

70

SECRET/CACTUS

Pres. file

**Saturday, February 3, 1968
1:10 p. m.**

Mr. President:

**Herewith the instructions that went
out from the State Department for the
Panmunjom meeting.**

**Panmunjom and its prospects will
be, I believe, the first sub-item under
today's lunch agenda Item 1.**

W. W. Rostow

To Seoul 109693

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DLG, NARA, Date 10/25/96

WWRostow:rla

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

109693

3

~~SECRET~~

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy SEOUL

IMMEDIATE

3 FEB 60 02 42z

Info:

STATE 109693

NODIS/CACTUS

1. Subject to your views, we envision following scenario for next MTG: You should open with statement along following lines:

QUOTE At our meeting on February 2 your side made several statements. I now address myself to these.

You characterized the USS PUEBLO as an QTE armed spy ship UNQTE. The PUEBLO is a commissioned ship of the US Navy. It carried three 50-caliber machine guns. These were kept covered. They were not fired when the PUEBLO was being seized by North Korean patrol boats. We have made quite clear that the PUEBLO was on an intelligence collection mission in the Sea of Japan at the time of its seizure by North Korea. Intelligence collection by vessels of this type is a standard and accepted practice in the world today. The USSR, for example, has intelligence collection vessels stationed at the present time off the coasts of many countries, including Korea.

Drafted by: L:LCMeeker:jf/njb 2/2/68	Tel. Ext. 4242	Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Under The/Secretary
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Clearance:

EA/KTF - Mr. Berger

IO - Mr. Sisco

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

S/S - Mr. Walsh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-194

By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~S E C R E T~~

Are you suggesting that neighboring countries have a right to seize vessels of this kind?

At the meeting of February 2 you charged that the mission of the PUEBLO constituted an QTE act of aggression UNQTE by the United States. The PUEBLO was engaged in a mission that is accepted by the navies and governments of the world, and ~~and~~ it engaged in no hostilities against anyone, including North Korea. The carrying out of its mission on the high seas cannot possibly be characterized as an aggressive action. Are you suggesting that Soviet intelligence-collecting vessels on similar missions are engaged in acts of aggression?

You stated that the mission of the PUEBLO constituted QTE the most flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement requiring the cessation of all hostile acts in Korea and respecting the waters, respecting the demilitarized zone and waters contiguous to the demilitarized zone and to this land UNQTE. The PUEBLO engaged in no hostilities at all. What provision of the Armistice Agreement did the PUEBLO violate? Paragraph 12 of the Armistice Agreement provides that --

INNERQTE The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities

~~S E C R E T~~

~~SECRET~~

in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. END INNERQTE

The PUEBLO was not engaged in hostilities. The PUEBLO reported it never uncovered its guns. It never offered any threat to anyone.

Your statement appeared to refer also to paragraph 15 of the Armistice Agreement, which reads as follows:

INNERQTE This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea. END INNERQTE

The expression QTE the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side ~~QTE~~ UNQTE could, under no interpretation, extend beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast.

I come now to the crucial question of where the PUEBLO was.

You have said that the United States Government QTE ~~XXXX~~ purposefully infiltrated your armed spy ship PUEBLO into our

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~~S E C R E T~~

territorial waters UNQTE. Your version of where the PUEBLO was does not square with the facts as we know them.

The PUEBLO ~~was~~ had strict orders to remain at all times at a distance more than 13 nautical miles from the nearest point in North Korean territory, in order to avoid any possible incident. We have no reason to believe the orders were not obeyed.

Where was the PUEBLO on January 23, 1968? At 1000 hours Korean Standard Time the PUEBLO reported its position as 39-24 N 127-59 E. Two hours later, when the PUEBLO ~~was~~ had been circled and threatened by North Korean submarine chaser No. 35, ~~was~~ her position ~~was~~ 39-25.2 N 127-55 E. No. 35 radioed its position at exactly the same time (1200 hours) as 39-25 N 127-56 E. All these positions are more than 15 nautical miles from the nearest point in North Korean territory, Ung Do Island.

The PUEBLO reported being boarded by North Korean personnel at 1345 hours. It radioed its position then as 39-25 N 127-54 E. Five minutes later North Korean submarine chaser No. 35 reported its position as 39-29 N 128-08 E. These positions also are clearly more than 15 miles from the coast.

~~S E C R E T~~

~~SECRET~~

These are the facts as known to the United States:

warship

A commissioned ~~ship~~ of the US Navy, carrying out an accepted and legitimate ~~XXXX~~ mission, engaged in no hostilities, and offering threat to no one, was seized in international waters. As your side must be aware, the rule of international law is that warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any state other than the flag state.

Even in the case of a warship that has entered territorial waters, the coastal state is not entitled to assert any jurisdiction over it other than to require the warship to leave the territorial sea if the warship does not comply with regulations of the coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards a request for compliance.

(cont'd)

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Let me emphasize here that this is the practice regularly followed by the United States. For example, the Soviet ship BAROMETER came within 2.8 miles of Puerto Rico on April 7, 1965 while maneuvering to remain near US Naval forces. On October 23, 1965 the Soviet ship ARBAN entered US territorial waters off San Pedro, California. And again on December 6, 1966 the Soviet ship TEODOLIT violated US territorial waters on three separate occasions. In each of these cases the United States observed the plain rules of international law in requesting departure of the ship in question without attempting to assert any other jurisdiction over it.

You have stated that the PUEBLO was within the territorial waters of North Korea. All our evidence shows that it was on the high seas. You have ~~HEARD~~ stated a right to seize a foreign war vessel within your territorial sea. We contend international law gives no such right. These are serious points of contention that should be resolved. Yet, they need not be resolved before the release of the PUEBLO crew and the return of the vessel.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

We are seeking a peaceful settlement of this matter by direct negotiation through the established machinery of the MAC. We ask for immediate ~~the~~/release of the crew and ~~the~~ return of the vessel, ~~anything about xxx peaceful settlement xxx~~ ~~What xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx~~ END QUOTE

2. General Pak may then assert that obvious way to resolve this disagreement is for US to accept North Korea's version of facts. In support of this, he may surface alleged confession of Commander Bucher or other evidence (such as purported ship's log) for purpose of sustaining North Korea's allegation. You can meet this as follows:

QUOTE You have referred to an alleged confession from the commander of the PUEBLO [and other purported evidence]. Because this alleged evidence conflicts with the data available to our side, we cannot be expected to accept it unless it is verified by the captain and crew of the PUEBLO. Without the availability of Commander Bucher and his crew, we would have no way of satisfying ourselves as to the value of what you present as evidence.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I can assure you that after the release of the crew and the vessel we will, of course, conduct an inquiry, and we will inform you of the results of that inquiry. If we find that the PUEBLO was in fact in North Korea's territorial sea contrary to all our present information, we will be prepared ^{so} ~~is~~/to acknowledge publicly and to express our regret.

Allegations made in this room as to the location of the ship will not resolve this disputed issue. Does your side have any ^{a peaceful resolution of this issue?} ~~constructive~~ proposals for ~~resolving it~~? We are prepared to receive your proposal now or at our next meeting, which I propose to be held on February ____.

~~SECRET~~

Saturday, Feb. 3, 1968
1:00 p. m.

71

Mr. President:

It looks as though Thieu and Ky are more nearly in harness than ever before; and there is the beginning of some executive drive as well as close U. S. - GVN coordination.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

71a
Saturday, February 3, 1968

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER (Saigon 17607)

SUBJECT: Government of Vietnam-U.S. Mission Task Force to Deal
with Emergency

As a follow-up to the meeting with President Thieu February 2, a broader joint Government of Vietnam-U.S. meeting was held morning of February 3. Present on Government of Vietnam side were President Thieu, Vice President Ky, Prime Minister Lc, Secretary General Nguyen Van Huong, Defense Minister Vy, Foreign Minister Do, Chief Joint General Staff Vien, Minister of Interior Vien, Minister to Prime Minister Cang, Information Director General Linh, Brigadier General Thung (South Vietnam Political Warfare Department). On the U.S. side were Ambassador Bunker, Westmoreland, Komer, Calhoun, Zorthian, MacDonald and Forsythe.

President Thieu led off by noting the need to establish a special task force to handle urgent problems relating to the civilian population, along the lines discussed yesterday. The Task Force would coordinate all matters on Government of Vietnam side and would be under the supervision of Vice President Ky. He said they plan to establish an operations center in Saigon for the entire country and similar centers in the provinces. These centers would collect information from the people about requirements and also receive offers to assist in the national effort in all fields. He cited as examples, youth groups, self-defense groups in villages and hamlets, etc. Thieu envisaged these centers as being in a position to determine priorities and authorize issuance of commodities and equipment as needed. He said that the Task Force would work closely with the Mission and request assistance from U.S. sources where the Government of Vietnam was not able to furnish or do what was needed.

I said that we of course wanted to help in whatever way we could and added that General Westmoreland and Komer had developed some suggestions about organizational arrangements at the national level, as well as in the Corps regions, provinces, and in Saigon. Westmoreland then described in general terms the organizational concept which he envisaged for these various levels, with Government of Vietnam principals assisted by U.S. deputies who could marshal U.S. support. He emphasized that this organization would make use of existing ministries and personnel resources. Westmoreland then outlined the most urgent tasks which he thought should be addressed, as follows:

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-152
R/p, NARA, Date 7/29/96

1. Return Saigon to normalcy tomorrow;
2. Open major lines of communications, especially route 4;
3. Make special appeal for national unity;
4. Begin immediately information campaign;
5. Prevent hoarding unwarranted price increases;
6. Determine extent of damage;
7. Promptly inventory resources;
8. Seek free-world assistance in project recovery.

I concluded these comments by saying that I thought there was a clear opportunity presented here for the Government to add to the military defeat of the Viet Cong by turning what appeared now to be a psychological victory for them into defeat by rapid and effective Government of Vietnam actions to restore the situation.

Thieu then asked General Cao Van Vien to comment on some of the plans developed on the Government of Vietnam side. Vien said that although he hoped to restore the Saigon situation promptly, he did not think it could be done as quickly as we hoped. He said there were still Viet Cong groups operating in certain parts of the Saigon area and he planned to divide the city into sectors for purposes of screening the population and ferreting out the enemy and their arms. He said that his present information is that the Viet Cong have the capacity to reinforce their effort, particularly through the 9th Viet Cong Division. With respect to the opening of Route 4, he agreed this was important but he was not as optimistic as General Westmoreland about opening it very rapidly. Westmoreland pointed out that traffic was already flowing to some degree and he thought it could be restored quite promptly.

Thieu then said that in his view six battalions must be kept in Saigon to clean out the enemy in collaboration with the Police Forces. He added that the Government of Vietnam would resume full operation Monday, February 5, working straight through from 9 to 4, in order to allow the Government workers time to get to and from their homes during the hours in which the curfew would be lifted, from 8:00 A. M. to 5:00 P. M. Thieu emphasized the necessity for keeping adequate forces in the area to protect Saigon and said that Vien would be ready to start his Saigon operations tomorrow, following a further preparatory meeting this afternoon.

Vice President Ky said that he agreed regarding the urgency of this effort, noting that he had met with Generals Vien and Khang yesterday and that General Vien would be personally placed in charge of the Saigon area so that he would have available whatever staff was needed. He said their plan would be ready tomorrow.

Westmoreland agreed that the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions and certain North Vietnamese Army elements were capable of making a follow-up attack in a number of areas. He said that he may therefore have to move certain nearby U.S. forces to outlying areas to deal with such attacks. He said it was vital, therefore, that the organization and plans for Government of Vietnam forces in the Saigon Area be completed as soon as possible. Ky reiterated that these plans would be ready Sunday, February 4.

Komer emphasized the necessity of restoring public services in Saigon. Ky agreed but said that it was also important to bear in mind the urgency and importance of the problem of the civilian population and armed forces in the provinces. He said that in many areas they remained in doubt about the facts of the situation, since for all practical purposes in recent days they had heard only the Viet Cong radio and Hanoi. He added that it was planned for Government of Vietnam representatives to get out to the provinces speedily to reassure the population and armed forces. I agreed with Ky that it was vital to get the information and psy-war effort going in the countryside. There was then some discussion of the radio broadcasting situation throughout the country and it was agreed that urgent action by the Government of Vietnam, supported by our resources, should be taken to restore such facilities. It was noted that in Qui Nhon the radio station had been destroyed and that in Hue the Viet Cong were still occupying and using it. General Vien said that he thought Government of Vietnam forces would be able to take back Hue radio today.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that the joint Task Force under Ky would start meeting immediately, which it did.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lunch Meeting With the President
Saturday, February 3, 1968 -- 1:30 p.m.

AGENDA

Pres file

Note: I will have a more detailed itemization of Item 1 after my 11:00 o'clock meeting at State, but before the 1:30 p.m. lunch.

1. **Diplomatic moves in the days ahead.** (Sec. Rusk)
 - Draft letter to Park
 - Draft letter to Kosygin
 - Arbitration options
2. **Military actions to induce return of the crew and Pueblo.** (Sec Rusk and Sec. McNamara)
 - Air reconnaissance over North Korea.
 - Sailing Banner into area where Pueblo was seized.
 - Seizing a North Korean vessel.
 - Limited blockade of North Korean naval vessels.
3. **Moves to strengthen our basic military posture worldwide.** (Sec. McNamara)

Note: We reviewed with Paul Nitze and General Johnson a long list of items. Sec. McNamara will report his net judgment at the lunch meeting.

W. W. Rostow

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Authority State 3-13-79 NSC 3-27-80

By ep/hg, NARA, Date 2-3-72

WWRostow:rlh

~~TOP SECRET~~

Saturday, 1 Feb. 3, 1968
1:20 p. m.

Pres file

T3

Mr. President:

You will be interested in this background briefing by Ambassador Bunker on the afternoon of February 3, Saigon time.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

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45

ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SAL 01,SSO 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,CIAE 00,NSAE 00,SS 20,GPM 03,

INR 07,AID 28,IO 13,EUR 15,RSR 01,MM 01,/103 W

O R 031300Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5580
CINCPAC
INFO USIA WASHDC 4496
DOD

Rostow

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 17608

FOR DONNELLEY FROM ZORTHIAN

AMBASSADOR BUNKER HELD BACKGROUND BRIEFING ATTRIBUTABLE
TO "SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS" AFTERNOON FEB. 3, ATTENDED BY
SELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF MAJOR AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA,
REUTERS AND AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE. HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS
IN INTRODUCTION:

WHILE WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET
CONG THINKING IN LAUNCHING WAVE OF ATTACKS THROUGHOUT REPUBLIC

PAGE 2 RUEHGN 17608/1 UNCLAS
THERE ARE MANY INDICATIONS CURRENT PHASE PART OF CAREFULLY-PLANNED
OPERATION LEADING TO WHAT COMMUNISTS HAVE LONG THOUGHT WOULD BE
FORERUNNER OF A GENERAL UPRISING. COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN SAYING
THIS PUBLICLY, AND HAVE BEEN TELLING THIS TO THEIR TROOPS. VC
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE THOUGHT AS THEY ENTERED CITIES PEOPLE
WOULD RISE UP TO SUPPORT THEM, OVERTHROW THE GVN AND JOIN THEM
IN RESISTANCE AGAINST AMERICANS. THIS THESIS SUPPORTED BY STORIES

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FROM HANOI, LIBERATION RADIO BROADCASTS AND INCIDENTS LIKE ONES IN SAIGON WHERE VC WENT THROUGH NEIGHBORHOODS SAYING "WE ARE FROM THE NFL. WE HAVE COME TO LIBERATE SAIGON."

IF THIS THEIR PURPOSE, THEN EFFORT HAS FAILED IN ITS ESSENCE. THIS IS NOT TO IMPLY COMMUNISTS HAVE FAILED TO GAIN HEADLINES IN WORLD PRESS AND MAKE IMPRESSION ON VIETNAM ITSELF. ENEMY HAS GIVEN DRAMATIC IMPRESSION OF ABILITY FOR TERROR AND DISRUPTION AND CREATED CONFUSION AND CERTAIN MILITARY PROBLEMS. BUT CLEARLY PEOPLE HAVE NOT RESPONDED WITH A "GENERAL UPRISING." THERE IS NO EVIDENCE FROM ANY CITIES ATTACKED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR VC. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SMALL GROUPS UNDOUBTEDLY, PARTICULARLY IN CITY LIKE HUE,

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WHO AIDED VC. BUT COMMUNIST CONCEPT OF "GENERAL UPRISING" FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. HOW MUCH HANOI LEADERSHIP ACTUALLY EXPECTED SUCH REACTION HARD TO JUDGE, BUT THIS THEY HAVE BEEN TELLING WORLD AND OWN PEOPLE. THEREFORE IF THIS THEIR BASIC PURPOSE, IT HAS NOT BEEN ACHIEVED.

I SAY THIS DESPITE FACT I RECOGNIZE IMPACT THEY HAVE HAD WORLDWIDE AND IN VIETNAM. THEY HAVE SHOWN THEY ARE STILL CAPABLE AT PRESENT OF CONSIDERABLE MILITARY CHALLENGE, WHETHER SHORT-LIVED OR NOT, AND THAT THEIR TROOP DISPLAY AND TACTICAL ABILITY IS STILL VERY GOOD. THIS, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED AT A CONSIDERABLE PRICE. WHATEVER ACTUAL FIGURES THEIR CASUALTIES ARE, THEY HAVE SUFFERED TREMENDOUS LOSSES, SOMEWHERE OVER 12,000 KILLED THUS FAR. THIS FIGURE VERY LIKELY TO INCREASE MORE. IT IS LIKELY MANY OF CASUALTIES ARE AMONG BEST TRAINED AND MOST EFFECTIVE SOLDIERS. THEY FOUGHT WELL AND IT WOULD BE LOGICAL THEY WOULD PICK MOST EFFECTIVE UNITS FOR TASK OF "LIBERATION." WE KNOW A NUMBER OF THEIR BATTALIONS FROM SUCH PLACES AS LONG AN ARE AMONG MOST SEASONED. LOSS OF THIS TYPE PERSONNEL CANNOT BE MADE UP QUICKLY THROUGH

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RECRUITMENT OR EVEN THROUGH INFILTRATION.

SO IN ADDITION TO LOSING IN NUMBERS, THEY HAVE LOST IN MILITARY QUALITY. CERTAINLY, THEY HAVE NOT ACHIEVED ANY SORT OF MILITARY OBJECTIVE. THEY HAVE CREATED HAVOC AND DISRUPTION, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE HOLD SINGLE OBJECTIVE OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE. ALSO, THEY ARE BEING PUSHED OUT OF FEW AREAS THEY STILL OCCUPY.

I DO NOT MEAN TO IMPLY VC WILL HAVE COLLAPSED MILITARILY BECAUSE OF THESE LOSSES. IN FACT, OUR MILITARY FEEL THAT THEY HAVE CAPACITY FOR A SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON SELECTED TARGETS SUCH AS SAIGON. FOR INSTANCE, THEY HAVE ELEMENTS OF THREE DIVISIONS: THE 7TH NORTH VIETNAMESE AND 5TH AND 9TH VC THAT THEY COULD USE IN SECOND EFFORT AT SAIGON. GENERAL WESTMORELAND ESTIMATES THAT THEY HAVE PROBABLY COMMITTED ONLY ABOUT 35,000 MEN TO FIRST WAVE OF ATTACKS. IN ADDITION TO SECOND WAVE POSSIBILITY, THEY ALSO HAVE MILITARY RESOURCES, LARGELY NVA, TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR EFFORT AT KHE SANH AND IN DMZ AREA. OUR MILITAR PEOPLE FULLY AWARE THESE POSSIBILITIES, ARE PREPARED

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FOR THEM, AND EVEN THOUGH MILITARY CHALLENGE MAY BE CONSIDERABLE, THE FIGHTING BITTER, WE BELIEVE WE WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE ANYTHING VC OR NVA CAN THROW AT US IN THIS SITUATION. THUS, I WOULD THINK BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES OF VC WILL ESSENTIALLY FAIL, ALTHOUGH I HASTEN TO ADD AGAIN THAT THEY HAVE CERTAINLY MADE SOME IMMEDIATE IMPACT AND OBVIOUSLY HAVE CREATED PROBLEMS.

TURNING TO MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. WITH CHALLENGE IN CITIES ESSENTIALLY RESPULSED, WE HAVE A NEED FOR VERY ENERGETIC EFFORT ON PART GVN, WITH OUR ASSISTANCE, TO MEET MULTITUDE PROBLEMS SITUATION HAS CREATED AMONG CIVIL POPULATION. STRIKING IN MIDDLE OF TET, VC FOUND GVN AT ITS WEAKEST IN TERMS OF MOBILIZING RESOURCES. OFFICIALS WERE ON HOLIDAY AND LACK OF NEWSPAPER AND OTHER MEANS COMMUNICATION MADE MOBILITING GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, PRESIDENT THIEU AND VICE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER HAVE BEEN ACTIVE ALL THROUGH

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PERIOD. I HAVE BEEN IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THEM AND GENERAL WESTMORELAND HAS BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THEIR MILITARY. FACT THAT VIETNAMESE MIGHT BE LESS AGGRESSIVE IN TERMS

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THEIR PUBLIC VISIBILITY WITH WESTERN CORRESPONDENTS THAN WE ARE SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THEY HAVE BEEN STANDING STILL. PRESIDENT THIEU HELD NUMBER MEETINGS WITH CABINET AND LEADING ADVISORS AND WE HAVE ALSO HAD JOINT MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICERS. THEY HAVE ALREADY INITIATED SOME EMERGENCY STEPS, SUCH AS PROVISION OF FOOD IN MANY PARTS OF CITY TODAY, AND THERE IS MORE IN OFFING. THEY ARE PUTTING INTO EFFECT EMERGENCY PLANS FOR MOBILIZING THEIR RESOURCES TO MEET PROBLEMS OF FOOD, PUBLIC SERVICES, RECONSTRUCTION OF DEVASTERED AREAS, ETC. WE WILL PROVIDE THEM WITH EVERY ASSISTANCE WITHIN OUR MEANS.

GENERAL WESTMORELAND SAYS IN MANY AREAS ARVN PERFORMED EXCEEDINGLY WELL AND I AM HOPEFUL CIVIL SIDE OF GVN SHOWS PARALLEL CAPABILITY IN DAYS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD.
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41
ACTION P 04

INFO EA 10,SAL 01,CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,CCO 00,SS 20,
GPM 03,INR 07,AID 28,EUR 15,RSR 01,MM 01,/090W

O R 031300Z JAN 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5581
CINCPAC
INFO USIA WASHDC 4497
DOD

UNCLAS SAIGON 17608 SECTION 2 OF 2

THERE IS NO DOUBT PAST FEW DAYS CREATED PROBLEMS AND WILL
TAX OUR ABILITIES TO UTMOST, BUT I AM HEARTENED BY FACT VIET-
NAMESE PEOPLE HAVE PASSED THE TEST BY PROVIDING NEGATIVE
ANSWERS TO VC APPEAL FOR GENERAL UPRISING. WHATEVER MILITARY
CHALLENGE IS AHEAD, I THINK WE CAN FIND SOME STRENGTH IN
ANSWERS VIETNAMESE HAVE GIVEN. AND, THEREFORE, WE CAN FIND AN
OPPORTUNITY AHEAD TO MEET THESE PROBLEMS AND TO FORGE A
BETTER SENSE OF NATIONAL PURPOSE. I SEE THUS A CHALLENGE
TO US AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO TURN THESE EVENTS TO THE LONGRANGE
DISADVANTAGE OF THE VC.

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FOLLOWING POINTS WERE MADE DURING QUESTION AND ANSWER PORTION
(SELECTED QUESTIONS ARE INCLUDED):

IN THE FIGHTING, THE ALLIES LOST 983 KILLED, OF WHICH
381 WERE AMERICANS, 361 ARVN AND 4 FREE WORLD.

PRESIDENT THIEU MET WITH HIS SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS

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CALLED IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE IS TRYING TO DRAW EVERYBODY INTO SITUATION EVERYWHERE IN COUNTRY IN AN APPEAL TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. MISSION HAS ALSO MET WITH LEADERS, AND HAS FOUND FAVORABLE SUPPORT TO GOVERNMENT'S APPEAL.

IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION OF WHO WAS OFFERING SUPPORT TO SUCH APPEALS, AMBASSADOR REPLIED GOOD RESPONSE WAS COMING FROM OPPOSITION PEOPLE IN LOWER HOUSE AND SENATE AND FROM OTHER WALKS OF LIFE.

WE DO NOT YET HAVE RESPONSIBLE FIGURES ON NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES.

Q. HOW CAN THE MILITARY ACTION BE TURNED TO THE GOVERNMENT'S

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ADVANTAGE? A. THE ATTACKS WERE MADE DURING THE TET TRUCE PERIOD, ON A NATIONAL AND TRADITIONAL HOLIDAY. IT HAS CREATED A SENSE OF OUTRAGE AMONG THE PEOPLE. IF THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ACTS QUICKLY AND USES THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNIFY THE PEOPLE, IT SEEMS THIS CAN BE TURNED TO A VERY GOOD ADVANTAGE.

Q. IN THE PAST THE U.S. AND GVN HAVE SAID SECURITY WAS THE KEY FOR SUCCESS IN PACIFICATION, THEN HOW CAN THESE ATTACKS BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GVN? A. I THINK THE ATTACKS WILL SLOW DOWN THE PROGRESS IN THE PROGRAM. BUT, BY THE SAME TOKEN I THINK MORE STRINGENT MEASURES CAN BE TAKEN IN GETTING MORE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM.

Q. WHAT PLANS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR BETTER SECURITY. A. MORE STRINGENT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO PROVIDE BETTER SECURITY THE OFFENSIVE CAME AT A TIME WHEN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT WAS LEAST PREPARED FOR IT. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE INCREASING ITS FORCES IN NEW MOBILIZATION MEASURES. IT WILL HAVE 65,000 MORE TROOPS BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. THIS IS A VERY SUBSTANTIAL

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FORCE FOR A COUNTRY OF THIS SIZE.

Q. HAS A LESSON BEEN LEARNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT
TAKE HOLIDAYS, EVEN AT TET? A. I THINK SO.

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF THE PLANS FOR SAIGON I THE
COMING WEEK? A. GOVERNMENT PEOPLE WILL RETURN TO WORK MONDAY.
THERE ARE STILL VC IN THE CITY, PARTICULARLY IN THE 7TH AND
8 TH DISTRICTS WHICH WILL TAKE UNTIL MONDAY OR TUESDAY TO CLEAN
OUT. THE POLICE ARE GETTING TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE POPULACE
TELLING THEM WHERE THE VC ARE LOCATED.

Q. WHAT ARE THE CHANCES FOR NEGOTIATION NOW? WHAT WOULD
BE THE SITUATION FOR TALKS IF WE HAD AGREED TO A BOMBING
PAUSE A MONTH AGO? A. IF THEY HADN'T TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE TRUCE
THERE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN AN ATTACK.

Q. IF YOU WERE ASKED TWO WEEKS AGO WHETHER THESE ATTACKS
BY THE VC WERE POSSIBLE, WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE SAID? A. THAT IS

PAGE 5 RUEHGN 17608/2 UNCLAS
A HARD QUESTION. I THINK I WOULD HAVE SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS
THAT THEY HAD THE CAPABILITY.

Q. IF A SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS COMES, WOULD IT BE IN AS MANY
PLACES AND ON THE SAME SCALE? A. NO. NO, IT WOULD NOT BE IN
AS MANY PLACES OR WITH THE SAME STRENGTH.

Q. DO YOU SEE THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH HANOI?

A. IT IS NOT UP TO ME TO SAY. I'VE NEVER SEEN ANY INDICATION
THAT HANOI IS INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS EXCEPT ON THE BASIS
OF THEIR OWN FOUR POINTS. AS FOR THE IMMEDIATE POSITION
OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM: THERE MIGHT BE A HARDENING ON ITS
PART BECAUSE OF THE ATTACKS-THE OBVIOUS PURPOSE OF HANOI WAS
TO TRY TO TAKE OVER IN THE SOUTH.

Q. CAN WE USE THE BASIS OF THESE ATTACKS NOW TO SAY TO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 SAIGON 17608 031625Z

GENERAL VINH HE MUST CHANGE HIS MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND...?

A. ARVN HAS HAD THE BRUNT OF THESE ATTACKS, AND HAS PERFORMED WELL.

PAGE 6 RUEHGN 17608/2 UNCLAS-

ON ANOTHER QUESTION IMPLYING THE WEAKNESS OF THE GVN AND MILITARY WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT SUCCESS THE ATTACKS HAD, THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THE ATTACKS WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL, THE GVN AND MILITARY HAD RECOVERED FROM THE ONSLAUGHT, WERE THROWING THE ENEMY OUT AND CAUSING HEAVY CASUALTIES.

ON ANOTHER QUESTION IMPLYING THE ATTACKS MEAN A FAILURE OF THE OVERALL EFFORT HERE, HE SAID: I DON'T THINK BECAUSE YOU HAVE HAD THIS KIND OF AN ATTACK THE SITUATION IS A FAILURE. WE HAVE HAD SETBACKS BEFORE. EVEN IN WOULD WAR II, THERE WAS THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE. I SAID WHEN I WAS IN WASHINGTON THE LAST TIME: "STEADY BUT NOT SPECTACULAR PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE." THIS HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY DEFEAT OF THE VC, BUT IT HAS CREATED SOME DIFFICULTIES, SOME SETBACKS, OF COURSE. BUNKER

UNCLASSIFIED

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Saturday, February 3, 1968
12:45 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

To round out Nick's scenario.

1. After Nick called me at 2225, I called Sec. Rusk to get his view. He said he had instructed his men to proceed with the immediate meeting.
2. I informed you of his decision which you strongly reaffirmed.
3. I promptly conveyed your affirmation to Sec. Rusk. He told me that communications difficulties might force a slide of about two hours.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

Mr Costow
74a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

February 3, 1968.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Chronology of Last Night's Events

Attached is a detailed chronology of the sequence of events pertinent to the scheduling of the next MAC meeting.

There are several additional facts you should have:

- Sam Berger (who is doing a superb job under back-breaking conditions) was, at all times, acting pursuant to my instructions.
- Every decision I took was made either in consultation with Dean Rusk or in the exercise of my own judgment, consistent with what I knew to be his views.
- I assumed that, as a result of my call to Walt, you were familiar with what was going on. However, at no time were Presidential instructions on how to proceed passed -- either directly or indirectly -- to me or to our Operations Center.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By cb, NARA Date 86-97

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

~~SECRET~~

74b

CHRONOLOGY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

February 2, 1968

2205 -- Operations Center received telephone call from Ericson, Political Counselor, Embassy Seoul. Bardach, Korean Task Force, took call. Ericson said that "we" have been invited by the "other side" to another meeting at 3:00 p.m., Korean time, February 3, or 1:00 a.m. EST., i.e. within three hours from time of call. Ericson asked for instructions whether to go ahead with meeting or postpone. Also asked for basic guidance for next meeting. Said that cable containing substance his telephone call was being sent and requested that we phone him back.

2207 -- Bardach called Berger and informed him of telephone message. Berger said he would make a few telephone calls at once and call back. Berger also asked Bardach to check on whether outgoing cable containing instructions for next meeting had been sent. (State 109693 was being transmitted at this time.)*

2210 (approx.) -- Berger called Katzenbach to inform him of telephone message. Katzenbach said he would call right back.

2212 (approx.) -- Katzenbach called Secretary. The two decided it was best to agree to a 3:00 p.m. meeting.

2215 (approx.) -- Katzenbach called Berger and told him to go ahead with 3:00 p.m. meeting. Berger pointed out that if we had the meeting at 3:00 p.m. the negotiating team would have 20 minutes, at most,--if negotiating instructions were received without delay--to prepare for the session.

*There are no secure voice communications with Embassy Seoul, so it was impossible to pass the negotiating instructions by telephone.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

2225 (approx.) -- Katzenbach called Walt Rostow and informed him of present state of events.

2230 (approx.) -- Katzenbach called the Secretary and told him of Berger's comments on the short time available to prepare for the meeting. The two agreed that it would be best to try to put the meeting off for "a couple of hours".

2235 (approx.) -- Katzenbach called Berger and told him to accept a 3:00 p.m. meeting, but to try for a delay of "a couple of hours".

2240 -- Berger called Bardach and gave instructions, which he had received from Mr. Katzenbach, to telephone Seoul and tell them to accept time for next meeting at 3:00 p.m., Korean time, as proposed by North Koreans, but also ask North Koreans if they would agree to two hour delay in view of the short notice given. Also to send flash telegram containing these instructions.

2250 -- Operations Center placed telephone call to Seoul. Bardach talked with Ericson and DCM Newman and passed message. They said that accepting meeting at hour indicated by other side--now only two hours ten minutes away--or even two hours later would not permit sufficient time to prepare instructions and get necessary people up to Panmunjom. Newman said Embassy had sent their comments on North Korean request by immediate cable and urged that we see this cable before giving final instructions on timing of meeting.

2305 -- Berger arrived in Operations Center. Bardach gave him Seoul telephone comments.

2310 -- Berger talked with Under Secretary on telephone, giving him above information. He also reported that the JCS was getting a report that the North Koreans were mobilizing (this proved to be a false report). Under Secretary said he would come to Operations Center immediately.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

2330 -- First Seoul cable reporting request for meeting received.

2350 -- Second Seoul cable with Embassy comments on same received.

2350 -- Under Secretary arrives in Operations Center. By then it was one hour and ten minutes to the time proposed for the meeting.

2355 -- Operations Center called Embassy Seoul for Under Secretary and Berger. Newman said they strongly urged we put in for meeting at 9:00 a.m., Korean time February 4. They were just receiving Part I of our long instructions for next meeting. There were garbles and they needed time to service cable and study instructions. Katzenbach and Berger said in view of this it was agreeable that they propose 9:00 a.m. meeting, but if North Koreans insisted on earlier meeting they should suggest alternative for 6:00 p.m., Korean time, February 3. This would be three hours later than original North Korean proposal and give them four hours from time of this call to prepare. FLASH cable sent.

February 3, 1968

2400 -- approx. 0130, February 3 -- Under Secretary and Berger worked on cable containing further guidance for Embassy (State 109716).

0140 -- McCafferty (White House Duty Officer) called and asked Berger if there was anything to report. Berger gave details of our instructions to Seoul.

0145 -- The President called Mr. Berger.

0200 -- Walt Rostow called Berger.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

0205 (approx.) -- Walt Rostow called Mr. Katzenbach and asked for a report on the sequence of events.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

75

Pres file

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

Saturday, February 3, 1968 -- 12:30 p. m.

Mr. President:

I thought you would not wish ^{me} to discuss the nuclear weapons matter in a meeting.

I did not discuss this question with Gen. Taylor.

I did discuss it with Clark Clifford, but I am 100% sure he did not raise it with the Pentagon. The discussion was yesterday and he confined his advice to saying I had the duty to share my anxiety with you verbally.

I have discussed various aspects of the matter over the past ten days or so with Bob Ginsburgh. It first arose in my mind from recollection that the issue was raised with us by the French at the time of the crisis at Dienbienphu.

In particular, we chatted informally about three matters:

1. Could such a question arise at Khe Sanh?
2. Would nuclear weapons be relevant?
3. What steps could be taken to minimize the likelihood that the question would arise?

With respect to 2, he asked me one day if he might explore the question informally with General Wheeler.

I told him he could if it was understood:

- this was in no sense a "White House request";
- the matter had never even been raised with the President, let alone by the President.

I did not envisage that any formal staff work would be set in train.

The fault, therefore, is mine.

WWRostow:rlh

PRESERVATION COPY

Saturday, F 3, 1968
9:30 a. m.

Pres file
76

Mr. President:

This is Berger's appreciation of the prospects for the next Korean meeting.

W. W. R.

~~SECRET~~ attachment

76a

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1968

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Second Meeting at Panmunjom

The meeting will be held at 7:00 p.m. tonight, our time, 9:00 a.m. February 4, Korea time.

We have sent Admiral Smith a detailed statement for him to make.

He will again ask for the names of the injured and wounded.

The North Korean chief effort we think will be to use the alleged confession of Lieutenant Harris which they issued yesterday to support their case that the vessel was in territorial waters. This confession includes several references to violations and one specific latitude - longitude position inside their waters.

We are sending a special guidance to Admiral Smith to handle this "evidence".

The minimum condition the North Koreans are going to attach to the release of the crew and possibly the vessel is beginning to take shape. What they seem to be shooting for is a signed statement by us admitting the vessel violated their waters. They may initially attach other conditions, such as espionage, hostile and provocative acts, but might settle for the single admission.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By CB, NARA Date 86-97

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

77

INFORMATION

Saturday
February 3, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Mrs. Ghandi's response to your conversation with the Indian Minister of Health and Family Planning

You will remember your comments regarding the Indian role in Cambodia which you asked Dr. Chandrasekhar, the Indian Minister of Health and Family Planning, to pass on to Mrs. Ghandi. In a rather peculiar way, Mrs. Ghandi's response has been conveyed to us in a conversation that the Indian Charge had with the State Department's Officer in Charge of Indian Affairs.

While ingratiatingly worded, there is nothing encouraging in the Indian response. The Indian reply stressed the limited nature of the ICC role, that the ICC could investigate only on specific Cambodian requests, that there thus far had been no such requests, that any special equipment needed to meet such requests should come from Cambodia, and that although decisions can be taken on a majority basis anything other than unanimous decisions "tends to complicate rather than tranquilize the problem." Finally, the Indians expressed their pleasure with the Bowles Mission for it reduced "the apprehensions felt by Prince Sihanouk."

Chester Bowles has been informed of the Indian response and will doubtless continue his efforts to bring the Indians around to a more helpful and realistic position.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Ed Hamilton

MWright:wpt

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By Ch, NARA Date 11-3-97



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520


February 1, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Indian Views on Cambodia and the ICC

In response to Mr. Marshall Wright's request of February 1 we are enclosing a memorandum of conversation between the Indian Charge and the Country Director for India regarding Indian views on Cambodia and the ICC.

for 
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum of conversation dated January 31, 1968

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State memo 9/11/95
By SP/sg, NARA, Date 4/29/96

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified.

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 FEB 2 AM 10 46

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: 31 January 1968

SUBJECT: Indian Views on Cambodia and the ICC

77b
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-207
By isa, NARA Date 6-12-97

PARTICIPANTS: Ashoke Chib, Indian Charge
Douglas Heck, Country Director for India

COPIES TO:	The White House	Amembassy New Delhi	Amembassy London
	EA	Amembassy Warsaw	Amembassy Paris
	EA/LC	Amembassy Ottawa	USUN
	NEA	Amembassy Canberra	
	IO	Amembassy Saigon	
	L/EA	Amembassy Vientiane	
	DOD/ISA	Amembassy Moscow	

Ashoke Chib, the Indian Charge, came in this afternoon to report he had a message from New Delhi which was in response to the message the President had asked Dr. Chandrasekhar, Minister of Health and Family Planning, to convey to Mrs. Gandhi regarding the Indian role in Cambodia. Chib said it was not clear from the messages he had received whether Mrs. Gandhi's views had been conveyed in any other channel. In order to be sure, he was delivering them to me as follows.

1. Prime Minister Gandhi was grateful for the friendly sentiments expressed by the President. She wanted to assure the USG that India remained always ready to discharge fully its obligations and responsibilities in Southeast Asia. On the matters currently under discussion regarding the ICC and Cambodia the Indian Government wanted to insure Cambodian sovereignty and full respect for the 1954 Agreements. It recognized it had a primary responsibility for the observance of the 1954 Agreements but the ICC was only a supervisory body.

The note issued by the Cambodians after Ambassador Bowles' visit asked the ICC only in a general way to verify and report within the framework of the provisions defined by the 1954 Agreements on incidents which

~~SECRET~~

GROUP3: Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically classified.

might take place in Cambodia or on foreign infiltration. The government of India has instructed its delegation on the ICC to take a positive approach and agree to investigate any specific Cambodian requests falling within the 1954 Agreements.

2. The GOI favors reinforcement of the ICC to undertake such investigations as and when necessary. However, the policing of the whole border is outside the provisions of the 1954 Agreement. In order to undertake specific investigations the GOI proposes in the first instance to obtain whatever equipment is required from Cambodia as heretofore. If helicopters are needed the ICC will obtain them from Cambodia which has such equipment or from the Laos ICC.

3. On the matter of unanimous decisions the GOI does not follow this as a rule. Majority decisions have been taken on substantive issues. The problem is that as the ICC is constituted, a majority decision angers one side or another and tends to complicate rather than tranquilize the problem.

4. The government of India is pleased that Ambassador Bowles went to Cambodia. His mission has to a considerable extent removed apprehensions felt by Prince Sihanouk. The GOI has informed Ambassador Bowles that the ICC will not stand by idly and will carry out its decisions to the best of its ability.

ACTION

Friday, February 2, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

When you approved a visit here by President Tubman of Liberia, the projected date was February 27-28. At the time the Vice President delivered your invitation, the Liberians asked if it might be possible to schedule the visit in late April, following the West African Conference on economic cooperation in Liberia April 17-24, or in May. Because your visit schedule is already heavy during that period, we have been examining alternate dates. (A list of presently scheduled visits is attached).

In response to our suggestion, Tubman has said that he prefers March 27-28 to the February dates. I recommend that we ask Tubman to accept the March 27-28 dates.

Approve ✓

Call me _____

The program for Tubman's visit would be as follows:

- Arrival ceremony (honors and remarks)
- One-hour office meeting
- Black tie dinner

Approve program ✓

We will check with you through George Christian before any dates are announced.

W. W. Rostow

cc: Jones
Hamilton

78a

CONFIDENTIAL

February 2, 1968

FOREIGN VISITOR SCHEDULE

<u>Approved and firm:</u>		<u>Type</u>	<u>Announced</u>
Prime Minister Wilson, UK	Feb 8-9	Official to Wash.	1/8
Prime Minister Egal, Somalia	Mar 14	Official to Wash.	1/8
President Stroessner, Paraguay	Mar 20	Official to Wash.	
Chancellor Klaus, Austria	Apr 10	Official to US	1/12
King Olav, Norway	Apr 25-26	State	12/28
President Thanom, Thailand	May 8-9	Official to Wash.	
President Bourguiba, Tunisia	May 15-16	State	1/10

Approved, date to be set:

President Tubman, Liberia	(Mar 27-28)	Official to US	1/1, date not specified
President Suharto, Indonesia	(June 5-6)	State	
<hr/>			
Jean Rey, President European Communities	Feb 7	5:30 PM Office meeting	1/9, time not specified
Manilo, Brosio, Sec-Gen, NATO	Feb 19	12 Noon Office meeting	

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By 19, NARA, Date Jan 30, 1992

~~SECRET~~Friday, February 2, 1968
2. Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing American Jewish Leaders

In response to your query whether we should brief Jewish leaders on your aircraft decision, I have taken discreet soundings in a number of quarters and have reached these two conclusions:

1. The Jewish community is relaxed and there is no immediate need to brief on this subject by itself. Right after Prime Minister Eshkol's visit, we and the Israeli Embassy thought Jewish leaders might not buy the indefinite language of the joint statement, especially against the background of earlier press stories playing up the Phantoms. However, the Embassy seems to have done a good job quieting their nervousness, and they seem content to live with the reassuring tone of the joint statement. Even Eppie Evron, who has to do much of the calming, feels we can live with the present situation. Neither Luke Battle nor our Jewish contacts on the Hill feel much pressure.

2. We will have to do something when you make your decision on an arms package for Jordan. A memorandum recommending a package including both aircraft and tanks is before Secretaries Rusk and McNamara today and will be over shortly. If you approve this or any substantial part of it, I think then we will need to have a real heart-to-heart talk with the Jewish leaders. We can't expect the Israelis to support us actively, but there is no question that their attitude toward Jordan has changed in the last two months, as Prime Minister Eshkol indicated to you. Without violating Eshkol's confidence, we ought to be able to make a reasonable case.

Since the time of your decision on Jordan is not far off, I will prepare a line, but I suggest you tackle that decision first.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

80

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:15 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

You might be interested in this
analysis by the Joint Staff of the JCS
on the Bermuda proposition.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla



THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

80a

DJSM-116-68
31 January 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: ~~Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff~~
~~1. The subject memorandum recommends that the United States modify its strategy in Vietnam and sets forth four points for consideration. These points are analyzed in the Enclosure.~~

1. The subject memorandum recommends that the United States modify its strategy in Vietnam and sets forth four points for consideration. These points are analyzed in the Enclosure.

2. It is recommended that the Joint Staff comments in the Enclosure be used in the further development of a US position on the subject paper.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John B. McPherson".

JOHN B. McPHERSON
Major General, USAF
Vice Director

A. First Point of Memorandum

1. Description. "In the war in the south every effort should be made to reduce violence to levels at which a sustained effort can be maintained with the support of both the American and Vietnamese people. The emphasis should not be on the military destruction of communist forces in the south but on the protection of the people of South Vietnam and the stabilization of the situation at a politically tolerable level. Tactically, this would involve a shift in emphasis from search-and-destroy to clear-and-hold operations."

2. Analysis.

a. Emphasizing the protection of the people of South Vietnam and stabilizing the situation at a politically tolerable level without continued emphasis on the military destruction of communist forces in SVN is contradictory. The enemy main and local force units, their bases, the local guerrillas and the infrastructure are all integrated to gain control of the land and the people at the expense of the GVN. The main and local force units protect the operations of the guerrillas and the infrastructure. Bases logistically support both. Therefore, military operations at present are focused on all elements of the enemy. ~~The enemy's main and local force units, their bases, the local guerrillas and the infrastructure are all integrated to gain control of the land and the people at the expense of the GVN. The main and local force units protect the operations of the guerrillas and the infrastructure. Bases logistically support both. Therefore, military operations at present are focused on all elements of the enemy.~~ This is the first step in achieving a successful pacification program.

~~The enemy's main and local force units, their bases, the local guerrillas and the infrastructure are all integrated to gain control of the land and the people at the expense of the GVN. The main and local force units protect the operations of the guerrillas and the infrastructure. Bases logistically support both. Therefore, military operations at present are focused on all elements of the enemy.~~

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~~The enemy's main and local force units, their bases, the local guerrillas and the infrastructure are all integrated to gain control of the land and the people at the expense of the GVN. The main and local force units protect the operations of the guerrillas and the infrastructure. Bases logistically support both. Therefore, military operations at present are focused on all elements of the enemy.~~

~~Security is not real in the eyes of the~~
Security is not real in the eyes of the people as long as their area can be threatened by enemy forces. Even with a vast increase in friendly forces, a defensive strategy would require the surrender of much of the countryside to the enemy. This would give him a continuing basis to recruit and logistically support his forces. By leaving the initiative to the enemy, we would permit him to pick and choose where he would strike. He would be free to interdict the routes of communication and strangle the economic life of the country. He could force friendly elements to react to his initiatives and eventually subject them to defeat in detail. Providing a protective shield at the expense of continued offensive operations would be more costly in manpower with greater risks and less actual security in the countryside.

c. ~~The enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
Their actual destruction will free the population from external threats and permit pacification forces to proceed with the job of rooting out and destroying the guerrillas and infrastructure. This in turn will permit the political, social and economic development of the countryside to proceed.

d. ~~The enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~. This task, which is primarily the job of RVNAF, could be done better than it is. However, ~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~
~~the enemy's base areas are limited in size. Placing~~

3. Conclusions.

~~Under the present environment in SVN, security can only be achieved by continued military operations with emphasis on all elements of the enemy.~~

~~b. Providing a protective shield at the expense of continued offensive operations would be more costly in manpower with greater risks and less actual security in the countryside.~~

B. Second Point of Memorandum

1. Description. "We should stop the bombing of North Vietnam. From now on the costs of strategic bombing will increasingly exceed the benefits. This step would tend to shift international pressures from Washington to Hanoi. It should not be made contingent upon an immediate military cuid pro quo nor taken in the expectation that it would lead to early negotiations. If North Vietnam chose to exploit the cessation flagrantly by expanding its forces in the south, bombing of infiltration routes could be resumed, with the prospect of increased domestic political support."

2. Analysis.

a. The Bermuda Memorandum indicates there are three separate wars in Vietnam. However, ~~"bombing in the north"~~ cannot be divorced from ~~"the war in the south" or the "other war" (pacification).~~ There is only one war, fought under a single integrated strategy. All three elements are interrelated. Air strikes in the north have an important influence on combat operations in the south. Combat operations in the south have a direct bearing on the success of the pacification. Whether or not the costs of bombing in the north exceed the benefits is a matter of judgment depending on how the factors are weighed. On

suffer casualties from the VC/NVA. The North Vietnam is free from attack and is, in effect, a sanctuary.

b. At first glance it would appear that a cessation of the bombing would initially gain favor internationally since it would be taken as a prelude to a termination of the war. Unless minimal requirements, such as those set forth in the President's San Antonio proposal, are placed on Hanoi, the pressure would remain on Washington to prevent a resumption of the bombing. Communist regimes are less susceptible to international pressures than is the US. As a result, ~~the North Vietnamese government would be able to maintain its position of strength and would be able to continue its military operations without any interruption.~~

~~the North Vietnamese government would be able to maintain its position of strength and would be able to continue its military operations without any interruption.~~

3. Conclusions.

a. ~~Some of the major points of the San Antonio proposal are that the North Vietnamese government should be required to accept the following conditions:~~

b. ~~1. The North Vietnamese government should be required to accept the following conditions:~~

c. ~~1. The North Vietnamese government should be required to accept the following conditions:~~

C. Third Point of Memorandum

1. Description. "The South Vietnamese government at all levels should be steadily pressed to assume greater responsibility, both political and military, for the defense and

pacification of the country. To achieve this purpose, the United States should seek every opportunity to make aid to the South Vietnamese conditional upon fulfillment of their commitments."

2. Analysis. ~~We should exert pressure on the GVN to assume greater responsibility for the war and we are~~
RVNAF is being strengthened so that it can take on a greater share of the military burden. The pacification program is completely a GVN program, with the US providing only advice and support. It is true, however, that many things which we feel the GVN should do to deal with its problems are not being done or are being done very slowly. To prod the GVN into greater action the US has been progressively extending its advisory efforts and has been using persuasive techniques ranging from exhortation to the withholding of support. ~~When it is considered that the US has been covering its own rear and US policy is to respect that sovereignty, it is not surprising that beyond persuasion it must be in a position to take action to force the present methods to result in some case where it which has been counterproductive.~~ Further, a major Viet Cong propaganda theme is that the GVN is a puppet of the US. Any additional control by the US will lend greater credence to this theme.

3. Conclusions.

a. ~~The leverage that the US has over the GVN must not undermine the respect and confidence of the people and the government.~~

b. ~~Precise measurements of expected performance, comparison to grant to demand corresponding consequences of threats and sanctions.~~

c. ~~Standards of GVN performance must be jointly planned and failures of achievement must be discussed.~~

d. ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ re.

D. Fourth Point of Memorandum.

1. Description. "A major problem arises concerning the role of the National Liberation Front as an organized factor in the political life of South Vietnam. In seeking an end to open hostilities, we should recognize that the risks of attempting to cope with the National Liberation Front primarily by political means on a long-term basis, although real, are less than the risks for the United States of persisting in an indefinitely prolonged attempt to destroy the National Liberation Front or to exclude it by American military force."

2. Analysis.

a. The basic contest in Vietnam is for dominant political influence over the population. It is a contest being waged between opposing political mechanisms of the Viet Cong and the GVN, each supported by military and paramilitary forces whose function is to protect and support their respective political structures.

b. ~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

c. In any discussion of the National Liberation Front one factor is paramount. The US is in Vietnam at the request of a sovereign state which is now established under a constitution and a duly elected government. The desires of the people, as expressed by their elected representatives, cannot be ignored in favor of what might appear to be an easy way out of the war for the US.

~~with a political basis and still permit achievement of~~
~~US objectives for SVN.~~ However, the non-communist political structure in the south is still too immature to deal with a hard core communist party, covertly supported by Hanoi, and which will resort to terrorist tactics to achieve its goals.

g. The real intentions of the communist coalition are:

(1) To destroy the rather promising beginnings of the independent, elected government in SVN.

(2) To create a new situation in which control of the towns and cities will initially remain in the feeble hands of the new "coalition government", while the all important control of the countryside reverts to the VC and their North Vietnamese supporters.

(3) Having control of the countryside, the towns and cities will become subject to communist pressure to complete the subjugation of all of SVN. It would then be an easy matter to reunify the north and south to achieve Hanoi's objectives at the expense of the free world.

3. Conclusions.

a. ~~The desires of the South Vietnamese people as expressed by their duly elected representatives are paramount. These representatives are united in the view that recognition of the NLF leading to a coalition government can never be accepted.~~

b. ~~The only coalition acceptable to the NLF would be a government formed and headed by the NLF.~~

c. The Bermuda Group's proposal would not be without merit if conditions were such that the NLF could be dealt with on a political basis and still permit achievement of US objectives. Those conditions are not now present.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:00 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith CIA's appreciation of
Khe Sanh.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET--CODEWORD~~



3.3 (b)(1)

SANITIZED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-180
By is, NARA, Date 12-30-03

INFORMATION

Friday, February 2, 1968
7:55 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Here is the McNamara-Wheeler
counter-attack on Nixon.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

Extract of transcript of remarks by Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler:

Q: Mr. Secretary, it is reported that one of the Presidential candidates says it is unthinkable to send the Pueblo out unarmed. Do you have any response to that?

A: Yes. I think it is unthinkable to send it out armed. It could not have accomplished its mission. It was operating in international waters. It was operating legally, operating in exactly the same way that similar ships have operated for this nation over a decade and a half. It was operating in exactly the same way that ships of other nations are operating for the same purposes. It would have been provocative to escort the vessel. It would have run the risk of a firefight and it would have been completely impossible for it to carry on its mission effectively. Let me ask General Wheeler -- he has studied this far more carefully than I -- to comment on that.

GENERAL WHEELER: In the first place, this was clearly an act of piracy on the high seas, highjacking, and one cannot foresee such an illegal act happening. We have supported the freedom of the seas for over 100 years. In fact, one of our first wars was fought on that very principle. To escort the vessel of that type would be provocative in terms of the requirements for forces to escort vessels such as this all over the world. The cost would be extremely high and as a matter of fact would require, in some cases, carrier task forces deployed thousands of miles from our shores in order to protect the vessel which should be able to proceed freely on the high seas in accordance with international law.

83

INFORMATION - POSSIBLE ACTION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Pres file

Friday, February 2, 1968 -- 7:15 p.m.

Mr. President:

You asked me about a visit with Dayan -- as did Harry.

I drafted the attached memorandum to Harry before I could get Abe Feinberg on the phone. Abe recognizes the pros and cons and is strongly negative concerning a formal visit to the White House -- even if off the record, because it could not stay off the record for very long.

But I believe he found a good device for seeing him informally and having an opportunity to impress on him what you wish. It would be wholly natural for the incoming Secretary of Defense (or Mr. Justice Abe Fortas) to have an informal reception or dinner for Defense Minister Dayan, at which the President might drop in and retire to the study for an appropriate period for bilateral conversation.

Abe thinks Eshkol could live with that, but not much more.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By CG, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By CL, NARA Date 11-3-97

Mr. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR HARRY McPHERSON

I would be inclined to let Dayan see the President--provided the President feels he can be pretty blunt in expressing our view that sitting on its present real estate won't bring long-term security to Israel. Dayan probably agrees and may be the one political figure in Israel capable of carrying this point. You're also right that he might give the President a better feel than either Eban or Eshkol have for the domestic Israeli political obstacles to a settlement. But I think the advantage of the meeting lies more in our stressing our points than vice versa.

It might save Eshkol's feelings a little if we could make his meeting with the President appear as impromptu as possible though that's probably marginal.

I would be a little less sure than Eppie of calling Dayan "the likely next Prime Minister." Eppie is far more expert than I, but I've been interested in the Israeli press' own recent analyses of Dayan which at least cast some doubt. However, Eppie seems to be right in tabbing Dayan as the Israeli most likely to put his finger on the gut issues and stand up bluntly for a sensible Israeli position.

On timing, the advantage to the President of seeing him at the beginning of his trip would be the opportunity to make some points before Dayan goes out on his speaking tour to American Jewish audiences. On the other hand, maybe you could keep him on his best behavior equally well just by letting him know he'll have to face the President at the end of his trip. The disadvantage of the President's seeing him early is that reporters at every stop will ask whether he plans to see the President, and the chance to keep their talk secret will diminish.

Finally, since we will shortly be involved in a serious effort to balance our books with Jordan, we would be in far better position with the Arabs if the President were to see the Jordanian Chief of Staff who is here talking arms. No one has proposed this to him yet, but if the President were concerned about this part of the problem, a partial solution is available.

W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, February 2, 1968-7 pm

Mr. President:

Pres file

Herewith a longer get well message to Ayub. It mentions both the wheat and the tanks you discussed with him at the Karachi airport.

On wheat we are moving ahead with the first 500,000 tons you discussed. We will go ahead with the second 500,000 tons as soon as the first agreement is signed.

On tanks the Paks have approached Belgium --with our blessing-- *to accept* the Belgian offer of reconditioned tanks at a reasonable price. In the meantime, however, the Belgian Foreign Office has caught wind of what their defense ministry is doing and is trying to get the Prime Minister to revoke the offer. If they succeed, the Italians are panting to step into the breach.

However this comes out, it looks as though Pakistan will get the tanks. But I think it would be unwise for you to get very far out on a limb in promising them.

W. W. Rostow

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Call Me-----

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 94-82

By *plp*, NARA, Date *4/29/96*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Confidential

Proposed Message to President Ayub

Dear Mr. President:

I was most distressed when Ben Oehlert informed me that you are ill. I know how frustrating it is to be cooped up in a sick bed when there is important work to be done. Lady Bird joins me in the fervent hope that your recovery will be swift and complete.

I have not forgotten our good talk at the Karachi airport. Ben will be following through with you soon on the wheat. We are also keeping a close eye on your negotiations for tanks in the hope that you will be able to arrange a transaction which will meet your needs.

Get well soon, old friend. The world needs you.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Confidential

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 94-82
By grip, NARA, Date 4/29/94

Friday, Feb. 2, 1968
6:45 p. m.

P file
85

Mr. President:

I hate to ask you to read a whole document; but this gives, better than anything I have seen, the flavor of this operation from the point of view of the enemy.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

85a

Feb. 2, 1968

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy of intelligence report TDCS 314-01890-68 (advance)

Subject: Viet Cong Prisoner's Account of Preparations for Attack on
Chau Doc City

Source: Vietnam, Can Tho (2 Feb. 68)

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

1. (Field comment. There are indications that source may be lying on some points which he made during the interrogation, especially concerning facts involving him personally. He claimed that when he was captured he was acting in the capacity of rear services support for Viet Cong troops. However, only about 200 Viet Cong actually are believed to have entered the city of Chau Doc as the multi-battalion Viet Cong attack was repulsed before they could enter the city. Also, he was captured behind a movie theater in Chau Doc City on 31 January, and it is felt that he may have been reconnoitering the city prior to the arrival of the Viet Cong battalions.

[REDACTED]

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] said that he first became aware of the Tet military operations of the Viet Cong about two weeks prior to the assault on Chau Doc City on the night of 30-31 January. At that time, [REDACTED] Chin Tanc, chief of security for Viet Cong An Giang province (Government of Vietnam Chau Doc and An Giang provinces and Ha Tien district of Kien Giang province) attended an indoctrination briefing in the Viet Cong redoubt on Nui Dai mountain. This briefing lasted for three days with 8-hour sessions each day. One of the principal indoctrinators was Bay Tha, a member of the provincial committee. Chin Tanc gave [REDACTED] a general account of these briefings shortly after his return. In general the briefings reviewed the entire Vietnamese situation, the world balance of forces, the balance of forces within Vietnam, and future plans of attack to create conditions which would bring the U. S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed to peace. The briefings also touched on the point that the attacks being carried out by the Viet Cong during Tet are a departure from previous operational practice of the Viet Cong.

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] said that the Viet Cong realized that they were committing everything and every person they had in this assault. It was obvious to all, he said, that

1.5(e)
3.4(b)(1)

SANITIZED

Authority NCJ019-028-2-3
By SP, NARA, Date 12-13-01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

the assault was a "go for broke" matter. He believes that few of the participants expected success, although most of them hoped that they would succeed. [redacted] a

[redacted] officer in Chau Doc province stated that if it had not been for the presence of the gunship "Spooky" and U. S. Navy PBR boats, the city would have indeed fallen.) There was no contingency plan for withdrawal or retreat because if even the possibility of defeat had been mentioned the morale of the troops would have been shattered and the operation would probably not have taken place. As it was, an unknown number of the troops fled with the first contact with defending forces.

4. [redacted] claims that he was assigned to the 512th and 510th battalions under the command of Major Nam Xuong. The objective of the operation was the liberation of Chau Doc. [redacted] learned of this objective only 24 hours before it was to begin, although he believes that the troops knew somewhat sooner. They were told that conditions were now right for a general uprising of the population, so that an aggressive and rapid assault would bring the people to the side of the Viet Cong and make untenable the positions of the Government of Viet Nam and American defenders. The uprising in fact did not take place during the attack, and [redacted] stated that it is likely that this lack of all-out popular commitment to the campaign is having a bad effect on the morale of the Viet Cong attackers. Source knew of no sandtabling of the operation nor any specific rehearsals. He said he was unfamiliar with the town of Chau Doc, and says he knew of no Viet Cong infiltrators or agents in the town before the actual attack took place.

5. [redacted] said Viet Cong main force units in Viet Cong An Giang province were designated the responsibility for "liberating" provincial capitals, whereas district forces and guerrillas were responsible for gaining control of their respective districts. The assault force which struck Chau Doc included ten party members who were to constitute the city front which was to organize a provisional government. [redacted] said he first heard the term "coalition government" about six months ago, but had never heard it brought into formal party proceedings until the briefings for the current operation.

##

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 2, 1968 -- 6:30 p.m.

Mr. President:

You should know:

1. I have a 9:30 a.m. meeting scheduled in the Situation Room to go over the military planning papers on which the Pentagon has been working today at your instruction. Paul Nitze, Bus Wheeler and Bill Bundy will be present, as well as Bob Glasburgh and myself.

2. At 11:00 a.m. there will be a meeting with Sec. Rusk to go over a series of diplomatic options, including those you instructed be staffed out.

3. Sec. Rusk has been notified to come to lunch. Whom else do you want?

Sec. McNamara_____

General Wheeler_____

Paul Nitze_____

Richard Helms_____

Clark Clifford_____

General Max Taylor_____

Other_____

4. Attached is a paper of Nick Katzenbach's on arbitration options, which he did yesterday and which crosses your instruction of today. I also attach a list of the 15 members of the World Court.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By reg, NARA, Date 1-30-92

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~SECRET~~

466
86a

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1968

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Impartial Settlement of Legal Issues
Involved in the PUEBLO Seizure

You asked for our thoughts on possible US proposals for impartial fact-finding or legal settlement of the PUEBLO case. Listed below are several proposals, which could either be advanced here or by Arthur Goldberg in New York.

Frankly, I doubt that the North Koreans would accept any of the proposals. Nor would the Soviets permit the Security Council to act affirmatively on them. But there might be some advantage to demonstrating confidence in our own case, while challenging the North Koreans to put up or shut up.

However, I think we should hold up on any proposals until we see the results of the talks now going on in Panmunjom.

If we do decide to go ahead with one of the proposals, we must make it clear that our willingness to proceed is dependent on the prior release of the crew and ship. To do otherwise would give the North Koreans an excuse for refusing to release either vessel or crew until the investigation or adjudication is completed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLJ 96-194

~~SECRET~~

By Ct, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~SECRET~~

-2-

Proposals


- A US statement that we would welcome an impartial fact-finding or adjudication of the legal issues raised by the PUEBLO seizure. We would state at the time of the announcement that we are prepared to accept and carry out the findings and recommendations made by an impartial tribunal. If the tribunal finds against us, we will make appropriate amends; if it finds in our favor, we expect North Korea to do the same.
- An arbitral tribunal. For example, we could propose a three-member tribunal consisting of one arbitrator named by the United States, one named by the North Koreans, and a third named by agreement. (If no agreement, the third member would be named by the President of the International Court of Justice.) The tribunal would be empowered to reach its decisions by majority vote. (A single arbitrator or a panel named by the UN Security Council are possible variations on this theme.)
- The Security Council itself undertakes an investigation under Article 34 of the United Nations Charter. This proposal, of course, would be subject to veto but--assuming no veto--the Council could establish an investigating body which would be veto-free.
- The Security Council asks the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. We would state our readiness to cooperate fully in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

the proceedings and to carry out the findings of the Court. We would insist that North Korea indicate that they would be prepared to do the same. (This would be preferable to proposing that the case go to the ICJ for adjudication, since an advisory opinion avoids the issue of North Korean recognition.)



Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

~~SECRET~~

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURT

The organization of the International Court of Justice is governed by Articles 2 to 33 of the Statute of the Court and by Articles 1 to 13 and 24 of the Rules of Court.

I. Members of the Court

1. Composition of the Court

The Court consists of 15 members (Statute, Art. 3, para.1). On 31 July 1967 the composition of the Court was as follows:

<u>Order of precedence</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Date of expiry of term of office</u>
President J.L. Bustamante y Rivero	Peru	5 February 1970 ¹
Vice President V.M. Koretsky	U.S.S.R.	5 February 1970 ¹
Judges Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice	United Kingdom	5 February 1973
K. Tanaka	Japan	5 February 1970
Ph. C. Jessup	United States	5 February 1970
G. Morelli	Italy	5 February 1970
Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan	Pakistan	5 February 1973
L. Padilla Nervo	Mexico	5 February 1973
I. Forster	Senegal	5 February 1973
A. Gros	France	5 February 1973
F. Ammoun	Lebanon	5 February 1976
C. Bengzon	Philippines	5 February 1976
S. Petren	Sweden	5 February 1976
M. Lachs	Poland	5 February 1976
C. D. Onyeama	Nigeria	5 February 1976

The members of the Court are elected for nine years, one-third of the total number of judges being elected every three years; they may be re-elected (Statute, Art. 13). In the event of a vacancy, a supplementary election is held and the new judge holds office for the remainder of his predecessor's term (Statute, Arts. 14-15).

As required by Article 7 of the Statute, the Secretary-General of the United Nations prepares for each election, a list of the persons nominated.

¹ The terms of office of Judges Bustamante y Rivero and Koretsky as President and Vice-President respectively expire on the same date as their terms of office as judges.

Friday, February 2, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

Former Chancellor Erhard will be visiting several Latin American countries February 22-March 16 and plans to return to Germany via the U.S.

He told our Embassy in Bonn he would very much like to see you and would be available for a Washington visit March 17-19.

Should we set up an appointment?

W. W. Rostow

Yes _____

No _____

Call me _____

MWG:em



1727

IN REPLY REFER TO:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1968

44 /
870
2-1st.
Cy Moore

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Washington Visit of Former
Chancellor Ludwig Erhard

FRG former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard will be in the United States privately (New York and Indianapolis) February 16-21, in various Latin American countries February 22-March 16, and available for a Washington visit March 17-19. He has told our Embassy in Bonn that he would very much like to see his old friend the President at that time.

The President gave Erhard a luncheon during a similar trip last year. The Department would appreciate your advice on how to reply to Erhard.

for Alan Parker
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

On the day
of the trip
Erhard will
be in the city
for you will be to say well

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88

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 2, '1968

Pres file


Dear General Suharto:

I have been following closely Ambassador Green's reports of his conversations with you and your principal advisers on your current difficult economic problems. At the November meeting in Amsterdam we announced our intention to assist Indonesia during the current year, and I am happy to inform you that Ambassador Green has been authorized to negotiate with your government agreements to provide \$25 million in a development loan and \$35 million in commodities under PL-480, Title I. These commodities will include 50,000 metric tons of rice, 62,000 bales of cotton, 100,000 metric tons of bulgur wheat, 27,000 metric tons of wheat and wheat flour, and 1,000 metric tons of tobacco.

I understand the special urgency for early arrival of the rice and bulgur wheat, and you can be sure we will cooperate closely with the Indonesian Embassy here in Washington to assure the fastest possible delivery.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



His Excellency
General Suharto
Acting President of the
Republic of Indonesia
Djakarta

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By JON : M.A. Date 5/1/96

P.S. I would like to underline to you what I said to Foreign Minister Malik in Melbourne: Our experience is that, through government leadership, eating habits can be shifted to wheat. It is in wheat that I can most easily help Indonesia in the months ahead. Rice is more difficult. I would be grateful if you would tell me personally what you have been able to do in this direction and what could be done.

88a

ACTION

1. ensp
2. Pres file

Friday
February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: AID package for Indonesia

All agree with your suggestion that Suharto be informed of our \$60 million AID package by a personal letter from you. A suggested draft is attached.

I recommend that you sign the letter.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWright:wpt

February 2, 1968

Dear General Suharto:

I have been following closely Ambassador Green's reports of his conversations with you and your principal advisers on your current difficult economic problems. At the November meeting in Amsterdam we announced our intention to assist Indonesia during the current year, and I am happy to inform you that Ambassador Green has been authorized to negotiate with your government agreements to provide \$25 million in a development loan and \$35 million in commodities under PL-480, Title I. These commodities will include 50,000 metric tons of rice, 62,000 bales of cotton, 100,000 metric tons of bulgur wheat, 27,000 metric tons of wheat and wheat flour, and 1,000 metric tons of tobacco.

I understand the special urgency for early arrival of the rice and bulgur wheat, and you can be sure we will cooperate closely with the Indonesian Embassy here in Washington to assure the fastest possible delivery.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
General Suharto
Acting President of the
Republic of Indonesia
Djakarta

STATE:LBJ:MWright :wpt

S/S 458
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1-W right
2-But

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to Indonesian Acting
President Suharto

In response to the President's suggestion that he send a personal message to Indonesian Acting President Suharto in connection with the initial 1968 aid package which the President approved earlier today, a proposed message is enclosed.

The President's request was relayed to the Department of State this afternoon by Mr. Marshall Wright.

Ambassador Green in Djakarta is currently awaiting word that he can inform President Suharto of the aid package. When the President's letter is signed, it is proposed to cable the text to Ambassador Green for presentation to Suharto as the announcement of our program. This would be done as early as Friday evening Washington time if the President's message is available.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Suggested Message.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 83-46

By plw, NARA, Date 4/29/96

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals;
not automatically declassified

EA/IND:RGRich,Jr:111 2/1/68
Ext. 6697

Clearances:
EA/IND - Mr. Underhill
AA/EA (AID) - Mr. Ives
EA -
S/S -

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Suggested Message

His Excellency
General Suharto
Acting President of the
Republic of Indonesia
Djakarta

Dear General Suharto:

← I have been following closely Ambassador Green's reports of his conversations with you and your principal advisers on your current difficult economic problems. At the December meeting in Amsterdam we announced our intention to assist Indonesia during the current year, and I am happy to inform you that Ambassador Green has been authorized to negotiate with your government agreements to provide \$25 million in a development loan and \$35 million in commodities under PL-480, Title I. These commodities will include 50,000 metric tons of rice, 62,000 bales of cotton, 100,000 metric tons of bulgur wheat, 27,000 metric tons of wheat and wheat flour, and 1,000 metric tons of tobacco.

← I understand the special urgency for early arrival of the rice and bulgur wheat, and you can be sure we will cooperate closely with the Indonesian Embassy here in Washington to assure the fastest possible delivery.

With warm regards,

Sincerely yours,

Lyndon B. Johnson

BA/IND:FTUnderhill:111 2/1/68, Ext. 3628

RECEIVED
ROSTOW'S OFFICE

1968 FEB 1 PM 6 51

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday - February 2, 1968

Pres file

Mr. President:

You asked why we did not send a special representative to the funeral of President Gestido. The reason is that he was buried so soon after his death that there was insufficient time. He died on the morning of December 6 and was buried the following morning.

The Uruguayan Government did not ask for special representatives, recognizing that the quick burial would not give governments adequate time to make arrangements. Only the three contiguous countries -- Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil -- were represented by more than their ambassador.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-31-92

February 2, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Over the past few days I have mentioned to you references we have seen in captured documents to the general uprising. The following are some of these references which we have extracted from captured documents.

1. Three conditions for a general uprising:
 1. Create a crisis for the enemy.
 2. Win non-aligned civilians over to our side.
 3. Our Party will stand ready to deal with any problems.

(Military Region 5 Resolution dated July 1967.)

2. The Central (Executive Committee) of the Lao Dong Party came to the conclusion that the time is ripe to directly stage the revolution.

The opportunity for the General offensive and the General uprising has presented itself.

The Central (Executive Committee) of the Lao Dong Party and Uncle Ho (Ho Chi Minh) order the South Viet Nam Party Headquarters, the entire army and the entire people of South Viet Nam to carry out the General offensive and the General uprising in order to gain a decisive victory for the revolution during the 1968 Winter-Spring phase.

Strong, violent attacks must be launched (bullet hole) with the people rising up like a surging wave that carried away everything in its wake. Then, we will establish our administrative control, and (bullet hole -- possibly harass) the entire communication line network. Our troops will get ready for movement to the lowlands in order to march forward towards liberating the cities. We must use each regiment division to take over (the liberated areas) on a continuous basis.

(Political cadre notes from November 12, 1967, meeting on the execution of the order of Uncle Ho and the Party.)

3. ...the US "imperialists" will not easily abandon SVN because of their reactionary nature. They will try to increase their personnel strength and launch fiercer attacks.... To cope with such a prospect, the... Party, the Armed Forces, and the populace contribute their utmost effort to the coming "General Offensive and Uprisings" of Region (5) whose two main goals are:

1. To defeat the "enemy" in the military sphere.
2. To take over power through uprisings in rural areas, cities, and towns.

(September 1967 meeting of Military Region 5 Party Committee.)

4. The general mission for both North Vietnam and the Viet Cong is to destroy a part of the U. S. troops and an important part of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in order to create favorable conditions for offensive and a general uprising in a relatively short period of time.

(COSVN Resolution 13 dated Spring 1967.)

5. ...in compliance with the 12th Resolution passed by the Central Headquarters...our course of action is a general offensive and general uprising. Our strategy involves the simultaneous conduct of war and negotiations. Even in the event of peace negotiations, our efforts must be directed toward creating military and political conditions which favor our subsequent general offensive and uprising.

(Political reorientation conference, June 1967.)

6. A directive, dated 2 September 1967...of Military Region 2... Winter-Spring Campaign. The primary objective of the general attack is to create a favorable situation for a general uprising which will lead to the seizure of governing power in South Vietnam. The document asserts that the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign is a decisive phase for final victory.

(September 2, 1967, Directive of Military Region 2.)

7. The Allied failures and our progress and victories present a new strategic advantage which allows the revolution to enter a strategic offensive stage in which decisive victories will be gained. For this reason, the immediate objective consists of stepping up military and political offensive in all the battlefronts, to create favorable conditions for a turning point and move towards the general counter offensive and general uprising which will lead to the gaining of the entire governing power by the people.

(October 21, 1967, Viet Cong Current Affairs Committee report for the Delta Region.)

8. After re-education, stay in the weak area and motivate the people to conduct a three front attack (military, political, troop proselyting). Exercise close coordination to lower the enemy's prestige and step up the general offensive and general uprising.

(November 5, 1967, directive of the Farmer's Association in Military Region 1)

9. ...the primary missions during coming months were to... create a favorable situation for the general uprising which will lead to the foundation of a coalition government, the withdrawal of US forces and unified Vietnam under a communist regime.

(Political indoctrination session, November 8, 1967.)

10. ...on November 5, 1967, Minh returned from "K" after spending a month there. He confirmed that the situation got better; there would be a "General Uprising and General Offensive" during the 1967-1968 Winter-Spring Campaign. "Blitzkrieg" offensive with modern weapons would soon solve the war in such a manner that "we (Viet Cong) gain but are not victorious and the US forces lose but are not defeated."

(Diary of a Viet Cong teacher; entries of November 1967.)

11. Speaking of friendly (VC/NVA) situation, the document states that the time is ripe for implementation of a general uprising to take over powers in South Vietnam. The masses are ready for action.

(Political cadre meeting, Quang Tri/Thua Thien, Fall 1967.)

12. The Viet Cong continue to score brilliant military victories and are in a very favorable position to implement the general counter offensive and general uprising to restore real democracy and neutrality for South Vietnam after the establishment of a coalition government.... Civilians should be informed... the (VC) revolution will succeed by the middle of 1968, and (VC/NVA) cadre will be able to rejoin their families approximately 5 August 1968. The strategy is to motivate the people to revolt against Republic of Vietnam authorities so as to seize power.

(Notes from study sessions on the Party Resolution, October - December 1967.)

13. ...the general uprising and the formation of a coalition government by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam is only a matter of time. The NFLSVN has adequate funds for the support of its army and cadre and military activities for the entire year of 1968, but needs

money to cover extraordinary expenses dictated by the implementation of the "uprising" order, such as accommodations for US and puppet (RVNAF) prisoners and personnel who surrender to the Liberation Army.

(December 26, 1967, meeting in Vinh Duong province to study the political platform of the National Liberation Front.)

14. ...the policy of COSVN. "The people should be motivated to revolt. They should feel that the time for Revolution is imminent and that it will be 'now or never.' In the process of this general uprising, there may be a coalition government. The U.S. troops must withdraw."
(Political cadre meetings in September 1967.)

I have been using this material in my conversations with the press over the past months.

W. W. Rostow

AMcC; jjs

Thursday - February 1, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ray Telles and other US members of the Border Development Commission -- Friday, February 2, 12:00 noon.

Purpose

The purpose of this meeting (originally scheduled in December) is to review with Ray Telles and his fellow commissioners the progress they have made in developing a joint program for development of border communities. The list of those attending is at Tab A.

Background

The US Section had a useful meeting with their Mexican counterparts last December. They examined areas for joint action and named study groups to develop specific projects. The Commission will meet again in mid-March to review the results and hopefully reach agreement on programs to be carried out. The fields cover national parks, urban development, public health, education, community services, transportation, tourism, sports, economic development, emergency planning and beautification.

Ray Telles' memorandum (Tab B) gives a resume of the projects which he and his colleagues have developed. They add up to a meaningful package if they can enlist full Mexican cooperation and get them underway. Joint projects are only at the planning stages.

Format

Ray is coming prepared to brief you on some of the more interesting projects. He would like to lead off with a short introduction and then ask three or four of his colleagues to describe what they are doing in their respective fields. I recommend that you follow this format. It would be helpful for you to ask those on whom Ray does not call for comments in order to make them feel a part of the enterprise.

Recommendation

In addition to informing yourself on the work of the Commission, the meeting affords the opportunity for you to make two points which, I gather, are not understood by all of Ray's colleagues. These are:

- your high personal interest in the success of this joint effort with Mexico.
- your expectation that each participating agency will give its full cooperation in developing and carrying out projects on our side of the border and jointly with Mexico when this is called for.

I recommend that you emphasize both points.

A cautionary note

I understand that Stanley Rittenberg of Labor may raise the question of Mexican commuters. Labor is taking a hard-nosed position in trying to force Mexican commuters to establish permanent residence in the US or give up their green cards. Ted Kennedy is also in this game. He introduced a bill last session requiring resident aliens living in a foreign contiguous country, but working in the US, to meet the labor certification requirement (i.e., that their employment will not adversely affect wages and working conditions of workers in the US simultaneously employed.) Behind Labor and Kennedy is strong pressure from the AFL/CIO.

Since the commuter issue is outside the terms of reference of the Commission, it is not a proper subject for this meeting. Furthermore, the commuter problem is not that large. A recent census by INS shows that there are 40,176 Mexican commuters -- and not the 60-100,000 that has been claimed. If we were to cut off these commuters, we would have serious problems in our relations with Mexico which would adversely affect the climate for cooperation in border development. I also suspect that faced with exclusion, most of the commuters would come to live on the US side which would place that many more low income workers in our part of the border cities and not give the relief that AFL/CIO expects.

W. W. Rostow

Attachments - Tabs A and B.



U.S.- MEXICO BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

1800 G STREET. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20525

9/a

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SECTION

January 31, 1968

The following persons have replied affirmatively to invitation to meet with the President at 12 noon, Friday, February 2, 1968:

Ambassador Raymond Telles
Chairman, U. S. Section

Mr. Melbourne L. Spector
Executive Director, U. S. Section

Honorable John A. Baker
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
and Special Programs
Department of Agriculture

Honorable William H. Crook
Director of VISTA, Assistant Director OEO
Office of Economic Opportunity

Honorable Price Daniel
Director
Office of Emergency Planning

Honorable Ross Davis
Assistant Secretary for Economic Development
Department of Commerce

Honorable Don Hummel
Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance
Department of Housing and Urban Development

Honorable Covey T. Oliver
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Department of State

Honorable Endicott Peabody
Assistant Director
Office of Emergency Planning

/...

Honorable Stanley H. Ruttenberg
Assistant Secretary and Manpower Administrator
Department of Labor

Honorable Harry Shooshan
Deputy Under Secretary for Programs
Department of Interior

Honorable Joseph Coleman
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Education
Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Honorable Vicente Ximenez
Chairman, President's Committee
on Mexican-American Affairs

Honorable Alfred G. Vigderman
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
Department of Transportation



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
U.S. SECTION

U.S.- MEXICO BORDER DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

1800 G STREET. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20525

February 2, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Program for 1968

Following plans outlined for you in my memorandum of November 30, the U.S.-Mexico Working Groups met in Ciudad Juarez December 5-7. Especially significant was the establishment of amiable and constructive working relationships between Mexican and American officials and their joint agreements on specific goals and priorities. These working groups are required to finish their initial studies no later than March 18, 1968 at which time the group chairmen will meet with a joint steering group in San Diego for review and further instructions. Actual beginning of pilot-project implementation is encouraged before that date.

All of the projects are important and on-target for the border area. However, I should like to call your attention to five areas which you should find particularly interesting and illustrative of what we are trying to accomplish. Each of the areas is described separately in the attached booklet.

Parallel National Parks (See Tab A)

Harry Shooshan

Through the device of the Commission, we appear to be making real progress for the first time with the focus on Big Bend, Amistad Dam, the Chamizal, and the volcanic area in Sonora, opposite Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona. Especially interesting will be a network of historic and scenic sites connected by roads criss-crossing the border.

Economic Development and Employment Opportunities (See Tabs C and D)

Ross Davis and Stanley Ruttenburg

One of our most important considerations will be accelerated economic development with the primary purpose of creating more and improved job opportunities. Studies are being launched on industrialization and tourism, and formulation of a general economic development approach

is in process. Manpower development and skills training will be expanded with consideration being actively given to joint centers, with Laredo/Nuevo Laredo as the possible pilot location. The Mexican Section has agreed that we will formulate a development strategy to guide the activities to be undertaken in the border area.

Cultural Development Centers (See Tab E)

Bill Crook

Considering "culture" in its broadest sense, both countries intend to work together in bringing their disadvantaged citizens into the mainstream of community life. Included in our planning are mobile service centers designed to reach out to the poor on both sides of the border. Both kinds of centers are expected to use the "total family approach"; planned activities aimed at elevating the living standards of both our peoples include bilingual libraries, and maternal and childfeeding programs.

Emergency Planning and Disaster Relief Coordination (See Tab F)

Governor Price Daniels


Mexico has been very responsive to our proposals for joint emergency planning and disaster relief coordination. It is expected that an exchange of notes will take place early this spring providing for mutual aid in the event of natural or other disasters along the border.

Urban Development (See Tab G)

Don Hummel

Some real progress is being made in twin border cities to develop interest and understanding in mutual urban metropolitan affairs. A workshop will be held on February 27-28 at Laredo to examine the problems of the twin cities of Laredo and Nuevo Laredo in order to develop unilateral and bilateral solutions. Also, the results of this meeting will form the basis for an urban conference of all the sister cities on the border later in the year. Short range problem solutions are currently being developed with programs for beautification, open space, Model Cities and housing. Long range solutions to urban renewal, transportation, public facilities, environmental health, unemployment and educational facilities problems are being studied concurrently.

The joint projects presented in the attached booklet, together with the U.S. unilateral projects sent to you with my memorandum of November 30, 1967, constitute our presently projected program for calendar year 1968.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Raymond Telles".

Raymond Telles
Ambassador

Attachments:

Joint 1968 Program

pres

92

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/BUTTERCUP

Friday, Feb. 2, 1968
10:00 a. m.

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

MR. PRESIDENT:

This NLF exhortation is interesting because it fits exactly the track put to us in the political portion of BUTTERCUP/1's long message and reveals the political purpose of the "general uprising." It is wholly consistent with the theme of the captured documents we have in abundance.

The purpose of the uprising is:

- to overthrow the government;
- replace it with a broad-based apparently non-Communist coalition, quietly sponsored by and dominated by the NLF (the Alliance of National and Peace Forces);
- negotiate a settlement with that government -- presumably with our acquiescence.

You may remember that BUTTERCUP/1 offered a negotiation between the NLF and non-Communists, but under no circumstances, talks with Thieu-Ky.

Thus far, the effort has failed because the uprising has shocked and frightened the urban folk -- who were somewhat complacent about their security -- but it did not generate support.

The real job is to galvanize the government and unite the people.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

S. VIETNAM REVOLUTIO APPEAL

LIBERATION RADIO (CLANDESTINE) IN VIETNAMESE 0700 GMT 2 FEB 68 B

92a

(APPEAL OF THZ NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND PEACE FORCES)

(TEXT) COMPATRIOTS: THE REVOLUTION WE WAITED AND YEARNED FOR HAS BROKEN OUT. THE HEROIC SAIGON PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES ARE LAUNCHING ATTACKS AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE A PALACE AND OTHZR MAIN OFFICES AND ORGANIZATIONS OF THE THIEU-KY PUPPET REGIME. WE HAVE BEEN LEADING AN IGNOMINIOUS AND SHAMEFUL LIFE FOR YEARS BECAUSE A GROUP OF VIETNAMESE TRAITORS HAS BEEN EXPLOITING AND OPPRESSING US. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US TO CONTINUE SUCH A MISERABLE LIFE. WE MUST RISE UP TO WREST BACK POWER AND RESTORE INDEPENDENCE, PEACE, FREEDOM, AND A CLEAN AND COMFORTABLE LIFE.

THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND PEACE FORCES HAS SET FORTH THE FOLLOWING GOALS:

1--TO OVERTHROW THE THIEU-KY PUPPET REGIME AND SET UP AN ADMINISTRATIVE POWER THAT REALLY REPRESENTS THE VARIOUS STRATA OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE.

2--TO RECOVER NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, DEMANDING THAT THE UNITED STATES PUT AN END TO THE VIETNAM WAR AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND THOSE OF ITS SATELLITES FROM SOUTH VIETNAM.

3--TO RESTORE PEACE AND BUILD AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL, AND NEUTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM.

4--TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE NFLSV IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE TOGETHRZ THE ABOVE-MENTIONZD GOALS.

COMPATRIOTS, THE HOUR TO WASH AWAY OUR NATIONAL DISHONOR AND TO LIBERATE OURSELVES HAS COME. EVERYBODY MUST STAND UP AND LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST THE HIDEOUTS OF THE THIEU-KY CLIQUE AND TOPPLE THE TRAITOROUS AND COUNTRY-SELLING GOVERNMENT IN VARIOUS AREAS. WE MUST SET UP AT ONCE A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, BUILD VARIOUS REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES AND VARIOUS PATRIOTIC ORGANIZATIONS, PUNISH AND ARREST ALL THE CRUEL LACKEYS OF THE THIEU-KY CLIQUE AND FOREIGN NATIONS, AND HELP THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES FULFILL THEIR DUTIES.

WE EXHORT THE OFFICERS, SOLDIERS AND THE POLICE FORCES OF THE SAIGON REGIME TO SIDE WITH THE RANKS OF THE PEOPLE AND TO GIVE THEIR ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES.

WE EXHORT ALL THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN GOING ASTRAY TO QUICKLY WAKE UP. THOSE WHO RECOGNIZE THEIR FAULTS AND ARE WILLING TO ACCOMPLISH AN EXPLOIT WILL BE FORGIVEN BY THE REVOLUTION. THOSE WHO WILLINGLY RESIST THE REVOLUTION WILL BE DULY PUNISHED.

WE EXHORT THE AMERICAN TROOPS AND THEIR ALLIED TROOPS TO PUT AN END TO THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND NOT TO INTERFERE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. WE EXHORT THZ AMERICAN PEOPLE, IN THZ SAKE OF JUSTICE AND HUMANITARIANISM, TO SIDE WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAM REVOLUTION. WE EXHORT THE FRIENDLY NATIONS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PERSONALITIES TO SYMPATHIZE WITH THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND TO SUPPORT POSITIVELY OUR JUST STAND.

COMPATRIOTS, WE WANT TO BE DELIVERED FROM SLAVERY AND FROM THE DICTATORIAL AND RUTHLESS REGIME. WE DO NOT WANT UNEMPLOYMENT AND BANKRUPTCY. WE DO NOT WANT OUR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS TO BE THWARTED. WE ARE DETERMINED TO ACHIEVE OUR JUST GOALS AT ANY COST.

NO MATTER WHO THZ ENEMY OF THE REVOLUTION IS OR THE MEANS HE USES TO OPPRESS US AND TO DESTROY THE CURRENT REVOLUTION, WE WILL NOT BE SHWKEN AND WILL NOT RETREAT. WE PREFER TO DIE THAN TO RETURN TO THE SLAVE REGIME.

LET US GO FORWARD TOGETHER! THE REVOLUTION WILL CERTAINLY BE CROWNED WITH SUCCESS! LONG LIVE AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC, PEACEFUL, AND NEUTRAL SOUTH VIETNAM!

30 JANUARY 1968

THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND PEACE FORCES.

2 FEB 1332Z AL/BK

93

ACTION

Friday, February 2, 1968
9:00 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Ayub is reported down -- possibly
with pneumonia.

A get-well message might be in
order. A possible draft is attached.

W. W. Rostow

Approved _____
Disapproved _____
Call me _____

WWRostow:rla

Message From President Johnson to President Ayub

Dear President Ayub:

Mrs. Johnson and I are distressed to hear that you are ill. We look to your early recovery.

From our good hour's talk at Karachi airport, I know how many constructive projects you have in hand and how deeply you personally are concerned with them.

So get well soon, old friend.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

WWRostow:rla

INFORMATION

94

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:55 a.m.

Mr. President:

This Viet Cong psywar trick
reveals something of their mind.

Amb. Bunker responds herewith
promptly and well.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 17402

WWRostow:rla

RECEIVED
WHCA

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WHCA

1968 FEB 2 08 24

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HCE280

PAGE 01 SAIGON 17402 020805Z

7

ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00,DODE 00,NSAE 00,NSCE 00,SSO 00,USIE 00,CCO 00,GPM 03,
H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SC 01,SP 02,SS 20,SAH 03,
SAL 01,IO 13,NIC 01,MM 01,RSR 01,AID 28,/116 W

O R 020535Z FEB 68 ZFF-1
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5444
INFO CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3419
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5642
AMCONSUL DNNANG 1647

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAIGON 17402

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1. ASSISTANT TO PRIME MIN DOAN BA CANG CALLED POLITICAL
COUNSELOR MORNING FEB 2 TO REPORT THAT VIET CONG RADIO IS
BROADCASTING STATEMENT TO EFFECT US FORCES ASSISTING
VIET CONG TAKE OVER CITY. ACCORDING CANG, BROADCAST SAYS US
IS WORKING WITH VIET CONG TO SET UP COALITION GOVERNMENT.
CANG RELAYED REQUEST FROM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT AMBASSADOR

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17402 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
MAKE A STATEMENT DENYING THIS VIET CONG CLAIM.

2. STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DENYING FALSE VIET CONG REPORT
WAS PASSED TO CANG AT 1130 HOURS AND WE UNDERSTAND SUB-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~PAGE 02 SAIGON 17402 020005Z~~

STANCE REPEAT SUBSTANCE WILL BE BROADCAST OVER VIETNAMESE RADIO AS SOON AS TRANSLATION PREPARED. IN MEANTIME, WE ARE BROADCASTING AMBASSADOR'S RECORDED TEXT IN ENGLISH OVER OUR ARMED FORCES RADIO.

3. TEXT OF AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS: QUOTE I HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT THE VIET CONG RADIO HAS BEEN TRYING TO TRICK THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM BY BROADCASTING CLAIMS THAT THE US ARMED FORCES ARE COOPERATING WITH THE VIET CONG FORCES TO INVEST THE CAPITAL OF SAIGON AND TO SET UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM. NOTHING COULD BE FARTHER FROM THE TRUTH THAN THIS RIDICULOUS CLAIM. THE US IS GIVING ITS FULL AND COMPLETE SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17402 C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
VIET CONG BROADCAST IS A DESPERATE AND SHAMEFUL EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR VIET CONG FAILURE TO DESTROY LAW AND ORDER IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM DURING THE LAST FEW DAYS.

I HAVE BEEN IN CONTINUING TOUCH WITH PRESIDENT THIEU DURING THESE DAYS AND GEN WESTMORELAND HAS BEEN COOPERATING CLOSELY WITH THE CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM. THE SITUATION IN THE SAIGON AREA, AS WELL AS IN OTHER POPULATION CENTERS, IS RAPIDLY BEING RESTORED. MEANWHILE, THE VIET CONG ARE SUFFERING UNPARALLELED LOSSES.

I REPEAT THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE ITS FULL AND COMPLETE SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, IN ORDER TO ASSURE CONTINUING FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE FOR THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND VIET CONG AGGRESSORS. THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, SUPPORTED BY ITS ALLIES, WILL CONTINUE TO DEFEAT THE ENEMY. THE VC WILL DOUBTLESS CONTINUE TO PUT OUT FALSE RUMORS. I ASK YOU NOT TO BELIEVE THEM.
END QUOTE
BUNKER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED

OFFICIAL USE

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:50 a. m.

Mr. President:

You may wish to read a full account of Adm. Smith's meeting yesterday with the North Korean.

The latter was obviously instructed to stonewall until U.S. position was revealed (pp. 2-3).

This looks like a slow track at the moment.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 3878

Seoul 3892

Seoul 3891

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By DLG, NARA, Date 6/25/96

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

ACTION COPY

CONTROL : 0422Q

RECD : Feb. 2, 1968

4:01 A.M.

***** ZZ RUEHC
DE RUALOS 3878E 0330858
ZNY SSSSS
Z 020741Z FEB 68 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8749
STATE GRNC
BT

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3878

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By C6, NARA Date 8-6-97

NODIS/CACTUS

1. FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF MAC SENIOR MEMBERS MEETING HELD AT PANMUNJOM BETWEEN 1100 - 1158 HRS LOCAL FEBRUARY 2. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS SEPTSL.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. RADM SMITH OPENED WITH BRIEF PREPARED STATEMENT. SAID HE HAD CALLED MEETING TO DISCUSS SERIOUS SITUATION RESULTING FROM FACT DPRK HAS POSSESSION PUEBLO AND CREW. SAID US POSITION IS THAT SHIP DID NOT ENTER NK TERRITORIAL WATERS UNTIL AFTER IT WAS SEIZED AND THAT CREW COMMITTED NO CRIME WHATEVER. RECOGNIZED THAT US AND NK POSITIONS DIFFER. SAID THIS SITUATION COMPLETELY

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3878E ~~SECRET~~
WITHOUT PRECEDENT. STRESSED INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES WOULD BE SERVED BY IMMEDIATE RETURN OF CREW AND EARLY RETURN OF SHIP TO US CUSTODY. EXPRESSED HOPE THAT MEETING WOULD RESULT IN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON RETURN OF SHIP AND CREW AS SOON AS PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO REPEATED DEMANDS FROM PAK THAT SMITH SAY ALL HE HAD TO SAY, SMITH MADE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL POINTS:

(A) TIME WOULD BE SAVED IF NEITHER SIDE MENTIONED CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, PUNISHMENTS OR APOLOGIES.

(B) REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE HAD COME TO REQUEST RETURN OF SHIP AND CREW, NAMES OF WOUNDED AND DEAD.

(C) EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH WHY PUEBLO CASE IS UNPRECEDENTED AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IN AND HELICOPTER INCIDENT, IN ACCORDANCE GUIDANCE RECEIVED, POINTING OUT THAT SHIP HAD VIOLATED NO LAWS, THAT IT WAS NOT UNDER UNC COMMAND BUT WAS UNIT OF US PACIFIC FLEET, AND THAT THERE NO VIOLATION TO ADMIT, AS WAS CASE WITH HELICOPTER.

(D) SET FORTH INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 SEOUL 3878 Feb. 2, 1968 NODIS

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3878E ~~SECRET~~

ACCORDANCE GUIDANCE CONTAINED STATE 108367, EMPHASIZING THAT EVEN IF PUEBLO HAD BEEN IN NK WATERS, PROPER PROCEDURE WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ESCORT IT BACK TO INTERNATIONAL WATERS AS IS PRACTICE FOLLOWED BETWEEN US AND USSR.

4. AS IT BECAME OBVIOUS PAK WOULD NOT RESPOND UNTIL HE HAD EXHAUSTED EFFORTS TO DRAW SMITH OUT, LATTER BEGAN INSISTING THAT PAK MAKE STATEMENT TO WHICH HE WOULD RESERVE RIGHT TO REPLY. PAK RESPONDED THAT PUEBLO CREW ARE AGGRESSORS AND CRIMINALS DISPATCHED TO NK TERRITORIAL WATERS FOR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSE AS MADE CLEAR BY THEIR CONFESSION. STATED THAT THANKS TO HUMANITARIAN MEASURES OF DPRK, WOUNDED ARE RECEIVING MEDICAL TREATMENT, DEAD BODY OF ONE CREW MEMBER HAS BEEN PRESERVED, AND ALL REMAINING MEMBERS ARE IN GOOD HEALTH WITHOUT ANY INCONVENIENCE. SAID IT UNNECESSARY TO COVER UP OR EXPLAIN AWAY CRIMINAL ACT. SMITH DENIED COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL ACT, NOTING THAT SHIP HAD NOT FIRED BACK, HAD OFFERED NO RESISTANCE, HAD VIOLATED NO LAW. SAID "CRIMINAL ACT" COULD ONLY BE DESCRIPTIVE OF NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS.

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3878E ~~SECRET~~

5. AFTER FURTHER EXCHANGE SMITH ASKED PAK TO SUPPOSE THAT KPA VEHICLE IN JSA OR OTHER NEUTRAL AREA WERE SUDDENLY SEIZED BY UNC, TAKEN SOUTH, AND ITS CREW WERE MADE TO CONFESS THAT TRUCK WAS SOUTH OF DMZ. SAID HE SUPPOSED IN SUCH CASE NORTH KOREANS WOULD WISH TO HAVE TRUCK BACK. SUCH SITUATION WAS ANALOGOUS WAY WE FEEL ABOUT PUEBLO.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 SEOUL 3878 Feb. 2, 1968 NODIS

6. PAK, AFTER OBVIOUS PAUSE FOR EDITING, THEN READ PREPARED STATEMENT IN WHICH HE SAID SMITH HAD MERELY ATTEMPTED COVER UP PLAIN FACT OF AGGRESSION AND THAT US HAD DELIBERATELY DISPATCHED ARMED SPY SHIP TO NK TERRITORIAL WATERS, WHICH CONSTITUTES MOST FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. CLAIMED NORTH KOREANS HAVE IN THEIR HANDS ALL THE MATERIAL AND HUMAN EVIDENCE TO PROVE US COMMITTED ACT OF AGGRESSION. SAID MATTER CAN IN NO WAY BE SOLVED BY US PROPOSAL TO MEET SOLELY FOR PURPOSE OF REJUSTIFYING CRIMINAL ACT. SAID IF US REALLY WANTS TO SOLVE MATTER IT MUST CHANGE STAND AND ATTITUDE IN ADDRESSING SUBJECT.

RUALOS 3878E ~~SECRET~~

7. PAK CONTINUED THAT "I HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSTRUCTED" TO INFORM US SIDE OF NAMES OF DEAD AND WOUNDED. HE THEN CONCLUDED PREPARED STATEMENT BY PROPOSING RECESS THIS MEETING AND SAYING SMITH "WILL BE INFORMED" OF DATE FOR NEXT MEETING.

8. SMITH REJOINED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE MUCH MORE PROOF THAN HE ALREADY GIVEN THAT SHIP WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IF SUCH WOULD BE USEFUL AT THIS TIME. PAK REJECTED THIS OFFER AND REPEATED SMITH WOULD BE INFORMED LATER OF NEXT MEETING.

9. COMMENT FOLLOWS. GP-3. PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

95b
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

DE RUALOS 3892E 0331050
ZNY SSSSS
Z 021026Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8761
STATE GRNC
BT

CN-479

February 2, 1968
6:18 a.m.

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3892

ACTION COPY

NODIS CACTUS

REF: SEOUL 3878

1. FOLLOWING ARE COMMENTS ON MEETING DESCRIBED
REFTEL:

(A) FOR THIS MEETING, PAK WAS CLEARLY NOT
RPT NOT AUTHORIZED TO NEGOTIATE OR MAKE OFFERS OF ANY KIND.
HIS TACTICS INDICATE THAT HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS ONLY
TO PROBE US POSITION AND TO ELICIT IF POSSIBLE US OFFER.
THIS IS BORNE OUT BY FACT THAT HIS ASSISTANT AT MEETING WAS
ONLY MINOR FUNCTIONARY. WE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO BE ACCOMPANIED

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3892 ~~SECRET~~

BY MORE PRESTIGIOUS FIGURE IF AND WHEN HE ACTUALLY AUTHORIZED
TO DISCUSS CONDITIONS FOR RELEASE OF SHIP AND CREW.

(B) EXCEPT IN MOST OBLIQUE SORT OF WAY, PAK DID
NOT THREATEN PUNISHMENT OF CREW, REQUEST APOLOGY OR
ADMISSION OF GUILT, OR REFER TO US MILITARY BUILD-UP.
ATMOSPHERE OF MEETING WAS IN FACT VERY BUSINESS-LIKE.
TAPE RECORDING INDICATES THAT SMITH PRESENTED
CASE IN DIGNIFIED, PATIENT, AND SINCERE MANNER,
WHICH ECHOED BY US INTERPRETER'S USE OF POLITE LANGUAGE.
WITH RESPECT LANGUAGE USED, PAK RECIPROCATED IN BEGINNING.
BUT USED BLUNTER TERMS AS MEETING WORE ON AND IT BECAME
APPARENT THAT SMITH WOULD BE OFFERING APOLOGY THAT
NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE HOPED HE WOULD. NOT

(C) SIGNIFICANT, OF COURSE, THAT PAK SAID HE
HAD "NOT YET BEEN INSTRUCTED TO INFORM US OF NAMES OF
DEAD AND WOUNDED, AND CONCLUDED MEETING BY INDICATING HE
WOULD INFORM SMITH OF DATE FOR NEXT SESSION. BY TANTALIZING
US IN THIS MANNER, BY OFFERING PROSPECT OF FURTHER MEETING
AND INFORMATION WHICH HE KNOWS WE BADLY WANT, NORTH KOREANS
PROBABLY SEEKING TO STRING THIS AFFAIR OUT FOR VARIETY OF
PURPOSES WHICH WILL BE APPARENT TO DEPT. BUT WHICH HERE IN

PAGE 3 RUALOS 3892E ~~SECRET~~

KOREA INCLUDE ENHANCING OPPORTUNITIES FOR FRICTION
BETWEEN OURSELVES AND ROKG.

GP-3. PORTER
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By CB, NARA Date 86-97



Department of State

~~SECRET~~

95c
TELEGRAM

ACTION COPY

CONTROL : 487Q
RECEIVED : Feb. 2, 1968
1155A.M.

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DE RUALOS 3891E 0331040
ZNY SSSSS
Z 021019Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 8760
STATE GRNC
BT
~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 3891

NODIS CACTUS

REF: STATE 108330

1. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT, CONTRARY TO OUR EXPECTATIONS, PYONGYANG HAS NOT YET SEEN FIT TO BRADCAST FACT OF TODAY'S MEETING. WE HAVE RECEIVED MANY INQUIRIES, HOWEVER, AND KNOWLEDGE THAT SOMETHING IS UP WILL SPREAD RAPIDLY SINCE ROKG OFFICIALS ARE NOW AWARE THAT MEETING TOOK PLACE, AND ROK SECURITY AGENCIES ARE MAKING EFFORT LEARN DETAILS. RESULTING SPECULATION MAY BE MORE HARMFUL TO OUR POSITION THAN MAINTAINING PRESENT SILENCE.

PAGE 2 RUALOS 3891E ~~SECRET~~

2. IF NEWS BREAK SEEMS IMMINENT OR COMES TO OUR ATTENTION, RENOMMEND THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED TO ISSUE BRIEF STATEMENT ALONG FOLLOWING LINES, TO BE SUPPLEMENTED ONLY BY GUIDANCE CONTAINED REFTEL:

BEGIN TEXT: "REAR ADMIRAL J.V. SMITH TODAY CONFIRMED THAT A CLOSED MEETING OF THE SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION WAS HELD AT 1100 HRS, FEBRUARY 2, 1968, AT PANMUNJOM." END TEXT.

GP-3. PORTERS
BT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By CB, NARA Date 8-6-97

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:48 a.m.

Mr. President:

This CIA report gives rather well
the political and psychological flavor of
the initial reaction to the attacks.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

CIA/OCI 82605

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 83-214

By is, NARS, Date 7-11-84

WWRostow:rla

1968 FEB 2 100

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FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
STATE (RCI)
DIRNSA ATTN: COMMAND CENTER
NFOIO, MD.
SSO CINCLANT
NPIC
SSO ACSI DA
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION
AFSSO USAF
CNO
SSO DIA
YSNKQAC/CIA REP NMCC
DIA ISIC
NIC
SSO NEW YORK (PASS TO USUN)
SSO STRIKE (CINSTRIKE/CONCMEAFSA)
ZEM
S E T T [REDACTED] CIA/OCI 82605

OCI NO. 01917/68

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 FEBRUARY 1968

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SPOT REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
(INFORMATION AS OF 5:30 P.M. EST)

SIDE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT ENEMY OFFENSIVE: REPORTS ARE BEGINNING TO COME IN FROM THE FIELD WHICH PROVIDE SOME MATERIAL FOR TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF CURRENT COMMUNIST MILITARY ACTION ON THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE, AND THE RURAL AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. IT IS CLEAR THAT THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD DISRUPTION OF GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, AFFECTING PARTICULARLY THE PACIFICATION EFFORT. REFUGEES HAVE BEGUN TO MOVE BOTH INTO OR OUT OF URBAN CENTERS, ACCORDING TO THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN THEIR AREAS. THE REACTION OF THE PEOPLE HAS GENERALLY BEEN ONE OF FEAR AND CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY.

2. THE VIET CONG IN SOME AREAS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO STIR UP POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THEIR MILITARY ACTION, BUT THERE ARE FEW INDICATIONS THAT THEIR EFFORTS ARE SUCCEEDING AND IN FACT, SOME LOCAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT POPULAR REACTION WILL BE DECIDEDLY NEGATIVE.

3. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN DISRUPTED. TEAMS IN MANY AREAS PARTICULARLY IN I CORPS HAVE BEEN ENGAGED BY ENEMY FORCES AND HAVE REPORTED HEAVY CASUALTIES. IN OTHER AREAS, CONTACT HAS NOT BEEN MADE WITH THE TEAMS, BUT THEIR STATUS IS UNCLEAR AND IN SOME AREAS THEY APPEAR TO HAVE LEFT THEIR POSTS. SOME OF THE CADRES SEEM TO BE CUT OFF FROM FRIENDLY MILITARY ELEMENTS AND SOME BECAUSE OF THE TET HOLIDAYS, WERE APPARENTLY CAUGHT OFF GUARD BY THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE AND HAVE NOT REPORTED BACK FOR DUTY. IN BINH LONG PROVINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, AN AMERICAN OBSERVER REPORTS THAT ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE CADRES AT ONE RD SITE WERE ON DUTY, WHILE AT ANOTHER SITE NEAR THE PROVINCE CAPITAL, ONLY 20 PERCENT WERE ON DUTY.

SANITIZED

Authority NLT 019-028-2-4
By 9, NARA, Date 12/13/01

FOR DUTY... IN BINH LONG PROVINCE, FOR EXAMPLE, AN AMERICAN OBSERVER REPORTS THAT ONLY 50 PERCENT OF THE CADRES AT ONE RD SITE WERE ON DUTY, WHILE AT ANOTHER SITE NEAR THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, ONLY THREE CADRES WERE PRESENT OUT OF TWO TEAMS ASSIGNED TO THE AREA.

4. A NUMBER OF AREAS HAVE REPORTED LARGE REFUGEE FLOWS. RESIDENTS OF DUY XUYEN DISTRICT TOWN IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE HAD BEEN EVACUATED BY THE EVENING OF 1 FEBRUARY, AND IN HOA VANG DISTRICT IN THIS PROVINCE APPROXIMATELY 1,000 REFUGEES WERE REPORTED IN NEED OF FOOD. THE BINH LONG PROVINCIAL CAPITAL HAS SEEN A STEADY FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM OUTLYING AREAS, WHICH ARE REPORTEDLY IN COMMUNIST HANDS. EVEN IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE, WHERE NO MINOR ENEMY ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED, PEOPLE ARE REPORTED LEAVING THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF XUAN LOC BECAUSE THEY FEARED AN ASSAULT ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 FEBRUARY.

5. THE POPULACE APPEARS GENERALLY COOPERATIVE WITH GOVERNMENT MEASURES, SUCH AS THE CURFEW, BUT FEARFUL FOR ITS OWN SAFETY AND IN MANY CASES, FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENEMY'S OFFENSIVE ON THE GOVERNMENT AND THE FATE OF THE COUNTRY.

IN BIEN HOA, THE APPROXIMATELY 50,000 NORTHERN REFUGEES IN THE PROVINCE HAVE REACTED QUIET NEGATIVELY TO THE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE AND WANT TO SEE THE VIET CONG DESTROYED, EVEN IF IT MEANS THE DESTRUCTION OF THEIR OWN PROPERTY. THE SOUTHERNERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, APPEAR DISMAYED AND INTIMIDATED BY THE COMMUNIST STRENGTH.

6. ONE SENIOR VIETNAMESE MILITARY COMMANDER REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THIS LATTER REACTION WILL BE WIDESPREAD. HE BELIEVES THAT MANY OF THE POPULACE, IE. NOT INTIMIDATED BY THE VIET CONG WILL AT LEAST LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE US. INDICATIONS FROM OTHER QUARTERS ARE THAT MANY FEAR THE OFFENSIVE WILL RESULT IN THE ALLIES' ACQUIESCENCE IN THE FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT.

7. THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS, DESPITE WHATEVER FEAR MAY BE PREVALENT, OF SIGNIFICANT VIET CONG SUCCESSES IN GENERATING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THEIR MILITARY ACTIONS. ISOLATED ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO START DEMONSTRATIONS BUT THESE HAVE APPARENTLY RECEIVED LITTLE RESPONSE. ONE RALLY CALLED BY THE VIET CONG IN FRONT OF A PAGODA IN DA NANG, WHICH IS USUALLY CENTER FOR

ANTI GOVERNMENT AGITATION, WAS PUT DOWN BECAUSE THE DA NANG BUDDHIST CONGREGATION SENT FOR HELP FROM THE AUTHORITIES. THE GATHERING

WHICH LISTED UNENTHUSIASTICALLY TO COMMUNIST CLAIMS OF VICTORY AND A CALL FOR THE END OF THE WAR IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, WAS DISPERSED AND SEVERAL VIET CONG WERE ARRESTED.

8. IN SAIGON, WHERE THE VIET CONG OCCUPIED THE MILITANT BUDDHISTS' AN QUANG PAGODA FOR SEVERAL HOURS ON 1 FEBRUARY, A GROUP OF MONKS AND NUNS FROM A NEIGHBORING PAGODA STAGED A BRIEF DEMONSTRATION TO SHOW THEIR SYMPATHY FOR THE COMMUNISTS. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, TO INDICATE THAT THE MILITANT BUDDHIST LEADERS FAVORED THE TAKEOVER OF THEIR PAGODA.

9. THE INITIAL REACTION OF SOME OF THE TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS TO THE CURRENT CRISIS SINCE PRESIDENT THIEN

MILITARY ACTIONS. ISOLATED ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO START DEMONSTRATIONS BUT THESE HAVE APPARENTLY RECEIVED LITTLE RESPONSE. ONE RALLY CALLED BY THE VIET CONG IN FRONT OF A PAGODA IN DA NANG, WHICH IS USUALLY CENTER FOR

~~EL 2000~~ ANTIGOVERNMENT AGITATION, WAS PUT DOWN BECAUSE THE DA NANG BUDDHIST CONGREGATION SENT FOR HELP FROM THE AUTHORITIES. THE GATHERING

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9. ~~ON THE~~ INITIAL REACTION OF SOME OF THE TOP GOVERNMENT LEADERS TO THE CURRENT CRISIS. SINCE PRESIDENT THIEU WAS IN MY THO WHEN THE VIET CONG CURRENT OFFENSIVE BEGAN ON 30 JANUARY, VICE-PRESIDENT KY TOOK CHARGE AT THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND DIRECTED THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM COUNTER-EFFORT UNTIL THIEU'S RETURN TO SAIGON. AT THAT TIME, KY ADVISED THIEU TO DECLARRE MARTIAL LAW AND TO TAKE OTHER MEASURES TO IMPOSE NEEDED CHANGES. HE ALSO ADVISED THIEU TO CALL A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE NEXT DAY KY HELPED DIRECT DEFENSE OF TAN SON NHUT AIRFIELD. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INFORMATION LINH, UPON HIS RETURN TO SAIGON, FOUND PRIME MINISTER LOC SOMEWHAT BEWILDERED AND LEAVING EVERYTHING IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY. A CABINET MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 1 FEBRUARY DECIDED NOTHING EXCEPT THAT A COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE DRAFTED AND BROADCAST THAT EVENING. THE REST OF THE MEETING WAS DEVOTED TO UNPRODUCTIVE, SELF-DEFENSIVE STATEMENTS BY THE VARIOUS MINISTERS.

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INFORMATION

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Friday, February 2, 1968
8:45 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

These reactions of civilian politicians indicate a potential for pulling the South Vietnamese urban population into a more active and positive frame of mind and of pulling the government and legislative branch together.

The negative potentials are obvious.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 17470

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By SP-2/2/84, NARA, Date 10/25/96

WWRostow:rla

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5488
INFO AMEMBSSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 5651
CINCPAC
AMEMB OFF DANANG 1648
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 3421

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SAIGON 17470

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: REACTIONS TO VC ACTIVITY

1. FOLLOWING ARE VIEWS ON VC ACTIVITY EXPRESSED BY
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF UPPER HOUSE IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS
MORNING FEBRUARY 2. FEW LOWER HOUSE DEPUTIES HAVE
TELEPHONES, AND THOSE WHO DO, AS WELL AS MANY SENATORS,
ARE OUT OF TOWN FOR TET HOLIDAY.

2. SENATOR TRUONG TIEN DAT, WHO LIVES NEAR BIEN
HOA HIGHWAY BRIDGE WHERE THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17470 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEAVY FIGHTING, WAS GENERALLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NET EFFECT
OF VC ACTIONS. HE FELT VC MADE THIS EFFORT AS SHOW OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ. 96-194
By cb, NARA Date 8-6-97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 03 SAIGON 17470 021255Z

ARTICLE 64, AND WOULD REQUIRE ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION.

6. SENATOR HUYNH VAN CAO LIVES NEAR JGS COMPOUND AND SPENT ONE NIGHT AT JGS OPERATIONS CENTER WHERE HE "REVIEWED SITUATION" AND HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK TO PRESIDENT THIEU. HE FEELS VC

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 17470 CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUFFERED HEAVY LOSS, BOTH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND MILITARILY. THE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE CITY-DWELLERS WOULD RISE UP IN SUPPORT; INSTEAD, SAID CAO, THERE WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF ACTIVE POPULAR RESITANCE TO ARMED VC UNITS.

7. CAO SAID THAT HE HAS TWICE SUGGESTED TO UPPER HOUSE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN VAN HUYEN THAT HUYEN ISSUE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF UPPER HOUSE EXPRESSING SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT THIEU'S ACTIONS. CAO ADDED THAT, REGARDLESS OF HUYEN'S DECISION, HE WOULD MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT IN HIS CAPACITY AS BLOC LEADER.

8. CAO BELIEVES ASSEMBLY WILL DISCUSS SITUATION AS A MATTER OF PRIORITY. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT, AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THIEU, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT PROLOCAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW REQUIRES FORMAL ASSEMBLY APPROVAL. CAO IS SURE SOME DEPUTIES AND SENATORS WILL BE HIGHLY CRITICAL OF WAY GVN HAS HANDLED SITUATION, BUT BELIEVES MAJORITY WILL EXPRESS THEIR SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT.

9. ACCORDING TO UPPER HOUSE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER NGUYEN THANH LUONG, PRESIDENT THIEU MET WITH CHAIRMAN JUYEN

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 17470 CONFIDENTIAL~~

AND LOWER HOUSE CHAIRMAN NGUYEN BA LUONG MORNING FEBRUARY 2. (THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES). OFFICERS OF BOTH HOUSES ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET TOGETHER AFTERNOON FEBRUARY 2 FOR PRELIMIINARY DISCUSSION OF ACTIONS ASSEMBLY SHOULD TAKE, SUCH AS ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF

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PAGE 04 SAIGON 17470 021035Z

VC ACTION, ETC.

10. LUONG ADDED THAT UPPERHOUSE DEFENSE COMMITTEE MET MORNING FEBRUARY 2 TO REVIEW EVENTS. (SENATOR NGAI HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH DEFENSE AND INTERIOR COMMITTEES WOULD MEET, AND POSSIBLY WOULD INVITE DEFENSE MINISTER VY AND INTERIOR MINISTER VIEN TO APPEAR.) LUONG SAID MEMBERS OF DEFENSE COMMITTEE WERE CONCERNED AT RUMOR THAT MORE THAN 100 AMERICANS WERE KILLED IN ATTACK ON EMBASSY. HE WAS RELIEVED TO LEARN TRUTH OF THE ATTACK AND PROMISED TO PASS INFORMATION TO COMMITTEE IMMEDIATELY.

11. COMMENT: A) THIS LIMITED SAMPLING INDICATES THAT PUBLIC REACTIONS OF ASSEMBLY MEMBERS WILL PERHAPS BE COLORED BY THEIR POLITICAL VIEWS, WITH SOME "OPPOSITION"

PAGE 6 RUMJIR 17470 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMBERS CRITICIZING GVN ABILITY TO PROTECT POPULACE WHILE GVN SUPPORTERS CALL FOR UNITY IN TIME OF CRISIS. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT, AS CAO SUGGESTS, MAJORITY WILL EXPRESS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR GVN ACTION IN FACE OF VC ATTACK.

3). MISINFORMATION OF DEFENSE COMMITTEE REGARDING EMBASSY ATTACK IS PROBABLY REPRESENTATIVE OF STATE OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING IN SAIGON. RUMORS ALWAYS RECEIVE UNDUE CIRCULATION HERE; WITH THE FACTS LAGGING FAR BEHIND, THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE NOW SINCE NO NEWSPAPERS ARE PUBLISHING. BUNKER
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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Feb 2, 1968

Q. How do you interpret events in Viet Nam this week?

A. We have known for several months now that the Communists planned a massive winter/spring offensive. We have detailed information on Ho Chi Minh's order governing that offensive.

Part of it is called a general uprising. We know the object was to overthrow the Constitutional government in Saigon and to create a situation in which we and the Vietnamese would be willing to accept a Communist-dominated coalition government. Another part of that offensive was planned as a massive attack across the frontiers of South Viet Nam by North Vietnamese units. We have already seen the general uprising. The Communists appear to have lost over 10,000 men killed and 2,300 detained. The U. S. has lost 249 men killed. The Vietnamese, who had to carry the brunt of the fighting in the cities, lost 553 killed. In short, the Communist casualties run more than 10 to 1.

There were also a number of attacks on U. S. airfields. 15 fixed-wing aircraft and 23 helicopters were destroyed. A good many more were damaged but will be returned to service. This is a very small proportion of our aircraft and helicopters available in the area that were affected. Military operations will be affected not at all.

The biggest fact is that the stated purposes of the general uprising have failed. Communist leaders counted on popular support in the cities for their effort. They found little or none. On the other hand, there have been civilian casualties and disruption of public services. Just before meeting with you, I read a long cable from Ambassador Bunker which described the vigor with which the Vietnamese government and our own people are working together to deal with the problems of restoring order and civilian services in the cities. In the meanwhile, we may at this moment be on the eve of a major enemy offensive in the area of Khe Sanh and generally around the demilitarized zone.

We have known for sometime this offensive was planned by the enemy. Over recent weeks I have been in very close touch with Gen. Westmoreland and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make sure that every single thing that Gen. Westmoreland believed he needed at this time was available to him. I am confident that our men and the South Vietnamese will be giving a good account of themselves.

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Thursday, February 1, 1968
7:30 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

The Secretary of State has cleared the attached contingency draft. He is clearing it because tomorrow the U. S. destroyer ROWAN will be entering a Japanese port; and it seems unlikely that it will long be a secret that it had a minor collision with a Soviet vessel, since the crew will be on leave.

This is for your information, unless you wish to alter Sec. Rusk's clearance.

W. W. Rostow

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-193
By CG, NARA Date 11-3-97

WWRostow:rla

FROM MR. GOULDING

2/1/68
4:15 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ -- NOT FOR RELEASE -- DRAFT, February 1, 1968

The Soviet merchant ship KAPITAN VISLOBOKOV and the USS ROWAN (DD-782) ^{had a minor collision} ~~collided~~ in the Sea of Japan approximately 95 miles east of Pohang, South Korea at 1:53 p.m. EST on Wednesday, January 31.

There were no personnel casualties aboard the destroyer ROWAN and no personnel casualties were reported by the merchant ship. The ROWAN sustained "minor damage," a three foot hole above the water line on the port bow. When queried by flashing light, the VISLOBOKOV signaled "no assistance required" and "damage to my stern two meters in length."

The collision took place at 30 degrees 06 minutes north and 130 degrees 28 minutes east. The accident occurred in a crossing situation, with the ROWAN ^{having the right of} ~~way~~ ^{way} under international regulations.

The ROWAN is a Gearing class destroyer with a displacement of 3500 tons and a length of 350 feet. It is commanded by Commander Loren I. Moore of Wheat Ridge, Colorado and carried a crew of approximately 250 men. The Soviet/ship VISLOBOKOV has a displacement of about 10,000 tons and is 511 feet long.

The incident is being investigated by the Navy.

tp

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-194
By CB, NARA Date 8-6-97

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INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 1, 1968
6:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

I now have clearances from all the
advisers.

Since several were out of town and
George Ball was on the way to an airport,
affirmations were by telephone rather than
initialing the document.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-31-92

WWRostow:rlh

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

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~~TOP SECRET~~

NLJ 94-473

By isa, NARA Date 6-30-97 February 1, 1968

Report on Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29, 1968

Advisors present: Messrs. George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Henry Cabot Lodge, Cyrus Vance, and General Maxwell D. Taylor.

Others present: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Joseph Sisco, Samuel Berger, Director Richard Helms, W. W. Rostow, and Bromley Smith.

Having been fully briefed by the Secretaries of State and Defense yesterday, Sunday, January 28 (except for Mr. McGeorge Bundy), the group met at noon to consider the operational alternatives immediately ahead of us and, perhaps, further down the road. The meeting opened by bringing them up to date with the latest word of the Panmunjom contact and Gromyko's reaction to Sec. Rusk's message.

It was universally agreed that we should make no further diplomatic or military moves, beyond those already undertaken and possible action under paragraph 11, until we could form a judgment as to whether the Panmunjom contact might be fruitful.

The first substantive issue addressed was whether and at what stage the President might offer arbitration via the World Court, or some other "suitable international tribunal" after the men and the ship were returned. After examining the problems posed by the World Court formula (implicit recognition of North Korea as a state) and the precedent represented by the RB-47 in 1960, it was agreed that some such offer might well be made if the Panmunjom exercise doesn't work or is bottlenecked.

The group then examined the following 11 possible courses of action.

1. Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. In the light of Tommy Thompson's cable, it was agreed we should not proceed now with an informal contact, although we might consider in the future the use of the hot line with the proviso about the press, laid down by Thompson. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with the USSR were in pretty good shape.
2. Conduct airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no recce of North Korea should be conducted; if it were judged that recce was desirable at a later time, BLACK SHIELD, rather than DRONE, photography was recommended.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

3. Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to put the Banner on station. When the incident has been settled, it was agreed the U. S. would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending on the situation at that time, we might wish to assert our rights in that area via an armed vessel -- perhaps a destroyer -- rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS Banner.

4. Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.

5. Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase if mining were maintained over an protracted period.

6. Seize North Korean vessels. Although our intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship -- or even the ship alone -- not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans had violated the rules governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to international waters. It was agreed to explore this suggestion with further staff work directed to establish what North Korean vessels might be accessible to seizure on the high seas.

7. Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of retaliation; large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities initiated by the U. S.; it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for early release of the Pueblo and its crew.

8. Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to 7, above, such punitive operations were judged to be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with respect to the return of the Pueblo and its crew.

9. Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited; the risks of escalation would be high; once undertaken, we would be committed for an indefinite period to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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- 3 -

10. Free World economic pressures on North Korea. The Free World's trade with North Korea is limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would, therefore, be small. With respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, we would certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West Germany. Taken together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic difficulties within the Free World make this line of action unattractive, on present evidence.

11. U.S. bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the U.S. military build up in the area. Although it was thought that, in general, our present build up offered a satisfactory background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should be staffed out and we would take a further look at it.

At lunch today (January 29, 1968) with the President, the group examined with the President certain lines of action that might be taken up with Congress at a future time. In particular:

-- Provision to the President of the right to extend the period of enlistment;

-- The maintenance in the area of forces sufficient to give the South Koreans a sense of security and provision of sufficient additional military aid so that they go forward with their plan to provide an extra division to the struggle in South Vietnam.

-- It was the universal judgment of the group that we should keep our eye on the major objectives in this crisis:

-- Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned;

-- Keep the confidence of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an increment of force in South Vietnam;

-- Avoid a second front in Asia.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 1, 1968 -- 4:00 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Frank Williams, Ambassador to Ghana
(5:30 PM tomorrow, February 2)

Williams has asked for this session to discuss his personal future and ways he can be useful to you in the future. He has been in Ghana for two years and has done a first-rate job. He is very well thought of by Nick Katzenbach, Joe Palmer, Sargent Shriver and all the people he has worked with and for in the government. He also has a considerable following in the civil rights movement because of his long service with the NAACP.

Williams will tell you that he has virtually decided to resign his post to become founder and director of a new center for study of urban affairs at Columbia. He feels that he has done what he can in Ghana and that the Columbia offer is too good to pass up at a time when he must be thinking of his next move.

The Columbia deal is not yet set in concrete, but he must give them a final answer very soon. Before doing that, he wants you to know: (1) why this offer is so attractive in his particular circumstances; (2) that he remains totally committed to you; and (3) that he thinks he can be of considerable use to you in New York, this year and later.

I shall not try to give you specific talking points. The relevant questions you may want to think about are two:

- (1) whether there is some foreign or domestic post in the government that would make sense for Williams now, and, if not,
- (2) is there some specific role in the campaign in which Williams can be especially helpful working from New York?

I would add with respect to the first question that I think you would get very solid -- perhaps rave -- recommendations from all the senior people in the government who know Williams. He has proved he can handle the tough ones. He would be an excellent appointment to any job you could persuade him to take.

W. W. Rostow

Hamilton/vmr

Thursday, February 1, 1968, 1:45 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pres file

SUBJECT: General Ridgway's Views on the Vietnam War

General Ridgway, in various newspaper and magazine articles has expressed the view that in Vietnam the U.S. is involved in an open-ended war. He fears that no clear-cut limit has been placed on U.S. military objectives in Vietnam, that the military effort may have outrun political policies and that, in short, the war could get out of the control of the civilian policy makers.

General Ridgway, basing his judgment on his experience in Korea, joined those who opposed an air strike in May 1954 when Dien Bien Phu was falling.

General Ridgway considers Southeast Asia important to America's interests but believes that we should negotiate now to end the war. His position on halting the bombing in return for peace talks is not clear and he discusses his position in a general way.

In answer to a question as to whether his views had caused him trouble, he is quoted in the December issue of Esquire as saying: "I've had no reaction from the Defense Department or the White House. ~~There~~^{There's} been no effort whatsoever to stop me from speaking out. The reaction from other military men has been overwhelmingly favorable judging from the letters I've received.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thursday, Feb. 1, 1968
1:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith recommended talking points with General Ridgway.

1. You may wish to ask one of the Joint Chiefs present to bring him up to date on the situation in Viet Nam and Korea.
2. Rather than assuming that we know his views, you might ask him what his reflections are on the situation in: Korea; Vietnam.
3. If he takes the view that we should not attempt to defend the frontiers but withdraw to enclaves, you might say: I have asked the same question. What do you think of General Westmoreland's response? You might then make available to him Westy's cable on this subject, as well as Cy Vance's response to Ted Kennedy. I sent both forward to you this morning, but will have copies with me at lunch.
4. Khe Sanh. You may wish to ask the Joint Chiefs to describe the situation at Khe Sanh, and why they feel that the position should and can be held. You might then elicit General Ridgway's views on the problem (it might be a good time for you to ask about the problem of reinforcement if the weather should go bad and air power cannot keep the enemy artillery under control).
5. You might end the session by taking General Ridgway aside and saying that it is your feeling that we are heading into a climax in Asia. We may face hard days ahead. You will be keeping in touch with him and would welcome his advice and observations at any time.

W. W. Rostow

Thurs. Feb. 1, 1968
1:05 p. m.

104

Mr. President:

I have marked the critical passages in the instruction to Admiral Smith for the meeting this evening with the North Koreans. I believe you should see them and clear them before they go forward.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

Cleared _____

No _____

See me _____

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By kg, NARA, Date 2-21-92

INFORMATION

105

Pres file

Thursday, February 1, 1968
12:45 p.m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Cy Vance responds to
Senator Edward Kennedy. It may be
relevant to your 2 o'clock lunch.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

January 31, 1968

105a

Senator Kennedy suggests in his recent speech that,

"we should begin immediately to moderate significantly our military activity in South Vietnam to levels more tolerable to all and more commensurate with our limited aims. Our over-riding goal should be to maximize the safety and security of the Vietnamese people and our soldiers rather than search out our enemy in his territory and on his terms."

I am unclear as to what is being suggested. Senator Kennedy appears to be proposing that U.S. troops limit their activities to protecting and holding areas of heavy population rather than seeking out the enemy. If this is a correct interpretation of his proposal, it is a re-statement of the Gavin "enclave theory". The deficiencies in the Gavin theory have been pointed out many times. Briefly, they are:

1. This strategy would turn over most of the country and millions of South Vietnamese to the mercies of the VC and the North Vietnamese.
2. This strategy would not make the best use of American strength, i.e., massive fire power and a high degree of maneuverability.
3. This strategy would place the initiative in the hands of the VC and the North Vietnamese.
4. The casualties inflicted on U.S. and South Vietnamese would probably be as high and

might be even higher than they are now.

To put the problem in proper perspective, it is worth-while to re-state our strategy. It is to use U.S. forces primarily in search and destroy operations against VC and North Vietnamese main force units. The reasoning is that U.S. forces can be used most effectively in such actions because of their vastly superior fire power and maneuverability. It should be pointed out, however, that search and destroy operations are not carried out exclusively by U.S. forces; in many instances, there are joint operations with the Vietnamese. These search and destroy operations are designed to provide a shield behind which the pacification efforts can go forward. Absent such a shield, pacification could never get started - let alone flourish.

The task of pacification is more difficult and complex than search and destroy operations against main force units. Moreover, it is a task which should and must be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. We can assist them in better performing this task, but the winning of the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese people cannot be accomplished by U.S. forces. Moreover, it is well to bear in mind that casualties incurred in pacification are normally greater than those suffered in main force engagements.

Senator Kennedy also states in his speech that a strategy

"designed to protect and hold areas of heavy population rather than to seek out the enemy, has, I found, some support among our military leaders in Vietnam."

It may well be that there are some military personnel who believe that we should adopt such a strategy. I know of no senior military commander in Vietnam who shares this view. That is not to say, however, that we should not attempt to improve the pacification efforts or require more of the South Vietnamese. That has been and is our objective. It was for this reason that our country team organization was changed to provide more effective training of South Vietnamese forces for pacification and a more effective pacification effort.

It has been said, from time to time, that the Marines believe that U.S. troops should give greater emphasis to pacification. That is partially true. It does not mean, however, that the Marines believe that the United States forces should give up search and destroy operations and sit within their current perimeters. The Marine strategy has been to push the perimeters westward towards the Laos and Cambodian borders..

In sum, no good reason has been given why our strategy should be changed to one of static defense of

heavily populated areas - a strategy unsuccessfully used by the French, and I do not believe that such a change would have the support of any of our senior military commanders.

Thurs., Feb. 1968
11:15 a.m.

106

Mr. President:

Herewith Bunker is reassured by Thieu that General Thang will, indeed, go to IV Corps after Tet. His other appointments sound also intelligent.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment (Saigon 17363)

~~SECRET~~

HCE193

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106a

PAGE 01 SAIGON 17363 001229Z

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~~SECRET~~ ~~EXDIS~~

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 17363

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

Rostow

EXDIS

REF: STATE 106924

1. DURING A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT THIEU, FEBRUARY 1, I RAISED THE MATTER OF GENERAL THANG'S RESIGNATION AGAIN AND SPECIFICALLY CITED THE KIND OF EDITORIAL COMMENT COMING OUT OF THE U.S., AS REPORTED IN STATE 106860.
2. THIEU SAID HE HAD JUST BEEN TALKING THAT MORNING WITH GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN ABOUT THANG'S APPOINTMENT AND RELATED CHANGES. HE CONFIRMED THAT THIS ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN RIGHT AFTER TET. HE OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING SERIES OF CHANGES WHICH HE AND VIEN SEEMED TO FEEL WOULD MEET THE SITUATION.

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 17363 ~~SECRET~~

3. THANG WOULD BE APPOINTED AS IV CORPS COMMANDER. GENERAL MINH WOULD BE BROUGHT IN AS ASSISTANT TO GENERAL VIEN FOR RF AND RF AND RD TRAINING. HE EXPLAINED THAT

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 90-103
By *g/p*, NARA, Date *4/29/96*

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 32 SAIGON 17363 001229Z~~

HE COULD NOT HAVE THE TITLE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF JGS SINCE HE WAS NOT SENIOR ENOUGH. THIEU THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE NEED FOR A GENERAL OFFICER TO COMMAND THE CAPITAL MILITARY REGION, NOTING THAT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR GENERAL KHANG TO COPE WITH ALONE. HE SAID THAT HE THEREFORE PLANNED TO APPOINT GENERAL LA AS COMMANDER OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER GENERAL KHANG'S OVER-ALL COMMAND AS HEAD OF III CORPS. THIEU SAID THAT IN ADDITION HE INTENDED TO APPOINT GENERAL VINH LOC AS COMMANDER OF THE NEW NATIONAL DEFENSE SCHOOL (WAR COLLEGE), REMARKING THAT LOC HIMSELF INDICATED AN INTEREST IN SOME SUCH SCHOOL COMMAND. HE THEN SAID THAT HE WOULD PLAN TO APPOINT GENERAL LU MONG LAN, PREVIOUSLY HEAD OF THE TRAINING COMMAND, AS THE NEW II CORPS COMMANDER.

4. COMMENT: I DISCUSSED THESE PLANNED APPOINTMENTS WITH GENERAL WESTMORELAND AND KOMER AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING AND THEY BOTH SEEMED TO FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE SATISFACTORY.

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 17363 SECRET~~

WESTMORELAND COMMENTED THAT HE THOUGHT LAN WAS VERY ABLE AND WOULD WORK WELL WITH US. HE SAID THAT AS A MATTER OF FACT, MOST OF THESE CHANGES WERE ONES THAT HE HAD SUGGESTED TO GENERAL VIEN A COUPLE OF WEEKS AGO.

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~ EXDIS

SECRET

Thurs., Feb. 1968
11:10 a.m.

107

Mr. President:

This picture of North Vietnamese
soldiers' attitudes towards the war
is worth reading.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment (NIC Rpt No. 1576/67)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page 2

1. The majority of the NVA in SVN were disgusted because they thought they had been abandoned by their leaders who did not have a true picture of war in SVN. Their leaders remained in HANOI with good food and material while they were fighting for a final victory none of the soldiers believed they could win. The leaders were blindly calling for more troops and a 20-years war if necessary. At the same time, these same leaders refused the assistance of Communist Chinese infantry, thereby sealing the fate of thousands more young Vietnamese. The soldiers believed that all the field grade officers remained in the North while the soldiers were sent off to the South to die as evidenced by the fact that during the entire infiltration of Company 1 there was no officer over the rank of Senior Captain.
2. The men hated VO NGUYEN GIAP for not accepting Communist Chinese infantry to take the strain from the NVA. The soldiers believed GIAP wanted someday to be able to say that he had defeated the Americans single-handed, just as the French had been defeated.
3. HANOI would continue to send more troops to the South although the draft age would not officially be dropped below 18. However, if a youth remained at home and did not attend school he was safe. Otherwise, the youth would be pressured by his teachers and fellow students which would cause him to "volunteer". HANOI was determined to united Vietnam without regard to NVA lives and did not seem to want negotiations.
4. The GVN grows stronger daily as the U.S. continues to fight in SVN while, in contrast, the NVA continues to experience shortages of everything-food, medicine and ammunition. The NVA does not have the firepower and must endure such adverse conditions that they will never be able to defeat the GVN. They have no way of successfully combatting the American planes and artillery. The continued bombing of supply routes causes supply shortages and even the stations along the route are desperately short.
5. The general opinion among the patients in the dispensary at Station 10 in Laos in June 1967 was that if they had known the actual situation in SVN, they would have deserted while still in NVN. No one ever dared openly blame the HANOI government or the LAO DONG Party. The wounded were disgusted with the war, since it had brought them so much hardship, and they blamed both the Americans and NVN for continuing the fight. These men complained that they were being killed simply because the HANOI government was too stubborn to negotiate. Others felt that if HANOI wished to continue the fight, it should bring in Communist Chinese infantry. Whether HANOI liked it or not, continued squandering of NVN youth would result in a shortage of manpower. Unless Communist Chinese troops got into the Vietnamese war, the GVN would surely win because of the tremendous American aid to SVN.

(FET Comment: Source opined that eventually negotiations would be HANOI's only recourse since the GVN was growing increasingly stronger with U.S. military help).

INTERROGATION REPORT

107a

THIS REPORT IS THE RESULT OF THE INTERROGATION ACTIVITY CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL INTERROGATION CENTER (NIC) UNDER THE JOINT AUSPICES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) AND THE U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF DETACHMENT 6, 6499TH SPECIAL ACTIVITIES GROUP (USAF).

COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : Opinion of NVN Soldiers that
SVN Would Win the War

DATE OF INFO : April 1967 - November 1967

DATE AND PLACE : 11 December 1967 (T-N)
OF ACQUISITION : DANANG, Vietnam

NIC REPORT NO : 1576/67

NIC CASE NO : FET

DATE OF REPORT : 22/12/67

NO. OF PAGES : 2

REF: NIC Report 1540/67(PIR)

This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 11 December 1967 in DANANG City, QUANG NAM Province, SVN. Source is not available at the NIC for further exploitation.

SOURCE: DOAN VAN LUY, a NVN national, was born in March 1949 in UNG HOA District, HA TAY Province, NVN, is unmarried and is an ancestor worshipper. He was a NVN 4th form (U.S. 4th grade) education. He was not a member of the Labor Youth Group as he had never achieved anything worthy of admission. Source was drafted 5 December 1966, underwent infantry training, and left NVN on 23 April 1967 on an infiltration route which passed through Laos and entered QUANG TRI Province, SVN, in August 1967. He was captured on 15 November 1967 in QUANG NGAI Province. His last rank was Private First Class, Squad 1, Platoon 1, Company 1, Battalion 3, Regiment 2.

SUMMARY

The majority of the NVA in SVN were disgusted because they thought they had been abandoned by their leaders who did not have a true picture of the war in SVN and who remained safe in HANOI while the soldiers fought a war they could not win. VO NGUYEN GIAP and the other leaders refused the assistance of Communist Chinese Infantry. Although the draft age would not officially be dropped below 18, youths would be pressured by their teachers and fellow students to "volunteer". HANOI was determined to unite Vietnam without regard to NVA lives and did not seem to want negotiations. The NVA will never be able to defeat the GVN which grows stronger daily with U.S. fighting in SVN. The patients in the dispensary at Station 10 in Laos complained that they were being killed simply because the HANOI government was too stubborn to negotiate.

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None

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E.O. 12356, Sec 3.3

DA Memo. Jan. 5, 1988

By MA NARA Date 13192

ATTACHMENT TO

IN 6027 0151 68

DTD 15 Jan 68

108

Free file

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

LITERALLY EYES ONLY

Friday, February 2, 1968 -- 10:10 a.m.

Mr. President:

General Westmoreland has given authority to subordinate commanders to use COFRAM.

He expects it may be used tonight, Southvietnamese time (i.e., any time from now on), in the Khe Sanh area.

We are now hearing clear voice transmissions in the Khe Sanh area.

Heretofore, this has been an indication of imminent attack.

Captured prisoners say the attack begins on February 3 -- one hour from now.

W. W. Rostow

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-205
By isa, NARA Date 7-20-98

WWRostow:rlh

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

109

Thursday, February 1, 1968
9:30 a.m.

Mr. President:

This piece will amuse you --
forwarded by my old friend Ernest
Lindley.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Vietnam Through the Looking Glass

By Kenneth Katzner

IT WAS in January 1965 that Lyndon Johnson made the Big Decision. Shortly after being elected to a full term as President, he had ordered a comprehensive review of the United States commitment in Vietnam. The review completed, he was now ready to go to the people.

Appearing on television, the President spoke in measured tones. He was issuing orders, he said, for the complete evacuation of American military personnel from Vietnam within 90 days.

Johnson acknowledged that this was an agonizingly difficult decision to make. He knew it would not be popular. He realized the United States was abandoning its long-term commitment to come to the aid of Southeast Asian nations in time of need, thus reversing a principle that had guided American foreign policy since the end of World War II. He was aware that the political consequences at home could be most damaging to himself and to his party. But after several months of weighing the most knowledgeable advice he could obtain, he had concluded that this was the only course he could follow.

The President described the type of war that was developing in Vietnam and the enormous difficulties in prosecuting it. In Korea, he ex-

KENNETH KATZNER, a new contributor here, is a writer and editor who specializes in world affairs.

plained, there were two opposing armies and a clearly marked battle line, whereas in Vietnam the enemy consisted of small guerrilla bands which usually vanished into the night. The war would be extremely hard to win and in fact might never be won. He visualized the involvement of more and more American troops in the fighting, who would only be matched by a similar increase of troops from the North. He pictured a long and bitter stalemate that could drag on interminably. And he recalled the advice given President Kennedy by General MacArthur some years earlier: "Son, never let yourself get bogged down in a land war in Asia."

In many respects, the President continued, Vietnam was more a civil war than an international conflict. The Vietcong were, after all, mainly from the South. The allegiance of the people in the South, meanwhile, was extremely doubtful. Many of them had little use for the Saigon government, others considered Ho Chi Minh their true leader, and the majority didn't really care at all. The President pointed out that the United States had agreed to help small nations preserve their independence, but not to fight their wars for them when they themselves didn't care.

Johnson cited staggering estimates of the war's costs in both lives and money. For victory to be achieved, a far greater number of Americans

would have to die in the jungles of Vietnam than had died in Korea. Expenditures would soon run about \$20 billion a year—outstripping the nation's domestic programs for poverty, housing, education, medical care, and highways combined.

Wars have a way of dominating all else, the President observed. If he pursued the war with full vigor, the Johnson Administration would come in time to be synonymous with the war in Vietnam. He was determined that this should not happen. The country had grave problems at home—racial strife, poverty and crime, to name a few—and it was to these problems that he wished to direct the nation's energies in the next four years, not to a guerrilla struggle in the jungles of a small nation halfway around the world. He expected to be criticized, but he had made his decision and was prepared to defend it forcefully and forthrightly.

The storm of criticism broke that evening, almost before the President finished speaking. Republican Senators and Congressmen led the parade, but they were joined by many Democrats, leaders from business and labor, and people in virtually all walks of life. Each seemed determined to outdo the other with the force of his rhetoric. "The President has betrayed the thousands of gallant American soldiers who have died unsung on foreign lands defending the cause of freedom,"

thundered a prominent Republic Senator. "The President's decision marks a return to the disastrous Truman-Acheson foreign policy of 15 years ago, in which the enemy was invited to take over weaker countries without American interference," added another. "The word of the United States in world councils will no longer be worth the paper it is printed on," editorialized a leading Midwest newspaper. In other quarters the key words were "shortsighted," "dishonest," "cowardly," and even "treasonable."

Subsequent events in Vietnam moved rapidly. Once the American military forces pulled out, the Vietcong immediately switched from its hit-and-run guerrilla tactics to a strategy of armed insurrection. The peasants offered no resistance. The South Vietnamese soldiers deserted en masse. In Saigon the generals were still bickering over who was in charge when the capital fell. The two Vietnams were now one: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with its capital in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh as President.

Information reaching the United States from Vietnam after that was sparse. Western journalists were barred and information had to be culled from visiting Communist newsmen and those few citizens who escaped. There were reports of a mass purge of landowners, businessmen, and the intelligentsia, with wholesale executions estimated at many thousands. The fragile Vietnamese economy practically ceased functioning. Stores and shops in Saigon were closed, and food was in short supply. Schools were shut down, pending reorganization of the educational system. Indoctrination became a way of life. Night clubs, bars, and brothels were permanently closed and converted into "houses of culture."

THE DEVELOPMENTS in Vietnam sent shock waves through Southeast Asia. Only six months after Hanoi took over Saigon, the govern-

ment of Prince Sihanouk collapsed. A new Democratic People's Republic of Cambodia was established, whose foreign policy pronouncements seemed almost certainly to have been written in Peking. In neighboring Laos, the Pathet Lao stepped up its harassment and many predicted it would soon go the way of Cambodia.

In Indonesia a sudden and dramatic coup occurred in the fall of 1965, destroying the last vestiges of democracy and neutrality in that country. President Sukarno remained as titular head of state, but real power was transferred to the Indonesian Communist Party, the country's only legal political party. Together with the newly formed governments of Vietnam and Cambodia, Jakarta pledged its full support to the "War of Liberation of Southeast Asia."

Thailand, long a staunch U.S. ally, found itself in the throes of a major guerrilla war, and the Thai Army of Liberation soon dominated 60 per cent of the country's rural population. United States advisers in Bangkok, sent to help the Thais deal with the situation, admitted that things looked "pretty grim." Urgent appeals to Washington for military aid were regretfully turned down on the grounds that the situation differed little from the Vietnam conflict in its earlier stages.

"Guerrilla movements on the same pattern also emerged in Burma and Malaysia. In February 1966, Radio Peking proclaimed: "The grandiose and inspired plan of Chairman Mao Tse-tung for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of Asia from the yoke of American imperialism is meeting with continued success in many countries. The enemy is tired and confused. His world is crumbling about him. The people will soon triumph. All hail Mao Tse-tung!"

Grave misgivings and warnings were sounded in the more distant countries of Asia. In Australia, the Prime Minister reminded his people of the SEATO pact of a decade earlier and wondered out loud what

America had in mind when it was proposed. "I remember those noble promises so well," he remarked, "and I recall nothing in the treaty to the effect that America would judge each situation on the basis of its merits." In Pakistan, President Ayub Khan denounced the U.S. as a nation that "fights only when the price is right and victory is near, leaving the tough battles to its weaker allies." In Japan, pressure for the dismantling of American military bases became even stronger. "It is bad enough having American military bases on our land, American destroyers in our harbors, and American soldiers sauntering through our streets," commented a Tokyo newspaper. "But the worst of it is that if the time ever comes when they are needed, they will probably turn tail and run."

Back home the assault on the President was stepped up on all fronts. His popularity rating in the polls dropped from 75 to 60 to 40 and then to 25 per cent. It was, in fact, hard to find anyone who really approved of the Administration's policies. Republicans and Democrats alike, liberals and Conservatives, labor and management, whites and Negroes, all took turns at raking Johnson over the coals. From a leading Republican came this assessment: "Mao Tse-tung has laid down his master plan for the subversion of Asia more clearly than any would-be conqueror before him. The President's failure to do his homework on this subject and act accordingly may go down as one of the most tragic blunders in the history of mankind."

What was particularly disappointing to the President, however, was the failure of the liberal voters to support him—especially those who sympathized with his domestic legislative program and were generally opposed to military adventures abroad. "I am opposed to war in all forms," remarked a liberal writer, "and it grieves me deeply when any human being, whatever his national-

ity, has to lose his life in so fruitless an exercise. But when I see nation after nation being subverted, and dictatorial regimes imposed on millions of people without their consent, I have to say the President was wrong. Yes, our poor in this country need help, but are we to ignore the oppressed and downtrodden in foreign lands?"

Severe though the verbal brickbats were, there was yet another, more devastating form of opposition—which the President admitted he had not foreseen. Across the country organized protest groups mushroomed, differing in political orientation, yet each certain it knew what the President should do, if only he would listen. Full page ads appeared almost daily in the New York Times, calling for new courses of action or announcing the formation of new committees and asking for contributions.

In the Midwest an organization called The Committee to Defend America in Time of Peril began its own large-scale military training program. Another, known as Citizens Strike for Peace, urged "the dispatching of half a million American soldiers to Southeast Asia to halt the spread of Communism once and for all. Peace doesn't mean simply running from a battle. Every time the United States has turned its back on a little war in one part of the world it has soon found itself fighting a bigger war somewhere else."

Mass demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins and protests became the nation's favorite pastime. In the summer of 1967 a huge march on Washington took place, calling for "taking whatever measures necessary to check the tide of Communism before it is too late." Particularly disturbing was the fact that the phrase "whatever measures necessary" was thought by some to mean the possible use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, a few Republican Presidential aspirants were already hinting at such a course.

Buffeted on all sides, the President stuck to his guns. He lashed out at his critics for being unable to visualize "the hopeless morass we would have been involved in in the jungles of Vietnam." As his popularity continued to plummet, the President often compared himself to the beleaguered Harry Truman of 1948. He could only hope that the miracle of '48 would repeat itself in '68.

THROUGHOUT the controversy there were the inevitable debates over the "might-have-beens." A few writers and intellectuals insisted that the President's original assessment of the situation had been correct and should not be forgotten. Some 250,000 American troops would have been in Vietnam by 1968, they declared, with victory no closer than in 1965. They cited the American penchant for getting things done—within a clearly defined time limit and at a previously determined cost—and visualized the nationwide sense of frustration if the country had become bogged down in a hopeless stalemate. Others recalled the danger of Chinese intervention and the very real possibility of the war in Vietnam leading to World War III. One writer maintained that the President had removed the major powers from a "collision course," and in so doing had at least insured the country's survival for a few more years.

Speculation sprang up concerning the dissenters. One school of thought maintained the protest movement arose out of an obsessive American fear of Communist expansion, nurtured by 20 years of waging the Cold War. They could not imagine such bitter dissent had the President's decision gone the other way. They felt that a stalemate in Vietnam would have cost the President many votes, but claimed nevertheless that his firm determination to halt the spread of Communism would certainly have won him considerable sympathy and would prob-

ably have assured his reelection in 1968.

Others saw things differently. They pointed to a whole new factor, the nation's young people. Those who would actually have had to fight and die in Vietnam, they observed, were born after World War II and acquired their political consciousness during the relative détente of the early 1960s. The history of the Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, the Berlin blockade, the Korean War, and in general the implacable hostility that marked Soviet-American relations for so long, had little meaning for them. America's youth, these analysts argued, would have rejected an escalated war in Vietnam, and some would have even refused to serve. One writer conjured up a fantastic picture of American boys publicly burning their draft cards.

Further distorting the controversy was the question of what President Kennedy might have done. "Kennedy would never have let Southeast Asia go," went one line of reasoning, citing a Kennedy speech of September 1963 in which he warned of the disastrous consequences of the loss of South Vietnam. Others believed that John Kennedy, like Lyndon Johnson, would have seen the writing on the wall in Vietnam and would likewise have pulled up stakes before getting hopelessly involved.

President Johnson himself remained optimistic. He took comfort in the knowledge that criticism of the President has always been a popular American sport. He was not hoping to please everyone and in fact was not trying to please everyone. He, too, occasionally thought about the "might-have-beens," but he insisted that the more he thought about them the more he became convinced he had acted wisely. Whether the American people agreed would soon be decided at the polls. He pledged a vigorous campaign and voiced the cautious hope that in the end his judgment would be vindicated.

~~SECRET~~

February 1, 1968

Pres. file

Mr. President:

Attached is a preliminary report on the results of CABRIOLET submitted by Glenn Seaborg.

The experiment appears to have been quite successful. The cratering results were more or less as predicted. As expected, the venting was relatively small -- considerably less than the "worst case" assumption on which the authorization to execute was based.

Although it was initially predicted that the radioactive cloud would stay in the U. S. for 60 to 70 hours and then exit over the Atlantic, the meteorology changed after the shot and the cloud was intercepted by a large snow storm north of Nevada which apparently precipitated most of the radioactivity. Subsequently, the radioactive cloud, with quite low levels of activity, was detected by our aircraft over northeastern Montana, and the air mass is presumed to have crossed into Canada some 30 to 35 hours after shot time. The residual levels are believed to have then been so low that it is very unlikely that it will be reported by Canadian ground stations.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-205
By je, NARA Date 2-11-00

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
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NLJ 08-211

By isb, NARA, Date 7-9-07

January 30, 1968

The first nuclear excavation experiment in support of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission program was conducted at 11:00 AM, EST, on January 26, 1968. The results obtained to date are necessarily very preliminary and, of course, subject to changes as more data and analyses become available.

Nuclear Explosive

Early indi-

cations are that the yield was about 2.6 KT.

Crater - The Cabriolet detonation was conducted at a depth of 170 feet in rhyolite, and was predicted to produce a crater about 340 feet in diameter, with a depth of about 90 feet. Preliminary estimates based on observation and rough optical measurements from helicopters indicate that the crater is about 350 feet in diameter and has a depth of about 130 feet.

Meteorology - At the time of detonation, the wind was blowing from the south and was predicted to continue moving toward the north for a few hundred miles, then turn toward the east or slightly to the southeast and exit the U.S. east coast. This would have given a 60 to 70 hour residence time for the air mass within the U.S. before exiting over the Atlantic. After the detonation, the meteorological conditions changed and the air mass did not turn east, but continued in a northerly trajectory. The air mass interacted with a massive snow storm which blanketed most of Montana, Idaho, and northern Nevada. The actual exiting of the air mass across the northern border is assumed to have occurred 30 to 35 hours after shot time.

Release of Radioactive Materials - The Cabriolet analysis, on which the authorization to execute was based, was predicated on the "worst case" assumption that 20% of the radioactive material produced might be vented and deposited in the fallout pattern. Our best estimate was that the figure would be about 4%. Preliminary evaluation of the close-in radioactivity indicates that about 3% of the radioactive materials produced are in the fallout field. Further evaluation could raise this figure to as much as 6%.

GROUP 1

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downgrading and
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Ground Level Radioactive Measurements - The Public Health Service ran monitoring surveys at ground level north of the Test Site. The highest level reported was 43 mr/hr just off NTS, about 5 hours after detonation. This reading dropped to 5 mr/hr in about 30 minutes. Several other contacts were made before the air mass intercepted the snow storm. The most distant contact was about 160 miles north of NTS and had a level of about 0.3 mr/hr. These levels are, of course, far below any level that might be considered to constitute any health hazard. Ground level measurements farther north have been severely hampered by the snow, and only negative results have been reported.

Aircraft Measurements - Tracking of the air mass by aircraft has also been hampered by the snow. Indeed, we have two airplanes snowbound, one in Idaho and one in Montana. A number of flights were flown along the 48th parallel, about 75 miles south of the Canadian border, and among these four contacts were made. The concentrations were in the 1 to 6 pCi/_m range and measurements were complicated by the fact that the Cabriolet debris was mixed with that of the most recent Red Chinese test. Additional flights farther north produced negative in-flight indication. Detailed radiochemical analyses of these samples might reveal very small amounts of radioactive materials.

This report is based on a preliminary evaluation of early data and, therefore, is subject to change as more data and better evaluation become available.

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