

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#1 memo	Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m. S 1 p [Duplicate of #108, NSF, Country File, Israel, Vol. 8]	2/9/68	A
	<i>open 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i>		
#3b memo	Goodpaster for Record S 5 p [Duplicate of #5b, NSF, Name File, Eisenhower, Dwight D.] [Sanitized 1984]	2/9/68	A
	<i>open 5-6-94 MR 93-405 #2</i>		
#4 memo	Rostow to President, 4:55 p.m. S 1 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>sanitized NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i>		
#4a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>sanitized 7.15.98 NLT 96-200</i>		
#5a rpt	"Mission of Cyrus Vance" TS 2 p	undated	A
	<i>open 3-25-94 NLT 93-367</i>		
#5b rpt	"Themes for Mission of Cyrus Vance" S 2 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>"</i>		
#5c cable	Intelligence Cable TS 2 p	2/9/68	A
#7a cable	Saigon 18699 S 3 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-191</i>		
#9a ltr	President to President Park PCI 1 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>(dup # 4u, NSF, SHOS, Korea, 1/1/68-4/30/68 Box 3)</i>		
#10 ltr	Duplicate of #9a		
#11a cable	Intelligence Cable C 2 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLT 96-200</i>		
#13 memo	Rostow to President, 12:50 p.m. S 1 p	2/9/68	A
	<i>open 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i>		
#13a cable	Amman 3316 S 3 p	2/7/68	A
	<i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-191</i>		

FILE LOCATION

NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 60, 2/7-9/68

Box 28

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#14b cable	Deptel to Moscow (draft) S 3 p open 6-10-95 NLT 93-458	2/8/68	A
#19a cable	Scout 4106 S 1 p [Duplicate of #123, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16] <i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-196</i>	2/9/68	A
#20a cable	From Westmoreland S 2 p [Duplicate of #32b, NSF, NSC Hist., 3/31 Speech, Vol. 6, "Khe Sanh Reports"] <i>OPEN 3-14-05 NLT 96-198</i> <i>[dupl # 72a NSF Country File, Vietnam, br 66, ZAZ 1 Corost AMZ, 2/68]</i>	2/9/68	A
#21 memo	Rostow to President, 8:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLT 96-199 8.11.98</i>	2/9/68	A
#21a cable	Intelligence Cable S 3 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLT 96-200</i>	2/8/68	A
#22a cable	Intelligence Cable C 3 p <i>open 4/96</i>	2/9/68	A
#28a rpt	"You may give the following message..." TS 1 p <i>OPEN 6/20/95 NLT 94-22</i>	undated	A
#29 memo <i>mani 8-B-D2 RAC 001-048-2-1</i>	Rostow to President, re: Dominican Republic S 1 p <i>(dup of #88, NSF, CF, DR, V18) (Exempted 4/95)</i>	2/9/68	A
#29a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 12 p <i>(dup of #88a, NSF, CF, DR, V18) (Exempted 12/94)</i>	2/9/68	A
#32a memo	Walt to Rostow S 2 p <i>open 6-14-04 NLT 96-198</i> [Duplicate of #55a, NSF, NSC Hist., 3/31 Speech, Vol. 2, Tabs 1-Z]	2/8/68	A
#33 memo	Rostow to President, 7:30 p.m. S 2 p <i>OPEN 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i>	2/8/68	A
#36a cable	Saigon 18583 TS 1 p <i>open 4/96</i>	2/8/68	A

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#37 memo	Rostow to President, 6:35 p.m. <i>open 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i> PCI 1 p	2/8/68	A
#37a ltr	President to Arosemena " " PCI 1 p <i>(dup of #58)</i>	2/8/68	A
#37b ltr	Arosemena to President PCI 1 p <i>dup of #58a</i> <i>open 1-16-97 NLT 96-191</i>	1/29/68	A
#40 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. <i>open 11-10-97 NLT 96-206</i> S 1 p	2/8/68	A
#40a cable	Paris 10089 S 2 p <i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-196</i>	2/8/68	A
#40b cable	Paris 10084 S 2 p <i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-196</i>	2/8/68	A
#41 memo	Rostow to President, 6:10 p.m. <i>sanitized NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i> PCI 1 p <i>(Dup. of # 109, NSF, CF, Korea, US) Box 255</i>	2/8/68	A
#41a cable	Intelligence Information Cable C 2 p <i>(Dup. of #109a, NSF, CF, Korea, US) sanitized 7.10.98 NLT 96-200</i>	2/8/65	A
#42a cable	Saigon 18582 S 7 p [Sanitized 1979] <i>open 10-2-97 NLT 96-196</i>	2/8/68	A
#48 memo	Rostow to President, 2:20 p.m. <i>open NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i> S 1 p	2/8/68	A
#48a memo	Intelligence Memorandum S 2 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLT 96-200</i>	2/7/68	A
#50 memo	Rostow to President, 2:05 p.m. S 1 p <i>open NLT 96-199 8.19.98</i> <i>[Dupl # 80 NSF Country File, Vietnam, box 66, "ZAZ, J Corps + DMZ, 2/68"]</i>	2/8/68	A
#54a cable	Saigon 16851 TS 5 p <i>open 5/1/96</i>	1/24/68	A

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#54b cable	Saigon 17006 TS 2 p <i>open 4/96</i>	1/26/68	A
#54c cable	Deptel 105226 to Saigon S 2 p <i>open 4/96</i>	1/26/68	A
#56 memo	Rostow to President, 10:10 a.m. S 1 p <i>open 9-25-97 WHG/mde/chaies per RG</i>	2/8/68	A
#56a cable	Seoul 4083 S 3 p <i>open 10-2-97 NLJ 96-196</i> [Duplicate of #114, NSF, NSC Hist., Pueblo Crisis, Vol. 16]	2/8/68	A
#58 ltr	Duplicate of #37a <i>open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206</i>		
#58a ltr	Duplicate of #37b <i>open 1-16-97 NLJ 96-191</i>		
#60 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.18.98</i>	2/8/68	A
#60a cable	Intelligence Cable S 2 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/8/68	A
#61 memo	Rostow to President PCI 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i>	2/8/68	A
#61a cable	Intelligence Cable C 1 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #82a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General Military Activity"] <i>Box 70</i>	2/68	A
#62a cable	Rawalpindi 3266 S 1 p <i>open 10-2-97 NLJ 96-196</i> <i>(Dup. of #82a, NSF, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. 6)</i>	2/8/68	A
#62b cable	Rawalpindi 3224 S 1 p <i>open 10-2-97 NLJ 96-196</i> <i>(Dup. of #82a, NSF, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. 6)</i>	2/7/68	A
#65 memo	Rostow to President, 7:25 p.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i> [Duplicate of #85, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General Military Activity"] <i>Box 70</i>	2/7/68	A

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	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#65a cable	Intelligence Information Cable S 4 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i> [Duplicate of #85a, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General Military Activity" - <i>Box 70</i>]	2/7/68	A
#68b rpt	Tables S 2 p <i>open SF, NSU 96-198</i> [Duplicate of #68b, NSF, Country File, Vietnam, "2C(5), General Military Activity"]	2/1/68	A
#72c rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p <i>(Dup. of #114, NSU, Vol 61)</i> <i>open 3-25-98 NLJ 96-204</i>	undated	A
#72d rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p <i>(Dup. of #114, NSU, Vol 61)</i> <i>open 3-25-98 NLJ 96-204</i>	undated	A
#75 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. S 1 p <i>(Dup. of #13, NSF, CF, Lat Am, Vol 7)</i> <i>open 12-1-94 NLJ 94-272</i>	2/7/68	A
#75a memo	Rusk to President S 2 p <i>(Dup. of #70, NSF, SF, Pres Det, 44, Bx 40)</i> <i>open 10-2-98 NLJ 96-196</i>	2/6/68	A
#77 memo	Rostow to President, 10:30 a.m. C 1 p <i>(Dup. of #19, Files of WWR, Non-VN: 1-2/68)</i> <i>open 12-3-96 NLJ 96-25</i>	2/7/68	A
#78a cable	Saigon 504 S 1 p <i>open 8-25-98 NLJ 96-196</i> <i>8-25-98</i>	2/7/68	A
#80 memo	Rostow to President, 8:15 a.m. S 1 p <i>sanitized NLJ 96-199 8.19.98</i>	2/7/68	A
#80a rpt	Intelligence Report S 1 p <i>sanitized 7.10.98 NLJ 96-200</i>	2/5/68	A
#85 memo	Rostow to President S 2 p [Duplicate of #1, NSF, Country File, UK, "Visit of PM Wilson" - <i>brief. BK., 2/68, Bx 216</i>] <i>open 6-11-98</i>	2/7/68	A

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#85b rpt	Talking Points open 6-10-98 NLJ 93-269 S 5 p [Duplicate of #1b, NSF, Country File, UK, "Visit of PM Wilson" Brief. BK., 2/68]	2/68	A
#85c memo	Fowler to President S 2 p open 2/11/97 NLJ 96-209 [Duplicate of #1e, NSF, Country File, UK, "Visit of PM Wilson" Brief. BK., 2/68]	2/7/68	A
#89 memo	Rostow to President, re: Japan C 1 p	2/7/68	A
#89a memo	Fowler to President C 6 p (Dup of #5, Fowler, 1968 B/P - mil. offset, Bx 45, Open NLJ 95-307 5-12-99 & # 51a, NSF, Subject File, Balance) Arguments Vol 5)	2/3/68	A
#91 memo	Rostow to President S 1 p open 8-30-95 NLJ 91-448	2/7/68	A
#93 ltr	President to PM Pearson S 1 p open 11-24-95 NLJ 92-397	2/7/68	A
#64 memo	Rostow to President open 11-10-97 NLJ 96-206 S 1 p	2/8/68	A
#54a 1 cable	Deptel 104215 to Saigon TS 2 p open 9-18-97 NLJ 96-207	1/25/68	A
#54a-2 cable	Saigon 16977 TS 1 p "	1/25/68	A

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NSF, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 60, 2/7-9/68

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FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#17 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:30 a.m. - TS 1 p <i>Open 2:25:04 NW/RAC 03-181</i>	2/9/68	A
#17a rpt.	Intelligence report - TS 1 p <i>Open 5:30:04 NW/RAC 03-182</i>	2/8/68	A
#18 memo	Rostow to the President, 9:30 a.m. - TS 1 p <i>Open 3:14:03 NW/RAC 99-77</i> <i>dup *Slc, NSF, NSC History, March 31st Speech, "Vol. 2, Tabs A-2 and A-22," box 47</i>	2/9/68	A
#18a rpt.	Intelligence report - TS 1 p <i>Open 5:30:04 NW/RAC 03-183</i>	2/9/68	A
#44 memo	Rostow to the President, 5:30 p.m. - TS 1 p	2/8/68	A
#44a memo	Wheeler to the President - TS 1 p	2/8/68	A
#44b rpt.	Intelligence Report - TS 6 pp	2/8/68	A
#64a cable	Westmoreland report - 5 3pp <i>Open 5:30:04 NW/RAC 03-182</i>	2/8/68	A

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National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Volume 60, February 7-9, 1968
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Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968 - 7:25 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with General Dayan

During his farewell talk with you Tuesday, you'll recall that Ambassador Harman offered to get an informal reaction from Eshkol to your seeing General Dayan.

Harman checked with the Prime Minister and has just phoned that "there isn't and couldn't be any objection" to your meeting. Harman (and Eshkol) understand that it would take place without publicity and as informally as possible.

Shall we now make arrangements?

This may be tough to arrange.

W.H. R.

Yes _____

Call me _____

cc: Harry McPherson

*P.S. Abe Finberg just called and suggested Fortas' home over Clifford's.
W.*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-206
By cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

~~SECRET~~

Pres file ²

February 9, 1968
Friday, 6:20 P.M.

Mr. President:

Here is General Westmoreland's latest estimate of the situation and his future strategy.

I understand General Wheeler has spoken to you on the phone about this message.

W. W. Rostow

BKS:amc

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

2a

O 091633Z ZYH ZFF-1
FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON
TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH
ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII
ZEM

DECLASSIFIED
Authority OSD ltr 11-22-78
By ip/hg, NARA, Date 2-3-92

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 01358 EYES ONLY SECTION ONE OF THREE

REFERENCES: A. JCS 01593, DTG 090021Z
B. CINCPAC DTG 090359Z

1. (U) SINCE REFERENCES A AND B CONCERN THE SAME GENERAL SUBJECT, I WILL ANSWER THEM COLLECTIVELY.
2. (S) TO PUT THE SITUATION IN CONTEXT, IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO GIVE YOU MY VIEWS OF THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY AND THE PLANS THAT HE DEVELOPED IN HANOI DURING EARLY FALL. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE ENEMY CONCLUDED THAT A PROTRACTED WAR WAS NOT IN HIS LONG-RANGE INTEREST IN VIEW OF THE SUCCESS OF OUR GROUND AND AIR ACTIONS AGAINST HIS FORCES, SUPPLIES, AND FACILITIES. HE THEREFORE DECIDED TO ADOPT AN ALTERNATE STRATEGY TO BRING THE WAR TO AN EARLY CONCLUSION. STEMMING FROM THIS STRATEGY, THERE EVOLVED A PLAN THAT I RECONSTRUCT IN THREE PHASES. PHASE I, WHICH STARTED AT THE END OF OCTOBER AND WAS SCHEDULED TO GO UNTIL THE FIRST OF THE YEAR, HAD AS ITS OBJECTIVE THE SEIZURE OF SELECTED AREAS IN REMOTE PROVINCES ALONG THE LAO AND CAMBODIAN BORDERS AND CONSOLIDATION OF THESE AREAS PENDING FURTHER OPERATIONS TO EXPAND HIS AREA OF CONTROL. ALSO DURING THIS PHASE, HE PROCEEDED TO CONCENTRATE ON DISTRICT TOWNS

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

TO DISRUPT THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL STRUCTURE OUTSIDE OF THE CITIES. DURING THIS PHASE, WE SAW THE MAJOR ATTACK ON DAK TO; ATTACKS BY FIRE ON KONTUM, PLEIKU, AND BAN ME THUOT; AND MAJOR GROUND ATTACKS AGAINST LOC NINH, BU DOP, AND SONG BE; AND ATTACKS AGAINST INNUMERABLE DISTRICT TOWNS AND OUTPOSTS. AS YOU KNOW, THIS PHASE ACHIEVED VERY LIMITED SUCCESS, RESULTED IN LARGE CASUALTIES TO THE ENEMY, AND A FAILURE TO PHYSICALLY CONTROL MORE TERRITORY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. AN ENCLAVE STRATEGY WOULD HAVE PLAYED INTO HIS HANDS. THE SECOND PHASE, WHICH WE SAW START AT TET, INVOLVED INFILTRATION OF CITIES TO DESTROY THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTROL APPARATUS AND TO BRING ABOUT A PUBLIC UPRISING. IN THE BORDER AREAS, THIS PHASE WAS DESIGNED TO SUPPORT HIS PLAN TO SEIZE CONTROL OF PLEIKU AND DARLAC PROVINCES WHICH WOULD GIVE HIM DE FACTO CONTROL OF THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE COUNTRY FROM THE ASHAU VALLEY IN WESTERN THUA THIEN ALL THE WAY DOWN THROUGH WAR ZONE C IN NORTHERN TAY NINH. THE THIRD PHASE, WHICH IS YET TO BEGIN, WOULD INVOLVE CONSOLIDATION OF HIS POSITION AND STRONG ATTACKS ACROSS THE DMZ AND AGAINST KHE SANH WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, THEREBY BRINGING ABOUT A DE FACTO PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY FROM WHEREIN HE WOULD CONTROL QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN, WESTERN QUANG NAM, WESTERN QUANG TIN, AND THE PROVINCES OF KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC, AND AT LEAST THE NORTHERN PORTIONS OF PHUOC LONG, BIEN LONG, AND TAY NINH. UNDER THE

~~TOP SECRET~~

REF ID: A66284

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

CIRCUMSTANCES, HE WOULD HAVE CREATED A SITUATION SIMILAR TO THAT WHICH NOW PREVAILS IN LAOS AND WOULD THEREFORE BE IN A STRONG NEGOTIATING POSITION, PARTICULARLY IF HE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN HIS DESIGN TO ASSUME CONTROL OF THE CITIES AND BRING ABOUT A PUBLIC UPRISING.

3. AS TO THE PRESENT SITUATION, AN ENEMY THREAT OF MAJOR PROPORTIONS IS STILL POSED NORTH OF THE DMZ AND AROUND KHE SANH. IN ADDITION, THE ENEMY IS APPLYING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO THE HUE AREA AND TO HIGHWAY 1 NORTH OF DANANG. FURTHERMORE, HE HAS A NUMBER OF BATTALIONS DIRECTLY SOUTH OF DANANG WHICH POSE A THREAT TO THE AIR FIELD AND THE CITY. THE 3D MAR DIV IS IN GOOD POSTURE AT KHE SANH AND SOUTH OF THE DMZ. THE 1ST CAV DIV IS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE WITH TWO BATTALIONS IN BLOCKING POSITIONS NORTH OF HUE. A MARINE REGIMENT IS SECURING HUE/PHU BAI AND ASSISTING IN THE CLEARING OF HUE CITY. THE MARINES HAVE MADE EXCELLENT PROGRESS, BUT THE GOING BY THE ARVN IN THE CITADEL HAS BEEN SLOW AND THEY WILL PROBABLY BE WITH IT FOR SEVERAL MORE DAYS. THE ROAD OVER AI VAN PASS IS CUT, WITH LITTLE PROSPECT OF BEING OPENED UNTIL ADDITIONAL TROOPS AND ENGINEERS CAN BE PROVIDED. BECAUSE OF THIS SITUATION, I AM DEPLOYING BY AIR TOMORROW A BATTALION OF THE 101ST ABN DIV TO HUE/PHU BAI TO ASSIST IN THE SECURITY OF THAT IMPORTANT AREA AND WILL BE MOVING OUT BY LST A SECOND BATTALION OF THE 101ST TO DANANG ON THE 12TH WITH THE MISSION OF PROVIDING SECURITY FOR HIGHWAY 1 OVER AI VAN PASS. ALSO I AM SENDING BY SEA AN ARMY COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION TO WORK ON HIGHWAY 1. THE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN QUANG TRI AND THUA THIEN IS LOGISTICS, NOW MARGINAL AT BEST. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE OPEN UP HIGHWAY 1 AND THE MARINES

~~TOP SECRET~~
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EYES ONLY

CANNOT SPARE THE FORCES TO DO THE JOB. THE SITUATION IN HUE SHOULD IMPROVE BECAUSE A TASK FORCE OF THREE VIETNAMESE MARINE BATTALIONS THAT ARE IN GOOD STRENGTH WILL BE REPLACING THE THREE UNDERSTRENGTH ABN BNS NOW FIGHTING IN THE CITY ALONG WITH ELEMENTS OF THE ARVN 1ST DIV.

4. THE SITUATION IN II CORPS IS GENERALLY FAVORABLE BUT THERE IS SOME FIGHTING WITH ENEMY ELEMENTS IN DALAT AND A SIZEABLE THREAT EXISTS AT DAK TO, I BELIEVE WE HAVE ENOUGH FORCES IN AT DAK TO, BUT ROSSON IS PREPARED TO REINFORCE WITH ELEMENTS OF THE 173D.

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

O 091633Z ZY4 ZFF-1

FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS WASH

ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 01858 EYES ONLY SECTION TWO OF THREE

5. IN III CORPS, FIGHTING CONTINUES IN SAIGON, BUT THIS SITUATION SHOULD BE CLEARED UP SHORTLY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT I EXPECT THE ENEMY TO INCREASE HIS EFFORT THERE IN THE NEXT SEVERAL DAYS. TODAY I DEPLOYED A US BATTALION IN THE AREA IN ORDER TO ENERGIZE THE ARVN AND TO PERMIT THEM TO REDEPLOY A BATTALION TO ANOTHER PART OF THE CITY. NORTH AND EAST OF SAIGON THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF THE 9TH AND 5TH VC DIVISIONS AND FURTHER NORTH WE HAVE THE 7TH NVA DIV. THE 5TH AND 9TH DIVISIONS HAVE BEEN HURT BY RECENT ACTIONS AND THEIR CAPABILITY IS CONSIDERED LIMITED. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE 7TH DIV IS IN FAIR SHAPE, BUT WE HAVE BEEN PUTTING THE PRESSURE ON THEM THROUGH GROUND RAIDS, ARTILLERY, AND AIR STRIKES DURING THE LAST WEEK, WHICH HAS PROBABLY DEGRADED THEIR CAPABILITY. WEYAND HAS SO DISPOSED HIS FORCES THAT THE ENEMY WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING AN ATTACK OFF THE GROUND AND COULD ONLY DO SO AT GREAT RISK. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS, SAIGON HAS BEEN REINFORCED BY TWO MARINE BATTALIONS WHICH WERE DEPLOYED FROM THE II CORPS. I AM PLANNING TO MOVE THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE INTO LONG AN ON THE 12TH AND IF NECESSARY CAN REINFORCE WITH TROOPS NOW IN THE IV CORPS ON SHORT NOTICE. FINALLY, THERE IS AN AIRBORNE BATTALION AT PHAN THUET WHICH I CAN USE TO FURTHER REINFORCE IF REQUIRED. IN SUMMARY, DESPITE

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

THE DEPLOYMENT OF TWO AIRBORNE BATTALIONS TO I CORPS, I FEEL THAT OUR POSTURE IN III CORPS IS ADEQUATE TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION.

IN IV CORPS, I NOW HAVE FIVE BATTALIONS ON THE 9TH DIV, TO INCLUDE THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE. THEY HAVE DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB AND IN MY OPINION HAVE SAVED THE SITUATION IN MY THOAND BEN TRE. YESTERDAY I PLANNED TO MOV THE MOBILE RIVERINE FORCE TO LONG AN ON THE 10TH, BUT BECAUSE OF CONTINUED ACTIVITY NEAR MY THO I HAVE DECIDED TO LEAVE THEM IN THAT AREA UNTIL THE 12TH.

S 6. THE ONLY REALLY SERIOUS THREAT THAT FACES ME NOW IS IN I CO AREA, WHERE WE ARE LIMITED BY LOGISTICS, WEATHER, THE CLOSURE OF HIGHWAY I AND ENEMY INITIATIVES. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I REINFORCE SOONEST WITH A MINIMUM OF TWO BATTALIONS.

7. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT CONCERNS ME IS THE SHORTAGE OF STRENGTH IN THE ARVN UNITS. THE SITUATION WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY HIGH CASUALTIES DURING THE PAST WEEK AND ABSENTEES FROM THE UNITS BECAUSE OF TET. MOST OF THESE ABSENTEES WERE AUTHORIZED IN THAT LEAVES WERE PERMITTED AND THE TROOPS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO GET BACK TO THEIR UNITS. ON THE OTHER HAND, I THINK WE MUST REALISTICALLY EXPECT DESERTIONS TO BE HIGH. IT IS GOING TO TAKE SOME TIME TO BUILD THE ARVN BACK UP TO STRENGTH. I HAVE EMPHASIZED THIS TO PRES. THIEU AND URGED THAT HE PROCEED IMMEDIATELY TO DRAFT 19-YEAR-OLDS, TO BE FOLLOWED AS NEEDED BY THE DRAFTING OF YOUTHS OF 18. FURTHERMORE, WE PLAN TO INCREASE THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES BY 65,000, AND THIEU HAS RECENTLY ASKED IF WE CAN SUPPORT AN EVEN GREATER BUILD-UP. IN MY OPINION, WE WILL HAVE NO DIFFICULTY SUPPORTING ANY BUILD-UP THAT THEY CAN ACCOMPLISH. AFTER FILLING THEIR DEPLETED RANKS, I DOUBT

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

THEIR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND TRAIN UNITS BEYOND THE PLANNED STRENGTH INCREASE OF 65,000.

8. I HAVE NOW DEPLOYED TO I CORPS THE 1ST CAVDIV LESS A BRIGADE, PLUS A BRIGADE OF THE 101ST ABN DIV. I WILL BE DEPLOYING SHORTLY TWO ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS OF THE 101ST AND WILL BE PREPARED TO DEPLOY A THIRD BATTALION WITH A BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AT A LATER TIME. IN MY OPINION, THIS IS THE MINIMUM FORCE THAT I WILL NEED TO INSURE STABILITY OF THE SITUATION IN THE TWO NORTHERN PROVINCES, BUT EVEN THIS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH. I MAY HAVE TO EMPLOY THE ENTIRE 101ST DIV AND AM PREPARED TO DO SO, DEPENDING UPON ENEMY ACTIONS. HOWEVER, LOGISTICS IS THE KEY AND THIS MEANS OPENING HIGHWAYS. DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, I WOULD MOVE INTO THE ASHAU VALLEY AND CLEAN IT OUT AND TO OPEN UP THE ROAD TO KHE SANH. ON THE OTHER HAND, I WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIORITY TO MOVING AGAINST THE ENEMY ONCE HE HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF. I AM NOT HAPPY ABOUT THINNING OUT III CORPS, BUT THE DEPARTURE OF THE 101ST WILL NOT PRESENT AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK; IT WILL SLOW DOWN PROGRESS THAT COULD OTHERWISE BE MADE IN DEFEATING MAIN FORCE UNITS IN THE AREA AND IN SUPPORTING PACIFICATION.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

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FM GEN WESTMORELAND COMUSMACV SAIGON

TO GEN WHEELER CJCS

ADM SHARP CINCPAC HAWAII

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET~~ MAC 01853 EYES ONLY FINAL SECTION OF THREE

9. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WOULD WELCOME REINFORCEMENTS AT ANY TIME THEY CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE:

A. TO PUT ME IN A STRONGER POSTURE TO CONTAIN THE ENEMY'S MAJOR CAMPAIGN IN THE DMZ-QUANG TRI-TRUA THIEN AREA AND TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE AS SOON AS HIS ATTACK IS SPENT.

B. TO PERMIT ME TO CARRY OUT MY CAMPAIGN PLANS DESPITE THE ENEMY'S REINFORCEMENTS FROM NORTH VIETNAM WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED MY DEPLOYMENTS AND PLANS.

C. TO OFF-SET THE WEAKENED VIETNAMESE FORCES RESULTING FROM CASUALTIES AND TET DESERTIONS. REALISTICALLY, WE MUST ASSUME THAT IT WILL TAKE THEM AT LEAST SIX MONTHS TO REGAIN THE MILITARY POSTURE OF SEVERAL WEEKS AGO. I SHOULD POINT OUT IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE CASUALTIES INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY, THIS IS NOT AN EXPECTED PRICE TO PAY.

D. TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE ENEMY'S WEAKENED POSITION BY GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST HIM.

10. IF THE ONE-HALF MARINE DIVISION WERE MADE AVAILABLE NOW, I WOULD OF COURSE ASSIGN IT TO III MAF, FOR EITHER NORTH OF DANANG OR IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE THEREBY RELEASING ELEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN DIVISION FOR DEPLOYMENT FURTHER SOUTH. IF THE 82D ABN DIV WERE

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

AVAILABLE NOW, I WOULD WANT IT TO ARRIVE AT DANANG AND BE DEPLOYED NORTH IN THE AI VAN PASS AND THENCE TO THE HUE/PHU BAI AREA FOR POSSIBLE OPERATIONS IN BASE AREA 117 AND LATER PERHAPS IN BASE AREA 101. THIS DIVISION WOULD OPERATE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 1ST CAV DIV. SUBSEQUENTLY, ALONG WITH THE 1ST CAV DIV, AND ELEMENTS OF THE III MAF, IT COULD EFFECT A LAND LINK-UP WITH KHE SANH AND THENCE MOVE INTO THE ANHAM VALLEY AND CLEAN IT OUT. (YORK II) THE SEQUENCE OF OBJECTIVES WOULD BE DETERMINED AFTER CONSIDERING THE FACTORS AT THE TIME. I ENVISION THE 82D WOULD MOVE BY FOOT AND ROAD TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE SO AS TO ECONOMIZE ON THE USE OF HELICOPTERS. SUCH DEPLOYMENT WOULD PERMIT ME TO RELIEVE ELEMENTS, IF NOT ALL, OF THE 101ST ABN DIV TO RETURN TO THE III CORPS TO ASSIST IN OPERATIONS THERE.

WHEN WEATHER

PERMITS, IT WILL BE DESIRABLE, IF NOT ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH A BEACH SUPPORT AREA SOUTH OF QUANG TRI.

THIS IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND ECONOMICAL WAY OF PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO THE AREA. IT WILL BE FEASIBLE TO SUPPORT THE 82D INITIALLY FROM DANANG ALONG HIGHWAY 1, PROVIDE NECESSARY TROOPS ARE COMMITTED TO KEEP THE ROAD OPEN. WITH THE COMMITMENT OF SUCH TROOPS, IT MIGHT ALSO BE PRACTICAL TO PUT THE RAILROAD IN OPERATION AND THIS WOULD FURTHER INCREASE THE TONNAGE. HOWEVER, I DO NOT YET HAVE A SURVEY AS TO THE COSTS AND TIME INVOLVED IN OPENING RAILROAD, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MAJOR TASK.

11. IN SUMMARY, I WOULD MUCH PREFER A BIRD IN THE HAND THAN TWO IN THE BUSH, BUT WOULD LIKE THE BIRDS TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE I CORPS AREA AND NOT IN THE II CORPS OR III CORPS. ELEMENTS THAT I HAVE HAD

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

TO DEPLOY FROM III CORPS COULD PERHAPS BE RETURNED AND THEREFORE
EXPAND OUR OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT A SIX-MONTH
LOAN OF THESE UNITS WOULD TURN THE TIDE TO THE POINT WHERE THE ENEMY
MIGHT SEE THE LIGHT OR BE SO WEAKENED THAT WE COULD RETURN THEM,
PARTICULARLY IF THE ARVN CAN REBUILD ITSELF FOLLOWING ITS RECENT
BATTLES AND IMPROVES ITS FIGHTING QUALITY BY VIRTURE OF THE MODERN
WEAPONS IT IS SCHEDULED TO RECEIVE.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3/

INFORMATION

SECRET

Pres file

Friday, February 9, 1968
5:20 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Andy Goodpaster's
latest briefing of Gen. Eisenhower.

Key passages are marked.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET

WWRostow:rla



~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315


3a

9 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memorandum for record of my meeting with General Eisenhower at Palm Desert yesterday. As the memorandum indicates, he exhibits no special concern over the Soviet missile and nuclear programs. He did offer some suggestions for consideration, set forth in paragraph 7. Also he made the comments indicated in paragraph 3.

He was appreciative for the report on the Communist TET attacks in South Vietnam and on the Pueblo incident. He made only limited comments, indicated in paragraphs 9 and 15.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(a)

BY hg ON 2-4-68

~~SECRET~~



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36

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315

9 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with General Eisenhower, 8 February 1968

1. I met with General Eisenhower for two hours at his office and home at Palm Desert on 8 February. The meeting covered 3 subjects: The Soviet missile and nuclear program; the Communist TET offensive in SVN; and the Pueblo incident.
2. I first covered the Soviet missile, nuclear and related programs at length, stressing that I would try to give a balanced picture, although many of the figures are subject to uncertainty and interpretation. To begin, I pointed out that we are at a significant point in the evolution of Soviet strategic nuclear forces in relation to our own. Major increases in Soviet missile forces are now underway and are anticipated in the next several years, the effect of which is to bring them generally to parity with us, and probably to surpass us in certain indices such as "megatonnage". Their expansion poses the issue of whether it makes better sense for us to accept that this is happening, or to initiate a further expansion ourselves in order to seek to "stay ahead".
3. General Eisenhower made two comments on this point. First, when we get to a point at which we think we have plenty in number on our side, it makes no sense simply to add more. Instead, we should concentrate on how to go forward in efficiency--i. e., advancement in performance--so that we will never be outmatched in performance. Second, he asked whether the numbers of weapons that would be produced by straight extrapolation would have any military meaning. I said that the number needed to give an assured capability of destroying the enemy nation, no matter what the circumstances--probably in the range of 500 to a 1000--seem to me to have special significance. Above this, some numbers are needed to attack his forces, to reduce the weight of his attack on our cities, and the like, but there is a point where the value of further weapons becomes small. A great deal of the analysis and debate that goes on in the Pentagon goes into finding sound levels

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
MR 93-405#2
By BM / BBM, NARA, Date 5-4-94

~~SECRET~~

for each of these.

4. I then reviewed specific US and USSR weapons figures, actual and projected, extending generally from 1964 to 1967. Key points included the rise in US ICBM and Polaris missiles from about 1000 in 1964 to some 1500 in 1967 (1700 total), then staying generally level till 1976. On the Russian side, the increase there is from about 300 in 1964 to nearly 600 in 1967 and 900 in 1968 with a further estimated increase to 1500-2100 in 1976 (400-500 of the increase being in submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The rapid rise in 1967 and 1968 is in hardened sites for 2 missiles of a recent generation (SS9 and SS11). The increase will apparently slow down in the coming year, since the number of these sites still under construction is much less than a year ago. Consistent with the rapid rise that has already occurred, current estimates for 1970 and 1974 have been substantially upped over those made two years ago (for 1970, 1200 vs. 800; for 1974, 1700 vs. 1000). The Soviets may also begin to introduce a smaller, cheaper, solid-fueled missile within the next year or two.

5. I next gave the figures for 1967, 1969 and 1972 for US intercontinental bombers and for Soviet intercontinental bombers, medium range bombers, submarine-launched cruise missiles, and intermediate or medium range strategic missiles aimed at targets in Europe and Asia. (I pointed out that no one can state with certainty just how the latter categories relate to US strategic missile power in all circumstances.) I then covered "megatonnage" figures for 1964 through 1976, first taking up US and USSR in comparison in the ICBM/SLBM category (US at approximately 2000 MT through 1970, then dropping to 1400; USSR rising from 700 in 1964 to 4500 in 1968 and 5000-9000 in 1976). Next I gave total loadings for ICBMs, SLBMs, and intercontinental bombers for 1967, 1969 and 1972 (US declining from 9000 to 4000; USSR rising from 4500 to 5600-8400). Finally, I pointed out that if the weapons were converted to 1 MT equivalents the US would go from 5700 in 1967 to 3700 in 1972, and the USSR from 1800 in 1967 to 2300-3200 in 1972. After having described the MIRV system earlier, I pointed out that our MIRV program, which is being initiated with 10 missiles in mid-1970, will give us a weapon which offers a vast increase in effectiveness; each missile equipped with MIRV's will outmatch much greater USSR "megatonnage".

6. As to production of nuclear materials, I summarized

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that USSR capacity and annual rates of production are now leveling off, since construction consists of completing existing facilities, not in starting new ones. It is estimated that the Soviets will have enough material to provide for the weapons now forecast and to fill their other requirements as well.

7. General Eisenhower emphasized the futility of simple increases in missile numbers or in megatons, stressing the need for efficiency and other advances. During discussion, he made the following three suggestions for consideration:

a. The desirability of having a limited number of large-yield missiles--perhaps 20 or more - having a yield of 20 to 30 MT. (I had mentioned that the Soviet SS9 war head yield is estimated in the range of 12-25 MT, and also that some of our airborne weapons are in the 20 megaton category). He would have such weapons largely for psychological and deterrent effect, and to make clear that the Soviets do not "outmatch" us.

b. A modest Polaris submarine replacement and re-inforcement program--perhaps 3 to 5 boats a year, to keep up technological progress and construction capability.

c. Avoidance of rigidity in total numbers of missiles projected for the United States in the future. A figure of 1500 or 1700 should never be regarded as holy; it cannot be that exact.

8. Having made these points, General Eisenhower indicated that he did not feel concerned about the trends and changes in the figures I had presented.

9. I next took up the TET attacks in South Vietnam beginning with the location, scale and nature of the attacks. Five major cities, 35 of 44 province capitals, 36 district towns, many villages and hamlets and 24 airfields were hit. Over 50,000 enemy troops were used, mostly VC, amounting to perhaps half the total VC unit strength. The attacks were directed against population centers, attacking whatever targets were available within them. There seem to have been no set withdrawal plans; instead there were orders to enemy units to "fight to victory". There is some evidence of a hope to bring large parts of the population over to the VC side and to seize and hold control of several large population centers.

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10. As to the condition of ARVN units, and their response, both the military and the police were engaged in TET when the attacks occurred and had half or more of their strength away. Nearly all Arvn and US forces were involved in the initial counteraction except for US forces in Northern I Corps. Within a short time, however, US forces were engaged only in six cities. ARVN forces bore the brunt of the attack and acquitted themselves well, defeating the VC in nearly all cases without requiring diversion of US forces.

11. As to the present situation, the VC are now out of the cities and towns except for remnants of their forces and snipers. Some VC actions continue near the outskirts of towns and cities, and other VC units are occasionally in heavy contact with ARVN units. No clear pattern of VC withdrawal is in evidence. Moreover, the VC retain the capability for renewing the attack with the substantial forces not yet committed. The status of nearly half of the GVN Revolutionary Development teams is not known.

12. Concerning losses and results of the attacks, up to 6 February the US had lost 670 KIA, ARVN 1294, others 44, and the enemy 24,199 KIA, plus 5007 detained. Over 6000 enemy weapons were captured. Civilian losses have been high and damage great, but figures are not yet available.

13. As to major effects, it is still too early to give a full assessment. The VC have suffered a severe military defeat, with tremendous losses, half of the committed force, perhaps a quarter of their whole regular force. They were not able to bring about the diversion of major US forces from Khe Sanh or elsewhere. However, the psychological impact has been great. Immediate critical reaction was strong in the US and elsewhere in the world. The VC have demonstrated a capability to enter and attack cities and towns and a technique for doing vast damage with widespread terrorism. The reaction of the SVN people is not yet fully evident. However, they did not turn against the government and there was no general uprising nor did the government or military go to pieces. While some comment seems to envisage more "fence-straddling", I commented that these attacks may bring the war, and the VC ruthlessness, home to the people of the cities who have been relatively secure and not personally engaged until now. I pointed out that it is early to judge the caliber of the government's response to the tasks that now confront them, but that they seem to be making

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an effective beginning. Finally, there is bound to be a profound impact on VC morale, particularly in those units which bore the brunt of the fight.

14. General Eisenhower commented that he agreed with this last point. He added that for the VC to commit their remaining forces in a new attack now would be to reinforce failure, which seems open to doubt. He asked whether it is possible to identify who is VC and who is a loyal citizen. I described some of the screening techniques that are being used.

15. Finally, I covered the Pueblo seizure, beginning with what happened at the time, according to messages received and monitored. As to location, it seems certain that the ship was in international waters when seized. In addition, there had been no information at any time suggesting that the ship had violated territorial waters. The orders to the ship expressly required that it stay outside. As to destruction of classified material and documents, full information was not received from the ship. It appears, however, that much, but perhaps not all, of the sensitive equipment was destroyed, and much of the rest may have been damaged to some degree. Diplomatic efforts are still being pursued. The South Koreans are very exercised and upset and we are trying to settle them down.

16. General Eisenhower had no major comment other than that the Liberty incident and this one should cause us to establish adequate plans and preparations for destruction of equipment and documents. He commented that, from his own experience, these preparations have sometimes been inadequately made. He asked whether the ship was under control in naval operational channels, and I told him that it was, as evidenced by messages between the ship and the naval station in Japan. He reiterated that this incident, like that of the Liberty, should alert and warn us.


A. J. GOODPASTER
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

~~SECRET~~

4

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
4:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

This is a more worrying picture
of Ky's task force than Komer's.

A second bad attack on Saigon
could be rough..

W. W. Rostow

[Redacted signature block]

~~SECRET~~

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

WWRostow:rlh

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-199
By is, NARA Date 8-19-98

1968 FEB 9 20 24

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200
By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

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[REDACTED]

Retlow

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 8-9 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT PROBLEMS AND ACTIVITIES OF, AND DISSENSION WITHIN, THE VIETNAMESE TASK FORCE.

ACQ SOURCE VIETNAM, SAIGON (9 FEBRUARY 1968)
[REDACTED]

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY HAS ORDERED MORE RICE DISTRIBUTED IN SAIGON AND MEAT TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE CITY TO AVERT THE DANGERS OF SHORTAGES, ESPECIALLY SHOULD ANOTHER ATTACK OCCUR. AT THE 8 FEBRUARY MEETING OF THE TASK FORCE, VARIOUS MEMBERS SPENT THEIR TIME CRITICIZING EACH OTHER, AFTER WHICH KY TRIED TO SOOTH EVERYONE. TASK FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL THANG IS FINDING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CUT THROUGH REDTAPE AND, AT HE TASK FORCE MEETING ON 9 FEBRUARY, THREATENED TO RESIGN. END SUMMARY.

1. IN HIS CAPACITY AS HEAD OF THE JOINT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN)/U.S. TASK FORCE, VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY HAS ORDERED THAT 2,000 TONS OF RICE BE DISTRIBUTED DAILY THROUGHOUT SAIGON RATHER THAN MERELY THE 200 TONS REPORTEDLY DISTRIBUTED ON 8 FEBRUARY. KY ALSO WANTS TO ASSURE THE DISTRIBUTION TO THE PEOPLE WITHIN THE NEXT 48 HOURS OF 1,300 TONS OF FROZEN PORK. HE FEELS THAT IF THERE IS ANOTHER ATTACK ON THE CITY, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT EVERYONE HAVE SEVEN DAYS' SUPPLY OF FOOD. AT PRESENT, 600 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) CADRES EQUIPPED WITH BULL HORNS AND SPLIT INTO TEN TEAMS ARE HELPING IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF RICE IN TEN OF THE 75 REFUGEE CENTERS THAT HAVE BEEN SET UP IN SAIGON.

2. [REDACTED] THE VIET CONG (VC) HAVE ALREADY INFILTRATED THE POPULACE IN CERTAIN SECTIONS OF SAIGON. GVN AUTHORITIES CANNOT USE FORCE EN MASSE BECAUSE INNOCENT PEOPLE WOULD BE KILLED. THE GVN HAS ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO BURN SOME HOUSES TO GET AT THE VC AND THIS HAS NATURALLY ANGERED THE PEOPLE AFFECTED. IF THERE IS ANOTHER ATTACK DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS, THE 130,000 REFUGEES NOW IN SAIGON, UNLESS THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FOOD SUPPLIES, COULD EVENTUALLY BE PROVOKED INTO A STREET MARCH IN SEARCH OF FOOD. THE REFUGEE CENTERS ALSO HAVE PROBABLY BEEN INFILTRATED BY THE VC AND IT WOULD BE BEHIND A VC FLAG THAT THE REFUSEES WOULD MAKE THEIR MARCH. IF SUCH A SITUATION

DAYS' SUPPLY OF FOOD. AT PRESENT, 600 REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (RD) CADRES EQUIPPED WITH BULL HORNS AND SPLIT INTO TEN TEAMS ARE HELPING IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF RICE IN TEN OF THE REFUGEE CENTERS THAT HAVE BEEN SET UP IN SAIGON.

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] THE VIET CONG (VC) HAVE ALREADY INFILTRATED THE POPULACE IN CERTAIN SECTIONS OF SAIGON. GVN AUTHORITIES CANNOT USE FORCE EN MASSE BECAUSE INNOCENT PEOPLE WOULD BE KILLED. THE GVN HAS ALREADY BEEN FORCED TO BURN SOME HOUSES TO GET AT THE VC AND THIS HAS NATURALLY ANGERED THE PEOPLE AFFECTED. IF THERE IS ANOTHER ATTACK DURING THE NEXT TWO DAYS, THE 130,000 REFUGEES NOW IN SAIGON, UNLESS THEY HAVE SUFFICIENT FOOD SUPPLIES, COULD EVENTUALLY BE PROVOKED INTO A STREET MARCH IN SEARCH OF FOOD. THE REFUGEE CENTERS ALSO HAVE PROBABLY BEEN INFILTRATED BY THE VC AND IT WOULD BE BEHIND A VC FLAG THAT THE REFUGEES WOULD MAKE THEIR MARCH. IF SUCH A SITUATION SHOULD OCCUR, THE GVN FORCES COULD NOT SHOOT INTO THE CROWDS. THUS, THERE IS EXTREME URGENCY IN THE TASK FORCE'S RELIEF JOB.)

3. AT A MEETING OF THE TASK FORCE ON 8 FEBRUARY, KY ATTEMPTED TO SOOTH EVERYONE'S FEELINGS AFTER THEY HAD BEEN CRITICIZED BY OTHERS. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN CRITICIZING MINISTER OF HEALTH TRAN LY Y FOR REQUESTING FUNDS, FOOD AND SUPPLIES WHICH, LOC CHARGED, HE WANTED FOR THE FAMILITES OF HIS DOCTORS AND NURSES. LOC ALSO CRITICIZED DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INFORMATION AND PRESS NGUYEN NGOC LINH. FOR HIS PART, THE LATTER TOLD DIRECTOR GENERAL OF YOUTH AND SPORTS NGUYEN GUU TRI THAT HE SHOULD GET THE YOUTH OUT ON THE STREETS WORKING ON THE DIRT AND GARBAGE PROBLEM. [REDACTED] AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO GET THE RD CADRES TO WORK WITH THE YOUTH IN CLEANING UP THE STREETS.) LINH CHARGED THAT TRI HAS BEEN PLAYING POLITICS BY USING ONE GROUP AND REFUSING THE SERVICES OF ANOTHER, SOMETIMES IGNORING THE BETTER ORGANIZATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, LINH SAID HE HAD A REPORT THAT TRI WAS DISCRIMINATING AGAINST THE NATIONAL COLUNTARY SERVICE.

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN IS UNHAPPY WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LOAN AND [REDACTED] VIEN AND TASK FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANH ARE BOTH UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WHOLE SITUATION. [REDACTED] VIEN, THANG AND OTHERS DISCUSSED THEIR GENERAL UNHAPPINESS AT A LUNCHEON CONVENED BY KY ON 8 FEBRUARY.)

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b)(1)

5. THANG HAS NOT BEEN PERFORMING WELL AS A COORDINATOR IN HIS JOB AS TASK FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF. ALTHOUGH WORKING HARD PERSONALLY, HE IS NOT PUSHING THE GROUPS ENOUGH TO ACCOMPLISH ASSIGNED TASKS. HE SPENDS A GREAT DEAL OF TIME AT MEETINGS, AND SEEMS UNABLE TO CUT THROUGH THE MINISTERIAL AND BUREAUCRATIC MORASS. IN FRUSTRATION, HE THREATENED TO RESIGN DURING THE TASK FORCE MEETING OF 9 FEBRUARY. LIEUTENANT COLONEL KHU DUC HUNG, WHO HAS BEEN NAMED HEAD OF THE TASK FORCE'S POPULAR PARTICIPATION SECTION, IS ALSO NOT WORKING OUT. DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INFORMATION LINH HAS ADVISED KY TO GIVE MINISTER OF OPEN ARMS NGUYEN XUAN PHONG HIGH LEVEL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS AREA.

[REDACTED] A NUMBER OF CIVILIAN INTELLECTUALS HAVE OFFERED KY THEIR SERVICE BUT HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE UNWILLING TO WORK UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF HUNG WHOM THEY CONSIDER TO BE UNQUALIFIED. [REDACTED]

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b)(1)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE USMACV 7TH AIR FORCE DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

Friday, February 9, 1968
4:45 p. m.

1. Suspense
2. File
5

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith, as approved by Sect. Rusk, special instructions for Cy Vance.

Also attached is a vivid account from General Bonesteel of the state of mind of President Park. I have confirmed with State Department that they believe the instructions still hold after the receipt of this message.

(~~was to be~~
~~yellow copy~~
on his desk)

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments (log 578 and Korea 0513 EO)

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

coll me _____

578
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(Approved by Secretary Rusk)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Rostow
For clearance

MISSION OF CYRUS R. VANCE

Special Instruction

You should arrange for a secret conversation with President Park with only his interpreter and/or personal assistant, Yi Hu-rak present. You should decide who should accompany you. You are to convey the following in any manner and with any elaboration you deem desirable.

1. The immediate release of the USS Pueblo and its crew is required to reduce quickly the tension in the area and the danger of war. This is of transcendent importance. But there is another aspect that is extremely important to President Johnson.

2. The country and the Congress have welcomed the President's restraint in the face of this great provocation, just as it has welcomed President Park's restraint in the face of the Blue House raid. If the crew and the vessel are not returned quickly, this will not only become a very serious matter between the U.S. and the North Koreans, but it can become a very serious matter on the American political scene. President Park knows the problems of free elections. This is an election year in the U.S., and the issue could become a major one in the campaign in such a way as to affect U.S.-ROK relations and our position in Southeast Asia. This is the second reason why the U.S. must do its utmost and use every possible means to obtain the immediate release of the crew

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By , NARA, Date 2-7-94

and the vessel. The private meetings channel is at present the only one which offers any prospect of obtaining release and we must give it every opportunity to show whether it will produce results. We cannot throw this matter into open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission, or insist on a Republic of Korea representative attending the public meetings, which would certainly produce a breakdown of those talks.

3. The President is deeply appreciative of the closeness of the exchanges which have been taking place in this very grave situation. It reminds him of the close and continuing contacts between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill during World War II and he wants to keep it that way. The President understands President Park's domestic problems and he wants President Park to understand his. There is no substitute for this personal trust and confidence at a time like this.

4. We are not going to abandon the Republic of Korea when the USS Pueblo and its crew are returned, but we will remain in Korea in even stronger force than before. President Johnson urges President Park to be calm and patient, not to permit any of his officers to engage in rash acts which might lead to fighting on the DMZ, which would create a wholly new set of problems and dangers and strains on our alliance, as well as interrupt the great progress that the Republic of Korea has been making under President Park.

~~SECRET~~

56

February 9, 1968

SUBJECT: Themes for the Mission of Cyrus Vance

1. To persuade President Park that we attach as much importance to the North Korean provocations against South Korea as we do to the return of the USS Pueblo and crew.
2. To make Park understand we do not see the issue in Korea as a double problem, one involving the U.S. in its attempts to obtain the release of the USS Pueblo and its crew, and one involving the Republic of Korea in the face of North Korean provocations. The provocations against the Republic of Korea are a problem for both countries, not just the Republic of Korea, and the SS Pueblo is not just our problem but requires South Korean cooperation to be resolved.
3. To explain to Park that we are committed to using peaceful means to resolve both sets of problems and until we have clearly abandoned hope for a peaceful settlement we must reserve judgment as to further courses of action.
4. To ask Park publicly and privately to associate himself with our view that he too seeks a peaceful solution.
5. To obtain a reaffirmation that the authority of General Bonesteel and the chain of command will be absolutely observed.
6. To impress on Park that just as we will not take unilateral reprisal actions against the North Koreans in the present tense situation without full advance consultation with him, we expect that no unilateral reprisal actions will be taken by the Republic of Korea, organized or spontaneous, without full advance consultation with us, and to inform him that such ROK actions could well alienate American and world opinion and destroy the very foundation of both the ROK case and our case and endanger support for our alliance.
7. To convince Park that we must _____] pursue private meetings with the North Koreans to obtain release of crew and vessel, until we are convinced that further talks of this kind are fruitless, and we must look to other courses of action.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NEJ 93-367
By ijp, NARA, Date 2-7-94

8. To make Park understand that the attachment of a South Korean to the private meetings is impossible because the North Koreans will not accept it and if we make an issue of this it will terminate the private meetings.

9. To make Park understand that open meetings of the Military Armistice Commission will not solve either the provocation problem or the Pueblo. It is a propaganda forum.

10. To make Park understand that when the Pueblo Case is settled we will not return to the status quo but by our actions in providing additional military and counter-infiltration assistance and by keeping augmented forces in and around South Korea we will display our determination to stand with the ROKs.

11. To stress to President Park that the continuing public evidence of differences between us, any threat to return units from Viet-Nam, any indication of unilateral action by South Korea against the North will only play into the hands of the North Koreans.

12. To show Park that we have played the game with him in full trust and confidence and we expect full trust and confidence from him.

Pres file

6

Friday, Feb. 9, 1968
4:15 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Carl Rowan, in passing through my office, told me the following:

Kalugin, of the Soviet Embassy, came to visit him delivering an invitation to a party at the Soviet Embassy later this month. He said the Soviet Government has told the North Koreans that they have made their propaganda point and should now deliver over the PUEBLO and its crew.

Carl plans to use the item on a broadcast. I told him we had confirmation of no such message.

W. W. Rostow

LDK'd to SS

7

INFORMATION

SECRET

Friday, February 9, 1968
4:00 p.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker gets to
Thien loud and clear.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 18699

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By 176, NARA, Date 1-31-92



Department of State

TELEGRAM

26

~~SECRET~~

2

PP RUEHC
DE RUMJIR 18699 0401015
ZNY SSSSS
P 090930Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6186
STATE GRNC
BT

CN: 2852Q
1968 FEB 9, 8:15 AM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 76-196
By is, NARA Date 8-28-97

~~SECRET~~ SAIGON 18699

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY FROM BUNKER

REF : STATE 111337; SAIGON 18583

1. AFTER PRESENTING THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THIEU, I SAID THAT I HAD A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC POINTS WHICH I WISHED TO DISCUSS PRIVATELY AND FRANKLY WITH HIM. I POINTED OUT THAT ONLY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY RUSK WERE AWARE OF THESE SUBJECTS.

2. I TOLD THIEU THAT WE FELT THE COORDINATED NVA/VC ATTACKS AND THE ENEMY'S EXTENSIVE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN HAD HAD A VERY NEGA-

~~PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18699 SECRET~~

TIVE EFFECT IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE ABROAD. I NOTED THAT AT THE BEGINNING THIS HAD ALSO BEEN TRUE OF VIETNAMESE OPINION BUT THAT THIS HAS CHANGED SHARPLY IN THE MEANTIME. I WENT ON TO SAY THAT I HAD TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES DURING THE PAST WEEK, WE FEEL STRONGLY THAT IT IS OF THE HIGHEST URGENCY FOR THE GVN TO ACT VIGOROUSLY TO MEET BOTH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF LONGER RANGE AND MORE DEEP-SEATED IN NATURE. I SAID THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS MADE IT EASIER FOR VC POLITICAL AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS TO BE EFFECTIVE. NOTING THAT RAPID AND DECISIVE ACTION MIGHT MEAN OCCASIONAL MISTAKES, I SAID WE MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE RISKS. WE CAN LIVE WITH SOME MISTAKES, BUT NOT WITH "BUSINESS AS USUAL". I ASSURED HIM THAT HE CAN COUNT ON OUR ENTIRE SUPPORT AND ADDED THAT THIS WAS NO TIME FOR HALF-MEASURES. NOTING THAT THIS WAS A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM AND THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER TO WORK TOGETHER AS A CLOSELY KNIT TEAM I REITERATED THAT THEY WOULD ALL HAVE OUR STRONG SUPPORT. I THEN SAID THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL SPECIFIC ITEMS I WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH HIM.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18699 SECRET~~

3. ONE OF THE MOST URGENT TASKS IS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARVN AND TO GET THE BEST OFFICERS INTO COMMAND POSITIONS WHILE ELIMINATING THE INCOMPETENTS. I SAID THIS WAS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO EVALUATE THESE OFFICERS, REMARKING THAT GENERAL WESTMORELAND CONSIDERED THAT THE DIVISION COMMANDERS HAD DONE WELL, BUT THAT OBVIOUSLY SOME IMPROVEMENTS WERE NEEDED AND THIS WAS THE TIME TO DO IT.

4. THIEU SAID HE AGREED AND ASSURED ME THAT THEY PLAN TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION TO MAKE NECESSARY CHANGES, INCLUDING TWO OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS. HE CONFIRMED HIS PLAN TO SEND GENERAL THANG TO IV CORPS BY MARCH 1, AND THAT FOLLOWING THIS HE INTENDED TO REPLACE VINH LOC; AND THAT OTHER CHANGES WOULD BE MADE. THIEU REFERRED TO HIS ANALYSIS OF THE ENEMY EFFORT IN HIS TALK WITH ME FEB. 7 (SAIGON 18561), ESPECIALLY THE COUNTER-PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN. HE THEREFORE SAW A POSSIBLE NEED TO STRENGTHEN ARVN TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN THE 65,000 INCREASE PREVIOUSLY PLANNED. HE THEN WENT OVER SOME OF THE MEASURES HE DESCRIBED YESTERDAY FOR SPEEDING UP THE INDUCTION PROCESS TO BRING IN THE YOUNGER CATEGORIES IN THE FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1968, SAYING HE HAD ALREADY TALKED TO DEFENSE MINISTER VY ABOUT THIS. THIEU ADDED THAT

~~PAGE 4 RUMJIR 18699 SECRET~~

HE WANTED VIEN TO TALK TO WESTMORELAND ABOUT WHETHER THERE WAS A NEED TO INCREASE THE FORCES BEYOND 65,000 ALREADY CONTEMPLATED. IF SO, WHAT COULD THE U.S. DO TO SUPPORT THESE ADDITIONAL FORCES IN THE WAY OF EQUIPMENT AND FUNDS IN FY 1969?

5. I THEN NOTED THE FAILURE OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN NOT KNOWING THE TIMING OF THE ENEMY ATTACK, AND POINTED OUT THE OBVIOUS NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT IN THIS FIELD. THIEU SAID THAT THEY CERTAINLY DID NOT KNOW THE EXACT TIME BUT THE ATTACK ITSELF WAS NOT A SURPRISE, AS IT HAD BEEN LAID OUT IN HANOI'S DECISION NO. 13 AND ITS SUPPLEMENTS, WHICH ENVISAGED AN UPRISING DURING THE FIRST OF 1968. THIEU SAID THE SURPRISE WAS IN THE SCALE AND THE ACCURACY OF THE ATTACK, ESPECIALLY THE CAREFULLY PIN-POINTED MOVES IN SAIGON. HE NOTED THAT IN PROVINCIAL TOWNS THERE HAD BEEN MORE OR LESS CONTINUING ATTACKS OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER. THIEU SAID THAT GENERAL VIEN HAD WARNED ALL THE CORPS COMMANDERS. HE ADDED THAT IN MY THO FOR EXAMPLE THE COMMANDER KNEW AN ATTACK WAS COMING AND WAS PREPARED; THIS WAS ALSO TRUE OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE 22ND AND 23RD ARVN DIVISIONS IN II CORPS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~PAGE 5 RUMJIR 18699 SECRET~~

6. I THEN EMPHASIZED TO THIEU THE EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF GETTING AT THE PROBLEM OF CORRUPTION, NOTING THAT IN HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS HE HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE ATTACKED AT ALL LEVELS. FAILURE TO TAKE VIGOROUS ACTION WILL MAKE THE GOVERNMENT INCREASINGLY VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM AT HOME AND ABROAD. I URGED THAT IT BE MADE CLEAR THAT A NEW DEAL IS IN EFFECT AND THAT THERE WOULD BE RAPID AND DRASTIC MEASURES OF JUSTICE TAKEN AGAINST OFFICIALS BY THEIR PROMPT REMOVAL.

7. THIEU SAID ONCE AGAIN THAT HE FULLY AGREED. HE PLANNED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ON MARCH 1, EVEN THOUGH THE NEW TRAINING OF PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS HAD TO BE POSTPONED FROM THE BEGINNING OF FEBRUARY UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF MARCH. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ITSELF IN THE PROVINCE WOULD BE A DETERRENT TO CORRUPTION SINCE THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WOULD NO LONGER BE ABLE TO LOOK TO THE CORPS COMMANDERS FOR PROTECTION. THIEU SAID THAT AS ALWAYS THE PROBLEM BOILED DOWN TO GETTING SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE. HE HAD TWO ALTERNATIVES - 1) TO REMOVE ALL SUSPECT PROVINCE AND DISTRICT CHIEFS AND HOLD THEM FOR

~~PAGE 6 RUMJIR 18699 SECRET~~

INVESTIGATION, OR 2) TO GET THE EVIDENCE FIRST AND THEN MOVE AGAINST THEM. I INTERJECTED THAT THERE WERE MANY RUMORS OF CORRUPTION AT HIGH LEVELS AND THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO MAKE AN EXAMPLE OF SUCH PAST OFFENDERS. I SAID THIS WOULD MAKE VERY CLEAR THAT THE FUTURE WOULD BE A NEW DEAL. THIEU CONCLUDED LACONICALLY THAT PROBABLY SOME 80 PERCENT OF THE PRESENT PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE EITHER INCOMPETENT OR CORRUPT. (COMMENT: I BELIEVE THAT FROM THIS FRANK TALK THIEU RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS AN OVERRIDING PROBLEM HERE WHICH CANNOT WAIT AND THAT HE INTENDS TO GET AFTER IT. IN ANY CASE I SHALL KEEP PUSHING BOTH HIM AND THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS SCORE.)

BUNKER

~~SECRET~~

~~WWR~~
8

Friday, February 9, 1968 -- ^{2:40 pm} ~~11:00 AM~~

Pres file

Mr. President:

Attached is a thoughtful memorandum from Secretary Rusk recommending that you appoint a Congressional team to visit India during the Easter recess and report on economic prospects after the drought. Possible names are suggested at the bottom of page 3. Chet Bowles is strongly for this.

I think this is a very good idea. The thing that might help the foreign aid bill most is an eye-witness report from non-India lovers on the Hill that Indian progress is possible and that we have a major stake in it. There is a risk, of course, that the group would return unconvinced, but I think it's a chance well worth taking.

The travel involved would not affect the balance of payments; it would be paid for entirely in excess rupees.

W. W. Rostow

EKH/vmr

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 6, 1968

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Congressional Delegation to go
to India

Recommendations:

That you send a Congressional delegation to India to review recent economic progress there as a means of stimulating Congressional support for the FY69 aid bill.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you provide the group with a military aircraft to facilitate their travel.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Discussion:

India will inevitably be a major focus of discussion for the FY69 aid bill. As India is the largest recipient of aid funds, Congress is forced to think in terms of India when it considers aid. This fact provides us with both the requirement and the opportunity to make known to Congress the economic progress India has made and the progress we anticipate in the coming year.

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Exempted from automatic decontrol.

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- 2 -

Knowledge about developments in India -- as elsewhere -- normally lags behind the fact. Most Congressmen probably still regard India as a vast famine area as a result of the droughts in 1965 and 1966. The Government of India is itself trying to improve its image in Congressional eyes. We should support this attempt.

I believe that a Congressional Team which could see Indian progress for itself and report back to Washington would be the most effective means of making Congress aware of India's accomplishments. The Poage Mission which you sent to India last winter returned to Washington with a much more sympathetic attitude towards India and performed great service in convincing Congress of the need for our food program.

A Congressional delegation would observe such visible signs of progress as:

- the wheat fields of northern India producing a record crop,
- the vast new irrigation project at Nagarjunasagar which will provide water for 650,000 acres,
- the large new fertilizer plant at Coromandel,
- the new electric power projects,
- the new industrial enterprises completed during the past year in such fields as graphite, plastics, nylon, ore pelletization, etc.

Other less tangible signs of progress which the delegation could be exposed to are:

- the enthusiasm of the farmers who have discovered the advantage of high yielding seed, fertilizer and new techniques,
- the improvement in industrial production, especially in consumer goods, now anticipated as the result of greater consumer demand,

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 -

- the advances, albeit somewhat spotty, in family planning,
- the increases in exports now expected to take place, especially in the agriculture-based industries such as jute.

Travel Ban

I believe that this trip is sufficiently important to qualify as essential travel under the travel ban. As noted below, it could be paid for with excess rupees and would hence not be a balance of payments item.

Arrangements

A team named by you and going over as a specific group would receive the most publicity here and, we believe, have the greatest effect. Ambassador Bowles has urged that wives be included and this strikes me as a good suggestion. A military aircraft provided by the Administration would facilitate the work of the mission. If funds are not available for a military aircraft, we recommend commercial flight with payment in excess currency as this arrangement would not affect our balance of payments.

Composition of Team

I suggest that the team should be made up of key members of such committees as Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, Banking and Currency, and Agriculture, with representation from both Houses and both parties. Ambassador Bowles has suggested these names as possibilities: Senators Monroney, Pastore, Jackson, Muskie and Hruska and Representatives Shriver, Bow, Adair, Goodell, Mahon and Laird. It might also be desirable to include one or two members of the Poage Team (which included Senator Miller and Representative Dole) for the sake of continuity. A total of 5 or 6

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 4 -

members would be desirable so that they could split up and visit different parts of the country. If you approve the general concept, we will explore the composition and the financing with appropriate Committee chairmen after which we will come back to you to ask you to name the members formally.

Timing

I believe the most appropriate time would be the Easter recess (April 7-14) when members of Congress would be more readily available.

Support

The proposed Congressional mission would support the Indian Government's efforts to publicize India's economic progress. The Indian Embassy recently arranged a tour of India for a group of US newspapermen. The successful visit of Minister of Family Planning Chandrasekhar to Washington was another step in improving India's image.

In addition, we are considering approaching one of the major TV networks about a documentary program on India's economic progress. Ambassador Bowles has suggested that a small group of respected private citizens be sent to India as a parallel mission to review India's progress and then testify before Congressional Committees. A variation of this suggestion would be to send the original Three Wisemen (Woods, Frank and Abs) back to India ten years after their first visit (1958) to review a decade of progress. Other ideas are also under consideration.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

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ACTION

2

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
1:45 p. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter from you
to President Park commending Cy Vance
and his mission to Park.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By Ag, NARA, Date 13/92

9a

February 9, 1968

Dear President Park:

As you have already been informed by Ambassador Porter, I am sending Mr. Cyrus Vance to Seoul as my personal representative to discuss with you our current common problems, to inform himself on the current critical situation, and to report back to me his findings and recommendations. As you know, Mr. Vance served with great distinction as Deputy Secretary of Defense. His ability to penetrate to the heart of difficult problems and find wise courses of action was demonstrated in the Dominican and Cyprus crises.

Mr. Vance has my complete confidence and is fully familiar with my thinking. No one would be better qualified to represent me in the mission on which he is about to embark, and I ask you to convey to him any thoughts you may have.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

LBJ:State:WWR:rlh

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


10

February 9, 1968

Dear President Park:

As you have already been informed by Ambassador Porter, I am sending Mr. Cyrus Vance to Seoul as my personal representative to discuss with you our current common problems, to inform himself on the current critical situation, and to report back to me his findings and recommendations. As you know, Mr. Vance served with great distinction as Deputy Secretary of Defense. His ability to penetrate to the heart of difficult problems and find wise courses of action was demonstrated in the Dominican and Cyprus crises.

Mr. Vance has my complete confidence and is fully familiar with my thinking. No one would be better qualified to represent me in the mission on which he is about to embark, and I ask you to convey to him any thoughts you may have.

Sincerely,


His Excellency
Chung Hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

Friday, Feb. 9, 1968
1:00 p. m.

Pres file

11

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith II Corps estimate of what a second round of city attacks would look like.

W. W. Rostow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200
By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

Rowlow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ [redacted] CITE [redacted]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 9 FEBRUARY
SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF RENEWED VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE
ARMY ATTACKS AGAINST CERTAIN PROVINCIAL CAPITALS IN
II CORPS DURING PERIOD 10-15 FEBRUARY.

ACQ VIETNAM, NHA TRANG (9 FEBRUARY 1963) [redacted]
SOURCE THIS IS A SITUATION REPORT PREPARED IN NHA TRANG
AT 1700 HOURS 9 FEBRUARY ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION
OBTAINED BY CAS [redacted] OFFICERS [redacted]
[redacted] AND FROM G-2, IFFV, NHA TRANG.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. IN THE PAST 6 HOURS THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF LOW
LEVEL AS YET UNCONFIRMED REPORTS FROM SEVERAL PROVINCES IN
II CORPS INDICATING THAT THE ENEMY IS PLANNING ANOTHER LARGE
MILITARY PUSH AGAINST SELECTED AREAS SOMETIME BETWEEN 10-15
FEBRUARY. [redacted] IN QUI NHON [redacted] THEY HAVE
INFORMATION [redacted] THAT THE CITY WILL BE
ATTACKED BETWEEN 10-15 FEBRUARY. G-2, I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM
IN NHA TRANG, HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA)
22D REGIMENT AND THE VIET CONG (VC) 2D REGIMENT FROM THE PHU MY
VALLEY COULD BE USED FOR AN ATTACK ON QUI NHON CITY.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. [redacted] IN PHU YEN PROVINCE
[redacted] AN ESTIMATED THREE TO FOUR NVA/VC BATTALIONS ARE IN THE
VICINITY OF TUY NTA CITY AND [redacted]
[redacted] THEY WILL ATTACK THE CITY

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

BETWEEN 10-15 FEBRUARY. OFFICIALS THEREFORE REASON THAT IF AN ATTACK IS TO COME, IT WILL BE BEFORE THE 15TH AS IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE UNITS WILL BE RUNNING LOW ON FOOD BY THAT TIME.

3. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OFFICIALS IN PLEIKU AREA CONVINCED THAT ANOTHER ATTACK ON THE CITY IS SCHEDULED SOME TIME AROUND 10 FEBRUARY. G-2, IFFV, BELIEVE THE NVA 953 REGIMENT, AND THE VC K101 REGIMENT, AND POSSIBLY A BATTALION OF THE 320 REGIMENT, MAY BE PREPARING FOR SUCH AN ATTACK.

4. IN ADDITION IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT CENSUS GRIEVANCE REPORTS FROM DALAT, TUYEN DUC PROVINCE, DURING THE LAST ATTACK THERE, INDICATED THAT THE ENEMY PLANNED A SECOND ATTACK AROUND 10 FEBRUARY IF THE FIRST ATTACK WAS UNSUCCESSFUL IN CAPTURING THE CITY. AT THIS TIME IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY WHAT EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FRIENDLY OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY UNITS THERE HAVE HAD ON THE ENEMY PLANS.

5. IN ADDITION G-2, IFFV, ALSO BELIEVES AN ATTACK ON MONTUM CITY IS POSSIBLE IN THE 10-15 FEBRUARY PERIOD, ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS HAVE BEEN CONCENTRATED NORTHEAST OF THE CITY ARE NOW THOUGHT TO BE BROKEN UP AS A RESULT OF HEAVY FRIENDLY ARTILLERY AND MORTAR BOMBARDMENT.

6. G-2, IFFV, DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE IS PRESENTLY A MAJOR THREAT TO BAN ME THUOT CITY, DARLAC PROVINCE, OR PHAN THIET CITY, BINH THUAN PROVINCE, ALTHOUGH PROVINCE OFFICERS IN THESE PROVINCES HAVE REPORTED VC/DVA UNITS OPERATING NEAR BOTH CITIES.

7. THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS OR INDICATIONS THAT NHA TRANG, KHANH HOA PROVINCE, IS TO BE THE TARGET FOR RENEWED ATTACKS, AND JUDGMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN FVN-0501 APPEAR TO BE STILL VALID. G-2, IFFV, LIKEWISE DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE ARE SIGNS OF A NEW OFFENSIVE AGAINST NHA TRANG, BUT DOES BELIEVE THAT BOTH NHA TRANG AND THE CAI BANH BASE COULD BE THE TARGET OF MORTAR AND/OR ROCKET ATTACKS.

8. FIELD DISSEM: IFFV CORDS II, CORPS SAIGON DISSEM STATE MACV 7TH AF CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF REPORT CLASS CONFIDENTIAL

GP-1
580

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b) (1)

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1.5 (c)
3.4 (b) (1)

12

INFORMATION

Friday, February 9, 1968
12:50 p. m.

Mr. President:

Just for the record, you should know that I met with Congressman Schwengel and Congressman Cowger's group which produced the attached report. It is not the final word; but it was, I concluded, worked on in good faith.

I am having it staffed out by Jordan and Leonhart.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

13

INFORMATION

~~Friday~~
~~Thursday~~
February 8, 1968 - 12:50 pm
9

~~SECRET EXDIS~~

Mr. President:

Pres file

State and Defense this afternoon are winding up their Congressional consultations on the Jordan arms package. Secretary Rusk's final recommendation should be over early tomorrow.

He is also considering recommending that you invite General Khammash in for a short reassuring talk before he leaves.

On the chance that you might be seeing Khammash, and knowing that you will want to talk to Gene Black when he returns, I thought you would be interested in the attached report of Black's talk with Hussein. You will note that, as important as the arms are, at the top of King Hussein's request for US help is that we put our muscle into support of the peacemaking process.

W. W. R.

Amman 3316, 2/7/68

SECRET EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-206
By CB, NARA Date 11-3-97



Department of State

130
TELEGRAM
26

~~SECRET~~ 907

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

41
ACTION SS 30

INFO MM 01/031 W

P R 071600Z FEB 68
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4587
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1246
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1253
USMISSION USUN NY 677

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-196
By iss, NARA Date 8-28-97

~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 3316

EXDIS

SUBJ: EUGENE BLACK'S CALLSON KING HUSSEIN

1. I ACCOMPANIED EUGENE BLACK AND HIS ASSISTANT JOSEPH REED
IN CALL ON KING HUSSEIN ON SIXTH.

2. BLACK EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS SPECIAL
ADVISER TO PRESIDENT ON EAST ASIAN ECON DEVELOPMENT HE HAD
NO OFFICIAL MISSION IN JORDAN BUT NEVERTHELESS HAD GREAT

PAGE 2 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST AS PRIVATE AMERICAN. PRESIDENT
JOHNSON HAD ASKED THAT HE REPORT HIS REACTIONS AND OBSER-
VATIONS WHEN HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON. BLACK SAID DURING
HIS TALKS IN KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA AND UAR HE HAD BEEN IM-
PRESSED BY EXTENT TO WHICH VARIOUS ARAB LEADERS SEEM BELIEVE
(1) ISRAEL DOES NOT REALLY WANT PEACE AND IS BECOMING
INCREASINGLY INFLEXIBLE AND EXPANSIONIST; (2) US HAS BECOME
IDENTIFIED WITH ISRAELI POLICY AND IS NOT RESPONSIVE ARAB
VIEWS; (3) US SO OCCUPIED IN FAR EAST IT DISINTERESTED IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
~~SECRET~~
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02. AMMAN 03316 071659Z

MIDDLE EAST AND LESS AND LESS INFLUENTIAL IN MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS. IN CAIRO HE HAD FOUND CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM REGARDING JARRING MISSION. EVERYWHERE HE HAD FOUND GLOOMINESS CONCERNING RECENT SOVIET SUCCESSES IN THE AREA. IN COURSE HIS REMARKS BLACK ALSO REFERRED TO KING FAISAL'S APPROACH TO HIM ON JORDAN ARMS AND SAID HE HAD NOW BEEN INFORMED FROM WASHINGTON THAT JORDAN'S ARMS NEEDS ARE RECEIVING ACTIVE AND SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION. BLACK CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE WOULD LIKE KING'S FRANK COMMENTS ON FOREGOING SUMMARY.

3. KING HUSSEIN WENT THROUGH PRESENTATION HE HAS MADE TO

PAGE 3 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

RECENT US VISITORS EMPHASIZING HIS BELIEF THAT AFTERMATH OF JUNE HOSTILITIES HAD CREATED A REAL CHANCE FOR AREA PEACE. HE RECITED HIS EFFORTS AT KHARTOUM AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO BRING ABOUT A CONSENSUS LEADING TO THE UK RESOLUTION OF NOV 22, 1967. HE SAID JORDAN IMMEDIATELY INFORMED JARRING OF ITS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESOLUTION. OTHER ARABS IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED HAD ALSO TRIED TO COOPERATE WITH JARRING. BUT AFTER SEVERAL VISITS JARRING STILL HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO INDICATE WHETHER ISRAEL ACCEPTS THE RESOLUTION. MEANWHILE ISRAEL HAS FOLLOWED A RUTHLESS AND ARROGANT POLICY OF EXPROPRIATION, DEPORTATION, DEPRIVAL OF PERSONAL RIGHTS, AND OTHER ACTIONS THAT CONSIDERED ALL TOGETHER INDICATED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO LIVE AT PEACE WITH ITS NEIGHBORS.

4. ACKNOWLEDGING BLACK'S REMARK THAT THE USG HAS ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL OR ANY OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVT, KING HUSSEIN QUESTIONED NEVERTHELESS WHETHER US HAS EXERCISED THE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IT DOES HAVE WITH ISRAEL. HE THEN SAID THAT SINCE THE SAMUA RAID HE HAS COME INCREASINGLY TO QUESTION WHETHER USG REALLY UNDERSTANDS NATURE OF ITS

PAGE 4 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST AND, IF IT DOES, WHETHER IT WILLING OR ABLE TO TRY TO MAINTAIN AND PROMOTE THEM. HE BRIEFLY

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED

~~SECRET~~ THE AUTHORIZATION

OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03316 071659Z

CITED SUSPENSION US ARMS SUPPLY AS ONE OF SEVERAL SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENTS TO JORDAN. BUT, HE EMPHASIZED, IMPORTANT AS ARMS SUPPLY IS TO JORDAN (AND AGAIN HE INDICATED HE WOULD GO TO SOVIETS IF NECESSARY), THE JARRING MISSION AND THE UK RESOLUTION ARE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT. THEY REPRESENT A "LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST." KING REFERRED TO ASSURANCES US WOULD PUT "MUSCLE" INTO ITS SUPPORT OF UK RESOLUTION. USG NOW HAS CHANCE TO ACT. QUESTION IS WILL USG ACT AND, IF SO, WHEN. TIME WAS RUNNING OUT. IF THE MATTER WENT BACK TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE CHANCE FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE LOST. THE RUSSIANS WOULD INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE AT US EXPENSE, AND THE ULTIMATE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS WHICH WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST, INCLUDING ISRAEL'S. KING CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE ALSO SHARED BELIEF OF THOSE ARAB LEADERS WHOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN SUMMARIZED BY BLACK. HE HOPED THEREFORE BLACK WOULD PASS HIS VIEWS TO PRESIDENT AND OTHER US OFFICIALS.

PAGE 5 RUQMKG 3316A ~~SECRET~~

5. AFTER KING HAD CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS, I TOOK OCCASION TO PASS ON TO HIM SUBSTANCE OF STATE 110500. HE EXPRESSED THANKS BUT INDICATED IN PLEASANT WAY THAT WHAT HE NEEDS AND WANTS ARE CONCRETE RESULTS RATHER THAN ASSURANCES WE ARE PRESSING ISRAELIS AND HOPE THEY WILL PRODUCE.

6. BLACK IS TO MAKE FAREWELL COURTESY CALL ON KING ON EIGHTH.

GP-1 SYMMES

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION
~~SECRET~~
OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

for file

14

~~SECRET~~

Meeting with the President
Friday, February 9, 1968, 10:30 A. M.

Agenda

DECLASSIFIED

Authority State 315-19, NS, 3-2780
By 4/1/82, NARA, Date 2-3-92

1. Viet Nam situation (The President)

Questions at Tab A

You might begin by saying: You thought it a good time for us to take stock of the situation in Viet Nam. In particular, you have had prepared eight questions designed to clarify where we stand. The object is to put ourselves in a position to answer the question: Does Gen. Westmoreland have the forces he needs to deal with the next phase of the battle? You could then go into the questions.

2. Korea (perhaps without all the Joint Chiefs)A. The Vance Mission

- when will he be briefed?
- by whom?
- when can the President see his instructions?

B. Next Steps at Panmunjom (Sect. Rusk)C. What Soviet naval forces are in the area? What is their significance?
(Sect. McNamara and Gen. Wheeler)D. Should we send another message to Kosygin today? (Sects. Rusk & McNamara)
Draft at Tab BE. What do we do if the North Koreans stall further?

- arbitration offer?
- what are results of soundings with Alex Johnson and David Bruce on free world maritime cooperation against North Korea?
- other measures?

F. Conclusion: Aside from deciding on the Vance instructions and the Kosygin letter, you may wish to close by asking Sects. Rusk and McNamara to focus planning sharply on what we do if Panmunjom stalls. What is the full range of diplomatic and military options? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each? We ought to have this by Monday at the latest.

W. Rostow

14a

~~SECRET~~

February 8, 1968

Questions Related to the Military Situation in Viet-Nam.

1. What are the problems confronting General Westmoreland if the enemy continues the attacks on the cities and, at the same time, opens up one or more border fronts (e. g., Khe Sanh, DMZ, Darlac-Kontum)?

a. What mobile reserve forces does Westmoreland have to meet these frontier attacks? Can he sustain them concurrently in action? In particular, will he have enough airlift to support and supply all of the actions?

b. With respect to Khe Sanh, what will be the supply problem if the airstrip is kept under artillery and rocket fire?

2. How have the Marines organized Khe Sanh for defense? How many days of supply, particularly ammunition, are in the perimeter? Are these supplies protected from enemy fire?

3. How is weather likely to affect the action along the border? When does it favor us, when the enemy?

4. What is the enemy air capability if he elects to use his IL-28's, MIG's and AN-2's in South Viet-Nam or against U.S. naval targets? Are there any other surprise weapons with which we should be concerned?

5. If we decided to send additional forces to Viet-Nam, what ones are available? How soon could they be deployed and become operational in South Viet-Nam? What would be the effect on our strategic readiness world-wide?

6. In case of an affirmative decision to reinforce, what actions should be taken with regard to extension of tours and terms of service, call-up of reservists, and requests of Congress? Should we reconsider the question of a declaration of war?

7. What would be the domestic and international impact of the foregoing actions?

8. In the light of the foregoing considerations and our estimate of the probable course of events during the next few months, are we satisfied with the military resources presently available in Southeast Asia or should we make a drastic effort to rush additional forces to the area?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority OSD ltr 10-25-78, NSC 8-1480

By plg, NARA, Date 2-3-97

~~SECRET~~

A

DRAFT.#2

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 93-458
By cb, NARA, Date 5-22-95

146

ACTION: Amembassy MOSCOW

Tab B

NOTES

STATE

Deliver soonest to Kosygin if possible or through Gromyko if Prime Minister not available following message dated February 8 from President to Kosygin:

BEGIN QUOTE

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Ambassador Thompson has reported fully to me on his conversation with you when he delivered my letter of February 5. I am glad to note that you still favor a prompt, peaceful settlement of the Pueblo problem. As you know from our statements and actions, I share this view.

We have had four meetings with the North Koreans at Panmunjom. There has been no progress. The North Koreans have not yet told us how they propose that the problem be settled. They have asked how we propose INNER QUOTE to dispose of the case END INNER QUOTE. Our position is clear. The Pueblo and its crew should be returned promptly.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

I am sure you have noted the public statements by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara over the weekend. These make clear that when the crew of the Pueblo are returned there will be an inquiry as to whether there was a violation of their instructions to remain 13 miles or more from the North Korean coast and that the results will be made public. Thus far we have no single scrap of credible evidence that the Pueblo was in North Korean territorial waters during any part of its mission.

The North Koreans have asked us to use the machinery of the Military Armistice Commission for direct negotiations; we have done so. They have suggested certain procedural changes for the conduct of the meetings. We can accept most of these, but we fail to see what the new procedures can accomplish that cannot be done under present arrangements. The central problem is the need for an immediate decision by North Korea to return the Pueblo and its crew. The present acute tensions in the area do not permit protracted negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

The atmosphere there is now so charged that further violations of the demilitarized zone, even minor ones, could seriously inflame the situation, adding new complications and new dangers to what is already the gravest threat to peace. North Korean loudspeakers in the demilitarized zone on February 6 carried statements that 31 infiltrators had been sent to assassinate President Park and his family and others would be sent to finish the job. I can think of nothing worse than this sort of inflammatory statement in the present situation. We are doing our best to calm the situation, ^{but} we see no evidence of a similar effort by the other side.

What is needed to take the acuteness out of the present inflamed situation is the immediate return of the Pueblo and its crew. If this is not done events may move in such a way that we may be confronted with a situation which neither of us wants. You have rightly pointed out that neither of us is in complete control of the situation, but it is incumbent upon both of us to do what we can to avoid a further deterioration.

END QUOTE

End

GP-1
EUR:SCV:MMoon:erk 2/8/68

~~SECRET~~

15

Friday, Feb. 9, 1968
9:50 a. m.

~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may wish to discuss this with Sects.
Rusk and McNamara this morning.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment *Jordan Arms Package*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RJ*, NARA, Date 13/92

16

Friday, February 9, 1968
9:40 a.m.

Mr. President:

Via: George Christian

**Herewith a proposed response,
along the line you outlined, should
Senator McCarthy's allegation about
nuclear weapons arise at the 11 o'clock
briefing.**

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rlh

Pres file

100

February 9, 1968

Proposed Statement on Senator McCarthy's claim that the military have asked the President for permission to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

Senator McCarthy's statement is false. It is also unfair to our armed services.

Decisions concerning nuclear weapons are solely the responsibility of the President. Discussion of the matter is not in the national interest.

We have nothing further to say.

INFORMATION

17

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
9:30 a.m.

Profile

Mr. President:

So that you have everyone's view,
herewith the anti-U.S., anti-GVN,
pro-Hanoi Frenchman in Saigon evaluates
the Viet Cong attack on the cities.

His grudging admissions are
interesting.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-181
By is, NARA, Date 2-12-04

WWRostow:rla

18

INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
9:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

The marked passage indicates that the B-52 strikes are helping at Khe Sanh and the enemy -- as well as ourselves -- has reason for concern.

W. W. Rostow

~~TOP SECRET TRINE~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ / RAC 99-77
By obm, NARA, Date 3-13-03

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/RAC 03-183
By is, NARA, Date 3-17-04

Developments in South Vietnam

Another phase of the "Tet offensive" may be launched shortly. The renewal of attacks may not be as widespread as in recent days, but will probably be concentrated against specific targets such as airfields, the cities of Da Nang and Kontum, and coincide with the expected assault against the base at Khe Sanh.

Enemy pressure against Khe Sanh continued on 8 and 9 February. Resistance continued in Hue where the enemy may have been reinforced. Farther south in 2d Corps, all the province capitals have been declared secure, but the enemy may be preparing to resume attacks against Kontum City and Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen. Clearing operations continued in Saigon, and except for three mortar attacks in 4th Corps, the area was generally quiet.

1st Corps

An NVA rallier on 30 January reported that the 8th Battalion of the 304th NVA Division's 66th Regiment suffered 50 per cent casualties and many desertions as a result of a B-52 strike while it was infiltrating into the Khe Sanh area. As of 21 January, the battalion's strength stood at 200 men. When the rallier left the battalion, its assigned mission was to attack the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. COMINT has indicated that elements of the 66th Regiment, the 304th Division's artillery unit, supported the 7 February attack against Lang Vei.

Further COMINT reports indicate that the enemy has continued to suffer casualties and desertions in the Khe Sanh area. On 8 February, a unit subordinate to the NVA 101D Regiment reported 89 killed in action, and an unidentified battalion near Khe Sanh indicated its desertion rate was growing daily. On 5 February its total desertions stood at 73 men, including a "number of platoon commanders."

(Continued)

ACTION

Pres file

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
9:20 a.m.

Mr. President:

Via: George Christian

On the basis of this cable, State recommends we announce the Vance mission to Korea at 6:00 p.m. tonight our time.

W. W. Rostow

Seoul 4106

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rlg, NARA, Date 1-31-92

WWRostow:rla



Department of State

Jenkins

19a

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 410S

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NODIS/CACTUS

REF; A. STATE 112641; B. SEOUL 4293

1. URGE YOU RECONSIDER TIME ANNOUNCEMENT (PARA 3 REF A) TO ~~ENABLE US GAIN MAXIMUM MASS MEDIA COVERAGE IN SEOUL WHERE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY COMING WILL BE OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE.~~ FOR US ANYTIME BETWEEN 0700 AND 1100 HRS SEOUL IS BEST. ~~IMPACT IS REQUIRED HERE, NOT IN WASHINGTON. BELIEVE WE SHAPLY AVOID SIMUTANEOUS RELEASE WITH ROKG BUT EMBASSY WOULD MAKE LOCAL RELEASE.~~

2. FOR REASONS CITED PARA 2 REF B, RECOMMEND

PAGE 2 RUALOS 410SE ~~SECRET~~
TEXT OF DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL SEND MR. CYRUS R. VANCE, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO SEOUL KOREA AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CHUNG HEE PARK OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA GOVERNMENT. THE TALKS WILL BE ABOUT THE GRAVE THREAT TO ROK WHICH HAS DEVELOPED AND ACTIONS BEING TAKEN BY BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEM. MR. VANCE WILL BE LEAVING WASHINGTON IN A SPECIAL PLANE ON FEBRUARY 9. UNQUOTE

3. PROPOSED TEXT IN REF A CAN BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN VANCE TRIP IS TO RESOLVE CURRENT STRAINS BETWEEN USG AND ROKG BY USE OF PHRASE "GRAVE SITUATION, WHICH HAS DEVELOPED IN KOREA." OUR SUGGESTED CHANGES WOULD FOCUS KOREAN ATTENTION ON FACT TALKS WOULD BE ON NK THREAT AND MEASURES TO DEAL WITH IT.

GP-3 PORTER
BT

* AS RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

NLI 96-196

By us, NARA Date 8-28-97

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Friday, February 9, 1968
9:15 a.m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Herewith Westy's latest on Khe
Sanh.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 1/31/92
c

Friday, February 9, 1968

TEXT OF CABLE FROM GENERAL WESTMORELAND

This is the fifth report on the Khe Sanh area and covers the 24 hour period of Thursday, February 8, 1968.

During the period the Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding area continued to receive sporadic mortar, rocket, and harassing small arms and sniper fire. A total of 21 Marines were killed and 27 were wounded and evacuated. There were 124 enemy killed, one captured, and 27 individual and 23 crew-served weapons captured as a result of the enemy mortar and ground attack on the Marine Company yesterday morning.

Marine aircraft flew 49 sorties in support of the Khe Sanh area while the Air Force flew 101, and the Navy flew 77, for a total of 227. Ten secondary fires and one secondary explosion were reported. Three personnel carriers and a "tank-like" vehicle were destroyed, and 10 other vehicles were damaged. The latter was the action taken against the enemy tanks and vehicles sighted yesterday southwest and west of Khe Sanh.

Seven ARC LIGHT strikes (39) sorties were run in the Niagara area. Four of these strikes were in proximity to Khe Sanh. Marine units in the area fired 5543 rounds of mortar and artillery ammunition.

The Khe Sanh logistics position continues to improve. A total of 214 short tons of supplies were airlifted in during the period for an increase of 87 short tons. The bulk of the airlift was the delivery of 140 short tons of ammunition. 41.5 short tons of engineering equipment, including bunkering material, and 24 short tons of vehicles were also delivered. Airlift resupply is being accomplished with Air Force C-130 and C-123 Aircraft and Marine C-130 and CH-53 helicopters. The 26 days of individual combat rations reported yesterday was not correct. The revised status of these ratios is 12 days. The ammunition stocks are adequate, the lowest being 11 days for the 105 MM howitzers. No COFRAM type ordnance was used during the period.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 96-198
By is, NARA, Date 8-12-04

For the next period, four ARC LIGHT strikes (27 sorties) will be flown in support of Khe Sanh. Marine tactical air plans 44 sorties (additional 16 on call), the Air Force plans 74 sorties, and the Navy 52, in support of Khe Sanh, for a total of 172 sorties. The Air Force will also have 128 tactical air sorties on call, and a potential of diverting pre-planned strikes from other areas for a total of 631 sorties (Air Force 381, Navy 250).

There is no new information on enemy identification, strengths, and capabilities.

The weather in the Khe Sanh area for the early afternoon of the 8th February was good but about 2:00 PM it became marginal. Fog formed at about 8:00 PM making the weather poor for the rest of the night and for the morning of the 9th. The forecast for the afternoon of the 9th is for marginal weather. The formation of fog by 8:00 PM will make the rest of the night poor with improvement to marginal again by noon on the 12th.

We have undertaken to evacuate the BV-33 Laotian Battalion, their dependents, and other refugees from the immediate Khe Sanh area. We will back-load resupply aircraft and take them to Danang for onward shipment to Laos. I am hoping we can arrange for other than military aircraft for the leg from Danang to Laos. The evacuation is underway and I will inform you as we proceed.

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

Pres file

Friday, February 9, 1968
8:30 a. m.

Mr. President:

This is an encouraging picture
from Ky of purposefulness and
executive energy.

W. W. Rostow



1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

SANITIZED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-199
By isa, NARA Date 8-19-98

INFORMATION

22

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, February 9, 1968
8:30 a. m.

Pres file

Mr. President:

Although the copy is bad, I didn't wish to hold up this Komer report of how recovery is going in Saigon and the Delta.

Answer: real progress, but not out of the woods.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 18651

CONFIDENTIAL

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By rg, NARA, Date 1-31-92

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~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-200
By us, NARA Date 7-10-98

SECTION ONE OF TWO

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI 8 FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT VICE PRESIDENT KY'S COMMENTS ON PROGRESS OF TASK
FORCE AND OTHER ASPECTS OF CURRENT CRISIS

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 FEBRUARY 1968)
SOURCE

SUMMARY: VICE PRESIDENT KY THINKS THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF, OR TASK FORCE, IS PROCEEDING WITH COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS IS GOOD, ALTHOUGH THEY AND KY HAVE DIFFERING IDEAS ABOUT PRIORITIES. KY IS DOING WHAT HE CAN TO MAINTAIN PRIME MINISTER LGO'S IMAGE AND AUTHORITY. THE ORGANIZING AND ARMING OF SAIGON'S CIVIL POPULATION WILL BE A SLOW PROCESS AND PARTICIPATION WILL BE ON A STRICTLY VOLUNTARY BASIS. KY IS CONSTANTLY BEING CONSULTED BY VARIOUS SENIOR MILITARY AND CIVIL

OFFICIALS. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 8 FEBRUARY, FOR EXAMPLE, HE PLANNED TO TRY TO MEDIATE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN GENERALS VIEN AND KHANG. END SUMMARY.

1. THE "COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF" IS FUNCTIONING QUITE EFFECTIVELY AND IS RECEIVING ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. OTHER THAN A SLIGHT CONFLICT ON THE PRIORITY TO BE ATTACHED TO THE VARIOUS EFFORTS, THERE HAS BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS BEEN MORE INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE EFFORTS WHICH WILL DEMONSTRATE "SURFACE" ACHIEVEMENTS BY GIVING THE APPEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THINGS BEING BROUGHT BACK TO NORMAL. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY FEELS THAT RESTORATION OF SECURITY IN SAIGON CITY IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE AND MUST BE UNDERTAKEN SLOWLY SO THAT, IN GETTING AT THE VIET CONG (VC), INNOCENT CIVILIANS ARE NOT INJURED AND PROPERTY IS NOT DESTROYED. IN KY'S OPINION, IT MIGHT TAKE AS LONG AS ONE OR TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS CAN BE PULLED OUT OF THIS DUTY IN THE CITY AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF SAIGON CITY RETURNED TO THE VIETNAMESE POLICE. KY IS ANXIOUS TO RELIEVE THE MILITARY UNITS AND RETURN THEM TO TASK OF DEFENDING THE ACCESS

BETWEEN GENERALS VIEN AND KHANG. END SUMMARY.

1. THE "COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF" IS FUNCTIONING QUITE EFFECTIVELY AND IS RECEIVING ALL NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE. OTHER THAN A SLIGHT CONFLICT ON THE PRIORITY TO BE ATTACHED TO THE VARIOUS EFFORTS, THERE HAS BEEN GENERAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS BEEN MORE INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE EFFORTS WHICH WILL DEMONSTRATE "SURFACE" ACHIEVEMENTS BY GIVING THE APPEARANCE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF THINGS BEING BROUGHT BACK TO NORMAL. VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY FEELS THAT RESTORATION OF SECURITY IN SAIGON CITY IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE AND MUST BE UNDERTAKEN SLOWLY SO THAT, IN GETTING AT THE VIET CONG (VC), INNOCENT CIVILIANS ARE NOT INJURED AND PROPERTY IS NOT DESTROYED. IN KY'S OPINION, IT MIGHT TAKE AS LONG AS ONE OR TWO WEEKS BEFORE THE VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS CAN BE PULLED OUT OF THIS DUTY IN THE CITY AND PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DEFENSE OF SAIGON CITY RETURNED TO THE VIETNAMESE POLICE. KY IS ANXIOUS TO RELIEVE THE MILITARY UNITS AND RETURN THEM TO TASK OF DEFENDING THE ACCESS ROUTES INTO SAIGON AROUND THE DEFENSE PERIMETER OF THE CITY, AND HE BELIEVES THE VC STILL HAVE THE INTENTION AND CAPABILITY OF HITTING SAIGON AGAIN WITH A MAJOR OFFENSIVE.

2. MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN DUC THANG IS THE SPEARHEAD OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF AND IS VERY HAPPY WITH HIS ROLE. HIS SPIRITS ARE VERY HIGH, AND HE IS MEETING WITH THE VIETNAMESE CABINET MINISTERS EVERY AFTERNOON. PRIME MINISTER NGUYEN VAN LOC WAS TAKEN ALONG ON KY'S TRIP TO CAN THO ON 7 FEBRUARY, AND KY IS DOING EVERYTHING HE CAN TO MAINTAIN LOC'S IMAGE AND PRESENCE AS PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT. KY CONVINCED ALL OF THE IV CORPS PROVINCE CHIEFS AT VAN THO ON 7 FEBRUARY. HE FOUND THEIR MORALE GENERALLY QUITE GOOD. THEY WERE CONFIDENT IN THE FUTURE, DESPITE THE SURPRISING VC ATTACKS OF LAST WEEK.

3. PRESIDENT NGUYEN THIEN ASKED KY TO ASSUME THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE FOR PEOPLE'S RELIEF, AND KY, AS HE HAS ALWAYS SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO DO, WAS MORE THAN WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE HIS SERVICES WHEREVER NEEDED. KY HAD NOT KNOWN OF THE PLAN TO ESTABLISH THE COMMITTEE UNTIL THE JOINT U.S./VIETNAMESE MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT ON ONE FEBRUARY. WHEN HIS PRESENT MISSION AS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN IS COMPLETED, KY WILL RETURN TO HIS NORMAL VICE PRESIDENT'S DUTIES OR ACCEPT WHATEVER NEW ROLE THE PRESIDENT MAY WISH TO ASSIGN TO HIM.

4. THE ORGANIZING AND ARMING OF THE CIVIL POPULATION OF SAIGON CITY WILL BE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR. PARTICIPANTS WILL BE SCREENED CAREFULLY AND WILL BE BASICALLY SELECTED FROM AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS OR MILITARY VETERANS. PARTICIPATION WILL BE ONLY A STRICTLY VOLUNTARY BASIS. ORGANIZING THE CILC WILL BE A SLOW PROCESS AND IT MAY BE MONTHS BEFORE AN EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED.

5. KY DOES NOT FEEL THAT ANY NEW SPECIAL LEGISLATION IS NEEDED TO VALIDATE PRESIDENT THIEN'S DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW. THE ASSEMBLY HAS ALREADY VOICED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE EXECUTIVE IN THIS CRISIS PERIOD AND, UNLESS SOME PARTICULAR GROUPS CHOOSE TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF IT, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM. THUS FAR, THIEN HAS NOT INDICATED TO KY WHAT HE WANTS TO DO ON THIS MATTER.

6. KY IS CONTINUOUSLY BEING CONSULTED BY VARIOUS SENIOR ELEMENTS OF THE VIETNAMESE MILITARY AND CIVIL OFFICIALS ON VARIOUS MATTERS. ON 8 FEBRUARY, FOR EXAMPLE, HE WAS CONTACTED BY TWO SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS ON THE SUBJECT OF REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE VIETNAMESE AIRBORNE BATTALIONS IN HUE CITY, WHICH ARE NOW DOWN TO A STRENGTH OF 190-200 MEN EACH FROM THEIR NORMAL 500 AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF GENERAL CAO VAN VIEN CONSULTED WITH KY ABOUT THE SENDING OF MARINE BATTALIONS TO REPLACE THE AIRBORNE UNITS. THEN A SHORT TIME LATER, III CORPS COMMANDER LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE NGUYEN KHANG, WHO IS ALSO COMMANDANT OF MARINES, TELEPHONED KY TO OBJECT TO THIS

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WHCA

1968 FEB 8 19 14

~~SECRET~~ 

DE YEKADL 6612RB 0391300
ZKZK 00 ZSL DE
O 081613Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
SSO ACSI DA
SSO ARLINGTON HALL STATION
AFSSO USAF
CNO
DIA/ISIC
JCS
NIC
DIRNSA COMMAND CENTER
STATE (RCI)
CIA-OCI
ZEM

~~SECRET~~  FINAL SECTION OF TWO

EMPLOYMENT OF MARINES, INDICATING THAT HE PREFERRED TO KEEP THEM IN RESERVE IN THE CAPITAL AREA UNTIL SECURITY HAS BEEN RESTORED THERE. KY PLANNED TO CALL VIEN AND KHANG TO HIS OFFICE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 3 FEBRUARY AND ATTEMPT TO MEDIATE THE ISSUE. SIMILARLY, THE MINISTERS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC WORKS HAVE BEEN COMING TOKY RECENTLY WITH REASONABLY MINOR PROBLEMS ON WHICH THEY HAVE ASKED KY'S ADVICE BEFORE PROCEEDING TO A SOLUTION.
7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL WESTMORELAND, GENERAL ABRAMS, AMBASSADOR KOMER, CHIEF OF STAFF) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL MOMYER ONLY) DIR/JUSPAO (MR. ZORTHIAN ONLY) CINCPAC PACFLT

GP 1
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~~SECRET~~ 

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1968 FEB 9 07 40

*Continued
To Follow*

VV EHA147
RR RUEHEX
DE RUMJIR 18651 0400620
ZNY CCCCC
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FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6142
INFO RUEHEX/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEPJS/DOD/WASHDC
RUEHIA/USIS WASHDC 4576
RUHHQA/CINCPAC FOR POLAD/HAWAII
STATE GRNC
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority State memo 9/11/95
By SP/rg, NARA, Date 4/29/96

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SAIGON 18651

SUBJECT: PROJECT RECOVERY SITUATION REPORT--1800 8 FEBRUARY

1. ~~GOOD SIGNS BEGINNING TO APPEAR IN SAIGON. VICE PRESIDENT KY AGREED AT THE MORNING COMMITTEE SESSION TO CONSIDER EXTENDING BLUE AREAS TO DISTRICT 4 AND PART OF DISTRICT 3 TOMORROW. HE~~

PAGE 2 RUMJIR 18651 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ANNOUNCED THAT THE CURFEW WOULD END AT 0730 INSTEAD OF 0800 IN BLUE AREAS. CURFEW IN RED AREAS WAS RAISED FROM 1400 TO 500. INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO MINISTERS INVOLVED TO ~~START ISSUING GOVERNMENT-FROZEN PORK STOCKS~~

2. AMBASSADOR KOMER RAISED THE URGENCY IN LETTING TRAFFIC COME INTO SAIGON ON PEN ROADS, E.E., ROUTE 149...659, ROUTE 15 FROM VUNG AU, ECT. BUT BY MID-AFTERNOON NO PRODUCE HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO COME EVEN FROM GIA DINH INTO SAIGON. IN GIA DINH, THE PROVINCE CHIEF REFUSED TO ALLOW MARKETS TO OPEN

UNTIL SECURITY IMPROVES. HOWEVER, TROOPS ARE NOT PRESSING ACTIVELY TO CLEAR REMAINING SUSPECTED AREAS. THROUGHOUT GIA DINH, RF/PF ARE REPORTED REMAINING ON THE DEFENSIVE.

3. GVN MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE COMPLAINED THAT AMERICAN WERE ~~ISSUING~~ DIFFERENT FIGURES ON REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. ~~ISSUING~~

AMBASSADOR KOMER AGREED THAT ALL RELEASES WILL BE CENTRALIZED IN THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE. ~~WE~~ HE WILL FEED ~~WE~~ IN OUR REPORTS.

4. AMBASSADOR KOMER VISITED BEN TRE, MY THO, VINH LONG CITY AND

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18651 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MOC HOA IN THE DELTA TO ASCERTAIN IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF PROVINCE

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18651 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MOC HOA IN THE DELTA TO ASCERTAIN IMMEDIATE NEEDS OF PROVINCE
AND MACCORDS ADVISORS. ~~LEAN-UP OPERATIONS PROGRESSING WELL IN~~
FIRST THREE HEAVILY DAMAGED CITIES. ACTIVITY IN LIGHTLY TOUCHED
MOC HOA IS PRACTICALLY BACK TO NORMAL SLOW PACE OF THAT FRONTIER
TOWN. PROVINCE CHIEF HAS MOBILIZED CIVIL SERVANTS INTO DEFENSE
FORCE IN PREPARATION FOR EXPECTED RESUMPTION OF VC ATTACK. FOUR
OF THE PROVINCE'S RD TEAMS ARE ALSO MANNING DEFENSES. THE
UNCOVERED RD AREA HASN'T BEEN HIT YET, HOWEVER.

5. REFUGEES IN ALL AREAS VISITED ARE BEING CARED ~~FOR SATIS-~~
FACTORILY WITH NO CRITICAL IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS. LOCAL STOCKS OF

PLIES ARE STILL ADEQUATE, EXCEPT IN VINH LONG WHERE MACCORDS
EXPECTS TO SEND AN EMERGENCY SHIPMENT TOMORROW. MOST OF THE
REFUGEES ARE HARD AT WORK CLEARING RUBBLE AND

~~PROPERTY. PROPER CARE FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IS FALLING BEHIND~~
SALVAGING THEIR
IN ALL THREE OF THE HARD HIT CITIES. NOT ENOUGH DOCTORS ARE
AVAILABLE TO TREAT SERIOUSLY INJURED, FACILITIES ARE OVERCROWDED
AND MEDICAL STOCKS ARE RUNNING LOW. PROVINCE OFFICIALS ARE BEGIN-
NING TO THINK BEYOND EMERGENCY MEASURES IN TERMS OF RECOVERY.

PAGE 4 RUMJIR 18651 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PLANS. AMBASSADOR KOMER URGED PROVINCE CHIEFS TO SUBMIT REQUIRE-
MENTS AGAINST 600 MILLION PIASTERS MADE AVAILABLE TODAY BY PRIME
MINISTER LOC AND AMBASSADOR BUNKER FOR RECOVERY ACTIVITIES FROM
THE SPECIAL FUND.

6. ACTIVITY WAS RETURNING TO NORMAL IN SAIGON'S BLUE DISTRICTS
1 AND 2. ABOUT HALF THE STORES DOING SOME BUSINESS. THERE WAS
LIMITED COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY IN RED DISTRICTS 3 AND 4. DURING
THE MORNING, AT LEAST FIVE SHIPS WERE BEING
UNLOADED IN SAIGON
PORT. THE PORT WAS NOT FUNCTIONING IN THE AFTERNOON. CHOLON
IS STILL CLOSED-DOWN. MANY AREAS ARE COMPLETELY DEVOID OF
ACTIVITY.

7. RICE DISTRIBUTION POINTS OPERATED BETTER TODAY OF SEVEN
SITES VISITED BY GENERAL FORSYTHE, NONE REPORTED SALES TO LESS
THAN ENPPP
PEOPLE. RD CADRE ARE HELPING AT ALL DISTRIBUTION
POINTS. PEOPLE ARE PLEASED WITH THE GVN'S EFFORTS. THERE APPEARS
TO BE SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE ON THE PART OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS--;
296-975, SCHOOLTEACHERS, AND PLAIN VOLUNTEER WORKERS.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 18651 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8. UTILITIES ARE OPENING SATISFACTORILY IN SAIGON. PTT IS
PRACTICALLY AT FULL CAPACITY. BY TOMORROW, ELECTRIC POWER SHOULD
BE AT LEAST UP TO 70 PERCENT OF NORMAL CAPACITY. A START HAS
BEEN MADE ON

PICKING UP GARBAGE AND DUMPING IT IN AN AUXILIARY
DISPOSAL AREA. ONE ARVN ENGINEER COMPANY IS ASSISTING. PLANS
FOR TOMORROW CALL FOR STEPPING UP GARBAGE COLLECTION. THERE
HAS BEEN NO INTERRUPTION IN THE WATER SUPPLY. A MAINTENANCE CREW
REPAIRED THE ESSENTIAL TRANSFORMER AT THE DONG NGAI WATER INTAKE.

9. TEN CIVILIAN NEWSPAPERS WERE PRINTED IN SAIGON TODAY -- TWO
MORE THAN YESTERDAY. NINE CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS PERFORMED AT
REFUGEE SITES.

TO BE SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE ON THE PART OF LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS--;
~~293-275~~, SCHOOLTEACHERS, AND PLAIN VOLUNTEER WORKERS.

PAGE 5 RUMJIR 18651 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8. UTILITIES ARE OPENING SATISFACTORILY IN SAIGON. PTT IS PRACTICALLY AT FULL CAPACITY. BY TOMORROW, ELECTRIC POWER SHOULD BE AT LEAST UP TO 70 PERCENT OF NORMAL CAPACITY. A START HAS BEEN MADE ON PICKING UP GARBAGE AND DUMPING IT IN AN AUXILIARY DISPOSAL AREA. ONE ARVN ENGINEER COMPANY IS ASSISTING. PLANS FOR TOMORROW CALL FOR STEPPING UP GARBAGE COLLECTION. THERE HAS BEEN NO INTERRUPTION IN THE WATER SUPPLY. A MAINTENANCE CREW REPAIRED THE ESSENTIAL TRANSFORMER AT THE DONG NGAI WATER INTAKE.

9. TEN CIVILIAN NEWSPAPERS WERE PRINTED IN SAIGON TODAY -- TWO MORE THAN YESTERDAY. NINE CULTURE-DRAMA TEAMS PERFORMED AT REFUGEES SITES.

10. ANOTHER RICE CONVOY (106.5 METRIC TONS) WAS RUN FROM THU DUC WAREHOUSES TO SAIGON. FOUR RICE SHIPS WERE BING UNLOADED IN THE PORT. SAIGON MAYOR CUA, IN CHARGE OF RICE DISTRIBUTION, WILL RELEASE 40 MORE CITY TRUCKS (TO BE MANNED BY VOLUNTEER DRIVERS) FOR RICE DISTRIBUTION.

11. COUNTRYWIDE COUNT OF EVACU^{E&J}ES (MANY WHO WILL RETURN HOME AS SOON AS FIGHTING SUBSIDES AND CURFEWS ARE LIFTED) HAS RISEN

PAGE 3 RUMJIR 18651 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
TO ALMOST 300,000. LATEST CIVILIAN CASUALTY FIGURES (PROBABLY STILL FAR UNDER REAL TOTAL) NOW ALMOST 800 DEAD AND ABOUT 8,200 INJURED. THE COUNT OF CIVILIAN HOMES DESTROYED REMAINS AT BELOW 15,000.

BUNKER

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNNN

ACTION

**Friday, February 9, 1968
8:15 a.m.**

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft letter for your signature, which commends the Air Force

-- for the efficiency of the recent deployment to the Pacific, and

-- for maintaining secrecy in the process.

Pres file

W. W. Rostow

RNG:WWR:rla

February 9, 1968

Dear J. P. :

The Air Force has handled the major deployment of aircraft to the Pacific in its usual professional manner.

I compliment all concerned for the security which was maintained during this complex, ramified operation.

Professionalism and discretion are qualities we need in these difficult times.

Sincerely,

(S) Lyndon B Johnson

General J. P. McConnell
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
Washington, D. C.

cc: Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Air Force

LBJ:RNGinsburgh:WWRostow:rlh

INFORMATION

Friday, February 9, 1968
8:10 a. m.

Mr. President:

In the midst of all this, Hanoi has just put out another Trinh interview in which they are more explicit than ever before about "promptly."

But there is still plenty of ambiguity

W. W. Rostow

FBIS 86

Pres file

WWRostow:ria

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FBI 86 (SEE 60

TRINH INTERVIEW

HANOI VNA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN ENGLISH 1445 GMT 8 FEB 68 B

(TEXT) HANOI--NGUYEN DUY TRINH, DRV FOREIGN MINISTER, TODAY GRANTED AN INTERVIEW (WORDS INDISTINCT), AFP SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT IN HANOI. FOLLOWING ARE THE QUESTIOS AND ANSWERS:

QUESTION: THE VIETNAM WAR IS UNDERGOING NEW DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE PRESENT EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. WHAT ARE, IN THIS NEW (WORDS INDISTINCT), SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT?

ANSWER: IN ITS WAR OF AGGRESSION IN VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES HAS GONE FROM DEFEAT TO DEFEAT, AND HAS BEEN DRIVEN INTO THE QUAGMIRE WITHOUT ANY HOPE OF GETTING OUT OF IT. OVER THE PAST FEW DAYS HZ PATRIOTIC ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTH, ALONG WITH THE ?MASS) UPRISING OF MILLIOS OF PEOPLE, (?HAVE) LAUNCHZD (WORDS INDISTINCT) CORRECTLY COORDINATED ATTACKS THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, WIPING OUT MANY ENEMY EFFECTIVELY, CONTROLLING SEVERAL CITIES AND NUMEROUS PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT TOWNS, AND LIBERATING IDE RURAL AREAS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS OF THZ PUPPET REGIME IS OLLAPSING AND THE PUPPET ARMY IS DISINTEGRATING BY BIG CHUNKS.

THE MARVELOUS FEAT OF THE HEROIC SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE HAS FILLED OUR ENTIRE PEOPLE WITH GREAT ENTHUSASM AND JUST PRIDE. IT HAS RECEIVED A WARM TRIBUTE FROM THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

SEETHING WITH HATRED AT THE MONSTROUS CRIMES OF THE U.S. AGGRESSORS AND THE THIEU KY TRAITOR CLIQUE, THE WHOLE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, UNITED AS ONE MAN, ARE DETERMINED TO FORGE AHEAD IN THE IMPETUS OF THEIR VICTORIES AND TO CARRY ON THEIR FIGHT UNTIL COMPLETE REALIZATION OF THEIR SACRED NATIONAL RIGHTS.

(?THE POSITION OF OUR) PEOPLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM (?IS VERY CLEAR): (PASSAGE INDISTINCT) FOR AGGRESSION AGAINST VIETNAM, IT MUST END THE AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS FROM VIETNAM. THAT IS THE SPIRIT OF THE FOUR POINTS OF THE DRV GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL PROGRAM OF THE NFLSV, WHICH CONFORM TO THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND THE MAIN CLAUSES OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM.

PRESERVATION COPY

IN MY 28 JANUARY 1967 STATEMENT, WHICH WAS FURTHER CLARIFIED BY THAT OF 29 DECEMBER LAST, I CLEARLY INDICATED THE WAY TO TALKS BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE UNITED STATES. BROAD SECTIONS (70% OF WORLD PUBLIC) OPINION HAVE WARMLY HAILED OUR JUST POSITION AND SERIOUS ATTITUDE, BUT THE BELLICOSE U.S. RULING CIRCLES OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN THEIR AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO BE EXPLORING AND TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE POSITION OF HANOI. IN FACT THAT IS A MANEUVER TO SOOTHE PUBLIC OPINION AND COVER UP ITS ATTEMPTS FOR CONTINUED ESCALATION OF THE AGGRESSIVE WAR IN VIETNAM. THE SO-CALLED SAN ANTONIO FORMULA IS BUT THE THEME OF A CONDITIONAL HALT IN THE BOMBING. OBVIOUSLY, THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT SERIOUSLY WANT TALKS TO SETTLE THE VIETNAM PROBLEM. IT MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS OBSTINACY.

QUESTION: IN YOUR 29 DECEMBER 1967 SPEECH, YOU STATED IN PART: AFTER THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV, THE DRV WILL HOLD TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON RELEVANT PROBLEMS. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY RELEVANT PROBLEMS?

ANSWER: THEY ARE QUESTIONS RELATED TO A SETTLEMENT OF THE VIETNAM PROBLEM ON THE BASIS OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENTS ON VIETNAM. THEY ARE ALSO OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH (WORDS INDISTINCT) BE RAISED BY EITHER SIDE.

QUESTION IT HAS BEEN SUBSEQUENTLY CLARIFIED THAT THE TALKS CAN BEGIN AFTER AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOLLOWING THE UNCONDITIONAL CESSATION OF THE BOMBINGS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DRV. COULD YOU CLARIFY FURTHER THE MEANING OF APPROPRIATE TIME?

ANSWER: THE TALKS WILL BEGIN AS SOON AS THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVED THAT IT HAS REALLY STOPPED UNCONDITIONALLY THE BOMBINGS AND ALL OTHER ACTS OF WAR AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

8 FEB 1967 CF/WP

WWR
25

encl

Friday, February 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval and signature is a warm letter to former Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag expressing your appreciation for the close cooperation and mutual understanding between the two of you during his period as Prime Minister.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, your signature will be needed on the attached letter

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWR
MWG:em

25a

FEB 1 0 1968

Dear Jens:

I want you to know, as you turn over the direction of the Government of Denmark to your successor, of my appreciation for the years of close cooperation and mutual understanding that we have enjoyed.

I am glad to have had the opportunity to work with you, as a NATO ally, as the leader of a people who share with my own countrymen the same goals of individual liberty, and as a trusted friend and colleague.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending to you and Mrs. Krag every best wish for the future.

Sincerely,

S/ Lyndon B Johnson

His Excellency
Jens Otto Krag
Copenhagen

LBJ:MWG:em
(2/9/68)

Friday, February 9, 1968

Pres file

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Continuing review of prisoner interrogation reports and captured documents still support the original evidence that the VC/NVA had been led to expect the support of the populace in the recent uprising and that this failed to materialize. There is evidence to support the fact that in some areas the local people are providing food and shelter to the soldiers (whether from fear of reprisal or from belief in the cause is unknown).

Evidence continues to support the fact that withdrawal plans had not been prepared, that many VC/NVA were unfamiliar with the terrain in which they were fighting (perhaps indicating a stepping-up in the planning with a resultant lack of time for proper preparation), and that the troops had been ordered to "hold at all costs."

In addition, we are accumulating material to answer the question "What did the VC/NVA expect in the way of replacing the SVN Government?"

On January 30, 1968, 80 Viet Cong political cadres were captured by Provincial officials in Hieu Nhon District. They had been organized into a provincial government cadre group and included among their number the individual designated to be the Province Chief.

In Qui Nhon, the plan had been to capture the Province Chief and Police Chief (unsuccessful) and to force the Province Chief to broadcast over the captured radio station urging formation of a coalition government.

A prisoner captured in Chau Doc stated that the assault force which hit Chau Doc included ten party members who were to constitute the city front which was to organize a provisional government.

Prisoners captured in Bien Hoa stated that they had come to receive the Province. They had been told that the "Americans" had negotiated with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam for the establishment of a coalition government. They had no knowledge of efforts to organize an "Alliance for Peace and Democracy" as a coalition movement to negotiate with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.

On January 30, 1968, a Radio Liberation broadcast claimed the formation of an organization called the "Alliance of National and Peaceful Forces" (supposedly comprising representatives of all major economic, political, and religious groups in South Vietnam) which was calling for both withdrawal of US forces from the country and negotiations with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam in order to restore "peace, sovereignty, and independence" to South Vietnam. On February 1, 1968, Radio Liberation announced that in Hue the "Peaceful and Democratic National Alliance Front" was making similar appeals to the people. It also announced that the Viet Cong were in control in Saigon and setting up a "revolutionary administration" supported by the masses, thousands of militia, and many puppet troops.

According to two Viet Cong high ranking cadres who were captured and interrogated by Saigon police, the Viet Cong plan to organize a "Coalition Front of People for Peace" to negotiate for peace. This new Front plans to substitute General Duong Van Minh for Thieu and Ky as National Leader of South Vietnam. The Front will then contact top US officials to discuss a cease fire and a coalition government.

In Nha Trang, two prisoners claimed knowledge of similar Fronts. One, the Assistant Secretary of the Nha Trang Municipal Committee and a Candidate-Member of the Khanh Hoa Province Committee stated that he first heard of the "Alliance for Peace and Democracy" at a Committee Meeting in early December 1967. He claimed that "Alliance for Peace and Democracy" was not the name of the Front; it was what the Front was. A name would be chosen later. The second prisoner stated that he thought the National Liberation Front had formed an organization called "Alliance of the People's Forces for Democracy and Peace" which was to gather enough popular support to force the present government in South Vietnam out of power and put in power a new government which would then accept a coalition government.

W. W. Rostow

AmcC:sjb

Pres file

Friday - February 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Mexican Ambassador Margain tells us that President Diaz Ordaz was deeply moved by your letter on his father's death.

President Diaz Ordaz asked him to check whether you would permit him to make your letter public. A copy of it is attached. Should I tell him:

He may release _____

Prefer not _____

W. W. Rostow

276

February 5, 1960

Dear Mr. President:


I have put aside my tasks this afternoon to write you this personal note on the death of your father.

I regret that I did not have the opportunity to meet him. I understand he lived to be 95. During his lifetime he was privileged to see Mexico develop into prominence among nations. What a joy it must have been for him to have his own son elected President of your great Republic.

I know you mourn his passing. But there is also comfort in the knowledge of his long and purposeful life, well beyond what God allots most men. I am sure his example will continue to be a source of strength and inspiration, as my father's has been to me.

In this moment of sorrow your many friends in the United States join me in expressing our deepest sympathy. Lady Bird and I especially ask that you tell your mother we share her grief.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz
President of the United Mexican States

LEJ:CLM:kad

28

February 9, 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~ and PERSONAL
FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER

Pres file

The following are extracts from the memorandum that we discussed
earlier today.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By RG, NARA, Date 1-31-92

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
NODIS

28a

You may give the following message:

The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam if this will lead promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the US and the DRV looking toward a resolution of the issues between them.

The United States is prepared to negotiate either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping secret the fact that negotiations are taking place. Accordingly, the DRV may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing while secret negotiations are in progress.

We would assume that, while discussions proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the DRV would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation. Any such move on their part would obviously be inconsistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues between the US and DRV which the negotiations are intended to achieve.

The US is ready to have immediate private contact with the DRV to explore the above approach or any suggestions the DRV might wish to propose in the same direction.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NJ 94-252
By CG, NARA, Date 6-27-95

Pres. file

~~SECRET~~

Friday - February 9, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - INFORMATION

SUBJECT: Dominican Republic - Disappearance of Col. Francisco Caamano

Since Caamano dropped from sight last October 24, CIA has been trying to find out his whereabouts. The suspicion was Cuba. The attached CIA report from [redacted] is the first evidence that the suspicion is probably correct -- but it is not conclusive.

25X1C

The present PRD leader -- Pena Gomez -- recently returned to Santo Domingo from a visit to Spain to confer with Bosch. Bosch is personally convinced that Caamano is in Cuba. He instructed Pena Gomez to issue a statement disassociating the PRD from guerrilla warfare, thereby indirectly disassociating itself from Caamano.

I suspect what discomfites Bosch and the PRD most of all is that establishment of Caamano in league with Castro will be taken as further justification of your intervention in the DR in 1965, and undercut the image of the "Constitutionalists" as a democratic, nationalist movement.

W. W. Rostow

Attachment

CIA report [redacted] 2/8/68
[redacted]

25X1A

SANITIZED
Authority RAC-NLJ 001-048-2-1
By ius, NARA, Date 8-8-02

Friday, February 9, 1968, 11:25 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Wilson

Prime Minister Wilson would like to speak to you briefly on the phone sometime prior to his departure from the British Embassy at 2:30 P. M. this afternoon.

The most convenient times would be:

between 11:30 and 12:15
12:30 to 12:45

However, anytime during this period would be acceptable to the Prime Minister.

Bremley Smith

BKS:amc

31

Pres file

Friday, February 9, 1968

Mr. President:

Attached for your approval and signature is a warm letter to former Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag expressing your appreciation for the close cooperation and mutual understanding between the two of you during his period as Prime Minister.

W. W. Rostow

If you approve, your signature will be needed on the attached letter

Disapprove _____

Call me _____

MWG:em

31a

February 10, 1968

Dear Jens:

I want you to know, as you turn over the direction of the Government of Denmark to your successor, of my appreciation for the years of close cooperation and mutual understanding that we have enjoyed.

I am glad to have had the opportunity to work with you, as a NATO ally, as the leader of a people who share with my own countrymen the same goals of individual liberty, and as a trusted friend and colleague.

Mrs. Johnson joins me in extending to you and Mrs. Krag every best wish for the future.

Sincerely,

(S) LBJ

His Excellency
Jens Otto Krag
Copenhagen

LBJ:MWG:em
(2/9/68)

P file
32

Thursday, Feb. 8, 1968
7:45 p. m.

MR. PRESIDENT:

Herewith General Walt's evaluation of the Khe Sanh position. As you see, it arose from a cocktail party conversation -- but outside of Georgetown.

W. W. Rostow

SECRET attachment

~~SECRET~~

32a



HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

8 February 1968

Mr. Walter Rostow
The White House

Dear Mr. Rostow: *(at the M. Nommas)*

Last evening you asked if I would give you my personal opinion as to the situation at Khe Sanh, and also the defensibility of the Khe Sanh area.

First, let me say that I left South Vietnam on 1 June 1967 and have not returned since. I knew the ground defenses at Khe Sanh as they were at that time but since then many changes have been made. We have three times as many Marines there now and I cannot speak as to the details of their fortifications or the disposition of the troops.

I did feel then, and I do now, that the combat base is of extreme importance to us, both from the psychological and military points of view. I believe the psychological is obvious because of the nature of the war. Militarily, Khe Sanh is the northwest anchor for the entire Quang Tri-Thua Thien defense sector. Its loss would allow the enemy to close in on the Camp Carroll-Dong Ha-Quang Tri City areas to our serious discomfort. To the enemy, Khe Sanh lies at the junction of several natural routes of infiltration into South Vietnam from Laos to the West and North Vietnam itself. Our location denies him easy access to these routes, and forces him to take the long way around. Lastly, Khe Sanh, as you know, serves as a base for certain of our specialized operations in the general area. The maps which we have provided your office portray rather vividly the terrain implications in the area.

In short, Khe Sanh is tactically vital to us, in addition to the psychological factors which would beset us were we to evacuate it.

I am sure that the Lang Vei evacuation assumes significant importance to you. A couple of points are significant here. First, Lang Vei, like all the Special Forces camps, has a mission to provide security in the local area, to conduct reconnaissance, and to train and employ indigenous para-military people who are locally recruited. It did not have the mission to serve as a conventional outpost for the defense of Khe Sanh against large organized enemy formations.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ 96-198
By ica, NARA, Date 5-18-04

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Significant also may be the perhaps forgotten concept of Special Forces camps--they were initially conceived as a mechanism which would recruit and employ persons who might otherwise be recruited by the other side. Only after we had had them on the payroll for a period of time did their other missions evolve.

Returning to Khe Sanh proper, all indications point to an attack on Khe Sanh in force, and soon. We can expect simultaneous efforts against Camp Carroll, Con Thien, Dong Ha, and Gio Linh, by fire at least and potentially by ground troops as well. Additionally, we can expect rocket/mortar attacks against Danang, Phu Bai and Chu Lai. The form of the attack against Khe Sanh itself will most probably come from the north, with probable diversionary effort from the west along Route 9. I base this probability on the nature of the terrain north of the base which provides the enemy more cover, which in turn permits him to move his supplies closer to the base and which subjects his troops to our supporting fires for a shorter time and over shorter distances.

I hope the foregoing may prove helpful. Rest assured that I share the assurance which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others have expressed in our capability to retain our hold in the Khe Sanh area. Our 6,000 Marines there will insure this.

Sincerely,


L. W. WALT

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Pres File**33*Thursday, Feb. 8, 1968
7:30 p. m.~~SECRET~~

MR. PRESIDENT:

I have been speculating with the members of my staff most directly concerned with the Korea problem. We have been looking beyond the present situation to the possible failure of Panmunjom or its endless stringing out.

We are conscious of the following weaknesses in all the forms of action which have been proposed:

-- the Soviets have committed a high proportion of their Far East fleet to the area. They will feel that their prestige is on the line if we move in on North Korean ports or attack North Korean installations with our air or naval power.

-- but equally, in our message to Kosygin we have indicated that time was relatively short before some form of action might have to be taken. Nothing would damage our credibility with the Russians more than if, having put forces in the area and stated to Kosygin the urgency of the matter, we did nothing.

-- it is true we can pick up some North Korean - Polish ships; but they turn out to be almost wholly Polish. Sect. Rusk is worried about possible pressure on the road to Berlin if we fuss with Polish transport, although I don't think the Poles want a Berlin crisis at the moment. But you should know that Gronouski, when sounded out, said in effect: Please don't.

-- we don't have any firm fix on the possibility of a Free World denial of shipping and bunkering in trade to North Korea, but it doesn't look like a very substantial measure.

In the face of these thin prospects and our desire to avoid a second front in Korea -- at least at our initiation -- the following thought has arisen: that we now mine the Haiphong and other harbors of North Viet Nam. The advantages are:

-- even if not a decisive action, it is an important action which bears upon the major battle we are fighting;

-- the Russian capacity to deal with it, and the Russian commitment to deal with it on a military basis is much less than something ^{done} ~~not~~ in the Sea of Japan;

-- it would maintain our credibility with Kosygin & Company, especially

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-206
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

SECRET

-2-

if timed in relation to the indication in the letter concerning the PUEBLO.

If we wish to institute the policy by increments, we could start by laying mine barriers in the south of North Viet Nam and progressively but swiftly moving north, perhaps using a back channel to suggest to Moscow that if they wish to have the mining stop short of Haiphong, they had better deliver the PUEBLO and its crew. * But it is a course which, once embarked upon, we would have to mean.

As for the men and the crew, we could continue being just as patient in the Panmunjom negotiations as the other side; but we would have to accept as likely that we would not get them back for some considerable period of time.

~~I am not recommending this course of action, but I believe it deserves careful thought if in fact the North Koreans and the Soviets are going to play this game out to extract humiliation of us.~~

W. Rostow

* The wisdom of saying anything to Moscow - even back-channel - would have to be checked.

34

INFORMATION

Pres file

Thursday, February 8, 1968
7:00 p. m.

Mr. President:

I won't sign the attached note, because it is
Marshall Wright's feeling and his speech draft.
(Marshall works for Bill Jorden.)

It's an excellent speech.

We've found an extra draftsman.

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

34a

Thursday
February 8, 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In the next day or so you have a unique opportunity to slay the credibility-gap dragon with one blow -- or rather with one speech.

The correspondents and the public know in their bones that we and our allies sustained a heavy blow last week. Yet there is a growing feeling that the Administration is attempting to pretend otherwise. It will do us no harm to tell them what they already know -- and it will do us much good to do it in so unvarnished a way that the wonder will be at your candor and frankness.

It is, I think, also the time to say plainly that hard fighting and heavy casualties lie ahead. They do, and the way to minimize their impact on American public opinion is to acknowledge them in advance and set the national tone by a call for steadiness and resolution.

Finally, sooner or later, we are going to have to take on the peace issue squarely. There is a widespread assumption in the country, even among those who support our policy, that peace requires only that the right button can be found to push -- the right gimmick discovered. This is, of course, naive. But it furnishes the basis for what will probably be a growing issue as the year proceeds. The serious opposition will not call for a pull-out from Vietnam. They will, instead, promise to do it better. They will say you cannot find the right button -- and they will imply they can. We can defuse this issue by saying plainly that there can be no peace because the enemy still wants war. And those who talk of peace only cause the enemy to redouble his attacks on our men in Vietnam.

In short, it is time for a war leader speech instead of a peace-seeker speech. The attached draft is an attempt at such a vehicle.

W. W. Rostow

Att.

MWRkght:wpt

My fellow Americans:

Nine days ago, the Communist enemy in Vietnam launched the biggest attack of the war. He chose to strike during the heart of the lunar New Year's celebration, which is Vietnam's major holiday. It was as if a widespread assault had been launched against American cities in the early morning hours of Christmas Day. Undoubtedly, the Vietnamese defense forces in the stricken cities were somewhat relaxed. Certainly, the civilian population of the cities was totally unprepared for the savage assault of which they were the victims.

[We should remember that this coordinated and long-planned attack came during the middle of a cease-fire which the communists themselves had announced. We should remember that -- because it tells us so much about the nature of the enemy we are facing.]

I feel that I should report to you on the events of the past nine days -- what the cost has been to us and to our friends -- what the enemy was able to accomplish -- what he was not able to accomplish -- and what we should expect in the days ahead.

The cost in terms of American lives and those of our friends and allies has been grievous. Since January 30, 614 telegrams have gone from this city to American citizens informing them of the death of their son or their husband. The toll among our Vietnamese allies has been even higher -- 1,500 Vietnamese soldiers have died since January 30 defending their cities and their homes. Very many Vietnamese civilians have died and been hurt, although we do not yet know the numbers. The damage in the cities and

towns of Vietnam has been heavy, so heavy that we now believe some 200,000 men, women and children have been left homeless as a result of the Communist assault.

There is no gainsaying the fact that we have sustained a heavy blow. I do not wish in the slightest to suggest otherwise. No one, I think, is more aware than I am of the grisly statistics by which we must measure the past few days and their meaning in terms of human grief. I have followed these developments almost hourly -- and with an increasingly heavy heart. The enemy set out to bring home to us the heavy cost of defending freedom. He set out to give us a grim week -- and he has succeeded.

He has also done something else during the past few days. He has learned the cost of aggression. The communist forces which attacked the cities of Vietnam have paid an appalling cost for their boldness. Over 22,000 communist soldiers died since January 30. Another 5,000 have been taken prisoner. In one week, the communists have lost many more soldiers than we have lost during the entire Vietnam war. I take no joy in this carnage. But I think that our sadness about the past week should be mixed with deep pride at the magnificent performance of our men in Vietnam, and of the performance of our allies.

The communist attack was, of course, an assault upon the will of the Vietnamese and American people to continue the fight. Apart from that, the communist attack appears to have had three primary purposes. First, they hoped to cause a general uprising in their favor among the inhabitants of the cities and towns of Vietnam. They told their own troops that this would

happen. Their propaganda broadcasts called upon the Vietnamese people to rise up and end the war. That they were serious in this hope seems clear, for they did not provide any orders to their troops for withdrawal, apparently believing that withdrawal would not be necessary.

They could not have been more wrong. Nowhere did the Vietnamese civilians come to the aid of the communist troops. Nowhere was there an uprising. To the contrary the civilian population of Vietnam's cities appears to view the Communist assault as exactly what it was -- a savage and vicious attack upon civilian populations with a callous and total lack of concern for the welfare of civilian lives.

A second communist purpose appears to have been the destruction of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam, the ARVN, as a cohesive and disciplined national military instrument. If that was their purpose -- they failed. Everywhere, the ARVN behaved well, and in many places they behaved with outstanding gallantry and professional competence. In the past, a number of prominent Americans have seized every opportunity to criticize the fighting capacity and will of the ARVN. In view of the ARVN performance in the past few days, and in view of the very heavy casualties which they have sustained and the much heavier casualties which they have inflicted -- I suggest it is time for such criticism to stop.

Finally, the communists undoubtedly intended to shatter the government of the Republic of Vietnam by simultaneous assaults on its national and district centers. The primary communist purpose in South Vietnam is, of course, to destroy the Government of South Vietnam, and to replace

it with a communist government. Thus, throughout Vietnam the communist assault on the cities concentrated on government offices and police stations, on the Vietnam equivalent of the city hall, the county courthouse, and the State Capitol. The communists even announced the creation of a new government in the hope that people would rally to it -- and if not rally to it, then at least accept it as an alternative preferable to a continuation of the fighting. This phony coalition government was treated by the Vietnamese people with the contempt which it deserved.

In these purposes, then, the communists have failed. And they have failed at the cost of 22,000 of their best men slain. The tidings in Washington and Saigon have been heavy this week. But they cannot have been light in Hanoi.

It is a fact that the attacks which began on January 30 were more ambitious in concept, broader in scope, more savage in execution, and more secure in their development than we had thought possible.

It is certain that in the savagery of the past week, the enemy has squandered, for little gain that we can see, a major part of the human and material resources available to him. All of these will be hard for him to replace and some of them may prove impossible to replace. It may be that what we have witnessed the past week is a convulsive effort which he can hardly repeat. But we cannot, in prudence, assume that to be the case.

We know that he has many more forces which were not committed to the assault upon the cities. We believe he is capable of repeating that assault, if he is willing to pay the price.

We also know that the enemy has brought down from the north large and

well-trained forces of the North Vietnamese regular army. They have concentrated these forces in the northern part of South Vietnam -- and particularly around our Marines at Khe Sanh. We expect in the very near future that the enemy will attempt to overrun the Marines at Khe Sanh. We expect that he will make a determined effort to do that. We expect that he will fail, and we expect that he will suffer appalling casualties before he discovers that there-is-not-going-to-be-any Dien-Bien-Phu-in-this-war.

I cannot, therefore, hold out to you the prospect of quiet weeks ahead. There will be fierce fighting around Khe Sanh. There may be a recurrence of the assault on the cities of Vietnam. There will be casualties for us and for our friends to mourn.

You may ask, why is it necessary for us to bear this heavy burden. I have discussed with you many times the reasons why we are in Vietnam. This is not the time to discuss those reasons again. There is nothing new to add to the reasons. The only thing that is new is the intensity of the enemy's effort to break our will. He is waiting to see what the effect will be upon the American public -- and upon the Vietnamese public -- of last week's savagery.

I believe that I can tell him what the effect will be. We have known savagery before. And we have known how to deal with it. We still do. Do not look to Iowa, or New York, or Oregon or Alabama for a reward for your deeds of last week. You will not find it.

As for the Vietnamese people, I will let them speak for themselves. They have endured this kind of gangsterism for many years with a fortitude and an ⁿendurance which compliment the human race. I will say simply this: We will not let you down. Do not fear that we will cut and run when the going

gets tough. Neither this administration nor any other elected by the American people will betray you -- or the American soldiers who fight with you. We will be there to the end. And in the end, it will all come out right.

Now -- what is left of the hopes for peace after the events of last week -- and the events we believe will come in the next few weeks. I will tell you frankly that I do not see any prospect for an early peace. At San Antonio I set forth our minimum requirements for peace. We would stop the bombing of North Vietnam if the enemy would assure us, publicly or privately, that prompt and productive peace talks would result, and that they would not take advantage of the cessation of bombing to mount a larger war effort. We set these conditions because we have had some experience with peace talks with communists. At Panmunjon in Korea we talked for 372 days and during that period 12,700 American soldiers lost their lives and almost 49,000 were wounded. I am not interested in such peace talks as that. I have no intention of denying to the American troops in South Vietnam the advantages of American air power if the only purpose of that denial is the well-being of those who are shooting at American troops. That is the meaning of the San Antonio formula. We want peace. We will stop the bombing of the North to get quick and serious peace talks. We will not stop it for any other reason.

I think we have clearly had our answer to our offer of peace talks. I think that the assault upon the cities of Vietnam was the answer. I think ~~that~~ the massive effort the enemy has made to besiege the American garrison at Khe Sanh is the answer -- and incidentally, every man and every pound of material surrounding our men at Khe Sanh came down from North Vietnam.

If it were not for our bombing of the North, our Marines at Khe Sanh would face more enemies and better armed and supplied enemies.

The enemy does not want peace. He wants to try to win a military victory. He expects to defeat us as he defeated France -- by fighting us fiercely in the field and propagandizing us fiercely in our own homes. It was a communist who said that a coffin is better propaganda than a leaflet. They believe that principle, and they are acting upon it in Vietnam.

I repeat to you: they do not want peace at this time. They want to continue the fight. You cannot make peace with a man who is determined to fight you. It is not a question of finding the right words, the right place, the right gimmick. It would be easy to find the formula for peace --if they wanted peace. It is impossible to find the formula for peace so long as they are determined to have war.

What are we going to do about this? We are going to give them the fight they want -- and more than they want. We are going to mete out the measure they have asked for -- and more than the measure. We will not do this with any joy -- for we are a people who hate war. But we are also a people who *are willing - and not for the first time -* have always been able to do what ~~was~~^{is} necessary to preserve our freedom and the freedom of our friends.

Peace is available to the communists in Vietnam -- when they want it. The San Antonio terms are reasonable. Indeed, they are more than reasonable. When the enemy wants peace it is available to him. In the meantime, we do not intend to confuse him and to raise his hopes of a cheap victory with constant pleas that he talk peace. He has heard us at San Antonio. We have

heard him in the mortars that he fired into the heart of the largest cities in South Vietnam. We fully expect to hear him in the fury of the attack upon our Marines. We understand the message. We do not like it -- but we are prepared to accept it. As Winston Churchill put it to another enemy who specialized in savagery, "you do your worst -- and we will do our best."

For that is the way to peace. In this war as in many others, the aggressor will not make peace until he has been convinced that he has no choice. He has chosen to make a supreme effort to obtain victory. That has made the last week a hard one and it is likely to make for other hard weeks to come. If we meet this challenge with fortitude and with unity, then the answer is clear to the enemy. If we meet it with dismay and panic -- if we respond to the enemy attack by calling for our own forces to retreat -- by questioning whether our own forces should be there at all -- by criticizing our friends and our allies -- then the enemy will be succeeding -- and he will see that he is succeeding. He will redouble his efforts, with all that implies for the safety of the American men in Vietnam.

This is a time for steadiness -- and for resolution -- and for determination. I intend to do my best to show all three on your behalf. I ask your help.

35

INFORMATION

Pres. file

Thursday, February 8, 1968 -- 6:45 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: News Media Contacts

Today I met with John Steele and Jess Cook, TIME magazine;
Richard L. Wilson, Cowles publications; and Winston Churchill, London
Evening News, all on the Vietnam situation.

I took them all through the documents: prisoner of war reports; reports from the field on cooperation and revival in the Delta; material on casualties; an account of reorganization of the Vietnamese government; etc. I took the same line as yesterday: we are in the middle of an important battle; the first stage has not gone badly for our side; the battle is not yet over and its outcome would depend on the scale of further attacks on the cities and how they are handled; the continued vitality of the Vietnamese government; the outcome of Khe Sanh and other frontier battles; and the steadiness of U. S. public opinion!

W. W. Rostow

WWRostow:rla

36

INFORMATION

Pres file

~~TOP SECRET~~

Thursday, February 8, 1968
6:40 p. m.

Mr. President:

Herewith Amb. Bunker reports
delivery of your letter as well as our
case for urgent governmental action with
respect to ARVN reform, etc.

Your letter appears to have been
particularly helpful.

W. W. Rostow

Saigon 18583

~~TOP SECRET~~

WWRostow:rla

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3 4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
By *RG*, NARA, Date 1-31-92



Department of State

366
TELEGRAM

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

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FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM BUNKER

1. I SAW PRESIDENT THIEU TODAY, FEBRUARY 8, AND GAVE HIM YOUR LETTER. HE EXPRESSED HIS VERY GREAT APPRECIATION FOR IT AND FOR YOUR STATEMENT OF SUPPORT.

2. I WENT OVER IN DETAIL WITH HIM THE SPECIFIC POINTS CONTAINED IN YOUR EARLIER MESSAGE TO ME AND WILL BE REPORTING MORE FULLY ON MY DISCUSSION WITH HIM TOMORROW. IN GENERAL, I BELIEVE HE UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED WITH THE NEED TO MOVE VIGOROUSLY ON THESE VARIOUS FRONTS AND I WILL, OF COURSE, BE FOLLOWING UP WITH HIM ON THEM. I BELIEVE YOUR LETTER HAS HAD A VERY HELPFUL EFFECT AT A DIFFICULT TIME FOR THIEU.

BUNKER
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Hate memo 9/11/95
By plg, NARA, Date 4/29/96

~~TOP SECRET~~

Limited Official Use

Thursday - February 8, 1968

6:35pm

Pr

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

ACTION

SUBJECT: Reply to Message of President of Ecuador

State recommends that you reply to President Arosemena's message (Tab B) expressing gratitude over US support for Galo-Plaza as Secretary General of the OAS along the lines of the draft at Tab A.

The reply has just the right mix of responsiveness and aloofness. I recommend you sign.

Incidentally, the Ecuadoreans are getting restive over our long delay in naming a successor to our PNG'd Ambassador. They are making noises about recalling their Ambassador. Both our Charge in Quito and Covey Oliver continue to think that we should hold off appointing a new man until after Arosemena leaves office (September 1).

W. W. Rostow

Attachments:

Tab A - Letter to President Arosemena

Tab B - Letter of January 29 from Arosemena to President.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-206
By CG, NARA Date 11-3-97

37a

February 8, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent message of appreciation for my Government's support of the Ecuadorean candidate for the Secretary Generalship of the Organisation of American States. We share your view that the inter-American system needs vigorous and distinguished leadership in this critical phase of its history.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Otto Arosemena Gomez
Constitutional President of the
Republic of Ecuador

LBJ/WGB:mm

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-206
By Cb, NARA Date 11-3-97

37b

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Ecuadorean President Arosemena's Message
of Appreciation for US Support of Galo-Plaza as OAS Secretary-General

"Quito - January 29, 1968

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to address myself to Your Excellency in order to express to the illustrious government of the United States and personally to you my profound gratitude for the backing which at all times you have been kind enough to give to the candidacy of Ecuador, represented in the person of ex-President Galo Plaza, for Secretary General of the OAS. The support which your government is giving is particularly valuable.

In presenting the candidacy of Sr. Plaza, my government has been concerned only with offering for the consideration of friendly countries the name of a person who fulfills the necessary conditions to carry out effectively and successfully the functions of the Secretary General of the OAS, since Ecuador is determined that the Inter-American system should achieve the necessary strength for the maintenance of continental peace and security, and should promote more fraternal and expedient cooperation on an economic and social plane for the benefit of the great Latin American masses.

Accept, Your Excellency, my thanks and those of my government as well as the good wishes which I offer in a most sincere and auspicious manner for the success of your difficult and complex task in the Presidency of the illustrious people of the United States, with which we are bound by tight bonds of friendship and understanding.

I take this occasion to renew to Your Excellency the testimony of my highest and most distinguished consideration.

/s/ Otto Arosemena Gomez
Constitutional President of the Republic
of Ecuador."

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
NLJ 96-191
By wp, NARA Date 11-29-96

ACTION

P file
38

Thursday, Feb. 8, 1968
6:30 p. m.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. President:

Herewith a draft message to Kosygin, on
which Sect. Rusk wishes your judgment.

W. W. Rostow

~~SECRET~~ attachment

*cy attac: ↓ to suspense cy
(also do 10:30 agenda as tel'd
2/9/68)*

Approved _____

Disapproved _____

Call me _____

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)

White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983

By *RB*, NARA, Date 1/31/92

Thursday, Feb. 8, 1968
6:20 p. m.


Mr. President:

This is an excellent, well-balanced evaluation,
by the Australian Ambassador in Saigon,
of the Tet offensive.

W. W. Rostow

CONFIDENTIAL attachment

39a



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

7th February, 1968

Dear Phil,

You asked yesterday what assessments we had had from Border about events of the last week in Vietnam. You may be interested to read the attached report received this morning.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R.W. Furlonger', written over a horizontal line.

(R.W. Furlonger)

Mr. P. Habib,
Department of State,
WASHINGTON. D.C.

**DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
NOT NAT'L SECURITY
INFORMATION, E. O. 12356,
SEC. 1.1(c)**

BY kg ON 1-31-92

396

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

362 Canberra

Authority NLS/CBS 10
By ms, NARS, Date 11-16-83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Immediate

7 Feb. 1968 (1218)

7 Feb. 1968 (0040)

ADDRESSED DJAKARTA 284, REPEATED WASHINGTON 362.
FOR THE MINISTER

Following is repetition of telegram No. 030 dated 6/2/68 from Saigon.
Begins --

Enemy Tet Offensive.

Preliminary Assessment.

In the week beginning 29th January Viet Cong and NVA forces have demonstrated a greater military resourcefulness and dedication to their cause than most observers here would have believed possible. It will be some time before we know the real objectives of their offensive and whether it is to be ultimately recorded as a victory or a severe defeat. There will be much speculation about its repercussions, but no one will deny that the Viet Cong supported and directed by Hanoi and assisted by the NVA, put up a dramatic, spectacular and memorable performance, and have shown themselves capable not only of great skill in planning and coordinating their strategy and tactics but also of great courage and fanaticism in executing their plans.

2. The major questions are whether this Viet Cong offensive was a final all-out desperation effort to achieve military victory with the aid of a general uprising, or an exhibition of their strength to either to offset the progress being made in the south or to place themselves in a favourable position prior to accepting negotiations in an attempt simply to relieve the heavy pressure being applied on them in all fields and so restore some balance in the picture being presented of relative power and influence. It will also be asked whether the GVN and the allies have tended in the past to under-estimate the strength, resourcefulness and devotion of the Communists, and whether the allied effort here can make a speedy recovery from what must be seen as being a setback to our efforts locally and internationally.

The Plan.

3. When the analysts have completed their researches, it will probably be seen that this offensive has followed the doctrinal steps laid down by Giap and the leadership in Hanoi. Such a cunningly conceived and coordinated campaign must have taken months of planning. The fact that it was kept secret points to the devotion of all those who took part in it, not a word of it seems to have leaked. In II, III and IV Corps, enemy dispositions did not indicate that a major attack on a widespread scale was imminent, and the timing -- for the Tet truce which the enemy had said they would observe for seven days -- was perfect.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. The basic strategy was to bring the war simultaneously into all the major centres of population throughout the country where there was plenty of cover, where schools, pagodas and hospitals could be used as command posts, and where the counter firepower and striking force of the allies could not be effectively brought to bear. The overall pattern is not yet clear but it seems that local forces and guerrilla-type squads were the spearhead of the attack, forces made up of men who in many cases had lived or worked in or near the towns and cities by day and donned their uniforms at night or were guided to their goals by local supporters. Targets were carefully selected, access and escape routes were mapped, and it was probably expected that these forces were sufficiently well-known to give the leadership required to incite the local population to join in a general uprising which would both overthrow the government and paralyze the allied forces.

5. The infiltration of large numbers of troops -- perhaps running as much as 3,000 in Saigon -- could have easily taken place in the pre-Tet days when the traditional large scale movement of people carrying bulky parcels had begun, and the police could have been relied on to be even slacker than usual in stopping vehicles and travellers and even more purposeful in foregoing inspections at the offer of a sum of money or a "Tet gift". In some cases main force units waited outside, presumably to back up the units working inside the populated centres or to cover their withdrawals if necessary, or even to move in and take vital installations such as airfields, ports, radio stations and provincial headquarters if the activities of the guerrillas brought the local people massing spontaneously and vociferously to their side. We need not be surprised about the success of the infiltrations, the enemy had time and circumstances going for him particularly the laxity and corruption of the police and the inefficiency of the government's intelligence machine.

The Execution.

6. We do not know yet whether an offensive in the DMZ and I Corps was to coincide with the plan to carry the battle into the population centres. The build-up and threat there might have been designed to facilitate the offensive in the cities by tying up allied forces and generally diverting attention from the cities. On the other hand, an attack there might have been temporarily thwarted by massive U. S. bombardments and by the failure of the weather to provide the required cloud cover.

7. Whatever the case, the fact was that the penetration of the populated areas was successful, it seems, in every instance, and designated targets were hit. In some places the damage was great, as in Pleiku, Kontum, Nha Trang, My Tho and Den Tre, in others, as in Saigon, Banmethuot and Danang, it was quite light. Installations were sometimes occupied, most seem not to have been. In the Delta cities no withdrawal plans seems to exist, and -- according to Westmoreland -- most of the available enemy forces seem to have been committed. In Saigon, the attackers were to be relieved, after 48 hours, of the positions they were meant to be then holding, and, even though this did not occur, they were backed by main force units waiting outside. In all, including I Corps and the DMZ, some 60,000 troops are believed by MACV to have been involved.

The Objectives.

8. The pattern of events does not lead easily to a conclusion about objectives. It does seem at this early stage, however, that the general offensive was in fact launched, designed to bring down the government both by force and by generating a popular uprising. The latter would be brought about by a show of considerable force and audacity, by incitement, by evidence of physical occupation of important installations and government and administrative centres, and by the exposure of the helplessness of the U. S. to bring their power to bear when the battle was to be fought in the very places where the people lived. The fact that the main damage in the towns was the result of the fighting itself, not of deliberate sabotage by the Viet Cong, suggests that the Viet Cong were confident that they would need to make use themselves of the main installations. Thus here is evidence that the attackers of Tan Son Nhut Airfield in Saigon were instructed not to damage it if possible.

9. The conception and the planning were brilliant. The execution, if the above analysis is correct, was not successful--at least in our terms.

(For the Viet Cong; perhaps it was a great victory.)

For the most part the installations were not taken and held. The people although frightened--did not respond and rise up. The Tet-depleted Vietnamese Army and police forces fought back well, and the physical and moral support of the U. S. and the other allies did make itself felt, not only in the defence of their own installations but also in the aid given to the local forces in gunships, flares, airlifts, tactical advice, communications, and in the many other trappings of a highly mobile, mechanised force.

10. In less than one week after the offensive began the VC/NVA forces held not one of the towns or cities they had attacked. (At no time did they take real control.) Small pockets of resistance continued in many places, there was some fighting in the outskirts, and in one or two centres there were uncommitted mainforces still waiting on the outside. Enemy casualties were placed as high as 20,000 dead, bringing their total to over 30,000 since the beginning of the winter-spring campaign last November. Their forces, some still defiant, were on the run or being ferretted out, they had lost thousands of weapons.

11. If the objective was to demonstrate strength per se--in an election year in the U. S. it was successful, because this offensive revealed more clearly than ever before the nature and extent of Viet Cong organisation, discipline and power. It confirmed what has been said many times, that the ultimate solution of the Vietnam problem must be political, not simply military. Viet Cong losses were undoubtedly heavy but, according to MACV, their strength remains formidable, and the Vietnamese people know this.

The effort does not seem to have been a desperate, all-out one, although the Viet Cong have undoubtedly been badly hurt.

12. If the demonstration of strength was to bring the Viet Cong back into the picture, to offset the growing political and military confidence of the GVN and the weight of the U. S. forces here, it was again successful. If it was designed to open the way to negotiations (I remain sceptical on this) they will presumably now give some sign. On the other hand, they could allow events to do their work, knowing that their actions will give rise to a fresh wave of demands overseas for negotiations and of pressure on the U. S. to halt or completely stop the bombing of the north. They will know that the voices favouring a coalition government will be strengthened, because the Viet Cong are demonstrably a political and military force which cannot be belittled or turned aside.

13. Having said this, the possibility remains that this offensive was forced on the Viet Cong by the progress being made in the south. If they were not to react to the increasing pressures upon them they were in danger of gradually losing by default their hold in the countryside. Too many people were saying that the trend of events was no longer in their favour. If this was the objective, its success is questionable. Having been repulsed with great losses and having used such questionable tactics in Vietnam's eyes, the Viet Cong might find that their currency will be further debased by this episode. They might try a second wave, or launch their big move in I Corps, but they will still run the risk of heavy defeats whatever the damage they cause of the fear they inspire. There is no doubt a limit to their ability to keep up such offensives.

Viet Cong Strength

14. Has the power of the Viet Cong been underestimated? I am inclined to think not. In reporting on my provincial tour three weeks ago I noted that there was a realistic acknowledgement almost everywhere of the continuing strength of the enemy, despite our own gains, and of the protracted nature of the struggle ahead. The confidence of the enemy in his own military power has been frequently pointed out, especially in relation to the discussions on the negotiations issue. It was only last year that Westmoreland made his plea for more troops. The difficulties of making the pacification programme work have always been evident. Nor has Viet Cong resourcefulness ever been underestimated.

15. What, then, was at fault? Not underestimation of the Viet Cong strength, I suggest, but failure to insist that the Vietnamese make a genuine effort to protect themselves against insidious infiltration, for only the Vietnamese can do this work, and undue confidence that the Viet Cong would not run the risks of casualties and loss of face which unsuccessful attacks on the towns were almost sure to bring. The Viet Cong did what we hoped they could not do, or would not dare to do, on such a large scale.

The Results

16. There are no easy answers to these questions.

But already the next is upon us--where do we go from here?

The GVN reacted to the crisis like a stunned mullet.

It did not utter for two days, and then only did so at the prompting of the Americans.

The Press which had closed down for the week, was not brought back to life for the emergency, but the Americans have got things moving.

Thieu has called on the people to back the Government, and the Lower House has now met and given its support.

The Assembly itself will no doubt do the same, and the Press will, I think, follow suit.

On the military side the Viet Cong will be pursued.

17. Our best hope perhaps is that the Government, assisted by the U. S. and the friends of Vietnam, will now take the opportunity to show what it can do for the people in the way of reconstruction.

The ARVN fought well and will continue to improve.

Now the civilians must get to work on the problems of the refugees and the injured, and all the other work involved in restoring normal economic and social life. The chance is offered to gain the confidence of the people, the very people who preferred not to rise with the Viet Cong.

Surely this must be some stimulus to the Government to do more, surely it must give the Government some confidence in itself.

18. I take some comfort personally from the fact that the Vietnamese charged with running the new reconstruction task force are Ky and General Thang because, in my book, they are among the few Vietnamese who have the drive and ability and sense of dedication and national spirit to make a success of this venture and to try to break down the prevailing indifference, corruption, and recklessness of the officials with whom they will have to work.