secretary Rusk feels that he might take it as a personal affront that we announce shortly before his arrival that we were going to continue bombing of North Vietnam south of the 18th parallel.

Therefore:

-- We shall be trying to establish whether or not Kosygin does intend to proceed to Hanoi during the Tet stand-down period;

-- If we find that he is then going to Hanoi, we shall probably be recommending to you that we brief him beforehand on the general nature of the military activities being conducted near the DMZ and why we shall be bombing in that area during Tet.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-191  
By iq, NARA Date 11-25-96

~~SECRET~~

100

INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Thursday, January 25, 1968 -- 10:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith a report of telephone conversation from the German Embassy; of yesterday:

Minister Georg von Lillienfeld telephoned to say their press officer is sending to George Christian a report informing him of what Chancellor Kiesinger actually said yesterday about the NPT. The news report yesterday (Jan. 23) that the Chancellor had termed the treaty "unacceptable" was incorrect. He had, on the whole, welcomed the progress made in Geneva, had said there were some essential improvements, but that he thought the draft could still be improved a little bit -- that in its present form, and as of today, the question whether the treaty should be signed didn't pose itself. In other words, it wasn't quite as bad as it looked yesterday.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

*Cy sent George Christian*

INFORMATION

101

**SECRET**

*Pres file*

Thursday, January 25, 1968  
8:15 a. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read the attached  
before 8:30.

Kuznetsov tells Tommy:

- they "informed" the North  
Koreans of our message;
- USSR cannot act as an  
intermediary.

Tommy also makes some comments.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 2566

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-148  
By plp, NARA, Date 2/20/96

WWRostow:rln

RECEIVED  
1968

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100 JAN 25 11 01

~~SECRET~~

HCE188

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02566 251044Z

3  
ACTION SS 25  
INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM' 01, /026 W

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Z 250945Z JAN 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7269

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 2566

EXDIS

SUBJ: USS PUEBLO INCIDENT

1. I WAS CALLED IN TO SEE KUZNETSOV 11:00 A.M. TODAY. REFERRING TO OUR MEETING JAN 23, HE SAID OUR CONVERSATION HAD BEEN REPORTED TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND HE INSTRUCTED INFORM ME AS FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT. NORTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN INFORMED REGARDING YOUR COMMUNICATION TO MFA OF USSR ON JAN 23 IN CONNECTION WITH INCIDENT INVOLVING USS PUEBLO IN AREA OF KOREAN PORT OF WONSAN. AT SAME TIME, I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT SOVIET GOVERNMENT CANNOT ASSUME ROLE OF INTERMEDIARY IN CONNECTION WITH INCIDENT.

~~PAGE 2 PUEBLO 2566P ~~SECRET~~~~  
END TEXT.

3. KUZNETSOV SAID HIS COMMUNICATION WAS ORAL STATEMENT AND SOVIETS DID NOT INTEND PUBLISH IT. ALSO, SOVIETS EXPECTED US WOULD NOT PUBLISH IT EITHER. THIS CONNECTION, KUZNETSOV COMPLAINED THAT PRESS REPORTS ABOUT MY MEETING WITH HIM DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY HAD APPEARED EVEN BEFORE I ARRIVED AT MFA. I POINTED OUT REPORTS HAD MERELY SAID US APPROACHING USSR WITHOUT STATING WHERE AND WHEN. I ALSO ASSURED HIM I HAD NOT TOLD PRESS ABOUT MEETING. WHEN I COMMENTED IT WOULD BE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-153  
By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 4/24/96

DIFFICULT FOR US NOT TO SAY SOVIETS DECLINED TO BE INTERMEDIARY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF FACT THAT WASHINGTON HAD ALREADY MADE STATEMENTS ON SUBJECT, KUZNETSOV SAID HE WAS NOT SPEAKING OF PAST BUT OF PRESENT MESSAGE. I REPEATED I DID NOT SEE HOW WE COULD FAIL TO MAKE THE POSITION CLEAR. HE MERELY SMILED AND SHRUGGED HIS SHOULDERS. I PRESUME SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT FIRST SENTENCE OF THEIR OFFICIAL REPLY AND SEE NO PROBLEM IN OUR MAINTAINING OUR POSITION THAT THEY HAVE REFUSED TO INTERVENE.

4. I TOLD KUZNETSOV I WOULD REPORT HIS MESSAGE BUT NOTED THAT, AS I HAD SAID AT OUR PREVIOUS MEETING, MY GOVERNMENT WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED ABOUT SOVIET NEGATIVE ATTITUDE.

~~PAGE 3 RUENCR 2566FD S E C R E T~~

5. BEFORE LEAVING, I REFERRED TO FACT NORTH KOREAN STATEMENT ON INCIDENT AS CITED IN SOVIET PRESS SPOKE OF VESSEL HAVING BEEN DETAINED IN "COASTAL" RATHER THAN "TERRITORIAL" WATERS. NOTING I DID NOT HAVE PERTINENT CHARTS, I INQUIRED, FOR MY PERSONAL INFORMATION, IF KUZNETSOV KNEW WHERE POINT INDICATED BY COORDINATES LISTED IN NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS. KUZNETSOV REPLIED HE UNABLE GIVE ME ANY INFORMATION AND SAID SOVIETS' SOURCE OF INFORMATION ALSO NORTH KOREAN ANNOUNCEMENT.

6. COMMENT: IF THE NORTH KOREANS ARE ANYTHING LIKE THE SOVIETS, THE PRESENCE OF OUR NAVAL FORCE OFF WONSAN WILL MAKE IT VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NORTH KOREANS TO RETURN OUR VESSEL AND CREW. WHILE I DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES ACT AS INTERMEDIARY, I AM SURE THAT THEY WILL NOT SO LONG AS THESE FORCES REMAIN IN PLACE, AND IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WILL EVEN USE THEIR INFLUENCE QUIETLY. THEY ALWAYS REACT NEGATIVELY TO OPEN THREATS OF FORCE.

7. I SUPPOSE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ENGINEERED THIS AFFAIR EITHER TO BRING PRESSURE ON US IN CONNECTION

~~PAGE 4 RUENCR 2566FD S E C R E T~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02566 251244Z~~

WITH VIETNAM OR SIMPLY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON OUR INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, BUT JUDGING BY THE OVERALL SITUATION HERE I THINK THIS UNLIKELY. THE FACT THAT SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL OUR SHIPS COULD INDICATE CAUTION ON THEIR PART, BUT IT COULD ALSO MEAN THAT KOREANS ACTED WITHOUT OR AGAINST THEIR ADVICE.

GP-1. THOMPSON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 94-290  
By CG, NARA Date 10-16-96

1.2

(INFORMATION)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - January 25, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Guyana's Border Dispute with Venezuela

During Prime Minister Burnham's call he asked for our help in persuading Venezuela to be less "bellicose" about the border dispute. You asked for a memorandum.

The dispute, involving some 5/8 of Guyana (see attached map), goes back to colonial times. We became involved in the 1890s in an arbitration effort between the British and Venezuelans. The award generally corresponds to Guyana's present boundaries. Venezuela has never accepted it.

Venezuela allowed the case to lie dormant until Guyana approached independence. Thinking that it could get more concessions out of a Britain anxious to get rid of a problem colony than an independent new nation, the Venezuelans began agitating their claim. They blocked Guyana from joining the OAS and becoming part of the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone.

In 1966 at Geneva the British and Venezuelan Governments agreed to establish a Mixed Guyana-Venezuela Commission to discuss the dispute. The agreement provides that if the dispute has not been resolved by 1970, the Commission will be dissolved and the problem taken to the United Nations.

The Commission has not made any progress toward resolving the boundary question but it has succeeded in draining off some of the political heat. Last year there was a small flareup when Venezuela occupied the border island of Ankoko, half of which is claimed by Guyana.

We have made it clear to both governments that they should use the Mixed Commission to work out their differences. We follow the controversy closely and counsel restraint when things get unsettled. After the Ankoko incident interrupted the dialogue, we encouraged President Leoni to receive an emissary from Guyana to resume bilateral talks. Venezuela eventually agreed to this, and offered to consider joint economic development projects in Guyana under the aegis of the Mixed

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


-2-

**Commission.** Prime Minister Burnham accepted this suggestion in the understanding that the projects would not be limited just to the disputed territory.

The prospects for reaching a solution to the border controversy in the near future are not bright, unless there is a sharp change in attitude by the Venezuelans. For internal political reasons, they now find it convenient to agitate the issue from time to time. Our strategy is to use our influence to restrain the Venezuelans from further adventurism along the frontier and from too much politicking at home. We have repeatedly reminded the Venezuelans that if they undermine Burnham, they run the risk of getting a communist bridgehead at their back door under Cheddi Jagan.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment



**GUYANA**

- International boundary
- National capital
- Railroad
- Road

0 25 50 75 Miles  
0 25 50 75 Kilometers

BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITY

# Background Notes

## GUYANA



102b

Population: 650,000 (est.)  
Capital: Georgetown

Guyana is situated on the northeast coast of South America and covers an area of some 83,000 square miles. It is bounded on the north by the Atlantic, on the south and southwest by Brazil, on the east by Surinam (Dutch Guiana), and on the northwest by Venezuela. The country is divided into three areas: an inland forest covering about 85 percent of the whole; a grass-covered savanna covering some 8,000 square miles near the southeast coast and the southwest hinterland; and a coastal plain which varies from 10 to 40 miles in depth. Guyana is watered by three great rivers running roughly north-south: the Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice.

The climate is tropical, but the northeast trade winds mitigate the heat on the coast. Coastal temperatures vary between 72° and 90° F. Temperatures in the interior average 80° F. with extremes of 60° and 103°. Average annual rainfall is between 80 and 102 inches in different parts of the colony. The coastal rainy seasons are from April to July and November to January.

Guyana's flag has a green background with a red triangle edged with black superimposed upon a yellow triangle edged with white.

### THE PEOPLE

The population is estimated to be about 650,000, 90 percent of whom live along the coast in a strip 5-10 miles wide. This area is below sea level at high tide and must be protected by an extensive system of dikes and drainage.

The ethnic composition of the population, based on the 1960 census, is: East Indian 267,840 (47.8 percent); African 183,980 (32.9 percent); mixed 67,189 (12 percent); indigenous Indians (Amerindians) 25,450, (4.5 percent); Chinese 4,074 (.7 percent); and other (including Portuguese and other Europeans) 11,963 (2.1 percent). The total population in that census was 560,496. The main religions are Hindu, Christian, and Moslem. The most numerous Christian denominations are Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Presbyterian.

### HISTORY

The original area of Guiana, which included present-day Surinam, French Guiana, and Guyana, and parts of Brazil and Venezuela, was sighted

by Columbus in 1498. Voyages by Sir Walter Raleigh in 1595 and others increased European interest, and the first settlement of Europeans in what is now Guyana was made late in the 16th century by the Dutch. For the next century and a half the territory alternated between Dutch and British rule with a short French interlude. Although the British exercised effective control after 1796, the area was not finally ceded to England until 1814. In 1831 the settlements were united into the colony of British Guiana.

Following many years of gradual preparation for home rule and ultimately for independence, the British Government in 1945 extended the franchise to include all literate adults with small income or property qualifications. In 1953 a new and advanced Constitution was introduced with universal adult suffrage, a bicameral legislature, and a ministerial system. The general elections of April 27, 1953, were won by the People's Progressive Party (PPP) under the leadership of Cheddi Jagan. However, in the belief that there was a threat of Communist dictatorship, the Constitution was suspended by the United Kingdom Government on October 9, 1953, and an interim Government established which was wholly composed of nominated members and senior officers of the civil service. In 1956 the Constitution was amended to allow the inclusion of elected members on the legislative council, and general elections were held the following year. The PPP won and resumed participation in the Government.

The next elections were held in 1961 under a new Constitution providing for internal self-government. The PPP won and formed the Government, which they controlled until December 7, 1964. On that day elections were again held, this time under a system of proportional representation. This change in electoral procedure resulted from a constitutional conference at London in October 1963 when the leaders of all three parties, being unable to agree, requested the British Colonial Secretary to settle all outstanding issues and agreed in advance to accept his decisions. The Colonial Secretary indicated that before independence there would be a new election under a system of proportional representation.

The results of this election were: PPP—45 percent of the vote (24 seats but three members were subsequently expelled from the PPP or resigned from the party and now are classified as independents); People's National Congress (PNC)—40.52 percent of the vote (22 seats);

ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Thursday - January 25, 1968

*Free file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: IDB Loan to Ecuador

Since Punta del Este no new AID loans have been given to the Arosemena Government in Ecuador. Disbursements on existing loans have been held up pending a review of which ones Ecuador wants badly enough to meet the self-help criteria. This process will be strung out for the remainder of Arosemena's tenure (until September 1, 1968).

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will shortly have to decide on a \$3 million loan to resettle small farmers under the agrarian reform program. The loan will be on concessional terms from the Fund for Special Operations to which we are the principal contributor and where our vote is decisive.

The question arises whether your injunction against lending to Arosemena applies to the IDB as well as AID.

I recommend that you not carry the freeze to the IDB where our opposition to a small loan to improve agriculture which meets all IDB criteria will be taken as vindictive on our part.

W. W. Rostow

OK to approve IDB loan \_\_\_\_\_

Freeze also applies to him \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

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By wp, NARA Date 11-25-96