

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#2 memo	Rostow to President, 6:15 p.m. <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i> S 1 p <i>(Dup of #183a, Pakistan, Vol 8)</i>	1/31/68	A
#2a cable	Deptel 110658 to Rawalpindi <i>open 1/26/98 NLT 96-194</i> S 2 p <i>[Dup. of #106, Pakistan, Vol 8]</i>	2/6/68	A
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 5:55 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i>	2/6/68	A
#4a cable	Seoul 3976 S 3 p <i>open 11-25-97 NLT 96-193</i> [Duplicate of #79, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/5/68	A
#6a cable	CAP80391 to Saigon TS 2 p <i>(dup. of #35a) open 4-25-97 NLT 96-202</i>	2/6/68	A
#7 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. PCI 1 p <i>sanitized 5-17-00 NLT 96-199</i>	2/6/68	A
#7a ltr	Oehlert to President <i>[Dup of #31a, NSF, HoSC, Pakistan, Ayub, Vol 3, Box 6; sanitized 6/95]</i> S 4 p	1/24/68	A
#7c rpt	Appendix A S 5 p <i>[see above]</i>	undated	A
#7e rpt	Appendix B S 9 p <i>[see above]</i>	undated	A
#9a cable	Saigon 18269 S 2 p <i>open NLT 96-194 1/26/98</i> [Duplicate of #75, Papers of W. Westmoreland, "#29 History File;" Sanitized 90-103]	2/6/68	A
#10a cable	Moscow 2708 S 2 p <i>open NLT 96-194 1/26/98</i> [Duplicate of #33a, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 6, Part 10]	2/6/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

Box 28

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#11a rpt	Record of Actions of 478th NSC Meeting TS 3 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Near duplicate of #33, VP Security File, "National Security Council, 1961," Box 4; Sanitized 1977]	4/22/61	A
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 9:05 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i> [Duplicate of #31, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 6, Part 10]	2/6/68	A
#13a cable	Seoul 4002 S 2 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLS 96-194</i> [Duplicate of #32, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 6, Part 10, and #82, Vol. 16]	2/6/68	A
#14 memo	Rostow to President E 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i>	2/6/68	A
#14a memo	Katzenbach to President C 3 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLS 96-194</i>	2/5/68	A
#14b rpt	"Talking Points" C 4 p " "	undated	A
#14c rpt	"Fact Sheet and Bio Data" C 2 p " "	undated	A
#15 memo	Rostow to President, re: Israel S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i> [Duplicate of #109, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	2/6/68	A
#16a cable	Moscow 2710 S 3 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLS 96-194</i>	2/6/68	A
#17 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i>	2/6/68	A
#17a ltr	Shah of Iran to President <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i> PCI 2 p	2/1/68	A
#18 memo	Rostow to President, re: Jordan <i>open 11/25/97 NLS 96-193</i> S 3 p	2/6/68	A

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#22 memo	Rostow to President <i>Open NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i> S 1 p	2/6/68	A
#22a memo	Intelligence Memorandum <i>Open 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> S 1 p	2/5/65	A
#22b memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 10 p <i>Open 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/5/65	A
#23 memo	Rostow to President, 9:20 a.m. <i>Open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i> S 1 p <i>(dup of #182, NSF, CF, Pakistan, Vol 9)</i>	2/6/68	A
#23a cable	Rawalpindi 3196 <i>dup of #26, NSF, CF, Pakistan, (10/8)</i> S 1 p <i>Open 1/26/98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/6/68	A
#24 memo	Rostow to President, 9:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i>	2/6/68	A
#24a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 18 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/6/68	A
#27 memo	Briefing Officer to President S 1 p <i>Open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/5/68	A
#27a cable	Seoul 3977 S 1 p <i>Open 1/26/98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/5/68	A
#30 memo	Rostow to President, 5:00 p.m. <i>(dup of #15, NSF, CF, Lat Am, Vol 7)</i> S 5 p <i>(dup. in WHCF, CF, "CO 1-8") Open 12-1-94 NLJ 94-272</i>	2/5/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 4:05 p.m. C 1 p <i>same sanitization NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i> [Duplicate of #38, NSF, NSC Hist, "3/31 Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z, AA-ZZ;" Sanitized 1979] <i>Box 47</i>	2/5/68	A
#34 memo	Rostow to President C 1 p <i>Open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/5/68	A
#35a memo	President to Bunker <i>Open 4-25-97 NLJ 96-202</i> TS 4 p <i>(dup of #6)</i>	2/3/68	A

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#44 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p open 11-24-95 NLS 92-397	2/5/68	A
#44a memo	President to PM Pearson S 1 p open 4/96	2/5/68	A
#44b memo	PM Pearson to President S 3 p exempt 8-6-93 NLS 92-397 (Poss. dup. of #15, HofSC, Canada, Pearson, Vol. 2, Bx1)	1/22/68	A
#45 memo	President to Westmoreland E 1 p open NLT 96-193 11/25/97 [Duplicate of #34, NSF, NSC Hist, "3/31 Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z, AA-ZZ;" Sanitized 1980]	2/5/68	A
#46 memo	Draft of #45 open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193		
#48 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193	2/5/68	A
#49 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193	2/5/68	A
#49a cable	Amman 3270 S 4 p open 1/26/98 NLT 96-194	2/3/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President E 1 p open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193	2/5/68	A
#54a cable	Intelligence Cable C 1 p sanitized 7.10.98 NLT 96-200 [Duplicate of #16, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(4), General Military Activity"] Box —	undated	A
#55 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193	2/5/68	A
#55a cable	Seoul 3970 S 3 p open 1/26/98 NLT 96-194 [Duplicate of #69, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/5/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#56 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/5/68	A
#56a cable	Saigon 18103 S 3 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/5/68	A
#56b cable	Deptel 109831 to Saigon S 4 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/4/68	A
#56c cable	Saigon 464 S 1 p <i>" " "</i>	2/5/68	A
#56d cable	CAP 80389 S 1 p <i>open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/4/68	A
#58a cable	Saigon 17920 S 11 p <i>open 4/96</i> [Sanitized 1979]	2/4/68	A
#59a cable	Seoul 3935 S 3 p <i>open 3-25-94 NLJ 93-367</i> [Duplicate of #50, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/4/68	A
#60a memo	Ginsburgh to Rostow S 1 p <i>(Dup of #63a) open NLJ 96-205 7.20.98</i> [Duplicate of #28a, NSF, NSC Hist, "3/31 Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs A-Z, AA-ZZ"; Sanitized 1981] [Dupl # 104a, NSF Country File, Vietnam, bx 66, "ZAZI Corpst DMZ, 2/68"]	2/4/68	A
#60b memo	Duplicate of #60a		
#61a memo	From Komer in Saigon C 1 p <i>open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/4/68	A
#62a ltr	President to Kosygin PCI 1 p <i>open 11/24/97 NLJ 96-193 (dup. of #136, NSF, HqJSC, USSR, Kosygin, vol 1, Bx 7)</i>	2/4/68	A
#63a memo	Duplicate of #60a <i>Open NLJ 96-205 7.20.98</i>		

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a cable	Moscow 2683 S 2 p <i>open 6-10-95 NLT 93-458</i> [Duplicate of #77a, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 5, Part 9]	2/3/68	A
#67a cable	Vientiane 4234 S 4 p <i>open 11/26/98 NLT 96-194</i>	2/3/68	A
#68 memo	Smith to President PCI 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i>	2/3/68	A
#68a cable	Moscow 2682 S 1 p <i>open 11/26/98 NLT 96-194</i> [Duplicate of #76a, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 5, Part 9]	2/3/68	A
#69 memo	Rostow to President, 1:20 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i>	2/3/68	A
#70 memo	Rostow to President, 1:10 p.m. S 1 p <i>OPEN 7/10/96</i>	2/3/68	A
#70a cable	Deptel 109693 to Seoul S 8 p <i>open 11/28/98 NLT 96-194</i> [Duplicate of #75, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 4, Tabs 1-12]	2/3/68	A
#71a cable	Saigon 17607 S 3 p <i>open 4/29/96</i>	2/3/68	A
#74 memo	Rostow to President, 12:45 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i>	2/3/68	A
#74a memo	Katzenbach to President <i>open 1-26-98 NLT 96-194</i> S 1 p	2/3/68	A
#74b rpt	Chronology " " S 4 p	2/2/68	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 12:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLT 96-193</i>	2/3/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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#76a memo	State Dept. to President S 1 p <i>Open 1-26-98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/3/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, re: India PCI 1 p <i>Open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/3/68	A
#77a memo	Read to Rostow S 1 p <i>Open 4/96</i>	2/1/68	A
#77b memo	"Indian Views on Cambodia and ICC" <i>Open 9-18-97 NLJ 96-207</i> S 2 p <i>(dup of # 131a, NSF, CF, India, Vol 10)</i>	1/31/68	A
#79 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p <i>Open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/2/68	A
#83 memo	Rostow to President, 7:15 p.m. C 1 p <i>Open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i> [Duplicate of #108b, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	2/2/68	A
#83a memo	Rostow to McPherson S 1 p <i>Open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i> [Duplicate of #108c, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8] [Sanitized NLJ 85-322]	2/2/68	A
#84 memo	Rostow to President, 7:00 p.m. <i>Open 4/96</i> C 1 p <i>dup. # 1a, NSF, Files of Hamilton "Pakistan" Box 2</i>	2/2/68	A
#84a ltr	President to President Ayub <i>Open 4/96</i> C 1 p <i>dup. # 1b, 26 & box 2</i>	undated	A
#85a memo	Intelligence Memorandum C 2 p <i>Sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> <i>same case NLJ 019-028-2</i> [Sanitized NLJ 83-216]	2/2/68	A
#86a memo	Katzenbach to President S 3 p <i>Open 1-26-98 NLJ 96-194</i> [Duplicate of #6, NSF, Country File, Korea, Filed by the LBJ Library and #49a, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 5, Part 8]	2/1/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 59, 2/1-6/68

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#88 ltr	President to Suharto <i>open 4/29/96</i> PCI 1 p	2/2/68	A
#88b ltr	Partial duplicate of #88 <i>open 4/29/96</i>		
#88c memo	Read to Rostow C 1 p <i>open 4/29/96</i>	2/1/68	A
#88d ltr	President to Suharto PCI 1 p <i>open 4/29/96</i>	2/1/68	A
#92 memo	Rostow to President, 10:00 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i> [Sanitized NLJ 83-220]	2/2/68	A
#95 memo	Rostow to President, 8:50 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 7/10/96</i>	2/2/68	A
#95a cable	Seoul 3878 S 5 p <i>open 1/26/98 NLJ 96-194</i> [Duplicate of #9, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/2/68	A
#96a cable	Intelligence Cable S 3 p <i>Sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Sanitized NLJ 83-21] <i>some semi NLJ 019-028-2</i>	2/2/68	A
#97 memo	Rostow to President, 8:45 a.m. C 1 p <i>open 7/10/96</i>	2/2/68	A
#97a cable	Saigon 17470 C 4 p <i>open 1-26-98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/2/68	A
#99 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. S 1 p <i>open 11/25/97 NLJ 96-193</i>	2/1/68	A
#99a memo	For Mr. Goulding S 1 p <i>open 1-26-98 NLJ 96-194</i>	2/1/68	A

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#100a rpt	"Meeting of Advisory Group, 1/29/68" <i>Open 9-23-97 NLJ 94-173</i> TS 3 p <i>(Dup of #112, WWR, Mat. re: WJ + Pueblo, Box 10)</i> <i>(Near dup of #332, MTR, Vol 58)</i>	2/1/68	A
#108 memo	Rostow to President, 10:10 a.m. <i>Open NLJ 96-205</i> S 1 p <i>7.20.98</i>	2/2/68	A
#106a cable	Saigon 17363 S 2 p <i>Dup Open 4/29/96</i>	2/1/68	A
#110 memo	Rostow to President <i>open 2-24-00 NLJ 96-205</i> S 1 p	2/1/68	A
#95b cable	Seoul 3892 <i>Open 1/28/98 NLJ 96-194</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #13, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/2/68	A
#95c cable	Seoul 3891 <i>open 1/28/98 NLJ 96-194</i> S 1 p [Duplicate of #12, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/2/68	A

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#81 memo	Rostow to the President, 8:00 p.m. - S 1 p <i>SANITIZED 2-25-04 NW/RAC 03-180</i>	2/2/68	A
#110a rpt.	Preliminary Report - S 2 pp <i>SANITIZED 8-9-01 NW 03-213</i> <i>same sanitization 7-23-09 NLJ 08-211</i>	1/30/68	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 59, February 1-6, 1968
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INFORMATION

1

TOP SECRET

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
6:40 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith 39 B-52 sorties in support of the next 24 hours at Khe Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By kg, NARA, Date 1-30-92

1a
Rostow



THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 February 1968
4:30 PM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Watch Officer, White House Situation Room
Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary
Department of State, c/o Operations Center

Subject: Operational Highlights

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following US Air Force B-52 missions are now scheduled to be flown during the next 24 hours:

<u>MISSION & NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
UNIFORM 30 (6 B-52s)	10:40 PM 6 February (071140 SVN)	In SVN, <u>7 miles northwest of Khe Sanh.</u> Contains elements of the NVA 325C Division.
UNIFORM 48 (6 B-52s)	4:45 AM 7 February (071745 SVN)	In SVN, <u>20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.</u> Contains elements of the NVA 320th Division.
UNIFORM 63 (9 B-52s)	7:00 AM 7 February (072000 SVN)	In Laos, <u>9 miles southwest of Khe Sanh.</u> Contains elements of the NVA 304th Division.
UNIFORM 83 (12 B-52s)	1:10 PM 7 February (080210 SVN)	In SVN, <u>10 miles south-southwest of Khe Sanh.</u> Contains rear services of the NVA 304th Division.
UNIFORM 39 (6 B-52s)	3:30 PM 7 February (080430 SVN)	In SVN, <u>9 miles west-northwest of Khe Sanh.</u> Contains elements of the NVA 325C Division.

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now scheduled during the next 24 hours:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
AF Guide, SEA Records, 4/1/88
By *18* NARA, Date *1-30-92*

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON TIME</u>
Kinh No RR Yard, 9 miles north of Hanoi	3:31 AM 7 February	7 AF	12 F-105	071631
Chu Son Army Barracks (N), 10 miles south- west of Hanoi	3:51 AM 7 February	7 AF	4 F-105	071651
Ha Dong Army Barracks SW, 9 miles southwest of Hanoi	3:55 AM 7 February	7 AF	8 F-105	071655
Hanoi RADCOM Receiver (JCS 66.1), 12 miles south-southeast of Hanoi	6:00 AM 7 February 9:00 AM 7 February	77.4	1 A-6A 1 A-6A	071900 072200

DDO *[Signature]*

ADDO *[Signature]*

CCOC *[Signature]*

NMCC - 6 FEBRUARY 1968, 4:30 PM EST

TOP SECRET/LIMDIS

2

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968 -- 6:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

Thru Mr. Marvin Watson

Dr. Hurst was contacted. He has a major speaking commitments in Miami through Thursday evening. He could leave immediately thereafter with arrival at Karachi late Saturday night or Sunday. If necessary, he is prepared to try to depart Wednesday afternoon, with probable arrival at Karachi on Friday.

A telegram has gone out to Amb. Oehlert giving him above information and requesting immediate response as to wishes of the Pakistan government.

W. W. Restow

To Rawalpindi 0686
State 110658

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

rla

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

2a

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~ 223

PAGE 01 STATE 110658

47
ORIGIN SS 30

INFO SSC 00 NSCE 00, MM 01, /031 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/PAF:JWSPAIN
APPROVED BY: NEA-WILLIAM J. HANDLEY
WHITE HOUSE-MR. ED HAMILTON, S/S-JPWALSH

O 061806Z FEB 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI IMMEDIATE 0686

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~SECRET~~ STATE 110658

EXDIS

REF: RAWALPINDI 3196 AND 3208

1. YOU AUTHORIZE OFFER SERVICES PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S PHYSICIAN, DR. HURST, TO APPROPRIATE QUARTER GOP. BELIEVE YOU SHOULD MAKE SURE OFFER IS PHRASED IN TERMS WE WILLING TO HELP IN THIS AND EVERY OTHER WAY POSSIBLE IF PAKS WANT BUT ARE NOT REPEAT NOT ATTEMPTING GRATUITOUSLY INVOLVE OURSELVES IN SITUATION.

2. DR. HURST HAS MAJOR SPEAKING COMMITMENTS MIAMI THROUGH THURSDAY EVENING. COULD DEPART IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER WITH ARRIVAL KARACHI LATE SATURDAY NIGHT OR SUNDAY. IF GREATER URGENCY EXISTS.

~~SECRET~~
DR. HURST PREPARED TRY DEPART HERE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON WITH PROBABLE ARRIVAL KARACHI FRIDAY. (ASSUME YOU AND GOP WILL TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION POSSIBLE IMPACT ON PAK RUMOR MILLS OF

~~SECRET~~ NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

~~STATE 1955~~

APPARENT EMERGENCY VISIT BY US PRESIDENT'S PHYSICIAN.

3. PLEASE RESPOND IMMEDIATE (A) WHETHER GOP WISHES DR. HURST TO COME, (B) PREFERRED ARRIVAL DATE, AND (C) RECOMMENDED ARRANGEMENTS FOR HANDLING ARRIVAL.
GP-1. RUSK

~~SECRET~~ NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Pres file

INFORMATION

**Tuesday, February 6, 1968
6:00 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith a list of my news
media contacts January 29 thru Feb. 5.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

News Media Contacts

Monday, January 29, 1968

Hobart Lewis, Dave Reed, John Hubbell, Kenneth Gilmore
of Reader's Digest, doing "anatomy of Pueblo incident"

Tuesday, January 30, 1968

Drew Pearson, Washington Post, on telephone

Philip Geyelin, Washington Post, on telephone

Joseph Alsop, on telephone

Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News, on telephone

Wednesday, January 31, 1968

Joseph Rogaly, London Financial Times

Thursday, February 1, 1968

Richard L. Wilson, Cowles publications

Joseph Alsop, on telephone

William S. White

Friday, February 2, 1968

Jack Sutherland, US NEWS & WORLD REPORT

John Hubbell and Dave Reed, Reader's Digest, further on "anatomy"

Joseph Alsop

Phil Potter, Baltimore Sun

Saturday, February 3, 1968

Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News

Monday, February 5, 1968

Boyd France, BUSINESS WEEK

Russell Wiggins, Washington Post, re editorial

INFORMATION

4

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
5:55 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Park replies with great courtesy to your letter to him; but he makes a strong plea for retaliatory action against North Korean incursions into South Korea.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3976

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By C6, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

TELEGRAM

#64a

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC
DE RUALOS 3976E 0361445
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051423Z FEB 68 ZFF1
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8844
STATE GRNC
BT

CONTROL: 1276Q
RECEIVED: FEB 5, 1968
10:39 a.m.

Roxlow

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3976

NODIS

REF: STATE 109821

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT PARK TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON, OF WHICH WE RECEIVED COPY THROUGH INFORMAL CHANNELS. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL PROBABLY BE DELIVERED THROUGH AMBASSADOR KIM IN WASHINGTON. PLEASE PROTECT FACT THAT WE OBTAINED COPY HERE.

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR PRESIDENT.

I RECEIVED AN ADVANCE COPY OF YOUR LETTER OF

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3976E ~~SECRET~~
FEBRUARY 3 THROUGH AMBASSADOR PORTER YESTERDAY AND I THANK YOU SINCERELY FOR YOUR KEEPING ME INFORMED OF YOUR VIEWS THROUGH YOUR AMBASSADOR HERE.

THE RECENT SEIZURE BY THE NORTH KOREA OF THE USS PUEBLO AND THE INFILTRATION OF THE ARMED COMMUNIST RAIDERS INTO SEOUL HAVE DEMONSTRATED TO THE WORLD ANEW THE AGGRESSIVENESS AND LAWLESSNESS OF THE COMMUNISTS. THESE ACTS HAVE ALSO ARISEN A SERIOUS PROBLEM TO OUR PRESTIGE AND A GRAVE THREAT TO OUR SECURITY.

I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND ONCE AGAIN MY EXPRESSIONS OF SINCERE SYMPATHY TO YOUR EXCELLENCY, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAMILIES OF THE CREW OF THE PUEBLO.

ALSO, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GREAT ADMIRATION AND DEEP RESPECT FOR YOUR PERSEVERANCE SHOWN IN SEEKING DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM AND FOR YOUR RESOLUTE DETERMINATION AS EVIDENT IN YOUR OUBRIGHT ACTION TAKEN IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 3976 FEB 5

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3976E ~~SECRET~~
THE MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES.

I AM VERY GRATEFUL THAT YOU ARE URGENTLY CONSIDERING MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

MR PRESIDENT,

IN THE WAKE OF THESE INCIDENTS, WE HAVE MADE OUR VIEWS KNOWN TO EACH OTHER THROUGH AMBASSADOR PORTER.

AND I QUITE AGREE WITH YOU THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AT THESE DIFFICULT HOURS, SHOULD STAND IN CLOSER UNITY AND DEAL WITH THE SITUATION WITH CONCERTED MIGHT. THE TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THE UNCHANGEABLE, PARTICULAR RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES SHOULD BID US TO DO SO.

WHAT WE SHOULD DO FIRST WILL BE TO HAVE THE VESSEL AND THE CREW BACK AND TO SEEK A GUARANTEE THAT THE NORTH KOREANS CEASE THEIR AGGRESSIVE ACTS AGAINST THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3976E ~~SECRET~~

THESE, IF DEVOID OF ONE OF THE TWO, WILL NOT BE COMPLETE IN ATTAINING OUR COMMON GOAL.

HOW LONG OUR EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL AND DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE KEPT GOING WILL, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT, BE OUR PROBLEM.

HOWEVER, IN SINCERELY HOPE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND MY CONVICTION THAT THE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED BY ALL MEANS BEFORE THE PUBLIC OPINIONS OF THE WORLD WHICH HAVE STOOD WITH US MAY COOL DOWN.

IT HAS BEEN FIFTEEN YEARS SINCE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED AND DURING THIS SPAN OF TIME, THE NORTH KOREANS HAVE CONSTANTLY THREATENED US, THEIR VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT TOTALLING SOME 5,000 CASES. THE THREAT HAS BECOME EVEN MORE SERIOUS DURING THE PAST SIXTEEN MONTHS. CULMINATING IN THE AGGRESSIVE INTRUSION INTO SEOUL ON JANUARY 21.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 3976 FEB 5

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3976E ~~SECRET~~

I SHOULD MENTION THAT IN DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS, INDEFINITE EFFORTS FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION WILL ONLY BRING ADVANTAGES TO THEM RATHER THAN TO US. I CAN SAY THROUGH OUR OWN EXPERIENCE THAT THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD BE TAUGHT A LESSON THAT ANY AGGRESSIVE ACTION CANNOT ESCAPE DUE PUNITIVE ACTION.

IF WE HAD TAKEN ANY PUNITIVE ACTION WHENEVER THE NORTH KOREANS VIOLATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN THE PAST, WE COULD HAVE FORESTALLED THE SITUATION WHICH HAS ENSUED ON THESE BREACHES.

IN OTHER WORDS, I THINK THE SITUATION WHICH WE ARE FACING TODAY HAS RESULTED FROM OUR INACTION TO MEET EFFECTIVELY THE VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE NORTH KOREANS.

TO THE NORTH KOREANS, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD SHOW

PAGE 6 LUALOS 3976E ~~SECRET~~

OUR RESOLUTE STAND AND DETERMINATION THAT THEY CANNOT COMMIT AN AGGRESSIVE ACT FREE OF PUNISHMENT. IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THIS ALONE WILL PROVIDE A CORRECTIVE MEASURE FOR THE HABITUAL AGGRESSIVENESS OF THE NORTH KOREANS.

I HAVE ALREADY MADE MY VIEWS KNOWN TO YOU ON THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH KOREA THROUGH AMBASSADOR AND I AM NOT REPEATING THEM HERE.

PLEASE ACCEPT, YOUR EXCELLENCY, MY BEST WISHES FOR A FULL MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN YOUR ENDEAVORS.

WITH MY KINDEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

/S) PARK CHUNG HEE, END TEXT. GP-3 PORTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

INFORMATION

Profile

Tuesday
February 6, 1968 -- 5:50 p. m.

SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Fighting Around Khe Sanh

At 5:09 tonight the enemy is using flamethrowers at the Lang Vei Special Forces camp. Latest reporting indicates the enemy used 9 tanks and 4 to 5 are disabled.

Twenty-eight rounds of 105mm COFRAM was fired in support.

Khe Sanh combat base is receiving 6 rounds of mortar fire per minute and the runway is cratered.

W. W. Rostow.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.3
DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1938
By *hf*, NARA, Date 1-30-92

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-202
By iss, NARA Date 4-8-97

6

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

VZCZCDSI085
OO YEKADLC
DE YEKADS 526 0370359
O 050351Z ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
TO AMEMB SAIGON
ZEM

1968 FEB 6 05 13

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~ LITERALLY EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS
CAP80391

FEBRUARY 3, 1968
FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SAIGON, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
BUNKER.

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST THE ACCOUNT OF YOUR LATEST
TALK WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, REPORTING THE FORMATION OF A
SPECIAL JOINT TASK FORCE. THE REPORT OF ITS FIRST MEETING
WAS HEARTENING. IT SHOULD MOVE THINGS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION
IN THE DAYS AHEAD.

GETTING THIEU AND KY TO WORK TOGETHER AND STAY TOGETHER
COULD BE A FAVORABLE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES.

I ALSO NOTED HOW PROMPTLY YOU ENCOURAGED THIEU TO REALIZE
THAT THIS WAS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY FOR LEADERSHIP, AS WELL
AS DANGER. I KNOW THAT YOU HAVE HAD ON YOUR MIND ALL THE
POSSIBLE WAYS TO GET THIEU MOVING. WE HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT
CONCERNED ABOUT THIEU'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO PROBLEMS WHICH
REQUIRE FERVENT LEADERSHIP.

I AM WRITING YOU NOW TO SEE IF YOU DON'T AGREE THAT THIS
IS THE TIME TO LET THIEU KNOW HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT HE
ALSO MOVE RAPIDLY ON SOME OF THE DEEPER PROBLEMS FACING THE
VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT, ITS PEOPLE, AND OURSELVES AS THEIR
FIGHTING ALLIES. IF YOU AGREE--AT THE RIGHT MOMENT--I
SHOULD HOPE YOU WOULD HAVE A PRIVATE AND VERY FRANK TALK WITH
THIEU. YOU MIGHT TELL HIM THAT ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY RUSK ARE AWARE OF THE SUBJECT OF THIS CONVERSATION.

SUBJECT TO YOUR JUDGMENT, I WOULD TALK TO HIM ALONG
SOMETHING LIKE THESE LINES.

I WOULD TELL HIM IT IS OUR OPINION THAT THE COORDINATED
NVA/VC ATTACKS AND THE ENEMY'S EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN
HAVE HAD A STRONGLY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON BOTH VIETNAMESE AND
AMERICAN OPINION. IT IS OF THE HIGHEST URGENCY THAT THE
GVN ACT DECISIVELY TO MEET THE PROBLEM--NOT MERELY THE
SHORT-RANGE DIFFICULTIES, BUT THE DEEP-SEATED PROBLEMS THAT
MAKE THINGS EASIER FOR THE VC IN BOTH THEIR MILITARY AND
POLITICAL EFFORTS. THE TIME FOR CAUTION AND SLOW STEPS
FORWARD IS PAST. WE RECOGNIZE THAT DECISIVE ACTION MAY
INVOLVE MISTAKES ALONG THE LINE. WE CAN LIVE WITH THESE
NOW AND THEN. BUT WE CANNOT LIVE WITH A "BUSINESS AS
USUAL" APPROACH.

THIEU CAN COUNT ON OUR SUPPORT. WE WILL HELP HIM IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. BUT WE WANT TO AVOID INACTION OR HALF-MEASURES. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT HE, VICE PRESIDENT KY, AND PRIME MINISTER LOC SHOULD BE A CLOSELY-KNIT TEAM; THAT EACH SHOULD HAVE HIS OWN CLEARLY DEFINED RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THAT EACH OF THEM CAN MOVE, KNOWING HE HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE OTHERS AND OF THE AMERICANS.

WE CONSIDER IT URGENT THAT HE MOVE RAPIDLY ON:

- STRENGTHENING THE ARVN, GETTING THE MOST CAPABLE OFFICERS IN COMMAND POSITIONS, ELIMINATING OR SHELIVING THOSE WHO ARE INEPT AND WEAK.
- SHAKING UP AND GETTING MORE TEAMWORK IN HIS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. IT IS A DISGRACE THAT THE VC CAN MOUNT DOZENS OF ATTACKS SIMULTANEOUSLY ALL OVER THE COUNTRY AND HIS GOVERNMENT DOESN'T KNOW A THING ABOUT IT IN ADVANCE;
- A LARGE-SCALE DRIVE ON CORRUPTION. THIEU AND KY MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT CORRUPTION IS NO LONGER GOING TO BE TOLERATED. IF THEY CAN MOVE IN ON BLATANT PAST OFFENDERS ALL TO THE GOOD. BUT IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT A NEW DEAL IS IN EFFECT AND CORRUPTION OR VIOLATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST IS GOING TO GET RAPID AND STRONG JUSTICE. OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS WHO ARE CORRUPT NEED TO BE REMOVED AND THIS IS A GOOD OCCASION TO SPEED UP THE CLEAN-UP.

I CANNOT FULLY EXPRESS MY ADMIRATION AND APPRECIATION FOR YOUR EFFORTS IN THE DANGEROUS AND TRYING CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH YOU ARE FACING. WE WANT TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO SUPPORT YOU, WESTY, AND ALL OF YOUR COURAGEOUS COLLEAGUES. IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT YOU NEED THAT YOU ARE NOT GETTING LET US KNOW AND YOU WILL GET IT

740

NNNN

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

W. W. R. 1

Tuesday, February 6, 1968 -- 5:00 PM

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a newsy letter from Ben Oehlert. He also encloses the memorandum on tanks (Tab A) you asked him for in Karachi, and a special year-end report (Tab B) for you on what has happened since he arrived in August. You may want to read the letter and glance over the other papers.

Ben's principal conclusions are: (1) that we should help Ayub replace his Sherman tanks with Pattons bought from Europe, (2) that we should make another 500,000 ton wheat agreement soon, and (3) both negotiations -- and all our aid this year -- will inevitably be connected [REDACTED]

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(3)

As you know, we are working hard on the wheat and the tanks, and in the direction Oehlert wants. We will also look into the other matters he raises in his year-end report.

Ben also sent along some mementos of your visit to Karachi: a collection of all the coverage of your visit by the (government-controlled) press; a copy of Ayub's official 1968 calendar, which lists your visit as one of the "highlights of the decade" for December; and a newsreel film of the visit. I will give these items to Jaunita Roberts in case you want to look them over.

At Tab C, for your signature, is a short thank-you letter to Ben.

DECLASSIFIED NL 896199
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RB/jc, NARA, Date 5-5-00

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

~~SECRET ATTACHMENTS~~

SANITIZED

7a

~~SANITIZED~~

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 94-81

By 120, NARA, Date 7-5-95

Rawalpindi, Pakistan

~~SECRET~~

January 24, 1968

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Your visit here was a treat to me, a great boost for the morale of all of us, and continues to be a tremendous assist with President Ayub and his government. I'm truly grateful to you.

1. I had certainly planned to get this off to you long ago. You will recall that when you suggested to President Ayub that he could use more wheat than the 500,000 tons recently agreed upon (100,000 additional commercial purchase and 400,000 additional PL-480) he requested me to give him a memo on that subject. The memo was promptly prepared and submitted to Washington. After several exchanges of telegrams it has been revised to the following form:

WHEAT SUPPLY IN PAKISTAN AND PL-480 PROGRAMS

The following are estimates of wheat supply and distribution in Pakistan in FY-68 and -69 which would provide for an increase in stocks to a level of 850,000 tons by the close of FY-69, the maximum amount believed to be safely stored in present facilities in Pakistan.

Wheat Supply and Distribution (thousand tons)

	<u>FY-1968</u>	<u>FY-1969</u>
Beginning stocks	230	700
Production	4,300	5,100
Imports		
Commercial (CCC credit)	200	100
PL-480	2,200	400
Other	70	50
Total supply	<u>7,000</u>	<u>6,350</u>
Consumption (gross)	6,300	6,600
Ending stocks	700	850
Total distribution	<u>7,000</u>	<u>7,450</u>
		Less 6,350
Uncovered needs		<u>1,100</u>

~~SECRET~~

Of the proposed 2.2 million tons of PL-480 wheat for FY-68, 1,750,000 tons have been thus far provided in the agreements of May, August and December 1967. The proposed additional 400,000 tons of PL-480 wheat would approximately cover the remaining 450,000 tons required this fiscal year. For purposes of stock building and to provide for orderly shipping and delivery schedules for meeting FY-69 consumption needs early consideration should be given to a new PL-480 agreement to make an initial provision against the uncovered 1,100,000 tons import needs estimated in the table above. The above estimates assume a spring wheat crop in West Pakistan of approximately five million tons. Should a harvest closer to the 5.4 million ton target materialize, the total uncovered import needs estimated for fiscal year 69 would have to be adjusted accordingly.

- - - - -

Since at this writing I do not yet have clearance I have of course not delivered it, but I did not wish to hold this letter up further.

2. Enclosed are:

- a. Two volumes of newspaper clippings of your visit here;
- b. A copy of the official Government of Pakistan 1968 calendar. On the reverse side of each month is a statement of the "highlights of the decade" for that month. You will note that your visit is one of the two highlights for December.

Your visit was well covered by the newsreel, and I will be sending you separately a filmed record of your visit.

3. Attached as Appendix A is the tank memo you requested of me when we were talking with President Ayub.

While I begrudge every dollar and rupee diverted from economic development to military expenditure, considering the requirements of minimal self-defense I cannot escape the conclusions that Pakistan's military expenditures are not excessive and that your wise military supply policy can properly accommodate approval of 100 M-47's now (preferably from Belgium) with subsequent consideration of other items including at least another 100 M-47's.

Ayub's power base is the military. His foreign policy must succeed in furnishing them with at least a reasonable proportion of what they honestly believe they need for the defense of the country, or he will lose that support. If he loses that support the resulting chaos will probably bring to power [redacted] Either consequence would be seriously against our interests.


1.3
(4)(5)

If we cannot be of at least indirect assistance to him his only alternatives to losing the support of the military will be:

- a. To purchase expensive hardware, as from France, which would be contrary to our policy of urging on him maximized economic effort; or
- b. Turn again to Communist China with all of the dangers to him and to us which that would entail.

Additionally, we face a Peshawar deadline on July 17, 1963. Ayub is, and will increasingly be, under severe pressure from both the USSR and the Chicom to cancel us out, and they may well be dangling rewards of military and economic assistance for doing so. His avowed and honest preference is to look to us, but we must furnish him an option to their threats, promises and blandishments.

While in the negotiations I will scrupulously avoid any linking of Peshawar with military supply, it is a fact that consideration of the two problems must proceed in the same time frame and it seems an inescapable conclusion that our policies on the one will influence theirs on the other.



1.3
(4)(5)

4. It seems to me to be altogether fitting and proper that I should give you a "year-end report" of my first few

months here. It is attached as Appendix B.

5. As I'm sure you know, Anita Bryant didn't accompany Bob Hope this year because, properly I think, she and her Bob felt that they were overdue to spend a Christmas with their own two little ones.

They are planning to take their own troupe, later in the year, to Vietnam and Thailand--financed by USO-Freedoms Foundation.

When they do, Anita and Bob are going to come on here for a visit with Alice and me, so I suggested that they bring the whole troupe both as a "cultural presentation" for the Paks and to entertain our isolated troops at Peshawar. They liked the idea and indicated that very little extra cost would be involved.

Hence I wrote to Frankel at State to see if that "very little extra cost" could be financed out of CU funds. The response was negative for lack of funds (although we get almost literally no cultural visits here), but I think you'll be amused to know that I have private, but authoritative, information that the real reason for the turndown was because CU "could not support Anita Bryant even if there were money because the Bryants are commercial and popular type entertainment rather than something esoteric like ballet or opera!"

I give you my GEORGIA GUARANTEE that she would indeed be popular entertainment here.

Mr. President, it was mighty good to have a glimpse of you and to see you in such full vigor despite both your nearly intolerable burdens and the frightful rigors of the trip you had undertaken. And I was grateful for the Fresca. It was the first I had had since leaving home.

As I wrote you some time ago in connection with Vietnam, the country desperately needs you for another term. I am at your disposal in any and all ways that I can possibly help to insure that.

With warmest affection to you and to Lady Bird (I hope you got a birthday message off in time) in which Alice joins me, I am

Devotedly,


Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.

76



~~SECRET~~

7c

APPENDIX ATANKSI. HISTORY

Prior to September, 1965, tank delivery agreed upon and furnished by USG was as follows:

Planned	632
Delivered	546
"Deficit"	<u>86</u>

The break-down of deliveries was:

M-47	230
M-24	114
M-48	202
	<u>546</u>

The M-47s were not new and had been overhauled in the USA before delivery to Pakistan. They have since undergone several overhauls in Pakistan. Because of the absence of spare parts they have progressively decreased in number due to necessary cannibalism.

The M-24s posed a maintenance problem from the day of delivery owing owing to the acute shortage of spares as early as 1955. They are expected to "die away" completely in another year owing to the total non-availability of spares.

The M-48s have borne the maximum brunt of training as a result of the progressive non-availability of 47s and 24s as noted above. It is estimated that by 1970 this fleet will also be due for a total turn-over, having gone beyond the limit of economic repair.

The former USMAAG program had provided for replacement as a part of the "modernization plan" (1964-69) which of course never materialized.

1965 battle losses were 24 Pattons and 56 Chaffees (total 80).

~~SECRET~~

RECAPITULATION

Planned	632
Delivered	546
Deficit	<u>86</u>
Battle losses	80
Attrition	202
Immediate need	<u>368</u>

Notes:

- i. The immediate need of 368 must be reduced by the acquisitions from China. While they totalled 175, it is conceded that 55 were T34's which were admittedly nearly worthless. This then results in a current need of 248.
- ii. The USG properly need feel no obligation springing from previous plans and/or commitments because the prior relationship was shattered, in part at least, by Pakistan's share of the fault for the highly embarrassing and dangerous 1965 war, which directly caused 80 of the current short-fall of 248. It does remain true, however, that our military experts then, and now, agree with the assessment that a minimum of 248 are needed now to meet the military threats Pakistan may face and it is also true that we are desirous of continuing to improve the adverse bilateral relationship which existed in the aftermath of the '65 war.
- iii. Pakistan does have in its possession approximately 300 M-4 Shermans with 75mm guns which were left by the British in 1947. These were in inventory when the above-referred-to force levels were agreed upon and US experts consider them so ineffective and so worn out that they are "junk." Additionally, Pakistan has agreed to scrap them one for one as replacements are obtained.
- iv. It should also be borne in mind that an additional probably 300 will be needed for attrition, obsolescence and cannibalization by 1970.

II. RELATIVE STRENGTHS

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF TANK FORCES
(As of August 1957)

Type	Model Designation	Main Armament	Country of Origin	India	Pakistan
Light	M-24 Chaffee	75mm	US		75
"	PT-76 Amphibious	76mm	USSR(a)		5
"	AMX-13		France	75	
"	PT-76	76mm	USSR	<u>176</u>	
Totals: Light Tanks				251	80
Medium	M-4 Sherman	76mm	US/Canada	400(c)	300(c)
"	M-47/48 Patton	90mm	US		340
"	T-34	85mm	Com.China		55(b)
"	T-59	100mm	Com.China		120(b)
"	Centurion	105mm(?)	UK	210	
"	T54A	100mm	Czech	256	
"	T55	100mm	USSR	157	
"	Vijayanta	105mm	India	<u>45</u>	
Totals: Medium Tanks				<u>1,068</u>	<u>815</u>
TOTALS: ALL TYPES				<u><u>1,319</u></u>	<u><u>895</u></u>

(a) Secured via Indonesia


(b) Figures on Chinese tanks are approximate and are based on sightings by US military personnel. Pakistani officials in conversations with US officials have cited lower totals of 150-160 Chinese tanks. However, some elements of the US intelligence community believe that the combined T34/54 (Chinese tank) inventory may run as high as 200-300.

(c) The Shermans are considered obsolescent, primarily because of the wear and tear of over 20 years. Repair and configuration, perhaps with a larger gun, is possible but would be unrealistically expensive. The Pakistanis have told us that the T-34 are of little use. We may credit this assertion in view of the fact that the T-34, the workhorse of the Soviet forces in World War II, is an aged design, even though we don't know the history of these particular tanks.

GOP military planners must accept the existing political situation and military capabilities: These, rather than the presumed intentions, particularly presumed good intentions, are the only reasonable basis for their work. Politically, they find themselves still at odds with India, with the principal issue of contention--Kashmir--still unsolved. It led to war once and could do so again. In such a war, East Pakistan would be almost defenseless and the key clashes could again be expected on the Punjab plain and the deserts of the Sind. In both areas armor could be expected to play the key role in ground warfare.

The military implications are ominous.

1.3
(4)(5)



III. SOURCES OF SUPPLYA. India

1. Indigenous production of 50 per year.
2. 150 Vickers which a recent intelligence report indicates India has ordered in the UK.
3. 250 T-55s on option from USSR.

B. Pakistan

1. China - GOP states none on order and agrees to order none (from China or elsewhere) without consultation USG.
2. Germany - A proposed transfer of 100 fell through because Germany would deliver only through a third country which USG would not approve.
3. Iran - A proposed transfer of up to 200 was abandoned at request of USG.
4. Italy - A proposed sale of indefinite quantity has been considered unacceptable both because of price and because the tanks appear to be in German possession thus raising the third country problem.
5. Belgium - 100 available within one year with another 100 available later. USG awaiting formal request from Belgium for transfer of 100 with appropriate data concerning condition, price and terms.
6. Russia - Indications are that USSR refused Ayub on recent trip to Moscow. GOP, as noted in (1) above has agreed to order none from any source without consultation USG
7. There are of course other commercial sources, such as France, but prices would be prohibitive

7d

B.

~~SECRET~~APPENDIX BYEAR END REPORTI. USG-PAK RELATIONS

While there has been no single favorable development of great magnitude, there have been no unfavorable ones either and the totality of small favorable developments would seem to justify the conclusion that relationships did definitely improve during the year. Among these developments are:

- a. Improved USG press treatment;
- b. Somewhat less idolatrous press treatment of USSR and Chicoms;
- c. Satisfactory settlement of the 1965 claim for the burning of the USIS Library in Karachi.
- d. Agreement on a satisfactory settlement of the 1965 seized-cargo claims. (Final closing of the settlement has been delayed by working out of details with GOI);
- e. Agreement to make all commercial wheat purchases from US and actual purchase of 300,000 tons;
- f. Reception by Ayub himself and all principal Army, Navy and Air Force officers of a high-level US military briefing team from Viet-Nam and Ayub's gracious remarks at the end of the briefing;
- g. Ayub's general Viet-Nam attitude including the restrained phrasing of his joint statements from Moscow, Paris and other capitals visited;
- h. A more cooperative attitude toward CENTO, both privately and publicly;
- i. A request for and participation in bilateral naval maneuvers;
- j. A successful visit to the United States by the Pakistan Parliamentary Delegation; and
- k. Acceptance of our proposals for improvement in import policies.

~~SECRET~~

Any satisfaction to be gained from these indications of improved relations must be tempered by the knowledge that the two biggest problems of our bilateral relations remain unresolved. They are:

First: Military Supply - A separate memo on tanks covers the principal aspects of this problem; and

Second: The Renewal of Peshawar - President Ayub and the Foreign and Defense Ministers have been informed of our desire to continue there, and active negotiations should start soon.

These negotiations will be difficult and the outcome is uncertain. In the Pak mind there will be at least the following reasons to refuse to continue:

a. Continuation is considered to be a violation of Ayub's foreign policy of balanced relations between USG, USSR and Chicoms;

b. Great pressure is being exerted by both Russia and China. The Pueblo incident will emphasize in the Pak mind the gravity with which the Communist world regards electronic intelligence operations;

c. Those pressures will cause Pakistan to fear reprisals for renewal;

d. Those pressures will cause Pakistan to hope for rewards for non-renewal; and

e. Renewal will cause domestic political outcry as Ayub prepares for a re-election campaign.

In the Pak mind there will be at least the following reasons to agree to renewal:

- a. Ayub's genuine affection for you and his desire to accommodate your wishes;
- b. The knowledge that Pakistan gets some useful take from the facility which would be endangered by the removal of our presence;
- c. The fact that our presence is of economic importance to the area; and
- d. A fear that that rejection would so adversely affect relations with us as to endanger aid programs and the possibility of military equipment support.

My instructions concerning the Peshawar negotiations are not to allow them to be linked with either aid or military supply and I shall of course observe those instructions scrupulously. However, it should be borne in mind that discussions of all three subjects will proceed in the same time frame; they will be related in the Pak mind and our policies (and anticipated policies) concerning aid and military supply will have a profound effect on the GOP policy toward Peshawar.

II. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL POLICIES

Pakistan's policies vis-a-vis China, Viet-Nam, the Middle East, CENTO, and Cyprus continue to be at variance with our own, but:

- a. There appears to be an awakening consciousness of the dangers posed by too close association with China;
- b. The Viet-Nam position has been subdued and shows some improvement;
- c. The Middle East posture has become less strident;
- d. The hostility to CENTO has softened somewhat, and
- e. The Cyprus issue is somnolent, at least for the moment.

III. GOI-GOP RELATIONS

There has been very little forward movement.

Agreements reached on over-flight privileges and telecommunications have been counterbalanced by the flap over the alleged East Pakistan coup and the expulsion of a diplomat on each side.

There is no visible progress in the restoration of road, water, rail and air communications or the resumption of trade.

There are indications that useful talks may be resumed on the problems of the Eastern Waters.

Troublesome border incidents have been contained and the Army C-in-C's have had a friendly and useful exchange.

The Kashmir dispute remains on dead center. It is doubtful that the release of the Sheikh will contribute to a solution in the foreseeable future.

Indeed, it is doubtful that there is a genuine thrust for solution on either side. Continued acerbation of the issue seems to serve useful domestic political purposes on both sides.


Attempts at third party intervention seem to serve no useful purpose at the present time--unless, perhaps, the USG and the USSR could and would move in close concert together. There would seem to be little prospect of such a movement at least before some Viet-Nam solution can be found.

IV. INDIA-PAKISTAN-USG RELATIONS

There are, of course many differences in our relations with India and Pakistan, but this is to be expected since we have different objectives in both countries, and our actions elicit different reactions. It is neither in the U.S. interest nor that of India or Pakistan to seek exact parity of treatment. Nonetheless certain U.S. actions ostensibly flow from world-wide policies and in those cases the implementation in India and Pakistan should be the same. It would seem, however, that this has not been the case.

a. The PL-480 legislation requires that existing U.S. commercial markets be protected when we sign PL-480 agreements, although we have generally tried to protect commercial markets of other friendly countries. Thus, in India and Pakistan, the normal marketing requirement can be met by purchases from either the U.S. and other friendly countries, or any combination. The Pakistan normal marketing requirement has been 75,000 tons of wheat for a great number of years whereas in India the requirement has been 200,000 tons. As a result of the drought of 1965 and 1966, the Government of Pakistan purchased considerable quantities of wheat with free foreign exchange since the U.S. supply position during 1966 was severely strained and PL-480 difficult to obtain. As a consequence, the five-year average of commercial purchase for Pakistan skyrocketed, and in the last PL-480 agreement the normal marketing requirement was set at 200,000 tons. The Paks point out, quite rightly in my view, that normal marketing requirements ought not to be calculated on the basis of the extraordinary requirements which prevailed during the two droughts. In India the government was much more conservative in using free foreign exchange to purchase food and preferred to run the risk of letting the food import pipeline be interrupted with its consequent effects on distribution. Nonetheless they did buy close to a million tons commercially, but their normal marketing requirement, as of the latest agreement, had not been changed.

1.3
(a)(5)



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[REDACTED]

b. Non-project assistance - Here the situation is less easy to quantify.

[REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)


These requirements are two kinds--policy and implementation. On the policy side, the conditions have led to fruitful negotiations and change and have contributed to Pakistan's development points. On the implementation side, some of the conditions were developed locally.

[REDACTED]

c. Defense expenditures - We have been in a continuous dialogue with the GOP on the relationship of defense expenditures to economic development and have very forcibly pressed the point that both total defense expenditures and foreign exchange outlays for defense would have to be drastically reduced from their 1965 levels and kept within bounds; i.e., they should not grow more than about 3% per year. Our representations were at least in part responsible for the reduction in defense expenditures announced in the June budget speech, and they have certainly also strengthened the hands of those in the GOP who see room for further reductions.

[REDACTED]

1.3
(a)(5)



1.3
(S)

V. STATE OF THE MISSION HERE

Almost without exception this Mission--State, AID, USIS, [redacted] is staffed by competent and dedicated people. Efficiency and morale suffer, however, from the following circumstances:

1.3
(S)

a. Two-year tours are completely inadequate. Just when a man gets really to know his job and the people with whom he must deal he is whisked off to another part of the world.

On August 15 a new Ambassador--new in every sense of the word--arrived here. Three weeks later the DCM, who had been acting as Chargé in the absence of an Ambassador, was replaced. Shortly thereafter the vacant post of Chief of AID Mission was filled, a new Department of Defense Attache arrived and Consul General vacancies in Karachi and Lahore were filled. The Naval Attache has been replaced, the Agriculture Attache has been borrowed for Indonesia. The Economic Counselor has just had three months home leave.

Within the next few months we will have a new Consul General in Dacca, a new Political Counselor, a new USIS Principal Officer and new Air and Army Attaches.

Before your Ambassador finishes one year of service, the only principal officers here with even a year of service will be [redacted] and the Economic Counselor.

1.3
(S)

This seems to be standard State Department practice, and applies to all echelons.

The situation could be very much improved if tours were for three years (or two two-year tours) and more attention given to spacing-out replacements in the various missions, posts and stations. Such a change in program would both improve efficiency and save money.

b. The morale of the Mission here understandably suffers from the almost total lack of recreational facilities and the marked contrast with the situation of the military in Peshawar and the American contractors at Mangla.

This is a hardship post. The water and food are unsafe. Summer temperatures rise to 125 degrees, but home airconditioning is inadequate and the Ambassador's car is the only State airconditioned car in the country.

The Chancery is a converted residence and many of the staff living accommodations are temporary and inadequate. Roofs and windows leak. Plumbing doesn't work. There are constant electric failures. Furnishings of houses and offices are unacceptable.

Personal safety is endangered by the use of left-hand drive cars in a left-hand side of the road country, with heavy traffic teaming with cars, taxis, trucks, pedestrians, bicycles, tongas, donkeys, water buffalo, bullock carts and camels.

Radio and television are only a few hours a day and largely in Urdu. The public movie houses are unsanitary and the films, when in English, are abominable.

There are no post recreation facilities. This is in sharp contrast to both Peshawar and Mangla, where there are movie theaters, gymnasiums, bowling alleys, swimming pools, tennis and squash courts, basketball courts, baseball and football fields, children's playgrounds and a golf course (at Mangla).

FY-68 building plans called for the construction of staff apartments and a small community center with tennis courts and a swimming pool, with Chancery, Ambassadorial Residence and principal officers housing to follow the next year.

We are now advised that nothing will be built this year or next. The reversal of this program has been a deep disappointment, especially since the British, French and Russians are well ahead with similar construction and other missions are getting under way.


The inconvenience of losing APO privileges has not helped.

Not for my own comfort, because an Ambassador is always relatively well off, I'm too busy for rest and recreation and too old for athletic pursuits, but rather in the interests of the health, safety and welfare of the American personnel who are my concern here, I would respectfully request that consideration be given to the following requests:

1. That authorization be issued for immediate construction of the originally-planned small community house with swimming pool and tennis courts, hopefully to be available by late spring 1968. Substantially all costs would be in rupees except for pool filtering equipment; and

2. That future purchases of cars be right-hand drive and airconditioned.

Respectfully submitted,


Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr.

7f.

②

February 8, 1968

79

Dear Ben:

Your letter and very thorough report made good reading. It is plain to see what a fine job you are doing. I have asked my people here to make sure they get on to all the matters you discussed.

I'm glad you enjoyed the Fresca. Seeing you and President Ayub again -- even for a moment -- was a real tonic for me too.

What you're accomplishing out there, Ben, is a great service to your country. Every American is in your debt, and I am deeply proud of you.

Lady Bird joins me in sending our very best to you and Alice.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

15/ Lyndon B. Johnson

The Honorable
Benjamin H. Cahert, Jr.
United States Ambassador
to Pakistan
Rawalpindi

EKH/RPM/vmr 2/6/68

INFORMATION

8

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
3:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith an attack on a South
Vietnamese unit in the Khe Sanh area,
in which for the first time COFRAM was
used.

We shall, of course, get an estimate
of the effectiveness as soon as possible.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *rg*, IN/OLA, Date 2-3-92

SECRET

8a

INFORMATION

Tuesday
February 6, 1968 -- 2:55 p.m.

SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Enemy Attacks in the Khe Sanh Area

We have just received information that the ARVN unit at Lang Vei, to the west of Khe Sanh, was under heavy ground attack at 2:20 p.m. this afternoon. Initial reports indicate that the enemy employed seven tanks; at least one of the tanks had been knocked out.

During the contact, the Marines at Khe Sanh fired COFRAM from 105mm guns.

1st
W. W. Rostow
for

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD/IN 10-25-78; OSC 628-1480
By wp/rq, NARA, Date 2-3-92

SECRET

INFORMATION

9

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
3:10 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

This interview between Westy,
Bunker, and Thieu will interest you.
They seem to be taking just the right
time.

W. W. Rostow

Salgon 18269

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 49, NARA, Date 1-30-92

9a

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

TEXT OF CABLE FROM BUNKER (Saigon 18269)

General Westmoreland and I spent about an hour and a quarter with President Thieu the afternoon of February 6. Thieu opened the conversation by calling attention to Vice President Ky's TV address last night informing the people about the task force and its purposes. Thieu noted that this program was moving ahead and that Ky was, in fact, visiting the First Corps today with Komer.

I stressed to Thieu how important it was to keep the people informed about the Government of Vietnam's efforts. It seemed to me that this was the psychological moment to galvanize the population and to develop their support for the Government of Vietnam and their opposition to the Viet Cong. I urged that Thieu make frequent brief appearances on radio and TV to tell the people what is going on and to seek their support. I said that I had many reports, not only from Saigon, but also from the provinces, that the people were angry and resentful at the Viet Cong treachery on Tet, and I thought he should capitalize speedily on this mood. I said that we wanted to help and participate in this effort in any way that he thought useful. I left with him a detailed memorandum of suggestions for such information activities.

I suggested to Thieu that other Cabinet members, especially those supervising specific emergency activities -- such as public health, refugees, welfare, public works -- also speak to the people about their programs and intentions. Moreover, other notables in Vietnamese life should be involved in all of these activities and should be encouraged to stimulate efforts by the population. I cited as an example the mobilization of labor support, observing that we had been impressed that the working population even in the poorest sections had not risen to support the Viet Cong. I said that I understood they wanted to help and were capable of contributing to the common effort. I noted some concern among such non-government elements that the government was trying to mobilize and control all the efforts and take all the credit as well.

Thieu said this was not the case. He said that one of his concerns was to assure that emergency supplies and programs got to the right people and was not frittered away through too many hands involved in the till. He said he would assure that the present means were properly used. Thieu went on to say that he planned to make an address to the Joint Session of both Houses of the Assembly on Friday, February 9. He noted that there had been critical questions in the Upper House today, particularly questioning why the government did not know about the Viet Cong attack in advance and take preventive measures. Thieu said the answer was that they knew the Viet Cong capability but not the exact timing of such attacks. He also remarked that identifying the Viet Cong groups was next to impossible as they came

in dressed as civilians mingling with the rest of the people celebrating Tet. Thieu went on to say that he planned to ask the Assembly to confirm the emergency measures taken so far by the Government of Vietnam and to empower the government to do whatever is necessary. He said he would warn the Assembly that other measures may be needed to deal with the situation.

In connection with the detailed memorandum of suggested information activities that the government might pursue, I suggested that they make particularly energetic efforts toward the foreign press in order to try to correct the many inaccuracies being reported. I suggested specifically that Information Director, General Linh, might make himself available one-half hour each day to the foreign press as this would pay off real dividends in the U. S. and elsewhere.

In connection with additional measures by the Government of Vietnam, Westmoreland took up the question of mobilization. He said that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had performed extremely well during the Viet Cong attacks, that all the division commanders had done well, and the corps commanders had also performed creditably, but now the Army of the Republic of Vietnam faced the problem of rebuilding, as its losses were high and many officers had been assassinated. Westmoreland said it was necessary to start drafting 19-year-olds promptly and to move on to the 18-year-olds fairly soon, to meet the manpower needs. Thieu said he thought the Assembly would no longer insist on the limits indicated in its earlier discussion of the partial mobilization decree. He personally saw no problem in drafting the 19-year-olds and the 18-year-olds in order to build up the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces by the 65,000 required. Westmoreland gave Thieu the latest statistics on enemy killed in action (21,330), detainees (4,727), and weapons captured (4,432 individual and 796 crew-served), as well as friendly killed in action (1,729).

I raised with Thieu the urgency of extending the curfew so that conditions could get back to normal as rapidly as possible in the Saigon area. Thieu confirmed that he had approved the task force proposal to divide the city into blue and red zones, and to relax the curfew hours immediately in the blue zones. I added that I had reports this afternoon that rice and gasoline were being distributed widely today.

Finally, I mentioned again the matter of summary executions and the stakes in the central market (mentioned previously). Thieu replied that he had sent for General Loan immediately after our earlier talk. He asked Loan about the photograph of his shooting of the Viet Cong officer. Loan said that he had shot him in the heat of anger, knowing all the deaths that he and his forces had caused in Saigon. Loan claimed that he had not seen a cameraman in the area. Loan also said that the stakes had been put up by the Third Corps Commander, General Khang. Thieu said he had instructed Khang to remove them, noting that there were means of military justice available for such cases. He added that the stakes had been removed, a fact we had also confirmed.

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INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
2:05 p. m.

Mr. President:

You will be interested in Kosygin's
response to your latest: calm but
committing himself to nothing.

W. W. Rostow

Moscow 2708

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 18, NARA, Date 1-30-92



Department of State

10a
TELEGRAM

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REF: STATE 110351

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By: cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

1. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO KOSYGIN AT 3 P.M. TODAY.
2. UPON HEARING TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE, KOSYGIN ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS TO PRESIDENT. AT SAME TIME HE WANTED ME TO TELL PRESIDENT THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO UNDERSTAND THIS SITUATION. WHEN A VESSEL GOT INTO TERRITORIAL WATERS OF OTHER NATIONS, MATTER SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN ACCORDANCE NORMAL PROCEDURES. AS US ITSELF HAD SAID, SOVIET VESSELS, ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY THEY WERE FISHING VESSELS, HAD INTRUDED IN US TERRITORIAL WATERS. US HAD SEIZED VESSELS, PUT CAPTAINS TO TRIAL, AND LEVIED FINES WHICH USSR THEN PAID. SIMILAR INCIDENTS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN NORWEGIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, BUT SOVIETS AGAIN USED DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, APOLOGIZED, PAID FINE AND SETTLED MATTER. IN NO INSTANCE HAD THE SOVIETS DISPATCHED THEIR NAVAL VESSELS ALTHOUGH, IN CASE OF NORWAY,

PAGE TWO RUEHCR 2708FD ~~SECRET~~

THERE WAS POWERFUL SOVIET SURFACE AND SUBMARINE FLEET IN VICINITY. IN EVERY INSTANCE SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT SETTLE INCIDENTS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITHOUT RAISING TENSIONS AND WITHOUT CREATING POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT. ON OTHER HAND, US REACTED TO PUEBLO SEIZURE BY DISPATCHING AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND OTHER VESSELS, WHICH INDICATED THAT THERE WERE MANY NOHEADS IN PENTAGON WHO NEEDED TRANQUILIZERS. KOSYGIN SAID TIME HAD PASSED WHEN THREATS WORKED OR WHEN GREAT POWERS COULD SIMPLY FLICK THEIR FINGERS AND HAVE SMALLER NATIONS DO WHAT THEY WANTED THEM TO DO. IT WAS IN DESIRE TO PUT PUEBLO INCIDENT IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE THAT HE HAD SAID IN NEW DELHI THAT THIS WAS LOCAL CONFLICT WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED BY TWO PARTIES CONCERNED.

3. REFERRING TO PRESIDENT'S MENTION OF INFILTRATION, KOSYGIN ASSERTED INFILTRATION GOING IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AND MERELY REFLECTED NATURAL DESIRE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR REUNIFICATION THEIR DIVIDED COUNTRY. IF US WERE DIVIDED, WE SOULD ALSO HAVE INFILTRATION IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. IN ANY EVENT, AREA WAS CLOSE TO SOVIET TERRITORY AND SOVIET UNION COULD NOT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-, MOSCOW 2708, FEBRUARY 6

BUT BE CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED TENSIONS AND POSSIBILITY OF INCIDENTS THERE. HE REITERATED THAT IT BETTER TO WORK THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THROUGH EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES, ETC., AND NOT TO RESORT TO SHOW OF FORCE.

4. THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED SOVIETS HAD NOT DISPATCHED THEIR FLEET WHEN RECENTLY US DESTROYER COLLIDED WITH SOVIET MERCHANT VESSEL. IN THIS CASE TOO, US DECIDED NOT EVEN TO APOLOGIZE BUT RATHER TO ARGUE THAT SOVIET VESSEL WAS AT FAULT. AT SEA, THERE WERE CERTAIN RULES TO BE ABIDED BY AND IF THEY WERE VIOLATED, APOLOGY WAS IN ORDER. FORTUNATELY, SOVIET VESSEL WAS DAMAGED ABOVE RATHER THAN BELOW WATER LINE, OTHERWISE IT WOULD HAVE SUNK.

5. I POINTED OUT WE HAD DELIVERED A NOTE TO MFA YESTERDAY IN WHICH WE DESCRIBED CIRCUMSTANCES OF COLLISION AND INDICATED FACT THAT OUR DESTROYER HAD RIGHT OF WAY UNDER INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS. KOSYGIN COUNTERED BY ASSERTING OUR CASE NOT CONVINCING AND WE SIMPLY TRYING PROTECT OUR CAPTAIN BY STRETCHING THE TRUTH. SOVIETS DEALT WITH THEIR CAPTAINS COMMITTING SIMILAR VIOLATIONS QUITE DIFFERENTLY: THEY DEMOTED THEM AND DEPRIVED THEM OF SHIP COMMAND.

6. REVERTING TO PUEBLO INCIDENT, I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE INCIDENT CITED BY KOSYGIN INVOLVED SOVIET FISHING VESSELS, PUEBLO WAS A NAVAL VESSEL. THERE WAS DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING FISHING VESSELS AND THOSE REGARDING NAVAL SHIPS. THERE HAD BEEN CASES WHERE SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS INTRUDED IN US TERRITORIAL WATERS, BUT WE MERELY ASKED THEM TO LEAVE AND DID NOT SEIZE THEM. AS KOSYGIN KNEW, OUR POSITION WAS THAT PUEBLO HAD BEEN SEIZED IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS. HOWEVER, EVEN IF IT HAD INTRUDED INTO NORTH KOREAN TERRITORIAL WATERS, PROPER PROCEDURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO ASK IT TO LEAVE RATHER THAN SEIZE IT. I THEN POINTED OUT THAT COINCIDENCE OF RECENT EVENTS IN KOREA, SUCH AS NORTH KOREAN PLAN FOR ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT PARK AND OUR AMBASSADOR AND PUEBLO SEIZURE, CREATED GREAT CONCERN AMONG SOUTH KOREANS WHO DID NOT KNOW WHAT TO EXPECT NEXT FROM NORTH KOREA. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE WERE TRYING TO USE DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO SECURE RELEASE OF PUEBLO AND ITS CREW, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MEETINGS AT PANNUNJOM WOULD SOON BEAR FRUIT.

5. KOSYGIN SAID HE THOUGHT DISCUSSIONS AT PANNUNJOM WERE PROCEEDING NORMALLY AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED. DIRECT US-NORTH KOREAN TALKS MUCH MORE USEFUL THAN INTERCESSION BY THIRD PARTY. HE FELT THAT PANNUNJOM MEETINGS APPARENTLY GAVE SOME SATISFACTION TO BOTH US AND NORTH KOREA.

6. WHEN I REITERATED MY HOPE FOR PROMPT SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME THOSE TALKS, KOSYGIN SAID SOVIETS ALSO INTERESTED IN PROMPT SETTLEMENT OF INCIDENT SINCE THERE WERE ENOUGH CONFLICTS IN WORLD ALREADY AND THERE WAS NO NEED TO HAVE A NEW ONE.

7. KOSYGIN THEN RAISED MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM, WHICH REPORTED SEPARATELY. AT END OF MEETING I ASKED HIM WHAT HE PROPOSED TO GIVE TO PRESS ABOUT OUR MEETING. HE SAID THAT, AS LAST TIME, HE WOULD ISSUE STATEMENT THAT HE HAD MET WITH ME AT MY OWN REQUEST, WITH NO INDICATION OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

GP-1. THOMPSON

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, February 6, 1968, 10:20 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Record of NSC Discussion of Bay of Pigs, April 22, 1961

A thorough check reveals there are no official or unofficial records of the discussion in the NSC on April 22, 1961, of the Bay of Pigs.

From the beginning of the Kennedy administration until July 1961, the record of NSC meetings consists only of the actions taken. The practice of the Eisenhower administration of preparing summary notes for the President's use only was discontinued. Mac Bundy's files contain no memorandum of the discussion. The then acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, Marion Boggs, says that he has no notes on this meeting.

There is attached the Record of Action following the April 22, 1961, meeting.

Bromley Smith

Attachment:
TOP SECRET

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *ky*, NARA, Date *6-30-92*

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF ACTIONS
by the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
at its
FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING
held on
April 22, 1961
(Approved by the President on April 24, 1961)

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; The Director, U. S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Counselor, Department of State; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council; General Maxwell Taylor; General David Gray, U. S. Army; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Mr. Bromley Smith, National Security Council; and the Acting Executive Secretary, National Security Council, attended the meeting. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Adviser to the President on Disarmament participated in NSC Action No. 2408. The Deputy to the Adviser to the President on Disarmament and the Deputy Director, U. S. Disarmament Administration, attended the meeting for NSC Action No. 2408.

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2406. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

- a. Noted the President's view that there should be no further discussion outside the Government of the meaning of recent landings in Cuba, since the object now is to move forward.
- b. Noted the President's view that U. S. citizens in Cuba should be shortly advised again of the view of this Government that they should leave Cuba, and that at an appropriate time publicity should be given to this advice.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLK 95-49
By plmk, NARA. Date 4/29/96

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2406. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

- c. Noted the President's view that U. S. assistance to active guerrillas in Cuba should, for the present, be extended only where there is a moral obligation, or to assist in survival or evacuation. Guerrillas with whom the United States may be in contact should be advised to lie low for the present. This directive should, however, be constantly reviewed in the light of the changing internal situation in Cuba.
- Action Memo sent to State and Defense

d. Discussed the training of Cuban soldiers, and agreed that the question of possible forms of large-scale, open enlistment of Cuban soldiers should be studied by the Departments of State and Defense.
- Action Memo sent to HEW and CIA

e. Discussed the support of refugees, and noted the President's directive that levels of support should be reported to him with recommendations for their improvement, and his desire that such support should be open and overt. The President also directed that the adjustment of Cubans to life in the United States should be given particular attention by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
- f. Noted that an interdepartmental study group would be considering an increase in U. S. assistance to Latin American countries in matters relating to internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and agreed that a representative of the Department of Justice should be added to this group.
- g. Noted the President's desire that there be prompt recommendations with regard to trading with Cuba from the Departments of State and the Treasury.
- Action Memo sent to State and Defense

h. Noted the President's directive that the possibility be studied of creating a Caribbean Security Agency, to which we and the other Caribbean countries would contribute forces, and to whom any nation attacked could appeal for help.

ACTION
NUMBER

SUBJECT

2406. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

Action Memo
sent to Justice
and CIA

i. Noted that the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence would examine the possibility of stepping up coverage of Castro activities in the United States.

j. Noted that the Secretary of State had established an Operations Group in the Department under Ambassador Achilles, who would be responsible for all action with respect to the Cuban situation.

Action Memo
sent to State

k. Noted the President's request that he and the Vice President receive from the Department of State prompt information as to which governments have been helpful in various parts of the Cuban crisis, and which unhelpful.

Action Memo
sent to Defense
and CIA

l. Noted the President's desire that a prompt and up-to-date report on Soviet assistance to Cuba be furnished by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director, U. S. Information Agency, and the Department of State.

2407. STRENGTHENING THE BASIC U. S. POSTURE TOWARD THE COMMUNIST WORLD

Action Memo
sent to Defense
and ODCM

a. Discussed possible changes in the level of effort of the United States in the fields of military activity, foreign policy, civil defense, and para-military effort. The President announced his prospective appointment of General Maxwell Taylor to advise him with respect to ways and means of improving U. S. efforts in para-military, guerrilla and counter-guerrilla activities, in the light of recent experiences. It was agreed that the Department of Defense would review its military budget, and that the study of the civil defense posture of the United States should be expedited by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

~~1 sheet~~
2 p file

12

Tuesday, Feb. 6, 1968
9:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith constructive thoughts from Amb. Lodge.

May I make them available to Sects. Rusk and
McNamara and Dick Helms?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (log 520 memo 2/5/68 fm HCLodge to P)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1968

12a

TOP SECRET - NODIS

To: The President

From: H. C. Lodge

H. C. Lodge

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State ltr 1-24-79

By eglip, FOIA, Date 2-3-92

1. While some of the recent raids in Viet-Nam eventually took on a conventional military aspect (as, for example, in Hue), most of them were clandestine; were conducted in civilian clothes; and were closely intertwined with the civilian population for information, for path finding, and for attempted political effects.
2. These raids, therefore, were appropriate activities for the use of police-type techniques and it seems fair to conclude that if the police-type work -- whether by military or police personnel -- had been superior, many of the raids would have been prevented and those which would not have been prevented would have been more rapidly put down.
3. The existence of effective police-type forces being, I believe, utterly vital both in the long and short run, I suggest that the present is a good time to have a fresh audit made of the adequacy of existing Vietnamese forces -- as to size, organization and training -- to perform those police-type functions.
4. This audit should be made by a civilian, since these clandestine terrorist raids involve weighty political and psychological considerations which make them altogether different from the military. The

TOP SECRET - NODIS

audit should be done as quietly, tactfully, unobtrusively, informally -- and rapidly -- as possible.

5. The above is said without derogating from the courageous performance of individual Vietnamese during the past week and from what has already been accomplished by the Americans in charge of pacification.
6. This moment may, however, be the heaven-sent opportunity to give the GVN some much needed stimulus which normally they would not be able to take.
7. Some of the questions to which answers should be obtained, on the American side, are:
 - a) With how much intensity and sharp focus is the job of revamping the ARVN going?
 - b) How clearly is the new mission of the ARVN, notably in its sociological and civil implications, understood up and down the line?
 - c) Are the ARVN trainers persuading and enthusing?
 - d) Do the trainers understand it all themselves?
8. Some questions on the Vietnamese side are:
 - a) What progress has been made on rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure in the places which were raided last week?
 - b) If, as has been reported, advance knowledge existed of the intended raids, what was done before the raids took place by way of a "comb out", that is: verification of identity cards, checkpoints, curfew, etc.

TOP SECRET - NODIS

- 3 -

- c) To what extent were the infiltrators picked up when they arrived in town?
- d) Are the police generally easily available in the slum sections of Saigon where information on location of Viet Cong normally exists? If not, are steps being taken to make them so?
- e) What is the feasibility of organizing the urban masses themselves to help the police?

H.C. [Signature]

TOP SECRET - NODIS

INFORMATION

13
/

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:05 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith the North Koreans request a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission Secretaries for 1:00 a. m. tomorrow morning our time. The purpose is obscure. You may wish to get Sec. Rusk's view of its significance at the 10:00 a. m. meeting this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4002

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By C6, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla



0430
13
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 4002

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJECT: MAC SECRETARIES MEETING

REF: SEOUL 3977

1. NORTH KOREAN SIDE PASSED MESSAGE EVENING OF 5 FEB REQUESTING MAC SECRETARIES MEETING FOR 1500 HOURS (KST) FEB 7 (REFTEL. PURPOSE OF MEETING WAS NOT GIVEN IN MESSAGE.

2. MEETING COULD BE FOR NORMAL MINOR BUSINESS OF SECRETARIES MEETING, I.E., NK SIDE MIGHT WISH TO

PAGE 2 RUALOS 4002E ~~SECRET~~
PASS LIST OF ALLEGED ARMISTICE VIOLATIONS. HOWEVER, IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT SECRETARY MEETINGS, ALTHOUGH OFFICIALLY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY, ARE USED BY NK AS "LITTLE MAC" MEETINGS AND THEY CAN AND DO DISCUSS ANY AND ALL *

ROK NATIONAL INTERPRETERS AND ROK AND THIRD COUNTRY ADVISORY GROUP MEMBERS ALSO CUSTOMARILY ATTEND.

3. MEETING MIGHT ALSO HAVE BEEN CALLED TO PRE-EMPT SCHEDULE. IN PAST, UNC AND NK SIDES HAVE DISPUTED WHETHER SENIOR MEMBER'S MEETING COULD BE CALLED PRIOR TO SECRETARIES MEETING ALREADY ON BOOKS. ISSUE HAS NEVER BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By ct, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~SECRET~~

-2-Page, SEOUL 4002 February 6, 1968 NODIS/CACTUS

4. THERE ARE OF COURSE INFINITE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE MOTIVES BEHIND NK CALL FOR SECRETARIES MEETING, INCLUDING DESIRE TO PUBLICIZE US-NK NEGOTIATIONS TO IRRITATE US-ROK RELATIONS. YET, POSSIBILITY ALSO REMAINS THAT NK'S, REALIZING US IS COMING UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE FROM ROK, IS SEEKING MEETING TO RELEASE

PAGE 3 RUALOS 4002E ~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION ON CREW MEMBERS. PASSING INFO THROUGH SECRETARIES WOULD SAVE FACE OF GEN. PAK. THEY MAY ALSO WISH TO KEEP US TALKING AT PANMUNJOM BY NOEATING IMPRESSION WITHIN USG AND PUBLIC AT SMALL COST TO THEM THAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE. THEY COULD ALWAYS TAKE CREDIT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES FOR HUMANITARIAN GESTURE.

5. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ACTUAL TRANSFER OF HELICOPTER PILOTS WAS EFFECTED AT SPECIAL MEETING OF SECRETARIES CALLED AT MEETING OF SENIOR MEMBERS AND HELD IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER. SECRETARIES MEETINGS ARE NOT ACTUALLY DISTINCT, ADDITIONAL CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH INFORMATION IS EXCHANGED, BUT ARE ALWAYS CONSIDERED AVAILABLE ON INSTANT CALL TO SETTLE ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS RAISED AT SENIOR MEMBERS MEETINGS.

6. WHILE WE CERTAIN THEY WOULD TRY TO USE SECRETARIES MEETING TO THEIR ADVANTAGE, IF IT CANNOT BE AVOIDED, RECOMMEND THAT UNCNAC SECRETARY BE INSTRUCTED TO LISTEN TO WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY AND ACCEPT INFORMATION

PAGE 4 RUALOS 4002E ~~SECRET~~
THEY WISH TO PASS WITHOUT COMMENT. IF THEY ATTEMPT TO PASS DECEASED OR BADLY WOUNDED MEMBERS OF CREW, HE WOULD REQUIRE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ON NATURE OF RECEIPT HE MIGHT SIGN.

7. REQUEST GUIDANCE. GP-3. PORTER

BT

* OMISSION, CORRECTIONS TO FOLLOW.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Jean Rey
Wednesday, February 7, 5:30 P. M.

As head of the Commission of the European Communities (Common Market, Euratom, Coal and Steel Community), Rey is one of the most influential officials in Europe. During his visit here he is meeting with your senior advisers on balance of payments issues, trade, agriculture, science and atomic energy. He will speak at a National Press Club luncheon on the day of his meeting with you. His main purpose in coming here, on his first visit as President of the Commission, is to meet with you.

Rey's worries here are the impact of our balance of payments program on the Communities -- mainly in the trade field, moves toward protectionism, and our continued support for European unity.

Attached is a good briefing memo from Nick Katzenbach, with talking points and biographic information.

I would only add that Rey may bring up the question of UK entry into the Communities. His speech to the Press Club mentions the hope of a reasonably compromise. This may turn out to be a form of association short of full membership. (Should he raise this possibility, you may wish to tell him we would find it damaging to our trade interests, without offsetting political advantages.)*

* * * * *

Rey will be accompanied by Vice President Hellwig (German, in charge of atomic energy matters), Commissioner Deniau (French, in charge of external trade), and Mr. Rifflet (Rey's special assistant).

Nick Katzenbach, John Leddy and Ambassador Schaetzel will be coming from State. I will be standing by with Ed Fried.

** This is standard U.S. position. We shouldn't change it. But if it turns out U.K. wants to go this route, I doubt we can or would hold out*

W

W. W. Rostow

ERF:mst
ERF:mst

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Rey
of the European Communities,
February 7, 5:30 p.m.

Jean Rey is making his first official visit to Washington as President of the Commission of the European Communities, a post he assumed in July 1967.

Our most important objective in this visit is:

To impress upon the Commission that we are determined to improve our balance of payments with European surplus countries. We seek their cooperation in promoting economic expansion, taking actions to increase our exports and/or agreeing not to retaliate against our own measures to increase our trade surplus.

In addition, we want:

To stress that combating protectionism in the U.S. requires Commission action to hold down protectionist moves in the Communities and progress to reduce non-tariff barriers; and

To convince Rey of your interest in his playing a positive role in the negotiation of a verification agreement under the NPT between the Communities and the IAEA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLJ 96-194
By CB, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Rey's objectives are:

Continued U.S. support for European unity based on the European Communities.

-- You might point out that this is long-standing U.S. policy. It is also important to maintain the momentum of the British application.

To encourage you to resist protectionist pressures threatening the Kennedy Round, and to abolish the American Selling Price.

-- Recount your efforts with the Congress but point out that fighting protectionism is a two-way street.

To explore establishing some sort of consultative mechanism between the U.S. and the Commission, an idea he is developing further within the Commission and with the members.

-- Tell him we agree to the usefulness of high-level consultation as needed to deal with problems of mutual concern. Just before his call on you we will have held a meeting between his party and interested sub-Cabinet officials focusing on the balance of payments problem. We can proceed in this informal manner to build up experience on the right form of consultation.


Enclosed are talking points for your meeting (Tab A). I have sent you a separate memorandum with a suggested text for a Joint Statement to be issued after your meeting with Rey. If you agree to such a statement, you may wish to review it with Rey at this meeting.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Vice President Hellwig and Commissioner Deniau will accompany Mr. Rey to the White House and will hope to greet you.

I will be present for the meeting. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Leddy and Ambassador Schaetzel will also be available.

A short fact sheet on the Communities with biographic data on Rey and his party is also enclosed (Tab B).


Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Enclosures:

- Tab A - Talking Points.
- Tab B - Fact Sheet and Biographic Data.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS

Presidential Opening

- Congratulate Rey on his role in the success of the Kennedy Round and his efforts to maintain forward motion on development of the European Communities and on U.K. membership.
- State continued support of European unification based on the European Communities.

Balance of Payments

You May Wish to Say

- U.S. is determined to reduce balance of payments deficit this year, by a tax increase and a curb on Government expenditures at home; a curb on capital outflows, travel and Government expenditures abroad, and improvement in our trade position.
- The countries of the European Communities have responsibilities to help restore international payments equilibrium. The Commission can help by:
 - promoting economic growth in member countries;
 - taking actions which increase U.S. exports and/or by agreeing not to retaliate against measures the U.S. may take to increase its trade surplus.

Rey May Say

- Your program is courageous, but Europeans demand restraint on U.S. inflation and regard your income tax surcharge proposal as crucial.
- The U.S. already has a billion dollar trade surplus with the Communities. Trade restriction is contagious.

You May Wish to Respond

- We favor an expansionary rather than a restrictive approach to the balance of payments problem but this depends on European cooperation.

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- 2 -

Protectionism

Rey May Say

- He hopes you will succeed in resisting the protectionist threat and get Congress to abolish the American Selling Price.

You May Wish to Say

- We will submit legislation to Congress to terminate the American Selling Price system and to endorse negotiations for reduction of non-tariff barriers.
- Liberal trade is a two-way street. The Commission should hold down EC protectionist moves (e.g., by resisting pressures for a highly restrictive tobacco policy, avoiding increased levies on poultry, exercising restraint toward increased export subsidies) that stimulate protectionist sentiment in this country and by moving forward together with us to reduce non-tariff trade barriers.

Non-Proliferation Treaty

You May Wish to Say

- We are pleased we obtained Soviet agreement to an Article III (on safeguards) satisfactory to our allies. The text together with our interpretations in Geneva will permit the EC Commission to negotiate a verification agreement with the IAEA.
- We hope Rey will use his influence to ensure a successful negotiation with the IAEA, showing the same statesmanlike approach he displayed during the Kennedy Round.

Rey May Reply

- It is too early for the Commission to begin negotiations with the IAEA. Member countries will first have to give it a mandate to do so.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 3 -

You May Wish to Respond

- Even though it may be too early for formal negotiations, the Commission should prepare itself for informal contacts with the IAEA as soon as possible.

U.K. Membership

You May Wish to Say

- We favor steps which maintain the momentum of the application of the U.K. and other European applicants (Norway, Denmark and Ireland).

Rey May Say

- Since the French veto last December, the task of keeping the U.K. application alive has been complicated by the German desire not to break with France and U.K. unwillingness to consider any compromise arrangement which does not lead to full membership at a specified stage.

You May Wish to Respond

- We have always opposed special trading arrangements between the U.K. and the Six (such as the French have mentioned and the Germans have been toying with) not involving a firm commitment on membership. Such arrangements would discriminate against U.S. exports, without offsetting political advantages. This would be especially difficult now in view of our balance of payments problem and the rise of protectionist sentiment.

Consultative Arrangement

Rey May Say

- He would like to explore with EC governments the possibilities of some institutionalized mechanism for high-level consultation between the Commission and the U.S. He may refer to his meeting with sub-Cabinet officials on the balance of payments as being a useful precedent.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- 4 -

You May Wish to Say

-- We are willing to consult at high levels as needed to head off or solve problems which may arise between us. Cite Katzenbach visit January 4 and Rostow visit January 29 as examples. We would think it useful to continue informally building up experience, as in the combined meeting earlier in the day.

Joint Statement

-- (If you have agreed to issue a joint statement), you may wish to go over the suggested text with Rey.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14c

Fact Sheet and Biographic Data

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By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

The European Communities

The European Communities form the basis for European unification. They comprise the Common Market, Euratom and the European Coal and Steel Community. Last July their separate executive bodies were merged into the single 14-member Commission of the European Communities and Rey was named by the six Member States (France, Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries) to be its first president. The major powers of the Commission are so far primarily in the trade and agricultural fields. However, as the customs union (which will be completed in July 1968) develops into full economic union, the powers of the Commission and its president will expand. The Six are already increasingly coordinating their international monetary and financial policies in the framework of the Communities.

Jean Rey

Jean Rey, 65, the son of a Protestant clergyman, is a Belgian national who was trained as a lawyer and served as a minister in several Belgian Governments. He has been a Commissioner of the Common Market since its inception in 1958 and was elected President of the unified Commission in July 1967. Rey was the able negotiator for the Common Market during the Kennedy Round trade negotiations, which he believes to be an example of the meaning of partnership with the United States. His support of U.K. membership in the European Communities despite French opposition has been courageous and statesmanlike. He will be a key figure in whatever is worked out between the U.K. and Europe.

Rey is deeply committed to European unification and to partnership with the United States but has to tread carefully to take account of present French policy. His daughter lives in California where her neuro-surgeon husband is a professor at UCLA. He speaks fluent English.

Accompanying Rey

Commission Vice President Fritz Hellwig and Commissioner Jean Francois Deniau will accompany Rey to the White House and will hope to greet you.

Hellwig comes from the European Coal and Steel Community where he was one of the more powerful members. His political base is Ruhr industry and he is on good terms with Chancellor Kiesinger. He is friendly to us and speaks good English.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Deniau is a brilliant young Frenchman whose primary responsibility in the Commission is foreign trade. Although committed to European unification, friendly to us and not a Gaullist, Deniau is prudent about questions on which he disagrees with General de Gaulle.

Photographs are enclosed.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. ~~2/8~~
2. Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Aircraft Sale to Israel

Just to give you a full response to your queries Sunday, the Israelis and Defense signed the agreement on January 30 for 40 more Skyhawks. They did this on the basis of your statement to Eshkol that you would add 27-30 Skyhawks to the present agreement--or another 10 if needed. Israel asked for 40.

I think we get two things out of this:

First, for the first time we have made a 100% cash sale to Israel for arms--\$60 million. They were in a hurry since the contract had to be signed by 1 February to take advantage of the production line arrangements Secretary McNamara worked out at your request.

Second, we will take advantage of your having gone the extra mile with Eshkol in our coming approaches to Eshkol and Eban to get the Jarring exercise off dead center.

Third, with this response and our generous handling of General Hod we seem to have bought a calm on the subject of aircraft for Israel. It remains to be seen, but we hope we may also have bought quiet--at least from the Israelis themselves--on our Jordan arms package.

In addition, you should know that Generals Hod and Wheeler had a good series of talks. Hod went back to Israel to do some homework and sent four of his officers back for technical discussions. If any cover was needed, the negotiations for the added Skyhawks provided it. Now General Wheeler is waiting for the final answers he needs from Hod to prepare the memo you asked for following the Eshkol visit.

One other point you should be aware of is that Secretary McNamara has married the current Skyhawk production line to the new one so as to slow the present one slightly but complete delivery of all Skyhawks by January 1970. This means that 4 were delivered in December; 28 will be delivered in 1968; 56 will be delivered in 1969 and January 1970. This pushes 16 originally scheduled for 1968 delivery into 1969, but the Israelis have agreed.

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NLJ 96-193
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

16

February 6, 1968

Mr. President:

Ambassador Thompson reports his discussion with Chairman Kossygin on the Middle East and Vietnam.

Pres file

Bromley Smith

16a

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT

TEXT OF CABLE FROM AMBASSADOR THOMPSON (Moscow 2710)

During my meeting with Kosygin on another matter today, he raised Middle East and Vietnam in context with his assertion that Soviets desired settlement of existing conflicts rather than creation of new ones.

Kosygin maintained that if there were a real desire for Middle East settlement, it could be achieved very quickly. If both the U. S. and U.S.S.R. were to tell Israel to withdraw from occupied territories, it would do so. However, apparently, some people wanted to continue tensions in the area. Israel was the aggressor, but if Israelis were to withdraw, everything else would fall into place, including the question of reopening the Suez. But the U. S. apparently did not want settlement and wished the tensions to continue. On the other hand, the Soviets wanted no conflicts anywhere and no one could accuse them of the contrary.

I stressed that we also wanted prompt Middle East settlement and noted that he was over-simplifying the problem. For one thing, Israeli Army is not under our control and is not accepting orders from us. In view of their experience, the Israelis are concerned about their security and wish to improve it. The Israelis won the war, but the other side does not want to talk to them. Also, the Israelis have their own views as to who the aggressor was. I expressed the hope that the Jarring Mission would be successful and emphasized the U. S. has no interest in continuing the conflict in the area. I also thought Israel was not interested in continuation of the present situation either, because it had to look after its long-range interests. The Israelis know that they are surrounded by much larger Arab population and that in order to live in peace, they have to find an accommodation with their neighbors. Yet, on the basis of their experience, they seem no longer to rely on the UN or anybody else for their security and are seeking to ensure it themselves. I said I wished to assure Kosygin that we had no interests in continued tensions in the Middle East.

Kosygin argued that in justifying Israelis' position, the U.S., in effect, was protracting the conflict. The U. S. should urge the Israelis to withdraw and thus assist the Jarring Mission.

I asked Kosygin if he really believed that if the Israelis withdrew, all other parts of the UN resolution would be implemented. Kosygin replied in the affirmative and said that otherwise the present situation, involving closure of the canal and misery for the Arab refugees, would continue. He then asserted that since Israel could not support financially such a big army indefinitely, the U. S. would have to support it.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
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I noted that, as the President had said, we are trying to restrain the arms race in the area despite considerable arms supplies being delivered to the other side and in so doing, we are seeking to facilitate the Jarring Mission.

Kosygin said the arms race would continue as long as military confrontation existed. In this connection, he cited the India-Pakistani situation, saying that the arms race in that area abated only after confrontation had ended. He said he knew that Israel was dispatching its people all over the world to try to get arms. Indeed, the U. S. was giving Israel 50 planes, thus the arms race will probably continue until and unless cause of tension is removed. As to my remark that the Israelis had their own view as to who the aggressor was, Kosygin said no aggressor would admit its aggression and Israel would never admit its own.

While saying that admittedly this was not entirely a one-sided affair, I pointed out that Nasser had taken some actions, such as withdrawal of U. N. observers, closure of Tiran Straits and movement of UAR troops into the Sinai Peninsula, which frightened the Israelis and made them think that Arabs would carry out their earlier threats. We had not been party to the conflict and tried to do everything to discourage hostilities. In any event, I did not wish to argue Israelis' case here for Israelis themselves were doing that quite eloquently.

In response to my reiterating the hope that the Jarring Mission would succeed, Kosygin said that it depended on us. If Israel continued to refuse to withdraw, the mission would fail. He said the main thing was to remove the roots of conflict; if that were done, the way to settlement would be clear.

I said that I agreed it was important to remove the cause of conflict and reach prompt settlement, for ~~I believed that continued conflict was in no one's interest.~~

~~Kosygin said he was sure that this was so~~ and that if the conflict continued, the U. S. would find that the situation would give it nothing but complications. Although the U. S. is a very powerful and rich country, it should know that it is not able to handle all situations as it pleases. Vietnam was a case in point. People fighting the U.S. there were not Russians or Frenchmen, but Vietnamese themselves. The U. S. is supporting what it calls the Saigon Government just as it had supported Denikin, Kolchak and Mueller in Russia during the civil war. He himself had fought against Americans in north Russia during intervention but the U. S. knows full well that neither Denikin or other so-called governments in Russia nor Saigon clique represented anyone. People in Vietnam do not support the Saigon Government and now is a good time for the U. S. to leave, for that government has, in effect, dispersed and ceased to exist. All the members of that government are doing now is fighting among themselves. The entire population in South Vietnam has risen while the U. S. is fighting in support of rotten elements fleeing from their own people. ~~He maintained that now is the most convenient moment for the U. S. to withdraw and cease interference, which only is creating tensions in the world.~~ He said he was convinced that we could not explain to anyone why the U. S. is in Vietnam and certainly that no one can be convinced by any of our explanations. He

also said that he knew his remarks would not change U. S. policy, but he felt he would express his views to me on the basis of our long acquaintance.

I said the picture as we saw it was quite different. While it was true that some opponents of the government appeared strongly motivated, there were more South Vietnamese supporting the government than opposing it, and in fact, even some of those opposing it were forced to do so. Our main purpose in Vietnam was to stop aggression from the north and insure conditions for peaceful resolution of South Vietnamese problems without foreign interference. I referred to the last year's elections in South Vietnam. While those elections were held in difficult circumstances and were therefore not ideal, they still represented a significant step towards democratic development of South Vietnam. In fact, some of those elected were opponents of the present government.

Kosygin asserted we know that the situation is quite different. He said there are entire South Vietnamese units now deserting because they have nothing to fight for. Members of the so-called Saigon Government cannot appear anywhere for fear of being assassinated. The U. S. knows perfectly well there is no government in Saigon. He, of course, realized that even though everyone has his own thoughts and views on certain problems, he sometimes is obliged to state different views because of his position. Yet no one will ever be convinced by the U. S. explanations. He repeated that he knew, of course, that his remarks would have no effect on U. S. policy.

I said that Kosygin's information about the situation in Vietnam was at variance with ours. Most of the fighting now is being done by government forces whose losses were greater than those of the U. S. forces. While fighting was fierce, South Vietnamese troops had achieved considerable success. Indeed, according to our figures, 20,000 men were killed on the other side in recent days.

~~SECRET~~Tuesday, February 6, 1968
*1. copy
2. Pur file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Shah's Reply on the Persian Gulf--and Your Talk with Wilson

The Shah replied immediately to your message on the Persian Gulf (attached). He had already made his final decision to postpone his visit to Saudi Arabia, but your letter let him know you expect him to act the statesman in developing local cooperation in the Gulf.

The Shah says he agrees with your view of the Gulf, and, although he tries to throw the blame for recent disagreements with Faisal on the Saudis, Armin Meyer thinks the Iranians are feeling guilty and will be especially good for a while. The quickness of the Shah's reply is one indication of how he takes your views.

This doesn't mean clear sailing ahead in the Gulf. The Shah may be feeling a bit overconfident, and his muscle-flexing may be part of the Gulf scene for some time. Also, local feuds and suspicions have long histories. But we have injected a sobering perspective at a heated moment. Fortunately, King Faisal--although deeply hurt by the Shah's actions and more distrustful than ever--is being much more patient than anyone expected.

The next step we will propose in your efforts to foster an orderly evolution in the Gulf is a word to Prime Minister Wilson. The main point is: Don't rock the boat any more than you already have; help us buy time for the locals to work out their own arrangements for the future.

First, we want the British to leave their treaties and political relationships intact to help calm local rulers' feelings of being deserted. Second, we want to keep the British from rushing around trying to arrange security pacts and other deals that won't work because they'll have an obvious "made in the UK" label. We think the best tack is for them to sit tight with their present relationships and let the locals come up with their own scheme for the future.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193

By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

17a

TEXT OF MESSAGE.

TEHERAN, IRAN
FEBRUARY 1, 1968

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER WHICH I HAVE RECEIVED TODAY AND HAVE PERUSED WITH GREAT CARE, AND I AM HAPPY TO OBSERVE THAT YOUR VIEWS CORRESPOND EXACTLY WITH MINE.

WE HAVE DONE EVERYTHING TO SECURE THE STABILITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF AREA IN COOPERATION WITH THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. WE HAVE GONE VERY FAR IN THAT DIRECTION, AND AS FAR AS ANY ONE CAN GO, BUT OUR EFFORTS SO FAR HAVE, UNFORTUNATELY, BEEN ANSWERED BY PRECISELY THE OPPOSITE REACTION TO THAT EXPECTED. BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO SHOW PATIENCE UNTIL THE PARTIES CONCERNED COME TO THEIR SENSES.

THE PERSIAN GULF IS VITAL FOR IRAN AND IS A MATTER OF LIFE AND DEATH TO US. SO LONG AS OUR HEART BEATS AND THERE IS ANY STRENGTH LEFT IN US, WE SHALL DO OUR UTMOST TO KEEP IT A FREE ZONE AND A STABLE ONE.

I AM SURE THAT YOUR AMBASSADOR, MR. MEYER, HAS REPORTED TO YOU ON THE CONVERSATION I HAD WITH HIM ON THE THIRTIETH OF JANUARY. IT IS MOST HEARTENING TO WITNESS THE INTEREST THAT YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND YOUR GOVERNMENT EVINCE IN THE SAFEGUARDING OF THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE PERSIAN GULF AND ITS IMMUNITY FROM OUTSIDE INTRUSION, NOW THAT THE BRITISH HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW.

IT IS ALSO MY FIRM CONVICTION THAT NO FOREIGN POWER OUTSIDE THE RELEVANT COUNTRIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF SHOULD GET INVOLVED IN

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PEACE OF THE AREA.

I LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING UNDER SECRETARY ROSTOW AND
TO HAVING DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM.

WITH MY KINDEST REGARDS AND WARMEST GOOD WISHES,

SINCERELY,

MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI

THE HONOURABLE
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

Pres file

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Tuesday, February 6, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Jordan Arms Package

In the attached, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara recommend what they feel is the minimum package that King Hussein might see as meeting his legitimate needs. This poses two separate issues: (1) whether you are now ready to go ahead with a substantial program; and (2) if so, how to handle the difficult Conte-Long amendments.

I. The package contains 18 F-104 aircraft, 88 M-48 A-1 tanks, medium artillery and a range of support equipment. This \$82 million (FY 1968-FY 1970) package contrasts to Hussein's \$200 million request, which included 36 aircraft and 200 M-48 A-4 tanks. Our rationale for paring his request is to help replace war losses except for some planes and tanks and heavy artillery. We would have to be willing to consider something beyond this package later but would suggest starting with this.

Our paring may leave this too little to meet what Hussein considers his needs. He lost 179 tanks in June, and we are offering half that. He wants tanks with a diesel engine (greater range) and a 105 mm. gun (which we sold the Israelis). We couldn't supply what he wants for two years. Our plane offer has a better chance, since we would just pick up our 1966 contract where it was suspended but offer half the number of planes now.

Our two hopes for flexibility are (a) that he can get British tanks to his specifications much sooner (they're available) and (b) that he might take some British aircraft if the Saudis would give them and we would supply a few more tanks instead. But the Secretaries feel we have to offer to supply both if neither of these deals works out.

Jordan could pay cash for the FY 1968 installment (about \$32 million, of which \$10 million already paid under the 1966 contract). The cost in FY 1969 would be \$36.3 million and in FY 1970 \$10.3 million. Neither Khammash nor the USG yet knows definitely how the FY 1968 and FY 1969 tranches might be financed, so we would have to feel our way.

This package will be painful to approve, but the alternative is accepting the probable consequences of not going ahead now. Eshkol acknowledged to you that he wished no one had to give arms to Jordan but he'd rather see us there than the USSR. Dayan in a published interview on January 19 said: "We shall not profit by it in any way if the Americans lose their influence in Jordan."

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- 2 -

I should hate to see this presented to you simply as selling arms to block Soviet military aid, because the issue is now much broader. We have reached the point in Jordan where the question is whether they think they have a better chance of achieving their objectives with US or Soviet help. If we are ending our aid relationship and are unable to press Israel toward a settlement, then Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing. It would just about end chances for the kind of settlement we'd like.

There are other things we must do on the diplomatic front such as presenting a clearer position on Jerusalem and helping get the Jarring exercise moving. But unfortunately, this military aid decision has become a symbol to Hussein. We have strung him along since last June, and Khammash has been here since January 17. Now Hussein has told you he would continue to avoid Soviet arms if he could be sure of meeting his legitimate needs in the US. That is the purpose of this exercise.

Approve Secretaries' approach _____ Disapprove _____ Call me _____

II. The Conte-Long amendments require you to withhold aid from Jordan in an amount equal to its expenditure for sophisticated weapons unless you waive on the ground that the Jordanian purchases are "vital to the national security of the United States." The airplanes, the tanks, and the howitzers in this package are pretty clearly sophisticated weapons. If you do not waive, we would have to eliminate all economic aid to Jordan for at least the next two years.

It would be possible to weave a complicated legal argument which might allow you to maintain aid without a waiver. But it would be very dubious and would certainly cause serious trouble on the Hill. Therefore, Rusk and McNamara recommend that you make the waiver.

This will be the first use of the waiver provision. I think the Secretaries have a strong case, but you may want to have some fast checking done on the Hill. I don't think we should seek agreement from Conte, Fulbright, Morse, Church and the others most interested in this topic, but you may want to be able to say that you notified them beforehand. (The law requires you to make formal notification of waiver to the Congress within 30 days.)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

- 3 -

III. If you approve this package, Secretary McNamara would go over it in detail with Khammash. In view of the importance of your personal intentions as Hussein sees them, there could be great advantage in your inviting him in before he leaves for a heart-to-heart talk.

I'll see him _____

I'd rather not _____

W. W. Rostow

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~~TOP SECRET~~

**Lunch Meeting with the President
Tuesday, February 6, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.**

AGENDA

- 1. Korea (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - Panmunjom and beyond
- 2. Vietnam (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
- 3. Bombing Targets (Secretary McNamara)
 - narrow circles?
- 4. Jordan Arms (Secretaries Rusk and McNamara)
 - Note at Tab A is a briefing paper on the Jordan Arms Package which you will wish to read, also as a backdrop for your 11:00 A. M. appointment with Israeli Ambassador Harman.
- 5. Other
- 6. Personnel (Secretary Rusk)

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
 White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
 By kg, NARA, Date 1309

INFORMATION

20

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:50 a.m.

Pres file

Herewith Gen. Wheeler's daily Khe Sanh
summary.

The handwritten note on Abrams' assess-
ment is encouraging.

In fact, there are now two solid conclusions:

- the people didn't rise;
- the government and the South Vietnamese
functioned under maximum surprise,
shock, and strain.

W. W. Rostow

CM-2970-68
6 February 1968

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By ry, NARA, Date 130-92



THE JOINT STAFF

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20a

CM-2970-68
6 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area.

1. There have been no major enemy contacts reported in the Khe Sanh area since the enemy attack on Hill 861. An updated report on US Marine casualties during the attack on Hill 861 shows 14 killed and 32 wounded.

2. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area received sporadic small arms and mortar fire. The enemy fire increased as supply missions to the outlying outposts and Hill 861 were conducted. However, there were no reports of casualties during the period. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 7,788 rounds of various caliber artillery and mortar ammunition in response to the sporadic harassment fire by the enemy forces.

3. During the past 24 hours, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 55 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. On 4 February (5 February South Vietnam time), 33 B-52 sorties, not previously reported, were flown against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. The B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 now total 654, with approximately 19,000 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy.

4. US tactical aircraft flew 213 strike sorties in support of US Marine units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (88 US Air Force, 90 US Navy, 35 US Marine Corps). Bomb damage assessment of the foregoing sorties included fifteen bunkers destroyed, seven gun positions destroyed, three trucks destroyed, three secondary fires, and one secondary explosion.

5. Air landed resupply during the period amounted to 214 tons.

6. No COFRAM was used during the period.

7. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST (4:00 PM, 6 Feb, South Vietnam time) today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 10 miles. The outlook for the next 14 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility,

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By ghg, NARA, Date 2-3-92

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drizzle and fog. From 9:00 PM EST, 6 Feb (10:00 AM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) until 7:00 AM EST, 7 Feb (8:00 PM, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time) the outlook is improved: cloudy, but with higher ceilings, and visibility at seven miles, with occasional light showers.

8. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:

a. During the next 24 hours, a total of 33 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb five targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Two of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh, two targets are near the Laotian border approximately 10 miles southwest of Khe Sanh, and one target is adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.

b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today (12:00 Noon, 7 Feb, South Vietnam time), 175 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. One hundred thirty-four additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 646 could be diverted into the area.

9. There have been no changes reported in enemy troop dispositions in the Khe Sanh area.

Earle G. Wheeler

EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

P.S. I talked to Gen Westwood and at 0830 hours. He had nothing spectacular to report. However, he stated that Gen Abrams has now visited all ARVN divisions except the 1st and 2nd in I Corps. Gen Abrams is highly pleased by alertness, aggressiveness and steadiness of all division commanders.

W

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ACTION

See file

Tuesday, Feb. 6, 1968
9:50 a. m.

21

Mr. President:

Herewith constructive thoughts from Amb. Lodge.

May I make them available to Sects. Rusk and
McNamara and Dick Helms?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment (log 520 memo 2/5/68 fm HCLodge to P)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

212

February 5, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~ - NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

To: The President

Authority State Ltr 1-24-79

From: H. C. Lodge

By ip/rg, NARA, Date 2-3-92

H. C. Lodge

1. While some of the recent raids in Viet-Nam eventually took on a conventional military aspect (as, for example, in Hue), most of them were clandestine; were conducted in civilian clothes; and were closely intertwined with the civilian population for information, for path finding, and for attempted political effects.
2. These raids, therefore, were appropriate activities for the use of police-type techniques and it seems fair to conclude that if the police-type work -- whether by military or police personnel -- had been superior, many of the raids would have been prevented and those which would not have been prevented would have been more rapidly put down.
3. The existence of effective police-type forces being, I believe, utterly vital both in the long and short run, I suggest that the present is a good time to have a fresh audit made of the adequacy of existing Vietnamese forces -- as to size, organization and training -- to perform those police-type functions.
4. This audit should be made by a civilian, since these clandestine terrorist raids involve weighty political and psychological considerations which make them altogether different from the military. The

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audit should be done as quietly, tactfully, unobtrusively, informally -- and rapidly -- as possible.

5. The above is said without derogating from the courageous performance of individual Vietnamese during the past week and from what has already been accomplished by the Americans in charge of pacification.
6. This moment may, however, be the heaven-sent opportunity to give the GVN some much needed stimulus which normally they would not be able to take.
7. Some of the questions to which answers should be obtained, on the American side, are:
 - a) With how much intensity and sharp focus is the job of revamping the ARVN going?
 - b) How clearly is the new mission of the ARVN, notably in its sociological and civil implications, understood up and down the line?
 - c) Are the ARVN trainers persuading and enthusing?
 - d) Do the trainers understand it all themselves?
8. Some questions on the Vietnamese side are:
 - a) What progress has been made on rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure in the places which were raided last week?
 - b) If, as has been reported, advance knowledge existed of the intended raids, what was done before the raids took place by way of a "comb out", that is: verification of identity cards, checkpoints, curfew, etc.

TOP SECRET - NODIS

- 3 -

- c) To what extent were the infiltrators picked up when they arrived in town?
- d) Are the police generally easily available in the slum sections of Saigon where information on location of Viet Cong normally exists? If not, are steps being taken to make them so?
- e) What is the feasibility of organizing the urban masses themselves to help the police?

H.C. [Signature]

TOP SECRET - NODIS

Tuesday, Feb. 6, 1968
9:45 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith the CIA's Board of National Estimates conclude there probably isn't much in it for the Russians in trying to divert us from Viet Nam with another major, dramatic crisis; but they will continue "to seize all occasions to harass and complicate the American effort in Viet Nam."

Worth reading.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ Attachment (log 516 "The Second Front Hypothesis" 5 Feb 68)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-199
By is, NARA Date 8-19-98

516 22a

~~SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. You will recall that at lunch on Thursday there was discussion with the Service Chiefs of what steps the Soviets might take to harass the United States in parts of the world other than Vietnam. Emphasis in the talk was placed on significant diversions which might in effect present the United States with another "front".

2. In light of this discussion, I asked the Board of National Estimates to write a paper on this subject. It is herewith.

Rich

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment - 1

The "Second Front" Hypothesis

cc: Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200
By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

22b

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

5 February 1968

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200
By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: The "Second Front" Hypothesis

1. Will the Soviets pose a major challenge to the US at some other point of confrontation in order to assist the Communist cause in Vietnam? When put previously, this question has been answered in the negative. The present stage of the struggle in Vietnam perhaps makes it relevant again.

2. There has not been much doubt, at least since 1964, that the Soviets regard the "national liberation" struggle in Vietnam and the burdens it places on American policy and resources as advantageous to them in the perspective of the broader Soviet-American competition. They have given great and essential material aid to the North Vietnamese. Their propaganda and diplomacy have been tireless in support of Hanoi, increasing wherever possible the political costs the US has had to bear because of its involvement. Clearly, they would welcome an

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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outcome which constituted a defeat for the US, not only because this would mean a local advance for Communist forces, but also, and perhaps more importantly, because of the setback to US power and influence generally. If some diversionary action of theirs could insure this result, it might appear that they would have every reason to undertake it.

How the Soviet Leaders Might Calculate

3. A Soviet decision to move in this way is more complex than appears at first blush, however. Some sense of this can be obtained by posing the questions which the Soviet leadership would ask itself in making its calculations about a diversionary action.

4. Is the Soviet move necessary to Communist success in Vietnam? -- The actual Soviet estimate of the outlook for the war is not known. If Moscow believes that Communist victory is certain eventually, it has no incentive to do much more than it is already doing. If it believes the war is at a stalemate, it probably considers that a more direct involvement would limit its ability to help the Communist side in eventual negotiations. Meantime, Soviet propaganda can continue to exploit the war against the US in many areas. Probably only if the Soviets believed that a

diversionary move by them was necessary to avert collapse of the Communist effort in South Vietnam would they have compelling reason to entertain such a move at all. There is no indication that they estimate the situation in Vietnam in this way.

5. Is Hanoi's victory in the South vital for the USSR? --

It is unlikely that the Soviets believe that it is. They were not a party to Hanoi's initial decisions, and everything we know about the North Vietnamese leadership indicates that it would probably not assert that the Soviets had an obligation to act to insure success. There is evidence that in the early phase of American direct involvement the Soviets counseled negotiations and were rebuffed. They do not assert that any security interest of their own is involved. Finally, the Soviets must know that, even if Hanoi won, its support for Moscow in the latter's contest with Peking for influence in the Communist movement would not be assured. In this regard, in fact, a failure of Hanoi's adventure in South Vietnam might be as auspicious.

6. Could there be assurance that pressures on the US elsewhere would achieve the desired effect, i.e., cause the US to abandon its objectives in Vietnam? -- The Soviet leaders would

probably have to give a problematical answer. They would recognize that a threat to transform the issue into a general Soviet-American confrontation could harden American will rather than the contrary. Some if not all of those in this and other countries who oppose the American course in Vietnam would take a new view of what was at stake. The resulting political climate might make it easier for the US Administration to undertake a fuller mobilization of military resources. Further, when world opinion recognized that the Vietnam issue had broadened into a dangerous Soviet-American confrontation, demands would mount sharply that all parties negotiate at once. Hanoi, too, would then be heavily pressured to abandon its dilatory tactics and to negotiate without pre-conditions, the precise result US policy has long sought.

7. Could the cure turn out to be worse than the disease, i.e., might a diversionary crisis bring on direct Soviet-American hostilities, or at least high and uncontrollable risks of them? --

Something would obviously depend on the locale and intensity of the challenge posed. But if the Soviets aimed at a significant diversion of American military resources from Vietnam, or at convincing the US that it faced a major setback in some other area, then the challenge would have to be formidable indeed. Ugly

words or gestures would not be enough; Soviet practice has long since depreciated such currency. If Moscow actually did something big enough to have a serious effect on the US, then it could scarcely escape some considerable measure of risk. It is entirely possible that the Soviets think that there is no effective diversionary move they can make, the risks of which are not out of all proportion to whatever stake they have in Communist success in South Vietnam. Moreover, to make the attempt and fail would not only be costly to the USSR itself but damaging to the Communist cause in Vietnam.

8. Would the challenging move by the USSR involve costs for other aspects of Soviet policy or in other areas? -- The Soviet leaders are aware that in many countries they are credited with having renounced bad old aggressive habits in favor of peaceful methods. For some opinion, the US involvement in war has heightened Soviet repute by contrast. Threatening Soviet moves in areas other than Vietnam would revive old memories, even though some would still find it easy to blame the US for such a turn in Soviet policy. The tactics of Communist parties in Western countries, now aimed at establishing political alliances with non-Communist groups, would probably be compromised. The Soviets

would even consider the cost to bilateral relations with the US. Bad as these have been, they have not precluded movement on some matters in which the Soviets have an interest, for example, the NPT. And Washington's hopes for certain constructive developments in Soviet-American relations have caused it to tolerate Soviet aid to Hanoi. Sharp new Soviet-American tensions would change the setting and the play in many ways which Moscow would probably see as potentially disadvantageous.

Where and How

9. Questions like those above, which the Soviet leaders would inevitably ask themselves, make it clear that a decision to incite a major crisis elsewhere would be at least a very complicated one. Still, they obviously have such a capability. When they ask themselves where and how specifically they should act, however, the decision would probably seem even tougher.

10. Berlin. -- This chronic focus of crisis has the advantage of insuring maximum Soviet control; the screw has been turned there with great delicacy in the past. Beyond a certain point, however, no area of possible confrontation carries greater danger. Even well short of maximum risk, moreover, gains which have been

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

registered in Western European attitudes toward the USSR, with all that these imply for Soviet hopes of undermining the American position in Europe, would tend to be reversed. While some might blame American policy for causing new tensions in Europe, very few would accept a Soviet power play in Berlin with equanimity. Even the USSR's allies in Eastern Europe, except perhaps East Germany, would be appalled by a new crisis over Berlin.

11. Korea. -- The Soviets appear to have given at least tacit approval to North Korea's policy of armed subversion against the ROK. So far this has had no effect on US and ROK policy in Vietnam. And Pyongyang, despite the Pueblo incident, appears to have no stomach for raising the ante to the point where renewed hostilities could result. The Soviets must recognize that the margin for additional pressure in this theater without bringing this result is narrow. Yet, if there is war, they would be committed in a far more overt way to a regime over which they have far less control than was the case in 1950. The risk of direct Soviet-American hostilities would be greater. The US effort in Vietnam would appear much more plausibly as resistance to a general thrust of Communist aggression in Asia. The resultant change in perspectives would set back Soviet policy

- 7 -

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

in a number of Asian states, and especially in Japan, where a burgeoning trade must seem to hold promise for future Soviet influence.

12. The Middle East -- Here the Soviets would presumably have to act through clients whose reliability and controllability is far from assured. The Arabs will hardly be ready for another round with Israel very soon, and the Soviets have already demonstrated that they do not care to take a direct hand in that quarrel. Moreover, the June war had no effect on the US effort in Vietnam, even though insofar as they played a part in the preliminaries to that event, the Soviets may have thought they were storing up diversionary trouble for the US. Other Middle East tensions could become aggravated (e.g., in the Persian Gulf), but it is hard to see how these could be either on a scale sufficient to have a bearing on the US effort in Vietnam or manipulable by the Soviets to that end.

13. The three areas mentioned are obvious examples; no doubt there are others where Soviet mischief-making might contrive to produce crises of some sort. But it is doubtful that such crises would meet what would appear to be essential criteria: to create a disturbance significant enough to have a real effect on

American policy in Vietnam; to permit close management of risks by the USSR and preclude irresponsible conduct by clients; to avoid important compromises or setbacks for Soviet policy, in the immediate area or generally, which could outweigh whatever the Soviets might gain from possible Communist success in South Vietnam.

Conclusion


14. This analysis, like that made in earlier estimates, finds little to credit in the "second front" hypothesis. It still seems unlikely that the Soviets, in order to further Communist aims in Vietnam, would move against the US elsewhere in some dramatic way. It seems out of character for the present leadership, and incompatible with what it appears to believe it has at stake in Vietnam. But, as indicated, the calculations involved are complicated, and there can be no complete assurance that Soviet judgments would fall out in the manner set down here, either now or at some later stage as the context changes.

15. It is certain, however, that short of the kind of dramatic move considered in this paper, Soviet policy will continue to seize all occasions to harass and complicate the

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

American effort in Vietnam. Where possible, others will be incited to do the same. Anywhere that the American preoccupation with Vietnam offers an opportunity to extend the USSR's influence and reduce that of the US, it will be taken. This much at least seems clearly dictated by the Soviet leaders' present view of their interests.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



JOHN HUIZENGA
Acting Chairman

~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

INFORMATION

23/

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

You will wish to know there are rumors circulating that Ayub's illness may be more serious than first reported.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Rawalpindi 3196

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
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By cb, NARA Date _____

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2
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, MM 01, /031 W

0 060905Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY RAWALPINDI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3065

~~SECRET~~ RAWALPINDI 3196

EXDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR. PLEASE PASS WHITE HOUSE

1. PERSISTENT RUMORS INDICATE AYUB ILLNESS MORE SERIOUS THAN OFFICIALLY ADMITTED. DETAILS SEPTEL.
2. CERTAIN CREDENCE GIVEN SUCH RUMORS BY EVIDENT HIGH LEVEL GOP CONSULTATIONS TAKING PLACE COUPLED WITH CANCELLATION OF ENGAGEMENTS BY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS POWER STRUCTURE INCLUDING AMONG MILITARY DEFENSE MINISTER AND CINC ARMY AS WELL AS CIVILIANS SUCH AS PRESIDENT ADVISER FIDA HASSEN.

PAGE 2 RUQVGM 3196 ~~SECRET~~

3. AM PLANNING TOMORROW, THROUGH FIDA HASSEN, TO OFFER MEDICAL CONSULTATIVE ASSISTANCE UNLESS YOU ADVISE INAPPROPRIATE.
- GP-3 CEHLERT

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

~~SECRET~~

68 FEB 6 AM 8:11

11 MAY

24

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Tuesday, February 6, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You will, I believe, wish to read the summary of this analysis done by the CIA in Saigon, of the Vietnamese attitudes in the wake of the Viet Cong attack. It seems well balanced.

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted]

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Authority NLS 019-028-2-1
By CP, NARA, Date 12-13-01

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 6 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL: ANALYSIS OF VIETNAMESE ATTITUDES
IN WAKE OF VIET CONG ATTACK ON SAIGON

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 FEBRUARY 1968)

FIELD NO.

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SOURCE STAFF OFFICER OF THIS ORGANIZATION. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF A STAFF OFFICER BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO HIM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION.

SUMMARY: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT AND PERHAPS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE FAILURE OF THE VIET CONG (VC) ASSAULT PLAN HAS BEEN THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC EFFORT. PEOPLE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE STRENGTH SHOWN BY THE VC BUT ENRAGED BY THEIR VIOLATION OF THE TET PERIOD. THEY NOW SEEM TO REALIZE THAT THE VC ARE NOT TO BE TRUSTED. FOR MANY, IT WAS

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THEIR FIRST PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE VC TERROR ABOUT WHICH THEY HAD HEARD BUT TO WHICH THEY FELT IMMUNE. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT (GVN) ARE MIXED. THE GVN IS FAULTED FOR HAVING BEEN CAUGHT UNPREPARED BUT ITS REACTION TO THE VC ASSAULT SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN WELL RECEIVED. THE THREAT OF A VC TAKEOVER HAS TENDED TO MUTE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AND, FOR THE MOMENT AT LEAST, TO CREATE A SEMBLANCE OF UNITY. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY IMPORTANT GROUP IS SUBLIMATING VITAL INTERESTS. THE ULTIMATE REACTION WILL PROBABLY DEPEND HEAVILY ON HOW THE GVN HANDLES THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE ATTACK. VARIOUS GVN OFFICIALS ARE BEING CRITICIZED AND IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MAY UNDERTAKE AN INVESTIGATION TO AFFIX BLAME FOR REAL OR ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS ONCE THE SITUATION HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE ATTACK HAS PROMOTED TEMPORARY UNITY AND OFFERS A CHANCE TO CONSOLIDATE IT, BUT THE FORCES DIVIDING VIETNAMESE STILL REMAIN STRONG. OVERALL REACTIONS TO THE U.S. ROLE ARE FAVORABLE, BUT A SURPRISINGLY LARGE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE BELIEVE, OR PROFESS TO BELIEVE, THAT THE U.S. SOMEHOW CONNIVED WITH THE VC. VARIOUS AND CONTRADICTORY REASONS ARE ADVANCED. ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION IS THAT MANY VIETNAMESE ARE CONVINCED THAT NOTHING HAPPENS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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UNLESS THE AMERICANS WANT IT TO HAPPEN. HOSTILITY TOWARD AMERICANS COULD BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM IF CONTINUED VC ATTACKS IN SAIGON SHOULD REQUIRE STRONG U.S. COUNTERMEASURES IN HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS, WITH A RESULTING HEAVY TOLL IN CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE. END SUMMARY.

1. THIS REPORT ATTEMPTS TO COLLATE VIETNAMESE OPINIONS TOWARD THE RECENT ATTACKS BY VIET CONG (VC) FORCES ON THE CITY OF SAIGON. (PROVINCIAL ATTITUDES WILL BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE REPORT.) NATURALLY, IT IS DIFFICULT TO GENERALIZE ABOUT POPULAR PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY TO A STIMULUS OF SUCH SUDDENNESS, COMPLEXITY AND MAGNITUDE. EACH INDIVIDUAL HAS SEEN BUT A SMALL PART OF THE OVERALL PICTURE. HIS FIRST REACTIONS HAVE BEEN SHAPED LARGELY BY THESE LIMITED PERSONAL EXPERIENCES, OCCASIONALLY COLORED BY ESTABLISHED PREJUDICES OR INTERESTS. THOSE WHO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY PERSONAL LOSSES UNDERSTANDABLY HAVE DIFFERENT EMOTIONAL FEELINGS THAN THOSE WHO HAVE MET THE DANGER VICARIOUSLY. FINALLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN ATTITUDES WHICH ARE SHORT RUN AND SUPERFICIAL AND THOSE WHICH WILL HAVE LONG-LASTING EFFECT. MORE OVER, SOME ATTITUDES ARE CONDITIONED PRIMARILY BY THE

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DESIRE TO GAIN PERSONAL POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OR TO ADVANCE A PET IDEA OR PIQUE. IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT OTHERWISE.

2. OPINIONS, OF COURSE, ARE BASED ON WHAT PEOPLE THINK THE SITUATION IS, AND THIS MAY BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM ACTUAL FACT. IN ANY FAST MOVING AND LARGE-SCALE OPERATION RUMORS ARE ALWAYS RAMPANT, A CONDITION WHICH CONTINUES PREVALENT IN SAIGON AT THIS TIME. THE GENERAL LACK OF NEWSPAPERS DURING MUCH OF THIS PERIOD, AND THE PROBLEMS INCURRED BY RADIO SAIGON, HAVE ADDED TO THE ACUTE LACK OF FACTUAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND, INDEED, TO MOST ELITE GROUPS. ANY ANALYSIS ALSO SUFFERS FROM THE LIMITED SAMPLING OF OPINIONS AVAILABLE. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF REPORTING, THERE ARE ALSO OBVIOUS GAPS. ALTHOUGH OPINIONS HAVE BEEN RECORDED FROM A GOOD CROSS SECTION OF THE POPULATION, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EXAMPLE, TO COME TO DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS AT THIS TIME AS TO DIFFERENCES IN GROUP VIEWS, BETWEEN CATHOLICS AND BUDDHISTS, BETWEEN NORTHERNERS AND SOUTHERNERS, AND BETWEEN THE WEALTHY AND THE POOR. DESPITE THESE AND OTHER LIMITATIONS WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE CERTAIN GENERALIZATIONS AND HAZARD SOME INTERPRETATIONS.

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3. FOR THE PURPOSE OF ORDERLY ANALYSIS WE HAVE DIVIDED THE REPORT INTO MAJOR SUB-SECTIONS: ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE VIET CONG, ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT, AND ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE AMERICAN PRESENCE.

"ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THE VIET CONG"

4. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT AND PERHAPS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE FAILURE OF THE VC MASTER PLAN HAS BEEN THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC EFFORT. PRACTICALLY ALL SOURCES COMMENT ON THE REFUSAL OF THE POPULACE TO SUPPORT THE VC CALL FOR A POPULAR UPRISING, EVEN IN THOSE PORTIONS OF THE CITY WHICH WERE TEMPORARILY UNDER VC CONTROL. TO THE CONTRARY, THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS TOOK CONCRETE ACTIONS TO OPPOSE THE VC. SIGNIFICANTLY, MANY OF THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN BY VIETNAMESE FROM THE LOW INCOME GROUPS, THE VERY CLASS THE VC WERE COUNTING ON FOR MAXIMUM SUPPORT. IN ONE CASE, THE VC TOOK REFUGE IN A CYCLO DRIVER'S HOME IN GIA DINH. THE CYCLO DRIVER MANAGED TO ESCAPE, DIRECTED ARVN FORCES TO HIS HOUSE AND TOLD THEM TO DESTROY IT IF NECESSARY TO GET RID OF THE VC. A GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) POLICE REPORT STATES THAT INDIVIDUALS IN THE BAC HA DISTRICT DENOUNCED SUSPECTED VC MEMBERS TO THE AUTHORITIES, AND IN HANG XANH DISTRICT, GIA DINH, THE VILLAGERS REPORT CLASS SECRET [REDACTED]

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ATTACKED SUSPECTED VC MEMBERS WITH STICKS AND CAPTURED SIX OF THEM. IN OTHER CASES CITIZENS REPORTED THE PRESENCE OF A VC UNIT ON A ROAD LEADING TO THE QUANG TRUNG MILITARY TRAINING CENTER IN HOC MON DISTRICT, GIA DINH, AND VILLAGERS IN GIA DINH ALERTED POLICE THAT A COMPANY-SIZED VC UNIT PROBABLY WOULD LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON A POLICE FIELD FORCE. STILL ANOTHER SOURCE, A BUDDHIST, REPORTS THAT INCIDENTS OF THIS SORT HAVE BEEN FAIRLY COMMON IN THE CATHOLIC AREAS OF THE CITY. FINALLY, A VIETNAMESE ARMY COMMANDER STATED THAT IN ALL HIS VISITS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS HIS LIEUTENANTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY HAD SEEN NO EVIDENCE OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE VC.

5. SUCH DIFFERING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSONALITIES AS TRAN VAN TUYEN, THICH TAM GIAC AND NGUEYN VAN NGAI FEEL THAT THE VC BADLY MISREAD THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, WERE SORELY DISAPPOINTED BY THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF SUPPORT AMONG ALL POLITICAL, RELIGIOUS AND ECONOMIC GROUPINGS. SOME VIETNAMESE BELIEVE, AS DOES NGAI, THAT WHILE THE VC MAY HAVE WON A PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, IT HAS SUFFERED A NET PSYCHOLOGICAL LOSS IN ITS OWN BACKYARD.

6. THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING ELEMENTS IN THE "NET LOSS". THE VC SURELY LOST CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY BY VIOLATING THE SPIRIT OF TET.

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THIS VIEW IS WELL SUMMED UP IN THE STATEMENT OF A MIDDLE-AGED VIETNAMESE NURSE WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED TOLERANCE FOR VC ACTS BECAUSE "THAT IS THE WAY ALL SOLDIERS ACT." SHE SAID, "THE VC DELIBERATELY SPOILED TET BY KILLING INNOCENT CIVILIANS AND BURNING HOMES. THEY DID IT AT A TIME WHEN ALL VIETNAMESE WANT A FEW DAYS OF PEACE AND CELEBRATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES. ALL THIS WOULD BE BAD AT ANY TIME BUT IT IS VERY, VERY BAD TO DO SUCH THINGS AT TET. EVERYONE WITH WHOM I HAVE TALKED IS VERY ANGRY AT THE VC AND FEELS IT WILL ALSO BRING BAD LUCK FOR THE COMING YEAR. IT IS LIKE AN EVIL MAN BEING THE FIRST GUEST OF A FAMILY ON TET, WHICH MEANS EVIL AND BAD LUCK FOR THE REST OF THE YEAR."

7. SEVERAL SOURCES HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE VC BROKE A MYTH WHEN THEY RENEGED ON THEIR PROMISE FOR A SEVEN-DAY TET TRUCE. THESE SOURCES CLAIM TO HAVE TALKED WITH A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED VC STATEMENTS BUT NOW SAY THAT THE VC WILL NO LONGER BE TRUSTED. IN SIMILAR VEIN, FOR THE FIRST TIME MANY PEOPLE IN SAIGON WERE ABLE TO COMPARE STATEMENTS MADE ON THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) RADIO WITH NFLSV ACTION, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE VICIOUSNESS OF THEIR ATTACK ON THE CITY. THE CREDIBILITY OF NFLSV RADIO BROADCASTS HAS SUFFERED. ONE SOURCE STATED THAT MANY OF HIS FRIENDS WHO HAD LISTENED TO THESE BROADCASTS REALIZED THAT THE INFOR-

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MATION GIVEN WAS UNTRUE. INSTALLATIONS REPORTEDLY WIPED OUT HAD SUFFERED ONLY SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE. PREDICTIONS MADE DID NOT COME TO PASS. VIETNAMESE ALSO EXPRESSED ANGER THAT THE VC SHOULD USE PAGODAS, HOSPITALS, AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS AS SANCTUARIES AND COMMAND POSTS. THE NET EFFECT OF THE VC ATTACKS MAY BE TO PUSH MANY RESIDENT OF THE CAPITAL WHO PREVIOUSLY STRADDLED THE FENCE INTO AN ANTI-VC POSTURE.

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ATTACKS BROUGHT A NEW APPRECIATION OF VC CAPABILITIES TO MANY URBAN DWELLERS WHO HERETOFORE HAD FELT RELATIVELY LITTLE PRESSURE FROM THE ENEMY. FOR THE FIRST TIME MANY CITIZENS IN SAIGON CAME FACE TO FACE WITH THE ENEMY AND EXPERIENCED FIRST HAND THE TERRORISM AND DESTRUCTION FROM WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY FELT IMMUNE. RESPECT FOR VC CAPABILITY HAS GROWN AND WITH IT A LATENT FEAR OF THE VC. MOST VIETNAMESE WERE SURPRISED THAT THE VC HAD THE ABILITY TO LAUNCH WIDESPREAD, SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS OF SUCH INTENSITY, COORDINATION AND AUDACITY.

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HAS NOTED THE DIFFICULTY IN ASSESSING CURRENT ATTITUDES SINCE MANY PEOPLE ARE STILL IN A STATE OF SHOCK. HIS USE OF THE WORD WAS NOT FIGURATIVE. HE BELIEVES THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE VC HAS BEEN ABLE TO DISRUPT THE LIFE OF SAIGON HAS IMPRESSED MOST PEOPLE. IN

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THIS SENSE THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE VC GAINED AN INITIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY. DESPITE THE ENHANCED CAPABILITY OF THE VC, A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE STATED THAT THEY HAVE FOUND NO INCREASE IN SENTIMENT AMONG VIETNAMESE FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE VC.

9. INCREASED CONCERN OVER THE NEWLY REALIZED CAPABILITY OF THE VC HAS A POSITIVE ASPECT SINCE IT COULD LEAD TO AN INCREASED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND PERHAPS FOR MEASURES NEEDED TO ORGANIZE EFFECTIVE DEFENSE AGAINST THE NEWLY APPRECIATED ENEMY.

"ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT"

10. AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, THE ATTITUDE OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD THEIR GOVERNMENT SEEMS MIXED. ON THE ONE HAND, THE GVN IS FAULTED FOR HAVING BEEN CAUGHT UNPREPARED, FOR NOT HAVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE OF VC PLANS, INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES. A VIETNAMESE [REDACTED]

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COMMENTED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD LOST MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT BECAUSE IT HAD NOT MOVED MORE FORCEFULLY AGAINST THE VC WHILE THEY WERE "ENROUTE TO SAIGON". [REDACTED] CLAIMS THE ATTACKS "REVEALED WEAKNESS AND INEFFECTIVENESS" OF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY APPARATUS.

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11. IN CONTRAST, A NUMBER OF SOURCES ABSOLVE THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHARGE OF INEFFECTIVENESS AND PRAISE THE REACTION OF THE ARVN FORCES.

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[REDACTED] WHO WITNESSED THE VIET CONG ARRIVING IN SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 30 JANUARY OVER THE BIEN HOA BRIDGE, AT FIRST THOUGHT THEY WERE ARVN TROOPS STAGING A COUP. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH AT FIRST HE WAS ANGRY AT THE GOVERNMENT FOR ITS INABILITY TO PREVENT THE VC FROM ENTERING SAIGON, HIS ANGER VANISHED WHEN HE LEARNED HOW WIDESPREAD THE VC ATTACKS WERE. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] IS SATISFIED WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE GVN AND THE ARVN IN REACTING TO THE VC OFFENSIVE. [REDACTED] SAID THAT THIS FEELING IS SHARED BY MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ALSO HAD EXPRESSED HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE ARVN REACTION. [REDACTED] A FORMER [REDACTED] OFFICER, SPENT ONE NIGHT DURING THE ATTACK AT THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF OPERATIONS CENTER. LOWER HOUSE MEMBERS [REDACTED] HAVE SPOKEN APPROVINGLY OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GVN SO FAR. [REDACTED] A NORTHERN CATHOLIC, AGREES. ALTHOUGH HE FAULTS THE GVN FOR POOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING, HE SUPPORTS MOST OF ITS ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE VC THREAT.

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12. THE SPECTRE OF A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER HAS AFFORDED CERTAIN PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS. IT HAS CLEARLY TENDED TO MUTE MINOR POLITICAL DIFFERENCES AND GENERATE A SEMBLANCE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. ANGER AT VC PERFDIDY WILL NOT, HOWEVER, AUTOMATICALLY BE

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TRANSFORMED INTO ACTIVE AND POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR THE THIEU/KY ADMINISTRATION, NOR WILL THE PRESENT COMMENDABLE INTERACTION AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT BY THE VARIOUS RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL GROUPINGS NECESSARILY LEAD TO LONG-TERM COOPERATION OR THE DIMINUTION OF FACTIONALISM. ONE EXAMPLE: ALTHOUGH MILITANT BUDDHIST LEADER [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] HAS ALREADY INDICATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO SUPPORT THE GVN TO THE EXTENT OF ESTABLISHING RECEPTION CENTERS FOR REFUGEES, HE HAS REFUSED TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT DENOUNCING THE VC FOR THEIR WIDESPREAD ATTACKS OR URGE HIS FOLLOWERS NOT TO SUPPORT THE VC. HIS REFUSAL TO ISSUE SUCH A STATEMENT IS PROBABLY RELATED TO HIS DESIRE TO AVOID ANY COMPROMISE OF HIS TRADITIONAL OPPOSITION TO THE PRESENT THIEU-KY REGIME.

13. IN SHORT, WHILE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF TEMPORARY BACKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO DATE THAT ANY IMPORTANT INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP IS SUBLIMATING VITAL INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SHOCK AND CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY THE VC ATTACKS MAY GALVANIZE THE GOVERNMENT TO ACTION AND PROVIDE SUFFICIENT POPULAR ENTHUSIASM TO MAINTAIN FORWARD MOMENTUM AFTER THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS HAS PASSED.

14. THE ULTIMATE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE WAY THE GOVERNMENT HANDLES THE CRISIS FROM NOW ON. QUICK RESTORATION

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OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM WOULD BE A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT FOR THE GVN AND COULD RESTORE LOST CONFIDENCE. THERE IS POPULAR AGREEMENT AMONG VIETNAMESE THAT THE GOVERNMENT MUST ADDRESS ITSELF IMMEDIATELY TO A NUMBER OF SERIOUS OR POTENTIALLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS: SHORTAGES OF FOOD IN CERTAIN AREAS AND RESULTANT RISING PRICES, A SERIOUS NEW REFUGEE PROBLEM, THE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, CONSIDERABLE PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION AND DAMAGE, AND THE RESTORATION OF UTILITIES AND OTHER VITAL SERVICES, SUCH AS GARBAGE COLLECTION.

15. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT THE MAIN CONCERN OF MOST PEOPLE NOW IS THE SATISFACTION OF THEIR IMMEDIATE NEEDS. THE FACT THAT THE PRICE OF BREAD HAS RISEN FROM 10 TO 70 PIASTRES OVERNIGHT AND THE PRICE OF A LITER OF RICE HAS RISEN FROM 15 TO 50 OR MORE PIASTRES CAUSES GENERAL CONCERN, EVEN THOUGH MOST OBSERVERS FEEL THE DISRUPTION IS ONLY TEMPORARY. TO MANY OF THE REFUGEES THE PROBLEM IS MUCH MORE SERIOUS, HAVING LOST THEIR HOMES, THEIR LIVELIHOOD, AND POSSIBLY THE BREAD WINNER IN THEIR FAMILY.

16. MEMBERS OF THE UPPER AND LOWER HOUSES, ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, HAVE SUPPORTED PRESIDENT THIEU'S DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE OTHER MEASURES HE HAS TAKEN. AT THE SAME TIME MOST MEMBERS HAVE STRESSED THEIR CONCERN FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW.

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HOWEVER, AS INDICATED ABOVE, UP TO THIS MOMENT IT WOULD BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE GOVERNMENT FULL SUPPORT AND HAVE AVOIDED STEPS WHICH MIGHT INDIRECTLY AID THE VC.

17. AS THE SITUATION STABILIZES, AND THE VC THREAT DIMINISHES, INDICATIONS ARE THAT THIS POSTURE OF UNQUESTIONED SUPPORT AND LIMITED, CAUTIOUS CRITICISM WILL CHANGE. THE ASSEMBLY MAY UNDERTAKE TO INVESTIGATE GOVERNMENT "UNPREPAREDNESS" AND TO AFFIX BLAME FOR REAL OR ALLEGED SHORTCOMINGS. SENATOR NGUYEN VAN NGAI IS URGING FELLOW SENATORS TO ENGAGE IN A FULL INVESTIGATION AFTER THE CRISIS IS PAST.

HE IS ESPECIALLY CRITICAL OF MINISTER OF INTERIOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL LINH QUANG VIEN AND DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN. SENATOR TRAN NGOC NHUAN IS ALSO PUSHING FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUEYN KHANG AND CAPITAL MILITARY DISTRICT COMMANDER COLONEL NGUYEN VAN GIAM. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHETHER THEY ARE MOTIVATED BY PATRIOTIC OR PERSONAL REASONS OR HOW SERIOUS THEY ARE IN CARRYING OUT THE PROPOSED INVESTIGATIONS.

18. CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT LEADERS IS NOT LIMITED, HOWEVER, TO MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE CRISIS GENERATED BY THE VC ATTACKS MAY HAVE ATTENUATED, BUT CERTAINLY HAS NOT ELIMINATED, A FAVORITE

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VIETNAMESE PASTIME, CRITICISM OF OTHER VIETNAMESE. HARDLY ANY SENIOR VIETNAMESE LEADER HAS ESCAPED UNSCATHED. IN ADDITION TO THOSE CRITICIZED ABOVE, COMPLAINTS HAVE BEEN REGISTERED AGAINST PRESIDENT THIEU, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN AND A STABLE OF LESSER LUMINARIES. PROBABLY THE SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO HAS RECEIVED THE MOST CRITICISM IS PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC. HIGH-LEVEL COLLEAGUES IN THE GOVERNMENT HAVE FOUND LOC SOMEWHAT BEWILDERED BY THE CRISIS. MINISTER OF FINANCE TRINH HAS BEEN CRITICAL OF LOC'S ROLE. VICE PRESIDENT KY IS KNOWN TO BE DISAPPOINTED WITH LOC.

19. IN SHORT, WHILE THE VC ATTACK HAS PROMOTED MOMENTARY UNITY AND OFFERS A PROMISING CHANCE TO CONSOLIDATE IT, THE FORCES THAT DIVIDE VIETNAMESE AND IMPAIR THEIR ABILITY TO COOPERATE WITH EACH OTHER REMAIN STRONG.

"ATTITUDES OF THE VIETNAMESE TOWARD AMERICANS"

20. ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE IS FAVORABLE TO THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE UNITED STATES FORCES DURING THE RECENT VC ATTACKS, A SURPRISING NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE APPARENTLY BELIEVE, OR PRETEND TO BELIEVE, THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN COLLUSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE VC. ON 3 FEBRUARY A MEMBER OF THE LOWER HOUSE STATED ON THE FLOOR OF THE ASSEMBLY THAT PERHAPS THE VC WAS HELPED BY "WESTERN FRIENDS",

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IMPLYING THE AMERICANS. A NUMBER OF SOURCES HAVE STATED THAT MANY VIETNAMESE BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE VC AND PERMITTED THEM TO COME INTO SAIGON IN ORDER TO FORCE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT INTO AN UNWANTED COALITION WITH THE NFLSV. SURPRISINGLY, THESE VIEWS ARE HELD BY A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WITH RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS AT THE MIDDLE LEVEL OF THE GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HIERARCHY.

21. [REDACTED] TELLS OF A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WHO HAVE CALLED AT HIS HOME TO ASK HIM ABOUT THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE VC ATTACKS ON SAIGON. SOME OF THEM HAD HEARD THAT THE AMERICANS HAD PROVIDED THE VC WITH TRANSPORTATION TO BRING THEIR TROOPS INTO SAIGON, PRESUMABLY TO PRESSURE THE GVN INTO AGREEING TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT. OTHERS AMONG THE VIETNAMESE VISITORS HAD HEARD THAT THE "HAWKS" IN THE U.S. HAD MANEUVERED THE VC INTO MAKING THE ATTACK ON SAIGON SO THAT THEY COULD GAIN SUPPORT FOR ESCALATING THE WAR. SOME HAD THE OPPOSITE VIEW; IT WAS THE "DOVES" WHO INSTIGATED THE ATTACK SO THAT THEY COULD CAPITALIZE ON THE ENEMY SHOW OF STRENGTH AND RESULTANT CASUALTIES TO ARGUE FOR AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR.

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22. SIMILAR FLIGHTS INTO FANTASY WERE DESCRIBED TO OTHER SOURCES BY A WIDE CROSS SECTION OF VIETNAMESE. ONE SOURCE STATES THAT HE HAS TALKED WITH AT LEAST TEN OFFICERS IN THE ARVN WHO BELIEVE THAT THERE

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MAY HAVE BEEN COLLUSION BETWEEN U.S. AND VC FORCES. ANOTHER SOURCE HAS TALKED WITH SEVERAL NORTHERN REFUGEE CATHOLIC PRIESTS WHO ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE WAS COLLUSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VC.

2. IT IS DIFFICULT TO ISOLATE CLEAR-CUT REASONS FOR THESE ATTITUDES. EXPLANATIONS ADVANCED BY THE VIETNAMESE IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ARGUMENTS ARE EITHER BASED ON MISINFORMATION, ARE CLEARLY ILLOGICAL AND INCONSISTENT, OR BOTH, AT LEAST TO THE WESTERN MIND. IN SOME CASES THE VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY NFLSV RADIO BROADCASTS OR BY RUMORS PASSED BY VC CADRES. IN MANY CASES THE BELIEFS APPEAR TO SPRING FROM A GENERAL SUSPICION OF U.S. INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES. THE RECENT SPATE OF STORIES IN THE PRESS ABOUT SECRET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE NFLSV, AND THE STRONG U.S. DESIRE TO SET UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITH THE NFLSV, HAVE APPARENTLY IMPRESSED MANY VIETNAMESE AND MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO ALLEGATIONS (RUMORS) OF COLLUSION.

2. MANY VIETNAMESE WHO ORIGINALLY SHARED THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS COLLUSION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VC GAVE UP SUCH VIEWS WHEN CONFRONTED WITH OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. A VIETNAMESE PARATROOP OFFICER SAID HE FELT, AS MANY OTHERS DID, THAT THE AMERICANS WERE

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SUPPORTING THE VC. THE RECENT FLURRY OF NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WERE REPOSIBLE FOR THIS VIEW. AFTER LISTENING ^{TO} THE NFLSV RADIO, HOWEVER, THIS NOTION HAS DISPELLED AS THE RADIO CLAIMED THE ATTACK WAS A REVOLT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. A VIETNAMESE HOUSEWIFE SAID SHE ACCEPTED THE VIEW THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SUPPORTED THE VC UNTIL SHE /WITNESSED AMERICAN FORCES FIGHTING IN THE STREETS AGAINST THE VC. HOWEVER, OTHER VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO HOLD THEIR VIEWS ABOUT U.S. COLLUSION DESPITE THE EVIDENCE.

25. A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THESE BELIEFS IS THAT MANY VIETNAMESE HAVE BECOME CONDITIONED TO THINK THAT NOTHING HAPPENS IN VIETNAM UNLESS THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WANTS IT TO HAPPEN. WHEN EVENTS TAKE PLACE THAT ARE CLEARLY COUNTER TO OUR BEST INTERESTS, INSTEAD OF ADMITTING THAT THEY WERE WRONG, THE VIETNAMESE OFTEN PUT FORTH BIZARRE EXPLANATIONS TO EXPLAIN WHY THE U.S. WANTED DEVELOPMENTS TO TAKE SUCH A SEEMINGLY UNFAVORABLE TWIST. UNABLE TO COMPREHEND THAT VC RESPONSE MAY HAVE EXCEEDED U.S. EXPECTATIONS, THESE VIETNAMESE INSTEAD TRY TO RATIONALIZE WHY THE U.S. WANTED THE VC TO SUCCEED EVEN AT THE COST OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY, NOT TO MENTION THE COST TO A CLOSE ALLY.

2. STILL, THESE ACCOUNTS SHOULD NOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. THE VAST

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

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MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION CONTINUES TO SUPPORT U.S. PRESENCE AND APPRECIATES U.S. ACTIONS AND SACRIFICES. AN OLDTIME VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST POINTS OUT THAT IN HIS VIEW THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES COULD NOT HAVE TURNED BACK THE VC THRUST AGAINST THE CAPITAL IF THEY HAD NOT BEEN SUPPORTED BY U.S. FORCES. HE SAID THAT HIS FRIENDS FEEL THE SAME WAY. SOME SOURCES EVEN CONTEND THAT THE U.S. CARRIED THE BRUNT OF THE FIGHT AGAINST THE VC AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SAVING THE CITY FROM A VC TAKEOVER. AN EX-ARVN OFFICER BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR ITS EFFECTIVE BUT MEASURED REACTION TO THE VC THREAT. THIS SOURCE COMPARED U.S. PRUDENCE WITH THE FRENCH PENCHANT FOR OVER-REACTION. HE OBSERVED THAT THE AMERICANS EMPLOYED ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MINIMIZE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, SOMETHING WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, THE FRENCH WOULD NEVER HAVE DONE. HOWEVER, SEVERAL OTHER SOURCES HAVE CRITICIZED THE U.S. FORCES FOR DESTROYING VIETNAMESE LIVES AND PROPERTY IN COMBAT OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH HARD FACTS ARE DIFFICULT TO COME BY, THERE ARE MANY STORIES CIRCULATING CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, AND THE AMOUNT OF PROPERTY DAMAGE CAUSED BY U.S. ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS.

27. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

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ACTION

Tuesday, February 6, 1968 -- 8:35 a.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres. file

VIA MARVIN WATSON

Dick Helms is scheduled to give testimony all day today and tomorrow, starting at 10:00 a.m., with a lunch break, before the Mahon subcommittee on appropriations.

I assume you would not wish to have him cancel his testimony for the 10:00 a.m. meeting this morning.

W. W. Rostow

Cancel testimony _____

We shall do without Helms this morning _____

Call me _____ -

WWRostow:rla

Tuesday, February 6, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have gone through the accumulated materials resulting from interrogation of prisoners and documents captured last week, and sought the answers to three questions:

1. Did the VC/NVA troops expect the Vietnamese populace to rise up and support them in their attacks?
2. Did the VC/NVA have any known plans for retreat or withdrawal?
3. What is the VC/NVA evaluation as to success or failure of the campaign?

In general, the answers are as follows:

1. Yes, they did expect assistance and uprising as evidenced by the following responses to interrogation.

A prisoner captured on January 31 in Chau Doc City stated that the attack was to create conditions which would bring the U. S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace. The time was ripe for an uprising. He said that the VC realized that they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. It was obvious to all that the assault was a "go for broke" matter. He believes that few of the participants expected success, although most of them hoped that they would succeed.

Prisoners captured in Nha Trang (II Corps) state that they were told they could take Nha Trang because of the VC organization in the city. The NVA officers did not believe this but went on with the attack in order to support the nation-wide effort and make success possible elsewhere.

According to one of these who was captured on the morning of February 4, "The current general insurrection campaign will extend for the duration of the Winter-Spring Campaign. Many attacks will continue because the order has been given and cannot be countermanded." He stated that "when the VC/NVA attacked Nha Trang, they expected to be defeated; however, they believed in the general insurrection campaign of South Vietnam."

The Executive Officer of the VC Zone Committee II, Gia Lai (Pleiku), who was captured on January 30, stated that the aim of the present action is to achieve the goals set forth in Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, that is, guide people to strike and demonstrate and to liberate all areas. He also advised that the present offensive was scheduled to last seven days and would end on February 5, 1968.

Three prisoners captured in the Bien Hoa area stated that they had believed that the population would assist in an uprising against the GVN and U. S. forces and in their opinion the anticipated support from the population has not been forthcoming.

2. All evidence points to the conclusion that orders were received to "hold at all costs." Prisoners captured on January 30 in the attack on Pleiku revealed that they had orders to "take Pleiku City or not return." Three prisoners captured in the Bien Hoa area apparently were not provided with withdrawal plans since there was no question about achievement of victory. The prisoners said their orders were to continue fighting until victory. (Lack of a withdrawal plan and unfamiliarity with the local terrain may account in part for the large enemy losses.)

Four prisoners captured in the attack on Saigon provided the following: Casualties were to be left behind. After Saigon had been occupied, there would be a special detachment to take care of wounded. The Battalion was not to retreat. The objective was to be held indefinitely. Supplies would be brought in later. Troops were ordered to fight until Saigon was taken. A prisoner who died of wounds on February 1 revealed before his death that the major objectives in the attack on Saigon were the Presidential Palace, the radio station, and the Tan Son Nhut Airbase, with orders to hold at all costs, with no thought of retreat.

Another prisoner (believed to be a VC General and currently undergoing more intensive interrogation) revealed that the VC planned to take over Chau Doc Province at any cost. If this failed, then taking over the Province was to be completed before the end of the "Spring Phase," that is, before the end of March 1968. This all came about because of an order from COSVN to use the Tet period as a "unique opportunity to make sacrifices of their lives for the survival of the fatherland." There was no plan of retreat or withdrawal as the VC were convinced of success. This was part of a general uprising throughout South Vietnam, which would reduce the number of U. S. or GVN troops which could be sent in as reinforcements. Thus, if their first attack on Chau Doc City failed, they planned to keep attacking until they achieved success.

Approximately 100 VC prisoners captured in the attack on the city of Rach Gia, Kien Giang Province, with an average age being between 15 and 18 years, revealed during interrogation that the soldiers were given no contingency plan and were directed simply to take the town and hold it until a coalition government could be formed.

3. There is little hard evidence in the form of response to interrogation or captured documents which give feel for their assessment of success or failure. However, the following does show that plans did not progress as anticipated.

A prisoner captured in Chau Doc City indicated that his troops had been told that the conditions were now right for an uprising of the population and that an aggressive and rapid assault would bring the people to the side of the VC and make untenable the positions of the GVN and American defenders. The uprising in fact did not take place during the attack and the prisoner said that it is likely that this lack of all-out popular commitment to the campaign is having a bad effect on the morale of the VC attackers.

A prisoner captured during the attack on Nha Trang stated that there would be a second attack on the city and that the Special Forces Headquarters, the 62nd Aerial Squadron, and the airfield

would be shelled. Shelling had been intended during the first attack but the element in charge of transporting ammunition did not arrive on time.

W. W. Rostow

*This is from the first batch of documents.
We will keep this analysis running.*

AmcC:jjs

W

Jim Rostow

27

Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, February 5, 1968
10:35 PM

Mr. President:

Mr. Rostow wanted you to know that the North Koreans have asked for another meeting, and if we accept, it will come at 1:00 AM EST, Wednesday February 7.

White House Situation Room

Raymond L. Hatting
Briefing Officer

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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NODIS/CACTUS

1:00 AM, dated 7 Feb

NKOREANS HAVE CALLED FOR MEETING OF MAC SECRETARIES
AT 1500 HRS (KST) FEBRUARY 7. OUR COMMENTS ON POSSIBLE
REASONS AND ALTERNATIVE TACTICS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 46-194
By cb. NARA Date 8-6-97

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Pres file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Monday, February 5, 1968
9:50 PM

Mr. President:

Herewith, two papers on Military aid to Korea.

1. A defense paper on the future possibilities in which Under Secretary Katzenbach has concurred.
2. A State paper setting out what has been done by emergency airlift to Korea.

Walt
Walt

INFORMATION

Pres file

Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the casualty figures and weapons captured by Corps areas from 29 January to midnight February 4 in Vietnam.

Roughly speaking, if these figures are correct, they took 10 weeks' casualties in a week.

The weapons captured are also round about 10 weeks' take.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 5, 1968

29a

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Statistics on the Past Week's Activity in Vietnam


The following are cumulative statistics for the period from the 29th of January to midnight, February 4, by Corps areas:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Captured</u>	<u>Weapons Captured</u>
<u>I Corps</u>				
Enemy	6030		2009	1276
U. S.	225	1218		
South Vietnamese	335	1159		
<u>II Corps</u>				
Enemy	3562		1477	1103
U. S.	77	309		
South Vietnamese	270	933		
<u>III Corps</u>				
Enemy	7118		456	1412
U. S.	148	1109		
South Vietnamese	238	905		
<u>IV Corps</u>				
Enemy	3625		559	1043
U. S.	65	239		
South Vietnamese	226	956		
<u>TOTAL</u>				
Enemy	20,335		4,501	4,834
U. S.	515	2,875		
South Vietnamese	1,069	3,953		

It is interesting to look at this in comparison with other periods.

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>Last week</u>
Ratio enemy/friendly killed	2.8/1	3.7/1	4.1/1	12.8/1
Enemy weapons captured (weekly average)	224	357	598	4,834

It is difficult to make a relationship with prisoners, due to a change in reporting procedures. However, it is interesting to note that the prisoner of war population as of January 1 was 9,743. Assuming all those captured last week are valid POWs, this will mean we have increased this population by almost 50 percent in just one week.



Art Mc Cafferty