

~~SECRET~~

Monday - February 5, 1968 - 5 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - ACTION

SUBJECT: Measures to Invigorate the Form and Substance of Our Activities in Latin America

You asked for ideas to dramatize our Latin American policy. I suggest the following:

Measures Demonstrating High-level US Interest

1. Special Message to the Inter-American Cultural Council. Dr. Eisenhower and Dr. Hornig leave for Venezuela on February 13 to attend a special meeting of the Inter-American Cultural Council. The Council will pass on programs for carrying out the OAS Summit decisions in education and science and technology. I suggest you send a special message, with emphasis on the possibilities of satellite ETV. I have asked Dr. Hornig and Doug Cater to prepare a draft.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Trip by the Vice President. To demonstrate our interest in economic integration and in opening the inner frontiers of South America, the Vice President could make a 3-week tour, visiting primarily projects related to development of the heartland of the continent: road building, hydroelectric plants, colonization, community development, cooperatives. Covey Oliver, Bill Gaud (who hasn't been to Latin America except to Punta del Este) and perhaps some Congressman should go with him. They would dramatize these two distinctly Johnsonian dimensions of the Alliance for Progress: integration and multinational projects.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_.

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NEJ 94-272

By Wig, NARA, Date 11-16-94

3. Invite Presidents to the Opening of Hemisfair. Hemisfair officials could invite the Presidents of participating countries to the opening of the Fair. As part of their visit to San Antonio, you could invite them to the Ranch.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

4. Visits of Latin American Presidents. You have the President of Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner, scheduled for March. For the remainder of the year you could have:

President Leonl of Venezuela. He was invited for January but could not make it. State is proposing July.

President Lleras of Colombia. He is going to Europe this spring and would like to stop in the US.

President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. He will have finished half of his term on July 1.

The Amistad Dam will be ready for dedication in September. You could join President Diaz Ordaz for that ceremony.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

5. Interview with Selected Latin American Newsmen. An interview with a group of carefully selected, prominent Latin American reporters would give you good exposure in Latin America. You could make it an informal, personal affair by having the interview in your office and taking the newsmen on a tour of the White House. This could be filmed by USIA for the newsmen and played all over Latin America. You could use the interview to project your vision of an

economically integrated Latin America with the benefits that this would bring to the entrepreneur as well as the average citizen. State and USIA have developed a plan for bringing such a group of newsmen to the US, using Hemisfair as the cover.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

5. More Direct Contact by Covey Oliver with Latin Americans. Covey has just finished a highly successful, two-week swing through Central America and Panama. He plans to travel to Peru, Chile, and Brazil, starting this week. A Taveras Dam loan signing ceremony in the Dominican Republic in March is another possibility. On these trips he tries to reach the people through TV, press conferences and public appearances in places outside the capital. His mastery of Spanish and natural empathy are a great asset.

Our OAS-CIAP man should also be doing some missionary work of this nature, but he lacks the language and substantive knowledge of country problems and what CIAP might do to dramatize the Alliance. Nevertheless, if you reject proposal 2 above, he could tour the inner frontiers and be photographed on the modern roads, at dams, gas pipelines, etc. in the interior.

#### Measures to Give New Thrust to the Alliance for Progress

1. Restructure CIAP. CIAP is not giving leadership to the Alliance. The Chairman tends too much towards private diplomacy and does not exert enough firm, imaginative, public leadership. Our man is not feeding him ideas and pushing him for action behind the scenes. There is a serious structural weakness -- 7 part-time members cannot do the job of policy direction, country review, and performance follow-up that is required. It is politically impossible to replace the present members, but a few more full-time members with imagination and drive could be added. The new men

are needed to translate the Summit directives into specific courses of action, determine priorities and, through close personal contact, persuade governments to move accordingly. Bill Bowdler has prepared a proposal for restructuring CIAP which he is taking up with Covey and Sol. We are shooting to get this done at the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting in June.

We can also expect more dynamism from a new OAS Secretary General if Galo Plaza is elected.

2. New US Executive Director on the IDB. Related to our leadership in CIAP is leadership in the Inter-American Bank. The Bank is assuming a larger role in the Alliance. Last year annual investments by the Bank reached the half billion mark. It did more dollar lending than our entire AID program in Latin America. My hunch is that the Congress will increasingly want to funnel assistance through the multilateral lending institutions, so the IDB's role in the Alliance is likely to increase. This makes it most important that we have a top-flight pro as US Executive Director who knows how to work with Latins while protecting our interests -- especially since our top man on the Bank management is not effective. I know you are considering this matter. You have in Ray Sternfeld -- the present US alternate -- the man who can do that kind of job. I strongly recommend that you name him. (Tom Mann and Joe Barr agree.)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_.

3. Modernize our Military and Security Relations with Latin America. The pattern of these relationships was established during World War II and the years immediately thereafter. They are outdated. There is too much emphasis on bilateral programs with us and an excessive paternalism on our part. As we have done in the economic field, we should get the Latins to think more of military and security policy in collective terms and in relationship to economic and social goals. New instruments of inter-American cooperation are needed to replace the present antiquated -- and stigmatized -- ones. Bob Sayre has prepared a strategy for doing this which Nick Katzenbach has approved and is now awaiting the concurrence of Secretary McNamara.

4. Three Additional Measures Contingent on Future Developments. These measures of high impact for Latin America are contingent on future developments:

- a. Untieing of AID for the Western Hemisphere, when our balance of payments situation permits.
- b. Granting of Trade Preferences to Latin America, if the Europeans continue their preferences for Africa and do not go along with further temporary world-wide tariff cuts for the LDCs.
- c. A New Program to Open South America's Inner Frontier More Rapidly, after the heavy expenditure in Vietnam decrease.

/S/

W. W. Rostow

Monday, Feb. 5, 1968  
5 p. m.

31

Mr. President:

Herewith the 48 B-52 strikes scheduled  
around Khe Sanh in the next 24 hours.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

(NMCC 5 Feb 68 memo subj: Operational Highlights



## THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 February 1968  
4:30 PM EST

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Watch Officer, White House Situation  
Room  
Mr. Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary,  
Department of State, c/o Operations Center

Subject: Operational Highlights

Rastow

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The following US Air Force B-52 missions are now scheduled  
to be flown during the next 24 hours:

<u>MISSION &amp; NR OF ACFT</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>TARGET LOCATION AND DESCRIPTION</u>
UNIFORM 78 (6 B-52s)	9:10 PM 5 February (061010 SVN)	In South Vietnam, 17 miles northeast of <u>Khe Sanh</u> ; contains elements of the NVA 320th Division.
UNIFORM 100 (6 B-52s)	10:10 PM 5 February (061110 SVN)	In South Vietnam, <u>19 miles northeast of</u> <u>Khe Sanh</u> ; contains elements of the NVA 320th Division.
UNIFORM 16 (6 B-52s)	1:15 AM 6 February (061415 SVN)	In South Vietnam, <u>8 miles west-northwest</u> <u>of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains extensive bunkers and storage areas.
UNIFORM 9 (6 B-52s)	5:20 AM 6 February (061820 SVN)	In South Vietnam, <u>6 miles northwest of</u> <u>Khe Sanh</u> ; contains extensive bunkers and storage areas.
UNIFORM 6 (6 B-52s)	9:30 AM 6 February (062230 SVN)	In South Vietnam, <u>8 miles west-northwest</u> <u>of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains elements of the NVA 325C Division.
UNIFORM 46 (12 B-52s)	1:35 PM 6 February (070235 SVN)	In Laos, <u>9 miles southwest of Khe Sanh</u> ; contains elements of the NVA 304th Division.
UNIFORM 22 (6 B-52s)	3:50 PM 6 February (070450 SVN)	In South Vietnam, <u>7 miles northwest of</u> <u>Khe Sanh</u> , contains elements of the NVA 325th Division.

~~TOP SECRET - LIMDIS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958

AFM 1-100-100-100

1309.2

TOP SECRET - LIMDIS

The following ROLLING THUNDER 57 ALFA strikes are now scheduled during the next 24 hours:

<u>TARGET AND LOCATION</u>	<u>TIME (EST) ON TARGET</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRIKE FORCE</u>	<u>SAIGON TIME</u>
Chuc Son Army Bks (N), 10 miles south- west of Hanoi	7:36 PM 5 February 3:36 AM 6 February	7AF	4 F-105 4 F-105	060836 061636
Ha Dong Bks SW 9 miles southwest of Hanoi	7:38 PM 5 February 3:38 AM 6 February	7AF	8 F-105 8 F-105	060838 061638
Kinh No RR Yd 9 miles north of Hanoi	7:16 PM 5 February 3:16 AM 6 February	7AF	12 F-105 12 F-105	060816 061638
Lan Son RR/Hwy Br 79 miles northeast of Hanoi	3:15 AM 6 February	7AF	4 F-4	061615

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ADDO B

CCOC a

NMCC - 5 FEB 68, 4:30 PM EST

TOP SECRET - LIMDIS



Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 4:30 PM

*Fre*

Mr. President:

I know how you feel about staff travel, particularly now. But I thought you should know about one proposition involving Ed Hamilton.

As you know, Hamilton's parish includes India and Pakistan. He knows the terrain and the horseflesh fairly well, but he hasn't visited either country for three years. A lot has changed in that time. There is a meeting of our chief diplomatic officers in Dacca, East Pakistan, at the end of next week. It might make sense for him to go to that meeting and to stop briefly in Delhi and Rawalpindi afterwards.

On the plus side, this trip would:

- Give him a useful refresher on the issues and the people he deals with.
- Be a nice gesture to Bowles and Oehlert, both of whom enjoy White House attention and have urged him to come.
- Cost us nothing in the balance of payments, since travel to India and Pakistan -- with no stops in Europe -- is payable entirely in excess rupees.

On the minus side, the trip would remove Hamilton from Washington during the last part of the message season. (He has already done the Foreign Aid Message, subject to your approval, but he would probably do the Food Message and help with some of the others if he were here.) Further, I recognize that you may want to put an absolute freeze on staff travel for psychological reasons whatever the actual effect on the balance of payments.

Hamilton understands the minuses as well as the pluses. He would like to go, but he will be entirely peaceful if you decide otherwise.

W. W. Rostow

Let him go \_\_\_\_\_

Better not \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 4:05 pm

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

This is the report I didn't send along the other day because: it was only one such straw in the wind; and CIA could not evaluate the source. Nevertheless, it is interesting.

[REDACTED] reports that the North Vietnamese army has informed the Viet Cong that support will be withdrawn in March 1968 and therefore the Viet Cong must make every effort to win before March. "

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

W. W. Rostow

SANTIZED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-199  
By isa, NARA Date 8-19-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rln

Pres file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 5, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Harman's Farewell Call Tuesday, February 6-11:00 a.m.

While Ambassador Harman's call is a protocol call to say good-bye, you could use it to advantage.

Of course, we wish to send the Ambassador and Mrs. Harman off with our warm wishes. He has been ambassador for 8 years--and in the US for 13 altogether.

One way to make this positive point is to dwell on your belief that US-Israeli relations are closer than ever. Our position following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war is a far cry to the US position in 1956-7 just before Harman came. On the personal level too, we are learning better how to deal with each other (much less suspicion between our governments, though much survives). Finally, Israel is much more self-reliant economically.

But I think you ought to give him one capsule statement of your forebodings for the future if Israel doesn't take full advantage of Jarring. We can't agree that time is now on Israel's side.

Luke Battle in a go-round with Harman this afternoon urged the Israelis to think what steps they can take to keep a sense of movement in the Jarring mission. If one approach doesn't work, he told them to try another. That's quite different from the Israeli tendency to sit tight until someone pushes them to move a little.

You might indicate you're aware of Luke's talk and generalize from it your expectation that Israel will do everything it can to keep Jarring in business and to get negotiations going. Israel's future is too important to leave to legalisms.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-193

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

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*Pres file*

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Monday, February 5, 1968  
1:20 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith, cleared by Sec. Rusk and Under Secretary Katzenbach, is a proposed personal cable to Amb. Bunker with guidelines for a possible talk in your name with Thieu.

W. W. Rostow

Message cleared \_\_\_\_\_

No, revise as follows \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)  
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983  
By lg, NARA, Date 13092

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ

96-202

VIA CAS CHANNEL By is, NARA Date 4-8-97 February 3, 1968

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO SAIGON, LITERALLY EYES ONLY FOR  
AMBASSADOR BUNKER

I have read with interest the account of your latest talk with President Thieu, reporting the formation of a special joint task force. The report of its first meeting was heartening. It should move things in the right direction in the days ahead.

Getting Thieu and Ky to work together and stay together could be a favorable consequence of the attack on the cities.

I also noted how promptly you encouraged Thieu to realize that this was a moment of opportunity for leadership, as well as danger. I know that you have had on your mind all the possible ways to get Thieu moving. We have been somewhat concerned about Thieu's cautious approach to problems which require fervent leadership.

I am writing you now to see if you don't agree that this is the time to let Thieu know how important it is that he also move rapidly on some of the deeper problems facing the Vietnamese Government, its people, and ourselves as their fighting allies. If you agree -- at the right moment -- I should hope you would have a private and very frank talk with

Thieu. You might tell him that only the President and Secretary Rusk are aware of the subject of this conversation.

Subject to your judgment, I would talk to him along something like these lines.

I would tell him it is our opinion that the coordinated NVA/VC attacks and the enemy's extensive propaganda campaign have had a strongly negative effect on both Vietnamese and American opinion. It is of the highest urgency that the GVN act decisively to meet the problem -- not merely the short-range difficulties, but the deep-seated problems that make things easier for the VC in both their military and political efforts. The time for caution and slow steps forward is past. We recognize that decisive action may involve mistakes along the line. We can live with these now and then. But we cannot live with a "business as usual" approach.

Thieu can count on our support. We will help him in every way possible. But we want to avoid inaction or half-measures. We strongly believe that he, Vice President Ky, and Prime Minister Loc should be a closely-knit team; that each should have his own clearly defined responsibilities, and that each of them can move, knowing he has the support of the others and of the Americans.

We consider it urgent that he move rapidly on:

- strengthening the ARVN, getting the most capable officers in command positions, eliminating or shelving those who are inept and weak.
- shaking up and getting more teamwork in his intelligence services. It is a disgrace that the VC can mount dozens of attacks simultaneously all over the country and his Government doesn't know a thing about it in advance;
- a large-scale drive on corruption. Thieu and Ky must make it clear that corruption is no longer going to be tolerated. If they can move in on blatant past offenders all to the good. But it should be clear that a new deal is in effect and corruption or violation of the public

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

-4-

trust is going to get rapid and strong justice. Officers and officials who are corrupt need to be removed and this is a good occasion to speed up the clean-up.

I cannot fully express my admiration and appreciation for your efforts in the dangerous and trying circumstances which you are facing. We want to do everything we can to support you and your courageous colleagues. If there is anything that you need that you are not getting let us know and you will get it.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~



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*Pres file*

INFORMATION

Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 1:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

George Woods called me from Rome this morning. He asked if it would be possible for you to say a few words to Prime Minister Wilson in support of an idea he has been supporting; namely, that a group of independent, well-known citizens of various countries, preferably chaired by Lord Oliver Franks, undertake this year a study of how foreign aid has evolved in the past 20 years and where it should go in the future. This idea was supported by our representative at a recent meeting of the OECD. It would be completed by the end of the year.

The idea has the advantage of looking at foreign aid on an international basis and implying for our people and the Congress that any moves forward in the future would be on the basis of multilateral commitments.

If you would have a few words with Wilson about this, he believes Pearson will also talk to Wilson in support of his proposition. He has talked to officials of the UK Treasury who are favorable. But they believe that Britain, with its weak economy at the present time, should not be too far out in front. George Woods is personally taking on the Germans.

He plans to make a further statement in support of the proposition on Friday in New Delhi at the UNCTAD meeting.

Woods also reported that the IDA replenishment, at \$400 million, is "now buttoned up." He assured me that the terms are acceptable to our Treasury balance of payments position. Only the Australians and South Africans now have to be brought aboard.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Mr. E. Fried  
Mr. E. Hamilton  
WWR/stow:rla

INFORMATION

37

Monday, February 5, 1968  
12:30 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's views  
on Senator Kennedy's strategy.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

31a

CM-2965-68  
3 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Senator Kennedy's Views on South Vietnam

1. My views on the proposals set forth by Senator Kennedy during his appearance on "Face the Nation" are expressed below.

2. Corruption in South Vietnam. As you know, solutions to corruption in Vietnam have been sought consistently and urgently by US authorities. Vietnamese leaders are now also well aware of what must be done and some specific actions to reduce corruption are already underway. Although progress has not been as rapid as we would like, there have been encouraging signs of forward movement during the three months that the new government has been in office. Senator Kennedy apparently does not fully understand that there are no instant solutions to this deeply rooted problem and that two critical ingredients for improvement are time and patience. His proposal to use the threat of US withdrawal from Vietnam as a lever for more rapid action in this area reflects this general lack of understanding and ignores Vietnamese national and individual sensitivities, which are important factors in this equation. US objectives in Vietnam and, in fact, Southeast Asia would not be served well by this type of pressure.

3. Strategic Alternatives. You are aware also of the pros and cons of the various "enclave" theories which have been offered as substitutes for the current strategy in Vietnam. Comments on Senator Kennedy's modified enclave proposal have been provided you by the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I support these views. The Senator's

proposal would in effect result in abandonment of a large portion of Vietnam to the control of the enemy and would preclude further significant broadening of the Government of Vietnam's influence throughout the countryside. Thus, much of the progress to date in building a viable Vietnamese nation would be nullified and the lives, effort and time which have already been invested would have been spent in vain.

4. In summary, I disagree with Senator Kennedy's views on these matters. His proposed solutions to these deep-seated and complex problems are, in my judgment, neither feasible nor desirable.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Earle G. Wheeler".

EARLE G. WHEELER  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Monday, Feb. 5, 1968  
12:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have gone over Harry McPherson's latest draft which looks to me basically good.

I shall put forward to him certain minor specific suggestions.

My major suggestion is that it requires -- perhaps just before the last paragraph on page 22 -- a passage like the following:

"In the end, the Communists' attacks are aimed against two political targets:

- the political life of South Viet Nam;
- the political life of the United States.

As for the South Vietnamese, the reports that I have been receiving are encouraging. The military and civilian leadership understand that this is a moment of opportunity, as well as crisis. The new Constitutional institutions of the country must be made to work on the basis of efficiency and national unity. Coordinated efforts are now under way of a kind we have not before seen in Saigon, to re-establish normal life and security in the cities, the towns, and the countryside. There is a chance that South Viet Nam will emerge in the weeks and months ahead with stronger political institutions and a greater sense of nationhood and common destiny than before. We shall help them to do that in every way we can; although they know that it is basically a job they must do for themselves.

The second target is the political life in the United States. They want us to believe that the struggle against them is hopeless: that we should settle not for self-determination and one-man, one-vote, but for turning power over to them. "

With minor changes, the text would then proceed "responding to that pressure, etc. "

W. W. Rostow

cc: Harry McPherson

## INFORMATION

*Pres file*

Monday, February 5, 1968--12:15 p.m.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your 12:30 p.m. appointment with Henry Brandon

You should know that the London Sunday Times is, perhaps, the worst offender in reporting that we have lost confidence in Westy.

Henry Brandon came back from Vietnam skeptical of Westy. In short, Washington rumors may consist of dinner conversation in Washington that he himself generated.

You may wish to deal with this in your talk with him.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday, Feb , 1968  
12:00 noon

40

Mr. President:

Herewith Bus Wheeler's first daily  
report on Khe Sanh.

"Gravel munitions," in para. 7, are  
the small anti-personnel mines developed  
for the barrier.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachment

(CM-2968-68 5 Feb 68)

*Pres file*

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 1-30-92



~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

40a

CM-2968-68  
5 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Situation in the Khe Sanh Area

1. At the present time, the situation in the Khe Sanh area is quiet. No enemy contacts have been reported in the area since the attack on Hill 861 ended yesterday at 6:25 PM EST, the details of which are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

2. At 3:00 PM EST yesterday, the Khe Sanh combat base began receiving heavy concentrations of enemy rocket, artillery and mortar fire. Twenty minutes later a force of from 200 to 300 enemy, supported with rocket and mortar fire, launched a ground attack against the US Marine company position on Hill 861, three and one-half miles northwest of the Khe Sanh airstrip. As the fighting grew in intensity, the Khe Sanh combat base provided artillery support, which included the delivery of chemical munitions (CS tear gas) on the enemy. At 4:20 PM EST a small group of the enemy succeeded in penetrating the defensive wire on the perimeter of the position, but the Marine defenders held their positions and drove the enemy off. Approximately thirty minutes later the enemy resumed the assault on Hill 861 while continuing to deliver mortar fire on the Khe Sanh combat base. Approximately one hour later the mortar fire on the Khe Sanh base ended and the attack on Hill 861 began to diminish in intensity. At 6:25 PM EST all action had ended and the Khe Sanh airstrip was open. In the attack on Hill 861, the enemy lost approximately 108 killed; eight of the dead were found inside the perimeter and numerous enemy dead were hanging from the barbed wire on the perimeter of the Marine company position. US Marine casualties, all from the company on Hill 861, were placed at seven killed and 44 wounded. Marine units in the Khe Sanh area expended a total of 2,800 rounds of various calibre artillery and mortar rounds in response to enemy shelling of the Khe Sanh base and surrounding area.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority JCS 10-3-78  
By ip/hg, NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~TOP SECRET~~

CV 1 of copies



~~TOP SECRET~~

3. Yesterday, US Air Force B-52 bombers flew 45 sorties against enemy targets in the Khe Sanh/DMZ area. This brings the total number of B-52 sorties flown in that area since 15 January 1968 to 566, with approximately 16,980 tons of bombs delivered on the enemy. In these strikes a total of 426 secondary explosions have been observed.

4. US tactical aircraft flew 216 strike sorties in support of US Marine units at Khe Sanh during the past 24 hours (79 US Air Force, 94 US Marine Corps, and 43 US Navy). Bomb damage assessment of the foregoing sorties included three structures destroyed, seven bunkers destroyed and three secondary explosions. Weather prevented complete bomb damage assessment.

5. Airlanded resupply during the period amounted to 128 tons.

6. No COFRAM was used during the period; however, these munitions are available and will be considered for use at the appropriate time.

7. General Westmoreland told me this morning at 9:30 AM EST that gravel munitions were emplaced yesterday in areas north of Khe Sanh.

8. The weather observation at 3:00 AM EST today in the Khe Sanh area reflects cloudy conditions with visibility at 15 miles. The outlook for the next 15 hours is cloudy with low ceilings, poor visibility, drizzle and fog. From 10:00 PM EST today until 7:00 AM EST tomorrow the outlook is improved cloudy, but with higher ceilings and visibility at seven miles.

9. Planned operations in support of Khe Sanh:


a. During the next 24 hours a total of 45 US Air Force B-52 aircraft are scheduled to bomb six targets near the Demilitarized Zone. Four of the targets are in the vicinity of Khe Sanh while two targets are adjacent to the Demilitarized Zone approximately 20 miles northeast of Khe Sanh.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. For the period ending 11:00 PM EST today, 156 tactical sorties are planned in the Khe Sanh area. Some 192 additional sorties are available on call to augment the planned effort. Should the situation require it, additional sorties up to a theoretical total of 623 could be diverted. The actual number which could be employed depends upon the weather in the area and the ability to control the strikes. In addition, the aircraft carrier KITTY HAWK has been alerted to provide additional close air support when requested.

10. Enemy units in contact are unknown at this time, but it is believed that the 95C Regiment is targeted on Hills 881 and 861 and the 101st Regiment on Khe Sanh. The exact location of other enemy units believed to be in the area is unknown.



EARLE G. WHEELER

Chairman

Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~TOP SECRET~~

Monday - February 5, 1968  
12:00 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

SUBJECT: Funeral Arrangements for President Diaz Ordaz's  
Father

Our Embassy in Mexico City reports that the funeral is to be a family affair in which they prefer no outsiders. Our Charge has been discouraged from attending.

The Embassy also reports a change in burial plans. Interment will not take place in Puebla tomorrow, as originally planned, but today in Mexico City at 1:00 p.m., our time.

W. W. Rostow

INFORMATION

Monday

February 5, 1968 -- 11:40 a. m.

## SITUATION ROOM MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Fighting in Saigon


The press is reporting that a police substation in Saigon was overrun and a nearby precinct police headquarters was in flames.

The NMCC received the following information by telephone from Saigon:

At 7:30 a. m. EST a police substation in southwest Saigon was overrun by an enemy force. At 7:50 a. m. civilians were reported to be evacuating the area; the Viet Cong were setting fires. ARVN forces were air-dropping tear gas in the area.

At 9:40 a. m. ARVN forces reported that they were engaging an estimated 300-man Viet Cong force in the northern section of the city.

At about the same time, a South Vietnamese Airborne battalion reported it was engaged in a fire fight one mile north of Tan Son Nhut with an estimated 300 enemy troops.

 W. Rostow

~~MACU CANT~~ ~~CONFIRM NOR DENY~~

VIET ATTACK (TOPS 6)

420

SAIGON (AP)-A VIET CONG FORCE OF ABOUT 400 MEN OVERRAN A POLICE SUBSTATION IN SAIGON TONIGHT AND DROVE POLICE OUT OF A NEARBY PRECINCT POLICE HEADQUARTERS THAT WAS IN FLAMES.

S

POLICE ABANDONED THE 8TH PRECINCT HEADQUARTERS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE CAPITAL AND WITHDREW TO THE NORTH TOWARD THE CENTER OF THE CAPITAL.

POLICE SAID THEY DID NOT WANT TO OPEN WITH HEAVY GUNFIRE BECAUSE OF THE THOUSANDS OF CIVILIANS IN THE AREA.

U.S. OFFICIALS SAID EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT BETWEEN 500 AND 700 VIET CONG WERE STILL IN SAIGON, AND STILL WERE CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING ANOTHER BIG ATTACK IN THE CITY.

IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE FRESH ATTACKS WOULD TOUCH OFF A NEW ROUND OF STREET FIGHTING IN SAIGON, SIX DAYS AFTER THE START OF THE ORIGINAL BIG OFFENSIVE.

THE 8TH PRECINCT WAS ONE OF TWO OR THREE OF THE CITY'S PRECINCTS IN WHICH THE VIET CONG WERE STILL BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN STRENGTH.

THE ASSAULT ON THE SUBSTATION BEGAN AT ABOUT 8:30 P.M. AN HOUR LATER, THE ENEMY FORCE ATTACKED THE 8TH PRECINCT.

U.S. PLANES FLEW OVER THE AREA DROPPING FLARES TO LIGHT UP THE SCENE.

AN HOUR AND A HALF AFTER THE OPENING ATTACK, THE PRECINCT WAS IN FLAMES AND THE POLICE HAD ABANDONED IT.

SR948AES 2/5

Monday, February 5, 1968

*Pres file*

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Proposed Joint Statement for Rey Visit**

Attached is a memo from Nick Katzenbach recommending your approval of a joint statement to be issued following your meeting on Wednesday, February 7, with Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities. (We will have the briefing memo on the visit for you shortly.)

The statement does three things:

- reaffirms our support for the unity of Western Europe;
- expresses the need for the European surplus countries to work closely with us on balance of payments issues;
- suggests that high level consultations between the U. S. and the Commission would be useful in the future.

We issued a joint statement following your meeting with Hallstein in 1965 when he was President of the Commission.

I concur in the recommendation.

W. W. Rostow

Approve ✓

No       

Call me       

ERF:mst

43a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Joint Statement for Rey Visit

Attached, for your approval, is a draft joint statement which you may want to release following the Rey visit on February 7.

Rey's visit gives you an opportunity to make the point hard that European surplus countries must share responsibility with us for restoring balance of payments equilibrium. Our draft statement is aimed at making this point publicly.

Rey has his own reasons for wanting to strengthen the hand of the EEC Unified Commission (which he heads); we want to capitalize on this to move him and the EEC member states in a direction which will:

- help us, in real terms, on our balance of payments;
- convince the Congress and the public that we are hard at work on the payments problem;
- demonstrate that the answer to our deficit lies in expansionist solutions and cooperative action from the surplus countries.

The text we suggest is in the form of a joint statement, but the form is not as important as the substance. A statement to the press (based on the suggested text) would do just as well. What we want is to have Rey go back to Brussels publicly committed to an active role in dealing with the international payments situation.


Finally, we have tried to make our points in such a way that Rey--who has to be sensitive to French reactions--can accept. It is for this reason--plus British sensitivities--that we have left out any reference to UK entry into the EEC.

I will send you a separate briefing memo and talking points for your visit with Rey.

Recommendation:

That you agree to issue the attached joint statement after Rey's February 7 visit.

Approve ✓ Disapprove           



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach



436~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

Suggested Text of Joint Statement Issued  
Following Meeting of President Johnson and  
Jean Rey, President of the Commission of  
the European Communities, in Washington,  
February 7, 1968

The President and Mr. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, met at the White House on February 7. During his visit to Washington, Mr. Rey, accompanied by Vice President Hellwig and Commissioner Deniau, is also meeting with the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials.

The President and Mr. Rey confirmed their belief in the need for continued progress toward the unity of Europe. The President reaffirmed the support of the United States for the progress of the European Communities. A strong and democratic Western Europe working as an equal partner with the United States would help to build a peaceful, prosperous and just world order. Both the United States and the European Communities recognize their responsibilities to the developing countries in expanding export earnings and development.

The President reviewed his balance of payments program with Mr. Rey and emphasized the firm intention of the United States to take the necessary action to restore equilibrium. The President and Mr. Rey recognized the need for both surplus and deficit countries to continue and intensify their individual and common efforts to achieve a better equilibrium in the international balance of payments. The closest cooperation between the United States and the European Communities is necessary to ensure that international adjustment takes place under conditions of continued economic growth with financial stability. In particular, they agreed that the achievements of the Kennedy Round must be preserved, that protectionist measures should be avoided and that further progress should be made in the elimination of barriers to trade.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE  
MARKING CANCELLED PER E.O. 12358,  
SEC. 1.3 AND ARCHIVIST'S MEMO OF  
MAY 18, 1962.

BY 19 ON 1-30-92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Mr. Rey told the President of his satisfaction with a meeting held on February 7 between his party and senior officials of the United States Government on matters of common concern pertaining to the economic interrelationship of Europe and the United States. The President and Mr. Rey agreed similar high level consultations would be useful in the future.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWR

44

*Pres file*

Monday, February 5, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached is a letter to you from Prime Minister Pearson. He expresses appreciation for our close consultation with the Canadians on our balance of payments program and suggests we place our trade proposals before appropriate international bodies so as to avoid retaliation and damage to the international trade system.

At Tab A is a brief draft reply for your approval and signature. It was prepared in State. Bill Roth and Treasury concur.

W. W. Rostow

(If you approve we will need your signature at Tab A.)

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*WWR*  
MWG:em

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NJ 92-397  
By CB, NARA, Date 10-6-95

~~SECRET~~

WWR

44a

Dear Mike:

Thank you for your letter of January 23 concerning our balance of payments program.

I know that while you recognize that the strength of the U.S. dollar and the integrity of the international monetary system are important to Canada, you must also be concerned about possible problems our measures may create for Canada. We are doing our best to keep in close touch with your representatives in order to minimize these problems. I appreciate your recognition of our efforts in this regard.

I have taken careful note of your suggestion that we deal with the trade aspects of our program through international bodies. I share your interest in using appropriate international bodies whenever possible and I will certainly bear your counsel in mind.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable  
Lester B. Pearson, O.B.E., M.P.  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa

*mb*  
LEJ:MWG:em  
2/5/68

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4  
NLJ 92-397  
By g/eb, NARA, Date 4/29/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND

*Pres file*

There is some irresponsible talk in the newspapers abroad and here today that we have lost confidence in you.

I wish to tell you in the bluntest and most direct way I can that I have never dealt with a man in whom I had more confidence. You and your Vietnamese colleagues have, in my judgment, dealt with the attack on the cities well.

It is my judgment that your leadership and Ellsworth's will bring us much further ahead a month from now than we otherwise would have been.

Let us make that happen.

I believe that everything you have asked for has been supplied.

As you go into this battle, you have my fullest possible confidence and support.

###

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

*Confidential*

*CAS*  
*Chamuel*  
*L. to ally E go only*

*46*

*DRAB* -- February 5, 1968

FROM THE PRESIDENT

FOR GENERAL WESTMORELAND

*irrefutable*  
There is some talk in the newspapers ~~here and abroad~~ *and here* today that  
*h* we have lost confidence in you.

I wish to tell you in the bluntest and most direct way I can that I  
have never dealt with a ~~military~~ man in whom I had more confidence.

You and your Vietnamese colleagues have, in my judgment, dealt with  
the attack on the cities *Well.* ~~superbly.~~ There is no point ~~crowding about it now~~

*It* but it is my judgment that ~~with~~ your leadership and Ellsworth's, ~~if the~~

~~Vietnamese can rally themselves to exploit the Communist setback,~~ *will bring* ~~we~~

*us* ~~will~~ be much further ahead a month from now than we otherwise would

have been. *It* Let us make that happen. ~~As for Khe Sanh, it was my duty...~~

~~to make sure that all the questions that could be asked were asked and~~

~~answered.~~ Now you and the JCS have answered them. The time for

questioning is over. *It* I believe that everything you have asked for has been  
supplied.

As you go into this battle, you have *my* ~~the~~ fullest possible confidence  
and support ~~of your Commander in Chief.~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By *Cb*, NARA Date 11-3-97

TRANSFERRED TO HANDWRITING FILE

*Pres file*

Monday - February 5, 1968

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**SUBJECT: Death of President Diaz Ordaz's Father**

President Diaz Ordaz's father died yesterday afternoon in Mexico City. Our Embassy reports that the funeral is expected to take place tomorrow.

Attached is a suggested message from you to President Diaz Ordaz.

Approve ✓

Disapprove       

Call me       .

We have asked State to find out immediately when the funeral will take place and whether it would be appropriate to send a special representative in case you desire to do so. I will let you know as soon as we hear back from the Embassy.

W. W. Rostow

**Attachment**

Suggested Presidential message  
of condolence to President Diaz Ordaz

47a

February 5, 1968

**Suggested Presidential Message of Condolence to President  
of Mexico Gustavo Diaz Ordaz**

**Dear Mr. President:**

**Lady Bird and I were saddened to learn of your father's death.  
Our thoughts are with you in your grief. Please extend our  
deepest sympathy to all the members of your family.**

**Sincerely,**

**Lyndon B. Johnson**

**His Excellency**

**Gustavo Diaz Ordaz**

**President of the United Mexican States.**



~~SECRET~~ - SENSITIVE

Monday - February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Appointment with Covey Oliver - Monday, February 5,  
12:00 noon.

Covey asked for the appointment to discuss policy and personnel matters relating to Latin America.

We understand that he is sending you a memorandum through Marvin on specific issues he will take up. We are not privy to them, but Bill Bowdler says he has these matters on his mind:

1. Symington-Conte-Long Amendments. He is concerned over the slowness with which Bill Gaud and Nick Katzenbach are proceeding in deciding how to apply these amendments. He is particularly disturbed by their inclination to be harsh with Peru for having precipitated the amendments by purchasing Mirages.

Actually, there has been some delay in the processing of loan papers for CY 1968, but the two key ones -- Brazil and Colombia -- will be ready for your consideration this week, and Chile will follow shortly thereafter. Peru is a tough case because Belaunde is letting the military proceed with large purchases despite the critical economic situation. The case for applying the Symington amendments on AID and IDB loans is a strong one. What Covey fears is that application could precipitate an economic situation in which the military would oust a civilian constitutional president. He thinks this is bad for you in an election year and our Latin American policy in general.

Bill and Nick fear that softness on Peru will harden Congressional attitudes on the amendments in terms of the FY 1969 AID appropriations. They want Covey to go to Peru to discuss the situation with Belaunde and then consult on the Hill on the basis of what Belaunde is prepared to do. In the case of Peru, this makes sense.

2. Our Representation in CIAP and the OAS. Covey's relations with Sol are on the surface harmonious but underneath uneasy. Covey has avoided asserting his authority in order to avoid

blow-ups. He is now sufficiently concerned about Sol's free-wheeling to take some action. Covey would like to let Sol have his OAS Mission arrangement, but in so doing, spell out procedures for Sol to keep him and the rest of State currently informed of his activities in the OAS. Knowing how you feel about the OAS Mission proposition, he may not raise it.

Covey would like to separate the OAS and CIAP jobs or find some other arrangement for getting adequate US representation on CIAP. He knows that Bill Bowdler has developed a proposal for meeting the problem of CIAP's inadequacy -- which goes beyond Sol's failure to provide leadership.

3. US Executive Director on IDB. Covey feels strongly that the present alternate US Director -- Ray Sternfeld -- would be the best appointment. He bases this on Sternfeld's demonstrated ability, experience, language proficiency and capacity to work well with Felipe Herrera and the Latin Directors. His views are reinforced by Joe Barr, Tom Mann, David Rockefeller and George Moore's agreement with him.
4. US Ambassador to Argentina. Covey wants very much for Bob Sayre to have this job. He is aware that you have someone else in mind, but he may still raise it. He would also like to do some shifting of Ambassadors who have been in their posts too long: i.e., Ambassadors Jones in Peru and Henderson in Bolivia.
5. Congressman Gallagher Visit to the DR. Covey believes that Ambassadors are sent to represent the President and the US Government, and it is a mistake to send special emissaries to look over their shoulders or do special jobs. This attitude probably stems from his having been an Ambassador and not liking interloper. He knows of your desire that Gallagher go to Santo Domingo.
6. Your Remark at Last Friday's Meeting with the Border Development Commission. Covey is concerned about your remark on the handling of our Latin American policy. Bill Bowdler has prepared a list of ideas for galvanizing our image and activities in the area. He has asked Covey for his views. I will be sending this list to you separately. Covey may bring up the subject.

W. W. Rostow

48a

Monday  
February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*Pres file*

Attached is a memorandum to you from Secretary Rusk recommending that you approve our negotiating with the Philippine Government a \$6 million agreement to assist private education in the Philippines. This has been held up for some months while we worked out an arrangement to ensure that this project does not get us involved in a charge that public funds are being used to support parochial education. That has now been done. The money will be mostly spent on improved facilities such as libraries and laboratories.

You are also being asked to approve about \$1 million for the Philippine Science High School and about \$0.5 million for construction of a series of Youth Development Training Centers. The Philippine Science High School is the only secondary school in the Philippines which emphasizes science and draws its student body from honor students throughout the Islands. The Training Centers are a kind of cross between a vocational school and a CCC camp.

The money for these agreements would come from the Special Fund for Education created by the Philippine War Damage legislation. The specific projects were suggested by the Filipinos, and have the approval of Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget, as well as State. The author of the Special Fund legislation, Congressman Zablocki approves the projects, as does the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

I recommend that you approve the projects.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

*Approved* —  
*Disapproved* —  
*Call me* —  
MWright:wpt



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

481b

S/S 13944

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

August 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Philippine Special Fund for Education:  
Final Three Project Proposals

Recommendation:

That you authorize project agreements with the Philippine Government for the expenditure of approximately \$7.5 million from the Philippine Special Fund for Education (PL 88-94) to implement the Philippine proposals for assistance to private education in the Philippines, the Philippine Science High School, and a Youth Development Program.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Discussion:

The Special Fund for Education, the uncommitted balance of which is now about \$9 million, held in the Philippine Education Program account of the U. S. Treasury, was established by a 1963 amendment to Philippine War Damage Legislation of 1962. The Fund is to be used as jointly determined by the President of the United States and the President of the Philippines to further educational programs to the mutual advantage of both countries.

On March 22, 1967 you approved Special Fund support for the Philippine classroom construction and textbook production proposals. Agreement on the classroom

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proposal was reached on May 17, 1967 in Manila, and on the textbook proposal on June 26, 1967. On June 22, 1967 you approved Special Fund Support for the Cultural Development Fund of the Philippine National Cultural Center. An agreement is now pending on this third proposal.

In September 1965, in authorizing the opening of negotiations on the uses of the Fund, you also authorized the conclusion of an agreement on a Land Reform Education project. We have received a preliminary Philippine proposal for such a project in the amount of \$1.3 million.

We received in March 1967 and have carefully scrutinized the detailed Philippine project proposals for assistance to private education in the Philippines, for construction of a physical plant for the recently established Philippine Science High School, and for the construction of a series of rural Youth Development Training Centers. We believe the three projects meet the criteria for support under Special Fund auspices, and fulfill the requirements of 1963 legislation. The amounts requested for support of the Land Reform Education project and the final three proposals would commit the entire \$9 million remaining balance of the Special Fund.

The Philippine Government has indicated its interest in reaching agreement on these projects in the near future. We would expect to commit about \$6 million of the Special Fund to assistance to private education, up to \$1 million to the Science High School, and \$.5 million to the Youth Development project during 1967 and 1968. These projects have the approval of the Treasury Department and the Bureau of the Budget staff. Congressman Zablocki, author of the Special Fund legislation, has expressed his satisfaction with the projects. We have also reviewed these projects with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

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3

In negotiating agreements on these three projects, it is our intention to discuss with the Philippine Government appropriate ways of identifying the projects as jointly approved by the President of the United States and the President of the Republic of the Philippines for financing from the Special Fund for Education.

Enclosed is a memorandum containing further details on the three projects.



Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Background Memorandum

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEBACKGROUND MEMORANDUMThe Philippine Proposals for Assistance to Private Education, a Science High School, and Youth Development

An Amendment to the Philippine War Damage legislation of 1962, PL 88-94, approved August 12, 1963, established the fund known as the Philippine Special Fund for Education, to be used "for the purpose of furthering educational exchange and other educational programs to the mutual advantage of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States in such manner as the Presidents of these two Republics shall from time to time determine." The uncommitted balance of the Special Fund for Education is now about \$9 million.

On April 26, 1966, pursuant to Presidential authority, the two governments exchanged notes constituting the basis for commencement of negotiations on Special Fund project proposals. Under the April 1966 understanding, disbursements for the Fund will be made in accordance with a schedule of payments to be mutually agreed upon for each project, and deposited by the U.S. Government in such banking institutions in the Philippines as may be agreed upon by the two governments. The understanding also calls for periodic reports by the Philippine Government on each Fund project until authorized funds have been spent.

The two Presidents agreed in the Joint Communique of September 15, 1966, to accelerate Special Fund discussions and to move for rapid implementation of projects. Pursuant to Presidential authorization, agreements were signed on classroom construction and textbook production on May 18 and June 20, 1967 respectively. A third proposal for a Cultural Development (trust) Fund is now in final stages of

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negotiation. The President has also authorized conclusion of an agreement on Land Reform Education with the September 1965 authorization to open Special Fund negotiations. A preliminary proposal in the amount of \$1.3 million has been received.

In March 1967 we received the Philippine Government proposal for assistance to private education. Private schools in the Philippines, including many church sponsored institutions, are an important segment of education and their graduates have been prominent in past and present Philippine leadership. Private education operates 64% of the country's secondary schools and enrolls 83% of secondary students. 87% of the college and university students are enrolled in private institutions.

The Philippine proposal would create a \$6.1 million Private Education Fund for low interest loans and grants to deserving private education institutions. Project decisions would be made by a committee composed of representatives of the Philippine National Economic Council, which now supervises the Special Fund classroom and textbook projects, the Department of Education, and representatives of private education.

The Private Education Fund would be devoted to the provision of facilities, such as libraries and laboratories, and the improvement of the standards of the private schools. Our agreement with the Philippine Government on this project will contain an appropriate section to preclude the use of Special Fund monies for support of religious worship or instruction.

The Science High School proposal, also received in March 1967, calls for expenditure of up to \$1 million for construction of a physical plant for the Science High School, including classroom and library, laboratory and other buildings. The Science High School is presently limited by its rented facilities to an enrollment of 250, but envisions future expansion to 875 students. The school, which was established through Philippine-American cooperation in 1963, has a student body selected from honor students

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throughout the Philippines. It is the only secondary school in the Philippines which provides a curriculum emphasizing the basic sciences.

The Philippine proposal for a Youth Development program, received in April 1967, calls for expenditure of about \$.5 million from the Special Fund to establish and equip rural regional training centers for young men. At the centers, the youths will receive training in civics, agriculture, and vocational and trade skills. The Philippine ROTC summer training program will use the centers during the two summer months of the year and the centers will be maintained by the armed forces. After training at the centers, trainees will be sent to the field where they will join in road building, school construction, reforestation, irrigation, and other development projects and activities.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

*Pres file*INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 5, 1968

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Background on Jordan Arms Package

The attached from Harry Symmes is the best background I could give you for your decision on the arms package for Jordan, which will be coming up in the next day or two. It also provides a useful backdrop for Harman's farewell call tomorrow.

What strikes me is not the familiar point about buying Soviet arms if we can't meet Jordan's needs but the increasing Jordanian conviction that we are bowing out of the Middle East and only the USSR can bring justice to the Arabs.

We told our Arab friends last fall that, if they went along with a balanced UN resolution, we'd do all in our power to help bring Israel around. Until last Thursday, the Israelis had refused to tell Jarring they accepted that resolution. In addition, they keep making their own changes in Jerusalem, either feeling they have us in their pockets or discounting our view entirely. The Arabs are beginning to believe that we aren't even trying to press Israel.

In fact, we can take some credit for Eban's acceptance of the resolution last week. But we haven't made a dent on his Jerusalem position, and we are trying today to keep the Jordanians from calling a Security Council meeting on Jerusalem.

Our dilemma is that it's hard to lean on the Israelis until negotiations produce a reasonable proposition to throw our weight behind. But if we can't persuade the Arabs now that we're willing and able to get some results, we may not get to negotiations because they may figure the Jarring mission is hopeless without our behind-scenes help.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-193

By CG, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

Attachment: Amman 3270, 2/3/68

~~SECRET~~





Department of State

49a  
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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DE RUQMG 3270A 0342300  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557  
STATE GRNC  
BT

10420  
FEB 3, 1968  
8:14 P.M.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3270

NODIS

SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES  
TOWARD SOVIETS

1. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE TO GENERAL KHAMMASH TODAY THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS (IN ESSENCE KING TOLD KHAMMASH THAT IF USG DOES NOT MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS HE WILL BUY SOVIET ARMS), I ARRANGED MEETING WITH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY AND CONFIDANT ZAID AL-RIFA'I TO TRY TO OBTAIN BETTER INSIGHT INTO KING'S CURRENT MOOD. I ALSO WANTED TO GET ZAID'S ADVICE ON WHETHER IT WOULD BE WISE FOR ME TO TRY TO SEE KING BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS WITH ARMS PACKAGE.
2. ZAID TOLD ME THAT HUSSEIN HIMSELF HAD DRAFTED MESSAGE TO KHAMMASH. HE SAID THAT KING HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CONVINCED ABOUT THE CORRECTNESS OF HIS VIEW OF LARGER CONTEXT IN WHICH HE NOW SEES USG POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST. ZAID THEN EXPLAINED KING'S ANALYSIS VERY MUCH ALONG LINES KING HAD TAKEN WITH ME ON JAN 25 (AMMAN 3129). US IS TIED DOWN IN FAR EAST AND OTHER AREAS AND HAS LITTLE FLEXIBILITY OR, FOR THAT MATTER, WILL TO ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY TO PROMOTE JUST PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MOVING IN, PARTICULARLY SINCE JUNE WAR AND, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, ARE CREDITED BY ARAB LEADERS WITH RIGHT MOTIVES AND SYMPATHETIC POLICIES IN MIDDLE EAST. USG IS JUDGED TO BE BOTH UNWILLING AND UNABLE TO CONTROL ISRAEL. THUS, MODERATE JORDANIANS AGREE WITH KING HUSSEIN THAT TIME HAS COME TO "STAY A STEP AHEAD OF SITUATION BY MOVING TOWARD SOVIETS".
3. KING FEELS HE HAS GONE "NINETY PERCENT OF THE WAY" WITH THE US. AFTER JUNE THE US SEEMED TO FORGET COMPLETELY ALL THAT HE AND OTHER MODERATE JORDANIANS HAD DONE OVER PAST DECADE AND MORE TO HELP PRESERVE STABILITY AND MODERATION IN MIDDLE EAST. US HAD DONE NOTHING TO HELP JORDAN OUT SINCE JUNE..TO THE CONTRARY,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-194

By CB, NARA Date 6-97



WE HAD IN EFFECT, VOTED AGAINST JORDAN ON JERUSALEM QUESTION; WE HAD POSED CONTINUOUS DIFFICULTIES ABOUT MATTERS OF MERE WORDS IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS; WE HAD FINALLY LIFTED ARMS EMBARGO FOR ISRAEL AND CERTAIN OTHER ARAB STATES BUT POINTEDLY EXCLUDED JORDAN; AND THEN WE HAD DISCONTINUED BUDGETARY SUPPORT WHICH HAD BECOME SYMBOL OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENTLY WE HAD AFFIRMED OUR CONTINUED SUPPORT OF JORDAN IN GENERAL WAY, FACT WAS THAT TOTALITY OF OUR ACTIONS TOWARD JORDAN HAD BEEN NEGATIVE RATHER THAN POSITIVE. FINALLY, KING'S RECEPTION IN US IN NOVEMBER, PARTICULARLY IN CONTRAST TO LATER RECEPTION OF ESHKOL, HAD BEEN SERIOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW.

4. ZAID EXPLAINED THAT HE SEPARATELY AND LATER TOGETHER WITH PRIMIN TALHOUNI TODAY HAD ARGUED AT SOME LENGTH WITH KING TO EFFECT HE SHOULD ACCEPT US ARMS PACKAGE, EVEN IF IT PROVIDES ONLY 50 PERCENT OF JORDAN ARMS STRENGTH AS OF JUNE 4. THEY HAD URGED IT WOULD BE BETTER GO ALONG WITH US IN PRESENT SITUATION BECAUSE SOVIET ARMS DEAL WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO SOLUTION MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND, IN THEIR VIEW, WOULD FURTHER OBSTRUCT SOLUTION. KING HAD PRESSED HIS OWN ANALYSIS IN PARAGRAPH TWO ABOVE IN RESPONSE TO THIS ADVICE.

5. IN ZAID'S VIEW THERE IS MUCH TO WHAT KING SAYS. HE SAID HE BELIEVES THAT IF US ARMS PACKAGE PROVES INADEQUATE IN KING'S VIEW ONLY WAY TO KEEP KING FROM GOING TO SOVIETS FOR ARMS IS TO BE ABLE TO CITE SOMETHING TANGIBLE AND DRAMATIC TO INDICATE THAT US DOES HAVE CONTINUING POSITIVE INTEREST IN JORDAN AND DOES IN FACT INTEND "USE ITS MUSCLE" TO PREVENT ISRAELIS FROM CARRYING OFF A MASSIVE FAIT ACCOMPLI. ZAID SAID THAT "STATEMENTS WITHOUT PRACTICAL EFFECT" SIMPLY ARE NOT ENOUGH. JORDAN MUST BE ABLE TO POINT TO SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO SHOW THAT USG INTENDS TO IMPLEMENT ITS STATEMENTS ABOUT JERUSALEM AND THE JARRING MISSION. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY USG WILL EXERT PRESSURE; USG MUST ACTUALLY EXERT PRESSURE AND POINT TO RESULTS. IN THE PAST DECADE AND MORE THE KING FELT THAT JORDAN HAD GIVEN EVERYTHING AND GOTTEN NOTHING IN TRYING TO LIVE WITH ISRAEL. USG HAD SPOKEN A GREAT DEAL ABOUT HUMAN AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN VIET NAM. WHAT ABOUT ARAB RIGHTS? WHAT ABOUT VILLAGES THAT HAD BEEN LEVELLED ON WEST BANK BY ISRAEL? WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN EVICTED FROM THEIR HOMES IN GAZA, JERUSALEM, AND WEST BANK? WHAT ABOUT UN DECISIONS THAT HAD BEEN CONSISTENTLY FLOUTED? WHAT ABOUT RECENT US STATEMENTS ABOUT NOT ACCEPTING UNILATERAL ISRAELI ACTIONS? FACT IS THAT USG IS ACCEPTING ISRAELI ACTIONS AND DOING NOTHING ABOUT THEM.

6. THROUGHOUT THIS CONVERSATION ZAID EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ARE THINGS KING IS THINKING. THIS IS HIS READING OF SITUATION. ACTUALLY HIS ADVISERS ARE TRYING WITHOUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS TO CONVINCE HIM TO MAKE NO DRASTIC MOVES. YET, MANY JORDANIANS NOW BELIEVE THE SOVIETS CAN CALL THE TUNE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. THEY ARE BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THE SOVIETS

~~SECRET~~

~~ARE ABLE~~  
~~SZOPKIN~~ TO CHALLENGE THE US SIXTH FLEET IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE MARINES AND HELICOPTERS TO LAND IN MIDDLE EAST IF NECESSARY. THUS, MANY JORDANIANS AND OTHER ARABS NOW SEE A POSSIBILITY OF SECURITY COUNCIL OR OTHER UN ACTION TO FACE ISRAEL WITH SANCTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT HAD BEEN PUT ON ISRAEL IN 1956 BY THE US. BUT IN THIS CASE IT WOULD BE THE SOVIETS THAT WOULD TAKE THE CREDIT FOR FORCING THE ISRAELIS TO RESPECT WORLD OPINION, NOT THE US.

7. I SHALL NOT DETAIL REJOINDERS AND COMMENTS I MADE TO ZAID WITH REGARD TO FOREGOING. I SOUGHT HIS REACTION TO IDEA I MIGHT SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH HUSSEIN TOMORROW OR MONDAY BEFORE KHAMMASH RETURNS IN ORDER TO TRY TO DISPEL SOME OF KING'S APPARENT MIS-INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS. ZAID COUNSELLED ME AGAINST SEEING KING BUT SAID HE WOULD LET HUSSEIN KNOW I WAS AVAILABLE WHENEVER HE WANTED TO SEE ME. (I WILL IN ANY CASE ACCOMPANY EUGENE BLACK IN CALL LATE ON SIXTH). HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ME NOT TO SEE KING UNTIL KHAMMASH HAS RETURNED WITH "PACKAGE", BUT HE EMPHASIZED IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR PACKAGE TO BE APPROXIMATELY WHAT KING WANTED AND FOR IT TO BE PLACED IN BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, WOULD BE SOME KIND OF US ACTION WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM OR JARRING MISSION THAT COULD BE CITED AS REAL EVIDENCE OF US INTENTIONS TO USE ITS MUSCLE TO BRING ABOUT A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

8. AS ZAID WAS LEAVING HE SAID HE AND PRIMIN TALHOUNI HAD OBTAINED KING'S GRUDGING AGREEMENT TO LET KING FAISAL KNOW IF HE FINDS US PACKAGE UNACCEPTABLE. ACCORDING TO ZAID, TALHOUNI HAD SAID TO KING THAT EVEN HE, WHO HAD NEVER HAD GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH AMERICANS, BELIEVED IT WOULD BE IN JORDAN'S INTEREST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AVOID CHANGING "POLITICAL BALANCE" IN AREA AT THIS TIME. ZAID AND TALHOUNI, HOWEVER, ARE NOT SANGUINE HUSSEIN WILL GO AGAIN TO FAISAL IF US PACKAGE APPEARS TOO FAR SHORT OF HIS REQUIREMENTS. (DEPT. MAY WISH INFORM AMBASSADOR EILTS OF MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.)

9. COMMENT: A. AT THIS STAGE WE NEED SOMETHING MORE THAN A GIMMICK. WE NEED AN EARNEST OF OUR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO JERUSALEM AND THE UK RESOLUTION. JORDAN ACCEPTED THE UK RESOLUTION AND HAS CATEGORICALLY STATED THIS TO JARRING. JORDAN IS WILLING TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT AS SOON AS ISRAEL SIMILARLY COMMITS ITSELF TO JARRING AND PUBLICLY ACCEPTS RESOLUTION. IN MY OPINION EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN GIVING HUSSEIN DOUBLE THE ARMS HE HAS REQUESTED WOULD BE A CLEARCUT PUBLIC STATEMENT WITH PRACTICAL EFFECT OF OUR INTENTIONS RE JERUSALEM AND JARRING (OR FAILING THAT, UNPUBLICIZED EVIDENCE THROUGH JARRING OR OTHERWISE THAT ISRAELIS WILL CEASE THEIR UNILATERAL

PAGE 4 AMMAN 3270 2/3/68 ~~SECRET~~

ACTIONS IN JERUSALEM AND WILL ACCEPT UK RESOLUTION AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS). IN THIS REGARD, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT JORDANIANS IMMEDIATELY PICKED UP AND BEGAN TO SUSPECT PHRASE "IN SPIRIT OF" IN REFERENCE TO ISRAELI ATTITUDE TOWARD JARRING MISSION AS CARRIED IN ESHKOL-JOHNSON COMMUNIQUE.

B. I THINK WE ALSO MIGHT CONSIDER GIVING IMMEDIATE PUBLICITY TO OUR DECISION SUPPLY ARMS TO JORDAN THUS MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR KING TO MOVE TOWARDS SOVIET ARMS RELATIONSHIP. THIS STATEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE TO EFFECT WE HAVE DECIDED SATISFY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS OF JORDAN BECAUSE OF OUR LONG AND CORDIAL RELATIONSHIP, BECAUSE OF ITS MODERATE VIEWS, AND BECAUSE WE THINK JORDAN IS ENTITLED SATISFY ITS DEFENSIVE REQUIREMENTS.

C. DEPT MAY WISH REPEAT THIS ON NODIS BASIS TO USUN AND TEL AVIV.

GP-1

SYMMES

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Monday, February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Ambassador Goldberg's Call on You

*Pres file*

At his request, Ambassador Goldberg is coming to see you at 6:00 p.m. today.

1. He wishes to talk about "certain aspects of the Pueblo incident."

Foremost on his mind is likely to be the unfair treatment given his statement in New York concerning the position of the Pueblo as compared to statements yesterday in the Rusk-McNamara TV interview. Some of the press, and particularly the Washington Post, has interpreted Ambassador Goldberg's statements at the UN as meaning that the Pueblo was at no time in territorial waters. The full context of the Ambassador's statement makes it clear that he was talking about the period when the Pueblo was first approached and when seized.

Ambassador Goldberg's statement was carefully worded in recognition of the fact that at this time we simply cannot be sure of the ship's position at all times prior to capture.

We understand that Ambassador Goldberg has no complaint concerning any misunderstanding within government circles on this score. He is believed to lay the possible damage to his credibility at the door of the press alone, which not only took his statements out of context, but which -- at least in the case of the Post -- did not research the matter of his meaning either at State or in the U. S. Delegation in New York.

Attached are the pertinent portions of Ambassador Goldberg's statement in New York.

2. Ambassador Goldberg understands the need "to tread water" in New York while emphasis is in Panmunjom. You may wish to ask if he has any recommendations concerning tactics at Panmunjom.

3. He is expected to be especially interested in your appraisal of the current Viet-Nam situation.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

AJ:mm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ambassador Goldberg's statements on January 26 concerning the Pueblo's position.

1. The strict instructions under which the Pueblo was operating required it to stay at least 13 nautical miles from the North Korean coast. While my country adheres to the three-mile rule of international law concerning territorial waters, nevertheless, the ship was under orders whose effect was to stay well clear of the 12-mile limit which the North Korean authorities have by long practice followed.

2. Now, Mr. President, I want to lay to rest -- completely to rest -- some intimations that the Pueblo had intruded upon the territorial waters and was sailing away from territorial waters and that the North Korean ships were in hot pursuit. This is not the case at all and I shall demonstrate it by this map.

3. Mr. President, it is incontrovertible from this type of evidence, which is physical evidence of international Morse code signals and voice reports, that the Pueblo when first approached and when seized was in international waters, well beyond the 12-mile limit; and that the North Koreans knew this.



Monday, February 5, 1968

*Pres file*

MR. PRESIDENT:

The British Embassy informs us that Earl Mountbatten will be visiting the United States during March as a guest of Variety Clubs International. He will be in Washington March 9 - 12 and told the Embassy he would like very much to call on you as he has done in the past.

Should we set up an appointment?

*No serious reason - unless you'd just like to chat.*

W. W. Rostow

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Call me \_\_\_\_\_

*MWG*

MWG:mst


INFORMATION

Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 9:00 a.m.

Mr. President:

Responding to a question from Elspeth last night, I explained events in Vietnam as follows.

The war had been proceeding in 1967 on an attritional basis with our side gradually improving its position, the Communists gradually running down: like this



Behind these curves were pools of military forces and fire power which represented the working capital available to the two sides.


As the documents forecast, the Communists decided to take a large part of their capital and put it into:

- an attack on the cities;
- a frontier attack at Khe Sanh and elsewhere.

In the one case their objective was the believed vulnerability of the GVN and the believed latent popular support for the Viet Cong.

In the other case, the believed vulnerability of the U. S. public opinion to discouragement about the war.

So the curves actually moved like this:



The dotted portions indicate the potentiality if:

- the cities are cleared up and held against possible follow-on attacks;
- the GVN demonstrate effective political and relief capacity;
- we hold Khe Sanh;
- we keep U.S. opinion steady on course.

In short, if all on our side do their job well, the net effect could be a shortening of the war.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

## INFORMATION

*Pres. file*

Monday, February 5, 1968 -- 8:50 a.m.

Mr. President:

While on night duty I asked Bob Ginsburgh to do a terse statistical comparison of the situation at Dien Bien Phu and that at Khe Sanh.

The numbers suggest why our military are confident.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Monday, February 5, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Khe Sanh and Dien Bien Phu

The campaign for Dien Bien Phu lasted 209 days and the actual seige 56 days.

The French began with a strength of about 5,000 (including Montagnards, North Africans, Vietnamese and Foreign Legionnaires). Although a total of 15,000 participated, maximum strength on the French side at any one time was about 13,000. Total casualties were: 1,100 killed, 1,600 missing and 4,400 wounded.

The Viet-Minh totaled 49,500 combat troops plus 55,000 support troops.

By comparison we have 6,000 Americans at Khe Sanh versus an enemy strength of about 20,000. Thus the enemy's advantage is less than 4 to 1 rather than 8 to 1 as it was at Dien Bien Phu (including support troops). If we consider total strengths in I Corps north of Hue, the enemy has only 38,600 versus our 41,000 (including South Vietnamese).

Usable supplies parachuted to Dien Bien Phu averaged about 100 tons per day during the seige. General Westmoreland has a capability of 600 tons per day.

Total aircraft available to the French were 75 combat aircraft and 100 supply and reconnaissance aircraft. By comparison, the U.S. has more than 2,000 aircraft and 3,300 helicopters.

ROBERT N. GINSBURGH

INFORMATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Tres file*

Monday, February 5, 1968  
8:25 a.m.

Mr. President:

This summary of three prisoner of war interrogation reports is consistent with the longer one I sent up earlier.

If our boys follow through in clearing up the cities and we hold Khe Sanh, the morale problem will shortly be on the other side.

W. W. Rostow

TDCS 314/02051-68 (advance)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WWRostow:rlm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority CIA ltr 9/79

By wplng, NARA, Date 1-31-92

FM CIA  
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM  
SSO ACSI DA  
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
AFSSO USAF  
CNO  
DIA/ISIC  
JCS  
NIC  
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER  
STATE (RCI)  
CIA-OCI  
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**SANITIZED**  
**E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6**  
**NLJ 96-200**  
**By us, NARA Date 7-10-98**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 27 JANUARY 1968 - 4 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF ONE VIET CONG AND TWO NORTH VIETNAMESE  
ARMY PRISONERS CONCERNING THE PLANS AND OBJECTIVES  
OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND POPULAR SUPPORT FROM THE  
SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE DURING THE OFFENSIVE.

ACQ: BIEN HOA (5 FEBRUARY 1968) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)  
3.4 (b)(1)

1.5 (c)  
3.4 (b)(1)

1. A BRIEF INTERROGATION OF THREE PRISONERS IN THE BIEN HOA AREA REVEALS THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (A) THEY WERE GIVEN ORDERS FOR THE TET CAMPAIGN SHORTLY BEFORE THE TIME OF ATTACK AND WERE TOLD THAT THE EFFORT WOULD BE A FINAL THRUST TO LIBERATE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN). THE PRISONERS SAID THEY WERE TO ATTACK CITIES AND TO CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS AGAINST HEADQUARTERS INSTALLATIONS, PARTICULARLY U.S. FACILITIES, (B) LOW LEVEL CADRES APPARENTLY WERE NOT PROVIDED WITH WITHDRAWAL PLANS SINCE THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF VICTORY. THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE TET HOLIDAY WOULD BE CELEBRATED IN "LIBERATED" AREAS FOLLOWING THE TRIUMPH. THE PRISONERS SAID THEIR ORDERS WERE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING UNTIL VICTORY, (C) THERE WAS AN INITIAL BELIEF THAT THE POPULATION WOULD ASSIST IN AN UPRISING AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND U.S. FORCES, (D) IN THE OPINION OF THE PRISONERS THE ANTICIPATED SUPPORT FROM THE SVN POPULATION WAS NOT FORTHCOMING, (E) NO MENTION WAS MADE TO THE PRISONERS OF A MAJOR OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTHERN AREAS OF SVN TO FOLLOW-UP OR COINCIDE WITH THE TET CAMPAIGN, (F) THE PRISONERS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY EFFORTS TO REORGANIZE THE "ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY" AS A COALITION MOVEMENT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM (NFLSV), (G) THE PRISONERS WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY FOLLOW-UP PLANS FOR THE CURRENT OFFENSIVE, (H) THE PRISONERS WERE UNABLE TO COMPREHEND A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY BECAUSE THEY WERE ORIENTATED SOLELY TOWARD A MILITARY TRIUMPH. THE PRISONERS WOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE REACTIONS OF HANOI OR THE NFLSV TO THE FAILURE TO ACHIEVE THE MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF THE TET OFFENSIVE.

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, MACV, 7TH AF, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF, POLAD/CINDPAC. (ALSO SENT SAIGON).

GP-1

625

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

Monday, February 5, 1968  
8:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith the report of the  
inconclusive Panmunjom meeting of  
February 5.

I believe we should decide promptly  
today about the Moscow message in the  
light of Tommy's cable.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3970, Feb 5, 1968

~~SECRET~~/CACTUS

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

*Pres file*





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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DE RUALOS 3970E 0361100  
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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3970

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-194  
By CB, NARA Date 8-6-97

NODIS/CACTUS

SUBJ: SUMMARY OF PANMUMJOM MEETING, FEB 5

1. RADM SMITH OPENED MEETING BY READING VERBATIM TEXT OF STATEMENT CONTAINED PARA 2, STATE 109854, CONCERNING ATMOSPHERE OF COMPULSION. BEFORE READING HIS STATEMENT, SMITH PASSED TO PARK TWO COPIES IN BOTH ENGLISH AND KOREAN. PAK AND HIS ADVOSOR READ STATEMENTS INTENTLY WHILE SMITH WAS SPEAKING.
2. PAK, READING FROM PREPARED STATEMENT, RESPONDED THAT AT FEB 4 MEETING SMITH HAD GIVEN EXPLANATION DISTORTING FACTS TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT PUEBLO HAD BEEN IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND CREW HAD COMMITTED NO CRIME. SAID CHARGE SMITH HAD JUST MADE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH PUEBLO MATTER AND RESERVED RIGHT TO EXPRESS POSITION IN FUTURE. REFERRING AGAIN TO HIS FEB 4 STATEMENT ABOUT COMPULSIVE ATMOSPHERE HAVING BEEN CREATED BY US SIDE, PAK ADVISED SMITH TO ANSWER LATER AFTER SERIOUSLY STUDYING HIS STATEMENT. HE THEN REQUESTED ANSWER TO HIS SECOND QUESTION AT FEB 4 MEETING (WHETHER CASE WAS TO BE DEALT WITH AS MATTER BETWEEN DPRK AND USA, SINCE SMITH HAD STATED PUEBLO NOT UNDER UNC COMMAND AND CASE WAS WITHOUT PRECEDENT).
3. SMITH RESPONDED BY AGAIN REQUESTING NAMES OF PUEBLO CREW WHO ARE DEAD AND WOUNDED.
4. PAK, AGAIN READING PREPARED STATEMENT, CONTENDED THAT PURPOSE OF THESE CONTACTS IS TO ARRANGE MEANS OF DISCUSSING MATTERS RELATED TO PUEBLO CASE. SAID THAT IF SMITH WISHED TO SOLVE MATTER "PRACTICALLY", IT PROPER THAT REPRESENTATIVE FROM BOTH SIDES APPOINTED BY DPRK AND US SHOULD MEET AMONG THEMSELVES. HE AGAIN REQUESTED CLEAR ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION IN FEB 4 MEETING IN THIS CONNECTION.

~~SECRET~~

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-2- SEOUL 3970, FEBRUARY 5. NODIS/CACTUS

5. SMITH, SAYING HE WOULD ADDRESS THAT SUBJECT SHORTLY, THEN READ PREPARED STATEMENT REFERRING TO FACT THAT HE HAD REQUESTED INFO ON NAMES OF PUEBLO DEAD AND WOUNDED BY WRITTEN AND ORAL MEANS WITHOUT RESULT, ENDING WITH STATEMENT THAT US SIMPLY CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY NK PERSISTS IN REFUSING SIMPLE HUMANITARIAN REQUESTS OF THIS NATURE; SUCH REFUSAL, WITHOUT REASON, AGGRAVATES TENSIONS.

6. SMITH, STATING HE WAS RESPONDING TO PAK'S SECOND QUESTION AT FEB 4 MEETING, READ VERBATIM TEXT OF STATEMENT CONTAINED PARA 4, STATE 109854, AS AMENDED BY STATE 109876. AS WITH FIRST STATEMENT, SMITH PROVIDED PAK COPIES IN ENGLISH AND KOREAN, WHICH WERE AGAIN AVIDLY READ.

7. PAK REPLIED AFTER LONG LAPSE, DURING WHICH HE MADE EXTENSIVE PENCILLED CHANGES IN HIS PREPARED TEXT AND COMBINED LATTER WITH NOTES HE HAD MADE ON WRITTEN COPY OF SMITH'S STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT SMITH IN HIS LAST STATEMENT HAD STATED HE REPRESENTS GOVT OF US IN HANDLING PUEBLO CASE. ASKED WHETHER HE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT US SIDE ADMITS PUEBLO CASE IS MATTER TO BE HANDLED BY DPRK AND US AND THAT SMITH REPRESENTS US GOVT.

8. SMITH REJOINED THAT HE DID NOT FEEL HE COULD IMPROVE ON STATEMENT HE HAD JUST READ, WHICH PREPARED BY US GOVT.

9. PAK, AFTER DELETING SEVERAL LINES AND MAKING BRIEF ADDITION TO PREPARED STATEMENT, SAID HE NOTED "YOUR ACKNOWLEDGMENT" THAT PUEBLO CASE IS MATTER TO BE HANDLED BY DPRK AND BY US GOVT AND THAT SMITH REPRESENTS US GOVT. ASKED WHETHER SMITH AGREED WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING. (FOREGOING WAS SPOKEN VERY SLOWLY AND DELIVERATELY BY INTERPRETER.)

10. AFTER REPEATING STATEMENT ABOUT HIS INABILITY TO IMPROVE ON WORDS GIVEN HIM BY US GOVT, SMITH STATED THAT "I WILL AGREE THAT I AM ACTING FOR US GOVT." AFTER REVIEWING HIS STATEMENT, SMITH ADDED THAT HE SAW NOTHING IN STATEMENT WHICH STATES THAT US GOVT WILL DEAL DIRECTLY WITH DPRK AS SUCH.

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-3- SEOUL 3970, FEBRUARY 5. NODIS/CACTUS

11. PAK RESPONDED WITH NOTATION OF FACT THAT SMITH HAD STATED HE REPRESENTS US GOVT WITH FULL AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH PUEBLO CASE. HE SUGGESTED CONCLUSION THIS MEETING AND "LET'S HAVE A TALK WHEN WE MEET AGAIN."

12. SMITH SAID THAT BEFORE CONCLUDING HE WISHED MAKE ADDITIONAL POINT. HE THEN READ PREPARED STATEMENT CONTAINING SUGGESTION THAT FUTURE MEETINGS BE HELD AT 1400 HRS (AS SUGGESTED STATE 109852). SMITH THEN SAID HE HAD GIVEN PAK REPLIES TO HIS QUESTIONS OF PREVIOUS DAY, THAT HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER, WOULD AWAIT PAK'S REPLY, AND SUGGESTED RECESS. PAK STATED HE NOTED WHAT SMITH HAD SAID. MEETING RECESSED AT 1631 HRS.

13. COMMENT: MEETING WAS VERY BUSINESSLIKE. PAK WAS OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY OVER WHAT SMITH SAID BUT REMAINED POLITE. OBVIOUS THAT HIS PRINCIPAL INTEREST, FOR WHICH HE WAS WELL PREPARED, WAS TO ATTEMPT TO LEAD SMITH INTO STATEMENTS TO EFFECT THAT THIS WAS GOVT TO GOVT NEGOTIATION. BOTH SIDES LEFT DOOR OPEN FOR FURTHER SESSIONS, AND WE EXPECT THAT COMMUNIST SIDE WILL SHORTLY CALL NEXT MEETING. PAK DID NOT IN ANY WAY INDICATE AWARENESS OF CONTENTS RUSK/MCNAMARA MEET-THE-PRESS INTERVIEW. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KNOWLEDGE OF CONTENTS OF THIS INTERVIEW HAD NOT BEEN PASSED TO HIM PRIOR TO MEETING, OR THAT PYONGYANG IS STILL STUDYING ITS IMPLICATIONS. PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

information

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Monday, February 5, 1968  
8:15 a.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith two heartening Bunker messages:

1. A wrap-up response to a State cable on efforts to generate recovery and political progress (key passages marked).

2. A response to a personal back-channel message of mine on the importance of engaging the people in their own recovery.

I attach the outgoing, as well

~~SECRET~~ - Rostow

Saigon 18103, Feb 5, 1968  
State 109831 to Saigon, Feb 4, 1968  
Saigon 464 (CAS channels), Feb 5, 1968  
To Saigon CAP 80389 (CAS channels), Feb 4, 1968

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla

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PAGE 01 SAIGON 18103 051117Z

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ACTION SS 30

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5803

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 18103

EXDIS

REF: STATE 109831

1. I APPRECIATED VERY MUCH EXCELLENT REFTEL WHICH IN ITS BROAD LINES ACCORDS WITH MY OWN IMPRESSION AND IDEAS. IN FACT, MANY OF THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 6. A THROUGH E, ARE ALREADY IN THE WORKS HERE. ALTHOUGH MOST OF OUR INFORMATION AND IDEAS ARE BEING REPORTED IN SEPARATE MESSAGES, THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS HAVE BEEN SPARKED BY THE DEPARTMENT'S OBSERVATIONS.

2. IN CONNECTION WITH THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE VC, AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF REFTEL, WE HAVE INCREASING SIGNS BOTH WITHIN SAIGON AND FROM OUTLYING AREAS THAT THEY WERE INDEED COUNTING ON SUPPORT FROM THE POPULACE AND POSSIBLY FROM THE GVN MILITARY AND POLICE FORCES. WHILE THE PRESENT CONFUSION,

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18103 ~~SECRET~~  
ESPECIALLY IN SAIGON AND CHOLON, IS AFFORDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE VC TO ENGAGE IN VARIETY OF PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES WHICH CANNOT BE EASILY POLICED, THEY DO NOT IN FACT SEEM TO BE STIRRING UP ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT WITHIN THE CITY,

PRESERVATION COPY

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By CB, NARA Date 8-6-97



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PAGE 32 SAIGON 18103 351117Z

3. WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTIONS IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF REFTTEL, I WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS: I AGREE BROADLY WITH THE INTENT OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE GVN AND WE WILL BE SEEKING TO STIMULATE THEM AND ASSIST THE GVN IN CREATING THE MOST EFFICIENT MEANS FOR DEALING WITH ITS URGENT PROBLEMS. AS YOU KNOW, THE TASK FORCE WILL BE A GVN TASK FORCE, CALLING ON U. S. AGENCIES FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT. AS NEEDED, USING KOMER AS ITS FOCAL POINT ON THE U. S. SIDE. I THINK THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT IS CALLED FOR SINCE IT PLACES THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY, AS WELL AS CREDIT FOR ACTIONS TAKEN, WHERE IT SHOULD BE, I. E., ON THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. IT ALSO FURNISHES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS IN AN EFFECTIVE BUT UNOSTENTATIOUS WAY.

4. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE URGED ON THIEU THAT THIS IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MOMENT FOR HIM TO EXERT AGGRESSIVE

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18103 ~~SECRET~~

LEADERSHIP AND TO MOBILIZE AND ENERGIZE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. I HAVE URGED HIM ESPECIALLY TO BRING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY INTO THE PICTURE.

5. CONTACTS ARE BEING MADE WITH NON-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO TRY TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. WE SHALL BE MAKING CONTINUOUS EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD ON OUR OWN AND STIMULATING THE GVN TO ACT.

6. I AGREE THAT AN IDEAL SITUATION PRESENTS ITSELF TO EVALUATE THE PERFORMANCE OF KEY OFFICIALS DURING THE CRISIS, TO REWARD THOSE WHO HAVE PERFORMED WELL AND TO GET RID OF THOSE WHO HAVE FALLEN DOWN ON THE JOB. GENERAL WESTMORELAND THIS MORNING INFORMED US THAT ALL ARVN DIVISION COMMANDERS HAD PERFORMED WELL AND THAT THIS APPLIED ALSO TO THE CORPS COMMANDERS. THE ONLY ONE NOT AT HEADQUARTERS WHEN THE BLOW CAME WAS VINH LOC AT II CORPS, BUT HE HAS SINCE MADE UP FOR THIS DEFICIENCY. WE SHALL HAVE A CHANCE TO EVALUATE PROVINCIAL AND OTHER OFFICIALS ALSO. SOME PERFORMED MAGNIFICENTLY, OTHERS LESS WELL.

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7. WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 6D, I BELIEVE THAT THIEU IS ALREADY MOVING MORE RAPIDLY ON HIS OWN AND THERE IS

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AMPLE EVIDENCE IN RECENT DAYS OF HIS DESIRE AND INTENTION TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH KY AND DELEGATE MORE AUTHORITY TO THE LATTER. CONTRARY TO YOUR IMPRESSION THAT KY HAS ON HIS OWN BEEN TAKING OVER DE FACTO CONTROL OF THE TASK FORCE, IT WAS BY EXPLICIT DECISION OF THIEU HIMSELF THAT KY WAS DELEGATED THIS AUTHORITY. WE ONLY MADE A PASSING SUGGESTION TO THIS EFFECT AND THIEU TOOK THE BALL FROM THERE. I WOULD ADD A NOTE OF CAUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE REMAINING THOUGHTS IN THAT PARAGRAPH. I DO NOT BELIEVE THIEU IS LIKELY TO ALLOW HIMSELF TO BECOME A FIGUREHEAD PRESIDENT WITH KY EXERCISING THE MAIN GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL AND AUTHORITY. I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIEU IS INCREASINGLY EXERCISING THE POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY WHICH THE CONSTITUTION PASSES TO HIS OFFICE. THE MOST ENCOURAGING ASPECT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS TO MY MIND IS THAT THIEU IS NOW TALKING TO AND WORKING WITH ON MANY IMPORTANT MATTERS. IN FACT I BELIEVE THEY ARE COOPERATING MORE EFFECTIVELY AND WITH BETTER SPIRIT THAN AT ANY TIME SINCE MY ARRIVAL HERE LAST APRIL. IT WILL BE MY OBJECTIVE TO KEEP THIS PROCESS

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MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION RATHER THAN TO ENCOURAGE KY TO RUN AWAY WITH MUCH OF THIEU'S EXECUTIVE POWER. IF WE CAN MAKE THEM A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE WORKING TEAM, THEN WE WILL INDEED HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS. A GRADUAL TAKING OVER OF POWER AND AUTHORITY BY KY WOULD ULTIMATELY STIMULATE THE OLD RIVALRY AND DIVISIONS. MOREOVER, THIEU ENJOYS CONSIDERABLY GREATER DEGREE OF TRUST AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION THAN KY AND IF PRESENT ADMINISTRATION IS TO GAIN WIDE PUBLIC SUPPORT, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIEU SHOULD BE THE HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT IN FACT

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 18103 051117Z

AS WELL AS NAME.

8. I APPRECIATE YOUR SENTIMENTS ON NOT WANTING TO ADD TO OUR ALREADY DIFFICULT TASK, BUT WE ARE ALWAYS GRATEFUL FOR HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS SUCH AS THESE. BUNKER

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DRAFTED BY: EA/IN JBURKE  
APPROVED BY: EA PHILIP C HABIB  
U KATZENBACH  
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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
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By CL, NARA Date 8-6-97

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TO AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE 0000

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EXDIS

1. WE RECOGNIZE HERE THAT SITUATION CONTINUES TO REMAIN FLUID IN SAIGON AND THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. WE FULLY ENDORSE THE MOVES YOU HAVE BEGUN WITH THE GVN IN AN EFFORT TO RECOVER FROM THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW AGAINST THE ALLIED EFFORT. WE FEEL PARTICULARLY

THAT JOINT GVN AND US TASK FORCE IS GOOD FIRST STEP AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WILL PROVE TO BE THE VEHICLE BY WHICH THIEM AND THE MEMBERS OF HIS GOVERNMENT CAN BE URGED NOT ONLY TO TAKE THE EMERGENCY MEASURES THAT ARE NECESSARY TO RECOVER FROM RECENT EVENTS BUT ALSO TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAMS OUTLINED IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS AND HIS JANUARY 25 STATE OF NATION SPEECH.

2. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THEIR URBAN OFFENSIVE, THE VC SEEM TO HAVE ACHIEVED A SHORT TERM ADVANTAGE, IN POLITICAL IF NOT IN MILITARY TERMS.

ASSUMING THAT THE REMAINING NVN/VC FORCES CAN NOW BE RAPIDLY DRIVEN FROM POSITIONS THEY STILL OCCUPY IN CITIES AND TOWNS AND THE

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THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF  
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OWN CAN GET ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF PICKING UP THE PIECES, THE ADVANTAGE COULD BE SWUNG TO OUR SIDE.

3. THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS WHICH INCLINE ONE TOWARD THE JUDGMENT THAT VC HAVE PUT SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THEIR RESOURCES ON THIS "THROW OF THE DICE." INTERROGATION REPORTS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THEY EXPECTED AND HOPED TO FIND A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THE URBAN POPULACE READY TO JOIN THEIR CAUSE IN RESPONSE TO DIRECT EXHORTATIONS FOLLOWING THEIR SHOW OF FORCE IN THE CITIES AND TOWNS, HOWEVER, AS YOU HAVE POINTED OUT THEIR EXPECTATIONS DO NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO HAVE MATERIALIZED.

4. ANOTHER INTERESTING INDICATION TENDING TO SUPPORT THE "ALL OR NOTHING" THESIS IS THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY LIBERATION RAIDS OF THE CREATION OF THE "FRONT OF NATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PEACE ALLIANCE," IN UNVEILING WHAT PURPORTS TO BE A WHOLLY NEW ORGANIZATION, WITH ITS SWEEPING REVOLUTIONARY CALL TO ARMS, THE NLF HAS TACITLY CONCEDED THAT ITS OWN CAPACITY TO STIR UP AND MOBILIZE BROADER SEGMENTS OF POPULATION HAS REMAINED LIMITED, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS CLAIM TO BE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE AND SPOKESMAN FOR THE SVN PEOPLE. IF THIS PLOY DOES NOT RPT NOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT DEFECTIONS FROM THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, THE NLF MAY SUBSEQUENTLY FIND ITSELF AT A DISADVANTAGE IN ITS EFFORTS TO REPRESENT ITSELF BEFORE THE WORLD AS THE ONE VALID ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE. THIS SUGGESTS THE IMPORTANCE OF VIGOROUS PSYWAR EFFORT TO EXPOSE IT AS JUST ANOTHER, PHONY COMMUNIST FRONT.

5. THIEU AND THE GVN ON THE OTHER HAND HAVE BEEN DEALT A SIGNIFICANT BLOW AND THIEU MUST MOVE EMERGETICALLY IF GVN IS TO RECOVER FROM IT. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE GVN CAN REGAIN FIRM CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN THE CITIES, AND THE VC FORCES ARE FORCED TO WITHDRAW THIEU MAY ENCOUNTER IMPORTANT CRITICISM IN THE PRESS, THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND IN THE COUNCIL OF GENERALS. ALL OF WHOM MAY BEEN TO BLAME HIM FOR LETTING THE ENEMY FORCES STRIKE SUCH A BLOW. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE DO WHAT WE CAN TO SPUR HIM AND TO ASSIST HIM IN TAKING THE KINDS OF MEASURES WHICH WILL NEUTRALIZE THIS CRITICISM AND CHANNEL IT IN A CONSTRUCTIVE DIRECTION. BUT IN DOING SO WE WOULD WANT AT ALL COSTS TO INSURE THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL FABRIC SO CAREFULLY WOVEN OVER THE LAST 2-1/2 YEARS SHOULD NOT BE TORN AT THIS TIME.

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6. WITH THIS PRE-AMBLE WE WOULD LIKE TO LAY OUT FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION

CERTAIN OF OUR OWN THOUGHTS AS TO WHAT STEPS WE BELIEVE MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AT THIS TIME. ESSENTIALLY THESE ARE OUR FIRST THOUGHTS FOLLOWING THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK BUT THEY DERIVE FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST FEW MONTHS. AS WE SEE IT, THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE GOVERNMENT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

A. AN ENERGETIC AND WELL-COORDINATED EFFORT TO MOBILIZE ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, PARTICULARLY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IN A REDEDICATION TO THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY.

B. A CAREFULLY THOUGHT OUT PROGRAM OF CONTACTING IMPORTANT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ELEMENTS WITHIN THE BODY POLITIC AND ENLISTING THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE OBVIOUSLY LABOR, THE RELIGIOUS SECTS (INCLUDING EVEN THE MILITANT BUDDHISTS IF IT CAN BE DETERMINED THAT THEY DID NOT CONSPIRE OR COLLABORATE WITH THE VC/NVA FORCES), THE INTELLECTUALS, AND THE PRESS.

C. A SWEEPING RE-APPRAISAL OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN AN EFFECT TO EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF KEY OFFICIALS DURING THE CRISIS. WE WOULD HOPE TO EXPECT THAT OFFICIALS ON THE NATIONAL, PROVINCIAL, DISTRICT LEVELS WHO PERFORMED WELL DURING THE RECENT CRISIS WOULD HAVE THEIR PERFORMANCE ACKNOWLEDGED IN SOME SUITABLE WAY, BY THE SAME TOKEN

WE WOULD EXPECT THE GVN TO DISMISS THOSE WHO HAD FAILED TO MEASURE UP.

(IF GVN CAN BE PERSUADED TO CONDUCT SUCH A REVIEW, THIS MIGHT PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY WE HAVE LONG SOUGHT TO GET RID OF INEFFICIENT ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN.) THE GVN SHOULD GET ON WITH THE TASK OF CLEARING HOUSE.

D. A USEFUL BY-PRODUCT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT BE A MODIFICATION IN THIEU'S SENSE OF TIMING AND PRIORITIES. AS A RESULT OF THE CRISIS HE MIGHT SHIFT FROM HIS CAUTIOUS, METHODOICAL APPROACH TO PROBLEMS AND PROGRAMS TO A MORE DRAMATIC ENERGETIC ONE—OR AT LEAST GIVE FREER REIN TO THOSE WHO NATURALLY TAKE A MORE ACTIVIST POSTURE. WE MIGHT COME, HOPEFULLY, TO FIND HIM MORE RECEPTIVE TO OUR ADVICE IN FUTURE AND MORE WILLING TO ACT QUICKLY ON IT. CRISIS MIGHT ALSO CONVINCE HIM OF NECESSITY OF COLLABORATING MORE CLOSELY WITH KY AND DELEGATING HIM MORE AUTHORITY. NOTE THAT KY

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APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TAKING DE FACTO CONTROL OF TASK FORCE ON GVN SIDE PRESUMABLY WITH THIEU'S BLESSING. THIS WOULD NOW PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND CLEAR PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS DIRECTLY WITH HIM WITHOUT UNDUE RISK OF DAMAGING THIEU'S SENSIBILITIES. THIEU MIGHT, INDEED, BE WILLING TO ASSIGN HIM ACTION ROLE AND WITHDRAW HIMSELF INTO POSITION OF PRESIDING OFFICER.

E. FINALLY, IN ADDITION TO OUR SUGGESTIONS ABOVE AND THOSE ACTIONS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE JOINT GVN-US TASK FORCE, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN ENERGETIC HARD-HITTING PSYWAR EFFORT ORGANIZED IMMEDIATELY. THIS WOULD HAVE THREE BASIC PURPOSES: (1) TO REASSURE THE POPULACE THAT THE GVN AUTHORITY IS STILL INTACT AND WILL BE RAPIDLY REASSERTED; (2) TO REAFFIRM THE US COMMITMENT, AND (3) TO EXPLOIT WHAT WE HOPE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DISARRAY AND CONFUSION IN VC RANKS IF THEIR OFFENSIVE FAILS COMPLETELY. ALL THE MASS MEDIA FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE MISSION AND THE GVN SHOULD BE ORGANIZED IN AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THOSE THREE GOALS.

7. AS STATED ABOVE THIS REPRESENTS ONLY OUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON A STILL FLUID, FAST MOVING SITUATION. THE STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN SO FAR, INCLUDING YOUR EXCELLENT BACKGROUNDER, AND THE APPARENTLY HELPFUL FIRST MEETING WITH THIEU-KY OF THE JOINT GVN/US TASK FORCE SEEM TO US EMINENTLY CORRECT. WE ARE VERY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULT SITUATION FACING YOU AND WE INTEND TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TRYING TO AVOID ADDING TO YOUR ALREADY ENORMOUS TASKS.

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TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
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IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE FOR TRANSMISSION ONLY. ACTUAL  
PRECEDENCE IS PRIORITY.

FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 464

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY WALT ROSTOW

REF: CAP 80389

1. MANY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE. I AGREE ENTIRELY WITH YOUR SUGGESTIONS. IN FACT, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE JOINT TASK FORCE, WHICH HAS BEEN SET UP HERE, IS TO MOBILIZE THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, YOUTH GROUPS, STUDENTS, CIVIL SERVANTS, AND CIVIC AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO TAKE PART IN THE RE-BUILDING AND RE-CONSTRUCTION EFFORTS.

2. THE TASK FORCE WILL BE A GVN TASK FORCE, CALLING ON U.S. AGENCIES FOR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT AS NEEDED, USING BOB KOMER AS ITS FOCAL POINT ON THE U.S. SIDE. I THINK THIS IS EXACTLY WHAT IS CALLED FOR SINCE IT PLACES THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY, AS WELL AS CREDIT FOR ACTION TAKEN, WHERE IT SHOULD BE, I.E., ON THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. IT ALSO FURNISHES US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPORT THEIR EFFORTS IN AN EFFECTIVE BUT UNOSTENTATIOUS WAY.

3. I AGREE WITH YOU THAT POLITICAL SUPPORT IS BEST GENERATED BY INVOLVEMENT AND SACRIFICE.

~~SECRET~~-EYES ONLY VIA CAS CHANNELS

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
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By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

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EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR BUNKER FROM WALT ROSTOW

AGAIN AS A DISTANT OBSERVER--A POTENTIALITY APPEARS TO  
EXIST TO GET THE CITY PEOPLE TO ENGAGE: TO TAKE SOME OF  
THEIR DESTINY INTO THEIR OWN HANDS.

PASSING OUT ARMS--AS BUU SUGGESTS--IS NOT THE ANSWER  
REPEAT NOT THE ANSWER. BUT IS IT REALISTIC TO THINK OF  
THE GOVERNMENT MOBILIZING STUDENTS, CIVIL SERVANTS, AND  
OTHERS TO SHARE IN RE-BUILDING, DISTRIBUTING FOOD,  
RECONSTRUCTING HOUSES, ETC?

THE ONE LESSON I'VE LEARNED ABOUT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
IS THAT POLITICAL SUPPORT IS GENERATED ONLY BY INVOLVEMENT  
AND SACRIFICE.

AGAIN, FORGIVE THE KIBITZING AT AN EMBATTLED TIME FOR YOU ALL  
140

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

February 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the B-52 strikes for the day now scheduled -- 33, all in the Khe Sanh area.

This battle will probably take some time.

We shall monitor round-the-clock in the Situation Room.

I suggested to Bus Wheeler he file a daily report with you.

W. W. R.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1968

Mr. President;

Herewith Ellsworth Bunker finds  
time to report fully -- and with  
great poise.

Despite its length -- and your  
familiarity with some of the material --  
it's worth reading as a well-balanced  
wrap-up.

W. W. R.



Sunday, February 4, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 17920)

Herewith my thirty-seventh weekly message:

A. General

Because of the emergency caused by the widespread enemy attacks which began in the early hours of January 31, I have regretfully had to delay this week's message. It thus covers a period of ten days from January 25.

The early days of the period, although witnessing a continuation of the massive build-up of enemy strength along the DMZ and the norther part of the First Corps, with anticipatory preparations for the Tet holidays underway, began in an atmosphere of relative calm. It began, however, with what to me was an occasion of great significance, an occasion largely overlooked as so many important developments here tend to be because of the concentration on the military situation. Appearing as the nation's freely elected President before the freely elected legislative branch, President Thieu delivered his first State of the Union message. It was a sober, positive, and constructive speech, wide-ranging and comprehensive in scope, outlining plans to benefit the Vietnamese people. He began by a reference to the constitutional framework now in place and expressed the hope that the executive and legislative branches can work effectively together to serve the nation. He indicated his plans to move quickly in establishing the other institutions called for in the constitution, notably the judiciary, the inspectorate, and the advisory councils. But he noted that the democratic system cannot exist only through an external form; that it demands fundamental changes in organizations and laws as well as in political structures and habits; and he noted the importance of the development of political parties.

While he mentioned some of the substantial achievements which had already been accomplished, the main thrust of his speech looked to the future. Here he covered both plans for the longer term and short range priority programs on which the government proposed to concentrate in the next six to seven months. These included judicial and administrative reform, expansion of educational opportunities; the development of industry and agriculture; the stimulation of land reform, in the social field, vigorous measures to improve the refugee situation; to expand public health measures; to improve the conditions of labor and measures and incentives to bring the youth into the service of the nation. To carry out these programs, he presented a budget of 95 billion piasters which the Assembly is scheduled to take up as the first order of business when it resumes its session on February 6. It is almost certain, however, that by mid-year the government will have to submit a supplementary budget since the amounts provided in its present submission for the military effort are inadequate.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-465

By SP4, NARA, Date 4/29/96~~SECRET/NODIS~~



In dealing with the government's position on the question of peace and negotiations, Thieu stressed the fact that the Government of Vietnam is merely acting to defend itself against aggression and re-affirmed the government's adherence to the principles established by the Manila Summit Conference. Implicit in this program is the desire and intention of the Government of Vietnam to strengthen its position before any negotiations open. The contrast between Hanoi's methods and that of President Thieu's government is very great and, I hope, instructive to the critics of this regime and our effort in support of it.

The massive, countrywide terrorist attacks on centers of population which began in the early morning hours of January 31 have been fully reported. I will not attempt to duplicate this reporting here. It is obvious that they were premeditated and planned well in advance. It is equally clear that they were coordinated and correlated with the massive and open invasion in northern First Corps by North Vietnamese Forces.

It is evident, too, that the initial success of the attacks was due in part to the element of surprise and to the fact that they were made in flagrant violation of the Tet truce period which Hanoi as well as the Government of Vietnam had proclaimed. I think it's fair to say also that there was some failure of intelligence on our side, for a sizeable number of Government of Vietnam troops and many Government of Vietnam officials were on leave.

That these widespread, concerted attacks will result in a massive military defeat for the enemy is evident in the casualty figures reported Saturday morning. From 6:00 p.m. January 29, the beginning of Tet Truce period, to midnight, February 2, according to our figures, 12,704 of the enemy were killed, and 3,576, many of whom will become prisoners of war, were detained; 1,814 individual and 545 crew-served weapons were captured. Allied losses were 983 killed of which 318 were U. S., 661 Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and 4 other free world; the number of allied wounded was 3,483. Enemy casualties for these few days are considerably larger than for any previous month of the war. Based on the enemy casualties, I asked General Westmoreland for an estimate of the total number of enemy committed and he said he thought that this was probably in the neighborhood of 36,000.

Enemy military operations have been well orchestrated with their psychological warfare. As you know, for a considerable period, both Hanoi and the National Liberation Front have spread rumors that negotiations and a resulting coalition government were imminent after Tet. The inference, of course, was clear: If peace is so near, why go on fighting and getting killed? When the attacks came, the liberation radio called for everybody to rally to the revolution, alleged that many Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops had defected, and of course claimed great victories, that the "U. S. bandits and their lackeys had never before been dealt such stinging blows." Liberation radio also spread the rumor that U. S. forces were cooperating with Viet Cong attacks in order to put greater pressure on the Government of Vietnam to agree to a coalition government; and Hanoi radio announced the formation of a "front of national, democratic, and peace alliance" in Saigon and Hue.

Given the fact that the enemy has suffered massive military defeat, the question arises whether he has secured in spite of it a psychological victory; whether peoples trust in the invincibility of the allied forces has been shattered; whether their confidence in the ability of the Government of Vietnam to provide security has been shaken; or whether on the other hand Viet Cong perfidy in flagrant violation of the truce during the traditional Tet holiday, their use of pagodas, hospitals, and residential areas as sanctuaries and their terrorist tactics have aroused peoples indignation and resentment. While our information at this point on the reaction of the Vietnamese, especially in the provinces, is sketchy, it seems apparent that both reactions have occurred. But it also seemed to all of us here that if the Government of Vietnam would take prompt action, if Thieu would give evidence of strong leadership, would call in all elements in support of the government, then what might have turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for the Government of Vietnam and its allies could be turned into a psychological victory as well.

It is for this reason, as I have reported, that I saw Thieu Thursday morning and told him that I thought this was the psychological moment for him to demonstrate his leadership and to galvanize the nation by a statement which would constitute a declaration of national unity. I said it would not only reassure the civil population, especially in the provincial centers, but could also be a positive declaration to give life and meaning to the main programs and priorities he had spelled out in his State of the Union message. I suggested that he might want to meet with leaders of both houses of the Assembly and perhaps have them associate themselves with his declaration and intentions. I think Thieu was impressed with the arguments for taking advantage of the present situation to mobilize greater popular support. The next morning, he held a meeting of the National Security Council and included the Presidents of both Houses of the Assembly to lay out an action plan of relief and recovery for the civil population. In the afternoon, he recorded a speech to the nation which was delivered on TV and radio the same evening.

As I have reported, at a meeting of the mission council yesterday morning, we agreed that it would be useful to propose to Thieu that a joint task force be formed, reporting to him, that could address itself to problems across the board in Saigon and the provincial centers affected by the Viet Cong attacks; and that he might want to consider delegating supervision to Vice President Ky. On the Government of Vietnam side, the appropriate Ministries could be instructed by the Prime Minister and Ambassador Komer would serve for the U.S. as his opposite number. General Westmoreland and I, therefore, saw Thieu and proposed that we jointly set up such a task force. We went into considerable detail with him regarding the scope of measures which could be taken to turn the psychological situation around and to gain the people's participation and support; and said that with the resources we both had we should be able to demonstrate quickly that the government was on top of the situation. Thieu reacted favorably to our suggestion and agreed that we would meet the next morning (Saturday) to go into the matter in greater detail. General Westmoreland, Bob Komer, and other members of the mission council and I met with President Thieu and his colleagues Saturday morning. With him were Vice President Ky, Prime Minister Loc, Secretary General Nguyen Van Huong, Defense

Minister Vi, Foreign Minister Do, Chief of the Joint General Staff Vien, Minister of Interior Vien, Minister to the Prime Minister Cang, Director General for Information Linh, Brigadier General Thung (Army of the Republic of Vietnam Pol. War Department). Thieu opened the meeting by saying that they had considered the proposals we had made the day before, outlining what preparations the Government of Vietnam had been making, agreed that a joint task force should be set up which would report to him, and that Vice President Ky would serve as the supervising head for the Government of Vietnam. Overnight, General Westmoreland had had our suggestions put into diagrammatic form and made an excellent presentation to the President and his colleagues. With no hesitation at all, it was agreed that we should proceed immediately, the meeting was adjourned, and Ky, Bob Komer, and some of their associates went to Ky's office to begin work on establishing the organization. One interesting thing we observed was the fact that on the Government of Vietnam side the group included some who until now had scarcely been on speaking terms, but now seem to be working closely together. This is, at least, a hopeful sign. Thieu informed me also that both Houses of the Assembly would convene as soon as members could get into Saigon from the province.

As of the moment, there is still cleaning up to be done in Saigon and elsewhere in Hue and in some of the Delta provincial capitals. General Loan estimates that there are still eight Viet Cong Companies in Saigon on the edges of the 7th and 8th districts, varying in strength from 50 to 130 each. He believes that he may be able to eliminate these by Monday or Tuesday of next week. But General Cao Van Vien believes that the enemy has the strength to stage a second wave attack on Saigon that the elements of the 5th, 7th, and 9th Viet Cong Divisions still could be committed to such an attack. In the meantime, the curfew has been lifted from 0800 to 1400 hours. People are moving around, trucks are being sent to some districts of Saigon to sell rice, pork, bread, and frozen chicken to the people, and the Ministry of Social Welfare is making strenuous efforts to provide food and shelter to victims of the fighting in the city. People have been advised of points in the city where they can find food and shelter. Another encouraging factor is that General Loan reports that the police are getting many telephone calls from people alerting them to locations where Viet Cong are holed up, a good indication that there has been no "popular uprising" in support of the Viet Cong.

One naturally considers what the motives and purposes of Hanoi and the Front have been in staging these massive attacks and apparently preparing momentarily to launch extremely heavy ones in Northern First Corps. Were they prepared to suffer these tremendous casualties in order to gain a psychological and propaganda victory? There are some evidences that they might actually have had some expectations of popular uprisings, and in any case they are publicly claiming that these have occurred. The British ambassador, who has had much Asian experience, remarked that the Viet Cong, having made these claims, will suffer, in Asian eyes, a very serious defeat if they prove to be not true. Had they planned these offenses hoping to put themselves in a strong position to enter negotiations, hoping to force a coalition government by demonstrating that the National Liberation Front commands the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people and must have a major voice in any peace settlement; conversely hoping to demonstrate that the Government of Vietnam is a weak puppet government and can be ignored?

Or is this part of a longer Winter-Spring offensive which would endeavor to exert pressure to the extent of the enemy's capabilities at least until our elections, hoping if possible to score some major victory, but in any case to inflict heavy casualties on our troops in the expectation that they might create adverse psychological reactions in the United States and thus a chance in policy?

I am inclined to the former theory. It seems to me that the primary purpose of this particular operation was probably psychological rather than military, that it was designed to put Hanoi and the Front in a strong position for negotiations by demonstrating the strength of the Viet Cong while shaking the faith of the people in South Vietnam in the ability of their own government and the U. S. to protect them. This would be consistent with the determination on their part to press towards peace talks.

In my talk with him today, Thieu expressed somewhat similar views. He felt that Hanoi and the Front are tired and would like to get into negotiations, that while their power has been steadily diminishing, they still have the capability to mount operations such as the recent one and the current invasion of the First Corps. They are, therefore, willing to make a major effort and to take heavy losses in the hope of gaining enough advantage, especially psychological, both here and abroad, to put themselves in a strong bargaining position at the table. Failing in this, Thieu believes that they will endeavor to keep on as much pressure as they can during the summer in the hope that they can at least give the impression of a military stalemate, so as to maintain themselves in a strong bargaining position. We are sending in a more detailed, though preliminary, discussion and estimate of our views of the enemy's purposes.

Progress continues to be made at cleaning up the situation, though as I mentioned above, there is a possibility of a second wave attempt by the enemy. General Westmoreland reported that the enemy has not yet committed his 7th Division in the Third Corps area. In the meantime, enemy casualties continue to mount. As of this morning, February 4, our reports are that to midnight February 3, the enemy had suffered about 15,000 killed, approximately 4,000 detainees, with 3,000 individual and crew-served weapons captured. General Westmoreland is having an audit and spot checks made of the country and believes that these figures are conservative. They are substantiated to some extent by the high count of weapons captured. On our side, casualties for the same period amounted to 1,116, of which U. S. were 367, Army of the Republic of Vietnam 738, and free world forces 11. Enemy losses for the previous five days have been approximately 50 percent greater than the highest casualties he has suffered in any month of the war to date. He has thus met with an extremely heavy military setback.

Since I began dictating this section yesterday, rapid progress has been made in the establishment of the joint task force. At the meeting presided over by Ky, which followed our joint meeting with Thieu, reported earlier, rapid agreement was reached on the setup of the organization. Ky will head it up with the Prime Minister and Bob Komer at the policy level. General Thang and General Forsythe will act as the operating heads. The public image will be that of a Vietnamese organization, but

we will have opposite numbers at every level. In effect, the Vietnamese people have accepted all of our functional and organizational suggestions but they will be out in front and we in the background back-stopping and supporting which is as it should be. It was agreed that daily breakfast meetings will be held to review the situation and to make necessary plans. Bob Komer reports that the first meeting was held this morning (Sunday) and that Thang and Forsythe have already gone into action. Two thousand five hundred cadre are to be brought from Vung Tau to help with operations in the Saigon area. Ky is to go on TV tonight to explain the organization and what the Government of Vietnam, through it, will do to provide prompt relief to the civilian population and to get the country back to normal as quickly as possible.

In closing this section, I want to say a word in tribute to all members of the U. S. mission here, military and civilian. To every demand made upon them they have responded with great courage, calmness, devotion, and determination. They have worked long hours and performed difficult and exhausting tasks willingly and cheerfully with never a word of complaint. Through the country, they have been exposed to great dangers and hazards and have met every challenge fearlessly and with a high sense of duty. They deserve well of their countrymen and I am immensely proud and humble to have the privilege of being at the head of such a mission.

#### B. Political

As I reported in the General section, after the initial stunning impact of the Viet Cong attack on the cities had passed, Vietnamese leaders at least here in Saigon began to show a most encouraging willingness to close ranks and work together. The Assembly in particular has rallied to the government in an effective way. The chairmen of both Houses issued a communique on the morning of February 3 which denounced the "treacherous scheme of the Viet Cong, who proposed a seven day cease fire in order to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out a predetermined military plan". The statement went on to say that the Assembly is "cooperating closely with the executive to carry out effective measures aimed at restoring security and order", and called on the people to support the government.

Earlier, on February 2, the Senate National Defense Committee issued a resolution calling on the government to strictly apply the 24-hour curfew and use all necessary means to restore security. The Lower House met February 3, but took no action because they did not have a quorum, many deputies still being in the provinces where they had gone for the Tet holiday. Under the rules, the House may take action without a quorum on the second such day, and the Lower House is in fact meeting again this afternoon. They are expected to issue a statement of support for the government.



Individual legislators and opinion leaders have also voiced to us their desire to back the government and get the situation here back to normal. Former Deputy Premier and leading political figure Tran Van Tuyen told an Embassy officer yesterday that he and many of his supporters are most anxious to take part in any effort to restore the situation. He complained that the government was not taking the lead in mobilizing those who are outside official ranks but who nevertheless want to "struggle" against the enemy. I hope that this kind of spirit will prompt a broad and effective response to the government's appeal for help from such citizens when the task force operation center is set up. We will certainly be encouraging people such as Tuyen to pitch in.

There is, of course, a good deal of criticism of the government as well. Senator Nhgyen Van Ngai, for example, told an Embassy officer on the morning of February 2 that the attacks clearly revealed the "weakness and ineffectiveness" of the government security apparatus. He went on to speak of a possible vote of no-confidence in the government because of its failure to protect the population. At the same time, however, Ngai observed that the people were outraged by the Viet Cong use of the Tet holiday and it is up to the government actively to seek their assistance so as to share with them "anti-Communist responsibilities".

Senator Juhnny Van Cao pointed out to an Embassy officer that despite Viet Cong propaganda, there seems to have been no instance in which the Viet Cong were welcomed by any part of the city population, and there were apparently no defections from police or military ranks. From the limited reports available from the provinces, this seems to be the case throughout the country. I think it clearly gives the lie to the Viet Cong claim that the people support their cause.

Some citizens and officials are not waiting for the central government to organize their active support. Senator Nguyen Van Huyen, for example, was off early this morning to visit the wounded and make his own survey of the needs of the Saigon population. Mayor Cua has been at his office day and night, along with most of his staff. Dr. Nguyen Day Tai, a man close to Tri Quang and not noted for any pro-government sympathies, was busy getting water to hospital operating rooms that had none -- his own clinic being well supplied. Thich Tam Giac announced that his pagoda would provide shelter and food to victims of the fighting. Thich Tam Chau put out a communique calling on all Buddhists to support the government and oppose the Communists. (The whereabouts of Tri Quang and some other militant Buddhist leaders of the An Quang faction is unknown at this time, however.)

Although our reports from the provinces are scattered, there is no denying that many people see the events of the last few days as initially a substantial Viet Cong victory despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy. The fact that the Viet Cong were able to enter and in some cases hold for extended periods so many provincial capitals has certainly shaken the confidence of the people in the ability of the government to provide security. At the same time, as noted above, there is no evidence that anyone welcomed or helped the Viet Cong in the province towns. The political and psychological damage in the provinces can be repaired, but it will take time and vigorous government action.

One continuing problem will be the need to dispel the rumors and half truths floated by the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong radio at one point announced that American forces were cooperating with them to set up a coalition government. This of course played on the worst fears of the nationalists here, and I felt it essential to respond at once to the Prime Minister's request for an official statement of denial and support for the Government of Vietnam. Another similar rumor is being heard in many parts of the country, to the effect that we deliberately allowed the Viet Cong to enter the cities in order to put pressure on the government to come to terms with the National Liberation Front.

The Communists are also busy trying to back up their claims that the populace met them with open arms. Hanoi radio claims the formation of a number of "popular" organizations, including peace fronts and peace forces in Saigon and Hue. In Hue, the "peace alliance" is allegedly headed by a Hue University professor who was active in the 1966 Buddhist "struggle". Radio Hanoi has also alleged the formation of "uprising committees" in Saigon and other cities. Any further outbursts of terrorism which the enemy may be able to mount -- and I anticipate a strong effort to make further attacks, even if they are only token -- will probably be portrayed as the work of these phantom organizations. We must mount a major psychological war offensive and I strongly urged this on Thieu and his colleagues at our joint meeting yesterday.

Concern that the U. S. will force an unacceptable settlement on South Vietnam remained very high during this reporting period. Although President Thieu has told me he thinks the crest of this wave is past, I am not yet certain that this can be said with a great degree of confidence. The pre-Tet press continued to express misgivings about our intentions. On January 21, the politically important Catholic Greater Solidarity Force held a "seminar" in the Saigon City Hall and adopted a resolution which strongly opposed any recognition of the National Liberation Front and warned against a coalition government. Among the participants in the "seminar" were influential Senators Nguyen Gia Hien and Tran Van Lam. The Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on January 24 heard Foreign Minister Do's views. This session was part of the committee's investigation of the government position in the face of rumored U. S. pressure for Government of Vietnam contact with the National Liberation Front and the formation of a coalition government. Active and influential Senator Nguyen Van Ngai in particular questioned Do closely on the possibility that the U. S. could force a coalition government on South Vietnam.

The government itself obviously continues to be very sensitive on the question of a coalition government. In both his Tet message to the nation and in a series of speeches made during a trip to the First Corps just before Tet, President Thieu made strong statements opposing any form of coalition government. These statements were picked up by Vietnam press. In his Tet message to the nation, Thieu said "the purpose of my visit (to the First Corps) was to reiterate the government commitments and the determination of the armed forces to never accept a coalition with the Communists nor to surrender to the Communists any inch of our land". Earlier, on January 27, Vietnam press carried a statement by Prime Minister Loc: "Coalition with the Communists would amount to suicide and would be a form of surrender to the Communists." In his January 31 emergency message,

President Thieu threatened severe punishment for all political movements aimed at helping the Communists through the so-called "peace and coalition government."

Fears of coalition government and a "false peace" have been fed somewhat by the "professor's" appeal. Before Tet, sixty-five university teachers issued a simplistic and emotional appeal calling for "all the belligerent parties to extend indefinitely the Tet ceasefire and to negotiate immediately a peaceful settlement". The appeal suggests no prior conditions for the cease-fire, a situation that would, of course, permit the Communists to continue infiltration and terrorism.

The group issuing the appeal is very young and junior in academic circles, and most of the signers are both relatively unknown and politically naive. Among the signers are some extremist Buddhists with very shady backgrounds. Nevertheless, the government felt it necessary to respond directly to their statement, and on January 27 the Ministry of the Interior put out a communique spelling out the government's position on the Tet truce. The communique refers directly to the professors' appeal and notes that "the President of the Republic and the government of the Republic of Vietnam have affirmed and reaffirmed that the question of a coalition with the Communists will never arise and that the government of the Republic of Vietnam will never recognize the so-called National Liberation Front".

As I have mentioned, in his state of the union message, President Thieu referred to the importance of political party formation. While noting that "at present we do not have strong political parties to assume power and form the opposition", he expressed his conviction that such parties will be developed.

Thieu, in part, persuaded by our representations, has in fact decided to form a party to support his program and policies. He has appointed his Secretary General, Nguyen Van Huong, to serve as chief organizer of this pro-government party, and we understand from Huong that he intends to convene a preliminary party congress which will launch the party sometime in March. While Huong is not an ideal choice for a party organizer, we are hopeful that Thieu can put together a strong national organization which will back his program and his candidates in future elections.

Senator Tran Van Don is also moving ahead in organizing a political machine. In addition to his Nnong-Cong Binh group which did so well in the Senate race and which reportedly has a number of affiliated members in the Lower House. Don is apparently having some success in finding new allies and in developing another organization, the Freedom Fighters.

Don is known to be trying to bring both militant An Quang and moderate Tam Chau Buddhists in line behind his group, and he seems to have captured some support from individuals though he certainly cannot claim the backing of either Buddhist organization. In the Senate, he has formed an alliance with Dai Viet leader Nhuyen Van Ngai and put together a Senate bloc of 9 Senators. While the degree of cooperation between the Dai Viets and Don's supporters outside the Senate is still unclear -- and both sides are evidently planning to use each other and maintain a degree of independence -- the alliance could flower if more common interests develop.



Don formed a Veterans organization before his Senate campaign but did little with it. Recently, however, he held a meeting of this group, the Freedom Fighters, at which he claimed a total of 20,000 members throughout the country. Statements in the Freedom Fighters "platform" issued at the meeting suggest that Don may hope to use all of the various groups under his influence as a nucleus for a broadly based political party. He has also been talking with Tran Quoc Buu about using the labor party organizations in the provinces as nuclei.

Don's apparent success would be encouraging if we were more certain of the source of his funds. He has been spending a good deal more money than we think he and his chief allies have, most recently purchasing a very expensive newspaper which will soon begin publishing under Don's aegis. We will be trying to learn something more about where these funds are coming from.

### C. Economic

Economic movement is usually almost at a complete stand-still during the Tet holiday, so the initial impact of the Viet Cong attacks was not too great. Now, however, it is urgent to get supplies moving normally into the cities. The government is giving such movement a high priority, and while there will probably be some transitory shortages, we do not anticipate any prolonged squeeze.

Before Tet, the Saigon Retail Price Index stood at 326, up from the 318 of the previous week and the 308 of my last regular weekly report. This was the result of the Tet holiday, a period when prices traditionally move up sharply. (The upward price movement was the result of increases in commodities other than rice, which declined six to nine percent this week.) The upward movement of the Retail Price Index was countered by a continued fall in the Import Price Index, which dropped to 219 the week before Tet. Gold also continued to fall, from 214 to 211 to 208.

Six thousand demonstration rice kits, each sufficient to plant 1/10 hectare, will be made available to farmers in most provinces in Vietnam this spring. The kits, containing than nong (IR-8) rice seed, will be a major promotional tool in the coming campaign for farmer adoption of the new rice varieties in the country. Materials will include 4 kilos of than nong rice seed, plus chemical fertilizer and insecticide.

### D. Chieu Hoi

During the period January 8-15, there were 291 Chieu Hoi returnees, and for the period January 15-21 there were 26. This compares with 420 and 592 for the same periods last year. The total for this year is 1,033.

Unfortunately, the Chieu Hoi rate has not yet experienced any Tet upsurge like that of last year. Last year's rate was twice as high during January and jumped to over 1,000 per week during and after Tet. Chieu Hoi Minister Phong attributes the current low rate to the intensified Viet Cong anti-Chieu Hoi campaign, increased enemy military operations and the apparently successful Viet Cong propaganda ploy regarding negotiations and coalition government. Phong proposes, and we agree, to mount a post Tet psychological war campaign playing up non-fulfillment of the Viet Cong promise of coalition government.

#### E. Vietnamese Killed

In the week ending January 20, the Viet Cong killed 131 Vietnamese civilians, wounded 180, and kidnapped 187. For the week of January 21-27, the figures are 147, 206, and 179, respectively. (Since January 1, 1968, 501 civilians have been killed, 1030 wounded, and 593 kidnapped by the enemy.)

*Jo*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres file*

February 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Porter reports on Park's  
reaction to your letter.

You will, I believe, wish to read it all.

Rarely does an Ambassador write the  
last sentence: they take it for granted.

One up for Porter!



# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

OO RUEHC  
DE RUALOS 3935E 0351405  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 041344Z FEB 68 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL  
TO EECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8804  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CONTROL: 1108Q  
RECD: FEBRUARY 4, 1968  
10:49 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3935

MODIS/CACTUS

REF: STATE 109821

1. PRESIDENT PARK WAS CLEARLY MOVED BY MESSAGE CONTAINED REFTTEL. I HAVE NOT SEEN HIM AFFECTED IN THIS WAY BEFORE NOW AND HE MADE NO EFFORT TO TIDE HIS FEELINGS AS HE HEARD PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S SOLICITUDE FOR HIM AND HIS FAMILY, LENGTHY DISCUSSION OF MUTUAL PROBLEMS AND FINALLY THE WARM REFERENCE TO HIM AS TRUSTED FRIEND AND ALLY. ONE MAY OCCASIONALLY MAKE HIM SMILE AND EVEN LAUGH, BUT IT IS A VERY RARE THING TO SEE HIS EMOTIONS STIRRED AS THEY WERE BY THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3935E ~~SECRET~~

2. HE KEPT ME FOR ALMOST TWO HOURS, DURING WHICH I TOOK OCCASION TO BRIEF HIM ON THE US/NK MEETING THIS MORNING. HE WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN FACT THAT NK REP PUT QUESTIONS TO US CONCERNING AUGMENTATION OF OUR AIR AND NAVAL FORCES, AND TROOP ALERT. HE SAID THIS ANOTHER INDICATION OF THEIR PREOCCUPATION WITH STRENGTH AND THEIR NEED TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER IT MIGHT BE USED AGAINST THEM. HE FEELS THEY WILL PROBE TO DETERMINE OUR INTENTIONS AND IF AND WHEN THEY BELIEVE WE HAVE ADDITIONAL MEASURES IN MIND, THEY WILL MEET OUR DEMANDS FOR RETURN OF PUEBLO AND CREW. THEY WILL NOT ALTER THEIR POLICY OF DELIBERATE HUMILIATION OF US, HE SAID, IF THEY DO NOT SENSE DETERMINATION ON OUR SIDE.

3. HE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT. I SAID IT LOOKED TO ME AS THOUGH THE NK'S MAY BE APPROACHING SOMETHING LIKE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE "YOU-STOP-THE-BOMBING-AND-WE'LL-TALK" PLOY. IN THEIR CASE THE NK'S MAY TELL US "YOU-

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 93-367

By ing, NARA, Date 2-7-94

~~SECRET~~

-2- SEOUL 3935, FEBRUARY 4 (NODIS/CACTUS)

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3935E ~~SECRET~~

WITHDRAW-YOUR-NAVAL-AND-AIR-STRENGTH-FROM-ROK-AND-WE'LL-TALK-ABOUT-YOUR-SHIP-AND-CREW." IN NEITHER CASE, OF COURSE, WAS THERE MUCH PROSPECT OF ANYTHING SUBSTANTIAL. I SAID THIS WAS MY OFF-THE-CUFF REACTION AND WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL ESTIMATE, AS I HAD NOT YET HEARD FROM YOU ON THE SUBJECT.

4. PARK SAID WE MUST BE CAREFUL, THAT THEY HAD PROVED TIME AND AGAIN THAT THEY CANNOT BE TRUSTED. HUMILIATION OF THE US IS THEIR GOAL, HE SAID, AND "YOUR PRESTIGE IS ROK PRESTIGE."

5. HE THEN TOOK UP MATTER OF PUBLIC OPINION, AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY VIEW OF THE SITUATION, ALL OF THIS ALONG LINES KNOWN TO YOU, BUT WITH CERTAIN IDEAS ADDED. HE REMARKED THAT THE NK/US PRIVATE MEETINGS ARE STIRRING UP ADVERSE COMMENT HERE AND EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE (I WOULD NOT SAY IT WAS STRONGER THAN THAT) FOR FUTURE MEETINGS IN PUBLIC, OR, IF CLOSED MEETINGS CONTINUE TO BE NECESSARY, A ROK REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD BE PRESENT.

PAGE 4 RUALOS 3935E ~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC MEETINGS, OR CLOSED MEETINGS WITH A ROK OFFICER PRESENT, WOULD DO MUCH TO REASSURE THE PUBLIC. FACT OF MATTER, HE SAID, IS THAT ROK SIDE OF PROBLEM, I.E. DMZ VIOLATIONS AND RAIDS BY NK, NOT BEING DISCUSSED IN ANY FORUM AT PRESENT.

6. I SAID THAT HE KNEW WE DEEPLY APPRECIATED HIS PATIENCE IN ALL THESE MATTERS, AND HIS CONCURRENCE IN MEETINGS WE FOUND IT DESIRABLE TO HAVE. HE CAN SEE KEY POSITION OCCUPIED BY MEN OF PUEBLO IN THIS PROBLEM AND HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THAT ENABLED US TO SOUND OUT THE ADVERSARY WHEN OTHER CHANNELS HAD FAILED. IT IS SOMETIMES NECESSARY, I WENT ON, FOR PRESIDENTS TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION TEMPORARILY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, TO FACE PRESS AND PUBLIC CRITICISM WHILE THEY ARE DOING SO, AND THIS SEEMED TO BE ONE SUCH CASE. I WOULD OF COURSE TRANSMIT HIS COMMENTS AND, AS HE KNEW, THEY WOULD COMMAND ATTENTION AT OUR HIGHEST LEVELS.

7. I SAID I WOULD COMMENT NOW, HOWEVER, ON THE MATTER OF A PUBLIC MAC MEETING. THESE USUALLY TURN INTO PROPAGANDA DISPLAYS AND AS SUCH CAUSE IMPORTANT MATTERS TO BE DRAWN OUT FOR WEEKS AND MONTHS LONGER THAN MIGHT BE NECESSARY WERE THEY DEALT WITH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3- SEOUL 3935, FEBRUARY 4, (NODIS/CACTUS)

PAGE 5 RUALOS 3935E ~~SECRET~~

IN CLOSED SESSION. TRUE, AS HE SAID, THE CORRESPONDENTS COULD BE PRESENT AND COULD AT LEAST PUBLICIZE OUR STATEMENTS. TROUBLE IS, THEY USUALLY GIVE AS MUCH TIME AND SPACE TO THE PROPAGANDA OF THE ADVERSARY AND WE END UP NO BETTER OFF. I WOULD SOUND OUT MY PEOPLE ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT AND WOULD COME BACK TO HIM. (SEE COMMENT BELOW ON ADVISABILITY OF TRYING TO SET UP OPEN MAC MEETING TO DISCUSS DMZ VIOLATIONS ONLY.)

8. I DID NOT COMMENT ON SUGGESTION THAT ROK MIGHT BE PRESENT AT CLOSED MEETINGS. WE ARE LIKELY TO MAKE MORE PROGRESS WITH NK'S IF THER IS NO ROK PRESENCE AT THESE MEETINGS.

9. COMMENT: PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR VIEWS ON DESIRABILITY OF ANOTHER OPEN MAC MEETING ON DMZ VIOLATIONS ONLY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD EVOKE NK RIPOSTE WITH PUEBLO STATEMENT, BUT ALSO POSSIBLE, IF WE MADE NO MENTION OF PUEBLO, THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THAT AS INDICATION WE WISH CONTINUE PRIVATE TALKS WITH THEM ON THAT SUBJECT. WHAT I AM TRYING TO DO IS FIND DEVICE WHICH WILL MEET PARK'S PUBLIC OPINION (ASSEMBLY, PARTY, INTELLECTUALS, MILITARY) PROBLEM HERE WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH OUR NK CONTACT

PAGE 6 RUALOS 3935E ~~SECRET~~  
ON PUEBLO.

10. IT WOULD ALSO HELP US GREATLY IF YOU COULD ARRANGE EARLY DELIVERY TO KIMPO AIRPORT BY LARGEST AIRPLANES AVAILABLE OF SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ITEMS ALREADY PROMISED ROK, IF THEY ARE PRESENTLY AVAILABLE. WE WOULD TAKE CARE TO HAVE ADEQUATE PRESENCE OF ELEMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, AS WELL AS ALL ELEMENTS OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS. THIS KIND OF THING, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, MIGHT ALSO AID US IN OUR PALAVER WITH THE NK'S. PLEASE COMMENT SOONEST ON THIS POSSIBILITY.

11. THE EXCELLENT SUPPORT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME HAS MADE ALL THE DIFFERENCE AT THIS END. GP-3. PORTER  
BT

~~SECRET~~

February 4, 1968

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum summarizes possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet begun.

General Ginsburgh prepared it for Mr. Rostow, who ~~has~~ not in the office at the moment.

Bromley Smith

60

F  
S

Pres file



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-205  
By isa, NARA Date 7-20-98

60a  
Sunday, February 4,

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

I would speculate that there are two possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet materialized:

- Our B-52 and tactical air attacks may have upset their timing -- especially if the air bombardment actually put their headquarters out of operation for a day or so.
- They may have planned the attack on Khe Sanh to coincide with a second round of attacks on the cities. Initial attacks on the cities would be designed to force General Westmoreland to commit his reserves. The second round would keep them committed while they launched a major assault on Khe Sanh.

Since the first attacks did not achieve their objectives, it is conceivable that the attack might not take place.

More likely, the enemy would try to carry out its original plan. If so, we might expect the battle for Khe Sanh to start within the next three days. Various intelligence reports indicate; for example:

- Attack as early as possible before 5 February.
- General Loan, police director, believes another attack on Saigon is scheduled for 4 or 5 February.
- Enemy troop movements in Pleiku area indicate possibility of attack the night of 4 February (today our time).
- A second attack is scheduled for Nha Trang ten days after the first attack (6 or 7 February).
- Special communications plans for enemy units the night of 4-5 February.

  
General Ginsburg



606

~~SECRET~~

Sunday, February 4,

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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ NLJ 96-205  
By SP/ics, NARA Date 12/13/01

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General Gine...

41

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*February*  
~~January~~ 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob Komer reports with some enthusiasm the organizational drive of the GVN.

With Ky and Thang at the center of things we have, at last, about all the executive energy mobilized there could be.

If they see it through, this could be the great compensation for the urban attacks.

*WCR.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

61a

Sunday, February 4, 1968

From Komer in Saigon:

Spurred by U. S. initiative, the South Vietnamese Government's recovery task-force has gotten off to a flying start. Vice President Ky has held three extensive working sessions with the Prime Minister and relevant ministers, with the U. S. side present to get the show on the road.

The Government of South Vietnam decided that while eager to have U. S. help at all levels, special recovery program should appear to be primarily Vietnamese. We heartily concurred.

Ky has established a round the clock coordination center at Independence Palace, under the direction of General Thang as chief coordinator, with my deputy, M.G. Forsythe as full-time counterpart. The Prime Minister has assigned Minister to Prime Minister Cang to serve full-time with Thang. Under them are four coordinating staffs drawn from senior officials of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, civil ministries and MACV/USAID. They cover requirements and allocations, resource availability, information and psychological operations, and popular participation.

First priority will be given to the restoration of normal functioning of the Saigon area as fast as the security situation will permit. Ky described three maximum efforts:

- A. Military clearing of Viet Cong from Saigon area;
- B. An emergency refugee effort;
- C. A major program to assure adequate food supplies, utilizing South Vietnamese air transport -- and U. S. if needed.

Orders have gone out to set up similar special coordinating bodies at Corps and province level. There will be a separate one for Saigon under Mayor Cua, with U. S. AID handling U. S. participation.

A good start has already been made at surveying damage, keeping vital utilities going, refugee care, identifying food stocks. Initial needs will be to coordinate security and relief operations, which involves resolving numerous bottlenecks. 2500 Revolutionary Development cadre will be brought in from Vung Tau and divided into 250 ten-man teams to help in relief work.

Our first impression is one of energetic South Vietnamese Government commitment under Ky and Thang. The initial omens are quite encouraging.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-193

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

February 4, 1968

Mr. President:

Herewith the Kosygin message  
and the draft response revised  
as you directed.

I await your guidance before  
calling Secretaries Rusk and  
McNamara.

W. W. Rostow

February 4, 1968

## Draft response from the President to Kosygin

1. For many months, infiltration from North Korea across the DMZ had been increasing. There were about 50 incidents initiated by the North Koreans in 1966; there were more than 500 in 1967. We have reports that there were some trying to persuade North Korea to open a second front. Then, within a few days, a North Korean mission was intercepted in Seoul with orders to assassinate President Park, and a U.S. vessel was seized in international waters. Against this background and confronted with these facts, adequate air and naval forces are now in the vicinity of South Korea.
2. In the light of your message of yesterday, I have requested that there be no further buildup of our air and naval forces at this time, and that the Enterprise proceed on its original mission.
3. We agree that a prompt settlement of this matter is in the common interest. This means, of course, the prompt return of the Pueblo and its crew. I would suggest that their return sometime within the next two days could be regarded as "prompt."
4. If the ship and its crew are returned, tension in the Korean area would be considerably relieved, and I believe that forces there could then be phased down.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

1:30 p. m.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1968

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum summarizes possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet begun.

General Ginsburgh prepared it for Mr. Rostow, who is not in the office at the moment.

*Brom*  
Bromley Smith



~~SECRET~~

63a

Sunday, February 4, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

I would speculate that there are two possible reasons why the attack on Khe Sanh has not yet materialized:

- Our B-52 and tactical air attacks may have upset their timing -- especially if the air bombardment actually put their headquarters out of operation for a day or so.
- They may have planned the attack on Khe Sanh to coincide with a second round of attacks on the cities. Initial attacks on the cities would be designed to force General Westmoreland to commit his reserves. The second round would keep them committed while they launched a major assault on Khe Sanh.

Since the first attacks did not achieve their objectives, it is conceivable that the attack might not take place.

More likely, the enemy would try to carry out its original plan. If so, we might expect the battle for Khe Sanh to start within the next three days. Various intelligence reports indicate; for example:

- Attack as early as possible before 5 February.
- General Loan, police director, believes another attack on Saigon is scheduled for 4 or 5 February.
- Enemy troop movements in Pleiku area indicate possibility of attack the night of 4 February (today our time).
- A second attack is scheduled for Nha Trang ten days after the first attack (6 or 7 February).
- Special communications plans for enemy units the night of 4-5 February.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-205  
By iss, NARA Date 7-20-98

1  
General Ginsburgh

~~SECRET~~

64

*PS*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Feb 4, 1968*

*Pres file*

Mr. President;

Herewith two sober, well- balanced  
assessments by Westy and Abrams plus Bunker's  
response on handling the press.

1. Westy on the over-all situation.
2. Abrams on how the Delta took the  
attacks and responded -- on the whole, heartening.
3. Bunker's specific suggestions,  
which require your judgement.

*West*



~~SECRET~~

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Authority JS 10-10-78  
By g/hg, NARA, Date 2-3-92

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OO YEKADS  
DE YSNKQA 8 0351531  
O 041522Z ZYH ZFF-5  
FM GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH DC  
TO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC  
MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC  
MR HELMS CIA  
Z 040959Z ZYH ZFF3  
FM GENERAL WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, SAIGON  
TO GENERAL WHEELER, CJCS, WASHDC  
INFO ADMIRAL SHARP, CINCPAC HAWAII  
AMB BUNKER SAIGON  
ZEM  
~~SECRET~~ T MAC 0161 EYES ONLY  
REF CJCS MSG 031606Z

AFTER NEARLY FIVE DAYS OF WIDESPREAD FIGHTING, THE TRUE DIMENSIONS OF THE SITUATION ARE BEGINNING TO EMERGE.

FROM A REALISTIC POINT OF VIEW WE MUST ACCEPT THE FACT THAT THE ENEMY HAS DEALT THE GVN A SEVERE BLOW. HE HAS BROUGHT THE WAR TO THE TOWNS AND THE CITIES AND HAS INFLICTED DAMAGE AND CASUALTIES ON THE POPULATION. HOMES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED; DISTRIBUTION OF THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE HAS BEEN INTERRUPTED. DAMAGE HAS BEEN INFLICTED TO THE LOC'S AND THE ECONOMY HAS BEEN DISRUPTED. MARTIAL LAW HAS BEEN INVOKED, WITH

STRINGENT CURFEWS IN THE CITIES. THE PEOPLE HAVE FELT DIRECTLY THE IMPACT OF THE WAR.

A TREMENDOUS CHALLENGE HAS BEEN POSED TO THE GVN TO RESTORE STABILITY AND TO AID THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE SUFFERED.

THE ENEMY HAS PAID A HIGH PRICE FOR HIS EFFORTS. HIS LOSSES FROM 291800H TO 041200H STAND AT 15,595 KIA, 3,122 INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS AND 682 CREW SERVED WEAPONS. HE HAS COMMITTED A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF HIS LOCAL FORCES, SAPPER UNITS, AND VC MAIN FORCE UNITS INTO THE BATTLE. OUR ESTIMATE INDICATES ABOUT 52,000. WE DO NOT KNOW, AT THIS TIME, HOW MUCH OF HIS GUERRILLA FORCE AND INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BUT, IN THE TOWNS AND CITIES, IT MUST BE A SIGNIFICANT PORTION. AGAIN OUR ESTIMATE WOULD BE AS HIGH AS 10,000 ALL OF THESE FORCES HAVE BEEN BADLY HURT, SOME HAVE BEEN WIPED OUT. THE ENEMY HAS REALLY FAILED TO ACHIEVE HIS OBJECTIVES. POLITICALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN NO UPRISINGS, NONE OF THE TOWNS WHICH HE PENETRATED ARE NOW HELD BY HIM, ALTHOUGH HE STILL IS HOLDING OUT IN PARTS OF A FEW SIGNIFICANT PLACES SUCH AS HUE, KONTUM CITY, DALAT, SAIGON AND IS CONTINUING TO LAUNCH NEW ATTACKS AGAINST NUMEROUS TOWNS IN IV CTZ. SPECIFICALLY, IN THE DELTA THE BATTLE SURGES IN AND OUT OF THE TOWNS, SOME BEING HIT REPETITIVELY, OTHERS TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AND THEN FREED BY FRIENDLY REACTION FORCES. AS OF

THIS WRITING, HE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HOLD ON ANY TOWN IN IV CTZ.

MILITARILY, THE ENEMY HAS FAILED IN HIS OBJECTIVES AND HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO SUSTAIN HIS ATTACKS. THUS, HE HAS DEMONSTRATED THE LACK OF A BASIC CAPABILITY TO DO SO. ALL OF OUR AIRFIELDS ARE OPERATIONAL DESPITE HIS ATTACKS. WE HAVE LOST A NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BUT THESE HAVE NOT SERIOUSLY INFLUENCED OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE ALL FACETS OF AIR SUPPORT. HE HAS FAILED TO BREAK COMMUNICATIONS. IN FACT, THROUGHOUT THIS BATTLE, COMMUNICATIONS HAVE BEEN COMPLETELY DEPENDABLE. HE HAS FAILED TO DESTROY ANY FRIENDLY UNITS, ALTHOUGH FRIENDLY CASUALTIES DURING THE FIVE DAY SPAN ARE THE HEAVIEST OF THE WAR. AS OF 041200H, THEY STAND AT 415 U.S. KIA, 904 ARVN KIA, 13 FW KIA AND 2,385 U.S. WIA, 2,705 ARVN WIA AND 102 FW WIA.

ALL FW AND ARVN FORCES HAVE THE STRENGTH, DISPOSITION, AND ARE IN THE PROPER FRAME OF MIND TO KEEP AT THE ENEMY AND INFLICT EVEN GREATER LOSSES IF HE PERSISTS IN THE ATTACK. AND, SINCE MANY OF HIS NVA/VC MAIN FORCES HAVE NOT BEEN COMMITTED, WE MUST ACCORD HIM THE CAPABILITY OF A SECOND CYCLE OF ATTACKS EITHER AGAINST THE POPULATED AREAS OR MOST LIKELY, IN THE DMZ AND OTHER AREAS OF NVA CONCENTRATION. THESE MAY COME IN CONCERT.

I HAVE NO DOUBT OF THE ABILITY OF THE FW FORCES TO MEET THIS RENEWAL.

ALSO, I BELIEVE THE ARVN HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT IT CAN AND WILL FIGHT VALIANTLY TO STEM THIS ENEMY SURGE. AS FOR ARVN PERFORMANCE, THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THEY WERE CAUGHT IN A "PRE-TET" POSTURE. WE DO NOT HAVE FULL DETAILS, BUT THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT UNITS WERE REDUCED BY TET LEAVE AND WERE NOT FULLY ALERT DESPITE PRESIDENTS THIEU'S ASSURANCE TO ME THAT 50 PERCENT OF EACH UNIT WOULD BE ON THE ALERT. FROM THE OPENING OF THE FIGHTING, HOWEVER, THEY HAVE MOVED THEIR FORCES RAPIDLY AND TOWARDS THE BATTLES, AND THE TROOPS HAVE FOUGHT WELL. THEY ARE CARRYING THE BRUNT OF THE CITY FIGHTING, WITH THE U.S. FORCES WORKING ON THE OUTSKIRTS, OR IN COOPERATIVE OPERATIONS IN THE MORE CRITICAL TOWNS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ARVN APPRECIATES THE ENORMITY OF THE TASKS AHEAD AND, ALTHOUGH THE HIGH COMMAND IS UNDERSTANDABLY ENGROSSSED IN CLEARING THE CAPITAL, THE REST OF THE MACHINERY IS FUNCTIONING. THE FULL IMPACT OF ARVN LOGISTICAL LOSSES HAS NOT BEEN DETERMINED.

THE IMMEDIATE TASK FACING US IS TO COMPLETE THE CLEAN UP OF ENEMY FORCES IN THE CITIES.

IN HUE, THE BATTLE IS STILL GOING ON. FIVE ARVN BATTALIONS AND ONE U.S. MARINE BATTALION ARE OPERATING IN THE CITY. 2 BATTALIONS OF THE 1ST CAV ARE EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE CITY. I AM HOPEFUL THAT THE NEXT

FEW DAYS WILL SEE THE SITUATION CLEANED UP.

IN KONTUM, ORGANIZED RESISTANCE HAS STOPPED AND FRIENDLY FORCES ARE MOPPING UP. WE HAVE A U.S. INFANTRY BATTALION WITH APC'S AND TANKS, AND AN ARVN INFANTRY BATTALION IN AND AROUND THE CITY. THE ENEMY HAS SUFFERED HEAVY CASUALTIES IN THE AREA.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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00 YEKADS

DE YSNKQA 9 0351531

O 041523Z ZYH ZFF-5

FM GEN WHEELER CJCS

TO MR ROSTOW WHITE HOUSE WASH DC

MR RUSK STATE DEPT WASH DC

MR HELMS CIA

O 041244Z ZYH ZFF3

FM GEN WESTMORELAND, COMUSMACV, SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER, CJCS, WASHDC

INFO ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

AMB BUNKER (PASS TO MR. CHILLEMI)

ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MAC 01628 EYES ONLY

1. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OBTAINED TODAY BY GENERAL ABRAMS IN VISIT TO IV CTZ MAY BE USEFUL AS BACKGROUND FOR TELECAST.

2. LTC DU, PROVINCE CHIEF, KIEN HOA PROVINCE, WAS AT HIS PLACE OF DUTY IN PROVINCE HEADQUARTERS IN BIEN TRE CITY. HIS FAMILY WAS AT FAMILY HOME IN SAIGON. AT 0230 HOURS, VC ENTERED HOME AND MURDERED HIS FAMILY. ALTHOUGH LTC DU WAS ADVISED OF THIS TRAGEDY, HE CARRIED ON DURING THE HEAVY ATTACKS ON HIS HEADQUARTERS. HE DISPLAYED REAL LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY IN THE FACE OF THE RUTHLESS VC TERRORISM IN BIEN TRE IN WHICH THOUSANDS OF HOME WERE DESTROYED. HE CONTINUED TO WORK AROUND THE CLOCK TO HELP HIS PEOPLE.

3. GENERAL TRI, COMMANDER 9TH ARVN DIVISION WAS AT HIS OPERATIONS CENTER AT SA DEC ON 310200, AT WHICH TIME THE VC ENTERED HIS HOME IN THE CITY NOT FAR FROM HIS OPS CENTER. HIS FAMILY WAS NOT IN HIS HOUSE. UPON LEARNING OF THE VC RAID, GENERAL TRI SENT A PLATOON TO DESTROY THE VC. IT SUCCEEDED IN DRIVING OFF THE VC AND CAPTURED ONE PRISONER. UPON INTERROGATION IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE VC MISSION WAS TO CAPTURE THE GENERAL AND HIS FAMILY AND FORCE HIM TO CALL FOR HIS CHIEF OF STAFF AND DEPUTY. WITH THESE HOSTAGES, THE VC WERE TO GIVE GENERAL TRI THE CHOICE OF TURNING OVER HIS DIVISION OR ALL WOULD BE EXECUTED.

4. GENERAL THAN, COMMANDER 7TH ARVN DIVISION, WAS AT HIS HEADQUARTERS WHEN THE VC ATTACK WAS INITIATED. DURING THE BATTLE A VC PLAN WAS CAPTURED WHICH DETAILED THE MISSION OF CAPTURING GENERAL THANH AND HIS HEADQUARTERS FOR THE SAME PURPOSE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE IN THE CASE OF GENERAL TRI.

5. THE SIGNIFICANT FEATURE IN ALL OF THE ABOVE INCIDENTS IS THAT THE PRINCIPALS WERE AT THEIR POSTS OF DUTY WHEN THE ATTACKS WERE INITIATED. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS WAS DURING THE TET PERIOD. THEIR ATTENTION TO DUTY UNDOUBTEDLY SAVED THEIR LIVES AND PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL DEFENSIVE ACTIONS OF GOVERNMENT FORCES IN THE DELTA.

6. GENERAL ABRAMS DISCUSSED THE DELTA SITUATION WITH MR. COTTRELL, DEPUTY FOR CORDS AND COLONEL HILL, MILITARY DEPUTY IN THE IV CTZ. THESE OFFICERS HAD JUST COMPLETED A TOUR OF ALL 16 PROVINCES IN IV CTZ AND TALKED WITH EVERY PROVINCE CHIEF AND THEIR US ADVISORS. THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE VC ATTACKS IS GREAT. THEY ESTIMATE OVER 10,000 HOMES DESTROYED AND

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Authority JSR 10-10-78  
By g/lr, NARA, Date 2-3-92



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SSO NOTE DELIVER DURING DUTY HOURS

820

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

O 041153Z ZYH  
FM SAIGON  
TO WHITE HOUSE  
ZEM

IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE USED FOR XMSN PURPOSE ONLY, ACTUAL PRECEDENCE  
IS PRIORITY.

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Copy should be  
sent to Christian  
BICS

Rostow

~~SECRET~~ 051049Z FEB 68 VIA CAS CHANNELS  
PRIORITY ~~NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED~~  
FM AMB BUNKER SAIGON 445

DECLASSIFIED

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVE FOR MR ROSTOW

Authority State Dec 36-79  
By ep/ez, NARA, Date 2-3-92

REF: CAP 80386

1. WESTY AND I WILL, OF COURSE, BE RESPONSIVE TO THE PRESIDENT'S WISHES. WESTY GAVE EXCELLENT COMPREHENSIVE PRESS BRIEFING LAST FRIDAY AND WILL GIVE ONE TOMORROW ALSO. EARLIER FRIDAY, HE WAS PRECEDED BY GENERAL WEYAND WHO DID FIRST RATE JOB. HE HAD TO BE IN FIELD YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND GENERAL CHAISSON FILLED IN FOR HIM, ALSO TURNING IN EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE. I HAVE GIVEN TWO STATEMENTS TO PRESS, RADIO, AND TV AND HAD BACKGROUND CONFERENCE WITH PRESS YESTERDAY.
2. WESTY, BARRY ZORTHIAN, AND I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SUGGESTION. WE BELIEVE THAT WESTY CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND HAVE MORE IMPACT WITH THE PRESS IF HE DOES NOT MAKE HIS BRIEFING A DAILY EVENT. IF IT BECOMES ROUTINE, ITS SIGNIFICANCE TENDS TO DIMINISH. ANOTHER READING MIGHT BE THAT IF THE TOP COMMANDER HAS TO APPEAR DAILY THE SITUATION HERE MUST BE EXTREMELY SERIOUS, CERTAINLY MORE SERIOUS THAN WE BELIEVE IT TO BE.  
IF, AS IS CASE NOW, ENEMY ACTIVITY TAPERS OFF AND CLEANUP PROGRESSES THERE WILL BE LESS NEWS AND WE FELT THAT IF WESTY WERE TO GIVE A BRIEFING AT TIMES HE AND I THINK APPROPRIATE, SAY EVERY TWO OR THREE DAYS, IT WOULD HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT WITH THE PRESS.
3. I WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE COMMENTS ON THE NON-MILITARY COURSE OF EVENTS AT APPROPRIATE TIMES AS YOU SUGGEST.
4. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR REACTION TO THE ABOVE SUGGESTIONS.
5. ON ANOTHER SUBJECT, ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT GVN-US TASK FORCE GOT UNDERWAY YESTERDAY. AT MEETING WITH KY PRESIDING, IT WAS AGREED THAT PUBLICLY IT WOULD BE A GVN TEAM WITH U.S. IN SUPPORTING ROLE. ACTUALLY IT WILL FUNCTION AS WE HAD SUGGESTED (SAIGON 17607) WITH U.S. HAVING FULL PARTICIPATION WITH VIETNAMESE. BOB KOMER WAS PLEASED WITH RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING YESTERDAY AND I BELIEVE WE SHALL BE ON THE WAY PROMPTLY. I HAVE REPORTED MORE FULLY IN MY WEEKLY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT, GETTING OFF TODAY.
6. I AM ALSO GLAD TO REPORT THAT IN OTHER ACTIONS MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS RESPONDED MAGNIFICENTLY. IT HAS PRE-EMPTED SERVICES OF SOME 40 ARVN DOCTORS IN SAIGON, AND MINISTER LU Y HAS WORKED AROUND THE CLOCK FOR THE LAST THREE DAYS. THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS HAS ALSO PERFORMED EXTRAORDINARILY WELL. REPAIRS WERE QUICKLY MADE TO THE AQUEDUCT IN THE CITY AND ALL OF SAIGON HAS WATER. FOOD SUPPLIES ARE AMPLE, AID HAS BEEN ABLE TO RESTORE POWER OUTAGE OF TWO NIGHTS AGO, AND THERE IS FUEL ON HAND FOR AT LEAST TWENTY DAYS' SUPPLIES. YESTERDAY WE PICKED UP GVN LEAFLETS SHOWING PICTURE OF VC TERROR KILLING RECOUNTING THE NUMBER OF VC KILLED AND CAPTURED, PRAISING ARVN FOR ITS PROMPT RESPONSE TO THE VC ACTION, AND CALLING FOR THE PEOPLE TO STAND FAST IN THE FACE OF THE VC.

GP-1  
A-9

65

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, 7:05 P.M.  
February 3, 1968

*Free file*

Mr. President:

Here is the text of Kosygin's message to you, the essential point of which we reported earlier on the basis of Ambassador Thompson's summary.

Bromley Smith

BKS:amc

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1982

By 18, NALM, Date 1-30-92

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

Saturday, February 3, 1968

Following is text of Kosygin Message: Moscow 2683

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 93-458

By CB, NARA, Date 5-22-95

"Dear Mr. President:

"We are aware of concentration of military forces of the USA in the area of the Sea of Japan and Korea, including movement of several large aircraft carriers, bringing of other naval vessels to Korean coast, and intense movement of aviation units to bases in South Korea. This is the first concentration of this magnitude of U.S. naval and aviation forces in direct proximity of Far Eastern regions of Soviet Union.

This naturally cannot but attract the greatest attention of the Soviet Government, and I can tell you that we are following these events with greatest care.

Question occurs to us what does U.S. intend to achieve and whom is it threatening by concentrating its forces in the area of the Sea of Japan and Korea? All references to defense needs of USA in this instance it goes without saying must be rejected. This concentration clearly will lead to results which cannot serve interests of peace in this area.

If the Government of the USA resorts to methods of military pressure on Korean People's Democratic Republic in connection with question to Ship Pueblo, then we find it necessary to say such activity will not lead to solution of this question. Quite the reverse. Attempt to deal with Korean People's Democratic Republic by threats and pressure can only lead to impasse in solution to question of interest to United States and cause further complications fraught with great consequences.

The only approach which can lead to settlement of question of Ship Pueblo, which invaded territorial water of Korean People's Democratic Republic, is one based on respect for sovereignty of Korean People's Democratic Republic. We have already expressed to you our conviction about this. I can add that if U.S. is interested in creating atmosphere which would facilitate settlement question of Ship Pueblo and its crew, USA should not ignore fact that Korean People's Democratic Republic like any other State, has its prestige, its national dignity and right to protect its security. All states must take this into account.

We propose that U.S., instead of resorting to ultimata and military threats, should concentrate on its efforts on settling conflict by negotiations with Korean People's Democratic Republic.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

In your message of January 25 you pointed out that increase of tension in this area would not serve interests preservation of international peace. We agree with this. But it is difficult for us to understand why then there is concentration of large American armed forces in this area which can lead only to increase in tension and arouse just indignation of entire world community.

I think you understand that in our actions we must take into account fact that what goes on close to our frontiers affects security interests of the Soviet Union.

We proceed from fact that relaxation of tension in the area of the Far East would serve interests of all. But for this it is necessary that all act to defuse tension. This is indispensable prerequisite.

We hope, Mr. President, that you, will give due attention to considerations expressed and that actions of USA will serve to facilitate normalization of situation in this area.

Sincerely,

A. Kosygin"



INFORMATION

66

Saturday, February 3, 1968  
6:10 p.m.

*Pres file*

Mr. President:

Herewith a first report of  
Prime Minister Gorton in action --  
feeling his way cautiously, I would  
judge.

W. W. Rostow

A-311, Jan 27, 1968,  
from Canberra

WWRostow:rla

# AIRGRAM

FOR RM USE ONLY

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : ADELAIDE, BRISBANE, MELBOURNE, PERTH, SYDNEY, KUALA LUMPUR, SAIGON, SINGAPORE, WELLINGTON

DEPT PASS: LONDON, DJAKARTA, BANGKOK, MANILA, SEOUL, TOKYO, TAIPEI, VIENTIANE, CINCPAC FOR POLAD

ANALYSIS BRANCH

FROM : Amembassy CANBERRA

DATE: January 27, 1968

SUBJECT: Policy Statements by Prime Minister Gorton

REF :

A major task for John G. Gorton, since he has become Prime Minister, has been to clarify his views on key foreign and domestic policy issues. Thus far his principal vehicle for doing this has been a series of televised press conferences. With three major appearances now having taken place, more clearly defined attitudes on a number of basic questions have emerged. These are summarized below. Copies of the pertinent transcripts are enclosed for the Department, Wellington, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Saigon.

Vietnam - The Prime Minister on several occasions has indicated full support for existing Australian and U.S. policies. On peace talks and a bombing cessation, he has said that the bombing should halt only when there is a clear indication that Hanoi will not only talk, but also will halt the movement of men and supplies into the south. On the other hand, he has indicated opposition to any massive increase in the scale of the bombing of the north. With regard to Australia's military commitment in Vietnam (now 8000 troops plus a destroyer and aircraft), he has said that no further increases will be made in force levels, unless there is some complete kind of change in the situation.

Singapore/Malaysia - On several occasions Gorton has indicated that he feels Britain's pullout from this area represents a shirking of obligations and international responsibility. He maintains that the cuts could have been better made in Europe or elsewhere.

Enclosure: 10

Press Conferences, January 17-21, 1968

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☐ In ☐ Out

FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL: JCDofance/mj

1/25/68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

POL: JVMartin

Clearances:

USIS: KLoewald

ECON: CTaylor (in draft)

At the same time, he has clearly stated that Australia has neither the intention nor the capability to take over Britain's role after 1971. He has said that Australia's military role in the area after 1971 remains to be decided upon, but that Australian forces now in the area would remain at their present level through 1971.

Australia's Relations with U.S. - He has made clear his view that Australia must maintain the existing close relationship with the U.S., and has expressed the hope that he can build up a "personal liaison" with President Johnson as did Menzies and Holt. At the same time, he has said that he would not be making as many trips to Washington as had Prime Minister Holt. He has made a point of making clear that he is independent-minded and will stand up to Washington when he believes Australian interests require it.

Australia's Relations with Asia - He has reaffirmed, in very general terms, existing policies regarding Australian involvement in Asia, and has praised former Prime Minister Holt for bringing Asia and Australia closer together. He has committed himself to visit Vietnam and other Asian countries as soon as possible, probably some time this year, but after April or May.

Australia's Relations with Britain - He has made clear his view that, with the British pullout from Singapore/Malaysia, Australia's ties with Britain will be only ones of sentiment. He has even indicated that there is some doubt whether he will attend future Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences.

Foreign Aid - He has reaffirmed in broad terms existing aid policies and has expressed the view that Australian economic assistance should be heavily concentrated in the Singapore/Malaysia/Indonesia area. At the same time, he has indicated that overall economic assistance levels will not be significantly increased in the near future. He has gone to some length to emphasize that economic (and military) assistance programs must be limited in magnitude by Australia's own national development requirements. He maintains that Australia's defense requires rapid national development as a foundation to security.

Domestic Economy - Without being too specific, Prime Minister Gorton has repeatedly driven home the view that, in sorting out priorities with regard to the use of financial resources, Australia's own national development must be given the highest priority.

666

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Canberra A-331

He has also hammered home the theme that social welfare services must be improved and expanded. With regard to the controversy over Holt's decision not to devalue the Australian dollar, and the likely impact on Australian industries, he has expressed support for Holt's decision and has indicated that he would closely examine any subsidization measures designed to prop up uneconomic industries hurt by sterling devaluation.

Government Leadership - In response to questions concerning his style of leadership, he has said that ~~he did not intend to be a "chairman of the board" but would provide strong personal leadership.~~ He has clearly implied that any conflict of views between himself and his ministers would be resolved in his favor.

The Ministry - He has announced ~~his intention to reform the Ministry in late February or early March.~~ Without going into details, he has said that he would, to the extent possible, ignore seniority and regional representation requirements in order to appoint "the best man for the job."

Federal-State Relationships - He has indicated that the Commonwealth Government must provide stronger and more determined guidance to the States ~~in terms of allocating the country's financial resources for the benefit of the nation as against individual states.~~

Government's Organization - Without going into detail, he has said that ~~he plans to streamline, in the interests of efficiency, the Federal Government's organization by some reallocation of responsibilities between various Government Departments.~~

CRONK



UNCLASSIFIED

Saturday, Feb 3, 1968  
5:30 p. m.

*Pres. File*

67

Mr. President:

I think you will agree this is an odd time for the North Vietnamese Charge in Vientiane to chat in a chummy way with Bill Sullivan about the San Antonio formula, but he apparently did.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Vientiane 4234)



# Department of State

~~SECRET~~

67a  
TELEGRAM

5.

PP RUEHC RUMJIR  
DE RUMJFS 4234/1 0340735  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 030635Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7012  
INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 1786  
STATE GRNC  
BT

CN- 874

Feb 3, 1967  
4:25 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 4234 SECTION 1 OF 2

NODIS

1. AT CZECHOSLOVAK RECEPTION LAST EVENING, I HAD LONGEST AND MOST SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION I HAVE YET HAD WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE CHARGE NGUYEN CHANH. IT WAS FIRST TIME I HAD SEEN HIM SINCE MY RECENT RETURN FROM LEAVE AND HIS RETURN FROM SHORT TRIP TO HANOI. HE SEEMED GENUINELY PLEASED TO SEE ME AND GREETED ME WARMLY. OUR CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE IN PRESENCE RLG SECSTATE FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOUK UPRAVAN AND AND WAS MONITORED CONSPICUOUSLY BY TWO POLISH INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. THE CHICOM CHARGE ALSO CRUISED BY A COUPLE OF TIMES BUT DID NOT RPT NOT EAVESDROP.

~~PAGE 2 RUMJFS 4234/1 SECRET~~

2. CONVERSATION WAS NOT RPT NOT CONCLUSIVE, BUT COVERED A GREAT MANY POINTS OF INTEREST. I WILL CITE SEVERAL OF THESE BELOW TO GIVE GENERAL FLAVOR OF TALKS, RATHER THAN TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS FROM THEM.

3. SAN ANTONIO FORMULA: CHANH SAID SAN ANTONIO FORMULA, NO MATTER HOW WE INTERPRETED IT, WAS STILL AN EFFORT TO IMPOSE "CONDITIONS" FOR A CESSATION OF BOMBING. HE SAID HANOI POSITION WAS THAT CESSATION MUST BE "UNCONDITIONAL." I STRESSED THAT THERE WAS GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN "ASSUMPTION" AND A "CONDITION." I SUGGESTED HIS GOVERNMENT STUDY THAT DIFFERENCE AND DRAW SOME POSITIVE CONCLUSIONS. AT THIS POINT, SOUK INTERJECTED BENIGN COMMENT THAT "EVERYONE" BELIEVES THE AMERICAN POSITION AS STIPULATED RECENTLY BY CLIFFORD AND MCCLOSKEY IS "REASONABLE." CHANH THEN SUBSIDED ON THIS SUBJECT AND TURNED TO OTHER MATTERS.

4. "NO ADVANTAGE" CLAUSE: CHANH SAID "NO ADVANTAGE" CLAUSE WAS IMPRACTICAL TO ADMINISTER. HE ASKED HOW WE COULD

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-194

By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~SECRET~~

-2- VIENTIANE 4434 NODIS CN 374

~~PAGE 3 RUMJFS 4234/1 SECRET~~

DETERMINE WHETHER SAME "RYTHM" OF SUPPLY ACTIVITY WAS CONTINUING AFTER BOMBING CEASED. I SAID THAT SUCH DETERMINATION WOULD BE OUR PROBLEM AND WE OBVIOUSLY FELT WE HAD WAYS OF MAKING IT. (HE DID NOT RPT NOT RAISE QUESTION OF RECOMMAISSANCE FLIGHTS.)

5. TET ATTACKS IN SOUTH VIETNAM: CHANH SAID THAT HE SUPPOSED WE WOULD HAVE CONSIDERED CURRENT SERIES OF "ATTACKS" (SIC) IN CITIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM A VIOLATION OF "NO ADVANTAGE" CLAUSE IF THEY HAD TAKEN PLACE AFTER THE CESSATION OF BOMBING. I FINESSED REPLY TO THIS BY DISCUSSING RATIONALE FOR CURRENT ATTACKS. CHANH'S ANSWER, WHILE AVOIDING EFFORT CHARACTERIZE THESE ACTIONS AS GENERAL UPRISING, WAS TO INDICATE THAT ACTION WAS DESIGNED TO SHOW THAT NLF HAD SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND THAT PEOPLE WERE OPPOSED TO SAIGON "REGIME FANTOCHE." I SAID THAT IT LOOKED TO ME AS THOUGH EFFORT HAD FAILED SINCE NO RPT NO POPULAR SUPPORT WAS GENERATED. INSTEAD, THEY HAD EXPOSED AND LARGELY DESTROYED THEIR CLANDESTINE APPARATUS IN THE CITIES. MOREOVER, I THOUGHT THEY MISJUDGED PROPAGANDA EFFECT IN U.S. WHERE, IN MY JUDGEMENT, ATTACKS WOULD PRODUCE

~~PAGE 4 RUMJFS 4234/1 SECRET~~

REVULSION FOR VIET CONG METHODS AND DISTRUST OF HANOI AS NEGOTIATING COUNTERPART - CHANH CONTENTED HIMSELF WITH SUGGESTING WE WAIT A FEW DAYS AND SEE THE RESULTS. (HIS THOROUGHLY DISPIRITED DEFENSE OF TET ACTIONS SUGGESTED THAT HE PERSONALLY MAY NOT RPT NOT HAVE BEEN IN FAVOR OF THEM.)

6. INFILTRATION: CHANH TOOK A LINE ON INFILTRATION WHICH MARKS A NEW DEPARTURE IN MY EXPERIENCE IN DEALING WITH NORTH VIETNAMESE. RATHER THAN CATEGORICALLY DENYING ITS EXISTENCE, HE INITIATED A DISCUSSION OF IT IN CONNECTION WITH HIS EFFORT TO PROVE THAT MILITARY ACTION HAD POPULAR SUPPORT. HE SAID "LET US ASSUME FOR THE MOMENT THAT OFFICIAL U.S. FIGURES ON TROOP INFILTRATION FROM NORTH TO SOUTH ARE CORRECT." HE THEN WENT ON TO CONTRAST THESE FIGURES WITH TOTAL FIGURES OF U.S., ALLIED, AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN EFFORT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT SMALLER NUMBERS OF NVN AND VC TROOPS SURVIVED AND SUCCEEDED ONLY BECAUSE "PEOPLE" SUPPORTED THEM.

7. CHICOMS: AT ONE POINT, I MENTIONED VC TACTICS AS "RECOMMANDEES" BY HANOI'S "NEIGHBORS TO THE NORTH." CHANH,

~~PAGE 5 RUMJFS 4234/1 SECRET~~

WHO THOUGHT I HAD SAID "COMMANDEES", BRISTLED SHARPLY AND THREATENED TO CUT OFF THE CONVERSATION. SOUK HELPFULLY INTERVENED TO POINT OUT THAT CHANH HAD MISUNDERSTOOD ME, AND WE MOVED ONWARD IN REASONABLE TONES.

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T

~~SECRET~~



# Department of State

## TELEGRAM

PP RUEHC RUMJIR  
DE RUMJFS 4234/2 0340755

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 060635Z FEB 68

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7013

INFO RUMJIR/AMEMBASSY SAIGON PRIORITY 1737

STATE GRNC

BT

~~SECRET~~ VIENTIANE 4234 SECTION 2 OF 2

CN-883

February 3, 1968

4:36 a.m.

NODIS

8. NVN NEGOTIATING POSTION: CHANH SAID THAT "WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN," HANOI POSTION WILL BE BASED ON TWO PRINCIPLES; (A) INDEPENDENCE AND (B) UNIFICATION. I SAID NEITHER OF THESE GAVE US MUCH TROUBLE, PROVIDED IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE WOULD NEVER PERMIT UNIFICATION TO TAKE PLACE BY FORCE. HE ASKED HOW WE, AS AN OUTSIDE STATE, COULD HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT THE MANNER OF UNIFICATION IF WE SINCERELY ACCEPTED IDEA OF INDEPENDENCE. I SAID I THOUGHT SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD HAVE QUITE A BIT TO SAY IF WEST GERMANS ATTEMPTED TO UNIFY GERMANY BY FORCE. SOVIETS WERE AN "OUTSIDE

~~PAGE 2 RUMJFS 4234/2 SECRET~~

STATE" BUT THEY HAD AN INTEREST IN GERMAN SITUATION. WE HAD INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND HAD MOVED MORE THAN 5000,000 TROOPS HERE AS AN INDICATION OF THAT INTEREST. HANOI HAD BETTER UNDERSTAND THAT WE WOULD VERY MUCH INTEREST OURSELVES IN MANNER IN WHICH UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM ULTIMATELY CAME ABOUT AND THAT USE OF TERROR WAS AN UNACCEPTABLE METHOD.

9. COMMENT: CHANH DISPLAYED FAR MORE CONFIDENCE, FLEXIBILITY AND ASSURANCE THAN I HAVE EVER SEEN. PART OF THIS DOUBTLESS STEMS FROM FACT HE HAS JUST RETURNED FROM HANOI AND HAS SURE GRASP ON PARTY LINE. PART, HOWEVER, SEEMS TO DERIVE FROM FACT THAT HANOI HAS AUTHORIZED HIM TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING WITH ME. ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, WHEN HE SAID "YOU" WERE DOING OR SAYING SUCH AND SUCH, HE TOOK PAINS TO EXPLAIN THAT "YOU" REFERRED TO "AMERICANS" AND NOT TO ME PERSONNALLY. MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF DISCUSSION TO ME, HOWEVER, WAS WILLINGNESS OF NORTH VIETNAMESE REPRESENTATIVE TO TALK CANDIDLY OF "INFILTRATION" FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AND ABOUT "RHYTHM" OF SUPPLY MOVEMENT. THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE SOME GENUINE CHANGES IN HANOI DIALECTIC. BUT



~~SECRET~~

-2- VIENTIANE 4234 2 of 2 NODIS

~~PAGE 3 RUMORS 4234/2 SECRET~~

ALSO A CLEAR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT LEVEL OF  
MILITARY ACTIVITY OF FAIRLY OVERT DIMENSIONS NO MATTER WHAT  
DEVELOPS ON NEGOTIATING FRONT.

GP-1 SULLIVAN

BT

NOTE: NOT PASSED SAIGON BY OC/T 2/3/68.

~~SECRET~~

68

Saturday, 3:45 P.M.  
February 3, 1968

Mr. President:

Here is Ambassador Thompson's  
Flash report on a message to you  
from Kosygin containing a relatively  
mild complaint about the concentration  
of our naval forces off Korea.

*Pres file*

Bromley Smith

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-77



Department of State

66a 771  
TELEGRAM

11111 ZZ RUEHC  
DE RUEHCR 2682FD 0341920  
ZNY SSSSS  
Z 031910Z FEB 68  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7373  
STATE GRNC  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 2682

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 978Q  
RECD; FEBRUARY 3, 1968  
2:39 P.M.

ACTION COPY

NODIS

1. GROMYKO CALLED ME TO FOREIGN OFFICE AT 9:15 TONIGHT AND HANDED ME MESSAGE FROM KOSYGIN TO PRESIDENT CONTAINING RELATIVELY MILD COMPLAINT AT CONCENTRATION OUR NAVAL FORCES OFF KOREA. TRANSLATION FOLLOWS IN SEPTTEL.

2. I SAID SINCE MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT I WISHED MAKE ONLY TWO PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. FIRST WAS THAT I UNDERSTOOD OUR VESSELS WERE LOCATED OFF SOUTH AND NOT NORTH KOREA AND I UNDERSTOOD ENTERPRISE HAD NEVER COME WITHIN TWO HUNDRED MILES OF WONSAN.

PAGE 2 RUEHCR 2682FD ~~SECRET~~

3. SECOND WAS THAT AS I HAD POINTED OUT TO HIM BEFORE THE PUEBLO WAS NOT THE ONLY RECENT INCIDENT IN THIS AREA AND I MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THE THIRTY-ONE INFILTRATORS WHO HAD ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE PRESIDENT OF SOUTH KOREA. NATURALLY THIS HAD MADE THE SOUTH KOREANS SOMEWHAT NERVOUS.

4. GROMYKO SAID A HUNDRED MILES OR SO DIDN'T CHANGE SITUATION, THERE WERE MUTUAL CHARGES ABOUT INCIDENTS ALONG DMZ AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WERE OF NO USE AGAINST INFILTRATORS. I REPLIED THAT THE POINT WAS SOUTH KOREANS WERE LEGITIMATELY CONCERNED THAT THESE INCIDENTS MIGHT PRESAGE SOME FURTHER ACTIONS BY NORTH KOREA.

5. I ASKED GROMYKO IF HE HAD ANY INFORMATION ON LAST MEETING AT PANMUNJON. HE SAID HE HAD ONLY BRIEF REPORT BUT UNDERSTOOD OUR REPRESENTATIVES HAD AGREED TO MEET AGAIN.

THOMPSON  
BT

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-194  
By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~SECRET~~

69

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Feb. 3, 1968  
1:20 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

With respect to item 2 of the agenda, you should know that in the military meeting this morning at 9:30 -- and then again with Sect. Rusk at 11:00 -- I raised the possibility of interrupting North Korean access to the high seas as a pressure measure. This had not been considered in the staff work prepared for this morning. This will be staffed out in addition to the four measures already listed.

W. W. Rostow

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
NLJ 96-193  
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~